Opinion ID: 178471
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: plain and ordinary meaning

Text: In order to determine whether Leal-Felix's criminal history points were correctly calculatedand more specifically, whether his intervening citations were intervening arrests within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2)it is necessary, in my view, to determine the meaning of the term arrest as it appears in § 4A1.2(a)(2). When interpreting the Sentencing Guidelines, [a court] applies the general rules of statutory construction. United States v. Cruz-Gramajo, 570 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir.2009). Very recently, the United States Supreme Court reiterated that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. When the statutory language is plain, the sole function of the courtsat least where the disposition required by the text is not absurdis to enforce it according to its terms. Carr v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2229, 2242, 176 L.Ed.2d 1152 (2010). Similarly, this court has observed, [O]ur inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous. Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 951(9th Cir.2009). This court has expressly applied this rule to the interpretation of Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Treadwell, 593 F.3d 990, 1006 (9th Cir.2010) (If the text of a guideline is unambiguous, its plain meaning controls.); see also United States v. Cruz-Gramajo, 570 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2009). In assessing plain meaning, `unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.' United States v. Gonzalez, 492 F.3d 1031, 1041 (9th Cir.2007); see also Bailey v. Hill, 599 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir.2010) (The United States Supreme Court has declared that where a statute does not define its terms ... we are to give such a [term] its ordinary or natural meaning.) (citing Johnson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 1269, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010)); Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S.Ct. 311, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979). [T]he structure and purpose of a statute may also provide guidance in determining the plain meaning of its provisions. Bailey, 599 F.3d at 980. An omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied, however much later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. Doyon, Ltd. v. Bristol Bay Native Corp., 569 F.2d 491, 498 (9th Cir. 1978). We apply these well-settled first principles of statutory construction to the term arrest within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2) below.
An inquiry into the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of the word arrest should begin and end with recognition of the way that a thousand ordinary citizens (without law degrees) would answer the question of whether they had been arrested, if they had been stopped, briefly detained, issued a citation for a traffic or driving offense, and sent on their way. I posit that virtually all would unequivocally answer no. Indeed, I am confident that virtually all would believe that the term arrest includes either being told you are under arrest or being physically taken to jail, or both. That is the plain meaning of the term arrest in the United States. More than two decades ago, the Supreme Court described the ordinary expectations of a motorist who receives a citation, as follows: [D]etention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief. The vast majority of roadside detentions last only a few minutes. A motorist's expectations, when he sees a policeman's light flashing behind him, are that he will be obliged to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court then observed, State laws governing when a motorist detained pursuant to a traffic stop may or must be issued a citation instead of taken into custody vary significantly, but no State requires that a detained motorist be arrested unless he is accused of a specified serious crime, refuses to promise to appear in court, or demands to be taken before a magistrate. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437 n. 26, 104 S.Ct. 3138 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court in Berkemer recognized, as any ordinary citizen would, that being arrested required something more than simply receiving a citation. Even if the use of a citation in lieu of arrest has been expanded to encompass more serious offenses since Berkemer, release on a promise to appear still reinforces the citation recipient's reasonable belief that he or she has not been arrested. In Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998), the Court pointed out, in the first sentence of the opinion, that [a]n Iowa police officer stopped petitioner Knowles for speeding, but issued him a citation rather than arresting him. Knowles, 525 U.S. at 114, 119 S.Ct. 484 (1998) (emphasis added). The Court then observed that a routine traffic stop, for which a citation was issued, was deemed to be a relatively brief encounter and more analogous to a so-called `Terry stop' ... than to a formal arrest. Knowles, 525 U.S. at 117, 119 S.Ct. 484 (citing Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138). Again, the Supreme Court perceived immediately the difference between being arrested and receiving a citation. It would be odd for a unanimous Supreme Court to distinguish so readily between arrest and citation for Fourth Amendment purposes, but not to do so for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines. This court has also recognized the difference between an arrest and a citation in the perceptions of persons stopped for a traffic or driving offense. In Karam v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir.2003), this court held that an individual who was charged with a misdemeanor and, in lieu of jail, was allowed to sign an agreement to appear in court and ordered not to leave the State of California without first obtaining court permission, was not seized for Fourth Amendment purposes. This court reasoned, [T]hese requirements are no more burdensome than the promise to appear [that] a motorist makes when issued a traffic citation. Id. at 1194. Also, somewhat recently, this court held that detention [does] not become an arrest until [a] defendant [is] moved to a locked detention cell. United States v. Bravo, 295 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir.2002) (being handcuffed and walked 30 to 40 yards to a security office did not turn a detention into an arrest, when the individual was told the handcuffs would be removed when he reached the security office). The Sentencing Commission would have been aware of the use of citations in lieu of arrest when § 4A1.2(a)(2) was drafted. As early as 1968, the American Bar Association (ABA) suggested standards for the pretrial use of the citation procedure, stating, It should be the policy of every law enforcement agency to issue citations in lieu of arrest or continued custody to the maximum extent consistent with the effective enforcement of the law. ABA, Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Pretrial Release, 31-38 (1968). In 1984, Debra Whitcomb published her study for the National Institute of Justice, finding that the field citation was the speediest arrest alternative for street police officers. Debra Whitcomb, Bonnie Lewin & Margaret J. Levine, Citation Release, 2(National Institute of Justice 1984). If the Sentencing Commission had meant to treat intervening citations the same way that it treated intervening arrests, for purposes of counting multiple sentences, it could simply have said intervening arrests or citations. Our task [here] is to apply the text, not to improve upon it. Harbison v. Bell, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1481, 173 L.Ed.2d 347 (2009). A decision to use one word over another ... is material ... and is a decision that is imbued with legal significance and should not be presumed to be random or devoid of meaning. United States v. Gonzales, 506 F.3d 940, 949 (9th Cir.2007). Reading arrest as not including citations gives effect to the language actually used by the Sentencing Commission. Again, the United States Supreme Court has reiterated that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. When the statutory language is plain, the sole function of the courtsat least where the disposition required by the text is not absurdis to enforce it according to its terms. Carr, 130 S.Ct. at 2242; see also Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 537, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994) (When the text of the statute is clear, our interpretive inquiry ends.); Treadwell, 593 F.3d at 1006 (If the text of a guideline is unambiguous, its plain meaning controls.); United States v. King, 244 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir.2001) (unless the plain meaning leads to an absurd or unreasonable result, our judicial inquiry is at an end). I cannot find any way in which interpreting the word arrest to exclude citations renders the applicable guideline section absurd or unreasonable. It is our task ... not to enter the minds of the [Sentencing Commission]who need have nothing in mind in order for their votes to be both lawful and effectivebut rather to give fair and reasonable meaning to the text of the [Sentencing Guidelines].... Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 30, 109 S.Ct. 2273, 105 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (Judge Scalia, concurring). In Justice Jackson's words, a court should engage in analysis of the [Guidelines] and not be tempted to engage in psychoanalysis of Congress [or the Sentencing Commission]. United States v. Public Utilities Commission of Cal. 345 U.S. 295, 319, 73 S.Ct. 706, 97 L.Ed. 1020 (1953) (Jackson, concurring). Because it is not a court's task to psychoanalyze the Sentencing Commission, and I find that the plain meaning that I would attribute to the guideline in question does not lead to an absurd result, [3] I conclude that arrest within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2) unambiguously does not include citation. Moreover, I find that this reading of arrest comports with the purpose of § 4A1.2(a)(2), as explained below.
Interpreting the term arrest as not including citation provides the most continuity between both the purpose of the specific guideline section at issue here, and the overall purpose and structure of the whole guidelines scheme. See United States v. Lewis, 67 F.3d 225, 228-29 (9th Cir.1995) (Particular phrases must be construed in light of the overall purpose and structure of the whole statutory scheme.); see also Bailey, 599 F.3d at 980 ([T]he structure and purpose of a statute may also provide guidance in determining the plain meaning of its provisions.). [T]he purpose of § 4A1.2 is `to reflect the seriousness of a defendant's criminal history,' while, at the same time, avoiding `overstat[ing] the seriousness of the defendant's criminal conduct.' United States v. Cruz-Gramajo, 570 F.3d 1162, 1169-70 (9th Cir. 2009). The purpose of the Guidelines sections addressing a defendant's criminal history, generally, is to address the likelihood of recidivism, taking into account the notion that [r]epeated criminal behavior is an indicator of a limited likelihood of successful rehabilitation. U.S.S.G. Chapter Four, Part A, Introductory Commentary. Interpreting the term arrest to exclude a citation comports with the purpose of avoiding overstat[ement] [of] the seriousness of the defendant's criminal conduct. Cruz-Gramajo, 570 F.3d at 1169-70. An individual who is taken into custody pursuant to the traditional meaning of arrest, who then subsequently commits another offense, could arguably be said to be likely to re-offend in the future regardless of the discomfort of a custodial arrest. The United States Supreme Court has noted, however, that a traffic stop involves a temporary and relatively nonthreatening detention. Maryland v. Shatzer, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1224, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2010) (holding that a Miranda warning is not necessary in such a situation). A pattern of receiving citations for minor offenses, thus, may not indicate that there is an increased probability that an individual will commit serious crimes in the future. Interpreting the word arrest as not including citation is also consistent with the over-all scheme of computing criminal history, as demonstrated by Application Note 3 to the Commentary to this section. Note 3 specifically recognizes that [c]ounting multiple prior sentences as a single sentence may result in a criminal history score that under-represents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history and the danger that the defendant presents to the public. In such a case, an upward departure may be warranted. If a court determines, that a defendant's criminal history is underrepresented, after counting prior sentences as a single sentence rather than separate sentences on the basis that a citation was not an intervening arrest, the court can make an appropriate adjustment. Further, [t]he Sentencing Commission has a mandate to establish sentencing practices that impose punishments which are just in relation to the social costs a convict has imposed on society. See United States v. Zakhor, 58 F.3d 464, 465-66 (9th Cir.1995) (U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(i); reflects society's costs of punishment by requiring the convict to reimburse the federal government for the cost of his own incarceration or supervisory detention.). Given that there is little cost to society associated with a run-of-the-mill traffic stop and issuance of a citation, it would arguably be unjust to conclude that citations for traffic stops are intervening arrests which justify the imposition of additional criminal history points. In light of the purpose of § 4A1.2(a)(2), my reading of arrest as not including citation is not absurd.
Finally, the mere fact that I disagree with the court in Morgan about the meaning of arrest in § 4A1.2(a)(2) does not mean that the term is ambiguous. Language in a statute or a guideline does not automatically become ambiguous every time two courts disagree as to its meaning. For example, the Supreme Court in Carr determined the plain meaning of travels in the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, even though there was a division among the Circuit Courts of Appeals as to the meaning of the term. See Carr, 130 S.Ct. at 2234 & 2241-42. Thus, a split in the circuits on the plain meaning of arrest does not mean that the guideline cannot simply be enforced according to its terms. See id. at 2242 (where a statute is plain and unambiguous, the court must enforce it according to its terms). Therefore, I would hold that the plain and ordinary meaning of arrest in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2) is that an arrest does not include being given a citation.