Opinion ID: 42252
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidentiary Issues as to Conviction

Text: On appeal, Looney argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to present “all witnesses” that were central to his defense, which was good faith 12 reliance. Looney contends that the district court should have allowed Chappell to testify, pointing out that Chappell would have: (1) testified about the manner in which he advised Looney; (2) explained why he advised Looney to seek a status determination from the IRS; (3) spoken about Looney’s good faith, but misguided, belief that the UBTO was legal; and (4) testified that the IRS’s internal documents showed that Looney owed no taxes for 1997. Looney further argues that the district court should have allowed Simmons to testify about the advice that he gave Looney regarding the UBTO.3 A violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203 must be willful. See 26 U.S.C. § 7203. The statutory willfulness requirement in § 7203 can be negated by a subjective, “good-faith misunderstanding of the law or a good-faith belief that one is not violating the law.” Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199-202, 111 S. Ct. 604, 609-11 (1991) (analyzing the term willfully as used in 26 U.S.C. § 7203). “Such a question of whether a defendant believed in good faith that he was not violating the tax law is for the jury.” United States v. Lankford, 955 F.2d 1545, 1550 (11th Cir. 1992). “[W]here the element of willfulness is critical to the defense, the defendant 3 We review the district court’s rulings on admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Jiminez, 224 F.3d 1243, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000). “A district court’s evidentiary rulings will only be reversed if the resulting error affected the defendant’s substantial rights.” United States v. Delgado, 321 F.3d 1338, 1347 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 13 is entitled to wide latitude in the introduction of evidence tending to show lack of intent.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, where the substance of the defendant’s good faith defense was presented to the jury, notwithstanding the missing evidence, any error in not admitting the evidence did not warrant a reversal. See United States v. Wellendorf, 574 F.2d 1289, 1290 (5th Cir. 1978).4 Evidence concerning the reasonableness of Looney’s belief that he was not violating the tax laws when he failed to file a return in 1997 would have been relevant to whether his violation was willful under 26 U.S.C. § 7203. See Fed. R. Evid. 401; Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199-202, 111 S. Ct. at 609-11. However, the district court did not err in refusing to allow Chappell to testify. Chappell advised Looney in 2003, subsequent to the commission of the instant offense (failure to file a tax return for 1997). Therefore, Chappell’s testimony would have been irrelevant to Looney’s state of mind at the time of the offense. Additionally, Looney and the government stipulated as to the contents of Chappell’s testimony, and those stipulations were published to the jury. We also reject Looney’s contentions about Simmons’s testimony. First, the 4 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this Court adopted as precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals prior to October 1, 1981. 14 district court did not prevent Simmons from testifying. In fact, Simmons testified about the conversations that he witnessed between Looney and Officer Kendall. Further, the district court did not prevent Simmons from testifying that he had advised Looney about the UBTO and that he sold Looney the trust. The district court simply ruled that Simmons could not testify regarding the substance of his theory that the trusts were a lawful way to avoid payment of taxes. The district court’s concern that Simmons’s testimony might confuse the jury regarding the state of the law was not an abuse of discretion. Further, even assuming arguendo that the district court abused its discretion in limiting Simmons’s testimony and not allowing Chappell to testify, Looney’s substantial rights were not affected. Looney testified extensively concerning his beliefs that the payment of taxes was voluntary, that compensation for his labor was not taxable, and that the trusts were a lawful way of avoiding taxes. Looney testified at length about specific individuals he relied upon for advice, including Simmons. Also, the district court allowed Looney to read from taxation literature, which the district court admitted into evidence. We find no reversible error in Looney’s trial from any of the district court’s evidentiary rulings.