Opinion ID: 2761123
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Right of Self-Representation

Text: “In the federal courts, the right of self-representation has been protected by statute since the beginnings of our Nation.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 812 (1975); see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1654. “‘[T]he Constitution does not force a lawyer upon a defendant.’” United States v. Warner, 428 F.2d 730, 733 (8th Cir. 1970) (alteration in original) (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)). “To thrust counsel upon the accused, against his considered wish, . . . violates the logic of the [Sixth] Amendment. In such a case, counsel is not an assistant, but a master; and the right to make a defense is stripped of the personal character upon which the Amendment insists.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820 (footnote omitted). When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. For this reason, in order to represent himself, the accused must knowingly and intelligently forgo those relinquished benefits. Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose selfrepresentation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open. Id. at 835 (quotations omitted). -11- “The right to self-representation, however, is not absolute. Once the defendant makes a clear and unequivocal request to represent himself, a court may nonetheless deny the request in certain circumstances,” such as when the request is untimely, the defendant “engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct,” and when the defendant is unable to produce a “valid waiver” of right to counsel. United States v. Edelmann, 458 F.3d 791, 808 (8th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46) (internal quotation marks omitted). “If [a defendant’s] request” to “assert his right to self-representation” “is clear and unequivocal, a Faretta hearing must follow.” Bilauski v. Steele, 754 F.3d 519, 522 (8th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 682 (6th Cir. 2004) (“We agree that Faretta procedures are only required when a defendant has clearly and unequivocally asserted his right to proceed pro se.”); Dorman v. Wainwright, 798 F.2d 1358, 1366 (11th Cir. 1986) (“To invoke his Sixth Amendment right under Faretta a defendant . . . must do no more than state his request, either orally or in writing, unambiguously to the court so that no reasonable person can say that the request was not made. . . . [T]he court must then conduct a hearing on the waiver of the right to counsel.”). “We review the district court’s decision [to deny a request to proceed pro se] de novo.” United States v. Mosley, 607 F.3d 555, 558 (8th Cir. 2010). In Mosley, we affirmed the district court’s denial of Mosley’s motion to proceed pro se even though the district court “did not expressly articulate its reasons” for the denial. Id. But in that case, the district court denied an appeal of a magistrate judge’s written ruling, and the district court “explained to Mosley that he had reviewed the proceedings before the magistrate judge,” so our court was “satisfied that the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s reasoning,” and we took “the district court’s statements as an adoption of the magistrate judge’s conclusion that Mosley could not proceed pro se because he was unwilling to participate in the proceedings.” Id. at 558-59. -12- In this case, the district court recognized Kelley’s request to proceed pro se: “Now, knowing that I’m not going to grant a continuance, is it your wish that you proceed pro se and without [the public defender] representing you?” The district court then denied Kelley’s pro se request without any explicit discussion, perhaps due to the unusual circumstance of a courtroom observer shouting a question during ex parte proceedings, which resulted in a recess. We do not know if the district court found Kelley’s request to be unclear and equivocal, in the first instance, see Bilauski, 754 F.3d at 522, or if the district court found the request untimely or obstructionist, or if the district court found Kelley could not produce a valid waiver of his right to counsel. The district court did not engage in a Faretta inquiry on the record. Because we find the record before us wanting, we remand to the district court for clarification of its ruling.