Opinion ID: 1406453
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence and Findings of Bodily Injury to the Victim of the Robbery and to the Occupant of the Burglarized Premises

Text: We deal initially with defendant's contention that there is no evidence or finding that he inflicted, with intent to do so, great bodily injury upon the victim of the robbery. The information charges that defendant by means of force or fear took personal property from the person, possession and immediate presence of Jon [ sic ] Keating, and in the course of the robbery, with the intent to inflict great bodily injury upon Charles Burk, did inflict great bodily injury upon Charles Burk. The pertinent portions of section 213 provide for increased punishment in the case of a defendant who is found to be guilty of robbery if the trier of fact also finds upon proper allegations that such person with the intent to inflict such injury, inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim of the robbery. [3] (1a) Defendant makes two attacks on the conclusion that he intentionally injured the victim of the robbery. First, the alleged victim as charged in the information is John Keating, who in fact suffered no bodily injury, and the injury which was suffered by Charles Burk, not alleged as a victim of the robbery, cannot be substituted in lieu of injury to Keating. Second, even if it is assumed that section 213 encompasses an injury during the course of a robbery inflicted on a person other than the one from whom personal property is taken, the evidence is nevertheless insufficient to establish that defendant intended to inflict great bodily injury on Burk. In attempting to refute defendant's first contention that it was not alleged that Burk was a victim of the robbery, the People contend that Burk was in fact a victim on the record presented. They argue that as a security guard on duty Burk had constructive possession of the personal property he was charged with safekeeping, and that the jewelry was taken by force from his immediate presence. (2) Robbery is an offense against the person; thus a store employee may be the victim of a robbery even though he is not its owner and not at the moment in immediate control of the stolen property. ( People v. Johnson (1974) 38 Cal. App.3d 1, 9 [112 Cal. Rptr. 834].) Robbery convictions have been upheld against contentions that janitors and night watchmen did not have a sufficient possessory interest in their employer's personal property to qualify as victims. ( People v. Downs (1952) 114 Cal. App.2d 758, 765-766 [251 P.2d 369]; People v. Dean (1924) 66 Cal. App. 602, 607 [226 P. 943].) Even a visitor in a store who was forced to remove and surrender money from the store's cash box was held to be a victim of the robbery. ( People v. Moore (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 668, 670-671 [84 Cal. Rptr. 771].) Defendant would distinguish the foregoing cases on the ground that the victims of the robberies in those cases were the only persons present at the times of the robberies and, accordingly, were the only persons who could have been vested with constructive possession and from whom the personal property could have been taken. (3) But the distinction is not one which excludes Burk as a potential robbery victim. He had constructive possession at the time of the robbery in the same sense as did the night watchman at the time of the robbery in Dean. The fact that there were other persons present in the store who also had constructive possession of the personal property is not relevant as more than one person may constructively possess personal property at the same time and be a victim of the same offender. (See People v. Johnson, supra, 38 Cal. App.3d 1, 9.) Thus Burk had constructive possession of the property taken and could properly have been alleged to be a victim. [4] (1b) Notwithstanding the fact that Burk could have been designated a victim of the robbery, he was not expressly so designated in the information. Section 213 provides in pertinent part that if a defendant inflicted great bodily injury on the victim of the robbery, such fact shall be charged in the indictment or information and if found to be true the defendant shall suffer the augmented penalty. (See fn. 3, ante, italics added.) The People would have us read into the information language which designates Burk as a victim by adding after the allegation that defendant did inflict great bodily injury upon Charles Burk, the phrase another victim of the robbery. The information otherwise in no way describes the role of Burk in the robbery; for all that appears as to the events constituting the robbery he may have been a complete stranger who was unintentionally and accidentally injured during the course of the commission of the crime. [5] (4) Although an allegation of the existence of the circumstances which warrant the increased punishment provided by section 213 does not itself constitute the allegation of a substantive crime, nevertheless if such augmented punishment is to be imposed all the elements which are necessary to the imposition of that punishment must be alleged and found to be true. One such necessary element is great bodily injury to a victim of the robbery. It is not enough that Burk falls within that class of persons who may have been alleged to be a victim; the trier of fact must have found him to be a victim on pleadings and instructions which properly framed the issue. (1c) Here the jury found only that defendant did inflict great bodily injury as alleged in ... the information. [6] As the information charged only injury to Burk without alleging his status, we cannot conclude that the jury found Burk to be a victim of the robbery, and we do not elect to impute such a finding by the jury through the device of adding substantive language to the information. Accordingly, the finding of great bodily injury to Burk cannot sustain the imposition of the increased punishment for robbery. (5) Defendant was also found to have inflicted great bodily injury on Burk in the course of the commission of the burglary. Section 461 provides for increased punishment for a person convicted of a burglary if in the course of the burglary with intent to inflict such injury he inflicted great bodily injury on any occupant of the premises burglarized, and such facts are charged in the indictment or information. [7] The information charged defendant with the commission of a burglary at the jewelry store during the course of the commission of which he with intent to inflict great bodily injury, did inflict great bodily injury upon Charles Burk. The jury was properly instructed in terms of section 461 and the jury found that defendant inflicted the injury as alleged in the burglary count of the information. [8] It thus appears that although defendant must be relieved of the imposition of the augmented penalty for the robbery, he cannot be relieved of the augmented penalty for the burglary. Both sections 213 and 461 require the imposition of a term of 15 years to life when findings are made in accordance with the provisions thereof. Defendant also contends that he cannot be held for the augmented penalty for the reason that the evidence does not support a finding that he specifically intended to inflict Burk's injuries. Although defendant appears to argue this contention only with respect to the robbery count, the issue is equally presented with respect to the burglary count. Defendant's argument is that the gun was first discharged while he grappled with Burk for its possession and that those circumstances precluded a finding that he intentionally sought to injure Burk. But defendant fired the second shot while Burk was falling backwards and defendant cannot reasonably argue that such shot was unintended. He argues instead that this shot which struck and pierced Burk's right arm near the elbow did not cause great bodily injury. Defendant's contentions are without merit. The jury might well have found that defendant intentionally fired both shots with intent to cause injury. According to Burk's testimony he was rising from the floor when defendant first pulled the trigger, and Burk was falling away when defendant fired the second shot. Both Burk's chest wound and the damage caused by the bullet which pierced Burk's arm could reasonably have been found by the jurors to constitute great bodily injuries. That term has been defined as meaning significant or substantial bodily injury or damage as distinguished from trivial or insignificant injury or moderate harm (see People v. Wells (1971) 14 Cal. App.3d 348, 360 [92 Cal. Rptr. 191]), and the jurors were so instructed in the instant case. In view of Burk's injuries and the circumstances under which they were inflicted the finding of intentional infliction of great bodily injury was manifestly proper. (6) Defendant further challenges the finding that he intentionally inflicted Burk's injuries on the ground that the trial court failed to instruct the jurors properly on proof by circumstantial evidence of a specific intent to injure. The court refused to instruct the jurors in terms of CALJIC No. 2.02, as proposed by defendant. Defendant's instant contention might be rejected on the ground that as proposed the instruction appears to relate to one of the substantive counts rather than to a finding relating to section 213, 461 or both of such sections. [9] As to the substantive counts, the People did not depend on circumstantial evidence and the instruction, if proposed in that connection, was properly refused. ( People v. Malbrough (1961) 55 Cal.2d 249, 250-251 [10 Cal. Rptr. 632, 359 P.2d 30].) Moreover, the court expressly instructed on the proof necessary to support a finding that defendant intentionally inflicted great bodily injury. Thus the jurors were instructed that they must find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant entertained a specific intent to inflict such injury and that the intent with which an act is done is shown by the circumstances attending the act, the manner in which it is done, the means used, and the soundness of mind and discretion of the person committing the act. (See CALJIC No. 3.34.) In view of the foregoing the jury was properly instructed in the prevailing circumstances and, on the record, defendant cannot complain of adverse findings on the issue of his intent to commit great bodily injury.