Opinion ID: 1867524
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Hunters' Void-for-Vagueness Argument

Text: We must next determine whether the trial court erred in declaring § 34-11-1, Ala.Code 1975, as amended in 1997, unconstitutionally vague. In addressing the Hunters' vagueness claim, the trial court stated: The constitutional right to due process that is guaranteed under the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, §§ 6 and 13, `is violated when a statute or regulation is unduly vague.' Ross Neely Express, Inc. v. Alabama Dep't Envtl. Mgmt., 437 So.2d 82, 84 (Ala.1983).' Alabama Dep't Envtl. Mgmt. v. Legal Environmental Assistance Fndn., Inc., 922 So.2d 101, 114 n. 3 (Ala.Civ.App. 2005). `A state's legislative enactment is void for vagueness under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment if it is inherently standardless, enforceable only in the exercise of an unlimited, and hence arbitrary, discretion vested in the state.' Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 999 (5th Cir.1986). `A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and the attendant dangers discriminatory application.' Mason v. Florida Bar, 208 F.3d 952, 959 (11th Cir.2000), citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972). In this case, the official minutes of the Board of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors and the testimony of the Board's executive director and Rule 30(b)(6) representative reflect that the statute is so vague, indefinite, and imprecise that the members of the Board  those who are charged by the legislature with the power to decide whether violations of the statute have occurred and to impose punishment for such violations  can decide when the law is violated only after the fact and only on a `case-by-case basis.' The official minutes of the meeting on October 29, 2004, of the Board of Directors of the Board of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors state that the Board will decide `on a case-by-case basis' whether testimony constitutes the practice of engineering: `The Board discussed what aspects of testimony should fall under the definitions of the practices of engineering and surveying. The discussions involved the Board's function versus the judges having the responsibility to determine who are classified as expert witnesses. The Board determined that each case had to be handled on a case-by-case basis. ' Dinger depo. Exhibit 28. . . . This decision by the Board to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the statute has been violated demonstrates that the statute gives so little guidance to the Board that the Board is free to exercise its enforcement power arbitrarily. Indeed, the evidence developed during the deposition of the Board's executive director and Ala. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) representative, Mrs. Regina Dinger, demonstrates in some detail the extent to which the statute allows the Board to decide arbitrarily whether to charge a person with violating it. When Mrs. Dinger was asked to explain what conduct was proscribed by this statute, she was unable to do so. Mrs. Dinger was first qualified as the person with the highest and best knowledge about the Board's construction and application of the statute: . . . . Despite being most qualified to answer for the Board as its representative, Mrs. Dinger was unable to answer basic questions about whether common, everyday practices are now subject to prosecution because of the 1997 amendment of the statute that included `testimony' within the practice of engineering. For example, Mrs. Dinger was unable to answer whether expert testimony regarding accident reconstruction work in civil litigation would require licensure as an engineer. `I would have to say it would depend.' (Dinger depo. 22/11). According to Mrs. Dinger, a plumber testifying why there was a sewage backup would not have to be licensed if he could give his testimony based on `a visual inspection,' but Mrs. Dinger `wouldn't be able to tell' whether he was practicing engineering (and would therefore have to be licensed as an engineer to testify) if the plumber could not see the problem without actually digging up all of the pipe. According to Mrs. Dinger, if an Alabama citizen whose car catches on fire asks a mechanic to give an opinion as to why the carburetor caught on fire, it `may or may not be a decision based on engineering principles as to how he rendered his decision,' but she could not answer when `it would be engineering in violation of the statute as opposed to where it wouldn't be.' Mrs. Dinger testified that common investigations of the causes and origins of fires involve the practice of engineering, but she could not identify any Alabama fire marshals or state fire investigators who are licensed engineers. When asked whether the author of the National Electric Safety Code would be able to testify about the requirements of that code without licensure as an engineer, Mrs. Dinger answered, `I wouldn't be able to tell you.' There is no indication as to how testimony by an expert witness threatens the health, welfare, or safety of any Alabama residents. Dinger depo., 58-59. As to the rationale for including testimony in the definition of the practice of engineering, Ms. Dinger could testify only that `the primary purpose of the Board is to protect the health, safety and public welfare of the individuals of the state.' Id. at 56. Thus, the statute makes `no distinction between conduct that is calculated to harm and that is essentially innocent.' Indeed, if the enforcers of the statute cannot identify any conduct that is harmful that is governed by the statute, it exclusively allows prosecution of conduct that is `entirely innocent.' More to the point, as demonstrated in Ms. Dinger's deposition and in the amicus curiae's brief, the enforcement of this statute is `subject to the unfettered discretion of' the Board of Licensure. Thus, Plaintiffs, Mr. Hicks, and amicus curiae have standing to challenge this statute as allowing arbitrary enforcement, even if it may be deemed to `facially' apply to Mr. Hicks's proposed testimony, just as Mr. Horn was entitled to challenge the ordinance that facially applied to his `entirely innocent' behavior that subjected him to `arbitrary law enforcement.' Horn [v. City of Montgomery, 619 So.2d 949,] at 951 [(Ala. 1993)]. For the reasons stated, the Court holds that the word `testimony' in amended § 34-11-1(7), Ala.Code 1975, is void for vagueness and thus violates article I, §§ 6 and 13, of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901. (Citations to record omitted.) We reject this analysis. The United States Supreme Court has stated: A statute can be impermissibly vague for either of two independent reasons. First, if it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits. Second, if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56-57 (1999). Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000). However, in order to challenge a statute on the basis of vagueness, the challenger must first have standing to do so. Opinions from the United States Supreme Court establish that a litigant has no standing to assert a vagueness claim against a statute if that litigant's conduct is clearly proscribed by that statute. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982) (A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others. A court should therefore examine the complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law. (footnote omitted)); see, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974) (One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before this Court.). In addition to the above pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court on the issue of standing, this Court has recognized: `[B]ecause [t]he essential purpose of the `void for vagueness' doctrine is to warn individuals of the criminal consequences of their conduct, [o]ne to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness, even though the statute may well be vague as applied to others. Therefore, a defendant who challenges a statute on the grounds of vagueness must demonstrate that the statute under attack is vague as applied to his own conduct, regardless of the potentially vague application to others.' Hunt v. State, 642 So.2d 999, 1027-28 (Ala. Crim.App.1993) (quoting Senf v. State, 622 So.2d 435, 437 (Ala.Crim.App.1993); citations omitted). See also Fletcher v. Tuscaloosa Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 294 Ala. 173, 178, 314 So.2d 51, 56 (1975) (Where a particular litigant is not within the group of persons affected by a statute or portion thereof which is allegedly unconstitutional, such litigant lacks standing to raise such constitutional issue.); Kid's Stuff Learning Ctr., Inc. v. State Dep't of Human Res., 660 So.2d 613, 620 (Ala.Civ.App.1995) (One who challenges a regulation as being unconstitutionally vague or overbroad must be directly affected by the statute's alleged vagueness. . . . Therefore, even if the regulation could, in some other set of circumstances, be considered vague, it was not vague as to [the appellant]. [The appellant] is not in a position to argue the vagueness or overbreadth of the regulation as it might apply to other parties, when the regulation was not vague as to [the appellant].). These cases establish that, in order to challenge a statute for vagueness, the challenger must fall within the group of persons affected or possibly affected by the statute. At a minimum, the challenger must have a concern that the statute might be unconstitutionally applied to him or her. However, in the case before us, the Licensure Act is not directly applicable to the Hunters. There is no question whether they are engaging in the practice of engineering; additionally, there is no question that the Hunters are not subject to the licensing requirement under the Licensure Act. Additionally, the Licensure Board has not attempted to prosecute the Hunters for an alleged violation of the Licensure Act. Thus, the Hunters are not even within the class of persons to whom the Licensure Act is directed, much less affected by its alleged vagueness. We next consider whether the Hunters have standing to challenge the Licensure Act for vagueness as that Act is applied to others. Such a challenge is a facial challenge, which is defined as [a] claim that a statute is unconstitutional on its face  that is, that it always operates unconstitutionally. Black's Law Dictionary 244 (8th ed.2004) (emphasis added). However, Hicks, the Hunters' proffered expert witness, unquestionably falls within the proscription of the Licensure Act. It is undisputed that Hicks is not licensed as an engineer; it is also undisputed that Hicks attempted to offer sworn testimony regarding engineering matters. Because Hicks falls squarely within the prohibition of the Licensure Act, the Hunters cannot successfully assert their facial challenge to the Licensure Act. However, the Hunters rely heavily on City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999), as support for their argument that they have the necessary standing to challenge the Licensing Act because, they say, the statute is so permeated with vagueness as to be unconstitutional. The trial court obviously was persuaded by these arguments; we are not. In City of Chicago, supra, the United States Supreme Court addressed an antiloitering ordinance, which prohibited any person the police reasonably believed to be a member of a gang from loitering in a public place with one or more persons. The ordinance defined loiter to mean to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose. See 527 U.S. at 47, 119 S.Ct. 1849, quoting Chicago Municipal Code § 8-4-015. The United States Supreme Court held that the ordinance failed to provide adequate notice to the public as to what conduct it sought to prohibit. The Court held that what was an apparent purpose was purely subjective and required a subjective interpretation by the law officer on the scene. Therefore, Chicago citizens had no way of knowing if the purpose for their remaining in one place was or was not apparent to law enforcement, until it was too late to avoid violating the ordinance. The Court concluded that the ordinance was unconstitutional because (1) it was so vague and standardless that it left the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibited, and (2) it authorized and even encouraged arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement because it lacked definite standards for law enforcement to follow. When vagueness permeates the text of such a law, it is subject to facial attack. City of Chicago, 527 U.S. at 55, 119 S.Ct. 1849 (footnote omitted). However, the Licensure Act has none of the indicia of vagueness found in the ordinance declared unconstitutional in City of Chicago. The Licensure Act is specific enough to allow the public to discern what conduct it seeks to prohibit; the statute unequivocally prohibits the practice of engineering without a license. Unlike the ordinance in City of Chicago, which required an officer to make a subjective determination of what constituted loitering, the Licensure Act contains a detailed and objective definition of the practice of engineering. This definition provides sufficient notice to the public as to the conduct the Licensure Act prohibits. Simply because the Licensure Act requires specialized knowledge to properly apply the statute does not compel the conclusion that it is void because it is vague. `Mere difficulty of ascertaining its meaning or the fact that it is susceptible of different interpretations will not render a statute or ordinance too vague or uncertain to be enforced.' The judicial power to declare a statute void for vagueness `should be exercised only when a statute is so incomplete, so irreconcilably conflicting, or so vague or indefinite, that it cannot be executed, and the court is unable, by the application of the known and accepted rules of construction, to determine with any reasonable degree of certainty, what the legislature intended.' Vaughn v. State, 880 So.2d 1178, 1195-96 (Ala.Crim.App.2003) (citations omitted). As evidenced by the fact that the Licensure Act clearly applies to Hicks, the Licensure Act does not rise to the level of vagueness found to exist in City of Chicago. Additionally, we can find no arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement of the Licensure Act. The definition of the practice of engineering is definite enough to allow an objective determination as to whether a person has engaged in that practice as defined. If the person engages in that practice without obtaining a license, he or she has violated the statute. This is in sharp contrast to the abstract and subjective analysis required by law enforcement in City of Chicago, supra, to determine whether the alleged loiterer had an apparent purpose for remaining in one place. Moreover, if a person has any uncertainty as to whether his or her proposed testimony falls within the meaning of the practice of engineering, the Licensure Act allows him or her to obtain an advisory opinion from the Licensure Board as to whether the statute has or will be triggered. See Regulation 330-X-1-.12, Ala. Admin. Code (Alabama State Board of Registration for Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors). Thus, a person wanting to testify to engineering matters within this State need not wait until after the testimony to determine whether it runs afoul of the Licensure Act. This again is in sharp contrast to the ordinance considered in City of Chicago. We can find no deficiency in the Licensure Act based on the notice provided to the public by the Act or in the standards established for enforcement of that Act. Additionally, it cannot be questioned that the Alabama Legislature has the power to regulate professions and to classify the activities subject to regulation as part of that profession. See, e.g., McCrory v. Wood, 277 Ala. 426, 171 So.2d 241 (1965) (recognizing that the Alabama Legislature has the power to regulate the practice of optometry); State of Alabama ex rel. Attorney General v. Spann, 270 Ala. 396, 400, 118 So.2d 740, 743 (1960) (acknowledging that the State has the power to regulate the practice of architecture; We believe that it is within the discretion of the legislature to determine at what point licensing is to begin and at what point it shall end.); § 34-3-6, Ala. Code 1975 (requiring a license in order to practice law in Alabama); § 6-5-540 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, the Alabama Medical Liability Act (requiring, among other things, that any person wishing to testify as an expert witness for or against a defendant physician in a medical-malpractice action be a similarly situated health care provider, i.e., must be licensed as a physician). Thus, it cannot be seriously disputed that the Alabama Legislature had the right to regulate the practice of engineering and to establish a credentialing requirement for engineers, if it saw fit. In essence, the legislature has established that the minimum level of expertise required to qualify as an expert on engineering matters within Alabama is the same level required to obtain a license in Alabama. The legislature has the power to establish such standards. The Licensure Act no more infringes on constitutional rights than did the Alabama Medical Liability Act, which has passed constitutional muster. See Plitt v. Griggs, 585 So.2d 1317 (Ala.1991) (applying the rational-basis test to uphold the Alabama Medical Liability Act against an equal-protection challenge). In support of their vagueness challenge, the Hunters rely on out-of-state decisions in which the courts concluded that, despite the wording of that state's licensing act, a witness need not hold an engineering license in order to testify as an expert in a court of law. See Thompson v. Gordon, 356 Ill.App.3d 447, 293 Ill.Dec. 102, 827 N.E.2d 983 (2005); Baerwald v. Flores, 122 N.M. 679, 930 P.2d 816 (Ct.App.1997). [5] These cases, however, are merely persuasive authority, and we decline to follow them. We also disagree with the emphasis placed by the trial court on Regina Dinger's deposition testimony. In its deposition notice served pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., the Hunters did not request to depose a Water Board representative with expertise in engineering matters, or anyone capable of interpreting the practice of engineering, or anyone capable of rendering an opinion on actual or alleged violations of the Licensure Act. Had the Hunters wished to obtain more definitive information regarding the Board's interpretation and application of the Licensing Act, they could have done so by deposing one or more of the members of the Licensure Board. Additionally, Dinger is not an engineer, and at her deposition she expressly disclaimed the ability to determine who should be licensed under the Licensure Act. Ms. Dinger testified: I don't render the opinion on anybody's qualifications for licensure. That's not what my responsibility is. That's what my Board members' responsibilities are. I process the applications. I can't render the decisions on competency of who becomes licensed. That's a . . . matter for the Board to render that decision. In response to hypothetical situations posed by the Hunters' counsel, Dinger offered her personal opinions as to the proper interpretation of the Licensure Act. For these reasons, we will not rely on Dinger's application of the Licensure Act to hypothetical situations to undermine what we conclude is an otherwise valid legislative act. We find the reasoning of Toussaint v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 303 S.C. 316, 400 S.E.2d 488 (1991), applicable to this case. In that case, a physician was charged with unprofessional conduct as defined by a statute directed at the regulation of physicians in South Carolina. The physician challenged that statute as unconstitutionally vague. However, the Supreme Court of South Carolina rejected these arguments: The constitutional standard for vagueness is the practical criterion of fair notice to those to whom the law applies. When the persons affected by the law constitute a select group with a specialized understanding of the subject being regulated, the degree of definiteness required to satisfy due process is measured by the common understanding and knowledge of the group. One to whose conduct the law clearly applies does not have standing to challenge it for vagueness. 303 S.C. at 320, 400 S.E.2d at 491 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that, when considered in light of the specialized knowledge and understanding of physicians, the statute was sufficiently definite to notify physicians  the select group to which the statute was directed  of those actions prohibited by the statute. Id. Like the statute at issue in Toussaint, the Licensure Act is sufficiently definite for engineers, the group of persons to whom it is addressed, to understand and apply its terms. For the above-stated reasons, we conclude that the Licensure Act provides sufficient notice of the conduct it seeks to prohibit. Additionally, the Licensure Act does not authorize or encourage arbitrary enforcement. We therefore conclude that the trial court erred in declaring § 34-11-1, Ala.Code 1975, unconstitutionally vague.