Opinion ID: 2429685
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: pecuniary profit

Text: Appellant argues the trial judge erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict on the charge of engaging children in sexually explicit conduct for use in visual or print media in violation of Ark.Code Ann. § 5-27-303. Appellant moved for a directed verdict on the basis the state had not proven the photographs were taken for pecuniary profit. The trial judge ruled pecuniary profit was not an element of the crime. Section 5-27-303 provides in pertinent part: (a) Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any child to engage in, or who has a child assist any other person to engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual or print medium depicting such conduct shall be guilty of a Class C felony for the first offense and a Class B felony for subsequent offenses. At issue is the definition of producing as used in the statute. Producing is defined at Ark.Code Ann. § 5-27-302(3) (1987) as producing, directing, manufacturing, issuing, publishing, or advertising for pecuniary profit. Appellant contends pecuniary profit modifies producing, directing, manufacturing, issuing, publishing, and advertising. Appellant contends that to read the statute in any other way results in the absurd consequence that only advertising not for pecuniary profit is prohibited. Appellant also points to the other sections in Act 499 of 1979 as indicating the legislature's intent to limit the statute to the production of visual or print media for pecuniary profit. The state argues that the rules of statutory construction require a limiting clause to be restrained to the last antecedent, unless the subject matter requires a different construction. Sutherland Stat. Const. § 47.33 (5th Ed.). Therefore, the state argues since there is no comma preceding the phrase for pecuniary profit, the phrase only modifies advertising and pecuniary profit is not an element of the crime which applies to producing, directing, manufacturing, issuing or publishing. The definition at issue was originally enacted pursuant to Act 499 of 1979. The definition of producing in Act 499 contained a comma after the word advertising and before the phrase for pecuniary profit. The pertinent provision of Act 499 reads: `Producing' means producing, directing, manufacturing, issuing, publishing, or advertising, for pecuniary profit. As originally codified at Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-4202 (Supp. 1985) the definition of producing also contained a comma after advertising and before for pecuniary profit. Thus, it is clear to us that the legislature intended pecuniary profit to modify not just advertising, but also producing, directing, manufacturing, issuing, and publishing. Additional authority for determining the legislature intended for pecuniary profit to modify all the preceding terms is provided by House Bill 1471 of 1987. In H.B. 1471, the General Assembly authorize[d] and empower[ed] the Arkansas Statute Revision Commission to revise, codify, and publish a code of all the statute law of the State of Arkansas of a general and permanent nature, but without changing the substance or meaning of any provision of the statutes and after approval and adoption by the Arkansas General Assembly[.] [Emphasis added.] The result was the Arkansas Code of 1987. H.B. 1471 also provided in pertinent part: SECTION 4. (b) All acts, codes, and statutes, and all parts of them and all amendments to them of a general and permanent nature in effect on December 31, 1987, are repealed unless: . . . . (2) Omitted improperly or erroneously as a consequence of compilation, revision, or both, of the laws enacted prior to the Code, including without limitation any omissions that may have occurred during the compilation, revision, or both, of the laws comprising the Code; .... . . . . (c) In the event one of the exceptions in subsection (b) should be applicable, the law as it existed on December 31, 1987, shall continue to be valid, effective, and controlling. Removal of the comma changed the substance and meaning of section 41-4202. Obviously, the absence of the comma after the word advertising was an omission as contemplated under Section 4(b) of H.B. 1471. Therefore, the law as it existed on December 31, 1987, is controlling. The law as it existed on December 31, 1987, contained a comma after the word advertising. Thus, for pecuniary profit is a required element of proof under the statute. The state failed to present proof appellant took the photographs for pecuniary profit. This charge should properly have been dismissed.