Opinion ID: 306444
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: One-year residency requirement.

Text: 14 Ross argues that the one-year residency requirement of section 1865 (b)(1) violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Again, a similar challenge was rejected by this court in Duncan, supra, 456 F.2d at 1406. 15 Ross contends that in Duncan we applied the wrong constitutional standard to the residency requirement and urges us to re-examine its holding in the light of Dunn v. Blumstein, 1972, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274. 16 In Dunn, the Supreme Court held invalid a Tennessee statute which prohibited new residents from voting in state elections for certain periods of time. It found that this residency requirement could not withstand the close scrutiny required by the strict equal protection test of the Fourteenth Amendment. 405 U.S. at 342, 360, 92 S.Ct. 995. Ross would have us apply the same test here. However, while the equal protection clause and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment are not mutually exclusive, see Schneider v. Rusk, 1963, 377 U.S. 163, 168, 84 S.Ct. 1187, 12 L.Ed. 2d 218; Bolling v. Sharpe, 1954, 347 U.S. 497, 499, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884, decisions applying the one are not automatically transferable to the other. Rather, classifications in federal statutes will be invalidated only if they are arbitrary or otherwise so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process. Bolling v. Sharpe, supra, 347 U.S. at 499, 500, 74 S.Ct. at 694. It was that test under which we sustained the residency requirement in Duncan; Dunn v. Blumstein is not in point. We adhere to our decision in Duncan. 17