Opinion ID: 66016
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: United States v. Garey

Text: In United States v. Garey, __ F.3d __, No. 05-14631, 2008 WL 3850284 (11th Cir. Aug. 20, 2008) (en banc), a federal criminal defendant claimed on direct appeal that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by requiring him to represent himself at trial. The defendant moved to dismiss his appointed counsel (Scott Huggins) three days before trial based on an alleged conflict of interest. Id. at . After determining no conflict existed, the district court informed Garey it would not appoint a new lawyer for him and Garey had to decide between proceeding with appointed counsel or pro se. Id. at -3. The district court reviewed the sentence Garey faced, explained the disadvantages of self-representation, and advised Garey to proceed with Huggins as counsel. Id. at , . Garey insisted he would not allow Huggins to represent him, but stated he was not voluntarily waiving his right to counsel and never affirmatively chose selfrepresentation. Id. at -6, . The district court interpreted Garey’s uncooperative behavior as a voluntary and knowing waiver of his right to counsel. Id. at . Garey ultimately represented himself at trial, with Huggins remaining as standby counsel. Id. at . The jury found Garey guilty, and the court sentenced him. Id. On appeal, Garey contended the district court violated his Sixth Amendment 24 right to counsel by requiring him to represent himself when he had not made an affirmative request to do so. Id. A divided panel of this Court agreed and reversed Garey’s conviction. See United States v. Garey, 483 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2007). This Court granted en banc review and affirmed Garey’s convictions. The en banc Garey Court stated it is well-established that a defendant may waive his right to counsel when he does so voluntarily and knowingly, but the means by which he may do so are less clear. Garey, __ F.3d __, 2008 WL 3850284, at . The Court noted Faretta “recognized the right to selfrepresentation in the context of deciding whether a defendant who had asked to represent himself and had demonstrated a rudimentary knowledge of legal procedure was entitled to proceed pro se.” Id. However, “Faretta’s discussion of the right to self-representation presupposed a cooperative defendant willing to engage in reciprocal dialogue with the court” and “[t]he Supreme Court has never confronted a case in which an uncooperative defendant has refused to accept appointed counsel or engage in a colloquy with the court.” Id. at  (emphasis added). Thus, the Supreme Court had never been asked to determine the issue presented in Garey of “whether a defendant may waive counsel without making an explicit, unqualified request to represent himself.” Id. The en banc Court explained that the problem with treating the express, 25 affirmative request for self-representation discussed in Faretta as the exclusive means by which a defendant may waive the right to counsel is that “it forces judges to ignore words, actions, and circumstances relevant to the Sixth Amendment inquiry,” such as when a defendant makes “repeated, unequivocal statements rejecting his lawyer even though he knew the court would not appoint another lawyer to represent him.” Id. at . Thus, the Garey Court concluded “it is possible for a valid waiver of counsel to occur not only when a cooperative defendant affirmatively invokes his right to self-representation, but also when an uncooperative defendant rejects the only counsel to which he is constitutionally entitled, understanding his only alternative is self-representation with its many attendant dangers.” Id. (emphasis added). The Court further stated “when an indigent defendant rejects competent, conflict-free counsel, he may waive his right to counsel by his uncooperative conduct, so long as his decision is made with knowledge of his options and the consequences of his choice.” Id. at . Turning to Garey’s case, the Court concluded that “[b]y rejecting appointed counsel, Garey voluntarily chose to proceed pro se as surely as if he had made an affirmative request to do so” and that “Garey voluntarily waived his right to counsel by his conduct.” Id. at  (emphasis added). In addition to being voluntary, the Garey Court explained a waiver of 26 counsel also must be knowing. Id. The Garey Court cited Supreme Court precedent establishing that a waiver of the right to counsel must be a knowing act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and that whether a waiver was knowingly made depends upon the particular facts and circumstances of the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. Id. at . The Court recognized Faretta established that “[b]efore a court concludes a defendant has knowingly waived his right to counsel, the defendant ‘should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’” Id. at  (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S. Ct. at 2541). “To that end, the best practice is for district courts to begin by attempting to engage the defendant in a full discussion of the dangers of self-representation . . . .” Id. But when a defendant is not willing to engage in such a dialogue, the district court may discharge counsel so long as it is assured that the defendant understands the choices before him and knows the potential dangers of proceeding pro se. Id. The Court concluded Garey’s waiver was knowing because the district court explained to Garey, “clearly and repeatedly, what his constitutional choices were and what dangers lay along the path of self-representation” and the record showed Garey understood his choices. Id. 27