Opinion ID: 900324
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurisdiction to Terminate Parental Rights Absent Adjudicatory Hearing

Text: [¶ 7.] The father argues the trial court had no jurisdiction to conduct the dispositional hearing and to terminate his parental rights because it failed to first hold an adjudicatory hearing. When the father objected during the dispositional hearing to the fact no adjudicatory hearing was held, the trial court reasoned such a hearing was unnecessary because of the mother's stipulation of abuse and neglect. Pointing out the adjudicatory hearing decides the status of the child, without necessarily assigning fault to either parent, the court denied the father's repeated requests for an adjudicatory hearing. In support of its determination, the court relied upon the following pertinent language from SDCL 26-8A-1: [a]djudication of a child as an abused or neglected child is an adjudication of the status or condition of the child who is the subject of the proceedings and is not necessarily an adjudication against or in favor of any particular parent, guardian or custodian of the child. [¶ 8.] The court's reasoning overlooked the father's status as an interested party. [1] SDCL 26-7A-43 makes both parents parties to abuse and neglect proceedings by requiring that parents (plural) be included as named respondents in a petition. A summons for the hearing on a petition must be directed to both parents. SDCL 26-7A-44. The summons must also be served on all the persons or parties named therein. SDCL 26-7A-47. [2]  Every person or party who receives a summons may appear and answer in response to the petition. SDCL 26-7A-53 (emphasis added). Most importantly, if a petition for abuse and neglect is not admitted by all necessary parties or if the petition is denied by any necessary party, the trial court,  shall proceed with the adjudicatory hearing on the petition[.] SDCL 26-7A-55 (emphasis added). Obviously, if after proper notice a parent fails to appear, the court may enter a default, but that did not occur here. SDCL 26-7A-53. The trial court omitted mandatory procedural requirements in bypassing the adjudicatory hearing for the father based upon the mother's stipulation alone. Under the above statutes, however, the court could only dispense with an adjudicatory hearing if all of the necessary parties, including the father, agreed. Here, the father did not agree. Thus, the trial court denied the father an adjudicatory hearing under SDCL 26-7A-55. [¶ 9.] Normally, parents denied due process are entitled to litigate their rights anew without prejudice from the adjudication proceedings from which [they were] excluded. [3] In Interest of Amanda H., 4 Neb.App. 293, 542 N.W.2d 79, 87 (1996). Yet, at this juncture we must ask if reversing for an adjudicatory hearing will truly produce any rational possibility of a different result. C.V. has waited for years on her dysfunctional parents and all a reversal seems to promise is more delay. The Nebraska Supreme Court confronted a similar quandary in the case of In Re Interest of Amber G., 250 Neb. 973, 554 N.W.2d 142 (1996). Two children were removed from their mother's care due to reports of sexual abuse and neglect. The father was not present for the adjudicatory hearing and was not named as a parent in the petitions filed on behalf of the children. On appeal from an order of permanent guardianship for the children, the father challenged the juvenile court's jurisdiction because it was never alleged he abused and neglected the children. In rejecting his contentions, the Court held: [T]he rights of the parent and the child are protected by the separate adjudication and dispositional phases of the dependency proceeding. A petition ... is brought on behalf of the child, not to punish the parents. The purpose of the adjudication phase of the proceeding is to protect the interests of the child; the purpose of the dispositional phase is to determine placement and the rights of the parties in the action. It is not improper for the court to sustain jurisdiction at the adjudication phase if the State makes a proper prima facie showing of lack of proper parental care in the child's present living situation. In this case, the issue at the adjudication phase was whether the children lacked proper parental care in the custody of their mother. The question of whether the father was fit or unfit to have custody did not arise and should not have arisen until the dispositional phase. The record clearly indicates that the mother admitted to the allegations of the petitions at each adjudication, and thus the juvenile court could properly take jurisdiction ... To protect the minor children involved in this case from further abuse in the mother's home, the court took jurisdiction and removed the children from their mother's custody. Because we find that the juvenile court properly took jurisdiction at the adjudication phase of this case, we find the father's assignment of error as to jurisdiction to be without merit. Amber G., 554 N.W.2d at 148 (citations omitted). See also Amanda H., 542 N.W.2d at 86 (if child needs protection, then juvenile court must first look to protection of child even if proper persons were not allowed to participate). Here, at the time the petition was filed, the father was confined in the penitentiary for an appallingly brutal assault on the mother. Although incarceration itself is not a sufficient reason to terminate parental rights, a father in prison is obviously unable to provide for his children or to perform normal parental duties. Matter of R.P., 498 N.W.2d 364, 368 (S.D.1993). Thus, between the mother's stipulation of abuse and neglect and the father's inability to care for the child, there can be no doubt that, even had an adjudicatory hearing been held, C.V. would have been found abused and neglected. [4] [¶ 10.] The Iowa Supreme Court faced a similar procedural defect in the case of In Interest of T.C., 492 N.W.2d 425 (Iowa 1992). There, the parents of three children were separated and the children were in the physical care and control of their mother. An adjudicatory hearing was held while the father was confined in a locked hospital mental ward on an involuntary substance abuse commitment. He did not appear at the adjudicatory hearing nor was he represented by anyone. Just as in this case, the children's attorney and their mother and her attorney stipulated the children were in need of assistance and the court entered its order in accord with the stipulation. The father's parental rights were subsequently terminated. On appeal, the father claimed a denial of due process due to his incarceration and lack of representation at the adjudicatory hearing. In rejecting that argument, the Iowa Supreme Court observed: [W]e do not believe that a failure to appoint a guardian ad litem for [the father] in the [adjudicatory] proceeding voids the legal effect of the termination proceeding. At the [adjudicatory] proceeding, W.C., the children's mother, and her attorney stipulated that the children were in need of assistance. [The father] was obviously not able to provide the help that the children then needed. Had he been present, it is completely unlikely that the court would have entered any order different from what it did. Interest of T.C., 492 N.W.2d at 429. The same is true here. [5] [¶ 11.] At every stage, from initial appearance to final disposition, our brightest beacon is the best interests of the child. Matter of R.P., 498 N.W.2d at 366. Children have so little time to be children. Remanding for an adjudicatory hearing at this stage would accomplish nothing but unfairly delay the child's right to a safe, caring, permanent home. [6] We cannot squander childhood's precious hour in an empty quest for exactitude. See Matter of C.L., 397 N.W.2d 81, 88 (S.D. 1986) (Their time is now [.]) (Henderson, J., concurring in result) (emphasis original). `Reversal for error, regardless of its effect on the judgment, encourages litigants to abuse the judicial process and bestirs the public to ridicule it.' Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436, 89 L.Ed.2d 674, 685 (1986) (quoting R. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 50 (1970)). The court should have held an adjudicatory hearing for the father, but we conclude its failure to do so was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. See Phyle, 491 N.W.2d at 435-36 (error even of constitutional dimension may be deemed harmless where it had no effect on final result). Accordingly, we hold the trial court's adjudication based on the mother's stipulation was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the trial court to conduct the dispositional hearing and to enter its later order terminating the father's parental rights. [¶ 12.] Affirmed. [¶ 13.] MILLER, C.J., and AMUNDSON and GILBERTSON, JJ., concur. [¶ 14.] SABERS, J., dissents.