Opinion ID: 202346
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: De Araujo's removal proceedings

Text: De Araujo is a native and citizen of Portugal who was lawfully admitted to the United States on September 4, 1973. He was six years old at the time. On January 6, 1992, De Araujo was convicted in Massachusetts state court of assault and battery with -2- a dangerous weapon and was sentenced to a two-and-a-half-year term of imprisonment. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 15. On April 6, 2000, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)1 issued De Araujo a Notice to Appear, charging him with removability pursuant to INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), for being an alien convicted of an aggravated felony.2 De Araujo failed to appear at his scheduled hearing before an Immigration Judge (IJ) on January 4, 2001 and was subsequently ordered removed in absentia. However, on April 1, 2001, De Araujo's Massachusetts assault and battery charge was vacated. He then moved to reopen proceedings on April 2, and the IJ granted the motion on July 6. 1 In March 2003, the relevant functions of the INS were transferred into the new Department of Homeland Security and reorganized into the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE). For simplicity, we refer to the agency throughout this opinion as the INS. 2 Under its definition of an aggravated felony, the INA includes a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of Title 18, but not including a purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). In turn, 18 U.S.C. § 16 defines a crime of violence as-- (a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or (b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. -3- On October 3, 2001, the INS amended the original charging document to include two additional charges of removability. The first additional charge alleged that De Araujo was removable on account of a November 7, 1995 Connecticut state conviction for assault on a Department of Corrections employee for which he received an eighteen-month sentence of imprisonment. The INS charged De Araujo with removability for the Connecticut assault under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), for being an alien convicted of an aggravated felony. The second additional charge alleged that De Araujo was removable because of a January 27, 2000 Massachusetts state conviction for illegal possession of a controlled substance. It appears that De Araujo was convicted on the same day for three different drug charges which had occurred on different days. Removability for the Massachusetts controlled substance violations was charged under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2)(A)(iii).3 3 The INS's amendment appears to mis-cite the relevant INA provisions. The INS charged that De Araujo was subject to removal under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) for having been convicted of an aggravated felony. The appropriate statute for an aggravated felony, however, is INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(A)(iii). The INS further charged that De Araujo was subject to removal under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) for having been convicted of a controlled substance offense, but the appropriate statute for a controlled substance offense is INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). -4- At a hearing before the IJ, De Araujo argued that he was eligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b and for relief under former section 212(c) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)4 (repealed 1996). The IJ found that De Araujo's Connecticut conviction for assault on a Department of Corrections employee constituted a crime of violence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) and therefore qualified as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(43)(F), which rendered him ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3).5 In addition, the IJ found 4 Under former section 212(c) of the INA, aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily proceed abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation, and who are returning to lawful unrelinquished domicile of 7 consecutive years, may be admitted at the discretion of the Attorney General without regard to certain specified grounds for exclusion. In re Edwards, 20 I. & N. Dec. 191, 194 (BIA 1990). Section 212(c) has been interpreted to allow discretionary relief for lawful permanent residents who have not proceeded abroad subsequent to the acts which rendered them deportable. In re Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26, 30 (BIA 1976). The exercise of discretion requires a balancing of positive and negative factors in the alien's case to determine whether relief is warranted. In re Edwards, 20 I. & N. at 195. De Araujo argued that since his 1995 conviction predated the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, which repealed § 212(c), he remained eligible for relief under former § 212(c). See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001) (holding that the repeal of section 212(c) did not apply retroactively to an alien who had pled guilty to an aggravated felony prior to the repeal). Unlike 8 U.S.C. § 1229b, see infra note 5, former section 212 did not contain the condition that a permanent resident seeking relief would be statutorily ineligible if the alien was convicted of an aggravated felony. 5 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), the Attorney General may cancel removal for certain permanent residents found to be inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien– -5- that De Araujo's multiple Massachusetts drug convictions rendered him ineligible for relief under former section 212(c) because the drug convictions occurred after the passage of IIRIRA and repeal of section 212(c). The IJ ordered De Araujo removed to Portugal on February 13, 2002. The IJ noted that De Araujo had a motion pending to vacate his Massachusetts drug convictions and that, if his motion was granted, he would become eligible for relief from removal under former section 212(c). B. De Araujo's appeal and motions to reopen proceedings with the BIA De Araujo filed a timely notice of appeal with the BIA and on May 8, 2002 requested an extension of time to file his appellate brief. The BIA granted De Araujo's motion and set a deadline of June 21. According to De Araujo, his counsel sent the brief via Federal Express on June 20. However, the brief did not reach the BIA until June 24, and the BIA rejected the brief as untimely.6 On July 8, De Araujo filed a motion to accept the latefiled brief; however, that same day, the BIA dismissed the appeal for failure to file a brief. De Araujo did not appeal the (1) has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than 5 years, (2) has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status, and (3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony. 6 Apparently, the wrong zip code had been provided for the BIA's address, although counsel for De Araujo maintains that the correct zip code was given to Federal Express. -6- dismissal to this Court but instead filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal with the BIA on July 26. The BIA denied De Araujo's motion on December 23. On January 23, 2003, De Araujo filed a motion to reopen his immigration proceedings with the BIA. The BIA denied this motion on March 7, stating that this motion was in essence a second motion to reconsider and therefore exceeded the numerical limits on motions to reconsider set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).7 On or about November 17, 2003, De Araujo filed a motion in Massachusetts state court to vacate his controlled substance convictions. De Araujo submitted a short affidavit in support of his motion to vacate, which indicated that he had been unable to understand the nature and effect of his pleas of guilty because of his problems with drug addiction.8 On November 19, a Massachusetts state court vacated De Araujo's drug convictions. The following day, De Araujo filed a request with the BIA to reopen proceedings sua sponte based on changed circumstances in his case. De Araujo argued that he should 7 Only one motion to reconsider with the BIA is allotted to each alien under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). 8 De Araujo's affidavit consisted of three sentences, stating I am presently serving time for violation of my probation. I entered guilty pleas in cases in 1999, and 1998 while I was addicted to both heroin and cocaine. I was so addicted that when I entered my pleas of guilty, that the only thing I remember was that I was not going to jail. -7- now be entitled to relief under former section 212(c) because his drug convictions had been vacated. De Araujo acknowledged that, under In re Pickering, 23 I. & N. Dec. 621 (BIA 2003), convictions vacated solely to avoid immigration consequences remain convictions for INA purposes. He also conceded that the state record was unclear as to the factual reasons for the state court's decision to vacate but argued that his affidavit regarding his addiction suggested that his pleas were not made knowingly or intelligently, and that the convictions were vacated in response to this affidavit. De Araujo requested the BIA to invoke its discretionary authority to reopen the case because of his clear eligibility for a 212(c) hearing. On March 22, 2004, the BIA denied the request to reopen proceedings sua sponte. The BIA found De Araujo's affidavit in support of his motion to vacate the Massachusetts convictions to be extremely limited in nature and stated that it would need more information before [it] [found] that [the] reason for vacating was sufficiently unrelated to the immigration consequences of his conviction. The BIA further found that De Araujo was undeserving of a section 212(c) waiver in the exercise of discretion, indicating that even if it were to reopen De Araujo's case, it would not grant his request for relief. It noted that De Araujo had previously been convicted of four criminal offenses and, while three of these had been vacated, none had been vacated because De -8- Araujo was not guilty of the crimes committed. The BIA also noted that, at the time he filed his request to the BIA to reopen proceedings sua sponte, De Araujo was incarcerated for parole violations. The BIA concluded that De Araujo's criminal actions, and apparent inability to comply with the terms of his probation do not support the reopening of proceedings to apply for discretionary relief which we do not believe he merits in the exercise of our discretion. C. De Araujo's petition for review De Araujo filed a timely petition for review with this Court, claiming (1) that the 1995 Connecticut conviction for assault against a Department of Corrections employee did not constitute an aggravated felony, and (2) that the BIA abused its discretion in failing to reopen his removal proceedings and, in doing so, violated his constitutional right to due process. De Araujo v. Ashcroft, 399 F.3d 84, 88-89 (1st Cir. 2005) (De Araujo I). On February 23, 2005, we dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction over either claim. Id. at 89. With regard to the first argument, we found that [w]hether [De Araujo's] 1995 conviction . . . did or did not amount to an aggravated felony is not an issue now open for review because that order became final on July 8, 2002, and De Araujo did not appeal that order to this court within 30 days as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). Id. at 88-89. We described the 30-day filing deadline as a strict -9- jurisdictional bar, which precluded us from considering his first argument. Id. at 89. Regarding the second argument, we found that we lacked jurisdiction to reach De Araujo's other claims on direct review because he remained removable as an aggravated felon. Id. at 89 (citing INA § 242(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)); Emile v. INS, 244 F.3d 183, 189 (1st Cir. 2001) (Because [defendant] was convicted of an aggravated felony, we have no authority to consider on direct review any other claim once we conclude that he was legitimately so classified.); Sousa v. INS, 226 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 2000) ([H]aving determined that [the petitioner] is removable as an aggravated felon, our authority to act in this case with respect to the removal proceeding, including incidental rulings on discretionary relief, is at an end.). D. De Araujo's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and transfer On May 10, 2005, De Araujo filed a habeas petition in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.9 However, the passage of the REAL ID Act, § 106, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 311 (2005), stripped the district court of habeas jurisdiction. The district court therefore transferred the case 9 Apparently, De Araujo filed yet another motion to reopen with the BIA on August 30, 2005. He based this motion on 8 C.F.R. § 1003.44, which allows eligible aliens to file a special motion seeking relief under former section 212(c) if the alien pled guilty to certain crimes before April 1, 1997. The BIA denied this motion pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.44(d), which states that aliens previously denied section 212(c) relief by an IJ or the BIA on discretionary grounds are not eligible for special reopening. De Araujo has not appealed this denial. -10- back to this Court, where we are to treat De Araujo's claims as ones for direct review. See REAL ID Act, § 106(c).