Opinion ID: 4103812
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Statutory Right to Be Present

Text: Defendant also argues her exclusion from the hearing on Phillip Sanders‘s discovery obligations violated her statutory rights. With exceptions not relevant here, at the time of defendant‘s trial section 977 provided in pertinent part: ―In all 64 cases in which a felony is charged, the accused [shall be personally] present at the arraignment, at the time of plea, during the preliminary hearing, during those portions of the trial when evidence is taken before the trier of fact, and at the time of the imposition of sentence. The accused must be present at all other proceedings unless he shall, with leave of court, execute in open court, a written waiver of his right to be personally present, approved by his counsel, which waiver must then be filed with the court . . . .‖ (Former § 977, subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 1968, ch. 1064, § 1, p. 2064.) The present version of the statute, section 977, subdivision (b)(1), is essentially the same. (See Stats. 2014, ch. 167, § 1.) Section 1043 is also relevant. It provides that a felony defendant ―shall be personally present at the trial‖ (id., subd. (a)), provides for removal of disruptive defendants (id., subd. (b)(1)), and when read together with section 977, provides that ―a capital defendant cannot voluntarily waive his right to be present during the proceedings listed in section 977.‖ (People v. Cunningham, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 635.) In other words, section 1043 when read in conjunction with section 977, permits a capital defendant to be absent only in very limited circumstances (People v. Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th 86, 117–118). Like the constitutional imperative, the statutory requirement that a criminally accused be personally present in court applies to all proceedings where his presence bears a ― ‗ ―reasonable, substantial relation to his opportunity to defend the charges against him.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 959, quoting People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 745–746.) But as with the constitutional claim, we need not decide whether the ex parte hearing now challenged satisfies the ―reasonable, substantial relation test,‖ because no prejudice could have resulted from the exclusion of defendant and her attorneys from the hearing. Again, as defendant was undoubtedly aware of the existence 65 and contents of the letters, as well as Jennifer Lee‘s part in copying them, defendant‘s exclusion from the hearing could not have negatively affected her trial or trial strategy in any meaningful way.