Opinion ID: 2101622
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The Voluntary Intoxication Instruction

Text: At the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, the judge instructed the jury as follows: Voluntary intoxication is a defense only to the extent that it negates specific intent. Appellant complains that the instruction shifted the burden of proof to him, because it did not state where the burden of proof for the defense lay, and was in close proximity to the instruction that placed the burden of proof of insanity upon him. He also complains that the instruction failed to define specific intent. The instruction is not erroneous or incomplete on this basis. In Melendez v. State (1987), Ind., 511 N.E.2d 454, this Court held that while voluntary intoxication is entitled to the appellation of defense, it operates by negating the essential element of intent. If the jury is properly instructed upon the substantive crimes charged, including their intent elements, and the burden is maintained upon the State to prove such crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, an instruction which places the issue of intoxication before the jury is sufficient. Taken as a whole, the instructions, including those defining the intent elements of murder as intentional and knowing, were sufficient, and no burden was thereby shifted to appellant. We find no likelihood that this instruction rendered the trial process of determining guilt unreliable or fundamentally unfair.