Opinion ID: 1275779
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Man With Secrets

Text: Having reviewed the factual background, we now turn to Higgenbotham's claim of error in the denial of his mistrial motion. He argues that the prosecutor's closing argument comment about secrets referenced his failure to testify, thus violating his Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial. He also complains that the district court erred in failing to admonish the jury on the references to a man with many secrets in closing argument. The declaration of a mistrial is a matter entrusted to the district court's discretion. Higgenbotham has the burden of showing substantial prejudice before we will find abuse of discretion. State v. Arteaga, 257 Kan. 874, Syl. ¶ 6, 896 P.2d 1035 (1995); see K.S.A. 22-3423(1). Judicial discretion is abused only when no reasonable person would take the view of the district court. State v. Rinck, 256 Kan. 848, 853, 888 P.2d 845 (1995) (no abuse of discretion found in district court's denial of motion for mistrial). Higgenbotham links his Fifth Amendment contention to Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 14 L. Ed.2d 106, 85 S. Ct. 1229, reh. denied 381 U.S. 957 (1965). Griffin held that the Fifth Amendment forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt. Section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights also protects this right. The Griffin rule is codified in K.S.A. 60-439. We have said that any comment on the defendant's failure to testify is error, but not per se reversible error. To constitute reversible error, the comments must be prejudicial. See State v. Beebe, 244 Kan. 48, 53, 766 P.2d 158 (1988). We said in State v. Baker, 219 Kan. 854, Syl. ¶ 9, 549 P.2d 911 (1976): In summing up a case before a jury, counsel may not introduce or comment on facts outside the evidence, but reasonable inferences may be drawn from the evidence and considerable latitude is allowed in discussing it. Counsel may appeal to the jury with all the power and persuasiveness his learning, skill and experience enable him to use. Higgenbotham claims that the prosecutor's statement And nobody will ever know because it's locked up in the secrets of this man is a direct reference to his failure to testify. We do not agree. The targeted phrase must be considered in context. Higgenbotham references State v. Davis, 255 Kan. 357, 360-63, 874 P.2d 1156 (1994); State v. Beebe, 244 Kan. at 52-54; State v. Henderson, 226 Kan. 726, 737, 603 P.2d 613 (1979); State v. Reeves, 224 Kan. 90, 92-94, 577 P.2d 1175 (1978); and State v. Jagger, 11 Kan. App.2d 350, 351-52, 720 P.2d 673 (1986), as cases in which the prosecutors' comments were considered Griffin violations, although no explicit reference was made to a defendant's refusal to testify. The State counters that the five cases are distinguishable. We agree. In Davis, the prosecutor made direct reference to the fact that the defendant could not `give [the jury] one bit of evidence' throughout the course of the entire trial. We found harmless error. 255 Kan. at 361-62. The prosecutor in Beebe said, `But, I want you to think about what the defendant said he was gonna show, and ask yourselves if he showed it, and I think you'll conclude that he did not.' We found error noting additional egregious conduct from the prosecutor. 244 Kan. at 53. In Henderson, the comment was more direct: `In other words, the defendant is not forced to testify against himself.' We reversed, coupling the prosecutor's calling the jury's attention to Henderson's failure to testify with additional prosecutorial comment. 225 Kan. at 735, 738. In Reeves, the comment was: `The constitution under the Fifth Amendment guarantees the right to even not incriminate oneself in a criminal proceeding. You can judge for yourself if that thing should or ought to be considered in your deliberations. I am not supposed to comment on that. I can't comment on it.' 224 Kan. at 93. We reversed. The comments before the Court of Appeals in Jagger included: `We had no direct testimony about Mr. Jagger's intention. Mr. Jagger is the only person who really knows of his own experience what is intention was. Therefore, you are left with having to decide for yourself what his intention was on the basis of his actions and his statements to other people.' 11 Kan. App.2d at 351. Jagger's conviction was reversed. The State reasons that the prosecutor made no comment, either veiled or direct, about Higgenbotham's failure to testify. Instead, the comments were on the evidence, Higgenbotham's use of a false identify, and the many lies that Higgenbotham told both before and after the crimes in question. We recently considered a similar issue in State v. Ninci, 262 Kan. 21, 936 P.2d 1364 (1997). Ninci was convicted of first-degree felony murder, robbery, and aggravated battery. During closing argument, the State reviewed aspects of Ninci's videotaped statement. Ninci's counsel moved for a mistrial because he thought the prosecutor's comment was an improper reference to Ninci's decision not to testify. The State asserted that the comment was not improper because it referred only to Ninci's videotaped statement to the police. The district court denied the motion. We analyzed the prosecutor's comment and said: When read in context, it becomes obvious that the prosecutor's closing argument mostly consisted of a dissection of Ninci's videotaped statement. When the prosecutor stated that there was no evidence `out of Mike Ninci's mouth' as to how Ford compelled him to commit the crimes charged, the prosecutor was referring to the fact that Ninci never told the police on the videotape how Ford compelled him to commit the crimes. The State was not referring to the fact that Ninci had never testified on the stand at trial, as prohibited by Griffin. 262 Kan. at 48. We affirmed Ninci's convictions. Here, the prosecutor referred to Higgenbotham's secrets often, both in the opening and closing statements, without objection until the last reference. The prosecutor then said, Nobody's going to know what Jodi was thinking or feeling in the last minutes of her death. Nobody knows. And nobody will ever know because it's locked up in the secrets of this man. Defense counsel lodged an objection and requested a mistrial. The district judge denied the mistrial but told the prosecutor, You've used the word `secret' before, but I think the better course of action would be to stay away from it so the jury does not interpret that as being contrary to the instructions. The judge also denied defense counsel's request for a special instruction to disregard the prosecutor's comments on secrets. The judge commented that the jury would be instructed that a defendant's failure to testify is not to be considered and that arguments and statements of counsel are not evidence. The prosecutor made no further reference to secrets. We have reviewed the prosecutor's opening and closing statements. We conclude that the prosecutor was referring to what the evidence showed about Higgenbotham's secretive conduct, not his failure to testify at trial. The prosecutor's comments were not of such a character that the jury would have naturally and necessarily understood the statement to be a comment on [Higgenbotham's] failure to testify. Ninci, 262 Kan. at 48.