Opinion ID: 1669462
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicability of the Guest Statute to a Claim of Negligent Supervision

Text: In Standifer v. Pate, 291 Ala. 434, 282 So.2d 261 (1973), a year-and-half-old infant pulled a skillet of hot grease off a counter onto himself while he was being cared for by a volunteer babysitter at her residence. This Court concluded that by undertaking to supervise, watch, and care for the child, the babysitter had bound herself to the exercise of due care in those activities. Acknowledging that the recognized duty owed by an occupier of land in Alabama to a licensee is not to wilfully or wantonly injure him, or not to negligently injure him after discovering him in peril, the Court explained that that duty in no way abrogates or insulates a land occupier from duties which arise from other relationships between himself and another on his premises. 291 Ala. at 436, 282 So.2d at 263. The place at which such supervision occurred should not affect the duty owed the plaintiff. The location of the alleged breach of duty is unimportant, whether it occurred on the plaintiff's premises or elsewhere. .... ... The occurrence of the breach of duty on one's own premises is a mere fortuity. 291 Ala. at 436, 282 So.2d at 263. The Court pointed out that it had recently held in Beasley v. MacDonald Engineering Co., 287 Ala. 189, 249 So.2d 844 (1971), that a volunteer undertaking a gratuitous safety inspection of business premises was under a duty once he has acted or assumed the duty, to execute the task undertaken with reasonable care. 291 Ala. at 437, 282 So.2d at 263. Accordingly, having undertaken to supervise the activities of the child, the volunteer babysitter necessarily incurred the duty to exercise due care in the undertaking. Darryl argues that the guest statute has no application to a claim of negligent supervision even if the breach of the duty to exercise due care involves the operation of a motor vehicle. In that regard Darryl relies on this statement in Walker v. Garris, 368 So.2d 277, 280 (Ala.1979): The guest statute is inapplicable to a claim for negligent supervision of children even though the instrumentality which inflicted the harm may have been a `motor vehicle.' That statement must be understood in context, however. In Walker, the defendant Garris held a hayride for a church youth group consisting of some 15 to 25 children, including 13-year-old Lisa Walker. Garris provided a flatbed trailer loaded in the center with bales of hay. The children sat around the hay bales towards the edge of the trailer and [t]here were no fenders over the trailer's wheels, and there were no sides, railings, or handholds. 368 So.2d at 278. Garris pulled the trailer with his pickup truck, accompanied by another adult. No adults were on the trailer with the children during the hayride, and there was testimony that some of the children at various times were dangling their feet over the edge and jumping on and off the trailer as it moved at a slow speed down the roadway. 368 So.2d at 278. Garris and his adult companion in the pickup truck neither observed these activities nor instructed the children to stop them. Lisa somehow got off the trailer and was run over by it, sustaining personal injuries. 368 So.2d at 278. There was no claim that Garris had negligently or wantonly operated his pickup truck or the trailer being pulled behind it, or that he had in any other way driven improperly. Rather, the complaint filed in the ensuing personal-injury action alleged simply that Garris so negligently conducted said hayride on said highway at said time and place as to allow Lisa to fall off and be run over by the trailer. 368 So.2d at 279. These allegations are sufficient to state a claim for relief under Standifer v. Pate, 291 Ala. 434, 282 So.2d 261 (1973). In that case we held that a volunteer babysitter on her own premises owed a duty of due care in supervising a child under her care and control, thereby overruling Nelson v. Gatlin, 288 Ala. 151, 258 So.2d 730 (1972). In Standifer we noted that the gist of the action is negligent supervision. When an individual undertakes the control and supervision of a child, reasonable care must be exercised to protect that child from injury, irrespective of compensation. Garris was under no obligation to hold a hayride for these children, but once he undertook to do so he was under a duty to conduct the hayride properly by providing a suitable conveyance for the hayride and by controlling and supervising the children so as to protect them from injury. The guest statute is inapplicable to a claim for negligent supervision of children even though the instrumentality which inflicted the harm may have been a `motor vehicle.' The duty is to supervise the children properly, and an individual should not be allowed to escape liability simply because the child is injured by a motor vehicle rather than a hot pan of grease as in Standifer. Sufficient evidence was presented for a jury to find that Garris was negligent in the manner in which he conducted the hayride. 368 So.2d at 279-80 (emphasis supplied). As can be seen, Walker involved a claim of negligent supervision totally separate from and independent of the manner in which the motor vehicle (and the towed trailer) were operated. The duty alleged to have been breached was not a duty imposed by law on the operator of a motor vehicle as to third parties, but rather was the duty imposed by law on one who voluntarily undertakes to supervise children. Consequently, as in Standifer, the duty owed by Garris, as the operator of a motor vehicle, in no way abrogated or insulated him from the duty he owed as a volunteer adult supervisor of a child. It was that latter duty he breached by failing to use due care in its execution, rather than the separate duty he owed arising from his status as the operator of a motor vehicle. In the present case Darryl does not argue that Ms. Key failed to use due care in supervising Steven, apart from the fact that he was a passenger in her automobile when she is alleged to have negligently or wantonly operated it. Thus, the duty implicated is not a duty she owed Steven as his supervisor; rather, it is the separate duty she owed him arising from their relationship as automobile operator and passenger. That duty, and its breach, are governed by the guest statute. There is no allegation that Steven was engaging in any conduct or activity that posed a danger to him, or that Ms. Key, in the exercise of her duty to use due care in supervising him, should have monitored or curtailed. For all that appears, Steven was simply passively present in the automobile, requiring no particular control or supervision. Accordingly, we understand the statement in Walker that [t]he guest statute is inapplicable to a claim for negligent supervision of children even though the instrumentality which inflicted the harm may have been a `motor vehicle,' 368 So.2d at 280, to mean that the claim being asserted must actually relate to some negligence in the supervision of the child, thus implicating the duty the supervisor owes as a result of that relationship to exercise due care. Here Darryl argues no such claim, other than the idea that while Steven was under the continuing supervision of Ms. Key, as a passenger in her automobile, she negligently or wantonly operated that vehicle.