Opinion ID: 1153076
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: When does the statute begin to run?

Text: Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-39 begins to run from the time the wrong is committed by which the party becomes chargeable by legal implication. Thames v. Holcomb, 230 Miss. at 395, 92 So.2d 548; Cooper v. Cooper, 61 Miss. 676. The repudiation of an implied or constructive trust is not necessary to set the statute of limitation in operation; the statute begins to run in such trust from the time the act or acts were committed by which the actor becomes chargeable. Thames at 395, Rimmer v. Austin, 191 Miss. 664, 4 So.2d 224 (1941). We stated in Rimmer v. Austin : in the absence of fraud and concealment, the statute runs from the time when the act was done by which the party became chargeable as trustee by implication, which is to say, from the time when the cestui que trust could have enforced his right by suit. (Implied or constructive trusts) are not created by agreement, nor are they the results of agreement, express or implied; they are products of conduct, in which it is not necessary that the cestui que trust may have had then or theretofore any part or knowledge whatever, but in respect to which the law imputes to the actor then and there an intention, and in consequence the obligation to do equity when called on so to do, and this whether he had any such intention at the time or not. Rimmer v. Austin, 191 Miss. at 668, 4 So.2d 224. See also Stebbins v. Hayes, 379 So.2d 898 (Miss. 1980) (right to enforce constructive trust accrues at the time of performance of the act from which the trust results). The question, therefore, is what act gave rise to the trust, or at what point did Vernard become chargeable as trustee by implication. Arguably, this moment occurred at Dixie's death on May 29, 1982, when the Droke Family Trust agreement would have become irrevocable, had it been effective. At that point, Vernard took exclusive possession of the entire marital estate, for his unlimited use and enjoyment. He may fairly be said to have held half of the marital estate in constructive trust for Dixie's designees. Alvarez filed his claims on December 4, 1989, within ten years of the accrual of this cause of action. Alternatively, the date of accrual of this cause of action may be considered August 12, 1982, when Vernard sent his revocation letter to Alvarez. This letter put Alvarez on notice that Vernard did not intend to carry out the terms of the trust. That is, the cause of action arguably did not accrue until Alvarez had reason to know of Vernard intent not to comply with the joint testamentary plan. At any rate, Alvarez filed his claim in a court of equity within the ten year statutory period of Miss. Code Ann. (1972) § 15-1-39. As for Alvarez's non-equitable claims  that is, the third party claims on a breach of contract theory  the six year statute of limitations is applicable. We agree with Alvarez that such statute would not begin to run until Vernard's death, since the contract to make a will could not be breached until the party obliged to make the will died without performing. We find that the statutory period began to run on October 29, 1988, and that Alvarez's contract claims were timely filed.