Opinion ID: 161005
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of the Hobbs Act

Text: 16 Morris challenges the constitutionality of the Hobbs Act arguing its application to him is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's power to regulate under the Commerce Clause. He asserts that this Court should reverse his convictions and overrule its prior Hobbs Act jurisprudence in light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), as it applies to isolated robberies not committed as part of racketeering acts (Appellant's Br. at 7) or that this Court should remand for a new trial so that the jury can be instructed it must find the activity substantially impacted interstate commerce (id. at 16). Morris's argument relies on the proposition that to be constitutionally applied to non-racketeering robberies, the Hobbs Act requires a demonstration that a defendant's conduct more than minimally impacted interstate commerce. We review this challenge to the constitutionality of the Hobbs Act de novo. Pearson, 203 F.3d at 1267. 17 In United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396 (10th Cir. 1995), we examined our prior Hobbs Act jurisprudence in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez. We concluded that 18 Lopez did not... require the government to show that individual instances of the regulated activity substantially affect commerce to pass constitutional muster under the Commerce Clause. Rather, the Court recognized that if a statute regulates an activity which, through repetition, in aggregate has a substantial affect [sic] on interstate commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence. 19 Bolton, 68 F.3d at 399 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558) (further citation omitted). We then concluded that the Hobbs Act regulates activities which in aggregate have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, the statute represents a permissible exercise of the authority granted to Congress under the Commerce Clause, and... under Lopez, all the government need show is a de minimis effect on interstate commerce in order to support a conviction under the Act. Bolton, 68 F.3d at 399. Citing the government's production of evidence at trial establishing that defendant's robberies affected interstate commerce, we upheld defendant's Hobbs Act conviction. Id. at 399-400. 20 We have also upheld the Hobbs Act in light of the Supreme Court's more recent Commerce Clause cases, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), and Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000). See United States v. Malone, 222 F.3d 1286 (10th Cir. 2000). In Malone, we again held that only a de minimis showing [of effect on interstate commerce] is required under the Hobbs Act. Id. at 1294. Central to our determination was that the Hobbs Act, unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act at issue in Lopez and the Violence Against Women Act at issue in Morrison, regulates economic activity and contains an explicit and expansive jurisdictional element establishing that it is in pursuance of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce. Malone, 222 F.3d at 1295. In examining the Hobbs Act in light of Jones, we again focused on the jurisdictional element of the Act. Malone, 222 F.3d at 1295. Citing Jones, 529 U.S. at 854, for the proposition that when Congress uses the words `affecting commerce' without qualification, it intends to invoke its full authority under the Commerce Clause, we concluded that the Hobbs Act does not suggest that Congress intended to limit its jurisdiction in any way. Malone, 222 F.3d at 1295. 21 Petitioner argues that the Hobbs Act is meant to regulate racketeering and not garden variety robberies. (Appellant's Br. at 11-14.) From there, he argues garden variety robberies, such as the ones he participated in, do not bear[] a substantial relation to commerce, [such that] the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 548. He asserts that even if we conclude the Act is intended to regulate garden variety robberies, the United States would need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual robberies in these case[s] substantially impacted interstate commerce. (Appellant's Br. at 15.) 22 As an initial matter, we conclude that the plain language of the Hobbs Act does not limit its scope to racketeering robberies. Contrary to petitioner's argument, there is nothing in the statute to indicate that the plan or purpose language limits its scope. In fact, the plan or purpose language only requires the accused individual to have a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of [the Act]. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). One way to violate the Act is to commit a robbery that affects commerce in any way or degree. Id. Under the Act, robbery means the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person... against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence.... Id. § 1951(b)(1). Nothing in the definition of robbery requires a series of so-called racketeering robberies. Because the statute is clear on its face, we decline to examine the alleged lack of legislative intent to regulate criminal activity already punished by the States. 23 Second, Morris defeats his own argument by relying on the constitutional pitfall enunciated in Lopez-that is, the lack of a jurisdictional element to ensure impact on interstate commerce-to support his contention that the government must show a substantial effect on interstate commerce. (Appellant's Br. at 15.) Once again, petitioner fails to read the plain language of the statute. There is no question that the Hobbs Act contains a jurisdictional element. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (Whoever in any way or degree... affects commerce... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned....). As discussed above, the reason we have repeatedly held that the government need only show a de minimis effect on interstate commerce to prove a Hobbs Act violation is because the Act has a jurisdictional element, which ensures that in each case a nexus between the conduct at issue and interstate commerce exists. As we concluded in Malone, the presence of the jurisdictional element in the Act demonstrates Congress's intent to exercise its full authority under the Commerce Clause. 222 F.3d at 1295. 24 Although Morris attempts to style his challenge to the Hobbs Act as an as-applied one, his challenge is really to Tenth Circuit jurisprudence holding that only a de minimis effect on interstate commerce must be demonstrated to convict a defendant of a Hobbs Act violation. Because this Circuit has addressed precisely these challenges since Lopez, Morrison and Jones, Morris's challenge must fail. This panel can not overrule established Tenth Circuit precedent. See, e.g., In re Smith, 10 F.3d at 724. 25 In sum, we reject Morris's contention that the Hobbs Act was unconstitutionally applied to him. Morris participated in an activity expressly regulated by the Act, i.e., robbery. We have held that the Hobbs Act regulates economic activity and that the jurisdictional element shows Congress's intent to exercise its full authority under the Commerce Clause. Malone, 222 F.3d at 1295. Finally, in Bolton we concluded that Congress determined that robbery... [is an] activit[y] which through repetition may have substantial detrimental effects on interstate commerce. 68 F.3d at 399. Thus, under Lopez, the fact that any robbery may have had only a de minimis effect on interstate commerce does not render regulation of that activity an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. Here, the jury explicitly found that Morris's conduct affected interstate commerce; accordingly, the Hobbs Act was constitutionally applied to Morris.