Opinion ID: 2812473
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Sovereign immunity implicates a trial court’s jurisdiction, and, when it applies, precludes suit against a governmental entity. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex. 2004); Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 853 (Tex. 2002). The State acknowledges this Court’s decisions to the effect that sovereign immunity is inapplicable when a suit challenges the constitutionality of a statute and seeks only equitable relief. See City of Elsa v. M.A.L., 226 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. 2007) (concluding “that the appeals court did not err by refusing to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims [against the city] for injunctive relief on alleged constitutional violations”); City of Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143, 149 (Tex. 1995) (determining that a plaintiff whose constitutional rights have been violated may sue the State for equitable relief). But referencing Texas Department of Insurance v. Reconveyance Services, Inc., 306 S.W.3d 256, 258-59 (Tex. 2010), and City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 370-72 (Tex. 2009), the State argues that our more recent decisions indicate that we may be departing from that rule. We are not. In Heinrich we decided that sovereign immunity does not prohibit suits brought to require state officials to comply with statutory or constitutional provisions. 284 S.W.3d at 372. But, to fall within this “ultra vires exception,” a suit must allege that a state official acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act, rather than attack the officer’s exercise of discretion. Id. The governmental entities themselves remain immune from suit, though, because unlawful acts of officials are not acts of the State. Id. at 372-73. Thus, we concluded that suits complaining of 7 ultra vires actions may not be brought against a governmental unit, but must be brought against the allegedly responsible government actor in his official capacity. Id. at 373. We reconfirmed the point in Reconveyance, where we held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear a suit against the Texas Department of Insurance. 306 S.W.3d at 258-59. We concluded that the claims were substantively ultra vires claims because the pleadings alleged the Department of Insurance had acted beyond its statutory authority. Id. That being so, the claims should have been brought against the appropriate state officials in their official capacities. Id. In this case, the Threaders did not plead that the Department and Commission officials exceeded the authority granted to them; rather, they challenged the constitutionality of the cosmetology statutes and regulations on which the officials based their actions. The State proposes that an official can act ultra vires either by acting inconsistently with a constitutional statute or by acting consistently with an unconstitutional one. It urges that the Threaders’ claims fall within the “acting consistently with an unconstitutional statute” category. But the premise underlying the ultra vires exception is that the State is not responsible for unlawful acts of officials. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372. The State’s proposal would effectively immunize it from suits claiming a statute is unconstitutional—an illogical extension of that underlying premise. Contrary to the State’s position, Heinrich and Reconveyance do not represent a departure from the rule that sovereign immunity is inapplicable in a suit against a governmental entity that challenges the constitutionality of a statute and seeks only equitable relief. See id. at 373 n.6. To the contrary, in Heinrich we clarified that “[f]or claims challenging the validity of . . . statutes . . . the Declaratory Judgment Act requires that the relevant governmental entities be made parties, and 8 thereby waives immunity.” Id. (citing Tex. Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432, 446 (Tex. 1994)). And we have reiterated the principle more recently. See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 621-22 & n.3 (Tex. 2011) (restating that state entities can be—and in some instances such as when the constitutionality of a statute is at issue, must be—parties to challenges under the UDJA); Tex. Lottery Comm’n v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628, 634 (Tex. 2010) (holding that allegations against the lottery commissioner were not ultra vires allegations because the claim challenged a statute and was not one involving a government officer’s action or inaction). Accordingly, because the Threaders challenge the validity of the cosmetology statutes and regulations, rather than complaining that officials illegally acted or failed to act, the ultra vires exception does not apply. The Department and the Commission are not immune from the Threaders’ suit.
Next, the State contends that the officials are immune from suit because the Threaders had to prove their claims in order to survive a plea to the jurisdiction. See Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372 (“To fall within this ultra vires exception, a suit must not complain of a government officer’s exercise of discretion, but rather must allege, and ultimately prove, that the officer acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act.”). The State argues that because the trial court granted summary judgment to the State on the merits, the Threaders did not prove a valid claim, rendering their pleadings insufficient to give the trial court jurisdiction. The State relies on Andrade v. NAACP of Austin, in which we held that the Secretary of State was immune from suit because the constitutional claims against her were non-viable. 345 S.W.3d 1, 6, 11-12, 18 (Tex. 9 2011). But, our conclusion there simply followed a line of decisions in which we held that claims were not viable due to basic pleading defects. Id. at 13-14. Andrade stands for the unremarkable principle that claims against state officials—like all claims—must be properly pleaded in order to be maintained, not that such claims must be viable on their merits to negate immunity. Id. Because the Threaders’ pleadings presented a viable claim, they were sufficient.
Next, the State employs the doctrines of standing, ripeness, and redundant remedies to argue that the courts below, and this Court, lack jurisdiction because the claims of the Threaders are not justiciable. We consider each doctrine in turn.
The standing doctrine identifies suits appropriate for judicial resolution. Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297, 305 (Tex. 2001). Standing assures there is a real controversy between the parties that will be determined by the judicial declaration sought. Id. (quoting Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 517-18 (Tex. 1995)). “[T]o challenge a statute, a plaintiff must [both] suffer some actual or threatened restriction under the statute” and “contend that the statute unconstitutionally restricts the plaintiff’s rights.” Garcia, 893 S.W.2d at 518. The State argues that Patel and Satani—whose claims are based solely on their status as threading salon owners—lack standing because they fail both prongs of the standing test. Generally, courts must analyze the standing of each individual plaintiff to bring each individual claim he or she alleges. Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 152 (Tex. 2012). However, “where there are multiple plaintiffs in a case, who seek injunctive or declaratory relief (or 10 both), who sue individually, and who all seek the same relief[,] . . . the court need not analyze the standing of more than one plaintiff—so long as that plaintiff has standing to pursue as much or more relief than any of the other plaintiffs.” Id. at 152 n.64. The reasoning is fairly simple: if one plaintiff prevails on the merits, the same prospective relief will issue regardless of the standing of the other plaintiffs. Id.; see also Andrade, 345 S.W.3d at 6 (“Because the voters seek only declaratory and injunctive relief, and because each voter seeks the same relief, only one plaintiff with standing is required.”). Here, Momin and Yogi, the threaders who received Notices of Alleged Violation, have standing, and the State does not contend otherwise. First, they have suffered some actual restriction under the challenged statute because TDLR initiated regulatory proceedings against each of them pursuant to their alleged violations of the Texas cosmetology statutes and regulations. And second, they are contending that the statute unconstitutionally restricts their rights to practice eyebrow threading. Accordingly, because Momin and Yogi have standing, we need not analyze the standing of Patel and Satani. The State also argues that because the Threaders seek attorneys’ fees, the relief ultimately awarded will not necessarily be identical. But standing is determined at the beginning of a case, and whether the relief ultimately granted is the same for all parties is not determinative of the question. Here, Momin and Yogi have standing to seek relief and that is all we need to determine. See Andrade, 345 S.W.3d at 6-11; Barshop v. Medina Cnty. Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 626-27 (Tex. 1996); Garcia, 893 S.W.2d at 518-19. 11
The State next argues that the claims brought by Patel, Satani, and Chamadia are not ripe because Patel, Satani, and Chamadia have not faced administrative enforcement. We disagree. Under the ripeness doctrine, courts must “consider whether, at the time a lawsuit is filed, the facts are sufficiently developed ‘so that an injury has occurred or is likely to occur, rather than being contingent or remote.’” Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849, 851-52 (Tex. 2000) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Thus, the ripeness analysis focuses on whether a case involves uncertain or contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated or may not occur at all. Id. at 852. Here, although Patel, Satani, and Chamadia have not yet faced administrative enforcement, the threat of harm is more than conjectural, hypothetical, or remote. Satani’s business, Browz and Henna, has received two warnings for employing unlicensed threaders, and he has been referred to TDLR’s legal department for enforcement. Patel and Satani risk $5,000 in penalties daily for employing unlicensed threaders. TEX . OCC. CODE §§ 51.302(a), 1602.403(c)(1). And Chamadia works at the same threading salon where Momin and Yogi were cited. Because at the time the lawsuit was filed Chamadia was performing threading services without a cosmetology license and Patel and Satani were employing threaders who did not have cosmetology licenses, these individuals were subject to a real threat of likely civil and criminal proceedings, as well as administrative proceedings that could result in penalties and sanctions. See Mitz v. Tex. State Bd. of Veterinary Med. Exam’rs, 278 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. dism’d by agr.) (holding that a 12 constitutional challenge to a state-licensing law is ripe when enforcement of the law is “sufficiently likely” to occur). Therefore, their claims are ripe.
The State also seeks to dismiss the claims of the Threaders who have received citations based on the redundant remedies doctrine. Under the redundant remedies doctrine, courts will not entertain an action brought under the UDJA when the same claim could be pursued through different channels. See, e.g., Tex. Mun. Power Agency v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 253 S.W.3d 184, 200 (Tex. 2007). The focus of the doctrine is on the initiation of the case, that is, whether the Legislature created a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity that permits the parties to raise their claims through some avenue other than the UDJA. See, e.g., Aaron Rents, Inc. v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 212 S.W.3d 665, 669 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.) (en banc) (“When a statute provides an avenue for attacking an agency order, a declaratory judgment action will not lie to provide redundant remedies.”); see also Alamo Express, Inc. v. Union City Transfer, 309 S.W.2d 815, 827 (Tex. 1958) (holding “an action for declaratory judgment does not lie” in a suit that asserts a “direct attack upon the [agency’s] order by appeal”). The State maintains that the Legislature has provided Momin and Yogi two alternative avenues under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA): (1) a suit for judicial review alleging that the administrative decision was “in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision,” TEX . GOV ’T CODE § 2001.174(2)(A); or (2) a suit for a pre-enforcement declaratory judgment alleging “that the rule or its threatened application interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, a legal right or privilege of the plaintiff.” Id. § 2001.038(a). The State contends that because either 13 of those APA provisions permits Yogi and Momin to file suits that would redress their alleged injuries, they may not pursue relief under the UDJA. We disagree with the State’s assertion that a favorable decision under Section 2001.174 of the APA—authorizing courts to review administrative decisions—would obviate the need for the relief the Threaders seek. See id. § 2001.174 (allowing state courts to reverse or remand existing agency orders, but not enjoin future ones). The available remedies on appeal from an administrative finding are limited to reversal of the particular orders at issue. Id. But the Threaders seek more than a reversal of the citations issued to Momin and Yogi. They seek prospective injunctive relief against future agency orders based on the statutes and regulations. Accordingly, because the declaration sought goes beyond reversal of an agency order, Section 2001.174 of the APA does not provide a redundant remedy. The State’s contention that Section 2001.038 of the APA creates an avenue for preenforcement declaratory judgment that an agency rule is invalid and would redress the Threaders’ alleged injuries is likewise unavailing. When a plaintiff files a proceeding that only challenges the validity of an administrative rule, the parties are bound by the APA and may not seek relief under the UDJA because such relief would be redundant. See Leeper, 893 S.W.2d at 443-44. The APA defines a rule as: (A) . . . a state agency statement of general applicability that: (i) implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy; or (ii) describes the procedure or practice requirements of a state agency; (B) includ[ing] the amendment or repeal of a prior rule; and 14 (C) . . . not includ[ing] a statement regarding only the internal management or organization of a state agency and not affecting private rights or procedures. TEX . GOV ’T CODE § 2001.003(6). Here the Threaders challenge both rules as defined by the APA and statutes. Because the Threaders cannot attack the constitutionality of the statutes pursuant to Section 2001.038 of the APA, their UDJA claims are not barred by the redundant remedies doctrine. Having concluded that the lower courts had jurisdiction, we turn to the merits. III. Constitutionality of the Statutes and Regulations A. Due Course of Law Article I, § 19 of the Texas Constitution provides that No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land. TEX . CONST . art. I, § 19. We have at least twice noted that Texas courts have not been entirely consistent in the standard of review applied when economic legislation is challenged under Section 19’s substantive due course of law protections. See Trinity River Auth. v. URS Consultants, Inc.—Tex., 889 S.W.2d 259, 263 & n.5 (Tex. 1994); Garcia, 893 S.W.2d at 525. The Threaders go beyond those two cases. They assert that courts considering as-applied substantive due process challenges under Section 19 have mixed and matched three different standards of review through the years. They label those standards as: (1) real and substantial, (2) rational basis including consideration of evidence, and (3) no-evidence rational basis. 15 The Threaders argue that the first referenced standard—“real and substantial”—is exemplified by cases such as State v. Richards, 301 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. 1957); Aladdin’s Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 713 F.2d 137, 138 n.2 (5th Cir.1983) (applying Texas law); Satterfield v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 268 S.W.3d 190, 215 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.); Texas State Board of Pharmacy v. Gibson’s Discount Center, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 884, 887-89 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.); City of Houston v. Johnny Frank’s Auto Parts Co., 480 S.W.2d 774, 779 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. City of Georgetown, 428 S.W.2d 405, 407-08 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1968, no writ); and City of Coleman v. Rhone, 222 S.W.2d 646, 649 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1949, writ ref’d). They interpret this standard as one in which the reviewing court considers whether (1) the legislative purpose for the statute is a proper one, (2) there is a real and substantial connection between that purpose and the language of the statute as the statute functions in practice, and (3) the statute works an excessive or undue burden on the person challenging the statute in relation to the statutory purpose. They argue that the distinguishing characteristic of cases employing the standard is that the courts using it consider evidence concerning both the government’s purpose for a law and the law’s real-world impact on the challenging party. The Threaders recognize that the real and substantial test affords less deference to legislative judgments than does the federal rational basis standard. But they point to In the Interest of J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 197-98 & n.23 (Tex. 1994); Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 10 (Tex. 1992); and LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 338-41 (Tex. 1986), as examples of cases in which this Court specifically said or implied that certain language in the Texas Constitution affords more 16 protection than comparable text in the federal Constitution. They also reference the United States Supreme Court as having noted in City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982), that Article I, § 19 of the Texas Constitution might afford more protections than does the Fourteenth Amendment. They claim that twenty other states utilize the “real and substantial” test.2 The Threaders present the second standard—“rational basis including consideration of evidence”—as being exemplified by cases such as City of San Antonio v. TPLP Office Park 2 The Threaders cite the following to support their position: Khan v. State Bd. of Auctioneer Exam’rs, 842 A.2d 936, 946-48 & n.7 (Pa. 2004) (upholding auctioneer regulations designed to prevent fraud); OM YA, Inc. v. Town of Middlebury, 758 A.2d 777, 780 (Vt. 2000) (upholding commercial traffic limits that reduced congestion, pollution, and property damage); Peppies Courtesy Cab Co. v. City of Kenosha, 475 N.W .2d 156, 158-59 (W is. 1991) (striking down taxicab dress code because it lacked a substantial relation to improving city’s public image); Katz v. S.D. State Bd. of Med. & Osteopathic Exam’rs, 432 N.W .2d 274, 278-79 & n.6 (S.D. 1988) (upholding medical-practice regulations designed to prevent malpractice and fraud); Louis Finocchiaro, Inc. v. Neb. Liquor Control Comm’n, 351 N.W .2d 701, 704-06 (Neb. 1984) (striking down liquor wholesale price controls because they lacked any substantial relationship to public welfare); Myrick v. Bd. of Pierce Cnty. Comm’rs, 677 P.2d 140, 143-47 (W ash. 1984) (en banc), amended by 687 P.2d 1152 (striking down most provisions of massage parlor regulations); Red River Constr. Co. v. City of Norman, 624 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Okla. 1981) (striking down municipal ordinance prohibiting sand trucks from using certain streets because the ordinance actually increased traffic and the risk of accidents); Rockdale Cnty. v. Mitchell’s Used Auto Parts, Inc., 254 S.E.2d 846, 847 (Ga. 1979) (reversing lower court ruling that zoning requirements were facially unconstitutional, but remanding to allow the plaintiff to show that the requirements had no real and substantial