Opinion ID: 520335
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Nature of the Offenses Charged

Text: 39 With regard to the nature of the crimes charged in Counts Two through Nine, the government makes two arguments. First, the government contends that the Congressional concern about the safety of nuclear power plants which is reflected in the Atomic Energy Act demands that violations of the Act be treated as continuing offenses for limitations purposes. Second, the government argues that since the defendants are charged with possessing and using a nuclear power facility in violation of NRC license conditions, and since possession and use imply a continuing course of conduct, Congress must have intended that the offenses charged be construed as continuing ones. We do not find either of these arguments persuasive. 40 While the Atomic Energy Act undoubtedly reflects a serious Congressional concern about the safety of nuclear power facilities, this fact alone is insufficient to justify construing violations of the Act as continuing offenses. In Toussie, after concluding that defendant's failure to register for the draft did not constitute a continuing offense, the Supreme Court made these pertinent remarks: 41 It should be emphasized that this conclusion does not mean that the gravity of this offense is in any way diminished. Failure to register is subject to heavy criminal penalties. The only question is whether those penalties must result from a prosecution begun within five years or whether they can be delayed for a longer period. 42 397 U.S. at 123, 90 S.Ct. at 864. We do not believe that the Toussie doctrine permits us to construe offenses as continuing ones based upon our perception of the seriousness of the crimes charged. If Congress had deemed it desirable to prescribe a longer statute of limitations for violations of the Atomic Energy Act, it could easily have done so. We decline the government's invitation to exercise this legislative function. 43 The government next argues that the possessory nature of the crimes charged mandates that they be treated as continuing offenses. In support of this argument, the government relies upon the fact that section 2131, which provides the statutory basis for four counts in the indictment, proscribes the possession and use of a nuclear facility in violation of NRC license conditions. The government contends that possession and use imply a continuing course of conduct, and that the charged offenses therefore must be construed as continuing crimes for limitations purposes. 44 In evaluating this argument, we first note that the government has cited no cases which hold that a possessory crime constitutes a continuing offense for statute of limitations purposes. Instead, the government relies upon several cases which address whether a defendant's possession of contraband items at different points in time properly may give rise to multiple counts in an indictment. In United States v. Jones, 533 F.2d 1387 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 964, 97 S.Ct. 2919, 53 L.Ed.2d 1059 (1977), for example, we addressed whether defendant's illegal possession of the same firearm at five different points in time could provide the basis for five separate counts in an indictment. We held that because defendant's possession of the firearm involved a continuing course of conduct, the alleged offenses constituted only one crime. In the course of so holding, we made the following remarks: 45 Possession is a course of conduct, not an act; by prohibiting possession Congress intended to punish as one offense all of the acts of dominion which demonstrate a continuing possessory interest in a firearm. If Congress had wished to punish each act of dominion it could have done so easily by forbidding the acts of dominion instead of the course of conduct. 46 Id. at 1391. 47 Relying upon this language, the government argues that the continuing nature of the possessory offenses charged in this case demands that they be treated as continuing crimes for limitations purposes. We disagree. In Jones, the charged offense involved the simple and continuous act of possessing a contraband item. In this case, by contrast, the defendants' possessory actions became unlawful only upon their alleged failure to comply with the pertinent safety regulations. Given the sparse language of the statutory provisions under which the defendants are charged, the district court was correct in its determination that no crime under these provisions can be described without reference to the regulatory provisions upon which the grant of a license is premised. 657 F.Supp. at 855 (emphasis added). As noted earlier, those regulations provided that operators of covered nuclear facilities must submit to the NRC by March 19, 1981 plans and schedules for making certain plant modifications, as well as implement those modifications in accordance with a prescribed time schedule. These regulations provide the substantive bases for the charged offenses and define the nature of those offenses. Since we find nothing inherent about failing to submit accurate reports or make plant modifications which demands that these actions (or omissions) be construed as continuing crimes, we find Jones to be inapposite. See United States v. Sloan, 389 F.Supp. 526, 528 (S.D.N.Y.1975) (holding that crime of failing to make, keep and preserve certain financial records did not constitute a continuing offense under Toussie ). Therefore, despite the presence of the possession and use language in section 2131, we reject the government's assertions in this regard. 48 Finally, we note that the defendants did not attempt to conceal the alleged violations from the NRC or otherwise preclude the government from discovering the alleged offenses. Under different circumstances, a possessory crime might properly be found to constitute a continuing offense because of the nature of the defendant's actions. In this case, however, the government was aware well prior to the expiration of the limitations period that the defendants might be guilty of criminal violations. While the government was not able to obtain an indictment until September of 1986, the record shows that a federal grand jury began hearing testimony regarding this matter in mid-1984. Moreover, although the government sought and obtained extensions of the limitations period for the charges in Count One of the indictment, no extensions were sought for the charges contained in Counts Two through Nine. We do not believe that the government should be permitted to correct its own oversight by unilaterally extending the limitations period. We therefore conclude that this case is a particularly inappropriate one in which to construe the crimes charged as continuing offenses. 49 In sum, we do not believe that Congress must assuredly have intended that the crimes charged in Counts Two through Nine of the indictment be treated as continuing offenses. We therefore hold that the limitations period on Counts Two through Nine began to run on March 19, 1981 when the NRC submissions were due. Since the indictment was brought in September of 1986, more than five years after the alleged offenses were complete, the district court properly dismissed Counts Two through Nine as time-barred under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3282. 1