Opinion ID: 4542480
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fourth Amendment False Arrest

Text: Wright also maintains that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the officers on his Fourth Amendment false-arrest claim. For Wright to succeed on this claim, he must prove that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him. Burley v. Gagacki, 834 F.3d 606, 613–14 (6th Cir. 2016). “An officer possesses probable cause when, at the moment the officer seeks the arrest, ‘the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge and of which [he] had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the plaintiff had committed or was committing an offense.’” Wesley v. Campbell, 779 F.3d 421, 429 (6th Cir. 2015) (alterations omitted) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). “If probable cause exists to arrest the suspect for any of the charged offenses, then the false arrest claim must fail.” Fineout v. Kostanko, 780 F. App’x 317, 328 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565, 573 (6th Cir. 2005)). Wright was charged for failure to use his turn signal, resisting arrest, obstructing official business, and criminal trespass. However, for purposes of summary judgment, the officers maintain that their bases for probable cause to arrest were Wright’s resisting arrest and his obstruction of official business. We therefore address below whether probable cause existed for the arrest based on these latter charges only.
The officers contend that they arrested Wright, in part, “because he was … obstruct[ing] official business.” Appellees’ Br. at 40. Under Ohio law, one is guilty of obstructing official business if he, “without privilege to do so and with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any authorized act within the public official’s official capacity, shall do any act that hampers or impedes a public official in the performance of the public official’s lawful duties.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2921.31. With respect to the element of “purpose to obstruct,” “[a] person acts purposely when it is his specific intention to cause a certain result.” City of N. Ridgeville v. Reichbaum, 677 N.E.2d 1245, 1249 (Ohio 1996) (quoting Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.22(A)). The statute also requires an affirmative act that interrupts police business; “[a] person may not be convicted of the offense simply by doing nothing.” Lyons, No. 19-3452 Wright v. City of Euclid, et al. Page 22 415 F.3d at 573 (citing State v. McCrone, 580 N.E.2d 468, 470–71 (Ohio 1989)). The act must actually hamper or impede the officer in the performance of his duties, and “there must be some substantial stoppage of the officer’s progress.” State v. Wellman, 879 N.E.2d 215, 219 (Ohio 2007) (quoting State v. Stephens, 387 N.E.2d 252, 253 (Ohio 1978)). On several occasions we have examined the Ohio statute that prohibits obstruction of official business. The affirmative-act requirement requires more than a failure to comply with an officer’s request. See Jones v. City of Elyria, 947 F.3d 905, 915 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Patrizi v. Huff, 690 F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2012)). Also, when a suspect pulls her hand away from the police but otherwise complies with orders, she has not engaged in an affirmative act giving officers probable cause to arrest for obstruction of official business. Smith v. City of Wyoming, 821 F.3d 697, 716 (6th Cir. 2016). Based on this standard, a reasonable juror could find that Wright’s actions did not involve any affirmative act that obstructed police business. Wright maintains that he was doing his best to comply, and the act of moving his arm was really an attempt to maneuver his torso in the car so as to allow Flagg to remove him from the car— despite the fact that the seizure was unlawful. Certainly, Wright’s and the officers’ respective versions of events are not necessarily inconsistent. Wright could have earnestly believed that he was trying to help Flagg remove him from the car, and Flagg could have simultaneously believed that Wright was trying to interfere with his arrest. But viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Wright, a reasonable jury could find that he did not engage in an affirmative act such as to give rise to probable cause that he was obstructing official business.
In his deposition, Flagg conceded that he did not have probable cause to arrest Wright until he started “resisting.” This puts the cart before the horse. When an underlying arrest is for resisting arrest and nothing more, “the officers could not, as a matter of law, have probable cause to arrest [Wright] where the underlying arrest was not lawful.” Osberry v. Slusher, 750 F. App’x 385, 395 (6th Cir. 2018); see Ohio Rev. Code § 2921.33(A) (“No person, recklessly or by force, shall resist or interfere with a lawful arrest . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also Hoover v. Garfield No. 19-3452 Wright v. City of Euclid, et al. Page 23 Heights Mun. Court, 802 F.2d 168, 174 (6th Cir. 1986) (“[W]e conclude that [Ohio Rev. Code] § 2921.33 indeed forbids only resisting a lawful arrest and does not prohibit resisting an unlawful arrest.”). Because a reasonable jury could find that Flagg and Williams did not have probable cause to arrest Wright prior to his alleged resistance, they are not entitled to summary judgment that the arrest was justified. See Osberry, 750 F. App’x at 395.