Opinion ID: 867236
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged Deck error

Text: ¶ 25 Before authorizing visible restraints, the trial court must make a case specific determination reflecting particular concerns, say, special security needs or escape risks, related to the defendant on trial. Deck, 544 U.S. at 633, 125 S.Ct. 2007. A decision based solely on a general jail policy of shackling defendants who wear jail garb or exercise their constitutional right to represent themselves is clearly not the kind of `case specific' determination of `particular concerns' that Deck requires. State v. Gomez, 211 Ariz. 494, 504, ¶ 49, 123 P.3d 1131, 1141 (2005) (footnote omitted). A trial judge must have grounds for ordering restraints and should not simply defer to the prosecutor's request, a sheriff's department's policy, or security personnel's preference for the use of restraints. Rather, the judge should schedule a hearing at the defendant's request regarding the need for the restraints. State v. Cruz, 218 Ariz. 149, 168, ¶ 119, 181 P.3d 196, 215 (2008). ¶ 26 The trial judge here cited only jail policy and made no particularized finding of the need for security measures. We reiterate that judges should not simply defer to jail policy in ordering restraints of defendants. Rather, they should determine on a case-by-case basis whether security measures are required as to the particular defendant before them. ¶ 27 Deck, however, requires reversal only if restraints are visible to the jury. Deck, 544 U.S. at 633, 125 S.Ct. 2007; Gomez, 211 Ariz. at 504, ¶ 50, 123 P.3d at 1141; see also Mills, 196 Ariz. at 272-73, ¶ 13, 995 P.2d at 708-09 (observing that an unseen restraint could not have affected the presumption of innocence (internal quotation marks omitted)). The central issue here is thus whether the restraints were visible.
¶ 28 In Gomez, we rejected the State's argument that leg irons and chains were not visible, in large part because the trial judge offered to instruct the jury not to consider the chains. 211 Ariz. at 504 ¶ 50, 123 P.3d at 1141. Unlike leg irons or shackles, however, leg braces and stun belts are typically worn under a defendant's clothes, as they were here. ¶ 29 Dixon cites no case holding that concealed leg braces violate the rule announced in Deck. Rather, the reported decisions correctly treat a leg brace worn under clothing as not visible in the absence of evidence to the contrary. See, e.g., State v. Ninci, 262 Kan. 21, 936 P.2d 1364, 1387 (1997); Zink v. State, 278 S.W.3d 170, 186 (Mo.2009). There is no evidence here that the jury either saw the brace or inferred that Dixon wore one. Cf. State v. Wassenaar, 215 Ariz. 565, 576, ¶ 44, 161 P.3d 608, 619 (App.2007) (While Defendant contends that several jurors did see the restraints at some unspecified time, he provided no admissible evidence to support his contention.).
¶ 30 Because Dixon did not object to the stun belt below, under fundamental error review he must show that it was visible to the jury. He has not met that burden. Although the trial judge, in warning Dixon not to bend over or turn his back to the jury, speculated that jurors might be able to see the outline of the belt beneath Dixon's clothing, Dixon has not established that the jury actually saw the belt or inferred its presence. ¶ 31 Dixon cites United States v. Durham, 287 F.3d 1297, 1305 (11th Cir.2002), which suggests that even a non-visible stun belt might violate the right to a fair trial. But the Durham court was primarily concerned about the defendant's argument that the threat of electric shock would inhibit his ability to communicate with counsel and participate in his defense. Id. at 1305-06. In contrast, Dixon did not object to the stun belt, expressly conceding that the non-visible belt would allow him to freely express himself in court. Under these circumstances, we find no fundamental error.
¶ 32 Even when visible restraints are improperly imposed, [w]hen it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error, the error is harmless. Hymon v. State, 121 Nev. 200, 111 P.3d 1092, 1099 (2005); see also Deck, 544 U.S. at 635, 125 S.Ct. 2007 (noting applicability of harmless error doctrine). Given the DNA evidence implicating Dixon and the circumstances of the crime, this is such a case. To conclude that Dixon had not committed the murder, the jury would have had to accept that Deana agreed, in the ninety minutes between the time she left the bar and was found dead, to have had sex with Dixon, apparently a complete stranger, and that after Dixon left her apartment, another person entered the apartment, strangled and stabbed her.