Opinion ID: 1589326
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Officer Glenn's statement

Text: Mr. Baumruk asserts that the trial court plainly erred in overruling his motion to suppress the statement of Officer Glenn in allowing an expert, Dr. Rabun, to rely on Officer Glenn's statement and in failing to bar, sua sponte, any expert opinion that relied on that statement. While incarcerated, Mr. Baumruk asserted that his newspapers were stolen and asked to speak to someone. In October 1998, Officer Glenn was assigned to discuss the missing newspapers with Mr. Baumruk. During this discussion, Officer Glenn also asked Mr. Baumruk questions about his wife's murder and the shooting at the courthouse. Officer Glenn never read Mr. Baumruk his rights under Miranda v. Arizona , [8] and Mr. Baumruk never waived these rights. Prior to this meeting with Officer Glenn, Dr. Rabun, a psychiatric expert for the state, had determined that Mr. Baumruk suffered from amnestic disorder but had the capacity to understand the proceedings against him and to assist in his defense and, therefore, was competent to stand trial. Dr. Rabun relied on Mr. Baumruk's statements to Officer Glenn, two cellmates and a social worker to conclude that Mr. Baumruk recalled details of the event and did not suffer from amnestic disorder. This change in diagnosis had no bearing on Dr. Rabun's conclusion. Both before and after the change in diagnosis, Dr. Rabun concluded that Mr. Baumruk was competent to stand trial. At trial, the state agreed not to present evidence of Mr. Baumruk's statement to Officer Glenn during its case-in-chief and did not attempt to do so. Defense counsel made no objection to the trial court's taking judicial notice of the trial court's ruling in the competency hearing or to the state's experts' reliance, during rebuttal, on the statement to Officer Glenn. [9] As there was no objection to the experts' reliance on Mr. Baumruk's statement to Officer Glenn as rebuttal evidence, this Court reviews for plain error. Rule 30.20. Only if the admission of the evidence substantially violated Mr. Baumruk's rights such that a manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice resulted will this Court overrule the trial court's decision. Clayton, 995 S.W.2d at 478. Here, the prosecution did not present Mr. Baumruk's statement to Officer Glenn as evidence of his guilt. Instead, its experts relied on this statement as evidence that Mr. Baumruk remembered the event. [A]n expert opinion may be based on otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence. State v. Woltering, 810 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Mo.App.1991). During his testimony to rebut Mr. Baumruk's defense that he was not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, Dr. Rabun did not reveal Mr. Baumruk's statement to Officer Glenn in detail to the jury, only that Mr. Baumruk's discussion with Officer Glenn demonstrated memory of the event. In addition to the statement to Officer Glenn, Mr. Baumruk spoke with two of his cellmates and a social worker. All three of these individuals also stated that Mr. Baumruk provided details of the event that indicated he remembered the shooting itself. Officer Glenn was merely one of four individuals providing support for Dr. Rabun's conclusion that Mr. Baumruk did not suffer from amnestic disorder. This Court need not consider whether the information was admitted improperly or whether Officer Glenn's actions violated Mr. Baumruk's Miranda rights as the evidence of Officer Glenn's conversation with Mr. Baumruk was merely duplicative of other admitted evidence. See State v. Pennington, 642 S.W.2d 646, 648 (Mo. 1982). As such, Mr. Baumruk cannot demonstrate any manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice that resulted due to the admission of the information.