Opinion ID: 739089
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Arguing Punishment to the Jury

Text: 22 Kenneth also argues that the district court erred by refusing his pretrial request to advise the jury about the sentencing consequences of a guilty verdict. He contends that the jury, upon learning of his mandatory life sentence, would have deemed the penalty too great and exercised their unreviewable power to acquit. 23 Kenneth's request was properly denied. Without commenting on the propriety of jury nullification, 4 we note that the practice of informing juries about the sentencing consequences of their verdicts is strongly disfavored. The Supreme Court has stated that, unless a jury has a role in sentencing, such as in capital sentencing proceedings, jurors should be instructed not to consider a defendant's potential sentence during deliberations. See Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579, 114 S.Ct. 2419, 2424, 129 L.Ed.2d 459 (1994). The Shannon Court also pointed out that jurors generally are not informed of mandatory minimum or maximum sentences. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2428. See United States v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564, 574 (6th Cir.1996). 24 In Kenneth's trial, the jury had no sentencing function, and no statute required that the jury be informed of the consequences of the verdict. The district court correctly refused to allow Kenneth to argue about his potential punishment.