Opinion ID: 1872635
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: cr 60.02 setting aside a judgment

Text: CR 55.02 provides that [f]or good cause shown the court may set aside a judgment by default in accordance with Rule 60.02. CR 60.02, in turn, provides in pertinent part that [o]n motion a court may, upon such terms as are just, relieve a party or his legal representative from its final judgment, order, or proceeding upon the following grounds: (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; . . . or (f) any other reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and on grounds (a), (b), and (c) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. As often noted, default judgments are disfavored and the trial court is vested with broad discretion to set them aside. See e.g., Educator & Executive Insurers, Inc. v. Moore, 505 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Ky.1974) (asserting that courts should assess motions to set aside default judgments liberally in order that litigants may not be deprived of their day in court.). Nevertheless, [t]he moving party . . . cannot have the judgment set aside and achieve his day in court if he cannot show good cause and a meritorious defense. . . . Good cause is most commonly defined as a timely showing of the circumstances under which the default judgment was procured. Green Seed Company, Inc. v. Harrison Tobacco Storage Warehouse, Inc., 663 S.W.2d 755, 757 (Ky.App.1984) (citing Jacobs v. Bell, 441 S.W.2d 448 (Ky.1969)). To entitle the movant to relief, the extenuating circumstances must amount to one of the reasons specified in CR 60.02. If the circumstances constitute mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, then the movant may be entitled to relief, but only if she brings her motion within the rule's one-year limitations period. CR 60.02(f), the subsection permitting relief within a reasonable time for any other reason of an extraordinary nature, is to be invoked only with extreme caution, and only under most unusual circumstances. Cawood v. Cawood, 329 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Ky.1959). It is available only for reasons not otherwise set forth in the rule, Commonwealth v. Spaulding, 991 S.W.2d 651, 655 (Ky.1999), and ought not to be invoked so as to undermine the time constraints applicable to the other subsections. Thus, as the United States Supreme Court has explained with reference to the corresponding subsection of Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), a party who failed to take timely action due to `excusable neglect' may not seek relief more than a year after the judgment by resorting to subsection (6). Pioneer Investment Services Company v. Brunswick Associates Limited Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 393, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 1497, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993). That subsection, rather, is limited to extraordinary circumstances beyond the movant's control which effectively prevented the movant from responding in a timely manner to the litigation. Id.