Opinion ID: 1594360
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Motions For Disqualification And Change Of Judge.

Text: Lohnes informally requested Judge Davis to disqualify himself under SDCL 15-12-21.1. This request was denied. Lohnes then filed an affidavit of prejudice with the presiding judge of the circuit which was also denied. Lohnes also made a motion for Judge Davis to disqualify himself pursuant to SDCL 15-12-37. Lohnes claims that the filing of an affidavit of prejudice requires that the judge assigned to the case be replaced by another judge. The State responds that Lohnes waived his right to request and demand a change of judge under SDCL 15-12-24, by submitting to the jurisdiction of Judge Davis in the two prior proceedings. In State v. Alexander, 313 N.W.2d 33 (S.D.1981), the defendant was charged by indictment with four counts relating to controlled substances. The first trial ended in a mistrial and the State amended its indictment which realleged count I of the original indictment, but amended counts II through IV to allege different charges. On defendant's request for a change of judge, the court reasoned that the amended charges created new proceedings for purposes of SDCL 15-12-24, and stated: Considering that new charges were alleged by the amendments of counts II, III and IV, appellant was facing completely new charges with different defenses available. He was entitled to disqualify Judge McMurchie, as he had not waived this right under SDCL 15-12-24 under those specific charges. (emphasis added). Id. at 36. Despite the quoted language, the court concluded that defendant would have waived his right to change of judge if he had been retried under the original indictment and held that since count I of both indictments were identical any error was harmless. Unlike Alexander, Lohnes was charged with the identical offense in both amended informations. Further, Lohnes was charged under the original complaint, so it was a continuation of the same prosecution. He pled guilty to the first amended information in Judge Davis' court. In Lohnes II, we remanded to permit Lohnes to withdraw his plea of guilty to manslaughter. On remand, the State charged Lohnes with the identical crime of manslaughter. Where a remanded matter is a continuation of the original proceeding, rather than a new one, the judge may not be changed by way of affidavit. Matter of Est. Certain Terr. Elec. Boundaries, 318 N.W.2d 118 (S.D.1982). Lohnes waived his right to disqualify Judge Davis under SDCL 15-12-24 by previously pleading guilty to manslaughter in his court. Lohnes also contends that Judge Davis erred in not disqualifying himself for personal bias, pursuant to SDCL 15-12-37. Lohnes relies upon statements made by Judge Davis at the hearing to withdraw Lohnes' guilty plea, and the fact that the judge sat on the two prior proceedings. The statements of Judge Davis, read in their context, do not reveal bias. Judge Davis specifically asserted that he believed he would be able to maintain his professional impartiality and intended to provide a fair trial for Lohnes. A review of the entire record supports the position that Judge Davis provided a fair trial. The fact that Judge Davis presided over the two prior proceedings does not constitute sufficient bias for removal despite his position throughout that Lohnes should receive a substantial sentence if convicted. The proper rule is that, only personal bias or prejudice, as distinguished from judicial predilection, constitutes a disqualifying factor. State v. Smith, 242 N.W.2d 320, 324 (Iowa 1976). A disqualifying bias, under the statute, must result from an extra-judicial source. Smith, supra; Antonello v. Wunsch, 500 F.2d 1260 (10th Cir.1974); 46 Am.Jur.2d, Judges § 167 (1969). We find no bias, as a matter of law, and the decision to preside over the case remained in the sound discretion of the trial judge. State v. Bird Head, 225 Neb. 822, 408 N.W.2d 309 (1987); Forsmark v. State, 349 N.W.2d 763 (Iowa 1984).