Opinion ID: 1032294
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Judgment as to Events of May 23, 2003

Text: Smith claims that the padlocking of his tire shop on May 23, 2003, represented an unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.4 In the district court, Smith conceded that police told him that the shop was padlocked for security reasons after the original locks were damaged during the police search of the premises. He further conceded that police told him that he was permitted to enter at any time. Despite these admissions, Smith claims that the seizure was unlawful because he was unsure whether he was permitted to enter the shop because of the lock. However, based on the evidence in the record, no reasonable juror could conclude that the locking of the shop constituted a seizure of the shop by the authorities. In any event, Smith offers no evidence that any of 4 The shop was searched pursuant to a warrant. Smith has abandoned his earlier claims that the warrant was invalid and that the police executed the search in an unnecessarily destructive manner. 5 the named defendants placed the locks on his shop.5 The district court therefore did not err in granting summary judgment on this claim. III. Jury Instructions as to Events of March 19, 2003 Smith claims that the district court erred in various ways when it instructed the jury on the claims it allowed to proceed to trial, which arose from Smith’s arrest for operating a motor vehicle without a valid license on March 19, 2003. He identifies three alleged errors that he claims warrant a new trial. To the extent Smith did not object to the allegedly incorrect instructions, he is only entitled to a new trial if the errors in the district court’s jury instructions rose to the level of plain error. Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 556-57 (2d Cir. 1994). For those instructions that Smith did object to, a new trial is warranted unless the error was harmless. Cobb, 363 F.3d at 112. On the facts of this case, the instructions do not warrant a new trial. First, Smith objects that the district court misinstructed the jury regarding probable cause by failing to give a single definition of the term. Even if the district court’s instruction was insufficient, any error was harmless because the jury’s verdict did not turn on niceties of probable cause. It is undisputed that Smith’s license was suspended. Defendant Tobon testified that he observed Smith sitting in the driver’s seat of a double-parked car with the engine running; according to Smith; he was in the passenger seat and the engine was 5 Although Smith’s wife claimed to have seen defendant Tobon outside the shop around the time of the search, she did not testify that she saw Tobon involved in padlocking the shop. 6 turned off. The district court instructed the jury, correctly, that its task was to decide which version of events was accurate. The judge was correct: on Tobon’s version, probable cause existed; on Smith’s, it did not. Given that posture, we cannot conclude that any lack of clarity in the district court’s definition of probable cause influenced the jury’s verdict. See Gordon v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2000). Second, the district court did not err by instructing the jury that, contrary to plaintiff’s statement in summation, no inference could be drawn from the fact that Tobon’s partner was not called by either side to testify at trial. Even if we were to construe Smith’s objection to this instruction below as preserving this argument on appeal, the instruction given by the district court was not erroneous because it accurately instructed the jury to “decide the case on the basis of what you actually heard.” As a result, the jury charge “sufficiently cover[ed] the case so that [the] jury [could] intelligently determine the questions presented to it.” Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 4 Leonard B. Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions ¶ 75.01 (2013). We therefore conclude that the instruction was adequate. Finally, Smith claims the district court erred in instructing the jury regarding the malicious prosecution claim. First, his argument that the district court should have instructed the jury that Tobon initiated the criminal proceedings, which in any event Smith waived by failing to raise it below, fails because the district court did so instruct the jury. Second, Smith argues that the district court misinstructed the jury regarding the 7 level of deprivation of liberty necessary to state a claim. But the judge correctly instructed the jury that it could find a deprivation of liberty on the facts of the case even though Smith was not detained after his arraignment. In any event, the jury also found for defendants on the false arrest claim. That verdict implies that the jury found that there was probable cause for the arrest and, given that Smith presented no evidence arising after his arrest sufficient to undermine the finding of probable cause, provides a basis for the jury’s verdict that could not have been affected by the alleged errors in the jury charge. The questioned instruction thus could not amount to plain error affecting substantial rights. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 8