Opinion ID: 741876
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The UM Act's Judicial Upbringing

Text: 23 The Mississippi Supreme Court has applied a relatively thick coat of judicial gloss to the UM Act. Four principles form the basis of our Erie guess. 3 24 First, the Mississippi Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that courts should liberally construe the provisions of the UM Act to effectuate the remedial and humanitarian purposes of the Act. 4 Second, uninsured motorist provisions within automobile insurance policies must be interpreted from the standpoint of the injured insured. 5 Third, if the provisions of the UM Act provide broader protection than the uninsured motorist policy, then the terms of the Act become part of the policy, providing the insured a statutory level of monetary protection. 6 Fourth, although the Mississippi Supreme Court has not always closed its judicial eye to the insurance law of other jurisdictions, 7 the court has more recently suggested that courts interpreting Mississippi uninsured motorist law should be guided by [the terms of Mississippi's] uninsured motorist statute, not the jurisprudence of foreign jurisdictions. 8 25 Based on these principles of uninsured motorist coverage, the Mississippi Supreme Court has stated that the overwhelming number of uninsured motorist insurance policy exclusion provisions that this Court has considered have been found to be void and against public policy. Payne, 603 So.2d at 347. 9 Of course this does not mean that every exclusion necessarily violates Mississippi public policy, for some provisions have survived challenges brought by Mississippi insureds. 10 Policy terms that meet the minimum requirements under the UM Act by definition cannot run counter to Mississippi public policy. See, e.g., Gillespie v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 343 So.2d 467, 470 (Miss.1977); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Chappell, 246 So.2d at 509 (interpreting the Safety Responsibility Act); see also Black v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 582 F.2d 984, 989 (5th Cir.1978). 26 II. DOES THE TERRITORIAL RESTRICTION IN ATLANTA SPECIALITY'S UNINSURED MOTORIST POLICY VIOLATE MISSISSIPPI PUBLIC POLICY AS EXPRESSED IN THE UM ACT? 27 With this background in mind, we now turn to the central question presented in this appeal: Did the Mississippi legislature intend, without explicitly saying so, to provide Mississippians worldwide uninsured motorist coverage? Or did the legislature import into the UM Act the territorial limits prescribed by the Safety Responsibility Act? We have looked at the statute, canvassed the case law and commentary in this area, and conclude that nothing in the language or purpose of the statute or the case law supports the conclusion that the UM Act expresses a policy judgment that Mississippians are entitled to worldwide uninsured motorist coverage. Instead, we find that the UM Act is subject to the same territorial restrictions found in the Safety Responsibility Act. 28 A. The UM Statute--Its Plain Meaning and its Purpose 29 A bedrock principle of statutory construction in Mississippi is that courts should strive to effectuate the intent of the legislature and the purpose of the legislation. See Easterling v. Howie, 179 Miss. 680, 176 So. 585 (1937). Legislative intent, the Mississippi Supreme Court has said, is the  'pole star of guidance.'  Evans v. Boyle Flying Serv., Inc., 680 So.2d 821, 825 (Miss.1996) (quoting Quitman County v. Turner, 196 Miss. 746, 18 So.2d 122, 124 (1944)). At the same time, we have been instructed to avoid deciding what the law ought to be and focus instead on the positive command of the statute. Wickline, 530 So.2d at 714 (emphasis added); see also Brown v. Hartford Ins. Co., 606 So.2d 122, 125 (Miss.1992). We must show due regard ... for the differing functions of the legislative and judicial branches of government. Such due regard prevents us from rewriting the statutes to reach a more preferable result under the pretext of interpretation. Cossitt, 541 So.2d at 442; see also Harris v. Magee, 573 So.2d at 655. 30 At the outset, we note that it is far from clear that if the UM Act does not include the territorial limitations of the Safety Responsibility Act, it must follow that the UM Act mandates worldwide uninsured motorist coverage. For one can plausibly argue that absent the territorial restriction, the UM Act is silent as to territorial scope and an insurer may therefore limit coverage to Mississippi alone. This conclusion would be in keeping with Daughdrill, 474 So.2d 1048, in which the Mississippi Supreme Court (interpreting the UM Act) held that a statute which enumerates and specifies the subjects or things upon which it is to operate, is to be construed as excluding from its effect those subjects not expressly mentioned or included under a general clause. Id. at 1051 (construing Southwest Drug Co. v. Howard Bros. Pharmacy, 320 So.2d 776 (Miss.1975)); see also Cossitt, 541 So.2d at 440 (applying the principle to the UM Act). 31 However, we do not believe that the Mississippi legislature intended to restrict uninsured motorist coverage to Mississippi alone. By referring to the limits of the Safety Responsibility Act, the Mississippi legislature plainly intended to import into the UM Act the protections afforded by the Safety Responsibility Act (which provides coverage for the United States and Canada). See Belk v. Bean, 247 So.2d 821, 828 (Miss.1971) (Where statutes refer specifically to another statute, it specifically embodies the statute referred to into the adopting statute. The effect of the adopting of an earlier statute is to incorporate the entire section of the earlier statute, the same as if recopied in the later statute.). 32 The district court's conclusion that the plain terms and purpose of the UM Act provide worldwide uninsured motorist coverage rests on two grounds. First, the district court reasoned that because the UM Act did not explicitly state that uninsured motorist coverage is subject to a territorial restriction, [t]he Court will not read provisions into the UM Act which were not included by the legislature. Second, the district court concluded that the term limits in the UM Act refers only to the monetary, and not territorial, limits in the Safety Responsibility Act. The district court reached this conclusion based on the ordinary meaning of the word limits in insurance policies and the fact that limits in the Safety Responsibility Act appears after the territorial restriction in that statute. From these two premises, the district court held that [i]f the insurance companies are opposed to providing [worldwide uninsured motorist] coverage, their remedy lies with the Mississippi legislature and not with this Court. We are not persuaded. 33 The district court's first rationale simply proves too much. Just because the Mississippi legislature did not explicitly include a territorial restriction in the UM Act does not mean that uninsured motorist coverage should extend to automobile accidents occurring around the world. The district court itself read into the UM Act the monetary limits found in the Safety Responsibility Act even though those monetary limits do not appear on the face of the UM Act. 34 Moreover, rather than support such a construction of the UM Act, the plain terms of the UM Act in fact belie the contention that the Act represents an across-the-board policy judgment that Mississippians shall receive worldwide uninsured motorist coverage. As we have pointed out, the UM Act incorporates the limits of the Safety Responsibility Act. The Safety Responsibility Act distinguishes between policies issued to owners and those issued to operators. § 63-15-43(2)(a) & (b) (owners); § 63-15-43(3) (operators). Notably, although not stated as such in the section applicable to owners of automobiles, subsection (3) of the Safety Responsibility Act imports the territorial limits applicable in subsection (2)(b). This reference to territorial limits in subsection (3) unambiguously suggests that uninsured motorist coverage for policies issued to operators of automobiles is subject to the territorial restriction in the Safety Responsibility Act. Accordingly, we find it highly implausible (indeed, there is not even a hint) that the Mississippi legislature intended to establish a policy of worldwide coverage for owners of automobiles, but limit coverage to specified territories in operator liability policies--especially because the plain terms of the Safety Responsibility Act provide that owner and operator policies are subject to exactly the same limitations. 35 More to the point, to the extent that the district court's conclusion can be read to apply to uninsured motorist claims brought under owner and operator policies, the district court's reasoning writes the words territorial limits out of § 63-15-43(3). This is so for obvious reasons: If, as the district court concluded, the UM Act is not at all subject to the territorial limitations of the Safety Responsibility Act, yet the Safety Responsibility Act explicitly states that operator policies are subject to the territorial limits in § 63-15-43(2)(b), then the territorial limits language of § 63-15-43(3) is rendered nugatory. We decline to read such critical terms out of the Safety Responsibility Act. 36 The district court's second rationale fails as well because the district court erroneously concluded that the term limits only refers to the monetary limits in the Safety Responsibility Act. Based on the meaning and location of the word limits, the district court found, by negative implication, that the Mississippi legislature intended through the UM Act to provide Mississippians worldwide uninsured motorist coverage. We conclude that the Mississippi legislature, through nothing more than silence, could not have intended to provide Mississippians such broad-based uninsured motorist coverage. 37 By all accounts, the UM Act was enacted to fill the gaps left by the Safety Responsibility Act--nothing more and nothing less. As we have said, the Mississippi legislature intended to provide Mississippians injured by uninsured motorists a floor of coverage; the Safety Responsibility Act provides that floor. Nothing in Mississippi case law or commentaries suggests the Mississippi legislature, through the UM Act, addressed the problem of Mississippians injured by uninsured motorists around the world. Notwithstanding the tragic and compelling facts presented in this case, our duty under Erie prevents us from finding worldwide uninsured motorist coverage under the UM Act. 38 In short, we find that the only construction of the UM Act which properly accounts for subsection (3) in the Safety Responsibility Act and recognizes the gap-filling role of the UM Act is that the term limits in the UM Act refers to the territorial and monetary limitations in the Safety Responsibility Act. The case law bolsters our conclusion. B. The Case Law 39 We have found no indication in Mississippi case law that the UM Act requires insurers to provide Mississippi insureds worldwide uninsured motorist coverage. We reach this conclusion by analyzing the territorial restriction in the Boatners' policy in light of the four principles we have extracted from Mississippi's uninsured motorist case law.
40 The Mississippi Supreme Court has instructed us to avoid exceptions or exemptions from coverage under the UM Act. See In re Guardianship of Lacy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 649 So.2d 195, 197 (Miss.1995); Garrett, 487 So.2d at 1323. At the same time, however, we simply cannot rewrite the UM Act to include situations not expressly provided for or contemplated under the guise of liberally construing the statute in order to accomplish its designed purpose. Cossitt, 541 So.2d at 440; see also Medders v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 623 So.2d 979, 989 (Miss.1993); Washington v. Georgia Am. Ins. Co., 540 So.2d 22, 25-26 (Miss.1989). 41 We reiterate that neither the plain language of nor the purpose behind the UM Act suggests that worldwide uninsured motorist coverage represents Mississippi public policy. The Mississippi legislature was simply not concerned with this problem, and the Boatners have provided no persuasive authority to the contrary. The result urged by the Boatners would require us, under the rubric of liberal construction, to extract from the UM Act that which does not exist. 42
43 This principle of uninsured motorist law essentially turns on the Boatners' expectations with regard to coverage for Bradley Boatner's death. The Mississippi Supreme Court has repeatedly said that the Mississippi legislature intended to put first accident insureds in as good a position as they would have been had the uninsured motorist purchased automobile liability insurance pursuant to the terms of the Safety Responsibility Act. 11 Accordingly, our task is to determine whether the Boatners could have expected coverage under their policy if the owner or operator of the flatbed truck was insured. 44 The answer to this question is plain enough--the Boatners could not have expected coverage under the circumstances of this case because the Safety Responsibility Act provides coverage only for accidents occurring in the United States and Canada. See, e.g., Spradlin, 650 So.2d at 1387-88 (declining to find UM Act coverage for shooting that did not involve the operation, use, or maintenance of an automobile when such coverage would not have been available under the Safety Responsibility Act). Thus, both the district court's and the Boatners' reading of the UM Act as providing broader (worldwide) coverage than the Safety Responsibility Act does not square with Mississippi principles of divining the intent behind the UM Act. 45
46 Both the district court and the Boatners rely on language from the Mississippi Supreme Court's decision in Lowery, 285 So.2d 767, which states that 47 Whenever bodily injury is inflicted upon [a] named insured or insured members of his family by the negligence of an uninsured motorist under whatever conditions, locations, or circumstances, any of such insureds happen to be in at the time, they are covered by uninsured motorist liability insurance .... 48 Id. at 773 (quoting Mullis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 So.2d 229, 233 (Fla.1971)). From this statement, the district court and the Boatners conclude that the UM Act provides for worldwide uninsured motorist coverage and that therefore Atlanta Speciality's territorial restriction is void because it provides less protection than that contemplated by the UM Act. 12 We cannot agree. 49 To begin with, we hesitate to hold that this language is a permanent fixture of Mississippi uninsured motorist law because the language (1) comes from an out-of-state court's interpretation of its own uninsured motorist statute and (2) was quoted, for illustrative purposes, in a series of quoted passages from other jurisdictions. Nonetheless, even if we assume that this language is a correct statement of Mississippi law, we do not subscribe to the district court's or the Boatners' interpretation of that language. We agree with Atlanta Speciality that the Lowery court was not speaking of worldwide uninsured motorist coverage; rather, the court was suggesting--as the plain language of the Lowery opinion states--that covered insureds  'may be pedestrians at the time of ... injury, they may be riding in motor vehicles of others or in public conveyances and they may occupy motor vehicles (including Honda motorcycles) owned by but which are not insured automobiles of [the] named insured.'  Lowery, 285 So.2d at 773 (quoting Mullis, 252 So.2d at 233). 50
51 Finally, although the Mississippi Supreme Court has not always ignored the view among other American jurisdictions on questions of uninsured motorist law (see supra note 7), we have focused our analysis on and grounded our conclusion in the plain terms of the UM Act as well as the Mississippi Supreme Court's interpretation of it.