Opinion ID: 2555237
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Equitable Principles to Apply on Remand

Text: To be sure, there is no perfect forum in this case. There will be practical problems litigating this matter in New Jersey, just as there would be if it were litigated in South Africa. But the trial court has a panoply of equitable remedies to level the playing field and to guarantee the parties a fair trial. Whatever problems arise can be surmounted. We will enumerate some equitable options available. We do not foreclose the use of others. We cannot forecast how this case will develop through discovery and afterwards. We therefore must leave to the trial court the discretion to guide the process to the end that defendants will receive as fair a trial as humanly possible in this jurisdiction. Forum non conveniens is an equitable doctrine. Its aim, in part, is to ensure that the parties receive a fair trial, and that no party is so prejudiced that it cannot pursue a legitimate claim or present a viable defense. See, e.g., Civic S. Factors Corp. v. Bonat, 65 N.J. 329, 333, 322 A. 2d 436 (1974) (stating that primary purpose of forum non conveniens is to prevent injustice to defendant). With equitable principles in mind, our courts have the power to craft special remedies to guarantee that justicea fair hearingis not denied to any party. See, e.g., Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 609, 525 A. 2d 287 (1987) (stating that a court of equity `has a broad discretion in framing its decrees in order to adapt the relief to the circumstances of particular cases' (quoting 30A C.J.S. Equity § 599 (1965))); Salorio v. Glaser, 93 N.J. 447, 469, 461 A. 2d 1100 (1983) (stating that [e]quity courts have often recognized matters of public policy, convenience of administration, and practicality as matters to be weighed in shaping equitable decrees (quoting D. Dobbs, Remedies 56 (1973))). In the exercise of its equitable powers under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the trial court has authority to make certain that relevant evidence that bears a strong indicia of reliability is not kept from the jury merely because this case will be tried in New Jersey. See Heuer v. Heuer, 152 N.J. 226, 242, 704 A. 2d 913 (1998) (The equity jurisdiction of our courts should be exercised to do justice, not to create injustice.); cf. Olivieri v. Y.M.F. Carpet, Inc., 186 N.J. 511, 521-22, 897 A. 2d 1003 (2006) (`[E]ven where [the requirements of collateral estoppel] are met, the doctrine, which has its roots in equity, will not be applied when it is unfair to do so.' (quoting Pace v. Kuchinsky, 347 N.J.Super. 202, 215, 789 A. 2d 162 (App.Div.2002))). Plaintiffs will receive the benefit of their choice of forum based on a balancing of the equities. [12] Accordingly, we decline to simply affirm the denial of defendants' motion without specifically authorizing the trial court on remand to consider certain measures that will guarantee a fair trial to all parties. Needless to say, we expect the parties to cooperate with one another for the purpose of removing unnecessary hurdles to the presentation of evidence here. Everyone understands that if the trial were conducted in South Africa, evidence located in that country would be easier to present in that jurisdiction. Although the parties should consider stipulating to documentary evidence obtained from South African authorities or other reliable witnesses, in the absence of agreement by the parties, or feasible alternatives, the court may consider relaxing the Rules of Evidence for the purpose of admitting relevant evidence that bears a strong indicia of reliability. One possible option available to the parties is conducting de bene esse depositions of relevant, cooperative witnesses in South Africa. We do not know with certainty that this is a viable option. We acknowledge the difficulties of deposing witnesses in South Africa, which has opted out of Article 23 of the Hague Convention. But case law reveals that obtaining de bene esse depositions from witnesses in South Africa for use in the United States may not be an impossible task. See, e.g., Chrysler Int'l Corp., supra, 280 F. 3d at 1362 & n. 9 (noting that de bene esse deposition was taken in South Africa for use in case venued in federal district court, although use of deposition disallowed because it was received outside of discovery deadline). Thus, if one party can arrange to conduct de bene esse depositions of relevant, cooperative witnesses in South Africa, the other party cannot complain about costs, and must participate or else waives the right to object by not doing so. If a party chooses not to participate in a de bene esse deposition, that party will be able to challenge only the admissibility of the deposition testimony based on our Rules of Evidence. Failure to participate will not be a ground for challenging the admissibility of deposition testimony. We note that plaintiffs and defendants already have secured South African counsel. Indeed, defendants have presented two affidavits from a tow truck operator in South Africa. Ordinarily, each party should bear its own costs, but the trial court in its sound discretion is vested with power to apportion costs, if necessary, to see that justice is done. [13] We are sensitive to defendants' argument that there is no statutory authority to implead the South African municipality as a third-party defendant in New Jersey. Because the South African municipality cannot be impleaded as a party, New Jersey's Comparative Negligence Act, which only applies to parties, does not permit allocation of fault between defendants and the non-party municipality. See N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.2(a)(2) (The percentage of negligence or fault of each party shall be based on 100% and the total of all percentages of negligence or fault of all the parties to a suit shall be 100%. (emphasis added)). Assuming that defendants have taken steps necessary to preserve their rights against the municipality under South African law, [14] and assuming that there is adequate evidence to support a claim of municipal liability going to the jury, the trial court may consideras a matter of equity allowing the jury to consider apportioning fault between defendants and the municipality. [15] In this way, the disadvantage to defendants in trying this case in New Jersey will be greatly diminished if, in the event of a determination of liability, they can apportion damages in a way consistent with the Comparative Negligence Act. [16] Last, as stated earlier, we do not foreclose the admission of relevant evidence that bears a strong indicia of reliability, but that otherwise might be excluded on hearsay grounds under our Rules of Evidence. We do not attempt to define the entire realm of equitable steps that may be taken to guarantee a fair trial. We leave those important details to the sound discretion of the trial court.