Opinion ID: 149972
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Aggravated Felony as a Crime of Violence

Text: The INA defines aggravated felony to include a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of Title 18 ...) for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year. INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). A `crime of violence' is any `offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.' Dos Santos v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)). [2] A `crime of violence' thus has two elements: it is a felony, and it involves a substantial risk that physical force may be used during its commission. Id. (citing Chery, 347 F.3d at 407). Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) refers only to those offenses in which there is a substantial likelihood that the perpetrator will intentionally employ physical force. Id. at 83-84 (quoting Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 208 (2d Cir.2001)). In determining whether a crime satisfies these requirements, we use the so-called categorical approach. Id. at 84 (citing Chery, 347 F.3d at 407). Applying this method, we focus on the `intrinsic nature of the offense rather than on the factual circumstances surrounding any particular violation.' Accordingly, `only the minimum criminal conduct necessary to sustain a conviction under a given statute is relevant,' and the factual aspects of a defendant's situation are immaterial. Id. (quoting Chery, 347 F.3d at 407) (footnote omitted). Costa asserts that as a result of amendments to CGS § 53a-71 [3] enacted since this Court's decision in Chery that statute is now divisible, and it is therefore subject to a modified categorical approach. Costa identifies three amendments to CGS § 53a-71 that he asserts bring it outside the realm of Chery's holding. We do not agree. We examine each argument in turn. First, in 2000, subsection (2) of the statute was revised to delete the words or mentally incapacitated after mentally defective. See Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53a-71 (2000). As written, the provision prohibits sexual intercourse under circumstances where the victim is mentally defective to the extent that [the victim] is unable to consent to such sexual intercourse. Id. § 53a-71(a)(2) (emphasis added). Costa argues that the revised section lessened the offense conduct criminalized by § 53a-71 such that it no longer necessarily constitutes an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). This argument is without merit. The very language of subsection (2) limits its application to protecting victims who are mentally defective to the extent that they are unable to consent to sexual intercourse. The revision to this subsection is of no consequence to the analysis set forth in Chery. See Chery, 347 F.3d at 408-09. Second, in 2002, subsection (9) was added, which prohibits sexual intercourse where the actor is a coach in an athletic activity or a person who provides intensive, ongoing instruction and such other person is a recipient of coaching or instruction from the actor and (A) is a secondary school student and receives such coaching or instruction in a secondary school setting, or (B) is under eighteen years of age. Id. § 53a-71(a)(9) (2002). Costa argues that this provision for the first time, changes the age for which a violation can occur from the age of sixteen to the age of eighteen. In Connecticut, the age of consent is sixteen years old. Appellant's Br. 16. This argument fails as well. At the time of our decision in Chery, a violation of § 53a-71 could occur without regard to the victim's age under every subsection of the statute except subsections (1) and (4), and subsection (4) already defined a victim as a person who was less than eighteen years old. Third, in 2004, subsection (10) was added. It prohibits sexual intercourse where the actor is twenty years of age or older and stands in a position of power, authority or supervision over such other person by virtue of the actor's professional, legal, occupational or volunteer status and such other person's participation in a program or activity, and such other person is under eighteen years of age. Id. § 53a-71(a)(10) (2004). Costa argues that this provision is vague and broadly written and that the terms power, authority or supervision are not defined. Costa also asserts, as he did with respect to subsection (9), that the provision changes the age defining a victim from under sixteen to under the age of eighteen. Costa's arguments on this point are also unavailing. None of the amendments to § 53a-71 alters the statute in a way that renders our analysis in Chery inapplicable. To the contrary, each of the statute's subsections, including those added as amendments to the statute considered in Chery, categorically describe crimes of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). There is, therefore, no need to apply a modified categorical approach in our analysis. Applying the categorical approach in Chery, we held that a defendant convicted under CGS § 53a-71 has committed a crime of violence. Chery, 347 F.3d at 408-09. CGS § 53a-71 prohibits, inter alia, sexual intercourse with a person thirteen or older but younger than sixteen when the perpetrator is more than three years older and intercourse with someone whose mental deficiencies vitiate his or her consent. In short, because of the disparate ages of the defendant and the victim, or the mental incapacity or physical helplessness of the victim, or the defendant's position of authority over the victim, the crime, semper et ubique, includes a substantial risk of physical force. Chery, 347 F.3d at 408-09. In holding that a conviction under this statute constituted a crime of violence, we noted that although a conviction may be obtained under § 53a-71 for consensual sexual intercourse and force may not be present in all circumstances, the risk of the use of force is inherent in each of the offenses set forth in the statute. Id. at 408. Indeed, `[i]t matters not one whit whether the risk ultimately causes actual harm.' Id. (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 979 F.2d 138, 141 (8th Cir.1992)). What matters is that the risk of force is inherent in the offense. Id. Moreover, when the victim cannot consentthe statute inherently involves a substantial risk that physical force may be used in the course of committing the offense. Id. Thus, in Chery, we held that because § 53a-71 criminalizes sexual conduct with victims who cannot consentbecause of their age, mental status, etc.the conduct that it prohibits is inherently accompanied by a risk of violence. Dos Santos, 440 F.3d at 84 (citing Chery, 347 F.3d at 408-09). Such conduct thus constitutes a `crime of violence.' Id. In so holding, we emphasized that [i]n cases involving sexual crimes against children, courts have repeatedly recognized a substantial risk that physical force will be used to ensure compliance. Chery, 347 F.3d at 409. This is because [a] child has very few, if any, resources to deter the use of physical force by an adult intent on touching the child. In such circumstances, there is a significant likelihood that physical force may be used to perpetrate the crime. Id. Indeed we have endorsed the Tenth Circuit's reasoning that `when an older person attempts to sexually touch a child ... there is always a substantial risk that physical force will be used to ensure the child's compliance.' Chery, 347 F.3d at 409 (quoting United States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377, 379 (10th Cir.1993)) (emphasis added).