Opinion ID: 1152477
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: whether curative work was required before the title to the land became marketable, and if so may attorney's fees be awarded as a measure of damages

Text: The lower court found that the suit to confirm title was not necessary, since a breach of the warranty of title had not occurred. In fact, a breach of the warranty of title did not occur for this covenant is broken only by eviction or the equivalent of eviction. See Bridges v. Heimburger, 360 So.2d 929 (Miss. 1978); Green v. Irving, 54 Miss. 450 (1877); Brunt v. McLaurin, 178 Miss. 86, 172 So. 309 (1937). However, as will be seen, this is not determinative of the issue for the covenants of seizin and of power to sell were breached. Mississippi Code Annotated § 89-1-33 (1972) provides that, The word `warrant' without restrictive words in a conveyance shall have the effect of embracing all of the five covenants known to common law, to wit: seizin, power to sell, freedom from incumbrance, quiet enjoyment and warranty of title. It is uncontested that Clanton conveyed the 40 acres to Howard by warranty deed. By this act, Clanton was brought within the confines of § 89-1-33. Therefore, a brief discussion of the five covenants is deserving. The most basic distinction between the covenants is that some run with the land, while others are merely personal. The effect of a covenant running with the land is that remote grantors may be liable for their breach. Conversely, the covenants characterized as personal are breached, if at all, at the moment of conveyance. Thus, personal covenants bind only the covenantor and, if breached, may only be taken advantage of by the immediate covenantee. The covenant of freedom from encumbrance is a guarantee to the grantee that the property is not subject to any rights or interests that would diminish the value of the land. (Examples being mortgages, liens and easements). In Mississippi this covenant is generally held to run with the land, being closely compared to the warranty of title. Simon v. Williams, 140 Miss. 854, 105 So. 487 (1925). The covenants of quiet enjoyment and warranty of title are held to run with the land, and as such may be taken advantage of by a remote grantee. However, as seen above, these are only broken by eviction or the equivalent thereof. Bridges v. Heimburger, supra . The covenants of seizin and power to sell (right to convey) are personal covenants, and as such the immediate covenantor may only be charged with the breach thereof. As stated in Green v. Irving, supra , when dealing with the covenants of seizin and power to sell, these latter covenants are personal, in presenti, and do not run with the land. They are broken as soon as made, if the covenantor is not seized according to their stipulations; and suit may be at once instituted for their breach. 54 Miss. at 458; See also Bridges v. Heimburger, supra . As stated in 20 Am.Jur.2d Covenants § 75 (1965), The term seisin as used in a covenant is generally construed to mean that the grantor is seised of the legal title. Under this rule, a covenant of seisin is regarded as a guaranty against any title existing in a third person, and which might defeat the estate granted, and it does not embrace a title that may already be in the grantee. While the covenant of seisin is regarded in legal effect as a covenant of title as well as a covenant of possession, mere possession of the property is not sufficient, under this doctrine, to satisfy the covenant; the covenant is deemed to be broken at the time it is made if the grantee has no title. (Emphasis added). ... . A definition also employed by the courts is to the effect that a covenant of seisin is tantamount to the representation by the grantor that he is seised in fee of an indefeasible title to the property conveyed. As stated in Bridges v. Heimburger, 360 So.2d 929, 930 (Miss. 1978), The covenant of seizin and the covenant of power to sell (good right to convey) are an assurance that the grantor has the estate he purports to convey. Furthermore, the Court in H. Weston Lumber Co. v. Lacey Lumber Co., 123 Miss. 208, 85 So. 193 (1920), found, The covenant of seizin only extends to a title existing in a third person, which may defeat the estate granted by the covenantor. 123 Miss. at 216, 85 So. 195. (Emphasis added). The covenants of seizin and power to sell were breached in the case sub judice. Again, these covenants are breached, if at all, when made if a third person has a title that may defeat that estate granted by the covenantor. We construe this language to mean exactly what it says  namely, that the covenants are breached when the deed is delivered, and a subsequent lawsuit confirming title in the grantee (in this case, Howard) has nothing to do with whether the covenants were breached or not. The court below also based its decision in denying an award of attorney's fees on the case of Brooks v. Black, 68 Miss. 161, 8 So. 332 (1890), and the numerous decisions following that case. (Citations omitted) In no way do we attempt to circumvent Brooks, supra, or its progeny, but merely find their factual situations distinguishable from this case. In order to do justice to the rationale of this opinion, a brief discussion of Brooks, supra, is necessary. Brooks involved an action by a purchaser at a foreclosure sale against his remote vendor to recover, among other things, attorney's fees incurred in defending an ejectment action brought by parties claiming title paramount to that of the vendor. The theory of the action was that there had been a breach of warranty of title. In discussing the measure of damages, the Court found that, Regardless of the value of the land at the time of the eviction, the recovery is measured by the value of the land at the time of the conveyance, which value is conclusively fixed by the price paid by the vendee or received by the vendor. Id. at 167, 8 So. at 333. The Court continued, and held that attorney's fees could not be recovered. The Court reasoned that since the measure of damages is the price paid by the vendee, an awardance of attorney's fees would extend those damages above and beyond the settled standard of damages. With this we have no quarrel. However, in Brooks the covenantee was divested of his land while in the case sub judice Howard retained the title to his land. This factual distinction decides the case. To hold that a covenantee is not entitled to attorney's fees in a case such as this would have the effect of dissolving the power to sell covenant, for what is the purpose of a covenant if, when breached, the covenantor is not held responsible for that breach? We interpret Brooks v. Black, supra , to mean that attorney's fees may not be had when the maximum measure of damages has been awarded to the covenantee. However, as in the case at bar, we hold that reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses may be awarded the covenantee, not to exceed the price paid by the covenantee when purchasing the land. Furthermore, in viewing the matter in this light it matters not which of the five covenants are breached, except of course when remote covenantors are involved. Accordingly, we find that Howard is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of $2,414.30.