Opinion ID: 2599781
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Improper Denial of Automatic Motion to Modify the Verdict

Text: Defendant contends that, in ruling upon his automatic motion to modify the verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)), the trial court impermissibly deferred to the jury's verdict, and improperly failed to separately consider each of the two death sentences. He contends that these errors violated various constitutional provisions and require remand for reconsideration of his motion. Section 190.4, subdivision (e) states, in relevant part: In every case in which the trier of fact has returned a verdict or finding imposing the death penalty, the defendant shall be deemed to have made an application for modification of such verdict or finding.... In ruling on the application, the judge shall review the evidence, consider, take into account, and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in Section 190.3, and shall make a determination as to whether the jury's findings and verdicts that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances are contrary to law or the evidence presented. The judge shall state on the record the reasons for his findings. In ruling on the motion, the trial court must independently reweigh the evidence of aggravating and mitigating factors presented at trial and determine whether, in its independent judgment, the evidence supports the death verdict.... On appeal, we independently review the trial court's ruling after reviewing the record, but we do not determine the penalty de novo. ( People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1267, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225.) Defendant claims that the trial court failed to engage in the required independent review, but concedes that the trial court framed its analysis in light of the applicable independent review standard. The court observed: The trial judge has a duty to review the evidence to determine whether in his independent judgment the weight of the evidence supports the jury's verdict.... [¶] In determining whether in his independent judgment the weight of the evidence supports the verdict, the judge is required to assess the credibility of the witnesses, to determine the probative force of the testimony and weigh the evidence. In its review of the evidence as to each count, the trial court cited specific evidence that had led it to agree with the conclusion reached by the jury that all counts, special circumstances and special allegations had been established beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court also applied the standard of independent review to the penalty phase evidence  again, citing specific evidence in mitigation and aggravation  and concluded that the evidence in aggravation is so substantial when compared to the evidence in mitigation to support the selection of the death penalty as the appropriate punishment and that this is overwhelmingly supported by the weight of the evidence. The trial court's remarks demonstrate that it understood and applied the independent review standard. (See People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 640, 134 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302 [In this case, the court's preliminary remarks show it understood [its] duty precisely].) Contrary to defendant's suggestion that the trial court's invocation of the independent standard was rote, our reading of the record persuades us that the court carefully and conscientiously performed its duty under section 190.4. ( People v. Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1268, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225.) We also find no merit in defendant's other claim that the trial court failed to consider the Tynan and Dean death sentences separately. As noted, the trial court considered the evidence that supported defendant's conviction of each count separately in its analysis of the guilt phase verdicts. As for the penalty phase, defendant does not suggest, nor does the record reveal, that he presented mitigating evidence that might have applied to one case but not the other. Thus, defendant's claim must be rejected.