Opinion ID: 26078
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Claim of Constructive Discharge

Text: 49 Hunt argues that because her family situation prevented her from accepting a night shift position, the loss of her full-time day shift position required her to take a part-time pool nurse job, in which she earned less money and lost her benefits. Hunt alleges the she could not continue to work under such circumstances, amounting to constructive discharge. 50 A constructive discharge occurs when the employer makes working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign. See Faruki v. Parsons, 123 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1997); Ward v. Bechtel Corp., 102 F.3d 199, 202 (5th Cir. 1997); Barrow v. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n, 10 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 1994). Courts consider a variety of factors, including the following: (1) demotion; (2) reduction in salary; (3) reduction in job responsibilities; (4) reassignment to menial or degrading work; (5) badgering, harassment, or humiliation by the employer calculated to encourage the employee's resignation; or (6) offers of early retirement that would make the employee worse off whether the offer was accepted or not. Barrow, 10 F.3d at 297. The test is objective. The question is not whether Hunt felt compelled to resign, but whether a reasonable employee in her situation would have felt so compelled. Id. at 297 n.19 (citing McKethan v. Texas Farm Bureau, 996 F.2d 734, 740-41 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 3 F.3d 441 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1046 (1994)). 51 Hunt failed to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a reasonable person in her position would have felt compelled to resign. Hunt's duties did not change. Hunt did not allege that she was harassed, badgered, or required to perform menial or demeaning tasks. She received a merit increase. She did lose compensation and benefits by shifting from full-time to part-time status, but the record discloses that she worked an average of only ten hours per two week period less than she had worked as a full-time employee. The evidence does not raise a genuine issue of material fact that the Medical Center assigned her to the pool in order to encourage her resignation. To the contrary, the evidence showed that other full-time, day shift positions became available, but Hunt did not apply for them because she did not want to work outside the CCU. The only open day shift position in the CCU was in the pool, on an as-needed basis, but it was Hunt's choice to limit herself to working in the CCU. 52 Hunt did argue, and testify, that she felt demeaned by her change of status. However, constructive discharge cannot be based upon the employee's subjective preference for one position over another. Jurgens v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 903 F.2d 386, 391 (5th Cir. 1990)(quoting Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 798 F.2d 748, 755-56 (5th Cir. 1986), modified on other grounds, 491 U.S. 701 (1989)). Hunt has failed to show that the choice among the night shift CCU position, applying for day shift positions outside the CCU, and the VSP position, was inherently demeaning. 53 Hunt failed to present evidence that would raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Medical Center retaliated against her for taking FMLA leave, or constructively discharged her on her return.