Opinion ID: 1500324
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: sufficiency of evidence to support verdict

Text: Finally, the defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that it was error to deny his motion for judgment of acquittal. The applicable test on appeal in relation to such question is, whether in view of all the evidence the jury was justified in believing beyond a reasonable doubt that Thibodeau was guilty of knowingly receiving stolen property. State v. Rowe, 1968, Me., 238 A.2d 217, 223-224. See, Glassman, Maine Practice, § 29.3. That the goods in the defendant's room at 77 Pierce Street, Lewiston, Maine, were in fact stolen property is overwhelmingly supported by the record. The adequacy of proof respecting the defendant's receipt of the equipment and his subjective knowledge that the same had been stolen is the only matter remaining for consideration on this point of appeal. The attempt to bring the facts of the instant case within the factual setting of State v. Dall, supra, is not appropriate. The evidence here discloses much more than the mere presence which this Court had to deal with in Dall. Indeed, most of the stolen property was located in the room which Thibodeau concedes he occupied. He displayed to Maynard a familiarity with the stolen equipment which could be inferred from intimate connection with the goods such as having them in possession. His declared intention to appropriate the articles to his own use would further support his receiving them. His receipt of a share of the marked money paid by the police in their purchase of some of the loot completely refutes his testimony that some unknown individuals had deposited the goods in his room with the understanding that they would reclaim the property later. Furthermore, the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not receive the property from the owners, and that he himself did not commit the actual theft. His own alibi testimony that he was visiting a friend at the time of the break would, if accepted as true by the fact-finder, exclude the possibility that Thibodeau himself was the thief. His further statement to the police that he had no knowledge concerning the property found in his room would support a finding that he was not the actual thief. Such obvious denial of the theft may be taken against the accused in support of a charge of receiving stolen property. People v. Fiorito, 1952, 413 Ill. 123, 108 N.E.2d 455. On the issue of knowledge that the property was stolen, we observed in State v. Beale, 1973, Me., 299 A.2d 921, that the knowledge required to sustain a conviction for receiving need not be direct knowledge or positive proof such as that which might be derived from witnessing the theft or from hearing the thief's admission thereof. It is sufficient if the accused was aware of circumstances which caused him to entertain the subjective belief that the property was stolen. Many factors were present which justified the fact-finder in concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that Thibodeau, as an ordinarily intelligent man, at the time of receiving the goods, had himself in fact reached his own judgment that the equipment was stolen property. The large quantity of goods involved, their strange and unusual character, Thibodeau's intention to dismantle some, his presence during the negotiations relating to fencing the same and while others in the apartment were obviously engaged in forging checks, his knowledge that Maynard had sold some of the articles, his pocketing of a share of the proceeds, all point logically to his own knowledge that the goods were stolen, and were sufficient to lead the fact-finder to draw the rational inference that Thibodeau actually believed them to have been stolen. The entry will be Appeal denied. DELAHANTY, J., did not sit.