Opinion ID: 4516420
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: c.a.

Text: The grave risk defense requires de Aredes to show, by clear and convincing evidence, there is a grave risk that . . . return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm. Danaipour, 286 F.3d at 13 (quoting Hague Convention, art. 13, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 8). This standard requires the factfinder to have an abiding conviction that the truth of its factual contentions are 'highly probable.' Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984) (quoting Charles McCormick, Laws of Evidence § 320, at 679 (1954)). De Aredes must prove subsidiary facts by a preponderance of the evidence. Yaman, 730 F.3d at 11. Further, the harm must be 'something greater than would normally be expected on taking a child away from one parent and passing [the child] to another.' Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 218 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Re A. (a Minor) (Abduction) [1988] 1 F.L.R. 365, 372 (Eng.C.A.)). This defense is not a vehicle to litigate (or relitigate) the child's best interests. Danaipour, 286 F.3d at 14 (quoting Hague International Child Abduction - 9 - Convention: Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,510 (Mar. 26, 1986)). De Aredes first argues that the finding of some degree of abuse of de Aredes requires a finding that A.C.A. would be exposed to grave risk. Not so. There is no claim that A.C.A. was ever herself abused. The claims here are largely that A.C.A. would be at grave risk from seeing the instances of conflict between her parents, or that the conflict between her parents demonstrates that A.C.A. would be at grave risk of da Silva abusing her in the future. But that degree of conflict does not come close to the witnessed abuse in Walsh v. Walsh.4 See 221 F.3d at 219-22. The district court found that, while da Silva on occasion . . . engaged in some degree of physical assault or abuse, the abuse was not so severe as in Walsh. The court found that da Silva never abused A.C.A. Unlike in Walsh, the physical 4 In Walsh, the record showed that John, the petitioner, had an uncontrollably violent temper and committed bloody and severe assaults on his wife Jacqueline (the abducting parent) and his son from a previous relationship. 221 F.3d at 209, 220–21. The district court found that Jacqueline was the victim of random beatings, the severity of which medical records confirmed. Id. at 209. The abducted children often witnessed these severe assaults, and John forced one of them to see a room and victim bloodied by John's abuse. Id. at 210. John also disregarded protective orders and fled the United States after being criminally indicted for threatening to kill his neighbor. Id. at 215, 220. The court reasoned that this disregard demonstrated that John would violate protective orders in the abducted children's habitual residence. Id. at 218, 220-21. - 10 - assault or abuse here never resulted in any hospital visits by de Aredes, police complaints, or arrests. And de Aredes's own testimony about the abuse was often conflicting or inconsistent. Further, the details of the abuse alleged were insufficient to support a finding of grave risk as to A.C.A.5 The district court committed no clear error in concluding that the showings of physical abuse were not so pervasive as to support a determination of grave risk of harm as to A.C.A. Nor did the district court err in finding that de Aredes failed to show returning A.C.A. to Brazil would expose A.C.A. to grave risk of sexual harm. That assertion is primarily based on the testimony of M.A.'s therapist, Dana Bonanno, about the alleged sexual abuse of M.A. and de Aredes's characterization of da Silva's testimony as failing to explicitly deny abusing M.A., this being an admission of child abuse. Bonanno testified that she held therapy sessions with M.A. and, at one session, M.A. stated that she used to sit on [her] stepfather's lap and move her hips around and that was a way 5 For instance, de Aredes testified the she once brandished a knife in self-defense when she and da Silva were in a fight, and A.C.A. grabbed the knife. De Aredes cited this fight and A.C.A.'s intervention as an example demonstrating that A.C.A. would be exposed to a grave risk of harm if A.C.A. were returned to Brazil. But the district court seemed to credit M.A.'s testimony that it was a butter knife, which, the court noted, doesn't take on the range of wandering around with a knife all the time. - 11 - to massage him. De Aredes testified that she heard the same story from her aunt. Bonanno stated that M.A. became withdrawn and avoided eye contact when speaking of da Silva. Bonanno opined that such behavior was consistent with childhood sexual abuse. Bonanno also stated later, however, that this behavior could have resulted from M.A.'s recent immigration to the United States. Bonanno also testified that her assumptions regarding M.A.'s behavior, demeanor, and condition were made to advance therapeutic treatment. They were not conclusions made with a reasonable degree of medical certainty. The district court found this distinction important in its conclusions that these assumptions did not carry the weight of evidentiary inferences. The district court observed the testimony and demeanor of da Silva by video conference and reasonably found his testimony not to evidence that he had committed sexual abuse of M.A. See Díaz-Alarcón, 944 F.3d at 312. The facts of this case are much weaker than in Danaipour v. McClarey.6 286 F.3d 1. In Danaipour, an expert in the field of child trauma concluded the younger 6 In Danaipour, the mother alleged that she witnessed the father inappropriately touching the children, the children exhibited signs of sexual abuse after returning from visits with the father, and one child complain[ed] of pain in her vaginal area [and] express[ed] general fear of her father. 286 F.3d at 7. Later, the younger child made various statements [to her therapist] that could be taken as indicating her father had sexually abused her. Id. at 7. The older child stated to the therapist that the younger sister had also told her of the abuse by the father. Id. at 7-8. - 12 - child suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. at 10. [A]n expert in sexual abuse evaluations . . . testified that, in [the expert's] opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the younger [child] had been sexually abused. Id. No such facts are present here. Here, the alleged sexual abuse is not of A.C.A. De Aredes did not witness any sexual abuse as to A.C.A.'s sister. The testimony evidence of abuse is far thinner here, and there is no expert testimony as to the certainty of sexual abuse. C. The District Court Did Not Clearly Err in Finding that A.C.A. Was Not Now Settled in the United States When the petition for return has been filed one year or more after the wrongful removal, as here, a district court may decline to order return if the child is now settled in the new country. Hague Convention, art. 12, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670. Courts also refer to the defense as the well settled defense. E.g., Yaman, 730 F.3d at 22 n.18. De Aredes must show by a preponderance of the evidence that, as of the petition date, A.C.A. was now settled.7 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2)(B). This defense protect[s] a child's interest in remaining in a place she is settled. Yaman, 730 F.3d at 15-16 (citing Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 54 (2d 7 It appears the district court used the date of the petition as the relevant time. At oral argument, counsel for de Aredes agreed that this date was proper. - 13 - Cir. 2012), aff'd sub nom. Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1 (2014)). Courts look to the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a child is now settled. See, e.g., Yaman, 730 F.3d at 9; Alcala, 826 F.3d at 170-71. A court may consider any relevant fact, including immigration status. See, e.g., Lozano, 697 F.3d at 56 (stating that an abducted child's immigration status should be only one of many relevant factors in determining whether the child is now settled, and its weight will necessarily vary); Alcala, 826 F.3d at 171, 173–74 (similar); Hernandez v. Garcia Pena, 820 F.3d 782, 789 (5th Cir. 2016) (requiring an analysis of the child's immigration status). The district court considered the relevant facts and found that A.C.A. was not now settled. Although it found that the evidence supported A.C.A.'s having developed meaningful relationships and lasting emotional bonds with a community in East Boston, the district court found that A.C.A.'s resiliency and ability to form bonds in Brazil would not make her return to Brazil an event that wrench[ed] [her] out of a well-settled position. In support, the district court properly considered the unsettled character [of] the immigration status of de Aredes, A.C.A., and M.A. De Aredes argues that the district court erred in finding A.C.A. was not now settled and that the district court erroneously - 14 - gave dispositive weight to A.C.A.'s immigration status. Both arguments lack merit. The district court plainly did not give immigration status any such dispositive weight, and so that legal issue is not present in this case. The district court stated that it paid careful attention . . . to all of the various factors and, considering A.C.A.'s ties to the community and resiliency, found that she was not now settled. The district court subsequently commented on A.C.A.'s immigration status in support of its finding A.C.A. was not now settled, but nothing in the court's reasoning suggests that A.C.A.'s immigration status controlled the finding. But the evidence before the district court supported its finding that A.C.A. was not now settled, and that finding was not clearly erroneous. Although A.C.A. was engaged in school, she was repeatedly tardy and absent. During the 2017-2018 school year, A.C.A. was tardy on 40 days and absent 8 days, out of 167 days. In the first half of the 2018-2019 school year, she was tardy 41 out of 113 days. The district court could credit this administrative record as weighing against a finding that A.C.A. was now settled. See Lozano, 697 F.3d at 57 (noting that courts generally should consider as a now settled factor whether the child attends school or day care consistently (quoting Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F.3d 563, 576 (9th Cir. 2008) (Bea, J., dissenting)). As of October 26, 2018, just two weeks before the petition date, - 15 - de Aredes seemed to struggle to find a regular and steady employment [yet] at th[at] time however manage[d] to run the household. A.C.A. was diagnosed with adjustment disorder with depression or anxiety. A.C.A. experienced a documented difficulty adjusting to her move to the United States and the absence of her father, grandparents, and friends in Brazil. D. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying De Aredes's Motion for a New Trial The district court denied de Aredes's motion for a new trial. A motion for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence requires the movant to show that: (1) The evidence has been discovered since the trial; (2) The evidence could not by due diligence have been discovered earlier by the movant; (3) The evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching; and (4) The evidence is of such nature that it would probably change the result if a new trial is granted. Duffy v. Clippinger, 857 F.2d 877, 879 (1st Cir. 1988). De Aredes argues that her October 30, 2019 immigration hearing led to such new evidence. She argues that, by setting her asylum hearing date for February 16, 2023, the immigration judge removed de Aredes and A.C.A.'s risk of removal for three years, stabilized their immigration status, and that now made A.C.A. now settled in the United States. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that this showing did not comply with the rule. The evidence was plainly cumulative and not newly discovered. The - 16 - district court was aware of de Aredes's application for political asylum and its possible immigration consequences, and called her October 30, 2019 hearing neither unforeseen nor unforeseeable. Significantly, the district court found that de Aredes could have filed her application for asylum earlier, but did not. We affirm the denial of relief from return. E. The Injunction Should Be Modified To Be Clear It Did Not Determine the Custody of A.C.A The implementing statute of the Hague Convention expressly forbids a court from determining the merits of any underlying child custody claims. 22 U.S.C. § 9001(b)(4); see also Yaman, 730 F.3d at 22-23 (stressing that a Hague Convention case did not involve a determination of custody). The return requirement is a 'provisional' remedy that fixes the forum for custody proceedings. Upon the child's return, the custody adjudication will proceed in that forum. Monasky, 140 S. Ct. at 723 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Linda Silberman, Interpreting the Hague Convention: In Search of a Global Jurisprudence, 38 U.C.D. L. Rev. 1049, 1054 (2005)). As the district court explicitly recognized, it is the job of the courts of Brazil, not the district court, to make the appropriate custodial and family law determinations. Mauvais v. Herisse, 772 F.3d 6, 21 (1st Cir. 2014). This injunction, as - 17 - worded, could be read to violate this rule. It reads, in the relevant parts: On January 2, 2020, A.C.A. shall travel to Brazil to reside in the care and custody of the petitioner Nelio Nelson Gomes da Silva. Prior to that date, Mr. da Silva will travel to Massachusetts to facilitate A.C.A.'s return to Brazil in his custody . . . . . . . . Any further proceedings regarding A.C.A's custodial arrangements shall be conducted by the appropriate Brazilian court under Brazilian law. Injunctive Decree at 1-2, da Silva v. de Aredes, No. 1:18-cv12353-DPW (D. Mass. October 28, 2019), ECF No. 102 (emphasis added). Perhaps the order meant no more than that the parent returning the child to Brazil had the authority to do so. At oral argument, we were told that de Aredes had not decided whether she would return to Brazil on the removal of A.C.A. The order that A.C.A. reside in the care and custody of da Silva and the reference to further custodial proceedings could be read as making a custody determination. The order should not be read to mean that the proceedings carried out in the district court determined custody. In consequence, we direct the district court to address and make the needed modifications to the injunction. At oral argument, counsel for da Silva had no objection to the injunction being made clear that it did not deprive de Aredes of her custody rights as to A.C.A. - 18 -