Opinion ID: 1522122
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Instructions Concerning Mitigation

Text: Defendant makes four claims concerning the trial court's instructions regarding mitigating factors. Defendant first asserts that the trial court's refusal to give instructions that were submitted by the defendant violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments of the federal Constitution. We find this assertion to be without merit. It is fundamental that a trial court is not bound to instruct a jury in the language requested by a party. If the subject matter is adequately covered in the text and purport of the whole charge, no prejudicial error comes into existence. State v. Thompson, supra, 59 N.J. at 411; see State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281, 290 (1981); State v. Brown, supra, 46 N.J. at 103. Defendant had no right to select the particular phrasing of the jury instructions in his case. United States v. Gaines, 690 F. 2d 849, 855 (11th Cir.1982); see United States v. Rothbart, 723 F. 2d 752, 754 (10th Cir.1983); Irving v. State, 441 So. 2d 846, 851 (Miss. 1983) (trial court properly refused detailed instructions on mitigating factors submitted by defendant), cert. den., 470 U.S. 1059, 105 S.Ct. 1774, 84 L.Ed. 2d 834 (1985). Defendant's second contention is that the trial court failed to explain the meaning of the mitigating factors in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. The trial court instructed the jury in the following manner: For purposes of this case you may consider whether the following mitigating circumstances are present: First, the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance insufficient to constitute a defense to the Prosecution. In order to find the existence of this mitigating circumstance you must determine that the defendant was suffering from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance and that such extreme mental or emotional disturbance influenced him in committing the act with which he is charged. Defendant's age. Thirdly, the defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication but not to a degree sufficient to constitute a defense to the Prosecution. In order to find the existence of this mitigating circumstance you must determine that the defendant's ability to [sic] capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired by reason of a mental disease or defect. In other words, you must find that such mental disease, defect or intoxication significantly impaired defendant's capacity to appreciate right from wrong or to conform his conduct to the law. Fourth, any other factor which is relevant to the defendant's character or record or to the circumstances of the offense. Now, with respect to this mitigating factor I charge you that you are required to consider anything concerning defendant's life and characteristics and the particular circumstances of the crime for which you have found him guilty. We believe that the instructions given by the trial court were adequate. We first note that despite defendant's contention that the trial court failed to explain mitigating factors, the jury did in fact find that two mitigating factors existed: that defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution, and that defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired as the result of mental disease or defect or intoxication, but not to a degree sufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution. The trial court's explanation regarding mitigating factors did not preclude the jury from considering as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. Lockett v. Ohio, supra, 438 U.S. at 604, 98 S.Ct. at 2964, 57 L.Ed. 2d at 990 (footnote omitted; emphasis in original). In addition, the trial court instructed the jury to consider any evidence regarding mitigating factors and that testimony and physical evidence presented at the guilt phase could be considered by the jury in the penalty phase. For example, the trial court charged as follows: Defendant also contends that he was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance insufficient to constitute a defense to the Prosecution. In determining whether the defendant was laboring under a mental disturbance or defect, you are to consider the testimony of both the defense and the State witnesses and that, of course, includes both the State's experts and the experts of the defense. We recognize that the trial court did not provide a definition for the mitigating factor of the age of the defendant. Defendant was forty-two years old at the time of the killing. Defendant sought to argue that death was inappropriate since the imposition of a mandatory thirty-year term without parole would protect society: at the time defendant would become eligible for parole, he would be too old to constitute a threat to anyone. This argument addresses defendant's age not as a mitigating factor but as part of his potential for rehabilitation. We therefore conclude that the pertinent mitigating factor here is not Section c(5)(c), but Section c(5)(h) ([a]ny other factor which is relevant to the defendant's character or record or to the circumstances of the offense). This Court has allowed the introduction of statistical data to assist the jury in evaluating an individual's potential for rehabilitation. State v. Davis, 96 N.J. 611, 616-17 (1984) (statistical evidence indicating defendant was less likely to commit an offense after a long prison term is admissible under Section c(5)(h)). We therefore conclude that the trial court correctly declined to explain the significance of the age of defendant within the meaning of Section c(5)(c). Our position is supported by the simple language of Section c(5)(c): the jury may find as a mitigating factor [t]he age of the defendant at the time of the murder. (Emphasis added.) This language does not consider what age a defendant will be when he is released from prison. We believe that age should be recognized as a mitigating factor under Section c(5)(c) only when the defendant is relatively young, see Eddings v. Oklahoma, supra, 455 U.S. at 116, 102 S.Ct. at 877, 71 L.Ed. 2d at 12; State v. Valencia, 132 Ariz. 248, 645 P. 2d 239, 242 (1982); Giles v. State, 261 Ark. 413, 549 S.W. 2d 479, 483, cert. den., 434 U.S. 894, 98 S.Ct. 272, 54 L.Ed. 2d 180 (1977); State v. Oliver, 309 N.C. 326, 307 S.E. 2d 304, 333 (1983), or when the defendant is relatively old, in accordance with the probable legislative intent to recognize our society's reluctance to punish the very young and the very old as severely as it punishes others. However, the trial court's instruction under Section c(5)(h) did not include whether the jury may consider defendant's potential for rehabilitation, in possible violation of the Supreme Court's mandate in Eddings v. Oklahoma, supra, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed. 2d 1, and Lockett v. Ohio, supra, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed. 2d 973, that all mitigating evidence must be considered. We decline to address the propriety of the trial court's lack of instruction in light of our decision to reverse on other grounds. ( See VI(F), infra at 299-300.) Defendant's third contention is that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that any aspect of the defendant's character or record or the circumstances of the offense could be given independent mitigating weight. This claim is simply not supported by the instructions that were actually given by the trial court. The trial court did not inhibit the independent consideration of mitigating factors: If any evidence has been presented with respect to a mitigating factor, you are bound by the law to consider it and weigh it against any aggravating factor or factors that you have found to be present. [Emphasis added.] We now turn to the final claim concerning mitigation, which arises from the trial court's denial of a so-called sympathy instruction. At the close of the penalty phase, defendant requested that the jury be instructed to consider fairness and mercy and compassion and sympathetic understanding as mitigating factors. The trial court rejected the request and instructed the jury that it should decide the case on the evidence without any bias, prejudice or sympathy and, of course, without reference to conjecture and with cool, calm and dispassionate judgment. (Emphasis added.) Also in its charge, the trial court carefully explained the process by which the jury was to weigh the aggravating against the mitigating factors, including an instruction that the jury might consider as mitigating evidence any other factor which is relevant to the defendant's character or record or to the circumstances of the offense. Without identifying the provision of the state or federal Constitution that allegedly was offended, defendant argues that the charge violated his rights under both charters. We disagree. Tracking the language of Section c(5)(h), the charge advised the jury to consider in mitigation circumstances pertaining to defendant. As a result, the jury was free to consider as mitigating all evidence pertaining to defendant's character or record or the circumstances of the offense. The reference to these factors as mitigating inevitably suggests that the jury may properly consider whether they engendered feelings of sympathy for the defendant. In that regard, [t]he defendant [had] the burden of producing evidence of the existence of any mitigating factor[].... Sec. c(2)(a). The instruction actually given by the court did nothing to prevent the jury from considering any such evidence. Instead, the instruction merely refused to encourage the jury to generate feelings of sympathy unrelated to mitigating factors recognized by the Act. Its purpose in this regard was to prevent the arbitrary and capricious exercise of discretion by the jury. The United States Supreme Court has recently held that instructing a capital jury not [to] be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy ... did not violate a defendant's eighth and fourteenth amendment rights. The Court, in California v. Brown, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed. 2d 934 (1987), concluded that an admonition to avoid mere sympathy properly functioned to focus the jury's attention upon only record evidence of mitigation and to avoid the jury's exercise of unbridled discretion, thereby furthering the reliability and consistency mandated by the Constitution. This instruction, the Court found, did not in any way preclude the jury from fulfilling its constitutional obligation to consider any mitigating evidence. As in California v. Brown, supra , the instructions here did not preclude the jury from considering all possible mitigating circumstances and such sympathy as those circumstances might inspire. Cf. State v. Conyers, 58 N.J. 123, 136-37 (1971) (under former death penalty law that provided for unified trial, instruction against bias and sympathy related to jurors' role in finding facts on guilt phase, and was not intended to foreclose compassion for defendant with respect to punishment). Nor could the charge have confused the jury by conflicting with other parts of the charge that directed it to consider all mitigating circumstances. As noted above, the court specifically charged that the jury could consider any factor relevant to defendant's character or record or to the circumstances of the offense. The charge given was far different from the charge in People v. Lanphear, 36 Cal. 3d 163, 680 P. 2d 1081, 203 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1984), which, in the absence of a direction to consider defendant's character or background, admonished the jury not to be swayed by sympathy. Id. at 167-68, 680 P. 2d at 1084, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 125 (instructions held to be constitutionally inadequate). If defendant's claim is one under the eighth and fourteenth amendments (although these amendments are not specifically alluded to), it must fall. California v. Brown, supra, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed. 2d 934. Those constitutional provisions require that the sentencer ... not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death, Lockett v. Ohio, supra, 438 U.S. at 604, 98 S.Ct. at 2964, 57 L.Ed. 2d at 990 (emphasis in original), and this guarantee is not violated by an instruction directing the jury to decide the case on the evidence without sympathy. [70] Thus viewed, we fail to find erroneous the instruction that the jury should decide the case ... without any ... sympathy, especially since the charge at that point had nothing to do with sympathy but was simply an attempt to charge the jury not to be irrational  without any bias, prejudice or sympathy. [71] While we find no confusion here, it is possible that this traditional  and proper  general admonition to the jury against bias, prejudice, or sympathy might in some other case, depending on the circumstances, conflict with the permissible role of sympathy specifically engendered by any mitigating factor. As noted by Justice O'Connor, concurring in Brown, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 107 S.Ct. at 840, 93 L.Ed. 2d at 942-43, one difficulty with attempts to remove emotion from capital sentencing through instructions such as those at issue in this case is that juries may be misled into believing that mitigating evidence about a defendant's background or character also must be ignored.... On remand, the California Supreme Court should determine whether the jury instructions, taken as a whole, and considered in combination with the prosecutor's closing argument, adequately informed the jury of its responsibility to consider all of the mitigating evidence introduced by the respondent. Trial courts should be aware of that possibility and frame their charges so as to avoid it.