Opinion ID: 796039
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Flawed Indictment

Text: 86 No principle of procedural due process is more clearly established than that notice of the specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial of the issues raised by that charge, if desired, are among the constitutional rights of every accused in a criminal proceeding in all courts, state or federal. Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201, 68 S.Ct. 514, 92 L.Ed. 644 (1948); see also Valentine v. Konteh, 395 F.3d 626, 631 (6th Cir.2005) ([A]n indictment is only [constitutionally] sufficient if it (1) contains the elements of the charged offense, (2) gives the defendant adequate notice of the charges, and (3) protects the defendant against double jeopardy.). 17 These fundamental principles of procedural fairness apply with no less force at the penalty phase of a trial in a capital case than they do in the guilt-determining phase of any criminal trial. Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14, 16, 99 S.Ct. 235, 58 L.Ed.2d 207 (1978). Joseph claims that he was denied due process because the flawed indictment failed to give him adequate notice of the capital specification. The Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged the error in the indictment, but it concluded that Joseph had received sufficient notice of the correct capital specification and that the error had not prejudiced his defense. Joseph II, 653 N.E.2d at 291-92. 87 Joseph principally relies on Lucas v. O'Dea, 179 F.3d 412 (6th Cir.1999). There, a person was shot and killed in the course of a robbery committed by Lucas and two other men. Lucas was indicted for intentional murder, which required proof that he shot the victim. The only witness testified that he did not know which of the robbers fired the fatal shot, and Lucas's entire defense was that he did not shoot the victim. Despite the intentional-murder charge in the indictment, the jury was given instructions for wanton murder, for which it was immaterial who fired the shot. The state supreme court upheld the conviction, characterizing it as a conviction for wanton murder. We concluded that in these circumstances, Lucas had been deprived . . . of his Fourteenth Amendment right to notice of the charges against him. Id. at 417. We conclude likewise here: much as Lucas was indicted for one crime (intentional murder) but convicted of another (wanton murder), Joseph, too, was indicted for one asserted capital specification (being the principal offender in commission of the kidnapping) but convicted of another (being the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder). Indeed, the lack of notice is arguably even worse here, as Joseph was initially indicted under a specification that did not even exist. 88 In granting relief on this claim, the district court, relying on United States v. Ford, 872 F.2d 1231, 1235-36 (6th Cir. 1989) (explaining that an amendment to an indictment is prejudicial per se), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 843, 111 S.Ct. 124, 112 L.Ed.2d 93 (1990), held that the error in Joseph's indictment was not subject to harmless-error review. The district court held in the alternative that the error was not harmless in this case. Given the Supreme Court's decision in Esparza II (discussed above), we think it prudent to engage in the harmless-error analysis. 18 For the reasons similar to those that have already been discussed above, we conclude that the due-process violation had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict, Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted), and therefore was not harmless. Moreover, it was objectively unreasonable for the state court to conclude otherwise.