Opinion ID: 3035868
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sentencing and Appeals

Text: Because Dixon became an inactive member of the bar on July 16, 1997, the trial court reappointed a public defender to represent Young during sentencing. The court first imposed a concurrent twenty-five years to life three-strikes sentence for Young’s two offenses, with a determinate term of eleven years for enhancements. Later, pursuant to its discretion under Cal. Penal Code § 1385(a), the trial court struck one of Young’s prior convictions and imposed a determinate sentence of twenty years. Young simultaneously filed a direct appeal and state habeas petition alleging that Dixon suffered from a conflict of interest, that she failed to pursue plea negotiations, and that the State Bar proceedings rendered her presumptively incapable of providing effective assistance. The California Court of Appeal, unswayed by Young’s arguments, denied relief on December 27, 1999, and the California Supreme Court denied Young’s petition for review on April 12, 2000. Young timely filed a federal habeas petition in which he argued that Dixon’s failure to disclose her pending disciplinary charges amounted to an actual conflict of interest, and that the State Bar’s finding that Dixon was unfit to pracYOUNG v. RUNNELS 871 tice law established per se ineffective assistance under Cronic. The District Court denied the petition on August 30, 2002, and this appeal timely followed.