Opinion ID: 1395626
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Federal and State Equal Protection Tests as They Relate to the Right of Interstate Migration

Text: Initially, our analysis of state equal protection law tracked that of federal law by the United States Supreme Court closely in all areas, including that of classifications penalizing the exercise of the right of interstate migration. [4] As we used the traditional two-tier analysis [5] under our equal protection clause, there was no need to differentiate between the federal and state modes of analysis. Following some broad language in the United States Supreme Court case of Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 Ed.2d 274 (1972), [6] we interpreted this line of cases as holding that any durational residency requirement [7] imposed a penalty on the right of interstate migration, and thus automatically invoked the strict scrutiny analysis: [8] All durational residency requirements inherently infringe upon the fundamental constitutional right of interstate travel. Hence, all such requirements are prima facie invalid and will be countenanced only when they serve a compelling state interest. State v. Adams, 522 P.2d 1125, 1131 (Alaska 1974) (footnotes omitted). However, the United States Supreme Court made it clear that this interpretation was incorrect as a matter of federal equal protection law. In Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974), the Supreme Court, although invalidating that durational residency requirement, made it clear that some durational residency requirements would not penalize the right of interstate migration, and thus would not invoke strict scrutiny. [9] This was made even clearer in the case of Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975), which upheld a one-year durational residency requirement for filing a divorce petition. Thus, under federal law, a durational residency requirement does not automatically invoke strict scrutiny. That our interpretation in this area was stricter than the federal interpretation is also shown by the rulings in our cases, which struck down durational residency requirements which the United States Supreme Court probably would have upheld. For example, in State v. Adams, 522 P.2d 1125 (Alaska 1974), we struck down a one-year durational residency requirement for eligibility to file for a divorce, very similar to the one upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975). [10] Our cases, still functioning under the two-tier approach, continued to regard durational residency requirements as automatically triggering strict scrutiny, and rejected the distinctions by which federal equal protection cases in this area separated strict scrutiny cases from rational basis cases. [11] Implicitly, our course was based on a recognition that removing these cases from the strict scrutiny approach would require that they be judged by a rational basis standard, which would give insufficient weight to the important right involved. [12] But the need for an intermediate approach between these two extremes [13] was apparent in an increased willingness to find a compelling state interest, a very difficult standard to fulfill under federal law. [14] In State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978), we adopted a new equal protection analysis, using one uniform balancing approach rather than the two-tier approach which had been increasingly subjected to criticism on several grounds. [15] Since Erickson, and prior to our decision in Zobel I, we had decided two cases which involved the right of interstate migration, and in both the question of Erickson 's application to this area was postponed. See Thomas v. Bailey, 595 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1979); Castner v. City of Homer, 598 P.2d 953 (Alaska 1979). In Zobel I, we announced our decision to apply Erickson to the right-to-migrate context. [16] In our view the uniform balancing approach adopted in Erickson is much more appropriate in this context than the two-tier analysis used in our prior cases. Further, we will no longer regard all durational residency requirements as automatically triggering strict scrutiny and requiring a showing that such a classification is absolutely necessary to promote a compelling state interest. Instead, we will balance the nature and extent of the infringement on this right caused by the classification against the state's purpose in enacting the statute and the fairness and substantiality of the relationship between that purpose and the classification. [17] In those situations in which federal law would apply strict scrutiny, this court must also. This divergence of the two sets of analyses will necessitate separate consideration of the permanent fund earnings distribution statute under federal and state equal protection law.