Opinion ID: 3002114
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: after 2 years from the Date of Issue,

Text: but within 2 years from the effective date of the last reinstatement of this policy. The limited amount will equal all premiums paid on this policy. Although courts in Indiana and other others states have frequently analyzed suicide clauses in insurance contracts, no court has construed the exact language at issue here. See, e.g., Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 432 N.E.2d 1382, 1384 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (construing a suicide clause that stated: “the amount payable . . . shall be limited to the premium or premiums paid hereunder without interest”); Cont’l Assurance Co. v. Krueger, 66 N.E.2d 133, 134 (Ind. App. 1946) (construing a suicide clause that stated: “the liability of the company shall be limited to an amount equal to the premiums actually paid on this policy”); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Doerr, 115 N.E. 700, 701 (Ind. App. 1917) (construing a suicide clause that stated: “If the insured shall commit suicide within one year . . . this policy shall be null and void.”). Officer argues that the exclusion is susceptible to two meanings. First, the amount payable could equal the face value minus the premiums paid, or $999,460. Second, the amount payable could equal the amount of premiums paid, or $540. Obviously, Officer prefers the first interpretation and Chase prefers the second. The district court rejected Officer’s interpretation of the suicide provision and concluded that it was unambiguous as written. The court noted that the plain and ordinary meaning of the words “proceeds” and “amount” 6 No. 07-2826 are “virtually interchangeable.” Officer v. Chase Ins. Life & Annuity Co., 478 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1075 (N.D. Ind. 2007). Although we can imagine improved ways to write this exclusion, we, too, conclude that the policy is not ambiguous as written. The first clause of the insurance provision sets out Chase’s exclusion by stating: “We will limit the proceeds we pay.” It then sets out the circumstances under which it will limit the proceeds. The final sentence states: “The limited amount will equal all premiums paid on this policy.” None of these terms is defined, and so “the limited amount” most logically refers back to the first phrase. Combining those two phrases, the policy’s meaning is clear: “The limited amount [of proceeds we pay] will equal all premiums paid on this policy.” Officer’s alternate interpretation—“We will limit the proceeds, and the amount by which they will be limited will equal the premiums paid”—is not a reasonable interpretation. If, as he suggests, the limited amount were equal to the face value minus the premiums paid, Chase would be required to pay more money where an insured committed suicide one day after buying the policy than it would have to pay one day before the suicide exclusion expired. Reasonably intelligent persons would not find that the provision was susceptible to Officer’s interpretation. Officer also argues that another portion of the policy uses clearer language: “The proceeds payable on the death of the insured are equal to . . . .” He asserts that because Chase knew how to clearly write “proceeds payable” elsewhere, the term “limited amount” can reasonably mean something else in the suicide provision. It is approNo. 07-2826 7 priate to look at the insurance contract as a whole in determining ambiguity, and courts should attempt to harmonize provisions rather than placing them in conflict. Dunn v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 836 N.E.2d 249, 252 (Ind. 2005). These two provisions are not in conflict, though. Chase could have used the same language in both provisions, but the fact that it used different language to express the amount of proceeds payable does not compel the conclusion that two otherwise unambiguous statements have become ambiguous.