Opinion ID: 1819058
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether a proper foundation was laid thus permitting the state to introduce the results of the intoxilyzer test

Text: ¶ 28. As with Issue I, since we are again reviewing a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. Culp, 933 So.2d at 274. See also Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. McLemore, 863 So.2d 31, 34 (Miss.2003); Beech v. Leaf River Forest Prods., Inc., 691 So.2d 446, 448 (Miss.1997). Additionally, [t]he discretion of the trial judge must be exercised within the boundaries of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. Beech, 691 So.2d at 448 (citing Johnston v. State, 567 So.2d 237, 238 (Miss.1990)). See Miss. R. Evid. 103(a). ¶ 29. McLendon asserts the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to properly lay the foundation for the results of the intoxilyzer test to be admitted into evidence. However, at trial McLendon made no objection to the operational checklist of the completed test being admitted into evidence. By failing to properly object to the admission of evidence at trial, McLendon did not preserve his claim that the trial court erred by improperly allowing the intoxilyzer results into evidence. Spicer v. State, 921 So.2d 292, 309 (Miss.2006) (citing Williams v. State, 684 So.2d 1179, 1203 (Miss.1996)). Despite McLendon's waiver of this issue on appeal, we will, alternatively, address the merits of this issue. ¶ 30. McLendon asserts that trooper Ross should not have been allowed to testify with regards to the intoxilyzer results since he recorded the result as a test refusal in the logbook. McLendon contends that it was prejudicial error for the trial court to allow trooper Ross to testify that McLendon actually had a breath-alcohol content of 0.13% based on an un-logged intoxilyzer test. Even if McLendon were correct in asserting that the trial judge erred in allowing trooper Ross's testimony (an error which we do not find), such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The State had already entered into evidence the printout from the completed test. Likewise, in the end, McLendon, himself, through counsel during the cross-examination of trooper Ross, offered Uniform Traffic Ticket No. 6-067326, which trooper Ross had issued to McLendon, and this ticket noted that McLendon registered 0.13%. Therefore, trooper Ross's testimony specifically stating the result as being a breath-alcohol content of 0.13% was not unfairly prejudicial to McLendon. See Palmer v. City of Oxford, 860 So.2d 1203, 1209-10 (Miss.2003). ¶ 31. Next, McLendon contends trooper Ross did not administer the intoxilyzer test in a scientifically acceptable manner. However, we again state that the trial judge cannot be put in error on a matter which was not presented to him for decision. Estate of Stevens v. Wetzel, 762 So.2d 293, 296 (Miss.2000); Parker v. Miss. Game & Fish Comm'n, 555 So.2d 725, 730 (Miss.1989); Cossitt v. Federated Guar. Mut. Ins. Co., 541 So.2d 436, 446 (Miss.1989); Crenshaw v. State, 520 So.2d 131, 134-35 (Miss.1988); Ponder v. State, 335 So.2d 885 (Miss.1976); See also Harrison v. State, 534 So.2d 175, 181 (Miss.1988). Since he did not initially raise this issue in the trial court, McLendon is procedurally barred from asserting the issue today. Procedural bar notwithstanding, even considering this issue on its merits, the totality of the record reveals no merit to this assertion. As correctly pointed out by the State in its brief, [t]hat [Ross] may have failed to note the result of the second test in the log hardly suggests that the test itself was somehow invalidly administered. The logbook entries have nothing whatsoever to do with the reliability of the test itself. We agree. The trial court committed no error in admitting this evidence. ¶ 32. In sum, we find this second issue to have no merit.