Opinion ID: 2641881
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: FairPoint's request to vacate the award

Text: Review of a district court's decision to grant summary judgment affirming an arbitral award is plenary. Teamster Local Union No. 42 v. Supervalu, Inc., 212 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir. 2000). Yet, [c]ourts [] do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error by an arbitrator as an appellate court does reviewing decisions of lower courts. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFLCIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987). Rather, judicial review of arbitration awards is among the narrowest known in law. Me. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 873 F.2d 425, 428 (1st Cir. 1989). -9- Our review, therefore, adopts the same highly deferential standard as did the court below. See Pérez-Acevedo v. RiveroCubano, 520 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 2008). Moreover, an arbitrator's factual findings are not open to judicial challenge. El Dorado Technical Servs., Inc. v. Unión Gen. de Trabajadores de P.R., 961 F.2d 317, 320 (1st Cir. 1992). Instead, we accept the arbitrator's factual conclusions, Bos. Med. Ctr. v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 285, 260 F.3d 16, 18 (1st Cir. 2001), and limit our review to determining if the arbitrator's interpretation of the contract is in any way plausible, Labor Relations Div. of Constr. Indus., Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local No. 379, 29 F.3d 742, 745 (1st Cir. 1994); see also Misco, 484 U.S. at 38 ([A]s long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.). It is through this exceedingly narrow lens that we assess the appropriateness of the FairPoint-Union arbitral award.
FairPoint first asserts that the panel acted in excess of the authority granted to it by the CBA's arbitration clause. This clause provides that an arbitrator shall have no power to add to, subtract from, modify or disregard any of the provisions of this -10- agreement. FairPoint purports that this provision raises the standard of our review, requiring us to reject even plausible interpretations of the CBA that exceed this express limitation[] on an arbitrator's authority. This argument asks too much of the broadly worded arbitration provision in question. In interpreting a provision of similar generality,2 we have recognized that a standard 'no modification' clause incorporates general legal principles concerning an arbitrator's authority, reinforcing the admonition . . . that legitimate arbitral awards draw their essence from the contract. Kraft Foods, Inc. v. Office & Prof'l Emps. Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, Local 1295, 203 F.3d 98, 101 (1st Cir. 2000) (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted) (quoting LaRocque v. R.W.F., Inc., 8 F.3d 95, 97 (1st Cir. 1993)). That an award must draw its essence from the contract, Misco, 484 U.S. at 38, is simply a reiteration of our requirement, described above, that the interpretation be in some way plausible. Labor Relations Div. of Constr. Indus., 29 F.3d at 745 (citing Misco, 484 U.S. at 36-38). As such, without foreclosing the possibility that the text of some arbitration clauses might limit an arbitrator's power of 2 That clause stated: '[t]he arbitrator shall have no authority to amend, alter, or modify this Agreement or its terms and shall limit the decision solely to the interpretation and application of this Agreement.' Kraft Foods, Inc. v. Office & Prof'l Emps. Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, Local 1295, 203 F.3d 98, 101 (1st Cir. 2000). -11- contract construction to a greater extent than the background law, Kraft Foods, Inc., 203 F.3d at 101 n.1, we find that the generic no-modification provision in question evidences no intent to circumscribe the arbitrator's authority beyond our accepted standard.3
In any case, FairPoint struggles to identify precisely how the panel's decision on subcontracting veered over the line separating interpretation and modification. In sum, FairPoint forwards two arguments in support of its claim. First, it notes that the CBA grants it an express right to manage its business subject [only] to the limitations contained in [the CBA]. By restricting subcontracting, FairPoint asserts that the arbitrator wrongly subtract[ed] from this right by add[ing] additional restrictions not clear on the CBA's face. Second, it argues that the CBA's specific restrictions on subcontracting certain plant jobs imply that the parties knew how to explicitly limit subcontracting and would have done so for sales jobs if so desired. Moreover, interpreting the Limitation on Transfer of Jobs provision to create a blanket ban on subcontracting would render these provisions superfluous, in violation of a basic rule of contract 3 We would be hard-pressed to identify an instance in which an interpretation that in fact disregarded express contract terms, or created additional terms from thin air, would be found plausible. -12- interpretation. FairPoint contends, therefore, that the panel clearly disregard[ed] these specific provisions and impermissibly add[ed] an overly broad restriction to the CBA. Certainly, the narrow nature of our review does not amount to a blank check. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960) ([A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice.). Yet, considering these arguments in turn, we are unable to identify any instance in which the panel exceeded the bounds of its interpretative powers. As to the management rights provision, we see no contradiction between its terms and the arbitrator's interpretation of the Limitation on Transfer of Jobs provision. The former provision grants FairPoint control over all management decisions, save those limited by other provisions of the CBA. The panel interpreted the latter provision, in a manner not expressly foreclosed by anything in the CBA, as one such limitation. In reaching this conclusion, the panel neither disregarded [] the lack of restrictions on FairPoint's ability to subcontract nor added subcontracting restrictions. It simply read one provision as creating an exception to another that, by its terms, allowed for just such exceptions. This is not the stuff of which vacated arbitral awards are made. -13- On a review of the record, neither can we agree that the arbitral panel manifestly disregarded the other CBA provisions limiting subcontracting for particular plant jobs. The panel explicitly stated that it would be possible to interpret the [] two [specific restrictions] as exceptions to the broad jobs prohibition of the [CBA].4 It also directly considered the inconsistency between the Limitation on Transfer of Jobs provision and the agreement letter, but ultimately concluded that it could not disregard the plain language of the [CBA]. In reaching this conclusion, the panel relied heavily on the parties' apparent intent. It highlighted the parties' extended negotiations regarding the Limitation on Transfer of Jobs provision, during which they undisputedly deleted the 0.7% cap and removed other language that had previously been interpreted as restricting only transfers between Verizon-owned entities. While finding it hard to fathom why this letter was executed as written, the panel reasoned that the parties' bargaining history made clear their intent to construct a more 4 The provisions in question are indeed worded so as to plausibly create exceptions to an otherwise total ban. For instance, one provision states that under the following conditions work may be contracted out, while the other states that [t]he Company will maintain its established policies as to assignment of work in connection with the installation and maintenance of communications facilities. Both, therefore, could be interpreted as granting a greater power to subcontract in certain specific instances than was permitted under the more general Limitation on Transfer of Jobs provision. While perhaps this was not the best interpretation, neither can we deem it a wholly implausible one. -14- comprehensive ban on job transfers than that of the pre-amendment CBA. In light of this mutual intent, the panel was unwilling to allow a letter -- incorporated into the CBA but apparently based erroneously on a since-amended version of its text5 -- to prevail over the express terms of the current provision. Ideally, the panel's discussion of these points would have been more robust, and we are not untroubled by its contention that a more thorough attempt to harmonize these provisions would be rash. Still, we are not tasked with reviewing the intricacies of these provisions anew, but only with determining if the panel's resolution supplants express contract terms with [its] own brand of industrial justice. Id. On the whole, the panel's decision that these apparent inconsistencies could not overwrite the plain meaning of the phrase any entity -- bolstered as it was by the parties' bargaining history and apparent intent -- does not appear wholly contrary to either basic reason or rules of contract interpretation. See Smart v. Gillete Co. Long-Term Disability Plan, 70 F.3d 173, 178 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that contract interpretation looks first to the text's plain meaning and, if ambiguity exists, then to the parties' intent). 5 We express no conclusive opinion as to whether, in fact, the parties simply erred by not updating this letter, but we note that its text also includes reference to the December 2000 bargaining sessions. Because the Union and FairPoint's negotiations occurred in 2008, this lends plausibility to the panel's suggestion that the text mistakenly referenced the prior CBA. -15- Ultimately, FairPoint's arguments in regard to subcontracting express disagreement with the panel's interpretation of the CBA, suggesting an alternative interpretation that it believes is more appropriate. These arguments do not establish, however, that the panel's interpretation was either implausible or in excess of its authority.
FairPoint next contests the panel's decision that jobs once completed by a computer program were wrongfully transferred away from Union employees. It asserts, as it did before the court below, that the only plausible interpretation of transfer requires an element of predicate possession that was absent in this case. Therefore, FairPoint concludes, the panel's determination that jobs were impermissibly transferred away from Union employees ignores the plain language of the CBA in favor of an impermissible construction that is clearly in excess of the panel's interpretive authority. We do not disagree that the term transfer connotes an assignment from one entity to another. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2426-27 (1971) (defining transfer as to carry or take from one person or place to another or the conveyance . . . from one person to another (emphasis added)). Therefore, we must review the facts presented in this case to determine whether, given this definition, the panel's finding that -16- a transfer occurred was indeed plausible. We begin this review by adopting the panel's factual findings in full, including the determination that the Union had a concrete expectation, amounting to a legitimate claim, that its employees would perform these jobs. El Dorado Technical Servs., Inc., 961 F.2d at 320 (holding that courts, in considering arbitral awards, do not review findings of fact). Our inquiry is thus limited to determining whether it is conceivable that this legitimate claim vested in the Union a degree of possession sufficient to make the subcontracting of these jobs a form of transfer. The panel's interpretation of transfer is indeed expansive, and if we were initially tasked with construing the meaning of this term, we might find FairPoint's argument more convincing. We cannot say, however, that it is beyond any plausible interpretation of the term as used in the CBA that subcontracting jobs to which Union employees had a legitimate claim -- undisputedly founded on a mutual understanding of the parties -- constituted a transfer. It is at least conceivable that this well-defined expectation was a sufficient form of predicate possession to mean that these jobs were indeed removed or conveyed away from the Union. See Local 1445, United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Stop & Shop Co., Inc., 776 F.2d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 1985) (finding that to warrant reversal, awards must be premised on reasoning so palpably faulty that no -17- judicial body ever could conceivably have made such a ruling (citing Bettencourt v. Bos. Edison Co., 560 F.2d 1045, 1050 (1st Cir. 1977))). The plausibility of this reading is further bolstered by the panel's factual finding that some small portion of LSR work was already completed by Union employees. That FairPoint contracted to resolve disputes via arbitration means they must now live by the bargain they struck. Misco, 484 U.S. at 37-38 (Because the parties have contracted to have disputes settled by an arbitrator . . . it is the arbitrator's view of the . . . meaning of the contract that they have agreed to accept.). Finding no grounds on which to vacate the arbitral award, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Union.