Opinion ID: 615103
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Detainment

Text: Having determined the search warrant was supported by probable cause, we 5 Based on the issues presented on appeal as well as the totality of the circumstances, probable cause existed for issuance of the search warrant. Therefore, we need not alternatively address the Leon good-faith doctrine, other than to agree with the district court the officers executing the search warrant had an objective good-faith belief the warrant was properly executed by a neutral magistrate. See United States v. Campbell, 603 F.3d 1218, 1225-26 (10 th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 351 (2010). -18- address Mr. Stout’s contention the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements. In appealing the district court’s denial, Mr. Stout contends officers violated his Fourth Amendment right against seizure when they arrested him without an arrest warrant by pointing guns at him as he voluntarily exited the house, making him kneel on the ground, handcuffing him, and placing him in a patrol vehicle while they searched his residence, even though, as he alleges, nothing established he had committed or was committing a crime at that time. Our standard of review on this issue is the same as previously set forth in our discussion of the validity of the search warrant. See Basham, 268 F.3d at 1203. Applying our standard of review, we reject Mr. Stout’s argument for the reasons discussed hereafter, as well as those contained in the district court’s Order and Opinion and the federal magistrate’s Report and Recommendation. As the district court and federal magistrate explained, a search warrant for contraband founded on probable cause gives “the police officer an easily identifiable and certain basis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity justifies a detention of that occupant” and otherwise “implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.” Summers, 452 U.S. at 704-05 (emphasis added). Since Summers, the -19- Supreme Court, in Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005), has extended this holding, stating, “police officers have a ‘categorical’ authority to detain persons found on premises subject to a lawful search warrant for ‘contraband’ materials, incidental to the officers’ execution of the warrant.” See Denver Justice & Peace Comm. v. City of Golden, 405 F.3d 923, 929 (10 th Cir. 2005) (relying on Muehler, 544 U.S. at 98). “Summers makes clear that when a neutral magistrate has determined police have probable cause to believe contraband exists, the connection of an occupant to a home alone justifies a detention of that occupant.” Muehler, 544 U.S. at 99 n.2 (quotation marks omitted). Applying Summers and Muehler to the case at hand, it is plain the search warrant in this case carried with it the authority to detain Mr. Stout as an occupant during the search of the house, and the fact he was not observed committing a crime at the time did not prevent authorities from detaining him. See United States v. Ritchie, 35 F.3d 1477, 1483 (10 th Cir. 1994). For this reason, the fact Mr. Stout was not allowed to leave does not make it an illegal arrest. We also reject Mr. Stout’s contention his handcuffing by authorities while they detained him constituted an illegal arrest. Where a search warrant authorizes a search for weapons, an “inherently dangerous situation” arises which extends the governmental interest “in not only detaining but using handcuffs” during the detention. Muehler, 544 U.S. at 99-100 & n.2. In this case, Mr. Stout left a -20- house subject to a search warrant for firearms, ammunition, and explosives, so his handcuffed detention was justified by a substantial governmental interest in minimizing the risk of harm to authorities who reasonably believed he might present some danger to the officers during the course of the entire search. Similarly, officers had the authority to order Mr. Stout to kneel or get down prior to handcuffing him because “[s]uch an order is a reasonable means of effecting Summer’s aims of preventing flight and minimizing the risk of harm by the ‘officers routinely exercising unquestioned command of the situation.’” United States v. Sanchez, 555 F.3d 910, 919 (10 th Cir. 2009) (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 703) (holding order for suspect to get down was reasonable). For these reasons, Mr. Stout was not illegally arrested or detained when officers pointed their guns at him, told him to kneel, and handcuffed him. Turning to Mr. Stout’s detention in the law enforcement vehicle where he made statements to Officer Cox, “[i]t is well established that police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question.” United States v. Eckhart, 569 F.3d 1263, 1275 (10 th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). “Instead, the protections set out by the Supreme Court in Miranda only apply when an individual is subject to custodial interrogation.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). -21- In this case, even if Mr. Stout’s initial placement in the vehicle rose to a custodial interrogation, Mr. Stout’s Constitutional rights were not violated because Officer Cox administered his Miranda rights before asking any incriminating questions, including his initial two questions as to whether any firearms were inside the house and concerning law enforcement hearing about pipe bombs in the residence, which he asked as officers began to enter a residence where such dangerous criminal activity was suspected. 6 In turn, Mr. Stout intelligently waived those rights before providing any inculpatory answers, and therefore, Officer Cox did not violate his Constitutional rights. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457-58 (1994). Moreover, once officers finished the search and found firearms, ammunition, and bomb-making materials in Mr. Stout’s residence, law enforcement had probable cause to continue to detain him and question him. See United States v. Ray, 973 F.2d 840, 843 (1992). As a result, no Fourth or Fifth Amendment violations occurred and the district court did not err in dismissing Mr. Stout’s motion to suppress his statements on those grounds. 6 Because Officer Cox read Mr. Stout his Miranda rights before asking these initial questions, we need not address whether to apply the narrow exception outlined in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 659 n.8 (1984). Under Quarles, a police officer may question a suspect in custody before giving a Miranda warning “without running afoul of the Constitution” if the questions arise out of “an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public from any immediate danger.” United States v. DeJear, 552 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10 th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). -22-