Opinion ID: 24438
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: babo loe

Text: Babo Loe contends that she can not be convicted of conspiracy on counts 1, 17, and 18, which alleged conspiracy to defraud the government and conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud. She 24 The proposed mail fraud instruction included the following definition of materiality: A statement is material if it has a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing a decision by the party to whom the representation is made. In contrast, the proposed wire fraud instruction did not include a definition of materiality. 25 Pettigrew, 77 F.3d at 1511. 26 Id. at 1510. 27 See United States v. Davis, 226 F.3d 346, 358-59 (5th Cir. 2000) (upholding a jury instruction that failed to define materiality). Babo Loe adopts Cornelius Loe's argument regarding the jury instructions. The preceding analysis applies equally to her case. 13 argues, first, that being convicted of conspiring with LHI, which she owned, is equivalent to being convicted of conspiring with herself. Second, she notes that, with the exception of Cornelius Loe, the other alleged co-conspirators were acquitted. She argues that she can not be convicted of conspiracy if the other coconspirators were acquitted. Similarly, Babo Loe asserts that, if the evidence was insufficient to support Cornelius Loe's conviction under count 17, her conviction under that count also can not stand. Her argument is without foundation. This Court has repeatedly held that the acquittal of all other co-conspirators does not bar conviction for conspiracy.28 We therefore need not address Babo Loe's assertion that she can not be convicted of conspiring with LHI.29
Babo Loe also contends that the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the search of the marina. As we understand her argument, she asserts that all of the evidence should be suppressed because of defects in the warrant and its execution. She contends that the warrant was 28 See United States v. Zuniga-Salinas, 952 F.2d 876, 877-78 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc); United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1554 (5th Cir. 1994). 29 As noted above, the evidence was sufficient to support Cornelius Loe's conspiracy conviction under count 17. Moreover, counts 1 and 18 involved acquitted conspirators other than LHI. Babo Loe's arguments regarding LHI are consequently irrelevant. 14 overbroad and that the FBI exceeded the scope of the warrant in conducting its search. The affidavit upon which the warrant was based provided evidence that the Loes (1) had underreported boat sales revenue to the Corps; (2) had underreported boat sales revenue to the IRS; (3) had not paid state sales tax on cash cover charges obtained from bars and restaurants located on the marina; and (4) did not report the cash sale of various boats, in violation of the Bank Secrecy Act.30 The warrant authorized the search of the following areas: two offices on level one of the corporate office building; all of level two; the storage area of level three; a tan mobile home designated, Loe's Highport Yacht Sales; and the safes and vaults of the Pompano's Club and Clipper Bar. An attachment to the search warrant listed approximately fifty-four categories of items to be seized. The warrant did not authorize a search of the Loe's residence, which was located on the third floor of the corporate office building. In reviewing the district court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we review factual findings for clear error.31 We review de novo the court's legal conclusions regarding the constitutionality of law enforcement action, sufficiency of the 30 See 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 5312(a)(2)(T), 5313 (2000). 31 See Davis, 226 F.3d at 350. 15 warrant, and the reasonableness of an officer's reliance on a warrant.32 We address a Fourth Amendment challenge to a seizure conducted pursuant to a search warrant by asking, first, whether the seizure falls within the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.33 Under the good-faith exception, where a warrant was based on an affidavit which was insufficient to establish probable cause, the evidence obtained is still admissible if law enforcement officials acted in objectively reasonable good-faith reliance upon a search warrant.34 If the good-faith exception applies, we need not examine whether the warrant was supported by probable cause.35 When officers execute a warrant in a manner that offends the Fourth Amendment, however, there is no objectively reasonable good-faith reliance. Evidence which falls outside the scope of the warrant normally must be suppressed.36 However, two exceptions apply. First, items of an incriminatory character which are found in the course of a legal search, yet which were not described in the search warrant, may be seized. Second, officers may seize 32 See id. 33 See United States v. Davis, 226 F.3d 346, 350 (5th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 34 Davis, 226 F.3d at 351 (quoting United States v. Shugart, 117 F.3d 838, 843 (5th Cir. 1997)). 35 Davis, 226 F.3d at 351. 36 See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 140 (1990). 16 property which is not described in the warrant if the property exhibits a sufficient nexus to the crime under investigation.37 The Fourth Amendment does not countenance, however, a general, exploratory search through personal belongings.38 Although the bulk of her arguments address the sufficiency of the warrant itself, Babo Loe contends that the fourteen-hour search of the marina exceeded the scope of the warrant. Agents seized several hundred boxes of documents, of which 130 boxes were subsequently returned as irrelevant to the Government's investigation. Babo Loe fails to cite specific pieces of evidence that were seized outside the scope of the warrant. While Babo Loe argued to the district court that a variety of broad categories of evidence were seized outside the scope of the warrant,39 her brief does not indicate whether she is reiterating those arguments on appeal. On appeal, she refers only to the seizure of estate 37 See Creamer v. Porter, 754 F.2d 1311, 1318 (5th Cir. 1985). 38 Id. 39 The district court examined the following categories of evidence which Babo Loe objected to as falling outside the scope of the warrant: (1) various date books, organizers, calendars, attendance lists, and Rolodexes; (2) entirely personal notes and files; (3) litigation and other legal files, including files relating to the Hull litigation; (4) state and federal labor law files; (5) trust and estate planning files; (6) gift and estate tax files; (7) files on property damage; (8) medical and health insurance files; (9) life insurance files; (10) automobile insurance files; (11) other insurance files unrelated to property insurance; (12) maps and floor plans; and (13) an audiotape. The district court found that, while some of the preceding categories of items appeared to fall outside the warrant's scope and did not demonstrate a sufficient nexus to the crimes investigated, the officers did not act in blatant disregard of the search warrant. 17 planning files, the Loes' personal files, whole computers and computer files, and litigation files. Although we are troubled by the scope of the search conducted, we are unprepared to say that the items seized should be suppressed on the basis that they exceeded the terms of the warrant. The warrant specifically authorized the seizure of computers and computer files. Although the warrant did not refer to estate planning files, it authorized, for example, the seizure of files relating to any and all wire transfers and information relating to stock/brokerage accounts. Without specifics, we are unable to evaluate the merits of Babo Loe's contention that personal files were seized. Finally, while the warrant did not expressly authorize the seizure of litigation files, certain non-privileged documents contained within those files may have fallen within the scope of the warrant. Again, without specifics, we are unable to conclude that any given file was seized improperly. Babo Loe also complains of the extensive search of the Loe residence. The warrant authorized a search of the third-floor storage area. Because the elevator was either locked or inoperable, agents could only access the storage area through the Loes' residence, which was also on the third floor. Despite the warrant's failure to authorize a search of the residence, the Government 18 argues that a protective sweep was necessary.40 The FBI knew prior to the search that the Loes were registered gun owners, and a search of their persons did not reveal firearms. Although examining drawers and closets may or may not have been quick and limited—and therefore within the scope of a protective sweep41—we need not address this issue. No items from the residence were seized, nor was anything from the residence used as evidence at trial. Babo Loe further argues that the warrant itself was overbroad because it authorized the seizure of many categories of documents unrelated to the crimes described in the affidavit. The good-faith exception articulated above does not apply where there is a discrepancy between the assertions in the affidavit and the scope of the warrant sufficient to make reliance on the warrant unreasonable.42 While the wisdom of including such a broad array of documents in the warrant is questionable, we are unprepared to find the 40 A protective sweep is justified when the searching officer reasonably believed that the area swept harbored an individual posing a danger to the officer or others. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990). 41 See id. (A 'protective sweep' is a quick and limited search of premises . . . narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person might be hiding.). But see United States v. Hernandez, 941 F.2d 133, 135-38 (2d Cir. 1991) (extending the proper scope of a protective sweep to a search for weapons that the arrestee could easily reach). 42 See United States v. Davis, 226 F.3d 346, 352 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Cherna, 184 F.3d 403, 409-10 (5th Cir. 1999). Babo Loe does not invoke the other bases for not applying the good-faith exception. See Cherna, 184 F.3d at 407-08. Given the specificity of the warrant, which lists fifty-four categories of evidence, we find that the warrant did not violate the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723, 727 (5th Cir. 1995). 19 officers' reliance on the warrant unreasonable. The district court found that documents such as real estate and insurance files were logical indicators of LHI's gross fixed assets. We agree. A company's gross fixed assets may indicate a failure to report income to the IRS and Corps, as well as Appellants' knowledge of the unreported income. The twenty-two-page affidavit provided ample indication of the Loes' failure to report income to the IRS and Corps. Although the warrant authorized seizure of a vast array of documents, the crimes alleged in the affidavit could reasonably be viewed as requiring a search of this magnitude. The fifty-year history of the marina and the scope of the operations under investigation lend additional support to the breadth of the search warrant. Moreover, the warrant expressly limited the search to a portion of the marina's business premises, and nothing was seized from the Loes' residence.43 The Loes point to the FBI's prompt return of the 130 boxes of irrelevant documents as evidence of the warrant's overbreadth. However, this is merely proof that the proper breadth of a warrant is always clearer after the fact. We find only that the agents' reliance on the warrant was not objectively unreasonable and did not indicate bad faith.44 43 The search in this case is therefore distinguishable from the all records search discussed in United States v. Humphrey, 104 F.3d 65 (5th Cir. 1997). In Humphrey, we recognized that the Fourth Amendment requires closer scrutiny of an all records search of a residence, noting that a search of this nature would only be upheld in extreme cases. See id. at 69 & n.2. 44 Cornelius Loe adopts Babo Loe's Fourth Amendment arguments. For the reasons given above, these arguments also fail as applied to Cornelius Loe. 20
Babo Loe argues that the district court improperly applied the Sentencing Guidelines in determining her sentence for money laundering. She contends that fraud was the essence of her offense. Accordingly, Babo Loe argues that she should have been sentenced under the fraud guidelines, not the money laundering guidelines. This Court reviews a court's legal interpretations of the Guidelines de novo.45 A sentencing court's refusal to depart from the applicable guideline is unreviewable, however, unless the court mistakenly believed that it lacked the authority to grant such a departure.46 The district court here was aware of its power to grant a downward departure. Babo Loe attempts to escape this limitation on our power to review sentencing decisions. She asserts that a court's application of a guideline range is a purely legal interpretation, meriting de novo review. We find no error in the sentencing court's decision to apply section 2S.1 of the Guidelines to Babo Loe's violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. Appendix A of the Guidelines indicates that guideline section 2S1.2 corresponds with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 45 See United States v. Barbontin, 907 F.2d 1494, 1497 (5th Cir. 1990). 46 See United States v. Powers, 168 F.3d 741, 753 (5th Cir. 1999). 21 1957.47 We would not hesitate to apply de novo review and correct a court's misapprehension of this elementary component of the sentencing architecture constructed by the Guidelines. However, where a court finds that the facts in a section 1957 case are sufficiently atypical as to warrant the application of a lower guideline range, its decision constitutes a downward departure.48 The court in such an instance does not misinterpret the Guidelines by failing to apply section 2S1.2; it exercises its discretion under the facts of that case.49 The sentencing court's refusal to apply a different set of guidelines in this case therefore constitutes a refusal to grant a downward departure—a decision which this Court may not review.
Babo Loe also challenges her money laundering conviction on count 25, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. We review the evidence to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the evidence established guilt 47 See U.S.S.G. App. A. (2000); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a); U.S.S.G. § 2S1.2, cmt. 48 See United States v. Dadi, 235 F.3d 945, 954-55 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hemmingson, 157 F.3d 347, 360-63 (5th Cir. 1998). Our Court therefore differs from those circuits which view the initial choice of which guideline to apply as a question of law subject to de novo review. See United States v. Smith, 186 F.3d 290, 297 (3d Cir. 1999). 49 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b) (2000) (requiring a court to follow the applicable guideline unless it finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance . . . not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission). 22 beyond a reasonable doubt.50 Babo Loe notes that she spent some of the fraudulently obtained money years after having received it. She contends that the passage of time negates the inference that she knew that she was spending dirty funds. This argument is meritless. A rational jury could find that she possessed such knowledge at the time of the transaction. Babo Loe asks this Court to effectively re-weigh the evidence. We refrain from taking such a step and reject her sufficiency challenge.51
Babo Loe argues that the forfeiture of the Florida property should be reversed on three grounds: the indictment did not allege the extent of her interest in the property; the forfeiture was not incorporated in the judgment; and the forfeiture is disproportionate to the offense. We reject each of these contentions. First, the indictment was sufficient. Rule 7(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states: No judgment of forfeiture may be entered in a criminal proceeding unless the indictment or information shall allege the extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture. As this Court has noted, [t]he purpose of the notice of forfeiture in the indictment is to inform 50 See United States v. Mergerson, 4 F.3d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 1993). 51 See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 414 (1980). 23 the defendant that the government seeks forfeiture as a remedy.52 An indictment is sufficiently specific if it puts the defendant on notice that the government seeks forfeiture and identifies the assets with sufficient specificity to permit the defendant to marshal evidence in their defense.53 Babo Loe asserts that the indictment was insufficient because it failed to specify the interest in the property that was subject to forfeiture, which the court later determined to be 52.6 percent. Rule 7(c)(2) does not require the level of detail sought by Babo Loe. She had ample notice that the Florida property itself was subject to forfeiture. Her defense could not have been jeopardized by the Government's failure to more precisely delineate the scope of the forfeiture.54 Second, the forfeiture was incorporated in the judgment. Rule 32(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: At sentencing, a final order of forfeiture shall be made part of the sentence and included in the judgment. In this case, Judge Brown indicated orally at the sentencing hearing that the Florida property would be forfeited. Moreover, the court issued a written preliminary order of forfeiture on March 31, 1999. However, the judgments of conviction did not refer to the March 31st order or discuss forfeiture. Upon the Government's motion, the court entered 52 United States v. Puma, 937 F.2d 151, 156 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1347 (5th Cir. 1983)). 53 Puma, 937 F.2d at 156. 54 See id. at 156-57. 24 a nunc pro tunc amendment to the written order describing the forfeited property.55 We find nothing objectionable about this procedure. Moreover, in the event of a conflict between an oral judgment and a written order, the oral ruling prevails.56 The court's oral pronouncement on forfeiture, which it issued at the sentencing hearing, consequently remains effective in the face of a contrary written judgment. Finally, the forfeiture is not excessive. The court ordered Babo Loe to forfeit only so much of the property as was purchased with illegally obtained funds—money that she had no right to in the first place.57 We therefore find no disproportionality, let alone the gross disproportionality required by United States v. Bajakajian.58
Babo Loe argues that the Government failed to adduce evidence sufficient to support venue for count 19, mail fraud. As a continuing offense, mail fraud may be prosecuted in any district 55 See Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 36 (2000). 56 See United States v. McDowell, 109 F.3d 214, 217 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Shaw, 920 F.2d 1225, 1231 (5th Cir. 1991). 57 See United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295, 300 (5th Cir. 1994). 58 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998). Cornelius Loe adopts Babo Loe's arguments regarding the forfeiture. For the reasons given above, they fail as applied to his case. 25 in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed.59 Although the government must prove venue by the preponderance of the evidence, circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to establish venue.60 On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict.61 Babo Loe's contention is meritless. The evidence supports a finding that on three occasions she mailed numerous documents from locations in the Eastern District of Texas in furtherance of the fraudulent conspiracy. Babo Loe contends that, if the three mailings described above support her conviction on mail fraud, that count 19 suffered from duplicity. An indictment may be duplicitous if it joins in a single Count two or more distinct offenses.62 However, count 19 only alleges a single act of mail fraud. Babo Loe also does not claim prejudice as a result of duplicity in count 19.63 Her argument is more appropriately considered as a claimed variance. Variance results when the charging terms of the indictment remain unaltered, but the evidence at trial proves facts 59 18 U.S.C.A. § 3237(a) (2000). 60 See United States v. White, 611 F.2d 531, 534-35 (1980). 61 Id. at 535. 62 See United States v. Sharpe, 193 F.3d 852, 870 (5th Cir. 1999). 63 See United States v. Drury, 687 F.2d 63, 66 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding that, even if an indictment was duplicitous, there was no prejudice). 26 other than those alleged in the indictment.64 The dates of the three mailings differ slightly from the date presented in the indictment. Moreover, three acts of mail fraud were proven at trial, whereas the indictment only charged one act. We are unconvinced that this variance affected Appellant's substantial rights.65 Babo Loe does not allege prejudice and we do not discern the potential for such prejudice on the facts of this case.
Babo Loe further contends that the cumulative effect of numerous evidentiary errors committed by the district court violated her rights under the Confrontation Clause.66 We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.67 Although Babo Loe provides numerous cites to the record, she fails to indicate how a specific cited decision by the court was erroneous. More fundamentally, she concedes that none of these decisions constituted an abuse of discretion. She argues that the cumulative effect of these errors was prejudicial to her Sixth Amendment rights. 64 Sharpe, 193 F.3d at 866 (quotations omitted). 65 See Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 52(a) (2000); Sharpe, 193 F.3d at 866; United States v. Faulkner, 17 F.3d 745, 760 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Winship, 724 F.2d 1116, 1122 (5th Cir. 1984). 66 U.S. Const. amend. VI. 67 See United States v. Pace, 10 F.3d 1106, 1113-14 (5th Cir. 1993). 27 We fail to see how the whole can be greater than the sum of its parts. There can be no error if the district court acted within its discretion. As the cumulative effect of such valid discretionary decisions cannot violate the Sixth Amendment, Babo Loe's argument fails.68
Babo Loe contends that the district court denied her right to compulsory process by quashing the subpoena duces tecum she had issued to the Corps. Under Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a district court has discretion to quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive.69 On appeal, Babo Loe must show that (1) the subpoenaed document is relevant, (2) it is admissible, and (3) that it has been requested with adequate specificity.70 We review the grant of a motion to quash for abuse of discretion.71 68 Babo Loe's reliance on United States v. Riddle, 103 F.3d 423, 434-35 (5th Cir. 1997), is misplaced. In that case, we held that the cumulative effect of actual errors—i.e., rulings in which the district court abused its discretion—prejudiced the defendant. We recognize that evidentiary rulings must be viewed in context. A decision to exclude evidence may, in light of prior evidentiary rulings, constitute an abuse of discretion where that same decision would not be erroneous if considered in isolation. Our holding today does not deny the path-dependent nature of individual evidentiary rulings. In this case, Babo Loe fails to contend or prove that a specific decision was itself erroneous in light of prior rulings. We hold that the cumulative effect of a series of valid discretionary judgments can not deny defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause. 69 Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 17(c) (2000). 70 See United States v. Arditti, 955 F.2d 331, 345 (5th Cir. 1992). 71 See id. 28 The district court quashed the subpoena on the basis that it lacked the requisite specificity. Babo Loe does not challenge the court's finding. Instead, she argues that the court should have modified, rather than quashed, the subpoena. This was not an abuse of discretion.72