Opinion ID: 2518345
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State's Cross-Petition for Review Issue

Text: In its cross-petition, the State argues that the Court of Appeals erred in vacating the defendant's downward departure sentence of 96 months for a severity level 1 drug felony (138-154 months), on the conviction of possession of pseudoephedrine or ephedrine and remanding to the district court for a severity level 4 drug felony (10-12 months) sentence on the same charge under State v. Frazier, 30 Kan. App. 2d 398, 42 P.3d 188, rev. denied 274 Kan. 1115 (2002). Resolution of this issue involves the interpretation of statutes which is a question of law permitting unlimited review. State v. Engles, 270 Kan. 530, 532, 17 P.3d 355 (2001). The following statutes in effect at the time of the offense are applicable to this analysis. K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 65-7006 provided in relevant part: (a) It shall be unlawful for any person to possess ephedrine, pseudoephedrine or phenylpropanolamine, or their salts, isomers or salts of isomers with intent to use the product as a precursor to any illegal substance. A violation of this section is a drug severity level 1 felony. K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 65-7006(d). K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 65-4152, provided in relevant part: (a) No person shall use or posses with intent to use: . . . (3) any drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, sell or distribute a controlled substance in violation of the uniform controlled substances act. Violation of this subsection other than by planting, propagation, growing, or harvesting less then five marijuana plants, is a drug severity level 4 felony. K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 65-4152(c). K.S.A. 65-4150(c) defines drug paraphernalia as all equipment, products and materials of any kind which are used or intended for use in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging, storing, containing, concealing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling or otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled substance in violation of the uniform controlled substances act. Drug paraphernalia includes but is not limited to: (2) Kits used or intended for use in manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing or preparing controlled substances. . . . . (8) Blenders, bowls, containers, spoons and mixing devices used or intended for use in compounding controlled substances. K.S.A. 65-4150(c)(2), (8). In Frazier, the defendant was convicted of possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine, a drug severity level 1 felony, pursuant to K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 65-7006(a), and he argued on appeal that the conduct for which he was convicted also fell under the statute prohibiting possession of drug paraphernalia, a drug severity level 4 felony, pursuant to K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 65-4152(a)(3). The Court of Appeals found that possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine and possession of drug paraphernalia are identical offenses because both offenses prohibit the possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine for use in the manufacture of a controlled substance, and ephedrine and pseudoephedrine fall within the definition of drug paraphernalia because they are materials used to manufacture a controlled substance. As the offenses were identical, the defendant could only be sentenced for a drug severity level 4 felony. 30 Kan. App. 2d at 403-06. See State v. Nunn, 244 Kan. 207, 229, 768 P.2d 268 (1989) (Where two criminal offenses have identical elements but are classified differently for purposes of imposing a penalty, a defendant convicted of either crime may be sentenced only under the lesser penalty provision.). In this case, the State argues that the Court of Appeals erred in relying upon Frazier because it was incorrectly decided. The State argues that the elements of possession of drug paraphernalia and the elements of possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine are not identical; that the defendant could only be charged and convicted under the more specific possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine statute rather than the general drug paraphernalia statute; and that the legislative intent of K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 65-7006 was to create a specific crime addressing and punishing one kind of drug paraphernalia more severely than the other kinds of drug paraphernalia covered by the general statute, K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 65-4152(a)(3). We recently rejected the State's arguments in State v. Campbell, 279 Kan.1, 106 P.3d 1129 (2005). Campbell came before this court on petition for review from a Court of Appeals' decision which had declined to follow Frazier. State v. Campbell, 31 Kan. App. 2d 1123, 78 P.3d 1178 (2003). After examining the legislative history and language of the statutes, the Campbell panel concluded that possession of ephedrine or pseudophedrine was the more specific statute which controlled over the more general possession of drug paraphernalia statute, that K.S.A. 65-4152(a)(3) and K.S.A. 65-7006 were not identical offenses, and that 65-7006 was intended to criminalize possession and uses of specific substances which are used as a precursor to any illegal substance. 31 Kan. App. 2d at 1134-37. In reversing on appeal, we found it was unnecessary to consider the legislative history because the statutes were not ambiguous and the legislative intent was clear. Unlike either the Frazier or Campbell panels, we recognized three situations where a defendant's conduct may fall within two statutes (1) where one statute defines a lesser included offense of the other and they carry different penalties, (2) where the statutes overlap and carry different penalties, and (3) where the statutes are identical. 279 Kan. at 14 (quoting LaFave, Israel & King, 4 Criminal Procedure, § 13.7[a], pp. 95-99 [2d ed. 1999]). We found that the unfettered prosecutorial discretion that is the mischief of some courts, including Kansas courts, seek to avoid is significantly curbed when the statutes are overlapping, as contrasted with identical or duplicative statutes. 279 Kan. at 15. We agreed with the ultimate conclusion of Frazier, if not the exact reasoning: With regard to guidance in prosecutorial charging decisions, the statutes at issue here are overlapping rather than duplicative, which as described in LaFave, Israel & King present the hard case because to the extent of any overlap, the conduct involved is identical. The conduct prohibited by K.S.A. 65-7006(a) is a defendant's act of knowingly possessing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine with the intent to use the product to manufacture a controlled substance. The conduct prohibited by K.S.A. 65-4152(a)(3) is a defendant's act of knowingly possessing drug paraphernalia with the intent to use it to manufacture a controlled substance. The definition of drug paraphernalia in K.S.A. 65-4150(c) includes `products and materials of any kind' which are intended for use in manufacturing a controlled substance. Thus, the conduct prohibited by K.S.A. 65-4152(a)(3) may include a defendant's act of knowingly possessing a product with the intent to use it to manufacture a controlled substance. Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are products used in the manufacture of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. Indeed, in K.S.A. 65-7006(a) the legislature used the term `product' as a synonym for ephedrine or pseudoephedrine. In the circumstances of this case, the elements of the offense were knowingly possessing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine with the intent to use it to manufacture a controlled substance. The elements were the same whether Campbell had been charged under the ephedrine statute or the drug paraphernalia statute. Consequently, he must be sentenced under the lesser penalty provisions for violation of 65-4152(a)(3). Likewise, in this case, the elements of K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 65-7006, possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine, and K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 65-4152(a)(3), possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to use it to manufacture a controlled substance, were overlapping rather than identical. Campbell thus counsels that the defendant should have been sentenced under the lesser penalty provisions of K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 5-4152(a)(3), a severity level 4 felony. While the Court of Appeals reliance upon Frazier was misplaced in light of Campbell, it properly reversed and remanded the case for resentencing of the possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine conviction as a severity level 4 felony.