Opinion ID: 895280
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Glazing Materials and Federal Preemption[19]

Text: We next consider the effect of FMVSS 205 on the Plaintiffs' claim that the motorcoach should have had laminated-glass windows. Unlike the seatbelt claim, here NHTSA issued an actual federal safety standard giving manufacturers a choice of glazing materials, including laminated and tempered glass. The jury determined that MCI should have used laminated glass rather than tempered glass and that this defect caused some of the Plaintiffs' injuries. The parties agree that FMVSS 205 gives a choice but disagree on its significance. Thus, we must decide if an agency's deliberate decision to give manufacturers a choice between several different materials, none of which is superior to the others in all circumstances, preempts a jury's conclusion that another of the required types should have been used. We conclude that it does not. The Safety Act defines the federal motor vehicle safety standards as minimum standard[s]. 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(9). And state regulation of vehicle safety through common-law tort actions is expressly allowed: [The Safety Act's saving clause] preserves those actions that seek to establish greater safety than the minimum safety achieved by a federal regulation intended to provide a floor. Geier, 529 U.S. at 870, 120 S.Ct. 1913; see also 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e). Of course, a tort action that seeks to impose a requirement forbidden by a federal standard, or that forbids what the standard requires, is preempted due to the actual conflict. Likewise, a tort action that presents an obstacle to the federal purpose is preempted Geier is clear that ordinary preemption principles apply. 529 U.S. at 874, 120 S.Ct. 1913. But we must be mindful that Congress generally intended the federal safety standards to set a minimum standard for performance and allowed juries to determine in particular cases if the vehicle manufacturer should have done more. The text of FMVSS 205 states its three-fold purposeto reduce injuries resulting from impact to glazing surfaces, to provide driver visibility, and to minimize ejectionsand incorporates by reference the standards of ANSI/SAE Z26.1-1996. 49 C.F.R. § 571.205, S2, S3.2(a). The ANSI standard delineates the testing requirements for the various glazing materials and allows the use of either laminated glass or tempered glass in vehicle windows other than the windshield, which must have laminated glass. See ANSI/SAE Z26.1-1996, T.1 (Items 1 & 2). Nothing in the text of FMVSS 205 indicates that it is anything other than a minimum materials standard. In the absence of the standard, manufacturers could use any material allowed by state law; the standard simply limits the range of available choices. MCI argues that the choice of glazing materials is enough to preempt a jury's finding that a different material should have been used. To be clear, the jury did not find that MCI should have used a glazing material not permitted by FMVSS 205, only that MCI should have used a different glazing material allowed by the standard. Even such a finding, MCI contends, violates the purpose of FMVSS 205 and the policy-motivated decisions NHTSA made in adopting it. Central to MCI's argument is its interpretation of Geier and that opinion's analysis of FMVSS 208. MCI claims that Geier and lower courts following it have applied FMVSS 208 to preempt tort actions that sought to hold manufacturers liable for not choosing a different safety measure allowed by the standard. Lower courts have, in fact, interpreted Geier in this fashion, [20] but we believe these courts have read Geier too broadly. The Supreme Court in Geier did not condemn a common-law rule merely because it foreclosed a choice under the relevant safety standard. Rather, the Court emphasized the purpose of the choice: FMVSS 208 embodies the Secretary's policy judgment that safety would best be promoted if manufacturers installed alternative protection systems in their fleets rather than one particular system in every car. 529 U.S. at 881, 120 S.Ct. 1913 (quotation marks omitted). That is, the choice itself furthered the overall goal of safety, allowing manufacturers to experiment with different options and to build the public's confidence in the new technologies. The specific reasons for this mix of safety options phased-in over time is discussed above, and there is no doubt that Geier 's choice-with-a-purpose reasoning is securely grounded in FMVSS 208 and its particular history. To the extent that other courts have interpreted Geier in the context of FMVSS 208 and NHTSA's decision to phase-in a mix of passive restraint systems, we agree they are correct. But when Geier 's reasoning is oversimplified to find preemption based on a choice between two safety options and then exported to other safety standards where the unique text and history of FMVSS 208's passive restraint requirements are not relevant, we must respectfully disagree. [21] Given our interpretation of Geier, we turn to MCI's argument that FMVSS 205 represents NHTSA's deliberate decision to give manufacturers a choice of safety options. That is, MCI seems to contend that NHTSA made a Geier -like policy decision to encourage a range of glazing choices. We do not agree. As noted, FMVSS 205 then and now gives manufacturers a choice of materials and recognizes that no one type is superior in all circumstances. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.205, S3.2(a); ANSI/SAE Z26.1-1996 § 2.2. In the final rule adopting the new ANSI/SAE standards, NHTSA did not state a positive desire to preserve the use of tempered glass in windows by forbidding contrary state regulation. See 68 Fed.Reg. 43,964. Rather, NHTSA declined to continue rulemaking regarding advanced glazing materials after completing a ten-year study of the subject because other safety measures, such as side air curtains, also helped to mitigate ejections and NHTSA needed to devote its resources to developing standards for them. See 67 Fed.Reg. at 41,366. NHTSA also cited the costs associated with redesigning vehicles to accept advanced glazing materials and noted that use of these materials may increase the risk of neck injuries. Id. In short, NHTSA extensively studied the issue and did not change the safety standard, which still allows manufacturers to choose among several types of glazing materials. FMVSS 205 is unlike FMVSS 208 and its carefully constructed timetable and mix of safety options. Compare 49 Fed.Reg. 6732, and 68 Fed.Reg. 43,964, with Occupant Crash Protection Final Rule, 49 Fed.Reg. 28,962 (July 17, 1984) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571). Neither set of standards is, as MCI argues, a choice among the best available alternatives. Rather, the former merely narrows the range of manufacturers' choice of glazing materials from potentially unlimited to a short list. The latter emphasizes the choice among options as an important and integral part of the overall safety scheme. We find nothing in the standard's text, history, or NHTSA's comments to indicate that FMVSS 205 is anything other than a minimum standard. As a minimum standard, FMVSS 205 does not preempt the jury's finding that MCI should have used laminated glass in the motorcoach's windows. [22] We are not the first court to examine the preemptive effect of FMVSS 205. In O'Hara v. General Motors Corp., the Fifth Circuit addressed the same issue in the context of a sport utility vehicle. 508 F.3d 753, 755 (5th Cir.2007). The plaintiffs claimed that General Motors should have used advanced glazing materials in the side windows of a 2004 Chevrolet Tahoe instead of tempered glass. Id. The Fifth Circuit considered the text and history of FMVSS 205 as well as NHTSA interpretations of the standard and general comments on the subject matter of advanced glazing materials. See id. at 759-63. It concluded that FMVSS 205 differs from FMVSS 208 both in text and purposespecifically that the relevant factors of the latter, detailed implementation timelines, full vehicle testing procedures and `options' language, that supported preemptionwere conspicuously absent from FMVSS 205. Id. at 760. The court found that NHTSA commentary on FMVSS 205 supported the conclusion that it is a minimum safety standard. Id. at 761. Interestingly, the court also considered NHTSA's decision to terminate rulemaking on advanced glazing materials and analogized that choice to the Coast Guard's non-action in Sprietsma: We find the parallels between NHTSA's Withdrawal of Rulemaking and the Coast Guard's statements in Sprietsma to be compelling. NHTSA's 2002 Notice of Withdrawal focused on the need to develop experimental standards for new rollover accident technologies. It did not reject advanced glazing as unsafe (indeed, FMVSS 205 continued to require advanced glazing in vehicle windshields). Like the Coast Guard, the NHTSA Notice of Withdrawal cited cost concerns and minor safety issues to justify the agency's change in course. And also like the Coast Guard, NHTSA has continued to study advanced glazing as part of its rollover protection program. NHTSA's Notice of Withdrawal does not convey an authoritative message of a federal policy against advanced glazing in side windows. Id. at 762-63. [23] Finding FMVSS 205 to be a minimum safety standard, the court held that the plaintiffs' negligence and strict liability claims were not preempted. Id. at 763. The Supreme Court of West Virginia also considered whether FMVSS 205 preempted a claim that a vehicle manufacturer should have used advanced glazing materials rather than tempered glass in the side window of a sport utility vehicle. Morgan v. Ford Motor Co., 224 W.Va. 62, 680 S.E.2d 77, 81 (2009). The court examined Geier, O'Hara, and Wyeth at some length, see id. at 88-93, and specifically rejected the interpretation of Geier that we adopt, instead holding that a regulation giving a choice between different materials preempts a tort action premised on the superiority of one option, id. at 94-95. The court reasoned that because the NHTSA made a public policy decision to not mandate advanced glazing in side windows because of safety concerns that advanced glazing has a slightly increased risk of neck injuries, it was compelled to find Geier directly applicable. Id. at 94. [24] As our analysis makes plain, we agree with O'Hara. The Morgan court errs by concluding that merely because NHTSA chose not to require something for policy reasons, states may not do so as well. As discussed above, the rule in Sprietsma regarding the preemptive force of regulatory non-action is not so broad, particularly when NHTSA still permits manufacturers to choose what it would not require. There is no evidence that NHTSA intended to disallow states from requiring the use of advanced glazing materials in side windows. Nor do we agree with the Morgan court's broad interpretation of Geier, that preemption is mandated whenever an agency makes a considered decision to preserve the status quo and its range of choices. As the Solicitor General has said: Manufacturers always have the `option' of exceeding a minimum safety standard when NHTSA has decided not to mandate a more stringent alternative because of considerations of cost or feasibilityas NHTSA did in this case and, indeed, often does in considering regulatory alternatives. But if such an `option' alone were enough to trigger federal preemption under Geier, the Safety Act's savings clause would be greatly undermined. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 15, Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc ., No. 08-1314. We agree. Attributing preemptive intent to every deliberate agency decision runs afoul of Congress's choice to define the safety standards as minimum standards and its clear decision to allow juries a place in developing common-law rules that exceed the federally defined floor. We hold that FMVSS 205 is a minimum standard that merely limits the possible glazing materials a manufacturer may choose for incorporation in its vehicles. As such, the jury's finding that MCI should have used a different glazing material in the motorcoach here presents no obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of a federal policy. Thus, we hold that the jury's verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs is not preempted by federal law.