Opinion ID: 1331504
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Witness Rehabilitation

Text: Appellant contends that the trial court wrongly questioned Mrs. Plumley, the victim's mother, in an attempt to rehabilitate her credibility. The following is the exchange about which he complains: Court: All right, Mrs. Plumley, I want to ask you some questions. What is the date of your birth? Witness: 10/15/53. Court: Wait a minute now. Ten what? Witness: 10/15/53. Court: How old were you on this night of December? Witness: Forty-three. Court: And do you have additional sons as well as Shawn and your son that was killed? Do you have any more boys? Witness: No, sir. Court: On that December day, do you recall what time you got up in the morning? The usual time? Witness: Yes. Court: What time was that? Witness: About between 7:00 and 7:30. Court: What time? Witness: 7:00, 7:30. Court: Okay. Did you do your housework that day? What did you do on that day? Did you work? Witness: No. I was living with my cousin at the time. Court: All right. And I think you told me but I lost my notes. About what time did you get down to the bar? Witness: Between 10:30 and 11:00. Court: All right. And the shooting occurred when to your best knowledge? Witness: Five till 1:00. Court: Almost 1:00? Witness: Yes, sir. Court: You had been down there a couple hours, right? Witness: Yes, sir. Court: And in that process  and I hate to remind you  you lost a son, didn't you? Witness: Yes, sir. Court: Saw your son shot down, is that right? Witness: Yes, sir. Court: You went to the hospital? Witness: Yes, sir. Court: With your son? Witness: Yes, sir. Court: I dare say you prayed on the way? Witness: Yes, sir. Court: And how long was your son in the hospital before they told you that he was dead? Got any idea? Witness: It was about an hour and a half to two hours. Court: Then the officer, the deputy began to quiz you and ask you questions? Witness: Yes, sir. Court: How long had your son been dead when the officer questioned you? Hour? Two hours? What would you tell me? Witness: I'd say between three hours. Court: Were you possessed at that time of all your faculties in view of what you went through? Witness: I don't understand the question. Court: All right. Did you know everything you were saying when you tried to answer the deputy's questions? Witness: I did the best I could do. Court: Pardon? Witness: I did the best I could do. Court: Well, were you level headed and calm and collected? Witness: Not with my son lying there dead, no. Court: Did the deputy offer to question you later after you could go home and get some rest and get your head screwed on right? Witness: When he took me to the room, I asked him if I could wait until the next morning. And he said no. Court: It had been  what is it, about 20 hours since you got any rest? You got up at 7:00 and he questioned you at 3:00. Witness: Yes, sir. Court: All right. That's all the questions I have. As we recognized in syllabus point three of State v. Farmer, 200 W.Va. 507, 490 S.E.2d 326 (1997), [t]he plain language of Rule 614(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence authorizes trial courts to question witnesses-provided that such questioning is done in an impartial manner so as to not prejudice the parties. [9] We further recognized in Farmer that A trial court must exercise its sound discretion when questioning a witness pursuant to Rule 614(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence. Farmer, 200 W.Va. at 508, 490 S.E.2d at 327, syl. pt. 1, in part. Appellant argues that the trial court wrongly questioned Mrs. Plumley for the purpose of rehabilitating her testimony. He contends that the trial court specifically engaged in the questioning quoted above to explain the discrepancies between her testimony at trial and her statement given to a sheriff's deputy after the murder. The discrepancies to which Appellant refers pertain to whether or not she saw the murder weapon prior to its use and whether she overheard an argument between her son and the victim. Appellant suggests that the examination was improper and that its aim was to garner pity from the jury. The State maintains that Appellant selectively cites transcript references to suggest testimonial discrepancies that in fact do not exist. [10] Refuting the alleged inconsistencies in Mrs. Plumley's statement, the State contends that rather than being rehabilitative in nature, the trial court's examination was aimed at trying to make Mrs. Plumley feel better about herself, as the mother of the victim, given the fact defense counsel had berated her so harshly on cross. It is axiomatic that [a] trial judge in a criminal case has a right to control the orderly process of a trial and may intervene into the trial process for such purpose, so long as such intervention does not operate to prejudice the defendant's case. Syl. Pt. 4, in part, State v. Burton, 163 W.Va. 40, 254 S.E.2d 129 (1979). The examination that the trial court undertook with Mrs. Plumley concerned background information relevant to Mrs. Plumley's state of mind on the night of the murder. Whether the trial court was trying to make her feel better after her cross-examination or attempting to give the jury additional information for purposes of understanding Mrs. Plumley's mental state when she gave her statement is unclear. Either way, the trial court's queries appear to have exceeded the scope of what this Court has previously recognized to be the proper objective of the type of judicial questioning that is authorized by Rule 614(b). As we recognized in Alexander ex rel. Ramsey v. Willard, 208 W.Va. 736, 542 S.E.2d 899 (2000), `[a] judge may ask questions for the purpose of clearing up points that seem obscure, and supplying omissions which the interest of justice demands, but it is not proper that he conduct an extended examination of any witness.' Id. at 742, 542 S.E.2d at 905 (quoting Nash v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 106 W.Va. 672, 679, 146 S.E. 726, 728 (1929)). In Willard we discussed the dangers of a judge proceeding beyond the accepted and traditional province of the trial court and engaging in extensive questioning of a witness. 208 W.Va. at 742-43, 542 S.E.2d at 905-06. As we observed, judicial intrusions of this nature run the risk of confusing the jury and carry the potential for injecting bias into the trial. Given the harm that may result when the trial judge assumes the typically adversarial role of questioning a witness, extended judicial examinations are clearly discouraged in the interest of avoiding the possibility of resulting prejudice and an invasion of the jury's province as trier of the facts. At the trial of this matter, Appellant failed to raise any objection to the trial court's examination of Mrs. Plumley. [11] He asserts on appeal that the judicial examination rose to the level of plain error, arguing that the trial judge's actions prevented him from receiving a fair trial. Our examination of the record, however, does not compel us to conclude that the jury's determination was likely to have been prejudiced by the trial judge's questioning of Mrs. Plumley. If the judge's objective was to impress upon the jury the fact that Mrs. Plumley was in a highly emotional state at the time she gave her statement to the police after her son had just been murdered, the jury could have reached this same conclusion on their own, as the jury was likely comprised of both mothers and fathers. More importantly, Mrs. Plumley's credibility was not in need of rehabilitation as her testimony was not necessary for the conviction of Appellant. While the trial court's questioning of Mrs. Plumley appears to have diverged from the sanctioned purpose of elucidating information necessary to assist in the orderly progression of the trial and to bring out matters necessary to the interests of justice, it does not appear likely to have skewed the fundamental fairness or basic integrity of the proceedings in some major respect that would amount to plain error. Willard, 208 W.Va. at 744, 542 S.E.2d at 907 (quoting LaRock, 196 W.Va. 294, 470 S.E.2d 613, syl. pt. 7, in part). While we clearly do not approve of the scope of the trial court's questioning of Mrs. Plumley, we cannot conclude that Appellant has demonstrated that the trial court's examination of Mrs. Plumley impacted the integrity of the trial proceedings in a manner which requires that Appellant's conviction be reversed on grounds of plain error. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decision of the Circuit Court of Mason County. Affirmed.