Opinion ID: 2520349
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: First Issue on Appeal

Text: ¶ 8 The first issue involves whether the City may use a general power of eminent domain combined with the Local Development Act, 62 O.S.2001 § 850, et seq. to take the Landowners' property. The parties agree that this issue was settled in City of Midwest City v. House of Realty, Inc., supra . The City and Hospital Authority state that this opinion makes the issue moot. ¶ 9 An opinion in one appeal that settles an issue raised in a second pending appeal does not make the latter moot. The opinion in the first appeal is controlling as to the latter appeal. See, for example, Rogers v. Excise Bd. of Greer County, 1984 OK 95, 701 P.2d 754, 758-759, where the Court stated that Summey v. Tisdale, 1982 OK 133, 658 P.2d 464, an opinion decided while the Rogers was pending, was controlling on an issue in Rogers. [3] We did not dismiss as moot the appeal in Rogers, but rather, we applied the controlling precedent and adjudicated the assigned error on appeal. The presence of controlling decisional precedent does not, by itself, make an issue moot. ¶ 10 What makes the first issue moot is the City's post-appeal conduct in response to our opinion in City of Midwest City v. House of Realty, Inc., supra . The City admits that pursuant to City of Midwest City the trial court decided the first issue incorrectly. The City states that it has abandoned its efforts to take the property by eminent domain. The City states that the Midwest City Urban Renewal Authority, and not the City, is the entity now seeking to obtain Landowners' property. The Midwest City Urban Renewal Authority is not a party to this appeal. ¶ 11 Landowners sought both injunctive and declaratory relief relating to the City's exercise of eminent domain. In Sharp v. 251st Street Landfill, Inc., 1996 OK 109, 925 P.2d 546, we said that: Entitlement to injunctive relief must be established in the trial court by clear and convincing evidence and the nature of the complained of injury must not be nominal, theoretical or speculative ... There must be a reasonable probability that the injury sought to be prevented will be done if no injunction is issued  a mere fear or apprehension of injury will not be sufficient. Sharp, 1996 OK 109, 925 P.2d at 549, (citations omitted). The argument is made that no act of the City is involved in an eminent domain proceeding, valid or not, and thus whether the City would continue to take Landowners' property by eminent domain is merely speculative. Of course, a person's rights adversely affected by a threatened enforcement of invalid conduct by a public official will support a request for both declaratory and injunctive relief. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Oklahoma Corporation Commission, 1994 OK 142, n. 2, 897 P.2d 1116, 1118. But, threatened enforcement of the City's eminent domain power is no longer occurring. Mootness may arise from a post-appeal development that adversely affects the court's capacity to administer effective relief. Lawrence v. Cleveland County Home Loan Authority, 1981 OK 28, 626 P.2d 314, 315. Plaintiffs requesting an injunction must show that the acts against which they ask protection are not only threatened, but will, in probability, be committed to their injury. Hodgins v. Hodgins, 1909 OK 101, 103 P. 711, 713. [4] The City's decision for the City to no longer attempt to exercise its eminent domain power adversely affects the court's capacity to administer effective injunctive relief. [5] ¶ 12 We have stated that declaratory relief is based upon the existence of a justiciable controversy. City of Oklahoma City v. Oklahoma City Urban Renewal Authority, 1999 OK 71, ¶ 28, 988 P.2d 901, 907; Ethics Commission v. Cullison, 1993 OK 37, 850 P.2d 1069, 1073. The term justiciable refers to a lively case or controversy between antagonistic demands. Lawrence v. Cleveland County Home Loan Authority, 1981 OK 28, 626 P.2d 314, 315. When a party presents antagonistic demands that are merely speculative a prohibited advisory opinion is being requested. State ex rel. Oklahoma Capitol Imp. Authority v. E.A. Cowen Const. Co., 1974 OK 4, 518 P.2d 1264, 1266; Post Oak Oil Co. v. Stack & Barnes, P.C., 1996 OK 23, 913 P.2d 1311, 1314. The City's argument is that it is not seeking to use eminent domain, and it will not attempt to do so in the future with regard to similar circumstances. In other words, an allegation by Landowners that the City would attempt such acts prohibited by Midwest City v. House of Realty, Inc., supra, is merely speculative. ¶ 13 We said in City of Midwest City v. House of Realty, Inc., supra , that the City could not use a general power of eminent domain combined with the Local Development Act, 62 O.S.2001 § 850, et seq. to take the Landowners' property. The City is no longer attempting to do this. This issue is moot. [6]