Opinion ID: 2582024
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Amendment Changed the Law

Text: The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3.) The judicial power of this State is vested in the Supreme Court, courts of appeal, and superior courts, all of which are courts of record. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 1.) Thus, The judicial power is conferred upon the courts by the Constitution and, in the absence of a constitutional provision, cannot be exercised by any other body. ( Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California E. Com. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 321, 326, 109 P.2d 935.) The legislative power rests with the Legislature. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 1.) Subject to constitutional constraints, the Legislature may enact legislation. ( Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Saylor (1971) 5 Cal.3d 685, 691, 97 Cal.Rptr. 1, 488 P.2d 161.) But the judicial branch interprets that legislation. Ultimately, the interpretation of a statute is an exercise of the judicial power the Constitution assigns to the courts. ( Western Security Bank, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 244, 62 Cal. Rptr.2d 243, 933 P.2d 507; see also People v. Cruz (1996) 13 Cal.4th 764, 781, 55 Cal. Rptr.2d 117, 919 P.2d 731.) Accordingly, it is the duty of this court, when ... a question of law is properly presented, to state the true meaning of the statute finally and conclusively.... ( Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California E. Com., supra, 17 Cal.2d at p. 326, 109 P.2d 935.) In Carrisales, supra, 21 Cal.4th 1132, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 804, 988 P.2d 1083, we interpreted the FEHA finally and conclusively as not imposing personal liability on a nonsupervisory coworker. This interpretation was binding on lower state courts, including the Court of Appeal. ( Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455, 20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937.) The decisions of this court are binding upon and must be followed by all the state courts of California.... Courts exercising inferior jurisdiction must accept the law declared by courts of superior jurisdiction. It is not their function to attempt to overrule decisions of a higher court. ( Ibid. ) It is true that if the courts have not yet finally and conclusively interpreted a statute and are in the process of doing so, a declaration of a later Legislature as to what an earlier Legislature intended is entitled to consideration. ( Western Security Bank, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 244, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 933 P.2d 507.) But even then, a legislative declaration of an existing statute's meaning is but a factor for a court to consider and is neither binding nor conclusive in construing the statute. ( Ibid.; see also Peralta Community College Dist. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1990) 52 Cal.3d 40, 52, 276 Cal.Rptr. 114, 801 P.2d 357; Del Costello v. State of California (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 887, 893, fn. 8, 185 Cal.Rptr. 582.) This is because the Legislature has no authority to interpret a statute. That is a judicial task. The Legislature may define the meaning of statutory language by a present legislative enactment which, subject to constitutional restraints, it may deem retroactive. But it has no legislative authority simply to say what it did mean. ( Del Costello v. State of California, supra, at p. 893, fn. 8, 185 Cal.Rptr. 582, cited with approval in People v. Cruz, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 781, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 117, 919 P.2d 731.) A declaration that a statutory amendment merely clarified the law cannot be given an obviously absurd effect, and the court cannot accept the Legislative statement that an unmistakable change in the statute is nothing more than a clarification and restatement of its original terms. ( California Emp. etc. Com. v. Payne (1947) 31 Cal.2d 210, 214, 187 P.2d 702.) Because this court had already finally and definitively interpreted section 12940, the Legislature had no power to decide that the later amendment merely declared existing law. On another occasion, the Legislature similarly enacted legislation overruling a decision of this court  which was within its power  but also purported to state that the new legislation merely declared what the law always was  which was beyond its power. In People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754, 159 Cal.Rptr. 696, 602 P.2d 396, we interpreted Penal Code section 1170.1 as not permitting a certain consecutive sentence enhancement. The Legislature promptly amended the statute to permit the enhancement. (Stats.1980, ch. 132, § 2, p. 306.) It also declared that its intent was to clarify and reemphasize what has been the legislative intent since July 1, 1977. (Stats.1980, ch. 132, § 1, subd. (c), p. 305.) The judicial response was swift and emphatic. The courts concluded that, although the Legislature may amend a statute to overrule a judicial decision, doing so changes the law; accordingly, they refused to apply the amendment retroactively. ( People v. Savala (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 41, 55-61, 171 Cal. Rptr. 882; People v. Harvey (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 132, 138-139, 169 Cal.Rptr. 153; People v. Cuevas (1980) 111 Cal. App.3d 189, 198-200, 168 Cal.Rptr. 519; People v. Vizcarra (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 858, 866, 168 Cal.Rptr. 257; People v. Fulton (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 777, 783, 167 Cal.Rptr. 436; People v. Matthews (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 793, 796, 167 Cal.Rptr. 8; see People v. Wolcott (1983) 34 Cal.3d 92, 104, fn. 4, 192 Cal.Rptr. 748, 665 P.2d 520.) As one of these decisions explained, this court had finally and conclusively interpreted the statute, and a legislative clarification in the amended statute may not be used to overrule this exercise of the judicial function of statutory construction and interpretation. The amended statute defines the law for the future, but it cannot define the law for the past. ( People v. Cuevas, supra, at p. 200, 168 Cal.Rptr. 519.) Plaintiff points out that Carrisales, supra, 21 Cal.4th 1132, 90 Cal. Rptr.2d 804, 988 P.2d 1083, itself postdated the acts alleged in this case and argues that before that decision, nonsupervisory coworkers had been personally liable under the statute. However, [a] judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to that construction. ( Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc. (1994) 511 U.S. 298, 312-313, 114 S.Ct. 1510, 128 L.Ed.2d 274; accord, Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. (1995) 514 U.S. 211, 216, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 131 L.Ed.2d 328.) This is why a judicial decision generally applies retroactively. ( Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., supra, at pp. 311-312, 114 S.Ct. 1510; People v. Guerra (1984) 37 Cal.3d 385, 399, 208 Cal.Rptr. 162, 690 P.2d 635.) It is true that two administrative decisions had previously interpreted the statute differently than we did. (See Carrisales, supra, at pp. 1138-1139, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 804, 988 P.2d 1083.) But we merely concluded that those decisions had misconstrued the statute ( ibid. ); we did not, and could not, amend the statute ourselves. (See People v. Guerra, supra, at p. 399, fn. 13, 208 Cal.Rptr. 162, 690 P.2d 635.) It is the courts' duty to construe statutes, even though this requires the overthrow of an earlier erroneous administrative construction. ( Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California E. Com., supra, 17 Cal.2d at p. 326, 109 P.2d 935; see also Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., supra, at pp. 312-313 & fn. 12, 114 S.Ct. 1510 [explaining that a United States Supreme Court decision interpreting a statute stated what the statute had always meant, even if the decision overruled earlier federal appellate court decisions that had interpreted the statute differently].) Our conclusion that the amendment to section 12940, subdivision (j)(3), changed rather than clarified the law does not itself decide the question whether it applies to this case. It just means that applying the amended section to this case would be a retroactive application. The fact that application of [the statute] to the instant case would constitute a retroactive rather than a prospective application of the statute is, of course, just the beginning, rather than the conclusion, of our analysis. ( Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1206, 246 Cal.Rptr. 629, 753 P.2d 585.) We turn now to the question whether the amendment applies retroactively.