Opinion ID: 2107935
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether other crimes evidence was irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible propensity evidence.

Text: Appellant argues for the first time on appeal that the admission of the 2005 incident as other crimes evidence was irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible propensity evidence and highly prejudicial. Arguments or issues asserted for the first time on appeal are not adequately preserved for appeal. Miller v. Avirom, 127 U.S.App. D.C. 367, 369-70, 384 F.2d 319, 321-22 (1967) ([q]uestions not properly raised and preserved during the proceedings under examination, and points not asserted with sufficient precision to indicate distinctly the party's thesis, will normally be spurned on appeal). As a result, a claim that is not properly preserved at trial is subject to the strictures of `plain error' review. Thomas, 914 A.2d at 8. Although appellant did not raise the issue of relevance or propensity below, the trial court specifically found that the May 2005 bad acts evidence was relevant to prove motive and intent and to provide context concerning the background of the relationship between appellant and Ms. Deloatch. Although, appellant denied involvement in the May 2006 incident, we have previously held that where the accused denies that he committed the act ... the prosecutor is permitted, as part of his effort to prove that the particular accused did commit the act, to prove that the accused had a motive for [the act]. See Hazel v. United States, 599 A.2d 38, 41 (D.C.1991) (quoting ( Arnold) Hill v. United States, 600 A.2d 58, 61-62 (D.C.1991)) (internal quotations and other citations omitted). Specifically, this court has concluded that, [w]here one spouse or partner in a relationship commits a crime against the other, any fact or circumstance relating to ill-feeling; ill-treatment; jealousy; prior assaults; personal violence; threats, or any similar conduct or attitude by the [spouse] are relevant to show motive and malice in such crimes. Mitchell, 629 A.2d at 13 quoting Gezmu v. United States, 375 A.2d 520, 522 (D.C.1977) (internal quotations and other citations omitted) (emphasis added); accord Rink v. United States, 388 A.2d 52, 56 n. 4 (D.C.1978) (for purposes of admitting prior bad acts, a significant relationship can be the functional equivalent of a marriage); Garibay, 634 A.2d at 948 (evidence of past aggressions between the same parties is relevant to material issues, malice and motive, not to show criminal propensity); Flores, 698 A.2d at 482 (evidence of previous hostility between partners is often relevant to malice, motive and intent, and is therefore admissible in domestic violence cases); cf. Thompson v. United States, 546 A.2d 414, 420 (D.C.1988) (the intent exception has the potential to emasculate the other crimes rule because it is difficult or impossible to differentiate between the intent to do an act and the predisposition to do it). But see Hill, 600 A.2d at 61-62. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the prior assault as relevant to explain the history of the parties' relationship and the hostility between them and also relevant to appellant's motive and intent in committing the crimes charged. Next, we address appellant's argument that the other crimes evidence was highly prejudicial. In examining whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of its prejudicial effect, we review for plain error. While the trial court did not make an explicit finding that the other crimes evidence was more probative than prejudicial, it is well settled that, [w]hen the evidence is relevant and important to one of [the Drew exceptions], it is generally conceded that the prejudicial effect may be outweighed by the probative value. Drew, 118 U.S.App. D.C. at 16, 331 F.2d at 90. Here the trial court admitted the disputed evidence to show motive and intent as permitted by Drew. The likelihood of the disputed evidence having an undue prejudicial impact is diminished because there was no jury. In bench trials the trial judge is presumed to know the purpose for which evidence may be considered, see, e.g., Flores, 698 A.2d at 482 (noting that the risk of the evidence having an unduly prejudicial effect on the jury is not present in a bench trial), and nothing in the record suggests that the trial judge-who credited the complainant's account  considered the May 2005 assault for any improper purpose. Therefore, we conclude that appellant has not demonstrated plain error.