Opinion ID: 1831493
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: direct action against insurance company

Text: ¶ 39. The majority concludes that direct action may not be maintained against MMLP in this case because the question is not coverage, but the extent of coverage. However, if it looks like a duck and it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, I dare say it is indeed a duck. This is a question of coverage and, therefore, is a proper basis for a direct action pursuant to M.R.C.P. 57. ¶ 40. The comment to Rule 57 states that: The two principal criteria in favor of rendering declaratory judgments are: (1) when the judgment will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue, and (2) when it will terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceeding. Titan Indem. Co. v. Williams, 743 So.2d 1020, 1023 (Miss.Ct.App.1999) (quoting M.R.C.P. 57 cmt.). ¶ 41. The case at bar fits squarely within these criteria. The majority characterizes MMLP's argument as simply one of the extent of coverage. However, this is not a case where an insurer is accepting coverage, but claiming that the policy limit would be met. Nor is this a case where an insurer is accepting coverage but waiting to see the amount of damages set by the jury. ¶ 42. Instead, here an insurer is claiming that despite a policy limit of $500,000, the Mississippi Tort Claims Act relieves it from paying in excess of $50,000. Such a determination fits within the criteria established for Rule 57, and a direct action in this case was proper. ¶ 43. One final point bears mentioning. I am disheartened that the majority is so inclined to let the defendant in this case to have its cake and eat it too. In one breath the majority tells us that the defendant is not an insurance company and, therefore, it may not be treated as such. Thus, the $50,000 statutory cap may not be exceeded. ¶ 44. However, in the next breath the majority does an about face and tells us that the defendant is entitled to the same treatment as an insurance company and, therefore, a direct action was improper. These two conclusions are contradictory. ¶ 45. If the defendant is an insurer, then the statutory cap is inapplicable. However, if the defendant is not an insurer, then it is not guaranteed the same benefits of an insurer and a direct action may be maintained. ¶ 46. For these reasons, I would affirm the chancery court's judgment and remand this case for further proceedings in the chancery court. ¶ 47. Accordingly, I dissent.