Opinion ID: 2463945
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Venirepersons Stricken for Cause (Clayton's point 1)

Text: In his first point, Clayton alleges that the trial court erred in sustaining the state's challenge for cause to venirepersons Houston and Kingry. Venirepersons may be excluded from the jury when their views would prevent or substantially impair their ability to perform their duties as jurors in accordance with the court's instructions and their oath. State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831, 839 (Mo. banc 1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 2387, 141 L.Ed.2d 753 (1998); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). A juror may be stricken for cause if it appears that he or she cannot consider the entire range of punishment, apply the proper burden of proof, or otherwise follow the court's instructions in a first degree murder case. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d at 839; State v. Debler, 856 S.W.2d 641, 645-46 (Mo. banc 1993). The qualifications of a prospective juror are not determined conclusively by a single response, `but are made on the basis of the entire examination.' State v. Kreutzer, 928 S.W.2d 854, 866 (Mo. banc 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1083, 117 S.Ct. 752, 136 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997) ( citing State v. Brown, 902 S.W.2d 278, 285 (Mo. banc 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1031, 116 S.Ct. 679, 133 L.Ed.2d 527 (1995)). The trial court is in the best position to evaluate a venireperson's commitment to follow the law and is vested with broad discretion in determining the qualifications of prospective jurors. See Kreutzer, 928 S.W.2d at 866; Rousan, 961 S.W.2d at 839; State v. McMillin, 783 S.W.2d 82, 91-93 (Mo. banc 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S.Ct. 225, 112 L.Ed.2d 179 (1990). A trial court's ruling on a challenge for cause will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly against the evidence and constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. Kreutzer, 928 S.W.2d at 866.
During the state's voir dire, venireperson Houston stated that he was unsure whether he could vote for death, that he could do so in extreme cases only. He stated that if he did vote for death he would not mind telling the defendant. Mr. Houston stated that he could sign a death verdict, but only in some extreme case and he could hardly imagine it. Mr. Houston also stated: I read the book `Dead Man Walking' this nun wrote down in Louisiana. And she's kind of convincing, if you understand. Well, the death penalty is just dished out to poor people, minorities, and such as that, and it costs the state so much more money to put somebody to death than to hold them. That's -She's kind of convinced me of her thinking on that. That's how I feel. The court sustained the state's motion to strike Mr. Houston for cause. The record supports the trial court's ruling. The totality of Houston's statements provided a basis for the trial court to conclude that Houston's views on the death penalty would substantially impair his ability to follow the court's instructions. See Rousan, 961 S.W.2d at 839-40; Brown, 902 S.W.2d at 285; McMillin, 783 S.W.2d at 93. A trial court's determination whether to excuse a juror for cause is not dependent upon a technical evaluation of the venireperson's use of magic words. Instead, it is heavily weighted to the impressions of the trial court and the exercise of the court's judgment and discretion. See Kreutzer, 928 S.W.2d at 866; Rousan, 961 S.W.2d at 839; McMillin, 783 S.W.2d at 91-93. Here, the trial court stated: The Court, of course, we're down to 13 now. And the Court in observing Mr. Houston, I think it started out he could consider. When it got down those, I heard things like: not sure, hesitant, maybe in extreme cases, might be possible case. And I'll have to say, in looking at his demeanor and way he was hesitant, he took his glasses off several times, I'll have to say that the Court's impression in considering all those, I believe under Witherspoon and Witt, that I just think it would prevent him or substantially impair his performance. You know, I have the impression he's unable to faithfully in impartially apply the law in this case. The Court's going to at this time strike Number  it was Number 1 here, but it was Number 3 on the list. This careful exercise of discretion by an experienced trial judge is precisely what is required. The trial court did not err in striking venireperson Houston for cause.
During the state's voir dire, venireperson Kingry expressed doubt that she could vote for the death penalty. She vacillated under questioning by the prosecution, then the defense, as to whether she could follow the law in a capital case. She stated that the only way I could vote for it is if I had no doubt, you know, in my mind and that she would require the prosecutor to prove the case beyond all possible doubt before she could consider the death penalty. When asked if she could sign a death verdict if she were to serve as the foreperson, she responded no, no. The court sustained the state's motion to strike Ms. Kingry for cause. The record supports the trial court's ruling. A juror's equivocation about his ability to follow the law in a capital case together with an unequivocal statement that he could not sign a verdict of death can provide a basis for the trial court to exclude the venireperson from the jury. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d at 840; see also State v. Smith, 944 S.W.2d 901, 914 (Mo. banc 1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 377, 139 L.Ed.2d 294 (1997); Kreutzer, 928 S.W.2d at 866-867. Again, this situation required the exercise of the judgment and discretion of the trial court in determining whether Ms. Kingry should have been stricken for cause. The trial court indicated its judgment by stating: I tell you what, I think I'm going to strike for cause, but let me tell you why. It is  she vacillated. She went back and forth. And I listened. But the whole thing seems to me is she says  And I think that probably the defense is correct, I think you rehabilitated her to the point that she says, no, for the first stage, for guilt or innocence, it's  beyond a reasonable doubt is fine. But if I'm going to vote for the death penalty, which is one of the authorized voting, they would have to  I would have to have no doubt. And I don't think it requires no doubt. The law requires beyond a reasonable doubt on even that one. So I think on that, as I have a belief in watching her that  you know, that  I just have  you know, I have an impression that she'd be unable to apply the law in this case when it comes to second stage in the instruction. The trial court did not err in striking venireperson Kingry for cause. Point 1 is denied.