Opinion ID: 1586914
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: application of peart

Text: The first of our three holdings in Peart was merely an extension of our decision in Wood to postconviction motions raising rule 3.172(c)(8) violations. In Wood, this Court eliminated the requirement in rule 3.850 that the defendant be in custody, which had compelled defendants not in custody to use the writ of error coram nobis in postconviction challenges to their convictions. 750 So.2d at 595. Thus, the Court ruled in Peart that since Wood both custodial and noncustodial defendants have been required to employ rule 3.850 to raise their claims under rule 3.172(c)(8). 756 So.2d at 46. However, the second holding in Peart, that the limitation period begins to run when the defendant learns or should have learned (whichever is earlier) of the threat of deportation based on the plea, id. at 48, contravened language in Wood holding that claims formerly raised via error coram nobis are subject to the time periods in rule 3.850: Limiting claims cognizable under coram nobis to the same time limit that is applied to rule 3.850 motions places both such claimants on equal footing and prevents unwarranted circumvention of the rule. We hasten to add that the discovery of facts giving rise to a coram nobis claim will continue to be governed by the due diligence standard, and that coram nobis claims cannot breathe life into postconviction claims that have previously been held barred. Wood, 750 So.2d at 595 (citation omitted). By starting the two-year clock with actual or imputed notice of a threatened deportation rather than finality of the judgment and sentence, as in rule 3.850(b), Peart authorized claims that otherwise would have been time-barred under the rule. District court decisions demonstrate that as applied, Peart actually deters defendants from raising rule 3.172(c)(8) claims within the first several years after a plea. The claim does not ripen until a defendant is threatened with deportation. The conflict issue in this case reflects division in the district courts on what constitutes threatened deportation. However, under any of the thresholds for threatened deportation applied by the district courts, many motions claiming rule 3.172(c)(8) violations that have been filed long after the two-year period governing other postconviction claims under rule 3.850(b) are nonetheless timely under Peart. Cases in which initiation of deportation proceedings constitutes the threatened deportation involve some of the longest delays. In Ghanavati v. State, 820 So.2d 989 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), the Fourth District ruled that a motion to withdraw a plea entered fourteen years earlier was timely because it was filed within two years of the date when the defendant learned that INS had commenced a deportation action against him. Id. at 990. In its 2002 decision in Alfaro v. State, 828 So.2d 1056 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), the Third District ruled that a motion to withdraw a 1991 plea alleging that the defendant received notice to appear in deportation proceedings was timely. Id. at 1058. In State v. Lindo, 863 So.2d 1237 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), the Fourth District determined that a 2002 motion to withdraw a 1990 plea, filed less than a year after the defendant received notice to appear in deportation proceedings, was timely. Id. at 1239. Likewise, in the 2000 decision in Gray v. State, 774 So.2d 30 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), the trial court denied a postconviction motion claiming a rule 3.172(c)(8) violation on a 1990 plea on grounds that it was untimely and not subject to the exception for newly discovered evidence. The Second District reversed, concluding that the motion was filed within two years of the time when the defendant had or should have had knowledge of the threat of deportation. Id. at 31; see also Martinez v. State, 842 So.2d 900, 901 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (concluding that motion filed quickly after INS notice to appear in deportation proceedings, but nine years after plea, cannot be ruled untimely on its face). Even under the Fourth District's less exacting standard for establishing a threatened deportation in this case, timely motions alleging a rule 3.172(c)(8) violation can be filed many years after the plea. Green filed his motion to withdraw his 1993 plea in 2002, within months after denial of the application to waive grounds for excludability. Similarly, in Alguno v. State, 892 So.2d 1200, (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), the Fourth District ruled that a 2003 motion seeking to withdraw a 1995 plea and alleging that INS had denied his application for naturalization in 2001 stated a legally cognizable claim. Id. at 1201-02. Precedent in which motions have been denied as premature also reflect the delay inherent in Peart's criteria for a prima facie case. In Saldana v. State, 786 So.2d 643 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001), the court ruled that notice that a detainer would be placed on the movant and an investigation into deportability initiated did not constitute threatened deportation based on a 1990 plea. Id. at 645. In Kindelan v. State, 786 So.2d 599 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001), the Third District ruled insufficient a motion to withdraw a 1987 plea alleging that when Kindelan applied to adjust his immigration status, INS advised him that he was excludable from the United States due to his conviction. Id. at 600. In State v. Gaston, 911 So.2d 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005), notice invoking discretionary review filed, No. SC05-1901 (Fla. Oct. 14, 2005), [3] in which the Third District certified conflict with Green, the court ruled that a motion to withdraw a plea which alleged that an immigration attorney advised the defendant that he would be subject to deportation if he applied for residency did not state a prima facie case for relief. Id. at 258; see also Aparicio v. State, 893 So.2d 630, 631 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (ruling premature a motion to withdraw a 1998 plea alleging that defense was advised by immigration counsel that if he applied for citizenship or tried to visit his son in Cuba he would at least be detained); Wigley v. State, 851 So.2d 784, 785 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (affirming denial of premature motion alleging that federal government had instituted action to revoke naturalization). As courts have explicitly held in some of these cases, the denial of the rule 3.850 motion is without prejudice to the defendant seeking relief when the `threat of deportation' is more demonstrable. Wigley, 851 So.2d at 785 (citation omitted); see also Aparicio, 893 So.2d at 631. In sum, the district court opinions applying Peart reflect that in many cases, commencement of deportation proceedings or another event constituting a threatened deportation can lag far behind a guilty or no contest plea to a deportable offense. Because a claimed rule 3.172(c)(8) violation is not ripe under Peart until the defendant is threatened with deportation and has or should become aware of the threat, the delay in commencing deportation proceedings causes a corresponding delay in bringing these claims. Delayed filing hampers adjudication because transcripts of plea colloquies that would demonstrate whether defendants were advised of immigration consequences often become unavailable over time. When a transcript was not previously prepared, court reporters are required to retain original notes or electronic records no longer than ten years in felony cases, five years in misdemeanor cases. Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.430(f). Accordingly, contrary to the Fourth District's opinion, there is no transcript of the plea colloquy in the record in this case, only a notation by the court reporter that in general transcripts are unavailable after ten years. Similarly, plea hearing transcripts were unavailable in Gaston, 911 So.2d at 258 n. 1, and Kindelan, 786 So.2d at 599-600. The opinion in Kindelan also reflects an unsuccessful attempt to reconstruct the record. Id. at 600. Further, one court has held that inclusion of the immigration warning on a preprinted plea form signed by the defendant is an insufficient basis for denial of relief on this claim. Alexis v. State, 845 So.2d 262, 262 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Benelhocine v. State, 787 So.2d 38, 39-40 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Therefore, too often, the filing delay required by Peart deprives defendants of the means by which they could conclusively meet their burden of demonstrating that they were not given the immigration warning. In addition, when a defendant's motion to withdraw a plea is granted for failure to give the rule 3.172(c)(8) warning, the passage of time between the guilty plea and the postconviction motion puts the State at a great disadvantage in seeking to try the case to conviction. Evidence may become unavailable and witnesses' memories may fade. Concern over the effect of delays in filing these motions was at the heart of Justice Wells' dissenting view in Peart that a defendant should establish a probability of acquittal, not merely threatened deportation, to obtain relief: Requiring that the defendants establish that they most probably would have been acquitted is concordant with this court's conclusion that these motions must be brought within two years after judgment and sentence become final, as required by Rule 3.850. This two-year limitation assures some realistic probability that evidence will remain available and that the trial court can reliably determine whether defendant most likely would have prevailed at trial. If we adopt defendants' argument that the triggering event is the onset of deportation proceedings, in many cases the court files will be quite stale and evidence or witnesses may or may not be available. The two-year limit addresses this problem. Peart, 705 So.2d at 1063-64 (footnote omitted). . . . . . . . As Justice Lewis stated in his concurring opinion in Provenzano v. State, 750 So.2d 597, 604 (Fla.1999), [p]rocedures are not simply `technical' niceties. The procedure here is a two-year limitation which serves the purpose explained by Judge Shevin and should not be avoided by fixing the two years so that these otherwise stale claims are reviewed. Peart, 756 So.2d at 52 (Wells, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (alteration in original). The rejection by the Peart majority of a requirement that a defendant show probable acquittal in order to withdraw a plea is consistent with decisions by this Court and the United States Supreme Court in cases involving ineffective assistance claims. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); Grosvenor v. State, 874 So.2d 1176, 1179-81 (Fla. 2004). Nonetheless, the district court decisions discussed above validate the concern that the requirements in Peart for stating a prima facie case for withdrawal of a plea based on a rule 3.172(c)(8) violation will render evidence and witnesses unavailable.