Opinion ID: 2976539
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The EEOC Letter to Prove Pretext

Text: 5 See Tucker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 23184, at  (6th Cir. Sept. 30, 1991) (“In general, a court may not allow an inference that a party destroyed evidence that is in its control, unless the party did so in bad faith.”); Eady v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Cos., 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 687 (Tenn. Dec. 27, 1999) (“In regards [sic] to negative inferences, there was no proof offered at trial to show that the appellee purposefully destroyed the previous [ozone] testing records.”) 19 Scott argues that the EEOC determination letter in her favor demonstrates a genuine dispute of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment. It is within the discretion of the court to accept the EEOC’s final determination. See Williams v. Nashville Network, 132 F.3d 1123, 1129 (6th Cir. 1997) (“This court has explicitly ruled that it is within the [sound] discretion [of the district court] whether . . . to accept the EEOC’s final investigation report in evidence.”) (brackets in original) (quotation omitted); see also Heard v. Mueller Co., 464 F.2d 190, 194 (6th Cir. 1972). Eastman argues that Scott was required to offer admissible evidence to show pretext, and that the EEOC determination letter was inadmissible; thus, the district court was correct in disregarding it. Sherman v. Chrysler Corp., 47 F. App’x 716, 722 (6th Cir. 2002) (“An EEOC letter of violation is presumptively inadmissible because it suggests that preliminarily there is reason to believe that a violation has taken place and therefore results in unfair prejudice to defendant.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). However, in this case, the district court’s opinion states that “for purposes of ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the court will presume that all evidence before it is admissible at trial.” Scott, 2005 WL 1325014, at  n.1. The EEOC determination letter was clearly before the district court, though he did not discuss it. Though there is no basis from which we can determine the weight, if any, that the district court gave the EEOC determination letter, we find that there is only information in regard to the 1996/97 Polymers Team Manager position which might arguably be considered in support of her claim and that information is already reflected in the record, as discussed below. The EEOC determination letter notes in regard to the 1996/97 Polymers Team Manager position that: (1) Scott received a higher score on the objective portions of the test than many of the male selectees; (2) yet, she received the lowest rating on the subjective portions of the test; and (3) the evidence in her 20 personnel file concerning her leadership skills, oral communication and customer service was inconsistent with the low ratings she received. (EEOC Determination Letter, J.A. 465.) However, the record upon which the EEOC relied, primarily the spreadsheets discussed below, does not support these findings. Furthermore, there is no substantive information in the EEOC determination letter showing that Eastman’s articulated, non-discriminatory reasons for not promoting Scott to Team Manager in 1996/97 for the CM&S Division, 1997/98, or 1998/99 were pretextual. Therefore, we find that the EEOC determination letter does not preclude summary judgment in Eastman’s favor on any of Scott’s failure to promote to Team Manager claims.