Opinion ID: 1355273
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Propriety of State's Argument to Jury

Text: The Tennessee Supreme Court has recognized that argument of counsel is a valuable privilege that should not be unduly restricted. Smith v. State, 527 S.W.2d 737, 739 (Tenn.1975). Attorneys have great leeway in arguing before a jury, and the trial court's broad discretion in controlling their arguments will be reversed only upon an abuse of discretion. See Terry, 46 S.W.3d at 156. However, closing argument must be temperate, must be predicated on evidence introduced during the trial of the case and must be pertinent to the issues being tried. See Russell v. State, 532 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Tenn.1976). The State is more limited in its prerogative due to the prosecutor's role as a seeker of justice, rather than a mere advocate. See Coker v. State, 911 S.W.2d 357, 368 (Tenn.Crim.App.1995), overruled on other grounds, State v. West, 19 S.W.3d 753 (Tenn.2000). Thus, the state must refrain from argument designed to inflame the jury and should restrict its commentary to matters in evidence or issues at trial. Id. Prosecutorial misconduct during argument does not constitute reversible error unless it appears that the outcome was affected to the defendant's prejudice. See State v. Bane, 57 S.W.3d 411, 425 (Tenn.2001). Both Defendants contend that the prosecutor's opening statement and closing arguments were so marred by misconduct as to require a new trial. We note first, however, that Defendant Thomas and Defendant Bond's failure to object to opening and closing argument at trial waives our consideration of this issue on appeal. See Tenn. R.App. P. 36(a) (providing that relief is not required for a party who failed to take reasonably available action to prevent or nullify an error); State v. Little, 854 S.W.2d 643, 651 (Tenn.Crim.App.1992) (holding that the defendant's failure to object to the State's alleged misconduct during closing argument waives that issue). Thus, where a prosecuting attorney makes allegedly objectionable remarks during closing argument, but no contemporaneous objection is made, the complaining defendant is not entitled to relief on appeal unless the remarks constitute plain error. See Tenn. R.App. P. 36(b); Tenn. R.Crim. P. 52(b); State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 282 (Tenn.2000). In determining whether an alleged trial error constitutes plain error, we consider five factors: 1) the record must clearly establish what occurred at trial; 2) a clear and unequivocal rule of law must have been breached; 3) a substantial right of the defendant must have been adversely affected; 4) the defendant did not waive the issue for tactical reasons; and 5) consideration of the error is necessary to do substantial justice. See State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 641-42 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994). Ultimately, the error must have had an unfair prejudicial impact which undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial. Id. at 642.
The prosecutor for the State who made opening statement in this case began, You can't hide from greed and evil. James Day learned that lesson on April 21st, 1997.... She continued: James Day learned you can't hide from greed and evil, and He walked into the path of greed and evil. Throughout opening statement, the prosecutor referred collectively to Defendant Thomas and Defendant Bond as greed and evil. This theme was repeated during closing argument, in which both prosecutors made references that James Day couldn't hide from greed and evil, there was no hiding from or escaping the circle of greed and evil, and greed and evil really didn't care that day whether he lived or died. The prosecutors referred to the Defendants as greed and evil a total of twenty-one times during the opening statement and closing arguments of the guilt phase of the trial. Defendant Thomas and Defendant Bond, neither of whom entered a contemporaneous objection to these statements, ask this Court to find plain error in the State's conduct. See Tenn. R.Crim. P. 52(b). It is improper for the prosecutor to use epithets to characterize a defendant. The prosecutors' repeated references to Defendant Thomas and Defendant Bond as greed and evil was improper. See, e.g., Cauthern, 967 S.W.2d at 737 (evil one); State v. Bates, 804 S.W.2d 868, 881 (Tenn.1991) (rabid dog); State v. Ladonte Montez Smith, No. M1997-00087-CCA-R3-CD, 1999 WL 1210813, at  (Tenn.Crim.App., Nashville, Dec. 17, 1999) (guilty dog); State v. Joel Guilds, No. 01C01-9804-CC-00182, 1999 WL 333368, at  5 (Tenn.Crim.App., Nashville, May 27, 1999) (this clown). When a prosecutor engages in improper argument, we must also consider the curative measures taken by the court and/or the prosecution; the prosecutor's intent in making the improper remarks; the cumulative effect of the erroneous statements and any other errors in the record; and the relative strength or weakness of the case. See Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d at 809; State v. Buck, 670 S.W.2d 600, 609 (Tenn.1984). Here, we find the prosecutors' comments unseemly but harmless in the context of the entire argument. No curative instruction was provided primarily because neither Defendant Thomas nor Defendant Bond objected to the characterization. Moreover, the State's case was strong and the effect of the error was insignificant. In short, the State's improper argument did not undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial, and we therefore conclude that this issue gains the Defendants no relief.
During opening statement of the penalty phase, counsel for Defendant Thomas stated, [Defendant] Thomas will never get out of jail. He'll be in there, at the earliest, until he's eighty. In response to this statement, the prosecutor began her closing argument with, I'm going to start off this morning by apologizing ... for wasting your time this week because you heard it, they're both doing a lot of time already. Why in the world are we down here? Let's just forget this murder. I'm sorry, Ms. Day, James Day's death should be a freebie. I mean, they're already doing a lot of time. Defendants contend that it was improper to argue that a defendant should be sentenced to death as additional punishment for a previous conviction. The State contends that this was a proper response to Defendant Thomas' attempt to minimize the current crime by emphasizing the penalties he already faced. While community conscience arguments are generally improper, a prosecutor's closing argument must be evaluated in light of the defense argument that preceded it. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2470, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986). Here, both Defendants ignore that it was defense counsel who first invoked community conscience by telling the jurors that Defendant Thomas had already been sentenced to a lengthy period of confinement. Obviously the prosecutor's comment was a response to that statement. In Darden, supra , the Supreme Court considered the following factors in determining that the prosecutors' closing argument did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial: The prosecutors' argument did not manipulate or misstate the evidence, nor did it implicate other specific rights of the accused such as the right to counsel or the right to remain silent. Much of the objectionable content was invited by or was responsive to the opening summation of the defense.... [T]he idea of invited response is used not to excuse improper comments, but to determine their effect on the trial as a whole. The trial court instructed the jurors several times that their decision was to be made on the basis of the evidence alone, and that the arguments of counsel were not evidence. The weight of the evidence against petitioner was heavy; the overwhelming eyewitness and circumstantial evidence to support a finding of guilt on all charges, reduced the likelihood that the jury's decision was influenced by argument.... Darden's trial was not perfect  few are  but neither was it fundamentally unfair. Id. at 181-83, 106 S.Ct. 2464 (citations omitted). Similar factors are present here. Doubtless the testimony of the numerous witnesses and the admission by Defendant Bond did far more to seal their fate than a single abbreviated comment by the prosecutor during closing argument. As in Darden , the trial may not have been perfect, but it was fair and no reversible error can be predicated on the prosecutor's closing argument.