Opinion ID: 1424217
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Scope of Premises-Operations Coverage.

Text: A motion for summary judgment is to be granted only when the record indicates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Alaska R.Civ.P. 56(c). Further, [t]he construction of an insurance contract is a matter for the court, unless its interpretation is dependent upon the resolution of controverted facts. O'Neill Investigations v. Illinois Employers Ins. of Wausau, 636 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Alaska 1981). Well-known principles of insurance contract interpretation govern the analysis of the question of coverage in this case. An insurance policy may be considered a contract of adhesion, and as such, should be construed to provide the coverage which a lay person would have reasonably expected, given a lay interpretation of the policy language... . To ascertain the reasonable expectations of the parties, we look to the language of the disputed policy provisions, the language of other provisions of the insurance policy, and to relevant extrinsic evidence. In addition, we refer to case law interpreting similar provisions. Stordahl v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 564 P.2d 63, 65-66 (Alaska 1977) (footnotes and citations omitted). Furthermore, provisions of coverage should be construed broadly while exclusions are interpreted narrowly against the insured. Starry v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 649 P.2d 937, 939 (Alaska 1982) quoting Hahn v. Alaska Title Guar. Co., 557 P.2d 143, 145 (Alaska 1976). Hale argues that a lay person would reasonably expect that the comprehensive general liability policy which covered the premises and operations of the produce stand would extend coverage to off-premises risks which arise from necessary and incidental produce stand operations. Looking first at the language of the disputed policy provisions, the comprehensive general liability policy provides simply that premises-operations are a hazard which is included. Contrary to the assertion by Fireman's Fund that the coverage was expressly limited to Swanson's operations at the trailer park and the produce stand, there is no express provision so limiting the provision PREMISES-OPERATIONS Included. Looking next to other provisions of the policy and relevant extrinsic evidence, Swanson's original Owners, Landlords & Tenants policy insured against damages because of bodily injury arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the insured premises and all operations necessary or incidental thereto.  (Emphasis added). A leading insurance treatise states: Where the policy expressly covers not only the risks involved in the use of the designated premises, but also declares that it covers operations which are necessary or incidental to the operations conducted on the premises, there is coverage of off-premises risks which arise from such necessary and incidental operations conducted off the premises. M. Rhodes, Couch on Insurance § 44.308, at 478 (rev. 2d ed. 1984). Reading the policy in light of the earlier policy's provisions, a reasonable lay person could only conclude that both the premises and the operations of the business were included in the policy's coverage. Since, for purposes of Fireman's Fund's motion for summary judgment, we must assume that the accident occurred in the course of the produce stand business, the trial court erred in finding that as a matter of law Hale's injury was not covered under the policy. [1]