Opinion ID: 1237351
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Terms of Decree

Text: It remains to determine what decree should be entered. The power of the court under § 13 of the Act is to enter a decree enforcing, modifying and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside the order of the examiner. Under § 14 the court is authorized to make any appropriate order or decree in addition to those set forth in § 13. Unlike the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 USCA § 160 (c) there is no provision in the Oregon Act for reinstatement of employees in a case where an employer is found to have engaged in an unfair labor practice. The only sanction so far as violation by an employer is concerned would be punishment for contempt in case of refusal to comply with a cease-and-desist order. As disclosed by the finding of the examiner the employer discharged employees because they joined the Union and threatened to discharge any others who should join. This occurred in May, 1953, before the  Act went into effect. At that time, it would seem, the picketing was protected against judicial restraint by the anti-injunction statute (ORS 662.010-662.130). On July 21, 1953, the Act, pursuant to which this proceeding was commenced, went into effect, and an entirely new situation then emerged. The Union, which claimed to have a majority among the employees, could have called for an election in which the discharged employees would have had the right to vote, for under § 1 (2) an employee shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any action declared to be unlawful by the Act. But the employer could not demand an election because the Union had served no written notice that it claimed to represent a majority of the employers (§ 3). And, if the employer was then discriminating against employees because of their union activities, the Union could have filed charges with the examiner and obtained a cease-and-desist order. The Union, however, taking the position that the Act was unconstitutional in its entirety, chose to ignore its provisions, to continue with the picketing, and, when charges were filed against it, to challenge the entire proceeding on constitutional grounds. This, of course, was the Union's privilege. But, as it turns out, the Act is in large part valid, and the Union has been, and, we assume, is still, violating one of its provisions. Early in July, 1953, Burgers commenced suit in the Circuit Court for Lane County to enjoin the Union from further picketing. While the suit was pending Burgers' attorney offered in writing to settle the controversy by an election under the supervision of the labor commissioner or the labor examiner, when one should be appointed, and by entering into a union security contract with the Union if in such an election it  should be selected by a majority of the employees as their bargaining agent. The offer expressed a willingness that persons employed at the restaurant at a time to be selected by the Union within a week or two preceding May 25, 1953, would be permitted to vote (apparently thus including those discharged for affiliating with the Union), and that the Union might determine whether persons employed since May 25 would likewise be permitted to vote. Burgers further offered to sign such contract as might be agreed upon as a result of negotiations then being carried on between the Eugene Restaurant Association and the Union. The Union rejected the offer for the reason that the employer had announced that under no circumstances would the discharged employees be reinstated, but offered to enter into negotiations with the employer. If it should be suggested that the Act is one sided because it fails to include a provision under which the examiner could order reinstatement of employees discharged in violation of § 16, that would not be a ground for the court to refuse to enforce a cease-and-desist order otherwise unobjectionable. American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Company, supra, 335 US 540-543; National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 US 1, 81 L ed 893, 57 S Ct 615, 108 ALR 1352. Nor is it a valid objection that the picketing may have been in part for a lawful purpose, since it has been undertaken and carried on with at least one of its substantial purposes in conflict with the declared policy of this state. Local Union No. 10 v. Graham, supra; International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, supra, 341 US 700; NLRB v. Denver Building & Const. Trades Council, supra, 341 US 688-689. 19. It is the conclusion of the court, therefore, that a  decree should be entered reciting that the picketing by the Union of the business premises of the appellant Burgers is in violation of the policy of Oregon as declared in ORS 662.750 (Oregon Laws 1953, ch 723, § 16), and ordering the Union to cease and desist from such picketing.