Opinion ID: 1954355
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: equal pay violations under chapter 34-06.1, n.d.c.c.

Text: The second issue Swenson presents on appeal is that NCI violated North Dakota's Equal Pay Act by paying her less than a man for a similar job because she is a woman. The Act establishes public policy in these words:  Declaration of public policy. The public policy of this state is declared to be that the practice of discriminating on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees of one sex at a lesser rate than the rate paid to employees of the opposite sex for comparable work on jobs which have comparable requirements unjustly discriminates against the person receiving the lesser rate; leads to low worker morale, high turnover, and frequent labor unrest; discourages workers paid at the lesser wage rates from training for higher level jobs; curtails employment opportunities, decreases workers' mobility, and increases labor costs; impairs purchasing power and threatens the maintenance of an adequate standard of living by such workers and their families; prevents optimum utilization of the state's available labor resources; threatens the well-being of citizens of this state; and adversely affects the general welfare. It is therefore declared to be the policy of this state through exercise of its police power to correct and, as rapidly as possible, to eliminate discriminatory wage practices based on sex. Section 34-06.1-01, N.D.C.C. Before we reach the merits of this issue, we must address some procedural issues raised by NCI and Krabseth concerning Swenson's response to their summary judgment motion under Rule 56, N.D.R.Civ.P. They assert that Swenson failed to present any admissible evidence on this issue to the trial court in her response to their motion, thereby violating Rule 56(e), N.D.R.Civ.P. In support of their motion for summary judgment, NCI and Krabseth submitted an affidavit of their attorney supplemented by various documents, including minutes from corporate meetings and excerpts from depositions. This is allowable under Rule 56(e), N.D.R.Civ.P. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. Id. However, [s]upporting and opposing affidavits must be made on personal knowledge, set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Id. In light of the motion for summary judgment with a supplemented affidavit, Swenson could not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [her] pleading, but [her] response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. NCI and Krabseth assert that Swenson failed to comply with Rule 56(e) by not coming forward with any admissible, competent evidence, and therefore any evidence she submitted on appeal should not be considered by this Court. Unfortunately, there is no transcript of the summary judgment hearing in the record for this case. However, along with her response and brief opposing summary judgment, Swenson submitted an affidavit of her attorney to the trial court. Attached thereto were significant parts of her testimony given at a deposition, excerpts from Rick Wallace's deposition testimony, and a letter from Swenson to the President of NCI. We conclude, without reciting the essence of the response and affidavits, that the mode of response was sufficient. This determination does not end our inquiry on the issue, however, as NCI and Krabseth assert that even if Swenson's material submitted to the trial court was in compliance as to form with Rule 56(e), it still failed to prevent summary judgment because it did not raise genuine issues of material fact. [4] We disagree. In reviewing Swenson's evidence provided to the trial court, we find three men receiving higher pay than Swenson. The first man, Rick Wallace, received $25,000 per year as the office manager, and Swenson received approximately $20,000 per year in that same position. Swenson does not dispute this pay difference because, I was not, um, going to be doing the technical part of it, the assisting the agents if they had technical questions. The second man, Tom Hove, was hired as a program specialist before Swenson terminated her employment with NCI. Concurrent with Hove's hiring, Swenson was demoted and received a pay decrease from $10.00 per hour to $6.00 per hour ($1.50 per hour less than she received before in the clerk/secretary position). Swenson had no questions or qualms or anything about [Hove's] salary and his wages. She said: I was very unqualified for that job and I knew that. That was assistance to the agents. Her concern is with the dramatic decrease in her pay while retaining many of the same responsibilities she had prior to the pay decrease. Additionally, according to her, Krabseth expressed his views on wages for women in this fashion: I distinctly remember him saying something about, `I know I can hire a woman cheaper, but I want a man.' I'd say, `Why a man?' `Because a woman should not get $10 an hour.' I told him that, if he did demote me down to six, something likehow did the conversation go? He had already told me, you know, that he didn't feel a woman needed ten dollars an hour, you know, to survive and stuff. It should be a man. [H]e said he was going to be hiring a man; that he'd be starting the man at, `A higher wage than you're getting because he's a man.' And he kept telling me that, you know, men needed more, you know, supporting the family andand that he just didn't see that a woman should get $10 an hour. The third man, Terry Skarphol, was hired as a computer operator one month before Swenson terminated her employment with NCI. Swenson asserts that Krabseth did not inform her of this new position, so she could not apply for it. Skarphol was also hired at a rate higher than Swenson. Additionally, Krabseth offered Skarphol training for the job. Swenson argues that she was qualified for that job, did not need training as to NCI's existing computer system, and would have welcomed any further training available. Swenson claims that Krabseth hired Skarphol and paid him a higher rate because he is a man. All of these allegations are material facts in the equal pay claim. NCI and Krabseth assert that the three men were much more qualified, thereby justifying higher salaries. Furthermore, NCI and Krabseth argue that Swenson's position as office manager was phased out during the reorganization, thereby justifying her demotion to clerk/secretary. Because there are material facts in dispute as to the equal pay claim under Chapter 34-06.1, N.D.C.C., it was improper for the trial court to grant summary judgment on this issue. We therefore reverse this part of the judgment and remand for a determination of Swenson's equal pay claim. [5]