Opinion ID: 2679927
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory Definition of Manufacture

Text: [¶16] A person is guilty of aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs if the person violates 17-A M.R.S. § 1103(1-A), and, at the time of the offense, the person has one or more prior convictions for any Class A, B, or C drug offense.3 17-A M.R.S. § 1105-A(1)(B). A person is guilty of unlawful trafficking in schedule W drugs pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 1103(1-A)(A) if the person (1) intentionally or knowingly (2) trafficks in (3) what the person knows or 3 Because of the aggravating factor, Lowden’s conviction was agreed to by stipulation and not left for the jury to decide, see 17-A M.R.S. § 1105-A(1)(B), and Lowden’s challenge on appeal deals exclusively with the statutory interpretation of unlawful trafficking in schedule W drugs, see 17-A M.R.S. § 1103(1-A)(A), we refer to the elements of unlawful trafficking in schedule W drugs when evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support Lowden’s conviction. 8 believes to be a scheduled drug, which (4) is in fact a scheduled drug and (5) the drug is a schedule W drug. To “[t]raffick,” in this context, means “[t]o make, create, manufacture.” 17-A M.R.S. § 1101(17)(A). To “[m]anufacture” means “to produce, prepare, propagate, compound, convert or process, either directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of natural origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis.” 17-A M.R.S. § 1101(4). [¶17] Although the definition of “[m]anufacture” could appear to suggest that mere preparation or processing of chemicals may be sufficient, when the language is read in the context of the crime of unlawful trafficking in scheduled drugs, it is clear that preparation and processing, without more, is insufficient. Unlawful trafficking in scheduled drugs mandates not only that a person “trafficks” in a drug, but that the drug “is in fact a scheduled drug.” 17-A M.R.S. § 1103(1-A). One cannot “prepare” or “process,” and therefore traffick in, a drug that “is in fact a scheduled drug” without a scheduled drug ultimately being produced. 17-A M.R.S. §§ 1101(4), 1103(1-A); see Shepley, 2003 ME 70, ¶ 15, 822 A.2d 1147 (stating that courts must not construe statutory language “in a manner that creates an absurd, illogical, or inconsistent result”). [¶18] This interpretation is corroborated by an examination of the relationship between unlawful trafficking in scheduled drugs via manufacture and the criminal attempt statute, which provides 9 1. A person is guilty of criminal attempt if, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of the crime, and with the intent to complete the commission of the crime, the person engages in conduct that in fact constitutes a substantial step toward its commission and the crime is: .... B. A Class A crime. Violation of this paragraph is a Class B crime; .... A substantial step is any conduct that goes beyond mere preparation and is strongly corroborative of the firmness of the actor’s intent to complete the commission of the crime. 17-A M.R.S. § 152 (1) (emphasis added). To interpret “[m]anufacture” pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 1101(4) to require only “mere preparation” and processing of ingredients, without more, would allow defendants to be convicted of attempted unlawful trafficking or unlawful trafficking based on the same actions. This runs afoul of the rules of construction by making the crime of criminal attempt redundant, yet carrying a lesser penalty. See State v. White, 2001 ME 65, ¶ 4, 769 A.2d 827 (stating that statutes will be interpreted as being free of “unnecessary and superfluous language”). [¶19] We will attempt to harmonize inconsistent provisions within a statutory scheme if at all possible in order to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. Id. The most appropriate way to harmonize the definition of manufacture with the 10 criminal attempt statute is to require that a scheduled drug actually be produced. There is nothing in the text of 17-A M.R.S. § 1101(4) or 17-A M.R.S. § 1103 that suggests that the Legislature intended to duplicate criminal attempt in this context, and we will not infer such an intention. [¶20] We have previously addressed what type of evidence is required to support a conviction for unlawful trafficking in schedule W drugs via the manufacture of methamphetamine. In State v. Woo, we affirmed a conviction for unlawful trafficking in schedule W drugs where, like in this case, no methamphetamine was found in the defendant’s possession. 2007 ME 151, ¶¶ 15, 23, 938 A.2d 13. Likewise, the defendant in Woo did not have all of the ingredients to manufacture methamphetamine in his possession at that time he was apprehended. Id. ¶ 21. There was, however, “substantial circumstantial evidence that Woo successfully made methamphetamine. ” Id. ¶ 20. Based upon that evidence, we concluded that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant unlawfully trafficked in methamphetamine. Id. ¶ 21. [¶21] Here, unlike in Woo, there is no evidence, either direct or circumstantial, from which the jury could infer that Lowden successfully created methamphetamine or that methamphetamine had been created on or brought to the premises. No methamphetamine was found, Lowden lacked some of the chemicals necessary to create it, and the State did not present evidence—direct or 11 circumstantial—from which a jury could have rationally inferred that Lowden successfully manufactured or possessed methamphetamine. Therefore, we must vacate his conviction for aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs.