Opinion ID: 2513963
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Intel's injury is properly related to the chattel

Text: The majority does not dispute that Intel suffered a loss of work product as a matter of fact, so much as it denies that this loss may constitute the requisite injury as a matter of law. According to the majority, the reduced utility of the chattel to the owner does not constitute a sufficiently cognizable injury, which exists only where the chattel itself suffers injury, i.e., its market value falls. The Restatement and related case law are to the contrary. The Restatement recognizes that the measure of impairment may be subjective; a cognizable injury may occur not only when the trespass reduces the chattel's market value but also when the trespass affects its value to the owner. In the great majority of cases, the actor's intermeddling with the chattel impairs the value of it to the possessor, as distinguished from the mere affront to his dignity as possessor, only by some impairment of the physical condition of the chattel. There may, however, be situations in which the value to the owner of a particular type of chattel may be impaired by dealing with it in a manner that does not affect its physical condition. (Rest.2d Torts, § 218, com. h, p. 422.) The Restatement goes on to explain that A's using B's toothbrush could extinguish its value to B. The brushing constitutes a trespass by impairing the brush's subjective value to the owner rather than its objective market value. (Rest.2d Torts, § 218, com. h, p. 422.) Moreover, there can be a trespass even though the chattel is used as intendedto brush teethif it is used by an unwanted party. As the Court of Appeal's opinion below indicated, interference with an owner's ability to use the chattel supports a trespass. The opinion recalled the rule, which dates back almost 400 years, holding that chasing an owner's animal amounts to a trespass to chattels. (See, e.g., Farmer v. Hunt (1610) 123 Eng. Rep. 766; Winfield & Jolowicz, supra, Trespass to Goods, p. 403.) These authorities do not require injury or damage to the animal; the interference with the owner's use of the animal suffices to create a trespass. (Winfield & Jolowicz, p. 40.) Interference is actionable if it deprives the possessor of the use of that chattel. (Fleming, The Law of Torts (9th ed. 1998) Trespass, § 4.1, p. 598.) Moreover, such interference need not permanently deny the owner the ability to use the chattelmere delay is enough. (See Tubbs, supra, 932 S.W.2d at p. 456.) A contemporary version of this interference would occur if a trespasser unplugged the computers of the entire Intel staff and moved them to a high shelf in each employee's office or cubicle. The computers themselves would suffer no damage, but all 35,000 employees would need to take the time to retrieve their computers and restart them. This would reduce the computers' utility to Intel, for, like the chased animals, they would not be available for immediate use. If the chasing of a few animals supports a trespass, then so does even minimal interference with a system used by 35,000 individuals. CompuServe is in accord, as it observed how a bundle of unwanted messages decreased the utility of the server. ( Compu-Serve, supra, 962 F.Supp. at p. 1023.) Here, Intel maintains a possessory interest in the efficient and productive use of its systemwhich it spends millions of dollars to acquire and maintain. Hamidi's conduct has impaired the system's optimal functioning for Intel's business purposes. As the Restatement supports liability where harm is caused to ... some ... thing in which the possessor has a legally protected interest (Rest.2d Torts, § 218, subd. (d)), Hamidi has trespassed upon Intel's chattel.