Opinion ID: 172353
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Immunity Under the Communications Decency Act

Text: Accusearch's primary argument on appeal is that even if the FTC stated a claim, it is immune from liability under § 230(c)(1) of the CDA. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). The CDA is intended to facilitate the use and development of the Internet by providing certain services an immunity from civil liability arising from content provided by others. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330-31 (4th Cir.1997). The prototypical service qualifying for this statutory immunity is an online messaging board (or bulletin board) on which Internet subscribers post comments and respond to comments posted by others. See id. at 328-29, 332 (discussing operation of messaging board and holding that it was clearly protected by § 230's immunity). Indeed, Congress enacted the CDA in response to a state-court decision, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710,  (N.Y.Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), which held that the provider of an online messaging board could be liable for defamatory statements posted by third-party users of the board. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc) (noting Congress's concern about Stratton Oakmont ). The Stratton Oakmont court ruled that the administrator of the board became a publisher when it deleted some distasteful third-party postings, and thus was subject to publisher's liability for the defamatory postings it failed to remove. 1995 WL 323710, at -5. The decision was criticized for discouraging the voluntary filtration of Internet content, because a forum provider's efforts to sanitize content would trigger liability that could be avoided by doing nothing. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1163. The CDA, however, does more than just overrule Stratton Oakmont. To understand the full reach of the statute, we will need to examine some of the technical terms used in the CDA. But to put those terms in context we first quote the operative provisions of the law. Section 230(c)(1) provides as follows: No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider. Section 230(c)(2), which protects services that filter content, states: No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of  (A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or (B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1). [paragraph (1) should probably be subparagraph (A), see U.S.C.A. § 230(c), n. 1]. Finally, § 230(e)(3) provides that No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section. Accusearch claims immunity under § 230(c)(1). The language of that provision, quoted above, sets three limits on the immunity provided. First, immunity is available only to a provider or user of an interactive computer service. Id. § 230(c)(1). The term interactive computer service means any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions. Id. § 230(f)(2). Second, the liability must be based on the defendant's having acted as a publisher or speaker. Id. at § 230(c)(1). Third, immunity can be claimed only with respect to information provided by another information content provider. Id. Accusearch contends that it satisfies these requirements. If it fails to satisfy any one of the three, it is not entitled to immunity.
With respect to the first requirement for CDA immunity, the district court ruled that Accusearch provided an interactive computer service. See Accusearch, 2007 WL 4356786, at . The FTC argues on appeal that Accusearch did not provide such a service because its website did not allow for any interaction between third parties. Aplee. Br. at 20. The FTC asserts that the CDA's legislative history and Congress's use of the word interactive evince an intent to protect only the providers of online bulletin boards. It distinguishes such boards from a website like Accusearch's, which merely permits a user to conduct the same sort of business that it would in a retail store (or private investigator's office). (We note, however, that the FTC's argument would also deny immunity to nonretail websites, such as one that posted medical-journal articles online (perhaps after removing graphic pictures), unless the website also permitted direct interaction among its visitors.) Accusearch essentially concedes the factual premise of the FTC's argument  namely, the absence of direct interaction among users of the Abika.com website. Although Accusearch occasionally tries to portray its website as an interactive forum on which independent researchers connected with persons seeking information, it ultimately acknowledges that all information passed between the [customer] and researcher went through Abika.com, as an intermediary. Aplts. Reply Br. at 3. But despite the FTC's accurate characterization of Abika.com, its interactivity argument does not fully respect the CDA's text. Section 230(f)(2) does not say that an interactive computer service must facilitate interaction among third parties; rather, it says that an interactive computer service is one that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server.  47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (emphasis added). See Universal Commc'ns Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419 (1st Cir.2007) (web site operators ... are providers of interactive computer services because [a] web site ... enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, namely, the server that hosts the web site. (internal quotation marks omitted)); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th Cir.2003) (suggesting, but not deciding, that a website necessarily provides an interactive computer service). Accordingly, we are reluctant to embrace the FTC's contention that one who operates a website does not thereby provide an interactive computer service unless it allows interaction among the users. Because we can resolve the matter of CDA immunity in this case without deciding whether the FTC's contention is correct, we leave it to another day.
Turning to the second requirement for CDA immunity, we refrain from adopting the concurrence's view that the CDA does not protect Accusearch because Accusearch's liability under the FTCA is not based on its being a publisher or speaker. According to the concurrence, the FTC sought and ultimately held Accusearch liable for its conduct rather than for the content of the information it was offering on the Abika.com website. Op., (Tymkovich, J., concurring) at 2. It appears to us, however, that Accusearch would not have violated the FTCA had it not published the confidential telephone information that it had improperly acquired. And that publication was on its website. It would seem to be irrelevant that Accusearch could have operated the same business model without use of the Internet. The concurrence thoughtfully raises an interesting point, but, as with the first requirement for CDA immunity, we choose not to resolve the immunity issue on this ground.
The predicate for CDA immunity on which we resolve the matter is the third requirement. A provider of an interactive computer service, such as Accusearch, may claim CDA immunity only with respect to information provided by another information content provider. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). Thus, an interactive computer service that is also an information content provider of certain content is not immune from liability arising from publication of that content. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162; Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co., Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985 n. 4 (10th Cir.2000). The CDA defines the term information content provider as any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). This is a broad definition, covering even those who are responsible for the development of content only `in part.' Universal Commc'n Sys., 478 F.3d at 419. Accordingly, there may be several information content providers with respect to a single item of information (each being responsible, at least in part, for its creation or development). See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). Accusearch contends that under the plain language of the CDA it was not an information content provider, because it was not responsible for creation or development of information. We disagree. To begin with, we consider whether confidential telephone records are developed, within the meaning of the CDA, when, as here, they are sold to the public over the Internet. The CDA does not define the term development. Accusearch would construe the word narrowly. It relies on two dictionary definitions, correctly noting that develop can mean to [m]ake something new and [c]ome into existence. Aplts. Am. Br. at 39 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the information provided to its customers came originally from the telecommunications carriers, it argues, it made nothing new nor brought anything into existence. But the CDA uses the phrase creation or development of information, 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3), and if the meaning of the word develop were limited to the two senses relied upon by Accusearch, the word development would add nothing not already conveyed by the word creation. Under a long-standing canon of statutory interpretation, one should avoid construing a statute so as to render statutory language superfluous. McCloy v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 351 F.3d 447, 451 (10th Cir.2003); see Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1168. We therefore examine whether we can reasonably construe development more broadly. We can. When faced with an undefined statutory term, an investigation of its core meaning can be illuminating. United States v. Montgomery, 468 F.3d 715, 720 (10th Cir.2006); see also Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 128-29, 118 S.Ct. 1911, 141 L.Ed.2d 111 (1998) (investigating etymological origins of carries to uncover its primary meaning). The word develop derives from the Old French desveloper, which means, in essence, to unwrap. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 618 (2002) (explaining that developer is composed of the word veloper, meaning to wrap up, and the negative prefix des ). The dictionary definitions for develop correspondingly revolve around the act of drawing something out, making it visible, active, or usable. Id. Thus, a photograph is developed by chemical processes exposing a latent image. See id. Land is developed by harnessing its untapped potential for building or for extracting resources. See id. Likewise, when confidential telephone information was exposed to public view through Abika.com, that information was developed. See id. (one definition of develop is to make actually available or usable (something previously only potentially available or usable)). This conclusion, however, does not end the inquiry. The question remains whether Accusearch was `responsible, in whole or in part, for the ... development of the offending content. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162 (quoting § 230(f)(3)). That is, was it responsible for the development of the specific content that was the source of the alleged liability? The answer is yes. Just as the CDA does not define development, it does not define responsible. We need not provide a complete definition of the term that will apply in all contexts; but we can say enough to resolve this case and to assuage concern that the broad meaning for development that we have adopted will undermine the purpose of immunity under the CDA. The meaning of responsible becomes an issue under the CDA when a court is considering whether CDA immunity from liability is unavailable because one is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information that is the source of the liability. In this context  responsibility for harm  the word responsible ordinarily has a normative connotation. See The Oxford English Dictionary 742 (2d ed.1998) (stating one definition of responsible as Morally accountable for one's actions.). As one authority puts it: [W]hen we say, `Every man is responsible for his own actions,' we do not think definitely of any authority, law, or tribunal before which he must answer, but rather of the general law of right, the moral constitution of the universe.... James C. Fernald, Funk & Wagnalls Standard Handbook of Synonyms, Antonyms, and Prepositions 366 (1947). Synonyms for responsibility in this context are blame, fault, guilt, and culpability. See Oxford American Writer's Thesaurus 747 (2d ed.2008). Accordingly, to be responsible for the development of offensive content, one must be more than a neutral conduit for that content. That is, one is not responsible for the development of offensive content if one's conduct was neutral with respect to the offensiveness of the content (as would be the case with the typical Internet bulletin board). We would not ordinarily say that one who builds a highway is responsible for the use of that highway by a fleeing bank robber, even though the culprit's escape was facilitated by the availability of the highway. This construction of the term responsible comports with the clear purpose of the CDA  to encourage Internet services that increase the flow of information by protecting them from liability when independent persons negligently or intentionally use those services to supply harmful content. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a), (b). We therefore conclude that a service provider is responsible for the development of offensive content only if it in some way specifically encourages development of what is offensive about the content. In the case before us, the offending content was the disclosed confidential information itself. We need not construe the word responsible to extend beyond its core meaning in this context to conclude that Accusearch was responsible for the development of that content  for the conversion of the legally protected records from confidential material to publicly exposed information. Accusearch solicited requests for such confidential information and then paid researchers to obtain it. It knowingly sought to transform virtually unknown information into a publicly available commodity. And as the district court found and the record shows, Accusearch knew that its researchers were obtaining the information through fraud or other illegality. Accusearch argues that our decision in Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d 980, establishes its entitlement to CDA immunity. In that case the plaintiff corporation sued America Online for allegedly posting on three occasions incorrect information concerning the corporation's stock price and share volume. Id. at 983. America Online purchased price and volume information on numerous stocks from a third-party vendor who had compiled it from major national and international stock exchanges and stock markets. Id. We held that America Online was protected from liability by the CDA. Id. at 986. Most relevant to this case, we said that Plaintiff has not demonstrated [that America Online] worked so closely with [the third-party vendor] regarding the allegedly inaccurate stock information that [it] became an information content provider. Id. at 985. Accusearch argues that because America Online was not considered an information content provider despite soliciting the relevant information for online publication, Accusearch's own solicitation of information could not make it an information content provider either. But Accusearch takes too broad a view of what was the relevant information in Ben Ezra. Although America Online solicited stock quotations, the plaintiff's claim was based on inaccuracies in the solicited quotations. See id. at 983. The offending content was thus erroneous stock quotations and, unsurprisingly, America Online did not solicit the errors; indeed, it sent the vendor emails requesting that it correct the allegedly inaccurate information. Id. at 985. If the information solicited by America Online had been inherently unlawful  for example, if it were protected by contract or was child pornography  our reasoning would necessarily have been different. In Ben Ezra, however, America Online had done nothing to encourage what made the content offensive  its alleged inaccuracy. America Online's conduct was neutral with respect to possible errors in the stock quotations. It was therefore not responsible for the offensive content. Our holding that Accusearch was an information content provider is supported by authority from outside this circuit. Most recently, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the provider of an online roommate-matching service was responsible for the development of discriminatory preferences contained in its users' personal-profile pages. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1167-68. Subscribers of the website were required to specify from a set of preselected answer choices their sex, sexual orientation and whether [they] would bring children to a household. Id. at 1161; see id. at 1165 & n. 17. Subscribers also had to select their preferences in roommates with respect to the same three criteria. Id. at 1161. For example, subscribers seeking housing had to state whether they [were] willing to live with `Straight or gay' males, only with `Straight' males, only with `Gay' males or with `No males.' Id. at 1165. These preferences were then posted on a subscriber's profile page, where they could be reviewed by other subscribers looking for a roommate match. Id. To be sure, the matching service did not place discriminatory preferences in the minds of its users. It did not, in other words, create those preferences. But the court found that by requiring its users to disclose their illicit preferences, the service provider became much more than a passive transmitter of information provided by others; it bec[ame] the developer, at least in part, of that information. Id. at 1166. It summarized: [A] website helps to develop unlawful content, and thus falls within the exception to section 230, if it contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct. Id. at 1168. That language applies to Accusearch's role in this case. By paying its researchers to acquire telephone records, knowing that the confidentiality of the records was protected by law, it contributed mightily to the unlawful conduct of its researchers. Indeed, Accusearch's responsibility is more pronounced than that of Roommates.com. Roommates.com may have encouraged users to post offending content; but the offensive postings were Accusearch's raison d'etre and it affirmatively solicited them. An earlier Ninth Circuit case, Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir.2003), provides a useful comparison. In that case an unknown person created a bawdy dating profile for actress Christianne Carafano on the defendant's online-dating website. See id. at 1121. To create the profile, the anonymous poster had to draft an essay and select answers to more than fifty questions from menus providing between four and nineteen options. Id. Some options were sexually suggestive and some were innocuous. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the dating service was not an information content provider of the libelous profile. Id. at 1124. As the en banc court would later explain in Roommates.com, [t]he salient fact in Carafano was that the website's classifications of user characteristics did absolutely nothing to enhance the defamatory sting of the message, to encourage defamation or to make defamation easier. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1172. Although an unknown person created Ms. Carafano's profile in part from preselected answer choices, the menus provided by the website did not encourage a defamatory response. See id. at 1171. Unlike Roommates.com, which prompted the disclosure of discriminatory preferences, the dating website provided only neutral tools which were employed to create the offending content. Id. at 1172; see Universal Commc'n Sys., 478 F.3d at 420 (messaging board immune with respect to posts it did not prompt); cf. Chi. Lawyers' Comm., 519 F.3d at 671 (Craigslist did not cause discriminatory housing advertisements within the meaning of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c), by hosting online marketplace where they were posted). Accusearch attempts to portray itself as the provider of neutral tools, stressing that it merely provided a forum in which people advertise and request telephone records. Aplts. Am. Br. at 37-38. But that phrasing mischaracterizes the record. As explained above, Accusearch solicited requests for confidential information protected by law, paid researchers to find it, knew that the researchers were likely to use improper methods, and charged customers who wished the information to be disclosed. Accusearch's actions were not neutral with respect to generating offensive content; on the contrary, its actions were intended to generate such content. Accusearch is not entitled to immunity under the CDA.