Opinion ID: 1387045
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the prejudgment order's finality

Text: An order is final within the meaning of 12 O.S. 1991 § 953 [8] if it prevents judgment upon the process in progress, even though the aggrieved party would have been free to abandon the course then in pursuit to relaunch or press the same claim along a different remedial track. Through this conceptual analysis included in the class of orders that are treated in law as having prejudgment finality are those that (a) quash process [9] and (b) those that dismiss the action sans prejudice, [10] although the former do not inhibit the issuance of alias process and the latter leave the plaintiff free to bring another suit. Other examples for the same appealability analysis are: (c) a suit's termination otherwise than on the merits, is deemed appealable although the suit may be refiled; [11] and (d) an order that overrules the landowner's challenge to the condemnor's power to take by eminent domain, which also is treated as appealable, even though the landowner's initial challenge could be renewed before a condemnation decree (with a compensation award) is entered in the case. In short, an appeal need not always be the appellant's sole remedial avenue of relief to make a prejudgment order appealable as final under § 953. [12] This is not to say that every judicial refusal to give a favorable dispositive order in a prejudgment contest over some process, pleading or probative deficiency in the case is enough to make a nisi prius ruling appealable. Extant § 953 jurisprudence unmistakably and consistently teaches that, to be appealable under this section, an order which prevents a judgment must preclude the appealing party from proceeding further in the case for the pursuit of the very relief that is then and there sought. [13] The order tendered for our review in this case bears all the requisite attributes of prejudgment finality in the § 953 sense. It bars judgment on the very arbitration award tendered for confirmation in the case. While the appellant might have given up his quest for judgment and submitted to another arbitration proceeding before a different panel, he remained free to press with vigor for a judgment confirming the award in his favor. [14] The nisi prius order denying confirmation of the arbitration award precludes Gilliland from obtaining the desired relief in the case. Because it stands as an insuperable barrier to a specific arbitration award's confirmation by judgment sought in the action, it is appealable under § 953. [15] We so hold. Nor are we persuaded that the provisions of 15 O.S. 1991 § 817 [16] are a special statute which restricts the range of appealable dispositions available under the rubric of forensic disputes over arbitration and must always control over the general provisions of §§ 952 [17] and 953. [18] Section 817 lays no textual pretense to exclusivity in its application to arbitration-related appeals. It is no more than a litany of orders  all typically occurring in litigation over arbitration  which, in addition to more mainstream rulings, are to be treated as appealable. In short, we view § 817 as no hurdle either to this § 953 appeal or to any § 952 appeal. The motion to dismiss is accordingly denied with prejudice to renewal. This appeal shall proceed to the decisional stage. The present controversy over the size, content of, and the time for, the briefs to be submitted will be settled by a later unpublished order. WILSON, C.J., KAUGER, V.C.J., and LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, OPALA, SUMMERS and WATT, JJ., concur. SIMMS, J., concurs in result. HODGES, J., disqualified.