Opinion ID: 2571470
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: White and Faulkner

Text: As observed by the majority of the Court of Appeals, previous Kansas cases have declined to apply credit to the postrelease supervision portions of offenders' sentences in other contexts. Two cases, while not factually similar, support the concepts that the two phases of the sentence  confinement and postrelease supervision  are mandated and each segment is treated separate from the other. In White v. Bruce, 23 Kan.App.2d 449, 932 P.2d 448, rev. denied, 262 Kan. 969 (1997), the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether Kansas law requires the application of credit against an unrevoked period of postrelease supervision for time a prisoner spent incarcerated on another charge. The defendant's argument relied on the assumption that he remained on postrelease supervision, in spite of his incarceration, until the parole board revoked his postrelease supervision. The White court rejected the argument, commenting that such a proposition seems fundamentally illogical. 23 Kan.App.2d at 452, 932 P.2d 448. The panel cited the statutory definition of postrelease supervision and concluded that the defendant ceased serving his postrelease supervision period upon his reincarceration since he was no longer released to the community. 23 Kan.App.2d at 452, 932 P.2d 448. Further commenting that incarceration and postrelease supervision are independent concepts, the White court stated that an inmate cannot logically remain on postrelease supervision if that inmate is incarcerated. 23 Kan.App.2d at 453, 932 P.2d 448. Holding that the defendant's postrelease supervision was interrupted and suspended by his reincarceration, the court determined that the time he spent incarcerated did not vest as credit against his postrelease supervision period. 23 Kan.App.2d at 455, 932 P.2d 448. Gaudina asserts that White supports his contention that postrelease supervision time should be credited where the inmate has been held in custody solely on the pending case at hand. Because White held that the petitioner could not receive credit against an unrevoked term of postrelease supervision during the time he was incarcerated on another charge, Guadina argues that the holding in White is consistent with the proposition that incarceration on the same charge yields credit against the postrelease supervision period. In response, the State points to other situations where defendants have not received jail time credit. For example, in State v. Guzman, 279 Kan. 812, 112 P.3d 120 (2005), this court held that the defendant was not entitled to jail time credit for the period that he was under house arrest while awaiting trial and sentencing for aggravated robbery and aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer. We rejected the defendant's argument that his house arrest, where he was electronically monitored and ordered to be locked down 24 hours a day, qualified as incarceration under the K.S.A. 21-4614. 279 Kan. at 815, 112 P.3d 120. Likewise, in State v. Palmer, 262 Kan. 745, 942 P.2d 19 (1997), this court denied jail time credit for the defendant's time spent in a community residential facility, which was a condition of his appearance bond. We specifically stated: K.S.A. 21-4614 does not authorize or require that time an individual resides in a private residential facility as a condition of preconviction appearance bond be credited as time spent `incarcerated' pending disposition of a case. 262 Kan. at 754, 942 P.2d 19; see also State v. Parks, 27 Kan.App.2d 544, 6 P.3d 444 (2000) (denying jail time credit for defendant's time spent under house arrest with electronic monitoring, which was condition of appeal bond); State v. Williams, 18 Kan.App.2d 424, Syl. ¶ 4, 856 P.2d 158 (1993) (K.S.A. 21-4614a does not authorize or require jail time credit for time spent under house arrest as condition of probation). Compare State v. Mackley, 220 Kan. 518, 552 P.2d 628 (1976) (granting defendant 109 days of jail time credit for time spent not in jail, but in state hospital for competency and mental evaluations). For a general discussion of credit for time served, see Pierce, Giving Credit Where Credit is Due: The Kansas Law on Jail Time Credit, 69 J.K.B.A. 22 (2000). Consistent with these cases, we do not read White as suggesting that time served in custody, even if on the same case, must be credited against the total bifurcated sentence. In a second case suggesting that the legislature intended the two segments of the bifurcated sentence to be segregated, Faulkner v. State, 22 Kan.App.2d 80, 911 P.2d 203, rev. denied 259 Kan. 927 (1996), the defendant was initially sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 1- to 5-years' imprisonment. He was released on parole, which was later revoked. Following the revocation, his sentence was converted to 10 months' imprisonment and 12 months' postrelease supervision under the KSGA. The defendant filed a motion under K.S.A. 60-1507 attacking his sentence, arguing the 14 months he spent on parole should have been credited to satisfy his postrelease supervision time under the converted sentence. The Faulkner court determined that time spent on parole under an indeterminate sentence may not be credited to the postrelease supervision period of a converted sentence. 22 Kan.App.2d at 83, 911 P.2d 203. Distinguishing parole from postrelease supervision, Faulkner observed that Kansas statutes and case law established that time spent on parole is time spent in custody and parolees are given credit against time served in such confinement. In contrast, Faulkner cited the definition of postrelease supervision and held: Postrelease supervision . . . does not begin until after the confinement portion of the sentence has been served. The only instance in which inmates will be required to serve their postrelease supervision time in custody is when the inmate violates the terms of the postrelease supervision. 22 Kan.App.2d at 83, 911 P.2d 203. Gaudina points out that, unlike the defendant in Faulkner, he did not serve his postrelease time in custody because of a violation of the conditions of his postrelease supervision. Instead, he was in prison during what should have been his postrelease supervision period and he was there because the district court erroneously denied his petition seeking a correction of his sentence under Apprendi. By the time the appeal process ended and his sentence was corrected, Gaudina had been held for the entire length of his legal prison sentence and almost the entire length of a 36-month postrelease supervision term. (Gaudina alleges that he was held 32 months beyond the new prison term.) While arguing that the facts in Faulkner are not on point with this case, Gaudina also argues that Faulkner discusses one matter regarding postrelease supervision that, by analogy, supports his position. Although Faulkner held that time spent on parole under an indeterminate sentence may not be credited to the postrelease supervision period of a converted sentence, Faulkner also stated: However, it is . . . true that time spent on a converted sentence cannot exceed the time required to serve the indeterminate sentence. 22 Kan.App.2d at 83, 911 P.2d 203 (citing State v. Fierro, 257 Kan. 639, 645-46, 895 P.2d 186 [1995]). Faulkner went on to explain the circumstances where a petitioner would not be subject to postrelease supervision: If the petitioner has served his entire 1-to 5-year sentence either by confinement or by time spent on parole or by a combination of both, he cannot also be required to serve postrelease supervision time under his converted sentence. This would have the effect of extending his guidelines sentence beyond the time called for by the original indeterminate sentence. If petitioner has not completely served his indeterminate sentence of 1 to 5 years, he remains subject to postrelease supervision time under his converted sentence and cannot be credited with the time spent on parole. 22 Kan.App.2d at 84, 911 P.2d 203. Gaudina argues that he, too, by analogy, served the entire term of his bifurcated sentence in prison and should not be required to serve additional postrelease time upon being belatedly resentenced to the lawful term of imprisonment. This dicta from Faulkner does not suggest this conclusion, however. When Faulkner was sentenced, it was contemplated he would serve either his maximum sentence and be discharged from custody or serve less than the maximum and be paroled. Upon conversion, his sentence could not be made longer than the sentence originally imposed. K.S.A. 21-4724. If the entire sentence had been served, there could be no period, however labeled, extending the sentence. Additionally, as discussed, K.S.A. 22-3722 provides that time served on parole is applied to the sentence of confinement. In contrast, the statute provides that the total time served on postrelease supervision is capped by the period of postrelease supervision imposed at sentencing. In other words, under the sentencing scheme in effect when Gaudina was sentenced, it was contemplated he would serve a period of postrelease supervision regardless of whether he served every day of the prison sentence imposed or whether he earned good time credit allowing an early release from prison. White and Faulkner support the proposition that the language of K.S.A.2006 Supp. 21-4614 suggests that any credit for time served pending the disposition of a case applies only to the confinement portion of the defendant's sentence. Postrelease supervision is not confinement and, therefore, credit for time spent incarcerated was not applicable to Gaudina's postrelease supervision period.