Opinion ID: 1591968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: transference of surface estate

Text: The next inquiry is whether the warranty deed executed by Floyd E. Wright and his wife nonetheless conveyed the mineral rights to plaintiffs, as the district court found, and, if not, whether plaintiffs acquired the mineral estate in some other way. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 76-268 (Reissue 1990) provides as follows: If any conveyance of the title to, or any right or interest in real estate ... shall be made after July 24, 1917, to any person ... as trustee without naming any beneficiary and without any declaration of the terms of the trust having been executed and recorded in the manner prescribed by statute, in the office of the register of deeds of the county in which such real estate is located, it shall be conclusively presumed that such person... as trustee, has power and authority to convey the title, right and interest in such real estate which has been conveyed to him ... and a purchaser from such trustee shall not be bound to inquire or ascertain the terms of the trust, unless before such conveyance ... has been made by such trustee, the person claiming a beneficial interest therein shall have filed a notice as provided in section 76-267, in the office of the register of deeds of the county in which said real estate is located. The notice as provided in section 76-267 is a statement, supported by the affidavit of the person claiming a beneficial interest, identifying the affiant's residence and giving a description of the property and the affiant's interest therein. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 76-267 (Reissue 1990). Floyd E. Wright was not only trustee of the mineral trust but was also a beneficiary. As such, he was a person claiming a beneficial interest in the minerals. His affidavit gives his residence, describes the property, and states the interest claimed. The affidavit was filed with the register of deeds. It therefore qualifies as notice under §§ 76-267 and 76-268. The question at this point is: Was the notice filed before such conveyance was made by such trustee? All deeds, mortgages and other instruments of writing which are required to be or which under the laws of this state may be recorded, shall take effect and be in force from and after the time of delivering the same to the register of deeds for recording, and not before, as to all creditors and subsequent purchasers in good faith without notice; and all such deeds, mortgages and other instruments shall be adjudged void as to all such creditors and subsequent purchasers without notice whose deeds, mortgages or other instruments shall be first recorded; Provided, that such deeds, mortgages and other instruments shall be valid between the parties. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 76-238 (Reissue 1990). Both the warranty deed and the affidavit are instruments within the meaning of this provision. The affidavit was recorded 1 minute before the deed was filed and therefore took effect before the deed. Thus, there is no conclusive presumption that Floyd E. Wright had the power and authority to convey title to the mineral estate. Because they had notice, plaintiffs had a duty under § 76-268 to inquire or ascertain the terms of the trust. Moreover, since, as first established in part IV, supra, those seeking to quiet title must rely on the strength of their own title and not on the weakness of the title of others, plaintiffs had the burden of demonstrating that Floyd E. Wright had the power to sell the mineral estate. This they failed to do. While a trustee acting under the Nebraska Trustees' Powers Act, Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 30-2819 et seq. (Reissue 1989), might have such authority, the sale in question predates that act by several years. The applicable rule, therefore, is that found in Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 190 at 418 (1959): The trustee can properly sell trust property if (a) a power of sale is conferred in specific words, or (b) such sale is necessary or appropriate to enable the trustee to carry out the purposes of the trust, unless such sale is forbidden in specific words by the terms of the trust or it appears from the terms of the trust that the property was to be retained in specie in the trust. See, also, Clark v. Fleischmann, 81 Neb. 445, 116 N.W. 290 (1908) (trustee of testamentary trust could not sell trust corpus unless will provided express power of sale). We have no evidence that a power of sale was conferred in the agreement creating the trust, nor was any evidence adduced to indicate the sale was necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of the trust. We thus cannot conclude that Floyd E. Wright had the power to sell the mineral estate. Plaintiffs nonetheless contend that Neb.Rev.Stat. § 76-269 (Reissue 1990) prevents defendants from attacking the warranty deed executed by Floyd E. Wright and his spouse, which by its terms purports to transfer the entire estate, both surface and mineral. Section 76-269 provides, in relevant part, that no action shall be maintained whereby to set aside, cancel, annul, declare void or invalid any deed of conveyance ... or other instrument affecting the title to any real estate, which has been recorded in the office of the register of deeds ... for more than fifteen years prior to the commencement of such action, and purporting to be executed by any executor, administrator, guardian, receiver or trustee, notwithstanding any defect in, or absence of, any record of the court granting authority to such executor, administrator, guardian, receiver or trustee to execute the same. Leaving aside the questions of whether the deed purports to be executed by Floyd E. Wright as trustee, whether the deed purports to convey the mineral estate, and whether this is an action to set aside or void the deed, § 76-269 is nevertheless inapplicable to the facts before us. The action was commenced when plaintiffs filed their petition. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-501 (Reissue 1989). The petition was filed June 21, 1988. The deed was recorded August 13, 1973. This action was thus commenced less than 15 years after the deed was recorded and is therefore not within the ambit of § 76-269. Finally, plaintiffs argue that, in any event, they acquired the mineral estate by adverse possession. One who claims title by adverse possession must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has been in actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious, and adverse possession under claim of ownership for the full 10-year statutory period. Paasch v. Brown, 217 Neb. 761, 351 N.W.2d 74 (1984). The sufficiency of the possession is dependent upon the character of the land and the use which can reasonably be made of it. Young v. Lacy, 221 Neb. 511, 378 N.W.2d 192 (1985). Plaintiffs' claim of adverse possession must therefore be judged in reference to the fact that the property claimed is a severed mineral estate. When, as here, there has been a severance of the mineral estate from the surface estate, mere occupancy of the surface is insufficient to establish title to the minerals by adverse possession. An actual, public, notorious and uninterrupted working of the minerals for the statutory period is generally required. The mere execution, delivery, or recording of oil and gas leases or mineral deeds will not constitute adverse possession. H. Williams & C. Meyers, Oil and Gas Law § 224.4 at 54 (abridged ed. 1984). In order to bring this statement into line with Nebraska's law on adverse possession, we add that the working of the minerals must also be under claim of ownership. Since plaintiffs have offered no evidence that there has been any actual working of the minerals, their claim of adverse possession must also fail.