Opinion ID: 626232
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Within the Scope

Text: First, Mr. Viera's § 2255 motion falls within the scope of the plea agreement's waiver provision. The waiver not only states that Mr. Viera waives his rights to collaterally attack but expressly names § 2255 motions as waived. See ROA, Vol. 1, at 29. Even if the waiver had only mentioned collateral attack, we would find Mr. Viera's § 2255 motion to be within the scope of the waiver. See United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 974 (10th Cir.2009) (holding that waiver of a right to appeal or collaterally challenge encompassed a § 2255 motion). The question remains whether his specific claimthe appeal issueproperly falls in the waiver's scope. [2] [A] plea agreement waiver of postconviction rights does not waive the right to bring a § 2255 petition based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims challenging the validity of the plea or the waiver. United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir.2001). However,  [c]ollateral attacks based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims that are characterized as falling outside that category are waivable.  Id. (emphasis added). As we acknowledged in Cockerham, [t]he characterization of a challenge to the validity of a plea is certainly subject to different interpretations and may be quite broad. Id. at 1188. For this reason, we held that it was necessary to address these claims on a case-by-case basis to determine whether they attack the validity of the plea or the waiver. Id. Following that approach, we determined that a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to recognize the insufficiency of evidence for a charge could reasonably be construed... as an argument that his plea was unintelligent because his counsel failed to properly inform him about the potential insufficiency before pleading. Id. at 1190. Accordingly, we concluded that the waiver could not bar that claim and remanded for consideration of its merits. Id. at 1190-91. Turning to the instant case, we are satisfied that the appeal issue here does not relate to the validity of the plea or waiver. In contrast to the claim in Cockerham, Mr. Viera's appeal issue cannot reasonably be construed as an argument that counsel's alleged deficiencies made his plea unintelligent or involuntary. Mr. Viera has not alleged that counsel failed to inform him of his waiver of appellate review, and he certainly has not claimed that any such omission rendered his plea unintelligent. [3] The district court granted COA on the appeal issue because it was uncertain about how to apply United States v. Garrett, 402 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir.2005), which involved a collateral attack alleging that petitioner's counsel had failed to file an appeal in which petitioner had waived his right to bring a collateral challenge. In Garrett the petitioner was allowed an evidentiary hearing regarding whether he requested counsel to file a notice of appeal despite the waiver. See id. at 1267. But Garrett does not apply here. In Garrett, unlike this case, the government did not argue that the plea agreement waiver barred Mr. Garrett's § 2255 motion. 402 F.3d at 1266 n. 5 (The government has not argued that this waiver bars a § 2255 motion based on counsel's failure to file a requested appeal.). [4] Here, the government raises the waiver issue. We are satisfied that the plea agreement waived Mr. Viera's ineffective assistance claim because counsel's alleged failure to file an appeal does not undermine the validity of the plea or the waiver. See Cockerham, 237 F.3d at 1187.