Opinion ID: 1752752
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did sanford's extreme intoxication at the time of the shooting negate the intent to commit the assault, thus making the exception for intentional acts, in sanford's policy, irrelevant?

Text: At the time of the shooting, Kado was quite intoxicated, having drunk more than two (2) pints of whiskey. Coleman claims that Kado, because of his extreme intoxication, could not form the requisite intent to commit an intentional tort, and that the intentional act exception of Kado's liability policy was therefore inapplicable. Nationwide, the only appellee concerned about this point, confesses that there was a fact issue as to intent. It claims, however, that the point is irrelevant. Because the injuries did not arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of Kado's vehicle, there is no coverage, regardless of whether Kado was too intoxicated to commit an intentional tort. The fact issue as to intent does not raise a fact question as to whether the act was voluntary ( Roberts says independent voluntary act renders use of vehicle incidental). An act is intentional if the actor desires to cause the consequences of his act, or believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it. Stevens, et ux v. FMC Corp., 515 So.2d 928 (Miss. 1987). A voluntary act, on the other hand, is one that is unconstrained by interference; unimpelled by another's influence; spontaneous; acting of oneself. Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.