Opinion ID: 1801861
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Double Jeopardy Clause Applies to Penalty Allegations

Text: In Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th 652, the defendant was charged with attempted murder. It was further alleged that the murder he attempted was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. A true finding on this allegation would have elevated his sentence from five, seven, or nine years to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. (§ 664, subd. (a).) The jury convicted the defendant of attempted murder but could not reach a finding on the premeditation allegation. ( Bright, at p. 658.) We considered whether federal or state double jeopardy principles prevented retrial. We held that the answer depends on the nature of the allegation. A conviction on a lesser degree of an offense is generally considered to be an implied acquittal of the greater degree. However, a jury's failure to return a verdict on a penalty allegation does not constitute an acquittal, and thus retrial of the allegation does not implicate double jeopardy principles. ( Id. at pp. 661-662.) After much analysis, we concluded the allegation under section 664, subdivision (a) did not create a greater offense, i.e., of attempted premeditated murder, but rather constituted a penalty provision. ( Bright, at pp. 662-669.) Accordingly, double jeopardy principles did not bar retrial of the allegation. ( Id. at p. 671.) We revisited this holding after the United States Supreme Court questioned the constitutional significance of the distinction between penalty provisions and elements of offenses. In Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, the high court ruled that, with the sole exception of facts relating to a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Id. at p. 490, italics added.) The court explained that the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect-does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict? ( Id. at p. 494.) If so, regardless of whether a state labels the fact a sentencing factor or an element of an offense, the Sixth Amendment requires that it be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Apprendi, at pp. 494-495; see also Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania (2003) 537 U.S. 101, 111 [154 L.Ed.2d 588, 123 S.Ct. 732] (lead opn. of Scalia, J.) ( Sattazahn ).) Thus, the high court reasoned, when the term `sentence enhancement' is used to describe an increase beyond the maximum authorized statutory sentence, it is the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense than the one covered by the jury's guilty verdict. ( Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 494, fn. 19; see also People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 326 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 27 P.3d 739] ( Sengpadychith ) [ Apprendi treated the crime together with its sentence enhancement as the `functional equivalent' of a single `greater' crime.].) Citing the functional equivalen[ce] language from Apprendi, defendant here argues that a factual allegation charged in connection with an underlying felony effectively transforms the underlying felony into a greater offense. He then maintains that a conviction of the underlying offense alone bars retrial on state and federal double jeopardy grounds of an attached penalty allegation on which the jury has deadlocked. We have not previously discussed Apprendi 's effect on mistried sentencing allegations, nor has United States Supreme Court spoken to the issue directly. In Seel, supra, 34 Cal.4th 535, we considered whether Apprendi undermined our holding in Bright that section 664, subdivision (a) is a penalty provision to which double jeopardy protections do not apply. Seel involved not a hung jury, but a reversal on appeal. Seel was convicted of attempted murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) with true findings on allegations that he acted with premeditation (§ 664, subd. (a)) and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) during the offense. ( Seel, at p. 540.) However, the Court of Appeal reversed the premeditation finding as unsupported by substantial evidence. It then remanded for a retrial of the allegation based on our holding in Bright. ( Seel, at p. 540.) We held that a retrial of the allegation would violate double jeopardy. Because proof of the premeditation allegation exposes a defendant to significantly greater punishment than a jury's verdict of attempted murder without premeditation, we concluded Apprendi required the allegation to be treated as the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense and not simply as a penalty provision without constitutional significance. ( Seel, at pp. 548-550.) We rejected the Attorney General's argument that Apprendi 's reasoning extends only to Sixth Amendment jury trial protections, noting the high court has indicated that the principles underlying the double jeopardy clause on the one hand, and the ... right to jury trial on the other, are not wholly distinct. [Citations.] ( Seel, at p. 547; see, e.g., Sattazahn, supra, 537 U.S. at p. 111.) Seel did not completely overrule Bright, however, because for double jeopardy purposes the procedural posture of the cases differed in an important way. In Seel, the section 664, subdivision (a) finding was reversed because the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law. In Bright, on the other hand, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the premeditation allegation. ( Seel, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 550; Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 658.) We described this difference as [s]ignificant[], noting `[a] mistrial does not constitute a termination of jeopardy, and accordingly double jeopardy does not arise from the legal necessity of a mistrial. [Citation.]' ([ Bright, ] at p. 662.) ( Seel, at p. 550; see also Stone v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 516.) As the Supreme Court made clear in United States v. DiFrancesco (1980) 449 U.S. 117, 130-131 [66 L.Ed.2d 328, 101 S.Ct. 426], the double jeopardy clause prohibits retrial after a conviction has been reversed for evidentiary insufficiency but allows it after a mistrial occasioned by manifest necessity. Because Apprendi required the premeditation allegation to be resolved by the jury, and because the appellate court's finding of evidentiary insufficiency was a classic example of a termination of jeopardy barring retrial ( Burks v. United States, supra, 437 U.S. 1), we concluded in Seel that federal double jeopardy principles barred retrial of the allegation. ( Seel, at pp. 548-550.) We expressed no opinion on the application of these principles when, as in Bright, the trial court has declared a mistrial on the penalty allegation due to juror deadlock. Defendant in this case was charged with the substantive crime of lewd and lascivious conduct on a child under age 14. (§ 288, subd. (a).) It was also alleged, as a question of fact to be proven under Apprendi, that he kidnapped the victim in order to commit the substantive offense. (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(1).) [10] As discussed, the One Strike law sets forth an alternative and harsher sentencing scheme for certain sex crimes, including the lewd act offense alleged here (§ 667.61, subd. (c)(8)). ( People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 741 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 41 P.3d 556].) The One Strike law applies if the defendant has previously been convicted of one of seven enumerated offenses or if the current offense was committed under one or more specified circumstances. ( Ibid. ) Section 667.61, subdivision (e)(1), the allegation at issue in defendant's first trial, provides for an indeterminate sentence of 15 years to life imprisonment if the jury finds that the defendant kidnapped the victim while committing an enumerated offense. (See § 667.61, subd. (b).) Without a true finding on the section 667.61, subdivision (e)(1) allegation, a defendant can only be sentenced to a lower determinate term. (§ 288, subd. (a).) Thus, like the premeditation allegation at issue in Bright and Seel, a One Strike allegation exposes a defendant to greater punishment than would be authorized by a verdict on the offense alone. (See Seel, 34 Cal.4th at p. 548.) Accordingly, unless a defendant waives its protection, the Sixth Amendment requires that a One Strike allegation be tried to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490.) Our inquiry does not end here, however, because the factual sentencing allegation in this case did not result in an acquittal or its legal equivalent (see ibid. ), but in a mistrial. The next question is whether the double jeopardy clause permits retrial of such a factual sentencing allegation when the first trial did not result in an express or implied acquittal.