Opinion ID: 798092
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims Against Defendants in their Individual Capacity

Text: 29 Defendants brought this interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's denial of their defense of qualified immunity. The denial of a claim of qualified immunity is an appealable final decision for the purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which vests the courts of appeals with jurisdiction over final decisions of the district courts, but only to the extent that the claim of qualified immunity turns on an issue of law. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). If the denial of qualified immunity turns on an issue of fact, this Court has no jurisdiction to resolve the claim. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995). Whether a particular job is entitled to First Amendment protection from patronage dismissals and the related question of whether the law was sufficiently unclear to entitle Defendants to qualified immunity are both legal questions to which this Court's jurisdiction extends. See Sowards v. Loudon County, Tenn., 203 F.3d 426, 435 (6th Cir.2000) (Whether political affiliation is an appropriate consideration for a government position is a question of law.); McCloud v. Testa, 97 F.3d 1536, 1546 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that whether the law was sufficiently clear was a question of law). 30 Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, `government officials performing discretionary functions are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' Heggen v. Lee, 284 F.3d 675, 686 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). Qualified immunity involves a two-step inquiry. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). First, the court must ask whether, [t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the [official's] conduct violated a constitutional right? Id. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. If the party asserting the injury was deprived of his constitutional rights, then the court must go on to ask whether that right was clearly established. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable [official] that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151. 31 Plaintiff's claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to establish a violation of § 1983, Plaintiff must show that Defendants deprived him of his rights secured by the Constitution while acting under color of state law. See Waters v. City of Morristown, Tenn., 242 F.3d 353, 358-59 (6th Cir.2001). Since the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976), patronage dismissals (i.e., dismissals for failure to support a particular party or candidate) have been, in general, unconstitutional. Caudill, 431 F.3d at 908. This rule represents the outcome of the Supreme Court's application of the strict scrutiny required by the First Amendment to the interests promoted by the party patronage system. See McCloud, 97 F.3d at 1543. Allowing the government to deny a benefit to an individual because that individual exercised his First Amendment rights presents two principal dangers. First, the inevitable tendency of a system of party patronage is to coerce employees into compromising their true political beliefs. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 513-14, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980). The second danger, which is related to the first, is that the denial of a government benefit on account of a person's political beliefs is in effect a penalty for holding those beliefs; permitting the state to impose such a penalty would constitute an unconstitutional condition that would allow the state to indirectly interfere with an employee's constitutional rights in a manner that it could not accomplish directly. Id. at 514, 100 S.Ct. 1287; see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972) ([E]ven though a person has no `right' to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely.). 32 Despite the costs of patronage dismissals, the Court in Elrod recognized that party affiliation may be an acceptable requirement for some types of government employment. Branti, 445 U.S. at 517, 100 S.Ct. 1287. While these positions have been referred to as policymaking or confidential, whether those labels appropriately fit the position under consideration is not the ultimate inquiry. Id. at 518, 100 S.Ct. 1287. Instead, the test is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved. Id. In answering this question, the Court looks not to the position as it was performed by the terminated employee, but instead to the inherent duties of the position, and to the duties that the new holder of that position is expected to perform. Faughender v. City of N. Olmsted, 927 F.2d 909, 913 (6th Cir.1991). 33 The first step in analyzing a claim of patronage dismissal requires asking whether the party asserting that he was wrongfully terminated has produced sufficient evidence for a jury to find that he was discharged because of his political beliefs or affiliations. Caudill, 431 F.3d at 909. If the terminated party makes this showing, then the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the terminated party's job was one for which political affiliation was an appropriate requirement. Id. 34 Defendants first argue that, as the Recreation Director, Plaintiff served at the pleasure of the City Council and could be dismissed for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all. Defendants' Br. at 32 (quoting Shelby v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 842 F.Supp. 999, 1006 (M.D.Tenn.1993), aff'd, 19 F.3d 1434 (6th Cir.1994)). This contention can be dismissed out of hand. The Supreme Court squarely rejected this argument in O'Hare Truck Service v. City of Northlake : The Court has rejected for decades now the proposition that a public employee has no right to a government job and so cannot complain that termination violates First Amendment rights.... A State may not condition public employment on an employee's exercise of his or her First Amendment rights. 518 U.S. 712, 716, 116 S.Ct. 2353, 135 L.Ed.2d 874 (1996); see also id. at 725-26, 116 S.Ct. 2353 (Government officials may indeed terminate at-will relationships . . . without cause; but it does not follow that this discretion can be exercised to impose conditions on expressing, or not expressing, specific political views.). If Plaintiff can demonstrate that he was terminated on account of his political beliefs, then the fact that he was an at-will employee who could have been terminated for other permissible reasons is irrelevant to the ultimate question of Defendants' liability. 35 Plaintiff has produced sufficient facts to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether his termination was politically motivated. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Jennings threatened him in an attempt to convince Plaintiff to cease supporting Lobertini in the mayoral election. Plaintiff also contends that Defendant Jennings stated in a workshop before the City Council that his recommendation to terminate Plaintiff was political. The temporal proximity between Defendant Jennings' assumption of power and Plaintiff's termination also bolsters Plaintiff's allegations. Defendant Jennings became the mayor on December 1, 2004, and Plaintiff was terminated on January 4, 2005. Plaintiff has created a genuine issue of fact as to Defendants' motives for terminating him; it is therefore immaterial that Plaintiff was an at-will employee. 36 For the first time at oral argument, Defendants Fannon and Hatmaker argued that, even if the record contained evidence that Defendant Jennings terminated Plaintiff for political reasons, summary judgment should be granted in favor of Defendants Fannon and Hatmaker because Plaintiff has not produced evidence that their decision to terminate Plaintiff arose from a motive to retaliate against him for his political activity. As an initial matter, we note that Defendants Fannon and Hatmaker have waived this argument by not including it in their brief. See Dillery v. City of Sandusky, 398 F.3d 562, 569 (6th Cir.2005). 37 In any event, Plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment. Plaintiff's allegation that Defendant Jennings stated in a workshop before the city council that the recommendation to terminate [Plaintiff] was political implies that Defendants Fannon and Hatmaker, whose votes were necessary in order to terminate Plaintiff, were aware of Defendant Jennings' opinion that Plaintiff should be terminated for his political beliefs. J.A. at 46. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants Fannon and Hatmaker voted to terminate [Plaintiff] from [his] position as [Recreation Director] due to [Plaintiff's] political beliefs and association. J.A. at 46. Moreover, Defendant Hatmaker states that [i]t has been the custom, practice and policy of the City Council of LaFollette to replace and/or renew all Department Heads after each City election; J.A. at 24, Defendant Fannon contends that [w]hen the new administration began . . . new Department Heads or `cabinet level' individuals were selected who would best serve the City Council in promoting, coordinating, [and] assisting to formulate and implement the policies for the City government. J.A. at 29. While certainly not conclusive, these statements each suggest that political considerations were the impetus for Plaintiff's termination, a fact which, if true, strengthens Plaintiff's claim that he was terminated on account of his political beliefs. These facts suffice to allow a reasonable jury to find that Defendants Hatmaker and Fannon voted to terminate Plaintiff in retaliation for protected First Amendment conduct. 38 The closer question in this appeal is whether Defendants have carried their burden of demonstrating that Recreation Director is a position for which political party affiliation is an appropriate consideration. See Branti, 445 U.S. at 518, 100 S.Ct. 1287. We conclude that, on the record before us, factual disputes prevent us from resolving this question as a matter of law. The nub of the problem is that the record discloses neither the inherent duties of the Recreation Director, nor the duties of the position as envisioned by Defendants. See Faughender, 927 F.2d at 913. 39 In his affidavit, Plaintiff baldly asserts that his position was not a policy making position; he claims that he did not make any policy or have discretion implementing the policies set by the mayor and city council, advise the council on policies, or assist the city council in formulating or have discretion in implementing the policies for the recreation department. J.A. at 46. Standing alone, Plaintiff's conclusory allegations, which provide no guidance as to what the Recreation Director actually does, might not carry significant weight. But Plaintiff's allegations do not stand alone; his position is reinforced by the City Charter and the Employee Handbook. 40 Under the doctrine announced in Rice v. Ohio Department of Transportation, the legislature's decision as to whether a particular job should be classified as political or nonpolitical is at least entitled . . . to `some deference.' 14 F.3d 1133, 1143 (6th Cir.1994) (quoting Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d 236, 246 (1st Cir.1986) (en banc)). Here, the State of Tennessee has arguably spoken to whether party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the job of Recreation Director. The City Charter, which is the law of Tennessee, states that [a]ll officers [which includes the Recreation Director] shall be elected with due regard to their qualifications and fitness and for the good of the public service, and without reference to . . . political party affiliation. J.A. at 68. Thus, the plain language of the City Charter, which the City Council is powerless to change, strongly suggests that Tennessee's position is that party affiliation is not a valid factor to consider in deciding whether the Recreation Director should be terminated. 41 The Employee Handbook also provides Plaintiff with some support for his contention that Recreation Director is not a position whose holder may be discharged on account of his political affiliations. While descriptions contained within an employee handbook typically will not definitively enumerate a particular position's responsibilities, the contents of the employee handbook are relevant to that inquiry. See Gonzalez v. Benavides, 712 F.2d 142, 149 (5th Cir.1983) (relying on information contained within an employee handbook); cf. Latham v. Office of Attorney Gen., 395 F.3d 261, 268 (6th Cir.2005) (analyzing the plaintiff's job description as a component of the Branti inquiry). In this case, the Employee Handbook locates policymaking authority with the Mayor, the City Council, and the City Administrator. This fact alone undoubtedly does not resolve the question of whether the Recreation Director is a policymaker for purposes of Branti and the cases interpreting it. Policymaking authority can be delegated from positions explicitly vested with that authority to subordinates, placing the subordinates within the exception to Branti 's rule forbidding patronage dismissals. See McCloud, 97 F.3d at 1557; Bicanic v. McDermott, 867 F.2d 391, 394 (7th Cir.1989) (upholding dismissal of parks and recreation coordinator notwithstanding the fact that the city had the last formal word on policymaking subjects). Yet notwithstanding the prospect that the City Council or City Administrator delegated functional policymaking authority to the Recreation Director, the fact that the Employee Handbook locates all policymaking authority outside of the Recreation Director's office supports Plaintiff's claim that his former position did not involve policymaking of the type that would make its holder terminable on account of his political beliefs. 42 The Employee Handbook also bolsters Plaintiff's claim by explicitly stating that [n]o person in the service of the City of LaFollette . . . shall be . . . removed . . . because of political opinions or affiliations. J.A. at 78. Thus, according to the City's own materials, political affiliation is not permissible to consider when deciding whether to terminate the Recreation Director. True, Defendants may be capable of redefining the position of Recreation Direction, provided that Defendants act with a good faith belief that such a transformation is necessary to implement [their] policies. Baker v. Hadley, 167 F.3d 1014, 1020 (6th Cir.1999) (quoting Faughender, 927 F.2d at 914). The record, however, contains no evidence that Defendants have redefined the position of Recreation Director. 43 Defendants argue that Plaintiff (1) managed his own department of the City, (2) made the departmental budget, (3) independently made significant employment decisions with respect to schedule, staff and discipline, (4) worked with the City Council in a close and confidential manner to formulate and implement policies for his department, (5) controlled the communications between his department and the City Council, (6) controlled communication between his department and the public, and (7) acted as the `alter ego' of the [City] and the City Council with respect to the day to day management of the recreation department. Defendants' Br. at 24. 44 We need not decide whether, if true, these allegations would make the Recreation Director removable for his political beliefs. We simply hold that, on this record, Defendants have not carried their burden of demonstrating that political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the Recreation Director, because the duties of the Recreation Director remain too ill-defined for us to adjudicate the issue as a matter of law. 3 See McCloud, 97 F.3d at 1558 ([I]n the situation where the inherent duties of the plaintiffs' positions are not apparent and the facts are not yet fully developed, it is not possible for us to decide, when reviewing in an interlocutory posture the denial of a motion for summary judgment, whether a defendant should be granted qualified immunity with respect to those positions.). Defendants' affidavits do not specifically speak to the position of Recreation Director, but instead refer in blanket terms to the functions of the heads of all four departments of the City. 4 Moreover, Defendants' allegations do not address the actual job functions of the Recreation Director in the specific and detailed manner that is necessary for us to decide the legal issue presented in this case. This record does not allow us to determine whether the Recreation Director performs solely ministerial tasks with no policymaking functions, Hager v. Pike County Bd. of Educ., 286 F.3d 366, 373 (6th Cir.2002), or whether the nature of the job of Recreation Director is inherently political, Hoard v. Sizemore, 198 F.3d 205, 214 (6th Cir.1999). Because the dispute in this case stems from obscurities in the facts, not the law, we must affirm the district court's denial of summary judgment in favor of Defendants at this stage in the litigation. McCloud, 97 F.3d at 1558. 45