Opinion ID: 2542656
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: mr. allen is entitled to hold title free of the remaining indebtedness

Text: ¶ 23 Based on its interpretation of the terms of the decree of divorce, the court of appeals held that Mr. Allen was liable for indebtedness, secured by the property, that was acquired after he conveyed the home to Ms. Satterfield. The court of appeals agreed with the trial court that Mr. Allen's consent to be responsible for all indebtedness thereon until the house is sold meant that he would be liable for debt acquired before the property reverted to him by reason of Ms. Satterfield's relocation. This interpretation fails to account for the effect of the reversion on that indebtedness. ¶ 24 The estate that reverted to Mr. Allen was the same estate that he held at the time he conveyed the fee simple determinable interest to Ms. Satterfield. That estate was one unencumbered by any indebtedness acquired after the conveyance. The language relied on by the court of appeals to justify Mr. Allen's liability for the indebtedness acquired by others addresses only three forms of debt: the indebtedness that was in place when he conveyed the property to Ms. Satterfield (it had been long since paid off), indebtedness incurred by Mr. Allen after title reverted to him, and indebtedness that he expressly consented to assume. No indebtedness fell into any of these categories. It is the nature of the fee simple determinable property interest created by the terms of the decree of divorce that defines the scope of Mr. Allen's post-reversion debt obligations. Upon the reversion of the property to Mr. Allen, no indebtedness was owed on it, and thus no debt existed for which Mr. Allen was responsible. We therefore hold that Mr. Allen's title is unencumbered by post-conveyance indebtedness.