Opinion ID: 1561306
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: appellant thomas's conviction for trafficking in cocaine

Text: As to Thomas, I find no evidence to support an instruction on trafficking in cocaine, and the trial court should have directed a verdict against the Commonwealth as to this charge. Certainly, all of the evidence suggests that Thomas had every intention of purchasing a huge amount of cocaine. However, the Commonwealth concedes that Thomas never received any quantity of cocaine, and the tragic events of this evening followed from the undisputed fact that Thomas surrendered $27,000 to Woods but did not receive his drugs in return. KRS 218A.1412 criminalizes as first degree trafficking in a controlled substance knowingly and unlawfully trafficking in a number of controlled substances including cocaine and KRS 218A.010(28) defines traffic: Traffic, ... means to manufacture, distribute, dispense, sell, transfer or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or sell a controlled substance. While the majority appears comfortable affirming Thomas' conviction on the basis of the complicity statute contained at KRS 502.020(1), such a conclusion is explicitly barred by KRS 502.040(1), which explains that: A person is not guilty under KRS 502.010 or 502.020 for an offense committed by another person when: (1) The offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission. The 1974 Commentary to this statutory provision explains that subsection one is intended to apply to transactional offenses: Subsection (1) provides for two exemptions to the general doctrine of imputed liability for conduct which aids in the perpetration of crime.... The second is for a person who joins another in a two-party transaction that constitutes a crime.... As a consequence of this exemption, the purchaser of an alcoholic drink cannot be convicted as an accomplice under a statute which provides a penalty only for the seller. In other words, KRS 502.040 reasonably limits the reach of the complicity statute and prevents a drug purchaser from being charged with trafficking. A number of jurisdictions have interpreted this Model Penal Code provision to bar prosecution of drug buyers and sellers for complicity in the crime committed by the other party to the transaction. See, e.g., People v. Manini, 79 N.Y.2d 561, 584 N.Y.S.2d 282, 594 N.E.2d 563 (1992) (a seller of a controlled substance is not an accomplice in the possession crime of his buyer); Robinson v. Texas, 815 S.W.2d 361 (Tex.App.1991) (a buyer of drugs is not an accomplice in the delivery crime committed by his seller); Louisiana v. Celestine, 671 So.2d 896 (La.1996) (buyer of drugs is not an accomplice in the distribution crime committed by his seller); Owes v. Alabama, 638 So.2d 1383 (Ala.Crim.App.1993) (buyer of cocaine is not an accomplice in the sale crime committed by his seller); Long v. Arkansas, 260 Ark. 417, 542 S.W.2d 742 (1976) (buyer of narcotics cannot be an accomplice in the illegal sale of drugs by his seller); Colorado v. Hart, 787 P.2d 186 (Colo.App.1989) (the conduct of one who takes delivery of the controlled substance is inevitably incident to the criminal conduct of one who delivers the controlled substance); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 426 Pa.Super. 391, 627 A.2d 732 (1993) (buyer of drugs cannot be an accomplice in the delivery crime committed by his seller). Thomas cannot therefore, as a matter of statutory law, be liable as an accomplice for the crime of trafficking in cocaine because all of the evidence presented indicates that he was the intended buyer in this transaction. In addition, the evidence presented by the Commonwealth would not permit the trial court to instruct the jury that they could find Thomas guilty as a principal of the offense since the record contains no evidence that Thomas sold or transferred cocaine and the Commonwealth concedes that he never possessed this alleged cocaine. KRS 218A.1412; See, e.g. Butler v. Commonwealth, Ky., 560 S.W.2d 814 (1978); Pilon v. Commonwealth, Ky., 544 S.W.2d 228 (1976). The Commonwealth presented a purely circumstantial case for trafficking in cocaine by Woods (the alleged dealer) and Graves (the alleged dealer's driver), but the testimony relating to preparations for the transaction and the admission by Woods to McDuffie that he had the cocaine were sufficient evidence to allow the trial court to instruct the jury on the crime of trafficking in cocaine as to Woods and Graves. While the evidence that Woods possessed a quantity of cocaine for sale was far from overwhelming, I feel that under the evidence as a whole, it [was not] clearly unreasonable for a jury to find the defendant guilty. Trowel v. Commonwealth, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 530 (1977). The jury could have determined rationally, consistently with the evidence, and beyond a reasonable doubt that Woods had been in possession of cocaine for sale, and the trial court was correct to deny the motions for directed verdicts made by counsel for Woods and Graves. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).