Opinion ID: 782965
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Akers's tort-of-outrage claim against Alvey

Text: 18 The district court dismissed Akers's tort-of-outrage claim against Alvey, concluding that [w]hile Alvey's conduct and that attributable to the Cabinet might be considered crude and completely inappropriate, it does not rise to a level of conduct which is `atrocious and intolerable' as required by Kentucky law. Under Kentucky law, [i]n order to recover [for the tort of outrage], the plaintiff must show that defendant's conduct was intentional or reckless, that the conduct was so outrageous and intolerable so as to offend generally accepted standards of morality and decency, that a causal connection exists between the conduct complained of and the distress suffered, and that the resulting emotional stress was severe. Brewer v. Hillard, 15 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Ky.Ct. App.1999). 19 There is no question in this case that Alvey's behavior was intentional, and thus the first element of the tort of outrage is satisfied. Akers maintains that the district court erred in holding that Alvey's conduct did not reach the level of outrageousness required by the second element. In assessing this element, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Akers and determine whether this case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, `Outrageous!' Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d (1965) (applied by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Brewer, 15 S.W.3d at 6). In our opinion, this is just such a case. 20 Alvey's behavior went far beyond the sexual jokes, comments, and innuendos that this court has previously found insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment on a tort-of-outrage claim. Wathen v. General Electric Co., 115 F.3d 400, 407 (6th Cir.1997) (applying Kentucky law). Any one of the particular incidents complained of, taken in isolation, might not reach the level of outrageousness required by Kentucky law to survive summary judgment. But taken together, Alvey's pervasive behavior, as alleged by Akers, was outrageous. At the very least, this is a case where reasonable men may differ and, as such, it is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. h (1965) (§ 46 was adopted by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Craft v. Rice, 671 S.W.2d 247, 251 (Ky.1984)). 21 Alvey argues, as his last line of defense on this claim, that the distress suffered by Akers, if any, was not caused by Alvey's behavior and was not severe. In both her verified complaint and her deposition testimony, however, Akers maintains that she suffered severe emotional distress as a result of Alvey's outrageous conduct. Akers specifically testified that she experienced depression and sought psychological counseling shortly after leaving her job with the Cabinet. Although the evidence of emotional distress may be sparse, we believe that it is sufficient to send the issues of causation and severity to the jury. 22 In sum, we find that Akers has satisfied all of the elements of her tort-of-outrage claim against Alvey as set forth in Brewer, 15 S.W.3d at 6. We therefore reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment on this claim. 23