Opinion ID: 3009673
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the district court required to dismiss any

Text: charge in the indictment (or to conduct a hearing in order to determine whether to dismiss any charge in the indictment) on the ground that it is based on conduct that is protected by the Speech or Debate Clause? The defendant cites two categories of allegations in the indictment that he claims are ambiguous and therefore necessitated evidentiary exploration in order to determine whether they violate the Speech or Debate Clause: allegations concerning his travels and allegations concerning his contacts with the Executive Branch. We agree with the defendant 0 See infra, pp. 35, 38-39. 0 We clearly lack jurisdiction at this time to consider whether, pursuant to provisions of law other than the Speech or Debate Clause, the indictment is sufficient or the government provided sufficient notice of the charges against the defendant. Consequently, our opinion should not be interpreted as expressing any view on such questions. 34 that if a district court lacks sufficient factual information to determine whether dismissal of a particular charge in an indictment is required under the Speech and Debate Clause, the court must obtain that information before trial by conducting a hearing or by some other means. See Lee, 775 F.2d at 524-25; In re Grand Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d at 597. In this case, however, no hearing or other procedure was needed for this purpose with respect to either of the categories of allegations that the defendant cites. 1. Travel. Travel is an essential element of some of the offenses charged in the indictment,0 but we fully agree with the Second Circuit's conclusion in United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89, 104 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989), that travel by a member of Congress to or from a location where the member performs legislative acts is not itself protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. The text of Article I, § 6 of the Constitution supports this view. In addition to the Speech or Debate Clause, this provision contains the clause providing that Senators and Representatives . . . shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony, and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in 0 For example, Counts II and IV charge the defendant with violating 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(B) by, among other things, actually receiving a thing of value for and because of official acts. The thing of value alleged in these counts is travel or a payment for travel. If travel or a payment for travel were protected by the Speech or Debate Clause, and could therefore not be proven, receipt of the specified thing of value could not be established. 35 going to and returning from the same . . . (emphasis added). Since this clause specifically addresses the protection enjoyed by members in going to and returning from the site of legislative activity and limits that protection to a qualified freedom from civil0 arrest, it seems most unlikely that the very next clause, which is couched in terms of Speech or Debate in either House, was meant to confer additional protection with respect to such travel. Supreme Court precedent fortifies this conclusion. As observed earlier, the Court has held that the Speech or Debate Clause protects matters other than actual speech or debate only if they are an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625. Travel to and from the Capitol or any other site where legislative acts are performed, although a necessary precondition for the performance of these acts, is not an integral part of Congress's deliberative and communicative processes. If it were, then the Speech or Debate Clause would produce seemingly absurd results, such as immunizing a member of Congress from being prosecuted or sued for striking a pedestrian with his or her car while racing to the Capitol. As the Second Circuit has aptly stated: 0 See Gravel, 408 U.S. at 614. 36 [U]nless the focus of the legislation itself is transportation, the mere transport of oneself from one place to another is simply not an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which members participate in committee and House proceedings. We conclude that the Speech or Debate Clause does not immunize a congressman from prosecution for interstate travel in furtherance of receipt of an unlawful gratuity, any more than it would immunize him for a charge of theft of services if he traveled as a stowaway. Biaggi, 853 F.2d at 104 (citations omitted). In this case, the defendant's briefs, in challenging the travel allegations in the indictment, do not claim or offer to prove anything more than that the travel in question was undertaken so that he could perform what he claims were legislative acts upon arriving at one of his final or intermediate destinations. Therefore, the defendant's briefs do not claim or offer to prove facts that would be sufficient to establish that the travel at issue is protected by the Speech or Debate Clause, and we consequently have no basis for concluding that the district court was required to dismiss the charges based on the defendant's travel or to conduct a pretrial proceeding or otherwise delve further into the indictment's travel allegations. 2. Executive Branch Contacts. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the Speech or Debate Clause does not apply to efforts by members of Congress to influence the Executive Branch. See, e.g., McMillan, 412 U.S. at 313; Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625; Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512; Johnson, 383 U.S. at 172. 37 Nevertheless, the defendant and his amici argue that these statements do not apply to legislative oversight. Neither the defendant nor his amici have provided a definition of oversight, but the term, as usually employed, appears to have a broad meaning. For example, a recent study explains that the term is used to refer to a variety of techniques for monitoring components of the Executive Branch, ranging from formal procedures or processes, such as committee hearings to informal techniques, such as communication with agency personnel by staff or committee members and even casework and program evaluations performed by private individuals or groups. Joel D. Aberbach, Keeping a Watchful Eye - The Politics of Congressional Oversight 130, 132 (1990). Activities at one end of this spectrum, such as committee hearings, are clearly protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. See Eastland, 421 U.S. at 504-06. Activities at the other end of the spectrum, such as routine casework for constituents, are just as clearly not protected. See Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512. Whether the Speech or Debate Clause shields forms of oversight falling between these extremes -- for example, letters or other informal communications to Executive Branch officials from committee chairmen, ranking committee members, or other committee members - - is less clear. See, e.g., Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 121 n.10; Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311, 313-15 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1240 (1988); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d at 594-95; Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 579 F.2d 1027, 1031-32 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd in part on other 38 grounds, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); McSurely v. McClellan, 521 F.2d 1024, 1036-40 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In this case, the defendant's briefs mention only two specific allegations in the indictment -- overt act 16 in Count I and overt act 17 in Count III -- that concern the defendant's contact with Executive Branch officials0 and that are claimed to involve protected oversight,0 and we therefore limit our inquiry to consideration of these overt acts. Overt act 16 in count I alleges that the defendant caused a letter to be sent to the Secretary of the Navy warning that the Navy's decision to issue a stop work order with respect to UCC's work on a Navy project, the Sea Shed program, would be viewed by the defendant with extreme gravity. Overt act 17 in count III alleges that the defendant wrote to the Secretary of the Army requesting that the Army delay in making a final decision on a possible secondsource contract for the SINCGARS program. Both the Sea Shed program and the SINCGARS program fell within the jurisdiction of committees on which the defendant sat, and while the Sea Shed letter openly lobbies on behalf of UCC, a business in the defendant's district, the SINCGARS letter does not explicitly refer to any particular business seeking a second-source 0 See Appellant's Br. at 32-33; Appellant's Reply Br. at 21. 0 The defendant also mentioned his efforts to raise funds for a concert held at the Capitol on July 4, 1983. Appellant's Br. at 33 n.18. Raising money for this concert is mentioned in predicate act 1 of count V, which alleges that the defendant extorted from UCC a $10,000 contribution for this concert. This is not an allegation of contact with the Executive Branch. Moreover, we do not see how this alleged conduct can possibly be viewed as oversight or as protected under the Speech or Debate Clause. 39 contract. Instead, the SINCGARS letter discusses the broader policy question whether the Army should award such a contract before the General Accounting Office has completed its review of the second-source selection process. Thus, whatever the defendant's motivation in writing the SINCGARS letter, the letter appears on its face to fall into the above-described middle category of oversight activities. Even if we were to hold, however, that both of the overt acts in question are invalid, no charge in the indictment would have to be dismissed. Both counts I and III, which charge conspiracies under 18 U.S.C. § 371, allege numerous other overt acts, and an indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 371 need only allege one overt act. See, e.g., Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 216 (1946); United States v. Kapp, 781 F.2d 1008, 1012 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1024 (1986). Thus, irrespective of the validity of the two overt acts in question, it is apparent that the district court was not required to dismiss (or to conduct a hearing in order to determine whether to dismiss) either count I or count III.