Opinion ID: 329338
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: original 61 order

Text: 24 The company argues that the original 61 order should be denied enforcement on three grounds. First, it is contended that the bonus did not equate with wages within the meaning of the Act. Second, according to the company, the order is moot the company has paid the third quarter bonus, it has bargained in good faith within the meaning of the Act, and it has supplied the union with information. Finally, with respect to the section of the order dealing with information, the company argues that enforcement would deprive it of due process because the failure to supply information was not charged in the complaint.
25 It is clear that bonuses and fringe benefits may constitute wages within the meaning of the Act. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 366, 367 (6th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Central Illinois Public Service Co.,324 F.2d 916, 918-19 (7th Cir. 1963). Upon the basis of the evidence as set forth hereinbefore, we have no difficulty in saying that there is a substantial basis in the record for the board's finding that the bonus payments were wages within the meaning of the Act.
26 Circumstances may arise where an enforcement proceeding will become moot because a party can establish that there is no reasonable expectation that a wrong will be repeated. NLRB v. Raytheon Co., 398 U.S. 25, 27, 90 S.Ct. 1547, 26 L.Ed.2d 21 (1970), citing United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953). More commonly, (a) Board order imposes a continuing obligation; and the Board is entitled to have the resumption of the unfair practice barred by an enforcement decree. NLRB v. Mexia Textile Mills, 339 U.S. 563, 567, 70 S.Ct. 826, 829, 94 L.Ed. 1067 (1950). 27 It appears from the record that the payments of the third quarter bonus have been completed and that enforcement is not required of that portion of the order. Nevertheless, this is only a portion of the order. That the company must furnish the union with certain information is not a new concept. Taylor Forge & Pipe Works v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 227, 231 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 942, 77 S.Ct. 265, 1 L.Ed.2d 238; NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36, 87 S.Ct. 565, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967); Mallory & Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 948, 953 (7th Cir. 1969). The company does not argue to the contrary but rather argues that it has already supplied the information sought by the union and no further information is in existence. 28 Most, if not all, of the company's reliance upon mootness is founded upon the history of the bargaining and the information furnished during bargaining sessions. This evidence, if the company's version is correct in fact, would be pertinent and material in a compliance proceeding. The complaint in the 61 case, however, is concerned with the period following the union's certification and running to a time shortly after the first bargaining meeting in October 1970. Since the board has chosen to pursue enforcement of the 61 order after an earlier withdrawal of an application for enforcement, and being of the opinion that we cannot say that there was not substantial evidence to support the 61 order for the period it involved, we defer to the board's determination that there should be the imposition of a continuing obligation on the company. We decline to speculate that the likelihood of repeated conduct is so remote as to mandate disposition of the case on the ground of mootness. Clearly the company had more specific information about the payment of the bonus than that it was discretionary and not computed on a mathematical formula. The union was entitled to this information. Whether it received it at sometime subsequent to the order is, as we have observed above, a matter for compliance proceedings.
29 The company argues that enforcement of the board's order with respect to disclosure of information would violate due process because this was not charged in the general counsel's complaint. The company relies on NLRB v. Bradley Washfountain Co., 192 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1951). The general counsel argues that the refusal to bargain language in the complaint is sufficiently broad to include the refusal to supply information and in any event full litigation satisfies the requirements of due process. The board relies on NLRB v. Duncan Machine Works, Inc., 435 F.2d 612, 615 (7th Cir. 1970), and NLRB v. Scenic Sportswear, 475 F.2d 1226 (6th Cir. 1973), among others. The board also argues that this issue is not properly before this court because the company did not file exceptions to the ALJ's findings on the issue. The company responds that the issue is before the court because the general counsel admitted compliance and that the ALJ limited the scope of the hearing to the extent that it cannot be said that there was a full hearing on the issue. 30 The position of the board must be upheld. As related in part I of this opinion, the company's response to the union's request for information was to refer the union to the company's Answer to Complaint. That the company included information on this issue in its answer shows it knew the matter was before the board. In addition, substantial evidence on the failure to supply information was adduced during the hearing. The limitations imposed by the ALJ did not prevent testimony on the issue but rather prevented introduction of evidence related to bargaining on other issues. In any event, the company makes no specific showing of how it was mislead by the actions of the board. If the company is relying on the general counsel's motion for dismissal of the original enforcement proceedings, its reliance is misplaced; any argument to the board would have had to occur before those proceedings were brought. This is not the type of extraordinary circumstance in which failure to raise objections before the board can be overlooked. See § 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act.