Opinion ID: 1664416
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Propriety of the Court-Jury Communication.

Text: McConnells also contend that the trial court's responses to the jury's questions during deliberations were improper communications which constituted an abuse of the court's discretion to assist the jury with further instructions during deliberations. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 197: While the jury is deliberating, the court may in its discretion further instruct the jury, in the presence of or after notice to counsel. Such instruction shall be in writing, be filed as other instructions in the case, and be a part of the record and any objections thereto shall be made in a motion for a new trial. The McConnells emphasize that jury deliberations are sacrosanct, noting that in Daniels v. Bloomquist, 258 Iowa 301, 138 N.W.2d 868 (1965) this court said: In order that the institution of jury trials be preserved and its usefulness continued, its deliberations and pronouncements must be kept pure, and untainted, not only from all improper influences, but from the appearance thereof.... [A] communication by the judge to the jury stands on a different basis from that of any other person, and for a like reason the law should throw a higher degree of circumspection around such communications. Id. at 306-07, 138 N.W.2d at 872. Bloomquist, however, is distinguishable on its facts. There, the trial court sent the bailiff to the jury room and removed the foreman for five to seven minutes for a private visit with the court. The foreman on his return informed the jurors that they would have to reach a verdict, and a verdict was returned fifteen minutes later. Id. at 305-06, 138 N.W.2d at 871-72. We reversed and remanded for a new trial because the trial court's private communication with one juror had been improperly initiated by the court, the communication was outside the presence of counsel, and the likely effect was to taint the deliberations of the jury. Here, in contrast, the court's communications were each in response to questions from the jury, presented in writing to all jurors and formulated only after consultation with counsel for all parties. We find that the trial court exercised sound discretion in determining first whether the jury had arrived at conclusive special verdicts on the issue of Alcoa's liability, and only then ascertaining by written questions what those verdicts were. The court's conduct neither tainted the process of jury deliberations nor gave the appearance of impropriety. We also find merit in Alcoa's contention that the McConnells have not shown they were prejudiced by the court's conduct. McConnells' principal objection to the manner in which the trial court chose to respond to the jury's questions was that the court did not explain to the jurors what would be the effect of their special verdict answers. McConnells' counsel asked the court to advise the jury that in the event they only have one `yes' answer to the first four [special verdicts], they have rendered a defense verdict. McConnells' objection is without merit. In a special verdict submission like that used in this case, the jury need be instructed only insofar as is necessary for it to make the required factual findings. It is for the court, not the jury, to enter the general verdict and judgment for one party or another based on the jury's factual determinations. See Poyzer v. McGraw, 360 N.W.2d 748, 753 (Iowa 1985). It would have been improper for the trial court to advise the jury concerning what would be the ultimate resolution of issues on which it was making specific findings, just as it is commonly thought to be inappropriate in a special verdict submission for counsel to direct the jury's attention to the impact of any specific findings. Id. at 753. A special verdict is in lieu of a general verdict, and its design is to exhibit all the ultimate facts, and leave the legal conclusions entirely to the court. Sparks v. Long, 234 Iowa 21, 26, 11 N.W.2d 716, 719 (1943); see generally Note, Judicial Discretion in the Use of Special Verdicts, 37 Iowa L.Rev. 95, 104-05 (1951) (advocating more frequent use of special verdicts). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying McConnells' objection to the form of its responses to the jurors' questions, and no prejudicial error resulted from the court's communications with the jury.