Opinion ID: 2169311
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Extension of Revocation Period for Prior Section 321J.2A Revocation.

Text: A. Scope of review. When the district court exercises its powers of judicial review, it functions in an appellate capacity to correct errors of law. Wiebenga v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 530 N.W.2d 732, 734 (Iowa 1995). In reviewing such a decision, this court determines whether the district court correctly applied the law. See id. B. Discussion of merits. Garwick challenges only the length of the revocation imposed on him pursuant to section 321J.12(1). As noted earlier, a one-year revocation is required if the person has had a previous revocation under this chapter. Iowa Code § 321J.12(1)(b). Therefore, we focus on the quoted language to determine whether the DOT properly imposed a one-year revocation. As discussed above, when Garwick was eighteen years old, his license was revoked for sixty days pursuant to section 321J.2A, which states in pertinent part: A person who is under the age of twenty-one shall not operate a motor vehicle while having an alcohol concentration ... of .02 or more. The motor vehicle license ... of a person who is under the age of twenty-one and who operates a motor vehicle while having an alcohol concentration of .02 or more shall be revoked ... for a period of time specified under section 321J.12. Iowa Code § 321J.2A (emphasis added). Clearly, Garwick's prior loss of his license constituted a revocation, and this revocation was indisputably required by a provision of the Iowa Code found in chapter 321J, namely section 321J.2A. Notwithstanding the logic of this analysis, Garwick contends that the phrase under this chapter as it is used in section 321J.12(1)(b) does not really mean any revocation under chapter 321J, but is instead limited to revocations under section 321J.2. He offers several policy reasons supporting his contention that the legislature surely did not mean to include a revocation under Iowa's zero-tolerance law for minors within the class of revocations that could be used to lengthen an OWI revocation. Garwick's argument flies in the face of the long-settled principle of statutory construction that when a statute is plain and its meaning clear, the court should not reach beyond the express terms of the statute. See Iowa Dep't of Transp. v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Woodbury County, 488 N.W.2d 174, 175 (Iowa 1992); State v. West, 446 N.W.2d 777, 778 (Iowa 1989). Only when the terms of a statute are ambiguous do we engage in an analysis of legislative intent by applying rules of statutory construction. See State v. Guzman-Juarez, 591 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 1999); Lockhart v. Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist., 577 N.W.2d 845, 847 (Iowa 1998). Here, an examination of the express terms of the statute reveals that the term this chapter clearly refers to chapter 321J and we have so held under nearly identical circumstances. In the Woodbury County case, this court considered the meaning of the words this chapter as used in section 321J.4(8), which allows the issuance of a temporary restricted license to persons whose license is currently revoked. 488 N.W.2d at 175. Section 321J.4(8) limits eligibility for a temporary license to those persons whose license has either been revoked under this chapter, or revoked or suspended under chapter 321 solely for violations of this chapter.  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Iowa Code section 321J.4(8) (1991)). This court held that the terms of the statute were clear and unambiguous. Id. Therefore, we looked to the express terms of the statute to ascertain the legislature's intent. [3] Id. In doing so, we concluded that the words this chapter referred to chapter 321J. Id.; accord State v. Vargason, 607 N.W.2d 691, 698-99 (Iowa 2000) (interpreting the phrase this chapter as used in Iowa Code section 321J.4(9) (1999) as referring to chapter 321J); cf. Searls v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 405 N.W.2d 808, 810 (Iowa 1987) (interpreting the words this chapter as used in Iowa Code section 321B.16 (1983) to mean chapter 321B). Although Garwick argues that the rationale of the Woodbury County case is limited to section 321J.4(8), we find no reasonable basis upon which to distinguish the identical language used in section 321J.12(1)(b). There is nothing in the context of section 321J.12(1)(b) that renders the words this chapter ambiguous. Therefore, we give these words the same meaning we gave them in section 321J.4(8); they refer to chapter 321J. Garwick's argument that the interpretation placed on this statute by the DOT is strained, impractical or absurd also lacks merit. There is nothing strained, impractical or absurd about a legislative intent to remove repeat offenders from the highways for a longer period of time than those who have violated chapter 321J only once. Garwick has previously violated the law with respect to drinking and driving; therefore, treating him as a repeat offender is not strained, impractical or absurd. In summary, because Garwick's prior revocation was pursuant to section 321J.2A, it was a revocation under this chapter and was properly considered by the DOT in determining the length of Garwick's current revocation. The district court did not err in so ruling. AFFIRMED. All justices concur except CADY, J., who takes no part.