Opinion ID: 1276328
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: result showing effects of such influence

Text: The most damaging evidence in this respect are the wills of March 20, 1981, and July 8, 1981. The July 8, 1981 will of Frederick Borsch gives his home to the Herberts. It then devises percentages of certain mining claims to Jeraldine Fahrni, Chester Borsch, Jr., and others. These percentages are very small (in the 1/2% to 2% range). Finally, the residue of the estate is bequeathed to the Herberts. There is testimony to the effect that Borsch wanted to provide for the Herberts. He was grateful to them for their help throughout the years, particularly when his mother was ill and needed a great deal of care. However, there is also testimony from several sources, including Jeraldine Fahrni, that from the time she was a young girl, Frederick Borsch intended his earthly goods to be Jeraldine's. There is evidence describing Borsch's affection for Jeraldine and testimony that their relationship was a close one. There is some indication that Borsch may have initially been displeased with Jeraldine's marriage in November 1980. However, he resolved his feelings on that matter and stated on several occasions how happy he was for her. Frederick Borsch's 1980 will reflected that Jeraldine inherit his home. However, just one year later he devised virtually all of his property to the Herberts. Certainly, [a] testator has the privilege and right to dispose of his property as he chooses within limits and in the manner fixed by statute. The law does not require that he recognize his relatives equally or at all. In re Blake's Estate, 81 S.D. 391, 398, 136 N.W.2d 242, 246 (1965). However, in determining if a will reflected undue influence, this Court took into account the total disinheritance of a niece and nephew in In re Estate of Jones, 320 N.W.2d at 170, saying: Jones executed a will in 1974 leaving the major portion of his estate to a niece and two nephews. His 1979 will disinherited his relatives completely and bequeathed to [another] his bank stock, cash, silver bars, and coin collection. While nieces and nephews are not considered the natural objects of the testator's bounty ... their total disinheritance just five years after the execution of the 1974 will demands close judicial scrutiny. (Citations omitted.) There is also testimony that on June 17, 1981, after the March 20th will which effectively disinherited Jeraldine, Borsch again told a close friend that Jeraldine was going to get the house and that someday it will all be Jeraldine's. [A] [d]eclaration of testator made previous to the execution of the will, and indicating a purpose inconsistent with the provisions thereof, `is competent and relevant, in connection with other evidence, as tending to show susceptibility to undue influence.' Johnson v. Shaver, 41 S.D. at 595, 172 N.W. at 678. There was no reflection of this wish in the July 1981 will. There is no direct proof of undue influence.... There seldom is. Undue influence is not usually exercised in the open. It is therefore usually solely through inferences drawn from surrounding facts and circumstances that a court arrives at the conclusion that a will is the product of undue influence working on the mind of the testator. In re Metz' Estate, 78 S.D. at 221, 100 N.W.2d at 397 (citation omitted). The establishment of a confidential relationship in which Alan Herbert had a hand in the formation of the will is clear. The establishment of facts giving rise to the presumption also establishes a prima facie case which can sustain a finding of undue influence.... The presumption ... remains even though the beneficiary introduces evidence rebutting the presumption. In re Estate of Nelson, 274 N.W.2d 584, 588 (S.D.1978). The trial court did not believe the Herberts had overcome the presumption of undue influence by going forward with sufficient evidence necessary to show they did not take advantage of Borsch to their gain. As the trial court heard the testimony and was able to view the witnesses, we must give deference to its determination. There is sufficient evidence to show by a preponderance that the wills of July 8, 1981 and March 20, 1981 were the result of undue influence. Intervenors-appellants insist the trial court erred in declaring the will of March 20, 1981 invalid. The only issue raised in the pleadings was the invalidity of the July 8, 1981 will. They assert that this singular issue did not change. In actuality, however, it did. As a result of evidence presented, two wills were at issue. The wills of March 20, 1981 and July 8, 1981 were substantially similar, with the exception of a repetitive paragraph in the first will which was deleted in the second. The issue of undue influence with regard to both wills was raised through the course of the trial. It was argued that both wills were a result of Herberts' influence. Testimony was offered from all parties on undue influence, encompassing both wills. No objections were made as to the inclusion of the March 20, 1981 will. SDCL 15-6-15(b) provides in part: When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Amendment of the pleadings may be made at any time to conform to the evidence, even after judgment, however, failure ... to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. Id. Where an issue has been tried without objection it is treated in all respects as if it had been raised in the pleadings. Durr v. Hardesty, 76 S.D. 232, 240, 76 N.W.2d 393, 397-98 (1956). The validity of the March 20, 1981 will was fully adjudicated at trial without objection. The trial court did not err in declaring both wills invalid. Affirmed.