Opinion ID: 1405837
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Factor (k)/sympathy.

Text: Defendant urges the trial court erred prejudicially when it declined his request at the penalty phase to (1) countermand anti-sympathy instructions given at the guilt phase, (2) give a pro-sympathy instruction, and (3) advise that the jury could consider any proffered mitigating evidence, whether or not it extenuated the capital crime. (15) Even when given at the penalty phase, the California standard instruction on the irrelevance of mere sympathy for the defendant (CALJIC No. 1.00) is not unconstitutional per se. ( California v. Brown, supra, 479 U.S. at pp. 542-543 [93 L.Ed.2d at pp. 940-941] [plur. opn.], 545 [93 L.Ed.2d at p. 942] [conc. opn. of O'Connor, J.].) A fortiori, refusal to give a pro-sympathy instruction at the penalty phase is not error. The sentencer must, of course, be adequately apprised of its duty to consider all mitigating character and background evidence proffered by the defendant. The 1978 death penalty law allows such consideration under section 190.3, factor (k) (any factor extenuating the gravity of the crime), and therefore meets the requirements of a valid death penalty law. ( Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 777; People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 541 [220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440]; Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 775.) (16) However, instructions in the unadorned language of factor (k) have a potential for misleading the jury to believe that mitigating evidence is irrelevant unless it relates directly to the capital charges. Hence, we must examine the instructions and arguments as a whole to determine whether the jury was adequately informed of the proper scope of mitigating evidence. ( California v. Brown, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 546 [93 L.Ed.2d at p. 943 (conc. opn. of O'Connor, J.)]; see Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 113-115 [71 L.Ed.2d 1, 10-11, 102 S.Ct. 869]; Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 777; People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 536-537, 544, fn. 17; People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 878, & fn. 10 [196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813].) Here the trial court expressly instructed that the jury was to consider separately the defendant's personal history and family background. Defendant introduced extensive evidence on these subjects, which formed the principal basis of his penalty defense. Defense counsel stressed that the court would instruct on the relevance of defendant's history and background, which must be considered because the law has a heart. The prosecutor made no objection. In his own argument, the prosecutor did briefly question the purpose, the relevance of some of defendant's evidence to the extent [i]t does not tell us too much about the 8th of July in 1979 (the date of the Opel murder). He implied his view that events from defendant's early childhood were relevant, if at all, only to the reasons why defendant pulled the trigger at the gallery. However, the instructions given in this case were contrary; they advised the jury that it must consider both extenuating factors and personal history and family background. Under these circumstances, we conclude the jury cannot have been misled to defendant's prejudice about the relevant range of mitigating evidence.