Opinion ID: 451681
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jencks Material

Text: 21 Appellants contend that the Government failed to provide properly discernible impeachment material until well after the cross-examination of informant, Larry Jackson, the Government's key witness. The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3500, gives defendants the right to inspect all documents containing statements of a government witness which relate to the subject matter of that witness's testimony. This disclosure is required for impeachment purposes only. United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 893 (9th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120, 95 S.Ct. 802, 42 L.Ed.2d 820 (1975). Failure to comply with the Jencks Act may result in striking the testimony, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3500(d), United States v. Birrell, 421 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir.1970), or even reversal of the conviction, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3500(d), Sperling v. United States, 692 F.2d 223, 227 (2d Cir.1982). 22 The prosecution had overlooked, until after Jackson testified, an edited version of a statement made by Jackson. The defendants had access to the original unedited version of the statement. Upon discovering the edited statement, which had only a few variations from the unedited version, the prosecutor gave copies to defense counsel. The report showed that the edited version had been read by Jackson. The defendants moved to strike Jackson's testimony or to declare a mistrial. 23 The court denied both motions, finding that the prosecutor had acted in good faith and that the late disclosure of the edited version did not prejudice the defendants. The court, in making this ruling, found that although the document would impeach Jackson, the defense already had as extensive impeaching material as this court has ever encountered in over 30 years of experience. Even though the court found that any further evidence is really superfluous it allowed the defendants to further cross-examine Jackson. The second cross-examination filled 68 pages of transcript. Buzard and Dupuy contend that the court erred and that a reversal of the convictions is mandated. The district court's finding of no prejudice is reversible only if it is clearly erroneous. Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487, 495, 83 S.Ct. 1356, 1361, 10 L.Ed.2d 501 (1963). 24 The appellants are not claiming that there was no disclosure, but rather that the delayed disclosure was prejudicial. In a similar situation, this Circuit has concluded that untimely disclosure does not require striking a witness's testimony or calling a mistrial where the defendant is not prejudiced and the untimely disclosure was not willful avoidance and egregious dereliction of the prosecutor's statutory obligation. Polizzi, 500 F.2d at 893. Furthermore, [t]he administration of the Jencks Act is entrusted to the 'good sense and experience' of the district judge 'subject to appropriately limited review of appellate courts.'  United States v. Parker, 549 F.2d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 971, 97 S.Ct. 1659, 52 L.Ed.2d 365 (1977). 25 In this case, during the course of the first cross-examination, which lasted five days, the defendants brought out extensive impeaching evidence, including Jackson's propensity to lie and his mistreatment of his wife. The court found that the inconsistencies between Jackson's original statement and his present testimony would only serve to show that Jackson was indeed prone to lie. In addition, the defendants had access to the unedited version and had used it in the original cross-examination. The court's conclusion that the late disclosure did not prejudice the defendants is not clearly erroneous. 26 The court's finding that the prosecutor had acted in good faith was based upon the prosecutor's prompt disclosure (within a few hours) upon discovery of the document. The late discovery was due to the volume of the documents and the fact that a case agent had been directed to go through the file and make copies of all pertinent documents to give to the defendants. Although he found the unedited version, he failed to discover the edited version. This oversight could not be labeled as a willful avoidance and egregious dereliction of the prosecutor's statutory obligation. Cf. Polizzi, 500 F.2d at 893. Neither a mistrial nor a striking of Jackson's testimony was required.