Opinion ID: 2446427
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's Claim of Defense of Premises

Text: The defendant next contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to set aside the verdict on the grounds that the State failed to rebut his claim of defense of premises under RSA 627:7 (2007). Specifically, he asserts that Harris criminally trespassed on his property, see RSA 635:2 (2007), and, therefore, he was justified in using non-deadly force to persuade her to leave. According to the defendant, use of non-deadly force to terminate a trespass is  per se reasonable under RSA 627:7. The State counters that the defendant's waving of the gun was unreasonable and constituted deadly force. We will uphold a trial court's denial of a motion to set aside the verdict unless its ruling was made without evidence or constituted an unsustainable exercise of discretion. State v. Kousounadis, 159 N.H. 413, 421, 986 A.2d 603 (2009). To overturn the trial court's decision, the defendant must establish that no rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Gruber, 132 N.H. 83, 92, 562 A.2d 156 (1989). RSA 627:7, entitled Use of Force in Defense of Premises, governs when a person is justified in using non-deadly force to terminate the commission of a criminal trespass. It states, in relevant part: A person in possession or control of premises or a person who is licensed or privileged to be thereon is justified in using non-deadly force upon another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to prevent or terminate the commission of a criminal trespass by such other in or upon such premises. . . . The defendant raised this justification at trial. Thus, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it was unreasonable for the defendant to believe it necessary to . . . terminate the commission of [the] criminal trespass by using non-deadly force. RSA 627:7; see RSA 626:7, I(a) (2007). Assuming without deciding that the defendant's actions constituted non-deadly force, we focus our analysis upon whether it was reasonable for the defendant to believe it necessary to use such force. Whether the defendant's belief was reasonable is determined by an objective standard. See State v. Cunningham, 159 N.H. 103, 107, 977 A.2d 506 (2009) (construing comparable language in statute concerning use of force by correctional officers). A belief that is unreasonable, even though honest, will not support the defense. Id. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational juror could have found that the defendant's belief that it was necessary to wave his pistol to terminate Harris's trespass was not objectively reasonable. While Harris drove past no trespassing signs onto the defendant's property, she had been given directions to follow the roads with these signs by the defendant's niece, who had then telephoned the defendant to tell him that Harris was going to look at the Viano property and might stop at his property, and that she was driving a Ford Ranger. Cf. State v. Gilbert, 473 A.2d 1273, 1275-76 (Me.1984) (upholding the trial court's denial of a motion to acquit in a criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon case where evidence demonstrated that the victim was invited and expected at the defendant's home and, thus, was neither a trespasser nor reasonably perceived as such by the defendant). Harris also testified about her exchange with the defendant on arriving at the property. She testified that she asked the defendant if he was the boyfriend of the woman selling the property, and he responded by yelling get the F off my property and pointing a gun at her. We affirm the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict.