Opinion ID: 1264924
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hawai`i Law Recognizes A Claim Of NIED Where An Individual Can Prove Exposure To HIV-Positive Blood.

Text: A majority of the jurisdictions that have addressed the issue has determined, either expressly or by implication, that, where a plaintiff is actually exposed to HIV, he or she may state a claim for fear of contracting AIDS. [8] See, e.g., Burk v. Sage Products, Inc., 747 F.Supp. 285, 286 (E.D.Pa. 1990) (noting that [a] plaintiff must show exposure to the AIDS virus before he can recover for emotional distress); Kerins v. Hartley, 27 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1074, 33 Cal. Rptr.2d 172, 179 (Cal.Ct.App.1994) (holding that, in the absence of physical injury or illness, damages for fear of AIDS may be recovered only if the plaintiff is exposed to HIV or AIDS); Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1363 (Del.1995) (finding that, without actual exposure to HIV, the risk of its transmission is so minute that any fear of contracting AIDS is per se unreasonable); Russaw v. Martin, 221 Ga.App. 683, 472 S.E.2d 508 (1996) (noting that to allow recovery for emotional injuries and mental anguish, without any proof whatsoever that [the plaintiff] was actually exposed to HIV ... is per se unreasonable); Majca v. Beekil, 183 Ill.2d 407, 233 Ill.Dec. 810, 701 N.E.2d 1084, 1090 (1998) (examining claims for fear of AIDS in light of [the] plaintiffs' actual exposure to AIDS); Reynolds v. Highland Manor, Inc., 24 Kan.App.2d 859, 954 P.2d 11, 16 (1998) (adopting the requirement that plaintiffs must demonstrate actual exposure to HIV in order to maintain an action based on fear of acquiring AIDS); Falcon v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 729 So.2d 1169, 1173 (La.Ct.App.1999) (holding that, in order to establish a cause of action [for NIED based on fear of AIDS], a plaintiff must be able to demonstrate the presence of HIV ... and a channel of exposure or infection); K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 559-60 (adopting an actual exposure requirement for recovery for emotional damages based on fear of AIDS); Pendergist v. Pendergrass, 961 S.W.2d 919, 925-26 (Mo.Ct.App.1998) (adopting an actual exposure rule in fear of AIDS cases for NIED recovery); Brown, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 886 (concluding that a plaintiff who has not tested seropositive must offer proof of `actual exposure' for cause of action due to fear of AIDS); Fosby v. Albany Memorial Hosp., 252 A.D.2d 606, 675 N.Y.S.2d 231, 232 (N.Y.App.Div.1998) (noting that a plaintiff who is not HIV positive does not have a viable claim [for NIED] unless there is proof of actual exposure); Seimon v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 91 Ohio App.3d 323, 632 N.E.2d 603, 605 (1993) (noting that, absent some showing of exposure to HIV as a proximate cause of emotional distress, plaintiffs may not recover); Carroll, 868 S.W.2d at 594 (holding that, [i]n order to recover emotional damages based on the fear of contracting AIDS, the plaintiff must prove... that he or she was actually exposed to AIDS); Drury v. Baptist Mem. Hosp. System, 933 S.W.2d 668, 674-75 (Tex.App.1996) (noting that fear of contracting HIV and AIDS should be reasonably based upon circumstances showing actual exposure to the disease causing agent); Funeral Services By Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Community Hosp., 186 W.Va. 424, 413 S.E.2d 79, 84 (1991) (concluding that the court would not recognize a legally compensable injury where there is no evidence of an actual exposure to HIV), overruled on other grounds by Courtney v. Courtney, 190 W.Va. 126, 437 S.E.2d 436 (1993); cf. Babich v. Waukesha Mem. Hosp., Inc., 205 Wis.2d 698, 556 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Ct.App.1996) (requiring plaintiffs seeking damages for emotional distress arising out of needlestick injuries (and other puncture wounds) to prove that the device which wounded them came from a contaminated source). We agree that exposure is aptly defined as proof of both a scientifically accepted transmission of [HIV]... and that the source of the allegedly transmitted blood or fluid was in fact HIV-positive[.] Brown, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 886; see also Falcon, 729 So.2d at 1173 (holding that a plaintiff must demonstrate the presence of HIV and a channel of exposure or infection to recover for NIED based on fear of AIDS). Exposure to HIV-positive blood makes the threat of infection much more of a real possibility to be feared and far more than a speculative worry. Brown, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 886 (citation omitted). As such, exposure to HIV-positive blood involve[s] circumstances which guarantee the genuineness and seriousness of the claim. Rodrigues, 52 Haw. at 171, 472 P.2d at 519. Inasmuch as actual exposure to HIV-positive blood would in fact pose a direct, immediate, and serious threat to an individual's personal safety, such exposure would foreseeably engender serious mental distress in a reasonable person. [9] Accordingly, we hold that a plaintiff states a claim of NIED for which relief may be granted where he or she alleges, inter alia, actual exposure to HIV-positive blood, whether or not there is a predicate physical harm. Thus, assuming that the other elements of NIED are proved, a plaintiff is entitled to a recovery if such actual exposure is proved as well. We emphasize, assuming that a plaintiff has been exposed to HIV-positive blood, that liability will attach only to the extent that the resulting mental distress is within the range of that experienced by a reasonable person under the same circumstances. See Rodrigues, 52 Haw. at 173, 472 P.2d at 520. Moreover, any damages recoverable for NIED should be confined to the time between discovery of the actual exposure and the receipt of a reliable negative medical diagnosis. See Carroll, 868 S.W.2d at 594 (confining recovery for NIED to the period between discovery of exposure and a negative medical diagnosis); see also Majca, 233 Ill.Dec. 810, 701 N.E.2d at 1091.