Opinion ID: 1765023
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: public official

Text: In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra , the Supreme Court of the United States, for the first time, considered the extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit recovery in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct. The plaintiff, an elected city commissioner whose duties included supervision of the city's police department, brought suit in a state court alleging that he had been libeled by an advertisement printed in the New York Times newspaper. The advertisement included statements, some of which were false, about action by the city police directed against students who participated in a civil rights demonstration and against a leader of the civil rights movement. Following a jury verdict for the plaintiff and affirmance by the state supreme court, the case was reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States which reversed and remanded holding that the constitutional guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments require a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with `actual malice'that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. [1] [Emphasis added.] 376 U.S. 254 at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710 at 726. In so holding the Court recognized a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. 376 U.S. 254 at 270, 84 S.Ct. 710, at 721. The Court further reasoned that [a] rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertionsand to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amountleads to ... `self-censorship.' 376 U.S. 254 at 279, 84 S.Ct. 710 at 725. In New York Times the Court did not attempt to define the public official and official conduct concepts, but left determination of the scope of these concepts for future cases. [2] Further explanation of the public official concept was then provided by the United States Supreme Court in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966). The plaintiff in Rosenblatt was not an elected official but, rather, a former supervisor of a county recreation area who was employed by and directly responsible to the county commissioners. His libel action was brought against a local newspaper for publication of a column that allegedly criticized the financial management of the recreation area while it was under the plaintiff's supervision. In deciding whether to classify the plaintiff as a public official, the Court set forth the competing values that must be weighed and formulated a broad definition of the public official concept. First, the Court emphasized that there is a strong interest in debate on public issues and about persons who are in a position to influence the resolution of those issues. Criticism of government is at the very center of the constitutionally protected area of free discussion. Criticism of those responsible for government operations must be free, lest criticism of government itself be penalized. 383 U.S. 75 at 85, 86 S.Ct. 669 at 676. Secondly, the Court recognized that [s]ociety has a pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation. In balancing society's interest in protecting the reputations of its citizens and the constitutional values of free speech and press, the Court unmistakably concluded that the public official designation does not apply to all government employees. [3] Rather, the designation applies [w]here a position in government has such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and performance of all government employees. [Emphasis added.] 383 U.S. 75 at 86, 86 S.Ct. 669 at 676. In determining whether Foster was a public official for purposes of the New York Times rule, two aspects of Foster's relationship with the county government must be examined. Foster was, first, a private consulting engineer who was from time to time employed by the County and, second, he was the duly elected county surveyor. The Newspaper contends that the New York Times rule is applicable because Foster was a public official in his capacity as a private consulting engineer employed by the County. The summary judgment proof shows that Foster was employed by the County as a private consulting engineer for numerous projects and, according to the county judge, Foster performed the large majority of the County's engineering jobs. Nevertheless, Foster had no permanent engineering position with the County and it was undisputed that the County also hired other consulting engineers. Therefore, Foster must be treated as a temporary employee of the County and the applicability of the New York Times rule must be determined with reference to the particular engineering project discussed in the allegedly libelous article. [4] Foster's involvement with the flooding problems in Del Mar Hills as a consulting engineer for the County dated back to April 1971 when he was employed by the commissioner's court to conduct an inspection of the newly constructed streets and storm drainage system in Del Mar Hills. Subsequently, in May and June 1972 when residents of the subdivision complained to the commissioner's court about recent flooding of their homes, Foster was employed to study the drainage problem and determine the availability of a federal grant to remedy the flooding problem. Finally, in June 1973 when a resident of Del Mar Hills again complained to the commissioner's court about the recent flooding of his home, the court summoned Foster to appear before the court and advise it about the drainage problem. [5] We hold that the summary judgment proof failed to establish that Foster's position as a consulting engineer possessed such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and performance of all government employees. Rosenblatt v. Baer, supra, at 86, 86 S.Ct. at 676. The summary judgment proof showed that whatever public interest the flooding aroused was focused primarily on the commissioner's court which was attempting to determine the County's responsibility for the flooding problem. Although Foster occasionally reported his findings to the commissioner's court at public meetings, the record fails to show that the presentation of his reports stirred up any significant public interest. The apparent lack of public interest in Foster's activities was undoubtedly attributable to the fact that Foster had little if any authority to exercise on behalf of the County. The commissioner's court assigned Foster specific tasks, such as conducting a drainage study and determining the availability of a federal grant to solve the flooding problem, but the nature of these tasks, as described in the summary judgment proof, did not require that Foster exercise a significant amount of discretion. Furthermore, it does not appear that Foster could personally authorize the expenditure of public funds to solve the flooding problem, nor did he supervise any other employees of the County. Another fact that probably explains the lack of public interest in Foster's activities was that Foster had very little public contact. There was apparently no public input with regard to Foster's employment by the commissioner's court to study the flooding problem. In addition, the tasks assigned to Foster did not require that he act in a representative capacity for the County or have any direct dealings with the public. The Newspaper also urges that Foster was a public official under the New York Times rule in his capacity as elected county surveyor and that the allegedly libelous statements in the newspaper article were relevant to his fitness for that elected position. On the other hand, Foster points to the summary judgment proof which indicates that the office of county surveyor entails minimal responsibilities and has become virtually obsolete in recent years. According to Foster, he occupied the office as a matter of convenience to the County because the County was required by statute to elect a surveyor. [6] Furthermore, Foster was paid no salary as county surveyor, and he had no staff provided by the County. During the seven and one-half years that he held the position Foster made an occasional patent survey for the County, but he performed no other duties in his official capacity. Although the summary judgment proof certainly established that Foster was a member of the lower echelons of the County government, we note that the United States Supreme Court has not reserved the public official designation for highlevel public officers alone. Time v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 91 S.Ct. 633, 28 L.Ed.2d 45 (1971) (deputy chief of detectives); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968) (deputy sheriff); Beckley Newspapers v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 88 S.Ct. 197, 19 L.Ed.2d 248 (1967) (elected clerk of county criminal and circuit courts); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 85 S.Ct. 992, 13 L.Ed.2d 892 (1965) (county attorney). More important, the definition of public official in Rosenblatt v. Baer, supra , is keyed to the apparent importance of the official position and the public interest in such position. It may be presumed that a certain amount of public interest exists with regard to any governmental position if the general public selects the person who holds the position through the election process. In recognition of the special public interest in elected officials, the Supreme Court has held that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press have their fullest and most urgent application to the election process. Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 91 S.Ct. 621, 28 L.Ed.2d 35 (1971). Finally, it cannot be doubted that the New York Times rule applies to any candidate for public office, even a candidate for a position such as county surveyor, at least during the course of the election campaign. It would be somewhat incongruous to hold that a candidate for public office is a public person during the campaign but loses that status upon taking office. We therefore conclude that Foster was a public official for purposes of the New York Times rule. We hold, however, that the summary judgment evidence failed to establish the applicability of the New York Times rule because the allegedly libelous statements in the newspaper article did not clearly relate to Foster's official conduct as county surveyor. It is undoubtedly true that the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the official conduct concept very broadly, [7] but all of the public official defamation cases considered by the Court, except one, [8] involved statements that referred to performance of official duties or fitness for office of government officials. In the instant case, however, the newspaper article containing the allegedly libelous statements made no express reference to Foster's fitness for the office of county surveyor, nor was it concerned with Foster's performance of his official duties. Instead, the article discussed Foster's activities as consultant engineer for Webb County. Nevertheless, the Newspaper seeks to invoke the New York Times rule on the grounds that the allegedly libelous statements in the article were germane to Foster's fitness for the office of county surveyor. However, if the article contained no reference, implied or otherwise, to Foster's position as county surveyor, it could not be said that the article related to his fitness for the office. If such is the instance, the allegedly libelous statements did not concern Foster's official conduct and the New York Times rule would not be applicable. The public official rule set forth in the New York Times case was not meant to protect reporting of matters that have at best a coincidental bearing on governmental affairs. Of course, there may be instances where the absence of an express reference to an individual's official capacity is unimportant. Many public officials are so well-known in their communities that the general public automatically associates them with their official positions. In such instances an express reference in a newspaper article to the individual's official capacity is unnecessary and the reference is implied. Based upon the summary judgment evidence presented we cannot conclude that the article in question contained any implied reference to Foster's position as county surveyor. [9] In particular, Foster has shown that the duties and responsibilities of the county surveyor were minimal and that he was not opposed in any election for the position. Thus, a fact issue was raised as to whether the allegedly libelous statements in the newspaper article referred to Foster's position as county surveyor. In order to establish the applicability of the New York Times rule the Newspaper must at least prove upon the trial of this case that the article impliedly referred thereto. [10]