Opinion ID: 2450080
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Bentley case

Text: In appellate review of ordinary equity cases there are two different components of the chancellor's ruling that are considered. The appellate court will not set aside a chancellor's finding of fact unless it is clearly erroneous. This deference is granted because of the regard the appellate court has for the chancellor's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Ark.R.Civ.P. 52. However, a chancellor's conclusion of law is not entitled to the same deference. If a chancellor erroneously applies the law and the appellant suffers prejudice, the erroneous ruling is reversed. Manifestly, a chancellor does not have a better opportunity to apply the law than does the appellate court. In an early zoning case, which was actually determined on appeal by a chancellor's finding of fact, we wrote that the findings of fact made by the court are abundantly supported by the testimony, and as a result, we affirmed the ruling by the chancellor. City of Little Rock v. Bentley, 204 Ark. 727, 731, 165 S.W.2d 890, 892 (1942). Unfortunately, through seemingly rote citation, the Bentley statement became the Bentley dogma. As an illustration, in Olsen v. City of Little Rock, 241 Ark. 155, 406 S.W.2d 706 (1966), we wrote: In a case of this kind the chancellor should sustain the city's action unless he finds it to be arbitrary. No matter which way the chancellor decides the question, we reverse his decree only if we find it to be against the preponderance of the evidence. City of Little Rock v. Garner, 235 Ark. 362, 360 S.W.2d 116 (1962). Id. at 156, 406 S.W.2d at 706. The Bentley doctrine was criticized in a 1969 law review article, Morton Gitelman, Judicial Review of Zoning in Arkansas, 23 Ark.L.Rev. 22 (1969), which, in part, states that under Bentley , the appellate court does not even mention whether the decisions of both the planning commission and city council are supported by evidence. Id. at 34. In 1981, in the case of City of Little Rock v. Breeding , we returned to affirming only the chancellor's findings of fact under Ark. R.Civ.P. 52, and held that a trial court could not substitute its judgment for that of the legislative branch. Thus, we have retreated from the Bentley dogma, even though we have never expressly overruled it.