Opinion ID: 170350
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: failure of any juror to find severe-disturbance mitigator

Text: Fields complains that no juror found that he committed the murders under severe mental or emotional disturbance. The government insists he does not raise a cognizable issue for our review. We agree.
The now-repealed capital scheme for continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) offenses expressly sanctioned review of mitigator findings by directing the court of appeals to remand if the record did not support either a jury's finding of an aggravator or its failure to find[] any mitigating factors. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(3). In contrast, the FDPA directs the court to remand if the record fails to support the existence of the required aggravator, i.e., the statutory aggravator(s) making the defendant eligible for the death penalty, and does not mention mitigating factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3595(c)(2). This clearly indicates that the FDPA does not contemplate evidentiary review of mitigator findings. Moreover, the government cites decisions from two circuits holding that, so long as the jury is not precluded from considering evidence relating to a mitigator, its determination of the matter is not subject to challenge on evidentiary grounds. See United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 327 (4th Cir.2003); United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 999-1000 (8th Cir.2000). Fields has not cited any contrary authority. [13] He does point out that Higgs and Paul alternatively reached the merits to affirm the jury's rejection of the mitigatory in question, Higgs, 353 F.3d at 327; Paul, 217 F.3d at 1000, and notes that the Fifth Circuit (while expressing doubts on the matter) [a]ssum[ed], arguendo, that [it] possessed] the authority to review the juror's special findings regarding mitigating factors in United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 413 (5th Cir.1998), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Martinez-Salazar 528 U.S. 304, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000). These illustrations of cautious judicial practice do not substantively undermine the operative holdings in Higgs and Paul, or negate the FDPA's telling silence (particularly compared to the CCE scheme) as to review of mitigator findings. We agree with Higgs and Paul that a jury's failure to find a particular mitigator is not subject to challenge on evidentiary grounds in cases governed by the FDPA. Indeed, the peculiar challenge advanced by Fields would not be cognizable even if we held that mitigator findings were subject to review for evidentiary sufficiency' in the traditional sense. Fields contends that at least one juror should have found he committed the offenses while under a severe mental or emotional disturbance. Aplt. Opening Br. at 100-02. He does not argue (with one possible exception in his reply brief) that the evidence was such that no reasonable juror could have rejected the mitigator; if that were his argument, his position would necessarily be that he was entitled to a unanimous finding on the mitigator. He makes the very different claim that his evidence was merely strong enough that some juror(s) should have found in his favor. None of the cases we have discussed which ultimately did review the merits of the appellant's challenge to the mitigator findings, under the CCE ( McCullah ), on an arguendo basis ( Hall ), or as an alternative rationale for disposition ( Higgs and Paul )even potentially recognize this kind of objection. Rather, they review the findings in the objective way challenges for evidentiary sufficiency are traditionally considered in the criminal law: was the evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact (and hence each and every juror) would be compelled to find the matter in the defendant's favor. See McCullah, 76 F.3d at 1112-13; Higgs, 353 F.3d at 327; Paul, 217 F.3d at 999; Hall, 152 F.3d at 413. Fields' attempt to frame an argument for reversal based on a lesser evidentiary claim is not authorized by any authority he has cited or that we have found. It is akin to seeking reversal on the legally fanciful basis that a defense too weak to render the prosecution's case insufficient should have at least convinced one juror to hang the jury. [14] At one point in his reply brief, Fields does characterize his argument as the converse of an argument of insufficient evidence to support a conviction and compares his situation to one where a properly instructed jury fails to convict even when it can be said that no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Aplt. Reply Br. at 54 (internal quotation marks omitted). This might suggest a recasting of his position to bring it in line with traditional principles. Yet the peculiar legal hedge clearly remains as he continues to assert only that some juror(s) should have ruled in his favor, see id. at 52, 56. And, of course, even if he did recast his objection in cognizable form, we would not be obliged to consider his belatedly adopted position. See United States v. Hall, 473 F.3d 1295, 1301 n. 1 (10th Cir.2007) (declining to address new argument on issue in reply brief).