Opinion ID: 2345595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Preclusion of Bias Cross-Examination

Text: When Sue Ann Mascall was on the witness stand during trial, McCraney's counsel asked her during cross-examination whether Rosebure had a presence in the area of Sixteenth and E Streets, N.E., before she became romantically involved with him. In response, Mascall said that Rosebure used to hustle around there. Picking up on that answer, appellants later sought to question her and her father about Rosebure's drug dealing at 1600 E Street on the day he was murdered. The avowed purpose of this proposed cross-examination was not only to support appellants' third-party perpetrator defense, but also to expose Mascall's and her father's motive to mislead the police about the identity of Rosebure's assailants in order to conceal the alleged fact that Sue Ann Mascall was selling drugs with Rosebure when he was killed. [17] The trial judge sustained the government's objection to the latter rationale because appellants proffered no factual basis for believing that Mascall was involved with Rosebure in any drug dealing on the day of his murder. [18] Without such a factual predicate, the judge ruled, the introduction of evidence that Rosebure was a drug dealer would be highly and improperly prejudicial to the government. [19] Before reaching that conclusion, the judge personally examined Mascall outside the jury's presence to ascertain whether there was any factual basis whatsoever to justify the inquiry. [20] In answer to the judge's inquiries, Mascall testified under oath that Rosebure was not selling drugs at her building in the hours immediately before his murder; that she was not selling or using drugs then; and that she and Rosebure were not talking about dealing drugs. She denied being involved in any way with [Rosebure] with anything to do with drugs at all. [21] Appellants argue that the judge's ruling abridged their Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine Mascall and Johnson for testimonial bias. [22] The question is a close one in our view, but we uphold the judge's determination that appellants did not lay a sufficient foundation for the inquiry they wished to pursue. In order to pursue a line of cross-examination suggesting that a witness is biased, a defendant must lay a proper factual foundation. [23] This requirement serves to prevent harassment of the witness, prejudice to the opposing party, confusion of the issues, and unnecessary waste of time; it enables the judge to guard against the danger that counsel will ask highly prejudicial questions of witnesses with the almost certain knowledge that the insinuations are false. [24] As with other evidentiary rulings, the determination of whether a defendant has laid a satisfactory foundation to proceed with bias cross-examination is a discretionary decision for the trial judge. [25] A judge does not abuse his discretion by precluding cross-examination where `[t]he connection between the facts cited by defense counsel and the proposed line of questioning [is] too speculative to support the questions.' [26] To lay a proper foundation, the examiner must proffer facts supporting a genuine belief that the witness is biased and that allow the judge to evaluate whether the proposed questioning will be probative of bias. [27] If unable to make such a proffer, the questioner at least must articulate a `well reasoned suspicion' rather than `an improbable flight of fancy' to support the proposed cross-examination. [28] Although these criteria are meant to be fairly lenient, [29] they are not trivial; and [t]he more pointed and directly accusatory the examiner's question, the stricter the foundational requirement becomes[.] [30] Where, as here, the claim of bias is predicated on the witness's conduct having been felonious, it is appropriate for the trial judge to subject the proffered foundation to a careful evaluation. Appellants made a sufficient factual proffer (based on the reported statement of the mother of Rosebure's child, a seemingly credible witness) that Rosebure went to 1600 E Street to sell drugs. That, however, was not the issue. Whether Sue Ann Mascall, or her father, had the alleged motive to testify falsely or misleadingly depended on whether she could be implicated in Rosebure's criminal conduct. Appellants could not proffer any factual basis to believe that Mascall sold drugs or assisted Rosebure in doing so; nor did such a basis materialize when the judge put the question to Mascall herself under oath. [31] At best, appellants could argue that if Rosebure was selling drugs at 1600 E Street, and if Mascall was (even innocently) present when he did so, thendespite the total absence of any evidence or claim of wrongdoing on her partshe (and her father) had a motive to lie about the circumstances of Rosebure's murder in order to avoid her being charged with a drug offense as an aider and abettor. That argument strikes us the same way it struck the trial judgeas unduly speculative. We cannot fault the judge for finding that it fell short of being a well-reasoned suspicion that Mascall or her father were biased. [32]