Opinion ID: 613010
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Substantive Scope of Question 76

Text: As noted, Question 76 asks simply whether the organization engage[d] in any activity not previously reported to the IRS. In elaborating on the reporting obligation, the guiding instructions demand an explanation of any significant changes in the kind of activities the organization conducts to further its exempt purpose. Taking his lead from the instructions, Mubayyid argues that the question asks only about changes, and that he was thus not required to report activities that were ongoing and unchanged, even if they had never previously been included in Care's filings. He asserts that Care had engaged in no new activities in the relevant tax years, and that his answer to Question 76 could therefore not be found to be false. We consider this view of Question 76 to be unreasonable. A straightforward reading of Form 990 and its instructions makes plain that Question 76 seeks the disclosure of information about activities not accurately depicted in the organization's application for recognition of exemption, Form 1023, or in any other year's return. Indeed, reading Question 76 together with Form 1023 confirms that, in posing Question 76, the IRS's purpose was to require organizations to update their initial filings on an annual basis. Like Question 76, Form 1023 contains a broad request for information regarding every activity of the organization. It asks organizations to provide a detailed narrative description of all the activities of the organization. It instructs filers to list each activity separately in order of importance and to include, as a minimum, (a) a detailed description of the activity including its purpose; (b) when the activity was or will be initiated; and (c) where and by whom the activity will be conducted. The interpretation of Question 76 advanced by Mubayyid would defeat the IRS's clear intent to obtain an accurate, current report of the organization's activities. It defies common sense to conclude that the IRS sought, under penalty of perjury, detailed information about a tax-exempt organization's activities if begun, altered, or ended in the current tax year, but that it was wholly uninterested in such an organization's ongoing, previously unreported activities if begun in any other year. Hence, in context, the instruction's references to changes cannot reasonably be understood to circumscribe the broad request for disclosure of any activity required by the text of Question 76 itself. Mubayyid's proffered reading does not take into account the IRS's justifiable assumption, built into the instruction, that an organization would have complied with its obligation to disclose previously existing reportable activities in either its Form 1023 or in a prior Form 990. In other words, the instructions focus on significant changes because the IRS expects that changes will be the only information not previously reported. The question itself, however, clearly requires disclosure of any activity not previously reported to the IRS. Further, the request in the instruction for disclosure even of those activities that are being discontinued highlights that the IRS is seeking to correct and update all information previously submitted to it about the organization's activities. A defendant who has previously filed a fraudulent or incomplete return, in contravention of the government's reasonable expectation, may not then `twist the meaning of a question in his own mind into some totally unrecognizable shape and then hide behind it' by alleging its fundamental ambiguity. Richardson, 421 F.3d at 35 (quoting United States v. Reveron Martinez, 836 F.2d 684, 691 (1st Cir.1988)). In urging an interpretation of Question 76 that disregards its obvious context, Mubayyid falls far short of demonstrating a fundamental ambiguity that would preclude a jury's evaluation of his defense. Of course, a defendant is entitled to argue even an unreasonable interpretation of a question to the jury. [33] Here, Mubayyid did so, and the jury rejected it. But the unreasonableness of his claimed interpretation shows that Question 76 is, at most, only arguably ambiguous. Where a question is only arguably ambiguous, the issue of the defendant's guilt is properly one for the jury. Id. at 33. There is no question that sufficient evidence supported the jury's rejection of Mubayyid's claim that he understood Question 76 to require reporting only of changes. The jury reasonably could have found that Mubayyid, as Care's treasurer, understood the context described above and, specifically, knew that the IRS sought through Question 76 to determine whether the organization remained entitled to its charitable tax status. To that end, the IRS plainly needed to know what the organization was currently doing. The interpretation Mubayyid posits is so inconsistent with the plain intent of the question when considered in context thatparticularly given his role as the organization's financial managera reasonable jury could readily reject his claim that he understood the question in the way he describes. In sum, we conclude that Question 76 is, at most, only arguably ambiguous in its demand that the filer advise the IRS of all activities, not simply changes. It was well within the jury's capability to find that Mubayyid in fact understood that the obligation imposed by Question 76 required reporting of more than just Care's new or modified activities.