Opinion ID: 2196556
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Miranda Protection.

Text: In Miranda the Court addressed the question of how the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-incrimination could provide protection from coercive pressures that may be imposed on a suspect during custodial interrogations. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. The central principle established in Miranda is: if the police take a suspect into custody and then ask him questions without informing him of the rights enumerated [in Miranda ], his responses cannot be introduced into evidence to establish his guilt. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 429, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3144, 82 L.Ed.2d 317, 328 (1984). In determining whether an individual [is] in custody, a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there was a `formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. ___, ___, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 1528-29, 128 L.Ed.2d 293, 298 (1994) (citation omitted). We apply an objective standard when making this determination. Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1529, 128 L.Ed.2d at 299-30. The district court found Scott was in custody at the time of the pat-down search because guns were drawn and his freedom of movement was restrained. Because no Miranda warnings were given prior to officer Blad's question about the item in Scott's pocket, the court concluded the question violated his Miranda rights. We disagree. The temporary detention of a motorist in an ordinary traffic stop is not considered in custody for purposes of Miranda. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437-39, 104 S.Ct. at 3148-50, 82 L.Ed.2d at 333-34. Similarly, the use of a weapon by a peace officer as a protective measure during an investigatory stop does not convert the stop into an arrest if the officer's action is reasonable under the circumstances. In re S.A.W., 499 N.W.2d 739, 742 (Iowa App.1993); United States v. Raino, 980 F.2d 1148, 1149-50 (8th Cir.1992). Officers are entitled to protect themselves. To allow such a protective measure to transform a Terry stop into an arrest would create a dangerous dilemma for law enforcement officers. United States v. Jackson, 652 F.2d 244, 249 (2d Cir.1981). If the officer approaches a [suspect] with his gun still in his holster, he increases the risk that he will be shot. If, on the other hand, he protects himself by drawing his gun, he increases the risk that a court will set the criminal free by construing his action as an illegal arrest. We decline to impose such a Hobson's Choice on our law enforcement personnel. Id. at 249-50. Likewise, we believe that when an officer detects an object that may be contraband during a pat-down search, the officer may ask what it is because the right to interrogate during a `stop' is the essence of Terry and its progeny. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 63 (2d Cir.1977). We conclude Scott was not in custody for Miranda purposes when he was asked about the object in his pocket. The investigatory stop was temporary and brief. The stop and search was conducted in public. The officers followed routine procedures during the pat-down search. The marijuana was removed from Scott's pocket only after he told the officer that he had marijuana in his pocket. At that time the officer had probable cause to seize the baggy and to arrest Scott for illegal possession. The investigatory stop ripened into a probable cause arrest. We therefore reverse the district court ruling on the motion to suppress and remand the case for trial. REVERSED AND REMANDED.