Opinion ID: 1224193
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: irregularity in the proceedings regarding counsel's references to the child-deller settlement

Text: Child next argues that during opening and closing statements, Gonda's counsel flagrantly violated the district court's pretrial order prohibiting reference to the Child-Deller settlement. These violations, he maintains, constituted an irregularity in the proceedings entitling him to a new trial pursuant to rule 59(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a new trial may be granted if, by reason of the irregularity, either party was prevented from having a fair trial. Because the grant of a new trial is ordinarily left to the sound discretion of the trial court, we will review the court's decision in this regard under an abuse of discretion standard. See Rukavina v. Triatlantic Ventures, Inc., 931 P.2d 122, 126 (Utah 1997) (citing Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 804 (Utah 1991)); Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1984) (A trial court has broad latitude in granting or denying a motion for a new trial, and will not be overturned on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.). Moreover, we have stated that absent a showing by the appellant that the trial outcome would have differed, every reasonable presumption as to the validity of the verdict below must be taken as true upon appeal. See Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 301 (Utah 1982). Child claims that Gonda's counsel made no fewer than three references to the Deller settlement during opening and closing argument. In particular, he asserts that Gonda's counsel, during his opening statement, referred to the settlement and then stated that Child was suing Gonda to get paid more money. Initially, we note that the record citations in Child's brief indicate that Gonda's counsel during closing argument referred not to the settlement but to the fact that Child and Deller had resolved their differences. As we have already stated, such references do not even trigger rule 408's application because they do not constitute evidence of an offer or acceptance of valuable consideration. Therefore, the only irregularity that may have occurred was counsel's remark during opening statement that Child was suing Gonda to get paid more money. While we agree with Child that Gonda's counsel's remark violated the trial court's in limine order, Child has failed to present any compelling arguments that convince us that the offending remark denied him a fair trial. Indeed, Child asserts in his brief that there is simply no way of knowing precisely what effect Ms. Gonda's counsel's remarks had on the jury. For this reason, we must give great deference to the trial court, which is in a much better position than this court to evaluate the parties' conduct, the context in which the irregularity occurred, and the jury's reaction to the statement. In denying Child's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court stated: The statements of defense counsel regarding settlement with the driver of the vehicle in which [Ms.] Child was riding at the time of the accident were not so prejudicial so as to require this Court to grant a new trial on that basis. This is particularly true in view of the curative instruction given by the Court at the conclusion of the evidence on that issue.[ [5] ] While Child argues that the instruction given by the District Court ... was, contrary to Ms. Gonda's contention, not sufficient to cure her counsel's misconduct, he provides no reasons or support for his assertion. Moreover, instead of providing argument for the proposition that there is a reasonable likelihood that the trial outcome would have been different absent the error, Child merely asserts that the only effective sanction for Ms. Gonda's counsel's direct and repeated violation of the District Court's ruling is to grant a new trial. Trial courts will not grant a new trial every time an error occurs, and neither will this court. See Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a) & 61. Therefore, in the absence of any compelling arguments to the contrary, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Child a new trial on the basis of the irregularity in the proceedings.