Opinion ID: 2570849
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: overview of first amendment principles

Text: ¶ 11 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940), provides in pertinent part: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit the free exercise thereof . ... These two clauses are known, respectively, as the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. In this case, the LDS Church Defendants rely primarily on the Establishment Clause in making their constitutional argument that Franco's claims are barred by the First Amendment. [8] ¶ 12 In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), the United States Supreme Court explained that the Establishment Clause does not merely prohibit the establishment of a state church or a state religion, but commands that there should be `no law respecting an establishment of religion.' Id. at 612, 91 S.Ct. 2105 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. I). Accordingly, laws that do not establish a religion but that are a step that could lead to such establishment may violate the First Amendment. Id. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the command to make no law respecting an establishment of religion as prohibiting all forms of governmental action, including both statutory law and court action through civil lawsuits. See Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 191, 80 S.Ct. 1037, 4 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1960) (per curiam). ¶ 13 Lemon and subsequent cases have relied on a three-part test to determine whether governmental activity constitutes a law respecting an establishment of religion. Specifically, for governmental action not to be a law respecting an establishment of religion, the action (1) must have a secular legislative purpose, (2) must neither advance[ ] nor inhibit[ ] religion, and (3) must not foster `an excessive government entanglement with religion.' Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970)). In addressing the tort liability of clergy under the Establishment Clause, courts have focused on the third prong of the Lemon test, excessive government entanglement. See Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1432 (7th Cir.1994) (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Coffey, J., concurring) (applying entanglement doctrine to tort claim against clergyman); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F.Supp. 321, 328 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (same); Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal.3d 278, 253 Cal.Rptr. 97, 763 P.2d 948, 960 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007, 109 S.Ct. 1644, 104 L.Ed.2d 159 (1989) (same); Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450, 454 (Ind. Ct.App.1996) (same); H.R.B. v. J.L.G., 913 S.W.2d 92, 98-99 (Mo.Ct.App.1995) (same); Turner v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 18 S.W.3d 877, 897 (Tex.App. 2000) (same); L.L.N. v. Clauder, 209 Wis.2d 674, 563 N.W.2d 434, 440 (1997) (same). ¶ 14 The excessive entanglement test is, by necessity, one of degree. Indeed, separation of church and state cannot mean the absence of all governmental contact with religion, since the complexities of modern life inevitably produce some contact. 16A Am. Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 422, at 405 (1998). In light of this reality, the entanglement doctrine does not bar tort claims against clergy for misconduct not within the purview of the First Amendment, because the claims are unrelated to the religious efforts of a cleric. See, e.g., Heath v. First Baptist Church, 341 So.2d 265 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.), cert. denied, 348 So.2d 946 (Fla.1977) (holding that church may be held liable for slip and fall on the premises under negligence claim); Fintak v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 51 Ill.App.3d 191, 9 Ill.Dec. 223, 366 N.E.2d 480 (1977) (same); Bass v. Aetna Ins. Co., 370 So.2d 511 (La.1979) (holding church liable for negligence of pastor who created an unreasonable risk of injury by not clearing aisles to make way for running in the Spirit, a form of religious expression in that church). ¶ 15 However, it is well settled that civil tort claims against clerics that require the courts to review and interpret church law, policies, or practices in the determination of the claims are barred by the First Amendment under the entanglement doctrine. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709-10, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976); Dausch, 52 F.3d at 1432; L.L.N., 563 N.W.2d at 440. For, as the Supreme Court stated in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952), churches must have power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine. Id. at 116, 73 S.Ct. 143.