Opinion ID: 857535
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Supervisory Writ

Text: ¶13 We conclude that the SPD has not met the requirements for issuance of a supervisory writ. However, pursuant to our superintending and administrative authority, we nonetheless consider the second question presented. ¶14 A supervisory writ is an extraordinary remedy to prevent a court from refusing to perform, or from violating, its plain duty. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist. v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2011 WI 72, ¶33, 336 Wis. 2d 95, 800 N.W.2d 442 (citing Dressler, 163 Wis. 2d at 630). A petition for a supervisory writ will not be issued unless: (1) an appeal is an utterly inadequate remedy; (2) the duty of the [] court is plain; (3) its refusal to act within the line of such duty or its intent to act in violation of such duty is clear; (4) the results of the [] court's action must not only be prejudicial but 6 No. 2012AP544-W must involve extraordinary hardship; and, (5) the request for relief was made promptly and speedily. Id., ¶77 (quoting Dressler, 163 Wis. 2d at 630). ¶15 The parties agree on the first prong, that an appeal would be an inadequate remedy, and on the fifth prong, that the SPD's request for relief was made promptly and speedily. The SPD argues that under Wis. Stat. § 972.15, the court of appeals had a plain duty to accept Buchanan's brief as filed and its refusal to accept Buchanan's brief was clear. Further, the SPD argues that requiring it to seek circuit court permission to cite a PSI would be an extraordinary hardship because it may violate a defendant's due process right to appeal and would be too costly for the SPD. The court of appeals argues that it did not violate a plain duty when it ordered Buchanan to seek circuit court permission to cite his PSI. The court of appeals further argues that it would not be an extraordinary hardship for the SPD to seek circuit court permission to cite a PSI. ¶16 The standard for extraordinary hardship has been met in few cases. For example, in Madison Metropolitan, after a school district expelled a student, the circuit court issued an order requiring the district to provide appropriate educational resources to the student. 336 Wis. 2d 95, ¶22. This court affirmed the court of appeals' grant of a supervisory writ, finding that the extraordinary hardship prong had been met: [T]he potential extraordinary harm to the District is inherent in the specter of interference by the courts. The District would be faced not only with the costs of any continued educational services ordered by the circuit court but also the prospect that such costs 7 No. 2012AP544-W would interfere with the District's performance of its duties in lawfully expelling students who endanger the health and safety of others. Id., ¶89. In Lynch, in response to a criminal defendant's demand for all exculpatory material in the district attorney's possession at the preliminary hearing stage, the circuit court ordered the district attorney to make its case files available for defense counsel's inspection. 82 Wis. 2d at 458-59. The State argued that the circuit court's order would cause an extraordinary hardship because it would, inter alia, unjustifiably delay the case below and would create a precedent which is likely to hinder the efforts of the prosecution in future cases. Id. at 462-63. We agreed that the extraordinary hardship test had been met: Inspection of the state's files by the defense at this early stage, where there has been no showing of particularized need for inspection, can serve only as an opportunity for generalized, unrestricted discovery, rather than as a device for the constitutionally mandated disclosure of specific exculpatory material. Such discovery . . . will unjustifiably delay the administration of justice. Id. at 466 (footnote omitted). ¶17 In the case before the court, even assuming the delay and extra cost of obtaining circuit court permission would cause an extraordinary hardship, we conclude that the SPD has not met the criteria to grant a supervisory writ. After Parent, there remained a legitimate question of whether parties to a merit appeal needed circuit court permission to cite a PSI in their appellate briefs. When Buchanan filed his brief including information from his PSI, it was unclear whether the court of 8 No. 2012AP544-W appeals had a plain duty to accept the brief as filed. Part III.B.1. of this opinion discusses that question. ¶18 We nonetheless conclude that it is appropriate for this court to exercise our superintending and administrative authority to clarify the procedure that a defendant's counsel and the State's representative should follow to cite a PSI in their appellate briefs. Superintending and administrative authority allows this court to implement procedural rules not specifically required by the Constitution or the [statute]. State v. Ernst, 2005 WI 107, ¶19, 283 Wis. 2d 300, 699 N.W.2d 92 (quoting United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983)). Such rules are designed to implement a remedy for a violation of recognized rights. Id. The Wisconsin Constitution provides that [t]he supreme court shall have superintending and administrative authority over all courts. Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3. This power is indefinite in character, unsupplied with means and instrumentalities, and limited only by the necessities of justice. Ernst, 283 Wis. 2d 300, ¶19.