Opinion ID: 1973885
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Application of the Exception

Text: a. Actual Knowledge Because it focuses on actual or constructive knowledgewhat the user knew or reasonably should have known the applicability of the experienced user exception to the duty to warn is a question of fact for the jury when the extent of the plaintiff's knowledge is in dispute. Billiar v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 623 F.2d 240, 244 (2d Cir.1980). Appellants have failed to point to evidence demonstrating that the question should have been resolved by the court as a matter of law. They argue that the evidence showed conclusively that Pineda, by his experience and training, had actual knowledge of the dangers associated with charging batteries, [8] and similar knowledge of the safety precautions to be taken when working around them. [9] They assert that, from his testimony, Pineda recognized the warning signs of a battery with the potential to explode. Pineda, however, testified that he had received only informal instruction in the care and handling of batteries as a youth in Guatemala, see note 8, supra, that he handled the battery on the day of the accident exactly as he had seen his uncle do it and as he had done himself on hundreds of occasions, and that he did not foresee the explosion because he understood that a spark would not cause a battery to explode unless the vent caps were loose or removed. In fact, he had not worn goggles while removing the battery because he perceived no danger under the circumstances. Pineda viewed the warning signs of a potential explosion that appellants contend he recognizedthe smell of gas and the warmth of the battery caseas normal incidents of charging. He was aware that a large quantity of sparks could cause a battery to explode, but believed that this would occur only if someone was connecting or disconnecting the battery in the wrong manner, whereas a small spark was normal in work on battery cables and would not cause problems. All told, this testimony fails to prove as a matter of law that Pineda had nothing to learn from a properly detailed warning. b. Constructive Knowledge Appellants also charge Pineda with constructive knowledge of the right way to handle a battery. Leeth Brothers argues that the testimony of Pat Goss, an expert witness for the defense, set forth the standard of care expected of an experienced mechanic regarding the handling of batteries after recharging. Goss testified that, upon smelling gas and noting that a battery is warm to the touch, a mechanic should walk away and let the battery cool down for an hour before touching it. Then, before attempting to disconnect the jumper cables, he should first cover the vent caps with a wet rag to dampen any spark ignited, then disconnect the negative cable before the positive. Goss stated that the negative jumper cable should never be connected to the negative terminal of the dead battery, as Pineda had done, but to a piece of grounded metal on the disabled vehicle. Pineda, as Leeth Brothers argues, should have known that this battery would not have exploded if the negative cable had been removed `by the book,' as explained by Pat Goss, or if the negative jumper cable had been attached to a grounded piece of metal instead of the negative terminal. [10] Appellants, however, ignore the testimony of plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Abraham, who stated that the way in which Pineda had disconnected the cables was correct given the way in which they had been connected. He also stated that, until the Battery Council recommended grounding the negative cable, the accepted way of charging batteries had been the manner which Pineda thought correct. Abraham's opinion was that, if there was indeed a proper method of connecting battery cables, it should appear on the warning label to instruct both the layman and experienced user alike. We conclude that, while Pineda clearly knew that a person should exercise care around batteries because they produce explosive gases, the evidence that he knew or reasonably should have known of the specific risk of explosion associated with charging and jump starting was not so one-sided as to justify a determination as a matter of law that appellants owed him no duty to warn.