Opinion ID: 1780710
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Practical Effect of the Court of Civil Appeals' Decision

Text: The majority, in denying the petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Civil Appeals, leaves in place an erroneous precedent and effectively allows a trial court to presume that a parent's adultery does not harm the children of a marriage until a detrimental effect has been shown. This is so in spite of the fact that adultery is a crime under § 13A-13-2; that it is a ground for terminating a marriage under § 30-2-1(a)(2); that it destroys marriages and families; that it involves a violation of the most solemn of oaths; that it normally involves a pattern of deceit; and that it violates the established law of this State. In this case the wife committed many acts of adultery and brought a succession of men into the household, yet the Court of Civil Appeals found no detrimental effect on the child from such behavior. The holding of the Court of Civil Appeals in this casethat adultery is not relevant to a custody determination until a detrimental effect on the child is shown is contrary to the law in Alabama and does not reflect the judgment and experience of our legal heritage. Under the common law, adultery was treated as a serious crime, and the guilty party received judgment of the pillory, tumbrel, or the like; or to be branded, whipt, or stigmatized; or... [was] outlawed or excommunicated, Beasley v. State, 39 Ala.App. 182, 186, 96 So.2d 693, 697 (1957) (quoting III W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 361, 362). Sir William Blackstone wrote: Divorce a mense et thoro is when the marriage is just and lawful ab initio, and therefore the law is tender of dissolving it, but for some supervenient cause, it becomes improper or impossible for the parties to live together: as in the case of intolerable ill temper or adultery, in either of the parties. For the canon law, which the common law follows in this case, deems so highly and with such reverence of the nuptial tie, that it will not allow it to be unloosed for any cause whatsoever, that arises after the union is made. And this is said to be built on the divine revealed law .... I W. Blackstone, Commentaries 428-29. The common law followed canon law, which allowed divorce under limited circumstances, one of which was adultery. Our law adopts the common law unless specifically repealed by statute. Section 1-3-1, Ala.Code 1975, states: The common law of England, so far as it is not inconsistent with the Constitution, laws and institutions of this state, shall, together with such institutions and laws, be the rule of decisions, and shall continue in force, except as from time to time it may be altered or repealed by the Legislature. Furthermore, our Legislature has explicitly adopted adultery as a grounds for divorce. § 30-2-1(a)(2). To hold that adultery carries no presumption of unfitness in custody situations not only defies logic, but also defies the well-established law of Alabama as well. Divorce based on the ground of adultery once served as a conclusive adjudication of relative unfitness to have custody. Johnson v. Johnson, 215 Ala. 487, 111 So. 207 (1927). While society's sensitivity to the staggering impact of adultery and divorce may have weakened considerably, [10] the Alabama Code requires us to take adultery into account when considering custody matters. Section 30-3-1, Ala. Code 1975, provides: Upon granting a divorce, the court may give the custody and education of the children of the marriage to either father or mother, as may seem right and proper, having regard to the moral character and prudence of the parents and the age and sex of the children; and pending the action, may make such orders in respect to the custody of the children as their safety and well-being may require. (Emphasis added.) While this Court has made it clear that acts of adultery are not an absolute bar to custody, such misconduct is still a conclusive adjudication of that parent's relative unfitness to have custody. See Beasley, 276 Ala. at 249, 160 So.2d at 865. Should we now turn our backs on this plain legal rule and exchange it for a rule that relegates acts of adultery to the ash heap of legal irrelevance? In this case, the Court of Civil Appeals disregarded this Court's precedent and instead relied upon one of its own prior decisions, Hearold v. Hearold, 620 So.2d 48 (Ala.Civ.App.1993), in which that court held that, when one of the parents has engaged in adultery, a direct detrimental effect of that adultery upon the child must be demonstrated in order for adultery to be relevant to the custody determination. [11] This Court has never reviewed Hearold or Nesmith v. Nesmith, 419 So.2d 247 (Ala. Civ.App.1982), upon which the Court of Civil Appeals relied for support in Hearold. This Court has never burdened a parent before it with the duty to prove such a detrimental effect. As support for this detrimental-effect requirement, the Court of Civil Appeals cited Hearold, which, in turn, cited Nesmith, supra, which, in turn, cited Gould v. Gould, 55 Ala.App. 379, 316 So.2d 210 (1975). The first case to use the detrimental-effect language was Monk v. Monk, 386 So.2d 753, 755 (Ala.Civ.App.1980), where the Court of Civil Appeals stated: We noted [in Eskew v. Eskew, 57 Ala.App. 512, 329 So.2d 567 (1976)] that a parent should not, necessarily, be deprived of child custody for each act of indiscretion or immorality unless such behavior had a detrimental effect on the child. (Emphasis added.) Eskew had relied upon Gould for the proposition. 57 Ala.App. at 515, 329 So.2d at 570. Thus, Gould appears to be the genesis of the detrimental-effect requirement relied upon by the Court of Civil Appeals in this case. In Gould, the Court of Civil Appeals did not use the words detrimental effect but in effect said the same thing, stating: The moral unfitness of a mother to deprive her of custody must be such as to have a direct bearing upon the welfare of her child. 55 Ala.App. at 383, 316 So.2d at 214 (emphasis added). Two points deserve notice regarding this supposed requirement that a party show that the parent's moral unfitness has a direct bearing on the welfare of the child. First, the Court of Civil Appeals cited no Alabama cases as authority for the proposition; it could not do so because, as noted above, no Alabama Supreme Court cases have adopted or even mentioned this proposition. Second, Gould involved a request for a modification of custody, not an initial custody determination as in Pankey. This is significant because a modification of custody requires a high burden of proof to justify removing a child from the custody of one parent and placing him or her in the custody of the other. [12] For initial custody determinations, however, [t]he rule is, of course, that ... the paramount and controlling consideration is what is best for the interest and welfare of the child. Harrison v. Harrison, 279 Ala. 675, 677, 189 So.2d 471, 473 (1966). In an initial custody determination, each parent stands on equal footing, and the prevailing party should be the one who demonstrates that it is in the child's best interest that that party have custody. The innocent party need not prove that the other party's immoral conduct somehow has a detrimental effect upon the child. In proceedings dealing with initial custody determinations, such a rule turns the law completely on its head. Proof of adultery plays a crucial role in determining the moral fitness of a parent. See Johnson v. Johnson, supra . See also Hanby v. Hanby, 229 Ala. 527, 158 So. 727 (1935); McGregor v. McGregor, 257 Ala. 232, 58 So.2d 457 (1952); and Vinson, supra . The Court of Civil Appeals' rule that in order to deny custody to the adulterous parent the adultery must be shown to have a direct bearing upon the welfare of the child not only creates a burden of proof that does not exist under Alabama law, but also places the parties on unequal footing by shifting the burden of showing a detrimental effect to the innocent party. The detrimental-effect rule forces the innocent parent to prove that the adultery has had a direct negative effect on the child, something that is difficult, if not impossible, to prove. The effects of adultery upon a childespecially the moral or emotional effectsare normally subtle and may not manifest themselves until many years after the divorce. The Court of Civil Appeals has operated for years under a rule of its own creation that conflicts with the conclusive presumption established by this Court. The detrimental-effect rule propounded by the Court of Civil Appeals eliminates the conclusive presumption of relative unfitness and places a heavy burden of proof on the innocent parent. The Court of Civil Appeals' misconstruction of the law it relies upon in affirming the trial court's custody award in this case conflicts directly with Ex parte Devine, which sets out this Court's current test for determining initial custody. With the direct conflict this case presents to us, we should take the opportunity to correct the error of the Court of Civil Appeals, an error it has repeated and expanded in a multitude of cases since Gould. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Mitchell, 723 So.2d 1267 (Ala.Civ.App.1998); Murphree v. Murphree, 579 So.2d 634 (Ala.Civ.App. 1991); Jones v. Haraway, 537 So.2d 946 (Ala.Civ.App.1988); Smith v. Smith, 464 So.2d 97 (Ala.Civ.App.1985). The Court of Civil Appeals has not only disregarded historic precedent, but it now concludes that the trial court may not find an adverse effect from the proven fact of adultery until a detrimental effect on the minor children has been shown. This destroys the presumption of relative unfitness altogether, and, in effect, places a seemingly insurmountable burden on the innocent party to prove a detrimental effect in a case where the wife has committed numerous acts of adultery and in fact has brought the child with her into an adulterous relationship from which a second minor child has been born. Adultery can, and inherently does, have serious effects on both adults and children; it therefore must be taken seriously in custody cases: The mother testified that the child calls both the father and her boyfriend `Daddy.' Pankey, 848 So.2d at 961. This six-year-old child is obviously confused as to the identity of his father because the mother has been living with her boyfriend since the child was four, a year before the final divorce judgment was entered. The mother even admitted in her letter to the Court of Civil Appeals that the child is confused about the situation, yet she testified at trial that she is not concerned about the effect of her irresponsible behavior on the child. The mother obviously was not concerned about the effect her adulterous conduct would have on her marriage; it is no surprise that she is not concerned about its effect upon her child. In Commander v. Commander, 493 So.2d 530 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1986), a Florida appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of a mother's request for overnight visitation with her three children at the one-bedroom apartment she shared with her boyfriend. The Florida court stated: [T]he courts have not reached the level of impotency in protecting and preserving the institutions of marriage and the family that they are powerless to prevent impressionable young children from being thrust into the middle of a cohabitation living arrangement, such as in the case at bar, which would tend to foster the development of a distorted view by such children of acceptable norms of family life in our society.... We have also considered the notion that the subject order may be vulnerable because there has been no evidence that the visitation demanded by the appellant has adversely affected the children.... [W]e do not believe a court must wait until there is a demonstrable adverse effect upon a child.... Rather, we believe that a reasonably anticipated adverse effect on the child from exposure to a proposed situation or circumstance may be sufficient to support an order prohibiting such situation or circumstance. 493 So.2d at 532-33. Judge Ingram, then serving on the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, expressed agreement with this view: I agree with the views expressed in... Commander. ... If a court must wait until the harm to an impressionable child caused by parental misconduct becomes demonstrable, then it is too late for the court to fulfill its obligation to act in the best interests of the child. Jones v. Haraway, 537 So.2d 946, 952 (1988) (Ingram, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Ingram and the Florida appellate court express what should be common sense and what was previously recognized in Alabama law: where adultery exists, detrimental effects to a child should be assumed. To apply the truism to a mother whose life is not blameless, but is dominated by the carnal desires of the flesh, can it be doubted that her principles, example, and influence, if allowed the child's custody, would not be reflected in the life and character of the child? Hanby v. Hanby, 229 Ala. 527, 528, 158 So. 727, 728 (1935). In stark contrast to the law expressed in Hanby, Johnson, Vinson and Beasley v. Beasley, the Court of Civil Appeals has, under the facts of this case, declared that adultery could never be proven to have a detrimental effect on a minor child so that an adulterous parent could never be presumed to be unfit. By denying certiorari, this Court fails to correct this error.