Opinion ID: 4580877
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Langlois’ Disparate Treatment Claims

Text: Langlois argues on appeal that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the Defendants-Appellees on her disparate treatment claims because issues of material fact exist as to whether she was subject to discrimination. We examine Title VII discrimination claims based on disparate treatment using the burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). We apply this approach to CFEPA claims as well. See Kaytor v. Elec. Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 556 (2d Cir. 2010). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See 411 U.S. at 802. After the plaintiff has done so, the burden then shifts to the employer to “rebut that showing by articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment action,” Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d Cir. 2000), that is supported by admissible evidence “which, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action,” Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 221 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (2004)). Once the defendant employer has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, “the presumption of 3 discrimination arising with the establishment of the prima facie case drops from the picture.” Weinstock, 224 F.3d at 42. The plaintiff must then establish that the “employer’s explanation is a pretext for race discrimination.” Kirkland v. Cablevision Sys., 760 F.3d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 2014); accord McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S at 804. Here, even assuming arguendo that Langlois established a prima facie case of race-based discrimination, she failed to produce evidence sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the Defendants-Appellees’ proffered reasons for their employment actions constituted mere pretext for unlawful discrimination. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 519 (“It is not enough . . . to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must [also] believe the plaintiff’s explanation of intentional discrimination.” (emphasis omitted)); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (“[T]he plaintiff . . . must be afforded the opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant . . . were a pretext for discrimination.” (quotation marks omitted)). Langlois’ main evidence in support of her claim that the Defendants-Appellees’ proffered reasons are pretextual were two comments allegedly made by the principal of the school where she worked. The first was allegedly made in Spring 2015 at a teachers’ meeting, where the principal commented that “students should have teachers that look like them.” App’x at 54, 131. The second comment—that “[w]hite teachers could not, are not competent to teach our students”—was allegedly made at another unspecified meeting. App’x at 54, 138. These stray remarks, troubling as they may be, are nonetheless insufficient to establish discrimination in the absence of other indicia of discrimination. See Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 468 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[S]tray remarks of a decision-maker, without more, cannot prove a claim of employment discrimination[.]” (citation omitted)). 4 Langlois has offered no other indicia of discrimination in the facts and circumstances she alleges. Notably, an outside consultant, not the principal, was responsible for providing Langlois’ performance evaluations, which precipitated her departure from the school. A68. Furthermore, Langlois has not shown that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated non-white teachers. See Ruiz v. Cnty. of Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 493 (2d Cir. 2010) (“A showing of disparate treatment—that is, a showing that an employer treated plaintiff less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside of his protected group—is a recognized method of raising an inference of discrimination for the purposes of making out a prima facie case.” (quotation marks omitted)). She points only to the experience of two other white teachers—that is, teachers inside of her protected group—who faced distinguishable situations. See Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[P]laintiff must show that she was similarly situated in all material respects to the individuals with whom she seeks to compare herself.” (quotation marks omitted)). In sum, Langlois failed to submit evidence providing a basis on which a reasonable jury could conclude that she suffered adverse employment action as a result of discriminatory animus. The district court thus did not err in granting summary judgment to Defendants-Appellees on Langlois’ disparate treatment claim.