Opinion ID: 878314
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Conduct Authorized by Statute

Text: Lemmon's argument that a statutory defense exists because he was a member of the Fergus County Sheriff's Posse is irrelevant. Vigilante days are over in Montana. His membership in the posse made him merely an auxiliary officer as defined by section 7-32-201(1), MCA: `Auxiliary Officer' means an unsworn, part-time, volunteer member of a law enforcement agency who may perform but is not limited to the performance of such functions as civil defense, search and rescue, office duties, crowd and traffic control and crime prevention activities. Auxiliary officers have very limited authority. Section 7-32-232, MCA, states: (1) Auxiliary officers: (a) are subordinate to full-time law enforcement officers; and (b) may not serve unless supervised by a full-time law enforcement officer. (2) No auxiliary officer may carry a weapon while on assigned duty.  (Emphasis added.) Section 7-32-233, MCA, states: An auxiliary officer has only the arrest authority granted a private person in section 46-6-502 and 46-6-503. As an auxiliary officer's arrest authority is no greater than that of a private citizen, Lemmon's membership in the posse is irrelevant and section 46-6-502, MCA, controls. Section 46-6-502 states: A private person may arrest another when: (1) he believes on reasonable grounds that an offense is being committed or attempted in his presence; (2) a felony has in fact been committed and he believes on reasonable grounds that the person arrested has committed it; or (3) he is a merchant, as defined in XX-XX-XXX, and has probable cause to believe the other is shoplifting in the merchant's store. Lemmon meets none of these criteria  no offense was committed in his presence, no felony was committed, and he is not a merchant. He had neither authority to arrest the victim nor reason to believe he did. Issue No. 3. Was the District Court's Refusal of Jury Instructions Reversible Error? Lemmon appeals the refusal of two proposed jury instructions. In reviewing jury instruction [t]his Court must look at jury instructions as a whole to determine if they fully and fairly present the applicable law of the case. State v. Johnson (Mont. 1982), 646 P.2d 507, 512, 39 St.Rep. 1014, 1020. Applying this standard the trial court correctly refused the proposed instructions. Instruction no. 16, on conjecture, although correct, was redundant. Instruction no. 38 is section 45-2-103(4)(d), MCA. It does not state law applicable to this case because Lemmon had no statutory defense and because the statute does not apply to this situation. Section 45-2-103(4)(d), MCA, deals with reliance on official interpretations by public officers or agencies. No such interpretation exists. Issue No. 4. Is the Sentence Excessive? This Court has consistently held that if a sentence is within the limits provided by statute, it is not an abuse of discretion. State v. Garrido (Mont. 1981), 621 P.2d 1105, 1108, 38 St.Rep. 78, 80. Lemmon was convicted of simple assault and unlawful restraint, both punishable by up to six months in the county jail and a $500 fine (sections 45-5-201(2) and 45-5-301(2)). He was sentenced to two consecutive 6 month terms with all but 90 days suspended. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. The judgment and sentence of the trial court is affirmed. SHEA, GULBRANDSON, WEBER and MORRISON, JJ., concur.