Opinion ID: 852394
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Genealogy of Indiana's Judicial Article

Text: Justice Dickson's opinion for the majority uncovers a rich and interesting history of the events leading up to the 1970 adoption of a revised Article 7 of the Indiana Constitution that overhauled the Indiana judiciary and introduced a number of concepts new to our jurisprudence. As one who graduated from law school in 1963 and was a practicing lawyer in Indiana throughout the period leading up to the voter's adoption of this amendment, I cannot altogether separate my own impressions of this period from the paper trail that Justice Dickson outlines. I ultimately reach the conclusion that he does: the language of Article 7, Section 4 authorizes appellate courts to revise a sentence either upward or downward. I do not believe, however, that this leads to the conclusion that this Court should consider itself equally ready to revise in either direction, or that the defendant's decision to appeal the sentence is relevant to whether this Court may revise it upward. I believe the history of the 1970 amendment demonstrates that appellate review was to be encouraged, but also indicates a strong disposition against upward revision of sentences. First, I do not think these issues were carefully considered by either the study committee, the legislature, or the voters. The public discussion of the revisions to Article 7 focused on the selection process for the appellate bench, which changed Indiana from a state that chose its appellate judges by contested partisan election every six years to the merit selection plan we now have. The authors and proponents of this were civil lawyers. I knew the three members of the study commission that recommended adoption of the American Bar Association proposal to authorize appellate review of sentences. C. Ben Dutton, William M. Evans, and Robert V. Bridwell were all well-known Indianapolis attorneys engaged, so far as I recall, either exclusively or overwhelmingly in civil practice. A search of the attorneys field in reported cases confirms this. All three, like me, were educated at a time when the conventional wisdom in the United States was that sentencing was a trial court function, best left to the judge who is most familiar with the defendant and the circumstances of the case. All three, like me, had little practical experience with the criminal justice system. From this I conclude that the study committee's recommendation was little more than a blind acceptance of the provisions adopted in the ABA's Model Judicial Article. We are, however, explicitly instructed to consider the Commission's report in construing this constitutional provision. In the Joint Resolution agreeing to the proposed amendment, the General Assembly advised that [t]he report of the Judicial Study Commission and the comments to the article contained therein may be consulted by the Court of Justice to determine the underlying reasons, purposes and policies of this article and may be used as a guide in its construction and application. H.J.R. 12, 96th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., Ind. Acts, Ch. 457, at 1853 (Mar. 10, 1969). The Indiana Judicial Study Commission's endorsement of the ABA Model Judicial Article is therefore relevant. And what should we make of the ABA recommendation? It was not that appellate courts should review and revise sentences. Rather it was that sentences should be subject to appellate review under such terms and conditions as the [state] Supreme Court shall specify by rules. In other words, this proposal contemplated a fleshing out of the procedures and conditions that would govern an appellate court's review and revision of sentences. It explicitly asked the voters adopting this provision as a constitutional amendment to give the state Supreme Court the authority to prescribe whether and how this appellate function should be carried out. As the majority points out, the ABA commentary, adopted by our study commission, explained that [t]he proposal that the appellate power in criminal cases include the power to review sentences is based on the efficacious use to which that power has been put by the Court of Criminal Appeals in England. Op. at 748.