Opinion ID: 1155625
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Consideration of Defendant's Subornation of Perjured Testimony

Text: Jose Uranga, whose apartment was next to defendant's at the time of the killings in this case, testified for the prosecution at the guilt phase of the trial. Uranga said he heard, through the apartment wall, an argument between defendant and another man implicating defendant as the killer of the two girls. Uranga could not identify the other man in the argument, nor did he know Alfredo Reyes, defendant's companion at the time of the killings. To counter Uranga's testimony that he did not know Alfredo Reyes, defendant called Robert Vigil as a witness. Vigil, a relative of defendant's wife, testified that he had once seen Uranga, whom Vigil knew only as the Spaniard, talking with Alfredo Reyes in the stairwell near Uranga's apartment. Vigil also said he had seen the Spaniard and Alfredo Reyes seated together in an automobile; on that occasion, Uranga had his arm around Reyes's shoulder. When the prosecution recalled Vigil as a witness later at the guilt phase of the trial, Vigil recanted his earlier testimony, and explained that defendant had asked him to lie about seeing Uranga and Reyes together. In his closing argument at the guilt phase, the prosecutor argued that, by urging Vigil to lie at the trial, defendant had suborned perjury. The prosecutor described perjury as a crime that goes to the heart of our jury trial system. Later, during argument at the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecutor again mentioned defendant's subornation of perjury, arguing that it belied the claim of defendant (who had testified at the penalty phase that he was a born again Christian) to be a person who tries to live a Christ-like life. (10) Defendant now argues that evidence that he asked Vigil to lie under oath at the guilt phase of the trial would not have been admissible as evidence in aggravation under the California capital sentencing scheme (§ 190.3). He also asserts that such evidence had no bearing on his personal responsibility and moral guilt, and thus its consideration by the jury deciding penalty violated the Eighth Amendment of the federal Constitution. ( Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782, 801 [73 L.Ed.2d 1140, 1154, 102 S.Ct. 3368]; see also Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. ___, ___ [115 L.Ed.2d 720, 729-730, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2604]; Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S. 862, 879 [77 L.Ed.2d 235, 251, 103 S.Ct. 2733].) Not in dispute is that testimony of defendant's subornation of perjury was properly before the jury in its determination of guilt. Thus, when the same jury later had to decide what penalty to impose, it already knew of the perjury. Defendant contends, however, that because of the jury's knowledge of that evidence, which he asserts was not appropriate for penalty determination, the trial court had a duty to instruct the jury on its own motion not to consider that particular evidence in its penalty determination. We disagree. In People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 776 [215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782], we explained that section 190.3 excludes from consideration at the penalty phase all evidence of criminal conduct by the defendant except evidence of other felony convictions admissible under factor (c) of that section and of activity involving defendant's use or attempted use of force or violence ... or the express or implied threat to use force or violence similarly admissible under section 190.3, factor (b). Defendant points out that he has suffered no felony conviction for subornation of perjury and that the conduct, although criminal, is nonviolent. Thus, defendant argues, the perjury evidence was improperly before the jury at the penalty phase. But, as we shall explain, the evidence was proper for jury consideration at the penalty phase to rebut mitigating evidence offered by defendant that since his Christian conversion three weeks before his arrest in this case he has tried to live a Christ-like life. In specifying the type of evidence of criminal conduct by a defendant that would be admissible as part of the prosecution's case-in-chief at the penalty phase under factors (b) and (c), People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at page 776, did not limit the jury's consideration of evidence offered by the prosecution as rebuttal. ( Ibid. [prosecution rebuttal evidence would be admissible ... to `disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.'].) The scope of such rebuttal evidence must be specific, however, and must relate directly to a particular incident or character trait the defendant has offered in mitigation of penalty. ( People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 792, fn. 24 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113]; accord, People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 143-144 [2 Cal. Rptr.2d 335, 820 P.2d 559]; People v. Ramirez, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1193.) Here, at the penalty phase of his trial, defendant testified he became a born again Christian after the killings of the two girls but before his arrest in this case. Defendant explained that, while in county jail awaiting trial, he had actively ministered the Gospel to other inmates. To rebut the implication from this testimony that defendant's behavior since his conversion was exemplary, the prosecutor during closing argument reminded the jury of instances after that conversion when defendant had been less than candid. It was in that context that the prosecutor referred to defendant's having suborned the perjured testimony of Robert Vigil. This reference, which related directly to a character trait that defendant himself had put in issue, was proper rebuttal. Because we conclude that the jury could appropriately consider at the penalty phase evidence that defendant had in this case induced Vigil to give perjured testimony, defendant was not entitled to an instruction directing the jury not to consider it.