Opinion ID: 1920305
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Application of the Witt Standard

Text: Having determined that the question of the retroactivity of decisions should be controlled solely by Witt, we now turn to the issue presented in the instant action, namely the retroactivity of this Court's decision in Thompson. To be applied retroactively, Thompson must satisfy the three-part Witt test. First, it must emanate from this Court or the United States Supreme Court; second, the decision must be constitutional in nature; and third, it must constitute a development of fundamental significance. See Witt, 387 So.2d at 931. Clearly, the first prong is satisfied, as Thompson was a decision of this Court. The remaining two prongs are, however, not met, and therefore we hold that Thompson is not retroactive. In Sweeney v. State, 722 So.2d 928 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that Thompson should not be applied retroactively because it failed to satisfy the second prong of the Witt test. See id. at 930. There, the court held that Thompson merely applied principles of statutory construction in holding that the statute implicitly requires a factual finding of the victim's status; it did not create nor abrogate any substantive rights or offense[s], and therefore it was not constitutional in nature. Id. at 931. The Sweeney court's holding was correct with regard to the Witt analysis. In State v. Callaway, 658 So.2d 983 (Fla. 1995), receded from on other grounds by Dixon v. State, 730 So.2d 265 (Fla.1999), this Court held that the decision in Hale v. State, 630 So.2d 521 (Fla.1993), satisfied all three prongs of the Witt test and should therefore be applied retroactively. In Hale, we held that there was no statutory authority that allowed trial courts to impose consecutive habitual felony offender sentences for multiple offenses arising out of the same criminal episode. See Callaway, 658 So.2d at 985. The Callaway Court determined that the second prong of Witt was satisfied because the imposition of consecutive habitual felony offender sentences for offenses arising out of a single criminal episode could not withstand a due process analysis ... [and] ... the decision in Hale significantly impacts a defendant's constitutional liberty interests. Id. at 986 (citation omitted). Similarly, in State v. Stevens, 714 So.2d 347 (Fla.1998), we held that the decision in State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371 (Fla. 1995), satisfied all three prongs of the Witt test and should be applied retroactively. See Stevens, 714 So.2d at 348. In Iacovone, this Court held that sections 784.07 and 775.0825 of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988), relating to sentencing for attempted murder of a law enforcement officer were not applicable to attempted second- and third-degree murder, limiting the statutes' scope to attempted first-degree murder. See id. at 347-48. In Iacovone, we noted that applying the statutes' mandatory life sentences for attempted second- and third-degree murder would lead to irrational results because the completed crimes of second- and third-degree murder were subject to lesser penalties. See id. at 348 n. 3. Applying the Witt test to the Iacovone decision, we held that Iacovone was constitutional in nature because imposition of a hefty criminal sentence pursuant to a patently `irrational' sentencing scheme `could not withstand a due process analysis' of any sort. Id. at 348 (quoting Callaway, 658 So.2d at 986). The Thompson decision, holding that section 784.07(3) contains a knowledge element, does not implicate due process concerns present in both Callaway and Stevens. As noted in Sweeney, Thompson utilized principles of statutory construction, not a constitutional analysis. The due process concerns present in both Callaway and Stevens related to lengthy sentences that this Court subsequently determined were not intended by the statute. The trial courts had incorrectly interpreted the statutes and sentenced the defendants without statutory authority, i.e., their sentences were not what the Legislature intended. The same cannot be said in the instant action. Here, the respondent was convicted of attempted first-degree murder of a law enforcement officer, a life felony with a twenty-five year mandatory minimum under sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825 of the Florida Statutes (1991). The trial court sentenced him to twenty-seven years' imprisonment. Unlike the defendants in Callaway and Stevens, Barnum was not sentenced against Legislative intent; in fact, he was sentenced precisely according to Legislative intent. Additionally, in Callaway and Stevens, but for the erroneous sentencing by the trial courts, the defendants unquestionably would not have been sentenced to the same lengthy periods of incarceration. Again, the same cannot be said here. Pursuant to sections 777.04(4)(a) and 775.082(3)(b) of the Florida Statutes (1991), the penalty for attempted murder in 1991 was a term of imprisonment not exceeding 30 years. § 775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (1991). Although Barnum would not have been subject to the twenty-five year mandatory minimum, it is clear that he would still have had the potential for a substantial sentence. Clearly, the due process concerns of Callaway and Stevens are not the prevalent consideration in the instant action. Therefore, we hold that Thompson does not satisfy the second prong of the Witt testthat the decision sought to be applied is constitutional in nature. Similarly, Thompson does not satisfy the third prong of the Witt test because it is not a decision of fundamental significance. Witt dictates that those decisions constituting evolutionary refinements and not jurisprudential upheavals should not be applied retroactively. See Witt, 387 So.2d at 929. Thompson was a conventional, nonconstitutional concept requiring that courts find a knowledge element in the statutory scheme. It was not a decision such as Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977), where the United States Supreme Court held that a sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape. Id. at 592, 97 S.Ct. 2861. Thompson merely provided that section 784.07(3) contains a knowledge element; it did not place beyond the authority of the state the power to regulate certain conduct or impose certain penalties. Witt, 387 So.2d at 929. In a similar manner, Thompson was not a major constitutional change of law, such as Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). As Thompson was not a major constitutional change, it will not be applied retroactively.