Opinion ID: 1201769
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Waiver of Sequestered Hovey Voir Dire

Text: Before jury selection, the trial court showed the parties a proposed questionnaire to be completed by each prospective juror. Of the 56 proposed questions, 3 dealt with the prospective juror's views on the death penalty. [9] After minor changes, the parties approved the questionnaire. While the parties were discussing the questionnaire and related jury selection procedures, the trial court suggested that the parties by stipulation dispense with the procedure mandated by Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 80 [168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301], under which the death-qualification portion of the voir dire is conducted with each prospective juror individually and in sequestration. The prosecutor and defense counsel so stipulated and defendant personally waived the Hovey voir dire procedure with the understanding that sequestered voir dire of individual prospective jurors would be available based on responses to the questionnaires and answers given in open court. (27) Defendant contends that the trial court erred in soliciting and accepting the parties' stipulation and defendant's personal waiver of the Hovey voir dire procedure. Defendant further contends that in agreeing to dispense with the Hovey procedure, defendant's trial counsel violated defendant's rights under the federal and state Constitutions to the effective assistance of counsel (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, ง 15). No statute requires the Hovey voir dire procedure, nor has any court held it to be mandated by the Constitution of this state or of the United States. Rather, this court invoked its supervisory authority over California criminal procedure to declare that henceforth the death-qualification voir dire should be conducted with each juror individually and in sequestration. ( Hovey, supra, 28 Cal.3d 1, 80.) When this court adopted the rule, we cited evidence that prolonged discussion of penalty phase procedures during voir dire fosters a perception that the penalty phase will occur, and thereby conditions jurors to anticipate that they will find the defendant guilty. ( Id. at pp. 70-80.) Also, prospective jurors who see other jurors excused for cause after expressing reluctance or unwillingness to return a death verdict may conclude that the law disapproves of such attitudes and may in consequence feel less willing to express or rely on such attitudes in their consideration of penalty. ( Id. at p. 74, fn. omitted.) As a general rule, a person is free to waive the advantage of any law or rule intended primarily or exclusively for that person's own benefit. (Civ. Code, ง 3513.) This court adopted the Hovey voir dire procedure to benefit defendants in capital cases ( People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 51 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388] [the sequestered voir dire is for the benefit of the defendant]), and defendant offers no persuasive reason for depriving defendants in capital cases of the freedom to waive Hovey voir dire procedures. We conclude that capital defendants may waive the Hovey procedure and that defendant validly waived it in this case. We reject also defendant's contention that his trial counsel's stipulation to dispense with the Hovey voir dire procedure constituted ineffective assistance. The record contains no explanation for counsel's decision to dispense with Hovey voir dire procedures. In this situation, as we have seen, an appellate court will reject a claim of ineffective assistance unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation[.] ( People v. Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d 412, 426.) Defendant maintains that there could be no satisfactory explanation for a decision to waive a procedure that is clearly advantageous to the defense, but the argument is based on a false premise. Defendant assumes that by stipulating to dispense with the Hovey voir dire procedure defense counsel exposed defendant to the risks of collective voir dire mentioned in Hovey, supra, 28 Cal.3d 1. But the procedure used in this case was far different from the pre- Hovey collective voir dire; competent counsel might well conclude that it protected defendant's interests as well as, or better than, the Hovey procedure. The record reveals that the death-qualification voir dire in this case occurred primarily through the juror questionnaires rather than through voir dire in open court. Because the prospective jurors answered the questionnaires individually and in isolation from each other, defendant received the primary advantage of Hovey voir dire โ minimizing each prospective juror's exposure to the death-qualification voir dire of others ( Hovey, supra, 28 Cal.3d 1, 81). By including the death-qualification questions among a much larger group of questions, the questionnaire avoided one of the main drawbacks of the Hovey voir dire procedure โ giving special emphasis to the death-qualification aspect of voir dire. Moreover, the stipulation did not waive the Hovey procedure entirely; defendant retained the right to obtain sequestered voir dire of individual jurors. Although some death-qualification questioning did occur during general voir dire, competent counsel might well conclude that a slight exposure of prospective jurors to the death-qualification of others was a small price to pay for the additional reduction in the pretrial emphasis on penalty ( id. at p. 80) obtained by conducting death-qualification voir dire primarily through the questionnaires. (Cf. People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 289-290 [266 Cal. Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892] [defense counsel's stipulation limiting death-qualification voir dire to four standard questions does not establish incompetence].)