Opinion ID: 1782162
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the circuit court erred by admitting Carter's prior felony convictions into evidence.

Text: ¶ 11. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that: [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Miss. R. Evid. 404(b). In admitting evidence of Carter's prior felony convictions for the limited purposes of showing intent, the circuit court determined that in this particular case, given the facts thus far, the intent of [Carter] is greatly an issue. (Emphasis added). That determination was permissible under Miss. R. Evid. 404(b). See Miss. R. Evid. 404(b) (may . . . be admissible for . . . proof of . . . intent. . . .). Moreover, the circuit court analyzed the evidence under Miss. R. Evid. 403 [7] and found that it was extremely probative of [Carter's] intent, a necessary element, and that outweighs the prejudicial effect in this case. [O]ur task as an appellate court reviewing a Rule 403 determination is not to engage anew in the Rule 403 balancing process. Rather, this Court must simply determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in weighing the factors and admitting or excluding the evidence. Baldwin v. State, 784 So.2d 148, 156 (Miss.2001) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). ¶ 12. Carter concedes that [b]ecause of the closeness of the evidence and the inchoate nature of the crime, the jury's key duty was having to determine [Carter's] intent, namely, whether it was burglarious or whether he was merely a trespasser gone horribly awry. However, he argues that prior convictions are inherently prejudicial and, therefore, the trial court should not have allowed the admission of the prior convictions because their probative value was far outweighed by the unfair prejudice standard. In so arguing, Carter attempts to distinguish his case from Jones v. State, 904 So.2d 149 (Miss. 2005). ¶ 13. In Jones, the defendant: approached the home of Kevin Voyles and knocked on the door. Voyles testified that it was his belief that Jones was attempting to break into his house. Jones admitted he may have knocked too hard, but denied kicking, or in any other way, attempting to force entry. Voyles, on the other hand, testified that Jones banged and kicked on his door to the point that it scared him. Voyles called 911 and then retrieved a gun. Voyles also testified that he peered through the window and saw Jones with a knife in his hand. The investigating officer testified that the door had dents and scratches on it, particularly around the peephole. Items were knocked off the interior wall of the house and were found lying on the floor near the door. The peephole of the door was also found lying on the floor inside the house. When first questioned, Jones claimed that he knew nothing about the incident. Later, Jones admitted that he was at the residence, but said he was there in an attempt to retrieve water for his over-heated car. . . . [T]here was no corroborating evidence that supported Jones'[s] claim that he had radiator problems on the specific day of the incident. Jones was convicted of attempted burglary of a dwelling. Id. at 151-52. In Jones, the State introduced evidence of Jones'[s] prior convictions for burglary and attempted burglary solely for the purpose of proving his intent to commit larceny in the Voyles' home. Id. at 152. This Court found that [i]ntent was shown by the fact that Jones admitted (by pleading guilty) to five prior burglaries and to one attempted burglary. . . . The prior convictions tend to prove, along with other facts, that Jones'[s] intent was to burglarize the house, not to obtain help. Id. at 153. As such, this Court concluded that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Jones's prior convictions. See id. [8] ¶ 14. Carter argues that Jones presented a `perfect storm' of facts that would reasonably allow prior crimes into evidence against a Defendant to show intent without unfairly prejudicing the Defendant. In support thereof, Carter notes that Jones had six times previously admitted to burglary or attempted burglary with the intent to commit larceny and that the door which Jones admitted to attempting to open had been scratched and kicked, apparently with such force to dislodge the peephole our of the door and shaken items from the wall. Carter contends both that Jones's actions were far more egregious than his, as well as that two of his prior convictions which were admitted by the circuit court are distinguishable from the guilty pleas involved in Jones. [9] First, Carter maintains he did not plead guilty, but was convicted by a jury, in his October 20, 1992, conviction for burglary of a dwelling. For this reason, he insists that the essential element for the Jones Court justifying allowance into evidence to show intent, admission of larcenous intent in a burglarious situation, was absent. Second, Carter argues that his April 6, 2005, conviction for taking a motor vehicle can be committed without a requisite mens rea or intent. [10] As such, he argues that while his guilty plea does constitute an admission to take, it does not necessarily admit to steal and carry away. Without those elements, there is insufficient similarity to the intent charged in the present indictment against [Carter]. ¶ 15. In response, the State maintains that [a]s this was an attempted burglary, it is incumbent upon the State to prove that Carter actually intended to break and enter. See Harris v. State, 642 So.2d 1325, 1327 (Miss.1994) (quoting Edwards v. State, 500 So.2d 967, 969 (Miss.1986)) (the attempt to commit a crime consists of three elements: (1) an intent to commit a particular crime; (2) a direct ineffectual act done toward its commission; and (3) the failure to consummate its commission.) (emphasis added). Moreover, from the outset . . . Carter's entire defense . . . is that he was drunk, lost, and looking for work, [and] that he had no intent to break and enter and no intent to steal. Evidence of Carter's intentions was accordingly highly probative.  (Emphasis added). As to the admissibility of the two contested convictions, the State insists that Jones does not stand for the proposition that the admissible prior conviction must be accompanied by a guilty plea. Rather, it is the prior conviction (or other evidence of a prior bad act), that must be considered, not the method by which it was attained. In total, the State argues that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitt[ing] evidence of [Carter's] criminal history to confirm his present criminal intent. ¶ 16. This Court concludes that Carter's argument is without merit. Even Carter concedes that his intent in this incident was the key issue for the jury to resolve. In admitting Carter's prior felony convictions into evidence, the circuit court was careful to limit the scope of that admission as the intent of [Carter] is greatly an issue. Admitting such evidence for the purpose of showing intent is permissible under Miss. R. Evid. 404(b). Furthermore, in its Miss. R. Evid. 403 analysis, the trial court found that because the evidence was extremely probative of [Carter's] intent . . . that outweighs the prejudicial effect in this case. Carter attempts to obscure the issue by arguing that Jones is a jurisprudential anomaly where prior convictions, each attained through guilty pleas, were admissible because of the perfect storm of facts present in that particular case. Assuming arguendo that the facts of Jones were more egregious than those of the case sub judice, that case in no way limits the admissibility of prior felony convictions to those arrived at via guilty pleas. Moreover, five of Carter's six prior felony convictions involved guilty pleas. ¶ 17. Carter's intent was a necessary element for his conviction, and his prior felony convictions were admitted for limited purposes, permissible under Miss. R. Evid. 404(b), including intent. As such, this Court cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Carter's prior felony convictions into evidence.