Opinion ID: 2538150
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory Language and Context

Text: (5) We begin with the statutory language, viewed in light of the entire legislative scheme of which it is a part, as the language chosen is usually the surest guide to legislative intent. ( In re Corrine W., supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 529.) To the extent we find the statutory language susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, we examine other sources, including the history of the provision's enactment, for insight into the Legislature's intent. ( Ibid. ; Elsner v. Uveges (2004) 34 Cal.4th 915, 929 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 530, 102 P.3d 915].) Subdivision (f) of section 51 provides that [a] violation of the right of any individual under the ADA is also a violation of section 51. The subdivision does not distinguish between those ADA violations involving intentional discrimination and those resulting, in the words of the federal law, from the discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers and the failure to make modifications to existing facilities. (42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5).) The remedies for violation of section 51 specified in section 52include a private action for damages. A reasonable interpretation of section 51, subdivision (f) is therefore that it, together with section 52, authorizes a private action for damages for ADA violations without proof of intentional discrimination. This is the reading embraced by the Lentini court ( Lentini, supra, 370 F.3d at pp. 846-847) and urged on us by plaintiff. On the other hand, subdivision (f) of section 51 states only that an ADA violation is also a violation of this section, i.e., of section 51. Section 51 does not, in itself, establish any remedy for its violation. And section 52 does not expressly state that its remedies apply to every violation of section 51. Instead, section 52 applies its remedies to any person who denies, aids or incites a denial, or makes any discrimination or distinction contrary to Section 51, language we read in Harris as connoting intentional discrimination. ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1172.) As a purely linguistic matter, therefore, another reasonable interpretation of section 51, subdivision (f) is that it makes all violations of the ADA violations of section 51 but, together with section 52, authorizes a private action for damages under the Unruh Civil Rights Act only for ADA violations involving intentional discrimination. This is the reading embraced by the Gunther court ( Gunther, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 234-235) and urged on us by defendant. Although linguistically admissible, Gunther 's reading of the statute is not consistent with our understanding of the Unruh Civil Rights Act as elucidated in Harris, or with the law's history. As noted earlier, sections 51 and 52 have, throughout their history, functioned as an integral legal scheme; section 51 has defined the civil rights of Californians to equal treatment in public accommodations, and section 52 has established the liabilities of those who violate such civil rights. Section 52 has always referred expressly to violations of section 51 and provided remedies for those violations. As we said in Harris, section 52 provide[s] an enforcement mechanism for section 51. ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1153.) In Harris, we analyzed the statutory scheme as a wholeincluding both sections 51 and 52and concluded a violation of that law could not be established on a disparate impact theory. Our holding in Harris was not that section 52 required proof of intentional discrimination in order to obtain damages, but that a plaintiff seeking to establish a case under the Unruh Act must plead and prove intentional discrimination . . . . ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1175, italics added.) In reaching this conclusion, we relied on a provision of section 51 providing that application of neutral standards does not violate the law and on the entire history of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, as well as on the particular language of section 52. ( Harris, at pp. 1172-1174.) Nowhere in Harris did we suggest that unintentional discrimination would violate section 51, but would not support an action for damages under section 52. Rather, we held that unintentional discrimination did not violate the Unruh Civil Rights Act at all. The Gunther court misread our Harris decision as interpreting section 52 only, hence unaffected by the addition of subdivision (f) to section 51. (See Gunther, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 233-235.) As a federal court (which followed Lentini and disagreed with Gunther ) explained, Conceptually . . . Gunther envisions a two-step process for obtaining damages: first, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant engaged in discrimination, Cal. Civ. Code § 51, and second, that the discrimination was intentional, Cal. Civ. Code § 52. ( Wilson v. Haria and Gogri Corp. (E.D.Cal. 2007) 479 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1137.) Because the 1992 amendment that added subdivision (f) to section 51 made no substantial changes to the language of section 52 relied on in Harris, the Gunther court believed that amendment did nothing to affect Harris 's requirement of intentional discrimination. ( Gunther, at p. 234.) But Gunther 's distinction between violations of section 51 and violations of section 51 warranting a remedy under section 52 is without historical support. Section 52 has always provided remedies for violations of section 51, and our holding in Harris concerned both sections. The most natural reading of the statutory languagethat section 52 provides remedies for all categories of discrimination prohibited under section 51is also the reading that best accords with the law's history. Section 52 authorizes a damages action against any person who makes any discrimination . . . contrary to Section 51. By adding subdivision (f) to section 51, making all ADA violationswhether or not involving intentional discriminationviolations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act as well, the Legislature included ADA violations in the category of discrimination contrary to section 51, thus making them remediable under section 52. As the Lentini court explained, quoting an earlier district court decision, `Because the Unruh Act has adopted the full expanse of the ADA, it must follow, that the same standards for liability apply under both Acts.' ( Lentini, supra, 370 F.3d at p. 847.) The effect was to create an exception to Harris 's holding that a plaintiff seeking to establish a case under the Unruh [Civil Rights] Act must plead and prove intentional discrimination . . . . ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1175.)