Opinion ID: 1980967
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Due Process Inquiry

Text: A. To determine whether a retrial would violate the right to due process, the trial court must (1) evaluate the impact of the appeal period on the appellant. [18] If the impact has been prejudicial, the court shall (2) decide whether the relationship between (a) the nature and severity of the prejudice and (b) the government's alleged responsibility for it by delaying the appeal, warrants dismissal of the information or indictment under the Fifth Amendment. See Lovasco, supra, 431 U.S. at 789-90, 97 S.Ct. at 2048-49; Williams, supra at 355. Several aspects of this approach should be addressed. First, prejudice to a fair retrial is not necessarily congruent with the prejudice attributable to denial of a speedy trial. Prejudice to defense preparation, of course, is obviously a factor in common; and, under some circumstances, incarceration can implicate due process, as well as the right to a speedy trial, but its adverse impact on the ability to prepare for trial. See Day v. United States, D.C.App., 390 A.2d 957, 972 (1978). Nonetheless, we cannot say categorically that the right to a fair trial will be affected by a defendant's incarceration let alone by anxiety  two types of prejudice given Sixth Amendment significance. See Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at 532-33, 92 S.Ct. at 2193. [19] We therefore leave to case-by-case analysis the determination of the kinds of prejudice relevant to considering whether a retrial would offend due process. Second, in calling for evaluation of the impact of the appeal period on the appellant, we intend an evaluation of prejudice arising at any time after the notice of appeal has been filed. The trial court, however, eventually may conclude that identifiable prejudice has arisen so early during the appeal period that it cannot properly be attributed to delay; but that determination cannot accurately be made until all possible prejudice has been identified. Thus, the trial court should proceed to the second inquiry if any prejudice is demonstrated. [20] Third, some prejudice can be so unrelated to a fair retrial  or in any event so minimal  that the court may find the nature and/or severity of the prejudice insufficient to justify further inquiry into the government's alleged responsibility for prejudicial delay. Finally, if the trial court finds prejudice during the appeal period sufficient to trigger an inquiry as to whether government delay is responsible, the nature of that inquiry will depend on the type of government delay alleged. If, for example, the alleged delay stems from a missing transcript, or from this court's processing in the clerk's office, or from continuances in the briefing schedule, then the reasons for the time taken can be checked easily and used objectively to evaluate whether, under the circumstances, the government should be held responsible for taking too long. But if the alleged delay, as in this case, is attributable primarily to the period when this court has taken the case under advisement, an objective evaluation would be virtually impossible. The circumstances are likely to be complex, even elusive; but even more fundamentally, at least two institutional considerations inherently contribute to the likelihood of a substantial period of deliberation (or at least a longer period than a trial court is likely to take when a matter of some complexity has been argued). First, there is the need for several judges at the appellate level to collaborate on a satisfactory disposition, with the attendant possibilities of initial disagreement, post-argument debate, revisions of draft opinions, changes of mind, and even dissent. Second, the appellate court's lawmaking function  the process by which precedents are reconsidered and rules are developed  is inherently time-consuming, for the court must consider the potential impact of its decision beyond the case at issue. These factors do not always cause delay  indeed, the latter one is not always present  but it is true, nonetheless, that the deliberative process on appeal has dimensions which legitimately can require substantial time in addition to any delay attributable simply to the volume of cases on the docket. [21] In light of these institutional considerations, as well as the complexity of evaluating the reasonableness of deliberation time for any particular case, we believe it would be inappropriate and counter-productive to permit scrutiny of the deliberative period. Accordingly, in the event that the length of appellate deliberation becomes material to determining whether prejudice is fairly attributable to the government and, if so, is sufficient to warrant dismissal, objective norms will have to be established defining a generally-acceptable timetable for appellate decision-making, such that delay for due process purposes begins to run once that time frame has been exceeded. [22] B. With this background we turn, now, to the facts of this case. The period between notice of appeal (May 8, 1975) and this court's mandate (February 13, 1978) was divided as follows: notice of appeal to filing of transcript May 8-June 24, 1975 1½ months filing of transcript through briefing June 24, 1975-March to oral argument 18, 1976 9 months oral argument to decision and order by March 18, 1976-January three-judge division 20, 1978 22 months decision and order to January 20-February issuance of mandate 13, 1978 ¾ month ------------ 33¼ months The trial court noted that, because of the time taken on appeal, Alston had been incarcerated for approximately thirty months (including almost 24 months after he filed a notice of appeal). The court acknowledged that this incarceration stemmed from the revocation of Alston's probation for a prior offense, and that his sentence for that offense was to run concurrently with the sentence in this case. The court nonetheless found the prejudice from incarceration attributable to appellate delay in this case, since [t]he revocation of his probation ... occurred only after his subsequently reversed conviction in the instant case. Even if we assume, without deciding, that Alston's incarceration could contribute to a violation of due process, [23] this finding of prejudice is plainly wrong. D.C.Code 1973, § 17-305(a). Although it is true that Alston's probation for a prior offense was not revoked until May 9, 1975, after he had been convicted and sentenced on the charge underlying the present case, it is also true that the conviction itself triggered the revocation, see D.C.Code 1973, §§ 24-205, 24-206, which would have occurred without regard to the length of the appeal. In order for Alston's claim of prejudice from incarceration to have force, therefore, we would have to accept the proposition that Alston could have sustained the burden of convincing the authorities that he should be (1) paroled on the prior offense immediately upon this court's (earlier) reversal of his conviction in the present case, see D.C.Code 1973, § 24-204, and (2) released pending retrial in this case, see D.C.Code 1973, § 23-1321  results which are far from automatic. More than likely, Alston would have remained incarcerated because of the prior and/or present charges. We cannot assume to the contrary. The question then becomes whether, if there had been a more rapid appellate process, Alston could have expected retrial and release, if acquitted, before April 1977, when he actually was paroled. Although it is possible that this court's decision followed by retrial, acquittal, and release could have occurred before April 1977 (23 months from the date of conviction), that is a speculative proposition. We cannot conclude that Alston was prejudiced from incarceration based on that mere possibility. Accordingly, because there is no demonstrable relationship between Alston's incarceration and his appellate delay claim, this trial court finding of prejudice cannot stand. The trial court found a second kind of prejudice: appellant may no longer be eligible for sentencing under the Youth Corrections Act if he is convicted following a second trial [Finding 13]. Loss of the opportunity to be considered for youthful offender treatment is prejudice of a sort germane to speedy trial analysis. See United States v. Roberts, 515 F.2d 642, 646 (2d Cir. 1975). Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that prejudice to sentencing or other dispositional alternatives is germane to due process analysis, we perceive no such prejudice here. Alston turned 22 in January 1976, seven months into the appellate briefing period. Thus, it is most unlikely that this court, under the best of circumstances, could have acted expeditiously enough to save his Youth Corrections Act eligibility, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 5006(d), 5010 (1976), and there is no evidence that Alston called the problem to this court's attention. [24] Accordingly, the finding of prejudice from possible ineligibility under the Youth Corrections Act is also plainly wrong. D.C.Code 1973, § 17-305(a). It is important to note, finally, that although the trial judge alluded generally to the usual fading memory of witnesses, he did not find specific prejudice to defense preparation from the delay. In fact, the very basis for Alston's earlier successful appeal  a request to use the record of codefendant Burton's plea-hearing testimony at trial  reflects evidence which is still available for use in its original form. See United States v. Sarvis, 173 U.S.App.D.C. 228, 233, 523 F.2d 1177, 1182 (1975). [25] We are therefore left with only the trial court's finding that Alston has suffered an undue amount of anxiety and concern because of the delay since the first trial  a finding we accept. See D.C.Code 1973, § 17-305(a). The question then becomes whether anxiety and concern, without more, are enough to implicate due process. We conclude that emotional distress, when derived primarily from a lengthy period of appellate deliberation, does not in itself constitute prejudice sufficient to offend due process. It cannot be related to the constitutional guarantee of a fair retrial. Moreover, if the appropriate length of appellate deliberation had to be tested by reference to a particular appellant's generalized anxiety, the appellate court would have no reliable guide, and its priorities could not be rationally ordered. [26]