Opinion ID: 2513963
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Harmless Trespasses to Chattels May be Prevented

Text: Defendant Hamidi used Intel's server in violation of the latter's demand to stop. This unlawful use of Intel's system interfered with the use of the system by Intel employees. This misconduct creates a cause of action. [I]t is a trespass to damage goods or destroy them, to make an unpermitted use of them, or to move them from one place to another. (Prosser & Keeton on Torts (5th ed. 1984) Trespass to Chattels, § 14, p. 85, fns. omitted & italics added.) [T]he unlawful taking away of another's personal property, the seizure of property upon a wrongful execution, and the appropriation of another's property to one's own use, even for a temporary purpose, constitute trespasses, although a mere removal of property without injuring it is not a trespass when done by one acting rightfully. (7 Speiser et al., American Law of Torts (1990) Trespass, § 23:23, p. 667 (Speiser) fns. omitted & italics added.) Regardless of whether property is real or personal, it is beyond dispute that an individual has the right to have his personal property free from interference. There is some division among authorities regarding the available remedy, particularly whether a harmless trespass supports a claim for nominal damages. The North Carolina Court of Appeal has found there is no damage requirement for a trespass to chattel. (See Hawkins v. Hawkins (1991) 101 N.C.App. 529, 400 S.E.2d 472, 475.) A trespass to chattels is actionable per se without any proof of actual damage. Any unauthorized touching or moving of a chattel is actionable at the suit of the possessor of it, even though no harm ensues. (Salmond & Heuston, The Law of Torts (21st ed. 1996) Trespass to Goods, § 6.2, p. 95, fns. omitted.) Several authorities consider a harmless trespass to goods actionable per se only if it is intentional. (Winfield & Jolowicz on Torts (10th ed. 1975) Trespass to Goods, p. 4 03 (Winfield & Jolowicz); Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (17th ed.1995) ¶ 13-159, p. 703.) The Restatement Second of Torts, section 218, which is less inclined to favor liability, likewise forbids unauthorized use and recognizes the inviolability of personal property. However, the Restatement permits the owner to prevent the injury beforehand, or receive compensation afterward, but not to profit from the trespass through the remedy of damages unrelated to actual harm, which could result in a windfall. ( Thrifty-Tel, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1569, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 468; Whang, supra, 37 San Diego L.Rev. at p. 1223.) The interest of a possessor of a chattel in its inviolability, unlike the similar interest of a possessor of land, is not given legal protection by an action for nominal damages for harmless intermeddlings with the chattel... . . . Sufficient legal protection of the possessor's interest in the mere inviolability of his chattel is afforded by his privilege to use reasonable force to protect his possession against even harmless interference.  (Rest.2d Torts, § 218, com. e, pp. 421-422, italics added.) Accordingly, the protection of land and chattels may differ on the question of nominal damages unrelated to actual injury. The authorities agree, however, that (1) the chattel is inviolable, (2) the trespassee need not tolerate even harmless interference, and (3) the possessor may use reasonable force to prevent it. Both California law and the Restatement authorize reasonable force regardless of whether the property in question is real or personal. (Civ.Code, § 51; Rest.2d Torts, § 77.) The law's special respect for land ownership supports liability for damages even without actual harm. (Speiser, supra, § 23:1, p. 592.) By contrast, one who suffers interference with a chattel may prevent the interference before or during the fact, or recover actual damages (corresponding to the harm suffered), but at least according to the Restatement, may not recover damages in excess of those suffered. But the Restatement expressly refutes defendant's assertion that only real property is inviolable. From the modest distinction holding that only victims of a trespass to land may profit in the form of damages exceeding actual harm, defendant offers the position that only trespasses to land may be prevented. The law is to the contrary; numerous cases have authorized injunctive relief to safeguard the inviolability of personal property. The law favors prevention over posttrespass recovery, as it is permissible to use reasonable force to retain possession of a chattel but not to recover it after possession has been lost. (See 1 Dobbs, The Law of Torts (2001) §§ 76, 81, pp. 170,186; see also Deevy v. Tassi (1942) 21 Cal.2d 109, 118-119, 130 P.2d 389.) Notwithstanding the general rule that injunctive relief requires a showing of irreparable injury (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Pleading, § 782, p. 239), Witkin also observes there are exceptions to this rule where injunctive relief is appropriate; these include repetitive trespasses. ( Id., § 784, p. 242.) The first case cited in that section, Mendelson v. McCabe (1904) 144 Cal. 230, 77 P. 915 ( Mendelson ), is apposite to our analysis. In entering McCabe's property, Mendelson exceeded the scope of the consent he received to do so. McCabe had granted Mendelson the right to pass through his property on condition that Mendelson close the gates properly, which he did not do. ( Mendelson, supra, 144 Cal. at pp. 231-232, 77 P. 915.) McCabe did not allege that any actual damage had been caused by the acts of [Mendelson] ... in leaving the gates open. ( Id. at p. 232, 77 P. 915.) After finding that Mendelson planned to continue his conduct over McCabe's objection, we authorized injunctive relief. ( Id. at pp. 233-234, 77 P. 915.) Our analysis in Mendelson applies here as well. The right to an injunction is not always defeated by the mere absence of substantial damage from the acts sought to be enjoined. The acts of the plaintiff in leaving the gates open, if persisted in as he threatened, will constitute a continual invasion of the right of the defendant to maintain the gates.... Moreover, the only remedy, other than that of an injunction, for the injury arising from such continued trespass, would be an action against the plaintiff for damages upon each occasion when he left the gates open. The damage in each case would be very small, probably insufficient to defray the expenses of maintaining the action not recoverable as costs. Such remedy is inadequate and would require numerous petty suits, which it is not the policy of the law to encourage. ( Id. at pp. 232-233, 77 P. 915.) Our decision thus noted that injunctive relief was proper, regardless of actual injury, (1) if it is necessary to protect the trespassee's right to control his property, or (2) if suits for damages are impractical, because no individual suit would be worthwhile. Accordingly, we reiterated the rule that `[a] trespass of a continuing nature, whose constant recurrence renders the remedy at law inadequate, unless by a multiplicity of suits, affords sufficient ground for relief.' ( Mendelson, supra, 144 Cal. at p. 233, 77 P. 915.) Both Mendelson grounds support an injunction here. Injunction is a proper remedy against threatened repeated acts of trespass ... particularly where the probable injury resulting therefrom will be `beyond any method of pecuniary estimation,' and for this reason irreparable. [5] ( Uptown Enterprises v. Strand (1961) 195 Cal.App.2d 45, 52,15 Cal.Rptr. 486; see also ibid, at p. 52, 15 Cal.Rptr. 486 [an otherwise lawful entry for the purpose of harassing the owner, giving his business a bad reputation ... or unjustifiably interfering with the business relations between him and his patrons is unauthorized, wrongful and actionable].) Although Mendelson and Uptown Enterprises concerned real property, the principles of safeguarding a party's possessory interest in property and of not encouraging repetitive litigation apply no less to trespasses to chattels. Accordingly, several courts have issued injunctive relief to prevent interference with personal property. In 1996, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court considered the claim of plaintiff Tillman, who sought to enjoin the unwanted delivery of a newspaper onto his property. ( Tillman, supra, 224 A.D.2d 79, 648 N.Y.S.2d 630.) He offered no specific critique of the newspaper's content, observing only `[t]here is no reason that we have to clean up [defendant's] mess.' ( Id. at p. 632.) Citing Rowan, Martin, and Lloyd, the court rejected the defendants' argument that there is nothing a homeowner can do to stop the dumping on his or her property of pamphlets or newspapers, no matter how offensive they might be, and instead upheld Tillman's right to prevent the mail's delivery, regardless of whether his objection was due to the quantity (volume) or quality (content) of the messages. ( Tillman, at p. 636.) In authorizing injunctive relief, the Tillman court found no need to quantify the actual damage created by the delivery; it merely noted that the homeowner should not be forced either to allow such unwanted newspapers to accumulate, or to expend the time and energy necessary to gather and to dispose of them. ( Ibid. ) Subsequent courts have extended this policy to the delivery of e-mail as well. The CompuServe court followed Tillman in authorizing an injunction to prevent the delivery of unwanted e-mail messages. ( CompuServe, supra, 962 F.Supp. 1015.) The majority summarily distinguishes CompuServe and its progeny by noting there the plaintiff showed, or was prepared to show, some interference with the efficient functioning of its computer system. (Maj. opn., ante, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 42, 71 P.3d at p. 304.) But although CompuServe did note the impairment imposed by the defendant's unsolicited email, this was not part of its holding. Just before beginning its analysis, the court summarized its ruling without mentioning impairment. [T]his Court holds that where defendants engaged in a course of conduct of transmitting a substantial volume of electronic data in the form of unsolicited e-mail to plaintiffs proprietary computer equipment, where defendants continued such practice after repeated demands to cease and desist, and where defendants deliberately evaded plaintiffs affirmative efforts to protect its computer equipment from such use, plaintiff has a viable claim for trespass to personal property and is entitled to injunctive relief to protect its property. ( CompuServe, supra, 962 F.Supp. at p. 1017.) The cited criteria apply fully to Hamidi's conduct. Likewise, the conclusion of CompuServe's analysis fully applies here: Defendants' intentional use of plaintiffs proprietary computer equipment exceeds plaintiffs consent and, indeed, continued after repeated demands that defendants cease. Such use is an actionable trespass to plaintiffs chattel. ( Id. at p. 1027.) Post- CompuServe case law has emphasized that unauthorized use of another's property establishes a trespass, even without a showing of physical damage. Although eBay appears unlikely to be able to show a substantial interference at this time, such a showing is not required. Conduct that does not amount to a substantial interference with possession, but which consists of intermeddling with or use of another's personal property, is sufficient to establish a cause of action for trespass to chattel. ( eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc. (N.D.Cal.2000) 100 F.Supp.2d 1058, 1070.) [6] While the eBay decision could be read to require an interference that was more than negligible, ... this Court concludes that eBay, in fact, imposes no such requirement. Ultimately, the court in that case concluded that the defendant's conduct was sufficient to establish a cause of action for trespass not because the interference was `substantial' but simply because the defendant's conduct amounted to `use' of Plaintiffs computer. ( Oyster Software, Inc. v. Forms Processing, Inc. (N.D.Cal., Dec. 6, 2001, No. C-00-0724 JCS) 2001 WL 1736382 at .) An intruder is not entitled to sleep in his neighbor's car, even if he does not chip the paint. Hamidi concedes Intel's legal entitlement to block the unwanted messages. The problem is that although Intel has resorted to the cyberspace version of reasonable force, it has so far been unsuccessful in determining how to resist the unwanted use of its system. Thus, while Intel has the legal right to exclude Hamidi from its system, it does not have the physical ability. It may forbid Hamidi's use, but it cannot prevent it. To the majority, Hamidi's ability to outwit Intel's cyber defenses justifies denial of Intel's claim to exclusive use of its property. Under this reasoning, it is not right but might that determines the extent of a party's possessory interest. Although the world often works this way, the legal system should not.