Opinion ID: 519284
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory Authority to Bind the Vessel Under Section 972

Text: 15 Ken Lucky also concedes that the master of the Ken Lucky, appointed by the owner, accepted the supplies. Ken Lucky contends that the master had no authority to accept the supplies and incur a lien against the vessel because of the no lien clauses in the charter agreements. However, such reasoning contradicts the language of Sec. 972, which states that a ship's master has presumed authority to incur a lien. See Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. M/V Grand Loyalty, 608 F.2d 197, 200 (5th Cir.1979) (chief officer who ordered services possessed management powers envisioned by Act and thus had presumed authority as well as actual authority to incur lien). 16 A claimant's dealings with an intermediary at the port rather than a charterer or owner does not preclude the existence of a lien. Reinholm Crane & Rigging Co., Inc. v. M/V Ocean Crown, 484 F.Supp. 935, 936 (W.D.Wash.1979). The parties agree that the order originated from Bulkferts. Eurostem, Bulkferts' managing agent, placed the order with Brook. Marine Fuel received a telex from Gray confirming that the owner authorized the order, identifying Fillette as Ken Lucky's local (husbanding) agent. Before delivering the bunkers, Marine Fuel notified Fillette of the order and Fillette arranged for delivery of the bunkers. Fillette received a telex from Bulkferts' domestic agent, WKM Ship Management Services, stating that WKM was arranging for a purchase of bunkers in the same amount for the ship. Ken Lucky's chief engineer accepted the bunkers, acknowledging receipt, with the approval of the master. The ship's master also had presumed authority to incur a lien under the Act. The vessel certainly benefited from the bunker supply. 17 We conclude that this sequence of events is sufficient to establish implied authority to incur a lien against the vessel for fuel. See Yacht, MARY JANE v. Broward Marine, Inc., 313 F.2d 516, 517 (5th Cir.1963) (implied authority existed because the real captain failed to object although he was aware of work being done for vessel); Reinholm, 484 F.Supp. at 936 (no objections from vessel's master, owner or charterer to obvious and prolonged services precluded summary judgment because material issue of fact remained as to the existence of implied authority); Jan C. Uiterwyk Co. v. M/V MARE ARABICO, 459 F.Supp. 1325, 1330-31 (D.Md.1978) (subcharterer was held to have had implied authority from the time charterer to procure the services because masters of the vessels who ordered the services were held to be agents of persons with apparent authority to bind the vessels, the time charterer and owner). 18 Moreover, the district court's reliance on the no lien clause to deny the lien thwarts the purpose of the statute by charging Marine Fuel with the onerous duty of resolving the ambiguities in the Sipra-Bulkferts-Eurostem-Brook relationship. Cf. Signal Oil, 310 U.S. at 280, 60 S.Ct. at 943 (purpose of lien act thwarted if courts compel the material-man furnishing supplies to the vessel to resolve the ambiguities which may be found in [the charter agreements]). We recently noted, construing a lien under the Preferred Ship Mortgage Act, that one of the purposes of the Maritime Liens Act, 46 U.S.C. [App.]Secs. 971-75 ... is to create liens in favor of those who furnish necessaries for the vessel's operation. Permitting [a] contrived financial scheme to prevail effectively destroys the liens of suppliers and subverts the purposes of the Maritime Liens Act. Wardley Int'l Bank, Inc. v. Nasipit Bay Vessel, 841 F.2d 259, 264 (9th Cir.1988) (citation omitted).