Opinion ID: 1194882
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Excluding Evidence of Trone's Character for Violence

Text: Defendant moved to admit evidence from three witnesses who would testify to past statements and criminal activity by Trone. Defendant maintained that such evidence was relevant to deciding whether Trone or defendant was the person who actually pulled the trigger of the gun that killed Lois Haro. After hearing argument, the trial court ruled the proffered evidence was barred by the statutory prohibition on character evidence (Evid. Code, § 1101), that the evidence was not relevant, and that even if relevant, the evidence was properly excludable under Evidence Code section 352. (10a) Defendant now contends the trial court erred in making these rulings, thereby depriving him of the ability to mount a defense in violation of his federal right to due process of law. We need not address the relevance or character evidence issues, for the ruling under Evidence Code section 352 is supportable. (11) We will not disturb a trial court's exercise of discretion under Evidence Code section 352 ` except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.' ( People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124 [36 Cal. Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1].) (10b) Because the evidence proposed by defendant would delve deeply into Trone's past, and because Trone was being tried separately, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the evidence would require an undue consumption of time and mislead the jury. Having concluded the trial court's decision excluding the proffered evidence was supportable, we further reject defendant's claim that the trial court's decision violated his rights under the federal Constitution. The essence of his claim is that the trial court denied him his federally guaranteed right to present witnesses in his own defense. (See Taylor v. Illinois (1988) 484 U.S. 400, 408 [108 S.Ct. 646, 652-653, 98 L.Ed.2d 798]; Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 302 [93 S.Ct. 1038, 1049, 35 L.Ed.2d 297].) In this case, the defense would have been that some third party (i.e., Trone) was the actual killer. We have rejected this precise argument. As a general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the accused's right to present a defense. Courts retain, moreover, a traditional and intrinsic power to exercise discretion to control the admission of evidence in the interests of orderly procedure and the avoidance of prejudice. ( People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834 [226 Cal. Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99].) In this case, defendant was not precluded from attempting to prove Trone was the actual triggerman. Instead, he merely was precluded from proving it with time-consuming hearsay and character evidence that was not particularly probative on the question. Moreover, defendant claims that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by arguing, in Trone's separate trial, that the evidence of Trone's past violent behavior and provocative statements was admissible. He contends that if the prosecutor had suddenly realized such evidence was admissible after all, he was ethically bound to reveal this fact to the trial court during the proceedings on defendant's new trial motion. He presents this contention perfunctorily, however, without argument or authority in support, and we reject it in kind. ( People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 210, fn. 16.) Defendant also asserts in effect that the trial court applied a double standard to the foregoing offers of proof by permitting the prosecution to admit similar testimony in proceedings against Trone. But what happened in those proceedings has no bearing on the propriety of the ruling in this case. [3] We find no state law error, and no violation of the due process clause.