Opinion ID: 322654
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was evidence of prior conduct by appellant improperly admitted?

Text: 19 When King took the stand on his own behalf, the Government cross-examined him regarding an incident in Ohio. The Government claimed, and King admitted, that a $7,000 civil judgment had been entered in the state courts of Ohio against King. The judgment was obtained when King sold a mobile portrait trailer for $7,000, then shuttled the trailer to Florida, neglecting to deliver the trailer to the Ohio purchaser. The trailer involved in the Ohio transaction was the same trailer King sold to Fuller, and was the same trailer in which waldorf purportedly purchased an interest. King claims the prosecutor's injection into the trial of this prior transaction was reversible error. 20 We find no merit to this contention. The Ohio transaction was not introduced merely to show the defendant's bad character, nor was the evidence of prior fraud of a vague and uncertain character. Compare Kraft v. United States, 8 Cir., 1956, 238 F.2d 794, 801-803. The Ohio fraud was almost identical in nature, it involved the same portrait trailer which was the subject of the alleged Florida fraud, and it was recent in time. This was sufficient connection to show a general pattern of conduct, it was a transaction reasonably near in time, and the fraud reflected intent similar to that charged in the present case. The reference to King's prior fraudulent dealings was thus proper. Gilstrap v. United States, 5 Cir., 1968, 389 F.2d 6, 9-10. It is well established that evidence of prior similar acts is admissible to prove the elements of knowledge and intent. 'Evidence that similar and related offenses were committed in this period (prior to indictment) tended to show a consistent pattern of conduct highly relevant to the issue of intent.' Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618, 69 S.Ct. 766, 769, 93 L.Ed. 919 (1949); see United States v. Jones, 5 Cir., 1973, 486 F.2d 1081, 1083-1085 and cases cited; United States v. Jaqua, 5 Cir., 1973, 485 F.2d 193, 195 and cases cited n. 3; Matthews v. United States, 5 Cir., 1969, 407 F.2d 1371, 1381; Gilstrap v. United States,supra; 2 Wigmore on Evidence 302 (3d ed. 1940). Moreover, the development of such evidence is viewed more favorably when it is introduced, as it was here, on cross-examination rather than direct. See McCormick on Evidence, 190, at 452, 196, at 468. The admission of such evidence is highly relevant where, as here, there has been a repetition of fraudulent dealings such as to indicate a great improbability of ignorance or innocent intent. 21 Affirmed.