Opinion ID: 815314
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mr. Jones’s Sentencing

Text: Mr. Jones challenges the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence. He specifically challenges the use of his two prior convictions for resisting arrest as predicates for 45 R.308 at 47. 46 Id. at 43-44. -53- a career offender classification under the Guidelines and the district court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) mandatory sentencing factors. He also contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court gave insufficient weight to the report of Mr. Jones’s forensic psychologist. We address these issues in turn.
The district court classified Mr. Jones as a career offender under United States Sentencing Guidelines section 4B1.1 based on his prior Massachusetts convictions for resisting arrest. Thus, Mr. Jones’s offense level was set at thirty-four, resulting in an increased guidelines range. We review de novo a determination that a prior conviction qualifies as a predicate offense for the purposes of the career offender Guideline. See United States v. Almenas, 553 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2009). United States Sentencing Guidelines section 4B1.1(a) classifies a defendant as a career offender if (1) he was at least eighteen years old at the time he committed the offense of conviction, (2) the instant offense is a crime of violence and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of a crime of violence. Mr. Jones urges that his convictions for resisting arrest cannot be the basis for his career offender classification because resisting arrest is not a crime of violence. We consistently have rejected this argument. In Almenas, we held that -54- resisting arrest under Massachusetts law is a crime of violence within section 4B1.1(a). 553 F.3d at 32-35. We reaffirmed this conclusion recently in United States v. Grupee, 682 F.3d 143, 149 (1st Cir. 2012), and United States v. Davis, 676 F.3d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 2012). Mr. Jones attacks Almenas (and its progeny) as inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009), decided after our decision in Almenas. However, we rejected this claim in United States v. Weekes, 611 F.3d 68, 72-73 (1st Cir. 2010). Therefore, the district court did not err in classifying Mr. Jones as a career offender under the Guidelines.
“[A reviewing court] must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error . . . . Assuming that the district court’s sentencing decision is procedurally sound, the appellate court should then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Accordingly, “[o]ur first task is to determine whether the district court made any procedural errors . . . . If the district court has committed no such procedural error, we then review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed and review the sentence for abuse of discretion.” Marsh, 561 F.3d at 85-86 (internal quotation marks -55- omitted). “[W]e afford the district court wide discretion in sentencing.” Id. at 86. Here, because Mr. Jones did not object to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence before the district court, we review for plain error. See Matos-Quiñones, 456 F.3d at 20-21. Mr. Jones submits that the district court committed significant error by failing to consider the mandatory § 3553(a) factors, to make explicit reference to those factors and otherwise to explain adequately his sentence. The record demonstrates that the district court explicitly considered the § 3553(a) factors. It identified the main factors upon which it relied in sentencing Mr. Jones, emphasizing the connection between the sentence imposed and the nature and circumstances of the offense, the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense and the avoidance of unwarranted sentence disparities. Although the district court’s discussion of these factors was brief, “we do not require the court to address those factors, one by one, in some sort of rote incantation when explicating its sentencing decision.” Marsh, 561 F.3d at 86 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court also addressed adequately Mr. Jones’s history and characteristics. It discussed his psychologist’s report detailing his family background, his history of restraining orders and his statement to the court. However, after considering -56- all of the relevant factors, the district court found that the gravity of the offense trumped any weight that might otherwise be given to Mr. Jones’s background. The district court stated: While I have read the report that [Mr. Jones’s counsel] handed up, there are frankly certain offenses that are so serious that even if there’s an explanation for it in someone’s background and history and even if you can draw a straight line from who they were to who they are now, and if you can understand it, there are some offenses that can’t be explained, can’t be justified. This is one of them.[47] In Mr. Jones’s view, this statement indicates the district court’s refusal to consider his history and characteristics--a mandatory factor under § 3553(a). We cannot accept this argument. The district court considered Mr. Jones’s history and characteristics, but after reviewing these factors, still believed that the nature of the offense and surrounding circumstances required the sentence imposed. The district court committed no procedural error in making that determination. We now address the substantive reasonableness of Mr. Jones’s sentence. Mr. Jones faults the district court for failing to give 47 R.303 at 17. -57- “significant weight” to the report of his forensic psychologist.48 The district court stated that it considered this report.49 Mr. Jones contends, however, that, because the district court relied on his treatment of the victims in determining his sentence, the district court also should have considered the mitigating circumstances in his background that may have caused his behavior. We cannot accept this contention. “That the sentencing court chose not to attach to certain of the mitigating factors the significance that the appellant thinks they deserved does not make the sentence unreasonable.” United States v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588, 593 (1st Cir. 2011). Here, the district court considered Mr. Jones’s mitigating evidence but was not persuaded by it. We therefore conclude that Mr. Jones’s sentence was procedurally correct and substantively reasonable.