Opinion ID: 520594
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Subornation of Perjury

Text: 62 Hill and Rose allege that Smyth and Goodman solicited and prepared perjured testimony by witnesses, Hill Amended Complaint p 40(a); Rose Amended Complaint p 41(a); that they attempted to get Rose to perjure himself in the grand jury proceedings, Hill Amended Complaint paragraphs 40(c), 41; Rose Amended Complaint paragraphs 41(d), 42; and that they subjected other grand jury witnesses to similar efforts to solicit perjury in investigatory interviews and before the grand jury, and some of these witnesses actually did perjure themselves. Hill Amended Complaint p 40(d); Rose Amended Complaint p 41(e). According to the district court, although the plaintiffs conceded that a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity for the knowing use of perjured testimony, see Imbler, they contended that the procurement or solicitation of perjured testimony by coercion is distinguishable; that, at best, such activity is an investigative act. 7 The district court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments, holding that solicitation of testimony is intimately related to the judicial proceedings, and that there is no policy reason for distinguishing between knowing use of perjury and subornation of perjury in the immunity context. See, e.g., Rose v. Bartle, 692 F.Supp. at 526. 8 63 As discussed above, the appropriate inquiry in determining whether immunity is available involves the role in which the prosecutor is acting--an advocacy role, or an investigative role. Although the plaintiffs, in their briefs, characterize the solicitation and coercion of perjury by the defendants as having taken place while the defendants were acting in an investigative capacity, they proffer no adequate explanation for such a characterization. Except as to Rose, there is no elaboration in the pleadings regarding the circumstances in which the alleged solicitations of perjury took place. Tellingly, however, the plaintiffs do not dispute the district court's statement that their allegations involved the solicitation and preparation of perjured testimony for use in the grand jury proceedings, 692 F.Supp. at 526, and in fact themselves indicate in their briefs that the defendants attempted to coerce witnesses into committing perjury before the grand jury. Rose brief at 37; Hill brief at 34. Moreover, the more fact-specific allegations involving the solicitations of Rose to commit perjury allege that Rose was asked, or coerced, to testify perjuriously before the grand jury. Hill Amended Complaint paragraphs 40(c), 41; Rose Amended Complaint paragraphs 41(d), 42. 64 Although there may well be situations in which the allegations establish that the solicitation or coercion of false statements from a witness occurred while the prosecutor was acting in an investigative capacity, this does not appear to be one of them. The plaintiffs' allegations involve direct solicitations of testimony for use in the grand jury proceedings. Such solicitations are encompassed within the preparation necessary to present a case and therefore are immunized as involving the prosecutors' advocacy functions. Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1449 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987). Similarly, in Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830 (3d Cir.1976), this court affirmed the district court's dismissal of a complaint alleging that a federal prosecutor and a cooperating witness had conspired to use perjured testimony ... in order to convict appellants, id. at 832, reasoning that [t]he allegations in the complaint implicating [the prosecutor] all related to actions in his role as an advocate, rather than as an administrator or investigator. Id. at 834; see also Heidelberg v. Hammer, 577 F.2d 429, 432 (7th Cir.1978) (charges that the prosecutors induced witnesses to commit perjury are barred by the immunity doctrine); cf. Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir.) (allegations that prosecutor coerced perjured testimony from witnesses barred because injuries alleged by plaintiff, which stem from his multiple trials, are same injuries for which Imbler granted immunity), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861, 101 S.Ct. 165, 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980). 9 65 It is true that the plaintiffs allege that the defendants engaged in efforts to solicit perjury in investigatory interviews as well as before the grand jury. Hill Amended Complaint p 40(d); Rose Amended Complaint p 41(e) (emphasis added). The mere invocation of the catch-word investigatory, however, cannot suffice in this case to forestall dismissal on immunity grounds. See, e.g., Cook v. Houston Post, 616 F.2d 791, 793 (5th Cir.1980) (interviewing witnesses before presenting their testimony to grand jury falls within prosecutor's advocacy function). 66 In short, although it is true that the distinction between actions taken in a quasi-judicial role and those taken in an investigative role often will involve a gray area, see Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1215 (3d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 3147, 69 L.Ed.2d 997 (1981), the plaintiffs' own pleadings indicate that the alleged solicitations of perjury occurred in preparation for the grand jury proceedings, not in an investigatory capacity. Smyth and Goodman therefore are absolutely immune from liability for this alleged activity. 67