Opinion ID: 1540195
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the Plaintiffs Have Standing to Object?

Text: The court first determined that the plaintiffs had standing to oppose the motion. Because the plaintiffs were bound by their settlement agreement to defend, indemnify and hold harmless GWU from and against Dr. Schoonover's cross-claims for contribution and indemnity, they effectively stood in GWU's shoes with respect to that cross-claim. Moreover, the plaintiffs were not asserting a generalized grievance, but were opposing a threatened financial injury particular to them. [I]f Dr. Schoonover's Motion is granted and a pro tanto credit is applied, the Plaintiff's final judgment will be $575,000 less than a judgment after a pro rata credit is applied. To be sure, the plaintiffs would recover the full amount of the verdict even if a pro tanto credit were applied. Nevertheless, as we discuss below, this court has allowed plaintiffs, in comparable circumstances, to recover more than the full amount awarded by the jury. See note 9, infra. Therefore, a very large sum was at stake, and the plaintiffs had a real and substantial interest in the trial court's ruling. Under these circumstances, the trial court properly accorded the plaintiffs standing to oppose Dr. Schoonover's motion to dismiss her cross-claim. Relying on two cases from Maryland, Dr. Schoonover asserts that the trial court should not have considered the plaintiffs' opposition to dismissal because they were not parties to the cross-claim. Given the difference in circumstances, we do not find the broad language in those decisions to be persuasive, and they are not binding upon us in any event. [5] In Murphy v. Board of County Commissioners, 13 Md.App. 497, 284 A.2d 261 (Ct.Spec.App.1971), each defendant moved to dismiss its crossclaim with prejudice [after all evidence was closed], and each consented to the other's dismissal. Id. at 267. Counsel for [the plaintiff] objected, stating that he deemed it wise as a matter of strategy that they stay in. Id. After the trial court granted the motions to dismiss, the plaintiff asked for an instruction informing the jury that the cross-claims would not be considered because they had been dismissed. Id. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that denial of this instruction was error, but the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. Although the appellate court stated that it knew of no principle or rule that a plaintiff has any rights arising from crossclaims among defendants[,] id. at 268, this dictum does not control our decision here, and the court was not considering comparable factual circumstances. Most importantly, both defendants remained in the case and were equally exposed to a jury determination of the liability or non-liability of each. Id. at 268. As it happened, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants, so the court was not faced with issues of pro rata or pro tanto credit. Id. at 264. In Garlock, Inc. v. Gallagher, 149 Md. App. 189, 814 A.2d 1007 (Ct. Spec.App.2003), the same court held the trial court erred in ruling that [a] stipulated dismissal was a nullity, concluding that [o]nce the actual parties to the cross-claim stipulated a dismissal, the Gallagher plaintiffsand the trial courthad no voice to contest it. Id. at 1018. Acknowledging that plaintiffs have an interest in determining the number of joint tort-feasors and the amount each owes, the court stated that [t]hat interest does not empower them, however, to force a defendant to prosecute a claim that may benefit plaintiffs. Id. Our case does not involve a stipulation of dismissal, nor did the trial court require Dr. Schoonover to undertake any future prosecution. Although GWU did not file an opposition to Dr. Schoonover's motion, neither did it sign a stipulation of dismissal. And such a stipulation might not have been effective in these circumstances. Given the terms of the settlement agreement, the plaintiffs stood in GWU's shoes. We do not find Murphy and Garlock sufficiently compelling that we should overturn the trial court's decision to consider the interests of the plaintiffs. [6]