Opinion ID: 604904
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Peak's running of MAI software licenced to Peak customers

Text: 56 To prevail on a claim of copyright infringement, a plaintiff must prove ownership of a copyright and a  'copying' of protectable expression beyond the scope of a license. S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir.1989). 57 MAI software licenses allow MAI customers to use the software for their own internal information processing. 3 This allowed use necessarily includes the loading of the software into the computer's random access memory (RAM) by a MAI customer. However, MAI software licenses do not allow for the use or copying of MAI software by third parties such as Peak. Therefore, any copying done by Peak is beyond the scope of the license. 58 It is not disputed that MAI owns the copyright to the software at issue here, however, Peak vigorously disputes the district court's conclusion that a copying occurred under the Copyright Act. The Copyright Act defines copies as: 59 material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. 60 17 U.S.C. § 101. The Copyright Act then explains: 61 A work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. 62 17 U.S.C. § 101. 63 The district court's grant of summary judgment on MAI's claims of copyright infringement reflects its conclusion that a copying for purposes of copyright law occurs when a computer program is transferred from a permanent storage device to a computer's RAM. This conclusion is consistent with its finding, in granting the preliminary injunction, that: the loading of copyrighted computer software from a storage medium (hard disk, floppy disk, or read only memory) into the memory of a central processing unit (CPU) causes a copy to be made. In the absence of ownership of the copyright or express permission by license, such acts constitute copyright infringement. We find that this conclusion is supported by the record and by the law. 64 Peak concedes that in maintaining its customer's computers, it uses MAI operating software to the extent that the repair and maintenance process necessarily involves turning on the computer to make sure it is functional and thereby running the operating system. It is also uncontroverted that when the computer is turned on the operating system is loaded into the computer's RAM. As part of diagnosing a computer problem at the customer site, the Peak technician runs the computer's operating system software, allowing the technician to view the systems error log, which is part of the operating system, thereby enabling the technician to diagnose the problem. 4 65 Peak argues that this loading of copyrighted software does not constitute a copyright violation because the copy created in RAM is not fixed. However, by showing that Peak loads the software into the RAM and is then able to view the system error log and diagnose the problem with the computer, MAI has adequately shown that the representation created in the RAM is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. 66 After reviewing the record, we find no specific facts (and Peak points to none) which indicate that the copy created in the RAM is not fixed. While Peak argues this issue in its pleadings, mere argument does not establish a genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment. A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 56(e); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Harper v. Wallingford, 877 F.2d 728 (9th Cir.1989). 67 The law also supports the conclusion that Peak's loading of copyrighted software into RAM creates a copy of that software in violation of the Copyright Act. In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 594 F.Supp. 617, 621 (C.D.Cal.1984), the district court held that the copying of copyrighted software onto silicon chips and subsequent sale of those chips is not protected by § 117 of the Copyright Act. Section 117 allows the 'owner' 5 of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy without infringing copyright law, if it is an essential step in the utilization of the computer program or if the new copy is for archival purposes only. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp.1988). 6 One of the grounds for finding that § 117 did not apply was the court's conclusion that the permanent copying of the software onto the silicon chips was not an essential step in the utilization of the software because the software could be used through RAM without making a permanent copy. The court stated: 68 RAM can be simply defined as a computer component in which data and computer programs can be temporarily recorded. Thus, the purchaser of [software] desiring to utilize all of the programs on the diskette could arrange to copy [the software] into RAM. This would only be a temporary fixation. It is a property of RAM that when the computer is turned off, the copy of the program recorded in RAM is lost. 69 Apple Computer at 622. 70 While we recognize that this language is not dispositive, it supports the view that the copy made in RAM is fixed and qualifies as a copy under the Copyright Act. 71 We have found no case which specifically holds that the copying of software into RAM creates a copy under the Copyright Act. However, it is generally accepted that the loading of software into a computer constitutes the creation of a copy under the Copyright Act. See e.g. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 260 (5th Cir.1988) (the act of loading a program from a medium of storage into a computer's memory creates a copy of the program); 2 Nimmer on Copyright, § 8.08 at 8-105 (1983) (Inputting a computer program entails the preparation of a copy.); Final Report of the National Commission on the New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, at 13 (1978) (the placement of a work into a computer is the preparation of a copy). We recognize that these authorities are somewhat troubling since they do not specify that a copy is created regardless of whether the software is loaded into the RAM, the hard disk or the read only memory (ROM). However, since we find that the copy created in the RAM can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, we hold that the loading of software into the RAM creates a copy under the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 101. We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment as well as the permanent injunction as it relates to this issue. 72