Opinion ID: 1785185
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedures Act

Text: In the recent case of Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County v. Shacklett, released for publication at Nashville on January 24, 1977, the Court had occasion to consider the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act governing judicial review, both in the chancery court and on appeal, T.C.A. §§ 4-523, 524. There, it was noted that the provisions of T.C.A. § 4-523(h) provide for a limited review in the chancery court, rather than a de novo review upon the record. New evidence may be received in that court only in cases of alleged irregularities in procedure before the agency, not shown in the record... . T.C.A. § 4-523(g). Otherwise, review is confined to the record made before the administrative agency. There are provisions for remand to the agency for further proceedings. On the record before it, however, the court may reverse or modify the decision of the agency only if it finds that the agency findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (1) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or (5) unsupported by evidence which is both substantial and material in light of the entire record. T.C.A. 4-523(h). The statute further provides that in determining the substantiality of evidence the chancellor shall take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight, but the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. In light of this language, it appears that the General Assembly intended that the trial court should review factual issues upon a standard of substantial and material evidence. The court is directed to consider the entire record, including any part detracting from the evidence supporting the findings of the administrative body. Nevertheless the trial court is not to review issues of fact de novo or to substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of evidence... . The statute also contains a harmless error provision, stating that no agency decision in a contested case be reversed, remanded or modified unless for errors which affect the merits of the decision complained of. T.C.A. § 4-523(i). Appeals under the Act are taken directly to the Supreme Court as in chancery cases. T.C.A. § 4-524. In the Shacklett case, supra, however, the Court construed that phrase as follows: We do not believe that the drafters of the Administrative Procedures Act intended that there be a broad, or de novo, review in this Court of the decision of a trial judge, when his action, initially, is confined to a narrow and statutorily prescribed review of the record made before the administrative agency. We consider that it would be impracticable for this Court to afford any broader or more comprehensive review to cases arising under the Act than is afforded to them by the trial court in the first instance, except, of course, this Court can review for the first time any new or additional evidence introduced in the chancery court with respect to `alleged irregularities in procedure' before the agency as provided in T.C.A. § 4-523(g). Therefore we do not deem the words `as in chancery cases' contained in T.C.A. § 4-524 to be definitive of the scope of review to be given such cases in this Court, but merely as descriptive of the general procedure to be followed in bringing cases from the chancery court to this Court, where procedures are not otherwise expressly set out in the Administrative Procedures Act itself. Accordingly, insofar as appellant suggests a de novo review of the factual issues presented before the Commission, its assignments are not well taken. The record must be reviewed here, as in the trial court, under the statutory criteria.