Opinion ID: 894512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Department's Plea to the Jurisdiction

Text: In Texas, sovereign immunity deprives a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction for lawsuits in which the state or certain governmental units have been sued unless the state consents to suit. Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex.1999); Fed. Sign v. Tex. S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, 405 (Tex.1997), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Little-Tex Insulation Co., 39 S.W.3d at 593; Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Tex.1980); Hosner v. DeYoung, 1 Tex. 764, 769 (1847). The Texas Tort Claims Act provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE §§ 101.001-.109. Sovereign immunity includes two distinct principles, immunity from suit and immunity from liability. Jones, 8 S.W.3d at 638; Fed. Sign, 951 S.W.2d at 405. Immunity from liability is an affirmative defense, while immunity from suit deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction. Jones, 8 S.W.3d at 638; Fed. Sign, 951 S.W.2d at 405. The Tort Claims Act creates a unique statutory scheme in which the two immunities are co-extensive: Sovereign immunity to suit is waived and abolished to the extent of liability created by this chapter. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 101.025(a); State ex rel. State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d 322, 326 (Tex.2002); Miller, 51 S.W.3d at 587. Thus, the Department is immune from suit unless the Tort Claims Act expressly waives immunity. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE §§ 101.001(3)(A) (defining a governmental unit to include all departments of the state), 101.021, 101.025; White, 46 S.W.3d at 868. The Tort Claims Act expressly waives sovereign immunity in three areas: `use of publicly owned automobiles, premises defects, and injuries arising out of conditions or use of property.' Brown, 80 S.W.3d at 554 (quoting Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Able, 35 S.W.3d 608, 611 (Tex.2000)); see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code § 101.021. Section 101.058 of the Tort Claims Act further modifies a governmental unit's waiver of immunity from suit by imposing the limitations of liability articulated in the recreational use statute. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE § 101.058 (To the extent that Chapter 75 limits the liability of a governmental unit under circumstances in which the governmental unit would be liable under [the Tort Claims Act], Chapter 75 controls.). The recreational use statute provides: If an owner, lessee, or occupant of real property other than agricultural land gives permission to another to enter the premises for recreation, the owner, lessee, or occupant, by giving the permission, does not: (1) assure that the premises are safe for that purpose; (2) owe to the person to whom permission is granted a greater degree of care than is owed to a trespasser on the premises; or (3) assume responsibility or incur liability for any injury to any individual or property caused by any act of the person to whom permission is granted. Id. § 75.002(c)(1)-(3). Recreational use includes camping and picnicking, the activities in which the Mirandas were engaged at the state park when Maria was injured. Id. § 75.001(3). As applied to a governmental unit, the recreational use statute limits liability even if the person pays to enter the premises. Id. § 75.003(c) (excepting governmental units from the chapter's exclusion of landowners who charge a fee for recreational use of land). The recreational use statute limits the Department's duty for premises defects to that which is owed a trespasser. [5] Id. The limited duty owed a trespasser is not to injure that person willfully, wantonly, or through gross negligence. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co. v. Timmons, 947 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Tex.1997). Therefore, a governmental unit waives sovereign immunity under the recreational use statute and the Tort Claims Act only if it is grossly negligent. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 75.002(c)-(d); City of Bellmead v. Torres, 89 S.W.3d 611, 613 (Tex.2002); Timmons, 947 S.W.2d at 193. [G]ross negligence involves two components: (1) viewed objectively from the actor's standpoint, the act or omission complained of must involve an extreme degree of risk, considering the probability and magnitude of the potential harm to others; and (2) the actor must have actual, subjective awareness of the risk involved, but nevertheless proceed in conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or welfare of others. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Andrade, 19 S.W.3d 245, 246 (Tex.1999) (citing Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 23 (Tex.1994)).
Sovereign immunity from suit defeats a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction and thus is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction. Jones, 8 S.W.3d at 637; see also Hosner, 1 Tex. at 769 (recognizing as appropriate procedure the challenge of a courts subject matter jurisdiction through a plea to the jurisdiction). The trial court must determine at its earliest opportunity whether it has the constitutional or statutory authority to decide the case before allowing the litigation to proceed. Austin & N.W.R. Co. v. Cluck, 97 Tex. 172, 77 S.W. 403, 405 (1903) ([T]here can be no doubt that the courts of Texas must look to the Constitution of this state, the enactments of the Legislature, and the common law for their authority to proceed ....); see also State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex.1994) (As a general proposition, before a court may address the merits of any case, the court must have jurisdiction over the party or the property subject to the suit, jurisdiction over the subject matter, jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, and capacity to act as a court.); Gentry v. Bowser, 2 Tex.Civ.App. 388, 21 S.W. 569, 570 (Fort Worth 1893, no writ) (Certainly the court has the right to hear the necessary evidence to enable it to decide as to whether or not it has power to try the case it is sought to have it adjudicate, whether the allegations disclosing such want of jurisdiction appear in the petition of the plaintiff, or in the plea to the jurisdiction by the defendant.). Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex.2002). Whether a pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo. Likewise, whether undisputed evidence of jurisdictional facts establishes a trial court's jurisdiction is also a question of law. However, in some cases, disputed evidence of jurisdictional facts that also implicate the merits of the case may require resolution by the finder of fact. See Gates v. Pitts, 291 S.W. 948, 949 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1927, no writ); Gentry, 21 S.W. at 570; see also Valentin v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 363 n. 3 (1st Cir.2001) (observing that in certain situations, the predicate facts can be so inextricably linked to the merits of the controversy that the district court may defer resolution of the jurisdictional issue until the time of trial); Cameron v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 131 F.3d 1167, 1170 (6th Cir.1997) ([W]hether a district court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question for the court, not a jury, to decide, even if the determination requires making factual findings, unless the jurisdictional issue is inextricably bound to the merits of the case.); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 n. 6, 416 n. 10 (5th Cir.1981) (suggesting that a federal district court's role in determining jurisdictional facts may be more limited in cases in which the jurisdictional attack implicates the merits of plaintiff's cause of action). In this case, we address a plea to the jurisdiction in which undisputed evidence implicates both the subject matter jurisdiction of the court and the merits of the case. When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we determine if the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction to hear the cause. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex.1993). We construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiffs and look to the pleaders' intent. Id. If the pleadings do not contain sufficient facts to affirmatively demonstrate the trial courts jurisdiction but do not affirmatively demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the issue is one of pleading sufficiency and the plaintiffs should be afforded the opportunity to amend. Brown, 80 S.W.3d at 555. If the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may be granted without allowing the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend. Id. However, if a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised, as the trial court is required to do. See Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 555 (confining the evidentiary review to evidence that is relevant to the jurisdictional issue). When the consideration of a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction requires the examination of evidence, the trial court exercises its discretion in deciding whether the jurisdictional determination should be made at a preliminary hearing or await a fuller development of the case, mindful that this determination must be made as soon as practicable. Id. at 554. Then, in a case in which the jurisdictional challenge implicates the merits of the plaintiffs' cause of action and the plea to the jurisdiction includes evidence, the trial court reviews the relevant evidence to determine if a fact issue exists. The United States Supreme Court and all of the federal circuits have authorized federal district courts to consider evidence in deciding motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1); Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735 & n. 4, 67 S.Ct. 1009, 91 L.Ed. 1209, (1947), overruled by implication on other grounds by Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949) (observing that as a general rule, district courts have authority to inquire into the facts as they exist by affidavits or otherwise as well as the pleadings when determining whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction). [6] If the evidence creates a fact question regarding the jurisdictional issue, then the trial court cannot grant the plea to the jurisdiction, and the fact issue will be resolved by the fact finder. However, if the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court rules on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law. We acknowledge that this standard generally mirrors that of a summary judgment under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c). We adhere to the fundamental precept that a court must not proceed on the merits of a case until legitimate challenges to its jurisdiction have been decided. This standard accomplishes this goal and more. It also protects the interests of the state and the injured claimants in cases like this one, in which the determination of the subject matter jurisdiction of the court implicates the merits of the parties' cause of action. The standard allows the state in a timely manner to extricate itself from litigation if it is truly immune. However, by reserving for the fact finder the resolution of disputed jurisdictional facts that implicate the merits of the claim or defense, we preserve the parties' right to present the merits of their case at trial. Similar to the purpose of a plea to the jurisdiction, which is to defeat a cause of action for which the state has not waived sovereign immunity (usually before the state has incurred the full costs of litigation), the purpose of summary judgments in Texas is `to eliminate patently unmeritorious claims and untenable defenses.'  Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 556 (Tex.1989) (quoting City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 n. 5 (Tex.1979)). By requiring the state to meet the summary judgment standard of proof in cases like this one, we protect the plaintiffs from having to put on their case simply to establish jurisdiction. Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 554. Instead, after the state asserts and supports with evidence that the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, we simply require the plaintiffs, when the facts underlying the merits and subject matter jurisdiction are intertwined, to show that there is a disputed material fact regarding the jurisdictional issue. See Huckabee v. Time Warner Entm't Co. L.P., 19 S.W.3d 413, 420 (Tex.2000); Phan Son Van v. Pena, 990 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Tex.1999). Appellate courts reviewing a challenge to a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction review the trial court's ruling de novo. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 855. When reviewing a plea to the jurisdiction in which the pleading requirement has been met and evidence has been submitted to support the plea that implicates the merits of the case, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant. See Sci. Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex.1997). We indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant's favor. Id. In his dissent Justice Jefferson criticizes this standard of review as depriving plaintiffs responding to a plea of the procedural protections of a motion for summary judgment, including a twenty-one day notice period or an adequate time to conduct discovery. Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c), 166a(i). However, the scheduling of a hearing of a plea to the jurisdiction is left to the discretion of the trial court, which is in the best position to evaluate the appropriate time frame for hearing a plea in any particular case. This procedure does not dramatically differ from that outlined in Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 120a governing special appearances. Although Rule 120a requires any affidavits to be used at a hearing on a special appearance to be served at least seven days before the hearing, it does not specify the length of a notice period and is therefore presumably subject to the three-day notice period of Rule 21. Tex.R. Civ. P. 21. Rule 120a allows the trial court to order a continuance and allow time for discovery if the development of the case requires it. Nothing prevents a trial court from doing the same with a plea to the jurisdiction where evidence is necessary. Many other procedures in Texas practice ranging from a trial court's rulings on motions to strike intervention to the timing of a class certification decision to even the alteration of the summary judgment notice periodsalso depend[] ... upon the wise exercise of discretion by the trial court. Union Carbide Corp. v. B.D. Moye, 798 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tex.1990) (Hecht, J., concurring); see, e.g., TEX.R. CIV. P. 42(c)(1)(A) (directing a trial court to determine whether a suit may be maintained as a class action at an early practicable time); Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c) ( Except on leave of court, with notice to opposing counsel, the motion and any supporting affidavits shall be filed and served at least twenty-one days before the time specified for hearing.) (emphasis added); Guaranty Fed. Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 793 S.W.2d 652, 657 (Tex.1990) (observing that the trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion to strike intervention, even though Rule 60 does not provide explicit guidelines for the scheduling of a hearing or the evaluation of evidence). Thus, the Texas civil procedural scheme entrusts many scheduling and procedural issues to the sound discretion of the trial court, subject to appellate review. Of course, Texas practice and rules also allow the parties to request additional time to prepare for certain hearings or to conduct discovery upon a showing of sufficient cause, and the court's ruling on such a motion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., TEX.R. CIV. P. 166a(g), 247, 251, 252. We note, also, that federal practice does not prescribe a procedure for the consideration of jurisdictional evidence but instead allows the district courts to tailor a method to suit the requirements of the cases before them. Land, 330 U.S. at 735 n. 4, 67 S.Ct. 1009; Moran, 27 F.3d at 172. In any event, the Mirandas do not complain that they had an inadequate opportunity to conduct sufficient discovery, nor did they request a continuance to do so.

The Mirandas contend that their pleadings fall within the Tort Claims Act's waiver of immunity for both premises defects and injuries arising out of conditions or use of property. The Act provides that a state agency is liable for injury and death caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property if the governmental unit would, were it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 101.021(2). The Mirandas' pleadings allege injuries caused by a falling tree limb, which falls under the definition of real property i.e., `land, and generally whatever is erected or growing upon or affixed to land.' San Antonio Area Found. v. Lang, 35 S.W.3d 636, 640 (Tex.2000) (quoting Chastain v. Koonce, 700 S.W.2d 579, 584 (Tex.1985) (Gonzalez, J., concurring)). The Mirandas' allegation of an injury caused by a tree limb falling on Maria Miranda constitutes an allegation of a condition or use of real property and is an allegation of a premises defect. To state a claim under the recreational use statute, the Mirandas must allege sufficient facts to establish that the Department was grossly negligent. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE §§ 75.002(c)-(d), 101.021, 101.025, 101.058. The Mirandas contend that both their allegations and the evidence presented on the plea establish claims of gross negligence. Looking first to the relevant factual allegations in the third amended petition, the Mirandas claim that (1) they specifically asked the Department's employee for a recommendation of a safe camping location; (2) at the campsite, Maria was struck by a falling tree branch that severely injured her; (3) the unpruned, uninspected tree branches created a dangerous, defective condition on the premises of which the Department was aware; (4) the Department knew of the dangers of its falling tree branches but failed to inspect, prune, alleviate the dangers, or otherwise make safe the dangerous conditions of its trees; (5) the Department consciously and deliberately failed to warn the Mirandas of the extremely dangerous condition; and (6) the Department's conduct was willful, wanton, or grossly negligent. A liberal construction of these allegations, as required, demonstrates that the Mirandas stated a claim against the Department for gross negligence. This conclusion should not be read as a suggestion that the Department has a duty to inspect every tree in each of the many parks that the Department manages. Instead, in this case, the Mirandas alleged sufficient facts to survive a plea to the jurisdiction based solely on the pleadings. Justice Jefferson's dissent contends that the Mirandas' third amended petition does not state a claim for gross negligence because the allegations are conclusory and do not assert enough specific facts alleging that the Department had actual subjective awareness of the risk involved and proceeded, nevertheless, with conscious indifference. He suggests that to state a claim the Mirandas should have pled that the Department had actual knowledge that the branch would fall yet nevertheless instructed Maria to camp beneath it. 133 S.W.3d at 242. The pleading hurdle he seeks to erect would be groundbreaking, indeed, extending beyond current requirements under our rules of civil procedure and case law. Rules 45 and 47 require that the original pleadings give a short statement of the cause of action sufficient to give the opposing party fair notice of the claim involved. Tex.R. Civ. P. 45, 47; Paramount Pipe & Supply Co., Inc. v. Muhr, 749 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Tex.1988); Castleberry v. Goolsby Bldg. Corp., 617 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex.1981). Rule 45 does not require that the plaintiff set out in his pleadings the evidence upon which he relies to establish his asserted cause of action. Muhr, 749 S.W.2d at 494-95. While it is clear that [t]he party suing the governmental entity must establish the state's consent, which may be alleged either by reference to a statute or to express legislative permission, Jones, 8 S.W.3d at 638, and that [m]ere reference to the Tort Claims Act does not establish the state's consent to be sued and thus is not enough to confer jurisdiction on the trial court, Miller, 51 S.W.3d at 587, the Mirandas' pleadings allege sufficient facts to bring their claims under the recreational use statute and the Tort Claims Act. Although facts alleged in a petition should not be improperly stretched to state a claim for gross negligence, Justice Jefferson's pleading standard for gross negligence would be virtually impossible to meet, even when grossly negligent conduct occurred, absent an admission of liability. His standard requires specific factual allegations in an original petition of what the defendant knew and thought i.e., its state of mind. His pleading hurdle would require discovery into the very extrinsic facts which he bemoans consideration of in the plea to the jurisdiction. The Mirandas' third amended petition provided sufficient notice to ascertain the nature and basic issues of the controversy and the evidence that probably would be relevant. JUSTICE JEFFERSON also contends that the Mirandas are entitled to replead. As a practical matter, the Mirandas have already repled to try to cure the defects that Justice Jefferson raises. The Mirandas no doubt filed their third amended petition, in which allegations of gross negligence were raised for the first time in this lawsuit, in response to the Department's plea to the jurisdiction. However, because the Mirandas' third amended petition satisfies the notice pleading requirements of our procedural rules, the Mirandas do not need, nor are they entitled to, an opportunity to replead. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 47.
The Department challenged the Mirandas' pleadings and also submitted evidence to controvert the factual allegations supporting jurisdiction. We consider the relevant evidence submitted to decide this jurisdictional challenge. See Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 555. The Department attached the deposition testimony of Craig VanBaarle, the assistant park manager for Garner State Park, to its plea to the jurisdiction. VanBaarle testified that while the park normally inspects and maintains its trees, tree limbs are only pruned or trimmed if they appear to be dead. According to VanBaarle, the tree limb that fell on Maria was living. He testified that both dead and living tree limbs have fallen at various locations in the park. He testified that the park knows that tree limbs can fall and have fallen on approximately twenty occasions. However, no one had ever been injured by falling tree limbs. He also testified that the tree limb that injured Maria Miranda fell from fifty feet above the campsite and that the park employees would not have been able to see the limb clearly without climbing the tree even if the limb had been dead. In addition, the Department attached the affidavit of Roy B. Inks, operations and maintenance specialist at Garner State Park. Inks' responsibilities included supervision of park maintenance including preservation and maintenance of trees at campsites. According to his affidavit, Inks inspected the campsite after the accident. His examination of the tree and the fallen branch failed to reveal any indication that the branch was dead, decaying, or in need of pruning. Inks opined that there was no reason to conclude that the tree presented a dangerous or hazardous condition. Inks further opined that the branch that struck Maria broke away from the tree as a result of an unpredictable and unforseeable phenomenon known as `sudden branch drop syndrome.' Inks explained that [i]t would be rare for anyone to be able to predict which branches will fall and which ones will not as a result of this phenomenon. The Mirandas cite the Department's evidence as proof that the Department knew about sudden branch drop syndrome and did nothing about it, thus establishing gross negligence. The Mirandas did not cite any controverting evidence in their response to the Department's plea. We first examine this evidence to determine whether it establishes that the Department was grossly negligent. We have observed that with regard to the subjective component of gross negligence, it is the defendant's state of mind whether the defendant knew about a peril but nevertheless acted in a way that demonstrated that he did not care about the consequences that separates ordinary negligence from gross negligence. Louisiana-Pacific, 19 S.W.3d at 246-47. We search the record for evidence that the Department's acts or omissions demonstrate that it did not care about the consequences to the Mirandas of a known extreme risk of danger. The Mirandas fail to point to any evidence, and the record contains no evidence, that shows that sudden branch drop syndrome constitutes an extreme risk of danger or that the Department had actual, subjective knowledge of that risk but nevertheless proceeded in conscious disregard for the safety of others. Nor is there any evidence that the Department could have taken any reasonable steps to minimize the dangers of an unforseeable and unpredictable phenomenon. We conclude that the evidence in the record establishes that the Department was not grossly negligent and that the Mirandas have failed to raise a fact question regarding the Department's alleged gross negligence. The Mirandas fall short of satisfying the requirements for the Legislature's limited grant of a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit under the applicable statutes. Therefore, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
In his dissent, Justice Brister takes the view that all pleas to jurisdiction based on immunity must take the form of two standard or established motionseither special exceptions or motions for summary judgment. 133 S.W.3d at 239-40. This approach might be appropriate, if we were starting from scratch. Given that we are not writing on a blank slate, that pleas have been a useful procedural vehicle in Texas for over 150 years, and that use of its counterpart (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)) to challenge subject matter jurisdiction in the federal judicial system when evidence is involved has been authorized by every federal circuit court, the Court declines to abolish by written opinion such pleas to the jurisdiction. The plea to the jurisdiction was included in procedural rules promulgated by this Court in 1877 and has been used as a procedural vehicle to challenge subject matter jurisdiction in trial courts for over a century and a half. See TEX.R.CIV. P. 85; Tex. Dist. Ct. R. 7, 47 Tex. 597, 617 (1877); Hosner, 1 Tex. at 769. In fact, as early as 1893, Texas courts indicated that evidentiary challenges to subject matter jurisdiction raised in pleas to the jurisdiction should be considered by trial courts. See, e.g., Gates, 291 S.W. at 949; Gentry, 21 S.W. at 570. With such a long lineage, one wonders why a plea to jurisdiction does not qualify as a standard or established motion. Perhaps a second mention in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure would suffice. We decide that refining the rules for considering a plea supported by evidence is a better approach than eliminating the motion. This approach is consistent with precedent, is not disruptive to civil practice going back more than a century, and furthers the legislative purpose of timely adjudicating subject matter jurisdiction when the immunity and liability facts are the same. There is a suggestion in the dissents that confirming in this opinion the authority of trial courts to consider evidence in a plea to the jurisdiction is unfair to the parties in this case. The facts undercut this assertion. At the trial court, both parties relied on extrinsic evidence in briefing the plea, and both parties had extrinsic evidence on file with the court. Furthermore, plaintiffs expressly stated in their response to the plea that they were relying on Defendants' responses to discovery requests, and upon the deposition of Craig VanBaarle [the Department's assistant park manager]. In fact, the Mirandas deposed VanBaarle months before the Department filed its plea. There is good reason why Plaintiffs have not argued unfair surprise. Given Texas precedents and the actions of the parties, there was none.
The Mirandas assert that their pleadings also state a cause of action for injuries resulting from a condition or use of tangible property. The allegations' in the Mirandas third amended petition concern only the Department's failure to act to reduce risks of falling tree limbs and failure to warn the Mirandas of the risk of falling tree limbs. These allegations comprise the elements of their premises defect claim. The Tort Claims Act's scheme of a limited waiver of immunity from suit does not allow plaintiffs to circumvent the heightened standards of a premises defect claim contained in section 101.022 by re-casting the same acts as a claim relating to the negligent condition or use of tangible property. See State v. Tennison, 509 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tex.1974) (rejecting the argument that the Tort Claims Act creates two entirely separate grounds of liability for negligent use or condition of real property and premise defect, but instead interpreting the premises defect provision to further limit the waiver of immunity for negligent use or condition of real property). Other Texas courts have recognized that to allow plaintiffs to characterize premises defect claims as claims caused by the negligent condition or use of personal or real property would render the Legislature's heightened requirements for premises defect claims meaningless. See, e.g., State v. Estate of Horton, 4 S.W.3d 53, 54 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1999, no pet.) (stating that once a claim is determined to be a premises defect, the claimant is limited to the provisions delineated by the section on premises defects and may not assert a general negligence theory); accord Laman v. Big Spring State Hosp., 970 S.W.2d 670, 671-72 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1998, pet. denied); Univ. of Texas Pan Am. v. Valdez, 869 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied); Hawley v. State Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 830 S.W.2d 278, 281 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1992, no writ). Accordingly, we conclude that the Mirandas have not established a cause of action under the Tort Claims Act for condition or use of tangible property separate from their premises defect claim.