Opinion ID: 2766899
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exclusion of Alibi Witness

Text: Ramos argues that the district court violated his constitutional right to present witnesses in his defense when it refused to allow an alibi witness that Ramos did not disclose to the government until he sought to call her on the third day of trial. See generally Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 402 & n.1 (1988) (noting the accused's right under the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause to obtain the testimony of favorable witnesses); United States v. Portela, 167 F.3d 687, 705 (1st Cir. 1999) (same). We review this claim de novo, balancing the defendant's right to present his defense with [t]he State's interest in the orderly conduct of a criminal trial. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 411. Among the countervailing public interests are [t]he integrity of the adversary process, which depends both on the presentation of reliable evidence and the rejection of unreliable evidence, the interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice, and the potential prejudice to the truth-determining function of the trial process. Id. at 414-15. Even if constitutional error occurred, it may be found harmless if the prosecution is able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict. Portela, 167 F.3d at 706 (citing Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256 (1988)). Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.1, if the government requests notice of the defendant's intent to offer an -19- alibi defense, the defendant must respond in writing with the names of each alibi witness on whom he intends to rely. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.1(a)(1), (2). The Supreme Court has observed that rules providing for pretrial discovery of an opponent's witnesses minimize[] the risk that a judgment will be predicated on incomplete, misleading, or even deliberately fabricated testimony. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 411-12. Here, the government made a request under Rule 12.1(a)(1), and Ramos notified the government that he would present testimony that he was at the beach with friends and family members on July 4, 2002, the day of the chase. He identified his alibi witness as Johanna Bermúdez, his then-mistress and the mother of one of his children, and he reported that Bermúdez was accompanied to the beach that day by her daughter and Mrs. Rosa López. At trial, after Bermúdez testified that Ramos spent most of July 4 with her and others, Ramos sought to call López's daughter, Kiomarie Hernández-López (Hernández), as a corroborating witness. Defense counsel explained that Hernández was being called because her mother, Rosa López, doesn't want to get involved in court. The government objected on the ground that Hernández had not been named as an intended alibi witness and that, indeed, López had not been identified as a witness either. The court sustained the government's objection, pointing out that Rule 12.1 required Ramos to provide the name, address, and telephone -20- number of each alibi witness. Defense counsel did not press the issue. On appeal, Ramos does not dispute that he violated Rule 12.1(a)(2). Rather, he argues that the district court committed constitutional error by failing to weigh his right to present the proposed witness against the integrity of the adversary process, Taylor, 484 U.S. at 414, and by unjustifiably disregarding the Supreme Court's statement that sanctions other than preclusion would be 'adequate and appropriate' for most discovery violations, Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152 (1991) (quoting Taylor, 484 U.S. at 413). See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 413 (noting the availability of less drastic sanction[s], including granting a continuance to provide time for further investigation). As an initial matter, we note that defense counsel did not contemporaneously protest the exclusion,16 giving the court 16 After the government objected to the witness, defense counsel stated that he did not think he needed to provide all the names of the people that I am going to present. In response, the district court reviewed aloud Rule 12.1's requirement that the defendant give the government the name, address and telephone number of each alibi witness. The following exchange then took place: DEFENSE COUNSEL: However, it does say that, but I said, I told the government the address. COURT: Counsel, you have not given her that information. DEFENSE COUNSEL: I did not give her the name. COURT: Objection sustained. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. COURT: Do you have any other witnesses aside from that? DEFENSE COUNSEL: No, sir. -21- little reason to consider a less severe sanction for Ramos's admitted rule violation. Although Ramos now argues that a corroborating alibi witness was essential to his case because Bermúdez was an easy target for impeachment on grounds of bias, the only justification offered at trial for presenting Hernández as a surprise witness was that she was a substitute for another unannounced witness who had declined to appear. Importantly, having proffered the alibi through Bermúdez, supported by Héctor Néris's testimony that his brother was the truck driver, Ramos was not denied the opportunity to present his defense. Cf., e.g., United States v. Levy-Cordero, 67 F.3d 1002, 1014-15 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding exclusion of alibi evidence unjustified and remanding for a hearing to evaluate its content and reliability); Bowling v. Vose, 3 F.3d 559, 562 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding error where an exculpatory and potentially reliable alibi was wholly excluded). All told, this issue is not a close call. Without any apparent justification for doing so, and in the course of presenting a newly unveiled alibi, Ramos ignored the federal notice rule whose purposes include minimiz[ing] the risk that fabricated testimony will be believed. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 413; see also Chappee v. Vose, 843 F.2d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 1988) (observing that a The defense then rested. Both parties treat the issue as properly preserved, and we therefore do likewise. -22- court may reasonably 'presume that there is something suspect about a defense witness who is not identified until after the eleventh hour has passed' (quoting Taylor, 484 U.S. at 414)). Indeed, Ramos did not even mention Hernández in his Rule 12.1 notice reporting that her mother was at the beach with Bermúdez and Bermúdez's daughter. That omission magnified the government's surprise at trial and presumably was easy to avoid. See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 415 (noting that the simplicity of compliance with the discovery rule is . . . relevant in determining the proper sanction for a violation). Finally, because the alibi first appeared in Ramos's second trial, and that delay was emphasized by the government, see supra Section II.A, the proposed corroborating testimony was unlikely to be compelling even if the jurors did not consider it unbelievable.17 We therefore conclude that the district court's exclusion of Kiomarie Hernández's testimony was not constitutional error.