Opinion ID: 8126858
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review

Text: [¶26] Mr. Rodriguez claims the prosecutors committed misconduct twice during the State’s opening statement and twice during its closing argument. Because Mr. Rodriguez objected to each statement, we review for harmless error. Armajo v. State, 2020 WY 153, ¶ 33, 478 P.3d 184, 193 (Wyo. 2020) (citing Bogard v. State, 2019 WY 96, ¶ 18, 449 P.3d 315, 321 (Wyo. 2019)). “To demonstrate harmful error, the defendant must show prejudice under circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice or conduct which offends the public sense of fair play.” Armajo, 2020 WY 153, ¶ 33, 478 P.3d at 193 (quoting Dixon v. State, 2019 WY 37, ¶ 40, 438 P.3d 216, 231 (Wyo. 2019)). “Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are settled by reference to the entire record and ‘hinge on whether a defendant’s case has been so prejudiced as to constitute denial of a fair trial.’” Byerly v. State, 2019 WY 130, ¶ 20, 455 P.3d 232, 242 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting Mraz v. State, 2016 WY 85, ¶ 60, 378 P.3d 280, 294 (Wyo. 2016)). I. The prosecutor’s argument during the State’s opening statement did not prejudice Mr. Rodriguez. [¶27] The first incident that Mr. Rodriguez claims as prejudicial misconduct occurred after the prosecutor told the jury it would hear evidence that Mr. Rodriguez told a friend he was acting in self-defense. But, ladies and gentlemen, you’re going to learn that when the El Paso County authorities took the defendant’s statement when he walked in, they called Casper, who did a home check; and they walked in – or excuse me. They tried to open the doors. The doors were all locked. The dog was gone. They further searched. Mary’s purse was gone, her cell phone 7 was gone, her billfold was gone, all of her credit cards were gone, and her checkbooks were gone. They later found that that is what the defendant drove to Colorado when he tried to turn himself into the El Paso County Sheriff’s Department. That is not, ladies and gentlemen, the acts of a man who killed somebody – [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor. That’s argument. THE COURT: Sustained as to the phrasing. [PROSECUTOR]: We will introduce evidence, ladies and gentlemen, that you just don’t do something like that when you’re saying that you killed somebody in self-defense. [¶28] The second incident that Mr. Rodriguez claims as prejudicial misconduct also occurred when the prosecutor was discussing Mr. Rodriguez’s claim that he killed Ms. Fogle in self-defense. They got into a fight about pizza, ladies and gentlemen. You’re going to hear that, Oh, the defendant – he sent text messages to his friend Eric – Mary refuses to feed me. She didn’t give me a piece of pizza. Well, we’re going to introduce, ladies and gentlemen, that the pizza cutter never left the kitchen. It was still sitting right on the pizza pan. It still had pizza fragments all over it. And, ladies and gentlemen, a pizza cutter in the hands of a woman that’s five feet five inches tall, 160 pounds, compared to 5’11”, 190 pounds, isn’t something that I think you’re going to have to defend yourself with. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. That’s argument. THE COURT: Sustained. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I move to strike. THE COURT: I sustained the objection. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I would ask for a mistrial, Your Honor. 8 [PROSECUTOR]: That’s just evidence that we’re – that’s not a mistrial, Your Honor. THE COURT: Go ahead. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I would ask for a ruling, Your Honor. THE COURT: We’ll take it up at a later time. [¶29] Defense counsel renewed his request for a mistrial, and the district court denied the motion. It explained: All right. I’ll just note that I sustained the objections when they were made to particular, what amounted to be, in my assessment, arguments. And I think that’s sufficient. I don’t think anything that occurred during opening would rise to the level that would require a mistrial or justify a mistrial at this time. So I’ll deny the motion. [¶30] Mr. Rodriguez contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by presenting argument during his opening statement. Argument in an opening statement is improper, Whitney v. State, 2004 WY 118, ¶ 86, 99 P.3d 457, 485 (Wyo. 2004), but not all argument rises to the level of prosecutorial misconduct. “Prosecutorial misconduct occurs when a prosecutor illegally or improperly attempts to persuade a jury ‘to wrongly convict a defendant or assess an unjustified punishment.’” Hartley v. State, 2020 WY 40, ¶ 9, 460 P.3d 716, 719 (Wyo. 2020) (quoting Bogard, 2019 WY 96, ¶ 16, 449 P.3d at 320). We need not decide whether the prosecutor’s argument in this case rose to that level because, in any case, the record cannot support a finding of the prejudice Mr. Rodriguez claims. [¶31] In determining prejudice, we balance the following factors: “1) the severity and pervasiveness of the misconduct; 2) the significance of the misconduct to the central issues in the case; 3) the strength of the State’s evidence; 4) the use of cautionary instructions or other curative measures; and 5) the extent to which the defense invited the misconduct.” Klingbeil v. State, 2021 WY 89, ¶ 44, 492 P.3d 279, 289 (Wyo. 2021) (quoting McGinn v. State, 2015 WY 140, ¶ 16, 361 P.3d 295, 299-300 (Wyo. 2015)). [¶32] As to the first factor, considering the prosecutor’s statements in context, we are unable to conclude that they were either severe or pervasive. The prosecutor presented argument only twice in opening, and in both instances the statements were brief. Moreover, to the extent the prosecutor’s argument depended on facts, evidence of those facts was admitted at trial, and Mr. Rodriguez has not suggested otherwise. See Ross v. State, 930 9 P.2d 965, 971 (Wyo. 1996) (upholding finding of no prejudice where evidence argued in opening was eventually delivered in admissible form). [¶33] Additionally, we have recognized that “the district court is in the best position to assess” the impact of alleged prosecutorial misconduct. Teniente v. State, 2007 WY 165, ¶ 27, 169 P.3d 512, 524 (Wyo. 2007); see also Ross, 930 P.2d at 971 (“[T]he trial judge is best situated to plumb the potential for injury arising from prosecutorial misconduct.”). The court determined that sustaining defense counsel’s objections was a sufficient response to the prosecutor’s conduct, reflecting its view that the conduct was neither severe nor pervasive. See Armajo, 2020 WY 153, ¶ 44, 478 P.3d at 195 (“[T]he court sustained objections to each improper statement, lessening their potential prejudicial effect.”). [¶34] The second factor, the significance of the misconduct to the central issues in the case, also weighs against finding prejudice. The prosecutor’s improper argument concerned Mr. Rodriguez’s self-defense claim, but he does not contend it prejudiced him in that defense.3 He instead contends that the prosecutor’s argument during his opening statement prejudiced him because it alluded to his mental state and thereby undermined his NGMI defense. We fail to see the connection. The prosecutor’s arguments pointed to inconsistencies between Mr. Rodriguez’s self-defense claim and the evidence. Even if they could be interpreted in some manner as an allusion to his mental state, the asserted connection between the arguments and Mr. Rodriguez’s NGMI defense is simply too tenuous to support a finding of prejudice. [¶35] Turning to the fourth and fifth factors, it is clear that Mr. Rodriguez did not invite the alleged misconduct. As to the use of curative instructions, Mr. Rodriguez did not request any, and the district court did not provide any. The court did, however, instruct the jury, before opening statements, and again before closing arguments, that it was the exclusive judge of the facts, that those facts must be determined from the evidence, and that statements by counsel may not be regarded as evidence. See Whitney, 2004 WY 118, ¶ 92, 99 P.3d at 488 (general instruction that jury is to make findings based on evidence, not comments of counsel, lessened prejudice). [¶36] The most important factor is the third factor, the strength of the State’s case. Klingbeil, 2021 WY 89, ¶ 46, 460 P.3d at 289; Shields v. State, 2020 WY 101, ¶ 40, 468 P.3d 1097, 1108 (Wyo. 2020). Under this factor, Mr. Rodriguez “must show ‘it is reasonably probable he would have received a more favorable verdict if the error had not been made.’” Klingbeil, 2021 WY 89, ¶ 46, 492 P.3d at 289 (quoting Leners v. State, 2021 WY 67, ¶ 24, 486 P.3d 1013, 1018 (Wyo. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 410, 211 L.Ed.2d 220 (2021)). 3 By the time of closing arguments, Mr. Rodriguez had substantially retreated from his self-defense claim. 10 [¶37] Mr. Rodriguez concedes that “there was no real question of who killed Ms. Fogle,” but argues “there was a viable NGMI defense and a viable argument regarding premeditation.” As to premeditation, the jury found Mr. Rodriguez not guilty of firstdegree murder, so there plainly was no prejudice to that defense. As to his NGMI defense, Mr. Rodriguez failed to present evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that his mental condition excused his murder of Ms. Fogle. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-11-304 to 305 (LexisNexis 2021). It is therefore impossible for him to show a reasonable probability that he would have received a more favorable verdict but for the prosecutor’s conduct. [¶38] An NGMI defense is governed by statute, and the law presumes every defendant to be “mentally responsible.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-305(b). Mr. Rodriguez had to disprove that presumption. Gabbert v. State, 2018 WY 69, ¶ 13, 420 P.3d 172, 175 (Wyo. 2018). He had “the burden of going forward and proving by the greater weight of evidence that, as a result of mental illness or deficiency, he lacked capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-305(b). A mental illness or deficiency means “only those severely abnormal mental conditions that grossly and demonstrably impair a person’s perception or understanding of reality . . . .” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-304(a). [¶39] The evidence was overwhelming that when Mr. Rodriguez committed his crimes, he was not suffering a severely abnormal mental condition, and he understood the wrongfulness of his conduct. The jury heard the opinions of both Drs. Mahaffey and Pelc to that effect, and Mr. Rodriguez offered no contrary expert opinion. Additionally, Mr. Rodriguez’s behavior immediately after the crime confirmed that he understood the wrongfulness of his conduct. He fled the state in Ms. Fogle’s vehicle with her purse, billfold, credit cards, and checkbook, and he told authorities he felt bad for killing Ms. Fogle and requested a plea deal. See Gabbert, 2018 WY 69, ¶ 19, 420 P.3d at 177-78 (citing flight and awareness of consequences as evidence defendant understood wrongfulness of conduct). [¶40] The evidence was likewise overwhelming that Mr. Rodriguez was able to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Again, the jury heard the opinions of both Drs. Mahaffey and Pelc to that effect, and Mr. Rodriguez offered no contrary expert opinion. Additionally, Mr. Rodriguez testified that he was able to comply with the rules of the road when driving to Colorado, and to various locations in Colorado, showing his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. The same can be said for his decision to flee in Ms. Fogle’s vehicle instead of his own. He testified: Q. Well, you said you were trying to do everything law abiding, and that’s why you didn’t use your Volvo; right?
11 Q. Because it had expired plates and no insurance and things? A. Uh-huh. [¶41] The only evidence Mr. Rodriguez points to in support of his NGMI defense is his own testimony. He does not cite to any particular testimony but instead suggests the testimony overall supported his defense because it “was so disjointed.” Mr. Rodriguez’s testimony was indeed disjointed at times, and at times nonresponsive. There was no evidence from which the jury could conclude that Mr. Rodriguez’s testimony was the byproduct of a severely abnormal mental condition. Nor did his behavior during trial provide the jury with any evidence from which it could conclude that at the time of his crimes, it was impossible for him to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. [¶42] We rejected a similar argument in favor of an NGMI defense in Haddock v. State, 909 P.2d 974 (Wyo. 1996). In that case, the defendant pled guilty to credit card fraud and forgery and then moved to withdraw his plea on grounds that he had a valid NGMI defense and had not been competent to enter his plea. Id. at 975-76. He cited his behavior during the presentence investigation, and his unusual testimony when he entered his guilty plea, as evidence of his mental state. Appellant maintains that the presentence investigation report supported his claim that he was emotionally unstable. The presentence investigation report indicated that Appellant was suffering from extreme stress and that he may have been experiencing psychological difficulties at the time when the probation agent interviewed him. The report stated that Appellant believed that he was being harassed by law enforcement officials and that, while he was previously incarcerated at the Wyoming State Penitentiary, a monitoring device had been placed in his leg during a surgical procedure. The report further stated that Appellant believed that the monitoring device was being used to track him and was causing unusual magnetic occurrences. Appellant also claims that his testimony which he gave when he entered his guilty pleas reflected his emotional instability. He testified that he took the credit cards and the check so that he could force his parents to give him certain family information. Id. at 976. 12 [¶43] We upheld the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea, concluding that he had failed to present reliable evidence of a mental illness or deficiency. The probation agent’s observations which were included in the presentence investigation report described Appellant’s mental state at the time when the presentence investigation interview was being conducted and did not pertain to Appellant’s state of mind when he committed the crimes or when he pleaded guilty. Similarly, although Appellant’s testimony may have shown that he harbored unusual motives for his crimes, the testimony was not the type of evidence which would sustain a mental illness or deficiency defense. Id. at 976; see also Delgado v. State, 2022 WY 61, ¶ 34, 509 P.3d 913, 924 (Wyo. 2022) (evidence must relate to defendant’s mental state at time of crime). [¶44] Given the lack of evidence to support Mr. Rodriguez’s NGMI defense, it is not reasonably probable that the verdict would have been different in the absence of the State’s argument in opening. Any error in the opening statement was therefore harmless. See Mendoza v. State, 2021 WY 127, ¶ 20, 498 P.3d 82, 87 (Wyo. 2021) (rejecting claim of harm in prosecutor’s alleged misstatement of self-defense law where defense was “weak, at best”). II. The prosecutor’s comments during closing argument did not prejudice Mr. Rodriguez. [¶45] Defense counsel ended his closing argument by referring to Mr. Rodriguez’s demeanor at trial and arguing to the jury that his demeanor was evidence of his delusional disorder. The prosecutor then gave his rebuttal argument: [PROSECUTOR]: Ladies and gentlemen, he should get an Emmy. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor. That is improper argument. That’s attacking the defendant over the shoulders of the defense counsel. THE COURT: Overruled. . . . [PROSECUTOR]: We talked about malingering and feigning. There’s quite a bit of testimony about that. 13 Ladies and gentlemen, the defendant is guilty. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor. The instructions specifically say he is not guilty until the jury deliberates and returns its verdict. That is a misstatement of the law. And to say that he is guilty is an example of prosecutorial misconduct. [PROSECUTOR]: Judge, I’m making a closing argument. Going over the three charges, I believe they should return a verdict of guilty. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, he can say, You should find him guilty; but he cannot say he is guilty. That is an improper argument. And I – it’s – it’s clearly prosecutorial misconduct for him to say the defendant is guilty. THE COURT: I’ll sustain based on the phrasing, although there are other ways to make that argument. [¶46] Because Mr. Rodriguez cannot make the most important showing under our prejudice analysis, we need not address whether the prosecutor’s statements constituted misconduct. Mr. Rodriguez again only claims prejudice to his NGMI defense, and as we concluded above, that was not a viable defense. Mr. Rodriguez presented no evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that, at the time of the murder, he suffered a severely abnormal mental condition that made it impossible for him to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of law. Mr. Rodriguez is unable to show “it is reasonably probable he would have received a more favorable verdict if the error had not been made.” Klingbeil, 2021 WY 89, ¶ 46, 492 P.3d at 289. [¶47] Affirmed. 14