Opinion ID: 1402588
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Trial Court's Response to a Jury Question Regarding Premeditation

Text: {22} The Legislature has defined the crime of first degree murder as, inter alia, the killing of one human being by another without lawful justification or excuse, by any of the means with which death may be caused . . . by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing. . . . Section 30-2-1. The trial court instructed the jury on the crime of first degree willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, in accordance with our Uniform Jury Instructions, as follows: For you to find the defendant guilty of first degree murder by a deliberate killing as charged in Count 1, the state must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements of the crime: 1. The defendant killed CHRIS ALFRED MARTINEZ; 2. The killing was with the deliberate intention to take away the life of CHRIS ALFRED MARTINEZ or any other human being; 3. The defendant did not act in defense of himself or another; 4. This happened in New Mexico on or about the 8th day of March, 1995. A deliberate intention refers to the state of mind of the defendant. A deliberate intention may be inferred from all of the facts and circumstances of the killing. The word deliberate means arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and the weighing of the consideration for and against the proposed course of action. A calculated judgment and decision may be arrived at in a short period of time. A mere unconsidered and rash impulse, even though it includes an intent to kill, is not a deliberate intention to kill. To constitute a deliberate killing, the slayer must weigh and consider the question of killing and his reasons for and against such a choice. (Emphasis added.); see UJI 14-201 NMRA 1999. During deliberations, the jury posed the following question to the trial court: Does premeditation belong in this case or are we even to consider premeditation? The State proposed to respond, The elements to be considered are only those contained in the written instructions you have been given. The defense proposed an alternative response: The word `deliberation' is used in the instructions instead of premeditation. During an extended discussion with the trial court, defense counsel theorized that the jury's question reflected confusion about the meaning of the word deliberation, probably in response to the reference to the word premeditation during voir dire and the jury's probable expectation that it would appear in the instructions. Defense counsel explained that, although [w]e all understand that deliberation equals premeditation, the jury did not, and according to defense counsel, the proposed response would clear[ ] up for [the jury] that deliberation is the same thing as premeditation. The trial court told defense counsel, I understand your point. I don't think you could argue it any more clear than you have. I know what you want from me. The trial court then crafted the following response: The instructions refer to deliberation not premeditation. The elements to be considered are only those contained in the written instructions you have been given. {23} Coffin now claims that the trial court's response removed the statutory element of premeditation from the crime of first degree murder. The trial court's response was clearly an attempt to combine the proposed requests from the State and the defense. The trial court apparently accepted Coffin's argument and attempted to respond to the jury in accordance with his request. Although Coffin now claims that the phrase deliberation not premeditation, as opposed to deliberation instead of premeditation, significantly altered the proposed response from defense counsel and confused the jury, defense counsel, when asked by the trial court if there was anything further for the record, did not object to the trial court's proposed response, despite the clear indication by the trial court that the defense's request was understood and seemingly accepted. It was incumbent upon Coffin to alert the trial court to the claimed error and to the significance of any deviation from the requested response in order to allow the trial court the opportunity to remedy any potential error. By his failure to do so, we conclude that Coffin did not preserve this argument for appeal, and we limit our review to fundamental error. See Rule 12-216 NMRA 1999, Madrid v. Roybal, 112 N.M. 354, 356, 815 P.2d 650, 652 (Ct.App.1991) (The principal purpose of the rule requiring a party to preserve error in the trial court is to alert the mind of the trial judge to the claimed error and to accord the trial court an opportunity to correct the matter.). The rule of fundamental error applies only if there has been a miscarriage of justice, if the question of guilt is so doubtful that it would shock the conscience to permit the conviction to stand, or if substantial justice has not been done. State v. Orosco, 113 N.M. 780, 784, 833 P.2d 1146, 1150 (1992). {24} Coffin does not claim that UJI 14-201 inadequately explains the proper mens rea for first degree willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder. Instead, he asserts that the trial court's response confused the jury by making it appear that premeditation is not an element of the crime. Based on precedent from this Court and our interpretation of legislative intent, we disagree. {25} The history of first degree murder in New Mexico clearly demonstrates that the concept of premeditation is subsumed within the meaning of deliberate intention. In State v. Smith, 26 N.M. 482, 487-94, 194 P. 869, 870-73 (1921), this Court interpreted a statutory scheme defining murder as the unlawful killing of a human being, with malice aforethought, either express or implied, 1891 N.M.Laws ch. 80, § 1, defining express malice as that deliberate intention, unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof, 1891 N.M.Laws ch. 80, § 2, defining first degree murder as [a]ll murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison or lying in wait, torture, or by any kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, ... or perpetrated from a deliberate and premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being, 1907 N.M.Laws ch. 36, § 1, and defining second degree murder as any murder not constituting first degree murder, id. We held, in accordance with the statute, that the Legislature intended that both first degree murder and second degree murder require malice aforethought. Smith, 26 N.M. at 491, 194 P. at 872. We also determined that aforethought is an exact synonym for `premeditation.' Smith, 26 N.M. at 491, 194 P. at 872. With respect to deliberate intention, however, even though the Legislature had used the phrase in the definition of express malice for murder in general, we concluded that the Legislature intended to set apart the type of intensified or first degree malice signaled by a deliberate intent to take away the life of a fellow creature. Smith, 26 N.M. at 491, 194 P. at 872. Thus, although first degree murder and second degree murder shared the element of premeditated malice, we concluded that the Legislature intended to distinguish first degree murder from second degree murder by the element of a deliberate intent to kill, defined as a thinking over with calm and reflecting mind to do the fatal act. Smith, 26 N.M. at 491, 194 P. at 872 (In all cases of murder then we have premeditated malice. The statute defining express malice adds to premeditated malice an additional mental state, viz. deliberation; that is to say, there is not only premeditated malice present, but it is accompanied by a deliberationthat is, a thinking over with calm and reflective mindto do the fatal act.). Because `[p]remeditation' means nothing more nor less than thought of beforehand, Smith, 26 N.M. at 491, 194 P. at 872, we necessarily concluded that the existence of a deliberate intention to kill will include premeditation. See Torres v. State, 39 N.M. 191, 195, 43 P.2d 929, 931 (1935) (Deliberation is more than mere premeditation and is the distinguishing characteristic of first degree murder.); see also State v. Garcia, 114 N.M. 269, 271, 837 P.2d 862, 864 (1992) (The courts of this state have construed [the statutory definition of first degree murder as any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing] to mean a killing with the deliberate intention to take away the life of another. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). See generally Black's Law Dictionary 427 (6th ed.1990) (defining deliberately as with premeditation). {26} Against the backdrop of our construction of first degree murder in Smith, the Legislature, in 1963, repealed the murder statutes at issue in Smith, 1963 N.M.Laws, ch. 303, § 30-1, and enacted a new murder statute, 1963 N.M.Laws, ch. 303, § 2-1. The 1963 enactment, though somewhat altered in form, contained a substantially similar definition of the requisite mens rea for first degree murder: Murder is the unlawful killing of one human being by another with malice aforethought, either express or implied, by any of the means with which death may be caused. A. Murder in the first degree consists of all murder perpetrated: (1) by any kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing; (2) by means of poison, lying in wait or torture; ... (5) from a deliberate and premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being. 1963 N.M.Laws, ch. 303, § 2-1. Once again, the Legislature defined second degree murder as any murder not constituting first degree murder. Id. § 2-1(B). Thus, the Legislature's definition of the mens rea for the applicable form of first degree murder, wilful, deliberate and premeditated, did not change from the statute interpreted in Smith. As a result, we presume that the Legislature approved of our prior construction of the crime of first degree murder and the significance of deliberate intent. See 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 45.12, at 62-63 (5th ed. 1992) ([I]f [a] court interprets a statute and the legislature fails to take action to change that interpretation, it is presumed that the legislature has acquiesced in the court's interpretation.). {27} The Legislature again revisited the murder statute in 1980, 1980 N.M.Laws, ch. 21, § 1, and established the present definition of first degree murder applicable in this case. See Section 30-2-1. For the second time, the Legislature chose not to alter the mens rea description of the applicable form of first degree murder, though it did expand the mens rea for second degree murder, see Garcia, 114 N.M. at 272-73, 837 P.2d at 865-66. The mens rea for the type of first degree murder of which the jury convicted Coffin remains as it was when first enacted in 1907: a killing that is willful, deliberate and premeditated. Thus, we apply the construction of this language from our earlier cases. {28} The instruction on first degree murder given by the trial court explained to the jury that a deliberate intent is one that is arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and the weighing of the consideration for and against the proposed course of action and cautioned the jury that the slayer must weigh and consider the question of killing and his reasons for and against such a choice. Based on the precedent of this Court and rules of statutory construction, we conclude that the word deliberation as used in the trial court's response to the jury and the phrase deliberate intention as defined in UJI 14-201 subsumes the statutory concept of premeditation. Cf. Garcia, 114 N.M. at 273, 837 P.2d at 866 (1992) (When the legislature amended the Criminal Code in 1980 to redefine the offenses of first and second degree murder as set out in Section 30-2-1, it did so against the background of cases holding that intentional killings were embraced within second degree murder. The legislature also had, as background, the benefit of our uniform jury instruction defining `deliberate intention' in the same terms, verbatim, as are now contained in UJI 14-201. (footnote omitted)). {29} With this construction of first degree willful, deliberate and premeditated murder in mind, we believe that the trial court should have responded to the jury's question by instructing the jury that deliberation includes premeditation. The trial court wrongly told the jury that the jury instruction refers to deliberation not premeditation, and we caution trial courts faced with similar jury questions in the future to craft a response consistent with this opinion. Nevertheless, a deliberate intention is the defining characteristic of the requisite mental state for this form of first degree murder. See Garcia, 114 N.M. at 273, 837 P.2d at 866 (We think it reasonable, therefore, to conclude that the legislature intended to exclude from second degree murder the element of deliberation but not to exclude otherwise intentional killings from that crime.). Further, the definition of deliberate intention in UJI 14-201 substantially conforms to our interpretation in Smith of the statutory phrase wilful, deliberate and premeditated, and is an exceedingly clear, unambiguous explanation of the proper mens rea for first degree murder in New Mexico. See State v. Noble, 90 N.M. 360, 365, 563 P.2d 1153, 1158 (1977) (stating that the description of deliberate intention in the jury instruction is clear, unambiguous and remarkably free of `legalese'). Viewing the response to the jury in context with the jury instruction itself, we determine that the response could not have caused confusion or created ambiguity concerning the requisite mens rea for first degree willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder under Section 30-2-1. Cf. State v. Parish, 118 N.M. 39, 41-42, 878 P.2d 988, 990-91 (1994) (stating that an apparently defective jury instruction when considered in the context of other instructions given to the jury ... may `fairly and accurately state the applicable law' and that if a jury instruction is capable of more than one interpretation, then the court must next evaluate whether another part of the jury instructions satisfactorily cures the ambiguity (quoting State v. Hamilton, 89 N.M. 746, 750, 557 P.2d 1095, 1099 (1976))). Thus, we conclude that the trial court's response to the jury, though deficient, did not constitute error and, therefore, did not rise to the level of fundamental error warranting reversal of Coffin's conviction.