Opinion ID: 2033261
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Chapter 23ACompetition of Governmental Subdivisions with Private Enterprise.

Text: Chapter 23A prohibits state agencies or political subdivisions from competing with private enterprises under specified circumstances: 1. A state agency or political subdivision shall not, unless specifically authorized by statute, rule, ordinance or regulation: a. Engage in the manufacturing, processing, sale, offering for sale, rental, leasing, delivery, dispensing, distributing, or advertising of goods or services to the public which are also offered by private enterprise unless such goods or services are for use or consumption exclusively by the state agency or political subdivision. Iowa Code § 23A.2(1)( a ). There are, however, exceptions to this prohibition, including one for [t]he operation of a city enterprise, as defined in section 384.24, subsection 2. Id. § 23A.2(10). The district court concluded that the defendants' recycling programs constituted a city enterprise and, therefore, were exempt from chapter 23A. We agree. Section 384.24 states in relevant part: 2. City enterprise means any of the following, including the real estate fixtures, equipment, accessories, appurtenances, and all property necessary or useful for the operation of any of the following: ... f. Solid waste collection systems and disposal systems. Id. § 384.24(2). Based on this definition, it is clear that the legislature intended that a city could operate a solid waste collection and disposal system in competition with private enterprise. HMR argues, nonetheless, that the exemption does not apply here for two reasons. First, HMR argues that only the real estate, fixtures, equipment, accessories, appurtenances, and all property necessary or useful for the operation of the solid waste collection system, id. § 384.24(2), fall within the definition of city enterprise, but not the collection service itself. Second, HMR contends that recyclable materials are not solid waste such that collection of these materials is appropriately considered part of a solid waste collection and disposal system. A. Scope of exemption. As noted, HMR asserts that only the tangible assets of a solid waste collection system are exempted. This interpretation of section 384.24(2) ignores the fact that it is the solid waste collection system that is the subject of the exemption. See id. (`City enterprise' means any of the following ...:... [s]olid waste collection systems.  (Emphasis added.)). The tangible items listed in the statute are specifically made a part of the exempted system; they are not a limitation on what is encompassed within the exemption. See id. (`City enterprise' means any of the following, including real estate, fixtures.... (Emphasis added.)). Clearly, the service itselfsolid waste collection and disposalis part of the exempted system. B. Recyclable materials as solid waste. HMR argues that recyclable materials are not solid waste such that the collection of recyclables could be considered a  solid waste collection system. Solid waste is defined in the Iowa Code as garbage, refuse, rubbish, and other similar discarded solid or semisolid materials.... Id. § 455B.301(20) (emphasis added). To discard means to get rid of as no longer useful, valuable, or pleasurable. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 644 (unabr. ed.1993). Refuse is the worthless or useless part of something. Id. at 1910. Similarly, rubbish is defined as miscellaneous useless valueless waste or rejected matter. Id. at 1983. Based on the common meaning of the statutory terms, we think that recyclable materials fall within the definition of solid waste. Residents who put recyclable materialstin cans, glass, paper, plastic and cardboardat the curb surely regard these materials as discarded: the residents are getting rid of something that is of no use to them. Moreover, the discarded recyclables are similar in nature to the other materials residents place in a trash can at curbside for pickup by the city; all such materials, recyclables and other waste, are useless to the residents throwing them away. We hold, therefore, that recyclables left at curbside for collection fall within the definition of solid waste. This holding is bolstered by other provisions in the Iowa Code that make it clear the legislature intended that a system of solid waste collection and disposal would include recyclables. Section 455B.301A declares that [t]he protection of the health, safety, and welfare of Iowans and the protection of the environment require the safe and sanitary disposal of solid wastes.  Iowa Code § 455B.301A(1) (emphasis added). To promote this goal, the statute establishes a solid waste management policy that includes, in descending order of preference: a. Volume reduction at the source. b. Recycling and reuse. Id. (emphasis added). In addition, section 455B.302 requires each city in the state to have a comprehensive solid waste reduction program consistent with the waste management hierarchy under section 455B.301A. Id. § 455B.302. It is apparent from the legislature's inclusion of recycling in the statute's waste management hierarchy that the general assembly not only envisioned, but also required, that recycling be part of a city's solid waste system. See also id. § 455D.21 (suggesting that city councils consider the adoption of an ordinance for the mandatory curbside collection of recyclable materials). To interpret chapter 23A as prohibiting a municipal recycling program that competes with private enterprise would conflict with the legislature's clear mandate that cities have a recycling program. See generally William C. Mitchell, Ltd. v. Brown, 576 N.W.2d 342, 349 (Iowa 1998) (We must not forget in our interpretation of statutes that our primary goal is to give statutes a reasonable construction which will effectuate rather than defeat the purpose of the statute[s].). Because recycling is a legitimate component of the defendants' solid waste collection and disposal systems, their residential curbside recycling programs fall within the definition of city enterprise. See Iowa Code § 384.24(2)( f ) (defining city enterprise to include [s]olid waste collection systems and disposal systems). Accordingly, chapter 23A's prohibition against government competition with private businesses does not apply. See id. § 23A.2(10) (exempting the operation of a city enterprise from the prohibitions of chapter 23A). We therefore agree with the district court's ruling that the defendants have not violated chapter 23A as a matter of law.