Opinion ID: 2173484
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Before it Became Manifest

Text: Cases interpreting § 1623(d) appear without exception to require that the retraction occur before exposure of the falsification becomes manifest to the witness. Clavey, supra, at 1222, n. 5; United States v. Tucker, 495 F.Supp. 607, 615 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). Section 1623(d) is modeled on a New York statute, Penal Law § 210.25 (McKinney), which in turn is based upon a rule propounded in People v. Ezaugi, 2 N.Y. 439, 161 N.Y.S.2d 75, 141 N.E.2d 580 (1957). Moore, supra, at 1042; United States v. Lardieri, 506 F.2d 319, 322-23 (3d Cir. 1974). One part of the original Ezaugi rule allows retraction only when no reasonable likelihood exists that the witness has learned that his perjury is known or may become known to the authorities. We believe this portion of the Ezaugi rule, though not drawn from a statute like ours, states concisely the construction ours ought to be given. Thus, we hold that the exposure of perjury becomes manifest when the defendant knows or has reason to know that the authorities are or will be aware of the falsification. The crucial matter is the defendant's motive in retracting. It may be important to know whether or not the authorities have already discovered, or are certain to discover, the falsification when we are assessing the defendant's state of mind, but that alone does not determine the validity of the retraction defense. It is not the state of mind of the authorities that controls. Some federal cases withholding the defense have held by implication that the defendants failure to retract false testimony before controverted by other witnesses makes exposure manifest. United States v. Swainson, 548 F.2d 657, 663 (6th Cir. 1977); Kahn, supra, at 283; United States v. Mitchell, 397 F.Supp. 166, 176-77 (D.C.D.C. 1974). In other cases, including Ezaugi, where also the defendant was denied the defense, the recantation was inspired by actual knowledge that the authorities had learned of the perjury. Tucker, supra, at 614; United States v. Crandall, 363 F.Supp. 648, 655 (W.D.Penn.1973). As we have indicated, the defendant's motive as deduced from all the evidence is the determining factor. The mere presence of conflicting testimony does not make manifest the exposure of falsification. In the instant case, the probate judge has stated that credibility, not perjury, was his primary consideration in weighing Hanson's testimony. The record does not indicate that Hanson suspected, or had reason to suspect, the probate court was on to her attempt to deceive. Courts should refrain from speculating, when there is an absence of proof, that genuine regret and a desire to set matters straight did not motivate the retraction. Section 12.1-11-04(3) was designed to foster truthfulness, and every instance of inconsistent testimony should not be viewed as perjury.