Opinion ID: 204733
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Counsel's Deficient Performance Prejudiced Tibbetts

Text: Beyond showing that counsel was deficient for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence, Tibbetts must further show that counsel's actions were prejudicial. The majority concludes that Tibbetts failed to demonstrate prejudice because any additional evidence that counsel failed to uncover or present would have been cumulative. We have stated that we reject a requirement that any later-identified cumulative mitigating evidence must have been introduced in order for counsel to be effective. Clark v. Mitchell, 425 F.3d 270, 286 (6th Cir.2005); id. at 286-90 (surveying cases); see also Beuke, 537 F.3d at 645. And, according to our case law, `to establish prejudice, the new evidence that a habeas petitioner presents must differ in a substantial wayin strength and subject matter-from the evidence actually presented at sentencing.' Broom, 441 F.3d at 410 (quoting Clark, 425 F.3d at 286) (alteration omitted). The question is thus whether the additional mitigation evidence concerning Tibbetts's mentally and physically abusive childhood and upbringing differs in strength and subject matter from the evidence introduced such that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. As explained below, I believe that the evidence does demonstrate that Tibbetts was prejudiced and that a contrary conclusion is unreasonable. At mitigation, Dr. Weaver's testimony on Tibbetts's abusive childhood consisted of the following: [Tibbetts] had a miserable childhood. Horrible. . . . The parents were both drug users. His father was, in addition to an alcoholic. He and two of his siblings, brothers, all of them who have been in difficulty with the law, were cared for by a 10-year-old sister, whom I talked with this morning incidentally. And when the Welfare Departmentor Human Services found out about this, or when it was reported, they stepped in. And there was a continuing contact with Human Services from 1961 or '62, throughout those years, and he and his brothers were taken for foster home placement. Not very happy ones, according to his sister. . . . And he had several placements . . . which were not satisfactory. Like, they were too punitive with him. Matter of fact, the sister reported that he and his two brothers were tied in bed at night so they would not be any problem. No sheets, no pillows, no pillow case or anything. Treated more like animals. The[re] wasn't any [nurturing] of him or the other sibling. J.A. at 1125-26 (Weaver Test.). Tibbetts's unsworn statement regarding his childhood revealed that Tibbetts did not like to talk about [his] childhood because [he] never did like it, that he didn't like going home because he didn't like to hear the hollering[ and] the belts, and that there was no family love. J.A. at 1220-22 (Tibbetts Statement). The evidence discovered in post-conviction materials, however, revealed a much more chaotic and abusive environment, including never-before-revealed details about Tibbetts's abuse at the hands of his biological parents. For example, Terry submitted an affidavit disclosing that Tibbetts's biological mother and father were cruel and engaged in extreme violence toward the children, requiring Terry to protect Tibbetts and the younger siblings from the blows of their parents. Terry Aff. ¶ 6. Terry also revealed that Tibbetts's mother and father failed to provide their children with basic needs, leaving them alone often without food or proper clothing, id. ¶ 7, and the children had to rely on people from the community to donate such items, lest they go hungry and cold. Tibbetts's father also brutalized Tibbetts's mother, beating her bloody with a fan and a telephone, id. ¶ 8, and, in general, the household where Tibbetts lived with his biological parents was a place of constant violence, id. ¶ 8. In addition to Terry's recollection of these events, an affidavit from Tibbetts's father submitted during post-conviction proceedings revealed that he would have testified first-hand that he and Tibbetts's mother were unable to care for their children. Tibbetts, S. Aff. ¶¶ 3, 4. Once removed from the biological household, Tibbetts did not fare any better. One of the foster-care mothers, Ms. Merriman, was a drug addict, wacked out of her head, and never took care of Tibbetts. Terry Aff. ¶ 11. In fact, far from becoming a safe space for the already-abused Tibbetts, the foster-care mother's own biological children brutalized Tibbetts and his siblings by kicking them down the stairs, beating them with spatulas, and burning their hands on heat registers, which sent at least one child the hospital. Id. ¶ 12. The Merrimans essentially treated Tibbetts like an animal. He was required to sit in the corner of the kitchen all day long until bedtime, id. ¶ 11, at which point he was tied to the bed. Although Dr. Weaver did mention this detail, perhaps equally disturbing is how this task was accomplished: Ms. Merriman would lash rope around [Tibbetts's] waist[] that dug into [his] stomach[], id. ¶ 11, causing pain throughout the night. Moreover, Ms. Merriman never fed the children while in the foster-care home, id. ¶ 13, and locked them outside for long periods of time without access to a toilet, causing one of Tibbetts's siblings to have a bowel impaction, id. ¶ 14. Mr. Merriman also abused the Tibbetts children, and according to Terry, he attempted to molest her sexually on at least one occasion while they were residing in the Merriman home. Id. ¶ 14. Tibbetts's father's affidavit indicated that he and Tibbetts's mother knew that the children were being mistreated in foster care but did nothing. Tibbetts, S. Aff. ¶¶ 3, 4. Ultimately, Tibbetts's mother gained authorization to remove her children from the Merrimans' care, but she decided to take only two of them, leaving Tibbetts behind. According to Terry, when it came time for the others to leave, her mother ignored Tibbetts, act[ing] like [he] did not exist, and she refused to even see Tibbetts when he came to visit. Id. ¶ 15. Tibbetts's father confirmed that Tibbetts's mother simply wanted nothing to do with Tibbetts. Tibbetts, S. Aff. ¶¶ 3, 4. Perhaps Tibbetts's mother's cruelty and emotional abuse was not entirely surprising, however, as post-conviction materials also revealed that she likely had a borderline personality disorder and was a dangerous individual. Id. ¶ 17. The State finally removed Tibbetts from the Merriman home, and Tibbetts was placed with a second family, where he was not treated much better. Id. ¶ 19. The evidentiary hearing also revealed that had counsel contacted Tibbetts's childhood friend, Sandra Nunley, counsel would have learned that once Tibbetts exited the foster-care system he was still denied an environment conducive to normal childhood development. The Children's Protestant Orphanage where Tibbetts was sent following foster care was very strict, and although it was not physically abusive, the children were not permitted to do much of anything. Nunley Aff. ¶ 3. Nunley recounted that the people who ran the orphanage provided no affection or nurturing and there was no opportunity to get close to or bond with any of the adults, id. ¶ 4, which was what Tibbetts most desired. Moreover, Tibbetts never received visits from anyone, which was [u]nlike the other children at the orphanage, id., and Tibbetts was never allowed to engage in activities with friends after school or participate in normal social functions, id. ¶ 5. Nunley also would have explained to the jury that Tibbetts so yearned for affection that she and Tibbetts often broke the rules in order to see one another. Id. ¶¶ 6-7. This additional evidence is not cumulative but instead adds real substance to the story of Tibbetts's childhood that was conveyed to the jury. For example, the undisclosed evidence reveals Tibbetts's mental and physical abuse at the hands of his biological mother and father, which was not presented to the jury during the penalty phase. Cf. Eley v. Bagley, 604 F.3d 958, 969 (6th Cir.2010) (Although the evidence presented at the post-conviction hearing did go into more depth than the evidence presented by trial counsel at sentencing, it did not cover any new subject matter and was not substantially more persuasive than the trial evidence.). The additional evidence also provides shocking, disheartening, and utterly disturbing details about [Tibbetts's] upbringing, Beuke, 537 F.3d at 646, and does not merely elaborate on a difficult childhood that had been described already by several witnesses. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 398, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (finding prejudice where the evidence that was not disclosed provided a graphic description of [the petitioner's] childhood, filling with abuse and privation); cf. Wiles v. Bagley, 561 F.3d 636, 639 (6th Cir.2009) (Most of the ostensibly new evidence represents variations on th[e] same theme presented at the penalty phase); Beuke, 537 F.3d at 646 (concluding that details such as the fact that the petitioner had low self-esteem and was sheltered when growing up did not support a finding of prejudice despite being noncumulative); Broom, 441 F.3d at 410. To the contrary, as outlined above, none of Tibbetts's family or friends had been interviewed or testified about the details revealed in the post-conviction hearing, and Dr. Weaver's description of Tibbetts's childhood as miserable or horrible, or even Dr. Weaver's example of Tibbetts's foster family as being too punitive by tying the children to the bed, does not even come close to conveying the extent and gravity of Tibbetts's torture and abuse. The two foster-care placements were more than just not satisfactory, as Dr. Weaver testified, but rather they were abusive. In essence, rather than being cumulative, the evidence that counsel failed to uncover and present provides a more nuanced understanding of [Tibbetts's] psychological background and presents a more sympathetic picture of [Tibbetts] that is sufficient to support a finding of prejudice. Jells, 538 F.3d at 501; see Johnson, 544 F.3d at 604 (finding prejudice where not one witness testified about the abuse that [the petitioner] suffered as a way of life (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Broom, 441 F.3d at 410 n. 27 (holding habeas relief was not warranted when the additional mitigation evidence included the fact that [Defendant] was placed in a juvenile detention facility as a teenager, that a close friend of [Defendant's] was shot and killed, and that [Defendant's] father was a pimp.). [2] Even assuming, however, that the majority is correct that sufficient details about Tibbetts's abuse were introduced via Dr. Weaver's testimony, I remain unconvinced that Tibbetts was not prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance and failure to call lay witnesses such as Tibbetts's sister, father, and friends. First, had Tibbetts's family and friends testified, the evidence regarding Tibbetts's childhood abuse would have come directly from individuals who experienced the same abusive environment as Tibbetts and even from one individual who actually inflicted some of the abuse. Having those individuals testify as to what Tibbetts endured certainly would have had a greater impact on the jury than just listening to Dr. Weaver mention Tibbetts's childhood abuse vaguely and in passing. Second, it is important to remember one of the State's tactics during the penalty phase was to challenge the legitimacy of the defense's mention of childhood abuse, however minimal the reference. Thus, even assuming that the testimony from the above-mentioned lay witnesses would not have uncovered evidence different in substance from that which was introducedagain, a proposition with which I do not agreethe evidence certainly would have been different in strength based on its source. Throughout the hearing, the State attempted to undermine the mitigation value of Tibbetts's abusive childhood by implying that the defense was fabricating any mention of such abuse. For example, when Dr. Weaver spoke vaguely about the problems that Tibbetts had in foster care, the prosecutor pointed out that [t]he information [Dr. Weaver was] telling . . . the jury [wa]sn't in [the children's services records]. . . . This [information was] in a conversation [that Dr. Weaver] had with [Tibbetts's] sister at some other time which [the court and the jury] have nothing about. J.A. at 1171 (Weaver Test.). The State also noted that the records contained no information about Tibbetts's abusive childhood, id. at 1170, and, to the contrary, indicated that the State had monitored appropriately Tibbetts's placement in foster care, implying that any claim that the placements were problematic was exaggerated, if not an outright lie, id. at 1172. As mentioned above, the State's claim regarding the various records was not far from the truth. Again, the records contained surprisingly little in the way of definitive evidence that Tibbetts was raised in a mentally and physically abusive environment, and much of the mention of abuse was couched in terms of speculation and possibilities with social workers reporting rumors of abuse but never making any determination or conclusion. Based on the evidence that counsel submitted at mitigation, then, the jury could have deliberated with the erroneous impression that Tibbetts was never actually abused as a child, which the evidence revealed in post-conviction proceedings shows is clearly not the case. In short, had counsel relied on first-hand accounts about Tibbetts's abusive home and foster-care placements, the State would have been unable to challenge so readily the little evidence of Tibbetts's abusive childhood that was conveyed. Furthermore, I cannot turn a blind eye in the prejudice analysis to the fact that the effectiveness of the defense's sole mitigation witness, Dr. Weaver, was undermined by several of his statements characterizing Tibbetts as a dangerous individual, even when sober. When trial counsel asked Dr. Weaver whether Tibbetts had the ability to control himself and his impulses, Dr. Weaver stated: When I saw him the first time, I guess that I got a little concerned about my own safety. . . . When I saw him initially, and when he came in, the air when I hadwhen I looked at him, you know, I'm not going to cross him. I'm not going to cross him. This was even in the Justice Center in the medical department there. . . . It was more of a more of an open-ended interview which I had with him for the most part, about things. I didn't push him. I'm concerned about my own safety. J.A. at 1139 (Weaver Test.). These statements not only cast Tibbetts in an extraordinary negative light, but they also weaken the legitimacy of the mitigation theory on which the defense reliedthat drugs and alcohol precluded Tibbetts from being able to appreciate his criminal acts or control himself. After all, the only witness who had been called to make the case to spare Tibbetts's life was, in reality, concerned about Tibbetts's inability to control himself even when lucid, sober, and incarcerated, thus implying that it might not have been the drugs and alcohol that induced the crime. Dr. Weaver's statements did not escape the prosecutor, who emphasized them on cross examination: Q: You were apprehensive of this man at that time when you walked in to sit down to see him. A: Sort of bad vibes that I had when he walked in the room, yes sir. J.A. at 1162 (Weaver Test.). In short, the evidence that counsel failed to uncover and introduce through Tibbetts's family members and friends differs in both substance and strength from that introduced via Dr. Weaver, Tibbetts, and the official records. As in Porter, the jury at Tibbetts's original sentencing heard almost nothing that would humanize him or allow them to accurately gauge his moral culpability. Porter, 130 S.Ct. at 454. And the type of mitigation evidence that trial counsel failed to uncover and introducethat Tibbetts was abused as a childis markedly different from the evidence that supported defense counsel's chosen mitigation theory. Evidence of childhood abuse certainly would have elevated the jurors' sympathies for [Tibbetts], Beuke, 537 F.3d at 645, in a way that evidence of his intoxication and drug abuse would not. As a panel of this Circuit stated in Wiles v. Bagley , it is hardly self-evident that getting high on barbiturates before stabbing someone to death is the kind of evidence that makes a capital defendant look better in the eyes of a court as opposed to making him look even worse. Wiles, 561 F.3d at 640 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). But it is impossible to conclude that evidence of his mistreatment as a child would not have provided a compelling reason to find Tibbetts less morally culpable and spare him a death sentence. Mitigating evidence unrelated to dangerousness may alter the jury's selection of penalty, even if it does not undermine or rebut the prosecution's death-eligibility case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 398, 120 S.Ct. 1495. As a final response to the majority's claim that counsel was not constitutionally deficient and that Tibbetts was not prejudiced, I emphasize that the Supreme Court recently made clear that it has never limited the prejudice inquiry under Strickland to cases in which there was only little or no mitigation evidence presented. Sears v. Upton, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 3259, 3266, 177 L.Ed.2d 1025 (2010). Instead, the Court noted that it has found deficiency and prejudice in cases such as the instant case, where counsel presented what could be described as a superficially reasonable mitigation theory during the penalty phase, id. (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 398, 120 S.Ct. 1495; Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 378, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005), and Porter, 130 S.Ct. at 449), but failed to uncover and present compelling mitigation evidence related to another, legitimate and consistent theory, [3] cf. Wong, 130 S.Ct. at 385 ([Counsel] understood the gravity of [the] aggravating evidence [of guilt], and he built his mitigation strategy around the overriding need to exclude it.). Indeed, the case that the majority selects to demonstrate lack of prejudice, Phillips v. Bradshaw, 607 F.3d 199 (6th Cir.2010), is inapposite because in Phillips the additional mitigation evidence conflicted with counsel's mitigation strategy. In Phillips, [t]he majority of the additional evidence [would have] contradict[ed] the theory that [the defendant's] counsel presented during the mitigation phase, and a different approach [to mitigation] would have been required if the totality of the mitigating evidence [had been] presented. Id. at 217. Here, as shown above and in contrast to Phillips, the additional evidence of first-hand accounts of Tibbetts's childhood abuse would have provided compelling reason for the jury to conclude differently at the penalty phase.