Opinion ID: 1850321
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Admission of Mrs. Dycus's Pre-trial Identification Is Reversible Error.

Text: ¶ 65. The majority never concludes whether admission of the pretrial identification was error. Instead, the opinion quotes the trial court's ruling allowing Mrs. Dycus to make an in-court identification. Assuming that the majority finds the admission of the pretrial identification harmless error, I must respectfully dissent on this issue. ¶ 66. The majority correctly finds that Lattimore's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when his attorney was absent from the pretrial lineup. Yet, I cannot agree that this constitutional violation was not fatal to this case. ¶ 67. In Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 1957, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178, 1186 (1967), the United States Supreme Court held that when a criminal defendant is denied the right to counsel at a pretrial lineup, [t]he State is therefore not entitled to an opportunity to show that that testimony had an independent source. Only a per se exclusionary rule as to such testimony can be an effective sanction to assure that law enforcement authorities will respect the accused's constitutional right to the presence of his counsel at the critical lineup. (emphasis supplied); see also Brooks v. State, 903 So.2d 691, 694-697 (Miss.2005) (quoting Gilbert ). Accordingly, it was clear error for the trial court to admit evidence of the pretrial identification, and the majority's reliance that Dycus's in-court identification was based upon her view of the defendant at the scene of the crime and not based upon the lineup, has no relevance to whether the pretrial identification was admissible. ¶ 68. Second, the error cannot be harmless where this was the only evidence tending to show it was Lattimore, and not the suspect Brown, who committed the murder. Harmless error requires that we declare a belief that [admission of the pretrial identification] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 274, 87 S.Ct. 1951 (emphasis supplied) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 711 (1967)). In other words, [t]he question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction. Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 84 S.Ct. 229, 230, 11 L.Ed.2d 171, 173 (1963). ¶ 69. Because Mrs. Dycus was the only eyewitness to the attack, her testimony was crucial to the State's case. This is especially true because Brown was subsequently acquitted for the crime of which Lattimore was found guilty. As discussed at length supra, Mrs. Dycus had extreme difficulty in identifying Lattimore; indeed, she de facto failed to identify him. The pretrial identification she offered played a substantial role in his eventual conviction. For as the United States Supreme Court recognized in Gilbert, the witness' testimony of [her] lineup identification will enhance the impact of [her] in-court identification on the jury and seriously aggravate whatever derogation exists of the accused's right to a fair trial. 388 U.S. at 273-74, 87 S.Ct. 1951. Accordingly, the majority's comparison to Jimpson v. State, 532 So.2d 985, 989 (Miss.1988), where the amount of other evidence was overwhelming, is completely unfounded. ¶ 70. I am also mindful that, as Justice Dickinson recently warned, [t]he phrase harmless beyond a reasonable doubt has now become synonymous with harmless error analysis, but this Court's current usage of that phrase has set it loose from its original moorings. Haynes v. State, 934 So.2d 983, 994 (Miss.2006) (Dickinson, J., dissenting, joined by Waller and Cobb, P.JJ., and Graves, J.). We cannot continue to allow this misuse of the phrase harmless. ¶ 71. Because admission of the pre-trial identification substantially contributed to Lattimore's conviction, it was not harmless error, and I would reverse.