Opinion ID: 2304668
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State v. Farmer

Text: Defendant, Edward Farmer, age 62, lived with Theresa Chapman and her twelve-year-old son, George. On October 5, 1990, neighbors heard Farmer and Chapman arguing in their home. A loud boom from Farmer's dining room punctuated the fight. Farmer then asked two neighbors to call an ambulance. On entering Farmer's residence, one neighbor found Chapman lying on the floor in a pool of blood. The neighbor called for an ambulance. Carrying a bag, Farmer ran to another neighbor's home and placed a shotgun on the porch. Farmer told his neighbors that he had shot T.C. and she was laying on the kitchen floor. Farmer then placed a shotgun under a car in the parking lot of an apartment complex across the street from his home. Emergency medical personnel declared Chapman dead at the scene. The spent shell found near Chapman's head matched the shotgun recovered from the parking lot. A short time later the police apprehended defendant, who was carrying a live shotgun shell in his left front pocket. During questioning, Farmer told investigators that he had only one thing to say: he had kissed a set of dying lips. A Camden County grand jury indicted defendant on six counts: murder, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) and (2) (count one); possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a (count two); possession of a shotgun without a permit, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5c(1) (count three); hindering apprehension or prosecution, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3b(1) (count four); tampering with witnesses, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5a(2) (count five); possession of a shotgun by a person previously convicted, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7 (count six). The State subsequently dismissed counts five and six and defendant proceeded to trial on the remaining four counts. Concerning the State's burden of proof, the trial court charged: The finding of an indictment by a Grand Jury is not evidence of the guilt of an accused and in this case is not to be taken by you as such. This defendant, like all defendants in criminal cases, is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That presumption continues throughout the trial of this case and even during your deliberations and unless and until you have determined that the State has proven his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden of proof of the guilt of the defendant is on the State and it never shifts. It remains on the State throughout the whole trial of the case. No burden with respect to proof is imposed on the defendant. He is not obligated to prove his innocence or produce witnesses. Unless the State has proven the crime charged in each of its elements beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal. Now, ladies and gentlemen, what I have just told you is very important because what it is, the State must prove the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, that is what they must prove and as I charge you on the law of the offense I will point out to you what the elements are and that is what the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Only the elements. Now, the term reasonable doubt means a doubt based upon reason and common sense. It is a doubt for which a reason can be given arising from a fair and rational consideration of the evidence or a want of evidence. It means such a doubt as would cause a man of ordinary prudence to pause or hesitate when called upon to act in the most important affairs of life. A reasonable doubt is not a doubt that is merely fanciful or speculative such as a skeptical mind might suggest. A doubt that ignores a reasonable interpretation of the evidence or which arises merely from sympathy or from a fear to return a verdict of guilt is not a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is not merely a doubt such as may be conjured up in the mind of one desiring to escape the responsibility of a decision. While it is your duty to give the defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt, you are not to search for doubt. You are to search for the truth and give the defendant the benefit of a reasonable doubt if it arises in your minds after you have carefully considered all of the evidence in the case. Reasonable doubt is not a mere possible or imaginary doubt. Because as we all know, everything relating to human affairs or dependent upon oral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. A reasonable doubt is an honest and reasonable uncertainty as to the guilt of the defendant existing in your minds after you have given full and impartial consideration to all of the evidence. It may arise from the evidence itself or from a lack of evidence. [emphasis added]. Farmer's counsel objected to this instruction. He argued that the charge should include an instruction that circumstantial evidence could also support a verdict of not guilty and that the court should instruct the jury that the State's burden of proof extended beyond the elements of the crime to the underlying facts. The trial court responded that the charge adequately explained both parts of the burden. Defense counsel also objected that the instruction defined reasonable doubt in terms of what it was not, and gave precious little guidance about what the term means. The trial court believed that its instruction was adequate, but gave the supplemental instruction: Okay, ladies and gentlemen, just one or two things. I want you to understand that in determining whether or not the burden of proof has been met, as I said to you, that can be found by the evidence or a lack of evidence and that is one of the things that I went through with you and that may be either direct or circumstantial evidence, however you consider it. That is, the same standards apply. The jury found Farmer guilty of all four counts. The court sentenced him to life imprisonment with a thirty-year parole disqualifier. The Appellate Division affirmed. We granted Farmer's petition for certification, 140 N.J. 275, 658 A. 2d 299 (1995).
The challenged language is substantially identical to the language in the charge in State v. Medina. As in Medina, we hold that the charge, as a whole, did not violate Farmer's rights to a fair trial and due process. Read in its entirety, the instruction properly explained the State's burden of proof. We repeat, however, that the instructions should not define reasonable doubt as a doubt for which a reason can be given; exclude from reasonable doubt a doubt that ignores a reasonable interpretation of the evidence; or direct jurors to search for truth and avoid search[ing] for doubt. The court properly charged the jury on the State's burden of proof and Farmer's presumption of innocence. It stressed that [t]he burden of proof of the guilt of the defendant is on the State and it never shifts. The court instructed that [n]o burden of proof is imposed on the defendant. Further, the court instructed that the defendant is neither obligated to prove his innocence nor produce witnesses. It emphasized that the State must prove Farmer's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court repeated this standard when explaining each of the four counts. In all, the court informed the jury twenty-one times that the prosecution must prove Farmer's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court rehabilitated its charge on reasonable doubt by adding: A reasonable doubt is an honest and reasonable uncertainty as to the guilt of the defendant existing in your minds after you have given full and impartial consideration to all of the evidence. It may arise from the evidence itself or from a lack of evidence. On balance, the instruction passes muster.