Opinion ID: 1687603
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether cavett was denied a fair trial?

Text: ¶ 7. Cavett first argues that he was denied a fair trial by the actions of the trial judge and the prosecutor. Specifically, Cavett contends that he was denied a fair trial by 1) the State's attorney continually asking leading questions and being sustained upon timely objection; 2) the trial judge's failure to grant the lawyers the respect they deserve by threatening them with jail for contempt and telling them to shut up and sit down; 3) the trial judge's failure, upon request, to admonish the jury to disregard; 4) the trial court's failure to grant a mistrial; and, 5) the State's failure to inform defense counsel that a firearms expert would testify regarding the stippling on the decedent's arm.
¶ 8. Cavett contends that he received an unfair trial because, on numerous occasions, defense counsel successfully objected to leading questions posed by the prosecutor. Cavett argues that, although leading questions occur in probably every case ever tried, there comes a saturation point wherein the technique causes an unfair result. ¶ 9. Cavett does not cite any authority in support of this argument, and, therefore, consideration of this issue is procedurally barred. The appellant bears the burden on appeal, and we will entertain no claims for which no supporting authority has been cited. Beckwith v. State, 707 So.2d 547, 597 (Miss. 1997) (citing Allman v. State, 571 So.2d 244, 254 (Miss.1990); Smith v. State, 430 So.2d 406, 407 (Miss.1983)). Furthermore, a review of the record reveals that Cavett's argument is specious.
¶ 10. Cavett also argues that the demeanor of the trial judge on two occasions resulted in an unfair trial. However, neither of the disputed incidents occurred in the presence of the jury, and Cavett has demonstrated no prejudice therefrom. ¶ 11. The first incident of which Cavett complains occurred after a lengthy discussion on peremptory challenges, during which the trial court repeatedly told the defense attorneys that they would have twelve peremptory challenges among the three defendants: [STEVENS' ATTORNEY]: I understand, but what we're saying is in light of the Court's ruling that the Defendants collectively get 12 challenges. We don't agree with that, as Your Honor said, but in light of the Court's ruling, that's again putting us in the position where we're forced to try to agree on which 12 and [the defense attorneys]  THE COURT: I'm not going to advise you how to do it. I'd probably do it mathematically. Three into twelve goes four times. I don't know how to do it. I think it's a stupid rule but it's a rule. [CAVETT'S ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, I make a motion on behalf of Patrick Cavett for additional strikes as a result of the Court's ruling. THE COURT: Let me explain something. See, the more times I hear it doesn't convince me anymore that I ought to grant it. [CAVETT'S ATTORNEY]: I understand, but  THE COURT: Let me stop you. I'm denying it and I'm citing anybody for contempt who raises it again and states any reason that's one I've already heard before. I'm not going to spend all morning denying the same motions. Y'all are just saying the same thing and little children sitting in here know all you're doing is saying the same thing over and over again. I'm not hearing it anymore. If you've got a new motion you need to raise it. If you raise the same motion and you say the same thing to me, you're going to be fined. The only reason I'm not going to put you in jail is because I need you so I can get this trial over with. ¶ 12. Cavett also complains that the trial judge told his attorney to sit down and shut up. This is not an accurate depiction of the record. After Cavett's attorney had interrupted him twice in the same sentence, the judge actually said, Shut up while I'm talking. Of course, this terminology is not an example of ideal courtroom decorum, but, then, neither is interrupting a judge twice in one sentence. ¶ 13. Certainly, this Court has acknowledged that the actions of a trial judge can be bad enough to prejudice the jury. See Waldrop v. State, 506 So.2d 273, 276 (Miss.1987) (trial judge understandably lost his cool in front of jury). However, the disputed interactions in the case sub judice were limited to arguments held outside the presence of the jury. Therefore, Cavett's argument that the trial judge's demeanor resulted in an unfair trial is without merit. ¶ 14. Although the judge's conduct in this case did not affect the outcome of the trial, discourteous conduct in the courtroom can have broader ramifications. Canon 3. 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, requires judges to be patient, dignified, and courteous. How well the judiciary abides by this requirement greatly affects the public perception of the courts. Furthermore, all officers of the court should comport themselves in a manner that instills public trust and confidence in the decisions rendered.
¶ 15. Cavett further argues that the trial judge should have granted defense counsel's request to admonish the jury to disregard witness testimony on two occasions. These requests to admonish arose after the trial court sustained defense objections. The trial judge found that, at least with regard to one of the requests, a contemporaneous admonition would have drawn even more attention to the objectionable matter. Furthermore, although the trial judge denied the contemporaneous requests for an admonition, he subsequently gave a written instruction admonishing the jury to disregard all excluded evidence. ¶ 16. Cavett argues that, when the trial judge sustained the objections and denied the request to admonish the jury, it can only be presumed that [the jury] considered the incompetent testimony. However, [a]s this Court has oft-stated: `Our criminal justice system necessarily proceeds on the premise that jurors take their responsibilities quite seriously,' and this Court `presume[s] as a matter of institutional imperative that our jurors respect the law as they are instructed by the court.' Alexander v. State, 602 So.2d 1180, 1183 (Miss.1992) (quoting Middlebrook v. State, 555 So.2d 1009, 1013 (Miss. 1990)). See also Hoops v. State, 681 So.2d 521, 528-29 (Miss.1996) (jury is presumed to have followed trial judge's admonition to disregard witness's inappropriate remarks). ¶ 17. Moreover, [i]t is the well established rule in Mississippi that where a trial judge sustains an objection to testimony interposed by the defense in a criminal case and instructs the jury to disregard it, the remedial acts of the court are usually deemed sufficient to remove any prejudicial effect from the mind of the jurors. The jury is presumed to have followed the directions of the trial judge. Vickery v. State, 535 So.2d 1371, 1380 (Miss. 1988) (citations omitted). ¶ 18. Cavett's timely objections were sustained. Moreover, at least with regard to the second request of admonition, the trial judge ruled that a contemporaneous admonition would have drawn further attention to the objectionable comment. Subsequently, at the conclusion of the presentation of all evidence, the trial judge gave a written instruction to the jury to disregard such comments. Therefore, this issue is without merit.
¶ 19. Cavett next asserts that the trial judge should have granted a mistrial during the State's redirect examination of Calvin Shelton. Shelton was in Cavett's car the night of Brown's murder. He was indicted with Cavett, Stevens, and Strahan, but he was not tried with them. He testified against all of them at trial. On cross-examination, the defense questioned Shelton at length regarding his motives for testifying. During the State's redirect examination of Shelton, the following transpired: [ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: Has either one of these defendants tried to threaten or intimidate you at any  [CAVETT'S ATTORNEY]: Your Honor  [ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY]:  time after the shooting that night? A. No, ma'am. Q. Have you ever told Detective Wade or anyone that they did? A. Yes, ma'am. Q. Who did you make such a statement to? A. Detective Wade. Q. What did you tell Detective Wade that had happened? A. I told Detective Wade that Glynn [Stevens] and Pat [Cavett] had threatened me. [STEVENS' ATTORNEY]: May we approach the bench, Your Honor? THE COURT: You may. (OFF THE RECORD DISCUSSION AT THE BENCH) THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, let me ask you to please be excused for a few moments while we take up a legal matter. ¶ 20. Thereafter, a lengthy discussion was had, during which defense counsel argued for a mistrial. The trial judge denied the motion for a mistrial, but allowed the defense attorneys to recross-examine Shelton. The trial judge ruled that the State's line of questioning was improper redirect, but that the defense attorneys had not objected and had allowed the evidence to be elicited. ¶ 21. The record reflects that Cavett's attorney said Your Honor during the State's line of questioning, but did not say anything further. Unless timely and specific objection is made to allegedly improper testimony, the objection is deemed waived and may not be raised on appeal. Hall v. State, 691 So.2d 415, 418 (Miss.1997) (emphasis added) (quoting McQuarter v. State, 574 So.2d 685, 688 (Miss.1990)). Moreover, although the trial judge ruled to the contrary, the prosecutor's questions were proper redirect examination. ¶ 22. That is, [t]he defense opened the door to the questions asked and the answers given on re-direct. See Id. The defense questioned Shelton at length about his motivation to testify in favor of the State. In so doing, the defense opened the door for questions on redirect examination regarding Shelton's motives for testifying against the State (i.e.: he had been threatened to keep his mouth closed). The trial court has broad discretion in allowing or disallowing redirect examination of witnesses. When the defense attorney inquires into a subject on cross-examination of the State's witness, the prosecutor on rebuttal is unquestionably entitled to elaborate on the matter. ... Because these matters were all brought out on cross-examination, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing redirect examination on the matters. Beckwith, 707 So.2d at 591 (citations omitted). ¶ 23. Thus, no specific objection was made as the evidence was being elicited, and the questions were proper. In addition, the defense attorneys were allowed to recross-examine Shelton on this matter. Therefore, Cavett's argument on this point is without merit.
¶ 24. Cavett asserts that a discovery violation occurred when the State's firearms expert testified about stippling on the decedent's arm. Although Cavett does not argue this issue or cite any authority, he contends that this alleged discovery violation also contributed to an unfair trial. Cavett's failure to cite authority precludes consideration on appeal. See Beckwith, 707 So.2d at 597. ¶ 25. In the alternative, Cavett's argument is without merit, because he clearly failed to follow the proper procedure for combating discovery violations. After all parties had rested their cases, the defense attorneys moved for a portion of the firearms expert's testimony to be struck from the record. They argued that they were unfairly surprised by his testimony as to the cause of the stippling on the decedent's arm. After lengthy discussions, the trial judge noted that the defendants knew the firearms expert was going to testify, and they had his lab report. The trial judge also ruled that the objection should have been made when the allegedly surprising testimony was presented, and denied the defendants' motion to strike portions of the testimony. ¶ 26. It is well-settled, that a defendant claiming unfair surprise must, at a minimum, request a continuance to consider the previously undisclosed evidence: Should the defendant fail to request a continuance, he has waived the issue. Snelson v. State, 704 So.2d 452, 458 (Miss.1997) (quoting Duplantis v. State, 644 So.2d 1235, 1250 (Miss.1994)). ¶ 27. Thus, Cavett's argument is procedurally barred for failure to cite authority. Moreover, Cavett did not request a continuance when allegedly surprising information was first brought to light. Therefore, his argument on this point is without merit.