Opinion ID: 2777003
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: lack of an appeal as voiding a certificate

Text: OF PRIMARY ELECTION ¶ 60 For the above reasons, I disagree with the grounds for the court’s decision to affirm the district court’s decision annulling and setting aside the election in question on its merits. Yet I would still affirm the decision of the district court on the basis of a procedural bar in the election code. On this point, moreover, a majority of the court agrees. ¶ 61 Under Utah Code section 20A-4-406(2), “[w]henever an election is annulled or set aside by the judgment of a court and no appeal is taken within 10 days, the certificate of election, if any has been issued, is void, and the office is vacant.” The conditions of this provision have been satisfied in this case. Judge Laycock entered an order annulling and setting aside the election in question on August 14, 2014. That judgment became unassailable when no appeal was taken by the parties within ten days—on or before August 24, 2014. At that point, the “certificate of election” in question became “void” by statute. I would affirm Judge Laycock’s order annulling and setting aside the election in this case on that basis. And in so doing, I would stop short of reaching the pleading and proof problems discussed in Part I of this opinion above. ¶ 62 For these reasons, and for others set forth in the majority opinion of Associate Chief Justice Nehring, supra ¶¶ 36–39, I would also hold that the district court erred in ordering a special election. As Justice Nehring indicates, the election code nowhere empowers the court to order a special election. And a decision ordering government officials to conduct such an election without affording them notice and an opportunity to be heard would fail as a matter of procedural due process. 68 In any event, the impact 68 Under the governing civil rule, a party to an injunction is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard. UTAH R. CIV. P. 65A(a)(1) (“No preliminary injunction shall be issued without notice to the adverse party.”); id. 65A(d) (providing that an injunction “shall be binding only upon the parties to the action, (con’t.) 31 COX v. LAYCOCK JUSTICE LEE, opinion of the Court in Part II of the lack of an appeal is clear: The “certificate of election . . . is void, and the office is vacant.” UTAH CODE § 20A-4-406(2). That remedy affords no room for a special election. ¶ 63 Justice Nehring arrives at the same ultimate conclusion—affirming the decision setting aside the election but reversing the decision ordering a special election. But he rests his decision on the merits of the underlying election contest, while deeming section 406(2) inapplicable. The proffered grounds for avoiding section 406(2), however, misunderstand my basis for invoking this provision, and provide no basis for ignoring its terms. ¶ 64 I have no quarrel with the proposition that the lieutenant governor acted with “diligence” in submitting his petition for extraordinary writ. Supra ¶ 24. Thus, I am on board with the conclusion that the petition was timely (and not barred by the doctrine of laches), and agree that we should “reach the merits” of the lieutenant governor’s claims. Supra ¶ 24. My point is simply that in addressing the merits, we should give effect to the governing provisions of the election code, including Utah Code section 20A-4-406(2). ¶ 65 I am not suggesting that this provision “insulate[s]” the district court’s decision “from review.” Supra ¶ 23. Instead, I would simply hold that in exercising our extraordinary writ power, we are no less bound to follow the law. A petition for extraordinary relief invokes this court’s “original jurisdiction.” See UTAH CONST. art VIII § 3. Such a petition is simply an alternative procedural pathway for a party to ask this court to exercise its judicial power. But whether we are exercising original or their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive notice”). That rule, moreover, is an outgrowth of the constitutional right to due process. See 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2956 at 383–84 (3d ed. 2013) (“A court ordinarily does not have power to issue an order against a person who is not a party and over whom it has not acquired in personam jurisdiction. Therefore, persons who are not actual parties to the action or in privity with any parties may not be brought within the effect of a decree merely by naming them in the order.” (footnote omitted)). 32 Cite as: 2015 UT JUSTICE LEE, opinion of the Court in Part II appellate jurisdiction, we are always bound to follow the law. And here that law includes section 406(2). ¶ 66 Section 406(2) is simple and straightforward. It provides a “brief ten-day window for the parties to appeal an election decision,” supra ¶ 23, and expressly indicates that the election certificate is “void” where there is no appeal, UTAH CODE § 20A-4- 406(2). That provision sustains significant reliance interests; and those interests ought to be protected in the exercise of our original jurisdiction. I would affirm on the basis of section 406(2), which clearly dictates affirmance of the district court’s decision.