Opinion ID: 1454621
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Trial Court's Decision to Excuse Prospective Juror Clinton Lee for Cause

Text: When asked by the court whether he had ever been arrested or in jail for anything, prospective juror Clinton Lee responded in the negative. The prosecutor produced a rap sheet showing Lee's convictions for various misdemeanor offenses including, on two occasions, drunk driving. It also showed two charges of obstructing and resisting an officer (§ 148), one of which was dismissed upon a plea of guilty to drunk driving and another which showed no disposition. The prosecutor moved to excuse Lee, arguing that he had committed perjury. Over objection by defense counsel that ignorance and stupidity are not grounds for disqualification, the trial court granted the motion. (3a) Defendant claims error, noting that Lee was not specifically asked whether he had been charged with a crime and his answers could have been correct (e.g., he might have surrendered himself as opposed to being arrested and might not have spent time in jail). Observing that Lee had expressed no preconceived views on the death penalty, he further asserts that any error was prejudicial. (4) The qualification of a juror challenged for cause is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and is seldom a ground for reversal on appeal. ( Odle v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 932, 944 [187 Cal. Rptr. 455, 654 P.2d 225]; People v. Sanchez (1989) 208 Cal. App.3d 721, 732 [256 Cal. Rptr. 446].) (3b) There was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling. Whether Lee was taken into custody or surrendered himself, he was nonetheless arrested numerous times. An arrest is taking a person into custody in a case and in a manner prescribed by law. (§ 834.) An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person, or by submission to the custody of an officer.  (§ 835, italics added.) In view of Lee's rap sheet, his responses to questions about his arrest record were lacking in candor and completeness. Concealment by a potential juror constitutes implied bias justifying disqualification. ( People v. Diaz (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 926, 934-936 [200 Cal. Rptr. 77]; see also Clark v. United States (1932) 289 U.S. 1, 10-11 [77 L.Ed. 993, 997-998, 53 S.Ct. 465].) Lee's disqualification was justified. Moreover, even apart from whether or not Lee concealed his arrest record on voir dire examination, the trial court had ample cause for disqualification. The prosecutor represented to the court that he had personally prosecuted Lee for some of the charges listed on the rap sheet. The trial court could have reasonably inferred that Lee might harbor ill feelings amounting to bias from these experiences. (See People v. Williams (1988) 199 Cal. App.3d 469, 476-478 [245 Cal. Rptr. 61]; People v. Farris (1977) 66 Cal. App.3d 376, 385-387 [136 Cal. Rptr. 45].)