Opinion ID: 3015454
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Bronshtein v. Horn

Text: Our discussion would be incomplete if we did not mention our recent holding in Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700 (3d Cir. 2005). There, the defendant was convicted of firstdegree murder and conspiracy. We held that the charge on accomplice liability “misleadingly suggested that Bronshtein could be found guilty of first-degree murder even if he did not have the specific intent to kill.” 404 F.3d at 711. We nevertheless denied relief on that claim because we concluded that the error was harmless. Following the decision in Bronshtein, the parties filed supplemental briefs addressing whether or not that decision impacted this appeal. Not surprisingly, the Commonwealth now suggests that Bronshtein undermines the district court’s analysis of Laird’s jury charge. The Commonwealth argues that any error here was also harmless given the rationale in Bronshtein. We can not agree. Bronshtein was convicted of first-degree murder, robbery, theft, and conspiracy. We held that, given the wording of the court’s instruction, “the jury could [have found] Bronshtein guilty of first-degree murder if it found that he had conspired to commit the robbery and that another conspirator had killed [the victim] in furtherance of the robbery.” Id. However, we reasoned that the error was harmless because the jury also convicted him of first-degree murder and conspiracy. The trial court had given the following instruction on accomplice liability for first-degree murder: 23 [I]n order to find the defendant guilty of first- degree murder as an accomplice, you must find the Commonwealth has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant shared a specific intent to kill [the victim] with the active perpetrator and encouraged or assisted the active perpetrator by comparable overt behavior. Remember when we talked about first-degree murder? That's the one that requires that specific intent to kill? Yes, it is possible to convict the defendant as an accomplice to that even if he’s not the one who killed [the victim], but you'd have to find that he shared that specific intent to kill . . . before you can find him guilty as an accomplice, and that he assisted the active perpetrator by some comparable overt behavior. Id. at 711 (emphasis added). Since the instructions explained that shared criminal intent is necessary to convict for firstdegree murder, and since Bronshtein was convicted of conspiracy as well as first-degree murder, we reasoned that the jury must have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he was either the actual killer or shared the specific intent to kill required for first-degree murder. Thus, the erroneous charge was harmless. That is not the situation here. As we explained above, the trial court here did not explain that a co-conspirator can not be convicted of first-degree murder absent a shared specific intent to kill. Moreover, Bronshtein was convicted of first-degree murder. Laird was convicted of first, second, and third-degree murder, as well as 24 conspiracy. Thus, there is no way for us to determine if the jury understood that an accomplice to a first-degree murder must also intend to kill the victim. See Commonwealth v. Waters, 418 A.2d at 93-94.