Opinion ID: 2582839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether the prosecutor unfairly vouched for the credibility of the victims during closing argument?

Text: [¶ 15] The appellant asserts that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of the victim witnesses in statements he made during closing argument. This claim is one of prosecutorial misconduct. Our standard of review for claims of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument is well established: In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument, the court looks at the entire record to determine whether the defendant's case was so prejudiced by the improper comments as to result in the denial of a fair trial. Capshaw v. State, 10 P.3d 560, 567 (Wyo. 2000); Metzger v. State, 4 P.3d 901, 910 (Wyo.2000). The challenged comments are judged in the context of the prosecutor's entire argument, considering the context of the statements and comparing them with the evidence produced at the trial. Helm v. State, 1 P.3d 635, 639 (Wyo.2000). ... When an objection is launched to a statement made in closing argument, we defer to the trial court's ruling in the absence of a clear or patent abuse of discretion. Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 860 (Wyo.1998). Harris v. State, 2008 WY 23, ¶ 14, 177 P.3d 1166, 1170-71 (Wyo.2008) (quoting Burton v. State, 2002 WY 71, ¶¶ 11-12, 46 P.3d 309, 313 (Wyo.2002)). If the trial court abused it's discretion by allowing impermissible argument, we will only reverse if `a reasonable probability exists, absent the error, that the appellant may have enjoyed a more favorable verdict.' Moe v. State, 2005 WY 58, ¶ 17, 110 P.3d 1206, 1212 (Wyo.2005) (quoting Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 542 (Wyo.2000)). [¶ 16] We have addressed the issue of an expert witness vouching for the credibility of the testimony of an alleged sexual assault victim on a number of prior occasions. See Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 103, ¶¶ 9-26, 98 P.3d 143, 146-151 (Wyo.2004); Seward v. State, 2003 WY 116, ¶¶ 18-29, 76 P.3d 805, 812-18 (Wyo.2003); Wilde v. State, 2003 WY 93, ¶¶ 15-19, 74 P.3d 699, 708-09 (Wyo.2003); Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 68 (Wyo.1989), overruled in part on other grounds by Large v. State, 2008 WY 22, 177 P.3d 807, 816 (Wyo.2008). Before examining the appellant's specific claims, we note that this case is unlike the above-cited cases in that the appellant does not argue that the expert improperly vouched for the credibility of the victim witnesses. Instead, he claims that the prosecutor used the statements of the expert testimony to vouch for the credibility of the witness and achieved the same result. (Emphasis in original.) The appellant points to three statements, all made during closing argument, where he contends the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of the victim witnesses. The first two, in which the prosecutor references testimony of the expert witness, are set forth below with emphasis added to the specific portions to which the appellant takes exception: [Prosecutor]: Just because [the younger sister] did not want to talk about it does not mean that it didn't happen. Just because [the younger sister] didn't disclose the sexual molestation in detail does not mean that it didn't happen. The expert, the psychologist, Fred Lindberg, explained to you the disclosure process in these kinds of situations where children have been sexual[ly] abused. He told you that there was partial or piece-by-piece disclosure, if you will, in many of these cases, and that's exactly what happened with [the younger sister]. You saw her, ladies and gentlemen. She was absolutely petrified in the CAP interview. [4] She was absolutely petrified when she took the stand. He explained to you, piece-by-piece disclosure is when they're testing the waters, you know, and they are so embarrassed and so humiliated that they're going to tell a person just a little bit at a time until they see (Emphasis added.) Defense counsel objected at this point and the following exchange occurred at the bench: [Defense Counsel]: I hate interrupting the closing argument but, Your Honor, this is exactly what I objected to before Dr. Lindberg testified. I think it amounts to vouching for the credibility of the witness. The Court: I don't believe so. I think he's talked about the characteristicsbehavioral characteristics, and I think that's appropriate under the case law. So Ill overrule the objection. Mr. Schafer may continue. As long as he's talking about behavior characteristics, that's fine. But if it gets into truth and veracity, that's another [sic]. The next instance of alleged vouching occurred right after the prosecutor continued his closing argument: [Prosecutor:] Like I was trying to indicate to you, ladies and gentlemen, the expert, Dr. Lindberg, was trying to explain to you the common misconceptions of the way sexual disclosure occurs with children, children like [the younger sister], in these cases. It's a very emotional, traumatic thing for them to go to [sic]. And what they do is, they test the waters, and they wont always disclose everything that happened to them each and every time. You heard Dr. Lindberg's testimony that there are victims who never even report sexual abuse at all. And in his testimony, also, a third of them never even indicate what the sexual abuse is until after five years. And isn't this exactly what happened with [the older sister] in this case? It took her 3, 4 years to disclose the sexual abuse.... (Emphasis added.) [¶ 17] The appellant argues that by saying that the behaviors described by Dr. Lindberg are exactly what happened in this case, the prosecutor gave more credibility to the victims testimony, thereby improperly vouching for their credibility. We disagree with the appellant's conclusion. When addressing vouching issues in the context of prosecutorial misconduct, we have said: Counsel are allowed wide latitude during the scope of their closing arguments, and a prosecutor may comment on all of the evidence in the record and suggest reasonable inferences from that evidence. However, the prosecutor may not inflame or mislead the jury or express his personal beliefs or opinions about the evidence. Davis v. State, 2005 WY 93, ¶ 25, 117 P.3d 454, 463 (Wyo.2005). Similarly, a prosecutor cannot personally vouch for the credibility of a state's witness, nor can a prosecutor assert his own credibility as a basis for conviction of a defendant. [W]hen the prosecutor asserts his credibility or personal belief, an additional factor is injected into the case. This additional factor is that counsel may be perceived by the jury as an authority whose opinion carries greater weight than their own opinion; that members of the jury might be persuaded not by the evidence, but rather by a perception that counsel's opinions are correct because of his position as prosecutor, an important state official entrusted with enforcing the criminal laws of a sovereign state. While the prosecutor is expected to be an advocate, he may not exploit his position to induce a jury to disregard the evidence or misapply the law. Condra v. State, 2004 WY 131, ¶ 11, 100 P.3d 386, 390 (Wyo.2004). Teniente v. State, 2007 WY 165, ¶ 30, 169 P.3d 512, 524 (Wyo.2007). With regard to the admissibility and appropriate use of expert testimony in sexual assault cases, we have said: Expert testimony that discusses the behavior and characteristics of sexual assault victims and the range of responses to sexual assault encountered by experts is admissible. Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036 (Wyo.1987). Such testimony is relevant and helpful in explaining to the jury the typical behavior patterns of adolescent victims of sexual assault. Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973 (Wyo.1988). It assists the jury in understanding some of the aspects of the behavior of victims and, so long as there is no comment on the credibility or truthfulness of the victims, it does not invade the province of the jury. Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357 (Wyo.1988). Rivera v. State, 840 P.2d 933, 939 (Wyo. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Springfield v. State, 860 P.2d 435 (Wyo.1993). [¶ 18] After reviewing the entire record on appeal, and particularly the trial transcripts, we find that the prosecutor's comments relating the victims' actions to the general behaviors described by Dr. Lindberg were not tantamount to vouching for the victims' credibility. The prosecutor's statements merely informed the jury about the relevance of Dr. Lindberg's testimony and suggested how that testimony might assist the jury in determining the facts at issue. Such use of expert testimony is proper. See Lessard v. State, 719 P.2d 227, 233-34 (Wyo.1986) (expert testimony as to why sexual assault victim would ask assailant not to tell about sexual encounter was admissible in that it did not constitute testimony with respect to veracity of victim, but rather assisted jury in understanding evidence). Furthermore, relating the general behaviors described by Dr. Lindberg to the behaviors exhibited by the victims in this case was particularly important to effective prosecution of the case inasmuch as one of the appellant's defense strategies was to argue that the victims' behaviors were inconsistent with the allegations they were making against the appellant. Specifically, the appellant attempted to discredit the victims by raising questions regarding: 1) the victims' delay in reporting, 2) their methods of disclosure, 3) their maintaining a relationship and continued contact with the appellant, 4) their inconsistent or incomplete disclosure, and 5) their lack of overt manifestations of distress. Without expert testimony to educate the jury about common misconceptions concerning the general behaviors of child victims, the jury might have drawn inappropriate conclusions. [¶ 19] The third and final statement the appellant argues amounted to improper vouching by the prosecutor was also made during his closing statement: Now, [the younger sister] went through two traumatic experiences. The first time was when she was molested, February 18th of 2008, and that will be a day that shell never forget. But the second time is when she went through the judicial process. She had theshe didn't have the power and the time or the ability to stop what that man was doing to her in the bedroom. But she did have the ability, the time, and the power to stop what the defendant says she is doing [now, which is] fabricating this whole thing. But she didn't do that because she has the courage, and she knows what's right. And she came in here with all that difficulty and rose her right hand and told you, ladies and gentlemen, that she would tell the truth. And she's a human being just like everybody in this courtroom, and she has a conscience. The appellant asserts that this statement is similar to one made in Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 103, 98 P.3d 143 (Wyo.2004). Lopez is another in the line of vouching cases where we found that an expert improperly vouched for the credibility of the child victim. In that case, the prosecutor made the following statement: if you believe that 12-year-old child when she was sitting on that witness stand, and you believe what she told you was the truth, that is all the evidence you need. Id. at ¶ 24, 98 P.3d at 151. The appellant argues that both the Lopez statement and the above-quoted statement made by the prosecutor in this case resulted in improper vouching. [¶ 20] The appellant's reliance on Lopez is misplaced. To begin, we did not find that the statement in Lopez was improper, but only quoted it in the course of examining the improper vouching testimony of the expert witness. Furthermore, the substance and context of the two statements is different. A more analogous statement can be found in Teniente v. State, 2007 WY 165, 169 P.3d 512 (Wyo.2007), where the prosecutor made the following comment regarding an eye-witness's testimony in a first-degree murder trial: [W]e have one eyewitness, one eyewitness that stepped up to the plate February 18th, and said, `I was there. This is what happened.'.... . . . . He saw what happened, and he decided to step forward and tell the truth, even though the first time, it's against his very own brother, and now the second time, against his cousin. Courage. Id. at ¶ 32, 169 P.3d at 525. Both the statement in Teniente and the statement made here are comments about the courage of the witness to come forward in the face of opposition and testify truthfully. We sustained the prosecutor's statement in Teniente holding: While a prosecutor cannot continuously and repeatedly express his opinions or beliefs as to the truth or falsity of testimony or the innocence or guilt of the defendant, he may comment on evidence and present reasonable inferences that logically flow from that evidence including making a reasonable inference that a witness is not truthful, assuming that the evidence supports such an inference. . . . . Teniente claims that this is improper vouching for the credibility of [the witness]. We do not interpret the comments in the same fashion. The prosecutor was not vouching for the credibility of [the witness]. Rather, he was arguing reasonable inferences, drawn from evidence introduced at trial, that [the witness] testimony could be seen as reliable. Id. at ¶¶ 31-33, 169 P.3d at 524-25. In neither statement does the prosecutor express a personal belief or opinion about the credibility of the witness, witness's testimony, or truth or falsity of the evidence. Given the context in which they were made, we find neither statement to be improper. However, we note that the Teniente statement that the witness came forward to tell the truth draws closer to the line of misconduct than the statement made here. The Teniente statement, made in a different context, might reasonably lead a jury to believe the prosecutor has a personal belief or opinion about the credibility of that witness. In contrast, the prosecutor's statement here, that the witness rose her right hand and swore to tell the truth, carries no express message that the prosecutor believes or has an opinion about the credibility of the witness but merely reiterates what the jury already knows and witnessed.