Opinion ID: 2595351
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Any Error in Admitting the Prior Sworn Testimony of Francis Gallela Was Harmless.

Text: At the 1999 trial, the Aldermans called Francis Gallela as an expert witness to prove the economic damages suffered by the Aldermans due to Iditarod's alleged interference with their business. At the 2002 trial, Judge Christen allowed Iditarod to read into evidence Gallela's prior sworn testimony that had been given as part of an offer of proof. In the portion of testimony that was offered into evidence, Gallella stated that Caleb Alderman had told Gallela that the rental agreement required the Aldermans to provide Iditarod with fifteen percent of Alaska Guestours's gross receipts, a statement that contradicted the Aldermans' position at the 2002 trial. At that trial, the Aldermans maintained that their rent agreement called for them to pay only fifteen percent of their ticket sales from locations on the Gottstein property, not fifteen percent of their gross revenues. The Aldermans argue that the trial court erred in admitting Gallela's prior sworn testimony because it was hearsay and did not fall within an exception to the hearsay rule. Under Alaska Evidence Rule 801(c), hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. A statement is not considered hearsay if it is an admission by a party and is offered against that party. [28] Iditarod urges this court to hold that when a party puts a witness on the stand to prove a particular fact and the witness does so, the witness's testimony constitutes an adoptive admission by that party and is therefore not hearsay. We need not reach this issue because, even if Gallela's testimony was admitted in error, it was harmless. The admission of evidence, even if erroneous, is harmless when there is no reasonable likelihood that the admitted evidence had an appreciable effect on the court's decision. [29] When determining whether an allegedly erroneous admission of evidence was harmless, we do our best to put ourselves in the position of the trier of fact. [30] In this case, there is no reasonable likelihood that admission of Gallela's testimony would have had an appreciable effect on a reasonable trier of fact (here, the court was the trier of fact) because the financial records presented at the second trial, [31] the testimony of Robert Gottstein, [32] and substantial testimony from the Aldermans themselves at the first trial all supported the court's decision [33] and all were in conflict with the testimony of the Aldermans at the second trial.