Opinion ID: 351559
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: national firearms act violation

Text: 35 Bubar, Peter Betres, Dennis Tiche and Michael J. Tiche were convicted under Count Four for possession of an unregistered firearm in violation of the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1970). 11 A firearm is defined in § 5845(a)(8) 12 to mean a destructive device. A destructive device in turn is defined in § 5845(f) 13 to mean (1) any explosive, incendiary. . . . (A) bomb . . . or (F) similar device; . . . and (3) any combination of parts either designed or intended for use in converting any device into a destructive device as defined in subparagraphs (1) and (2) and from which a destructive device may be readily assembled. . . .  Peter Betres and Dennis Tiche contend that the combination of dynamite, detonating cord, detonating caps and drums of gasoline used to commit the arson at Shelton did not constitute a destructive device within the meaning of § 5845(f). We disagree. 36 In United States v. Cruz, 492 F.2d 217, 219 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 935 (1974), we held that a completed Molotov cocktail was an incendiary bomb or similar device within the meaning of § 5845(f), relying on the ordinary meaning of the statute and its legislative history: 37 (T)he legislative history of the Firearms Act indicates that it requires registration of objectively destructive devices, devices inherently prone to abuse and for which there are no legitimate industrial uses. Id. (emphasis added). 38 We likewise hold in the instant case that the materials utilized, once placed on the Shelton premises with timers connected to detonating caps, caps connected to a fuse, a fuse connected to sticks of dynamite and the dynamite placed under barrels of gasoline similarly constituted an objectively destructive device which had no legitimate industrial use. We recognize that a Molotov cocktail, although homemade, is portable, adaptable, and perhaps even saleable. The apparatus in this case, in contrast, was designed for a single purpose and became a device within the meaning of § 5845(f), as opposed to an aggregation of parts not covered by the statute, see United States v. Posnjak, 457 F.2d 1110 (2 Cir. 1972), only upon being set up in the Shelton plant. But under our construction of § 5845(f) in Cruz this distinction is not determinative. Once the components were connected, in however crude a fashion, to form a new entity with destructive capabilities of its own and without a legitimate purpose, an incendiary device within the meaning of § 5845(f) came into being. Cf. United States v. Tankersley, 492 F.2d 962 (7 Cir. 1974); United States v. Peterson, 475 F.2d 806, 810 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846 (1973); United States v. Davis, 313 F.Supp. 710, 714 (D.Conn.1970). 39 United States v. Posnjak, supra, is not to the contrary. There we held that the possession of dynamite, a fuse and caps, taken alone, did not amount to possession of a destructive device. Since those materials were susceptible of legitimate use and since the language of § 5845(f) contemplated the existence or potential existence of a device which would meet objectively the criteria of the statute independent of the user's intent, the materials there involved did not constitute a destructive device within the meaning of § 5845(f). While we recognized in Posnjak that Congress, in enacting the National Firearms Act, was concerned mainly with objectively identifiable weapons of war and 'gangster-type weapons' , 457 F.2d at 1116, we explicitly noted that a homemade incendiary product also might be embraced within the statute's definition. Id. at 1119 & n. 10, 1120. 40 We sustain the convictions of Bubar, Peter Betres, Dennis Tiche and Michael J. Tiche for possession of an unregistered firearm in violation of the National Firearms Act. 41