Opinion ID: 2590700
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Nature of informant testimony

Text: We also reject defendant's unsubstantiated assertion that Loar was an informant in, what defendant describes as, the now-notorious Los Angeles informant ring. We have consistently rejected claims that informant testimony must be excluded because it is inherently unreliable. ( People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1165, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950.) In sum, because we conclude defendant was given an opportunity to cross-examine Loar in the first trial, and Loar was unavailable under Evidence Code section 240, Loar's former testimony was admissible pursuant to Evidence Code section 1291. As such, admitting this testimony did not violate defendant's right of confrontation under the federal Constitution. ( Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 59, 124 S.Ct. 1354; People v. Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 742, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485.) Moreover, even assuming that the reliability of Loar's testimony is pertinent to the issue of confrontation, defendant fails to show that Loar's former testimony was unreliable to justify its exclusion at the retrial. Significantly, defendant himself testified that he and Loar discussed eliminating a witness, i.e., Robert Berrie, who could tie defendant and the victim together before the murder. Although in contrast to Loar's prior testimony defendant denied actually wanting to eliminate Berrie, it was up to the jury as trier of fact to determine what weight to assign each person's testimony and to resolve any conflicts in testimony. (See People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 1164-1165, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950.)