Opinion ID: 1945980
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Delayed Disclosure

Text: Over the term of the lengthy trial, appellants raised numerous claims under these doctrines. The trial court carefully examined each claimed violation, and, where necessary, took steps to either sanction the prosecution or rectify the alleged inequity. On more than several occasions, the trial court held hearings to determine the extent of any violations, and whether or not sanctions would follow. On two occasions, the trial court sanctioned the prosecutor for discovery violations and informed the jury of the sanctions and the reasons behind them  namely, that the prosecutor had failed to disclose evidence as required by law. [17] In the relatively rare instances where the trial court ruled that alleged Brady or Giglio material need not be disclosed, appellants were nevertheless not prejudiced because the jury was in fact apprised of claimed exculpations and the witnesses' motives to lie. Although much of the material requested by the appellants was not disclosed initially, the majority of the requested material was turned over to appellants during trial. More importantly, appellants were able to employ those truantly disclosed materials in their cross-examinations of the relevant witnesses. [18] Taken together, these factors rebut the necessary demonstration that appellants were prejudiced, or that the court abused its discretion. Looking at the claims of abuse in this light, we find no reversible error. Of the numerous claimed violations, the majority represented late disclosure of Brady and Giglio material. Appellants' counsel were able to exploit this material as part of their defense, and they are unable to show reversible prejudice arising from the tardy disclosure  they point to no difference earlier disclosures would have made in their respective cases, with the exception of their opening arguments. Where, as here, the defense was able to eventually use Brady evidence to cross-examine government witnesses, the requisite prejudice is lacking, and we will not disturb the trial court's ruling. [19] See Edelen v. United States, 627 A.2d 968, 972 (D.C.1993) ([T]he trial judge was on the scene. He was in a far better position than we are to assess the atmospherics of the case and to determine whether, given all that had occurred, [the] defense was appreciably prejudiced by any delay in the [ Brady ] disclosure . . . .); see also, e.g., United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1376 (10th Cir.1997) (As long as ultimate disclosure is made before it is too late for the defendant[] to make use of any benefits of the evidence, Due Process is satisfied.) (internal quotations omitted). Appellants nevertheless argue that the cumulative effect of such last minute disclosures undermined the credibility of the prosecutor. This, they argue, indirectly impinged upon the prosecutor's assurances that certain witnesses were not parties to extensive agreements with the government, who in turn gave false testimony against appellants. Appellants, however, misstate their argument by relying on the cumulative effect the alleged Brady violations had on the prosecutor's credibility. As Kyles makes clear, the relevant inquiry is whether the cumulative effect of suppressed Brady evidence raises a reasonable probability that disclosure would have produced a different result, not whether a prosecutor's repeatedly late disclosures under Brady might otherwise affect the prosecutor's credibility on other matters. 514 U.S. at 421-22, 115 S.Ct. 1555. The prosecutor's credibility is not Brady evidence. Without a demonstration of how the late disclosure of the evidence prejudiced their case, the prosecutor's consistently late disclosures cannot form the basis for reversal.