Opinion ID: 2360954
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: [¶ 19] Ardolino contends the trial court erred by denying his motions for a judgment of acquittal. He argues that to meet its burden of proof on a charge of depraved indifference murder, the State must establish the specific death-causing action so the objective test for the precise risk-producing potential of the action may be applied by the factfinder. We disagree. [¶ 20] A person is guilty of depraved indifference murder if that person engages in conduct which manifests a depraved indifference to the value of human life and which in fact causes the death of another human being. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 201(1)(B). Section 33 provides: Unless otherwise provided, when causing a result is an element of a crime, causation may be found where the result would not have occurred but for the conduct of the defendant operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the defendant was clearly insufficient. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 33 (1983). The standard to be applied to determine whether evidence is sufficient to support a jury's conviction is whether, based on that evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any trier of fact rationally could find beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense charged. State v. Barry, 495 A.2d 825, 826 (Me.1985). A conviction may be grounded on circumstantial evidence and is not for that reason less conclusive. State v. Benner, 654 A.2d 435, 437 (Me.1995). The factfinder is allowed to draw all reasonable inferences from the circumstantial evidence. Id. The law is well established that it is the duty of the factfinder to reconcile conflicting testimony, determine its relative weight and decide what part of the testimony is credible and worthy of belief. Id. In State v. LeClair, we stated: When the state produces circumstantial evidence tending to support an inference of the defendant's guilt, the jury must also consider, of course, any explanation for the evidence consistent with the defendant's innocence. The jury's guilty verdict must be based not on a determination that there exists no alternative explanation, but that, after assessing the credibility of such explanations, they raise no reasonable doubts as to the defendant's guilt. 425 A.2d 182, 184 (Me.1981). [T]he reasonable doubt which will prevent conviction must be the fact finder's doubt and not that of an appellate court. State v. Bonney, 351 A.2d 107, 110 (Me.1976) (citation omitted). [¶ 21] Applying these principles to our review of the record in this case, we conclude the jury properly could have found that the circumstances, viewed in relation to each other and together with the rational inferences that could be dawn from them, satisfied the State's burden of proof that every element of the charged offense had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's denial of Ardolino's motions for a judgment of acquittal.