Opinion ID: 446761
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Additional Considerations: The Special Administrative and Legislative Context

Text: 77 Our holding today that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 applies to all commercial air carriers and that the CAB erred in restricting the application of its section 504 regulations to those few small carriers receiving direct money subsidies is buttressed by several unique features of this case. These include the particular concern evidenced by Congress for the right of handicapped persons to travel and to have the greatest possible access to employment opportunities, the regulatory inconsistencies manifested by the Board in the proceedings below, and the recent reaffirmation by Congress of its commitment in this area through its passage of the Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984. 78 Our starting point in this case must be not only the statutory language, 148 which in the case of section 504 must be accorded the scope that its origins dictate, ... a sweep as broad as its language, 149 but the statute as a whole. So concerned was the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 with transportation in particular that it established within the Federal Government the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board composed of, among others appointed by the President, the heads of the Departments of Health, Education, and Welfare, Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, Labor, Interior, Defense, and of the General Services Administration, Postal Service, and Veterans Administration. This Board [hereinafter ATBCB] was charged particularly with the task of reducing architectural, transportation, and attitudinal barriers in, inter alia, public transportation (including air, water, and surface transportation whether interstate, foreign, intrastate or local). 150 Consequently, it was not surprising that a 1974 Senate report should list transportation as one of five itemized areas to which section 504 was meant to apply. 151 79 Congress was well aware in passing the 1973 Act, so much of which was aimed at vocational rehabilitation, that even [if] the maximum employment opportunities for the handicapped [were] fully created, they could not be filled without the ability of handicapped individuals to get to their jobs. 152 Obviously, today more than ever, air transportation is a necessary element in securing and performing many jobs. 153 So even if transportation per se had not been singled out by Congress in section 502 of the 1973 Act, and even if the Act's administrative creation, the ATBCB, had not testified in favor of giving the broadest possible reading to section 504 in the proceedings below, 154 any fair reading of the Act reveals that maximizing employment opportunities--and therefore minimizing barriers to transportation--for the disabled goes to its very heart. 155 As the comments of the Act's own agency put it to the CAB: Accessible transportation is often the key to a disabled person's employment, education, recreation, and access to social services. Without the right of access to transportation, all other civil rights are meaningless. 156 80 We find additional support for our holding today in what might best be termed the need for regulatory consistency and rationality. The CAB's discussion of its section 504 authority, and particularly of its rather sudden reversal of position between 1979 and 1982, was inadequate, vague and contradictory. Not only was its reliance on Angel (and that case's misreading of Gottfried ) misplaced, 157 but even on its own terms the Board's analysis was turgid. Claiming to reject the restrictive reading of our jurisdiction put forth by the airlines, the Board insisted that it was adopting an approach ... that represents a compromise between applying the rule to all carriers and having no rule at all. 158 The form this compromise took, of course, was to apply only the general antidiscrimination provisions (Subpart A) to all airlines, 159 while applying the specific, substantive provisions (Subparts B and C) to subsidized carriers only, 160 claiming without any citation to authority that [t]hose carriers subject only to the general provisions of Subpart A should look to the specific requirements of Subpart B as guidance for meeting their general obligation not to discriminate. 161 81 Respondents are unclear, as the Board was, about the source of the CAB's conclusion that non-subsidized carriers should look to Subpart B. They point to the duty of every air carrier to provide adequate service under section 404(a) of the Federal Aviation Act 162 as supplying the requisite authority to apply general provisions to non-subsidized carriers. 163 But they do not--and, we believe, cannot--explain why section 404(a), if it authorizes the application of Subpart A, will not extend to Subparts B and C, which give the general provisions substance and teeth. They do not--and, we believe, cannot--explain what look to means, or why it is that, as respondents contend in their brief, non-subsidized certificated carriers could not ignore the specific requirements applicable to the subsidized carriers. 164 In fact, they could do precisely that if the CAB's view of the scope of section 504 in this case were affirmed by this court. 165 82 In the proceeding below, the CAB rightly rejected the airlines' assertion that its proposed rules merely duplicate existing FAA regulations. 166 It correctly characterized the primary purpose of the FAA rules as ensuring passenger safety, reasonably deferred to the FAA's inflight safety expertise where it was appropriate to do so, 167 and noted that its own aim was not merely to ensure that the disabled are carried safely, but to ensure that they face no unreasonable, nonsafety-related obstacles to travel. To that end, this rule covers issues ... that are not reached by the FAA rules. 168 The Board's admirable sensitivity to the work of other agencies and the need for consistency in removing unreasonable obstacles to travel, however, did not extend far enough. It was aware that regulations of the Department of Transportation already required all certificated carriers to comply with section 504's mandate in the operation of, inter alia, ticket counters, boarding devices, and baggage check-in and retrieval. 169 It was aware, indeed, that DOT had relied upon the CAB's earlier assertion of section 504 authority and was now urging the Board to exercise it. 170 Nevertheless, the CAB refused to recognize the full measure of its own authority, leading to the absurd result that handicapped persons are protected from discrimination in air transportation only up to the door of the aircraft--that is, so long as they are not being transported in the air. Our holding today obviates any such nonsensical outcome and vindicates the clear congressional purpose. 171 83 In addition, restoring the scope of section 504 rulemaking authority to the dimensions originally contemplated by the CAB will vindicate that agency's hard and conscientious work in fashioning substantive requirements through these proceedings. The nondiscrimination rules will now actually apply to a meaningful number of handicapped travelers. The specific regulations fashioned with great sensitivity in order to minimize expense and regulatory burden will no longer fall--not only most heavily but exclusively--upon those small (subsidized) airlines least able to carry the load. And certain otherwise anomalous aspects of the rules, which appear to have been drafted sometimes with all carriers in mind, sometimes with only the small, subsidized carriers in mind, can now be rendered more uniform and consistent when, on remand, the regulations are in part repromulgated and applied consistently with this opinion. 172 84 Finally, we note that our holding as to the scope of section 504 in the unique context of commercial air transportation is consistent with the recent action of Congress in its Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984. 173 That statute provides in its section 14, Access for Handicapped Persons, that the Secretary of Transportation, when exercising authority previously the CAB's, 85 shall consult with the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board established under section 502 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, prior to issuing or amending any order, rule, regulation or procedure that will have a significant impact on the accessibility of commercial airports or commercial air transportation for handicapped persons. 174 86 Of course, to mandate a consultation with the ATBCB is not to mandate an acceptance of its recommendations, which in this case were to require not only a broad reading of section 504 but also affirmative action in the form of the structural modification of aircraft. 175 Still, this recent demonstration of the continuing concern of Congress for the accessibility not only of commercial airports but also of commercial air transportation for handicapped persons is significant. 176 It suggests strongly that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was designed and is still intended to protect handicapped air travelers as a matter of law not only before they board an aircraft and after deplaning, but while they are inside the airplane as well. And it reinforces our view that Congress meant and still means handicapped persons to be free from discrimination whenever reasonably possible--not merely when, in the special context of air transportation, handicapped passengers happen to fly a small subsidized airline to a remote town, or are lucky enough to find a large carrier treating them fairly out of courtesy. B. The Substance of the Rules 87 As we have already indicated, the record in this case suggests that in its promulgation of specific, substantive regulations the CAB worked conscientiously and, in an area characterized by great individual variability and acute sensitivity, managed reasonably to resolve many difficult problems. 177 This characterization applies equally to the Board's promulgation of the two specific sections of the substantive regulations that petitioners challenge here. 178 However, because certain aspects of the challenged Rule would have been drafted differently if the Board had properly construed the scope of its rulemaking authority under section 504, we remand the regulations in part for reconsideration in light of today's holding. 88 1. The Definition of Qualified Handicapped Person 89 Under the CAB's final regulations, only a qualified handicapped person is protected by section 504. 179 The statute itself uses the term otherwise qualified handicapped individual, 180 which the Supreme Court has defined as one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap. 181 90 In the context of air transportation, the Board's regulation now defines such an individual as a handicapped 182 person 91
92 (2) Whose carriage will not violate the requirements of the Federal Aviation Regulations, ... or, in the reasonable expectation of carrier personnel ..., jeopardize the safe completion of the flight or the health or safety of other persons; and 93 (3) Who is willing and able to comply with reasonable requests of the airline personnel or, if not, is accompanied by a responsible adult passenger who can ensure that the requests are complied with. A request will not be considered reasonable if(i) It is inconsistent with this part; or 94 (ii) It is neither safety-related nor necessary for the provision of air transportation. 183 95 Petitioners contend that by selectively imposing requirements on handicapped persons which are not imposed upon other passengers and prospective passengers, the CAB's definition of qualified handicapped person violates section 504. In addition, they argue that the definition lacks objective guidelines or criteria that would limit arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory requests or demands by airline personnel. 184 96 The record reveals, and it is uncontested, that numerous incidents of arbitrary refusals of service and of irrational decisions by airline personnel concerning the qualifications of handicapped individuals have occurred. 185 Unwarranted assumptions and stereotypes have clearly caused airline personnel to discriminate against disabled passengers. 186 Yet, the record suggests that the Board was sensitive to such concerns and others voiced by handicapped individuals and their representatives, 187 and it is far from clear that amending the definition of qualified handicapped individual would provide any remedy more meaningful than that provided by the rules as they now exist. 97 Decisions involving safety, especially, require the granting of a certain amount of discretion to airline personnel. Individuals differ considerably, sometimes dramatically, in their abilities as well as in their disabilities. What is an unreasonable or unwarranted request when made of one handicapped person may be perfectly legitimate when made of another. Because of the unique nature of every individual, because of the infinite variety of disabling conditions and the varying extent to which they may handicap a particular person, the vesting of some discretion in airline personnel to make case-by-case determinations is unavoidable. This is especially so where, just as individuals differ, so do airlines and aircraft. A wide-bodied jet may present different safety concerns or space limitations than a smaller jet or a much smaller piston-powered aircraft. 188 In this situation, some discretionary decisionmaking on the part of airline personnel is inevitable. 98 The risk that arbitrary or irrational decisions may occasionally be made, of course, follows the grant of decisional discretion as night follows the day. The final regulations promulgated by the CAB, however, have significantly limited the discretion of airline personnel. 189 For example, section 382.13(a) of the Final Rule creates a presumption that every handicapped person is a qualified handicapped person unless a carrier has a reasonable, specific basis for doubting those qualifications. 190 Moreover, 99 A carrier shall not refuse transportation to the handicapped person unless an agency or employee designated by the carrier to make such determinations and familiar with the carrier's standards and procedures for such determinations reasonably believes on the basis of available information, including any presented by the handicapped person, that the person is not a qualified handicapped person. 191 100 Section 382.13(e) requires that [t]he name of the employee designated by the carrier to refuse service or require an attendant ... shall be made known to ticket and reservation agents, who shall inform any person who requests that name. 192 From the outset, any request made of a handicapped person must be reasonable and either safety related or necessary for the provision of air transportation. 193 And, of course, no carrier may [e]xclude a qualified handicapped person from or deny that person the benefit of any air transportation or related services that are available to other passengers.... 194 101 Thus, we are not presented with a case of unbridled discretion but instead with a situation where discretionary, case-by-case decisions are mandatory. We are not presented with a case involving relatively unambiguous distinctions based upon gender or race but instead with the endless complexities of handicapping conditions. And we are not presented with regulations applying to any service--or even any transportation--industry but to a unique industry that carries its clients tens of thousands of feet above the earth at hundreds of miles per hour. Safety and air transportation requirements go to the very essence of commercial aviation and must be applied not only to handicapped persons but to all passengers. 195 In its efforts to do so without discrimination, the Board sought to define qualified handicapped person in a manner that removes the subjective aspects of the standard to the maximum extent possible consistent with our need to defer in the first instance to the reasonable judgment of carrier personnel on safety questions. 196 In that regard, it has succeeded. We surely cannot say that the agency's decision ... manifests a clear error in judgment, 197 or that the definition challenged here in any way lacked a rational basis. 198 Accordingly, petitioners' challenge to the definition is denied. If arbitrary or unreasonable decisions do occur under that definition or the regulations to which it applies, the remedy lies in enforcement proceedings or other corrective action under Subpart C of the Rule. 199 2. The Forty-Eight Hour Notice Requirement 102 Section 382.15(c) of the CAB's final regulations permits airlines to require all handicapped passengers who will need extensive special assistance to notify the airline forty-eight hours in advance of their flight. 200 Extensive special assistance was defined in the Final Rule as including: 103 (1) Medical oxygen for on-board use; 104 (2) Boarding and deplaning assistance using mechanical boarding lifts, aisle chairs, other special equipment, or requiring the presence of more than the usual complement of personnel; and 105 (3) Ground wheelchairs at facilities where they are not usually available. 201 106 In response to further comment from groups representing the handicapped, the Board amended its Final Rule to prohibit carriers from refusing assistance on the ground of inadequate notice if the service or equipment is available with the lesser notice given. 202 Petitioners nevertheless challenge the forty-eight hour notice requirement as arbitrary, overbroad, discriminatory and inconsistent with the mandate of section 504. 203 107 We disagree. Here again, a balance must be struck between furthering the nondiscriminatory purposes of section 504 and allowing for the practicalities of providing special assistance. As we have noted, the Supreme Court (in the context of education) and this court (in the context of urban mass transportation) have held that extensive, extremely expensive modifications of existing programs may impose such substantial affirmative burdens that they cannot be required under section 504. 204 The record reveals that with respect to its advance notice rule, as elsewhere, the Board conscientiously and rationally sought to implement section 504 in a manner likely to be reasonable and effective. 205 As a reviewing court, we can require no more. 206 108 Nevertheless, it is clear that when the CAB fashioned this rule, the Board was assuming its application primarily to small air carriers--those least likely to be able to provide special assistance without suffering a substantial financial burden. 207 It conceded that some carriers now provide such services on 24 hours' notice, but argued that many, especially smaller carriers, may not be able to do so. 208 Respondents expand upon this point by noting the 109 undue burdens for small airlines operating at small airports or airfields where facilities and equipment are extremely limited. For example, if an airline operates between a number of small facilities that do not receive Federal financial assistance and do not provide ground wheelchairs, it should not be required to maintain a wheelchair at each airport. 209 110 If such reasoning formed the basis of the forty-eight hour notice requirement below, that requirement will, of course, need to be reconsidered on remand. Under our holding today, such small carriers will be a minority of the carriers subject to the regulations implementing section 504. Should the rule be redrafted in accordance, for example, with the comments regarding notice requirements made by both the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board 210 and the Department of Transportation, 211 an exemption may need to be provided for the small carriers. 3. The Rule on Remand 111 The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 provided for the sunset of the Civil Aeronautics Board and the transfer to other agencies, effective January 1, 1985, of those CAB functions that are to continue. 212 As specified further by the Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, the vast majority of functions performed by the Board before it ceased to exist have been transferred to the Department of Transportation. 213 Among these transferred functions--and substantial enough in the consideration of Congress to have been one of sixteen prominently captioned sections--was the furtherance of the accessibility of commercial airports or commercial air transportation to handicapped persons. 214 On account of our holding today, vacating the CAB's restrictive reading of its rule-making authority and ordering any regulations promulgated under section 504 to be applied to essentially all air carriers, the DOT will have an opportunity, on remand, to fashion a Nondiscrimination Rule that is consistent with its current regulation of airports, its own understanding of the CAB's regulatory authority over air carriers as expressed throughout these proceedings, and the intent of Congress. 215 112 On remand we expect the DOT to act with expedition. We have affirmed the specific provisions of the CAB's regulations challenged by petitioners. The Department may, as we have indicated, wish to take another look at certain aspects of the Final Rule that appear to have been drafted with small carriers in mind. It may wish then to specify certain exemptions for such carriers if changes are made to reflect the wider applicability of the rules to this nation's major commercial airlines. Certainly the Department will need to make some non-substantive deletions of language, and it may wish otherwise to economize editorially. By now, however, a dozen years have passed since Congress enacted section 504. 216 It is time that a handicapped person's right of reasonable access to nondiscriminatory commercial air transportation had the force of law.