Opinion ID: 2511875
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Errors in the Trial Court's Order of Enforcement

Text: The preceding review of the scope and procedure of Crim. P. 17(c), as well as the interests involved, illuminates the flaws in the trial court's order in this case. Two serious errors require us to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in modifying and ordering enforcement of the defendant's subpoenas. As an initial matter, the trial court's order improperly converted the subpoenas into the functional equivalent of search warrants by ordering B.G.'s parents to allow Spykstra, through her own computer forensic expert, to search their home and personal property rather than requiring the parents to produce the emails in court. Only after the defense expert searched the computer would the trial court review any privileges claimed by the parents. In creating this procedure, the trial court eliminated the very protections against unreasonable search and seizure that Crim. P. 17(c) provides, including the court's role in protecting the subpoenaed party from unreasonable or oppressive subpoenas. The nature of the subpoenas as modified compelling disclosure of electronic information stored on a personal computermakes more evident the inappropriateness of the trial court order. Although a personal computer's contents are not confidential by nature, personal computers may contain a great deal of confidential data. Computers today touch on all aspects of daily life. As one commentator observed, they are postal services, playgrounds, jukeboxes, dating services, movie theaters, daily planners, shopping malls, personal secretaries, virtual diaries, and more.[] Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 Harv. L.Rev. 531, 569 (2005). Very often computers contain intimate, confidential information about a person. See, e.g., United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718 (10th Cir.2007) (A personal computer is often a repository for private information the computer's owner does not intend to share with others.); United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1077 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) ([F]or most people, their computers are their most private spaces.). When the right to confidentiality is invoked, discovery of personal computer information thus requires serious consideration of a person's privacy interests. Cantrell, 195 P.3d at 661. Here, the trial court gave the defendant unfettered access to every aspect of the parents' personal lives that is stored on their computer. This cannot be condoned. See In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 295 S.W.3d 309, 317 (Tex.2009) (Providing access to information by ordering examination of a party's electronic storage device is particularly intrusive and should be generally discouraged, just as permitting open access to a party's file cabinets for general perusal would be.). Under the circumstances, the trial court could not compel production of the computer itself. Rather, all that could be required of B.G.'s parents was production of the emails themselves in a form that was not burdensome. The second serious error was the trial court's failure to require Spykstra to show a specific factual basis demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that the emails Spykstra sought existed on the computer and contained material evidence. Spykstra set forth no factual predicate which would make it reasonably likely that the [computer] will bear such fruit and that the quest for its contents is not merely a desperate grasping at a straw. People v. Gissendanner, 48 N.Y.2d 543, 423 N.Y.S.2d 893, 399 N.E.2d 924, 928 (1979). Spykstra's attempt to narrow her initial and undeniably overbroad request cannot overcome the reality that nothing in the record before us, beyond Spykstra's own speculative belief, proves that such emails existed. [4] In fact, Spykstra had not even a mere inkling that the evidence existed. Henning, Defense Discovery, supra, at 67 (although advocating for a more lenient admissibility requirement than in Nixon, acknowledging that a defendant must have more than a mere inkling about the contents of a third party's documents). At oral argument, when asked to establish a basis for the belief that such evidence existed, defense counsel tellingly replied, I can't point to anything in particular. At best, Spykstra's subpoenas were premature. This is underscored by the lack of supporting evidence that the emails existed, the lack of specificity in providing a broad date range encompassing dates prior to the alleged assault and dates that had not even occurred at the time the subpoenas issued, and the inconsistency in describing the evidence sought. The record before us suggests that Spykstra issued the subpoenas before she had received discovery from the prosecution and without conducting her own investigation of the facts. It appears that Spykstra issued the subpoenas based on nothing more than a hope of uncovering something to support her belief that B.G. had recanted or made inconsistent statements. Crim. P. 17(c) provides a means for the prosecution and defense to bring to trial evidence that is in the hands of third parties, not a tool for broad discovery. It is the moving party's responsibilitynot the court'sto independently conduct her own investigation and present witnesses or documents that demonstrate the likelihood that the evidence she intends to bring to court through Crim. P. 17(c) in fact exists. Cf. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 58 n. 15, 107 S.Ct. 989 (holding that a defendant cannot require in camera review of the confidential file without first establishing a basis for his claim that it contains material evidence); People v. Turley, 870 P.2d 498, 502 (Colo.App.1993) (holding that the trial court was not required to conduct an in camera review of statutorily confidential information where the existence of the records was speculative and not established and defendant failed to demonstrate materiality). Contrast the lack of showing made by Spykstra with the facts of Commonwealth v. Lam . After reviewing pretrial discovery documents, the Lam defendant uncovered facts to support the theory that the complainant had fabricated her allegations and that her parents were cooperating with the prosecution to avoid facing their own charges. Lam, 827 N.E.2d at 211-12. With this information, the defendant successfully moved the district court for summons pursuant to that state's counterpart to Crim. P. 17(c) for various items, including a summons to the victim's father for the victim's journals and emails concerning sexual abuse. Id. at 212 n. 3, 213. Applying the Nixon test, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ordered production of the journals and emails because the existence of the information had been substantiated and had been shown to have clear evidentiary value. Id. at 215-16. Specifically, the victim had acknowledged that she had recorded in her journals the dates of her alleged abuse. Id. It was also known that the victim first complained of her abuse in an electronic communication to another child. Id. at 216. This did not mean, however, that a privilege might not still prevent disclosure of the requested materials. Id. at 216 n. 10. Thus, in Lam, unlike here, the defendant was able to show the requested materials existed. The Lam defendant, having already reviewed the prosecution's pretrial discovery, had a more than sufficient basis to believe that the materials contained specific information with evidentiary value. By contrast, here, Spykstra's subpoenas were nothing more than an attempt to conduct exploratory discovery. Given the inadequate factual basis for the existence of the emails, it follows that the remainder of the requisite unreasonable-or-oppressive analysis cannot be satisfied. We recognize that on remand, Spykstra may attempt to reissue subpoenas compliant with Crim. P. 17(c) for emails similar to those the trial court ordered to be disclosed. This will necessarily raise the question of whether the parents have a right to confidentiality in such emails, an issue addressed by several of the briefs in this case. However, because of the posture in which this case was presented, we do not address the confidentiality of the emails ordered to be disclosed or whether it precludes disclosure. The issue of confidentiality in the emails that Spykstra sought was not briefed or argued to the trial court. Rather, the motion and hearing below focused almost exclusively on standing, the method and form of compliance, and the protected nature of other, irrelevant information stored on the computer, which, as this opinion explains, should have remained protected from disclosure regardless of whether the emails Spykstra sought were ultimately produced. In reviewing the trial court's errors, we do not overlook the availability of modification of a subpoena where the right to confidentiality might adequately be protected while at the same time giving the defendant needed access. However, the speculative nature of the subpoenas in this case cannot be remedied.