Opinion ID: 547523
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Auerbach

Text: 7 Auerbach claims that he did not cause anyone to travel between Indiana and Kentucky since he did not direct and control the couriers who shuttled between Bernstein and him delivering marijuana and picking up money. 1 Bernstein, he contends, caused this travel. This argument is specious. Auerbach cannot dodge personal responsibility for the interstate character of his involvement with the operations of the Heilbrunn drug ring when he was an out of state operative. Auerbach regularly provided directions (via telephones and beepers) to the couriers dispatched by Bernstein; moreover, by the same exercise in semantics Auerbach employs one also may argue that his residence in Kentucky caused Bernstein to dispatch the couriers across state lines. 8 In any event, criminal liability under the Travel Act does not hinge upon which side can reach farther back into a sequence of but fors. To establish a violation, 9 it is sufficient to show interstate travel or the use of an interstate facility with intent to promote or carry on an unlawful activity, and facts constituting the promotion or carrying on of the unlawful activity. Of course, where as here, a conspiracy is shown, conspirators are responsible for the acts of their coconspirators in furtherance of the unlawful activity. 10 United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 455, 489 (7th Cir.1977) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820, 99 S.Ct. 82, 58 L.Ed.2d 110 (1978). Personal knowledge of the interstate activities, or the use of interstate facilities, is not an element of a Travel Act violation; it is sufficient that the defendant's unlawful activity caused the interstate travel. See, e.g., United States v. Raineri, 670 F.2d 702, 716-17 & n. 12 (7th Cir.1982) (evidence that checks issued by defendant's nude dancing establishment crossed state lines during collection process sufficient to support Travel Act conviction). Here, Auerbach's illegal activity was participation in a drug distribution conspiracy; it is immaterial whether Auerbach personally caused, or knew of, the interstate travel because, as a co-conspirator, he is liable for Bernstein's acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. 2 11 Auerbach's reliance on Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 91 S.Ct. 1056, 28 L.Ed.2d 493 (1971) is therefore misplaced. In Rewis, the Court reversed the Travel Act conviction of the owner of a gambling establishment, holding that he did not, for purposes of the Act, cause his out of state patrons to travel across the state line to reach his establishment. Rewis did not, however, address a preexisting business relationship (not to mention a criminal conspiracy) between two principals who shuttled couriers back and forth between themselves. See United States v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 289 n. 3 (4th Cir.1989) (Rewis distinguishable on this basis). Moreover, the Court noted that there are cases in which federal courts have correctly applied Sec. 1952 to those individuals whose agents or employees cross state lines in furtherance of illegal activity.... Id. 401 U.S. at 813, 91 S.Ct. at 1060. In fact, the Court suggested that Congress intended the Travel Act to reach exactly such cases, noting that it targeted the Act not toward sporadic, casual involvement [in the predicate offenses], but rather toward a continuous course of conduct sufficient for it to be termed a business enterprise. Id. at 811 n. 6, 91 S.Ct. at 1059 n. 6 (quoting Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General when the Act was proposed). Auerbach purchased marijuana from Bernstein and the Heilbrunns regularly from May 1985 to June 1986 in furtherance of their conspiracy; his involvement in their interstate shipments was anything but sporadic or casual.