Opinion ID: 2585
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: As a preliminary matter to our discussion of the City's state law claims, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction over them. Defendants argue that we lack jurisdiction over the appeals from the District Court's orders dismissing the state law claims because the City's notices of appeal did not specifically indicate an appeal from those orders. However, for the reasons explained below, we agree with the City that its notices of appeal from the final judgments encompass all prior interlocutory orders, including the earlier dismissals of the state law claims. Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that the notice of appeal designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed. Fed. R.App. P. 3(c)(1)(B). Rule 4 sets forth the time limits for filing a notice of appeal. Fed. R.App. P. 4. Rules 3 and 4 are a single jurisdictional threshold and may not be waived. See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 317, 108 S.Ct. 2405, 101 L.Ed.2d 285 (1988); New Phone Co. v. City of New York, 498 F.3d 127, 131 (2d Cir.2007) (per curiam). However, we have held that the requirements of the rules should be liberally construed. Marrero Pichardo v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 46, 54-55 (2d Cir.2004). Unless the District Court directs entry of a final judgment, any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action is, by definition, interlocutory. Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b); see Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., 475 F.3d 465, 467-68 (2d Cir.2007) (per curiam) (finding no jurisdiction as grant of partial summary judgment was not final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, in part, because a separate claim remained unresolved); Hanlin v. Mitchelson, 794 F.2d 834, 838 (2d Cir.1986) ([A]n order disposing of only a portion of a case is ordinarily not appealable absent a Rule 54(b) certification.). In 2005, the District Court dismissed all of the City's claims, with leave to replead the RICO claims only. These dismissals were interlocutory because they did not end the actions. The only case here where the District Court directed entry of a judgment in 2005 is Smokes-Spirits. That judgment stated as follows: [T]he Court ... having rendered its Order granting defendants' motions to dismiss with leave to plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint within 45 days of the Order dated February 8, 2005, it is, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: That for the reasons stated in the Court's Order dated February 8, 2005, defendants' motions to dismiss are granted. Clerk's Judgment, Smokes-Spirits, No. 04 civ. 6616 (S.D.N.Y. April 8, 2005). In light of the District Court's grant of leave to replead, we do not view this judgment as a final judgment or a certification by the District Court pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Thus, it too was interlocutory. As the decisions dismissing the state law claims were interlocutory, the notices of appeal specifying the final judgments incorporate those 2005 orders. We generally interpret[ ] an appeal from a specific order disposing of the case as an appeal from the final judgment, which incorporates all previous interlocutory judgments in that case and permits their review on appeal. Anobile v. Pelligrino, 303 F.3d 107, 115 (2d Cir.2002); see also Shannon v. Gen. Elec. Co., 186 F.3d 186, 192 (2d Cir.1999) (When a district court enters a final judgment in a case, interlocutory orders rendered in the case typically merge with the judgment for purposes of appellate review.); 16A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3949.4 at 72 (3d ed. 1999) ([A] notice of appeal that names the final judgment is sufficient to support review of all earlier orders that merge in the final judgment under the general rule that appeal from a final judgment supports review of all earlier interlocutory orders.). Here, the City appealed from each and every part of the final judgment entered in each case. Thus, the earlier orders dismissing the state law claims, with leave to amend the RICO claims, merge into the final judgments. See Phelps v. Kapnolas, 123 F.3d 91, 93 (2d Cir.1997) (construing the notice of appeal to apply both to an earlier order dismissing the complaint as to five out of six defendants, as well as to the final judgment order dismissing case against final defendant). Moreover, the City's intent to appeal from the entire judgment can be reasonably inferred from the City's notices of appeal. The cases defendants cite to the contrary, where we found certain District Court orders to be outside of the scope of the appeal, are distinguishable. In those cases, the notices of appeal generally specified certain aspects of an order or judgment, or particular orders, but not others, and intent to appeal from the entire final judgment could not be inferred. See New Phone Co., 498 F.3d at 131 (finding no jurisdiction to review separate order enjoining plaintiffs from filing additional complaints without leave of court because intent to appeal from it [could not] be inferred); Johnson v. Smithsonian Inst., 189 F.3d 180, 185 n. 2 (2d Cir.1999) (finding no jurisdiction to consider separate denials of motion for leave to amend or for reconsideration because the plaintiff's notice of appeal specifically state[d] that he [was] appealing only the district court's June 25, 1998 decision dismissing the complaint); Kowsh v. Bd. of Elections, 99 F.3d 78, 80 (2d Cir.1996) (per curiam) (finding no jurisdiction over parts of judgment other than discrete portion specifically mentioned); Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 256 (2d Cir.1995) (finding no jurisdiction to review the district court's earlier decision to dismiss the plaintiff's Railway Labor Act challenge where notice of appeal referred solely to an order dismissing the claims under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and noting in passing that the Railway Labor Act challenge appear[ed] to be meritless). [32] Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to review the dismissals of the City's state law claims.