Opinion ID: 1856212
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: second theory of recovery

Text: SIC contends that equitable estoppel precludes the Department's denying any obligation because, in its duty to supervise industrials and NDIGC, the Department impliedly promised protection of $30,000 for each certificate of indebtedness of an industrial loan and investment company. In the language of SIC's petition, the Department knowingly concealed material facts regarding the financial stability and management of Commonwealth, a situation unknown to SIC and its assignor, SSS. According to SIC, the Department's implied promise to insure an industrial's certificates of indebtedness, coupled with concealment of Commonwealth's condition, induced SIC to forbear obtaining alternate deposit insurance. As expressed in L.J. Vontz Constr. Co. v. State, 230 Neb. 377, 382, 432 N.W.2d 7, 11 (1988): [A] court must examine and construe a petition's essential and factual allegations by which the plaintiff requests relief, rather than the legal terminology utilized in the petition or the form of a pleading. The doctrine of equitable estoppel is not a cause of action, but is a judicial device to preserve a right already acquired, not generate a new right. Warren v. Papillion School Dist. No. 27, 199 Neb. 410, 259 N.W.2d 281 (1977); Clark & Enersen, Hamersky, S., B. & T., Inc. v. Schimmel Hotels Corp., 194 Neb. 810, 235 N.W.2d 870 (1975); State v. Bardsley, 185 Neb. 629, 177 N.W.2d 599 (1970). Rather than allegations of equitable estoppel, SIC's second theory of recovery contains allegations that the Department knowingly concealed material facts about Commonwealth, SIC reasonably relied on the ... Department's ... concealment of material facts, and [a]s a direct result of [SIC's] reasonable reliance upon ... the concealment of Commonwealth's condition by the State and the Department, SIC was injured. Conceal means to hide, secrete, or withhold from knowledge of others; to withhold from utterance or declaration; to cover or keep from sight; to hide or withdraw from observation, cover or keep from sight, or prevent discovery. Christopher v. Evans, 219 Neb. 51, 361 N.W.2d 193 (1985). The word conceal pertains to affirmative action likely to prevent or intended to prevent knowledge of a fact and has reference to some advantage to the concealing party or a disadvantage to some interested party from whom the fact is withheld. Christopher v. Evans, supra . State v. Copple, 224 Neb. 672, 691, 401 N.W.2d 141, 155 (1987). In Nelson v. Cheney, 224 Neb. 756, 762, 401 N.W.2d 472, 476-77 (1987), this court specified the elements of fraud by concealment: (1) that the defendant concealed or suppressed a material fact; (2) that the defendant had knowledge of this material fact; (3) that this material fact was not within the reasonably diligent attention, observation, and judgment of the plaintiff; (4) that the defendant suppressed or concealed this fact with the intention that the plaintiff be misled ... (5) that the plaintiff was reasonably so misled; and (6) that the plaintiff suffered damage as a result. Examining SIC's petition in terms of essential and factual allegations, we conclude that SIC's cause of action against the Department is based on the Department's alleged concealment of Commonwealth's unsound financial condition. While § 21-17,141 provides that certain parties, including the Department, may be held liable only for willful, wanton, or fraudulent acts in connection with the NDIGC Act, the State Tort Claims Act precludes the Department's liability based on misrepresentation or deceit. See § 81-8,219(1)(d). Does § 21-17,141, which provides for the Department's liability under the Nebraska Depository Institution Guaranty Corporation Act, waive the State's common-law immunity from suit? Waiver [of sovereign immunity] will only be found `where stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.' Wiseman v. Keller, 218 Neb. 717, 720, 358 N.W.2d 768, 770 (1984) (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974)). Section 21-17,141 is not a waiver of common-law governmental immunity. Section 21-17,141 imposes tort liability on certain defendants, many of whom are not protected by sovereign immunity, for conduct which is willful, wanton, or fraudulent and provides a shield from liability which might otherwise be imposed for negligent conduct. Tort liability of the State, pursuant to § 21-17,141, is controlled by the State Tort Claims Act, which grants the right to sue the state for its negligent or wrongful act or omission. See § 81-8,210(4). Under § 81-8,219(1)(d) of the State Tort Claims Act, the State is not liable for misrepresentation or deceit. Fraud by concealment is a form of deceit and conduct for which the State is immune from liability under the State Tort Claims Act. SIC's Second Theory of Recovery fails to state a cause of action against the Department. The district court correctly sustained the Department's demurrer.