Opinion ID: 2995692
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: U.S.S.G. sec. 3C1.1 Obstruction of

Text: Justice In determining if the sentencing enhancement was properly applied we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error. E.g., United States v. Carrera, 259 F.3d 818, 831 (7th Cir. 2001). The prosecution must establish that the enhancement is applicable by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Ewing, 129 F.3d 430, 434 (7th Cir. 1997). Section 3C1.1 provides: If (A) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and (B) the obstructive conduct related to (i) the defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (ii) a closely related offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels. U.S.S.G. sec. 3C.1.1.
Lisa Templin, after being confronted by federal agents about her involvement in the conspiracy, agreed to cooperate with the agents and make controlled buys in 1999. Templin set up a controlled buy, and the following day Victor Matias, Jr.’s home was searched and he was arrested. Evidently Matias, Jr. put two and two together and called Hector Carrasco, told Carrasco Lisa had informed on him, and that Carrasco should tell her to knock it off. After posting bond Victor Matias, Jr. and Douglas Martin visited Lisa Templin at home. Templin’s roommate answered the door and Martin restrained her while Matias, Jr. confronted Templin. Martin argues that there is no direct proof that he was at the residence because Lisa Templin only relayed what her roommate told her happened and did not see Martin herself. [T]he Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply at sentencing hearings and the judge may consider information that would not be admissible at trial, including uncorroborated hearsay. Smith, 280 F.3d at 810. The district court concluded that Martin attempted to obstruct justice by aiding and abetting Matias, Jr.’s efforts to intimidate Lisa Templin and by restraining Templin’s roommate. See U.S.S.G. sec. 3C1.1, Application Note 9 (Under this section, the defendant is accountable for his own conduct and for conduct that he aided or abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused.). The district court’s findings are sufficient to impose the enhancement and there was no clear error.
In 1997, Michael Sutton was a cooperating informant who made a series of controlled buys from the defendants wearing a recording device. In June 1997, Melvin Alicea heard that Sutton might have said something [to the police] about their deals. Melvin told Sutton that [talking to the police] was a good way to get a bullet in the head. Melvin was found to have obstructed the investigation by threatening Sutton. Melvin argues that in order for the guideline to apply he would have to know or believe than an investigation is underway, otherwise there is no willful violation. For support he cites United States v. Oppendahl, 998 F.2d 584, 586 (8th Cir. 1993), which held the term ’willfully’ [in U.S.S.G. sec. 3C1.1(A)] should be reserved for the more serious case, where misconduct occurs with knowledge of an investigation, or at least with a correct belief that an investigation is probably underway. However, this circuit has already ruled that knowledge of an investigation is not required for a willful violation to occur. United States v. Snyder, 189 F.3d 640, 648 (7th Cir. 1999) (It is clear, however, that a defendant need not know that he is under investigation at the time of the obstructive conduct.); United States v. Schmidt, 47 F.3d 188, 192 n.3 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Polland, 994 F.2d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1993); accord United States v. Jenkins, 275 F.3d 283, 288-89 (3d Cir. 2001). The term willful does not mean knowing or aware, it means intentionally or deliberately. Jenkins, 275 F.3d at 287- 88 (holding that [i]n view of the language, structure, and context of U.S.S.G. sec. 3C1.1, we believe the ordinary meaning of ’willfully’ is ’deliberately or intentionally’); cf. Ewing, 129 F.3d at 434-35. Thus, a defendant does not need to know or be aware that an investigation is underway, rather he need only intentionally or deliberately impede or attempt to obstruct justice for the enhancement to apply. Jenkins, 275 F.3d at 287-88. Accepting Melvin Alicea’s contention would allow defendants to threaten witnesses and informants with impunity if they simply argue they did not know the police were attempting to catch them conducting dangerous illegal activity. The obstruction of justice enhancement in section 3C1.1 is not dependent on a defendant’s subjective knowledge and its scope is not so narrow; otherwise every defendant would be able to avoid its imposition by claiming lack of knowledge. See Snyder, 189 F.3d at 648-49; Polland, 994 F.2d at 1269; U.S.S.G. sec. 3C1.1 (providing that the enhancement shall be applied if: (A) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction) (emphasis added); U.S.S.G. sec. 3C1.1, Application Note 4 (listing conduct the adjustment applies to including: (a) threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully influencing a co-defendant, witness, or juror, directly or indirectly, or attempting to do so) (emphasis added); Ewing, 129 F.3d at 435. Moreover, Oppendahl provides little support for Melvin Alicea’s proposition considering the district court’s finding that Melvin made the threat because he believed an investigation was underway. Oppendahl, 998 F.2d at 586 (conceding misconduct occurs [when a defendant obstructs or attempts to obstruct justice] . . . with a correct belief that an investigation is probably underway). As the district court noted, Melvin Alicea made a threat to the confidential informant, [or] at least the person to whom Mr. Alicea believed to be a confidential informant. The district court’s findings fully support the imposition of the enhancement and are not clearly erroneous.
Victor Alicea moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the search of his home on the grounds that he never gave consent to search. Victor submitted an affidavit in support of his motion stating that the officers never asked for consent to search and he never gave consent to search. In the alternative, Victor stated that if he gave consent, it was not voluntary. Special Agent Paul Byal testified to the contrary. In addition to the affidavit, Magistrate Judge Stephen Crocker heard testimony from Victor at the evidentiary hearing. The magistrate judge found that Victor did consent to the search and specifically that he did not believe Vic tor’s assertion that he did not consent; however, he also concluded that the consent was not voluntary, based on the stressful circumstances, and recommended suppressing the evidence. The district court found the consent to search was voluntarily given and refused to suppress the evidence. The enhancement may be imposed for: providing materially false information to a judge or magistrate. U.S.S.G. sec. 3C1.1, Application Note 4(f). In the perjury context, which is akin to providing false information to a judge, we have required the district court to find the three elements of: (1) falsity; (2) willfulness; and (3) materiality.