Opinion ID: 185026
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Communications Act of 1934

Text: As mentioned above, Lakeshore claims that the Commission's deadline rule violates the Communications Act of 1934because it requires payment of the hearing fee prior to formaldesignation of the application for hearing. Under s 8 of theAct, as added by the COBRA in 1986, the Commission isrequired simply to assess and collect a charge for a comparative hearing; the time for its payment is not specified. Theconference report accompanying the 1986 legislation, however, describes the hearing fee as [t]he charge levied when anapplication is designated for hearing. H.R. Conf. Rep. No.99-453, at 427 (1985). Lakeshore therefore argues that theCongress expressed its intention that the hearing fee not belevied--let alone made payable--before an application is formally designated for hearing. Because the Congress committed administration of the Actin general, and of s 8 in particular, to the Commission, see 47U.S.C. ss 154(i) and 158(f), Lakeshore's challenge to theagency's statutory authority is governed by the two-stepanalysis of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837(1984). Under Chevron step one, we ask whether Congresshas directly spoken to the precise question at issue. Id. at842. If so, then we must give effect to the unambiguouslyexpressed intent of Congress. Id. at 843. If not, thenunder Chevron step two we will defer to the agency's inter- pretation of the statute if it is reasonable in light of the text,the structure, and the purpose of that enactment. See id. As for Chevron step one, we cannot say that the Congresshas spoken to the issue and made the hearing fee payableonly after the application is formally designated for hearing. Clearly, s 8 itself is silent on the question when the hearingfee must be paid; it requires only that the Commission shallassess and collect application fees. Nor does the apparentpurpose behind s 8--to recapture the costs of regulation-- have any implication for what the Congress must have intended with respect to the deadline for paying the hearing fee tocover those costs. Finally, the conference report contains noevidence at all that the Congress intended to preclude theCommission from changing the timing of payment. Therelevant fragment is: 2.c. Hearing Charge--The chargelevied when an application is designated for hearing. H.R.Conf. Rep. No. 99-453, at 427 (1985). This description appears only in the legislative history, not in the statute itself; moreover, it is but an entry in a list describing 80 differentfees being newly imposed by the Congress in the COBRA. We will not, based upon nothing more than this itemization inthe conference report, attribute to the Congress a definitiveintent upon a subject as to which the statute itself is silent. With respect to Chevron step two, the important feature ofthe present rule is that it ties the time for payment of thehearing fee to the Commission's acceptance of mutually exclusive applications. That event marks the beginning of aprocess that will, unless the applicants settle, lead inexorablyto a comparative hearing. See Report & Order, 6 F.C.C.R.157, p 6. Considering that the Act directs the Commission toassess and collect a fee for such a hearing, we can hardlysay it is unreasonable for the Commission to demand payment of the fee when the hearing first becomes necessary,rather than waiting for the formality of the HDO in which thehearing is scheduled and the issues are set out. We concludethat the Commission's current rule on the hearing fee deadline reflects a reasonable interpretation of s 8 of the Communications Act.