Opinion ID: 871078
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Taylor's arguments

Text: In his opening brief to the ICA, Taylor contended that the circuit court erred in denying his claim that, as a matter of law, the artifacts were not `property of another' for purposes of HRS §§ 708-800, 708-830(1), and 708-830.5(1)(a). Taylor argued that the indictment was based on the State's theory that the artifacts were property of the museums that once cared for them[,] but neither [the Bishop nor the Peabody Essex Museums] possessed the artifacts or retained any sort of property interest in them after they were repatriated under NAGPRA. (Emphasis in original). Taylor contended that NAGPRA confirms that ownership in such artifacts resides solely in the appropriate Native Hawaiian organization[.] Consequently, Taylor argued that [t]o properly indict someone for stealing repatriated artifacts from a site such as Kanupa Cave, the State's presentation to the grand jury must identify the Native Hawaiian organization to whom the artifacts were repatriated, since that entity is the only `person,' for purposes of HRS § 708-800's definition of `property of another,' who possess[es] and retains all other property interests in such artifacts. Taylor also argued that NAGPRA preempted HRS §§ 6E-1 and 6E-7. Taylor further argued that the circuit court erroneously denied his HRS § 701-112 claim because the state offense of theft in the first degree and the federal offense of conspiracy to traffic in native Hawaiian artifacts required proof of the same facts. Taylor also argued that the legislatures that enacted the laws defining each of the two offenses did not intend to prevent substantially different harms or evils. [16]