Opinion ID: 2295861
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Cumulative Impact of the Alleged Misconduct

Text: We recognize that appellants have proffered the many instances of alleged judicial misconduct for their cumulative impact. Jackson v. United States, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 325, 326, 329 F.2d 893, 894 (1964); see Petway v. United States, supra ; United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 391 (7th Cir. 1972); Egan v. United States, 52 App.D.C. 384, 387, 287 F. 958, 961 (1923). Thus, we have considered very carefully whether all the instances taken together constitute reversible error, even though we have concluded that the examples in each particular category, taken by themselves, do not. In making this analysis, we also have had to examine defense counsel's own conduct, as well as the trial court's overall performance  including its rulings for, as well as against, the defense. We note that the court's allegedly objectionable behavior frequently was prompted by the improper conduct of defense counsel. [99] Furthermore, the trial court did not orient its rulings toward the government, tilting the balance against the accused and casting the judge, in the eyes of some jurors, on the side of the prosecution. Jackson, supra, 117 U.S. App.D.C. at 326, 329 F.2d at 894. The court ruled for the defense on numerous occasions. For example, the court commonly clarified testimony or sua sponte raised objections in favor of the defense [Tr. 1780, 2411, 2381, 5496], overruled government objections and sustained defense objections (including several during the prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument) [Tr. 1535, 2046, 2091, 2260, 2269-71, 2310, 2334, 3558-59, 4069, 4322, 4326, 4649, 5304, 6241, 6274, 5520, 5682], told the prosecutor to wait until a recess to document its objections [Tr. 2791], admonished the prosecutors for improprieties [Tr. 2192, 2384, 2829, 2980, 4624-25, 4644, 5493, 5533-34, 5684, 5561, 5686, 6240, 6764], excused the jury to warn the prosecutors that they were risking contempt [Tr. 5533, 6286], and ruled in favor of the defense on a number of critical issues, such as suppressions of in-court identifications [Tr. 5502, 4679] and a taped conversation [Tr. 6463]. In its final instructions to the jury, the court put its role in perspective: The actions of the court  and we are talking about my actions at this time  actions of the court during the trial in ruling on motions or objections by counsel or in comments to counsel, or in questions to witnesses, or in setting forth the law in these instructions are not to be taken by you as any indication of my opinion as to how you should determine the issues of fact. I assure you that I take no position whatsoever. So please don't read anything into my rulings during the course of this trial. If you believe that I have expressed or intimated any opinion in any way as to the facts, disregard it because the verdict is your duty, your responsibility. Compare Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 472, 53 S.Ct. 698, 700, 77 L.Ed. 1321 (1932) (trial court's characterization of the manner and testimony of the accused was of a sort most likely to remain firmly lodged in the memory of the jury and to excite a prejudice which would preclude a fair and dispassionate consideration of the evidence). In summary, we find no basis for reversing appellants' convictions after examining the trial court's conduct. Especially in view of the overwhelming evidence against appellants, see Rosenberg, supra at 491, the cumulative impact of the court's conduct was not prejudicial.