Opinion ID: 3172528
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mother’s Abuse of Discretion Argument

Text: [¶21] Mother contends that the district court abused its discretion in awarding primary custody to Father because the decision failed to give sufficient weight to the status quo and to ADN’s preference. We will first set forth the district court’s explanation for its custody ruling and then address each factor Mother argues should have been given controlling consideration in making the determination. [¶22] The district court explained its basis for granting Father primary custody of ADN as follows: The court has carefully considered and applied the factors set forth in Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-201 to the evidence received during trial. The court has also considered the above 5 The Temporary Custody Order notes that both parties appeared at the hearing on temporary custody and that the court heard oral argument. The order does not indicate that the court took evidence on the child’s best interests, the relative fitness of each parent, or travel and visitation concerns. Moreover, the Temporary Custody Order contained no findings concerning the statutory factors a court is required to consider in entering a divorce decree or custody order. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a) (LexisNexis 2015) (setting forth factors the court shall consider in determining the best interests of the child). 7 case-law and precedent of the Wyoming Supreme Court. After doing so, the court believes it is in the best interest of the child for both parents to have joint legal rights, but for [Father] to be the primary custodial parent. As this court noted at the conclusion of the testimony, the hardest custody cases to decide are cases where both parents are decent parents. That is the situation here. Both parents clearly have a quality relationship with their son, and both love him very much. Moreover, both parents have the ability to provide adequate care and are fit to have custody of the child. Both are willing and able to accept the responsibility of parenting. This case turns largely on the “relative competency and fitness” of the two respective parents. While the evidence establishes that [Mother] is generally a good mother, the testimony establishes that [Father] is an exceptional father, and the court finds that A.D.-N. has more stability in his father’s care. The court notes that [Father] has a very stable career with the Air Force. The court finds credible and persuasive [Father’s] testimony that there is a high likelihood that he will be able to finish his military career in Cheyenne, which provides additional predictability and stability for A.D-N.’s future. Furthermore, the court finds that [Father] has also historically demonstrated a more “steady hand” as a parent, has consistently made parenting decisions with A.D-N.’s best interests at stake. For example, the court found persuasive [Father’s] testimony that he has generally given in to [Mother’s] demands over the years in order to protect A.D-N. from the stress of a confrontation. Additionally, [Father] is presently in a committed relationship with his wife, Brittany, and he has the ability to provide better financial and parenting support/care for A.D-N. [Father] has resided in Cheyenne for over 16 years and has a very stable lifestyle. Unlike [Mother], the court heard no testimony to suggest that [Father] has ever been cited with any criminal violations; nor has he been involved in any personal relationships that necessitated the filing for protection orders. The undisputed evidence establishes A.D-N. is doing well in school and that he has good friends in 8 Cheyenne. In sum, there is presently a lot of stability and certain[t]y in A.D-N.’s life in Cheyenne. In contrast, the future for [Mother], with her intended move to Colorado Springs, involves much more uncertainty. [Mother] has made clear that she intends to move to Colorado, regardless of how this court rules on the custody issue. [Mother] testified that she wants to move to Colorado to be closer to “her family.” She testified that she believes such a move would be in the child’s best interests. However, she failed to adequately explain to this court’s satisfaction any credible reason that would support her conclusion, other than a closer proximity to her own family. For example, she failed to convince this court or explain how uprooting A.D-N. from school, where he has friends and is doing very well, in the middle of the semester, was a good thing for her son. She also failed to articulate how moving her son a considerable geographic distance from his father, with whom he is very close, is in the child’s best interests. While A.D-N. would certainly be closer to her family, he would be farther away from his natural father as well as from his friends at school. The evidence is undisputed that A.D-N. is a very good student who has close friends in Cheyenne. In short, the proffered reasons for [Mother’s] move seemed to be more conducive to her own personal desires to be closer to her family, as opposed to looking out for her son’s best interests. The court also determines that [Father] has historically demonstrated a better ability to respect the rights of [Mother] as a parent, and more of a willingness to relinquish care to [Mother] at appropriate times. In contrast, the court is concerned with the testimony it heard as to the incident in Denver where [Mother] threatened to call the police while [Father] was exercising visitation, as well as [Mother’s] emotional and inappropriate response when [Father] filed the present action seeking custody. Finally, the court notes that the GAL has done an extensive investigation in this case and has recommended to this court that [Father] be made the primary custodial parent. The court agrees with the GAL’s recommendation. 9 In sum, the court believes, based on all of the evidence, that [Father] has met his burden of proving that it is in the best interests of A.D-N. that [Father] be the primary custodial parent. In making its determination, the court has given serious consideration to the stated preference of A.D-N. However, the court is not convinced that the child, who is only ten, is of a sufficient age or maturity to make a wellreasoned decision as to what is truly in his future best interests. His reasons for wanting to live with his mother, as opposed to his father, centered on the fact that his dad smokes, and that he would be closer to his mother’s family in Colorado. It was clear to the court, however, that A.D-N. loves both his mother and his father, and that the child is okay living with either parent. Considering the totality of the circumstances, it is in A.D-N.’s best interest for his father to be the primary custodial parent.
[¶23] Mother contends that the status quo−the shared custody arrangement the parties had when they both lived in Cheyenne−was a material factor deserving significant weight, and the district court abused its discretion in failing to give the factor consideration. This argument finds no support in the record. [¶24] The district court did in fact give consideration to the parties’ existing arrangement. In rejecting that arrangement as a workable option, the court explained: It is abundantly clear to this court that the existing custody arrangement, with both parties equally splitting parenting time with the child, will no longer work in light of [Mother’s] imminent relocation to Colorado. This court must therefore undertake an analysis of the factors set forth in W.S. § 20-2- 201 and fashion an appropriate custody/visitation schedule that will take into consideration what is in A.D-N’s best interests. [¶25] The record supports the district court’s reasoning. Mother did testify that she was moving to Colorado regardless of the court’s custody ruling. Q. Okay. If you moved to Colorado, you plan – let’s talk about that. You plan to move to Colorado? 10 A. Yes, I do. Q. We heard testimony earlier today that you plan to make that move, even if the court is not favorable to your position, correct? A. Yes. [¶26] The parties’ status quo custody arrangement had the parties alternating weekends and changing custody of ADN throughout the school week. As the district court observed, that is not a practical arrangement if the parties live hours away from each other. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s rejection of the status quo as a custody option.
[¶27] Mother next contends that the district court abused its discretion by failing to give adequate weight to ADN’s stated preference of living with Mother. We again find no abuse of discretion. [¶28] A child’s custody preference, though not conclusive, is a factor that should be given serious consideration in determining custody. Dahlke, ¶ 18, 351 P.3d at 942. We have said:    We have long held that “the preference of a child of sufficient age and maturity is a factor to be considered by a court in ascertaining what is in the child’s best interests.” Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283, 1289–90 (Wyo.1993) (quoting Roberts v. Vilos, 776 P.2d 216, 218 (Wyo.1989)). We have identified several factors to consider in weighing a child’s custodial preference: [T]he age of the child; the reason for the preference; the relative fitness of the preferred and non-preferred parent; the hostility, if any, of the child to the non-preferred parent; the preference of other siblings; and whether the child’s preference has been tainted or influenced by one parent against the other. Roberts, 776 P.2d at 219. “In addition, the preference which has a stated basis and is expressed in a plain manner should be accorded greater weight than one whose basis cannot be described.” Id. at 218–19.    While it is true that a child’s preference is only one 11 factor to consider, and that it cannot form the sole basis for a custody determination, a child’s preference should be seriously considered when the child is of an appropriate age and maturity to assert such a preference. Love, 851 P.2d at 1291; Mulkey–Yelverton v. Blevins, 884 P.2d 41, 44 (Wyo.1994) (“A child’s unequivocal preference to live with a particular parent is a factor to be considered, but the expression of a preference is not conclusive.”). Courts have relied on children’s preferences in granting custody where they were found to be “bright, communicative, understanding, and mature for their age,” and the decision was “well-reasoned” and “not the product of coaching.” Hansen v. Hansen, 327 N.W.2d 47, 49 (S.D.1982). We agree that the “welfare of the children    is not being served if their wishes are not considered by the trial court.” In re Marriage of Kramer, 177 Mont. 61, 580 P.2d 439, 444 (1978). See also, In re Custody of Maycelle D., 213 Mont. 225, 691 P.2d 410, 412 (1984). Though the child’s preference is but one factor to consider, theses wishes should receive “serious consideration.” In re Marriage of Rolfe, 216 Mont. 39, 699 P.2d 79, 87 (1985). Love, 851 P.2d at 1290–91. Dahlke, ¶¶ 17-18, 351 P.3d at 942. [¶29] The district court’s decision reflects that the court considered ADN’s stated preference: In making its determination, the court has given serious consideration to the stated preference of A.D-N. However, the court is not convinced that the child, who is only ten, is of a sufficient age or maturity to make a wellreasoned decision as to what is truly in his future best interests. His reasons for wanting to live with his mother, as opposed to his father, centered on the fact that his dad smokes, and that he would be closer to his mother’s family in Colorado. It was clear to this court, however, that A.D-N. loves both his mother and his father, and that the child is okay living with either parent. Considering the totality of the 12 circumstances, it is in A.D-N.’s best interest for his father to be the primary custodial parent. [¶30] Mother acknowledges the district court’s consideration but argues the district court improperly discounted ADN’s preference without first holding a competency hearing. This argument misses its mark. The district court did not find ADN incompetent to testify. The court simply was not persuaded that ADN was mature enough to decide what was in his best interest. Given ADN’s testimony, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in so concluding. [¶31] On examination by the court, ADN testified: Q.    Are there things that you don’t like when you’re spending time with your mom or with your dad? A. No. Q. So when you’re there, you’re pretty happy either place? A. Yeah. Q. Okay. I know this is really a hard question to ask you, but I’m going to ask it to you. Where would you prefer to live? A. I want to live with my mom. Q. Can you tell me why? A. Um, I – well, ‘cause my mom – my dad is mostly nice. I’ve been asking him to quit smoking, then he’s trying to. He hasn’t been able to. And I think I want to live with my mom so I can see my family more. [¶32] On examination by the GAL, ADN testified: Q. Okay. You know that I said to the Court that I thought you ought to live with your dad, didn’t you? A. Yeah. Q. If the Court does that, would you be okay with that? A. If I had to live with my dad, I would be okay. Q. If you had to live with your mom, you would be okay, too, wouldn’t you? A. (Witness nodded head.) Yeah. [¶33] On examination by Father’s counsel, ADN testified: Q. Is it fair to say you don’t want to hurt anybody’s feelings? 13 A. Kind of, yeah. Q. You don’t want to be put in the middle? A. No. Q. Would you rather somebody else make the decision on where you live rather than you? A. Yeah. [¶34] On examination by Mother’s counsel, ADN testified: Q.    So you don’t want to be put in the middle. Do you want the judge to hear what your preference is? A. Um, I don’t know what that means. Q. Did you want to come here today to talk to the judge? Was that something you wanted to do? A. Um, not really, huh-uh. Q. You didn’t really want to be here? A. No. Q. Do you want the judge to listen to you now that you’re here? A. Yeah. [¶35] ADN’s testimony shows that although ADN expressed a custody preference, he showed no hostility toward either parent and stated he would be okay living with either parent. He also, probably consistent with his age of ten, expressed his desire that someone other than him make the custody decision. We recognize that a trial court, having heard and witnessed testimony, is in the best position to weigh the evidence and determine its place in the court’s custody analysis. Dahlke, ¶ 16, 351 P.3d at 942. Given the tenor of ADN’s testimony, we cannot say that the district court acted unreasonably in concluding that ADN lacked the maturity to make a well-reasoned decision concerning his best interests. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to award custody in a manner that was contrary to ADN’s stated preference.