Opinion ID: 874854
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The district court properly dismissed Ridgley's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to determine Ridgley's competence to enter a plea of guilty.

Text: The district court found that Ridgley failed to establish necessary facts to support a finding that his counsel was deficient by failing to seek a competency evaluation before Ridgley entered his guilty plea or that Ridgley was prejudiced by any deficient performance. In his petition for post-conviction relief, Ridgley alleged that [m]y attorney did not advise me of the potential of having an evaluation to determine my mental status, whether or not I would appreciate the proceedings that were filed against me or be able to assist in my defense. In fact, I was not able to assist in my defense. I had no basis of knowledge. In other words, Ridgley alleges that his counsel was ineffective for failing to recognize that he was incompetent at the time he entered his plea. See I.C. § 18-210 (No person who as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense shall be tried, convicted, sentenced or punished for the commission of an offense so long as such incapacity endures.). This Court has determined that the I.C. § 18-210 standard is consistent with that applied by the federal courts. State v. Powers, 96 Idaho 833, 842, 537 P.2d 1369, 1378 (1975) (citing Dusky v. U.S., 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960)). The standard to determine competency to stand trial is whether the defendant has the capacity to understand the proceedings against him and (2) assist in his defense. Id. Once again, we find that Ridgley has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to prejudice. With respect to the prejudice prong of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel [for failing to order a competency evaluation], [a petitioner] need only demonstrate a `reasonable probability' that he was incompetent, `sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome' at the time he entered his plea. Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 594 (5th Cir.1990) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698). A claim of incompetence does not lend itself very well to the outcome test in Strickland because it does not turn on the validity of the result vis a vis guilt or innocence. Since to convict an incompetent person is a per se due process violation, guilt or innocence of the offense charged is irrelevant. Id. at 595 n. 20. The South Carolina Supreme Court states the rule this way: Due process prohibits the conviction of an incompetent defendant, and this right may not be waived by a guilty plea. Jeter v. State, [308 S.C. 230, 417 S.E.2d 594, 595-596] (1992) (citations omitted). In a [post-conviction relief] action, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was incompetent when he entered his guilty plea. Id. at 232[, 417 S.E.2d at 596]; Rule 71.1(e), SCRCP. In order to find that petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective for refusing to request a ... hearing on petitioner's competency to stand trial, petitioner must show that counsel was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the outcome of petitioner's proceedings. In [ Jeter, 417 S.E.2d at 596], this Court proclaimed that in proving Strickland prejudice within the context of counsel's failure to fully investigate the petitioner's mental capacity, the [petitioner] need only show a `reasonable probability' that he was ... incompetent at the time of the plea. Matthews v. State, 358 S.C. 456, 596 S.E.2d 49, 50-51 (2004). Thus, we must decide whether Ridgley has presented admissible evidence showing that there is a reasonable probability that he was incompetent at the time he entered his plea. We conclude that he has not. In discussing whether Ridgley's trial counsel should have ordered an evaluation, the district court stated that [t]he only evidence offered in this case that Ridgley was emotionally distraught, in a state of shock, and incompetent are the allegations of Ridgley's own affidavit. Ridgley's own conclusory and bare assertions, alone, are not sufficient to survive summary dismissal.... While Ridgley's affidavit does raise the fact issue that he was emotionally distraught when he entered the guilty plea, the affidavit offers no more than a mere conclusion that he was not competent to understand the nature of the proceedings and knowingly enter into a guilty plea, and is unsupported by any facts as to the alleged mental incompetency. The court further stated that without something in the record suggesting that an examination in February 2002 would have shown [that Ridgley was incompetent] to proceed, there is nothing to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland. We note that the district court was not entirely accurate in saying that Ridgley offered nothing more on the issue of his incompetency than his own statements. Ridgley also offered the psychological evaluation prepared by Dr. Timlin for sentencing purposes nine months after Ridgley's plea in support of his claim that he was not competent to plead guilty. Despite noting that Ridgley suffers from some indications of depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and anxiety disorder, the report also states that Ridgley is `oriented to person, place and time.' More importantly, the report addressed only Ridgley's mental state at the time it was prepared; the report says nothing about Ridgley's mental state at the time he entered his pleanine months earlier. By contrast, in Bouchillon, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in holding that a defense attorney's failure to investigate the defendant's competency to stand trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, recognized that the psychologist who examined Bouchillon... testified that, in his opinion, Bouchillon was incompetent at the time of his pleading. While that opinion was not offered based on a contemporaneous examination of Bouchillon it was rendered in the context of his diagnosis of Bouchillon's condition. That diagnosis is consistent with Bouchillon's record of treatment in prison and his previous history of mental problems. Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d at 594. In the present case, Ridgley did not present an expert's opinion that he was not competent, as defined by I.C. § 18-210, at the time he pled guilty. Although Ridgley stated in his petition that he was not able to assist in his defense, to the extent that this statement may be interpreted as an opinion regarding his competence for purposes of I.C. § 18-210, it was not admissible evidence. This Court has recognized that in order to render admissible opinions regarding mental condition, the witness must be qualified as an expert under the Idaho Rules of Evidence. State v. Winn, 121 Idaho 850, 855, 828 P.2d 879, 884 (1992). [1] In the absence of admissible evidence showing a reasonable probability that he was incompetent at the time of his plea of guilty, we conclude that Ridgley failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to his claim that his attorneys deficient performance resulted in prejudice. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district court.