Opinion ID: 4317843
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Other Felony Oﬀense Enhancement

Text: Next, all defendants argue the court improperly imposed the other felony oﬀense enhancement because it also imposed the stolen ﬁrearm enhancement and the traﬃcking enhance- 4The quoted text is the present wording of Application Note 8(A). While not verbatim to the text we considered in Podhorn, it is substantially similar. Nos. 17-3084, 17-3127, 17-3396, 17-3559 13 ment. Because the Guidelines do not expressly preclude adding these enhancements together in appropriate cases, and each enhancement addresses a diﬀerent aspect of defendants’ conduct in this case, the district court did not err. Defendants ﬁrst suggest Application Note 13(D) to § 2K2.1 expressly prohibits application of both the other felony offense and traﬃcking enhancements. Note 13(D) reads: In a case in which three or more ﬁrearms were both possessed and traﬃcked, apply both subsections (b)(1) and (b)(5). If the defendant used or transferred one of such ﬁrearms in connection with another felony offense (i.e., an oﬀense other than a ﬁrearms possession or traﬃcking oﬀense) an enhancement under subsection (b)(6)(B) also would apply. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.13(D). It is true that Note 13(D) “expressly prohibits” imposing enhancements under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) and § 2K2.1(b)(5) if the other felony oﬀense is the traﬃcking oﬀense itself. United States v. Johns, 732 F.3d 736, 740 (7th Cir. 2013). For that reason, in Johns, we held that the court erred because it applied both enhancements “based on the same conduct—[the defendant’s] transfer of the ﬁrearms to the CI with knowledge that the CI was going to resell the ﬁrearms.” Id. Critically, however, “the guidelines do not prohibit simultaneous application of the traﬃcking and other-felony [offense] enhancements” when the other felony oﬀense is an offense other than ﬁrearms possession or traﬃcking. United States v. Rodriguez, 884 F.3d 679, 681 (7th Cir. 2018); see also United States v. Grove, 725 F. App’x 252, 254 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v. Truitt, 696 F. App’x 391, 394 (11th Cir. 2017); 14 Nos. 17-3084, 17-3127, 17-3396, 17-3559 United States v. Sweet, 776 F.3d 447, 451 (6th Cir. 2015). Here, defendants possessed ﬁrearms in relation to a felony oﬀense “other than a ﬁrearms possession or traﬃcking oﬀense”: burglary of the cargo train. Thus, unlike in Johns, only § 2K2.1(b)(5) applied based on defendants’ sale of the ﬁrearms; § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) was imposed due to the burglary. Additionally, defendants maintain the court’s application of the other felony oﬀense enhancement constituted impermissible double counting because the stolen ﬁrearms were already used to apply the stolen ﬁrearm enhancement. While they point to no Guidelines provision or commentary that suggests a court cannot impose both enhancements, they emphasize that in Vizcarra, we held that “double counting is generally permissible.” 668 F.3d at 519 (emphasis added). They thus maintain that double counting may be impermissible even when not expressly prohibited by the Guidelines. They suggest that other circuits—which, as we said in Vizcarra, “allow double counting unless the competing guidelines provisions address identical harms caused by the defendant’s conduct”—provide a roadmap for this supposed exception. See 668 F.3d at 526 & n.8 (citing United States v. Gallegos, 613 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Coldren, 359 F.3d 1253, 1256 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. De La Cruz Suarez, 601 F.3d 1202, 1220 (11th Cir. 2010)). 5 Defendants’ argument is not persuasive. Our holding in Vizcarra was clear, well-reasoned, and based on the text and 5Defendants argue the government waived the opportunity to respond to this argument because it did not address the out-of-circuit cases cited by Lewis in its response brief. We disagree. In its response brief, the government responded to this precise argument. It explained why it believed the various enhancements accounted for distinct harms. Nos. 17-3084, 17-3127, 17-3396, 17-3559 15 structure of the Guidelines. Indeed, nothing in our subsequent case law suggests any sort of exception. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 884 F.3d at 680 (“[D]ouble counting is permitted unless the text of the guidelines or the authoritative commentary expressly prohibits it. Thus, to ﬁnd that the court erred …, we must conclude that the guidelines expressly prohibit it.” (emphasis added)). Moreover, the “competing guidelines provisions” at issue here do not “address identical harms caused by the defendant’s conduct.” See Vizcarra, 668 F.3d at 526. To be sure, all three enhancements relate to the same stolen guns. However, the court imposed the three enhancements to address distinct conduct and harm: the § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) enhancement applied because defendants possessed ﬁrearms that happened to be stolen (regardless of whether defendants were involved in the theft of the ﬁrearms); the § 2K2.1(b)(5) enhancement applied because defendants traﬃcked ﬁrearms; and the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement applied because the defendants committed another felony oﬀense, the burglary. See United States v. Hill, 563 F.3d 572, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he [other felony oﬀense] enhancement in this case was based on conduct that was distinct from [the defendant’s] simple possession of the ﬁrearms, namely the burglary.”). Indeed, Guidelines commentary explicitly instructs that the other felony oﬀense enhancement does apply when a defendant acquires a ﬁrearm during a burglary: Subsection[] (b)(6)(B) … appl[ies] … in a case in which a defendant who, during the course of a burglary, ﬁnds and takes a ﬁrearm, even if the defendant did not engage in any other conduct with that ﬁrearm during the course of the burglary…. In [this] case[], application of 16 Nos. 17-3084, 17-3127, 17-3396, 17-3559 subsection[] (b)(6)(B) … is warranted because the presence of the ﬁrearm has the potential of facilitating another felony oﬀense…. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(B). Defendants argue Note 14(B) does not apply to the particular burglary at issue here. They emphasize that defendants did not set out to steal ﬁrearms, that the stolen ﬁrearms were boxed up for distribution, and that the ﬁrearms were not readily accessible and available for use. Defendants thus contend that applying the other felony enhancement would not serve the underlying rationale of Note 14: the risk of stolen ﬁrearms facilitating another oﬀense. This argument is not persuasive. “Application Note 14(B) is unequivocal about when the § 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement should apply: when a defendant, ‘during the course of a burglary, ﬁnds and takes a ﬁrearm, even if the defendant did not engage in any other conduct with that ﬁrearm.’” United States v. Krumwiede, 599 F.3d 785, 790 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(B)); see also United States v. Johnston, 533 F.3d 972, 976 (8th Cir. 2008) (“Stealing a ﬁrearm during the course of a burglary triggers application of the [other felony oﬀense] enhancement.”). Put simply, as the district court concluded, “there’s nothing in the application note that suggests [defendants’ proﬀered] limitation.” In sum, the stolen ﬁrearm, traﬃcking, and other felony offense enhancements were all appropriate, there was no impermissible double counting, and the court did not err.