Opinion ID: 1764855
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: 15-year license revocation period

Text: Section 60-4,104 provides that a copy of the order of the director revoking any operator's license, duly certified by the director and bearing the seal of the DMV, shall be admissible in evidence without further proof and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated in any proceeding, civil or criminal, in which such suspension or revocation is an issuable fact. [9] In this case, the State entered into evidence a certified copy of the order of the director reflecting that Nelson's license for his third-offense DUI was revoked until September 6, 2007. Thus, the burden shifted to Nelson to rebut the correctness of that order. [10] Nelson argues that the May 29, 1992, bail order and the September 4 sentencing order rebut the State's prima facie case. As a preliminary matter, we agree with Nelson that the record is unclear as to how much jail time Nelson served for his third-offense DUI conviction. This is potentially relevant because, even if the 15-year period began when Nelson alleges, § 39-669.07(2)(c) provided that the 15-year revocation period shall not run concurrently with any jail term imposed. In other words, had Nelson served the 3 months of jail time to which he was sentenced, the 15-year period would not have expired by the time he was stopped on June 18, 2007. In this case, however, the DMV records admitted into evidence by the State indicate that Nelson spent only 3 days in jail, and there is no other evidence indicating the time actually served. Thus, we will assume that Nelson's arguments are not rendered irrelevant by the concurrency clause of § 39-669.07(2)(c). Nelson's first argument in support of his contention that his 15-year revocation expired May 29, 2007, is that he should be given credit for the time he was ordered not to drive while on bail awaiting his sentence for the third-offense DUI. Nelson points out that under the current administrative license revocation scheme, not yet in effect at the time of his conviction, any period of revocation imposed for a violation of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60-6,196 (Reissue 2004) is reduced by any period of revocation imposed under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60-498.02 (Reissue 2004). [11] Nelson also points out that Neb.Rev.Stat. § 83-1,106 (Reissue 2008) gives credit against a term of incarceration for time served while awaiting sentencing. But Nelson admits that there is no law which requires him to be given credit for the time he was unable to drive pursuant to the terms of his bail while awaiting sentencing in 1992. The Legislature has demonstrated that it can and will specify when credit should be given for similarly imposed restrictionswhen it wishes to do so. The plain language of § 39-669.07(2)(c) did not provide for credit for any license restrictions imposed prior to sentencing, and it is not within an appellate court's province to read a meaning into a statute that is not there. [12] We find no merit to Nelson's argument that he should be given credit against his 15-year license revocation. We next turn to Nelson's contention that under the plain language of § 39-669.07(2)(c), his 15-year license revocation began with the order of May 29, 1992. Nelson points to the provision of § 39-669.07 that the driver shall not drive for a period of 15 years from the date ordered by the court and [the court] shall order that the operator's license . . . be revoked for a like period. Nelson reasons that because the September 4 sentencing order did not otherwise specify when the imposed 15-year revocation began to run, under § 39-669.07, the revocation period must run from the first time the court ordered him to turn over his license, on May 29. Relying on State v. Schulz, [13] Nelson further argues that such construction of the statute is necessary to prevent the sentence from being illegal for imposing a sentence in excess of that directed by the statute. In Schulz, upon finding the defendant guilty of second-offense DUI, the trial court had sentenced the defendant to 1 year of probation, with 6 months' suspension of his driver's license and 48 hours in the county jail as conditions of his probation. Five months later, the defendant's probation was revoked, and the court revoked the defendant's driver's license for an additional 12 months and sentenced him to 30 days in jail. Section 39-669.07, as it existed at that time, stated that a person found guilty of second-offense DUI would be ordered not to drive `for a period of one year from the date of his or her conviction.' [14] Section 28-106 stated that the mandatory penalty for a second conviction of a Class W misdemeanor was 30 days' imprisonment. We held in Schulz that the 48 hours of jail time served by the defendant was not part of his mandatory sentence of 30 days' imprisonment, but was instead a statutory condition of probation. Therefore, imposing 30 days in addition to that time did not violate the maximum sentence for the crime. However, we held that imposing a 1-year license revocation from the time the defendant's probation was revoked violated the plain language of the statute mandating that the license revocation run `from the date of his or her conviction.' [15] We concluded that the State's concernthat such construction left little incentive not to violate the probationwas a concern to be addressed by the Legislature rather than by this court. [16] But by the time of Nelson's conviction in 1992, § 39-669.07 had changed significantly. It no longer stated that the revocation should run from the date of the conviction, and it stated that the revocation shall be administered upon sentencing, upon final judgment of any appeal or review, or upon the date that any probation is revoked. [17] Thus, our reasoning in Schulz does not support Nelson's argument that we must construe his 15-year revocation period as running from the date he was released on bail pending sentencing. To the contrary, by holding that the court could impose 30 days' jail time in addition to the 48 hours already incarcerated, we recognized that the same type of consequence does not necessarily make for the same sentence. The fundamental error of Nelson's arguments is that what he misconstrues as a sentence is merely a condition of bail. Neb. Const. art. I, § 9, provides in part that [a]ll persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for treason, sexual offenses involving penetration by force or against the will of the victim, and murder, where the proof is evident or the presumption great. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-901 (Cum. Supp. 2006), in turn, states that any bailable defendant shall be ordered released from custody pending judgment and that the judge shall impose conditions of release which will reasonably assure the appearance of the person for trialincluding restrictions on travel. In a criminal case, the judgment is the sentence. [18] It is clear that Nelson was released pending the creation of the PSI report that the judge was to consider in sentencing. It was not until September 6, 1992, that the sentence was rendered. Conditions of release are generally entrusted to the discretion of the judicial officer, who must consider the unique circumstances of each case. [19] Restrictions on the right to drive are not generally considered so severe as to unreasonably restrain the accused from liberty while on bail, [20] and are, in fact, not uncommon. [21] For instance, in Wells v. State, [22] the court held that the continuing enforcement of the court's order that the defendant surrender his driver's license did not violate a statutory prohibition against enforcing a sentence under supersedeas, because the order for surrender was not part of the defendant's sentence. The Georgia Court of Appeals explained that even though the trial court made the surrender a condition of the defendant's bond, it was a requirement imposed by statute on the court. In this case, Nelson does not claim that the court's condition suspending driving privileges while on bail was an abuse of discretion, but instead argues that the sentence began with his condition of bail. We disagree. Nelson's driving privileges were suspended simply as a condition of bond. That period was not part of Nelson's sentence to a 15-year license revocation. Nor can the language from the date ordered by the court be construed to require that the 15-year period ran from the time of the bail condition when, at that time, Nelson had not yet been sentenced to a 15-year revocation period. Under the plain language of § 39-669.07, for purposes of delimiting the period of fifteen years from the date ordered by the court, the date ordered by the court refers to the date the court ordered the 15-year license revocation, and not from any date the court may have issued an order affecting the defendant's driving privileges. In summary, we find no merit to the defendant's argument that his 15-year revocation period had expired by the time he was pulled over in June 2007.