Opinion ID: 221071
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Riley/Munson/Schaumburg Scrutiny

Text: Having determined that the public receptacle disclosures at issue are charitable solicitations, we evaluate the constitutionality of § 17.922(d) under the standard announced in Riley, Munson, and Schaumburg. The Act will therefore be sustained as constitutional under the Speech Clause if (1) it serves a sufficiently strong, subordinating interest that the [government] is entitled to protect and (2) it is `narrowly drawn ... to serve the interest without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms.' Munson, 467 U.S. at 960-61, 104 S.Ct. 2839 (quoting Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 636-37, 100 S.Ct. 826). Our discussion, however, can be brief. The Charities did not challenge the district court's holding that the identification and the sold-for-profit disclosure requirements are constitutional under the First Amendment. Texas did not challenge the district court's holding that the fee arrangement disclosure requirement, as applied to telephonic, door-to-door, or mail solicitation are unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Indeed, the able Assistant Solicitor General correctly conceded at oral argument that the fee arrangement disclosure portions of this statute ... cannot be squared with the Supreme Court's opinion in Riley.  We agree. In Riley, the Supreme Court held that the North Carolina statute at issuewhich required fund-raisers to disclose the average percentage of money they had turned over to charities within the past yearwas not narrowly tailored. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 798-801, 108 S.Ct. 2667. The Court held that [i]n contrast to the prophylactic, imprecise, and unduly burdensome rule the State has adopted to [further its interest], more benign and narrowly tailored options are available. Id. at 800, 108 S.Ct. 2667. Specifically, the Court said that the State may itself publish the detailed financial disclosure forms it requires professional fundraisers to file. This procedure would communicate the desired information to the public without burdening a speaker with unwanted speech during the course of a solicitation. Id. Alternatively, the Court explained, the State may vigorously enforce its antifraud laws to prohibit professional fundraisers from obtaining money on false pretenses or by making false statements. Id. In this case, there is nothing stopping Texas from requiring for-profit resellers to file financial disclosure forms, which Texas could publish without burdening the charities with unwanted speech on the receptacle notices. Texas could also ramp up its anti-fraud enforcement efforts. Both of these alternative means are available to Texas and both would be less of a burden on the Charities' speech rights than the Act's fee arrangement disclosure requirement. We have rejected Texas's characterization of the public receptacle disclosures as pure commercial speech and hold that § 17.922 regulates charitable solicitations and is to be evaluated under Riley, Munson, and Schaumburg. Same standard, same result. The fee arrangement disclosure requirement for public receptacles is unconstitutional under the First Amendment.