Opinion ID: 3033697
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Additional Supremacy Concerns

Text: Because of the arguably protected character of the speech at issue, we would next assess whether the state statute is preempted because Congress would “prefer[ ] the costs inherent in a jurisdictional hiatus to the frustration of national labor policy which might accompany the exercise of state jurisdiction.” Sears, 436 U.S. at 203. For essentially the same reasons detailed above in the primary jurisdiction analysis, the risk that a state court applying AB 1889 could “misinterpret[ ] . . . federal law,” id., is nonexistent in this case. Not only is there no identicality of claims, but the subject matter of an AB 1889 suit is so far removed from the NLRA’s primary focus — the determination of what constitutes an unfair labor practice — that any rationale for Garmon preemption is absent. Sears itself provides a strong analogy. The Court, after noting the state interest in hearing trespass claims, identified a clear potential overlap between the NLRB’s jurisdiction and that of the state court: “[T]he state court was obligated to decide [whether] the trespass was not actually protected by federal law, a determination which might entail an accommodation of Sears’ property rights and the Union’s § 7 rights. In an unfair labor practice proceeding initiated by the Union, the Board might have been required to make the same accommodation.” Id. at 201. The Court further noted that the trespass at issue was arguably protected by the NLRA, whereas previ- 4 There is no merit to the Chamber of Commerce’s claim that the California statute provides an additional remedy for NLRA violations. The statute’s damages provisions are intended to remedy the misuse of state funds under the statute, regardless of whether any NLRA violation has occurred. 12222 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE v. LOCKYER ously recognized exceptions to Garmon preemption did not “involve[ ] protected conduct.” Id. at 204. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the risk that regulation of trespass might impermissibly trench upon the NLRB’s jurisdiction over the speech rights of union members was too unlikely to justify usurpation of the state’s prerogative. There was no “significant risk of prohibition of protected conduct,” so the Court was “unwilling to presume that Congress intended the arguably protected character of the [regulated] conduct to deprive the California courts of jurisdiction to entertain Sears’ trespass action.” Id. at 207. Here, I have noted the important state interest in determining how its funds are spent. Even if the exercise of this state prerogative could have some effect on the arguably protected advocacy rights of employers, given the nature and functioning of the statute — which has no concern for whether the speech at issue was protected by the NLRA, but only for where the money to fund it came from — there is no “significant risk of prohibition of protected conduct.” Id. Indeed, the state interest is so strong that we cannot “presume that Congress intended the arguably protected character of the [regulated] conduct to deprive” California of the ability to control the use of its own funds in this manner. Id.