Opinion ID: 1444047
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: private cause of action for violation of criminal statutes

Text: The Yoakums argue that Hartford's alleged obstruction of justice, I.C. § 18-705, and violations of the Idaho Bribery and Corrupt Influences Act, I.C. §§ 18-1351 to -1362, should provide them with a private cause of action. In White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 730 P.2d 1014 (1986), we analyzed whether a private right of action against an insurer exists under the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act. 112 Idaho at 100-01, 730 P.2d at 1020-21. Recognizing that in certain cases statutory law establishes rights, defines wrongs and implies remedies, we quoted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A which provides: When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured member of the class a right of action, using a suitable existing tort action or a new cause of action analogous to an existing tort action. Id. (emphasis in original). We noted in White that the absence of an express civil remedy under the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act was not automatically fatal to the plaintiff's tort action, although we held there that an implied private right of action did not exist under that particular statute. Id. at 101, 730 P.2d at 1021. In this case, the criminal statutes Hartford allegedly violated satisfy none of the criteria set forth in White that would militate in favor of implying a private right of action in favor of the Yoakums. The criminal statutes involved are clearly not designed to protect any special class of persons but are instead intended to protect the general public from those who would corrupt a public officer. More importantly, there is absolutely no indication that the legislature intended to create a private cause of action through the enactment of these statutes and in determining whether a statute impliedly authorizes a private cause of action, the focus of our inquiry is whether the legislature intended to create such a private remedy. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 2485, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979). In the absence of strong indicia of a contrary legislative intent, courts must conclude that the legislature provided precisely the remedies it considered appropriate. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1, 15, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2623, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981). As criminal offenses under Title 18, the Idaho legislature has specifically provided punishment for Hartford's alleged obstruction of justice and violations of the Idaho Bribery and Corrupt Influences Act, see I.C. §§ 18-112, -113; there is no indication that providing an additional civil remedy is necessary to assure the effectiveness of these statutes. Otherwise, courts must conclude `that the legislature intended to enact a civil code companion to the criminal code.' Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 79, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2088, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975) (quoting Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416, 428-29 (3d Cir.1974) (Aldisert, J., dissenting), rev'd, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975)). For these reasons, a private right of action for Hartford's alleged criminal violations is not available and the district court's dismissal of these claims is affirmed.