Opinion ID: 555084
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Great Weight of the Evidence.

Text: 54 Munn amorphously asserts that the jury's verdict is against the great weight of the evidence, but he fails to specify which aspect of the verdict he finds objectionable. However, Munn seems most upset with the jury's apparent conclusion that Mrs. Munn would not have died had she accepted the blood transfusion. 55 We reverse the disposition of a new trial motion predicated on the movant's view of the weight of the evidence only if the court abused its discretion. Smith v. Transworld Drilling Co., 773 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir.1985) (citing Shows v. Jamison Bedding, Inc., 671 F.2d 927, 930-31 (5th Cir.1982)). Our deference is somewhat greater when the court denies the new trial motion. Jones v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 870 F.2d 982, 986 (5th Cir.1989) (citing Franks v. Associated Air Center, Inc., 663 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir.1981)); Evers v. Equifax, Inc., 650 F.2d 793, 796-97 (5th Cir. Unit B July 1981). 56 Although various witnesses disagreed about whether Mrs. Munn would have lived had she consented to the blood transfusions, the jury was entitled to believe those witnesses who concluded that she would have survived. The jury was entitled to believe the testimony of Drs. Walker and Fabian, despite conflicting testimony, see supra note 8, and to conclude that she would have survived had she assented to the blood transfusions. Accordingly, the jury's conclusion in this regard was not against the great weight of the evidence, and the district court's denial of the motion for new trial is in this regard affirmed.D. Adequacy of the Damage Award. 57 Munn contends that he deserves a new trial because the jury award was inadequate. We do not alter a damage award unless it is so  'inadequate as to shock the judicial conscience and to raise an irresistible inference that passion, prejudice, corruption or other improper cause invaded the trial.'  Taylor v. Green, 868 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir.) (quoting Garrick v. City & County of Denver, 652 F.2d 969, 972 (10th Cir.1981) (citation omitted)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 127, 107 L.Ed.2d 87 (1989). Munn fails to specify which aspect of the jury's award was inadequate. 58 Although the court did admit potentially prejudicial testimony into evidence, see supra, the jury's award is not so inadequate as to shock the judicial conscience. That the jury was not improperly biased against the Munns is evident in its award of $10,000.00 for Mrs. Munn's eight hours of pain and suffering. Furthermore, its decision to deny the wrongful death beneficiaries any compensation reflects a reasoned application of the avoidable consequences doctrine. In addition, the jury's refusal to award Munn any pain and suffering damages mirrors the relatively minor nature of his injuries. 59 It cannot be plausibly argued that the jury's award is so inadequate as to shock the conscience. Consequently, we affirm the court's denial of this aspect of his new trial motion. 60 E. Jury Instructions. 61 Munn asserts that the court erroneously instructed the jury in two ways: (1) by directing the jury to judge the reasonableness of Mrs. Munn's decision to refuse blood against an objective standard; and (2) by refusing to inform the jury of the identity of the potential wrongful death beneficiaries. The court's instructions were appropriate in both regards, and we therefore affirm. 62 During the jury instruction conference, Munn's counsel urged the court to direct the jury to ask what a reasonable Jehovah's Witness would have done in Mrs. Munn's situation. The court refused to adopt this instruction, instead instructing the jury in a way that defies easy categorization as objective or subjective: 63 In determining whether or not Elaine Munn's decision to refuse the blood transfusion was unreasonable, you may consider that the blood transfusions were medically recommended. But, you may also consider her religious beliefs and related teachings, together with the known risks of blood transfusions, if you find that to be a factor in her decision. 64 Both parties blithely conclude that this language reflects an objective standard of reasonableness. However, this standard is not purely objective; it does not ask the jury whether reasonable people would have done what Mrs. Munn did. It contains a subjective component, allowing the jury to consider her religious beliefs and related teachings. 65 In any event, the proper characterization of this instruction is not the issue at hand; instead, the question is whether the instruction was wrong as a matter of Mississippi law. This instruction does not incorrectly state Mississippi law. More precisely, Mississippi cases considering the avoidable consequences doctrine do not prohibit this instruction. See Buras v. Shell Oil Co., 666 F.Supp. 919, 924 (S.D.Miss.1987) (applying Mississippi law); National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Jumper, 241 Miss. 339, 130 So.2d 922, 923 (1961); Levy v. J.A. Olson Co., 237 Miss. 452, 115 So.2d 296, 298 (1959); North Am. Accident Ins. Co. v. Henderson, 180 Miss. 395, 177 So. 528 (1937). 66 None of these cases clearly indicates whether an objective or subjective standard of reasonableness should be applied; however, once again, that is not really the issue here, because the court's instruction in this case does not plainly reflect either of those paradigms. The above-cited cases either combine objective and subjective elements (as does the instruction in this case) or fail to specify which standard is to be applied. 67 For example, in Buras the court declared that a plaintiff is required to take reasonable steps to mitigate his damages. 666 F.Supp. at 924. This answer to the objective vs. subjective debate begs the question. Most other cases similarly fail to address the question. See, e.g., National Dairy, 130 So.2d at 923 ([o]ne seeking to hold another liable for damages must use reasonable efforts to avoid or mitigate them); Levy, 115 So.2d at 298 (plaintiff required to put[ ] forth a reasonable effort to mitigate damages). 68 Some cases do apply a standard of reasonableness that is subjective in the sense that the nature of the plaintiff is taken into account. In Henderson, the plaintiff sought damages for his continuing physical disability, even though surgery would have enabled him to return to work and thus mitigate his damages. The plaintiff argued that he was unable to pay for the operation, and the defendant responded by asserting that the plaintiff's financial condition was not relevant to the reasonableness of his failure to mitigate damages. 69 The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected this position, stating that the mitigation of damages rule is one of reason, and, if the injured person be powerless to take the needed step, reasonableness has become exhausted and the applicability of the rule is at an end. 18 177 So. at 530. Although Henderson effectively jettisons the notion that Mississippi has a purely objective standard of reasonableness, 19 it does not render erroneous the district court's instruction, which did not contain a purely objective standard. The instruction allowed the jury to consider factors unique to the decedent, such as her religious beliefs and related teachings. Hence, because the instruction comported with Mississippi law, the district court's judgment in this regard is affirmed. 20 70 Munn also contends that the court should have informed the jury that the Munn children would be the primary beneficiaries of any wrongful death damages it awarded. Munn argues that the jury assumed that he would be the sole recipient of these damages and thus that the interests of the children were unfairly prejudiced. 71 This argument is utterly without legal foundation. The Mississippi wrongful death statute, Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 11-7-13 (Supp.1990), does not require that the jury know the identity of the beneficiaries. Munn fails to suggest any legal basis for this argument, and it accordingly must fail. 72 The judgment of the district court is in all respects AFFIRMED. 73