Opinion ID: 2974983
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Relocation Alternative

Text: Regardless of whether the claimant makes a showing of past persecution, he must show that relocation within his country of origin would not prevent the harm he fears or is otherwise 12 unreasonable. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(i)(B), 1208.13(b)(2)(ii). Since we affirm the IJ’s decision on other grounds, we need not confront the issue of relocation at the present time.3 Id. 3. Nexus Between the Harm Feared and an Enumerated Ground In order to qualify as a refugee, the harm that the applicant fears must be “on account of” some enumerated ground, including “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). One may qualify, for instance, if authorities impute a political opinion to a claimant. Abdulnoor v. Ashcroft, No. 03-3001, 2004 WL 1894731, at  (6th Cir.). Also, it may be possible for one’s immediate family to constitute a “particular social group” in some instances. Gonzales v. Thomas, __ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1613, 1615 (2006) (remanding on the issue for agency determination); Akhtar v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 399, 405-06 (6th Cir. 2005) (deciding not to find a family-based nexus on particular facts); Toma v. Gonzales, No. 04-4310, 2006 WL 1208075, at  (6th Cir.) (finding family-based nexus but denying asylum on other grounds). 3 The IJ held that relocation within Albania “could very well have been a viable alternative” for them. We note parenthetically that the IJ’s precise statement does not quite address the statutory standard for the relocation alternative. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii) (stating that the applicant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if he “could avoid persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant's country of nationality . . . [and] under all the circumstances it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so”). Since a finding that relocation is infeasible is not necessary to the resolution of this case, however, we need not address this portion of the IJ’s Order. 13 The IJ found that petitioners did not prove a nexus to an enumerated ground. Because the petitioners’ application should be denied on other grounds, however, we neither approve nor reject the conclusion reached by the IJ regarding the required nexus. 4. Humanitarian Asylum It is possible for a victim of past persecution to be granted asylum even when: 1) the government has rebutted the presumption that his fear is well-founded; and 2) the applicant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution independent of his past persecution. In such cases, the applicant may still receive asylum if the harm he suffered in the past is so severe that it would be inhumane to expect his return. As noted by petitioners, humanitarian asylum has a basis in both the regulations and in case law interpreting the statute. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii); Matter of Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 21 (BIA 1989). Under these authorities, a claimant must have suffered “atrocious forms of persecution” such that the “attitudes of the population” or the predicament in the “mind of the refugee” would result in pain and suffering by the individual. Matter of Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 21 (quoting Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva, 1979)). Since we agree with the IJ that petitioners have not suffered past persecution, it follows that petitioners are not eligible for humanitarian asylum, which requires petitioners to have suffered “atrocious forms” of past persecution. 14