Opinion ID: 4546295
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Realistic-Probability Test

Text: Next, the government argues that even if § 2–401(A)(1) is not divisible by individual drug, the statute nevertheless satisfies the categorical approach because we can ignore the fact that Oklahoma characterizes three substances as controlled dangerous substances which are not federal controlled substances. It urges us to apply the realisticprobability test to reach that conclusion. The realistic-probability test has been applied by the Supreme Court to preclude defendants from arguing that a state statute does not satisfy the categorical approach because under certain imagined circumstances it would be possible to violate the state statute and not satisfy requirements under the ACCA for a violent felony or a serious drug offense. The test requires the defendant to show that there is “a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the [definition in the federal statute].” Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007). In Gonzales the Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument that his California vehicle-theft offense did not satisfy the federal statutory definition of theft because California courts could apply state accomplice-liability doctrine to non-theft conduct. See id. at 190. The Court held that his “application of legal imagination to a state statute’s language” was insufficient. Id. at 193. Instead, he was required to point to 18 cases in which the statute had been applied to such conduct. See id. The government argues here that Defendant would fail the realistic-probability test because the parties have not identified any case prosecuting a defendant under § 2–401(A)(1) for conduct involving the three non-federally controlled substances. In this circuit, however, we have held that a defendant need not come forward with instances of actual prosecution when the “plain language” of the statute proscribes the conduct at issue. Titties, 852 F.3d at 1274. In Titties the government argued that the defendant was required to come forward with a “case in which Oklahoma has prosecuted someone under [the purported ACCA predicate statute] for pointing a firearm in obvious jest.” Id. We said that it was enough that the statute explicitly “reaches conduct undertaken for purposes of ‘whimsy, humor or prank.’” Id. So too here. The plain language of § 2–401(A)(1) expressly criminalized drugs that were not federally controlled and thus falls “outside the ACCA’s ambit.” Id.; see United States v. Abeyta, 877 F.3d 935, 944 (10th Cir. 2017) (applying this aspect of Titties in the context of a sentencing-guidelines enhancement). It requires no “legal imagination,” Gonzales, 549 U.S. at 193, to see that Oklahoma law forbade distribution of three substances that are not federal controlled substances. In sum, we conclude that § 2–401(A)(1) is not divisible by individual drug. Because that statute prohibits the distribution of three drugs that were not federally controlled, Defendant’s conviction under that statute was not a “serious drug offense” 19 under the ACCA. The enhancement of Defendant’s sentence under the ACCA was therefore error. 5