Opinion ID: 77214
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Cotton's Complaint of Harassment Caused an Adverse Employment Action?

Text: 20 Title VII also prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for enforcing her rights under the Act: It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To state a claim for retaliation under Title VII, the plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the adverse action was causally related to the protected expression. Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1454 (11th Cir.1998). The district court found that Cotton had engaged in statutorily protected expression by filing an internal complaint of sexual harassment, and Cracker Barrel does not challenge this finding on appeal. We must determine whether there is evidence that Cotton suffered an adverse employment action related to her protected expression. See id. 21 An adverse employment action is conduct that alters the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, deprives him or her of employment opportunities, or adversely affects his or her status as an employee. Gupta, 212 F.3d at 587. Although Title VII's protection against retaliatory discrimination extends to adverse actions which fall short of ultimate employment decisions, the plaintiff must still demonstrate some threshold level of substantiality. Wideman, 141 F.3d at 1456. We look to the totality of the alleged reprisals to determine whether this burden has been met. Id. To satisfy the causation requirement, Cotton had to prove that the protected activity and the adverse action are not completely unrelated. Id. at 1457 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 22 Cotton failed to satisfy her burden. As with her claim of sexual harassment, Cotton's claim of retaliation is unsupported by evidence of causation. Cotton argues that her work hours were reduced in retaliation for her claim of harassment, but Walker informed Cotton, when she was hired, that her hours would decrease after the Christmas holidays. See Clark County, 532 U.S. at 272, 121 S.Ct. at 1510-11 (Employers need not suspend previously planned transfers upon discovering that a Title VII suit has been filed, and their proceeding along lines previously contemplated, though not yet definitively determined, is no evidence whatever of causality.). Moreover, Popee, not Walker, was responsible for scheduling the employees' hours of work. Cotton's hours increased in the weeks after she complained of discrimination, and her hours decreased after the holidays in keeping with Cotton's previous expectations and in parity with the hours of the other part-time employee. Cotton failed to offer any evidence that the decision to hire a full-time employee was at all related to Cotton's complaint. 23 Besides her expected reduction in hours, Cotton fails to describe any substantial reprisal for her complaint. Although we look to the totality of the alleged reprisals, id. at 1456, we consider only those that are truly adverse. See Gupta, 212 F.3d at 588-89. Whether an action is sufficient to constitute an adverse employment action for purposes of a retaliation claim must be determined on a case-by-case basis using both a subjective and an objective standard. Id. at 587 (citations omitted). [T]he employee's subjective view of the significance and adversity of the employer's action is not controlling; the employment action must be materially adverse as viewed by a reasonable person in the circumstances. Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir.2001). Title VII[ ] is neither a `general civility code' nor a statute making actionable the `ordinary tribulations of the working place.' Gupta, 212 F.3d at 587 (quoting Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1178 (10th Cir.1999)). 24 None of Cotton's other allegations of retaliation can be described as adverse. Two alleged reprisals—that Walker reprimanded Cotton for using the company phone for personal matters and that Popee refused to allow Cotton to sit on a stool while working as a cashier—were examples of Cracker Barrel's enforcement of its internal policies, and Cotton does not present any evidence that Cracker Barrel discriminatorily enforced its policies against her as a result of her complaint. When an employer applies its standard policies in a nondiscriminatory manner, its action is not objectively adverse. See Gupta, 212 F.3d at 588. Cotton's bald assertion that [she] wasn't treated the same by anybody is insufficient to establish an adverse employment action. See id. 25 Cotton's allegation that Popee failed to conduct her 30-day evaluation also fails to rise to the level of an adverse employment action. When the evaluation was due, Cotton neither complained to Popee that she had not yet received the evaluation nor reported the problem to the Cracker Barrel corporate management. Cotton offers no evidence that she subjectively viewed Popee's failure to conduct the evaluation as an adverse action. The district court correctly entered summary judgment against Cotton's complaint of retaliation.