Opinion ID: 4565900
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: C. Special Condition Three

Text: Thomas next contests Special Condition Three, which requires him to submit to a psychosexual evaluation, on the grounds that his instant conviction did not involve sexual acts and that his prior conviction for sexual abuse is too remote to justify the condition. We disagree. Sentencing courts in appropriate cases have broad discretion to impose special release conditions related to the defendant’s sexual behavior even when the instant conviction does not involve a sexual offense. See Dupes, 513 F.3d at 343–44 (upholding conditions requiring the defendant to, inter alia, attend sex offender treatment where his instant conviction was for securities fraud). Here, as part of its discussion of the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court recounted Thomas’s criminal history, which includes criminal possession of stolen property, attempted robbery and robbery, resisting arrest, narcotics offenses, and assault, and noted that in 1983 when Thomas was 17 years old, he was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse in violation of New York Penal Law § 130.65 in connection with his abuse of a mentally challenged 15-year-old girl. The court acknowledged Thomas’s arguments that the current conviction did not involve a sexual offense and that Thomas’s conviction for sexual abuse was remote in time, but stated that Thomas’s history of sexual abuse and overall characteristics justified a condition requiring him to be evaluated. J.A. at 189–90. The court also noted that Thomas’s prior sentence in state court had required him to attend treatment when he was released in 2014, but that the length of the intake process prevented Thomas from receiving treatment. Id. at 190. The court stated that now that there is sufficient time to complete an evaluation, Thomas should be subject to the condition. Id. 5 We discern no abuse of discretion in this determination. Although Thomas points to cases from our sister circuits disfavoring reliance on distant-in-time convictions to support special conditions of supervised release in some circumstances, see, e.g., United States v. T.M., 330 F.3d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 2003), we have not taken this approach, but have approved the consideration of even distant convictions in appropriate cases, see, e.g., Dupes, 513 F.3d at 343–44 (affirming imposition sex offender conditions of supervised release eight years after defendant’s offense); see also United States v. Fields, 777 F.3d 799, 803 (5th Cir. 2015) (upholding a condition of supervised release prohibiting the defendant from “going to places where a minor or minors are known to frequent without prior approval” where the defendant’s last sexual offense occurred twenty-five years before). Further, the instant condition merely requires Thomas to submit to an evaluation and does not necessarily require any further deprivation of Thomas’s liberty after the evaluation is complete, unlike treatment conditions that we have upheld in the past. See, e.g., United States v. Genovese, 311 F. App’x 465, 466–67 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order) (approving of a condition of supervised release which required participation in sex offender treatment programs where the defendant’s conviction occurred twelve years previously). Given Thomas’s criminal history and the serious conduct involved in his conviction for sexual abuse in particular, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the special condition was appropriate.