Opinion ID: 1800410
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was There a Tortious Interference with Business Relations?

Text: ¶ 29. In response to the Biglanes' assertion that the Saloon was a private nuisance, the bar counterclaimed, arguing that its neighbors had interfered with the operation of their business. There are four elements necessary to prove a claim of tortious interference with a business relationship: (1) The acts were intentional and willful; (2) The acts were calculated to cause damage to the plaintiffs in their lawful business; (3) The acts were done with the unlawful purpose of causing damage and loss, without right or justifiable cause on the part of the defendant (which constitutes malice); (4) Actual damage and loss resulted. MBF Corp. v. Century Business Comms., Inc., 663 So.2d 595, 598 (Miss.1995). In this case the Biglanes essentially concede the presence of the first two prongs, but urge that neither the third nor the fourth factors were satisfied. If any of the factors are not met, there cannot be a finding of tortious interference with business.
¶ 30. Mr. Biglane, or corporations of which he has substantial control, owns much of the property surrounding the Under the Hill Saloon, including multiple parking areas around the Saloon. After the tensions escalated between the Biglanes and the Saloon, Mr. Biglane caused the two parking areas in his control to be blocked, one with a cable gate after 6:00 p.m. and the other by an iron gate. It is undisputed that Mr. Biglane controls the former lot outright, but the ownership of the second lotthe so-called Water Street areais more complicated. ¶ 31. Ownership of the property is important because it speaks to the third factor of the tortthat the allegedly tortious acts must be performed without right or justifiable cause. It is a basic tenet of property law that a landowner or tenant may use the premises they control in whatever fashion they desire, so long as the law is obeyed. See generally Ewing v. Adams, 573 So.2d 1364, 1367-68 (Miss. 1990). This leads to the logical conclusion that a landowner or valid tenant may forbid any other persons from using their property. This ideal is protected in our law to the point that there are both civil and criminal prohibitions against trespassing. See Alexander v. Brown, 793 So.2d 601, 605 (Miss.2001) (definition of civil trespass); Miss.Code Ann. § 97-17-87 (Rev.2006) (criminal trespass). ¶ 32. Generally speaking, it cannot be malicious for a person to refuse access to others to their private property. Accordingly, blocking off the parking lot he owned in whole was not tortious conduct by Mr. Biglane. ¶ 33. The property comprising the area called Water Street is a different matter. There was extensive testimony by multiple witnesses regarding the property, its history, nature, and various owners whether Mr. Biglane, the City of Natchez, or others. The Water Street property is not a paved street per se, but an area that has been built up on the western bank of the Mississippi River by placement of rock and soil. ¶ 34. Part of Water Street is a parking lot, and the city engineer testified that roughly two parking spaces, or portions of the spaces, were owned by the city. Another portion of Water Street is a boat ramp owned by Mr. Biglane. The city has a permanent easement to use the ramp, but of late it is basically only used by riverboat traffic. Previously the only access to the city's portions of Water Street were through Mr. Biglane's parcel, and the city engineer testified that blocking the city's right of way was impermissible, as the city no longer had use and access to the property they owned or had access to its easement because of the gate. There was also testimony that there had been a city-owned sign advertising the area as parking for the public that was later taken down. The city ultimately acquiesced to the placement of the gate and the blocking of its own property. ¶ 35. It is undisputed that Mr. Biglane erected an iron gate blocking Water Street. The chancellor found that part of the property blocked by the iron gate was owned by the city; that the gate itself partially rested upon city property; and that two of the parking spaces blocked by Mr. Biglane were city property. In light of this evidence, the trial court found that the third factor required for tortious interference with business was presentthat Mr. Biglane did not have the right to block property which he did not own from public access. ¶ 36. Substantial evidence provided at trial and in the record supported the detailed and extensive findings of fact provided by the trial court. Accordingly, we defer to the chancellor's findings and conclude that the Biglanes acted without right in blocking the Water Street property. Yet our inquiry does not end there.
¶ 37. Next we must consider whether the Under the Hill Saloon was damaged by the actions of the Biglanes. To satisfy this tort, we require actual damages, which are synonymous with compensatory damages; they are substantial, rather than nominal. ACI Chems., Inc. v. Metaplex, Inc., 615 So.2d 1192, 1202 (Miss.1993). ¶ 38. This does not mean that an exact dollar value must be set before we can find actual damages. In the case of ACI Chemicals, we affirmed a chancellor's finding of tortious interference with business relations when a company, after suffering interference from a competitor, no longer received any new orders from a customer; when its credit line was frozen; and it lost the opportunity to solicit business from at least three potential customers. Id. at 1202. We found that this was evidence of actual damages. Id. This is in accord with the public policy underscoring this tort: to maintain a fair and legal playing field between competitors in the business arena. ¶ 39. In the case at hand, Under the Hill conceded that it could not demonstrate a loss of income from the lack of parking. In fact, business had slightly increased after the parking lots were blocked by Mr. Biglane, which was attributed by Mr. Farish to more riverboats docking in Natchez. There was evidence that one server at the Saloon had worked less than she had in years, but no receipts or other evidence was presented by the Saloon to demonstrate any sort of a loss. In its amended order the trial court found that punitive damages were not warranted under these facts, and accordingly declined to assess attorney's fees against the Biglanes. Compare ACI Chems., 615 So.2d at 1194 (attorney's fees can be warranted when trial court assesses punitive damages in tortious interference with business case). ¶ 40. The trial court assessed a damages award of $500 for nominal damages because it determined the Biglanes' conduct was intentional. The trial court based this finding upon the basic legal concept that nominal damages can be awarded for intentional torts. See Williams v. Wiggins, 285 So.2d 163, 164-65 (Miss.1973) (nominal damages . . . can only be granted in the absence of actual injury in cases of intentional tort, and not in cases involving negligence). The situation at hand is different. Unlike intentional torts such as trespass or battery, actual damage and loss is a required component of the tort of interference with business relations. As noted supra, this factor can be met in differing ways, but it must be met. The Under the Hill Saloon admitted it had suffered no actual damage or loss. Nominal damages do not satisfy a finding of the tort of intentional interference with business relations. In this type of case, there must be actual damages. Because the fourth factor was not met, there cannot be a tortious interference with business and the award of nominal damages must be reversed.