Opinion ID: 2623312
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Subjective bias of the peer review committee

Text: Meyer further argues that the hospital did not act in furtherance of quality health care because its decision to suspend her privileges was made based on the hospital's fear of lawsuits and COBRA investigations. Similar allegations have been made by other physicians trying to overcome the presumption of qualified immunity under HCQIA. In Mathews, 87 F.3d at 634-35, a physician claimed that his privileges were suspended because some of the members of the peer review committee were the doctor's economic competitors. The Mathews court rejected the physician's claim about subjective bias, reasoning that Congress had explicitly disaffirmed a subjective good faith standard for reviewing HCQIA immunity, and instead opted for an objective reasonable belief criteria. [5] See id. at 635 (citing the House Committee on Energy and Commerce Report on the HCQIA, H.R.Rep. No. 99-903 at 10 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6392-93 (omitting a good faith standard out of concern that it would be misinterpreted)). Similarly, in Egan, the court rejected a physician's allegations that the peer review committee's decision was based on economic motives because there was no evidence to show that anyone exaggerated or manufactured complaints against the doctor. 971 F.Supp. at 44. Like the physicians in Mathews and Egan, Meyer has failed to provide any evidence that the peer review committee's decision was based on anything other than Meyer's treatment of Anguiano. Although Meyer notes that Wilson and Kilburn were concerned about potential COBRA violations and potential lawsuits, these concerns related to quality health care. Indeed, the purpose behind the COBRA regulatory scheme is to ensure quality health care and prevent discrimination against homeless patients or those patients who cannot afford to pay for treatment. The hospital had already been sanctioned for refusing to properly treat indigents. The peer review professionals were then faced with the findings of the FHC that Meyer's treatment of Aguiano was substandard and facts from which an objective observer could conclude that Meyer failed to treat Aguiano's complaints seriously because of his homeless condition and general appearance. If a doctor's personal attitude towards a homeless patient affects his or her professional judgment, this is an issue of quality health care. There is objective evidence to support a conclusion that this is precisely what happened with Meyer. While we agree that the hospital could have imposed a lesser sanction, they are not required to do so under HCQIA. Because there was a reasonable evidentiary basis for the committee's decision in this matter, Meyer's allegations concerning the subjective beliefs of Wilson and Kilburn are insufficient to overcome the presumption of reasonableness. Accordingly, we conclude that Meyer has failed to proffer relevant evidence that would overcome the presumption that the hospital acted in furtherance of quality health care.