Opinion ID: 1281809
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: charging in the alternative

Text: The mechanism exists. RCW 10.37.060 reads in part: When there are several charges against any person, or persons, for the same act or transaction, or for two or more acts or transactions connected together, or for two or more acts or transactions of the same class of crimes or offenses, which may be properly joined, instead of having several indictments or informations the whole may be joined in one indictment, or information, in separate counts; ... CrR 4.3(a) states Joinder of Offenses. Two or more offenses may be joined in one charge, with each offense stated in a separate count, when the offenses, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both: (1) Are of the same or similar character, even if not part of a single scheme or plan; or (2) Are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan. I submit that under circumstances such as this, it would have been proper to have charged a defendant with two counts, one for aggravated first degree murder and the other for felony first degree murder under RCW 9A.32.030(1)(c), and I submit that it is appropriate to charge in such manner when offenses arise out of the same transaction but which do not fit the framework of RCW 9A.32.030(1)(a) and RCW 10.95.020. L. Orland, in 4A Wash. Prac. § 6262 (3d ed. 1983) regarding joinder of offenses, states: The test of the propriety of joining separate offenses in one information because they arise out of the same act or transaction or are connected together is whether evidence of one offense includes evidence of the other. State v. Courville (1963) 63 Wash.2d 498, 387 P.2d 938; CrR 4.3(a)(2). In such a situation the guidelines are set forth in State v. Russell, 101 Wn.2d 349, 352-54, 678 P.2d 332 (1984), wherein it was said: As related above, the prosecuting attorney ultimately amended the information on retrial to do more than charge intentional second degree murder under RCW 9A.32.050(1)(a). The information was amended to add felony murder as an alternative means of committing second degree murder. ... CrR 4.3(c)(1) defines related offenses as follows. Two or more offenses are related offenses, for purposes of this rule, if they are within the jurisdiction and venue of the same court and are based on the same conduct. Clearly, intentional second degree murder and second degree felony murder are intimately connected and thus are related offenses within the above definition.... ... As indicated above, petitioner was charged with intentional second degree murder and with second degree felony murder as an alternative means of committing second degree murder. The jury was instructed that to convict petitioner of intentional second degree murder or the alternative second degree felony murder, the jury must be unanimous as to the particular alternative chosen. Unfortunately, the verdict form supplied to the jurors did not distinguish between second degree felony murder and intentional second degree murder. The jurors were authorized to vote guilty or not guilty on the ultimate charge of second degree murder. No provision was made for considering each of the alternatives that composed the charge. State v. Smith, 74 Wn.2d 744, 754-55, 446 P.2d 571 (1968). As we said in State v. Long, 65 Wn.2d 303, 396 P.2d 990 (1964), quoting from State v. Brunn, 145 Wash. 435, 260 Pac. 990 (1927), the joinder of counts should never be utilized in such a way as to unduly embarrass or prejudice one charged with a crime, or deny him a substantial right. The defendants quote the following from Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 88 (D.C. Cir.1964): The justification for a liberal rule on joinder of offenses appears to be the economy of a single trial. The argument against joinder is that the defendant may be prejudiced for one or more of the following reasons: (1) he may become embarrassed or confounded in presenting separate defenses; (2) the jury may use the evidence of one of the crimes charged to infer a criminal disposition on the part of the defendant from which is found his guilt of the other crime or crimes charged; or (3) the jury may cumulate the evidence of the various crimes charged and find guilt when, if considered separately, it would not so find. A less tangible, but perhaps equally persuasive, element of prejudice may reside in a latent feeling of hostility engendered by the charging of several crimes as distinct from only one. Thus, in any given case the court must weigh prejudice to the defendant caused by the joinder against the obviously important considerations of economy and expedition in judicial administration. See also State v. Winters, 39 Wn.2d 545, 550, 236 P.2d 1038 (1951); State v. Kinsey, 7 Wn. App. 773, 775-76, 502 P.2d 470 (1972), review denied, 82 Wn.2d 1002 (1973). In State v. Anderson, 96 Wn.2d 739, 740-41, 638 P.2d 1205, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 842 (1982), the setting forth of two offenses in two counts in one information was approved if the offenses were related, the court stating: CrR 4.3(c)(1) provides that offenses are related if based upon the same conduct and are within the jurisdiction and venue of the same court. The bathtub scalding death described in Anderson I [ State v. Anderson, 94 Wn.2d 176, 616 P.2d 612 (1980)] was the basis for both charges of first degree murder. The two charges brought against petitioner, one based upon RCW 9A.32.030(1)(b) and the other based upon RCW 9A.32.030(1)(a), are related and could have been joined in the same information. See also State v. Courville, 63 Wn.2d 498, 500, 387 P.2d 938 (1963).