Opinion ID: 2042260
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Whether the Relief Sought Would Operate to Control the Actions of the State or Subject It to Liability

Text: The relief sought by plaintiffs is money damages for two types of loss: the reduction in the fair market value of the horse and the revenue lost as a result of the horse's inability to race. Plaintiffs argue that a judgment in their favor will not control the actions of the state and will not subject the state to liability. At oral argument, counsel for defendant averred that if the defendant were to be found liable in tort and if the plaintiff were awarded such damages, the University would indemnify defendant. In Jinkins, the defendant state employees did not argue that the state's statutory duty to indemnify them (see 5 ILCS 350/2(a) (West 2004) (Indemnification Act)) would make the state liable for any judgment against them. Nevertheless, this court remarked, in a footnote, that the appellate court had, in two previous cases, rejected this argument based on the distinction between liability and indemnification. Jinkins, 209 Ill.2d at 336 n. 2, 282 Ill.Dec. 787, 807 N.E.2d 411 (citing Janes v. Albergo, 254 Ill.App.3d 951, 965-66, 193 Ill.Dec. 576, 626 N.E.2d 1127 (1993), and Kiersch v. Ogena, 230 Ill.App.3d 57, 63-64, 172 Ill.Dec. 335, 595 N.E.2d 696 (1992)). In the present case, the appellate court cited Jinkins, Janes, and Kiersch in support of its conclusion that a judgment against defendant, in itself, would not subject the state to liability. 375 Ill. App.3d at 456, 314 Ill.Dec. 446, 874 N.E.2d 542. We agree. In Kiersch, the defendant was being provided legal representation and indemnification by his employer, Illinois State University, in keeping with the University's policy and the Indemnification Act. The appellate court rejected defendant's argument that a state university's providing legal representation and indemnification to its employees transformed all suits against university employees in their individual capacities into suits against the state. Kiersch, 230 Ill.App.3d at 63, 172 Ill.Dec. 335, 595 N.E.2d 696. Indemnification, which is the statutory or contractual obligation of the indemnitor to reimburse the indemnitee for his loss, is not the same as liability, which is a legal obligation or responsibility enforceable by civil remedy or criminal punishment. The statutory duty to indemnify runs from the state employer to the state employee. In contrast, liability is imposed on the tortfeasor himself, not upon the party who indemnifies him. As the appellate court observed in Janes, the State's obligation to indemnify its employees for liability incurred by them does not constitute the State's assumption of direct liability. Janes, 254 Ill.App.3d at 965, 193 Ill. Dec. 576, 626 N.E.2d 1127. This distinction is further enforced by the language of the Indemnification Act itself, which provides in section 2(d) that unless the court or jury finds that the conduct or inaction which gave rise to the claim or cause of action was intentional, wilful or wanton misconduct and was not intended to serve or benefit interests of the State, the State shall indemnify the State employee for any damages awarded and court costs and attorneys' fees assessed as part of any final and unreversed judgment, or shall pay such judgment. (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 350/2(d) (West 2004). Jury trials are not available in the Court of Claims. Kiersch, 230 Ill.App.3d at 64, 172 Ill.Dec. 335, 595 N.E.2d 696. See also Seifert v. Standard Paving Co., 64 Ill.2d 109, 120, 355 N.E.2d 537 (1976) (the lack of a provision for jury trials before the Court of Claims does not violate the state constitutional guarantee of the right to trial by jury). Thus, the Indemnification Act anticipates that there will be cases tried in the circuit court in which a state employee will be found liable and, unless the court or jury finds that his actions were wilful or wanton, he will be indemnified by the state. If the availability of indemnification were sufficient to confer exclusive jurisdiction in the Court of Claims, there would be no role for a jury. Janes, 254 Ill.App.3d at 966, 193 Ill.Dec. 576, 626 N.E.2d 1127. We agree with the appellate court that a judgment against defendant would not subject the state to liability. The appellate court also rejected the premise that a judgment against defendant in circuit court would operate to control the state. Surely, the appellate court remarked, the College of Veterinary Medicine does not have a policy of performing unauthorized surgeries. 375 Ill. App.3d at 455, 314 Ill.Dec. 446, 874 N.E.2d 542. In Jinkins, we considered whether a judgment against a psychiatrist and a counselor employed by a state mental health facility would operate to control the actions of the state. The defendants asserted that a judgment for the plaintiff, the administrator of the estate of a deceased patient, might cause the state to change its policies so that health-care professionals would be required to involuntarily admit individuals to state mental health facilities as a precautionary measure, even if admission was not necessary. This, they argued, could increase the number of lawsuits brought by involuntarily admitted patients and place a strain on scarce resources. Jinkins, 209 Ill.2d at 336, 282 Ill.Dec. 787, 807 N.E.2d 411. We found the argument speculative and without basis in the record. And, in any event, we noted that judgment for the plaintiff would merely have had the effect of reinforcing the policy, expressed in state law, that requires both state and private institutions to devote resources and fashion policy to adhere to the standard of care. Jinkins, 209 Ill.2d at 337, 282 Ill. Dec. 787, 807 N.E.2d 411, citing 20 ILCS 1705/4.1 (West 1996). We concluded that a judgment for the plaintiff would not operate to control the actions of the State, which would continue to make policy decisions and expend resources in keeping with the goal of meeting the standard of care already directed by existing state law. Jinkins, 209 Ill.2d at 337, 282 Ill. Dec. 787, 807 N.E.2d 411. In Fritz, we formulated the operate to control inquiry as whether a verdict for the plaintiff in circuit court `would limit the employee's ability to engage in lawful activity on behalf of the State.' Fritz, 209 Ill.2d at 315, 282 Ill.Dec. 837, 807 N.E.2d 461, quoting Wozniak v. Conry, 288 Ill.App.3d 129, 133, 223 Ill.Dec. 482, 679 N.E.2d 1255 (1997). We concluded that if the allegedly tortious acts of a state employee cannot properly be characterized as lawful actions on behalf of the state, then a circuit court judgment that would tend to curb such actions does not violate sovereign immunity. We agree with the appellate court that a judgment against defendant will not operate to control the state or limit the ability of a member of the veterinary faculty of the University of Illinois to engage in lawful activity. Thus, the Court of Claims does not have exclusive jurisdiction over a claim that a veterinarian employed by the state has breached the duty of care applicable to veterinarians because that duty arises from the common law, independently of state employment, and a judgment against such a veterinarian will neither operate to control the state nor subject the state to liability.