Opinion ID: 692072
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Rights on an Issue of Law

Text: 109 The issue of validity of a patent is an issue of law. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17, 86 S.Ct. 684, 694, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966) ([T]he ultimate question of patent validity is one of law, [Great] A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket [Equipment] Corp., [340 U.S. 147] at 155 [71 S.Ct. 127 at 131-32, 95 L.Ed. 162 (1950)].) This interpretation of the current statute is in sharp contrast to interpretations of prior statutes under which patent validity was treated as an issue of fact for the jury. Graver Tank & Mfg. v. Linde Air Prods., 336 US. 271, 279, 69 S.Ct. 535, 539, 93 L.Ed. 672 (1949); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275, 64 S.Ct. 593, 88 L.Ed. 721 (1944); Tucker v. Spalding, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 453, 20 L.Ed. 515 (1871); Bischoff v. Wethered, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 812, 19 L.Ed. 829 (1869); Gill v. Wells, 89 U.S. (22 Wall) 1, 22 L.Ed. 699 (1874); Battin v. Taggert, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 74, 15 L.Ed. 37 (1854); 3 William C. Robinson, The Law of Patents, Sec. 1075, (1890). What is the effect of the Supreme Court declaring a particular issue to be an ultimate issue of law? Is it part of the Seventh Amendment right that the underlying factual disputes relevant to the issue of law must be decided by the jury? Or is the entirety of an issue of law including factual disputes, taken from the jury the same as with an equitable issue? Or does the answer depend on the particular issue? No clear answer can be found in Supreme Court precedent, and the circuit court decisions are in conflict respecting the role of a jury in determining patent validity. 110 The Ninth Circuit held in Sarkisian v. Winn-Proof Corp., 688 F.2d 647 (9th Cir.1982) (in banc ), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1052, 103 S.Ct. 1499, 75 L.Ed.2d 930 (1983), that the issue of validity of a patent is determined as a matter of law by the court, but facts must be found by the jury. If only the legal issue is submitted to the jury, the jury verdict is advisory. The court called for specific factual findings by the jury or by the judge. Id. 688 F.2d at 650. Where a district court judge of that circuit made independent findings of fact and conclusions of law after receipt of an advisory verdict, this court rejected the trial court's treatment of the verdict as advisory. American Hoist & Derrick v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1361 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821, 105 S.Ct. 95, 83 L.Ed.2d 41 (1984); see also Perkin-Elmer v. Computervision, 732 F.2d 888, 895 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 857, 105 S.Ct. 187, 83 L.Ed.2d 120 (1984); Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1234 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 853, 110 S.Ct. 154, 107 L.Ed.2d 112 (1989). 15 111 The Seventh Circuit in Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 723 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir.1983) (in banc ) addressed the issue of nonobviousness, one of the three conditions of patentability (novelty and utility being the other two) and declared that issue to be one of law. However, it further held that the factual issues underlying obviousness go to the jury, but that mandatory alternative instructions must be given delineating the particular factual dispute in the case that controls the outcome. Thus, under Seventh Circuit law, the trial court announces the ultimate result in its instructions, dependent upon the jury finding of a particular fact. 16 While this case was cited with approval in one Federal Circuit case, Structural Rubber Prods. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707 (Fed.Cir.1984), unlike the Seventh Circuit this court has not imposed the use of mandatory alternate instructions, and the procedure has not been used, to my knowledge, in any appeal to come to this court. One of the difficulties with mandatory alternative instructions is that a validity decision is likely to require a number of underlying fact findings which would have to be covered by cumbersome instructions setting out various possible combinations of subsidiary facts. While the mandatory alternative instructions procedure separates the law/fact roles of judge and jury, the question remains: Is the fact finding role of a jury a constitutional right with respect to the conditions of patentability? 112 The Tenth Circuit recognized the ultimate issue of validity to be one of law but held the conditions of patentability, e.g., novelty, utility, nonobviousness, are issues of fact for the jury. See, e.g., Norfin Inc. v. International Business Machine Corp., 625 F.2d 357 (10th Cir.1980), and Celebrity, Inc. v. A & B Instrument Co., 573 F.2d 11 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824, 99 S.Ct. 94, 58 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978). Under this analysis, there is no separate judgmental decision for the judge to make. If the jury holds that an invention would have been obvious, the judge is not permitted to review that verdict except for the substantiality of the evidence. 113 In Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1547 (Fed.Cir.1983), this court declared that it was not error to give the issue of validity to the jury over a litigant's objection and that the judge maintained control over the issue of law by the court's instructions on the applicable law and by ruling on directed verdict, JNOV (now JMOL) and new trial motions. Id. at 1547-48. It was not entirely clear from Connell (even in a suit for damages) whether our precedent actually required the validity issue to go to the jury or merely held that it was not reversible error per se to ask the jury for a validity/invalidity verdict. However, because of the strong language of Connell, and later precedent endorsing jury rights, the right to a jury on validity issues has simply become ingrained without analysis. 17 In banc efforts to clarify the issue have been unsuccessful, as this case itself illustrates. 18 This court has tacitly approved instructions and special interrogatories (purportedly under Fed.R.Civ.P. 49(a)) directing juries to decide the ultimate legal issue of validity and subsidiary issues of law (most frequently obviousness). Perkin-Elmer Corp., 732 F.2d at 894-95; DMI, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 802 F.2d 421, 424 (Fed.Cir.1986). Only if the verdict does not withstand the stringent standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 50 may the verdict be overturned. 19 Thus, this court invokes the standard of review applicable to an ultimate issue of fact or an ultimate issue of fact mixed with law and applies it to an ultimate issue of law. Further, a JMOL motion is required to review the judgment, absent plain error. Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 854 (Fed.Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2957, 119 L.Ed.2d 579 (1992). However, if a verdict loser does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, i.e., the presumed facts, but simply the ultimate conclusion of law, is a JMOL required for review of the judgment? Is it not enough to object to giving the legal issue to the jury, contrary to the holding in Connell ? 114 The panel order holding that petitioner is entitled to a jury trial on the factual issues underlying the issue of validity must be read in light of our precedent. Petitioner asked that the jury be given the issue of validity to decide. Our precedent supports this request. Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506 (Fed.Cir.1984); Richardson, 868 F.2d at 1235. Once the verdict is rendered on the ultimate legal issue, the court will presume the jury resolved all facts in favor of the verdict winner. Perkin-Elmer, 732 F.2d at 893; Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1557 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 902, 112 S.Ct. 281, 116 L.Ed.2d 232 (1991); DMI, 802 F.2d at 425; But see, Newell, 864 F.2d 757 (not function of jury to pick and choose among established facts relating to obviousness). The instructions need not delineate factual disputes in the case. General instructions, for example, outlining the broad legal standard of Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 17, 86 S.Ct. 684, 693, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966), for determining obviousness, bear our imprimatur. DMI, 802 F.2d at 425; Shearing v. Iolab Corp., 975 F.2d 1541, 1544 n. 2 (Fed.Cir.1992); Sjolund v. Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1575-76 (Fed.Cir.1988). The trial court's ruling on a JMOL motion may be no more than Denied. Sjolund, 847 F.2d at 1576. We do not require a reasoned analysis from the trial judge. Some panel opinions speak of de novo review of the legal conclusion after accepting the presumed findings of fact. Jurgens, 927 F.2d at 1557. Others reject the de novo standard. Bio-Rad Lab. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d 604, 607 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1038, 105 S.Ct. 516, 83 L.Ed.2d 405 (1984). Still others conflate the standard to whether a reasonable jury could reach the verdict it rendered. Sun Studs, 872 F.2d at 982; Shearing, 975 F.2d at 1545; Richardson, 868 F.2d at 1235. 115 The validity/invalidity of a patent is a matter which affects the public, not merely the litigants. Yet, under the confusing jury jurisprudence of this court, the matter can be treated as if only the rights of the litigants were involved. That a reasonable jury could have reached the contrary verdict on the record before us and that verdict would have been accepted under the reasonableness standard is of no consequence. I do not agree with this treatment of an issue of law. In my view, an issue of law has only one possible answer on a given record. At a minimum, the decision on the issue must be reviewed to determine if it is right or wrong, not reasonable. See Newell Co., 864 F.2d at 762; Structural Rubber, 749 F.2d at 718-19. 20 116 I can point to no definitive Supreme Court pronouncement respecting a Seventh Amendment right or no right to have a jury decide factual issues underlying an issue of law. However, clearly the touchstone of jury rights is not that a fact dispute underlies the issue to be decided. [T]he Seventh Amendment was never intended to establish the jury as the exclusive mechanism for factfinding in civil cases. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 451 n. 8, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 1267 n. 8, 51 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977). I glean from City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) (plurality opinion), and Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 108 S.Ct. 1537, 99 L.Ed.2d 839 (1988), that the entirety of an ultimate issue of law is taken from the jury. Others read those cases differently. 117 Similarly, Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984), speaks of close scrutiny of the evidence by the courts to protect constitutional rights and can be read as so limited. I do not argue that patent rights equate with First Amendment rights. But the determination of patent validity also does not equate with a decision which benefits from the communal wisdom of the jury. It is my understanding that the denomination of an issue as one of law represents a policy decision that a judge is more appropriate than a jury to make the decision. As a matter of policy for reasoned and uniform decisions, this is true of patent validity. The identification and resolution of underlying facts in the case is as important as the judgmental decision. If one presumes, for example, that a jury verdict on the issue means all the Graham factors were answered in favor of the verdict winner, the judgmental call is likely to be skewed. 118 As jury cases are now tried, in accordance with our precedent, the evidence respecting validity of a patent is thrown into the black box of the jury room, and the verdict is returned either valid or invalid. If both parties agree to that procedure, so be it. But where a party objects, I believe that a litigant has a right to a trial court's decision with findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issue of validity. The judge has an essential role to play in a constitutional jury trial. As stated in Herron v. Southern Pacific Co.: 119 In a trial by jury in a federal court, the judge is not a mere moderator, but is the governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct and of determining questions of law. This discharge of the judicial function as at common law is an essential factor in the process for which the Federal Constitution provides. 120 283 U.S. 91, 95, 51 S.Ct. 383, 384, 75 L.Ed. 857 (1931). See also Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13, 14, 19 S.Ct. 580, 585, 43 L.Ed. 873 (1899). Moreover, only a reasoned decision lays the foundation for meaningful review. 121 Because our precedent has been read to require jury resolution, litigants no longer challenge the propriety of giving the issue of validity to the jury to decide if there is conflicting evidence on underlying facts. By not raising the issue, they must be deemed to have consented even if there is no jury right. This case, which is in the posture of a declaratory judgment for invalidity, presents a sufficiently different setting from prior cases that a litigant could raise the issue without fear of chastisement. We are provided with an opportunity to at least speak definitively on jury rights and procedures. We have thrown away that opportunity once again. I respectfully dissent.