Opinion ID: 773894
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: BIA's New Requirement of Ongoing Disability

Text: 14 The Board erred, however, in its treatment of Mr. Lal's application under the Matter of Chen exception. In its brief consideration of the application, the BIA makes the following statement regarding the humanitarian exception:there are not compelling reasons for being unwilling to return to Fiji arising out of the severity of the past persecution of the lead respondent. In this regard we observe that the principal respondent does not claim to suffer from lasting physical or emotional disability as a result of past mistreatment. (citations omitted) No other factors are considered by the Board in this regard. It is apparent, therefore, that the Board required that Mr. Lal demonstrate ongoing disability in order to warrant asylum under the Matter of Chen exception. Such a requirement is an untenable interpretation of the exception. 15
16 The Matter of Chen exception has been codified by the INS at 8 C.F.R. §208.13(b)(1)(ii) (1999). We owe agency interpretations of their own regulations substantial deference. Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994). 3 When the meaning of regulatory language is ambiguous, the agency's interpretation of the regulation controls so long as it is `reasonable,' that is, so long as the interpretation sensibly conforms to the purpose and wording of the regulations. Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 150-51 (1991) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 17 However, we need not defer to the BIA's reading of an INS regulation if an alternative reading is compelled by the regulation's plain language or by other indications of the [agency's] intent at the time of the regulation's promulgation. Thomas Jefferson University, 512 U.S. at 512 (quoting Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988)); see also Singh-Bhathal v. INS, 170 F.3d 943, 945 (9th Cir. 1999); Crown Pacific v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 197 F.3d 1036, 1038 (9th Cir. 1999). 18
19 It is difficult to reconcile a requirement of ongoing disability with the plain language of the regulation. Cf. Vincent v. Apfel, 191 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 1999) (There is no justification for adding limiting language to a clear and unambiguous statute and regulation.). One who has been persecuted and seeks asylum falls within the regulatory exception if they possess compelling reasons for being unwilling to return to his or her country . . . arising out of the severity of the past persecution. 8 C.F.R. §208.13(b)(1)(ii). Although we ordinarily owe the BIA some deference to decide what type of past persecution is severe enough, we need not defer if the line they draw is arbitrary or otherwise unreasonable. Santamaria-Ames v. INS, 104 F.3d 1127, 1132 n.7 (9th Cir. 1996) ([D]eference is not afforded if the administrative construction is clearly contrary to the plain and sensible meaning of the regulation.); Crown Pacific, 197 F.3d at 1040 ([I]n examining a regulation, we take into account common sense, the regulatory purpose and the practical consequences of the suggested interpretations.). The ongoing disability requirement is unreasonable because it treats two applicants who are tortured alike differently if one has the good fortune to fully recover from his injuries and the other does not.Sound regulation should not be founded on shot of accident[or] dart of chance. Crown Pacific, 197 F.3d at 1040 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). Lal was burned, tortured and cut with knives; his wife and child were harassed and assaulted and his wife was sexually assaulted while he was forced to watch. According to the BIA, this treatment was not severe enough to qualify him for the exception because he does not, for example, have a permanent limp or suffer a loss of hearing. The plain language of the regulation does not allow for this interpretation. 4 20
21 Even aside from the plain language of the regulation, we still need not defer to the BIA's interpretation because it contravenes the clear intent of the agency in creating the rule. In cases involving regulations originally written to codify a rule created by case law, as long as the agency meant to endorse the rule of the particular case without modification, we can refer to that case for insight into the intent and regulatory history behind the rule. Here, Matter of Chen is the unquestioned progenitor of the regulation, and it serves as a useful, if not dispositive, guide to determining agency intent. See 63 Fed. Reg. 31945, 31947 (June 11, 1998) (calling Matter of Chen the case which the existing regulatory provisions were intended to codify); Kumar v. INS, 204 F.3d 931, 935 (9th Cir. 2000) (construing the exception by closely examining the facts of Matter of Chen); Vongsakdy v. INS, 171 F.3d 1203, 1207 (9th Cir. 1999) (same). Statements of policy in Matter of Chen are strong indicators of the intent behind the rule. 5 This case suggests that the exception codified in 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(ii) cannot be read as narrowly as the BIA does here. 22 Matter of Chen identifies the exception as a general humanitarian principle which applies to a person who has himself or whose family has suffered under atrocious forms of persecution. 20 I. & N. Dec. at 19. In Matter of Chen, the BIA recited the horrible persecution that the applicant had suffered in China during the Cultural Revolution as a result of his religious beliefs. The BIA never refers to the fact that Chen suffered permanent injuries as dispositive, and notes that he qualifies for the exception because his family suffered more than the usual amount of ill-treatment during that turbulent period. Id. at 21. See also Matter of N-M-A-, Interim Decision 3368, 1998 WL 744095 (BIA 1998); Matter of H-, Interim Decision 3276, 1996 WL 291910 (BIA 1996); Matter of B-, Interim Decision 3251, 1995 WL 326740 (BIA 1995). 23 It is clear from reading Matter of Chen that the BIA intended to except from the requirement of proving fear of future persecution those applicants who suffered severely under past persecution. These people are excepted because, as the case explains, [e]ven though there may have been a change of regime in his country, this may not always produce a complete change . . . in view of his past experiences, in the mind of the refugee. 20 I. & N. Dec. at 19. With this focus, there is no reason to limit the exception to those who suffer permanent disability. The focus is on the suffering that other people caused the applicant in the past, not on whether the medical maladies that arose from that treatment extend over the years. 24
25 The BIA has, through its adjudications, created a set of established policies concerning the meaning of the Matter of Chen exception. In Matter of B-, Interim Decision 3251, 1995 WL 326740 (BIA 1995), the Board granted asylum to an individual from Afghanistan who had been interrogated, physically abused, detained for thirteen months, and forced to serve in the army on the basis of his assistance to the mujahidin. Id. at 9. The Board noted that despite the changes in Afghanistan since the abuse had occurred, the applicant should be granted asylum because the past persecution suffered by the applicant was so severe insofar as it involved physical torture and psychological abuse, inadequate diet and medical care, and the integration of political prisoners with criminal and mentally ill prisoners. Id. at 10. Nowhere does the Board find, much less rely on, the existence of an ongoing physical or emotional disability. 26 In Matter of H-, the BIA remanded to the IJ for exercise of discretion when it found that an individual who was detained, beaten, and separated from his family in Somalia on the basis of his clan membership, was eligible for asylum. Matter of H-, Interim Decision 3276, 1996 WL 291910 (BIA 1996). In its page-length discussion of the Matter of Chen exception, the Board again did not mention - as a requirement or as a factor - the existence of an ongoing physical or emotional disability. Id. at 16-17. Instead, it noted that the IJ should consider compelling, humanitarian considerations when determining whether an applicant qualified under the exception. Id. at 17. Citing Chen, the Board concluded that the rule applies to those applicants who have suffered such severe persecution that [they] should not be expected to repatriate. Id. 27 Finally, in Matter of N-M-A-, the BIA determined that an individual who was detained for one month, beaten, and deprived of food for three days by Afghan authorities because he was suspected of being an anti-communist, had not demonstrated that his past persecution was severe enough to establish eligibility for the humanitarian exception. Matter of N-M-A-, Interim Decision 3368, 1998 WL 744095 (BIA 1998). The Board examined Ninth Circuit case law and its own practice, and concluded that to demonstrate that [an applicant] is eligible for asylum on the basis of his past persecution alone, the applicant must also show that he belongs to the smaller group of persecution victims whose persecution (including the aftermath) is so severe that the `compelling reasons' standard [of 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(ii)] has been met.  Id. at 16-17. While the Board does indicate that it considers theaftermath of persecution as part of its evaluation of the severity of the abuse, it also cites to both Matter of Chen and Matter of B-in support of its construction of the governing regulations. Id. at 17. As discussed above, Matter of B-did not refer to an ongoing physical or mental disability. 28 In sum, then, BIA case law demonstrates that while the existence of lasting physical or emotional disability may sometimes be a factor in determining the severity of an applicant's past persecution, it has not been a requirement. This means, by necessity, that the Matter of Chen exception, as interpreted by the Board and now codified in the regulations, does not require the demonstration of an ongoing physical or emotional disability. 29 By changing its settled practice with respect to this rule, the BIA acted impermissibly and committed an arbitrary and capricious act. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).Though the agency's discretion is unfettered at the outset, if it announces and follows - by rule or by settled course of adjudication - a general policy by which its exercise of discretion will be governed, an irrational departure from that policy (as opposed to an avowed alteration of it) could constitute action that must be overturned . . . . INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32 (1997). The Supreme Court has further held: 30 An additional reason for rejecting the INS's request for heightened deference to its position is the inconsistency of the positions the BIA has taken through the years. An agency interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the agency's earlier interpretation is `entitled to considerably less deference' than a consistently held agency view. 31 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447 n.30 (1987) (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981)). Cf. Syncor Int'l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94-95 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting, in dictum, that an agency's past interpretations of a regulation are more binding on the agency than its past statutory interpretations because [o]therwise, the agency could evade its notice and comment obligation by`modifying' a substantive rule that was promulgated by notice and comment rulemaking). 32 The BIA has consistently interpreted the Matter of Chen exception without requiring ongoing disability. To suddenly change course and add this requirement now is an arbitrary act that is impermissible and, even giving the BIA the deference it is due, should be overturned. Cf. Dept. of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 339-40 (1999) (refusing to give Chevron deference to the Census Bureau's interpretation of a statute regarding statistical sampling because the Bureau had taken the opposite position on the issue for years). 33 We accordingly find that the Board's arbitrary use of the physical or emotional disability factor as a requirement in Mr. Lal's case was contrary to its own regulations and case law. Its rejection of Mr. Lal's application was therefore an irrational departure from its policy, which must be overturned. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 447 n.30. 34
35 Our holding is supported by our own case law concerning the humanitarian exception. While we owe deference to the Board's interpretation of the immigration laws, we do not explicitly apply the principles of deference to questions already controlled by circuit precedent, because a panel may not reconsider the correctness of an earlier panel's decisions. Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 896 (9th Cir. 2000). 36 We have never required that a petitioner demonstrate ongoing disability to qualify for the Matter of Chen exception. In Vongsakdy v. INS, 171 F.3d 1203, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 1999), we found the petitioner eligible for asylum regardless of current country conditions because he had sufferedreeducation, physical and verbal abuse, and deprivation of food in a Laotian camp. Although his persecution was so severe that he did suffer a permanent impairment, id. at 1207, this fact was included in a discussion of the severity of the applicant's abuse, and it was not cited as a requirement. Instead, we held in Vongsakdy that the proper approach to the humanitarian exception was to determine whether the petitioner's persecution was roughly comparable to Chen's in Matter of Chen, without applying a mechanical minimum showing of`atrocity.'  Vongsakdy, 171 F.3d at 1207 (quoting and citing Kazlauskas v. INS, 46 F.3d 902, 907 (9th Cir. 1995)). 37 Similarly, in Lopez-Galarza v. INS, 99 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1996), we held that the petitioner was eligible for asylum based on the severity of her past persecution, which included rape and physical abuse at the hands of the Sandinista military. We did not find or comment on any ongoing physical or emotional disability to the petitioner. 6 38 Our past case law demonstrates that it is permissible to consider ongoing disability as a factor in applying the humanitarian exception. It is not, however, a requirement that such an impairment exist. The BIA's requirement of ongoing disability is unwarranted under the Matter of Chen humanitarian rule. For this reason, we reverse. 39
40 The plain language of the regulation as well as the intent behind the rule cannot be read to include a requirement of ongoing disability. 7 Further, the BIA changed course from its settled policies and ignored Ninth Circuit precedent. Thus, we need not defer to the BIA's attempt to require an ongoing disability in this case. Thomas Jefferson University, 512 U.S. at 512. Accordingly, we hold that the regulatory exception cannot be read as limited to applicants who suffer ongoing disabilities. Because the BIA's interpretation is inconsistent with this holding, it is reversed. 41
42 We are mindful of the Supreme Court's analysis and holding in INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999). We apply the reasoning of that case, but find it to be distinguishable. See 526 U.S. at 415. 8 The Supreme Court reviewed our court's reversal of the BIA's conclusion that an asylum applicant was ineligible for withholding of deportation because he had committed a serious nonpolitical crime. 121 F.3d 521 (9th Cir. 1997). In particular, we held that the BIA failed to consider the rules embodied in two United Nations documents to which the United States was a party, and which gave rise to the immigration statute in question, as well as a United Nations handbook. 121 F.2d at 524. The Supreme Court held that we failed to accord the required level of deference that the BIA was due in interpreting the statute which it administers. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424. However, the Supreme Court did not blindly defer to the BIA's interpretation. It carefully examined the statute and decided that theBIA's approach [was] consistent with its plain language. Id. at 430; see also id. at 426. We undertake the same analysis in this case and reverse because the BIA's approach is not consistent with the regulation's plain language. 43 In Aguirre-Aguirre we erred and were reversed because we substituted our own interpretation for the BIA's consistent, reasonable interpretation of a statute that was for the BIA to interpret. In this case, we do not replace the BIA's interpretation with our own interpretation. Instead, we follow the approach taken by the Supreme Court and examine whether the BIA's interpretation is contrary to the plain language and intent of the regulation. 9 As we have shown, the BIA's new requirement of ongoing disability is unreasonable and inconsistent with the text of the regulation, the intent of the agency as embodied in Chen, and the past practices of the BIA and this Court. We were admonished in Aguirre-Aguirre to give deference to the BIA in interpreting immigration laws, but the Court in Aguirre-Aguirre acknowledged that while giving deference, we may still identify and reverse decisions of the BIA that are at odds with the text and spirit of our nation's immigration rules. We are faced with such an inconsistent and unreasonable decision now. 44 The Matter of Chen exception is an expression of humanitarian considerations that sometimes past persecution is so horrific that the march of time and the ebb and flow of political tides cannot efface the fear in the mind of the persecuted. Long-lasting, genuine fear can be visited upon somebody even if they do not have a crippled arm or leg to remind them of what they have suffered, and any other interpretation of the language of the regulation and the intent behind the rule is so clearly inconsistent and unreasonable as to be undeserving of our deference.