Opinion ID: 2527692
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Short's Challenge to the Ashworth Colloquy

Text: {¶ 60} In State v. Ashworth, 85 Ohio St.3d 56, 706 N.E.2d 1231, paragraph one of the syllabus, we held: In a capital case, when a defendant wishes to waive the presentation of all mitigating evidence, a trial court must conduct an inquiry of the defendant on the record to determine whether the waiver is knowing and voluntary. (Emphasis sic.) As part of the inquiry, the trial court must determine whether the defendant understands his or her rights both in the plea process and in the sentencing proceedings. Id. at 62, 706 N.E.2d 1231. {¶ 61} Ashworth sets forth specific requirements for the colloquy: The trial court must inform the defendant of the right to present mitigating evidence and explain what mitigating evidence is. The court must then inquire of the defendant, and make a determination on the record, whether the defendant understands the importance of mitigating evidence, the use of such evidence to offset the aggravating circumstances, and the effect of failing to present that evidence. After being assured that the defendant understands these concepts, the court must inquire whether the defendant desires to waive the right to present mitigating evidence, and, finally, the court must make finding of fact as to the defendant's understanding and waiver of rights. Id. In addition, [t]he trial court must decide whether the defendant is competent, but only if counsel so requests or if the defendant displays any indicia of incompetence. Id. {¶ 62} But the requirement of an Ashworth inquiry is triggered only when a defendant wishes to waive the presentation of all mitigating evidence. (Emphasis sic.) Ashworth, at paragraph one of the syllabus; see also State v. Barton, 108 Ohio St.3d 402, 2006-Ohio-1324, 844 N.E.2d 307, ¶ 51. The state contends that the defense did not waive the presentation of all mitigating evidence; therefore, the trial court was not required to conduct any inquiry to determine whether Short's waiver of mitigation was knowing and voluntary. {¶ 63} The state's argument has merit. During the guilt phase, the defense had introduced mitigating evidence, to which counsel referred during the penalty phase. Specifically, the defense had attempted to show that Short was deeply emotionally distressed because Rhonda left him. Mike Rosenbalm, a Monroe, Ohio police officer and the sole witness in the defense case-in-chief, testified that he was dispatched to Short's house on July 16, and that Short was very emotional [and] crying. {¶ 64} In cross-examining prosecution witnesses, the defense elicited further testimony to support its claim of emotional distress. Justin Short testified on cross-examination that the police had come to the house one night after Rhonda's departure and had confiscated Short's gun, and that Short went to a hospital. Justin further testified that his father had received disturbing phone calls, during which someone had played songs that upset him. Short's boss, Robert Thomas, testified on cross-examination that on the Monday or Tuesday before the murders, Short was tearful, appeared run down, said he just wanted to die, and was unable to work. {¶ 65} During the cross-examination of Brandon Fletcher, the defense elicited that Fletcher had told Short about Sweeney and Rhonda hugging at church in a manner he considered inappropriate and that this news had upset Short. In cross-examining Short's cousin, Loren Taylor, concerning Short's July 21 visit to the Abundant Life Tabernacle, the defense stressed that Short was not a member of the congregation, but had attended the service and had gone up to the altar for prayer, implying that Short was taking unusual actions in an attempt to deal with strong emotions. Similarly, the defense elicited testimony from Justin that Short had attended services at four churches other than his own from July 15 to 22, and that the congregation at each one offered special prayers for him. {¶ 66} Short's emotional distress over Rhonda formed the principal theme of the defense penalty-phase closing argument. The defense argument juxtaposed Justin's testimony with Officer Rosenbalm's to imply that Short had been suicidal. During closing arguments, the defense reminded the jury: First day, Justin says, how did your dad seem very sad, very sad. Officer Rosenbalm is called out, he comes to the house. What did you find, Officer?    He was crying, he was depressed, I confiscated a gun. {¶ 67} Defense counsel argued that Short had gone to several churches during the week before the murders because he was crying for help the only way he knows. He goes to church.    [H]e's going from church to church to church trying to get some sort of help, trying to stop this stuff that he's been carrying around for two months. His life is gone, his wife is gone, the kids are gone, he has nothing, he goes to church. {¶ 68} Using both the state's evidence and the testimony elicited by defense cross-examination, the defense argued that Short was not a cold-blooded person, but was a mess, was torn apart, and had lost the battle with his demons when he killed Rhonda and Sweeney. {¶ 69} This case is analogous to Barton, 108 Ohio St.3d 402, 2006-Ohio-1324, 844 N.E.2d 307. In Barton, a capital defendant declined to present mitigating evidence in the penalty phase of his trial. Id. at ¶ 43. Although he did make an unsworn statement, his statement urged the jury to sentence him to death. Id. at ¶ 50. However, during the guilt phase, defense counsel cross-examined several prosecution witnesses    and elicited mitigating testimony on [the defendant's] behalf. Id. at ¶ 49. {¶ 70} On appeal, Barton argued that the trial court should not have accepted his waiver of mitigation without an Ashworth inquiry. We rejected Barton's claim: We conclude that the evidence of mitigation presented during the guilt phase of trial as contained in the record, together with Barton's unsworn statement during the penalty phase of trial and defense counsel's closing argument, rendered Ashworth inapplicable to this case because Barton did not waive the presentation of all mitigating evidence. Id. at ¶ 52. {¶ 71} Here, although Short did not make an unsworn penalty-phase statement, his counsel did elicit mitigating evidence in the guilt phase by cross-examining the state's witnesses. Moreover, counsel used that evidence in the penalty phase to argue that Short did not deserve death. {¶ 72} Barton states: Presentation of any mitigating evidence during either the guilt phase or the penalty phase of a capital-murder trial relieves the trial court of the duty to conduct an Ashworth inquiry. (Emphasis added.) 108 Ohio St.3d 402, 2006-Ohio-1324, 844 N.E.2d 307, paragraph two of the syllabus. Short did not forgo the presentation of all mitigating evidence. Clearly, he presented mitigating evidence during the guilt phase. Hence, no Ashworth inquiry was required. {¶ 73} Short's first proposition of law is overruled.