Opinion ID: 2570777
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The district court abused its discretion in failing to dismiss the charges based on the prosecution's failure to execute the bench warrants without unnecessary delay.

Text: Lei argues that the district court abused its discretion in failing to dismiss the charges for lack of prosecution because the bench warrants were outstanding for over two years before he was arrested on December 1, 1998. Lei relies upon State v. Mageo, 78 Hawai`i 33, 889 P.2d 1092 (App.1995), in which the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed the district court's dismissal of two traffic citations for want of prosecution. The defendant in Mageo was cited on July 12 and October 9, 1989, and March 8, 1991, for driving without no-fault insurance. Each time, he failed to appear in court in response to the citation. Penal summonses were issued to him on August 1 and November 1, 1989, and April 5, 1991. The summonses were reinstated on February 5, 1992. Prior to that date, there had been no activity on the record after the issuance of the penal summonses. On February 21, 1992, Mageo pled not guilty as to all charges. Mageo subsequently moved to dismiss the first two citations based on HRPP Rule 48 and speedy trial violations. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Mageo informed the court that he had been living in Hawai`i since 1989 and had not left the state. Id. at 34, 889 P.2d at 1093. The district court granted the motion to dismiss because the penal summonses had not been served without unreasonable delay as required by HRPP Rule 9(c)(3)(ii). [6] The ICA affirmed, holding that the district court's dismissal was within its inherent power to dismiss as a case for failure to prosecute with due diligence. Applying the standard enunciated in State v. Moriwake, 65 Haw. 47, 56, 647 P.2d 705, 712 (1982) (stating that the State's interests must be balanced against fundamental fairness to the defendant and the orderly functioning of the courts), the ICA stated: [W]e acknowledge the State's interest in punishing criminal conduct. That is clearly outweighed, however, by the State's failure to timely prosecute and by the impact on the orderly functioning of the court system. There was a delay of over two years from the issuance of the penal summonses to the prosecution of the case. No explanation for the delay appears in the record. The State offered no written memoranda or oral offer of proof at the hearing to explain the delay, and the record is devoid of any reason for delay in service of the summonses. Unreasonable delay in the determination of [a] criminal action subverts the public good and disgraces the administration of justice[.] Estencion, 63 Haw. at 268, 625 P.2d at 1043. The record indicates Defendant was available for service in the jurisdiction over the period of non-prosecution and there is no evidence Defendant intentionally avoided service. Under such circumstances, the district court's exercise of its discretion was not arbitrary or without reason and was within the parameters set forth in Moriwake. Mageo, 78 Hawai`i at 38-39, 889 P.2d at 1097-98 (footnote omitted) (some alterations in original). Thus, the ICA focused primarily upon whether the defendant was amenable to service while the penal summonses were outstanding and whether there was a reason for the delay in serving the summonses. Courts in other states look to similar factors in determining whether the prosecution has brought a defendant before the court in a timely manner. In Washington, where there is an unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant before the court for arraignment, under State v. Striker, 87 Wash.2d 870, 557 P.2d 847 (1976), a constructive arraignment is deemed to have occurred fourteen days after the filing of the information. State v. Jones, 100 Wash.App. 820, 998 P.2d 921, 924 (2000) (citing State v. Greenwood, 120 Wash.2d 585, 845 P.2d 971 (1993)). If the defendant is not brought to trial within 104 days of the filing of the information, the charge must be dismissed with prejudice. Id. (citing Wash.Super. Ct.Crim. Rules Rule 3.3(i)). However, the Striker rule does not apply if the defendant was not amenable to process or if the prosecution establishes that any efforts to serve the defendant were or would have been futile. Id. at 924-25. See also, e.g., People v. Sigismundi, 89 N.Y.2d 587, 657 N.Y.S.2d 381, 679 N.E.2d 620, 623 (1997) (noting that, pursuant to N.Y.Crim. Pro. Law § 30.30(4)(c) (1994), the prosecution is required to show due diligence in its efforts to execute a bench warrant where it cannot show that the defendant attempted to avoid apprehension or prosecution). In the present case, there were delays of over two years in the execution of the bench warrants. HRPP Rule 9 requires that bench warrants, like penal summonses, be served without unnecessary delay. HRPP Rule 9(c)(3)(i). [7] Lei proffered evidence that he was available for service while the bench warrants were outstanding; there is no indication in the record that he intentionally avoided service. The prosecution did not adduce any evidence that it attempted to serve Lei during that time, nor did it establish that an attempt to serve Lei would have been futile. Further, at least with regard to the May 9, 1996 bench warrant, the prosecution had opportunities to serve Lei without expending additional time or resources. The May 9 bench warrant could have been executed on May 18, 1996, when Lei was cited, or on May 20 and July 22, 1996, when he appeared in court for the May 18 citations. The failure to act upon these opportunities discredits the prosecution's argument that it acted diligently in attempting to serve the bench warrants. Except for the district court's judicial notice of the large volume of outstanding misdemeanor bench warrants, there is nothing in the record to indicate any reason for the lengthy delay in executing the bench warrants. The volume of misdemeanor bench warrants is a relevant consideration as to what constitutes a reasonable amount of time for execution and is a legitimate subject of judicial notice. [8] Rule 201(b) of the Hawai`i Rules of Evidence (HRE) states: A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court, or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Where neither party requests that the court take judicial notice of a particular fact, whether the court takes judicial notice of that fact is within its sound discretion. See HRE Rule 201(c). The number of outstanding misdemeanor bench warrants issued by the district court is a fact capable of accurate and ready determination through reliable sources, and the court was therefore free to take judicial notice of that fact. Accord State v. Herrera, 63 Haw. 405, 629 P.2d 626 (1981) (holding that the trial court is free to take judicial notice of, inter alia, (1) the assignment schedule of cases for the judges in the criminal division; [and] (2) the workload and resultant congestion in the division . . .). The district court did not abuse its discretion in taking judicial notice of the number of misdemeanor bench warrant that were outstanding. However, the volume of outstanding warrants alone is insufficient to excuse the delays in the present case. The prosecution did not argue that the volume of outstanding warrants was unusually high due to exceptional circumstances. Cf. HRPP Rule 48(c)(2) (excluding periods of delay caused by congestion of the trial docket when the congestion is attributable to exceptional circumstances  (emphasis added)). There is no indication in the record that the prosecution made any attempts whatsoever to execute the bench warrants and Lei proffered evidence that he was available for service. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that the delay in executing the bench warrants was necessary. Therefore, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to dismiss the charges based on HRPP Rule 9. Because we hold that the district court should have dismissed the charges for failure to prosecute with due diligence, we do not address Lei's argument that the DUI charge should have been dismissed under HRPP Rule 48.