Opinion ID: 1591333
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Evidence of Insurance Contract and Its Terms.

Text: The plaintiff wanted the jury to know that he sought benefits under the UIM coverage of his automobile policy; that he had UIM limits of $100,000; that there had been a prior settlement with the underinsured motorist; and that the plaintiff's previous recovery from the underinsured motorist would be deducted from the amount of damages awarded by the jury. [2] The trial court refused to permit such evidence or similarly instruct the jury, ruling this information was not relevant to the only disputed issues: the damages caused by the 1999 accident and the amount of those damages. Pexa was allowed to testify, however, that he had been insured with Auto Owners for quite some time. Consequently, the jury knew there was an insurer/insured relationship between Auto Owners and Pexa. On appeal, the plaintiff does not explain how the excluded evidence was relevant to any disputed fact to be determined by the jury. He simply argues the jury should have been given these details to avoid speculating on the dispute between Pexa and Auto Owners. In addition, he claims the rulings and instructions of the trial court effectively denied [him] all right to maintain his action in contract. We review the court's exclusion of evidence of the insurance contract, its terms, and how the contractual recovery would be calculated for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Sinclair, 582 N.W.2d 762, 764 (Iowa 1998) (This court reviews the trial court's decision on the relevancy of evidence for an abuse of discretion.). An abuse of discretion occurs when the court's decision is based on a ground or reason that is clearly untenable or when the court's discretion is exercised to a clearly unreasonable degree. Graber v. City of Ankeny, 616 N.W.2d 633, 638 (Iowa 2000). We evaluate the alleged instructional error from the perspective that a trial court is generally required to give a requested instruction when it states a correct rule of law having application to the facts of the case. Stover v. Lakeland Square Owners Ass'n, 434 N.W.2d 866, 868 (Iowa 1989). Consequently, [w]e review a challenge to the district court's refusal to submit a jury instruction for correction of errors of law. State v. Ceaser, 585 N.W.2d 192, 193 (Iowa 1998). It is important in evaluating the trial court's rulings to understand the context within which they were made. As noted earlier, the court submitted this case to the jury on a special verdict form that only required the jury to make two factual findings. This procedure is authorized by rule 1.933, which provides in part: The court may require that the verdict consist wholly of special written findings on each issue of fact. It shall then submit in writing questions susceptible of categorical or brief answers, or forms of several special findings that the jury might properly make under the issues and evidence, or submit the issues and require the findings in any other appropriate manner. It shall so instruct the jury as to enable it to find upon each issue submitted.... The court shall direct such judgment on the special verdict and answers as is appropriate thereto. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.933. Under this form of submission, the jury resolves pertinent factual issues pursuant to the court's instructions, and the trial court enters the general verdict by applying the applicable law to the jury's factual determinations. Poyzer, 360 N.W.2d at 753. A special verdict is not to be confused with a general verdict using interrogatories, where the jury finds the facts and applies the law to the facts to render a verdict in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.934 (providing for the use of interrogatories with a general verdict). A special verdict serves two purposes: it simplifies a case for the jury and compels the jury to more accurately focus on what it properly should. Poyzer, 360 N.W.2d at 753; accord Franklin v. Sedore, 450 N.W.2d 849, 853 (Iowa 1990). As we noted in Franklin, [s]pecial verdicts contribute uniquely to the truth-finding process because they divert jurors' attention away from any preconceived notions of desired results. 450 N.W.2d at 853. Consequently, when a special verdict is used, [f]actual determinations tend to be evidence based, not result oriented. Poyzer, 360 N.W.2d at 753. We have held that in such a submission, it is wholly unnecessary and is generally improper for the jury to be concerned with the effect of its special findings. Id. It is within the trial court's discretion to employ a special verdict in lieu of a general verdict. Franklin, 450 N.W.2d at 853. The trial court here did not abuse its discretion in submitting this case on a special verdict. By doing so, the court ensured the jury focused on the factual issues in dispute and decided those issues on the evidence and not to reach a certain result. The court also avoided the possible confusion that can arise when a jury is required to decide the value of a tort claim in the context of a contractual UIM claimthe proverbial case within a case. The method of submission chosen by the court was clearly reasonable and did not deprive the plaintiff of his right to maintain a contract action. See Johnson v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 504 N.W.2d 135, 138 (Iowa Ct.App.1993) (rejecting insured's claim that procedure followed by trial court, which was very similar to that employed here, improperly forced [the plaintiff] into bringing a tort suit, when she had filed a contract suit, noting the district court properly understood the issues before it, namely that due to the insurer's admissions, [t]here was really no contract dispute). Consistent with its decision to use a special verdict, the court limited the evidence to those facts that were relevant to the questions propounded to the jury. We agree with the district court that the nature of the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant, the limits of the UIM coverage, Pexa's settlement with the tort-feasor, and the required deduction of the settlement amount from any damages awarded by the jury were not relevant to these questions. See Waits, 572 N.W.2d at 570 (holding evidence of tortfeasor's payment to insured irrelevant in UIM case submitted on special verdict). [3] Moreover, it would have defeated the purpose of the special verdict format to admit evidence of and instruct the jury concerning matters extraneous to these issues. [4] See McConnell v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 367 N.W.2d 245, 250 (Iowa 1985) (stating it would have been improper for the trial court to advise the jury of the effect of its special verdict answers); cf. Poyzer, 360 N.W.2d at 753 ([I]t is commonly thought to be inappropriate in a special verdict submission for counsel to direct the jury's attention to the impact of any specific findings.). Therefore the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit evidence of the contractual dispute between the parties. See Johnson, 504 N.W.2d at 138 (holding evidence of settlement with tortfeasor and insurance contract properly excluded in UIM case where insurer had admitted liability, provided insured established tortfeasor's negligence caused her injuries and damages). Likewise, the court did not err in refusing to inform the jury of the details of this dispute in the court's instructions.