Opinion ID: 675764
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Chapter Three Adjustments

Text: 46 The district court ruled on two Chapter Three adjustments in this case--it increased Ritsema's offense level by two points under section 3A1.1 (Vulnerable Victim), and denied a two point reduction under section 3E1.1 (Acceptance of Responsibility). 47
48 Section 3A1.1 (Vulnerable Victim) provides that a court should increase a defendant's offense level by two points if the defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the offense was unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition.... (emphasis added). Ritsema argues that K.J.L. cannot be a victim of the offense, because possession of unregistered silencers is a victimless crime. Therefore, he concludes, no upward adjustment is appropriate under the Vulnerable Victim provision. 49 The district court's decision to increase Ritsema's offense level under section 3A1.1 was based not on the silencers themselves, but on the obstruction of justice conduct. 8 In United States v. Wright, 12 F.3d 70 (6th Cir.1993), the Sixth Circuit held that section 3A1.1 is applicable only where the alleged victim is the victim of a defendant's offense of conviction. Id. at 73 (emphasis added). It reasoned that the relevant conduct provision of the guidelines did not govern section 3A1.1, because it read the language of 3A1.1 to specifically instruct courts to consider only a charge-offense in applying the section. Wright conflicts with an earlier Eleventh Circuit case, United States v. Yount, 960 F.2d 955 (11th Cir.1992). Yount held that a court may consider relevant conduct pursuant to section 1B1.3 when applying the Vulnerable Victim adjustment, implicitly holding that no language in section 3A1.1 precluded the operation of the relevant conduct provision. Id. at 957-58. 50 We need not decide the issue presented by Wright and Yount, for either approach would lead to the same result in this case. We have already stated that the possession of silencers is a victimless offense, and therefore we agree with Ritsema that K.J.L. cannot be a victim of his charge-offense. Furthermore, given our holding that Ritsema's obstruction of justice was not relevant conduct for the purposes of Chapter Two calculations, we must deem Ritsema's obstruction conduct not relevant to the Chapter Three Vulnerable Victim adjustment either. Because the district court may not count the obstruction of justice conduct as relevant conduct, and K.J.L. is not the direct victim of Ritsema's possession of unregistered silencers, we conclude that the two point increase in this case was error. 51
52 Finally, we briefly note that section 3E1.1 (Acceptance of Responsibility) is also governed by the relevant conduct provision of the guidelines. See United States v. White, 993 F.2d 147, 151 (7th Cir.1993). Hence, in order for a sentencing court to grant a defendant a reduction of his offense level for acceptance of responsibility, a defendant must clearly demonstrate[ ] a recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct, and all relevant conduct as well. In this case, Ritsema acknowledges his responsibility for the possession of the unregistered silencers, although he does deny ever having threatened K.J.L. or forcibly raping her. Because we have determined that Ritsema's obstruction of justice is not relevant conduct in this sentencing, Ritsema may have qualified for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility in this case, because he needed not accept responsibility for that behavior. 53 The record indicates that the district court based its denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility at least in part on Ritsema's refusal to accept responsibility for the obstruction of justice or the sexual assault. The court should therefore reconsider its section 3E1.1 determination upon resentencing.