Opinion ID: 2290649
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: APPELLANTS TRANSACTED BUSINESS IN KENTUCKY AS SET FORTH IN KRS 454.210(2)(a)(1)

Text: Turning to the present case, we now apply the two-step process to determine if the Shelby Circuit Court could properly assert personal jurisdiction over the Appellants. First, we examine whether Appellants' Kentucky-related activities fall within any of the enumerated provisions as set forth under KRS 454.210(2)(a). Provisions two, and five through nine, may be quickly eliminated because the types of activities and conduct defined therein have no application at all to either the subject matter of this litigation or the types of contacts, conduct, and activities at issue in this case. Provision three directly addresses the general subject matter of this litigation, [c]ausing tortious injury. However, this provision does not apply because it includes the requirement that the tortious injury have occurred by an act or omission in this Commonwealth. The incident alleged in Appellee's complaint, as well as the act or omission which produced it (i.e., the butter on the floor), occurred in Indiana. Provision four directly implicates the type of conduct engaged in by Appellants, that is, solicitation of business by media advertising and direct mail advertising, and the provision is cited by Appellee in support of Kentucky jurisdiction. However, like provision three, this provision also requires the tortious injury to have occurred in this Commonwealth, and is, therefore, also inapplicable. Having eliminated provisions two through nine of KRS 454.210(2)(a) as possible grounds for long-arm jurisdiction over Appellants, only KRS 454.210(2)(a)(1) remains as a possible basis for litigation in this Commonwealth. This provision permits long-arm jurisdiction against defendants [t]ransacting any business in this Commonwealth. Appellants' conduct consisting of mass media and billboard advertising in Kentucky, direct mail advertising to Kentucky residents, preferred customer incentives directed to Kentucky residents, and substantial civic and charitable activities in the Commonwealth would certainly qualify as transacting business in the state. Further, fifty percent of Appellants' casino boat revenue is derived from Kentucky residents. Nevertheless, as noted, personal jurisdiction is authorized under the statute only if Appellee's claim arises from the statutory provision upon which long-arm jurisdiction is predicated.