Opinion ID: 2449956
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the prosecutor's misconduct affect the outcome of the trial?

Text: Having found the prosecutor erred in suggesting Hall could have premeditated the murder after firing the first shot, we next determine whether this misstatement required reversal. Prior to our recent discussion in State v. Ward, 292 Kan. ___, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), we applied the following three-part test: `(1) whether the misconduct is gross and flagrant; (2) whether the misconduct shows ill will on the prosecutor's part; and (3) whether the evidence against the defendant is of such a direct and overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely have little weight in the minds of the jurors. None of these three factors is individually controlling. Before the third factor can ever override the first two factors, an appellate court must be able to say that the harmlessness tests of both K.S.A. 60-261 (inconsistent with substantial justice) and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (conclusion beyond reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the results of the trial), have been met.' State v. Richmond, 289 Kan. 419, 440, 212 P.3d 165 (2009) (quoting State v. Bryant, 285 Kan. 970, Syl. ¶ 2, 179 P.3d 1122 [2008]). However, in Ward we recognized that when, as here, the defendant argues that an error implicates the defendant's rights under the United States Constitution, the statutory harmless error analysis under K.S.A. 60-261 and the federal constitutional error test under Chapman are the same. See State v. Ward, 292 Kan. at ___, 256 P.3d 801 (leaving open the question of what standard applies when errors are raised that do not implicate the federal Constitution). Specifically, we have modified the third factor of the second prong in our prosecutorial misconduct analysis to consider whether the error affected substantial rights, meaning whether the error affected the outcome of the trial. Ward, 292 Kan. ___, Syl. ¶ 6, 256 P.3d 801. We further specified in Ward, that the State, as the party benefitting from an error of constitutional magnitude, must bear the burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of... did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record. Ward, 292 Kan. ___, Syl. ¶ 6, 256 P.3d 801. We find no evidence in the record suggesting the prosecutor's conduct in this case was gross and flagrant or exhibited ill will. However, the defendant urges us to find, as we did in Morton I, that the prosecutor's error affected the outcome of the trial, requiring reversal. In Morton I, the prosecutor pantomimed the firing of a gun while advising the jury that `[o]ne squeeze of the trigger is all it takes.' 277 Kan. at 578, 86 P.3d 535. This court reasoned the prosecutor's statement improperly implied to the jury that it could find the defendant instantaneously premeditated the killing. See 277 Kan. at 583-85, 86 P.3d 535. Hall fails to note, however, that the Morton I court felt compelled to reverse despite finding plenty of evidence of premeditation because the jury in that case had indicated in the verdict form that it could not agree unanimously on the premeditation theory, thus indicating an uncertainty on the part of the jury with respect to this theory. 277 Kan. at 585-86, 86 P.3d 535. As in Morton I, here the State presented the jury with more than sufficient evidence of premeditation. Witnesses who waited in the car with Hall testified that before the shooting they saw Hall get out of the car, pause, and pull his hood over his head before walking down the corridor toward the victim and her friends. They then heard gunshots, saw Hall run back toward the vehicle with a gun in his hand, and heard Hall tell the driver of the vehicle to just fucking go. Further, police later found Hall's clothes, including a dark hooded sweatshirt, and a gun in a bag at Waterman's home, where Hall had been dropped off after the shooting. However, in this case, unlike Morton I, we have no evidence indicating the jury experienced any difficulty in deliberating over the issue of premeditation. Nor, as discussed below, do we have any additional errors which, when considered with the prosecutor's misstatement, require reversal, or any evidence that the prosecutor's statements were deliberate. See, e.g., Cosby, 285 Kan. at 251-52, 169 P.3d 1128 (cumulative effect of multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct, coupled with prosecutor's statement implying premeditation was instantaneous, denied defendant a fair trial and required reversal); State v. Holmes, 272 Kan. 491, 499-500, 33 P.3d 856 (2001) (prosecutor, after correctly informing the judge as to the law regarding premeditation, deliberately misstated the law in closing argument, requiring reversal). Further, the jury was properly instructed in this case on the law regarding premeditation and also was instructed that arguments of counsel were not evidence. See, e.g., State v. Hebert, 277 Kan. 61, 85, 82 P.3d 470 (2004) (prosecutor's improper comment regarding premeditation was not reversible error when there was no evidence that prosecutor deliberately misstated the law, jury was given proper PIK instruction on premeditation, and jury was told that arguments of counsel were not evidence). In light of the trial record as a whole, we conclude the State has demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor's misstatement did not affect the outcome of the trial and does not require reversal.