Opinion ID: 2303223
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory Construction with Constitutional Issues Implicated

Text: [¶ 18] We have interpreted the anti-SLAPP statute only a few times since its 1995 enactment by P.L.1995, ch. 413, § 1 (effective Sept. 29, 1995). See Schelling, 2008 ME 59, 942 A.2d 1226; Maietta Constr., 2004 ME 53, 847 A.2d 1169; Morse Bros., 2001 ME 70, 772 A.2d 842. We have striven to interpret the anti-SLAPP statute in accordance with its plain language. See Driscoll v. Mains, 2005 ME 52, ¶ 6, 870 A.2d 124 (When construing a statute, we look to its plain meaning and try to give effect to the legislative intent.). [¶ 19] When constitutional rights are implicated in the application of a statute, another rule of statutory construction holds that we must construe a statute to preserve its constitutionality, or to avoid an unconstitutional application of the statute, if at all possible. See Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 14, 761 A.2d 291. Thus, when there is a reasonable interpretation of a statute that will satisfy constitutional requirements, we will adopt that interpretation, Driscoll, 2005 ME 52, ¶ 6, 870 A.2d 124, notwithstanding other possible interpretations of the statute that could violate the Constitution, see Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 14, 761 A.2d 291; Bossie v. State, 488 A.2d 477, 479 (Me.1985) (stating that this Court is bound to avoid an unconstitutional interpretation of a statute if a reasonable interpretation of the statute would satisfy constitutional requirements). [¶ 20] This appeal requires us to interpret and apply the anti-SLAPP statute against a backdrop of several constitutional rights that are implicated by Nader's claims. [6] These rights include the right to petition, the right of access to the courts, and the right of access to the ballot for candidates and voters.
[¶ 21] The right to petition the government, including the right to file complaints in courts, is a fundamental right protected by the First Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. I; Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2488, 2491, 2494, 180 L.Ed.2d 408 (2011) (Among other rights essential to freedom, the First Amendment protects `the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.'); McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482, 484-85, 105 S.Ct. 2787, 86 L.Ed.2d 384 (1985). [7] The right to petition is one of the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights and is made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222, 88 S.Ct. 353, 19 L.Ed.2d 426 (1967); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d 535 (2003). This right belongs not just to MDP and Moffett in their petitioning of the courts and state agencies as alleged in the underlying complaint, but to Nader in petitioning the court to seek redress for alleged injuries to his right to participate in elections and to voters' rights to have the opportunity to vote for the qualified candidate of their choice. These rights, Nader alleges, were diminished or eliminated as a result of MDP's and Moffett's petitioning activities. [8] [¶ 22] When interpreting the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute, which contains provisions nearly identical to 14 M.R.S. § 556, see Morse Bros., 2001 ME 70, ¶ 15, 772 A.2d 842, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recognized the conflicting rights to petition inherent in the statute, stating: Despite the apparent purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute to dispose expeditiously of meritless lawsuits that may chill petitioning activity, the statutory language fails to track and implement such an objective. By protecting one party's exercise of its right of petition, unless it can be shown to be sham petitioning, the statute impinges on the adverse party's exercise of its right to petition, even when it is not engaged in sham petitioning. Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 691 N.E.2d 935, 943 (1998). [9] As we interpret the language of the anti-SLAPP statute applicable to the second step of our anti-SLAPP analysis, we must keep in mind the conflicting rights to petition implicated by the statute.
[¶ 23] The right of access to the courts is a right protected in the Maine Constitution and recognized under the United States Constitution. The Maine Constitution provides a right of redress through the courts for injuries, stating, Every person, for an injury inflicted on the person or the person's reputation, property or immunities, shall have remedy by due course of law; and right and justice shall be administered freely and without sale, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay. Me. Const. art. I, § 19. This open courts provision means the courts must be accessible to all persons alike without discrimination, at times and places designated for their sitting, and afford a speedy remedy for every wrong recognized by law as remediable in a court. Maine Med. Ctr. v. Cote, 577 A.2d 1173, 1176 (Me.1990). [¶ 24] The substantive right of access to the courts is also `one of the fundamental rights protected by the [United States] Constitution.' Webb v. Haas, 1999 ME 74, ¶ 10, 728 A.2d 1261 (considering whether an officer reasonably should have known that the coverup of a violation of police procedure deprived the plaintiffs of their Constitutional right of access to the courts by interfering with their ability to bring state law actions against perpetrators of a crime); see Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 971-72 (5th Cir.1983); see also U.S. Const. Amend. I. [¶ 25] The right of access to the courts has also been recognized as a substantive right applicable to plaintiffs in civil actions under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [10] Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379, 382-83, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971) (holding that a court filing fee requirement precluded welfare recipients' access to courts to file complaints for divorce in violation of their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment); Ryland, 708 F.2d at 971-73.
[¶ 26] Restrictions on access to the ballot burden two distinct and fundamental rights, the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs [under the First Amendment], and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively. Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184, 99 S.Ct. 983, 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979); see Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 193, 107 S.Ct. 533, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986). These fundamental rights are implicated most clearly where minor-party access to the ballot is restricted. Munro, 479 U.S. at 200, 107 S.Ct. 533 (Marshall, J., dissenting). [11] [¶ 27] Nader's complaint alleges that the restriction on his access to the ballot was the result of improper action by private parties rather than by state action, although those private parties did avail themselves of state action and court access in order to, allegedly, challenge and obstruct Nader's access to ballots. Regardless, Nader's right of access to the ballot is implicated in, and forms an essential basis for, his complaint.