Opinion ID: 1450094
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: seizure of evidence from vehicle

Text: Grissom's 1981 brown Toyota Corolla was discovered in the parking lot of Stonybrook South Apartments in Grandview, Missouri, on June 27, 1989. There was a warrantless entry into the vehicle. The car then was towed and searched pursuant to a warrant. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from the car. After a hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's motion. The trial court ruled that Grissom had no standing to challenge the search and subsequent seizure because he had abandoned his expectation of privacy in the Toyota. Grissom disagrees with the trial court's ruling and raises this issue on appeal. It has long been the law that individuals who abandon items of personal property will not be permitted to effectively contest the legality of the search and seizure of such abandoned items. Some cases speak in terms of individuals without standing to contest the search or seizure where they have relinquished ownership or possession of the property in question. Others have held that police retrieval of abandoned property is not a `seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, while a third line of cases turns on the question of whether, under the circumstances, individuals who have abandoned property can do so and maintain a `reasonable expectation of privacy' of the property abandoned. See Annot., 40 A.L.R.4th 381; 68 Am.Jur.2d, Searches and Seizures § 9. State v. Brunson, 13 Kan. App.2d 384, 389, 771 P.2d 938, rev. denied 245 Kan. 786 (1989). In California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 51, 100 L.Ed.2d 30, 108 S.Ct. 1625 (1988), the United States Supreme Court framed the issue in terms of whether society accepts as reasonable the individual's expectation of privacy in the searched or seized material. In State v. Chiles, 226 Kan. 140, 147, 595 P.2d 1130 (1979), this court stated that [t]he test for abandonment is whether the complaining party retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises. See State v. Clemons, 251 Kan. 473, 484, 836 P.2d 1147 (1992) (One moving to suppress evidence has the burden of proving not only that the search was illegal, but also that he or she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place from which the property was seized.) Abandonment raises questions of fact and intent of the person who allegedly abandoned the property. [Citation omitted.] Chiles, 226 Kan. at 147. [E]vents that occurred after the abandonment may be considered by the court as evidence of the defendant's intent to abandon the property at the previous time. [Citation omitted.] United States v. Winchester, 916 F.2d 601, 604 (11th Cir.1990). The Court of Appeals, in State v. Brunson, 13 Kan. App.2d 384, recently considered the warrantless search of an abandoned automobile and the seizure of items therein. The defendant was sitting in his parked car on a public street in a subdivision in which several burglaries had occurred. When the defendant realized the police were observing him, he drove off. The police followed. The defendant drove the car onto a golf course, into some bushes or trees, and then took off on foot. When the police reached the defendant's vehicle, they found the car lights were on, the keys were in the ignition, and the gear selector was in drive, but the engine was turned off. The Court of Appeals upheld the warrantless search of the defendant's vehicle and set forth the following principles: The warrantless search of an automobile which has been abandoned by its owner will violate the Fourth Amendment only if the defendant manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the automobile and its contents that society accepts as objectively reasonable. One's personal right to Fourth Amendment protection of property against search and seizure is lost when that property is abandoned, absent a manifested reasonable expectation of privacy. [I]n determining the continued existence of Fourth Amendment property rights, whether the facts reveal a complete abandonment of an automobile in the strict property rights sense is not the issue. The issue is whether, by any good, sound, ordinary sense standard, the defendant abandoned any reasonable expectation to a continuation of his personal rights against having his car searched. 13 Kan. App.2d 384, Syl. ¶¶ 3, 4, 5. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals phrased the property versus privacy interests as follows: The test for abandonment in the search and seizure context is distinct from the property law notion of abandonment: it is possible for a person to retain a property interest in an item, but nonetheless to relinquish his or her reasonable expectation of privacy in the object. U.S. v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843, 845 (D.C. Cir.1989). In upholding the warrantless search, the Brunson court reasoned that the defendant abandoned his automobile while attempting to evade the police, who were in hot pursuit. He knew, or should have known, that when the police reached his vehicle they would search it. He left his keys in the ignition and his doors unlocked. Under these circumstances, we do not believe society is prepared to accept an expectation of privacy in such vehicle as objectively reasonable. 13 Kan. App.2d at 394-95. Other jurisdictions have addressed this issue. If a suspect parks his car and flees on foot to avoid being questioned or apprehended by the police, some jurisdictions have held that the suspect's expectation of privacy in the vehicle is not objectively reasonable. One court placed emphasis on the fact that the suspect made no effort to assert a possessory interest, even after realizing the police had impounded the car. See, e.g., State v. Asbury, 124 Ariz. 170, 602 P.2d 828 (1979); Thom v. State, 248 Ark. 180, 450 S.W.2d 550 (1970); Hunt v. Commonwealth, 488 S.W.2d 692 (Ky. 1972). If the police do not objectively identify the suspect's vehicle during the chase, they cannot claim abandonment if they later locate a parked car of similar description. Furthermore, if officers do not follow departmental procedures on handling abandoned vehicles, this is indicative that the officers themselves did not consider the vehicle abandoned. United States v. Abbott, 584 F. Supp. 442, 452 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd 749 F.2d 28 (1984). In State v. Asbury, 124 Ariz. 170, an officer, after hearing a radio communication describing a robbery suspect and his vehicle, spotted the vehicle and gave chase. The suspect parked the car and fled on foot. After establishing that the vehicle did not belong where it was parked, the officer searched it. An Arizona appellate court concluded that the car had been abandoned and upheld the warrantless search. In Hunt v. Commonwealth, 488 S.W.2d 692, the police were investigating the robbery of a post office. The suspicious activities of three men and a description of their two cars had been reported. An officer saw a car, which matched the description of one of the cars in the report, parked at a roadside park with three men standing beside it. The officer pulled into the park, and the three men ran into the woods. The officer apprehended two of the men, who both claimed they had been hitchhiking and did not know the driver (Hunt). The car was kept under police surveillance for about four hours. Hunt never returned to the car nor asserted any possessory interest in it after the police impounded it. The highest court in Kentucky agreed that the car had been abandoned and upheld the warrantless search. In Thom v. State, 248 Ark. 180, a city marshal saw a white car parked at a service station at about 4 a.m. The marshal then observed the defendant tampering with a cigarette machine inside the station. When the defendant saw the marshal, he fled. The Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that the defendant had abandoned the car, and the court upheld the warrantless search. The court reasoned: Sometimes an automobile takes on the characteristics of a man's castle. Other times an automobile takes on the characteristics of an overcoat  that is, it is movable and can be discarded by the possessor at will. If [the defendant] in his endeavors to avoid the clutches of the law had discarded his overcoat to make his flight more speedy, no one would think that an officer was unreasonably invading his privacy or security in picking up the overcoat and searching it thoroughly. In that situation most people would agree that the fleeing suspect had abandoned his coat as a matter of expediency as well as any rights relative to its search and seizure. What difference can there be when a fleeing burglar abandons his automobile to escape the clutches of the law? 248 Ark. at 182. Did Grissom manifest a subjective expectation of privacy in his Toyota that society accepts as objectively reasonable? Grissom maintains it is patently unreasonable to believe that a person intends to abandon an expectation of privacy in a locked, properly parked vehicle which is full of his personal property. Those were not the only facts upon which the trial court based its findings. The trial court specifically noted the following: Grissom was parked on private property without authorization. He fled the apartment complex because of the arrival of the police. He slept in a field across the street from the complex. The defendant was aware his car was in the parking lot when the police arrived and when his car was towed. He did not attempt to identify himself or assert his right to privacy in the car. He did not inquire where the car was being towed or go to the police station to claim the car. Although Grissom remained in the immediate vicinity, he consciously avoided any contact with the car. The next morning, the defendant stole a different car and drove to Texas. The only evidence in Grissom's favor, according to the trial court, was the stipulation that the Toyota, bearing stolen plates and a bogus VIN, belonged to him at the time he drove it to the apartment complex on the night in question. Grissom contends the trial court's finding that he did not return to his vehicle because he was aware he was under suspicion is erroneous because he was not required to incriminate himself to preserve his Fourth Amendment rights. In support of this contention, Grissom cites 4 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.3(e), p. 333 (2d ed. 1987) (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 88 S.Ct. 967 [1968]). LaFave stated that [a]bandonment is different than a disclaimer of ownership made to the police prior to the search, which should not (but sometimes is held to) defeat standing.... Given the fact that one does not otherwise have to incriminate himself to preserve his Fourth Amendment rights, it is difficult to understand how a refusal to make incriminating admissions in response to police interrogation can be held to deprive a person of Fourth Amendment standing. (Emphasis added.) 4 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.3(e), at 333. The italicized portion of the quote is the part to which the defendant refers. Grissom could have testified at the suppression hearing in an attempt to establish standing without damaging his trial defense, but chose not to do so. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 393-94, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 88 S.Ct. 967 (1968) (If a defendant testifies in an attempt to establish standing, that testimony cannot be used against him at trial to establish guilt.); State v. Cruz, 15 Kan. App.2d 476, 484, 809 P.2d 1233 (1991) (same). If the findings of the trial court on a motion to suppress evidence are based upon substantial evidence this court on review will not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the trial court. Substantial evidence is evidence which possesses both relevance and substance and which furnishes a substantial basis of fact from which the issues can reasonably be resolved. Stated in another way, `substantial evidence' is such legal and relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as being sufficient to support a conclusion. State v. Garcia, 250 Kan. 310, Syl. ¶¶ 2, 3, 827 P.2d 727 (1992). The record supports the trial court's findings. Under these circumstances, Grissom's expectation of privacy in his Toyota was not objectively reasonable. Grissom also argues that information omitted from the affidavit necessitates the suppression of evidence seized pursuant to the warrant. The affidavit omitted mention of the Grandview officer's warrantless entry into the Toyota and the discovery of credit cards belonging to Christine Rusch and Theresa Brown. In State v. Lockett, 232 Kan. 317, 319, 654 P.2d 433 (1982), this court, relying upon Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 57 L.Ed.2d 667, 98 S.Ct. 2674 (1978), reviewed the general rules applying to a false statement in an affidavit for a search warrant and extended the rules to a deliberate omission. This court stated that a person attacking the affidavit must show the deliberate omission of material information. 232 Kan. at 319. Here, in determining whether the omission was deliberate, the trial court noted the following: The facts are clear that a Grandview police officer directed a private citizen, the tow truck operator, to invade the locked door of the Toyota by use of a `slim jim' device commonly used by tow truck operators to open locked vehicles. The officer had been called to the private parking lot of an apartment complex by the manager. He was told that the Toyota auto in question did not belong to any resident and was believed to belong to a person wanted in connection with a disappearence in Johnson County, Kansas. In plain view he observed a credit or bank card on the floorboard of the Toyota. The owner or possessor of the vehicle was not present. He testified he directed the door to be opened in an effort to determine ownership. The actions of this investigating officer are not those the Court would recommend. Appropriately he should have done nothing more than make his `plain view' observations, impound the vehicle known to have a stolen license plate and a VIN not applicable to the Toyota.... .... ... The officer upon entering the vehicle looked at the credit or bank card for the express purpose of determining ownership of the automobile. The officer so testified and there is no evidence to the contrary. The vehicle was parked on private property without the authority of the property owners. The apartment manager was requesting that the police authorities tow or remove the vehicle from the premises. The vehicle was full of personal belongings but none were searched nor disturbed by the officer who made the entry without a warrant. He did not enter the glove compartment nor the trunk. He attached no significance to the name or names on the cards. He did not think this information to be of enough importance to mention it to the officer who later prepared the Affidavit for Search Warrant. Any information obtained by entering the vehicle was not contained in the affidavit nor made known to Judge Aylward who issued the warrant. The officer who prepared the affidavit for the search warrant was not involved in the investigation of the case. The Grandview officer mentioned above supplied an Overland Park officer with information pertaining to the discovery of the Toyota. The Overland Park officer, who was involved in the investigation of Butler's disappearance and had interviewed Thibodo, supplied the information to the affiant. The trial court found that the officer's actions in opening the car door, although not recommended, were not a subterfuge to obtain the basis for a search warrant. The trial court was satisfied the information was omitted only because the officer had not realized the significance of the names on the credit cards. The trial court concluded that Judge Aylward was not misled because the affidavit omitted the officer's observation of the credit cards. Grissom contends the omission was deliberate, based upon conflicting testimony concerning the officers' knowledge of the names on the credit cards and of the significance of those names. The defendant questions the credibility of one of the officers. It is not the function of this court to determine the credibility of witnesses. There is substantial evidence to uphold the trial court's finding that the omission was not deliberate. The Lockett court defined material as if the issuing judge had the omitted information before him when he examined the affidavit, would a finding of probable cause to issue a search warrant still have been proper? 232 Kan. at 320. As the State points out, the omitted information would have strengthened the probable cause showing, not weakened it. The trial court did not err in holding that the omission was neither deliberate nor material. The trial court also commented that the Grandview officer's actions would fit within the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, adopted in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 82 L.Ed.2d 677, 104 S.Ct. 3405, reh. denied 468 U.S. 1250 (1984). For a recent Kansas discussion of the good faith exception, see State v. Probst, 247 Kan. 196, 203-05, 795 P.2d 393 (1990). The trial court concluded that the officer's actions did not justify suppression of the evidence. We agree. Grissom's final argument concerning the validity of the search warrant was that the warrant was executed illegally by Kansas police officers. The defendant maintains that the actual search did not comply with the terms of the warrant because Johnson County detectives removed the items from the vehicle. The warrant was directed to any peace officer in the State of Missouri. The trial court found that the search warrant had been executed properly because Johnson County detectives had searched the Toyota in the presence of a Missouri officer; Johnson County detectives had acted as agents of the Missouri officer; and the Missouri officer had signed the return of the warrant. The trial court rejected the defendant's argument that the Kansas officers were acting as private citizens. The trial court's findings are persuasive. The trial court did not err in denying Grissom's motion to suppress evidence seized from his Toyota. Grissom also contends that the affidavit in support of the search warrant did not establish probable cause to search Grissom's car for evidence relating to Joan Butler's disappearance. According to Grissom, the search warrant authorized the search of Grissom's Toyota for [i]tems of evidence pertaining to the abduction of Joan Marie Butler  specifically hair, blood, fibers and trace evidence, and related articles. Keys, personal effects, clothing. Whether probable cause existed to issue a search warrant is determined by the totality of the circumstances. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 103 S.Ct. 2317, reh. denied 463 U.S. 1237 (1983); see State v. Probst, 247 Kan. at 200-02. The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the `veracity' and `basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a `substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]' that probable cause existed. 462 U.S. at 238-39. Probable cause is the reasonable belief that a specific crime has been committed and that the defendant committed the crime. It does not require evidence of each element of the crime or evidence to the degree necessary to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations omitted.] Probable cause has been described as `[b]its and pieces of information ... fitted together until a picture is formed which leads a reasonably prudent person to believe a crime has been ... committed and that evidence of the crime may be found on a particular person or in a place or means of conveyance.' [Citations omitted.] State v. Mayberry, 248 Kan. 369, 377-78, 807 P.2d 86 (1991). The State and Grissom summarize the information contained in the affidavit as follows: Joan Butler was reported missing on June 19, 1989. Six days later, defendant was observed in possession of her vehicle in Lawrence, Kansas, where he was seen unlocking the car trunk. He then fled from the police, [and] returned to Lenexa, where he moved all of his personal belongings from his apartment to the Toyota. At the apartment complex in Grandview the apartment manager observed a light-skinned black male matching the description of Richard Grissom, whom she knew was wanted in Kansas for an abduction. A brown Toyota Corolla was parked in the complex lot and it did not belong there. The magistrate judge did not err in issuing the search warrant. There was a fair probability evidence would be found in Grissom's car relating to the disappearance of Joan Butler, particularly since Grissom recently had moved many of his personal belongings to his car.