Opinion ID: 2976216
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims Against the LFUCG

Text: Because no constitutional violations occurred in this case, the LFUCG necessarily is not liable to Simon. See, e.g., Monday, 118 F.3d at 1105; Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 365 (6th Cir. 1993). “If no constitutional violation by the individual defendant is established, the municipal defendants cannot be held liable under § 1983.” Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273 F.3d 682, 687 (6th Cir. 2001); see also City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (holding that a municipality can be liable under § 1983 only for an actual constitutional violation committed by individual official). C. Constitutionality of Kentucky Revised Statutes Section 202A.041
In addition to suing based on Officer Cook’s conduct, Simon also challenges the constitutionally of warrantless mental evaluations. Simon requests that we “declare that the Fourth Amendment requires two separate and discrete determinations of probable cause,” the first regarding detention and the second regarding mental evaluation. Simon also argues that the Kentucky statute - 15 - Simon v. Cook, et al. No. 06-6514 is unconstitutional because it authorizes unreasonable searches. Both arguments fail. As noted above, we have held that the Fourth Amendment requires a showing of probable cause before a person may be seized for mental evaluation. Monday, 118 F.3d at 1102. The Monday court held that no right was violated when an officer had probable cause, and it certainly did not require a warrant. See ibid. Thus, so long as an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual is dangerous, a warrant is not required in this circuit for a mental-health seizure. Neither does any precedent suggest that a separate inquiry is required before a mental evaluation may begin. Indeed, we note that requiring a separate warrant for mental evaluation could introduce significant delay beyond what the statute presently requires. See KY . REV . STAT . ANN . § 202A.041(1) (requiring evaluation within eighteen hours of transport to a hospital or mental facility). Instead, logically, the probable cause to detain suffices to authorize a mental evaluation. Regarding Simon’s challenge to the Kentucky statute, the Monday court’s establishment of the probable cause standard itself is meant to ensure the reasonableness of any searches. Thus, Simon’s arguments fail.
Simon argues that the Kentucky statute authorizing mental-health evaluations is void for vagueness because it fails to provide a police officer “with precise standards to follow in determining whether an individual is dangerous as a result of mental illness.” Appellant’s Br. 16. “It is established that a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits . . . .” Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966); see United States v. Haun, 90 F.3d 1096, - 16 - Simon v. Cook, et al. No. 06-6514 1101 (6th Cir. 1996). An enactment is “void for vagueness” if it fails to establish standards for police that are sufficient to guard against arbitrary deprivations of liberty. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999). An ordinance may also be unconstitutionally vague if it fails “to define the offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand prohibited conduct.” Belle Maer Harbor v. Charter Twp. of Harrison, 170 F.3d 553, 556 (6th Cir. 1999). “An enactment imposing criminal sanctions or reaching a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct may withstand facial constitutional scrutiny only if it incorporates a high level of definiteness.” Id. at 557; see Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982). Where a statute does not reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct, the statute is void “only if [it] is impermissibly vague in all its applications.” Belle Maer Harbor, 170 F.3d at 557. Unfortunately for Simon, Section 202A.041 seems particularly unsuited to a facial challenge to its alleged vagueness. First, although our precedents regarding facial challenges outside the First Amendment have been described as “inconsistent,” see Staley v. Jones, 239 F.3d 769, 790 n.26 (6th Cir. 2001), it is clear that outside of certain contexts (including the First Amendment and abortion) facial challenges are normally rejected because a person to whom the statute may be constitutionally applied may not challenge the statute on behalf of third parties. See Amelkin v. McClure, 205 F.3d 293, 296 (6th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (stating that to mount a successful facial challenge outside of the First Amendment, a party must “establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] could be valid”); but see Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 477 (6th Cir. 2007) (rejecting application of Salerno and holding that “facial - 17 - Simon v. Cook, et al. No. 06-6514 invalidation is justified where the statute, on its face, endorses procedures to authorize a search that clearly do not comport with the Fourth Amendment”), reh’g en banc granted and opinion vacated Warshak v. United States, No. 06-4092 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007) (order). Second, and more particular to this case, numerous court decisions have upheld the constitutionality of other statutes that are similar to the Kentucky statute. The fact that similarly phrased statutes allow police officers to detain an individual involuntarily if they have “reason to believe” or a “reasonable belief” that the individual is mentally ill and poses a danger to himself or others weighs heavily against Simon’s facial challenge. See S.P. v. City of Takoma Park, Md., 134 F.3d 260, 271 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Ahern, 109 F.3d at 817; Pino v. Higgs, 75 F.3d 1461, 1468-69 (10th Cir. 1996); Gooden, 954 F.2d at 960). Simon’s attempts to bolster his facial challenge are unpersuasive. First, Simon characterizes Section 202A.041 as a criminal sanction. It may be true that criminal sanctions are more susceptible to facial challenges for vagueness. See Morales, 527 U.S. at 55 n.22 (declining to apply Salerno and stating that even if the First Amendment is not implicated, where “vagueness permeates the ordinance, a facial challenge is appropriate”). Even so, Section 202A.041 clearly does not impose criminal sanctions. Second, although Simon argues separately that the statute violates First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, his vagueness argument does not implicate the First Amendment. Third, Simon argues that a facial challenge is appropriate because Section 202A.041 reaches substantial constitutionally protected conduct. See Belle Maer Harbor, 170 F.3d at 557 . However, Belle Maer reiterated that “vagueness claims not involving First Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the facts of the particular case at hand and not as to the statute's facial validity.” - 18 - Simon v. Cook, et al. No. 06-6514 Ibid. Therefore, since the statute does not impose criminal penalties and Simon’s vagueness challenge does not arise from the First Amendment, a facial challenge is inappropriate, and Simon may only challenge the statute as it was applied to him. As applied to Simon, the definitions of dangerousness and mentally ill person included in chapter 202A are not sufficiently vague as to raise concerns about arbitrary enforcement. “Danger” means “substantial physical harm or threat of substantial physical harm upon self, family, or others . . . .” KY . REV . STAT . ANN . § 202.011(2). “Mentally ill person” means a person with “substantially impaired capacity to use self-control, judgment, or discretion . . . .” KY . REV . STAT . ANN . § 202.011(9). These definitions suffice to prevent arbitrary enforcement and did not give unlimited discretion to Officer Cook. Simon argues the statute is too vague because it does not require an explicit connection between the individual’s mental illness and the individual’s dangerousness. This argument is meritless, as the statute does require that Cook reasonably believed that Simon was both dangerous and mentally ill. We hold that Cook’s belief was reasonable; therefore, as applied to Simon, the statute’s conjunction of danger and mental illness is sufficiently definite.
On appeal, Simon argues for the first time that Section 202A.041 is unconstitutionally overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment. Because this claim was not raised below, this court is not required to consider it. “Generally, an appellant cannot raise a claim before the appellate court that was not raised below.” United States v. Cline, 362 F.3d 343, 348 (6th Cir. 2004). As the Monday court itself stated, when a claim was not raised before the district court, and the district court - 19 - Simon v. Cook, et al. No. 06-6514 never addressed it, plaintiff “has waived this argument and we will not review it.” 118 F.3d at 1105.
Simon next argues that Section 202A.041 is unconstitutional because it does not require the hospital to retain the officer’s written documentation of the reasons why the individual is being detained for a mental evaluation. The statute merely requires that the “peace officer shall provide written documentation which describes the behavior of the person which caused the peace officer to take the person into custody.” KY . REV . STAT . ANN . § 202A.041(1). Simon argues that this enables officers to evade allegations that they have submitted false statements, as Simon alleges Officer Cook did in this case. We disagree that due process requires retention of officers’ citations. In the context of involuntary commitment, the Supreme Court has “recognized that for the ordinary citizen, commitment to a mental hospital produces a massive curtailment of liberty, and in consequence requires due process protection.” Vitek, 445 U.S. at 491-92 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Noble v. Schmitt, 87 F.3d 157, 161 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Involuntary commitment to a mental institution substantially restricts individual liberty in many respects.”). Accordingly, the Court has held that a “State cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself . . . .” O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975). Accordingly, state laws have been interpreted to require a finding of dangerousness before an individual can be committed. See, e.g., Glass, 984 F.2d at 57. The “fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting - 20 - Simon v. Cook, et al. No. 06-6514 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). Due process “is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Id. at 334. To determine the process due, courts look at three factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Id. at 335. Applying Mathews to the question of the burden of proof required for involuntary civil commitment, the Supreme Court has noted that it “is indisputable that involuntary commitment to a mental hospital after a finding of probable dangerousness to self or others can engender adverse social consequences to the individual.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979). The Court also noted that the “state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for themselves; the state also has authority under its police power to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill.” Id. at 426. Addressing the rights of prisoners involuntarily transferred to mental facilities, the Supreme Court approved of a district court’s requirement that prisoners be provided written notice of the transfer, a hearing, opportunity at the hearing to present testimony of witnesses, an independent decisionmaker, a written statement as to the evidence relied upon and reasons for transfer to mental hospital, legal counsel, and effective notice of the foregoing rights. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 494-95; see also Doe ex rel. Doe v. Austin, 848 F.2d 1386, 1393-94 (6th - 21 - Simon v. Cook, et al. No. 06-6514 Cir. 1988) (taking Vitek as guidance in identifying procedures required for involuntary commitment of mentally retarded adults).5 Simon’s claim is not that the entire chapter 202A scheme fails to provide due process. Rather, he argues simply that due process requires that written documentation from the officer be retained. This argument is also unpersuasive. Importantly, upon presentment of the allegedly mentally ill individual, the physician makes her own independent evaluation of the patient. In this case, Dr. Goldstein noted that she had reviewed the Uniform Citation and Adult Case Summary provided by the police, but as the district court found, “her evaluation was done independently from what the police do and her decision was based on Simon’s mental status at the time of his evaluation.” The statute is quite clear that, “[i]f after evaluation, the qualified mental health professional finds that the person does not meet the criteria for involuntary hospitalization, the person shall be released immediately . . . .” KY . REV . STAT . ANN . § 202A.041(1) (emphasis added). Since the doctor’s evaluations are independent, retaining an officer’s citation adds little or nothing to the process of admitting someone involuntarily. Moreover, the retention of an officer’s citation has no bearing on the constitutional adequacy of the qualified mental-health professional’s independent examination. As the Second Circuit has stated, “due process does demand that the decision to order an involuntary emergency commitment be made in accordance with a standard that promises some reasonable degree of accuracy.” 5 In approving of the requirements formulated by the district court, the Supreme Court did not hold that those requirements were mandatory. The Court merely said that the district court’s list of requirements sufficed under Mathews to meet the needs of due process. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 494-95. - 22 - Simon v. Cook, et al. No. 06-6514 Rodriguez v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1051, 1062 (2d Cir. 1995). However, Simon is not challenging Kentucky’s standard for involuntary emergency commitment, and the retention of an officer’s citation has no bearing on the adequacy of that standard or its application. We note that under Section 202A.041, allegedly mentally ill individuals receive all of the due process protections the Supreme Court approved in Vitek, except for legal counsel and the opportunity to call witnesses to contest the initial involuntary hospitalization. The omission of legal counsel and the right to call witnesses makes sense since the decision to hospitalize is being made in response to an immediate presentment of an individual and is only going to last 72 hours. Additional procedures, the adequacy of which Simon does not challenge, are required following the initial decision to hold an individual for 72 hours. See KY . REV . STAT . ANN . §§ 202A.031(2), 202A.051. Thus, even though individuals have a strong interest in not being erroneously committed, there is almost no added value to requiring retention of officer citations as part of the process for 72hour emergency commitment. Moreover, retaining such reports has no bearing on Kentucky’s standards, which Simon does not challenge, for involuntary emergency commitment. Therefore, we hold that the statute’s failure to require retention of an officer’s citation is not a constitutional defect. D. Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege Finally, Simon claims that the district court’s decision to allow discovery of his psychotherapist-patient communications violated the attendant privilege. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s ruling that, because Simon had placed his mental health in issue, he had waived the privilege. The district court also ordered that any confidential records be placed under - 23 - Simon v. Cook, et al. No. 06-6514 seal. The Supreme Court has recognized a federal-common-law psychotherapist-patient privilege, holding that “confidential communications between a licensed psychotherapist and her patients in the course of diagnosis or treatment are protected from compelled disclosure under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.” Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996). The Court also noted that, “[l]ike other testimonial privileges, the patient may of course waive the protection.” Id. at 15 n.14. The Court did not say explicitly, however, whether the privilege is waived if a plaintiff puts his mental health at issue. However, this circuit has held that placing one’s mental health at issue constitutes waiver of the privilege. See Maday, 480 F.3d at 821 (holding privilege waived when plaintiff sought mental-health damages); see also Schoffstall, 223 F.3d at 823 (“a plaintiff waives the psychotherapist-patient privilege by placing his or her medical condition at issue”). In this case, it is undisputed that the privilege attached to Simon’s communications with Dr. Goldstein. However, the privilege was waived. Simon’s case against Officer Cook and the LFUCG hinges on whether Cook acted with probable cause when he detained Simon. That determination, in turn, depends on whether Cook had probable cause to believe that Simon was mentally ill and dangerous. Clearly, Simon’s case placed his mental state at issue. Although only Cook’s impressions are part of the probable cause inquiry, not Dr. Goldstein’s later conclusions, Dr. Goldstein’s later communications from Simon may inform our analysis of whether Cook’s view of Simon’s mental state on the day of his detention was objectively reasonable. Therefore, Simon’s suit waived the privilege. - 24 - Simon v. Cook, et al. No. 06-6514