Opinion ID: 3013382
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of New 1996 Policy to Thomas

Text: The possession of a discretionary component in a parole policy does not per se exempt it from constitutional scrutiny. The presence of discretion does not displace the protections of the Ex Post Facto clause. Garner, 529 U.S. at 253; cf. Winsett v. McGinnes, 617 F.2d 996, 1007 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (holding that prison officials’discretion must be exercised consistently with the purpose and policy governing early release program to satisfy due process). A Parole Board policy, although partly discretionary, is still subject to ex post facto analysis when there are sufficiently discernible criteria to suggest to a reviewing body that the new retroactive policies are being applied against the offender’s interest. In this case, as in our Winsett decision, a prison release authority is not permitted to circumvent its constitutional obligations merely because it has some discretion:[I]t is by no means clear that the [relevant authorities] may, under the rules, invoke any criterion [they] choose[ ]. Winsett, 617 F.2d at 1006. Rather, the Board has, by both its past decisions to grant parole for commuted sentences, and by its formal declarations of policy, expounded discernible parameters that govern its discretion. See id . Here, the changes in parole policy can be shown to have been applied to Thomas’s parole application, even though the Board possessed some discretion both before and after the 1996 policy change. Although we are unable to express precisely what moved the Board to deny Thomas’s petition, there is significant 20 evidence that it acted upon policies that were established after Thomas’s crime and conviction. Although discretion inheres within the Board’s parole authority, and new Board members may carry new ideas regarding the exercise of that discretion, and old Board members may change their mind in the light of new considerations, Thomas is nevertheless entitled to have the Board give genuine consideration and due regard to the factors prescribed by the Board’s pre-1996 policies. We agree that the Board is entitled to learn from past experiences and mistakes. Board Brief at 17. This is so, just as a legislature might determine sentences for some crimes are too light and order judges to weigh certain factors more heavily in rendering a sentence. That a Board or legislature may learn from experience does not mean that those who were sentenced at an earlier juncture may now be more severely re-sentenced in the light of newly-found wisdom. This is precisely what the Ex Post Facto clause prohibits. Under the Board’s reasoning, a determination, founded on newly discovered experience, could, by virtue of the Board’s exalted discretion, forever deny a prisoner’s preexisting right to parole consideration. Although some discretion might still exist within the pre1996 parameters, a parole decision that fails to address any of the criteria mandated by Board policy, such as institutional recommendations, willingness to undergo counseling and educational achievement, and instead utterly ignores all factors counseling in favor of release, falls outside of the realm of the legitimate exercise of discretion under the pre-1996 policies. Inference instructs us that the Board inappropriately relied on policies implemented in 1996, rather than the parole policies in place at the time of Thomas’s crime and conviction. In its briefs to this court, the Board purports to have reasons apart from public safety for its Thomas decisions. Those reasons appear to be asserted primarily as a post hoc defense to the allegations made in these proceedings. The Board argues that Thomas’s instant assault offense and very high assaultive potential, both functions of the nature of the past crime, were not the primary bases on which the decision to deny parole was made. It claims that, upon reading Thomas’s file, it is easy to see why the Board 21 found the [arguments against releasing Thomas] so persuasive. Board Reply Brief at 21. It asserts that numerous reasons were considered in support of its decision, including an unfavorable recommendation from the District Attorney, lack of sex offender therapy, and questionable psychological evaluations. However, these were not bona fide considerations in the decisions to deny parole. Our analysis shows that the primary basis for the parole denials was the risk of potential harm to public safety. Under the Guidelines, Thomas was entitled to parole at his hearings in both 1997 and 1998. He is the only prisoner out of 266 commuted sentences who was not granted parole in his first or second application. The voting members of the Department of Corrections staff unanimously recommended Thomas for release at each application. The pre-1996 policies place significant weight on factors relating to an inmate’s potential to adapt to life on the outside, and on the recommendations of the institutional staff. The pre-1996 policies suggest that no single factor should be controlling in a decision to deny parole to an applicant. Moreover, the pre-1996 Decision Making Guidelines were given significant, although not dispositive weight. A departure from the Guidelines required a recitation of unique factors, outweighing those in the Guidelines analysis. The Board Decisions on each of Thomas’s parole hearings rely heavily on high assaultive behavior potential, which relates primarily to the nature of the original offense, despite many other significant factors favoring parole. Thus, reviewing the pre-1996 documents pertaining to parole, it becomes evident that, although the risk of potential danger to the public has always been a factor, it became the controlling feature of the Board’s decision after 1996. The Board defaulted in its duty to consider factors other than the underlying offense and risk to public safety; it has failed to address any of the factors favoring release.