Opinion ID: 169067
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Photographs and Testimony

Text: M r. Lamb also contends that the admission of certain photographs and parts of the victims’ testimony was more prejudicial than probative, improperly influencing the jury and resulting in an excessive sentence. Specifically, he asserts that his constitutional rights were violated by the admission of two 2 Under state law, when the defendant adequately raises self-defense at trial, the burden shifts to the state to prove the defendant did not act in selfdefense. See Howell v. State, 882 P.2d 1086, 1092 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994). -6- photographs (showing one of the victims in a hospital bed) and testimony from both victims regarding medical complications. Because he does not allege a violation of a specific constitutional right, he is entitled to habeas relief “only if the alleged error was so grossly prejudicial that it fatally infected the trial and denied the fundamental fairness that is the essence of due process.” Willingham v. M ullin, 296 F.3d 917, 928 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). Furthermore, we are mindful that “[f]ederal habeas review is not available to correct state law evidentiary errors; rather it is limited to violations of constitutional rights.” Thornburg v. M ullin, 422 F.3d 1113, 1128–29 (10th Cir. 2005). W e therefore review the OCCA’s determination of this claim to determine whether its decision is a reasonable application of federal due process principles. In this context, this Court has held that federal due process “will be satisfied only if the probative value of [the challenged] evidence is . . . greatly outweighed by the prejudice flowing from its admission.” Welch, 451 F.3d at 688 (quotation omitted) (alterations in original). The OCCA determined that the photographs were relevant to proving the charged offense of shooting with intent to kill. In particular, the court noted that the photographs were relevant to showing the nature, extent, and location of the victim’s gunshot wound and that they did not show any complications arising from the wound. Consequently, their probative value was not outweighed by their prejudicial effect. The D istrict Court agreed that the photographs were not so -7- grossly prejudicial as to infect the trial with unfairness. And we agree. As the District Court noted, we have denied habeas relief in a factually similar case. See Willingham, 296 F.3d at 928–29 (rejecting petitioner’s argument that victim’s photographs entitled him to habeas relief when the OCCA had held that the photographs w ere relevant to the intent-to-kill element of the offense); see also Thornburg, 422 F.3d at 1128–29 (holding that OCCA’s decision affirming trial court’s admission of “disturbing” photographs of the victim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law ); Smallwood v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 1257, 1274–75 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that photographs did not render proceedings fundamentally unfair in light of their probative nature, the nature of the crime, and evidence of the defendant’s guilt). Similarly, the admission of testimony by both victims regarding their medical complications did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. Again, the OCCA concluded that the probative value of this evidence was not outweighed by the danger of prejudice, noting the testimony’s relevance in proving that M r. Lamb shot the victims w ith the requisite intent to kill. After review ing this testimony, which included the victims’ accounts of complications resulting from the gunshot wounds (namely, a “near coma” and paralysis), the D istrict Court concluded that the admission of the testimony was not fundamentally unfair and the OCCA’s determination was reasonable. Because the probative value of the testimony was not greatly outweighed by any prejudicial effect, we agree that the -8- OCCA’s resolution of this claim was reasonable and in accordance with federal law. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 819 (1991) (“[T]he assessment of harm caused by the defendant as a result of the crime charged has understandably been an important concern of the criminal law , both in determining the elements of the offense and in determining the appropriate punishment.”). Finally, to the extent M r. Lamb argues that admission of this testimony violates O klahoma law prohibiting the admission of “victim impact evidence” in “unenhanced, non-capital crimes,” see Perryman v. State, 990 P.2d 900, 905 (O kla. Crim. App. 1999), his argument fails. The OCCA considered this argument and determined that the testimony did not constitute victim impact evidence under state law. Because this is a state law question, we may not consider it or question the OCCA’s decision. M anlove v. Tansy, 981 F.2d 473, 478 (10th Cir. 1992).