Opinion ID: 1791715
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: We first address Flint's renewal of its argument that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear Hall's retaliatory-discharge claim because, it argues, that claim should have been brought in Georgia. Section 6-5-430, Ala.Code 1975, gives Alabama courts jurisdiction over claims arising under the laws of another state. Section 25-5-35, Ala.Code 1975, a part of the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act, allows the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act to apply to work-related injuries that occur outside Alabama, so long as the law of the other state is not applicable and when certain facts exist. As previously noted, Flint had settled two previous worker's compensation claims brought by Hall as well as the claim in the instant case, with a recitation in each agreement, [The parties] agree and represent unto the Court ... [t]hat they are subject to the provisions of the [Workers'] Compensation Statute of Alabama, as amended. Flint is therefore estopped under Alabama law from asserting different facts to prevent the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act from applying. See Ex parte First Alabama Bank, 883 So.2d 1236 (Ala.2003); Ex parte Flint Constr. Co., supra, 775 So.2d at 807-08. Flint is likewise estopped from asserting different facts to argue that Georgia law, rather than Alabama law, should apply to this case. [2] Our resolution of these issues in Hall's favor makes it unnecessary for us to address Flint's argument that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the three workers' compensation settlement petitions.