Opinion ID: 1610587
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Buckley Violation?

Text: During the direct examination of co-indictee Gilbert Jimenez, the State had marked for identification the plea bargain agreement executed by Jimenez. That agreement stated that Jimenez would plead guilty to a charge of conspiracy to commit capital murder. Also during the direct examination of Jimenez, the following exchange occurred: Q. What, if any, crimes have you ever been convicted of? A. I had a burglary charge back in '79, but Houston Police Department couldn't find my  BY DEFENSE COUNSEL: I object to what they couldn't find. That is hearsay. BY THE COURT: Sustained. Q. But, anyway, you are telling us that you were convicted of that? A. Yes, sir. Q. And this here? A. Yes, sir. During cross-examination of Jimenez, defense counsel questioned him extensively concerning his guilty plea to conspiracy to commit capital murder, his twenty year sentence, and prior inconsistent statements made during his arraignment hearing. The defense attorney also mentioned in his closing argument Jimenez's guilty plea and the prior inconsistent statements Jimenez made during the hearing in which he entered his plea. On appeal, Nixon contends the State committed reversible error by using Jimenez's guilty plea against Nixon. Nixon cites as authority Buckley v. State, 223 So.2d 524 (Miss. 1969) which held: [W]here two or more persons are jointly indicted for the same offense but are separately tried, a judgment of conviction against one of them is not competent evidence on the trial of the other because such plea of guilty or conviction is no evidence of the guilt of the party being tried. Id. at 528. See also Henderson v. State, 403 So.2d 139, 141 (Miss. 1981) and Warren v. State, 407 So.2d 100, 101 (Miss. 1981), both reaffirming Buckley. This Court notes that the defense counsel in the instant case neither objected to the testimony at trial, nor specifically assigned it as error in his motion for new trial. More recently, the Buckley rationale was explained and distinguished on its facts in Johnson v. State, 477 So.2d 196 (Miss. 1985), in which the prosecutor brought out that a co-indictee had pled guilty to the crime for which Johnson was tried. Id. at 213. In limiting Buckley to its own facts, this Court held: We do not overrule Buckley, but neither do we extend its holding beyond the unusual situation of that case. If defense counsel under some unusual case wishes to withhold from the jury the fact that a co-indictee testifying for the state has pleaded guilty and received a lesser sentence, he has a duty to object to the testimony offered by the state. ..... To permit this defendant to say nothing at trial, and complain for the first time in post-trial proceedings presents a classic case of having your cake and eating it, too. Id. at 214. A thorough reading of the Buckley facts suggests the facts of the instant case are a clearer reflection of those in Johnson. For that reason, the Court holds there was no reversible error committed on this point.