Opinion ID: 1844249
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Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether paragraph 21 limits Bowdoin Square's relief

Text: Bowdoin Square maintains that paragraph 21 of the lease agreement does not limit its options in seeking relief for Winn-Dixie's alleged breach. It is well settled that lease agreements are contracts and that the general principles of contract construction apply in ascertaining the scope and meaning of a lease agreement. 49 Am.Jur.2d Landlord & Tenant § 43 (1995). In deciding the rights of the parties under a lease, courts are required to give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of the parties. Darling Shop of Birmingham v. Nelson Realty Co., 255 Ala. 586, 591, 52 So.2d 211, 215 (1951); see also 49 Am.Jur.2d Landlord & Tenant § 43. Where language used in a lease is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for construction of the contract. Babcock v. Smith, 285 Ala. 557, 562, 234 So.2d 573, 577-78 (1970). Therefore, if a lease is reduced to writing, the court must ascertain from the writing the intention of the parties, and the provisions of the writing are conclusive and govern the rights of the parties. 49 Am.Jur.2d Landlord & Tenant § 53 (1995). Furthermore, the court is required to give the words in the lease their ordinary meaning. Hill v. Talladega College, 502 So.2d 735, 737 (Ala.1987); BoWing Office Sys., Inc. v. Johnson, 744 So.2d 915, 918 (Ala.Civ.App.1999); see also, 49 Am.Jur.2d Landlord & Tenant § 54 (1995). The pertinent phrase at issue in paragraph 21 provides that upon the tenant's default, the Landlord, at its option, may either terminate the lease or mitigate and seek damages. As Bowdoin Square correctly argues, this Court has long recognized that words such as may and at its option denote permissive alternatives, not mandatory restrictions. See Rudisill Soil Pipe Co. v. Eastham Soil Pipe & Foundry Co., 210 Ala. 145, 97 So. 219, 221-22 (1923) (lease stipulation that lessee may, at its option, elect was not mandatory but permissive stipulation); see also Mobile Eye Ctr., P.C. v. Van Buren P'ship, 826 So.2d 135, 138 (Ala.2002) (renewal provision that stated that the lease may be renewed did not operate automatically to renew lease); ANCO TV Cable Co. v. Vista Comm. Ltd. P'ship I, 631 So.2d 860, 863 (Ala.1993) (holding that may signified discretion). Therefore, applying the ordinary meaning of the language contained in paragraph 21, we conclude that the lease does not foreclose common-law remedies for Winn-Dixie's default. Winn-Dixie raises a number of arguments in support of the trial court's finding that paragraph 21 provided Bowdoin Square the exclusive remedies for Winn-Dixie's alleged breach. However, we need address only two of Winn-Dixie's arguments. First, Winn-Dixie claims that the trial court's reading of the lease is consistent with that of other courts considering similar provisions. Specifically, Winn-Dixie relies on two cases from foreign jurisdictions Linens of Paris, Inc. v. Cymet, 510 So.2d 1021 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987), and Wilson v. Pate, 17 Ariz.App. 461, 498 P.2d 535 (1972). In Linens of Paris, the lease provided that upon the tenant's breach the landlord could either cancel the lease or attempt to re-let the premises as the tenant's agent. In Wilson, the lease provided that, upon the tenant's failure to pay the rent, the lessor may, at his election, either distrain for said rent due or declare this lease at an end, and recover possession.... In both cases, the courts determined that by executing the leases the parties had modified their common-law rights and set out their remedies specifically under the lease. Therefore, the landlords were limited to only those options specified in the leases. As discussed above, this Court has long recognized that words such as may and at its option denote permissive alternatives. Moreover, Linens of Paris and Wilson give virtually no analysis of the meaning of these terms. [9] Therefore, we find that those cases are distinguishable. Next, Winn-Dixie argues that in giving paragraph 21 its ordinary meaning, the focus should be on the words either ... or rather than on the words may or at its option. Winn-Dixie contends that with the inclusion of either ... or the provision connotes a choice between two alternatives and, giving the provision its ordinary meaning, Bowdoin Square is limited to only those alternatives. We disagree. Because the clause the Landlord, at its option, may appears before the specification of the two remedies, we find that the better reading is that the provision simply sets forth the elective rights of Bowdoin Square. See 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 748 (1991) (Where, however, there is no express or implied limitation in the contract making the stated remedy exclusive, the prevailing view seems to be that a party may at his election pursue either the prescribed remedy or any other remedy the law gives....). Accordingly, we hold that, as a matter of law, paragraph 21 is permissive in nature and allows Bowdoin Square to seek redress outside of the alternative remedies discussed in paragraph 21. Therefore, the trial court erred in holding that paragraph 21 limited Bowdoin Square's relief for Winn-Dixie's alleged breach of the lease agreement.