Opinion ID: 844253
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hanif and the Measure of Damages for Past Medical Expenses

Text: (8) We agree with the Hanif court that a plaintiff may recover as economic damages no more than the reasonable value of the medical services received and is not entitled to recover the reasonable value if his or her actual loss was less. ( Hanif, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 641.) California decisions have focused on reasonable value in the context of limiting recovery to reasonable expenditures, not expanding recovery beyond the plaintiff's actual loss or liability. To be recoverable, a medical expense must be both incurred and reasonable. (See Melone v. Sierra Railway Co., supra, 151 Cal. at p. 115 [proper measure of damages for medical expenses is [s]uch reasonable sum ... as has been necessarily expended or incurred in treating the injury (italics added)]; Townsend v. Keith (1917) 34 Cal.App. 564, 566 [168 P. 402] [trial court's failure to instruct the jury to limit its finding to the reasonable value of the expenses incurred  did not prejudice defendant, as the expenses incurred were, on their face, not unreasonable (italics added)].) (9) The rule that a plaintiff's expenses, to be recoverable, must be both incurred and reasonable accords, as well, with our damages statutes. Damages must, in all cases, be reasonable .... (Civ. Code, § 3359.) But if the plaintiff negotiates a discount and thereby receives services for less than might reasonably be charged, the plaintiff has not suffered a pecuniary loss or other detriment in the greater amount and therefore cannot recover damages for that amount. ( Id., §§ 3281, 3282.) The same rule applies when a collateral source, such as the plaintiff's health insurer, has obtained a discount for its payments on the plaintiff's behalf. (10) The Restatement rule is to the same effect. While the measure of recovery for the costs of services a third party renders is ordinarily the reasonable value of those services,  [i]f ... the injured person paid less than the exchange rate, he can recover no more than the amount paid, except when the low rate was intended as a gift to him. (Rest.2d Torts, § 911, com. h, pp. 476-477, italics added.) (11) Plaintiff argues section 911 of the Restatement is irrelevant, as it deals only with the wrongful taking of services and damage to property. Not so. Section 911 articulates a rule, applicable to recovery of tort damages generally, that the value of property or services is ordinarily its exchange value ( id. at p. 476), that is, its market value or the amount for which it could usually be exchanged. (12) Comment h to section 911, on the [v]alue of services rendered, applies, inter alia, to services the plaintiff must purchase from third parties as a result of the tort, noting that if the plaintiff obtains these for less than the exchange value, only the amount paid may be recovered. The expenses of medical care, although not specifically mentioned, are logically included in the rule articulated. Thus the general rule under the Restatement, as well as California law, is that a personal injury plaintiff may recover the lesser of (a) the amount paid or incurred for medical services, and (b) the reasonable value of the services. (13) Contrary to the view of the dissent (dis. opn., post, at pp. 575-576), section 924 of the Restatement Second of Torts, which provides that a tort plaintiff may recover reasonable medical and other expenses, expresses no different principle. (Rest.2d Torts, § 924.) To be recoverable as expenses, monies must generally have been expended, or at least incurred; that they must also be reasonable does not alter this general rule. [5]