Opinion ID: 1455603
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the state's right to appeal

Text: Hannagan obtained reversal of his conviction via post-conviction relief under Criminal Rule 35(b). [2] The initial question before the court is whether the state may appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court under Criminal Rule 35(b). [3] Hannagan argues that a proceeding under Criminal Rule 35(b) should be considered a proceeding in the original criminal case. The state's right of appeal in criminal cases is limited to testing the sufficiency of indictments or informations and to sentence appeals. [4] The state claims that a Rule 35(b) proceeding is a separate civil proceeding in the nature of a habeas corpus action or a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the federal post-conviction relief statute. We decline to adopt Hannagan's argument that a Criminal Rule 35(b) proceeding is part of the original criminal case and therefore hold that the state may appeal. Various reasons mandate this conclusion. First, we look to the wording of Criminal Rule 35 itself. Section (j) states: (j) Review. A final judgment entered under this rule may be reviewed by the supreme court on appeal brought either by the applicant or the state within 40 days from the entry of judgment. (emphasis added) This language indicates that the state's right of appeal is broader than the more limited rights of the state to appeal from the criminal trial itself. This construction is bolstered by other provisions of Criminal Rule 35. Criminal Rule 35(c) [5] states that the post-conviction remedies set out in the rule do not affect and are not a substitute for remedies of direct review of the sentence or conviction. Criminal Rule 35(h) [6] provides that all rules and statutes applicable in civil proceedings are available to the parties. Rule 35(h) also states that an order made by the court in a post-conviction relief proceeding is a final judgment. These sections indicate that a Rule 35(b) proceeding is separate from the original criminal proceeding, is governed by civil procedure, results in a final judgment and may be timely appealed by the state as well as the applicant. Additional support for our conclusion is found in the case law addressing the function of Criminal Rule 35 and its federal analogs. In Merrill v. State, 457 P.2d 231 (Alaska 1969), this court suggested that a Criminal Rule 35 proceeding was similar in nature to a habeas corpus proceeding. [7] A habeas corpus proceeding is an independent civil proceeding. [8] In Donnelly v. State, 516 P.2d 396, 398 (Alaska 1973), we stated that Criminal Rule 35, like the federal statutory post-conviction relief remedy, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, was designed to supplant the more cumbersome traditional habeas corpus remedy. [9] A proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is similar to an independent civil proceeding, and the government has the right to appeal an adverse determination. [10] We therefore hold that a post-conviction relief proceeding instituted by the defendant under Criminal Rule 35(b) is similar to an independent civil proceeding such as a habeas corpus proceeding for purposes of the state's ability to appeal, and that consequently the state has the right to appeal in this case. [11]