Opinion ID: 1386258
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: history of the proceedings and issues presented

Text: Following jury verdict and death sentence, initial appeal was taken with five issues stated: (1) right to individual voir dire of jurors; (2) peremptory challenges used to create a death qualified jury; (3) insufficient evidence of intent to kill to justify the death penalty; (4) duplicate use of robbery and an offense committed for pecuniary gain as aggravating factors; and (5) proportionality of the death penalty. In Engberg v. State, 686 P.2d 541, 544 (Wyo.), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1077, 105 S.Ct. 577, 83 L.Ed.2d 516 (1984) ( Engberg I ), this court observed that [t]he only factual issue at the trial of this case was the identity of the perpetrator. In decision, this court found [t]he desideration and methodology of voir dire examination of the jurors was discretionary. Id. at 547. On the second issue, use of peremptory challenges going beyond Witherspoon expendables, Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, reh'g denied 393 U.S. 898, 89 S.Ct. 67, 21 L.Ed.2d 186 (1968), we said: Within the limits imposed by Swain v. State of Alabama, supra [380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759, reh'g denied 381 U.S. 921, 85 S.Ct. 1528, 14 L.Ed.2d 442 (1965)], peremptory challenges must be recognized as partisan in nature and idiosyncratic in application. They are part of the tools of interested and able advocates. As such they always have been viewed as wholly discretionary and beyond inquiry with respect to motivation and intention. Engberg I, 686 P.2d at 549. The intent to kill issue was addressed by this court in decision that intentional homicide would not be a requirement for the felony murder death penalty sentence. The most significant issue addressed in Engberg I was dual use of murder for pecuniary gain and robbery as distinct aggravating circumstances. In validating the instruction, this court concluded that the rule [permitting submission of both as separate circumstances] is premised upon an assumption that the number of aggravating circumstances has some independent significance. Id. at 553. This was the thesis of aggregating numerically aggravating circumstances. Finally, Engberg I determined that the death penalty was neither excessive nor disproportionate when compared with other capital cases in Wyoming. Id. at 555. Initial appellate briefing was apparently prepared by law school students in the Defender Aid Program at the University of Wyoming. The appellate attorney in the public defender's office left that position and new counsel filed a petition for rehearing first presenting what is now the Lockhart-Lowenfield issue, Collins v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1013, 106 S.Ct. 546, 88 L.Ed.2d 475 (1985); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568, reh'g denied 485 U.S. 944, 108 S.Ct. 1126, 99 L.Ed.2d 286 (1988), of use of the aggregative factor to achieve the felony murder status and then use of the same factor for an aggravating death penalty circumstance. The issue was foreclosed to Engberg by the denial of the petition for rehearing. In this second appeal ( Engberg II ), following trial court denial of post-conviction relief, we are now presented with a 212-page appellant brief stating additional or differently phrased issues: ISSUE 1    the court's refusal to permit appellant to call an expert on eye-witness identification was error which deprived appellant of his right to a fundamentally fair trial and his right to compulsory process. ISSUE 2    the State's failure to disclose its use of hypnosis as means of enhancing Kay Otto's memory violated its ethical obligations and denied appellant his right to due process of law, his right of confrontation, and his right to effective assistance of counsel. ISSUE 3 (a)    appellant was denied due process of law by the extradition procedure used to bring him to Wyoming such that the proceedings here must be declared null and void. (b)    appellant was denied due process by the introduction of evidence that he had to be beaten by the police officers who arrested him in order to prevent him from fleeing. ISSUE 4    the State's introduction of evidence showing that appellant frequently used aliases denied him his right to a fundamentally fair trial. ISSUE 5 (a)    appellant's rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution were violated when evidence that he refused to wear a stocking cap so that he could be photographed was introduced at his trial and argued as evidence of guilt. (b)    appellant's right to confront witnesses was denied him by the court's refusal to permit cross-examination of the police officer who photographed him concerning appellant's medical condition. ISSUE 6 (a)    a defendant's spouse can invoke spousal privilege and decline to testify when the defendant seeks to have the spouse testify. (b)    the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution were violated by the trial judge's erroneous ruling that appellant could not call Donna Engberg as a witness, cross-examine her, nor introduce her prior statements for impeachment purposes. (c)    a defendant's spouse who refuses to testify is an unavailable witness whose hearsay statements may be admitted into evidence. ISSUE 7    the use of a conclusive presumption to convict appellant of first degree murder is plain error and requires reversal of the conviction. ISSUE 8    appellant's rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution were violated by the introduction of evidence seized by the police during a warrantless search of appellant's trailer. ISSUE 9    the testimony of the ballistics expert was incompetent and should have been disregarded, and should be disregarded now, and thus whether there is insufficient evidence to support the conviction. ISSUE 10 (a)    the prosecution's use and manipulation of the press prior to appellant's trial deprived appellant of his right to a fair trial. (b)    appellant's right to effective assistance of counsel was denied him by his initial court-appointed attorney's failure to combat the prosecution's misuse of the media. ISSUE 11    the trial court's failure to excuse venireman Alberts for cause deprived appellant of his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. ISSUE 12    the voir dire procedure used at appellant's trial denied him his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. ISSUE 13 (a)    the introduction of evidence in the penalty phase that appellant had escaped from the authorities in Missouri denied him his right to due process and a fundamentally fair finding that the death penalty should be imposed. (b)    the prosecutor's closing argument in the penalty phase of the trial deprived appellant of his right to due process and fundamentally fair trial when the prosecutor argued appellant needed to be executed in order to restrain him and when the Wyoming Supreme Court has previously recognized that kind of argument is only proper where the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance is involved. ISSUE 14    the court's refusal to permit appellant the opportunity to present evidence of a mitigating circumstance, the cruelty of the manner of execution, denied appellant his right to due process of law and a fundamentally fair finding to impose the death penalty. ISSUE 15    appellant's right to due process and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment was violated by the statutory presumption in favor of death under Wyoming law which requires the defendant to bear the burden of demonstrating that sufficient mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances so as to warrant leniency. ISSUE 16    appellant's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and to due process were violated by the jury's finding as aggravating circumstances that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain and while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery when the robbery had already been used to elevate the crime to capital murder. ISSUE 17    the cumulative nature of the error is such that, regardless of the harmlessness of any one error, together they prejudiced appellant's rights to due process, fundamental fairness, and a reliable determination that the death penalty should be imposed. ISSUE 18    appellant was afforded [in]effective assistance of counsel during his appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court. ISSUE 19    it was improper for the office of the attorney general to represent the State in post-conviction proceedings to urge that an assistant attorney general's proper representation was a procedural bar to the issues raised in appellant's petition for post-conviction relief. ISSUE 20    this court's discussion and holding in prior cases with regard to petitions for post-conviction relief ignore the plain and obvious statutory language and establish a procedure which is violative of fundamental fairness[,] due process and equal procedure [sic] and whether it has established a confusing and unworkable process wherein courts simply dismiss petitions for post-conviction relief to get rid of them. The State frames these issues as: Argument I Was there error in the procedures followed in the lower court on Engberg's petition for post-conviction relief? Argument II Was it error to admit evidence of consciousness of guilt at trial? Argument III Was Engberg's motion to suppress evidence seized at the trailer properly denied? Argument IV Did any impropriety or illegality in Engberg's extradition to Wyoming affect the jurisdiction of the Wyoming courts? Argument V Was Engberg denied a fair trial due to pretrial publicity; was Engberg denied effective trial counsel due to pretrial publicity? Argument VI Was the jury selection process    proper? Argument VII Was the admission or exclusion of expert testimony discretionary and did the exercise of that discretion affect a constitutional right in this case? Argument VIII Was Engberg deprived of a fair trial, due process or confrontation by the failure of the State to disclose Kay Otto's contact with a hypnotist? Argument IX Was Engberg denied due process by the trial court's ruling that his spouse had a privilege not to testify? Argument X Was evidence of Engberg's status as an escapee properly admitted in the penalty phase; was the prosecution's closing argument at the penalty phase proper? Argument XI Was Engberg's proffer of evidence in mitigation to show the effects of lethal gas, etc., properly excluded; is this issue moot? Argument XII Is there a presumption in favor of the death penalty under Wyoming statutes in violation of due process or cruel and unusual punishment? Argument XIII Was the jury    properly instructed as to statutory aggravating circumstances; was Engberg denied due process or subjected to cruel and unusual punishment? Argument XIV Did Engberg receive effective assistance of counsel on appeal? Argument XV Does the cumulative nature of any errors in this case warrant relief? Argument XVI Is the attorney general's entire staff disqualified from post-conviction proceedings because one of Engberg's four attorneys on direct appeal has since become an assistant attorney general?[ [1] ] II.