Opinion ID: 4535301
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 2(i) of the Compact.” JA296.

Text: Wayne appealed. Our Court upheld the District Court’s decision regarding the DRBC’s arguments, but concluded that “the District Court erred when it decided that the Commission’s project review authority under the terms of the Compact unambiguously includes Wayne’s proposed activities.” Wayne I, 894 F.3d at 533. We remanded for further fact-finding as to the Compact drafters’ intent, cautioning that our opinion should not be read as “adopting or endorsing either Wayne’s interpretation or the [DRBC]’s, or anyone else’s.” Id. On remand, the Senators again sought to intervene. This time, they presented a unique proposed complaint, articulating two grounds for relief. In Count I, they requested that the District Court “invalidate the de facto moratorium and enjoin 8 its further enforcement,” JA424, arguing that it “violates the terms of the Compact because it exceeds the scope of authority ceded to the [DRBC] under the Compact,” JA421. Alternatively, in Count II, the Senators requested an order that the DRBC “provide just compensation for the deprivation of the economic value of the property in question.” JA424. According to the Senators, even if the Determinations are a valid exercise of the DRBC’s authority, they nevertheless constitute “a regulatory taking without just compensation” under the Fifth Amendment. JA422. The DRBC and the Riverkeeper again opposed the Senators’ attempt to intervene. This time, however, neither party contended that the Senators lack standing, resting their arguments chiefly on the merits of the Senators’ motion. The District Court agreed, denying the motion because the Senators had not shown a “significantly protectable interest in th[e] litigation.” JA41. The Senators timely appealed. II5 The Supreme Court has repeatedly described the question of Article III standing as a “threshold” issue. See, e.g., Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1951 (2019); Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1923 (2018); Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 445 (2009); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998). It is an “irreducible constitutional minimum,” without which a court would not have jurisdiction to pass on the merits of the action. Lujan, 504 5 The District Court’s and our jurisdiction is at issue here, and “it is familiar law that a federal court always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.” In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 855 F.3d 126, 142 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002)). 9 U.S. at 560. As a result, federal courts “have an obligation to assure [them]selves of litigants’ standing under Article III.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 340 (2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, as we have put it, “[o]ur continuing obligation to assure that we have jurisdiction requires that we raise [the] issue[] of standing . . . sua sponte.” Seneca Res. Corp. v. Township of Highland, 863 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We must “assess our own appellate jurisdiction in the first instance.” Id. These principles apply even when an individual seeks to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2). In this context, as in any other, standing is a “threshold issue.” Town of Chester, 137 S. Ct. at 1648. “[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief that is sought.” Id. at 1650 (quoting Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008)). As a result, if a putative intervenor of right “seeks additional relief beyond that which the plaintiff requests,” then the intervenor “must demonstrate Article III standing.” Id. at 1651. “Absent such a showing, exercise of its power by a federal court would be gratuitous and thus inconsistent with the Art. III limitation.” Id. at 1650 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976)). The District Court in the present case therefore had a duty, before passing on the merits of the Senators’ motion to intervene, to determine whether the Senators must demonstrate Article III standing—whether, that is, they seek relief “different from that which” Wayne requests. Id. at 1651. To be sure, in its denial of the Senators’ second motion to intervene, the District Court did briefly confront this issue, though not as a threshold inquiry but rather as part of its ruling on the merits of the motion. The Senators, it noted, failed to “address the broadened scope of the current litigation which 10 their [Proposed] Complaint presents.” JA36 (brackets in original). The District Court distinguished between the two counts of the Senators’ complaint. “It may be true,” the District Court wrote, “that the relief sought in [Wayne’s] Complaint is sufficiently similar to the relief sought in Count I of the [Senators’] [Proposed] Complaint that the Senators need not meet the standing criteria for that claim.” JA36 (third brackets in original) (citations omitted). But as to Count II, “it is clear that the Senators seek relief that is broader than” that requested by Wayne. JA37 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, the District Court, citing Town of Chester, concluded that the Senators had failed to show “that they are not required to satisfy standing criteria to support their claim for intervention as of right.” JA37. Yet, despite this conclusion, the District Court provided no further elaboration on the standing issue.