Opinion ID: 2302502
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether Assembly's Premises Were Exempt Because They Were Used for Religious Purposes

Text: Alternatively, Assembly argues that, even if the statute and Federal Constitution permit apportionment within a house of public worship, all of the uses to which Assembly put the property in 2008 were religious uses and, thus, tax-exempt. Assembly first argues that the space occupied by the grandson was used for religious purposes because this space, although temporarily occupied by the grandson, was made available for missionaries and the homeless/needy. Assembly describes the space occupied by the grandson in 2008 as a first-floor missionary apartment and a dorm-style room on the second floor. The BTLA found that the apartment on the first floor was taxable because, in fact, it was not used by furloughed missionaries at any time in 2008. The BTLA also observed that in the four-year period that the caretaker resided on the second floor of the main building, he could recall missionaries using the apartment on the first floor only three or four times. The BTLA decided that this use was slight and insignificant, and, therefore, [did] not qualify the [first floor missionary apartment] [as] being used for religious purposes. The BTLA also ruled that the fact that [Assembly] designated and made [the first floor apartment] available for missionary use does not by such designation automatically qualify [the apartment] as being used `directly for religious training or for other religious purposes.' With respect to the second floor dorm-style room, which Assembly claimed was used to house the needy, the BTLA found that there was no evidence of any recent historical use [of the room] for such purpose that was more than `slight, negligible or insignificant' or `indefinite or prospective.' The BTLA noted that the City's director of human services testified that Assembly was not one of the churches identified as providing immediate or short-term housing for the needy. The BTLA specifically found that the grandson's occupancy of the room was not so much the result of an expression of [Assembly's] intent to provide housing for the needy as it was a consequence of him being related to a member of [Assembly's] advisory board and a convenience for him by not having to find alternative housing. Assembly asserts that the BTLA erred when it found these areas to be taxable because Assembly's religious use of them, to house the needy and/or furloughed missionaries, was too infrequent to serve a religious purpose. Assembly contends that the BTLA misapplied the governing law when it based its decision upon the infrequency of the religious use of these rooms. Assuming, without deciding, that housing the needy and/or furloughed missionaries constitutes a religious purpose, we find no error. We have previously held that a tax exemption is not warranted when the asserted compliance with any of the requirements therefor is no more than slight, negligible or insignificant, indefinite and prospective, or theoretical. Appeal of City of Concord, 161 N.H. at 351, 13 A.3d 186 (quotations and citations omitted). Assembly's remaining arguments about the space occupied by the grandson are based upon its misreading of the BTLA's decision. Contrary to Assembly's assertions, the BTLA did not find that residential use cannot be tax exempt. Nor did it focus upon the grandson's use of the space, instead of Assembly's use of it. Assembly next addresses the caretaker's housing. Assembly argues that since the beginning of time[,] ... churches have had onsite caretakers and this did not negate their status as churches. Again, Assembly misreads the BTLA's decision. Nothing in that decision contravenes Assembly's status as a church. Assembly further asserts that the BTLA erred when it found that there was no compelling evidence that the caretaker's physical presence at the Property was necessary for the religious use of the Property by [Assembly]. Assembly argues that, in fact, the caretaker's physical presence was necessary for security, and implies that providing security constitutes use for a religious purpose. Assuming, without deciding, that providing security for a church is a religious purpose, we uphold the BTLA's finding that the caretaker's physical presence for that purpose was not necessary. But cf. Appeal of City of Nashua, 155 N.H. at 446, 924 A.2d 418 (providing maintenance and security services to deconsecrated parishes were not religious purposes). The BTLA found that the caretaker's physical presence was not necessary to secure Assembly's property because the main building could be secured (even the `prayer room' which had 24/7 exterior access had its interior door locked), and the adjacent parsonage provided on-site physical presence for any security concerns. As the record supports these findings, we uphold them. To the extent that Assembly contends, in effect, that the BTLA failed to weigh the testimony properly, we defer to its judgment on such issues as resolving conflicts in the testimony, measuring the credibility of witnesses, and determining the weight to be given evidence. See LLK Trust v. Town of Wolfeboro, 159 N.H. 734, 739, 992 A.2d 666 (2010). Assembly next asserts that the BTLA's finding that the second floor men's bathroom was not significant or critical for the religious use of the Property was erroneous. The BTLA found that the bathroom appeared to exist primarily to serve any occupants of the second floor dorm rooms and did not appear to be critical for the congregation's activities that occur on the first floor. To the extent that the bathroom was used by congregants, such use, the BTLA found, did not appear to be significant or critical for the religious use of the Property on the first floor. Assembly apparently challenges these findings as unreasonable because the caretaker testified that parishioners used the second-floor men's room during worship services. Assembly, thus, impliedly asserts that the BTLA failed to weigh the testimony properly. We defer to the BTLA's judgment in determining the weight to be given evidence. See id. Because Assembly has not demonstrated by a clear preponderance of the evidence, see RSA 541:13, that the second-floor restroom was owned, used and occupied directly for religious training or for other religious purposes, RSA 72:23, III, we cannot find error in the BTLA's finding such space taxable. We have reviewed Assembly's remaining arguments regarding whether the BTLA erred in its apportionment between tax-exempt and taxable uses of the property and conclude that they warrant no extended consideration. See Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321, 322, 627 A.2d 595 (1993); see also Sabinson v. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 160 N.H. 452, 459, 999 A.2d 380 (2010) (declining to address arguments that are insufficiently developed for appellate review). Affirmed.