Opinion ID: 848681
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Preserving Michigan's Constitutional Structure

Text: Among the reasons why Lee's article III-based standing test or any judge-created standing test should not be applied to MEPA plaintiffs, the most important is that to do so defeats the clear, unambiguous, and readily understandable purpose of art. 4, § 52 of the Michigan Constitution. [24] Through art. 4, § 52, the people of Michigan directed the Legislature to provide for the protection of the air, water and other natural resources of the state from pollution, impairment and destruction. Art. 4, § 52 provides that this mandate serves the people's express paramount concern in the interest of the health, safety and general welfare of the people specifically with respect to the conservation and development of the natural resources of the state. Employing the precise words of art. 4, § 52, the Legislature enacted MEPA in fulfillment of art. 4, § 52's mandate. Since MEPA's enactment, this Court has held that the Michigan Legislature could confer standing under MEPA to any person who alleges that a defendant's conduct has or is likely to pollute, impair or destroy the air, water or other natural resources or the public trust therein. Ray, supra . MEPA plaintiffs have not been required, until now, to overcome any judge-created standing tests to gain access to the courts. [25] It is clear that the Legislature's explicit grant of standing to any person under MEPA was intended to operate free from judge-made standing tests. Expanding the application of Lee, therefore, undermines art. 4, § 52 and the Legislature's policy decisions, by restricting who may bring a MEPA action to court. Expanding the application of Lee's standing test, as the majority does in this case, also infringes the Legislature's power to make laws pursuant to art. 4, § 52. [26] The Legislature's decision to allow any person to maintain a cause of action under MEPA is consistent with art. 4, § 52's environmental mandate and is an exercise of legislative discretion that carries a presumption of constitutionality. Johnson v. Kramer Bros Freight Lines, Inc., supra at 257, 98 N.W.2d 586. As duly recognized by Justice COOLEY: no court can compel the Legislature to make or to refrain from making laws, or to meet or adjourn at its command, or to take any action whatsoever, though the duty today it be made ever so clear by the constitution or the laws. Sutherland, supra at 326. Through MEPA, the Legislature has given the private citizen a sizable share of the initiative for environmental law enforcement. Eyde, supra at 454, 225 N.W.2d 1. Yet it is strongly implied by the majority that MEPA's citizen-suit provision unconstitutionally transfers to the judiciary the executive power to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. This argument is unsupportable and incorrect. MEPA's citizen suit provision does not expand the power of the judiciary; it grants the power to the people of this state to pursue MEPA violations. The court's role in these cases differs in no way from any other controversy that comes before it: the court hears the case, interprets the applicable law, and renders a decision. [27] Moreover, the Legislature's decision to permit any person to sue under MEPA does not interfere with the enforcement of the law by the executive branch, it simply provides every citizen an opportunity to ensure that the laws that are designed to prevent environmental harm are enforced. In this sense, MEPA's citizen-suit provision is consistent with the fact that, [a]ll political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their equal benefit, security and protection. Art. 1, § 1. Further, the majority's application of Lee's standing test ignores the fact that the three branches of government cannot operate in all respects independently of the others, and that what are called the checks and balances of government constitute each a restraint upon the rest. Sutherland, supra at 325. Justice COOLEY elaborated: The Legislature prescribes rules of actions for the courts, and in many particulars may increase or diminish their jurisdiction; it also, in many cases, may prescribe rules for executive action, and impose duties upon, or take powers from the governor; while in turn the governor may veto legislative acts, and the courts may declare them void where they conflict with the constitution, notwithstanding, after having been passed by the Legislature, they have received the governor's approval. But in each of these cases the action of the department which controls, modifies, or any manner influences that of another, is strictly within its own sphere, and for that reason gives no occasion for conflict, controversy or jealousy. The Legislature in prescribing rules for the courts, is acting within its proper province in making laws, while the courts, in declining to enforce an unconstitutional law, are in like manner acting within their proper province, because they are only applying that which is law to the controversies in which they are called upon to give judgment. It is mainly by means of these checks and balances that the officers of the several departments are kept within their jurisdiction, and if they are disregarded in any case, and power is usurped or abused, the remedy is by impeachment, and not by another department of the government attempting to correct the wrong by asserting a superior authority over that which by the constitution is equal. Id. The legislative power includes the power to create new legal rights. And, where the Legislature chooses, it may exercise its discretion to create and define new causes of action. [28] Unlike its federal counterpart, the jurisdiction of the Michigan Judiciary is not limited by the case or controversy limitations expressed in Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution nor by the federal court's ever-evolving interpretation of those limitations. Without a doubt, the constitutionality of MEPA's citizen-suit provision remains teed up for a future open and direct ruling that Lee's judicial standing test supercedes the Legislature's authority to confer standing. The majority's application of Lee's standing test to any person's legislatively conferred and constitutionally-based standing under MEPA improperly enlarges the court's power at the expense of the Legislature's power, ironically violating the very constitutional architecture the majority purported to protect in Lee. [29]