Opinion ID: 2519785
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Tainted product.

Text: Invoking the broad fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine developed in such cases as Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (Wong Sun ), defendant insists his November 21 statement is the tainted fruit of the Edwards violation at the police station on November 19. He urges that no intervening circumstance dispelled the coercive impact of the earlier refusal to honor his request for counsel, or interrupted the chain of causation, so as to rebut the presumption that the November 21 statement was obtained by exploiting the prior illegality. Indeed, he asserts, his November 21 statement must be deemed the involuntary product of the Edwards violation that produced his earlier admissions. This is so, he contends, because he had already let the cat out of the bag on November 19, thus removing all psychological incentive to remain silent on November 21. We reject these contentions. [10] In Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (Elstad) , the high court considered whether a suspect's voluntary incriminating statement in custody, made pursuant to a waiver of Miranda rights, was nonetheless inadmissible because it followed an earlier incriminating statement obtained by custodial questioning without a Miranda warning. Finding that the subsequent statement need not be excluded, the Elstad majority held that (1) a Miranda violation does not require full application of the Wong Sun fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine developed for Fourth Amendment violations; (2) instead, if an unwarned custodial statement was otherwise voluntary, a later statement must be deemed untainted if also voluntary and in compliance with Miranda; and (3) in determining whether the second statement was voluntary, the suspect's awareness that he had already let the cat out of the bag is not dispositive. As Elstad explained at length, the exclusionary rule serves different purposes under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Exclusion of statements or evidence obtained as the fruits of an unreasonable search or seizure prohibited by the Fourth Amendment is necessary to deter direct violations of that constitutional guarantee. Thus, even if a confession arising from a Fourth Amendment violation is voluntary, that is only a threshold requirement in determining its admissibility; the prosecution must [further] show a sufficient break in events to undermine the inference that the confession was caused by the Fourth Amendment violation. ( Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. 298, 306, 105 S.Ct. 1285, italics added; see also Taylor v. Alabama (1982) 457 U.S. 687, 690, 102 S.Ct. 2664, 73 L.Ed.2d 314; Brown v. Illinois (1975) 422 U.S. 590, 602, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416.) On the other hand, the Fifth Amendment, at bottom, protects against compelled testimonial self-incrimination. Miranda and its progeny are designed to allow full understanding and exercise of this constitutional right in the inherently custodial atmosphere of police custody. However, [t]he failure of police to administer Miranda warnings does not mean that the statements received have actually been coerced, but only that courts will presume the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination has not been intelligently exercised. [Citations.] ( Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. 298, 310, 105 S.Ct. 1285.) Thus, such statements must be excluded even if they were otherwise voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. ( Id., at p. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1285, italics added.) But it does not follow that the fruits of such an otherwise voluntary statement are invariably tainted and inadmissible. For example, according to the Elstad court, Michigan v. Tucker (1974) 417 U.S. 433, 445, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182, had held that neither the general goal of deterring improper police conduct nor the Fifth Amendment goal of assuring trustworthy evidence would be served by suppressing the testimony of a witness whose identity was discovered as the result of a suspect's statement in custody which, though elicited without Miranda warnings, was otherwise uncoerced. ( Elstad supra, 470 U.S. 298, 308, 105 S.Ct. 1285.) We believe that this reasoning applies with equal force when the alleged `fruit' of a noncoercive Miranda violation is neither a witness nor an article of evidence but the accused's own voluntary testimony.... Once warned, the suspect is free to exercise his own volition in deciding whether or not to make a statement to the authorities. The Court has often noted: `[A] living witness is not to be mechanically equated with the proffer of inanimate evidentiary objects illegally seized.... [T]he living witness is an individual human personality whose attributes of will, perception, memory and volition interact to determine what testimony he will give.' [Citations.] ( Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. 298, 308-309, 105 S.Ct. 1285, italics in Elstad.) Under these circumstances, the break in events analysis applied to the fruits of Fourth Amendment violations is inapposite. Where a prior custodial statement, though obtained without Miranda warnings, was otherwise uncoerced, any taint upon a second statement is dissipated by a determination that the second statement was itself voluntary and obtained without a Miranda violation. ( Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. 298, 310-311, 105 S.Ct. 1285.) Moreover, a later statement obtained in compliance with Miranda, and without coercive methods of interrogation, is not to be presumed involuntary simply because the suspect has already incriminated himself. `[A]fter an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of having confessed .... But this Court has never gone so far as to hold that making a confession under circumstances which preclude its use, perpetually disables the confessor from making a usable one after those conditions have been removed.' ( Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. 298, 311, 105 S.Ct. 1285, quoting United States v. Bayer (1947) 331 U.S. 532, 540-541, 67 S.Ct. 1394, 91 L.Ed. 1654.) Indeed, the Elstad majority observed, [t]his Court has never held that the psychological impact of voluntary disclosure of a guilty secret qualifies as state compulsion or compromises the voluntariness of a subsequent informed waiver. ... When neither the initial nor the subsequent admission is coerced, little justification exists for permitting the highly probative evidence of a voluntary confession to be irretrievably lost to the factfinder. [¶] There is a vast difference between the direct consequences flowing from coercion of a confession by physical violence or other deliberate means calculated to break the suspect's will and the uncertain consequences of disclosure of a `guilty secret' freely given in response to an unwarned but noncoercive question.... ( Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. 298, 312, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222.) Under such circumstances, absent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of compulsion. A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement. In such circumstances, the finder of fact may reasonably conclude that the suspect made a rational and intelligent choice whether to waive or invoke his rights. ( Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. 298, 314, 105 S.Ct. 1285.) Defendant, and the dissenters, insist Elstad is distinguishable. As they note, the Elstad majority limited its holding to cases in which the Miranda violation was a mere failure to provide warnings of the rights to silence and counsel, and expressly declined to decide whether similar rules might apply where [suspects'] invocation of their rights to remain silent and to have counsel present were flatly ignored while police subjected them to continued interrogation. [Citations.] ( Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. 298, 313, fn. 3, 105 S.Ct. 1285.) Defendant and the dissenters urge that where the police elicited incriminating statements by ignoring a custodial suspect's request for counsel, the more stringent Wong Sun analysis must apply, and any later confession, even if otherwise valid, must be presumed the tainted product of the earlier illegality. In a 1993 decision on which both defendant and the dissenters heavily rely, we applied pre-Elstad California precedent to conclude that when the police improperly elicit incriminating statements from a custodial suspect who has invoked his Miranda rights, any subsequent statement by the suspect must be presumed the tainted product of the first because the suspect has already `let the cat out of the bag by confessing.' ( Sims, supra, 5 Cal.4th 405, 444-445, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537, 853 P.2d 992, citing People v. Johnson (1969) 70 Cal.2d 541, 547, 75 Cal.Rptr. 401, 450 P.2d 865 and People v. Spencer (1967) 66 Cal.2d 158, 167, 57 Cal.Rptr. 163, 424 P.2d 715.) We said that, to overcome the presumption and show sufficient attenuation to dissipate the taint, the People must demonstrate `at least an intervening independent act by the defendant or a third party' to break the causal chain in such a way that the second confession is not in fact obtained by exploitation of the illegality. ( Sims, supra, at p. 445, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537, 853 P.2d 992, citing People v. Sesslin (1968) 68 Cal.2d 418, 425, 67 Cal.Rptr. 409, 439 P.2d 321 and People v. Rich (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1036, 1081, 248 Cal.Rptr. 510, 755 P.2d 960.) Despite a brief reference to Elstad supra, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285 ( Sims, supra, at p. 446, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537, 853 P.2d 992), our Sims opinion made no effort to address how the sharply different analysis of Elstad might pertain to facts like those presented by Sims and this case. More recently, we considered that issue. Undermining Sims, supra, 5 Cal.4th 405, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537, 853 P.2d 992, we unanimously concluded that the less stringent Elstad tainted product analysis applies when a prior confession was obtained despite the custodial suspect's Miranda request for counsel. ( People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1039-1040, 60 Cal. Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544, cert. den. sub nom. Bradford v. California (1997) 522 U.S. 953, 118 S.Ct. 377, 139 L.Ed.2d 293 (Bradford). The facts of Bradford are instructive. In the early morning of April 19, 1988, suspect Bradford was in custody after his arrest for murder. When Detective Riehl sought to question Bradford, he refused to waive his Miranda rights and stated he wanted a lawyer. But Riehl persisted. Riehl urged Bradford to unburden his guilty conscience, assured Bradford their conversation was off the record, and advised Bradford he was safe from a legal standpoint because he had requested an attorney. ( Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1026, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544.) Bradford confessed. Later the same morning, while Bradford remained in custody, he was approached by Detective Hooks. Hooks again interviewed Bradford off the record, and Bradford again confessed. During the interview, Hooks pressed the theme that Bradford would feel better if he talked. Hooks also professed sympathy for Bradford's problems, including drug and alcohol abuse, that might have contributed to the crime. Hooks suggested that, although no promises could be made and Bradford must pay for what he did, his best chance to get help for his problems was to tell his side of the story on the record. Hooks urged Bradford to contact him if he wished to do so. ( Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 1029-1030, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544.) Bradford remained in custody overnight. The next morning, April 20, 1988, he sent for Detective Arnold, indicated a willingness to talk on the record, waived his Miranda rights, and confessed once more. Bradford moved to suppress all three confessions. The trial court found that the Riehl confession, though uncoerced, was obtained in violation of Edwards. The court therefore excluded this confession from the prosecution's case-in-chief. The court concluded that the Hooks confession stemmed from coercive police tactics, and therefore suppressed it entirely. However, the court admitted the Arnold confession for all purposes, reasoning that it was properly obtained after Bradford himself initiated contact and volunteered to talk. Bradford was convicted of murder. On appeal, Bradford urged that the Arnold confession should also have been suppressed as the tainted product of the earlier Edwards violations. We conceded that the Riehl and Hooks interviews were improper under Edwards, and the confessions thereby obtained were thus properly excluded. However, we held, this did not mean the Arnold confession also must be suppressed. Noting the factual distinction between Elstad and Bradford's case, we nonetheless reasoned that just as a failure to give Miranda warnings does not in and of itself constitute coercion ( [ Elstad], supra, 470 U.S. [298,] 307, fn. 1 [105 S.Ct. 1285]), neither does continued interrogation after a defendant has invoked his right to counsel, or an Edwards violation, inherently constitute coercion. [Citation.] ( Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1039, 60 Cal. Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544.) As we explained, the Edwards rule simply `ensures that any statement made in subsequent interrogation is not the result of coercive pressures....' ( Bradford, supra, at p. 1040, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544, quoting Minnick v. Mississippi, supra, 498 U.S. 146, 151, 111 S.Ct. 486.) Yet [t]he United States Supreme Court itself has observed that `the Edwards rule cannot be said to be a sine qua non of fair and accurate interrogation.' ( Solem v. Stumes [(1984)] 465 U.S. [638,] 644 [104 S.Ct. 1338, 79 L.Ed.2d 579].) `... Edwards did not confer a substantive constitutional right that had not existed before; it created a protective umbrella serving to enhance a constitutional guarantee.' ( Id., at p. 644 & fn. 4, 101 S.Ct. 1880, citation omitted). Thus, we cannot conclude that an Edwards violation, `unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free will, so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period.' ( [ Elstad], supra, 470 U.S. [298,] 309 [105 S.Ct. 1285].) Rather, if the statement made after an Edwards violation is voluntary, `the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn ... solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made.' (Ibid.) ( Bradford supra, 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1040, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544.) [11] We then proceeded to determine, under the totality of circumstances (see Moron v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410), whether the Riehl and Hooks confessions, though obtained in violation of Edwards, were voluntary. In doing so, we cautioned that while a police violation of Miranda is a circumstance bearing on voluntariness, a Miranda violation does not invariably constitute coercion for purposes of determining whether a subsequent statement was voluntarily given. ( Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1041, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544, citing Withrow v. Williams (1993) 507 U.S. 680, 693-694, 113 S.Ct. 1745, 123 L.Ed.2d 407; Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157, 164, fn. 2, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473; and Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. 298, 307, fn. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1285.) We also admonished that [t]he Fifth Amendment is not `concerned with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion.' ( [ Elstad], supra, ... at pp. 304-305 [105 S.Ct. 1285].) ( Bradford supra, at p. 1041, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544.) After independently reviewing the evidence under these standards, we concluded that defendant had voluntarily confessed to both Riehl and Hooks. We noted, as had the trial court, that the tapes of both the Riehl and Hooks interviews indicated defendant's willingness, even eagerness, to talk once told his statements were off the record. We further observed that, though the trial court was concerned about Hooks's `almost outrageous' conduct in reapproaching Bradford after he requested counsel, the court had noted it was `not going to the extent of saying there was coercion in the sense of a person's will was broken down.' ( Bradford supra, 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1042, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544.) We agreed that though Hooks's conduct was unethical and must be strongly disapproved, it did not deprive[] [Bradford] of the ability to freely and deliberately choose to speak to either detective. (Ibid.) Finally, we concluded that Hooks's extensive efforts to establish rapport with Bradford did not constitute coercion. As we noted, Hooks's empathetic references to Bradford's substance abuse problems were not interrogation techniques `so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned.' [Citations.] ( Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1043, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544.) We further determined that in the subsequent interview with Detective Arnold, also undertaken in custody, Bradford had knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda right to counsel, and had confessed of his own free will. On the latter point, we stressed that Bradford himself had reinitiated contact with Arnold. Moreover, we pointed out, at the outset of the Arnold interview, Bradford said he had some questions, and would probably talk, though he was not sure. This statement indicates, as the trial court observed, that [Bradford] did not feel that his prior statements had made his current confession a foregone conclusion. [Moreover,] ... the tape of this interrogation `clearly indicate[d] [Bradford's] eagerness to talk....' ( Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1043, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544.) Similarly here, we conclude that despite any Edwards violation on November 19, 1996, the statements defendant made on that date were otherwise voluntary. The trial court found that though polygraph operator Redden engaged in skillful questioning after defendant expressed the need to consult counsel, Redden's tactics were not overtly threatening. Indeed, the court noted, [v]iewing the videotape [of the interview], [defendant] seemed ready to talk. There were no lengthy pauses. He volunteered a lot of information to Mr. Redden at the time.... Moreover, the court observed, at the end of the interview, defendant expressed an interest in having the detectives look at the case from his standpoint utilizing witnesses he [said] he [had], which were witnesses he repeatedly had made references to in the preceding pages. And clearly he's indicating he wants some further work done.... The record amply supports this assessment. None of the circumstances of the November 19 interview suggest that defendant's free will was overborne by state compulsion. Defendant arrived at the station on his own, was treated courteously, was not deprived of human comforts or necessities, and was not worn down by lengthy interrogation. Though Redden did not honor defendant's request for counsel, Redden employed no interrogation techniques involving actual physical or psychological coercion. He merely offered a sympathetic ear and encouraged defendant to keep talking. [12] Little encouragement was needed. Though emotional and disjointed, defendant's statement emerged in narrative form. Defendant expressed an understanding of his predicament, and he tried on several occasions to restrain himself before more damage was done, but once told he had failed the polygraph examination, he displayed a manifest eagerness to unburden his conscience. He told Redden he should not have agreed to the test, because he knew he could not lie. He insisted at several points that he wanted to help the authorities close the case. Indeed, he seemed motivated in large part by a desire to put forth a self-serving version of his role in Andrade's death. Before leaving the station on November 19, defendant pressed Detective Rowe to contact witnesses who would corroborate his claims about Andrade's depressed mental state. He also told Rowe that while he wished he had not said anything, I can't live with the guilt either. Thus, there seems no doubt that defendant's statements on November 19 stemmed not from police coercion but from his own troubled conscience, his assumption he would inevitably be caught, and a desire to minimize his culpability. Defendant points to his several complaints, during the November 19 interview, that he had gotten no sleep the previous night. But defendant's lack of rest was not the result of state compulsion. We have little difficulty in concluding, as the trial court implicitly did, that defendant's November 19 statement was voluntary. The same is true of the November 21 statement. Defendant stresses that he did not recontact the detectives between November 19 and November 21, but all other signs are that he spoke with them freely. On November 19, Detective Rowe had admonished him that the matter was not concluded. Defendant had responded he realized this was so, and he had urged Rowe to investigate and confirm Andrade's suicidal depression. The trial court viewed this latter action as clearly ... an effort on [defendant's] part to reinitiate some contact with the police. Thereafter, defendant had been free for two days, with ample opportunity to consider his situation and seek help, including legal assistance, if he wished. On November 21, the officers approached him at his home. As the trial court recited, they knock[ed] at the door, [and] contacted] [defendant] who invite[d] them to come in and agree[d] to talk to them. They [told] him they [would] leave ... [a]t the conclusion of the interview, [and] they [did] leave, and he [was] free to go about his business. The interview itself lasted slightly over one hour. The detectives used no coercive tactics. As on November 19, defendant did most of the talking, while the officers interrupted only occasionally to clarify points he had made. In the interview transcript, defendant displays no agitation or hesitancy. He appears calm, prepared, and intent on presenting a coherent and sympathetic version of his claim that he assisted Andrade to commit suicide. Moreover, defendant made clear on November 21 that he was not confessing simply because he had already incriminated himself on November 19. On the contrary, he said he assumed he had left telltale evidence behind, always knew he could not get away with it, and never really intended to escape, but attempted a feeble coverup only because of a human instinct for self-preservation. Indeed, defendant remarked, the first night you were here and said you'd probably want me to come down for a polygraph, ... I knew it was over. (Italics added.) He indicated that his motive in talking to the officers was simply to tell[] you the absolute truth and try[] to convince you. I really felt obligated. (Italics added.) Under these circumstances, we are amply persuaded that defendant's November 21 statement, like the one he gave on November 19, was voluntary. [13] Defendant urges that the November 21 statement nonetheless fails to meet an additional requirement of Elstad and Bradford. Under those decisions, he insists, when a prior statement was obtained in violation of Miranda, the state must show not only that a subsequent confession was voluntary, but also that the suspect received new Miranda warnings and expressly rewaived the Miranda rights to silence and counsel. Defendant emphasizes again that the police did not re- Mirandize him before he was questioned on November 21, and he did not explicitly agree to give up the rights provided by Miranda. The dissenters, too, cite the failure to give new Miranda warnings as a factor weighing against any conclusion that the November 21 statement was voluntary. However, defendant was not in custody on November 21. As we have previously observed, Miranda procedures apply only in the custodial setting. In both Elstad and Bradford suspects requestioned by the police after prior Miranda violations remained in custody. Any suggestion in those decisions that new Miranda advisements and waivers were necessary must be understood in that context. Indeed, in Elstad, the suspect had not heard and waived his Miranda rights before first giving an incriminating response to custodial police questioning. It was thus logical to hold that a second custodial interrogation was also invalid unless it was preceded by explicit Miranda warnings and waivers. Here the police did give defendant full Miranda warnings before they first questioned him on November 19. During that interview, defendant evidenced his understanding of his Miranda rights by attempting to invoke them. Moreover, he knew on November 19 that he should expect further contact with the police, and he had two intervening days to consult the lawyer he then said he wanted. A competent attorney would undoubtedly have further stressed defendant's right to silence. We conclude no new warnings and waivers were necessary here. Defendant's November 21 statement is not tainted by any Edwards violation that occurred two days earlier. The dissenters lament that, by finding defendant's November 21 statement admissible, we remove any incentive for police to honor suspects' Miranda rights to stop custodial questioning (dis. opn. of Chin, J., post, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 135, 52 P.3d at p. 73) and encourage precisely the sort of subterfuge by ... law enforcement investigators . . . that Miranda sought to end (dis. opn. of George, C.J., post, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 135, 52 P.3d at p. 73). For several reasons, we are not persuaded by these criticisms. First, as indicated, we have found no evidence of ruse, subterfuge, or pretext in this case, and have limited our holding accordingly. Moreover, schemes to violate Miranda deliberately, then to manipulate the break-in-custody exception in hopes of obtaining valid confessions, are fraught with risks and difficulties that diminish their allure. After all, any such scheme necessarily involves the suspect's release. This, in turn, leaves the suspect free to learn information (including the invalidity of his prior statement) that would encourage him to refuse further cooperation when recontacted. (Indeed, in this case, defendant, who was not being observed by the police, was at large and presumably free to take flight.) Moreover, even if a later statement is obtained, the issue will inevitably arise whether its validity is tainted by the prior illegality. Considerations of this kind lead us to believe the dissenters exaggerate the enthusiasm with which police would embrace the subterfuge they envision. Accordingly, the concerns they express do not dissuade us from our result. [14]