Opinion ID: 2525735
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Family Court Adequately Considered Whether a Bill of Particulars was Necessary to Corder's Preparation for Trial.

Text: The SDO concluded that the Family Court failed to consider whether the bill of particulars was necessary to Corder's preparation at trial and to prevent him from being prejudicially surprised as to what acts he allegedly committed in violation of the EOP. SDO at 3. For the following reasons, we disagree. At the September 18, 2007 hearing on Corder's Motion to Dismiss or for Bill of Particulars, the Family Court stated that the primary function of a bill of particulars is to sufficiently apprise a defendant of the... essential facts ... of the offenses charged so the defendant is able to prepare a defense and avoid surprise at trial. The Family Court was aware of the contents of the above-referenced police reports [8] and that Corder had been provided such reports in discovery. [9] After hearing argument from both sides, the Family Court found that discovery has been provided to the defendant which does sufficiently apprise the defendant of the essential facts of the offenses charged such that Mr. Corder is able to prepare a defense and avoid surprise at trial. In his Response, Corder acknowledges that the police reports underlying Count II and Count III detailed his alleged conduct. Corder argues, however, that his alleged conduct could arguably be prohibited under several different sections of the EOP, not just the sections identified in the police reports. He further notes that, for each count, the State argued at trial that Corder engaged in several different acts, some of which may be judged as separate and distinct violations of the EOP and some of which are not prohibited under the EOP. As a result, the jury could potentially convict Corder without unanimously agreeing on the specific conduct that violated the EOP, or by considering conduct not prohibited by the EOP. Thus, Corder argues, the State should have been required to identify the specific act along with the specific sections of the EOP violated by that act in Count II and Count III in a bill of particulars. At the hearing on Corder's Motion to Dismiss or for Bill of Particulars, the Family Court anticipated this situation, stating: With respect to the conduct which is alleged to have violated the protective order, if there is more than one act which could be the basis of a separate charge, the court can deal with that situation by way of an As Arceo instruction should that arise.[ [10] ] At trial, the Family Court instructed the jury that, as to Count II and Count III, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: Defendant Lawrence Corder engaged in conduct which was prohibited by the Order of Protection; and [t]hat the Defendant Lawrence Corder engaged in said conduct intentionally or knowingly. Regarding the conduct element, the Family Court gave the following unanimity instruction: The law allows the introduction of evidence for the purpose of showing that there is more than one act upon which proof of an element of an offense may be based. In order for the prosecution to prove an element, all jurors must unanimously agree that the same act has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The Family Court also instructed the jury that, as to Count II and Count III, its verdict must be unanimous and gave a separate instruction explaining the meaning of a unanimous verdict. The Family Court complied with our holding in Arceo by instructing the jury on the necessity of reaching a unanimous verdict on the same underlying act. Thus, the Family Court did not have to require the State, in a bill of particulars or otherwise, to elect the specific acts under which it was relying to establish the conduct element of the charged offense. Arceo, 84 Hawai`i at 32-33, 928 P.2d at 874-75. The ICA's SDO states that the Family Court incorrectly suggested that Corder's request amounted to requiring the State to reveal its evidence and called for information which could not be supplied. SDO at 3. This misstates the Family Court's position. The Family Court stated that the primary purpose of a bill of particulars is not to make the State reveal its evidence, but rather to sufficiently apprise defendant of the essential facts of the charged offense. The Family Court noted that a motion for a bill of particulars will be denied where the information requested cannot be supplied by the prosecution because it is unknown, but specifically stated that this was not the situation in the present case. In accordance with HRS section 806-47, the Family Court considered the whole record of the case and entire course of the proceedings against Corder and found that a bill of particulars was unnecessary because Corder was not actually misled or prejudiced as to the charges against him. See HRS § 806-47 (1993). On this basis, the Family Court denied Corder's motion. We hold that such a decision was not an abuse of the Family Court's discretion. See Reed, 77 Hawai`i at 78, 881 P.2d at 1224.