Opinion ID: 403761
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The DEA's Claims

Text: 35 The DEA reasserts its argument that a request for all the records within a particular computer system is overbroad and thus does not reasonably describe those records as required by the Act. This argument was properly rejected by the district court. Memorandum Order at 6; App. at 44. Although the number of records requested appears to be irrelevant to the determination whether they have been reasonably described, appellees' overbreadth argument raises serious questions concerning the allowable scope of FOIA requests. 36 The linchpin inquiry is whether the agency is able to determine precisely what records (are) being requested. S.Rep. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1974); Source Book at 162. See also H.Rep. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1974), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 6267; Source Book at 125-26. It is clear in this case that the DEA knew precisely which of its records had been requested and the nature of the information sought from those records. See supra note 2. Accordingly, we believe that under the circumstances of this case, the requested records were reasonably described in accordance with subsection (a)(3) of the Act. 37 The DEA also reasserts its argument that the technical records associated with the NADDIS system are exempt under section 552(b)(2) as solely intra-agency records. The district court found that (i)f Yeager had magnetic tapes of computer records, then the codes necessary to read and use the tapes would become more than intra-agency records. Memorandum Order at 9; App. at 47. This issue is thus intertwined with the Agency's argument that the FOIA does not require an agency to release the records in the form of magnetic tape. The DEA did not present the magnetic tape argument to the district court nor did that court order that the material that the DEA has agreed to disclose must be released on magnetic tape. Accordingly, we decline to pass on these issues.