Opinion ID: 579142
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 3 Stewart contends that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find him guilty of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, bank fraud and making a false statement on a bank loan application. This argument lacks merit. 4 We review the sufficiency of evidence to determine whether any rational jury, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government,  'could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'  United States v. Castro, 887 F.2d 988, 994 (9th Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648, 654 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1030 (1989)). 5 To prove a conspiracy, the government must show  'an agreement to accomplish an illegal objective coupled with one or more overt acts in furtherance of the illegal purpose and the requisite intent necessary to commit the underlying substantive offense.'  Castro, 887 F.2d at 994 (quoting United States v. Melchor-Lopez, 627 F.2d 886, 890 (9th Cir.1980)). The agreement can be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case. Id. To prove bank fraud, the government must show that the defendant knowingly (1) engaged in a scheme to defraud a federally chartered or insured financial institution, or (2) participated in a scheme to obtain money under custody or control of a federally chartered or insured financial institution by means of material, false statements or representations. United States v. Cloud, 872 F.2d 846, 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1002 (1989). To prove the submission of a false loan application, the government must show that the defendant knowingly made a false statement about a material fact to a bank in order to influence the bank's actions. United States v. Bonnette, 663 F.2d 495, 497 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 981 (1982); see also Theron v. United States Marshall, 832 F.2d 492, 496 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988). 6 Here, Stewart served as the Chairman of the Crow Tribal Land Resources Committee (Land Committee), which purchased and disposed of trust land within the reservation. In May 1986, Stewart's codefendant, Theodore Hogan, negotiated a land sale contract between himself and the Land Committee for property he owned but on which the Little Horn State Bank (Little Horn) had begun foreclosure proceedings. Stewart signed the agreement, which was conditionally approved by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). 1 Hogan used this agreement as leverage to avert the foreclosure proceedings on the property begun by the Little Horn. The Land Committee defaulted on its payments to Hogan due to lack of funds. In March 1987, Little Horn foreclosed on Hogan's property and assumed ownership because he could not meet his payment obligations. 7 In May 1987, Hogan's mother obtained a loan from the Billings Federal Credit Union (Billings Federal) based on representations by Hogan that he would be receiving proceeds from a land sale. 2 Stewart, in his official capacity as Chairman of the Land Committee, wrote a letter to Billings Federal stating that Hogan would be receiving funds from the proceeds of the sale of property, but not informing the bank that Little Horn had already foreclosed on that property. In December 1987, Hogan obtained a loan from the First Citizen's Bank (First Citizen) based on a letter written by Stewart, also in his official capacity, to the bank. Stewart assured First Citizen that Hogan would be receiving money from the Land Committee. In December 1988, Hogan obtained another loan from Little Horn based on a new letter by Stewart, again in his official capacity, stating that the Land Committee owed Hogan a substantial amount of money. 8 At trial, the government introduced the testimony of BIA Realty Specialist Madison. Madison testified that, in February 1987, he wrote and sent a memorandum to Stewart concerning over 600 land purchases approved by the Land Committee. Madison testified that in the memorandum he explained that there were no funds available to consummate the deals. Madison further testified that he personally spoke with Stewart and expressed these concerns. 9 Because Stewart and Hogan knew that information in the loan applications were false, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that (1) Stewart and Hogan had agreed to defraud the banks by making false statements, see Castro, 887 F.2d at 988, (2) Stewart affirmatively assisted in the execution of Hogan's fraudulent scheme to obtain the bank funds, see Cloud, 872 F.2d at 846, and (3) Stewart knowingly made the false representations to influence the bank's decisions, see Bonnette, 663 F.2d at 497-498. In light of this evidence, we hold that a rational trier of fact could have found that Stewart conspired to commit bank fraud, committed bank fraud and knowingly made false statements on a bank loan application. See id.; Castro, 887 F.2d at 988; Cloud, 872 F.2d at 846.