Opinion ID: 1609293
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Initiation of Adversary Judicial Proceedings and Subsequent Critical Stages

Text: As correctly noted in Hattaway, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only after the commencement of adverse judicial criminal proceedings. In the plurality opinion of Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 1882, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972), the Supreme Court held the right to counsel does not attach prior to the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment. In an oft-quoted passage, the Court explained why the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach until this point in the proceedings. The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere formalism. It is the starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal justice. For it is only then that the government has committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law. It is this point, therefore, that marks the commencement of the criminal prosecutions to which alone the explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are applicable. Kirby, Id. at 689-90, 92 S.Ct. at 1882. The Court has never waivered from this holding, and it has been reiterated time and again in subsequent jurisprudence. [3] Even though the Sixth Amendment right to counsel may have attached, however, it does not exist to protect the defendant at all post-attachment proceedings. The right exists only during those post-attachment, pre-trial confrontations which can be considered critical stages. In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1931, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), the Court described a critical stage as a critical pretrial confrontation[] where the results might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial to a mere formality. See also United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 2298, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984) (A critical stage is a pretrial proceeding where the accused [is] confronted, just as at trial, by the procedural system, or by his expert adversary, or by both.) (quoting United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 310, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 2574, 37 L.Ed.2d 619 (1973)). Interrogation of the defendant, when occurring after the attachment of the right to counsel, is a critical stage of the proceedings entitling a defendant whose Sixth Amendment right has attached to the assistance of counsel during the interrogation. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629-30, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 1407-08, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986) (citations omitted) (The arraignment [under Michigan law] signals `the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings' and thus the attachment of the Sixth Amendment, thereafter, government efforts to elicit information from the accused, including interrogation, represent `critical stages' at which the Sixth Amendment applies.); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 400-01, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1240, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964). In sum, a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel only after adversary criminal proceedings have been initiated against him, and then, only at specific, critical stages of the proceedings. Consequently, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is only an issue where adversary judicial criminal proceedings have begun against defendant and where defendant lacks assistance of counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings. [4] Turning to the right to counsel protected under La. Const. Art. I, Sec. 13, the Hattaway court held the right to counsel under this constitutional provision attaches no later than a defendant's initial court appearance or first judicial hearing and thereafter applies to those pre-trial proceedings which would be considered critical stages under the jurisprudence interpreting the Sixth Amendment. It is clear interrogation of the defendant, when occurring after the attachment of the right to counsel, is a critical stage of the proceedings, or under Louisiana law, a stage of the proceedings entitling defendant to the presence of an attorney. We need not decide today however, whether we were correct in Hattaway that an initial appearance under La.C.Cr.P. Art. 230.1 marks the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings. Even if defendant's right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment or La. Const. Art. I, Sec. 13 attached at his initial appearance, we find defendant made a valid waiver of his right to counsel prior to making the statement at issue herein.