Opinion ID: 1758839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Testimony of Barbara Sparks

Text: Barbara Sparks was a State's witness who testified that she had known the appellants for seven years. She said that, approximately two months before the appellants were arrested, she worked with them in manufacturing methamphetamine. Six months prior to the arrests, she purchased chemicals for the appellants to use in the manufacturing process. She said that, primarily, Gary Dean Owens made the drug while Judy Owens handled business. She had purchased methamphetamine from Judy Owens about one month before the arrests, in a bedroom of the Owens home. In the year before the arrests, she had observed others going back to the bedroom and leaving a short time later. She also stated that she had observed the appellants using methamphetamine and that their preferred method was to inject the drug. Prior to trial, the appellants filed a motion in limine to prohibit the introduction of this testimony. They argued at trial, as they do on appeal, that the evidence violated A.R.E. 404(b) and A.R.E. 403. The trial court allowed Ms. Sparks to testify as to her knowledge of the appellants' activities, so long as they were not too remote in time. A.R.E. 404(b) reads as follows: Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Generally, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible merely to prove the bad character of the defendant and to show that his actions conformed to that character. However, if the evidence is relevant to the main issue of the case, in the sense of tending to prove some material point rather than to prove the defendant is a criminal, the evidence may be admissible with a proper cautionary instruction by the court. Lindsey v. State, 319 Ark. 132, 890 S.W.2d 584 (1994). [3] In Sullivan v. State, 289 Ark. 323, 711 S.W.2d 469 (1986), we said the following: We interpret Rule 404(b) as meaning that if the evidence of prior bad acts is relevant to show the offense of which the appellant was accused occurred, and is thus not being introduced to show only bad character, we will not exclude it. Barbara Sparks's testimony falls within the independent relevance concept enunciated in Sullivan and Lindsey . The jury in this case had the task of deciding whether the appellants engaged in the manufacture of methamphetamine, possessed methamphetamine with the intent to deliver, and possessed drug paraphernalia. Barbara Sparks's testimony was relevant to the issues of whether, in this case, the appellants were actually manufacturing methamphetamine, were actually using certain ordinary household items in the manufacturing process, merely possessed the drug or possessed it with the intent to deliver, and whether the items found in the house could be used as drug paraphernalia. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-64-101(v) (Repl.1993). Her testimony was relevant to show that these offenses of which the appellants were accused occurred. Thus, Rule 404(b) was not violated. The appellants cite Rios v. State, 262 Ark. 407, 557 S.W.2d 198 (1977) in support of their argument. In that case, the appellant was charged with delivery of marijuana. The state presented evidence that, after the sale of marijuana occurred, the appellant sold another drug later that day. We held that the admission of the other drug sale was reversible error. In Rios , the subsequent sale was not independently relevant, nor did it pertain to the offense actually charged, nor was it useful in shedding any light on the appellant's intent. In several recent cases, we have recognized that when a defendant is legitimately charged with possession with intent to deliver, evidence of prior drug sales, if not too remote in time, are admissible to show intent. Scroggins v. State, 312 Ark. 106, 848 S.W.2d 400 (1993); Holloway v. State, 293 Ark. 438, 738 S.W.2d 796 (1987); Lincoln v. State, 285 Ark. 107, 685 S.W.2d 166 (1985). While Barbara Sparks testified to more than prior drug sales, the cases are analogous because they recognize the value of such evidence to the jury in those drug cases in which intent or purpose is an issue. A trial court is accorded broad discretion in ruling on Rule 404(b) questions. Larimore v. State, 317 Ark. 111, 877 S.W.2d 570 (1994). In light of the foregoing, we find no abuse of discretion in admitting the testimony of Barbara Sparks. A trial court is likewise entitled to great discretion in ruling on issues which arise under A.R.E. 403. Robinson v. State, 314 Ark. 243, 861 S.W.2d 548 (1993). We are convinced that, although Ms. Sparks's testimony was detrimental to the appellants, its probative value was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.