Opinion ID: 1057381
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The trial court's denial of defendant's request for a hearing or in-camera interview of an allegedly biased juror

Text: ¶ 22. Defendant next claims that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to hold an in-camera hearing to investigate his allegations that a juror lied during voir dire and later brought extraneous evidence to jury deliberations. Defendant raised this claim for the first time in his motion for new trial. ¶ 23. Defendant is entitled to a new trial if he can show juror partiality or the presence of extraneous information that corrupted the jury's deliberations. To show juror partiality, defendant must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984). To prove that extraneous information has corrupted the jury, defendant must show that an irregularity . . . creating . . . suspicion of extraneous influences with the capacity to influence jury deliberations has occurred. State v. Schwanda, 146 Vt. 230, 232, 499 A.2d 779, 781 (1985) (quotation omitted). ¶ 24. Defendant here claimed that a juror failed to answer honestly during voir dire when he denied that he knew defendant. Because others said that the juror did know defendant, defendant argues, the juror could have disclosed information about defendant's past conduct to the jury, thus corrupting their deliberative process. In support thereof, defendant submitted five affidavits  from himself and four acquaintances  all of which allege that the juror must have known defendant in the past. [2] The State responded by submitting an affidavit from the juror refuting these claims, stating directly that he did not, and do[es] not, know [defendant]. ¶ 25. The court declined to hold an evidentiary hearing on these claims, and denied defendant's motion for new trial for two reasons: he failed to make the requisite showing for challenging juror misconduct as required in McDonough, and, in any case, he waived his objection by failing to bring it to the court's attention before the jury was empaneled. We review the trial court's decision for abuse of discretion. State v. Gorbea, 169 Vt. 57, 60, 726 A.2d 68, 70 (1999). ¶ 26. Here, the trial court was within its discretion to decide that no evidentiary hearing was needed. Viewing defendant's proffer in the light most favorable to defendant, his affidavits provided at best speculative or merely conclusory claims of the juror's knowledge, and thus did not demonstrate that the juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire.  McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556, 104 S.Ct. 845. While defendant demanded a hearing and cited a number of cases where courts have held evidentiary hearings in order to decide claims of juror misconduct, he gave no reason why such a hearing would be helpful or provide any additional information beyond the speculation contained in his affidavits. ¶ 27. Defendant's juror-bias and corruption claims were, in any event, waived due to the fact that defendant failed to raise them until his motion for a new trial. By statute and through case law, Vermont generally bars challenges to the composition of the jury after that jury has been empaneled. In In re Nash we held that the right to challenge a juror is waived by a failure to object before the jury is [e]mpaneled if the basis for the objection is known or might, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered during voir dire. 158 Vt. 458, 467, 614 A.2d 367, 372 (1991). Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(b) similarly requires that challenges for cause be made prior to the empanelment of the jury. ¶ 28. Here, defendant stated that [a]t the time that the jury was being selected I thought that I might have known [the juror]. Even though defendant indicated this to his attorney at that time, no action was taken during voir dire to further this inquiry. Despite the fact that defendant had additional time to confer with his attorney after voir dire, while exercising his peremptory challenges, and following the jury selection process  the jury was selected eight days before the commencement of trial  he let the matter drop until the filing of his motion for a new trial. Under the Nash standard, because defendant knew there was a potential problem with the juror during voir dire, but failed to properly pursue this challenge, he waived his right to assert the claim. ¶ 29. Because we find no error in the trial court's rulings, we also dismiss defendant's claim that the trial court's errors collectively were sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal. Affirmed.