Opinion ID: 2594806
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Victims' Expressions of Fear of Defendant

Text: Richard Muniz, defendant's prison friend, testified that seven months before the murders, Eva Petersen called him and asked him to pick up some of defendant's belongings. The defense objected on hearsay and relevance grounds to proposed testimony by Muniz that the reason Petersen wanted him to remove defendant's belongings was because she was afraid of defendant and did not want him anywhere near her house. The prosecutor argued that the evidence was admissible under Evidence Code section 1250 to prove Petersen's state of mind. The prosecutor explained: I think that's relevant, to show the premeditation involved in this murder, in that . . . this was communicated to [defendant], first of all, by Mr. Muniz at some point; second, that she would not have let him into the house, that he would have had to have broken into the house, which I think shows some degree of premeditation and deliberation in the commission of the crime. The defense argued that the state of mind exception did not apply because the defense was not claiming that Petersen voluntarily admitted defendant into the residence. Furthermore, the defense argued that because the statement was made seven months before the murder, its relevance, if any, was speculative and the statement should be excluded under Evidence Code section 352. The trial court disagreed and overruled all objections to the evidence. The court said, As I understand it, the theory is that [Petersen] would not have voluntarily let him in; therefore, bearing upon the question of premeditation. . . . Sometime later in the trial, the trial court also admitted testimony from Robert Paredes that Carol Spadoni told him she did not want defendant living with her because she was afraid of him. The defense again objected on hearsay grounds and the prosecution again successfully argued that the evidence was relevant to her state of mind and why he wasn't allowed in Burlingame. . . . Again, I think that goes to premeditation for the murder, he knew he wasn't supposed to be in the area. Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously admitted the evidence of the victims' fear of defendant under the state-of-mind exception because their states of mind were not at issue. The Attorney General argues that the evidence was relevant to defendant's state of mind because it tended to show he was aware that the victims did not want him at their residence and that he would have to gain entrance surreptitiously. The Attorney General also adopts the prosecutor's argument that the evidence showed the victims' state of mind. In pertinent part, Evidence Code section 1250 creates an exception to the hearsay rule that permits admission of evidence of a statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation (including a statement of intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily health) . . . when: [¶] (1) The evidence is offered to prove the declarant's state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation at that time or any other time when it is itself an issue in the action; or [¶] (2) The evidence is offered to prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant. (Evid.Code, § 1250, subd. (a).) As our cases have made clear, `a victim's out-of-court statements of fear of an accused are admissible under section 1250 only when the victim's conduct in conformity with that fear is in dispute. Absent such dispute, the statements are irrelevant. [Citation.]' ( People v. Ruiz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 589, 608, 244 Cal.Rptr. 200, 749 P.2d 854.) In People v. Armendariz (1984) 37 Cal.3d 573, 209 Cal.Rptr. 664, 693 P.2d 243, we concluded that the victim's statement to his son that he was afraid because the defendant had demanded money and threatened to assault him if he did not comply, which was made 17 months before the defendant killed the victim, was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1250 because the victim's state of mind was not at issue. ( People v. Armendariz, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 585-586, 209 Cal.Rptr. 664, 693 P.2d 243.) [I]n this case there was no issue of fact as to [the victim's] conduct on the night of his death. Appellant did not claim that [the victim] admitted him into the house or otherwise behaved in a friendly manner toward him on the night of the killing. Nor did the evidence raise any question as to whether the killing had been accidental or justifiable. . . . Thus, [the victim's] state of mind was irrelevant and could not be used to justify admission of the disputed statement. ( Id. at p. 587, 209 Cal.Rptr. 664, 693 P.2d 243.) We reaffirmed this principle in People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 835, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 602, 69 P.3d 446 where we observed that [a] prerequisite to this exception to the hearsay rule is that the declarant's mental state or conduct be factually relevant. [Citations.] A murder victim's fear of the alleged killer may be an issue when the victim's state of mind is directly relevant to an element of the offense. [Citation.] That fear may also be in issue when, according to the defendant, the victim has behaved in a manner inconsistent with that fear [citation]. ( Id. at p. 872, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 602, 69 P.3d 446.) An instance of the former is where the victim's statement that she feared the defendant was relevant to whether the victim would have consented to the defendant's entry into her residence where burglary and robbery special circumstances were alleged. Lack of consent was material to burglary because it was material to the element of entry [citation], and was also material to robbery because it was material to the element of taking by means of force or fear [citation]. ( People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 723, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.) An instance of the latter is where the decedent's fear was relevant to disprove the defendant's claim that the victim was sitting on his lap and examining his gun when it accidentally discharged. ( People v. Lew (1968) 68 Cal.2d 774, 778-780, 69 Cal.Rptr. 102, 441 P.2d 942.) We agree with defendant that the victims' statements were inadmissible under section 1250 because the state of mind of the victims was not relevant to any disputed issue. Thus, to the extent the trial court admitted the statements under this theory, the trial court erred. However, threaded through the discussion of the admissibility of Petersen's statement was the prosecution's contention that, because the statement had been communicated to defendant by Muniz, it was generally admissible on the issue of premeditation. The trial court agreed that Petersen's statement had some bearing upon the question of premeditation. . . . To the extent that Petersen's statement was admitted to show its effect on defendant, the statement was not hearsay because it was not admitted for the truth  that is, that Petersen was afraid of defendant. (See People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 428-429, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391 [trial court erroneously excluded as hearsay testimony by defendant's mother of threats against her where defendant testified that such threats had led him to accept blame for shooting to protect his family; evidence of threats would not have been barred by the hearsay rule, for such evidence would not have been offered for its truth (i.e., that Thomas or Johnson actually intended to retaliate against defendant or his family), but for a different purpose: to show the effect of the statements on defendant]; People v. Jackson (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1670, 1680-1681, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 778 [evidence of threat admitted for nonhearsay purpose of showing consciousness of guilt].) However, [a] hearsay objection to an out-of-court statement may not be overruled simply by identifying a nonhearsay purpose for admitting the statement. The trial court must also find that the nonhearsay purpose is relevant to an issue in dispute. ( People v. Armendariz, supra, 37 Cal.3d 573, 585, 209 Cal.Rptr. 664, 693 P.2d 243.) Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action. (Evid.Code, § 210.) We review a trial court's relevance determination under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. ( People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, 973, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 131, 75 P.3d 53.) Evidence that defendant believed Petersen was afraid of him had some bearing on his mental state in going to visit the women  as the trial court expressed it he was not going for a friendly visit  and how he planned to approach the victims (by stealth as opposed to open confrontation) both of which, in turn, were relevant to premeditation. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion to the extent it admitted evidence of Petersen's statement for its effect on defendant and notwithstanding that the statement was communicated to him seven months before the murders. To the extent the victims' statements were erroneously admitted under section 1250, in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, the error was harmless under either the Watson standard ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243) for assessing the prejudicial effect of state error or the Chapman standard ( Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24, 87 S.Ct. 824) for evaluating the prejudicial effect of federal constitutional error.