Opinion ID: 1203210
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the trial court err in dismissing appellant's inverse condemnation cause of action?

Text: Appellant argues the trial court erred in dismissing its inverse condemnation cause of action. We disagree. An action for inverse condemnation is appropriate where the government takes private property for public use. See South Carolina State Hwy. Dep't v. Moody, 267 S.C. 130, 136, 226 S.E.2d 423, 425 (1976). The State's exercise of its eminent domain power is distinguished from its exercise of the police power. Myers v. Real Property at 1518 Holmes Street, 306 S.C. 232, 235, 411 S.E.2d 209, 211 (1991). [J]ust compensation is required in the case of the exercise of eminent domain but not for the loss by the property owner which results from the constitutional exercise of the police power. South Carolina State Hwy. Dep't. v. Wilson, 254 S.C. 360, 365, 175 S.E.2d 391, 394 (1970). The exception to the rule is when police power regulation denies all economically beneficial use of land. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992). This is not such a case. Appellant does not claim Myrtle Beach City Code § 23-133 deprived it of all economically beneficial use of its property. Rather, it argues the city took the Appellant's right to do business with private property owners in the City of Myrtle Beach and imposed significant and costly requirements over that right. This assertion fails to state a claim for inverse condemnation and the trial court properly granted the city summary judgment as to that claim.