Opinion ID: 2570424
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: conduct while suspended

Text: Gershater argues that this court cannot regulate conduct which occurred when her license was suspended because she was not a lawyer within the meaning of KRPC 3.3(a)(1) (2000 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 385) (a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal). This argument is without merit. Attorneys who have been suspended remain members of the Kansas Bar and are subject to the provisions of the KRPC for acts committed during the period of suspension. In re Wilkinson, 251 Kan. 546, 553, 834 P.2d 1356 (1992); Phelps v. Shanahan, 210 Kan. 605, 608, 502 P.2d 768 (1972). See also In re C. de Baca, 11 P.3d 426, 430 (Colo. 2000) (a lawyer is subject to discipline for misconduct committed while the attorney is suspended from the practice of law because they are still members of the bar); The Florida Bar v. Ross, 732 So.2d 1037, 1040-41 (Fla. 1998) (attorney can be disciplined for acts of misconduct when the acts occur while the attorney is suspended from the practice of law even though suspended attorney not considered member of the bar); In re Chavez, 129 N.M. 35, 40, 1 P.3d 417 (2000) (rules of professional conduct apply to an attorney who has been suspended even though acts occur during the period of suspension); In re Conduct of G. Hereford, 306 Or. 69, 74, 756 P.2d 30 (1988) (suspended attorney has an obligation to cooperate with the bar in the investigation of unethical conduct even when acts occur during the period of the attorney's suspension from the practice of law); Kirvin v. Secretary of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, 271 S.C. 194, 196-97, 246 S.E.2d 857 (1978) (attorneys remain members of the bar while under suspension and, thus, can be disciplined for misconduct which occurs both prior to and during the period of suspension). In the alternative, Gershater argues that she had a good faith basis to believe that she was licensed to practice law in the state of Kansas when she filed the complaint. This contention is unsupported by the facts. When the complaint was filed on January 11, 1996, Gershater had not complied with the requirements of reinstatement that were mailed to her by the Disciplinary Administrator's office. Gershater knew that she had been suspended when she filed the complaint and knew that she had not yet been reinstated by this court. This argument is also without merit.