Opinion ID: 373835
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Equal Pay Act

Text: 24 Under the Equal Pay Act, Mary Institute is forbidden to discriminate 25 between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees    at a rate less than the rate at which (it) pays wages to employees of the opposite sex    for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex   . 26 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). For purposes of the Act, equal means substantially equal; male and female jobs may be compared even if they are not identical. See, e. g., Peltier v. City of Fargo, 533 F.2d 374, 377 (8th Cir. 1976); 29 C.F.R. §§ 800.120, .122 (1978). 7 If a plaintiff shows that an employer has paid males and females different wages for substantially equal work, the employer then must show that one of section 206(d)(1)'s four exceptions applies. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195-97, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974); Ridgway v. United Hospitals-Miller Division, 563 F.2d 923, 926 (8th Cir. 1977); 29 C.F.R. § 800.141 (1978). 27 As to the portion of Horner's claim that is based on a comparison between her job and that of Thorne, there is no dispute that Mary Institute paid different wages to Horner and Thorne. The only questions are (1) whether their jobs were substantially equal and (2) if so, whether the wage differential was related to sex. The district court held, in effect, that the jobs were not substantially equal and announced that, in the event that the issue were reached, it would find the difference in their wages was due to factors other than sex. 28 Our duty in reviewing these determinations is to uphold them unless they are clearly erroneous. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52. This standard of review does not permit us to substitute our own impressions for those of the district court. 29 It is not enough that we might give the facts another construction, resolve the ambiguities differently, and find a more sinister cast to actions which the District Court apparently deemed innocent.    We are not given those choices, because our mandate is not to set aside findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. 30 United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485, 495-96, 70 S.Ct. 711, 717, 94 L.Ed. 1007 (1950) (citations omitted). The appellant's burden of showing clearly erroneous findings is especially great where, as here, the findings are primarily based upon oral testimony. St. Louis Typographical Union No. 8 v. Herald Co., 402 F.2d 553, 557 (8th Cir. 1968). 31 Horner asserts some inaccuracies in the district court's findings of basic facts and attacks the findings as inadequate because they do not detail and compare the job requirements of Horner and Thorne. Instead, complains Horner, the findings focus on Thorne's allegedly superior job performance. We agree that the district court's findings are not as detailed as they should be. But we do not agree that the court's ultimate findings are clearly erroneous. A lack of specific findings is not necessarily ground for reversal or remand where an understanding of the issues may be gleaned from a review of the record on appeal. See Janzen v. Goos, 302 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir. 1962); 5A Moore's Federal Practice P 52.06(2), at 2718-23 & n.2.
32 Our review of the record reveals there was substantial evidence to support the district court's conclusion that Horner had failed to show that her job required substantially equal skill, effort, and responsibility as that of Thorne. The jobs are superficially identical in that both involve teaching of physical education. And Mary Institute has, for recruiting purposes, used a leaflet that describes the general duties of a Teacher of Physical Education, Grades K-12. But (t)he consideration of equal pay standards is based on actual job requirements and performance, not on-job classifications or titles. Peltier v. City of Fargo, supra, 533 F.2d at 377; Accord, 29 C.F.R. § 800.121 (1978). The district court was not clearly erroneous in finding that the work actually required of Thorne was different from that actually required of Horner. 33 During a three day trial, the district court heard the oral testimony of Headmistress Wilson, Horner, Thorne, and other employees of Mary Institute. It received the deposition of Wilson and of former Headmaster Stearns. There was ample testimony for the court to conclude that Thorne's job was not substantially equal to Horner's in terms of skill or responsibility. Thorne was to develop and implement a physical education curriculum for children in grades K through 4. Horner, by contrast, was to teach courses selected by someone else. There was evidence from which the court could conclude that Thorne's job required more experience, training, and ability, all of which are factors to consider in determining whether jobs require substantially equal skill under the Equal Pay Act. See 29 C.F.R. § 800.125 (1978). 8 34 There was also evidence to find that Thorne's job was not substantially equal to Horner's in terms of responsibility. Thorne reported directly to his school head and to parents on his physical education programs. The district court was entitled to conclude that his job differed from Horner's in terms of degree of accountability and the importance of job obligation. See 29 C.F.R. § 800.129 (1978). 35 What is more, the evidence before the district court justifies its conclusion that if for any reason it can be said that plaintiff did make a prima facie case, the defendant rebutted it. Headmaster Stearns attempted to hire Thorne at the same $7,500 salary at which he had hired other teachers, both male and female, but Thorne rejected Stearns' offer because he thought he could command a $9,000 salary at Twillman Elementary School. There is evidence to find that Stearns met Thorne's demand not because Thorne was male but because Thorne's experience and ability made him the best person available for the job and because a higher salary was necessary to hire him. The differential was based on a factor other than sex. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(iv). 36 Although an employer's perception that women would generally work for less than will men is not a justification for paying women less, See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, supra, 417 U.S. at 205, 94 S.Ct. 2223, it is our view that an employer may consider the market place value of the skills of a particular individual when determining his or her salary. See generally Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356 (8th Cir. 1977).
37 During 1974-78, Thorne's job grew while Horner's, until recently, was relatively static. While retaining his curriculum responsibilities, Thorne instituted several special annual events, introduced three varsity athletic teams, and established an intermural athletic program and an intramural floor hockey program at the Beasley School. Horner, by contrast, appears to have assumed no significant new responsibilities until 1977-78, when she helped supervise the intramural program, instituted intermural field hockey and tennis, and served for a time as chair of the curriculum committee. Our conclusion that the district court was justified in finding that Horner and Thorne were hired to fill different jobs therefore applies with even greater force for the years subsequent to their initial employment. 38 Because Horner failed to establish that her job was substantially equal to that of Thorne, the amount by which Thorne's salary exceeded hers is not relevant under the Equal Pay Act. 9 Congress did not intend to put either the Secretary (of Labor) or the courts in the business of evaluating jobs and determining what constituted a proper differential for unequal work. Hodgson v. Corning Glass Works, 474 F.2d 226, 231 (2d Cir. 1973), Aff'd, 417 U.S. 188, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974). We note that judicial determination of the relative economic value of unequal work may be particularly ill-advised in the context of faculty salaries in a private school. 39 We therefore conclude the district court was justified in holding that Horner had not made out a prima facie case of sex discrimination. The court had substantial evidence upon which to find that Thorne's job was not substantially equal to Horner's in terms of skill, effort, and responsibility.
40 Apart from the comparison of her job with that of Thorne, Horner relies on pension fund figures that indicate males earn higher average salaries at Mary Institute than do females. That fact is relevant, however, only in connection with a showing that the figures represent wages paid males and females for substantially equal jobs. Horner made no such showing. The district court found that these figures were influenced by such factors as the inclusion of lower-paid female clerical workers and higher-paid male administrators and a maintenance engineer. The concentration of men in one job and women in a substantially different job does not make out a case under the Equal Pay Act. See 29 C.F.R. § 800.120 (1978). Horner does not attack either the district court's explanation of the pension fund figures or its specific comparisons of male and female salaries, from which it concluded that Horner had made out no prima facie case under the Act. We cannot say the district court was clearly erroneous in making these determinations.
41 While our affirmance of the district court makes it unnecessary to consider Horner's arguments concerning liquidated damages and attorney's fees under 29 U.S.C. § 216, we are met with Mary Institute's contention that it is entitled to attorney's fees as the prevailing party on appeal. But Mary Institute points to no specific statute that would authorize an award to the prevailing defendant or appellee in an Equal Pay Act case. Nor does Mary Institute attempt to show that Horner's appeal was motivated by anything other than an earnest belief that she was a victim of sex discrimination. We cannot say that Horner's contentions were devoid of merit or otherwise reflective of bad faith. See Mosby v. Webster College, 563 F.2d 901, 905 (8th Cir. 1977) (denial of attorney's fees to prevailing defendant in Title VII case). 42 Judgment affirmed.