Opinion ID: 769380
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Reopening The Suppression Motion.

Text: 39 In United States v. Vastola, 915 F.2d 865, 876 (3d Cir. 1990), we relied upon United States v. Blankenship, 775 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1985), in holding that the question of whether the government may augment the record at a suppression hearing after a remand is analogous to the question of whether the government may reopen its case after resting. Such decisions are traditionally within the discretion of the district court. Id. Nonetheless, courts should be extremely reluctant to grant reopenings. Blankenship, 775 F.2d at 740 (6th Cir. 1985)(citation omitted). When faced with a motion to reopen, the district court's primary focus should be on whether the party opposing reopening would be prejudiced if reopening is permitted. Id.; see also 28 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE S 6164 (1993). However, the trial judge must consider a number of factors. Blankenship, 775 F.2d at 741 (emphasis added). Furthermore, [t]he party moving to reopen should provide a reasonable explanation for failure to present the evidence [initially]. Id. In order to properly exercise its discretion the district court must evaluate that explanation and determine if it is both reasonable, and adequate to explain why the government initially failed to introduce evidence that may have been essential to meeting its burden of proof. Here, no explanation was even offered by the government. 40 At the first suppression hearing, Kithcart and the government argued and briefed issues going to probable cause as well as reasonable suspicion. Thus, from the beginning the government was fully aware of what it had to establish to successfully oppose Kithcart's suppression motion. Presumably, the government believed that the weapon seized from Kithcart during a pat-down would be admissible once the legality of the stop was established. See 134 F.3d at 535 (McKee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 5 However, the government did not present any evidence of the circumstances of a pat-down nor any testimony to support a conclusion that a Terry pat-down was justified. Id. (This record is devoid of evidence to support a conclusion that any search of Kithcart's person after the stop was reasonable.). The government did not even initially offer the testimony of Officer Williams -- the officer who performed the pat-down search of Kithcart. 41 As noted above, despite the total absence of any explanation for why such evidence was not produced during the first suppression hearing, the district court denied the defense motion in limine and allowed the government to reopen its case and present additional evidence that satisfied the constitutional requirements for a Terry pat-down. There is nothing to suggest that evidence was either newly discovered or unavailable during the first hearing. 42 The government argues, that our decision in Kithcart I permitted the government to reopen its case on the suppression motion. Government's Br. at 5. The government and district court believed that Kithcart I set no limit on the nature of the evidence that the government could present after remand. Id. This conclusion is erroneously based upon our direction to consider both of the government's asserted grounds for the stop, as well as our direction to consider whether the events leading to the discovery of the weapon in Kithcart's pouch can be justified as a Terry `pat-down.'  Id. 43 In fairness to both the government and the district court, we recognize that our opinion in Kithcart I did not expressly address whether the litigants could introduce additional evidence after remand. Nevertheless, our requirement that the district court consider certain issues on remand is not a justification to allow a party to reopen its case and relitigate those issues. Moreover, our decision in United States v. Vastola, supra, is clearly controlling precedent. There, we prescribed the limitations on the district court's discretion to allow additional testimony after remand, and the district court and the litigants should have been guided by the analysis and holding in that case. In addition, the concurring and dissenting opinion in Kithcart I informed the government of the need to explain why it had not offered any additional evidence at the initial suppression hearing. 44 I would leave it to the trial court's discretion to decide whether the prosecutor should be allowed to produce the testimony that I think is needed to bridge the interstices in this transcript. That court will be in the best position to determine whether or not the government should be allowed a second... bite of the Terry apple by producing testimony beyond that which is necessary to rule upon the issue of the alleged traffic violation. If there was no traffic violation, Officer Nelson was not justified in stopping the car in which Kithcart was riding. If the suppression court concludes that there was a traffic violation, then it should determine the propriety of allowing testimony regarding the circumstances of the seizure after considering any explanation as to why that testimony was not produced initially. 45 134 F.3d at 536 (McKee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)(emphasis added). The government apparently read this as suggesting that the concurring/dissenting opinion interpreted the majority as allowing additional evidence on remand. The government argues, [i]n his dissent, Circuit Judge McKee acknowledged that the majority opinion would provide `the government with an opportunity to establish Office Nelson's stop was appropriate... ' . Government Br. at 5. However, the fact that the majority opinion provided an opening for the government to establish Officer Nelson's stop was appropriate, does not mean that the government could do so in a manner that was inconsistent with our holding in Vastola. 6 Yet, that is exactly what the government did, and precisely what the district court's denial of the defense motion in limine allowed.