Opinion ID: 198347
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 54 Owens argues that his RICO convictions must be set aside because the government offered insufficient proof of the enterprise charged in the indictment and of Owens's participation in that enterprise. In considering Owens's sufficiency claims, we must view the evidence, together with all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the government, ... [and consider] whether a rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Loder, 23 F.3d 586, 589 (1st Cir.1994) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). After examining the evidence under this standard, we reject Owens's arguments.
55 The indictment charged Owens and one Keillen Smith with being leaders of an enterprise, consisting of individuals associated in fact, which operated from 1988 to 1995 and engaged in drug trafficking and acts of violence, including murder. The alleged purpose of the enterprise included enriching members through drug trafficking and drug distribution; preserving, protecting and expanding the power and control of the enterprise through the use of murder, violence, threats of violence, and intimidation; and promoting and enhancing the enterprise and its members' drug trafficking and related activities. 56 During trial, the government introduced evidence that Owens and Smith were the major players in an organization, made up of two sub-groups, that supplied cocaine to the Boston area. Owens, assisted by Johnny Stephens, Robert Owens, and Coleman Essex, was in charge of supplying the organization with cocaine. Smith, assisted by Kenneth Allen, Anthony Lewis, Charles Brown, Wayne Meadows, and Gordon Lowe, was responsible for packaging and distributing the cocaine in the Boston area. 57 Owens first began selling cocaine to Smith in ounce quantities in 1987. By 1990, Smith had become a large-scale distributor for Owens, purchasing and reselling cocaine by the kilogram. Owens continued to sell cocaine to Smith even after Owens left Boston and began to move from state to state in order to avoid arrest. In early 1991, Owens relocated to Providence, Rhode Island, where he continued his drug trafficking activities until his arrest in 1995. While in Providence, Owens sold cocaine to Smith on a near weekly basis for $20,000 to $25,000 a kilogram. Although Smith sometimes personally collected the drugs from Owens, he usually had Lewis, Brown, or Meadows travel to Rhode Island from Massachusetts to pick up kilogram quantities. The men would return with the drugs in Owens's Thunderbird, which Owens had outfitted with hidden compartments. In Boston, Smith and his group cooked the cocaine, packaged it, and distributed it to customers, making a profit of $2,500 to $5,000 for every kilogram sold. Smith's group therefore relied on Owens's group for a steady supply of cocaine, and Owens's group correspondingly depended on Smith's group for cash. The two groups collaborated on drug deals in other meaningful ways. Owens was often accompanied by members of both groups as he traveled to Florida and New York to purchase cocaine; and on at least one occasion, Smith and Owens jointly contributed $100,000 to finance a drug buying trip to Florida, which was made by Owens and Lewis. 58 Owens's and Smith's groups also relied on one another as they resorted to violence to protect their drug interests. On two occasions, when Owens's New York source provided cocaine that Owens deemed unacceptable, Owens and Smith, accompanied by other gang members, drove to New York to obtain redress. On one of these trips, the men were armed with guns provided by Owens. The first trip was a success as Owens and Smith, at gunpoint, extracted a refund from the source. The second refund trip was unsuccessful. On yet another occasion, when Rodney Belle's cohorts stole cocaine from Owens during a drug deal, Owens turned to Smith and Lewis for help, directing Smith to determine who was responsible for the theft. When Smith and Allen learned that Belle was responsible, Smith told Lewis to set up a meeting with Belle, purportedly to purchase guns. During the meeting, Owens, assisted by Lewis, Stephens, and Lowe, killed Belle.
59 Owens contends that the evidence suggested two separate and autonomous enterprises, one directed by Owens and the other directed by Smith. He points to testimony that Smith received less than half of his cocaine from Owens and did not know all of Owens's buyers. According to Owens, the government therefore failed to establish the existence of the enterprise charged in the indictment. We disagree. 60 The term enterprise in the RICO statute includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(c). An association in fact type of enterprise can consist of two illegal entities. Cf. United States v. London, 66 F.3d 1227, 1243 (1st Cir.1995) (holding that two or more legal entities can form or be part of an association-in-fact RICO enterprise) (emphasis in original); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 585, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981) (holding that RICO applies to wholly illegal enterprises). To prove an enterprise, the government must introduce evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and ... evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit. Id. at 583, 101 S.Ct. 2524. Where two sub-groups are at issue, what is necessary is evidence of systemic linkage, such as overlapping leadership, structural or financial ties, or continuing coordination. Libertad v. Welch, 53 F.3d 428, 443 (1st Cir.1995). 61 Here, the government introduced sufficient evidence of systemic linkages between Owens's and Smith's organizations. Members of the two groups depended on one another both financially and structurally. They regularly exchanged money for cocaine, coordinated in the transporting of cocaine to Boston, accompanied one another on cocaine buying trips, and assisted one another in acts of violence to protect their drug interests. Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of the enterprise charged in the indictment. Compare Libertad, 53 F.3d at 443-44 (two organizations constituted one RICO enterprise when one organization issued a press release referring to second organization as affiliated group; leaders of second organization shared information with first organization on a regular basis; and both organizations participated in one protest together); with United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 667 (8th Cir.1982) (no enterprise where evidence showed two separate associations of individuals, with no common personnel, except one defendant who was a member of both organizations at different times). 62 That Smith received less than half of his cocaine from Owens and did not know all of Owens's buyers does not detract from the existence of the enterprise because RICO does not demand total fusion or that all defendants participate in all racketeering activities, know of the entire conspiratorial sweep, or be acquainted with all other defendants. Libertad, 53 F.3d at 445 (citation omitted) (discussing RICO conspiracy count). Accordingly, the government sufficiently proved the existence of an enterprise. 6 63 Owens's related argument, that the evidence was insufficient to show that he conducted or participated in the affairs of the enterprise, also fails because, as discussed supra, the evidence more than sufficiently established that Owens conducted and participated in the affairs of the enterprise.