Opinion ID: 788076
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The agent must be in the business of wholesaling, manufacturing, or distributing.

Text: 112 5. The tangible movable (personal) property that the dealer agrees to sell, distribute, or retail and that the agent agrees to wholesale, manufacture, or distribute must pertain to one or more of five industries only: (1) farming; (2) construction; (3) heavy industrial material handling; (4) utility; or (5) lawn and garden. 113 6. The tangible movables that are the objects of the dealership contract must be one or more of the following types: (1) equipment; (2) engines; (3) implements; (4) machinery; or (5) attachments. 114 7. In addition to the type or types of equipment that are the objects of the dealership contract, the dealer must also agree to sell, distribute or retail, and the agent must also agree to wholesale, manufacture, or distribute repair parts for such equipment. 115 8. In the dealership contract, the dealer must agree to maintain an inventory of one or more of the following: (1) repair parts for the subject tangible movables; or (2) the tangible movables themselves; or (3) attachments. 116 Lake Charles Diesel, 328 F.3d at 200. The CLM-Volvo dealer agreement fulfills all of these prerequisites. Because the dealer agreement fulfills all of the prerequisites outlined by the court in Lake Charles Diesel, the substantive sections of Title 51 apply to the dealer agreement. In particular, § 482 is applicable. Section 482(A)(1) provides that: 117 [n]o agent, directly through an officer or an employee, may terminate, cancel, fail to renew, or substantially change the competitive circumstances of a dealership agreement or contract without good cause. 118 La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 51:482 (West 2003). Accordingly, § 482 is an applicable law under the Local Law Provision of the dealer agreement. 119 Under the majority's interpretation of the Local Law Provision, § 482 is not applicable in this case because CLM failed to request a modification of its dealer agreement. Maj. Op. at 601-02. But the plain language of the Local Law Provision does not require CLM to request a modification of the dealer agreement in order to gain the protection of § 482. Under the Local Law Provision, either party, either Volvo or CLM, could have requested a modification if it believed, in [its] judgment that a local law would substantially alter the contractual relationship between the parties. Neither CLM nor Volvo requested a modification. As the majority duly notes in its opinion, Volvo recognized that § 482 would alter the relationship between the two parties: 120 According to Volvo, the State Statutes, if applied, would effectively nullify the Without Cause Provision, substantially altering the relationship between Champion and the Dealers. 121 Maj. Op. at 601-02. Despite this realization, Volvo never sought a modification of the contract. 122 The Louisiana state legislature added § 482 to Title 51 in 1991. See La.Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:482 (West 2003). Until the time of this addition, neither CLM nor Volvo was subject to § 482(A)(i), and immediately upon enactment, and until 2000, either CLM or Volvo could have asked for a modification of the dealer agreement. The reason that CLM did not seek such a modification is at once apparent; under the dealer agreement, if there had been no applicable local law, the agreement could have been terminated under the Without Cause Provision of CLM Dealer Agreement § 24. At the time the dealer agreement was signed in 1984, neither party had any cause to seek a modification. The passage of § 482 in 1991 modified the dealer agreement. CLM had no cause for concern, however, because it derived a benefit from § 482. Volvo, as it admits and as the majority notes in its opinion, did have its rights and advantages altered by the passage of § 482. Maj. Op. at 602. Since Volvo now recognizes the impact of § 482, as shown without objection, it could have recognized § 482's significance at any time since 1991, and did not. 123 Furthermore, the Local Law Provision provided a method for Volvo to alter the dealer agreement to regain any advantages, in its judgment it lost by the passage of § 482. The majority opinion holds that only CLM bears the burden of requesting a modification of the dealer agreement, but as I have noted, the plain language of the Local Law Provision does not limit to CLM alone the ability to request a modification. The majority interprets the Local Law Provision so that, while § 482 alters the relationship of the parties, CLM loses on its claims because it did not request a modification. Using the same logic, the majority should, with equal facility, reach the opposite conclusion; that because § 482 alters the relationship between the parties, Volvo loses because it did not request a modification. 124 The majority offers no reason or justification for declaring Volvo the winner with respect to the construction of this provision of the contract, which, by its literal terms, applies to either party. Indeed, a more logical and reasonable construction of the contract is that in the absence of a request [of] the other party, the literal terms of the contract should stand as written and unaltered. 125 Under the majority's reasoning, CLM, as the party benefiting from § 482, must call Volvo's attention to the existence of a provision that benefits CLM for the purpose of altering the relationship to the point where CLM loses the benefit of § 482. Such a departure from human nature is not a reasonable contract construction, I suggest.