Opinion ID: 2599164
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kidnapping for Robbery and the Kidnapping-murder Special Circumstance

Text: The jury convicted defendant of kidnapping Schultz for robbery and found true a kidnapping-murder special circumstance. The trial court also instructed on kidnapping as a theory of first degree felony murder. As the court instructed the jury, the kidnapping count was not based on the movement in the truck, for there was no evidence that movement was against Schultz's will. Rather, the kidnapping charge was based solely on the dragging of Schultz after he was stabbed. The evidence showed defendant and Lonnie dragged him around 100-150 feet to a place difficult to see from the road. Section 209, subdivision (b), makes guilty of kidnapping for robbery Any person who kidnaps or carries away any individual to commit robbery.... Kidnapping for robbery, or aggravated kidnapping, requires movement of the victim that is not merely incidental to the commission of the robbery, and which substantially increases the risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in the crime of robbery itself. ( People v. Rayford (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 12, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317, 884 P.2d 1369.) Defendant argues several reasons the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction and special circumstance. We need not consider all of the arguments, for we find one to be dispositive: the evidence was insufficient to prove that Schultz was still alive at the time of the dragging. There can be no doubt that, like rape ( People v. Kelly, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 524, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385), kidnapping in general, and kidnapping for robbery in particular, requires a live victim. The Attorney General does not argue otherwise. If one kills, then moves the body, the crimes committed do not include kidnapping. The statutory references to a person (§ 207, subd. (a)) or an individual (§ 209, subd. (b)), as the kidnapping victim, clearly contemplate someone alive. Indeed, no further harm can befall someone already dead; asportation of a corpse cannot increase the risk of harm. The evidence regarding whether Schultz was dead or alive when defendant dragged him is inconclusive, but most of it indicates he was probably already dead. Lonnie testified that all the stabbing occurred by the truck before the movement and said that the body never moved on its own or made a sound during any of the dragging. Dr. Gwen Hall, the pathologist who performed the autopsy, provided the most important testimony. Schultz died of four stab wounds, each of which independently could have been fatal. The injuries themselves indicated Schultz could have survived minutes, perhaps twenty minutes to an hour at the most. This testimony alone would suggest that Schultz might have survived during part or all of the dragging. But Dr. Hall also testified that a certain head bruise caused by hitting something like a car door or the ground (i.e., likely caused when Schultz fell after the stabbing) occurred at or about the time of death. More importantly, abrasions on the back, obviously caused during the dragging, showed no signs of bleeding. The absence of bleeding suggested to Dr. Hall that the body was already dead when it suffered the abrasions, although she could not say with absolute certainty. Thus Dr. Hall's testimony, as a whole, indicates Schultz was probably dead when his body was dragged. Citing Dr. Hall's testimony that she could not be certain exactly how long Schultz lived, the Attorney General argues that the absence of bleeding under the abrasions on [Schultz's] back is not conclusive evidence that he was dead at the time of the dragging. But, as defendant notes, the question is not whether the evidence conclusively proved Schultz was dead, but whether substantial evidence supported a finding he was alive. We see no such substantial evidence. Moreover, even if we assume Schultz was dying but not yet dead when the dragging began and died during the dragging, before receiving the bloodless abrasions, no evidence supports a finding that the movement substantially increase[d] the risk of harm.... ( People v. Rayford, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 12, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317, 884 P.2d 1369, italics added.) The primary harmthe four stab wounds, each alone potentially fatalhad already occurred; any additional harm was insubstantial. Accordingly, the kidnapping for robbery conviction and the kidnapping-murder special circumstance cannot stand. Finding that defendant dragged Schultz's body after, rather than before, he killed Schultz does not minimize the heinousness of defendant's deeds. It does, however, mean he was not guilty of kidnapping in addition to murder and robbery. Defendant also argues that because the court instructed the jury on kidnapping as a theory of felony murder, we must also reverse the first degree murder conviction. We disagree. As we explain, the evidence supported the robbery and robbery-murder special-circumstance findings as well as the lying-in-wait special-circumstance finding. These findings show the jury necessarily concluded the killing was committed in the course of a robbery and by lying in wait. Thus, we know that the first degree murder verdict rested on at least one correct theory. (§ 189; People v. Kelly, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 531, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385; see also People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1130, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365, 847 P.2d 45.) [3]