Opinion ID: 794522
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plain Error Claims

Text: 13 Rice contends that the district court erred with respect to certain evidentiary rulings and jury instructions, but Rice's trial counsel failed to object to any of the allegedly erroneous rulings at trial. Where trial counsel failed to raise an error at trial, this Court can correct the error where there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 550 (8th Cir.2005) (quotation omitted). Critically, Rice bears the burden of persuasion with respect to proving that his rights were prejudiced, and he normally can meet that requirement only by showing that the alleged error affected the case's outcome. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). Where he has met his burden on the first three prongs, the Court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Pirani, 406 F.3d at 550 (quotation omitted). We are unpersuaded that the district court committed any plain error requiring a new trial.
14 Rice argues that the district court plainly erred when it admitted alleged prior bad acts evidence consisting of testimony suggesting that Rice was abusive toward FSA employees. A review of the record, however, makes it clear that, although the Government elicited some testimony on the subject, it was primarily Rice who elicited testimony and made arguments about the poor relationship he had with FSA. As Rice's trial counsel stated in his opening, [t]he evidence is going to show that there was a long period of conflict between Darwin and various people at the FSA. Rice's trial counsel also elicited testimony that Rice was volatile when he dealt with FSA employees and that, because FSA employees were instructed not to contact Rice directly due to Rice's volatility by the attorney that represented Rice in the loan process, loan documents were changed without directly discussing the changes with Rice. Rice's trial counsel also explained at sidebar that part of the defense is that the FSA engaged in fraud and that the FSA has not acted properly in this whole transaction and has an ax to grind. In closing argument, Rice's trial counsel again addressed the subject, stating that this case is about misunderstanding, it's about anger, failure to communicate, and all those other problems, personality problems ... that ... infect relationships between people. That is what this case is about. 15 We cannot say that admission of such evidence constituted plain error that affected Rice's substantial rights or that the fairness of the proceeding was seriously affected simply because the district court allowed evidence on a subject that Rice repeatedly raised. See, e.g., United States v. Tulk, 171 F.3d 596, 600 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that plain error review of a prosecutor's use of a prior conviction was unavailable because the defendant's reference to his prior conviction in his opening statement deliberately waived his right to object); United States v. York, 830 F.2d 885, 892-93 (8th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (holding that there can be no reversible error where a defendant affirmatively introduced his confession in an effort to bolster his claim of entrapment because his own use of the confession opened the door) (quotation omitted). 16 Rice also argues that the district court committed plain error when it allowed hearsay evidence involving the activities of Rice's loan counsel, Rice's abusive behavior toward FSA employees and bank employees telling Rice he was not allowed to withdraw money from the supervised account without FSA consent. Having reviewed the record, we find that most of the statements that Rice claims were hearsay were not in fact hearsay, and we find no plain error with respect to the admission of any actual hearsay. Once again, Rice's own counsel elicited hearsay concerning Rice's loan counsel and Rice's abusive behavior. As such, for the reasons cited above, the admission of evidence on those subjects cannot constitute plain error requiring reversal. This is true even though the government also elicited a limited amount of testimony on the same subjects. Tulk, 171 F.3d at 600. Moreover, testimony describing the conduct of Rice's loan counsel and recounting the actual statements made by Rice's loan counsel do not constitute hearsay. Fed.R.Evid. 801(c) (generally, hearsay consists of an out-of-court statement ); Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(C)-(D) (admissions of agents of party-opponent generally are not hearsay). 17 Finally, to the extent that hearsay was admitted concerning what bank employees told Rice, we do not find that its admission constitutes plain error. There was an overwhelming amount of other evidence— testimony from FSA employees, agreements signed by Rice and cancelled checks reflecting that Rice previously obtained approval before withdrawing funds—showing that Rice well knew that he needed FSA approval before withdrawing funds. As such, the introduction of limited hearsay concerning what bank employees told Rice did not affect the outcome of the case or Rice's substantial rights.
18 Rice contends that the district court erroneously failed to give jury instructions defining knowingly or knowledge and intent to defraud and failed to instruct the jury on a good faith or advice of counsel defense. Jury instructions are adequate if, taken as a whole, [they] adequately advise the jury of the essential elements of the offenses charged and the burden of proof required of the government. United States v. Sherer, 653 F.2d 334, 337 (8th Cir.1981). We conclude that the instructions were adequate. 19 It is settled law that a district court's failure to define knowledge or knowingly does not constitute error, much less plain error. United States v. Smith, 635 F.2d 716, 720 (8th Cir.1980) (holding that there is no need to define knowledge because the word has the meaning assigned it in common usage, and a juror would already understand the word); see also United States v. Williams, 923 F.2d 76, 78 (8th Cir.1991) (per curiam) (In the Manual of Model Criminal Instructions for the District Courts of the Eighth Circuit ..., it is stated that `the Committee believes that in most cases the word knowingly does not need to be defined.' Clearly, it was not plain error to omit such a definition.). 20 Nor was it plain error to omit an instruction defining intent to defraud with respect to the § 658 charge as Rice claims. In United States v. Williams, 935 F.2d 1531, 1536-37 (8th Cir.1991), this Court held that failure to instruct the jury that intent to defraud was an essential element of a charge under § 658 was error but not plain error. Despite the omission of the intent to defraud element in its entirety, this Court affirmed because the evidence against the defendant was overwhelming and because intent and proof of intent were defined elsewhere in the instructions. Id. Critically, the Court opined that [w]e recognize that the addition of the third element or simply a definition of `intent to defraud' would have made the substantive § 658 instruction complete. Id. at 1536 (emphasis added). 21 In this case, the jury instructions offered the essential protections recognized as sufficient in Williams; that is, the instructions defined proof of intent and also contained intent to defraud as an element of a violation of § 658. The jury in this case also benefitted from a definition of fraudulent, as the jury instructions informed the jury that a statement is `fraudulent,' if known to be untrue, and made or caused to be made with intent. Moreover, just as in Williams, the evidence of Rice's § 658 violation is overwhelming. As discussed above, the evidence plainly supported a finding that Rice was aware of the requirement that any withdrawal from his supervised account be approved by FSA. He nevertheless went from branch to branch to find a teller who would allow the unapproved withdrawal. And he failed to return the funds when FSA again reminded Rice of the approval requirement and demanded he return the money he wrongfully withdrew. The evidence of Rice's guilt is overwhelming, and the failure to separately define intent to defraud cannot be said to have affected his substantial rights. 22 Rice also challenges the district court's failure to give, sua sponte, defense instructions addressing a good faith and advice of counsel defense. However, the failure sua sponte to instruct concerning a good faith defense was not plain error. The instructions in this case clearly informed the jury that it could not find Rice guilty unless it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Rice knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally made a false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation and that Rice knowingly concealed, removed, disposed of or converted to his own use or that of another money or accounts mortgaged or pledged to the [FSA] [and] acted with intent to defraud the [FSA]. The jury also received more specific definitions of false, fictitious, and fraudulent, all of which informed the jury that a statement that met any of those definitions must have been made with knowledge that it was untrue. Finally, a definition of reasonable doubt told the jury that, to find guilt, the proof must be of such a convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely on or act upon it. 23 These instructions, taken as a whole, fairly encompass the concept of good faith. The essence of a good-faith defense is that one who acts with honest intentions cannot be convicted of a crime requiring fraudulent intent. Sherer, 653 F.2d at 338. A defendant who knowingly made a false statement or acted with intent to defraud cannot fairly be said to have acted in good faith, see United States v. Rashid, 383 F.3d 769, 778 (8th Cir.2004) (holding in substantially identical circumstances that [w]e find no error, much less plain error, in the district court's refusal to give the requested good faith instruction), sentence vacated on Booker grounds sub nom. Abu Nahia v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 300, 163 L.Ed.2d 36 (2005), and we are unpersuaded that the jury would have reached a different conclusion had a good faith instruction been given. 24 Rice also contends that he was entitled to an advice of counsel instruction because he consulted an attorney with respect to the loan documents and had counsel at all meetings, including the meeting at which he made the false statement. However, a defendant is not immunized from criminal prosecution merely because he consulted an attorney in connection with a particular transaction. Rather, to rely upon the advice of counsel in his defense, a defendant must show that he: (i) fully disclosed all material facts to his attorney before seeking advice; and (ii) actually relied on his counsel's advice in the good faith belief that his conduct was legal. Covey v. United States, 377 F.3d 903, 908 (8th Cir.2004). Here, Rice cited no evidence indicating that Rice told his loan counsel he sold his soybeans the day before the loan closing, that Rice obtained any advice from his loan counsel about representing to FSA employees that his financial circumstances had not materially changed or that Rice consulted his attorney about withdrawing pledged funds from the supervised account. A district court need not give any defense instruction where the facts do not support the defense. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 364 F.3d 934, 945-46 (8th Cir.2004). Rice failed to establish a factual basis necessary to support such an instruction, and there is no error, much less reversible plain error. 25 At bottom, we conclude that, taken as a whole, the jury instructions adequately advise[d] the jury of the essential elements of the offenses charged and the burden of proof required of the government, Sherer, 653 F.2d at 337, and the district court did not plainly err when it omitted the definitions and instructions that Rice now claims were required.