Opinion ID: 185852
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Litigation in District Court

Text: 27 In this case, the parties do not appear to doubt that Iran is a proper defendant, at least with respect to the claims brought by Fr. Jenco's estate and his siblings. Iran has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism by the Secretary of State. See 22 C.F.R. § 126.1(d). There is also weighty evidence in the record confirming the involvement of Iran in connection with Fr. Jenco's kidnapping and brutal imprisonment. Jenco, 154 F.Supp.2d at 31. Because of Iran's culpability, Fr. Jenco's family brought suit against Iran and the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS) on March 15, 2000. The District Court found that, because of Iran's material support for Hizbollah's hostage taking and torture, the terrorism exception stripped Iran's immunity from suit. It also found the defendants liable on most, but not all, counts alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint. Jenco, 154 F.Supp.2d at 33. The court ultimately awarded over $314 million in compensatory and punitive damages to Fr. Jenco's estate and his siblings. Id. at 40. 28 The District Court rejected the claims of Fr. Jenco's nieces and nephews, who were seeking damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court recognized the tremendous impact that Fr. Jenco's detention had on his nieces and nephews. Id. at 36. The court concluded, however, that these family members could not recover under common law because they were not among Fr. Jenco's immediate family. In reaching this decision, the District Court was guided by § 46 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, which purports to delineate common law claims for Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress, as follows: 29 (1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm. 30 (2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress 31 (a) to a member of such person's immediate family who is present at the time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or 32 (b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress results in bodily harm. 33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1986). 34 The District Court noted that in Sutherland, another terrorism exception suit, the court allowed the wife of a man whom Hizbollah held hostage for six and a half years to recover damages from Iran for intentional infliction of emotional distress even though the wife was not actually present to witness the outrageous conduct against her husband. 151 F.Supp.2d at 50. The presence requirement of § 46(2)(a) was construed liberally to include this claim, because the court found that the defendants' intent to cause distress to the wife was quite clear from their conduct. Id. In the instant case, however, the District Court held that, although the presence requirement could be given a generous reading, the immediate family requirement of § 46(2)(a) could not: 35 [S]ome lines must be drawn, if, for example, millions of people who are not present ... watch the torture or murder of the President on television. ... In hostage cases, this Court finds that the line is best drawn according to the plaintiff's relationship with the victim of the outrageous conduct. That is, to collect for intentional infliction of emotional distress in cases such as this one, the plaintiff need not be present at the place of outrageous conduct, but must be a member of the victim's immediate family. 36 The Court draws the line with respect to family relationship (and not presence) for two reasons. First, hostage cases are unique in that they implicitly involve a physical separation of the plaintiff from the victim of the outrageous conduct. As a matter of fact, a plaintiff's lack of presence is the exact source of his emotional distress. Thus, if the Court were to limit recovery in hostage cases using a presence test, plaintiffs would never recover despite there being extremely strong evidence of significant emotional suffering. 37 Second, comparing the presence test to the family relationship test, courts have been more willing to stretch the boundaries of presence than family relationship. 38 Jenco, 154 F.Supp.2d at 36 (quoting DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 307, at 834 (2000)). And in applying the immediate family requirement of § 46(2)(a), the District Court adhered to the traditional definition of that term: 39 This Court defines one's immediate family as his spouse, parents, siblings, and children. This definition is consistent with the traditional understanding of one's immediate family. See Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts, § 310 (2000) (addressing the scope of recovery in consortium claims). 40 Jenco, 154 F.Supp.2d at 36 n. 8. The court then found that the nieces and nephews did not satisfy the requirement. Id. 41 The nieces and nephews now appeal the District Court's decision to deny them recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Because Iran did not enter an appearance, the court appointed the Georgetown University Law Center's Appellate Litigation Program as Amicus Curiae to present arguments in support of the District Court's judgment.