Opinion ID: 1664341
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Life Without the Possibility of Parole Instruction

Text: In 1993, the General Assembly amended the capital sentencing statutes to provide for the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. See 1993 Tenn.Pub.Acts ch. 473. Section 16 of chapter 473 provides that [t]his act shall take effect on July 1, 1993, the public welfare requiring it, and shall apply to all offenses committed on or after that date. The appellant argues that although his offense was committed before the effective date of the actit was committed on March 17, 1990he is nevertheless entitled to the instruction because his second sentencing hearing on remand occurred more than four years after the act was passed. The appellant also argues that the failure to instruct the jury on the punishment of life without parole violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, sections eight and sixteen of the Tennessee Constitution. For the reasons given herein, we hold that the appellant was not entitled to an instruction on life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and that such an instruction was not constitutionally required.
Before addressing the constitutional issues presented with respect to the propriety of this instruction, we first observe that the plain language of the statute applies only to cases in which the offense was committed after July 1, 1993, and therefore, the appellant was not statutorily entitled to the instruction. We have previously addressed this issue in State v. Cauthern, 967 S.W.2d 726, 734-36 (Tenn.1998), in which we first held that the statutory language prohibited a jury from considering life without the possibility of parole as a sentencing option where the offense was committed before July 1, 1993. In denying the defendant relief on this basis, we first noted that according to the plain language of the statute, the instruction was not available to the defendant because his offense was committed well before July 1, 1993. Id. at 735. We also held that the specific provisions of this act governed over the more general provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-13-204(k) (Supp.1996) and 39-11-112 (1991), which the defendant argued made the instruction a viable possibility for sentences imposed after July 1, 1993. [4] We concluded by finding no indication that the legislature intended that the option of life without parole apply retrospectively to offenses occurring before July 1, 1993. The appellant in this case argues that Cauthern cannot directly resolve this issue because the statute is ambiguous as to whether it applies to sentencing hearings occurring after the effective date of the act. As such, the appellant contends, any ambiguity should be weighed in favor of allowing the life without parole instruction. We disagree. First, the statute is not ambiguous. Although the statute does not mention sentencing hearings specifically, the statute is clear that it applies only to offenses committed on or after that date. We will not construe the plain, unambiguous language of the statute to give any forced or subtle construction which would extend or limit its meaning. State v. Butler, 980 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Tenn.1998); see also State v. Davis, 940 S.W.2d 558, 561 (Tenn.1997). Second, as evidenced by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-117(b) (1997), the General Assembly could have drafted the statute so as to apply the life without parole instruction to sentencing hearings if it had so desired. In stark contrast to the language of the statute at issue in this case, the language of section 40-35-117(b) specifically states that [u]nless prohibited by the United States or Tennessee constitution, any person sentenced on or after November 1, 1989, for an offense committed between July 1, 1982 and November 1, 1989, shall be sentenced under the provisions of this chapter [the 1989 Criminal Sentencing Reform Act]. (emphasis added). We have recently reaffirmed that this language requires sentencing according to the 1989 Act, absent any violation of due process, even if the offense was committed before the effective date of the act. See McConnell v. State, 12 S.W.3d 795 (Tenn.2000). Because the General Assembly has demonstrated its ability to draft statutes that apply sentencing changes to sentencing hearings, its failure to do so in this case must work against allowing the appellant to receive the life without parole instruction. Having reviewed our discussion of this issue in Cauthern , we see no justification to depart from the reasoning of that case. [5] The plain language of the statute permits the life without parole instruction to be given only in cases in which the offense was committed after July 1, 1993. The importance of the use of this language is reinforced by the fact that the corresponding language of the 1989 Criminal Sentencing Reform Act applies to all sentences imposed after its effective date. We further note that the General Assembly has made no effort to amend the life without parole statute since Cauthern to correct any apparent misunderstanding. Accordingly, we hold that the appellant was not entitled to receive an instruction on the punishment of life without the possibility of parole according to the plain language of the statute.
The appellant next argues that the failure to give a life without the possibility of parole instruction violates the federal and Tennessee Constitutions because it is contrary to society's evolving standards of decency. As evidence that the life without parole instruction is part of the evolving standards of decency, the appellant cites this state's adoption of the instruction in 1993 as well as the fact that of the thirty-eight states that currently have capital punishment schemes, at least thirty-five give the sentencing body the option of imposing life imprisonment without parole in lieu of a death sentence. The appellant also cites opinion polls and the purported practice of sentencing juries as further evidence of the nation's evolving standards of decency. Accordingly, Tennessee's own evolving standards of decency, the appellant argues, mandate that the sentencing option [of life without parole] be given when requested in all sentencing hearings after the Act's effective date. Again, we must disagree. A review of the federal case law on the application of the Eighth Amendment's evolving standards of decency doctrine reveals that doctrine provides both substantive and procedural protections against the imposition of cruel and unusual punishments. The substantive part of this doctrine ensures that no type of punishment will be inflicted that is inhuman and barbarous, see Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910), or that is excessive [in] length or severity, [or] greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged, id. at 371, 30 S.Ct. 544 (citing O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 12 S.Ct. 693, 36 L.Ed. 450 (1892)). The substantive protections of the evolving standards of decency doctrine in capital cases may be seen in the following cases from the United States Supreme Court, in which certain types of executions were held to constitute cruel and unusual punishment: Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 101 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988) (holding that the death penalty may not be imposed on persons fifteen years of age or younger); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) (prohibiting the execution of mentally incompetent persons); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977) (holding that a defendant convicted of rape, without more, cannot be given the death penalty); and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987) (limiting death eligibility based on accomplice liability). Beginning with Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment also took on a procedural aspect to ensure that the death penalty was not, in the words of Potter Stewart, wantonly or freakishly imposed. [6] Gregg stated that the concerns expressed in Furman [v. Georgia] that the penalty of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance. 428 U.S. at 195, 96 S.Ct. 2909. Since Gregg , these procedural aspects of the Eighth Amendment's evolving standards of decency doctrine have focused on ensuring that the system used to impose death is not one of standardless jury discretion. Id. at 428 U.S. 153, 195 n.47, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859. A review of the case law reveals that these procedural issues generally arise in two areas: (1) issues related to the channeling of the jury's discretion to impose death, see Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980); and (2) issues related to the notion of individualized sentencing and consideration of mitigating evidence, see Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978). As these cases demonstrate, so long as the system used to impose death is not rendered arbitrary or capricious in that the sentencing authority lacks adequate information or guidance, the procedural protections of the Eighth Amendment in capital cases have no application. Although the appellant argues that the failure to give an instruction regarding the punishment of life without the possibility of parole violates the evolving standards of decency doctrine, he has failed to show that his ineligibility for this instruction has rendered the Tennessee system of capital punishment arbitrary or capricious, or has in any way precluded the jury from considering his individual circumstances or the nature of his crime. For despite his ineligibility for the life without parole instruction, the appellant was given a full and fair opportunity to present to the jury evidence in mitigation of sentence, and from all indications, the jury carefully considered and weighed the mitigating evidence before imposing death. This instruction has never been required by the Eighth Amendment in capital cases, and we conclude that its absence in this case certainly did not turn otherwise constitutional procedures into ones infected with standardless discretion. The appellant argues that, given the option, juries in Tennessee have sentenced defendants to life without parole more times than they have imposed death. He draws from this statistic that the reliability of death sentences actually imposed subsequent to inclusion of the life without parole option has been enhanced. Once again, though, the focus of the Eighth Amendmentand of Article I, section sixteenis on the capital sentencing process as a whole. Simply stated, we can little see how the absence of this instruction has rendered the process so unreliable, or so arbitrary and capricious, as to violate the ban on cruel and unusual punishments. The jury in this case still heard all of the appellant's evidence presented in mitigation of sentence, and the jury was given constitutionally acceptable instruction and guidance as to the use of that evidence. Moreover, the jury independently considered and weighed this evidence against the two aggravating circumstances it found beyond a reasonable doubt, and it unanimously concluded that the aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. We simply are unable to conclude that the process by which the appellant was sentenced to death for his crimes was the result of standardless jury discretion, even without the life without parole instruction. Neither the Eighth Amendment, nor Article I, section 16, requires anything more. Cf. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605, 98 S.Ct. 2954. [7]
The appellant next argues that the life without parole instruction should have been given because death is in excess of that reasonably needed for incapacitation of the offender. Neither our statutes nor our case law has ever rested the overall philosophical justification for the death penalty upon the need for incapacitation. Rather, it is well recognized that the only two penological goals served by capital punishment are retribution and general deterrence of crime. See State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 190 (Tenn.1991); see also State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 340 (Tenn.1992) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 183, 96 S.Ct. 2909). In fact, our research has uncovered no Tennessee case in which incapacitation has even been cited as a legitimate penological goal supporting the death penalty, no doubt for the very reasons cited by the appellant. In response, the appellant argues that even though incapacitation may not be a legitimate goal of capital punishment generally, social science data indicate that it is reasonably likely that jurors return death sentences solely to prevent a defendant's release into the community. However, the appellant provides no support for this assertion, and even if taken as true, we see no indication from the record of this case that the appellant was sentenced to death by the jury, in whole or in part, for incapacitative reasons. The district attorney did not argue that the appellant needed to be incapacitated or removed from society, and the judge certainly gave no such instruction allowing incapacitation to be considered. Accordingly, we conclude that the appellant was not entitled to a life without parole instruction on the basis that juries impose death for reasons of incapacitation.
Last, the appellant argues that he has been denied the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, because other defendants, whose crimes were committed before July 1, 1993, have received a life without parole instruction. Even if correct, the appellant has succeeded only in showing that others similarly situated have been treated differently. A successful equal protection claim, however, also requires a showing that the decision not to give a life without parole instruction ha[d] a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Cf. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987); State v. Irick, 762 S.W.2d 121, 129 (Tenn.1988). There is no indication in this record that the decision not to instruct the jury on the punishment of life without parole was the result of any discriminatory purpose. Rather, it appears by all accounts that the trial court's actual reason for not instructing the jury on life without parole was because the court believed it had no jurisdiction to do so. This legitimate reason does not provide us with a sufficient basis to find discriminatory intent, and the appellant's assignment is accordingly overruled.