Opinion ID: 203695
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Evidence of Alienage

Text: Nadal-Ginard's alternative argument attacks the documents the BIA relied upon in reaching its alienage conclusion, specifically, his passport, greencard, and customs declaration. In particular, he argues that the photocopies of his passport and his customs declaration card were not translated into English, and that the photocopies of his passport and greencard are largely illegible. These arguments are unpersuasive. The greencard, combined with Nadal-Ginard's prior convictions, provided compelling evidence supporting the DHS's decision to inspect him as an alien for purposes of admissibility. This is especially so given that the record contains no other claim of citizenship. While it is true that the BIA did not explicitly rely on the greencard as evidence of alienage in its decision, [t]he law is pellucid that `each piece of evidence need not be discussed in a decision,' Pulisir, 524 F.3d at 310 ( quoting Morales v. INS, 208 F.3d 323, 328 (1st Cir.2000)), and the BIA's opinion is clear in recognizing his status as a lawful permanent resident, evidence of which was his greencard. Additionally, the passport, which Nadal-Ginard acknowledges to be foreign and which was explicitly mentioned in the BIA's decision, provided further evidence of Nadal-Ginard's alienage. It is true that foreign language documents are normally required to be accompanied by an English translation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.33, and that illegible documents are often useless. In this case, however, the fact that the relevant evidence was not translated or entirely legible did not preclude it from the IJ's or BIA's consideration under the circumstances. The evidentiary significance of each document was facially apparent to the adjudicators, and there was no question as to the authenticity of the documents: the greencard bore Nadal-Ginard's name and photograph, and there was no direct evidence offered to show that his status had changed; similarly, the passport bore Nadal-Ginard's name and photograph, and was clearly and admittedly not issued by the United States. See United States v. Diaz, 519 F.3d 56, 64 (1st Cir.2008) (no plain error in a criminal case where untranslated foreign language documents, including a passport, were admitted under the Federal Rules of Evidence because the evidentiary significance was facially apparent); Toure v. Ashcroft, 400 F.3d 44, 48 (1st Cir.2005) ([T]he Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in INS proceedings, rather, `the less rigid constraints of due process impose outer limits based on considerations of fairness and reliability.') ( quoting Yongo v. INS, 355 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir.2004)). The BIA therefore did not err in considering the government's evidence of alienage. [4] As to the sufficiency of that evidence, although the government has not explicitly argued the point, we are doubtful of our jurisdiction to consider the evidence of alienage in this case, as Nadal-Ginard's prior convictions appear to bring him within the ambit of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). In any event, we note that at no point did Nadal-Ginard offer the IJ or BIA any evidence capable of casting a reasonable doubt upon the examining officer's decision to inspect him as an alien, or upon the government's evidence. Moreover, evidence Nadal-Ginard adduced during his administrative hearings tended to support the examining officer's actions and the government's evidence of alienage. Specifically, his marriage license lists his place of birth as Arta, Spain, and we have held that an individual born abroad is presumed to be an alien and bears the burden of rebutting that presumption by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Leal Santos v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.2008). The record offers no support for the conclusion that Nadal-Ginard carried that burden. [5] We therefore have no basis to upset the BIA's factual finding that Nadal-Ginard was an alien for purposes of his removal hearings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary).