Opinion ID: 3012166
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Counts One Through Six

Text: As our recitation of Counts One through Six should indicate, those counts challenge the administration or implementation of Pennsylvania’s approved alternative bonding program. This was so clear as to Counts Two and Five that plaintiffs did not seek reconsideration of the District Court’s dismissal of those two counts. Similarly, as to Counts Four and Six, it is Pennsylvania, not SMCRA, which, respectively, creates the treatment period of fifty years in determining the adequacy of bonds and creates the capital replacement cost method used by Seif for bond calculations. Indeed, no provision of SMCRA or the federal regulations is even cited in Counts Two, Four, Five, and Six, except by boilerplate incorporation by reference. As the District Court put it, [t]o allow a federal court to second_________________________________________________________________ 13. We note in passing that S 1270(a)(2) of SMCRA applies only to acts or duties which are not discretionary. While it is far from clear that the acts and duties at issue in Counts One through Six are not discretionary, that alternative reason for the potential dismissal of those counts is not before us on these interlocutory appeals. 21 guess certain detailed aspects of a state program infringes upon state sovereignty, and it is inappropriateto question a certain discretionary aspect of the state program which was given primacy by the OSM, and to direct the state on what method to use to conduct its calculations. A.32, 33. The District Court correctly determined that, at least as to Counts Two, Four, Five, and Six, this case fell outside the Ex parte Young exception and that Seif enjoyed immunity. Simply put, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits a federal court from considering a claim that a state official violated state law in carrying out his or her official responsibilities. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). [I]t is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law. Such a result conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment. We conclude that [Ex parte] Young and Edelman [v. Jordan] are inapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law. Id. at 106. The District Court, however, wrongly came to the opposite conclusion when it refused to dismiss Counts One and Three, based on its finding that those counts stated violations of SMCRA, i.e., federal law. These counts do, at least nominally, allege violations of SMCRA -- and, we note, also allege specific violations of the approved Pennsylvania program. But saying that certain conduct is a violation of SMCRA does not make it so as a matter of law. Rather, the appropriate inquiry for Ex parte Young purposes is whether a court is being asked to enforce state law or federal law as against an individual state officer. See MCI, 271 F.3d at 507. The only reference to SMCRA in Count One is a citation to S 1259(a) and (c), which simply set forth the requirements for the performance bond or bonds which are to be filed with the state regulatory authority and states that the Secretary can approve an alternative bonding system. The language of Count One does track a federal 22 regulation, 30 C.F.R. S 800.11(e), but S 800.11(e) merely sets the criteria that guide the OSM when, in its discretion, it determines whether to approve an alternative bonding system that a state proposes. As outlined above, those criteria were met, and Pennsylvania’s alternative system was conditionally approved. As such, jurisdiction for its administration and enforcement devolved on the state. Whether, in practice, the Pennsylvania program subsequently meets the minimum standards set forth in SMCRA is a matter for the federal oversight body-- the OSM -- and not for the federal courts. With authority vested in the state, the approved state program developed pursuant to that authority is what governs surface coal mining operations. The administration and functioning of the state bonding program is thus a matter of state law, and as such prospective relief vis-a-vis that program as against Seif is barred in federal court by the Eleventh Amendment. The same is true for Count Three, which clearly articulates a closer connection to state provisions than to federal provisions, as evidenced by the example given of a post-mining discharge at a particular mine site. Pennsylvania’s bonding program provides detailed guidelines for addressing such discharges. See 52 Pa. C.S.A. S 1396.4(d.2),(g.2),(g.3). SMCRA nowhere discusses them. More generally, however, given the bonding framework established under the state’s regulatory program, the explicit guidelines for determining bond amounts developed under that framework, and the language of 52 Pa. C.S.A. S 1396.4(d) authorizing increases when necessary (a statute at least as stringent as its federal counterpart), it is clear that Count Three challenges, and seeks relief under, state, rather than federal, law. It is thus barred in federal court by the Eleventh Amendment. Indeed, any assertion that it is federal law that precludes a state from setting a bond amount that does not comply with state law and, thus, that a district court has jurisdiction to review the state determination as to each particular mine site, is simply beyond the pale. What should be obvious by now is that, at least implicitly, we have rejected plaintiffs’ theory that the 23 Pennsylvania program, with its Pennsylvania-specific standards, has been incorporated or codified into federal law. We now do so explicitly. Plaintiffs point to the language of 30 C.F.R. S 900.11 and S 900.12(a) by which, under S 900.11, a state program establishing surface mining standards applicable within each State is codified in the part [of the C.F.R. reserved] for that State and, under S 900.12(a), on approval of a state program the Secretary will publish a final rule to be codified under the applicable part number assigned to the State. They argue that this language explicitly incorporates the state standards into federal law. Indeed, they suggest that this incorporation is even more explicit than that at issue in Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992) where all applicable state standards for water quality were found to be effectively incorporated into the Clean Water Act. We disagree. First, nothing in SMCRA itself explicitly or implicitly incorporates state law as federal law or directs the OSM to do so. Second, it bears repetition that Part 938 of the C.F.R. reserved for Pennsylvania does not set forth any portion of the text, much less the complete text, of the Pennsylvania statutes and regulations approved by the OSM. Rather, the reader is referred to the office locations in the state of Pennsylvania at which copies of those statutes and regulations can be obtained, and merely identifies the dates the Pennsylvania program was approved, the action taken by the Secretary on amendments proposed by Pennsylvania to its program, and the dates by which Pennsylvania must adopt additional amendments recommended by the Secretary. The federal surface mining regulations, in stark contrast, are codified in their full text at 30 C.F.R. Part 772-85. Third, simply referring to a state statute or regulation in the Code of Federal Regulations does not invest it with federal authority, even if the OSM had the authority under the Constitution or under SMCRA to transform state law into federal law, which it does not. Plaintiffs, however, invoke the language of the C.F.R. sections applicable to Pennsylvania and, more particularly, 30 C.F.R. S 938.1, which states that the succeeding sections contain those rules applicable only within 24 Pennsylvania that have been adopted under the [SMCRA]. Despite plaintiffs’ suggestion, the adopted under clause cannot imbue a regulation enacted by a Pennsylvania agency, and only applicable within Pennsylvania , with federal authority. This conclusion is supported by the fact that throughout the federal regulations, approved state programs are described not as federal law but asstate laws and regulations; further, the federal regulations establish different mechanisms for state and federal programs. Moreover, the state-specific nature of mining standards illustrates why Arkansas v. Oklahoma is inapposite. As that case noted, the Clean Water Act was intended to establish a uniform system of interstate water pollution regulation in which the federal role was integral; indeed, the interstate flow of water federalized the issue. 503 U.S. at 110 (emphasis added). Although SMCRA was intended to establish a nationwide program of minimum standards for protecting health, safety, and the environment, 30 U.S.C. S 1202(a), Congress also explicitly found that mined areas across the nation had such a range of environmental and physical conditions that the primary governmental responsibility for developing and regulating each state’s program should rest with that state, with the federal role restricted to limited oversight and enforcement only if the state did not do so. S 1201(f). Indeed, the laws in the various states differ because the terrains and environments of the various states differ; if, then, any violation of state law were a violation of federal law, there would be different federal law in every primacy state. Finally, there is no explicit incorporation of each state’s standards even into the separate C.F.R. subchapters devoted to each state’s program, nor do the federal regulations evidence the intent to incorporate state standards with which plaintiffs credit them. Nor, of course, could they incorporate state standards, for if Congress could empower the OSM to incorporate state law into federal law by agency action via the OSM’s regulations such that states could be sued by citizens in federal court, the limitations on Congress’s authority to override the Eleventh Amendment by means of legislation would be rendered a virtual nullity. 25 Plaintiffs also rely heavily on our decision in Geis v. Board of Educ. of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 774 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1985), where we found that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), formerly known as the Education of the Handicapped Act, explicitly incorporated New Jersey educational standards. To be sure, in both the IDEA and SMCRA the states are given considerable latitude in establishing the applicable standards, subject to a floor mandated by federal law. Id. at 581. But there are important differences between the two statutes. First, as we have discussed, the incorporation of state standards is not explicit in SMCRA. Second, in the IDEA the federal government retains considerable authority to enforce the applicable state standards, id., whereas in SMCRA federal enforcement authority is in large measure restricted to situations where imminent danger to the public or imminent environmental harm is threatened or where the state has defaulted in enforcing its program -- SMCRA, in other words, emphasizes the mutually exclusive jurisdiction to regulate by either the particular state or the federal government. Third, in the IDEA, which, unlike SMCRA, is a true cooperative federalism statute, Congress granted state and federal courts concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes. In sum, then, SMCRA indicates a clear distinction between state and federal law for regulatory purposes, for the enforcement of violations, and for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. The IDEA does not. Separate and apart from the reasons why Pennsylvania’s program was not incorporated or codified into federal law, it would have made little sense to have done so. The federal standards set forth in SMCRA are simply ones which a state must meet initially for its proposed program to qualify for exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of surface mining within that state. When a state then enacts laws that outline its duties in regulating such mining, it is those state laws that become directly applicable; the federal law and regulations, which continue to provide the‘blueprint’ against which to evaluate the State’s program, ‘drop out’ as operative provisions, even though the relevant language in the State law is identical to that in the federal law. Bragg, 248 F.3d at 289, 296. Of course, if a state does not fulfill the duties outlined by those state laws, then either the 26 United States (in the person of the Secretary), the state, or injured citizens may step in to ensure compliance. The Secretary may step in to withdraw approval of the state’s ineffective program or a part thereof and to enforce, in federal court, federal provisions and sanctions for violations of the minimum standards set forth in SMCRA. 30 U.S.C. SS 1254, 1271. The state shall, upon notice from any person, conduct an inspection of the alleged violation. 52 Pa. Stat. Ann. SS 1396.18c(b), 1406.13(c). And injured citizens, as they have done here, may file suit to enforce the provisions and standards delineated under state law, and Pennsylvania has consented to be sued in state court. 52 Pa. Stat. Ann. SS 1396.18c(a), 1406.13. Suit for violations of state law brought against a state or its officials, however, may simply not be brought in federal court. The absence of incorporation also illustrates why, as we discussed earlier, the arrangement is not true cooperative federalism. As the Bragg Court put it, SMCRA, unlike other cooperative federalism statutes, exhibitsextraordinary and, indeed, unparalleled deference to the states, and a careful and deliberate encouragement ofexclusive state regulation. Id. at 293, 294. In turn, this lack of true cooperative federalism and mutual jurisdiction defeats one of plaintiffs’ criticisms of Bragg. They argue that Bragg wrongfully held that the federal government is divested of direct regulatory authority under the Interior Board of Land Appeals’14 holdings. In particular, they rely on Central Ohio Coal Co. v. OSMRE, 140 IBLA 1, 6 (July 31, 1997), which holds that while a primacy state has primary jurisdiction for enforcement of an approved state program, that jurisdiction is not exclusive, and OSM has the authority to enforce the state program on a mine-by-mine basis under proper circumstances. While at least the latter point is correct, it is clear from Central Ohio that the OSM’s jurisdiction does not reach the full enforcement authority for which plaintiffs hope. The oversight jurisdiction there was the authority vested in the OSM to inspect specific _________________________________________________________________ 14. The Interior Board of Land Appeals is part of the Secretary of the Interior’s Office. It hears, among other matters, appeals from decisions rendered by Departmental officials relating to . . . the conduct of surface coal mining under the [SMCRA]. 43 C.F.R.S 4.1(b)(3). 27 mines, and, if violations were observed, to issue violation notices. See 30 C.F.R. S 843.12(a)(2). Importantly, such notice is given to both the permittee and to the state, so that appropriate action can be taken by the State. Id. (emphasis added). Because the state has primary authority, only if the state fails to act within ten days is further action taken by the OSM, either by issuing another violation notice or a cessation order. This deference to the state’s authority clearly indicates that enforcement by the federal government is a last resort; jurisdiction is hardly shared.15 Indeed, as the Hodel Court observed, SMCRA contemplated enforcement responsibility lying with either the State or Federal Government. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 269. According to Bragg, to construe SMCRA otherwise would circumvent the carefully designed balance that Congress established between the federal government and the States because the effect of a citizen suit to enjoin officials in a primacy State to comport with the federal provisions establishing the core standards for surface coal mining would end the exclusive State regulation and undermine the federalism established by the Act. Thus, rather than advancing the federal interest in preserving this statutory design, [plaintiffs’] interpretation would frustrate it. 248 F.3d at 295 (emphasis in original). This is so because, again, if a state fails to properly administer the provisions and the OSM has done nothing or too little, citizens can sue in state court to enforce the state law standards.16 52 _________________________________________________________________ 15. 30 C.F.R. S 843.11 is even stronger, allowing the OSM to order the cessation of surface mining activity when--consistent with SMCRA’s balancing of societal and economic interests--there is imminent danger to health or to the environment. Id. S (a)(1). Again, this reluctance to interfere absent imminent danger suggests a deference to state enforcement and an intent to allow federal enforcement only as a last resort. The provisions of 30 U.S.C. S 1271, allowing the revocation of a deficient state program, are similarly to be applied after notice to the state or when there is imminent danger. 16. This is not to adopt the controversial suggestion in Justice Kennedy’s Coeur d’Alene opinion that the availability of a state forum to hear a dispute should, virtually without more, bar application of the Ex parte 28 Pa. Stat. Ann. SS 1396.18c(a), 1406.13. They can also bring suit against the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and the Director of the OSM under 30 U.S.C. S 1270 as, of course, they have done here in Counts Nine through Eleven. Plaintiffs’ fall-back position is that even if state law is not incorporated into federal law, Seif has a federally imposed duty to implement specific state provisions that triggers the Ex parte Young exception; in essence, this was the question certified by the District Court. That duty is purportedly based on 30 C.F.R. S 733.11, which does no more than require Pennsylvania to implement, administer, and enforce its program in accordance with SMCRA, this chapter, and the provisions of the Pennsylvania program. The District Court did not credit this federal duty argument, observing that to allow a federal court to sit in judgment of a state concerning the state’s duty to satisfy its own regulations contradicts the spirit of the Eleventh Amendment and the Ex parte Young doctrine. Indeed, it seems, if there is such a federal duty, the Eleventh Amendment would become an irrelevancy. In support of their federal duty argument, plaintiffs point to Barnes v. Cohen, 749 F.2d 1009 (3d Cir. 1984), where we rejected a Pennhurst argument in the context of Pennsylvania’s administration of the Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. That program involved state payments to needy families that were matched with federal funds. In order to qualify for the _________________________________________________________________ Young doctrine. 521 U.S. at 270-74. That suggestion has been rejected by all but one other Member of the Court, the Chief Justice. Nevertheless, the opportunity to redress violations in state court emphasizes the primary jurisdiction enjoyed by Pennsylvania. Parenthetically, it appears that both the Bragg Court and the District Court did adopt the conclusion, again joined in only by Justice Kennedy and the Chief Justice, that a federal court, in determining whether to exercise jurisdiction over a state official, must engage in a case-by-case analysis of a number of concerns, including whether a state forum is available. That error, however, did not affect the principal basis of the Bragg and District Courts’ holdings, i.e. the plain language of SMCRA and the Supreme Court’s Pennhurst decision. 29 matching funds program, states were required to set criteria to determine a minimum income that would qualify a family for funds, and to determine a payment level of how much the state would actually pay. States were givena great deal of discretion under the AFDC as to both sets of criteria. Everett v. Schramm, 772 F.2d 1114, 1115 (3d Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs brought suit alleging violations of the standards Pennsylvania had established, and we concluded that injunctive relief against the state official was not precluded by the Eleventh Amendment. We noted the intensely federal nature of the AFDC program as well as its requirement that state plans  ‘be in effect in all political subdivisions of the State, and, if administered by them, be mandatory upon them.’ 42 U.S.C. S 602(a)(1). Barnes, 749 F.2d 1019 & n.8. In brief, plaintiffs here urge that we interpret SMCRA as, in Barnes, we interpreted the AFDC, finding that it [requires] the state to adhere to its own regulations, at least so long as the regulations are still in effect. . . . [In acting inconsistently] with the state regulation[, t]he Pennsylvania officials, then, were not adhering to their own regulations and, consequently, violated the state . . . plan, thereby transgressing federal law. Thus, the Pennhurst case is inapplicable and injunctive relief against the state officials is not precluded. Id. at 1019 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). Everett came to a similar conclusion, allowing a Section 1983 suit to go forward. 772 F.2d at 1118-19. Barnes is simply inapplicable. First, of course, Barnes addressed the incorporation of the state criteria into the federal AFDC statute, and not any federal regulation that might impose or purport to impose an ongoing federal duty. We have explained above why the incorporation argument must be rejected in the SMCRA context. Relatedly-- a point that we have also made above -- the interplay of federal and state governments in SMCRA is more limited than in other cooperative federalism statutes such as the Clean Water Act, the IDEA, or the intensely federal AFDC at issue in Barnes and Everett. The federal agencies administering those statutes, for example, at no point drop out of that administration as the OSM does under SMCRA. 30 The language and structure of the AFDC mandated the result in Barnes and the language and structure of the IDEA mandated the result in Geis; similarly, the unique language and structure of SMCRA mandate a different result here. Further, the federal duty argument makes as little sense as the incorporation or codification argument, for many of the same reasons. State standards with reference to surface coal mining operations are specifically crafted to a specific state’s conditions and may, and frequently do, exceed federal minima in stringency. Where they do, a scenario can easily be envisioned in which state standards are not being met but the minimum standards established by federal law are (assuming, of course, that federal standards were operative after approval of a state program, which, as we have discussed, they are not). Under plaintiffs’ theory, a federal duty to enforce state standards would exist even though no standard established by federal law was being violated. It simply stretches 30 C.F.R. S 733.11 too far to say that it imposes a duty under federal law to implement state law. Once primacy was granted, Seif ’sduty to implement the Pennsylvania program on a day-to-day basis arose under state law. We thus answer with a resounding yes the certified question which asked whether Seif was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court as to allegations of continuing violations of duties under the [approved] Pennsylvania program. . . .