Opinion ID: 1890965
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: issues raised by baham

Text: Baham makes three arguments concerning his AAWA conviction: (1) that there was insufficient evidence that Mr. Brown suffered serious bodily injury; (2) that the trial court committed plain error by failing to define serious bodily injury in its jury instructions; and (3) that the court erred by not instructing the jury on simple assault as a lesser included offense of AAWA. For the following reasons, we reject all of these arguments. [12]
When moving for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the government's case, Baham's counsel argued with respect to the AAWA count that the government had failed to prove serious bodily injury, an essential element of AAWA. The court denied the motion. Baham renews that contention on appeal. Serious bodily injury is not defined in the aggravated assault statute, D.C.Code § 22-504.1 (1996), [13] but the definition found in the sexual abuse statute has been applied to aggravated assault. See Nixon v. United States, 730 A.2d 145, 150 (D.C.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 899, 120 S.Ct. 233, 145 L.Ed.2d 196 (1999). The sexual abuse statute says: Serious bodily injury means bodily injury that involves a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty. D.C.Code § 22-4101(7) (1996). [14] Baham argues that Brown suffered no serious bodily injury, since he spent only two days in the hospital [15] and his CAT scans were all negative. In making this argument, Baham relies chiefly on Nixon, in which we held there was insufficient evidence of serious bodily injury even though the victims suffered gunshot wounds. Because being shot is more serious than being hit on the head, reasons Baham, the trial court should not have denied his motion. Baham's reliance on Nixon is misplaced because in Nixon we did not express any opinion as to the seriousness of the gunshot wounds suffered. Rather, we reversed the AAWA conviction in Nixon because neither victim testified, and there was no medical testimony or documentation to establish that the gunshot wounds fit the definition of serious bodily injury. See Nixon, 730 A.2d at 151. Consequently, the jury was left to speculate about whether the victims' injuries were serious bodily injuries within the meaning of the aggravated assault statute. In the present case, however, there was testimony by the victim that he lost consciousness from multiple blows to his head. Thus the situation here is more like that in Gathy v. United States, 754 A.2d 912 (D.C.2000), in which the victim, who was slashed across the face with a broken beer bottle, testified that he was semi-unconscious, in total shock, and [not] totally coherent. In light of this testimony, we held that a reasonable juror could reasonably conclude that there was a `substantial risk of unconsciousness.' Id. at 918. By analogy, a reasonable juror in the case at bar could conclude, from Brown's similar testimony, that there was not merely a substantial risk of unconsciousness, but an actual loss of consciousness, thus placing his injuries squarely within the statutory definition of serious bodily injury. [16]
Baham further argues that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to define serious bodily injury in its instructions to the jury. [T]rial courts must instruct juries on the definition of serious bodily injury in aggravated assault cases. Riddick v. United States, 806 A.2d 631, 638 (D.C.2002) (citation omitted); accord, Hudson v. United States, 790 A.2d 531, 533 (D.C.2002); Zeledon v. United States, 770 A.2d 972, 976 (D.C.2001). Thus there can be no doubt that the court's failure to do so was error. Whether this error warrants reversal, however, depends in large part on the applicable standard of review. Because Baham's counsel did not object to the jury instructions, his present argument must be assessed under the plain error standard. See Zeledon, 770 A.2d at 974. Under that standard, as set forth in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993), Baham not only must establish error, but also must show that the error was plain and that it affect[ed] substantial rights. See Wilson v. United States, 785 A.2d 321, 326 (D.C.2001) (citation omitted). Additionally, even if Baham satisfies these three hurdles, he must then show either a `miscarriage of justice,' that is, actual innocence; or that the trial court's error `seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' Id. (citations omitted). Although this issue has arisen in other cases, we have not yet decided whether such an error is plain. Instead, in every case thus far we have based our decision on other parts of the Olano plain error standard. Thus, for example, in Wilson we held that the defendant's substantial rights were not affected because the trial court instructed the jury on each element of aggravated assault. Wilson, 785 A.2d at 327. [17] Furthermore, even if the trial court in Wilson had defined serious bodily injury, we found it unreasonable, in light of the evidence, to conclude that a juror who voted to convict [the defendant] under the instruction given by the trial judge would have acquitted him of aggravated assault because of insufficient evidence of `serious bodily injury.' Id. at 328; see also Riddick, 806 A.2d at 639 (we are not persuaded that his conviction amounted to a `miscarriage of justice', or that the `fairness and integrity' of judicial proceedings will be undermined ... in light of the trial court's complete enumeration of all the elements of the crime of aggravated assault ... and ample evidence of the seriousness of the assault (citations omitted)). The course we followed in Wilson and Riddick is appropriate here as well. The jury was instructed on each element of AAWA, and there is no reason to believe that the jury would have voted to acquit, given Brown's testimony that he lost consciousness. Thus Baham's substantial rights were not affected. In addition, in light of the overwhelming evidence against him which we have already summarized, Baham cannot establish the final element of plain error  that is, actual innocence or a miscarriage of justice.
The trial court agreed to instruct the jury on simple assault as a lesser included offense of ADW, but did not do so for AAWA. Baham argues that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on both simple assault and ADW as lesser included offenses of AAWA. We hold that the trial court did not err. Simple assault is a lesser included offense of ADW. Glymph v. United States, 490 A.2d 1157, 1158 (D.C.1985). The factual element which separates ADW from simple assault is the use of a weapon. Id. at 1160. ADW is, in turn, a lesser included offense of AAWA. Gathy, 754 A.2d at 919. However, before the court may instruct the jury on any lesser included offense, there must be evidence before the jury that would rationally support a finding that appellant committed the lesser offense but not the greater. Glymph, 490 A.2d at 1160. Because Baham struck Brown from behind, it is possible  regardless of Brown's belief that he was struck with the gun  that Baham used only his hands. See id. (because the victim did not see the object with which she was struck, there was clearly a rational basis for finding that appellant assaulted [her] with his hands, but not with a baseball bat). Thus, had Baham acted alone, a lesser included offense instruction on simple assault might have been warranted. But because Baham was, at a minimum, an aider and abettor of Beaner, whom Brown clearly saw standing in front of him with a pistol pointed at his stomach, there could have been no rational basis for the jury to find that a weapon was not used in the assault, regardless of whether Brown was ever struck. Accordingly, no lesser included offense instruction was warranted for AAWA. Indeed, the trial court was overly generous in instructing the jury on simple assault as a lesser included offense of ADW, but if that was error, it benefited Baham, so he cannot complain about it now.