Opinion ID: 2258875
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The basic periods of incarceration

Text: Prewara first attacks the propriety of the basic period of incarceration of forty years on Count I, and by extension, the ten years on Count II. In determining the basic period of incarceration, the trial court must compare the conduct of [the defendant] on a scale of seriousness against all the possible means of committing gross sexual misconduct, and conclude that it ranks at or near the top of that scale. State v. Michaud, 590 A.2d 538, 542 (Me.1991). Only if the offense is among `the most heinous and violent crimes that are committed against a person,' is the maximum statutory sentence available for a Class A offense increased from twenty to forty years. State v. Babbitt, 658 A.2d 651, 653 (Me.1995) (citing State v. Lewis, 590 A.2d 149, 151 (Me.1991) (citations omitted)). Close-to-maximum sentences for sexual assaults are inappropriate in cases that involve neither a weapon, nor a heightened degree of violence, injury, torture, or depravity. State v. Clark, 591 A.2d 462, 464 (Me.1991). The horrific nature of the conduct in this case, as well as the injury to a child victim of such tender age, justifies a basic period of incarceration of forty years on Count I. See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1151(8)(A) (1983 & Supp.1996) (age of victim is a factor to be considered in imposing sentence). Prewara exposed his genitals and inserted his penis into a six-month old child. The injuries to the child's vaginal area were potentially fatal had she not been found, and her infancy rendered her completely helpless during the ordeal. Prewara committed a savage, heinous, and depraved act. The court that bound Prewara over to be tried as an adult described Prewara's acts as aggressive, violent, willful ... caus[ing] severe pain to the victim ... [, and] utterly senseless. Although worse sexual assaults are not beyond the realm of imagination, hypothesizing what might constitute more gruesome possible means of committing gross sexual misconduct belies reality. Here, the degree of violence committed on a defenseless infant supports the imposition of a forty-year basic period of incarceration by the trial court as to Count I. Performing oral sex on a six-month-old child and biting the child's genitals justifies a basic period of incarceration of ten years on Count II. Neither basic period of incarceration is a misapplication of principle.