Opinion ID: 862
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Constructive Active Duty

Text: Alternatively, Barnick contends that he is entitled to active duty pay from 1998 to the present under the constructive service doctrine on the theory that he was improperly transferred to the Retired Reserve in 1998 (which he characterizes as an improper discharge), that he did not receive a proper medical evaluation in 1998 in violation of 10 U.S.C. § 1214, and that he still has not received a proper evaluation for disability retirement. Until that happens, he claims that he must be retained on active duty. The government agrees that the NLOD determination was erroneous. We may also assume, as Barnick alleges, that he was denied a full and fair hearing as to his medical condition in 1998 for disability retirement purposes, and that he was improperly forced to transfer to the Retired Reserve. Barnick argues that cases applying the constructive service doctrine have held that where a service member is improperly discharged, he is entitled to receive active duty pay for the period from the improper discharge until the end of his original term of enlistment or he is discharged in the normal course following the correction of the improper discharge. Thus, Barnick claims that the Board and the trial court erred in failing to apply the constructive service doctrine to extend his term of service beyond January 25, 1998. In general, a reservist is entitled to active duty pay only for the period that he is actually on active duty. Palmer v. United States, 168 F.3d 1310, 1314 (Fed.Cir. 1999). The Court of Federal Claims upheld the AFBCMR's decision to deny Barnick's request to be placed on constructive active duty status retroactive to January 1998, finding no legal basis for placing... Barnick on active duty pending the resolution of either the LOD determination or the disability determination. Barnick, 80 Fed.Cl. at 557. Under the constructive service doctrine, military personnel who have been illegally or improperly separated from service are deemed to have continued in active service until their legal separation. Christian v. United States, 337 F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed.Cir.2003). [T]he constructive service doctrine is a `legal fiction': `as appellants have never been lawfully terminated from active duty, they are deemed to have served during the time of their illegal release.' Id. (quoting Dilley v. Alexander, 627 F.2d 407, 413 (D.C.Cir.1980)). The basic premise of the constructive service doctrine is to return successful plaintiffs to the position that they would have occupied `but for' their illegal release from duty. Dilley, 627 F.2d at 413. Barnick's circumstances do not warrant the application of the constructive service doctrine. Barnick was a reservist who had only been on temporary active duty assignments never longer than thirty days, and he was on inactive status at the time of the improper action. Even if Barnick's injury had been properly classified ILOD, he would still have been medically evaluated, found unfit for duty due to physical disability, and either retired or discharged. The cases do not support treating a service member as being on constructive active duty in such circumstances. In each case applying the constructive service doctrine cited by Barnick, the plaintiff was on extended active duty and able to continue on active duty when the improper action leading to his separation from the service occurred. See, e.g., Christian, 337 F.3d 1338 at 1341; Groves v. United States, 47 F.3d 1140, 1142 (Fed. Cir.1995); Bray v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 60, 515 F.2d 1383, 1385 (1975); Clackum v. United States, 148 Ct.Cl. 404, 296 F.2d 226, 226 (1960); Egan v. United States, 141 Ct.Cl. 1, 158 F.Supp. 377, 379-80 (1958). As such, absent the improper action or discharge, the service member would have remained in the military on active duty. None of the constructive service doctrine cases involved a plaintiff who claimed that he should have been retained on active duty merely for disability evaluation, and we agree that those cases are inapplicable to such a situation. [6] Here, there is no evidence that Barnick would have been able to continue on active duty in 1998, nor is there any evidence that Barnick even asserted his ability to do so at the time. Indeed, Barnick's first application to the AFBCMR admitted that he was no longer fit for service: [T]he Air Force failed to evaluate Petitioner for disability retirement ... even though he met its requirements. J.A. 138. Thus, if improperly denied disability payments in 1998, Barnick should be entitled only to receive the disability payments due to be paid on that date. We have repeatedly recognized that this remedy is appropriate where disability payments have been improperly denied. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1177-84 (Fed.Cir. 2005) (recognizing that courts can review a former serviceperson's claim for disability pay at the time of release); McHenry v. United States, 367 F.3d 1370 (Fed.Cir. 2004) (reviewing a Marine officer's challenge to his disability rating at the time of retirement); Jordan v. United States, 205 Ct.Cl. 65 (1974) (reversing the Army's refusal to grant disability pay at the time of discharge); Ward v. United States, 178 Ct.Cl. 210 (1967) (awarding Naval officer disability retirement pay retroactive to his release from active duty). The Board is competent to make such a retroactive disability determination. Sawyer v. United States, 930 F.2d 1577, 1581 (Fed.Cir.1991). Here, the Board awarded Barnick disability severance retroactive to 1998, so he has already received all the relief to which he was entitled as the result of the alleged illegal discharge. By resetting Barnick's discharge date to January 25, 1998, the Board was in fact adhering to the same policy underlying the constructive service doctrine: to place Barnick in the position he would have occupied absent the improper action-the NLOD finding. See Roth v. United States, 378 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed.Cir.2004) (The Secretary is obligated not only to properly determine the nature of any error or injustice, but also to take `such corrective action as will appropriately and fully erase such error or compensate such injustice.') (quoting Caddington v. United States, 147 Ct.Cl. 629, 178 F.Supp. 604, 606 (1959)). As our predecessor court recognized, the discretionary power granted to the Correction Boards by [10 U.S.C. § 1552] includes the power to backdate discharges where such backdating places the claimant where he likely would have been absent the improper discharge. Denton v. United States, 204 Ct.Cl. 188, 200 (1974); see also O'Callahan v. United States, 196 Ct.Cl. 556, 451 F.2d 1390, 1391-93 (1971); Kimmel v. United States, 196 Ct.Cl. 579, 588-91 (1971). Thus, it was appropriate for the Board to order Barnick's discharge date to be changed retroactively to January 25, 1998, as Barnick would still have been discharged at that time for physical disability even if his injury had been properly found ILOD. The Board merely proceeded in such a manner as to best approximate, in its judgment, what would have occurred in 1998 but for the improper NLOD finding. The Court of Federal Claims did not err in finding that the AFBCMR's decision not to award Barnick constructive active duty pay was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.