Opinion ID: 1407600
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ultimate disposition of the cause.

Text: In Green I we noted there was substantial evidence of rape and observed that even Green did not challenge the sufficiency of that evidence. Thus, the State suggests, that since sufficient evidence exists to support the element of rape, there is no need to remand the cause for trial on aggravated murder in the first degree based solely on the element of rape. We do not agree. Our unanimous observation in Green I was based on a standard of review since rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, supra ; Moore v. Duckworth, 443 U.S. 713, 61 L.Ed.2d 865, 99 S.Ct. 3088 (1979); and Leonard v. California, supra. Having employed an incorrect standard in Green I, our observation concerning sufficiency of the evidence of rape was, of course, faulty. Whether the element of rape or attempted rape may be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to establish aggravated first degree murder is first and foremost a jury question rather than one to be resolved by an appellate court. In answer to appellant's motion for reconsideration, the State asserts, without supporting authority, the cause should not be remanded for new trial. It argues that the cause should be remanded for sentence on the lesser included offense of murder in the first degree under RCW 9A.32.020 which offense was necessarily included in the charge, the instruction to the jury and the verdict in the instant case. We do not agree. [9] In the case at hand the jury was not instructed on the subject of a lesser included offense. In general, a remand for simple resentencing on a lesser included offense is only permissible when the jury has been explicitly instructed thereon. Based upon the giving of such an instruction it has been held that the jury necessarily had to have disposed of the elements of the lesser included offense to have reached the verdict on the greater offense. See State v. Jones, 22 Wn. App. 447, 454, 591 P.2d 796 (1979); State v. Martell, 22 Wn. App. 415, 419, 591 P.2d 789 (1979); State v. Liles, 11 Wn. App. 166, 171-73, 521 P.2d 973 (1974); see also People v. Codding, 191 Colo. 168, 551 P.2d 192 (1976); United States v. Thweatt, 433 F.2d 1226, 1234 (D.C. Cir.1970); Austin v. United States, 382 F.2d 129, 142 (D.C. Cir.1967). In addition, it is clear a case may be remanded for resentencing on a lesser included offense only if the record discloses that the trier of fact expressly found each of the elements of the lesser offense. See State v. Jones, supra ; see also State v. Jackson, 40 Ore. App. 759, 596 P.2d 600, 602 (1979). Obviously, there is no such clear disclosure in this record. We have previously determined there was insufficient evidence to support the kidnapping element and that it is impossible to know whether the jury determined unanimously that the element of rape had been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we cannot say the jury found all the elements of the lesser included offense of first degree murder which is dependent upon proof of the crime of rape. Consequently, the cause cannot be remanded for sentencing on the lesser included offense of first degree murder. The cause is remanded for new trial on the charge of aggravated murder in the first degree as it is impacted by the element of first degree rape or attempted first degree rape. [5] HOROWITZ, HICKS, and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur. UTTER, C.J. (concurring) I join in the majority's analysis and holdings concerning the insufficiency of the evidence of first degree kidnapping in this case, the failure of the trial court to instruct on the subject of a unanimous verdict, and the equal protection issue. Accordingly, I believe the conviction must be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. I also concur with the majority's rejection of appellant's Miranda claim, but reach this result with a different analysis. Appellant contends that the police questioning which resulted in his written statement was a custodial interrogation and therefore subject to the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966). The majority reaffirms the Green I analysis of this claim, which concluded that the questioning was not a custodial interrogation because the police, at the time of the questioning, did not have probable cause to believe that Green had committed an offense. See State v. Green, 91 Wn.2d 431, 436-37, 588 P.2d 1370 (1979) ( Green I). I find it necessary to reach an issue which the Green I majority did not explicitly address: the applicability and effect of the additional test of custodial interrogation which applies to circumstances in which the police do not have probable cause at the time of the questioning. In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court declared that the requirements established in the decision apply to every custodial interrogation. 384 U.S. at 444, 478-79. Thus, the threshold question in applying Miranda is whether the police questioning was an interrogation conducted in a custodial manner. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 P.2d 291, 297-302, 64 L.Ed.2d 297, 305-08, 100 S.Ct. 1682 (1980); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 50 L.Ed.2d 714, 97 S.Ct. 711 (1977). The express police questioning which took place in this case was an interrogation, see Rhode Island v. Innis, supra at 301, and therefore the critical issue is whether the interrogation was custodial for purposes of Miranda. The United States Supreme Court explained in Miranda that [b]y custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. 384 U.S. at 444. However, as we have observed in State v. Creach, 77 Wn.2d 194, 198-99, 461 P.2d 329 (1969), [i]t is difficult to set forth an all-inclusive rule defining the circumstances in which an individual has been deprived of his freedom of action in [a] significant way and is therefore entitled to the Miranda protections. The definition of custodial must be broad enough to protect all individuals whose freedom has actually been restricted in a significant manner, see Oregon v. Mathiason, supra at 495, and yet narrow enough to allow the police to briefly restrict people's freedom of action in order to conduct the type of [g]eneral on-the-scene questioning ... or other general questioning of citizens that is part of the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime. Miranda, at 477; see State v. Hilliard, 89 Wn.2d 430, 436, 573 P.2d 22 (1977). The rule for determining whether an individual has been significantly deprived of his freedom must, moreover, involve objective criteria and not rest upon the police officer's subjective intention to deprive the defendant of his freedom, or the defendant's subjective belief regarding whether he was free to go. The [United States Supreme] Court could scarcely have intended the issue whether the person being interrogated had `been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in any significant way' to be decided by swearing contests in which officers would regularly maintain their lack of intention to assert power over a suspect save when the circumstances would make such a claim absurd, and defendants would assert with equal regularity that they considered themselves to be significantly deprived of their liberty the minute officers began to inquire of them. United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir.1969). We held in State v. Creach, supra , that one objective criterion that will definitively classify an interrogation as custodial is the police officer's possession, at the time of the questioning, of probable cause to believe that the interrogated individual has committed an offense: [O]nce an investigating officer has probable cause to believe that the person confronted has committed an offense, the officer cannot be expected to permit the suspect to leave his presence. At that point, interrogation becomes custodial, and the suspect must be warned of his rights. Creach, at 198; accord, State v. Hilliard, supra at 435-36. Since an officer possessing probable cause cannot be expected to permit the suspect to leave his presence, the probable cause factor provides objectively verifiable evidence that the interrogated individual in fact was not free to go. We simultaneously recognized in Creach, however, that other factors can demonstrate the deprivation of the defendant's freedom, and we specifically indicated that when the facts of the case are such that an interrogated individual would reasonably believe that he or she was not free to go, then the interrogation will be considered custodial. See Creach, at 199; accord, State v. Dennis, 16 Wn. App. 417, 421-22, 558 P.2d 297 (1976). Such an assessment of whether an interrogated individual would reasonably believe that he or she was free to go, is similarly employed in other jurisdictions as a central standard for determining whether an interrogation is custodial for purposes of Miranda. See, e.g., United States v. Curtis, 568 F.2d 643, 646 (9th Cir.1978); Fisher v. Scafati, 439 F.2d 307, 310 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 939, 29 L.Ed.2d 719, 91 S.Ct. 2256 (1971); People v. Arnold, 66 Cal.2d 438, 449, 426 P.2d 515, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967); People v. Pugliese, 26 N.Y.2d 478, 260 N.E.2d 499, 311 N.Y.S.2d 851 (1970). The focus upon a defendant's reasonable belief reflects the policy considerations underlying Miranda. The United States Supreme Court has explained that the concern of the Court in Miranda was that the `interrogation environment' created by the interplay of interrogation and custody would `subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner' and thereby undermine the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Rhode Island v. Innis, supra at 299; see also United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 n. 5, 52 L.Ed.2d 238, 97 S.Ct. 1814 (1977); Oregon v. Mathiason, supra at 495. By focusing upon whether the facts of the case are such that a defendant would reasonably believe that he or she was restrained of their freedom and not free to go, the definition of custodial interrogation effectuates the concern for the psychological impact which custody and restraint can have upon an interrogated individual. In determining whether the interrogation in this case was custodial, the Green I majority applied the probable cause test and concluded that the questioning was not a custodial interrogation under this test since the officers, at the time of the questioning, did not have probable cause to believe that appellant had committed the offense. Green I, supra at 436-37. The Green I majority, however, failed to then go on and consider whether the facts in this case are such that an interrogated individual would reasonably believe that he was under restraint and was not free to go. Prior case law in this jurisdiction and other jurisdictions, and the policies underlying Miranda, make it necessary to also consider the applicability and effect of this second criterion for assessing the custodial nature of an interrogation. The record reveals that the police officers' questioning of appellant Green was not conducted in circumstances that would lead an interrogated individual to reasonably believe that he or she was under restraint and was not free to go. Green claimed to be an eyewitness to the commission of the killing by another individual, and he went entirely voluntarily to the police station in accordance with the routine police procedure of taking material witnesses to the station to record their statements. Although the police thoroughly questioned Green as to his knowledge of the offense and his observation of the assailant, they did not in any way indicate that they were questioning him as a suspect rather than as the eyewitness which he purported to be. Since the interrogation in this case was not custodial under either the probable cause test or the test of examining a defendant's reasonable belief, the Miranda protections were not applicable to the challenged statements. The Miranda requirements only began to apply at the point at which the detective acquired probable cause to believe that Green had committed the offense, as a result of observing a suspiciously large blood stain on Green's undershorts and receiving a report that a person matching Green's description had been seen struggling with the victim. See Green I, at 436-37. Accordingly, I join the majority's conclusion that the challenged statements were obtained in a permissible manner. WILLIAMS, J., concurs with UTTER, C.J. DOLLIVER, J. (concurring in the result) While I agree with the result reached by the majority, I cannot concur with its view that our substantial evidence rule is somehow different from the standard expressed by the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979). Nor can I agree we must adopt the Jackson rule because of our language in Green I, State v. Green, 91 Wn.2d 431, 588 P.2d 1370 (1979). The Supreme Court in Jackson stated, at page 319: [T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The Jackson rule was adopted to replace the no evidence rule of Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 4 L.Ed.2d 654, 80 S.Ct. 624, 80 A.L.R.2d 1355 (1960). Under the no evidence rule, a conviction based upon a record wholly devoid of any relevant evidence of a criminal element of the offense charged is constitutionally infirm. The court in Jackson, however, stated that the court is not required to `ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' Jackson, at 318-19. This is exactly what we said in Green I, at page 443: In determining whether the necessary quantum of evidence exists, it is unnecessary for the [reviewing] court to be satisfied of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In Jackson, the United States Supreme Court, and in Green I, this court, both have said it is not the role of the court to be satisfied of the guilt of a defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. The question raised by the two cases is whether the substantial evidence rule as articulated in State v. Randecker, 79 Wn.2d 512, 487 P.2d 1295 (1971), and followed in Green I, conflicts with the rational-trier-of-fact/beyond-a-reasonable-doubt rule of Jackson. Justice Rosellini has clearly and succinctly demonstrated in his dissent that there is no distinction between the two rules. If, after an examination of the record, the reviewing court is satisfied that there is `substantial evidence' to support either the State's case, or the particular element in question ( Randecker, at 518), this is sufficient to meet the Jackson test that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, at 319. See also People v. Johnson, 26 Cal.3d 557, 606 P.2d 738, 162 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1980), for a post- Jackson case in which the California Supreme Court upheld its substantial evidence rule as being plainly consistent with Jackson. The view of the majority needlessly abandons the substantial evidence rule. We have never said the Jackson rule and the substantial evidence rule are different. We have said only that a rule requiring the reviewing court to be satisfied itself of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is not the same as the substantial evidence rule. The United States Supreme Court concurs. We have not previously adopted the rule of the majority; neither has the United States Supreme Court, nor should we now. ROSELLINI, J. (dissenting) I see no reason to depart from the position which we took upon the first hearing of this case with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence. The majority is much concerned with the holding in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979), that a reviewing court must find sufficient evidence to justify the jury's finding that the State's case was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. I see no difference in substance between that test and the one which we have consistently applied. When we speak of substantial evidence to support the verdict, we mean evidence to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, since that is what the jury's verdict must reflect. Of course, this court need not decide that it agrees with the verdict, for the credibility of witnesses is a matter for the jury. But our test has always been that there must be substantial evidence which, if believed, would support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If a part of this test is implied rather than express, it nevertheless governs our disposition of the question. As far as the evidence in this case is concerned, I believe that reasonable minds could find without a doubt that the defendant kidnapped the victim, as that term is defined in the statute. One of the definitions is: `Abduct' means to restrain a person by ... using ... deadly force. RCW 9A.40.010(2). That is precisely what the defendant did in this case. There is no question that the victim was restrained. She was kicking and screaming when first observed by the witness, and later she was further restrained by deadly force. The statute does not say deadly force other than killing the victim. The majority would have us believe that the statute makes it a crime to use deadly force only if that force does not result in the death of the victim. It would seem clear to me that the kind of actions engaged in by the defendant in this case are precisely the kind of actions which the legislature intended to punish under the kidnapping statute. If the kidnapping did not culminate in the death of the victim, the only crime would be kidnapping, first degree. If the victim died as a result of the defendant's actions, the crime would be kidnap-murder. That the crime of kidnapping would merge with that of murder if the latter were proven to the jury's satisfaction, see State v. Johnson, 92 Wn.2d 671, 600 P.2d 1249 (1979). As I hope we made clear in that case, the commission of a lesser crime may be only incidental to a greater crime, but that does not make it any the less a crime, which is an aggravating factor in the greater crime. If the greater crime is proven, the lesser crime merges in it, but it does not for that reason lose its efficacy as an element of the greater offense. The majority argues that every killing must be kidnapping, because it results in restraint. Under that analysis every assault is a kidnapping, because it likewise results in a restraint, albeit a lesser one. I would interpret the statute as requiring some showing that restraint was a purpose of the attack, as was evidently the case here, since the defendant had grabbed the victim and carried her away from the place in which he found her. The majority says that the people intended Initiative 316 to identify those crimes which are particularly outrageous. I wonder how much further they should have us look to find facts which fit that description. I would imagine that the people who voted in favor of the initiative will be surprised indeed to learn that it does not apply to a case in which a man grabs a young child and carries her away, and who, when she begins to kick and scream, silences her by means of a knife. Whether he threatened her with the knife before he killed her, we cannot know, since she is not here to testify. In that case, the majority would approve a kidnap-murder conviction; also, I gather, if he had traveled another 100 feet with her before he found a place of possible hiding. I doubt that this law was intended to hinge on such technicalities. If there was substantial evidence to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant killed the victim in the course of kidnapping her, as I believe there was, then the further contention treated in the majority opinion, that the verdict may have rested on a finding for which there was inadequate support in the evidence, has no merit. I would adhere to our decision in State v. Green, 91 Wn.2d 431, 588 P.2d 1370 (1979). WRIGHT and BRACHTENBACH, JJ., concur with ROSELLINI, J. Reconsideration denied October 6, 1980.