Opinion ID: 2224640
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Preemption Argument.

Text: When a dispute arises over a matter in which the primary and exclusive jurisdiction lies in the National Labor Relations Board, we must defer to that board. See generally San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243, 79 S.Ct. 773, 778, 3 L.Ed.2d 775, 782 (1959) (When the exercise of state power over a particular area of activity threatened interference with the clearly indicated policy of industrial relations, it has been judicially necessary to preclude the States from acting.); Hollander v. Peck, 261 N.W.2d 507, 509 (Iowa 1978). In the present case, two sections of the parties' collective bargaining contract are involved. The first, section 3.5, provides: The Union in its behalf and on behalf of the employees agrees that during the life of this Agreement, there shall be no strikes, slowdowns, refusals to or interferences with work, sympathy strikes or refusals to work, or picketing by the Union or the employees. No officer or representative of the Union shall authorize, aid or condone any such activity, and no employee shall participate in any such activity. The second, section 6.2, provides: It is agreed that in the event an authorized picket line is in effect at the entrance to the plant, the Company shall not discipline employees who choose to honor such picket line. The Union agrees to use whatever influence they possess to remove such picket line from the plant. The claimants contend that, since interpretation of these contract provisions is required, the state has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the parties' rights. The general rule of preemption does not apply, however, in cases where the regulated conduct touche[s] interest[s] so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling Congressional direction, [the Court] could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act. San Diego Bldg. Trades, 359 U.S. at 244, 79 S.Ct. at 779, 3 L.Ed.2d at 782. The Supreme Court has recognized such an exception in state unemployment compensation cases. See, e.g., New York Tel. Co. v. New York Labor Dep't, 440 U.S. 519, 540-46, 99 S.Ct. 1328, 1341-44, 59 L.Ed.2d 553, 569-72 (1979). The issue in New York Telephone Co. was whether the National Labor Relations Act preempted the jurisdiction of the states in the exercise of their power to regulate unemployment benefits to strikers. In holding that it did not, the Court stated that the silence of Congress in 1935 actually supports the contrary inference that Congress intended to allow the States to make this policy determination for themselves. Id. at 540, 99 S.Ct. at 1341, 59 L.Ed.2d at 569. The Court further stated that [u]ndeniably, Congress was aware of the possible impact of unemployment compensation on the bargaining process. The omission of any direction concerning payment to strikers in either the National Labor Relations Act or the Social Security Act implies that Congress intended that the States be free to authorize, or to prohibit, such payments. 440 U.S. at 544, 99 S.Ct. at 1343, 59 L.Ed.2d at 571 (footnote omitted). A similar view of preemption was expressed in Baker v. General Motors Corp., 478 U.S. 621, 633-38, 106 S.Ct. 3129, 3136-39, 92 L.Ed.2d 504, 516-19 (1986), which held that a state's denial of unemployment compensation to strikers who had helped finance a strike was not preempted by the National Labor Relations Act. We reject the claimants' preemption argument and, based on the above authorities, hold that the board and the district court had jurisdiction to determine the claimants' eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits.