Opinion ID: 1536940
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Abuse of (Civil) Process

Text: In instructing the jury as to Wood's abuse-of-process claim, Judge Anderson told jurors that they were to consider only the criminal action that the Neumans instigated against Wood. Wood argues that the instruction was erroneous and that she was entitled to have the jury consider as well whether the Neumans committed abuse of process in filing their civil suit against her. We agree with the trial judge that this theory of liability was properly excluded. The tort of abuse of process lies where the legal system has been used to accomplish some end which is without the regular purview of the process, or which compels the party against whom it is used to do some collateral thing which he could not legally and regularly be required to do. Bown v. Hamilton, 601 A.2d 1074, 1079 (D.C.1992) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The fact that a plaintiff has an ulterior motive in filing suit is not enough to sustain a claim for abuse of process if there [i]s no showing that the process was, in fact, used to accomplish an end not regularly or legally obtainable. Id. at 1080; see also Morowitz v. Marvel, 423 A.2d 196, 198-99 (D.C.1980) (explaining that an action against patient for abuse of process did not lie where, in response to a lawsuit by physicians to obtain payment of patient's outstanding debt, the patient filed a malpractice suit with the ulterior motive of coercing a settlement). Here, Wood's claim was that the Neumans threatened and then filed their civil suit against her in order to force the Duddington Condominium Board to take actions (such as amending its bylaws in a manner favorable to the Neumans and acceding to the Neumans' demands with respect to the disputed land) to avoid a suit against the Duddington itself. Wood emphasizes Delia Neuman's admission that the Neumans filed their civil suit not actually to recover damages, but to solve these other problems. We agree with Judge Anderson, however, that these facts are not sufficient to support an abuse of (civil) process claim. The leverage that the Neumans apparently sought with respect to the Board was not without the regular purview of the civil litigation process and was not some collateral thing which [the Board] could not legally and regularly be required to do. Quite the contrary, as Wood's counsel argued to the trial court, the Neumans apparently sought to persuade the Board that Wood's actions arising out of the land dispute were the board's responsibility. In other words, the Neumans sought in part to force the Board to bring its power to bear to resolve the Neumans' dispute with Wooda dispute in which the Duddington Condominium had a legitimate interest and as to which it at least possibly had prospective liability. Following Bown and Morowitz, we cannot say that the Neumans' civil suit amounted to abuse of process.