Opinion ID: 1964239
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Perjury Per Se

Text: We next address Lotter's claim that the mere presence of perjured testimony, regardless of the State's knowledge that it was perjured, violated his rights to due process. Since this is the first time that admissible evidence is available regarding Nissen's recantation, such a claim is arguably not procedurally barred. However, we hold that Nissen's recantation, even if proved true, does not present a constitutional claim amendable to postconviction relief. Therefore, postconviction relief on this basis was properly denied without an evidentiary hearing. [13, 14] Perjury per se is not a ground for collateral attack on a judgment. The guilt or innocence determination in a procedurally fair trial is `a decisive and portentous event.' [39] The Due Process Clause guarantees a procedurally fair trial, but does not guarantee that the verdict will be factually correct. [40] The U.S. Supreme Court, while holding that affirmative prosecutorial involvement in perjured testimony may interfere with the fairness of the trial process, [41] has never held that the prosecution's unknowing reliance at trial on perjured testimony violates any constitutional right. [42] Other courts, more directly confronted with the issue, have concluded that perjury itself, absent prosecutorial misconduct surrounding the perjury, does not constitute an independent constitutional claim. [43] For instance, the court in Luna v. Beto [44] rejected the defendant's claim that a conviction on perjured testimony was a constitutional violation even absent state complicity, explaining that the unknowing use of perjured testimony is simply an evidentiary mistake. In Luna v. Beto , the court stated: [F]or an otherwise valid state conviction to be upset years later on federal habeas, surely something more than an evidentiary mistake must be shown. If mistake is enough, then never, simply never, will the process of repeated, prolonged, postconviction review cease. For in every trial, or at least nearly every trial, there will be, there are bound to be, some mistakes. [45] We agree. A defendant has a due process right to a trial process in which the truth-seeking function has not been corrupted. But it is axiomatic that the truth-seeking process is not defective simply because not all evidence weighed by the trier of fact was actually true. The protections of a fair trial granted the defendant in the criminal process are there precisely because some of the evidence against the defendant may be disputed. Lotter relies on Ortega v. Duncan , [46] wherein the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that regardless of prosecutorial knowledge of the perjury, due process is violated when a court is left with the firm belief that but for a witness' perjured testimony, the defendant would most likely not have been convicted. In Ortega v. Duncan , the defendant was granted habeas relief when a key witness placing the defendant at the scene of the murder later recanted. The majority of the federal circuits, however, reject the Second Circuit's conclusion that affirmative prosecutorial involvement is not a necessary element of a due process violation based on perjured testimony. [47] While some state courts allow such a claim, many do so under postconviction relief statutes that do not limit relief to constitutional claims rendering the judgment void or voidable. [48] [15, 16] In Nebraska, postconviction relief is strictly prescribed. In a different statute, the Legislature has provided defendants with the ability to file a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence showing that the defendant was wrongfully convicted. [49] Unlike postconviction relief, relief under § 29-2103 is not strictly limited to constitutional claims. But a motion under § 29-2103 must be filed within 3 years of the date of the verdict. [50] We have repeatedly held that a motion for postconviction relief cannot be used to obtain, outside of the 3-year time limitation, what is essentially a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. [51] This can be no less true for a recently discovered recantation than for any other newly discovered evidence material to the defendant. It has been said that there is no form of proof so unreliable as recanting testimony. [52] `The opportunity and temptation for fraud are so obvious that courts look with suspicion upon such an asserted repudiation of the testimony of a witness for the prosecution, and this is so even though the repudiation be sworn to.' [53] `Society's resources have been concentrated at [the time of trial] in order to decide, within the limits of human fallibility, the question of guilt or innocence of one of its citizens.' [54] We will not set aside that decision more than a decade after it was made based only on the recent recantation of some portion of a key witness' testimony against Lotter. The 3-year limitation of § 29-2103 reflects the fact that with the passage of time and the erosion of memory and the dispersion of witnesses, there is no guarantee that the truth-seeking function of a new trial would be any more exact than the first trial. [55] We do not grant postconviction relief in the absence of a constitutional violation, and the presence of perjury by a key witness does not, in and of itself, present a constitutional violation.