Opinion ID: 2507609
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Stipulation to Factual Basis

Text: Decisions of the United States Supreme Court acknowledge that a defendant's sentence may be increased above the statutory maximum based upon  `facts ... admitted by the defendant.'  ( Cunningham, supra, 127 S.Ct. at p. 865, quoting Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 303, 124 S.Ct. 2531.) As discussed above, defendant's plea of no contest constituted an admission to the elements of the charged offenses only, and not to any additional aggravating circumstances. The Attorney General contends, however, that defendant's stipulation to the factual basis for the plea as described by the prosecutor constituted an admission to the aggravating circumstance that defendant took advantage of a position of trust in committing the offense. We disagree. Before accepting a guilty or no contest plea pursuant to a plea agreement in a felony case, the trial court is required to determine that a factual basis for the plea exists. (§ 1192.5; People v. Holmes (2004) 32 Cal.4th 432, 440-442, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 678, 84 P.3d 366.) The purpose of the requirement is to protect against the situation where the defendant, although he realizes what he has done, is not sufficiently skilled in law to recognize that his acts do not constitute the offense with which he is charged. [Citation.] Inquiry into the factual basis for the plea ensures that the defendant actually committed a crime at least as serious as the one to which he is willing to plead. ( People v. Watts (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 173, 178, 136 Cal.Rptr. 496.) A defendant is not required to personally admit the truth of the factual basis of the plea, which may be established by defense counsel's stipulation to a particular document, such as a police report or a preliminary hearing transcript. ( People v. Holmes, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 436, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 678, 84 P.3d 366.) The factual basis as stated by the prosecutor does not clearly establish an aggravating circumstance in the present case. The prosecutor indicated that defendant committed the offenses against Brandon B.including the count on which defendant received the upper term sentencewhen he took the victim to a bathroom located in a park. The prosecutor did not state that Brandon B. had been entrusted to defendant's care. The prosecutor did state regarding victim Zachary L. that the offenses occurred while Zachary was in [defendant's] daughter's care at the daycare, but defendant did not receive an upper term sentence on the counts involving Zachary L. and, in any event, the prosecutor did not specify what defendant's role was in relation to his daughter's daycare operation. Furthermore, nothing in the record indicates that defendant, either personally or through his counsel, admitted the truth of the facts as recited by the prosecutor. Defense counsel stated that she had discussed the facts of the case at length with defendant and that she had allowed defendant to view a portion of the tapes of interviews of the victims, which had been provided to the defense in discovery. As noted earlier, when asked by the trial court whether she believed there was a sufficient factual basis for the no contest pleas, defense counsel stated, I believe the People have witnesses lined up for this trial that will support what the D.A. read in terms of the factual basis, and that's what they'll testify to. Indeed, counsel was careful to state that she agreed that witnesses would testify to the facts as recited by the prosecutor; she did not stipulate that the prosecutor's statements were correct. Under the circumstances of this case, defense counsel's stipulation to the factual basis cannot reasonably be construed as an admission by the defendant sufficient to satisfy the Sixth Amendment requirements established in Cunningham, supra, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 856, 166 L.Ed.2d 856. [5] The Attorney General contends that People v. Wallace (2004) 33 Cal.4th 738, 749-750, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 96, 93 P.3d 1037, stands for the proposition that a defendant who has pleaded guilty or no contest may not contest the version of events presented in the factual basis recited for the plea. In Wallace, a magistrate dismissed a charge of willful discharge of a firearm after the preliminary hearing, finding the evidence was insufficient. Subsequently, the charge was refiled and the defendant pleaded no contest. In a later prosecution, the defendant's prior conviction for discharging a firearm was alleged as a strike under the Three Strikes law. The trial court dismissed the strike allegation based upon the magistrate's conclusion in the prior case that the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing had been insufficient to support the charge. We held that the trial court erred in viewing the defendant's conviction as one `in form rather than substance' and in dismissing the allegation of the prior conviction under the Three Strikes law. (33 Cal.4th at p. 749, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 96, 93 P.3d 1037.) We explained: In light of defendant's express stipulation as to the factual basis of his plea and his acknowledgement that his offenses constituted strikes, the trial court was not free to look beyond defendant's no contest plea ... nor could the trial court properly give dispositive weight to the magistrate's evaluation of the evidence at some earlier period in the prior proceeding. ( Id. at p. 750, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 96, 93 P.3d 1037.) We did not hold that such a stipulation would be dispositive in all circumstances, and indeed explicitly declined to decide whether a trial court could strike a prior-conviction allegation based upon proof of factual innocence of the prior offense, and if so, what types of evidence the court may consider for this purpose. ( Wallace, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 754, fn. 3, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 96, 93 P.3d 1037.) Wallace does not stand for the broad proposition asserted by the Attorney General; namely, that a defendant's stipulation to a factual basis constitutes a binding admission for all purposes.