Opinion ID: 870353
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Coupe's Pretext Contentions

Text: Coupe's second argument contends that the court failed to recognize that the actual purposes of Condemnation 2 was first, to avoid liability for breach of the Development Agreement, inasmuch as [a]t the time County was considering and adopting Resolution 31-03, the Development Agreement... appeared to be in full force and effect[,] and [the] County believed it had obligated itself to comply with the Development Agreement[.] (Emphasis in original.) Second, Coupe asserts that the County instituted Condemnation 2 so that, if Condemnation 1 failed, the County could [take] the position that Condemnation 2 would insulate it from [HRS §] 101-27 damages should Condemnation 1 ultimately fail. Third, Coupe contends that only Oceanside benefitted from [Condemnation 2] because (a) Oceanside was obligated to build the Bypass as a condition of rezoning Hokulia, (b) the County would have no means to condemn the right-of-way from Oceanside should Oceanside go bankrupt or the Development Agreement be in fact void ab initio,  and (c) [t]he [r]ecord contains no evidence that Resolution 31-03 was part of a carefully considered and integrated plan to alleviate traffic apart from the Development Agreement. In response, the County maintains that there is no evidence that the County passed Resolution 31-03 either to avoid liability to Oceanside or to [Coupe.] [15] Oceanside contends that Condemnation 2 was not predominantly for Oceanside's benefit because the facts and circumstances surrounding Condemnation 2 evidences the County's independent desire to get the Bypass built for public purposes. [16] In response to the County's and Oceanside's arguments, Coupe initially contends that [t]he only conclusions which can be drawn from the [court's] finding that the record contains `no evidence' of pretext is that the [court] either did not look at the undisputed evidence ... or ... it simply did not understand what this [c]ourt tasked it to do on remand. According to Coupe, the County's and Oceanside's admission that Condemnation 2 was filed because Condemnation 1 was failing destroys Oceanside's and the County's claim that Condemnation 2 was independent of Condemnation 1 because an unrevealed side benefit [of saving County from breach of the Development Agreement] is sufficient to show that the County's professed reason for Condemnation 2 was not the actual reason, since the side benefit was never advanced as a reason for Condemnation 2. Additionally, Coupe argues that the court relied on erroneous evidence of public benefit because the review by the Department of Public Works was a technical review that does not diminish delegation to Oceanside, Oceanside had no access for the Hokulia project and could not obtain its rezoning to build Hokulia without building the Bypass, and there was no new consideration for the Development agreement because Oceanside was already obligated to acquire and build the Bypass before the Development Agreement[.] Furthermore, Coupe maintains that a claim of `need' is not the comprehensive plan envisioned by the majority opinion in [ Kelo ] and that the general plan shows two roadways which roughly parallel the shoreline whereas the proposed Bypass results in a deletion of one roadway and alters the route of the other, resulting in a single bypass (which strikes diagonally across the two general plan corridors) [and] instead of paralleling the shoreline, cuts from nearly sea level to nearly 2,000 feet.
As to Coupe's first assertion that [a]t the time County was considering and adopting Resolution 31-03, the Development Agreement ... appeared to be in full force and effect[,] neither the County nor Oceanside argues to the contrary. However, the fact that the Development Agreement existed at the time that Condemnation 2 was instituted, as discussed supra, does not in and of itself require a finding of pretext. While Coupe asserts that the County's true purpose in proceeding with Condemnation 2 was to comply with its obligations under the Development Agreement, the court's Supplemental FOF 19 of its Supplemental FOFCOL as to Condemnation 2 found that [n]o evidence supporting this contention was presented at trial. Coupe challenges this finding, arguing that it does not reflect the undisputed evidence in the record of overwhelmingly private benefit, and lack of public benefit from Condemnation 2. However, other than Coupe's assertion, there is no support in the record on remand that complying with the Development Agreement predominated over the public purpose of building a traffic corridor for the public at large traveling through the Kona area. Instead, the record suggests that at least some of the council members believed that the County was not in breach of the Development Agreement and that Condemnation 2 was necessary to build the Bypass for the general public. For example, the minutes of the January 7, 2003 public hearing on Resolution 31-03, reflect that one council member stated: I'm going to vote against [Resolution 31-03] [], although the need for the road is enormous, the people in Kona do need it. What I see is that we're being having [sic] to pay multiple times for this road. We've carried out our portion of the development agreement. I think that we don't need to carry out any further parts of this. The ball should be in Hokulia or [Oceanside's] court, and they should be taking care of these costs. Thank you. (Emphasis added.) Another council member asserted: I'll be supporting the resolution. We need to get this road moving; and if it requires that the County condemn and pay for some of the property in order to get this road done in the interest of the general public so that we have an alternative highway, because of the terrible traffic conditions in Kona; I think that we need to do this; and that we need to show our resolve in getting this road built. (Emphasis added.) Further, another council member declared: I, too, will be supporting [Resolution 31-03]. When I ran for election, part of my promise was that I'd do everything that I could to improve the road situation in Kona; and believe me, when I was going door to door, that was the biggest concern of the people. And to not do everything we can do would be derelict, in my opinion; and particularly for me, since this is in the heart of my district. (Emphasis added.) As noted before, Coupe argues that even if saving County from breach of the Development Agreement was only a `side' benefit[,] an unrevealed side benefit is sufficient to show that the County's professed reason for Condemnation 2 was not the actual reason[.] However, Coupe cites no authority for this proposition. [G]reat weight is accorded to legislative findings and declarations of public use and a heavy burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that the use was clearly and palpably of a private character. Coupe I, 119 Hawai'i at 374-75, 198 P.3d at 637-38 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Consequently, the argument that a side benefit[,] even if not advanced[,] should automatically establish that the government's professed reason for condemnation is not the actual reason, is not persuasive.
Next, as stated previously, Coupe argues that Condemnation 2 was instituted so that if Condemnation 1 failed, the County could assert that it was not liable for damages under HRS § 101-27 because the land would eventually be taken in Condemnation 2. In response to this argument, Oceanside asserts that Coupe[] did not make this argument to the court below[.] Coupe, on the other hand, contends that it raised this issue below when Coupe urged the court to view Condemnation 2 in light of Condemnation 1 and the Development Agreement in its proposed COL 21. [17] Coupe's proposed COL 21 stated: 21. Thus, in the present case, the [c]ourt must look to the context of Condemnation 2 and the factual situation surrounding it, which includes the historical context of the taking, the specific series of events leading to Resolution 2 and Condemnation 2, and the legislative history including statements made by County officialsnot just the text of Resolution 2to determine whether Condemnation 2 is for a public use, or whether it was pretextual as the Hawai'i Supreme Court instructed on remand. Church of Lukumi Bablu [ Babalu ] Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993); [ Coupe I ], 119 Hawai'i 352, 198 P.3d 615 (2008). Although proposed COL 21 contends in general terms that the court must look at the facts surrounding Condemnation 2, proposed COL 21 did not make any reference to avoiding liability under HRS § 101-27. Thus, Coupe did not raise the County's avoidance of a liability claim under HRS § 101-27 as a reason for Condemnation 2. Consequently, this court need not address this issue on appeal. See State v. Moses, 102 Hawai'i 449, 456, 77 P.3d 940, 947 (2003) ([I]f a party does not raise an argument at trial, that argument will be deemed to have been waived on appeal; this rule applies in both criminal and civil cases.); State v. Hoglund, 71 Haw. 147, 150, 785 P.2d 1311, 1313 (1990) ([T]he failure to properly raise an issue at the trial level precludes a party from raising that issue on appeal.) (Citation omitted.). Even if Coupe did raise this argument below, there is no evidence in the record to reflect that the County's actual purpose for Condemnation 2 was to avoid liability for attorneys' fees and costs under HRS § 101-27. It is true that in defending against Coupe's October 11, 2007 Motion, the County asserted, inter alia, that it was not liable because the property was eventually taken in Condemnation 2. However, there is no evidence that this was the prevailing reason for the County Council's approval of Condemnation 2. Thus, while Condemnation 2 provided an incidental benefit to the County, as Coupe maintains, it is insufficient to rebut the strong presumption in favor of the court's finding of public purpose in Condemnation 2.

Coupe argues, as said before, that the only entity that stood to benefit from Condemnation 2 was Oceanside because Oceanside could not open the Hokulia project without completing and conveying the Bypass to the County. To support this argument, Coupe asserts that Oceanside had invested in excess of $90 million in Hokulia, and Ordinance 94-73 required Oceanside to build the Bypass as a condition of its zoning change. The Supreme Court has recognized that the government's pursuit of a public purpose will often benefit individual private parties. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485, 125 S.Ct. 2655. Where the asserted public purpose is a road, this court has noted that the character of the proposed public use, i.e., a public road, is itself strong evidence mitigating in favor of the presumption of validity and [i]ndisputably, public roads have long been recognized as a public purpose for which private property may be condemned. Coupe I, 119 Hawai'i at 380 n. 32, 198 P.3d at 643 n. 32 (citations omitted). But, `the single fact that a project is a road does not per se make it a public road.' Id. (quoting City of Novi v. Robert Adell Children's Funded Trust, 473 Mich. 242, 701 N.W.2d 144, 150 (2005) (emphasis in original)). [W]hen considering a condemnation action for the purpose of constructing a public road, there is no mechanical formula for determining public use; instead, [t]his issue must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Id. (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). There are many factors that courts have considered when determining whether a road is a public use. Courts have recognized that roads often benefit the owners of adjacent or nearby property and are often constructed at the request of individuals; however, such a benefit to adjoining property owners does not render the taking invalid. See e.g., Sturgill v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways, 384 S.W.2d 89, 91 (Ky.1964) (Any public way naturally confers a special benefit on those persons whose property adjoins it.); Rodgers Dev. Co. v. Town of Tilton, 147 N.H. 57, 781 A.2d 1029, 1034 (2001) (holding that although [the developer] will be particularly benefitted by the dedication of the roads to public use, the taking of the landowners' property for that use is constitutional); cf. Territory by Sylva v. Mendonca, 46 Haw. 83, 95, 375 P.2d 6, 13 (1962) (recognizing that landowners in a condemnation proceeding may receive special and direct benefit arising from its own position upon the way itself in addition to general benefit.) Where the road is to be open for public travel, courts have weighed such a factor in favor of a public use even if the road is more convenient only to a few individuals. See, e.g., Road Dist. No. 4 v. Frailey, 313 Ill. 568, 145 N.E. 195, 197 (1924) (stating that the great weight of authority in this country sustains the right of the Legislature to authorize the taking of private property against the owner's consent where the taking is for a public use, notwithstanding a much greater benefit will accrue to private parties especially interested than to the public generally); Sturgill, 384 S.W.2d at 91 (The accepted test is whether the roadway is under the control of public authorities and is open to public use, without regard to private interest or advantage.); City of Novi, 701 N.W.2d at 151 (upholding a public use where (a) the city initiated the project in response to the growing traffic problems in the area[,] (b) [o]wnership, control, and maintenance w[ould] remain with that public body[,] and (c) although [a private entity] may be the primary user of the spur, [i]t is the right of travel by all the world, and not the exercise of the right, which constitutes a way a public highway (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); State Highway Comm'n v. Thornton, 271 N.C. 227, 156 S.E.2d 248, 260 (1967) (holding that [a] road does not cease to be a public road merely by reason of the fact that one individual or corporation derives more benefits from it than does anyone else). On the other hand, courts have held that a road which is not a public highway or which is not open to the public is not a public use. See Tolksdorf v. Griffiff, 464 Mich. 1, 626 N.W.2d 163, 169 (2001) (holding unconstitutional a state law that allowed landlocked private landowners to build private roads on property of others, finding that [a]ny benefit to the public at large was purely incidental and far too attenuated to support a constitutional taking of private property (citation omitted)); Thornton, 156 S.E.2d at 260 (stating that, if, in reality, [the road] is by its very nature and location to be used only by one family or corporation, save for occasional incidental use by visitors, it is not a public road and the property of another person cannot be taken for its construction under the power of eminent domain);.
Contrary to Coupe's assertions, the record reflects that Oceanside was not the only entity that stood to benefit from the construction of the Bypass. As indicated in the court's findings in the Supplemental FOFCOL as to Condemnation 2, the record reflects that a number of studies and plans were undertaken by the County, prior to the development agreement, that recognized the public's need for a Bypass. In particular, on remand, the following Supplemental FOFs in Supplemental FOFCOL as to Condemnation 2 state in relevant part: 3. A 1979 State Department of Transportation study stated that a highway to bypass the M&amacr;malahoa Highway would be beneficial because the M&amacr;malahoa Highway did not conform to the desired level of service criteria due to the inadequate physical elements of the existing highway, high accident rates, anticipated higher traffic volume and congestion, and the need for a route continuously around the island. 4. The Department of Planning Kona Regional Plan (1982) stated that traffic counts [on M&amacr;malahoa Highway] show the traffic to be equal to or exceeding the roadway design capacity which is an undesirable traffic condition ... [resulting in] heavy burden on the roadway network, increasing both travel time and inconvenience.  A community survey conducted in connection with the report indicated that the deteriorating traffic condition was viewed as a major problem by a third of the sample group. 5. The 1989 Hawai'i County Council General Plan (Ordinance 89-142) adopted the 1979 State Bypass highway and Ali'i Highway. The General Plan's South Kona transportation course of action identified as desirable the construction of a roadway from Keauhou to N&amacr;po'&omacr;po`o. 6. A November 1995 traffic study stated that the Bypass Highway will result in a beneficial reduction of traffic volumes on M&amacr;malahoa Highway.  7. A June 1997 traffic study concluded that: The fundamental public enhancement provided by the proposed project [Bypass] will be its contribution to helping relieve the congested regional transportation system. The traffic study again confirmed that there was a limited ability to improve the M&amacr;malahoa Highway between the areas of Honalo and Captain Cook because of the limits to the existing highway right of way, the existing business and structures that presently exist on the right away and the number of other topographical constraints. 8. A 1998 study prepared for the Department of Transportation recognized the need, based on traffic safety considerations, for the Bypass Highway. .... 15. Community and public meetings, including those held before the Planning Commission, the Planning Committee and the County Council, have shown support for the Bypass Highway. 16. A highway to bypass the M&amacr;malahoa Highway has thus been determined to serve the public interest and no credible evidence was presented that indicate that the County Council intended that Oceanside, as opposed to the public, would predominantly benefit from Resolution No. 31-03. (Brackets in original.) Coupe did not challenge any of the above findings on appeal, and therefore, these findings are binding on this court. See Bremer v. Weeks, 104 Hawai'i 43, 63, 85 P.3d 150, 170 (2004) (This court has held that findings of fact ... that are not challenged on appeal are binding on the appellate court.) (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.). Hence, these studies and plans support a conclusion that the Bypass satisfied a broad public use of alleviating traffic congestion in the area, rather than to simply confer a wholly private benefit to Oceanside. Furthermore, the instant case does not present the situation where [the Bypass] is by its very nature and location to be used only by [Oceanside], save for occasional incidental use by visitors[.] Thornton, 156 S.E.2d at 260. While the condemned property is to be initially transferred to Oceanside, the Development Agreement required that Oceanside dedicate the Bypass to the County upon its completion and that the County would assume all responsibility and costs for operation, maintenance, repair, or reconstruction of the [Bypass]. In the instant case, the County would ultimately be given ownership, control and maintenance of the Bypass, and Oceanside would have no ability to control the use of, or access to, the Bypass. Coupe admits that over 1,250 acres of Oceanside's project did touch a public road and the existing road system was at 80% capacity, and traffic improvements along M&amacr;malahoa Highway would significantly increase traffic flow through the area. Moreover, the court's Supplemental FOF 20 in the court's FOFCOL as to Condemnation 2, stated that Oceanside already had public access to the M&amacr;malahoa Highway through Haleki'i Street and [t]he Bypass ..., which bisects Hokulia and connects with other public roads at both ends beyond the Hokulia property [.] (Emphasis added.) Supplemental FOF 20 acknowledged that the Bypass does provide improved access to Hokulia for development of a luxury subdivision[.] It stated further, however, that that does not negate the County Council's predominant purpose by enacting Resolution 31-03 to obtain the Bypass Highway for [a] broader public purpose, consisting of an additional traffic corridor for those traveling through the region (as opposed to those traveling to and from Hokulia). (Emphasis in original.) Coupe challenges the court's Supplemental FOF 20, arguing that Oceanside's requested rezoning could not be accommodated by the existing road system, and, thus, Oceanside's needs predominated over public needs, because it was Oceanside's need for a rezoning that would add hundreds of residential units to the system that required the construction of the [B]ypass so Oceanside would have sufficient access without burdening the existing traffic net. Nevertheless, that the Bypass allows Oceanside to develop its property does not detract or destroy the public character of the Bypass or render the condemnation invalid.
Next, according to Coupe, the change in the northern terminus of the Bypass from Kuakini Highway to Ali'i Highway was to benefit Oceanside. The court clearly rejected this argument, stating in FOF 18 of its Supplemental FOFCOL as to Condemnation 2, that the alignment of the [Bypass], with a northern terminus at Ali'i Highway rather than at Kuakini Highway, was [(1)] preferred and selected by the [C]ounty, and [(2)] is consistent with the General Plans that have been adopted by the County. Coupe challenges FOF 17 and 18, that the Bypass was in conformity with the General Plan, arguing that the finding is plain error and reflects that the [] court made no effort to look below the surface of Oceanside's and [the] County's representations. However, contrary to Coupe's assertions, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the court's findings. For example, in the testimony of Donna Kiyosaki, director and chief engineer of the County of Hawai'i Department of Public Works from 1993 to 1998, Kiyosaki explained the County's reasons for moving the northern terminus from the intersection of Kuakini and M&amacr;malahoa highway to the Ali'i Highway were as follows: As we started reviewing available information for this bypass road and looking at options that were available, alternatives that were available, we soon realized that there were a lot of issues with the Kuakini intersection, including some difficult engineering design, that would have to be accomplished in order to make that intersection work as well as the need to go through an area that would require the taking of private properties in terms of actual smaller lots in residential areas and would exact people in the area. At the same time we were pushing to get Ali'i Highway Bypass Road designed and completed. When we looked at all the concerns combined, we felt continuation of the Ali'i Highway ... would provide that type of regional bypass road that would make sense for the Kona area. (Emphases added.) Kiyosaki elaborated on the safety and engineering design difficulties with the Kuakini intersection, stating that: Kuakini being an existing road was already seeing a host of issues regarding safety, because it had a lot of direct access from properties onto the road. So it was not what you would call a limited access type of road. There were a lot of stops along the road, a lot of direct driveways on the road. And especially near that intersection point, the grade was very steep, and it was not a place that it would have been easy to make a connection to. Any connection you made to that would cause, I believe, congestion and problems along Kuakini in the condition that it was currently in. And making improvements to Kuakini would have been very difficult. (Emphases added.) She also testified that a letter from the County of Hawai`i Department of Public Works was sent to the project manager of Oceanside on January 4, 1995, which related that the alternative location of the Bypass, with the northern terminus at Ali'i Highway, provide[d] the best overall circulation system for this region of Kona in accordance with the General Plan Facilities Map. William Moore was retained by Oceanside to assist in the completion of the [Bypass Highway] and did the initial contacts with all the landowners along the Bypass. He testified that (1) his work on the Bypass process resulted from the approval of the alignment by the Department of Public Works in [a] January 1995 letter[,] (2) [it was] the Department of Public Works that ma[de the] determination on the alignment, and (3) it was [his] understanding that the determination was made in that January '95 letter[.] In light of Kiyosaki's testimony, the January 4, 1995 letter, and Moore's testimony, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the court's supplemental FOF 20 in the court's Supplemental FOFCOL as to Condemnation 2. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Hawai'i 97, 119, 9 P.3d 409, 431 (2000) (recognizing that substantial evidence is credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of reasonable caution to support a conclusion (quoting Leslie v. Estate of Tavares, 91 Hawai'i 394, 399, 984 P.2d 1220, 1225 (1999))). Thus, Supplemental FOF 20 is not clearly erroneous. See id. (A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when (1) the record lacks substantial evidence to support the finding or determination, or (2) despite substantial evidence to support the finding or determination, the appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.).
Coupe contends that the County receives no benefit from Condemnation 2 because should Oceanside go bankrupt or the Development Agreement be in fact void ab initio, County would have no means to condemn the right-of-way from Oceanside. Coupe asserts that in the hypothetical situation in which Oceanside or its lenders declare bankruptcy while the Bypass was being constructed, [t]he Development Agreement being an executive contract, could be voided ..., leaving County with an unsecured damage claim and the bankrupt estate could then sell the partially built right-of-way to the highest bidder. Coupe also argues that if the Development Agreement was illegal, then Oceanside would have no obligation to build the Bypass. As discussed above, there is a presumption that the declared public purpose in Resolution 31-03 is valid, and Coupe bears the heavy burden of proving that the finding of public purpose is manifestly wrong. See Coupe I, 119 Hawai'i at 375, 198 P.3d at 638. The fact that Coupe can posit a hypothetical situation in which the Bypass may not be built, does not establish that Condemnation 2 was clearly and palpably of a private nature and provided no benefit to the public. Whether there are contingencies in the future that might prevent Oceanside from building the Bypass is not dispositive in the inquiry of whether the actual reason for the taking was for a public purpose. Thus, Coupe's argument that Condemnation 2 was a sham because the County had no assurance that Oceanside or its lenders would be viable at the time of performance, is unavailing.
As discussed supra, the court's findings in the Supplemental FOFCOL as to Condemnation 2 reflects that a number of studies and plans were undertaken by the County prior to the Development Agreement. For example, in 1979, the State of Hawai'i Department of Transportation (DOT) conducted a preliminary engineering report to perform the preliminary planning activities necessary to define a highway corridor through North and South Kona ..., thereby enabling the State to design a safe and efficient highway through that area. According to the 1979 Report, the planning for another highway through the area was needed because of (1) [t]he inadequate physical elements of the existing [M&amacr;malahoa H]ighway[,] (2) [h]igh accident rates on the M&amacr;malahoa Highway, (3) [a]nticipated higher traffic volume and congestion[,] (4) the improvement of a route continuously around the island[,] and (5) the County land use policy[.] The 1982 Kona Regional Plan also indicated the need for improvements to the existing roadway infrastructure. In particular, the 1982 Kona Regional Plan stated, in part, that: The traffic counts at all recording stations show large growth in recent years. Available data indicates that this growth has nearly doubled the traffic volume from Captain Cook to Keauhou.... The rapid growth has placed heavy burdens on the roadway network, increasing both travel time and inconvenience. The community survey indicates that the deteriorating traffic situation is viewed as a major problem by 33% of the persons polled. (Emphasis added.) A DOT Hawai'i Long Range Land Transportation Plan, dated May 1998, also included a new two-lane highway including intersection improvements from Alii Highway terminus to [the] M&amacr;malahoa [Highway]/Napoopoo Road intersection, [18] and then widen[ing] [the] (proposed) two-lane highway to four lanes[.] In sum, these traffic studies and general plans presented at trial recognized (1) that there would be a projected increase in the volume of traffic between Keauhou and Captain Cook, (2) that the projected volume of traffic would exceed the capacity of the existing M&amacr;malahoa Highway, and (3) that a Bypass highway would result in a reduction of the traffic congestion on M&amacr;malahoa Highway. None of these FOFs were challenged on appeal. Thus, the Kona Regional Plan, the Hawai'i Council General Plan, and other traffic studies conducted by the County and the State indicate that a proposed Bypass was contemplated even prior to the Development Agreement.

Instead, on appeal, Coupe challenges FOF 15 in the court's First Amended FOFCOL and Supplemental FOF 17 in the court's Supplemental FOFCOL as to Condemnation 2. FOF 15 states: 15. County Ordinance Number 96-8 amended 94-73 to include a shift in the alignment of the bypass highway from Kuakini Highway to the appropriate vicinity of Keauhou. (Citation omitted.) Ordinance 96-8 declared that it is  an ordinance amending section 25-87 (North Kona Zone Map) and Section 25-88 (South Kona Zone Map), Article 3, Chapter 25 (Zoning Code) of the Hawai'i County Code, and Ordinance No. 94-73, which classified certain lands from agricultural (A-5a) and unplanned (U) to Agricultural (A-1a)[.] (Formatting altered.) (Emphasis added.) As indicated in Ordinance 96-8, prior to its adoption, Section 3 of Ordinance 25-87 provided that the district classification was conditioned upon numerous conditions, one of which was construction of the Bypass. Among other amendments made, Ordinance 96-8 amended Ordinance 25-87 Section 3(L)(2) and Section (L)(3), by removing all references to an Exhibit C which established the bypass location and amending the text to allow for the alignment of the Bypass between the approximate vicinity of Keauhou and Captain Cook[.] Ordinance 96-8 also deleted section (L)(4) which specifically designated that the north end of the Bypass would intersect with Kuakini Highway. Accordingly, Ordinance 96-8 amended Ordinance 25-87 to read in part as follows (with deletions in brackets and the new, amended language underscored): (L) Roadway improvements and access(es) to the subject property, including all plans and construction, shall meet with the approval of the Department of Public Works. Prior to the issuance of Final Subdivision Approval for any portion of the subject property, the applicant shall: .... (2) determine the final right-of-way alignment of the entire M&amacr;malahoa Highway Bypass [road as shown in Exhibit C,] [sic] between the approximate vicinity of Keauhou and Captain Cook, including its intersection areas and its acquired ownership or control.... (3) construct [Phase One of] the M&amacr;malahoa Highway Bypass [as shown in Exhibit C,] [sic] in its entirety between the approximate vicinity of Keauhou and Captain Cook, consisting of two lanes with sufficient right-of-way for a total of four lanes, provided further that the section of the M&amacr;malahoa Highway Bypass between Keauhou and Halekii Street shall be completed and available for public use prior to the occupancy of any dwelling unit within the entire project area; [(4) construct the channelization improvements on Kuakini Highway at its intersection with the north end of the M&amacr;malahoa Bypass;] In light of the foregoing amendments, the court's FOF 15 that Ordinance Number 96-8 amended 94-73 to include a shift in the alignment of the bypass highway from Kuakini Highway to the `appropriate vicinity of Keauhou' was not clearly erroneous.
Supplemental FOF 17 states: 17. The [c]ourt finds that the alignment of the Bypass Highway from Keauhou to Captain Cook that was identified in Ordinances 96-7 and 96-8 ... is consistent with the 1989 General Plan. Both Ordinances 96-7 [19] and 96-8 required as a condition of the change in district classification, that the applicant determine the final right of away alignment of and construct the Bypass between the approximate vicinity of Keauhou and Captain Cook[.] A review of the 1998 General Plan Facilities Map indicates that the 1998 General Plan anticipated the proposed arterial highway from Keauhou to Captain Cook. A bypass between the approximate vicinity of Keauhou and Captain Cook, as described in Ordinances 96-7 and 96-8, is consistent with the anticipated bypass designated in the 1998 General Plan Facilities Map. Accordingly, there is substantial evidence to support the court's finding, and, thus, Supplemental FOF 17 is not clearly erroneous. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Hawai'i at 119, 9 P.3d at 431.
In sum, the court's findings support the conclusion that (1) numerous plans and studies conducted prior to the Development Agreement recognized the need and anticipated the construction of a Bypass between Keauhou and Captain Cook and (2) Ordinances 96-7 and 96-8 were consistent with the County of Hawai`i's 1998 General Plan. Hence, Coupe's assertion that Condemnation 2 was not part of a general integrated plan is incorrect. [20]