Opinion ID: 783747
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jackson's Remaining Arguments

Text: 38 Jackson argues that the special interrogatories created an impermissible variance between the time frame of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment and the proof at trial. During Jackson's first term of imprisonment, he was housed with Basil Levy, 7 a man who eventually became one of Jackson's major cocaine suppliers. The formation of this relationship apparently served as the basis for the superseding indictment's allegation that the conspiracy began in August 1993. At sentencing, the district court found that the conspiracy began after Jackson was released from prison in September 1995. Jackson argues that the jury was erroneously allowed to hear evidence of drug transactions which took place prior to September 1995, and the variance may have resulted in the jury attributing to him an improper drug quantity. We reject Jackson's argument. 39 `[A] variance between the date in the pleading and the proof is not fatal if the proof shows that the acts charged were committed within the period of the statute of limitations and prior to the date of the [indictment], as long as the date is not a material element of the offense, and the defendant is not prejudiced.' United States v. Duke, 940 F.2d 1113, 1120 (8th Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Collins, 690 F.2d 670, 673 (8th Cir.1982)). The time period is not a material element of a conspiracy offense and all of the evidence introduced at trial fell within the conspiracy period alleged in the superseding indictment. Additionally, Jackson has not argued that he was unable to adequately prepare for trial. Because [a] defendant is not prejudiced when he `could reasonably have anticipated the evidence presented at trial from the indictment,' Duke, 940 F.2d at 1120 (quoting United States v. Shyres, 898 F.2d 647, 653 (8th Cir.1990) cert. denied 498 U.S. 821, 111 S.Ct. 69, 112 L.Ed.2d 43 (1990)), we find that no fatal variance has occurred. Moreover, if any error occurred, it was harmless. Our review of the record indicates that the drug quantity, which was attributed to the conspiracy prior to September 1995, resulted from the minor distribution activities of Washington. This amount is trivial compared to the total drug quantity the defendants were ultimately held responsible for distributing. 40 Next, Jackson argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for downward departure. Jackson argues that law enforcement officers improperly engaged him in undercover drug sales and purchases for the sole purpose of driving up his sentence under the sentencing guidelines. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, where law enforcement officers were investigating a large conspiracy, this argument is without merit. Under such circumstances, law enforcement officers are entitled to continue dealing with an individual with whom they have already engaged in illegal transactions in order to probe the depth and extent of a criminal enterprise, to determine whether coconspirators exist, and to trace the drug deeper into the distribution hierarchy. United States v. Shephard, 4 F.3d 647, 649 (8th Cir.1993) (citation omitted). 41 In seeking a downward departure, Jackson also argues that the United States Probation Office (probation office) violated his constitutional right to due process by participating in unlawful law enforcement conduct. The district court addressed this issue at sentencing before determining that there were no grounds for a departure. It is well settled that [a] district court's refusal to grant a downward departure is generally unreviewable on appeal, unless the district court had an unconstitutional motive or erroneously believed that it was without authority to grant the departure. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 335 F.3d 793, 799 (8th Cir.2003) (citing United States v. Young, 315 F.3d 911, 914 (8th Cir.2003)) cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 2108, 155 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2003). We have carefully reviewed this issue and find no violation of Jackson's constitutional right to due process. Accordingly, the district court's decision not to depart is not reviewable. 42 Finally, Jackson argues that the district court's imposition of a life sentence on the CCE conviction and a provisional life sentence on the conspiracy conviction constitutes double jeopardy. This court has previously determined that [n]o double jeopardy is created by the contingent imposition of a sentence because the provisional sentence has no effect unless the first conviction and sentence is overturned. Jelinek, 57 F.3d at 660 n. 5. In addition, Jelinek instructs that the proper procedure for this court is to review the merits of both the CCE and conspiracy convictions, and, if both are upheld, remand the case to the district court to vacate one of the convictions. Id. (citations omitted). We have upheld the CCE conviction and the imposition of a life sentence. Accordingly, we remand this case to the district court to vacate Jackson's conspiracy conviction. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the district court.