Opinion ID: 626096
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Liability Waiver

Text: The district court first found that Appellants waived all of their claims when Mayfield signed the Driver/Owner Agreement and the Driver and Car Owner Application. The parties agree that Florida law governs this action. Further, Appellants admit that their negligence claim is barred by the waiver. Thus the only issues are whether Appellants also waived the defamation, breach of contract, and unfair and deceptive trade practices claims. Under Florida law, a party is bound by, and a court is powerless to rewrite, the clear and unambiguous terms of a voluntary contract. Med. Ctr. Health Plan v. Brick, 572 So.2d 548, 551 (Fla.Dist. Ct.App.1990). While waivers are generally disfavored and will be construed strictly, Cain v. Banka, 932 So.2d 575, 580 (Fla. Dist.Ct.App.2006), exculpatory clauses are enforceable where the intention to be relieved was made clear and unequivocal in the contract, and the wording [is] so clear and understandable that an ordinary and knowledgeable party will know what he is contracting away, Hinely v. Fla. Motorcycle Training, Inc., 70 So.3d 620, 624 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2011) (citations omitted). [A]s a general proposition, unambiguous exculpatory provisions are enforceable unless they contravene public policy. Loewe v. Seagate Homes, Inc., 987 So.2d 758, 760 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2008).
Because we affirm the district court's dismissal of Appellants' defamation claim on other grounds, see infra Section II.A, we do not address the question of whether Florida law will enforce the waiver with respect to that count of the complaint.
With respect to their contract claim, Appellants contend that the liability waiver should not be enforced because Florida law does not recognize a limitation-of-liability provision that precludes any and all recovery for a breach of contract. The Florida courts have held that exculpatory clauses which negate one party's contractual obligations fail for lack of mutuality. In Ivey Plants, Inc. v. FMC Corp., the District Court of Appeal of Florida held that such a release could not be enforced: If plaintiffs can prove a breach of this contractual obligation, the provisions of paragraph 16 [the exculpatory provisions] should not act as a bar to the maintenance of a breach of contract action. If such was the case then the contract would be lacking in mutuality of obligation and mutuality of remedy, rendering it unenforceable. 282 So.2d 205, 208 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1973); see also Golden v. Mobil Oil Corp., 882 F.2d 490, 494 (11th Cir.1989). However, this is not to say that Florida will refuse to enforce any liability waiver for breach of contract claims. In Greater Orlando Aviation v. Bulldog Airlines, Inc., the appellate court enforced a liability waiver against a complaint that included, inter alia, a breach of contract count. 705 So.2d 120, 121 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1998). The Greater Orlando court could not have reached this holding without implicitly finding that a liability waiver is enforceable against at least some breach of contract claims. In Sniffen v. Century Nat'l Bank of Broward, the appellate court again threw out an exculpatory provision, but did so because enforcement would render the agreement between the parties entirely nugatory.  375 So.2d 892, 894 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1979) (emphasis added). It went on to say that the provision the liability waiver supposedly covered is the very heart of the relationship and the only real reason anyone would ever have entered into the contract in the first place. Id. [It] is obvious that [the plaintiff] will have received nothing whatever in return for his rental fee. Id. Taking these cases together, we conclude that Florida law permits waiver of run-of-the-mill breach-of-contract actions, but will not enforce a waiver where the claim renders the contract itself entirely nugatory. In this case, the liability waiver is enforceable under Florida law. Appellants argue that if the waiver provision purports to apply to any and all claims of liability, the contracts between [Appellants] and NASCAR are nullities and fall under the Ivey Plants rule. However, Appellants misread Florida law. In Greater Orlando, the liability waiver contained a similar phrase, making the defendant free from any and all liability. 705 So.2d at 121. But there the appellate court enforced the waiver. Id. at 122. Thus the question must be whether a refusal to enforce the particular claim made by the Appellants would abolish any lack of mutuality. And here, the complaint does not fall under the Ivey Plants rule. Appellants allege in their complaint only that NASCAR and AEGIS have breached their contracts with each other, and NASCAR has breached its contracts with Mayfield and MMI. On its own, the complaint does not allege a breach that would render the entire contract nugatory. Moreover, it is apparent from the briefs that the crux of the complaint does not allege a breach of such a basic provision. Appellants' contention is that NASCAR was obligated to perform the drug tests in a particular way, using particular laboratories with particular government-certified standards, and that NASCAR failed to do so. Whether these allegations turn out to be true, they do not not go to the heart of the contractgranting a license to Appellants to race in NASCAR events in exchange for abiding by a number of other terms including, for example, that Mayfield abide by the NASCAR rule book, that Mayfield give NASCAR permission to use his name and likeness for advertising purposes, that Mayfield appropriately distribute any prize money, and that Mayfield not transfer his NASCAR license to anyone. The drug policy, in other words, constituted only one term of a multifaceted contract. We therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of the breach of contract claim.
As discussed above, Florida law permits a party to waive its rights as to at least some types of claims. The district court found that the liability waiver applies to Appellants' unfair and deceptive trade practices counts. Rule 28(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure notes that the Appellant's brief must contain appellant's contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies.... FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8). Appellants make no argument whatsoever that the unfair and deceptive trade practices count of their complaint is not covered by the waivers Mayfield signed. [2] A party's failure to raise or discuss an issue in his brief is to be deemed an abandonment of that issue. 11126 Baltimore Blvd., Inc. v. Prince George's County, Md., 58 F.3d 988, 993 n. 7 (4th Cir.1995) (citations omitted). We therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of that claim.