Opinion ID: 1919690
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 26

Heading: The instructions to the jury and the wholesale adoption of the guilt phase testimony at the sentencing phase gave judicial approval to the prosecution's efforts to divert the jury's focus from the proper factors for decision.

Text: Davis argues that the lower court committed reversible error when it allowed the prosecution to adopt all of the testimony from the guilt phase. Davis contends that this wholesale adoption of the testimony from the guilt phase allowed the jury to sentence Davis to death based upon non-statutory aggravating circumstances and therefore, his death sentence should be set aside and he should be given a new trial as to the penalty phase. We disagree. Davis cites Balfour v. State, 598 So.2d 731, 747-48 (Miss. 1992), for the proposition that the State may only offer evidence of the eight aggravating circumstances during the penalty phase of the trial. See also Stringer v. State, 500 So.2d 928, 941 (Miss. 1986); Coleman v. State, 378 So.2d 640, 648 (Miss. 1979). Any mention of nonstatutory aggravators during the penalty phase, Davis argues, warrants a reversal of his death sentence. However, in this assignment of error, Davis does not point to any testimony or evidence given at the guilt phase of his trial that would allow the jury to consider nonstatutory aggravating circumstances. During the penalty phase, the trial judge, after all of the evidence establishing aggravating and mitigating circumstances had been presented, instructed the jury as follows: Consider only the following elements of aggravation in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed: (1) Whether the capital murder was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment; (2) Whether the capital murder was committed intentionally while the Defendant was engaged in the commission of armed robbery or flight after committing the crime of armed robbery; (3) Whether the capital murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest of the Defendant; (4) Whether the capital murder was committed for pecuniary gain. The State argues that Jackson v. State, 337 So.2d 1242, 1256 (Miss. 1976), controls the case at bar. Jackson, provides in part: At this hearing [penalty phase], the State may elect to stand on the case made at the first hearing, if before the same jury, or may reintroduce any part of the evidence adduced at the first hearing which it considers to be relevant to the particular question of whether the defendant shall suffer death or be sentenced to life imprisonment. (emphasis added). Jackson, 337 So.2d at 1256. The State reintroduced all of the evidence associated with the armed robbery of Dr. Duck's and murder of Biggert. With the exception of the McLaurin burglary, no mention of any other crime or bad act from the guilt phase was admitted into evidence during the penalty phase of the trial. The McLaurin burglary was not used by the trial court as an aggravator, nor did the jury find that the McLaurin burglary was an aggravating circumstance. See Stringer v. State, 500 So.2d 928, 941 (Miss. 1986). Therefore, this assignment of error is without merit.