Opinion ID: 1277344
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Vasquez' Cross-Appeal

Text: [17] We next consider Vasquez' cross-appeal. Vasquez contends jurisdiction exists because the State timely filed notice of appeal and because she properly asserted her cross-appeal under Neb. Ct. R. of Prac. 9D(4) (rev. 2001). Neb. Ct. R. of Prac. 1(E) (rev. 2000) governs cross-appeals, stating that [t]he proper filing of an appeal shall vest in an appellee the right to a cross-appeal against any other party to the appeal. The cross-appeal need only be asserted in the appellee's brief as provided by Rule 9D(4). Further, rule 9D(4) provides: Where the brief of appellee presents a cross-appeal, it shall be noted on the cover of the brief and it shall be set forth in a separate division of the brief. This division shall be headed Brief on Cross-Appeal and shall be prepared in the same manner and under the same rules as the brief of appellant. But as a general rule, the right to appeal in a criminal case can only be exercised by the party to whom it is given, and only a person aggrieved by a judgment may appeal from it. See State v. Sports Couriers, Inc., 210 Neb. 168, 313 N.W.2d 447 (1981). The State initiated this appellate proceeding by filing an exception to the district court's sentence modification; Vasquez then asserted a cross-appeal, arguing that the court could not enhance her sentence using her prior convictions. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912 (Cum. Supp. 2004) requires an appellant to file a notice of appeal within 30 days after the court renders the judgment appealed from. Vasquez filed no such notice and did nothing to pursue this issue until the State filed its exception proceeding. While Vasquez generally complied with this court's rules for cross-appeals, we cannot allow criminal defendants to circumvent the Legislature's appellate procedures in this way. We conclude that a criminal defendant cannot assert a cross-appeal in an exception proceeding.