Opinion ID: 2518325
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Brett's central argument on appeal is that the littoral boundary between his property and the Marina has never been established in accordance with Idaho law and that IDL failed to make specific findings regarding the competing littoral rights at issue in approving the amended lake encroachment permit. He requests that this case be remanded so IDL can do a detailed examination of the appropriate location of the littoral line between the properties, including the line of navigability. In addition, Brett contends that IDL's conclusions regarding the Association's need for the amended permit and its balancing of competing interests is arbitrary, capricious and without any factual support in the record. A. Establishing the Littoral Boundary Littoral rights, for the purposes of issuing lake encroachment permits, refer to the right of owners or lessees of land adjacent to navigable waters to maintain their adjacency to the lake and to make use of their rights as littoral owners by building or using aids to navigation. See I.C. § 58-1302(f). Issuance of a lake encroachment permit, i.e. permission to place a dock on the lake, necessarily contemplates a determination of littoral rights as defined by the Idaho Lake Protection Act. Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322, 326, 78 P.3d 389, 393 (2003). A holder of a valid permit cannot locate a dock in a manner that infringes upon an adjacent landowner's littoral right. Id. Thus, IDL must determine the littoral rights of adjoining riparian landowners when there is a dispute regarding placement of an encroachment pursuant to a permit and possible infringement of those rights. Id. Brett contends that IDL's finding that the Meckel survey represented a fair and equitable apportionment of the parties' common littoral boundary was not adequate and constitutes reversible error. See Hilleary v. Meyer, 91 Idaho 775, 430 P.2d 666 (1967). He argues that in determining the applicable littoral boundaries for purposes of approving the encroachment permit, an examination of the shoreline is a necessary prerequisite, and IDL failed to make specific factual findings with respect to the configuration of the shoreline or the location of the line of navigability. Therefore, Brett would have the Court remand this case so that IDL can make the appropriate determination. Initially, we make two observations about the lawsuit and earlier determinations granting amendments to the encroachment permit. First, there is a reasonable basis for concluding that the jury's verdict in the Johnson litigation determined the littoral boundaries of the properties at issue, collaterally estopping Brett from re-litigating the issue of littoral rights now. The jury had to rely on the Meckel survey, and its determination of the littoral boundaries, in order to conclude that no trespass had occurred. Secondly, the Association points out that the 1991 amended permit likewise resolved the question, as the permit utilized the littoral rights line established by the Meckel survey. However, we need not address either of those arguments because the current application for encroachment presented IDL with the issue of the littoral boundaries between the Marina and Brett's property, and IDL clearly resolved the issue. In Driesbach v. Lynch, 71 Idaho 501, 234 P.2d 446 (1951), this Court set forth the general rules which govern establishing littoral zones applicable to adjacent property owners: It is realized that due to the numerous variations of the shore line formations, such as a convex or a concave, or otherwise irregular shore line of a lake or other large body of water, no one rule or formula could be invoked to determine the littoral boundaries which would apply in all cases; in instances where the shore line is substantially a straight shore line these boundaries are more readily and easily ascertained and determined because in such instances it is practical and equitable to draw a straight line according to the general course of the shore at high water mark and extend the lateral lines of all the properties upon such body of water at right angles with the shore line towards the low water mark; however, the irregularity in the formation of the shore line as above mentioned would make the application of this rule inequitable in many instances. ... It seems quite firmly established that there are a few general and fundamental rules which in most instances may be applied with reference to the apportionment of littoral rights: If the shore line is straight or substantially so, the littoral lines are to be extended from the divisional lines on shore into the water perpendicular to the shore line; in the event the shore line is concave, converging lines shall be run from the divisional shore lines to the line of navigability; again, if the shore lines are convex, the lines will be divergent to the line of navigability (citation omitted). It is evident in examining the cases that there seems to be no hard and fast rule or rules which are without modification to meet peculiar facts and circumstances; the controlling thought in every case is to treat each case in an equitable manner so that, so far as it is possible, all property owners on such a body of water have access to the water; the courts in all cases have striven to see that each shore line owner shall have his proportionate share of the deep water frontage and all of the rules which have been adopted and applied throughout the years by the courts in relation to this problem have had that end in view; the courts have not hesitated to point out that these rules often require modification under the peculiar circumstances of the case in order to secure equal justice, and that where such is the case the courts do not hesitate to invoke a modification to attain such objective. Driesbach, 71 Idaho at 508-509, 234 P.2d at 450-451. While the IDL decision does not specifically set forth the nature of the shoreline or the line of navigability, IDL made extended findings as to the information it considered in making the determination as to the littoral boundary. IDL was in possession of the Meckel survey, as well as affidavits from James Meckel and Neil Fitzsimmons explaining the process they went through in establishing the proposed littoral boundaries. The information IDL considered also contained specific conclusions regarding the nature of the shoreline at issue and the line of navigability. Indeed, it appears from the surveyors' affidavits that they considered the Driesbach standards articulated by this Court and specifically followed them in formulating an opinion as to the applicable littoral boundaries. IDL was not required to repeat those findings in its decision, as it is clear from the record that it considered that information and found that Meckel's survey was a fair and equitable means of apportioning the boundaries so as to maximize access to navigable waters. Since IDL's findings, conclusions and decision are sufficiently detailed to demonstrate that it considered the applicable standards and reached a reasoned decision, we find that the decision was not arbitrary and capricious and was based on substantial evidence in the record. B. Establishing a Need for Permanent Moorage Brett next argues that IDL erred in finding that the Association established a need for permanent moorage, since there were not sufficient findings based on substantial evidence in the record regarding the navigational or economic necessity or justification for the Association's requested permit. IDL is directed to balance several factors when determining the necessity of a proposed navigational encroachment. The pertinent rules provide: It is the express policy of the State of Idaho that the public health, interest, safety and welfare requires that all encroachments upon, in or above the beds or waters of navigable lakes of the state be regulated in order that the protection of property, navigation, fish and wildlife habitat, aquatic life, recreation, aesthetic beauty and water quality be given due consideration and weighed against the navigational or economic necessity or justification for, or benefit to be derived from the proposed encroachment. IDAPA 20.03.04.011.01; See also I.C. § 58-1301. It is troubling that the Association did not initially seek permission to amend the permit before selling moorage to the two large houseboats on the east side of the boardwalk when, clearly, it did not have authority to do so. Nevertheless, it appears from the record that IDL considered the location of the docks, the number of slips, the navigability of the lake in that area, and concluded that the Association had demonstrated a need for permanent moorage on the east side of the boardwalk. It further appears that IDL did take into consideration Brett's concerns, but also concluded that mooring large vessels in the interior of the Marina was difficult due to the congestion from 90 slips jutting off a crowded boardwalk. IDL was entitled, based on evidence in the record, to conclude that it was necessary to amend the encroachment permit and we find that determination was not arbitrary or capricious. C. Weighing Benefits Against Adverse Affects Brett urges that IDL erroneously failed to measure or quantify the benefit to the Association to be gained by amending the permit, or address how such benefit outweighs the injury occasioned to Brett's property even if the vessels at issue are moored outside Brett's littoral property line. IDL is required to balance the competing interests involved while determining whether to approve permits for navigational encroachments. See I.C. § 58-1301, et seq.; IDAPA 20.03.04.011. Brett primarily raises economic concerns with the proposed encroachment, arguing that permitting the moorage of the two vessels in question physically behind his home would significantly diminish the value of his property. While the Lake Protection Act certainly contemplates that IDL will weigh the economic benefits and detriment of a proposed navigational encroachment, it is not the only factor considered in the determination. IDL must weigh environmental, navigational, recreational and other impacts associated with a proposed encroachment. Here, IDL adequately weighed the evidence, measuring the impact of the amended permit against the possible damage to Brett's property and Brett's enjoyment of his property, and there was nothing improper, arbitrary, or capricious in the conclusion that the encroachment benefits outweighed the adverse effects on Brett. Indeed, the decision to move the vessels at issue further waterward was an effort to balance out the interests and to permit the use, while attempting to ameliorate the adverse consequences to Brett. IDL, based on its experience and expertise, is in the best position to weigh the competing interests involved in determining whether to approve additional encroachments, and we will not independently evaluate those decisions unless they are not supported by the record or constitute an abuse of discretion. D. Attorneys Fees The Association requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho case law mandating that [a]ttorney fees are awardable if an appeal does no more than simply invite an appellate court to second-guess the trial court on conflicting evidence. See Sun Valley Shamrock Resources, Inc. v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 120, 794 P.2d 1389, 1393 (1990); See also Anderson v. Larsen, 136 Idaho 402, 408, 34 P.3d 1085, 1091 (2001). From the cases cited, it appears the Association is requesting fees pursuant to § 12-121. However, attorney fees are not available to a party on appeal from an agency decision under I.C. § 12-121. Staff of Idaho Real Estate Comn. v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 637, 22 P.3d 105, 112 (2001); See also Lowery v. Board of County Comm'rs, 117 Idaho 1079, 793 P.2d 1251 (1990). Moreover, Brett presented legitimate issues for consideration on appeal and, therefore, we decline to award the Association their fees.