Opinion ID: 1366816
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lesser related instruction.

Text: At the close of evidence, Webb and Ewish introduced a jury instruction describing malicious destruction of property using an explosive device, codified in NRS 202.830 (hereinafter explosive destruction). [2] The proposed instruction mirrored the elements appearing in the statute. Webb and Ewish argued that explosive destruction was a lesser related crime to arson, and thus, they were entitled to the instruction being presented to the jury. The district court held otherwise, and appellants renew their contentions on appeal. The trial court must instruct the jury on a lesser related offense when three factors are established: (1) the lesser offense must be closely related to the offense charged; (2) the defendant's trial defense must be consistent with the lesser related offense; and (3) evidence must reasonably support guilt for the lesser related crime. Stanifer v. State, 109 Nev. 304, 849 P.2d 282 (1993); Moore v. State, 105 Nev. 378, 776 P.2d 1235 (1989). This court adopted the lesser related instruction requirement in Moore, and an examination of the facts therein illustrates application of these three factors. In Moore, several persons were charged with the beating and murder of a woman at a Reno apartment complex. Codefendant Mayfield presented evidence that he had arrived at the scene after the fatal blow was struck and had merely dragged the dead body behind a fence. Mayfield appealed his murder conviction, arguing that the district court improperly rejected a jury instruction describing accessory after the fact. Moore, 105 Nev. at 379-80, 776 P.2d at 1237. This court reversed Mayfield's conviction. First, accessory after the fact was a lesser related offense to murder. Second, Mayfield's defense was consistent throughout trial that he did not participate in the beatings and was only an accessory after the victim was killed. Finally, evidence existed supporting Mayfield's guilt for the lesser related offense. There was testimony that Mayfield arrived at the scene more than five minutes after the beatings took place. This testimony, coupled with medical evidence, established that Mayfield had in fact arrived after the victim had died. Id. at 384, 776 P.2d at 1239.
In the instant case, application of Moore indicates that the district court properly rejected the lesser related instruction with respect to all Ewish's charges and Webb's charges solely related to the Lopez firebombing. In short, all three Moore factors are not satisfied. Applying the first factor, we conclude that explosive destruction is a lesser related offense to arson. [3] Nevada's arson statute, NRS 205.010, prohibits the willful and malicious burning of a dwelling. Similarly, explosive destruction, NRS 202.830, prohibits the malicious destruction of real property using an explosive. NRS 202.750 defines explosive as any incendiary devices . . . that ignition by fire, by friction, by concussion, by percussion, or by detonation of the compound, mixture or device or any part thereof may cause an explosion. Throwing a molotov cocktail into a house and causing a fire is prohibited conduct under both statutes. By contrast, the second and third Moore factors are not satisfied. Webb's defense to the Lopez firebombing and Ewish's overall defense are wholly inconsistent with the lesser related crime. Webb denied any participation in the Lopez incident, claiming that he was passed out in the back seat of Ewish's car. Similarly, Ewish defended against the State's aiding and abetting charges by flatly denying any active participation in either crime. Ewish also claimed that he was mentally incapable of forming the specific intent to aid in or abet any criminal activity. If believed, Webb's and Ewish's respective defenses would refute murder, arson, and even explosive destruction. The lesser related instruction is simply not required where a defendant completely denies culpability and is either guilty of the charged crime or not guilty at all. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 144 Ariz. 479, 486, 698 P.2d 724, 731 (1985); People v. Geiger, 35 Cal.3d 510, 199 Cal.Rptr. 45, 58, 674 P.2d 1303, 1315 (Ct.App.1984). In addition, there is no evidence in the record rationally supporting a conviction for the lesser related offense. Although Webb and Ewish presented evidence that they were not guilty of arson or aiding and abetting, this did not support an explosive destruction conviction. For example, all the evidence introduced in Webb's defense, if anything, established that he was passed out in the back seat of Ewish's car while Lopez's house was firebombed. From this posture, Webb could not have committed any crime. In turn, Ewish presented evidence refuting any active complicity in the night's events. If accepted, this evidence provided Ewish with a defense to any criminal activity. In view of this rationale, we conclude that the district court did not err by refusing to issue the lesser related instruction. This conclusion applies to all Ewish's convictions and Webb's convictions stemming from the Lopez firebombing.
Conversely, this same conclusion does not apply with respect to Webb's convictions for the Newton fire. After analysis under Moore, we conclude that Webb was entitled to the lesser related instruction. Webb's trial defense to the Newton firebombing was consistent with explosive destruction. He took the stand and admitted committing a culpable act by throwing the molotov cocktail at Newton's home. Webb then claimed that due to his voluntary intoxication, he could not have formed the requisite specific intent necessary to commit arson. This was a viable defense to a specific intent crime, and the jury was instructed accordingly. If believed, the only crime Webb could have committed was explosive destruction, a general intent offense. [4] See Geiger, 199 Cal.Rptr. at 47, 674 P.2d at 1304 (lacking specific intent to commit robbery was consistent with lesser related general intent offense of vandalism, thus requiring vandalism instruction). Moreover, the trial evidence reasonably supported Webb's guilt for the lesser related crime. There was testimony that Webb had been drinking and smoking cocaine and marijuana for several hours prior to the firebombing. Expert testimony also characterized Webb as a chronic alcoholic who may have been suffering from an intoxication blackout. For the reasons noted above, we conclude that Webb was entitled to the lesser related instruction. Rejecting such an instruction was an abuse of the trial court's discretion, warranting the reversal of Webb's arson conviction for the Newton firebombing.