Opinion ID: 811351
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Agreement Was Unenforceable.

Text: A Florida state-charted credit union “may purchase the conditional sales contracts, notes, and similar instruments of its members, provided that the credit union could have originally made the loan.” Fla. Stat. § 657.038(15). When Power Financial and the Administration entered the initial agreement on July 12, 2010, the mortgage debtors could not be members of Power Financial because they were outside the “limited field of membership” of Power Financial. Fla. Stat. § 657.002(9). The field of membership of Power Financial was not expanded to include the mortgage debtors until October 18, 2010. Even after the expansion the field of membership of Power Financial, Power Financial did not enroll the mortgage debtors as members. The district court correctly ruled that the agreement was unenforceable. Performance of the agreement would have required Power Financial to violate section 657.038(15) by purchasing loans on which the debtor was not a member of Power Financial. “[A] contract which violates a provision of . . . a statute is void and illegal and, will not be enforced in [Florida] courts.” De Lage Landen Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Cricket’s Termite Control Inc., 942 So. 2d 1001, 1003 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 7 Case: 11-14665 Date Filed: 11/06/2012 Page: 8 of 10 App. 5th Dist. 2006) (quoting Harris v. Gonzalez, 789 So. 2d 405, 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2001)). Power Financial argues that the agreement should be enforced against the Administration because section 657.038(15) applies only to the state credit union making the purchase, but this argument fails. The bar on the enforcement of contracts resulting in statutory violations applies even when the party seeking enforcement would be the only party violating the law. The Florida Supreme Court has explained that contracts that produce statutory violations are unenforceable because “courts have no right to ignore or set aside a public policy established by the legislature or the people. Indeed, there rests upon the courts the affirmative duty of refusing to sustain that which by the valid statutes of the jurisdiction . . . has been declared repugnant to public policy.” Local No. 234 of United Ass’n of Journeyman & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. of U.S. & Canada v. Henley & Beckwith, Inc., 66 So. 2d 818, 821 (1953). This principle applies regardless of which party would violate the law when the contract is performed. The agreement was unenforceable under Florida law even though Power Financial would have been the only party violating section 657.038(15). Power Financial argues that there remains a disputed issue of material fact about whether the Administration repudiated the agreement before Power Financial had a reasonable opportunity to enroll the mortgage debtors, but we disagree. 8 Case: 11-14665 Date Filed: 11/06/2012 Page: 9 of 10 Under Florida law, “[a] prospective breach of a contract occurs when there is absolute repudiation by one of the parties prior to the time when his performance is due under the terms of the contract. Such a repudiation may be evidenced by words or voluntary acts but the refusal must be distinct, unequivocal, and absolute.” Mori v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 380 So. 2d 461, 463 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1980). The Administration never repudiated the agreement. Its letter from Hornbrook to Power Financial noted “the impossibility of executing the outright loan pool sale” and informed Power Financial that a new staff had determined that “the real estate portfolio is an important asset to Keys both now and in the future.” But this language falls short of a “distinct, unequivocal, and absolute” refusal to fulfill the agreement, id., and did not create a genuine issue of material fact. B. Denial of the Joint Motion for an Enlargement of Time to Complete Discovery Was Not an Abuse of Discretion. Power Financial argues that the denial of the joint motion to extend the time for discovery was an abuse of discretion because the parties had only four months to complete discovery, but we disagree. “The abuse of discretion standard . . . allow[s] a range of choice for the district court, so long as that choice does not constitute a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 745 (11th Cir. 1989). The determination that four months was an adequate time in which to perform discovery was within the “broad discretion” of the district court 9 Case: 11-14665 Date Filed: 11/06/2012 Page: 10 of 10 to control discovery. See Am. Key, 762 F.2d at 1578. Moreover, Power Financial fails to explain how additional discovery would have enabled it to avoid a summary judgment against its complaint.