Opinion ID: 3063829
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based on sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 2006). We must determine whether a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Garcia, 405 F.3d 1260, 1269 (11th Cir. 2005). In doing so, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and all reasonable inferences and credibility choices are made in favor of the government and the jury’s verdict. Id.; United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, 1327 (11th Cir. 2005). To support a conviction, the government must prove an agreement between Martinez and one or more other persons to possess with intent to distribute MDMA, cocaine, and marijuana. “If there are only two members of a conspiracy, neither may be a government agent or informant . . . .” United States v. Arbane, 446 F.3d 1223, 1228 (11th Cir. 2006). The agreement may be proven circumstantially, using inferences from the alleged participants’ conduct or evidence of a scheme. Silvestri, 409 F.3d at 1328 (citing United States v. Tamargo, 672 F.2d 887, 889 (11th Cir. 1982)). 7 In this case, the evidence overwhelmingly supports the jury’s verdict on the conspiracy count. Martinez argues the government failed to prove his involvement in any conspiracy with “independent evidence.” Importantly, he does not dispute the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdicts on the other counts. The record contains more than enough evidence of a conspiracy between Martinez and Truong, who was not a confidential informant or government agent. Cf. United States v. Wright, 63 F.3d 1067, 1072 (11th Cir. 1995) (“record reveals little conversation between [the supplier] and the Appellant, and no evidence that an actual agreement was consummated”). Specifically, there is testimony that Martinez and Truong entered into multiple buy/sell exchanges of drugs. Martinez and Truong also entered into longer term “fronting” transactions. In fact, in one transaction Truong fronted Martinez 2,000 ecstasy pills, which Martinez was to pay for as he dealt the pills. Martinez knew that Truong would give a per pill discount if he bought in bulk, but this required Truong to front the pills to Martinez. Additionally, there is evidence in the record that Martinez and Truong had agreed to divide selling territory within the city. Martinez became upset with McCann when he learned Truong had sold drugs to McCann on his turf. The record contains ample evidence to infer from Martinez’ conduct that he had an agreement with Truong to possess drugs, intending to distribute them. There is sufficient evidence to support Martinez’ conviction on Count 1. Jackson v. 8 Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313-319 (1979).