Opinion ID: 3013048
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: This Court granted a certificate of appealability limited to the following issues: (1) whether Lutz was denied due process and equal protection when his right to a direct appeal was allegedly denied; (2) whether the District Court properly declined to dismiss the petition as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); and (3) whether this claim should have been denied on the basis of the Commonwealth’s procedural default defense. We will begin by addressing the time-bar issue and then turn to the procedural default issue. Because we conclude that Lutz’s claim regarding the unconstitutional deprivation of a direct appeal is procedurally defaulted, we will not address the merits of that claim. A. Statute of Limitations The District Court declined to dismiss this habeas petition as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) under the principle of equitable tolling. In the certificate of appealability, we ordered the parties to address that ruling, and informed the parties that the highly relevant decision in Robinson v. Johnson, 283 F.3d 581 (3d Cir. 2002), had been withdrawn and that a rehearing was pending. After the issuance of the certificate of appealability, this Court issued a revised opinion in Robinson holding that “because the AEDPA limitations period -7- is subject to equitable modifications such as tolling, it is also subject to other nonjurisdictional, equitable considerations, such as waiver.” 313 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 2002). The Robinson court also held that “affirmative defenses under the AEDPA should be treated the same as affirmative defenses in other contexts, and, if not pleaded in the answer, they must be raised at the earliest practicable moment thereafter.” Id. at 137. The Robinson holding controls our decision on the statute of limitations issue in Lutz’s case. The Commonwealth did not raise a statute of limitations defense in its Answer to Lutz’s habeas petition. The Commonwealth did not raise the defense before the Magistrate Judge either. In fact, the Magistrate Judge sua sponte raised the defense, but nonetheless determined that the petition was not time-barred under the principle of equitable tolling. The Commonwealth did not object to the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation. Because the Commonwealth failed to raise the affirmative time-bar defense in its Answer or at any of the “earliest practicable moment[s]” thereafter, the defense is waived. Id. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s ruling that Lutz’s habeas petition is not timebarred, but for the reason of waiver rather than equitable tolling. B. Procedural Default The District Court noted that Lutz’s claim regarding denial of due process and equal protection might be procedurally defaulted, but nonetheless proceeded to address the merits of the claim. The Commonwealth argues on appeal that the District Court should have found the claim to be procedurally defaulted rather than reviewing the merits. Lutz argues that his -8- claim is not procedurally defaulted. He argues in the alternative that if this Court finds that his claim is procedurally defaulted, the default should be excused in order to avoid a fundamental miscarriage of justice. “As a general rule, federal courts may exercise the power to consider habeas applications only where ‘it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.’” McCandless, 172 F.3d at 260 (quoting Walker v. Vaughn, 53 F.3d 609, 614 (3d Cir. 1995)). “When a claim is not exhausted because it has not been ‘fairly presented’ to the state courts, but state procedural rules bar the applicant from seeking further relief in state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied because there is ‘absence of available State corrective process.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)). “In such cases, however, applicants are considered to have procedurally defaulted their claims and federal courts may not consider the merits of such claims unless the applicant establishes ‘cause and prejudice’ or a ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice’ to excuse his or her default.” Id. (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991)). Accordingly, in order to prevail on its procedural default defense, the Commonwealth must establish that: (1) Lutz did not “fairly present” his claim to the Pennsylvania courts; and (2) Pennsylvania’s procedural rules bar Lutz from seeking further relief. If the Commonwealth meets its burden, Lutz must establish “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” in order to excuse his default. We must first determine whether Lutz “fairly presented” his claim to the Pennsylvania -9- courts. “To ‘fairly present’ a claim, a petitioner must present a federal claim’s factual and legal substance to the state courts in a manner that puts them on notice that a federal claim is being asserted.” McCandless, 172 F.3d at 261 (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971)). It is not sufficient that a “somewhat similar state-law claim was made,” Harless, 459 U.S. at 6, yet the petitioner need not have cited “book and verse” of the federal constitution. Picard, 404 U.S. at 278. Lutz’s habeas claim is that he was deprived of his right to a direct appeal in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal constitution. In his application for reconsideration to the Pennsylvania Superior Court following its January 2000 decision, however, Lutz made only the following arguments: a) that he had in fact or substance filed a direct appeal nunc pro tunc following the trial court’s March 8, 1995 order; and b) the erroneous styling of that appeal was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. Neither of those arguments sufficed to put the state courts on notice of his federal claim. See e.g. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366 (1995) (“If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state court.”). In fact, Lutz’s first argument to the Superior Court is the direct opposite of his habeas claim, and his second implicates a different constitutional amendment (the Sixth Amendment) than that implicated by his habeas claim (the Fourteenth Amendment). Accordingly, we find that Lutz did not “fairly present” his federal claim to the state courts. -10- Neither party disputes that Pennsylvania’s procedural rules bar Lutz from seeking further relief.2 Accordingly, Lutz’s claim regarding the unconstitutionality of his allegedly denied direct appeal is procedurally defaulted. The only remaining question is whether Lutz has established a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” to excuse his default.3 “To show a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must demonstrate that he is actually innocent of the crime . . .” Keller v. Larkins, 251 F.3d 408, 415-16 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 973 (2001). Lutz does not argue that he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted. Instead, he argues that the “miscarriage of justice” excuse 2 Even if Lutz were to file an additional PCRA petition, the Pennsylvania courts would find it to be time-barred under the one-year limitation period set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1), and he is outside of the sixty-day limitation for the invocation of an exception to the filing limitation. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). Because the limitations are jurisdictional, the Pennsylvania courts do not have the power to address the merits of an additional PCRA petition filed by Lutz. See Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 562 Pa. 70, 77, 753 A.2d 780, 783 (2000). 3 Lutz had the option of attempting to establish “cause and prejudice” to excuse his procedural default, but he did not avail himself of that option. We note, in any event, that Lutz would not have been able to establish “cause.” “To show cause and prejudice, ‘a petitioner must demonstrate some objective factor external to the defense that prevented compliance with the state’s procedural requirements.’” Cristin v. Brennan, 281 F.3d 404, 412 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. at 753). Examples of objective factors external to the defense sufficient to demonstrate “cause” include “interference by the state with the conduct of a defense or the previous unavailability of the factual or legal basis of a claim.” Cristin, 281 F.3d at 420. There was no interference by the Commonwealth with Lutz’s right to present his claim. The factual and legal predicate for the claim was available as soon as the Superior Court issued its January 2000 decision. In sum, Lutz has not presented any argument, nor does the Court find one available on the record, that would suffice to establish “cause.” See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 486 (1986) (“[T]he mere fact that counsel failed to recognize the factual or legal basis for a claim, or failed to raise the claim despite recognizing it, does not constitute cause for a procedural default.”). -11- encompasses an unconstitutional denial of direct appeal rights, and cites several non-binding authorities for support. Lutz’s argument is unpersuasive. In Cristin v. Brennan, we held that “[t]he miscarriage of justice inquiry is thus concerned with ‘actual innocence.’” 281 F.3d 404, 420 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 123 S. Ct. 195 (Oct. 27, 2002) (citing Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992)); see also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995). To the extent that the scope of the “miscarriage of justice” excuse could be expanded, this case does not present a justification for such an expansion. All of the substantive issues Lutz would have raised on direct appeal have already been reviewed by the Pennsylvania courts. Thus, Lutz has not established an excuse for his procedural default. Because we find that Lutz’s claim is procedurally defaulted, we will not address the merits. We will affirm the District Court’s denial of the habeas corpus petition, but on the ground of procedural default rather than on the ground provided by the District Court.