Opinion ID: 796486
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.

Text: 22 Recently, the Supreme Court had occasion to discuss the interplay between sections 107(a) and 113(f), and decided a key issue concerning the timing of a § 113(f) claim for contribution. In Cooper Industries, 543 U.S. 157, 125 S.Ct. 577, 160 L.Ed.2d 548, an owner and one time operator of several airplane maintenance sites had sold the properties to another company in the early 1980s. After operating the sites for a number of years, the buyer, Aviall Services, discovered that both it and the seller, Cooper Industries, had contaminated the facilities with hazardous substances that had leaked into the ground from storage containers. Aviall notified Texas authorities of the contamination, who in turn directed Aviall to clean up the site. Aviall then commenced cleanup and, after it had incurred some $5 million in response costs, brought an action for contribution against Cooper Industries under CERCLA § 113(f). 23 The Supreme Court held that § 113(f) did not authorize Aviall's suit for contribution. The Court began by noting that the cost recovery remedy of § 107(a) and the contribution remedy of § 113(f)(1) are clearly distinct. Id. at 163 & n. 3, 125 S.Ct. 577. The Court then examined the text of § 113(f)(1), which provides that a claim for contribution may be brought during or following any civil action under section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this title. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). As the Court emphasized, Aviall had not been the subject of any civil enforcement action, and its claim based on Section 113(f) therefore was not during or following any civil action. Id. On this basis, the Court deemed Aviall's contribution action premature. 24 Notably, the Court did not rule out the availability of a § 107(a) action, observing in dictum that § 113(f)(1) is not the exclusive cause of action for contribution available to a PRP. Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 167, 125 S.Ct. 577. The Court refused to speculate, however, on the precise nature of the alternative remedy and decided only the question of Aviall's right to a § 113(f) cause of action. 7 The limited holding of Cooper Industries is that a party first must have settled its liability with a government entity or been sued, either for costs under § 107(a) or for compliance under § 106, before it may look to other responsible parties for contribution under § 113(f)(1).