Opinion ID: 2584943
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judicially Created Exceptions to Mediation Confidentiality

Text: Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal majority relied on the doctrine of estoppel to prevent a litigant from tardily relying on mediation confidentiality to shield from the court facts which she had stipulated to be true and had extensively litigated without raising such bar. The dissenting opinion noted, however, that, [b]y focusing on estoppel, the majority in essence is attempting to create a new exception to the comprehensive scheme. We agree with this latter characterization. (6) On limited occasions, courts have crafted exceptions to mediation confidentiality and compelled mediators to testify in civil actions. However, those instances are very limited. In Rinaker v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 155, 167 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 464], the court compelled a mediator to testify because it found that a minor's due process right to confrontation of witnesses outweighed the statutory right to mediation confidentiality. In Olam v. Congress Mortg. Co. (N.D.Cal. 1999) 68 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1118-1119, 1129, the parties themselves expressly waived confidentiality. Because of this waiver, the court found that the policy driving mediation confidentiality had appreciably less force. ( Id. at p. 1133.) (7) Except in cases of express waiver or where due process is implicated, we have held that mediation confidentiality is to be strictly enforced. In Foxgate, we addressed the general validity of judicially crafted exceptions to mediation confidentiality. ( Foxgate, supra, 26 Cal.4th 1.) There, the Court of Appeal found an exception to section 1119 that would allow a mediator to report a party's failure to participate in good faith in the mediation process. ( Foxgate, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 9.) We held that the Court of Appeal erred in judicially creating an exception to section 1119. Distinguishing Rinaker and Olam, we noted that where a supervening due process right is not implicated or where no express waiver of confidentiality exists, judicially crafted exceptions to mediation confidentiality are not appropriate. ( Foxgate, at pp. 15-17.) To this end, we announced that in order [t]o carry out the [legislative] purpose of encouraging mediation by ensuring confidentiality, the statutory scheme ... unqualifiedly bars disclosure of communications made during mediation absent an express statutory exception. ( Id. at p. 15, fn. omitted.) Further, judicial construction of unambiguous statutes is appropriate only when literal interpretation would yield absurd results. ( Id. at p. 14.) In deciding whether a judicial exception was appropriate to carry out the Legislature's goals, we observed that with the enactment of the mediation confidentiality statutes, the Legislature contemplated that some behavior during mediation would go unpunished. ( Foxgate, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 17.) The Legislature was also presumably aware that general sanctions statutes permit punishing bad faith conduct. Considering this, we reasoned we were bound to respect the Legislature's policy choice to protect mediation confidentiality rather than create a procedure that encouraged good faith participation in mediation. Thus, we held that evidence of a party's bad faith during the mediation may not be admitted or considered. ( Ibid. ) (8) We subsequently reaffirmed that the mediation confidentiality statutes unqualifiedly bar disclosure of certain communications and writings produced in mediation absent an express statutory exception. ( Rojas v. Superior Court (2004) 33 Cal.4th 407 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 643, 93 P.3d 260] ( Rojas ).) In Rojas, the Court of Appeal concluded that, like work product, certain derivative materials exchanged during mediation were discoverable on a good cause showing. ( Id. at p. 414.) Rejecting this conclusion, we noted that section 2018 of the Code of Civil Procedure codified the good cause exception to the work product doctrine; the Legislature clearly knew how to enact a statutory good cause exception to the mediation confidentiality statutes, but it chose not to do so. ( Rojas, at p. 423.) Furthermore, the Legislature has enacted other statutory exceptions to mediation confidentiality. `Under the maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, if exemptions are specified in a statute, [courts] may not imply additional exemptions unless there is a clear legislative intent to the contrary. [Citation.]' ( Id. at p. 424.) Finding no such intent, we concluded that judicial exceptions should not be read into Evidence Code section 1119. ( Rojas, at p. 424; Fair, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 194 [reaffirming the disapproval of judicially crafted exceptions to the mediation confidentiality statutes].) Like Foxgate and Rojas, the present case does not implicate any due process right equivalent to the right bestowed by the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution, nor have the parties executed express waivers of confidentiality. Thus, Rinaker and Olam are distinguishable, and their rationale inapplicable. Instead, by creating fixed procedures that allow only certain evidence produced at mediation to be admitted in later civil proceedings, the Legislature was undeniably aware that some agreements made during mediation would not be enforceable. The statutes thus reflect a policy judgment made by the Legislature when weighing the value of confidentiality. Creating exceptions to admit evidence that does not meet statutory requirements would run contrary to legislative intent.