Opinion ID: 2192290
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claims Against Attorneys

Text: [¶ 31] In actions against attorneys, the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the act or omission giving rise to the injury, except in enumerated cases, when the statute begins to run upon the discovery of the cause of action. See 14 M.R.S.A. § 753-A. One such exception is an action alleging professional negligence in the drafting of a last will and testament. Id. § 753-A(B). [¶ 32] The plaintiffs argue that their claims fall within the statutory discovery rule because their claims assert negligence in the drafting of a last will. [¶ 33] We have recognized that statutes of limitation will be narrowly construed. See Harkness v. Fitzgerald, 1997 ME 207, ¶ 5, 701 A.2d 370, 372. Thus, we cannot, as the plaintiffs urge, construe the law firm's alleged negligence in its ongoing management and advice concerning the affairs of the Corporation to be negligence in the drafting of Learned's last will and testament. From all that appears, there was no negligence in the drafting of the will itself. [¶ 34] Plaintiffs also ask us to judicially construct a discovery rule for actions against estate planning lawyers. When the Legislature has given explicit directions as to when a statute of limitations begins to run, we are not free to re-define the term by the creation of a discovery rule. See Musk v. Nelson, 647 A.2d 1198, 1201 (Me.1994). In addition, when the Legislature provides for enumerated exceptions to its definition, those exceptions implicitly den[y] the availability of any other. Id. at 1202. [¶ 35] Had the Legislature intended that the will drafting exception to the occurrence rule in section 753-A should apply to negligence in drafting estate planning documents and the management of entities created as part of an estate plan, it could have said so. Accordingly, section 753-A bars application of the discovery rule to the claims against the attorneys. [¶ 36] The plaintiffs next argue that their claims against the attorneys are saved from the statutes of limitation by the doctrine of continuing representation. The doctrine of continuing representation tolls the running of the statute in an attorney malpractice action until the professional relationship terminates with respect to the matter underlying the malpractice action. Smith v. Stacy, 198 W.Va. 498, 482 S.E.2d 115, 120 (1996). [¶ 37] For the doctrine to apply, there must be a clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing, and dependent relationship between the client and the attorney. Schoenrock v. Tappe, 419 N.W.2d 197, 201 (S.D.1988) (quoting Muller v. Sturman, 79 A.D.2d 482, 437 N.Y.S.2d 205, 208 (N.Y.App.Div.1981)). Even if we might apply the continuing representation doctrine in the appropriate case, here plaintiffs have stipulated away any such claims by waiving claims regarding any representation in the period after February 1, 1989. [¶ 38] Application of 14 M.R.S.A. § 753-A bars the personal representative's claim against the attorneys.