Opinion ID: 1518773
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the jury selection was constitutionally valid?

Text: Appellant raises two types of jury selection challenges, one as to prospective jurors he contends either should or should not have been excused for cause and the other as to jurors who actually served but, in Appellant's view, should not have.
Appellant alleges as reversible error the trial court's failure to strike for cause certain prospective jurors he believes were not qualified to sit. Because the jurors were not stricken for cause, Appellant was forced to use peremptory challenges to remove them from the jury panel. In his opinion, this was a denial of his right to due process and to the free exercise of his peremptory challenges. Marsch v. Commonwealth, Ky., 743 S.W.2d 830, 831 (1987). Juror A, [1] when asked whether he could consider the full range of penalties, responded with, Are you asking me what I would do? When asked again, he said he would do the right thing. When asked a third time, he said, Yeah. Appellant contends that these responses indicate hostility to the consideration of the full range of penalties. Additionally, prospective juror A had spoken to a friend of a friend who had driven near the location where the bodies were found. As to prospective juror B, Appellant contends that her response that she was not sure if she could put aside pretrial publicity in consideration of the cases is sufficient to require the grant of a challenge for cause. Prospective juror C is said to be unqualified to sit because she stated that she would do her best to consider the full range of penalties but would not know whether that would be possible until she had heard all of the evidence and had to make a decision. Additionally, prospective juror C had testified during the Todd Ice murder trial. Ice, supra . Prospective juror D, who had seen on television an account of the charges against Appellant and could remember another recitation of the charges from a year or two ago, is alleged to be unqualified because he is unable to put aside pretrial publicity. Finally, prospective juror E stated that she did not know what her mind's gonna do when asked if she could set aside pretrial publicity. The Commonwealth's response to the arguments of Appellant boils down to an assertion that Appellant has carefully quoted out of context the statements of the prospective jurors in an effort to cast the worst possible light on their responses to the voir dire. When considered in the context of all of the responses each made during questioning, the statements cited by Appellant lose their prejudicial connotations and, for the most part, become rather innocuous. Whether a juror should be excused for cause is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 873 S.W.2d 175, 177, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 862, 115 S.Ct. 176, 130 L.Ed.2d 112 (1994); Thompson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 862 S.W.2d 871, 874 (1993). The trial court's decision will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Scruggs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 566 S.W.2d 405, 408, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 928, 99 S.Ct. 314, 58 L.Ed.2d 321 (1978). While some of the answers given may have indicated some ambiguity as to the prospective jurors' ability to consider the full range of penalties or to disregard pretrial publicity, the follow-up questioning by the court and counsel clarified any misunderstanding without falling into the forbidden arena of using magic questions to rehabilitate. Montgomery v. Commonwealth, Ky., 819 S.W.2d 713, 717-18 (1991). The trial court did not err in its refusal to strike these jurors for cause. Appellant also challenges the granting of two motions by the Commonwealth to strike potential jurors for cause. Potential juror F responded to the trial court's initial question in regard to the imposition of penalties by stating that she was against the death penalty. She later stated that she could consider the death penalty under certain circumstances, when the penalty seemed appropriate after hearing all of the evidence. The Commonwealth moved to strike her for cause stating that her answers indicated an equivocal ability to consider and vote for the death penalty in some situations. The defense did not object to the motion and it was granted by the court. During group voir dire, the Commonwealth asked if any juror would be unable to sit because he or she could not render a verdict because to do so would be passing judgment on another person. Prospective juror G answered that he hoped he would not have to pass judgment and that he did not feel he could render a verdict. Prospective juror G was excused over the objection of the defense, without further questioning. The Commonwealth correctly cites Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), and Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986), as dispositive of the striking of prospective juror F. In the former case, the United States Supreme Court said that a juror may be excluded for cause if his views on capital punishment would prevent or impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852, 83 L.Ed.2d at 851-52. `[D]eterminations of juror bias cannot be reduced to question-and-answer sessions which obtain results in the manner of a catechism.' The trial court, `aided as it undoubtedly was by its assessment of [the potential juror's] demeanor,' was under the obligation to determine whether [the juror's] views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror.' Darden, 477 U.S. at 178, 106 S.Ct. at 2470, 91 L.Ed.2d at 155 (citations omitted); see also Stanford v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 781, 786 (1987), aff'd, 492 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excusing prospective juror F. The Commonwealth emphasizes that there was more to juror G's reluctance to sit in judgment than set forth by Appellant. The juror's response to the voir dire question was that, I'm a very religious person and I don't believe  it goes against my belief to judge anyone. I'm not sure I could make a decision. He also listed that same information on his juror qualification form. It is apparent to this Court that prospective juror G had views that were completely incompatible with serving on a jury and fulfilling the duties required of that service. Stanford, supra . The trial court did not err.
We next address the jurors that Appellant contends should have been stricken for cause who actually sat on the jury and rendered a verdict against Appellant. Juror H recalled seeing a television story about the case when the bodies were found. She recalled pictures of water tanks and fields and remembered that the victims were found in the tanks. Juror I responded to the questions about whether she could consider all of the penalties with, I believe I can. Trial counsel declined to question her further, and moved to strike her for cause. Juror J stated that his vision was impaired due to injuries received in an accident and stated that should he need assistance in seeing something, he would notify the court. Counsel moved that he be excluded from service due to disability. Juror K had seen television accounts of the case, including one where Appellant was shown in handcuffs and another that mentioned drug involvement. She also recalled publicity about a common grave. She stated that she could consider the full range of penalties depending on the evidence and that she would presume innocence unless proven guilty. The Commonwealth responds that, once again, Appellant fails to consider the voir dire as a whole. In addition to the statements recited above, Juror H stated that she remembered very little of the story she had seen on television, thought there were only two bodies, and that she could give Appellant a complete presumption of innocence. As to Juror I, the Commonwealth points out that Appellant asked no follow-up questions to clear up what he considered to be an answer that was a little bit equivocal. The trial court considered the answer to be expressed in a manner that he interpreted to mean, I can [consider the entire range of penalties]. The Commonwealth also states that while Juror J admitted to problems with his vision, he also stated that he was a self-employed bulldozer operator. The Commonwealth believes heavy equipment operation indicates that Juror J has sufficient vision to serve on a jury. Finally, as to Juror K, the Commonwealth set forth most of her responses to voir dire questioning. Therein, Juror K stated that she could presume Appellant's innocence, knew that handcuffs were routine, knew that the news media could and did make mistakes, and that she had formed no opinion as to Appellant's guilt or innocence in this case. In overruling Appellant's motion to strike for cause, the court stated that he believed the juror had gone overboard to give any information to the court that she might have had about the case, that she had formed no opinion and that she had strong feelings about the unreliability of news reports. As previously stated, the trial court has discretion in determining whether to excuse a juror for cause and that decision will not be reversed on appeal unless its action is clearly erroneous. Further, prospective jurors do not live in a vacuum and cannot be expected to be totally ignorant of any case they may be called upon to decide. Jones v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 737 S.W.2d 466, 467 (1987). The fact that a prospective juror may have some knowledge of a case does not establish objective bias. Peters v. Commonwealth, Ky., 505 S.W.2d 764, 765 (1974); See also Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431-32, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 1908, 114 L.Ed.2d 493, 509-10 (1991). None of these four jurors had sufficient knowledge of this case to require disqualification or the granting of a motion for cause. Nor was there sufficient evidence that any of them would not be able to consider the entire range of potential penalties. Grooms, supra . There was no evidence that Juror J's vision impairment was of such a magnitude that he was unable to fulfill his responsibilities as a juror. See KRS 29A.080. The trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to strike these four jurors for cause was properly denied.