Opinion ID: 1657103
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: The district court convicted Carter of possessing cocaine with the intent to deliver in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)( c )(3). This provision provides in relevant part that it is unlawful for any person to ... possess with the intent to... deliver, a controlled substance. Iowa Code § 124.401(1). The only issue here is whether Carter possessed the controlled substance. To prove unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must prove that the defendant (1) exercised dominion and control [i.e., possession] over the contraband, (2) had knowledge of its presence, and (3) had knowledge that the material was a controlled substance. Proof of opportunity of access to the place where contraband is found will not, without more, support a finding of unlawful possession. State v. Bash, 670 N.W.2d 135, 137 (Iowa 2003) (citation omitted). Possession can be either actual or constructive. Actual possession occurs when the controlled substance is found on the defendant's person. Constructive possession occurs when the defendant has knowledge of the presence of the controlled substance and has the authority or right to maintain control of it. Id. at 138 (citations omitted). Contrary to the State's contention, we find that Carter did not have actual possession of the controlled substance because it was not found on his person. What remains then is whether Carter had constructive possession. The State is aided in its burden to prove constructive possession by recognized inferences: possession may be imputed when the [controlled substance] is found in a place which is immediately and exclusively accessible to the accused and subject to his dominion and control, or to the joint dominion and control of the accused and another. State v. Reeves, 209 N.W.2d 18, 22 (Iowa 1973). This inference is not available here because Carter did not have exclusive access to the place where drugs were found; the passenger in his car also had access to the console where the drugs were discovered. Reeves also recognized an inference arising from the exclusive possession of the premises where contraband is found: If the premises on which such substances are found are in the exclusive possession of the accused, knowledge of their presence on such premises coupled with his ability to maintain control over such substances may be inferred.... But where the accused has not been in exclusive possession of the premises but only in joint possession, knowledge of the presence of the substances on the premises and the ability to maintain control over them by the accused will not be inferred but must be established by proof. Id. at 23 (emphasis added). Because Carter and his passenger were in joint possession of the vehicle in which the drugs were located, the inference of possession arising from exclusive possession of premises cannot assist the State in this case. Thus, Carter's constructive possession of the cocaine found in his vehicle must be supported by other facts and circumstances shown by the record. When the accused has not been in exclusive possession of the premises, several factors are considered in determining whether the accused had constructive possession of the controlled substance. Such factors include: (1) incriminating statements made by the accused, (2) incriminating actions of the accused upon the police's discovery of a controlled substance among or near the accused's personal belongings, (3) the accused's fingerprints on the packages containing the controlled substance, and (4) any other circumstances linking the accused to the controlled substance. State v. Webb, 648 N.W.2d 72, 79 (Iowa 2002). When the premises involve a motor vehicle, a court may consider these additional factors: (1) was the contraband in plain view, (2) was it with the accused's personal effects, (3) was it found on the same side of the car seat as the accused or immediately next to him, (4) was the accused the owner of the vehicle, and (5) was there suspicious activity by the accused. State v. Kemp, 688 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Iowa 2004) (citing State v. Atkinson, 620 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 2000)). We have pointed out that all of these factors are only a guide in determining whether the State has established constructive possession. Id. And [e]ven if some of these facts are present, we are still required to determine whether all of the facts and circumstances ... allow a reasonable inference that the defendant knew of the [controlled substance's] presence and had control and dominion over [it]. Id. (ellipsis in original) (citation omitted); see also Reeves, 209 N.W.2d at 22 (Knowledge of the narcotic character ... of the drug, as well as of their presence ... may be shown by the conduct, behavior and declarations of the accused.). Constructive possession cannot rest on mere proximity to the controlled substance. State v. Cashen, 666 N.W.2d 566, 572 (Iowa 2003); see also Atkinson, 620 N.W.2d at 3, 4. Moreover, furtive movements alone cannot support a finding of constructive possession. Atkinson, 620 N.W.2d at 4. In addition, the right to maintain control is something more than the raw physical ability to exercise control over the controlled substance. Bash, 670 N.W.2d at 139. Rather, the accused must have some proprietary interest or an immediate right to control or reduce the controlled substance to the [accused's] possession. Id. Carter correctly points out that the controlled substance itself was not in plain view, the controlled substance was found in the center console underneath an ashtray which did not contain any of Carter's personal effects, and the center console was close and equally accessible to the driver and the passenger. Moreover, although Carter was driving the Blazer, he was not the owner, and he denied knowledge of the controlled substance. Nor was there any evidence of fingerprints on the package, or that Carter was under the influence of a controlled substance, or that he had any drug paraphernalia on his person. On the other hand, Carter engaged in suspicious activity before and after the stop. When Wissink signaled for him to stop, Carter did not do so immediately. In fact, he turned onto another street, began rummaging to the right of him, veered across three lanes of traffic while his head was down, and struck the curb while his attention was focused on the console area rather than driving. When the Blazer came to a stop, Carter quickly exited the vehicle, left the driver's door open, and appeared nervous. Wissink thought he would have to chase Carter on foot. In the almost six years, Wissink has worked in this particular neighborhood, he has made many narcotics arrests out of cars. When asked for identification, Carter did not give his true name. When asked why the collision with the curb occurred, Carter said the Blazer stalled. Yet when Wissink approached the Blazer, the engine was still running. The controlled substances were found on the driver's side of the console; they were within close reach of Carter while he was operating the Blazer. Although the controlled substances were not in plain view, their containera baggiewas. Baggies are known for their use in the drug trade, and Wissink has seen baggies used for holding narcotics. The baggie was in a location where one would not ordinarily leave a plastic baggieunderneath an ashtray. The place where the controlled substances were found is the same place toward which Carter was rummaging while the police were attempting to stop the vehicle. Neither officer saw the passenger making any furtive movements. Following the stop, the passenger denied the controlled substances were his and cooperated with the police. Cf. State v. Henderson, 696 N.W.2d 5, 9 (Iowa 2005) (drugs were found on premises occupied by the defendant and her guest; defendant was belligerent towards police whereas guest was cooperative, acted like she had nothing to hide, and denied the drugs were hers; such disparate reactions supported permissible inference that the drugs belonged to the defendant). Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we think the district court could reasonably infer that Carter was exhibiting a proprietary interest in the controlled substances by desperately trying to hide them while the police were pursuing him, resulting in his losing control of the Blazer. Moreover, Carter's furtive movements in contrast to the passenger's lack of such movements would further support such an inference. Wissink's explanation of what happened is a reasonable one: I believe he was placing narcotics under the ashtray trying to conceal them. And when the vehicle struck the curb, he didn't have enough time to stick the baggie down in there, leaving the two inches out of it. That's why he exited the vehicle. If he had the opportunity, he would have run off with it. All in all, we think this evidence was sufficient for the district court to reasonably infer that Carter knew of the controlled substances' presence and exercised control and dominion over them. Because Carter does not contend there was insufficient evidence on intent to deliver, that issue is conceded. We would, however, note that there was ample record evidence on this element. In short, there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction.