Opinion ID: 1615671
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Reeves Was Resentenced in Reeves III

Text: Reeves III occurred as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court's order vacating this court's affirmance of the denial of Reeves' first petition for postconviction relief in Reeves II. Prior to Reeves II, in Reeves I this court found sentencing errors, but upon reevaluation, this court concluded the death sentences were proper. The full text of the U.S. Supreme Court's order stated: Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990). (Emphasis supplied.) Reeves v. Nebraska, 498 U.S. 964, 111 S.Ct. 425, 112 L.Ed.2d 409 (1990). By its terms, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgments and directed this court to consider Reeves' claim challenging the propriety of appellate sentencing in light of Clemons. In its order of remand, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgments in Reeves' prior cases. The judgment in a criminal case is the sentence. See State v. Campbell, 247 Neb. 517, 527 N.W.2d 868 (1995). By vacating the judgment of this court, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly invalidated Reeves' death sentences as reflected in Reeves I and Reeves II, thus requiring resentencing. Vacating a judgment renders it ineffective and incapable of enforcement. See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 1388 (5th ed.1979) (defining vacate as [t]o annul; to set aside; to cancel or rescind.... As applied to a judgment or decree it is not synonymous with `suspend' which means to stay enforcement of judgment or decree (emphasis supplied)). Accordingly, although Reeves remained convicted of two murders, the sentences imposed on him ceased to be effective or capable of enforcement upon order of the U.S. Supreme Court. Thus, upon remand, this court's action in Reeves III was a resentencing.