Opinion ID: 2521459
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Silent-record cases

Text: Truly silent-record cases are those that show no express advisement and waiver of the Boykin-Tahl rights before a defendant's admission of a prior conviction. ( People v. Stills (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1766, 1769-1771, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 486 [without any rights advisements or waivers the defendant was asked if he admitted priors]; see also People v. Campbell (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 305, 309-310, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 315 [after conviction by jury on the substantive offense, the defendant, who received no admonishments and gave no waivers, admitted each of four alleged priors]; People v. Moore (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 411, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 286 [after conviction by jury on the substantive offense, the defendant, who received no admonishments and gave no waivers, admitted a prior conviction of assault with a deadly weapon and a prior prison term].) Although the record was not entirely silent in People v. Johnson (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 169, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 650, it was so nearly silent as to be indistinguishable from the three cases just cited. A jury convicted the defendant of three crimes, but before the jury was excused the trial court took the defendant's admission to having two prior convictions and having served a prior prison term. The court did so without admonishing the defendant of his right to a trial on the priors at which he could confront witnesses and need not testify. ( Id. at p. 177, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 650.) The court made a fleeting reference to `whether or not you want a jury trial,' and without waiting for a response, the court then immediately asked the defendant, `[W]ere you convicted?' The defendant admitted the priors. ( Ibid. ) Under the totality of circumstances, the Court of Appeal in Johnson had no doubt that the defendant was in fact aware of his right to a jury trial, his right to confront witnesses, and his right to remain silent, all of which he had just exercised in trial. ( Id. at p. 178, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 650.) Nonetheless, absent any advisement of those rights, the Court of Appeal concluded that it was impossible to determine whether the defendant not only was aware of these rights, but also was prepared to waive them as a condition to admitting his prior offenses ( ibid. ), thus rendering the defendant's admission of the priors neither intelligent nor voluntary. In all of the cases just discussed a jury trial on a substantive offense preceded the defendants' admissions of prior convictions. These defendants were not told on the record of their right to trial to determine the truth of a prior conviction allegation. Nor did they expressly waive their right to trial. In such cases, in which the defendant was not advised of the right to have a trial on an alleged prior conviction, we cannot infer that in admitting the prior the defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived that right as well as the associated rights to silence and confrontation of witnesses.