Opinion ID: 729912
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conflicting Medical Opinions on Plaintiff's Residual Functional Capacity

Text: 18 In determining the effect of Plaintiff's Somatoform Disorder on her ability to work, the ALJ considered the conflicting RFCA given by the ME (Dr. Hauer) and Plaintiff's psychologist (Dr. Hague). Although the ALJ cannot substitute his opinion for the physicians' opinions of Plaintiff's condition, see Scivally v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1070, 1076-77 (7th Cir.1992), the ALJ is free to accept either opinion as long as the officer's factual finding is supported by substantial evidence. Dray v. Railroad Retirement Board, 10 F.3d 1306, 1310 (7th Cir.1993): 19 In the case of dueling doctors, it remains the province of the hearing officer to decide whom to believe--a treating physician whose experience and knowledge about the case may (or may not) be relevant to understanding the claimant's condition, or a consulting specialist who may bring expertise and knowledge about similar cases. At all events, resolution of evidentiary conflicts lies within the exclusive domain of the hearing officer so long as those factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. 20 Id. Nevertheless, although it need not discuss all the evidence or testimony, the ALJ cannot, without explanation, discount entire lines of reasoning or discount an uncontradicted, dispositive medical opinion. Herron, 19 F.3d at 333. But medical evidence, even that from a treating physician, may be discounted if it is internally inconsistent or inconsistent with other evidence in the record. See Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 314 (7th Cir.1995). 21 Although Plaintiff argues that the ALJ substituted its own opinion regarding Plaintiff's RFC, the record shows that the ALJ merely chose to believe the ME's testimony rather than the RFCA submitted by Dr. Hague. Indeed, the ALJ's report indicates that it relied on the VE's testimony regarding the number of jobs available to an individual in the hypothetical situation (hypo. # 1) that was based on the RFCA attributed to Plaintiff by Dr. Hauer. It follows, therefore, that it must have rejected Dr. Hague's opinion, which, if accepted, supported a finding of no available jobs according to the VE. We recognize that the ALJ must be sufficiently clear in rejecting medical testimony. See Dray, 10 F.3d at 1311 (stating that the hearing officer must not only offer some principled basis explaining why one account [of conflicting testimony] is worthier than another, but also explain with particularity the basis of the decision). However, a remand is not required if in discounting Dr. Hague's opinion, the ALJ articulate[s] at some minimal level his analysis of the evidence.'  Herron, 19 F.3d at 333 (quoting Ray v. Bowen, 843 F.2d 998, 1002 (7th Cir.1988)). 22 Here, the structure of the ALJ's detailed report implicitly shows that the ALJ considered but rejected Dr. Hague's RFCA due primarily to the lack of clinical findings to support it and because Plaintiff participated in near normal activities. (R. at 79-80.) First, the ALJ clearly acknowledged that Dr. Hague evaluated Plaintiff's ability to perform most work functions as Poor or None. (R. at 79.) Next, he stated that there is no objective medical evidence to substantiate [Plaintiff's] complaints, noting that the medical evidence fails to substantiate that the claimant has a severe disabling physical impairment, and in regard to a mental impairment, that Plaintiff has near normal activities of daily living. (R. at 70-80) (emphasis). Moreover, the ALJ noted that the Plaintiff has refused treatment at the pain clinic. Also, despite Plaintiff's claim that she could not travel, the ALJ noted Plaintiff traveled to Kentucky and that she takes care of her grandchildren. (R. at 80.) Finally, the ALJ stated that the ME's testimony was contrary to Plaintiff's allegations and to Dr. Hague's REFCA. After this thorough summarization of the record, the ALJ concluded that the Plaintiff was not disabled. We thus reject Plaintiff's claim (made at oral argument) that the ALJ's discussion of the record was short-shrift. 23 In addition to the ALJ's implicit rejection of Dr. Hague's RFCA, the record as a whole supports the ALJ's decision to discount Dr. Hague's opinion. Most notably, Dr. Hague's RFCA of Plaintiff is inconsistent with his own clinical findings made during the relevant period. For instance, after Plaintiff's last visit with Dr. Hague, he reported no mental abnormalities, and, that Plaintiff was feeling well enough to travel to Kentucky to visit her friends and relatives. (R. at 251-52.). Moreover, Dr. Hague's assessment was also inconsistent with the opinions of two addtional psychologists who opined that Plaintiff's mental condition did not significantly limit her ability to perform basic work activities. (R. at 101-05, 108-12, 252-62.) 24 Based on the lack of clinical findings to support Dr. Hague's assessment and based on the apparent inconsistency between his assessment and Plaintiff's nearly normal activities, the ALJ properly discredited Dr. Hague's assessment of Plaintiff's residual functional capacity. Moreover, the ALJ met the minimal articulation standard because we can 'track the ALJ's reasoning and be assured that the ALJ considered the important evidence. Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 308 (7th Cir.1995) (quoting Green v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 96, 101 (7th Cir.1995)). 25