Opinion ID: 2460345
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legal Principles/General Standard of Review

Text: K.S.A. 22-3423(1)(c) permits a trial court to declare a mistrial because of prejudicial conduct, in or outside the courtroom, which makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to the defendant or the prosecution. Applying this statute, a trial court must engage in a two-step analysis. First, the trial court must decide if `there is some fundamental failure of the proceeding.' State v. White, 284 Kan. 333, 343, 161 P.3d 208 (2007) (quoting State v. Lewis, 238 Kan. 94, 97, 708 P.2d 196 [1985]). If so, in the second step of the analysis, the trial court must assess whether it is possible to continue the trial without an injustice. This means, as we explained in White, that if there is prejudicial conduct, the trial court must determine if the damaging effect can be removed or mitigated by an admonition or instruction to the jury. If not, the trial court must determine whether the degree of prejudice results in an injustice and, if so, declare a mistrial. White, 284 Kan. at 343, 161 P.3d 208. On appeal, the trial court's decision denying a motion for mistrial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Leaper, 291 Kan. 89, 96-97, 238 P.3d 266 (2010); State v. Foster, 290 Kan. 696, 718, 233 P.3d 265 (2010). Judicial discretion is abused if judicial action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e., if no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court; (2) is based on an error of law, i.e., if the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion; or (3) is based on an error of fact, i.e., if substantial competent evidence does not support a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of discretion is based. State v. Gonzalez, 290 Kan. 747, 755-56, 234 P.3d 1 (2010). In some cases, this three-part standard may narrow the broad discretion previously allowed when this court routinely applied only the no-reasonable-person-would-take-the-same-view standard. See, e.g., State v. Ransom, 288 Kan. 697, 715, 207 P.3d 208 (2009) (mistrial abuse of discretion standard does not change even if legal error prompted consideration of a mistrial; applying standard of whether any reasonable person would take the same view). Applying the abuse of discretion standard of review, an appellate court focuses on the two questions analyzed by the trial court and asks: (1) Did the trial court abuse its discretion when deciding if there was a fundamental failure in the proceeding? and (2) Did the trial court abuse its discretion when deciding whether the conduct resulted in prejudice that could not be cured or mitigated through jury admonition or instruction, resulting in an injustice? The rubric for analysis of the first question varies with the nature of the alleged misconduct, such as whether the allegation is based on the actions of a witness, the actions of a bystander, prosecutorial misconduct, or evidentiary error. See Leaper, 291 Kan. at 96-104, 238 P.3d 266 (conduct of witness in allegedly stealing an offered exhibit from witness stand); Foster, 290 Kan. at 718-21, 233 P.3d 265 (conduct of bystander in crying during victim's testimony); White, 284 Kan. at 340-44, 161 P.3d 208 (prosecutorial misconduct in the form of inappropriate questioning and argument); State v. Tatum, 281 Kan. 1098, 1110, 135 P.3d 1088 (2006) (evidentiary error in admitting K.S.A. 60-455 evidence). As to the second inquiry of whether the conduct makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice, an appellate court's vantage point may be broader than was that of the trial court. An appellate court will examine the entire record whereas, depending on the timing of the motion for mistrial, the trial court may have made the assessment before the trial's end. See generally Leaper, 291 Kan. at 96-97, 238 P.3d 266; White, 284 Kan. at 343-44, 161 P.3d 208; see also K.S.A. 60-2105 (appellate harmless error statute, stating prejudice caused by error is assessed upon the whole record). Regarding the test against which the record is examined, the parties cite to cases that state the standard in three different ways. While at first glance it appears three different standards were applied in the various cases, we ultimately conclude that one standard has been applied, but that standard has been expressed in different ways. Some discussion of the cited cases is necessary to explain this conclusion.
The State cites State v. Rinck, 256 Kan. 848, 888 P.2d 845 (1995). In that case, this court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for mistrial because the alleged misconducta witness' statement that he ran into the defendant after the defendant had been released from prisoncould not have affected the result at trial. Rinck, 256 Kan. at 854, 888 P.2d 845. Similar language has been used in recent decisions. For example, in State v. Dixon, 289 Kan. 46, 55, 209 P.3d 675 (2009), we indicated that an appellate court should consider whether a limiting instruction was given, the degree of prejudice, and whether any evidence improperly admitted would affect the outcome of the trial. (Emphasis added.) Neither of these cases explains the origin of the would affect the outcome of the trial standard. Rather both cite to prior cases that, in turn, cite to prior cases. Tracking this judicial lineage eventually leads to previous versions of K.S.A. 60-261 as the source of the standard. ( Rinck, 256 Kan. at 853, 888 P.2d 845, cites to State v. Mitchell, 220 Kan. 700, 703, 556 P.2d 874 [1976], and Dixon, 289 Kan. at 55, 209 P.3d 675, cites to State v. Sanders, 263 Kan. 317, 324, 949 P.2d 1084 [1997], which in turn cites to Mitchell. Mitchell cites to State v. Bly, 215 Kan. 168, 178, 523 P.2d 397 [1974], overruled on other grounds by State v. Mims, 220 Kan. 726, 556 P.2d 387 [1976], disapproved on other grounds by State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, 144 P.3d 647 [2006]. In Bly, 215 Kan. at 178, 523 P.2d 397, the court cites to the statutory source, K.S.A. 60-261. The 2010 amendments to K.S.A. 60-261 did not change the substance of the statute that was in effect in Bly or at the time of Ward's trial; the amendments are stylistic only. See K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 60-261; Judicial Council Civil Code Advisory Committee, Report to Judicial Council regarding Proposed Amendments to the Kansas Code of Civil Procedure, Comments to K.S.A. 60-261, p. 159 [December 4, 2009]).
By an equally circuitous route, we conclude the standard stated by the Court of Appeals also derives from K.S.A. 60-261. Yet, the wording of the standard was different; the Court of Appeals stated that Ward failed to establish that her substantial rights were prejudiced by the error. State v. Ward, No. 99,549, 2009 WL 454947, at  (Kan.App. 2009) (unpublished opinion) (citing State v. Albright, 283 Kan. 418, 425-26, 153 P.3d 497 [2007]). This wording has been used by this court in several recent decisions, including Leaper, 291 Kan. at 96-97, 238 P.3d 266, and State v. Angelo, 287 Kan. 262, 283-85, 197 P.3d 337 (2008). Although Leaper, Angelo, Ward, and many other cases using this language do not cite to K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 60-261, the substantial rights wording echoes the language of that provision, which currently states: Unless justice requires otherwise, no error in admitting or excluding evidence, or any other error by the court or a party, is ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order. At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party's substantial rights.  (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 60-261.
The text of K.S.A. 60-261 explains the source of the substantial rights language. Yet, the statute does not specify a test for determining whether a party's substantial rights are affected. Despite the lack of statutory language, we have frequently stated that the test is whether the error affected the outcome of the trial. This test is widely accepted and has been used by the United States Supreme Court for more than a half-century and by this court for a century. E.g., Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946); Bly, 215 Kan. at 178, 523 P.2d 397; Smith v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 214 Kan. 128, 132, 519 P.2d 1101 (1974); Saunders v. Railway Co., 86 Kan. 56, 62, 119 P. 552 (1911); see generally 2 Childress & Davis, Federal Standards of Review § 7.03 (4th ed. 2010). At the federal level, the phrase affect the substantial rights was codified in 1919 at 28 U.S.C. § 391, which provided that appellate courts should decide cases based on the entire record of the case without regard to technical errors, defects, or exceptions that do not affect the substantial rights of the parties. See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 757, 66 S.Ct. 1239. In Kotteakos, the United States Supreme Court noted that the phrase affect the substantial rights also had been incorporated in the harmless error rule, Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which the Court characterized as a restatement of existing law. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 757 n. 9, 66 S.Ct. 1239. The Court then concluded that an error affected the defendant's substantial rights if it had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239. Since Kotteakos, the United States Supreme Court has consistently reiterated that an error affected substantial rights when it had a prejudicial effect on the outcome of the proceeding. See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) (the phrase `error that affects substantial rights' means error with a prejudicial affect on the outcome of a judicial proceeding); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (The plain error rule of Fed. R.Crim. Proc. 52[b] requires showing that the error affected substantial rights; [t]his is the same language employed in Rule 52[a], and . . . means that the error must have been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the . . . proceedings.); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239 and concluding that error involving misjoinder affected substantial rights requiring reversal only if the misjoinder results in actual prejudice because it `had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict'). A similar history can be traced in Kansas cases. In 1911, this court discussed the version of K.S.A. 60-261 that was then in effect. The statute required the court to ignore technical errors and defined a reversible error as one that prejudicially affected the substantial rights of the party complaining. G.S.1909, 95-6176 (Civ. Code § 581). The court explained that a court must disregard immaterial errors and rulings that do not appear to have influenced the verdict or impaired substantial rights. The ruling must be prejudicial as well as erroneous, and prejudice must affirmatively appear, or the error will be disregarded. Prejudice may be said to appear when the proceedings show that the court or jury was misled by the error, and that the verdict or judgment was probably affected to the injury of the complaining party. Saunders, 86 Kan. at 62, 119 P. 552. When the various statutory amendments that result in the current version of the harmless error statute, K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 60-261, are traced through this court's case law, similar statements can be found in many cases. This history and the use of the would affect the outcome of the trial standard when examining if substantial rights were affected leads us to the conclusion that the Court of Appeals in this case was applying 60-261. This conclusion is reaffirmed if we follow the judicial lineage of the cases cited by the Court of Appeals; the line eventually ends with 60-261. In addition to citing to K.S.A. 60-261, many of this court's cases also cite the appellate harmless error statute, K.S.A. 60-2105, as the standard for an appellate court's review of the trial court's application of K.S.A. 60-261. See, e.g., State v. Rider, Edens & Lemons, 229 Kan. 394, 407, 625 P.2d 425 (1981); cf. Thompson v. General Finance Co., Inc., 205 Kan. 76, 101, 468 P.2d 269 (1970) (noting that there had been no motion for mistrial or showing of a basis for mistrial under K.S.A. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-2105). The appellate harmless error statute, K.S.A. 60-2105, also uses the substantial rights standard, providing: The appellate court shall disregard all mere technical errors and irregularities which do not affirmatively appear to have prejudicially affected the substantial rights of the party complaining, where it appears upon the whole record that substantial justice has been done by the judgment or order of the trial court; and in any case pending before it, the court shall render such final judgment as it deems that justice requires, or direct such judgment to be rendered by the court from which the appeal was taken, without regard to technical errors and irregularities in the proceedings of the trial court. (Emphasis added.) Even if we did not have numerous cases relying on K.S.A. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-2105 when assessing if a mistrial should be granted, the text of those provisions would lead us to conclude the statutes should be applied because the language clearly fits the task of evaluating a mistrial motion. For example, applying the statutory substantial rights standard to determine what justice requires under 60-261 is congruent with a trial court's assessment of whether there was an injustice, as that term is used in K.S.A. 22-3423(1)(c), the criminal mistrial statute. Furthermore, applying 60-261 at the stage of the trial when a motion for mistrial is made is compatible with the plain language of 602-61 indicating the standard should be applied at every stage of the proceeding. K.S.A. 60-2105 can then be applied by an appellate court reviewing a trial court ruling.
While this discussion reconciles the standards cited by the State and the Court of Appeals and reveals them to be one standard stated in two different ways, Ward cites to a third line of cases. These cases apply the federal constitutional harmless error standard that was first stated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, reh. denied 386 U.S. 987, 87 S.Ct. 1283, 18 L.Ed.2d 241 (1967). The United States Supreme Court held that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824. The Court explained that this means that the beneficiary of [the] constitutional error . . . [must] prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824. We have frequently applied Chapman when reviewing a trial court's decision regarding a motion for mistrial if the underlying error implicated a right guaranteed by the United States Constitution or jointly by the United States Constitution and the Kansas Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 288 Kan. 443, 450, 204 P.3d 601 (2009); Saucedo v. Winger, 252 Kan. 718, 732, 850 P.2d 908 (1993) (standard discussed in context of substantial rights); cf. Foster, 290 Kan. at 718-21, 233 P.3d 265 (although not citing Chapman, finding conduct was not of nature warranting use of constitutional harmless error standard when defendant's father became emotional during trial); State v. Thompkins, 271 Kan. 324, 333-34, 21 P.3d 997 (2001) (rejecting application of Chapman to mistrial motion based on prosecution's use of defendant's post- Miranda statement for impeachment purposes). Unfortunately, in some of the cases cited by the parties and in many other cases, we have not discussed why Chapman does or does not apply. For example, in one of the cases cited by Ward, State v. Hall, 220 Kan. 712, 556 P.2d 413 (1976), the court apparently applied Chapman, although that conclusion is not clear from reading the decision. In Hall, the defendant sought a mistrial because of the prejudicial impact of his appearing for a brief time before the jury in prison clothing, despite his request to appear in his own clothes. The court found this to be a fundamental failure in the proceeding and explained: There can be no question that a practice of requiring an accused to stand trial in distinctive prison clothing, such as that described in the present case, may result in an unfair trial and may deny the prisoner the presumption of innocence mandated by the Kansas [Constitution] Bill of Rights, § 10 and K.S.A. 21-3109. This practice, if it exists in Kansas, should be discontinued. . . . . . . . However, the appearance of an accused in prison garb at a trial or some portion thereof, does not in and of itself constitute reversible error. It must be shown that the accused was prejudiced by such appearance in that such appearance resulted in an unfair trial. [Citations omitted.] Hall, 220 Kan. at 714-15, 556 P.2d 413. After examining the record, the Hall court concluded a mistrial was not warranted. In reaching that conclusion, the court first rejected the view that an appearance in prison garb per se results in an unfair trial. Hall, 220 Kan. at 715, 556 P.2d 413. Additionally, the court concluded: We can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the brief appearance of appellant in prison garb did not have [a] substantial effect upon the ultimate verdict. [Citation omitted.] Hall, 220 Kan. at 715, 556 P.2d 413. This last sentence is similar to the language in Chapman; at least it uses the Chapman benchmark of beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet, it muddles the standard by concluding the appearance in jail clothing did not have a  substantial effect upon the ultimate verdict. (Emphasis added.) Hall, 220 Kan. at 715, 556 P.2d 413. Consequently, we cannot fit the statement from the case neatly into a Chapman pigeonhole. Nevertheless, even with this departure from the wording of Chapman, the Hall court cited to one of the first Kansas cases to apply Chapman, State v. Fleury, 203 Kan. 888, Syl. ¶ 2, 457 P.2d 44 (1969). Similarly, in the other case cited by Ward, State v. Alexander, 240 Kan. 273, 729 P.2d 1126 (1986), the court appears to have applied the federal constitutional harmless error standard, without saying it was doing so. In Alexander, the issue was whether a mistrial was warranted because evidence had been admitted that showed the defendant was incarcerated. The court simply stated: In applying the Kansas harmless error rule (K.S.A.60-2105), a reviewing court must be able to declare the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial and the court must be able to declare such a belief beyond a reasonable doubt. Alexander, 240 Kan. at 276, 729 P.2d 1126. By itself, this discussion would not suggest that a federal constitutional harmless error analysis, as defined in Chapman, was being applied. Yet, it apparently was because the Alexander court cited to State v. Johnson, 231 Kan. 151, 159, 643 P.2d 146 (1982), and the Johnson decision, in turn, cited to Chapman. By using the standard of whether the error had little, if any, likelihood of changing the result of the trial, the Alexander court continued a line of cases, beginning with Fleury, in which this court altered the language from Chapman while expressing its intent to apply Chapman. Fleury, 203 Kan. 888, 457 P.2d 44, was decided approximately 2 years after the Chapman decision. In Fleury, the court first noted the Chapman holding that `before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citation omitted]. Fleury, 203 Kan. at 893, 457 P.2d 44 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824). The Fleury court then compared this standard to Kansas' harmless error rule, explaining: Our Kansas harmless-error rule has been incorporated in the statutory law of this state. (See K.S.A. 60-261 and K.S.A. 62-1718 [Corrick] [recodified at K.S.A. 60-2105].) Our harmless-error rule applies unless the error is of such a nature as to appear inconsistent with substantial justice. Our courts are directed to disregard any error or defect in the proceedings which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. The federal harmless-error rule declared in Chapman requires an additional determination by the court that such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in that it had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial. Fleury, 203 Kan. at 893, 457 P.2d 44. Next, the court briefly reviewed the application of this additional determination by the courts of other states and by this court in the relatively short time between Chapman and Fleury. This discussion led the Fleury court to conclude: We are convinced our harmless-error rule has a sound basis in the jurisprudence of this state, and when our rule is to be applied to a federal constitutional error our courts should apply the same in the light of what was said in Chapman. By this we mean a court in applying our harmless-error rule must be able to declare the federal constitutional error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial, and the court must be able to declare such a belief beyond a reasonable doubt. (Emphasis added.) Fleury, 203 Kan. at 894, 457 P.2d 44. The Fleury court did not further reconcile its statement that an error is harmless if it had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial, with the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt language of the federal constitutional harmless error standard stated in Chapman. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824 ([B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.). Nevertheless, because the wording is different, periodically a question has arisen as to whether there is a difference between the standard Kansas applies and the Chapman standard. On each occasion when this court has addressed this question, we have always concluded the little, if any, likelihood standard is essentially the same standard as the one adopted in Chapman. For example, in State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894, 1084, 40 P.3d 139 (2001), cert. denied 537 U.S. 834, 123 S.Ct. 144, 154 L.Ed.2d 53 (2002), we explained that, although the language is somewhat different from that used in Chapman, the standard is essentially the same. See also State v. Brown, 280 Kan. 65, 76, 118 P.3d 1273 (2005) (citing Kleypas for recognition that Kansas' standard, although different from Chapman, was essentially the same). Similarly, in State v. Cosby, 285 Kan. 230, 169 P.3d 1128 (2007), we reiterated that our use of `little, if any, likelihood of changing the result of the trial' is equivalent to Chapman 's `willingness to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' Cosby, 285 Kan. at 252, 169 P.3d 1128. The basis for our repeated conclusion that there is no difference between the standards is explained, in part, by examining the source of the little, if any, likelihood phrase and discussing the analysis in Chapman in more detail. The source of the little, if any, likelihood language is Chapman itself. However, the phrase is not found in the part of the opinion in which the United States Supreme Court established the federal constitutional harmless error standard. Instead, the phrase is in an earlier section of the opinion in which the Court considered whether a federal constitutional error can ever be harmless. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 21-22, 87 S.Ct. 824. The Court concluded that a federal constitutional error could be harmless and rejected the argument that all federal constitutional errors should require automatic reversal. In doing so, the Court noted that harmless error has been a long-standing feature of both federal law and the law of all 50 states. Harmless error rules, the Court found, serve a very useful purpose insofar as they block setting aside convictions for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial.  (Emphasis added.) Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22, 87 S.Ct. 824. After holding that a federal constitutional error can be harmless, the Court considered the appropriate analysis that should be applied. It looked to its recent decision in Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963), holding that the erroneous admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence required reversal because there was `a reasonable possibility the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.' Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23, 87 S.Ct. 824 (quoting Fahy, 375 U.S. at 86-87, 84 S.Ct. 229). The Chapman Court then addressed the question of which party should have the burden of showing harmless error, presumably because Fahy was silent on the point: Certainly error, constitutional error, in illegally admitting highly prejudicial evidence or comments, casts on someone other than the person prejudiced by it a burden to show that it was harmless. It is for that reason that the original common-law harmless-error rule put the burden on the beneficiary of the error either to prove that there was no injury or to suffer a reversal of his erroneously obtained judgment. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824. Integrating the burden of showing harmlessness with Fahy 's reasonable possibility that the evidence might have contributed to the conviction standard, the Chapman Court created the federal constitutional harmless error standard: There is little, if any, difference between our statement in Fahy v. Connecticut about `whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction' and requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. We, therefore, do no more than adhere to the meaning of our Fahy case when we hold, as we now do, that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824. While the United States Supreme Court concluded the standard in Fahy and Chapman had the same meaning, this court, in Cosby, noted the `little, if any, likelihood' wording used by this court when applying the federal constitutional harmless error standard was different from that used in either of those cases. Even so, we concluded unequivocally that neither [the Chapman nor Fleury ] formulations differs substantively or functionally from Fahy 's standard. Cosby, 285 Kan. at 252, 169 P.3d 1128. Our conclusion that there is no difference between phrasing the standard as little, if any, likelihood and beyond a reasonable doubt is validated by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999). In Neder, the Court held that the federal constitutional harmless error standard asks: Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have [convicted the defendant] absent the error? Neder, 527 U.S. at 18, 119 S.Ct. 1827. This standard, the Court said, prevents setting aside convictions for small errors that have `little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial.' Neder, 527 U.S. at 19, 119 S.Ct. 1827. In other words, the phrase little, if any, likelihood states a level of certainty that is equivalent to beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824 (the `reasonable possibility' the error contributed to the verdict standard is the same as the beyond a reasonable doubt the error did not contribute to the verdict standard). This high level of certaintybeyond a reasonable doubt, reasonable possibility, or little, if any, likelihoodwas intended to set a standard that protects rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Yet, in time, this court began to occasionally use the language regarding little, if any, likelihood of affecting a verdict when analyzing nonconstitutional errors as well. E.g., State v. Ricks, 257 Kan. 435, 440, 894 P.2d 191 (1995) (concluding limiting instruction regarding purposes for which jury could consider prior conflicts between defendant and homicide victim had little, if any, likelihood of changing the results of the trial, and any error therein is harmless.). When stating the analysis applicable to nonconstitutional errors in this way, this court has usually failed to discuss the difference in the level of certainty i.e., the standard of proofor the burden of production to be applied in the consideration of nonconstitutional errors as compared to federal constitutional errors. (For a note on terminology, see Microsoft v. i4i Limited Partnership, ___ U.S. ___, ___ n. 4, 131 S.Ct. 2238, 180 L.Ed.2d 131 (2011) (discussing burden of proof and distinguishing burden of persuasion [specifying which party loses if the evidence is balanced], burden of production [specifying which party must come forward with evidence at various stages in the litigation], and standard of proof [specifying `degree of certainty by which the factfinder' or a reviewing court must be persuaded by the party bearing the burden of production].))
It is only the little, if any, likelihood languagein other words, the level of certainty that is imposedin Ricks and numerous other nonconstitutional error cases that is difficult to reconcile with K.S.A. 60-261. The federal constitutional harmless error standard of Chapman and the Kansas harmless error statutes, K.S.A. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-2105, are based on the same measuring point: whether the error affected substantial rights. As we have noted, in Kansas we have used the same substantial rights standard, measured by whether an error changed the result of the trial, regardless of whether we are applying K.S.A. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-2105 or Chapman. This is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the harmless error standard. As the Court made clear in United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004), relief from errorwhether under Chapman, Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)/Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) (harmless error), or Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) (plain error)is tied in some way to prejudicial effect, . . . [which] mean[s] error with a prejudicial effect on the outcome of a judicial proceeding. See also United States v. Marcus, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2159, 2168-69, 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Fed. R.Crim. Proc. 52[a] and [b] provide a unitary standard for relief from error which turns on whether the error in question affected substantial rights[.]); Neder, 527 U.S. at 7, 119 S.Ct. 1827 (Fed. R.Crim. Proc. 52[a] applies to all errors; in applying Fed. R.Crim. Proc. 52[a]'s harmless error analysis to constitutional errors, reviewing court must `disregar[d]' errors that are harmless `beyond a reasonable doubt'). Under the United States Supreme Court's analysis, although relief for any type of error i.e., constitutional, harmless, or plainis based on the same benchmark, effect on the outcome, the analysis for each type of error is formulated differently to set a higher or lower threshold or level of certainty as to whether the error affected the outcome. In other words, the standard of proof varies by the degree of certainty by which a court must be persuaded that the error did not affect the outcome. See Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 86, 124 S.Ct. 2333 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (the Court has created too many gradations in the standards of probability relating to the assessment of whether the outcome of the trial would have been different if the error had not occurred); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 653-56, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353, reh. denied 508 U.S. 968, 113 S.Ct. 2951, 124 L.Ed.2d 698 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (harmless error requires the reviewing court to determine whether it has sufficient confidence that the verdict would have remained unchanged even if the error had not occurred; only difference between Chapman and the Kotteakos /Fed. R.Crim. Proc. 52 standard is the degree of confidence the reviewing court must have that the error did not affect the outcome); see also (Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error, pp. 34, 43 (1970)) (appellate courts must assess the risk that an error affected the outcome on a sliding scale of probabilities); Walker, Harmless Error Review in the Second Circuit, 63 Brook L. Rev. 395, 399 (1997) (harmless error standards establish the degree of certainty required. . . before a court can declare [an error] harmless). The Chapman harmless beyond a reasonable doubt threshold requires the highest level of certainty that the error did not affect the outcome. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, which quoted Fahy, 375 U.S. at 86, 84 S.Ct. 229, and concluding that under the Kotteakos standard, relief from error is granted only when the error had an actual effect on the outcome; under Chapman, relief from error is required merely because there is a `reasonable possibility' that trial error contributed to the verdict); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 n. 9, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) ( Chapman 's constitutional harmless error standard is considerably more onerous than the standard for nonconstitutional errors adopted in Kotteakos, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239). Under federal law, all other nonstructural errors (nonconstitutional errors, errors on collateral review, and plain errors) are subject to a less stringent threshold; such errors must be held harmless where there is no reasonable probability the error affected the outcome. See Marcus, 130 S.Ct. at 2164 (reasonable probability that the error affected outcome, not any possibility, is the appropriate standard for determining whether a plain error affected substantial rights under Fed. R.Crim. Proc. 52[b]); Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 81-82, 124 S.Ct. 2333 (a plain error `affects substantial rights' as used in Fed. R.Crim. Proc. 52[b] where there is a `reasonable probability' that, but for the error, the outcome would have been different). Which threshold or level of certaintyreasonable probability or reasonable possibilityshould be applied to K.S.A. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-2105 when nonconstitutional error is involved has not been as clear, however. Recently, the point was addressed in State v. Shadden, 290 Kan. 803, 830, 235 P.3d 436 (2010), in which we relied on Marcus, 130 S.Ct. 2159, to reject the threshold of a `possibility' that an error had affected the outcome of a trial. In Marcus, the United States Supreme Court discussed the harmless error provision of Fed. R.Crim. Proc. 52(b), which permits a federal appellate court to recognize plain error that affects substantial rights. The Court detailed four circumstances in which the rule could be applied, one of which is when an error `affected the appellant's substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means' it `affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.' Marcus, 130 S.Ct. at 2164. The Court discussed the level of certainty required in this circumstance, stating: In the ordinary case, to meet this standard an error must be `prejudicial,' which means that there must be a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial. [Citations omitted.] (Emphasis added.) Marcus, 130 S.Ct. at 2164. Citing Marcus, in Shadden, 290 Kan. at 830, 235 P.3d 436, we concluded the Kansas Court of Appeals had erred in reversing a conviction based on the mere possibility that a nonconstitutional error had affected the outcome of a trial. Based on Marcus, we applied a reasonable probability level of certainty to determine whether the error affected the outcome of the proceeding. Synthesizing these various holdings, we conclude that before a Kansas court can declare an error harmless it must determine the error did not affect a party's substantial rights, meaning it will not or did not affect the trial's outcome. The degree of certainty by which the court must be persuaded that the error did not affect the outcome of the trial will vary depending on whether the error implicates a right guaranteed by the United States Constitution. If it does, a Kansas court must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no impact on the trial's outcome, i.e., there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict. If a right guaranteed by the United States Constitution is not implicated, a Kansas court must be persuaded that there is no reasonable probability that the error will or did affect the outcome of the trial. (Because Ward claims a violation of rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, the question of whether an error that implicates a right guaranteed by the Kansas Constitution but not the United States Constitution can be declared harmless and, if it can, what level of certainty would apply is not presented in this case and, therefore, is not determined. Likewise, we do not address the analysis to be applied in the context of a collateral review of error. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 630-31, 113 S.Ct. 1710). That said, with the clarification that a reasonable probability threshold applies under K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-2105, it is confusing to talk about an error having little, if any, likelihood of affecting a trial's outcome. This language suggests a reasonable doubt threshold, which is the context in which the language originated. In contrast, the wording used by the United States Supreme Court when discussing harmless error in a nonconstitutional error setting does not include the phrase little, if any, likelihood and, therefore, avoids the potential for confusion. The Court considers all errorsconstitutional, harmless, and plainby the benchmark of affecting substantial justice, meaning affecting the outcome of the proceeding. Then, it applies the appropriate level of certainty. Our review of the history that has resulted from the varying wording this court has used persuades us that the analysis under K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-2105 should be phrased with similar consistency and without the little, if any, likelihood phrase. In addition, we clarify that our frequent reference, primarily in prosecutorial misconduct cases, to satisfying both harmlessness standardsK.S.A. 2010 Supp. 60-261 and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)should not be read to imply there are two different tests. E.g., State v. Kemble, 291 Kan. 109, 121-22, 238 P.3d 251 (2010) (using language of both standards); State v. Tosh, 278 Kan. 83, Syl. ¶ 2, 91 P.3d 1204 (2004) (discussing basis for statement). Rather, as discussed, there is one benchmark of whether substantial justice is affected with different levels of certainty required.
One further point of confusion remains: Who carries the burden of production to establish that there is no reasonable possibility or reasonable probability that the error affected or will affect the outcome? In the context of a motion for mistrial, we have frequently imposed the burden of production on the defendant. See, e.g., State v. Foster, 290 Kan. 696, 717, 721, 233 P.3d 265 (2010) (statutory harmless error). In other cases, we have often stated the standard in a burden-neutral fashion, merely concluding an appellate court must be convinced the error did not affect the outcome of the trial. E.g., State v. Wells, 289 Kan. 1219, 1233, 1238-39, 221 P.3d 561 (2009) (statutory harmless error and Chapman ). A recent case considered by the United States Supreme Court raises a question of whether the burden can be imposed on a defendant if the federal constitutional harmless error standard is being applied. In Gamache v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 591, 178 L.Ed.2d 514 (2010), the Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari in which a criminal defendant sought review of the California Supreme Court's finding that a federal constitutional error was harmless. Although the Court unanimously voted to deny the petition, four justices joined in a statement pointing out that the California court had incorrectly required a defendant to establish prejudice from the alleged error, stating: Under our decision in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), the prosecution must carry the burden of showing that a constitutional trial error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See also Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 635, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005) (`[W]here a court, without adequate justification, orders the defendant to wear shackles that will be seen by the jury . . . [t]he State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the [shackling] error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained' (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S., at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824)); United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81, n. 7, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) (`When the Government has the burden of addressing prejudice, as in excusing preserved error as harmless on direct review of the criminal conviction, it is not enough to negate an effect on the outcome of the case') (citing Chapman, 386 U.S., at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 295-296, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (`The Court has the power to review the record de novo in order to determine an error's harmlessness. In so doing, it must be determined whether the State has met its burden of demonstrating that the error did not contribute to [defendant's] conviction' (citations omitted)). The California Supreme Court, however, stated, `[I]n the absence of misconduct, the burden remains with the defendant to demonstrate prejudice under the usual standard for ordinary trial error.' 48 Cal.4th, at 397, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 771, 227 P.3d, at 387 (emphasis added). It is not clear what the court intended in allocating the burden to the defendant to demonstrate prejudice, but if it meant to convey that the defendant bore the burden of persuasion, that would contravene Chapman. [Citations omitted.] Gamache, 131 S.Ct. at 592. The four justices concluded the allocation of the burden did not impact the conclusion that the error was harmless in Gamache. Nevertheless, the four justices noted the allocation of the burden of proving harmlessness can be outcome determinative in some cases and in future cases the California courts should take care to ensure that their burden allocation conforms to the commands of Chapman.  Gamache, 131 S.Ct. at 593. We heed this warning even though Gamache is not controlling as it is merely a statement by four justices related to a denial of certiorari. We do so because we find the justices' statements persuasive for several reasons. First, because the standard of review (like the applicability of harmless error) is part and parcel of the federal right itself, a state court may be prohibited from adopting standards of review that are more deferential than the standards adopted by federal courts. 7 LaFave, Israel, King & Kerr, Criminal Procedure § 27.5(e) (3d ed. 2007). Second, we agree with the four justices that the allocation of the burden can be outcome determinative and, in such a case, Chapman would require the party favored by the errorusually the Stateto carry the burden of production. Third, a state court decision that is contrary to or applies the federal constitutional harmless error standard in an `objectively unreasonable' manner, is subject to federal habeas review. Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17-18, 124 S.Ct. 7, 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003). Finally, on occasion we have appropriately imposed the burden on the State as the party benefitting from the alleged error. E.g., State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894, 1084, 40 P.3d 139 (2001), cert. denied 537 U.S. 834, 123 S.Ct. 144, 154 L.Ed.2d 53 (2002). Consequently, the better practice is to express the federal constitutional harmless error standard as we did in Kleypas: A constitutional error may be declared harmless where the [party benefitting from the error] proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not [affect substantial rights, meaning it did not] contribute to the verdict obtained. Kleypas, 272 Kan. at 1084, 40 P.3d 139 (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824). Because we ultimately apply the federal constitutional harmless error standard in this case, we need not determine which party carries the burden of production regarding the effect of a nonconstitutional error under K.S.A. 60-261 or K.S.A. 60-2105.
With these different points in mind, we restate the two-step test that frames the analysis for a motion for mistrial: First, was there a fundamental failure in the proceeding? Second, if so, did this fundamental failure result in an injustice? To determine whether an error makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice, a trial court must assess whether the fundamental failure affected a party's substantial rights, which means it will or did affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record. The degree of certainty by which the court must be persuaded that the error did not affect the outcome will vary depending on whether the fundamental failure infringes upon a right guaranteed by the United States Constitution. If it does not, the trial court should apply K.S.A. 60-261 and determine if there is a reasonable probability that the error will or did affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record. If the fundamental failure does infringe upon a right guaranteed by the United States Constitution, the trial court should apply the constitutional harmless error analysis defined in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, reh. denied 386 U.S. 987, 87 S.Ct. 1283, 18 L.Ed.2d 241 (1967), in which case the error may be declared harmless where the party benefitting from the error proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record, i.e., proves there is no reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict. Regardless of whether the error is constitutional, one factor to be considered is whether any damage caused by the error can be or was removed or mitigated by admonition, instruction, or other curative action. An appellate court reviewing the second step for an injustice will review the entire record and use the same analysis, applying K.S.A. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-2105 or else Chapman, depending on the nature of the right allegedly affected.