Opinion ID: 73353
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: richardson’s habeas corpus petition

Text: Before examining the new immigration laws, we outline Richardson’s claims. In this case, Richardson does not dispute that he is an alien, that he has a cocaine-trafficking conviction, and that cocaine trafficking is a basis for both 12 Richardson’s brief was filed with the BIA on October 15, 1998, and the INS brief was due on November 28, 1998. 8 inadmissibility and deportability under the INA.13 Instead, Richardson’s habeas corpus petition asserts, inter alia, that his constitutional and statutory rights were violated because: (1) the INS ignored his thirty-year legal permanent resident alien status, misinterpreted INA § 101(a)(13)(C)14 in classifying Richardson as an arriving alien “seeking admission,” unlawfully detained him, and illegally denied him admission, as opposed to permitting entry into the United States and then initiating removal proceedings based on “deportability;” (2) the Attorney General’s detaining and denying a legal permanent resident alien admission back into the United States and delegating her custody release authority to only the INS district director, without a bond hearing before an immigration judge, are ultra vires of the INA and illegal; (3) the Attorney General’s detaining and denying a legal permanent resident alien admission and a bond hearing before the immigration judge solely because of 13 In the removal hearing before the immigration judge, Richardson contended that the INS’ evidence of his criminal conviction for cocaine trafficking was improperly certified, but the judge admitted this evidence of his conviction. The INS also introduced Richardson’s sworn statement at inspection that he had a cocaine-trafficking conviction. At the removal hearing, Richardson testified that while he signed the statement, he did not read it because he was “confused,” “shocked,” and “upset.” The immigration judge found that the INS had proved a cocaine-trafficking conviction. This is one of many issues Richardson has raised on appeal to the BIA; however, this issue was not raised in the district court. 14 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) (Supp. 1998). 9 his brief trip abroad violates that resident alien’s due process guarantees under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; and (4) the Attorney General’s allowing a bond hearing before an immigration judge for legal permanent resident aliens arrested in the United States, but denying a bond hearing to Richardson only because of his two-day sojourn abroad violates the equal-protection guarantees of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In explaining why he filed his habeas petition while his BIA appeal remained pending, Richardson contends that exhaustion of administrative remedies is futile because the INA, as amended by IIRIRA, eliminates judicial review in the courts of appeals over any prospective BIA final order removing him as a criminal alien, and forecloses appeal of the INS’ district director’s bond decisions to an immigration judge. Finally, Richardson asserts that INA § 242(g)’s exclusive- jurisdiction provision15 does not repeal habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and does not prevent the district court from hearing a permanent resident alien’s habeas petition alleging unlawful executive detention in violation of the INA and the Constitution. 15 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (Supp. 1998). 10 Since Richardson attempted to enter the United States on October 26, 1997, IIRIRA’s extensive revisions to the INA undisputedly govern this case.16