Opinion ID: 1697438
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: May the State Prove a Violation by Circumstantial Evidence?

Text: The district court in this case reversed Castillo's conviction because the State failed to establish a spoken understanding that if A.S. submitted to sexual intercourse with Castillo, he would not issue her a citation. 835 So.2d at 309. Thus, the court required direct evidence of an agreement between the public official and the person unlawfully compensating him. In Gerren, on the other hand, the court specifically held that [w]hile the state must show a quid pro quo, it should be permitted to establish this element indirectly, through the use of circumstantial evidence. 604 So.2d at 520-21 (emphasis added). [4] We agree with Gerren insofar as it holds that a violation of the statute may be proven through circumstantial evidence. The statute itself is silent on the type of proof required. It certainly does not require either a spoken understanding or any other direct evidence of a violation. In the absence of explicit statutory direction, it has long been established that circumstantial evidence is competent to establish the elements of a crime, including intent. See Moorman v. State, 157 Fla. 267, 25 So.2d 563, 564 (1946) (It is too well settled to require citation of authorities that any material fact may be proved by circumstantial evidence, as well as by direct evidence.); see also State v. Waters, 436 So.2d 66, 71 (Fla.1983) (The element of intent, being a state of mind, often can only be proved by circumstantial evidence.), cited in Gerren, 604 So.2d at 520. Moreover, Florida courts have regularly reviewed bribery and unlawful compensation cases for the legal sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence to support the charges, without requiring direct evidence. See, e.g., Merckle v. State, 512 So.2d 948, 949 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (rejecting the contention that circumstantial evidence was legally insufficient and not inconsistent with reasonable hypothesis of innocence, and affirming convictions for bribery, receiving unlawful compensation, and extortion by a state officer), approved, 529 So.2d 269, 272 n. 3 (Fla.1988); Garrett v. State, 508 So.2d 427 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (finding the circumstantial evidence legally insufficient to support a conviction for receiving unlawful compensation); Bias v. State, 118 So.2d 63 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960) (affirming an unlawful compensation conviction where the officer fined a car's occupants $75 for various offenses, took the $25 proffered, and released the occupants, telling them he expected the rest to be paid later). In Gerren, the Fourth District Court of Appeal warned that if an express agreement were required to prove a violation of the statute, a public servant could receive funds or other benefits from interested persons and avoid prosecution so long as he never explicitly promises to perform his public duties improperly. 604 So.2d at 520. The court concluded that requiring proof of a violation through circumstantial evidence did not violate procedural safeguards. As the court noted, `[t]he element of intent, being a state of mind, often can only be proved by circumstantial evidence,' and when guilt is proven by circumstantial evidence, the state is required to present evidence inconsistent with the defendant's theory of defense. Id. at 520 (quoting State v. Waters, 436 So.2d 66 (Fla.1983)); see State v. Law, 559 So.2d 187 (Fla.1989). Therefore, we hold that circumstantial evidence can establish a violation of the unlawful compensation statute. The district court's requirement of a spoken understanding imposes too high a burden on the State and would prohibit prosecution of all but the most blatant violations. Public corruption has become sophisticated enough at least to expect that public officials soliciting or accepting unlawful compensation ordinarily will not be so audacious as to explicitly verbalize their intent.