Opinion ID: 6500514
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence to Support William

Text: Maxwell’s Convictions
Unlawfully Transfer or Possess a Firearm56 William Maxwell disputes the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for conspiracy to unlawfully transfer a firearm.57 That count was brought under the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, which requires the government to prove “(1) an agreement between two or more persons to achieve an unlawful goal; (2) the defendant intentionally joined the agreement, with knowledge of its objective; and (3) an overt act taken in furtherance of the conspiracy by a co-conspirator.” United States v. Whiteford, 676 F.3d 348, 357 (3d Cir. 2012). Insofar as William was concerned, the object of the alleged conspiracy was to get guns 56 William Maxwell moved before the District Court for judgment of acquittal on this count. We exercise plenary review over the denial of the motion, although “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, mindful that it is the jury’s province (and not ours) to make credibility determinations and to assign weight to the evidence.” United States v. Richardson, 658 F.3d 333, 337 (3d Cir. 2011). 57 The same count also charged a conspiracy to unlawfully possess a firearm, but, as in the previous section, it is sufficient for us to concern ourselves with William’s efforts to transfer a firearm. See supra Section V.D. 95 into the hands of Scarfo and Pelullo, both of whom were convicted felons. The evidence supporting that count involved William’s brother John delivering a firearm from Dallas, Texas, to Scarfo’s home in Egg Harbor Township, New Jersey. The FBI recorded multiple wiretapped phone conversations between John and Pelullo as John made his way to New Jersey. In one call on September 6, 2007, John expressed his suspicion that he was being followed by “a chopper over-head” and “a black and white Suburban [that was] right behind [him] too.” (JAD at 6156.) They agreed that John should stop for lunch, presumably to avoid leading the suspected surveillance vehicles to Scarfo’s house. Later that day, John and Pelullo spoke again; John said he “talked to Bill [i.e., William Maxwell] and he[, William,] said it could be everything and it could be nothing. He said there’s no way of knowing. He said … just take whatever precautions that you [Pelullo] thought were best.” (JAD at 6168.) Months later, FBI agents executed a search warrant at Scarfo’s house in Egg Harbor Township and uncovered a gun that, according to an ATF report, John Maxwell purchased from a pawn and gun shop in Dallas on September 4, 2007. William Maxwell claims that the only evidence tying him to the firearm delivery – the call in which John told Pelullo about his conversation with William – was insufficient to bring William within the conspiracy to have the firearm transferred to or possessed by Pelullo or Scarfo. We take that as an argument that the government failed to furnish sufficient evidence of the second element of a conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371: that William intentionally joined an agreement with knowledge of its objective. Whiteford, 676 F.3d at 357. 96 But considering that phone call, as we must, in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, it is enough. United States v. Richardson, 658 F.3d 333, 337 (3d Cir. 2011). From John’s statement on the phone that he “talked to Bill” about the suspected surveillance vehicles (JAD at 6168), a rational trier of fact could have found that William had knowledge of John’s illicit objective to deliver the firearm. See United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 431 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (“[A]lthough the prosecution must prove the defendant’s knowledge of the conspiracy’s specific objective, that knowledge need not be proven by direct evidence.”). And a rational jury could also have found, from John’s statement noting William’s shared concern about the possibility of surveillance and the advice he gave about the precautions to take (or at least whose precautions to follow), that William was in on the agreement. See United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 241 (3d Cir. 2007) (“A defendant’s knowledge and intent may be inferred from conduct that furthered the purpose of the conspiracy.”). Although thin, there was thus sufficient evidence as to the second element of the charge – that William intentionally joined the conspiracy, knowing of its objective.58 58 The evidence of the first and third elements of a conspiracy was also sufficient, and William does not meaningfully contest those elements. As to the first, the multiple wiretapped phone calls between John and Pelullo as John made his way to New Jersey, plus John’s call with William, supported a finding that an agreement existed for John to deliver a firearm to Scarfo’s home, where it would be possessed unlawfully by Scarfo or Pelullo. See United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 238 (3d Cir. 2007) (permitting circumstantial proof of agreement “based upon reasonable 97
Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud59 William Maxwell also disputes the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his guilty verdict on sixteen counts of wire fraud and one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Those counts were predicated on William’s involvement in two schemes to defraud FirstPlus, namely by causing the company to pay substantial sums to Pelullo’s and Scarfo’s sham businesses, and by causing the company to purchase other Pelullo- and Scarfo-owned businesses at vastly inflated prices. inferences drawn from actions and statements of the conspirators or from the circumstances surrounding the scheme”). And as to the third element, John’s purchase of the firearm and his cross-country drive to deliver it are certainly overt acts taken in furtherance of the conspiracy. See id. at 243 (“[A]n overt act of one conspirator is the act of all[.]”). 59 Because William Maxwell did not move at trial for a judgment of acquittal supporting these convictions, we review for plain error. See supra note 49. We look for “a manifest miscarriage of justice[.]” United States v. Burnett, 773 F.3d 122, 135 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). “[T]he record must be devoid of evidence of guilt or the evidence must be so tenuous that a conviction is shocking.” Id. Pelullo and John Maxwell purport to adopt William’s arguments on this issue, but William’s arguments pertain specifically to his particular conduct supporting the convictions, and adoptions “that concern an argument specific to the arguing party will not be regarded[.]” United States v. Williams, 974 F.3d 320, 374 n.41 (3d Cir. 2020). 98 To prove wire fraud, the government needed to show “(1) the defendant’s knowing and willful participation in a scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) with the specific intent to defraud, and (3) the use of interstate wire communications in furtherance of the scheme.” United States v. Andrews, 681 F.3d 509, 518 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation, internal quotation marks, and alteration omitted). As for the charge of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, once again that required the government to prove “(1) a conspiracy existed; (2) the defendant knew of it; and (3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily joined it.” United States v. Wheeler, 16 F.4th 805, 819 (11th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). William does not focus his attack on the evidence supporting any particular element; he instead claims that he only did “as directed[.]”60 (WM Opening Br. at 34-36.) But the trial evidence against him belies that attempted evasion.61 There was, for example, plenty of evidence to support the jury’s finding that William Maxwell participated in the scheme to defraud FirstPlus by causing the company to funnel money to Pelullo and Scarfo. Evidence at trial showed that FirstPlus gave to William, as “Special Counsel,” the authority “to retain any and all consulting firms, in [his] sole discretion” and compensated him $100,000 per month plus expenses for his efforts. (JAD at 1653-56.) With that authority, he retained 60 Specifically, he is referring to the jury’s verdict with respect to Counts 4 through 16. 61 William Maxwell tries to resist any such conclusion by pointing to instances in which he provided legitimate legal services for FirstPlus. But evidence of legal conduct does not negate the evidence of other, illegal conduct. 99 Seven Hills (Pelullo’s company) pursuant to a consulting agreement in which Seven Hills was given authority to “run the entire operation of FirstPlus Financial Group and its subsidiaries” in exchange for $100,000 per month plus expenses. (JAC at 3755.) Seven Hills then turned around and retained LANA (Scarfo’s company), whereby LANA would receive $33,000 of Seven Hills’s $100,000 per month, plus expenses, to perform identical duties as Seven Hills, although it was clear that LANA was not actually going to perform any of those duties, nor was Seven Hills. William was the one who made those payments happen: he received monthly expense reports from Seven Hills and would coordinate and then issue payments for those expenses by wire transfer on behalf of FirstPlus from his attorney trust account. William also disputes the sufficiency of the evidence of his participation in the purchases of Rutgers and Globalnet.62 But he fails on that score too. When Pelullo bullied Kenneth Stein into drafting inflated business valuations for Rutgers and Globalnet, it was actually William Maxwell who signed the engagement letter formally hiring Stein, with Pelullo operating behind the scenes. And when Stein was compensated for his services, the payment came via wire transfer from William’s law firm account. Moreover, William participated in a discussion that resulted in the inclusion of a false statement in FirstPlus’s 10-K regarding its acquisitions of Rutgers and Globalnet from Seven Hills and LANA. When those deals came together, Pelullo had lawyers working on both sides of the transaction. Nevertheless, FirstPlus falsely claimed in its 62 Specifically, he is referring to the jury’s verdict with respect to Counts 17 through 19. 100 10-K that the acquisitions of Rutgers and Globalnet were “arms-length” deals, notwithstanding William’s unsupported assertion to the contrary. (JAD at 2771.) In sum, evidence of William’s participation in the wire fraud counts and the wire fraud conspiracy was neither lacking nor so “tenuous” as to render the convictions “shocking.” United States v. Burnett, 773 F.3d 122, 135 (3d Cir. 2014). In fact, it was quite the opposite. His convictions on the wirefraud related counts are amply supported by the trial record.