Opinion ID: 2070338
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: issues

Text: Defendant's final contention is that the imposition of the thirty year sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 18, of the Indiana Constitution. This Court will not impose a sentence different from that authorized by the jury unless it is grossly disproportionate to the nature of the offense or unquestionably excessive. Hall v. State (1978), 371 N.E.2d 700, 701. In the instant case, there was evidence that the defendant aimed a handgun at a service station attendant, and ripped the station's wallet from a chain attached to his person. Under those facts, imposition of the jury's verdict of thirty years does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.    Generally, the constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment are proscriptions of atrocious or obsolete punishments and are aimed at the kind and form rather than the duration. Hollars v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 229, 286 N.E.2d 166 and cases there cited. `These are primarily legislative considerations, and we are not at liberty to set aside a conviction and sentence because, on the record, they seem severe. Blue v. State (1946), 224 Ind. 394, 67 N.E.2d 377; Mellot v. State (1942), 219 Ind. 646, 40 N.E.2d 655. `It is only when a criminal penalty is not graduated and proportioned to the nature of the offense, or where it is grossly and unquestionably excessive that this provision of the Constitution is intended to apply. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793. Such is not the case here.' 286 N.E.2d at 170. Beard v. State, (1975), 262 Ind. 643, 648-49, 323 N.E.2d 216, 219. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. GIVAN, C.J., and DeBRULER, HUNTER and PIVARNIK, JJ., concur.