Opinion ID: 667507
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence--Possession/Attempted Possession Counts

Text: 143 Ochoa was charged in Counts Two, Three, Four and Five with possession of cocaine. Although he does not dispute that he supplied cocaine to Sims and his associates, Ochoa nonetheless challenges his conviction on these counts, arguing that (1) his participation ended once the cocaine was sold; (2) there is no evidence showing that he actually possessed cocaine on any occasion or that he constructively possessed it (i.e. exercised ownership and control over it); and (3) as to the attempted possession charges, he took no substantial step toward possession. 144 We agree with the government, however, that given Ochoa's prolonged and cooperative partnership as the supplier of cocaine to the other members of the conspiracy, Ochoa aided and abetted their possession and attempted possession of the cocaine. One who participates in a criminal venture and seeks by his actions to make it succeed commits the crime of aiding and abetting. United States v. Wesson, 889 F.2d 134, 135 (7th Cir.1989) (citing United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230, 1235 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901, 110 S.Ct. 260 (1989)). The sale of cocaine to a narcotics trafficking enterprise may not in and of itself render the seller an aider and abettor. See Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at 1235. However, given that Ochoa made repeated sales to Sims and his associates over a significant time period, supplied cocaine on a credit basis, and had continuing contact with a number of participants in the conspiracy, the jury could reasonably infer that he had associated himself with their criminal venture and had provided the cocaine with an intent to facilitate the conspirators' possession and in the hope that they would distribute the narcotic successfully. See id.; United States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441, 449 (7th Cir.1980). Consequently, Ochoa's conviction on the possession and attempted possession counts was proper. Accordingly, we affirm his conviction on Counts Two, Three, Four, and Five of the third superseding indictment. 145 3. Constructive Amendment of the Indictment through Evidence of April 1987 Drug Negotiations with Undercover Drug Agent 146 In April 1987, Ochoa negotiated the sale of four kilograms of cocaine to an undercover agent. Following delivery of the first kilogram, Ochoa and two associates were arrested. Tr. 273-88. A consensual search of two of Ochoa's apartments produced just under a kilogram of cocaine, a scale, approximately $4,000 in cash, and four empty kilogram wrappers. Tr. 551-54. The district court permitted the government to introduce evidence of this episode as substantive evidence of the conspiracy or alternatively under Rule 404(b). Ochoa argues that this evidence effectively amended the indictment to include a charge (the April 1987 transaction) otherwise absent. The government responds that this was simply one piece of evidence proving that Ochoa was a multi-kilogram supplier of cocaine during the time period of the alleged conspiracy. 147 We are not convinced that this evidence was properly admitted as evidence of the conspiracy with which Ochoa was charged, although in our view the admission did not prejudice Ochoa significantly. Insofar as Ochoa was guilty of conspiracy, his culpability sprang from his sales to Sims and Sims' associates; his sales to independent buyers, in this case undercover agents, thus do not establish in any direct way his conspiratorial relationship with Sims et al. A multi-kilogram sale that occurred within the same time frame as the charged conspiracy was nonetheless relevant to Ochoa's intent, and thus could have been admitted under Rule 404(b). The district court did not give the jury a contemporaneous instruction limiting its consideration of the evidence to the question of Ochoa's intent, although it did give a generalized other act instruction in its final instructions to the jury when Ochoa's counsel (for the first time) requested such an instruction. Tr. 1234-35, 1239. However, in view of what we agree is the overwhelming evidence of Ochoa's participation in the charged conspiracy, we find any error to have been harmless. And because this was merely one small piece of a prosecution case which, for the most part, focused correctly on Ochoa's dealings with the other members of the conspiracy, we discern no constructive amendment of the indictment. See generally United States v. McAnderson, 914 F.2d 934, 945 (7th Cir.1990) (where there was no risk of confusion as to the nature of the charge against defendants, no constructive amendment occurred). 148 4. Admission of Evidence concerning Ochoa's Post-Conspiracy Telephone Conversations with Sims and Items found on Ochoa's Person at time of his 1991 Arrest 149 At trial, Adrienne Ross testified that on several occasions following Sims' arrest (and thus after the termination of the conspiracy), Sims called her from jail and she then initiated a three-way call including Ochoa so that Sims and Ochoa could talk. Tr. 649-51. The government argues that this was relevant to show an ongoing relationship between Sims and Ochoa. The government was also permitted to show that when Ochoa himself was arrested in February 1991, police found in his possession a digital pager, cellular and mobile phones, $1,000 in cash, and false identification bearing the false name of Martin Garcia that Ochoa gave the police upon his arrest. Tr. 526-27, 528-32, 537-39; Gov.Ex. 400-04. The government argues that use of the false name and identification reflected Ochoa's modus operandi of using aliases as he did during the conspiracy (see, e.g., Tr. 790: Ann Love testifies that Ochoa used Jesse as an alias) as well as a consciousness of guilt. It does not offer a basis for admission of the mobile phone, beeper, and cash, but contends any error in the admission was harmless. Ochoa contends for the first time on appeal that all of this evidence was improperly admitted under Rule 404(b) and suggested improperly to the jury that because Ochoa had contact with Sims and was found at the time of his arrest to be in possession of items suggesting drug activity, he must have conspired with the others as charged. 150 Because Ochoa failed to object to this evidence below, our inquiry is limited to whether the admission amounted to plain error. It did not. The fact of Sims' post-arrest conversations with Ochoa was probative of their relationship and thus relevant to whether or not they had been co-conspirators. See Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 219-20, 94 S.Ct. 2253, 2260-61 (1974). This is particularly true in view of the fact that Ochoa disclaimed any contact with Sims after 1987. Tr. 965-67. The mobile phone, beeper, cash, and false identification are all hallmarks of the drug trade and were thus probative of Ochoa's involvement in that profession. United States v. Duarte, supra, 950 F.2d at 1260. 151 5. Admission of Co-Conspirator Statements against Ochoa 152 Ochoa objected to the admission of co-conspirator statements at trial. After hearing the government's case, the district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the government had adequately proved the existence of a conspiracy involving many, many people, including among others Milton Sims and 'Tooter,' Rodney Ross and so on. Tr. 903. The court did not explicitly find that Ochoa was a member of the conspiracy, and Ochoa seizes upon that omission to argue that the court committed plain error in admitting the statements against Ochoa. 153 Although Ochoa is correct to point out that the district court is obligated to find that the defendant was a member of the charged conspiracy before co-conspirator statements may be admitted against him under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), United States v. Peters, 791 F.2d 1270, 1285 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 847, 107 S.Ct. 168 (1986), the context of the court's remarks indicate that this was its finding. Although the court did not mention Ochoa by name in rendering its findings, at a minimum, its use of the phrase and so on clearly indicates that the list of names it mentioned was not meant to be exhaustive. Indeed, we believe the court's remarks reveal an unspoken assumption that each of the three defendants in this trial (Ochoa, Crawford, and Corey Sims) had been shown to be a member of the conspiracy and that the court's intent was simply to attempt to identify some of their other co-conspirators. In any case, whatever ambiguity there might have been as to Ochoa's status were resolved moments later, when the court denied his Rule 29(a) motion for a judgment of acquittal on the conspiracy charge, observing that there was strong evidence of each defendant's guilt on that count. Tr. 908. Thus, there is nothing fatal in the court's failure to name Ochoa in its findings. Moreover, given that there was, in our view, substantial evidence pointing to Ochoa's membership in the conspiracy, we discern no clear error in the court's decision to admit co-conspirator statements against Ochoa. 154 6. Sufficiency of the Evidence and Variance: Multiple Conspiracies vs. Single Conspiracy 155 Ochoa argues both that the evidence was insufficient to prove his participation in the conspiracy and that, at most, the evidence showed multiple conspiracies rather than the single conspiracy that the indictment alleged. In essence, Ochoa maintains that there was no demonstrable cohesion between the various individual members of the conspiracy, and that really there were several smaller operations working independently. 156 Although there may have been some peripheral players whose role, if any, in the conspiracy was tenuous or unclear, we think the evidence established with relative clarity a single cocaine trafficking conspiracy with Milton Sims at the top (supplied most frequently by Ochoa), with the various couriers taking cocaine to Milwaukee and returning to Los Angeles with cash, and with distributors and customers in Milwaukee at the bottom of the pyramid consuming the cocaine. It may be true, as Ochoa claims, that he had no particular interest in how the cocaine was distributed once he was paid for it. Yet, his status as the principal supplier, his familiarity and interaction with a number of conspirators, and his willingness to advance cocaine and await the couriers' return from Milwaukee for payment reveal an association, stake, and participation in the conspiracy that peg him as a co-conspirator himself. United States v. Townsend, supra, 924 F.2d at 1406; United States v. Douglas, supra, 874 F.2d at 1153, 1156-57; United States v. Koenig, supra, 856 F.2d at 854. It may also be that Sims and the other members of the conspiracy did not always deal exclusively with Ochoa or with one another. But conspiracies are often loosely staffed with itinerant personnel whose loyalties are divided; this does not detract from the existence or nature of the conspiratorial agreement. See Townsend, 924 F.2d at 1391. Based on the evidence showing that Ochoa was the principal supplier of fairly large quantities of cocaine to Sims and his people over several years and that Sims had built a fairly well structured and cohesive distribution network, the jury reasonably could have found the single conspiracy that the indictment alleged and that Ochoa participated in that conspiracy. See United States v. Goines, supra, 988 F.3d at 772. 7. Obstruction of Justice Enhancement 157 Ochoa testified on his own behalf at trial. At sentencing, the district court found that he had testified falsely and gave him a two-level upward adjustment pursuant to section 3C1.1 of the Guidelines for obstruction of justice. Ochoa contends that the district court failed to make an adequate finding of perjured testimony to support such an enhancement. We review the district court's finding for clear error. United States v. Carson, 9 F.3d 576, 583 (7th Cir.1993), pet. for cert. filed (Jan. 28, 1994) (No. 93-7654); United States v. Pitz, 2 F.3d 723, 730 (7th Cir.1993). 158 There is no merit to this argument. As Ochoa himself concedes, the district court made an explicit finding on the record, independent of the jury's verdict, that Ochoa had testified falsely. Sent.Tr. 32-33. It may not have cited specific examples of what it perceived to have been Ochoa's falsehoods, but our precedents make clear that the court was not required to do so. United States v. Jones, 938 F.2d 1425, 1430 (7th Cir.1993); United States v. Casanova, 970 F.2d 371, 377 n. 5 (7th Cir.1992); United States v. Davis, 938 F.2d 744, 747 (7th Cir.1991).