Opinion ID: 1707183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the trial court erred in refusing to suppress evans' statements.

Text: ś 15. In Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829 (Miss.1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1123, 115 S.Ct. 2279, 132 L.Ed.2d 282 (1995), reh'g denied, 515 U.S. 1179, 116 S.Ct. 20, 132 L.Ed.2d 903 (1995), this Court held that [t]he general rule is that for a confession to be admissible it must have been given voluntarily and not given as a result of promises, threats or inducements. Id. at 838-39 ( citing Layne v. State, 542 So.2d 237, 240 (Miss. 1989)). The burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary. Id. (citing Haymer v. State, 613 So.2d 837, 839 (Miss.1993); Kirkland v. State, 559 So.2d 1046 (Miss. 1990)). The burden is met and a prima facie case made out by testimony of an officer, or other persons having knowledge of the facts, that the confession was voluntarily made without any threats, coercion, or offer of reward. Id. (citing Cox v. State, 586 So.2d 761, 763 (Miss.1991)). ś 16. In Hunt v. State, 687 So.2d 1154 (Miss.1996), this Court reiterated the standard of review when determining the admissibility of confessions. In Hunt, this Court held: Once the trial judge has determined at a preliminary hearing, that a confession is admissible, the defendant/appellant has a heavy burden in attempting to reverse that decision on appeal. Sills v. State, 634 So.2d 124, 126 (Miss.1994) ( quoting Frost v. State, 483 So.2d 1345, 1350 (Miss.1986)). Such findings are treated as findings of fact made by a trial judge sitting without a jury as in any other context. Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1281 (Miss.1994) (citations omitted). The trial judge's decision will not be reversed on appeal unless it is manifestly in error, or is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Id. Where the evidence is contradictory, this Court generally must affirm. Lesley v. State, 606 So.2d 1084, 1091 (Miss.1992) (citations omitted). Id. at 1160. ś 17. Evans argues that his statements should have been suppressed by the trial court on four bases: (1) Evans was subjected to coercion and harassment by law enforcement; (2) Evans' confessions were the product of plea negotiations with the federal government; (3) Evans was not advised either by law enforcement or his attorney that the conditions placed in the waiver of rights form were ineffective; (4) and Evans was not promptly taken before a state magistrate. ś 18. The testimony and evidence presented at the hearing on the Motion to Suppress detailed the sequence of events preceding Evans' confessions. Following his arrest, Evans invoked his right to remain silent and did not give a statement. Later that day, Evans was transported to New Orleans, Louisiana, and formally charged with the federal offense of kidnapping. Counsel was appointed and Evans waived extradition proceedings. Evans was returned to Mississippi on August 7, 1991. ś 19. On August 8, 1991, Evans made an appearance in federal court before United States Magistrate Judge Roper. Judge Roper appointed Fred Lusk to represent Evans on federal kidnapping charges. Later that day, Lusk met with Evans and made arrangements for Gail Stewart, Evans' girlfriend, to come to Gulfport. ś 20. Lusk testified that at the time he began meeting with Evans, Gulfport authorities were in the process of trying to locate Beatrice Louise Routh. Assistant United States Attorney (hereinafter AUSA) Jay Golden informed Lusk if this guy ever wants anything out of us he better tell us where the child is if the child is alive. Lusk and Stewart met with Evans several times over the next two days. Evans was emotional and upset at times, however, Lusk indicated that a great deal of his turmoil or a great deal of his trying (sic) on both Thursday and Friday was brought about by Ms. Stewart discussing his and her religious philosophy and belief in God and what that should bring about and what that shouldâ what the end result of that belief as to particular circumstances should be. Lusk testified that Stewart was pushing Evans to make full, complete disclosure, drop all screens, tell everything, do it, let's get on with it. ś 21. On August 10, 1991, at approximately 9:00 a.m., AUSA Golden requested a meeting with Evans in order to locate Beatrice. Lusk agreed to speak with Evans and arrived at the Harrison County Detention Center at approximately 12:00 p.m. Evans was meeting privately with Ms. Stewart at that time, however, federal and state law enforcement officers were also present. ś 22. Following several hours of discussions among Lusk, Evans, Stewart, and Golden, Evans agreed to reveal the location of Beatrice's body if certain conditions were met. Golden testified that he never spoke directly with Evans, but rather all communication was through Evans' attorney. Golden wrote Evans' requests on a sheet of paper: (1) to plead guilty to federal kidnapping; (2) to be maintained by federal authorities until fifteen days prior to state murder trial; (3) to be returned to federal authorities ten days after state trial for murder; (4) to remain in federal custody until fifteen days prior to an execution; (5) to be returned to federal custody if a stay of execution is granted. ś 23. Lusk took the sheet of paper to Evans who made several changes and returned the paper to Golden. Evans inserted in a federal facility to request number (2) and inserted the word capital before murder on number (2). Evans also inserted language stating that he would be maintained in a federal facility fifteen days prior to an execution date no matter how many stays were implemented. Golden testified that he told Evans' attorney that he was in no position to make promises, but agreed to prosecute Evans on federal kidnapping charges if there was a factual basis for the crime. Golden initialed the document after writing that he would use whatever influence he had to insure that these desires will be carried out. ś 24. Despite the discussions between Golden, Lusk, and Evans, no agreements were reached. Golden terminated the discussions and left the jail after Evans indicated he wanted to take a shower and failed to sign a document, drafted by Golden, to reflect that Evans had been advised of his right to remain silent. Prior to leaving, Golden instructed law enforcement not to proceed unless Evans was so advised. ś 25. Prior to making a statement, Evans drafted a document, using portions of the language in the document drafted by Golden, wherein he acknowledged that he had been advised by his attorney and U.S. Magistrate Judge Roper against making any statements. That document provides the following: I, Donald Leroy Evans, having been advised by my attorney Fred Lusk that I have the right to remain silent, and also having been advised by Judge Roper that I don't have to say anything, and having been advised by various law enforcement agents that I have the right to remain silent do hereby decide that I want to make contingent statement regarding the kidnapping of Beatrice Routh, to be used exclusively by my attorney Fred Lusk and the federal authorities to solely establish that a federal offense has been committed and, that the state of Mississippi in no way, shape, form, or usage ... as well as the State of Louisiana ... shall have no power to use this statement for any investigative or criminal applications whatsoever. This statement is being made solely for the usage and protection of my attorney Fred Lusk. And as is undersigned by Attorney Fred Lusk he assures me, Donald Leroy Evans that no copies of this declaration will not be given in any copied form to any federal agency to be used against me. This is only to establish protection of Fred Lusk and myself, Donald Leroy Evans, and to establish a federal crime has been committed and that I, Donald Leroy Evans will remain in federal custody throughout this whole criminal endeavor. ś 26. Evans and his attorney signed the document and their signatures were witnessed by Major Wayne Payne of the Gulfport Police Department and FBI Agent Holder. This document was later brought to the attention of Judge Gex at the federal guilty plea hearing on August 19, 1991, and placed under seal due to the ongoing criminal investigation. AUSA Golden testified that the first time he became aware of the existence of this document was at the guilty plea hearing. ś 27. Major Payne testified that Chief Payne of the Gulfport Police Department asked that he witness the signatures of Lusk and Evans. Major Payne testified that he did not read the document, nor was he aware of the contents of the document. After the document was witnessed, Evans' attorney folded it and placed it in his pocket. Payne testified that no copies of the document were given to him nor did he see any other law enforcement officer receive copies of the document. Payne confirmed that no agreements were made with Evans or his attorney by law enforcement prior to Evans' statement. ś 28. Detective Whitney Carvin testified that Evans was advised of his rights and asked to sign a FBI form styled Interrogation, Advice of Rights prior to making the statement. Detective Carvin, Agent Holder, and Evans testified that Evans indicated that he understood his rights, but declined to sign the form. Holder and Carvin testified that Evans refused to sign the waiver due to the language in the last paragraph of the form which stated that no promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me. Evans indicated that he would not sign because promises about housing in a federal facility and visitation with Ms. Stewart had been made. ś 29. Despite Evans' refusal to sign the waiver, Detective Carvin, Agent Holder, Lusk and Evans testified that Evans was advised of his rights prior to the interview. Evans' attorney also advised him of the impact of an incriminating statement on state charges. ś 30. At 8:14 p.m., the advice of rights form was signed by Agent Holder, Detective Carvin, and Lusk and Evans. Evans then proceeded to give his first statement wherein he described the events of August 1, 1991. Evans did not confess to the murder or sexual assault of Beatrice at this time, but did describe the kidnapping. Evans stopped the interview at approximately 8:28 p.m. and indicated that he would lead investigators to the body. Evans was accompanied by his attorney and girlfriend during the ride to Pearl River County where the body was eventually located. ś 31. At approximately 2:56 a.m., Evans was returned to the Harrison County Detention Center, advised of his rights, and interviewed by Agent Holder. Evans again refused to sign the waiver of rights form. In his second statement, Evans confessed to kidnapping and murdering Beatrice. ś 32. Evans later agreed to give a videotaped confession on August 14, 1991. The statement was taken at approximately 4:31 p.m. at the Harrison County Detention Center and a videotape and transcript of the statement was introduced into evidence at the hearing on the Motion to Suppress. Present during that statement were Agent Holder, Detective Carvin, and Fred Lusk. Evans was advised of his rights and declined to sign a waiver of rights form. The waiver, however, was witnessed by Evans' attorney. Evans and his attorney stated that agreements had been made regarding Evans' housing and visitation. Evans, however, agreed that no other promises had been made. The contents of this statement is consistent with the two prior statements. However, for the first time, Evans described the sexual assault of Beatrice.
ś 33. Evans argues that his confession was involuntary because he was coerced and harassed by law enforcement. During the Motion to Suppress, Evans was questioned about coercion and/or intimidation by law enforcement. Evans described being threatened by Sergeant Steve Barnes of the Gulfport Police Department while he was in custody in Louisiana. Evans testified that Barnes stated that things would go worse on Evans if he did not cooperate. Evans also claims that Sergeant Barnes told him that the major's on his way over here and it's not going to be real nice when he gets here. Evans, however, testified that he remained silent. ś 34. After being booked into the Harrison County Detention Center, Evans testified that he was not given a mattress or hygiene items, was not allowed to bathe, and was kicked by an officer. Evans testified that he was prevented from sleeping due to harassment by jail personnel throughout the night and was denied food. ś 35. In determining the voluntariness of a confession, a trial court must examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement. Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 841 (Miss.1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1123, 115 S.Ct. 2279, 132 L.Ed.2d 282 (1995), reh'g denied, 515 U.S. 1179, 116 S.Ct. 20, 132 L.Ed.2d 903 ( quoting Davis v. State, 551 So.2d 165, 169 (Miss.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1074, 110 S.Ct. 1796, 108 L.Ed.2d 797(1990), reh'g denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2221, 109 L.Ed.2d 546 (1990)). In addition, the resolution of conflicting testimony regarding voluntariness is a question of fact to be resolved by the trial judge at the suppression hearing. Id. (quoting Smith v. State, 465 So.2d 999, 1002 (Miss.1985)). ś 36. The trial court was presented with conflicting evidence about Evans' harassment allegations. Evans' attorney testified that Evans did not complain about harassment by jail officials during August 7-10, 1991. Lusk also testified that Evans complained that a guard had been obnoxious to him, but clarified that this alleged incident occurred after Evans' statements. ś 37. Lusk testified that although Evans did not like the food he was given, he was not denied food by law enforcement. In fact, Lusk testified that he purchased food for Evans from the snack bar and brought Evans food from home. Lusk also testified that Evans had a steady supply of coffee and snacks. ś 38. Lusk testified that [law enforcement] were doing everything possible to make us asâ to be as helpful and to make us as comfortable as possible so that if there was a problem it was taken care of immediately by the sheriff himself or by Lieutenant Carver. Detective Carvin and Agent Holder testified that Evans was not in any way threatened or coerced into making his statement to law enforcement. ś 39. Despite Evans' allegations of harassment, the testimony at the hearing on the Motion to Suppress reveals that Evans was not coerced into making a statement. While Evans may have had complaints about his accommodations, there is nothing to suggest that he endured treatment which would render his confession involuntary. Moreover, at all times prior to and during his statements, Evans was represented by counsel. The testimony is uncontradicted that prior to each statement Evans was advised of his rights by Agent Holder and his attorney. Evans was so familiar with his rights and the consequences of a waiver that he drafted a document wherein he agreed to make a contingent statement. Evans' familiarity is also evidenced by the fact that he refused to sign the waiver of rights form. ś 40. Somewhat problematic, however, is the presence of Gail Stewart. At Evans' request, Stewart was flown to Gulfport by U.S. Customs. Prior to traveling to Gulfport, Stewart allowed FBI agents to place a telephone recording device in her home in order to track Evans' whereabouts. Stewart was allowed to meet with Evans during the three-day period leading up to the confession during which she counseled Evans about their religious beliefs and encouraged him to confess. Evans' attorney testified that Ms. Stewart was the most important person in Evans' life. ś 41. The presence of Gail Stewart is somewhat similar to the situation in Abram v. State, 606 So.2d 1015, 1033 (Miss.1992), wherein this Court held that the confession was involuntary due to various statements conveyed to Abram [which] proximately caused him to confess.... In Abram, after several unsuccessful attempts to secure a statement from the defendant, the Sheriff solicited the intervention of Reverend Jones on the belief that he would put Abram at ease. Id. at 1022. Reverend Jones had been one of Abram's school teachers and counselors. As instructed by the Sheriff, Reverend Jones encouraged Abram to confess and advised Abram that it might be easier on him if he cooperated with law enforcement. ś 42. Here, however, this Court is faced with a situation which may be distinguished from Abram. Gail Stewart was not acting on behalf of law enforcement. Rather, Evans requested her presence. Specifically, Evans stated that he would consider speaking with law enforcement if he could visit with Stewart. ś 43. Additionally, there is no indication that Stewart advised Evans that cooperation might be of some benefit. Abram, 606 So.2d at 1031. In Abram, the confession was held to be involuntary partially due to the fact that various individuals conveyed to the defendant the impression that his cooperation/confession might have been beneficial. These circumstances are not present in the case sub judice. ś 44. Moreover, there is no indication that Stewart's advice induced Evans to confess. Lusk testified that Evans indicated if the authorities would bring Stewart over then Evans would tell authorities where the body was located. While her presence seems undoubtedly to have contributed to Evans' urge to confess, there is nothing in this record which compels the conclusion that Stewart induced Evans to confess. ś 45. In Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170, 107 S.Ct. 515, 523, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986), the United States Supreme Court, addressing the issue of the voluntariness of a waiver under the Fourteenth Amendment clearly held: The sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)] was based is governmental coercion. See United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 [97 S.Ct. 1814, 1818, 52 L.Ed.2d 238] (1977); Miranda, supra, [384 U.S. at 460, 86 S.Ct. at 1602 [1620], 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 Ohio Misc. 9, 36 Ohio Ops 2d 237, 10 ALR 3d 974]. Indeed, the Fifth Amendment privilege is not concerned with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305, 105 S.Ct. 1285 [1290], 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985). The voluntariness of a waiver of this privilege has always depended on the absence of police overreaching, not on free choice in any broader sense of the word. ś 46. In light of the testimony, the trial judge was well within his discretion in holding that Evans' confessions were voluntary. Moreover, here, as in Thorson v. State, 653 So.2d 876, 887 (Miss.1994), [w]e are not confined in this case to a written record, but have the videotaped confession of [Evans]. The videotape does not suggest any coercion, and in it Evans indicated that he understood his rights and wished to make a statement. Based on the totality of the circumstances, there is nothing to suggest that the trial judge's findings were manifestly wrong or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
ś 47. Evans next challenges the admissibility of his confessions on the basis that they were precipitated by plea negotiations and were therefore inadmissible under M.R.E. 410. Specifically, Evans argues that his confessions were made in conjunction with plea negotiations wherein Evans agreed to lead investigators to the body if he was allowed to plead guilty to federal kidnapping charges. ś 48. A review of Evans' Motions to Suppress and the argument presented before the trial court reveals that Evans did not assert this specific ground in arguing his confessions were inadmissible at trial. Although Evans argued during the hearing on the Motion to Suppress that his previous pro se offers to plead guilty to capital murder were inadmissible under M.R.E. 410 and Miss.Crim. R. Cir. Ct. Prac. 4.03, Evans did not argue that his confessions were inadmissible for these same reasons. On numerous occasions, this Court, has held that an objection on one ground waives remaining grounds for purposes of appeal and that the failure to raise an issue in the trial court requires this Court to impose a procedural bar on appeal. Notwithstanding Evans' failure to raise this specific ground before the trial court, this Court may, alternatively, consider the merits of the argument. Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 845 (Miss.1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1123, 115 S.Ct. 2279, 132 L.Ed.2d 282 (1995), reh'g denied, 515 U.S. 1179, 116 S.Ct. 20, 132 L.Ed.2d 903 (1995); Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1270 (Miss.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1019, 115 S.Ct. 1365, 131 L.Ed.2d 221 (1995), reh'g denied, 514 U.S. 1123, 115 S.Ct. 1992, 131 L.Ed.2d 878 (1995). ś 49. M.R.E. 410 provides (in pertinent part): Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions: (1) A plea of guilty which was later withdrawn; (2) A plea of nolo contendere; (3) Any statement made in the course of any proceedings under Mississippi statutory or rule of court provisions regarding either of the foregoing pleas; or (4) Any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority which does not result in a plea of guilty or which results in a plea of guilty later withdrawn. ś 50. The initial issue before this Court is whether Evans' confessions fall within the ambit of M.R.E. 410. That rule specifically provides that inadmissible discussions are those with an attorney for the prosecuting authority which does not result in a plea of guilty or which results in a plea of guilty later withdrawn. We, however, are not faced with a situation wherein the discussions sought to be admitted were between Evans and a prosecuting attorney. The record clearly reflects that Evans' statements were made to Detective Whitney Carvin and FBI Agent Holder. Moreover, the record reflects that AUSA Golden discontinued his discussions with Evans' prior to any statements. ś 51. A review of M.R.E. 410 and URCCC 8.04 clearly reveals that the only governmental officer with authority to enter into plea negotiations is the prosecuting attorney. This view is entirely consistent with federal interpretation of the language contained in Fed.R.Evid. 410 and Fed. R.Crim. Prac, 11(e)(6) which mirror M.R.E. 410. ś 52. In United States v. Keith, 764 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir.1985), the Fifth Circuit held that Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(6) makes clear that the sort of plea bargain discussions that are inadmissible under it are only those had with a government attorney. Discussions with a law enforcement agency in the spirit of cooperation and with hope for leniency, are not inadmissible under 11(e)(6)(D). Id. (citing United States v. Jimenez-Diaz, 659 F.2d 562, 568 (5th Cir.1981)). See also United States v. Jones, 32 F.3d 1512, 1517 (11th Cir.1994) (FBI agent is without authority to enter into negotiations regarding charges or sentence); United States v. Davidson, 768 F.2d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir.1985) ([T]he automatic exclusion rule of Rule 11(e)(6) `does not extend to statements made to law enforcement agents, as distinguished from government counsel'.). Applying this reasoning to the case sub judice compels the conclusion that Evans was not engaged in the type of discussions contemplated by M.R.E. 410. ś 53. In United States v. Kettering, 861 F.2d 675 (11th Cir.1988), the defendant, like Evans, sought to enforce a plea agreement made by a law enforcement officer. There, the court conducted the following two-pronged inquiry to determine whether the plea agreement was enforceable: [T]he general rule requiring governmental adherence to promises made during plea negotiations is subject to two conditions. First, the agent making the promise must be authorized to do so, and second, the defendant must detrimentally rely on the promise. If either condition is lacking, then the agreement is unenforceable and the government may withdraw its offer. Id. at 677 ( quoting Johnson v. Lumpkin, 769 F.2d 630, 633 (9th Cir.1985)). ś 54. As indicated earlier, Agent Holder and Detective Carvin were not authorized to conduct plea negotiations with criminal defendants. Moreover, prior to Evans' first statement, AUSA Golden, the only government officer with authority to conduct plea negotiations, left the jail and terminated all discussions with Evans. Golden testified that the only directive given to Agent Holder and Detective Carvin was the admonition not to proceed with a statement unless Evans was advised of his rights. There is simply no evidence in this record to support the conclusion that Holder and Carvin were authorized to conduct any type of plea negotiations with Evans. ś 55. Moreover, a review of the testimony presented at the Motion to Suppress clearly reveals that Evans was not involved in plea negotiations. Prior to making his initial statement to law enforcement, Evans' primary concerns were to be housed in a federal facility and to have visitation privileges with Gail Stewart. Evans' objective, therefore, was to cooperate with federal authorities and provide enough information to establish federal jurisdiction. Specifically, Evans had to establish that he transported Beatrice across state lines. ś 56. Evans relies on Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 97 S.Ct. 202, 50 L.Ed.2d 194 (1976), where the United States Supreme Court held that a confession is not per se inadmissible in a criminal trial because it was made subsequent to an agreed upon plea bargain that did not call for such a confession. However, in Hutto, the Court clearly stated that the issue in that case was not the admissibility in criminal trials of statements made during the plea negotiation process. Id. at 30, n. 3, 97 S.Ct. at 203, n. 3. ś 57. Evans also relies on United States v. Herman, 544 F.2d 791 (5th Cir.1977), and United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir.1978), wherein the Fifth Circuit addressed whether statements made by defendants were inadmissible at a subsequent criminal trial pursuant to Fed.R.Crim. P.11 (e)(6) and Fed.R.Evid. 410. Fed.R.Evid. 410 and Fed. R.Crim. Prac. 11(e)(6) mirror M.R.E. 410. ś 58. The analysis set forth in Robertson is instructive. There, the Court, en banc, held: Plea negotiations are inadmissible, but surely not every discussion between and accused and agents for the government is a plea negotiation. Suppressing evidence of such negotiations serves the policy of insuring a free dialogue only when the accused and the government actually engage in plea negotiations: discussions in advance of the time for pleading with a view to an agreement whereby the defendant will enter a plea in the hope of receiving certain charge or sentence concessions. (citations omitted). Id. at 1365. In Robertson, the court directed that trial courts should carefully consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a discussion should be characterized as a plea negotiation. Id. at 1366. Recognizing the vulnerability of confessions if the accused's subsequent account were the sole determinative factor, the Robertson court directed trial courts to apply a two tiered analysis and determine, first, whether the accused exhibited an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion, and, second, whether the accused's expectation was reasonable given the totality of the objective circumstances. Id. The Robertson court held that the distinction within this analysis is between offers to do something in furtherance of a negotiated plea, which are inadmissible, and independent admissions of fact, which may be admitted. Id. at 1367 (citations omitted). The Robertson court, citing Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30, 97 S.Ct. 202, 203, 50 L.Ed.2d 194 (1976), held that confessions or admissions which are either made in the absence of plea negotiations or which are wholly independent from any plea negotiations are still admissible. Id. Continuing, the court stated: Generally, a person who has been fully advised of his rights may make a full or partial admission to the arresting officers. Such a statement, if otherwise admissible under the general law of confessions, still is admissible despite the fact that the accused makes some request of those in charge. Such a request, without more, does not transform a confession into a plea negotiation. Id. ś 59. Applying the Robertson analysis to the present case reveals that Evans' statements were not made during plea negotiations. Foremost is the fact that AUSA Golden repeatedly testified that he was not engaged in plea negotiations with Evans. Golden testified that while negotiations had taken place, these were not tied to a plea. Moreover, as reflected in the record, Evans' attorney agreed with Golden during the federal guilty plea hearing that while some agreements had been made, they were not necessarily tied to this plea. As stated earlier, a frustrated Golden left the Detention Center and terminated any discussions. ś 60. At the time Golden left the courthouse, no plea bargain been established. Prior to Golden's departure, a sheet of paper with Evans'desires had been passed between Evans and Golden, but as testified to by Golden, no plea negotiations had taken place nor had Golden expressly agreed to the conditions written on the paper. Golden repeatedly testified that he instructed Evans that he could not agree to allow Evans to plead guilty to federal kidnapping charges because he was not sure that federal authorities had jurisdiction. Following Golden's departure, Evans gave a statement. ś 61. From the record, it appears that Evans was negotiating with the federal authorities with regard to Evans' placement in a federal facility as well as with regard to Evans' desire to plead guilty to federal kidnapping charges. However, after several hours and no basis in fact to establish that a federal crime had occurred, the AUSA left the jail. Therefore, any plea negotiations clearly terminated. Moreover, Evans and his attorney were advised that Golden had left and from this point forward it was a state investigation. Evans' decision to make a statement was clearly motivated by his desire to be housed in a federal facility. A necessary prerequisite to federal housing is of course that Evans be prosecuted for a federal offense. Evans' first inculpatory statement was made after Golden's departure. Therefore, if any plea negotiations had in fact occurred, these had terminated and Evans was now cooperating in order to establish federal jurisdiction. ś 62. Whatever Evans' subjective impressions may have been at the point at which he made his August 10, 1991 statements, this expectation was not reasonable given the totality of the objective circumstances. See United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356, 1366 (5th Cir.1978). Moreover, the case sub judice clearly demonstrates the distinction set forth in Robertson where that court held, distinction will be drawn between offers to do something in furtherance of a negotiated plea, which are inadmissible, and independent admissions of fact which may be admitted. Id. Evans' statements were independent admissions of fact and were therefore admissible. There is no merit to this issue.
ś 63. Evans argues that he was not advised by law enforcement that the limitation placed in the waiver of rights form was ineffectual and therefore he did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. On August 10, 1991, Evans refused to sign a document drafted by AUSA Golden wherein Evans would attest to the fact that he had been advised of his constitutional right to remain silent by his attorney and U.S. Magistrate Judge Roper. After Evans refused to sign this document, Golden terminated his discussions with Evans and left the detention center. ś 64. Golden testified that the next time he saw the document that he had drafted on August 10, 1991, was at the federal guilty plea hearing. However, Evans, using portions of Golden's language from the original document, drafted his own statement wherein he indicated he wished to make a contingent statement regarding the kidnapping of Beatrice Routh. Unlike the document drafted by Golden, Evans included additional language which purported to limit the use of the statement. Specifically, the document stated ... to be used exclusively by my attorney Fred Lusk and the federal authorities to solely establish that a federal offense has been committed and, that the State of Mississippi in no way, shape, form, or usage... as well as the State of Louisiana ... shall have no power to use this statement for any investigative or criminal applications whatsoever. ś 65. Evans testified that he prepared the document which Lusk took to Golden. Evans testified that Detective Carvin took the unsigned document, made copies and returned the document to Lusk. Carvin testified that he did not remember taking the document to be photocopied. However, Carvin testified that to his knowledge the document was a form broughtâ brainstorm of attorney Fred Lusk to cover him because Donald kept wanting to do this and wanting to do this and wanting to do this and Fred kept advising him not to do this, not to do this, not to do this, and I think that was some kind ofâ I thought it was a form where it was just an agreement between Donald and Fred that Donald would not come back and get Fred for being a bad attorney at a different time. ś 66. Evans testified that no one explained to him that the limiting language was ineffectual and thus he was under the impression that neither Louisiana or Mississippi would be able to use the statements. After the document was returned to Evans, Lusk and Evans signed the document. Agent Holder and Wayne Payne of the Gulfport Police Department witnessed the signatures of Evans and Lusk. Major Payne testified that Chief Payne told him to sign the document in order to witness the signatures of Lusk and Evans. Payne testified, however, that he did not read the document. Following the signatures, Payne testified that Lusk took control of the original document and that no law enforcement officers received a copy. ś 67. Gulfport Police Chief George Payne testified that law enforcement was not aware of the contents of the document, but that he understood that Lusk indicated that he had some concerns ... in reference to protecting himself and how he defended his clients and that he wasâ he, as I remember it, prepared a document between him and his client and asked that after it was signed that there be a witness, and I directed the chief of detectives at the time to witness the signing of the document. ś 68. Agent Holder testified that he also witnessed the signatures of Lusk and Evans, but did not understand the contents of the document. Holder testified that Golden was not present when this document was signed. Holder testified that he made no promises in relation to pending state charges in either Louisiana or Mississippi nor did he have the capacity to do so. Holder testified that Evans later sent him a copy of the document. When asked what he believed the purpose of the document to be, Agent Holder testified: A. Your Honor, I'm not certain, but I believe it was to show that Mr. Lusk had advised Mr. Evans of his constitutional rights or that Mr. Evans was well aware of his constitutional rights. But, I might be in error on that. It wasn't of any concern to me because all I was doing was witnessing it. ś 69. Evans' attorney testified that he was in possession of the original document. Lusk testified that he handed the document to Chief Payne who in turn gave the document to Major Payne to witness. However, Lusk testified that Golden was not present and had left after becoming tired of playing Donald Evans games and, you know, it was wearing out everybody. ś 70. Lusk testified that he did not advise Evans that limiting language in the document was ineffective. Specifically, Lusk testified: Q. He didn't ask you could he limit that statement? A. No, sir. I never discussed it with him at all. He gave it to me, I looked at it, handed it to the police officers and smiled. ś 71. Lusk testified that after the document was signed he advised Evans about the ramifications of making a statement. Lusk testified that before every statement he and Agent Holder advised Evans that the statements could be used against him. When specifically asked what the purpose of this document was, Lusk testified: A. As Jay Golden saidâ and the purpose of the agreement was two-fold; so that Mr. Evans would acknowledge that he had been advised of his rights and also that Fred Lusk had advised him of his rights to remain silent and that he was, you know, that he fully understood what he did when he made the statement if he made a statement. Q. There was never any purpose in this agreement that was signed by you and Evans and witnessed by Wayne Payne and George Holder that the State of Mississippi or the State of Louisiana would not pursue charges against him or would not use statements against him, were there? A. That was not discussed between Mr. Evans and I. Q. Was that discussed between you and any police? A. No, Sir. ś 72. Furthermore, Lusk testified that the original document drafted by Golden did not contain any language limiting the use of the information provided in Evans' statements. Lusk's testimony corroborates that by Evans and Lusk during the federal guilty plea hearing. Moreover, during the guilty plea hearing, Evans stated to the court that this document was not an agreement, but was just basically an attestation to the fact that Fred Lusk has advised me of my right to remain silent and so on.... ś 73. This record clearly demonstrates that no agreement was reached either with the State of Mississippi or the State of Louisiana. Rather, the sole purpose of this document was to protect Lusk from future claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The record amply supports the conclusions of the trial judge: that Evans unilaterally inserted limiting language into a document. There is no indication that this language was discussed with law enforcement or with the AUSA. Moreover, there is no indication that law enforcement was aware of any language which purported to limit the use of the information provided by Evans. ś 74. Evans was repeatedly advised by his attorney and Agent Holder that he was not required to make a statement. Evans was advised prior to each statement that the information given in the statement could and would be used against him. Evans, however, accompanied by counsel, chose instead to make a statement. The document drafted and executed by Evans was a private agreement between an attorney and his client, not a waiver of rights. There was simply nothing that the State of Mississippi was obligated to honor. There is no merit to this issue.
ś 75. Evans next argues that the failure of the State to take him before a judicial officer in a timely manner undermines the voluntariness of his confessions. Evans argues that at the time he made his statements to law enforcement he was unaware that he would be facing state murder charges. ś 76. Evans was arrested on August 5, 1991, in Louisiana on federal kidnapping charges. At that point, authorities were not aware that Beatrice had been murdered. Five hours after his arrest, Evans was taken before a United States Magistrate in New Orleans, advised of his rights and formally charged with kidnapping. Counsel was appointed and Evans waived extradition proceedings after which he was transported to Harrison County on August 7, 1991. ś 77. On August 8, 1991, Evans was given an initial appearance before U.S. Magistrate Judge Roper in Biloxi. Judge Roper advised Evans of his rights and appointed attorney Fred Lusk to represent Evans on the federal kidnapping charge. Evans, represented by counsel, later confessed to the kidnapping and murder of Beatrice. ś 78. At the time of Evans' confessions, he had been arrested on federal kidnapping charges. On August 2, 1991, a warrant was issued against Evans on state kidnapping charges. However, at the time of Evans' statements, he had not been arrested on state kidnapping charges. An arrest warrant for capital murder was not issued until August 20, 1991. Evans was arrested for capital murder at 10:30 a.m. on August 20, 1991, at the Harrison County Jail and was soon given an initial appearance. ś 79. At the time of Evans' arrest, Unif. Crim. R. Cir. C.P. 1.04 [2] governed initial appearances and required that every arrested person be taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay. Here, however, Evans had not been arrested on any state charges at the time of his statements. Rather, Evans had only been charged with federal kidnapping charges for which he did receive an initial appearance. ś 80. In Abram v. State, 606 So.2d 1015 (Miss.1992), this Court held that [t]he importance of this first appearance is that the accused is advised of his right to remain silent, his right to appointment of counsel, his right to communicate with counsel and family, his right to preliminary hearing, and the conditions under which he may obtain release, if at all. Id. at 1029. In Abram, this Court held that [b]ecause the `major purpose' of the initial appearance `is to secure to the accused prompt ... advice of his right to counsel by a judicial officer ... who [presumably] has no professional duty nor personal inclination to try to exact a waiver of that right,' it is imperative that the initial appearance be given `without unnecessary delay' as the rule commands. Id. (quoting Nicholson v. State, 523 So.2d 68 (Miss.1988)). `Without unnecessary delay' means as soon as `custody, booking, administrative and security needs have been met.' Id. ś 81. Abram was arrested without a warrant on August 12, 1982. Questioning began and Abram eventually gave a full confession. Despite the fact that a judge was available at all times, Abram was not given an initial appearance until August 15, 1982, immediately after his uncounseled confession was obtained by law enforcement. This Court held: The failure to provide Abram with an initial appearance sooner had devastating consequences for the defense, clearly derogating his right to a fair trial. Common sense suggests that law enforcement authorities would never have obtained an uncounseled confession from Abram had he been given an initial appearance, and consequently, access to counsel, without unnecessary delay. See cf., Nicholson, 523 So.2d at 77. We hold the failure to provide the initial appearance reversible since, as a consequence, Abram gave a full confession in the absence of, and in violation of, his right to counsel. Such an error could hardly be deemed harmless since the conviction of Abram for capital murder was based entirely on his confession. Id. at 1029. ś 82. The facts in the case sub judice are clearly distinguishable from those present in Abram, The most glaring distinction is that Evans did not make an uncounseled confession. Rather, Evans, in spite of advice from his attorney and U.S. Magistrate Judge Roper, made three separate statements. Prior to each statement, Evans was counseled and warned by his attorney against making any statements. Moreover, Evans memorialized his acknowledgment that he had been advised of his right to remain silent by Judge Roper and his attorney. Also unlike Abram, the conviction in the case sub judice was not based entirely on his confession. ś 83. In Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 757 (Miss.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1098, 105 S.Ct. 607, 83 L.Ed.2d 716 (1984), this Court held that [r]epeated Miranda warnings coupled with the passage of enough time to allow an accused to become acclimated to his surroundings followed thereafter by a voluntary waiver are generally more than sufficient to remove from a subsequent confession the taint, if any, of delay in taking the accused before a committing magistrate. Evans had been in custody for four days prior to making his first statement. Moreover, Evans was repeatedly advised by his attorney, Detective Carvin, and Agent Holder of his right to remain silent. ś 84. Evans, however, argues that he did not understand that his statements could be used in a subsequent state murder prosecution. Evans' attorney testified that he advised Evans that his statements could be used against him in both state and federal court. Lusk testified that he instructed Evans not to give a statement because there was no body. Specifically, Lusk advised Evans that I did not believe there was enough evidence unless he incriminated himself to bring about any state charges. ś 85. Perhaps the most conclusive evidence which demonstrates that Evans was fully aware that state capital murder charges would be pursued is Defense Ex. 12 to the Motion to Suppress wherein Evans' housing and visitation requests were listed. These requests focus solely on his desire to be housed in a federal facility despite a state capital murder conviction. Evans' awareness is illustrated by the fact that at one point, Evans inserted into the document the word capital before murder. Moreover, Evans, in this document, contemplates the fact that his execution may take place. ś 86. Evans was aware of the possibility and the probability of state murder charges if he made incriminating statements. However, acting in direct conflict to the advice given by his counsel, Evans chose to confess. There is simply no indication that the appointment of state counsel, who would have presumably counseled Evans as did Lusk, would have deterred Evans from confessing. ś 87. In Wright v. State, 512 So.2d 679, 681 (Miss.1987), this Court held: Under our law Wright was entitled to counsel without unnecessary delay following his arrest, and nothing turns on whether that law be labeled constitutional or procedural or both. Denial of that entitlement will result in reversal of a subsequent conviction, however, only where it is shown that the accused experienced some untoward consequences flowing directly from denial of counsel. ś 88. At all times during and prior to making statements, Evans was represented by an attorney. He was advised by his attorney and a federal judge not to make incriminating statements. Evans was aware that federal kidnapping charges were pending. Moreover, Evans was advised by his attorney that if a body was discovered, state murder charges would follow. Evans chose not to follow this advice. There is simply nothing in this record which demonstrates that the trial judge erred in finding that Evans' confessions were voluntary and admissible. This issue is without merit.
ś 89. Evans argues that the State failed to satisfy Agee v. State, 185 So.2d 671 (Miss. 1966). Specifically, Evans argues that the State failed to call Deputy Lee to rebut Evans' harassment allegations and Sheriff Joe Price to respond to Evans' allegation that Sheriff Price made promises regarding his treatment in the jail. ś 90. In Agee, this Court held Lee v. State, supra 236 Miss. 716, 112 So.2d 254 (1959)], is also authority for the proposition that when, after the State has made out a prima facie case as to the voluntariness of the confession, the accused offers testimony that violence, threats of violence, or offers of reward induced the confession, then the State must offer all the officers who were present when the accused was questioned and when the confession was signed, or give an adequate reason for the absence of any witness. 185 So.2d at 673. ś 91. In Morgan v. State, 681 So.2d 82 (Miss.1996), the defendant alleged that a detective threatened to hit him with his blackjack. This Court held that [t]he prosecution was charged under Agee with putting all of the detectives on the stand who were present when Detective Hall allegedly threatened Morgan. Id. at 89. ś 92. Here, the State called each law enforcement officer who was present when Evans was questioned and when the statements were made. Specifically, the State called Detective Whitney Carvin and FBI Special Agent George Holder and Major Wayne Payne of the Gulfport Police Department. In rebuttal, the State recalled Detective Carvin and called Assistant U.S. Attorney Golden and Gulfport Police Chief George Payne. ś 93. Sheriff Price was not called, nor does the State offer any reason why he was not. However, the trial court heard testimony concerning the assurances by Sheriff Price to Evans that his complaints would be remedied. Moreover, there was no dispute that Sheriff Price spoke with Evans on August 10, 1991, and made such assurances. Given that little conflict existed about Sheriff Price's presence or his assurances, his testimony was not required. ś 94. Evans also argues that Deputy Lee should have been called as a witness by the State. This Court has held that [o]nly those persons who are claimed to have induced a confession through some means of coercion are required to be offered by the State under Agee. Abram v. State, 606 So.2d 1015, 1030 (Miss.1992)( citing Reid v. State, 266 So.2d 21, 26 (Miss.1972)). Evans, however, did not testify that Deputy Lee made any threats or offers of reward which induced his confession. In Thorson v. State, 653 So.2d 876 (Miss.1994), this Court held that the Agee Rule was satisfied despite the fact that the State did not call officers who allegedly were abusive and yelled at the defendant two days prior to his confession. There, this Court held: The principle enunciated in Agee remains sound, but its importance to an accused has receded in view of the strong affirmative mandates of Miranda. In Abram v. State, 606 So.2d 1015, 1030 (Miss.1992), we held Only those persons who are claimed to have induced a confession through some means of coercion are required to be offered by the State under Agee.  We hold that any alleged statement made by Cook and some unidentified person on March 7 at which time Thorson revealed nothing had no bearing on Thorson's confession on the Monday following. Indeed, he never claimed that they did. Here, Thorson informed the officers on Monday, March 9, that he had read and understood his rights, and there is nothing, as above noted, about any of this videotape suggesting coercion or mistreatment of any kind. Mettetal v. State, 602 So.2d 864, 868 (Miss. 1992). Id. at 888. As in Thorson, there is no indication that alleged actions by Deputy Lee contributed or induced Evans' confession. As such, the State was not required to call him as a witness under the Agee Rule. This issue is without merit.