Opinion ID: 2321139
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Court Erred in Ruling on the Hearsay Objections

Text: Hearsay evidence, the in-court testimony of an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, is generally not admissible at trial. Laumer v. United States, 409 A.2d 190, 194 (D.C.1979) (en banc). Hearsay will be admissible[,] [however,] if it falls under an exception. Dutch v. United States, 997 A.2d 685, 688 (D.C.2010). We review a trial court's decision to admit hearsay evidence for abuse of discretion; however, the determination of whether a statement falls under an exception to the hearsay rule is a legal conclusion, which we review de novo.  Id.; see also Melendez v. United States, 26 A.3d 234, 245 (D.C.2011). The accepted premise of the excited utterance exception [is] that a person making an exclamation or a statement while under the influence of the excitement or shock caused by witnessing an extraordinary event[] is unlikely to fabricate an untruth, but, on the contrary, has a tendency to disclose what is actually on his mind [because] [t]he mental stress and nervous strain preclude deliberation and bar reflection. Simmons v. United States, 945 A.2d 1183, 1190 (D.C.2008) (third and fourth alterations in original) (quotation marks omitted). To be admissible, a purported excited utterance must meet three elements: `(1) the presence of a serious occurrence which causes a state of nervous excitement or physical shock in the declarant, (2) a declaration made within a reasonably short period of time after the occurrence so as to assure that the declarant has not reflected upon his statement or premeditated or constructed it, and (3) the presence of circumstances, which in their totality suggest spontaneity and sincerity of the remark.' Melendez, 26 A.3d at 245 (quoting Odemns v. United States, 901 A.2d 770, 776 (D.C.2006)). While [excited] utterances have long been recognized . . . as exceptions to the hearsay rule, the acceptance of a particular statement as [an excited] utterance depends upon the facts peculiar to each case. ( Andre) Price v. United States, 545 A.2d 1219, 1225-26 (D.C.1988) (quotation marks omitted). The key factor is whether the circumstances reasonably justify the conclusion that the remarks were not made under the impetus of reflection. Young v. United States, 391 A.2d 248, 250 (D.C.1978). With respect to satisfying the first prong of the excited utterance test, there is no question that a stabbing can be a sufficiently serious occurrence, see, e.g., Reyes-Contreras v. United States, 719 A.2d 503, 506 (D.C.1998) (physical attack was [c]learly . . . a startling event (quotation marks omitted)); Young, 391 A.2d at 250-51 (declarant's statements, made after he was stabbed, admissible as excited utterances), but the analysis cannot end there. The test requires that the serious or startling event cause[] a state of nervous excitement and shock in the declarant, Smith v. United States, 666 A.2d 1216, 1222 (D.C.1995), because the exception is intended to apply only to situations in which the declarant [is] so excited by the precipitating event that he or she [is] still under the spell of its effect. Odemns, 901 A.2d at 777 (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
The trial court admitted Gant's statement that Smith cut him (through Laura Brown's testimony) as an excited utterance based on, inter alia, findings that the stabbing was an excitable incident and that the statement was uttered a short time after the incident happened. Missing from both the record and the trial court's analysis, however, is any evidence describing Gant's actual demeanor in the minutes after he was stabbed. A showing sufficient to satisfy the first element [of the excited utterance test] cannot be made when there is no evidence that the declarant suffered mental disturbance or physical shock as a result of the event. Alston v. United States, 462 A.2d 1122, 1127 (D.C. 1983); see also Walker v. United States, 630 A.2d 658, 666 (D.C.1993) (where there was nothing to demonstrate that the declarant[] was distraught, in shock, or in a state of nervous excitement at the time the statement was uttered, the trial court had no basis . . . to find that the first element had been satisfied). Without the government's having put forth any evidence to demonstrate that Gant was sufficiently excited, there would appear to be no support for the trial court's decision to admit Brown's testimony about what he told her. However, given our disposition of issues actually raised by Smith, we need not decide this issue.
There also was a dearth of evidence in the record about Gant's level of excitement when he told Detective McCloud that he did not know who stabbed him. To the extent any such evidence existed, Smith was deprived of the chance to present it because of two separate errors on the part of the trial court. First, the court's holding that Gant's statement to Detective McCloud was inadmissible as an excited utterance overlooks Crawford's impact on hearsay analysis. The Supreme Court held in Crawford that `the Confrontation Clause bars the government from introducing testimonial statements at trial against a criminal defendant without calling the declarant to testify in person, unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.' Long v. United States, 940 A.2d 87, 93 (D.C.2007) (quoting Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 11 (D.C. 2006)). [A]t a minimum, the definition of testimonial includes police interrogations, Michigan v. Bryant, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1153, 179 L.Ed.2d 93 (2011) (quotation marks omitted), where the `primary purpose . . . is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.' Id. at 1154 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006)). Here, the trial court held that Gant's statement was not an excited utterance because the court believed that it was testimonial: I don't think it's excited utterance. To me it's testimonial, you are telling the police who stabbed you. Even assuming that Gant's statement to Detective McCloud was testimonial, Crawford would not apply because Smith was the party seeking to introduce the statement. The guarantee of the Confrontation Clause, from which Crawford stems, is that `[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.' Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI). In this case, because the accused was the party seeking to introduce Gant's statement, the trial court erred by treating the fact that it was made to a police detective as outcome-determinative. Whether Gant's statement to Detective McCloud was testimonial under Crawford was irrelevant, and the trial court should have allowed her to take the stand and testify about her interaction with Gant in sufficient detail for the court to analyze meaningfully the excited-utterance factors listed above. [7] The trial court's second error with respect to Detective McCloud's testimony occurred after Smith argued that Gant's statement to her was admissible as a present sense impression, which is a statement[] describing or explaining events which the declarant is observing at the time he or she makes the declaration or immediately thereafter. Hallums v. United States, 841 A.2d 1270, 1276 (D.C. 2004). The trial court's holding, that the statement was not a present sense impression because Smith was trying to get it in for the truth of the matter asserted therein, was error. The definition of hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted,  Dutch, 997 A.2d at 688 (emphasis added), so understandably Smith's attorney was trying to get it in for its truth by arguing that it fit within the present sense impression exception. Furthermore, when Smith's counsel argued that the statement fit within this exception because [Gant was] making the statement immediately after the event ha[d] happened to him, the trial court cut off her argument by holding: It's testimonial. Denied. Let's move forward. As already explained, whether or not the statement was testimonial was irrelevant, and the trial court should have attempted to determine whether it was admissible as a present sense impression.