Opinion ID: 76054
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Assessment of filing fees against indigent inmates

Text: 7 Before enactment of the PLRA in 1996, the decision whether or not to assess a filing fee against a prisoner proceeding IFP under § 1915 was left to the discretion of the district court. See Collier v. Tatum, 722 F.2d 653, 655 (11th Cir.1983). The PLRA, however, clearly and unambiguously requires that `if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.' Hubbard v. Haley, 262 F.3d 1194, 1197 (11th Cir.2001) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1136, 122 S.Ct. 1083, 151 L.Ed.2d 983 (2002). Nevertheless, the PLRA provides that [i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). Accordingly, the impecunious defendant, although liable for the entire fee, may pay his or her entire fee in installments. Id. § 1915(3)(b)(1); see McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 606 (6th Cir.1997) (observing that the only issue [in IFP fee determination] is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceeding or over a period of time under an installment plan); see also Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir.1997). Thus, in the case before us the district court properly assessed Wilson an initial filing fee.