Opinion ID: 773475
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Existence of a Contract and FMLA Benefits

Text: 13 Because Pearle employed less than 50 employees within 75 miles of the store at which Dr. Thomas worked, she would not be an eligible employee as defined by the FMLA. See 29 U.S.C. sec. 2611(2)(B). Thus, Dr. Thomas's claim arises not under the FMLA, but under the language of her contract. Dr. Thomas contends that the 1997 SPD that Pearle distributed to all of its employees, and language therein created an enforceable contract granting her rights under the FMLA. Under Illinois law, employee manuals can create enforceable contracts if the traditional elements of contract formation are present. See Duldulao, 505 N.E.2d at 318; Perma v. Arcventures, Inc., 554 N.E.2d 982, 987 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). 14 To support her contention that Pearle made an express promise to grant her benefits under the FMLA, Dr. Thomas points to a passage in the 1997 SPD that reads: 15 If you have worked for Pearle for at least one year, and have worked 1,250 hours or more during the 12 month period prior to requesting leave, you are eligible for Family and Medical Leave. 16 Dr. Thomas argues that this language, repeated elsewhere in the 1997 SPD, serves to waive the jurisdictional threshold mandating a minimum number of employees be employed within a certain radius for an employee to be eligible for the FMLA. In essence, Dr. Thomas contends that this language expressly incorporates the FMLA, in its entirety, into her contract. 17 Pearle contends on appeal, as it did below, that the 1997 SPD does not create an enforceable contract because the statement discussing FMLA eligibility is not an express promise that it incorporates, adopts, abides by, or provides to all its employees the full array of FMLA rights. But it is hard to construe the statement in the 1997 SPD that all employees with one year of service who worked 1,250 hours with Pearle in the 12 months immediately prior to requesting leave are eligible for the FMLA as anything other than an express promise. Cf. Lee v. Canuteson, 573 N.E.2d 318, 322 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that employee manual that stated it is the sincere intent of [employer] to be fair and reasonable with all employees at all times and that employees may be subject to progressive discipline did not constitute express promises). Had Pearle wished to limit this clause, it needed only omit the all and replace it with any employee who is employed at a work site with less than 50 employees. Similarly, had Pearle intended the section on the FMLA to merely describe FMLA benefits for those employees who were eligible it could have drafted the clause accordingly. It did neither. 18 The above is not the only evidence in the record that Pearle obligated itself to provide Dr. Thomas (and other employees not otherwise statutorily eligible) the benefits of the FMLA. Pearle's actions provide further evidence of their intent to provide Dr. Thomas with FMLA benefits. The 1997 SPD established a procedure for employees to follow when requesting leave under the FMLA, and pursuant to this procedure Pearle provided Dr. Thomas with FMLA forms to complete. In short, Pearle acted as if the 1997 SPD did, in fact, grant Dr. Thomas the right to request leave under the FMLA, despite the fact that at this point in time she was not statutorily eligible. Dr. Thomas's reliance on Pearle's actions was reasonable, and Pearle's argument that the 1997 SPD did not offer Dr. Thomas the benefits of the FMLA is disingenuous at best. 19