Opinion ID: 75739
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Specific Grants of Authority

Text: 15 As this Court has emphasized before, magistrate judges draw their authority entirely from an exercise of Congressional power under Article I of the Constitution. Thomas v. Whitworth, 136 F.3d 756, 758 (11th Cir. 1998). 8 Congress granted authority to magistrate judges in both 28 U.S.C. § 636 and 18 U.S.C. § 3401. Although both statutes contain numerous specific grants of authority, we first conclude that these statutes do not contain any specific grant of authority for a magistrate judge, either independently or on a district court's referral for a report and recommendation, to conduct the evidentiary and fact-finding portion of the sentencing hearing in a felony case. 16 Although § 636 and § 3401 specifically grant initial sentencing authority to magistrate judges in petty offenses, and, if the defendant consents, in certain misdemeanors, there is no similar specific grant of initial sentencing authority in a felony case. More explicitly, under § 636(a)(3), a magistrate judge has the power to conduct trials under section 3401 . . . in conformity with and subject to the limitations of that section. 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(3). Under § 3401, a magistrate judge may try and sentence persons convicted of misdemeanors, but [a]ny person charged with a misdemeanor, other than a petty offense may elect to be tried before a district judge, [t]he magistrate judge shall carefully explain to the defendant that he has a right to trial, judgment, and sentencing by a district judge, and [t]he magistrate judge may not proceed to try the case unless the defendant . . . expressly consents. 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b). A magistrate judge also has the power to enter a sentence for a petty offense under § 636(a)(4) and the power to enter a sentence for a class A misdemeanor in a case in which the parties have consented under § 636(a)(5). Thus, while a magistrate judge may try and sentence a defendant for a petty offense, a magistrate judge may try and sentence a defendant for a misdemeanor only if the defendant expressly consents. The fact that Congress has specified that sentencing for a class A misdemeanor can be performed by a magistrate judge only with the parties' consent alone indicates the sentencing delegation here was problematic in this felony case without the defendants' consent. 17 In addition to this limited initial sentencing authority, the statutory scheme also carefully circumscribes a magistrate judge's authority over subsequent probation and supervised release proceedings. Section 3401(d) provides that [t]he probation laws shall be applicable to persons tried by a magistrate under this section, and such officer shall have power to grant probation and to revoke, modify, or reinstate the probation of any person granted probation by a magistrate judge. 18 U.S.C. § 3401(d). As for supervised release, a magistrate judge has the power to modify, revoke, or terminate supervised release of any person sentenced to a term of supervised release by a magistrate judge. Id. § 3401(h). In addition, [a] district judge may designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings to modify, revoke, or terminate supervised release, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to the judge proposed findings of fact and recommendations. Id. § 3401(i). 9 18 Although at least some authority is specifically granted regarding petty offenses, misdemeanors, supervised release and probation, notably absent in this statutory scheme is any specific grant of authority to a magistrate judge to sentence initially in a felony case or even any authority for a district court to delegate in a felony case the evidentiary and fact-finding portion of an initial sentencing hearing on a report and recommendation basis. Moreover, in addition to carving out only certain sentencing functions, Congress delineates with great specificity in § 636(b)(1)(A) and § 636(b)(1)(B) the circumstances in which a magistrate judge has authority to conduct evidentiary hearings on a report and recommendation basis, and none of these circumstances include the hearing at issue here. Thus, we conclude that there is no specific grant of authority in either § 636 or § 3401 for a district court to delegate to a magistrate judge the evidentiary and fact-finding portion of a sentencing hearing in a felony case.