Opinion ID: 73353
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: new immigration laws

Text: In 1996, Congress twice revised the INA. The changes began incrementally with the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) in April 1996 and accelerated with IIRIRA’s major structural revisions to the INA in September 1996.17 Congress’ reconstruction of the INA includes, inter alia, these key elements applicable to Richardson’s appeal: (1) new custody rules mandating detention of aliens after a serious criminal conviction; (2) new procedures for prompt removal of criminal aliens from the United States; (3) new restrictions on judicial review that preclude all judicial involvement in the administrative agency removal and detention process until after a final removal order is entered by the BIA; 16 IIRIRA was signed into law on September 30, 1996 and became effective on April 1, 1997. 17 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). 11 (4) new provisions directing that judicial review shall be exclusively under the INA and in only the court of appeals after a final BIA removal order; and (5) new provisions removing all other formerly available federal-court jurisdiction over the detention and removal of criminal aliens, including repeal of statutory habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Simply put, IIRIRA strips all jurisdiction, including § 2241 habeas, from the district courts, places exclusive judicial review in the court of appeals, and delays even that judicial review until after a final administrative agency order. Congress has reduced judicial review to one time in one place in an effort to expedite the removal of resident aliens with serious criminal convictions. Since these legislative revisions to the INA are extensive, complicated, and affect so many resident aliens with criminal convictions in such a significant manner, we outline them in detail.
Upon being denied entry, Richardson was detained and immediately placed in “removal” proceedings.18 As one of its broad structural changes to the INA, IIRIRA eliminated some of the distinctions between “deportation” and “exclusion” 18 Before IIRIRA, the INA separated the concepts of exclusion proceedings and deportation proceedings. Different procedural rules applied to proceedings to exclude an alien from entering the United States. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1996) with 8 U.S.C. § 1252b (1996). 12 proceedings and created a unified set of proceedings in INA § 24019 called “removal proceedings.”20 New INA § 240(e)(2) defines the term “removable” as an alien who is “deportable” or an alien who is “inadmissible” (replacing the old term “excludable”).21 New INA § 240(a)(3) provides that unless specified otherwise under the INA, a removal proceeding “shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining whether an alien may be admitted to the United States or, if the alien has been so admitted, removed from the United States.”22 Under the unified framework in INA § 240, many of the procedures in “removal proceedings” are now the same regardless of whether the alien is seeking admission to the United States or the alien is being deported from the United States.23 In contrast, the substantive grounds for determining “inadmissibility” and 19 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (Supp. 1998). 20 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (Supp. 1998). Removal proceedings were created in INA § 240. Other sections of the INA established the procedures to be employed in removal proceedings. For example, INA § 239, 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (Supp. 1998), established the procedures for the initiation of removal proceedings. INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (Supp. 1998), established the procedures for the cancellation of removal proceedings. 21 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(2) (Supp. 1998). 22 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3) (Supp. 1998). 23 Within INA § 240’s framework, certain procedures are still differentiated based on whether deportability or inadmissibility is the subject of the removal proceeding. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (Supp. 1998). For example, INA § 240(c)(2)(A) provides that an alien has the burden of establishing eligibility for admission “clearly and beyond doubt” or “by clear and convincing evidence that the alien is lawfully present in the United States pursuant to a prior admission;” whereas, INA § 240(c)(3)(A) provides that the INS has the burden of establishing by clear and 13 “deportability” are still handled in several separate parts of the INA and vary considerably.24 However, Richardson’s cocaine-trafficking conviction is a sufficient basis alone for both deportation and inadmissibility under the INA.25 B. Permanent Resident Criminal Aliens Returning From Abroad IIRIRA also altered the rules for permanent resident aliens returning from abroad, which is why the INS detained Richardson and immediately initiated “removal proceedings” against him. Under IIRIRA’s restructuring, most permanent resident aliens returning from abroad are summarily admitted back into this country. In this regard, new INA § 101(a)(13)(c) provides that “an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into the United States for purposes of the immigration laws unless the alien”: convincing evidence “that the alien is deportable.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(2)(A) (Supp. 1998) & 1229a(c)(3)(A) (Supp. 1998). As discussed infra in footnotes 38 and 40, the INS district director decides bond requests for arriving aliens detained while seeking admission into the United States; whereas, aliens being deported may request bond from an immigration judge. 24 Compare admission qualifications for aliens covered by 8 U.S.C. §§ 1181-1189 (Supp. 1998), with the basis for deporting aliens in 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (Supp. 1998). 25 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (Supp. 1998) (listing criminal inadmissibility grounds); Id. § 1227(a)(2) (listing criminal deportability grounds). A permanent resident alien is “deportable” for many more crimes than a permanent resident alien is deemed “seeking admission” and “inadmissible.” Id. 14 (i) has abandoned or relinquished that status (ii) has been absent from the United States for a continuous period in excess of 180 days (iii) has engaged in illegal activity after having departed the United States (iv) has departed from the United States while under legal process seeking removal of the alien from the United States, including removal proceedings under this Act and extradition proceedings, (v) has committed an offense identified in section 212(a)(2) of this Act [which includes controlled substances], unless since such offense the alien has been granted relief under section 212(h) or 240A(a), or (vi) is attempting to enter at a time or place other than as designated by immigration officers or has not been admitted to the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer. INA § 101(a)(13)(C) (emphasis supplied).26 Section 101(a)(13)(C)(v) references offenses in “section 212(a)(2),” which provides that any alien convicted of a controlled substance offense is inadmissible.27 Because Richardson was a lawful 26 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (Supp. 1998). INA §§ 212(a)(2) and (h) are codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) and (h) (Supp. 1998). INA § 240A(a) is codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (Supp. 1998). 27 INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) and (II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(2)(A)(i)(I) and (II) (Supp. 1998), includes controlled substance offenses as follows: . . . any alien convicted of . . . a crime involving moral turpitude . . . or . . . a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance . . . is inadmissible. Id. Pre-IIRIRA, certain criminal aliens could seek discretionary relief under INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (1995), or suspension of deportation under INA § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1995). Post-IIRIRA an alien, including a permanent resident alien, convicted of an aggravated felony as defined under INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (Supp. 1998), is statutorily ineligible for a waiver under INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (Supp. 1998), and also statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (Supp. 1998). See footnote 11 supra. 15 permanent resident with a cocaine-trafficking conviction covered by Section 1182(a)(2), the INS treated him as an arriving alien “seeking admission” to the United States under INA § 101(a)(13)(C) and subjected him to inspection as any other alien arriving to the United States.28 C. Supreme Court’s Fleuti Doctrine Immediately upon his detention, the INS initiated removal proceedings against Richardson. In turn, Richardson filed his § 2241 habeas petition in the district court. Richardson contended, inter alia, that the INS had interpreted erroneously new INA § 101(a)(13)(C), illegally considered him an arriving alien “seeking admission,” and therefore unlawfully detained him and denied him admission and bond. Before 1996, INA § 101(a)(13) provided that a returning permanent resident alien shall not be regarded as making “an entry” into the United States if the alien’s presence abroad was not “intended or reasonably . . . expected.”29 In Rosenberg v. 28 Since under INA § 101(a)(13)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) (Supp. 1998), Richardson was “seeking admission” at a port of entry, the INS treated Richardson an “arriving alien” under INS regulation 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10330 (1997) (currently codified in 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(q) (1998)), which states: “The term arriving alien means an alien who seeks admission to or transit through the United States . . .” 29 INA § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1994), provided: (13) The term “entry” means any coming of an alien into the United States, from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession, whether voluntarily or otherwise, except that an alien 16 Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1964), the Supreme Court interpreted “intended” in former INA § 101(a)(13) as an intent to depart the country in a manner “meaningfully interruptive of the alien’s permanent residence.” The Court held that a lawful permanent resident’s “innocent, casual and brief” excursion was not sufficiently interruptive of the alien resident’s status to be “intended” and would not be deemed an “entry.” Id. Unfortunately for Richardson, IIRIRA replaces former INA § 101(a)(13) with an entirely new statutory scheme.30 New INA § 101(a)(13)(A) replaces the term “entry” with the terms “admission” and “admitted,” which are defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.”31 The statute no longer references an alien’s intent. having a lawful permanent residence in the United States shall not be regarded as making an entry into the United States for the purposes of the immigration laws if the alien proves to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that his departure to a foreign port or place or to an outlying possession was not intended or reasonably to be expected by him or his presence in a foreign port or place or in an outlying possession was not voluntary: Provided, That no person whose departure from the United States was occasioned by deportation proceedings, extradition, or other legal process shall be held to be entitled to such exception. Id. 30 IIRIRA § 301(a) enacted the new version of INA § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (Supp. 1998). 31 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (Supp. 1998). 17 Instead, new INA § 101(a)(13)(C) provides that a lawful permanent resident “shall not be regarded as seeking admission,” and thus shall be summarily admitted back into the United States, unless the alien falls under one of the six subparagraphs (i) through (vi) of INA § 101(a)(13)(C) quoted above. Since Richardson’s cocainetrafficking conviction is covered expressly by INA § 101(a)(13)(C)(v), the INS treated Richardson as an arriving alien “seeking admission.”32 In the district court, the INS stressed that, in another case, the BIA had held that Fleuti’s “innocent, casual, and brief” rule no longer applies because IIRIRA repealed the statutory language relied upon in Fleuti.33 The INS emphasized that INA § 101(a)(13)(C) no longer defines “admission” with reference to an alien’s intent, thus removes the entire Fleuti concept, and requires the INS to treat Richardson as “seeking admission.”34 Rejecting the INS’ position, the district court determined that the INS was not required to treat Richardson as “seeking 32 See footnote 28 supra. 33 See Matter of Collado-Munoz, Int. Dec. No. 3333 (BIA Dec. 18, 1997). 34 Fleuti addressed the harsh result of a legal permanent resident alien suddenly being excludable from the United States just because he left the country a few days, while not being deportable for the same conduct. The INS stresses the concern in Fleuti is not applicable here as Richardson is both inadmissible and deportable for his crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (Supp. 1998); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 1998). New INA § 101(a)(13)(C) is also arguably more favorable for most legal permanent residents as they are able to re-enter the United States automatically for up to 180 days (as opposed to just after a brief trip abroad under Fleuti), unless they fall into one of the six categories in INA § 101(a)(13)(C)(i–vi). 18 admission.” The district court interpreted new INA § 101(a)(13)(C) as specifying only when a returning alien may not be regarded as “seeking admission,” as opposed to shall be regarded as “seeking admission.” The INS submits that the language of INA § 101(a)(13)(C) is explicit and nondiscretionary and that the district court circumvented its plain language.35 The proper construction of INA § 101(a)(13)(C) and the Fleuti issue are some of the issues Richardson has raised before the BIA in his pending appeal of the immigration judge’s removal order. D. Detention of Criminal Aliens “Seeking Admission” While his BIA appeal proceeds, Richardson’s habeas claims also stem, in part, from IIRIRA’s new stringent custody rules for aliens with serious criminal convictions. INA § 235(b)(2)(A) provides that any alien “seeking admission” to the United States who “is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted” “shall be detained” for removal proceedings, as follows: . . . in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall 35 The INS also asserts that the Attorney General is entitled to deference if her interpretation of an immigration statute is reasonable, citing Chevron USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Perlea-Escobar v. Executive Office for Immigration, 894 F.2d 1292, 1296 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Chevron). 19 be detained for a proceeding under section 240 [removal proceedings]. INA § 235(b)(2)(A) (emphasis supplied).36 An alien so detained may seek parole into the United States temporarily. INA § 212(d)(5)(A) provides that the Attorney General “may in his discretion . . . parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest any alien applying for admission to the United States.”37 At the time of Richardson’s attempted entry, the Attorney General’s regulations delegated to the INS district director the authority to review “parole” requests.38 On December 4, 1997, the 36 8 U.S.C. §1225(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 1998). INA § 240 is codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (Supp. 1998). 37 8 U.S.C. §1182 (d)(5)(A) (Supp. 1998). 38 8 C.F.R. § 103.1(g)(2)(ii)(B) (1997) stated: (B) District directors are delegated the authority to grant or deny any application or petition submitted to the Service, except for matters delegated to asylum officers pursuant to part 208 and § 253.1(f) of this chapter, or exclusively delegated to service center directors, to initiate any authorized proceeding in their respective districts, and to exercise the authorities under § § 242.1(a), 242.2(a) and 242.7 of this chapter without regard to geographical limitations. District directors are delegated authority to conduct the proceeding provided for in § 252.2 of this chapter. Id. 20 district director sent Richardson’s counsel a letter outlining Richardson’s criminal convictions and denying parole on the basis of no showing of a significant public benefit or urgent humanitarian reasons.39 After initial custody and release determinations by the INS district director, aliens may seek release from the immigration judge. However, at the time of Richardson’s attempted entry, the Attorney General’s regulations provided that immigration judges lacked jurisdiction over release requests by “arriving aliens” facing removal proceedings.40 39 Noting that Richardson’s criminal convictions included an aggravated felony as defined by INA § 101(a)(43), the district director’s letter, dated December 4, 1997, stated: “The release of Mr. Richardson into the community will be of no significant public benefit. Mr. Richardson has not shown that his release would be warranted based upon urgent humanitarian reasons.” 40 62 Fed. Reg. 10312 (1997) (currently codified in 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1) (Nov. 3, 1998) stated: Application to immigration judge. After an initial custody determination by the district director, including the setting of a bond, the respondent may, at any time before an order under 8 CFR part 240 becomes final, request amelioration of the conditions under which he or she may be released. Prior to such final order, and except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the immigration judge is authorized to exercise the authority in section 236 of the Act (or section 242(a)(1) of the Act as designated prior to April 1, 1997 in the case of an alien in deportation proceedings) to detain the alien in custody, release the alien, and determine the amount of bond, if any, under which the respondent may be released, as provided in § 3.19 of this chapter. If the alien has been released from custody, an application for amelioration of the terms of release must be filed within 7 days of release. Once a removal order becomes administratively final, determinations regarding custody and bond are made by the district director. 21 E. Detention Under TPCRs in IIRIRA § 303(b)(3) IIRIRA enacted new mandatory custody rules for certain criminal aliens in both INA § 236(c) and the Transition Period Custody Rules (“TPCRs”) in IIRIRA § 303(b)(3). When Richardson attempted to enter the United States, the TPCRs mandated the detention of certain criminal aliens, as follows: (A) In General - During the period in which this paragraph is in effect pursuant to paragraph (2), the Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who - (i) has been convicted of an aggravated felony (as defined under section 101(a)(43)) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by section 321 of [IIRIRA]) (ii) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 212 (a)(2) of such Act (iii) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 241 (a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of such Act (before redesignation under this subtitle), or (iv) is inadmissible under section 212(a)(3)(B) of such act or deportable under Id. However, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10360 (1997) (codified in 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(5)(i) (Jan. 1, 1998)) stated: An immigration judge may not exercise the authority provided in this section, and the review process described in paragraph (d) of this section shall not apply, with respect to . . . [a]rriving aliens as described in § 1.1(q) of this chapter. . . . Id. This provision was subsequently modified in 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(11) (Nov. 3, 1998). 22 section 241 (a)(4)(B) of such act (before redesignation under this subtitle) when the alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense. IIRIRA § 303(b)(3)(A).41 The TPCRs mandated Richardson’s detention because his cocaine-trafficking conviction is an aggravated felony under the INA42 and thus falls under subparagraph (i) of the TPCR in IIRIRA § 303(b)(3)(A). Richardson’s cocaine-trafficking conviction is also an offense covered by INA §§ 212(a)(2), 241(a)(2), 212(a)(3)(B), and 241(a)(4)(B),43 and thus is also covered by the other three subparagraphs (ii), (iii), and (iv) of the TPCR in IIRIRA § 303(b)(3)(A). 41 The TPCRs are not codified. The text of the TPCRs can be found in the historical notes following 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (Supp. 1998). Richardson argues that the interim TPCRs apply to aliens detained while attempting to gain admission to the United States. Whether these rules apply only to aliens within the United States or to any alien detained by the INS is not material to the resolution of this appeal. The Court assumes without deciding that the detention and release provisions of the TPCRs apply to aliens seeking admission and aliens already in the United States. INA § 101(a)(43) is codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (Supp. 1998). INA § 212 is codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (Supp. 1998). INA § 241 is codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (Supp. 1998). 42 Successive definitions of the term “aggravated felony” have been enacted in INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). As initially enacted in 1988, the term covered only a few serious offenses, such as murder, drug trafficking, and illicit trafficking in firearms. The definition has expanded continually to include less serious offenses. The adverse immigration consequences legislated by Congress for permanent resident aliens with an aggravated felony conviction, as defined under the INA, have likewise continued to expand. 43 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), 1182(a)(3)(B), & 1227(a)(4)(B) (Supp. 1998). 23 The TPCRs also significantly restricted the Attorney General’s release authority for the criminal aliens subject to the TPCRs’ mandatory detention. The TPCR in IIRIRA § 303(b)(3)(B) provides that the Attorney General “may release” an alien but only if the alien is an alien described in subparagraphs (A)(ii) or (A)(iii) of the TPCR in IIRIRA § 303(b)(3), is lawfully admitted, will not pose a danger and is likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding.44 Under the TPCRs, the Attorney General could not have released an alien detained because of an aggravated felony conviction because that alien is in a category mandatorily detained under the TPCR in IIRIRA § 303(b)(3)(A)(i) and is not in an (A)(ii) or (A)(iii) category subject to release under the TPCR in IIRIRA § 303(b)(3)(B).45 44 The TPCR in IIRIRA § 303(b)(3)(B) states: (B) Release. – The Attorney General may release the alien only if the alien is an alien described in subparagraph (A)(ii) or (A)(iii) and – (i) the alien was lawfully admitted to the United States and satisfies the Attorney General that the alien will not pose a danger to the safety of other persons or of property and is likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding, . . . Subsections (A)(ii) and (A)(iii) describe aliens inadmissible because of an offense described in INA § 212(a)(2) or deportable because of an offense described in INA §§ 241 (a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D). The TPCR in IIRIRA §§ 303(b)(A)(ii) & 303(b)(A)(iii). 45 Commentators note that since criminal aliens, even if legal permanent resident aliens, are now clearly removable for certain crimes, the mandatory custody rules for criminal aliens were intended to insure removal because criminal aliens no longer have incentive to show up 24 When Richardson attempted to enter the country, the Attorney General had implemented regulations delegating her detention and release authority under the TPCRs and INA § 236(c). Under those regulations, the INS district director made an initial determination regarding custody and release of criminal aliens under both the TPCRs and INA § 236(c).46 After the district director’s initial determination, an alien could seek release from an immigration judge.47 However, immigration judges lacked jurisdiction over release requests of “arriving aliens” facing removal proceedings.48 In addition to denying parole, the INS district director’s letter, dated December 4, 1997, concluded that Richardson “would have no incentive to appear for Immigration hearings” and thus in effect denied bond as well. Although Richardson was subject to mandatory detention and not eligible for release on bond, it appears that the district director considered release on bond. F. Detention Under INA § 236(c) voluntarily for removal proceedings. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, INS Detention and Removal: A “White Paper”, 11 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 667, 671 (1997). Similarly, the INS acknowledged at oral argument that it is discovering permanent residents convicted of serious crimes when they seek re-entry in part because of the difficulty of finding them through the myriad state courts. 46 See footnote 40 supra. 47 Id. 48 Id. 25 Although enacted by IIRIRA in 1996, new INA § 236(c) was not in effect when Richardson attempted to enter the United States on October 24, 1997.49 IIRIRA § 303(b)(2) allowed the Attorney General to delay the implementation of INA § 236(c) for up to two years by providing notice to Congress that the INS lacked sufficient space and personnel to accommodate the mandate of INA § 236(c). The Attorney General twice provided such notice and delayed the effective date of INA § 236(c) until October 10, 1998. During the two-year interim, the TPCR in IIRIRA § 303(b)(3) supplanted INA § 236(c).50 As of October 10, 1998, INA § 236(c)(1) also mandates Richardson’s detention, whether he is considered inadmissible or deportable, for his criminal convictions, as explained below. New INA § 236 contains some general custody rules for aliens in removal proceedings and some specific, more stringent, custody rules for certain criminal aliens. Under INA § 236(a) “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.”51 Under INA § 236(a) and (b), the Attorney 49 INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (Supp. 1998). 50 Id. 51 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis supplied). 26 General may grant bond or parole and may revoke bond or parole for an alien so arrested.52 However, INA § 236(c) provides for mandatory detention of certain criminal aliens, whether inadmissible or deportable. Subparagraph (1) of new INA § 236(c), entitled “Detention of criminal aliens,” mandates that the Attorney General shall take into custody a criminal alien who falls into one of these four categories: (A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 212(a)(2),53 (B) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D),54 (C) is deportable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(i)55 on the basis of an offense for which the alien has been sentence[d] to a term of imprisonment of at least 1 year, or 52 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and (b) (Supp. 1998). 53 INA § 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (Supp. 1998), covers certain crimes involving “moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime,” or “a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate)” any state, federal, or foreign law “relating to a controlled substance.” 54 These sections cover certain multiple criminal convictions in INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), an aggravated felony in § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), certain controlled substance offenses in INA § 237(a)(2)(B), certain firearm offenses in INA § 237(a)(2)(C), and other miscellaneous crimes in INA § 237(a)(2)(D). INA §§ 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C) & (D), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C) & (D) (Supp. 1998). 55 INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 1998), covers crimes involving moral turpitude committed within a certain time frame after the date of admission and for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed. 27 (D) is inadmissible under section 212(a)(3)(B) or deportable under section 237(a)(4)(B),56 when the alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense. INA § 236(c)(1).57 Next, subparagraph (2) of new INA § 236(c) provides that the Attorney General “may release” an alien in one of these four mandatory detention classes “only if the Attorney General decides” that the alien’s release is necessary to the protection of someone cooperating in the investigation of major criminal activity, and the alien satisfies the Attorney General that the alien will not pose a danger to the safety of others and is likely to appear at any scheduled hearing.58 56 INA § 212(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (Supp. 1998), and INA § 237(a)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B) (Supp. 1998), cover certain “terrorist activities.” 57 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (c)(1) (Supp. 1998). 58 INA § 236(c)(2), entitled “Release,” provides: The Attorney General may release an alien described in paragraph (1) only if the Attorney General decides pursuant to section 3521 of Title 18, that release of the alien from custody is necessary to provide protection to a witness, a potential witness, a person cooperating with an investigation into major criminal activity, or an immediate family member or close associate of a witness, potential witness, or person cooperating with such an investigation, and the alien satisfies the Attorney General that the alien will not pose a danger to the safety of other persons or of property and is likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding. A decision relating to such release shall take place in accordance with a procedure that considers the severity of the offense committed by the alien. 28 Richardson’s cocaine-trafficking offense brings him within several mandatory detention categories in INA § 236(c)(1), but he does not fall within the discretionary release option in INA § 236(c)(2). G. INA § 236(e) Restricts Review of Bond and Parole Decisions Of particular relevance to Richardson’s situation is INA § 236(e) which applies to detention and release decisions under both INA § 236(c)59 and the TPCR in IIRIRA § 303. INA § 236(e) significantly restricts the judicial review of the Attorney General’s decisions as follows: (e) Judicial review The Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section [236's custody rules] shall not be subject to review. No court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole. INA § 236(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2) (Supp. 1998). 59 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (Supp. 1998). 29 INA § 236(e).60 Thus, the INS contends that the district court had no jurisdiction to review the INS district director’s discretionary decision to grant or deny Richardson bond or parole. Richardson responds that INA § 236(e) applies to only final, not interim, orders, and that historically bond decisions were considered collateral to the removal proceedings and cognizable under § 2241 habeas in immigration cases. However, INA § 236(e), by its plain language, bars judicial review of the INS’ discretionary bond and parole decisions. Nonetheless, we note that Richardson is not actually seeking review of those INS discretionary decisions but instead review of his constitutional claim that denial of bond without a hearing before an immigration judge violates his constitutional rights. 60 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (Supp. 1998). Richardson contends that INA § 236(e) does not apply to this case because he was detained while the TPCRs were in place. Although Richardson correctly argues that the TPCRs (and not INA § 236(c)) applied to his detention from October 26, 1997 to October 9, 1998, the TPCRs appear to supplant only INA § 236(c) and not INA § 236(e) for the reasons below. IIRIRA § 303(b)(2), the effective date provision for IIRIRA § 303(a), allows the Attorney General to delay for up to two years the effective date of INA § 236(c). During the period when INA § 236(c) is not in effect, the TPCRs apply instead of INA § 236(c). However, IIRIRA § 303(b)(2) does not provide that the Attorney General can delay the effective date of new INA § 236(e). Instead, INA § 236(e) is governed by the effective-date provision in IIRIRA § 303(b)(1) which provides the general rule that INA § 236 is effective the same day as the rest of Title III of IIRIRA. In any event, we need not resolve this issue because the two-year delay has expired and INA § 236(e) is now clearly effective. 30 H. Procedures for Removal Hearings While only the INS district director decided Richardson’s request for parole and bond, IIRIRA did not diminish Richardson’s right to a full hearing before the immigration judge on the merits of his removal from the United States.61 Before issuing any removal order, an immigration judge still must hold a hearing62 in which the alien may be represented by counsel.63 The alien is entitled to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses presented by the United States.64 A complete record is required to be kept of all testimony and evidence produced at the hearing.65 A “criminal alien” subject to removal (either as inadmissible or deportable) has a right to appeal a removal order to the BIA,66 and the immigration judge “shall inform the alien of the right to appeal.”67 61 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1995) with 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (Supp. 1998). 62 The hearing can take several forms – a hearing with the alien present, a hearing without the alien’s presence if the alien so consents, through a video conference, or over the telephone if the alien so consents. INA § 240(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(2) (Supp. 1998). 63 Although an alien subject to removal may secure his or her own counsel, according to INA § 240(b)(4)(A) the government is not required to provide counsel to the alien. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (Supp. 1998). 64 INA § 240(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (Supp. 1998). 65 INA § 240(b)(4)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(C) (Supp. 1998). 66 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b)(3) (1998). 67 INA § 240(c)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4) (Supp. 1998). 31 Represented by counsel, Richardson received a hearing before an immigration judge on the merits of his removal from the United States and has appealed the judge’s removal order to the BIA. As of this date, the BIA has not issued its decision. I. IIRIRA Consolidates Judicial Review in the Court of Appeals IIRIRA also completed the major overhaul of federal-court jurisdiction over immigration matters begun by the AEDPA. Prior to 1996, INA § 106 set out the judicial-review scheme for deportation and exclusion orders.68 INA § 106(a)(2) provided for petition for review in the court of appeals.69 In addition, INA § 106(a)(10) allowed aliens in custody to seek habeas corpus review of final deportation orders under the INA.70 Aliens also could rely on 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus to challenge INS detention or deportation proceedings.71 68 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1995). 69 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(2) (1995). 70 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10) (1995). See general discussion of the old scheme of judicial review and Congress’ attempts as early as 1961 to streamline judicial review of deportations to avoid “interminable procedural delays” in deportations through overlapping modes of judicial review. United States, ex rel. Marcello v. District Director, 634 F.2d 964, 967-72 (5th Cir. Jan. 1981) (INA § 106(a)(q) discussed in Marcello became INA § 106(a)(10).) 71 See, e.g., Orozco v. INS, 911 F.2d 539, 541 (11th Cir. 1990). 32 On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).72 AEDPA § 44073 repealed INA § 106(a)(10), which had allowed habeas corpus review under the INA. In its place, AEDPA § 440(a) enacted a new INA § 106(a)(10), which states that a final deportation order against an alien deportable for certain criminal offenses “shall not be subject to review by any court.”74 Five months after the AEDPA, Congress enacted IIRIRA.75 Section 306 of IIRIRA repealed the entire judicial-review scheme in INA § 106 and replaced it with a new judicial-review scheme in INA § 242. IIRIRA did not eliminate all judicial review. Instead, IIRIRA removed all jurisdiction from the district courts 72 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 73 Id. 74 AEDPA § 440(a) amended INA § 106(a)(10), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10) (1995), to read: Any final order of deportation against an alien who is deportable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D), or any offense covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) for which both predicate offenses are covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(i), shall not be subject to review by any court. Id. See footnote 83 infra for IIRIRA’s amendments to INA § 106(a)(10). INA § 241 is codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (Supp. 1998). 75 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). 33 and consolidated judicial review into the court of appeals.76 INA § 242(b)(2) provides that the venue for judicial review is only in the court of appeals.77 More importantly, INA § 242(g), entitled “Exclusive Jurisdiction,” provides that except as provided in INA § 242, no court shall have jurisdiction over aliens’ claims arising from the Attorney General’s decisions or actions, as follows: Except as provided in this section [242] and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this Act. INA § 242(g).78 76 As outlined infra at footnote 93, INA § 242(e)(2) does provide for a truncated form of habeas review for non-resident aliens summarily rejected at ports of entry without any removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) (Supp. 1998). Throughout the remainder of this opinion, we repeatedly note that IIRIRA consolidates all judicial review into one procedure – a petition for review in the court of appeals after a final removal order has been issued. We note that INA § 242(e)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) (Supp. 1998), remains a narrow exception to our statement about IIRIRA’s providing for judicial review in only the court of appeals. Since that narrow exception applies only to non-resident aliens in limited circumstances, it has no applicability here or to any immigration cases involving resident aliens. 77 INA § 242(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (Supp. 1998), provides: The petition for review shall be filed with the court of appeals for the judicial circuit in which the immigration judge completed the proceedings. Id. 78 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (Supp. 1998). This Court recently held that INA § 242(g) divests district courts of jurisdiction over removal orders under former INA § 106(a)(10) and that 34 IIRIRA also mandated the timing of the INA’s exclusive judicial review. INA § 242(b)(9) proscribes that judicial review shall be only after a final removal order, as follows: Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this chapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section. INA § 242(b)(9).79 INA § 242(d)(1) mandates that “a court may review a final order of removal only if . . . the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available . . .”80 In these new INA provisions, Congress has abbreviated judicial review to one place and one time: only in the court of appeals and only after a final removal order and exhaustion of all administrative remedies. In IIRIRA, Congress strictly “judicial review of orders of removal may only be initiated in the court of appeals” under the INA. Auguste v. Reno, 152 F.3d 1325, 1328 (11th Cir. 1998). Auguste did not address judicial review under § 2241 habeas because Auguste, a non-criminal alien in custody, filed a habeas petition in the district court pursuant to only INA § 106(a)(10) which provided for habeas review under the old INA. The AEDPA repealed the habeas review in INA § 106(a)(10) and replaced it with the version of INA § 106(a)(10) that restricted judicial review of deportation orders against criminal aliens. Thus, whether INA § 242(g) repealed § 2241 was not discussed in Auguste. 79 INA § 242(b)(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (Supp. 1998). 80 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (Supp. 1998). IIRIRA imposes other timing requirements to expedite judicial review. The petition for direct review in the court of appeals must be filed 30 days after a final order, as opposed to 90 days under the pre-IIRIRA version of the INA. Compare INA § 242(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (Supp. 1998), with former INA § 106a(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(1) (Supp. 1996). 35 regulated the exclusive mode and timing of judicial review in order to remove overlapping jurisdiction and to prevent dilatory tactics previously used to forestall departure of aliens. J. INA § 242(a)(2)(C) Restricts Review of Removal Orders Against Criminal Aliens Even within the INA’s exclusive judicial-review scheme, Congress further limited what a court of appeals can review after a final removal order. Of particular relevance to Richardson is INA § 242(a)(2)(C), which provides that no court shall have jurisdiction to review “any final order of removal against an alien who is removable” because of certain criminal convictions, as follows: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in section 212(a)(2) [covers certain controlled substance offenses] or 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D), or any offense covered by section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) for which both predicate offenses are, without regard to their date of commission, otherwise covered by section 237(a)(2)(A)(i). INA § 242(a)(2)(C).81 Section 212(a)(2)82 includes Richardson’s cocainetrafficking conviction. 81 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (Supp. 1998). INA § 212(a)(2) is codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2). INA § 237(a)(2) is codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (Supp. 1998). 82 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (Supp. 1998). 36 New INA § 242(a)(2)(C) is similar to former INA § 106(a)(10) which also placed restrictions on judicial review of deportation orders against criminal aliens.83 As detailed later, this Court has upheld the judicial review restrictions in former INA § 106(a)(10) as constitutional. Boston-Bollers v. INS, 106 F.3d 352 (11th Cir. 1997). K. INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii) Restricts Review of Discretionary Decisions IIRIRA also limits other aspects of the exclusive judicial review remaining for aliens under the INA. INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii) limits judicial review of the Attorney General’s discretionary decisions, as follows: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review– 83 See footnotes 74 and 176 in order to compare INA § 106(a)(10), as amended by the AEDPA, with INA § 242(a)(2)(C), as amended by IIRIRA. IIRIRA made two amendments to INA § 106(a)(10). First, IIRIRA § 306(d) eliminated the phrase “any offense covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) for which both predicate offenses are covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(i)” and replaced it with the phrase “any offense covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) for which both predicate offenses are, without regard to the date of their commission, otherwise covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(i).” IIRIRA § 306(d). This amendment was effective immediately and has been applied by several circuits. Id. IIRIRA’s second amendment to INA § 106(a)(10) included more substantial changes, although the end result – new INA § 242(a)(2)(C) – is overall very similar to its predecessor. As a technical matter, IIRIRA repealed INA § 106(a)(10) and replaced it with new INA § 242(a)(2)(C). Altering the language of INA § 106(a)(10) in several respects, IIRIRA added the introductory phrase “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . .” and replaced INA § 106(a)(10)’s reference to a final order of “deportation” with a reference to a final order of “removal.” Similarly, IIRIRA changed the citations listing the criminal offenses that precluded judicial review to the citations corresponding to the sections amended under IIRIRA. The cumulative result of the two amendments enacted by IIRIRA is new INA § 242(a)(2) which limits the judicial review of removal orders based on certain criminal convictions with language similar to that in former INA § 106(a)(10). 37 ... (ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General the authority for which is specified under this title to be in the discretion of the Attorney General, other than the granting of relief under section 208(a). INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii).84