Opinion ID: 1800186
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: was the trial court without authority to apply sanctions in this instance and therefore make its actions erroneous?

Text: Sanctions are covered by Rule 37, Miss.R.Civ.P. Cunningham argues that sanctions for discovery violations are specifically covered by Rule 37(b)(2), and therefore the $200.00 fine against her attorney was not authorized by Rule 37(b)(2), which in and of itself constitutes an abuse of authority by the trial court. Rule 37(b)(2) is not totally controlling. Rule 37(e) states that the court may impose such sanctions as may be just, including the payment of reasonable expenses and attorneys' fees. The trial court has need of and the use of additional flexibility to deal with abuses. We have stated that the trial court has considerable discretion in the imposition of sanctions. White v. White, 509 So.2d 205, 209 (1987); Kilpatrick v. Mississippi Baptist Medical Center, 461 So.2d 765, 767 (Miss. 1984). In taking the action of the $200.00 fine against Cunningham's counsel and not Cunningham for counsel's failure to notify the court of his planned absence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion nor act outside its authority. Cunningham also argues that the hearing at which this $200.00 fine was imposed was not a valid hearing because proper notice was not given for that October 15, 1985, hearing and therefore the sanctions themselves were improper. Once again Cunningham relies on Rule 37(b)(2) as the total authority for granting sanctions and that rule does give the trial court authority to apply sanctions only where there has been an order requiring discovery. We point out once again, however that Rule 37(e) may also be used to apply sanctions and supports the granting of the $200.00 sanction since the issue with regard to the sanction does not involve the notice requirements but how Cunningham's counsel failed to notify the trial court of his absence. Because the trial court also ordered Cunningham's attorney to respond to discovery within twenty days the notice requirements will also be examined. The general guidelines for the computation of time are controlled by Rule 6, Miss.R.Civ.P. Mitchell and Cunningham each calculate this notice period differently. Mitchell filed his Motion to Compel on October 7, 1985, and the hearing was held on October 15, 1985, a period of nine days. Under Rule 6(d) notice of a motion shall be served no later than five days before the time fixed for the hearing. Rule 6(a) states that the computation of time, when the period is less than a week, shall not include the day of filing, and intermediate Saturdays and Sundays, thus the period of notice is six days. When a party receives a notice by mail three days must be added to the prescribed period under Rule 6(e). When we add the three days to the five day limit it is calculated that Mitchell must have filed his motion at least eight days before the hearing. This was not done because since subparagraph (a) applies to discount the weekend, notice was only given six days before the hearing. Therefore the hearing on the Motion to Compel was not properly noticed. In our view the only order the improper hearing could effect is the order to respond to discovery within twenty days. Following the order Cunningham's attorney filed a Motion For Relief of the Order which was denied. In this motion Cunningham's attorney stated that all discovery had been complied with. It was this motion that caused the hearing to be held on November 6, 1985. In his motion and at that hearing Cunningham's attorney claimed that all discovery had been complied with, therefore, it is difficult to see how the order issued from the improperly noticed October 15, 1985, hearing, requesting discovery be completed within twenty days, prejudiced Cunningham or her attorney. At best this is harmless error and this Court will not reverse on those grounds for error that is harmless. The lack of proper notice was harmless because Cunningham's attorney claimed to have complied with discovery thereby negating the twenty day order and the $200 sanction was not for missing the hearing but for Cunningham's attorney not notifying the court of his intended absence. The sanction and the order that issued from the hearing were not relevant to the notice requirement and therefore no prejudice results.