Opinion ID: 853754
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Indiana Constitutional and Common Law Precedent

Text: Confusion over double jeopardy is not new. Over twenty years ago, this Court addressed punishment for multiple offenses under the Fifth Amendment and reviewed several of our recent decisions which appear[ed] to be in conflict. Elmore v. State, 269 Ind. 532, 533, 382 N.E.2d 893, 894 (1978). As we recently noted in Games v. State, there is no authority from this Court establishing an independent state double jeopardy protection based upon an analysis of the Indiana Constitution. 684 N.E.2d 466, 473 n. 7 (Ind.1997), modified on reh'g, 690 N.E.2d 211 (Ind.1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 98, 142 L.Ed.2d 78 (1998). [5] Specifically, there has been, and remains, widespread confusion in the decisional law and in the commentary as to what constitutes the same offense, and under what circumstances the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked. Although I concede that today's case is decided in the light of several relatively recent precedents stating or assuming that multiple punishments for the same offense implicate the constitutional right, this notion lacks foundation in either constitutional text, constitutional principle or solid authority. First as a matter of syntax, Article I, § 14 does not appear to deal with multiple punishments at all. As this Court recently observed in another context, the cardinal principle of constitutional construction [is] that words are to be considered as used in their ordinary sense. Ajabu v. State, 693 N.E.2d 921, 929 (Ind.1998) (quoting Tucker v. State, 218 Ind. 614, 670, 35 N.E.2d 270, 291 (1941)). The relevant portion of Article I, § 14 provides that [n]o person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense. As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent in Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 798, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994): `[t]o be put in jeopardy' does not remotely mean `to be punished,' so by its terms this provision prohibits, not multiple punishments, but only multiple prosecutions. [6] Second, Indiana authority does not provide a sound footing for applying double jeopardy to multiple punishment cases. Indeed it is very clear that some of the seminal cases cited for the proposition that multiple punishments implicate Article I, § 14 of the Indiana Constitution stand for precisely the opposite conclusion. The majority suggests that multiple punishment challenges under Article I, § 14 first began appearing in the 1930s. See 717 N.E.2d at 43 n. 25. Of the eleven cases cited by the majority, seven neither mention double jeopardy nor refer to either the federal or the state constitution. [7] Three other cases recite a defendant's invocation of double jeopardy protection, but the Court's analysis turns on common law principles. [8] The remaining case rejects the defendant's claim that constitutional double jeopardy prohibits separate convictions for drawing and aiming a firearm, citing Blockburger and rules of statutory construction. [9] This Court itself did not explicitly state that multiple punishments in one proceeding violated Article I, § 14 until Bevill v. State, 472 N.E.2d 1247, 1253 (Ind.1985), which was clearly incorrect in citing earlier authority for this assertion. To understand this point, begin with Kokenes v. State, 213 Ind. 476, 13 N.E.2d 524 (1938), which the majority cites as an example of a multiple punishment double jeopardy case. That case held that convictions for a greater and lesser included offense (armed robbery and robbery) could not stand. It is not at all clear however, that Kokenes is a constitutional double jeopardy case under either the federal or state constitution. First, although Kokenes cites some double jeopardy cases dealing with subsequent prosecutions, there is no mention in Kokenes of either constitution. The only mention of the term jeopardy is to point out that because defendant was convicted of robbery and armed robbery in the same case there was no former jeopardy. [10] Id. at 480, 13 N.E.2d at 526 (emphasis in original). Nonetheless, the robbery conviction was thrown out in Kokenes because a defendant may not be convicted of committing a robbery and committing a robbery while armed, where the same identical robbery is involved. Id. at 479, 13 N.E.2d at 526. The Court thus spoke only in common law language, not in constitutional terms, and invoked a rule that bars the dual convictions while in the very same opinion rejecting a claim of former jeopardy. The authorities cited by Kokenes also demonstrate that it was purely a common law holding. For example, Jackson v. State, 14 Ind. 327, 328 (1860), was cited for the proposition that the state cannot split up one crime and prosecute it in parts. Jackson made no mention of the constitution and cites only common law authorities. Kokenes also cited State v. Elder, 65 Ind. 282 (1879), which recognized the common law roots of the former jeopardy doctrine and concluded that: No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense is a common-law principle, which, we believe, is incorporated into the constitutions of each of the States which compose the United States. This provision, however, has not been interpreted and applied uniformly throughout all the States. In some it has been held to mean no more than the common law principle. Id. at 284. The Elder court summarized the then already confusing state of the law in a set of principles, all of which dealt with whether a subsequent prosecution could be brought. It supported its summary of the law with a series of citations to the distinguished treatises of its day that very clearly dealt only with the problem of subsequent prosecutions [11] and a long list of cases from Indiana and elsewhere. The first two cited Indiana cases are Jackson, 14 Ind. at 327, and Bruce v. State, 9 Ind. 206 (1857). Neither of these cases made any mention of either the state or federal constitution. Each held a second prosecution barred by reason of a prior prosecution, citing the rule that an earlier prosecution for the same offense would bar a second. In 1969, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969), for the first time held the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause applicable to state criminal proceedings. In the same year Pearce announced the federal doctrine that the Fifth Amendment applied to multiple punishments. Three years later in Thompson v. State, 259 Ind. 587, 290 N.E.2d 724 (1972), this Court explicitly rejected a claim that double jeopardy applied to multiple punishments, citing both the Fifth Amendment and Art. I, § 14 of the Indiana Constitution: The Double Jeopardy clause is assurance that the State will not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an accused for the same offense. U.S. CONST. amen. V and XIV; IND. CONST. Art. 1, § 14; See Benton v. Maryland, (1969), 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707; Green v. United States, (1957), 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 61 A.L.R.2d 1119, 2 L.Ed.2d 199; Armentrout v. State, (1938), 214 Ind. 273, 15 N.E.2d 363. Since Appellant has been subjected to only one judicial proceeding for the offenses charged, his claim of double jeopardy is inappropriate. 259 Ind. at 591-92, 290 N.E.2d at 726 (emphasis in original). Thompson nonetheless held the dual conviction impermissible, not as a matter of federal or state constitutional double jeopardy doctrine, but rather as a matter of state law: [w]e hold that before the court may enter judgment and impose sentence upon multiple counts, the facts giving rise to the various offenses must be independently supportable, separate and distinct. Id. at 592, 290 N.E.2d at 727. I take it that this formulation as applied to multiple punishments amounts to essentially the same thing as today's majority's more precise way of putting itthere should be no reasonable possibility that the same set of facts supports two convictions. The Court next used the term double jeopardy in the course of an opinion rejecting the defendant's claim that his convictions for asportation and kidnaping were error because the two were separate offenses. Neal v. State, 266 Ind. 665, 366 N.E.2d 650 (1977). It is only when two offenses require proof of the same fact or act that double jeopardy considerations bar a prosecution for both. Id. at 667, 366 N.E.2d at 651. The Court did not cite either constitution for this proposition. Elmore, 269 Ind. at 532, 382 N.E.2d at 893, seems to be the first case to deal with multiple punishments solely as a constitutional double jeopardy issue. Elmore, citing Pearce, viewed the issue solely as a Fifth Amendment problem and made no mention of the state constitution. Elmore expressly and correctly observed that Thompson was incorrect insofar as it dealt with the federal constitutional standard. But Elmore did not address the question whether Thompson remained a correct statement of Indiana common law. Elmore dealt with a single trial that produced convictions for both theft and conspiracy to commit theft. The Court of Appeals, invoking the common law doctrine of merger, held that the two convictions merged. On transfer this Court took the view, which was inconsistent with both venerable [12] and then recent [13] authorities, that [t]oday, the problem of when a trial court may impose multiple punishments upon convictions on multiple counts at a single trial is a problem controlled largely by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 533, 382 N.E.2d at 894. Applying Blockburger, the Court found that the convictions were proper because they were not based on the same offense. Elmore noted that earlier Indiana authorities had developed a same evidence [14] test to secure the rights found in the double jeopardy provision of the state constitution [15] and observed that this Court's previous holdings on multiple punishments were often consistent with federal double jeopardy even if they did not seem to derive from it. Id. at 536, 382 N.E.2d at 896. Because Fifth Amendment double jeopardy had been held applicable to state criminal proceedings in Benton, Elmore concluded that [n]ow that we are bound by the federal Double Jeopardy Clause, it more necessary than ever that we be in line with federal standards. 269 Ind. at 537, 382 N.E.2d at 896. Insofar as Elmore has any implication for the state constitution, it turns on the proposition that because the federal Double Jeopardy Clause applies to the states, the state doctrine (whether common law or constitutional) should be conformed to federal constitutional law. This is contrary to current state constitutional law in Indiana and other states. To be sure, we have often adopted federal constitutional rules in interpreting their state counterpart. See, e.g., Ajabu, 693 N.E.2d at 927 (adopting the rule of Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986), as to self incrimination). But we frequently find Indiana judicial precedent, history or other factors to dictate a different result under the state provision, even where the federal and state constitutions are textually similar or even identical. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77 (Ind.1995) (unreasonable search or seizure); Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72 (Ind.1994) (equal privileges and immunities); Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954 (1993) (free speech). Indeed, all of the opinions in this case tread this independent path. The first significant [16] post- Elmore authority to refer expressly to Article I, § 14 of the Indiana Constitution appears to be Bevill, 472 N.E.2d at 1247, which cited Thompson as the Indiana authority, paired with Pearce, in referring to the prohibitions of the Indiana Constitution, Article I, § 14 and the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution against multiple punishments for the same offense. Id. at 1253. It is of course correct that Pearce stated that doctrine as to the Fifth Amendment. But Thompson, which dealt with convictions in the same trial for possessing and dealing the same drugs, held unequivocally that double jeopardy had nothing to do with multiple punishment. Only after Bevill was decided in 1985, do we find cases referring to double jeopardy and citing state and federal constitutions in dealing with multiple punishments. And in every instance, as Games noted, there is no suggestion that there is any difference between the two constitutions. From this line of cases, I take it that notwithstanding the somewhat suspect [17] announcement in Pearce that the federal Double Jeopardy Clause bars multiple punishments, there is no such holding in Indiana except to the extent that a number of cases in the last two decades, bound by federal constitutional doctrine as it existed before the U.S. Supreme Court decision in U.S. v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993), sometimes recited this federal rule, usually citing Pearce. Although these more recent cases purported to resolve claims under both the state and federal constitutions, they did so without any discussion as to how or where or why this newfound state rule arose. In no case was anyone contending that there was a difference between the two constitutions. Because federal constitutional law is binding on this Court, these cases' reference to the state constitution was pure dicta. These cases, of which Bevill is an example, appropriately cited Pearce for the proposition that multiple punishments implicate federal double jeopardy protection. But to the extent they cited any authority, for example Thompson, for the same proposition under the Indiana Constitution, they did so inaccurately, and contrary to the express holding of Thompson. The sum of this is that, although there is a great deal of dicta on the point, no case from this Court has considered whether the Indiana Constitution raises a bar higher than or different from the Fifth Amendment. And as far as I can see, in no case until Games conformed Indiana's understanding of federal double jeopardy to Dixon, did the Court note any potential for difference.