Opinion ID: 2831610
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: conclusion

Text: As the many appellate decisions construing Rule 4-215 demonstrate, it is not unusual for a defendant represented by appointed counsel to seek a substitute. Perhaps because of a human tendency to equate price with value, assistant public defenders sometimes do not receive the credit they deserve from those they most directly serve – their clients. In most instances there is no good cause for a court to allow a discharge and appoint new counsel, and the defendant must decide whether to continue with current counsel or to proceed pro se. This is the rare case in which the court found good cause to discharge the assistant public defender assigned to Mr. Dykes. That determination, coupled with Mr. Dykes’ continued assertion of his right to counsel, required the court to take some action to obtain counsel for him, perhaps exercising its inherent authority to appoint counsel. Accordingly, we hold: 1. When an indigent defendant asks to discharge appointed counsel and the trial court determines, after conducting the inquiry required by Rule 4-215(e), that the defendant has a meritorious reason to discharge counsel, the decision to discharge counsel is not itself a waiver of appointed counsel. 28 2. If an indigent defendant has discharged appointed counsel for a meritorious reason and the Office of the Public Defender is unable or unwilling to provide new counsel, the trial court may appoint counsel for that defendant pursuant to its inherent authority. J UDGMENT OF THE C OURT OF S PECIAL A PPEALS R EVERSED. C ASE R EMANDED TO THAT C OURT WITH I NSTRUCTIONS TO R EVERSE THE J UDGMENT OF THE C IRCUIT C OURT FOR B ALTIMORE C OUNTY AND R EMAND TO THAT C OURT FOR F URTHER P ROCEEDINGS C ONSISTENT WITH THIS O PINION. C OSTS IN THIS C OURT AND IN THE C OURT OF S PECIAL A PPEALS TO BE PAID BY B ALTIMORE C OUNTY. 29 Circuit Court for Baltimore County Case No. 03-K-11-006626 Argued: April 8, 2015 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 70 September Term, 2014 ______________________________________ ALEXANDER DYKES v. STATE OF MARYLAND ______________________________________ Barbera, C.J. Harrell Battaglia Greene Adkins McDonald Watts, JJ. ______________________________________ Concurring Opinion by Watts, J. ______________________________________ Filed: August 27, 2015 Harrell, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion. Respectfully, I concur. I join Judge McDonald’s excellent opinion, and write separately only to observe that our holding in this case implies a responsibility that is not required by Maryland Rule 4-215(e)—namely, if an indigent defendant discharges counsel for a meritorious reason, a circuit court must upon request consider whether to exercise its authority to appoint new counsel. See Maj. Slip Op. at 27. From my perspective, this case illustrates the desirability that Maryland Rule 4-215(e) be reviewed by the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure. Seven years ago, Judge Moylan aptly observed: “For a judge to traverse [Maryland] Rule 4-215 is to walk through a minefield. A miracle might bring one across unscathed. For mere mortals, the course will seldom be survived.” Garner v. State, 183 Md. App. 122, 127, 960 A.2d 649, 651 (2008), aff’d, 414 Md. 372, 995 A.2d 694 (2010). Regrettably, despite having been amended three times since then, Maryland Rule 4-215 remains a minefield. Indeed, Judge McDonald acknowledges that Maryland Rule 4-215(e)’s silence on “the situation of an indigent defendant entitled to appointed counsel” could be a “source of confusion[.]” Maj. Slip Op. at 26. Given that our holding in this case appears to impose upon circuit courts a responsibility that is not addressed in Maryland Rule 4-215(e), I would refer to the Rules Committee the issue of amending Maryland Rule 4-215(e) to clarify what a circuit court must do after determining whether or not there is a meritorious reason for discharge of counsel. For the above reasons, respectfully, I concur.