Opinion ID: 617431
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plaintiffs’ Claim Against Steinert

Text: Whenever a “district court denies an official’s motion for summary judgment predicated upon qualified immunity, the district court can be thought of as making two distinct determinations, even if only implicitly.” Kinney, 367 F.3d at 346. “First, the district court decides that a certain course of conduct would, as a matter of law, be objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law.” Id. Here, the district court explicitly determined that “[i]f Steinert had the knowledge that Mr. Brown needed urgent medical care, then . . . [his] refusal to provide Mr. Brown with medical care would be objectively unreasonable in light of established law.” Brown v. Strain, No. 2:09CV-2813, slip op. at 15 (E.D. La. Dec. 13, 2010). Steinert does not appeal this determination. “Second, the court decides that a genuine issue of fact exists regarding whether the defendant(s) did, in fact, engage in such conduct.” Kinney, 367 F.3d at 346. “[W]e lack jurisdiction to review conclusions of the second type on interlocutory appeal.”1 Id. The district court determined that “[t]he evidence Plaintiffs provide establishes at least a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Steinert was aware that Mr. Brown had swallowed a large amount of cocaine and needed urgent medical care.” Brown, slip op. at 13. Steinert appealed this determination, which is precisely the type of factual conclusion we are without jurisdiction to review on interlocutory appeal. See Kinney, 367 F.3d at 347 (“[W]e have jurisdiction only to decide whether the district court erred in 1 Because of this limitation on our appellate jurisdiction, “officials may sometimes be required to proceed to trial even though the ultimate resolution of th[e] factual disputes may show that they are entitled to qualified immunity from liability.” Kinney, 367 F.3d at 346 n.8. While this “‘threatens to undercut’ the policy of affording immunity from trial, . . . ‘countervailing considerations’ nonetheless support this limitation on interlocutory jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 304, 317–18 (1995)). 7 Case: 11-30082 Document: 00511670378 Page: 8 Date Filed: 11/18/2011 No. 11-30082 concluding as a matter of law that officials are not entitled to qualified immunity on a given set of facts.” (emphasis added)). Steinert disagrees with the district court about what inferences a jury could appropriately draw from the district court’s factual findings.2 He points to Brown’s, Lane’s, and Smith’s various lies and deceptions during the course of their interactions with Steinert prior to the drive to the jail, and to Steinert’s assertions of what he was aware of and when, as reasons why the district court erred in finding the alleged facts could support a finding of deliberate indifference. Steinert’s arguments, however, are directed at the credibility of the witnesses and the truth of the facts alleged; they are not directed at whether the facts, taken as true, could legally support an inference of deliberate indifference by Steinert during the drive to the jail. Steinert gives no persuasive reason why Plaintiffs’ allegations that he was aware that Brown had overdosed on cocaine and needed immediate medical treatment are legally insufficient to either support their claim or defeat his qualified immunity defense, which are analyzed using the same deliberate indifference standard. See Tamez, 589 F.3d at 771 2 In its order denying summary judgment on this issue, the district court made the following findings: First, Steinert had initiated Mr. Brown’s arrest based on the discovery of an empty bag of cocaine. Second, Steinert was aware that Mr. Brown had moved his hands to his front for some reason. Third, the recording Steinert listened to at the Slidell Complex suggested that one of the three arrestees had swallowed something. Fourth, Plaintiffs submit that they actually told Steinert that Mr. Brown had swallowed a quarter-ounce of cocaine and needed immediate medical attention. Fifth, Plaintiffs have produced numerous depositions that indicate that Sheriff Strain’s deputies knew that the Covington jail would refuse medical treatment of arrestees that had pre-existing illnesses or injuries. Finally, the video of the Covington jail shows quite clearly that Mr. Brown was already in a medical emergency upon arrival at the sally port, so it is unlikely that he was not exhibiting some symptoms of overdose during the ride to the jail. Based on this evidence a rational jury could conclude that Steinert had drawn the inference that Mr. Brown needed to be taken to the hospital and that he intended on denying Mr. Brown the care he required by continuing to the jail, where Mr. Brown would not receive treatment. Brown, slip op. at 13–14. 8 Case: 11-30082 Document: 00511670378 Page: 9 Date Filed: 11/18/2011 No. 11-30082 (stating that had the defendant officials been told to take the plaintiff to the hospital and failed to do so, “the case would be different”). Accordingly, Steinert’s appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.