Opinion ID: 868471
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Intervening Change in Law

Text: In the interim between the issuance of the district court’s decision and the present appeal, we decided two cases that bear upon our resolution of this case. See R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2012); M.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 685 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2012). In M.H., we emphasized that federal courts reviewing administrative decisions in the IDEA context “must give due weight to these proceedings, mindful that the judiciary generally lacks the specialized knowledge and experience necessary to resolve persistent and difficult questions of educational policy.” 685 F.3d at 240 (internal quotation marks omitted). We explained that our review of state administrative decisions “requires a more critical appraisal of the agency determination than clear-error review[,] but nevertheless falls well short of complete de novo review. In the course of this oversight, the persuasiveness of a particular administrative finding, or the lack thereof, is likely to tell the tale.” Id. at 244 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). We also explained that where, as here, the SRO and IHO disagree, “reviewing courts are not entitled to adopt the conclusions of either state reviewer according to their own policy preferences or views of the evidence; courts must defer to the reasoned conclusions of the SRO as the final state administrative determination.” Id. at 246. But in cases where “the SRO’s determinations are insufficiently reasoned to merit that deference . . . it is entirely appropriate for the 7 court . . . to consider the IHO’s analysis, which is . . . informed by greater educational expertise than that of judges.” Id. Three months after our decision in M.H., we addressed in R.E. the appropriateness of considering “retrospective testimony” in evaluating whether an IEP provides a FAPE. R.E., 694 F.3d at 174. Retrospective testimony is “testimony that certain services not listed in the IEP would actually have been provided to the child if he or she had attended the school district’s proposed placement.” Id. at 185. We adopted “the majority view that the IEP must be evaluated prospectively as of the time of its drafting and therefore . . . retrospective testimony that the school district would have provided additional services beyond those listed in the IEP may not be considered in a Burlington/Carter proceeding.”5 Id. at 186 (emphasis added). This view rests on the recognition that “parents must have sufficient information about the IEP to make an informed decision as to its adequacy prior to making a placement decision.” Id. At the same time, we elaborated that,“[w]hile testimony that materially alters the written plan is not permitted, testimony may be received that explains or justifies the services listed in the IEP.” Id. 5 “Under New York [law], the local school board bears the initial burden of establishing the validity of its plan at a due process hearing. If the board fails to carry this burden, the parents bear the burden of establishing the appropriateness of their private placement and that the equities favor them. This framework is known as the Burlington/Carter test.” R.E., 694 F.3d at 184-85 (internal citations omitted). 8