Opinion ID: 1587246
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Caudill's racial slur.

Text: During her March 15, 1998, statement, Detective Lyons told Caudill that he was only repeating what other people had told him. Caudill then remarked: You were talking to the junkies down the street, the crackheads, who were telling you something you wanted to hear, maybe for something that they had done, laying it on me. I know who you talked to out on the street. I know who you talked to. Jeanette and that other chick and and I know you talked to that n____ [racial slur] up the street. They're all sagers [phonetic], I know that. Caudill asserts that the failure to delete the racial slur from her statement was reversible error. We disagree. The word came from her own mouth. She is a Caucasian accused of brutally murdering an African-American. Although it is obvious from the context that the slur did not refer to the victim, it is at least somewhat probative of an animus against African-Americans. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in determining that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. KRE 403; Commonwealth v. English, Ky., 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (1999). 10. Caudill's demeanor. Caudill asserts it was error to permit Julia Davis to testify that when Caudill told her that Lonetta White had said, Help me, why are you doing this to me? Caudill was laughing and using a mocking tone of voice. We disagree. A lay witness may express an opinion as to another's demeanor. KRE 701; McKinney v. Commonwealth, Ky., 60 S.W.3d 499, 503-04 (2001). The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in determining that the probative value of this evidence was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. KRE 403; English , at 945. 11. Cross-examination of Goforth. After Goforth testified that he fled Kentucky because he did not have $5,000.00 to pay an attorney, the prosecutor inquired about Goforth's knowledge of the legal system, specifically whether he had taken a paralegal course before these crimes were committed. Goforth claims that this was prejudicial error because he was in prison when he worked as a paralegal. However, the Commonwealth only established when, not where, the paralegal training occurred for the purpose of establishing his legal knowledge at the time he fled Kentucky. Goforth also complains that the prosecutor repeatedly pointed out that he had lied in thestatement he gave to the police in Gulfport, Mississippi. [W]hen [a defendant] assumes the role of a witness, the rules that generally apply to other witnessesrules that serve the truth-seeking function of the trialare generally applicable to him as well. Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 69, 120 S.Ct. 1119, 1125, 146 L.Ed.2d 47 (2000) ( quoting Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 282, 109 S.Ct. 594, 600-01, 102 L.Ed.2d 624 (1989)). A defendant's credibility may be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness. Id. ( quoting Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154, 78 S.Ct. 622, 626, 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958)). It is essential ... to the proper functioning of the adversary system that when a defendant takes the stand, the government be permitted proper and effective cross-examination in an attempt to elicit the truth. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626-27, 100 S.Ct. 1912, 1916, 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980). 12. Alleged violation of KRE 609. During the direct examinations of Steve White, Edna Sharp, Cynthia Ellis, and Julia Davis, the prosecutor asked the witnesses whether they had been convicted of felonies and, upon receiving affirmative answers, the nature of the felonies committed which were, respectively, DUI-fourth offense, trafficking in cocaine, theft by deception of $300 or more, and forgery. Neither appellants nor any of the witnesses in question objected to these inquiries. Goforth now asserts that eliciting the nature of the convictions amounted to improper impeachment in violation of KRE 609(a) and that he was prejudiced thereby because the witnesses all inculpated Caudill, thus were favorable to him. In fact, the inquiries had the effect of casting the witnesses in a more favorable light. The only purpose for inquiring whether a party's own witness has been convicted of a felony is to defuse anticipated impeachment by the opposing party; and the obvious purpose for inquiring as to the nature of each offense was anticipatory rehabilitation, i.e., to show that the witnesses had, at least, not been convicted of a crime of violence. Furthermore, KRE 609(a) only provides that [t]he identity of the crime upon which the conviction was based may not be disclosed upon cross-examination ... (emphasis added), and these disclosures were elicited upon direct examination. 13. Hearsay. Goforth raises six hearsay issues with respect to the testimonies of Caudill, Cynthia Ellis, and Julia Davis. Ellis and Davis were jailhouse informants who testified as witnesses for the Commonwealth against Caudill. Neither indicated any acquaintanceship with Goforth. Both had been cautioned prior to trial and pursuant to Gray v. Maryland and Richardson v. Marsh, both supra, not to testify as to any statements by Caudill indicating that anyone else was present when the crimes were committed. For the most part, both complied with this directive. a. Goforth's first claim relates to Ellis's testimony that Caudill told her that she had gathered some black, she did say black plastic bags, and that they had, that she had wrapped the woman in this. (Emphasis added.) In the first place, Ellis immediately corrected herself by changing the identifying pronoun from plural to singular. Secondly, Goforth admitted he was present when the victim's body was wrapped in a carpet and that he assisted in carrying it to the garage and loading it into the trunk of the victim's automobile. There was no objection to Ellis's slip and the totality of the circumstances are persuasive that it did not change the result in this case. Sanders, supra, at 668; Cosby, supra, at 369. b. When the prosecutor asked Davis what Caudill had told her about what she had done, Davis replied: I can't say the other person's name . . . . Technically, this statement was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove the truth of any relevant fact. At worst, it was a Bruton violation and was rendered harmless when (1) Caudill subsequently testified and subjected herself to cross-examination and (2) Goforth subsequently testified and admitted that he was present when the crimes were committed. c. On cross-examination by Caudill's attorney, Davis responded to an inquiry about her alleged inconsistent statements to Detective Lyons by saying, [i]t was all in the process of them murdering her, so, you know, it was as if she was being killed. (Emphasis added.) There was no objection to Davis's slip and, because Caudill subsequently testified that Goforth killed White and was subjected to extensive cross-examination on the subject, we are unpersuaded that, absent this isolated slip, the result would have been different. Sanders ; Cosby. d. Caudill admitted on cross-examination by the prosecutor that the victim had pleaded with her to please help me. The statement was not introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted, KRE 801(c), but to prove that the victim was still alive when the statement was made. Because it had a relevancy without regard to the truth of the assertion, the statement was admissible. Osborne v. Commonwealth, Ky., 43 S.W.3d 234, 242 (2001); Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 8.05, at 367-68 (3d ed. Michie 1993). e. Caudill testified that when she and Goforth returned to Lexington after burning Mrs. White's automobile, they encountered Sonny Price who asked Goforth, Now where did you get, where did all the blood come from? To the extent that Price's inquiry can be characterized as hearsay, it falls within the exception for a present sense impression, i.e., a statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter. KRE 803(1); Bray v. Commonwealth, 68 S.W.3d at 381. Regardless, Goforth admitted that he assisted in carrying the victim's body to the garage and that the victim's blood had spilled through the carpet during that process, thus explaining the presence of the blood. f. After her arrest, Caudill accompanied the police on a walk-through of the crime scene, explaining how Goforth killed Mrs. White. As noted earlier in Part I, issue 4(b), the videotape was not introduced. KRE 801A(a)(2); Fields v. Commonwealth, Ky.,12 S.W.3d 275, 280-81 (2000). Goforth complains, however, that Caudill testified at trial that, after her arrest, she did a walk-through reenactment with the detectives. That testimony, of course, was not hearsay. Goforth then complains that Detective Lyons testified that he took Caudill out to the location on Bryanwood Park (Mrs. White's residence). That, testimony, of course, also was not hearsay. Finally, Goforth complains that Detective Lyons testified that Caudill showed him where Goforth's truck had been parked in the shopping center parking lot (supporting Caudill's version that she did not want White to know she was with another person), whereas Goforth subsequently testified that his truck was parked directly in front of White's residence (supporting Goforth's version that Caudill told White they were having car trouble). Although Caudill may or may not have said to Lyons that we parked the truck here so that White would not know that another person was with me, Lyons's testimony was arguably hearsay by implied assertion. See Lawson, supra, § 8.05 III(1), at 369. However, Goforth did not object to the testimony and we are unpersuaded that the result in this case would have been different absent the admission of the implied assertion. Sanders, supra, at 668; Cosby, supra, at 369. That is especially true since Caudill subsequently testified to the same fact under oath and subject to cross-examination. 14. Effects of cocaine. Goforth complains of the fact that, during cross-examination of Steve White, Caudill's attorney elicited information that using cocaine caused White to become paranoid. Presumably, Caudill was hoping by the inquiry to establish an intoxication defense. Goforth did not object to this testimony and does not articulate any rational reason how this testimony prejudiced him. He only speculates that the jury may have viewed this evidence as giving credence to Dr. Schilling's penalty phase testimony that Caudill was a submissive person. Dr. Schilling did not testify that Caudill was paranoid or that paranoia is in any way related to submissiveness.