Opinion ID: 1280915
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: ms lattimore

Text: Ms. Lattimore initially stated that she did not think that she could vote for a life sentence with the possibility of parole once the defendant had been convicted and there was a finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance. However, she later qualified her response, stating that she was unsure as to how she would vote in that situation and would have to consider all of the evidence. Ms. Lattimore also stated that she could not say she would always vote for the death penalty. It is not decisive that some of Ms. Lattimore's responses, if considered in isolation, could be construed as disqualifying. Ms. Lattimore's voir dire also contains qualifying responses and the trial court, having heard all of Ms. Lattimore's responses, concluded that she was qualified. This is in contrast to the prospective juror in Pope, who categorically and unequivocally stated that mitigating evidence would not change his mind. Although Ms. Lattimore may personally have favored the death penalty for murder, she repeatedly responded that there could be situations in which she would vote for another sentence. Based upon a review of all of Ms. Lattimore's voir dire, we find that it supports the trial court's determination that she was qualified to serve. 7. Bishop urges that he should have been allowed to ask prospective jurors whether they would be more likely to vote for death if the defendant was under the influence of drugs at the time of the crimes. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Bishop to ask this question, as it called for a prejudgment of the sentence. See Hittson v. State, 264 Ga. 682, 686(6)(d), 449 S.E.2d 586 (1994); Lee v. State, 258 Ga. 762, 763(5), 374 S.E.2d 199 (1988). The trial court did not prohibit Bishop from engaging in relevant voir dire, such as by asking the prospective jurors whether they would consider drug use a mitigating factor. See Lee v. State, supra at 763(5), 374 S.E.2d 199. Bishop further contends that the trial court erred by preventing him from exploring the prospective jurors' attitudes with regard to the various forms of murder, such as premeditated murder. However, there is no such offense in Georgia and, therefore, it was not improper to curtail questioning in that regard. Ledford v. State, supra at 63(5), 439 S.E.2d 917. 8. The trial court's pre-voir dire charge included an instruction on the sentence of life without parole, which informed the prospective jurors, in accordance with OCGA § 17-10-31.1(d)(1), that such a sentence would result in incarceration for the remainder of the defendant's natural life and his ineligibility for parole, unless he is subsequently adjudicated to be innocent of the offense for which he was sentenced. Bishop urges that the inclusion of this qualifying phrase may have misled the prospective jurors into believing that there was a potential loophole in the life-without-parole sentence and that this may then have caused them to reject imposition of that sentence. The qualifying phrase is a part of the statutory language applicable to a life-without-parole sentence, and this Court recently held that such an instruction is not misleading. Henry v. State, 265 Ga. 732, 741(10)(c), 462 S.E.2d 737 (1995). 9. Prospective jurors who arrived late were allowed to read the trial court's pre-voir dire charge and, on appeal, Bishop contends that this was error. Whether to give pre-voir dire instructions is within the discretion of the trial court. Frazier v. State, 257 Ga. 690, 695(10), 362 S.E.2d 351 (1987). If, however, the trial court determines to give a pre-voir dire charge, the better practice certainly is to do so in accordance with the established procedure and formality applicable to the giving of the jury charge at the conclusion of the guilt-innocence phase. Therefore, we do not approve of the trial court's inconsistent treatment of its pre-voir dire charge in this case by permitting some of the prospective jurors merely to read its charge. However, Bishop has shown no prejudice resulting from the trial court's actions. Whether they heard or read the trial court's pre-voir dire charge, the prospective jurors thereafter were subjected to a thorough and extensive voir dire to determine their qualifications to serve as jurors. At the guilt-innocence and sentencing phases of the trial, the trial court followed proper procedure and gave oral instructions to the entire jury. Accordingly, there is no reasonable probability that the procedure utilized by the trial court in the delivery of its pre-voir dire charge resulted in any harm to Bishop. See generally Griffin v. State, 265 Ga. 552, 554(6), 458 S.E.2d 813 (1995).