Opinion ID: 1102725
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged Violations of Batson v. Kentucky[1]

Text: Drinkard claims that the State struck prospective jurors based on gender and race. He relied on the fact that the State peremptorily struck four of six black veniremembers and struck six females. Drinkard, however, objected only to two of the six strikes of females, and the trial court held that he had made no prima facie showing of discrimination based on gender. The trial court acknowledged that the strikes against the four black veniremen supplied an inference of discrimination. See Drinkard v. State, 777 So.2d at 261. The prosecution then provided its explanations for the strikes. As to three of the struck jurors, Mr. L., Ms. S., and Ms. T., the prosecution stated valid race-neutral reasons that were discussed during voir dire. [2] These three jurors had either expressed doubt about their ability to impose the death penalty or had relatives that had been murder victims. However, the prosecution's reason for striking the fourth juror, Mr. T.his involvement with law enforcement and his position as a radio talk-show hostis unsubstantiated by the record. We have said repeatedly that the failure of the State to engage in any meaningful voir dire on a subject of alleged concern is evidence that the explanation is a sham and a pretext for discrimination. Ex parte Bird, 594 So.2d 676, 683 (Ala.1991), citing Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d 609 (Ala.1987). The trial judge cannot merely accept the specific reasons given by the prosecutor at face value.... Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d at 624. While we understand that the publicity surrounding Mr. T. and his involvement with the Decatur police might be common knowledge, to allow a peremptory strike on that basis would encourage the use of presumption instead of documentation to support the prosecutor's reasons for striking a juror. If Mr. T's activities cause the prosecutor to have concerns about his ability to be fair, then a simple question directed to the veniremember could have dispelled any doubt about his ability to hear the case fairly. Ex parte Bird, 594 So.2d at 683. However, the State referred to an answer given by Mr. T., which the prosecutor believed indicated that Mr. T. would hold the testimony of the police officers to a tougher standard. The trial judge agreed that the State had given a race-neutral reason. We can reverse a trial court's determination on a Batson issue only if it is clearly erroneous; therefore, we cannot hold that there was a Batson violation in this instance. Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d at 625. We address the issue to make clear the point we made in Ex parte Branch: The trial judge cannot merely accept the specific reasons given by the prosecutor at face value; the judge must consider whether the racially neutral explanations are contrived to avoid admitting acts of group discrimination. This evaluation by the trial judge is necessary because it is possible that an attorney, although not intentionally discriminating, may try to find reasons other than race to challenge a black juror, when race may be his primary factor in deciding to strike the juror. 526 So.2d at 624 (citations omitted).