Opinion ID: 3022392
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Malachy

Text: We have jurisdiction to review final orders of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). There are, however, certain situations in which our jurisdiction to review final orders of removal is limited or eliminated. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(A)-(C), 1158(b)(2)(D). If the issues presented in a petition for review of a final order involve constitutional claims or questions of law, our jurisdiction is never limited or 3 The BIA’s decision also found that Nicola and Sean’s motion did not meet any of the exceptions to the timeliness requirement. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). -5- eliminated. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).4 On the other hand, if an alien is removable for having committed one of the offenses enumerated in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C),5 we lack 4 On May 11, 2005, the President signed into law the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005). The REAL ID Act amended the INA and provided that the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction to review all final orders of removal that raise constitutional claims and questions of law. 5 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C) Orders against criminal aliens Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code [28 USCS § 2241], or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title [28 USCS §§ 1361 and 1651], and except as provided in subparagraph (D), no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in section 212(a)(2) or 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) [crimes of moral turpitude, violation of laws relating to controlled substances, conviction of 2 or more offenses with aggregate sentences of confinement of 5 years of more, involvement in drug trafficking, involvement in prostitution and o t h e r u n la w f u l c o m m e r c ia li z e d v ic e , immunization from prosecution for a crime committed in the U.S., severe violations of religious freedom by foreign government officials, significant trafficking in persons, money laundering, and other enumerated offenses.], or any offense covered by section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) [multiple criminal convictions] for which both predicate offenses are, without regard to their date -6- jurisdiction to review a final order of removal that does not raise constitutional claims or questions of law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)-(D). In the present case, the BIA did not specifically find that Malachy was removable for having committed one of the offenses enumerated in subsection (C). Rather, the BIA found Malachy removable based on his engagement in terrorist activities. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B).6 Thus, whether subsection (C) limits our jurisdiction depends on whether the jurisdictional bar of subsection (C) requires the final order of removal to be based on one of subsection (C)’s enumerated offenses. We address this issue as one of first impression for our Court. Our sister circuits have addressed the application of the jurisdictional bar of subsection (C), and of similar jurisdictional provisions, e.g., § 440(a) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), and § 309(c)(4)(G) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), amended by the Act of Oct. 11, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-302, 110 Stat. 3656 (1996). Some courts have held that the final order of removal does not need to be grounded in one of the enumerated offenses for the jurisdictional bar to apply. See Fernandez-Bernal v. Attorney General, 257 F.3d 1304, 1310 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that of commission, otherwise covered by section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) [moral turpitude]. 6 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B) Terrorist activities Any alien who is described in subparagraph (B) or (F) of section 212(a)(3) [8 USCS § 1182(a)(3)] is deportable. -7- jurisdictional bar of subsection (C) is not dependent upon the grounds of removal being based on one of the enumerated offenses); Lopez-Elias v. Reno, 209 F.3d 788, 793 (5th Cir. 2000) (same); Abdel-Razek v. INS, 114 F.3d 831, 832 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that jurisdictional bar of AEDPA § 440(a) is not dependent upon the final order of removal referring to one of the provision’s enumerated offenses) Other courts, however, have required the final order of removal to be based on one of the enumerated offenses. See Yousefi v. INS, 260 F.3d 318, 325 (4th Cir. 2001) (requiring a deportation order to be based on an offense enumerated in § 309(c)(4)(G) for that provision’s jurisdictional bar to apply); Xiong v. INS, 173 F.3d 601, 608 (7th Cir. 1999) (prohibiting the INS from arguing that the alien committed an enumerated offense on appeal in support of a jurisdictional bar because the final order of removal was based on an unenumerated offense); Choeum v. INS, 129 F.3d 29, 39 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding it doubtful that Congress intended “deportable for reason of” in AEDPA § 440(a) to be the equivalent of “potentially susceptible to being deported by reason of”). We conclude that Congress intended that the clear language of the statute be utilized. Thus, we read the jurisdictional bar of subsection (C) to apply when the actual basis for the final order of removal was the alien’s commission of one of the enumerated offenses. See Yousefi, 260 F.3d at 325. See also Xiong, 173 F.3d at 608; Choeum, 129 F.3d at 39. We are convinced that the approach taken by the First, Fourth and Seventh Circuits with regard to the jurisdictional bar for review of final orders of removal is the proper approach. We hold that for purposes of the jurisdictional bar found in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), an alien is not “removable for reason of having committed [an enumerated] criminal offense” unless the final order of removal is grounded, at least in part, on one of those enumerated offenses. -8- In this case, the BIA found Malachy removable because he engaged in terrorist activities, which is not an offense enumerated in subsection (C). Therefore, subsection (C) does not limit our jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of removal, and we will give full review to his petition.