Opinion ID: 774819
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: improper remarks during sentencing phase

Text: 114 Petitioner objects to several of the comments made by the prosecution during the sentencing phase. 115 a. consideration of the heinous nature of the crime and decision to seek death penalty 116 During closing arguments, the prosecutor made the following comments: 117 The aggravating circumstances in this case are heinous. The death of Louis Roth, the robbery that occurred, are heinous aggravating circumstances. 118 As [the other prosecutor] told you, we do not seek the death penalty lightly. We don't frivolously come into a courtroom asking for that penalty. 119 The Ohio Supreme Court considered petitioner's arguments and concluded, [W]hatever residual error inheres in the making of the statements at issue, it would appear that such error was harmless. Greer, 39 Ohio St. 3d at 252; 530 N.E.2d at 401. The district court likewise concluded, Given the largely undisputed evidence supporting Greer's conviction, this Court cannot find that the cumulative effect of the two issues so infected Greer's trial with unfairness as to result in a denial of his due process rights. Memorandum of Opinion, Aug. 7, 1998, at 70 (J.A. at 214). 120 We affirm the district court. 121 b. comment that jury's decision on death only a recommendation 122 During closing arguments, the prosecutor stated, Your result then, if you should find that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors, is to recommend to Judge Spicer that the death penalty be imposed in this case. Petitioner contends that this comment runs afoul of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), which stands for the proposition that the State cannot seek to minimize the jury's sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness of death. Id. at 341. 123 Caldwell is distinguishable from the instant case. In Caldwell, the jury was told, Your job [i.e., decision on death] is reviewable . . . the decision you render is automatically reviewable by the Supreme Court. Id. at 325-26. However, in the case before us, the prosecutor's comment represents a correct statement of Ohio law. See Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.03(D)(2). On direct appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court held that this distinction correctly disposed of the Caldwell claim. Greer, 39 Ohio St. 3d at 253; 530 N.E.2d at 402. Moreover, this court recently rejected a similar claim in Mapes, 171 F.3d at 414-415, albeit in the context of a challenged jury instruction. 124 The district court is affirmed. 125 c. sympathy 126 The prosecutor also asked the jury to set aside sympathy in reaching a decision: 127 What you have to be careful of, ladies and gentlemen, and Judge Spicer will instruct you on this, that you do not decide this case based on bias, sympathy or prejudice.... 128 In other words, if you go into the jury room and you feel sorry for Paul Greer because he has an alcohol problem, you feel sorry for Paul Greer because . . . he has borderline intelligence, or you feel sorry for Paul Greer because he had so many children in his family, or that he only went to a certain level of education, if you feel sorry for him, that isn't mitigation. 129 Of course, it is axiomatic that a jury cannot be precluded from considering virtually any aspect of defendant's character in mitigation. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating factor) (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)). 130 Once again, our recent decision in Mapes comes close to presenting this issue. In that case, defendant had asked for a merciful discretion instruction. We noted, however, that the Supreme Court had upheld an instruction to the effect that the jury should not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling. Mapes, 171 F.3d at 416 (citing California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987)). 131 The Ohio Supreme Court rejected petitioner's claim because sympathy alone is not a mitigating factor. Greer, 39 Ohio St. 3d at 250; 530 N.E.2d at 399. Just because petitioner was allowed to introduce personal characteristics in mitigation does not mean that the prosecution may not strongly and forcefully argue that such mercy need not be extended, and that the jury should not be roused to a sympathetic reaction. Id. 132 In our view, the Ohio Supreme Court correctly resolved this issue. We affirm the denial of relief. 133 d. improper characterization of mitigating factors 134 During trial, defense counsel introduced evidence of three mitigating factors listed in Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.04(B). However, the prosecution discussed all seven mitigating factors included in the statute. According to petitioner, the jury quite possibly interpreted the lack of a mitigating factor to be aggravating, or at least to have diminished the mitigating factors that did exist. No case law is cited in support other than for the general proposition that courts must minimize the risk that death will be imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner. 135 This contention is without merit.