Opinion ID: 201905
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Motion to Suppress Wiretap Evidence

Text: 14 Yeje-Cabrera argues that the district court should have excluded evidence derived from electronic surveillance of telephone conversations because the wiretap applications failed to meet the statutory requirements. If the intercepted conversations and all evidence derived therefrom had been properly excluded, he argues, his convictions would not stand. 15 Yeje-Cabrera bases his challenge on 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c), which states that each wiretap application shall include... a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous. 16 The parties disagree on the proper standard of review. We have long applied a unitary standard of review in § 2518(1)(c) cases: When reviewing the government's showing of necessity, our role `is not to make a de novo determination of sufficiency as if [we] were [the issuing judge], but to decide if the facts set forth in the application were minimally adequate to support the determination that was made.' United States v. Santana, 342 F.3d 60, 65 (1st Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. López, 300 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir.2002) (alterations in original)). 17 Yeje-Cabrera urges us to adopt a bifurcated standard of review: first, we should review de novo whether the applicant provided to the issuing judge a full and complete statement as required by § 2518(1)(c); second, if and only if the first prong is satisfied, we should review for abuse of discretion the issuing judge's determination that, under the circumstances described, electronic surveillance was necessary. One reason for this approach, Yeje-Cabrera suggests, is that § 2518 imposes separate duties on separate actors: the applicant has an absolute duty under § 2518(1)(c), while the issuing judge has a discretionary duty under § 2518(3)(c). 3 Another reason for de novo review of the full and complete statement requirement, he argues, is that it would give effect to the necessity requirement: it would ensure that necessity is actually present, that the issuing judge is able to engage in an independent determination on that point, rather than one subject to the affiant's manipulation of the facts, and that meaningful appellate review is possible. 18 Though we recognize that other circuits have adopted bifurcated standards similar to that proposed by Yeje-Cabrera, see, e.g., United States v. Ramirez-Encarnacion, 291 F.3d 1219, 1222 n. 1 (10th Cir.2002); United States v. Blackmon, 273 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir.2001), this panel is bound by circuit precedent. 19 Moreover, we see no reason to depart from the unitary standard. First, Yeje-Cabrera's approach artificially separates two concepts that are a unified whole in the statute: full and complete statement, and necessity. One might ask: of what must the applicant provide a full and complete statement? The answer is: of whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous. § 2518(1)(c). This is one requirement, not two: a full and complete statement regarding necessity, that is, circumstances in which a wiretap, though disfavored as an investigative technique, is justified. See United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 n. 12, 94 S.Ct. 977, 39 L.Ed.2d 225 (1974) (the necessity requirement is designed to assure that wiretapping is not resorted to in situations where traditional investigative techniques would suffice to expose the crime). We see no basis for splitting in two what is properly a single inquiry. 20 The determination of necessity is properly committed to the issuing judge in the first instance, and we will uphold the sufficiency of the affidavit wherever the issuing court could have reasonably concluded that normal investigatory procedures reasonably appeared to be unlikely to succeed. López, 300 F.3d at 53 (quoting United States v. Ashley, 876 F.2d 1069, 1074 (1st Cir.1989)). It is simply not our province to engage in de novo review of an application. United States v. Bynum, 763 F.2d 474, 476 (1st Cir.1985) (quoting United States v. Smith, 726 F.2d 852, 864 (1st Cir.1984)); see also United States v. Rivera-Rosario, 300 F.3d 1, 19 n. 23 (1st Cir.2002). 21 We also note that the issuing judge has the power to require the applicant to furnish additional testimony or documentary evidence in support of the application, § 2518(2), if such information is necessary. Of course, officers may not deliberately omit material information that, if known to the issuing judge, would prevent a finding of necessity. Should the defendant come to believe that the government omitted material information that would have prevented a finding of necessity, he is free to seek a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 337 F.3d 103, 105 (1st Cir.2003) (district court held Franks hearing with government's consent where search warrant affidavits misleadingly omitted multiple pieces of information casting doubt on credibility of informants); id. at 105-06 (not error to deny suppression of resulting evidence where improperly omitted information was immaterial to overall determination of probable cause); id. at 107 n. 2 (An evidentiary hearing is required only if the defendant is able to show that alleged misstatements or omissions are material to the probable cause determination.). A Franks hearing, not de novo review in this court, is the proper route for addressing that concern. Cf. Rivera-Rosario, 300 F.3d at 20 (Material omissions in a government's application are ... sufficient to constitute the basis for a Franks evidentiary hearing. (citation omitted)). Yeje-Cabrera, however, did not pursue this option. 22 Applying our unitary standard of review, we inquire whether the affidavits satisfied the statutory requirement. After reviewing the sealed affidavits, we hold that they provided a sufficient basis for the issuing judge to authorize the wiretap. Without revealing any of the information for which it was appropriate to seal the affidavits, we note that the initial affidavit supplies a detailed overview of the investigation to date, concrete reasons why a wiretap was necessary, and thorough explanations of how traditional investigative techniques were proving, or were expected to prove, unlikely to succeed or dangerous. These representations were supported. 23 The initial affidavit could reasonably be thought to be more than adequate. After receiving authorization to conduct the first wiretap, the officers applied for and received authorization to conduct others and to extend some beyond the initial time period. As Yeje-Cabrera points out, the subsequent affidavits do overlap considerably with the initial affidavit and with each other, sometimes containing identical wording of some points. The last affidavit, seeking authorization to wiretap a telephone line over which officers expected to hear vital information on a large cocaine delivery expected to occur the next day, incorporates by reference the statement of necessity set out in a prior (attached) affidavit, instead of setting out a fresh one. Despite Yeje-Cabrera's characterization of the affidavits as consisting largely of boilerplate, all the affidavits did contain much that was concrete and pertained to this specific investigation. See López, 300 F.3d at 53-54 (rejecting defendant's argument that application was mere boilerplate where affidavit contained specific details about the investigation and about attempts to use less invasive surveillance techniques). We have reviewed these affidavits and find no flaws in the issuing court's determination that they were sufficient. 24 Yeje-Cabrera raises several objections to the conclusion that there was no abuse of discretion by the issuing judge in determining that the affidavits were sufficient. His primary argument is that a statement which appears in all of the affidavits constitutes an admission that the affiant expressly ignored the `full and complete statement' requirement. The officer applying for the wiretap authorization stated near the beginning of each affidavit: 25 Since this Affidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose of securing an order authorizing the interception of wire communications, I have not included details of every aspect of this investigation to date. Facts not set forth herein are not being relied on in reaching my conclusion that an order should be issued. 26 Yeje-Cabrera argues that 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) requires the application to describe all prior investigative steps undertaken. 27 The argument fundamentally misreads 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). The requirement of a full and complete statement cannot possibly mean that every single detail, even if relevant to the wiretap, must be included. The plain language of § 2518(1)(c) only requires a full and complete statement as to the crucial issue: whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). Many aspects of an investigation, especially in a large, complex case like this one, will not be relevant to the question of whether a particular wiretap is necessary. And even if there is some relevance, the officer need not detail every single fact, so long as sufficient facts are described as to the crucial issue and material contrary facts are not omitted. If there are relevant and material omissions, the issuing judge may deny the application or seek additional information, or the defendant may seek a Franks hearing. 28 Second, Yeje-Cabrera argues that the government did not do enough to exhaust traditional investigative methods before resorting to the wiretap. We have previously made clear, though, that the government need not demonstrate that it exhausted all investigative procedures. Santana, 342 F.3d at 65 (citing López, 300 F.3d at 52). The wiretap application simply must `demonstrate that the government has made a reasonable, good faith effort to run the gamut of normal investigative procedures before resorting to means so intrusive as electronic interception of telephone calls.' Id. (quoting United States v. London, 66 F.3d 1227, 1237 (1st Cir.1995)); see also Ashley, 876 F.2d at 1072 ([T]he government is not required to show that other methods have been wholly unsuccessful. Nor is the government forced to run outlandish risks or to exhaust every conceivable alternative before requesting authorization for electronic surveillance. (citations omitted)). We conclude that the district court did not err in refusing to suppress the evidence obtained from the wiretaps. 29