Opinion ID: 1264567
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Precedent

Text: This Court has invariably maintained that the owner of premises upon which an injury occurs is not to be considered an insurer of the safety of an invited person present upon such premises. In syllabus point three of Puffer v. The Hub Cigar Store, Inc., 140 W.Va. 327, 84 S.E.2d 145 (1954), overruled on other grounds by Mallet v. Pickens, 206 W.Va. 145, 522 S.E.2d 436 (1999), [2] this Court explained as follows: The owner or the occupant of premises used for business purposes is not an insurer of the safety of an invited person present on such premises and, if such owner or occupant is not guilty of negligence or willful or wanton misconduct and no nuisance exists, he is not liable for injuries there sustained by such invited person. Subsequent cases elaborated upon such principles of reasonable care and duty in a premises liability and latent defect cases. In Andrick v. Town of Buckhannon, 187 W.Va. 706, 421 S.E.2d 247 (1992), this Court examined a situation in which a plaintiff had been injured due to the alleged defective condition of a parking area adjoining a restaurant business. In syllabus point three of Andrick, this Court held as follows: Where the operator of a business obtains the right for its customers to park in an adjoining lot owned by another and invites them to do so, the operator has a duty of reasonable care to protect its invitees from defective or dangerous conditions existing in the parking area which the operator knows or reasonably should know exist. The Andrick Court concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate because little evidence was adduced in the proceedings below on the issue of whether the defendants knew or should have known of the existence of a dangerous condition on the parking lot. 187 W.Va. at 712, 421 S.E.2d at 253. Similarly, in McDonald v. University of West Virginia Board of Trustees, 191 W.Va. 179, 444 S.E.2d 57 (1994), a student filed a negligence action against the university trustees after suffering a broken leg during a stage movement class conducted on the lawn. This Court examined the Puffer standard and found that if the owner was not guilty of negligence or willful or wanton misconduct, and if no nuisance existed, there would be no liability. This Court concluded that the student in McDonald had failed to establish that the university was negligent concerning any irregularity in the lawn which allegedly precipitated the fall. In discussion of this matter, this Court quoted the following with approval: In order to make out a prima facie case of negligence in a slip and fall case, the invitee must show (1) that the owner had actual or constructive knowledge of the foreign substance or defective condition and (2) that the invitee had no knowledge of the substance or condition or was prevented by the owner from discovering it. . . . With respect to slip-and-fall cases, the mere occurrence of a fall on the business premises is insufficient to prove negligence on the part of the proprietor. 191 W.Va. at 182, 444 S.E.2d at 60 (quoting 3 S. Speiser, et al., The American Law of Torts § 14.14 (1986)). Thus, McDonald clarifies that before an owner can be liable under a negligence theory, he must have had actual or constructive knowledge of the defective condition which caused the injury. See also In Estate of Helmick by Fox v. Martin, 192 W.Va. 501, 453 S.E.2d 335 (1994). In Adkins v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 199 W.Va. 518, 485 S.E.2d 687 (1997), a truck driver brought a negligence claim against a business owner to recover for injuries allegedly sustained when a driveway collapsed under the driver's vehicle. There had apparently been a latent defect in the driveway, specifically a crack which had been covered with gravel. On appeal from a jury verdict in favor of the driver, this Court examined the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the driver and found that he had presented adequate evidence that the business had actual or constructive knowledge of the hidden danger in the driveway. 199 W.Va. at 523, 485 S.E.2d at 692. The Adkins Court examined precedent regarding the existence of a duty to exercise reasonable care. Utilizing the standards set forth in Puffer, Andrick, and McDonald, the Adkins Court analyzed the requirement of knows or reasonably should know and recognized that the manager for the defendant business specifically testified that he had knowledge of the crack in the driveway at least a month prior to the plaintiff's injury. Id. at 523, 485 S.E.2d at 692. [3] Thus, the actual or constructive knowledge requirement was fulfilled in Adkins. In Mallet, this Court explained that certain factors must be considered in a premises liability case. The Mallet Court cited, with approval, syllabus point three of Sewell v. Gregory, 179 W.Va. 585, 371 S.E.2d 82 (1988): The ultimate test of the existence of a duty to use care is found in the foreseeability that harm may result if it is not exercised. The test is, would the ordinary man in the defendant's position, knowing what he knew or should have known, anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result? The Mallet Court reasoned as follows in syllabus point six: In determining whether a defendant in a premises liability case met his or her burden of reasonable care under the circumstances to all non-trespassing entrants, the trier of fact must consider (1) the foreseeability that an injury might occur; (2) the severity of injury; (3) the time, manner and circumstances under which the injured party entered the premises; (4) the normal or expected use made of the premises; and (5) the magnitude of the burden placed upon the defendant to guard against injury. 206 W.Va. at 146, 522 S.E.2d at 437. In Story v. Worden, 210 W.Va. 218, 557 S.E.2d 272 (2001), this Court explained that an exhaustive investigation of all the Mallet factors is not necessary at the summary judgment stage. 210 W.Va. at 221, 557 S.E.2d at 275. In Story, this Court stated that the contention that a summary judgment order failed to analyze all five Mallet factors was not well advanced. While some of the Mallet factors may have application in a premises liability action at the summary judgment stage, the Mallet factors were intended to be used by a jury when determining liability. Id. at 221, 557 S.E.2d at 275. In Eichelberger v. United States, 2006 WL 533399 (N.D.W.Va. March 3, 2006), the federal court examined West Virginia law with regard to a defendant's knowledge of a defective condition and held as follows: Thus, in order to establish a prima facie negligence claim in a slip and fall case, the invitee must show (1) that the owner had actual or constructive knowledge of the foreign substance or defective condition and (2) that the invitee had no knowledge of the substance or condition or was prevented by the owner from discovering it. 2006 WL 522299 at  (citations omitted); see also Bruno v. Town of Hempstead, 248 A.D.2d 576, 670 N.Y.S.2d 864, 865 (1998) (owner of softball field not liable to player injured by slipping on sprinkler head alleged to be protruding from ground; no evidence that owner had knowledge of defective condition of sprinkler).