Opinion ID: 1175478
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: claimed errors in trial judge's stated reasons for refusing to modify penalty verdict

Text: (34) Whenever the jury returns a verdict imposing the death penalty, the defendant is deemed to have applied for modification of the verdict. In ruling on the application, the judge shall review the evidence, consider, take into account, and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in Section 190.3, and shall make a determination as to whether the jury's findings and verdicts that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances are contrary to the law or the evidence presented. The judge shall state on the record the reasons for his findings. (ง 190.4, subd. (e).) The judge must determine independently whether the weight of the evidence supports the verdict. ( People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 200 [246 Cal. Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629]; People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, 793-794.) (35) The present trial judge denied defendant's automatic application for modification and stated his reasons on the record, analyzing each of the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors in the order in which they appear in section 190.3. Defendant contends that the judge's stated reasons displayed erroneous views of the law and that defendant was thereby denied a proper determination of the application. As to factor (a), circumstances of the crime, the judge found that based on defendant's admissions to Karen, the defendant had observed Ms. Neidig and Ms. Prendergast at the dog show in San Francisco, and came to their home for the purpose of stealing its contents. Defendant argues that this finding is erroneous because the judge failed to weigh the evidence that defendant arrived unarmed and on foot, and thus unprepared for using armed force or readily escaping with stolen goods, and that he correctly identified himself to all to whom he spoke immediately prior to his arrival. The judge was not, however, required to recount all the evidence, and it cannot be presumed from his failure to mention particular evidence that he did not consider it. Under factor (b), the presence or absence of violent criminal activity by defendant, the judge considered the stabbings of Ms. Prendergast and Karen. The judge's determination took place long before our holding in People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 763, that the term `criminal activity [involving] force or violence' as used in [factor (b) of section 190.3] is limited to conduct other than the immediate circumstances for which the death penalty is being contemplated [citing People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d 57, 105-106]. ( People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 763.) It is true that the judge, in noting that factor (a) refers to the circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding (italics added), could have concluded that factor (b) encompassed violent criminal activity other than the murder itself. But there is no indication or likelihood that he gave the stabbings any undue weight by attaching them to more than one aggravating factor. Defendant argues that the judge erroneously treated the absence of mitigating factors as constituting aggravation. (See People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 769; People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, 789-790 [mere absence of evidence of statutory mitigating factor is not itself an aggravating factor].) He points to the judge's discussion of factor (f), whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances which the defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct. The judge declared there was not a scintilla of evidence to support the existence of such belief, and asked rhetorically, how could one justify killing an innocent, unsuspecting victim coming into her own home? The judge could, of course, properly consider these objective circumstances of the killing under factor (a), as ones pertaining to the crime, and there is no suggestion that he gave them additional weight simply because he perceived an absence of the justificatory belief that would be essential to mitigation under factor (f). Defendant also criticizes the judge's conclusions that there was no ... convincing testimony ... that the defendant's intelligence level was a factor in the crimes of which he stands convicted, and (in connection with factor (h)) that the psychiatrist's testimony showed that defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was not impaired as a result of mental defect. Defendant argues that the judge failed to consider, in mitigation, aspects of defendant's character and background that did not directly relate to the present crimes. But the judge expressly specified, as relevant to factor (k) (other circumstances extenuating the gravity of the crime), the testimony of the psychologists and the psychiatrist ... relating to [defendant's] family and his youth and upbringing. Moreover, in connection with factor (d) (whether the offense was committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance), the judge outlined the evidence of defendant's deprived childhood, and concluded it did not excuse the criminal conduct for which he stood convicted. Accordingly, the judge's statement of reasons appears free from any defects which would undermine the validity of the determination upon which he denied the application for modification of the verdict under section 190.4, subdivision (e).