Opinion ID: 3056063
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims 1, 2, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18

Text: As an initial matter, we have “already concluded that the procedural requirements of Florida’s Rule 3.850 constitute independent and adequate state grounds under the applicable law.” LeCroy v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 421 F.3d 1237, 1260 n.25 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Whiddon v. Dugger, 894 F.2d 1266, 1267-68 (11th Cir. 1990)). In LeCroy, we held that because the petitioner did not raise his claim on direct appeal in the state court, “the State 3.850 Court’s refusal to consider” the petitioner’s claim “as procedurally barred rested on an 9 Case: 11-13411 Date Filed: 02/11/2013 Page: 10 of 10 independent and adequate state ground that precludes federal habeas consideration of this issue.” Id. at 1260. Because Taylor did not raise Claims 1, 2, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18 on direct appeal to the state court, the district court’s determination that those claims were procedurally defaulted rested on an independent and adequate state ground. Taylor further argues that these claims were not procedurally defaulted because, in his state habeas petition, he argued that his counsel had been ineffective for failing to include these claims in Taylor’s brief on direct appeal. However, this argument is without merit because, for purposes of exhaustion of state remedies, a substantive claim is “separate and distinct” from an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the substantive claim. See id. at 1260 n.24; see also Pietri v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 641 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1551 (2012). Based on our review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we affirm.1 AFFIRMED. 1 Taylor’s Motion for Leave to File Reply Brief Out of Time is GRANTED. 10