Opinion ID: 2615088
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: appellant's proposed informed consent instruction

Text: Appellant contends that the district court erred in refusing to give a proposed jury instruction on informed consent. He argues that the instruction was justified by evidence that Drs. Thomas and Pitts did not discuss with him or his parents the possibility of early amputation to save more of his leg. A party is entitled to have the jury instructed on all of his theories of the case that are supported by the evidence. See American Cas. Co. v. Propane Sales & Serv., 89 Nev. 398, 400, 513 P.2d 1226, 1227 (1973); Rocky Mtn. Produce v. Johnson, 78 Nev. 44, 52, 369 P.2d 198, 202 (1962). In addition to being supported by evidence, the requested instruction must be consistent with existing law. Federal Ins. Co. v. Public Service Co., 194 Colo. 107, 570 P.2d 239, 242 (1977). If the other instructions given to the jury adequately cover the subject of the requested instruction, or if there is no proof in the record to support the instruction, the trial court should not give it. Village Development Co. v. Filice, 90 Nev. 305, 312, 526 P.2d 83, 87-88 (1974). See Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1981). Appellant's proposed instruction varies from the traditional and perhaps still majority view of informed consent. Under the traditional view, the physician's duty to disclose is measured by a professional medical standard, which the plaintiff must establish with expert testimony. The standard is either the customary disclosure practice of physicians in the relevant community, or what a reasonable physician would disclose under the circumstances. Annot., 88 A.L.R.3d 1008, 1011-12 (1978). See Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, 1107 (1963). Insofar as we have considered standards of care for the medical profession, our holdings have been consistent with the traditional view. See, e.g., Orcutt v. Miller, 95 Nev. 408, 411, 595 P.2d 1191, 1193-94 (1979). In addition, the Nevada Legislature has seen fit to enact a general rule requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate the alleged negligence of a physician with expert testimony. See NRS 41A.100(1). [1] Appellant does not explain why this statutory rule does not apply. Moreover, he fails to direct us to sufficient expert testimony in the record to support an informed consent instruction under the rule. For these reasons, the district court did not err in refusing appellant's informed consent instruction.