Opinion ID: 1215411
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the double jeopardy question

Text: The final question involves whether, under the evidence, a new trial is mandated, or whether, under the double jeopardy holding in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), and Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978), a judgment of acquittal must be entered. In Burks, a unanimous Supreme Court declared: The Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding. This is central to the objective of the prohibition against successive trials. The Clause does not allow `the State . . . to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,' since `the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy was designed to protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense.' Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187, 78 S.Ct. 221, 223, 2 L.Ed.2d 199, [77 Ohio L.Abs. 202, 61 A.L.R.2d 1119 (1957)]; see Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 387-388, 95 S.Ct. 1055, 1061-1062, 43 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479, 91 S.Ct. 547, 554, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971). [437 U.S. at 11, 98 S.Ct. at 2147, 57 L.Ed.2d at 9-10] However, the Court did carefully distinguish between reversal on the ground of evidentiary insufficiency and reversal on the ground of trial error: In short, reversal for trial error, as distinguished from evidentiary insufficiency, does not constitute a decision to the effect that the government has failed to prove its case. As such, it implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Rather, it is a determination that a defendant has been convicted through a judicial process which is defective in some fundamental respect, e. g., incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence, incorrect instructions, or prosecutorial misconduct. . . . [437 U.S. at 15, 98 S.Ct. at 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d at 12] In regard to the standard of review for evidentiary insufficiency, it acknowledged an existing standard not substantially different from that stated in Syllabus Point 1 of State v. Starkey, W.Va., 244 S.E.2d 219 (1978): [15] The prevailing rule has long been that a district judge is to submit a case to the jury if the evidence and inferences therefrom most favorable to the prosecution would warrant the jury finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations omitted] Obviously a federal appellate court applies no higher a standard, rather it must sustain the verdict if there is substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, to uphold the jury's decision.. . . [437 U.S. at 16, 98 S.Ct. at 2150, 57 L.Ed.2d at 13] Factually, Burks involved the claim that on the affirmative defense of insanity, the prosecution failed to prove the defendant sane beyond a reasonable doubt. As a matter of law, the Circuit Court of Appeals found this to be true based on its review of the record. The Supreme Court agreed, and concluded double jeopardy dictated a judgment of acquittal. In Greene, a first degree murder conviction in a Florida trial was attacked on double jeopardy through a federal habeas corpus. After his initial conviction of first degree murder without recommendation of mercy, the defendant appealed to the Florida Supreme Court, which reversed in a per curiam opinion. The basis for the reversal was obscure, although there was some suggestion that the evidence was insufficient to establish a conviction of first degree murder. In any event, over the defendant's double jeopardy objection, a second trial ensued. The jury returned another first degree murder verdict, but with a recommendation of mercy. The United States Supreme Court found that jeopardy could attach. It acknowledged that Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969), had settled that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Federal Constitution is binding on the states, [16] and therefore required the application of the Burks principle to the Florida conviction. It concluded that because of the ambiguity of the Florida per curiam opinion, the case would be remanded to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to determine whether the Supreme Court of Florida had found from the record of the first trial that the evidence was insufficient. There is no question that Greene avoided determining what the outcome would be if the evidence was sufficient to support a verdict of a lesser included offense: Given our decision today to remand this case for reconsideration by the Court of Appeals, we need not reach the question of whether the State could, consistent with the Double Jeopardy Clause, try Greene for a lesser-included offense in the event that his first-degree murder conviction is voided. [437 U.S. at 25, 98 S.Ct. at 2155, 57 L.Ed.2d at 21 n. 7] Both Burks and Greene do not precisely answer the problem before us. Here, the evidentiary insufficiency arises as a result of our having determined on appeal that the polygraph test and the testimony of Morgan are not admissible. It is these rulings that create the evidentiary insufficiency since our rulings carve out of the State's case the only evidence which proves that the substance was marijuana. Such proof is an essential element of the crime. Neither Burks nor Greene involved the situation where the appellate court had determined that certain evidence was inadmissible and thereby created the state of evidentiary insufficiency. Both of these cases dealt with claims that all the evidence submitted to the jury was insufficient to support a conviction. In Burks, the Court stated that trial error would not trigger double jeopardy, but that evidentiary insufficiency would. It then went on to explain the concept of trial error: Rather, it is a determination that a defendant has been convicted through a judicial process which is defective in some fundamental respect, e. g., incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence, incorrect instructions, or prosecutorial misconduct. [437 U.S. at 15, 98 S.Ct. at 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d at 12] [Emphasis supplied] Obviously, if the incorrect receipt . . of evidence constitutes trial error which does not invoke double jeopardy, there will be those occasions, such as here, where, after excising the bad evidence, what is left is insufficient to establish a sufficient case to submit to the jury. Yet, it seems apparent that Burks did not intend to overlap the two categories of trial error and evidentiary insufficiency, even though both dealt with evidentiary problems. We believe that Burks' teaching is that where on appeal the entire record as given to the jury was insufficient to support the conviction, then there is an evidentiary insufficiency, and the defendant is entitled to the double jeopardy bar. Where, however, the appellate court finds reversible evidentiary error, then this is trial error and the case is reversed and no jeopardy attaches. In other words, the appellate court cannot, after excluding evidence on appeal, take the remaining evidence and see if it is sufficient to uphold the verdict. The cornerstone of the double jeopardy bar as determined by Burks was that the State cannot complain when upon all of the evidence  submitted to the jury an appellate court concludes that such evidence was insufficient to warrant a jury conviction. [437 U.S. at 16, 98 S.Ct. at 2150, 57 L.Ed.2d at 13] [Emphasis in original] This is amplified in the central statement on double jeopardy announced in Burks and which we adopt under our Double Jeopardy Clause in Article III, Section 5 of our Constitution: The Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding. [437 U.S. at 11, 98 S.Ct. at 2147, 57 L.Ed.2d at 9] Again we note the emphasis on the initial failure of the prosecutor to muster evidence in the first proceeding. Clearly, the focus is on the evidence introduced at the trial and not on what is left after the appellate court completes its review. Thus, we conclude that in order to determine if there is evidentiary insufficiency that will bar a retrial under double jeopardy principles, such determination is made upon the entire record submitted to the jury and not upon the residual evidence remaining after the appellate court reviews the record for evidentiary error. [17] The present case aptly illustrates the unfairness that can result if the evidentiary insufficiency test is applied by the appellate court after it has ruled inadmissible critical areas of the State's evidence. Here, there were evidentiary points that involved matters of first impression in this State. A reasonable prosecutor might well have concluded that the polygraph test would be admitted through the Valdez line of cases or that the witness Morgan's testimony was admissible. When the new evidentiary rule is set adversely to his position on appeal, he should not be foreclosed from developing on a new trial alternate sources of proof. Perhaps implicit in this rule is the recognition that often in a criminal trial there are close legal issues which must be resolved. Such resolutions may occur without the opportunity for studied research and reflection. In consequence, the State should not be foreclosed from a chance to correct these trial errors, which have been found to be reversible by an appellate court exercising the advantage of extensive research and reflection. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently confronted this same question in United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979). It determined that part of the government's evidence was not admissible, but declined to rule on the insufficiency of the remaining portion of the government's case under Burks, since there was other trial error found besides the inadmissible evidence, and advanced this as one of the reasons: Another reason for not requiring an appellate court to adjudge the sufficiency of the balance of the evidence, when a part of the evidence has been improperly admitted, is that it is impossible to say what other evidence the government might have produced had the faulty evidence not been admitted, and what theory of the case the government might have principally pursued had it been presented in the context of different evidence before the jury. [at 1374] We conclude under Burks that in determining whether there exists evidentiary insufficiency on appeal that invokes the principles of double jeopardy, the appellate court must view the evidence as submitted to the jury and not what remains in the record after the appellate court rules out inadmissible evidence. Under the double jeopardy principles set out in Burks and Greene, which we incorporate into our own Double Jeopardy Clause in Article III, Section 5 of the West Virginia Constitution, the defendant is not entitled to a judgment of acquittal. Therefore, this case is reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded.