Opinion ID: 1224111
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Violation of Mahoe's constitutional rights to due process and unanimous jury verdict

Text: Although not raised by Mahoe on appeal, our review of the record indicates that Mahoe's right to due process, as set forth in State v. Arceo, 84 Hawai`i 1, 928 P.2d 843 (1996), was violated in that there were two distinct acts upon which a juror could find Mahoe guilty and only one count of burglary. The prosecution did not elect the one act upon which it was relying to support the charge, nor did the court give a unanimity instruction. Moreover, the prosecuting attorney's closing argument misstated the applicable law regarding the meaning of remains unlawfully for the purpose of a burglary conviction and the court neither corrected this erroneous statement of law nor gave an instruction which correctly defined this element for the jury. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court. Hawai`i Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 52(b). See also State v. Cullen, 86 Hawai`i 1, 8, 946 P.2d 955, 962 (1997); Arceo, 84 Hawai`i at 33, 928 P.2d at 875. Because these errors infringed on Mahoe's constitutional rights to due process and unanimous jury verdict, we address them as plain error. We answer questions of constitutional law `by exercising our own independent constitutional judgment based on the facts of the case.' State v. Trainor, 83 Hawai`i 250, 255, 925 P.2d 818, 823 (1996); State v. Lee, 83 Hawai`i 267, 273, 925 P.2d 1091, 1097 (1996). Arceo, 84 Hawai`i at 11, 928 P.2d at 853 (parentheticals omitted). Determination of the correct meaning of remains unlawfully requires us to interpret the Hawai`i Penal Code. We review statutes de novo. The starting point in statutory construction is to determine the legislative intent from the language of the statute itself. Our foremost obligation when interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself. We read statutory language in the context of the entire statute, and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose. A rational, sensible and practicable interpretation of a statute is preferred to one which is unreasonable or impracticable. The legislature is presumed not to intend an absurd result, and legislation will be construed to avoid, if possible, inconsistency, contradiction, and illogicality. As a general rule, penal statutes are to be strictly construed. Ambiguous penal statutes are to be construed in favor of the accused. State v. Bautista, 86 Hawai`i 207, 209-10, 948 P.2d 1048, 1050-51 (1997) (citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted). HRS § 708-810 (1993) provides, in pertinent part, that: (1) A person commits the offense of burglary in the first degree if the person intentionally enters or remains unlawfully in a building, with intent to commit therein a crime against a person or against property rights, and: .... (c) The person recklessly disregards a risk that the building is the dwelling of another, and the building is such a dwelling. The issue presented by this case is whether, in order to uphold Mahoe's burglary conviction, his unlawful entry must have been effected for the purpose of committing a crime against a person or against property rights. Based on the plain language of the statute and the historical development of the offense of burglary, we hold that, in order to sustain a burglary conviction, the evidence must show that the unlawful entry was effected for the purpose of committing an offense against a person or property rights. The intent to commit the offense must have existed at the time the unlawful entry was made. The issue presented by this case has not previously been addressed by the Hawai`i appellate courts. We begin our analysis with the plain language of the statute. In order to be convicted of the offense of burglary, the perpetrator must intentionally [enter] or [remain] unlawfully in a building, with intent to commit therein a crime against a person or against property rights. The Hawai`i Penal Code's definition of burglary was adopted from the Model Penal Code. The commentary to the Model Penal Code discusses the evolution of the offense of burglary as follows: The initial development of the offense of burglary, as well as much of the later expansion of the offense, probably resulted from an effort to compensate for defects of the traditional law of attempt. The common law of attempt ordinarily did not reach a person who embarked on a course of criminal behavior unless he came very close to his goal.... Under that view of the law of attempt, a person apprehended while breaking into a dwelling with intent to commit a felony therein would not have committed an attempt, for he would not have arrived at the scene of his projected theft, rape, or murder.... The development and expansion of the offense of burglary provided a partial solution to these problems. Making entry with criminal intent an independent substantive offense carrying serious sanctions moved back the moment when the law could intervene in a criminal design and authorized penalties more nearly in accord with the seriousness of the actor's conduct. Since every burglary is by hypothesis an attempt to commit some other crime, it is appropriate to consider the sanction for the completed offense that is the objective of the burglary in evaluating the propriety of the sentence that is authorized for the burglary itself. Model Penal Code § 221.1 (1985) (emphasis added). Pursuant to the commentary to the Model Penal Code, the elements of the offense of burglary are established at the moment that an unlawful entry or remaining with the requisite criminal intent is made. It would be an unwarranted extension of Hawai`i's modern burglary statute to expand the offense of burglary to include situations in which the criminal intent develops after an unlawful entry or remaining has occurred. See State v. Madrid, 113 Ariz. 290, 552 P.2d 451, 452 (1976) ([b]urglary may be distinguished from the crime of theft and shoplifting in that the intent to commit a theft or any felony must be formed at the time of entry ) (emphasis added). The Model Penal Code defines burglary, in pertinent part, as follows: A person is guilty of burglary if he enters a building or occupied structure ... with purpose to commit a crime therein[.] In adopting the Model Penal Code, the Hawai`i legislature made two changes that must be addressed herein. First, the Hawai`i Penal Code provides that a person commits the offense of burglary if the person intentionally enters or remains unlawfully in a building. Second, the person must have an  intent to commit therein a crime against a person or against property rights. Our interpretation of the legislative intent behind these changes is that the legislature did not intend to alter the Model Penal Code's requirement that an intent to commit an offense exist at the time of the unlawful entry or remaining. The requirement that the unlawful entry be made with intent to commit a crime is functionally identical to the language of the Model Penal Code that provides that the purpose of the entry must be the commission of a crime. HRS § 702-206(1)(c) (1993) provides that [a] person acts intentionally with respect to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious object to cause such a result. Black's Law Dictionary 1236 (6th ed.1990) defines purpose as [t]hat which one sets before him to accomplish or attain; an end, intention, or aim, object, plan, project. Term is synonymous with ends sought, an object to be attained, an intention, etc. (Emphases added.) Therefore, the language of the Hawai`i statute that defines burglary as unlawful entry with intent to commit a crime is functionally the same as the Model Penal Code which provides that the purpose of the entry must be the commission of a crime. The commentary to the Model Penal Code states that [t]he purpose that must accompany the intrusion is described as a `purpose to commit a crime therein.' (Emphasis added.) The intent and the entry must be coexisting, such that the entry is made for the purpose of committing the crime. We have not previously addressed the meaning of unlawfully remain in the context of the burglary statute. We interpret this language, as have other courts that have addressed similar language, as being inserted to cover situations in which the initial entry was lawful, but the presence later becomes unlawful and the perpetrator remains with the intent to commit a crime. In People v. Hutchinson, 124 Misc.2d 487, 477 N.Y.S.2d 965 (App.Div.1984), the Supreme Court of New York, Bronx County, held that, if a criminal defendant entered with true consent, his subsequent commission of a criminal act could not in and of itself convert a lawful entry into an unlawful remaining sufficient to sustain a burglary charge. The Hutchinson court held that [c]riminal liability for unlawfully remaining is designed to apply to situations in which a person enters with genuine license and privilege but remains after the termination of the license or privilege. 477 N.Y.S.2d at 967. In rejecting the prosecution's argument that the commission of a criminal act was enough to uphold a conviction for burglary even if the initial entry was lawful, the court held that [t]his reasoning impermissibly broadens the scope of liability for burglary, making a burglar of anyone who commits a crime on someone else's premises. It erroneously merges two separate and independent elements that must coexist to establish burglary: First, the trespassory element of entry or remaining without license or privilege; Second, intent to commit a crime. Id. Other jurisdictions that have considered the meaning of the term remains unlawfully have reached the same interpretation as the New York courts. In Arabie v. State, 699 P.2d 890 (Alaska Ct.App.1985), the court addressed the statutory remains unlawfully language as follows: The commentary to [the Alaska burglary statute] explains that the word `remain' in the phrase `enter or remain unlawfully' is also designed to apply to cases in which a person enters with a `license or privilege' but remains on the premises after his license or privilege has terminated. Thus, the provision is intended to cover situations in which a person is privileged to enter a closed building but remains in the building after the privilege has expired; likewise, it applies to the situation where a person enters a building when it is open to the public but remains after the building has closed. 699 P.2d at 894. [5] The general rule is that [p]enal statutes are to be strictly construed. State v. Ganal, 81 Hawai`i 358, 373, 917 P.2d 370, 385 (1996) (citation omitted). We adopt the formulation of remains unlawfully as interpreted by the courts of Alaska and New York, cited supra. A perpetrator remains unlawfully for the purposes of a burglary prosecution only in situations in which the individual makes an initial lawful entry, that subsequently becomes unlawful. In the instant case, Mahoe's initial entry was unlawful. Therefore, the unlawfully remaining portion of the statute is inapplicable to the instant case. At the close of trial, the prosecuting attorney argued to the jury that [t]he State is just asking you to do your job and follow the law which shows that [Mahoe] entered [Delos Santos's] dwelling unlawfully, and while he was in there he had the intent to commit a crime against a person. Moreover, the prosecuting attorney argued that: [One element of burglary is] that he entered or remained in that building, Kristy's house, with an intent to commit a crime therein against either a person or property rights. And it says enter or remain with that intent. It's one or the other. He either entered the house with the intent or while he was in the house he remained in the house, he formed the intent. The State only has to prove one or the other of those two elements that he either entered or he remained with the intent to commit a crime against a person or property. The prosecuting attorney's statement that the element of intent may be proven if it is shown that while [the perpetrator] was in the house he remained in the house, he formed the intent is an incorrect statement of the law. Arguments of counsel generally carry less weight with a jury than do instructions from the court. The former are usually billed in advance to the jury as matters of argument, not evidence, and are likely viewed as the statements of advocates; the latter, we have often recognized, are viewed as definitive and binding statements of the law. Arguments of counsel which misstate the law are subject to objection and to correction by the court. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 384, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990) (emphasis added). Here, this portion of the prosecuting attorney's closing argument did not relate to the evidence presented, but to the correct interpretation of the law. The incorrect statement of the meaning of remains unlawfully was not corrected by the court during the argument, nor was a correct definition presented to the jury in the instructions. See State v. Kupihea, 80 Hawai`i 307, 317, 909 P.2d 1122, 1132 ([I]mproper comments by a prosecutor can be cured by the court's instructions to the jury and ... it will be presumed that the jury adhered to the court's instructions.). We have stated that: It is now firmly established in this jurisdiction that, where potential error affects the integrity of the jury's findings[,] [o]nce all the evidence has been presented, it becomes the court's fundamental duty to properly instruct the jury on the law on the precise issues of fact it is to decide. This is because [t]he trial court is the sole source of all definitions and statements of law.... It is the duty of the circuit judge to see to it that the case goes to the jury in a clear and intelligent manner, so that they may have a clear and correct understanding of what it is they are to decide, and [the judge] shall state to [the jury] fully the law applicable to the facts. Hirahara v. Tanaka, 87 Hawai`i 460, 463, 959 P.2d 830, 833 (1998) (citations omitted) (brackets and emphases in original). The failure of the circuit court to correct the prosecution's erroneous interpretation of remains unlawfully therefore impacts the integrity of the jury verdict. We decline to decide whether this would, in isolation, amount to reversible error because Mahoe's rights to due process and a unanimous jury verdict were also violated. When the evidence indicates that several distinct criminal acts have been committed, but [the] defendant is charged with only one count of criminal conduct, jury unanimity must be protected.... The [prosecution] may, in its discretion, elect the act upon which it will rely for conviction. Alternatively, if the jury is instructed that all 12 jurors must agree that the same underlying criminal act has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, a unanimous verdict on one criminal act will be assured. When the [prosecution] chooses not to elect, this jury instruction must be given to ensure the jury's understanding of the unanimity requirement. Arceo, 84 Hawai`i at 31, 928 P.2d at 873 (brackets in original) (quoting State v. Petrich, 101 Wash.2d 566, 683 P.2d 173, 178 (1984)). Mahoe made two distinct entries into Delos Santos's residence. The prosecution did not elect one entry upon which to rely, instead arguing facts from both entries to the jury in its closing argument. The court did not give a unanimity instruction as required by Arceo. Therefore, Mahoe's constitutional right to a unanimous verdict was violated. Considering both the violation of the right to a unanimous jury verdict and the lack of correct instruction of the meaning of remains unlawfully, we hold that these errors amount to plain error requiring that Mahoe's conviction be vacated and remanded for a new trial.