Opinion ID: 4417118
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Seventh Circuit Decisions

Text: Just months after Zinermon, this court sitting en banc in Easter House did just that.1 Easter House was an adoption agency that alleged employees of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services conspired to deprive it of property without due process by, among other things, withholding the renewal of its license. We accepted the defendants’ argument that Parratt barred Easter House’s suit and rejected Easter House’s three main arguments: (1) that Parratt applies only to minor deprivations; (2) that a conspiracy can never be a “random and unauthorized” act; and (3) that the actions of high-level policymaking employees are per se “authorized” because they amount to the policy or established procedure of the State. See id. at 1398 (majority opinion). The last of these is particularly relevant here. In rejecting that argument, we distinguished Zinermon on the grounds that the statute delegating authority in that case did not include procedural safeguards, meaning the state oﬃcials had “broadly delegated authority.” Id. at 1401. In eﬀect, we limited Zinermon’s qualification of Parratt to situations where the state oﬃcial in question had unfettered discretion to act. That