Opinion ID: 1037568
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: IAP’s Contentions on Cross-Appeal

Text: Now we turn to IAP’s cross-appeal. IAP seeks reversal of the district court’s disallowance of $637,030.41 in fees. The special master recommended 35 We note that even if Local Rule 54.1 did apply, IAP’s noncompliance with the rule would not bar its recovery of attorneys’ fees. Contrary to Johnson Controls’ assertions, a district court has discretion to waive or excuse noncompliance with its local rules. See Quick v. Peoples Bank of Cullman Cnty., 993 F.2d 793, 798-99 (11th Cir. 1993). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to deny all of IAP’s requested fees. Indeed, Johnson Controls’ interpretation of Local Rule 54 to require the total denial of fees is contrary to the district court’s discretion. “[A] compulsory exercise of discretion is not discretion at all.” Id. at 799. 23 Case: 12-10793 Date Filed: 08/14/2013 Page: 24 of 38 that the district court disallow fees in the amount of $578,500 for “its failure to file the invoices with the Court pursuant to the local rules of court”36 and $58,530.41 for IAP’s attorneys’ failure to bill in tenth-of-an-hour increments.37 IAP objected to these reductions before the district court, reiterating its objection to the application of Local Rule 54.1. IAP also asked, in the alternative, that the district court exercise its discretion and excuse its noncompliance with the local rule, should it apply. The district court, after reviewing IAP’s objections, accepted the special master’s recommendations and, declining to exercise its discretion, disallowed $637,030.41 of IAP’s claimed fees. Under New York law, “[t]he determination of reasonable counsel fees is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Shrauger v. Shrauger, 146 A.D.2d 955, 537 N.Y.S.2d 84, 85 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). The only stated basis in the record for the disallowance of these fees is the special master’s determination that IAP failed to comply with Local Rule 54.1. The district court “approved and . . . incorporated by reference” the special master’s report and recommendation.38 36 R.331 at 10. 37 Id. at 11. 38 R.334 at 1. 24 Case: 12-10793 Date Filed: 08/14/2013 Page: 25 of 38 As we already noted, Local Rule 54.1 does not apply to IAP’s stand-alone claim of indemnification for attorneys’ fees. Therefore, disallowing indemnification for fees that did not comply with Local Rule 54.1 was a mistake of law. “[A] mistake of law is, by definition, an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Hoffer, 129 F.3d 1196, 1200 (11th Cir. 1997). Johnson Controls urges this court to affirm the district court’s disallowance of IAP’s fees on the ground that IAP failed to comply with the district court’s initial scheduling order. We decline to do so. The initial scheduling order imposes requirements identical to those contained in Local Rule 54.1. Given the similarities in content and language, it is evident that the order incorporated Local Rule 54.1, to which IAP’s stand-alone claim is not subject. We therefore cannot penalize IAP for failing to comply with prevailing-party fee requirements, whether contained in Local Rule 54.1 or in the district court’s scheduling order. Accordingly, we must reverse the district court’s disallowance of IAP’s attorneys’ fees for noncompliance with Local Rule 54.1. On this issue, we remand to the district court with directions to amend its judgment to include the previously disallowed $637,030.41. 25 Case: 12-10793 Date Filed: 08/14/2013 Page: 26 of 38