Opinion ID: 1880861
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: impermissible fact finding by the commission

Text: The commission engaged in improper fact finding, initially, when it concluded that plaintiff's arthritis was a condition of the aging process. A review of the magistrate's opinion shows that he found arthritic changes in [Mr. Layman's] entire spine which predated October 17, 1991. This does not equate with a finding that the arthritis was a condition of the aging process. While arthritis may be related to the aging process, it is certainly not always aging-related. Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary. Arthritis is often caused by repetitive stress on a certain part of a person's body, and can occur at any time in a person's lifetime. The magistrate did not make a specific finding regarding whether plaintiff's arthritis was part of the aging process. Whether a plaintiff's arthritis is part of the aging process is the type of medical factual inquiry that is reserved for the magistrate's fact-finding powers. Without a finding by the magistrate, the commission is not entitled to invoke the significant-manner test. The commission cites this Court's decisions in Holden and the Court of Appeals decision in Woody as justification to exercise its limited fact-finding powers and to then apply the significant-manner test. However, we have since reversed the Woody decision. In Woody v. Cello-Foil Products, we examined (1) whether the magistrate made sufficient findings of fact regarding work-related causation, and (2) whether those findings were supported by substantial, material, and competent evidence on the whole record. The Court of Appeals had ruled that, because the magistrate made no findings regarding the origin of the plaintiff's sensitivity, the commission was free to make a factual finding of its own. Woody, 204 Mich.App. at 262, 514 N.W.2d 228. In reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals, we held: The magistrate did not make findings of fact that were sufficiently detailed for us to separate the facts found from the law applied. Further, the conclusory findings are inadequate because we need to know the path taken through the conflicting evidence, the testimony adopted, the standards followed, and the reasoning used to reach his conclusion. [Woody, 450 Mich. at 597, 546 N.W.2d 226.] We remanded the case to the magistrate for further proceedings and detailed findings of fact regarding whether the plaintiff's injury was caused by her exposure to MEK at defendant company. Id., citing Kostamo v. Marquette Iron Mining Co., 405 Mich. 105, 138, 274 N.W.2d 411 (1979). In the case at bar, it is not clear whether the magistrate based his decision on subsection 1 or subsection 2 of M.C.L. § 418.301; M.S.A. § 17.237(301). The commission stated: A review of the Magistrate's opinion reveals that he failed to apply the `significant manner' test, apparently applying a less stringent `causal relationship' standard.... 1995 Mich. ACO 1392. Plaintiff argues that evidence that the magistrate applied the significant-manner test is shown by the magistrate's use of terms like originated, initiation, and resulted. For the commission to find that those terms clearly convey the magistrate's application of the significant-manner test requires the commission to speculate regarding the facts and the legal reasoning that the magistrate relied on to reach his conclusion, which it cannot do. Woody, 450 Mich. at 597, 546 N.W.2d 226. The commission also cited this Court's ruling in Holden, supra, to support its decision to enter into the fact-finding arena. It remarked that, in both the case at bar and in Holden, the magistrate had failed to make certain findings of fact essential to a legal determination regarding causation. In Holden, the WCAC ruled that the magistrate's findings and conclusions were not supported by substantial evidence on the whole record, and then proceeded to make its own findings. This Court found that the commission did not exceed its legislatively prescribed reviewing function. Any interpretation of Holden as permitting the commission to make original fact finding on issues overlooked by the magistrate is refuted by our subsequent decision in Woody. We hold in the instant case, as we did in Woody, that the proper person to make findings of fact is the magistrate. On remand, the magistrate must be given the task of providing comprehensive findings of fact while applying the proper legal standard. The Legislature intended that the magistrate have the final word regarding most fact finding and that the commission play a much more limited role: A primary purpose of [1985 PA 103] is to make the decisions of the magistrates final in most cases. While an appeal can be filed, it is intended that relatively few appeals will be successful. The number of members of the workers' compensation appellate tribunal has been reduced because the appellate role has been reduced from factfinder to a limited review for error. The decision of the magistrates will in most cases constitute the final decision. [ Civil Service Comm. v. Dep't of Labor, 424 Mich. 571, 621, 384 N.W.2d 728 (1986), amended by 425 Mich. 1201, 387 N.W.2d 384 (1986).] We agree with plaintiff that the commission went beyond its legislatively prescribed function of reviewing the magistrate's decision and substituted its interpretation of the evidence for the findings of the magistrate. In Goff, supra at 538, 563 N.W.2d 214, this Court explained: If the magistrate's decision is reasonably supported in the record by any competent, material, and substantial evidence, then it is conclusive and the WCAC must affirm. If it does not, it is exceeding the scope of its reviewing power and impermissibly substituting its judgment for the magistrate's. In reviewing the magistrate's decision, the WCAC must do so with sensitivity and deference toward the findings and conclusions of the magistrate in its assessment of the record. If in its review the WCAC finds that the magistrate did not rely on competent evidence, it must carefully detail its findings of fact and the reasons for its findings grounded in the record. If after such careful review of the record the WCAC finds that the magistrate's determination was not made on the basis of substantial evidence and is therefore not conclusive, then it is free to make its own findings. In such circumstances, the findings of fact of the WCAC are conclusive if the commission was acting within its powers. Ultimately, the role of the Court of Appeals and this Court is only to evaluate whether the WCAC exceeded its authority. [Emphasis added.] We hold that the commission exceeded its authority when it made impermissible findings of fact in the absence of findings by the magistrate. A reviewing court should not identify alternative findings that could be supported by substantial evidence and supplant the agency's findings with them. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 113, 112 S.Ct. 1046, 117 L.Ed.2d 239 (1992), and see In re Payne, 444 Mich. 679, 692, 514 N.W.2d 121 (1994). In the instant case, the commission gave only passing lip service to the requirement that the commission be aware of the deference due the magistrate. Goff, supra at 536, 563 N.W.2d 214, citing Holden, supra . The commission justified imposing its own factual conclusions because the magistrate did not use the magic words significant manner. It essentially turned the substantial-evidence standard on its head when it embarked on its own fact-finding journey. Arkansas, supra . M.C.L. § 418.861a(12); M.S.A. § 17.237(861a)(12) provides: The commission or a panel of the commission may remand a matter to a worker's compensation magistrate for purposes of supplying a complete record if it is determined that the record is insufficient for purposes of review. Where a magistrate's findings are insufficient for appellate review, nothing in the Worker's Disability Compensation Act prevents this Court or the Court of Appeals from remanding the case to the magistrate for additional fact finding. Woody, 450 Mich. 588, 546 N.W.2d 226. The office of the magistrate is the appropriate place for additional fact finding because only the magistrate has the opportunity to observe live testimony and argument. [6] The commission engaged in impermissible fact finding in the absence of findings by the magistrate. The findings that the magistrate did make were made on the basis of competent, material, and substantial evidence. The magistrate did find an injury date of October 17, 1991, and continuing disability from that date. Unfortunately, the magistrate did not clearly delineate which standard he applied to find the injury. Additionally, it is not clear that the magistrate found that plaintiff's arthritis is a condition of the aging process, thus requiring the application of the significant-manner test. The commission was in error when it stated that the magistrate found that plaintiff suffers from a preexisting aging condition. The magistrate did not make that finding. A determination on the issue must be made on remand. We conclude that the commission erred in disregarding certain of the magistrate's findings and reversing the award of benefits. Where a factual finding needs to be made, but has not been rendered by the magistrate, the case should be remanded to the magistrate. When the commission finds that the magistrate has failed to make necessary fact findings, it should remand the case to the magistrate for that purpose. See Woody, 450 Mich. 588, 546 N.W.2d 226. We hold that the commission must remand this case, and other cases where fact findings are incomplete, to the magistrate for the requisite fact finding. To hold otherwise would deprive parties of any meaningful review of factual findings by the commission. The commission must review the magistrate's findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence.