Opinion ID: 2778699
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gomez’s Other Excessive Force Argument

Text: On appeal, it is not clear whether Gomez preserved an additional argument that, assuming Officer Doe could detain him, his use of force was excessive during a lawful detention. Even assuming that Gomez properly preserved this issue, this argument lacks merit, too. Although the use of force in a detention or an arrest must be judged on a case-by-case basis, “the application of de minimis force, without more, will not support a claim for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 2000). This Court has held that a variety of physical force techniques used by police on unhandcuffed individuals 19 Case: 14-10031 Date Filed: 02/11/2015 Page: 20 of 23 constituted de minimis force that does not rise to excessive force that could violate the Fourth Amendment. See Croom v. Balkwill, 645 F.3d 1240, 1245 (11th Cir. 2011) (plaintiff alleged that, during the execution of a search warrant at a residence plaintiff was visiting, an officer pushed the unhandcuffed plaintiff from a squatting position to the ground, placed a foot on the plaintiff’s back for up to ten minutes, and “click[ed]” her gun during that time); Nolin, 207 F.3d at 1255 (during the course of an arrest, an officer grabbed an unhandcuffed plaintiff from behind by the shoulder and wrist, threw the plaintiff against a van, kneed the plaintiff in the back, pushed the plaintiff’s head into the side of the van, searched the plaintiff’s groin area, and then handcuffed him); Jones v. City of Dothan, Ala., 121 F.3d 1456, 1460 (11th Cir. 1997) (police officers looking for a suspect in a harassment case seized a plaintiff, “slammed” the unhandcuffed plaintiff against a wall, kicked the plaintiff’s legs apart, and caused the plaintiff pain by requiring him to raise his arms above his head) 13; Post, 7 F.3d at 1559 (during the course of an arrest, plaintiff alleged that an officer placed the unhandcuffed plaintiff in a choke hold for about five seconds). On the other hand, the application of gratuitous force on an alreadyhandcuffed and compliant detainee or arrestee constitutes excessive force in 13 The Jones Court did not use the phrase “de minimis force,” but we have since described Jones as being part of the line of cases establishing the de minimis force doctrine. See Nolin, 207 F.3d at 1256; Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1348–49 n.13. 20 Case: 14-10031 Date Filed: 02/11/2015 Page: 21 of 23 violation of the Fourth Amendment, even if there is no visible or compensable injury. See Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2014) (denying qualified immunity where officers allegedly slammed an alreadyhandcuffed arrestee’s head against the pavement with extreme force and stating also that “a plaintiff claiming excessive force under the Fourth Amendment can seek nominal damages if he does not have compensable injuries”); Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2008) (concluding that an officer used excessive force when he punched an individual in the stomach while the individual was handcuffed and not struggling or resisting); Slicker v. Jackson, 215 F.3d 1225, 1231–32 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that a plaintiff could seek nominal damages based on pain and suffering where officers kicked and beat the handcuffed plaintiff). Here, the force used by Officer Doe was applied before Gomez was handcuffed. Gomez’s allegations are thus most closely analogous to the line of cases in which this Court has held that the amount of force used on unhandcuffed individuals was de minimis and did not rise to excessive force that could violate the Fourth Amendment. See Nolin, 207 F.3d at 1255; Jones, 121 F.3d at 1460; Post, 7 F.3d at 1559. Accordingly, under our precedent, and even if Gomez preserved this argument, we cannot say the district court erred in dismissing his excessive force claim. 21 Case: 14-10031 Date Filed: 02/11/2015 Page: 22 of 23