Opinion ID: 167974
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Kolstad defense

Text: 16 To avail itself of Kolstad's good-faith-compliance standard, an employer must at least 1) adopt antidiscrimination policies; 2) make a good faith effort to educate its employees about these policies and the statutory prohibitions; and 3) make good faith efforts to enforce an antidiscrimination policy. Cadena v. Pacesetter Corp., 224 F.3d 1203, 1210 (10th Cir.2000) (quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). Fairfield contends that it maintained a written policy against discrimination and retaliation. 5 While there is some debate regarding whether Fairfield demonstrated good-faith efforts to educate its employees about its specific policies, we need not address that issue because the jury could have reasonably concluded that Fairfield failed to enforce, or make good-faith efforts to enforce, any antidiscrimination policies it adopted. We have previously explained that, even if an employer[] adduces evidence showing it maintains on paper a strong non-discrimination policy and makes good faith efforts to educate its employees about that policy and Title VII, a plaintiff may still recover punitive damages if she demonstrates the employer failed to adequately address Title VII violations of which it was aware. Cadena, 224 F.3d at 1210. 17 Here, the evidence indicates that, in December 1999, McInnis complained to Jamtaas, her then-immediate supervisor, about Thull's sexually harassing behavior. Although Jamtaas contacted Thull about McInnis's complaint, he never followed up with McInnis and later made light of her complaint. 6 In January 2001, McInnis called Gray, her immediate supervisor at the time, to complain about Thull's sexual harassment and Turolla's, Thull's, and Mikula's retaliation against her. Gray told McInnis that [she] [could] always look at something different, when you step away from it, out of sight and out of mind and that McInnis needed to not let emotions take over. After this phone call, Gray did not follow-up with McInnis about her complaint. McInnis called Gray a second time to raise her sexual harassment and retaliation complaint. During this conversation, Gray told McInnis that after their first telephone call, he talked to Thull, Mikula, and Fogel about her complaint. Gray then told McInnis that he did not need this on [his] 90 day [probation period]. He directed McInnis to report any past personnel issues to Mikula because he did not want to get involved. McInnis then contacted Mikula to complain about being harassed and retaliated against, and he instructed her to put her retaliation complaint in writing. While preparing this written complaint, McInnis sent a memorandum to Fogel complaining of Gray's retaliation and his failure to respond to her complaint. Fogel then contacted Gray by email and informed him of McInnis's complaint. 18 In short, the evidence in this case indicates that between December 1999 and February 2001, McInnis reported harassment and retaliation to at least the Senior Regional Vice President of Property Management, the Vice President of Property Management, and the Regional Human Resource Director, all of whom failed to take any action to remedy the situation or stop the retaliation. 7 Because sufficient evidence was presented on which a jury could have found [Fairfield] did not make good faith efforts to comply with Title VII, this court will not enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of [Fairfield] on the question of punitive damages. Cadena, 224 F.3d at 1210.