Opinion ID: 853161
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Requirements for Emancipation

Text: What constitutes emancipation is a question of law, while whether an emancipation has occurred is a question of fact. Quillen v. Quillen, 659 N.E.2d 566, 576 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) adopted in part by Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 100 (Ind.1996). Emancipation cannot be presumed, but must be established by competent evidence by the party seeking emancipation. Id. Indiana Code section 31-16-6-6(b) provides: ( b) For purposes of determining if a child is emancipated under subsection (a)(1), if the court finds that the child: (1) has joined the United States armed services; (2) has married; or (3) is not under the care or control of: (A) either parent; or (B) an individual or agency approved by the court; the court shall find the child emancipated and terminate the child support. (emphasis added). The trial court determined that emancipation was a factual question dealing with parental control over a minor and found that Chad was emancipated because (1) Chad had not resided with his parents since the fall of 1996, (2) it was Chad's sole decision to move in with the Hembrees, (3) neither of Chad's parents had physical custody, care, or control of Chad as required by section 6(b)(3)(A), and (4) the Hembrees alone provided for Chad's care, control, and support. Although the Court of Appeals found Chad waived consideration of the emancipation issue by focusing his arguments on subsection (a)(3) rather than challenging the trial court's conclusion under subsection (b)(3), the Court of Appeals nevertheless found subsection (b)(3) controlling: Recognizing that past decisions have addressed the emancipation question in terms of a child placing himself beyond the parental custody and his ability to support himself without parental assistance, we nevertheless conclude that section 31-16-6-6(b)(3)(A) unambiguously requires only that a child not be under the care or control of either parent to be found emancipated under Indiana law. Dunson, 744 N.E.2d at 968-69. The Court of Appeals therefore affirmed the trial court's conclusion that Chad became emancipated by putting himself outside the care and control of his parents. We disagree with the Court of Appeals' holding that emancipation requires only that a child not be under the care or control of either parent. Rather, we reaffirm the longstanding view that emancipation requires that (1) the child initiate the action putting itself outside the parents' control and (2) the child in fact be self-supporting. Indiana Code section 31-16-1-2 states that [t]he purpose and policy of [31-16-6 is] to provide for child support. We believe the legislature's intent in enacting the emancipation statute is to require that parents provide protection and support for the welfare of their children until the children reach the specified age or no longer require such care and support. Reading subsection (b)(3) in isolation to permit emancipation of children who are no longer under parents' care or control conflicts with this underlying purpose. If this automatic emancipation is permitted, parents are permitted to divorce their children and avoid paying child support simply by sending their children to live with a third party or, worse yet, just throwing the child out of the house. In 1984, the legislature enacted what is now subsection (b), which provides that a child who joins the United States armed services, gets married, or is not under the care and control of either parent is emancipated. I.C. § 31-16-6-6. This language evolves from prior case law. [2] Green v. Green, 447 N.E.2d 605 (Ind.Ct.App.1983), trans. denied, involving the emancipation of a married daughter, was decided a year before the enactment of subsection (b). The court identified several situations in which a minor child may place itself beyond the control and support of its parent, including entering the military and voluntarily leaving the home of a parent and assuming responsibility for its own care. Id. at 609. Green stated, The salient feature of these situations is the child creates a new relationship between itself and its parent, relieving the parent from the responsibilities of support. Id. Green concluded that marriage of a minor child creates a similar relationship, and also emancipates the child. Id. at 610. We think the legislature intended to adhere to Green by enacting subsection (b), and did not intend to permit emancipation without the child's active participation. Thus we think the statutory phrase not under the care and control carries with it the implication that the child must be the one who creates a new relationship or voluntarily leaves home. Certainly, the other two circumstancesmarriage and service in the armed forcesapply only if the child takes affirmative action. The language of subsection (b)(3), viewed in isolation, leads to the conclusion that neither self-support nor initiative of the child is required for emancipation. Here, however, we think both stare decisis and legislative acquiescence support the view that subsection (b)(3) requires that the child must in fact be supporting itself to be emancipated. The idea that children must be supporting themselves to be emancipated has been a part of Indiana case law since at least 1952. Corbridge v. Corbridge, 230 Ind. 201, 208, 102 N.E.2d 764, 767 (1952) (child deemed emancipated because he was in military and could support himself, but if the child becomes unable to support itself, the father's duty [to support the child] revives). When the legislature enacts a statute in derogation of the common law, this Court presumes that the legislature is aware of the common law, and does not intend to make any change therein beyond what it declares either in express terms or by unmistakable implication. Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ind. 1993). As we observed in Durham ex rel. Estate of Wade v. U-Haul Int'l, 745 N.E.2d 755, 759 (Ind.2001): [T]here is no constitutional bar to revisiting judicial authority interpreting a statute. But if a line of decisions of this Court has given a statute the same construction and the legislature has not sought to change the relevant parts of the legislation, the usual reasons supporting adherence to precedent are reinforced by the strong probability that the courts have correctly interpreted the will of the legislature. The view that emancipation requires that the child place herself beyond the parents' control has been frequently assumed or restated since subsection (b)(3) was enacted. Subsequent case law has also maintained the self-supporting component of emancipation in interpreting the emancipation statute. See e.g., Young v. Young, 654 N.E.2d 880, 883 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied (Our inquiry under [subsection (b)(3) ] is whether the child is in fact supporting herself without the assistance of her parents.); Taylor v. Chaffin, 558 N.E.2d 879, 883 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) (Our inquiry under [subsection (b)(3) ] is not whether the child is capable of supporting herself but whether the child is in fact supporting herself without the assistance of her parents.). Indeed, in Quillen, 671 N.E.2d at 100, this Court adopted and incorporated by reference a Court of Appeals opinion interpreting subsection (b) to that effect. [3] The court there stated, To determine whether a child has placed herself beyond the control, custody and care of either parent, we consider whether the child is in fact supporting herself without the assistance of her parents. Quillen, 659 N.E.2d at 576. Elimination of self-support and the child's initiative as components of emancipation would be a radical departure from precedent. It would seem to permit parents to liberate themselves from support obligations by unilateral action. In view of the frequently recited judicial assumption that the statute retained these, we do not think the 1984 amendment effected such a drastic change by omission. Because we conclude that emancipation requires the child's initiative and the child's self-support, we find Chad was not emancipated. Although the trial court found that it was Chad's sole decision to live with the aunt, he was not in fact supporting himself. The trial court found that Chad has worked part-time jobs since living with Hembree, but his income has been less than $2,000 per year. The trial court also found that Chad has been dependent on his extended family since the Fall of 1996 for shelter, clothing, food, and parental supervision. We cannot say Chad was supporting himself. Although this case does not present the issue, we add that we do not mean to suggest that the child may create an obligation of the parents to provide financial support outside the home by refusing support available within the structure of the residence of the family or a single parent. Put another way, we are not suggesting that a child who leaves the familial residence to escape customary parental supervision is entitled to enlist the aid of a court in obtaining an order for support. If anything, the parents in such a case could insist that the child be ordered home to take advantage of the available support, subject to ordinary supervision.