Opinion ID: 580695
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Weston's Sentence.

Text: 28 At sentencing, there was vigorous debate concerning the applicability of U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(1) to Weston's conviction on the retaliation count. The colloquy focused almost exclusively on whether Weston's behavior was conduct undertaken in order to obstruct the administration of justice. 4 The defense contended that the conduct could not be said to have been undertaken in order to obstruct the administration of justice unless Weston acted with the specific intention of inhibiting Brann's future cooperation. The government urged that, independent of whether Weston had intended actually to influence Brann's later conduct, the enhancement was proper so long as Weston's threats pertained to Brann's cooperation with the ongoing drug investigation. The district judge utilized the eight-level enhancement, interpreting the jury verdict as equivalent to a finding that Weston intended to affect Brann's future conduct. The judge thought that such a finding was an inevitable consequence factually of a conclusion that [Weston] did retaliate because of information given by Wendell Brann to law enforcement officers. The judge stated: 29 [Although] I am not persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that this defendant went there with an actual affirmative intention to dissuade Wendell Brann from continuing to cooperate with the government.... I feel that I am bound by the jury's determination that he did retaliate against Wendell Brann, in the words of the charge, with intent to retaliate for information given by the said Wendell Brann to law enforcement officers and I think that jury determination on what is an element of the charged offense, as it is charged in the indictment, is sufficient to trigger the 8 level increase. 30 On appeal, Weston argues that his conviction on the retaliation count implied only that he sought to punish Brann for past cooperation; that the language of the guideline--in order to obstruct the administration of justice, U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(1)--demands an intent to affect the victim's willingness to cooperate in the future; and that, therefore, the judge's conclusion that the government failed to prove that he (Weston) actually intended to dissuade Brann from future cooperation placed the enhancement out of reach. We find this analysis unpersuasive. 31 Weston's basic premise--that retaliation, in and of itself, is strictly past-oriented, having nothing to do with an intent to affect present or future conduct--seems much too crabbed. In practice, the real meaning of an act of pure retaliation is not necessarily gleaned from, or confined to, the act's retributive aspects. This is especially true when a retaliatory act occurs in response to conduct capable of repetition. In such circumstances, the act often contains an aposematic component, expressing both a backward-looking intention (designed to punish for past misdeeds) and a forward-looking intention (designed to deter repeat performances). The parental spanking administered upon discovering the child's hand in the cookie jar serves not only to punish for the attempted purloinment but to deter future incursions. 32 Retaliation against an informer, undertaken before the informer's utility to the authorities has been exhausted, fits comfortably within this integument. When the target of the retaliatory act has begun, but has not completed, his cooperation, the retaliatory act almost inevitably does double duty, manifesting a desire both to punish past disobedience and to forestall future disobedience. Here, at a minimum, it was a forceful reminder of the club's policy against cooperation with governmental authorities. Thus, Weston's notion of a fundamental incompatibility between a conviction for retaliation and an enhancement under section 2J1.2(b)(1) is untenable. 33 Weston also posits error premised on a claim that the lower court abdicated its responsibilities when, in deciding to apply U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(1), it deferred to the guilty verdict. We discern no error. Although an acquittal is not always conclusive on an issue for sentencing purposes due to differing standards of proof, see, e.g., United States v. Mocciola, 891 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir.1989), a guilty verdict, not set aside, binds the sentencing court to accept the facts necessarily implicit in the verdict. Cf., e.g., United States v. Whitetail, 956 F.2d 857, 864 (8th Cir.1992) (district court may depart downward under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.12 on grounds of duress although jury rejected duress defense at trial because duress as a ground for departure does not require proof of the same elements necessary to establish [the defense of duress] at trial). Thus, the district court was correct in recognizing the primacy of the jury's determination on the issue of Weston's retaliatory intent. 34 Weston's best argument is that section 2J1.2(b)(1) contains language that can only be applied to conduct designed primarily to affect the course of future events. This argument hinges on the phrase in order to obstruct the administration of justice. It assumes that phrase is both future-oriented and simplistically clear. In fact, the phrase is anything but self-defining. Many kinds of actions and many kinds of outcomes can fit linguistically within the phrase's loosely woven confines. 35 When, as here, the language of a guideline is not fully self-illuminating, a court should look to the application notes and commentary for guidance as to the scope of the provision. See United States v. Bierley, 922 F.2d 1061, 1066 (3d Cir.1990); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1(i) (sentencing court should refer to any ... policy statements or commentary in the guidelines that might warrant consideration). While the application notes and commentary do not possess the force of law, they are important interpretive aids, entitled to considerable respect. United States v. White, 888 F.2d 490, 497 (7th Cir.1989); cf. United States v. Anderson, 942 F.2d 606, 613-14 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc) (discussing interrelationship between guidelines and commentary). 36 In this instance, the policy statements cast light on the problem. The commentary lists 18 U.S.C. § 1513 in the compendium of statutory provisions to which the guideline presumptively applies. U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2, comment. Moreover, in a non-exhaustive recital, the commentary describes [n]umerous offenses that may constitute obstruction of justice, including causing a witness bodily injury ... in retaliation for providing testimony, information or evidence in a federal proceeding. Id., comment. (backg'd). The commentary also makes clear that the conduct giving rise to the enhancement may ... range from a mere threat to an act of extreme violence. Id. 37 We are of the opinion that, when silhouetted against this backdrop, conduct such as the court below supportably attributed to Weston--threatening a witness with physical injury in retaliation for the witness' past cooperation with federal authorities, while the federal criminal proceeding in question is still pending--can trigger an elevation of the defendant's offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(1). We think this view is compatible with the language of the guideline and coheres with the Sentencing Commission's obvious intention of making obstruction of justice sufficiently inclusive that it can encompass a wide range and rich variety of antisocial conduct. Hence, the eight-level enhancement was proper in this case even if Weston lacked an actual affirmative intention to deter Brann from providing testimony in the future. 5 38