Opinion ID: 2795463
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the committee complied with 29 U.S.C.

Text: § 1133 Niebauer next argues that the committee failed to comply with ERISA's notice provision, which requires plan administrators to provide adequate notice in writing to any participant or beneficiary whose claim for benefits under the plan has been denied, setting forth the specific reasons for such denial, written in a manner calculated to be understood by the participant. 29 U.S.C. § 1133(1); see 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503–1 (setting forth implementing regulations). Plan beneficiaries whose claims have been denied are further entitled to a reasonable opportunity . . . for a full and fair review by the appropriate named fiduciary of the decision denying the claim. 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2). Relying on these provisions — in particular § 1133(1) — Niebauer argues that the notice of the compensation committee's final decision on his appeal was inadequate. The notice requirements of ERISA are designed to insure that when a claimant appeals a denial to the plan administrator, [he] will be able to address the determinative issues and have a fair chance to present [his] case. DiGregorio v. Hartford Comprehensive Emp. Benefit Serv. Co., 423 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Halpin v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 962 F.2d 685, 689 (7th Cir. 1992)). This purpose is the lodestar in determining whether there has been substantial compliance with the notice provisions; strict compliance is not required. See Terry, 145 F.3d -24- at 39. In assessing a notice-based challenge, we ask whether the beneficiary [was] supplied with a statement of reasons that, under the circumstances of the case, permitted a sufficiently clear understanding of the administrator's position to permit effective review. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A claimant typically must demonstrate that he or she has been prejudiced as a result of the notice's inadequacy. Bard v. Bos. Shipping Ass'n, 471 F.3d 229, 240–41 (1st Cir. 2006). Here, Niebauer complains that notice of the committee's final decision was inadequate because it failed to provide specific reasons. But although Niebauer claims that [t]he entirety of the Committee's decision on the appeal [was] contained in two sentences, the two-page memorandum at issue in fact provided a procedural and factual background, in addition to a description of the relevant provisions of the plan and the information the committee considered in arriving at its decision, before summarizing its conclusion. At the end of the memo, the committee encapsulated its decision as follows: After considering and discussing the information presented, the Committee concluded that [Niebauer] had in fact elected to resign his employment rather than continue to work in support of the Crane & Co. project to which he had been assigned and further that his resignation was not for good reason as that term is described in the Severance Plan. See Article 2, Sections 2.10 and 2.16. Therefore [Niebauer's] appeal is denied. -25- This explanation, which clearly outlines the reason for the committee's decision, satisfies ERISA's notice requirements. See Orndorf v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 404 F.3d 510, 526 (1st Cir. 2005) (The denial letter need not detail every bit of information in the record . . . .). In any event, the notice of the committee's initial decision, with which ERISA's notice provisions are primarily concerned, was adequate to permit effective review of Niebauer's claim. As Crane observes, it is undisputed that the key issue before the committee was whether Niebauer had resigned or instead had been involuntarily terminated. Niebauer was undeniably aware that this question was dispositive of his claim; indeed, after receiving notice of the committee's initial decision,13 he submitted an appeal with seventy pages of supporting documentation, addressed to the precise issue of whether he had retired, or whether, in his parlance, he was retired against his will. After considering the documents that he submitted, the committee upheld its earlier decision on the same grounds. As such, Niebauer has no credible claim that his understanding of the issues at stake was so muddled as to inhibit effective review.14 Compare Terry, 145 F.3d at 39 13 As discussed above, this notice advised Niebauer of the committee's conclusion that he, a valued senior executive, had voluntarily elected to resign his employment, and that therefore he was not eligible for a severance benefit pursuant to the Plan. 14 Niebauer also argues that the inadequacy of the notice is manifested in its incorrect reference to section 2.10 of the plan, -26- (where claimant submitted additional information to committee that directly addressed whether he was disabled from performing any job, [h]is actions demonstrate[d] that he was well aware of the reasons for the decision, and was submitting additional evidence on the crucial point), with Bard, 471 F.3d at 241 (where administrator provided no notice of denial, claimant was not informed that he needed to show that his total disability occurred prior to termination of his employment, [and accordingly] submitted medical documentation not meant to address that point . . . which ultimately proved quite harmful to his administrative appeal).