Opinion ID: 2614563
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Double Jeopardy Clause As a Limit on Prosecutorial Power

Text: Having set forth the competing interests underlying double jeopardy, we now consider the effect of the double jeopardy clause on prosecutorial power. We have repeatedly recognized the following purpose of the double jeopardy clause: the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him [or her] to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him [or her] to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he [or she] may be found guilty. Whiting, 88 Hawai`i at 359, 966 P.2d at 1085 (quoting Quitog, 85 Hawai`i at 140, 938 P.2d at 571) (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957)) (brackets added). In doing so, we have implicitly acknowledged the enormous imbalance of power between the prosecution and the criminal defendant. Indeed, the prosecution wields great discretion in the decision to charge and what to charge; in the control of vast governmental resources in investigating and preparing a case; in the plea bargaining process for the majority of cases that are resolved without trial; and in the deference and authority the prosecution commands before juries in those cases that are tried to a conclusion. Kenneth Rosenthal, Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double Jeopardy: Case Studies in an Emerging Jurisprudence, 71 Temp. L.Rev. 887 (1998) (footnote omitted). [6] The double jeopardy clause addresses this reality by imposing a potential constitutional bar to reprosecution where there is egregious misconduct on the part of the prosecution. In this connection, we have held that retrial is barred where `the defendant's mistrial motion is the necessary response to ... prosecutorial misconduct designed to avoid an acquittal, or is necessitated by deliberate misconduct which has for its intended purpose the denial of the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial[.]' State v. Baranco, 77 Hawai`i 351, 355, 884 P.2d 729, 733 (1994) (quoting State v. Pulawa, 58 Haw. 377, 382, 569 P.2d 900, 905 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 925, 98 S.Ct. 2818, 56 L.Ed.2d 768 (1978)) (brackets in original). The juxtaposition of the prosecution's great discretion and the substantial interests of the defendant, who bears the brunt of the prosecution's exercise of its power, gives rise to the special standards of conduct discussed fully in Section III.A.1. above. As discussed, the prosecution's primary duty is not merely to seek a conviction. See Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 648-49, 94 S.Ct. 1868 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that the prosecution's function is not to tack as many skins of victims as possible to the wall). Rather, as stated, the prosecution's primary duty is to seek justice, to exercise the highest good faith in the interest of the public and to avoid even the appearance of unfair advantage over the accused. Quitog, 85 Hawai`i at 136 n. 19, 938 P.2d at 567 n. 19 (citations omitted). To this end, the prosecution must serve the truth-seeking and fairness functions of trial and to pursue and present relevant evidence, regardless of which side it benefits. Therefore, unlike any other advocate, the prosecutor must always be mindful of his or her primary obligation to seek justice while at the same time fulfilling his or her obligation to seek convictions.