Opinion ID: 2628164
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Herron argues that, although there was a wealth of evidence regarding the events leading up to the shooting at the Jacksons' home, the evidence of the actual event was scant and composed only of his statement and Lawson's testimony. He argues that the State failed to meet its burden to prove that he was in any way involved beyond being present in the van and an associate of the shooters, or that he did or said something to assist in the criminal discharge of a firearm that led to Deborah's death. First-degree felony murder is the killing of a human being committed . . . in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony as defined in K.S.A. 21-3436 and amendments thereto. K.S.A. 21-3401(b). Criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling is an inherently dangerous felony that can support a felony-murder conviction, K.S.A. 21-3436(a)(15); conspiracy is not. At this point, Herron does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conspiracy conviction. Rather, he focuses on the sufficiency of the evidence to support criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling, the charge on which he was acquitted. Under our precedent, the fact that a defendant is acquitted of an underlying felony does not automatically require reversal of a felony-murder conviction. In State v. Shultz, 225 Kan. 135, 142, 587 P.2d 901 (1978) (quoting State v. McCorgary, 218 Kan. 358, 366, 543 P.2d 952 [1975], cert. denied 429 U.S. 867, 97 S.Ct. 177, 50 L.Ed.2d 147 [1976]), this court noted that reversal is not required in cases where two verdicts are irreconcilable. See State v. Meyer, 17 Kan. App.2d 59, 65, 832 P.2d 357 (1992). In State v. Wise, 237 Kan. 117, 122-23, 697 P.2d 1295 (1985), this court summarized a New York case, People v. Murray, 92 A.D.2d 617, 459 N.Y.S.2d 810 (1983), as follows: In [ Murray ], the court held that the completion of the underlying felony is not an essential element of felony murder, and that an acquittal of the underlying felony is not inconsistent with a conviction of felony murder. Wise also noted: At any rate, consistency in a verdict is not necessary; a verdict, though inconsistent, is not erroneous so long as there is sufficient competent evidence to support it. [Citations omitted.] 237 Kan. at 122, 697 P.2d 1295. Wise also specifically held that a charge and conviction of an underlying felony is not necessary to sustain a conviction of felony murder: We hold that under our statute, K.S.A. 21-3401, an accused need not be prosecuted [for] or convicted of the underlying felony in order to be convicted of felony murder. 237 Kan. at 123, 697 P.2d 1295; see State v. Dixon, 279 Kan. 563, 571, 112 P.3d 883 (2005); State v. Beach, 275 Kan. 603, 615-17, 67 P.3d 121 (2003); see also State v. Antwine, 4 Kan. App.2d 389, 396, 607 P.2d 519 (1980) (While the verdict may be somewhat inconsistent, substantial competent evidence exists to support it and we find no error. Our Supreme Court has recognized that a jury may sometimes reach its verdict partially out of clemency for the accused.). Thus, the jury's acquittal aside, our charge is to determine whether, after review of all the evidence, examined in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we are convinced a rational factfinder could have found Herron guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder based on an underlying felony of criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling. State v. Scott, 285 Kan. 366, 372, 171 P.3d 639 (2007); State v. Swinney, 280 Kan. 768, 778, 127 P.3d 261 (2006). While the State must sustain its burden of proof on each element of an offense, circumstantial evidence and the logical inferences therefrom can be sufficient to support a conviction of even the most serious crime. Scott, 285 Kan. at 372, 171 P.3d 639; State v. Murillo, 269 Kan. 281, 286, 7 P.3d 264 (2000). Criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling is the malicious, intentional and unauthorized discharge of a firearm at a dwelling . . . in which there is a human being. K.S.A. 21-4219(b). Herron argues, and we agree, that the evidence may be insufficient to establish his guilt for criminal discharge as a principal. But, as he notes, criminal liability may be established on an aiding and abetting theory. Under K.S.A. 21-3205(1), a person is criminally responsible for a crime committed by another if such person intentionally aids, abets, advises, hires, counsels, or procures the other to commit the crime. Herron insists that the evidence demonstrates mere presence and association with the others in the van, not that he was willfully furthering the success of the venture. He believes his situation to be akin to that of the witnesses in State v. Simmons, 282 Kan. 728, 148 P.3d 525 (2006). In that case, three witnesses were aware of defendant's plan to rob a victim, and they ultimately received some fruits of his illegal labors in the form of $100 bills, incentives for silence. The defendant sought reversal of his convictions based on the district court's failure to caution the jury concerning accomplice testimony in accord with PIK Crim.3d 52.18. We concluded there was no error because, inter alia, the witnesses were not accomplices; they did not participate in the crime. We held that their mere presence during the planning stages, their failure to stop or report the crime, and their receipt of stolen goods absent a prearranged plan of theft and delivery did not make them accomplices. 282 Kan. at 737-39, 148 P.3d 525. Herron is correct that mere association with a principal who actually commits a crime or mere presence in the vicinity of the crime is itself insufficient to establish guilt as an aider and abettor. However, when a person knowingly associates with an unlawful venture and participates in a way that demonstrates willful furtherance of its success, guilt as an aider and abettor is established. See Simmons, 282 Kan. at 738, 148 P.3d 525; State v. Kaiser, 260 Kan. 235, 242, 918 P.2d 629 (1996), disapproved on other grounds State v. Gonzalez, 282 Kan. 73, 145 P.3d 18 (2006); State v. Hobson, 234 Kan. 133, 138, 671 P.2d 1365 (1983). In this case, Herron's situation is distinguishable from that of the Simmons witnesses. See 282 Kan. at 736, 148 P.3d 525. According to Herron's unrecorded statements, he did more than listen to his associates' discussion. He participated in the planning, the mobilization, and the actual attack. We acknowledge that Herron's videotaped interview conflicted somewhat with his unrecorded statements, as reported to the jury by Lawson; but this is not fatal to the prosecution's case. A rational factfinder could easily have concluded that Herron was a willing participant in a planned, retaliatory shooting. His friends had traded gunfire with Eric throughout the day; his good friend had been shot while in a car; and his own house had been fired on earlier. Furthermore, Herron's associate had stolen the van so that they would not be recognized; the group loaded it with pistols, high-powered semi-automatic rifles, and ammunition; they drove to the Jacksons' house; and they pummeled it with more than 30 rounds before speeding away, ditching the van, and scattering. Herron's felony-murder conviction was supported by sufficient evidence. One additional point merits mention. The State urged us to consider that 9 hours passed between the first shooting and the murder, giving Herron a long time to walk away. At oral argument before this court, Herron's counsel urged this court to overrule our decisions in State v. Wakefield, 267 Kan. 116, Syl. ¶ 3, 977 P.2d 941 (1999), and State v. Smolin, 221 Kan. 149, 152-53, 557 P.2d 1241 (1976), which held that a defendant's failure to oppose the commission of a crime can be considered, along with other circumstances, in determining the sufficiency of evidence of aiding and abetting. We do not reach this issue here, because we need not rely on Herron's failure to walk away or oppose the crime to arrive at our conclusion.