Opinion ID: 2360959
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Destruction of the Oldsmobile

Text: The government maintains that its failure to preserve the Oldsmobile from destruction did not violate Mr. Day's due process rights. Mr. Day insists that the destruction of the automobile substantially prejudices his ability to cross-examine the government's expert witness, and further, he is unable to have his own automobile expert conduct an evaluation of the brakes and other mechanical systems of the automobile so as to furnish information to defense Counsel. The trial court relied on Cotton v. United States, 388 A.2d 865 (1978), in concluding that the Oldsmobile was of paramount significance to this case and the Defendant's inability to inspect it constituted a significant prejudice. The government argues that Cotton is inapplicable to this case, and that under Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988), Mr. Day's due process rights were not violated by the destruction of the Oldsmobile. To demonstrate significant prejudice, Mr. Day relies on Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), to explain his inability to effectively cross-examine the government's potential witness who inspected the automobile and its brake system. All three of these cases pertain to the issue of whether Mr. Day has suffered actual prejudice due to the government's destruction of the Oldsmobile. Cotton, supra, decided prior to Youngblood, involved the government's failure to preserve photographic array evidence from which the defendant had been identified. There, we reiterated that (the government has) a duty to preserve, and the defendant has a right to discover, the photographic array evidence. [8] Id. at 869 (alteration in original). However, we found no substantial prejudice to the defendant in Cotton after applying three factors: (1) the degree of [government] negligence or bad faith involved, (2) the importance of the evidence lost, and (3) the evidence of guilt adduced at trial in order to come to a determination that will serve the ends of justice. Id. We determined that given the strength of the eyewitness identification . . . the jury would not have reached a contrary verdict even had the photographic identification testimony been suppressed. Id. at 871. We never intimated, however, that outright dismissal of an indictment with prejudice was one of the array of permissible sanctions for a discovery violation. The discussion of sanctions there was within the context of the appellant's argument that the judge should have struck testimony or at least given a variant of the missing witness instruction. See 388 A.2d at 869 & n. 7. In Youngblood, supra, a case involving charges of child molestation, sexual assault and kidnapping, the government failed to preserve the victim's clothing through refrigeration, and did not test semen samples. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law. 488 U.S. at 58, 109 S.Ct. at 337. And in Chambers, supra, the Supreme Court recognized that [t]he right of cross-examination. . . is implicit in the constitutional right of confrontation, and helps assure the `accuracy of the truth-determining process.' 410 U.S. at 295, 93 S.Ct. at 1046 (citations omitted). Here, under Youngblood, we see nothing in the record to support a finding that the government's destruction of the Oldsmobile amounted to bad faith. In Cantizano v. United States, 614 A.2d 870 (D.C.1992), a police officer told a victim of an assault that she could throw away a paper towel used to wipe off a substance that the defendant had smeared on her face. We found no bad faith on the officer's part in failing to preserve the paper towel. Here, the Oldsmobile was destroyed after an officer mistakenly believed it was no longer needed for further investigation. Nothing in the record on appeal hints, even remotely, that the police destroyed the car so that Mr. Day could not examine it, or have it viewed by an expert. [9] Thus, under Youngblood, we see no evidence of bad faith on the government's part in destroying the Oldsmobile. [10] With respect to the Cotton factors, the trial court found gross governmental negligence, not bad faith, in the failure to preserve the Oldsmobile, which the trial court considered to be of paramount significance in Mr. Day's case. We agree with the government that Cotton does not control the outcome of this case, but disagree with the government's suggestion that Cotton has been superseded by Youngblood,  and that its remaining vitality is at least questionable. Cotton did not concern due process dismissals. It still retains vitality in regard to sanctions short of terminating a prosecution. As to whether dismissal is appropriate, it is Youngblood that controls. Thus, because the government did not destroy the Oldsmobile in bad faith, and because some evidence probative of guilt existed at the indictment stage of the criminal process, the ends of justice would not be served by the dismissal of the indictment against Mr. Day. In short, the defendant has the burden of showing a constitutional violation, and on the record before us, we find no violation of Mr. Day's Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights during the preindictment period. [11] Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's dismissal of the indictment against Mr. Day, and remand the case to the trial court for trial. Reversed and remanded.