Opinion ID: 1100343
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the special tribunal's ordering a special primary run-off was the proper remedy?

Text: ¶ 69. In his written order, Judge Smith held in relevant part that the violation of Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-911 is a total departure from the mandatory provisions of the statute. This finding was likewise consistent with his bench opinion. Judge Smith determined that the only appropriate remedy was to order a special primary run-off election be to held between Gnemi and Waters on December 16, 2003, in order to determine the Democratic primary nominee. Judge Smith also ordered a special general election to be held on January 6, 2004, between the Democratic nominee emerging from the special primary run-off and the Independent candidates. ¶ 70. In Riley, we stated: The key in deciding whether an act not in strict compliance with the statutory election procedures renders that election void is whether the act is such a total departure from the fundamental provisions of the statute as to destroy the integrity of the election and make the will of the qualified electors impossible to ascertain. Ulmer v. Currie, 245 Miss. 285, 147 So.2d 286 (1962); Sinclair v. Fortenberry, 213 Miss. 219, 56 So.2d 697 (1952); Gregory v. Sanders, 195 Miss. 508, 15 So.2d 432 (1943). 441 So.2d at 1328. ¶ 71. Ordering a special election is indeed an extraordinary remedy and requires a careful balancing of many competing factors. In Noxubee County Democratic Executive Committee v. Russell, 443 So.2d 1191 (Miss.1983), we addressed this issue, and set forth a two-pronged test: When an election has been successfully contested, this Court has employed different tests over the years to aid its determination of what form of relief is in order.[ ] By various routes, we have attempted to discern whether the entire election should be thrown out or only the tainted votes. We have employed a two pronged test which though it has been stated in different ways, essentially provides that special elections will be required only when (1) enough illegal votes were cast for the contestee to change the result of the election, or (2) so many votes are disqualified that the will of the voters is impossible to discern.[] Russell, 443 So.2d at 1197 (citing Walker v. Smith, 213 Miss. 255, 56 So.2d 84, suggestion of error, 213 Miss. 255, 264, 57 So.2d 166, 167 (1952); Pyron v. Joiner, 381 So.2d 627 (1980)). See also, footnotes 1 and 2, 443 So.2d at 1197-98. Stated differently, this Court has determined that in an election contest, when a significant number of legal votes have been rejected, or illegal votes received, an inquiry should be made as to whether the election truly reflected the voters' will with the Russell test as the guide. If not, then a special election must be held. [22] ¶ 72. Since disqualification of illegal votes is not the dispositive issue in this appeal, we turn our focus squarely on whether the irregularities were substantial enough to warrant a special election. Russell, 443 So.2d at 1198. In Walker, we held that this determination depends upon the facts and circumstances in each particular case, including the nature of the procedural requirements violated, the scope of the violations and the ratio of illegal votes to the total votes cast. 213 Miss. at 264, 57 So.2d at 167. Accordingly, if the irregularities are due to fraud or willful violations of the election procedure, this Court will not hesitate to order a new election, even though the percentage of illegal votes is small. Harris, 193 So. at 346. ¶ 73. In Clark v. Rankin County Democratic Executive Committee, 322 So.2d 753 (Miss.1975), we dealt with error wherein election officials substantially deviated from mandatory election day procedure by opening ballot boxes while the election was still in progress. 322 So.2d at 756. In violating section 23-3-13 of the then-applicable Corrupt Practices Law, which was passed specifically to insure the secrecy of a voter's ballot and to guard against the opportunity for fraud in the counting of the ballots, officials totally departed from mandatory procedure. Id. In Clark we stated: When, as in this case, there has been a total departure from the mandatory provisions of the Corrupt Practices Law with respect to time, manner and conditions under which the ballots were counted, the contestee cannot successfully claim that the contestant has failed to show the will of the electors could not be ascertained or has not shown the existence of fraud in connection with such counting. The departure complained of deprives him of the very means by which the fraud could be detected if any exists. Id. at 757 (citing Briggs v. Gautier, 195 Miss. 472, 15 So.2d 209 (1943)). We likewise stated in Clark: We have held in a number of cases that where there has been a radical departure from the mandatory provisions of the Corrupt Practices Law the result of the particular precinct or precincts in question is void. Wallace v. Leggett, 248 Miss. 121, 158 So.2d 746 (1963); Ulmer v. Currie, 245 Miss. 285, 147 So.2d 286 (1962); May v. Layton, 213 Miss. 129, 56 So.2d 89 (1952); Briggs v. Gautier, supra ; Harris v. Stewart, 187 Miss. 489, 193 So. 339 (1940); Hayes v. Abney, 186 Miss. 208, 188 So. 533 (1939). Id. ¶ 74. In this case, the special remedy of a new election ordered by Judge Smith was not only an appropriate remedy, it was the only remedy. The gross deviation and total departure from mandatory election procedure by the HCDEC (via the county election commission) caused the result of the August 5, 2003, election for District Three supervisor to be completely undermined as all indicia of reliability were compromised. Similar to the gross error in Clark, a radical departure from statutory mandate occurred when the seals of all six election day boxes for District Three were broken and the contents therein were left exposed. Likewise, the circuit clerk did not take charge of the ballot boxes on election night as required by statute. Accordingly, the evidentiary value of the boxes' contents was completely lost and the ability of the county executive committee, the candidates, and the voting public to detect the existence of voter fraud and/or any other type of impropriety or miscalculations was lost. ¶ 75. We readily acknowledge that there have been no allegations or proof of fraud by Gnemi against the voters or election officials. While Waters thus maintains that Gnemi's election contest fails due to his failure to claim fraud, it is Gnemi's inability to even be able to detect fraud that mandates today's extraordinary remedy. Like secret vote counting, removal of the ballot boxes and their contents from the secure and prescribed custody of the circuit clerk for sixteen days, during which time the contents were removed, commingled and placed in insecure cardboard boxes, not only prevented Gnemi and objective reviewing bodies from properly ascertaining the accuracy and substance of the result posted on election day, but also prevented any discovery of ballot irregularities or outright fraud in the election. Moreover, Gnemi, in a tightly contested race, has been unable to compare the total number of voted, unvoted and spoiled ballots in each separate precinct or even be certain that they equal the total number of ballots the receiving election manager in a particular precinct swore he received and took to the precinct at the time the polls opened on election day, such being a fundamental check for fraud readily exercised by a candidate in a post-election examination of sealed ballot boxes. Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-591. ¶ 76. In discussing the importance of a box examination, we stated in Lopez v. Holleman, 219 Miss. 822, 69 So.2d 903 (1954), that the right is one `by which in its main objective the candidate is made a mere instrumentality in the better assurance of an honest, impartial and lawful election.' 219 Miss. at 836, 69 So.2d at 907 (citing and quoting from Sartin v. Barlow, 196 Miss. 159, 16 So.2d 372, 375 (1944)). In the case sub judice, Gnemi was wholly deprived of his opportunity to utilize fundamental safeguards installed in the mechanism created by the election code. Accordingly, Judge Smith quite appropriately found that the denial of Gnemi's right to an accurate examination of the ballot boxes mandated a special election. ¶ 77. Having found, for the reasons stated, that there were numerous violations of our election laws, we find that the special tribunal properly determined that a special primary election should be conducted; therefore, Issue II, concerning Waters's assertion that the special tribunal committed reversible error in finding such as radical departure from our election laws so as to require a special primary run-off, is without merit.