Opinion ID: 3168517
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Construing the Historical Facts in the

Text: Plaintiff’s Favor Even after Twombly and Iqbal, a complaint’s allegations of historical fact continue to enjoy a highly favorable standard of review at the motion-to-dismiss stage of 17 proceedings. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231 (noting that Twombly “leaves intact” the pleading standard under which “detailed factual allegations” are not required). Although a reviewing court now affirmatively disregards a pleading’s legal conclusions, it must still – as we have already emphasized – assume all remaining factual allegations to be true, construe those truths in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and then draw all reasonable inferences from them. Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 154 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014); see also Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231 (holding that Twombly did not “undermine [the] principle” that all reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of the plaintiff, and reaffirming that “the facts alleged must be taken as true and a complaint may not be dismissed merely because it appears unlikely that the plaintiff can prove those facts or will ultimately prevail on the merits”).
With respect to Connelly’s disparate treatment claim,8 the Amended Complaint set forth sufficient factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery would reveal evidence that Connelly was a member of a 8 While Connelly advances a disparate treatment claim under both Title VII and the PHRA, we refer to those claims in the singular, as they are governed by essentially the same legal standards. See Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 317 n.3 (3d Cir. 2000) (“The analysis required for adjudicating [plaintiff’s discrimination] claim under PHRA is identical to a Title VII inquiry, and we therefore do not need to separately address her claim under the PHRA.”) (internal citation omitted). 18 protected class and that she suffered an adverse employment action when Lane did not rehire her in 2011. More specifically, Connelly has alleged that (i) during her tenure at Lane, she was the only female truck driver at the Pittsburgh facility; (ii) she was qualified to drive all but one of Lane’s trucks; (iii) Lane failed to rehire her at the start of the 2011 construction season, despite recalling the six other union truck-drivers – all male, and two with less union seniority than Connelly; and (iv) since failing to rehire Connelly, Lane has employed no other female truck drivers. Once accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, those allegations raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence that Connelly’s protected status as a woman played either a motivating or determinative factor in Lane’s decision not to rehire her. That is enough for Connelly’s disparate treatment claim to survive a motion to dismiss. Cf. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211-12 (“Although [the] complaint is not as rich with detail as some might prefer, it need only set forth sufficient facts to support plausible claims.”). Connelly has also alleged that Lane apparently deviated from its own past hiring norms and work assignments during the 2011 construction season by employing rental trucks and allowing a less senior driver to operate the tack truck. Once accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to Connelly, those factual allegations would also permit the reasonable inference that Lane’s proffered explanation that it failed to rehire Connelly for lack of work was pretextual. But, to be clear, at this stage Connelly is not obliged to choose whether she is proceeding under a mixed-motive or pretext theory, nor is she required to establish a prima facie case, much less to engage in the sort of 19 burden-shifting rebuttal that McDonnell Douglas requires at a later stage in the proceedings. It suffices for her to plead facts that, construed in her favor, state a claim of discrimination that is “plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). She has done that.
Turning to the elements of Connelly’s retaliation claim, the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint, taken as true, also raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence both that Connelly engaged in activity protected by Title VII and that Lane took an adverse employment action against her.9 To the latter point, Lane took an adverse employment action against Connelly when it failed to rehire her at the start of the 2011 construction season. To the former, Connelly engaged in protected activity when she filed multiple complaints of sexual harassment – including and most obviously her May 2010 complaint that Manning, a company foreman, had made unwanted physical advances toward her.10 9 Again, although Connelly’s retaliation claims are advanced under both Title VII and the PHRA, we refer to those claims in the singular because the same framework for analyzing retaliation claims applies to both. Cf. Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[W]e analyze ADA retaliation claims under the same framework we employ for retaliation claims arising under Title VII.”). 10 To be protected from retaliation under Title VII, the protected activity must relate to employment discrimination charges brought under that statute, implicating “discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or 20 The District Court held that Connelly’s retaliation claim came short of plausibility by “fail[ing] to plead a causal connection between the failure to rehire Connelly in April 2011 and her alleged protected activity.” (App. 13.) In pertinent part, the District Court concluded that there was “no temporal proximity (as pled, her last report of sexual harassment was in May 2010, almost a year prior to the failure to rehire her), and no pattern of antagonism by Lane management.” (App. 13.) Given the seasonal character of Connelly’s work, we question the District Court’s conclusion about temporal proximity. Because Lane only hired Connelly during construction seasons, traditionally laying workers off in October or November and then rehiring them in March or April of the following year, it may be that a retaliatory decision to not rehire her would not become apparent until after the off-season that ran from October 2010 to March 2011.11 national origin.” Slagle v. Cty. of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 268 (3d Cir. 2006). For that reason, we agree with the District Court that Connelly’s other complaints, to the extent they implicated only safety issues, were not protected activity for purposes of her retaliation claim. 11 As we have already stated, no showing of proof is necessary at this stage of the proceedings, but even if the record ultimately produced no evidence of temporal proximity suggestive of retaliation, that would not necessarily be fatal to Connelly’s claim. See Robinson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 982 F.2d 892, 894 (3d Cir. 1993) (“The mere passage of time is not legally conclusive proof against retaliation.”); 21 In any case, the question of temporal proximity does not render Connelly’s retaliation claim facially implausible. Connelly alleged that, after she complained of Manning’s unwanted advances, and after overcoming another supervisor’s resistance to her grievance by complaining Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 1997) (“It is important to emphasize that it is causation, not temporal proximity itself, that is an element of plaintiff’s prima facie case, and temporal proximity merely provides an evidentiary basis from which an inference can be drawn.”). Where the time between the protected activity and adverse action is not so close as to be unusually suggestive of a causal connection standing alone, courts may look to the intervening period for demonstrative proof, such as actual antagonistic conduct or animus against the employee, or other types of circumstantial evidence, such as inconsistent reasons given by the employer for terminating the employee or the employer’s treatment of other employees, that give rise to an inference of causation when considered as a whole. Marra v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 302 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted and emphasis added). Even at this stage, if one accepts as true all of Connelly’s factual allegations about her union seniority, Lane’s past hiring practices, the company’s traditional distribution of labor, and her personal observations of Lane’s 2011 workforce, one could reasonably draw the inference that Lane gave Connelly inconsistent and false reasons for declining to rehire her. 22 directly to the Ethics Line, her relationship with both her supervisors and male co-workers became “increasingly strained” throughout the year. (App. 32.) Thus, Connelly has alleged facts that could support a reasonable inference of a causal connection between her protected activity in May 2010 and the gradual deterioration of her relationship with her employer until she was laid off in October 2010. In finding no causal connection between Connelly’s protected acts and Lane’s failure to rehire her in 2011, the District Court noted that Lane continued to rehire Connelly for four consecutive years despite her many complaints, and even encouraged her to continue calling the Ethics Line. While we agree that those facts could be viewed as cutting against Connelly, that is not what the applicable standard of review allows at this point in the case. We must adhere to the requirement that all alleged facts be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, which, if done, permits the view that gender discrimination was a motivating factor or determinative factor in the decision not to recall Connelly in 2011. Likewise, the fact that Lane continued to rehire Connelly for four years despite her complaints about coworkers, but declined to rehire her at the first such opportunity after she complained of harassment by a supervisor, can be construed to support a reasonable inference of a causal connection between the protected act and the adverse employment action. Therefore, even if one believed it “unlikely that the plaintiff can prove those facts or will ultimately prevail on the merits,” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8), it must still be said that Connelly – under a favorable standard of review – has raised a reasonable 23 inference that discovery will reveal evidence of the elements necessary to establish her claims.