Opinion ID: 768110
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Immediate or Continuous

Text: 38 The hot pursuit exigent circumstance exception invoked by the government to justify the officers' warrantless search of Johnson's property requires that pursuit be either immediate or continuous from the scene of the crime. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753; Salvador, 740 F.2d at 758 n.5. Any exigency is to be viewed from the totality of the circumstances known to the officers at the time of the warrantless intrusion. Lindsey, 877 F.2d at 781. Furthermore, the government must produce specific and articulable facts to justify the finding of exigent circumstances. United States v. Alvarez, 810 F.2d 879, 881 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Driver, 776 F.2d 807, 810 (9th Cir. 1985)). Warden taught that [t]he Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others. 387 U.S. at 298-99. Conversely, here we are forced to decide whether, on the facts of this case, the Fourth Amendment hot pursuit exigent circumstance exception required Officer Kading to immediately leave his vehicle and trudge off into the dense brush and woods in search of Smith, exposing himself to a possible ambush. We decide that hewas not required to do so in order to fit within this exception to the warrant requirement. 39 A substantial delay between the last known sighting of a fleeing criminal and the beginning of a search for that criminal will clearly negate any applicability of the hot pursuit exigent circumstance exception. See Alvarez, 810 F.2d at 881-82 (holding agents' actions fundamentally inconsistent with any true exigency where between ninety minutes and two hours elapsed from the time they learned where suspect was located to when they actually arrested him); Salvador, 740 F.2d at 755-56, 758 n.5 (no hot pursuit where bank robbery occurred in early afternoon and police set up surveillance of house, which led to search just prior to 8:00 that evening). Furthermore, where it is clear the police can set up a guard of the perimeter so as to prevent the suspect's escape while waiting for a warrant, a claim of exigency is severely undermined. See United States v. Duran-Orozco, 192 F.3d 1277(9th Cir. Nov. 2, 1999) (where police could guard perimeter of house during two-and-a-half hour wait for warrant, warrantless look into back window not supported by exigency rationale). Here, due to the nature of the terrain, the officers would not have been able to establish a perimeter sufficient to ensure Smith's capture or inability to escape. 40 Kading's pursuit of Smith was both immediate and continuous, at least up until the point when Smith ran off the highway into the woods. Johnson argues that the thirty-minute delay between the last-known sighting and the first entrance onto his property sufficiently cooled down the pursuit to take it outside the realm of any Fourth Amendment exceptions. To this end he relies on O'Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990 (6th Cir. 1994), and United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158 (6th Cir. 1984). Both cases, however, are distinguishable. 41 In O'Brien, the police surrounded a suspect's home when the suspect brandished a weapon at an officer, who was on the scene to aid in the execution of a writ of seizure on the suspect's pick-up truck. 23 F.3d at 993. The officer called for backup, and the police engaged in an approximately nine-hour standoff with the suspect. Id. at 993-94. After approximately four-and-a-half hours, the police performed the first of four warrantless probes of the house by peering into a window using mirrors. Id. at 994. The Sixth Circuit decided that the probes were not justified by any exigent circumstance or by hot pursuit, as the initial officer on the scene chose not to pursue the suspect after the first confrontation, but instead called for backup to surround the house and secure the area, thereby slowing down and controlling the action. Id. at 997. 42 The case we must decide has two important factors which distinguish it from O'Brien. First, there was no standoff. Second, the area was by no means secure and the action was clearly not controlled. Cf. United States v. Curzi, 867 F.2d 36, 42 (1st Cir. 1989) (rejecting exigency rationale where officers waited for almost two hours before bringing the operation to its planned climax . . . . Time was ample; manpower abounded; the premises were surrounded and secured; the neighbors had been led to safety; the drama was being played out during daylight hours and in an urban setting. All in all the situation was in good control.). Both of these factors make Kading's delay for backup entirely consistent with a hot pursuit rationale tempered with concerns for officer safety. Cf. Lindsey, 877 F.2d at 781-82 (rejecting argument that one hour delay for reinforcements precluded finding of exigency where officers expected backups to arrive quickly and did not realize there would be a delay). 43 The exigency had not dissipated merely because Kading understandably delayed his pursuit due to safety concerns. Of course, a safety concern must be reasonable and cannot be used as a pretextfor a more controlled and organized -yet still warrantless -search. We merely decide under these facts that in a heavily wooded, rural area, with a single officer in pursuit of a fleeing suspect, the officer's decision to delay a search for a reasonable amount of time to wait for backup is not inconsistent with the hot pursuit exigent circumstance exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. 44 Morgan, Johnson's other relied-upon case for his argument that the officers' pursuit was neither immediate nor continuous, is similarly distinguishable. In that case, officers decided -prior to arriving at a suspect's home -to meet at a coffee shop to assess the situation, discuss the logistics of approaching the suspect's home, position everyone, and give out assignments. Morgan, 743 F.2d at 1160. Noting that the hot pursuit exception is reserved for situations where speed is essential, the court decided these facts directly contradicted the notion that the officers were in hot pursuit of the suspect since their first encounter with him earlier that day. Id. at 1162. Here, aside from briefly conferring to decide that it would take too long for the canine unit to arrive and that, with three officers now on the scene, safety concerns had diminished, Kading and Sigman did not stop to plan or organize their efforts to the extent the officers did so in Morgan. Thus, the government's claim of a hot pursuit exigent circumstance does not fail on these grounds. 45 Other courts have similarly concluded that the hot pursuit trail does not necessarily cool down because an officer briefly delays a search in the course of taking prudent safety precautions. See Griffin v. City of Clanton, 932 F. Supp. 1359, 1367 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (concluding that hot pursuit still applicable where officer waited for backup, which arrived before suspect had gained admittance to aunt's house though he was banging on back door and yelling); Laurent v. Town of Sturbridge, No. 89-30005-F, 1990 WL 92470, at -8 (D. Mass. June 18, 1990) (concluding that hot pursuit exigent circumstance applicable where [i]t would have been as imprudent for [the officer] to have marched directly into the [suspect's] house as it would be incorrect to penalize him for waiting for assistance when need for backup compelling and backup arrives within thirty minutes). Under the circumstances of this case, Kading's decision to delay his search until backup arrived broke neither the immediacy nor the continuity of his search for Smith. Therefore, Johnson's argument on this point fails. 7 46