Opinion ID: 673526
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did the illegal arrest taint perez' subsequent consent to search?

Text: 30 We must next consider whether Perez' consent to search the Dodge remains valid despite the illegal arrest. Melendez contends that Perez was coerced into consenting to the search because of the force used in the arrest and that the evidence discovered as a result of the search should be suppressed. 31 When a consensual search is preceded by a Fourth Amendment violation, as in this case, the government must prove not only the voluntariness of the consent under the totality of the circumstances, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), 4 but the government must also establish a break in the causal connection between the illegality and the evidence thereby obtained. 5 United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 1458 (10th Cir.1985). See also, Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501, 507-08, 509, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1326, 1329-30, 1330, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion, and Brennan, J., concurring) (affirming state court judgment that evidence was inadmissable as tainted when consent to search followed Fourth Amendment violation); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2261, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). See also, King, 990 F.2d at 1563-65 (finding that drugs that defendant discarded during illegal arrest were fruits of the illegal arrest). We require the government to demonstrate that any taint of an illegal search or seizure has been purged or attenuated not only because we are concerned that the illegal seizure may affect the voluntariness of the defendant's consent, but also to effectuate the purposes of the exclusionary rule. See Brown, 422 U.S. at 599, 601, 602, 95 S.Ct. at 2259, 2260, 2261. 32 The Court in Wong Sun, as is customary, emphasized that application of the exclusionary rule on [the defendant's] behalf protected Fourth Amendment guarantees in two respects: in terms of deterring lawless conduct by federal officers, and by closing the doors of the federal courts to any use of evidence unconstitutionally obtained. [Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486, 83 S.Ct. at 2259-60].... The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter--to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way--by removing the incentive to disregard it. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 [80 S.Ct. 1437, 1444, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669] (1960). 33 Brown, 422 U.S. at 599-600, 95 S.Ct. at 2259-60. Thus, the government has a heavier burden to carry when consent follows an illegal stop. Recalde, 761 F.2d at 1457. 34 The Supreme Court has provided three factors that are especially relevant to determining whether a consent is tainted by a preceding illegal search or seizure: 1) the temporal proximity between the police illegality and the consent to search; 2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and particularly 3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. at 2261-62; Recalde, 761 F.2d at 1458. Although voluntariness is a fact question subject to review for clear error, we will review de novo or remand cases in which the district court has failed to utilize the Brown factors to determine if taint has been purged, even when the court has determined that consent was voluntary under Schneckloth. Recalde, 761 F.2d at 1458; United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 881 n. 7 (10th Cir.1994) (reviewing de novo); United States v. Lowe, 999 F.2d 448, 451 n. 5 (10th Cir.1993) (same); United States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 993, 1011 (10th Cir.1992) (same); United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444, 1454 n. 13 (10th Cir.1989) (same). 35 The dual requirement of voluntariness and sufficient independence from the prior illegal arrest to purge the taint of that arrest was blurred in our opinion of United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 1141, 1150 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 914, 107 S.Ct. 315, 93 L.Ed.2d 289 (1986), which came after Recalde. There we said that a consent that is voluntary in fact is in itself an intervening act that purges any police illegality. Id. at 1147-48. However, Recalde was decided before Carson, and we are bound by the decision of the earlier panel. Thus, we reiterate that not only must the government show that consent is voluntary in fact, but it must also demonstrate a break in the causal connection between the illegality and the consent, so that the court will be satisfied that the consent was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486, 83 S.Ct. at 416-17. Although the two requirements will often overlap to a considerable degree, they address separate constitutional values and they are not always coterminous. Accord United States v. Chavez-Villarreal, 3 F.3d 124, 127 (5th Cir.1993) (admissability of evidence after illegal stop depends on a finding that consent was both voluntary and an independent act of free will); United States v. Campbell, 920 F.2d 793, 797 (11th Cir.1991) (same); United States v. Delgadillo-Velasquez, 856 F.2d 1292, 1299 (9th Cir.1988) (The mere fact that consent to search is voluntary within the meaning of [Schneckloth] does not mean that it is untainted by a prior illegal arrest.); United States v. Gooding, 695 F.2d 78, 84 (4th Cir.1982) (same); Wayne R. LaFave, 3 Search and Seizure Sec. 8.2(d) at 190-94 (1987); Note, Joseph G. Casaccio, Illegally Acquired Information, Consent Searches, and Tainted Fruit, 87 Colum.L.Rev. 842, 857-58 (1987). 36 While there is a sufficient overlap of the voluntariness and fruits tests that often a proper result may be reached by using either one independently, it is extremely important to understand that (i) the two tests are not identical, and (ii) consequently the evidence obtained by the purported consent should be held admissible only if it is determined that the consent was both voluntary and not an exploitation of the prior illegality. 37 LaFave, 3 Search and Seizure Sec. 8.2(d) at 190 (citation omitted). 38 The Supreme Court in Brown made it clear that purging the taint of an illegal arrest requires an analysis beyond merely determining whether the consent was voluntary. For example, the purpose and flagrancy prong of the Brown test can only be aimed at exploring whether the police have exploited their illegal search. 422 U.S. at 604, 95 S.Ct. at 2262. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88, 83 S.Ct. at 417-18 (an important question in determining whether evidence is tainted is if police have exploited the illegal search or seizure to obtain the evidence). In short, there is an exclusionary purpose as well as a fairness purpose in depriving police of the fruit of an illegal arrest or search. 39 In our case, the district court understandably did not address whether the taint from the illegal arrest had been adequately attenuated before Perez consented to the search of his car because the court believed that the stop itself was a valid Terry stop, despite the court's misgivings about the coercive nature of the police behavior in this case. 6 However, since we hold that the stop cannot be justified as a Terry stop but was, instead, an illegal arrest, it is necessary to conduct an analysis of whether the taint of the illegal arrest had been purged before the consent was obtained. Such an analysis should ordinarily be performed in the first instance by the trial court, utilizing the three-prong test set out in Brown: temporal proximity; intervening circumstances; and the purpose and flagrancy of the police misconduct. 40 Whether the taint had been adequately purged in this case prior to obtaining Perez' consent to search is not clear from the record before us. The temporal proximity between the illegal arrest of Mr. Perez and his granting of consent does not support the government's argument that the taint was purged. Only seconds, or at most minutes, separated the unjustified use of highly intrusive force by the police and Perez' consent to search, assuming that the consent to the visual search and the consent to the canine search were obtained at the same time. Compare Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 883 (consent tainted when it took place only moments after illegal search); Recalde, 761 F.2d at 1459 (consent tainted where only several minutes passed); Maez, 872 F.2d at 1447, 1455, 1456 (consent obtained thirty minutes after illegal arrest was tainted); Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d at 1012 (considered alone, thirty to forty-five minute time period between illegal entry and consent revealed little about defendant's decision to permit the search). 41 However, the other two factors are less clear. There was some deescalation in force between the time that the officers stopped Perez and when Officer Cox asked for consent, because Cox holstered his gun. However, we are uncertain from the record whether Cox removed Perez' handcuffs before asking for consent or whether the other police officers' guns had been holstered. Further, we are unsure whether the consent to search visually and the consent to search by canine were obtained at the same time, or, if obtained at different times, how much time elapsed between the consents and what took place in between. Since the canine search located the evidence in this case, the consent to the use of the dog was the critical consent in this case. The district court is in a better position to reconstruct the circumstances of the consent. 42 Finally, the purpose and flagrancy prong of the Brown test cannot be determined on the record before us. On one hand, the police used excessive force without justification in this case, resulting in an unreasonably intrusive arrest. However, the officers did have reasonable suspicion temporarily to detain Perez and the others to investigate if they were carrying drugs. Thus, this is unlike a situation in which officers have no right whatsoever to detain the person from whom consent is sought. See e.g. Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 882-83. Further, we have allowed police to use force during Terry stops when they show it to be reasonably necessary for officer safety. Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1462-63 (citing cases). It is not obvious on the limited record before us that the excessive force was a factor in obtaining the consent. 43 Because of the outstanding questions regarding the circumstances surrounding the stop, we remand to the district court for such proceedings as it considers appropriate to determine whether the taint of the illegal arrest had been purged when the officers received permission to use the dog to search Melendez' car. 44 IV. DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT MELENDEZ WAS AN ORGANIZER FOR THE PURPOSES OF SENTENCING? 45 Although we remand for further proceedings on the suppression issue, we can quickly address Melendez' challenge to his sentence so that it need not remain an issue upon remand. 46 The district court accepted the recommendation of the presentence report that Melendez was a leader or organizer of the marijuana conspiracy pursuant to U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.1(c) and enhanced his base offense level by two points. We review the district court's factual findings regarding the role of the defendant under a clearly erroneous standard. United States v. McIntyre, 997 F.2d 687, 710 (10th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 736, 126 L.Ed.2d 699 (1994). In order to be a supervisor in the criminal activity, 'one needs merely to give some form of direction or supervision to someone subordinate in the criminal activity.'  United States v. Hanif, 1 F.3d 998, 1004 (10th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Backas, 901 F.2d 1528, 1530 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 870, 111 S.Ct. 190, 112 L.Ed.2d 152 (1990)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 573, 126 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993). Among the factors which a court may consider are the defendant's exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal activity and the degree of control and authority exercised over others. Id. 47 In this case, the district court found that Melendez had recruited accomplices, Perez and Angel. In addition, the vehicle hauling the drugs was Melendez' and he obtained the motel room in which the conspirators met. Melendez notes that some of the evidence is contradictory and may suggest that he is more of a novice than an organizer. He also argues that the evidence points to Ponce as the organizer of the criminal activity. However, from a review of the record, including the uncontroverted facts in the Presentence Report, we conclude that the district court's conclusion that Melendez was an organizer was not clearly erroneous. 48 We thus REVERSE the district court's denial of Melendez' suppression motion and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.