Opinion ID: 63111
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Perkins’s Appeal

Text: Perkins argues on appeal that the district court violated 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), which prohibits disparity in sentencing between defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct, when it sentenced Perkins to sixty-one months of imprisonment, while sentencing the ringleader of the conspiracy to only thirty-three months of imprisonment and other defendants to nominal sentences. Perkins argues that he and McCullen are similarly situated regarding their ages, lack of criminal histories, and convictions for participation in the same conspiracy. Perkins points out that McCullen invented the scheme, recruited co-conspirators, and profited the most from the scheme, while Perkins himself only received $200 for behavior that he characterizes as minor in comparison. “As a result of [the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)], the [Sentencing] Guidelines are now advisory, and appellate review of sentencing decisions is limited to determining whether they are ‘reasonable.’” Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594 (2007). “[The Supreme Court’s] explanation of ‘reasonableness’ review in the Booker opinion made it pellucidly clear that the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard of review now applies to appellate review of sentencing decisions.” Id. (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 260–62). This court presumes Perkins’s sentence is reasonable because it falls within the recommended range of the Sentencing Guidelines. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462–63 (2007); United States v. Williams, 520 F.3d 414, 422 (5th Cir. 2008). Because Perkins did not object at the time of sentencing, this court reviews the district court’s actions for plain error. United 3 No. 07-30238 States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997). The disparity in sentencing was not unwarranted because Perkins is not similarly situated to McCullen. First, the case against Perkins proceeded to trial, in which he was convicted by a jury on all eighteen counts in the indictment. McCullen, on the other hand, pled guilty only to the last two counts of the indictment; all other charges against him were dropped. Second, because Perkins proceeded to trial, he did not receive the benefit of a three-point reduction on his offense level calculation for acceptance of responsibility like McCullen. Third, the district court found that Perkins falsely testified at trial and received a two-level enhancement in his offense level for obstruction of justice; McCullen received no such penalty. Finally, the district court ordered Perkins to pay $36,900 in restitution to compensate only for his theft of thirteen soldiers’ identities, but ordered McCullen to pay over $95,975 for his primary role in the conspiracy. Therefore, Perkins’s sentence is reasonable based upon the district court’s proper consideration of the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the Guidelines. (2) Offense-level enhancement for obstruction of justice In light of the testimony of two rebuttal witnesses, the district court enhanced Perkins’s offense level by two points after finding that Perkins lied under oath about having full access in the Motor Pool to other soldiers’ personal information without a supervisor’s permission and about the events surrounding his application for a loan for a car he would have accepted as payment for supplying stolen information. Perkins appeals this finding, arguing only that he ultimately admitted to the prosecutor upon cross-examination that he had full access to the information. The Guidelines allow a district court to enhance a defendant’s base offense level if the court finds that the defendant “willfully obstructed . . . the 4 No. 07-30238 administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (2007). “Where a district court enhances a defendant’s offense level on account of an obstruction of justice, the district court’s finding of obstructive conduct is reviewed for clear error.” United States v. Graves, 5 F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1993) (internal quotations omitted). A review of the record and a comparison of the testimony of rebuttal witnesses with that of Perkins reveals that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Perkins equivocated, skirted issues, or lied regarding all aspects of his involvement in the scheme. (3) Refusal to grant challenge for cause to a potential juror During voir dire, Perkins challenged a potential juror’s service for cause, citing the juror’s stated views on guilt by association. The district court denied the challenge. Perkins then used all of his peremptory challenges, including one to exclude that juror from the jury. Perkins appeals the district court’s denial of his challenge for cause, arguing that the district court’s decision forced him to use one of his peremptory challenges to keep that potential juror off of the jury. “[D]eference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the [prospective] juror,” Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 426 (1985), and this court “will only second-guess the court’s decision that a juror is unbiased if there is an abuse of discretion,” United States v. Flores, 63 F.3d 1342, 1357 (5th Cir. 1995). Based upon a review of the record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Perkins’s challenge for cause. Further, the Supreme Court has held “that a defendant’s exercise of peremptory challenges pursuant to Rule 24(b) [of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure] is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause.” United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 317 (2000). 5 No. 07-30238 (4) Denial of Rule 29 judgment for motion of acquittal At the close of the government’s case, Perkins moved for a Rule 29 judgment of acquittal, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence required to prove Perkins’s involvement in Count 1, conspiracy to commit fraud against the United States. On appeal, however, he argues that no testimony was presented regarding the element of Count 18, aggravated identity theft, that required him to “knowingly transfer, possess and use without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person during and in relation to an enumerated felony . . . .” He contends that none of the stipulations offered by the government from the soldiers whose identities he had stolen to obtain fraudulent loans stated that their identities had been used “without lawful authority.” This court reviews de novo a denial of a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Floyd, 343 F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir. 2003). “The standard for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Daniel, 957 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). In United States v. Herrera, this court limited the grounds upon which a defendant may appeal the denial of a Rule 29 motion. 313 F.3d 882, 884–85 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam). On appeal, a defendant may raise only those specific arguments he made before the district court. Id. Perkins did not seek a judgment of acquittal for Count 18 before the district court, so our review becomes more narrow than the usual sufficiency-of-evidence review. Our review now “‘is limited to determining whether . . . the record is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt.’” Id. at 885 (quoting United States v. Delgado, 256 F.3d 264, 274 (5th Cir. 2001)). A review of the record clearly shows that the jury could have reasonably inferred that Perkins stole soldiers’ identities and used them 6 No. 07-30238 without lawful authority. First, Perkins had access to the information for the limited purpose of checking out vehicles to authorized personnel. Clearly, the information in the Motor Pool computer was not intended to be used to obtain loans in the names of soldiers without their knowledge or consent. Second, McCullen testified that the identities were stolen by Perkins.