Opinion ID: 2973192
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: SMI’s Claim of Slander of Title

Text: The district court held that, although the supporting affidavits were untimely, Dunbar’s mechanic’s liens did not constitute slander of title under Ohio law because they were not filed maliciously. As aforementioned, we defer to the district court’s assessment of credibility but review its interpretations of state law de novo. Malice, moreover, typically presents a question of law. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 492 (1984). To prove slander of title in Ohio, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) made a defamatory statement against the property of another, (2) which was false and malicious, and (3) caused actual or special damages. Green v. Lamarr, 744 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ohio App. Ct. 2000). A statement is malicious if made with “reckless or wanton disregard of the rights of another.” Childers v. Commerce Mortgage Invs., 579 N.E.2d 219, 221 (Ohio App. Ct. 1989). SMI asserts that a letter from Dunbar employee Skip Galbraith evidences Dunbar’s malice. In this letter, dated February 5, 2001, Galbraith states that Dunbar is “within three (3) weeks of instituting our legal rights under the Ohio Lien laws.” Galbraith testified that he was familiar with O.R.C. § 1311.06(B)(3)’s time requirements. Furthermore, SMI points out that three weeks from February 5, 2001, is almost exactly 75 days from the day SMI tested the system. According to SMI, this letter shows that Dunbar knew its affidavits, filed in March, were untimely. Nevertheless, the district court did not find “reckless or wanton disregard” in Dunbar’s act of filing the affidavits on March 22, 2001. The court credited Galbraith’s explanation of his letter at trial, namely, that Dunbar was within three weeks of giving up its collection efforts and exercising -6- Nos. 04-4376/4377 Specialty Minerals v. Dunbar Mechanical its option under Ohio law to file a mechanic’s lien. That the date coincided with SMI’s test of the system was, according to the district court, a coincidence. We affirm the district court for two reasons. First, we owe substantial deference to the credibility determination of the lower courts; the plaintiff is not entitled to a redetermination of credibility. NLRB v. S. E. Nichols of Ohio, Inc., 472 F.2d 1228, 1229 (6th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (“This court does not sit to retry disputed issues of fact or to redetermine issues of credibility of witnesses.”). Thus, although our examination is de novo, we read Galbraith’s letter with the assumption that his trial testimony is true. Second, the facts do not easily support a claim for slander of title. “Generally, the claim arises because the presence of the affidavit or other filed documents prevents the titled owner from completing a proposed sale.” Green, 744 N.E.2d at 224. Ohio’s rule allowing property holders to post bonds in lieu of mechanic’s liens, see O.R.C. § 1311.11(C), provides an easy mechanism to remove the cloud to title. Thus, the subject affidavits do not constitute “instrument[s] that cast doubt on the property’s title and [do] not stand in the way of a record owner’s ‘full and free exercise of ownership.” Green, 744 N.E.2d at 224 (quoting Catawba West, Inc. v. Domo, 598 N.E.2d 883, 885 (Ohio App. 1991).