Opinion ID: 537726
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Invasion of the Jury's Province

Text: 87 Defendant Granito, joined by Gennaro Angiulo, raises an additional objection to the expert testimony. Specifically, Granito challenges Agent Eberhart's testimony regarding the roles played by various defendants in the North Margin Street poker operation--in particular, Eberhart's testimony that, based on his analysis of the tape recordings, it was his opinion that Granito was a partner in the poker game. 7 88 Granito contends that Eberhart's expert testimony should have been limited to a description of the general operation of gambling businesses and an explanation of any specialized terminology appearing on the tapes. With such testimony as background, the jury would have been more than competent to determine for itself the nature of Granito's involvement. In letting the expert state his opinion regarding Granito's role, the trial court impermissibly allowed the expert to give a legal conclusion and effectively tell the jury what result to reach, argues the defendant. 89 We disagree. The permissible scope of expert testimony under Fed.R.Evid. 702 is quite broad, 8 and encompasses an expert's statement of opinion on an ultimate fact at issue. See, e.g., United States v. Lamattina, 889 F.2d 1191, 1193-94 (1st Cir.1989); United States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587, 591 (3d Cir.), mandamus denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1179, 103 L.Ed.2d 246 (1989). The only significant limitation is that the expert opinion be helpful to the trier of fact. See Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d at 591. Furthermore, the trial court has wide discretion in determining whether to admit expert testimony under this standard. See Lamattina, 889 F.2d at 1194. 90 Applying these principles to the facts at hand, we find that the trial court committed no error in allowing the expert to give his opinion as to the defendant's role in the criminal activities at issue here. We recently have upheld similar expert testimony in closely analogous circumstances. In United States v. Lamattina, we found no error in allowing an expert witness to testify that, after listening to the government's recorded conversation involving the defendant, it was his opinion that the conversation pertained to a loansharking transaction. See Lamattina, 889 F.2d at 1193-94. Similarly, in United States v. Angiulo, we found no error in allowing an expert to testify that, after listening to the government's tapes, it was his opinion that the defendants were close associates of the Patriarca Family. See Angiulo, 847 F.2d at 973-75. In both cases, we reasoned that the testimony was helpful to the jury in determining the meaning and significance of recorded conversations and the criminal jargon used in them. See Lamattina, 889 F.2d at 1194. We noted in Angiulo that, although this type of testimony posed some risk of prejudicing the defendants, it was particularly helpful in assisting the jury to understand the often complex structure of organized crime activities. See Angiulo, 847 F.2d at 975; see also Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d at 592. 91 The same reasoning is equally applicable here. Given the extensive criminal organization controlled by the Patriarca Family, the complexity of the interrelationships within the organization, and the use of criminal jargon by defendants in their conversations, we cannot find that the district court abused its discretion in permitting expert testimony as to defendants' roles in certain activities on the ground that such testimony would be helpful to the jury. As we did in Angiulo, we acknowledge that some risk exists that this type of testimony will be overly persuasive to the jury. We note with approval, however, that the trial court explicitly instructed the jury that it could accept or reject the expert testimony in whole or in part. Cf. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d at 592 (approving of a similar jury instruction). Considering the matter in its entirety, there was no error here.