Opinion ID: 1522122
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Flight Charge

Text: Shortly after defendant stabbed Asaline Stokes, Newark Police Officer Andrew Byrd arrived at the scene. At trial Officer Byrd testified that he observed defendant walking quickly from the scene and raising his leg as if he were about to begin running away. Byrd testified that three times he ordered defendant to halt before defendant finally turned around with a knife in hand, at which point Byrd drew his revolver, forced defendant to drop his knife, and arrested him. Defendant's psychiatric expert, Dr. Lewis, testified at trial that defendant's failure to respond immediately to Byrd's commands suggested that he remained in an altered state of consciousness induced by a psychomotor seizure; the prosecution contended that defendant's conduct evidenced a conscious attempt to flee from the murder scene and undermined his claim that the killing was not purposeful or knowing. In both the guilt and the penalty phases, the trial court instructed the jury that it could consider the evidence of defendant's alleged attempted flight. Defendant contends that the trial court's penalty-phase charge with respect to flight was erroneous in several respects. At the penalty phase the defense relied on four mitigating factors: (1) defendant suffered extreme mental or emotional disturbance insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution (Sec. c(5)(a)); (2) defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication, but again to a degree insufficient to constitute a defense (Sec. c(5)(d)); (3) defendant's age (Sec. c(5)(c)); and (4) any other factor relevant to defendant's character or record or to the circumstances of the offense (Sec. c(5)(h)). The defense claims that these mitigating factors could not have been properly considered or weighed by the jury in light of the court's flight charge. Before instructing the jury, the court overruled a defense objection to its penalty-phase charge on flight, observing that flight to some extent would have a bearing upon whether the defendant was suffering from a psychomotor seizure at the time of the killing.... According to defendant, this analysis seriously misconstrued the defense. In the penalty phase, the defense claims, it no longer sought to persuade the jurors that defendant had suffered a seizure during the stabbing that prevented him from forming the requisite intent for murder. Rather, defendant sought to have the jury find that he was not a whole man, but the victim of either a mental disease or an extreme mental or emotional disturbance. The trial court's actual charge, however, tied the flight issue explicitly to the mitigating factors defendant sought to prove: For departure to take on the legal significance of flight there must be circumstances present which in conjunction with leaving reasonably justify an inference that it was done with consciousness of guilt.... You may consider such evidence [of flight] in determining the defendant's state of mind. In other words, you can consider such evidence in determining whether the defendant had the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law and also whether the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the killing. This explicit link between the flight charge and the jury's consideration of mitigating factors also causes us to reject defendant's argument that the trial court had, in effect, charged a non-statutory aggravating factor, consciousness of guilt. The trial court's reference to consciousness of guilt occurred in the context of its discussion of considerations relevant to the mitigating factors, and cannot be construed as charging an additional aggravating factor. The trial court clearly explained that only two aggravating factors  c(4)(a) and c(4)(c)  were appropriate for the jury's consideration, neither of which incorporated or expressed the consciousness of guilt language. Defendant contends that the flight charge did not belong in the penalty-phase instructions at all. Extensive trial evidence relating to defendant's mental and emotional condition was introduced by the defense during the guilt phase of the trial. This evidence clearly relates also to mitigating factors c(5)(a) and c(5)(d), and, in fact, was considered by the jury in determining that those factors existed. Factual issues relating to flight involve defendant's mental or emotional condition, for flight implies that defendant had the presence of mind to recognize the need to flee from the scene. If the jury believed that there was a link between defendant's alleged flight and his mental or emotional condition, flight would be relevant in its consideration of mitigating factors. Hence, we cannot conclude that it was error for the flight charge to be given to the jury. Defendant contends further that the flight charge heavily favored the prosecution. The court supplied a short summary of the prosecution's factual contentions regarding flight, followed by a terse reference to the defense's contention that defendant denied that he sought to flee. Nevertheless, the trial court carefully and repeatedly admonished the jurors that it was not attempting to summarize the evidence, that it would not tell them what they should consider to be salient features of the case, and that their own recollections of the evidence were to be controlling. Furthermore, it urged the jurors not to abdicate their responsibility to weigh, evaluate, and assess the aggravating and mitigating factors. We find no prejudicial error. Nor can we agree with defendant's assertion that the court failed to tailor the flight charge to the facts of the case and the special issues at the penalty phase. It is true that the court gave a conventional charge on the issue of flight, e.g., State v. Sullivan, 43 N.J. 209, 238 (1964), cert. den., 382 U.S. 990, 86 S.Ct. 564, 15 L.Ed. 2d 477 (1966); see New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Model Jury Charges, Criminal, Model Jury Charges, Criminal 4.152 (1980), but it does not appear that the charge was inaccurate or inadequate in terms of the jury's consideration of the relevance and probative worth of the circumstances. [67] Finally, defendant contends that in discussing mitigating factors c(5)(a) and c(5)(d) the trial court's flight charge omitted that part of the statutory language providing that the defendant's mental or emotional disturbance, or mental disease or defect, need not constitute a defense to prosecution to qualify as a mitigating factor. See Sec. c(5)(a), (d). Defendant cites State v. English, 367 So. 2d 815 (La. 1979), in which the trial court improperly indicated to the jury that the test for determining the applicability of the mitigating factor similar to New Jersey's factor c(5)(d) was the same as that for determining sanity at the guilt phase, and Lewis v. State, 380 So. 2d 970 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980), in which the sentencing court failed to consider mitigating factors similar to our factors c(5)(a) and c(5)(d). The trial court here, however, did indicate clearly that the evidence necessary for a finding as to each of these mitigating factors was not the same as that required to constitute a defense. This understanding is confirmed by the fact that both mitigating factors were found by the jury and were included in the verdict sheet. We are satisfied that under the circumstances the trial court did not commit error when it instructed the jury that it could consider the defendant's flight from the murder scene, as this flight related to the jury's determination of the applicability of mitigating factors c(5)(a) and c(5)(d).