Opinion ID: 662498
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sandra Colello

Text: 13 We find no merit in Mrs. Colello's contention that her pre-Guidelines sentence of six months incarceration and six months work release is excessive. Although Mrs. Colello suggests that the sentence was so disproportionate to her culpability as to violate the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment, the sentence was well short of the maximum term of ten years (five on each of the two counts to which she pled guilty), and in that context our review is limited to determining whether the district court abused its discretion by relying on improper criteria or unreliable information or failed to exercise its discretion at all. United States v. Simpson, 8 F.3d 546, 550 (7th Cir.1993); United States v. Vasquez, 966 F.2d 254, 261 (7th Cir.1992); United States v. Ramusack, 928 F.2d 780, 783 (7th Cir.1991); United States v. Nesbitt, 852 F.2d 1502, 1521-22 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1015, 109 S.Ct. 808, 102 L.Ed.2d 798 (1989). As we observed in United States v. Nowicki, [i]f the sentencing judge gives thoughtful consideration to the sentence she imposes, this court will not disturb the imposition of disparate sentences on co-defendants. 870 F.2d 405, 409 (7th Cir.1989) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 14 Our review of the sentencing transcript satisfies us that the district judge exercised his discretion appropriately in sentencing Mrs. Colello. Other defendants, it is true, received sentences that were more lenient than hers. But disparity among co-defendants per se is not sufficient to demonstrate an abuse of discretion, e.g., United States v. Threw, 861 F.2d 1046, 1049 (7th Cir.1988); rather, consideration[ ] of the extent and nature of a defendant's role in a scheme is a sound basis for disparate sentences among co-defendants, United States v. Neyens, 831 F.2d 156, 159 (7th Cir.1987). Sandra Colello participated directly in a number of incidents--staging a car fire, submitting false claims for water damage and theft, scripting a fictional slip-and-fall injury in her beauty salon, and arranging to have a car driven into her backyard swimming pool. She admitted her role in many of these incidents before the grand jury. Colello Tr. 26-28; see also J. Bascom Tr. 51, D. Bilski Tr. 7. She also acknowledged preparing a variety of false documents to support the insurance claims, including fire and police reports, automobile rental bills, wage loss verification forms, and tax forms. Colello Tr. 22-28; see also W. Bascom Tr. 14, Jedrzejas Tr. 7. She even helped her husband prepare the script for Charles Jedrzejas to use in misleading the authorities. Colello Tr. 29-31. If these activities were not enough to distinguish Mrs. Colello's culpability from other participants in the scheme, the profits she enjoyed together with her husband were. As she acknowledged before the grand jury: 15 I was responsible for paying the bills and keeping track of our checking account. The checks that my husband and I received from insurance companies were generally deposited into our joint checking account. We did not keep the insurance proceeds separate from our other money. We used the money to pay bills and to purchase various things, and to run our household. 16 Id. at 28. 6 Under these circumstances, the relatively modest sentence that the district court imposed on Mrs. Colello was amply justified and certainly consonant with the Eighth Amendment.