Opinion ID: 6326387
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Independent Ground for Reopening

Text: Based on the foregoing, we are convinced the legislature intended KRS 342.710(3) to provide an independent ground for reopening, especially given the important governmental purposes KRS 342.710 seeks to achieve. Clearly, the provisions of KRS 342.710 pertain specifically to applications and motions to reopen seeking vocational rehabilitation services, while the provisions of KRS 342.125 pertain to motions to reopen seeking to “end, diminish, or increase compensation previously awarded” or to “change or revoke” a related order. To 15 the extent the two statutes differ or conflict, KRS 342.710 is the more specific relative to vocational rehabilitation services and controls. Thus, as the Board held, and the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed, “KRS 342.125(1) is not the sole vehicle by which reopening can be achieved in order to obtain vocational rehabilitation[;]” “a motion to reopen seeking vocational rehabilitation need not be pigeon-holed into one of the grounds set forth in KRS 342.125(1)[;]” and “KRS 342.710 contemplates motions to reopen based on grounds set forth exclusively within [its own statutory provisions].” As the Board correctly discerned, today’s holding was presaged, expressly or implicitly, by two prior decisions of this Court. In Neighbors, though a request for vocational retraining was not mentioned in the BRC memorandum or the claimant’s brief, an ALJ found the injured worker totally disabled and ordered an evaluation to determine the propriety of vocational retraining. The claimant filed a petition for reconsideration asserting his physical condition precluded retraining. However, the employer argued vocational rehabilitation is a crucial goal of the Workers’ Compensation Act and complained the injured worker was avoiding reasonable attempts to return him to suitable employment. The ALJ overruled the claimant’s petition. Thereafter, an evaluation was conducted but the claimant refused to cooperate with recommended retraining. The employer filed a motion to reopen the original award to seek a reduction of PTD income benefits due to the claimant’s refusal to cooperate, citing both KRS 342.125(1) and KRS 342.710(5). The claimant objected to 16 reopening, arguing none of the grounds enumerated in KRS 342.125 permitted reopening under the circumstances and KRS 342.710’s silence regarding the mechanism for requesting a reduction of income benefits meant the matter must be brought under circuit court jurisdiction. Because the process established by KRS 342.710(3) had not been accomplished, the CALJ ordered the matter reopened and assigned it to another ALJ for further proceedings. A second vocational evaluation confirmed prior findings and recommendations. The ALJ found the claimant’s physical condition did not prevent participation in a retraining program and that his willing participation might reasonably return him to suitable employment. The employer’s motion for reduction of PTD income benefits was overruled but the claimant was ordered to undergo vocational rehabilitation services as previously recommended. A second petition for reconsideration was overruled and the claimant appealed. In affirming the ALJ’s order upon reopening directing the claimant’s acquiescence to recommended vocational retraining, our Court held: Post-award disputes concerning vocational rehabilitation under KRS 342.710(3) and requests for a reduction in benefits under KRS 342.710(5) are matters that arise under Chapter 342; therefore, KRS 342.325 grants an ALJ jurisdiction to decide them. A worker seeking to resist rehabilitation has the burden to show that the evaluator’s recommendations or the available options are impractical or inappropriate. An employer seeking a reduction in benefits has the burden to show that the worker has refused to accept rehabilitation pursuant to an ALJ order. Neighbors, 187 S.W.3d at 324. Notably, our holding in Neighbors—establishing that the four grounds authorizing reopening under KRS 342.125(1) are not exhaustive—was decided in 2006. 17 [T]he failure of the legislature to change a known judicial interpretation of a statute [is] extremely persuasive evidence of the true legislative intent. There is a strong implication that the legislature agrees with a prior court interpretation of its statute when it does not amend the statute interpreted. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Prichard, 532 S.W.3d 633, 636 (Ky. 2017) (citing Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Ky. 1996)). In Pinkston v. Teletronics, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 130 (Ky. 1999), an injured worker who was awarded PPD benefits requested to pursue a vocational rehabilitation program and the ALJ referred him for evaluation. The injured worker subsequently enrolled in a full-time, lengthy, and distant retraining program. The employer voluntarily paid for program registration fees, books, and tuition, but refused reimbursement for mileage under KRS 342.710 or payment of rehabilitation income benefits pursuant to KRS 342.715. The injured worker filed a motion to reopen. Ultimately, our Court held medical evidence supported extending the claimant’s period of vocational retraining, the claimant was entitled to reimbursement of mileage expenses for commuting to the rehabilitation program, and that enhanced rehabilitation benefits authorized by KRS 342.715 did not apply to the claimant, whose permanent disability was merely partial. Our decision in Pinkston referenced none of KRS 342.125(1)’s grounds as having authorized the reopening. Thus, in Pinkston we implicitly recognized KRS 342.710(3) as an independent ground by resolving issues raised upon reopening on their merits with no mention of any authority other than the related KRS 342.715. 18