Opinion ID: 2224284
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Lack of Effective Assistance of Counsel.

Text: Holloway's second main attack alleges that the trial court erred in permitting defendant Holloway to be represented by the same attorney that represented the codefendant, Simmons, in the conspiracy trial. It is alleged that this dual representation deprived Holloway of effective assistance of counsel during trial in violation of the Sixth amendment to the United States constitution. Our court has recently dealt with the problem of dual representaton of codefendants in the case of Mueller v. State. [15] In this case the court considered Glasser v. United States, [16] a United States supreme court case where the central issue was denial of the effective assistance of counsel because of dual representation. We summarized the Glasser holding as follows: Thus, the major element in the Glasser holding is the existence of a conflict of interests between the codefendants, which actually lessened the effectiveness of counsel's presentation. [17] Massey v. State [18] also supports the general rule that one attorney may represent two defendants indicted for participation in the same crime, unless the interests of the defendants are shown to be in conflict. The attorney for Holloway attempts to show that the attorney at trial interposed many objections for Simmons and few for Holloway, and that the trial attorney weighted his closing arguments in favor of codefendant Simmons. One of the main witnesses for the prosecution was George Griffin, one of the original three musketeers in the conspiracy plot. Griffin's testimony implicated both Simmons and Holloway. Simmons and Holloway each took the stand during the case for the defense and denied Griffin's testimony. Neither defendant implicated the other when testifying. In an attempt to impeach Griffin counsel read into the record certain statements made at Holloway's preliminary, fingering Holloway but not Simmons. Boiled down all this amounts to is the probability that the state had a much more difficult case against Simmons than Holloway, because it could not get Holloway's statement into evidence against Simmons. The positions of Holloway and Simmons were not inconsistent in that both maintained they were innocent and both maintained that Griffin, the state's witness, had suggested the holdup which neither defendant was interested in. The fact that the case against one defendant was stronger does not mean their positions at trial were inconsistent. In closing, defense counsel argued that Simmons had nothing to do with the conspiracy and Holloway could not conspire with himself. Defense counsel also attempted to attack the character and veracity of Griffin. From Holloway's standpoint, this strategy appears to be all his counsel could do in the face of Holloway's own statement, which had been admitted against him. In our opinion, Holloway was not thrown to the wolves to save Simmons, nor was he denied effective representation. Plaintiff in error also argues that he was denied effective representation because defense counsel chose to put both defendants on the stand, and testimony which tended to exculpate one inculpated the other thus developing a conflict. [19] Neither defendant implicated the other by his testimony. Both stated that Griffin initially suggested the robbery. Simmons said he would have nothing to do with the robbery and left. Holloway said nothing about the robbery while he was there. Holloway confirmed Simmons' testimony that Simmons left immediately, and also testified that he was not interested. This trial strategy of putting both defendants on the stand does not demonstrate a conflict of interests. Accordingly, no showing of a conflict of interest has been made. Defendant Holloway was vigorously and ably defended at trial.