Opinion ID: 1175478
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: evidentiary rulings on claim of apparent consent as defense to rape charge

Text: The jury was instructed that a defendant's reasonable and good faith belief that a person voluntarily consented to sexual intercourse is a defense to a charge of forcibly raping her, and that if the jury had a reasonable doubt whether defendant had such a belief, they should acquit him of that charge. (CALJIC No. 10.23, based on People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 153-157 [125 Cal. Rptr. 745, 542 P.2d 1337].) Defendant attempted to prove such a defense through his testimony that Karen invited him into the house, volunteered that the ladies who lived there were pretty rich, started counting the money without being asked to do so, and said nothing when he told her to take off her clothes. He testified he did not use profane language or hit or choke her, but when asked whether she was frightened, replied that under the circumstances, I would say yes. Defendant also had the jury listen to a tape recording of an interview between Karen and a detective the day after the crimes occurred, to demonstrate composure in her speech and to impeach certain details of her testimony. In rebuttal on this issue, the prosecution called two witnesses, a counselor from a county mental health clinic, and a physician who specialized in the examination and treatment of sexual assault victims. Defendant claims prejudicial errors in the admission of their testimony. The counselor, Shirley Barnhart, testified that in February 1981, Karen consulted her with respect to feelings and psychological problems stemming from involvement in a murder, rape, and robbery. Defendant made a hearsay objection to any testimony by the counselor of Karen's statements. The prosecutor said the testimony was being offered in rebuttal on the issue of Karen's state of mind, whereupon the trial court ruled the testimony admissible except for statements about events on the day of the crimes. The counselor then recounted statements by Karen that she had had little feeling about the crimes immediately after they occurred, but that a few months later, she began experiencing nervousness and various great fears, which she described in detail. (11) Defendant contends that although Karen's statements to the counselor were indicative of her state of mind at the time the statements were made, they were not relevant to the issue whether at the time of the alleged rape, defendant reasonably and in good faith believed she was consenting to intercourse. The Attorney General argues that this contention of irrelevancy was waived because the only objection to the evidence was on the ground of hearsay. In response, defendant cites People v. Vindiola (1979) 96 Cal. App.3d 370, 378 [158 Cal. Rptr. 6], where the Court of Appeal, after declaring that certain evidence was irrelevant to any issue before the court and therefore not admissible on any ground, continued: Since it was not admissible on any ground, the hearsay objection to its admissibility was sufficient to preserve the issue on appeal. ( People v. Terry (1962) 57 Cal.2d 538, 567-568 [21 Cal. Rptr. 185, 370 P.2d 985]; Swan v. Thompson (1899) 124 Cal. 193, 195 [56 P. 878].) (Italics added.) The two cited decisions, however, hold only that a general objection is sufficient to preserve for appeal a contention that the evidence was inadmissible for any purpose. Whether or not the relevancy objection to the counselor's testimony was waived, it is without merit. Statements of a complaining witness to a counselor describing emotional and psychological trauma suffered by the witness following an alleged rape are admissible as circumstantial evidence on the question whether the defendant had a reasonable good faith belief that the witness had consented to his act. ( People v. Bledsoe (1984) 36 Cal.3d 236, 246, 250, fn. 12, 251 [203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 681 P.2d 291].) Here, the counselor's testimony was proper to rebut arguable inferences from the taped interview or from defendant's testimony that Karen's words or conduct could reasonably have been understood as manifesting consent to his sexual act. ( Id. at p. 248.) (12a) A more serious problem is presented by the testimony of the physician, Dr. Novotny, to which an objection of irrelevancy was overruled. He did not examine Karen personally, but reviewed her medical records, her taped interview with the detective, and her statements to the counselor, Ms. Barnhart, and testified that in his professional opinion, her conduct and statements were consistent with rape trauma syndrome. He did not, however, state expressly that she had been raped or assaulted. (13a) In People v. Bledsoe, supra, 36 Cal.3d 236, we held that expert testimony that a complaining witness suffers from rape trauma syndrome is not admissible to prove that the witness was raped. ( Id. at p. 251.) Even when the expert stops short of expressing an opinion on the ultimate issue of whether the complaining witness was raped and, as here, states simply that the witness is suffering from `rape trauma syndrome,' the use of this terminology is likely to mislead the jury into inferring that such a classification reflects a scientific judgment that the witness was, in fact, raped. ( Id. at p. 251, fn. 14.) We recognized the propriety of introducing evidence on rape trauma syndrome under some circumstances to provid[e] the jury with recent findings of professional research on the subject of a victim's reaction to sexual assault ( id. at p. 247), but such evidence is limited to discussion of victims as a class, supported by references to literature and experience (such as an expert normally relies upon) and does not extend to discussion and diagnosis of the witness in the case at hand ( People v. Roscoe (1985) 168 Cal. App.3d 1093, 1100 [215 Cal. Rptr. 45]). (12b), (13b) Here, though Dr. Novotny had not examined Karen in person, he testified in detail to the records of her conduct and responses and stated his opinion that they were consistent with rape trauma syndrome. Hence, admissibility of his testimony over the objection of irrelevancy was error under Bledsoe. (12c) The question remains whether the error was prejudicial. In Bledsoe, supra, 36 Cal.3d at page 252, we concluded there was no prejudice because the case against the defendant was so strong that it was not reasonably probable that the erroneously admitted expert testimony affected the result ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243]). The same is true here. Defendant admitted that he was a stranger to Karen, and that prior to the sexual encounter he had picked up the letter opener, put the knife in his belt, pointed the shotgun at her (telling her not to panic because it was not loaded), and told her to undress. He also conceded she was frightened when he had intercourse with her. Karen herself testified that defendant forced his way into the house and told her he was the boss and was going to rape her, and that she not only was frightened but was crying. Even in the absence of Dr. Novotny's erroneously admitted testimony that Karen's conduct was consistent with rape trauma syndrome, it is not reasonably probable that the jury would have concluded that defendant had a reasonable, good faith belief that Karen was consenting to his sexual act, or even that the jury would have entertained a reasonable doubt whether defendant had such a belief. Accordingly, the error was nonprejudicial. ( People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)