Opinion ID: 1203661
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Discovery Claims

Text: Spencer filed a pretrial motion seeking, inter alia, written scientific reports and the work notes [or] memoranda that were the basis of the reports. The trial court granted the motion as to the reports, but ruled that the work notes are not discoverable. We agree. Spencer's discovery rights are controlled by Rule 3A:11. While that Rule permits a defendant to discover written scientific reports, by its very terms the Rule does not authorize the discovery ... of reports, memoranda or other internal Commonwealth documents made by agents in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case.... See Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423, 436, 304 S.E.2d 271, 278, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977, 104 S.Ct. 414, 78 L.Ed.2d 352 (1983); Bellfield v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 303, 306, 208 S.E.2d 771, 774 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 965, 95 S.Ct. 1359, 43 L.Ed.2d 444 (1975). Moreover, contrary to Spencer's assertion that the Due Process Clause mandates discovery of the material, [t]here is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case. Lowe v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 670, 679, 239 S.E.2d 112, 118 (1977) (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct. 837, 845, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977)), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 930, 98 S.Ct. 1502, 55 L.Ed.2d 526 (1978). Indeed, the Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 2211, 37 L.Ed.2d 82 (1973). Spencer also argues that the trial court erred in permitting the Commonwealth to introduce updated statistics on the probability of the DNA extracted from the semen stains found at the crime scene matching the DNA extracted from Spencer's blood samples. He admits that, pursuant to the discovery order, he received a copy of the written report concerning DNA print identification testing prior to trial. The report stated that the chance that anyone other than Spencer produced the semen stains was one in 135 million. Dr. Kevin C. McElfresh, an expert in molecular and population genetics and the manager and supervisor of the forensic and paternity laboratories at Lifecodes Corporation in New York, testified on behalf of the Commonwealth at a pretrial hearing concerning the admissibility of the DNA printing evidence. Spencer admits that Dr. McElfresh testified that the probability figure contained in the written report had been calculated in March 1988 and that an August 30, 1988 update of the data base had increased the probability of a random match to one in 705 million. [4] Nonetheless, Spencer contends that the Commonwealth violated its continuing duty under the discovery order by failing to provide him a written report of the updated statistics and that the trial court therefore erred in permitting Dr. McElfresh to testify at trial about the new probability figure. Significantly, Spencer does not allege, and, indeed, we cannot discern from the record, any element of prejudice or surprise resulting from the timing of the disclosure of the new statistics. As previously noted, Spencer was made cognizant of the updated probability figure before trial. Prior to his cross-examination of Dr. McElfresh at trial, Spencer requested and was granted an overnight recess to consult with a scientist about the new figure. Following the overnight recess, Spencer did not request a continuance nor did he indicate that he was unprepared to cross-examine Dr. McElfresh. Indeed, Spencer's cross-examination of Dr. McElfresh was skilled and thorough. We hold, therefore, that Spencer's claim concerning the admission into evidence of the updated statistics is without merit. [5] D