Opinion ID: 492083
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Search and Seizure of the Suitcases

Text: 12 Once a room is legally entered under exigent circumstances, a subsequent search or seizure of items in the room must be justified by a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement. United States v. Kunkler, 679 F.2d 187 (9th Cir.1982). After entering the room, the agents saw the suitcases, believed them to contain contraband, and seized them under the plain view doctrine. The doctrine allows the government to seize evidence in plain view when (1) the initial intrusion was lawful; (2) the discovery of the evidence was inadvertent; and (3) the incriminating nature of the evidence was immediately apparent. Perlman v. City of Chicago, 801 F.2d 262, 265 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1349, 94 L.Ed.2d 520 (1987); Moya v. United States, 761 F.2d 322, 326 (7th Cir.1984). Appellant Rivera argues both that the discovery was not inadvertent and that the incriminating nature of the suitcases was not immediately apparent. 13 In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 470, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2040, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (plurality opinion), the Supreme Court required that evidence seized under the plain view doctrine must be inadvertent. The inadvertency requirement limits the use of the doctrine to those situations in which the government could not have procured a warrant through a magistrate. Coolidge involved the government's attempt to justify a warrantless seizure of an automobile, parked adjacent to the defendant's house, under the plain view doctrine. The court found the seizure could not be justified under the doctrine. Since the police knew in advance what they were looking for and where it was--there was no need to excuse them from the requirement of obtaining a warrant. 14 The continued validity of the inadvertency requirement of the plain view doctrine is not at all clear. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 743, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1543, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983). What is clear, however, is that the requirement has little relevance to an entry due to exigent circumstances. When agents lawfully enter an abode due to fear of imminent destruction of evidence, it is useless to ask again whether they could have secured a warrant in advance. The discovery was inadvertent to the extent that the agents did not place themselves in a legal vantage point for the purpose of discovering evidence that they were previously aware of; this is all that is required. See, Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 743, 103 S.Ct. at 1544; see also United States v. Thompson, 700 F.2d 944, 951 (5th Cir.1983), appeal after remand, 720 F.2d 385 (1983). (The fact that the agents expected to find contraband, which is easily destroyed, on the premises does not preclude operation of the plain view doctrine....) 15 Rivera also contends that the criminal nature of the luggage was not immediately apparent. The district court found that the agents had probable cause to believe that contraband was in the room. The only question then, is whether it was immediately apparent that the luggage might contain contraband. The immediately apparent requirement does not mean that the criminal nature of the items seized must be apparent at first glance; rather it requires that the agents had probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741-42, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1543, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983); (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 578, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1376, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); United States v. Schire, 586 F.2d 15, 19 (7th Cir.1978). The agents here noted the suitcases and knew the following: first, that this may have been a large-scale cocaine operation; second, that rooms near airports are often used by drug-runners to facilitate distribution; and third, that Rivera had been seen carrying what appeared to be narcotics to and from the room. Thus, with the information they had before the search, the agents ascertained that the suitcases probably contained contraband or evidence thereof. Accordingly, the seizure of the suitcases was justified under the plain view doctrine. 16 Once the suitcases were seized, agents brought them to the DEA office and exposed them to a narcotics-sniffing dog. After the dog alerted, agents prepared an affidavit in support of probable cause and secured a warrant for their search. The only objection raised to the warrant is that the affidavit was tainted because it depended on information secured in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Since we have determined that the room entry and the subsequent seizure were legal, the only remaining question is whether subjecting the luggage to a sniff-test was a warrantless search. It was not. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983); United States v. Klein, 626 F.2d 22 (7th Cir.1980).