Opinion ID: 1435897
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Receipt of Compensation

Text: Strickland initially contends that D.C.Code § 36-303(a-1) is not applicable to him because he did not receive compensation under the workers' compensation law of New Jersey. [4] He asserts that he never availed himself of New Jersey law because he never filed a claim with the New Jersey Division of Workers' Compensation and was never informed that he was receiving compensation under New Jersey law. [5] Implicitly, he challenges the hearing examiner's finding that Jevic accepted Strickland's claim of a work-related injury on August 5, 1996, and voluntarily paid him workers' compensation benefits pursuant to the laws of the state of New Jersey. [6] We review a factual finding made by DOES to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support it. E.g., Sturgis v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Services, 629 A.2d 547, 551 n. 3 (D.C.1993); Dell v. Department of Employment Services, 499 A.2d 102, 106-107 (D.C.1985). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938). In this case there was substantial evidence that Strickland received workers' compensation benefits under New Jersey's workers' compensation law. Jevic's insurance manager, Kevin Long, testified that during their conversation about Strickland's work-related injury, he told Strickland that information he acquired during the conversation would be used to generate a report of the injury so that Strickland could receive workers' compensation benefits under New Jersey law. Strickland acknowledged that he received and accepted the benefits that Jevic voluntarily made, and that he did not file a claim in the District of Columbia under the WCA until after he received those benefits. Furthermore, New Jersey law permits the voluntary payment of workers' compensation benefits by employers. See N.J. REV. STAT. § 34:15-16 (1998). When such voluntary payments are made, they constitute a payment of compensation under the New Jersey statute, so long as their payment would have been mandated by the statute. Sheffield v. Schering Plough Corp., 146 N.J. 442, 454, 680 A.2d 750, 756 (1996). There is no dispute that the payments Jevic made to Strickland would have been required under the New Jersey workers' compensation statute. We conclude, therefore, in light of the evidence presented at the hearing as well as New Jersey law, that Strickland received benefits under the workers' compensation law of New Jersey.