Opinion ID: 1513262
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: upon estates by the entirety.

Text: R.S. 37:2-12 provides: The real and personal property of a woman which she owns at the time of her marriage, and the real and personal property, and the rents, issues and profits thereof, of a married woman, which she receives or obtains in any manner whatever after her marriage, shall be her separate property as if she were a feme sole. At least nine jurisdictions took the view that the Married Women's Act, having destroyed the spousal unity, destroyed the foundation upon which estates by the entirety rested, and therefore such concurrent ownership could no longer arise. Phipps, supra, 25 Temple L.Q., at pp. 28-29. This was the view originally taken in New Jersey, Kip v. Kip, 33 N.J. Eq. 213 ( Ch. 1880), and was the view taken by the lower court in Rosenblath v. Buttlar, 7 N.J.L.J. 143 ( Ch. 1884). It might be noted that presently tenancy by the entirety does not exist in 29 states. Phipps, supra, 25 Temple L.Q., at p. 32. In the absence of legislation abolishing or altering estates by the entirety, our role, in light of the settled precedent that they do exist in New Jersey, is merely to define their incidents. The Court of Errors and Appeals in Buttlar v. Rosenblath, 42 N.J. Eq. 651 ( E. & A. 1887), settled the question of the effect of the Married Women's Act upon estates by the entirety. After holding that the act does not destroy the estate, it was held that the effect and purpose of the act was to put the wife on a par with the husband. It was held: There is nothing in the married woman's act which indicates an intention to exclude this estate wholly from its operation. I think, therefore, that the just construction of this legislation, and the one in harmony with its spirit and general purpose, is that the wife is endowed with the capacity, during the joint lives, to hold in her possession, as a single female, one-half of the estate in common with her husband, and that the right of survivorship still exists as at common law. (42 N.J. Eq., at page 657) Subsequent decisions have confirmed that presently husband and wife, by virtue of the Married Women's Act, hold as tenants in common for their joint lives; that survivorship exists as at common law and is indestructible by unilateral action; and that the rights of each spouse in the estate are alienable, voluntarily or involuntarily, the purchaser becoming a tenant in common with the remaining spouse for the joint lives of the husband and wife. See e.g., Schulz v. Ziegler, supra ; Wortendyke v. Rayot, supra; Zubler v. Porter, supra . It is clear that the Married Women's Act created an equality between the spouses in New Jersey, insofar as tenancies by the entirety are concerned. If, as we have previously concluded, the husband could alienate his right of survivorship at common law, the wife, by virtue of the act, can alienate her right of survivorship. And it follows, that if the wife takes equal rights with the husband in the estate, she must take equal disabilities. Such are the dictates of complete equality. Thus, the judgment creditors of either spouse may levy and execute upon their separate rights of survivorship. These conclusions necessitate the overruling of Zanzonico and Dworan cases, supra. Nor can we perceive any sound policy reason for adhering to the Zanzonico ruling. The unities of the estate are not thereby preserved, since a creditor can become a tenant in common with the non-debtor-spouse during the joint lives of husband and wife. It might be argued that the involuntary sale of a right of survivorship will not bring a fair price. However, the creditor even under Zanzonico can receive a one-half interest in the life estate for the joint lives. It seems to us that if this interest were coupled with the debtor-spouse's right of survivorship the whole would command a substantially higher price and the creditor may thereby realize some present satisfaction out of the debtor-spouse's assets. Moreover, to hold that a sheriff's deed does not pass the debtor-spouse's right of survivorship compels the creditor to maintain a constant vigilance over the estate. This is particularly true where the purchaser at execution sale of the debtor-spouse's life interest is someone other than the judgment creditor. There is, in short, no compelling policy reason why a judgment creditor should be inordinately delayed, or, in some instances completely deprived of his right to satisfaction out of the debtor-spouse's assets. The judgment appealed from is reversed and the cause is remanded for the entry of a judgment in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion. WEINTRAUB, C.J. (dissenting). The estate by the entirety is a remnant of other times. It rests upon the fiction of a oneness of husband and wife. Neither owns a separate, distinct interest in the fee; rather each and both as an entity own the entire interest. Neither takes anything by survivorship; there is nothing to pass because the survivor always had the entirety. To me the conception is quite incomprehensible. The inherent incongruity permeates the problem before us. Presumably the estate by the entirety was designed to serve a social purpose favorable to the parties to the marriage. We are asked to recognize incidents more compatible with present thinking. Specifically, we are asked to subject a spouse's interest in the fee to execution sale. I am not sure that I can identify just what is being sold. In theory there is no right of survivorship; nothing accrues on death. And during coverture neither spouse has a separate interest in the fee. Whatever the nature of the fee interest a purchaser receives, he can do nothing with it except wait and hope. What he buys is the chance that the non-debtor spouse will expire before the judgment debtor. I do not seriously urge such academic difficulties; indeed, one cannot confidently make deductions from a premise that is fictional. My objection is a practical one, to wit, that so long as we adhere to the concept of an estate by the entirety, an execution sale will result in the sacrifice of economic interests. Since the purchaser at the sale does not acquire a one-half interest in the fee with a right to partition the fee, the execution sale can be but a gambling event, yielding virtually nothing to the debtor, or for that matter to the creditor either unless he is the successful wagerer at the sale and in the waiting game to follow. I concede that earlier decisions recognizing a right to sell the life interest of the debtor presented the same problem in theory, but the practical consequences were negligible. I think it has been the general experience of the bar that judgments obtained against a spouse have not been followed by execution sales of the life interest. And in bankruptcy proceedings the interest of the debtor regularly has been sold for a nominal sum to the other spouse or a representative of both. The general assumption, I believe, has been that the fee was not involved; and the life interest for one reason or another was not regarded by outsiders as sufficiently attractive. But if the purchaser at an execution or bankruptcy sale may one day reap the harvest of a full title, there will be an invitation to speculators. If public policy demands that a creditor's interest be respected (I have no quarrel with the thought), the basis should be just to both the creditor and the debtor. It cannot be unless what is offered for sale is a non-contingent, non-speculative one-half interest which would support a partition suit. In that setting, bidders would know what is being sold and the sale could yield a fair price. An equitable solution can be achieved only by a statute abolishing the estate by the entirety in favor of a joint tenancy, or at least entitling the purchaser at an involuntary sale to have partition. In my judgment, a half-way approach will prove unjust. It will appreciably turn against the husband and wife a fictional concept that doubtless was originated for their benefit. It should be noted that R.S. 46:3-7 forbids execution sales of the contingent interests there described. The majority hold the interest of a spouse in the fee is vested. I find it difficult, again in abstract thought, to determine what part of the fee can be said to be vested in one spouse at the time of the sale. But realistically it would seem accurate to recognize that the so-called right of survivorship is quite contingent, and whether it is within the statute or not, still it would serve the same policy to keep it from the auction block. The impact upon the free movement of property in the marketplace may also be noted. In effect, the purchaser at the involuntary sale becomes a member of the entity for title purposes. In the hands of a husband and wife, property will be sold when the common economic interests of the family will be furthered. But when the power to alienate the whole is divided between a spouse and a stranger with unrelated economic motivations, property will not be moved unless those diverse interests can come to terms. Neither can compel a sale. In practical effect, there is a new restraint upon alienability to the disservice of the public interest. I accordingly vote to affirm. HALL, J. (dissenting). We are called upon here to determine a question of importance relating to certain incidents of tenancies by the entirety, which oddly enough has never been directly decided by the court of last resort in this State. The decision, no matter which way it goes, will be of retrospective effect and so will be bound to affect titles, since there have been divergent views on the question to some extent among New Jersey lawyers. The obligation of the court in such a situation is, of course, to determine what our law is on the subject, as an original proposition, and if at all possible, to arrive at that conclusion primarily on the basis of past expressions of our highest court bearing closest on the question, which therefor may well be said to have been relied upon by the bar in passing upon titles or advising as to rights under a judgment against one spouse. This approach will wreak the least havoc. Cf. Kimble v. City of Newark, 91 N.J.L. 249, 253 ( E. & A. 1917); Fox v. Snow, 6 N.J. 12, 14, 21-25 (1950). I therefore do not conceive it to be a proper exercise of our function, and indeed it may be a grave disservice, to determine the question on the basis of what we think our law might well be or ought to be in the light of modern social and economic considerations or what the law may be elsewhere. The majority opinion really comes down to this: At common law the husband could voluntarily alienate the possibility of a fee simple interest (so-called right of survivorship) subject to defeasance if the wife survived him, and so it was subject to execution for his debts and involuntary alienation by sheriff's sale to the same extent. The Married Women's Act in New Jersey affected only the husband's common law right (the estate by the marital right or jure uxoris ) to her share of the rents, issues and profits during their joint lives, so that she became entitled to hold and receive the possession and usufructs of one-half of the estate, in common with her husband, as if a single female, and this result placed her on a complete par with him. Therefore her defeasible survivorship interest became likewise voluntarily alienable by her act and so subject to involuntary alienation at the hands of her creditors. On the basis of the considerations mentioned I submit that the majority's syllogistic approach and reasoning arrives at and rests upon an incorrect major premise, i.e., the voluntary alienability of the husband's chance of survivorship at common law. This is not only in disregard of expressions of the Court of Errors and Appeals specifically referring to the question and two recent trial court decisions squarely in point, but is at odds with the long-standing basic theory of this peculiar estate. The final result reached is, I am firmly convinced, fundamentally wrong from the standpoint of principle and local precedent and is likely to have maximum adverse effect on an incalculable number of titles. The essential primary inquiry should be, I suggest, to discover what our courts have decided was the effect of our Married Women's Act of 1852 on this tenancy and its incidents. This is so because such would necessarily supersede the common law, and in other states the effect of such statutes has been determined with great contrariety of opinion, running all the way from abolition of the estate and conversion into a complete tenancy in common to holding that the statute is inapplicable to entireties and so has no effect. 2 American Law of Property, § 6.6, pp. 28-30 (1952); 2 Walsh, Commentaries on the Law of Real Property, pp. 32-39 (1947). There is no real difficulty in determining New Jersey's holding on this point and I do not disagree fundamentally with the majority in this respect. The effect was early settled in the leading case of Buttlar v. Rosenblath, 42 N.J. Eq. 651 ( E. & A. 1887), and has been reiterated without deviation since. See Gery v. Gery, 113 N.J. Eq. 59 ( E. & A. 1933), in which Justice Case cogently reviews and analyzes the leading cases beginning with Buttlar. For our purposes, the New Jersey rule is that the statute had no effect on the incident of survivorship, which, as Buttlar put it, still exists as at common law. (42 N.J. Eq., at page 657). What the act did without question, and all it did, as was well put in Gery (113 N.J. Eq., at pages 64, 65), was to destroy the husband's estate by the marital right and make the spouses tenants in common as to the right of possession and the use of the property and as to the right of either spouse to convey his or her estate for the term of the joint lives to a third party, with the stranger becoming a tenant in common with the retaining spouse for the same term. Incidentally, I believe Justice Case in Gery put into final discard the concept suggested in a few cases since 1852, probably more by way of graphic language than of technical holding, that the right of survivorship had become, by virtue of the statute, a contingent remainder in fee to the survivor. See e.g., Schulz v. Ziegler, 80 N.J. Eq. 199, 201 ( E. & A. 1912), and Zubler v. Porter, 98 N.J.L. 444, 446, 447 ( E. & A. 1922). The new rule of tenancy in common during the joint lives of course meant that, since each spouse was separately entitled to one-half of the possession and profits and each could now alienate such interest for the term of the joint lives, the same interest could be reached by a creditor of the particular spouse to the same extent. There was no longer any distinction between the spouses. Each could do what the other could. The retention of survivorship as at common law leads one to consider what that common law was in the respect in question as it existed in New Jersey before 1852, and it is here where I respectfully say the majority has fallen into underlying error. In considering this phase of the question before us it may well be suggested that the common-law theory and consequent incidents have little reason and less logic to support them, but to me such can be of little or no concern. The technical aspects of the common law of real property are what they are from ancient days, and generally they can and should only be changed by prospective legislation if different conditions and policies of modern times indicate the desirability of modification. Until then, a court should be bound by them and the chips must fall where they may. The tenancy rests fundamentally, as the majority points out, on the fiction or artificial contrivance of the unity of the spouses as if they constituted a separate juristic third person, with the property being held by each spouse seized of the whole and not of a share or divisible part. And that unity is indestructible by the unilateral act of either so long as the marriage subsists. Such was the theory on origin in England and has always been accepted in New Jersey both before and after the Married Women's Act. Den ex dem. Hardenbergh v. Hardenbergh, 10 N.J.L. 42 ( Sup. Ct. 1828); Den ex dem. Wyckoff v. Gardner, 20 N.J.L. 556 ( Sup. Ct. 1846); Washburn v. Burns, 34 N.J.L. 18 ( Sup. Ct. 1869); Gery v. Gery, supra . A consequence early said in England (principally by Blackstone in his Commentaries ) to flow from this concept (whether rightly or wrongly from the theoretical viewpoint is presently immaterial) was that neither spouse could separately, or without the assent of the other, dispose of or convey away any part. In the first case on the estate in New Jersey this consequence was repeated and recognized. Den ex dem. Hardenbergh v. Hardenbergh, supra, 10 N.J.L., at page 45. It was shortly modified here, however (and we are not concerned with how the law remained in England or elsewhere, see Hopper v. Gurtman, 126 N.J.L. 263, 276 ( E. & A. 1940)), by our holding that the unity could be broken during the joint lives to the extent that the husband, without the wife's concurrence, could devise, alien or mortgage his interest during his own life so long as such did not prejudice her rights in case she survive. Den ex dem. Wyckoff v. Gardner, supra, 20 N.J.L., at pages 560, 563. And by virtue of jure uxoris, he could do the same with the wife's interest. The majority concludes, by reasoning therefrom, that because of the absence of such prejudice the husband could convey his chance of survivorship and so the ultimate fee simple, to be nullified if he predeceased. This, I submit, is unwarranted. (The confessed inability to find any English cases before 1776 on the question is significant to me. Quite probably no one conceived there was any such right in view of the indestructible unity theory.) In Gardner the wife was still alive and the only question before the court was whether the husband alone could validly mortgage his interest (which of course included the wife's) for his life. All the court held was that he could and that the mortgagee was entitled to possession on default. It was not concerned with the situation in the event the wife died first, and the opinions must be read in that light. To me they are no authority for the majority's position. While it may sound logical to reason from the language in Gardner, as the majority does, logic cannot overcome the theoretical incidents of the tenancy. Lack of prejudice to the wife if the majority's view is followed, the supposed incongruity of an opposite result with the husband's power over property held solely by the wife and pure logic are, fortunately or unfortunately, quite beside the point in dealing with this peculiar estate. The reason I feel the majority arrives at what to me is this legally wrong premise goes back to the unity theory previously mentioned and what takes place when the first spouse dies. On this event, as Chief Justice Weintraub so tersely puts it in his dissenting opinion, nothing accrues. During coverture neither spouse owns a separate, distinct interest in the fee; rather each and both as an entity own the entire interest. Neither takes anything by survivorship; there is nothing to pass because the survivor always has the entirety. While this may seem incomprehensible to the modern legal mind, and I confess to a somewhat similar feeling, the concept must remain immutable so long as the tenancy exists in this State in its present form. Thus the unity cannot be broken and the right of survivorship destroyed at law, presently or contingently, by unilateral action. Such to me is the only sound view, best expressed by Professor Walsh in his authoritative Commentaries ( op. cit. ): The right of survivorship cannot be destroyed at law by a conveyance by either breaking the unities. That is the essential difference between a joint tenancy and an estate in entirety. Therefore such conveyance in fee is void at law, and the chance or possibility of survivorship is inalienable at law. ( vol. 2, p. 35) But this does not mean that voluntary deeds or mortgages of the whole interest of one spouse are not and should not be given effect to put the entire fee in the grantee if and when that spouse survives. Such result is and should be reached, not on the erroneous theory of power to alienate the right of survivorship, but by equitable estoppel. Again I quote Walsh: But the deed void at law becomes effective in equity on the grantor's survival because equity by estoppel does not permit him to set up the invalidity of the deed; he is bound by his act in selling or mortgaging the property or his interest therein in fee and accepting the purchase price or loan, and justice demands that the void deed or mortgage be given effect as though it were valid. ( vol. 2, pp. 35-36) This approach has been approved in New Jersey. Den ex dem. Wyckoff v. Gardner, supra, 20 N.J.L., at pages 560-561, 563. Cf. Bilder v. Robinson, 73 N.J. Eq. 169, 172 ( Ch. 1907). I submit that it can be the only true basis of decisions in other states purportedly supporting the majority's premise, see 2 American Law of Property, p. 28, n. 21; 166 A.L.R. 969, 971-974 (except, of course, in those jurisdictions, of which New York is an example, in which married women's acts and other similar legislation have been given a much broader effect than in New Jersey. See Bilder v. Robinson, supra, 73 N.J. Eq., at page 173). It must follow that, absent the legal right to alienate the chance of survivorship voluntarily, there is no right to involuntarily alienate through execution sale. Professor Walsh says: On a sale on execution of the separate interest of a spouse in the event of the survival of such debtor thereafter, see Hoffman [ n ] v. Newell, 249 Ky. 270, 60 S.W. 2 d 607 [89 A.L.R. 489] (1933), arguing that the expectancy passes subject to defeat by survivorship of the other spouse; Hetzel v. Lincoln, 216 Pa. 60, 64 A. 866 (1906); Pos [ r ] ohenski v. Am. Alliance Ins. Co., 317 Pa. 410, 176 A. 205 (1935); Cole Mfg. v. Collier, 95 Tenn. 115, 31 S.W. 1000 [30 L.R.A. 315] (1895). As explained above, the sale of the separate interest of each in the fee is given effect in equity based on estoppel, and as [ sic ] a sale on execution is at law, with no elements of estoppel. It is clear that these cases cannot be approved as against the cases in most states holding contra. ( op. cit., p. 37, n. 16) The result may be said to give in modern times, as a matter of policy, an undesirable shield from creditors, even those willing to speculate. Perhaps that was one of the original purposes for the creation of the estate. However, any change should be brought about only by prospective legislation and not by retrospective judicial fiat. So much for theory. Turning to expressions by our highest court which it may well be said the bar has relied upon, I find a direct statement in Schulz v. Ziegler, 80 N.J. Eq. 199 ( E. & A. 1912), in the quoted opinion below of Vice-Chancellor Walker, substantially adopted by Justice Parker for the court in a unanimous decision. There a father and mother were tenants by the entirety. The father conveyed his entire interest to his daughter, who sought partition against her mother. A motion to strike the bill was denied and the decree affirmed. The vice-chancellor said: What they became by virtue of the father's conveyance to the daughter was tenants in common for the joint lives of the parents. The father's conveyance to the daughter did not operate in anywise to limit the estate of the wife or her right to the survivorship, and it seems that it will not defeat his right of survivorship, but that it amounts only to a conveyance of his right of possession during his life, and that it cannot operate to let in a third party as tenant by entirety with his wife. That estate exists only between husband and wife, and neither can dispose of any part of it without the assent of the other; the peculiar interest and estate not being severable. Den ex dem. Wyckoff v. Gardner, 20 N.J.L. ( Spenc. ) 556. The husband can, however, alienate his interest in the estate for his own life. Ibid. See also Servis v. Dorn, 76 N.J. Eq. (6 Buch. ) 241. Life tenants may be tenants in common and their estates may be partitioned. Roarty v. Smith, 53 N.J. Eq. (8 Dick. ) 253, 255. The defendant is entitled to the enjoyment of her estate in the lands during the lifetime of herself and her husband by virtue of the married woman's act of 1852. Servis v. Dorn, supra . The complainant is entitled to the enjoyment of the estate and interest in the lands which she derived from her father's conveyance during the joint lives of her father and her mother, the defendant. The first section of our partition act ( P.L. 1898, p. 644; [ C.S. p. 3897]), gives the right to partition to tenants in common, and the parties to this suit are such. True, their estate is less than a fee simple, but it is an estate for the joint lives of the parents of the complainant, and such an estate is partible. If the premises should prove not to be susceptible of division between the parties, and shall be ordered to be sold, the purchaser's estate will terminate upon the death of either Mr. or Mrs. Ziegler. (80 N.J. Eq., at page 200; emphasis added) Even closer is the statement by the same judge, then Chancellor, in Zubler v. Porter, 98 N.J.L. 444 ( E. & A. 1922), also unanimous: This conveyance [a sheriff's deed to the wife following execution on a judgment against the husband] divested out of Mr. Butterworth and vested in Mrs. Butterworth, as trustee, the former's estate in the land as potential tenant in common with her for the joint lives of both of them, leaving him only the remainder of the entire estate in the event of his surviving her. (98 N.J.L., at page 447; emphasis added). The rationale of the decision, and indeed the very language of Justice Case for the same unanimous court in Gery in 1933, appears to me to have the same connotation. See 113 N.J. Eq., at pages 64-65. While the statements in all these opinions may be said to have been unnecessary to the actual decision and therefore dictum, they are to me expressions of the strongest effect in that category and of the character lawyers would naturally and justifiably rely upon. It is hard to imagine judges of the learning of Walker, Parker and Case in the field of real property at common law expressing or approving such views without being certain of their correctness. The majority seems to think Schulz, Zubler and Gery are not persuasive, and this upon contrary assertions by single judges, one at the trial level and citing no authority and the other sitting alone on an appeal from the district court. Taub v. Shampanier, 95 N.J.L. 349 ( Sup. Ct. 1920); J. & A. Steinberg Co. v. Pastive, 97 N.J. Eq. 52 ( Ch. 1925). To me these statements are just as much dictum as those in the Court of Errors and Appeals, but entitled to very little weight. And then we have the holdings precisely in point in recent years of trial judges by well-documented opinions in Zanzonico v. Zanzonico, 24 N.J. Misc. 153 ( Sup. Ct. 1946) and Dworan v. Miloszewski, 17 N.J. Super. 269 ( Cty. Ct. 1952), which the bar must also have relied upon. Nor can I see how it can be seriously urged that a seemingly contrary observation in one Appellate Division opinion subsequent to the cases just cited, and a query in another, would completely reverse reliance by lawyers on the three highest court statements, one almost half a century old, and the two recent exact decisions at the trial level. I agree thoroughly with the observation of the Chief Justice, borne out by the observations of the amicus curiae and my own experience in practice, that the bar generally has been of the opinion that the ultimate fee was not involved as a result of a judgment against or bankruptcy of one tenant by the entirety and has acted accordingly in passing titles or advising action concerning such judgments. The opposite point of view, illustrated by defendants in this case, would seem to be a rarity. So, to my mind, the result reached by the majority has the definite and dangerous possibility of upsetting many more titles relied upon for years and causing activation of dormant judgments with similar effect than if we were to hold that the contingency of survivorship cannot legally be voluntarily or involuntarily alienated. And, as I have said, the latter to me is the only sound and correct conclusion. For the reasons here expressed, as well as for those set forth in the dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice in which I concur, I would affirm the judgment below. For reversal  Justices BURLING, JACOBS, FRANCIS, PROCTOR and SCHETTINO  5. For affirmance  Chief Justice WEINTRAUB, and Justice HALL  2.