Opinion ID: 2517596
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Motion for Change of Venue for Penalty Retrial

Text: Defendant contends the jurors who sat on the penalty phase retrial were exposed to extensive inflammatory pretrial publicity. The trial court denied defendant's request for a change of venue, concluding the publicity was unlikely to have an impact on defendant's ability to select a fair and impartial jury. Defendant contends the trial court's denial of her request violated her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial and due process of law, her Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury, and her Eighth Amendment right to a reliable, rational, and accurate determination of the appropriate punishment. We disagree. `A change of venue must be granted when the defendant shows a reasonable likelihood that in the absence of such relief, a fair trial cannot be had. Whether raised on petition for writ of mandate or on appeal from a judgment of conviction, `the reviewing court must independently examine the record and determine de novo whether a fair trial is or was obtainable.' [Citation.] The de novo standard of review applies to our consideration of the five relevant factors: (1) nature and gravity of the offense; (2) nature and extent of the media coverage; (3) size of the community; (4) community status of the defendant; and (5) prominence of the victim. [Citation.]' ( People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 447, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790 ( Panah ), quoting People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1236-1237, 283 Cal.Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163.) [17] Defendant cites numerous newspaper articles published after her arrest and during the course of her trial, following conviction, and after the first penalty phase ending in a mistrial. The news articles reported that defendant had confessed to killing the victim in order to keep from being caught for stealing items from the house and that she had been wired on drugs during the crime. In one news article, defendant was described as a drug-addicted prostitute who resided in Anaheim's Hispanic barrio, and the victim as a popular White A-student, nine years of age, who was at home wearing a pink polka dot dress and cutting out paper dolls when defendant stabbed her 57 times. Several news articles contained statements by the victim's mother indicating that she was not convinced by defendant's expression of remorse, supported imposition of the death penalty because defendant deserved to die, and hoped the second penalty phase jury was not so indecisive. As a threshold matter, defendant's claims are undermined by her failure to exercise all of her available peremptory challenges. In the absence of some explanation for counsel's failure to utilize his remaining peremptory challenges, or any objection to the jury as finally composed, we conclude that counsel's inaction signifies his recognition that the jury as selected was fair and impartial. ( People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 854, 277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906 ( Daniels ).) Defendant's claim also fails on the merits. The first factor we consider in determining whether error occurred in the trial court's denial of a motion for change of venue, the nature and gravity of the offense, might weigh in favor of granting the motion. This factor alone is not dispositive, however. ( Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 449, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790; People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 905, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103 ( Weaver ).) With regard to the second factor, the pretrial publicity in this case was neither extensive nor prejudicial. In her motion, defendant cited 20 newspaper articles concerning her case that appeared between July 1990 and April 1992. Twenty articles during a 22-month period cannot be considered extensive coverage. ( Panah, supra, at p. 448, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790 [18 articles over 12-month period not extensive].) Nor were the articles particularly prejudicial. Certain of the articles were news stories that variously reported the circumstances of defendant's arrest and the victim's death, and others reported developments as the case proceeded through the guilt phase and the first penalty trial. Although the articles recounted the disturbing circumstances of the crime and described the victim's mother's grief and desire that the defendant receive the death penalty, the coverage was not biased or inflammatory. ( Ibid. [articles describing the circumstances of the child's murder and grief of the victim's family were not biased or inflammatory].) Moreover, defendant's trial did not commence until February of 1992, more than 18 months after publication of many of the articles. Any potential prejudice arising from those articles was attenuated by the passage of time. ( Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 744, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754.) The two articles that were published, respectively, six and four weeks prior to trial, quoting the victim's mother as supporting imposition of the death penalty, were neither biased nor inflammatory. Moreover, the fact that prospective jurors may have been exposed to pretrial publicity about the case does not necessarily require a change of venue. ( Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 448, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790.) `It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.' ( Ibid., quoting Chadd, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 750, 170 Cal.Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837.) All of the jurors and alternates who had prior knowledge of the case stated they were capable of setting aside that knowledge and deciding the case based on the law and the evidence presented at trial. None of the remaining relevant factors support a change of venue in the present case. Defendant's trial was held in Orange County, which, as we previously have observed, is one of the largest counties in population not only in the State of California, but in the entire United States. ( People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 807, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436; People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 495, 268 Cal.Rptr. 126, 788 P.2d 640.) Accordingly, the size of the community does not support a change of venue. ( People v. Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434, 449, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 213, 11 P.3d 968.) Moreover, neither defendant nor the victim occupied positions of prominence and popularity. Autumn Wallace became known following her murder, but otherwise was not prominent as an individual or as a member of a well-known family. ( Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 449, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790; Daniels, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 852, 277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906.) Although the articles describe Autumn as popular and well-liked, these assessments were made by the limited audience of her grade school peers and her teachers at the school she attended. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that Linda Wallace's status as an employee of the Orange County Superior Court had any effect on members of the jury pool. ( Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 449, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790; Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 906, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103.) Although defendant urges that the pretrial publicity emphasized her status as a Hispanic, drug-addicted prostitute who had failed to integrate into Anaheim's middle class, `there was no evidence of unusual local hostility to such persons, such that a change of venue would likely produce a less biased panel. Nor was the pretrial publicity calculated to excite local prejudices in this regard.' ( Panah, supra, at p. 449, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790, quoting People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 179, 222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480; cf. People v. Williams (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1112, 1129, 259 Cal.Rptr. 473, 774 P.2d 146 [pretrial publicity focused on the defendant's race and status as an outsider to the community, in contrast with the victim's ties to the community].)