Opinion ID: 2075892
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Victim's Medical Records

Text: The defense presented a theory that the victim's former boy friend killed her in a fit of anger. As defense counsel summed up to the jury: He goes to the store [before 6:00 p.m. on November 29th] to resolve the issues that he has been seething about that have been boiling up inside of him. She tells him that she's breaking off with him, she's going to get back together with Charles Stout, she's going to make a life with him, she doesn't want to have anything more to do with Dominic. And the final straw is she tells Dominic Ladue, I'm not pregnant with your child anymore, I aborted it. And Dominic Ladue couldn't handle that. And in a drunken violent rage, he killed Kimberly Giroux.... To support the evidence of Ms. Giroux's recent abortion, defendant subpoenaed Ms. Giroux's medical records. The custodian of the records, University Associates in Obstetrics and Gynecology, Inc. and University Health Center, Inc., opposed disclosure. The trial court initially ordered disclosure to the defense, and an interlocutory appeal was taken to this Court. We ordered the records custodian to provide the materials requested in the subpoena to the trial judge for the purpose of an in camera examination to determine whether the records were privileged under 12 V.S.A. § 1612(c). [9] After reviewing the records in camera, the trial court ruled against disclosure. Defendant contends that 12 V.S.A. § 1612 does not bar disclosure of the records in this case, on the ground that V.R.E. 503(d)(3) [10] constitutes an express provision of law sufficient to waive the medical privilege under § 1612(a). Whatever the merits of this argument, it is evident from the transcript that the court's decision barring disclosure was based, not just on § 1612, but also on the conclusion that the materials would not be helpful to the defendant. While the medical records apparently contain relevant materials in that they pertain to the victim's pregnancy and/or abortion, Judge Levitt concluded as follows: [Section 1612(c)] does not allow[] what I thought to be was the relevant materials from her medical records to be introduced. On the other hand though, much of what you [defense] want to introduce has already been introduced through other witnesses which testimony would allow today. . . . . I think that I have allowed much of the material to come out as you [defense] wanted it, because I thought maybe there would be some problem under [§ 1612]. And so much of it has already come out to begin with. So I don't think you have suffered any prejudice.... Also in reviewing the materials contained within the file I don't think they will be helpful to your particular defense that you presented. Thus it is fair to read the court's decision as an exercise of discretion under V.R.E. 403: Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed... by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Here, the probative value of the medical records was marginal. At best, they would show that the victim had procured an abortion, but that fact, of course, would not by itself establish that her former boy friend knew of the event. Therefore, the records were only tenuously related to a fact in issue at trial, namely, Mr. Ladue's state of mind. [11] Furthermore, what the records could show had already been shown. Mr. Ladue admitted that he knew Ms. Giroux was pregnant. A friend of the victim's who had accompanied her to the University Medical Center for an appointment testified that Ms. Giroux had had an abortion. And the medical examiner who performed the autopsy testified that she was not pregnant within the thirty days prior to her death. The records could reveal nothing more of substance. In addition to the statutory argument, defendant claims a constitutional right to present the medical records to the jury in aid of his defense. There is, however, no constitutional right to introduce irrelevant evidence or marginally relevant but cumulative evidence. See State v. Roy, 151 Vt. at 35, 557 A.2d at 895 (no constitutional right of access to police officer's personnel file where information therein would not be admissible as evidence); State v. Patnaude, 140 Vt. 361, 370, 438 A.2d 402, 409 (1981). Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), upon which defendant principally relies, is inapposite. In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant's rights under the federal Confrontation Clause were denied when he was prohibited from questioning a key prosecution witness concerning the witness's juvenile criminal record. The Court stated: The accuracy and truthfulness of [the witness's] testimony were key elements in the State's case against petitioner. The claim of bias which the defense sought to develop was admissible to afford a basis for an inference of undue pressure because of [the witness's] vulnerable status as a probationer .... Id. at 317-18, 94 S.Ct. at 1111. The considerations present in the instant case are entirely dissimilar. As we have stated, the trial court determined, after reviewing the materials in camera, that they were not admissible because they were not helpful to the defense and were cumulative. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 61, 107 S.Ct. 989, 1004, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (trial court on remand should conduct in camera inspection of privileged material to determine whether its disclosure probably would have changed outcome of trial). Furthermore, in Davis, the defense sought to impeach a witness testifying for the State: The State could have protected [the witness] from exposure of his juvenile adjudication in these circumstances by refraining from using him to make out its case; the State cannot, consistent with the right of confrontation, require the petitioner to bear the full burden of vindicating the State's interest in the secrecy of juvenile criminal records. 415 U.S. at 320, 94 S.Ct. at 1112. In contrast, in the case at bar, the State had not put on the evidence that information from Ms. Giroux's medical file was expected to rebut or impeach. At most, the medical records would be used to substantiate the testimony of the medical examiner and the victim's friend (a defense witness). In light of the policy favoring confidentiality of medical recordsand the especially private nature of gynecological recordsthe trial court's decision not to publish Ms. Giroux's medical file in these circumstances must be affirmed.