Opinion ID: 1238139
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Cross-examination Concerning Gang Affiliation

Text: (50a) Defendant next contends the trial court committed prejudicial error by permitting the prosecutor to ask questions of defendant's mother, Dolores Fierro, implying that defendant was a member of a youth gang. He contends the questions were irrelevant, exceeded the proper scope of rebuttal, were more prejudicial than probative, and violated his constitutional rights to confrontation and due process of law. [21] Defendant's mother testified about his family background, relationship with his parents and siblings, educational difficulties and extracurricular activities. She stated that defendant often helped his neighbors with yard work, played Little League baseball, acted in school plays and accompanied his family on picnics; she indicated that defendant was well behaved, was close to his brothers and sisters, and was loved by his wife and children. Thereafter, the trial court ordered an in-chambers hearing to address defense objections to several areas of the prosecutor's cross-examination of Dolores Fierro. [22] Counsel argued, inter alia, that questions concerning defendant's alleged membership in street gangs were irrelevant and beyond the scope of the direct examination. The prosecutor responded that he was prepared to have several detectives from the Fontana Police Department testify that defendant was a member of two Latino street gangs. Furthermore, the prosecutor observed that Mrs. Fierro had testified generally to defendant's good character and specifically had mentioned his participation in such wholesome activities as Little League and school plays. The prosecutor argued that he was entitled to rebut such testimony by inquiring into defendant's participation in youth gangs. The trial court overruled defendant's objection. The prosecutor thereupon questioned Dolores Fierro concerning defendant's membership in two street clubs. Mrs. Fierro denied, however, that defendant was ever a member of a club based in Fontana called South Fontana or South Fonta and further denied that a tattoo on defendant's arm signified his membership in that group; she also denied having seen similar tattoos on defendant's friends, and disclaimed any knowledge of a group called Junior Chingones. The trial court's decision to allow the cross-examination was correct. (51) Under People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762 [215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782] evidence not falling within one of the enumerated statutory factors in aggravation is inadmissible. However, as we noted in Boyd, Once the defense has presented evidence of circumstances admissible under factor (k), ... prosecution rebuttal evidence would be admissible as evidence tending to `disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.' (Evid. Code, ง 210.) ( Id. at p. 776.) As we subsequently explained in People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113], a defendant who introduces good character evidence widens the scope of the bad character evidence that may be introduced in rebuttal. The theory for permitting such rebuttal evidence and argument is not that it proves a statutory aggravating factor, but that it undermines defendant's claim that his good character weighs in favor of mercy. Accordingly, the prosecutor, when making such a rebuttal effort, is not bound by the listed aggravating factors or by his statutory pretrial notice of aggravating evidence. (ง 190.3.) ( Id. at p. 791, italics in original; see also People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 882-883 [277 Cal. Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906]; People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 860 [258 Cal. Rptr. 184, 771 P.2d 1270].) The circumstances here are similar to those in People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, where we held that the prosecutor could properly refer in closing argument to prior criminal conduct which had not been admitted as evidence in aggravation under section 190.3. As we explained: [A]ppellant offered substantial evidence and argument that he was a kind, loving, contributive member of his community, regarded with affection by neighbors and family. Once appellant placed his general character in issue, the prosecutor was entitled to rebut with evidence or argument suggesting a more balanced picture of his personality. (42 Cal.3d at p. 791.) To be sure, we cautioned in Rodriguez that good character evidence does not open to door to any evidence the prosecution can dredge up. As in other cases, the scope of rebuttal must be specific, and evidence presented or argued as rebuttal must relate directly to a particular incident or character trait defendant offers in his own behalf. ( Id. at p. 792, fn. 24.) (50b) The prosecutor's cross-examination here satisfied these requirements. The witness had testified generally to defendant's good character and offered specific examples of his socially useful activities, including participation in Little League and school plays. The prosecution was entitled to present a more balanced picture. ( People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 791.) Membership in youth gangs was relevant to the issue of defendant's character and activities as a youth and specifically rebutted the direct testimony of the witness. Accordingly, the cross-examination constituted proper rebuttal. (52) Defendant also asserts that the trial court failed to expressly weigh the probative value versus the potential prejudicial effect. (See Evid. Code, ง 352; People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 25.) Contrary to defendant's assertion, however, the record does not show an objection on these grounds to this line of questioning. [23] Accordingly, the trial court was not obligated to make such an explicit ruling. ( People v. Anderson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 453, 477 [276 Cal. Rptr. 356, 801 P.2d 1107].) The same infirmity inheres in defendant's claim that the prosecutor's cross-examination violated his rights to due process and confrontation. ( People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 27.)