Opinion ID: 2584053
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the jury instruction defining proof beyond a reasonable doubt adequately states the law

Text: The jury instruction used by the district court to define proof beyond a reasonable doubt states: Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge against the defendant. An abiding conviction is one that would make an ordinary person willing to act in the most important affairs of his or her own life. There are very few things in this world that we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require proof which overcomes every possible doubt. If, based upon your consideration of the evidence, you have an abiding conviction that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must find the defendant guilty. If on the other hand, you think there is a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, you must give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and find the defendant not guilty. When reviewing jury instructions, this Court must determine whether the instructions, as a whole, fairly and adequately present the issues and state the law. Silver Creek Computers, Inc. v. Petra, Inc., 136 Idaho 879, 882, 42 P.3d 672, 675 (2002). When reviewing a reasonable doubt instruction, [t]he Constitution does not dictate that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the State's burden of proof, so long as `taken as a whole, the instructions correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable doubt.' State v. Gleason, 130 Idaho 586, 589, 944 P.2d 721, 724 (Ct.App.1997) (quoting Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140, 75 S.Ct. 127, 137-38, 99 L.Ed. 150, 166 (1954)). An erroneous instruction does not constitute reversible error unless the instructions, when taken as a whole, misled the jury or prejudiced a party. Silver Creek Computers, 136 Idaho at 882, 42 P.3d at 675; State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 716, 52 P.3d 857, 861 (2002). If a reasonable doubt instruction is found to have lessened the state's burden of proof, the error is never harmless error. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 281, 113 S.Ct. at 2082-83, 124 L.Ed.2d at 190. Idaho cases have described reasonable doubt as not being a fanciful or imaginary doubt. See State v. Taylor, 76 Idaho 358, 361-62, 283 P.2d 582, 584-85 (1955) (approving an instruction stating that a reasonable doubt is not a flimsy, fanciful, fictitious doubt which you could raise about anything and everything); State v. Levy, 9 Idaho 483, 496, 75 P. 227, 231 (1904) (a reasonable doubt is not a mere imaginary, captious or possible doubt); People v. Dewey, 2 Idaho 79, 82, 6 P. 103, 106 (1885) (approving an instruction stating that a reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt, nor is it a captious or imaginary doubt). Also, the Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions define reasonable doubt as not mere possible doubt, because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. I.C.J.I. 103. [1] However, reasonable doubt instructions need not exactly quote Instruction 103 to survive a challenge on appeal. State v. Harris, 136 Idaho 484, 485, 36 P.3d 836, 837 (Ct.App.2001). Idaho cases have also permitted jury instructions that provide the State need not overcome every possible doubt, with no reference to terms such as imaginary or fanciful. See State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 962 P.2d 1026 (1998); State v. Hoffman, 123 Idaho 638, 643, 851 P.2d 934, 939 (1993). [2] In Merwin the Court addressed the issue of whether a proof beyond a reasonable doubt jury instruction that said the prosecution is not required to overcome every possible doubt misstated the law. The Court stated: We first address Merwin's contention that the district court misstated the law when it instructed the jury that the prosecution was not required to overcome every possible doubt. We find Merwin's arguments to be unpersuasive. Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 103, itself, states that reasonable doubt is not mere possible doubt. Although worded differently, the instruction given by the district court stated the same legal proposition. That is, the prosecution need overcome only those doubts that are reasonable, not just possible. We therefore find no error. 131 Idaho at 647, 962 P.2d at 1031. The jury instruction in Merwin was taken from the Federal Judicial Center's Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions. [3] Only portions of the instruction in this case are the same as the federal instruction that was allowed by this Court in Merwin. However, the instructions are similar in relevant part: neither contains any reference to fanciful or imaginary doubt. Sheahan points to the federal instruction language of real possibility, which is not in the instruction of the instant case. The Court in Merwin, however, did not rely on that language but relied on the fact that the doubt was still required to be reasonable, and that the instruction thus properly stated the law. Id. at 647, 962 P.2d at 1031. The issue was not significantly different in Merwin to warrant a distinction on those grounds. The instruction given by the district court adequately states the law for reasonable doubt. The sentence in which the possible doubt language is found states, There are very few things in this world that we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require proof which overcomes every possible doubt. In context, the phrase every possible doubt is clearly linked to the idea of absolute certainty. The message to the jury is that doubts that are possible, although not at all reasonable, and that prevent a knowledge to an absolute certainty, do not preclude a juror finding a defendant guilty. The first and last sentence of the paragraph also refer to reasonable doubts as those doubts that exonerate a defendant, reinforcing the proper interpretation of the word possible. This instruction, when taken as a whole, does not lessen the State's burden of proof. Despite the ruling in this case there appears to be no reason to depart from the standard instruction set forth in Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions 103 and approved for use by this Court. Such departures have created unnecessary controversies with nothing added by way of clarity. The instruction in this case is adequate but is, if anything, less clear than the accepted instruction. Trial courts are encouraged to avoid unnecessary appeals and controversy by utilizing the instruction that has an accepted history defining the burden the State bears.