Opinion ID: 1468508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Paint Controversy

Text: At trial the Authority contended that the failure of the paint to adhere to the steel was caused by contaminants on the steel prior to painting. The alleged contaminant was mill scale or a residuum thereof. Mill scale is similar to rust in that both are caused by oxidation of the steel, but unlike rust in that it is bluish-black in color. However, whereas rust occurs at normal everyday temperatures, mill scale occurs in the manufacturing process as the steel cools, when temperatures are greater than 1000° F. Mill scale is not, therefore, an unusual condition. The prime component of mill scale is the oxide FeO, but FeO is not always evident because it is an extremely unstable compound, which rapidly deteriorates. If chemical analysis reveals FeO, mill scale is present, but the absence of FeO does not preclude the presence of mill scale. Paint systems most commonly used on bridges contain a linseed oil and red-lead base which is capable of penetrating mill scale, thereby helping the paint to adhere to the steel. Such systems generally have a high pigment volume concentration (PVC) which also helps the paint adhere to the surface. The Newport system was epoxy rather than linseed oil based and had a low PVC. Witnesses at trial agreed that an epoxy system had never been used on a bridge before; however, there was testimony that such systems had been used on ships and other marine structures and were in fact used on bridges subsequent to the painting of the Newport structure. It was recognized that the epoxy system was not able to penetrate mill scale. Therefore, the steel used in the project would have to be free of mill scale, although the residual stain could remain. This required cleaning of the steel to standard specifications (SSPC) 6 level, [3] and this requirement was part of the Specifications under which Bethlehem was to perform. Essentially, the Authority claimed that the SSPC 6 level had not been met, whereas Bethlehem argued that no competent engineer would have ordered a new and untested paint system for this bridge. Bethlehem's first argument, that the trial justice misconceived issues of law and fact, is two-pronged: (1) the trial justice's ultimate finding as to the presence of mill scale or a residuum thereof was based on a purely conjectural preliminary finding, and (2) the trial court overlooked the distinctions between the claim and counterclaim and the burden of proof allocable to each of the parties. In arguing that the findings as to mill scale were speculative, the company points to evidence adduced militating against its presence. Additionally, Bethlehem directs our attention to language in the trial court's decision which noted that the oxide FeO might well disappear in the open air after a period of time. This further breakdown of the oxide would presumably account for its absence from the bridge's superstructure. Bethlehem strenuously maintains that FeO does not disappear into thin air as rapidly as the trial court suggests, but that even assuming the absence of FeO could logically be explained, a finding of might well disappear is insufficient to sustain the Authority's burden of proof. Had the trial justice based his conclusions solely on the instability of FeO, Bethlehem might have cause for complaint, but that simply is not the case. The question of whether the steel had been properly prepared was exhaustively litigated. Numerous witnesses testified for and against the theory that mill scale or another contaminant was responsible for the paint failure. Quite simply, the question had to be resolved by weighing conflicting testimony. The trial justice did precisely this, and there was ample evidence on which he could base a finding concerning the presence of the mill scale. There was testimony that the paint system used on the Newport Bridge required an extremely careful job of surface preparation for the paint to adhere properly and that Bethlehem had encountered considerable difficulty with the blasting equipment it used to clean the steel. Witnesses also testified that examination of paint chip specimens from the bridge revealed the bluish-black substance on the underside of the chips was the oxide Fe3O4, which is usually the end product of corrosion. Moreover, the black substance conformed precisely to the contour of the paint, leading one to conclude that contaminants were on the steel when the paint was applied. There was expert testimony which identified the substance as mill scale. Finally, the trial justice gave great weight to motion pictures taken in 1974, which showed that the remedial work performed by Cannon was holding up extremely well where Bethlehem's had failed. As noted earlier, we will not disturb a trial court's finding unless it is shown to be clearly wrong. In light of the foregoing evidence, we cannot say that the trial justice was engaging in speculation, and accordingly we will not disturb his finding that mill scale or other contaminants were on the steel before Bethlehem began to apply the paint. The second aspect of Bethlehem's argument on this point concerns each party's burden of proof. Essentially, the company contends that the trial `justice rolled into one the Authority's claim and Count II of Bethlehem's counterclaim, found that Bethlehem did not prove Count II, and concluded that, therefore, the Authority's claim was proven. This formulation of the trial justice's findings and conclusions misses the mark. While it is true the trial court spoke in terms of the sole controversy being whether the paint failure was due to faulty steel preparation and paint application or attributable to inherent deficiencies of the paint specifications themselves, it does not necessarily follow that he misperceived the respective burdens of proof. Indeed, quite the opposite is evident in his decision. After summarizing the evidence at length and making numerous findings of fact, the trial justice observed that [a]lthough the plaintiff AUTHORITY has the burden of proving by a fair preponderance of evidence that the paint failure was due to a faulty preparation of the steel by BETHLEHEM in that mill scale and other contaminants were not removed to an SSPC No. 6 level prior to the application of paint, it is not necessary that the plaintiff prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the contaminant in each instance was mill scale. The court then found that the Authority had met its burden, that contaminants were present at the time of painting, and that in most instances the contaminant was mill scale or a residuum thereof. Proceeding to Bethlehem's burden of proof on Count II, the trial justice observed that the company's attempt to show that the Section 7 Specifications were inherently inadequate was a complete failure. He found the overwhelming weight of the testimony showed almost beyond doubt that the paint system designed by the Engineer was adequate for the Newport Bridge. He thus concluded that the massive failure which took place by 1970 was due to faulty surface preparation and/or application on the part of BETHLEHEM, its employees and agents. We are sure that the trial justice would be the first to admit that he treated the paint controversy as an entity. He summarized separately the evidence pertaining to it and made separate findings of facts and conclusions of law. We find no fault, however, with his treatment of the issue. The claim and counterclaim were not tried separately; all parties presented evidence on the steel preparation as well as the paint specifications. To argue, as Bethlehem has, that the trial justice erred because he spoke in terms of the sole controversy is to pay homage to semantics. It is abundantly clear from the findings and conclusions recited above that the trial justice knew the task before him and performed it. We, therefore, reject the contention that the trial justice misconceived issues of law and fact applicable to the Authority's complaint.
Bethlehem next argues that even if it did fail to prepare or paint the steel properly, the Authority should be estopped from claiming such. In support of this contention, the company maintains that agents of the Authority inspected and approved the work, and any alleged defects would have been discoverable. Moreover, says Bethlehem, certain contractual provisions preclude the Authority from recovering damages following inspection and approval of the steel. The Authority engaged inspectors from Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory (PTL) to inspect Bethlehem's cleaning, preparation, and painting of the steel at Bethlehem's Pottstown, Pennsylvania plant. A total of eight inspectors worked at the plant for approximately 2 years. Four men on the day shift, and two on the evening and night shifts, kept an eye on all operations concerning the Newport project. Their duty was to spot check the cleaning and painting operations on more than one shift at unannounced times. The chief inspector of the Newport job estimated that approximately 10% of the steel was actually checked in various stages of cleaning and painting. The total amount of steel produced by Bethlehem for the Newport project was estimated to be 10,000 to 10,200 pieces. Thus, approximately 1,000-1,200 pieces were spot checked. Of these, about 842, 70-84%, were found unsatisfactory by the PTL inspectors. Bethlehem inspectors were also on the job. The company had designed a system for keeping track of when its own or PTL employees checked material. Each steel member was marked with a yellow tag, which Bethlehem said signified the steel was ready for painting. The tags had places for inspectors to mark which coat of paint they had approved. There was no specific place for noting that cleaned but unpainted steel had been checked and approved. PTL's chief inspector testified that his men did not check all steel prior to Bethlehem's yellow-tagging, and PTL workers themselves never yellow-tagged anything. There was, however, another tagging procedurethe red tag. It signified that PTL had visually inspected the finished product, found it suitable, and was releasing it for shipment. Later, in the fall of 1969 the Engineer inspected and approved a large segment of the bridge and thereafter released a portion of the contract retainage applicable to the completed areas. Based on this inspection and approval, Bethlehem maintains that because the defects were discoverable, the Authority is precluded from recovering remedial costs after the steel was incorporated into the structure. An examination of the cases cited by Bethlehem as well as numerous others fails to persuade us to this point of view. In those cases where the owner was estopped from asserting breach, one or more of several circumstances was present: (1) each piece of material was subject to careful examination; (2) the owner, in effect, was challenging the very specifications which he had mandated and which the work product had met; (3) the inspecting party did not object or complain about any of the work. Had PTL inspected each piece of steel prior to painting and never complained about the workmanship, we might well be faced with a situation where the owner had lulled the contractor into a false sense of assurance. But in this case quite the opposite is evident. All parties involved knew that PTL was only spot checking. Furthermore, the inspectors hardly closed their eyes to discrepancies, demanding that at least 70% of the work inspected receive remedial treatment. Bethlehem cannot now be heard to claim it was led down the proverbial primrose path. Nor can the Engineer's partial acceptance of the work bar the Authority's claim, for the contract specifically provides that: Any approval by the engineer of any materials, workmanship, plant, equipment, drawings, programs, methods or procedure, or of any other act or thing done or furnished, in or in connection with the performance of the work, shall be construed merely to mean that at the time the Engineer knows of no good reason for objecting thereto; and no such approval shall release the Contractor from his full responsibility for the accurate and complete performance of the work in accordance with the Plans and Specifications or from any duty, obligation or liability imposed upon him by the provisions of the contract. (Emphasis added.) It is evident from this provision that defects of which the Engineer was not cognizant can be the subject of a complaint subsequent to the Engineer's approval. Bethlehem does not contend, nor do we think, that the Engineer was under a duty to test the steel once it was incorporated into the bridge. The Engineer had a right to believe Bethlehem had fulfilled its side of the contract. Bethlehem seems to rely on the notion that the defects were discoverable, but we have not been shown any testimony which would establish that a visual inspection of the bridge would reveal the presence of mill scale under three coats of paint. Bethlehem, however, makes yet two more arguments. The first is that the special contract provisions relating to paint and painting envisioned the possibility of dispute and provided for arbitration. [4] Thus, says the company, it is unfair to allow claims for deficient work long after the event when such work failures could have been remedied at an earlier time. The only problem with their theory is that no dispute within the meaning of the' section ever arose. The chief inspector noted that whenever PTL requested remedial work, it was done. Finally, Bethlehem points to sec. 106.04 of the Standard Specifications relating to Plant Inspection. This section provides that despite any plant inspection and acceptance, the Authority may retest the material at the site and, prior to the material's incorporation into the structure, reject defective work. Bethlehem maintains that under this provision, the Authority cannot reject the company's product once it is built into the bridge. We are constrained to disagree with Bethlehem on this point. Standard Specification 105.16(b), relating to final acceptance, reads in pertinent part: Upon due notice from the Contractor of presumptive completion of the entire project, the Engineer will make an inspection   . If, however, the inspection discloses any work, in whole or in part, as being unsatisfactory, the Engineer will give the Contractor the necessary instructions for correction of same, and the Contractor shall immediately comply with and execute such instructions. Reading this section in conjunction with sec. 106.04, cited by Bethlehem, we conclude that the Plant Inspection provision provides merely that plant approval is not final. Furthermore, sec. 106.04 does not mandate the Authority to test every piece of steel before it collectively becomes a bridge, or the Authority forever hold its peace. The final acceptance provision clearly envisions the possibility of remedial work in the air. Accordingly, we reject Bethlehem's argument that the Authority is estopped from asserting its claim.
Bethlehem also contends that the trial justice erred in dismissing Count II of the counterclaim wherein the company alleged that the paint system was developed and prepared in a negligent manner and not in accordance with the usual and customary standards of care and professional competence. On appeal Bethlehem argues that the Engineer was negligent as a matter of law. It is well established that negligence is ordinarily a question of fact, Ferreira v. McGrath Truck Leasing Corp., 104 R.I. 642, 247 A.2d 842 (1968), and it is only when the evidence presented and reasonable inferences therefrom are susceptible of only one conclusion that it becomes a matter of law. See Garris v. Gloss, 111 R.I. 453, 303 A.2d 765 (1973); Waltz v. Aycrigg, 103 R.I. 109, 235 A.2d 338 (1967). Bethlehem contends that the trial justice did not find the Engineer not negligent, but simply found that the paint specifications were adequate. In fact, the court in dismissing this count of the counterclaim found the specifications adequate and suitable for the purpose for which they were intended. We fail to see how a company that designed a paint system which the trial justice specifically found to be adequate and suitable for its purposes could be negligent as a matter of law, but in any event we find the trial justice's conclusions amply supported by the evidence. There was abundant testimony tending to show that the paint system was properly designed. Even the so-called father of epoxy coatings, noting the marine environment, stated unequivocally that the paint system was not just adequate but excellent for    the bridge. Evidently the trial justice found the experts on behalf of the Authority and Parsons more persuasive, for he commented that on the whole they were more experienced and qualified than Bethlehem's principal witnesses, with the possible exception of one particular Bethlehem employee who was the coatings expert of that company's own research laboratory. This employee, however, had in fact approved the paint specifications. As the trial justice observed, [h]ad the specifications been so inherently and obviously defective as is now asserted, this employee would have been qualified and in a position to point this out very quickly. In our opinion, even a cursory examination of the foregoing evidence reveals that the trial justice could well find the specification's adequate and suitable and not negligent as a matter of law or fact. Therefore, we affirm his rejection of Count II of the counterclaim.