Opinion ID: 187350
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Proper Grounds for Habeas Relief

Text: A court considering a request for preliminary relief must examine four factors: (1) the moving party's likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury to the moving party if an injunction is denied; (3) substantial injury to the opposing party if an injunction is granted; and (4) the public interest. Belbacha v. Bush, 520 F.3d 452, 459 (D.C.Cir.2008). We review for abuse of discretion the district court's weighing of these factors; insofar as the district court's decision hinges on questions of law, however, our review is de novo. Serono Labs., Inc. v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313, 1318 (D.C.Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the moving party can show no likelihood of success on the merits, then preliminary relief is obviously improper and the appellant is entitled to reversal of the order as a matter of law. See Munaf, 128 S.Ct. at 2220. [3] The detainees here seek to prevent their transfer to any country where they are likely to be subjected to further detention or to torture. Our analysis of their claims is controlled by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Munaf. In that case, two American citizens held in the custody of the United States military in Iraq petitioned for writs of habeas corpus, seeking to enjoin the Government from transferring them to Iraqi custody for criminal prosecution in the Iraqi courts. Id. at 2214-15. The Court held the district court had jurisdiction over the petitions, but that it could not enjoin the Government from transferring the petitioners to Iraqi authorities. Id. at 2213. As we explain below, Munaf precludes a court from issuing a writ of habeas corpus to prevent a transfer on the grounds asserted by the petitioners here; therefore the detainees cannot prevail on the merits of their present claim and the Government is entitled to reversal of the orders as a matter of law. [4]
Like the detainees here, the petitioners in Munaf asked the district court to enjoin their transfer because they feared they would be tortured in the recipient country. The Court recognized the petitioners' fear of torture was of course a matter of serious concern, but held in the present context that concern is to be addressed by the political branches, not the judiciary. Id. at 2225. The context to which the Court referred was one in whichas herethe record documents the policy of the United States not to transfer a detainee to a country where he is likely to be tortured. Id. at 2226. Indeed, as the present record shows, the Government does everything in its power to determine whether a particular country is likely to torture a particular detainee. Decl. of Pierre-Richard Prosper, United States Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues ¶¶ 4, 7-8, Mar. 8, 2005. The upshot is that the detainees are not liable to be cast abroad willy-nilly without regard to their likely treatment in any country that will take them. Under Munaf, however, the district court may not question the Government's determination that a potential recipient country is not likely to torture a detainee. 128 S.Ct. at 2226 (The Judiciary is not suited to second-guess such determinationsdeterminations that would require federal courts to pass judgment on foreign justice systems and undermine the Government's ability to speak with one voice in this area). In light of the Government's policy, a detainee cannot prevail on the merits of a claim seeking to bar his transfer based upon the likelihood of his being tortured in the recipient country. [5] The detainees seek to distinguish Munaf on the ground that the habeas petitioners in that case did not raise a claim under the Convention Against Torture, as implemented by the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring (FARR) Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note. See Munaf, 128 S.Ct. at 2226 n. 6. That distinction is of no help to them, however, because the Congress limited judicial review under the Convention to claims raised in a challenge to a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4) (Notwithstanding any other provision of law ... including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, ... a petition for review [of an order of removal] shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of any cause or claim arising under the Convention). Here the detainees are not challenging a final order of removal. As a consequence, they cannot succeed on their claims under the FARR Act, and Munaf controls. [6]
To the extent the detainees seek to enjoin their transfer based upon the expectation that a recipient country will detain or prosecute them, Munaf again bars relief. After their release from the custody of the United States, any prosecution or detention the petitioners might face would be effected by the foreign government pursuant to its own laws and not on behalf of the United States. Decl. of Matthew C. Waxman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs ¶ 5, June 2, 2005. It is a longstanding principle of our jurisprudence that [t]he jurisdiction of [a] nation, within its own territory, is necessarily exclusive and absolute. Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136, 3 L.Ed. 287 (1812). As the Supreme Court explained in Munaf, the same principles of comity and respect for foreign sovereigns that preclude judicial scrutiny of foreign convictions necessarily render invalid attempts to shield citizens from foreign prosecution. 128 S.Ct. at 2224 (quoting Brown, J., dissenting in part in Omar v. Harvey, 479 F.3d 1, 17 (D.C.Cir.2007)). Munaf therefore bars a court from issuing a writ of habeas corpus to shield a detainee from prosecution and detention by another sovereign according to its laws. Judicial inquiry into a recipient country's basis or procedures for prosecuting or detaining a transferee from Guantanamo would implicate not only norms of international comity but also the same separation of powers principles that preclude the courts from second-guessing the Executive's assessment of the likelihood a detainee will be tortured by a foreign sovereign. See id. at 2225 (Even with respect to claims that detainees would be denied constitutional rights if transferred, we have recognized that it is for the political branches, not the judiciary, to assess practices in foreign countries and to determine national policy in light of those assessments). Furthermore, the requirement that the Government provide pre-transfer notice interferes with the Executive's ability to conduct the sensitive diplomatic negotiations required to arrange safe transfers for detainees. Prosper Decl. ¶ 10 (Later review in a public forum of the Department's dealings with a particular foreign government regarding transfer matters would seriously undermine our ability to investigate allegations of mistreatment or torture ... and to reach acceptable accommodations with other governments to address those important concerns). [7] In short, habeas is not a means of compelling the United States to harbor fugitives from the criminal justice system of a sovereign with undoubted authority to prosecute them. Munaf, 128 S.Ct. at 2223. Therefore, the district court may not issue a writ of habeas corpus to shield a detainee from prosecution or detention at the hands of another sovereign on its soil and under its authority. As a result, the petitioners cannot make the required showing of a likelihood of success on the merits necessary to obtain the preliminary relief they here seek.