Opinion ID: 1771982
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: did the trial court commit reversible error in failing to grant discovery of all evidence pertaining to crimes committed against karon ann pierce by persons other than jessie derrell williams on the night of her death; in failing to grant discovery of all statements of persons charged with committing crimes against pierce on the night of her death; and in failing to grant discovery of all evidence which led to the arrest of john paul adams and mitchell byrd for the capital murder of pierce; in failing to provide a list of all persons whose statements were provided to the court for in-camera inspection?

Text: We discuss only that part of Assigned Error VI which involves approximately sixteen (16) statements provided to the court by the State for in-camera inspection, since, in our opinion, there is no merit in the other requests stated in Assignment VI. Appellant contends that under the holding in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), he was denied due process when the prosecution declined to make available to him statements which were delivered by the prosecution to the trial judge for inspection and determination as to whether or not they were exculpatory. The United States Supreme Court held in Brady v. Maryland, supra , that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process where the evidence is material, either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. In Brady, the defendant requested that he be permitted to examine the extra-judicial statements made by the defendant's confederate, wherein the confederate admitted he had done the actual killing, and the court ruled that denial of such request denied due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985), the court held that the U.S. Government's failure to assist the defense by disclosing information that might have been helpful in conducting cross-examination amounts to a constitutional violation only if it deprives the defendant of a fair trial; that constitutional error occurs, and a conviction must be reversed, only if the evidence is material in the sense that its suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial; and that evidence withheld by the government is material, as would require reversal of conviction, only if there is reasonable probability, that, had evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Mississippi Uniform Criminal Rule 4.06(a)(6) requires disclosure to the defense of a copy of any exculpatory material concerning the defendant. The trial judge carefully examined the statements provided to him in camera review prior to the trial, and held that they were not exculpatory and thus not discoverable under the rules and law. The question before this Court now, in light of the rules and decisions, is whether the trial judge erred in holding that the material delivered to him and examined by him prior to trial was not exculpatory and not discoverable. Without question, it is settled that exculpatory evidence in possession of the State must be turned over to the defense prior to a criminal trial, if material, and if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. We are faced with a different situation from that in Hentz v. State, 489 So.2d 1386 (Miss. 1986), where the prosecuting attorney stated in response to the request for certain tape recordings that, in his judgment, there was no exculpatory material in the tapes, thus, the reason that disclosure was declined. There, the trial judge did not examine, hear and inspect the evidence, i.e., tapes, while here, the trial judge read the statements, examined them, and made a finding of fact that they were not exculpatory. In Hentz, the defendant could only rely upon the statement made by the prosecuting attorney, which was far from sufficient. In-camera review of the statements and material, as was done here by the trial judge, was sufficient compliance with the rules and with state and federal law. The judgment of the trial judge is subject to the review of this Court only for correctness under the facts and the law. Now, having stated the narrow question that is before us on this issue, we turn to a review of the trial judge's conclusion that the material in issue was not exculpatory, thus not discoverable. The documents in question are numerous papers, consisting of reports and statements. We have carefully examined these documents and find nothing in them which suggests that they could have been successfully utilized by the defense to create a reasonable doubt as to Williams' guilt. In our opinion, there is no probability, much less the reasonable probability as required by law, that this material would have substantially altered the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, we hold that the trial judge acted within his discretion in finding that the material was not discoverable under state and federal law, and that the appellant's argument to the contrary is without merit. Finding no reversible error in the trial below, the judgment imposing the death penalty upon appellant is affirmed and the date of his execution is set for Tuesday, November 17, 1987. CONVICTION FOR CAPITAL MURDER AFFIRMED AND TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1987, SET FOR EXECUTION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE MANNER PROVIDED BY LAW. As to Parts I-V: All Justices concur. As to Part VI: WALKER, C.J., ROY NOBLE LEE and HAWKINS, P.JJ., and DAN M. LEE, GRIFFIN and ANDERSON, JJ., concur. As to Part VI: SULLIVAN, PRATHER and ROBERTSON, JJ., dissent.