Opinion ID: 2584198
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the plaintiffs' failure to meet their burden of proof as a matter of law

Text: We next address whether the plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence  in the form of expert testimony  to defeat summary judgment. Preliminary, we recite the well-settled legal principles governing motions for summary judgment  specifically, that [a] summary judgment motion challenges the very existence or legal sufficiency of the claim or defense to which it is addressed. In effect, the moving party takes the position that he or she is entitled to prevail because his or her opponent has no valid claim for relief or defense to the action. Accordingly, the moving party has the initial burden of identifying those portions of the record demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The moving party may discharge his or her burden by demonstrating that[,] if the case went to trial[,] there would be no competent evidence to support a judgment for his or her opponent. Cf. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 . . . (1986) ( a party moving for summary judgment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56 need not support his or her motion with affidavits or similar materials that negate his or her opponent's claims, but need only point out that there is [an] absence of evidence to support the opponent's claims ). For if no evidence could be mustered to sustain the nonmoving party's position, a trial would be useless. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his or her pleading, but his or her response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in HRCP Rule 56, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he or she does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him or her. HRCP Rule 56(e) (1998) (emphasis added). In other words, a party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot discharge his or her burden by alleging conclusions, nor is he or she entitled to a trial on the basis of a hope that he can produce some evidence at that time. On motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Young v. Planning Comm'n of the County of Kaua`i, 89 Hawai`i 400, 407, 974 P.2d 40, 47 (1999) (internal quotation marks, citation, and original brackets omitted) (emphases added). Moreover, [t]he evidentiary standard required of a moving party in meeting its burden on a summary judgment motion depends on whether the moving party will have the burden of proof on the issue at trial. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB v. Russell, 99 Hawai`i 173, 182, 53 P.3d 312, 321 (App.2002) (citation omitted). Where the moving party is the defendant, who does not bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is proper when the non-moving party-plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof. Hall v. State, 7 Haw.App. 274, 284, 756 P.2d 1048, 1055 (1988) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Bearing the foregoing principles in mind, we now turn to the issue at hand, i.e., whether the plaintiffs' expert reports are legal[ly] sufficien[t] to sustain their claims against DuPont such that, if the case went to trial[,] there would be . . . competent evidence to support a judgment in their favor. Young, 89 Hawai`i at 407, 974 P.2d at 47 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In this case, the plaintiffs proffered reports of their economic expert and attorney experts as evidence of damages. As indicated above, one factor among many relevant factors in determining the fair compromise value of a particular claim on the date of settlement is the validity  or lack thereof  of the plaintiffs' claim for damages at the time of trial: The nature of the injuries in the foregone tort action are relevant only to the extent of how they would affect the value of the claim to be compromised[.] DiSabatino, 635 F.Supp. at 355. Indeed, such factor requires the application of economic principles to ascertain the reasonably certain future income/profits of the plaintiffs in a particular market, and, thus, economic experts would likely be necessary to aid the jury in determining the underlying tort damages at least in the context of how those economic damages affect the settlement value, if at all. The plaintiffs' economic expert reports (prepared by David J. Weiner of Valvoulis and Weiner) revealed that McCully sustained damages in the sum of $11,847,889.00, Willman in the sum of $3,278,202.00, Isa in the sum of $967,222.00, and the Takas in the sum of $649,871.00. Weiner calculated the total value of each plaintiff's underlying product liability claim, beginning with the alleged first day of Benlate loss through June 2005  ten years after their settlements. However, the submission of the economic reports does not negate the fact that the plaintiffs are also required to adduce evidence  via attorney expert testimony  as to the factors that must be considered when determining the fair compromise value for each of the plaintiffs' cases. In that regard, the plaintiffs presented reports from five attorneys, designated as experts, four of whom had litigated the underlying product liability actions. They were: (1) Wayne D. Parsons, who along with Kevin A. Malone [12] (a Florida attorney) represented Isa and the Takas; (2) J. Richard Peterson, who represented Willman; (3) Judith Pavey, who negotiated Willman's settlement; (4) George W. Playdon, Jr., who represented McCully; and (5) Jeffrey S. Portnoy, the only designated expert not involved in the underlying product liability cases. According to the circuit court, however, the aforementioned attorney expert reports, as discussed more fully infra, were insufficient as a matter of law to establish the plaintiffs' damages. Specifically, the circuit court ruled that: [The p]laintiffs have not submitted the expert testimony required to sustain their burden of proof on the proper measure of damages in their cases. The deadlines for [the p]laintiffs to submit their final expert reports and amend their pleadings were October 15, 2004, and December 14, 2004, respectively. This court previously made clear that expert reports were to be final and that the experts would not be allowed to testify on matters beyond their respective reports in its Order Related to Trial Procedures, filed May 6, 2004. [The p]laintiffs are therefore unable to prove the fact or amount of settlement fraud damages as a matter of law, and summary judgment is granted on all remaining claims herein. (Emphasis omitted.) The plaintiffs, however, contend that the circuit court ignored the numerous expert attorney [d]eclarations which [the p]laintiffs did, in fact, submit to substantiate their damages. The plaintiffs argue that their legal experts averred that the valuation of [the p]laintiffs' cases would have been substantially higher had the truth of DuPont's duplicity been known. Conversely, DuPont maintains that the plaintiffs cannot establish []either the fact [ ]or the amount of damage. [The plaintiffs] cannot meet this burden for a variety of reasons, the pertinent one here being that they simply cannot prove the correct measure of fraud damage based upon the way they have positioned this case. They have no expert testimony to provide assistance to the jury on how to evaluate [the] fair compromise value of each [of the plaintiffs'] claims, what the pertinent settlement factors would be and how they would be applied in this case, nor what methodologies could be used to determine what those amounts should be. (Emphasis omitted.) As previously stated, although the determination of damages is an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact, damages must be based on evidence that shows loss with reasonable certainty and eliminates speculation. Chung, 62 Haw. at 605, 618 P.2d at 291 ([T]he rule that uncertainty as to the amount does not necessarily prevent recovery is not to be interpreted as requiring no proof of the amount of damage. The extent of plaintiff's loss must be shown with reasonable certainty and that excludes any showing or conclusion founded upon mere speculation or guess. (Citation omitted.)). Parsons' report described the documents that were not properly produced during discovery in the product liability cases by DuPont and contended that these documents would have proven or tended to prove that Benlate caused the damages and losses to crops suffered by [his] clients. Parsons, therefore, concluded that the concealed documents would have increased the strength of the liability cases for [the p]laintiffs and the plaintiffs would have been in a stronger position regarding settlement. Parsons further concluded that: The decision of whether to settle the case for the amount offered by DuPont to an individual client, or to take the case to trial before a jury is ultimately the decision of the client. In the Hawai`i [product liability] case that I handled, additional evidence supporting the proposition that Benlate could cause damage to my client's crops would have reduced the risk of going to trial. The client would have been informed about the risk of going to trial in terms of the strength of the [p]laintiffs' liability claims as well as the strength of the clients' damages claims. If the client rejected their settlement offer, we would have been prepared to take the claim before a jury, in any event, and knowing the [concealed documents] would have made the plaintiffs' case stronger when taking an individual case to trial if the client rejected DuPont's settlement offer. (Emphases added.) Peterson's report opined that, had he and his client, Willman, had the concealed information, it most definitely would have a substantial difference in [their] analysis of liability/causation in the case against DuPont. The information, taken as a whole, would have greatly strengthened Mr. Willman's claim that Benlate was defective and the cause of his crop damage and loss. Peterson believed that had Willman known in September 1994 all the information[,] he would have rejected DuPont's settlement amount paid to him and gone to trial. The information is strong and persuasive that Benlate was defective[.] . . . Willman's case would have been substantially stronger [.] (Emphases added.) Pavey's report averred that: It has been 10 years since we settled those cases, but I recall [that] we discussed and applied the same range of probability of winning on negligence/product defect to all of the cases. Our liability assessment was made on the basis of the evidence which had been produced by DuPont, evidence developed by us as of the time of settlement and, to some extent, on prior trial and settlement outcomes. It is clear to me that DuPont fraudulently withheld significant evidence from us and even more from plaintiffs who tried or settled their cases prior to the time our clients settled. It is my opinion that had DuPont not fraudulently withheld the evidence in the cases which were tried prior to our settlement, DuPont would probably have lost all of those cases on the issues of negligence and product defect. I know for a fact that some of the cases that settled prior to our cases would have either been settled for substantially higher sums or gone to trial had DuPont refused to pay a fair settlement[.] We represented many clients, some of whom had a lengthy track record of being successful nurserymen and farmers, other who did not. There were individual causation and damages issues that also figured into our settlement evaluations. However, I can say without hesitation that had the previous trials all resulted in finding against DuPont on negligence and product defect, my evaluations of our client's claims would have been higher because, typically, it is true that the stronger the liability case, the more value both sides assign to any damages claim. (Emphases added.) Playdon also stated that, in his opinion, the concealment and/or misrepresentation of factual information by DuPont impaired [his] ability to fairly evaluate the status of [his] client's [product liability] litigation. He asserted that the information would have made a substantial difference in his analysis regarding the strength of the liability/causation cases against DuPont. Playdon concluded that, if the information had been properly disclosed, he would not have recommended [his] client settle his claim for the amount DuPont offered during negotiations because, [i]n [his] opinion, the value of [his] client's economic losses greatly exceeded the value of the settlement which was negotiated. In [his] opinion, assuming timely and appropriate access to all of the information[,] and further assuming that . . . DuPont would not and did not offer any settlement consideration greater than that which was in fact paid to settle [his] client's underlying Benlate litigation claim, [he] would have taken the claims before a jury. (Emphases added.) Lastly, the plaintiffs indicated in their answers to DuPont's June 4, 2004 interrogatories that Portnoy's opinion will not be based on any particular documents of [the plaintiffs] relating to the prior Benlate product litigation, but will be based on [the] general litigation experience of Mr. Portnoy. Consequently, in his report, Portnoy explained the general litigation and settlement practices and concluded that had [he] been representing these claimants, the settlement value of the cases would have been dramatically impacted had the wrongfully withheld information been available and would have significantly increased. [13] In sum, the plaintiffs' experts offered essentially two opinions, to wit, that, if the plaintiffs and/or their attorneys had known about the concealed evidence, (1) they would not have settled and would have proceeded to trial and (2) the valuation of the plaintiffs' cases would have been substantially higher. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, as the nonmoving party, Lau v. Bautista, 61 Haw. 144, 147, 598 P.2d 161, 163 (1979), we agree with the circuit court's implicit ruling that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to damages to defeat summary judgment. As indicated above, the plaintiffs' attorney experts merely presented conclusory opinions that would do little to assist a jury. Of crucial importance is the fact that none of the attorney experts provide any opinion testimony as to what specific settlement factors were or should be considered in settling each of the plaintiffs' underlying product liability cases and the evaluation of how those factors would have been altered had they known about the concealed evidence. Although the plaintiffs have filed their claims jointly, they each have separate claims against DuPont, and each of their claims must be individually established. The experts did not explain how DuPont's conduct affected the plaintiffs' evaluation such that they would have settled for more, what each plaintiff claimed as his damages in the product liability cases at the time he settled and what he recovered, and how the settlement factors would apply to each plaintiff's case. It is not sufficient for an expert to simply state that he or she believed that, had the concealed evidence been known, the settlement value would have been greater because the existence of the concealed evidence strengthened the liability aspect of the litigation. See Acoba v. Gen. Tire, Inc., 92 Hawai`i 1, 14, 986 P.2d 288, 301 (1999) (Although expert testimony may be more inferential than that of fact witnesses, in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment[,] an expert opinion must be more than a conclusory assertion about ultimate legal issues. (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.)); see, e.g., Zelinski v. Brunswick Corp., 185 F.3d 1311, 1317 (Fed.Cir.1999) (ruling that the federal district court properly characterized patent attorney expert's statement as conclusory because the statement was an assertion without further explanation); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Huntsman Polymers Corp., 157 F.3d 866, 876 (Fed.Cir.1998) (reasoning that conclusory expert declarations devoid of facts upon which the conclusions were reached fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact to resist summary judgment); Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 235-36 (Tex. 1999) (holding that the attorney expert affidavit stating that he considered the relevant facts and concluded that the settlements were fair and reasonable was conclusory because he did not explain why the settlements were fair and reasonable for each of the [plaintiffs]) (emphasis added); Griswold v. Kilpatrick, 107 Wash.App. 757, 27 P.3d 246, 248-49 (2001) (the plaintiff's expert testimony that, but for the delay in prosecuting the case, the claim would have settled for a larger sum was speculative and conclusory and therefore insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact in a legal malpractice case). The unsubstantiated conclusions of the plaintiffs' experts are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact that would preclude summary judgment. [14] The circuit court properly concluded that the plaintiffs are unable to prove the fact or amount of settlement fraud damages as a matter of law. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of DuPont. [15]