Opinion ID: 5234635
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whistleblower Protection

Text: [¶11] “The WPA protects an employee against retaliation for making a good faith report to the employer of what the employee has reasonable cause to believe is a violation of a law.” Nadeau v. Twin Rivers Paper Co., LLC, 2021 ME 16, ¶ 26, 247 A.3d 717. The WPA provides, in relevant part: 1. Discrimination prohibited. No employer may discharge, threaten or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location or privileges of employment because: A. The employee, acting in good faith . . . reports orally or in writing to the employer . . . what the employee has reasonable cause to believe is a violation of a law or rule adopted under the laws of this State, a political subdivision of this State or the United States. 8 26 M.R.S. § 833(1)(A).3 “The Maine Human Rights Act provides a right of action to employees discharged because of protected activity.” Stewart-Dore v. Webber Hosp. Ass’n, 2011 ME 26, ¶ 9, 13 A.3d 773; 5 M.R.S. §§ 4572(1)(A), 4621.4 [¶12] To prevail on her WPA claim, Handlin must show that “(1) she engaged in activity protected by the WPA; (2) she experienced an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Stewart-Dore, 2011 ME 26, ¶ 10, 13 A.3d 773 (alterations and quotation marks omitted); see Costain v. Sunbury Primary Care, P.A., 2008 ME 142, ¶ 6, 954 A.2d 1051. Therefore, if Handlin’s report to her co-worker was not an activity protected by the statute, her entire claim fails. [¶13] The unopposed and supported facts establish that Handlin’s report to her co-worker concerned conduct of a Broadreach employee that occurred during nonwork hours at a private party while the employee was not engaged 3 The legislative history of the WPA is clearly in accord with the plain language of the statute. Its sponsors stated, “This bill protects employees from being fired for reporting violations of law by their employers and for refusing to follow a directive that violates a law.” L.D. 736, Statement of Fact (111th Legis. 1983). Although Handlin cited to the entirety of the WPA in her initial complaint, the summary judgment record and her brief do not allege any alternative theory under the WPA. 4Title 5 M.R.S. § 4572(1)(A) was amended in 2021, although the amendments are not relevant in the present appeal. See P.L. 2021, ch. 366, § 5 (effective Oct. 18, 2021) (to be codified at 5 M.R.S. § 4572(1)(A)). 9 in work for Broadreach. Even when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Handlin and assuming that Handlin did have reasonable cause to believe that the president’s conduct at her private party was a violation of a rule or law, Handlin has failed to demonstrate that her report concerned behavior that was in any way associated with her employer—Broadreach. The record presents Handlin’s conversation with her co-worker as a gossipy account of the boss’s party and not a whistleblowing account of a perceived violation of a law. Sharing a story with a co-worker about the boss’s alleged behavior at her nonwork event is not the exposure of wrongdoings the WPA was intended to protect. Because the summary judgment record established that Handlin’s report was not an activity protected by the WPA, Handlin cannot establish a prima facie case for unlawful retaliation pursuant to the Maine Human Rights Act, and Broadreach is entitled to a summary judgment on Count 1 of the complaint. See Bonin v. Crepeau, 2005 ME 59, ¶ 8, 873 A.2d 346.