Opinion ID: 2777752
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Remaining Conditions.

Text: The defendant's challenge to the remaining conditions (all of which to some extent inhibit his interaction with minors) has three facets. He starts with the argument that the conditions do not serve the purposes identified by the district court. He adds that the conditions are overbroad and unrelated to either his history and characteristics or any legitimate sentencing objective. Finally, the defendant — noting that he has two minor children — argues that the conditions infringe upon his constitutional rights of freedom of association and familial association. These arguments are futile. The sentencing court's rationale for imposing these conditions is clear-cut. The court stated unequivocally that compliance with the conditions would promote the defendant's 2 The defendant asseverates that when the offense of conviction is not a sex crime, a stronger nexus must exist to justify a sex-offender treatment condition. See United States v. Dougan, 684 F.3d 1030, 1036 (10th Cir. 2012). This court, however, has not adopted such a requirement. Reasonableness is the touchstone; and a sex-offender treatment condition is valid as long as it is reasonably related to the defendant's history and characteristics and to the permissible purposes of supervised release. See Morales-Cruz, 712 F.3d at 75; York, 357 F.3d at 2021. -12- rehabilitation. In addition, the conditions were intended to mitigate the obvious risk of recidivism by requiring the defendant to obtain the probation officer's approval before coming into contact with minors. With this tableau in mind, we have no difficulty in concluding that the district court's rationale is plausible. The defendant's second argument is no more compelling. The conditions appear to draw heavily on the defendant's history and characteristics and are buttressed by case-specific reasons. See United States v. Gilman, 478 F.3d 440, 446 (1st Cir. 2007). For one thing, the defendant previously had been convicted of a sex offense against a minor. For another thing, the offense of conviction is a failure to register under SORNA — a type of lapse that has been credibly linked to an increased risk of recidivism. See Morales-Cruz, 712 F.3d at 75. These facts make manifest that the challenged conditions are reasonably related to the defendant's prior history and characteristics. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 558 F.3d 408, 411, 413-14 (5th Cir. 2009). In an effort to show that the court mechanically applied cookie-cutter conditions, the defendant pounces upon the court's statement that these conditions are fairly standard in sex offender cases. But the defendant wrests that statement from its contextual moorings: the court did not stop there but, rather, went on to explain that these conditions were intended to mitigate the -13- risk of this particular defendant re-offending. To seal the deal, the court specifically linked the rehabilitative and deterrent features of the supervised release term and its conditions to the defendant's lengthy criminal history and his persistent failure to comply with the terms of his pretrial release. The defendant's third argument has a patina of plausibility. Supervised release conditions that unduly restrict a defendant's contact with his own minor children may spark concerns related to the constitutional right of familial association.3 See, e.g., United States v. Worley, 685 F.3d 404, 408 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Lonjose, 663 F.3d 1292, 1303 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 269-70 (3d Cir. 2001). Here, however, the conditions are sufficiently circumscribed so that no such concerns arise. Importantly, the conditions imposed by the district court do not comprise an outright ban on the defendant's ability to associate (or even live) with his minor children. They merely require that his association with his children be pre-approved by the probation officer and take place in the presence of an adult familiar with his criminal history. There is no basis for believing that the probation officer will unreasonably withhold permission for the defendant to see his own children. If she does, 3 The record reveals that the defendant has two minor children living in Florida with whom he has had some contact. He has neither resided with them nor supported them, though, since 2007. -14- the defendant has an easily available avenue for redress. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2); Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1 advisory committee's note. That ends this aspect of the matter. The group of supervised release conditions restricting the defendant's interactions with minors do not impress upon the defendant a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to serve the goal of deterrence. See, e.g., United States v. Tang, 718 F.3d 476, 487 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam); United States v. Roy, 438 F.3d 140, 144-45 (1st Cir. 2006). Thus, the district court did not act outside the commodious encincture of its discretion in imposing these conditions.