Opinion ID: 2391945
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: DiscussionThe Exceptions

Text: Respondent has filed nineteen exceptions to the hearing judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Respondent's first ten exceptions, however, for all intents and purposes, can be merged into a general exception objecting to different factual findings made by the hearing judge in light of the testimony she heard and the facts presented to her at respondent's hearing. In his first ten exceptions, excluding his exception number five, respondent has done nothing more than reiterate excerpts of the testimony given at the hearing and/or rewrite excerpts of the hearing judges findings. To support these exceptions respondent proffers little, or most often, no arguments or reasons to substantiate his exceptions; rather he merely emphasizes the contrary testimony that was given or the contrary facts that were presented to the hearing judge. As indicated supra, we accept the hearing judge's findings of facts as they are not clearly erroneous and, as such, we shall not disturb her factual findings. Most important, we keep in mind that it is elementary that the hearing judge `may elect to pick and choose which evidence to rely upon.' Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 17-18, 741 A.2d 1143, 1152 (1999) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kemp, 303 Md. 664, 675, 496 A.2d 672, 677 (1985)). Such deference is given because the hearing judge is in the best position to assess first hand a witness' credibility. Ultimately, Judge North found, after a full hearing at which the witnesses on whose testimony respondent relies, including his own testimony, were heard and observed, that the testimony of the complainant, Klingenberg, and her son, was more credible than the testimony proffered by respondent, his secretary and his paralegal assistant. The testimony and facts before the hearing judge constituted clear and convincing evidence for Judge North to find as she did. As a result, we overrule these factual exceptions. We quickly dispense with respondent's fifth exception to the finding that Klingenberg's son, who was a sequestered witness, confirmed Respondent made these comments [about needed documents]. (alteration added). Respondent argues that the hearing judge attempted to lend more credibility to the testimony of Klingenberg's son by noting that he was a sequestered witness. All of the witnesses were sequestered. This argument is without merit. It is clear that the hearing judge was merely stating fact. We see no reason to further comment on this exception and thus, overrule it. In the following paragraphs we shall next discuss respondent's exceptions tailored to the hearing judge's conclusions of law; they are respondent's exceptions eleven through nineteen. Respondent's eleventh exception is to the conclusion that Since Respondent testified he specializes in debtor law, the Court can reasonably conclude that Respondent possesses the legal knowledge and skill to handle Klingenberg's case. Respondent accurately argues that he did not testify that he specialized in debtor law. During the hearing, Bar Counsel asked respondent Does your practice concentrate in any particular area? Respondent replied I practice debtor law, illustrating that he never used the word specialize and that his response cannot be used in that manner because the term concentrate and specialize have different meanings. Regardless of the hearing judge's inaccurate account of respondent's testimony on this point, the semantics of the language used does not warrant the Court to overturn the hearing judge's conclusion that respondent did not provide competent representation to Ms. Klingenberg. There was a clear perception, due to the testimony about his legal practice, that respondent possessed the requisite legal knowledge and skill to handle Ms. Klingenberg's case because he, admittedly, practiced debtor law. We note that respondent was the one who initially contacted Ms. Klingenberg by unsolicited letter stating that he might be able to provide her legal services particular to her bankruptcy matter. Additionally, the record reflects that respondent has handled numerous bankruptcy cases, supporting the hearing judge's general conclusion that he possessed the general knowledge and skill necessary to represent Ms. Klingenberg and that he was, due to his type of practice, whether he specialized in or concentrated in or practiced debtor law, aware of the thoroughness and preparation that would be necessary to undertake and carry out such a case. We overrule this exception. Respondent's twelfth exception is to the hearing judge's conclusion that respondent violated Rule 1.2(a), pertaining to scope of representation, because he did not abide by his client's decision to immediately file the petition for bankruptcy given the deadline of August 28, 2001. Respondent claims this conclusion should be overturned for various reasons, i.e., because he did not ever possess the required documents he would need to file the petition, he would have needed Ms. Klingenberg to return to the office to sign the petition, he would have needed more of his fee to file the petition, etc. For the reasons stated supra, wherein we accepted all of the hearing judge's findings on these factual issues, we overrule this exception. Additionally, the fact remains that having the information and interaction that he did have with Ms. Klingenberg, respondent did nothing regarding her case. Respondent undertook no action to further her case or even get the ball rolling on her bankruptcy petition knowing, himself, that the foreclosure was two weeks away. Ms. Klingenberg wanted to prevent the foreclosure on her home; to do so, respondent would have needed to file the petition immediately given the two week time frame, therefore, by doing nothing he violated Rule 1.2(a). Respondent's thirteenth exception relates to the previous exception and, specifically, to the hearing judge's conclusion that [Respondent] did not take the necessary steps to abide by her decision to file for bankruptcy, therefore, he violated his duty in regard to scope of representation. Essentially, respondent proffers that he did all he could reasonably do in preparing for filing her bankruptcy case given what he had and that it was Ms. Klingenberg's failure to follow up with him that ultimately resulted in her petition not being filed. For the reasons just indicated, we overrule this exception; respondent failed in his scope of representation to Ms. Klingenberg because all that he could reasonably do in reality, for Ms. Klingenberg amounted to complete inaction regarding her legal matter and her objective of filing for bankruptcy. Respondent's fourteenth exception is to the conclusion that he never made any inquiries to ensure her petition had been properly filed. Respondent supports this exception by noting that he did, in fact, follow up on her case and that he even contacted the owner of the house on several occasions, but that Ms. Klingenberg would not grant him permission to take any action to attempt to void the foreclosure sale. This exception is without merit. Respondent's attempts to remedy Ms. Klingenberg's situation after-the-fact do not trump his blatant lack of diligence or promptness in attending to her legal problem up until that time, which led to the hearing judge's conclusion that he violated Rule 1.3 pertaining to attorney diligence. We overrule this exception. Respondent's fifteenth exception relates to his violation of Rule 1.4(b), requiring that an attorney explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. He excepts to the hearing judge's conclusion that he violated this rule by not making it clear to Ms. Klingenberg how much the fees would be, when they would be due, if any other documents were needed and, most importantly, whether there were any other financial, legal or procedural impediments to the filing of her petition. The hearing judge went on to conclude that had Ms. Klingenberg known other documents were needed she would have provided them to respondent due to her anxiety over losing her home. To support this exception, respondent once again relies upon the fact that he and Martha testified that respondent made the status of the situation clear by telling Ms. Klingenberg that her signature, other monies and other visits would be necessary before he could proceed with her case. As indicated supra, the hearing judge found the opposite to be true and the findings of the hearing judge, especially those findings relating to Ms. Klingenberg's understanding of her legal problem in light of her interview and subsequent contact with respondent, support this rule violation. Respondent did little to clearly explain her legal problem to her and certainly not to the extent to permit her to make informed decisions regarding his representation of her. We, therefore, overrule this exception. Respondent's remaining exceptions, sixteen through nineteen, relate to the same attorney misconduct upon which petitioner bases its sole exception which we discuss infra -respondent's false and misleading statements to Bar Counsel and the hearing judge about what he stated to Ms. Klingenberg in her representation and what she allegedly said to him during that time. We will sustain petitioner's sole exception and, in so doing, we overrule all but one of respondent's remaining exceptions and hold that he has proffered insufficient evidence to sustain these remaining exceptions and that the exceptions do not warrant this Court's rejection of the hearing judge's conclusions regarding respondent's violations of Rules 8.1, 8.4(c) and (d). Because we sustain petitioner's sole exception and affirm the ultimate conclusion that respondent violated Rules 8.1, 8.4(c) and (d) in representing Ms. Klingenberg, we need not address specifically the merits of each of these exceptions, except for his sixteenth exception. We sustain respondent's sixteenth exception to the hearing judge's conclusion that: Respondent has also violated Rule 8.1 because he knowingly made a false statement of material fact. Respondent testified that he had sent Klingenberg a letter urging her to come in with the documents because time was running out. Had Respondent sent such a letter to Klingenberg, surely he or Klingenberg would have a copy of it. Klingenberg and Respondent both testified that there was no communication flowing between them [from] August 12, 2001 through August 28, 2001. Both cannot be true. Since no such document was admitted into evidence, the Court finds no letter was sent. [Alteration added.] [Emphasis added.] Respondent argues that the hearing judge took his testimony out of context and that he never stated to bar counsel or the hearing judge that he sent a letter to Ms. Klingenberg urging her to come in with documents because time was running out in the time period between August 12th and August 28th. Based upon our independent review of the record, the record reflects that the only letter respondent testified that he sent, excluding his initial solicitation letter, was his September 16, 2001 letter. This letter included a refund of the $200 in fees Ms. Klingenberg had paid, explained how respondent might have been able to reverse the sale of her home, how she refused his help and how he would have attempted to rectify the sale of her home for her for free. Respondent did state in his letter to bar counsel that he sent them [Klingenberg] a letter explaining that they were running out of time. Even though respondent's September 16th letter does not, as petitioner notes, indicate explicitly that time is running out, we hold that the September 16th letter is the one to which respondent was referring and the letter the hearing judge inaccurately concluded was not sent. It was the only letter mentioned in his testimony (other that the original solicitation letter). The hearing judge took respondent's testimony out of context to imply that he testified that he had sent an additional letter to Ms. Klingenberg between August 12th and 28th Therefore, we sustain this exception regarding the hearing judge's conclusion that no letter was sent. Petitioner's only exception in the case sub judice pertains to the hearing judge's conclusion that respondent violated Rules 8.1 and 8.4(c) and (d). Specific to these conclusions, petitioner excepts only to the hearing judge's failure to explicitly find that the Respondent misrepresented to Bar Counsel that Ms. Klingenberg was to `come back' to his office `and sign the paper' and that she was to come back to his office prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition to pay the Respondent a fee. Those statements, made in correspondence and to a Commission investigator were misleading and/or false and demonstrate violations of Rules 8.1, 8.4(c) and 8.4(d). Based upon the factual findings of the hearing judge, i.e., her findings accepting other testimony as the true facts, not the facts as stated by respondent or his witnesses, we sustain this exception and hold that respondent misrepresented the facts to Bar Counsel and to the hearing judge in his statements regarding that which he told Ms. Klingenberg she needed to do prior to filing her petition and regarding her representation generally. Respondent's misconduct in the case sub judice warrants the conclusion that respondent violated Rule 8.1, 8.4(c) and 8.4(d).