Opinion ID: 2587611
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The question of unfair prejudice

Text: Finally, even if charges could otherwise be properly joined, severance may still be mandated where joinder would result in unfair prejudice to the defendant. [10] To establish that joinder was [unfairly] prejudicial `requires more than a mere showing that severance might have made acquittal more likely.' [11] Rather, the defendant carries the heavy burden of showing an abuse of discretion by the district court. [12] We conclude that Weber fails to meet his burden of showing that he was unfairly prejudiced by the joinder of charges. The jury was properly instructed in regard to the multiple charges as follows: Each charge and the evidence pertaining to it should be considered separately. The fact that you may find a defendant guilty or not guilty as to one of the offenses charged should not control your verdict as to any other ... offense charged. Weber has given us no reason to abandon the customary presumption that his jury followed this instruction. [13] In addition, prejudice from joinder of charges requiring reversal is more likely in a close case because it may prevent jurors from making a reliable judgment about guilt. [14] Our review of the record shows that none of the charges against Weber presented a close case; on the contrary, the evidence was strong and conclusive in regard to all three groups of crimes. This is not an instance where due process was violated by combining charges in a weak case with charges in a strong case to help bolster the former. [15] Weber nevertheless argues that joinder unfairly prejudiced him by preventing him from developing a theory of self-defense and testifying on his own behalf in regard to the attempted murder charges relating to his attack upon C. and Froman. Severance is not required simply because a defendant wishes to testify on one charge but remain silent on another. [16] Weber therefore has the burden to present sufficient information regarding the testimony he wished to give on the April 14 counts and his reasons for not testifying on the other counts to show this court that his claim of prejudice is genuine and to allow us to intelligently weigh his interest in testifying against considerations of judicial economy. [17] Weber has raised this claim in a perfunctory manner and fails to make such a showing. In sum, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Weber's motion to sever.
Weber contends that the district court improperly admitted hearsay testimony during trial. He objects to the following testimony by Robin Thornton, relating what Kim told Thornton on the day of Kim's murder. She had told me that a boy had called for [M.]; that T.J. had answered it and went crazy, cussed out the kid on the phone; proceeded to call M. names and call her a slut and racial gestures, to her going out with black guys. And M. told Kim. Kim was mad. She told T.J.: [M.] is going to be able to talk to boys and go out with boys. You are not her boyfriend; you're my boyfriend. You need to start acting like a father figure, if you're in her life, and not her boyfriend.... And she was going to drive her and her boyfriend to wherever they wanted to go on a date, the movies or  Before this testimony was admitted, Weber objected citing the multiple layers of hearsay contained in the statement. The State maintained: It's our position they are not hearsay; we are not offering those statements for the truth of the matter. We are offering them specifically to show an effect on the hearer, the defendant. We are not offering those statements to prove that Kim was, in fact, going to allow M. to date; that she was, in fact going to facilitate the dating process. It is important ... to show the defendant's mental state, to show how the defendant reacted to M. entering the dating process. So these statements are offered to show the effect they had on the defendant. The district court agreed and ruled that Thornton's testimony was not hearsay because it was not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted. The court then instructed the jury that Thornton's testimony could only be used to show the effect of Kim's statements on Weber. We conclude that Thornton's testimony contained inadmissible hearsay and should not have been admitted, but that the error does not warrant reversal. Generally, hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. [18] Hearsay is inadmissible unless it falls within one of several exceptions. [19] Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms to an exception.... [20] Hearsay evidence is traditionally excluded because it is not subject to the usual tests to show the credibility of the declarant. Lacking is cross-examination to ascertain a declarant's perception, memory and truthfulness. [21] The State and the district court's position  that Thornton's testimony simply related statements by Kim to Weber that were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted but only to show their effect upon Weber  fails to take into account the multiple levels of hearsay contained in that testimony. Thornton did not testify simply about a statement that Kim made directly to her. She testified also about earlier statements that, according to Kim, Kim made to Weber; Weber made to Kim, M., and M.'s friend; and M. made to Kim and Weber. Thornton herself had not been present for or heard any of these earlier statements. The district court's ruling failed to recognize that Thornton's testimony contained statements by three declarants  Weber, M., and Kim  involving as many as three levels of hearsay. The statements by each declarant require independent analysis to determine whether Thornton's testimony was properly admitted in whole or part. The alleged statements furthest removed from Thornton's direct knowledge were Weber's initial remarks on the telephone to M.'s friend and his and M.'s remarks in the ensuing argument. Weber's remarks are statements by a party opponent, which are excepted from the hearsay rule. [22] The State argues on this basis that Thornton's reference to his remarks was proper, but the State disregards the three levels of hearsay present. The exception applies to the first level of hearsay, testimony by the direct percipient of the statements, in this case, M. But this exception does not extend to the successive layers of hearsay in Thornton's testimony. [23] Neither Kim nor Thornton heard Weber's remarks, so absent a basis for Kim to relate M.'s statement and a basis for Thornton to relate Kim's statement, the State could not introduce evidence of Weber's remarks by way of Thornton. The State has not proffered any such bases. No prejudice resulted, however, because evidence of Weber's remarks was properly introduced through M.'s testimony, which was subject to cross-examination by Weber. Thornton also never heard the statements made by M.; she learned of them through Kim. Therefore, there must be a hearsay exception that applies to Kim's recounting to Thornton of M.'s remarks and another exception that applies to Thornton's testimony about that recounting. On appeal, the State argues that it was not concerned with the truth of M.'s statements, only their effect on Kim. The State also argues that M.'s statements were admissible as excited utterances. Even assuming this is so, it is only a basis for Kim, not Thornton, to testify about the remarks. Again, however, no prejudice is discernible because M. testified, subject to cross-examination, that she told her mother about her dispute with Weber and that as a consequence Kim confronted Weber and the two quarreled. Finally, we consider Kim's own statements, apart from any references to M.'s and Weber's remarks. But there are still two levels of hearsay to Kim's own statements because in speaking to Thornton she also related earlier statements she allegedly made to Weber  such as, she was going to drive M. and her boyfriend on dates. Thornton did not hear those earlier statements directly, so a hearsay exception is necessary for Kim to relate them to Thornton and another is necessary for Thornton to testify about them. As noted above, the State maintains and the district court agreed that these statements by Kim to Weber were not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted but only to show the effect of the statements upon Weber. It is true that the hearsay rule does not exclude a statement merely offered to show that the statement was made and the listener was affected by the statement. [24] But this exception applies only to Kim's statements to Weber, not to her later statement to Thornton. That is, under this exception, Kim could have testified about her own out-of-court statements to Weber to help the State prove that he heard and reacted to the statements, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted, e.g., that Kim truly intended to drive M. on dates. But Kim's statements to Thornton about what Kim told Weber were being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, that is, Kim actually made earlier statements to Weber. In order for the jurors to evaluate the effect of Kim's statements upon Weber, the jurors had to accept as true that Kim had made those statements. Thornton could not testify  and be cross-examined  on that crucial matter because she had no direct knowledge of it. Kim's statement that she talked to Weber is inadmissible hearsay. But we conclude that any prejudice resulting from its admission was minimal because the same evidence was introduced through M.'s testimony. Although M. did not testify to the specific statements Kim made to Weber, she was able to testify that Kim confronted Weber and quarreled with him about his treatment of M. Thornton's testimony also had a single level of hearsay in regard to Kim's statements that did not involve references to earlier statements by Weber, M., or Kim herself. It appears that Kim told Thornton directly that she was mad about Weber's dealings with M. and that she intended to drive M. on dates. We conclude that these statements reflected Kim's state of mind just before her murder and were relevant to the State's theory of why Weber murdered Kim. They were therefore admissible under NRS 51.105(1), which provides: A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation or physical condition, such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain and bodily health, is not inadmissible under the hearsay rule. In sum, the testimony by Thornton at issue comprised largely inadmissible hearsay evidence. [25] When testimony has been improperly admitted in violation of the hearsay rule, we must determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: [26] Evidence against the defendant must be substantial enough to convict him in an otherwise fair trial, and it must be said without reservation that the verdict would have been the same in the absence of error. [27] We conclude without reservation that even if Thornton's hearsay testimony had been excluded the verdict here would have been the same. First, most of the evidence provided by Thornton was also provided to the jury by M.'s testimony. Second, M.'s remaining testimony, the images of M. found on Weber's computer, the forensic evidence recovered from the house, and the testimony of C. and Froman constitute overwhelming independent evidence of Weber's guilt. Therefore, even without Thornton's hearsay testimony, the jury would have had ample evidence to convict Weber and to show that on April 3 and 4, 2002, Weber believed that his ongoing sexual abuse of M. was threatened and supporting the inference that this belief motivated his subsequent crimes.
Weber contends that the district court erroneously denied his challenges to two members of the venire for cause, depriving him of his right to a fair trial. We conclude that the district court erred but that Weber has not demonstrated any resulting prejudice. District courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to remove prospective jurors for cause. [28] The test for evaluating whether a juror should have been removed for cause is whether a prospective juror's views `would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' [29] Here, Weber contends that prospective jurors number 40 and number 127 should have been removed under this standard. The record shows that prospective juror number 40 repeatedly expressed doubt that she could fairly consider all four penalty options, in the event of a first-degree murder conviction, and even indicated that she could not consider a penalty that allowed parole for a person found guilty of the crimes with which Weber was charged. She also expressed her belief that the death penalty was imposed too humanely and that a murderer should suffer as the victim suffered. Although in response to questions by the prosecutor she stated that she could consider all four penalty options, she did not maintain that position when questioned again by defense counsel. When the district court described her as flip flopping and complained, I don't know where you stand, the prospective juror said, I guess it's the way the questions are put. Nevertheless, the court denied Weber's challenge for cause, and eventually he used a peremptory challenge to excuse the prospective juror. Prospective juror number 127 expressed preconceived opinions about the strength of the State's case and Weber's likely guilt, acknowledging that he had learned of the case in the media. His remarks showed that he did not fully accept the burden of proof that the State had to meet to overcome Weber's presumption of innocence. The prospective juror stated, for example: The judge has presented, theoretically, you [the defense] don't have to say anything. Realistically, I feel you do to discredit . The district court admonished the prospective juror, You can't judge a case by how many witnesses a side puts on, and the prosecutor attempted to rehabilitate the prospective juror through some hypothetical questions. The district court then denied Weber's challenge for cause, and Weber excused the prospective juror with a peremptory challenge. We conclude that the district court erred in denying Weber's challenges to these prospective jurors. Neither was able to state without reservation that she or he had relinquished views previously expressed which were at odds with their duty as impartial jurors. Detached language considered alone is not sufficient to establish that a juror can be fair when the juror's declaration as a whole indicates that she could not state unequivocally that a preconception would not influence her verdict. [30] Weber claims that his right to due process was violated, but he has not shown that he was prejudiced by the district court's error. Weber was able to remove both prospective jurors with peremptory challenges. Although he appears to have exhausted his peremptory challenges during voir dire, he does not allege or demonstrate that any jurors actually empanelled were not fair and impartial. Any claim of constitutional significance must focus on the jurors who were actually seated, not on excused jurors. Because Weber does not establish that any of the jurors who sat in judgment against him were not fair and impartial, his claim warrants no relief. [31]
Weber contends that the jury was erroneously instructed on flight in regard to his actions after the April 2002 crimes. He moved unsuccessfully to strike the instruction. We conclude that his contention has no merit. A jury may properly receive an instruction regarding a defendant's flight so long as it is supported by the evidence. [32] We have cautioned that flight signifies something more than a mere going away. It embodies the idea of going away with a consciousness of guilt, for the purpose of avoiding arrest. [33] Because of the possibility of undue influence by such an instruction, this court carefully scrutinizes the record to determine if the evidence actually warranted the instruction. [34] Here, jury instruction number 51 provided: The flight of a person immediately after the commission of a crime is not sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact which, if proved, may be considered by you in the light of all other proved facts in deciding the question of his guilt or innocence. The weight to which such circumstance is entitled is a matter for the jury to determine. This instruction itself is appropriate. [35] But Weber asserts that incompetence on the part of the police delayed his arrest  not any attempt on his part to flee. There is ample evidence to the contrary. The State showed that Weber abandoned his car at a casino parking lot on the day of the murders and left Las Vegas on a bus. Over the next week, he traveled to California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Utah. He purchased a fake moustache while in Seattle. Weber returned to Las Vegas sometime on April 12 and broke a police seal and entered his and Kim's home. Two days later he attacked C. and Froman and immediately disappeared again until he was arrested two weeks later, hiding out in a trailer. Given this evidence, Weber's behavior after the crimes constituted more than a mere going away, and it was proper to instruct the jury regarding flight.
Weber maintains that the district court improperly denied his motion to suppress the evidence of child pornography seized from his computer. He contends that two search warrants authorizing the computer search were constitutionally defective because they were based on unsupported and misleading probable cause statements. At the very least, Weber maintains that the district court was required to hold a hearing on his motion before denying it. We conclude that this claim is without merit. The Nevada Constitution and the United States Constitution require all government searches to be reasonable and all warrants to be based on probable cause. [36] [N]o warrant shall issue but on probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation, particularly describing the place or places to be searched, and the person or persons, and thing or things to be seized. [37] Probable cause requires trustworthy facts and circumstances which would cause a person of reasonable caution to believe that it is more likely than not that the specific items to be searched for are subject to seizure and at the place to be searched. [38] This court will not overturn a probable cause finding unless the evidence in its entirety provides no substantial basis for the magistrate's finding. [39] The first warrant in question was prepared by and based upon an affidavit by LVMPD Detective Sherwood and permitted search of any computer(s) or computer-related storage media, as well as paperwork and credit card records in Weber's name in his home, that could be associated with false identification. District Judge Nancy Saitta issued the warrant on April 8, 2002. Detective Sherwood's affidavit in support of probable cause stated in part: It was learned through the investigation that the computer in the living [ ]room area was the computer that was used by Weber. It was also learned that Weber is very computer literate. It is known by your affiant that persons that have computers and fixations with children may access web sites that are pornographic in nature. It is also common for these types of persons to send electronic mail or be involved in Chat Groups regarding child pornography. LVMPD Homicide Detectives also received information that Weber utilizes the computer to produce and manufacture false identities that would [aid] and abet in his efforts to evade capture. Weber has been known by his associates to use false identification in the past. Detective Sherwood's affidavit was based upon statements made by M. and by Kim's friend Robin Thornton. During an interview with LVMPD investigators on April 8, M. told them that Weber could make a fake I.D. and had at least like twelve or thirteen credit cards in his name. That same day, Thornton told investigators that Weber and Kim had used fraudulent credit cards extensively in the past, that Weber was very computer literate, and that he made a lot of money with a scam over the Internet on his computer. Given these two statements and Detective Sherwood's own statements of professional knowledge and experience, [40] the detective's affidavit provided a substantial basis for the district judge's initial finding of probable cause to search the computer. Pursuant to that first warrant, LVMPD Forensic Investigator Larry Smith searched Weber's computer on April 18. When he discovered several depictions of what he believed was child pornography, including photos of M., Investigator Smith ceased his search and wrote an affidavit for an additional warrant to continue the search to specifically look for child pornography and related materials. District Judge Valorie Vega signed this warrant on April 23, and the search resumed. Based on Investigator Smith's discovery of child pornography during his initial computer search, probable cause existed for this second warrant. Weber maintains that the district court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress before deciding it. We have held that a defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing [under Franks v. Delaware [41] ] to examine the validity of a search warrant unless he or she can make a preliminary showing and an offer of proof that there were intentional or reckless material falsehoods in the affidavit. [42] Here, even assuming the two warrants were based on defective probable cause, Weber has failed to make even a minimal showing of bad faith, intentional or reckless material falsehoods on the part of the investigators. Thus, Weber was not entitled to a Franks hearing on his motion challenging the warrants' validity. The district court properly denied Weber's motion without an evidentiary hearing.
Weber argues that his penalty hearing should have been bifurcated. We have rejected this argument before, most recently in McConnell v. State. [43] We decline to reconsider the issue. Weber also claims that he had a right to argue last to the jury during his penalty hearing and the district court improperly denied his motion to do so. This claim has no merit. As we have repeatedly explained, NRS 175.141(5) requires that counsel for the State open and conclude argument. [44] Weber contends that the State's notice of intent to seek the death penalty was flawed because Nevada's death penalty sentencing scheme is unconstitutional. The district court denied his motion to strike the notice. Weber argues that the death penalty scheme is unconstitutional because it fails to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants, fails to require a probable cause finding to support the State's alleged aggravating circumstances, fails to protect the innocent, permits relaxed evidentiary standards, fails to require the jury to identify all mitigating circumstances considered during deliberations, allows cruel and unusual punishment, and violates international law. Weber's arguments do not persuade us to revisit our prior determinations that the death penalty scheme is constitutional. [45]
This court is required pursuant to NRS 177.055(2) to review every death sentence and consider the following three questions: (c) Whether the evidence supports the finding of an aggravating circumstance or circumstances; (d) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any arbitrary factor; and (e) Whether the sentence of death is excessive, considering both the crime and the defendant.