Opinion ID: 1928749
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Was Officer Douglass a Peace Officer Within the Meaning of Iowa Code Section 321J.1(7) (1995)?

Text: The State first contends the district court erred in finding Douglass was not a peace officer under chapter 321J. The State concedes Douglass does not fall within the literal definition of a peace officer as defined in section 321J.1(7). Douglass was not a member of the highway patrol, was not under civil service, was not a sheriff and was not a regular deputy sheriff; although he was a law enforcement officer, he had not completed an approved course relating to motor vehicle operators under the influence of alcoholic beverages. See Iowa Code § 321J.1(7). The State asserts, however, Douglass was a de facto peace officer. The State relies on the fact Douglass was authorized under chapter 321 to make arrests for OWI. See id. §§ 321.1(50), 804.7. We think this fact is not relevant. The authority to arrest for OWI is determined by the definition of peace officer contained in Iowa Code chapter 321. See Iowa Code § 321.1(50). Douglass fell within this definition. We are not concerned here, however, with Douglass's authority to make an arrest; that authority is not challenged on appeal. The issue here is whether Douglass's valid arrest of Palmer for OWI met the statutory conditions required for implied consent. That determination is made by reference to the definition of peace officer in chapter 321J. See Iowa Code § 321J.1(7)(e). Because different statutes control these questions, it is possible for an officer to make a valid arrest for OWI but not be able to invoke implied consent. Under these circumstances, prosecution of the defendant is still possible; such prosecution will simply not have the benefit of a test taken pursuant to chapter 321J. We reject the State's argument for an additional reason. Section 321J.1(7)(e) defines a peace officer to include a law enforcement officer who has satisfactorily completed an approved course relating to motor vehicle operators under the influence of alcoholic beverages. Iowa Code § 321J.1(7)(e). To hold a law enforcement officer without the training required by section 321J.1(7)(e) is, nevertheless, a de facto peace officer under that section is to ignore the legislature's decision to define peace officer more narrowly for purposes of the implied consent law. In essence, we would be saying that a law enforcement officer meeting the definitions of peace officer in section 321.1(50) or section 804.7 would also qualify as a peace officer under section 321J.6. The court cannot subscribe to such an interpretation as it would completely ignore section 321J.1.(7)(e)'s requirement of specialized OWI training. We will not interpret statutes in a way that makes portions of them meaningless. State v. Ahitow, 544 N.W.2d 270, 273 (Iowa 1996). Although the State may find it easier to enforce Iowa's drunk driving laws by conducting warrantless searches of suspects regardless of the qualifications of the arresting officers, the legislature did not provide for such an unlimited use of Iowa's implied consent law. The unambiguous language of the statute evidences the legislature's clear intent that law enforcement officers have special training in OWI procedures. We will not undermine the legislature's policy decision by ignoring the plain language of the statute. See Henriksen v. Younglove Constr., 540 N.W.2d 254, 259 (Iowa 1995) (where legislature has defined a term, the court cannot apply a definition it finds more to its liking); Krull v. Thermogas Co., 522 N.W.2d 607, 612 (Iowa 1994) (we are bound by what the legislature said, not by what it should or might have said). Where the meaning of a statute is clear, our role is simply to enforce the law according to its terms. Henriksen, 540 N.W.2d at 260. The State cites to our decision in State v. Driscoll, 455 N.W.2d 916, 918 (Iowa 1990), to support its argument that Douglass was a de facto peace officer. In Driscoll, the officer who invoked implied consent had not completed the psychological testing required under Iowa law for all law enforcement officers. Driscoll, 455 N.W.2d at 916; see Iowa Code § 808.11(5) (1987). The officer had successfully completed OWI training at the Iowa Law Enforcement Academy. Driscoll, 455 N.W.2d at 917. We held the officer was a de facto peace officer under section 321J.1(7) in spite of the technical infirmity clouding his appointment: It would be contrary to the public good, and produce only uncertainty and confusion, were we to allow defendants like Driscoll to collaterally attack the authority of a public official who was otherwise trained for and certified to administer the test that is at issue in these proceedings. Id. at 918 (emphasis added). The present case is easily distinguished. Douglass was not trained for and certified to administer the test that is at issue in these proceedings. Douglass's inability to come within the statutory definition of a peace officer is based on more than a technical infirmity. His lack of qualifications goes to the heart of section 321J.1(7)(e). OWI training teaches officers skills that permit an objective and uniform assessment of intoxication. Thus, the statutory requirement that law enforcement officers have this training protects the citizens of Iowa from indiscriminate testing and harassment. See Hopkins, 465 N.W.2d at 896 (referring to section 321J.6 in general and its requirement of reasonable grounds to believe the defendant was operating a vehicle while intoxicated). It ensures that a warrantless search is not conducted unless valid reasons exist for testing. Id. Douglass lacked the OWI training that would provide these safeguards. Therefore, we decline to hold he is a de facto peace officer for purposes of allowing a warrantless search as authorized in chapter 321J.