Opinion ID: 2558735
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Special Harmless Error Test

Text: A judge's failure to recuse as required by the Judicial Code does not lead to automatic reversal; prejudice must be shown. Bearing in mind that to perform its high function in the best way `justice must satisfy the appearance of justice,' the Supreme Court in Liljeberg devised a special harmless error test to determine whether relief should be granted where a judge does not recuse as required. Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 864, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955)). We have adopted Liljeberg 's special harmless error test. See Scott, 559 A.2d at 750-51 (en banc). Under the Liljeberg test, we consider three factors: [1] the risk of injustice to the parties in the particular case, [2] the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in other cases, and [3] the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the judicial process. Id. at 752-53. We address each of these factors and conclude that the trial judge's denial of the motion to recuse was not harmless. Applying the first prong of the Liljeberg test, we conclude that the risk to M.C. is considerable and the corresponding risk to the government is minimal. M.C. has been found to have committed twenty serious crimes that would be felony convictions if this had been a criminal prosecution. The trial judge, who was sitting as the sole trier-of-fact, acquired personal knowledge of a disputed evidentiary fact the circumstances surrounding I.W.'s recantationwithout evaluation of its admissibility (it was hearsay) or the rigors of cross-examination. The trial judge acquired this information contemporaneously with I.W.'s trial recantation, shortly before deciding M.C.'s guilt. Under the circumstances, M.C. reasonably could question whether the trial judge's verdict was influenced, at least in part, by the extrajudicial information that she had received. Cf. Foster v. United States, 615 A.2d 213, 220 (D.C.1992) (noting that sentencing, as compared to the merits phase of a trial, is usually a highly discretionary function of the trial judge and [a] trial judge generally may consider information from a wide variety of sources in evaluating the appropriate sentence). Meanwhile, there is no indication that retrying M.C. would involve any special hardship to the government. See Scott, 559 A.2d at 754 (noting that whether denial of relief will produce injustice to litigants turns on whether the parties made a showing of `special hardship by reason of their reliance on the original judgment') (quoting Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 870, 108 S.Ct. 2194). [22] Providing relief to M.C. in the present case would not produce injustice in future cases Liljeberg 's second prong. To the contrary, we consider that reversal will be beneficial for two reasons. First, in light of the ease and frequency with which judges use email, our decision will prompt judges to use the utmost caution in exchanging communications that might contain information about litigants or witnesses in order to avoid unintended ethical consequences that can result from innocent communications. See Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 4(A)(1) (A judge shall conduct all of the judge's extra-judicial activities so that they do not: (1) cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially as a judge.); Model Judicial Code, Rule 3.1(C) ([W]hen engaging in extrajudicial activities, a judge shall not... participate in activities that would appear to a reasonable person to undermine the judges' independence, integrity or impartiality.). Second, in light of the trial judge's reliance on her own subjective ability to compartmentalize and disregard the extrajudicial information as a basis for denying appellant's motion to recuse, we think it is important to emphasize that recusal under Canon 3(E)(1) is mandatory (unless the parties, after receiving full disclosure, agree otherwise), and that a judge's confidence in her ability to set aside extrajudicial information about a disputed evidentiary fact is irrelevant to the proper objective analysis whether there is an appearance of bias. Thus, reversal would have prophylactic value since it might prevent a substantive injustice in a future case by encouraging greater sensitivity to the concerns underlying [3(E)].... Scott, 559 A.2d at 754. We are also persuaded that the third and final prong of the Liljeberg test favors reversal. Because the standard for recusal is whether an objective observer would have questioned the trial judge's impartiality, it is nearly axiomatic that a violation of Canon 3(E)(1)(a) risks eroding the public's confidence in the judicial process. See Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1(A) cmt. ([V]iolation of this Code diminishes public confidence in the judiciary.); Model Judicial Code, Rule 1.2, cmt. [1, 2]. Despite having received extrajudicial knowledge about a fact central to the matter for adjudication, and notwithstanding the juvenile defendant's motion to recuse, the trial judge refused to remove herself from the case. We have no reason to doubt that the judge reached this decision in good faith, but it was an erroneous choice. As the Court explained in Liljeberg, [t]he problem, however, is that people who have not served on the bench are often all too willing to indulge suspicions and doubts concerning the integrity of judges. The very purpose [of the disqualification requirement] is to promote confidence in the judiciary by avoiding even the appearance of impropriety whenever possible. 486 U.S. at 864-65, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (emphasis added). Thus, this case ... requires a new trial in order to assure the continued public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. Scott, 559 A.2d at 756. In sum, the trial judge was required to recuse by Canon 3(E)(1)(a) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and her failure to do so was not harmless. The judgment of the Superior Court is hereby reversed and the case is remanded for retrial before a different judge. [23] So ordered.