Opinion ID: 1661389
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: the expert testimony tested

Text: Defendant called William E. Billings as an expert witness and by his testimony undertook to reconstruct defendant's version of the accident. Plaintiff assigns the admission of this evidence as error, calling it a hodge-podge of assumptions, conjectures and conclusions, stated as facts. The significant portions of Billings' testimony have been set out in the forepart of this opinion. We do not condemn its admissibility in its entirety. One of the crucial issues in this case was: which of the two vehicles, the Cadillac or the Pontiac, was in the wrong traffic lane at the time of the collision? The point of impact was all-important. Billings approached his analysis of the known physical conditions by a preliminary discussion of the forces of collision. This was testimony explaining the laws of inertia and the effect on each car. This information is not ordinarily within the knowledge of the common man. The description given by the witness would likely be beneficial to the jury in its assessment of the evidence and its admission under this record was proper. In attempting to fix a point of impact, Billings gave his opinion as to the relative speed of the two cars which he undertook to substantiate by defining and applying momentum and deflection. He gave his explanation of why the location of tire marks, dirt and debris in the northbound traffic lane was not inconsistent with his expressed belief that the point of impact was in the southbound traffic lane. This testimony was vital in the defense of the case and challenged the credibility of the testimony of Officer Brantner. It had the further purpose of furnishing a basis to support the expert's opinion. Its admission as evidence did not constitute prejudicial error. Billings had prepared a drawing of the accident scene to a scale of one inch equals ten feet and upon which he had indicated the final positions of the Pontiac and the Cadillac cars based on measurements given him by Officer Brantner, photographs in evidence, and oil marks still visible in the grass and on the shoulder when he made his investigation. Billings testified that the gouge marks shown on his drawing were to scale and located on the basis of the photographs. He stated that in his opinion they were caused by the buckled frame members of the Pontiac car. This was not expert testimony but an assumption or conclusion of the witness. If proper objection had been made, it should have been excluded. In a somewhat argumentative narration, Billings attempted to prove the angle of collision between the Cadillac and the Pontiac cars. A portion of his testimony was based on the extent of the damage to the left side of the Pontiac, which he observed for the first time when he made his own examination of the vehicle. That examination was made September 22, 1962  four months following the accident  and at the Doss Auto Parts, being the second location to which the Pontiac had been moved from the accident scene. Billings admitted the damage to which he referred was not shown by the photograph of the Pontiac car. His observations were too remote and his testimony of the damaged condition was received without an adequate foundation having been first laid to give it probative value. This portion of the testimony should have been excluded under proper objection. By using photographs, Billings undertook to point out to the jury that rear bumper damage on the left side of the Ford was especially indicative of how the accident occurred. Billings contended that since the photographs showed the bumper to be pushed in and forward into the corner of the Ford, it substantiated his opinion (already given) that the Pontiac was undertaking to pass the Ford just prior to the accident but was unable to do so because of the approaching Linehan Cadillac. In an attempt to drop back into his own lane, the driver of the Pontiac, according to the opinion of Billings, caught the right side of the front bumper of the Pontiac in the left side of the rear bumper of the Ford, causing the rear of the Ford to kick around to the right and the Pontiac to run head-on into the Cadillac. It is undisputed that the Ford spun across the paved highway and into a farmer's fence along the west boundary of the roadway at a point approximately 600 feet to the north. There was testimony by the occupants of the Ford that the rear of the car was up against the corner post of the fence when the Ford came to rest and that the left rear fender was down into the wheel so that the car could not be moved. The fender was ultimately pulled away from the tire by using the wrecker. Upon this record, the opinion of Billings as to how the accident occurred based on the evidence of physical damage to the Ford was purely speculative. The preliminary factual foundation was wholly inadequate to permit him to express an expert opinion, if such it may be called. After stating his qualifications, Billings began his testimony on direct examination by giving his opinion as to how the accident occurred based on his own investigation. He undertook to fix the blame for the accident. This was error. Unlike some situations, such as actions for malpractice, there was nothing so exceptional in the record of this case as to require an expert opinion on the ultimate issue for the jury. John Gutekunst, on cross-examination, made the statement that when he first observed the Cadillac car turning toward him it was about one and one-half car lengths away and that he explained: My God, Carol, look at this guy coming at us. Gutekunst estimated the speed of the Ford at the time at about 60 miles an hour. In an obvious attempt to discredit this witness, counsel for defendant interrogated Billings as to the length of a Cadillac car and by use of a stop watch had Billings announced the time it took counsel to repeat the remark Gutekunst said he made to Carol. Billings then testified that at a speed of 60 miles an hour a vehicle would travel 88 feet a second. Under an assumption by counsel that the Cadillac was also traveling at a speed of 60 miles an hour, Billings computed and testified that the closing time of the two cars would have been 16/100ths of a second. The witness also testified as to the normal reaction time of a 25-year-old man in braking a car. The information obtained through the answers of Billings cannot be classed as common knowledge. Presumably it would be helpful to the jury in its evaluation of the Gutekunst testimony. There was no error in this respect. Our determination that prejudicial error was committed by the trial court in its rulings on the admission of expert testimony makes it unnecessary to consider the other assigned errors which, in any event, because of their nature are unlikely to recur on a retrial. The judgments in the Court of Appeals and in the circuit court are reversed and the case remanded to the circuit court for a new trial. Costs to the appellant.