Opinion ID: 2998113
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendants’ Evidentiary Challenge

Text: This court reviews a district court’s evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion. United States v. Reed, 259 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2001). Generally, we afford great deference to a district court’s determinations in this area. United States v. Wilson, 307 F.3d 596, 601 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Walton, 217 F.3d 443, 450 (7th Cir. 2000)). If the district court’s decision rested on an error of law, however, then it is clear that an abuse of discretion has occurred because it is always an abuse of discretion to base a decision on an incorrect view of law. United States v. Mietus, 237 F.3d 866, 870 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990)); see also United States v. Wesela, 223 F.3d 656, 664 (7th Cir. 2000). We review the district court’s determination of the appropriate legal standard de novo. United States v. Cotnam, 88 F.3d 487, 498 (7th Cir. 1996). Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence is typically used by prosecutors seeking to introduce evidence of a criminal defendant’s prior misconduct as proof of motive or plan to commit the crime at issue. Reed, 259 F.3d at 634. However, a defendant can seek to admit evidence of other crimes under this rule if it tends to negate the defendant’s guilt of the crime charged against him. United States v. Della Rose, 403 F.3d 891, 901 (7th Cir. 2005). This is Nos. 02-4235 & 03-2483 9 commonly referred to as reverse 404(b) evidence. In determining whether to admit reverse 404(b) evidence, a district court must balance “the evidence’s probative value under Rule 401 against considerations such as prejudice, undue waste of time, and confusion of the issues under Rule 403.” Reed, 259 F.3d at 634; see also Della Reese, 403 F.3d at 90102; Wilson, 307 F.3d at 601. We adopted this rule from a decision by the Third Circuit, United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380 (3d Cir. 1991), which distinguished between the standards that govern admissibility of standard 404(b) and reverse 404(b) evidence. Id. at 1404-05. See also Reed, 259 F.3d at 634 (citing Stevens); Walton, 217 F.3d at 449 (same); Agushi v. Duerr, 196 F.3d 754, 760 (7th Cir. 1999) (same). Stevens held that “a lower standard of similarity should govern reverse 404(b) evidence because prejudice to the defendant is not a factor.” Stevens, 935 F.2d at 1404. The district court in the instant case did not reference any case law involving reverse 404(b) issues in its analysis. Rather, the district judge stated that Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988), “instructs what I need to look at in terms of 404(b) evidence and the ability of the Government to bring out ‘prior bad acts.’ ” Trial Transcript, 9:8. Huddleston involved the admissibility of standard 404(b) evidence. The district court explained: One of the prongs in the Huddleston case requires a similarity of the prior bad act such that it would be fair to use it in the instant case. It seems to me that that same logic applies in determining whether or not the defense can bring out a separate crime committed by separate individuals to allege that those individuals are the ones who committed the instant crime. I am going to hold the defense to the same standard that I held the Government, and that is there has to be enough similarity that the jury is not confused and that the evidence becomes relevant. 10 Nos. 02-4235 & 03-2483 Id. at 9:8-9 (emphasis added). Contrary to the district judge’s statement, the defense is not held to as rigorous of a standard as the government in introducing reverse 404(b) evidence. Agushi, 196 F.3d at 760 (citing Stevens, 935 F.2d at 1404). By applying the wrong legal standard, the district court abused its discretion. Mietus, 237 F.3d at 870. This is not to say that the evidence proffered by Seals and Johnson should have been admitted. It was irrelevant, and thus inadmissible. FED. R. EVID. 402. The similarities between the two robberies were generic. Many robbers disguise their identities, carry firearms, and use a stolen vehicle in their getaway. Moreover, the facts underlying the two robberies were dissimilar. The number of robbers was different. The disguises they wore were different. The defendants contend that both robberies involved a man disguised as a woman, but there is nothing similar about the Cahokia robber wearing a blond wig and fatigues and the New Baden robber wearing a woman’s dress. The guns the robbers used were different. Finally, the robbers’ modus operandi was different; while the robbers of the Cahokia Credit Union vaulted over the teller counter to retrieve the money themselves, the New Baden robbers waited on the customer side of the tellers station for bank employees to bring them the money at gunpoint. The defendants rely on a note that Detective Bailey made in a report dated June 25, 2001, that the modus operandi of the New Baden robbers appeared similar to that of the Cahokia Credit Union robbers. Although that may have appeared true to the detective at first blush the afternoon of the New Baden robbery, the differences between the robberies are apparent. The defendants rely heavily on the fact that the robberies occurred two weeks and 31 miles apart. Thirty-one miles might not appear very far on a globe, but in practical terms these two robberies occurred in separate counties. If this is all it took to admit evidence of other crimes, district courts would be reluctant to exclude evidence of dissimilar bank Nos. 02-4235 & 03-2483 11 robberies in neighboring counties for weeks thereafter. Although we appreciate the fact that the legal standard for admitting reverse 404(b) evidence is relatively lenient, the evidence must still be relevant. Here, it was not. Even if the evidence involving the New Baden robbery should have been admitted, its exclusion was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence presented by the government at trial. We employ the harmless error standard because the defendants preserved their objection on this issue when they challenged the government’s motion in limine. See FED. R. EVID. 103; see also Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562, 563 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding that “a definitive ruling in limine preserves an issue for appellate review, without the need for later objection.”). This court will only reverse a defendant’s conviction if the erroneous decision by the district court to exclude evidence “had a substantial influence over the jury and the result reached was inconsistent with substantial justice.” Reed, 259 F.3d at 634 (quoting Walton, 217 F.3d at 449) (internal quotes omitted); see also Agushi, 196 F.3d at 759 (quoting Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332, 1339 (7th Cir. 1997)). We consider the “overall strength of the prosecution’s case against the defendant[s]” in assessing the harmlessness of the district court’s evidentiary ruling. United States v. Manske, 186 F.3d 770, 779 (7th Cir. 1999). The government’s case was strong enough that the admission of evidence pertaining to the New Baden robbery would not have exonerated Seals or Johnson. The testimony given at trial by the defendants’ erstwhile collaborators, Paschal and Townsend, was highly incriminating. The defendants argue that this testimony was unreliable because it was motivated by a desire to secure reduced sentences, but we disagree. The testimony by Paschal and Townsend was detailed and highly consistent. What is more, it was consonant with testimony given by Tiffany Paschal at trial. It was corroborated by the testimony of Credit Union 12 Nos. 02-4235 & 03-2483 employees. It was corroborated by the used car dealers who testified that Seals and Johnson paid cash for their automobiles the day of or after the robbery. And it was corroborated by the other inmates and acquaintances who testified that the defendants tried to coerce them or Paschal and Townsend not to testify. The overwhelming evidence eliminates any doubt that the exclusion of evidence of the New Baden robbery led to a result that was inconsistent with substantial justice. The defendants argue that the exclusion of evidence involving the New Baden robbery must have had a substantial impact on the jury because it denied them the primary evidence in support of their defense. In United States v. Byrd, 208 F.3d 592 (7th Cir. 2000), we recognized that “[e]xclusion of evidence which is the only or the primary evidence in support of a defense is deemed to have had a substantial effect on the jury.” Id. at 594. In Byrd, the defendant, a federal prisoner, was convicted of assaulting a police officer who was trying to secure him in the back seat of a squad car. Id. at 593. His defense at trial was that the shackles he wore made attacking the officer impossible. Id. at 594. The district court denied his request to present his shackles and restraints to the jury. Id. at 595. We reversed, holding that because the evidence was central to his defense, its exclusion affected his substantial rights and was not harmless. Id. at 596. In so ruling, we emphasized that the holding should be construed narrowly in light of the “peculiar facts of this case.” Id. Byrd is distinguishable from the instant case. Perhaps most importantly, the evidence pertaining to the New Baden robbery was neither the only nor the primary evidence in support of the defendants’ claim that they were not present at the robbery. Seals called three witnesses who testified that he was at a friend’s birthday party at the time of the robbery. His mother, who was among these witnesses, also testified that she bought the used Oldsmobile for him Nos. 02-4235 & 03-2483 13 the day after the robbery as a gift. By contrast, the defendant in Byrd called no witnesses. Although Johnson declined to testify on his own behalf or call witnesses, he tried to recruit Terry Taylor to provide a false alibi.2 What is more, he stood to benefit from statements made by Seals’ witnesses which challenged the government’s assertion that he and Seals were together the day of the robbery. Furthermore, in Byrd the only evidence that the defendant assaulted the police officer came from the police officer himself and his partner, both of whom the court noted had a history of unpleasant dealings with the defendant. That was not the case here. Seals and Johnson argue that Paschal and Townsend testified out of self-interest, but they cannot say the same about the many other witnesses whose testimony corroborated their stories. In sum, we do not believe that the exclusion of the New Baden robbery evidence was so fundamental to Seals’ and Johnson’s defense that the trial was not fair in its absence.