Opinion ID: 1613814
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Harassment Restriction

Text: The protestors also attack as vague subparagraph (b) which enjoins them from harassing, intimidating or physically abusing persons connected with the clinic. Again, we must consider this proscription in the context of this litigation, that is, the protestors' past conduct, the relief sought by the clinic, and the district court's findings. See Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, supra . The protestors blocked patients walking to the clinic and the cars of patients, trapping patients as the protestors screamed, waved signs and flashed cameras in the patients' faces, and forced leaflets on them. The protestors followed the doctor and clinic staffers and members of their families. The protestors waited in airport parking ramps to confront the doctor. The doctor and staffers described the fear and loss of sleep created by these activities and the extraordinary steps taken to assure their safety and that of their families. The district court found that the clinic had stated a prima facie claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. That finding necessarily includes the finding that the protestors' intentional conduct was extreme and caused severe emotional distress, or was so outrageous that a severe emotional reaction is implied. See Muchow v. Lindblad, 435 N.W.2d 918 (N.D.1989). Given this background, the protestors cannot reasonably argue that the prohibition on harassing, intimidating or physically abus[ive] conduct can be mistaken as describing their lawful expressive activities. Subparagraph (b) is not unconstitutionally vague. Subparagraphs (e) and (f) are attacked by the protestors as overbroad. These paragraphs are apparently directed at the protestors' excessive conduct. In addition to harassing and intimidating, subparagraph (e) prohibits following, photographing, videotaping, and speaking to staff and patients. We construe the trial court's order to enjoin following, photographing, and videotaping done without consent, and persistently and with the intent to harass and intimidate. To the extent that this construction is not clearly set forth in the order, we direct that on remand the trial court modify the order in accordance with our construction. In the context of this case, the order thus construed is permissible. See Chico Feminist Women's H. Ctr. v. Scully, 208 Cal.App.3d 230, 256 Cal.Rptr. 194 (3rd Dist.1989). However, speaking to staff and patients cannot be constitutionally enjoined. Cf. City of Bismarck v. Schoppert, 469 N.W.2d 808 (N.D.1981). We therefore strike that part of the injunction that prohibits speaking. Subparagraph (f) prohibits distributing literature to any person who has indicated a desire not to receive the material. Obviously, distributing literature is protected communicative activity and a complete ban violates the First Amendment. See, e.g., Lee v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2709, 120 L.Ed.2d 669 (1992) (per curiam) [explained by International Society For Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2711, 120 L.Ed.2d 541 (1992)]. The prohibition on physically abusing persons entering or leaving the clinic contained in subparagraph (b) offers sufficient protection from those protestors who physically force literature on passers-by. The order of the district court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ERICKSTAD, C.J., and LEVINE, MESCHKE and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.