Opinion ID: 1872381
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Compliance with KRS 189A.105(2)(b)

Text: Appellant's first contention is that the taking and testing of her blood violated KRS 189A.105(2)(b), which states in part that if the incident involves a motor vehicle accident in which there was a fatality, the investigating peace officer shall seek... a search warrant for blood, breath, or urine testing unless the testing has already been done by consent. [1] She argues that this statute conflicts with KRS 189A.103(3)(a), presumably meaning KRS 189A.103(1), [2] which states: The following provisions shall apply to any person who operates or is in physical control of a motor vehicle or a vehicle that is not a motor vehicle in this Commonwealth: (1) He or she has given his or her consent to one (1) or more tests of his or her blood, breath, and urine, or combination thereof, for the purpose of determining alcohol concentration or presence of a substance which may impair one's driving ability, if an officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a violation of KRS 189A.010(1) or 189.520(1) has occurred.... (Emphasis added.) Appellant claims that KRS 189A.105(2)(b)'s warrant requirement trumps any consent provision because it is more specific. This argument, however, depends on the interplay between the consent provision and the possibility of a refusal to submit to testing by a suspect. KRS 189A.103 lays out a framework for implied consent. See Commonwealth v. Hernandez-Gonzalez, 72 S.W.3d 914, 915 (Ky.2002) (stating that implied consent was unmistakable after the 2000 amendment of the statute to read has given his consent rather than deemed to have given his consent); Combs v. Commonwealth, 965 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Ky.1998) (KRS 189A.103 implies consent in DUI cases generally.); Commonwealth v. Wirth, 936 S.W.2d 78, 82 (Ky. 1996) (By virtue of KRS 189A.103, one who operates a motor vehicle consents to a test of his blood, breath or urine for the purpose of determining alcohol concentration.). If a driver refuses the test, he or she effectively withdraws consent for the test. KRS 189A.105(1) states that a refusal to submit to tests under KRS 189A.103 shall result in revocation of his driving privilege as provided in this chapter, and KRS 189A.105(2)(a) lays out requirements that an officer warn a suspect of certain things when the officer undertakes to test a person's blood, breath, or urine. Thus, it is clear that refusals are anticipated under the statutory scheme. See also Hernandez-Gonzalez, 72 S.W.3d at 915 (noting that suspects may avoid the test by refusing to submit, though thereby making themselves subject to other sanctions); Wirth, 936 S.W.2d at 82 (noting language in a prior version of the statute stating no person shall be compelled to submit to any test meant that a refusal to submit to testing could not be overcome by physical compulsion). KRS 189A.105(2)(b) comes into play by requiring the officer to obtain a warrant before testing the suspect when a motor vehicle accident results in a fatality, as is the case here, unless the blood test has already been done by consent. There is no conflict between the statutes, however. In making this conflict argument, Appellant ignores that KRS 189A.105(2)(b) conditions its warrant requirement on the fact of testing not already having been done by consent. But KRS 189A.103 makes consent the default rule in Kentucky. By operating a vehicle in this state, a driver gives his or her consent to certain tests, and KRS 189A.103(2) provides further that a person who is unconscious, or otherwise in a condition rendering him or her incapable of refusal is deemed not to have withdrawn consent.... Though allowances are made for withdrawal of consent, this does not create a conflict between KRS 189A.105(2)(b) and KRS 189A.103. Nor does it necessarily mean that KRS 189A.105(2)(b) was violated in this case by the officer's failure to obtain a warrant, assuming of course that Appellant consented to the test. Appellant argues that she did not consent because she was unconscious and therefore was in no position to consent to the taking of her blood. This argument attempts to invert the default rules for consent as established by KRS 189A.103. The default, as noted above, is statutorily implied consent. The question is not whether Appellant consented (or was in a position to be able to consent), but whether she withdrew her consent. Clearly she did not refuse to submit to the test; in fact, she was unable to do so because she was unconscious or nearly so. More importantly, the fact that Appellant was unconscious at the time did not nullify her statutory implied consent. KRS 189A.103 focuses on whether the suspect affirmatively withdraws consent by refusing to submit to testing. The statute specifically addresses the continuing consent of one who is unconscious, effectively nullifying the right to refuse the test in cases of incapacity to refuse. This is a public policy judgment call that is solely within the province of the legislature, provided no constitutional rights are violated. This statutory aspect of Appellant's argument, therefore, is fairly simple to resolve. Appellant consented to testing by operating a vehicle in Kentucky. She did not thereafter refuse to submit to testing and therefore did not withdraw her consent. Because Appellant consented, the officer did not violate KRS 189A.105(2)(b) in failing to get a warrant to withdraw and test her blood, but this statutory implied consent provision cannot trump a constitutional prohibition on unreasonable searches because of the Supremacy Clause.