Opinion ID: 2335399
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Assault as a Lesser-Included Offense of Armed Robbery

Text: Appellant claims that he was entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of assault. During a discussion of jury instructions, appellant requested an instruction on simple assault, arguing that because assault is a lesser-included offense of armed robbery, the jury could find that the defendant while assaulting [the store employees] did not commit the acts of armed robbery. The trial court refused appellant's request, finding that there was no basis in the record for the instruction. Although, any evidence, however weak, is sufficient to support a lesser-included instruction so long as a jury could rationally convict on the lesser-included offense after crediting the evidence, Woodard v. United States, 738 A.2d 254, 261 (D.C.1999), for the jury here to find that appellant assaulted the store employee, whom he confronted, but that he did not rob the store would require a bizarre reconstruction of the evidence. McClam v. United States, 775 A.2d 1100, 1104 (D.C. 2001) ([T]rial judges properly deny instructions which require the jury to engage in `bizarre reconstructions of the evidence.' (quoting Adams v. United States, 558 A.2d 348, 349 (D.C.1989))). A trial judge can properly deny the requested instruction only if there is no factual dispute and a finding to the contrary on the only evidence at issue would be irrational. ( Kevin ) Smith v. United States, 686 A.2d 537, 545 (D.C.1996) (quoting Rease v. United States, 403 A.2d 322, 329 (D.C. 1979)). An instruction on simple assault would have been irrational on the evidence presented. That the store was robbed was not in dispute. The critical issue was the identity of the robber: either the jurors credited the testimony of the store employees and the physical evidence indicating that appellant committed the crime, or they believed appellant's version that he was never in the store at all. Appellant also argues that if the jury found he lacked the requisite specific intent to commit armed robbery, see D.C.Code § 22-2801 (2001) (armed robbery); United States v. Owens, 332 A.2d 752, 753 (D.C.1975) (noting that although robbery statute does not mention specific intent, it must be read in light of common law requiring specific intent to take property of another as element of robbery), then it could have found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of assault, a general intent crime. But without an intoxication defensewhich we have determined was properly rejectedthere was no rational construction of the facts that would have allowed the jury to find that appellant pointed a gun at the store employees and customers and demanded money, but did not have the specific intent to rob them. The assault instruction, therefore, was properly refused.