Opinion ID: 374715
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Construction of the Loitering Ordinance

Text: 12 The Dade County ordinance in question makes it a crime to knowingly loiter in any place with one or more persons knowing that a narcotic or dangerous drug is being unlawfully used or possessed. Code of Metropolitan Dade County § 21-31.1(b)(2). Appellant contends that the ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments because it punishes mere association with an individual known to be in possession of or engaged in the use of narcotics. The ordinance does not require, nor has it been construed to require, any active participation in a substantive narcotics offense. Although appellant concedes that the ordinance does bring within its scope activity which may constitutionally be punished, he points out that the broad sweep of the ordinance also punishes essentially innocent association in violation of first amendment associational rights. 13 In analyzing appellant's overbreadth claim, our first task is to determine if some sort of limiting construction has been placed on the challenged ordinance. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2916, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 1105, 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972). When considering a contention that a statute or ordinance is facially unconstitutional, it is necessary to proceed with caution; facial invalidity should not be declared unless the statute or ordinance is not readily subject to narrowing construction by the state courts. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 2276, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975). 14 In the instant case, the trial court found appellant guilty under the ordinance because he had been knowingly in companionship or direct contact with individuals involved in suspected drug transactions. The Third District Court of Appeal noted that the loitering ordinance clearly has criminal intent (scienter) written into (it). The intent here is the knowledge on the part of the person loitering that he has voluntarily associated with one who is unlawfully possessing or using a narcotic or dangerous drug. State v. Sawyer, 346 So.2d 1071, 1074 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1977). The appellate court emphasized that to be convicted under the ordinance one must have knowledge of another's unlawful possession of narcotics. Moreover, the words 'loiters . . . with one or more persons' imply some type of comradeship or companionship. Id. at 1075 (emphasis in original). 15 In its order dismissing appellant's habeas corpus petition, the federal district court noted that the state court's narrowing construction of the loitering ordinance gave unmistakable notice to the offender. This ordinance is not . . . 'a direction by a legislature to the police to arrest all suspicious persons.' It is rather, a narrowly defined statute that gives more than adequate notice. Record at 45-46. In placing its emphasis upon the clarity of definition in the ordinance, the district court misconceived appellant's claim. Clearly, the Dade County ordinance, as construed by the state court, could withstand a constitutional challenge on grounds of vagueness. However, the fact that an enactment provides adequate notice of the acts it prohibits does not absolve it of the vice of overbreadth. 16 The objectionable quality of . . . overbreadth does not depend upon absence of fair notice to a criminally accused or upon unchanneled delegation of legislative powers, but upon the danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application. 17 N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33, 83 S.Ct. 328, 338, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963). In this case, the state court's narrowing construction of the loitering ordinance does not answer the charge of overbreadth. Appellant's constitutional claim has survived its first test; we now subject the claim to further analysis in accordance with well-established principles of constitutional law. 18 III. Striking The Constitutional Balance: The Freedom of the Individual vs. The Interest of the State 19 The United States Constitution grants to local governments broad discretion to control and regulate the activities of citizens; however, such controls and regulations cannot sweep so broadly as to infringe upon the constitutional and organic rights of the individual. (A) governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307, 84 S.Ct. 1302, 1314, 12 L.Ed.2d 325 (1964). 20 The protected freedom involved in this case is the first amendment guarantee of freedom of association. See, e. g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968). This right to freely associate is not limited to those associations which are political in the customary sense but includes those which pertain to the social, legal, and economic benefit of the members. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1681, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965). The rights of locomotion, freedom of movement, to go where one pleases, and to use the public streets in a way that does not interfere with the personal liberty of others are implicit in the first and fourteenth amendments. Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F.Supp. 1242, 1254 (M.D.Pa.1975), aff'd without opinion, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964, 97 S.Ct. 394, 50 L.Ed.2d 333 (1976). 21 The first amendment thus limits the permissible scope of loitering laws; such an enactment can be upheld only if it proscribes conduct which threatens the public safety or constitutes a breach of the peace. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942); State v. Ecker, 311 So.2d 104 (Fla.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019, 96 S.Ct. 455, 46 L.Ed.2d 391 (1975). The Supreme Court has provided some guidance as to what constitutes a breach of the peace. 22 The offense known as breach of the peace embraces a great variety of conduct destroying or menacing public order and tranquility. It includes not only violent acts but acts and words likely to produce violence in others. No one would have the hardihood to suggest that the principle of freedom of speech sanctions incitement to riot or that religious liberty connotes the privilege to exhort others to physical attack upon those belonging to another sect. When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order, appears, the power of the state to prevent or punish is obvious. 23 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308, 60 S.Ct. 900, 905, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). 24 In the case at bar, the Florida appellate court defended the Dade County loitering ordinance by pointing out that 25 it is universally known that possession of narcotics is a violation of the criminal laws of this State. Possession being a criminal violation, it is also a breach of the peace. If an ordinance proscribes loitering that threatens public safety or a breach of the peace, it can withstand constitutional attack. 26 State v. Sawyer, 346 So.2d 1071, 1073 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1977) (emphasis added). The Sawyer opinion suggests that the possession of narcotics constitutes a breach of the peace sufficient to justify some infringement of first amendment rights. We do not necessarily disagree with this conclusion, however, we find it inapposite to the facts before us. The appellant in this case was not charged with possessing narcotics, or with any other breach of the peace; his only criminal act was to associate with certain individuals, knowing that they were unlawfully using or possessing illegal drugs. Appellant has been convicted under the loitering ordinance for apparently innocent activity; his conviction clearly infringes on the free exercise of his associational rights. 27 An enactment which criminalizes ordinary associational conduct not constituting a breach of the peace runs afoul of the first amendment. See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 1689, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not permit a State to make criminal the exercise of the right of assembly simply because its exercise may be 'annoying' to some people.) The loitering ordinance before us punishes an individual not for his own criminal acts, but rather for his act of being in a public place and associating with individuals whom he knows to be engaged in criminal activity, i. e. drug use or possession. Both this court and the Supreme Court have recognized that under our system of justice punishment must be predicated only upon personal guilt.In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of punishment on a status or on conduct can only be justified by reference to the relationship of that status or conduct to other concededly criminal activity . . . that relationship must be sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order to withstand attack under the Due Process Clause . . . . 28 Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224-225, 81 S.Ct. 1469, 1484, 6 L.Ed.2d 782 (1961); accord, St. Ann v. Palisi, 495 F.2d 423, 425 (5th Cir. 1974). 29 Scales v. United States, quoted above, concerned the constitutionality of the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1976), which prohibits knowing membership in any organization advocating the overthrow of the government by force or violence. The statute was challenged on the ground that it imputed guilt by mere association, and therefore infringed on first amendment guarantees. Although the statute on its face punished only knowing membership, the Supreme Court found that mere knowledge of the criminal nature of an organization was an insufficient basis for conviction. Ruling that the statute could reach only active members having also a guilty knowledge and intent, the Court noted that a conviction could not be based upon what otherwise might be regarded as merely an expression of sympathy with the alleged criminal enterprise, unaccompanied by any significant action in its support or any commitment to undertake such action. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228, 81 S.Ct. 1469, 1486, 6 L.Ed.2d 782 (1961). 30 Scales thus teaches that knowing association with a group cannot be made a punishable act just because some of the group members are engaged in criminal conduct. In the instant case, however appellant was convicted solely on the basis of his companionship or direct contact with persons suspected of engaging in drug transactions; he was not charged with any active participation in any criminal act. The loitering ordinance rendered appellant's mere associational conduct criminal, based solely upon the suspected criminality of those with whom he publicly associated. In our opinion, this ordinance is unconstitutionally broad because it authorizes the punishment of constitutionally protected conduct. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 1688, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971). 31 We recognize that municipalities such as Dade County have a valid interest in limiting narcotics trafficking and use; presumably that is one of the purposes of the loitering ordinance before us. Of course, if the purpose of the ordinance is to nip crime in the bud by providing police with the means to arrest all suspicious persons, it is patently unconstitutional. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169, 171, 92 S.Ct. 839, 847, 848, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972). To the extent that the ordinance does have legitimate drug enforcement purposes, there exist alternative means of accomplishing those ends. 5 32 Even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose. 33 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247, 252, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960). A more artfully drawn ordinance would reach only those persons who are active participants in illegal narcotics transactions or who aid and abet the primary offender, without chilling the first amendment rights of persons engaged in essentially innocent associational conduct. See, e. g., People v. Cressey, 2 Cal.3d 836, 87 Cal.Rptr. 699, 708, 471 P.2d 19, 28 (1970) (accused must act to aid, assist, or abet the criminal violation); Jolley v. City of Jacksonville, 281 So.2d 901, 903 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1973) (enactment includes element of participation or acting in concert with or abetting by lending approbation to the violation). Even if a municipality failed to adopt a local ordinance regulating drug activity, the Florida Legislature has provided law enforcement officers with a vast array of tools with which to combat illegal narcotics activity. 6 The conduct which the state may punish without running afoul of the first amendment is more than adequately covered by these provisions.