Opinion ID: 1451194
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Our reading of Obviously, they were later proven wrong.

Text: Despite a degree of ambiguity surrounding the Obviously, they were later proven wrong sentence in Wrinkles II, we conclude that the Indiana Supreme Court was commenting on the process by which Wrinkles's attorneys decided not to object to the stun-belt restraintas opposed to commenting on the belt's visibility. In the disputed passage, the court first explained that it had just invalidated the use of stun belts based on a type of prejudice unavailable to Wrinkles's counsel at the time of trialthe potential effect . . . upon the person wearing the device. The court then set out the choice of restraint facing Wrinkles's attorneys at trial in light of the only theory of prejudice then available the effect on the jurors. Lastly, the court explained why, based on this latter theory of prejudice, counsel's decision to choose the stun belt was a prudent one even though the attorneys were later proven wrong to examine their choice solely based on the effect on the jurors. In rejecting Wrinkles's claim that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel, the court stated, in relevant part: Before trial began, the trial court informed counsel that Wrinkles would have to wear either shackles or a stun belt during trial. Without objection counsel chose a stun belt, and Wrinkles claims they rendered ineffective assistance as a result. We disagree. Although with this opinion we declare that stun belts no longer have a place in Indiana courtrooms, that was not the case at the time of Wrinkles' trial. Our prohibition is motivated primarily by the potential effect a stun belt may have upon the person wearing the device. However, without the benefit of this declaration, counsel were concerned about the effect on the jurors if they were to observe their client wearing a particular device. Counsel believed that the chance of the jury seeing the shackles was fairly high. On the other hand, counsel opted for the stun belt because they thought the jurors would not be able to see it. Obviously, they were later proven wrong. However, at the time the decision was made, it was a prudent one. Wrinkles II, 749 N.E.2d at 1195 (citations omitted). The last few sentences of this quoted sectionparticularly the sentence [o]bviously, they were later proven wrongare not entirely unproblematic. One could read this second-to-last sentence as referring back to the court's statement that the jurors would not be able to see it, with the it referring to the stun belt. So read, this could be seen as an implicit finding that the jurors had in fact seen the stun belt and that Wrinkles's attorneys were later proven wrong about their contrary assumption. In turn, this would suggest that the stun belt may have prejudiced the defendant. We cannot conclude that this is the appropriate reading for two reasons: (1) the quoted section is more consistent with a discussion of the choice facing Wrinkles's attorneys in light of the then-established prejudice associated with restraints; and (2) Indiana law as well as subsequent guidance by the Indiana Supreme Court sheds light on the more plausible reading. Parsing the above-quoted section, the paragraph begins: Before trial began, the trial court informed counsel that Wrinkles would have to wear either shackles or a stun belt during trial. Without objection counsel chose a stun belt, and Wrinkles claims they rendered ineffective assistance as a result. We disagree. Although with this opinion we declare that stun belts no longer have a place in Indiana courtrooms, that was not the case at the time of Wrinkles' trial. 749 N.E.2d at 1195. The issue before the court was whether Wrinkles's counsel rendered ineffective assistance when [w]ithout objection counsel chose a stun belt after the trial court informed counsel that Wrinkles would have to wear either shackles or a stun belt during trial. In the immediately preceding paragraphs of the opinion, the supreme court had just held that stun belts no longer ha[d] a place in Indiana courtrooms. But this did not end the inquiry because that was not the case at the time of Wrinkles' trial, when the counsel rendered their assistance. In prospectively banning stun belts, the court had relied on a form of prejudice that was unproven at the time of Wrinkles's trial. The supreme court continued: Our prohibition is motivated primarily by the potential effect a stun belt may have upon the person wearing the device. However, without the benefit of this declaration, counsel were concerned about the effect on the jurors if they were to observe their client wearing a particular device. Id. In Wrinkles II, the court reasoned that the prejudice from a stun belt resulted not from the jury being able to see the defendant in restraints, but from the potential effect a stun belt may have upon the person wearing the device. This form of prejudice marked a departure from preexisting case law, which had only discussed prejudice in terms of the defendant's visibility before the jury in restraints. Id. at 1193-95; see also Stephenson v. Indiana, 864 N.E.2d 1022, 1029, 1032 (Ind.2007) (discussing reasonableness of counsel's choice given that the case law addressing the issue had largely focused on the visibility of the restraint, and not, as Wrinkles later pointed out, on the belt's potential effect on the defendant's demeanor and ability to participate in the defense). Understandably then, without the benefit of this declaration, [Wrinkles's] counsel were concerned instead with the more established form of prejudice associated with restraints: the effect on the jurors if they were to observe their client wearing a particular device. The question then became whether effective counsel would have accounted for the new form of prejudice just identified in banning stun belts. But the supreme court said no; the failure to object was not ineffective assistance. In reaching this conclusion, the court first recreated the decision facing Wrinkles's counsel in choosing the restraint to be used: Counsel believed that the chance of the jury seeing the shackles was fairly high. On the other hand, counsel opted for the stun belt because they thought the jurors would not be able to see it. Wrinkles II, 749 N.E.2d at 1195. In other words, after assuming that they need only consider the effect on the jurors, the attorneys chose the stun belt because it posed the least risk of being seen by the jurors when compared to the shackles. Immediately following the court's articulation of these two options and the rationale behind the attorneys' choice, the court continued, Obviously they were later proven wrong. However, at the time the decision was made, it was a prudent one. Id. This first sentence refers back to the court's statement that counsel opted for the stun belt because they thought the jurors would not be able to see it. Wrinkles's attorneys opted for the form of restraint that they thought would minimize prejudicethe effect on the jurors. But the court had just held that its decision was instead motivated primarily by the potential effect a stun belt may have upon the person wearing the device, not the effect on the jurors. Thus, [o]bviously, they were later proven wrong to have evaluated the choice of restraint through the lens of juror-prejudice alone. Nonetheless, because the attorneys could not be faulted for failing to predict the form of prejudice announced in Wrinkles II, at the time the decision was made, it was a prudent one. Placing Wrinkles II within the larger context of Indiana lawboth procedural law and a subsequent interpretation laid out by the Indiana Supreme Courtreinforces this reading. When reviewing a state-court decision in federal courts, the resolution of potentially dispositive ambiguities occasioned by a state-court finding should be resolved, where possible, by reference to that state's law. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982) (direct review); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978) (collateral review); Rivera v. Sheriff of Cook County, 162 F.3d 486, 489 (7th Cir.1998) (collateral review post-AEDPA). Thus, in an analogous situation, the Supreme Court has instructed lower courts to examine the state's procedural law closely, or to certify questions to the state's highest court when necessary, Greene, 437 U.S. at 26 n. 8, 27, 98 S.Ct. 2151, or to examine subsequent decisions that may shed some light on the issue at hand, Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 46-47, 102 S.Ct. 2211. Here, Indiana procedural law and a subsequent supreme court decision support the conclusion that the above reading of Wrinkles II is the proper one. First, as discussed above, it is implausible to view the Obviously statement as an implicit factual finding by the the supreme court. Under Indiana law, the supreme court would not have examined additional affidavits contained in a motion to correct error. And the rest of Wrinkles II is more consistent with a blanket affirmance than with an affirmance despite a factual finding contrary to the post-conviction court's. This latter scenario is especially unlikely given that the supreme court was reviewing only for clear error. But more importantly, this court must credit the Indiana Supreme Court's later interpretation of Wrinkles II in resolving the ambiguity contained in the disputed passage. Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 46-47, 102 S.Ct. 2211 (Any ambiguity in Tibbs I ... was resolved by the Florida Supreme Court in Tibbs II,  which binds this Court.). Although it is not often that an ensuing state supreme court decision affects a disputed finding in a previous decision, it is not unprecedented. This scenario arises with some regularity when reviewing whether a defendant's retrial following a state appellate court's reversal of a conviction raises double jeopardy concerns. And defendants frequently raise these claims before federal courts on collateral review. See, e.g., Rivera, 162 F.3d at 489. If the state appellate court reversed because the evidence in the first trial was insufficient, double jeopardy attached and retrial is improper. But if the appellate court reversed simply because the defendant's first conviction was against the weight of the evidence, the defendant's retrial is constitutional. In deciding which basis the state appellate court relied on in reversing, federal courts must often parse the appellate court's decision against the backdrop of the state's procedural law and ensuing case law. Id. ([S]tate courts should themselves determine the right way to understand their pronouncements.). A scenario comparable to the case at hand presented itself to the Supreme Court in Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. at 31, 102 S.Ct. 2211. There, the Florida Supreme Court's first decision reversing Tibbs's conviction did not obviously rest on either the insufficiency or the weight of the evidence. But a second Florida Supreme Court opinion following Tibbs's retrial clarified matters; the earlier reversal had been based on the weight of the evidence. One issue before the Supreme Court on appeal from this latter decision was whether the initial reversal had been based instead on the weight of the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's conviction following retrial, noting that the Florida Supreme Court's construction of its prior opinion binds this Court. Id. at 46-47, 102 S.Ct. 2211. Because [a]ny ambiguity in Tibbs I ... was resolved by the Florida Supreme Court in Tibbs II,  id., the Court had to give effect to the decisionmeaning that the defendant's retrial had been proper. In Stephenson v. Indiana, 864 N.E.2d 1022 (Ind.2007), the Indiana Supreme Court provided similar guidance. In Stephenson, the court compared the decision made by Wrinkles's counsel in choosing the stun belt with the same decision made by Stephenson's during his trial. In so doing, the court explained its rationale in Wrinkles II : At the time of Stephenson's trial in 1996 and 1997, no Indiana ruling had addressed the use of stun belts. As in Wrinkles, counsel cannot be faulted for selecting the belt over more visible shackles, given that the case law addressing the issue had largely focused on the visibility of the restraint, and not, as Wrinkles later pointed out, on the belt's potential effect on the defendant's demeanor and ability to participate in the defense. Id. at 1032. The court went on to characterize the decision made by Wrinkles's attorneys as a tactical decision. The only real issue in Wrinkles's trial was sentencing, so [t]he decision to challenge the belt [there] arguably fell into the tactical range, balancing the likelihood of success against the risk of alienating the judge by challenging an announced `policy.' Id. Because in Stephenson's case, guilt was vigorously disputed, a tactical classification could not apply. The court went on to hold that the use of a stun belt, if perceived by the jury, produces all the results that shackling does. After a careful examination of the post-conviction record, the Stephenson court concluded that the jurors had been aware of the stun belt. Nonetheless, the court upheld Stephenson's convictions and death sentence because he had not demonstrated the requisite amount of prejudice to establish his ineffective-assistance claim. This discussion of Wrinkles II in Stephenson indicates that the above reading is the appropriate one. The section discussing the Wrinkles II decision tracks the Indiana Supreme Court's reasoning in the exact manner discussed above. The court recreated the decision facing Wrinkles's attorneys in light of the established form of prejudice at the time. The court again recognized that Wrinkles's attorneys viewed their decision at trial in light of the visibility of the restraint, and not the belt's potential effect on the defendant's demeanor and ability to participate in the defense. And just as it had in Wrinkles II, the court concluded that Wrinkles's counsel could not be faulted for failing to predict the prejudice the court would credit in banning the stun belt. Even with the benefit of this reading, the Indiana Supreme Court unreasonably applied Strickland in evaluating Wrinkles's attorneys' performance in Wrinkles II. The failure to object itself fell below what is expected under professional norms, regardless of the theory of prejudice. A blanket policy of restraint cannot be squared with the case law at the time of trial. But notwithstanding the propriety of the court's conclusion, it is evident that the court did not make a finding that the jurors had seen the stun belt. Instead, the court in Wrinkles II was reconstructing the decision made by Wrinkles's counsel based on the then-established form of prejudice associated with the stun belt. In light of the nature of the court's reasoning in Wrinkles II, the discussion in Stephenson, and the implausibility under Indiana law of the Indiana Supreme Court making implicit factual findings, we conclude that the Indiana Supreme Court did not make a finding of fact that the jurors had seen the stun belt. The controlling findings of facts are those set forth by the state post-conviction court and adopted by the Wrinkles II court. These findings of fact determined that the jury did not see the stun belt. Additionally, Wrinkles has not presented us with any evidence to demonstrate that the stun belt affected his abilities to properly participate in his own defense. Without evidence that the jurors saw the stun belt, or that he was otherwise affected by the stun belt throughout trial, Wrinkles cannot demonstrate prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. He therefore cannot show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, so he cannot demonstrate the requisite cause and prejudice necessary to overcome his procedural default. Guest, 474 F.3d at 930. Thus, this Court is procedurally barred from examining his freestanding stun-belt claim and must deny the writ.