Opinion ID: 4543809
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mr. Peña’s Post-Conviction Conduct in Prison

Text: Mr. Peña asserts that the district court failed to adequately consider all relevant information regarding his post-conviction conduct. He claims the court overemphasized his weapons violations and failed to consider the impact on recidivism of the programs and classes Mr. Peña completed. We are not persuaded. Agent Reshay Childress, a senior intelligence analyst for the Bureau of Prisons who worked at the United States Prison at Beaumont (“USP Beaumont”), testified at Mr. Peña’s resentencing. He explained the four classifications for inmate offenses, 100 series offenses being the most dangerous and 400 series offenses being the least. At the time of the resentencing hearing, Mr. Peña had been subject to eight disciplinary actions while incarcerated at USP Beaumont, including five Number 104 violations for possessing a dangerous weapon. His other three violations were for fighting with another person (Number 201), refusing to obey an order (Number 307), and possessing an unauthorized 12 item (Number 305). Based on some of these violations, Mr. Peña was transferred to a Special Management Unit (“SMU”), a segregated housing unit designed to increase supervision of inmates and ensure safety. As a part of the SMU program, Mr. Peña took vocational and educational classes. Mr. Peña completed the SMU program in sixteen months and returned to the general population at USP Beaumont. After completing the SMU program, Mr. Peña received two of his five Number 104 weapons violations. Both incidents involved possession of knives. After the second incident another inmate requested protective custody, expressing fear for his life based upon his belief that Mr. Peña intended to stab him. Prison officials found the inmate’s fear to be credible and recommended his transfer to another facility. Although the district court did give significant weight to Mr. Peña’s postconviction conduct, the court also considered the danger at USP Beaumont as a reason why Mr. Peña might have a weapon and acknowledged Mr. Peña’s participation in vocational and academic classes. After weighing the evidence in the record, the district court concluded that Mr. Peña “is determined to possess dangerous weapons and he will continue to defy the law to do so.” Peña, 2018 WL 6003538, at . Moreover, the court was not persuaded by the fact that Mr. Peña has not yet hurt anyone because his “history and characteristics reveal that he is completely capable of causing harm to innocent members of society.” Id. The court emphasized the need to protect the public from Mr. 13 Peña. While Mr. Peña may disagree with the district court as to the weight of his postconviction conduct on his sentence, the district court did not abuse its discretion. C. Sentencing Disparity with Mr. Peña’s Co-Defendant Mr. Peña points to the sentencing disparity with his co-defendant, Mr. Conde, as evidence of the substantive unreasonableness of his sentence. In assessing a sentence, “[a] district court may consider sentencing disparities between co-defendants, but the purpose of the Guidelines is not to eliminate disparities among co-defendants, but rather to eliminate disparities among sentences nationwide.” United States v. Zapata, 546 F.3d 1179, 1194 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted). Moreover, “[18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)(6)’s consideration of unwarranted sentence disparities is but one factor that a district court must balance against the other § 3553(a) factors in arriving at an appropriate sentence.” United States v. Martinez, 610 F.3d 1216, 1228 (10th Cir. 2010). Here, the district court correctly considered any sentencing disparity between “similarly situated defendants,” as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Peña, 2018 WL 6003538, at –15. Although Mr. Conde received a sentence of only 36 months, he had cooperated with the government, entered into a plea agreement, testified against Mr. Peña, accepted responsibility, and demonstrated a commitment to reforming his behavior. He was also sentenced from a much lower guidelines range, 70–87 months, than Mr. Peña. Given the vast differences in the circumstances related to Mr. Conde’s sentence, 14 the disparity between his and Mr. Peña’s sentences is not sufficiently compelling to demonstrate substantive unreasonableness. D. Exercising the Right to Trial Mr. Peña also contends the district court punished him for going to trial, asserting that he “implicitly accepted responsibility” for his conduct. Aplt. Br. at 17. Mr. Peña claims he acknowledged his conduct in the Luna incident and exercised his right to trial only to challenge the government’s position that his conduct violated the statute. Mr. Peña believes he should have received a reduction in his sentence based on acceptance of responsibility. We have only approved of acceptance of responsibility adjustments after a trial where the defendant “admitted to all the conduct with which he was charged” but went to trial to preserve issues unrelated to factual guilt. See, e.g., United States v. Gauvin, 173 F.3d 798, 806 (10th Cir. 1999) (affirming the application of the acceptance of responsibility guideline where the defendant only contested the legal element of intent); see also U.S.S.G. §3E1.1 application notes cmt.2 (“This adjustment is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt . . . .”). Mr. Peña is correct that his decision to go to trial was not frivolous because the district court found that one of the carjacking charges did not meet the elements under federal law and 15 dismissed the charge. But Mr. Peña went to trial on all counts of the indictment; he did not stipulate to any elements for any of the counts. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Mr. Peña did not accept responsibility for his conduct. Nothing else in the court’s opinion suggests a penalty for Mr. Peña exercising his right to trial. E. “Windfall” for the Dismissal of a Carjacking Charge Mr. Peña next takes issue with the district court’s reasoning that he received a benefit from the Johnson decision and a “windfall” from the dismissal of one count of carjacking for his conduct in the Luna incident. Mr. Peña argues that a defendant does not receive a windfall when the law is correctly applied. This argument disregards the context in which the district court discussed a “windfall.” While considering the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), the district court noted that “[t]he ruling under Johnson significantly reduced Pena’s exposure at resentencing, as it has for certain defendants nationwide.” Peña, 2018 WL 6003538, at . The court then concluded that “any potential nationwide sentence disparity is not unwarranted in this case when the Court considers ‘similar conduct’ for which other similarly situated defendants have been found guilty.” Id. The “similar conduct” the district court referred to included Mr. Peña’s actions in the drive-by shooting and the Luna incident. The court noted that Mr. Peña was not prosecuted in state court for his conduct in those incidents pursuant to N.M. Stat. § 30-3- 16 8 (shooting at a dwelling or occupied building, or shooting at or from a motor vehicle) and N.M. Stat. § 30-16D-1 (unlawful taking of a vehicle or motor vehicle).4 Because Mr. Luna was not close enough to his truck for the theft of it to constitute carjacking, Mr. Peña was acquitted of that crime as well as conspiracy to commit carjacking and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. See United States v. Brown, 200 F.3d 700, 705 (10th Cir. 1999) (carjacking requires that a victim be “sufficiently near to the vehicle for it to be within reach, inspection, or control, and absent threat or intimidation, to be able to maintain control of it.”) (citation omitted). It was for this reason that the district court said “a windfall . . . results for Pena from [the court]’s finding that Luna, who had run across the church parking lot out of fear of being shot, was not close enough to the vehicle for the theft of it to satisfy the legal definition of carjacking.” Peña, 2018 WL 6003538, at . Significantly, the district court clarified that it did not consider the additional offenses for the drive-by and the Luna incidents when it imposed Mr. Peña’s sentence. It only mentioned Mr. Peña’s acquitted conduct for the purpose of comparing him to other similarly situated defendants. See United States v. Todd, 515 F.3d 1128, 1137 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme Court and this circuit have both expressly held that acquitted conduct can be considered for purposes of sentencing.”) (citing United States v. Watts, 4 The Supreme Court has recently confirmed that the dual sovereignty doctrine, which allows for prosecution by the state and the United States for the same conduct, does not violate double jeopardy. See Gamble v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 1960, 1964 (2019). 17 519 U.S. 148, 154 (1997) (per curiam)). Given this context, the court’s statement that Mr. Peña received a “windfall” does not make Mr. Peña’s sentence substantively unreasonable. F. Mr. Peña’s Age and Risk of Recidivism At resentencing, Mr. Peña cited a 2004 study by the Sentencing Commission observing that “[r]ecidivism rates decline relatively consistently as age increases.” U.S.S.C., Measuring Recidivism: The Criminal History Computation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 12, 28 (May 2004). He argues on appeal that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court discounted his age (33 at the time of resentencing) as well as the fact that even under a within-guidelines sentence he would be less likely to recidivate by the time he was released. He also cites a 2017 study concluding that “[o]lder offenders were substantially less likely than younger offenders to recidivate following release.” U.S.S.C., The Effects of Aging on Recidivism Among Federal Offenders 3 (Dec. 2017). The district court addressed the 2004 study cited by Mr. Peña by discussing the same 2017 study, which the government cited below. Significantly, the study found that the recidivism rate increases among older federal offenders where the offender committed crimes involving firearms. Id. at 25. The court was “persuaded by the 2017 Study that [the sentence imposed was] sufficient, but not greater than necessary to significantly reduce the likelihood of recidivism” because Mr. Peña’s “actions and post-conviction conduct . . . show a lack of effort on Pena’s part to even attempt to reform his behavior.” 18 Peña, 2018 WL 6003538, at . Thus, the district court specifically considered Mr. Peña’s age at the time of resentencing and disagreed as to his likelihood of recidivism. G. Extent of the Upward Variance from the Applicable Guidelines Range Finally, Mr. Peña argues that the sentence’s upward variance from the applicable guidelines range is substantively unreasonable. “If [the district court] decides that an outside-Guidelines sentence is warranted, [the court] must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. On review, we must “give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Id. at 51. Mr. Peña attempts to distinguish the three cases the district court relied on in supporting the upward variance, cases where this court upheld large upward variances as substantively reasonable. Pinson, 542 F.3d at 836 (affirming a 135-month upward variance); United States v. Gantt, 679 F.3d 1240, 1250–51 (10th Cir. 2012) (concluding that a 156-month upward variance was reasonable); and United States v. Worku, 800 F.3d 1195, 1208 (10th Cir. 2015) (determining an upward variance of 31 offense levels was substantively reasonable). Mr. Peña argues that he has no prior convictions for injuring someone and therefore he should not receive a harsher sentence than defendants with “much more egregious histories.” Aplt. Br. at 23. Mr. Peña also cites a Fourth Circuit case to support his argument that the variance from the guidelines range is so extreme as to be substantively unreasonable. See United 19 States v. Tucker, 473 F.3d 556 (4th Cir. 2007). In Tucker, the Fourth Circuit determined that a 144-month sentence for one count of bank fraud was substantively unreasonable because “the district court did not provide compelling reasons to justify the extent of the variance” and the circumstances of the case did not warrant the extreme variance. Id. at 557. The Fourth Circuit explained the need to “maintain[ ] a strong connection between the sentence imposed and the offender’s real conduct—a connection important to the increased uniformity of sentencing.” Id. at 564 (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005)). Mr. Peña argues the district court broke the connection between his conduct and his sentence. We are not persuaded. We agree with the district court that the cases are useful in providing “guidance in how to satisfy the Tenth Circuit review of procedural and substantive reasonableness,” but the cases do not restrict a district court’s ability to impose an upward sentence only where specific facts are present. Peña, 2018 WL 6003538, at . The reasoning of Pinson, Gantt, and Worku support the court’s decision to impose an upward variance. In all three cases, the district courts pointed to the defendant’s history of violent or criminal conduct when reasoning that an aboveguidelines sentence was required. Pinson, 542 F.3d at 837; Gantt, 679 F.3d at 1250–51; Worku, 800 F.3d at 1207–08. In two of the cases, the danger the defendant posed to the public was also emphasized as part of the court’s justification for imposing an upward variance. Pinson, 542 F.3d at 837; Gantt, 679 F.3d at 1250–51. The district court here similarly explained that it “placed great weight on the determination that Pena’s offense 20 conduct and his history and characteristics support this upward variance,” emphasizing in particular that Peña brandished his firearm during the carjacking and “also brandished or used a firearm during the Luna vehicle theft and during the drive-by shooting, both of which threatened public safety with death or serious bodily harm.” Peña, 2018 WL 6003538, at . The court determined accordingly that a within-guidelines sentence would not “satisfy the sentencing goals of § 3553(a)(2), particularly in protecting the public and deterring future criminal conduct.” Id. The decision here stands in contrast to the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Tucker, where “the district court offered no compelling justification for why a 144 month sentence was necessary to protect society.” 473 F.3d at 564. Here the district court offered significant explanation for the sentence imposed and determined that a withinguidelines sentence would be “woefully inadequate to accomplish the goals of sentencing.” Peña, 2018 WL 6003538, at . Although the variance from the guidelines here is large, the district court addressed each of the § 3553(a) factors, provided compelling reasons for the upward variance, and thereby maintained the connection between Mr. Peña’s conduct and the sentence imposed. Given the district court’s detailed explanation of Mr. Peña’s sentence, he cannot meet his burden of showing the sentence is arbitrary, whimsical, or substantively unreasonable. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM. 21