Opinion ID: 511694
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the strike settlement agreements

Text: 77 As demonstrated in Part I supra, the union had a statutory right to limit the privileges and benefits afforded to core members. To the extent that it is possible to reconcile the Board's and the majority's analyses with the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 141, 158, their argument would appear to be that by signing the strike settlement agreements the union somehow waived this right, in whole or in part. Accordingly, I next consider the meaning of the strike settlement agreements and whether the union's conduct violated their provisions.
78 The strike settlement agreements provide in pertinent part: 79 The union and the company hereby agree that no employee shall be discriminated against in any way by virtue of lawful activity engaged in during or in connection with the strike.... 80 Neither party shall discriminate or seek any penalty from any employee, including supervisory employees, because of their choices or actions with respect to financial core status or resignation. 81 A principal purpose of the agreements was to preclude punishment by the union of its members for their past acts. As with many strike settlement agreements, the parties here each agreed not to retaliate against the other's partisans for actions taken while the economic warfare was in progress. 82 The agreements cannot reasonably be read as permanently or indefinitely prohibiting the union from limiting union-provided benefits to those who are willing to accept current full membership status, or from establishing prospectively two different categories of membership governing full and financial core members respectively, with two different sets of responsibilities and two different sets of correlative rights. The agreements neither state nor contemplate that all employees must be afforded identical rights and benefits regardless of what membership decisions they make on a continuing basis after the strike has ended. Thus, under the settlement agreements, the union remains free to take ordinary measures to govern itself, to regulate membership, to determine what benefits and privileges its members will enjoy, so long as it does not discriminate on the basis of strike-related conduct. Clearly, when the union agreed not to retaliate against non-striking employees, it did not waive its statutorily protected right to limit the privileges of core members. 83 In the alternative, it could be that both the majority and Board believe that the strike settlement agreements, while not serving to waive entirely the union's rights under section 8(b)(1)(A), constitute a partial waiver of such rights. Under this theory, the strike settlement agreements serve to limit the union's otherwise lawful conduct only if the conduct is motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory animus. For purposes of my dissent, I will assume that the majority relies on this latter theory, and, in that light, will analyze its argument that the union acted out of discriminatory animus.
84 As noted earlier, the question whether the union acted with discriminatory animus must be considered in light of the fact that the union had a statutorily protected right to limit the rights and privileges afforded core members, to treat them differently from its full members. See supra Part 1. Both the majority and the Board fail to recognize this point. This failure causes them to view otherwise innocent behavior as highly suspect, and as supportive of a finding of discriminatory motive. When the union's conduct is viewed in its proper context, its actions are readily characterized as eminently reasonable and justifiable. 85 Moreover, the most critical allegations the majority utilizes to sustain the Board's finding of discriminatory animus were not relied on by the Board and may not properly be relied on by the majority. The remainder of the evidence it cites is marginal at best and would be deemed either irrelevant or inadmissible hearsay were it introduced in a court of law.
86 The majority places great emphasis on its assertion that the evidence is undisputed that the only victims of the union's challenged policy were financial core members who crossed the picket line. See maj. op. at 1254-1255. While this may be true, it is wholly beside the point. There are no other financial core members; if there were, under the union's rules they would receive the identical treatment. As pointed out earlier, some rule was required when a new category of members emerged, and there is absolutely nothing suspect either about the fact that a rule was adopted, or that it provided that financial core members would receive fewer benefits than full members. Also, the issue is not whether the policy disadvantages core members--and the Board and the majority go to great lengths to establish this uncontested point--but whether the policy discriminated against non-striking employees because of their conduct during the strike. The facts clearly demonstrate that core members do not receive different treatment because of their strike-related activities. They receive different treatment only if they currently--months after the strike has ended--refuse to participate in the affairs of the union and currently elect not to become eligible for the full range of benefits. As long as an employee is currently willing to accept full membership, he is entitled to all of the union-provided benefits--irrespective of what actions he took during the strike. 6 87 Given these facts, it cannot reasonably be said that the union's policy is one of retaliation for past conduct. Indeed, as the NLRB noted, employees who chose to work during the strike, but did not resign their [union] membership receive exactly the same benefits as full members who wholeheartedly supported the strike. ALJ op. at 10, reprinted in 275 N.L.R.B. at 916. Equally important, individuals who converted to financial core membership status during the strike and subsequently reinstated their full memberships receive all of the benefits of full membership. It is clear from these facts alone that the challenged policy does not penalize individuals because of strike-related conduct. 88 In short, while financial core members receive fewer benefits, it is not because they chose to become financial core members during the strike. They can receive the full benefits of union membership whenever they wish to do so. They need only do what all the other persons who receive those benefits have done--become full members of the union. Thus the fact that all the core members are individuals who worked during the strike does not by itself support any inference that the union's action was motivated by discriminatory animus. 89
90 The majority next refers to four isolated statements that it apparently believes show that the union's actions were retaliatory in nature and therefore violated the strike settlement agreements. See maj. op. at 1254-55. 7 The first statement was purportedly an admission of an office manager as to the purpose of the rule. However, the statement in no way pertains to the reasons why the rule was adopted. If anything, it only relates a somewhat inaccurate description of the scope or effect of the rule. Equally important, an office manager does not participate in any way in the formulation of union policy, is not normally knowledgeable as to the motives underlying the union's decisions, and her statements cannot serve to bind the union on the issue of motivation. The second statement was purportedly made by an unnamed office worker, and the third by someone in the Union's office. Again, these hearsay statements, the contents of which were also far from definitive, cannot serve to bind the union, and provide no insight into the union's motivation. The only statement purportedly made by a union official was made by Marty Dolan, a business representative. Dolan simply told a core member that in order to reinstate his full membership he should write a letter explaining why he signed financial core and crossed the picket line, and also why he wanted to be reinstated. Clearly, this statement does not serve to establish the basis of the union's decision to adopt the challenged policy. 91 When viewed separately or together, the four isolated snippets, consigned to a footnote in the Board's opinion 8 , do little more than demonstrate the actual if undisputed existence of the challenged policy. They in no way constitute the substantial evidence as to motivation needed for this court to affirm the Board's order. 92
93 The majority also claims to find additional support for its conclusion that there is substantial evidence of discriminatory animus in the fact that core members were denied use of the union's building facilities. The majority's reliance on this evidence--even if only to provide additional support for its judgment--again reflects its failure to understand that the union may legitimately proscribe rights, privileges and benefits of core members, so long as employment status is not affected. Indeed, under the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A), the union may make core membership as unattractive as possible. 94 Nor is it relevant that members of the public were entitled to use the facilities. Such persons, unlike core members, have not rejected full union participation; nor can the union offer them an all or nothing full membership option. Clearly, the union has nothing to gain from denying the use of its facilities to the general public. However, the union does stand to benefit if core members are denied every possible privilege and as a result are given additional incentive to become full members. 95
96 Perhaps most important to the majority's conclusion that there is substantial evidence of discriminatory animus is its suggestion that the union effectively prevented core members from converting to full membership status. The majority refers to testimony by three core members who sent letters to union officials in early 1983 asking to become full members, and whose requests were still pending at the time of the administrative hearing that November. See Maj. op. at 1255-1256. My colleagues conclude that it was proper for the NLRB to infer, from the Union's failure to act upon these requests for reinstatement to full membership, that the purpose of its December 1982 discriminatory action against financial core members was to punish them for crossing the picket line. Id. at 1256. Unfortunately for the majority's argument, no such inference was made by the NLRB. 97 Both the non-existent inference and the evidence of delay are fundamental elements of the majority's case. Had the Board made an inference of discriminatory treatment in reliance on evidence that the union refused to act on applications for full membership, and had the record as a whole justified the drawing of such an inference from such evidence, there would in all likelihood be sufficient basis for a finding of improper motivation. However, not only did the Board not make the inference relied on by the majority but it appears to have given no weight at all to the testimony regarding the alleged delays. Nowhere in its decision is any reference whatever made either to the evidence or the rationale upon which the majority relies. Moreover, the record contains undisputed testimony that a number of employees who crossed the picket line and chose to become financial core members did convert to full membership status after the strike, apparently without difficulty. 98 Thus the majority is simply incorrect when it suggests that the Board concluded that the union effectively prevented core members from converting to full membership status. Indeed, the only logical inference we can draw from the entire record and the Board's decision not to rely on the evidence of delay is that the Board concluded that the evidence was not sufficiently credible or probative to affect its judgment. 99 Finally, even if the majority's suggestion that core members were effectively prevented from converting to full membership status were correct, the judgment of the Board could not be affirmed on that ground. [A]n agency's order must be upheld, if at all, 'on the same basis articulated in the order by the agency itself.'  FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 397, 94 S.Ct. 2315, 2326, 41 L.Ed.2d 141 (1974) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-69, 83 S.Ct. 239, 245-46, 9 L.Ed.2d 207 (1962)). See also Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 631, 100 S.Ct. 2844, 2858, 65 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1980) (plurality opinion); FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 249, 92 S.Ct. 898, 908, 31 L.Ed.2d 170 (1972). Indeed, the Supreme Court has long held that we must judge the propriety of such [administrative] action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 322 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 1577, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947). Here, the Board clearly did not purport to base its judgment on the inability of core members to convert. Thus the majority affirms the judgment of the Board in reliance on an entirely new ground, one never referred to by the Board. This it may not do. 100 The majority errs egregiously when it attributes to the Board an inference the Board never made, ignores the undisputed testimony that core members were free to convert, and upholds the Board's judgment on a basis not invoked by the Board. Without this critical underpinning, there is simply no adequate basis for the majority's decision.
101 The Board's finding of improper motivation amounts to little more than speculation. NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 827 F.2d 530, 537 (9th Cir.1987). Weighed against this [speculative] evidence was the uncontroverted fact, id., that employees who crossed the picket line but did not become financial core members and employees who became financial core members during the strike but returned to full membership afterwards were both afforded full membership benefits and neither suffered reprisals. They were treated identically, in every respect, to those who fully supported the strike. Only those individuals who chose more than four months after the strike to reject full membership status and to continue in a dues-paying-only capacity were deprived of the benefits the union decided to afford only to its full members. The union admittedly sought to treat financial core members differently, to treat them in a far less favorable manner than full members. But, there is no substantial evidence in the record to support the Board's inference that it was motivated by a desire to retaliate against those members for their strike-related conduct. Accordingly, the Board's conclusion that the union breached the settlement agreements should not be affirmed. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-89, 71 S.Ct. 456, 464-65, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951).