Opinion ID: 2434088
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: impairment of contracts/retroactivity

Text: The state argues that the trial court's injunction is in error because section 13.047 impairs no contract rights. Project Principle contends that teaching certificates are contracts with which the legislature may not interfere. We hold that a teaching certificate is not a contract within the meaning of article I, section 16. Rather, the certificate is a license, and like all licenses, is subject to such future restrictions as the state may reasonably impose. The United States Supreme Court spoke to the impairment of contracts argument more than forty years ago in Dodge v. Board of Education, 302 U.S. 74, 79, 58 S.Ct. 98, 100, 82 L.Ed. 57 (1937). In Dodge, retired teachers challenged an act of the Illinois legislature which decreased the amounts of annuity payments to retired teachers of Chicago public schools. The teachers claimed that the Act impaired the obligation of contracts in contravention of article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that in passing the statute providing for the annuities the state legislature evinced no intent to create a binding contract with teachers. The United States Supreme Court affirmed, stating the presumption is that (a tenure) law is not intended to create private contractual or vested rights but merely declares a policy to be pursued until the legislature shall ordain otherwise. As early as 1925 it was recognized in Texas that a teaching certificate is a license. In Marrs v. Matthews, 270 S.W. 586 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1925, writ ref'd), a teacher claimed that the state superintendent could not cancel his permanent teacher's certificate because the language used in describing the offenses for which a certificate may be cancelled was void for vagueness. The teacher also claimed that the statute giving the superintendent the authority to cancel the certificate of any unworthy teacher was an attempt to confer judicial powers upon an executive department of the state government. In dissolving the trial court writ enjoining cancellation of the teaching certificate, the court stated that a teaching certificate is merely a license granted by the state, and is revocable by the state. Id. at 589. The court noted that the teacher had voluntarily sought and secured a statutory privilege to be enjoyed subject to statutory conditions. Id. [1] Because we hold a teaching certificate is not a contract, the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts is not violated when the legislature imposes new conditions for the retention of the certificate. Further, because the certificate is a license and confers no vested rights, the constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws is not violated. It is only when vested rights are impaired that a retroactive law is invalid. Paschal v. Perez, 7 Tex. 348 (1851); Commercial Insurance Co. of Newark, N.J. v. Lane, 480 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).