Opinion ID: 2321544
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellant's Court-Ordered Mental Health Evaluations Were Admissible in the Fact-Finding Neglect Hearing

Text: Appellant contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it admitted expert testimony and written reports about appellant's mental health, over objection, without making an individualized determination that appellant's doctor-patient privilege should be waived in regard to statements made during the course of court-ordered mental evaluations. Generally, [e]xcept where otherwise provided by statute, the physician- or psychotherapist-patient privilege does not apply to communications . . . during a mental examination or psychological test required by a court, or to a communication made after a court-ordered examination with respect to that examination. 81 AM. JUR.2D Witnesses § 444 (2004) (citations omitted). This exception to the general rules governing privilege is logicala court-ordered examination is not for the purpose of treatment, but is rather geared towards determining the existence of a fact or condition for the court's benefit. Id. In the D.C.Code, the provisions governing [p]hysical and mental examinations provide that the results of a court-ordered mental examination shall not be admissible evidence in the fact-finding hearing unless the allegations contained in the petition set forth facts which support a petition pursuant to D.C. Official Code, section 16-2301(9)(C). [6] The government interprets this subsection to mean that the results of a court-ordered mental examination are admissible where the District's petition includes allegations that the parent's mental health status leaves them unable to properly care for the child. Therefore, the government contends that the expert reports and testimony were properly admitted because the petition in the present case alleges neglect based upon the parent's mental health status. Ultimately, we agree with the government's interpretation of the statute and affirm the trial court's order. However, the government, in support of its argument, relied on the outdated version of § 16-2301(9)(C). [7] While § 16-2301(9)(C) formerly read: [The term `neglected child' means a child:] whose parent, guardian, or other custodian is unable to discharge his or her responsibilities to and for the child because of incarceration, hospitalization, or other physical or mental incapacity, it no longer contains such language. [8] The current version of § 16-2301(9)(C) reads: Subparagraph (A)(viii), (ix), and (x) of this paragraph shall apply as of October 1, 2003. [9] The new language is the result of the Council's passage of the Improved Child Abuse Investigations Amendment Act of 2002 (the 2002 Act). Taken together and read literally, §§ 16-2315(e)(4) and -2301(9)(C) would now read: The results of the mental or physical examination shall not be admissible evidence in the fact-finding hearing unless the allegations contained in the petition set forth facts which support a petition pursuant to Subparagraph (A)(viii), (ix), and (x) of this paragraph shall apply as of October 1, 2003.  (Emphasis added). In other words, the 2002 Act has now rendered § 16-2315(e)(4) unintelligible. When the literal meaning of a statute produces absurd results, we do not follow it, but instead attempt to ascertain the legislative intention behind the statute by looking to the legislative history. Varela v. Hi-Lo Powered Stirrups, Inc., 424 A.2d 61, 65 (D.C.1980) (en banc) (citing District of Columbia Nat'l Bank v. District of Columbia, 348 F.2d 808, 810 (D.C.Cir.1965)); see also Blodgett v. Univ. Club, 930 A.2d 210, 220 n. 8 (D.C.2007). General canons of statutory construction dictate that, where the words of a later statute differ from those of a previous one on the same or related subject, the legislature must have intended them to have a different meaning. However, we are not bound to apply this canon where such an interpretation is unsupported by the statute's purpose and legislative history. Gause v. United States, 6 A.3d 1247, 1253-54 (D.C.2010) (en banc) (citing United States v. Wilson, 290 F.3d 347, 360 (D.C.Cir.2002)); see also Grayson v. AT & T Corp., 15 A.3d 219, 254-55 (D.C.2011) (en banc) (Ruiz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); In re A.O.T., 10 A.3d 160, 165 n. 15 (D.C.2010). Such is the case here. The stated purpose of the 2002 Act is: to broaden and clarify the definitions of child abuse, and to amend the circumstances under which child abuse reports can be expunged from the Child Protection Register; and to amend Title 16 of the District of Columbia Official Code to broaden and clarify the definitions of child abuse and neglect. [10] Prior to 2002, what constituted child neglect in this jurisdiction was defined more generally in only seven subsections. See D.C.Code § 16-2301(9)(A)(G) (2001). With the passage of the 2002 Act, the Council restructured the definition of child neglect in the District of Columbia from seven lettered subsections to the current ten numbered subsections. Compare D.C.Code § 16-2301(9)(A)(G) (2001), with D.C.Code § 16-2301(9)(A)(i)(x) (2009 Supp.) However, in drafting and passing the 2002 Act, the Council did not update the cross-reference to § 16-2301(9)(C) in § 16-2315(e)(4). Although the 2002 Act's stated purpose is silent on the issue of the admissibility of the results of a court-ordered mental examination, [11] reading the changed language in the subsection as signifying the intention of the Council to change the law to bar the admissibility of court-ordered examination results would contradict both the Council's earlier legislative history as well as our own case law. A 1977 Council Report explains that the Council earlier amended § 16-2315 to permit the court to order [mental or physical] examinations before the fact-finding and to admit the results in such a hearing when the mental or physical incapacity of the parent or guardian has been alleged in the petition as a cause of the neglect. . . . D.C. Council, Report on Bill 2-48 at 18 (Mar. 29, 1977) (emphasis added). If the Council sought to change the law regarding this issue with the 2002 Act, then surely it would have so stated in the act or in the legislative history. [12] However, it did not. Significantly, we recently stated that the 2002 Act has no effect on our analysis of § 16-2315 regarding the admissibility of court-ordered examination results. See In re N.P., 882 A.2d 241, 243 n. 2 (D.C.2005). In N.P., we found error in the trial court's admission of the results of a court-ordered mental examination where the underlying neglect petition did not provide any factual allegations of mental illness or other incapacity. . . . Id. at 249. Prior to reaching our determination, we noted that: The statute under which the neglect petitions were filed, D.C.Code § 16-2301(9) (2001), has since been amended by the [Improved Child Abuse Investigations Amendment Act], D.C. Law 14-206, 49 D.C. Register 7815 (2002). Subsections (9)(A), (9)(B), and (9)(C) of the 2001 version are now codified as D.C.Code § 16-2301(9)(A)(i), (ii), and (iii) (2005 Supp.), respectively. The amendment, however, has no effect on this case. N.P., supra, 882 A.2d at 243 n. 2. Moreover, we proceeded to conduct our § 16-2315(e)(4) analysis as though § 16-2301(9)(C) still pertained to a finding of neglect due to mental incapacity. [13] Similar to our analysis in N.P., here we should construe § 16-2315(e)(4) as if § 16-2301(9)(C) still contained the pre-2002 language. There are also persuasive policy arguments in support of construing § 16-2315(e)(4) in this manner. The Council enacted these provisions that confer upon family court judges the power to order psychological examinations and to use the results of the examinations to assist the court in making determinations of child neglect or abuse. Any concern about the privacy of this evidence would appear sufficiently addressed by § 16-2315(e)(4)'s requirement that the neglect petition sufficiently allege that the parent's mental or physical incapacity is a cause of the alleged neglect. See D.C.Code § 16-2315(e)(4). It seems unlikely that the Council intended to place another obstacle in the way of a family court judge's admission of evidence that may prove exceedingly beneficial to the court in making a determination of neglect. In addition to these policy considerations, we find further support for our interpretations of §§ 16-2301(9)(A) and -2315(e)(4) in case law that, interestingly, was not cited by either party here. The long-held rule in this jurisdiction is that a doctor who examines an individual only for testimonial purposesi.e., in preparation for testifying about the individual's physical or mental conditionhas no confidential relation with the individual and, therefore, the information gleaned from such an examination is not privileged. Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 402 (D.C.Cir.1955); see also Kendall v. Gore Props., Inc., 236 F.2d 673, 683 (D.C.Cir. 1956). [14] In Taylor, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit crafted the following rule: statements made to a psychiatrist in a professional capacity are protected by doctor-patient privilege, but statements made during an examination for solely testimonial purposes are not protected by privilege and are admissible. [15] 222 F.2d at 402. Here, the expert testimony of Drs. King and Christiansen was governed by the Taylor rule and therefore was not protected by doctor-patient privilege. [16] Appellant does not assert that the 2002 Act signified an intention by the Council to change the meaning of § 16-2315(e)(4). Instead, he directs our attention to D.C.Code § 4-1321.05, which provides that the physician-patient privilege shall [not] be grounds for excluding evidence in any proceeding . . . concerning the welfare of a neglected child; provided, that a judge of the Family Division . . . determines such privilege should be waived in the interest of justice. Appellant interprets this section as requiring a specific finding of waiver by the court before any statement from a court-ordered examination may be admitted. For support, appellant cites In re O.L., 584 A.2d 1230, 1233-34 (D.C.1990), and N.P, supra, 882 A.2d at 249-50. In O.L., we held that a specific finding that doctor-patient privilege should be waived was necessary before the neglect court could admit evidence of prior psychological treatment. 584 A.2d at 1233-34. In N.P., we discussed O.L.'s specific-finding requirement in the context of a neglect hearing where the parent had been subjected to a court-ordered psychological examination but did not contend that it was privileged. [17] 882 A.2d at 249-50. Moreover, appellant contends that Section 16-2315(e)(4) does not expressly deprive the trial court of discretion to either maintain or waive doctor-patient privilege, and it would be improper to read the provision as implicitly doing so. Appellant's argument is unpersuasive, because it cites our law outside of appropriate context. Had Drs. King and Christiansen examined appellant prior to Magistrate Judge Nooter's court-ordered examination, for a purpose other than subsequent testimony, the examination results would have been privileged and would have required a specific finding that such privilege should be waived prior to their admission pursuant to § 4-1321.05. [18] However, those are not the circumstances here. In this case, Drs. King and Christiansen only evaluated appellant pursuant to Magistrate Judge Nooter's court-ordered examinations. Therefore, pursuant to the Taylor rule, the results of those examinations were not privileged and were admissible in a neglect fact-finding hearing, according to § 16-2315(e)(4), as long as the underlying neglect petition alleged mental incapacity. As the neglect petition in the present case did allege mental incapacity, Magistrate Judge Nooter did not err in admitting the results of the court-ordered mental examinations because no privilege applied, and such evidence remains admissible pursuant to § 16-2315(e)(4).