Opinion ID: 435249
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: united's claims

Text: 57 The jury found that Stinnes had agreed to hold United harmless from any damages sustained by it as a result of taking products under the contracts with Stinnes, and assessed this damage at $149,320.69. The hold-harmless claim rested solely on testimony concerning a verbal agreement. There was other testimony to the contrary and Stinnes sets forth reasons to question the credibility of the United executive whose testimony furnished the principal evidence of that agreement. That testimony did not evidence a categorical commitment to make good any loss in cash. But the credibility of the witness in the face of contradictory testimony and the inferences that might reasonably be drawn from the statements made were matters for the jury. 58 In addition to assailing the credibility of the testimony, Stinnes contends both that the alleged oral statements were too vague to create a binding obligation and that in any event United, by cancelling its contracts in January, failed to perform its end of the alleged contract. Neither argument is persuasive. Although some agreements may, under Texas law, be too amorphous to be enforceable, 25 a contract is sufficiently definite if a court is able to determine the respective legal obligations of the parties. 26 The provisions of the contract which may at first appear incomplete or uncertain are often readily made clear and plain by the aid of common usage and reasonable implication of facts. Estate of Griffin v. Sumner, 604 S.W.2d 221, 229 (Tex.Civ.App.1980), writ ref. n.r.e. 27 United claimed losses arising out of mismeasurement and overpricing. The testimony evidencing the formation of the alleged hold-harmless contract referred generally to those losses and suggested that the parties understood the references. Stinnes has had no difficulty determining its own losses from mismeasurement and overpricing, and has offered no reason why we should take a different view of United's position. 59 A promise to forego assertion of a colorable claim for breach of contract obviously inures to the promisor's detriment, and in this case to the promisee's benefit; therefore, there is sufficient consideration to support enforcement of a contract. 28 Continued performance despite substandard measurement and pricing conditions constituted United's consideration for Stinnes's promise of indemnity. 60 United did thereafter seek concessions and ultimately terminated its contract. The jury might properly have inferred that United was not obliged to accept noncomplying delivery for the entire ten-year term, and that Stinnes had the benefit of such continued purchases as United chose to make. Stinnes made a profit on each sale, and hoped, it is apparent, to work out matters in such fashion as to benefit by the full term of the contract. Whether United's continued negotiations and ultimate cancellation of the contract negate the existence of the hold-harmless agreement was for the jury to determine; those circumstances do not necessarily betray a failure of consideration for Stinnes' promise. 61 United also contends that, because Stinnes subsequently refused to reimburse United for its losses, the hold-harmless promise was a false or deceptive act or practice giving rise to a cause of action for treble damages and attorney's fees under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Act. Tex.Bus. & Comm.Code Secs. 17.46, 17.50. The district court properly directed a verdict against United on this claim. Those provisions of the Act protect only consumers. 29 At the time of the alleged promise, 30 insofar as is here relevant, it defined consumer as a corporation who ... acquires by purchase ... any goods, and goods as tangible chattels ... purchased ... for use. Tex.Bus. & Comm.Code Sec. 17.45. United was not a consumer, as thus defined, for it did not purchase oil not for use but for resale. 31 Moreover, United has not directed our attention to any evidence in the record of any false, misleading, or deceptive acts by Stinnes. The mere insistence on litigation to determine one's obligations hardly constitutes such a practice. Stinnes's denial of the contract, although insufficient to earn a directed verdict, was not patently frivolous.