Opinion ID: 69373
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: hubbard’s sleep apnea

Text: Hubbard also argues that the ALJ erred because he did not examine Hubbard’s claims of sleepiness during the day caused by sleep apnea and his inability to drive while taking Vicodin. 1 Although it does not appear that the DOT was specifically placed into the record, we can take judicial notice of the fact that the DOT categorizes sales of home furnishings and household appliances as light in exertion—Hubbard previously worked at Home Depot. See Department of Labor, Dictionary of Occupational Titles §§ 270.357-010, 270.357-014 (rev. 4th ed. 1991). There would be little value in remanding this case just so that the ALJ may place the specific provisions of the DOT into the record. Therefore, we take judicial notice of the fact that Hubbard’s past relevant work is classified as light in exertion according to the DOT. 4 As discussed supra, we evaluate an ALJ’s factual findings to determine if they are supported by substantial evidence. Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1158. The ALJ has a basic obligation to develop a full and fair record. Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003). A full and fair record enables the reviewing court “to determine whether the ultimate decision on the merits is rational and supported by substantial evidence.” Welch v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 436, 440 (11th Cir. 1988) (internal quotations and citations omitted). We must reverse when the ALJ has failed to “provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted.” Keeton v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994). The Commissioner must consider the claimant’s testimony regarding pain or other symptoms if there is “(1) evidence of an underlying medical condition and either (2) objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition or (3) that the objectively determined medical condition is of such a severity that it can be reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain.” Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991). This standard can be satisfied by a claimant’s subjective testimony if that testimony is supported by medical evidence. Foote v. Charter, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995). The ALJ specifically addressed Hubbard’s allegedly debilitating symptoms 5 stemming from diabetes, asthma, degenerative disc disease, and depression. The ALJ determined that Hubbard’s testimony was not entirely credible with regard to the intensity, duration, and limiting effects of his symptoms. Although the ALJ did not go into great detail discussing Hubbard’s sleep apnea, the ALJ sufficiently addressed Hubbard’s condition. The ALJ’s report noted that Hubbard was diagnosed with severe obstructive sleep apnea and that it was recommended that Hubbard use a nocturnal nasal CPAP and start a program of weight management. The ALJ did not need to specifically address and reject Hubbard’s sleep apnea claim because his testimony showed that his sleep apnea was being controlled by use of a nocturnal nasal CPAP.2 Finally, the ALJ did not need to analyze Hubbard’s inability to drive while under the influence of Vicodin because driving had no relevance to Hubbard’s past relevant work. The ALJ did not err in determining that Hubbard could perform his past relevant work as it is generally performed in the national economy. Furthermore, the ALJ made sufficient factual findings to create a full and fair record, and the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. The district court did not err in affirming the Commissioner’s denial of Hubbard’s claim for disability. Therefore, we affirm. AFFIRMED. 2 Hubbard stated that the CPAP was not working properly and that he had an appointment to get it adjusted, but that is not sufficient to show that sleep apnea was disabling. 6