Opinion ID: 200831
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Impermissible delegation

Text: 27 York contends that the polygraph testing requirement, as worded in the district court's order, unlawfully delegates to non-judicial officers the power to determine matters of punishment. He argues that the district court's command that he shall be required to submit to periodic polygraph testing as a means to insure that he is in compliance with the requirements of his therapeutic program is vague as to the frequency, duration, and allowable scope of the questioning. By failing to specify these details, York claims, the district court impermissibly assigned to the Probation Office the power to determine the nature and extent of his punishment. 28 The district court committed no error in allowing York's probation officers to determine these details. Federal courts are not prohibited from using nonjudicial officers to support judicial functions, as long as th[e] judicial officer retains and exercises ultimate responsibility. United States v. Allen, 312 F.3d 512, 515-16 (1st Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court left no significant penological decision to the discretion of the Probation Office: the court itself determined that York is to participate in a treatment program for sex offenders and that York shall be required to submit to polygraph testing to confirm his compliance with his treatment regimen. This distinguishes York's case from our recent decision in United States v. Melendez-Santana, 353 F.3d 93 (1st Cir.2003). In Melendez-Santana, this court upheld a delegation challenge to a special condition of supervised release because the district court had authorized the defendant's probation officer to determine not only the details of the defendant's drug treatment, but also whether the defendant would be required to undergo such treatment. Id. at 101; see also Peterson, 248 F.3d at 84-85; United States v. Kent, 209 F.3d 1073, 1079 (8th Cir.2000). In this case, the district court made all such decisions itself. 29 Further, contrary to York's assertion, the district court did restrict the scope of permissible questioning: the polygraph testing is a means to [e]nsure that [York] is in compliance with the requirements of his therapeutic program. This is a permissibly narrow delegation of administrative details. See Melendez-Santana, 353 F.3d at 101 n. 6 (the question of which drug program a defendant must attend, and when he may be discharged, involves administrative details properly delegated to a probation officer); Allen, 312 F.3d at 516. Indeed, the delegation here is narrower than the one that this court upheld in Allen as acceptable reliance on probation officers' administrative expertise. 6 See 312 F.3d at 515-16 (upholding a condition requiring the defendant to participate in mental health treatment as directed by the probation officer, until such time as the defendant is released from the program by the probation officer). York's reliance on United States v. Merric, 166 F.3d 406 (1st Cir.1999), is misplaced. In Merric, this court vacated the defendant's sentence because the trial court impermissibly delegated to a probation officer the power to set the defendant's fine payment schedule. See id. at 408-09. If a probation officer cannot set a fine payment schedule, York argues, a schedule of polygraph sessions should be equally off-limits. The analogy is not persuasive. Merric simply held that it is the inherent responsibility of the judge to determine matters of punishment and this includes final authority over all payment matters. Id. at 409. But the schedule of installment payments for a fine or restitution order has a far more material impact on a defendant than the timing of intermittent polygraph examinations. Setting the former may be a core judicial function, United States v. Miller, 77 F.3d 71, 78 (4th Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted), but scheduling the latter is surely a matter of administrative detail. Here, the court provided that the polygraph testing shall be periodic, and that the purpose of the testing shall be to determine whether York is cooperating with his therapy. Further detail from the court was not required. Cf. United States v. Fellows, 157 F.3d 1197, 1204 (9th Cir.1998) (observing that a sentencing court cannot be expected to design and implement the particularities of a treatment program).