Opinion ID: 1126345
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Christina Davis

Text: Prior to trial, the State's motion for a severance was granted by the district court. No reasons for the severance appear in the record; nor was there any objection to the ruling by defense counsel. At trial, the defendant attempted to call Christina Davis to testify in his behalf. The defendant apparently based his decision to call Davis on letters that she had written to him, the District Attorney's office, and another jail inmate. In these letters, which have neither been authenticated nor introduced in evidence in the district court, Davis allegedly states that she and the defendant are not guilty of the murder and that she was at the scene and can identify the real killer. The State, arguing that Davis would merely assert her Fifth Amendment privilege, objected on the ground that a witness who will invoke his rights under the Fifth Amendment cannot be called to the stand so that the invocation of that right is made before the jury. Outside of the presence of the jury, the court examined Christina Davis and her attorney, both of whom stated that she would invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination if called to the stand. The district court then ruled that Davis could not be called to the stand and questioned. An objection was noted for the defense, but no grounds for the objection were urged. A defendant seeking a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence must show that the evidence was discovered since trial; that the failure to discover was not due to a lack of reasonable diligence; that the evidence is material; that the evidence is available; and, that the evidence is such that, had it been introduced at the trial, it would probably have changed the verdict or judgment of guilty. La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 851(3). When ruling on a new trial motion, a trial court's duty is the narrow one of ascertaining on an objective basis whether there is new material fit for a new jury's consideration. State v. Talbot, 408 So.2d 861, 885 (La. 1980). [9] The trial court has much discretion in ruling on a motion for new trial; however, if the court exercises this discretion arbitrarily, and the judgment is unjust, the reviewing court should set aside the judgment and order a new trial. State v. Hammons, 597 So.2d 990, 994 (La.1992); State v. Knapper, 555 So.2d 1335 (La. 1990). In State v. Perique, 340 So.2d 1369, 1377 (La.1976), we stated the general rule that, after a joint trial, an allegation in a motion for a new trial by one co-defendant that the other co-defendant will now testify on his behalf is not a sufficient ground for the granting of a new trial. There, the defendants, Perique and Merritt, were jointly tried for possession with intent to distribute heroin. Perique was found guilty as charged and sentenced to life imprisonment; Merritt was found guilty of simple possession and sentenced to ten years. Merritt filed a motion for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, claiming that Perique, having been convicted, was prepared to testify on her behalf. The district court denied the motion. On appeal in Perique, we found no error in that ruling. We first reasoned that Merritt had failed to show the facts that would be established by Perique's testimony, as required by La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 854. Merritt had also failed to show that, had Perique's testimony been introduced at trial, it would probably have changed the verdict. La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 851(3). Finally, we concluded that, in any event, the allegation that a co-defendant in a joint trial would testify at a subsequent trial is an insufficient basis for granting a motion for new trial under Article 851. In State v. Mince, 97-2947 (La.5/29/98), 714 So.2d 684 (per curiam), we acknowledged the rule we had stated earlier in Perique, and cited a number of federal cases with similar holdings. [10] However, we declined to decide whether the skepticism applied to the testimony of co-defendants tried together should also apply to the newly-available testimony of a witness who otherwise retains his Fifth Amendment privilege but volunteers to come forward and waive the privilege at a new trial to exculpate the defendant by taking responsibility for an offense the State has not charged against him. Id., p. 3, 714 So.2d at 686. Nonetheless, we held that, even assuming that testimony made newly available to the defendant because the witness has changed his mind with respect to the assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege may, under certain circumstances, constitute newly-discovered evidence, [11] the defendant must still show pursuant to La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 854(1) that he exercised reasonable diligence to present all of his evidence in a single trial. Id. In Mince, the defendant and his brother were involved in an altercation with another man. The defendant was convicted of second degree battery. At trial, he claimed that, although he had initially grappled with the victim, his brother had struck the victim and knocked him down. An eyewitness conceded that the two men looked alike. The brother, who was not charged, did not testify. Following trial, however, the brother executed an affidavit alleging that, though he had previously wished to preserve his Fifth Amendment privilege, he now wanted to testify to correct a miscarriage of justice. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for new trial. This court reversed, finding that the defendant had failed to show that he had exercised reasonable diligence to present the newly available evidence at trial. The defendant neither subpoenaed his brother nor made any other significant effort to procure his brother's testimony at trial. Mince, 97-2947, p. 3, 714 So.2d at 686. Thus, the defendant failed to show that his brother's testimony was newly available if not newly discovered. Further, the defendant had failed to show that his brother would be any more available to him at a new trial than he was at the first. La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 854(4). Finally, we reasoned that the brother's affidavit failed to provide any facts that he would establish at a new trial, as required by La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 854(3). In the instant case, the newly available witness, Christina Davis, was a co-defendant indicted for the same offense as the defendant until the day of trial, when their cases were severed on motion by the State without objection. At trial, the defendant attempted to call Davis to testify in his behalf, but Davis, who remained under indictment for first degree murder at the time, stated she would invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege and refuse to testify. Now, after Davis has entered a plea of guilty to a reduced charge and has, presumably, served her sentence, the defendant argues that she is newly available to testify because she no longer has cause to invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege. We note initially that the defendant, under La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 854(1) has failed to establish that he exercised reasonable diligence to present all of his evidence in a single trial. Mince, p. 3, 714 So.2d at 686. As the defendant must concede, had he truly desired to secure the testimony of Christina Davis, and, more questionably, had Davis been willing to testify in his behalf if she were tried first, he did not move to sever the cases for trial and did not request that the court try Davis first. Instead, the defendant futilely attempted to call Davis to testify, knowing that she most likely would assert her privilege against self-incrimination. These efforts to secure Davis's testimony, and the lack thereof, cannot be deemed reasonable diligence. [12] Nonetheless, even assuming that Davis's testimony could be considered newly available under these circumstances and thus newly discovered, we find the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for new trial. First, the defendant has failed to show that Davis would be willing to testify at a new trial. The defendant has produced no affidavit from Davis in which she states that she would testify at a new trial, nor did the defendant call her to so testify at the hearing on his motion for new trial. [13] Even assuming that Davis wrote the letters relied on by the defendant, none of which has been introduced in the district court, these letters contain numerous contradictory statements about her willingness to step forward. For example, though the writer at various points insists that she can identify the real killer and that Poonie and she are innocent, she also admits that, each time she has been given the opportunity to exonerate the defendant, she has chosen not to do so, instead, choosing to leave both hers and Poonie's fates to chanceeven though she was surely aware that she and Poonie faced a possible death sentence. She repeatedly states she is from the old school and cannot finger the real killer, who she insists must own up to his responsibilities. Nothing in the record suggests that the letter writer's intentions have changed, notwithstanding the defendant's allegation that Davis can now no longer invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege. Tellingly, despite the fact that the defendant was convicted and then sentenced to death, Davis has yet to appear in any court to give testimony on the defendant's behalf or to make a sworn affidavit in his favor. On this showing, the trial court could have little confidence that the witness, though presumably subject to process, would otherwise make herself available to the court and not continue to refuse to testify. See La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 854(4). Thus, it does not appear that the evidence is in fact available, as required by La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 851(3). Furthermore, absent Davis's affidavit or testimony at the hearing on the motion for new trial, the defendant is hard-pressed to show the facts that the witness would establish at the new trial, as required by La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 854(3). Again, the defendant relies on the contents of the letters to make this showing, insisting that the letter writer has consistently stated the defendant's innocence. However, those letters contain many questionable statements and contradictions, particularly those explaining her involvement and presence at the scene, calling into doubt their veracity and reliability. Although the defendant selectively excerpted the letters at the hearing on the motion for new trial, he effectively invited the trial judge, as he does us on appeal, to conjecture as to what Davis's actual testimony might be were she to be called at a new trial. The trial judge faced with such questionable evidence could hardly conclude that the testimony of the letter writer would be fit for presentation to a new jury. Talbot, supra . Accordingly, the defendant has failed to demonstrate either that Davis will testify at a new trial or the facts Davis's testimony will establish at a new trial. [14]