Opinion ID: 2633488
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Purports to Marry Provision of Utah's Bigamy Statute Is Applicable to Holm's Solemnization of His Relationship with Stubbs

Text: ¶ 16 To determine whether the purports to marry provision of Utah's bigamy statute is properly applicable to Holm, we must interpret that provision within its context in the Utah Code. [O]ur primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. Foutz v. City of S. Jordan, 2004 UT 75, ¶ 11, 100 P.3d 1171 (internal quotation marks omitted). We presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning. C.T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, ¶ 9, 977 P.2d 479 (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, [w]e read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters. Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ¶ 17, 66 P.3d 592. Only when we find that a statute is ambiguous do we look to other interpretive tools such as legislative history. See Adams v. Swensen, 2005 UT 8, ¶ 8, 108 P.3d 725. ¶ 17 The purports to marry provision of Utah's bigamy statute declares that [a] person is guilty of bigamy when, knowing he has a husband or wife or knowing the other person has a husband or wife, the person purports to marry another person. Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-101(1). Both parties to this appeal agree that purport means [t]o profess or claim falsely; to seem to be. Black's Law Dictionary 1250 (7th ed.1999). ¶ 18 The definition of marry, however, is disputed. The State argues that marry should not be construed as limited to legally recognized marriages. Holm argues that the word marry in subsection one refers only to a legally recognized marriage and that, therefore, there is no violation of the purports to marry provision unless an individual purports to enter into a legally valid marriage. We hold that the term marry, as used in the bigamy statute, includes both legally recognized marriages and those that are not state-sanctioned because such a definition is supported by the plain meaning of the term, the language of the bigamy statute and the Utah Code, and the legislative history and purpose of the bigamy statute. ¶ 19 First, the common usage of marriage supports a broader definition of that term than that asserted by Holm. The dictionary defines marry as to join in marriage according to law or custom, or to unite in close and [usually] permanent relation. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 761 (11th ed.2003) (emphasis added). Holm argues that such a definition of marriage is unsupportable and asks us to read the term legally into the bigamy statute. To support his argument that marry should be construed narrowly in this fashion, Holm relies on Black's Law Dictionary, which defines marriage as [t]he legal union of a man and woman as husband and wife. Black's Law Dictionary 986. While Black's Law Dictionary does offer this as one definition of marriage, a review of the dictionary's various entries and editions [5] makes clear that the dictionary itself does not confine its use of the term marriage to legally recognized unions. Indeed, the definitions Black's Law Dictionary provides for terms such as plural marriage, bigamy, and polygamy support a construction of the term marry that includes marriage not sanctioned by the state, as is true in common parlance. For example, plural marriage is defined as [a] marriage in which one spouse is already married to someone else; a bigamous or polygamous union, id. at 987 (emphasis added); bigamy is defined as [t]he act of marrying one person while legally married to another, id. at 154 (emphasis added); and polygamy is [t]he state of being simultaneously married to more than one spouse; multiple marriages, id. at 1180 (emphasis added). If we were to adopt Holm's construction of marry, these definitions would be nonsensical, as one could not marry another while legally married. ¶ 20 Furthermore, Black's Law Dictionary contains several definitions of different types of marriage that are, by definition, not legally recognized. For example, putative marriage is  marriage in which husband and wife believe in good faith that they are married, but for some technical reason are not formally married (as when the ceremonial official was not authorized to perform a marriage); clandestine marriage is  marriage that rests merely on the agreement of the parties or  marriage entered into in a secret way, as one solemnized by an unauthorized person or without all required formalities; and void marriage is  marriage that is invalid from its inception, that cannot be made valid, and that can be terminated by either party without obtaining a divorce or annulment. Id. at 986-87 (emphases added). ¶ 21 Moreover, the Black's Law Dictionary definition of the term marriage, unadorned by modifiers, states that [a]lthough the common law regarded marriage as a civil contract, it is more properly the civil status or relationship existing between a man and a woman who agree to and do live together as spouses. Id. at 986. Thus, the plain meaning of the term marry, as it is used in the bigamy statute, supports our conclusion that it encompasses both marriages that are legally recognized and those that are not. ¶ 22 Second, when we look, as we must, at the term marry in the context of the bigamy statute, as well as statutes in the same chapter and related chapters of the Utah Code, it is clear that the Legislature intended marry to be construed to include marriages that are not state-sanctioned. Most significantly, the text of the bigamy statute supports a more expansive definition of bigamy than that asserted by Holm. [6] Specifically, the bigamy statute does not require a party to enter into a second marriage (however defined) to run afoul of the statute; cohabitation alone would constitute bigamy pursuant to the statute's terms. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-101(1) (A person is guilty of bigamy when, knowing he has a husband or wife or knowing the other person has a husband or wife, the person ... cohabits with another person.). ¶ 23 Also, looking at related statutes in the Utah Code, it is clear that the Legislature did not intend to limit marriage, as it is used throughout the Utah Code, to legally recognized marriages. By expressly recognizing unsolemnized marriages and allowing for a judicial determination to establish a legal marriage at some point prior to the request for a judicial decree, the Legislature has acknowledged that the attainment of a marriage license from the State is not determinative of whether a marriage exists. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (Supp.2004); Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791, 793 (Utah 1994) ([The judicial decree] merely recognizes that a woman and a man have by their prior consent and conduct entered into a marital relationship, although it was not theretofore formally solemnized or otherwise legally recognized.). In other words, the Utah Code contemplates that there will be marital relationships or marriages that are not legally recognized from inception, but which the State has the ability to legally recognize, even if the parties to that relationship do not desire such recognition. See State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, ¶¶ 3-59, 99 P.3d 820 (rejecting a convicted polygamist's argument that the State was foreclosed from establishing a legally recognized marriage pursuant to the unsolemnized marriage statute to support its bigamy prosecution). The Utah Code also recognizes that a marriage may be solemnized even though the marriage is illegal. Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-15 (1998) (penalizing anyone who knowingly... solemnizes a marriage . . . prohibited by law (emphasis added)). ¶ 24 Holm contends that the term marry should be given the same breadth of meaning wherever it appears in the Utah Code. Accordingly, Holm argues that the term marry must be limited to legally recognized marriages because, if a broader definition is applied here, we would have to construe marry to encompass informal solemnizations in other sections of the bigamy statute specifically and the Utah Code generally. Holm bases this argument on subsection three of the bigamy statute, which essentially creates a mistake-of-fact defense for a bigamy defendant. Subsection three provides that [i]t shall be a defense to bigamy that the accused reasonably believed he and the other person were legally eligible to remarry. Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-101(3). Holm argues that the term remarry in subsection three clearly refers to a legal marriage and that the term marry in subsection one should carry the same meaning. See Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 74 Utah 103, 277 P. 206, 206-11 (1929) (The same meaning will be given to a word or phrase used in different parts of a statute.). ¶ 25 We are not persuaded that the term remarry, as used in subsection three, is so clearly limited to legally recognized marriage. Consequently, we are not convinced that a broader interpretation of marry as used in subsection one is inconsistent with other uses of that term in the bigamy statute. Rather, in the absence of language limiting the definition of the term, it is appropriate to give the term chosen by the Legislature its full force, applying it to marriages recognized both by law and by custom. Conceived in this fashion, the defense offered by subsection three merely excuses bigamous marriages commenced with a reasonable belief that initiating the marital relationship would not run afoul of this State's bigamy law. ¶ 26 Third, although we need not look at other interpretive tools when the meaning of the statute is plain, our construction of marry is supported by the legislative history and purpose of the bigamy statute. As will be discussed more fully below, see infra ¶¶ 40-48, the well-documented legislative history of this State's attempts to prevent the formation of polygamous unions supports our conclusion that the bigamy statute was intended to criminalize both attempts to gain legal recognition of duplicative marital relationships and attempts to form duplicative marital relationships that are not legally recognized. This court has previously recognized that the legislative purpose of the bigamy statute was to prevent all the indicia of marriage repeated more than once. Green, 2004 UT 76, ¶ 47, 99 P.3d 820. In Green, we allowed an unsolemnized marriage to serve as a predicate marriage for purposes of a bigamy prosecution. See id. ¶ 8. If an unlicensed, unsolemnized union can serve as the predicate marriage for a bigamy prosecution, we are constrained to conclude that an unlicensed, solemnized marriage can serve as a subsequent marriage that violates the bigamy statute. ¶ 27 The dissent nevertheless adopts Holm's position that purports to marry means purports to legally marry, claims to enter a legally recognized marriage, or claims benefits from the State based upon married status. In addition to the reasons proffered by Holm, the dissent seeks to support its reading of the statute by referring to our case law, which at times has used the term purported marriage to refer to a marriage that is presented as legally valid and recognized, when in reality the marriage enjoys no legal recognition. See infra ¶ 138 n. 4 (citing cases). These cases do not, however, delineate the scope of the term purports to marry as the term is used in the bigamy statute, but instead involve situations in which the proper resolutions of various claims are dependent in some fashion on the existence, or absence, of a legally recognized marriage. It is true that, in assessing such claims, we have referred to the claim that a valid, legally recognized marriage exists as a claim of a purported marriage. It does not, however, necessarily follow that the phrase purports to marry, as used in the bigamy statute, is similarly confined to claims that a legally valid and recognized marriage has been performed. Simply because one may also purport to enter into a legally recognized marriage does not foreclose the possibility that one may purport to marry without claiming any legal recognition of the marital relationship. ¶ 28 In sum, we are not convinced that the plain language of the statute, which fails to adorn the term marry with any limiting modifiers, justifies the inference drawn by the dissent, and we decline to import such a substantive term into the language of the statute. See Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 2001 UT 29, ¶ 12, 24 P.3d 928 (stating that this court will not infer substantive terms into the [statutory] text that are not already there (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we read the plain language of our bigamy statute as prohibiting an individual from claiming to marry a person when already married to another. Further, we conclude that the term marry is not confined to legally recognized marriages. In other words, one need not purport that a second marriage is entitled to legal recognition to run afoul of the purports to marry prong of the bigamy statute. Nowhere in subsection one is the word marry tied exclusively to state-sanctioned and recognized legal marriage. ¶ 29 Applying the definition of marry outlined above to the facts presented in this case, there can be no doubt that Holm purported to marry Stubbs. The undisputed facts establish that Holm stood before an official of the FLDS Church, Warren Jeffs (son of then-FLDS prophet Rulon Jeffs), with Stubbs at his side and responded affirmatively to a vow asking the following question: Do you Brother [Holm], take Sister [Stubbs] by the right hand, and receive her unto yourself to be your lawful and wedded wife, and you to be her lawful and wedded husband, for time and all eternity, with a covenant and promise, on your part that you will fulfil all the laws, rites and ordinances pertaining to this holy bond of matrimony in the new and everlasting covenant, doing this in the presence of God, angels, and these witnesses, of your own free will and choice? ¶ 30 At the ceremony, Stubbs wore a white dress, which she considered a wedding dress. Throughout her testimony at the trial court, Stubbs referred to the ceremony as a marriage. As mentioned, the ceremony was officiated by a religious leader and involved vows typical of a traditional marriage ceremony. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-6(1) (Supp.2004) (stating that religious officials who are older than eighteen and in regular communion with any religious society are empowered to solemnize a marriage). In short, the ceremony in which Holm and Stubbs participated appeared, in every material respect, indistinguishable from a marriage ceremony to which this State grants legal recognition on a daily basis. ¶ 31 At trial, Stubbs testified that following the ceremony she considered herself married. The facts show that Stubbs lived in a house with Holm, that Holm and Stubbs considered themselves husband and wife, and that Holm and Stubbs regularly engaged in sexual intercourse. Although no one of these factors is itself indicative of marriage, looking at the cumulative effect of the factors present in this case it is clear that the relationship formed by Holm and Stubbs was a marriage, as that term is used in the bigamy statute. ¶ 32 In rejecting the notion that Holm violated the purports to marry provision of the bigamy statute, the dissent assigns central importance, in fact almost exclusive importance, to the lack of a marriage license recognizing the marital commitments made by Holm and Stubbs. But while a marriage license represents a contract between the State and the individuals entering into matrimony, the license itself is typically of secondary importance to the participants in a wedding ceremony. The crux of marriage in our society, perhaps especially a religious marriage, is not so much the license as the solemnization, viewed in its broadest terms as the steps, whether ritualistic or not, by which two individuals commit themselves to undertake a marital relationship. Certainly Holm, as a result of his ceremony with Stubbs, would not be entitled to any legal benefits attendant to a state-sanctioned marriage, but there is no language in the bigamy statute that implies that the presence of or desire for such benefits should be determinative of whether bigamy has been committed. Holm, by responding in the affirmative to the question placed to him by his religious leader, committed himself to undertake all the obligations of a marital relationship. The fact that the State of Utah was not invited to register or record that commitment does not change the reality that Holm and Stubbs formed a marital bond and commenced a marital relationship. The presence or absence of a state license does not alter that bond or the gravity of the commitments made by Holm and Stubbs. ¶ 33 Accordingly, we hold that Holm's behavior is within the ambit of our bigamy statute's purports to marry prong. [7] Having so concluded, we now turn to Holm's arguments attacking the constitutional legitimacy of his bigamy conviction. Because this court has endorsed the primacy approach to constitutional challenges, whereby we first attempt to resolve constitutional challenges by appealing to our state constitution before turning to the federal constitution, we first analyze whether Holm's conduct is protected pursuant to the Utah Constitution. See West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1006 (Utah 1994) (outlining the rationale for adopting the primacy model). After addressing Holm's state constitutional claims, we will turn to Holm's contention that the bigamy statute offends the federal constitution.