Opinion ID: 184453
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Death Results Provision

Text: 41 Rezaq avers that it was improper for the district court to apply section 1472(n)'s death results provision (that is, its provision requiring the imposition of the death sentence or of life imprisonment in cases in which death results), as the Hague Convention only permits states to punish additional crimes associated with a hijacking if certain jurisdictional prerequisites are met. 42 Rezaq's argument is based on the text of Articles 4(1) and 4(2) of the Hague Convention. Article 4(1) provides that Contracting States shall establish jurisdiction over both the hijacking offense and any other act of violence against passengers or crew (a) when the offence is committed on board an aircraft registered in that State, (b) when the aircraft on board which the offence is committed lands in [the State's] territory with the alleged offender still on board, or (c) when the offence is committed on board an aircraft leased without crew to a lessee that is based in the state in question. When an offender is present in a state's territory without these additional connections being present, the Convention only requires the state to assert jurisdiction over the offence, and not over the associated acts of violence. Article 4(2). 43 Rezaq argues that, because none of the three jurisdictional elements listed in Article 4(1) is present here, this case must fall within Article 4(2); thus, he claims, it is not appropriate to try him for his other acts of violence. But Article 4(3) expressly provides that the Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. Thus, if Congress wished to reach other acts of violence, the Hague Convention allowed it to do so. 44 It is abundantly clear that Congress intended for the death results provision of section 1472(n) to apply irrespective of whether the additional jurisdictional elements of Article 4(1) are present. Indeed, it would seem that the only purpose of the death results provision of section 1472(n) is to reach cases in which these additional elements are absent, because if any of the Article 4(1) jurisdictional elements is present, the relevant statute is not section 1472(n), but section 1472(i). This is because section 1472(n) applies only to offenses committed aboard an aircraft in flight outside the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States. The special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States is defined in 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(34) (1994); that provision includes, among others, subsections that correspond to subsections (a), (b), and (c) of Article 4(1) of the Hague Convention. Thus, if the additional jurisdictional elements of Article 4(1) are present, the relevant criminal provision will be section 1472(i), which applies to hijackings within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States. 5 See also H.R.REP. NO. 93-885, at 12 (1974), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 3975, 3986 (explaining that an adjustment to section 1472(i) was intended to make the penalty which may be imposed for 'aircraft piracy' committed within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States identical with the penalty which may be imposed for such offense when committed outside the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States.). The death results provision of section 1472(n) therefore cannot, as a rule, apply to cases in which the additional jurisdictional elements listed in Article 4(1) are present; such cases will instead come within section 1472(i), which has its own death results provision. Rezaq's proposed reading of the death results provision of section 1472(n) would thus render it totally irrelevant. 45 Rezaq also argues that applying the death results provision to this case would violate the normal jurisdictional rules of international law. International law imposes limits on a state's jurisdiction to prescribe, that is, its ability to render its law applicable to persons or activities outside its borders; states may only exercise jurisdiction to prescribe under a limited number of theories. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401 (1987). This case, however, clearly falls within at least one such theory, the so-called passive personality principle. That principle asserts that a state may apply law--particularly criminal law--to an act committed outside its territory by a person not its national where the victim of the act was its national. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. g (1987). The principle has not been generally accepted for ordinary torts or crimes, but it is increasingly accepted as applied to terrorist and other organized attacks on a state's nationals by reason of their nationality.... Id. Scarlett Rogenkamp was a United States citizen, and there was abundant evidence that she was chosen as a victim because of her nationality. This suffices to support jurisdiction on the passive personality theory. 6 D. Evidence as to the Deaths of Passengers 46 Rezaq repeatedly sought to prevent the jury from learning about the deaths of passengers aboard the Air Egypt plane, and to insulate the jury from details of those deaths. He moved unsuccessfully to strike a reference in the indictment to the deaths of passengers he shot, and to bifurcate the trial into two phases, one addressing the hijacking, and the second the resulting deaths. He also offered to stipulate to the fact and manner of the hostages' deaths; the United States declined to stipulate, and the district court refused to compel it to do so. Rezaq also, without success, opposed the United States's efforts to introduce into evidence graphic details of Scarlett Rogenkamp's autopsy, including photographs, autopsy reports, and the testimony of a pathologist. Finally, Rezaq sought unsuccessfully to prevent the United States from adverting to the fact that 57 passengers died when the Egyptian commandos stormed the plane. Rezaq argues that the district court's rulings on all of these issues were erroneous.
47 We first discuss Rezaq's motion to strike from the indictment references to the deaths of Mendelson and Rogenkamp, and to the attempted killing of the other three passengers. Such motions are permitted under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(d); a motion to strike surplusage [from the indictment] should be granted only if it is clear that the allegations are not relevant to the charge and are inflammatory and prejudicial. 1 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 127, at 426 (1982); see also United States v. Huppert, 917 F.2d 507, 511 (11th Cir.1990). Such a motion is addressed to the discretion of the court, WRIGHT, supra, at 426; [t]he standard under Rule 7(d) has been strictly construed against striking surplusage. United States v. Jordan, 626 F.2d 928, 930 n. 1 (D.C.Cir.1980). 48 The district court was well within its discretion in concluding that the prejudicial effect of these references did not outweigh their relevance. The district court observed that an element of air piracy under section 1472(n) is that the defendant unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other form of intimidation, seizes, or exercises control of an aircraft. See United States v. Rezaq, 908 F.Supp. 6, 9 (D.D.C.1995). The fact that Rezaq shot several passengers was clearly relevant to establishing that he had seized the aircraft, and later maintained control of it, by force or by intimidation.
49 Rezaq also moved to bifurcate the proceedings, and have the jury first consider whether he had committed the offense of air piracy, as defined in section 1472(n), and then decide whether the death results provision in section 1472(n)(1)(B) applied. He asserted that the death results provision was simply a penalty enhancement provision, so that such bifurcation was necessary. The district court disagreed, finding that the death results provision was an element of the substantive offense defined by section 1472(n), and that severance should therefore be denied. 50 This court has wrestled with such problems before. In both United States v. Jackson, 824 F.2d 21 (D.C.Cir.1987), and in United States v. Michael, 10 F.3d 838 (D.C.Cir.1993), we were faced with the question of whether a statutory provision created two substantive offenses, or only one offense with the possibility of an enhanced penalty. Jackson involved a firearms statute that subjected those with previous convictions to higher penalties; Michael, a drug statute that applied higher penalties to possession of crack cocaine. The statutes we construed in Jackson and Michael and the one before us here all lack traits that might easily classify them as either creating two substantive offenses or creating one offense with an enhanced penalty. Each lacks  'common indicia of sentence-enhancement provisions'  like an explicit reference to a conviction ..., procedures for a sentencing hearing, a penalty derived as a multiplier of another offense, or a title indicating that it is a sentence-enhancement provision. Jackson, 824 F.2d at 23 (quoting United States v. Davis, 801 F.2d 754, 755-56 (5th Cir.1986)). But the statutes also do not expressly define two separate offenses; instead, they merely  'specif[y] one of the preceding classes of persons ... for different treatment.'  Jackson, 824 F.2d at 23 (quoting United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 219 (3d Cir.1987)). 51 In Jackson, we found that the fact of a defendant's prior conviction was a sentence enhancement, not an element of a substantive offense. The legislative history of the statute expressly treated this factor as a sentence enhancement, and we also observed that it would be highly prejudicial for the jury to consider this factor in deciding the defendant's guilt. See Jackson, 824 F.2d at 25-26. In Michael, by contrast, introducing evidence at trial that a drug was cocaine base would not have created an unusual risk of prejudice. Instead, we reasoned that, because treating this factor as a sentence enhancement would shift[ ] the issue [of the nature of the drug] from jury to court and deny[ ] the defendant the benefit of the reasonable doubt standard, ... we are reluctant to infer such classification in the absence of a reasonably clear statement from Congress, at least for a fact embedded in the statutory section defining the crime and closely related to the circumstances of the crime. Michael, 10 F.3d at 842 (citation omitted). We found no such clear statement in the statute or its legislative history, and so treated this factor as an element of a distinct offense. 52 The evidence before us is somewhat more equivocal than that in Michael. Section 1472(n)(1)(A) and section 1472(n)(1)(B) (in which the death results provision appears) are both introduced by the phrase shall be punished, and both list punishment options, suggesting the death results factor relates to punishment, not to guilt or innocence. 7 We do not think, however, that the placement of the death results factor after the phrase shall be punished should be accorded controlling weight. The structure of section 1472(n) is complex: it states the elements of  'an offense,' as defined in the [Hague Convention] in section 1472(n)(2), but then adds further substantive elements to this offense in section 1472(n)(1), including the requirement that the offense be committed aboard an aircraft in flight outside the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States and that the defendant be afterward found in the United States. Given this convoluted structure, it should not be that surprising to find still another additional element, defining an additional substantive offense, in section 1472(n)(1)(B), after the statute appears to have changed the subject to punishment. 8 53 The United States also points to the structural relationship of section 1472(n) to another statutory provision, section 1473(c)(2). Under that provision, a death-penalty sentencing hearing must be held when a defendant is found guilty of or pleads guilty to an offense under section 1472(i) or 1472(n) of this title for which one of the sentences provided is death. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1473(c)(2). The death-penalty sentencing hearing is to occur before the jury which determined the defendant's guilt. § 1473(c)(2)(A). The hearing may also occur before a jury impaneled for the purpose of the hearing, but only if the defendant had pleaded guilty, was convicted in a trial without a jury, or if good cause existed to discharge the previous jury. § 1473(c)(2)(B). Finally, the hearing may be before the court alone, but only upon the motion of the defendant and with the approval of the court and the Government. § 1473(c)(2)(C). 54 Construing the death results provision as a penalty enhancement would be markedly at odds with the structure and purposes of section 1473(c). Section 1473(c) is triggered whenever a defendant is found guilty of or pleads guilty to an offense under sections 1472(i) or 1472(n) of this title for which one of the sentences provided is death. If section 1472(n) does not define two distinct crimes, then a defendant cannot be found guilty of or plead[ ] guilty to an offense ... for which one of the sentences provided is death; a defendant can only be found guilty of or plead guilty to a generalized offense under section 1472(n). Before section 1473(c) could apply, there would need to first be a guilty plea or guilty verdict; then an intermediate proceeding, presumably tried to the court (the usual rule at sentencing proceedings) as to whether death resulted; and then, if necessary, the death-penalty sentencing hearing provided for in section 1473(c). This structure is inconsistent with the language of section 1473(c), which contemplates a verdict that leads directly into a death-penalty sentencing hearing. It also ignores the strong policy expressed in section 1473(c) of trying all matters related to the imposition of the death sentence to a jury, where possible. If Congress intended to establish an ornate, three-stage procedure for the imposition of the death sentence in air piracy cases--with the middle stage, and only that stage, tried to the court--it would presumably have said so explicitly, either in the statute or in its legislative history. Neither contains any indication that this is what Congress intended. 55 This is an appropriate case then in which to apply Michael's rule that we are reluctant to infer ... classification [as a penalty enhancement] in the absence of a reasonably clear statement from Congress, at least for a fact embedded in the statutory section defining the crime and closely related to the circumstances of the crime. Michael, 10 F.3d at 842. The fact that a death resulted from a hijacking is closely related to the circumstances of the hijacking; indeed, this fact will ordinarily be admissible at trial, to prove that the defendant used force or intimidation in committing the crime. Cf. United States v. Rivera-Gomez, 67 F.3d 993, 996 (1st Cir.1995). As to the statute's structure, we have found that Congress did not clearly demarcate factors related to guilt from those related to punishment in drafting section 1472(n), and that the need to harmonize section 1472(n) with section 1473(c) militates against the penalty-enhancement reading. 56 We recognize that our reading of the death results provision of section 1472(n) is at odds with the prevailing judicial interpretation of a number of other statutes that incorporate death results provisions. Under federal statutes criminalizing arson, see United States v. Ryan, 9 F.3d 660, 667-69 (8th Cir.1993), vacated in part on other grounds, 41 F.3d 361 (1994) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)), carjacking, see Rivera-Gomez, 67 F.3d at 996 (1st Cir.1995) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2119); United States v. Williams, 51 F.3d 1004, 1009 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 900, 116 S.Ct. 258, 133 L.Ed.2d 182 (1995) (same), and certain civil rights violations, see Catala Fonfrias v. United States, 951 F.2d 423, 424-25 (1st Cir.1991) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242), courts have read similarly-worded death results provisions as imposing penalty enhancements, not as creating separate offenses. We do not think that these cases conflict with our disposition here. Those cases generally turned on factors, such as legislative history, specific to the statutes in question. See, e.g., Ryan, 9 F.3d at 668; Catala Fonfrias, 951 F.2d at 427. They also relied on structural features of the statutes in question, like the fact that they only single[d] out a subset of [criminals] for more severe punishment. Ryan, 9 F.3d at 667. We found in Jackson, however, that structural cues of this kind may not be dispositive in the face of other contextual evidence. See Jackson, 824 F.2d at 23-24. Here, the unusual relationship of sections 1472(n) and 1473(c)(2) leads us to conclude that the death results provision must be classified as an element of a substantive offense. We therefore affirm the district court's ruling that Rezaq was not entitled to a bifurcated proceeding.
57 Rezaq offered to stipulate that Mendelson and Rogenkamp had died, and claims that the district court should have compelled the United States to accept his offer. In Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the general rule that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case free from any defendant's option to stipulate the evidence away. Id. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 654. Old Chief established an exception to this rule for crimes like possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in which the evidentiary issue is one of status, id. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 655, but that exception does not apply to this case, and Rezaq has not established that any other exception should apply. Thus, the United States was free to decline to stipulate.
58 The United States presented extensive evidence at trial relating to Rogenkamp's autopsy. This included the testimony of a pathologist, who described the autopsy in considerable clinical detail, and testified that Rezaq's bullet had caused Rogenkamp's death; the pathologist also discussed the cause of Mendelson's death on the basis of autopsy records that he had reviewed. The United States also introduced an autopsy report, and a number of enlarged photographs from the autopsy, which were placed on an easel near the jury box; the United States displayed the photographs again during closing arguments. 59 Rezaq had filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude this evidence as overly prejudicial. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 permits the district court to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. FED.R.EVID. 403. The district court accordingly weighed the probative value of this evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice. As to probative value, the district court found the evidence relevant to both the force or intimidation element of the statute and the death results element. The district court found that the autopsy reports were highly probative as to the fact of Rogenkamp's death, as to its cause, and as to the fact that the killings were intentional. It found that the autopsy photographs were likewise highly probative as to the first two of these factors, the fact and cause of death. 60 In weighing the prejudicial effect of this evidence, the district court found that the autopsy reports had no prejudicial effect, as they were straightforward and factual, and nothing in them was likely to inflame the jury. It observed that some of the autopsy photographs similarly presented no danger of prejudice; others it found were more graphic in nature, but it concluded that, [i]n light of the highly probative value of these particular photographs, the danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the evidence's probative value. 9 Rezaq asserts that the district court erred in admitting this evidence. 61 We review Rule 403 determinations most deferentially and will reverse only for 'grave abuse' of the trial court's discretion. United States v. Johnson, 46 F.3d 1166, 1171 (D.C.Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Manner, 887 F.2d 317, 322 (D.C.Cir.1989)). Here, although we might not have admitted at least one of the most grisly photographs into evidence, we cannot say that the district court's decision to do so amounted to grave abuse.We begin with the evidence's probative value. The fact that death resulted from the hijacking was an element of the offense with which Rezaq was charged. The autopsy report, the testimony of the pathologist, and the photographs all demonstrated that it was Rezaq's bullets that killed Rogenkamp and Mendelson. The fact that Rezaq's victims died is also relevant to the force and intimidation element of the statute. See Rivera-Gomez, 67 F.3d at 996 (1st Cir.1995) (It is difficult to conceive of a situation in which the death of a victim would not be relevant to the use of force and violence during the commission of an attempted carjacking.). The autopsy evidence corroborated the government's account of the way in which Rezaq used systematic executions to maintain control of passengers and airport personnel. 62 Based on this analysis, we can dismiss the autopsy report and the pathologist's testimony from consideration immediately. Both had some small prejudicial effect, as they presented unsettling details of the way in which Rezaq's victims died; but this effect does not substantially outweigh the evidence's probative value. All but one of the autopsy photographs that were introduced into evidence fell into the same category. These photographs were fairly antiseptic; they included three photographs of the entry wound in Rogenkamp's head, an x-ray image of her skull with the bullet embedded in it, and a photograph of the bullet itself. The harder case is a close-up photograph showing the removal of the bullet from Rogenkamp's skull. This photograph was notably graphic: in it, a large triangular portion of the skin on Rogenkamp's skull has been removed, revealing bone, tissue, and a large quantity of blood (as well as the bullet). 63 Blood will have blood, WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, Act 3, sc. 4; accordingly, photographs of gore may inappropriately dispose a jury to exact retribution. A number of courts have recognized this principle. For instance, in Ferrier v. Duckworth, 902 F.2d 545, 548 (7th Cir.1990), the court found it improper to admit photographs, in color and enlarged to twelve square feet, of the victim's blood on the floor of a bar, as the blood was not relevant to any issue in the case, and [t]he only conceivable reason for placing [the photographs] in evidence was to inflame the jury against the defendant. Id. at 548. See also Gomez v. Ahitow, 29 F.3d 1128, 1139 (7th Cir.1994) (similar). The fact that the photograph in this case was taken in a clinical setting somewhat reduced its prejudicial effect, but the photograph nevertheless created some risk of prejudice. Nor was its probative value great. Autopsy photographs can have immense probative value, if for example they confirm the prosecution's theory about the manner in which the crime was committed. See United States v. Cruz-Kuilan, 75 F.3d 59, 61 (1st Cir.1996) (autopsy photographs confirmed witness's account of the crime, establishing that bullets fired by defendant had indeed passed through the body of the victim and injured the witness). Here, however, the photograph only provided further corroboration that Rogenkamp was shot in the head; because the bullet was visible in the other photographs, this point did not especially need elucidation. 10 64 Although some might have doubts about the prudence of admitting this photograph into evidence, we cannot say that the district court's decision to do so amounted to grave abuse. The photograph did have some probative value, and its prejudicial effect, although significant, was not extreme. The trial judge's exercise of discretion in balancing the prejudicial effect and probative value of photographic evidence of this type is rarely disturbed. United States v. Goseyun, 789 F.2d 1386, 1387 (9th Cir.1986).
65 Rezaq also sought to bar the United States from introducing into evidence the fact that 57 passengers died in the Egyptian commandos' ill-fated storming of the plane. The district court denied his motion, finding that the United States could reasonably contend that Rezaq's claimed posttraumatic stress disorder only developed after the hijacking, and that the storming of the plane could have contributed to the symptoms his experts had identified. At trial, the United States brought up the storming of the plane in precisely this context, while cross-examining Rezaq's experts on posttraumatic stress disorder. 66 The fact that 57 passengers died in the storming of the plane might well have been unfairly prejudicial. Even though these deaths were not at issue in the case, the jury could have concluded that someone should be punished for them; the relevant Egyptian officials were not before the court, so that Rezaq would have borne the brunt of the jury's ire. But the facts surrounding the storming of the plane also had significant probative value, as it could be argued that the traumatic effects of this incident were comparable to the effects of many of the incidents Rezaq himself cited as causes of his asserted PTSD. We therefore find that the district court's decision to admit the evidence was an appropriate application of Rule 403. 11 E. Mid-Trial Publicity 67 The night after the government's closing argument, on Wednesday, July 17, 1996, TWA Flight 800 crashed off the coast of Long Island, on its route from New York to Paris. The disaster was covered extensively in various media; indeed, one survey indicated that it was the most heavily covered news event of 1996. News coverage was filled with speculation as to the cause of the crash, and one frequently cited theory was that terrorists (perhaps from the Middle East) were responsible. News coverage also observed that the plane had previously flown out of Athens, which one article (in the Washington Post) said was known as a base for terrorists. Don Phillips, 747 Explodes with 229 Aboard, WASHINGTON POST, July 18, 1996, at A1, A19. Athens, of course, was where Rezaq and his confederates boarded the Air Egypt flight. 68 The jury had not been sequestered or instructed to avoid news coverage, and was thus presumably exposed to the initial news of the crash. On the morning after the crash, at the request of Rezaq's counsel, the district court told the jury that the crash was unrelated to the case and to put the event out of their minds. Rezaq's counsel did not, however, ask that the jury be told to avoid further news coverage, and they were not given any such instruction. Rezaq's counsel gave his closing argument that same day, and the jury began to deliberate that afternoon. On the following day, Friday, July 19, after further news coverage speculating about terrorism, Rezaq moved for a mistrial; the motion was denied. That afternoon, the jury returned a guilty verdict. Rezaq now argues that the district court erred in declining to grant his motion for a mistrial, and, in the alternative, that the district court should have conducted individual voir dire of the jurors, and that its failure to do so requires that he receive a new trial. 69 Given that it is quite unlikely that publicity about an unrelated air crash could impair a jury's ability to remain impartial, we find that the district court's response to the publicity was appropriate in all respects. This court has adopted a three-part approach for district courts to apply in addressing potentially prejudicial media influence on the jury. The court is to (1) decide whether the material is prejudicial, (2) decide whether jurors were exposed to it, and (3) examine jurors to see if they can remain impartial. See United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 501 (D.C.Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 986, 136 L.Ed.2d 867 (1997). As to the second factor, the jurors hardly could have avoided exposure. As to the first, we find that there was at most a modest risk of prejudice. In most cases involving prejudicial publicity during trial, the publicity relates directly to the issues in the trial itself; here, the publicity was about an unrelated event that might have indirectly influenced the jury's perceptions of the case before it. Given the magnitude of the crash, the saturation news coverage, and the speculation that terrorists were to blame, it is theoretically possible that the sensibilities of some jurors might have been affected, heightening their reluctance to consider on their merits Rezaq's defenses of insanity and obedience to orders. 12 70 Turning to the third element of Williams-Davis, Rezaq complains that the district court, rather than conducting an individual voir dire, only questioned the jury as a whole as to whether it could remain impartial. Although the method of conducting the voir dire is left to the sound discretion of the district court, Waldorf v. Shuta, 3 F.3d 705, 710 (3d Cir.1993), the collective voir dire is not ordinarily the instrument of choice for discerning the impartiality of jurors. See Coppedge v. United States, 272 F.2d 504, 508 (D.C.Cir.1959) (It is too much to expect of human nature that a juror would volunteer, in open court, before his fellow jurors, that he would be influenced in his verdict by a newspaper story of the trial.). Here, however, the district court found, and Rezaq's counsel agreed, that it was important to avoid linking the crash with the trial in the jurors' minds, and that a single general question, directed to the jury as a whole, was the most appropriate way to accomplish this goal. Given the close involvement of his counsel in the process of formulating the court's response to the crash, Rezaq cannot object now to the approach the district court adopted. Indeed, Rezaq's counsel has effectively conceded on this appeal that he made a strategic decision not to seek an individual voir dire, saying that [s]uch a suggestion from counsel would have undercut the defense position that nothing could be done to alleviate the prejudice short of a mistrial. 71 Nor did the district court err in declining to declare a mistrial. The risk of prejudice from the crash-related publicity, although real, was somewhat reduced by the fact that the district court instructed the jurors to put the publicity out of their minds. On balance, the risk falls short of that degree of significance which has in other cases been found to warrant a new trial. See, e.g., Waldorf v. Shuta, 3 F.3d 705, 711 (3d Cir.1993) (jurors brought relevant news article into the jury room and discussed it there); United States v. Littlefield, 752 F.2d 1429, 1432 (9th Cir.1985) (similar); United States v. Lord, 565 F.2d 831, 838 (2d Cir.1977) (news coverage revealing prejudicial information about the defendant). F. Restitution 72 The district court ordered that Rezaq pay a total of $254,000 in restitution to seven victims. Rezaq argues that the district court erred in the manner in which it calculated the amount of his restitution, both in failing to consider his ability to pay, and in failing to demand more detailed proof of the amount of the victims' losses. 1. Ability to Pay 73 The provision under which the district court ordered restitution states: 74 The court, in determining whether to order restitution under section 3579 of this title and the amount of such restitution, shall consider the amount of the loss sustained by any victim as a result of the offense, the financial resources of the defendant, the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's dependents, and such other factors as the court deems appropriate. 75 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a). Rezaq claims that the district court failed to consider his financial resources and his earning ability in setting the amount of his restitution, and that this was error. 13 76 In United States v. Bapack, 129 F.3d 1320 (D.C.Cir.1997), we set forth our interpretation of section 3364's requirement that the district court shall consider these factors. We found that it was appropriate to treat orders of restitution as we do fines; as to fines, where the record demonstrates that the judge considered [a] factor before imposing the fine, the appellate court will not reverse the fine merely because no express finding was made but will review the finding of ability to pay necessarily implied by such consideration. See Bapack, 129 F.3d at 1328 (quoting United States v. Mastropierro, 931 F.2d 905, 906 (D.C.Cir.1991)). 77 The record demonstrates that the district court considered Rezaq's ability to pay in setting the amount of its restitution order. As to Rezaq's present ability to pay, the district court ordered at sentencing that [t]he $850 in the registry of the court will be paid to the victims, demonstrating that it knew the (limited) extent of Rezaq's assets. As to Rezaq's future earning ability, the district court could hardly have been ignorant of the fact that Rezaq's anticipated sentence would greatly restrict his earnings; imprisonment is rarely lucrative. In a brief filed with the district court, the United States argued that Rezaq might seek to write books or articles on his crimes, and thus might later have the resources to pay a large order of restitution. Rezaq's brief replied that this was quite unlikely to occur. Given the district court's demonstrated familiarity with Rezaq's present ability to pay, an issue addressed in the same set of briefs, it is fair to conclude that the district court made its ruling in light of those briefs, and hence considered the information they presented as to Rezaq's future earning ability. Cf. United States v. Cannizzaro, 871 F.2d 809, 811-12 (9th Cir.1989). We therefore find that there is adequate evidence that the district court considered this factor. 14 2. Adequacy of Documentation 78 The Probation Office provided the district court with copies of Victim Impact Statements from seven victims of the hijacking. The statements were very detailed, consuming a total of forty-two pages; the impacts they listed included extensive injuries and associated medical expenses, psychological harms, disruptions to the victims' lives, and loss of income and property. The record also included numerous signed statements from physicians, psychiatrists, and employers corroborating the victims' accounts of their losses; one victim also appended translations of newspaper articles and of an appellate brief relating to her unsuccessful efforts to obtain compensation in the Egyptian courts. The district court's order of restitution included all of the financial impacts listed in the victims' statements, including medical expenses, lost wages, and lost property. 79 Any amount to be paid in restitution must be obtained by accurate computation and cannot exceed the amount of loss actually caused. United States v. Forzese, 756 F.2d 217, 222 (1st Cir.1985) (emphasis omitted). This rule protects both the rights of the defendant and those of the victims, who will often share the defendant's limited assets pro rata and who will therefore be harmed if another victim receives an improperly high award. The district court had sufficient evidence on which to base its award of restitution in this case. The documentation before the court was extensive, especially when considered in light of the fact that the crime was committed over ten years earlier. Awards of restitution are reviewed for abuse of discretion, United States v. Henoud, 81 F.3d 484, 487 (4th Cir.1996); we are satisfied that no such abuse occurred here.G. Classified Materials 80 When classified materials may be relevant to criminal proceedings, the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), 18 U.S.C. app. III (1994), provides procedures designed to protect the rights of the defendant while minimizing the associated harm to national security. In the course of preparing for trial, the United States identified a number of arguably discoverable classified materials, and obtained permission from the district court to file an ex parte, in camera motion for a protective order. After reviewing this motion and the accompanying documents, the district court ordered the United States to prepare an index listing the contents of each document, whether it believed the document to be subject to discovery, and why. This document, too, was submitted ex parte and in camera; the district court subjected this document to detailed review, and prepared a list of the materials that it considered discoverable. 81 Under CIPA, the court may allow the United States to disclose a statement admitting relevant facts that the classified information would tend to prove, in lieu of disclosing the information itself. 18 U.S.C. app. III § 4 (1994). The United States sought, and obtained, permission to substitute admissions for all of the documents that the district court had identified as discoverable. The district court reviewed the United States's proposed substitutions, and concluded that they fairly stated the relevant elements of the classified documents. The substitutions were then disclosed to Rezaq's attorney. 82 Rezaq's request on appeal is very limited. He does not ask us to review the district court's determination as to which documents were discoverable in the first instance. Instead, he asks only that we review the documents that the district court found to be discoverable, and decide whether the summaries that the court furnished to him were as helpful to his defense as the original documents would have been. He is particularly concerned that the summaries may have omitted important information, or that the process of transforming the documents into desiccated statements of material fact might have hampered the evidentiary richness and narrative integrity of the defense he was able to present. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 651. 83 We found in Yunis that a defendant seeking classified information is not entitled to receive it on a mere showing of theoretical relevance, but is entitled only to information that is at least 'helpful to the defense of the accused.'  867 F.2d at 623 (quoting Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61, 77 S.Ct. 623, 627-28, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957)). This principle applies to sub-elements of individual documents; if some portion or aspect of a document is classified, a defendant is entitled to receive it only if it may be helpful to his defense. A court applying this rule should, of course, err on the side of protecting the interests of the defendant. In some cases, a court might legitimately conclude that it is necessary to place a fact in context in order to ensure that the jury is able to give it its full weight. For instance, it might be appropriate in some circumstances to attribute a statement to its source, or to phrase it as a quotation. As the Court said in Old Chief, [a] syllogism is not a story, and a naked proposition in a courtroom may be no match for the robust evidence that would be used to prove it. 519 U.S. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 654. 15 84 The district court's substitution decisions turned on the relevance of the facts contained in the discoverable documents, and are therefore reviewed, like other relevance decisions under CIPA, for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 625 (D.C.Cir.1989). We are obliged to consider the district court's substitution decisions very carefully, as Rezaq's counsel is unable to consult the original documents, and so cannot present arguments on his client's behalf. We have accordingly conducted a detailed in camera comparison of the originals of the discoverable documents with the summaries approved by the district court. We find that the district court did a commendable job of discharging its obligations under CIPA, and in particular that its orders protected Rezaq's rights very effectively despite the fact that Rezaq's attorney was unable to participate in the CIPA proceedings. No information was omitted from the substitutions that might have been helpful to Rezaq's defense, and the discoverable documents had no unclassified features that might have been disclosed to Rezaq.