Opinion ID: 4027532
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Manson v. Brathwaite and its Progeny

Text: In 1977, the Supreme Court established a basic framework for determining whether admission of a particular identification violates a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process in Manson v. Brathwaite.154 Under the Manson test, a court must first assess whether the eyewitness identification procedure at issue was, under the “totality of the circumstances,” unnecessarily suggestive.155 If the identification procedure was not unnecessarily suggestive, the inquiry ends. However, if it was unduly suggestive, a court must considers five factors to determine whether the resulting identification is nonetheless reliable. Those factors, drawn from the Supreme Court’s prior decision in Neil v. Biggers,156 are: (1) “the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime,” (2) “the witness’ degree of attention,” (3) “the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal,” (4) “the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation,” and (5) “the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.”157 These factors are weighed against “the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself.”158 Manson emphasizes that “reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony.”159 Since Manson, more than 2,000 scientific studies have been conducted on the reliability of eyewitness identifications.160 As I have explained, we now understand that 153 See Maj. Op. at 13, 17, 18-20. 154 432 U.S. 98 (1977). 155 Id. at 106 (internal quotation marks omitted). 156 409 U.S. 188 (1972). 157 Id. at 199-200; Manson, 432 U.S. at 114. 158 Manson, 432 U.S. at 114. 159 Id. 160 State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 892 (N.J. 2011), holding modified by State v. Chen, 27 A.2d 930 (N.J. 2011); Morgan et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Memory, supra, at 265. 38 even seemingly neutral identification procedures can lead to unreliable results due to a myriad of subtle variables. We also now know that a witness’ subjective confidence in the accuracy of her identification has limited correlation to the reliability of her identification. As the National Research Council emphasized in its recent report on eyewitness identifications, the Manson test “treats factors such as the confidence of a witness as independent markers of reliability when, in fact, it is now well established that confidence judgments may vary over time and can be powerfully swayed by many factors.” 161 The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the approach laid out in Manson in Perry v. New Hampshire.162 There, an eyewitness saw a man break into a car, called the police, and then told the responding officer that a man standing in the building’s parking lot was the perpetrator.163 That man was then arrested and convicted in state court. On appeal to the Supreme Court, he argued that the highly suggestive nature of the identification process entitled him to a suppression hearing prior to trial in order to determine the admissibility of the identification.164 The Supreme Court rejected this argument. It held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only requires such a hearing when law enforcement arranged the unnecessarily suggestive circumstances under which the identification was obtained.165 The Court “linked the due process check, not to suspicion of eyewitness testimony generally, but only to improper police arrangement of the circumstances surrounding an identification.”166 In reaching this conclusion, the Court acknowledged the scientific research on eyewitness reliability.167 It recognized 161 National Research Council, Identifying the Culprit, supra, at 6. 162 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012). 163 Id. at 721-22. 164 Id. at 722-23. 165 Id. at 730. 166 Id. at 726 (emphasis added). 167 Id. at 727 (“As one of Perry’s amici points out, many other factors bear on “the likelihood of misidentification,”—for example, the passage of time between exposure to and identification of the defendant, whether the witness was under stress when he first encountered the suspect, how much time 39 the importance of this body of science and urged more robust jury instructions. As the Court explained, “[e]yewitnessspecific jury instructions, which many federal and state courts have adopted, [] warn the jury to take care in appraising identification evidence.”168 The Court also stressed the importance of evidentiary rules “to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact or potential for misleading the jury.”169 Thus, instead of considering the relevant system and estimator variables “under the banner of due process,”170 the Supreme Court advocated that courts incorporate the relevant scientific findings through other avenues, such as jury instructions and evidentiary rules. Some state courts have heeded Perry’s call and created new procedures and evidentiary frameworks that minimize the risks associated with erroneous eyewitness identifications. Most notably, in a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of New Jersey re-wrote the state’s rules governing the admission of eyewitness identifications in State v. Henderson.171 Prior to that decision, New Jersey courts relied on the Manson test to determine whether certain identifications were admissible.172 Henderson, however, held that the Manson test did “not offer an adequate measure for reliability or sufficiently deter inappropriate police conduct.” The court also concluded that Manson “overstates the jury’s inherent ability to evaluate the witness had to observe the suspect, how far the witness was from the suspect, whether the suspect carried a weapon, and the race of the suspect and the witness.” (internal citation omitted)). 168 Id. at 728-29 (internal footnote omitted). 169 Id. at 729. 170 Id. at 727 (“To embrace Perry’s view would thus entail a vast enlargement of the reach of due process as a constraint on the admission of evidence.”). 171 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011), holding modified by State v. Chen, 27 A.2d 930 (N.J. 2011). 172 See id. at 918; State v. Madison, 536 A.2d 254, 258-59 (N.J. 1988) holding modified by State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011). 40 evidence offered by eyewitnesses who honestly believe their testimony is accurate.”173 To remedy these problems, the court pioneered a twopart revision to the judicial procedures related to eyewitness identifications. First, the court changed the requirements related to pre-trial hearings on the admissibility of eyewitness identifications. After Henderson, a defendant can now obtain a pre-trial hearing if she can show “some evidence of suggestiveness that could lead to a mistaken identification.”174 The court specified that this “evidence, in general, must be tied to a system—and not an estimator—variable.”175 The trial 173 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 878. 174 Id. at 920. 175 Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court instructed courts to consider the following non-exhaustive list of system variables when deciding whether to hold a pre-trial hearing:
procedure performed double-blind? If double- blind testing was impractical, did the police use a technique like the “envelope method” described above, to ensure that the administrator had no knowledge of where the suspect appeared in the photo array or lineup?
administrator provide neutral, pre-identification instructions warning that the suspect may not be present in the lineup and that the witness should not feel compelled to make an identification?
contain only one suspect embedded among at least five innocent fillers? Did the suspect stand out from other members of the lineup?
information or feedback, about the suspect or the crime, before, during, or after the identification procedure?
record the witness’ statement of confidence immediately after the identification, before the possibility of any confirmatory feedback? 41 court can end this hearing at any time “if it finds from the testimony that defendant’s threshold allegation of suggestiveness is groundless.”176 But if the defendant’s claim is meritorious, the trial judge must weigh both system and estimator variables177 to decide whether, under the “totality of
suspect more than once as part of multiple identification procedures? Did police use the same fillers more than once?
more than two hours after an event? Did the police warn the witness that the suspect may not be the perpetrator and that the witness should not feel compelled to make an identification?
from the eyewitness whether he or she had spoken with anyone about the identification and, if so, what was discussed?
eyewitness initially make no choice or choose a different suspect or filler? Id. at 920-21. 176 Id. at 920. 177 The New Jersey Supreme Court told courts to consider the following, non-exhaustive list of estimator variables in assessing the reliability of an eyewitness identification: 1. Stress. Did the event involve a high level of stress? 2. Weapon focus. Was a visible weapon used during a crime of short duration? 3. Duration. How much time did the witness have to observe the event? 4. Distance and Lighting. How close were the witness and perpetrator? What were the lighting conditions at the time? 5. Witness Characteristics. Was the witness under the influence of alcohol or drugs? Was age a relevant factor under the circumstances of the case? 42 the circumstances,” the defendant has “demonstrated a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”178 If the trial court concludes that the defendant has met this burden, the court must suppress the identification evidence.179 Second, the New Jersey Supreme Court directed the state judicial system to develop “enhanced jury charges on eyewitness identification for trial judges to use.”180 As the court explained, “[w]e anticipate that identification evidence will continue to be admitted in the vast majority of cases. To help jurors weigh that evidence, they must be told about relevant factors and their effect on reliability.”181 6. Characteristics of Perpetrator. Was the culprit wearing a disguise? Did the suspect have different facial features at the time of the identification? 7. Memory decay. How much time elapsed between the crime and the identification? 8. Race-bias. Does the case involve a cross- racial identification? ... 9. Opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime. 10. Degree of attention. 11. Accuracy of prior description of the criminal. 12. Level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation. Did the witness express high confidence at the time of the identification before receiving any feedback or other information? 13. The time between the crime and the confrontation. (Encompassed fully by “memory decay” above.) Id. at 921-22. 178 Id. at 920. 179 Id. 180 Id. at 878. 181 Id. 43 Henderson also emphasized that the “factors that both judges and juries will consider are not etched in stone.”182 Rather, “the scientific research underlying them will continue to evolve, as it has in the more than thirty years since Manson.”183 Accordingly, the court clarified that its decision does not “limit trial courts from reviewing evolving, substantial, and generally accepted scientific research.”184 Finally, the New Jersey Supreme Court suggested that, where appropriate, trial courts consider giving instructions during the trial before eyewitness identification testimony is elicited. Such instructions would help inform juries, up front, of the problems that can arise from seemingly unequivocal courtroom identifications.185 After Henderson, in July 2012,186 the New Jersey Supreme Court released its expanded set of jury instructions governing evaluation of identifications. These instructions explain that scientific research has shown eyewitness identifications can be unreliable, and they emphasize that eyewitness evidence “must be scrutinized carefully.”187 To this end, the instructions identify a specific set of factors that jurors should consider when deciding whether eyewitness identification evidence is reliable, including estimator and system variables.188 These instructions are consistent with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Perry and will better equip jurors to evaluate the reliability of eyewitness identifications.189 182 Id. 183 Id. 184 Id. at 922. 185 Id. at 924. 186 These instructions were released a year after the opinion in Henderson. 187 Supreme Court of New Jersey, New Jersey Criminal Model Jury Instructions, Identification: In-Court Identifications Only 2 (2012), http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/2012/jury_instructio n.pdf. 188 Id. at 3-9. 189 New Jersey is not alone in its response to the vast body of research on the reliability of eyewitness identifications. In 2011, the Justices of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 44 The Supreme Court of Oregon has likewise reformed the state judicial system’s approach to eyewitness identifications. However, Oregon has taken a slightly different approach. In State v. Lawson,190 the court addressed the reliability issue from an evidentiary standpoint as opposed to a due process one. Prior to Lawson, Oregon courts adhered to a rule under which trial courts could not consider whether an identification was unreliable until some evidence of suggestiveness was first introduced.191 In rejecting that approach, the Oregon Supreme Court explained: Such a requirement [] conflates evidentiary principles with due process concerns. A constitutional due process analysis might properly consider suggestiveness as a separate prerequisite to further inquiry because the Due Process Clause is not implicated absent some Court convened a study group to “offer guidance as to how our courts can most effectively deter unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures and minimize the risk of a wrongful conviction.” Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Study Group on Eyewitness Evidence, Report and Recommendations to the Justices 1 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). The report made five recommendations aimed at minimizing misidentifications: (1) acknowledge variables affecting identification accuracy; (2) develop a model policy and implement best practices for police departments; (3) expand use of pretrial hearings; (4) expand use of improved jury instructions; and (5) offer continuing education to judges and bar leaders. Id. at 2-5. Like Henderson, the Massachusetts report recommended that, when a defendant contests the reliability of an eyewitness identification, the trial judge should conduct a pretrial hearing to determine whether law enforcement used suggestive identification procedures to elicit that identification. Id. at 109-16. If a suggestive procedure was used, the report recommended that courts assess whether those procedures impacted the reliability of the identification. Id. at 111. The report suggested that courts consider both estimator and system variables in pre-trial hearings. Id. 190 291 P.3d 673 (Or. 2012). 191 See id. at 688; State v. Classen, 590 P.2d 1198 (Or. 1979). 45 form of state action, such as the state’s use of a suggestive identification procedure. As a matter of state evidence law, however, there is no reason to hinder the analysis of eyewitness reliability with purposeless distinctions between suggestiveness and other sources of unreliability. . . . A trial court tasked with determining a constitutional claim must necessarily assume that the evidence is otherwise admissible; were it inadmissible on evidentiary grounds, the court would never reach the constitutional question. However, a trial court tasked with considering a question of evidentiary admissibility clearly cannot begin by assuming admissibility.192 Lawson then fashioned a new approach to examining eyewitness identifications from existing rules of evidence. Under this revised test, “when a criminal defendant files a pretrial motion to exclude eyewitness identification evidence, the state as the proponent of the eyewitness identification must establish all preliminary facts necessary to establish admissibility of the eyewitness evidence.”193 If the challenged eyewitness evidence implicates the Oregon equivalents of Federal Rules of Evidence 602194 and 701,195 the state must 192 Lawson, 352 P.3d at 688-89 (citing Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 730 (2012) (“[T]he Due Process Clause does not require a preliminary judicial inquiry into reliability of an eyewitness identification when the identification was not procured under unnecessary suggestive circumstances arranged by law enforcement.”)). 193 Id. at 696-97 (emphasis added). 194 Fed. R. Evid. 602 (“A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of the witness’s own testimony.”). 195 Fed. R. Evid. 701 (“If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on the witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, 46 prove that the eyewitness has personal knowledge of the matter on which she will testify, and her identification “is both rationally based on [her] first-hand perceptions and helpful to the trier of fact.”196 This flips the burdens in due process cases such as Manson and Henderson. Rather than the defendant proving that the identification at issue is unreliable, the state must first prove that the identification meets the evidentiary requirements of Rules 602 and 701. If the state successfully shows that the identification evidence is admissible, the burden then shifts to the defendant to establish that “the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” 197 Thus, Oregon courts now rely on the state equivalent of Federal Rule of Evidence 403198 to exclude unreliable eyewitness identifications that are otherwise admissible. If a trial court concludes that the defendant has made such a showing, “the trial court can either exclude the identification, or fashion an appropriate intermediate remedy short of exclusion to cure the unfair prejudice or other dangers attending the use of that evidence.”199 State courts are not alone in their responses to the scientific research. Federal circuit courts of appeals have also acknowledged the unreliability of certain eyewitness technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.”). 196 Lawson, 291 P.3d at 697. 197 Id. 198 Fed. R. Evid. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”). 199 Lawson, 291 P.3d at 697. 47 testimony.200 In United States v. Brownlee,201 we recognized the importance of expert testimony in safeguarding against unreliable eyewitness identifications. There, we held that a district court properly admitted expert testimony concerning the effects of race, hair covering, weapons focus, and exposure on the identification accuracy of multiple witnesses.202 We further held that the district court improperly excluded expert testimony comparing the show-up procedure used in that case (a procedure where law enforcement presents a single individual arguably fitting a witness’ description to that witness for identification) and other identification procedures and analyzing the suggestiveness of the show-up and its potential effect on the identifications. We also held that the district court improperly excluded expert testimony on confidence malleability, post-event suggestiveness, and confidence of accuracy.203 In doing so, we joined the growing chorus in acknowledging that The recent availability of post-conviction DNA tests demonstrate that there have been an overwhelming number of false convictions stemming from uninformed reliance on eyewitness misidentifications. . . . In fact, mistaken eyewitness identifications are responsible for more wrongful convictions than all other causes combined. Eyewitness evidence presented from well-meaning and confident citizens is highly persuasive but, at the same time, is among the least reliable forms of evidence.204 We then explained that expert testimony can play a crucial role in counteracting the falsely persuasive effect of unreliable 200 See, e.g., United States v. Bartlett, 567 F.3d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1147 (2010); United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 141-44 (3d Cir. 2006). 201 454 F.3d 131 (2006). 202 Id. at 137. 203 Id. at 141. 204 Id. at 141-42 (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted). 48 eyewitness testimony.205 As the National Research Council has recognized, expert testimony on eyewitness identifications may hold certain advantages over jury instructions as a method to explain the relevant science to juries.206 Expert witnesses: (1) “can explain scientific research in a more flexible manner, by presenting only the relevant research to the jury”; (2) are more “familiar with the research and can describe it in detail”; (3) “can convey the state of the research at the time of the trial”; (4) “can be cross-examined by the other side”; and (5) “can more clearly describe the limitations of the research.”207 Therefore, expert testimony on eyewitness accuracy is a crucial tool for educating juries on the science surrounding identifications. It is against this backdrop that we must assess the jurors’ acceptance of the three eyewitness identifications of Dennis and the adequacy of the charge that guided their deliberations.