Opinion ID: 2287155
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: testimony of gloria flaherty

Text: The objection to the admissibility of certain testimony given by Laurence's daughter presents us with the novel and important question of the validity of recently enacted Rule 804(c) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence as it applies in the criminal context. Rule 804(c) provides for the admissibility into evidence of hearsay statements made by a deceased person. The rule reads:  Declaration of Decedent Made in Good Faith. A declaration of a deceased person shall not be inadmissible in evidence as hearsay if the court finds that it was made in good faith before the commencement of the action and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant. Flaherty testified to out-of-court statements Laurence made to her after his discharge from the hospital on the evening of the robbery. Defense counsel objected, specifically, to the following testimony: Q Do you recall exactly what he said concerning any monies missing from the robbery? MR. SHOER: Objection. MR. McKINNON: Objection. THE COURT: You may answer yes or no; whether you recall or not. A Yes, he did comment. Q What did he say about monies missing? MR. McKINNON: Objection. THE COURT: Objection overruled. You may answer. A He said that they took  they didn't get the big money they got between  they took between 30 or 40 dollars. Q Did your father tell you what the robbers said while he was being robbed? A He was very clear on that. He said that they wanted the big money, whatever that was. They kept saying the big money; the big money, and that's  that's all he kept saying. Q And what was the total amount of money that your father told you was missing? A Between 30 and 40. [1] The objection to this testimony was premised upon the assertions of counsel that Rule 804(c) does not operate to render such hearsay statements admissible in criminal proceedings. The defendants rely upon two theories to support such an assertion. First, the language of the rule on its face demonstrates that it was intended to apply only to civil actions. Second, the applicability of Rule 804(c) in a criminal proceeding would unduly infringe upon a defendant's constitutional right to confrontation. U.S. Const.Amend. VI; U.S. Const.Amend. XIV; R.I. Const. art. 1, § 10. Rule 804(c), which became effective October 1, 1987, was enacted to replace General Laws 1956 (1985 Reenactment) § 9-19-11, repealed by P.L. 1987, ch. 381, § 5. The rule, which was taken unchanged from § 9-19-11, is reminiscent of a similar statute existing in our sister state of Massachusetts. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 233, § 65 (West 1986). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has construed the language of its own statute to preclude application in criminal proceedings. See Commonwealth v. Gallo, 275 Mass. 320, 175 N.E. 718 (1931). It is this very construction that defendants rely upon in urging us to limit application of our own Rule 804(c). In Commonwealth v. Gallo , the supreme judicial court held that Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 233, section 65, was not intended to permit otherwise hearsay statements to be entered into evidence in a criminal prosecution. The language of § 65, as it existed at the time, was identical to Rule 804(c). The supreme judicial court in reaching its determination, however, looked to the language of the statute as first enacted. Gallo, 275 Mass. at 335, 175 N.E. at 725. The Massachusetts court found that [t]he provision was first enacted in substantially the same language in St. 1898, c. 535, except that the word `suit' was used in place of the word `action.' By no possible stretch of meaning can `suit' be held to include prosecutions for crime. Id. Thus, the original language of § 65 lent credence to the court's conclusion that `[a]ction', although a word of broad import, can hardly be interpreted in this connection as intended to include prosecutions for crime. Id. [2] We are not persuaded by the holding in Gallo, nor must we struggle with the language of our own Rule 804(c) in an effort to discern the legislative intent behind its enactment. The Advisory Committee's notes clearly articulate the intended reach of the exception. Unlike the exception for dying declarations contained in proposed [Federal] rule 804(b)(2), this exception applies in all criminal and civil cases, and is not limited to the cause or circumstances of the declarant's impending death. Application of this exception to criminal cases goes beyond the scope of Massachusetts statute from which this rule derives, but there appears no persuasive reason to limit the exception to civil cases. Constitutional considerations concerning the admission of statements under this section against an accused are subject to the same analysis as statements admitted under the exceptions for dying declarations, former testimony, etc. (Emphasis added.) Accordingly the statute was intended to apply to criminal proceedings, provided, of course, that constitutional safeguards are met. Hence we address defendants' constitutional concerns. The importance of a defendant's constitutional right to confront and cross-examine witnesses cannot be understated. In holding these Sixth Amendment rights applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1068, 13 L.Ed.2d 923, 927 (1965), concluded that [t]here are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this Court and other courts have been more nearly unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the right of confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal. Additionally our own State Constitution, recognizing the import of such rights, affords a defendant the opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses. R.I. Const., art. 1, § 10; see also State v. LaChappelle, 424 A.2d 1039, 1043 n. 4 (R.I. 1981). The strict requirement of confrontation in the Sixth Amendment, however, is tempered by the dictates of practicality and judicial economy. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-64, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2537-38, 65 L.Ed.2d 597, 605-06 (1980). Therefore, exceptions to the controversial hearsay rule requiring exclusion of out-of-court statements have evolved to encompass a great deal of testimony rendering admissible that which would otherwise never reach the factfinder. See, e.g., Fed.R.Evid. 803, 804; R.I.R. Evid. 803, 804 (hearsay exceptions). The United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts , acknowledging the necessity of a peaceful coexistence between a defendant's Sixth Amendment guarantees and the jurisdictional interest in effective law enforcement, articulated a general approach to admissibility questions of hearsay evidence. 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2359, 65 L.Ed.2d at 608. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, stated that when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate `indicia of reliability.' Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Id. Thus Roberts established a two-tiered test of admissibility that the high court, as well as lower Federal and State Courts, cites with approval in analyzing out-of-court statements. E.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182-83, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2782, 97 L.Ed.2d 144, 157 (1987); [3] Puleio v. Vose, 830 F.2d 1197, 1204-05 (1st Cir.1987) (and cases cited); Manocchio v. Moran, 708 F. Supp. 473, 475 (D.R.I. 1989); State v. Maldonado, 13 Conn. App. 368, 375, 536 A.2d 600, 604 (1988); Commonwealth v. Trigones, 397 Mass. 633, 637-38, 492 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (1986); State v. Anthony, 448 A.2d 744, 753-54 (R.I. 1982). Against this constitutional backdrop we turn now to consider the propriety of admitting into evidence, under Rule 804(c), the out-of-court statements made by Laurence to his daughter. The statements do not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception such as prior recorded testimony as discussed in Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213-16, 92 S.Ct. 2308, 2313-15, 33 L.Ed.2d 293, 301-03 (1972). Nor was the statement a dying declaration made in anticipation of impending death as recognized in Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43, 15 S.Ct. 337, 339-40, 39 L.Ed. 409, 410-11 (1895), or any of the other exceptions embodied in the Federal Rules of Evidence. We must therefore determine whether these controversial declarations bear any indicia of reliability as required by Roberts. [4] In the circumstances of the case before us we find that the testimonial evidence at issue carries the requisite reliability and trustworthiness to pass constitutional muster. The indicia of reliability is apparent in the trial justice's findings with respect to the requirements of our own Rule 804(c), that the statements were made in good faith before the commencement of the action and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant. The trial justice specifically found that the good-faith requirement is satisfied because they are the words of an individual who purportedly had just been robbed and beaten with a baseball bat; an individual who was taken to the hospital and returned and is speaking to a blood relative, his daughter; and he's saying to his daughter precisely what she says she is going to testify to. In the Court's judgment that's a statement made in good faith. It's not made to a police officer. It is made to a family member, and it has to do with something that occurred and was stated prior to the commencement of this action. This statement was made even before the defendants were arrested. It is made on the premises shortly after this robbery occurred. We think that these findings also amply fulfill the indicia-of-reliability requirement set forth in Roberts and that, therefore, the admission of the testimony was constitutionally sound. [5]
The defendants assign error to the admission of Flaherty's testimony as a violation of Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 16 allows for broad discovery in order to prevent hardship or surprise during the conduct of criminal trials. See State v. Ricci, 472 A.2d 291, 299 (R.I. 1984); State v. Concannon, 457 A.2d 1350, 1352-53 (R.I. 1983). The remedy for a violation of this rule varies depending upon whether the nondisclosure of certain facts was deliberate or inadvertent. Concannon, 457 A.2d at 1353-54. A deliberate nondisclosure by a party to a criminal proceeding results in the granting of a new trial. Id. at 1353. If the nondisclosure was inadvertent, the existence of procedural prejudice determines whether such a remedy is appropriate. Id. at 1354. In the case before us defendants take specific exception to Gloria Flaherty's testimony that they [the robbers] took between 30 or 40 dollars. The defendants contend that this testimony was substantially different from that represented by the state through discovery. The state informed defendants on Monday, March 28, 1988, that Flaherty would testify about monies missing from the store in which her father worked. This representation, as compared with the testimony ultimately elicited, defendants assert, operates as a Rule 16 violation because the disclosure was not specific. Without determining whether this contention holds any merit, we find that defendants are in no position to raise such an issue, having waived any Rule 16 objection to this testimony in the trial court. The following dialogue took place in front of the trial justice and on the record: MR. SULLIVAN [for the state]:    I should also point out to your Honor that yesterday I mentioned to defense counsel and this morning firmed up a supplement to the discovery, in that a witness by the name of Gloria Flaherty will be called to the stand to testify about monies missing from the store in which her father worked, because that witness is now deceased. MR. McKINNON [for defendant Burke]: We advised, we'll waive any Rule 16 objection to that. THE COURT: All right. MR. SHOER [for defendant St. Pierre]: I also have no objection to that, your Honor. This extract clearly reflects a waiver on the part of defense counsel to the testimony of Flaherty. The state made a general representation about the testimony it intended to elicit from this particular witness. Rather than ask for more specific details about the witness's testimony, defendants' counsel waived any objection they may have otherwise been entitled to make. The trial justice also recognized this factor in holding a waiver of the objection occurred. The trial justice found [defense counsel] accepted the prosecution's statement with regard that money was taken. [Defense counsel] did not ask the context in which that testimony was going to be given. The trial justice went on to note: [Defense counsel] accepted the generalization as to what Mrs. Flaherty might testify to, no matter what it might have been. And consequently, I find that there's no Rule 16 rule [ sic ] violation here. We agree with these findings.