Opinion ID: 2598207
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: analysis

Text: This case comes to us as a denial of a petition for writ of mandate. Although an appellate court defers to a trial court's factual determinations if supported by substantial evidence, where, as here, the trial court's decision did not turn on any disputed facts, the trial court's decision is subject to de novo review. ( Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 916, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 811, 62 P.3d 54; Gilbert v. City of Sunnyvale (2005) 130 Cal. App.4th 1264, 1275, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 297 [In resolving questions of law on appeal from a denial of a writ of mandate, an appellate court exercises its independent judgment].) The issues before us present questions of law and review is de novo.

Article VII of the California Constitution establishes a system of civil service employment for state government: 'The civil service includes every officer and employee of the State except as otherwise provided in this Constitution.' (Cal. Const., art. VII, § 1, subd. (a).) The hallmark of our civil service system is that appointments and promotions are based on merit ascertained by competitive examination. (Art. VII, § 1, subd. (b).) [11] The purposes of article VII as disclosed in the ballot argument of its predecessor provision are twofold: (1) to encourage efficiency and economy in state government, and (2) to eliminate the `spoils system' of political patronage by ensuring that demonstrated fitnessrather than political considerationsspurs all appointments to public service. ( Professional Engineers v. Department of Transportation (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 585, 592, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 599.) While article VII does not expressly prohibit the use of private contractors to perform state functions, judicial construction of this provision has long held that a restriction upon the use of such private contractors is necessary to fulfill its purposes. `Were the rule otherwise, the civil service system could be entirely undone by a system of contracting; and the state's work force could be dominated by independent contractors who would be hired from job to job.' Such a system, operating without regard to considerations of economy or efficiency, and open to a `patronage/spoils system' method of contracting, would conflict with the electorate's probable intent in adopting article VII and its predecessor. ( Professional Engineers v. Department of Transportation, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 564, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 467, 936 P.2d 473; California State Employees' Assn. v. Williams (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 390, 397, 86 Cal.Rptr. 305 [The restriction on `contracting out' emanates from an implicit necessity for protecting the policy of the organic civil service mandate against dissolution and destruction].) Decisional law construed article VII as a restriction, but not a total prohibition, against private contracting by public agencies, and developed three exceptions. The first, called the nature of the services rule, was explicated in State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Riley (1937) 9 Cal.2d 126, 69 P.2d 985. In Riley, we held that the employment of an outside attorney by the State Compensation Insurance Fund, which had its own in-house attorneys, violated article XXIV, the predecessor provision to article VII. We observed: There undoubtedly is a field in which state agencies may enter into contracts with independent contractors. But the true test is not whether the person is an `independent contractor' or an `employee', but whether the services contracted for, whether temporary or permanent are of such a nature that they could be performed by one selected under the provisions of the civil service. If the services could be so performed then in our opinion it is mandatory upon such appointing power to proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and statute above summarized. ( Id., at p. 135, 69 P.2d 985.) [I]f the services cannot be adequately rendered by an existing agency of the public entity ... the contract is permissible. ( California State Employees' Assn. v. Williams, supra, 7 Cal.App.3d at p. 397, 86 Cal.Rptr. 305.) The second exception to article VII's restriction on contracting out government functions to private entities is termed the new state function rule. [T]he restriction is inapplicable if the state seeks to contract for private assistance to perform new functions not previously undertaken by the state or covered by an existing department or agency. ( Professional Engineers v. Department of Transportation, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 549, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 467, 936 P.2d 473; California State Employees' Assn. v. Williams, supra, 7 Cal. App.3d at p. 399, 86 Cal.Rptr. 305 [the state civil service suffers no displacement and the underlying constitutional policy is not offended when a new state activity is conducted by contract with a separate public or private entity].) The third exception to article VII is referred to as the cost savings exception. In California State Employees' Assn. v. State of California (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 840, 245 Cal.Rptr. 1232, the Court of Appeal upheld section 19130, which, under specified conditions, allows the state to contract with private entities to perform personal services to achieve cost savings, against a claim that the statute violated article VII. Discussing that holding in our 1997 Professional Engineers opinion, we explained that the savings objective of section 19130 was permissible if, pursuant to the statute, the state can achieve these savings without ignoring other applicable civil service requirements (e.g., use of publicized, competitive bidding, no undercutting of state pay rates, no displacement of state workers or infringement of affirmative action plans, and no overriding public interest in having the state perform the function). ( Professional Engineers v. Department of Transportation, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 549, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 467, 936 P.2d 473.) These exceptions to article VII, derived from its restriction on private contracting, defined the scope of the Legislature's statutory efforts to permit some contracting out of government functions prior to the enactment of Proposition 35. This is plainly true of the statutes involved in this matter, sections 14101, 14130 et seq., and. 19130, all of which incorporate those exceptions. Under section 14101, Caltrans shall contract with qualified architects and engineers for the performance of work when it is determined by the Director of Transportation, with the approval of the Director of Finance, that the obtainable staff is unable to perform the particular work within the time the public interest requires such work to be done. Thus, this authorization includes a condition that conforms to the nature of the services exception. Similarly, section 14130 expresses the Legislature's intent that Caltrans contract for the services of engineers, [and] architects, ... whenever the department is inadequately staffed to satisfactorily carry out its program of project study reports, project development, surveying, and construction inspection in a timely and effective matter. (§ 14130, subd. (b); see also § 14131 [Services contracted for shall not cause the displacement of any permanent, temporary, or part-time employee of the department].) These sections appear consistent with decisional law interpreting article VII. ( Professional Engineers v. Department of Transportation, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 551, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 467, 936 P.2d 473.) This is also true of section 19130, which authorizes state agencies to enter into personal service contracts with outside entities to achieve costs savings but only if one of two conditions is met. Either [t]he contract is for a new state function and the Legislature has specifically mandated or authorized the performance of the work by independent contractors (§ 19130, subd. (b)(2)), or [t]he services contracted are not available within civil service, cannot be performed satisfactorily by civil service employees, or are of such a highly specialized or technical nature that the necessary expert knowledge, experience, and ability are not available through the civil service system. (§ 19130, subd. (b)(3); see Professional Engineers v. Department of Transportation, supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 594, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 599 [noting section 19130, subdivision (b)(2) is a codification of the `new state function' test].)
Our decision in Professional Engineers v. Department of Transportation, supra, 13 Cal.App.4th 585, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 599, provides a further indication that pre-Proposition 35 statutes regulating private contracting were constrained by article VII limitations. In Professional Engineers, we declined to overrule the decisional law that had inferred article VII's restriction on private contracting, and rejected legislative attempts to expand Caltrans's authority to contract with private entities for architectural and engineering services beyond the limits permitted by the exceptions to article VII. Professional Engineers had its genesis in a 1986 lawsuit brought by Professional Engineers to enjoin Caltrans from contracting with private entities to carry out state highway projects traditionally performed by civil service employees. The 1986 litigation resulted in a permanent injunction, issued in 1990, prohibiting Caltrans from (1) contracting privately for engineering and inspection services for highway projects unless the work was to be performed in compliance with the then existing criteria set forth in section 14101 and former section 14130 et seq.; (2) entering into cooperative agreements with local entities when private entities were to perform part or all of the work; and (3) awarding contracts to private entities for construction survey staking. ( Professional Engineers v. Department of Transportation, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 554, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 467, 936 P.2d 473.) In response to the injunction, the Legislature adopted chapter 433. (Stats.1993, ch. 433, p. 2448.) Chapter 433 amended section 14130 in order (1) to allow Caltrans 'continued flexibility' to contract privately as needed to assure timely delivery of its projects; and (2) to afford `a new and independent basis upon which to justify contracting out actions.' ( Professional Engineers v. Department of Transportation, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 552, 63 Cal. Rptr.2d 467, 936 P.2d 473.) Among its provisions, the amendment to section 14130 stated that the use of private consultants was necessary to increase Caltrans's project delivery on state highway construction projects; that its use of consultants to assist project delivery was a new state function; and that Caltrans was not required to use existing state employees or hire new staff to meet the goals set forth in the chapter. ( Id., at pp. 552-553, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 467, 936 P.2d 473.) Following the enactment of chapter 433, Caltrans sought to dissolve the 1990 injunction barring its use of private contractors except as permitted by established exceptions to article VII. The trial court declined to do so. It concluded that Chapter 433's legislative findings and directives are `obviously erroneous, unreasonable and inconsistent with the constitutional civil service mandate,' and for that reason the provisions are unconstitutional to the extent they purport to authorize Caltrans to contact privately without a factual showing that the contract is permissible under applicable constitutional principles. ( Professional Engineers v. Department of Transportation, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 557, (53 Cal.Rptr.2d 467, 936 P.2d 473.) A divided Court of Appeal disagreed and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to dissolve the injunction. We granted review. Caltrans asked us to overrule the body of decisional law originating with State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Riley, supra, 9 Cal.2d 126, 69 P.2d 985, that had construed article VII as a restriction on private contracting arid developed the exceptions to the restriction. Caltrans argued that ballot arguments made in connection with the predecessor provision to article VII demonstrated that the provision was only intended to implement merit as the basis of appointments and promotion in state service, but was silent on the issue of outside contracting. We declined to disapprove this body of law. As an analytical matter, Riley's rule seems appropriate to assure that the state civil service is not neglected, diminished, or destroyed through routine appointments to `independent contractors' made solely on the basis of political considerations and cronyism. ( Professional Engineers v. Department of Transportation, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 563-564, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 467, 936 P.2d 473.) Furthermore, even assuming for the sake of argument that Riley's constitutional interpretation was originally flawed, under settled rules of construction we must presume that Riley's interpretation was preserved and reincorporated into the Constitution on two subsequent occasions when (1) in 1970, the voters reenacted an amended version of former article XXIV pursuant to the recommendation of the California Constitution Revision Commission, and (2) in 1976, the voters adopted the substance of former article XXIV as new article VII. ( Id., at p. 564, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 467, 936 P.2d 473.) Addressing Caltrans's various policy reasons for urging this court to overrule the case law at issue, we observed that although these reasons, if factually based, might support a constitutional amendment to clarify, or indeed abrogate, the private contracting restriction, they offer no solid ground for ignoring traditional principles of stare decisis. ( Id., at p. 566, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 467, 936 P.2d 473.) We then turned to the question of whether chapter 433 affords an independent basis for overturning the trial court's injunction and enforcement orders. ( Professional Engineers v. Department of Transportation, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 568, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 467, 936 P.2d 473.) In answering this question we observed that [m]ost provisions of Chapter 433 appear intended to dispense with, rather than to satisfy, the constitutional civil service mandate. ( Id., at p. 570, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 467, 936 P.2d 473.) We observed that certain new subdivisions of the amended version of section 14130 that conflicted with the civil service mandate were unsupported by express or implied findings or by any evidentiary support. ( Ibid. ) Therefore, [w]e conclude[d] that Chapter 433 contains no express or implied findings sufficient on their face to justify dissolving the trial court's injunction. To the extent Chapter 433's provisions conflict with the civil service mandate, they are invalid. ( Id., at p. 572, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 467, 936 P.2d 473.) Proposition 35 expressly removed all article VII restrictions on the ability of government entities to contract out for architectural and engineering services. We turn now to the question of whether Proposition 35 also impliedly repealed statutes regulating private contracting that were enacted with the article VII restrictions in mind, particularly sections 14101, 14130 et seq., and 19130.
In construing the constitutional and statutory provisions added to the state Constitution and the Government Code by Proposition 35, we apply the same interpretive principles to each. The principles of constitutional interpretation are similar to those governing statutory construction. In interpreting a constitution's provisions, our paramount task is to ascertain the intent of those who enacted it. [Citation.] To determine that intent, we `look first to the language of the constitutional text, giving the words their ordinary meaning.' [Citation.] If the language is clear, there is no need for construction. [Citation.] If the language is ambiguous, however, we consider extrinsic evidence of the enacting body's intent. ( Thompson v. Department of Corrections (2001) 25 Cal.4th 117, 122, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 46,18 P.3d 1198.) Similarly, [i]n interpreting a voter initiative ..., we apply the same principles that govern statutory construction. [Citation.] Thus, we turn first to the language of the [initiative], giving the words their ordinary meaning.' [Citation.] The [initiative's] language must also be construed in the context of the statute as a whole and the [initiative's] overall ... scheme. ( People v. Rizo (2000) 22 Cal.4th 681, 685, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 375, 996 P.2d 27.) Absent ambiguity, we presume that the voters intend the meaning apparent on the face of an initiative measure [citation] and the court may not add to the statute or rewrite it to conform to an assumed intent that is not apparent in its language. ( Lesher Communications, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek (1990) 52 Cal.3d 531, 543, 277 Cal.Rptr. 1, 802 P.2d 317.) Where there is ambiguity in the language of the measure, [b]allot summaries and arguments may be considered when determining the voters' intent and understanding of a ballot measure. ( Legislature v. Deukmejian (1983) 34 Cal.3d 658, 673, fn. 14, 194 Cal.Rptr. 781, 669 P.2d 17.) The unambiguous intent of the electorate in adding article XXII to the state Constitution via Proposition 35 was to remove article VII's restriction on the use of private contractors by state agencies for architectural and engineering services: Nothing contained in Article VII of this Constitution shall be construed to limit, restrict or prohibit the State or any other governmental entities, including, but not limited to, cities, counties, cities and counties, school districts and other special districts, local and regional agencies and joint power agencies from contracting with private entities for the performance of architectural and engineering services. (Cal. Const., art. XXII, § 2.) Moreover, the initiative's statement of purpose and intent explicitly states that the removal of existing restrictions on contracting for architectural and engineering services is part of the intent of the electorate in enacting the initiative. (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2000) text of Prop. 35, § 2, subd. (a), p. 65; see appen. A, p. ii.) Additionally, section 4529.11 makes it clear that the elimination of article VII restrictions on private contracting applies to transportation projects. [5] While the initiative does not expressly repeal sections 14101, 14130 et seq., and 19130, we conclude that the constitutional and statutory provisions of the initiative, viewed in the context of the initiative as a whole, impliedly repeal these statutes. Notwithstanding the presumption against repeals by implication, repeal may be found where (1) the two acts are so inconsistent that there is no possibility of concurrent operation, or (2) the later provision gives undebatable evidence of an intent to supersede the earlier provision. ( Hays v. Wood (1979) 25 Cal.3d 772, 784, 160 Cal.Rptr. 102, 603 P.2d 19; accord, Chatsky and Associates v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 873, 877, 12 Cal. Rptr.3d 154.) Because the doctrine of implied repeal provides that the most recently enacted statute expresses the will of the Legislature ( In re Thierry S. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 727, 744, 139 Cal.Rptr. 708, 566 P.2d 610), application of the doctrine is appropriate in those limited situations where it is necessary to effectuate the intent of drafters of the newly enacted statute. `In order for the second law to repeal or supersede the first, the former must constitute a revision of the entire subject, so that the court may say it was intended to be a substitute for the first.' ( Board of Supervisors v. Lonergan (1980) 27 Cal.3d 855, 868, 167 Cal.Rptr. 820, 616 P.2d 802, quoting Penziner v. West American Finance Co. (1937) 10 Cal.2d 160, 176, 74 P.2d 252; see also Sutherland, Statutory Construction (6th ed.2002) § 23.9, p. 461 [Noting that courts will infer the repeal of a statute only when ... a subsequent act of the legislature clearly is intended to occupy the entire field covered by a prior enactment].) Finally, because the power to legislate is shared by the Legislature and the electorate through the initiative process (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 1), the principles governing repeals by implication where the statutory conflict is the result of enactments by the Legislature should also apply where, as here, the question is whether the provisions of an initiative impliedly repealed preexisting statutes. The standards for analyzing whether a statute has been impliedly repealed by constitutional amendment or another statute are the same. ( Barratt American, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 809, 817, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 132 [`The same standards apply in determining whether a constitutional amendment impliedly repealed a statutory provision']; see Martello v. Superior Court (1927) 202 Cal. 400, 404, 261 P. 476 [statutes that were verbatim repetition of a constitutional provision permitting stipulation to a judge pro tempore that was omitted by subsequent constitutional amendments were also impliedly repealed].) When we examine the constitutional and statutory provisions of Proposition 35, in light of the initiative as a whole, we find that they demonstrate a clear intent by the electorate to supersede prior law, under which the ability of state agencies to contract with private entities for architectural and engineering services was limited by article VII and article VII-derived statutory restrictions. Article XXII, section 1 grants to the State of California and all other governmental agencies the choice and authority to contract with qualified private entities for architectural and engineering services. Section 2 provides that Nothing contained in Article VII of this Constitution shall be construed to limit, restrict or prohibit the State or any other governmental entities ... from contracting with private entities for the performance of architectural and engineering services. (Cal.Const, art. XXII, § 2.) Although article XXII is silent as to the statutes at issue, other provisions of the initiative, including the statutory provisions, support a finding of implied repeal. The statement of intent expresses the intention to eliminate existing restrictions. (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2000) text of Prop. 35, § 2, subd. (a), p. 65; see appen. A, p. ii.) The use of the plural restrictions, combined with the absence of a specific reference to article VII, indicates an intention to remove all such restrictions, whether constitutional or statutory. ( People v. Rizo, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 685, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 375, 996 P.2d 27 [in construing the language of an initiative, the reviewing court gives words their ordinary meaning].) Several of the statutory provisions added to the Government Code by the initiative also support the application of the doctrine of implied repeal. For example, section 4529.20 states that [t]his act seeks to comprehensively regulate the matters which are contained within its provisions. (Italics added.) Section 4529.19 provides that [t]his act shall be liberally construed to accomplish its purposes. Notably, too, section 4529.18 provides that [i]f any act of the Legislature conflicts with the provisions of this act, this act shall prevail. Finally, the initiative, while authorizing the Legislature to amend the initiative by statute restricts that power to such amendments as will further its purposes. (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2000) text of Prop. 35, § 5, p. 66; see appen. A, p. iv.) Moreover, both the Attorney General's summary of Proposition 35 and the analysis of the measure by the Legislative Analyst put the electorate on notice that the measure was intended to repeal all article VII-based restrictions on private contracting. The summary explained that a yes vote meant that [t]he state could contract with private individuals or firms for architectural and engineering services in all situations rather than only under certain conditions ( such as when the work is of a temporary nature or of such a specialized nature that it cannot be provided by state employees.) (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2000) Ballot Measure Summary, Prop. 35, p. 2; see appen. A, p. vi.) The italicized language clearly alludes to such exceptions to article VII-based restrictions as those found in sections 14101, [obtainable staff is unable to perform the particular work within the time the public interest requires such work to be done], 14130, subdivision (b) [the department is inadequately staffed to satisfactorily carry out its program of project study reports, project development, surveying, and construction inspection in a timely and effective manner], and 19130, subdivision (b)(3) [the services contracted ... are of such a highly specialized or technical nature that the necessary expert knowledge, experience, and ability are not available through the civil service system].) Similarly, the Legislative Analyst's analysis of the measure summarized existing law by noting that private contracting was only permitted if services needed by the state are: (1) of a temporary nature, (2) not available within the civil service, or (3) of a highly specialized or technical nature. (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2000) Analysis of Prop. 35 by Legis. Analyst, p. 19; see appen. A, p. viii.) In summary, Proposition 35 authorizes public entities to contract for architectural and engineering services free of article VII restrictions and other existing restrictions; represents a comprehensive regulation of the entire subject of private contracting for those services; prevails over conflicting acts of the Legislature; must be construed liberally to achieve its goal of encouraging and authorizing private contracting of architectural and engineering services; and permits only such statutory amendments by the Legislature as will further its purposes. Moreover, at the time the initiative was proposed, the voters were informed that enactment of Proposition 35 would eliminate both the article VII rule and its exceptions. These provisions cannot be reconciled with the existing statutes that authorize private contracting by Caltrans of architectural and engineering services, subject to conditions derived from the exceptions to article VII's rule generally restricting such contracting. That rule has been abrogated by Proposition 35 and if the rule no longer has any force, neither should its exceptions. We therefore conclude that Proposition 35 impliedly repealed the particular statutes at issue here. [6] Although Professional Engineers asserts that the pre-Proposition 35 statutes are consistent with Proposition 35, it does not specifically attempt to reconcile them. Rather, its chief argument is less about the fate of these particular statutes than the broader question of who has authority to regulate private contracting for architectural and engineering services by state agencies in the post-Proposition 35 landscape. Professional Engineers explains: By enacting Proposition 35, the voters intended to expand the `State of California's' power to choose when and how to contract out for [architectural and engineering] services. A primary issue before this Court is to whom the voters intended that expanded power to be given. In the view of Professional Engineers, prior to the enactment of Proposition 35, the Legislature exercised plenary power in this area, subject to article VII restrictions on its authority. Therefore, the elimination of the Article VII restriction on contracting is intended to lift the restriction on the Legislature's power to authorize individual state departments to contract out, thereby expanding the Legislature's power over authorizing [architectural and engineering] contracting. (Original emphasis.) However, Professional Engineers argues, unless and until the Legislature uses its expanded power, sections 14101, 14130 et seq., and 19130 remain in effect, and Caltrans's authority to enter into contracts with private entities for architectural and engineering services is subject to the conditions set forth in those statutes. Professional Engineers bases this reading of Proposition 35 on its construction of the phrase State of California in article XXII, section 1, as referring only to the Legislature. Professional Engineers also directs us to the principle that, when a constitutional provision removes a restriction on the Legislature's authority, the provision must be liberally interpreted as an expansion of the Legislature's power. In addition to urging that its interpretation of Proposition 35 is correct, Professional Engineers contends that the alternative interpretation, that the initiative impliedly repealed the statutes at issue, creates a separation of power conflict because such construction divests the Legislature of the power to regulate private contracting and places it in the hands of executive branch agencies. Moreover, Professional Engineers argues that, if current statutory regulations of private contracting are deemed repealed by implication, then no statutory authorization exists at all for Caltrans to contract for architectural and engineering services with private entities. At the outset, we examine the issue of Legislature's plenary authority to determine the circumstances under which public agencies may enter into private contracts for architectural and engineering services, because appeal to that authority is central to Professional Engineers' arguments. Plenary authority and exclusive authority are not synonymous concepts. (See Independent Energy Producers Assn. v. McPherson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1020, 1035-1037, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 136 P.3d 178.) Under our constitutional system the Legislature is not the exclusive source of legislative power. The legislative power of this State is vested in the California Legislature which consists of the Senate and the Assembly, but the people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and referendum. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 1.) The initiative is the power of the electors to propose statutes and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 8, subd. (a).) The electorate's legislative power is generally coextensive with the power of the Legislature to enact statutes. ( Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 253, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 207, 902 P.2d 225.) Such statutes, moreover, like legislative enactments, are presumed to be valid. ( Legislature v. Eu (1991) 54 Cal.3d 492, 501, 286 Cal.Rptr. 283, 816 P.2d 1309.) If, therefore, as Professional Engineers maintains, the Legislature has plenary authority to regulate private contracting by public agencies, then so, too, does the electorate. By enacting Proposition 35, the electorate has exercised its authority. Our role as a reviewing court is to simply ascertain and give effect to the electorate's intent guided by the same well-settled principles we employ to give effect to the Legislature's intent when we review enactments by that body. ( People v. Rizo, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 685, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 375, 996 P.2d 27.) We do not, of course, pass upon the ``wisdom, expediency, or policy'' of enactments by the voters any more than we would enactments by the Legislature. ( California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627, 632, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 671, 927 P.2d 1175.) Central to Professional Engineers' argument that the purpose of Proposition 35 was to expand the Legislature's power is its interpretation of the phrase State of California in section 1 of article XXII as referring solely to the Legislature. That section reads in pertinent part: The State of California and all other governmental entities, . . ., shall be allowed to contract with qualified private entities for architectural and engineering services for all public works of improvement. ( Ibid.) Professional Engineers maintains that [fundamental principles of statutory construction confirm its interpretation of the phrase. But fundamental principles of construction, applicable equally to constitutional provisions, statutes and initiatives, require us to give words in such texts their ordinary meanings. ( Thompson v. Department of Corrections, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 122, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 46, 18 P.3d 1198.) Of course, in construing the statute, `[t]he words ... must be read in context, considering the nature and the purpose of the statutory enactment,' ( People ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 301, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 855, 926 P.2d 1042.) The ordinary meaning of the phrase State of California, as it refers to state government, includes all three branches, legislative, executive and judicial. (See Cal. Const., art. Ill, § 3.) Thus, section 1, in tandem with section 2, of article XXII grants all three branches of government the authority to contract with private entities for architectural and engineering services unimpeded by article VII restrictions. This interpretation is supported if we examine the phrase in context. The initiative specifically designates the Legislature in section 4, where newly added Government Code section 4529.18 provides, If any act of the Legislature conflicts with the provisions of this act, this act shall prevail. It also refers to each house of the Legislature in section 5, which sets forth the Legislature's authority to amend the initiative by statute. (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2000) text of Prop. 35, § 5, p. 66; see appen. A, p. iv.) These references demonstrate that the drafters of the initiative were perfectly capable of designating the Legislature by name where they intended to address the impact of the initiative on the Legislature's authority to regulate private contracting. It is inconceivable that the drafters would have failed to make clear in article XXII that the reference to State of California was to the Legislature alone. [7] Based on its assertion that the intent behind Proposition 35 is to expand the Legislature's power to regulate private contracting without article VII limitations, should it choose to do so, Professional Engineers argues [w]here a constitutional amendment removes restrictions and limitations on Legislative power, the constitutional amendment must be construed liberally in favor of the Legislature's action. However, given that the premise of its claimthat State of California in article XXII refers to the Legislature aloneis erroneous, this principle is inapplicable here. [8] In addition to urging us to embrace its interpretation of Proposition 35, Professional Engineers contends that an interpretation of the initiative that allows Caltrans to contract with private entities for architectural and engineering services without implementing legislation violates the separation of powers doctrine because it diverts a legislative function, regulation of private contacting, to an executive agency. We disagree. This interpretation of Proposition 35 does not endorse a shift of policymaking powers from the legislative branch to executive branch agencies. Rather, it recognizes that there has been a policy determination, made by a constitutionally empowered legislative entity, the electorate acting through its initiative power, to permit those agencies to contract for architectural and engineering services free of article VII-derived limitations. Professional Engineers cites Kugler v. Yocum (1968) 69 Cal.2d 371, 71 Cal.Rptr. 687, 445 P.2d 303, for the proposition that regulation of private contacting involves a core legislative function`the determination and formulation of the legislative policy.'  ( Id. at p. 376, 71 Cal.Rptr. 687, 445 P.2d 303.) We agree with the general principle, of course, but as Yocum itself illustrates, this legislative function is not the exclusive province of the Legislature. Yocum involved the refusal of a city council to hold an election on an proposed initiative ordinance involving the salaries of certain city employees. In affirming the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the city to conduct the election, we observed that the salary question raised a `legislative' rather than [an] `administrative' issue and therefore falls within the electorate's initiative power. ( Kugler v. Yocum, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 374, 71 Cal.Rptr. 687, 445 P.2d 303.) Similarly here, the setting of policy with respect to private contracting is a legislative matter and, therefore, a proper subject for the electorate to exercise its legislative authority through initiative, which is what the electorate has done. The initiative accomplishes what Professional Engineers argues under its interpretation of Proposition 35 that the Legislature could also have chosen to do in its own timerepeal statutes embodying article VII-derived restrictions on private contracting. We perceive no separation of power violation simply because the electorate, rather than the Legislature, exercised its constitutional authority as a legislative entity to make policy in this area. [9] Moreover, we agree with Caltrans that the constitutional provision in Proposition 35 is self-executing and does not require legislative implementation. ( People v. Vega-Hernandez (1986) 179 Cal. App.3d 1084, 1091, 225 Cal.Rptr. 209 [constitutional provisions are presumed to be self-executing unless a contrary expression is clearly stated.].) This being so, there is no separation of powers violation simply because the electorate has chosen to bypass the Legislature and, through Proposition 35, authorize public agencies to contract for architectural and engineering services pursuant to the constitutional and statutory provisions added by the initiative. ( Chesney v. Byram (1940) 15 Cal.2d 460, 462, 101 P.2d 1106 [constitutional provision is self-executing `if it supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the right given may be enjoyed and protected, or the duty to be imposed may be enforced'].) We do not believe that any interpretation of Proposition 35, other than an interpretation that expands the Legislature's power, impermissibly forecloses the Legislature's role in the realm of private contracting by state agencies. This case does not present the global question of the Legislature's power vis-à-vis such private contracting. We address only the issue before uswhether it was the intent of the electorate in enacting Proposition 35 to lift article VII-derived limitations embodied in certain specific statutes and thereby allow public agencies to enter into contracts with private entities for particular kinds of services, architectural and engineering services, free of these particular limitations. Even within this specific area of public contracting, section 5 of the initiative reserved to the Legislature some measure authority to act. [10] Therefore, our interpretation of Proposition 35 does not leave the Legislature out of the public contracting equation even as to the specific subject matter of this initiative. For the same reason, we reject the claim advanced by Professional Engineers that Proposition 35 produced such a fundamental restructuring of state government as to constitute a revision of the Constitution. A revision to the Constitution cannot be accomplished by an amendment but requires a constitutional convention. A revision may be found where an enactment is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the `substantial entirety' of the Constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions or accomplish[es] such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision also. ( Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 223, 149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281.) Professional Engineers' argument appears to be based on the latter, or qualitative, effect of Proposition 35: Taking away the Legislature's plenary power to determine contracting out policies and procedures for the State of California, and shifting that power to the Executive branch, constitutes a fundamental restructuring of our traditional tripartite system of government. [11] As we have pointed out, however, this characterization of the effects of Proposition 35 as we have discerned its intent and purpose, is erroneous. Proposition 35 does not usurp the Legislature's plenary authority to regulate private contracting by public agencies in a global sense, but simply permits public agencies to enter into contracts with private entities for architectural and engineering services without article-VII derived restrictions on their ability to do so. Under Professional Engineers' own interpretation of Proposition 35, repealing the statutes at issue could permissibly be done by the Legislature. Here, that repeal has been effected by the other constitutionally empowered legislative authority, the electorate. Therefore, this is not a case in which the Legislature has been stripped of authority to regulate private contacting but, rather, a case in which a permissible legislative decision has been made to remove previous limitations on the ability of public agencies to contract for architectural and engineering services. Moreover, as we have observed, even under our construction of Proposition 35, the Legislature retains some authority as defined in section 5 to amend the initiative by statute. Accordingly, we cannot agree that Proposition 35 creates such far reaching changes to our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision. ( Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 223, 149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281.) [12] Finally, Professional Engineers contends that, if Proposition 35 is construed to implicitly repeal preexisting statutes regulating private contracting, then Caltrans has ho statutory authority at all to enter into such contracts. The Court of Appeal found that authority in section 14030, subdivision (d), which authorizes Caltrans to plan, design, construct, operate, and maintain transportation systems which the Legislature has made, or may make, the responsibility of the department. Professional Engineers argues that section 14030 does not confer such authority because nothing in its language or history demonstrates that it was intended to authorize private contracting. This is true, but irrelevant. We agree with the Court of Appeal that section 14030 is a broad grant of power sufficient to encompass private contracting for the accomplishment of Caltrans's tasks once that authority became available to Caltrans, which it did when the voters enacted Proposition 35. The voters are presumed to have been aware of existing laws at the time the initiative was enacted. ( People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 844, 218 Cal.Rptr. 57, 705 P.2d 380.) Therefore, the voters can be deemed to have been aware that Caltrans's broad preexisting authority to plan, design, construct, operate and maintain transportation systems was sufficient to add to it the new authority to contract out for architectural and engineering services without requiring en actment of a separate implementing statute. Furthermore, as the Court of Appeal pointed out, article XXII, which confers the choice and authority to enter into contracts with private entities for architectural and engineering services is, like all constitutional provisions, presumed to be self-executing unless a contrary intention is clearly expressed. ( People v. Vega-Hernandez, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at p. 1092, 225 Cal.Rptr. 209.) Here no such intention has been shown and, as previously noted, we must presume the amendment is self-executing and needs no implementing legislation. For all these reasons, we conclude that Proposition 35 implicitly repealed preexisting statutes regulating private contracting for architectural and engineering services.
The remaining issue before us is the continued validity of the QBS procedure, set forth in sections 4525 to 4529.5, used by Caltrans to select private architectural and engineering firms. The QBS procedure requires the agency to negotiate a contract with the best qualified firm for such services at compensation which the state agency head determines is fair and reasonable to the State of California or the political subdivision involved. (§ 4528, subd. (a)(1).) Thus, qualifications, not cost, is the primary competitive measure by which contracts are awarded under the QBS procedure. But cost is not irrelevant. If the agency is unable to negotiate a contract with the most qualified firm at a fair and reasonable price, negotiations are terminated and the agency is directed to undertake negotiations with the second most qualified firm, and then, failing that, with the third most qualified firm. (§ 4528, subd. (a)(2).) If this process fails to produce a contract, the agency shall select additional firms in order of their competence and qualifications and continue negotiations ... until an agreement is reached. (§ 4528, subd. (a)(3).) As an additional cost safeguard, administrative regulations require Caltrans to prepare its own cost estimate for a project before commencing price negotiations. That estimate may be based on such factors as a market survey, comparison with fees paid to other departments' or agencies' contractors for similar services, or comparison with the salaries of comparable positions within the Department, within State service, or within other governmental entities. This estimate shall serve as a guide in determining fair and reasonable compensation for the services rendered. (Cal.Code Regs., tit. 21, § 1520.4.) In the trial court and the Court of Appeal, Professional Engineers contended that Proposition 35 implicitly repealed these statutes because the QBS procedure was inconsistent with the initiative's cost-saving mandate. In this court, however, Professional Engineers has retreated from that position. Instead, it argues only that, to meet the initiative's cost-saving mandate, [l]egislation implementing Proposition 35 must add a cost savings mechanism to the consultant selection process. We agree with the Court of Appeal that the QBS procedure is not inconsistent with Proposition 35's requirement that contracting for architectural and engineering services occur[] through a fair, competitive selection process, (Voter Information Guide, Gen. elec. (Nov. 7, 2000) text of Prop. 35, § 2, subd. (e) p. 65; § 4529.12; see appen. A, pp. ii-iv), for the reasons given by that court. First, the QBS process is a competitive process and while cost may be a less salient consideration in the qualifications-based selection procedure than in a competitive bidding process, it is a consideration nevertheless. Second, section 4529.16 requires that the initiative shall not be applied in a manner that will result in the loss of federal funding to any governmental entity. As the Court of Appeal explained: Federal law requires the use of a qualifications-based selection procedure where the construction of federal-aid highways is to be performed by a state transportation department or under its supervision, contracts for architectural and engineering services must be awarded pursuant to the Brooks Act (40 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.) or an equivalent state qualifications-based selection procedure. (23 U.S.C. § 112(b)(2)(A).) The Brooks Act establishes a qualification-based selection procedure virtually identical to Government Code chapter 10, sections 4525-4529.5. (40 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.) About 84 percent of Caltrans architectural and engineering contracts are subject to these federal requirements. At a minimum, as to federally funded projects, section 4529.16 compels a construction of section 4529.12 that allows the use of the qualifications based procedure. Third, while the initiative mentions taxpayer savings, the ballot materials made clear that cost savings were not necessarily the measure of the value to the taxpayers of permitting private contracting by public entities. As the Court of Appeal observed: The official summary of the initiative prepared by the Attorney General, and the Legislative Analyst's analysis of the measure both indicate that the fiscal impact of the initiative was unknown. The Legislative Analyst specifically notes that in some cases costs may be higher when an agency contracts out. `It may still be in the state's best interests to do so, however, because of other considerations' such as avoiding the delay of formally hiring and training state employees to meet a short-term surge in workload, and the financial benefits derived from completing construction projects more quickly. Moreover, the official summary clearly states that competitive bidding on the contracts (the prevailing method of public contractor selection that gives prominent weight to cost) is permitted but not required under Proposition 35. In addition, the argument in favor of the initiative specifically informed voters that existing selection statutes would be utilized to procure architectural and engineering services. Prop. 35 would simply restore state and local agencies' choice to utilize private experts using the same fair selection process on the books today to select the most qualified architects or engineers to get these projects designed and built on time and on budget. (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2000) Argument in Favor of Prop. 35, p. 20; see appen. A, p. xi.) The voters are deemed to have understood that reference was to the QBS statutes then in effect. ( People v. Weidert, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 844, 218 Cal.Rptr. 57, 705 P.2d 380.) We conclude, therefore, that the QBS procedure is not inconsistent with Proposition 35 and Caltrans's use of that procedure is not improper. To the extent that Professional Engineers' argument is that Proposition 35 requires some legislative alteration of the QBS procedure to give cost savings a more prominent role, that argument is best directed at the Legislature. Proposition 35 gives the Legislature the power to amend the initiative by statute to further its purposes. (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2000) text of Prop. 35, § 5; see appen. A, p. iv.) Unless and until the Legislature does so, however, we are in no position to pass upon the validity of such amendment.