Opinion ID: 179340
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defective Indictment Claim

Text: Kaczmarek also contends that his sentence violated Apprendi because his indictment did not charge that he was potentially eligible for a sentence enhancement for brutal or heinous conduct. According to Kaczmarek, Apprendi requires facts that increase the maximum penalty for a crime to be charged in the indictment. Kaczmarek included this argument in the habeas petition filed in the district court, summarizing his second claim as asserting that his sentence violated Apprendi, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties must be charged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the district court appears to have overlooked the argument, as it did not address the indictment issue. Nor did the Illinois Supreme Court address the issue, although Kaczmarek briefed the issue in that court. The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976); see also Sprosty v. Buchler, 79 F.3d 635, 645-46 (7th Cir.1996). We will entertain the claim because Kaczmarek preserved the issue, the issue has been fully briefed, and because we conclude that the claim is meritlessit is in the interest of judicial economy that we address it. Kaczmarek's claim is based on a misreading of Apprendi. In Apprendi, the Court held that [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The Apprendi Court noted that its decision was foreshadowed by Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n. 6, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999), in which it held that, in the context of federal prosecutions, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. However, in Apprendi, the Court expressly refused to address whether facts that increase the maximum penalty must be charged in the indictment in state prosecutions, as that question was not before it. 530 U.S. at 477 n. 3, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Thus, under current Supreme Court precedent, such aggravating facts must be charged in the indictment in federal prosecutions only. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 627, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) (under Apprendi and Jones, [i]n federal prosecutions, ... facts [that increase the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum] must also be charged in the indictment); see also Williams v. Haviland, 467 F.3d 527, 532-33 (6th Cir.2006) (reversing grant of habeas petition where district court erroneously concluded that Apprendi recognized a right to have sentence enhancements charged in the indictment). Kaczmarek relies on our decision in United States v. Watts, 256 F.3d 630, 631, n. 2 (7th Cir.2001), in which we noted that we have read Apprendi to require that certain facts must be charged in the indictment, as well as submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. However, Watts, and the cases cited therein, involved federal prosecutions. Kaczmarek cites no case in which a court has interpreted Apprendi to require that sentence enhancements be charged in state prosecutions. On appeal, Kaczmarek characterizes his indictment claim as alleging a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to notice of the charges against him. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the fundamental right to be informed of the nature and cause of the charges made against him so as to permit adequate preparation of a defense. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation....); Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201, 68 S.Ct. 514, 92 L.Ed. 644 (1948) (It is as much a violation of due process to send an accused to prison following conviction of a charge on which he was never tried as it would be to convict him upon a charge that was never made.); Bae v. Peters, 950 F.2d 469, 477 (7th Cir. 1991) (a criminal defendant must receive adequate notice of the charges against him so that he may defend himself against those charges). This right to notice is applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cole, 333 U.S. at 201, 68 S.Ct. 514 (No principle of procedural due process is more clearly established than that notice of the specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial of the issues raised by that charge, if desired, are among the constitutional rights of every accused in a criminal proceeding in all courts, state or federal.). We need not consider whether Kaczmarek could establish a Sixth Amendment right to notice claim because such a claim is distinct from an Apprendi claim. See Gautt v. Lewis, 489 F.3d 993, 1005 & n. 12 (9th Cir.2007). Kaczmarek did not present an independent right-to-notice claim to the district court, and consequently he has forfeited his ability to raise it for the first time on appeal. Pole v. Randolph, 570 F.3d 922, 940 (7th Cir.2009).