Opinion ID: 3183072
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prior Spanking Incident

Text: After the district court severed Count 4 from the indictment (the child-abuse count), the government filed notice under Rule 404(b) to attempt to introduce testimony of Contreras's spanking of A.C. on the buttocks in August 2011, which the court permitted. Contreras argues that the district court erred in admitting evidence of his prior spanking of A.C. under Rule 404(b) because the evidence fails to satisfy the four-part test for admissibility. He asserts that the testimony constituted impermissible propensity evidence intended to show that he is generally a violent person. Rule 404(b) provides that [e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). But -13- evidence may be admitted for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). We review for an abuse of discretion the district court's admission of evidence under Rule 404(b), and we will not reverse unless the evidence clearly had no bearing on the case and was introduced solely to prove the defendant's propensity to commit criminal acts. United States v. Williams, 796 F.3d 951, 958 (8th Cir. 2015) (quotation and citation omitted). Rule 404(b) is one of inclusion, such that evidence offered for permissible purposes is presumed admissible absent a contrary determination. Id. (quotation and citations omitted). In determining whether a district court abused its discretion, we apply a four-part test. Id. Under that test, a district court properly admits evidence under Rule 404(b) if (1) it is relevant to a material issue; (2) it is similar in kind and not overly remote in time to the crime charged; (3) it is supported by sufficient evidence; and (4) its potential prejudice does not substantially outweigh its probative value. Id. at 959 (quotation and citations omitted). The fourth requirement derives from Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which provides in relevant part that '[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by [the] danger of . . . unfair prejudice.' Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403). We conclude that the four-part test is satisfied. First, the August 2011 spanking incident was relevant to a material issue. Specifically, the government introduced the evidence to prove absence of mistake and lack of accident in light of Contreras's statement to the FBI that the child had fallen from a chair. Evidence that Contreras had struck the same victim hard enough to offer an apology to her mother just four months prior was relevant to rebut his claim of accident. Second, the August 2011 spanking incident was similar in kind and close in time to the crime charged. Both the spanking incident and the crime charged involve an assault by Contreras against A.C.—the same victim. And, the spanking incident occurred only four months prior to A.C.'s death. See, e.g., United States v. Straker, -14- 567 F. Supp. 2d 174, 178 (D.D.C. 2008), aff'd, 800 F.3d 570 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Moreover, the other crimes were close in time to the hostage taking charged in this case, all within four months of the April 2005 abduction of Balram Maharaj. (emphasis added)). Third, sufficient evidence supports the occurrence of the August 2011 spanking incident. Both Sine (A.C.'s mother) and Sine's mother (A.C.'s grandmother) testified to observing the handprint on A.C.'s buttocks. Contreras also admitted to Sine that he had spanked A.C. on the buttocks too hard and apologized for doing so. The court admitted a photo into evidence documenting the hand print on A.C.'s buttocks. Finally, the potential prejudice does not substantially outweigh the evidence's probative value. The district court gave two oral limiting instructions before the jury heard the testimony of Sine and her mother. These instructions minimiz[ed] the danger of unfair prejudice. See United States v. Hessman, 493 F.3d 977, 983 (8th Cir. 2007) (Further, the district court instructed the jury that the evidence of Hessman's prior convictions should be considered only with respect to the issues of knowledge and intent, thus minimizing the danger of unfair prejudice. (citation omitted)). Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the August 2011 spanking incident under Rule 404(b).