Opinion ID: 2563964
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Scope of NRS 334.030

Text: This court reviews issues of statutory construction de novo. Harris Assocs. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 119 Nev. 638, 641, 81 P.3d 532, 534 (2003). In Nevada, words in a statute should be given their plain meaning unless this violates the spirit of the act. McKay v. Bd. of Supervisors, 102 Nev. 644, 648, 730 P.2d 438, 441 (1986). Where a statute is clear on its face, a court may not go beyond the language of the statute in determining the [L]egislature's intent. Id. A statute must be construed as to `give meaning to all of [its] parts and language, and this court will read each sentence, phrase, and word to render it meaningful within the context of the purpose of the legislation.' Harris Assocs., 119 Nev. at 642, 81 P.3d at 534 (quoting Coast Hotels v. State, Labor Comm'n, 117 Nev. 835, 841, 34 P.3d 546, 550 (2001)). Further, a statute should not be read in a manner that renders a part of a statute meaningless or produces an absurd or unreasonable result. Id. NRS 334.030 facilitates the purchase of surplus governmental property by governmental entities. These transactions are eased by the provisions in NRS 334.030 that allow governmental entities to circumvent other statutory proceedings. [6] See NRS 334.030(2), (5). By looking at the plain meaning of the statute's words, we conclude that the statute is triggered by two governmental entities taking steps demonstrating their intent to enter into a contract for the purchase and sale of surplus governmental property. NRS 334.030(2)-(4). Specifically, NRS 334.030(2) states that [a]ny governmental entity may enter into any contract with any other governmental entity for the purchase of any ... property. (Emphases added.) The plain meaning of enter into is to participate in; engage in. Random House Webster's College Dictionary 435 (2d ed.1997). Thus, NRS 334.030(2) clearly contemplates that the relevant act for the statute's implication is when governmental entities begin to participate in or engage in the steps necessary to form a contract. NRS 334.030(3) goes on to state that in making the contract, governmental entities are authorized to accept statutory conditions as part of the contract. Accordingly, the statute's words demonstrate that the Legislature intended the statute to be triggered when the entities took steps toward entering into a contract for the purchase of surplus governmental property. Finally, as further evidence that the statute does not require the actual formation of a contract, NRS 334.030(4) discusses the bidding process. As the bidding process necessarily precedes the contract being formed, the language of NRS 334.030(4) indicates that the statute applies as soon as entities begin engaging in steps that show their intent to form a contract. NRS 334.030(5) is central to resolution of this case. The district court primarily relied upon this provision when it found that V & S Railway was barred from pursuing its condemnation action under NRS 37.230. NRS 334.030(5) suspends any portion of any law that is inconsistent with allowing governmental entities to take full advantage of purchasing surplus property from other governmental entities. Once NRS 334.030 is triggered, no other action may interfere with the surplus property purchase. [7] Further, V & S Railway's argument that such a reading would render NRS 334.030(2) through (4) mere surplusage is not persuasive. Applying the plain meaning of NRS 334.030(5) does not render any other section of NRS 334.030 nugatory because the provisions of NRS 334.030 do not contradict each other. Each provision is written in furtherance of the statute's intent: facilitating the purchase and sale of surplus property between governmental entities. NRS 334.030(1) states the statute's purpose; NRS 334.030(2) permits governmental entities to circumvent certain provisions of the law that might otherwise hinder their surplus property transactions; NRS 334.030(3) allows the purchasing governmental entities to accept any contractual condition imposed pursuant to law; and NRS 334.030(4) gives governmental entities the authority to designate an agent to enter bids and make payments on its behalf when purchasing surplus governmental property. Therefore, because NRS 334.030(1) through (4) promote the purpose of NRS 334.030 and are thus not inconsistent with each other, NRS 334.030(5) does not suspend any of them. Based upon the plain meaning of NRS 334.030, we conclude that condemnation actions like V & S Railway's are suspended pursuant to NRS 334.030(5) once two governmental entities take steps demonstrating their intent to enter into a contract for the purchase and sale of surplus governmental property. While NRS 37.230 gives authority to [a]ny company incorporated under the laws of this state, or constructing or operating a railway in this state, to acquire property for use as a railroad by condemnation, allowing a private entity to condemn surplus governmental property once two governmental entities have taken steps toward the formation of a contract for that property's sale is contrary to NRS 334.030(1)'s stated purpose. NRS 334.030(5) suspends a private entity's ability to condemn surplus governmental property once governmental entities have demonstrated their intent to enter into a contract for that property's sale. We conclude that NRS 334.030 does not support the district court's finding that the LADWP's designation of the railroad as surplus governmental property triggered NRS 334.030. Rather, as noted above, NRS 334.030 is triggered when governmental entities take steps showing their intent to enter into a contract for the purchase and sale of surplus governmental property. Therefore, on remand, the district court must determine whether the LADWP and Ely had already taken such steps when V & S Railway brought its condemnation action. [8] If the district court concludes that the LADWP and Ely had taken the steps necessary to make NRS 334.030 applicable when V & S Railway brought its condemnation action under NRS 37.230, then the district court should once again conclude that NRS 334.030(5) barred V & S Railway's condemnation action. NRS 37.230 is inconsistent with allowing White Pine County and Ely to take full advantage of the LADWP's sale of the surplus governmental property. Moreover, if the district court finds that NRS 334.030(5) precludes V & S Railway's condemnation action, then White Pine County and Ely do not replace the LADWP in V & S Railway's condemnation action, as V & S Railway suggests. Such an interpretation would undermine the statute's express purpose of allowing governmental entities to take full advantage of available surplus governmental property. Conversely, if the district court concludes that NRS 334.030 had not been triggered when V & S Railway brought its condemnation action, then the district court must reverse its grant of summary judgment in favor of White Pine County and Ely and permit V & S Railway to pursue its condemnation action against the LADWP. NRS 334.030 does not give governmental entities a priority right to acquire surplus governmental property absent prior evidence indicating their intent to enter into a contract for the purchase of such property. Because the district court incorrectly based its conclusion on its determination that NRS 334.030 was triggered by the LADWP designating the railroad as surplus governmental property, we reverse the district court's order and remand this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We concur: HARDESTY, C.J., and PARRAGUIRRE, DOUGLAS, CHERRY, and GIBBONS, JJ.