Opinion ID: 1318712
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Intoxication as a Defense to Second-Degree Murder

Text: On the night of the murder, Crozier had been drinking a toddy made of a whole bottle of brandy and a gallon of lemonade. Trial testimony also revealed that Crozier had consumed other alcohol as well that night. Bernadette Touney testified that when Crozier came to her bedroom to inform her that he was going home, he fell against the wall. This evidence at trial raised an issue of intoxication for the jury. As the most challenging question in this murder conviction, the jury was instructed on the intoxication issue as follows: Voluntary intoxication is no excuse for the commission of a crime. However, pertinent portions of the Wyoming statutes provide that `where a crime rests in intention, the inebriated condition of the defendant at the time of committing the offense may be proved to the jury, as bearing upon the question of intention.' Thus, evidence that a defendant acted or failed to act while in a state of intoxication is to be considered in determining whether or not the defendant acted, or failed to act, with specific intent as charged. This instruction only applies for your consideration with respect to murder in the first degree and not to either murder in the second degree or manslaughter. Appellant contends that intoxication should have been considered by the jury as bearing upon the question of intention regarding the second-degree murder charge. A toddy of a whole bottle of brandy in a gallon of lemonade could raise a jury question of intoxication. It is clear that in Wyoming intoxication may negate the existence of a specific-intent element of a specific-intent crime but is not a factor affecting a general-intent crime. McDonald v. State, Wyo., 715 P.2d 209 (1986); Simmons v. State, Wyo., 674 P.2d 1294 (1984); Carfield v. State, Wyo., 649 P.2d 865 (1982); § 6-1-202(a), W.S. 1977 (1983 Replacement). [1] The determination required to decide this case is whether second-degree murder is a general-intent crime or a specific-intent crime. Second-degree murder is defined in Wyoming as: Whoever purposely and maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any human being is guilty of murder in the second degree, and shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for any term not less than twenty (20) years, or during life. Section 6-2-104, W.S. 1977 (1983 Replacement). The wording of the homicide statutes in Wyoming was not substantially changed when the legislature revised the criminal code in 1983. The criminal code revision subcommittee of the Joint Judiciary Interim Committee, in its 1981 first draft, proposed to combine first-degree and second-degree murder into one offense. The subcommittee was heavily criticized for its proposal, because the draft, if enacted, would destroy 90 years of Wyoming case law in the area of homicide. The subcommittee subsequently chose to retain the existing second-degree murder statute without change. Thus, Wyoming case law which predates the criminal code revision and is interpretative of the second-degree murder statute is helpful in this discussion. [2] Gustavenson v. State, 10 Wyo. 300, 68 P. 1006 (1902), is the earliest case which aids us in our discussion. Gustavenson shot the victim during a scuffle involving five workers, all drunk, as they were returning to work on the railroad grade from Laramie after attending a funeral. At his trial, the defendant requested an instruction relating to drunkenness as an excuse for commission of a crime, bearing upon the question of intent. The court gave the instruction with the qualifier that: `   This instruction applies only to murder in the first and second degrees, and not to manslaughter.' 68 P. at 1010. Gustavenson contended on appeal that the instruction was erroneous  that the instruction should have applied to manslaughter as well. The court held that there was not error in the instruction given to the jury to which the defendant had any right to complain, since he was convicted of second-degree murder and received an instruction on intoxication bearing upon the issue of intent in second-degree murder to which he was not entitled. The court held:    But it is proper to be observed, though the point does not affect this case, that in reason and upon the authorities the court erred in applying the principle stated in the instruction to murder in the second degree.    What constitutes murder in the second degree by a sober man is equally murder in the second degree if committed by a drunken man. 68 P. at 1010. Gustavenson was cited with approval on this issue in the 1971 case of Teton v. State, Wyo., 482 P.2d 123. Our discussion on intoxication and its bearing on second-degree murder could end here if not for the troublesome question presented by the appellant's brief regarding Peterson v. State, Wyo., 586 P.2d 144 (1978). Peterson was tried and convicted of second-degree murder. A portion of the instruction given to the jury on the issue of intoxication includes the following: `If the jury believes from the evidence that the defendant did the shooting at a time when he was so intoxicated from alcohol as to render him incapable of forming an intent to kill and of being incapable of premeditation, you should find the defendant not guilty of murder in the first degree or murder in the second degree.' (Emphasis omitted.) 586 P.2d at 153 n. 10. The court in Peterson approved this instruction, finding no prejudice or error. As a result, we now consider in some detail whether second-degree murder is a general-intent crime or a specific-intent crime, affirming or rejecting the dicta statement in Peterson v. State, supra. General intent implies that the intent is not an element of the crime and requires that the prohibited conduct must be undertaken voluntarily. Armijo v. State, Wyo., 678 P.2d 864 (1984); Felske v. State, Wyo., 706 P.2d 257 (1985). Specific intent means that the intent is or may be made an element of the crime which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt as any other fact in the case. Dean v. State, Wyo., 668 P.2d 639 (1983). The court in Dean went on to further explain the difference between specific and general intent: `   When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a particular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence  the fact that the defendant intended to do the proscribed act makes that crime a general criminal intent offense. (Emphasis added.) When the definition refers to defendant's intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence, the crime is deemed to be one of specific intent.    ' (Emphasis in original.) People v. Love, 111 Cal. App.3d Supp. 1, 168 Cal. Rptr. 591, 600 (1980). `   A specific intent crime is one in which a particular intent is a necessary element of the crime itself.   ' Russell v. State, Fla.App., 373 So.2d 97, 98 (1979). 668 P.2d at 642. This court also attempted to explain the difference between general and specific intent in Dorador v. State, Wyo., 573 P.2d 839, 843 (1978): Realizing that the distinction between a specific intent crime and a general intent crime is apparently troublesome, we can perhaps clarify it by stating it in a somewhat different way. When the statute sets out the offense with only a description of the particular unlawful act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, the trial judge asks the jury whether the defendant intended to do the outlawed act. Such intention is general intent. When the statutory definition of the crime refers to an intent to do some further act or attain some additional consequence, the offense is considered to be a specific intent crime and then that question must be asked of the jury. 573 P.2d at 843. Applying Dean, Dorador and other cases, we will address individually the elements of second-degree murder  maliciously, purposely and, because the appellant raises the issue, intent to kill  to determine whether one of these elements provides the specific intent necessary to require an instruction on intoxication.