Opinion ID: 2631627
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Language and Construction

Text: ¶ 20 Contrary to the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals, our reading of RCW 9.35.020 convinces us that the actual use of another's single means of identification or financial information may be an element of the offense of identity theft, but not always. The language of the statute reveals that the legislature intended to establish an offense which has two elementsfirst, the accused must have engaged in a proscribed act involving another's means of identity or financial information and, second, the accused must have done so with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, a crime. Former RCW 9.35.020(1). As indicated by the use of the word or, the proscribed acts are disjunctive. Thus, under the statute's express language, use is a way to commit identity theft, but it is not the only way. An individual also commits identity theft when he has either possessed, obtained, used or transferred a means of another's identification or information with the requisite intent. ¶ 21 This is not to suggest that the statute does not allow an accused to be charged with multiple counts of identity theft. Under RCW 9.35.020(1), identity theft is a crime committed against each person whose identity has been stolen. Therefore, there would not be a constitutional violation if the State charged an accused with a different count each time he uses, possesses, transfers, or obtains a separate individual's means of identification or financial information. [9] Thus, Leyda could have been properly charged with multiple counts of identity theft if he had obtained, used, etc., the stolen credit cards of two or more persons. But, that is not the factual scenario here, the record showing that Leyda obtained, possessed, etc., a single credit card of one other individual, Ms. Austin. Thus, the State improperly charged him with multiple thefts of Austin's identity, who, common sense suggests, has only one identity that can be unlawfully appropriated. ¶ 22 Former RCW 9.35.020(2)(a) and (b) lend further support to a conclusion that the legislature did not intend that each use constitutes a separate unit of prosecution. Similar to RCW 9.35.020(1), these sections distinguish the manner by which the crime of identity theft can be committed. Under former RCW 9.35.020(2)(a) and (b), an offender who actually uses another's single piece of identification or financial information multiple times is subject to only one unit of prosecution, with the degree of the crime determined by the aggregate economic value of what he obtained while using the information or identification. Accord State v. Turner, 102 Wash.App. 202, 209, 6 P.3d 1226 (2000) (courts may look to the value element to ascertain legislative intent for the unit of prosecution). However, even if the offender does not use the stolen means of identification or information to obtain anything of value or if nothing of value is obtained by the use, the defendant has still committed the crime of identity theft due to an act of obtaining, possessing, or transferring another's identification or information. Former RCW 9.35.020(2)(b). ¶ 23 The State and the dissent take issue with Leyda's contention that if the legislature intended each discrete use to constitute a separate unit of prosecution, then the phrase aggregate total as that term as used in the statute is superfluous. Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 11. We agree with Leyda's reading. Under the plain language of the statute, when charging identity theft, the prosecutor must, under former RCW 9.35.020(2), determine whether the stolen identification or financial information was actually used. If it was, then the prosecutor aggregates the total value of credit, money, goods, or services obtained by the use in order to charge the crime in the first or second degree. When read in conjunction with RCW 9.35.020(1) creating the identity theft unit of prosecution, the aggregate total language in subsection .020(2) penalizes a defendant for his course of conduct after he steals another's identity. The penalty is not calculated, as the State suggests, by separating each use into a separate transaction and aggregating the total value obtained during that particular transaction to determine the degree of crime. Instead, the statute requires aggregation of the total amount of value obtained by use of the stolen means. ¶ 24 To aggregate means [t]o collect into a whole. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 72 (8th ed.2004). To give effect to the words aggregate total, the statute must be read to require all the accused's uses of the means of another individual's stolen identification or financial information be treated as a single continuing offense in order for the prosecutor to collect the value obtained into a whole. To read the statute another way reads out the word aggregate, running afoul of the requirement that a court not read out express language from a statute. State v. Azpitarte, 140 Wash.2d 138, 142, 995 P.2d 31 (2000).