Opinion ID: 560567
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: suppression of heroin found in safe

Text: 14 Sonnie Davis argues the heroin seized from the safe at Andrews' apartment impermissibly exceeded the scope of Andrews' probation search condition. We must first determine whether Sonnie Davis has standing to assert a violation of the fourth amendment. We review the question of whether a defendant has standing to assert a Fourth Amendment claim de novo, although we review the underlying facts for clear error. United States v. Iglesias, 881 F.2d 1519, 1522 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1154, 107 L.Ed.2d 1057 (1990) (citations omitted). This circuit has not addressed the standard for reviewing a question involving the scope of a probation search. The question of whether the officers could reasonably have suspected the safe was within the custody or control of Andrews' and within the scope of her probation search condition involves a mixed question of fact and law; we review it de novo. Cf. United States v. Flippin, 924 F.2d 163, 164-65 (9th Cir.1991) (whether a search was based on sufficient suspicion is mixed question of law and fact); United States v. McLaughlin, 851 F.2d 283, 286 (9th Cir.1988) (whether police exceed scope of a warrant reviewed de novo). But cf. United States v. Rubio, 727 F.2d 786, 797 (9th Cir.1983) (whether the scope of consent has been exceeded is a factual question reviewed for clear error); United States v. Guzman, 852 F.2d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir.1988) (unclear if question of authority to consent to a search is reviewed for clear error or de novo).
15 The government contests the district court's finding that Sonnie Davis had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched. 2 To contest the legality of a search under the fourth amendment, the defendant must demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place or item searched by showing an actual subjective expectation of privacy which society is prepared to recognize. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 1687, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 2580, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 & n. 12, 99 S.Ct. 421, 430 & n. 12, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). The defendant has the burden of establishing, under the totality of the circumstances, the search or seizure violated his legitimate expectation of privacy in a particular place. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2561, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980). 16 The Supreme Court has held an overnight guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a friend's residence even though he has no legal interest in the premises and does not have legal authority to determine who may enter the household. Olson, 495 U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. at 1688-89; see also United States v. Robertson, 606 F.2d 853, 858 n. 2 (9th Cir.1979) (overnight guest had standing to assert fourth amendment violation in search of his possessions). This court has held that a defendant who moved a laboratory to his friend's house to avoid detection and who used that site to manufacture drugs had a legitimate expectation of privacy. United States v. Pollock, 726 F.2d 1456, 1465 (9th Cir.1984). A defendant who was an alleged co-owner of a storage unit and had allegedly paid a portion of the rental payments even though defendant's name did not appear on the rental agreement was held to have had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched. United States v. Johns, 851 F.2d 1131, 1135-36 (9th Cir.1988). Finally, in United States v. Harwood, 470 F.2d 322 (10th Cir.1972), the court held that a defendant who stored containers in the attic of a friend's garage with the latter's permission to come and go to check the property had standing to challenge a search. Id. at 325; see also W. Lafave, Search and Seizure Sec. 11.3(c) at 303 (1987). 17 Sonnie Davis had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched. He had a key to Andrews' apartment, and was free to come and go as he pleased. He stored things there, and took the precaution of storing items in a locked safe to assure privacy. Moreover, he had previously lived in the apartment, and had independent access to the place searched. It is also significant that Sonnie Davis paid at least a portion of the rent for Andrews' apartment. Having assumed an ongoing obligation to pay the rent, Sonnie Davis exercised partial or joint control over the premises. See Johns, 851 F.2d at 1136. Joint control remains significant under the expectation of privacy standard. United States v. Quinn, 751 F.2d 980, 981 (9th Cir.1984), cert. granted, 474 U.S. 900, 106 S.Ct. 224, 88 L.Ed.2d 224 (1985), cert. dismissed, 475 U.S. 791, 106 S.Ct. 1623, 89 L.Ed.2d 803 (1986). Viewing the totality of the circumstances, we hold the district court correctly found that Sonnie Davis had a sufficient connection to the invaded place to assert the protection of the fourth amendment. 3
18 The district court concluded that the search of the safe was a reasonable extension of Andrews' search condition, and was therefore lawful. It applied both California and federal standards governing probation searches. See United States v. Solomon, 528 F.2d 88, 90 (9th Cir.1975) (admissibility of evidence obtained by state law enforcement officer depends on legality of actions measured by both state and federal standards); United States v. Lovenguth, 514 F.2d 96, 98 (9th Cir.1975) (per curiam); United States v. Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921, 93 S.Ct. 2742, 37 L.Ed.2d 148 (1973). 19 While the federal courts may consider state precedent for its persuasive value, the validity of a search conducted by state law enforcement officers is ultimately a question of federal law. See United States v. George, 883 F.2d 1407, 1412 (9th Cir.1989) (citing United States v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368, 1372-74 (9th Cir.1987) (evidence seized by state officers in compliance with federal law admissible without regard to state law)). For cases arising in California, the application of state standards would in any event prove redundant because the California State Constitution no longer affords independent state grounds for excluding relevant evidence. In Re Lance W., 37 Cal.3d 873, 888-90, 210 Cal.Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744 (1985) (Constitutional amendment stating relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding requires exclusion of relevant evidence only if federal constitution forbids its use). 20 Under limited circumstances, law enforcement officers may search a probationer's home without obtaining a warrant and without probable cause. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872-73, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 3167-68, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (upholding state regulation permitting probation search on reasonable suspicion); United States v. Duff, 831 F.2d 176, 179 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Johnson, 722 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir.1983); People v. Burgener, 41 Cal.3d 505, 528-36, 224 Cal.Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251 (1986) (parole search). The permissible bounds of a probation search are governed by a reasonable suspicion standard. See United States v. Giannetta, 909 F.2d 571, 577 (1st Cir.1990) (a search of the premises by a probation officer extends to the entire area of the premises and any container may be searched pursuant to probation search condition if reason to believe container could contain object of search); cf. Duff, 831 F.2d at 179; Toomey v. Bunnell, 898 F.2d 741, 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 390, 112 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990) (parole searches may be conducted without a warrant under a reasonableness standard). 21 We recognize that California cases draw a distinction between probationers and parolees in evaluating the permissible scope of a search. See People v. Bravo, 43 Cal.3d 600, 608-09, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d 336 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 904, 108 S.Ct. 1074, 99 L.Ed.2d 234 (1988) ([a] probationer, unlike a parolee, consents to the waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights in exchange for the opportunity to avoid service of a state prison term and thus the reasonable suspicion standard does not apply to parolee probation searches). We do not believe the distinction between the status of parolee and that of a probationer is constitutionally significant for purposes of evaluating the scope of a search. Cf. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874, 107 S.Ct. at 3168 (both probationers and parolees have diminished liberty rights); see generally W. Lafave, Search and Seizure, Sec. 10.10 (1987). We therefore conclude that police must have reasonable suspicion, that an item to be searched is owned, controlled, or possessed by probationer, in order for the item to fall within the permissible bounds of a probation search. 22 Sonnie Davis contends the search, while initially justified as a valid probation search, 4 became improper when the police exceeded the scope of the probationer's search condition by searching the safe. 5 The police opened the safe with a lock combination seized from Sonnie Davis earlier in the day. Therefore, appellant argues, the police could not reasonably suspect the safe was owned, possessed, or controlled by the probationer. 6 As a result, appellant argues, the search of the safe was not within the scope of Andrews' probation search condition and cannot be upheld as a valid warrantless search. 23 This argument overstates the significance of Sonnie Davis' access to the safe. Although Sonnie Davis possessed keys to Andrews' apartment and a combination to the safe, reasonable suspicion existed to believe the probationer shared ownership, possession, or control over the safe. The police spotted Sonnie Davis' car in front of probationer's apartment the day of Sonnie Davis' arrest. They had received a tip that drug activity was occurring on the premises. Once inside the house, but prior to opening the safe, the police found contraband and paraphernalia in common areas of the apartment. The discovery of evidence of wrongdoing bolstered the officers' suspicion that the probationer was involved in a drug conspiracy with Sonnie Davis. See Giannetta, 909 F.2d at 577 (upon discovering incriminating material, probation officer was justified in expanding the scope of the his probation search to look for related matters). Furthermore, the safe was located in Andrews' bedroom--increasing the likelihood she exercised control over the safe. Under these circumstances the police could have reasonably suspected the safe was jointly owned, possessed, or controlled by Sonnie Davis and probationer, and thus subject to search under the rubric of Andrews' probation search condition. 24 Sonnie Davis also argues that where there is a question of ownership of an item to be searched, law enforcement officers conducting a probation search must make a reasonable good faith effort to ascertain ownership in order to protect the privacy interests of both the owner and probationer in whose residence the item is located. 25 To date, no federal court has examined the issue of whether law enforcement officers conducting a probation search have a duty to inquire into the ownership, possession, or control of an item sought to be searched. California law is inconsistent on this issue. One line of cases imposes a duty to inquire when there is at best a fifty percent chance that the item sought to be searched belongs to the probationer or parolee. See People v. Montoya, 114 Cal.App.3d 556, 562, 170 Cal.Rptr. 624 (1981) (police had duty to inquire prior to searching a pair of pants found in the parolee's house in which another person, not subject to the parole search condition, was present); People v. Tidalgo, 123 Cal.App.3d 301, 306, 176 Cal.Rptr. 463 (1981) ([W]here police officers do not know who owns or possesses a residence or item and such information can be easily ascertained, it is incumbent upon them to attempt to ascertain ownership....); People v. Fuller, 48 Cal.App.3d 257, 263, 210 Cal.Rptr. 1 (1983) (citing Tidalgo, 123 Cal.App.3d at 306-07, 176 Cal.Rptr. 463); People v. Cruz, 61 Cal.2d 861, 867, 40 Cal.Rptr. 841, 395 P.2d 889 (1964) (where suitcases could have belonged to someone other than consenter, officer had duty to ask whether suitcase belonged to the person who had given consent to search). 26 The most recent decision, People v. Boyd, 224 Cal.App.3d 736, 274 Cal.Rptr. 100 (1990), follows a line of cases which reject Montoya's duty to inquire rule. See People v. Palmquist, 123 Cal.App.3d 1, 12-13, 176 Cal.Rptr. 173 (1981) (police did not need to inquire into possession, ownership or control prior to searching refrigerator and ski parka in the home of a probationer who lived with a non-probationer); People v. Britton, 156 Cal.App.3d 689, 701, 202 Cal.Rptr. 882 (1984) (search of paper bag in closet of apartment shared by parolee and nonparolee upheld where nonparolee was not present to question about the bag). In Boyd, a parole search by the police uncovered contraband in a handbag which belonged to a nonparolee. The nonparolee asserted the police's failure to inquire into the custody or control of the handbag required suppression of the evidence seized. The Boyd court rejected 27 any suggestion that a parole search will automatically be invalidated simply because the officer fails to ask the nonparolee roommate whether the object about to be searched is his or her property. Such a rigid rule would unnecessarily bind the officer to the answer given, regardless of its veracity. The officer should not be bound by the reply in the face of overwhelming evidence of its falsity. Even if the nonparolee roommate's claim of ownership sounds reasonable, reasonable suspicion may be predicated on the parolee's possession or control of the object. 28 Boyd, 224 Cal.App.3d at 749, 274 Cal.Rptr. 100. We interpret Boyd as holding that the police should inquire into the ownership, possession, or control of an item sought to be searched when the totality of the circumstances do not otherwise give rise to reasonable suspicion that the item to be searched belongs to, or is under control of, the parolee. Id. at 750-51, 274 Cal.Rptr. 100. 29 The Boyd decision, rejecting a duty to inquire rule, is the better view. Requiring the police to inquire into ownership, possession or control in all instances when ownership, custody, or control is not obviously and undeniably apparent, would force courts to undertake the difficult task of evaluating, in every case of doubt, the nature of the measures taken and the credibility of the responses given. Moreover, such a rule does not satisfactorily accommodate the situation here, where the nonprobationer is not present to affirm or deny ownership. As the court noted in Britton, [m]ost importantly there was someone in the house [in Montoya ] other than the parolee whom the officers could question about the ownership of the items searched. Britton, 156 Cal.App.3d at 701, 202 Cal.Rptr. 882. We do not believe law enforcement officers should in all circumstances be bound by the responses of persons with the greatest incentive to lie about ownership, possession, or control. See Boyd, 224 Cal.App.3d at 749, 274 Cal.Rptr. 100 (Such a rigid rule would unnecessarily bind the officer to the answer given, regardless of its veracity.); Britton, 156 Cal.App.3d at 701, 202 Cal.Rptr. 882 (An officer could hardly expect that a parolee would claim ownership of an item which he knew contained contraband.). Reasonable suspicion that an item is owned, possessed, or controlled by the probationer may exist even in circumstances when the item to be searched is not obviously and undeniably owned, possessed, or controlled by the probationer. While in some circumstances, questions of ownership, possession, or control may rise to a level requiring law enforcement officers to inquire into ownership, possession, or control in order to develop the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify the search of the item, we do not discuss that scenario because, for the reasons set forth above, the police had reasonable suspicion to believe the safe was within Andrews' ownership, possession, or control.IV. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE A. Standard of Review 30 In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The test is whether the evidence and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from it, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, sustain the verdict. United States v. Terry, 911 F.2d 272, 278 (9th Cir.1990) (quoting United States v. Soto, 779 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir.), amended, 793 F.2d 217 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 833, 108 S.Ct. 110, 98 L.Ed.2d 70 (1987)). B. Federal Nature of Offense 31 Kevin Davis was charged with obstructing or attempting to obstruct an official proceeding by shooting a known witness, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512(a). He argues there was insufficient evidence to establish his awareness of the federal nature of the proceeding with which he interfered. The district court denied appellant's motion for a new trial and judgment of acquittal, holding: The evidence, considering all the inferences that can fairly be drawn from it, amply supports the finding that defendant shot Marilyn Morrison with the intent of preventing the communication to law enforcement officers of information concerning the commission of federal offenses. United States v. Davis, 728 F.Supp. 1437, 1441-42 (N.D.Cal.1989). 32 Section 1512(f) of title 18 of the United States Code provides in relevant part: 33 In a prosecution for an offense under this section, no state of mind need be proved with respect to the circumstance-- 34 (1) that the official proceeding before a judge, court, magistrate, grand jury, or government agency is before a judge or court of the United States, a United States magistrate, a bankruptcy judge, a Federal grand jury, or a Federal Government agency;.... 35 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512(f). Under Sec. 1512, the United States was not required to prove the defendant knew he was tampering with a federal proceeding. United States v. Scaife, 749 F.2d 338, 348 (6th Cir.1984); see also United States v. Ardito, 782 F.2d 358, 360-61 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141, 106 S.Ct. 1792, 90 L.Ed.2d 338 cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1160, 106 S.Ct. 2281, 90 L.Ed.2d 723 (1986) (finding no scienter requirement that defendants know they were obstructing a federal proceeding). Cf. United States v. Brice, 926 F.2d 925, 929 (9th Cir.1991). Consequently, appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is without merit.