Opinion ID: 2807494
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appellant Richardson’s CDW Conviction

Text: Appellant Richardson argues that his conviction for CDW was not supported by sufficient evidence. He notes that the knife that is the subject of that charge was found in the possession of appellant Walker in a search incident to arrest, and that the knife was not displayed or used against Mr. O’Brien or Ms. Johnson. The government argues that the evidence was sufficient under a Pinkerton theory of coconspirator liability. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).6 At the close of the evidence, the jury was instructed on both aiding-andabetting liability, and co-conspirator liability under Pinkerton. With respect to the latter, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: 6 The government and appellant Richardson dispute whether Richardson preserved this issue for appeal. We need not resolve this dispute because the outcome is the same under any standard of review. 18 A defendant is responsible for an offense committed by another member of the conspiracy if the defendant was a member of the conspiracy when the offense was committed and if the offense was committed in furtherance of and as a natural consequence of the conspiracy. Where a jury has been properly instructed on two alternate theories of liability for an offense, a conviction may be upheld if either of the two is supported by sufficient evidence. See Gilliam v. United States, 80 A.3d 192, 210 n.61 (D.C. 2013) (citing Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 59 (1991)). Here, the government relies only on Pinkerton liability to defend appellant Richardson’s CDW conviction. “As articulated by this [C]ourt, ‘the Pinkerton doctrine provides that a coconspirator who does not directly commit a substantive offense may [nevertheless] be held liable for that offense if it was committed by another co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy and was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conspiratorial agreement.’” Wilson-Bey v. United States, 903 A.2d 818, 840 (D.C. 2006) (en banc) (quoting Gordon v. United States, 783 A.2d 575, 582 (D.C. 2001)). “The government is not, however, required to establish that the co19 conspirator actually aided the perpetrator in the commission of the substantive crime, but only that the crime was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Id. A defendant’s participation in a conspiracy must be established beyond a reasonable doubt before Pinkerton liability may attach. See United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing United States v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986, 999 (5th Cir. 1979)). Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence was sufficient under a straightforward application of Pinkerton. The jury could reasonably have found that a conspiracy existed, based on evidence that appellants arrived at the home together, and then worked in tandem to restrain, assault, and attempt to rob Mr. O’Brien and Ms. Johnson. See, e.g., Harrison v. United States, 76 A.3d 826, 835 (D.C. 2013) (jury reasonably inferred existence of conspiracy where two defendants armed with guns accompanied third defendant to drug deal and then followed him back to vehicle); Mitchell v. United States, 985 A.2d 1125, 1135 (D.C. 2009) (jury reasonably inferred existence of conspiracy where defendants ran from the scene of the crime and got into a vehicle together). Moreover, the evidence supports a finding that it was foreseeable that appellant Walker would possess a knife in furtherance of the conspiracy. The 20 evidence established that appellants were close to each other and lived in the same home; that they openly used another weapon (a gun) to commit the assaults and kidnappings; that appellant Walker threatened to “cut” Ms. Johnson while appellants were detaining her in the bedroom; and that appellants bound the victims’ hands with zip ties, which presumably could be removed with a knife. See United States v. Willis, 899 F.2d 873, 875 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[W]here, as here, co-conspirators are few in number and know each other well, the court may infer that each participant knew the others’ methods of operation.”); see also United States v. Smith, 697 F.3d 625, 635 (7th Cir. 2012) (co-conspirator’s possession of a weapon was reasonably foreseeable where co-conspirators planned bank robbery together); United States v. Aduwo, 64 F.3d 626, 630 (11th Cir. 1995) (coconspirator’s possession of a weapon was reasonably foreseeable where coconspirators planned together to rob a drug dealer); United States v. DeMasi, 40 F.3d 1306, 1319-20 (1st Cir. 1994) (co-conspirator’s possession of a weapon was reasonably foreseeable where co-conspirators planned together to rob a truck). Appellant Richardson argues that Pinkerton liability is unsupportable in a case where, as here, the jury acquitted both appellants of a charged conspiracy to commit robbery. Appellant Richardson argues that Pinkerton liability requires a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy existed, but the jury in this 21 case clearly declined to make such a finding when it acquitted appellants of the conspiracy charge. Although appellant Richardson’s argument seems logical at first blush, the apparent contradiction is, at most, an inconsistent verdict on the CDW and conspiracy counts. It is well established that “a not guilty verdict to one count of an indictment that is inconsistent with a guilty verdict to another count cannot invalidate the guilty verdict so long as the guilty verdict is based upon sufficient evidence.” Ransom v. United States, 630 A.2d 170, 172 (D.C. 1993).7 In reviewing appellant’s conviction of CDW, we look at that count of conviction independently, as if it were in a separate indictment. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 62 (1984) (“Consistency in the verdict is not necessary. Each count in an indictment is regarded as if it was a separate indictment.” ); United States v. Martin, 893 F.2d 1404, 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“[It is] settled law that the jury’s verdict on each count stands alone and that inconsistent verdicts do not necessarily 7 See also Hart v. United States, 863 A.2d 866, 874 (D.C. 2004) (“It is now well-established that inconsistent verdicts by themselves do not mandate reversal.”) (citing United States v. Dobyns, 679 A.2d 487, 490 (D.C. 1996)); District of Columbia v. Tulin, 994 A.2d 788, 798 (D.C. 2010) (“In criminal cases, inconsistent verdicts, while not favored, are generally allowed to stand.”); Evans v. United States, 987 A.2d 1138, 1140 (D.C. 2010) (“Both the Supreme Court and this court have long tolerated inconsistent verdicts.”); McClain v. United States, 871 A.2d 1185, 1193 (D.C. 2005) (“However inconsistent the verdict in this case is, we are precluded from second-guessing that verdict.”); Mayfield v. United States, 659 A.2d 1249, 1255 (D.C. 1995) (“[J]ury verdicts will not be overturned for inconsistency.”). 22 render a conviction infirm.”). Thus, appellant Richardson’s acquittal on the conspiracy count does not affect our conclusion, discussed supra, that the evidence was sufficient to support the CDW conviction under Pinkerton. “[T]here is no reason to vacate [appellant’s] conviction [for CDW] merely because the verdicts cannot rationally be reconciled.” Powell, 469 U.S. at 69.8