Opinion ID: 3012753
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Thorpe’s Fifth Amendment Claim

Text: Thorpe also contends that the DOC’s policy of excluding from the sex offender treatment program those who do not admit guilt to the offense violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Thorpe argues that by forcing him to choose between maintaining his innocence and participating in a treatment program necessary for parole recommendation, the DOC was in effect imposing an automatic punishment on him for remaining silent. Thorpe’s Fifth Amendment claim is unpersuasive. The DOC’s policy did not force 8 Thorpe to incriminate himself in a criminal trial. See Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003) (suggesting that violations of prophylactic rules safeguarding the right against self-incrimination do not amount to actual constitutional violations as required for civil liability under § 1983); see also Renda v. King, Nos. 01-2421, 01-2498, 2003 WL 22351620, at  (3d Cir. Oct. 16, 2003) (stating that “it is the use of coerced statements during a criminal trial . . . that violates the Constitution”) (citation omitted). Moreover, Thorpe did not receive additional punishment for maintaining his innocence under the DOC’s policy. His refusal to admit his guilt and the resulting inability to participate in the treatment program did not extend his term of his incarceration or automatically deprive him of consideration for parole. See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 38, 43-45 (2002) (Kennedy, J., plurality) (characterizing compulsion under the Fifth Amendment as hinging on the automatic nature and severity of the threatened punishment). Thorpe was not entitled to parole, just to consideration for parole. The DOC’s policy did not automatically deprive him of consideration for parole, although it may have been influential in that respect. Therefore, the District Court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of the Prison Officials on Thorpe’s Fifth Amendment selfincrimination claim. C. The Statute of Limitations for Thorpe’s Job Retaliation Claim Thorpe had no vested interest in any particular prison job, or in any job at all. The prison officials could have removed him for any reason, or no reason at all. His claim on 9 that ground must fail. Even if he had a claim, it would be barred by the statute of limitations. The appropriate limitation period for a § 1983 action brought in Pennsylvania is the two-year limitation provided by 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524. Smith v. City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1985). Thorpe was removed from his position as computer operating clerk on November 7, 1995, and he initiated this action in the District Court on December 15, 1997. Based on these facts alone, Thorpe’s claim of job retaliation by the Prison Officials is untimely, as the District Court found. We reject Thorpe’s assertion that the action of the Prison Officials constituted a continuing violation that tolled the statute of limitation. In Cowell v. Palmer Township, 263 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2001), we identified at least three factors relevant to analyzing a continuing violation claim: (1) subject matter–whether the violations constitute the same type of discrimination, tending to connect them in a continuing violation; (2) frequency–whether the acts are recurring or more in the nature of isolated incidents; and (3) degree of permanence–whether the act had a degree of permanence which should trigger the plaintiff’s awareness of and duty to assert his/her rights and whether the consequences of the act would continue even in the absence of a continuing intent to discriminate. Id. at 292. The enforcement of the DOC requirements governing participation in the sex offender treatment program is a distinct subject matter than Thorpe’s removal from his computer clerk position. We are also not persuaded by Thorpe’s assertion that a permanent job transfer constitutes a continuing violation in itself, as Thorpe does not 10 allege any recurring acts by the Prison Officials that would satisfy Cowell’s frequency requirement. Because Thorpe received notice on the day of his job transfer, and did not file his claim within the two-year statute of limitations, he is time-barred from pursuing his job retaliation claim. D. District Court’s Denial of Thorpe’s Motion to Compel Deposition We review a district court’s order concerning discovery for abuse of discretion. We “will not upset a district court’s conduct of discovery procedures absent a demonstration that the court’s action made it impossible to obtain crucial evidence, and implicit in such a showing is proof that more diligent discovery was impossible.” Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 778 (3d Cir. 2000) (quotation and citation omitted). The record shows that Thorpe had ample opportunity to conduct discovery, including identifying individuals for deposition and serving notice on them. Because Thorpe never precisely identified to the District Court the individuals he intended to depose, we cannot hold that the District Court abused its discretion in denying Thorpe’s motion to compel deposition.