Opinion ID: 524069
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mother Hubbard's Kitchen.

Text: 67 Before analyzing this case, one must understand the distinctive, in some respects puzzling, framework of federal labor regulation under the Railway Labor Act (RLA). In the 1920s, railroad unions demonstrated an unparalleled solidarity among American workers, before either the rejuvenation of other AFL unions or the conception of the CIO. 15 Concerned with the effect of strikes on the transportation system, Congress passed the RLA in 1926, almost a decade before passage of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 151 et seq. (NLRA). 16 The RLA constituted an innovative step in the history of labor relations, embodying a statutory policy of strike prevention and quasi-judicial dispute resolution almost a half century before the Supreme Court's decisions in the Steelworkers trilogy. 17 The RLA was amended in 1934 to provide for binding arbitration of certain disputes. See Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 77 S.Ct. 635, 640, 1 L.Ed.2d 622 (1957). In 1936, Congress extended the RLA to common carriers by air with the exception of 45 U.S.C. Sec. 153, which provides for a National Railroad Adjustment Board, the arbitral forum. 45 U.S.C. Sec. 181. Common carriers by air are subject to the provisions of 45 U.S.C. Sec. 184, which provides for an arbitration system separate from the Railroad Adjustment Board. 68 A. Major and Minor Disputes. Unions and employers subject to the RLA primarily encounter two types of disputes arising from the collective bargaining agreements to which they are parties. In Elgin, J. & E. Railway Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723-24, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 1289-90, 89 L.Ed. 1886 (1945), the Supreme Court attached the pregnant labels major and minor to the two types of disputes. A major dispute results from a party's proposed or unilaterally attempted change  in the terms of a collective bargaining agreement affecting rates of pay, rules or working conditions. 45 U.S.C. Secs. 155, 156 (emphasis added); Elgin, J. & E. Railway Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723-24, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 1289-90, 89 L.Ed. 1886 (1945). Minor disputes grow out of grievances, or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. 45 U.S.C. Sec. 184 (emphasis added); Elgin, 325 U.S. at 723-24, 65 S.Ct. at 1289-90 (minor disputes, ... involving grievances ... represent specific maladjustments of a detailed or individual quality); see also id. at 723 n. 16, 65 S.Ct. at 1290 n. 16 (quoting legislative history emphasizing that minor disputes commonly concern grievances). 69 Whether a dispute is major or minor is not necessarily a result of its importance. A grievance may be quite important, although the dispute is minor, and a proposed change in the agreement may be relatively trivial, although the dispute is major. One's inquiry must always focus on whether a unilateral act or proposal would effect a change in rates of pay, rules or working conditions, because such a unilaterally attempted or proposed change gives rise to a major dispute. See Part IV infra and note 4 supra. 70 Major disputes and minor disputes are subject to quite different dispute resolution processes. Minor disputes are resolved through binding arbitration by a board of adjustment. 45 U.S.C. Sec. 184. Parties may not resort to economic weapons while a minor dispute is pending before a board of adjustment. Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 77 S.Ct. 635, 640, 1 L.Ed.2d 622 (1957). 18 Major disputes result in a judicially-enforced status quo during which time the parties are subject to complex bargaining procedures. 45 U.S.C. Secs. 155, 160. These procedures are not binding, however, and once they are exhausted, the parties may resort to their economic weapons without fear of a federal court injunction. Burlington Northern v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 107 S.Ct. 1841, 1851, 95 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987). 19 Thus, whether a federal court labels a dispute major or minor when the parties contest the issue will have quite important consequences. 71 Determining whether a dispute deserves the grand label of major or minor is sometimes simple but may be a conceptually frustrating task. An employer's proposal to cut wages in half, or a union's proposal to double wages, of course, would constitute a proposed change in the rate of pay and would therefore constitute a major dispute. And most grievances, for example, simply involve straightforward questions concerning whether a contract term should apply to an employee's act for which the employer attempts to impose discipline. 20 But other nominally minor disputes may ultimately appear to be major disputes because a definitive interpretation of a contract may seem to be substantively indistinguishable from alteration of the contract. One court has addressed the conceptual difficulty by stating that the difference on the one hand between the interpretation and application of an existing agreement, and, on the other hand, a change in the original intended basis of agreement is often a question of degree. Rutland Railway v. BLE, 307 F.2d 21, 33 (2d Cir.1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 954, 83 S.Ct. 949, 9 L.Ed.2d 978 (1963). 72 The courts of appeals have articulated substantively similar standards to decide whether disputes are major or minor under the RLA scheme when the parties disagree. Under our circuit's standard, the dispute we confront is minor if Southwest's unilateral act is arguably justified by the terms of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. Railway Express Agency v. BRAC, 437 F.2d 388, 392 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 919, 91 S.Ct. 2230, 29 L.Ed.2d 696 (1971). The arguably justified standard imposes a relatively light burden on Southwest, but the term arguable has content. As Judge Tuttle has well-articulated, even colorable contentions are not equivalent to the arguable contentions giving rise to a minor dispute. St. Louis, S.F. & T. Railway v. Railroad Yardmasters of America, 328 F.2d 749, 753 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 980, 84 S.Ct. 1886, 12 L.Ed.2d 748 (1964). 21 73 B. Duty to Bargain. Under the Railway Labor Act, employers and Unions have a duty to bargain in good faith over rates of pay, rules and working conditions. 45 U.S.C. Secs. 152, 155, 156; Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. v. United Transportation Union, 402 U.S. 570, 91 S.Ct. 1731, 1735, 29 L.Ed.2d 187 (1971); Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 362 U.S. 330, 80 S.Ct. 761, 766, 4 L.Ed.2d 774 (1960). A change in working conditions governed by the collective agreement ... [is] by definition ... a major dispute. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Burlington Northern, 838 F.2d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir.1988); Order of Railroad Telegraphers, 80 S.Ct. at 764-66; United Industrial Workers v. Board of Trustees of Galveston Wharves, 351 F.2d 183 (5th Cir.1965); 45 U.S.C. Secs. 155, 156. Thus, if Southwest's drug testing program would effect a change in working conditions, Southwest must bargain over the content of the program in the major dispute process, unless the Union has waived its right to bargain. 74 The majority holds that implementation of the testing program would effect[ ] a change in rules and working conditions over which the employer has a duty to bargain. This dispute, then, is a major dispute by definition. Unless the Union has waived its right to bargain over the change in working conditions, this contest should be routed to the major dispute process. 75 Both the en banc majority and the panel opinion use the phrase mandatory subject of bargaining to describe the employer's duty to bargain over proposed changes in working conditions. It should be clear from the panel opinion and the en banc majority opinion that the term mandatory is a shorthand for the duty to bargain over a unilaterally attempted or proposed change in rates of pay, rules or working conditions under the RLA. As I have discussed, the duty to bargain under the RLA attaches to a change in rates of pay, rules and working conditions unless the parties' agreement properly provides otherwise. See, e.g., United Industrial Workers, 351 F.2d 183; see also, e.g., Order of Railway Telegraphers, 80 S.Ct. at 764-67 (employer had duty to bargain about job preservation issue despite employer's contention that decision was not bargainable and was within management prerogative); First National Maintenance, 101 S.Ct. at 2585 n. 23 (rejecting application of the duty to bargain under the RLA to an NLRA dispute, citing Order of Railroad Telegraphers, 80 S.Ct. 761). 76 The distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining is a concept confined to labor relations under the NLRA. Under the NLRA, employers have a duty to bargain only over mandatory subjects of bargaining. See, e.g., First National Maintenance, 101 S.Ct. at 2580-81 (employer that terminated contract with customer had duty to bargain only over effects of its decision to terminate and not the decision itself). An employer subject to the NLRA may choose to bargain over permissive subjects of bargaining, but is under no obligation to do so. 77