Opinion ID: 889474
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legal Basis of Scheffer's Right-to-Counsel Claim

Text: ¶ 15 As noted, Scheffer filed a motion to suppress his statements and the evidence obtained during the interview with McDermott on the ground that he had been denied his right to counsel. According to Scheffer, he made an unambiguous request for counsel, at which point all questioning should have stopped, and because it did not, any evidence obtained from the interrogation should have been suppressed. On appeal, the parties disagree as to which constitutional provisions govern this claim. In fact, Scheffer accuses the District Court and the State of having confused his Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights. It is necessary at the outset, therefore, before laying out the specific facts underlying Scheffer's claim, to clarify which right to counsel he was entitled to during the interrogation. ¶ 16 There are two distinct rights to counsel recognized under the Constitution. The first is the right to counsel in all criminal prosecutions. This right is expressly recognized by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. This right is also expressly recognized by Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution, which states that [i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel. The right of the accused to the assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions is limited by its terms: It does not attach until a prosecution has been commenced, i.e., until adversary judicial criminal proceedings have been initiated, whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment. Rothgery v. Gillespie Co., 554 U.S. 191, 128 S.Ct. 2578, 2583, 171 L.Ed.2d 366 (2008) (Sixth Amendment); State v. Schneider, 2008 MT 408, ¶¶ 16-23, 347 Mont. 215, 197 P.3d 1020 (Article II, Section 24). Indeed, the core of this right is a trial right, ensuring that the prosecution's case is subjected to the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing. Kansas v. Ventris, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1841, 1845, 173 L.Ed.2d 801 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Schneider, ¶ 23 (the Article II, Section 24 right to counsel is a trial-based right). However, because today's law enforcement machinery involves critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1931, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment and Article II, Section 24 extends (once the adversary judicial process has been initiated) to having counsel present at all pretrial critical interactions between the defendant and the State, see id. at 224, 226, 87 S.Ct. at 1931, 1932; Ventris, 129 S.Ct. at 1845; Montejo v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 2085, 173 L.Ed.2d 955 (2009); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170, 106 S.Ct. 477, 484, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); Ranta v. State, 1998 MT 95, ¶ 17, 288 Mont. 391, 958 P.2d 670. ¶ 17 The second right to counsel recognized under the Constitution derives from the privilege against self-incrimination and applies specifically to custodial interrogations. The Fifth Amendment provides that [n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. Likewise, Article II, Section 25 guarantees that [n]o person shall be compelled to testify against himself in a criminal proceeding. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves. Id. at 467, 86 S.Ct. at 1624. Furthermore, because the modern practice of in-custody interrogation contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely, the Supreme Court concluded that adequate protective devices are necessary to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 458, 467, 86 S.Ct. at 1619, 1624; see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434-35, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 2331, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000); State v. Morrisey, 2009 MT 201, ¶¶ 27-28, 351 Mont. 144, 214 P.3d 708. One of the protective devices recognized by the Court is the right of the individual to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer present with him during the custodial interrogation. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471, 474, 86 S.Ct. at 1626, 1628; see also Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2089 (Under Miranda 's prophylactic protection of the right against compelled self-incrimination, any suspect subject to custodial interrogation has the right to have a lawyer present if he so requests, and to be advised of that right.). The Miranda Court explained that [t]he circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege [against self-incrimination] by his interrogators. Therefore, the right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system we delineate today. Our aim is to assure that the individual's right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process. 384 U.S. at 469, 86 S.Ct. at 1625. Once an individual has invoked his or her right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, the interrogation must cease and officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-85, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153, 111 S.Ct. 486, 491, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990). Although the Miranda right to counsel derives from the Fifth Amendment, we have indicated, both implicitly and explicitly, that the rights and procedures dictated by Miranda are required by Article II, Section 25 of the Montana Constitution as well. See e.g. Schneider, ¶ 27; State v. Hurlbert, 2009 MT 221, ¶ 33, 351 Mont. 316, 211 P.3d 869; State v. Buck, 2006 MT 81, ¶¶ 45-48, 331 Mont. 517, 134 P.3d 53; State v. Olson, 2003 MT 61, ¶¶ 13-14, 314 Mont. 402, 66 P.3d 297. ¶ 18 The policies and interests underlying these two rights are distinct, see Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 297, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 2397, 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988), as are the applicable standards, see e.g. Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 524, 124 S.Ct. 1019, 1022-23, 157 L.Ed.2d 1016 (2004). The Sixth Amendment/Article II, Section 24 right to counsel, applicable throughout the course of a criminal prosecution, protects the unaided layman at critical confrontations with his expert adversary, the government, after the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified with respect to a particular alleged crime. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177-78, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 2208-09, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). This right is thus offense specific. Id. at 175, 111 S.Ct. at 2207; Schneider, ¶ 23. In contrast, the Fifth Amendment/Article II, Section 25 right to counsel, applicable during a custodial interrogation, protects the suspect's desire to deal with the police only through counsel. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178, 111 S.Ct. at 2209 (internal quotation marks omitted). This right is thus not offense specific, and [o]nce a suspect invokes the Miranda right to counsel for interrogation regarding one offense, he may not be reapproached regarding any offense unless counsel is present. Id. at 177, 111 S.Ct. at 2208; see also Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988). Hence, the interest protected by the Fifth Amendment guarantee is in one respect narrower than the interest protected by the Sixth Amendment guarantee (because it relates only to custodial interrogation) and in another respect broader (because it relates to interrogation regarding any suspected crime and attaches whether or not the `adversarial relationship' produced by a pending prosecution has yet arisen). McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178, 111 S.Ct. at 2209. It is worth noting that both rights to counsel may be applicable in certain situationsfor example, at a postarraignment custodial interrogation. See Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2090; Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 1407, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2091. ¶ 19 In addition to the foregoing distinctions, the consequences of violating the two rights differ in some important respects (at least insofar as federal law is concerned). The privilege against self-incrimination protects a person only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 2643, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1290, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (The Fifth Amendment, of course, is not concerned with nontestimonial evidence.); State v. Devlin, 1999 MT 90, 294 Mont. 215, 980 P.2d 1037. The Miranda safeguards, in turn, serve to protect the privilege by requiring that when a person is in custody, he must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79, 86 S.Ct. at 1630; State v. Buck, 2006 MT 81, ¶¶ 35, 45, 331 Mont. 517, 134 P.3d 53. Failure to give these warnings and obtain a valid waiver of rights prior to questioning, or failure to fully honor the exercise of these rights throughout the interrogation, generally requires the exclusion of any testimonial evidence (i.e., communications) obtained. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 476, 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1624, 1629, 1630; State v. Morrisey, 2009 MT 201, ¶ 28, 351 Mont. 144, 214 P.3d 708. However, the Supreme Court has refused to apply the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine [3] to exclude derivative evidence (i.e., evidence discovered as a result of a statement obtained in violation of Miranda ). [4] See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 124 S.Ct. 2620, 159 L.Ed.2d 667 (2004); see also Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (rejecting application of the fruits doctrine to a second confession that followed a first confession obtained in violation of Miranda ); Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004) (again declining to apply the fruits doctrine to a second confession); Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure vol. 3, § 9.5(a)-(c), 466-82 (3d ed., West 2007). ¶ 20 In contrast, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not a protective device that functions solely as a safeguard against compelled self-incrimination. Indeed, the Sixth Amendment's protection of the attorney-client relationshipthe right to rely on counsel as a `medium' between [the accused] and the Stateextends beyond Miranda 's protection of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Patterson, 487 U.S. at 296 n. 9, 108 S.Ct. at 2397 n. 9 (brackets in Patterson, some internal quotation marks omitted). The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is specifically affirmed in the Constitution, and it broadly guarantees an accused aid in coping with legal problems or assistance in meeting his adversary (the government) at critical stages of the criminal proceedings. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 310-11, 313, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 2574, 2575, 37 L.Ed.2d 619 (1973). It also protects the integrity and fairness of the adversary criminal process. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 368-69, 113 S.Ct. 838, 842, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 446, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2510, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). It thus is not limited to testimonial evidence, and the fruits doctrine applies to Sixth Amendment violations. See e.g. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 406 n. 12, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1243 n. 12, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977) (due to Sixth Amendment violation, neither the defendant's incriminating statements nor any testimony describing his having led the police to the victim's body was admissible); Nix, 467 U.S. at 441-50, 104 S.Ct. at 2507-12 (in the context of a Sixth Amendment violation, acknowledging the fruits doctrine and applying the inevitable-discovery exception to it); Wade, 388 U.S. at 239-42, 87 S.Ct. at 1939-40 (evidence based on identification made at postindictment lineup, in violation of the accused's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, is inadmissible); accord Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272-74, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 1956-57, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967). ¶ 21 Recognizing these distinctions, Scheffer insists that his right-to-counsel claim is governed by the Sixth Amendment and Article II, Section 24. As noted, he was acquitted of sexual intercourse without consent and unlawful restraint, but was found guilty of attempted tampering with or fabricating physical evidence. The primary evidence obtained from the interrogation and introduced at trial to prove this charge did not consist of testimonial statements given by Scheffer, but rather consisted of the videotape recording of what Scheffer did (sticking his fingers in his mouth) and the testimony of Detective McDermott and Sergeant Rio about what they witnessed through the hallway monitor (Scheffer sticking his fingers in his mouth). For the reasons discussed above, Scheffer faces significant obstacles to suppressing this evidence under a Fifth Amendment/Article II, Section 25 theory. Thus, Scheffer cites the Sixth Amendment, Article II, Section 24, and Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, in arguing that he is entitled to suppression of his conduct because he was questioned in the absence of counsel at a critical stage proceeding. ¶ 22 The State counters that Scheffer's claim is governed by the Fifth Amendment and Article II, Section 25, not the Sixth Amendment and Article II, Section 24, given that the interrogation was not part of a judicial proceeding. In response, Scheffer maintains his Sixth Amendment/Article II, Section 24 argument, but also argues that even if the Fifth Amendment and Article II, Section 25 apply, he had the right to have counsel present, this right was infringed, and his motion to suppress should have been granted. ¶ 23 The State is correct that the Fifth Amendment and Article II, Section 25 apply to Scheffer's claim. As explained above, the Sixth Amendment/Article II, Section 24 right to counsel does not attach until adversary judicial criminal proceedings have been initiated, and there is no question that at the time of the McDermott-Scheffer interview, the State had not yet commenced a formal criminal prosecution against Scheffer. See State v. Schneider, 2008 MT 408, ¶¶ 17, 21, 347 Mont. 215, 197 P.3d 1020. Scheffer's argument to the contrary (that the Sixth Amendment and Article II, Section 24 apply) is based entirely on Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964). In Escobedo which, it should be noted, was decided two years before the Supreme Court issued its decision in Miranda the defendant (Escobedo) was arrested, taken to police headquarters, and interrogated. Despite his repeated requests to speak to his retained lawyer, he was afforded no opportunity to do so during the course of the interrogation. He ultimately made an incriminating statement. On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that although the interrogation was conducted before Escobedo was formally indicted, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel nevertheless applied under the particular circumstances. The Court held that where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied the Assistance of Counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.... Id. at 490-91, 84 S.Ct. at 1765. In short, when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatorywhen its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confessionour adversary system begins to operate, and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer. Id. at 492, 84 S.Ct. at 1766. Relying on this holding, Scheffer argues that McDermott's interrogation of him was an accusatory process rather than a general investigation, that he was an accused rather than a mere suspect, that the underlying purpose of the interrogation was to get [him] to confess his guilt, and that the `guiding hand of counsel' was essential to advise him of his rights. ¶ 24 What Scheffer doggedly fails to accept, however, in the face of contrary authority cited by the State, is that subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court foreclose any reliance on Escobedo ... for the proposition that the Sixth Amendment right, in any of its manifestations, applies prior to the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings. Although Escobedo was originally decided as a Sixth Amendment case, the Court in retrospect perceived that the prime purpose of Escobedo was not to vindicate the constitutional right to counsel as such, but, like Miranda, to guarantee full effectuation of the privilege against self-incrimination. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 429, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1145, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 2297 n. 5, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984) ([W]e required counsel in ... Escobedo in order to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination rather than to vindicate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.). While Scheffer still insists that Escobedo permits application of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in certain instances before adversary judicial criminal proceedings have been initiated, the Supreme Court has stated otherwise, see Moran, 475 U.S. at 429, 106 S.Ct. at 1145; Rothgery, 128 S.Ct. at 2583 (The Sixth Amendment right of the accused to assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions ... does not attach until a prosecution is commenced. (internal quotation marks omitted)), and Scheffer's argument, therefore, is simply wrong. Accordingly, we conclude that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not arisen at the time of the interrogation, which occurred before Scheffer was formally charged, see State v. Reavley, 2003 MT 298, ¶¶ 37-45, 318 Mont. 150, 79 P.3d 270, and we reach the same conclusion under Article II, Section 24, see Schneider, ¶ 23 ([T]he Montana right applies with respect to an offense when prosecution has been commenced for that offense. (emphasis added)). We are left, then, with the question of whether Scheffer's right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment and Article II, Section 25 was violated.