Opinion ID: 2625941
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Suppression argument

Text: ¶ 38 Defendant argues first that the State must show that he voluntarily waived his rights and, second, citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), that the State was prohibited from reinitiating contact with him to obtain a statement. Edwards held that once a person invokes the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the police cannot ask further questions until that person is provided counsel. Id. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1885. Edwards is inapplicable in this case, however, because the transcript of Defendant's July 22, 1997 interview with Detective Daily clearly shows that Defendant invoked only his right to remain silent, not his right to counsel. [8] See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 n. 10, 96 S.Ct. 321, 326 n. 10, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). In Miranda, the Court distinguished between the procedural safeguards triggered by a request to remain silent and a request for an attorney and directed that `the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present' only `[i]f the individual states that he wants an attorney.' Id. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S.Ct. at 1628). Because Defendant never requested an attorney, the State could have reinitiated questioning and Defendant's statements would have been admissible as long as the State could show that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights. ¶ 39 Inmate L.C. did not read Defendant his Miranda rights before their jail cell conversation, nor was Defendant aware that L.C. might have been an agent of the State. But the Supreme Court has held that  Miranda warnings are not required when the suspect is unaware that he is speaking to a law enforcement officer and gives a voluntary statement. Perkins, 496 U.S. at 294, 110 S.Ct. at 2394. For example, in United States v. Stubbs, the court held that Miranda warnings are not required when the cellmate is not actually an undercover law enforcement agent but instead isat besta confidential informant. 944 F.2d 828, 831-32 (11th Cir.1991) (footnote omitted). Nor are Miranda warnings necessary when a jail visitor acts as an agent of the State. See Alexander v. Connecticut, 917 F.2d 747, 750-51 (2d Cir.1990). The Supreme Court has reasoned that the concerns underlying Miranda are not implicated in such circumstances because [t]he essential ingredients of a `police-dominated atmosphere' and compulsion are not present when an incarcerated person speaks freely to someone whom he believes to be a fellow inmate. Perkins, 496 U.S. at 296, 110 S.Ct. at 2397. The same is true in this case. Defendant chose to speak to fellow inmate L.C. Thus there has been no violation of Defendant's right to remain silent. ¶ 40 Defendant argues that Perkins is distinguishable because, unlike the defendant in Perkins, he had previously invoked his Miranda rights. [9] Defendant relies on Justice Brennan's statement in concurrence in Perkins that [i]f respondent had invoked either [his right to remain silent or his right to counsel], the inquiry would focus on whether he subsequently waived the particular right. 496 U.S. at 300 n., 110 S.Ct. at 2399 n.  (Brennan, J., concurring). Courts that have addressed similar arguments, however, have applied Perkins even if a suspect had previously invoked both the right to remain silent and the right to counsel. See Stubbs, 944 F.2d at 832 n. 3; Alexander, 917 F.2d at 751; People v. Guilmette, 1 Cal.App.4th 1534, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 750, 753-54 (1991). Critical to the analysis is the Supreme Court's reasoning that, absent a custodial interrogation, there cannot be a violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment Miranda rights and thus there would be no occasion to determine whether there had been a valid waiver of those rights. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 486, 101 S.Ct. at 1885. Here, Defendant's conversations with L.C. were not custodial police interrogations. Consequently, this court need not determine whether Defendant validly waived his rights before speaking to L.C. because Defendant's Miranda rights were not implicated. See id. [10] ¶ 41 Defendant also argues that his statements to L.C. were not voluntary because some of the conversations took place while drinking home-made prison wine. But the trial court found, and the record supports, that there was no evidence that [Defendant's statements to L.C.] were induced by or the result of any coercion, threats, pressure or promises of any sort, direct or indirect[,] from [L.C.]. The trial court did not err in admitting into evidence all of L.C.'s testimony about his conversations with Defendant.