Opinion ID: 2019301
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Definite vs Indefinite

Text: Although we have had few occasions to explore the contours of the issue presented, our precedents indicate that a hiring for an indefinite duration includes one that may have some definable ending point, but the actual length of employment is not fixed with precision. For example, in Arentz v Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co. (249 N.Y. 439) plaintiff sought to prove that he was employed for life or at least for as long a time as the defendant remained in business ( id. , at 440) based upon an oral promise of permanent employment. We characterized the promise as nothing more than that the employment [was] to continue indefinitely ( Arentz v Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co. , 249 NY, at 444; see also , Revere v Boston Copper Co. , 32 Mass 351, 361 [a contract (for life) with a corporation, which is in its nature perpetual, but determinable by some contingent event, is a contract for an indefinite time]). Similarly, an employment contract which provides that an employee may only be terminated for just cause represents a hiring for an indefinite duration ( see , Weiner v McGraw-Hill, Inc. , 57 N.Y.2d 458). [1] Such circumstances may be contrasted with an employment relationship where its duration `is either definite or capable of being determined' ( see , Weiner v McGraw-Hill, Inc. , 57 N.Y.2d 458, 465, supra [citation omitted]). In every example addressed by this Court, a definite duration was only determinable by reference to a precise calendar date. For example, in Gressing v Musical Instrument Sales Co. (222 N.Y. 215) and Cuppy v Stollwerck Bros. (216 N.Y. 591), the documentary evidence indicated that the parties had contracted for one year of definite employment. In the Gressing case, defendant had guaranteed a certain amount of business annually. In Cuppy , the employer's letters offered employment for 12 months and a certain rate per year ( see also , Carter v Bradlee , 245 App Div 49, affd 269 N.Y. 664 [contract which provided for two-year commitment with provisions to renew on the same terms could not be terminated after the third year of employment]). It would also appear that parties might specify that employment is to continue indefinitely until the happening of a particular event. However, it is only when the event precisely defines the length of employment that it will be considered of definite duration. Thus, a fixed duration may be precisely measured when employment lasts through summer (from the June solstice to the September equinox) or until the next election (first Tuesday in November) but not by the level of a company's stock, a lifetime or subjective performance evaluations. Indeed, the requirement that the length of the employment relationship be fixed and definite at the time of contracting effectively balances the rights of employees and employers since both will know exactly how long the employment relationship will last. It is only when the length of employment is actually and precisely ascertainable at the time of contracting, removing uncertainty for all, that we have found the duration to be definite. The question is not whether the event that may terminate employment is fixed but whether the duration of the relationship is precisely measured by that event. Indeed, as stated long ago in a case decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: The engagement of the plaintiff to perform services, being for the time for which the corporation was established,    is for an indefinite time, determinable by the dissolution of the corporation in a mode fixed by law ( Revere v Boston Copper Co. , 32 Mass 351, 361, supra ). A period of time measured by an individual employer's continued professional career is indistinguishable from a corporate employer remaining in business. Similarly, career-long employment is akin to a `permanent' position allegedly measured by an employee's lifetime which we have held is employment of an indefinite duration ( see , Arentz v Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co. , 249 N.Y. 439, 442, supra ). The majority reasons that contracts for a permanent position establish an indefinite duration because they are not delimited by legally and realistically cognizable boundaries (majority opn, at 691). The majority inevitably concludes that the ending of a professional boxing career is somehow more definite than death. Rather, both contracts, so delimited, indistinguishably define a fixed boundary, but for employment of indefinite duration. The distinction seen by the majority is elusive, to say the least. Indeed, it is difficult to glean the majority's basis for finding the boundary defining the duration at issue as more definite than contracts that are yearly or by the year (majority opn, at 691). The majority concludes that a period which might last any length could still be characterized as definite and fixed. Though the condition which might terminate the employment relationship is defined, the time in which the relationship might endure is obviously far from definite. By focusing on the definiteness of how employment might be limited rather than the definiteness of the term of employment, the majority reshapes precedent to hold that a stated event which could terminate an employment relationship, but which might occur at any time, may also definitively fix the duration of employment as a matter of law. The most troubling aspect of the majority's ruling is its consequences. The doctrine of at-will employment has served as the judicial bedrock of New York employment law since 1896. By creating a subcategory of employment relationships where the duration has some definiteness (majority opn, at 690), the majority chips away at the precedential foundation that this Court has consistently applied. As exposed below, the shift taken by the majority in concluding that the submitted language creates employment for a definite term may have substantial ramifications upon employment law as a practical matter. [2]