Opinion ID: 2338285
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Race and Age Discrimination Claims Under the DCHRA

Text: The DCHRA provides in pertinent part that (a) General. It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice to do any of the following acts, wholly or partially for a discriminatory reason based upon the race ... [or] age ... of any individual: (1) By an employer. To ... discharge, any individual; or otherwise discriminate against any individual, with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment... or to limit, segregate or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee. D.C.Code § 1-2512(a) (1999 Repl.) (now codified at D.C.Code § 2-1402.11(a) (2001)); Arthur Young & Co. v. Sutherland, 631 A.2d 354, 361 (D.C.1993). In considering claims brought under the DCHRA, we rely on the same three-part, burden-shifting test articulated by the Supreme Court for Title VII cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Hollins, supra, 760 A.2d at 571; accord, Blount, supra note 13, 775 A.2d at 1115; McManus v. MCI Communications, Corp., 748 A.2d 949, 956 n. 7 (D.C.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1183, 121 S.Ct. 1167, 148 L.Ed.2d 1026 (2001); Knight v. Georgetown Univ., 725 A.2d 472, 478 n. 5 (D.C.1999). In order to survive a motion for summary judgment on her age and race discrimination claims, Futrell must make a prima facie showing of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. The prima facie showing, when made, raises a rebuttable presumption that the employer's conduct amounted to unlawful discrimination. Once the presumption is raised, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut it by articulating some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment action. ... Finally, the burden shifts back to the employee to prove, again by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employer's stated justification for its action `was not its true reason but was in fact merely a pretext' to disguise discriminatory practice. Hollins, supra, 760 A.2d at 571 (citations omitted); Blackman v. Visiting Nurses Ass'n, 694 A.2d 865, 868 (D.C.1997); Arthur Young, supra, 631 A.2d at 361; Knight, supra, 725 A.2d at 478. Although the burden of production may shift from the employee to the employer and back to the employee, the employee retains the ultimate burden of persuading the finder-of-fact that the employer acted with discriminatory animus. Blackman, supra, 694 A.2d at 868; accord, Hollins, supra, 760 A.2d at 571; Knight, supra, 725 A.2d at 478. Moreover, conclusory allegations by the nonmoving party are insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact or to defeat the entry of summary judgment. Hollins, supra, 760 A.2d at 570; O'Donnell v. Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., 645 A.2d 1084, 1086 (D.C.1994).