Opinion ID: 1783612
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Burson v. Freeman: The First Amendment and the Electoral Process

Text: In Burson, the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a Tennessee statute which prohibited the solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of a polling place. As noted by the United States Fifth Circuit in its consideration of this case, [16] the Burson Court's plurality found that the statute in question implicated several core First Amendment concerns, and accordingly subjected the statute to strict scrutiny. The result of this scrutiny was the conclusion that the Tennessee statute was enacted to foster a compelling state interest, namely protecting voters from confusion and undue influence. Burson, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 1851. In addition, the plurality observed that [w]hile we readily acknowledge that a law rarely survives (strict) scrutiny, an examination of the evolution of election reform, both in this country and abroad, demonstrates the necessity of restricted areas in or around polling places. Burson, supra, at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 1852. Finding that [a] long history, a substantial consensus, and simple common sense show that some restricted zone around polling places is necessary to protect that fundamental right, the plurality went on to evaluate whether the means utilized by Tennessee's legislature were narrowly drawn to achieve its desired end. Burson, supra, at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 1858. Under the conventional formulation of this aspect of strict scrutiny, the legislative purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved, and therefore [t]he breadth of legislative abridgement (of First Amendment rights) must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247, 252, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960) ( footnotes omitted ). See also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2758, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) (Government may not regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals). The Burson plurality at this point, however, departed from the traditional strict scrutiny analysis. It chose, instead, what it termed a modified `burden of proof approach, focusing not upon alternative means of achieving the compelling legislative purpose, but rather whether the means chosen by the State significantly impinged upon constitutionally protected rights. Burson, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 1857. The plurality made clear that this departure from precedent was because a government has such a compelling interest in securing the right to vote freely that `Legislatures... should be permitted to respond to potential deficiencies in the electoral process with foresight rather than reactively.' Id., at ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. at 1856, 1857, quoting Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195-196, 107 S.Ct. 533, 537-538, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986). The plurality was also careful to specify the limited context in which this modified `burden of proof' was to operate: it applies only when the First Amendment right threatens to interfere with the act of voting itself, i.e., cases involving voter confusion from overcrowded ballots,... or cases such as this one, in which the challenged activity physically interferes with electors attempting to cast their ballots. Id., ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 1856 n. 11. Considering the statutory 100 foot proscription upon campaign advertising and voter solicitation before it, the Burson plurality declared, with little discussion, that [w]e do not think that the minor geographic limitation prescribed by (the Tennessee legislature) constitutes such a significant impingement. Burson, supra, at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 1857. The plurality did go on to note that [a]t some measurable distance [17] from the polls, of course, governmental regulation of vote solicitation could effectively become an impermissible burden. Id. Confining its decision to the facts before it, the plurality concluded only that it is sufficient to say that in establishing a 100-foot boundary, Tennessee is on the constitutional side of the line. Id.