Opinion ID: 77264
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Juror Fahey

Text: 109 Brown also cites as error the district court's decision to dismiss one juror, Kristin Fahey, for cause. We review a district court's decision to strike a prospective juror for cause for abuse of discretion. United States v. Abraham, 386 F.3d 1033, 1035 (11th Cir.2004). 110 Juror Fahey was struck for cause during the death-qualification stage of voir dire. The district judge and counsel for both sides asked her numerous questions concerning her ability to impose the death penalty. She struggled with her answers, saying that generally she was opposed to the death penalty, but that there might be circumstances where she could vote for a death sentence. She indicated she would want to listen to all the facts and had not predetermined whether she would vote for or against the death penalty. 111 However, toward the end of the inquiry, she had the following exchange with the prosecutor: 112 [A.U.S.A.] Newman: Ms. Fahey, would you make your decision on the ultimate punishment in this case based on your internal set of values or on what the law is that [the judge] will give you to apply, which by your oath as a juror you would be sworn to follow? 113 Juror: I believe I would probably make the decision based upon my own internal values. 114 Mr. Newnan: Even if those might conflict and be different than what [the judge] is telling the jury to apply? 115 Juror: Yes. 116 The district judge acknowledged that this was a very close call. 117 But the last question when she said — and I think she's altogether candid — I think we all agree, one, that here is a juror that is struggling. She is, by anybody's judgment, also at the point where she will say under no circumstances would she impose the death sentence. But she is not prepared to go quite that far, because she can imagine certain circumstances that she would go. But then she says, again in total candor, that I would have to impose my standards and I could not necessarily follow the law or the instructions. 118 The Supreme Court made it clear in Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980), that it is proper to strike for cause those potential jurors whose views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of [their] duties as ... juror[s] in accordance with [the court's] instructions and ... oath. Id. at 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521. See also id. ([t]he State may insist, however, that jurors will consider and decide the facts impartially and conscientiously apply the law as charged by the court ); id. at 48, 100 S.Ct. 2521 (noting that the State could exclude prospective jurors whose views on capital punishment are such as to make them unable to follow the law or obey their oaths) (emphasis added). Determining when a juror will reject the law as given by the trial court in favor of her own belief system is a difficult undertaking, but despite the difficulty inherent in the task and that the record will not always make bias unmistakably clear, there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 425-26, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). Thus, deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror. Id. at 426, 105 S.Ct. 844. 119 Based on Fahey's equivocating answers and her ultimate conclusion that she would vote based on her own internal values and not on the instructed law, the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking her for cause. Cf. Stewart v. Dugger, 877 F.2d 851, 855 (11th Cir.1989) (finding no Witherspoon violation where a potential juror, although indicating a strong aversion to the death penalty, admitted that after hearing the facts he could maybe consider imposing death).