Opinion ID: 4540186
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Drug Charges

Text: To make out a case of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), the government has to prove that the defendant[] knowingly and intentionally possessed, either actually or constructively, a controlled substance with the specific intent to distribute. United States v. García-Carrasquillo, 483 F.3d 124, 130 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. López-López, 282 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2002)). Actual possession means immediate, hands-on physical possession. United States v. Padilla-Galarza, 886 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2018). On the other hand, constructive possession is shown by proving that the defendant had dominion and control over the area where the contraband was found. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Wight, 968 F.2d 1393, 1397 (1st Cir. 1992)); see also García-Carrasquillo, 483 F.3d at 130 (Constructive possession exists when a person knowingly has the power and intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object either directly or through others. (quoting United States v. McLean, 409 F.3d 492, 501 (1st Cir. 2005))). Constructive possession does not require actual ownership, United States v. Ridolfi, 768 F.3d 57, 62 (1st Cir. -17- 2014), and can be established through circumstantial evidence, United States v. Howard, 687 F.3d 13, 20 (1st Cir. 2012), although the mere presence or association with another who possessed the contraband is insufficient, United States v. Hicks, 575 F.3d 130, 139 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. DeCologero, 530 F.3d 36, 67 (1st Cir. 2008)). As to the intent-to-distribute element, [a]n inference of intent to distribute may be drawn from the circumstances surrounding possession, including the drug's quantity (i.e., whether it is too large for personal use only), the drug's purity, the defendant's statements or conduct, or the number of people involved and their relationship to the defendant. United States v. Bobadilla-Pagán, 747 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 2014). The evidence in this case is sufficient to permit a jury to reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mendoza knowingly possessed the heroin and crack cocaine with intent to distribute. To begin, the jury learned that Mendoza had admitted in interviews with Agent Pérez and Agent del Valle that all of the items seized during the search belonged to him and Valle.18 The Government also presented the handwritten statement that Mendoza gave to the agents, which read: The bags that were seized in the pants and 18We explain below why Mendoza's statements did not have to be suppressed. -18- the money are mine. The ones seized in the house are [Valle's] and mine. [Colón] has nothing to do with this or anything that was seized inside the house, like the drugs, the weapons, et cetera. Agent Pérez and Agent del Valle both testified that the written statement was consistent with the admissions that Mendoza had verbally given to them earlier regarding his ownership of all the contraband. While Mendoza disputes that he confessed to possessing everything seized instead of only the marijuana found in his jeans and on the dresser in Valle's room, the jury chose to believe the officers' testimony and drew its own reasonable inferences from the written and verbal statements, which we are not to disturb. See United States v. Smith, 680 F.2d 255, 259 (1st Cir. 1982) ([I]f the evidence can be construed in various reasonable alternatives, the jury is entitled to freely choose from among them. (citing United States v. Klein, 522 F.2d 296, 302 (1st Cir. 1975))). Moreover, additional evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the verdict, shows that Mendoza had possession of the backpack containing the rifle, crack cocaine capsules, and empty baggies found in the child's bedroom where Mendoza was sleeping and where a number of other items that belonged to him were also found, such as his shoes, Percocet pills, watch, necklace, and clothing. Mendoza himself admitted that he had been -19- dating Colón's niece and that he had slept in the child's bedroom on several occasions. A jury could reasonably infer from these facts, including Mendoza's ownership of certain items and personal belongings and their proximity to the backpack in the closet, that Mendoza exercised dominion and control over the bedroom and had the ability and intention to exercise dominion or control over the contraband found within it. See United States v. Bristol-Mártir, 570 F.3d 29, 39 (1st Cir. 2009) (explaining jury can infer constructive possession from defendant's dominion and control over an area where narcotics are found (quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Gobbi, 471 F.3d 302, 309 (1st Cir. 2006))). Moreover, the fact that Valle was in charge of the residence and could thus also be the owner of the items does not negate possession by Mendoza because constructive possession can be joint. See Hicks, 575 F.3d at 139. Consequently, the jury could find that Mendoza constructively possessed the cocaine, rifle, and paraphernalia. Furthermore, the evidence shows that the empty capsules found in one of the stolen cars' trunks were identical to those filled with crack cocaine found hidden in the backpack located in the room where Mendoza slept. Next to those empty capsules were also Mendoza's sneakers. These facts further support the jury's finding that the items belonged to Mendoza. -20- Similarly, the jury could have inferred that Mendoza had constructive possession of the pistol and heroin found on top of the kitchen cabinet. The Government presented evidence that the contraband was in plain sight and in a common living area of a home Mendoza visited and stayed at several times, and therefore, was accessible to Mendoza. The evidence also showed that Mendoza, Valle, and Colón were close friends, that Mendoza on average felt comfortable in the house, and that he and Valle smoked marijuana in the living room area. Therefore, the jury could reasonably infer that Mendoza knew those items were there and that he had the power and intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over the pistol, heroin, and the other items found together with the pistol either directly or through [Valle and Colón], and consequently, that he had constructive possession of such items. García-Carrasquillo, 483 F.3d at 130. The record also supports the jury's finding that Mendoza intended to distribute the drugs. Agent Pérez testified that he found forty plastic capsules holding crack cocaine hidden in the backpack and sixty aluminum wrappings (the decks) of heroin in a plastic bag on top of the kitchen cabinet bound with cash and a pistol. Agent Pérez also told the jury that he had found over a thousand empty capsules like the ones used to hold the crack cocaine in the trunk of one of the stolen cars, and that these -21- were used for distribution of a controlled substance. The jury was entitled to believe these statements, see United States v. Rivera-Rodríguez, 617 F.3d 581, 595 n.6 (1st Cir. 2010) (noting that we do not assess the credibility of a witness, as that is a role reserved for the jury (quoting United States v. Troy, 583 F.3d 20, 24, (1st Cir. 2009))), and in any event, it could infer from the number of individual packages that the drugs were intended for distribution rather than for personal use. See United States v. Ayala-García, 574 F.3d 5, 13 (1st Cir. 2009) ([A] large amount and individual packaging of drugs is sufficient to demonstrate an intent to distribute for purposes of section 841(a)(1).). Agent Vidal's expert testimony that the crack capsules found in the backpack were typical packaging of crack capsules to be distributed, [for] retail further confirmed Mendoza's intent to distribute. He also explained generally how heroin was packaged for distribution and told the jury that, based on the packages found in the residence and the amount, that it was for distribution rather than for personal use. Agent Vidal further testified that when drugs are possessed for distribution, one might also find paraphernalia, like the plastic baggies and empty plastic vials found here, to process [the drugs]. Moreover, the evidence showed that $129 in cash were found together with the heroin decks and another $266 were found in Mendoza's pants. A loaded rifle -22- and pistol were also found with the crack and heroin, respectively, and Agent Vidal explained that keeping money together with drugs, and using guns for protection, were common behaviors for people who possess drugs for distribution. The jury was entitled to believe Agent Vidal's testimony, see Rivera-Rodríguez, 617 F.3d at 595 n.6, and from these facts, the jury could reasonably infer an intent to distribute. Considering all the evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Mendoza's convictions on Counts Two and Three. Accordingly, his first attempt to undermine the jury's verdict falls short, and we turn to his second claim.