Opinion ID: 172208
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: First Amendment Compelled Speech Claim

Text: Corder next argues that the School District's requirement that she submit a written apology for circulation as a condition to receiving her diploma violated her First Amendment right to refrain from speaking. [6] The Supreme Court has long held that the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantee prohibits the government from telling people what they must say. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 61, 126 S.Ct. 1297, 164 L.Ed.2d 156 (2006). [7] In addition, compelled statements of fact. . . like compelled statements of opinion, are subject to First Amendment scrutiny. Id. at 62, 126 S.Ct. 1297. In order to compel the exercise or suppression of speech, the governmental measure must punish, or threaten to punish, protected speech by governmental action that is regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1290 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted); see also Bauchman, 132 F.3d at 557 (noting that compulsion is a threshold element of a First Amendment compelled speech claim). All parties agree: Corder was compelled to apologize for evading the principal's instructions regarding the prior review of her speech and for any offense her actions may have caused the audience. The Supreme Court has long recognized that, for purposes of the First Amendment, forced speech is no different than censored speech. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256, 94 S.Ct. 2831, 41 L.Ed.2d 730 (1974) (noting that the challenged statute, which compelled newspapers publishing attacks on political candidates to devote equal space to replies to those attacks, operate[d] as a command in the same sense as a statute or regulation forbidding appellant to publish specified matter); Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796-97, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (There is certainly some difference between compelled speech and compelled silence, but in the context of protected speech, the difference is without constitutional significance, for the First Amendment guarantees `freedom of speech,' a term necessarily comprising the decision of both what to say and what not to say.). Thus, if the School District may censor Corder because her speech is school-sponsored rather than private, then so may the School District tell her what to say when she disregards the School District's policy regarding the school-sponsored speech, as long as the compulsion is related to a legitimate pedagogical purpose. See C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 178 (3d Cir.2005) (School-sponsored speech may be restricted for legitimate pedagogical purposes, and it seems clear that a school may compel some speech for such purposes. (internal citation omitted)); see also id. at 186 (Before exploring the contours of the First Amendment's protection of the right `to refrain from speaking at all,' it must be recognized that this particular right is necessarily different in the public school setting.). We have already concluded that Corder's presentation of a valedictory speech at her school's graduation ceremony involved school-sponsored speech. This conclusion also applies to Corder's forced apology. The imprimatur concept is satisfied because Corder's apology was directly related to her school-sponsored speech at the high school graduation. It occurred close in time after that graduation ceremony, and was disseminated through the principal's office via e-mail to the entire Lewis-Palmer school community. As a result, the School District was free to compel Corder's speech as long as the School District's decision was `reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.' Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1290 (quoting Fleming, 298 F.3d at 926). We give `substantial deference' to `educators' stated pedagogical concerns.' Id. (quoting Fleming, 298 F.3d at 925). Corder's forced apology is also reasonably related to the School District's pedagogical concerns. The school-sponsored speech cases emphasize the discretion school officials have to ensure that the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271, 108 S.Ct. 562; see also Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681-83, 106 S.Ct. 3159 (The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society's countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior. . . . Indeed, the fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system disfavor the use of terms of debate highly offensive or highly threatening to others. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of expression are inappropriate and subject to sanctions. The inculcation of these values is truly the work of the schools. The determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board. (internal quotations and citations omitted)). The School District's requirement that Corder apologize for her behavior is related to learning. Fleming, 298 F.3d at 925. As we stated in Fleming, the universe of legitimate pedagogical concerns is by no means confined to the academic for it includes discipline, courtesy, and respect for authority. Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted) (emphasis added). The discipline chosen by the School District for Corder's giving a speech different from the one she submitted for review was to require her to write an apology before she could receive her diploma. This disciplinary action, taken in response to Corder's violation of the review policy, was certainly reasonable. [T]he Hazelwood standard . . . `does not require that the [restrictions] be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitations, only that they be reasonable.' Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1292 (quoting Fleming, 298 F.3d at 932); see also Wildman v. Marshalltown Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 768, 771 (8th Cir.2001) (concluding there is no constitutional violation for requiring a student to issue an apology as a condition of continuing on a sports team after the student circulated an insubordinate letter; [i]t is well within the parameters of school officials' authority . . . to teach civility and sensitivity in the expression of opinions). We conclude that the School District did not violate Corder's First Amendment free speech rights by compelling her to e-mail an apology prior to receipt of her high school diploma.