Opinion ID: 1363126
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Plaintiff Has Standing

Text: (11a) Real party contends that, even if abstract rights to notice and hearing exist, plaintiff is not entitled to relief because he had not yet purchased his property at the time the tentative map was initially approved by the Ventura County Planning Department. (12) The argument is directed at plaintiff's standing to sue and may be raised for the first time on appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.80; Parker v. Bowron (1953) 40 Cal.2d 344, 351 [254 P.2d 6].) (11b) Nonetheless, we cannot accept the contention. As we have explained, notice and hearing must be afforded at some meaningful point in the approval process. It is argued that to grant plaintiff relief would permit him to assert the constitutional rights of others because he was not an affected landowner, not having acquired ownership until after the planning department's approval. However, plaintiff has alleged that the approval process was not yet final when he purchased his property, because an appeal to the board of supervisors of the planning department action was then pending. Moreover, the complaint avers that no prior notice or hearing had previously been given to any affected landowner, or to plaintiff or his predecessor. If, at the time of plaintiff's purchase, the county had already provided an adequate notice and opportunity for hearing to affected landowners then of record, the county would not, of course, be constitutionally required to repeat the process for subsequent purchasers, either before or after a final decision. Because it allegedly had not done so, however, the constitutional issues remain at large. It follows, accordingly, that plaintiff may assert his own claim to due process before he is finally deprived of a presently existing property interest. (13) Nor did the fact that plaintiff accidentally received notice of the hearing on real party's appeal constitute a waiver of plaintiff's own right to assert constitutional defects. At that hearing the board confined its review to the issue raised by the developer and rejected all requests by plaintiff and other landowners for more extended reconsideration. (But see County of Ventura, Ord. No. 2844, § 8211, subd. (a), supra. ) The notice received by plaintiff obviously led to no meaningful vindication of his due process rights. (11c) We therefore conclude that plaintiff has standing to assert his constitutional rights to notice and hearing in connection with the instant subdivision approval. The general demurrer to the petition for writ of mandate should not have been sustained. The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to overrule the demurrer to the petition for writ of mandate. The trial court is further authorized to award plaintiff trial and appellate attorneys' fees if it determines that this case has conferred a significant benefit ... on the general public or a large class of persons and that the necessity and burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5, subds. (a), (b).) The trial court shall determine the amount of any fees to be awarded. Plaintiff shall recover costs.