Opinion ID: 3008595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issues Raised Solely by Tyreese Hall

Text: 1. Initial Confession and Failure to Readvise of Miranda Rights Hall claims his two statements to police confessing to the attack should have been suppressed . Hall gave his first statement to police on April 6, 2004, the day of the attack, after he signed a waiver of his Miranda rights. On April 16, 2004, he was arraigned and appointed counsel, who then, as he describes in his brief, asserted his Miranda rights Three and one-half months later, Hall initiated telephone contact with the police and gave a second statement . Detective Wflliamson told Hall, When I originally brought you in, I advised you of your rights. Do you remember that? Hall said, Yes . Detective Williamson then said, So you're waiving those rights and the right to an attorney, and you've been arraigned on this assault charge, right. Hall again answered, Yes. However, the trial court entered an order finding that Hall was a seriously mentally retarded defendant as defined by KRS 543 .130 and . . . meets the criteria for a retarded person tinder Atkins v. Virginia, and that he, was excluded from the death penalty. As for his first statement to police, Hall argues that under the totality of the circumstances approach, his serious mental retardation rendered his initial confession involuntary and it should have been suppressed . The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the admission of involuntary confessions : `[if the defendant's] will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of [the] confession offends due process.'  Bate _ y Commonwealth, 1. 94 S.W. 3d 296, 300 (Ky. 2006) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1973)) (alterations in original) . The voluntariness of a confession is assessed based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the confession . Mills v. Commonwealth , 996 S .W.2d 473, 481 (Ky. 1999). The Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence . Bailey, 194 S.W .3d at 300. Voluntariness first turns on the presence or absence of coercion by police . See id. ( `[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not voluntary within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.') (quoting Colorado v. Connellv, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986)) . But the  `ultimate test' of the voluntariness of a confession is whether  `the confession [is] the product. of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker[ .Y Bailey, 194 S.W.3d at 300 (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U .S. at 225) . In undertaking the voluntariness assessment,  `both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation are considered.'  Bailey, 194 S.W.3d at 300 (quoting Schneckloth, 41 2 U .S . at 226) . When examining the characteristics of the accused, reviewing courts consider such factors as age, education, intelligence, and linguistic ability. . . . Factors relevant to a characterization of the interrogation include the length of the detention, the lack of any advice to the accused concerning his constitutional rights, the repeated or prolonged nature of the questioning, and the use of overtly coercive techniques such as the deprivation of food or sleep, or the use of humiliating tactics. Bailey, 194 S.W.3d at 300-301 (citation omitted). Finally, [t]his Court has succinctly summarized the relevant inquiry to determine voluntariness as follows: `(1) whether the police activity was 110jeltivel the coercion overbore the will of the defendant; and (3) whether the defendant showed that the coercive police activity was the crucial motivating factor behind the defendants' confession .' Id. at 301 (quoting Henson v. Commonwealth, 20 S .W.3d 466, 469 (Ky. 1999)) . Hall's interrogation with police began less than an hour after he was arrested, and it lasted just over an hour. Hall was also read his Miranda rights and signed a waiver form. He almost immediately confessed. He was not deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention . While he was found to be mentally retarded, his recorded IQ scores were higher than those of the defendant in Bailey . Hall also reads at a second-grade level, attended special education (lasses into the eleventh grade, and had prior contact with law enforcement . He was found to be competent t.o stand trial. Appellant's mental retardation is a factor to consider in assessing the voluntariness of a confession, but `the mere existence of a mental condition, by itself and apart from its relation to police coercion, does not make a statement constitutionally involuntary.' Ropers v . Commonwealth, 86 S .W.3d 29, 37 (Ky. 2002) (quoting Lewis v. Commonwealth, 42 S .W.3d 605, 612 (Ky. 2001)) . Early in Hall's interrogation, Detective Williamson asked him, [D]o you feel deep down in your soul that there's something you need to talk to me about? Hall told him that he did not know how it all happened, and he then admitted he swung and hit the victim and that was why his hand was swollen . This was the initial confession, and as the interrogation went on, the record demonstrates that the detective did in fact take special care not to be overly solicitous of further incriminating statements . While the detective did go on to tell Hall, I know already, presumably a ruse to convince Hall that he already knew all the details of the crime, Hall had already confessed to many of those details . Mhe `employment of a rose, or strategic deception, does not render a confession involuntary so long as the ploy does not rise to the level of compulsion or coercion .' Eq&rs, 86 S .W.3d at 37 (quoting Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439, 447 (Q. 1999)) . For the most part, the detective proceeded by pulling Hall along and asking him to just go one step further and to tell him some more. Under the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the confession, Mills, - 996,, S .W.2d at 481, including Hall's mental retardation, this Court finds there was nothing inherently or objectively coercive about the interrogation in this case, Bg ers, 86 S .W.3d at. 37, and that his initial statement was made voluntarily. Therefore, the trial court. properly denied Hall's motion to suppress this statement . Hall also argues the second statement he gave to Detective Williamson should have been excluded . Hall initiated telephone contact with Detective Hall Williamson, who asked if he remembered his rights from the first interrogation three and one-half months before, and specifically his right to counsel, and whether he was again waiving them. Hall said he was . The Supreme Court has never indicated that the `rigidity' of Miranda extends to the precise formulation of the warnings given a criminal defendant . . . Quite the contrary, Miranda itself indicated that no talismanic incantation was required to satisfy its strictures . California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981) . Reviewing courts therefore need not examine Miranda warnings as if construing a will or defining the terms of an easement . The inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably `conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda.'  Duckworth Y Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (quoting Plysock, 453 U.S. at 361) (alterations in original). Detective Williamson's asking Hall if he remembered his rights from when t.liey were read to him before, specifically his right to counsel, and whether he was again waiving them, did not render his statement involuntary under Miranda. Even though the second statement was three and one-half months after his initial interrogation and reading of his Miranda rights, under the circumstancesgiven that Hall initiated contact with the detective and told him he remembered his rights, specifically his right to counsel, and that he was once again waiving his rights-the trial court properly denied Hall's motion to suppress this statement as well. 2. Admission of Gruesome Photos of Victim's Injuries Hall claims the eight photos of the victim identified by Dr. Bill Smock, emergency room physician at the University of Louisville, should have been excluded. He also claims it was error to allow Dr. Smock to use a chart to describe the victim's injuries and for him to demonstrate with one of the prosecutors the length of the stick used in the sodomy in relation to a person's back. The photos at issue and the exhibition by the doctor were admissible .  `The rule prohibiting the exhibition of inflammatory evidence to a jury does not preclude the revelation of the true facts surrounding the commission of a crime when these facts are relevant and necessary.' Adkins v. Commonwealth , 96 S.W.3d 779, 794 (Ky. 2003) (quoting Salisbury v. Commonwealth , 417 S.W.2d 244, 246 (Ky. 1967)) . The general rule is that a photograph, otherwise admissible, does not become inadmissible simply because it is gruesome and the crime is heinous. Funk v. Commonwealth, 842 S.W.2d 476, 479 (Ky. 1992) . Were the rule otherwise, the state would be precluded from proving the commission of a crime that is by nature heinous and repulsive. Adkins, 96 S.W.3d at 794 (quoting Salisbury, 417 S.W.2d at. 246) . Even though the defense did not contest that the victim suffered terrible injuries, the prosecution is permitted to prove its case by competent evidence of its own choosing, and the defendant may not stipulate away the parts of the case that he does not want. the jury to see . Barnett v. Commonwealth, 979 S .W.2d 98, 103 (Ky. 1998) . The number of photos was not excessive, they were not unduly redundant, and admission of these photos and the exhibition by the doctor were not error. 3. Joint Trial and Penalty Phase Hall claims he should have received a separate trial without a deathqualified jury, since the trial judge ruled he was ineligible for the death penalty due to his serious mental retardation . However, [i)n a joint trial for capital murder where the death penalty is sought against one defendant, but not the other, the impaneling of a death-qualified jury does not deprive the defendant of the right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury selected from a fair crosssection of the community. Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 691 S.W. 2d 210, 211 (Ky. 1985) . In Buchanan, this Court rejected the specific argument raised by Hall: [The] contention that death qualification excludes a cognizable group from the jury panel so as to make it, unrepresentative of a fair cross-section of the community is also unconvincing . Persons who are unalterably opposed to capital punishment do not constitute a cognizable group for the purpose of the fair crosssection requirement . Such persons have diverse attitudes which defy classifications and have not-been singled out by the public for special treatment, . They do not meet the criteria for making a cognizable class . . . . It was not reversible error to death-qualify the jury. Id. at 212 . More generally, [t]he trial judge has broad discretion in determining whether to grant separate trials and his/her decision in that regard will not be overturned absent a showing of prejudice to the defendant and a clear abuse of discretion by the judge . Taylor v. Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d 355, 360 (Ky . 1999) . Given the clear state of the law on joint. trials in death penalty cases, the trial judge did not, abuse her discretion by declining to order separate trials . Additionally, Hall argues that the trial court: should have ordered ..separate ,-.,. .-,r~ ~~ penalt,J/ ,,- . . ,~.,i., phases ~. .,~, because evidence ,-.a£,~',~ainsl ,-.; . 'k-Almonds, a~<.Linsl.a- .,VVh-,-,il r .. ~- .1-. ;:,- ;i + i-, ., ~.~ ; ,-, r n LIM. Commonwealth sought the death penalty, would have prejudiced Hall. In making this claim he relies on Foster v. Commonwealth, 827 S.W.2d 670 (Ky. 1991), where this Court held that the mitigation evidence as to Foster's codefendant, Powell, was so prejudicial to Foster as to require reversal of her sentence . Specifically, Powell claimed duress and domination by Foster and introduced evidence that Foster threatened her and that Foster had said that she had to kill one of the victims because Powell was a weak bitch d not capable of finishing the work. Id. at. 681 . Additionally, Powell and Foster had a long-term lesbian relationship, and Powell testified that she had been beaten by Foster and that Foster had perpetrated other acts of violence against members of her own family. Id. Powell also introduced expert testimony that. her relationship with Foster had similar characteristics to battered spouse syndrome because she had learned helplessness toward Foster . Id . at 683 . In this case, however, Edmonds' four mitigation witnesses did not even mention Hall. Edmonds did not testify in the penalty phase, and he offered no evidence of prior misconduct by Hall . A separate penalty phase for Hall was not required, and the trial judge did not abuse her discretion. 4. Jury Instructions
Hall claims that he was entitled to an instruction on extreme emotional disturbance (EED) as another route to the lesser-included offense of firstdegree manslaughter . The evidence simply did not support an EED instruction. Extreme emotional disturbance is a temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome one's judgment, and to cause one to act uncontrollably from the impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil or malicious purposes . It is not a mental disease in itself, and an enraged, inflamed, or disturbed emotional state does not constitute an extreme emotional disturbance unless there is a reasonable explanation or excuse therefore, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under circumstances as defendant believed them to be. McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S. W.2d 464, 468-69 (Ky. 1986) . Hall testified he was startled when the victim in this case rose up in a dark alley. He did not testify that he was so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to be uncontrollable, and being merely startled was not a reasonable explanation or excuse for killing the victim in this case . No other evidence showed such a response in him. Therefore, the trial court did not err in failing to give an instruction on EED.
Hall also claims that he was entitled to a jury instruction on seconddegree manslaughter. At trial, Hall tendered a proposed instruction on seconddegree manslaughter, based in part on the proposed murder instruction which allowed a finding of guilty on either intentional or wanton murder. The trial judge denied the motion, finding no reasonable basis for the instruction because she believed the evidence showed at least a clear intent to injure, and thus the only possible lesser-included offense was first-degree manslaughter. The Penal Code commentary illustrates the difference between wanton murder and second-degree manslaughter : The two offenses described by these provisions, [wanton] murder by KRS 507.020(1)(b) and manslaughter in the second degree by KRS 507.040, have three elements in common: the conduct in question must have involved a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death to human life; the defendant, in causing the death in question, must have consciously disregarded that risk, and his disregard must have constituted a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would [have observed] in the situation . Taken together, these three elements constitute the culpable mental state defined in KRS 501 .020 as wantonness, and without more, will suffice for a conviction ofd manslaughter in the second degree . If accompanied by a fourth element, i.e., circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, they are sufficient for a conviction of [wanton] murder . KRS 507.020 cmt. 1 An instruction on a lesser-included offense is required only if, considering the totality of the evidence, the jury could have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt of the greater offense, and yet believe beyond a reasonable doubt. that. he is guilty of the lesser offense. Baker v. Commonwealth , 130 S .W.3d 90, 94 (Ky. 2003) (citing Clifford v. Commonwealth , 7 S.W.3d 371, 377-78 (Ky. 1999) ; Bills v. Commonwealth , 851 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1993)) . In most cases involving wanton killings, the evidence is such that. a jury could reasonably find wantonness with or without extreme indifference, and a. wanton murder instruction should be accompanied by an second-degree 1 . . .-tL.f-.... inst.il.lctior manslaug-lll.G1 ' -.-. .~~ : .~ . Jcc, C
y. % VIII ~/~ LjLyyV(Al%_11, u 1 -ri C S. qrl A .3- 8-5 p (Ky. 2007) (defendant opened fire into a car) ; Ward v. Commonwealth, 695 S .W.2d 404 (Ky. 1985) (testimony in murder trial that the plan was only to shoot out victim's tires, and defendant shouted that the gun got away from to A defendant is guilty of wanton murder when, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, he wantonly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person and thereby causes the death of another person . KRS 507 . .020(1)(b) A person acts wantonly when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists . The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. KRS 501 .020(3) . 37 him) . However, this case presents the rare situation where the attack was so incredibly brutal that, if the jury believes the facts presented, the act must be either intentional, or wanton with extreme indifference to human life (i.e. aggravated wantonness, supporting a wanton murder conviction) . Based on Hall's own testimony, Hall was present for the entirety of the attack, beginning with the kicking and hitting of the victim with a crock pot, and continuing through sodomizing hire with a 27-inch stick that extended into his lungs . Hall either impaled Clifton Agnew with a stick and bottle, or watched as Edmonds did. At the very least, Hall stood idly by while an unconscious man was beaten further and brutally sodomized. As a principal and/or complicitor, Hall is responsible for the ultimate act, and the attack must be judged as a whole. Under these circumstances, there was no error in refusing to instruct the jury on second-degree manslaughter . See Cecil v. Commonwealth , 888 S.W.2d 669, 674 (Ky. 1994) (no error in instructing on wanton murder but not second-degree manslaughter when defendant shot victim at point blank range, even though defendant claimed the gun went off') ; Crane, 833 S.W.2d at 817-18 (no error in instructing on wanton murder but not second-degree manslaughter when defendant shot store clerk at close range, even though defendant claimed he shot straight up in the air) . c. Complicity Hall argues that the trial court gave an erroneous complicity instruction. KRS 502 .020 creates two types of complicity : complicity to the act under subsection (1), and complicity to the result under subsection (2) : When causing a particular result is an element of an offense, a person who acts with the kind of culpability with respect to the result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense is guilty of that offense when he : (a) Solicits or engages in a conspiracy with another person to engage in the conduct causing such result; or (b) Aids, counsels, or attempts to aid another person in planning, or engaging in the conduct causing such result; or (c) Having a legal duty to prevent the conduct causing the result, fails to make a proper effort to do so . KRS 502.020(2) (emphasis added) . The Definitions section of Hall's jury instructions defined each type of complicity separately. Hall argues that the Complicity as to a Criminal Result definition should have included the mental state of intentional. This Court held in Harper v. Commonwealth that subsection (2) complicity liability is not limited to non-intentional mental states. 43 S.W .3d 261, 267 (Ky. 2001) . Therefore, an intentional mental state could have been included as a possible mental state for conviction of subsection (2) complicity, but it was not necessary, because Hall was also charged with wanton murder.
Hall claims the jury was improperly instructed that it could convict Hall of sodomy only if it believed that he, acting alone or in complicity, engaged in deviate sexual intercourse with the victim in this case. Hall bases his argument on the definition of deviate sexual intercourse provided in the instructions, which was consistent with the definition provided in KRS 510 .010(1) :  `Deviate sexual intercourse' means any act of sexual gratification involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another; or penetration of the anus of one person by a foreign object: manipulated by another person . hall asserts that there was no act of sexual gratification, and he contends that. act of sexual gratification modifies both parts of this definition. However, it is clear from the plain language of the statute that contrary to Hall's assertion, the two phrases are separated by the word and that the second phrase, penetration of the anus of one person by a foreign object manipulated by another person, need not, be done for sexual gratification. The instruction was proper.
Hall's final claims are that his verdict form directed a verdict of life without the benefit of probation or parole for twenty-five years, and that the aggravating circumstances instruction was improper. In support of his first claim, Hall points to Verdict Form Nos . 1 through 3, which arguably imply that if the jury found Hall guilty of an aggravator, then they could only fix his punishment at life without the benefit of probation or parole for twenty-five years. However, Hall conveniently failed to cite Instruction No . 6, which specifically says You do not have to sentence the Defendant, TYREESE HALL, to a term of imprisonment for life without benefit of probation or parole until he has served a minimum of 25 years of his sentence even if you find the aggravating circumstances stated in these Instructions were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (Emphasis added) . After a review of the instructions contained in the record, Hall's attempt to mislead the Court fails. This argument is without merit . However, the judge also gave the following instruction during the penalty phase : In fixing a sentence for the Defendant, fYREESE HALL, for the offenses of the Murder, Robbery in the First Degree, and Sodomy in the First Degree of Clifton Agnew, you shall consider the following aggravating circumstances which you may believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to be true . . . . Such an instruction improperly includes Robbery in the First Degree and Sodomy in the First Degree as offenses for which aggravating circumstances instructions may be found, thus Appellants argue that the jury might enhance the punishment for the robbery and sodomy, as well as the murder, under the aggravating circumstances in death penalty cases statute, KRS 532 .025(2)(x) . As to whether this taints Hall's sentences for robbery and first-degree sodomy, the Court concludes that any error was harmless . Though those offenses were improperly included under the general aggravator instruction, the specific penalty instructions and verdict forms for those crimes include no room for the use of aggravating factors, listing instead only the statutory penalty ranges (10 to 20 years for the robbery, 20 to 50 years or life for the first-degree sodomy) . Aggravating factors only go to whether the death penalty, life without benefit of probation or parole, or life without benefit of probation or parole for 25 years are options, and the instrt-ictions informed the jury tli