Opinion ID: 748182
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: interplay of the pda and the americans with disabilities

Text: ACT (ADA) 54 The majority sums up its position as follows: [t]he PDA merely requires that an employer treat a pregnant woman the same as any other temporarily disabled employee. In this regard we point out that it is not unlawful under the Americans with Disabilities Act for an employer when reducing its force to discharge an employee away from work by reason of a temporary disability. Maj. Op. at 297. Thus, the majority equates pregnancy-related disability with temporary disabilities under the ADA, and that analogy drives the majority's analysis. 55 I do not think that Rhett's claim can be decided by simply stating that the PDA requires her to be treated the same as any other employee and reasoning that her position can be terminated because an absent nonpregnant employee could have his or her position terminated under the facts of this case. Although the case law and EEOC guidelines refer to Title VII's requirement that pregnant employees be treated the same as other employees, those cases usually involve determining whether employee benefits or insurance policies discriminate by excluding pregnant employees or affording them less protection than afforded nonpregnant employees. That was the issue in Gilbert and Newport News. For example, in Gilbert, Justice Brennan stated in his dissent: A realistic understanding of conditions found in today's labor environment warrants taking pregnancy into account in fashioning disability policies.... Contemporary disability programs are not creatures of a social or cultural vacuum devoid of stereotypes and signals concerning the pregnant woman employee. 429 U.S. at 159-60, 97 S.Ct. at 419-20. The Court struck down the challenged health insurance policies in Newport News because they were the mirror image of the plan at issue in Gilbert. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 685, 103 S.Ct. at 2632. See also Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1074, 103 S.Ct. 3492, 3494, 77 L.Ed.2d 1236 (1983) (An employer who offers its employees the option of receiving retirement benefits from one of several companies selected by the employer, all of which pay a woman lower monthly retirement benefits than a man who has made the same contributions, violates Title VII.). 56 Thus, in the health insurance and employee benefits context it is now clear that pregnancy-related conditions must be treated the same as conditions that are not pregnancy-related. However, a simple example demonstrates the danger of carrying that basic premise too far beyond the insurance or benefits context. 57 Historically, employers have been reluctant to hire women or have afforded women different conditions of employment because of a generalized belief that a female employee would likely leave her job to raise a family. Accordingly, there was a reluctance to devote resources to train or to teach them a job related skill. 58 I doubt that an employer is precluded from refusing to hire a male employee because of a reasonable belief that the potential employee will leave shortly after he is hired. However, I think few would argue that the same employer could refuse to hire a female job applicant out of a concern that she would soon become pregnant and leave her job to raise a family. Similarly, absent a contract provision to the contrary, an employer could terminate a male employee who missed two weeks of work during his first year on the job in violation of a policy prohibiting more than one week of sick leave during the employee's first year on the job. 2 However, I think it clear that the PDA would prohibit that same employer from terminating a female employee who missed the same two weeks because of pregnancy or a pregnancy-related condition. Those two employees can not be treated the same because Congress has already differentiated their situations by enacting the PDA. One can not avoid a claim of discrimination by treating persons who are not similarly situated the same. Yet, this is what the majority's analysis does. The majority's reasoning would allow an employer to terminate a female employee because she missed a crucial meeting with an important client if a male employee would be terminated, even if the female missed the meeting because she was in labor delivering a baby, or suffering from a pregnancy-related condition. Although it may not be fair to terminate the male, it would not be illegal. It is illegal to terminate the female because of the PDA. Cf. California Federal Savings and Loan v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 292 n. 42, 107 S.Ct. 683, 695 n. 42, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987) ([W]e conclude that in enacting the PDA Congress did not intend to prohibit all favorable treatment of pregnancy....). 59 The majority notes that pregnancy is a temporary condition that gives rise to a temporary disability. It argues that since the PDA bars discrimination based upon pregnancy, it merely requires that pregnant employees be treated the same as all other temporarily disabled employees, thereby limiting the comparison group for pregnant employees to nonpregnant employees who have suffered a temporary disability. The majority concludes that, despite her temporary disability due to pregnancy, Rhett can be terminated unless Carnegie would not terminate a male employee who was similarly temporarily disabled. See Maj. Op. at 297. That analysis rests upon equating a protected, but temporary, condition (pregnancy) with a temporary unprotected disability under the ADA. The ADA does not shield a non-pregnant employee from termination because temporary disabilities are excluded from the ADA. Regulations that were promulgated pursuant to the ADA define disability as: 60 (1) A physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (2) a record of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment. 61 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g). Substantially limits is defined to mean: 62 (i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or 63 (ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity. 64 § 1630.2(j)(1). Several factors have been identified to assist in determining whether a particular disability is of such severity as to come within the protection intended under the ADA. These factors include: 65 (i) The nature and severity of the impairment; 66 (ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and 67 (iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment. 68 § 1630.2(j)(2). Disabilities that are temporary do not, by definition, rise to the level of substantially limiting a major life function. See Rogers v. International Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 758 (5th Cir.1996) ([T]emporary conditions that are not chronic usually do not rise to the level of a 'disability.' ) and (Taylor v. Dover Elevator Systems, Inc., 917 F.Supp. 455, 461 (N.D.Miss.1996)) ([T]emporary injuries with no permanent effects are ordinarily not considered disabilities under the ADA.) (citing Evans v. City of Dallas, 861 F.2d 846, 852-53 (5th Cir.1988); Rakestraw v. Carpenter Co., 898 F.Supp. 386, 390 (N.D.Miss.1995); Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 889 F.Supp. 253, 257 (N.D.Miss.1995), aff'd, 74 F.3d 91 (5th Cir.1996)). 69 However, just as temporary disabilities are excluded from the protections of the ADA by definition, temporary pregnancy-related conditions are explicitly covered by Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination under the PDA. Accordingly, the protection afforded pregnancy-related conditions can not be equated with that afforded temporary disabilities merely because pregnancy is temporary. To do so under the facts of this case is contrary to the mandate of the statute, effectively amends the PDA and forces Rhett to rely upon the ADA which provides no protection for pregnancy related conditions because of their temporary nature. 70 The majority relies on Rogers and Sanders v. Arneson Prods., Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1247, 137 L.Ed.2d 329 (1997), to substantiate its claim that the temporarily disabled employee resides outside of statutory protection--regardless of whether the temporary disability is due to pregnancy. See Maj. Op. at 297. In Rogers, an employee (Rogers) sued under the ADA when he was laid off pursuant to a reduction in force (RIF ). Rogers had been absent because of health problems related to an ankle surgery. The court held that Rogers was not protected by the ADA because he was not disabled within the meaning of the statute. In sum, Rogers' ankle afflictions were temporary and did not constitute a permanent disability.... The EEOC regulations concur, that 'temporary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact, are usually not disabilities.'  87 F.3d at 759 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (Appendix)). However, the fact that they are not disabilities under the ADA does not mean that they are not protected under the PDA, if they are pregnancy-related. 71 Similarly, in Sanders, employee Sidney Sanders (Sanders) was terminated while on leave for a cancer related psychological disorder. While he was away other employees assumed his responsibilities and employer Anreson Products decided to replace Sanders rather than allow him to return at the end of his sick leave. Although Sanders suffered from cancer, he conceded that his absence was related only to his psychological disorder that was temporary. Accordingly, the court framed the issue before it as whether Sanders' temporary psychological impairment qualifies as a disability under the ADA. Id. at 1353. The court held that it did not because that impairment did not substantially limit a major life function. Id. 72 If Congress intended to equate pregnancy with a temporary disability under the ADA, it afforded pregnant women precious little protection when it enacted the PDA. Pregnancy is by its nature temporary. Holding that it is therefore the equivalent of a temporary disability is hardly consistent with the social policies and aims to be furthered by Title VII and filtered through the phrase 'to discriminate' contained in [that Act] Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 155, 97 S.Ct. at 418 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Accordingly, we can only give effect to the intent behind this statute by viewing the term temporarily disabled as it applies to pregnancy as referring to the duration of the disability, not to the quality of it. 73 The majority also relies upon Troupe v. May Dept. Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir.1994). However, I am not persuaded by the reasoning of Troupe and believe that we should be guided instead by Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., Inc., 76 F.3d 413 (1st Cir.1996). 74