Opinion ID: 2076850
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Trial Counsel's Performance with Respect to the Trial Itself

Text: Mr. Page contends that the postconviction relief hearing justice erred in finding no ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to his representation during his trial. The applicant contends that his representation constituted egregious ineffective assistance of trial counsel because (in his view) trial counsel erred in: (1) failing to conduct an investigation into possible defenses and failing to present any defense at trial; (2) advising Mr. Page to waive his right to a jury trial; and (3) stipulating to the facts set forth by the prosecution. [19] After a careful review of the record, we perceive no basis for holding that the hearing justice erred in ruling that Mr. Page was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at his trial. We are in agreement with the hearing justice's ruling that Mr. Page's counsel acted well within the level of competence that is expected of trial attorneys representing criminal defendants. Our review of the record convinces us that the hearing justice did not err in finding that Mr. Page's trial counsel sufficiently investigated the defense of insanity or diminished capacity. Counsel made the strategic decision not to employ such a defense after consulting with the psychiatrist who had examined his client and learning that the psychiatrist's observations regarding Mr. Page appeared more damaging than helpful. The hearing justice found counsel's choice to be an appropriate strategic decision, and we perceive no error (and certainly no clear error) in that finding. Trial counsel also investigated the possible defense of intoxication by speaking with his client about that issue as it might relate to the pending criminal charges. We infer from trial counsel's testimony at the postconviction relief hearing that, after weighing his client's statements relative to possible intoxication and after conducting legal research concerning that subject, he determined that no potentially successful defense could be based upon that concept. [20] The postconviction relief hearing justice found that counsel's determination in that regard did not constitute ineffective assistance, and we perceive no basis in the record for holding that finding to be clearly erroneous. We turn next to the waiver of Mr. Page's right to a jury trial and the decision to let him be tried on stipulated proof (consisting solely of documents and exhibits). [21] As we have set forth in detail above, trial counsel was faced with a formidable amount of damaging evidence against his client (including the atrocious nature of Mr. Gardiner's murder, applicant's own incriminating statements, and the evidence of applicant's bloody fingerprints on the axe handle). He also became convinced that there was no defense strategy that had any meaningful chance for success on the merits. Trial counsel accordingly advised his client to proceed with a jury-waived trial in the hope of garnering leniency from the trial justice at the time of sentencingadvice which applicant appears to have accepted after counsel discussed the strategy with his stepfather as well as with him. The postconviction relief hearing justice found that the decision to waive a jury was a tactical decision and that it did not render trial counsel's assistance to be ineffective; he instead stated that he could not fault trial counsel for having made such a decision. The postconviction relief hearing justice further concluded that (by stipulating to the prosecution's evidence) trial counsel made a sound tactical decision in advising his client to spare Mr. Gardiner's family from the grief that a jury trial or a contested bench trial would entailwith the understanding that counsel would cite that considerateness towards the victim's family as a basis for a plea for mercy at the time of sentencing. After considering the entire record, we are utterly unable to conclude that the postconviction relief hearing justice clearly erred in finding that trial counsel made sound tactical decisions by advising applicant to waive a jury and to stipulate to the prosecution's evidence. We have previously stated that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not open the door for this Court to second-guess every decision made by defense counsel at trial. Chalk, 949 A.2d at 399; see also Vorgvongsa v. State, 785 A.2d 542, 549 (R.I.2001). With respect to the case at bar, we are unable to conclude that the postconviction relief hearing justice erred in holding that counsel's performance was reasonable and, as such, did not run afoul of even the first prong (deficiency) under the Strickland test. That being the case, we need not consider the second Strickland prong (prejudice). In view of the several findings of fact made by the hearing justice, each of which we have held to be not clearly erroneous, and after our own perusal of the record, it is our judgment that Mr. Page was not deprived of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel during his trial.