Opinion ID: 2635304
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: R.C.P. 53(a)(1), (b) (emphasis added).

Text: The decision to impose special master fees as the court may direct is, like the decision to appoint a special master, committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. See Pena v. Westland Development Co., Inc., 107 N.M. 560, 568, 761 P.2d 438, 446 (N.M.App.,1988) (stating rule identical to I.R.C.P. 53(a)(1) gives a trial court the discretion to decide who should bear the burden of paying the special master's fees and other expenses of the special master proceedings) (cited with approval in Pioneer Sav. & Trust, F.A. v. Rue, 109 N.M. 228, 231, 784 P.2d 415, 418 (N.M.,1989)); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401, 427 (1st Cir.1976) (citing F.R.Civ.P. 53(a) and noting the district court has broad discretion in determining which of the parties to charge with payment of special master fees); U.S. v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 901 F.2d 772 (9th Cir.1990) (analyzing district court's imposition of special master's fees under abuse of discretion standard). In a December 12, 2003 memorandum, the State opposed the district court's application to lift the June 2003 stay, claiming, If [the 2001 Decision is] not affirmed on appeal, it would be possible for the Supreme Court to hold that it was an abuse of discretion to assign Special Remedial Master costs to the State. . . . It appears even the State concedes the district court's decision to charge the State for the special master fees is discretionary, though the State has not argued the district court abused its discretion. Also, I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(E) directs, The Court may assess and apportion as costs between and among the parties to the action, in the sound discretion of the court, all fees and expenses of masters, receivers or expert witnesses appointed by the court in the action. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(E). Appointment of a special master and the assessment of costs are matters which clearly fall within the discretion of the district court and are, therefore, not proper for a writ of mandate or prohibition, which can issue only in matters where there is no discretion to be exercised. A trial court's assessment of costsand, specifically, assessment of costs against the State of Idahoare not decisions that exceed the judge's jurisdiction. Rather, they simply present the question of whether there is statutory or constitutional authority permitting the judge to do so. This case is not appropriate for the issuance of a writ of prohibition. However, the issues and arguments raised by the State in its Petition are the very same as those it previously raised on direct appeal: in each instance, the State argues that no statute authorizes assessing special costs against the State and no appropriation exists from which to pay those costs. This Court postponed consideration of the issue because the Petition was already pending. Because the issues and arguments are identical to those raised on direct appeal, and because the State is therefore not disadvantaged from having framed its case around a writ of prohibition, this Court will address the issues as though addressing them as part of the direct appeal. B. STATUTORY AUTHORITY At the outset of this discussion, it is important to point out what has not been raised by the State as an issue in this case and, therefore, what issues this Court is not deciding in this opinion. The State has raised no challenge regarding the district judge's ability to appoint a special master and allocate costs, nor is the State challenging the district judge's determination under Rule 53 that exceptional circumstances existed in this case which she believed justified the appointment of a special master. Neither has the state raised a challenge regarding the level of detailed direction the special master received. The only issue the State has raised regarding the special master is a narrow one: whether or not the judge properly ordered the State to pay the special master's costs during the pendency of the litigation. The State claims the district court erred because its December 2002 order assigning costs was issued before a final judgment was entered. The State asserts, No Idaho statute authorizes the State's payment of costs before the issuance of final judgment. However, as noted hereafter, the State concedes the district court's decision is now final and this matter is no longer pending before the district court. The State is correct that the 2002 order was issued before the district court entered a judgment. It is worth noting that neither the rules nor relevant statutes prevent the award of costs on an interim basis before the entry of final judgment. I.C. § 12-101 and Rule 53 do not differentiate between awards entered prior to final judgment and awards made as part of the final judgment. Regardless, the matter is now final, based on the April 25, 2003 order's certification in accordance with Rule 54(b) as a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be taken. In oral argument the State made the timing of the award of costs the crux of its argument. In doing so, the State acknowledged that costs against the State may be awarded after entry of judgmentan argument at odds with the position in the State's brief that no statutory authority exists for the award of costs against the State in the first place. The current appeal is a part of the April 25, 2003 final judgment, and any discussion regarding the award of pre-judgment costs is therefore resolved by the entry of judgment. Moreover, I.C. § 1-212 recognizes the inherent power of this Court to make rules governing the procedure to be followed in all Idaho courts. The statute directs, Costs shall be awarded by the court in a civil trial or proceeding to the parties in the manner and in the amount provided for by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. I.C. § 1-212. As already noted, Rule 53 permits the assessment of special master fees as the court may direct. The State concedes special master fees are classified as costs. Inland Group of Companies, Inc. v. Obendorff, 131 Idaho 473, 475, 959 P.2d 454, 456 (1998). Under Rule 54(d)(1)(E), the Court may assess and apportion as costs between and among the parties to the action, in the sound discretion of the court, all fees and expenses of masters . . . appointed by the court in the action. Rule 54(d)(1)(E). In Rickel v. Bd. of Barber Examiners, 102 Idaho 260, 629 P.2d 656 (1981), this Court held that the award of costs and fees against the State Board of Barber Examiners in an action brought by an apprentice barber candidate was within the trial court's discretion under I.C. §§ 12-101 and 12-121. Id. at 261, 629 P.2d at 657. Under Rickel, a court may award costs against a litigant when that is permitted by the Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Furthermore, as I.C. §§ 12-101 and 12-121 permit a court to award costs and fees against a municipality or county, the same necessary implication exists to award costs and attorney fees against the state. Id. Idaho Code section 12-101 provides clear statutory authority for the award of costs for the special master. Moreover, Rule 53 is clear in permitting the district court the authority to appoint a special master and to award costs in the district court's discretion. Special master fees are simply costsregardless of whether they were incurred during the fact-finding or remedial phase of the litigationand should not be treated differently from other costs that are on occasion awarded against the State. We affirm the district court's assessment of special master fees against the State. C. APPROPRIATION The next issue presented is whether an appropriation by the State exists to pay the special master's costs. The State argues there is no such appropriation, and consequently it has no way of paying the bill the special master has submitted to it. The State points to constitutional language reading, No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations made by law. Idaho Const. art. VII, § 13. Article IV, section 18 requires that claims against the State be presented to the Board of Examiners for consideration. Idaho Cost. art. IV, § 18 (. . . [N]o claim against the state, except salaries and compensation of officers fixed by law, shall be passed upon by the legislature without first having been considered and acted upon by said board.). Here, the Board of Examiners denied the special master's claim for lack of appropriation and the matter was to be submitted to the Legislature for its consideration. The Board noted the Idaho Supreme Court's authority under Article V, § 10, to make recommendations to the Legislature regarding claims for which there was no appropriation. The State's constitutional arguments are misplaced, however, because I.C. § 12-118 provides the relevant direction as to how costs awarded against the State are to be paid. The statute expressly addresses this situation: When the state is a party and costs are awarded against it, they must be paid out of the state treasury, and the state controller shall draw his warrant therefor on the general fund. I.C. § 12-118. The State has not shown how costs authorized and awarded against it are any different, in a separation of powers sense, from attorney fees or interest authorized and charged against the State. In none of the cases cited by the parties in which costs were assessed against the State did the Court consider the particular source from which such an assessment would be paid. In Chastain's, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 72 Idaho 344, 241 P.2d 167 (1952), this Court explained that I.C. § 12-118 provides the source from which such costs shall be paid. 72 Idaho at 350, 241 P.2d at 170. Even the Chastain's Court did not identify an appropriation from which the writ of prohibition costs assessed against the State were to be paid. Because I.C. § 12-118 directs that costs awarded against the State be paid out of the general fund, it is not necessary for the Court to identify a specific source of funds. The Court recognizes that the district judge, in assessing costs against the State, presented three possible sources from which funds to pay the special master could be drawn. Under I.C. § 12-118, the judge need only have entered an order of costs against the State. The Court is not aware of any procedure enabling a district judge to simply issue a writ of execution for the disbursement of funds in this situation. To the extent that the judge attempted to identify particular sources of funding or to issue a writ of execution, that action was unnecessary and inappropriate. Idaho Code section 12-118 is sufficient in its provision that the state controller shall draw upon the general fund to pay costs against the State. How the State proceeds with appropriation from particular accounts is the business of the State and not of this Court. In addition to claims raised by the State, the Intervenor ISEEO also made an argument based on the Idaho Constitution to justify the award of costs against the State. Because this Court finds a statutory basis for the award of costs against the State, this case does not require us to address the arguments raised by ISEEO. D. ATTORNEYS FEES ISEEO also seeks attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine, the common fund doctrine, and I.C. §§ 12-120 and -121. To determine whether a party is entitled to an award of attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine, this Court considers (1) the strength or societal importance of the public policy indicated by the litigation; (2) the necessity for private enforcement and the magnitude of the resultant burden on the plaintiff; and (3) the number of people standing to benefit from the decision. Miller v. EchoHawk, 126 Idaho 47, 49, 878 P.2d 746, 748 (1994) (citing Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571, 577-78, 682 P.2d 524, 530-31(1984)). The decision to award fees under this doctrine is a discretionary one. Id. The narrow issue before the Court in this litigation is whether the district court was empowered to order the State to pay $11,000 in special master fees, and this governs the analysis of ISEEO's claim for attorneys fees. The number of people standing to benefit from the Court's decision in the writ of prohibition matter is limited to parties in this case. In addition, the determination of whether the State must pay the costs of the special master would likely not be considered a matter of substantial public policy. For these reasons, ISEEO is not awarded its attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine. Neither is this case appropriate for an award of attorneys fees under I.C. §§ 12-120 and -121. Regardless, this Court need not address the statutory basis for fees because ISEEO presents no argument on this issue in its brief. See Weaver v. Searle Bros., 131 Idaho 610, 616, 962 P.2d 381, 387 (1998) (denying fees where no supporting argument presented). For the foregoing reasons, ISEEO's request for attorney fees is denied.