Opinion ID: 2185395
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: appeals of past orders

Text: Despite repeated procedural omissions in the periodic continuations of T.H.'s hospitalization in Stutsman County, the State argues that appeals of those orders are untimely and unreasonable. We agree. The right to appeal is an important aspect of mental-health procedures. In Interest of A. O. An involuntary patient has the right to an expedited appeal from a mental-health order, including one denying a petition for discharge. NDCC 25-03.1-29. See also In Interest of C.W., 453 N.W.2d 806 (N.D.1990). Unlike other civil appeals, where the time for appeal runs from the date of the service of notice of entry of the judgment or order appealed, [N.D.R.App.P. 4(a) ], the time for a mentalhealth appeal is thirty days after entry of the order. NDCC 25-03.1-29; N.D.R.App.P. 2.1(a). But yet, the trial court's failure to notify an involuntary patient of the right to appeal and of the right to counsel for the appeal, as directed by NDCC 25-03.1-29, extends the time for appeal of a mental-health order. A. O ., 443 N.W.2d at 625. Because the trial court did not notify T.H. about his right to appeal each continuation order from 1984 through 1989, nor about his right to counsel for each appeal, his time to appeal each order was extended. Still, the extension in A. O. was a few days. The extensions sought here vary from two years to seven years. The question here, then, is how long do these repeated failures, to notify T.H. of his rights for the appeals, extend the separate times to appeal? On September 11, 1991, T.H.'s present counsel moved the Burleigh County court to set aside the continuations of his treatment order from 1984 to 1990 for reasons that included the repeated failures to notify T.H. about his rights for the appeals. T.H. did not appeal those past continuations until after the Burleigh County court properly ruled that it had no jurisdiction to review Stutsman County orders. Although T.H., through counsel, knew of those past procedural omissions on September 11, 1991, T.H. did not appeal those past orders until seventy-five days later on November 25, 1991. This was more than thirty days after record knowledge of the right to appeal, and was thus too late. We pointed out in A. O. that, notwithstanding the lack of a relevant notice, where the required knowledge of appealability of a civil order or judgment was clearly shown on the record, the time for appeal runs from that knowledge, not indefinitely. A. O., 443 N.W.2d at 625. See also Morley v. Morley, 440 N.W.2d 493 (N.D.1989); Lang v. Bank of North Dakota, 377 N.W.2d 575 (N.D.1985). Here, too, we conclude that the times for appeal were not extended indefinitely by the court's failure to notify T.H. of his rights for those appeals, but only for the statutory period after the time that the record clearly shows that his counsel acquired knowledge of the lingering rights to appeal. The designated thirty-day time for each appeal expired before these notices of appeal were filed. Therefore, we dismiss the untimely appeals of the Stutsman County continuations of T.H.'s hospitalization.