Opinion ID: 3010248
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Elements of Court-martial Jurisdiction

Text: Generally, court-martial jurisdiction has three elements: (1) the accused must be in a status subject to the UCMJ at the time the offense was committed; (2) personal jurisdiction must attach at the time of the court-martial; and (3) the accused must be `amenable' to trial by court-martial for the alleged offense. See Earle A. Partington, Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Weekend Reservists After United States v. Caputo, 37 Naval L. Rev. 183, 194 (1988). Elements two and three are the focus of this appeal.
The UCMJ provides:
chapter:
the armed forces . . . and other persons lawfully called or ordered into, or to duty in or for training in, the armed forces, from the dates when they are required by the terms of the call or order to obey it. . . . . (3) Members of a reserve component while on inactive-duty . . . . 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(1) & (3) (1988). Those falling into one of the categories of persons listed above are said to be in a status subject to the Code. In the present case, there is no 6 dispute that Plaintiff was in a status subject to the Code at the time of the alleged offenses. In order to satisfy the second element, i.e., personal jurisdiction, Defendants called Plaintiff into active duty, a status subject to the Code, pursuant to the following statutory authority: (1) A member of a reserve component who is not on active duty and who is made the subject of proceedings under section 815 (article 15) or section 830 (article 30) with respect to an offense against this chapter may be ordered to active duty involuntarily for the purpose of-- (A) investigation under section 832 (article 32) of this title; (B) trial by court martial; or (C) nonjudicial punishment under section 815 of this title.
be ordered to active duty under paragraph (1) except with respect to an offense committed while the member was-- (A) on active duty; or (B) on inactive duty training . . . . 10 U.S.C. § 802(d)(1) & (2) (1988) (emphasis added). Under this section, Defendants posit that Plaintiff, as a reserve officer, was properly recalled to active duty to face court-martial for the offenses committed while he was a member of the regular component. They contend that § 802(d) expressly authorizes the recall of reservists for investigation and court-martial with respect to offenses committed on active duty even if such periods of active duty occurred in the regular component. In Defendants' view, because the term active duty is not qualified in any way it should be given its plain meaning and be applicable 7 to any period of active duty. Thus, Defendants invoked 10 U.S.C. § 802(d) as the statutory authority for personal jurisdiction over Plaintiff, and, by implication, the authority to order him to stand trial by court-martial. Contrary to Defendants' position, Plaintiff initially argues that the term active duty in § 802(d)(2)(A) refers only to those periods of active duty served while a reservist. As such, it has no application to situations where the offense was committed while on active duty in the regular component. The result, Plaintiff argues, is that § 802(d) cannot be used to effect personal jurisdiction. Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that the third element of court-martial jurisdiction, amenability to trial by courtmartial, cannot be met. Plaintiff argues that jurisdiction over him for past offenses committed during his prior period of service was lost after his discharge from the regular component of the Marines. He asserts that to have continuing jurisdiction over him for such past offenses requires the application of an earlier version of 10 U.S.C. § 803(a), which provided continuing jurisdiction over discharged military personnel when certain conditions were met.3 Because § 803(a) could not apply, Plaintiff argues he is not amenable to jurisdiction. 3 Section 803(a) as applied to Plaintiff provided: Subject to section 843 of this title, no person charged with having committed, while in a status in which he was subject to this chapter, an offense against this chapter, punishable by confinement for five years or more and for which the person cannot be tried 8 Defendants do not rely on the applicability § 803(a). Instead, they argue jurisdiction was never lost over Plaintiff upon his honorable discharge from the regular component because his discharge was handled simultaneously with his acceptance of a reserve commission. As such, they assert there was no break in service. We undertake our review beginning with the historical development of modern court-martial jurisdiction.
Our analysis of modern court-martial jurisdiction originates with United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210 (1949). Hirshberg, a naval enlisted man, while serving a second term of enlistment, was served with charges directing his trial by court-martial. The charges stemmed from misconduct that occurred during his prior term of enlistment. The government alleged court-martial jurisdiction under Article 8 (Second) of the Articles for the Government of the Navy, which provided that such punishment as a court-martial may adjudge may be inflicted on any person in the Navy . . . guilty of maltreatment of, any person subject to his orders. The government contended that this language authorized the courtmartial for Hirshberg's conduct during a prior enlistment because in the courts of the United States or of a State, a Territory, or the District of Columbia, may be relieved from amenability to trial by court-martial by reason of the termination of that status. 10 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1988), amended by 10 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1992). 9 Hirshberg was in the Navy when the offense was committed and when he was tried. Id. at 212-13. The government conceded that had Hirshberg not reenlisted he would not have been subject to court-martial because of his break in service. However, the Court pointed out that making such concession while urging such a literal construction of article 8 (Second) expose[d] the whimsical and uncertain nature of the distinctions that would mark the boundaries of court-martial powers. Id. at 213. Additionally, the Court reasoned that [j]urisdiction to punish rarely, if ever, rests upon such illogical and fortuitous contingencies. Id. at 214. Thus, out of Hirshberg came the doctrine that military jurisdiction over an individual for offenses committed during a prior period of enlistment or obligated service lapses after the discharge for that period. Today, [d]espite the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and various amendments to the Code, Hirshberg remains binding precedent. United States v. Cortte, 36 M.J. 767, 769 (N.M.C.M.R. 1992)(citing United States v. Clardy, 13 M.J. 308 (C.M.A. 1982)). It is the Hirshberg doctrine that applies throughout this appeal.
In Defendants' memoranda of law, adopted by the district court as its rationale, it is continually argued that Plaintiff's discharge was conditioned upon further military service, to wit, his acceptance of a reserve commission. This was an attempt to show the absence of a complete break in status under the Code. However, this simply is not the case. At the 10 time Plaintiff entered the Marines, he had a statutory obligation of six years of service. See 10 U.S.C. § 651. After completion of these six years, Plaintiff had no further military obligation. Consequently, he submitted his resignation, was honorably discharged, and accepted a reserve commission. Discharge orders were issued to reflect such facts. If Plaintiff decided not to accept the reserve commission, new orders would have been issued honorably discharging him with no further military obligation. See Letter from Asst. U.S. Attorney Brysh to Third Circuit Court of Appeals 2 (Oct. 19, 1995) (On file with Clerk's office) [hereinafter Brysh Letter]. In a letter from the Commandant of the Marine Corps to Plaintiff regarding Plaintiff's resignation, the Commandant stated: Your request for resignation . . . is approved. In response to your request, you have been considered for and are tendered a Marine Corps Reserve commission. . . . . . . . Should you not desire the Reserve commission tendered you, the Commandant of the Marine Corps (MMSR- 3) must be notified immediately. These orders are cancelled and new orders will be issued. Letter from Commandant of the Marine Corps to Captain Michael A. Murphy (April 27, 1988). (App. at 184.) There is no indication from any source in the record that a decision by Plaintiff not to request the reserve commission would have changed his military obligation. The following discussion contained in the Navy's Courts-Martial Regulations also supports Plaintiff's position: 11 A member of a regular or reserve component remains subject to court-martial jurisdiction after leaving active duty for offenses committed prior to such termination of active duty if the member retains military status in a reserve component without having been discharged from all obligations of military service. . . . A complete termination of military status refers to a discharge relieving the servicemember of any further military service. It does not include a discharge conditioned upon acceptance of further military service. Discussion to Rules for Courts-Martial 204(d) (1995) (emphasis added). Moreover, Plaintiff's Honorable Discharge Certificate contains no conditions to discharge. (App. at 55.) Lastly, it is indicated in a Memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy that Plaintiff requested a reserve commission which was Not Obligated. (App. at 60.) Thus, Plaintiff's military obligation was completely terminated in that his discharge was not conditioned on further military service, i.e., acceptance of a reserve commission. In an attempt to show continuing jurisdiction over Plaintiff and avoid the application of Hirshberg, Defendants now contend on appeal that because Plaintiff chose to submit his resignation with a request for a reserve commission, his resignation and acceptance of commission as a reserve officer were handled as a single transaction. Brysh Letter at 2. Therefore, they argue, there was no lapse in military service and Plaintiff remained subject to court-martial jurisdiction. Defendants have cited no authority to support their position nor has any come to our attention. Even if we were to assume that 12 Plaintiff's resignation and acceptance of a reserve commission were handled as a single transaction, his status under the Code still lapsed upon his honorable discharge from the regular component. Additionally, Plaintiff's situation is unlike those cases holding that there is no interruption in one's status subject to the Code upon an early discharge for the purpose of reenlistment. See, e.g., Clardy, 13 M.J. at 315-16. Defendants also attach some relevance to the fact that Plaintiff remained a commissioned officer, albeit a reservist. However, this fact is of no consequence. For it is not status as a officer which is determinative of court-martial jurisdiction; rather, it is status as a person belonging to the general category of persons subject to the Code. See United States v. Poole, 20 M.J. 598, 600 (N.M.C.M.R. 1985); see also United States v. Spradley, 41 M.J. 827, 830 (N.M.C.C.A 1995) (noting `subject to recall' is not the same as `subject to the Code'). It is apparent to this Court that Plaintiff was under no obligation to accept a reserve commission. When discharged, Plaintiff's status as a person subject to the Code completely terminated upon his separation from the regular component, notwithstanding his reserve affiliation. Moreover, Plaintiff did not join a reserve unit for more than three months after his discharge from the regular component. This alone evidences a clear break in status under the Code. Accordingly, we hold that at the moment Plaintiff's discharge from the regular component 13 became effective, his status as a person subject to the Code terminated subject only to a subsequent restoration of that status through possible applicable statutory exceptions. We turn to that possibility.
Title 10 U.S.C. § 803 is entitled Jurisdiction to try certain personnel. The section contains exceptions to Hirshberg when military jurisdiction is terminated by a discharge at the end of a period of enlistment or obligated service. Because of his complete termination in status subject to the Code, Plaintiff argues that to have continuing jurisdiction over him, he must be brought within the application of 10 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1988). See supra note 1. Before its recent amendment which is not applicable to the present facts, § 803(a) acted as a grant of continuing jurisdiction, notwithstanding a discharge, when the offense committed (1) was punishable by five years or more of confinement, and (2) was not triable in any federal or state court. It is noteworthy that [t]he language of [10 U.S.C. §803(a)] was drawn to cover only the most serious offenses and restricted to those instances in which the guilty would otherwise escape trial or punishment in any American courts. United Sates ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 27 (1955) (Reed, J., dissenting). Significantly, we note that § 803(a) was never tendered by Defendants as a basis for jurisdiction. 14 Plaintiff ultimately was charged with the following violations of the UCMJ: 1) Conspiracy, 2) Fraudulent Separation, 3) Violation or Failure to Obey Lawful General Order or Regulation and Dereliction in Performance of Duties, 4) False Official Statement, and 5) Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman. (See App. at 199-202 (General Court-Martial Order containing charges.) As part of a plea agreement, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to charges three and five. The remaining charges were dismissed. Id. Of the five charges, only two of the five were punishable by confinement for five years, i.e., Fraudulent Separation and False Official Statement. See Part IV of the Manual for Courts-Martial ¶¶ 8(e) & 31(e) and Appendix 12.4 The charge for Fraudulent Separation is a separate exception to Hirshberg and forms the basis for jurisdiction under 10 U.S.C. § 803(b).5 However, a conviction for such offense is 4 A review of the allegations in Charge I (Conspiracy), appears to indicate that the offense which is the subject of the conspiracy was for the offenses described in Charge III (Violation or Failure to Obey Lawful General Order or Regulation and Dereliction in Performance of Duties). (App. at 199-200.) The maximum punishment for conspiracy is the maximum punishment authorized for the offense which is the object of the conspiracy. See Part IV of the Manual for Courts-Martial ¶ 5(e). Under our analysis, the charge of conspiracy in this case would carry with it a maximum punishment of two years and six months. (See App. at 70 (Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's First Request for Admissions and Interrogatories).) 5 Section 803(b) provides: Each person discharged from the armed forces who is later charged with having fraudulently obtained his discharge, is, subject to section 843 of this title (article 43), subject to trial by court-martial on that charge . . . . Upon conviction of that charge he is subject to trial by court-martial for 15 needed under § 803(b) before a servicemember can be tried for other prior offenses. Hence, we do not feel it appropriate to consider the charge of Fraudulent Separation when reviewing the applicability of § 803(a).6 As to the charge of making a false official statement, we find no evidence in the record to show that Plaintiff could not have been tried in another court in the United States for an offense of similar import. Accordingly, we hold that Plaintiff's case does not fall within the statutory exception of § 803(a).