Opinion ID: 581194
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the ibla's decision

Text: 14 The district court, concerned that the IBLA's decision on an unexpected ground created a due process violation, allowed the trustees an opportunity to present additional evidence that would have influenced the IBLA's decision on the validity of the Jones-Moses assignment. After reviewing the evidence submitted by the trustees, the district court concluded it was duplicative of evidence already before the IBLA; no deprivation of due process had occurred. The trustees now argue the district court should have remanded the action to the IBLA for consideration of the evidence. 15 If errors occurred in the administrative process, a complaining party must show harm or prejudice arising from the procedural abnormality before the case will be remanded to the agency for further proceedings. See, e.g., Containerfreight Corp. v. United States, 752 F.2d 419, 427-28 (9th Cir.1985). Despite the trustees attempts to demonstrate prejudice, they have failed to convince us the district court erred in refusing to remand for further proceedings. Mere allegations of government misconduct do not create prejudice. The trustees' arguments require us to assume facts not established anywhere in the record. This we will not do. 16 The district court's procedure was an effective utilization of judicial resources. Instead of requiring further proceedings in the IBLA, the approach employed by the court was a proper means to identify potential constitutional defects in the IBLA's decision. No error has been demonstrated.
17 The trustees argue the Department of the Interior should be estopped from challenging the validity of the SAH scrip because, in reliance on the BLM's position on remand to the IBLA that the SAH scrip was valid, the trustees did not brief the dispositive issue. The district court correctly concluded that estoppel was inapplicable because the trustees had failed to establish affirmative misrepresentation or affirmative concealment of material fact by a government agent, a required element of estoppel against a government entity. See S & M Investment Co. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Co., 911 F.2d 324, 329 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 963 (1991); Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 707 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 384 (1990). 18 Although it is true the Department of the Interior may have possessed a file containing documents pertinent to the scrip claim, neither its contents nor its location are currently known. The trustees base their arguments of governmental misconduct solely on what they hypothesize happened to the scrip files. Unsupported speculation is insufficient however to support an estoppel claim. 19 No harm has been demonstrated by the trustees' failure to brief the assignment issue in reliance on the concessions of the BLM that the signatures were authentic and the soldier and entryman were the same individual. The IBLA was not estopped from considering an issue contrary to a position espoused by the BLM. Any shortcomings in the trustees' briefing of the IBLA on the assignment issue was cured by the district court's subsequent opportunity to adequately present their claims. 2 The trustees have failed to prove affirmative misconduct or serious injustice. Estoppel is therefore inapplicable and the district court did not err in so finding.
20 As noted by the district court, the IBLA has required the claimant in past disputes to establish the identities of the soldier/entryman and subsequent assignors through affidavits of two witnesses having personal knowledge of the facts. See William E. Moses, 31 L.D. 320, 321 (1902). The IBLA required the trustees to comply with this burden or provide other facts ... tending to establish such identity. The district court acknowledged that it was burdensome to prove an event that occurred over a hundred years ago, but concluded this fact did not diminish the quantum of proof necessary. 21 The only documents before the IBLA regarding the assignment of the claim from Jones to Moses were either unsigned documents or documents containing the typed names of the individuals instead of signatures. Although the trustees allege the government wrongly concealed the original assignment documents, no credible evidence has been presented beyond mere inferences to convince us the government actually possessed these documents and the government intentionally withheld them. 22 Because the IBLA is entrusted with implementing congressional policies, the quantum of proof required to establish an assignment falls within the agency's discretion. See United States v. Alpine Land and Reservoir Co., 887 F.2d 207, 212 (9th Cir.1989) (in the absence of congressional directives, [the Department of the Interior] can regulate distribution, acquisition, and vested water rights), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 60 (1990); Brennan v. Udall, 379 F.2d 803, 806 (10th Cir.) (Department of the Interior reasonably interpreted a statute where the same interpretation had consistently been applied for fifty years), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 975 (1967). The IBLA's imposition of an exacting standard of proof to establish the Jones to Moses assignment was therefore proper. Based on the evidence before the IBLA and the district court, we conclude the trustees have not established that the IBLA's decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with law.
23 The trustees allege the SAH scrip was certified within the meaning of the Act of August 18, 1894, 43 U.S.C. § 276 (repealed 1976). The 1894 Act validated three categories of certificates issued prior to 1894: (1) those issued under rules and regulations of the General Land Office under 43 U.S.C. § 274; (2) those issued pursuant to decisions or instructions of the Secretary as of March 10, 1877; and (3) those pursuant to decision or instructions of the Secretary or the Commissioner after March 10, 1877. Cord v. Morton, 449 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir.1971). 24 To support their certification argument, the trustees rely on a computer-enhanced reconstruction of a 1905 document and the General Land Office's June 30, 1876 cancellation of Jones' entry. We reject their certification claim for two reasons. First, the trustees have not demonstrated any relation between the June 30, 1876, cancellation and the 1894 Act. They do not even attempt to discuss how a cancellation can be the equivalent of a certification under the Act. Without more, the mere assertion that a certificate was issued is meaningless. Second, even assuming the 1905 document constituted such a certificate, it is not immunized by the 1894 Act because it was issued after 1894. See Cord, 449 F.2d at 329. Proof of a valid assignment from Jones to Moses would still need to be produced by the trustees. The IBLA did not err in concluding no certificate was issued pursuant to the 1894 Act.