Opinion ID: 1817484
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: origin of common law privilege to resist unlawful arrest

Text: [1] ¶ 12. The nature and scope of a common law privilege is a question of law which this court reviews de novo. See generally Kensington Development v. Israel, 142 Wis. 2d 894, 899-900, 419 N.W.2d 241 (1988); State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224 N.W.2d 407 (1974). Our review discloses that over its 400 year history, the nature and scope of this particular privilege has expanded and contracted based on prevailing legal and societal conditions. [2] ¶ 13. Article XIV, section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution preserves the English common law in the condition in which it existed at the time of the American Revolution until modified or abrogated. [9] See State v. Boehm, 127 Wis. 2d 351, 356 n.2, 379 N.W.2d 874 (Ct. App. 1985); see also, Davison v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 75 Wis. 2d 190, 201, 248 N.W.2d 433 (1977). ¶ 14. Ms. Hobson and amicus curiae Wisconsin Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (WACDL) and the State Public Defender make numerous citations to an article by Professor Paul G. Chevigny, The Right to Resist an Unlawful Arrest, 78 Yale L.J. 1128 (1969). Professor Chevigny's article traces the history of the English common law privilege and its adoption in this country. See id. at 1129-32. The English common law right to forcibly resist unlawful arrest appeared in reported decisions as early as the 17th century. See Rodgers v. State, 373 A.2d 944, 947 (Md. Ct. App.) (1977). As we explain more fully below, the privilege originally was part of the right to resist any unlawful official process. Action by an official exceeding his lawful authority constituted a trespass and a provocation, and could be resisted by physical force. See Right to Resist, 78 Yale L.J. at 1129. If a person committed a battery against an officer when resisting arrest, it was a defense to criminal prosecution that the arrest was unlawful. If a person killed an officer when resisting arrest, it was a partial defense to criminal prosecution that the arrest was unlawful; murder was mitigated to manslaughter. See id. ¶ 15. For a time, the privilege to forcibly resist unlawful arrest accrued not only to the subject of the arrest, but also to anyone who assisted him or her. In one 17th century case, a constable illegally attempted to impress a man into the army. See Hopkin Huggett's Case, 84 Eng. Rep. 1082 (K.B. 1666). The man initially offered no resistance, but others came to his aid and killed the constable. As Ms. Hobson notes in her brief, the majority of the Hopkin court initially concluded that the crime committed in the course of the rescue was manslaughter, not murder: if a man be unduly arrested or restrained of his liberty by three men, altho' he be quiet himself, and do not endeavour any rescue, yet this is a provocation to all other men of England, not only his friends but strangers also for common humanity sake, as my Lord Bridgman said, to endeavour his rescue[.] On certiorari it appears, however, that the Hopkin judges agreed that the defendant had committed murder, but also agreed to reduce his sentence from execution to one more consistent with manslaughter. See Hopkin, 84 Eng. Rep. at 1083. ¶ 16. Almost 50 years later the English court decided a seminal case on the privilege to resist unlawful arrest. A constable tried to arrest a woman because she was suspected of acting disorderly at some time in the past, although she was not acting disorderly at the time of her attempted arrest. See The Queen v. Tooley, 2 Ld. Raym. 1296, 92 Eng. Rep. 349, (K.B. 1710). Strangers who had not seen the unlawful arrest came to assist the woman and killed the constable. At that time, a person who killed another without provocation was guilty of murder, but if provocation existed, the crime was manslaughter. The Tooley court reduced the charge against the strangers from murder to manslaughter, reasoning: a man ought to be concerned for Magna Charta and the laws; and if any one against the law imprison a man, he is an offender against Magna Charta. We seven hold this to be sufficient provocation, and we have good authority for it: in Hopkin Huggett 's case...(and this case is stronger than that). 92 Eng. Rep. at 353. ¶ 17. Reexamining Tooley just last year, the supreme court of Washington offered this perspective: The important point to note is that Tooley is not about Mistress Anne Dekins' right to resist her unlawful arrest. It is about the right of others, strangers, to resist her unlawful arrest. The provocation the Tooley court spoke of was not the provocation of Mistress Dekins. It was the provocation of the three strangers at seeing someone unlawfully imprisoned, and whether that provocation provided sufficient reason to reduce their conviction from murder to manslaughter. Nevertheless, the Tooley rule has come down to us as a rule permitting an arrestee to use the necessary force (but no more) to resist an unlawful arrest. State v. Valentine, 935 P.2d 1294, 1300 (Wash. 1997) (footnote omitted). ¶ 18. As Professor Chevigny traces it, the English rule that eventually emerged was that facially valid legal process must be obeyed. See Right to Resist, 78 Yale L.J. at 1131. Patently unlawful legal process, on the other hand, was such a provocation that it gave rise to a privilege to forcibly resist. See id.