Opinion ID: 2117221
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Relevancy Analysis.

Text: After properly concluding that rule 412 was applicable to the evidence, the district court proceeded to conduct a relevancy analysis pursuant to rule 412(c)(3). Subdivision 412(c)(3) is triggered when the past sexual behavior evidence is offered. (A) ... upon the issue of whether the accused was or was not, with respect to the alleged victim, the source of semen or injury; or (B) ... upon the issue of whether the alleged victim consented to the sexual behavior with respect to which sexual abuse is alleged. Iowa R.Evid. 412(b)(2). The evidence sought to be admitted did not fit into either of these specific categories. Rather, pursuant to the rule, the court should conduct the constitutional relevancy analysis required by rule 412(b)(1). See, e.g., State v. Clarke, 343 N.W.2d 158, 161-62 (Iowa 1984). We have reviewed the proffered evidence under rule 412(b)(1) and find that it is inadmissible. We therefore affirm the ruling of the court. See Newmire v. Maxwell, 161 N.W.2d 74, 80 (Iowa 1968) (Where a learned judge's decision is right for a wrong reason it is nevertheless right.). The initial determination in a constitutional analysis pertains to a defendant's right to present a defense. The constitutional provisions most often implicated in cases of this type are the sixth amendment right of confrontation and the fourteenth amendment due process right to a fair trial. The Constitution, however, ordinarily requires only the introduction of otherwise relevant and admissible evidence. Evidence that is irrelevant is not constitutionally required to be admitted. State v. Clarke, 343 N.W.2d 158, 161 (Iowa 1984). See also Oliver, 760 P.2d at 1079. The defendant's constitutional rights must be weighed against the recognized interest that the State has to (1) protect the privacy of the victims; (2) encourage the reporting and prosecuting of sex offenses; and (3) to prevent time-consuming and distracting inquiry into collateral matters. State v. Gettier, 438 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 1989). A trial court can properly exclude evidence of the victim's prior sexual histories if the evidence were either irrelevant or more prejudicial than probative. Clarke, 343 N.W.2d at 161; Oliver, 760 P.2d at 1079. Such an analysis, although different, is highly similar to the relevancy analysis the court actually conducted. We proceed to analyze the evidence under this constitutional format. Jones claims the evidence should be admitted for the purpose of showing an alternative source of the child's ability to describe the sex act perpetrated on her. However, at the time of the trial in this matter the victim witness was thirteen years old. In the three years between the abuse and the trial, the victim had been through sexual counseling and sex education programs at school. The district court found that we are talking about a person who has at the time of this act reached the age where she had knowledge of sexual activity from other sources than actual sexual contact. We agree. Given the age of the victim at the time she testified, the education and counseling she had received in the interim between the abuse and the trial, and the rather unexplicit nature of the testimony; [1] we find it unlikely that a jury would infer that the victim could only describe the act because Jones had, in fact, done it. See Oliver, 760 P.2d at 1080. The evidence of the victim's previous abuse is marginally relevant and is more prejudicial than probative. See Annotation §§ 4[b], [c], 14-15 (1991). Jones also claims the evidence should be admitted to show that the child was actually confusing Jones' alleged sexual abuse with the previous abuse. We do not agree. First, the record reveals the alleged prior abuse occurred at least five years prior to the incident in question; the victim was then approximately five years old. There is no likelihood that the witness was confusing the incidents because of their proximity in time. Second, the prior incident involved different abuse. There is no likelihood that the victim was confusing the incidents because they involved completely different types of contact. See Annotation §§ 11-13. Here, there is no constitutional requirement that the evidence be admitted. It is, at best, marginally relevant and is more prejudicial than probative for the purposes urged. Accordingly, the district court's conclusion was correct.