Opinion ID: 2062290
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prior Testimony of Absent Witness

Text: Gillie's half-brother, Roger Cox, testified at the first trial. The State had difficulty locating Cox to testify at the second trial. Hearing that the prosecutor was looking for him, Cox telephoned from Texas shortly before trial and agreed to travel to Pike County to testify. However, Cox called back a few days before trial to say that he would not be coming because he could not afford the trip. When the defense objected at the second trial to the State's proffer of Cox's previous testimony, the State claimed the testimony was admissible because Cox was unavailable. The trial court agreed and admitted the testimony. Gillie now claims that ruling violated his right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment because the showing of Cox's unavailability was insufficient. The testimony of the absent witness clearly is hearsay. However, the Sixth Amendment does not bar all such hearsay. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). The prior courtroom testimony of an absent witness is admissible under the Sixth Amendment if that witness is shown to be unavailable and the testimony shows adequate indicia of reliability. To satisfy the unavailability requirement, the prosecution must have made a good faith effort to secure the witness's presence at the proceeding. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968). In Barber, the United States Supreme Court reversed the trial court for admitting the prior testimony of an accomplice lodged in a federal prison 225 miles away. The prosecution had not made any effort to produce the witness. The Court rejected the government's argument that simple absence of a witness from the jurisdiction was sufficient evidence of unavailability. In Ohio v. Roberts , the Supreme Court agreed that the State had met its burden of proving the unavailability of an absent witness. The State began searching for the witness four months before trial. The witness' family told the prosecutors that the witness was traveling out of state and they did not know how to reach the witness, even in an emergency. The family also related its own unsuccessful efforts to reach the witness for more than a year. The prosecution issued subpoenas to the witness at her parents' home on five occasions. The Court reasoned: The law does not require the doing of a futile act. Thus, if no possibility of procuring the witness exists (as, for example, the witness' intervening death), good faith demands nothing of the prosecution. But if there is a possibility, albeit remote, that affirmative measures might produce the declarant, the obligation of good faith may demand their effectuation. The lengths to which the prosecution must go to produce a witness ... is a question of reasonableness. California v. Green, 399 U.S. [149], at 189, n. 22 [90 S.Ct. 1930, 1951, n. 22, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970)] (concurring opinion, citing Barber v. Page, supra ). The ultimate question is whether the witness is unavailable despite good-faith efforts undertaken prior to trial to locate and present that witness. 448 U.S. at 74, 100 S.Ct. at 2543. The State's efforts to obtain Roger Cox's presence did not provide a solid foundation for a finding of unavailability. The State apparently subpoenaed Cox twice  once at his former Indiana address and once at his Texas home. When Cox initially contacted the prosecutor's office, he said he could not afford to travel to Pike County. The prosecutor assured Cox that he would be reimbursed once he arrived, and only then did Cox agree to testify. The record does not disclosed any action by the prosecutor after Cox called back the next week to say that he simply could not afford the trip. At the least, the prosecutor could have sought a continuance to enforce the subpoena or make further travel arrangements for Cox. The availability of such options presented more than a mere possibility that the witness's appearance could be obtained. A violation of the confrontation right may constitute harmless error. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973); Romey v. Glass (1950), 120 Ind. App. 279, 91 N.E.2d 850. Reversal is not required for a confrontation violation where the evidence is so convincing that, absent the improperly admitted testimony, the jury could not have properly reached a different conclusion. Brewster v. State (1983), Ind., 450 N.E.2d 507. Considering the wealth of evidence against Gillie, including the identification of him by the bank employees, Cox's testimony was relatively unimportant. Cox testified that the hat allegedly worn by the robber had come from Cox's car and that Gillie had left Pike County destined for Fort Wayne two days before the robbery. Cox also stated that Gillie was unemployed and had borrowed money from family members immediately before the bank robbery. And according to Cox, Gillie had telephoned from Texas shortly before his apprehension and said that he would surrender to police after he had saved enough money to hire an attorney. It is inconceivable that the jury would have come to a different result absent Cox's testimony. Consequently, the trial court's error in admitting the testimony was harmless.