Opinion ID: 1439594
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: August 3, 1999 October 14, 1999

Text: Appellant's trial was initially set for August 24, 1999. On August 3, Appellant filed a motion requesting a continuance. The trial court entered an order on August 5, continuing the trial until October 14. That order reflected that the continuance was chargeable to Appellant, for a total of seventy days. This court has repeatedly held that delays resulting from continuances requested by the defendant or defense counsel are excluded from the calculation of the speedy-trial period. See, e.g., Romes, 356 Ark. 26, 144 S.W.3d 750; Gamble v. State, 350 Ark. 168, 85 S.W.3d 520 (2002); Camargo v. State, 346 Ark. 118, 55 S.W.3d 255 (2001). In addition, the period from August 3 until August 5, when Appellant's motion was pending is a period properly excluded under Ark. R.Crim. P. 28.3(a). As this court stated in Gwin v. State, 340 Ark. 302, 9 S.W.3d 501 (2000), the period of delay attributable to a hearing on a pretrial motion is excludable. Thus, the State has established that seventy-two days are properly excludable.