Opinion ID: 2747604
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the BIA’s Decision was Arbitrary and

Text: Capricious Relying on Judulang, Petitioner argues that retroactive application of the stop-time rule is arbitrary and capricious and thus, not entitled to any deference. 132 S. Ct. at 490 23 (“We must reverse and agency policy when we cannot discern a reason for it.”). In Judulang, the Supreme Court considered the eligibility of aliens charged with deportability to seek a waiver under section 212(c), although the statute limited this relief to aliens charged with inadmissibility. The BIA had extended relief under section 212(c) to aliens charged with deportability, but only if the ground of deportation was comparable to a ground of inadmissibility. Id. at 480-81. In applying this to aliens who were deportable, the BIA based its grant of relief on whether the ground for deportation charged by DHS had a close analogue in the statute’s list of exclusion grounds. Id. at 481-82. The Court found this approach arbitrary and capricious because it “hing[ed] a deportable alien’s eligibility for discretionary relief on the chance correspondence between statutory categories—a matter irrelevant to the alien’s fitness to reside in this country.” Id. at 484. Petitioner argues that Judulang limits the BIA to interpreting a statute in a way that is rational, non-arbitrary and tied to the purposes of the immigration laws. He urges that the BIA’s decision to apply the stop-time rule to him conflicts with the purposes of the immigration laws because it treats legal permanent resident aliens who commit deportable crimes differently, depending on when they committed the crime. Those aliens who commit deportable crimes after seven years’ requisite presence are allowed to apply for waiver from deportation, while those who commit a crime before such requisite presence are not. Petitioner’s argument is markedly different from Judulang in one important respect: his is an objection to the stop-time rule itself, as enacted by Congress, not the BIA’s application of it, and “Congress has plenary power to pass legislation concerning the admission 24 and exclusion of aliens.” Acosta v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 218, 226 (3d Cir. 2003). Congress may have rationally concluded that an alien who has resided in the United States for a longer period of time should have a greater right to stay in the country than one who has resided here for a shorter period of time. Because the stop-time rule is one that Congress, and not the BIA, created, the argument that the BIA acted arbitrarily in applying it is misplaced. 2. Whether the BIA Erred in Finding that Petitioner Could Not Apply for 212(c)Waiver and Cancellation of Removal Concurrently Petitioner argues that the BIA and IJ should have allowed him to apply for relief under section 212(c) as well as cancellation of removal concurrently. He argues that although section 1229b(c)(6) provides: “[a]n alien whose removal has previously been canceled under [cancellation of removal] . . . or who has been granted relief under section [212(c)]” shall be “ineligible for relief,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(c)(6), this provision does not make clear whether aliens may apply concurrently for both, based on its use of the word “previously.” Additionally, he points to Munoz-Yepez v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 347 (8th Cir. 2006) (denying concurrent applications based on Congressional intent) and Garcia-Jimenez v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2007) (denying concurrent applications based on statutory interpretation) to demonstrate that the meaning of this provision is unclear, and urges this court to resolve this issue. The BIA believed that there was no ambiguity in 8 U.S.C. 1229b(c)(6), in that it clearly precluded an alien from applying for both, but noted in addition that even if Petitioner’s 1995 conviction were waived under section 25 212(c), the conviction would still end his period of continuous residence, because “the granting of 212(c) relief does not serve to universally pardon, expunge, or eliminate all negative immigration consequences stemming from an alien’s criminal conviction.” A.R. 4. On appeal, Petitioner continues to assert the right to apply for 212(c) and cancellation of removal concurrently, acknowledging that he needs both forms of relief in order to prevail. Petitioner’s counsel conceded during oral argument that, if we concluded that the application of the stop-time rule was not impermissibly retroactive as applied to Petitioner’s preIIRIRA crime, we need not reach the issue of whether concurrent applications are permitted. As we have so held, the issue is moot. We note in addition, however, that, as the BIA observed, Petitioner is also foreclosed from urging that if a 212(c) waiver were granted, his 1995 conviction would not serve as a bar to cancellation, because in Rodriguez-Munoz v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 245, 248 (3d Cir. 2005), we specifically held that a grant of 212(c) waiver does not nullify the underlying conviction and accordingly, it still exists for purposes of cancellation of removal analysis. Therefore, even if Petitioner were to somehow be granted a 212(c) waiver, he would still be barred from cancellation of removal relief under Rodriguez-Munoz. 3. Whether the BIA Improperly Refused To Dismiss Petitioner’s Case so He Could Pursue Naturalization Finally, Petitioner contends that the IJ should have allowed him to terminate his removal proceedings so that he could pursue naturalization. In making this argument, Petitioner urges that the BIA’s interpretation of its regulation governing the termination of removal proceedings in In re 26 Acosta Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 103 (BIA 2007) is inconsistent with the plain language of the requirements of the regulation. The regulation at issue provides: