Opinion ID: 617228
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonable suspicion to stop car

Text: Mr. Hunter next argues that Trooper Nicholas did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Hunter's car for traveling too closely in violation of § 8-1523(a). Whether a traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment turns on whether `this particular officer had reasonable suspicion that this particular motorist violated any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations of the jurisdiction.' United States v. Vercher, 358 F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir.2004) (quoting United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir.1995)). The district court found the following facts, which are not disputed on appeal. Trooper Nicholas was patrolling I-70, under normal weather and road conditions, when he observed Mr. Hunter's Dodge closely following a semi. He observed the Dodge for ten to fifteen seconds and estimated that it was approximately one second behind the semi, and probably in the truck's blind spot. According to Trooper Nicholas, two seconds is a safe following distance, a measurement recommended by the Kansas Highway Patrol, and which is contained in the Kansas Driver's Handbook. Because of the approximately one-second spacing, Trooper Nicholas pulled the Dodge over for violating § 8-1523. The district court found the Trooper's testimony regarding the two-second rule and the estimated interval of about one second to be credible. As indicated, Mr. Hunter does not dispute that the Trooper stopped him for following about one second behind a semi on an interstate highway, or that the Trooper suspected and articulated that such an interval was a violation of the Kansas statute. Rather, Mr. Hunter's sole argument is that in Vercher this court did not talk about seconds, but, instead, about speed and distance. Thus, he argues: Because the Tenth Circuit requires at least two factors to be present (speed and distance) for an officer to have a reasonable articulable suspicion that a driver has violated a traffic law, and because here, the trooper only possibly satisfied one of the four factors, the traffic stop was not justified at its inception. . . . Appellant's Br. at 21. There are two problems with this argument. First, as the district court noted, Vercher did not establish a two-factor rule for applying § 8-1523(a), i.e., a separate figure for speed and for distance. It determined what was sufficient reason for a stop in that case and some cases. Vercher, 358 F.3d at 1263. It did not rule out timed intervals as another method for taking speed and distance into account. Second, and more directly to the point, we have specifically approved the two-second rule as supporting reasonable suspicion to effect a traffic stop under § 8-1523(a). United States v. Nichols, 374 F.3d 959 (10th Cir.2004), cert. granted and opinion vacated to allow resentencing under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005); opinion reinstated, 410 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir.2005). As we stated in Nichols: We reject Nichols' argument that Trooper Weigel's use of a two-second rule of thumb to determine the Buick was following the vehicle in front of it too closely was improper.    Weigel explained it was in accord with his training and common practice in his department to use the two-second rule to determine violations of [Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1523(a)]. The district court found his testimony clear and credible and concluded from it that [t]he government ha[d] met its burden of showing. . . reasonable suspicion that a violation had occurred. We believe Weigel's use of a two-second rule of thumb together with his calculation of the interval three separate times provided the minimal level of objective justification required for reasonable suspicion justifying a traffic stop. Nichols, 374 F.3d at 965 (citations omitted). Nichols accordingly resolves this case. [3] Trooper Nicholas's use of the two-second rule of thumb and determination that Mr. Hunter's car was following a semi at about a one-second interval on an interstate highway, under normal traffic and road conditions, together with his ten to fifteen second observations, incorporated due regard for the statutory factors and provided the minimal level of objective justification required for reasonable suspicion that Mr. Hunter's car was proceeding in violation of § 8-1523(a).