Opinion ID: 1659386
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: effect of pierringer release on affirmative defenses

Text: [10] ¶ 37. Next, in addressing the second issue of whether the City waived its affirmative defenses, VanCleve takes the position that that the City's failure to object to the Pierringer release waived its statutory affirmative defenses under Wis. Stat. § 81.17. We disagree. This argument fails to consider that there was no legal basis for the City to make such an objection. See Unigard Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 184 Wis. 2d 78, 87 n.5, 516 N.W. 2d 762 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding [a] non-settling tort-feasor has no control over a claimant's decision to settle with another tort-feasor); and Johnson v. Heintz, 73 Wis. 2d 286, 297, 243 N.W. 2d 815 (1976) (holding no objection [by the third party] could be raised to the fact that the plaintiff and a joint tort-feasor defendant were exercising the option approved by Pierringer ). Moreover, this argument incorrectly assumes, without citing to authority, that the City has the burden of objecting to a Pierringer release. [11] ¶ 38. Generally, the rule is that a joint tort-feasor has a right to contribution from another tort-feasor for any sums the first tort-feasor is obligated to pay a plaintiff in satisfaction of the second's liability. Fleming v. Threshermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 131 Wis. 2d 123, 130, 388 N.W.2d 908 (1986). [12] ¶ 39. However, as previously noted, a Pierringer release, in effect, limits a second joint tort-feasor's liability to the amount reflecting its proportion of wrongdoing. [9] Id. Stated differently, a Pierringer release operates to impute to the settling plaintiff whatever liability in contribution the settling defendant may have to non-settling defendants and to bar subsequent contribution actions the non-settling defendants might assert against the settling defendants. Pierringer, 21 Wis. 2d at 193. ¶ 40. In Pierringer, the settling defendant moved for summary judgment to dismiss a cross-claim of a non-settling defendant for contribution, after it entered into a Pierringer release with the plaintiff. We held that as long as the causal, comparative and contributory negligence of all the relevant parties is determined by the jury, there is no requirement that a settling defendant remain a party to the suit. Pierringer, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106. ¶ 41. According to our decision in Pierringer, the non-settling tort-feasor has no control over a claimant's decision to settle with another tort-feasor. Id. See also, Unigard, 184 Wis. 2d 78 at 87 n.5. ¶ 42. In Johnson, a passenger in a car sued the driver and her insurance company, American Family Insurance. American Family then filed a third-party complaint against State Farm for contribution. State Farm insured the driver of a car that rear-ended the car the plaintiff rode in. In Johnson, the plaintiff entered into a Pierringer release with State Farm over American Family's objection. Johnson, 73 Wis. 2d at 294-95. The trial court approved the settlement agreement. On appeal, we recognized that it was harmless error for the trial court to approve the settlement agreement. Id. The plaintiff did not have a right to settle with State Farm because there was no direct claim against State Farm. Id. at 297. However, the error was harmless, because the parties could have taken steps to place themselves in a direct adversary position. Id. at 298. The court reasoned that had State Farm been an initial party defendant . . . no objection could be raised to the fact that the plaintiff and a joint tort-feasor defendant were exercising the option approved by Pierringer. The settlement of the claim against a defendant under those circumstances requires that he be dismissed from the action. Id. at 297. ¶ 43. Applying the rules of Pierringer and Johnson to the present case, the City did not have standing to object to the release, since pursuant to the terms, VanCleve assumed all of Keller's potential liability. Furthermore, it is clear from the rules set forth above, a non-settling tort-feasor has no control over a claimant's decision to settle with another tort-feasor. See also Unigard, 184 Wis. 2d at 87 n.5. ¶ 44. Therefore, since VanCleve and Keller were direct adversaries, any attempt by the City to object to the Pierringer release would have been unsuccessful. ¶ 45. Consequently, we reject VanCleve's argument that the City waived its statutory affirmative defenses by failing to object to the Pierringer release. We approve of the court of appeals' approach, which held that the non-settling City, claiming secondary liability as an affirmative defense, was not required to object to a Pierringer release to retain its affirmative defense. [10] VanCleve fails to cite any authority which places the burden of objecting to the release upon the non-settling tort-feasor in a successive liability case.