Opinion ID: 1115672
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Road Dispute

Text: Having concluded that Survey 2541 was public land until 1940, the next question is whether the public's use of the road across the northeast corner prior to 1940 was for such a period of time and under such conditions as to prove that the [§ 932] grant has been accepted. Hamerly, 359 P.2d at 123. One old timer who testified, Milo Adkinson, first came to Dillingham in 1925. He spoke of a trail to the beach that cut across Survey 2541, and testified that it's right in the  roughly in the  same spot now as it was in 1926. His testimony establishes that the road across Survey 2541 was used first for access to and from the beach, then later (in the late 30's) for hauling freight into town. Another long-time Dillingham resident, David Carlson, testified that ever since he arrived in Dillingham in 1936, the road was used by the public to haul freight to and from the beach. D.C. Co. did not produce any contrary evidence. The superior court did not err by finding that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to the public's acceptance of the § 932 grant over the road prior to 1940. Summary judgment on this issue was properly granted. D.C. Co. contends, however, that the route of the road across Survey 2541 was not definite enough to satisfy § 932. D.C. Co. asserts first that a right of way created by public user pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 932 connotes definite termini. We agree, but this does not change our conclusion. The road ran from Main Street on the north to the estuary on the south. This is not the sort of dead end road or trail, running into wild, unenclosed and uncultivated country that we held insufficient for the purposes of § 932 in Hamerly. 359 P.2d at 125. Rather, the road connects two essential transportation arteries. D.C. Co. next contends that there was no evidence showing the specific location of the road across Survey 2541. This contention is incorrect  Milo Adkinson testified that its location both now and in the 1920's has essentially remained unchanged. D.C. Co. further argues that even if a road has always been located on the northeast corner of Survey 2541, it is improper now to use that road for access to the City dock. We disagree. If there is a public road on Survey 2541, it may be used for any purpose consistent with public travel. E.G., Albee v. Town of Yarro Point, 74 Wash.2d 453, 445 P.2d 340, 344 (1968). D.C. Co.'s final contention is that the superior court erred by awarding the road to the City in fee simple. Section 932 by its terms grants only a right of way. The general rule is that the term right of way is synonymous with easement. Thus, a right of way creates only a right of use. See Wessells v. State Dept. of Highways, 562 P.2d 1042, 1046 n. 5 (Alaska 1977). Cf. Brice v. State, Div. of Forest, Land & Water Management, 669 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Alaska 1983) (rights of way created by § 932 referred to as easements). If this was not the case, and the City did receive fee simple title to the road, then the City could use the land for any purpose, such as a park. We think that this result would be contrary to the intent and scope of § 932, which contemplates rights of ways  for the construction of highways over public lands. Thus, the superior court erred by granting to the City a fee simple interest in the road over Survey 2541. [2]