Opinion ID: 1795931
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standard for Admitting Expert Testimony

Text: GM argues that we should change the law in Alabama to embrace the standard for admitting expert testimony set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), instead of retaining the standard set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923), which we have followed for many years. See Courtaulds Fibers, Inc. v. Long, 779 So.2d 198 (2000), and Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Washington, 774 So.2d 505 (2000). We decline to change the standard in this case. As we discuss in Part II.C. of this opinion, regardless of whether we abandon Frye and embrace Daubert, Mundo's expert testimony was admissible and offered substantial evidence of alternative designs. In fact, the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 702, Fed.R.Evid., when it was amended to reflect the issuance of Daubert and related cases, [15] contain a statement that particularly applies to Mundo's expertise in this case. The Comments state: Nothing in this amendment is intended to suggest that experience aloneor experience in conjunction with other knowledge, skill, training or educationmay not provide a sufficient foundation for expert testimony. To the contrary, the text of Rule 702 expressly contemplates that an expert may be qualified on the basis of experience. In certain fields, experience is the predominant, if not sole, basis for a great deal of reliable expert testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147 (6th Cir. 1997) (no abuse of discretion in admitting the testimony of a handwriting examiner who had years of practical experience and extensive training, and who explained his methodology in detail); Tassin v. Sears Roebuck, 946 F.Supp. 1241, 1248 (M.D.La.1996) ( design engineer's testimony can be admissible when the expert's opinions `are based on facts, a reasonable investigation, and traditional technical/mechanical expertise, and he provides a reasonable link between the information and procedures he uses and the conclusions he reaches' ). See also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, [526 U.S. 137, 156] 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1178 [, 143 L.Ed.2d 238] (1999) (stating that ` no one denies that an expert might draw a conclusion from a set of observations based on extensive and specialized experience. '). (Emphasis added.) Clearly, Mundo's experience and expertise were factors the jury could properly consider in this case, regardless of whether we reviewed his testimony under the standard enunciated in Daubert or the standard enunciated in Frye. Courtaulds, 779 So.2d at 202.