Opinion ID: 1959135
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: constitutionality of florida death penalty scheme

Text: On rehearing, Nelson has asserted that Florida's capital sentencing scheme violates the United States Constitution under the holding of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). This Court addressed a similar contention in Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So.2d 693 (Fla.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1070, 123 S.Ct. 662, 154 L.Ed.2d 564 (2002), and King v. Moore, 831 So.2d 143 (Fla.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1067, 123 S.Ct. 657, 154 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), and denied relief. We find that Nelson is likewise not entitled to relief on this claim. Accordingly, we affirm Nelson's convictions and sentences. It is so ordered. WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., and SHAW, Senior Justice, concur. PARIENTE, J., concurs specially with an opinion. ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. PARIENTE, J., specially concurring. I concur in the affirmance of Nelson's convictions and death sentence. I write separately because in my view this Court's opinions in Bottoson and King, which involved successive postconviction claims, do not answer why Nelson's Ring claim should be rejected in this direct appeal. In the guilt phase of trial, the jury found Nelson guilty of sexual battery, burglary, and kidnapping, in addition to first-degree murder. These offenses were charged and tried together with the murder count as related offenses. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.152(a)(2). The trial court found, in its order sentencing Nelson to death, that the murder was committed in the course of, or during flight after commission of, one or more of these additional offenses. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the United States Supreme Court held that, [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Referring to its holding in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), that the failure to allege prior convictions in an indictment did not preclude sentence enhancement, the Court in Apprendi stated: Both the certainty that procedural safeguards attached to any fact of prior conviction, and the reality that Almendarez-Torres did not challenge the accuracy of that fact in his case, mitigated the due process and Sixth Amendment concerns otherwise implicated in allowing a judge to determine a fact increasing punishment beyond the maximum of the statutory range. 530 U.S. at 488, 120 S.Ct. 2348. In Ring, the Court extended Apprendi to capital sentencing. I conclude that the Almendarez-Torres exception to Apprendi and Ring applies in this case. Like the enhancing factor of the prior convictions in Almendarez-Torres, the aggravator of commission of the murder in the course of a felony in this case has the procedural safeguards of a unanimous verdict of guilt on the separate offenses of sexual battery, burglary, and kidnapping, and the fact that the jury found the defendant guilty of these offenses and first-degree murder based on evidence of a single criminal episode concluding in the victim's death. [13] Additionally, Nelson has not asserted that the murder did not occur in the course of, or during flight after, commission of one or more of these offenses. Therefore, I believe that the Almendarez-Torres exception to Apprendi applies, and Nelson's sentence does not violate the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [14] Further, because a unanimous jury found Nelson guilty of the offenses relied on for the aggravator of murder in the course of a felony, specifically, sexual battery, burglary, and kidnapping, I conclude that a death sentence based on a nine-to-three death recommendation does not violate the requirement of unanimity of jury verdicts. See Butler v. State, 842 So.2d 817, 835 (Fla.2003) (Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In my view, the guilty verdicts on these separate offenses satisfy the requirement of jury unanimity for any fact necessary to render a defendant eligible for the death penalty. ANSTEAD, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in the majority opinion in all respects except for its discussion of the Ring issue. The majority opinion repeats the assertion that the plurality opinions in Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So.2d 693 (Fla. 2002), and King v. Moore, 831 So.2d 143 (Fla.2002), provide a basis to reject Ring claims despite the lack of a clear majority in either case. Moreover, for the reasons I expressed in my opinion in Duest v. State, No. SC00-2366, ___ So.2d ___, 2003 WL 21467248 (Fla. June 26, 2003), I cannot agree with the reasoning in Justice Pariente's separate opinion, which concludes that a Ring claim may be rejected because one of the six aggravating circumstances that the trial judge found was that the murder was committed in the course of enumerated felonies. Even if we were to view one aggravating circumstance as exempt from the dictates of Ring, four of the five remaining aggravating circumstances that the judge found alone were given great weight in imposing the death penalty. [15] Hence, such findings and reliance thereon would appear to violate the mandate of Ring that a death sentence may not be based upon findings made by the trial court alone.