Opinion ID: 6215762
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Presumptive Sentences for the Offenses

Text: Hall claimed in his petition and argues on appeal that the judgment should be vacated under section 16-90-111 or, at the least, that he should be resentenced because the sentences 2 imposed exceeded the presumptive sentences allowed for the offenses and because he was not afforded a hearing to rebut the evidence supporting departures from the presumptive sentences. As we have held, a claim that a sentence exceeded the presumptive sentence goes behind the face of the judgment and does not implicate the facial validity of the judgment. Redus, 2019 Ark. 44, 566 S.W.3d 469. An illegal sentence is one that is illegal on its face. Wesley v. State, 2019 Ark. 270, 585 S.W.3d 156. The general rule is that a sentence imposed within the maximum term prescribed by law is not illegal on its face. McArty v. State, 2020 Ark. 68, 594 S.W.3d 54. Hall was sentenced to 480 months’ imprisonment for first-degree murder and an additional 120 months’ imprisonment as a firearm enhancement. Pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-10-102(c)(1) (Repl. 2016), first-degree murder is a Class Y felony. A Class Y felony is punishable by a range of imprisonment of ten to forty years, or life. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-401(a)(1) (Repl. 2006). The use-of-a-firearm enhancement permits a sentence of up to fifteen years’ imprisonment. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-120(a) (Supp. 2011). Attempted first-degree murder under Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-3-203(2) (Repl. 2006) is a Class A felony if the offense attempted is a Class Y felony other than capital murder. The sentencing range for a Class A felony is six to thirty years’ imprisonment. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-401(a)(2) (Repl. 2006). Accordingly, the sentence imposed on Hall for each of the offenses and the firearm enhancement was within the statutory range for the offenses and was a legal sentence. 3 Hall asserts that when he pleaded guilty, he should have been allowed a hearing to contest the evidence supporting the departure from the presumptive sentences; however, claims of improper plea procedures do not raise a question of a void or illegal sentence. See Bell v. Gibson, 2019 Ark. 127. Rather, the claim amounts to an allegation that the sentence was illegally imposed. When the petitioner’s grounds for relief under the statute go behind the face of the judgment and do not implicate the facial validity of the judgment, the petitioner is obligated to pursue those claims in a timely filed petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1. See Redus, 2019 Ark. 44, 566 S.W.3d 469. The time limitations on filing a petition under section 16-90-111(a) and (b)(1) alleging that a sentence was imposed in an illegal manner were superseded by Rule 37.2(c). Swift, 2018 Ark. 74, 540 S.W.3d 288. Rule 37.2(c)(i) mandates that a petitioner seeking relief under the Rule must bring his or her petition within ninety days of the date that the judgment of conviction was entered on a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. Ford v. State, 2021 Ark. 112, 622 S.W.3d 635. Hall’s claim that the trial court did not properly conduct the plea hearing in 2012 should have been raised under Rule 37 within the time permitted by the Rule. A petition filed pursuant to section 16-90-111 is not a substitute for filing a timely petition under Rule 37. Id. All collateral challenges attacking a plea of guilty or nolo contendere must be filed under the Rule. Swift, 2018 Ark. 74, 540 S.W.3d 288.