Opinion ID: 2826267
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Diligence in Post-Conviction Proceedings

Text: Cannon contends that diligence is only required on direct appeal and that lack of diligence at the post-conviction stage is immaterial. We disagree. First of all, nothing in the text of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) distinguishes between appeals as of right and post-conviction proceedings—the statute simply requires that an applicant “develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). We see no obvious reason why AEDPA’s diligence requirement would apply only to direct appeals and not also to post- -14- conviction proceedings, especially when the post-conviction review involves legal errors not resolved on direct appeal. If anything, the policy of requiring petitioners to play all of their cards in state court is better served when prisoners have a second chance at demonstrating trial error and an opportunity to challenge errors made in the direct appeal. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000) (explaining the diligence requirement allows state courts “their rightful opportunity to adjudicate federal rights”). We note that this conclusion is in line with the Fifth Circuit’s finding in Dowthitt v. Johnson, which we cited favorably in Cannon I. Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 758 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that a petitioner was not diligent for failing to submit affidavits during state postconviction proceedings); see also Lopez v. Ryan, 630 F.3d 1198, 1206 (9th Cir. 2011); Koste v. Dormire, 345 F.3d 974, 985–86 (8th Cir. 2003); Alley v. Bell, 307 F.3d 380, 390–91 (6th Cir. 2002). We thus conclude 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) required Cannon to act diligently in developing the factual record during post-conviction review. Any other holding would deny the state its initial rightful opportunity to fully adjudicate the federal claims at issue. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 437.