Opinion ID: 2035999
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Variations of the Equitable Doctrine

Text: In considering whether to adopt the equitable doctrine in Nebraska, we note that there are numerous variations to choose from. The Ninth Circuit, for example, simply grants credit for time erroneously spent at liberty so long as the prisoner did not contribute to his or her release. [38] In so holding, the Ninth Circuit does not take into account whether the prisoner misbehaves while at liberty. [39] Several other courts, however, find that prisoners who abscond[] legal obligations while at liberty are not entitled to credit for time spent at liberty under the equitable doctrine. [40] Similarly, courts recognizing the equitable doctrine disagree about whether to grant credit to prisoners who remained silent when released, even though they knew the release was premature. A few courts, including the Ninth Circuit and Arizona Supreme Court, conclude that such informed silence is inconsequential. Those courts grant credit for time spent at liberty even where the prisoner knew the release was erroneous and yet said nothing to authorities. [41] In contrast, several other courts have either denied credit in cases of informed silence [42] or, conversely, granted credit specifically because the prisoner informed officials of the mistake. [43] The district court in this case specifically found that Anderson did not cause his premature release, nor is there evidence that Anderson committed any crimes while he was erroneously at liberty. However, a legitimate question remains as to whether Anderson knew that his release was premature and yet remained silent. In Schwichtenberg v. ADOC, [44] the Arizona Supreme Court addressed whether prisoners who remain in informed silence are entitled to credit under the equitable doctrine. The court framed the issue as whether a prisoner was at fault for his premature release simply because he knew the release was erroneous yet said nothing. The court observed that fault implies that an individual refrained from doing that which he had a duty to do. [45] Because a prisoner is under no legal obligation to speak up, the court concluded that a prisoner's informed silence should not disqualify him or her for sentence credit under the equitable doctrine. [46] We believe, however, that credit for time spent at liberty should be unavailable to prisoners who are aware of the error, yet fail to object. A refusal to grant credit for time spent at liberty is not a form of punishment, and therefore, it is irrelevant that prisoners have no legal duty to bring a mistake to the attention of authorities. Rather, [c]redit for time erroneously at liberty is an equitable doctrine and should be applied only where equity demands its application. [47] Therefore, the conclusion that informed silence disqualifies a prisoner from receiving sentence credit reflects not so much that the prisoner failed to execute a legal duty, but that such behavior renders the prisoner ineligible for equitable relief. That certain behavior might prevent a prisoner from invoking the equitable doctrine is not a novel concept. Indeed, as noted above, numerous courts believe that it would offend notions of equity to credit a prisoner for time erroneously spent at liberty if the individual spent that time committing additional crimes. We believe similar considerations ought to apply as to how a prisoner handles the prospect of being released prematurely. It has been said, both here and elsewhere, that two rights are served by the equitable doctrine. The first right is society's right to expect that once a defendant has been incarcerated, the time will not be served in bits and pieces. [48] Of course, it is also true that Whose tried and convicted of crimes owe a debt to society and that [s]ociety is entitled to have that debt paid. [49] So whatever society's interest in seeing that the government does not play cat and mouse with prisoners, society has at least as much interest in knowing that its criminals are serving the punishment to which they have been sentenced, regardless of. . . negligent error attributable to the government. [50] That leaves us with the other interest served by the equitable doctrine: The right of a prisoner . . . to pay his debt to society in one stretch, not in bits and pieces. [51] Drawing upon this language, Anderson reminds us that he had the right to serve his sentence in one single period of incarceration under Nebraska law. [52] Of course, a prisoner who genuinely cherishes his right to a continuous sentence, as Anderson purports to be, should at least call[] attention to the mistake being made before being ejected from the penitentiary. [53] In contrast, a prisoner who remains in informed silence when erroneously released and then asks for equitable relief upon reincarceration is not truly motivated by the right to a continuous sentence. Rather, such a prisoner is motivated by nothing more than the unsurprising desire to avoid as much jail time as possible. It takes little imagination to see that prisoners who know their release is premature might nevertheless remain silent in the hope that the mistake will go unnoticed by officials. Predictably, when officials discover the mistake, these prisoners try to obtain credit for time spent at large by arguing that the mistaken releasea mistake they declined to point outdeprived them of the right to a continuous sentence. It seems plain to us, however, that the equitable doctrine was not meant to encourage such a blatant attempt to game the system. [11-13] Like a majority of courts, we agree that no equitable relief is required where a prisoner causes his or her own premature release from prison, thwarts governmental attempts at recapture, or misbehaves while at liberty. But we also believe that [IA/'here it is clear that a prisoner had knowledge of a government mistake and made no effort to correct it, equity does not demand credit for time at liberty. [54] As such, we hold that prisoners who had knowledge of a governmental mistake and yet made no effort to correct itlike prisoners who actively cause or prolong a premature release or commit crimes while at libertydo not deserve sentence credit under the equitable doctrine. Such a prisoner has essentially acquiesced in the loss of his or her right to a continuous sentence. [14,15] To preserve the right to credit for time spent at liberty, a prisoner who knows his or her release is erroneous must make a reasonable attempt to notify authorities of the mistake. Although the prisoner need not continue to badger the authorities, a reasonable attempt may well include voicing an objection at the time of release or contacting authorities a short time later in order to clarify his or her status. [55] Having determined that informed silence disqualifies a prisoner from receiving credit for time spent at liberty, we next address how lower courts should determine whether the prisoner knew that the release was, in fact, premature. It has been argued elsewhere that determining whether a prisoner knew the release was premature would be difficult or impossible. [56] The argument is that the complex nature of modern sentencing schemes would make it difficult for prisoners to identify a precise release date and therefore recognize that they are being released prematurely. [57] In responding to these concerns, we note that [a]mong our most cherished rights, as American citizens, are the freedom of choice as to our movements, to be free to go where and when we wish, and the right to control and use our worldly possessions as we see fit. [58] Given the significance of those interests, we believe that unless the sentence has been extensively modified by things such as earned release time, work release, or a commutation, a prisoner ought to know the date of his or her release with some precision. We therefore hold that the prisoner carries the burden to show that the complexity in calculating his or her release date, or some cognitive deficiency, prevented him or her from realizing the release was premature. At the same time, the government has what essentially amounts to a burden of production to provide the prisoner with any and all records relevant to this inquiry. Such records would include any copies of the original sentencing order, as well as any records related to earned release time, work release, commutations, and any other such materials. The record in this case does not conclusively resolve whether Anderson tried to inform officials that his release was premature. We therefore find it necessary to remand this cause for the trial court to determine whether Anderson tried to inform officials of their mistake and, if not, whether Anderson reasonably did not know his sentence was set to expire. On remand, the district court is directed to make findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the 14-month lag from the date the district court authorized Anderson's recapture and the date the warrant was actually issued. Specifically, the district court is to determine whether Anderson had or should have had notice of the September 24, 2003, hearing on the Department's motion for capias. The parties should also present evidence with regard to Douglas County's motion to declare a forfeiture of Anderson's bond. If notice of either hearing was mailed to Anderson's residence, it could be evidence that Anderson knew his release was premature from that point forward. We reemphasize that the Department has a duty to provide any records and documents that may be relevant to this inquiry. On remand, the parties should also present evidence as to why the arrest warrant for Anderson was not issued immediately after it was authorized by the district judge on September 24, 2003. Since the Department has a responsibility to provide any records relevant to this issue, the district court's inquiry in this regard should include a determination as to whether the delay was the part of an organized and diligent plan to notify, find, and reapprehend Anderson, or was instead the product of misconductnegligent or affirmativeby public officials. If the latter, the district court shall determine what impact, if any, this should have on the equities of denying Anderson credit for any or all of the 14 months after the warrant was authorized, but before it was issued. Obviously, this equitable analysis should be conducted in a manner consistent with the rationale and policies expressed in this opinion.