Opinion ID: 2614001
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Instruction as to reasonable doubt

Text: (28) Defendant contends that the definition of reasonable doubt contained in CALJIC No. 2.90 (§§ 1096, 1096a), inasmuch as it contains references to moral evidence and moral certainty, impermissibly dilutes the prosecution's constitutionally imposed burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. [16] In Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. ___ [127 L.Ed.2d 583, 114 S.Ct. 1239], affirming People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 185-186 [14 Cal. Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862], the United States Supreme Court concluded that the California reasonable doubt instruction is constitutional. (See People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 501-505 [34 Cal. Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249].) The court in Victor initially reviewed the use of the term moral evidence, noting that, in defining the phrase reasonable doubt, the jury was told that everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. The high court explained: [I]n other words, ... absolute certainty is unattainable in matters relating to human affairs. Moral evidence, in this sentence, can only mean empirical evidence offered to prove such matters  the proof introduced at trial. ( Victor v. Nebraska, supra, 511 U.S. ___, ___ [127 L.Ed.2d 583, 595].) The high court observed that this conclusion was reinforced by other instructions requiring that the jurors determine the facts only from the evidence received at trial, defining the nature of that evidence, and requiring the jurors not to allow themselves to be swayed by pity or prejudice  instructions that correctly directed the jurors' attention to the facts of the case before them, and not to the ethics or morality of Sandoval's criminal acts. ( Ibid. ) The high court also reviewed the phrase moral certainty, concluding that, although in one respect that phrase is ambiguous in the abstract, the other instructions provided in the case lent content to the phrase, inasmuch as the jurors were told they must have `an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge,' and an instruction cast in terms of an abiding conviction as to guilt, without reference to moral certainty, correctly states the government's burden of proof. [Citation.] (511 U.S. ___, ___ [127 L.Ed.2d 583, 596].) The court observed: [T]he judge had already informed the jury that matters relating to human affairs are proven by moral evidence [citation]; giving the same meaning to the word moral in this part of the instruction, moral certainty can only mean certainty with respect to human affairs. As used in this instruction, therefore, we are satisfied that the reference to moral certainty, in conjunction with the abiding conviction language, `impress[ed] upon the factfinder the need to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused.' [Citation.] (511 U.S. ___, ___ [127 L.Ed.2d 583, 596].) The court further explained that, in view of the additional instructions concerning the jurors' duty to determine the facts from the evidence at trial and their duty not to be swayed by pity or prejudice, it was not reasonably likely the jury understood the words moral certainty either as suggesting a standard of proof lower than due process requires or as allowing conviction on factors other than the government's proof. ( Id. at p. ___ [127 L.Ed.2d at p. 597].) In the present case, the jury received instruction on reasonable doubt in a form identical to that provided in Sandoval. Moreover, the jurors also received the standard instructions requiring that they determine the facts solely from the evidence presented at trial and that they not allow themselves to be swayed by pity or prejudice. (CALJIC Nos. 1.00, 1.03) Accordingly, we conclude there was no error.
(29) Defendant also contends that four other instructions provided in the present case undermined the constitutional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In these instructions, which pertained to the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove (1) the charged offenses (CALJIC No. 2.01), (2) the required mental state (CALJIC No. 2.02), (3) the special circumstance allegations (CALJIC No. 8.83), and (4) the required mental state as to the special circumstance allegations (CALJIC No. 8.83.1), the trial court informed the jury that, if one interpretation of the evidence appears to you to be reasonable and the other interpretation to be unreasonable, you must accept the reasonable interpretation and reject the unreasonable. Specifically, defendant urges that, by informing the jurors of their duty to accept an interpretation of the evidence establishing defendant's guilt as long as that interpretation appears to be reasonable, the instructions (emphasized by the prosecutor's argument to the jury that the prosecution had presented a reasonable interpretation of the evidence) permitted the jury to determine guilt based upon a degree of proof less than that mandated by the reasonable doubt standard (see In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 364 [25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072]; see also Cage v. Louisiana (1990) 498 U.S. 39 [112 L.Ed.2d 339, 111 S.Ct. 328].) Defendant urges that the instructions thus functioned to convey an unconstitutional, mandatory, conclusive presumption of guilt. (See Carella v. California (1989) 491 U.S. 263, 265-266 [105 L.Ed.2d 218, 221-222, 109 S.Ct. 2419]; Sandstrom v. Montana (1979) 442 U.S. 510, 515 [61 L.Ed.2d 39, 45-46, 99 S.Ct. 2450].) We repeatedly have rejected analogous contentions. ( People v. Noguera (1993) 4 Cal.4th 599, 633-634 [15 Cal. Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160], People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1234-1235 [14 Cal. Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1]; People v. Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 926, 942-943; People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 385-386 [279 Cal. Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009].) When the questioned phrase is read in context, not only with the remaining language within each instruction but also together with related instructions, including the reasonable doubt instruction, it is clear that the jury was required only to reject unreasonable interpretations of the evidence and to accept a reasonable interpretation that was consistent with the evidence. ( People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d 334, 386.)