Opinion ID: 565995
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: LSC's Statutory Authority to Promulgate the Regulation

Text: 15 Appellees argue, and the district court agreed, that the Act contains no affirmative authority for LSC to promulgate the redistricting regulation and that certain provisions of the Act conflict with it. They further argue that the legislative history of the Act and its amendments indicates that Congress intended basic field programs to have exclusive authority to set caseload priorities. LSC challenges all of these assertions, contending that the Act provides more than ample support for its authority to issue the redistricting regulation and that the regulation is fully consistent with all provisions of the Act and with the legislative history. We conclude that the Act clearly grants both general and specific rulemaking powers to LSC and that, although specific provisions of the Act are somewhat ambiguous concerning limitations on those powers, LSC's interpretations of those provisions are permissible under Chevron.
16 Appellees contend that the Act does not grant general rulemaking authority to LSC, but rather permits LSC to promulgate regulations only for certain enumerated purposes, none of which provides authority for the redistricting regulation. We agree with LSC that the Act clearly does grant it general rulemaking authority and that, regardless, it possessed ample authority under the Act's more specific grants of rulemaking authority to promulgate the redistricting regulation. 17 Initially, LSC notes that, as the Supreme Court has stated, [t]he power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created and funded program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231, 94 S.Ct. 1055, 1072, 39 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974). Further, under Chevron, statutory silence or ambiguity on a particular question means that a court may assume that Congress implicitly delegated the interpretive function to the agency.... Public Citizen v. FTC, 869 F.2d 1541, 1553 (D.C.Cir.1989). Although LSC is not deemed an agency of the federal government, it is charged with administering the Act, and its authority under the Act is phrased in expansive rather than restrictive terms. LSC is authorized, among other things, to provide financial assistance to qualified programs, LSCA Sec. 1006(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2996e(a)(1)(A), to make ... grants and contracts as are necessary to carry out the purposes and provisions of the Act, LSCA Sec. 1006(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2996e(a)(1)(B), and to insure that grants and contracts are made so as to provide the most economical and effective delivery of legal assistance to persons in both urban and rural areas. LSCA Sec. 1007(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2996f(a)(3). 18 LSC emphasizes in particular the breadth of authority conferred by the last of these provisions, noting that courts have read this language, and similar language in other statutes, to confer broad discretionary powers. See, e.g., Spokane County Legal Services, Inc. v. Legal Services Corp., 614 F.2d 662, 669 (9th Cir.1980) (application of Act's economical and effective delivery provision necessarily 'requires the use of informed discretion' by LSC) (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 208, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 1583, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947)); AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 788-92 (D.C.Cir.) (words economy and efficiency are not narrow terms and, when used in federal procurement statute, supported authority to deny government contracts to companies that failed to comply with voluntary wage and price standards), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915, 99 S.Ct. 3107, 61 L.Ed.2d 879 (1979). We agree that this provision gives LSC substantial power to regulate the delivery of legal assistance by program recipients and supports the contention that LSC possesses general rulemaking authority under the Act. Appellees argue that this provision should be disregarded because LSC did not rely on it in issuing the regulation, but the record clearly shows that LSC did cite section 1007(a)(3) as one of the provisions supporting its authority to promulgate the regulation. See 54 Fed.Reg. at 31,959. 19 Other provisions of the Act provide further support for LSC's authority to issue the redistricting regulation. First, the Act grants LSC the powers conferred upon a nonprofit corporation by the District of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation Act.... LSCA Sec. 1006(a), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2996e(a). A private corporation, certainly, has the power to set the terms of grants it makes to other entities; equally important is the fact that, as explained earlier, Congress elected this organizational form for LSC in order to ensure its independence. This strongly implies that Congress intended to give LSC considerable discretion in implementing the Act. Appellees stress in response that section 1006(a) gives LSC the powers of a D.C. nonprofit corporation only [t]o the extent consistent with the provisions of the Act, but that objection implicates the separate question (addressed below) of whether any specific provisions of the Act prohibit LSC from exercising its power in the manner it has here; it does not imply that LSC has anything less than the general interpretive and rulemaking authority that normally inheres in agencies or other entities charged with administering a statute. 20 Second, the Act charges LSC with the duty to ensure that the legal services program remains free of partisan political influence and involvement. See LSCA Secs. 1006(b)(5), 1007(a)(6), 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2996e(b)(5), 2996f(a)(6); cf. LSCA Secs. 1001(5), 1006(e), 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2996(5), 2996e(e). As LSC maintains, redistricting almost inevitably implicates partisan political concerns. See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753, 93 S.Ct. 2321, 2331, 37 L.Ed.2d 298 (1973) ([p]olitics and political considerations are inseparable from districting and apportionment). LSC promulgated the redistricting regulation because it believed that its statutory mandate in this respect would best be implemented by remov[ing] even the implication of impropriety from a program whose very success was determined to be dependent upon its freedom from political influence. Smith v. Ehrlich, 430 F.Supp. 818, 823 (D.D.C.1976) (three-judge district court) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to statutory prohibition of political activities by staff attorneys of LSC recipient programs). Particularly in light of Congress's own decision to bar legal services litigation on hotly contested issues such as school desegregation and abortion, see LSCA Sec. 1007(b), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2996f(b), LSC's decision to enact a similar ban on redistricting litigation appears consistent with one of the fundamental purposes underlying the Act. 21 No different conclusion is compelled by the exceptions in subparts (B) and (C) of section 1007(a)(6) for legal advice and representation in connection with the activities prohibited therein. Those subparts generally prohibit attorneys of recipient programs from providing transportation to the polls or similar assistance in connection with an election and from assisting in voter registration activities. (Significantly, subpart (A) of section 1007(a)(6), which prohibits any political activity by attorneys of recipient programs, does not contain an exception for legal advice and representation.) We agree with LSC that redistricting activities are not encompassed within the rather narrow scope of these election-related provisions, and we therefore reject appellees' conclusion that the exceptions for legal advice and representation contained in them constitute affirmative statutory authorization for redistricting activity. 22 Considering all of these provisions together, we conclude that the Act invests general rulemaking authority in LSC and that the Act's more specific grants of authority buttress LSC's power to promulgate the redistricting regulation. 23
24 Appellees argue that even if LSC has the rulemaking powers outlined above, the redistricting regulation conflicts with certain other provisions contained in the Act. We consider each of these provisions in turn. 25 a. Section 1007(a)(2)(C). The first provision cited by appellees, and the provision chiefly relied upon by the district court in its decision, states that LSC shall insure that ... recipients, consistent with goals established by the Corporation, adopt procedures for determining and implementing priorities for the provision of [legal] assistance.... LSCA Sec. 1007(a)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2996f(a)(2)(C). The district court held that this provision authorizes LSC to set goals relating to the procedures by which LSC recipients set priorities, not to itself determine substantive case priorities. Texas Rural Legal Aid, 740 F.Supp. at 886. The district court buttressed its interpretation by contrasting the current version of this provision with the language originally enacted in 1974 and by consulting the legislative history of the 1977 amendments to the Act, which changed the provision to its present form. See id. at 883-84. 26 Although we do not agree with LSC's contrary position that section 1007(a)(2)(C) actually provides clear support for its authority to set substantive priorities, we do believe that the provision is ambiguous and that we should defer to LSC's interpretation. First, the language of the provision simply does not clearly support either appellees' or LSC's interpretation. Although section 1007(a)(2)(C) states that the procedures adopted by program recipients for setting priorities must be consistent with goals established by LSC, the placement of the latter phrase does not necessarily imply that only the procedures--and not also the priorities set by those procedures--must be consistent with LSC regulations. Section 1007(a)(2)(C) can just as easily be read as subordinating both the procedures and priorities adopted by local programs to the national goals established by LSC, or as simply not addressing LSC's authority concerning priorities at all. In the latter instance, the provision would do nothing to constrain LSC's general rulemaking powers; in the former, it would supplement and support those powers. 27 Second, the changes effected in section 1007(a)(2)(C) by the 1977 amendments to the Act do not compel the conclusion that Congress intended to place exclusive authority over caseload priorities in the hands of the local programs. As originally enacted, section 1007(a)(2)(C) directed LSC to establish priorities to insure that persons least able to afford legal assistance are given preference in the furnishing of such assistance. The House report accompanying the 1977 amendments indicates that the new version of section 1007(a)(2)(C) reflected Congress's determination that establishing poverty as the sole criterion for allocating program resources risked leaving unaddressed certain legal problems of importance to the poor. See H.R.REP. No. 310, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.NEWS 4503, 4512. The House report then stated: 28 Reference to goals that may be established by the Corporation permits the Corporation to set as goals the provision of legal assistance in the most effective manner, or so as to have the greatest effect on problems of poor people, or other similar goals. The reference is not intended to detract from the rightful role of local programs, in consultation with local client communities, to set priorities concerning the substantive law matters to which scarce program resources are to be allocated. This does not require the Corporation to establish goals, but authorizes the Corporation to do so if it finds appropriate. 29 Id. at 4513; cf. S.REP. NO. 172, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1977). Although this passage clearly contemplates that local programs will have a major, and perhaps even preeminent, role in setting program priorities, it does not necessarily imply that LSC should exercise no control at all over those priorities. The reference to the rightful role of local programs in setting priorities, in conjunction with the statement that LSC may set goals so as to have the greatest effect on problems of poor people, arguably implies that LSC and local programs are both to play roles in establishing priorities. LSC interprets the rightful role of local programs to be the assessment of the peculiar local needs of client populations, while LSC's own role is to provide caseload guidance based on considerations that it deems are not dependent on local conditions. In the instant case, LSC determined that redistricting activities raised concerns of general import analogous to those that motivated Congress to prohibit certain other categories of litigation, and it therefore acted to prohibit local programs from engaging in those activities. We believe that a reasonable construction of section 1007(a)(2)(C) and its legislative history supports LSC's authority to make such assessments. Under this interpretation of the Act, the roles of the local programs and LSC are complementary, with each exercising authority within the realm of its special expertise. There is thus no cause for asserting, as the district court did, that LSC's position would make the local boards mere puppets of LSC. See Texas Rural Legal Aid, 740 F.Supp. at 884. 30 b. Statutory Prohibitions on Litigation. Appellees argue next that the redistricting regulation is inconsistent with the specific substantive prohibitions included in the Act by Congress (e.g., the bans on school desegregation and abortion litigation) because Congress intended those prohibitions to be exclusive. The only support appellees provide for this assertion, however, is the general evidence they adduce that Congress meant to deprive LSC of any authority to control the caseload priorities established by basic field programs. Having rejected appellees' argument on that point, we reject their argument on this one as well. 31 Although they do not explicitly cite it, appellees appear to rely on the canon of statutory interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one is the exclusion of others). Whatever its usefulness in other circumstances, however, this canon has little force in the administrative setting. See, e.g., Cheney Railroad Co. v. ICC, 902 F.2d 66, 68-69 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 519, 112 L.Ed.2d 530 (1990); Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Comm'n, 895 F.2d 773, 779 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 137, 112 L.Ed.2d 104 (1990). Under Chevron, we normally withhold deference from an agency's interpretation of a statute only when Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue, 467 U.S. at 842, 104 S.Ct. at 2781, and the expressio canon is simply too thin a reed to support the conclusion that Congress has clearly resolved this issue. See Cheney Railroad Co., 902 F.2d at 69. Having decided that, we must defer to LSC's refusal to read the Act in the manner suggested by the expressio canon if its interpretation is otherwise reasonable. See id.; Michigan Citizens for an Independent Press v. Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285, 1292 (D.C.Cir.) (Chevron implicitly precludes courts picking and choosing among various canons of statutory construction to reject reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes) (emphasis deleted), aff'd without opinion by an equally divided Court, 493 U.S. 38, 110 S.Ct. 398, 107 L.Ed.2d 277 (1989). 32 In any event, an equally pertinent canon of interpretation states that a congressional decision to prohibit certain activities does not imply an intent to disable the relevant administrative body from taking similar action with respect to activities that pose a similar danger. See, e.g., Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 372-73, 93 S.Ct. 1652, 1662-63, 36 L.Ed.2d 318 (1973); Bailey v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank, 788 F.2d 498, 500 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 915, 107 S.Ct. 317, 93 L.Ed.2d 290 (1986). The expressio maxim is inappropriate in the administrative context, these cases suggest, because its application would undermine the flexibility sought in vesting broad rulemaking authority in an administrative agency. Mourning, 411 U.S. at 372, 93 S.Ct. at 1662. Indeed, a congressional prohibition of particular conduct may actually support the view that the administrative entity can exercise its authority to eliminate a similar danger. Id. at 372-73, 93 S.Ct. at 1662-63. Here, LSC determined that the dangers of entanglement in controversial local issues such as school desegregation and abortion were presented as well by redistricting litigation and, accordingly, justified imposing a similar ban on program recipients. Particularly in light of the Act's mandate to LSC to ensure that the legal services program remain free from partisan political involvement, we cannot conclude that LSC's position is based on an unreasonable interpretation of the Act. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387, 103 S.Ct. 683, 689-90, 74 L.Ed.2d 548 (1983) (expressio maxim and other canons of interpretation  'long have been subordinated to the doctrine that courts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominating general purpose' ) (quoting SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51, 64 S.Ct. 120, 123, 88 L.Ed. 88 (1943)). 33 c. Section 1010(c). Appellees' next argument is more narrowly drawn but also relies implicitly on the expressio maxim. They claim that the redistricting regulation's prohibition on the use of private funds by program recipients for redistricting activities conflicts with section 1010(c) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2996i(c), which provides that private funds received for the provision of legal assistance shall not be expended by recipients for any purpose prohibited by this subchapter.... This provision was intended to prevent local programs from contraven[ing] the other restrictions in the act by attributing them to the non-Federal share of funds contributed to such programs. 120 CONG.REC. 24,026 (1974) (summary of Act by Senator Nelson). Appellees read into section 1010(c) a congressional intent to bar use of private funds only for purposes prohibited by the Act itself (as they try to read a similar exclusivity into Congress's enactment of those prohibitions), but the only support they provide for this assertion, other than the language of the provision and similar language in the legislative history, is the fact that Congress has on several occasions overridden by statute other LSC regulations that limited the use of private funds by program recipients. See, e.g., Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1991, Pub.L. No. 101-515, Sec. 607, 104 Stat. 2101, 2152 (1990) (use of private funds for legislative representation); id., 104 Stat. at 2153 (use of private funds for financially ineligible clients). 34 Reliance on subsequent legislative history of this sort, however, is notoriously suspect and  'form[s] a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier [Congress].'  Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, 460 U.S. 150, 165 n. 27, 103 S.Ct. 1011, 1021 n. 27, 74 L.Ed.2d 882 (1983) (quoting United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313, 80 S.Ct. 326, 331-32, 4 L.Ed.2d 334 (1960)). In any event, consulting these later actions by Congress does not persuade us that they support appellees' position. Notably, Congress did not respond to LSC's prior regulations on the use of private funds by enacting a general provision barring LSC from imposing limitations in excess of those provided by the Act, nor has Congress taken any action with respect to the specific limitation contained in the redistricting regulation. Appellees direct our attention to a statement by Senator Rudman that expresses general dissatisfaction with LSC's misguided view of its authority to extend the coverage of regulations it promulgates to private funds. 135 CONG.REC. S7233 (daily ed. June 23, 1989). Yet Senator Rudman also seemed to recognize that LSC does have some authority to regulate the use of private funds by program recipients, stating only that LSC had overextend[ed] that authority. Id. The kind of regulation at issue here, which is more closely akin to the prohibitions specifically enumerated by Congress itself in the Act than were the regulations overridden by Congress, would seem to further rather than impede the purposes underlying the Act and to justify the exercise of LSC's authority to limit the use of private funds. At the very least, we cannot say that LSC's interpretation of its authority in this respect is an impermissible construction of the Act. If Congress disagrees with LSC's action, it remains free to override this part of the redistricting regulation, as it has done in other situations. 35 d. Section 1007(a)(5). Appellees also challenge the redistricting regulation's prohibition of legislative representation in connection with redistricting matters. See 45 C.F.R. Sec. 1632.2 (prohibiting any effort, whether by request or otherwise, even if of a neutral nature, to revise a legislative, judicial, or elective district at any level of government). This provision, they argue, conflicts with section 1007(a)(5) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2996f(a)(5), which prohibits program recipients from using federal funds to engage in legislative representation of clients except (1) when necessary to the provision of legal advice and representation with respect to such client's legal rights and responsibilities, or (2) when a legislative body or agency either requests the recipient to testify, draft, or review measures or to make representations to the body or agency or is considering a measure directly affecting the activities of the local program or LSC. Because the redistricting regulation's ban on legislative representation sweeps more broadly than the provisions contained in section 1007(a)(5), appellees conclude that LSC lacked authority to impose it. 36 Once again, however, appellees fail to explain why the Act's failure to prohibit certain activities on a general basis prevents LSC from imposing such a restriction in specific situations where it deems it necessary or prudent. Furthermore, it is not clear to us that the exceptions to the lobbying limitation in the Act necessarily apply in situations where (as with school desegregation and abortion) the Act bars program recipients from engaging in certain types of substantive legal activities. In any event, program recipients presumably would have few, if any, occasions to lobby on behalf of [a] client's legal rights and responsibilities with respect to prohibited activities, precisely because they generally are barred from representing clients on those matters. 37 e. Section 1006(b)(3). Finally, appellees argue that the absence of a grandfather clause exempting redistricting activities currently being conducted by local program recipients violates section 1006(b)(3) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2996e(b)(3), which requires LSC to ensure that activities under this subchapter are carried out in a manner consistent with attorneys' professional responsibilities. Because the regulation would require immediate withdrawal of local program attorneys from redistricting cases, appellees conclude that it would force these attorneys to violate their ethical obligations to their clients. 38 Appellees acknowledge, however, that the Ethics Committee of the American Bar Association has upheld withdrawal by an attorney in the face of a loss of LSC funding, provided that the attorney has given notice to the client and has made efforts to find other funding or substitute counsel. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 347 (1981). Appellees provide no reason for assuming that a different standard would be applied to attorneys forced to withdraw from pending redistricting cases because of the regulation at issue here. Furthermore, LSC has granted partial or temporary waivers for several pending cases brought by attorneys for two of the organizations involved in this litigation, indicating that LSC will administer the regulation flexibly. Should withdrawal of funding confront any local program attorneys with the risk of violating their ethical responsibilities, we trust that LSC will show similar flexibility, in conformity with its statutory duty to prevent such violations. 39 For all of the foregoing reasons, we hold that LSC's interpretations of the contested statutory provisions are permissible constructions of the Act. We therefore reject appellees' assertion that the regulation is inconsistent with those provisions. 40