Opinion ID: 418086
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discriminatory purpose or intent

Text: 15 The plurality opinion issued by the Supreme Court in Bolden mandated that a racial vote dilution claimant must prove discriminatory intent. See also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). The district court, upon remand, and in light of Bolden concluded that the creation and maintenance of the Mobile County at-large election procedures were intentionally discriminatory. See Rogers v. Lodge, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 3272, 73 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1982); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973). Appellant Board contends that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of discriminatory intent. Our standard of review is to determine whether the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir.1983); McMillan v. Escambia County, 688 F.2d 960 (5th Cir.1982). After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude the trial court's findings are not clearly erroneous. 5 16 Initially, it is argued that the 1852 enactment providing for at-large election procedures was not passed with a discriminatory intent. We agree. At that point in time there was no motive to dilute or injure the black vote because blacks were not permitted by law to vote. 17 In 1870, when new legislation was passed, blacks were permitted, for the first time, to vote in the school board commissioners election. The statute regulating voting procedure allowed a voter to cast only nine ballots for twelve commissioners. Appellees presented historical evidence demonstrating that the purpose of this voting procedure was to secure black representation on the Board. 18 In 1876, the Alabama legislature repealed the 1870 enactment, substituting the 1852 at-large election procedure which, in essence, removed any possibility of minority representation on the Board. Appellant contends that the 1876 enactment was merely a return to the 1852, original, arrangement and was, therefore, not passed with a discriminatory intent. This is evidenced by the fact that the 1870 act had not provided for single member districts. It is accurate that single member districts were not created by the 1870 enactment. However, the effect of allowing voters to cast nine out of twelve ballots was effective in securing minority representation. Single-member districting is not the only way to achieve this goal. The primary distinction between the 1870 and 1876 enactments is that the former deliberately and explicitly provided for minority representation, while the latter was created by a legislature whose primary goal was the eradication of the advances made by the reconstruction governments to provide equal rights for blacks. 19 The Supreme Court has consistently held that at-large election schemes are not per se unconstitutional. See e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120, 87 S.Ct. 820, 17 L.Ed.2d 771 (1967). However, the maintenance of a purposefully discriminatory vote-diluting at-large districting scheme comes within the purview of the fourteenth amendment. See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 1499. United States v. Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District, 625 F.2d 547, 553 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1002, 101 S.Ct. 2341, 68 L.Ed.2d 858 (1981). Although the original enactment of at-large voting procedures prior to 1870 was not rooted in discrimination, the situation created by that enactment made it virtually impossible in later days for blacks to be elected to any position. When the 1876 Alabama legislature met and undertook to cancel black political opportunities created by the 1870 act, the evidence is persuasive that the new enactment was motivated by discriminatory intent. The 1876 act which reenacted the 1852 Act of at-large voting procedures was a convenient method of making the election of a black board member unlikely, even though that same procedure had not, originally, been the product of discriminatory intent. When the Alabama legislature reinstated a law which suited the purpose of discrimination, the law may be said to have been a product of discriminatory intent, notwithstanding the fact that in its earlier enactment, discrimination was not a factor. 20 (a) Present Effects of Discrimination 21 The trial court concluded that the evidence in the record demonstrated there still exists present effects of discrimination based on the passage of the 1876 Act. 6 The ultimate findings of the court that: 22 The present effects of the at-large system, as a function of its original intent in 1876, is to enhance the discriminatory results of other forms of de jure and de facto discrimination in voting practices and procedures. These other forms of discrimination in turn enhance the present effect of the at-large system, to deny equal access to the political system, ... 23 are not clearly erroneous. Brown, 542 F.Supp. at 1091. The present effects of the discriminatorily motivated act of 1876 further demonstrate the intent behind the passage and maintenance of that Act. 24 In conclusion, we find that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the district court's conclusion that the 1876 Act was discriminatorily intended. We further support the district court's conclusions as to the other issues raised in this case and find the remaining errors assigned by the appellant to be without merit. 25 We AFFIRM.