Opinion ID: 1258573
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Prosecutor's Use of the Phrase Intestinal Fortitude

Text: Defendant also challenges on appeal a question asked individually of prospective jurors by the prosecutor at jury selection: Whether the individual possessed the intestinal fortitude to vote for a sentence of death. Defendant initially noted his objection to the prosecutor's use of this phrase and was overruled, but thereafter failed to preserve this assignment of error for appellate review with further timely objection. Alternatively, defendant has asserted plain error. Regardless of the applicable standard of review, we find no error related to this issue, plain or otherwise. Defendant attempts to distinguish this Court's previous decision in State v. Oliver, 309 N.C. 326, 307 S.E.2d 304 (1983). In Oliver, this Court found no error in the prosecutor's use of the words backbone and intestinal fortitude, respectively, when questioning two prospective jurors who equivocated on imposition of the death penalty for the specific purpose of determining, in light of their equivocation, whether they could comply with the law. Id. at 355, 307 S.E.2d at 323. The Court held that the defendants had failed to demonstrate prejudice since these comments could be viewed as favorable, rather than unfavorable to defendants' position as they tended to encourage jurors who equivocated on imposition of the death penalty to serve. Id. As stated in Oliver, we review prosecutorial remarks in light of both the context in which they were made and the overall factual circumstances to which they referred. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, no less than in Oliver, the prosecutor's questions were made not to badger or intimidate these [prospective jurors], but rather to determine . . . whether they could comply with the law. Id. It is evident from the transcript of jury selection proceedings that the prosecutor intended this question of intestinal fortitude to elicit from prospective jurors answers which would have provided grounds for a challenge for cause. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1212(8), (9) (2007). In fact, the phrase intestinal fortitude was simply substituted when defendant's objection to the word courage was sustained. Moreover, this Court has previously found no abuse of discretion or prejudicial error with respect to similar inquiries which have implicated a prospective juror's metaphorical physiological capacity to recommend a sentence of death when called upon to do so by law. See, e.g., State v. Flippen, 349 N.C. 264, 275, 506 S.E.2d 702, 709 (1998) (questions concerning courage of prospective jurors), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1135, 119 S.Ct. 1813, 143 L.Ed.2d 1015 (1999); State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 130, 400 S.E.2d 712, 729 (1991) (questions concerning whether prospective jurors were strong enough); State v. Hinson, 310 N.C. 245, 252, 311 S.E.2d 256, 261 (question concerning backbone of an equivocating prospective juror), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 839, 105 S.Ct. 138, 83 L.Ed.2d 78 (1984). Similarly, the prosecutor's question in the instant case was not posed to prospective jurors in a way that might affect their impartiality, and the trial court therefore committed no prejudicial error in overruling defendant's objection. Defendant also argues, without citing any authority, that his trial counsel were ineffective to the extent they failed to note a timely objection to the prosecutor's questions. As we have applied an abuse of discretion standard of review to defendant's argument and have found this argument to be without merit, we need not reach any ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to this issue as they have been rendered moot. Accordingly, defendant's related assignments of error are overruled.