Opinion ID: 172888
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: s ummary j udgment

Text: In dismissing Mr. Jones’s lawsuit, the district court cited Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), but relied on evidence outside the complaint—evidence that was presented in the government’s motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. In general, “if a party submits, and the district court considers, materials outside the pleadings,” the matter must be resolved under summary-judgment principles, rather than under Rule 12. Prager v. LaFaver, 180 F.3d 1185, 1188 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). -5- Nevertheless, if a party is not prejudiced by the district court’s failure to apply the correct legal standard, “the court of appeals should proceed with the appeal, relying upon summary judgment standards, without remanding.” Burnham v. Humphrey Hospitality Reit Trust, Inc., 403 F.3d 709, 713 (10th Cir. 2005). Because the government’s motion clearly indicated that it sought summary judgment as an alternative to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, and because Mr. Jones responded with his own motion for summary judgment, we conclude that Mr. Jones was not prejudiced by the district court’s failure to apply the correct legal standard. Accordingly, we review the district court’s order as one granting summary judgment. Our review of a summary-judgment order is de novo. Byers v. City of Albuquerque, 150 F.3d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We view the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Byers, 150 F.3d at 1274.
Under the FTCA, the United States is liable for an employee’s negligence “under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission -6- occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). Thus, “[t]o determine the liability of the federal government under the FTCA, it is necessary to apply the law of the place where the alleged negligence occurred.” Ewell v. United States, 776 F.2d 246, 248 (10th Cir. 1985). But under 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a)(2), the Federal Bureau of Prisons has an independent duty to “provide for the safekeeping, care, and subsistence” of persons in its custody. Courts have described the duty as requiring the government to exercise “ordinary diligence to keep prisoners safe and free from harm.” See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 534 F.2d 53, 54 (5th Cir. 1976); cf. Parrott v. United States, 536 F.3d 629, 637 (7th Cir. 2008) (describing § 4042’s reach in terms of reasonable care). And the Supreme Court has stated in an FTCA case that § 4042 supercedes “inconsistent state rule[s].” United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 164-165 (1963). In giving § 4042 primacy, the Supreme Court “avoided making an important part of a federal prisoner’s legal rights depend upon the extraneous criteria which send him to federal prison in one state rather than another.” The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 134, 135 (1963). But in doing so, it created a potential for conflict in FTCA cases brought by federal prisoners when state tort law provides a duty of care that is inconsistent with § 4042. The instant case demonstrates such a conflict in regard to Mr. Jones’s allegation that the prison maintained the basketball court in an unsafe condition. Under the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA), which governs negligence claims -7- brought against correctional facilities, see Cupples v. State, 861 P.2d 1360, 1367-72 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993), “any claim for injuries resulting from the use of any public property . . . for recreational purposes” requires a showing of “gross and wanton negligence.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-6104(o). 3 This is a lower standard of care than § 4042’s ordinary negligence standard. The Fifth Circuit, when confronted with a similar conflict in the standards of care prescribed by state law and § 4042, has avoided resolving the conflict where “the same result would be reached under [State law] or § 4042’s higher ordinary-care standard.” Massay v. Federal Correctional Institution, 243 F. App’x 871, 873 (5th Cir. 2007) (unpublished). We can do the same in this case. Accordingly, we will apply Kansas’s ordinary negligence standard of care, which is identical to the standard prescribed by § 4042. In general, a landowner must exercise reasonable care to keep the property safe for those lawfully present. See Herrell v. Nat’l Beef Packing Co., 202 P.3d 691, 696 (Kan. App. 2009). And when a plaintiff alleges injury from a dangerous condition on the property, the plaintiff “must show that the defendant had actual 3 The district court relied on the Kansas Recreational Use Statute (KRUS), which makes a landowner liable when a member of the public is engaged in a free recreational activity and is injured due to the landowner’s “willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 58-3206 (2005). We question how the KRUS would apply in the prison setting, given that the KRUS governs property made “available to the public for recreational purposes.” Id. § 58-3203 (2005) (emphasis added). It would not appear that a prison’s basketball court is available for use by the public. -8- knowledge of the condition or that the condition had existed for such a length of time that in the exercise of ordinary care the landowner should have known about it.” D.W. v. Bliss, 112 P.3d 232, 241 (Kan. 2005) (quotation omitted). Here, the government submitted affidavits from Leavenworth’s safety manager and recreation supervisor detailing the regular inspection routine for the basketball court and the condition of the basketball court. According to those officials, they had not been notified of a “fissure” or other hazard on the basketball court and their regular inspections did not reveal any hazard around the time of Mr. Jones’s injury. Moreover, Mr. Jones’s medical grievance submitted shortly after the injury states that he was hurt when he landed on another inmate’s leg, rather than by any condition of the basketball court. Thus, summary judgment in the government’s favor was appropriate as to Mr. Jones’s negligence claim. Mr. Jones’s medical malpractice claim is equally flawed. “In order to prevail in a medical malpractice action in Kansas, a plaintiff must prove the following three elements: (1) that a duty was owed by the physician to the patient; (2) that the duty was breached; and (3) that a causal connection existed between the breached duty and the injury sustained by the patient.” Heany v. Nibbelink, 932 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Kan. App. 1997) (quotation omitted). While § 4042 supplies the prison’s duty to provide reasonable medical care to Mr. Jones, see Barron v. Keohane, 216 F.3d 692, 693 (8th Cir. 2000), he has provided nothing establishing that medical personnel breached acceptable medical -9- standards in caring for his injury and that such a breach caused the harm he alleges. A breach of the standard of care “is never presumed, and may not be inferred merely from a lack of success or an adverse result from treatment.” Hare v. Wendler, 949 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Kan. 1997) (quotation omitted). Further, expert testimony is ordinarily required to show that a medical provider failed to conform to the applicable standard of care and caused the plaintiff harm. Id. The evidence in the record indicates that Mr. Jones received ample and prompt pre-operative and post-operative care. Further, it appears that his ankle surgery was successful and that his ankle is “solid” enough that he has resumed playing basketball. ROA, Vol. 1, Part 2, Doc. 28-2 at 23. And to the extent his malpractice claim targets independent medical contractors, like the orthopedic surgeon who operated on his ankle, the FTCA is inapplicable. See Tsosie v. United States, 452 F.3d 1161, 1163-64 (10th Cir. 2006). Thus, summary judgment in the government’s favor was appropriate on Mr. Jones’s medical malpractice claim.