Opinion ID: 783829
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Harris's Motion Seeking a Mental Competence Examination

Text: 18 On September 21, 1984, before the trial court ruled on Harris's motion to suppress, Harris and Giano escaped from the custody of a court officer at the County Court-house in Mineola, New York. During the ensuing shootout, Harris shot a court officer in the head. 1 Harris himself was also shot in the head. The bullet, which has never been removed, passed through the midline of his skull and lodged in the central ventricle of his brain. 19 In October 1984, Harris filed a motion seeking a competence examination pursuant to N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 730.30 (McKinney 1995). 2 In support of this motion, Harris's counsel filed an affirmation in which he stated that it was impossible to communicate with Harris about the case due to the combined effects of Harris's low IQ, Harris's head injury, and the medication Harris was taking in treatment of his head wound. Harris's attorney did not submit any medical documentation about the effect of Harris's injury on his mental capacity, a list of medications Harris was taking, or any other evidence in support of this motion. 20 On October 17, 1984, the state trial court heard oral argument on the motion. In support of the motion, Harris's counsel stated: 21 [I]t's my understanding from the physicians treating my client that a bullet is lodged in the ventricle of his brain. Accordingly, I have had difficulty communicating with my client in several respects. I would say that it is beyond my competence as a lawyer to decide whether this individual is competent to stand trial. For that reason, I would suggest to the Court that we have someone who is competent to [sic] make that determination. 22 App. 425-26. In response, the prosecutor argued that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a section 730.30 examination. Id. at 426. As evidence of Harris's competence, the prosecutor stated that: (1) Harris had been released from the hospital and returned to the jail; and (2) jail personnel with whom the prosecutor had spoken that morning reported that [t]hey have no problem in communicating with [Harris] and have made no noticeable observation of any inability to communicate at this time. Id. The prosecutor then suggested that the judge should inquire of the defendant at this time as to whether there are any facts that would warrant [a hearing]. Id. at 426-27. The trial judge then asked the prosecutor, How do you respond to [Harris's counsel's] oral argument that irrespective of the fact that none of the personnel that you've described have difficulty in communicating with the defendant Harris that he[, Harris's counsel,] has difficulty communicating with [Harris] ... ? Id. at 427. The prosecutor noted that, even though he was not privy to the conversation, he did observe [Harris's counsel] conversing with his client in the courtroom. Id. 23 The judge proposed that he himself question Harris to determine whether a section 730.30 hearing was required. Harris's counsel objected on Fifth Amendment grounds to any such questioning. Id. at 428. However, the judge overruled that objection and conducted a brief question-and-answer session with Harris. The colloquy was as follows: 24 [The Court]: Mr. Harris, I'm going to ask you some questions. Do you know what date today is? 25 [Harris]: What? 26 [The Court]: Do you know what day of the week it is? 27 [Harris]: Today? 28 [The Court]: What is it? 29 [Harris]: I don't know. 30 [The Court]: You know Mr. Liotti, don't you? 31 [Harris]: Yes. 32 [The Court]: He's your attorney? 33 [Harris]: Yes. 34 [The Court]: Have you spoken to Mr. Liotti recently? 35 [Harris]: No. 36 [The Court]: Pardon? 37 [Harris]: No. 38 [The Court]: When was the last time that you spoke to him? I'm not asking you what you discussed. All I want to know is if you've spoken to Mr. Liotti recently. 39 [Harris]: I don't remember. 40 Id. at 429-30. The trial judge then stated: All right, based upon the Court's observation in the questions that I've asked, I'm constrained to deny the motion seeking a section 730.30 examination. 41