Opinion ID: 6320574
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Judgment for Altech

Text: In partially reversing the trial court’s summary judgment for Altech, the court of appeals held that the G-Max report created a fact issue as to whether Altech breached its warranty that the field would not exceed a G-Max rating of 140 throughout its first eight years. 634 S.W.3d at 94–95. As noted, the court of appeals held that the G-Max report remained in the summary judgment record, despite the trial court’s express oral ruling sustaining Altech’s written objection to the report, because that ruling was never reduced to writing. Id. Altech argues that the court of appeals erred in requiring a written order and discounting the trial court’s on-the-record oral ruling, while the District maintains that allowing any consideration of the reporter’s record on 13 summary judgment review would amount to “a major revision to summary judgment and appellate procedure.” For the reasons discussed below, we agree with Altech and hold that the court of appeals erred in considering and relying on the G-Max report to reverse the trial court’s summary judgment. 7 It is well settled that while “[t]he same evidentiary standards that apply in trials also control the admissibility of evidence in summaryjudgment proceedings,” “the rules of error preservation also apply.” Seim v. Allstate Tex. Lloyds, 551 S.W.3d 161, 163–64 (Tex. 2018). Thus, to complain on appeal about defects in the form of summary judgment evidence, a party must both timely object and secure a ruling from the trial court on the objection. Id. at 164; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(f) (stating that a defect in the form of summary judgment evidence provides no “grounds for reversal unless specifically pointed out by objection by an opposing party with opportunity, but refusal, to amend”). Without both an objection and a ruling, the complained-of evidence remains part of the summary judgment record and should be considered by the court of appeals in reviewing the trial court’s judgment. Seim, 551 S.W.3d at 166; TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a) (stating that preservation of a complaint for appellate review requires that the record show both (1) the complaint 7 Altech and FieldTurf argue that the District waived the argument that a written order on Altech’s objection to the G-Max report was required by failing to raise it until the reply brief in the court of appeals. The District responds that it had no reason to raise the issue until Altech and FieldTurf argued in their appellees’ briefs that the report could not be considered despite the absence of a written order to that effect. Because we disagree with the District that a written order was required, we need not address whether the issue was waived. 14 was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion and (2) the court expressly or implicitly ruled, or refused to rule, on the request or objection). In Seim, we explained that before Rule 33.1 was amended in 1997 to allow for an “implicit” ruling, “it was ‘well settled’ that trial courts must expressly rule on objections in writing for error to be preserved.” 551 S.W.3d at 165 (citation omitted). The amendment led to a conflict among the courts of appeals regarding whether a trial court may “implicitly” rule on an objection to summary judgment evidence merely by granting the summary judgment motion. Id. at 164. Confirming that a ruling may be implied only if “the implication was ‘clear,’” we held in Seim that an order granting a party’s motion for summary judgment does not in itself clearly imply a ruling sustaining the party’s objections to summary judgment evidence, at least where “sustaining the objections was not necessary for the trial court to grant summary judgment.” Id. at 166 (citing In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d 163, 165 (Tex. 2003)). The District argues that while Seim “opened up the possibility that a written order could implicitly constitute [a ruling sustaining an objection to evidence] where the only way the ruling could have been reached is by necessarily sustaining [the] objection,” it did not “suggest that summary judgment review was now opened up to include rulings on reporter’s transcripts.” Of course, Seim addressed only the issue presented in that case, but we were careful to note in presenting the facts that the trial court had “neither signed the [proposed] order sustaining [the party’s] objections nor otherwise ruled on them.” Id. at 15 163 (emphasis added). And our conclusion that the objected-to evidence remained in the record was premised on the observation that “nothing in this record serves as a clearly implied ruling by the trial court on [the] objections.” Id. at 166 (emphasis added). By contrast, a trial court’s onthe-record, unequivocal oral ruling on an objection to specific evidence could hardly be more “clear.” Several courts of appeals have held as much, concluding that where the record shows the trial court heard argument and documented its express rulings on the pertinent objections in the reporter’s record, the rulings need not be reduced to writing to satisfy Rule 33.1. E.g., Birnbaum v. Atwell, No. 01-14-00556-CV, 2015 WL 4967057, at  (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 20, 2015, pet. denied); Columbia Rio Grande Reg’l Hosp. v. Stover, 17 S.W.3d 387, 395–96 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.) (holding that the absence of a written order overruling objections to summary judgment evidence was unnecessary to preserve error where the reporter’s record of the summary judgment hearing revealed that the trial court explicitly overruled the objections). 8 8 See also Ordonez v. Solorio, 480 S.W.3d 56, 63 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.) (“Failure to obtain written rulings on objections to summary judgment evidence waives the issue, unless . . . something in the record reflect[s] that the trial court ruled on the objections.”); Kothmann v. Cook, No. 07-05-00335-CV, 2007 WL 1075171, at  (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 11, 2007, no pet.) (holding that where a hearing has been held on the motion, and the trial court has clearly and unequivocally sustained the objection, the objected-to evidence does not form part of the summary judgment evidence); Rogers v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 41 S.W.3d 196, 200 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (“A party objecting to the competency of summary judgment proof must obtain a ruling on its objection or obtain a written order signed by the trial judge and entered of record, or the objection is waived and the proof remains a part of the summary judgment record.” (emphasis added)). 16 We agree with the reasoning of these decisions. A trial court’s on-therecord, unequivocal oral ruling on an objection to summary judgment evidence qualifies as a ruling under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1, regardless of whether it is reduced to writing. We do not view this holding as a significant shift regarding consideration of a reporter’s record in reviewing a summary judgment on appeal. Under our procedural rules, oral testimony may not be received at the summary judgment hearing. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). A motion for summary judgment must be in writing, and “[i]ssues not expressly presented to the trial court by written motion, answer or other response shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal.” Id.; see also City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 677 (Tex. 1979) (holding that under Rule 166a(c), “both the reasons for the summary judgment and the objections to it must be in writing and before the trial judge at the hearing”). Because issues, grounds, and testimony in support of and in opposition to summary judgment may not be presented orally, a reporter’s record of such a hearing is generally unnecessary for appellate purposes. McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 343 n.7 (Tex. 1993); see also Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264, 291 n.141 (Tex. 2004) (holding that the trial court did not err in denying a party’s request for a court reporter to transcribe the summary judgment hearing). 9 9 By the same token, appellate courts do not consult the reporter’s record of a summary judgment hearing to determine the trial court’s grounds, if any, for its ruling on a summary judgment motion. See Gonzales v. Thorndale Coop. Gin & Grain Co., 578 S.W.3d 655, 657–58 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.). 17 Our holding today does not alter that general principle. As a practical matter, sometimes summary judgment hearings are transcribed, and sometimes they are not; the best practice for a party objecting to summary judgment evidence is to secure a written order on the objection from the trial court. But if no such order is issued, and the reporter’s record of the hearing reveals an unequivocal oral ruling on the objection, that ruling is sufficient for error-preservation purposes. Here, Altech objected in writing to the G-Max report on authenticity and other grounds, and the District was given an opportunity to supplement the report before the summary judgment hearing. As noted, the parties presented additional argument on the objection at the hearing. The trial court then stated, “I’m . . . going to sustain your objection and Altech’s motion for summary judgment is granted.” No further written order was required, and, contrary to the court of appeals’ conclusion, the G-Max report did not “remain[] a part of the summary-judgment proof.” 634 S.W.3d at 94–95. 10 Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in relying on the report to conclude that a 10 Altech alternatively argues that because the report is “wholly unauthenticated,” it cannot serve as summary judgment evidence regardless of whether Altech preserved error under Rule 33.1. We need not reach this argument, but we note that the District responds by arguing, in part, that “the report was not unauthenticated.” To the extent the District now argues that the trial court erred in sustaining Altech’s objection to the report, the District made no such argument in the court of appeals—in either its opening brief or its reply brief. Instead, it argued only that the G-Max report remained a part of the summary judgment record due to the absence of a written order. We will not consider whether Altech’s objection to the report was improperly sustained when the court of appeals was given no opportunity to do so. See In re K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d 923, 928 (Tex. 2005). 18 genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the turf’s G-Max ratings exceeded those required by Altech’s warranty. The District alternatively argues that even if the G-Max report is not considered, the court of appeals’ judgment may nevertheless be affirmed because the report was cumulative of other evidence attached to Altech’s own summary judgment motion that created a fact issue on the G-Max warranty claim. See Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215–16 (Tex. 2003) (to be entitled to summary judgment under Rule 166a(c), the movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law). Specifically, the District argues that the same fact reflected in the G-Max report—that the field exceeded permissible shock-absorption levels—was also reflected in Kunkel’s expert report, which was attached as an exhibit to Altech’s motion. We disagree. Kunkel opined in his report that G-Max testing of the District’s field “indicat[ed] values exceeding the permissible levels as set forth in the relevant standards and guidelines, such as ASTM, STC, FIFA, EN etc.” The contract between Altech and the District required that the turf fall within a specific G-Max rating range over the life of the warranty (between 100 and 140), as measured in accordance with ASTM Standard F355. Kunkel’s report generally references ASTM standards, but not a particular standard, and is silent about the numerical result of any G-Max testing. Although in reviewing a summary judgment we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and indulge reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor, Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005), the inference the District would have 19 us draw is not a reasonable one. Reading Kunkel’s report to indicate that the field’s G-Max rating exceeded 140 as measured in accordance with ASTM Standard F355 would be impermissible speculation. Accordingly, we hold that Kunkel’s report does not create a fact issue as to the District’s G-Max warranty claim and does not provide an independent basis on which to affirm the court of appeals’ judgment.