Opinion ID: 712082
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Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Motivation Requirement Under the VRR Act

Text: 50 The VRR Act was enacted in 1968. One of its purposes was to encourage noncareer service in the uniformed services by minimizing the disadvantages to civilian careers and employment that could result from such service. See S.Rep. No. 1477 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News (USCCAN) 3421, 3421-22. It provided, inter alia, that an employee shall upon request be granted a leave of absence by such person's employer for the period required to perform ... inactive duty training. 38 U.S.C. § 2024(d) (1988). Prior to 1994, § 2021 of the Act (which was renumbered § 4301 in 1992, and relevant parts of which were renumbered § 4311 in 1994) provided, in pertinent part, that 51 [a]ny person who [is employed by the state or a political subdivision thereof] shall not be denied hiring, retention in employment, or any promotion or other incident or advantage of employment because of any obligation as a member of a Reserve component of the Armed Forces. 52 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3) (1988) (renumbered § 4301(b)(3) pursuant to Pub.L. No. 102-568, § 506 (1992); renumbered § 4311 in Pub.L. No. 103-353, § 2 (1994)). In 1981, the because of any obligation language of § 2021(b)(3) was interpreted by the Supreme Court as having the significant but limited purpose of protecting the employee-reservist against discriminations like discharge and demotion, motivated solely by reserve status. Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. at 559, 101 S.Ct. at 2516. In so stating, the Court relied on the legislative history of that section, including a House of Representatives Committee report which stated that the section 53 amplifies existing law to make clear that reservists not on active duty, who have a remaining Reserve obligation, whether acquired voluntarily or involuntarily, will nonetheless not be discriminated against by their employees [sic ] soley [sic ] because of such Reserve affiliation. 54 Id. at 558, 101 S.Ct. at 2521 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 1303, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1968) (brackets in Monroe )). In Monroe, the Supreme Court had ruled that the VRR Act did not require employers to make work-scheduling accommodations for reservists that were not made for other employees, i.e., to provide a reservist with a special work-scheduling preference. 452 U.S. at 561, 101 S.Ct. at 2517. Following Monroe, other courts interpreted § 2021(b)(3) as permitting the exoneration of an employer who could point to a nonpretextual reason for an adverse employment decision that was irrelevant to the employee's military status, even if that status played some role in the decision. See, e.g., Burkart v. Post-Browning, Inc., 859 F.2d 1245, 1247 (6th Cir.1988); Sawyer v. Swift & Co., 836 F.2d 1257, 1262 (10th Cir.1988); Clayton v. Blachowske Truck Lines, Inc., 640 F.Supp. 172, 174 (D.Minn.1986), aff'd, 815 F.2d 1203 (8th Cir.1987). 55 In 1994, Congress enacted the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) to replace the VRR Act in order to clarify, simplify, and, where necessary, strengthen the existing veterans' employment and reemployment rights provisions. H.R.Rep. No. 65, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1994) (House Report or Report), reprinted in 1994 USCCAN at 2449, 2451. USERRA was designed to [c]ontinue to prohibit discrimination or acts of reprisal against an employee ... because of a past, current, or future military obligation, House Report at 17, 1994 USCCAN at 2450, but it eliminated the because of language of § 2021(b)(3), and Congress disavowed the sole-motivation requirement inferred by Monroe and its progeny. The language was modified to state that an employer violates the Act if an employee's membership ... or obligation for service in the uniformed services is a motivating factor in the employer's action, unless the employer can prove that the action would have been taken in the absence of such membership ... or obligation. 38 U.S.C. § 4311(b) (emphasis added). 56 The Village argues that the district court properly applied the Monroe sole-motivation test in the present case in preference to the existing language of § 4311(b) because USERRA, which became effective on October 13, 1994, long after the events involving Gummo, did not expressly overrule Monroe. Given Congress's power to amend a statute to clarify its original intention when the courts have misperceived that intention, and to make such clarifications applicable to cases begun before passage of the clarifying statute, see generally Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1510, 1519, 128 L.Ed.2d 274 (1994); Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 755 (2d Cir.1987), and given the congressional descriptions of § 4311(b) discussed below, we disagree. 57 The report of the House of Representatives Committee on Veterans' Affairs accompanying the House bill that eventually became USERRA stated that the original intent of Congress when it enacted current section 2021(b)(3) of title 38, in 1968 was not the imposition of a sole-motivation test, House Report at 24, 1994 USCCAN at 2457, and that the cases applying the sole factor test suggested by Monroe had misinterpreted Congress's intent: 58 To the extent that courts have relied on dicta from the Supreme Court's decision in Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549, 559, 101 S.Ct. 2510, 2516, 69 L.Ed.2d 226 (1981), that a violation of this section can occur only if the military obligation is the sole factor (see Sawyer v. Swift & Co., 836 F.2d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir.1988)), those decisions have misinterpreted the original legislative intent and history of 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3) and are rejected on that basis. 59 House Report at 24, 1994 USCCAN at 2457. The Report stated that the new language of § 4311(b) was simply a reaffirmation of the original intent of Congress, House Report at 24, 1994 USCCAN at 2457, that the standard of proof in a discrimination or retaliation case is the so-called 'but-for' test and that the burden of proof is on the employer, once a prima facie case is established, id. The report of the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs likewise stated that § 4311's explicit mixed-motive and burden-shifting language simply reflected Congress's original intent: 60 New section 4311(b) would provide, consistent with current law, that the employer would be considered to have committed a prohibited act of discrimination under the VRR law if the claimant's covered connection with service was a motivating factor in the employer's action, unless the employer showed that the action complained of would have been taken in the absence of service connection. This provision is a reaffirmation of the original intent of Congress when it enacted current section 4301(b)(3) of title 38 in 1968. The Committee intends ... that the burden of proof with respect to this affirmative defense would be on the employer. 61 S.Rep. No. 158, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1994) (Senate Report) (emphasis added). 62 Explicitly rejecting Monroe, both congressional reports stated that courts applying § 4311(b) should instead use the scheme of burden-of-proof allocations approved by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 401, 103 S.Ct. 2469, 2474, 76 L.Ed.2d 667 (1983), for actions under the National Labor Relations Act. House Report at 24, 1994 USCCAN at 2457; Senate Report at 45. Under that scheme, a claimant carries his burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his protected status was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse [employment] action; but the employer may nonetheless escape liability by showing, as an affirmative defense, that it would have made the same decision without regard to the employee's protected status. Transportation Management, 462 U.S. at 401, 103 S.Ct. at 2474. 63 We reject the Village's contention that this analytical scheme was not meant to apply to preexisting cases such as the present case. With respect to § 4311, USERRA states as follows: 64 The provisions of section 4311 of title 38, United States Code, as provided in the amendments made by this Act, ... that are necessary for the implementation of such section 4311 shall become effective on the date of enactment of this Act. 65 Pub.L. No. 103-353, § 8(b) (emphasis added). Though this provision is perhaps susceptible to differing interpretations, the legislative history statements, describing § 4311 as simply a reaffirmation of Congress's original intent in enacting § 2021(b)(3), strongly indicate that Congress did not regard the linguistic change as an amendment that is necessary for the implementation of such section 4311. This was made more plain by a bicameral report with respect to the effective dates on which USERRA's various provisions were to become effective: it was agreed that the standard and burden of proof set forth in section 4311(b) are not additions to the Act but are a codification of existing law. Joint Explanatory Statement on H.R. 995, 140 Cong.Rec. H 9136 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1994), reprinted in 1994 USCCAN 2493, 2515. Accordingly, the House Report stated expressly that the Transportation Management 66 standard and burden of proof is [sic ] applicable to all cases brought under this section regardless of the date of accrual of the cause of action. 67 House Report at 24, 1994 USCCAN at 2457 (emphasis added). 68 Given Congress's clear statements as to its original intent in enacting the VRR and its wish to have the courts apply § 4311(b) in accordance with that intent to all cases regardless of their vintage, we conclude that the district court should not have employed the sole-motivation analysis adopted by Monroe and its progeny. Proper analysis, in connection with the Village's summary judgment motion, required a determination of (a) whether there was sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could infer that Gummo's status or conduct as a reservist was a substantial or motivating factor in his dismissal; and (b) if there was such evidence, whether it could be said as a matter of law that the Village would have discharged him even if he had not been a reservist.