Opinion ID: 1857771
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether 1995 Iowa Acts Chapter 136, Section 1 Applies Retroactively to Defeat the Veasleys' Claims.

Text: As a final issue, we must consider whether 1995 Iowa Acts chapter 136, section 1 applies retroactively so as to defeat the Veasleys' claims against Rapid Leasing. That statute was an amendment to section 321.493. It provides in part: [I]f the vehicle is leased, owner means the person to whom the vehicle is leased, not the person to whom the certificate of title for the vehicle has been issued or assigned or to whom the manufacturer's or importer's certificate of origin for the vehicle has been delivered or assigned. 1995 Iowa Acts ch. 136, § 1. The Veasleys' cause of action against Rapid Leasing under section 321.493 was fully matured prior to the amendment of that statute in 1995. They argue that, consistent with our holding in Thorp v. Casey's General Stores, Inc., 446 N.W.2d 457 (Iowa 1989), this claim may not be taken away by amending the statute after the injuries occurred. In the Thorp case, we held that it would be a denial of substantive due process to apply the 1986 sold and served amendment to the dram shop law so as to destroy claims that were fully matured under those statutes prior to the effective date of that amendment. In so doing, we stated: In summary, the 1986 amendment that deprived plaintiff of her cause of action does not fall within those categories of curative or emergency legislation that involve an overriding public interest and which can constitutionally be applied retroactively. Neither do we believe that the legislation was merely a change in procedure or remedy. Rather, we believe that plaintiff had a vested property right in her cause of action against Casey's and that the retroactive application of the 1986 amendment destroyed that right in violation of due process under both the federal and state constitutions. Id. at 463. We believe that the statutory cause of action involved in the present case is also not of the curative or emergency legislation type that may be applied retroactively. Nor is it a mere change in procedure or remedy. The statute is the sole basis for a matured claim against Rapid Leasing by the Veasleys. If the amendment is given retroactive effect, it will completely eliminate that claim or any remedy pursuant thereto. We hold that the 1995 amendment may not be retroactively applied so as to affect the Veasleys' rights in the present case. We have considered all issues presented on the appeal and conclude that the judgment for the district court granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Rapid Leasing, Inc. must be reversed. The case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED.