Opinion ID: 1539765
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Employment Discrimination Claim

Text: [¶ 13] The Maine Human Rights Act provides that it is illegal for an employer to fail or refuse to hire a person based on that person's sexual orientation: Unlawful employment discrimination 1. Unlawful employment. It is unlawful employment discrimination, in violation of this Act, except when based on a bona fide occupational qualification: A. For any employer to fail or refuse to hire or otherwise discriminate against any applicant for employment because of ... sexual orientation.... 5 M.R.S. § 4572. Sexual orientation is defined as a person's actual or perceived heterosexuality, bisexuality, homosexuality or gender identity or expression. 5 M.R.S. § 4553(9-C) (2008). The Act provides that a person who has been subject to unlawful discrimination may file a civil action in the Superior Court against the person or persons who committed the unlawful discrimination. 5 M.R.S. § 4621(2008). [¶ 14] Federal law guides our construction of the MHRA. Currie v. Indus. Sec., Inc., 2007 ME 12, ¶ 13, 915 A.2d 400, 404. Accordingly, we apply the burden-shifting analysis first described in McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817. See Doyle v. Dep't of Human Servs., 2003 ME 61, ¶ 14, 824 A.2d 48, 53-54. First, the employee must establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that (1) the employee is a member of a protected class; (2) the employee applied for and was qualified for the job that the employer was seeking to fill; (3) the employee was not hired for the job; and (4) the job was later filled by a person who was not in the protected class. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. If the employee makes this showing, a presumption of illegal discrimination is established, and the burden shifts to the employer to produce evidence that the adverse employment action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 506-07, 113 S.Ct. 2742; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. If the employer produces such evidence, the presumption of discrimination is rebutted, and the inquiry shifts to the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of intentional discrimination, which remains at all times with the employee. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 507-08, 113 S.Ct. 2742. To meet this burden, the employee must demonstrate that the reason asserted by the employer was a pretext and that the true reason was illegal discrimination. Id. [¶ 15] Cookson has generated issues of fact regarding her prima facie case by offering evidence that (1) she is a lesbian; (2) she applied for and was qualified for the job of softball coach; (3) she was not rehired for the job; and (4) the job was later filled by a person who is not in the suspect class. See id. at 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. The School Department then articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for refusing to rehire Cookson: that she was involved in hazing in violation of the school's anti-hazing policy and failed to provide a balanced sports program. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. Thus, the burden then shifted back to Cookson to present facts that could demonstrate that the reasons asserted by Lee were a pretext for illegal discrimination. See id. at 804-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817; St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 507-08, 113 S.Ct. 2742. This is the central issue on appeal. [¶ 16] Although the plaintiff in an employment discrimination case retains at all times the ultimate burden of persuading the fact-finder that the employer was motivated by discriminatory animus, the rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (Proof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination.... In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose.). Thus, once an employer has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for the employment decision, an employee can survive a motion for summary judgment by presenting sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that either (1) the circumstances underlying the employer's articulated reason are untrue, or (2) even if true, those circumstances were not the actual cause of the employment decision. [3] See Stanley v. Hancock County Comm'rs, 2004 ME 157, ¶ 23, 864 A.2d 169, 177. [¶ 17] Although trial courts should exercise caution in resolving issues of pretext on summary judgment in employment discrimination cases, see Billings v. Town of Grafton, 515 F.3d 39, 56 (1st Cir.2008), the presence of the issue of motivation or intent does not relieve the plaintiff of her or his burden of producing evidence sufficient to create a question of fact on that issue, Stanley, 2004 ME 157, ¶ 25, 864 A.2d at 178. One way to meet this burden is to demonstrate through affirmative evidence such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence and ... infer that the employer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons. Billings, 515 F.3d at 55-56 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 18] With these legal principles in mind, we examine the facts set forth in the parties' statements of material facts in the light most favorable to Cookson, the nonprevailing party, to determine whether the summary judgment record evidences a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of pretext. See Dyer, 2008 ME 106, ¶ 14, 951 A.2d at 825. [¶ 19] Cookson concedes that the conduct in the sheep pen constituted hazing. Thus, she does not assert that the factual circumstances underlying Lee's proffered explanation for the decision not to rehire her are false. She argues, rather, that illegal discrimination based on her sexual orientationand not concerns arising from the incidents of hazingcaused that decision. [4] [¶ 20] Viewed in the light most favorable to Cookson, the facts could be understood as follows: in early 2005, the parent of one of Cookson's former players registered a complaint with Betsy Webb, Lee's predecessor as superintendent, accusing Cookson of hazing. After investigating the allegations in the complaint, Webb issued a letter of reprimand to Cookson, Later that year, the same family that had made the previous complaint to Webb sent a notice of tort claim to Lee based on many of the same allegations contained in that complaint, and before Lee began his own investigation, he indicated that he was not thinking along the lines of requesting Cookson's resignation. During Lee's investigation, Cookson reported incidents of hazing on other teams to Lee, but he did not initiate an investigation into them. [5] After learning of Cookson's sexual orientation, Lee recommended Estes and not Cookson for the coaching position, ostensibly because of the same hazing incidents for which she had already been reprimanded and which he had suggested previously would not result in a decision not to rehire her. [¶ 21] The Superior Court concluded that these facts were simply insufficient to generate a challenge to Lee's assertion of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for declining to rehire Cookson. We recognize that pretext is difficult to assess at the summary judgment stage, particularly given that direct evidence of discriminatory animus will rarely be available. [6] See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141, 120 S.Ct. 2097. There is no mechanical formula for identifying pretext, and the issue of whether an employee has generated an issue of fact regarding an employer's motivation or intent is one heavily dependent on the individual facts before the court. See Che v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 342 F.3d 31, 39-40 (1st Cir.2003). [¶ 22] In these circumstances, an employee's assertion of discriminatory animus on the part of an employer will not survive summary judgment if she or he relies on mere conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation. Feliciano de la Cruz v. El Conquistador Resort & Country Club, 218 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2000) (quotation marks omitted); see also LaFrenier v. Kinirey, 550 F.3d 166, 167-68 (1st Cir.2008) (holding that a party cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment merely by asserting, without affirmative contradictory evidence, that the moving party's version of events is not believable). [¶ 23] However, an employee need not convince the court on summary judgment that she was subjected to an adverse employment decision because of her protected status, or even that her version of events is more plausible. See Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 47 n. 11 (1st Cir.2009) ([A]t summary judgment we do not decide which explanation for the [adverse employment action] is most convincing, but only whether [the plaintiff] has presented sufficient evidence regarding her explanation.); see also Arrow Fastener Co., 2007 ME 34, ¶ 17, 917 A.2d at 126-27 (indicating that the ultimate question for a court on summary judgment is the failure of proof and not the relative credibility or sufficiency of the evidence). Rather, the employee need only assert sufficient facts, supported in the summary judgment record, from which a reasonable fact-finder could disbelieve the employer's proffered rationale and conclude that illegal discrimination was the true motivating factor. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 146-47, 120 S.Ct. 2097; Stanley, 2004 ME 157, ¶¶ 12, 24, 864 A.2d at 174, 177-78. [¶ 24] Applying this standard, and viewing the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to Cookson, we conclude that she has generated a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of pretext. We recognize that a fact-finder could ultimately determine that Cookson failed to establish that Lee's offered rationale was a pretext for illegal discrimination and that the serious nature of the hazing and other alleged incidents, the parental concerns and complaints, and the need for a more balanced program were the actual motivating factors behind the decision not to nominate her as head coach. Indeed, Lee asserts that his final decision not to recommend Cookson could not have been motivated by discriminatory animus because he made that decision on January 17, 2006, prior to discovering that Cookson is a lesbian. However, he met with parents supportive of Cookson three days later and suggested that he had not yet ruled out Cookson for the position at that time. Further, his decision to recommend Estes was not communicated to the Committee until after January 23, 2006, the date that he asserts he learned of her sexual orientation. [¶ 25] Thus, the timing of Lee's ultimate decision, relative to when he knew of Cookson's sexual orientation, is, on the record before us, a material disputed fact inappropriate for resolution at the summary judgment stage. Considered in conjunction with evidence of Lee's initial impulse not to request Cookson's resignation, his alleged failure to fully investigate Cookson's reports of hazing on other teams, and his reliance on hazing incidents for which Cookson had already been punished, a fact-finder could reasonably conclude that Lee's decision was not based on Cookson's conduct but instead was motivated by her sexual orientation. [7] See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147, 120 S.Ct. 2097; Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 47 (noting that discrimination can be demonstrated through the elimination of other nondiscriminatory reasons, leaving discriminatory animus as the most plausible explanation). [¶ 26] Accordingly, a fact-finder is the proper entity to determine whether this and other evidence demonstrates that Lee's asserted legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons were a pretext for illegal discrimination, and we vacate the summary judgment on Cookson's MHRA claim.