Opinion ID: 1903266
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Residential Landlord and Tenant Act

Text: The trial justice found in favor of plaintiffs on their T & E claim under the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, awarding them damages for defendant's failure to relinquish possession of the property, as well as attorney's fees and costs. The defendant asserts that the trial justice committed an error of law by applying the act in this case. She argues that the act does not apply because there was no rental agreement, or indeed, a landlord-tenant relationship between the parties. We agree. The act supersedes the common law of residential landlords and tenants when the two bodies of law conflict. Errico v. LaMountain, 713 A.2d 791, 794 (R.I. 1998). It applies to, regulates and determines rights, obligations, and remedies under a rental agreement, wherever made, for a dwelling unit located within this state. Section 34-18-7. (Emphasis added.) The act defines rental agreement as all agreements, written or oral, and valid rules and regulations    embodying the terms and conditions concerning the use and occupancy of a dwelling unit and premises, and also includes any terms required by law. Section 34-18-11(14). It is undisputed that Cynthia's residence in the house was not governed by a rental agreement between the parties. Nor were plaintiffs her landlords; for better or for worse, Anthony Sr. was her father-in-law, and Audrey was her mother-in-law. In the trial justice's written decision on the issue of plaintiffs' attorney's fees, he addressed the applicability of the act, explaining that an implied rental agreement existed between plaintiffs and defendant. He further noted that it is axiomatic that unless defendant was a tenant she would not have been entitled to any damages on her claim for unjust enrichment arising out of plaintiffs' claim relying on the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. We do not agree with this reasoning. We are convinced that there was no rental agreement between plaintiffs and defendant, implied or otherwise. To say that defendant was a party to this alleged agreement belies the meaning of the word. [5] Not only was there no meeting of the minds in this case, Anthony Sr.'s admissions defeat the argument that Cynthia was a tenant. Both Anthony Sr. and Audrey admitted that they never discussed the terms of the kids' residency in the house with Cynthia. Certainly, a rental agreement can arise from the parties' actions for instance, if Anthony Jr. and Cynthia had sent monthly checks to plaintiffs and plaintiffs cashed them without complaint. See Marshall Contractors, Inc. v. Brown University, 692 A.2d 665 (R.I. 1997) (discussing implied-in-fact contracts); cf. § 34-18-16 (providing terms of an unsigned or undelivered rental agreement control if tenant pays and landlord accepts the agreed-upon rent). We have no such evidence before us from which such an agreement can be implied. Nor is there any proof of a landlord-tenant relationship between and among these parties. To the contrary, the evidence discloses that, based on plaintiffs' statements, Anthony Jr. and Cynthia treated the home as theirs, paying all expenses, including taxes and insurance. Given our determination that the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act did not apply to plaintiffs' claim, their award of attorney's fees must be vacated. There is no general equitable right to attorney's fees in the absence of an authorizing statute or a contractual provision. Jem Co. v. Fairway Capital Corp., 678 A.2d 1247, 1247 (R.I.1996) (mem.). Likewise, plaintiffs' award of $837.50 in litigation costs must be vacated, and defendant is entitled to reimbursement for the $105 paid to plaintiffs for costs associated with their District Court action. Because the basis for the awards of attorney's fees and litigation costs was the act, they cannot stand and are vacated.