Opinion ID: 2396343
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Freedom of Information Act

Text: The arguments relevant to the Freedom of Information Act require us to address two separate issues. First, we must determine whether a public record, as that term is applied in the Act, includes writings in the possession of a public body that were not actually prepared by, on behalf of, or at the request of, the public body. Second, we must determine whether a referendum petition, including the signatures appearing thereon, are a public record subject to disclosure under the Act. West Virginia's Freedom of Information Act mandates that [e]very person has a right to inspect or copy any public record of a public body in this State, except as otherwise expressly provided by section four [§ 29B-1-4] of this article, W.Va.Code, 29B-1-3(1) [1992]. The Clerk argues that the Act applies only to writings prepared, owned and retained by a public bodyin this appeal, the public body being the County Clerk's office. In support of that argument, the Clerk relies on the Act's definition of a public record [5] as set forth in W.Va.Code, 29B-1-2(4) [1977], which reads as follows (with emphasis added): Public record includes any writing containing information relating to the conduct of the public's business, prepared, owned and retained by a public body. Conversely, the Observer argues that the Clerk has failed to give effect to the Legislature's use of the word includes in its definition of what shall be deemed a public record for purposes of a FOIA request. In resolving issues pertaining to the meaning to be ascribed to words used in a statute, we have previously noted that [i]t is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but it must be drawn from the context in which it is used. West Virginia Health Care Cost Review Authority v. Boone Memorial Hospital, 196 W.Va. 326, 338, 472 S.E.2d 411, 423 (1996) (citations omitted). Similarly, we have held that [i]n the absence of any definition of the intended meaning of words or terms used in a legislative enactment, they will, in the interpretation of the act, be given their common, ordinary and accepted meaning in the connection in which they are used. Syllabus Point 1, Miners in General Group v. Hix, 123 W.Va. 637, 17 S.E.2d 810 (1941), overruled on other grounds by Lee-Norse Co. v. Rutledge, 170 W.Va. 162, 291 S.E.2d 477 (1982). We have further held that when interpreting statutory language, we must ascribe a meaning that accords with the spirit, purpose and object of the law in issue. A statute should be so read and applied as to make it accord with the spirit, purposes, and objects of the general system of law of which it is intended to form a part; it being presumed that the legislators who drafted and passed it were familiar with all existing law applicable to the subject matter, whether constitutional, statutory, or common, and intended the statute to harmonize completely with the same and aid in the effectuation of the general purpose and design thereof, if its terms are consistent therewith. Syllabus Point 5, State v. Snyder, 64 W.Va. 659, 63 S.E. 385 (1908). See also Davis Memorial Hospital v. West Virginia State Tax Commissioner, 222 W.Va. 677, 671 S.E.2d 682 (2008). The spirit, purposes, and objects of the general system of our Freedom of Information Act was clearly stated by the Legislature in W.Va.Code, 29B-1-1 [1977]: Pursuant to the fundamental philosophy of the American constitutional form of representative government which holds to the principle that government is the servant of the people, and not the master of them, it is hereby declared to be the public policy of the state of West Virginia that all persons are, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of those who represent them as public officials and employees. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the instruments of government they have created. To that end, the provisions of this article shall be liberally construed with the view of carrying out the above declaration of public policy. In addition to setting forth a clear statement of the public policy behind the Act, the Legislature also guided us in how to interpret disputes arising under that Act when it mandated that the provisions of this article shall be liberally construed with the view of carrying out the above declaration of public policy. W.Va.Code, 29B-1-1. We recognized this mandate of liberal construction in Syllabus Point 4, Hechler v. Casey, 175 W.Va. 434, 333 S.E.2d 799 (1985), where we held that: The disclosure provisions of this State's Freedom of Information Act, W.Va.Code, 29B-1-1 et seq., as amended, are to be liberally construed, and the exemptions to such Act are to be strictly construed. W.Va.Code, 29B-1-1 [1977]. Having fully considered the record, briefs and arguments of the parties, and our precedent, we find that the Legislature's use of the word includes in its definition of a public record, W.Va.Code, 29B-1-2(4) [1977], to be a clear indication that the Legislature was giving an illustrative definition, and not an exclusive definition. We have previously recognized that the term includes is not exclusive. In Davis Memorial Hospital, 222 W.Va. at 684, 671 S.E.2d at 689, we recognized that [t]he term `includ[es]' in a statute is to be dealt with as a word of enlargement and this is especially so where ... such word is followed by `but not limited to' the illustrations given. (Citations omitted). In ascribing a common, ordinary and accepted meaning, Syllabus Point 1, Miners in General Group v. Hix, supra , to the word includes, we have also considered the meaning accorded that word in other legislative enactments where it has been defined by the Legislature. We discussed one such example of this latter consideration in Apollo Civic Theatre, Inc. v. State Tax Commissioner, 223 W.Va. 79, 87, 672 S.E.2d 215, 223 (2008), citing W.Va.Code, 11-15-2(9)[2003], where we noted that the Legislature had given the following definition to the word includes: Includes and including, when used in a definition contained in this article, does not exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term being defined. We are also guided by the Legislature's choice of wording used for the other terms it has defined in the Freedom of Information Act. Presently, there are five defined terms in the Act, all contained in W.Va.Code, 29B-1-2 [1977]. [6] In reviewing these definitions, we note that for two of the definitions the Legislature used the more definite, restrictive word means to define a custodian in subsection (1) and a public body in subsection (3). [7] In stark contrast, the Legislature used the less definite, less restrictive word includes to define a person in subsection (2), a public record in subsection (4) and a writing in subsection (5). To adopt the position of the Clerk, the Legislature's definition of public record would need to read: `Public record' means any writing.... The Clerk's suggested definition of a public record would severely limit the scope of the Act and the right of every person to inspect or copy any public record of a public body in this state. W.Va.Code, 29B-1-3(1) [1992]. It is obvious that the Legislature did not intend such a restrictive interpretation, and meant for the word includes to be given its common, ordinary and accepted meaning, which is that of a word of enlargement. Davis Memorial Hospital, 222 W.Va. at 684, 671 S.E.2d at 689 ([t]he term `includ[es]' in a statute is to be dealt with as a word of enlargement). Accordingly, we hold that under the West Virginia Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), W.Va.Code, 29B-1-1, et seq., a public record includes any writing in the possession of a public body that relates to the conduct of the public's business which is not specifically exempt from disclosure by W.Va. Code, 29B-1-4, even though the writing was not prepared by, on behalf of, or at the request of, the public body. Having resolved the issue relevant to the word includes, we next address whether the referendum petition sought by the Observer is subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. In Associated Press v. Canterbury, 224 W.Va. 708, 688 S.E.2d 317 (2009), we discussed in detail when a writing in the possession of a public body is required to be disclosed under the Act. In that appeal we were asked to determine whether e-mails by public officials are writings as defined by the Act and whether, if so, the e-mails at issue were a public record under the Act. While we found in Syllabus Point 2 of Associated Press that e-mails, as a classification, are a writing under the Act, we concluded that the specific e-mails at issue in Canterbury were not a public record because the e-mails were of a personal nature and did not relate to the conduct of the public's business. Our decision in Associated Press sets forth a useful model of the analysis that should be applied by public bodies responding to a FOIA request. This model, succinctly stated, is as follows: A writing in the possession of a public body is a public record required to be disclosed under the Act where the writing relates to the conduct of the public's business and is not specifically exempted from disclosure pursuant to W.Va. Code, 29B-1-4. Conversely, a writing in the possession of a public body is not a public record and need not be disclosed under the Act where the writing does not relate to the conduct of the public's business or where the writing is specifically exempt from disclosure pursuant to W.Va.Code, 29B-1-4. In the case before us, the Jefferson County Commission voted to replace a non-traditional zoning ordinance with a traditional zoning ordinance. Pursuant to W.Va. Code, 8A-7-13(j)[2004], voters within Jefferson County were entitled to organize a petition drive to force a ballot referendum to approve or disapprove the ordinance passed by the County Commission. In order to force the referendum, two things were required to occur. First, 10% of the eligible voters residing in the area affected by the ordinance had to sign a petition demanding a referendum. Second, the petition had to be filed with the County Clerk within ninety days of the new ordinance being passed by the County Commission. [8] Based on the record before us, both of these conditions were met. It is clear to this Court that referendum petitions, such as the one before us, are a writing as that term is defined by W.Va. Code, 29B-1-2(5). [9] It is also clear that such petitions, when filed with a public body, are writings in the possession of a public body. It is equally clear that where such petitions call upon or require the public body to perform an official act, the petitions relate to the conduct of the public business. In the present case, the referendum petition was required to be filed with a public body (here the County Clerk) and, once filed, the petition required the County Commission and County Clerk to perform various official acts. There is no question that the petitions are public records required to be disclosed under our Freedom of Information Act. Accordingly, we find that under the West Virginia Freedom of Information Act, W.Va.Code, 29B-1-1, et seq., a referendum petition filed with a public body is a public record required to be disclosed under the Act. The Legislature has mandated that [e]very person has a right to inspect or copy any public record of a public body in this State, except as otherwise expressly provided by section four [§ 29B-1-4] of this article. W.Va.Code, 29B-1-3(1) [1992]. We find no exception which would exempt the petition at issue from disclosure under the Act.