Opinion ID: 2831298
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Attorney’s Fees and Mental Anguish Damages

Text: We turn next to Morton’s issue concerning the awards of attorney’s fees and mental anguish damages. Morton argues that the Nguyens are not entitled to either attorney’s fees or mental anguish damages because no claims supporting the awards survived the court of appeals’ judgment. We agree. The trial court found that Morton’s conduct violated various sections of Subchapter D and constituted statutory fraud in a real estate context. The trial court then utilized those findings to afford the Nguyens the maximum recovery by rendering judgment on the Subchapter D violations and Finance Code violations, which included an award of $67,020 in attorney’s fees. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the only two causes of action that supported an award of attorney’s fees—the claim for liquidated damages under section 5.077 of the Property Code and the Finance Code claims. See 369 S.W.3d at 669, 676. Because no remaining cause of action supports an award of attorney’s fees, the court of appeals should have also reversed the award of attorney’s fees predicated on the section 5.077 claim and the Finance Code claims. Cf. Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 441 (Tex. 1995) (reversing an award of attorney’s fees when the only cause of action that supported the award was reversed on appeal). To the extent that the Nguyens prevailed on their section 5.077 claim on remand or elected to recover under their alternative statutory fraud theory, the trial court could award attorney’s fees based on either of those causes of action. See TEX . PROP . CODE § 5.077(c) (providing for reasonable attorney’s fees); see also TEX . BUS. & COM . CODE § 27.01(e) (providing for reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees for claims of statutory fraud in 10 real estate transactions); Boyce Iron Works v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 747 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tex. 1988) (holding that a “[prevailing] party may seek recovery under an alternative theory if the judgment is reversed on appeal”). For similar reasons, we conclude that the court of appeals should have also reversed the award for mental anguish damages when it reversed the trial court’s judgment for damages under the Finance Code. Cf. Parkway, 901 S.W.2d at 441. The Nguyens’ pleadings demonstrate that they sought mental anguish damages only for the Finance Code violations and DTPA claims. The trial court did not find that Morton violated the DTPA, and the court of appeals reversed the award for damages under the Finance Code. See 369 S.W.3d at 676. Accordingly, no cause of action supports an award of mental anguish damages. Because the Nguyens’ pleadings do not support an award for mental anguish damages under any other claim, the court of appeals should have also reversed the award in conjunction with reversal of the Finance Code claim.3 See TEX . R. CIV . P. 301 (providing that a “judgment of the court shall conform to the pleadings”).