Opinion ID: 2515784
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Other Crimes Evidence Presented at Trial

Text: The prosecution presented evidence that Rojas had been convicted of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245) in 1982 and armed robbery (§ 211) in 1988. Richard presented evidence of the facts underlying these convictions: Ronald Tate testified that Rojas approached him, asked him questions about a fight Tate had just witnessed, and then pulled out a knife and stabbed him multiple times. An investigator for Richard testified that he interviewed Ruben Arrechiga, Jr., an inmate witness. Arrechiga told the investigator that Rojas told him that as he was fleeing from a convenience store that he had just robbed, he saw two young girls from the neighborhood and shot at them because they could identify him as the perpetrator. Defendant now contends that by limiting the admissibility of Rojas's other crimes to the issue of Rojas's credibility, and by further limiting evidence detailing the facts of those other crimes, the trial court erred under state law and violated his federal constitutional rights to due process, confrontation and cross-examination, and presentation of a defense under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and to a reliable judgment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Although counsel for Richard did not expressly argue that each incident of other crimes committed by Rojas was admissible as a common plan or scheme to intimidate a witness under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), she did argue generally that the other crimes were admissible on this ground. Because defendant joined in Richard's motion when it was first identified for the trial court, we conclude that he has preserved the claim under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). But, as discussed below, his claim is without merit. Defendant acknowledges that the facts underlying Rojas's two prior felony convictions were admitted for impeachment. But he contends that this evidence also should have been admitted to show Rojas's common plan or scheme to intimidate or eliminate witnesses, as relevant to the possibility Rojas killed Medina and Sanchez. In this vein, defendant also contends the court erred in precluding additional evidence about the Tate incident, namely that Rojas knew Tate because they had attended the same school years before the stabbing incident. Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), generally prohibits the admission of evidence of a person's character or a trait of his or her character when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion. Section 1101, subdivision (b), however, provides that evidence of a person's prior criminal act is admissible when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge ...) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act. To establish the existence of a common plan or scheme, the common features must indicate the existence of a plan rather than a series of similar spontaneous acts, but the plan thus revealed need not be distinctive or unusual. ( People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 403, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757.) Moreover, to be admissible, such evidence `must not contravene other policies limiting admission, such as those contained in Evidence Code section 352.' ( People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 637, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392.) Under Evidence Code section 352, the probative value of the proffered evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission would create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. (See People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 404, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757; Evid.Code, § 352.) The evidence of the 1982 Tate incident was weak on the issue of whether Rojas had a plan to intimidate a witness. There was no evidence that Rojas was involved in any way in the fight that Tate had witnessed. Absent such evidence, there was no motive for Rojas to stab Tate. Accordingly, the court did not err in limiting the admission of evidence of the Tate incident to impeach Rojas. Admittedly, the evidence of the 1988 armed robbery was stronger than the evidence of the Tate incident on the issue of Rojas's purported plan to intimidate witnesses because, arguably, Rojas shot at the girls while fleeing from the scene of the robbery because they could have identified him as the perpetrator of the robbery. But evidence of this shooting incident was weak in substance, considering that there was no offer of proof that Rojas was convicted of shooting at the girls, and considering that the testimony that Rojas shot at the girls was suspect because it was given by a convicted felon. Accordingly, the court did not err in limiting the admission of evidence of the armed robbery to impeach Rojas.