Opinion ID: 774866
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: questions about loaded weapons

Text: 21 As with questions about the observed violation and the driver's authority to operate the vehicle, a motorist expects an officer to take reasonable measures to protect officer safety during the stop. When these measures are not too intrusive, the government's strong interest in officer safety outweighs the motorist's interests. Thus, for example, the motorist may be detained for a short period while the officer runs a background check to see if there are any outstanding warrants or criminal history pertaining to the motorist even though the purpose of the stop had nothing to do with such prior criminal history. The justification for detaining a motorist to obtain a criminal history check is, in part, officer safety. See, e.g., United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528, 1535 n.6 (10th Cir. 1996) (Triple I checks are run largely to protect the officer. Considering the tragedy of the many officers who are shot during routine traffic stops . . . , the almost simultaneous computer check of a person's criminal record . . . is reasonable and hardly intrusive.); United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001) (The request for criminal histories as part of a routine computer check is justified for officer safety.); United States v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275, 1280 (7th Cir. 1998) (The results of a criminal history check could indicate whether further back-up or other safety precautions were necessary.). By determining whether a detained motorist has a criminal record or outstanding warrants, an officer will be better apprized of whether the detained motorist might engage in violent activity during the stop. 22 An officer also may order the driver and passengers out of the vehicle in the interest of officer safety, even in the absence of any particularized suspicion of personal danger. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977). While a motorist retains some reasonable expectation of privacy when officer safety is at stake, cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998) (rejecting the argument that officer safety justifies a full field-type search during a routine traffic stop), the motorist's expectations are necessarily diminished. 23 In this case, Holt's reasonable expectations of privacy are even lower with respect to his concealed weapon. Under Oklahoma law, it is 24 unlawful for any person to fail or refuse to identify the fact that the person is in actual possession of a concealed handgun pursuant to the authority of the Oklahoma Self-Defense Act when the person first comes into contact with any law enforcement officer . . . during the course of any . . . routine traffic stop. 25 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1290.8(C). Holt testified at the suppression hearing that he did not have a concealed-handgun permit. Thus, he was not under this statutory obligation to volunteer the presence of the gun when he was stopped. The above-quoted statute nevertheless remains relevant to determining reasonable expectations of privacy in Oklahoma. Oklahomans who lawfully possess concealed weapons have no expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable in the fact that they are carrying concealed weapons, because they are required by law to disclose that fact. It would make little sense for Oklahoma society nevertheless to recognize as reasonable the privacy expectations of those who illegally possess concealed weapons in not revealing that information. Holt therefore had no reasonable expectation (that is, no expectation that Oklahoma society would recognize as reasonable) of keeping private the fact he was carrying a loaded weapon behind the passenger seat of his vehicle. Cf. United States v. Villa-Chaparro, 115 F.3d 797, 802 (10th Cir. 1997) (a driver has no expectation of privacy in the Vehicle Identification Number due to the federal requirement that it be located in plain view). 26 While the individual-privacy-interests side of the Fourth Amendment balancing is weaker in this context, the governmental-interests side is much stronger. The Supreme Court has found it too plain for argument that the government's interest in officer safety is both legitimate and weighty, given the inordinate risks confronting an officer as he approaches a person seated in an automobile. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110. Other courts have also recognized that [l]aw enforcement officials literally risk their lives each time they approach occupied vehicles during the course of investigative traffic stops. United States v. Stanfield, 109 F.3d 976, 978 (4th Cir. 1997); see also McRae, 81 F.3d at 1536 n.6 (noting the tragedy of the many officers who are shot during routine traffic stops each year). 27 In Maryland v. Wilson the Supreme Court noted that in 1994 alone, 5,762 officers were assaulted and 11 were killed during traffic pursuits and stops. 519 U.S. at 413 (citing Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports: Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted 71, 33 (1994)). Thirty percent of police shootings occurred when a police officer approached a suspect seated in an automobile, and 'a significant percentage of murders of police officers occurs when the officers are making traffic stops.' Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973)). The most recent data reveal that in 1999, 6,048 officers were assaulted during traffic pursuits and stops and 8 were killed. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports: Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted 82, 28 (1999). More than 34% of those assaults involved a dangerous weapon such as a gun or knife. Id. at 83. Firearms were used to commit 82 of the 94 killings of law enforcement officers during traffic pursuits and stops during the 1990s. Id. at 34. 28 The terrifying truth is that officers face a very real risk of being assaulted with a dangerous weapon each time they stop a vehicle. The officer typically has to leave his vehicle, thereby exposing himself to potential assault by the motorist. The officer approaches the vehicle not knowing who the motorist is or what the motorist's intentions might be. It is precisely during such an exposed stop that the courts have been willing to give the officers wide latitude, Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 978, to discern the threat the motorist may pose to officer safety. 29 An officer in today's reality has an objective, reasonable basis to fear for his or her life every time a motorist is stopped. Every traffic stop, after all, is a confrontation. The motorist must suspend his or her plans and anticipates receiving a fine and perhaps even a jail term. That expectation becomes even more real when the motorist or a passenger knows there are outstanding arrest warrants or current criminal activity that may be discovered during the course of the stop. Resort to a loaded weapon is an increasingly plausible option for many such motorists to escape those consequences, and the officer, when stopping a car on a routine traffic stop, never knows in advance which motorists have that option by virtue of possession of a loaded weapon in the car. 30 In balancing the interests in this case, we are guided by other situations in which federal courts have allowed considerations of officer safety to outweigh fairly intrusive conduct during a traffic stop. Thus, during a routine traffic stop, an officer may order the driver and passengers out of the vehicle, Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110; Wilson, 519 U.S. at 415; order the passengers to remain in the vehicle, Rogala v. District of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1998); open the door of a vehicle with darkly tinted windows to check for weapons, Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 981; order the occupants to raise their hands during the stop, United States v. Moorefield, 111 F.3d 10, 13 (3d Cir. 1997); and use a flashlight to check the dark interior of a car, Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983) (plurality opinion). 31 In addition to information about loaded weapons that the officer may obtain from visually looking in the car, shining a light around the interior of the car, or asking the motorist and occupants to step out of the car or to keep their hands raised all procedures authorized by the courts in the name of officer safety an officer may also obtain information about the existence of a loaded weapon by simply asking the motorist if there is a loaded weapon in the vehicle. Indeed, straightforwardly asking this question is often less intrusive than many of the procedures authorized by our sister circuits. 32 If a motorist volunteers that there is a loaded weapon in the car, that will undeniably be an important piece of information causing the officer to proceed with greater caution. It was suggested during oral argument in the en banc rehearing that a motorist with a loaded gun is unlikely to admit that fact. The facts of this case somewhat belie that argument. Here, when asked that question, Holt freely admitted the presence of a loaded gun. Other cases present similar situations in which defendants either volunteered or truthfully responded that they possessed weapons. See, e.g., United States v. Cain, 155 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Patterson, 140 F.3d 767, 771 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Maza, 93 F.3d 1390, 1395 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Castellana, 500 F.2d 325, 326 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc); Burris v. State, 954 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Ark. 1997); State v. Hill, 577 N.W.2d 259, 262 (Neb. 1998). 33 Even in those cases where the motorist falsely denies the presence of a loaded gun, allowing the officer to ask the question may provide important clues pertaining to safety. Officers have become skilled at detecting nervous or evasive responses from which the officer may gain valuable clues about a motorist's intentions. Thus, even a denial may alert the officer that the denial may not be truthful and thus that the officer should take greater care. 34 A third possibility is that the motorist may decline to answer the question. That, too, conveys information relevant to the officer's personal safety. Although nothing compels the motorist to answer such a question, when a motorist declines to answer it, the officer may draw clues from that declination that he or she should be more prudent and concerned about personal safety. The officer may not use the refusal to answer as the basis for a more intrusive search, but the officer would certainly be permitted to use that information to justify prudent safety-related measures. 35 Thus, any response the officer receives in response to this question will be helpful in appraising the risk presented more accurately. We therefore conclude that allowing officers to ask about the presence of loaded weapons in a lawfully stopped vehicle will promote the government's legitimate and weighty interest in officer safety. 36 If a motorist offers a voluntary response to a question regarding the presence of a loaded gun, the response could be used just like any other voluntary admission made during a traffic stop. If the admission reveals a crime the officer can act accordingly, as is always the case when the officer is aware of a crime taking place. If the motorist declines to answer the question, however, the officer could not, in the absence of particularized suspicion, take any legal action (other than reasonable actions for personal safety) based on that refusal. Because it is within a motorist's right to refuse to answer, ordinarily no inference of guilt can be drawn from that refusal and any further detention must be supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Cf. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439-40 ([T]he detainee is not obligated to respond. And, unless the detainee's answers provide the officer with probable cause to arrest him, he must then be released. (footnotes omitted)); Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring) (Of course, the person stopped is not obligated to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, although it may alert the officer to the need for continued observation.). 37 Although Holt was not in his vehicle when Officer Tucker asked about loaded weapons, this does not eviscerate the safety rationale for the question. By ordering Holt to sit in the patrol car during the stop, Tucker had temporarily neutralized the risk posed by a weapon in Holt's vehicle. But with the stop nearing completion, Officer Tucker reasonably expected that Holt was about to return to his vehicle and once again would have access to any weapons in it. It was at this point that Tucker asked about loaded weapons in the vehicle, and the safety rationale is plain. The Supreme Court has held that the entire interior of a vehicle is treated as within a motorist's immediate control and therefore falls within the scope of a search incident to arrest, even after the motorist has been ordered out of the vehicle and placed under arrest. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462 (1981). A search incident to arrest is justified in part on the basis of officer safety. Id. at 457. If the interior of the vehicle is relevant to officer safety in a case like Belton, where the arrestee is unlikely to return to the vehicle, then it is all the more so relevant here, where the motorist is almost certain to return. 38 We emphasize also that the balance does not depend on whether the officer subjectively fears the motorist. 4 Subjective intentions rarely play a role in Fourth Amendment analysis. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811-13 (1996). In the context of officer safety in particular, the Supreme Court has relied on an objective view of the circumstances. See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38 (1996) (holding that objective circumstances during a traffic stop allow an officer to order a driver out of the car, subjective thoughts notwithstanding). Similarly, the availability of a search incident to arrest for officer safety does not depend on the subjective mindset of the arresting officer. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 & n.7 (1973). As the Supreme Court has explained in the context of the public safety exception to Miranda warnings, 39 [T]he availability of [the public-safety] exception does not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved. . . . [It] should not be made to depend on post hoc findings at a suppression hearing concerning the subjective motivation of the arresting officers. Undoubtedly, most police officers . . . would act out of a host of different, instinctive, and largely unverifiable motives their own safety, the safety of others, and perhaps as well the desire to obtain incriminating evidence from the suspect. 40 Whatever the motivation of individual officers in such a position, we do not believe the doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda require that it be applied in all its rigor to a situation in which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety. 41 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984) (footnote omitted). That one officer is braver (or more foolhardy) than another, and therefore not subjectively concerned for his or her safety, should not deprive that particular officer of a right to protect his or her safety. Even the brave officer should be allowed to minimize the ever-present risk of being attacked or killed. 42 Given the dangers inherent in all traffic stops, we hold that the government's interest in officer safety outweighs a motorist's interest in not being asked about the presence of loaded weapons. 5 This balance tips in the government's favor even when the officer lacks particularized suspicion that the motorist possesses loaded weapons and regardless of whether the officer subjectively fears the motorist. Accordingly, the district court erred in suppressing Holt's response to this question. 43 There are surprisingly few cases addressing this question in other jurisdictions, but the several federal circuit cases confronting this issue seem generally to support our conclusion. See, e.g., Maza, 93 F.3d at 1396-97 (finding nothing improper in an officer's questioning whether there were guns in a truck, although without any discussion of the constitutional issues); United States v. May, No. 98-3113, 1999 WL 1215651, at  (D.C. Cir. Nov. 8, 1999) (unpublished) (Certainly . . . the Fourth Amendment . . . permits an officer to ask simply whether a driver has a gun.), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1011 (2000). 6