Opinion ID: 62313
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Owens's argument that the manufacturers' offer to indemnify and defend the seller only for costs associated with their own products does not satisfy section 82.002 is now foreclosed by the Texas Supreme Court's decision. The district court therefore reached the correct result as dictated by the Texas Supreme Court in concluding that a manufacturer's offer to indemnify and defend the seller for costs associated with their own products satisfies its section 82.002 obligation. Apart from this first argument, Owens also presents a separate argument that the district court made an erroneous factual finding when it concluded that the manufacturers, BD and Ansell, actually made an offer to indemnify and defend Owens for costs associated with their own products. The district court, on summary judgment, construed a series of letters between the manufacturers and the seller as constituting the manufacturers' offer to indemnify and defend and the seller's rejection of that offer. The district court concluded that [a] fair reading of the letters shows that the manufacturers were willing to defend Owens until it was proven that Burden did not use their gloves. This court reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the trial court. Jenkins v. Cleco Power, LLC, 487 F.3d 309, 313 (5th Cir.2007). Summary judgment is proper if the evidence shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The Court views all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Id. at 313-14.
In a letter to Owens's counsel on March 24, 2000, responding to Owens's query as to whether Ansell was willing to defend Owens in pending litigation, Ansell, through its counsel, specifically refers to the Burden case, and notes that: As I have stated, Ansell is committed to defending any claims related to its products provided that we can agree upon an appropriate method whereby Ansell Healthcare Products, Inc. only defends its natural rubber latex gloves in this litigation. The letter also states: While Ansell is committed to defending any claims relating to its latex gloves in accordance with its contractual obligations, Ansell cannot defend Owens & Minor, Inc. with respect to distribution of other manufacturer's natural rubber latex gloves. After unequivocally promising Owens a full defense of claims relating to its own latex gloves in the Burden litigation, Ansell's counsel suggested as prudent to wait to see if any agreement is reached by pending negotiations. Ansell's counsel was merely suggesting this course of action: We therefore suggest that we defer any further discussions between our respective clients until such time as there is some direction from the manufacturers' and distributors' group as to whether a resolution can be arrived at regarding the distributors' tender of defense. (emphasis added). Ansell's counsel finishes the letter stating, [i]f you do not agree with this course of action, please call me so that we can discuss this matter further. Ansell's offer to defend is fully consistent with the statutory obligation under section 82.002 as construed by the recent Texas Supreme Court decision. Owens, 251 S.W.3d at 489 ([T]he product manufacturers satisfy their statutory duty [under section 82.002] to the seller by offering to indemnify and defend it only for any costs associated with their own products.). Ansell needed only to offer a defense of claims, as it did, relating to its own products. Furthermore, Ansell clearly did not condition its defense of claims on the outcome of the pending negotiations but only suggested that they defer further discussions about the defense until pending negotiations reach some result. Ansell also signaled its willingness to discuss and reconsider this suggestion. Owens never responded to this letter and never asked Ansell to follow up with its unequivocal offer to defend the claims. We find no ambiguity that Ansell plainly offered to defend Owens in the Burden suit satisfying its statutory obligation; the offer to defend was never accepted. We must accept the letter's plain meaning. Cf. Valmont Energy Steel, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 359 F.3d 770, 773 (5th Cir.2004) (If the court finds no ambiguity, the court's duty is to enforce the policy according to its plain meaning.). Owens's erroneous interpretation of the letters does not by itself create any ambiguity. See Forbau v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 876 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tex.1994); Valmont, 359 F.3d at 774 (Courts can only consider the parties' interpretation of a contract if the court first determines a contract to be ambiguous.). Under the plain language of the letters, we must rule in favor of Ansell; therefore, there is no genuine issue of material fact and summary judgment was appropriate in favor of Ansell.