Opinion ID: 2301631
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motions for New Trial and Sanctions

Text: [¶ 22] Gould contends that the court erred in denying his motions for a new trial and for sanctions. He asserts (1) that the court erred in finding that the crime lab test results were provided to him prior to the beginning of trial; (2) that even if he did receive the results at that time, the State's last-minute production of the report deprived him of the time needed to prepare his defense in violation of the requirements of M.R.Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(C), which requires the State to furnish exculpatory information to the defendant within a reasonable time; and (3) that this late disclosure also violated the constitutional guarantee of due process, as provided in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). [4]
[¶ 23] We review for clear error Gould's assertion that the court erred in its fact-finding. See State v. Kent, 2011 ME 42, ¶ 10, 15 A.3d 1286. At the hearing on Gould's motions, Detective Haines, the assistant district attorney, and a secretary in the District Attorney's office all testified that the lab report was delivered to the District Attorney's office and then given to Gould's attorney the morning of the trial. Gould's trial attorney testified that he recalled receiving the report close in time to the completion of the State's trial evidence. Because the court was free to base its factual findings on the testimony of the State's witnesses, it did not err in finding that the report was delivered prior to the beginning of trial and as soon as the assistant district attorney received it. See State v. Ahmed, 2006 ME 133, ¶ 21, 909 A.2d 1011 ([T]he court is free to determine which witnesses to believe and which evidence to accept or reject as trustworthy or untrustworthy.).
[¶ 24] Whether to order a new trial as a sanction for failure to comply with M.R.Crim. P. 16 is within the discretion of the trial court and is reviewed for an abuse of that discretion. See State v. Mannion, 637 A.2d 452, 454 (Me.1994). We will not characterize a trial court's decision not to impose sanctions as an abuse of discretion or an error of law unless the defendant has shown that he was in fact prejudiced by the discovery violation . . . and that the prejudice rose to the level of depriving him of a fair trial. State v. Leavitt, 625 A.2d 302, 305 (Me. 1993) (quotation marks and alteration omitted). [¶ 25] The record supports the court's findings that Gould received a copy of the crime lab report in the morning of the first day of trial, before the start of the trial. Although in some cases the disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence on the morning of the trialeven if the disclosure technically occurs before the start of trialmay be inherently unreasonable pursuant to M.R.Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(C), this is not such a case. Here, the record establishes that Detective Haines was advised by telephone of the results from the lab on July 13, the written report was completed on July 15, and it was mailed to him on July 16. However, Haines was on vacation or sick on the days leading up to the trial and he first obtained a hard copy of the report on July 22. He immediately delivered the report to the prosecutor. The record also shows that the prosecutor provided Gould with a copy of the report as soon as he received it. The record further shows that the State did not intend to introduce the report or its substance into evidence at the trial, and that Gould knew well in advance of trial that the bed sheet had been sent to the crime lab for forensic evaluation and that a report was expected. [¶ 26] The time between Detective Haines's telephone conversation regarding the test results and the mailing of the written report was only three days, and the delay between when the report was mailed and the date Gould received it was less than one week. There is no indication that the State unreasonably delayed delivering the test results to Gould, and on the facts of this case, the timeline by which the report was provided to Gould was reasonable. [¶ 27] Gould has also failed to establish that he was prejudiced by this sequence of events. Gould had the lab report in his possession before the trial started. He neither requested a continuance so that he could have more time to analyze the results, nor raised an objection based on the timing of his receipt of the report. The court concluded that there was neither a violation of M.R.Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(C) nor a violation of the principles set forth in Brady  because the State did not withhold evidencea required element for a Brady violation. The court also concluded that the laboratory results were given to the Defendant both orally and in writing as soon as that evidence was reasonably available, and that both parties were at least aware of the lack of DNA evidence prior to jury selection. The evidentiary record supports these conclusions. The court's ultimate conclusion that Gould was not prejudiced by this sequence of events is sound.
[¶ 28] As we have previously stated with regard to Brady, [w]hen the defendant is aware, before trial, of the exculpatory evidence alleged to have been withheld, he cannot claim that there has been an unfair trial in violation of due process. State v. Kelly, 2000 ME 107, ¶ 26 n. 11, 752 A.2d 188; see also State v. Dube, 478 A.2d 1138, 1142 (Me.1984) (declining to find an abuse of discretion where the defendant had the opportunity immediately prior to trial ... to cure the defect he alleges the State created by its non-disclosure). Here, because the court found that Gould was made aware of and, in fact, received the lab report prior to trial, he cannot succeed in his claim that his due process rights were violated. [¶ 29] We are unpersuaded by Gould's remaining claims of error, including his contention that the court abused its discretion by denying his motions to continue based on the unavailability of witnesses, and we do not address them separately. The entry is: Judgment affirmed.