Opinion ID: 1158185
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Informing the Jury of the First Jury's Deadlock

Text: (18) Defendant next contends the trial court impermissibly restricted the scope of voir dire in violation of his constitutional rights to due process, a fair and impartial jury, and a reliable penalty verdict. At the start of the penalty retrial, defense counsel requested the court to inform the prospective jurors that the first penalty trial had resulted in a hung jury and to specifically question them about their knowledge of the matter. Counsel stated that the request was motivated by two concerns: First, that the publicity surrounding the recent California Supreme Court retention election (in which three justices were not retained) might lead some jurors to mistakenly assume that defendant's prior death judgment had been reversed on a legal technicality; second, that several newspaper articles had revealed the first jury's vote to be nine to three in favor of death, which might prejudice certain jurors with this knowledge. The trial court denied the motion, but emphasized that counsel could question the jurors generally as to whether they had heard or read anything about the case, and could follow up with specific questions if any indicated an awareness of the earlier hung jury. Counsel renewed the motion midway through voir dire after several jurors had referred to the recent Supreme Court election in response to questions about their views on the death penalty. The trial court again denied the motion. In the seminal case of People v. Williams (1981) 29 Cal.3d 392, 407 [174 Cal. Rptr. 317, 628 P.2d 869], we held that counsel should be allowed to ask questions reasonably designed to assist in the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges.... However, we also expressly left intact the considerable discretion of the trial court to contain voir dire within reasonable limits. ( Id. at p. 408; see also People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 829 [1 Cal. Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436]; People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 48 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388].) Williams cited with approval the case of People v. Carmichael (1926) 198 Cal. 534 [246 P. 62], overruled on other grounds in People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1086 [259 Cal. Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659]. ( People v. Williams, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 403, fn. 4.) In Carmichael, the case on which defendant principally relies, the court held that the defendant was improperly denied the opportunity to question prospective jurors about their knowledge of the first jury's inability to reach a verdict. (198 Cal. at p. 543.) In so holding, however, the court emphasized that the more general questions put to the prospective jurors were inadequate to elicit this sort of information. Among these questions was whether the jurors had formed or expressed any opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of the defendant; whether they knew of any reason they could not give the defendant a fair and impartial trial; and whether they had talked with any witness or former juror in the case. ( Id. at pp. 544-545.) As the court explained: [A] juror in answer to a general question might state with perfect sincerity that he knew of no reason why he could not give the defendant a fair and impartial trial, but upon a further and more minute examination it might be shown that his conception of a fair and impartial trial for one who had been previously tried by a jury, ten of whom believed him guilty, differed in many material respects from that which the law accords to all persons accused of crime. ( Id. at p. 545.) Furthermore, the answers of the jurors ... that they had not talked with the former jurors or ... a witness in the case did not necessarily show that they had not heard how the former jury stood.... ( Id. at p. 546.) Here, in contrast, the general question sanctioned by the court, to wit, whether the prospective jurors had read or heard anything concerning the case, was designed to elicit precisely the sort of information which concerned counsel. If any prospective juror had indicated an awareness of the first jury's deadlock, counsel was expressly authorized to ask specific follow-up questions. The trial court's strategem thus avoided imparting the very information which might cause bias (awareness of the first jury's vote) while assuring counsel a reasonable opportunity to obtain a fair and impartial jury. (See People v. Thompson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 178 [no sua sponte duty to inform second penalty phase jury of the first jury's deadlock].) We conclude, therefore, that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in disallowing the proposed instruction and questions concerning the hung jury. Defendant makes a separate but related argument that the trial court erred in refusing counsel's request to inform the prospective jurors that the penalty retrial was not occasioned by an appellate reversal of an earlier death judgment. We rejected a similar claim in People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d 787, observing, We ... have never suggested that the trial court is required to inform the jury of the history of the prior proceedings.... ( Id. at p. 845.) There, as here, the record disclosed no basis even for speculation that the jury's verdict might have resulted from resentment over some presumed reversal by this court. ( Ibid. ) Accordingly, we hold that the court properly refused the requested instruction.