Opinion ID: 757029
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: 1997 Petition is a Successive Petition

Text: 16 Corrao initially argues that his 1997 petition is not subject to the AEDPA's gatekeeping provisions. He claims his 1997 petition was not a second or successive § 2255 petition because his first (1995) petition either: (1) was not properly brought under § 2255 because it really sought relief only under § 2241; or (2) was not decided on the merits after a hearing. We disagree. 17 The AEDPA does not define a second or successive petition or motion. Camarano, 98 F.3d at 45-46. Generally, a § 2255 petition is second or successive if a prior § 2255 petition, raising claims regarding the same conviction or sentence, has been decided on the merits. See Liriano, 95 F.3d at 122. This remains true even if the latter petition purports to raise new claims. See Triestman, 124 F.3d at 369. 18 On the other hand, a § 2255 petition is not a second or successive application where the prior petition(s), although labelled as arising under § 2255, sought relief available only under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Chambers v. United States, 106 F.3d 472, 474 (2d Cir.1997) (noting we will disregard a prisoner's mislabelling of a § 2255 petition and instead look to the requested relief). A motion under § 2255 must be directed to the sentence as it was imposed, not to the manner in which it is being executed. Dioguardi v. United States, 587 F.2d 572, 573 (2d Cir.1978). In contrast, a motion under § 2241 challenges the execution, not the imposition, of the sentence. See Chambers, 106 F.3d at 474. 19 At the hearing on the 1995 petition, Judge Glasser asked Corrao's counsel point blank whether the petition, although nominally filed under § 2255, actually was based on § 2241. In response, Corrao's attorney said it was based on § 2255 because it challenged the sentence as imposed. See Dioguardi, 587 F.2d at 573. Fortifying his argument, counsel argued that the government misled the sentencing court by representing that the federal medical facility could manage Corrao's health problems. Corrao also claimed that the court, in imposing sentence, violated his constitutional rights by refusing to sentence him below the suggested guideline range on account of his poor health. Judge Glasser specifically rejected Corrao's claims, concluding that he had sentenced Corrao with a full understanding of the nature of his condition. 20 Because Corrao's 1995 challenge to the sentence was grounded on § 2255 and was decided on the merits, his 1997 petition challenging the same sentence is a second or successive petition subject to the AEDPA.