Opinion ID: 2634931
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: giusti's appeal was timely

Text: ¶ 23 In arguing that his appeal was timely, Giusti relies on rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule, along with our recent holding in Code v. Utah Dep't of Health, [9] establish that the July judgment was necessary, and therefore, Giusti's appeal was timely. [10] ¶ 24 Giusti contends that under rule 7(f)(2) his appeal was timely because the rule requires that a separate orderin addition to the November and June ordersbe entered. Rule 7(f)(2) provides that [u]nless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The party preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an objection or upon expiration of the time to object. [11] ¶ 25 Giusti argues that because no order in conformity with the district court's [June order] was submitted by either party, the appeal period was not triggered until the entry of such an order in the form of the July judgment. The plain language of the rule, along with our decision in Code, support Giusti's argument. ¶ 26 Rule 7(f)(2) provides in pertinent part that [u]nless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party shall ... serve upon the other parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. [12] ¶ 27 The rule is clear. A prevailing party shall prepare for entry a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. There are only two exceptions to this mandate. First, if the court approves a proposed order that is submitted with an initial memorandum, then no additional order is necessary. Second, if the court directs that no additional order is necessary, then none is. ¶ 28 In this case, neither exception was satisfied. No proposed order was submitted with an initial memorandum, and the court did not direct the parties that no additional order was necessary. The court did not, for example, tell the parties that its June order was final for purposes of appeal and that no additional order need be prepared. In the absence of such a directive, rule 7(f)(2) could only be satisfied if one of the parties prepared an order for entry. The burden was on SWC, as the prevailing party, to prepare the order. When SWC failed to meet its burden, Giusti acted appropriately in preparing the order, [13] and the court entered it on July 10. Because the entry of the July judgment satisfied the requirements of rule 7(f)(2), the July judgment triggered the appeal period, and Giusti's appeal, taken on August 6, was timely. ¶ 29 This result is supported by our recent decision in Code, [14] in which we explained the correct application of rule 7(f)(2). In Code, the district court issued a memorandum decision in January dismissing plaintiff's claim. [15] When defendants, the prevailing party, failed to prepare a separate order for entry as required by rule 7(f)(2), plaintiff prepared the order, and the court entered it in February. [16] Plaintiff appealed in March, and the court of appeals dismissed her case for lack of jurisdiction, holding that her appeal was untimely. [17] We reversed and held that the [February] order, and not the [January] memorandum decision, constituted the district court's entry of judgment for appeal purposes. [18] ¶ 30 In our opinion, we emphasized the broad and mandatory nature of rule 7(f)(2): [a] court should include [an] explicit direction whenever it intends a document a memorandum decision, minute entry, or other document to constitute its final action. Otherwise, rule 7(f)(2) requires the preparation and filing of an order to trigger finality for purposes of appeal. [19] ¶ 31 Because the issue in Code turned on whether a memorandum decision constituted a final judgment, SWC argues that our holding is limited to memorandum decisions or minute entries where finality is not discernible. SWC thus argues that our mandate in Code does not apply to Giusti because (1) the district court issued a final order rather than a memorandum decision, (2) the finality of that order was clearly discernable, and (3) the July judgment was unnecessary because it was merely a compact summary of the two prior orders and did nothing more than restate what had already been resolved in the prior orders. We address each argument in turn. ¶ 32 First, our broad holding in Code is inclusive of all final district court decisions, regardless of how they are styled. We held that whenever a court intends any document to constitute its final action, the court must explicitly direct that no additional order is necessary. [20] Otherwise, rule 7(f)(2) requires the preparation and entry of a separate order in conformity with the court's decision. [21] Thus the requirements of rule 7(f)(2) apply to every final decision issued by a district court, not just memorandum decisions or minute entries, as SWC claims. ¶ 33 Second, our holding in Code removes the burden from litigants of discerning when the appeal period has been triggered. SWC argues that litigants retain this burden, and because the finality of the June order was discernible, in that it unequivocally ended the controversy between the parties[,] the June order triggered the appeal period. ¶ 34 SWC is correct that a decision is final when it ends the controversy between the parties. [22] SWC is also correct that, pursuant to rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appeal of right may be taken only from final orders and judgments. [23] But rule 3 does not trump rule 7(f)(2). That is, while rule 3 provides the substantive requirement for a decision's finalitythat it end the controversy between the partiesrule 3 does not eviscerate the procedural requirements of rule 7 for triggering the appeal period once a final decision is rendered. ¶ 35 The rules work in concert: pursuant to rule 3, parties may take an appeal of right only from a final decision. And pursuant to rule 7(f)(2), that decision triggers the appeal period only upon the occurrence of one of the following events: (1) the court approves an order submitted with an initial memorandum, (2) the court directs that no additional order need be entered, or (3) a party prepares an order for entry that is consistent with the court's final decision. It is the entry of the final order according to rule 7(f)(2) that triggers the appeal period. If the court fails to satisfy rule 7(f)(2)'s exceptions and if the prevailing party fails to prepare an order for entry, the appeal rights of the nonprevailing party will extend indefinitely. [24] ¶ 36 The strict application of rule 7(f)(2) supports the judicial policy favoring finality, and it prevents the confusion that often leadsas it has hereto additional litigation when parties are left to divine when a court's decision has triggered the appeal period. In Code, we explained that [w]e see no benefit to a system in which parties must guess, on a case-by-case basis, whether a judge's language in a memorandum decision `implie[s],' `invite[s],' or `contemplate[s]' further action by the parties. [25] While we spoke in terms of a memorandum decision because that was the issue before us in Code, we take this opportunity to clarify that the rule's requirements and the policy supporting the rule apply to all final decisions, regardless of how they are styled. ¶ 37 We reject SWC's argument that the July judgment was unnecessary and therefore the appeal period was triggered by the June order. In this regard, SWC argues that the July judgment was unnecessary because it was merely a compact summary of the [November and June] orders and did nothing more than restate what had already been resolved in the prior orders. Even if, as SWC claims, the July judgment was a duplication of the November and/or June orders, that does not change our analysis that the July judgment was nevertheless necessary to trigger the appeal period. That is, because the requirements of rule 7(f)(2) were not satisfied with the November or June order, the July judgment was the only order that satisfied rule 7(f)(2). Therefore, it triggered the appeal period. ¶ 38 Rule 7(f)(2) applies to every final decision issued by a district court. It therefore applies to the June order issued by the district court in Giusti's case. Because the district court did not direct that no additional order was necessary, SWC, as the prevailing party, had the obligation to prepare an order in conformity with the court's decision. When SWC failed to do so, Giusti acted appropriately in preparing the order, and the appeal period was triggered when that order, in the form of the July judgment, was entered on July 10. Thus, Giusti's appeal was timely. [26]