Opinion ID: 1838003
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: history of lewis

Text: This Court has not had occasion to directly consider Lewis since the opinion was originally filed nearly 35 years ago. It has been twice cited in footnotes and once in the text of our Court for the proposition that in a criminal case the accused has a right to be confronted by the witnesses against him. In none of the cases was it dispositive and in none of the cases was the issue related to the business entry statute. See People v Hobson, 369 Mich 189, 196; 119 NW2d 581 (1963); People v Shirk, 383 Mich 180, 189; 174 NW2d 772 (1970); People v Mobley, 390 Mich 57, 64-65; 210 NW2d 327 (1973). The Court of Appeals has recognized Lewis but has not actually excluded any business records from evidence on its authority. In two criminal cases, People v Wolke, 10 Mich App 582; 159 NW2d 882 (1968) and People v Parm, 15 Mich App 303; 166 NW2d 536 (1968) it was held that while it was technical error, in light of Lewis, that business records were admitted into evidence, the error was not prejudicial since it was corroborated by other competent evidence and did not require reversal of the conviction. In two other criminal cases, People v Herrera, 12 Mich App 67; 162 NW2d 330 (1968) reversed on other grounds 383 Mich 49; 173 NW2d 202 (1970) and People v Dickerson, 30 Mich App 447; 186 NW2d 850 (1971) it was found that Lewis did not apply in cases where the defendant had sought to introduce the record, as in these cases the accused would not be concerned with confronting the maker of the record. A last pair of Court of Appeals criminal cases, People v Flansburgh, 24 Mich App 470; 180 NW2d 373 (1970) and People v Lester, 50 Mich App 725; 213 NW2d 793 (1973) distinguished Lewis in that the record did not directly prove that defendant had committed a crime. (This was also part of the rationale in Parm, supra .) All of the above cases shared one common precept in interpreting Lewis regardless of how they distinguished it. We believe that the limitations of the Lewis case were intended to apply to the particular facts of that case   . Herrera, supra, 75. The first Court of Appeals case to make a frontal attack on Lewis, as opposed to factually distinguishing it, was People v Gauthier, 28 Mich App 318; 184 NW2d 488 (1970). The question in Gauthier was the admissibility of a handwritten message on a long-distance telephone call voucher. Such vouchers were ordinarily kept at a hotel's front desk in order that the clerk on duty might record the calls of the hotel's guests for appropriate billing. The importance of the voucher and the message written on it in this case was that it placed defendant at the scene of the murder of the hotel night clerk. The Court of Appeals per presiding Judge J.H. GILLIS noted at the outset that Lewis stood firmly against the admission of business record hearsay in criminal cases. While noting the cases of Wolke, supra, and Parm, supra which actually distinguished Lewis, Judge GILLIS stated: We proceed here on the assumption that Justice WIEST'S declaration is decisionally binding on this Court and that the Supreme Court did not intend its holding in Lewis to be limited to the facts of the case. However, on this appeal the people contend, and we agree, that Lewis was incorrectly decided.    We write in the hope that the Lewis rule will, on an appropriate record, be re-examined by its creating tribunal. 28 Mich App 318, 321-322. (Footnote omitted.) The Court of Appeals concluded that it was error under Lewis to admit the voucher as a business record but that the Lewis error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The conviction was affirmed. Leave to appeal was not granted. 384 Mich 812 (1971).