Opinion ID: 1747099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: evidence of uncharged prior criminal conduct

Text: In assignment of error no. 2, defendant asserts that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of uncharged prior criminal conduct at the guilt phase of his trial. Specifically, he claims that the court should not have admitted testimony of Kelly's sister, Angela Knight, because the state did not provide adequate notice to the defense of its intent to do so, as required by State v. Prieur, 277 So.2d 126, 130 (La.1973). Cf. LSA-C.E. art. 1103. Defendant claims that the state did not fulfill the Prieur requirements of specificity and timeliness. The testimony reveals that defendant assaulted and beat Kelly and entered the sister's home without authorization. As to specificity, defendant has initially pointed to an arguable violation of the principles set out in Prieur, which requires the state to give notice with the general particularity required of an indictment or information. 277 So.2d at 130. However, defendant fails to mention that the state filed a notice of intent to use inculpatory statements, which describes the conduct in detail, and satisfies the particularity requirement. Defendant's arguments about a lack of particularity ignore the fact that the title of a pleading does not matter, but rather courts should look through the caption of pleadings in order to ascertain their substance and to do substantial justice ... Smith v. Cajun Insulation, 392 So.2d 398 (La.1980). Defendant had detailed written notice of the other crimes evidence of which he now complains. However, the state did not file its notice of intent to use inculpatory statements until the eve of trial. Defendant argues that the state thus violated Prieur 's requirement that the state furnish notice within a reasonable time before trial. 277 So.2d at 130. However, not every violation of pre-trial procedures (including Prieur violations) requires reversal, and before a defendant can complain of such a violation, he must show prejudice. State v. Hooks, 421 So.2d 880 (La. 1982); State v. Strickland, 398 So.2d 1062 (La.1981). [6] The record reveals that well before trial, defendant (1) had knowledge of the state's whole file via discovery (which informed defendant of the state's awareness of the prior conduct and the availability of a witness who could testify to it); (2) had knowledge of the state's intention to use prior conduct at the penalty phase. This knowledge combined to give to defendant sufficiently particular notice of the admissible other crimes evidence in enough time to prepare a defense to it. Notably, appellate counsel does not in any event suggest how trial counsel could have defended against the evidence. In addition, counsel did not object to introduction of the testimony at trial. As this court's treatment of a situation similar to that presented by the instant case reveals, the issue of prejudice and lack of timely objection are closely linked. In State v. Clark, 492 So.2d 862 (La.1986), this court reviewed a capital case in which the defendant had independent knowledge of testimony to be offered against him at the guilt phase of his capital trial, but the state had not made the required Prieur notice. Trial counsel did not object to the testimony on Prieur grounds. The court pointed out that: [i]t is ... the policy of this court in capital cases to consider arguments which should have been raised in the trial court, but were not. State v. Glass, 455 So.2d 659 (La.1984), cert. denied, [471] U.S. [1080], 105 S.Ct. 2159, 85 L.Ed.2d 514, rehearing denied [472] U.S. [1033], 105 S.Ct. 3516, 87 L.Ed.2d 645 (1985). We therefore do not agree [with the state's contention] that [defendant's] failure to object precludes our consideration of the question; yet neither should a defendant, with knowledge of the state's intention to introduce such evidence and with an opportunity to prepare his defense, be permitted to withhold his objection at trial, take his chances with the jury, and assign error in this court when his gamble fails.... Under these circumstances, [defendant] cannot complain of lack of notice or a lack of opportunity to prepare his defense, and is not entitled to a mistrial on this basis. Clark, 492 So.2d at 865 (La.1986). The court thus refused relief to a capital defendant who complained that he had not received Prieur notice of other crimes evidence introduced at the guilt phase, when the court found that defendant had written notice ... of the state's intent to introduce the testimony of witnesses which, it turned out, contained evidence of other crimes. Id. In the instant case, defendant had received a detailed written notice of the state's intent to use inculpatory statements, which notice detailed the Prieur conduct introduced. In these circumstances, it is reasonable to charge counsel with knowledge of the state's intention to introduce the testimony complained of in spite of a failure of Prieur -required timely notice, and also reasonable to charge his failure to object either to a tactical decision, or to the fact that counsel knew that the situation did not call for an objection because he had received notice. In any event, the purpose behind the policy of this court in capital cases to consider arguments which should have been raised in the trial court, but were not, Clark, 492 So.2d at 865, is judicial determination of whether the error prejudicially affected the procedural fairness or accuracy of fact finding in the case. State v. Smith, 554 So.2d at 676. Allowing defendants to escape the consequences of decisions made at trial when no prejudice resulted from the ruling complained of does not serve that purpose. In this case, defendant received notice specific enough to satisfy Prieur; the lack of timeliness did not prejudice defendant; and failure of trial counsel to object in any event vitiates any claim defendant might have about lack of notice. Defendant's assignment of error no. 2 lacks merit.