Opinion ID: 686803
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend

Text: 35 The district court also denied plaintiff's motion for leave to file an amended complaint. In his amended complaint, Bisciglia sought to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981 based upon certain School Board members' alleged discriminatory bias against him. Although the court acknowledged that leave to amend shall be freely granted when justice so requires, it denied the motion, stating: 36 Section 1981 only provides relief for discrimination based on one's race, and claims based on one's national origin or Italian heritage are not cognizable under the Statute. See generally Anooya v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 733 F.2d 48, 49-50 (7th Cir.1984); Petrone v. City of Reading, 541 F.Supp. 735, 738-39 (E.D.Penn.1982). The Court may deny leave to amend where the proposed amendment fails to allege facts which would support a valid theory of liability.... Verhein v. South Bend Lathe, Inc., 598 F.2d 1061, 1063 (7th Cir.1979). 37 Bisciglia, 149 F.R.D. at 591. 38 As Bisciglia correctly notes, in rendering its decision, the district court relied on case law predating the Supreme Court's decision in Saint Francis College v. Alkhazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987). In Saint Francis College, which involved a claim by a man born in Iraq, the Court held that a claim of discrimination based on ancestry or ethnic characteristics was actionable under Section 1981. Specifically, after reviewing the legislative history and the definitions of race applicable when Section 1981 passed, the Court determined that Congress intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics. Id. at 612, 107 S.Ct. at 2027. In fact, the Court made clear: 39 The Court of Appeals was thus quite right in holding that Sec. 1981, at a minimum, reaches discrimination against an individual because he or she is genetically part of an ethnically and physiognomically distinctive sub-grouping of homo sapiens. It is clear from our holding, however, that a distinctive physiognomy is not essential to qualify for Sec. 1981 protection. 10 40 Id. 41 Here, Bisciglia was not given leave to amend his complaint based upon the district court's erroneous belief that Section 1981 only applied to discrimination based upon race. However, the proper inquiry here is not whether [Italians] are considered to be a separate race by today's standards, but whether, at the time [Section 1981] was adopted, [Italians] constituted a group of people that Congress intended to protect. Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617, 107 S.Ct. 2019, 2022, 95 L.Ed.2d 594 (1987) (holding that Jews are not foreclosed from stating a claim under Section 1982 based upon the Court's reasoning in Saint Francis College ). In fact, the Supreme Court's historical research suggests that Italians may have been considered an identifiable race. See Saint Francis College, 481 U.S. at 611, 107 S.Ct. at 2027; see also Benigni v. City of Hemet, 879 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir.1988) (elements of discrimination claim present where plaintiff was singled out based on his Italian ancestry); DeSalle v. Key Bank of Southern Maine, 685 F.Supp. 282, 284 (D.Me.1988) (Section 1981 was designed to protect identifiable classes of persons, such as Italo-Americans.) Therefore, on this record, it is not clear that Bisciglia can state no set of facts upon which relief can be granted under Section 1981. 11 The motion for leave to file this amended claim should have been granted.