Opinion ID: 1159595
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Serious Offense

Text: ¶ 40 On January 11, 1993, Martinez was convicted of Aggravated Assault, a class 3 felony in violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-1203(A)(2) and 13-1204(A)(2). On November 11, 1996, Martinez was convicted of two counts of Dangerous or Deadly Assault by a Prisoner, a class 2 felony in violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-1203 and 13-1206. Martinez concedes that his 1993 conviction for Aggravated Assault qualifies as a serious offense under A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2) and (H)(1). But he argues the trial court erroneously found that his two 1996 convictions qualified as serious offenses. First, he asserts that because Dangerous or Deadly Assault by a Prisoner is not included within the list of serious offenses in A.R.S. § 13-703(H), the trial court improperly considered his 1996 convictions. Next, he alleges that because one may, theoretically, commit assault recklessly, his 1996 convictions cannot qualify as serious offenses under A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2) and (H)(1). ¶ 41 (1) In concluding that Martinez' 1996 convictions were (F)(2) aggravating factors, the trial court reasoned: A comparison of the statutes shows that the crime of Dangerous or Deadly Assault by a Prisoner pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-1206 is the same as a section 13-1204(A)(2) aggravated assault committed by the use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, with the additional element that the offense must be committed by a prisoner. The jury instructions given in CR 96-01528 also bear this out. The offense of Dangerous or Deadly Assault by a Prisoner is deemed more serious. It is a class 2 felony, rather than a class 3 felony, and unlike a section 13-1204(A)(2) aggravated assault, requires flat time and that the sentence be consecutive to any other sentence presently being served. However, the definition of serious offense in section 13-703(H) is a list of described offenses and Dangerous or Dearly Assault by a Prisoner is not specifically listed. The current version of the (F)(2) aggravating circumstance was enacted in 1993 in order to remove ambiguities from the prior version's more vague reference to crimes involving violence. There are no appellate decisions to guide this court in interpreting the current statute with regard to this issue. But there is really only one logical conclusion. The previous convictions were for aggravated assault committed by the use, threatened use or exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. That they were committed by a prisoner does not make them anything less or change that. If the offenses listed in A.R.S. § 13-703(H) were identified by statute numbersif A.R.S. § 13-703(H)(4) [sic] read aggravated assault pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-1204, for examplethese previous convictions would not qualify as previous convictions for serious offenses under A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2). But section 13-703(H) is not that specific. The convictions here are for aggravated assault committed by the use or threatened use or exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. They involved different victims. They each constitute a previous conviction of a serious offense under section 13-703(F)(2), and the court finds that they have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Special Verdict at 3-4. ¶ 42 We agree. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-703(H)(1)(d), a serious offense includes [a]ggravated assault resulting in serious physical injury or committed by the use, threatened use or exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. This offense can be committed under A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(2) and A.R.S. § 13-1206. A.R.S. § 13-703(H)(1)(d) provides a broad definition for aggravated assault which encompasses all aggravated assaults resulting in serious physical injury or committed by the use, threatened use or exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. Neither section is specifically listed, but both sections fully satisfy the statutory definition. A.R.S. § 13-1206 is simply aggravated assault for prisoners. As a class 2 felony, it is a more serious offense than A.R.S. § 13-1204, a class 3 felony. A conviction under it satisfies A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2). [8] ¶ 43 (2) Martinez' argument regarding the theoretical possibility of committing reckless assault is based upon the erroneous assumption that the old (F)(2) concepts, see State v. McKinney, 185 Ariz. 567, 581, 917 P.2d 1214, 1228 (1996) (finding that the (F)(2) aggravating factor does not apply to offenses which can be committed recklessly), carry over to the new (F)(2). But in 1993, the legislature abandoned the (F)(2) language use or threat of violence and replaced it with serious offense. In so doing, the legislature provided a list of serious offenses described at A.R.S. § 13-703(H)(1)(a) through (k). This list contains several crimes that can be committed recklessly. Manslaughter is included in the A.R.S. § 13-703(H)(1) list. By definition, a person can commit manslaughter by [r]ecklessly causing the death of another person. A.R.S. § 13-1103(A)(1). A person can also commit aggravated assault recklessly. A.R.S. §§ 13-1203(A)(1) & 13-1204. ¶ 44 Martinez erroneously relies on State v. Ysea, 191 Ariz. 372, 379, 956 P.2d 499, 506 (1998) to support his McKinney argument. But like McKinney, Ysea addressed the (F)(2) aggravating factor before the 1993 amendments. We therefore agree with the trial court that Martinez' 1996 convictions qualify as serious offenses under A.R.S. § 13-703(H)(1)(d).