Opinion ID: 844218
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Improper Actions by the Prosecutor

Text: We are quite troubled by two instances of improper actions by the prosecutor that, we conclude, were not preserved for appeal. We briefly discuss here these instances of misconduct to express our disapproval of such behavior. (21) First, the prosecutor elicited from Deputy Lyons that he was testifying in the uniform he wore on the night of the shooting, which, in fact, still had Deputy Blair's blood on it, and that Lyons wore the uniform because [Deputy Blair] meant a lot to me; it was the last time that I saw him, after which Deputy Lyons apparently briefly wept. During closing argument, the prosecutor reminded the jury of Deputy Lyons's emotional moment on the stand by stating that Deputy Lyons stood up here and bared his soul to you. There was no holding back. [¶] Do you think he wanted to cry up here? Do you think it made him feel good in front of his fellow co-workers? [¶] These guys don't wear their emotions on their sleeve. They are very deep inside. They can't let their emotions come out. By presenting this witness to the jury in his bloodstained uniform and eliciting the deputy's emotional testimony, the prosecutor improperly engaged in inflammatory conduct that appealed to the passions of the jury. Further, in reminding the jury of this aspect of Deputy Lyons's testimony during argument, the prosecutor exceeded the permissible bounds of commenting on Lyons's demeanor while testifying as an indication of his sincerity (see CALJIC No. 2.20; CALCRIM No. 226) by improperly referring to facts not in evidence concerning what Deputy Lyons felt about his emotional breakdown, and how law enforcement officers in general deal with their emotions. (See Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 698 [a prosecutor should not, of course, argue facts not in evidence]; People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 742 [108 Cal.Rptr.3d 192, 229 P.3d 101] ( Redd ) [it is misconduct `to make arguments to the jury that give it the impression that emotion may reign over reason, and to present irrelevant information or inflammatory rhetoric that diverts the jury's attention from its proper role, or invites an irrational, purely subjective response'].) (22) Second, during his closing arguments, after discussing the basic dispute in the casewhether Deputy Blair fired on an unarmed gang member because he [(Blair)] is a Viking or it didn't happenthe prosecutor continued, Now it doesn't mean the men and women that are in court today and out there on the street protecting the lives of the people in Lynwood; if I am worthy enoughI actually asked permission before doing thisI am going to become a Viking. [¶] You see what this is? It's just a pin. [¶] ... [¶] A triangle and a Viking. The prosecutor then affixed the pin to the lapel of his suit coat. The prosecutor's act ofin his own wordsliterally becom[ing] a Viking in front of the jury constituted improper vouching in several ways. (See People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 206-207 [41 Cal.Rptr.3d 593, 131 P.3d 995] it is misconduct for prosecutors to vouch for the strength of their cases by invoking their personal prestige, reputation, or depth of experience, or the prestige or reputation of their office, in support of it].) [26] The prosecutor essentially gave unsworn testimony that the Vikings were not a group of rogue deputies as the defense suggested, but were, instead, simply anyone who (with the deputies' permission) wore a Viking pin in solidarity with the deputies. Further, the prosecutor placed his own prestige and the prestige of his office behind the Vikings, and in so doing, improperly interjected into the trial his personal view of the credibility of the heart of the defense case. Indeed, the prosecutor's comments that he had asked permission to become a Viking, and, nonetheless, wondered if he was worthy of doing so, implied to the jury that the status of the prosecutor and his office actually was less than that of the Vikings. In addition, the prosecutor's act implicitly contradicted his successful arguments regarding the exclusion of defendant's proffered evidence concerning the civil lawsuits against the sheriff's department by suggesting that because the other members of the Vikings (including, now, the prosecutor himself) would act only honorably, Deputy Blair also would have acted honorably. Having successfully opposed the admission of defense evidence regarding the Vikings' and other deputies' bad reputations, the prosecutor should not have sought to interject what amounted to equally immaterial evidence of the Vikings' good reputation.
Defendant presented evidence attempting to establish that Deputy Blair had a reputation and character for engaging in violence, thereby seeking to bolster the credibility of his contention that it was Deputy Blair who unjustifiably shot first. The trial court ruled that by doing so, pursuant to section 1103, subdivision (b) of the Evidence Code, [27] defendant opened the door for the prosecution to present evidence of defendant's violent character. The trial court ultimately instructed the jury concerning its consideration of the violent character evidence as follows: A person's character for violence may be shown by evidence of reputation, opinion, or specific acts of violence. Evidence of a person's character for violence may tend to show the person acted in conformity with such character. [¶] Whether a person had a character for violence and whether he acted in conformity with such character are matters for the jury to decide. Defendant contends on appeal that the admission of his violent character as propensity evidence and the instruction permitting the jury to consider it in determining his guilt was fundamentally unfair in violation of his rights to a fair jury trial, due process and to be protected from cruel and unusual punishment, as protected by the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. [28] Although defendant did not object to the instruction in the trial court, we nonetheless address the merits of his claim. It appears that because defendant, in essence, raises a legal challenge to section 1103(b), at the time of trial an objection may have been futile in light of People v. Blanco (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1173-1176 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 176] ( Blanco ), which had upheld the statute. (See People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 520, 851 P.2d 802].) In any event, we may address defendant's claim under section 1259 in light of his assertion that the challenged instruction affected his substantial rights. We conclude defendant's claim fails on the merits. (23) As a general rule, evidence that is otherwise admissible may be introduced to prove a person's character or character trait. ([Evid. Code,] § 1100.) But, except for purposes of impeachment (see [Evid. Code,] § 1101, subd. (c)), such evidence is inadmissible when offered by the opposing party to prove the defendant's conduct on a specified occasion ([Evid. Code,] § 1101, subd. (a)), unless it involves commission of a crime, civil wrong or other act and is relevant to prove some fact (e.g., motive, intent, plan, identity) other than a disposition to commit such an act ([Evid. Code,] § 1101, subd. (b)). ( People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 911 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847, 986 P.2d 182] ( Falsetta ) [addressing a constitutional challenge to § 1108 of the Evid. Code, which permits the admission in a sexual offense trial of evidence of the defendant's prior sexual offenses].) The Evidence Code, however, establishes several exceptions to this general rule. Three interrelated provisions relevant in the present case are set forth in section 1103, subdivisions (a) and (b). Pursuant to subdivision (a)(1), in a criminal action, the defendant is permitted to offer evidence of the victim's character or a trait of character (in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of conduct) in order to prove conduct of the victim in conformity with the character or trait of character. (Evid. Code, § 1103, subd. (a)(1).) Once the defendant has offered such evidence, the prosecution is permitted to offer its own character evidence of the victim to rebut the defendant's evidence. (Evid. Code, § 1103, subd. (a)(2).) Further, if the defendant has offered evidence that the victim had a character for violence or a trait of character tending to show violence, the prosecution is permitted to offer evidence of the defendant's character for violence or trait of character for violence (in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of conduct) in order to prove conduct of the defendant in conformity with the character or trait of character. (§ 1103(b), italics added.) In other words, if, as in the present case, a defendant offers evidence to establish that the victim was a violent person, thereby inviting the jury to infer that the victim acted violently during the events in question, then the prosecution is permitted to introduce evidence demonstrating that (1) the victim was not a violent person and (2) the defendant was a violent person, from which the jury might infer it was the defendant who acted violently. Section 1103(b) was enacted in 1991 by unanimous vote of the Legislature as part of a measure that also restored the permissible use of specific instances of conduct to prove character. (Legis. Counsel's Dig., Assem. Bill No. 263, 4 Stats. 1991 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) Summary Dig., p. 14; 1 Assem. J. (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) p. 301; 1 Sen. J. (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) pp. 366-367.) According to the statement of the author of the bill, the amendments to the statute create[] a level playing field between prosecutors and defense attorneys, and ensure[] that juries are given a complete picture of both the defendant's and victim's character. (Assemblyman Quackenbush, sponsor, letter to Governor re Assem. Bill No. 263 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.), Mar. 1, 1991.) (24) A defendant challenging the constitutionality of a statute carries a heavy burden: The courts will presume a statute is constitutional unless its unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears; all presumptions and intendments favor its validity. [Citations.] In the due process context, [the] defendant must show that [the statute] offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. ( Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 912-913.) (25) Defendant's argument rests on a claim that certain evidence is simply too prejudicial, and its admission at a criminal trial therefore violates due process. However, as the United States Supreme Court recently stated, [o]nly when evidence `is so extremely unfair that its admission violates fundamental conceptions of justice,' [citation], [has the court] imposed a constraint tied to the Due Process Clause. ( Perry v. New Hampshire (2012) 565 U.S. ___, ___ [181 L.Ed.2d 694, 706, 132 S.Ct. 716] [citing, as an example, the constitutional prohibition against a prosecutor's `knowin[g] use [of] false evidence,']; see also id. at pp. ___-___ [181 L.Ed.2d at pp. 706-708] [discussing cases in which due process was violated by the admission of witness identification evidence that was developed through improperly suggestive police procedures that created a `substantial likelihood of misidentification']; Jammal v. Van de Kamp (9th Cir. 1991) 926 F.2d 918, 920 [Only if there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due process. Even then, the evidence must `be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.'].) The high court has repeatedly stressed that, as a general matter, the federal Constitution does not mandate particular rules concerning the admission of evidence. As the court stated in Perry, at pp. ___-___, [181 L.Ed.2d at pp. 705-706] [c]onstitutional safeguards available to defendants to counter the State's evidence include the Sixth Amendment rights to counsel [citation]; compulsory process [citation]; and confrontation plus cross-examination of witnesses [citation]. Apart from these guarantees, we have recognized, state and federal statutes and rules ordinarily govern the admissibility of evidence, and juries are assigned the task of determining the reliability of the evidence presented at trial. (See also Marshall v. Lonberger (1983) 459 U.S. 422, 438, fn. 6 [74 L.Ed.2d 646, 103 S.Ct. 843] [the Due Process Clause does not permit the federal courts to engage in a finely tuned review of the wisdom of state evidentiary rules ...]; Spencer v. Texas (1967) 385 U.S. 554, 568-569 [17 L.Ed.2d 606, 87 S.Ct. 648] [concluding that mandating as a constitutional matter that a recidivist allegation must be tried separately from the issue of the defendant's guilt would be a wholly unjustifiable encroachment by this Court upon the constitutional power of States to promulgate their own rules of evidence to try their own state-created crimes in their own state courts].) Indeed, as pertinent to defendant's claim in the present case, the high court, in Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62 [116 L.Ed.2d 385, 112 S.Ct. 475], explicitly reserved the question whether a state law would violate due process if it permitted the admission of evidence of the defendant's criminal propensity to establish that the defendant committed the charged offense. ( Id. at p. 75, fn. 5; see also Alberni v. McDaniel (9th Cir. 2006) 458 F.3d 860, 863-867 [concluding there is no clearly established federal law for purposes of federal habeas corpus review of a state court's decision to admit propensity evidence, and noting that the high court had denied certiorari in at least four cases presenting the issue reserved in Estelle ]; Bugh v. Mitchell (6th Cir. 2003) 329 F.3d 496, 512 [There is no clearly established Supreme Court precedent which holds that a state violates due process by permitting propensity evidence in the form of other bad acts evidence.].) (26) Defendant's reliance on various judicial statements regarding the long-standing common law tradition of disallowing the use of propensity evidence to prove the defendant's conduct on a particular occasion is misguided for two primary reasons. First, as we stated in Falsetta, the existence of a general historical bar of the use of propensity evidence to prove the defendant's conduct does not mean that the Legislature's enactment of a contrary rule necessarily is at odds with affording defendants fundamentally fair trials. ( Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 914 [a long-standing practice does not necessarily reflect a fundamental, unalterable principle embodied in the Constitution].) Second, none of the cases defendant cites addressed the use of propensity evidence in the particular context at issue in the present casethe admission of evidence establishing defendant's propensity for violence to prove violent conduct on defendant's part (not merely criminal propensity to prove criminal conduct), which was presented to the jury only after defendant elicited evidence of the victim's violent propensity. (27) We cannot say that, in providing for the jury to obtain a balanced view of the possible violent tendencies of both the victim and the defendant, the Legislature ran afoul of any fundamental conception of justice embodied in the federal Constitution. As the Court of Appeal observed in Blanco, the operation of section 1103(b) is dependent upon a choice made by the defendant, in much the same way that other strategic choices made by the defense during a trial will make admissible evidence that otherwise would have been excluded. ( Blanco, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1176.) It is not fundamentally unfair to require the defendant to make that choice: The criminal process, like the rest of the legal system, is replete with situations requiring `the making of difficult judgments' as to which course to follow. [Citation.] Although a defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses, the Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring him to choose. ( McGautha v. California (1971) 402 U.S. 183, 213 [28 L.Ed.2d 711, 91 S.Ct. 1454].) [29] Moreover, in the time since Blanco was decided, the Federal Rules of Evidence have been amended to include a provision similar to section 1103(b). (See Fed. Rules Evid., rule 404(a)(1), 28 U.S.C., as amended Dec. 1, 2000 [providing in relevant part that if evidence of a trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by an accused and admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the accused offered by the prosecution is admissible].) Thirteen other jurisdictions, whose evidentiary rules generally parallel the federal rules, have since adopted the same or a similar rule. [30] The federal rule (and those of 12 other jurisdictions) actually would appear to be broader than section 1103(b), in the sense that its scope is not limited to evidence of violence. [31] The rationale for the amendment to the federal rule is essentially the same as that articulated for section 1103(b). According to the federal Advisory Committee Notes for rule 404 (2000 amend.): The amendment makes clear that the accused cannot attack the alleged victim's character and yet remain shielded from the disclosure of equally relevant evidence concerning the same character trait of the accused. For example, in a murder case with a claim of self-defense, the accused, to bolster this defense, might offer evidence of the alleged victim's violent disposition. If the government has evidence that the accused has a violent character, but is not allowed to offer this evidence as part of its rebuttal, the jury has only part of the information it needs for an informed assessment of the probabilities as to who was the initial aggressor. This may be the case even if evidence of the accused's prior violent acts is admitted under Rule 404(b), because such evidence can be admitted only for limited purposes and not to show action in conformity with the accused's character on a specific occasion. Thus, the amendment is designed to permit a more balanced presentation of character evidence when an accused chooses to attack the character of the alleged victim. Although defendant acknowledges the federal rule, he points to no decision (and we are aware of none) concluding that the amended federal ruleor the parallel provisions of the other jurisdictionsis unconstitutional. Because defendant has failed to demonstrate that section 1103(b) violates any fundamental constitutional principle of fairness and justice, we conclude he has not carried his heavy burden of establishing that the statute is unconstitutional. (28) Moreover, as in Falsetta, even were we to conclude that the general rule against the use of propensity evidence against a defendant is of a fundamental nature, and that the general rule would be applicable in the particular context of the operation of section 1103(b), we would nonetheless uphold the statute. Section 1103(b) is reasonably compatible with the three separate reasons supporting the general rule against admission of propensity evidence and therefore does not violate due process. ( Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 915-916.) As explained ante, the statute places no unfair burden upon the defendant because it leaves to the defendant the choice whether evidence of his or her violent propensity will be admissible. The statute also limits the admissible evidence to that establishing the defendant's character for violence, which, pursuant to sections 210 and 350 of the Evidence Code, must be relevant to a material issue in the trial. Although the statute does not contain an explicit statement of the applicability of Evidence Code 352 (unlike the statute at issue in Falsetta ), we discern nothing in section 1103(b) prohibiting a trial court from exercising its discretion to limit the admission of violent propensity evidence in the interest of fostering judicial efficiency, or preventing undue prejudice to the defendant. In sum, the statute remains constitutional because it does not unduly `offend' any fundamental principles advanced by the general practice of barring the use of propensity evidence to prove a defendant's conduct. ( Falsetta, supra, at p. 915.) For these reasons, defendant's challenge to the trial court's instruction regarding the consideration of evidence concerning his violent propensity fails.

Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an adequate investigation concerning the possibility that members of the jury had been improperly influenced by the conduct of two spectators in the courtroom audience. We are not persuaded. On the morning defense counsel was to resume giving his guilt phase closing argument to the jury, the trial court first conducted an in-chambers meeting with the parties to discuss a telephone call the court had received that morning from one of the jurors, Juror J. The court reported that Juror J., who was crying, told the court she had been awake all the previous night, had a migraine headache and felt nauseated, and was basically incapacitated and unable to come to court today. Juror J. had said she commonly gets such headaches when she was under stress, and that the case had caused her a great deal of stress. One particular source of stress was that she had observed two female spectators in the courtroom, who she believed were aligned with the defense, apparently speaking of the jurors and pointing at several of them. Although Juror J. did not perceive the pointing as intended to threaten the jurors, the incident concerned her. The trial court confirmed with Juror J. that no one had approached her or said anything to her. Juror J. stated, however, that as the jurors were walking through the parking lot on their way home the previous evening, some of the jurors talked about this, and one juror, Juror A., suggested that perhaps a note should be sent to the court. The trial court advised the parties that it had not observed any improper conduct by courtroom spectators, but the court was of the view that, [a]t a minimum, Juror J. should be excused and replaced with an alternate juror. The court then continued, Beyond that I am seeking counsel's input, to what, if anything, we should do to assuage any possible concerns that any of the jurors have. [¶] My own feeling would be that until the other jurors tell us something, it's not necessary to take any action. [¶] If [Juror A.] writes us a note, then we will read what the note is and we'll go from there. The court observed that there was no indication that anyone had said something directly to the jurors, and that Juror J. might have been just an overly sensitive person. In response to the trial court's suggestion that Juror J. could be called to state on the record what the trial court had recounted, defense counsel stated, No, I don't need to do that. Defense counsel also observed that it was not necessarily improper for courtroom spectators to discuss the jurors, and the trial court reiterated that Juror J. did not say that the gestures were threatening. The prosecutor agreed with the trial court's plan of dismissing Juror J., and not questioning the remaining jurors, but suggested that the court, outside the presence of the jury, admonish the spectators not to engage in any behavior directed at the jury. Defense counsel added that the court should remind the spectators that their gestures could be misinterpreted. After the trial court admonished the courtroom spectators as suggested, the jury was called into the courtroom, the court advised the jury that Juror J. was unable to continue because she had a migraine headache, which she says she gets ... occasionally, and was feeling nauseated. An alternate juror was seated in her place, and defense counsel then continued with his closing arguments. (29) On appeal, defendant contends that, even in the absence of a request by the parties, the trial court breached its duty to investigate the possibility that other members of the jury might have been prejudiced by the spectators' alleged conduct. We have held that when a court is put `on notice that improper or external influences were being brought to bear on a juror ... it is the court's duty to make whatever inquiry is reasonably necessary to determine if the juror should be discharged and whether the impartiality of the other jurors has been affected.' [Citation.] Such an inquiry is central to maintaining the integrity of the jury system, and therefore is central to the criminal defendant's right to a fair trial. [Citation.] ( People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 694 [276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278].) On the other hand, investigation. `The decision whether to investigate the possibility of juror bias, incompetence, or misconductlike the ultimate decision to retain or discharge a jurorrests within the sound discretion of the trial court. [Citation.] ... [¶] As our cases make clear, a hearing is required only where the court possesses information which, if proven to be true, would constitute good cause to doubt a juror's ability to perform his duties and would justify his removal from the case. [Citation.]' [Citation.] ( People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, 478 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 313, 21 P.3d 1225] ( Cleveland ); see also People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 942-943 [105 Cal.Rptr.3d 131, 224 P.3d 877]; § 1089 [providing that the trial court may discharge a seated juror and replace him or her with an alternate if a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his or her duty].) `The court does not abuse its discretion simply because it fails to investigate any and all new information obtained about a juror during trial.' [Citation.] ( People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1348 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259] ( Bradford ).) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in the present case by taking a wait and see approach concerning whether any juror other than Juror J. might have been affected by any actions of the courtroom spectators. First, the court itself had not observed any possibly inappropriate behavior by any spectators at the trial. Second, even assuming the truth of what Juror J. had reported to the courtthat two people associated with defendant had been talking and pointing at various jurors in a nonthreatening manner, and this had upset Juror J.these circumstances did not suggest that other jurors were similarly upset to the extent that they, too, might not have been able fairly to perform their duties as jurors. As the trial court observed, it may have been the case that Juror J. was an overly sensitive person. Assuming further that, as Juror J. reported, the subject was mentioned as the jurors were leaving the courthouse on the previous day, and that Juror A. had suggested that perhaps a note should be sent to the court, this similarly did not suggest that anyone other than Juror J. had been upsetthe exchange could have simply been Juror A. and the other jurors advising Juror J. that if she was disturbed by something that had happened during the trial, she should advise the court. There is no support for defendant's speculation that the other jurors were unsettled by the gestures of the spectators, or, for that matter, that anyone other than Juror J. even saw the alleged gestures at issue. Third, defense counsel's acquiescence in the trial court's decision regarding how to handle the situation, without an assertion of possible misconduct or a request for a hearing regarding the other jurors' ability to continue on the case, further supports our conclusion that a hearing was not warranted. (See Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1349.) Indeed, it was defense counsel who pointed out that there was certainly nothing improper if courtroom spectators simply had discussed the jurors. In sum, it was reasonable for the trial court to proceed on the belief that any other juror who might have been affected by asserted spectator conduct would call that circumstance to the court's attention, rather than the court suspending the trial in the midst of closing arguments to undertake an inquiry on the subject. (See ibid. ) Defendant's argument that there is uncertainty in the record concerning what occurred because the trial court did not conduct an inquiry, and, therefore, we must conclude the trial court erred, overlooks the starting point of the analysiswhether the information the trial court was aware of when it made its decision warranted further inquiry. Adopting defendant's position would, in essence, mandate that the trial court conduct an inquiry whenever it becomes aware of any indication of a possibility that there might be good cause to remove a juror. That is not the law. ( People v. Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 942; Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1348.) Accordingly, we conclude there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision not to conduct an inquiry of the remaining jurors. We also observe that defendant has pointed to nothing in the record that would indicate any remaining juror actually was biased against defendant as a result of the juror's having seen spectators talking and pointing at the jurors, such that we could conclude that there actually was good cause to remove a juror on that ground, or that any failure to excuse such a juror violated defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury. (See People v. Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 943 [`juror's inability to perform a juror's functions must be shown by the record to be a `demonstrable reality ...' [and a reviewing court] will not presume bias...'].)
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing Juror T. during the guilt phase deliberations because the record does not establish to a demonstrable reality that Juror T. was unable to perform his duties as a juror. He asserts this error violated his state and federal constitutional right to trial by jury, warranting the reversal of the judgment. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
On the third day of the jury's guilt phase deliberations, the trial court received a note from the jury foreperson, informing the court that Juror T. wished to speak with the court regarding a personal matter concerning this case. Accompanying the foreperson's note were two other notes addressed to the court: a typewritten note from Juror T., and a handwritten note from another juror, Juror P. We reproduce Juror T.'s note below as the original appeared: Dear Your Honor, As a juror of People v. Fuiava, I have encountered potentially significant and disturbing legal issue during the course of deliberation, which I believe can be addressed by the court and thus clarified to our fellow jurors. Juror [P.], on behalf of several jurors, has expressed and brought to my attention in explicit, no less certain terms, of their belief of reprehensible infraction for a juror to accentuate a testimony, while discrediting another statement by the very same witness, based on the juror's personal bias. Meanwhile, more than one fellow juror have taken adamant stance to outright reject entire testimonies of some key witnesses, valid or not, based solely on the witness' age, alleged association with the defendant, or affiliation with the gang, The Young Crowd. Again, I must confess to my disagreement with the treatment of witness credibility. I have rarely been accused of wrongdoing in my adult life, and never involving a matter with such momentous implication as in this case of determining the future of another individual's life. However, if the court's interpretation is fully consistent and concurs with [Juror P.]'s admonition, I will ask for permission for dismissal from the case at once as an unfit juror, based on failure to comply with the court's instruction as stated. Juror P.'s handwritten note read as follows: Your Honor, I read [Juror T.'s] letter to you and strongly feel that he has misinterpreted what I and others have said. I would like to speak to you in regards to the letter. Please know that the letter does not accurately reflect what I have said. Furthermore, I question [Juror T.]'s ability to follow the instructions of the law as you have instructed us to do. He is letting the death penalty and his emotions cloud the case. In addition, I question [Juror T.]'s understanding of English. If he feels he should be dismissed, I would support that request. Thank you. [Juror P.] (Pgs to refer to: pgs 11, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21) In closing, your Honor, I am disturbed that [Juror T.] thinks that I would discount a witness just because he/she is in Young Crowd or affiliated with YC. The trial court discussed the two notes with the parties. The court mentioned that it appeared Juror T.'s note had been prepared the night before, and that the pages referred to in Juror P.'s note appeared to be certain jury instructions, specifically, CALJIC Nos. 2.06 (Efforts to Suppress Evidence), 2.13 (Prior Consistent or Inconsistent Statements as Evidence), 2.20 (Believability of Witness), 2.20.1 (Evaluation of Testimony of Child Ten Years of Age or Younger), 2.21.2 (Witness Willfully False) and 2.23 (Believability of WitnessConviction of a Felony). The court then stated it was very troubled by Juror T.'s note, although it was not all that sure what it is he's saying. The court acknowledged that apparently some of the jurors are taking the position of outright rejection of entire testimony of some key witnesses and that he disagrees with that. The court also observed that Juror T.'s statement regarding the seriousness of the case was of concern because we want him to judge the case on the evidence without concern for the consequences of the assessment of the evidence, ... and that ties into a point that [Juror P.] raises in her note to us. The court then explained its inclinations concerning how to proceed: Since [Juror T.] asked to speak to me, I thought we should probably have him come out and tell us what is on his mind. [¶] He indicates that he is thinking about asking to be dismissed from the case as an unfit juror if he's misunderstanding the instructions on the law. [¶] This is what I read in this note. [¶] I don't want to misread what he is saying. [¶] My thought is another way to proceed would be to start with [Juror P.] and see what she says. [¶] The third option, of course, would be to take no action. But I think under these circumstances, that would be unwise. [¶] I think that we should try to assist the jury and these jurors in their understanding of the law. The court stated that it did not view questioning the jurors as an impermissible inquiry into how deliberations are proceeding but rather as a concern over what the law says and how the law should be understood, which the court viewed as a proper matter to address with the jurors. The court then invited counsel to comment. The prosecutor expressed his view that the notes brought out the potential that a juror or jurors are unwilling to follow the instructions as they were provided by the court, and therefore called for an inquiry. The prosecutor agreed with the suggestion to question Juror T. first, but noted that depending upon what he says obviously, I think that we may necessarily have to expand the inquiry to include [Juror P.] and potentially other members of the jury .... Defense counsel stated a different view of the notes: It sounds to me like there is some disagreement in there and that jurors have accused each other of not following the law. [¶] It's apparently a matter of interpretation, and I think that if [Juror T.] apparently is sensitive in, and has been accused I guess by other jurors of not following the law, but he apparentlythe gist that I get is he is following the law as he understands it. [¶] And I guessI think what he is asking for is a little help from the court to reassure him that he is entitled to interpret the evidence as he sees it or whatever. The prosecutor then pointed out that Juror T.'s note could suggest that he was inappropriately considering the issue of punishment in the guilt phase deliberations. The trial court agreed that was a concern, adding, Another concern I have is this idea ofthe sentence where a juror accentuating the testimony while discrediting another statement by the very same witness based on the juror's personal bias. [¶] Well, I don't think personal bias is appropriate when a juror weighs and considers evidence. The court concluded, stating, So I think we have got a lot of questions to ask. Thereafter, the readback of testimony that was occurring was interrupted, and Juror T. was brought into the courtroom. We reproduce the entirety of the court's colloquy with him: The Court: Hi, [Juror T.]. [Juror T.]: I'm sorry to trouble you. The Court: How are you doing today. [Juror T.]: Oh, I'm little bit tired because of not too much sleep, but I'm okay. Thank you. The Court: Are you? [Juror T.]: Yeah. The Court: I'm not sure I fully understand your letter. And I think we ought to start with that. [Juror T.]: Excuse me? Yeah. The Court: And are youis it okay with you to talk in this setting? [¶] First of all, did you just want to see me by myself in chambers, or is this okay? [Juror T]: Oh, no. This will do just fine. The Court: Because I think it is important for the attorneys and the defendant to hear what you have to say. [Juror T.]: Absolutely. The Court: All right. Whatis there a disagreement that you have with some of the other jurors as to what the law is? [Juror T.]: Well, actually we had a discussion in the jury room this morning. I wrote that actually last night following our deliberation. [¶] I mean it came to my attentionI was not fully aware of your instructions at the time. But some of the jurors made it clear thatwell, she used the term `legal' [32] to take account of some part of a witness testimony while disregarding another by the witness. [¶] And, also, thatyeah, it was made clear to me today, but I was not comfortable with the instruction thatto completely reject certain testimony from what I believe are key witnesses based on their age or some background. [¶] I would have liked to look at both, but I cannotI have problem with rejecting all the witnessall the testimony because of certain inconsistencies. The Court: Well, I don't want you to tell me about the deliberations or who is arguing what. [Juror T.]: Okay. The Court: I want to know though if there is a need to have a better clarification on what the law says? [Juror T.]: No, I think that partwell, this morning we examined the instruction book, and I had a chance to glance over it. The Court: All right. [¶] So in your own mind, do you have any question as to what the law says at this time? [Juror T.]: At this point, no, I am much more clear about that, yes. The Court: All right. [Juror T.]: Yes. The Court: Now, are you able to follow the instruction and the law? [Juror T.]: I thought over this last night, and today, but I might not be fair to the prosecutors or the defense if my bias plays a role in which testimonies I will reject entirely while relying on other evidence or witness which to me was little bit lesswell, more inconsequential. [¶] So to reject these testimonies based on certain background, it may not beI might not be fair to the system as intended. The Court: So are you telling me that as you sit here now and you have had a chance to think about the law and you have had a chance [Juror T.]: Yes. The Court:to think about these things overnightand you obviously wrote this letter, what, last night? [Juror T.]: Yes. The Court: Okay. But having had a chance to think about everything, are you telling me that you believe that it is likely that you will not be able to follow the law in this case? [Juror T.]: As, yes, stated in the instruction book. Of course, not all, but perhaps certainthe details. I may fail to meet the standards that you come to expect from the jurors. The Court: Well, what I expect from the jurors is for them to understand the law. [Juror T.]: Yeah. The Court: And for them to apply the law. [¶] Now, are you saying that you think that you are not going to be able to apply the law? [¶] Is that what you are saying? [Juror T.]: Yes, yes. The Court: Well, having said that, do you think that you should be excused from the case? [Juror T.]: I The Court: You know why I ask [Juror T.]: I think I shouldI think I should beI think I should be The Court: Excused? [Juror T.]: Excused. The Court: And, you know, this is not a personal thing. [¶] You understand that? [Juror T.]: Of course. The Court: It is just that you are saying if I understand youand I want to make it clear that you believe having thought about the law that you cannot follow theall the law's instructions; is that correct? [Juror T.]: Yes, Yes. The Court: Okay. The trial court then had Juror T. return to the jury room, and discussed the matter with counsel. The court stated it was satisfied that the juror has indicated an unwillingness to follow the law, and had stated it very clearly. Defense counsel, however, told the court he would like to know what bias he is talking about. The prosecutor stated his view that such an inquiry would be inappropriate under the circumstances, and the court told counsel it did not think it's necessary to explore it further. The court then stated, I am satisfied that he has said he will not follow the law. And that's all that I need I think to excuse him, and I think he should be excused. Defense counsel continued to request further questioning: Your honor, my impression is that his interpretation in following the law is what the other jurors have told him. [¶] And he hesitated, and he didn't specifically say that he couldn't follow the law. He just felt that his own biases somehow prevented him from following the law. [¶] But my interpretation of what he was saying is that that's according to what the other jurors think. And I'd like to at least ask him that. The trial court disagreed, stating, I think that it was very clear that he felt that heafter talking to the jurors, after reading the instruction that he had personal biases that would prevent him from following the law. [¶] And I am satisfied. I am going to go ahead and excuse him. The trial court then called the jury into the courtroom, excused Juror T., replaced him with an alternate, and directed the jury to begin its deliberations anew. The first alternate juror who replaced Juror T. participated in deliberations for the remainder of the day, but then, because she was too emotionally distraught to continue, was removed from the jury without objection the next morning. The next alternate juror then joined the jury, and it deliberated for approximately three hours before reaching its verdict.
(30) A trial court made aware of the possibility of a juror's misconduct, and particularly possible misconduct occurring during the jury's deliberations, is placed on a course that is fraught with the risk of reversible error at each fork in the road. (See People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1052 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 82, 162 P.3d 596] ( Barnwell ) [Removing a juror is, of course, a serious matter .... While a trial court has broad discretion to remove a juror for cause, it should exercise that discretion with great care. (fn. omitted)].) The court must first decide whether the information before the court warrants any investigation into the matter. (See People v. Compton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 55, 60 [98 Cal.Rptr. 217, 490 P.2d 537] ( Compton ) [trial court abused its discretion by failing to investigate possible misconduct and simply discharging the juror `out of an abundance of caution'].) If some inquiry is called for, the trial court must take care not to conduct an investigation that is too cursory (see People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 520-521 [224 Cal.Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251] [trial court abused its discretion by questioning only the jury foreman regarding the possible misconduct of another juror, and by not questioning the juror at issue]), but the court also must not intrude too deeply into the jury's deliberative process in order to avoid invading the sanctity of the deliberations or creating a coercive effect on those deliberations (see Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 475-476). After having completed an adequate (but not overly invasive) inquiry into the misconduct issue, the trial court must then decide whether, under section 1089, there is good cause to excuse the juror at issue. [33] The court at this final fork might err in declining to dismiss a juror who should have been excused (see, e.g., People v. Holloway (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1098, 1108 [269 Cal.Rptr. 530, 790 P.2d 1327] [trial court abused its discretion in failing to declare a mistrial based on guilt phase juror misconduct]) or excusing a juror who should have been retained (see, e.g., People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 814 [80 Cal.Rptr.3d 211, 187 P.3d 1041] [trial court abused its discretion by discharging a juror based on inadequate reasons].) In making these decisions, a trial court might at times be placed between a rock and a hard place; indeed, in this case defendant contends that the trial court's investigation was both too intrusive and not probing enough. Although we have long held that the decision to discharge a juror under section 1089 is committed to the trial court's discretion ( People v. Abbott (1956) 47 Cal.2d 362, 371 [303 P.2d 730]), assessing the breadth of that discretion, at least with regard to the decision to discharge a seated juror, is more complex than it otherwise might appear. Early on, we held that the trial court has at most a limited discretion to determine that the facts show an inability to perform the functions of a juror .... ( Compton, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 60, italics added [citing People v. Hamilton (1963) 60 Cal.2d 105, 124-127 [32 Cal.Rptr. 4, 383 P.2d 412]].) Subsequently, however, we revised that holding: The more modern rule provides that, under section 1089, a trial court `has broad discretion to investigate and remove a juror in the midst of trial where it finds that, for any reason, the juror is no longer able or qualified to serve.' ( Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 462, fn. 19 [quoting People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 142, fn. 19 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 954 P.2d 990]].) Nonetheless, as we made clear in Barnwell, supra, 41 Cal.4th 1038, regardless of how the scope of the trial court's discretion is described, an appellate court's review of the decision to remove a seated juror is not conducted under the typical abuse of discretion standard, but rather under the demonstrable reality test. In Barnwell we explained the difference as follows. The typical abuse of discretion standard involves an analysis of whether the trial court's decision is supported by `substantial evidence,' and has been characterized as a `deferential' standard. ( Barnwell, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1052.) A substantial evidence inquiry examines the record in the light most favorable to the judgment and upholds it if the record contains reasonable, credible evidence of solid value upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have relied in reaching the conclusion in question. Once such evidence is found, the substantial evidence test is satisfied. [Citation.] Even when there is a significant amount of countervailing evidence, the testimony of a single witness that satisfies the standard is sufficient to uphold the finding. ( Ibid.; see also Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 666 [typically, [a] court abuses its discretion when its ruling `falls outside the bounds of reason'].) In contrast, [t]he demonstrable reality test entails a more comprehensive and less deferential review. It requires a showing that the court as trier of fact did rely on evidence that, in light of the entire record, supports its conclusion that bias was established. It is important to make clear that a reviewing court does not reweigh the evidence under either test. Under the demonstrable reality standard, however, the reviewing court must be confident that the trial court's conclusion is manifestly supported by evidence on which the court actually relied. [¶] In reaching that conclusion, the reviewing panel will consider not just the evidence itself, but also the record of reasons the court provides. ( Barnwell, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1052-1053.) That heightened standard more fully reflects an appellate court's obligation to protect a defendant's fundamental rights to due process and to a fair trial by an unbiased jury. ( Id. at p. 1052; see also People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 589 [112 Cal.Rptr.3d 96, 234 P.3d 377] ( Lomax ) [on appeal, `a somewhat stronger showing' than is typical for abuse of discretion review must be made to support the decision to discharge a juror during deliberations].) Defendant initially challenges the trial court's inquiry into Juror T.'s ability to serve on the jury as being improperly coercive, and too intrusive. The manner in which the trial court conducted its inquiry is subject to review for abuse of discretion under the typical standard. ( People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 927 [113 Cal.Rptr.3d 190, 235 P.3d 873] ( Alexander ).) Even if we assume this claim is not forfeited by defendant's failure to raise it below, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the manner in which it conducted its inquiry. Defendant first contends the court improperly questioned Juror T. outside the presence of the rest of the jurors, which, he asserts, risked (1) tainting the rest of the jury by encouraging speculation about that isolated inquiry and suggesting that the court found [Juror T.'s] behavior problematic and (2) intimidating Juror T. such that the development of a true understanding of his ability to serve as a juror would be impaired. It was, however, Juror T. who (as stated in the jury foreperson's note) initially requested to speak with the court. Moreoverand especially in light of our past admonitions that courts must take care not to intrude needlessly into the sanctity of a jury's deliberationsthe trial court reasonably focused its inquiry on the juror whose ability to serve was in doubt. The notion that other jurors took some larger meaning from the court's questioning of Juror T. by himself that affected their deliberations is pure speculation on defendant's part. Furthermore, there is no indication that Juror T. was intimidated by the court's inquiry; indeed, the court asked whether he was agreeable to being questioned in open court, and the record discloses no hesitation in his assenting to that suggestion. Defendant also contends that once the trial court learned the jurors had discussed the jury instructions that morning and Juror T. reportedly had arrived at a better understanding of the law, the court should have ceased its inquiry. Defendant is incorrect, because although one inference from the information before the court was that Juror T. might not have understood the applicable law, another inference that reasonably could be drawn was that he was unable to follow the law. Juror T.'s own note brought out that possibility in stating that the other jurors believed he could not follow the law because of a personal bias, and Juror P.'s note echoed those concerns. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in asking Juror T. whether, in light of his newly enhanced understanding of the court's instructions, he could follow them. (See Alexander, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 927 [scope of trial court's inquiry of jury foreman properly extended beyond whether a problem juror was refusing to deliberate when indications were that the juror also might have been failing to follow the court's instructions].) Defendant next contends the trial court improperly ended its inquiry when Juror T. professed his inability to follow the law due to a personal bias, and that the court, pursuant to the defense counsel's requests, instead should have further probed the reasons why Juror T. believed he should be excused. According to defendant, the asserted inadequacy of the trial court's inquiry means that the court's decision to discharge Juror T. is not supported to a demonstrable reality. Defendant, however, misperceives the nature of our review of the trial court's decision. We conclude the manner in which the court conducted the hearing was within the court's reasonable discretion. The court's decision that bias was established is subject to somewhat more searching review, but, as we made clear in Barnwell, supra, 41 Cal.4th at page 1053, we do not reweigh the evidence that was before the trial court, which is, in essence, what defendant asks us to do. (31) The heart of what Juror T. told the trial court is that he understood the court's instructions on the law but he could not follow them because of a personal bias, and he therefore agreed he should be excused from the jury. It is beyond dispute that a juror who cannot follow the court's instructions because of a personal bias should be discharged under section 1089. ( People v. Engelman (2002) 28 Cal.4th 436, 442 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 862, 49 P.3d 209].) There also is no question that the trial court relied on Juror T.'s statement of his inability to follow the court's instructions due to his bias as the reason for discharging him. Accordingly, the court relied `on evidence that, in light of the entire record, supports its conclusion that bias was established.' ( Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 589.) Defendant asserts, however, that Juror T.'s other statements during the colloquy with the trial court as well as in his note rendered ambiguous his confession of disabling bias, and therefore the court was obligated to ask clarifying questions. In essence, defendant claims the trial court should not have believed Juror T. when he said he understood the law and could not follow it, because, in defendant's view, Juror T. (and perhaps the remainder of the jurors) actually may have misunderstood the court's instructions. This argument, in effect, is a challenge to the weight of the evidencethat the trial court gave Juror T.'s admission of disabling personal bias undue weight in light of other information before the court. As we have consistently cautioned, however, even under the demonstrable reality standard the reviewing court does not reweigh the persuasive value of the evidence. (See Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 590 [even when there is conflicting evidence of juror bias, an appellate court must recognize that it is for the trial court to weigh the credibility of those testifying and draw upon its own observations of the jurors throughout the proceedings, and the reviewing court must defer to factual determinations based on these assessments].) The trial court credited Juror T.'s confessions that he could not follow the court's instructions because of a personal bias, and we will not, as defendant wishes, revisit that assessment of the weight of the evidence before the trial court in our evaluation of whether the record supports to a demonstrable reality its decision to discharge the juror. (32) We reject the notion that a trial court, having received an admission of disabling bias from a juror, is always required to attempt, in essence, to rehabilitate that juror by further exploring what the juror really meant. We have recognizedin the context of the evaluation of prospective jurors during voir direthat a trial court has the discretion to decide that a juror's disqualification is so clear that further voir dire is pointless .... ( People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1085 [259 Cal.Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659]; see also People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 823 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2]; People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 846 [268 Cal.Rptr. 802, 789 P.2d 983].) In this case, even to the extent Juror T.'s statements surrounding his admission of disabling bias were not the model of clarity, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding there was no need to question him further because his disqualification was clear, based on his having told the court he understood the law but could not follow it because of a personal bias. Defendant's reliance on our decision in Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pages 480-484, in asserting that the trial court was required to inquire further, is misplaced. Contrary to defendant's argument, that decision does not mandate that a trial court must conduct further inquiry if there is some ambiguity surrounding the issue of whether a juror should be discharged. Rather, in rejecting the position taken in several decisions of the federal courts of appeals, we concluded a trial court is permitted to conduct further inquiry regarding a juror's fitness to serve, despite the possibility that such questioning might touch on the jury's deliberations. ( Id. at p. 484.) Again, we discern no abuse of discretion here in the trial court's decisions to take at face value Juror T.'s statements that he understood the court's instructions and could not follow them because of a personal bias, and therefore not to attempt any additional clarification of the juror's state of mindor that of the rest of the jury. The circumstances of this case are similar to those we recently addressed in People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79 [109 Cal.Rptr.3d 549, 231 P.3d 289] ( Thompson ), in which we also concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in discharging a juror during deliberations. In that case, the juror at issue told the trial court she was not emotionally capable of continuing to deliberate, and the court denied defense counsel's request to question the juror in order to determine whether the reason [she] felt [she] could not continue to deliberate was because the other jurors were telling [her] [she] should vote for the death penalty even though [she] had a lingering doubt about defendant's guilt. ( Id. at p. 136.) On appeal, we rejected the defendant's contentions that the trial court had abused its discretion in refusing to conduct further inquiry to determine if the other jurors had committed misconduct in pressuring the discharged juror, and in ultimately discharging the juror. We concluded the trial court had properly declined to inquire further because to do so would have threatened to intrude on the deliberation process, and in light of that conclusion and the existing record, the trial court had good cause to dismiss the juror. ( Id. at p. 137.) In the present case, defendant asserts the other jurors might have misunderstood the court's instructions, and subsequently may have convinced Juror T. of their own erroneous view of the law, meaning that his professed inability to follow the court's instructions would have been based on an invalid premise. [34] Juror T.'s comments, however, provide no indication that the rest of the jurors misunderstood the court's instructions. Indeed, Juror P.'s note indicated that, in her view, Juror T. had misinterpreted what she had said. What is clear from the juror notes and Juror T.'s statements in court was that the jurors had some disagreement concerning the assessment of the credibility of the various witnesses, which was the central issue of the trial. As was the case in Thompson, we cannot conclude either that the trial court abused its discretion in determining it had heard sufficient disqualifying information from Juror T., or that the court's refusal to delve further into the matter rendered the record inadequate to support to a demonstrable reality the decision to discharge him. To the extent defendant claims the trial court erred in discharging Juror T. simply because there was a reasonable possibility that Juror T.'s difficulties were related to his view of the merits of the case, we repeatedly have rejected that standard. ( Thompson, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 137-138.) Defendant's reliance on recent decisions, such as Williams v. Cavazos (9th Cir. 2011) 646 F.3d 626, certiorari granted sub nomine Cavazos v. Williams (2012) 565 U.S. ___ [181 L.Ed.2d 806], does not convince us to revisit that conclusion. Because the trial court's finding of good cause to dismiss Juror T. is supported to a demonstrable reality, there was no violation of defendant's statutory or constitutional rights. ( People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1410 [58 Cal.Rptr.3d 368, 157 P.3d 973].) Moreover, there is no merit to defendant's claim that the court's entirely proper discharging of Juror T., as well as the first alternate juror who replaced him, coerced the jury's verdict. We presume the reconstituted juries followed the trial court's instructions to begin the deliberations anew ( Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 34), and defendant's speculation to the contrary does not persuade us to conclude otherwise. Finally, it also follows that the trial court properly denied defendant's postverdict motion for a new trial premised on this issue. The trial court's decision to discharge Juror T. was proper when made; therefore, even if later-presented evidence might have contradicted to some degree the evidence the court had before it when it ruled, this would not establish grounds for concluding defendant had been denied his rights or a fair trial by that ruling. (See Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 132 [reviewing court evaluates a trial court's decision based on the evidence before the trial court when it ruled].)
Defendant contends the cumulative prejudicial effect of the guilt phase errors he has raised on appeal deprived him of a fair trial, even if the errors were harmless when considered separately. To the extent we have concluded or assumed for the sake of argument that errors occurred during the guilt phase of the trial, those errors, even when considered cumulatively, did not deprive defendant of a fundamentally fair trial.

(33) Defendant contends the extensive presentation of victim impact evidence violated [his] constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, and a reliable verdict as protected by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, correlative rights of the state Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 15 & 24), and Evidence Code section 352. Although the nature of defendant's claim is not entirely clear from his briefs, it appears he raises three challenges to the scope of victim impact evidence permissible under California law. Even assuming defendant may bring his claims on appeal despite his failure to raise them at trial, we conclude they are without merit. Defendant contends victim impact evidence must be limited (1) to members of the victim's family who were present during the crime or who witnessed its immediate aftermath, (2) in the number of witnesses, their age (that is, minors should not testify except when there are no available adult witnesses), and the scope of the testimony (that is, it must be factual and not designed to evoke the emotions or sympathy of the jury), and (3) to evidence admitted at the guilt phase to prove guilt and other facts or circumstances of which defendant was aware when he committed the crime. We previously have rejected these and related contentions, and discern no reason to revisit those decisions. ( Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 196-197 [victim impact evidence need not be limited to a single witness, individuals who witnessed the crime, or matters within the defendant's knowledge when the crime was committed]; Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 787 [emotion need not be eliminated from the penalty determination]; People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 364 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289, 181 P.3d 105] [emotional victim impact evidence is admissible unless `it invites a purely irrational response from the jury ...']; Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1057 [nothing precludes the children of murder victims ... from describing their loss simply because they are not adults at the time of trial ...]; People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1195 [13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353] [the jury may consider victim impact evidence in exercising sympathy for the victim and others affected by the crime].)
(34) Defendant contends the admission into evidence, and the jury's consideration, of testimony of Deputy Kele Kaono concerning defendant's admissions to having committed two armed assaults on people he believed were members of rival gangs violated the corpus delicti rule. That rule `generally requires the prosecution to prove the body of the crime itself independent of a defendant's extrajudicial statements.' [Citation.] ( Valencia, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 296.) We agree that error occurred, but conclude the error was harmless. Deputy Kaono testified in the penalty phase that he interviewed defendant concerning the incident in which someone shot at the car being driven by Manuel Ramirez (who had testified at the guilt phase regarding this incident), resulting in one of the passengers in the car being struck in the jaw by a bullet. Defendant told Deputy Kaono that he shot at the car because he thought it contained members of a rival gang. [35] Defendant also told Deputy Kaono that he had shot at two other cars that he thought contained rival gang membersone just minutes before he shot at Ramirez's car, and another a few weeks earlier. Defense counsel objected to the admission of the statements concerning the earlier two shootings on the ground that there was no corpus to the other shootings. The trial court overruled the objection, stating its view that the absence of other independent evidence went to the weight of the deputy's testimony. The prosecution presented no other evidence concerning the earlier two incidents. During his penalty phase arguments to the jury, the prosecutor referred to defendant's having committed five shootings, which included the two shootings at issue. The trial court did not instruct the jury regarding the corpus delicti rule. As defendant concedes, the admission of Deputy Kaono's testimony concerning defendant's confessions to the two earlier shootings was not error. ( People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1179-1180 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 46 P.3d 372] ( Alvarez ) [Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, former subd. (d) (now subd. (f)(2)) (the Right to Truth-in-Evidence provision enacted by the voters in 1982 as Prop. 8), eliminated a trial objection to the admission in evidence of the defendant's out-of-court statements on grounds that independent proof of the corpus delicti is lacking].) Nonetheless, although the corpus delicti rule no longer limits the admissibility of a defendant's extrajudicial confessions, Proposition 8 did not abrogate the requirements that the trial court instruct the jury on the rule, even on its own motion, and that the proof adduced at trial in support of a conviction must include sufficient independent corroboration of the defendant's confessions. ( Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1180.) After briefing in the present case was completed, we concluded, contrary to the Attorney General's contention, that these surviving portions of the corpus delicti rule apply to unadjudicated offenses proffered as aggravating evidence at the penalty phase of a capital trial. ( Valencia, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 296.) Although the challenged evidence was admissible under Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1161, it is undisputed that the trial court did not instruct the jury concerning the requirement that there be independent evidence corroborating defendant's admissions to Deputy Kaono concerning the earlier two shootings, and that the prosecution presented no independent evidence in support of those offenses. Accordingly, we conclude that there was error under state law. [36] This error, however, does not warrant reversal of the penalty verdict. Under the test applied to state law errors occurring at the penalty phase, we will affirm the judgment unless we conclude there is a reasonable (i.e., realistic) possibility that the jury would have rendered a different verdict had the error or errors not occurred. ( People v. Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 448.) In light of the circumstances of the shooting of Deputy Blair, defendant's guilt phase testimony placing the blame for what happened upon the victim, his penalty phase testimony expressing apparent unwillingness to accept responsibility for the crimes of which the jury had convicted him, and the other evidence of defendant's undeterred history of violence involving additional shootings, including his pleas to two, we cannot say there is a reasonable possibility the jury would have reached a different verdict if it had not considered Deputy Kaono's testimony regarding defendant's uncorroborated confessions to two other, ultimately nondescript, shootings.
During its guilt phase case-in-chief, the prosecution presented conviction records and the testimony of defendant's parole agent to establish that defendant had been convicted of an assault with a firearm in 1992. In his testimony in the guilt phase, defendant stated he did not commit that shooting, but had pleaded guilty to the charge merely because he had been offered a significantly reduced sentence if he did so. Later, at the penalty phase, the prosecution presented the testimony of Deputy Matt Brady, who was one of the deputies who responded to the 1992 shooting incident. Deputy Brady testified, without defense objection on this point, that the female victim reported someone had shot at her, and the bullet had passed through the hair on her head, grazing her scalp. Deputy Brady saw expended shell casings at the scene, and observed that the victim's hair had a crease in it, which looked like the bullet just passed right through her hair but touching her scalp. At a field showup, a person who had been with the victim at the time of the shooting identified defendant as the person who had shot at her. According to Deputy Brady, the female victim was too traumatized and frightened to participate in identifying the shooter. (35) On appeal, defendant contends the admission of Deputy Brady's testimony violated his federal constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him under the United States Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [158 L.Ed.2d 177, 124 S.Ct. 1354]. In Crawford, the high court held that the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution prohibits `admission of testimonial statements of ... witness[es] who did not appear at trial unless [the witness] was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.' [Citation.] ( People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 421 [79 Cal.Rptr.3d 334, 187 P.3d 56].) Assuming without deciding that defendant did not forfeit or waive his confrontation claim, that the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation applies to evidence introduced at the penalty phase of a capital trial, and that the admission of some of Deputy Brady's testimony violated defendant's right to confrontation (but see Michigan v. Bryant (2011) 562 U.S. ___, ___ [179 L.Ed.2d 93, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1155] [when the primary purpose of an interrogation is to respond to an `ongoing emergency,' its purpose is not to create a record for trial and thus is not within the scope of the [Confrontation] Clause]), we nonetheless conclude that any violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Properly admitted evidence, including Deputy Brady's personal observations, was sufficient to establish that someone assaulted the victim by shooting at her, and there was no dispute that defendant pleaded guilty to having committed this assault and received a prison sentence as a result. Moreover, although defendant at trial denied having committed the assault, when the jury heard Deputy Brady's testimony, it already had determined that defendant had falsely testified concerning the shooting of Deputy Blair. Defendant also admitted to the jury that he lied in his testimony concerning where he went immediately after the shooting, and admitted that he previously had committed an assault with a firearm. In sum, in light of defendant's obvious lack of credibility and confirmed history of violence, the addition of improperly admitted testimonial evidence in Deputy Brady's testimony could not have affected the jury's determination of whether defendant, contrary to his trial testimony, did commit the 1992 assault. Accordingly, we conclude that, if there was error, the death sentence `actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.' ( People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 396 [106 Cal.Rptr.3d 771, 227 P.3d 342] ( Gamache ) [quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 279 [124 L.Ed.2d 182, 113 S.Ct. 2078]]; see also Davis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 620 [any Crawford error in admission of police officers' hearsay testimony concerning statements of the defendant's prior victims was harmless in light of defendant's confessions to those offenses].) To the extent defendant adequately has raised a claim on appeal that the admission of Deputy Brady's hearsay testimony violated state law pursuant to section 1200 of the Evidence Code, he forfeited such a claim by not raising it during the trial. (See People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 433-434 [35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765] [`In accordance with [section 353 of the Evidence Code], we have consistently held that the defendant's failure to make a timely and specific objection on the ground asserted on appeal makes that ground not cognizable.'].) In any event, for the same reasons any federal constitutional error was harmless, so too was any possible state law error. (See People v. Wilson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1, 28 [73 Cal.Rptr.3d 620, 178 P.3d 1113] [the state standard for evaluating prejudicial effect of penalty phase errorwhether `there is a reasonable possibility the error affected the verdict'is effectively the same as the federal harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard].)
Defendant contends the trial court erred in preventing him from introducing at the penalty phase evidence concerning the federal civil rights lawsuits filed against the sheriff's department, which we discussed ante, in part II.D.1.a., and that this error denied defendant his right to a fair and reliable penalty determination. We disagree. During cross-examination of Deputy Westin, defense counsel asked several questions regarding whether he knew that allegations of the use of excessive force had been made against Deputy Blair. In response to defense counsel's question whether he knew of a lawsuit raising such a claim, Deputy Westin answered that there had been a lawsuit that sued the entire station of Lynwood, and if you worked there ... you were named in the suit. In response to the subsequent question whether Deputy Westin was aware of specific allegations raised in the lawsuit, he replied that he never read it personally, but the lawsuit seemed frivolous to me, and I never really followed it. Deputy Westin also testified that he and Deputy Blair were members of a group of deputies known as the Vikings, and he (Deputy Westin) had a Viking tattoo on his leg. In response to the prosecutor's questions on redirect examination, Deputy Westin testified that the group was not sinister or sadistic or evil, as had been alleged in the lawsuit, but was, instead, a multiracial group of deputies who merely adopted the Viking symbol as a mascot for their station. On recross-examination, defense counsel asked Deputy Westin to explain his testimony concerning the civil rights lawsuit, but the trial court interposed its own objection to the question. The court stated that, pursuant to section 352 of the Evidence Code, it was excluding evidence concerning the lawsuit, and advised the jury that a lawsuit had been filed in 1990, but the court had ruled it was too remote, and therefore, We're not going to get into it. At a sidebar conference, defense counsel argued that the defense should be permitted to introduce evidence that the lawsuit apparently had settled for the sum of $7 million in order to rebut Deputy Westin's testimony that the lawsuit was frivolous. The trial court disagreed, observing that lawsuits settle for different reasons and things that I don't want this jury to be focused on. Later, defense witness Terri Clark testified she believed the jury should spare defendant's life because defendant spoke the truth, and, like others in the neighborhood, he was afraid of the sheriff's deputies because they engaged in criminal activity. Clark then said, If I am wrong then why did we win over ... 7 million, at which point the trial court stopped her. The court stated her answer was not appropriate in this proceeding, and the court was very disappointed that you did not respond to the question. Following the prosecutor's request to strike the answer, the trial court advised the jury that Clark's answer was not relevant here and it gets us off into areas that I have ruled are not appropriate for this jury to consider, and therefore the jury should disregard it. Defense counsel then asked Clark to answer the question by just us[ing] your own personal experience. On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court erred by ruling he could not introduce evidence concerning the lawsuit and its alleged monetary settlement. He contends such evidence would have rebutted Deputy Westin's testimony that the lawsuit was frivolous, and that the Vikings were, essentially, an innocuous club merely reflecting the camaraderie of some of the deputies assigned to the Lynwood Station. Similarly, defendant also contends the trial court should not have instructed the jury to disregard Clark's testimony concerning the community's fear of the deputies. (36) As we stated in People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 856 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 831 P.2d 249]: While it is true, as defendant contends, a capital defendant must be allowed to present all relevant mitigating evidence to the jury [citations], the trial court determines relevancy in the first instance and retains discretion to exclude evidence whose probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will create substantial danger of confusing the issues or misleading the jury. We conclude the trial court in the present case acted within its discretion in excluding the proffered evidence, and, accordingly, there was no violation of defendant's constitutional rights. The resolution of this claim parallels the resolution of defendant's challenge to the exclusion of the lawsuit evidence from the guilt phase of the trial. Any relevance of the lawsuit or the community's fear of the deputies with regard to possible mitigation of the circumstances of Deputy Blair's murder (such as, for example, fostering some lingering doubt concerning defendant's guilt) depended on establishing the merits of the allegations raised by the plaintiffs in those cases and the reasonableness of the community's and defendant's supposed fear of the deputies. As the trial court observed, even the circumstance that the lawsuitwhich, it must be remembered, was actually a collection of a number of lawsuitsapparently had been settled with a global monetary payment to the plaintiffs did not establish that the plaintiffs' allegations necessarily had merit and therefore would have supported defendant's defense. The trial court acted well within its discretion in ruling that, once again, the trials within a trial that would have resulted from the introduction of evidence concerning the merits of the lawsuit or other supposed instances of misconduct by sheriff's deputies would have entailed an undue investment of time and might have unreasonably distracted the jury. This is especially true concerning the assertion that the merits of the lawsuit or its settlement should have been admitted in order to impeach Deputy Westin's characterization of the lawsuit as frivolous. In the context of his testimony, Deputy Westin's own views of the lawsuit were relevant in assessing his opinion of Deputy Blair's character, regardless of whether the lawsuit actually was meritorious or frivolous. But even to the extent Deputy Westin's testimony could have been impeached to some degree by evidence that the lawsuit was not frivolous, the probative value of evidence of the settlement in impeaching Deputy Westin on this minor point would have been greatly outweighed by the risk of misleading the jury, given that, as the trial court observed, a lawsuit might settle for reasons not necessarily related to its merits. Moreover, the trial court properly could be concerned that exploring the reasons why the lawsuit settled risked undue consumption of time and the possibility of the jury being distracted from deciding the appropriate punishment for defendant's crime.
During the defense case in mitigation, defense counsel asked defendant's sister, Now, if the jury comes back with a death verdict and Freddie is executed, how would that affect you? The trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection to this question, stating that the question was not appropriate[,] technically. The court went on to explain that it would permit testimony regarding the love for her brother and good things in his life and why she would not want the death verdict in this case. After defense counsel subsequently asked her why she did not want a death verdict, defendant's sister explained that she did not believe defendant deserved the death penalty because defendant acted to protect himself and his friend, and did not deserve to die for a crime he did not commit. (37) Defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred by sustaining the objection to the question concerning how defendant's sister would be affected by defendant's execution. This contention is without merit. As we recently stated: The impact of a defendant's execution on his or her family may not be considered by the jury in mitigation. [Citations.] In [ People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 454-456 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442]], we explained it is a defendant's background and character, and `not the distress of his or her family,' that is relevant under section 190.3. [Citation.] We distinguished between `evidence that [a defendant] is loved by family members or others, and that these individuals want him or her to live ... [and evidence about] whether the defendant's family deserves to suffer the pain of having a family member executed.' [Citation.] The former constitutes permissible indirect evidence of a defendant's character while the latter improperly asks the jury to spare the defendant's life because it `believes that the impact of the execution would be devastating to other members of the defendant's family.' ( People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 577, 601 [88 Cal.Rptr.3d 131, 199 P.3d 535].) There was no error in the present case, because the trial court's ruling and clarification of the permissible scope of the testimony were proper.
(38) Defendant contends the trial court improperly restricted his penalty phase testimony by preventing him from expressing remorse. (See Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1, 4 [90 L.Ed.2d 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669] [the federal Const. requires that `the sentencer ... not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death' (italics omitted)].) At the beginning of defendant's penalty phase testimony, defense counsel asked if defendant had anything that you want to say to Deputy Blair's family? The prosecutor objected to the question as inappropriate. The trial court sustained the objection, directing counsel to confine yourself to the issue of ... what the sentence [should] be. Defense counsel requested a sidebar conference, and subsequently explained that if the prosecutor is going to be prevented from arguing remorse, then I will withdraw the question and have my client sit down. The prosecutor agreed that he was not planning to argue remorse, presumably referring to an argument based on a lack of remorse on defendant's part. Defense counsel then stated that he needed to discuss with defendant whether he nonetheless wished to testify, and the trial court agreed, stating, He has a right to testify. He has a right to plead for his life. At this point it would be inappropriate given the position that the [P]eople are taking that they are not going to argue the issue of remorse that he should make a public apology, for instance, to the Blair family. I don't think that that would be appropriate. Defense counsel stated, That is fine, and proceeded to consult with defendant. After apparently confirming that defendant still wished to testify, defense counsel asked him why should this jury spare your life. Defendant answered that the jury should do so for his family and friends, those who knew that he was not the monster that they tried to make me out to be, and who knew that there ain't no way in hell [he] could have killed Deputy Blair that night in cold blood like they portrayed in this courtroom. Defendant's challenge to the trial court's ruling lacks merit. The trial court did not clearly state that it would not permit testimony on the subject of remorse in general. Rather, its comments show it believed that, in the context of the People's agreement not to argue absence of remorse, it would be particularly inappropriate that he [(defendant)] should make a public apology, for instance, to the Blair family. In any event, defense counsel expressly agreed to the trial court's limitation on defendant's testimony, and we therefore conclude defendant's appellate claim of error was not preserved. ( People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 397 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432] ( Hughes ) [claim of Skipper error was waived because defense counsel expressly acceded to the trial court's limitation on the evidence ...].) Even if defendant had preserved a challenge to the trial court's ruling, we would conclude any error in preventing him from making a public statement to the victim's family was not prejudicial. (See People v. Brown, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 576-577, 578 [applying Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824] harmless error standard to Skipper error]; Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 397-398.) Lingering doubt was a cornerstone of the defense's penalty phase strategy, and counsel argued it at length during closing argument. In light of the inconsistency between the lingering doubt defense and a genuine expression of remorse for his crime, it is doubtful that a statement by defendant to Deputy Blair's family would have been viewed as an effective apology. That an apology or even some other expression of remorse by defendant was not critical to his penalty phase defense is further supported by the fact that defense counsel offered to withdraw the question and his client's testimony as soon as he learned that the prosecutor would not be arguing lack of remorse. Finally, the likelihood that a statement to the victim's family would have carried any mitigating value is severely undercut by the testimony defendant did give, in which he rejected the jury's verdict that he murdered Deputy Blair. Accordingly, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant contends the trial court violated his rights under the state and federal Constitutions by imposing an overly restrictive time limit on defense counsel's opportunity to consult with defendant before he testified at the penalty phase. We are not persuaded. Before defendant testified, defense counsel advised the trial court at a sidebar conference that counsel had not had a chance to talk to [defendant] about testifyingI mean, I talked to him before but not today. And he is telling me now that he wanted to testify so I need a chance to talk to him. The court responded that it would give you five minutes, and stated that the court wanted to try to finish ... this case today. The court then recessed. After the recess, the court asked, Are we ready for the jury? Apparently receiving no response to the contrary, the court directed that the jury be brought out, and defense counsel began his examination of defendant. On appeal, defendant contends that five minutes was an inadequate amount of time for discussing defendant's testimony, and that the trial court's haste to complete the trial denied him his right to counsel and to prepare a defense. Defendant forfeited such claims by failing to assert at trial that the period of time provided was inadequate. In any event, defendant has not established on this record that any inadequacy in the time provided actually affected the defense. Indeed, there is nothing in the record establishing that the recess provided by the trial court actually was limited to five minutes. Defendant asserts that his testimony was negatively affected by an inadequate opportunity to consult with counsel, but this unsupported allegationespecially viewed in light of the absence of any request for additional timedoes not establish that his constitutional rights were violated.
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct during the penalty phase of the trial. Based upon our reading of defendant's appellate briefs, we conclude he forfeited the large majority his claims of misconduct by failing either to object or to request appropriate admonitions at trial ( People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 447 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610] in order to preserve for appeal a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the defense must make a timely objection at trial and request an admonition]), and by failing to adequately raise them on appeal ( Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 133 [declining to address an appellate claim when the defendant fail[ed] to offer any authority or argument in support of this claim]; People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1182 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384] [rejecting an appellate claim as not properly raised when the defendant fail[ed] ... to support that claim with adequate argument]). To the extent defendant relies simply on the number of asserted instances of misconduct he has raised on appeal to demonstrate that any objections would have been futile and that therefore his failure to preserve his claims during the trial should be excused, such reliance is misplaced. The prevalence of asserted misconduct raised for the first time on appeal cannot establish that, had defense counsel made proper objections at trial, the trial court would have consistently overruled those objections, the prosecutor would have persisted in engaging in the asserted misconduct, or the jury would have been alienated by defendant's bringing the prosecutor's asserted improprieties to the court's attention. (Cf. Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 29-30 [concluding that exceptions to forfeiture rule were inapplicable when defense counsel frequently objected to asserted misconduct and the trial court sustained several objections]; Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 821 [exception to forfeiture rule applied when the record established the unusual circumstances of continual misconduct, coupled with the trial court's failure to rein in [the prosecutor's] excesses, [which] created a trial atmosphere so poisonous that [counsel] was thrust upon the horns of a dilemma concerning whether to object, thereby provoking the trial court's wrath, or declining to object, thereby forcing the defendant to suffer the prejudice of the prosecutor's constant misconduct].) Similarly unpersuasive is defendant's blanket assertion that admonitions would not have been effective in curing any possible prejudice. ( Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 371 [an invocation of an exception to the requirements of an objection and request for an admonition must be based upon the record`[t]he ritual incantation that an exception applies is not enough.'].) Defendant's suggestion that we are required to review his forfeited claims of prosecutorial misconduct for plain error also is without merit. ( Redd, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 731, fn. 19.) (39) To the extent, however, defendant at least partially preserved two particular claims of misconduct regarding the prosecutor's closing argument to the jury, we conclude neither instance constituted prejudicial misconduct. First, defendant observes that, in arguing that the jurors should not let their religious convictions save [defendant's] life, the prosecutor reminded the jury of the adage in the King James version of Genesis chapter 9, verse 6: Whoso sheddeth man's blood by man shall his blood be shed for in the image of God made He man. We agree that the prosecutor's use of this adage, even taken in context, exceeded an acceptable comment that religious doctrine would not prohibit the jury from imposing the death penalty if that verdict was appropriate under the law, and instead encouraged it to rely on the Bible as justification for imposing that punishment. (See People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1168-1170 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 297, 163 P.3d 4].) In addition, the prosecutor's comment was made in 1996, after People v. Wrest (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1088, 1105 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 511, 839 P.2d 1020], and People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 261 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 421, 861 P.2d 1107], in which we explicitly condemned biblical references that lessen the jury's sense of responsibility or imply that the jury should follow some law other than that set forth in the trial court's instructions. (See People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 298, fn. 11 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.3d 990] [reserving question whether a prosecutor's biblical reference that postdates and deliberately contravenes the holdings in those decisions [might] constitute[] a more serious form of prosecutorial misconduct warranting reversal of the penalty phase judgment].) Nonetheless, defendant objected to the prosecutor's comment and the trial court sustained the objection and advised the jury, I'm going to strike that last argument, ladies and gentlemen. We are not going to be referring to the Bible. The misconduct therefore was not prejudicial. To the extent defendant contends on appeal that the trial court's admonition was insufficient, he forfeited such a claim by failing to request a different admonition. Second, defendant asserts the prosecutor committed an improper act of vouching when he drew the jury's attention to the absence of testimony from defendant's wife, Tina Fuiava. Although the trial court overruled defendant's nonspecific improper argument objection to the prosecutor's initial comments on the failure of the defense to call Tina as a witness, it sustained defendant's objection to the subsequent suggestion that the failure to call her might have been because they are afraid that they couldn't argue lingering doubt when I asked her what he told her. (Cf. People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 593 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 22, 139 P.3d 492] [a prosecutor is not permitted to suggest that evidence of which he or she is aware but which has been not submitted to the jury corroborates the prosecution's case].) As with the prosecutor's biblical reference, we deem the trial court's action sufficient to have prevented prejudice, and to the extent defendant contends the court's admonition was insufficient, he forfeited that claim. (40) As with our discussion of defendant's claims of guilt phase prosecutorial misconduct (see ante, part II.D.2.m.), we take this opportunity to comment on an aspect of the prosecutor's penalty phase closing argument that, although forfeited as a basis for reversal on appeal, warrants condemnation. In two instances the prosecutor improperly suggested to the jury that it speculate regarding aspects of defendant's violent criminal history that were not presented at the trialby describing defendant as a killing machine (although there was no evidence that defendant had killed anyone other than Deputy Blair), and then, with regard to defendant's victims, asking that the jury speculate How many others are there? (See People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 149 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166] [[c]ertainly a prosecutor should not invite the jury to speculate ...]; People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 212 [152 Cal.Rptr. 141, 589 P.2d 396] [the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by invit[ing] the jury to speculate aboutand possibly base a verdict upon`evidence' never presented at trial].)
(41) Defendant contends the trial court violated his statutory and state and federal constitutional rights by refusing to instruct the jury concerning its consideration in its deliberations of any lingering doubt regarding his guilt. [37] We previously have rejected similar contentions, and discern no reason to reconsider those decisions. ( People v. Page (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1, 55 [79 Cal.Rptr.3d 4, 186 P.3d 395] [`there is no requirement, under either state or federal law, that the court specifically instruct the jury to consider any residual doubt of defendant's guilt'].)
Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial because, he asserts, the evidence demonstrates he is innocent, in the sense that the evidence did not (1) negate a reasonable doubt that he acted in self-defense, (2) prove he acted with premeditation when he shot Deputy Blair, (3) establish that he shot Deputy Blair to prevent a lawful arrest, or (4) establish that Deputy Blair was engaged in the lawful performance of his duties when defendant shot him. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming. We conclude defendant's claim of error is without merit. (42) In reviewing a motion for a new trial, the trial court must weigh the evidence independently. [Citation.] It is, however, guided by a presumption in favor of the correctness of the verdict and proceedings supporting it. [Citation.] The trial court `should [not] disregard the verdict ... but instead ... should consider the proper weight to be accorded to the evidence and then decide whether or not, in its opinion, there is sufficient credible evidence to support the verdict.' [Citation.] [¶] A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion for a new trial, and there is a strong presumption that it properly exercised that discretion. `The determination of a motion for a new trial rests so completely within the court's discretion that its action will not be disturbed unless a manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion clearly appears.' [Citation.] ( People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 523-524 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119].) The trial court clearly did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion in the present case. It was not beyond the bounds of reason for the trial court to find credible the testimony of Deputy Lyons, establishing that the shooting started before Deputy Blair was completely outside of the patrol car and before he had drawn his gun, and that of Renele Brooks and Sara Frausto, establishing that defendant opened fire upon the deputies because he feared being apprehended and returned to prison for illegally possessing two handguns. The trial court also reasonably could accept the prosecution's interpretation of defendant's jailhouse conversation with his mother and sister, in which he never mentioned that the deputy shot first and that he returned fire only to protect his friend and himself, and in which he stated that he knew that if the deputies caught him with the two handguns he was carrying it would be all over for him. The trial court could reasonably find that the defense version of events was inherently unlikely, and the defense witnesses simply were not credible. The testimony of other witnesses to the shooting may have been contradictory, but this does not establish that the evidence pointing to defendant's guilt was insufficient. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding the evidence (1) negated defendant's claim of self-defense and (2) established that he deliberated and premeditated the murder in the moments between when he saw the police car stopping in front of Avila and when he opened fire on the deputies. The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in finding the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant committed the murder for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest. There is no requirement that defendant already must have been arrested, or even that the deputies actually had formed an intent to arrest defendant or Avila for this special circumstance to apply. (See Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1299.) The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish that defendant feared that an arrest was imminent ( People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 752 [209 Cal.Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994]), and he opened fire on the deputies for the purpose of preventing them from arresting him. (See Cummings, supra, at p. 1299 [special circumstance finding that the murder was for the purpose of preventing lawful arrest was supported by sufficient evidence, including that the defendant had stated more than once that he was not going back to jail and would shoot any police officer who stopped him].) Moreover, the evidence established that an imminent arrest was possible under the circumstances. ( People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 146 [255 Cal.Rptr. 813, 768 P.2d 32]; see also Cummings, supra, at p. 1300 [the circumstances of the case made an arrest highly likely]; People v. Vorise (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 312, 322 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 12] [observing that in the circumstances of that case, there was a direct connection between the perceived threat of imminent arrest and the murder ...].) The trial court also reasonably could have found that defendant shot at the deputies as they were exiting the patrol vehicle and therefore defendant killed Deputy Blair while he was engaged in his lawful duties. Whether the encounter actually would have progressed to a detention or arrest, and whether there would have been lawful grounds for the deputies to take such actions, is of no moment because the trial court reasonably could find that at the time defendant murdered Deputy Blair, the deputies were simply and properly beginning to investigate suspicious activity. Finally, to the extent defendant contends the trial court was required to apply a heightened standard of review to the sufficiency of the evidence because of the death sentence in this case, that contention is without merit. ( People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 161 [112 Cal.Rptr.3d 746, 235 P.3d 62] ( Letner ); People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1290, fn. 23 [96 Cal.Rptr.3d 512, 210 P.3d 1119].)
Defendant contends [t]he record supports the inference that race played an improper role in [his] case from the initial charging decision to the penalty sentencing, and therefore, he asserts, his federal constitutional rights to equal protection, due process, and a fair trial were violated. Defendant forfeited this claim by failing to raise it in the trial court. [38] In any event, there is no evidence in the record supporting a conclusion that any aspect of this case improperly was affected by racial factors. Defendant's unfocused speculation regarding possible inappropriate racial considerations in the manner in which the prosecution and trial were conducted does not establish a constitutional violation. ( People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 677 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392]; People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1218 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130].)
(43) Defendant contends he was denied a fair trial because the trial judge was biased against him, as demonstrated by various rulings during the trial proceedings, which, defendant asserts, improperly favored the prosecution and hindered the defense. This claim is forfeited because it was not raised below, and is without merit because a trial court's numerous rulings against a partyeven when erroneousdo not establish a charge of judicial bias, especially when they are subject to review. ( People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1112 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, 129 P.3d 321].)
Defendant asserts that various aspects of California death penalty law violate his constitutional rights. We previously have rejected his contentions, and discern no persuasive reason to reconsider those decisions. `[W]e reiterate that the death penalty statutes adequately narrow the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty, are not impermissibly vague or overbroad, and do not result in an arbitrary and capricious or wanton and freakish penalty determination. [We] also have held that the statutes do not require that the prosecution carry the burden of proof or persuasion at the penalty phase, that the jury make written findings or reach unanimous decisions regarding aggravating factors, or that the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the aggravating factors have been proved, (2) the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, or (3) death is the appropriate sentence. Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435, 120 S.Ct. 2348] and Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 [153 L.Ed.2d 556, 122 S.Ct. 2428] do not render the statutes invalid; neither does Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [166 L.Ed.2d 856, 127 S.Ct. 856]. [Citation.] There is no violation of the equal protection of the laws as a result of the statutes' asserted failure to provide for capital defendants some procedural guarantees afforded to noncapital defendants.' The statutes are not invalid because they permit the jury to consider in aggravation, under section 190.3, factor (b), evidence of a defendant's unadjudicated offenses. [Citation.] `The use in the statutes, and in the standard jury instructions, of terms such as extreme, substantial, reasonably believed, and at the time of the offense in setting forth the mitigating factors does not impermissibly limit the mitigation evidence or otherwise result in an arbitrary or capricious penalty determination. The statutes, as translated into those standard jury instructions, adequately and properly describe the process by which the jury is to reach its penalty determination. There is no need to instruct the jury at the penalty phase (1) regarding a burden of proof, except as to section 190.3, factors (b) and (c), or the absence of a burden of proof, (2) regarding the meaning of the term mitigation, (3) that mitigating factors can be considered only in mitigation, (4) that if the mitigating evidence outweighs the aggravating evidence, the jury must impose a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, or (5) that the jury is not required to impose the death penalty even if it finds the aggravating evidence outweighs the mitigating evidence. The trial court need not omit from the instructions any mitigating factors that appear not to apply to the defendant's case.' [Citation.] ( Letner, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 208-209.) The instructions also do not impermissibly permit the jury to consider nonstatutory aggravating factors. ( People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 993 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103] ( Weaver ).) In the absence of a request from the defendant, the trial court is not obliged to instruct the jury not to double count the same facts as circumstances of the crime and as special circumstances pursuant to section 190.3, factor (a). ( People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 769 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754].) Nor is the trial court required to instruct the jury concerning (1) which factors are aggravating and which are mitigating ( People v. Taylor (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1155, 1180 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 34 P.3d 937]), (2) the absence of a requirement that the jurors unanimously agree upon the existence of a particular mitigating factor ( Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 988), (3) the meaning of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole ( Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 187), or (4) the existence of a presumption in favor of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole ( id. at p. 199). The existence of prosecutorial discretion in deciding in which cases the death penalty should be sought does not render that punishment unconstitutional. ( Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 199.) `There is no requirement that the trial court or this court engage in intercase proportionality review when examining a death verdict. A sentence of death that comports with state and federal statutory and constitutional law does not violate international law or norms, or the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.' ( Letner, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 209.) Also without merit is defendant's assertion that supposed inadequacies in the postconviction review of death judgments in the state and federal courts render his sentence unconstitutional. ( Redd, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 758.)