Opinion ID: 6108254
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Challenge to Torture Aggravating Circumstance

Text: Collings's twelfth and final point on appeal claims the motion court erred in denying his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise a claim on appeal that Instruction 16 offered by the State and given to the jury was erroneous for not defining the statutory aggravating circumstance torture as the term is vague. Pursuant to section 565.032.2(7), a jury can recommend the death penalty if it finds the murder in the first degree was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, or depravity of mind. At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury was instructed to consider whether one or more of the following statutory aggravating circumstances existed in assessing the proper punishment: 1. Whether the murder of Rowan Ford involved torture and whether, as a result thereof, the murder was outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman. 2. Whether the murder of Rowan Ford was committed while the defendant was engaged in the perpetration of rape. 3. Whether Rowan Ford was a potential witness in a pending investigation of the rape of Rowan Ford and was killed as a result of her status as a potential witness. Collings's trial counsel objected to the instruction, arguing there was not sufficient evidence to submit the torture instruction as torture was not defined. Without such a definition, trial counsel claimed the jurors would be without guidance and could individually decide what torture is. The trial court overruled the objection, and the jury found the first and third aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, recommending the death penalty. Collings argues his appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising a claim that the torture aggravator is unconstitutionally vague. At the evidentiary hearing, Collings's appellate counsel testified she considered raising an issue addressing the constitutional validity of the torture aggravating circumstance, but she ultimately decided against including it in her initial brief due to the word limit and the 10 other claims of error she already had briefed. She did, however, include language addressing the lack of definition and potential unconstitutional vagueness in her reply brief when arguing Collings's sentence was disproportionate. As explained above, a movant must establish appellate counsel failed to raise a claim of error that was so obvious that a competent and effective lawyer would have recognized and asserted it in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Williams , 168 S.W.3d at 444 . Additionally, this Court has recognized appellate counsel has no duty to raise every possible issue asserted in the  motion for new trial on appeal, and no duty to present non-frivolous issues where appellate counsel strategically decides to winnow out arguments in favor of other arguments. Tisius , 519 S.W.3d at 431-32 . The motion court found Collings's appellate counsel's decision to not raise the constitutional claim in a separate point on appeal and, rather, address the issue in the claim regarding proportionality of the punishment, was a reasonable strategic decision. In addition, Collings fails to cite to any case law supporting his argument that the torture aggravating circumstance is unconstitutionally vague. He relies on cases addressing the vagueness of the depravity of mind aggravating circumstance and the need for instructions providing definitions to juries. See, e.g. , Godfrey v. Georgia , 446 U.S. 420 , 427-32, 100 S.Ct. 1759 , 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980) (plurality opinion); State v. Preston , 673 S.W.2d 1 , 10-11 (Mo. banc 1984). Despite his attempt to analogize depravity of mind to torture, the cases he cites suggest the opposite conclusion. For example, this Court in Preston noted infliction of physical or psychological torture upon the victim has been recognized as a factor to be considered when finding depravity of mind. 13 673 S.W.2d at 11 . Because there is case law supporting the use of torture as a sufficient definition in and of itself, it cannot be said Collings's appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a constitutional claim of vagueness. The effectiveness of counsel is measured by what the law is at the time of trial. Hoeber , 488 S.W.3d at 658 . As a result, counsel is not ineffective for failing to anticipate a change in the law. Id. Because Collings does not cite to case law supporting his argument that torture as used in section 565.032.2(7) and the jury instruction is unconstitutionally vague, he did not meet his burden of establishing that any competent and effective lawyer would have made such a novel constitutional claim on appeal. The motion court did not clearly err in denying this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.