Opinion ID: 2356070
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Is It Still Too Late?

Text: Although its cross-claim was barred as untimely, GWU argues that it is entitled to seek contribution or indemnification in this new lawsuit filed three years later. We reject this argument. As discussed above, the right of contribution is an equitable remedy. Accordingly, the present action is properly evaluated in light of the surrounding equitable considerations. See Paul, 758 A.2d at 47-48 (applying equitable considerations in evaluating timeliness of the cross-claim); see also id. at 53 (Schwelb, J., dissenting) (This case is somewhat unusual in that the issues presented are entirely equitable in nature. There is no statute or rule of court dictating the result.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A, cmt. c (1977) (The `right of contribution' stated [in § 886A] is not intended to be an absolute right in all cases; and in any case in which contribution would be inequitable it is still intended that a court will deny it.). We predicted in Paul that, if GWU's late cross-claim was properly denied, a separate complaint for contribution also would be subject to a defense of laches or estoppel. Id. at 46 n. 13. [7] However, we agree with GWU that the issue was not before the court at that time, and this comment is technically dictum. Similarly, the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and law of the case, strictly construed, may not apply here. Nevertheless, GWU's current claim for contribution looks much the same as the one it presented in 1996. Some things have changed, or perhaps could now be altered, but GWU is essentially asking us to revisit questions that we addressed in Paul. The core of our holding in Paul was that Dr. Bier would be prejudiced by the belated presentation of GWU's claim for contribution. For example, neither Ms. Paul nor GWU sought to have GWU's liability adjudicated by the same jury that found Dr. Bier liable, Paul, 758 A.2d at 43 n. 5, 44 & 49 n. 16, nor was that jury asked to determine how much of the harm was solely attributable to Dr. Bier. Id. at 43 n. 5. The GWU/Paul settlement was in part intended to weaken Dr. Bier's position in the litigation-it reflected a strategic choice by Ms. Paul that took into account the uncertainty of recovery and . . . the need for a settlement to help strengthen [her] litigation prospects against a nonsettler. Id. at 44 n. 8 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). With GWU removed from the lawsuit but not yet asserting a right to contribution, Dr. Bier defended against the only extant claim. However, [t]he manner of defense and trial strategy may be different . . . in light of a claim for contribution by an alleged joint tortfeasor. Id. at 48. We explained that [a]lthough there can be no doubt that it was in Dr. Bier's interest even prior to GWU's settlement to separate [his] responsibility from that of GWU if it could have reduced his potential liability to Paul as a result, Dr. Bier may have considered that the most effective defense with the jury was one that denied all liability on his part and attempted to minimize the injury alleged by Paul. Id. Even though GWU now claims that it is preposterous to believe that Dr. Bier would have altered his trial strategy in the face of a timely assertion of the contribution claim, we have already held to the contrary. We said specifically that [h]ad Dr. Bier been put on notice of GWU's intent to claim for contribution, he would have had an incentive to build a case during trial that separated his liability from that of GWU if he knew that joint tortfeasor liability would be a central feature of his responsibility to GWU. Id. at 48 (citing Washington v. Washington Hospital Center, 579 A.2d at 188 (plaintiff might have litigated differently had there been a request for pro rata credit)). Perhaps some of this prejudice could be mitigated or extinguished by starting afresh and conducting a new trial in which Dr. Bier would defend himself against GWU's claim for contribution unhampered by any strategic decisions he made years ago. But such an approach would prejudice Dr. Bier in different ways. He has an interest in repose, which would be affronted by having to retry the issue of negligence many years after he first defended against it. In the new trial, moreover, Dr. Bier might find himself in the awkward position of defending against a plaintiff (GWU) determined to prove its own liability. Most importantly, perhaps, allowing the case to be tried again under these circumstances would needlessly consume judicial resources. See DAN B. DOBBS, 1 LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.4(1) (2d ed.1993) (in balancing equitable hardships, court may consider public interests and those of third persons). Notwithstanding these clear indications of prejudice, GWU argues that the equities now balance in its favor. In weighing them, we first reiterate what we stated in Paul that GWU had no reason based in law, to delay asserting its claim [for] contribution. 758 A.2d at 47. We determined then that Dr. Bier would be prejudiced if he had to defend against the untimely claim for contribution. Fairness dictate[d] that all defendants, whether they choose to settle or litigate, file cross-claims for contribution before the verdict. . . . Id. at 48. We also commented that although GWU is not an adjudicated tortfeasor, we have no basis to assume that it is inequitable for it to have paid $2,000,000 to [Ms.] Paul. Id. at 49 n. 16. Indeed, by settling for $2,000,000, GWU signaled that it feared a much larger verdict than that ultimately returned. It may, in fact, have anticipated that the verdict would exceed $4,000,000, because it structured the settlement with Ms. Paul to protect itself from a potential claim for contribution by Dr. Bier. Id. at 45 n. 11. GWU could have enhanced the attractiveness of its own claim for contribution by reaching a settlement that released all the defendants, but it did not do so, presumably because that would have cost more money. To be sure, Dr. Bier has been adjudicated a tortfeasor and, at least on the surface, it hardly seems equitable that he will effectively escape financial liability for his malpractice. Nevertheless, we have already confronted that question in Paul. Moreover, it appears that however we resolve the present controversy, certain elements of unfairness will persist. If we allow GWU to pursue its claim for contribution (and if it succeeds), that will effectively overrule our previous decision in Paul upholding the trial court's award of a pro tanto credit to Dr. Bier. Contrary to our previous holding, Dr. Bier would have to pay $1,000,000, but now that sum would go to GWU rather than to Ms. Paul. That outcome would create a different type of unfairness. Moreover, it is difficult to explain how a claim for contribution that was rejected initially as untimely should now be adjudicated many years later. [8] In sum, we find no reason in law or in equity to alter the analysis we followed in Paul simply because GWU now asserts an independent action for contribution. [9]