Opinion ID: 1405904
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Secret Deal Between Ellison and Prosecutor.

Text: (4a) Boyde claims the prosecutor's failure to disclose an inducement given for Ellison's testimony constituted the suppression of substantial material evidence relating to the credibility of a key witness which denied him due process of law. ( People v. Ruthford (1975) 14 Cal.3d 399, 406 [121 Cal. Rptr. 261, 534 P.2d 1341, A.L.R.4th 3132]; see also, People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 45-49 [222 Cal. Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423].) Although Ellison was not called as a witness for the prosecution, and although no plea bargain was entered, Boyde asserts that Ellison's decision to waive jury and submit to a court trial and his decision to testify in his own defense were prompted by an express or implied agreement that the prosecutor would not seek the death penalty against Ellison, and would agree that any special circumstances found true as to Ellison should be stricken. (5) In People v. Ruthford we held that the duty on the part of the prosecution to disclose all substantial material evidence favorable to an accused extends to disclosure of evidence which relates to the credibility of a material witness and that the suppression of substantial material evidence bearing on the credibility of a key prosecution witness constitutes a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (14 Cal.3d at pp. 406, 408.) To demonstrate the existence of a secret deal between the prosecutor and Ellison, Boyde quotes from the statements of counsel and the district attorney made at the time of the jury waiver and later at Ellison's sentencing hearing. On October 6, 1981, while hearing another motion pertaining only to Ellison, counsel announced that Ellison had elected to waive jury trial. The prosecutor joined in the waiver as to trial on guilt, special circumstances, and penalty. The prosecutor stated on the record this is not a slow plea by any stretch of the imagination, and there are no concessions being made by either side, and it will be anticipated a fully contested trial down the line on the issue of guilt. The prosecutor also stated, As the Court well knows, and since there will not be picking a jury, there will be no evidence presented in aggravation other than the facts of the crime and the special circumstances. [¶] While I  I'm not going to come out in court and concede something at this point in time  it suggests to me that at some point in time the law is going to require the Court  will not put the Court in a position to come back with a finding of death in this case. [¶] We would not be willing to waive jury to put you in that kind of a predicament in a case like this. [¶] I think it is not part of the negotiations for the jury waiver, or anything else. It is just an understanding that there will be no further evidence in aggravation, and that as I interpret the factors under 209 [ sic ] of the Penal Code, the Court will be required as a matter of law, to come back if, in fact, special circumstances are found, of course, with life without parole, and I wanted the Court to be aware of that. Ellison's counsel then commented that Mr. Ellison will take part in the regular full-blown trial. There's been no concessions made by the District Attorney. In fact, it was after a little agonizing soul searching and conferences that my proposal to waive jury was accepted by him, and then I had to reconsider all the facets. [¶] We will take part in the trial. Evidence will be presented and Mr. Ellison will testify. The court, in taking Ellison's waiver of constitutional rights, informed Ellison that under the court's prior rulings the special circumstances would be applicable even if he had not actively participated in the murder and that he therefore faced a potential sentence to prison for life without possibility of parole. Boyde also points to statements made by Ellison's counsel in closing argument to the court: This was a pretty unique case to me. I've defended a lot of them but never assisted in the prosecution of one and during this trial, I did have the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Boyde and this sort of thing. [¶] Without Mr. Ellison, I think possibly Mr. Ellison's cooperation and assistance, I think possibly it would have been very difficult  maybe not impossible, but it would have been difficult to have a verdict of guilty come in on Mr. Boyde. [¶] But all those things aside, there was no plea bargain struck. Plea bargains are not struck in cases such as this. There was no plea bargain and no assurances made. At the sentencing hearing on June 21, 1982, Ellison's counsel reiterated: Mr. Ellison cooperated after he finally realized his uncle, Richard Boyde, the codefendant, was taking him down with intent. Mr. Ellison has been helpful. I believe that it would have been a great  there would have been a great deal of difficulty, not impossibility, but difficulty in convicting Mr. Boyde without Mr. Ellison's assistance. [¶] Mr. Ellison's testimony, I believe, was the turning point in making Mr. Boyde come forth and begin to show his true colors. Ellison's counsel thereupon urged the court to strike the special circumstances and the prosecutor agreed, stating: In large part, I think Richard Boyde  the conviction of Richard Boyde  resulted probably, even perhaps unintentionally from the posture Mr. Ellison and his attorney took in this case. Had Mr. Ellison not waived jury and obviously streamlined the entire proceeding, the case could have been severed. I don't think the Boyde jury would have then heard Ellison's statements made to the police officers on tape. They would not have been able to compare Ellison's statements with Boyde's statements. They would not have had Boyde's testimony.... And once they got to see what Mr. Boyde was really all about, and they got to hear the respective knowledge about the facts of the case, that each of the two defendants had, it became clear that Mr. Boyde was the killer and more culpable. So Mr. Ellison has, perhaps not intentionally, done a tremendous service to the People of the State of California by his posture in this particular case. The prosecutor also argued that Ellison was less culpable for the murder and concluded, I believe that if this defendant is sentenced to a 25 to life sentence, rather than a Life Without Parole, justice will have been served, or at least not disserved. (4b) The weakness of Boyde's argument lies in the fact that the record contains no direct evidence or admission of the existence of an agreement, but does contain express denials. While the facts recited by appellant would be consistent with the existence of an agreement, both the district attorney and defense counsel stated that no agreement had been made. The court never inquired on the record into the nature and extent of the discussions between Ellison and the district attorney leading to the mutual waiver of jury trial on guilt, special circumstances and penalty. Although Boyde's counsel was absent when the waiver was made, he did not raise the question on any other occasion and never suggested there had been a secret deal. The district attorney's position regarding the appropriate sentence for Ellison remained consistent throughout the prosecution: he charged only Boyde with personal use of a firearm and had apparently determined that Boyde was the leader and actual killer. The fact that Ellison later successfully moved to have his conviction reduced to second degree murder, pursuant to People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 [194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697], and that the district attorney at that time agreed the reduction would be appropriate, is not determinative either. The district attorney's position as to the relative culpability of the codefendants remained consistent. On this record, we cannot conclude that there was an agreement between Ellison and the prosecutor which was not disclosed to Boyde.