Opinion ID: 1090792
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Lundys

Text: There remains the problem of the Lundys' failure to move for a summary judgment. There is no basis in the record upon which to conclude that the trial court converted the Lundys' two-year-old motion to dismiss into a motion for a summary judgment pursuant to Rule 12(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. Even if it had done so, the Moores would have been entitled to notice of the trial court's intention to treat the motion to dismiss as a motion for a summary judgment. Graveman v. Wind Drift Owners' Ass'n, Inc., 607 So.2d 199 (Ala.1992). Rule 56(c)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., gives the nonmoving party certain rights to notice and a hearing after a summary-judgment motion has been filed. Rule 56(c)(2) states: The motion for summary judgment, with all supporting materials, including any briefs, shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time fixed for the hearing, except that a court may conduct a hearing on less than ten (10) days' notice with the consent of the parties concerned. Subject to subparagraph (f) of this rule, any statement or affidavit in opposition shall be served at least two (2) days prior to the hearing. We recently discussed the requirements of Rule 56(c)(2) in Van Knight v. Smoker, 778 So.2d 801 (Ala.2000). The Committee Comments to [Rule 78, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] state: `It is to be noted that the last sentence of the rule prohibits the granting of a Motion Seeking Final Judgment such as a Motion for Summary Judgment without giving the parties an opportunity to be heard orally.' (Emphasis added [in Van Knight ].) Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., itself entitles the parties to a hearing on a motion for summary judgment. Although, in certain limited circumstances, a trial court may rule on a motion for summary judgment without conducting a hearing, once the trial court has set a date for a hearing on the motion, the court must allow the nonmoving party an opportunity to be heard. .... One purpose of the procedural rights to notice and hearing under Rule 56(c) is to allow the nonmoving party the opportunity to discover and to present evidence opposing the motion for summary judgment. Although the nonmoving party may waive the requirements of notice and hearing, the `waiver requires knowledge, actual or implied, of the right being waived.' In Tharp [v. Union State Bank, 364 So.2d 335 (Ala.Civ. App.1978) ], the defendant attended a hearing conducted for the purpose of considering a motion to dismiss a counterclaim. However, at that hearing, the trial court also granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendant objected to the entry of summary judgment on the ground that it was not aware that the summary-judgment motion would be discussed and decided at the hearing. The Tharp court held that `[t]his objection to the entry of summary judgment and the state of the record showing that ten days had not expired since even the certified date of service [of the motion for summary judgment] negates any claim of waiver.' 364 So.2d at 338. The Tharp court noted that the plaintiff's argument that the defendant was not prejudiced against it was invalid because Rule 56 `is not prefaced upon whether or not the opposing party may successfully defend against summary judgment, [but] it does require that the opportunity to defend be given.' Tharp, 364 So.2d at 338. 778 So.2d at 805-06 (emphasis in final quoted paragraph added; footnote and citations omitted). Because Rule 56 requires, at the least, that the nonmoving party be provided with notice of a summary-judgment motion and be given an opportunity to present evidence in opposition to it, the trial court violates the rights of the nonmoving party if it enters a summary judgment on its own, without any motion having been filed by a party. Consequently, we reverse the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the Lundys, entered without a motion filed by them or on their behalf.