Opinion ID: 2679915
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Trust’s Foreclosure Action

Text: [¶35] Connelly argues that the record contains insufficient evidence or evidence of a quality not admissible at trial to support Lubar’s claim for damages. He also argues that, in general, Lubar submitted affidavits and other evidence in support of his motion for summary judgment that so lack indicia of trustworthiness and reliability that they would not be admissible at trial and that they generate genuine disputes of material fact. [¶36] For a mortgage holder to obtain summary judgment in a residential foreclosure action, its statement of material facts must include certain minimum 15 facts, supported by references to record evidence of a quality that could be admissible at trial. Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. deBree, 2012 ME 34, ¶ 7, 38 A.3d 1257; Higgins, 2009 ME 136, ¶ 11, 985 A.2d 508. A party seeking a summary judgment on a complaint for foreclosure is required to set forth the material facts necessary to support his claim, regardless of the adequacy of the opposing party’s response. deBree, 2012 ME 34, ¶ 9, 38 A.3d 1257; Gabay, 2011 ME 101, ¶ 8, 28 A.3d 1158. [¶37] Among the facts that a plaintiff in a residential foreclosure action must produce in its properly supported statement of material facts are those showing “the order of priority and any amounts that may be due to other parties in interest, including any public utility easements.” Higgins, 2009 ME 136, ¶ 11, 985 A.2d 508; see also 14 M.R.S. § 6322 (2013) (requiring the court to “determine . . . the order of priority and those amounts, if any, that may be due to other parties that may appear and whether any public utility easements held by a party in interest survive the proceedings”); Gabay, 2011 ME 101, ¶ 23, 28 A.3d 1158. Despite Lubar’s contention on appeal that he meets this element of a foreclosure action, it is apparent that he has not. [¶38] In reviewing the parties’ statements of material facts, we have found no statement of material fact with record references showing the order of priority and addressing whether there are any amounts that may be due to other parties in 16 interest, including public utility easements, as required. See Gabay, 2011 ME 101, ¶ 23, 28 A.3d 1158. Thus, viewing the statements of material facts in the light most favorable to Connelly, a genuine dispute of material fact remains in this regard.12 [¶39] Additionally, the mortgage holder is required to show the amount due on the mortgage note, including any reasonable attorney fees and court costs, in a statement of material fact supported by record evidence of a quality admissible at trial. Higgins, 2009 ME 136, ¶ 11, 985 A.2d 508; see also 14 M.R.S. § 6322. Lubar’s statement of material facts does address this point, but it states that, “[a]s of January 25, 2012,” attorney fees and costs due under the note amounted to $7671.40. However, this statement is not supported by the referenced record citation, which stated a different, higher, amount. [¶40] Furthermore, the judgment of foreclosure, which Lubar admitted at oral argument was based on the proposed judgment that he submitted to the court, awards $8649.75 in “[a]nticipated Attorneys fees and expenses” accruing as of 12 Lubar appears to be aware that he has not met his obligation on summary judgment as to this element of his foreclosure action. Lubar cited to no statements of material fact whatsoever, much less supporting evidence, in the bare allegation in his memorandum supporting his motion for summary judgment that “[t]here are no parties in interest.” In his appellate brief he cites, inexplicably, only to a page of his unverified complaint, the allegations of which Connelly denied. We observe generally that “[a] party’s citation to its own complaint is insufficient to support a material fact.” Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Raggiani, 2009 ME 120, ¶ 6, 985 A.2d 1. Regardless, even if Lubar did now point to some portion of the record to support this element of his claim, Lubar did not include the necessary facts in his statement of material facts to support his motion, and they are not, therefore, part of the summary judgment record. See HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Gabay, 2011 ME 101, ¶¶ 23-25, 28 A.3d 1158; Chase Home Fin. LLC v. Higgins, 2009 ME 136, ¶ 12 & n.4, 985 A.2d 508. 17 “December 19, 2011.” That award of attorney fees is inconsistent on its face with Lubar’s statement of material facts both as to the amount and the date on which that amount had accrued. Accordingly, the amount due under the note and mortgage as stated in the judgment is not supported by Lubar’s statement of material facts, which in turn was not supported by the record reference. [¶41] Thus, Lubar has failed to include the minimum required, properly supported, facts in his statement of material facts, and has therefore failed to demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See deBree, 2012 ME 34, ¶ 11, 38 A.3d 1257; Higgins, 2009 ME 136, ¶¶ 11, 13, 985 A.2d 508. [¶42] We do not, therefore, reach Connelly’s remaining arguments concerning damages or the specifics of Connelly’s argument that Lubar’s evidence submitted in support of his statement of material facts is wholly unreliable. We do observe, however, that in numerous instances, the underlying evidence presented by affidavit is contrary to documents appearing in the record or is not of a quality that would be admissible at trial for the purposes for which it is referenced in the statements of material facts. Lubar presents direct averments in his affidavit that do not appear to be based on his personal knowledge, as required by M.R. Civ. P. 56(e). Alternatively, Lubar often phrases averments in his affidavit in a manner that appears to avoid hearsay concerns, such as “I was advised that” or “it was 18 represented to me that,” indicating that Lubar is merely reporting that the words were stated to him by another person. However, when these averments in the affidavit are cited in Lubar’s statement of material facts, they are sometimes cited as support for the truth of the matter, and thus in a manner that would be inadmissible at trial.13 [¶43] Lubar’s affidavit also lacks overall trustworthiness. For example, Lubar states that he “personally handled the taking of the loan application” and that he “took a loan application from Frederick and Charles Connelly,” but those statements conflict with the loan application that Lubar references in his affidavit, which application states that it was taken by telephone by “Lot Bates” of “Beechwood Mortgage.” Finally, Lubar often phrases statements in his affidavit in the passive voice in an apparent attempt to obscure facts. [¶44] “In the setting of summary judgment practice, any substantial errors or defects in the affidavit itself submitted in conjunction with the moving party’s statement of material facts must also be considered to determine trustworthiness.” Murphy, 2011 ME 59, ¶ 11, 19 A.3d 815. This is consistent with summary 13 For instance, Lubar’s statement of material facts states that “[t]hrough his agent, [Connelly] proposed providing additional collateral for the loan on the Wells Property.” This statement is very poorly worded, but for purposes of this example we assume that the statement is meant to convey that Connelly proposed providing his Wells Property as additional collateral for the loan on the Belmont Property. However, the portion of Lubar’s affidavit cited in support of this statement is deficient in multiple respects. First, as noted previously, Lubar’s averment that the agent, Greenblott, was acting as Connelly’s agent is based on hearsay. Second, Lubar’s affidavit states only that Lubar “was advised that” Connelly would provide the Wells Property as additional collateral, which does not support the statement of material fact that Connelly in fact proposed providing the Wells Property as collateral. 19 judgment practice approved by the United States Supreme Court in Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 379-81 (2007), when the Court held that the trial court could not rely on a version of the facts offered by one party that was “so utterly discredited by the record” that it could not create a dispute of fact. [¶45] Although a mortgage holder is not required, as Connelly contends, to recite in its statement of material facts that the evidence it relies upon would be admissible at trial, the motion court must be able to discern from the statements of material facts and the record evidence referenced therein that the record evidence could, in fact, be admissible at trial. See generally Beneficial Me., Inc. v. Carter, 2011 ME 77, ¶ 10, 25 A.3d 96. The record presented by Lubar in this case presents significant deficiencies in this regard. [¶46] For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the summary judgment and the judgment of foreclosure.