Opinion ID: 1981890
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Death Penalty Sentencing Hearing Failure to Give Instructions on Life Without Parole

Text: Appellant raises three contentions concerning the death penalty sentencing hearing. Since we reverse and remand for a new sentencing hearing based on one of his contentions, we need not consider the remaining two. Appellant contends, and we agree, that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to instruct the jury on the consequences of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. He argues that as a result, the jury could erroneously conclude that even a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole might still result in the early release of Appellant, and therefore, fail to adequately punish Appellant for his conduct. Counsel sought the following jury instruction, which was rejected by the trial judge: I instruct you that the term life imprisonment without the possibility of parole means imprisonment for the natural life of the Defendant. If your judgment is that Mr. Bruce should be sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole, he will not be eligible for parole consideration, nor can he be granted parole at any time during his natural life. Maryland Rule 4-325(c) provides: The court ... shall instruct the jury as to the applicable law.... It is incumbent on the trial judge upon request to give an accurate instruction on the essential points of law involved in the proceeding. Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 592, 479 A.2d 1344, 1348 (1984); Lansdowne v. State, 287 Md. 232, 239, 412 A.2d 88, 91 (1980). In Doering v. State, 313 Md. 384, 545 A.2d 1281 (1988), this Court held that the defense is entitled to have the jury consider as a mitigating factor evidence concerning eligibility for parole in the event a life sentence was imposed. Id. at 411-12, 545 A.2d at 1295. We stated: [W]e now conclude that a jury seeking to determine the appropriateness of a life sentence will be aided by information correctly describing the legal and practical effects of such a sentence, and that the existence of an appropriate alternative sentence must certainly be considered a relevant mitigating circumstance. We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the defendant in a capital sentencing proceeding seeks to place before the jury relevant and competent information concerning his eligibility for parole in the event a life sentence is imposed, that request should be granted. Id. The Court also noted that in enacting Chapter 237 of the Laws of 1987 [now codified at Md.Code (1957, 1987 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, §§ 412-13], the life without parole penalty statute, we think the Legislature clearly articulated a policy in favor of greater jury involvement in matters of parole where the jury determines the sentence. Doering at 410, 545 A.2d at 1294. We note that in enacting Art. 27, § 413A, which provides [a] judge may not instruct the jury that the jury must assume that a sentence for life imprisonment is for the natural life of the defendant, the Legislature intended to assure that juries were not given incorrect information about the effect of a life sentence where the possibility of parole exists. That statute pre-dates and is in no way applicable to a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In Harris v. State, 312 Md. 225, 539 A.2d 637 (1988) we noted: Whether the punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, first authorized in capital cases by Ch. 237, Acts of 1987, will require reconsideration of the rule prohibiting reference to the possibility of parole at a capital sentencing proceeding is a question we leave for another day. Harris at 251 n. 9, 539 A.2d at 649 n. 9. That day has arrived. In weighing the appropriateness of a death sentence, the jury is entitled to know about the available sentencing alternatives. Mack at 592, 479 A.2d at 1348. Without some instruction by the judge, there is no reason to assume that the jury will know the sentence of life imprisonment without parole will mean that a defendant will be ineligible for parole for the balance of his natural life. It is universally recognized that the literal words of a sentence to imprisonment are generally not an accurate indication of the effect of the sentence. It is common knowledge that a ten year sentence does not mean that the prisoner will serve ten years in prison, and it is also common knowledge that a life sentence does not mean that a prisoner will serve the balance of his natural life in prison. There is no reason for jurors to assume, unless told, that life without the possibility of parole means that a prisoner will never be eligible for parole. The legislature apparently saw a need to define life without the possibility of parole since Md.Code (1957, 1986 Repl.Vol., 1989 Cum.Supp.), Art. 41, § 4-516(b)(3)(i) provides, [i]f a person is sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole ... the person is not eligible for parole consideration and may not be granted parole at any time during the term of the sentence. Without an appropriate instruction the jurors may not have understood that, as an alternative to the death penalty, they could impose a life sentence which would imprison the Appellant for the balance of his natural life. Had they been given a proper instruction on the meaning of life without the possibility of parole, they may have concluded that this was adequate punishment and mitigated against the imposition of the death penalty. For the reasons indicated, we find that the trial judge should have, when requested to do so, instructed the jury that a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole means that a defendant cannot be released on parole at any time during his natural life. This information can be relevant and assist the jury in determining whether death is the appropriate penalty. JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED, EXCEPT AS TO THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH SENTENCES; DEATH SENTENCES VACATED AND CASE REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR CHARLES COUNTY FOR A NEW SENTENCING PROCEEDING UNDER § 413 OF ART. 27; COSTS TO BE EQUALLY DIVIDED. McAULIFFE, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree that the convictions should be affirmed. I do not agree that the trial judge committed reversible error when he refused to give the defendant's requested instruction 10A, which dealt with the possible determination of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The defendant asked for this instruction: I instruct you that the term life imprisonment without possibility of parole means imprisonment for the natural life of the Defendant. If your judgment is that Mr. Bruce should be sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole, he will not be eligible for parole consideration, nor can he be granted parole at any time during his natural life. The State objected  not to that portion of the instruction that explained the obvious, i.e., that life imprisonment without parole means that the defendant will not be eligible for, and cannot be granted, parole during his lifetime  but to that portion which stated that `life imprisonment without the possibility of parole' means imprisonment for the natural life of the Defendant. The State argued that a correct statement of the law would have to include the possibility that the Governor could at any time exercise the right to commute the sentence, in whole or in part. Md. Const. Art. II, § 20; Maryland Code (1957, 1986 Repl.Vol.) Art. 41, § 4-603. The prosecutor expressed his concern to the trial judge that: They intend to get up and argue this man is never going to get out if you give him life without parole. That is not going to be correct. Judge Levin did not give the requested instruction. Instead, referring to the Findings and Sentencing Determination form that each juror had been given, he told the jury: As you can see by Section V ... if you have answered life imprisonment in Section V, you have to make a determination in Section VI whether the sentence should be life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. If you are in unanimous agreement that the defendant should serve his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, answer yes in Section VI. Unless all of you agree that the defendant should be denied the possibility of parole, answer no to this question. Section VI of the form, to which Judge Levin referred, provided: SECTION VI If Life Imprisonment is entered in Section V, answer the following question: Based upon the evidence, does the Jury unanimously determine that the sentence of life imprisonment previously entered shall be without the possibility of parole? yes no The better course would have been for the trial judge to give that portion of the defendant's requested instruction that clearly and unequivocally stated that a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole would be just that  the defendant could not be given parole if that sentence were imposed. That would have required only slight editing of the defendant's proposed instruction. The failure to pursue the better course does not, however, mean that there was error, or that if there was error, it required reversal. In the first place, the term life imprisonment without the possibility of parole needs no explanation. It is self-explanatory. The situation that existed here is entirely different from that the Court faced in Doering v. State, 313 Md. 384, 407-12, 545 A.2d 1281 (1988). That case dealt with the defendant's attempt to provide the jury with accurate factual and legal information in order to avoid the significant potential for misunderstanding that otherwise would exist because of widespread confusion and misunderstanding among lay persons concerning the practical effect of a life sentence. The defendant's concerns in Doering were very real. As I noted in Harris v. State, 312 Md. 225, 263, 539 A.2d 637 (1988) (McAuliffe, J. concurring): I believe the average juror is unaware of the intricacies of parole eligibility law, and is more likely to have been exposed to the generally apocryphal stories concerning murderers who were released on parole within a year or two of their convictions. Ordinarily, we are not reluctant about sharing with the jury the true state of the law, and we should have no reticence in this area. This Court thereafter concluded in Doering, supra, 313 Md. at 411-12, 545 A.2d 1281 that: [A] jury seeking to determine the appropriateness of a life sentence will be aided by information correctly describing the legal and practical effects of such a sentence, and ... the existence of an appropriate alternative sentence must certainly be considered a relevant mitigating circumstance. Here, we deal not with the effect of a life sentence, but with the effect of a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. I am not aware that there exists any popular misunderstanding or misconception concerning the sentence of life without possibility of parole. The meaning of the term is self-evident, and particularly so when it is presented to the jury as an alternative to the sentence of life imprisonment. The considerations that properly impelled the Court to reverse the sentence in Doering are simply not present here. [1] In the second place, if there were any need to inform the jury of the actual effect of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, Judge Levin's instruction fulfilled that need. He told them that the imposition of that sentence meant that the defendant would be denied the possibility of parole. If you are in unanimous agreement that the defendant should serve his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, answer yes in Section VI. Unless all of you agree that the defendant should be denied the possibility of parole, answer no to this question. (emphasis added). The prosecutor did not argue to the contrary. He did not address the effect of either life sentence. Defendant's attorney twice argued, without objection, concerning the meaning of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Near the beginning of his closing argument, he said: If you determine that he lives, you are then called upon at the end of the form to decide whether he is sentenced to life, or whether he is sentenced to life without parole, meaning life without the chance of being paroled at a future time. (emphasis added). That argument was entirely consistent with the instruction earlier given by Judge Levin. Again, at the conclusion of defense counsel's argument, he said: I think the great doubt that exists there, coupled with the great amount of mitigating circumstances, justifies you in returning a verdict of life imprisonment. If you feel that that is not severe enough  and that is the second most severe penalty that can be imposed under our law for a person to be caged and housed in the penitentiary for the rest of his natural life  if that is not severe enough you can attach without the possibility of parole. I cannot agree that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury as he did on the possible sentence of life without possibility of parole. Alternatively, if there was error, that error was harmless beyond any reasonable doubt. I would affirm the sentence of death. MURPHY, C.J., and RODOWSKY, J., join in this opinion.