Opinion ID: 2383955
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of the 1998 Collision Records

Text: The record discloses that defendant was permitted to introduce medical records that were not properly authenticated in accordance with the procedure set forth in G.L.1956 § 9-19-27. [5] According to plaintiff, defendants offered the medical records in question to establish, in the absence of any expert opinion or medical diagnoses, that his shoulder injury was the result of the 1998 collisions and not the collision with Sharples. Although defendants admit that they did not comply with the provisions of § 9-19-27, they argue that the records were admitted to attack plaintiff's credibility and were admissible on that basis. The defendants further suggest that medical records from other accidents proffering a similar `impairment' from those accidents were admissible on the issue of proximate causation. However, the record discloses that plaintiff admitted that he experienced periods of disability after the 1998 collisions and the question of whether the impairments were similar was contested. At trial, the defendants argued for the admission of the medical records on the basis that plaintiff produced the medical records in discovery and, therefore, they were admissible. This Court reviews questions of law de novo. LePage v. Babcock, 839 A.2d 1226, 1229 (R.I.2004) (per curiam). The defendants were unable to articulate, in either their written submissions or during oral argument, the evidentiary basis for introducing unauthenticated medical records into evidence. Section 9-19-27 provides a mechanism for admission of opinion evidence through documentation, without the need for expert testimony. Martinez v. Kurdziel, 612 A.2d 669, 673 (R.I.1992). The statute protects the opponents of such evidence by requiring advance notice. Id. at 674. The defendants admit that they did not comply with the statute's notice requirement and do not contend that the medical records were admissible under that statute. Certainly, with a proper foundation, the medical records could have been admitted pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule, Rule 803(6) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. [6] State v. Belanger, 792 A.2d 60, 64 (R.I.2002) (per curiam) (holding medical expert was properly cross-examined on data in a medical report because the type of report fell within Rule 803(6) and contained the type of data that normally would be relied upon by the witness). Records admitted under Rule 803(6) must be authenticated through the testimony of the custodian of records or some other qualified witness. It is well settled that [a] fundamental prerequisite to the admission of any business record is an adequate foundation. State v. Carrera, 528 A.2d 331, 335 (R.I.1987) (holding record inadmissible because there was no testimony about the making of the record). The plaintiff had no personal knowledge of the making and keeping of the medical records and, therefore, was not a competent witness to authenticate them. Without authentication, the records are not admissible under Rule 803(6). Consequently, we hold that the trial justice committed an error of law.