Opinion ID: 1862003
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for the correction of errors at law. State v. Thomas, 561 N.W.2d 37, 39 (Iowa 1997). A trial court's findings of guilt are binding if supported by substantial evidence. Id.; Iowa R.App. P. 14(f)(1). If a rational trier of fact could conceivably find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the evidence is substantial. Thomas, 561 N.W.2d at 39; State v. Robinson, 288 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Iowa 1980). The evidence is examined in the light most favorable to the State, including all legitimate inferences and presumptions which may be fairly and reasonably deduced from the record. Thomas, 561 N.W.2d at 39; State v. Simpson, 528 N.W.2d 627, 632-33 (Iowa 1995). We consider all the evidence presented, not just that of an inculpatory nature. Thomas, 561 N.W.2d at 39; State v. Randle, 555 N.W.2d 666, 671 (Iowa 1996). Evidence that only raises suspicion, speculation or conjecture is not substantial. Thomas, 561 N.W.2d at 39. Burglary is defined as a crime executed by: [a]ny person, having the intent to commit a felony, assault or theft therein, who having no right, license or privilege to do so, enters an occupied structure, such occupied structure not being open to the public, or who remains therein after it is closed to the public or after the person's right, license or privilege to be there has expired, or any person having such intent who breaks an occupied structure, commits burglary. Iowa Code § 713.1. Defendant argues the State failed to prove the element of intent beyond a reasonable doubt. Lambert claims he entered the home for the purpose of retrieving tools, clothing, and other personal effects he had previously been unable to collect due to a restraining order. At trial, Lambert testified he returned home under cover of darkness in hopes of reclaiming the property undetected. Lambert maintains he was looking through boxes of his belongings on the back porch when confronted by Robertson and told to leave the premises. He further claims as follows. He asked if he could first retrieve his gloves and other articles of apparel from a closet in the upstairs bedroom. Robertson assented, followed him, inquired as to whether the children were aware of his presence, and upon being informed in the negative, proceeded to scream, Help, help, he's killing me. Lambert asserts the struggle witnessed by the children was simply an attempt to procure her silence, that he harbored no ill-will toward his wife, and that he had no intention of committing an assault when he entered the home. In order to sustain a conviction for burglary the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, Lambert had formed the intent to commit an assault at the time of entry. State v. Finnel, 515 N.W.2d 41, 42-43 (Iowa 1994); State v. Morelock, 164 N.W.2d 819, 822 (Iowa 1969). This element of the offense is seldom susceptible to proof by direct evidence, and is usually established by inference. Finnel, 515 N.W.2d at 42; State v. Olson, 373 N.W.2d 135, 136 (Iowa 1985). Intent may be derived from actions preceding, or subsequent to, an accused's unauthorized entry, as well as all circumstances attendant thereto. Finnel, 515 N.W.2d at 42. The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is satisfied if it is more likely than not the inference of intent is valid. Id. ; Olson, 373 N.W.2d at 136. The facts of this case are analogous to those presented in Finnel. Therein, Finnel, without consent, entered the home of Mary Brown, a former girlfriend. Knowing full well contact with the victim would be considered offensive, Finnel woke Brown and expressed his desire to engage in a dialogue. Finnel was immediately told to exit the premises. When he refused, Brown attempted to make an escape, at which point Finnel grabbed her by the neck, and covered her mouth to prevent her from screaming. Eventually, Finnel was convinced to leave. He was later convicted of second-degree burglary. On appeal, we held Finnel's mode of entry, his knowledge with respect to Brown's desire to avoid contact, his threats to kill Brown, and his assaultive actions once inside, constituted sufficient evidence from which a court could infer an intent to commit assault. Finnel, 515 N.W.2d at 43. In the matter at hand, the jury was asked to consider evidence which indicated Lambert entered the premises without permission, in the dead of night, wearing gloves, and wielding a lead pipe. The evidence further suggested Lambert confronted his wife in violation of a restraining order, that he threatened her with imminent bodily harm, and that he assaulted her when she refused to accede to his requests. Most of this evidence was corroborated by eyewitness testimony. We thus conclude there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could properly find an intent to commit an assault. Viewing this evidence, together with the other evidence adduced in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Lambert of burglary.