Opinion ID: 844257
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Probable cause for defendant's arrest

Text: Defendant first contends his statements should have been excluded as the poisonous fruit of an arrest made without probable cause. The argument fails because defendant's arrest was proper. (7) Probable cause exists when the facts known to the arresting officer would persuade someone of `reasonable caution' that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. ( Dunaway v. New York (1979) 442 U.S. 200, 208, fn. 9 [60 L.Ed.2d 824, 99 S.Ct. 2248].) `[P]robable cause is a fluid conceptturning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts. . . .' ( Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 232 [76 L.Ed.2d 527, 103 S.Ct. 2317].) It is incapable of precise definition. ( Maryland v. Pringle (2003) 540 U.S. 366, 371 [157 L.Ed.2d 769, 124 S.Ct. 795].) `The substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt,' and that belief must be `particularized with respect to the person to be . . . seized.' ( Ibid. ) ( People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 673 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 85, 93 P.3d 1027].) Probable cause here was provided by statements of defendant's coworkers Ricardo Decker and Terry De la Torre. On January 21, 1993, the Riverside Police Department received the following phone message from an anonymous informant. The ninja guy who's breaking into the apartments in Canyon Crest was David Scott. Scott worked at a movie theater on Day Street. He was half black . . . half Japanese, six foot six one, and fairly skinny but . . . extremely strong. The informant had seen Scott dressed in a ninja outfit with a long skinny sword and a big knife. Scott had frequently spoken of stabbing people and being chased by the police. With regard to the murder of the librarian lady, Scott told me that he had dreamt about it or . . . had an out of body experience where he actually had done the crime and I just thought he was just full of it at the time, but . . . when I read the article yesterday it fit the description. That same day Detective Keers interviewed De la Torre, an assistant manager at the Canyon Springs Cinema in Moreno Valley. De la Torre confirmed they had an employee named David Scott. She said that other employees had discussed the possibility that defendant was the Ninja Rapist. He had been seen wearing a ninja outfit, carrying ninja stars and, after work, jumping from one roof to another. Asked by another employee the day before about his stars, defendant said he had lost them. [21] Christy Wells, another employee, had told De la Torre that defendant said he had been chased by police through the Canyon Crest area. Detective Keers then interviewed Ricardo Decker, the only other employee present at the time. Recognizing his voice from the recorded tip, Keers asked Decker if he was the anonymous informant. Decker confirmed he was. Decker was 21 years old, seemed to be of average intelligence, and responded to Keers's questions readily. Decker gave Keers the following information. Defendant liked to dress up as a ninja and told Decker he practiced ninja skills in the hills of the Canyon Crest area of Riverside. One evening, around January 17, 1993, defendant left the theater in a ninja outfit, including a hood, knife, and sword. [22] Defendant told Decker he had stabbed people. Defendant owned a .45-caliber handgun. Stephanie Compton told Decker that defendant had placed the gun to her head when he was angry with her. Compton also told Decker of an incident that occurred two days before the news of Brenda Kenny's murder appeared in the papers. As Compton and defendant drove past Ms. Kenny's apartment building, he pointed at it and said: A woman was murdered over there. The day after an article on Kenny's murder was published, Compton told Decker that defendant dreamt he saw the woman being stabbed by a man. Faced with this overwhelming showing of probable cause, defendant raises two objections. First, he claims that Decker could not be considered a reliable citizen informant because his initial tip had been made anonymously. The claim fails. We have distinguished between those informants who `are often criminally disposed or implicated, and supply their tips . . . in secret, and for pecuniary or other personal gain' and victims or chance witnesses of crime who `volunteer their information fortuitously, openly, and through motives of good citizenship.' ( People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263, 268-269 [127 Cal.Rptr. 629, 545 P.2d 1333].) ( Humphrey v. Appellate Division (2002) 29 Cal.4th 569, 576 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 645, 58 P.3d 476].) There was no reason to believe that Decker approached the police from any motive other than good citizenship. He readily acknowledged that he made the phone call. Thus, he no longer remained anonymous. He neither sought nor received any personal gain. He was an adult of apparently average intelligence. He responded to questions in a very open manner. Moreover, the information he provided was corroborated in significant part by De la Torre. Accordingly, ample reason existed to consider him a reliable citizen informant. Second, defendant contends that Decker should have been considered unreliable because he gave conflicting accounts of how he learned of defendant's dream about Kenny's murder. During the phone call, Decker reported that defendant told him that he had dreamt about the Kenny murder or had an out-of-body experience in which he committed it. In his interview with Detective Keers, Decker said that Stephanie Compton had told him of defendant's dream. Keers questioned Decker about this discrepancy. He explained that he had participated in numerous conversations with defendant and Compton, and he wasn't sure exactly who told him what portions. Regardless of whether Decker learned of the alleged dream directly from defendant or through Compton, it supported the conclusion that there was probable cause to arrest defendant.