Opinion ID: 2637512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: To prevail on his personal restraint petition, Tortorelli has the burden of establishing either error of constitutional magnitude resulting in actual prejudice or nonconstitutional error resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice. In re Pers. Restraint of Cook, 114 Wash.2d 802, 813, 792 P.2d 506 (1990). Tortorelli was charged under a statute that requires the jury to find he was stealing the property of another. RCW 9A.56.020(1)(a). He was not charged under subsection (c), which covers misappropriation of lost property. Thus, one of the elements the State must prove is that the logs and trees belonged to someone other than Tortorelli. At trial, Tortorelli did not contest that the State owned the logs and trees. However, in this personal restraint petition, Tortorelli argues for the first time that the State did not own the logs or, relatedly, that there is insufficient evidence of state ownership of the logs. We find both arguments unavailing. First, we find as a matter of law, the State of Washington does own both the ancient forest and unbranded stray logs. Our constitution vests ownership of the beds and shores of all navigable waters in the state to the State. Const. art. XVII, § 1. While no Washington court has had occasion to rule on the ownership of logs or trees that have been a part of that lake bed for centuries, generally, the State has title to valuable assets within the beds of navigable waters, with exceptions not relevant here. See ch. 79.95 RCW; see also Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 2 Wash. 236, 240-41, 26 P. 539 (1891) (noting that the State as the successor to the king is the absolute owner of navigable waters and the soil under them). Further support of State ownership appears in federal law. When the United States was constituted, the Constitution reserved to the original states the shores and beds of navigable waters within their respective boundaries. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 10 L.Ed. 997 (1842). Under the equal footing doctrine, states subsequently admitted to the Union obtained the same rights, sovereignty and jurisdiction ... as the original States possess within their respective borders. Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423, 436, 18 L.Ed. 756 (1867). More recently, the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 confirmed that the states took title to natural resources found within navigable waters: It is determined and declared to be in the public interest that ... title to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of the respective States, and the natural resources within such lands and waters, ... [is] vested in and assigned to the respective States ... in which the land is located.... 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a). Tortorelli disputes whether the trees and logs were natural resources. Natural resources is defined in the Submerged Lands Act as  without limiting the generality thereof, oil, gas, and all other minerals, and fish, shrimp, oysters, clams, crabs, lobsters, sponges, kelp, and other marine animal and plant life. 43 U.S.C. § 1301(e) (emphasis added). When a statute fails to fully define a term, we refer to dictionary definitions. W. Telepage, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, 140 Wash.2d 599, 609, 998 P.2d 884 (2000). Webster's dictionary defines natural resources as materials ... supplied by nature. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1507 (1993). Trees are supplied by nature. The legislature has recognized that timber is one of the most valuable natural resources in the state. See, e.g., RCW 76.13.005(4), .010(5). Thus, we have no difficulty in determining as a matter of law that trees are natural resources. The word marine is defined as of or relating to the commerce of the sea. Webster's at 1382. Because the Submerged Lands Act refers to all navigable waters in the United States, marine in this context encompasses navigable waters other than seas. We find no legal or logical reason to exclude the submerged trees from the definition of natural resources which also includes oil and gas which, like the trees, are resources as a result of ancient natural disasters and other natural occurrences. The ancient forest trees are located within the waters or soil of Lake Washington. Under state and federal statutory and common law, the State owns the submerged trees. It is well established that [u]nambiguous language does not require nor permit judicial construction. State v. Michaelson, 124 Wash.2d 364, 366, 878 P.2d 1206 (1994). Once the trees have been cut into logs, it is not so clear that they are natural resources as meant by the statute because cut logs are not supplied by nature. However, there is a separate basis for state ownership of stray logs, the marks and brands statute, which provides: Unbranded or unmarked stray logs or forest products become the property of the state when recovered. RCW 76.36.020. Therefore, as a matter of law the State also owned the stray logs left by the Corps of Engineers in about 1919. Tortorelli argues for the first time that under the law of finds, the State had no title to the logs and trees. The law of finds is a common law principle granting title to the first party to discover and reduce to possession unknown or abandoned artifacts found in the sea. Commonwealth v. Maritime Underwater Surveys, Inc., 403 Mass. 501, 531 N.E.2d 549 (1988). When the ancient trees slid from Mercer Island into Lake Washington 1,100 years ago, the State of Washington did not exist. Native American tribes do not claim ownership over the trees. Thus, Tortorelli argues that the trees are unowned and under the law of finds he is entitled to salvage them. However, we find the law of finds must give way to our state and federal constitutions and laws, and we decline to apply it to these logs. Because the submerged trees and stray logs belong to the State as a matter of law, Tortorelli cannot prove any actual and substantial prejudice, and we accordingly deny relief on these grounds. In a similar vein, Tortorelli argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict because the State was allegedly relieved of its burden to prove an element of the crime, that the logs were owned by another. Sufficiency of the evidence is a question of constitutional magnitude because due process requires the State to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Baeza, 100 Wash.2d 487, 488, 670 P.2d 646 (1983) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)). Evidence is sufficient to convict when `viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. ' State v. Green, 94 Wash.2d 216, 221, 616 P.2d 628 (1980) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781). We find Tortorelli has not met his burden for collateral relief. First, we note that the jury was instructed to decide whether the prosecution had proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Tortorelli had taken the property of another. It did so find. Second, there was a wealth of evidence on the record from which the jury could so find. Tortorelli has shown no prejudice, and accordingly, we reject this claim. Next, Tortorelli argues that there was insufficient evidence to determine that he operated under an invalid log patrol license. He claims that in 1991 he was authorized to operate under the Clearwater license. He bases this claim on a contract document that states that he was entitled to use the Clearwater permits, if legal. However, the license in question was for the Crawfish, which Clearwater retained. Licenses are specific to the vessel operated. As a result, Clearwater's license for the Crawfish could not provide Tortorelli authorization to salvage logs while operating the Shawnee. In 1992, Tortorelli operated under a new license, but when he applied for the license in the name of Clearwater, he was neither an owner nor an employee of Clearwater. He was found guilty of falsifying a document in his license application. These facts are sufficient to establish that the license Tortorelli was using in 1992 was invalid. Therefore, Tortorelli has failed to establish a constitutional error. Tortorelli also argues that the trial court should not have admitted a copy of the log patrol statute into evidence because it contains a presumption that anyone holding stray logs without a valid license did so with intent to deprive and defraud the owner thereof. Former RCW 76.40.080 (1984). He argues that an irrebuttable presumption of one of the elements of theft violates due process. However, this contention is not properly before us because the State initially offered excerpts from the statute, and it is Tortorelli himself who wanted the entire statute admitted, including the portion of which he now complains. The invited error doctrine prohibits a party from setting up an error in the trial court then complaining of it on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 114 Wash.2d 867, 870, 792 P.2d 514 (1990); State v. Neher, 112 Wash.2d 347, 352-53, 771 P.2d 330 (1989). Tortorelli failed to offer any limiting or curative instruction with respect to admitting the statute as an exhibit. Therefore, the invited error rule applies, and Tortorelli may not now complain on collateral attack that the trial court acceded to his request to admit the statute or that his due process rights were violated by the presumption contained in the statute. See State v. Studd, 137 Wash.2d 533, 552, 973 P.2d 1049, 1058 (1999). Tortorelli further argues that the trial court erred in failing to declare the law, leaving the jury to determine whether a log patrol license is transferable based on its interpretation of the log patrol statute and on opinion testimony from DNR that such transfers are illegal. The court has a duty to declare the law. Const. art. IV, § 16; Pepperall v. City Park Transit Co., 15 Wash. 176, 183, 45 P. 743 (1896), 46 P. 407 (1896), overruled on other grounds by Thornton v. Dow, 60 Wash. 622, 111 P. 899 (1910). At trial, Tortorelli objected to Meacham's testimony that log patrol licenses could not be transferred and to the State's proposed jury instruction on transferability of log patrol licenses. The court noted the objection for the record and referred to a pretrial ruling that the witness may indicate whether or not a transfer was permissible. Tortorelli's objection to Meacham's testimony at trial did not preserve the gravamen of his current argument for collateral review. Tortorelli must now show us that the trial court's alleged failure to declare the law was either constitutional error causing actual and substantial prejudice, or nonconstitutional error leading to a fundamental defect that inherently resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice. See In re Pers. Restraint of Cook, 114 Wash.2d at 810-11, 792 P.2d 506. Assuming a constitutional error, Tortorelli has failed to prove actual and substantial prejudice. Assuming Clearwater's license was transferable, the license for the Crawfish did not provide Tortorelli authority to salvage stray logs while operating the Shawnee. Moreover, the legal question of whether the license was transferable is irrelevant to the factual issue of whether Tortorelli was acting under a good faith belief that he was authorized to salvage the submerged trees and stray logs. Consequently, Tortorelli has failed to prove actual and substantial prejudice. Tortorelli finally argues that failure to object to admission of the log patrol statute constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient and not a matter of trial strategy or tactics, and that the petitioner was prejudiced. State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash.2d 61, 77-78, 917 P.2d 563 (1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). Washington courts indulge in a strong presumption that counsel's performance was reasonable. State v. Garrett, 124 Wash.2d 504, 518-19, 881 P.2d 185 (1994). Here, counsel allowed the admission of the entire log patrol statute in preference to excerpts from the statute, which the State wanted to admit. Admitting the entire statute enabled Tortorelli to argue his claim that he took the timber with good faith claim of title because there was nothing in the log patrol guidelines that says a corporation cannot do exactly what Clearwater did, which is to authorize somebody to use their license. Report of Proceedings (Feb. 10, 1995) at 126. We find this to be a legitimate trial strategy and cannot be a basis for ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Brett, 126 Wash.2d 136, 198-99, 892 P.2d 29 (1995). The only conviction not based on the premise that the State of Washington owns the timber salvaged by Tortorelli is count 4. This is the charge of offering false documents for filing, based on Tortorelli's false representation of himself as an agent of Clearwater when applying for a new log patrol permit. The statute provides: Every person who shall knowingly procure or offer any false or forged instrument to be filed, registered, or recorded in any public office, which instrument, if genuine, might be filed, registered or recorded in such office under any law of this state or of the United States, shall be punished by imprisonment in a state correctional facility for not more than five years, or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars, or by both. RCW 40.16.030. Tortorelli argues that even though materiality is not mentioned in the statute, materiality is an element of the crime. For this proposition he cites to State v. Price, 94 Wash.2d 810, 620 P.2d 994 (1980). However, the issue in Price was not materiality but whether the document in question was an instrument. Id. Thus, Tortorelli's citation to Price is not well taken. Even if materiality is required, the jury instructions as a whole required the false representation to be related to a material fact represented in the document. State's Resp. to Pers. Restraint Pet., App. Q, Instruction 26. Tortorelli's implied representation that he was an agent of Clearwater was material. We hold that the State of Washington had title to both the submerged trees and the stray logs. If admission of the log patrol statute was erroneous, the error was invited, and Tortorelli waived his right to object. The failure to object did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel as it was based on legitimate trial strategy. We therefore affirm the trial court on all counts. JOHNSON, MADSEN, IRELAND, BRIDGE, and OWENS, JJ., and SMITH, J. Pro Tem., concur. SANDERS, J., dissenting. As the majority notes, counts one, two, three, five, six, eight, and nine are all predicated on the State's asserted ownership of the submerged trees and the stray logs. [1] Majority at 612. Tortorelli contends the State submitted insufficient evidence to prove it owns the submerged trees Tortorelli allegedly stole from the state. The common law supplements the criminal statutes insofar as [it is] not inconsistent with the Constitution and statutes of this state.... RCW 9A.04.060. Tortorelli raises the common law doctrine of finds. Under this doctrine, the finder of things that have never been appropriated, or that have been abandoned by a former occupant, may take them into his possession as his own property; and the finder of any thing casually lost is its rightful occupant against all but the real owner. Eads v. Brazelton, 22 Ark. 499, 501 (1861). Because the ancient submerged trees fell into Lake Washington prior to the existence of the state and federal governments and none of the previous inhabitants lay claim to the trees, Tortorelli asserts ownership of the submerged trees under the law of finds. Pet. for Review at 14. Without reaching the merits of Tortorelli's common law claim, the majority concludes as a matter of law that the State owns the submerged trees. Majority at 609. The majority reaches this astonishing conclusion by overstating the State's claim to natural resources under the federal Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. § 1301. Majority at 610. As the majority notes, the act provides a nonexclusive definition of natural resources. Majority at 610. However, its illustrative examples, oil, gas, and all other minerals, and fish, shrimp, oysters, clams, crabs, lobsters, sponges, kelp, and other marine animal and plant life, 43 U.S.C. § 1301(e), are all resources that grow or evolve naturally below water, rather than resources that once grew on dry land and then happened to end up beneath the surface by accident or natural disaster. The majority's conclusion is counterintuitive. The Submerged Lands Act speaks of minerals and marine life, not of sunken trees. Moreover, the rule of lenity requires the court to construe an ambiguous statute in a criminal case favorably to the accused. In re Post Sentencing Review of Charles, 135 Wash.2d 239, 249-50, 955 P.2d 798 (1998). This assures adequate notice, and thus due process, concerning what conduct will be considered illegal. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985). Today's majority gives short shrift to this vital concern. I therefore respectfully dissent. ALEXANDER, C.J., concurs.