Opinion ID: 1289123
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Family Court's Resolution

Text: This Court has consistently recognized that [o]ur general rule is that the circuit court which grants a divorce is vested by statute with continuing subject-matter jurisdiction to modify or alter its original order as to alimony and child support, as the changed circumstances of the parties may ... require. Douglas v. Douglas, 171 W.Va. 162, 163, 298 S.E.2d 135, 136-37 (1982) (citations omitted). West Virginia Code § 48-5-701 (2001) (Repl.Vol.2004) provides the statutory authority of a court to alter an award of alimony. [8] It provides as follows: After the entry of a final divorce order, the court may revise the order concerning spousal support or the maintenance of the parties and enter a new order concerning the same, as the circumstances of the parties may require. Further guidance is provided by West Virginia Code § 48-6-201(b) (2001) (Repl.Vol.2004), [9] stating, in pertinent part, as follows: Any award of periodic payments of spousal support shall be deemed to be judicially decreed and subject to subsequent modification unless there is some explicit, well expressed, clear, plain and unambiguous provision to the contrary set forth in the court-approved separation agreement or the order granting the divorce. Child support shall, under all circumstances, always be subject to continuing judicial modification. As explained in the factual recitation above, the only explicit, well expressed, clear, plain and unambiguous provision to the contrary contained in the separation agreement in the present case provides a prohibition on altering the waiver of alimony. W. Va.Code § 48-2-16(a). Such language does not affect the ability of a court to modify the exception to the waiver of alimony regarding the payment for health insurance. In syllabus point three of In re Estate of Hereford, 162 W.Va. 477, 250 S.E.2d 45 (1978), this Court explained as follows: In all domestic relations cases where the final order is entered after 1 February 1979 wherever the court provides for a periodic payment (alimony) to a party either by reference to a property settlement agreement in the divorce decree itself or by incorporation of the property settlement agreement into the decree, regardless of whether the words ratified, approved, confirmed, or merged are used, it shall be presumed that such award of periodic payments is judicially decreed alimony or alimony and child support, and unless there are specific words in the property settlement agreement or divorce decree to the contrary, any award of periodic payments shall be governed by the law of alimony and child support and not by contract law. Syllabus point five of Hereford stated: In all domestic relations cases where the final order is entered after 1 February 1979 there shall be no special legal effect in the divorce decree attached to the words merged, ratified, confirmed, approved, incorporated, etc., and where the parties and the court wish to do something other than award judicially decreed periodic payments for alimony or alimony and child support enforcement by contempt and subject to modification by the court, the parties must expressly set forth the different terms to which they agree and the court must expressly indicate his approval of their agreement. This Court has also consistently held that the party seeking the modification has the burden of showing that a substantial change of circumstances occurred. Goff v. Goff, 177 W.Va. 742, 746, 356 S.E.2d 496, 500 (1987); see also Hickman v. Hickman, 210 W.Va. 608, 558 S.E.2d 607 (2001); Price v. Price, 205 W.Va. 252, 517 S.E.2d 485 (1999); Zirkle v. Zirkle, 172 W.Va. 211, 304 S.E.2d 664 (1983). In the case sub judice, the objective of the language in the separation agreement regarding waiver of alimony with a specific exception was clearly to provide a certain amount of monetary support toward the payment of the Appellant's health insurance premiums, in lieu of a traditional alimony award, while also limiting the husband's obligation to a certain amount, as determined by the January 2003 premium. Thus, the separation agreement provided for the Appellant's waiver of a general alimony award, with the specific exception that the Appellee would pay health insurance premiums. By introducing evidence of inability to obtain health insurance, as well as the corresponding lack of any actual premium to be paid by the Appellee, the Appellant has met her burden of presenting a substantial change in circumstances, requiring alteration of the technical requirements of the separation agreement with regard to payment of premiums. Faced with this changed circumstance, the Family Court developed a remedy which would enforce the Appellee's obligation to the Appellant regarding monetary assistance with the acquisition of necessary health care. While the obligation instituted in the Family Court's order is not in the same form originally contemplated by the parties, the ultimate result neither added to nor detracted from the fundamental obligation to which the Appellee agreed in the separation agreement. The Family court merely formulated an alternative method by which the Appellee's obligation, set forth in Paragraph Twelve of the separation agreement, could be satisfied. No increased monetary obligation resulted. Based upon this Court's analysis of this matter, we find that the Circuit Court erred in finding that the Family Court lacked jurisdiction. On the contrary, we find that the Family Court order was correct in its resolution of the matters before it, and we remand this case to the Circuit Court of Wood County for entry of an order affirming the Family Court order. Reversed and Remanded with Directions.