Opinion ID: 2542903
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Nguyen majority misapplied Mathews.

Text: ¶ 30 In Mathews, the Court pinpointed three factors used in identif[ying] . . . the specific dictates of due process. 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. The third factor of the Mathews test is the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-71, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970)). The Nguyen majority held that this third factor only relates to practical and financial burdens to be imposed upon the government were it to adopt a possible substitute procedure and does not relate to the interest which the government attempts to vindicate through the procedure itself. 144 Wash.2d at 532, 29 P.3d 689 (emphasis added). In other words, the Nguyen majority limited the scope of the third Mathews factor to administrative and pecuniary concerns. Such a limitation is contrary to the language used in Mathews, in which the Court described the third factor as the Government's interest, including the function involved. 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893 (emphasis added). ¶ 31 The Nguyen majority's limitation of the third factor of the Mathews test is also contrary to a vast body of precedent. Time and time again, both before and after Nguyen, this court, in applying the third Mathews factor, has considered broader governmental interests in addition to administrative and pecuniary burdens. See, e.g., City of Bremerton v. Hawkins, 155 Wash.2d 107, 110, 117 P.3d 1132 (2005) (considering the governmental interest in protecting the public from drivers who fail to comply with state laws); Born v. Thompson, 154 Wash.2d 749, 755-56, 117 P.3d 1098 (2005) (considering the governmental interests of prosecuting misdemeanors and increasing public safety); In re Harris, 98 Wash.2d 276, 286-87, 654 P.2d 109 (1982) (considering the State's interest in nonemergency detention of those who present a likelihood of danger to themselves or others); Ritter v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 96 Wash.2d 503, 511, 637 P.2d 940 (1981) (considering the public interest in insuring competent, careful medical attention at all times). [4] As a result of this misapplication of the third Mathews factor, the Nguyen majority erroneously deemphasized the governmental interests at stake and unnecessarily tipped the Mathews scale in favor of the intermediate standard of proof in professional disciplinary cases.