Opinion ID: 512405
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Other Statutory Provisions

Text: 44 The appellees also argue that some of the appellees are shielded from liability here by virtue of La.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 9:2792.1 (West Supp.1988), which provides: 45 A person who serves as a director, officer, or trustee of a nonprofit organization qualified as a tax-exempt organization under Section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, and who is not compensated for such services on a salary basis shall not be individually liable for any act or omission resulting in damage or injury, arising out of the exercise of his judgment in the formation and implementation of policy while acting as a director, officer or trustee of that organization, or arising out of the management of the affairs of that organization, provided he was acting in good faith and within the scope of his official functions and duties, unless the damage or injury was caused by his willfull or wanton misconduct. 46 We cannot accept the appellees' argument that this provision shields some of the appellees from liability, however, because we find that section 9:2792.1 was adopted after this case began and was not intended to apply retroactively. 9 47 The provision in question was adopted in 1987 while this lawsuit was initiated in 1985. In Louisiana, [a] law can prescribe only for the future; it can have no retrospective operation, nor can it impair the obligation of contracts. La.Civ.Code Ann. art. 8 (West 1952). Moreover, [n]o Section of the Revised Statutes is retroactive unless it is expressly so stated. La.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 1:2 (West 1987). While acknowledging these clear expressions of the Louisiana legislature's general policy disfavoring retroactive application, the appellees argue that section 9:2792.1 fits within one of the generally recognized exceptions to that policy. In Cahn v. Cahn, the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized four exceptions to the general rule that laws will not be applied retroactively: (1) where the legislature expressly states that the law is retroactive; (2) where the law is interpretive; (3) where it is a penal law which suppresses or lessens a penalty; and (4) where the law is procedural, remedial or curative in nature. 468 So.2d 1176, 1181 (La.1985); see also Ardoin v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 360 So.2d 1331, 1338 (La.1978); Peppard v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 482 So.2d 639, 639-40 (La.Ct.App.1986). 10 48 The appellees argue that section 9:2792.1 may be applied retroactively because it is merely interpretive, codifying existing case law rather than modifying or abridging any preexisting cause of action. The interpretive exception has been explained as follows: 49 The exception ... is justified on the ground that these laws do not establish new rules; they merely determine the meaning of existing laws and may thus be applied to facts occurring prior to their promulgation. In these circumstances, there is an apparent rather than real retroactivity, because it is the original rather than the interpretive law that establishes rights and duties. 50 Ardoin, 360 So.2d at 1338 (quoting A. Yiannopoulos, Civil Law System 68 (1977)); see also Peppard, 482 So.2d at 639. The interpretive legislation does not create new rules, but merely establishes the meaning that the interpreted statute had from the time of its enactment. Ardoin, 360 So.2d at 1339. As is clear from our earlier discussion of the liability of officers and directors to the corporation for misconduct grounded in the demesnes of negligence, section 9:2792.1's limitation of liability to willfull and wanton misconduct clearly works a change on existing law. As a result, we do not agree with the appellees that section 9:2792.1 is interpretive and may be applied retroactively. 11 51 We now turn to the bankruptcy implications of this case in order to determine whether the Committee is entitled to maintain the action on LWE's behalf.