Opinion ID: 1958321
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: perpetuities

Text: With these rules in mind it is necessary to ascertain, if possible, the dominant purpose of the testator, and then construe the language of the will in the light of this purpose and these authorities. Item III of the will provides: I hereby give, devise and bequeath unto my children (the children are here named) to share equally, per stirpes, all of my property ... to be held in trust in accordance with Item # IV until the year 2022, for their use and benefit to sell and dispose of and do any and all other acts that they may desire as long as they shall live. It is evident from the above language that the dominant purpose of the testator was to leave his property to his children subject to a trust with the children having the authority to sell and dispose of the property during their lives. The testator devised fee simple title of all his land to his children subject to the trust created in Item IV. Item III is a valid devise and testator could, under the law, devise fee simple title subject to a trust. However, the trust created in Item IV is repugnant to the fee simple devise in Item III and violates the rule against perpetuities because it modified the gift of Item III and made it in part too remote. Therefore, under the rule stated in Smith v. Muse and Carter v. Berry , the modification must be rejected in toto and the original gift in Item III allowed to stand. I have stated Item IV is repugnant to the absolute gift contained in Item III and an examination of the provisions of Item IV demonstrates this. Item IV(a) directs the trustee to take possession of testator's property and to: [H]old, manage, invest and reinvest and keep the same invested, and collect and receive interest and income thereof for and during the period of trust hereby created, and after paying all costs and expenses incident to the execution of this trust, shall until the year 2022 use the income from my estate, for the support, maintenance, care and education of my said children, per stirpes, paying such amounts as may be necessary for said purposes, in the discretion of said trustee either direct to my children, per stripes, as may be deemed best by such trustee. Item IV(b) provides: After the year 2021 my executor and trustee shall transfer, convey and pay over the corpus of said trust with all gain, increases and accumulations, if any, to my said children per stirpes, absolute and forever. Item IV(c) gives the trustee the power to sell any property of the trust estate, to acquire additional property, to encumber the property and make any contract with reference to the property of the trust estate deemed by him necessary and for the best interest of the trust estate. There is an irreconcilable conflict between the provisions of Item III and Item IV of the will. In Item III testator leaves his property to his children in fee simple subject to a trust; however, the trust created in Item IV takes away the fee simple grant to the children. It is evident that Item IV modifies the gift to the children contained in Item III for the following reasons. First, Item III gives the children the power to sell the property, but Item IV(c) gives the trustee the power to sell the same property thus canceling the power of sale in Item III. Second, Item III gives the children the authority to any and all acts they may desire to the property left to them, but Item IV directs the trustee to take possession and hold and manage the same property. Third, Item IV(b) directs the trustee, after the year 2021 to convey the trust property together with all gain, increases and accumulations to testator's children. It naturally follows that the trustee can only convey the trust property to the children who are living after the year 2021. The trustee could not convey the trust property to any child who died before the end of the year 2021 because a deed to a deceased person is void. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia v. Page, 178 Miss. 287, 172 So. 873 (1937); Morgan v. Collins School, 157 Miss. 295, 127 So. 565 (1930); Morgan v. Hazlehurst Lodge, 53 Miss. 665 (1876). Neither could the trustee convey any part of the trust estate to the heirs or devisees of any child of testator who died before the end of the year 2021 because Item IV(b) directs the trustee to convey the corpus of the trust estate, including all gain, increases and accumulations, if any, to my said children, per stirpes ... Item IV(b) thus takes away from the children the absolute devise contained in Item III. Fourth, Item IV(a) directs the trustee to pay to his children, per stirpes, such amounts as may be deemed best by the trustee. Item IV(a) does not permit the trustee to pay any income from the trust to any person other than a child of the testator. This cuts down the gift to the children in Item III because the trustee is not authorized to pay to the heirs or devisees of any child who died before the end of the year 2021. This is inconsistent with the absolute gift to the children contained in Item III. For the foregoing reasons Item IV conflicts with Item III and modifies it to the extent that the title vested in the children by Item III is divested from them by Item IV. Therefore, title is not vested in the children because of Item IV. In my opinion this is a proper construction of the conflicting provisions of the will. Under Smith v. Muse , every provision in a will must be construed as if the rule against perpetuities did not exist, and then the rule must be remorselessly applied. The rule is defined in Magee v. Magee, 236 Miss. 572, 111 So.2d 394 (1959) as follows: The rule against perpetuities prohibits the creation of future interests or estates which by possibility may not become vested within a life or lives in being at the time of the testator's death or the effective date of the instrument creating the future interest, and twenty-one years thereafter, together with a period of gestation when the inclusion of the latter is necessary to cover cases of posthumous birth. 41 Am.Jur., 50, Perpetuities and Restraints on Alienation, par. 3A. No limitation of a present life estate, or a present term of not more than twenty-one years, can be bad for remoteness. Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities, Fourth Edition, p. 228, sec. 225. (236 Miss. at 591-592, 111 So.2d 394). Item III vested title in the children but Item IV modified Item III by divesting title from the children. The modification makes the absolute gift in Item III, in part, too remote because there is a possibility that some, or all, of the children will die before the year 2022 and title could not vest under Item IV(b) until the year 2022. When the rule against perpetuities is applied to Item IV, it must be rejected in toto because of the possibility that title will not vest within a life or lives in being and twenty-one years thereafter. Application of the rule against perpetuities would not be contra to Phelps v. Shropshire, 254 Miss. 777, 183 So.2d 158 (1966). In Phelps, testatrix left all her property in trust for the use and benefit of her nieces and nephews on her mother's side, the Episcopal Church, and the Masonic Fraternity. The trust was to last as long as the institutions of the Episcopal Church and that of the Free Masons or their successors. The Church and Free Masons declined the legacy to them and the Court held that the gift over to the family of the testatrix was valid since it occurred within the period of perpetuity. Against this factual background the Court held that the trust was not invalid either in whole or in part merely because the duration of the trust may exceed the period of the rule against perpetuities, provided that the interest of all the beneficiaries must vest within the period. The Court then went on to state: In upholding such trusts, the courts, have frequently pointed out that there was no undue fettering of property for too long a time, because the beneficiaries could at any time terminate the trust. (183 So.2d at 163) In Phelps the Court said the beneficiaries evidenced a desire to terminate the trust. For this reason, the Court held that the gift over to the family did not violate the rule against perpetuities. Phelps is distinguished from May's will because May's beneficiaries are without power to terminate the trust. Therefore, Phelps does not apply to the facts in this case.