Opinion ID: 3011150
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Madamba

Text: Madamba raises a number of arguments on appeal. First, he contends that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the jury's finding of individual liability under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a) was against the weight of the evidence. Implicit in this argument is Madamba's assumption that the jury returned a verdict of individual liability under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a). We do not agree with this assumption. The district court's charge in this case clearly stated that the individual defendants were liable, if at all, for aiding and abetting the employer's violation of the Act. Hurley argues that supervisors may be individually liable as employers under the LAD. The New Jersey courts have not specifically addressed the issue. The dissent makes a cogent argument for individual liability, and it is clear that reasonable people can disagree on this point. But the New _________________________________________________________________ 24. On remand, the district court must determine whether Madamba was part of upper management. The ACPD claims that Madamba was a captain, along with numerous others with that rank. Although Madamba clearly was a supervisor of the personnel under his command, the ACPD contends that he did not establish policy and was not at the top tier of the department so as to be part of upper management. If a factual dispute should arise, however, the issue would be reserved for the jury. 45 Jersey decisions cited by the dissent, see Dissent at 74-77, did not rule on individual supervisory liability, and hence we do not find them controlling. Nor do we think the statutory text offers guidance. While an employer may be one or more individuals under N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(a), that does not necessarily mean that supervisors, themselves employed by individuals or corporations, are employers. Title VII defines employer to include a person . . . who has fifteen or more employees or any agent of such a person, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e(b), and it could be subjected to the same analysis the dissent uses to find individual liability possible under LAD. We also note that imposing direct liability on supervisors, who are likely to be substantially judgment-proof, will not significantly add to the force of anti-discrimination law, which already gives employers incentives to ban discrimination and monitor supervisors' activities. We think that there is insufficient reason to predict that New Jersey would diverge from the federal scheme on this point. See, e.g., Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1077-78 (3d Cir. 1996). In sum, while the point is close, as well as unclear, we are simply not willing to predict that New Jersey would include supervisors in the statutory definition of employer.25 Second, Madamba joins the ACPD's evidentiary challenges and its attack on the hostile work environment charge, which we have already rejected. Third, he objects that the court permitted the jury to find liability against Madamba on four separate theories of liability when they should have only considered liability for hostile work environment sexual harassment. We do not agree, because the various theories of liability were properly submitted to the jury. There was sufficient evidence on all theories to go to the jury, and the instructions clearly indicated that the mere presentation of a possible theory to the jury did not mean that any defendant was liable on that theory, or on any theory. We reiterate that the instructions indicated that _________________________________________________________________ 25. Trends may change, however, and a panel looking at this issue a year from now might see New Jersey pursuing a different course on supervisory liability through section 10:5-5(a). 46 the individual defendants were liable, if at all, for aiding and abetting the employer's violation of the Act. 26 Fourth, Madamba argues that the court's compensatory damages charge failed to instruct the jury that it cannot award damages for any conduct that plaintiff was not subjected to, aware of, or with respect to Madamba, which occurred prior to 1990. Madamba Br. at 49-50. But the relevant section of the instructions adequately limited Madamba's exposure by setting forth the time limits on recovery and the purposes for which the jury could use evidence of acts not directed at Hurley, even though it did not specifically mention Madamba at that point. See supra Section II.B.
Finally, Madamba contends that the court's aiding and abetting instruction permitted the jury to impose individual liability under an erroneous standard. The LAD provides that it is unlawful for any person, whether an employer or an employee or not, to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this act, or to attempt to do so. N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e). In our decision in Failla v. City of Passaic, issued after the verdict in this case, we held that individual supervisors may be liable for aiding and abetting under the LAD. In reaching this _________________________________________________________________ 26. Madamba particularly assails the availability of a quid pro quo instruction, which we discuss in greater detail supra Section II.E.2. The evidence to support Hurley's quid pro quo theory was a conversation she had with Madamba in which she complained about harassment and he responded that women in the private sector protect themselves from harassment by sleeping with their bosses and that women approached Madamba for sex when they're ready. After she made no response to these suggestive comments, he allegedly took further discriminatory action against her by transferring her to a less desirable position. However, as we suggested above, this is less a quid pro quo case than a hostile environment case, inter alia because it seems more plausible that the transfer, if retaliatory, was based on Hurley's memo alleging harassment and not on her rejection of Madamba's putative advances. At all events, as discussed below in Section IV.A.2, we conclude that a reasonable jury could impose aiding and abetting liability on Madamba for his substantial contribution to the hostile work environment; his putative advances could be evidence of aiding and abetting. 47 conclusion, we predicted that the New Jersey Supreme Court would follow the Restatement (Second) of Torts S 876(b) to define aiding and abetting liability under the LAD. See Failla, 146 F.3d at 158. That section provides that a person is liable for harm resulting to a third person from the conduct of another when he `knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself . . . .'  Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts S 876(b)). We also predicted that, under New Jersey law, inaction can form the basis of aiding and abetting liability if it rises to the level of providing substantial assistance or encouragement. Id. at 158 n.11 (citing Dici v. Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 542, 553 (3d Cir. 1996)). While we have rejected a requirement that an individual and an employer share the same discriminatory intent in order to find aiding and abetting liability, see Failla, 146 F.3d at 157, we have not fully elucidated the principles that might allow a harassing supervisor to be individually liable for aiding and abetting the actionable conduct of his employer, when the challenged conduct is failing to stop the supervisor's own harassment. Cf. United States v. Sain, 141 F.3d 463, 474 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding that a person can aid and abet a corporation that he or she fully owns and controls). This is a somewhat awkward theory of liability. We believe, however, that it can be explained in this manner: A supervisor, under New Jersey law, has a duty to act against harassment. See Taylor, 706 A.2d at 691. This duty can be violated by deliberate indifference or affirmatively harassing acts. When a supervisorflouts this duty, he subjects himself and his employer to liability. Cf. Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 134 A.2d 761 (N.J. 1957) (holding that both agent and principal will be liable when the agent acts within the scope of his employment but for his own purposes). The ACPD's wrongful conduct in this case was inaction -- its tolerance of sexual harassment. The jury had evidence before it that Madamba assisted this tolerance by tolerating and even encouraging the harassment. As part of the chain of command that Hurley was expected to follow, he controlled her access to the most effective potential 48 solutions to the harassment. Instead of taking steps to assist her, he told her that she should stop complaining or it would only get worse; he suggested that sleeping with him might protect her; he laughed at the drawings and graffiti about her; and he demeaned her as an officer on a daily basis. When she finally went over his head and requested a transfer because of the harassment, he gave his superior a memo accusing her of lying. We are also mindful of the moral authority of a police captain over his officers. When Madamba laughed at Hurley's discomfort and denigrated her, his officers could easily learn the lesson that harassing women was part of being an ACPD officer. Madamba arguably failed to stop the harassment because he wanted it to continue. But, as Failla held, there is no requirement of shared intent between the primary wrongdoer and the aider and abettor. If Madamba's malice substantially assisted the ACPD's inaction, then he is an aider and abettor despite any difference in state of mind, assuming that the ACPD can be said to have a mental state. His liability can be grounded in his failure to stop the harassment, which included both active and passive components. Because we conclude that Madamba could be liable for aiding and abetting, we must decide whether the jury instructions adequately set forth the applicable law. Based on Restatement S 876(b), courts have determined that the tort of aiding and abetting involves three elements: (1) the party whom the defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes an injury; (2) the defendant must be generally aware of his role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at the time that he provides the assistance; (3) the defendant must knowingly and substantially assist the principal violation. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also In re Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 113 F.3d 1484, 1495 (8th Cir. 1997); Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 624 (8th Cir. 1985).27 _________________________________________________________________ 27. To determine whether a defendant provided substantial assistance, the comments to section 876 of the Restatement provide a list of five 49 The district court provided the following charge for aiding and abetting: [I]ndividual defendants . . . may be held liable only for their individual, affirmative wrongful acts. They may not be held liable for the conduct of others, nor for their inaction or delay in responding to such conduct. An individual defendant may be held liable, however, if he aids, abets, incites, compels or coerces another person's unlawful acts of discrimination. . . . . Aid is defined as meaning to assist, support or supplement the efforts of another. Abet is defined as meaning to encourage, counsel, incite or instigate the commission of unlawful conduct. In order the [sic] aid or abet another to commit an unlawful act, it is necessary that the defendant willfully and knowingly associate himself in some way with the unlawful act, and that he willfully and knowingly seek by some act to make the unlawful act succeed. App. at 5284, 5314. Although the district court's charge is compatible in some respects with the substance of section 876(b), the court misstates the law in two crucial respects: First, the charge does not allow for liability based on inaction. To be sure, Madamba can hardly claim he was prejudiced by this particular omission, because the jury concluded that he committed affirmative, harassing conduct. But the instructions also allowed the jury to impose liability for mere assistance, rather than substantial assistance. This was incorrect. Moreover, we cannot conclude that it is highly probable that the absence of a substantial assistance _________________________________________________________________ factors: the nature of the act encouraged, the amount of assistance given by the defendant, his presence or absence at the time of the tort, his relation to the other and his state of mind. Restatement (Second) of Torts S 876(b) cmt. d. (1979). Additionally, the court in Halberstam provided a sixth factor, the duration of the assistance provided. See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 484. 50 requirement did not affect the jury's verdict. See McQueeney, 779 F.2d at 924. Accordingly, we must vacate the judgment against Madamba and order a new trial. 28