Opinion ID: 884474
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Testimony of Dr. Faust:

Text: Our holding that IMEs must, by statute, be conducted by physicians, not psychologists, does not affect the testimony of Dr. Faust. Although Dr. Faust, like Dr. Rogers, is a clinical psychologist, Dr. Faust did not conduct an IME and thus he was not subject to the definition of physician as we have interpreted that term in the context of §§ 39-71-605 and -116(30), MCA (1993). Dr. Faust, a professor of psychology from the University of Rhode Island, is a recognized authority on malingering. After reviewing Blythe's psychological tests and listening to Blythe testify at trial, he testified that, in his opinion, Blythe is malingering mental disorders. In the Workers' Compensation Court, Blythe argued that Dr. Faust did not conduct a face-to-face examination and that his testimony should not carry as much weight as the treating physician, Dr. Stratford. Blythe now argues in his appellate reply brief that since Dr. Faust is not a medical doctor, his testimony is not medical evidence under § 39-71-702(2), MCA (1987). Blythe cites Kloepfer for the proposition that the Workers' Compensation Court is only to resolve conflicts in medical testimony. He argues that in his case there is no conflicting medical testimony since the only experts for the insurer were psychologists who are not medical doctors; that the treating physician, Dr. Stratford, was the only medical doctor testifying. Blythe, however, did not object to the testimony of Dr. Faust nor did he ask the court to reconsider its decision which explicitly relies on both the testimony of Dr. Rogers and Dr. Faust. In the absence of any sort of objection to Dr. Faust's testimony, the Workers' Compensation Court had no basis for disregarding the testimony of the psychologist. Since Blythe failed to challenge the testimony of Dr. Faust in the Workers' Compensation Court or ask that court to reconsider its decision, he cannot now raise the issue for the first time on appeal. Guardianship & Conserv. of Estate of Tennant (1986), 220 Mont. 78, 83, 714 P.2d 122, 125. Furthermore, the argument that Dr. Faust and Dr. Rogers did not present medical testimony was raised for the first time in Blythe's reply brief. Rule 23(c), M.R.App.P., requires that reply briefs be confined to new matter raised in the respondent's brief. Thus, an appellant is prohibited from raising new issues or theories in a reply brief. Loney v. Milodragovich, Dale & Dye, P.C. (1995), 273 Mont. 506, 512, 905 P.2d 158, 162. For all of the above reasons, we reject Blythe's suggestion that the Workers' Compensation Court erred in considering the testimony of Dr. Faust. Since the court's conclusion that Blythe was malingering was based partly on testimony to which there was no objection and partly on inadmissible testimony, a question remains as to what the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law would have been absent Dr. Rogers' IME. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the Workers' Compensation Court as to weight of evidence on questions of fact. Mennis v. Anderson Steel Supply (1992), 255 Mont. 180, 184, 841 P.2d 528, 530. Accordingly, we remand this matter to the Workers' Compensation Court for a reweighing of the evidence as to malingering; contrasting the testimony of Blythe's experts, including Dr. Stratford, with the testimony of EBI/Orion's remaining expert, Dr. Faust.