Opinion ID: 2766626
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excusal for cause of Prospective Juror J.W.

Text: Defendant similarly argues that his death sentence must be reversed because Prospective Juror J.W. was erroneously excused for cause. The trial court excused J.W., over objection by defense counsel, because it concluded he would not be able to fairly consider the death penalty in a case in which the defendant did not intend to kill. Defendant contends the trial court erred because the juror‘s answers indicated that his views were consistent with the law. We disagree. In his questionnaire, J.W. responded to the question about what he would do if the law differed from his beliefs or opinions by writing, ―The law has to be.‖ Although he indicated he did not always agree with the law, he wrote: ―The law is not always right. But it is the law.‖ He did not have strong feelings about the death penalty; he did not like it, ―[b]ut it has[] to be.‖ He wrote that he could follow the court‘s instructions regarding the factors to be considered in deciding between a sentence of death and life without the possibility of parole, and that he could set aside his personal feelings about what the law should be and follow the law as the court explained it. The trial court began voir dire by questioning J.W. about his attitudes regarding the death penalty and life without the possibility of parole. J.W. 16 affirmed that if the law and facts justified it, he would be capable of voting for either punishment. He felt that life imprisonment was the more severe punishment, but could accept that the law regarded death as the more severe punishment. He affirmed that if his personal views conflicted with the law, he could follow the law. In response to questioning from the prosecutor, J.W. stated that he would favor life in prison over death for most people but he would apply the law. He was sure that he could ―make . . . a proper decision.‖ The prosecutor explained the felony-murder rule, including the same hypothetical she had used previously with Prospective Juror A.J. regarding two accomplices who commit arson of a store at night (―thinking, hoping, praying nobody‘s there‖), resulting in the death of a clerk who was working late. J.W. agreed that both people in the hypothetical — the one who drove the car and the one who set the fire — were equally responsible for the death even though they did not intend the person to die, but stated that in that scenario, ―I would go for life in prison without parole.‖ He explained that had they known the clerk was there, however, ―that would be a different circumstance and that might be a death sentence.‖ He affirmed that he could follow the law that makes a person guilty of murder ―even though they didn‘t have any intention to kill and they were not the actual killer.‖ The prosecutor then explained that a person could be eligible for the death penalty ―even though they‘re not the actual killer and they had no intention to kill,‖ if they ―act as a major participant in an underlying felony and they act with a reckless indifference to human life.‖ When asked whether his personal beliefs would prevent him from being able to ―seriously consider the death penalty in that situation,‖ J.W. responded ―I‘m sure I could follow the law.‖ The prosecutor then asked whether J.W. would have a ―hard time giving serious consideration to the death penalty in that situation.‖ J.W. stated that ―if a person accidentally killed 17 somebody, it would be hard to give them the death penalty. If a person deliberately killed somebody, then it‘s a different scenario.‖ When the prosecutor asked again whether J.W. could really set aside his moral principles, he responded, ―I would do it. . . . I know, that‘s a hard one. I would do it.‖ The prosecutor continued to pursue the point, asking, ―In the situation where someone doesn‘t have any intention to kill, do you feel that you could seriously consider the death penalty?‖ J.W. responded, ―If a person flat had no intention to kill . . . it would be hard to give them the death penalty. I don‘t know that I would, but I don‘t know that I wouldn‘t.‖ J.W. then attempted to explain his position with a hypothetical. ―[I]f someone was robbing a bank and they had a gun and a guard pulled his gun out and he shot the guard, that‘s intentionally killing him. If somebody was robbing a bank and somebody had a heart attack — and I believe under the law, he‘s in for murder there. No, that — that wasn‘t an intentional killing. . . . That would be the life in prison instead of the death penalty.‖ The prosecutor then asked whether J.W. felt it necessary to have an intent to kill in order to receive the death penalty. J.W. responded, ―Yes, I do. I may not have noticed that when I came in here, but now that we‘ve talked.‖ He affirmed that it would be hard for him to personally vote for the death penalty if there was no intention to kill, and then clarified, ―If there was no intention [to] kill, then I don‘t think that a person should have the death penalty.‖ The prosecutor rephrased the question, asking whether J.W. could not impose the death penalty unless the defendant intentionally killed the victim, even if the defendant had been convicted of first degree murder and a special circumstance. J.W. then questioned whether a person could be convicted of first degree murder if the person had not intentionally killed, stating that he did not know the law. The trial court interjected, explaining that ―somebody can be convicted of first degree special circumstance murder even though that person did 18 not personally kill the victim and even though that person did not have an intent to kill.‖ The court stated that it could not go into the specifics of this case, but ―[w]e‘re talking in a hypothetical case [the prosecutor] gave you.‖ ―But the law says that persons can be convicted of a first degree special circumstance murder such that the jury would be called upon to decide which of those two punishments, death or life without parole, was appropriate in a case where the defendant did not have the intent to kill anybody. If a person was killed, for example, in the course of one of the special — specified felonies, it was a felony-murder rule, and all the other criteria that the attorneys have mentioned. That‘s the law.‖ The court then asked whether J.W. could follow the law and whether he could honestly consider all the circumstances in aggravation and mitigation before he decided the penalty. J.W. responded, ―no, my mind would not be made up that I would not vote for the death penalty.‖ The court then rephrased the question, asking whether there was ―some absolute requirement, factually, regarding an intent to kill before you would ever vote for the death penalty, no matter what the other evidence was?‖ J.W. responded, ―Let me put it this way? If I — I thought that a person never intentionally killed somebody, I would have trouble voting for the death penalty, yes.‖ The court again rephrased the question, asking whether he would ―have trouble giving any serious consideration‖ to the penalty phase evidence, ―you kind of have your mind made up already?‖ J.W. responded, ―If he didn‘t deliberately kill somebody or she, then I would have trouble giving the death sentence. If they killed somebody, breaking the law or whatever, you know, and it was an accident or whatnot, no, then they go to jail for the rest of their life or whatever.‖ The prosecutor challenged J.W. for cause. Defense counsel responded that the questioning did not explain the requirement of major participation in the felony and an indifference to human life, and the juror did not really understand that law. 19 Defense counsel observed that the prospective juror‘s hypothetical demonstrated that he was thinking about an accident, someone who had a heart attack during a bank robbery. Accordingly, defense counsel argued, the juror was confused and did not have the whole picture The court stated it was ready to rule, and granted the challenge to exclude for cause. The court stated that J.W. had ―a predisposition to favor life without possibility of parole and to reject the death penalty such that . . . he would basically be precluded or, at the very least, appreciably impeded from engaging in the weighing process that the law requires in the second phase.‖ The court thought that ―this juror, ultimately, after all examination, understood that under the law, somebody could be convicted of first degree murder and eligible for consideration for the death penalty without an intent to kill, felony-murder rule was explained, both sides had the opportunity to do that. And I think this juror made it as clear as he could that if there was not an intent to kill, or a deliberate killing, he wouldn‘t be able to vote for the death penalty or there was no reasonable possibility of that.‖ As noted above, even if a prospective juror could fairly consider imposing the death penalty in some types of cases, one ―who would invariably vote either for or against the death penalty because of one or more circumstances likely to be present in the case being tried, without regard to the strength of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, is . . . subject to challenge for cause.‖ (People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1005.) ― ‗ ―[O]n appeal, we will uphold the trial court‘s ruling if it is fairly supported by the record, accepting as binding the trial court‘s determination as to the prospective juror‘s true state of mind when the prospective juror has made statements that are conflicting or ambiguous.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 987.) ―If there is no inconsistency . . . we will not set aside the court‘s determination if it is supported by substantial 20 evidence and hence is not clearly erroneous.‖ (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 809.) J.W.‘s statements regarding his ability to consider a death sentence for someone who did not intend to kill were conflicting. J.W. stated that he would have trouble voting for the death penalty if the person did not intend to kill. After the prosecutor explained the law that makes a person eligible for the death penalty ―even though they‘re not the actual killer and they had no intention to kill,‖ so long as the person acted ―as a major participant in an underlying felony and . . . with a reckless indifference to human life,‖ J.W. stated clearly that he would be able to follow the law. However, he then indicated that ―If a person flat had no intention to kill . . . it would be hard to give them the death penalty.‖ J.W. affirmed that he felt it was necessary to have an intent to kill in order to receive the death penalty. When the judge rephrased the question, he stated that his mind would not be made up against the death penalty. Yet when the judge asked him whether there was ―some absolute requirement‖ of an intent to kill before he could impose the death penalty, J.W. repeated, ―If he didn‘t deliberately kill somebody or she, then I would have trouble giving the death sentence.‖ Because Prospective Juror J.W.‘s statements were conflicting and ambiguous, we must accept the trial court‘s determination regarding his true state of mind. (See People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 987.) Defendant contends that J.W.‘s answers were not conflicting and his views were consistent with the law. Only one of the questions he was asked specifically mentioned a defendant who did not intend to kill but who also exhibited a reckless disregard for life. In response to that question, he stated that he could follow the law. The other questions he was asked referred to a defendant who did not intend to kill, but said nothing about a reckless disregard for life. Thus, defendant argues, J.W.‘s statements that he would have difficulty imposing a death sentence on a 21 defendant who did not intend to kill do not indicate he would have the same difficulty with a defendant who acted with reckless disregard for life. This conclusion is further supported, defendant contends, by the circumstance that J.W. consistently explained that his difficulty was with imposing the death penalty for an ―accidental‖ killing, demonstrating that he did not understand the questions concerning an unintentional killing to include a killing committed with ―reckless disregard for life.‖ Defendant‘s interpretation of J.W.‘s remarks is one reasonable interpretation of the record. It is not, however, the only reasonable interpretation of the record, and ―the question is not whether a reviewing court might disagree with the trial court‘s findings, but whether those findings are fairly supported by the record.‖ (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 434.) The trial court could fairly conclude, taking into account not only J.W.‘s words but also his demeanor, that his references to accidental killings were just one example of the circumstances in which he would have difficulty imposing the death penalty. And because J.W. had been informed about the ―reckless indifference to life‖ requirement, the trial court could fairly conclude that he understood the law and could interpret his continued statements that he would have a problem imposing the death penalty for an unintentional killing to encompass killings that were committed with a reckless disregard for life. C. Trial court’s refusal to impanel separate juries for the guilt and penalty phases Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to impanel separate juries for the guilt and penalty phases. In support of his motion for separate juries, defendant presented a transcript of the testimony of Professor Edward Bronson, of Chico State University, in another case. Professor Bronson testified that the process of death qualification is prejudicial to a defendant in two ways. First, the 22 remaining jurors who are not eliminated tend to be less supportive of due process values than those who were eliminated. Second, the process of death qualification, by focusing on the death penalty and asking jurors to put themselves in the position of having found defendant to be guilty, suggests to jurors that the defendant is guilty and that their duty is to find him guilty, and it may also desensitize them to their task. According to Professor Bronson, sequestered voir dire would ―to some extent, minimize or mitigate those effects,‖ but would not eliminate them. The trial court denied defendant‘s motion, concluding that much of the potential prejudice resulting from death qualification could be avoided if the court used individual, sequestered voir dire and if the court and counsel were careful to impress upon the potential jurors that defendant‘s guilt was not a foregone conclusion. Section 190.4, subdivision (c), requires the same jury to decide guilt and penalty absent good cause. We review the trial court‘s decision for abuse of discretion. (People v. Bivert (2011) 52 Cal.4th 96, 108.) Dr. Bronson‘s testimony supported only the conclusion that death-qualified juries in general tend to be more likely to convict. ―This court and the United States Supreme Court have repeatedly rejected the claim that separate juries are required because jurors who survive the jury selection process in death penalty cases are more likely to convict a defendant.‖ (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 626; see Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162; Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 6869.) Nothing in Dr. Bronson‘s testimony or the studies he cited provided any information significantly different from that which was considered in our previous decisions. Indeed, Dr. Bronson testified that studies undertaken after Lockhart and Hovey reached conclusions similar to those of the studies addressed in those cases and he was not able to cite any significant new developments in the research. Thus, Dr. Bronson‘s testimony provided no basis for the trial court to depart from 23 the holdings in these prior cases. Defendant offered no evidence to establish good cause for a separate penalty jury based on the particular circumstances of this case. The trial court took steps to reduce any prejudice to defendant that might result from the jury selection process, including conducting individual, sequestered voir dire. We find no abuse of discretion. D. Exclusion of Morris’s alleged statements against interest As noted above, witness Misty Abbott testified that Morris told her he killed the victim, first attempting to strangle her and then, because she did not die, taking a knife from the kitchen and stabbing her. This statement was admitted as a declaration against Morris‘s penal interest. (Evid. Code, § 1230.) The defense also sought to admit additional statements by Morris as declarations against interest: (1) testimony by Misty Abbott that Morris told her defendant did not take part in the killing and that after he ―did the lady‖ defendant and Wilson ―looked at [Morris] as if they were saying, what in the hell are you doing, dude‖; and (2) testimony by Albert Lawson that while he was incarcerated in the county jail, Morris told him that defendant and Wilson were ―in the house but took no part in the actual killing.‖ The trial court ruled that these statements were inadmissible hearsay because they did not qualify as declarations against interest under Evidence Code section 1230. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in excluding these statements and that the trial court‘s ruling violated his Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial, his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense, and the Eighth Amendment‘s requirement of reliable procedures in death penalty cases. (Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683; Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 302.) 24
There is an exception to the rule excluding hearsay for a statement against interest — that is, one that ―when made, was so far contrary to the declarant‘s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far subjected him to the risk of civil or criminal liability, or so far tended to render invalid a claim by him against another, or created such a risk of making him an object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.‖ (Evid. Code, § 1230.) This exception to the hearsay rule is ―founded on the assumption that a person is unlikely to fabricate a statement against his own interest at the time it is made.‖ (Chambers v. Mississippi, supra, 410 U.S. at p. 299.) ―The proponent of such evidence must show that the declarant is unavailable, that the declaration was against the declarant‘s penal interest when made and that the declaration was sufficiently reliable to warrant admission despite its hearsay character.‖ (People v. Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603, 610-611 (Duarte).) We review a trial court‘s ruling as to whether a statement is admissible as against a declarant‘s penal interest for abuse of discretion. (People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 153 (Lawley).) ―In determining whether a statement is truly against interest within the meaning of Evidence Code section 1230, and hence is sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible, the court may take into account not just the words but the circumstances under which they were uttered, the possible motivation of the declarant, and the declarant‘s relationship to the defendant.‖ (People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 745 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding statement of third party that he had killed the victim, where the statement was made 14 years after the murder and before defendant‘s retrial on special circumstances and penalty, the declarant knew there had been a prior verdict finding that defendant was the killer, and the trial ―court 25 could reasonably find [the declarant] wanted to aid his friend at little risk to himself‖].) Evidence Code section 1230‘s exception to the hearsay rule is ―inapplicable to evidence of any statement or portion of a statement not itself specifically disserving to the interests of the declarant.‖ (People v. Leach (1975) 15 Cal.3d 419, 441.) Even when the declarant admits culpability for a crime, those portions of the declarant‘s statements that do not incriminate the declarant are inadmissible. For example, in Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at page 154, we concluded that portions of a declarant‘s hearsay statement that did not specifically incriminate the declarant were inadmissible. In that case, the defendant was convicted of murder based on evidence that he hired one Seaborn to kill the victim. We held that the trial court did not err in admitting Seaborn‘s hearsay statement that he was hired to and did kill the victim, while excluding his hearsay statements that he had been hired by the Aryan Brotherhood and that an innocent man was in jail for the crime. The latter two statements, we observed, did not specifically disserve Seaborn‘s interests. Whether or not a statement is against penal interest can be determined only by considering the statement in context. (Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 153.) There are some circumstances in which a declarant‘s statement that fully or partially exculpates the defendant while placing the greater part of the blame on the declarant have been held to be sufficiently against the declarant‘s interests to be admissible. In United States v. Paguio (9th Cir. 1997) 114 F.3d 928 (Paguio), the defendants were a husband and wife who were charged with making false statements on a loan application. (Id. at p. 929.) The defendants‘ lawyer and his paralegal offered to testify concerning statements made by the husband‘s father, who was a fugitive at the time of trial. (Id. at p. 931.) They would have testified that the husband‘s father stated that ― ‗he was the one who was involved with 26 creating the false W-2‘s. He said his son had nothing to do with that.‘ ‖ (Id. at p. 931, fn. 1.) The appellate court held that the trial court erred in excluding the evidence as not sufficiently against interest: ―In context, the father‘s statement that his son had nothing to do with it was inculpatory of the father as well as exculpatory of the son. The father admitted not only participation but leadership, leading his son and daughter-in-law into the abyss. Because leading others into wrongdoing has always been seen as especially bad, there is a sentencing enhancement for it. [Citation.] Also, in context, the inculpating and exculpating statements were not practically separable.‖ (Id. at pp. 933-934; see United States v. Lopez (10th Cir. 1985) 777 F.2d 543, 554 [trial court erred in excluding hearsay statements of a passenger in a vehicle that he alone had placed cocaine into the vehicle and that the defendant was not aware of the drugs prior to transporting them].) In Lawley, we distinguished Paguio in a footnote, noting that in Lawley, ―the reference to some unidentified ‗innocent man‘ being in jail for the murder did not further incriminate [the declarant].‖ (Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 155, fn. 21.) The question, then, is whether portions of a declarant‘s statements exonerating the defendant further incriminate the declarant; that is, whether they are ―specifically disserving to the interests of the declarant.‖ (People v. Leach, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 441.) In excluding the proffered hearsay, the trial court reasoned that ―if somebody is confessing to a murder and to personally being the one who stabbed someone, that it does not in any way significantly enhance the personal detriment to the confessor if he says nobody else had any part in it. . . . [T]he fact that the others did or did not assist him isn‘t going to diminish his exposure, his public ridicule, et cetera.‖ The trial court found People v. Gatlin (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 31 (Gatlin) to be controlling. 27 The trial court may have been incorrect in its categorical statement that a declarant who has admitted to murder does not enhance his personal culpability by claiming that he acted alone. It is plausible that under some circumstances, as defendant contends, such statements may subject the declarant to a risk of increased criminal liability by establishing aggravating circumstances of the crime under section 190.3, factor (a), which would make the declarant more deserving of the death penalty. (See People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 414-415 [that defendant acted alone could be considered by jury as a circumstance of the crime in determining penalty]; People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1195 [defendant‘s role as the actual killer and motivating force behind the crime was a factor aggravating his culpability].) Although the trial court relied on Gatlin, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d 31, that case is not on point. In Gatlin, the defendant was charged with burglary and sought to offer recordings of statements made by three codefendants. The codefendants claimed the defendant ―had nothing to do with [it].‖ (Id. at p. 44.) However, the codefendants made these statements while disclaiming their own involvement. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal held that the exculpation of the defendant was ―not specifically disserving‖ (ibid.) and that the defendant‘s argument ignored the declarants‘ ―self-serving‖ (id. at p. 43) denials of culpability. Thus, in Gatlin, the declarants‘ exoneration of the defendant clearly did not suggest that the declarants were more culpable. Here, in contrast, Morris‘s statements were made during a conversation in which he admitted that he personally murdered the victim by choking and stabbing her. Nevertheless, ―we review the ruling, not the court‘s reasoning and, if the ruling was correct on any ground, we affirm.‖ (People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 582.) Below, we apply these principles separately to the portion of the 28 proffered statements by Morris describing defendant‘s reaction to the killing and those portions asserting that defendant did not take part in the killing. 2. Statement regarding defendant’s reaction to the killing We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the portion of Misty Abbott‘s proposed testimony that Morris told her that after he killed Bone, defendant and Wilson looked at him ―as if they were saying, what in the hell are you doing, dude.‖ It was defendant‘s burden to establish that Morris‘s statement describing defendant‘s reaction to the killing ―when made, . . . so far subjected [Morris] to the risk of civil or criminal liability . . . that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.‖ (Evid. Code, § 1230; see Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 610-611.) Defendant contends this portion of Morris‘s statement qualifies as a statement against interest because it meant that defendant was surprised that Morris killed the victim and thus that Morris alone made the decision to kill, a circumstance of the crime that could have aggravated Morris‘s potential sentence. The statement, however, was not necessarily against Morris‘s interest when made because its significance was unclear. Morris‘s description of defendant‘s look as signifying ―what in the hell are you doing‖ suggests that Morris thought defendant was surprised or alarmed, but not why he was surprised or alarmed. Defendant might have reacted as described by Morris for any number of reasons — for example, because of the manner in which Morris killed the victim or because of the extreme efforts (both strangling and stabbing) he had taken to kill the victim. If defendant‘s reaction was due to the circumstances, and not the fact, of the killing, the statement did not imply that defendant was unaware that Morris was going to kill the victim or that defendant was not involved in the decision to kill. If so, it did not further incriminate Morris, who had described the circumstances of 29 the crime to Misty, telling her that he had personally choked and stabbed the victim. In light of defendant‘s own statements to police, defendant‘s theory that the reaction described by Morris meant that defendant was surprised at the fact that Morris had killed the victim is an unlikely interpretation. Defendant told the police that he had observed Morris strangling Bone and heard Morris say that she ―won‘t die.‖ Later he saw Morris looking for a knife in the kitchen and then saw or heard him stabbing Bone. Under these circumstances, he could not have been surprised at the fact that Morris had killed Bone. Because Morris‘s proffered statement was vague and subject to reasonable interpretations that did not further incriminate Morris, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that defendant failed to establish that the statement was one that ―a reasonable man in [Morris‘s] position would not have made . . . unless he believed it to be true.‖ (Evid. Code, § 1230.) 3. Statements that defendant did not participate in the killing Whether the proffered testimony that defendant did not participate in the actual killing should have been admitted presents a closer question. On the one hand, as defendant contends, we have recognized that a defendant‘s role as the actual killer and motivating force behind a murder can be an aggravating factor. (People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1195.) Statements indicating that the declarant was the sole killer could subject the declarant to a risk of increased criminal liability by establishing aggravating circumstances of the crime. On the other hand, given that Morris had admitted that he was the actual killer, and had personally choked and stabbed the victim to death, it is not clear that his statements that defendant was in another part of the house and ―took no part in the actual killing‖ further incriminated Morris to such an extent that a reasonable person in his position would not have made the statements unless they were true. 30 However, we need not decide whether the trial court erred, or whether any such error violated defendant‘s constitutional rights, because, as explained below, we conclude that the exclusion of Morris‘s statements regarding defendant‘s lack of participation in the killing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 4. Attorney General’s failure to timely brief the harmless error issue The Attorney General did not argue, in her answer brief, that any error in the exclusion of Morris‘s hearsay statements was harmless. The issue was discussed at oral argument, after which we gave both parties the opportunity to brief the issue of harmless error. In addition, although defendant did not argue in his reply brief that the Attorney General had forfeited the harmless error issue by failing to brief it, we also gave both parties the opportunity to address the question of forfeiture. We conclude that the Attorney General‘s failure to respond to defendant‘s harmless error argument does not relieve this court of its responsibility to determine whether any error was harmless. A forfeiture is the loss of a right by the failure to make a timely assertion of it. (Cowan v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 367, 371.) When an appellant fails to raise an issue in the opening brief, raising it for the first time in a reply brief or at oral argument, we generally decline to address the issue or address it in a summary manner. (See People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 550, fn. 9 [claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised by defendant for the first time in reply brief is forfeited]; People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1290 [defendant‘s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object to prosecutor‘s argument, made for the first time in his reply brief in response to the Attorney General‘s waiver argument, ―is as meritless as it is belated‖]; People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 241, fn. 38 [― ‗perfunctorily‘ ‖ rejecting defendant‘s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, made for the first time in his reply brief and in a single paragraph]; People v. Crow (1993) 6 Cal.4th 952, 960, fn. 7 [declining to 31 address issue raised by defendant for the first time at oral argument]; Varjabedian v. City of Madera (1977) 20 Cal.3d 285, 295, fn. 11 [for reasons of fairness, court would not consider issue raised by defendant for the first time in its reply brief]; see also People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 254, fn. 5 [declining to address an argument that the People, as petitioners in this court, raised for the first time in their reply brief].) To allow an appellant to raise a new issue in its reply brief or at oral argument, ―would be unfair to the respondent, and would increase the labors of the court.‖ (Webber v. Clarke (1887) 74 Cal. 11, 13.) A respondent‘s failure to address an argument raised by an appellant may, under some circumstances, be interpreted as a concession. (See People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 480, [stating that the People ―apparently concede‖ a point made by the defendant to which they did not respond, either in briefing or in oral argument].) We do not, however, invariably interpret the failure to respond to an argument as a concession or a forfeiture. In People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, ―[w]e decline[d] to find a [forfeiture] based on nothing more than respondent‘s failure to respond to defendant‘s . . . argument, which was itself raised for the first time on appeal. Such a rule would require a party to respond to his opponent‘s every argument, subargument, and allegation, no matter how meritless or briefly made.‖ (Id. at p. 995, fn. 3; see Canaan v. Abdelnour (1985) 40 Cal.3d 703, 722, fn. 17 [court exercised discretion to address point that respondent raised for the first time at oral argument, because ―the point is but one aspect of the larger constitutional question‖], overruled on other grounds in Edelstein v. City and County of San Francisco (2002) 29 Cal.4th 164, 168.) Regardless, we have long recognized that, provided the parties have had a fair opportunity to address the issues, ―[t]his court . . . is undoubtedly at liberty to decide a case upon any points that its proper disposition may seem to require, whether taken by counsel or not . . . .‖ (Hibernia Sav. and Loan Soc. v. Farnham 32 (1908) 153 Cal. 578, 584.) A reviewing court‘s authority to decide issues not initially raised or briefed by the parties is recognized in Government Code section 68081, which requires that, before doing so, ―the court shall afford the parties an opportunity to present their views on the matter through supplemental briefing.‖ (Gov. Code, § 68081.) ―An appellate court is generally not prohibited from reaching a question that has not been preserved for review by a party.‖ (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6.) In most instances, ―[w]hether or not it should do so is entrusted to its discretion.‖ (Ibid.) In this instance, however, we do not have discretion to decline to address whether any error was harmless based on the Attorney General‘s failure to brief the issue in a timely manner. We are prohibited by the state Constitution from reversing a judgment unless, ―after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.‖ (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) The Attorney General‘s failure does not relieve this court of its constitutional responsibility to determine whether any error resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Defendant agrees that, regarding state law error, the state Constitution requires us to conduct harmless error analysis, and argues in this respect only that he should be given adequate notice of the Attorney General‘s position and an opportunity to respond to it. Ample notice and opportunity to respond were provided in the present case, through both supplemental briefing and oral argument. Regarding errors of federal constitutional dimension, however, defendant argues that because the beneficiary of federal constitutional error has the burden of showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24), we should adopt the approach that federal courts use when the government fails to argue that an error is harmless: the issue 33 is generally considered forfeited, but the court may exercise its discretion to overlook the forfeiture, considering (1) the length and complexity of the record, (2) whether harmlessness is certain or debatable, and (3) the futility and costliness of further proceedings in the trial court. (United States v. Giovanetti (1991) 928 F.2d 225, 226-227.) Although we must apply the federal standard of harmless error in determining whether such a miscarriage has occurred (Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 21), the forfeiture rules employed in the federal courts are not binding on this court. None of the federal cases cited by defendant suggest that the forfeiture rules they apply are mandated by the federal Constitution. (See United States v. Gonzalez-Flores (9th Cir. 2005) 418 F.3d 1093, 1100 [government‘s failure to argue nonconstitutional error was harmless usually waives the issue, unless harmlessness is clear beyond any serious debate]; United States v. Davis (3d Cir. 2013) 726 F.3d 434, 445, fn. 8 [applying same rule]; United States v. Cacho-Bonilla (1st Cir. 2005) 404 F.3d 84, 90 [noting that because the government made no harmless error argument, defendants had no chance to respond to any harmless error claim]; Hargrave v. McKee (6th Cir. 2007) 248 Fed.Appx. 718, 729 [concluding that even if the state did not forfeit the harmless error argument by failing to raise it until oral argument, the court would find the constitutional error not harmless]; United States v. Montgomery (8th Cir. 1996) 100 F.3d 1404, 1407 [stating the government‘s failure to raise harmless error in its brief waived the argument on appeal but, exercising its discretion to overlook the waiver and review the record on its own motion, court concluded the error was not harmless]; United States v. Varela-Rivera (9th Cir. 2002) 279 F.3d 1174, 1180 [stating the government did not argue that the error was harmless and this failure waived the argument]; United States v. Vallejo (9th Cir. 2001) 237 F.3d 1008, 1026 [same, adding that nevertheless, under the circumstances of the 34 case the error was not harmless].) Furthermore, most of these courts explicitly recognize that they retain discretion to review the record and decide whether any error was harmless even when the government fails to make the argument. This recognition undermines any contention that the forfeiture rule applied by federal courts is constitutionally mandated. The state cases cited by defendant in support of his position are similarly based on those states‘ own procedural rules and policies, not on federal constitutional principles. (See State v. Almaraz (Idaho 2013) 301 P.3d 242, 256257 [relying on state case law holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal at oral argument are not properly before the court]; Polk v. State (Nev. 2010) 233 P.3d 357, 359-361 [citing state rule of appellate procedure providing that if a respondent fails to adequately respond to an appeal, the court may consider the failure to respond as a confession of error].) These cases do not specifically discuss a failure to address harmless error. In any event, they are not persuasive because, as noted above, under the California Constitution, this court may not reverse a judgment unless it is convinced that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, and we clearly have the authority to address matters not initially raised by the parties. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Gov. Code, § 68081.)