Opinion ID: 785013
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Effect of Beamus's Testimony

Text: 29 Crayton makes two arguments based on the fact that during Crayton's second trial, the Government called Terri Beamus as a rebuttal witness. Beamus testified as to some individuals who may have aided Crayton with possible drug activity in Louisville. Beamus had not been called to testify in the first trial against Crayton and Alexander. The rebuttal testimony of Beamus does not require a reversal of Crayton's conviction because no bill of particulars was required, there was no unfair surprise in her testimony, and there was no violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
30 First, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Crayton's Motion for a Bill of Particulars because it is unlikely that Crayton would have gleaned anything from a bill of particulars. This court reviews the district court's denial of Crayton's motion for a bill of particulars for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Perkins, 994 F.2d 1184, 1190 (6th Cir.1993). To make a successful challenge to a district court's denial of a motion for a bill of particulars, the defendant must show not only that the court abused its discretion, but that defendant actually suffered surprise or other prejudice at trial. United States v. Salisbury, 983 F.2d 1369, 1375 (6th Cir.1993). 31 Between the first and second trials, Crayton moved for a bill of particulars to find out more about the conspiracy charge since Alexander had been acquitted. The district court denied this motion shortly before trial. Crayton argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for a bill of particulars and that he suffered prejudice because, he alleges, the Government unexpectedly changed the theory of its case in rebuttal by placing into evidence, during rebuttal, names of potential co-conspirators without any corroborative evidence. 32 Crayton claims that the second trial was virtually identical to the first trial until Beamus's testimony, but that her testimony was an unfair surprise. The function of a bill of particulars is to to minimize surprise and assist [the] defendant in obtaining the information needed to prepare a defense and to preclude a second prosecution for the same crimes. Id. A bill of particulars is not meant as a tool for the defense to obtain detailed disclosure of all evidence held by the government before trial. Id. 33 The Government was not aware of Beamus's testimony until the day before her rebuttal, and it is thus unlikely that a bill of particulars given before trial would have provided Crayton with helpful information. Further, the Government is not required to furnish the name of all other co-conspirators in a bill of particulars. United States v. Rey, 923 F.2d 1217, 1222 (6th Cir.1991). Therefore, even if the Government had known of Beamus's testimony at the beginning of trial, the identities of the possible co-conspirators she named would not need to be revealed in a bill of particulars. Crayton knew that unnamed persons were referred to in the conspiracy count of the indictment. Although Beamus's testimony may have been unexpected, it was not an unfair surprise that the grant of a bill of particulars would have avoided, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in this regard.
34 The Government also did not illegally withhold exculpatory evidence from Crayton. The Sixth Circuit reviews de novo a district court determination that the prosecution did not wrongfully withhold exculpatory evidence. United States v. Tarwater, 308 F.3d 494, 515 (6th Cir. 2002). Where, as in this case, the defense counsel did not make a motion for a mistrial or raise the question of a possible Brady violation to the district court, we review at most for plain error. See United States v. Delgado, 350 F.3d 520, 527 n. 10 (6th Cir. 2003). 3 As we explain, the district court did not err, much less commit plain error. 35 Crayton contends that the prosecution did not provide him with a prior statement by Beamus, in which she corroborated Crayton's story, until shortly before she testified. During her testimony, Beamus apparently changed her story and no longer corroborated Crayton's version of events. Thus, since the Government did not give the defense Beamus's prior inconsistent statement until shortly before her testimony, Crayton's due process rights are said to have been violated under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). 36 Beamus's prior statement was not explicitly exculpatory in that it did not tend to negate directly the guilt of the defendant. Instead, Beamus's statement was nonexculpatory evidence that could be used to impeach her testimony. Impeachment evidence, however, as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). 37 However, Crayton suffered no prejudice because the Government did produce the impeachment material in a manner consistent with the requirements of Brady. Where a defendant claims a violation of Brady because of the Government's failure to produce impeachment evidence, so long as the defendant is given impeachment material, even exculpatory impeachment material, in time for use at trial, we fail to see how the Constitution is violated. United States v. Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 1283 (6th Cir.1988). 38 The record indicates that Beamus's one-page prior inconsistent statement was turned over to the defense soon after the Government decided to call Beamus as a witness and before she testified. Any disadvantage that a defendant might suffer because of the tardiness of impeachment material can be cured by asking for a recess. Id. at 1283-84. Crayton's counsel only asked for a moment to look over Beamus's prior statement, and the district court granted this request. Further, Crayton's counsel questioned Beamus extensively about the prior inconsistent statement, during cross examination. Thus, there appears to have been no Brady violation. Moreover, even if there had been a Brady violation, the proper inquiry is whether the Brady violation undermines confidence in the verdict, because there is a reasonable probability that there would have been a different result had the evidence been disclosed. Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 344 (6th Cir.1998). It is difficult to imagine that the jury would have reached a different result if the defense had Beamus's prior statement before trial. There was therefore clearly no violation of Crayton's constitutional rights under Brady.