Opinion ID: 4118870
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Volume and Content of Victim Impact Evidence

Text: Next, defendant raises several challenges to the victim impact evidence admitted. He argues the evidence was excessive and the content was so emotionally charged as to be a memorial service for the victim. He specifically objects to testimony about Beeson‘s funeral and family visits to her grave. Finally, he complains the victim impact evidence supported ―an invidious comparison between the societal worth‖ of the deceased and defendant. ―Unless it invites a purely irrational response, evidence of the effect of a capital murder on the loved ones of the victim is relevant and admissible under section 190.3, factor (a), as a circumstance of the crime. [Citation.]‖ (People v. Booker, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 190.) Moreover, the federal Constitution prohibits victim impact evidence only if it is ―so unduly prejudicial‖ as to render the trial ―fundamentally unfair.‖ (Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 825; see People v. Pearson, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 466-467.) This victim impact evidence was well within these guidelines and typical in both volume and content to evidence we have routinely deemed acceptable. (See, e.g., People v. Pearson, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 467; People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 793.) Testimony from two family members is not excessive. (People v. Booker, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 194.) In Pearson, we upheld the admission of victim impact testimony from three family members and six close friends. (Pearson, at pp. 464-467.) In People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 573, 576577, we concluded testimony from a slain police officer‘s four sisters, fiancée, two fellow officers, police chief, and treating physician was not unfairly excessive. Defendant argues that, to be consistent with Payne v. Tennessee, victim impact evidence must be limited to testimony from a single witness describing the murder‘s effect on a family member who was present at or immediately after the crime, and these effects must have been known or reasonably apparent to the 65 defendant. He also contends events occurring years before or after the crime are not admissible in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (a). We have routinely rejected these claims (see, e.g., People v. Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 10311032; People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 364) and do so again. The People are entitled to present a complete history of the murder victim‘s life and may also present testimony from loved ones who, sometimes vividly, describe the impact of their loss. (People v. Garcia (2011) 52 Cal.4th 706, 751.) Nor was the testimony here so emotional as to invite an irrational response. The witnesses appropriately described the person Beeson was and the traumatic impact of her death on the family. We have consistently observed that the emotional trauma suffered by close friends and relatives is a permissible subject of victim impact testimony. (E.g., People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 368; People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 445.) Both witnesses testified to the devastating effect of the murder on Beeson‘s father, but neither speculated that the murder in some way caused his death. (See People v. Booker, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 193.) Lisa Beeson‘s testimony about her father stroking the box of her sister‘s ashes, and about her own visits to the gravesites, was poignant but not so emotional as to provoke an irrational juror response. ―Emotional testimony is not necessarily inflammatory.‖ (People v. Brady, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 575; see Booker, at p. 193.) Moreover, we have repeatedly held that evidence related to a murder victim‘s funeral is relevant and admissible. (See People v. Garcia, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 752; Booker, at pp. 192-193.) Finally, defendant complains the victim impact evidence created a risk that the jury‘s penalty decision would be swayed by improper comparisons between his character and Beeson‘s. He asserts this risk is particularly acute in cross-racial crimes, where jurors are likely to empathize with a White victim. We rejected similar arguments in People v. Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at page 799. Here, too, the claims lack merit. Nothing in the victim impact evidence or argument, or elsewhere in the record, even remotely encouraged the jury to consider race in 66 reaching a penalty verdict. (See ibid.) Defendant complains the prosecutor‘s closing argument expressly contrasted the backgrounds of Beeson and defendant. In fact, the prosecutor only fleetingly mentioned that defendant and Beeson were about the same age in the context of discussing defendant‘s criminal sophistication. He remarked on the absence of defendant‘s family at the trial but did not invite the jury to compare this lack of involvement with Beeson‘s family. In fact, it was defense counsel who argued, ―we have a clear contrast here‖ between ―the loving support that Erika Beeson‘s family gave Erika‖ and defendant‘s family, who not only failed to come to court but failed to support him when he struggled with ADHD as a child.