Opinion ID: 2386250
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gross Negligence Theory

Text: The District of Columbia cannot be held liable for claims arising out of the operation of a police car on an emergency run unless the officer driving the car acted with gross negligence. District of Columbia v. Henderson, 710 A.2d 874, 876 (D.C.1998); see also D.C.Code § 2-411 (2001). D.C.Code § 2-411 (2001) (4) defines emergency run, in pertinent part, as the movement of a District-owned vehicle, by direction of the operator or of some other authorized person . . ., under circumstances which lead the operator. . . to believe that such vehicle should proceed expeditiously upon a particular mission . . . for the purpose of dealing with a supposed . . . emergency, an alleged violation of a statute or regulation.. . . In the context of this statute, we have defined gross negligence to require such an extreme deviation from the ordinary standard of care as to support a finding of wanton, willful and reckless disregard or conscious indifference for the rights and safety of others. District of Columbia v. Walker, 689 A.2d 40, 44 (D.C. 1997). It includes conduct so extreme as to connote some sort of bad faith. Id. (citing Andrews v. Wilkins, 934 F.2d 1267, 1272 (D.C.Cir.1991)). However, when evidence of the actor's subjective bad faith is not present, the extreme nature of the conduct may be shown by demonstrating that the actor acted in disregard of a risk `so obvious that [the actor] must be taken to be aware of it and so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow.' Id. at 44-45 (quoting 3 S. SPEISER, et al., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 10.2, at 361 (1986)). Among the factors which courts consider in determining whether the conduct of a person involved in a police chase amounts to gross negligence are: (1) the length of the chase; (2) the type of neighborhood; (3) the characteristics of the street or roadways; (4) the presence of vehicular or pedestrian traffic; (5) weather conditions and visibility; and (6) the seriousness of the offense for which the police are pursuing the offender. Id. at 45 (quoting Peak v. Ratliff, 185 W.Va. 548, 556, 408 S.E.2d 300, 308 (1991)). However, the primary focus must be not upon the conduct in all its aspects, but rather upon that particular conduct that might be said temporally and spatially to have proximately caused the collision. Id. at 46.
The District argues that the evidence establishes as a matter of law that the police officers were not grossly negligent. In support of its argument, the District relies principally upon this court's decision in Walker, supra . In Walker, this court held that the police were not grossly negligent in continuing to chase an underage driver in a stolen vehicle through red lights onto a parkway, where they reached speeds of approximately 90 miles per hour. Walker, 689 A.2d at 43, 47-48. Shortly before the actual collision, the Prince George's police car entered the chase, pulling in between the cars of the District's police officers and the fleeing suspect, and the parkway changed from a four lane divided highway into a two lane road divided by a double yellow line. Id. at 43. The suspect pulled into the lane of oncoming traffic, passed three cars and struck an oncoming vehicle. [4] Thus, immediately before the collision, the police were faced with a driver proceeding down a divided limited access highway at a very high rate of speed where vehicular traffic was light, there were no pedestrians, and the conditions were clear and dry. Id. at 47. Although this court also recognized the presence of factors which suggested that continuing the pursuit might not be appropriate, it determined that it could not conclude that the relevant conduct which resulted in the collision was such an extreme deviation from the reasonable standard of care as to amount to gross negligence on the part of the District police. Id. at 47-48. The decision in Walker is instructive both in defining gross negligence in the context of a claim arising out of the operation of a police car on an emergency run and in identifying and applying the factors for consideration in making that determination. The court considered the same factors which other courts look to, such as the rate of speed, the traffic conditions, the weather conditions, and the absence of pedestrians, all of which the court found to weigh against a finding of gross negligence in Walker. The facts in Walker differ from the facts in the present case in important respects. In this case, the chase occurred in a residential area of the city, where private homes and multi-unit apartment buildings and schools were located. All of the officers involved in the chase were familiar with the conditions of the neighborhood. The chase and ensuing accident happened during the rush hour, at a busy intersection for vehicular and pedestrian traffic. Officer Lee, who drove the first scout car, and his partner, Officer Power, testified that they knew that the intersection where the accident occurred would be crowded during that time of day. There was testimony that the Pathfinder's speed was 83 to 90 miles per hour as it entered the intersection with the police vehicles, with sirens and emergency lights activated, following directly behind it. Officer Lee testified that he did not come to a stop until he was in the intersection, after he slammed on the brakes, when he saw the red light and to avoid colliding with the Pathfinder. Most importantly, as the police knew, the roadway (Ely Place) had a crest which obstructed the view of what was on the other side of the hill. Thus, as the trial court pointed out, the evidence showed that these officers were driving at an excessively high rate of speed without knowing what faced them, or the Nissan Pathfinder they were pursuing, over the crest of the hill. The jury could reasonably find that all these circumstances establish more than simple negligence. Cf. Henderson, supra, 710 A.2d at 877. [5] The serious aggravating factors required in order for the police officers' conduct to meet the gross negligence standard can be found in the continuation of this high speed chase under conditions which the officers knew created an extreme danger to others with reckless indifference to the situation. See id. While the need to apprehend the driver was more urgent in this case than in Walker, [6] it is only one factor to be balanced against others, including the hazards of the chase to people on the street. [T]he appropriate inquiry is whether, given the balance of the factors in th[e] case, a reasonable juror could conclude that the conduct of the [police] officers so grossly deviated from the conduct required under the circumstances as to support a finding of wanton, willful and reckless disregard or conscious indifference for the rights and safety of others. 689 A.2d at 46. While the standard for a finding of gross negligence in this context is a high one, we think that a reasonable juror could make that finding on the evidence presented. The District argues that the police officers violated no law in the course of the pursuit and were attempting to protect the public safety. It contends that the conduct of the police here was consistent with standard techniques used to stop the driver of a vehicle who is suspected of having committed a crime. In the course of a vehicle pursuit to apprehend a criminal offender, a police officer may exceed the speed limit and ignore traffic lights. Henderson, supra, 710 A.2d at 877 (citing 18 DCMR §§ 2002.2(b) and (c) and MPD General Order 301.3(1)(B)(5)). In doing so, however, the officer may not exceed rational bounds or act with gross negligence without being subject to liability. See D.C.Code § 2-412 (2001) (sanctioning the District's liability for gross negligence in operating an emergency vehicle). The conduct here, the jury might reasonably conclude, exceeded those bounds. Appellees' expert witnesses provided additional evidence bearing on the police conduct in this case. Both Dr. Kirkham and former Deputy Police Chief Klotz testified that the national standard of care required that a chase be discontinued where the circumstances presented an unnecessary risk to the safety of others. Dr. Kirkham testified that the standard of care requires the officer to weigh the urgency of immediate apprehension against the foreseeable risk to others. This standard, according to Dr. Kirkham, is consistent with the MPD General Order 301.3, which requires that the officer consider the vehicular and pedestrian traffic and the time of day, and the actions of the vehicle being chased. Dr. Kirkham testified that the conduct of the officers here represented an extremely serious violation of the nationally accepted law enforcement standards and procedures. He testified that following the Pathfinder closely at a high rate of speed acted as a catalyst which caused the Pathfinder to continue to travel at a high speed, thereby contributing to causing the collision. Klotz concluded that it was grossly negligent and reckless to continue the chase under the circumstances. He cited specifically the chase over nearly a mile of city streets in a densely populated urban neighborhood, near schools and into an intersection known to be crowded during rush hour. Each of the drivers of the police vehicles was familiar with the conditions which created the hazard and continued the chase at exceptionally high rates of speed. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to appellees, as we must, we cannot say that no reasonable juror could have found that the police officer's conduct was grossly negligent in this case. See Henderson, supra, 710 A.2d at 875 (citing Walker, supra, 689 A.2d at 42) (other citation omitted). [7]