Opinion ID: 4550285
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Framework of the Adoption Act

Text: ¶19 Under the Adoption Act, when individuals file a petition for adoption, they must serve notice of the adoption proceeding upon a number of specified people, including the adoptee’s biological mother.16 “A person who has been served with notice of an adoption proceeding and who wishes to contest the adoption [must] file a motion to intervene in the adoption proceeding . . . within 30 days after the day on which the person was served with __________________________________________________________ 15 We note that J.N., unlike Mother, has not raised any constitutional challenges to the Adoption Act. 16 UTAH CODE § 78B-6-110(2) (2017) (“Notice of an adoption proceeding shall be served on . . . any person or agency whose consent or relinquishment is required under Section 78B-6-120 or 78B-6-121, unless that right has been terminated by: (i) waiver; (ii) relinquishment; (iii) actual consent, as described in Subsection (12); or (iv) judicial action.”); id. § 78B-6-120(c) (identifying “mother of the adoptee” as a person from whom consent or relinquishment is required before an adoption may take place). 8 Cite as: 2020 UT 51 Opinion of the Court notice.”17 This motion must “set[] forth specific relief sought” and be “accompanied by a memorandum specifying the factual and legal grounds upon which the motion is based.”18 ¶20 If the biological mother fails to “fully and strictly comply with all of the requirements,” she “(i) waives any right to further notice in connection with the adoption; (ii) forfeits all rights in relation to the adoptee; and (iii) is barred from thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to assert any interest in the adoptee.”19 Under section 112, a district court may then terminate the mother’s parental rights in her child.20 And under section 120.1, the mother is deemed to have consented to the adoption or otherwise relinquished her rights in her child.21 ¶21 Together, these three sections of the Adoption Act permitted the district court to terminate Mother’s parental rights over her objection and without a determination that she was an unfit parent. For this reason she argues that the Adoption Act is unconstitutional as applied to her. II. Mother’s Procedural Due Process Rights Were Not Violated ¶22 First, Mother argues that the Adoption Act authorized the district court to violate her procedural due process rights.22 “At its core, the due process guarantee is twofold—reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard.”23 Because Mother fails to show that the Adoption Act authorized the district court to violate either of these guarantees, her procedural due process claim fails. ¶23 Mother’s right to reasonable notice was not infringed upon. “Before a right of property or other important interest is __________________________________________________________ 17 Id. § 78B-6-110(6)(a). 18 Id. 19 Id. § 78B-6-110(6)(b). 20 Id. § 78B-6-112(5)(c). 21 Id. § 78B-6-120.1(3)(d). 22Although Mother categorizes her challenge of the Adoption Act as both a procedural and substantive due process challenge, she does not direct much, if any, of her argument toward the procedural due process standard. 23In re Adoption of B.Y., 2015 UT 67, ¶ 16, 356 P.3d 1215 (citing United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48 (1993)). 9 IN RE K.T.B. Opinion of the Court foreclosed as a result of state action, reasonable notice must be afforded.”24 On appeal, Mother admits that she received notice of the adoption proceeding and of her obligation to participate in it. Accordingly, her right to reasonable notice has not been violated. ¶24 What is less clear, however, is whether Mother received an adequate opportunity to be heard. As we have previously explained, “[m]ere notice is an empty gesture if it is not accompanied by a meaningful chance to make your case.”25 For this reason, “the Due Process Clause also guarantees . . . an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”26 In this case, the district court relied upon the strict compliance requirement in section 110 of the Adoption Act to deprive Mother of an opportunity to contest the termination of her parental rights to K.T.B., as well as K.T.B.’s subsequent adoption. ¶25 But the promise of an opportunity to be heard may be limited by reasonable procedural prerequisites. 27 Thus if a statute of limitations, or some other procedural requirement, bars an individual from participating in a legal proceeding affecting his or her rights, a procedural due process violation has not occurred unless the “procedural bar can be shown to foreclose[] . . . meaningful access to the justice system.”28 “In past cases, we have found this standard to be met by a showing of impossibility.”29 ¶26 The impossibility inquiry contemplates whether “the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard were ‘completely within [the affected person’s] control.’”30 In other words, if the plaintiff __________________________________________________________ 24 Id. ¶ 18 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976)). 25 Id. ¶ 23. 26 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 182 (1996)). 27 See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437 (1982) (“The State may erect reasonable procedural requirements . . . [such as] statutes of limitations . . . . And the State certainly accords due process when it terminates a claim for failure to comply with a reasonable procedural . . . rule.”). 28 In re Adoption of B.Y., 2015 UT 67, ¶ 27 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 29 Id. ¶ 28. 30 Id. ¶ 32 (citation omitted). 10 Cite as: 2020 UT 51 Opinion of the Court could have complied with the procedural requirement under the circumstances, compliance is possible, and the plaintiff’s access to the justice system has not been foreclosed. Thus where the statute “afford[s] a reasonable opportunity to comply with the statute,” the statute’s procedural requirements do not offend procedural due process.31 ¶27 Two of our previous cases illustrate a proper impossibility determination. First, in Ellis v. Social Services Department of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,32 we upheld a putative father’s procedural due process claim challenging the requirements of the Adoption Act because his compliance with the law was shown to have been rendered “impossible” through no fault of his own.33 In that case, the adoptee’s biological father and mother were engaged to be married and both resided in California, but two weeks before the wedding the mother broke off the engagement.34 Then, just a few days before giving birth, the mother traveled to Utah from California without the father’s knowledge, where she placed the newborn for adoption (after representing to those involved that the father was unknown).35 After considering these facts we noted that due process requires a “reasonable opportunity to comply” with the statutory prerequisites to the establishment of a parental right.36 And because the father could not have complied with the Adoption Act’s procedural requirements under the facts alleged, we concluded that the requirements had violated the father’s due process rights.37 ¶28 In contrast to our decision in Ellis is our decision in In re Adoption of J.S.38 In that case, the district court barred a putative father from intervening in an adoption because he failed to file a required paternity affidavit within the time the Adoption Act __________________________________________________________ 31 Id. ¶ 31 (citation omitted). 32 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980). 33 Id. at 1256. 34 Id. at 1252. 35 Id. 36 Id. at 1256. 37 Id. 38 2014 UT 51, 358 P.3d 1009. 11 IN RE K.T.B. Opinion of the Court allotted.39 The father appealed the denial of his motion to intervene. As part of his procedural due process argument on appeal, the father blamed the deficiency in this filing on “his attorney’s failure to advise him that such an affidavit was required.”40 Because the father did not specify whether he was bringing a procedural or substantive due process challenge to the Adoption Act’s filing requirements, we were forced to speculate on the nature of his claim.41 We determined that his claim could not be characterized as a procedural due process challenge, because he claimed his procedural deficiency was due to “his counsel allegedly g[iving] him bad legal advice,” not due to an overly difficult procedural requirement.42 So our decision in In re Adoption of J.S. suggests that the failure to comply with a procedural requirement due to a mistake by an attorney cannot sustain a procedural due process claim under the impossibility inquiry.43 ¶29 Like the procedural deficiency in In re Adoption of J.S., Mother’s failure to comply with the Adoption Act’s procedural requirements can be attributed to a mistake by legal counsel. Mother received notice under section 110 informing her of both what was required to intervene in the proceedings and what would happen if she did not intervene. Rather than file a motion to intervene within thirty days, she filed an answer to the Adoptive Parents’ petition, which the district court found did not satisfy section 110’s strict compliance requirement. Mother does not suggest that compliance was impossible or too difficult.44 In fact, compliance clearly was neither impossible nor too difficult because Mother was able to file a compliant motion to intervene immediately after the Adoptive Parents filed their motion to strike. So the only plausible explanation for the deficiencies in Mother’s original attempt to intervene is that her legal counsel misread or __________________________________________________________ 39 Id. ¶ 1. 40 Id. ¶ 11. 41 Id. ¶ 19. 42 Id. ¶ 23. 43 Id. ¶¶ 23–24. 44 Instead, Mother has argued that strict compliance and intervention is unnecessary for a biological mother. This challenge is more properly categorized as a substantive due process challenge. 12 Cite as: 2020 UT 51 Opinion of the Court misunderstood section 110’s legal requirements. 45 But as In re Adoption of J.S. illustrates, when the failure to comply with a “simple and straightforward” procedural requirement is due to legal counsel’s mistake, the procedural requirement has not foreclosed meaningful access to the justice system. 46 Accordingly, Mother fails to show that the Adoption Act deprived her of her constitutional right to an opportunity to be heard. ¶30 Because Mother’s constitutional rights to reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard were not violated, her procedural due process challenge of the Adoption Act fails. III. Mother’s Substantive Due Process Rights Were Violated Because Section 110’s Strict Compliance Requirement is Not Narrowly Tailored ¶31 Mother also challenges the Adoption Act’s framework under the substantive component of the Due Process Clause. Such a claim is distinct from the procedural due process challenge analyzed above. In contrast to a procedural due process attack, a substantive challenge “involve[s] a broad-side attack on the fairness of the procedural bar or limitation, on the ground that the right foreclosed is so fundamental or important that it is protected from extinguishment.”47 In other words, a substantive due process challenge alleges that a procedural requirement is unfair because it improperly infringes an important right rather than because it operates to unfairly foreclose notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard. So if a statute allows the state to improperly extinguish or foreclose a protected right, even if it does so through straightforward procedural requirements, it is unconstitutional under the substantive component of the Due Process Clause. A. The district court applied provisions of the Adoption Act to extinguish Mother’s fundamental right to parent K.T.B. ¶32 Whether a statute improperly allows the state to extinguish or foreclose a protected right depends on the nature of the right and its attendant standard of review. If the right infringed or foreclosed is a right we have deemed “fundamental,” we review __________________________________________________________ 45Mother was represented by counsel when she filed her answer. 46 2014 UT 51, ¶ 23. 47 In re Adoption of B.Y., 2015 UT 67, ¶ 41, 356 P.3d 1215 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 13 IN RE K.T.B. Opinion of the Court the statute under our strict scrutiny standard.48 But if it is not fundamental, we review it under “the deferential, fallback standard of rationality or arbitrariness.”49 ¶33 The importance of correctly characterizing the nature of the right at issue was illustrated in our recent decision in In re B.Y.50 In that case, we considered an unmarried biological father’s challenge to a “strict compliance provision of the Adoption Act.”51 We explained that this procedural provision of the Adoption Act had been challenged on procedural and substantive due process grounds.52 We then proceeded to analyze the procedural requirement under both frameworks. ¶34 First, we analyzed the claim on procedural due process grounds, determining that the claim failed because “it was not impossible” for the unmarried father to comply with the strict compliance provision at issue.53 This was the correct analysis for a procedural due process claim, and it is the same analysis we have applied to Mother’s procedural due process claim in this case. ¶35 After deciding the father’s procedural due process claim, we turned to his substantive one.54 And we appropriately commenced our substantive due process analysis by identifying the nature of the infringed right. We determined that the right infringed in that case was “merely provisional” because the plaintiff was an unmarried biological father who had failed to perfect his parental rights by following the procedures established __________________________________________________________ 48Jones v. Jones, 2015 UT 84, ¶ 26, 359 P.3d 603 (“When the court has recognized a due process right it deems ‘fundamental,’ it consistently has applied a standard of strict scrutiny to the protection of such a right.”). 49In re Adoption of J.S., 2014 UT 51, ¶ 56, 358 P.3d 1009 (plurality opinion). 50 2015 UT 67. 51 Id. ¶ 41. 52 Id. 53 Id. ¶¶ 16, 37, 40 (internal quotation marks omitted). 54 Id. ¶ 41 (noting that the father had also “challenge[d] the application of the strict compliance provision . . . under the substantive component of the Due Process Clause.” (emphasis omitted)). 14 Cite as: 2020 UT 51 Opinion of the Court in law.55 Because the unmarried biological father’s right did not rise to the level of a fundamental right, we considered the father’s claim under the more deferential rational-basis prong of the substantive due process analysis.56 Under this standard, we rejected the father’s claim because the procedural requirement that barred the father from participating in the adoption proceeding—a strict compliance provision—was “far from arbitrary.”57 Thus our decision in In re B.Y. hinged on the provisional nature of the unmarried father’s right and on the standard of review we applied to the statutory provision in question. ¶36 In contrast to the right at issue in In re B.Y., the right at issue in this case is fundamental. Although “[s]ome variation exists” among the parental rights of unmarried fathers depending on the steps they have taken to perfect their parental rights,58 “no similar variation exists” among the parental rights of unmarried mothers.59 ¶37 Unmarried mothers “acquire parental rights—and the accompanying right to object to an adoption—as a result of the objective __________________________________________________________ 55 Id. ¶ 43. In In re B.Y., we explained that the right of an unmarried father is “merely provisional” until the father complies with the requirements established for the perfecting of that right. Id. This ruling is consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Lehr v. Robertson, where the Court explained that an unmarried father does not have a recognized parental right until he takes some affirmative action to “grasp” the opportunity to develop a relationship with his child. 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983). Thus the right at issue in In re B.Y. was not a fundamental parental right, but a provisional right to an “opportunity” to develop a parental right. See id. at 262–63 (“We are concerned only with whether New York has adequately protected [the unmarried father’s] opportunity to form such a relationship.”). 56 In re B.Y., 2015 UT 67, ¶ 43 (determining whether “the prerequisites established by the state [were] arbitrary” (emphasis omitted)). 57 Id. ¶ 46. 58 In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1365, 1374 (Utah 1982); see also In re Adoption of J.S., 2014 UT 51, ¶ 2 (distinguishing between the requirements imposed on unmarried fathers and unmarried mothers). 59 In re J.P., 648 P.2d at 1374–75. 15 IN RE K.T.B. Opinion of the Court manifestation of the commitment to the child that is demonstrated by their decision to carry a child to term.”60 So even though an unmarried father may be required to comply with certain procedural requirements before his parental rights become fundamental, an unmarried mother’s parental rights are “vested”61 and “inherent”62 without her having to comply with the same procedural requirements.63 In fact, this court has held that the right of a mother “not to be deprived of parental rights without a showing of unfitness, abandonment, or substantial neglect is so fundamental to our society and so basic to our constitutional order . . . that it ranks among those rights referred to in Article I, [section] 25 of the Utah Constitution and the Ninth Amendment of the United States Constitution as being retained by the people.”64 In other words, mothers retain a fundamental right in their children regardless of a failure to comply with any state-prescribed procedure.65 And this right remains in effect absent “a showing of unfitness, abandonment, or substantial neglect.”66 So if a statute __________________________________________________________ 60 In re Adoption of J.S., 2014 UT 51, ¶ 2 (emphasis added). 61 Wells v. Children’s Aid Soc’y of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 206 (Utah 1984) (citation omitted). 62 In re J.P., 648 P.2d at 1373. 63See In re Adoption of J.S., 2014 UT 51, ¶ 2 (explaining that an “unwed father’s legal obligation to file the paternity affidavit [was] a rough counterpart to the mother’s commitment,” which is “demonstrated by [the mother’s] decision to carry a child to term”). 64In re J.P., 648 P.2d at 1375 (emphases added); see also id. at 1372 (explaining that a mother “has a fundamental right, protected by the Constitution, to sustain [her] relationship with [her] child” (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 65 In fact, the Supreme Court has stated that, “[i]f anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections” than do others. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). For this reason, states “must provide . . . parents with fundamentally fair procedures” when moving to destroy parental bonds. Id. at 753–54. 66 Wells, 681 P.2d at 204; see also In re J.P., 648 P.2d at 1372 (“[T]he correlative of parental rights is parental duties. When parents fail to, or are incapable of, performing their parental obligations, the (Continued) 16 Cite as: 2020 UT 51 Opinion of the Court authorizes a court to terminate a mother’s parental rights without her consent or without proof of unfitness, abandonment, or neglect, a fundamental right has been infringed upon, and we determine the constitutionality of the infringing statute by reviewing it under the strict scrutiny standard.67 ¶38 As applied in this case, the Adoption Act authorized the district court to terminate Mother’s parental rights without her consent and without proof of parental unfitness, abandonment, or neglect. Specifically, section 110 authorized the court to rule that Mother had “forfeit[ed] all rights in relation to the adoptee” because she failed “to fully and strictly comply with all of the requirements” listed in that section. And because she failed to strictly comply with the requirements of section 110, section 112 allowed the court to terminate her parental rights, and section 120.1 allowed the court to rule that she had lost her right to consent or object to the adoption.68 __________________________________________________________ child’s welfare must prevail over the right of the parent.” We have noted, of course, that mothers and fathers may “choose to waive” their parental rights. In re Adoption of J.S., 2014 UT 51, ¶ 2 (emphasis added). 67 In re Adoption of J.S., 2014 UT 51, ¶ 42. By recognizing that statutorily imposed consequences for a failure to comply with procedural requirements infringe on a mother’s fundamental right, we are not suggesting that mothers may never be subject to procedural requirements. Instead, we are merely recognizing that where a procedural requirement—and the statutorily imposed consequences for failing to comply with that requirement— infringe on a fundamental right, that requirement is constitutional only so long as it is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest. 68The dissent argues that the Adoption Act does not authorize the termination of parental rights “without requiring ‘proof of unfitness, abandonment, or neglect’” because, had Mother strictly complied with the procedural requirements of the Act, she could have had an opportunity to defend her parental rights. See infra ¶ 154 n.213 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting). Not only does this argument ignore the “as-applied” nature of Mother’s substantive due process claim, but it also ignores our case law, which clearly recognizes a mother’s right to maintain her parental rights unless she (Continued) 17 IN RE K.T.B. Opinion of the Court ¶39 The Adoptive Parents argue, however, that Mother’s parental rights were not terminated by her failure to strictly comply with the Adoption Act’s procedural requirements. Instead, they assert that her parental rights were properly terminated after the district court considered relevant evidence at the uncontested adoption hearing held the following month.69 This argument fails because Mother had already been stripped of “all rights in relation to the adoptee”70—including the right to contest, or consent to, the adoption—by the time the court heard evidence relevant to a proper termination of parental rights.71 In other words, because the Adoption Act authorized the district court to bar Mother from participating in the adoption proceeding, Mother’s right to defend her parental rights was extinguished.72 So even if section 110’s strict __________________________________________________________ voluntarily relinquishes them or a court finds that she forfeited them by being an unfit parent or by abandoning or neglecting the child. So where this right is terminated for some other reason— such as in consequence of a mother’s procedural default—the termination of the mother’s parental rights must be reviewed under our strict scrutiny standard. And we note that, contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, this rule does not exempt mothers from constitutionally valid procedural requirements. 69 This assertion is only partially correct. Although the district court noted that the Adoptive Parents had provided sufficient evidence of abuse, unfitness, and neglect in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, it also based its decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the fact that Mother’s right to consent had been forfeited under sections 110 and 112, and that under section 120.1 her consent could be implied. 70 UTAH CODE § 78B-6-110(6)(b)(ii). 71 In re Adoption of J.S., 2014 UT 51, ¶ 2 (explaining that a mother’s parental rights include the “right to object to an adoption”); see also In re J.P., 648 P.2d at 1372 (explaining that a mother “has a fundamental right, protected by the Constitution, to sustain [her] relationship with [her] child” (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 72 See In re K.J., 2013 UT App 237, ¶ 26, 327 P.3d 1203 (explaining that in a typical proceeding to terminate parental rights, although the “petitioner bears the ultimate burden of proving the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence, once evidence is (Continued) 18 Cite as: 2020 UT 51 Opinion of the Court compliance requirement did not immediately allow the court to extinguish the full spectrum of Mother’s parental rights, it nevertheless infringed in part on Mother’s parental rights by requiring the court to exclude her from the adoption proceeding and mandating the forfeiture of “all [her] rights in relation” to K.T.B.73 B. As applied to this case, section 110’s strict compliance provision fails strict scrutiny review ¶40 Because the Adoption Act authorized the district court to terminate a fundamental right in this case, we must analyze it under the strict scrutiny standard.74 Under the strict scrutiny standard, “a fundamental right is protected except in the limited circumstance in which an infringement of it is shown to be ‘narrowly tailored’ to protect a ‘compelling governmental interest.’”75 Section 110’s strict compliance requirement fails this test.76 Even though the Adoption Act’s procedural requirements serve a number of compelling governmental interests, in this case the strict compliance requirement in section 110 was not necessary __________________________________________________________ presented that would justify termination, the burden shifts to the parent to persuade the court that the [petitioner] had not established [the ground for termination] by clear and convincing evidence.” (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 73 In re J.P., 648 P.2d at 1372–77 (recognizing a parent’s fundamental right to “maintain parental ties to his or her child,” and “in the care, custody, and management of [his or her] child,” as well as the right of a mother “not to be deprived of parental rights without a showing of unfitness, abandonment, or substantial neglect”). 74 See Jones, 2015 UT 84, ¶ 26. 75 Id. ¶ 27 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). 76 Although Mother has challenged three sections of the Adoption Act—sections 110, 112, and 120.1—as they work together, it is the strict compliance provision of section 110 that prompted the district court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights. Accordingly, we focus on this requirement in our strict scrutiny analysis. 19 IN RE K.T.B. Opinion of the Court to protect those interests and therefore it is unconstitutional as applied to Mother. ¶41 Although we have previously recognized that the “strict laws” in the Adoption Act further the state’s interest in promoting prompt and stable adoptions,77 we have not yet considered the constitutionality of section 110’s strict compliance requirement under a strict scrutiny analysis.78 So even though we have previously concluded that section 110’s requirements are not merely arbitrary,79 we have not yet determined whether those requirements were necessary to achieve the state’s compelling adoption-related interests under the circumstances presented in this case. We do so now. ¶42 The State of Utah has a number of “compelling interest[s] in the adoption process.”80 First, “the state has a compelling interest in providing stable and permanent homes for adoptive children in a prompt manner.”81 Second, it has an interest “in preventing the disruption of adoptive placements.”82 And third, it has an interest “in holding parents accountable for meeting the needs of children.”83 These interests satisfy the strict scrutiny standard’s “compelling interest” prong.84 Accordingly, we review section __________________________________________________________ 77 In re Adoption of B.B.D., 1999 UT 70, ¶ 14, 984 P.2d 967. 78 See, e.g., In re Adoption of B.Y., 2015 UT 67, ¶¶ 42–46 (declining to consider a putative father’s substantive due process claim under a strict scrutiny standard because the father had not yet perfected his parental rights and holding that until a putative father perfects his parental rights under the Adoption Act, his rights are “merely provisional” rather than fundamental). 79 See id. ¶¶ 41–46 (holding that “the strict compliance provision of the Adoption Act” was not arbitrary in the context of a putative father’s due process challenge). In re Adoption of B.B.D., 1999 UT 70, ¶ 14 (internal quotation 80 marks omitted). 81 UTAH CODE § 78B-6-102(5)(a). 82 Id. 83 Id. 84See, e.g., Thurnwald v. A.E., 2007 UT 38, ¶¶ 30, 34, 163 P.3d 623 (concluding that the state had a compelling interest in “speedily (Continued) 20 Cite as: 2020 UT 51 Opinion of the Court 110’s strict compliance requirement to determine if it is narrowly tailored to facilitate these interests. ¶43 Under strict scrutiny’s “narrowly tailored” prong, we must determine whether the “legitimate state purpose [could] be . . . more narrowly achieved.”85 In other words, we consider whether the challenged provisions were “necessary” to achieve the state’s purpose in facilitating a prompt and stable adoption of K.T.B., in preventing a disruption of that adoption, or in holding parents accountable for K.T.B.’s needs.86 ¶44 Section 110 requires a person to “file a motion to intervene in the adoption proceeding.”87 If the person fails to intervene within thirty days, that person is excluded from the adoption proceeding going forward.88 This timely intervention requirement serves the state’s interest in providing prompt adoptions and in preventing their disruption by a parent who chose not to intervene but later reconsiders this decision. ¶45 As part of section 110’s intervention requirement, the motion to intervene must “set[] forth specific relief sought” and be __________________________________________________________ identifying those persons who will assume a parental role over newborn illegitimate children,” “in promoting early and uninterrupted bonding between child and parents[,] and in facilitating final and irrevocable adoptions.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 85 In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085, 1090 (Utah 1981). The dissent criticizes us for applying this standard. See infra ¶ 165 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting). But we are merely applying the standard that has been well-established by our case law. In contrast to this established approach, the dissent suggests that a loss of an indisputably fundamental right does not trigger strict scrutiny review where that loss stemmed from a procedural default. See infra ¶ 217 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting) (suggesting that “procedures” may never be subject to “substantive due process scrutiny”). Because such an approach would be inconsistent with controlling precedent, we reject it. See infra ¶¶ 51–101. 86 Wells v. Children’s Aid Soc’y of Utah, 681 P.2d at 207 (considering whether any “infringement of the [plaintiff’s] rights not essential to the statute’s purpose ha[d] been identified”). 87 UTAH CODE § 78B-6-110(6)(a). 88 Id. § 78B-6-110(6)(b). 21 IN RE K.T.B. Opinion of the Court “accompanied by a memorandum specifying the factual and legal grounds upon which the motion is based.”89 These subrequirements serve section 110’s overarching purpose. They do so by (1) notifying the court and the petitioners of who will be contesting the adoption and (2) informing the court of the legal basis on which that person is entitled to intervene, thereby allowing the court to quickly weed out improper interveners. Mother’s attempt to intervene satisfied section 110’s overarching purpose as well as the underlying purposes of section 110’s filing requirements. ¶46 Mother filed an “Answer to Verified Petition for Termination of Parental Rights and for Adoption of Minor Child” within thirty days of receiving the notice of the adoption proceeding. And although her answer was not accompanied by a memorandum “specifying the factual and legal grounds upon which the [answer] was based,” she did admit in her answer that she was K.T.B.’s mother, as well as deny all of the factual allegations upon which the Adoptive Parents based their request to terminate her parental rights. Moreover, in the answer’s prayer for relief, Mother requested that the Adoptive Parents “take nothing by way of their Petition.” ¶47 This answer fulfilled the purposes of section 110’s motion to intervene requirement. First, we note that “it is the substance, not the labeling, of a motion that is dispositive in determining the character of the motion.”90 Based on the substance of Mother’s answer, the court and the Adoptive Parents knew or should have known that Mother wanted to participate in the proceeding in order to oppose the adoption. They also knew or should have known that Mother intended to participate by providing evidence to defend against the factual allegations they advanced in support of their request to terminate Mother’s parental rights. And because the answer was filed within thirty days, it did not hinder the state’s interest in facilitating a prompt adoption. ¶48 Second, the court’s interest in barring improper parties from the proceedings was not hindered by the procedural deficiencies in Mother’s answer. Mother is indisputably K.T.B.’s __________________________________________________________ 89 Id. § 78B-6-110(6)(a)(ii), (iii). 90 Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, ¶ 9, 20 P.3d 388, abrogated on other grounds by Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, ¶ 2, 135 P.3d 861, as recognized in A.S. v. R.S., 2017 UT 77, ¶ 21, 416 P.3d 465. 22 Cite as: 2020 UT 51 Opinion of the Court biological mother. And at oral argument before us, the Adoptive Parents conceded that timely motions to intervene brought by a biological mother are granted as a matter of course. Thus, even though Mother’s answer did not trigger scheduled briefing and oral argument as a motion to intervene would have done, the answer nevertheless fulfilled section 110’s purposes by alerting the court—and the Adoptive Parents—that K.T.B.’s biological mother sought to participate in the proceedings. Stated differently, in light of Mother’s unquestioned status as K.T.B.’s biological mother, the contents of the Adoptive Parents and Mother’s pleadings provided the district court with all of the information it needed to rule on the issue of Mother’s intervention. So in this case, section 110’s purposes were fulfilled by Mother’s attempt to intervene through her answer. ¶49 But section 110 also states that its requirements must be “fully and strictly” complied with.91 Despite the fact that Mother’s answer did not hinder the state’s compelling interests in promoting prompt and stable adoptions, the district court barred her from the adoption proceeding because she failed to strictly comply with section 110’s filing requirements. And this inevitably led the court to terminate all of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to section 112. ¶50 Because Mother’s timely filed answer—though not strictly compliant with section 110’s procedural sub-requirements— achieved everything section 110 is designed to achieve, we cannot say that the strict compliance requirement was necessary to achieve the state’s compelling adoption-related interests in this case. For this reason we hold that section 110’s strict compliance provision is unconstitutional as applied to Mother.92 Accordingly, we reverse __________________________________________________________ 91 UTAH CODE § 78B-6-110(6)(b). 92 To be clear, in holding that the strict compliance component of section 110 fails the strict scrutiny test, as applied to Mother in this case, we are not suggesting, as Mother argues in her brief, that the entire motion-to-intervene provision is “meaningless” as applied to biological mothers. In fact, by holding that the timing and substantive requirements of the provision are necessary to further the state’s purposes, see supra ¶¶ 45–46, we have held the opposite. So we are not lightly excusing the procedural requirements of the Adoption Act in this case. Rather, we have narrowed the scope of our opinion to the strict compliance (Continued) 23 IN RE K.T.B. Opinion of the Court the district court’s decision to strike Mother’s answer and remand to the district court for further proceedings, in which Mother may participate, on the Adoptive Parents’ adoption petition. C. The arguments raised by the dissent are unpersuasive ¶51 The dissent disagrees with our resolution of Mother’s substantive due process claim. At its heart, the dissent’s disagreement stems from a different view of the right at issue. We contend that the right at issue is Mother’s fundamental right to parent—a right firmly rooted in our history and case law. Because we view the right at issue to be fundamental, any governmental __________________________________________________________ provision in Utah Code section 78B-6-110(6)(b) and to the facts of this case. We also note that the dissent criticizes our decision on the ground that “strict procedural compliance” is “at a premium” in the “adoption arena.” See infra ¶ 207 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting). But in so doing, the dissent fails to engage with the specific and narrow reasoning in our decision. Instead, it argues only that “statutory procedures for natural parents to participate in and assert their rights” are a core element in the state’s effort to facilitate adoptions. See infra ¶ 207 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting). We take no issue with this general statement. But the dissent has failed to explain how the strict compliance requirement would have aided the State’s effort to facilitate adoptions in this case. As we have discussed, in this case, Mother’s timely attempt to intervene provided the court and the Adoptive Parents all of the information that a strictly compliant motion to intervene would have. For this reason, our decision in no way hinders the interests advanced by the procedural requirements of the Adoption Act. The dissent also suggests that, by subjecting the procedural requirements of the Adoption Act to a substantive due process review, we are foreclosing the state’s ability to impose procedural time bars in the adoption setting. See infra ¶ 213 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting). But our case law makes clear that procedural requirements have long been subject to substantive due process. And the dissent’s suggestion that subjecting procedural requirements to the demands of substantive due process will upend all procedural requirements misses the mark. Indeed, in this very case, we have upheld other procedural requirements in section 110—including section 110’s thirty-day filing requirement—as being narrowly tailored to further the state’s interest in prompt adoptions. 24 Cite as: 2020 UT 51 Opinion of the Court infringement of that right is subject to strict scrutiny review.93 And in applying our well-established strict scrutiny test, we have determined that the state violated Mother’s fundamental parental rights when it terminated those rights despite Mother’s timely, and substantially compliant, attempt to intervene. In other words, because the strict compliance requirement did not further the State’s compelling, adoption-related interests in this case, we hold that the strict compliance requirement is unconstitutional as applied in this case. ¶52 The dissent, in contrast, argues that the rights at issue in this case are not Mother’s parental rights—the rights that were terminated by the State. Instead, it argues that the right at issue is Mother’s right to retain her right to parent despite a failure to comply with procedural requirements. In other words, rather than asking whether Mother, as K.T.B.’s biological mother, has a constitutionally protected interest in engaging in any of the conduct inherent in the parent-child relationship, the dissent asks whether Mother has a constitutionally protected interest in being free from a particular form of governmental interference. But we reject this characterization of the right at issue because it is inconsistent with our case law, and it would lead us to entirely overlook the substantial parental interests at the heart of this case. ¶53 But before we discuss the specific ways in which the dissent’s approach is inconsistent with our case law, we also note that, as a practical matter, the dissent’s approach would strip Mother’s parental rights of their fundamental status. The dissent concedes that Mother had fundamental parental rights. And it cannot dispute that those fundamental rights were terminated by the State. Despite this, the dissent argues that the relevant right at issue in this case is not one of the fundamental rights that were terminated, but Mother’s right to retain her fundamental parental rights. And, according to the dissent, this newly identified right is not fundamental and so its infringement need not be reviewed under our strict scrutiny standard. In other words, although the dissent concedes that at least some of Mother’s parental rights were fundamental before they were terminated,94 it does not explain how we should analyze Mother’s loss of those fundamental rights. So the dissent’s proposed approach either ignores Mother’s __________________________________________________________ 93 See Jones, 2015 UT 84, ¶ 26. 94 See infra ¶ 179 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting). 25 IN RE K.T.B. Opinion of the Court pre-existing fundamental parental rights or treats them as if her failure to strictly comply with the challenged procedural requirements transformed her fundamental rights into the less valuable right the dissent argues is at issue in this case.95 The practical effect of this approach is that any procedural requirement triggering the forfeiture of fundamental rights is immune from strict scrutiny review because the right to retain those rights is not fundamental. For this reason, we reject the dissent’s approach. ¶54 We also reject the dissent’s approach because it is inconsistent with our case law. It is inconsistent for two reasons. First, it is inconsistent because it departs from the manner in which we, or the United States Supreme Court, have defined parental rights in parental rights termination cases.96 Second, it is inconsistent because it leads to a misapplication of the doctrine of forfeiture. __________________________________________________________ 95 The dissent pushes back on the notion that its approach transforms the fundamental nature of the underlying parental rights into something less than fundamental. See infra ¶ 157 n.215 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting) (“The fundamental nature of the underlying parental right stays the same throughout—my point is just that the right at issue here is distinct from that underlying right.”). But in so doing, the dissent confirms that it is ignoring the termination of the underlying fundamental right altogether. In other words, the dissent confirms that, under its approach, state action to terminate a fundamental parental right need not satisfy strict scrutiny review so long as the parent failed to comply with a procedural requirement—a procedural requirement that need not be narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest. 96 Although we reject the dissent’s argument because it mischaracterizes the right at issue, we note that our case law does in fact establish that Mother’s right to retain her parental rights is fundamental. We have held that mothers have a fundamental right to “maintain parental ties” to their children, In re J.P., 648 P.2d at 1377, to not be “deprived of parental rights without a showing of unfitness, abandonment, or substantial neglect,” id. at 1375, “to sustain [their] relationship with [their] child,” id. at 1372, and “to object to an adoption,” In re Adoption of J.S., 2014 UT 51, ¶ 2. Because our case law makes clear that Mother has a fundamental right to retain her parental rights, even under the dissent’s characterization of the right at issue the dissent’s argument fails. 26 Cite as: 2020 UT 51 Opinion of the Court 1. The dissent mischaracterizes the right at issue in this case ¶55 We reject the dissent’s argument because it is based on a mischaracterization of the right at issue. According to the dissent, the right at issue is not Mother’s parental rights, but her “right to retain parental rights despite failing to comply with required procedure.”97 But this mischaracterizes the right at issue in two ways. First, it incorrectly defines the right by referencing the manner—forfeiture triggered by a procedural default—in which the government interfered with Mother’s parental rights. Because this characterization of Mother’s right would mark a fundamental departure from the way courts have traditionally defined parental rights, we reject it. ¶56 Second, the dissent mischaracterizes the right at issue by failing to account for a key distinction between the nature of the rights of an unmarried biological mother and an unmarried biological father. Throughout its opinion, the dissent relies upon cases in which we or the United States Supreme Court dealt with the provisional, or inchoate, parental rights of unmarried biological fathers. Because the case law clearly establishes that mothers have a “retained” fundamental right in their children, whereas unmarried fathers have only provisional rights that must be perfected through compliance with procedure or some other means, the dissent’s argument fails.98 a. The dissent errs in defining the right in reference to the form of governmental interference ¶57 We first address the dissent’s attempt to characterize the right at issue by referencing the procedural requirement that triggered the forfeiture of Mother’s parental rights. It states that the right at issue is the “right to retain parental rights despite failing to __________________________________________________________ 97 See infra ¶ 135 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 98 In re J.P., 648 P.2d at 1375 (explaining that the right of a mother “not to be deprived of parental rights without a showing of unfitness, abandonment, or substantial neglect is so fundamental to our society and so basic to our constitutional order . . . that it ranks among those rights referred to in Article I, [section] 25 of the Utah Constitution and the Ninth Amendment of the United States Constitution as being retained by the people.” (emphasis added); see also id. at 1372 (explaining that a mother “has a fundamental right, protected by the Constitution, to sustain [her] relationship with [her] child” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 27 IN RE K.T.B. Opinion of the Court comply with required procedure.”99 To be clear the dissent does not dispute that at least some parental rights are fundamental.100 Nor does it dispute that Mother lost all of her parental rights in this case. But, according to the dissent, the right at issue in this case is not Mother’s fundamental right to parent (the right that was forfeited), but her right to retain that fundamental right despite her noncompliance with the challenged procedural requirement. In defining the right at issue in this way, the dissent adopts a novel approach to defining due process rights in parentage cases—an approach that effectively deprives Mother’s fundamental parental rights of the heightened protection our case law would typically provide.101 ¶58 The dissent’s mischaracterization of the right in this case appears to rest on a misconception of how we typically define parental rights. By incorporating a reference to the challenged governmental interference in this case—the procedural requirements that triggered the judicially imposed forfeiture of Mother’s parental rights—into its definition of the right at issue, the dissent would have us define the right at issue based on the particular form the governmental interference takes. That is not how the United States Supreme Court, nor we, have defined parental rights in the past. ¶59 Under the approach established by the Supreme Court, the nature of parental rights is defined based on (1) the status of the individual invoking the right and (2) the parental conduct to be protected. For example, in one of the Supreme Court’s seminal parental rights cases, Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court explained that the “liberty” component of the Due Process Clause includes “the right of the individual to . . . establish a home and bring up children.”102 The Court then specifically concluded that this liberty right included the right of “parents to control the education of their own.”103 So the Court defined the right to parent by referring to the __________________________________________________________ 99 Infra ¶ 135 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting). 100 See infra ¶ 179 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting). Jones, 2015 UT 84, ¶ 26 (“When the court has recognized a due 101 process right it deems ‘fundamental,’ it consistently has applied a standard of strict scrutiny to the protection of such a right.”). 102 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 103 Id. at 401 (emphasis added). 28 Cite as: 2020 UT 51 Opinion of the Court status of the individual claiming the right—the individual’s status as a parent—and by referring to the conduct to be protected—the education of children. ¶60 Following Meyer, the Supreme Court has repeatedly looked to the status of the individual and the conduct to be protected before determining whether the individual’s claim fell within the umbrella of parental rights. For example, the Court has looked to an individual’s parental status in distinguishing between the rights of parents and grandparents104 and between biological parents and foster parents.105 And, importantly for this case, this court has distinguished between the rights of unmarried biological fathers and unmarried biological mothers.106 ¶61 The Supreme Court has also looked to the conduct to be protected in determining that the right to parent included the right to homeschool,107 the right “to direct the religious upbringing of [the parent’s] children,”108 and, in a long line of cases, “the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”109 We also note that the Supreme Court has made clear that parental rights protect against all forms of “government interference.”110 ¶62 Thus Supreme Court precedent makes clear that we should characterize the parental right at issue in a given case by referring to (1) the status of the individual invoking the right and (2) the parental conduct to be protected. And our ultimate characterization of the right does not depend on the form of governmental interference at issue. But that is not how the dissent would have us characterize the parental right in this case. ¶63 The dissent characterizes the parental right in this case as the “right to retain parental rights despite failing to comply with __________________________________________________________ 104 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–73 (2000). 105See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families For Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842–47 (1977). 106 See supra ¶¶ 33–37. 107Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925). 108 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972). 109 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66 (compiling cases). 110 Id. at 65. 29 IN RE K.T.B. Opinion of the Court required procedure.”111 So rather than asking whether parental conduct falls within the umbrella of protected parental rights, the dissent asks whether parents have a recognized right to be free of a particular form of governmental interference—in this case, a judicially imposed forfeiture of all parental rights. Accordingly, under the dissent’s approach, it is the nature of the governmental interference, rather than Mother’s parental status (an unmarried biological mother)112 or the conduct in which she would like to engage (all parental conduct, or, at the very least, the maintaining of her parental rights)113 that would define her parental right. This characterization of the right at issue would mark a significant departure from the Supreme Court’s method of defining parental rights. ¶64 The dissent disagrees. Although it concedes that, under controlling precedent, parental rights are defined by the status of the individual invoking the right and the conduct to be protected, it nevertheless argues that its approach is consistent with this precedent because it has merely adopted a narrower view of “the precise form of parental conduct at issue.”114 So, according to the __________________________________________________________ 111 See infra ¶ 135 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 112In re adoption of J.S., 2014 UT 51, ¶ 2 (“Unwed mothers acquire parental rights—and the accompanying right to object to an adoption—as a result of the objective manifestation of the commitment to the child that is demonstrated by their decision to carry a child to term.”). 113 In re J.P., 648 P.2d at 1377 (“For the reasons and upon the precedents discussed above, we conclude that the Utah Constitution recognizes and protects the inherent and retained right of a parent to maintain parental ties to his or her child . . . .” (emphasis added)). 114 See infra ¶ 129 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting). The dissent argues that our approach “conflates the parental conduct that is being terminated . . . with the conduct triggering that termination.” See infra ¶ 146 n.211 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting). From this it appears that, in the dissent’s view, the focus of our substantive due process review should not be on the state action at issue (termination of all parental rights) nor on the nature of the rights being terminated (fundamental) but on whether a parent’s conduct in failing to comply with a procedural requirement was also constitutionally (Continued) 30 Cite as: 2020 UT 51 Opinion of the Court dissent, our disagreement regarding the nature of the right at issue is merely a disagreement regarding the “level of generality at which an asserted right [should be] framed.”115 ¶65 The dissent’s narrow framing fails because, in defining the “conduct” at issue by referencing the form of governmental interference at issue, the dissent fails to identify any parental conduct. And when we correctly identify the parental conduct at issue in this case, it is clear that we have framed the right appropriately. ¶66 The dissent explains that it has narrowly framed “the relevant conduct” by “asking whether there is a right to an exemption from procedural default.”116 Although it is unclear whether “an exemption from procedural default” constitutes conduct in any sense, even were we to accept it as such it would not constitute the type of parental conduct the Supreme Court uses to define parental rights. In identifying the relevant parental conduct in its past cases, the Supreme Court focuses on the parent’s conduct directed at the parent’s child, not conduct directed at, or from, the State. For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court identified the relevant conduct as the parents’ conduct in providing a religious education and upbringing to their children.117 The Court explained that the case involved “the fundamental interest of parents . . . to guide the religious future and education of their children” and it explained that this right had been “established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.”118 So, in defining the conduct at issue, the Yoder Court focused on the __________________________________________________________ protected conduct. So it follows that, under the dissent’s approach, where the parent lacked a constitutionally protected right to not comply with a procedural requirement, the state is free to terminate all of the parent’s constitutionally protected rights, including fundamental ones, even where the procedural requirement allegedly justifying the state’s action is not narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest (the test the state usually must pass before it terminates a fundamental right). 115 See infra ¶ 146 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting). 116 See infra ¶ 146 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting). 117 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232. 118 Id. 31 IN RE K.T.B. Opinion of the Court parents’ interactions with their children and asked whether the parent had a fundamental right to so interact. ¶67 In contrast to the Yoder court’s framing of the relevant parental conduct, the dissent frames the relevant conduct by focusing on Mother’s interactions with the State. The dissent explains that Mother does not have a fundamental right to be free of the consequences of a State-imposed forfeiture of parental rights because she has failed to “establish a tradition of protecting parental rights despite a procedural default.” This is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s approach in Yoder and other parental rights cases. ¶68 Had the Yoder Court defined the right in that case, as the dissent does here—by defining it in terms of the parent’s interactions with the State—it would have focused on whether the “American tradition” had established a parent’s right to be free from criminal prosecution despite the parent’s violation of a legislative enactment. So the dissent’s focus on the form of governmental interference at issue is clearly inconsistent with the Court’s framing of the parental right in Yoder. ¶69 The dissent also errs in attempting to narrow the scope of the relevant parental conduct in this case. Although the dissent correctly notes that the level of generality at which an asserted right is framed may be an outcome-determinative issue in some cases, its suggestion that the level of generality is an issue in this case conflicts with controlling precedent. ¶70 The level of generality at which an asserted right is framed may properly be considered an unresolved issue only where a party argues that the Due Process Clause protects someone whose (1) status or (2) conduct had not previously received constitutional protection. For example, in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families For Equality and Reform, the Supreme Court considered whether the “liberty” interest protected by the Due Process Clause extended to individuals in “their status as foster parents.”119 In considering this question, the Court considered the differences between biological families, which are created without state involvement, and foster families, which “have their origins in an arrangement in which the State has been a partner from the outset.”120 Reasoning that the “contours” of the liberty interest protected by the Due Process __________________________________________________________ 119 431 U.S. at 839 (emphasis added). 120 Id. at 845. 32 Cite as: 2020 UT 51 Opinion of the Court Clause did not have its source “in state law,” “but in intrinsic human rights, as they have been understood in this Nation’s history and tradition,” the Court concluded that the “foster parents” liberty interest received only the “most limited constitutional” protection. So, in Smith, the Supreme Court resolved a novel question regarding the constitutional protections provided to someone with a particular parental status by narrowing—to exclude foster parents—the parental status needed to receive full protection under the Due Process Clause. ¶71 The same is true of the Court’s decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D., the case upon which the dissent’s level-of-generality argument principally relies.121 The dissent relies on this case to argue that the Supreme Court “has never conclusively established a governing standard” for defining the level of generality at which an asserted right is framed.122 And, for this reason, the dissent states that it is free to define the right at issue as it does. But the level-of-generality discussion in Michael H. does not support the dissent’s proposed framing of the right in this case. ¶72 In Michael H., an unmarried father asserted a fundamental parental interest in a daughter who was born into a woman’s existing marriage with another man.123 So, as in Smith, the Court in Michael H. had to decide whether the “liberty” interest protected by the Due Process Clause extended to an individual whose parental status had not previously been recognized as deserving full due-process protection.124 The justices who joined the plurality opinion opted to construe the status of the unmarried father narrowly—as an unmarried father of a daughter born into a woman’s existing marriage with another man. The dissent, in contrast, would have construed the status of the father in more general terms—as a parent or father. So the competing opinions in __________________________________________________________ 121 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 122 See infra ¶ 147 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting). 123 491 U.S. at 125. 124 Id., 491 U.S. at 124 (“Thus, the legal issue in the present case reduces to whether the relationship between persons in the situation of Michael and Victoria [(an unmarried father’s relationship with his daughter, who was born while her mother was married to another man)] has been treated as a protected family unit under the historic practices of our society, or whether on any other basis it has been accorded special protection.”). 33 IN RE K.T.B. Opinion of the Court Michael H. suggest that where an individual asserts a fundamental parental right based on a parental status (or parental conduct) that had not previously been recognized as deserving constitutional protection, the level of generality at which the court defines the parental status (or conduct) may be an outcome-determinative issue. ¶73 But the level-of-generality problem discussed in Michael H. is not an issue in this case, because our case law has already established the level of protection the Due Process Clause provides to a biological mother’s parental right in a parental rights termination case. In fact, the dissent concedes that Mother’s parental status—as a biological mother—affords her certain, fundamental parental rights. The dissent’s only disagreement, therefore, is over our broad characterization of the parental conduct at issue. But our case law makes clear that, where the government is attempting to terminate all parental rights, courts should define the parental right broadly to encompass the full spectrum of constitutionally protected parental conduct inherent in the parent-child relationship. In other words, the “parental conduct” at issue in a parental rights termination case encompasses the entire bundle of parental rights, including the parent’s fundamental rights to homeschool,125 “to direct the religious upbringing of [the parent’s] children,”126 “to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children,”127 and any other right that will be terminated as a result of the State’s termination proceeding. ¶74 That the conduct at issue in parental rights termination cases encompasses the full spectrum of parental conduct is made apparent in the Supreme Court’s decision in Stanley v. Illinois.128 In that case, the Court determined whether the State of Illinois’ “method of procedure,” which created a presumption that unmarried fathers were unfit parents, violated principles of due process.129 As a result of this procedural rule, the father in the case lost his parental rights in his children. In resolving this case, the Court explained that the “issue at stake [was] the dismemberment __________________________________________________________ 125 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534. 126 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233. 127 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66 (compiling cases). 128 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 129 Id. at 647. 34 Cite as: 2020 UT 51 Opinion of the Court of [the father’s] family.”130 And throughout the opinion, it referred to the right or interest at issue variously as the interest “of a man in the children he has sired and raised,”131 as the “rights to conceive and to raise one’s children,”132 as the right of “custody, care and nurture of the child,”133 and as an interest in the “integrity of the family unit.”134 So the Court did not narrowly frame the right by defining it as a right to be free from a particular procedural rule, as the dissent would have us do here. Instead, it described the right broadly, and more accurately, to encompass all of the interests in parental conduct the father would have lost were the state’s “method of procedure” upheld. ¶75 The Court treated the relevant parental conduct similarly in Quilloin v. Walcott.135 There the issue presented was once again whether a state could “force the breakup of a natural family” through a procedural mechanism that provided fewer protections to unmarried fathers than it did to mothers.136 Although, based on the father’s unmarried status, the Court ultimately upheld this procedure as constitutional, the Court consistently referred to the interest at issue in the case as an interest to engage generally in parental conduct.137 So the decision in Quilloin likewise suggests that, in parental rights termination cases, we must take a broad view of the relevant parental conduct.138 ¶76 Our past parental rights termination cases have also described the parental conduct in broad terms. For example, in one __________________________________________________________ 130 Id. at 658. 131 Id. at 651. 132 Id. 133 Id. 134 Id. 135 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 136 Id. at 255 (citation omitted). 137 Id. (describing the parental right as an interest in having a “relationship between parent and child”). 138 See also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256–58 (1983) (discussing the parental right variously as an interest in the “intangible fibers that connect parent and child,” “family relationships,” and as including fundamental rights previously recognized by Supreme Court precedent). 35 IN RE K.T.B. Opinion of the Court of our earliest parental rights termination cases, In re J.P., we emphasized that the case “involve[d] a permanent termination of all parental rights.”139 And we explained that “all parental rights” included fundamental rights “to sustain [a parent’s] relationship with his [or her] child,” “to direct the upbringing and education of children,” and a right in “the custody, care and nurture of the child.”140 So, consistent with the Supreme Court precedent, we characterized the type of “parental conduct” at issue in parental rights termination cases in broad terms. ¶77 Following our decision in In re J.P., our decisions in parental rights termination cases have consistently referred to the relevant parental conduct in broad terms. For example, in Wells v. Children’s Aid Society of Utah, we stated broadly that the “relationship between parent and child is protected by the federal and state constitutions.”141 And in In re adoption of J.S., we acknowledged “a fundamental right for a mother not to lose her rights to her child absent proof of unfitness, abandonment, or neglect,”142 as well as the fundamental parental interest that a father has “in the children he has sired and raised.”143 We also cited our decision in In re J.P. for the proposition that the “integrity of the family and the parents’ inherent right and authority to rear their own children have been recognized as fundamental axioms of Anglo-American culture, presupposed by all our social, political, and legal institutions.”144 As these cases illustrate, in parental rights termination cases, we have consistently described the relevant parental conduct protected by the Due Process Clause in broad terms.145 And in defining parental conduct, we have never defined __________________________________________________________ 139 648 P.2d at 1366. 140 Id. at 1372. 141 681 P.2d at 202. 142 2014 UT 51, ¶ 38. 143 Id. ¶ 40 (citation omitted). 144 Id. ¶ 39 (emphasis added). 145The dissent relies on our decision in In re adoption of J.S. to argue that we must narrowly frame the relevant “conduct” at issue. But the narrow framing at issue in that case did nothing to limit the scope of relevant parental conduct. Instead, it more narrowly construed the parental status—to exclude unmarried fathers who (Continued) 36 Cite as: 2020 UT 51 Opinion of the Court it, as the dissent does in this case, by referencing the particular form of governmental interference. Accordingly, the level-of-generality problem identified by the dissent is not at issue in this case, and the dissent’s purported framing of the relevant conduct in this case is inconsistent with our case law. ¶78 In sum, Supreme Court precedent makes clear that parental rights should be characterized based on (1) the status of the individual invoking the right and (2) the parental conduct to be protected. The dissent’s characterization of the right, in contrast, defines the right in reference to the form of governmental interference. In other words, rather than asking whether Mother, as K.T.B.’s biological mother, has a constitutionally protected interest in engaging in any of the conduct inherent in the parent-child relationship, the dissent asks whether Mother has a constitutionally protected interest in being free from a particular form of governmental interference. Because such a characterization of the right at issue is inconsistent with our case law, and would lead us to entirely overlook the substantial parental interests at the heart of this case, we reject it. b. The dissent errs in failing to distinguish between the constitutionally protected status of biological mothers and the provisional parental status of unmarried biological fathers ¶79 Additionally, we also reject the dissent’s characterization of the right at issue in this case because it fails to account for a key distinction between the nature of the rights of a biological mother and the rights of an unmarried biological father. As we have __________________________________________________________ had not perfected their parental rights—deserving full due process protection. See id. ¶ 2 (“Unwed mothers acquire parental rights— and the accompanying right to object to an adoption—as a result of the objective manifestation of the commitment to the child that is demonstrated by their decision to carry a child to term. An unwed father’s legal obligation to file the paternity affidavit is a rough counterpart to the mother’s commitment.”). So our decision in In re adoption of J.S. merely reaffirmed an important distinction, based on parental status, between mothers and unmarried fathers that had previously been established in our case law. See In re J.P., 648 P.2d at 1374–75 (distinguishing between the variation in the protections afforded unwed fathers before noting that, “[i]n contrast, no similar variation exists among mothers who are unwed”). 37 IN RE K.T.B. Opinion of the Court discussed, parental rights should be defined based, in part, on the status of the individual invoking the right. And our case law has firmly established a clear distinction between the parental status of mothers and unmarried fathers. But, despite this, the dissent attempts to apply unmarried father cases to the facts of this case. Because the case law clearly establishes that mothers have a “retained” fundamental right in their children, whereas unmarried fathers have only provisional rights that must be perfected through compliance with procedure or some other means, the dissent’s argument fails.146 ¶80 We first addressed the distinction between the nature of the parental rights of a mother and an unmarried biological father in In re J.P.147 In that case, we considered an unmarried biological mother’s challenge to a statute that permitted a court to “decree an involuntary termination of all parental rights solely on the basis of a finding that such termination will be in the child’s best interest.”148 We began our review of the mother’s challenge by summarizing the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Stanley and Quilloin as standing for the proposition that “[s]ome variation [in the protection provided by the Due Process Clause] exists among unwed fathers.”149 ¶81 So, under the rule established in those decisions, we explained that unwed fathers “who have fulfilled a parental role over a considerable period of time are entitled to a high degree of protection” but “unwed fathers whose relationships to their children are merely biological or very attenuated may, in some __________________________________________________________ 146 In re J.P., 648 P.2d at 1375 (explaining that the right of a mother “not to be deprived of parental rights without a showing of unfitness, abandonment, or substantial neglect is so fundamental to our society and so basic to our constitutional order . . . that it ranks among those rights referred to in Article I, [section] 25 of the Utah Constitution and the Ninth Amendment of the United States Constitution as being retained by the people.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); see also id. at 1372 (explaining that a mother “has a fundamental right, protected by the Constitution, to sustain [her] relationship with [her] child” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 147 Id. at 1374–75. 148 Id. at 1374 (internal quotation marks omitted). 149 Id. 38 Cite as: 2020 UT 51 Opinion of the Court circumstances, be deprived of their parental status merely on the basis of a finding of the ‘best interest’ of the child.”150 Thus the nature of an unmarried father’s right may vary from case to case depending on what the father has done to develop a relationship with his child.151 ¶82 But in contrast to unwed fathers, we explained that “no similar variation exists among mothers who are unwed” and that “all unwed mothers are entitled to a showing of unfitness before being involuntarily deprived of their parental rights.” 152 And we explained that this right “is so fundamental to our society and so basic to our constitutional order . . . that it ranks among those rights . . . retained by the people.”153 ¶83 So our discussion of parental rights in In re J.P. makes clear that only unmarried fathers need comply with procedural mechanisms to perfect their parental rights. In other words, the parental status of all biological mothers, whether married or unmarried, gives mothers a right to not “be deprived of parental rights without a showing of unfitness, abandonment, or substantial neglect,” and this right is not contingent upon compliance with any procedural requirement that the state may establish. Accordingly, the dissent’s discussion of Mother’s rights in this case is inconsistent with our holding in In re J.P. ¶84 The dissent’s discussion of Mother’s rights is also inconsistent with our holding in In re Adoption of J.S.154 As our discussion of In re J.P. above makes clear, an unmarried father’s parental right is “merely provisional” until the father takes steps to perfect it. And in In re Adoption of J.S., we considered an unwed __________________________________________________________ 150 Id. at 1375. 151 We note that in later cases we have clarified that an unmarried father may perfect his right by complying with certain provisions in the Adoption Act, which include such requirements as filing an affidavit of paternity. See, e.g., In re Adoption of J.S., 2014 UT 51, ¶ 2 (explaining that the provision describing a paternity affidavit “prescribes the requirements that an unwed father must meet in order to secure the right to assert his parental rights and object to an adoption”). 152 In re J.P., 648 P.2d at 1375. 153 Id. (emphasis added). 154 2014 UT 51. 39 IN RE K.T.B. Opinion of the Court father’s challenge to provisions in the Adoption Act that provided a procedural mechanism for unwed fathers to perfect their parental rights.155 Echoing the distinction between mothers and unmarried biological fathers we made in In re J.P., we explained that “[u]nwed mothers acquire parental rights—and the accompanying right to object to an adoption—as a result of the objective manifestation of the commitment to the child that is demonstrated by their decision to carry a child to term.”156 But with unmarried fathers there is no such “objective manifestation,” so the father’s “legal obligation to file the paternity affidavit” described in the Adoption Act serves as “a rough counterpart to the mother’s [objective] commitment” to her child.157 Based on this distinction, we stated that a child may be placed for adoption only “if the mother and father choose to waive [their parental] right[s]—or in the case of a father, fails to assert the right by filing the paternity affidavit in a timely fashion.”158 So our decision in In re Adoption of J.S. recognized that the vested nature of a mother’s parental rights meant that only unmarried fathers could lose their rights to their children by failing to comply with state-instituted procedure. ¶85 With this distinction in mind, we proceeded to the merits of the unmarried father’s claim. After noting that the father had not brought a procedural due process claim, we then proceeded to analyze the Adoption Act’s paternity affidavit requirement under a substantive due process analysis.159 In so doing, we noted that procedural limitations “may be challenged on either procedural or substantive due process grounds.”160 And that a substantive due process claim may be brought where otherwise fair procedures are __________________________________________________________ 155 Id. ¶ 2. 156 Id. By “saying that the established procedures determine how and whether [Mother’s parental] right is preserved,” the dissent fails to account for this key distinction. Infra ¶ 205 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting). 157 In re Adoption of J.S., 2014 UT 51, ¶ 2. 158 Id. (emphases added). 159 Id. ¶ 6. 160 Id. ¶ 22 (emphases omitted). 40 Cite as: 2020 UT 51 Opinion of the Court alleged to be unfair in light of the “fundamental or important” right they foreclose.161 ¶86 We then analyzed the nature of the right of the unmarried father. Although we recognized that we had already determined that the parental rights of mothers are fundamental (in In re J.P.), we clarified that this labeling had been limited to mothers because of “extensive historical evidence of the ‘deeply rooted’ nature of [a mother’s] right.”162 A plurality of the court then noted that the father in the case had not made the “required showing of ‘deeply rooted’ history and tradition [that] was made in J.P. [regarding the rights of mothers],”163 and so, absent such a showing, the father’s substantive due process claim would be reviewed on the “deferential, fallback standard of rationality or arbitrariness.”164 Accordingly, our discussion of parental rights in In re Adoption of J.S. clarified that the parental rights of mothers are fundamental, requiring strict scrutiny analysis, but the parental rights of unmarried fathers are merely provisional, absent some future showing of “extensive historical evidence” that unmarried father’s rights are likewise fundamental. ¶87 As this discussion of In re J.P. and In re Adoption of J.S. demonstrates, our case law has established a significant distinction between the parental rights of unmarried biological mothers and unmarried biological fathers. Under this distinction, the fundamental parental rights of a mother are not contingent on compliance with any procedural requirements that may be imposed by the state. Because the dissent’s characterization of the right at issue, and its discussion of our previous cases, fails to adequately account for this significant distinction, its argument fails. ¶88 In fact, even though the dissent concedes that Mother, based on her parental status as a biological mother, did not need to strictly comply with the procedures in the Adoption Act to render her parental rights fundamental, it nevertheless argues that strict compliance was necessary to preserve the fundamental nature of her rights. So the dissent would create a novel framework in which a __________________________________________________________ 161 Id. 162 Id. ¶ 39. 163 Id. ¶ 54. 164 Id. ¶ 56. 41 IN RE K.T.B. Opinion of the Court right, although concededly perfected and fundamental, can lose the protection of strict scrutiny review where the holder of the right fails to take on-going steps to preserve it. But the dissent cites no authority for such a framework. And our case law clearly refutes it. ¶89 Our case law makes clear that the fundamental parental right is a “retained”165 right that stems from “nature and human instinct,” which is “chronologically prior” to “state or federal statutory law.”166 It also states that the right includes a fundamental right for parents to “sustain” their relationships with their children.167 If these phrases mean anything, they mean that the fundamental nature of a recognized parental right does not lose its fundamental status because of a failure to comply with a procedural requirement instituted by the State. ¶90 To be clear, we are not suggesting that the state can never terminate a fundamental parental right based on the parent’s failure to comply with a statutory requirement. Instead, we are merely reaffirming the firmly established principle that where the state intervenes “to terminate [a parent-child] relationship,” that intervention, whether accomplished through the imposition of a procedural requirement or some other means, “must be accomplished by procedures meeting the requisites of the Due Process Clause.”168 Applying this principle in this case, we have concluded that the State’s termination of mother’s fundamental parental rights, based on her failure to strictly comply with a Statecreated procedural requirement, would be constitutional only if the procedural requirement is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. The dissent’s criticism of this straightforward approach to substantive due process is misplaced. ¶91 Because the dissent fails to adequately account for a key distinction our case law has established between the status of biological mothers and unmarried biological fathers, it mischaracterizes the right at issue in this case. And the dissent’s attempts to defend this mischaracterization by proposing a theoretical framework in which the state could deprive an individual’s fundamental rights of strict-scrutiny protection __________________________________________________________ 165 In re J.P., 648 P.2d at 1375. 166 Id. at 1373. 167 Id. at 1372. 168 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 258 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 42 Cite as: 2020 UT 51 Opinion of the Court through the imposition of a preservation requirement is likewise inconsistent with our case law. ¶92 In sum, we reject the dissent’s characterization of the right at issue in this case because it incorrectly defines the right at issue based on the particular form the governmental interference takes and because it fails to adequately distinguish between the “retained” and fundamental nature of a mother’s parental rights and the merely provisional nature of an unmarried father’s rights. 2. The dissent misapplies the doctrine of forfeiture in this case ¶93 The dissent’s mischaracterization of the right at issue in this case is also problematic because it leads to a misapplication of the doctrine of forfeiture to Mother’s due process claim. As discussed, the dissent argues that the right at issue in this case is not Mother’s indisputably fundamental right to parent, but her right to retain that fundamental right despite her noncompliance with the challenged procedural requirement. Based on this characterization, the dissent argues that we have established a new right “to flout a legal filing requirement but avoid the normal consequence of such a move”169 and that, under our approach, a fundamental right can never “be forfeited due to a procedural default.”170 But the dissent misreads our opinion. And its proposed alternative approach misapplies the doctrine of forfeiture in this case. ¶94 Contrary to the dissent’s characterization of our opinion, we are not suggesting that the “mere possession of a fundamental right . . . forever insulate[s] the mother from ever losing that right.”171 And we are not saying that fundamental rights are entirely “beyond the procedural reach of the State’s regulatory authority.”172 Instead, we are merely reaffirming the firmly established principle that where the state intervenes “to terminate [a parent-child] relationship,” that intervention, whether accomplished through the imposition of a procedural requirement or some other means, “must be accomplished by procedures meeting __________________________________________________________ 169 See infra ¶ 126 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting). 170 See infra ¶ 133 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting). 171 See infra ¶ 133 n.208 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting). 172 See infra ¶ 163 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting). 43 IN RE K.T.B. Opinion of the Court the requisites of the Due Process Clause.”173 In other words, we are stating only that the imposition of unconstitutional procedures, as applied to the fundamental right in this case, is beyond the regulatory authority of the State. ¶95 Based on this principle, we have analyzed the facts of this case to determine whether the procedural mechanism through which the state terminated Mother’s fundamental rights was constitutional. And, after a straightforward application of the Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny standard, we have determined that the strict compliance provision in section 110 of the Adoption Act was unconstitutionally applied in this case. In other words, we are saying that the enforcement of the strict compliance requirement violated the Due Process Clause because it triggered the loss of fundamental rights even though it was not necessary to further the State’s compelling adoption-related interests in this case. And we are saying that because the strict compliance provision violated the Due Process Clause, as it was applied to Mother, it cannot justify the State’s termination of Mother’s parental rights. ¶96 In contrast, the dissent argues that the state did not terminate any fundamental rights in this case, because Mother forfeited her rights when she failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Act. But the dissent’s argument assumes, without analysis, that the procedural requirement that triggered Mother’s default was constitutional. In other words, the dissent avoids the central question presented by Mother’s substantive due process claim. ¶97 So, in effect, the dissent argues that the procedural requirement that authorized the state to terminate Mother’s fundamental parental rights is constitutional because Mother failed __________________________________________________________ 173Lehr, 463 U.S. at 258 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The dissent cites two cases, Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944) and State v. Rettig, 2017 UT 83, ¶¶ 15, 17, 416 P.3d 520, for the proposition that constitutional rights may be forfeited through procedural default. We agree with this assertion. But neither Yakus nor Rettig stand for the proposition that a party can be barred from challenging an unconstitutional procedural requirement due to that party’s failure to comply with that unconstitutional requirement. That proposition would be inconsistent with “the longstanding law of procedural default.” 44 Cite as: 2020 UT 51 Opinion of the Court to comply with that procedure. This approach is not only circular, it is inconsistent with the doctrine of forfeiture. ¶98 Forfeiture “is not appropriate when it is inconsistent with the provision creating the right sought to be secured.”174 The relevant provision in this case is the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. As we explained above, the substantive component of the Due Process Clause allows plaintiffs to challenge the “fairness of [a] procedural bar or limitation, on the ground that the right foreclosed is so fundamental or important that it is protected from extinguishment.”175 And Due Process Clause case law has further clarified that “fundamental” rights may be extinguished through the operation of procedural provisions only where those provisions survive strict scrutiny review.176 So, in other words, the substantive component of the Due Process Clause protects individuals from being deprived of fundamental rights through the operation of procedures that are not narrowly tailored to further __________________________________________________________ 174 New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 116 (2000). Although the Supreme Court in Hill addresses the issue of express waiver, rather than forfeiture, the principle for which we cite Hill applies equally in forfeiture cases. Waiver is sometimes used as an umbrella term encompassing all statements and acts that result in any loss of a right without a disposition on the merits. And we note that the Hill Court supported its statement—that “waiver is not appropriate when it is inconsistent with the provision creating the right sought to be secured”—by citing a case that is best characterized as a forfeiture case. Id. at 116 (citing Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 258–59 (1993) (holding that a criminal defendant’s right to be present at the beginning of trial cannot be forfeited through a failure to be present)). 175In re B.Y., 2015 UT 67, ¶ 41 (alteration in the original) (internal quotation marks omitted). So, by arguing that Mother is precluded from challenging the fairness of procedural bars on substantive due process grounds, the dissent would have us implicitly overturn the rule we established in In re B.Y. 176 See, e.g., Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 254–55 (applying a substantive due process analysis to a challenge of a procedural provision); Stanley, 405 U.S. at 650 (applying a substantive due process analysis to an Illinois “procedure”). 45 IN RE K.T.B. Opinion of the Court compelling state interests.177 And, as our analysis above demonstrates, the procedural requirements that triggered the loss of Mother’s fundamental parental rights were not narrowly tailored. So applying the doctrine of forfeiture to defeat Mother’s substantive due process claim in this case would be inconsistent with the Due Process Clause. ¶99 Because forfeiture “is not appropriate when it is inconsistent with the provision creating the right sought to be secured,”178 and the dissent’s proposed application of forfeiture in this case would be inconsistent with the substantive component of the Due Process Clause, we reject the dissent’s forfeiture argument. And in so doing, we clarify that the doctrine of forfeiture does not prevent an individual from challenging the constitutionality of a procedural requirement based on the individual’s failure to comply with that procedural requirement. ¶100 Accordingly, we reject the arguments the dissent raises for two reasons. First, we reject them because the dissent mischaracterizes the right at issue; second, we reject them because __________________________________________________________ 177 See also Stanley, 405 U.S. at 647 (applying the strict scrutiny standard where a state terminated a fundamental right through a “method of procedure”). The dissent states that strict scrutiny need not be applied in every instance in which a state terminates parental rights, but the only support for this position comes from cases far outside the parental rights field of law. The dissent argues that the “‘fundamental’ nature of a given right is not alone enough to trigger strict scrutiny of any procedural regulation of that right.” See infra ¶ 159 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting). It then cites cases involving abortion rights, the right to free speech, the right to free exercise of religion, and the right to vote. See infra ¶ 159 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting). But we do not view these cases, in which the Supreme Court articulated exceptions to the general rule based on the unique nature of the right at issue, to be relevant to this case. This case deals with the termination of all parental rights of a biological mother. And controlling precedent has clearly set forth the standard of scrutiny to be applied where a state attempts to terminate all of a biological mother’s fundamental parental rights. For this reason, the cases the dissent cites from other areas of law are unpersuasive. 178 Hill, 528 U.S. at 116. 46 Cite as: 2020 UT 51 Opinion of the Court the dissent misapplies the doctrine of forfeiture to the facts of this case. ¶101 In sum, Mother has fundamental parental rights. The district court severed those rights because Mother failed to strictly comply with the procedural requirements of section 110. Because the strict compliance provision in section 110 was not narrowly tailored, we hold that the strict compliance provision is unconstitutional as applied in this case. IV. J.N.’s Motion to Intervene was Properly Denied ¶102 We now turn to J.N.’s claim. He argues that he should have been allowed to intervene in the adoption proceedings after his marriage to Mother was judicially recognized. Although J.N. admits that he is not the biological father, he argues that due to his common-law marriage to Mother, he is K.T.B.’s presumptive father179 and therefore was entitled to notice of the adoption petition under section 120 of the Adoption Act. Because the Adoptive Parents did not serve him with notice, he contends that his motion to intervene was timely, and he was therefore entitled to intervene in the adoption proceeding under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.180 We disagree. ¶103 At the time the Adoptive Parents filed their adoption petition, J.N.’s marriage to Mother had not been legally recognized. After the court barred Mother from the adoption proceeding, J.N. sought this recognition by filing an action in a different district court. He succeeded, and the second district court recognized his marriage as beginning “on or about June 16, 2010,” or three months __________________________________________________________ 179”A man is presumed to be the father of a child if . . . he and the mother of the child are married to each other and the child is born during the marriage.” UTAH CODE § 78B-15-204(1)(a). 180UTAH R. CIV. P. 24 (“Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.”). 47 IN RE K.T.B. Opinion of the Court before the birth of K.T.B.181 With this judicial decree in hand, J.N. then filed his motion to intervene in this case. The district court denied his motion, in part, because it was untimely. ¶104 On appeal, J.N. argues that at the time the adoption petition was filed, his marriage to Mother—which, according to the subsequent judicial marriage decree, began on June 16, 2010— created a presumption that he is K.T.B.’s father, thereby entitling him to notice of the adoption. He reasons that because he never received notice of the adoption proceeding, section 110’s thirty-day time period to intervene was never triggered. Thus he argues his motion to intervene was timely, and he was therefore entitled to intervene under rule 24. ¶105 In support of his argument J.N. cites our decision in Whyte v. Blair.182 In Whyte we held that once a common-law marriage is legally recognized it can have retroactive legal effect from the time the marriage was entered.183 But contrary to J.N.’s assertion, Whyte did not answer the question of whether a common-law marriage entitles a couple to state-recognized marital rights in the absence of a judicial decree. That question is answered by the plain language of Utah Code section 30-1-4.5, Utah’s common-law marriage statute. ¶106 Under section 30-1-4.5, a person may seek legal recognition of a common-law marriage by obtaining a judicial or administrative order. Once this occurs, a common-law marriage “is treated as any other marriage for all purposes.”184 And as our decision in Whyte makes clear, these marital rights may apply retroactively once they are recognized.185 But the plain language of two provisions within section 30-1-4.5 also makes it clear that the marital rights stemming from a common-law marriage are merely __________________________________________________________ 181 In their opposition on appeal, the Adoptive Parents allege that J.N. failed to notify the second district court of the adoption pending in this case, as required by rule 100 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Although such a failure could seriously undermine the validity of J.N.’s marriage decree, we do not address it here because the marriage decree has not been appealed. 182 885 P.2d 791 (Utah 1994). 183 Id. at 793–94. 184 Id. at 793. 185 See generally id. 48 Cite as: 2020 UT 51 Opinion of the Court conditional unless they have been legally recognized through a judicial or administrative order. ¶107 First, section 30-1-4.5(1) states that a common-law marriage “shall be legal and valid if a court or administrative order establishes that it arises out of a contract between a man and a woman” who satisfy certain common-law marriage requirements. 186 Thus, by negative implication, a common-law marriage is not legal and valid in the absence of such an order. ¶108 Second, section 30-1-4.5(2) states that “[t]he determination or establishment of a [common-law] marriage shall occur during the relationship . . . or within one year following the termination of that relationship.” So if a couple terminates a relationship that would have qualified as a common-law marriage, but fails to obtain judicial recognition of that relationship within one year of termination, then any marital rights the couple could have enjoyed through legal recognition are forfeited. In other words, if a couple fails to perfect marital rights stemming from a common-law marriage within the one-year limitations period, it is as if the marriage never occurred. ¶109 These two aspects of section 30-1-4.5 suggest that the rights stemming from a common-law marriage must be perfected through a judicial proceeding before those rights take legal effect. This makes sense. “[M]arriage is a keystone of our social order.”187 For this reason, when “a couple vows to support each other, so does society pledge to support the couple, offering symbolic recognition and material benefits to protect and nourish the union.” 188 In this way, marital status serves as a basis for the conferral of a number of “governmental rights, benefits, and responsibilities,” including rights in the areas of adoption and child custody.189 But the state cannot confer these rights on a married couple unless the married couple makes their marital status known to it. And the inverse is also true: a married couple living in an as-of-yet unrecognized common-law marriage cannot obligate the state to respect rights __________________________________________________________ 186 UTAH CODE § 30-1-4.5(1) (emphasis added). 187 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015). 188 Id. 189Id.; see also Sanchez v. L.D.S. Soc. Servs., 680 P.2d 753, 755 (Utah 1984) (“Marriage is the institution established by society for the procreation and rearing of children.”). 49 IN RE K.T.B. Opinion of the Court stemming from that marriage until it has been legally recognized.190 But this is essentially what J.N. is asking the court to do. ¶110 At the time of the Adoptive Parents’ adoption petition, J.N.’s marital rights, including rights to notice or to intervene in the adoption as a presumptive father, had not been legally recognized by the State.191 Additionally, because J.N. admits that he is not K.T.B.’s biological father, he also did not have any rights in the adoption as K.T.B.’s putative father.192 J.N.’s lack of any legally recognized rights in K.T.B. at the time the Adoptive Parents filed their petition ultimately defeats his claim. __________________________________________________________ 190 See State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, ¶ 32, 137 P.3d 726 (“[Because] a marriage license represents a contract between the State and the individuals entering into matrimony . . . [the defendant], as a result of his [unsanctioned marriage] ceremony with [his alleged spouse], [is] not entitled to any legal benefits attendant to a state-sanctioned marriage.”). 191 Similar to our holding in Scott v. Scott, we find that the relevant date for consideration is the date the adoption petition was filed. 2017 UT 66, ¶ 30, 423 P.3d 1275 (requiring an ex-spouse to be cohabitating with a boyfriend at the time the petition to terminate alimony was filed); see also Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 571 (2004) (“[J]urisdiction of the court depends upon the state of things at time of the action brought. . . . . [The time-offiling rule] measures all challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction premised upon diversity of citizenship against the state of facts that existed at the time of filing.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Int’l Trading Corp. v. Edison, 109 F.2d 825, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (requiring a “duty [to] exist at the time of filing a petition for mandamus”); Koch v. Carmona, 643 N.E.2d 1376, 1381 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (evaluating an attorney’s conduct “under the circumstances existing at the time of the filing”). 192 See In re Baby Girl T., 2012 UT 78, ¶ 11, 298 P.3d 1251 (“[A]n unwed father’s biological connection to his child does not automatically grant him a fundamental constitutional right to parenthood. Rather, an unwed father has a provisional right to parenthood, and due process requires only that an unwed father have a meaningful chance to preserve his opportunity to develop a relationship with his child.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 50 Cite as: 2020 UT 51 Opinion of the Court ¶111 The crux of J.N.’s argument is his assertion that the Adoptive Parents were obligated to provide him with notice as a presumptive father. According to him, their failure to do so prevented the Adoption Act’s thirty-day intervention window from beginning and so his motion to intervene, filed nearly four months after the petition, was timely. But because he did not have any presumptive rights at that time, neither the Adoptive Parents nor anyone else was obligated to serve notice on him. So we must determine whether J.N., as merely a potential presumptive father, had a duty to timely intervene in the adoption proceeding despite the lack of notice. He did. ¶112 Although the Adoption Act does not establish requirements with which a merely potential presumptive father must comply before intervening in an adoption, we find that certain requirements the Adoption Act imposes on a potential biological father are applicable. Under the Adoption Act, an unmarried biological father “has a duty to protect his own rights and interests” by filing the necessary documents before relevant deadlines.193 If he does so, he preserves a right to notice and to intervene in the adoption.194 But until then, he “is considered to be on notice that . . . an adoption proceeding regarding the child may occur.”195 Although the method for protecting his rights differs from that of an unmarried biological father,196 placing the burden __________________________________________________________ 193 UTAH CODE § 78B-6-110(1)(a)(ii). 194 Id. § 78B-6-110(3). 195 Id. § 78B-6-110(1)(a)(i); see also In re Baby Girl T., 2012 UT 78, ¶ 11 (“The Act’s requirements operate under the presumption that an unwed father knows that his ‘child may be adopted without his consent unless he strictly complies with the provisions of [the Act].’” (alteration in original) (citing UTAH CODE § 78B-6-102(6)(f))). 196 We note that a potential presumptive father could protect his right to notice of an adoption by obtaining judicial recognition of his common-law marriage before an adoption petition is filed or he could protect his right to intervene by obtaining a judicial marriage decree, either within the adoption proceeding or as part of another case, within thirty days of the date on which the adoption petition was filed. Additionally, we note that in most cases section 110(2)(g) would guarantee a potential presumptive father the right to notice even in the absence of a judicial marriage decree because he would (Continued) 51 IN RE K.T.B. Opinion of the Court on J.N., as a potential presumptive father with no legally recognized parental rights, is equally appropriate. ¶113 Due to the unperfected nature of J.N.’s presumptive parental rights, he was responsible to take necessary steps to preserve his rights in the adoption. Had he done so by obtaining judicial recognition of his marriage before the Adoptive Parents filed their adoption petition, the Adoptive Parents would have been obligated to provide him with notice and he would have had thirty days to file a motion to intervene upon receipt of such notice.197 But in the absence of a legally recognized marriage, the Adoptive Parents had no such obligation, and so J.N. was considered to be on notice of the adoption proceeding once the Adoptive Parents filed their petition.198 This presumed notice initiated the Adoption Act’s thirty-day intervention window.199 __________________________________________________________ have been living in the same home as the child and holding himself out to be the child’s father. UTAH CODE § 78B-6-110(2)(g) (requiring notice to be served on “a person who is . . . openly living in the same household with the child at the time . . . and . . . [is] holding himself out to be the child’s father”). J.N. does not argue that he was entitled to notice under this provision. 197J.N. argues that at the time the petition was filed he could not have intervened because his marriage had not yet been judicially recognized. Not only does this argument undermine J.N.’s contention that his common-law marriage was legally effective at the time the adoption proceeding commenced, but it also ignores the fact that he could have sought judicial recognition of his marriage within this case. 198 We note that to hold otherwise would retroactively impose a burden on the Adoptive Parents as well as inject unnecessary delay and uncertainty into the adoption proceeding. This is something we seek to avoid. See id. § 78B-6-102(6)(c) (“A certain degree of finality is necessary in order to facilitate the state’s compelling interest. The Legislature finds that the interests of the state, the mother, the child, and the adoptive parents described in this section outweigh the interest of an unmarried biological father who does not timely grasp the opportunity to establish and demonstrate a relationship with his child in accordance with the requirements of this chapter.”). 199 See UTAH R. CIV. P. 24(a) (granting an intervention of right only if there is a “timely application” to intervene). 52 Cite as: 2020 UT 51 Petersen, J., concurring in the result Because J.N. failed to file a motion to intervene within this time, his motion was untimely and the district court had the discretion to deny it. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of J.N.’s motion to intervene.