Opinion ID: 535680
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bates' Subjective Pain Testimony

Text: 9 We first consider Bates' argument that the ALJ improperly rejected his subjective pain testimony. Bates argues that the ALJ did not make the required specific findings to justify his decision to discredit Bates' testimony of disabling chronic back pain. 10 The Secretary is not required to believe a claimant's pain testimony, and the Secretary may decide to disregard such testimony entirely whenever the claimant fails to submit objective medical findings that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimed pain. Taylor v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 872, 876 (9th Cir.1985); 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1529 (1988); Social Security Ruling 88-13. However, the Secretary must make specific findings justifying that decision. Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir.1989) (quoting Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 532 (9th Cir.1986)). 11 At the hearing Bates testified that his chronic back pain renders him incapable of working. He said that as a result of this back pain he is unable to pick up more than ten pounds or carry anything weighing five pounds. He also said that he is able to sit comfortably for only about fifteen minutes at a time, that he cannot walk long distances without increasing his back pain, and that he is unable to drive without stopping frequently to walk around. The ALJ rejected this testimony as not credible. 12 Relevant portions of the ALJ's decision read as follows: 13 ... [R]ecent records from the claimant's treating physician as well as an earlier assessment from his chiropractor, indicate that [Bates] retains the functional capacity to perform a light level of work-related activities; that is, he is able to lift and carry a maximum of 10 pounds frequently, or up to 20 pounds occasionally. The claimant's testimony that he is only able to lift and carry a maximum of 5 pounds is not supported by the medical evidence, and it is not accepted by the Administrative Law Judge.... FINDINGS 14 ... 15 The claimant's testimony concerning his exertional limitations was not supported by the reports of his treating physician, and was not fully credible. 16 The ALJ made a specific finding discrediting Bates' subjective pain testimony. 1 The finding is based on reports from Bates' own doctors that Bates is able to perform light-level work activities. The ALJ in his decision referred to these reports in reaching the conclusion that Bates' subjective pain testimony was not credible. In a vocational retraining evaluation it was noted that Dr. Leone, Bates' treating chiropractor, reported that he considered Bates able to engage in sedentary to light work activities, with the ability to stand and walk up to four hours during an eight-hour work day, and lift and carry ten to twenty pounds occasionally. Bates' treating physician, Dr. Nacht, an orthopedic specialist, in a report to a rehabilitation agency stated that he considered Bates able to lift up to twenty pounds, stand for one hour, and walk for one to two hours at a time. 17 We have stated that an ALJ may not discredit subjective pain testimony solely on the ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical findings. Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d at 502; Varney v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 846 F.2d 581, 584 (9th Cir.1988) (Varney I ); Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir.1986). 18 In Gamer v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 815 F.2d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir.1987), we held that an ALJ's findings discounting a claimant's subjective pain testimony are not sufficient where the ALJ makes only a general finding and does not state which pain testimony is not credible, nor what medical evidence suggests that the claimant's claim of pain is not credible. See also Varney, 846 F.2d at 584. The ALJ's findings in the present case do not suffer from such flaws. The ALJ referred specifically to portions of Bates' testimony and discussed the opinions of Bates' treating chiropractor and physician which indicate that Bates' testimony is not credible. The ALJ discredited Bates' testimony not because it was not fully corroborated by medical evidence but rather because the medical evidence--the opinions of his own doctors--affirmatively contradicts Bates' allegations of disabling back pain. 19 We afford greater weight to a treating physician's opinion because he is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir.1987). Moreover, credibility determinations are the province of the ALJ. Russell v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 81, 83 (9th Cir.1988). Bates' subjective pain testimony was impeached by the opinions of his own doctors. The ALJ referred to these reports in his decision and he made a specific finding concluding that Bates' testimony was not credible. We conclude that the ALJ made the requisite specific findings and that these findings are supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ was justified in rejecting Bates' subjective pain testimony.