Opinion ID: 3064709
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: He was the subject of age discrimination, and

Text: but for his age, he would not have been terminated by [Reichhold]. 3. [Reichhold] intentionally discriminated against [Cassino] because of his age. 4. That as a direct proximate result of such age discrimination, [Cassino] sustained damages. BROWNING v. UNITED STATES 6085 Id. The jury found in favor of Cassino. See id. at 1342. We held that the refusal to give Reichhold’s proposed instruction was appropriate: The jury was instructed that it was Cassino’s burden to prove that he would not have been fired “but for his age.” Because the instructions reviewed as a whole set forth the essential elements that Cassino had to prove in order to prevail, the court did not err in refusing to give Reichhold’s proposed pretext instructions. Id. at 1345; see also Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434, 1441 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding two jury instructions that “read together clearly state that the existence of a legitimate basis for terminating [an employee] would not save [the employer] if the retaliatory motive was the ‘but for’ cause of his discharge” were “an adequate statement of the law as it applies to pretext cases” and did not require separate pretext instruction). [2] In the years since Cassino, a circuit split has emerged on the question of permissive pretext instructions.2 Analysis of discrimination claims has also evolved since Cassino was decided in 1987. We see no reason, however, to depart from Cassino’s basic holding that if the jury instructions set forth the essential elements the plaintiff needs to prove, the district court’s refusal to give an instruction explicitly addressing pretext is not reversible error. 2 Compare Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2002), and Ratliff v. City of Gainesville, 256 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2001), and Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 1998), and Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1994), with Conroy v. Abraham Chevrolet-Tampa, Inc., 375 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding permissive pretext instruction is not required), and Moore v. Robertson Fire Prot. Dist., 249 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 2001), and Fite v. Digital Equip. Corp., 232 F.3d 3 (1st Cir. 2000), and Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340 (7th Cir. 1994). 6086 BROWNING v. UNITED STATES Here, the district court gave the following instructions regarding the reasons the IRS demoted Browning: In the plaintiff’s first claim, she contends that her race was a motivating factor in the defendants’ allegedly discriminatory conduct towards her. In her second claim, she contends the fact that she complained about discrimination in the workplace was a motivating factor in the defendants’ allegedly retaliatory conduct toward her. ... Now, in order to prevail on her first claim for race discrimination, the plaintiff must prove the defendants took certain actions against her and that the plaintiff’s race was a motivating factor in the defendants taking the action. In particular, the plaintiff must prove . . . that her race was a motivating factor in the defendants’ conduct. .... In order to prevail on her second claim for retaliation, the plaintiff must prove the defendants took certain actions against her because she complained about race discrimination in the workplace. In particular, the plaintiff must prove . . . that her protected activity was a motivating factor in the defendants’ conduct. The district court defined “motivating factor” as “a factor that played a role in the decisions” of Candanoza or Ayotte. The court also instructed the jury that it should “weigh and evaluate the testimony and the credibility of each witness” and that it should consider both direct and circumstantial evidence BROWNING v. UNITED STATES 6087 (after explaining both concepts). The court told Browning that, although it would not give her requested pretext instruction, she was free to explain to the jurors that they could find the IRS’s reasons for firing her to be pretextual and infer an unlawful motive. Specifically, the court said: I’m mindful of Ninth Circuit authority that cau- tions trial judges against giving any kind of inference instruction, and I’m mindful of the risk that an inference instruction can be seen as potentially a com- ment on the evidence; and so I’m not inclined to give any permissive inference instruction and instead to permit counsel full latitude to argue inferences, based on a circumstantial evidence instruction. Apparently in response to the court’s offer, Browning subsequently argued to the jury that “if you don’t believe the IRS witnesses, then you have the right to find for Ms. Browning.” Although cursory, Browning’s argument advised the jury that if it did not believe the IRS’s justifications for Browning’s demotion, it could find in her favor. [3] In sum, the district court’s jury instructions “set forth the essential elements that [Browning] had to prove in order to prevail,” and Browning was free to explain those elements to the jury in order to make clear that finding the IRS’s proffered reasons for Browning’s demotion pretextual could justify the jury finding the IRS had discriminated against Browning. Cassino, 817 F.2d at 1345; cf. Conroy v. Abraham Chevrolet-Tampa, Inc., 375 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2004) (“The charge to the jury gave instructions on drawing inferences from the evidence and weighing the credibility of witnesses. This was sufficient to allow the jury to find discrimination or retaliation so long as they disbelieved Abraham Chevrolet’s explanation for Conroy’s termination. We also find it significant that Conroy’s counsel made good use of his opportunity to argue pretext to the jury in closing state6088 BROWNING v. UNITED STATES ments . . . .”). The district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Browning’s more explicit pretext instruction. AFFIRMED.