Opinion ID: 2630898
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Summary of the Doctrine's Scope

Text: From these cases, the contours of the political structure doctrine can be delineated. For a law to violate the doctrine, and thus require application of heightened scrutiny, two conditions must be met. First, the law must single out a racial issue for special treatment. ( Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at pp. 470-474; Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. at pp. 390-391.) [14] That a law is facially neutral is of no consequence ( Seattle, at p. 471; Hunter, at pp. 390-391); rather, we ask whether it was effectively drawn for racial purposes. ( Seattle, at p. 471.) In speaking of a law's purpose, we do not mean whether it was motivated by invidious intent. ( Id. at pp. 484-486.) A racial purpose exists where the law was enacted because of, rather than in spite of, its effect upon the racial issue ( id. at p. 471) or where the law's impact falls on the minority ( Hunter, at p. 391) because the repealed policy inures primarily to [minorities'] benefit . . . and is designed for that purpose. ( Seattle, at pp. 471-472.) Second, the law must restructure the political process in a nonneutral manner, imposing unique burdens on minorities' future efforts to enact beneficial legislation. ( Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at pp. 474, 479-480; Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. at pp. 390-391.) [15] In other words, we ask whether the law effectively entrenches the result by altering the process such that a comparative structural burden [is] placed on the political achievement of minority interests ( Seattle, at p. 475, fn. 17) in contrast to the `treatment . . . afforded other problems in the same area' ( id. at pp. 479-480). For a violation of the doctrine to be established, both conditions must be met; one alone will not suffice. For example, the repeal of a law advantaging racial minorities certainly singles out a racial issue for special treatment. However, without more, the mere repeal of such a law by the enacting governmental entity does not run afoul of the doctrine. ( Crawford, 458 U.S. at p. 547 (conc. opn. of Blackmun, J.); Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at pp. 483; Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. at p. 390 & fn. 5.) [16] It simply reflects the normal operation of the political process in which there are winners and losers. Repeal of legislation favorable to the interests of a racial minority simply indicates that a prior winner has now lost . . . [but] does not alter or distort the existing political process in any way. (Amar & Caminker, Equal Protection, Unequal Political Burdens, and the CCRI (1996) 23 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1019, 1044 (Amar & Caminker); see Hunter, at p. 394 (conc. opn. of Harlan, J.).) As another example, amending California's Constitution to require that 25 percent of the electorate sign a petition before an initiative can qualify to be placed on the ballot (as opposed to the current, lower requirement in Cal. Const., art. II, § 8) would without a doubt make it more difficult for minorities to achieve favorable legislation via the initiative process. ( Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. at pp. 393-394 (conc. opn. of Harlan, J.).) However, such an alteration would not violate the doctrine because such a change would be grounded in neutral principle. ( Id. at p. 395; see Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 480, fn. 23.) Because such a change to the process would make it more difficult for every group in the community to enact comparable laws, there would continue to be a level playing field on which vying political groups could compete. ( Seattle, at p. 470.) Thus, only when a law singles out a racial issue for special treatment and alters the political process, imposing a unique structural burden on minorities' future ability to achieve beneficial legislation, is the political structure doctrine violated and is the law subject to heightened scrutiny.