Opinion ID: 2633881
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Assertedly Inadequate Investigation by the Trial Court of Conflict of Interest and Juror Misconduct

Text: Defendant contends the trial court violated its duty under Wood v. Georgia (1981) 450 U.S. 261, 272, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 to conduct an investigation into the possibility that Attorney Smith may have been laboring under a conflict of interest, before it decided to delay its inquiry into the alleged juror misconduct and to proceed with the penalty phase of the trial. We disagree. Although, with the benefit of hindsight, we have concluded above that defendant's attorneys were affected by an actual conflict of interest in the manner in which they conducted their examination of the witnesses at the hearing, we do not believe the circumstances impose[d] upon the court a duty to inquire further into the possibility of a conflict of interest. ( Wood, supra, 450 U.S. at p. 272, 101 S.Ct. 1097.) When the allegation of juror misconduct was raised, the possibility of a conflict of interest as to Smith was openly discussed by the court and counsel, with defendant present at the later discussions. Smith, in fact, eventually revealed the source of his information and explained the particular difficulties he faced, despite his earlier reluctance to do so. Moreover, there is no evidence, and not even an allegation by defendant, that any conflict had an impact on how the defense case was presented to the jury. The conflict of interest concerned only the collateral issue of whether jury misconduct had occurred, an issue the trial court thought could be adequately explored at the conclusion of the trial, at which time Smith recused himself and Humphreys took charge of the matter for the defense. It is unclear what would have been accomplished by a further inquiry by the trial court into the possibility of a conflict of interest of counsel, and we therefore conclude that no duty to inquire was breached. Defendant also contends the trial court's investigation of the possible juror misconduct was inadequate and thereby deprived him of his right to a fair and impartial jury under the federal and state Constitutions. The existing record, however, shows neither misconduct nor bias on the part of Juror T.W. (or any other juror) and, in fact, strongly contradicts any such claim. There simply is no indication that the jury was not fair and impartial. To the extent defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion concerning how it chose to determine whether Juror T.W. engaged in misconduct or was biased, we disagree. (See People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 676, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 28 P.3d 175 [specific procedures to follow in investigating an allegation of juror misconduct are generally a matter for the trial court's discretion]; see also People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 520, 224 Cal.Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251 [Failure to conduct a hearing sufficient to determine whether good cause to discharge [a] juror exists is an abuse of discretion subject to appellate review.].) The record demonstrates that the court at all times properly was concerned with avoiding the possibility that the jury foreman would be erroneously accused of misconductand the jury thereby prejudiced in some manner based upon uncertain information, and the court's cautious choice of how to avoid this consequence while still adequately addressing the allegation was within the bounds of reason. (See People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 666, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640.)