Opinion ID: 744117
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statement Two--The Phone Call Hang Ups and Qualifications

Text: 17 Statement two poses a more difficult question. Initially, we note that in light of our recent decision in Toney v. WCCO Television, we have no difficulty stating, contrary to defendants' assertions, that defamation by implication is a viable cause of action in Minnesota. 85 F.3d 383, 394 (8th Cir.1996). One form of defamation by implication is the omission of facts. Id. at 395. Another form is the juxtaposition of facts so as to imply a defamatory connection between them. Id. In an implied defamation case, a defendant does not avoid liability by simply establishing the truth of the individual statement. Instead, the defendant must also defend the juxtaposition of the two statements or the omission of certain facts. 18 As the district court found, statement two is susceptible of a defamatory meaning toward Michaelis. It is specifically directed to her professional credentials, is juxtaposed to a description of a lawsuit against her relating to the performance of her professional duties and of problems she had in her past professional employment, and [is] presented in the larger context of criticizing the competency of the persons investigating Lori Jensen's death. Michaelis v. CBS, Inc., Civ. No. 3-95-374, Mem. Op. at 10 (D.Minn. Aug. 8, 1995). Considering statement two in conjunction with the context and tenor of the entire report, a jury could conclude that Michaelis was evading the reporter because she was neither qualified to handle the Jensen autopsy nor professional in her investigation of Jensen's death. These are defamatory implications which could injure Michaelis's professional reputation. 3 19 Having concluded that statement two was capable of a defamatory meaning, we must consider which constitutional standards apply to Michaelis's defamation claims. Our discussion begins with the district court's finding that Michaelis was a public official. Defendants bear the burden on this issue. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 167-68, 99 S.Ct. 2701, 2707-08, 61 L.Ed.2d 450 (1979). The court's determination of Michaelis's public official status is a question of federal law, which we review de novo. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 84, 88, 86 S.Ct. 669, 675, 677, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966). 20 The Supreme Court has not determined how far down the ranks of government employees public officials may be found, New York Times, 376 U.S. at 283 n. 23, 84 S.Ct. at 727 n. 23, but has stated that public official status cannot extend to all public employees. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 119 n. 8, 99 S.Ct. 2675, 2680 n. 8, 61 L.Ed.2d 411 (1979). At the very least, however, public official status applies to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 85, 86 S.Ct. at 675. On the facts of this case, defendants not only failed to show that Michaelis was acting in her capacity as a government employee, but also that she was a hierarchical member of that group, with substantial control over governmental affairs. 21 Although Michaelis was the official Otter Tail County Coroner, she did not act in that capacity in this case, which arose out of events in Becker County. The record is replete with references to Michaelis as a hospital pathologist, not as the coroner of any given county. Indeed, Michaelis held no position of government employment with respect to Becker County, where the Jensen death occurred. She was neither the Becker County Coroner nor a duly appointed deputy coroner or medical examiner. She served merely as a private physician, to whom Dr. Watson occasionally referred autopsies. In this instance, she was employed by and paid by Orandi Medical, P.A. In light of this fact, Michaelis's Otter Tail County position was of little relevance. Even if Michaelis was found to be a public employee for purposes of this case, however, defendants failed to show that she had substantial responsibility for or control over governmental affairs. 22 As the record shows, Michaelis had a rather limited role in the Jensen case, serving under the control of Dr. Watson. Although Minnesota statutes entrust county coroners and duly appointed medical examiners with certain powers and duties, defendants failed to show that Michaelis could exercise any of those powers in her capacity in this case. 4 Indeed, the record more appropriately supports the conclusion that Dr. Watson simply enlisted the services of another pathologist, Michaelis, as was his option under state law. See Minn.Stat. § 390.11 subd. 4. These private medical specialists do not have any of the powers of a county coroner. Without such powers, it is difficult to see how Michaelis could exercise responsibility or control over governmental affairs. 23 Because defendants failed to establish Michaelis's status as a public official, the district court incorrectly granted summary judgment as to statement two. Therefore, we remand this case for further proceedings in which the appropriate constitutional standards are applied. Due to the district court's failure to reach the issue of Michaelis's possible public figure status, see Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967), we express no opinion as to that issue.