Opinion ID: 1720154
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: arrest of defendant

Text: Our next issue for determination is whether a search warrant, in addition to an arrest warrant, was necessary in order to make a valid arrest of defendant at the residence of a third party. The facts surrounding the arrest of defendant are as follows: Deputy Nugent stated that he had received information that defendant was at his aunt's house in Shreveport. After obtaining the arrest warrant, Deputy Nugent, two other deputies and the sheriff of Grant Parish, traveled to Shreveport, during the night of January 28-29, to apprehend defendant. Upon arrival, the arrest warrant was given to the Shreveport police for the purpose of making the arrest. The Shreveport officers went to the residence of defendant's aunt. They knocked upon the front door. Defendant testified that he was alone in the house when the officers knocked on the door. Defendant stated that he was fully clothed and asleep on a couch in the living room. He testified that the knock on the door awakened him and he went to the window and saw police and police cars outside. He asked who was outside and was told that it was the police. Defendant opened the door. The police placed him under arrest. [3] Defendant was taken to the police station where he was turned over to the Grant Parish authorities. In the recent case of State v. Ragsdale, 381 So.2d 492, 496 (La.1980), this court held that, without reasonable belief that defendant could be found in the third party's home as required by La.C.Cr.P. art. 224, search of such residence for the defendant was constitutionally prohibited. In Ragsdale, the third party answered the door. When it was opened, the police entered with guns drawn and began a search of the house, finding defendant in the shower in the bathroom. This court stated as follows: ... Any other result raises the possibility of police use of the arrest warrant, with no limitation, as carte blanche to search any residence in which they may believe a suspect is hiding. Such arbitrary invasion of the privacy of a person's home is exactly what the constitutional prohibitions of unreasonable searches seeks to prevent. State v. Jones, 358 So.2d 1257 (La.1978) . The question then arises as to whether Ragsdale renders the arrest invalid under the facts presented herein. We conclude, for the reasons set forth below, that the Ragsdale rule does not prohibit the arrest in the case at bar. Defendant was alone in the residence of his aunt. He opened the front door after ascertaining that the persons outside were police officers. No search of the premises was conducted in order to apprehend defendant and to make an arrest. Such a procedure does not violate the constitutional prohibitions of unreasonable searches. No search warrant is required to effectuate the arrest under these circumstances. In the case of United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976), the arresting officers, without an arrest warrant but with probable cause, went to arrest defendant on a drug related charge. Upon arriving at Santana's residence the officers saw her standing in the doorway of the house. After she saw the officers, she retreated into the house. The officer pursued her into the house, making the arrest. In upholding the arrest the court held as follows: In United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976), we held that the warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place upon probable cause did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Thus the first question we must decide is whether, when the police first sought to arrest Santana, she was in a public place. While it may be true that under the common law of property the threshold of one's dwelling is `private' as is the yard surrounding the house, it is nonetheless clear that under the cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment Santana was in a `public' place. She was not in an area where she had any expectation of privacy. `What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own house or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.' Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) . She was not merely visible to the public but was as exposed to the public view, speech, hearing, and touch as if she had been standing completely outside her house. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59, 44 S.Ct. 445, 446, 68 L.Ed. 898 (1924) . Thus, when the police, who concededly had probable cause to do so, sought to arrest her, they merely intended to perform a function which we have approved in Watson. The court also held that the officers had the right to pursue Santana into the house for the arrest since the arrest began by Santana's appearance in a doorway which was classified as a public place. The principles enunciated in Santana are applicable to the facts herein. The Shreveport officers proceeded to the residence of Haynie's aunt as a result of information supplied to them by Deputy Nugent. They had a warrant for the arrest of defendant. Upon their knocking on the door, defendant, knowing that officers were at the door, opened same. When he did so, he, being in a doorway or threshold, was standing in a place that has been classified as a public place which place is not amenable to the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment. An arrest made in such a public place, pursuant to an arrest warrant, does not violate the Fourth Amendment. The fact that he may have retreated into the house would not otherwise thwart a valid arrest. United States v. Santana, supra. The basis of this threshold rule is that an open doorway is a public place, thus, no distinction is to be drawn between a doorway of a person's own house or that of a third person (as was the case here). The rule is applicable to both situations.