Opinion ID: 862859
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: ¶4. A truck belonging to Milton Dixon was stolen from his job site at Galloway Elementary School in Jackson. Shortly after the broadcast of the description of the stolen truck over police radio, an officer with the Jackson Police Department made visual contact with the truck and its occupants. McGrone was driving the truck and sped away from the police officer at a high rate of speed. A transmission went out over the police radio that McGrone would not heed police efforts to stop the truck and was attempting to elude the police. ¶5. Patrolman Robert Bufkin heard this call and set up a road block with his patrol car in an attempt to stop the speeding truck. Deborah Goldman was riding with Bufkin at the time as part of her dispatcher training. Bufkin exited the patrol car, but Goldman remained seated inside the car. McGrone drove the speeding truck at Bufkin in an attempt to run over him, forcing Bufkin to dive out of its path. This action by McGrone gave rise to the charge of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer. McGrone then drove the truck into the side of the patrol car where Goldman was seated. This action gave rise to the second charge of aggravated assault. McGrone lost control of the truck causing it to crash into the side of a house. McGrone then fled on foot. Patrolman Jonathan Crawford came upon the scene and ordered McGrone to halt. According to the State, as Crawford attempted to draw his service revolver McGrone lunged at Crawford and grabbed his arm. This action by McGrone gave rise to the simple assault charge. Fearing that McGrone would obtain Crawford's weapon, Crawford shot McGrone once in the leg. McGrone claims to have been fleeing at the time he was shot by Crawford and that a gunshot residue test of his pants would have revealed that he was not in close proximity to Crawford at the time he was shot. ¶6. When McGrone was transported to the hospital for treatment of his gunshot wound, his pants were cut off of his body and bagged as evidence for the Jackson Police Department (JPD). At the hearing on the motion which is the subject of this appeal, Mike Boyanton, a nurse at the hospital where McGrone was treated, testified that hospital records indicated the JPD took possession of McGrone's clothing and any possible valuables. The State was unable to produce the clothing and contended that if the pants were recovered by some unknown JPD officer, they were never logged into evidence and should now be classified as lost evidence. Analysis of Issues Presented 1. Dismissal without finding a violation of due process ¶7. The State contends that it was error for the trial court to grant McGrone's motion to dismiss count four of the indictment without making a finding that McGrone's due process rights had been violated. The State further argues that the lower court's action in this regard was in contravention of the holding in California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984), the landmark case on preservation of evidence, the rationale of which was adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Tolbert v. State, 511 So. 2d 1368, 1373 (Miss. 1987). The State also argues that, under the holding in Trombetta, the State's duty to preserve evidence is limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense and that Trombetta defines significant role to mean that the exculpatory nature and value of the evidence must have been apparent before the evidence was destroyed and of such a nature that the defendant cannot obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. ¶8. The State claims that in the case at bar, there is nothing in the record to indicate any knowledge whatsoever by the police of the role that the pants might have played in McGrone's defense. Citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), the State goes on to argue that it was McGrone's burden to show that the exculpatory value of his pants was known to the police and that the police acted in bad faith when they lost the pants. The State continues its argument that due process does not impose on the police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution. The State concludes that McGrone failed to show either that the police knew or should have known that the pants McGrone was wearing at the time he was shot could have exculpated him or that there was no other comparable evidence available to McGrone. The State contends that the evidence could have shown an absence of gun powder residue or it could have shown a distinct pattern of gun powder residue, and on the basis of Trombetta, when the State fails to preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant, no due process violation occurs. ¶9. McGrone agrees with the State's position that the State's duty to preserve evidence is limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in a suspect's defense and that a significant role, according to Trombetta, means the exculpatory nature and value of the evidence must have been apparent before the evidence was destroyed and of such a nature that the defendant cannot obtain comparable evidence by other reasonable means. McGrone, however, urges us to consider Justice O'Conner's concurring opinion in Trombetta and its holding that rules concerning preservation of evidence are generally matters of state, not federal constitutional law. McGrone points out that the Mississippi Supreme Court, in