Opinion ID: 1167064
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: aldrich

Text: In Aldrich the commission held that petitioner committed wilful misconduct by attempting to dissuade an inexperienced attorney from representing Robert Aldrich, whom petitioner had jailed for contempt, and that petitioner committed prejudicial conduct in commenting to the press about the superior court ruling setting aside his contempt order and telling the attorney that Aldrich was a puke and psychopath. On January 11, 1978, petitioner sentenced Aldrich to 24 hours in jail for contempt based on courtroom conduct. John Olson, who petitioner knew was a newly admitted attorney, was retained to represent Aldrich. He petitioned the superior court for habeas corpus and obtained an order to show cause that he served on petitioner in chambers on January 12. No one else was present. Petitioner told Olson that Aldrich was a puke and a psychopath and that there was no defense to the contempt order. He also said Olson should not be representing Aldrich and urged Olson to talk with experienced local attorneys who assertedly would advise him against getting involved in the case. Olson said he would consider the suggestions. On January 18, preparing for the habeas hearing, Olson visited petitioner's court to examine the docket. They discussed the case for half an hour. Petitioner again tried to dissuade Olson from representing that puke (Aldrich) and had his clerk tell Olson of the events that led to the contempt order. Olson replied that the clerk's version was consistent with his own information but that he thought it was not a proper contempt case. Petitioner attacked Aldrich's criminal background and said that if Olson remained in the case he could never again practice before petitioner and probably not in western El Dorado County. He added that Olson's office associates also might have difficulties in practicing in his court. Olson asked what would happen if he did withdraw; petitioner replied that there would then be no problem. Olson left the conversation confused and upset. He consulted his associates; they advised him not to withdraw. One of them, Mark Nielsen, who had known petitioner since 1971, phoned him that evening, hoping he would reconsider. To Nielsen's dismay, petitioner reiterated what he had told Olson who, petitioner added, had been duped by the scheme of Aldrich (the puke) to embarrass petitioner's court. Though Olson did not withdraw from the case, neither he nor his colleagues experienced adverse consequences in later appearances before petitioner. As a deputy district attorney petitioner had assisted in successfully prosecuting Aldrich for armed robbery and arson. According to the testimony of Judge Smith, Aldrich had a community reputation as a hoodlum and describing him as a puke was not unfair. Between petitioner's two conversations with Olson, Aldrich harassed petitioner. He repeatedly drove past petitioner's home. When petitioner and his wife and bailiff went to lunch in a crowded restaurant, Aldrich and a friend continually hovered by petitioner's table, causing petitioner's party to leave. Petitioner obtained a shotgun and installed lights outside his house. A psychiatrist who examined petitioner on November 10 and 18, 1979, testified on November 20 that Aldrich's activities created a stress reaction that caused petitioner's outbursts to Olson and Neilsen on January 18, 1978. At the habeas proceeding on January 20 petitioner appeared in propria persona. After hearing evidence Judge Fogerty explained from the bench his reasons for granting the writ. He began by describing the extreme caution with which the summary contempt power should be exercised. He opined that Aldrich had been jailed simply for accepting a bailiff's invitation to express an opinion. [8] He concluded: There have been serious efforts made in California to improve the qualities of the lower courts, and people with professional training are put in those positions and they are supposed to use that professional position to exercise restraint that permits an efficient administration of justice. [¶] It is not a chamber of terror, or it is not a place people should be frightened to go; and when they are asked for an opinion, they should be able to express it. What might be loud and belligerent language to someone might simply be a heated expression of an opinion of another. All of those who have been in the cauldron of the courtroom know that the expression of opinion sometimes is loud and emphatic language. [¶] It is wrong to put people in jail whether it is by the process of contempt or any other ex parte proceeding, except in extraordinary circumstances. Finally, petitioner's request to reply in open court to Judge Fogerty's statement from the bench was denied. Immediately after the hearing, petitioner was interviewed by a reporter. A local newspaper published the Fogerty statement, followed by this concededly accurate account of what petitioner said: `It is unfortunate that the judge has taken the position he has,' said Wenger. [`]Superior court judges sit in an insulated environment buffered from direct public contact by the attorneys who represent them. We in the justice courts are not as fortunate, since we maintain a toe-to-toe contact with the public and are therefore exposed to a much greater dilemma than upper levels. [¶] In the instance of my court, removed from the center of activity, completely unprotected, without media contact, without means of relief should a dangerous situation arise it is incumbent that the judge have the ability to control the conduct of those who may appear before him. [¶] `The instant case is very typical of many that confront justice court judges each day,' Wenger continued. `Many persons from distant metropolitan areas are required to appear for assorted violations, and many of them manifest a contemptuous and disrespectful attitude to not only law enforcement but likewise the courts where they must appear. To divest justice court judges of the dignity and ability to control this potentially explosive environment is to strip away the underlying foundations originally built into these courts. [¶] It's unfortunate for the law-abiding populace that are required to share the same quarters with dissidents and those who would wilfully disrupt the court proceedings. [¶] It is tragic that the courts which are designed and intended for the man on the street must be turned into an arena for those dissidents who have no respect for the law or consideration for others. [¶] This decision undoubtedly undermines the entire judicial structure on the lower levels, the people's courts. A result of the news story was a rift between Judge Fogerty and petitioner that ended their informal communications on professional matters. (9) Of the three Aldrich charges sustained by the commission we begin with those found to be only prejudicial conduct. The tasteless use of puke and psychopath to describe Aldrich to Olson and Nielsen does not warrant discipline for rude and profane conduct. The words were not uttered from the bench but in one-to-one conversation in chambers or on the telephone. The effect differed little from a describing of Aldrich as a hoodlum or an unsavory character. As for petitioner's statement to the press, he correctly points out that his making it did not violate the command of canon 3(A)(6) of the Code of Judicial Conduct to abstain from public comment about a pending or impending proceeding in any court. The contempt litigation had been concluded. The canon states that it does not prohibit judges from making public statements in the course of their official duties or from explaining for public information the procedures of the court. An ethics opinion that petitioner introduced states that nothing in the Code of Judicial Conduct prevents a judge from making a dignified response to public criticism except as related to a case pending or about to be brought before the court. (Conference of Cal. Judges, Com. on Judicial Ethics, Opn. No. 24, Mar. 27, 1976.) Was petitioner's statement to the press, however, more than a dignified response to public criticism? He did not merely recount a justice court's need of power to control unruly conduct while defending his contempt order as a proper exercise of that power. He declared: To divest justice court judges of the dignity and ability to control this potentially explosive environment is to strip away the underlying foundations originally built into these courts.... This decision undoubtedly undermines the entire judicial structure on the lower levels, the people's courts. Those words did misrepresent Judge Fogerty's ruling, which was narrowly based on a finding that the bailiff had invited Aldrich's conduct. (See fn. 8, ante. ) But was petitioner's statement conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 18, subd. (c))? In the circumstances, we think not (Cf. United States v. Morgan (1941) 313 U.S. 409, 421 [85 L.Ed. 1429, 1435, 61 S.Ct. 999], re a practice familiar in the long history of Anglo-American litigation, whereby unsuccessful litigants and lawyers give vent to their disappointment in tavern or press) and dismiss the charge. (10) There remains the commission's determination of wilful misconduct in attempting to dissuade Olson from representing Aldrich. It is elementary that a judge must be on his guard neither to infringe upon the defendant's right to counsel of his choice, nor to compromise the independence of the bar. ( Smith v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 547, 559 [68 Cal. Rptr. 1, 440 P.2d 65] (trial court held without power to remove counsel as incompetent).) Smith makes it abundantly clear that the involuntary removal of any attorney is a severe limitation on a defendant's right to counsel and may be justified, if at all, only in the most flagrant circumstances of attorney misconduct or incompetence when all other judicial controls have failed. ( Cannon v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1975) 14 Cal.3d 678, 697 [122 Cal. Rptr. 778, 537 P.2d 898].) Petitioner does not claim to have questioned Olson's competence. Petitioner's stress reaction from Aldrich's harassment does not excuse his conduct. (Cf. In re Fahey (1973) 8 Cal.3d 842, 850, fn. 4 [106 Cal. Rptr. 313, 505 P.2d 1369, 63 A.L.R.3d 465] (attorney misconduct).) He does not contend that his January 12 talk with Olson reflected the stress reaction. He argues that his attempts in that conversation to convince Olson that Aldrich's case was meritless and that Olson should not handle it were not improper because petitioner then was simply a party to the [superior court] lawsuit, not a judge who was to decide anything further. The argument is specious; his position was that of judge attempting to discourage the exercise of rights to obtain review of his contempt order. His statements to Olson and Nielsen on January 12 and 18, 1978, constituted wilful misconduct in office.