Opinion ID: 1146057
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Validity of the order striking the request for jury trial.

Text: The applicable statute is C.R.S. '53, 71-1-13, (1957 Cum.Supp.) This section reads as follows:  Review. Any respondent or his attorney, his guardian ad litem, his legal guardian, parent, spouse, or adult next of kin may, within five days after the entry of the order of adjudication or commitment, file a demand in writing with the court having jurisdiction that the questions considered by the medical commission be tried by a judge or by a jury in such court. If the respondent requests a trial by jury, the court shall, within one month, cause a jury of six persons to be summoned, and the trial shall be had as provided by law for the trial of civil causes before a jury. The findings of the medical commission shall be admissible as evidence upon the identification thereof by the person, or persons, verifying the report of the commission, and such person, or persons, shall be subject to examination and cross-examination as a witness in other civil causes. The jury shall be instructed by the court that the findings of the medical commission may be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence. The verdict of the jury shall be in answer to the questions set forth in section 71-1-7(2). The judge shall enter a decree in accordance with the finding of the jury, either entering an order of commitment if any question shall be answered in the affirmative, or discharging the respondent if all questions are answered in the negative; provided, when, in the opinion of the court, said finding by the jury is contrary to the law or the evidence of the case, the court may set aside the finding and enter an order notwithstanding the finding of the jury. Pending such trial the court may make such order as it may consider proper in the premises relating to the custody and care of the respondent. It will be recalled that in the case at bar, the petitioner, as spouse, requested the review by jury in accordance with the above section. The county court refused to honor this request and struck it from the record on the ground that the petitioner was acting adversely to the interests of the ward. No doubt the court reasoned that since it may, under 71-1-13 (1957 Cum.Supp.), set a verdict aside which is contrary to the law, it may also in a proper case dispense with a jury trial. Respondent argues that the court's action was valid because of the ambiguity of the statutory provision that a respondent, his attorney, his guardian ad litem, parent, spouse or adult next of kin may make the demand. It then declares that if the respondent makes the request the court shall impanel a jury. It is argued that if someone other than the respondent makes the request the court has a discretion concerning the impaneling of the jury and, therefore, the county court could in a proper case refuse to impanel a jury. However, we are unable to agree with this construction of the statute. We do not believe that the court can, once a request has been made, determine whether the case is a proper one for a jury trial or whether it is in the best interests of the ward to impanel a jury. Our interpretation of the statute is that the words if the respondent requests means if the respondent or some one of the persons named requests the same in his behalf. Thus, the court has no discretion in the matter, but must impanel a jury. The strained construction requested would render the statute meaningless. This Court has had occasion to consider similar problems on numerous occasions and the holdings have been that the statutes must be carried out strictly in accordance with their provisions. Thus, in the relatively recent case of Barber v. People, 127 Colo. 90, 254 P.2d 431, it was held that all of the proceedings were void by reason of the fact that the Sheriff had changed the place of confinement by interlineation. The Court pointed out that every person, including those suspected of being insane, has certain fundamental constitutional rights and then continued: Respondent is restrained of her liberty in the instant case solely under the authority of the special statutory proceedings set forth in chapter 105, '35 C.S.A. Such proceedings must of course conform to the constitutional limitations upon the exercise of power contained in the Constitution of Colorado and that of the United States. While it is argued that in the instant case these constitutional limitations were violated in several ways, it is not necessary for us to pass upon those questions. It is sufficient for determination of this case to rely upon the well-established rule that, in an action which is entirely statutory, the procedure therein prescribed is the measure of the power of the tribunal to which jurisdiction of causes arising under the statute is given. There must be a strict compliance with the provisions of such a statute, which are mandatory, and in the absence of such compliance the court has no jurisdiction to act. This rule is especially applicable to a statutory proceeding, the object of which is to deprive a person of his liberty. 127 Colo. 95, 254 P.2d 433. The same view is expressed in Hultquist v. People, 77 Colo. 310, 236 P. 995 and Okerberg v. People, 119 Colo. 529, 205 P.2d 224. In the Hultquist case there was a failure to observe the requirement of the statute that a notice be given to the alleged insane person at least five days before the hearing before the commission. The Court said:     We are also of opinion that giving of this notice is mandatory, unless properly waived, and must be strictly complied with.    [77 Colo. 310, 236 P. 998.] The Court then condemned the unusual expedition exhibited by the lunacy commission. At page 315 of 77 Colo., at page 997 of 236 P., it was said: We think the evidence makes it clear that the sheriff did not deliver to the defendant a copy of the complaint or arrest order. It was imperative that he do so. As his return apparently was not filed until after the hearing, no opportunity was afforded defendant to object to it, or to contradict it, but, if there had been, as will appear later, it is likely that the opportunity would not have been availed of. This nonobservance of the statute constitutes reversible error.    In Okerberg v. People, supra the same question was presented and the pronouncement was again made that the requirements of the statute are mandatory. This was reiterated in Rickey v. People, 129 Colo. 174, 267 P.2d 1021. Having expressed our view that the county court is required to honor the request which is made by a spouse, we now turn to whether this is changed where the contention is then being made that the marriage itself is subject to annulment. In other words, should the county court suspend the jury trial pending the outcome of an annulment action in the district court with a view to finally setting aside the request if the district court concludes that the marriage should be annulled and that it was void ab initio. To so rule would seriously impair the right to a jury trial and while the facts of the present case might be such as to produce an equitable result if this view of the statute were accepted, we hesitate to give our sanction to a principle which will permanently undermine the provision of the statute authorizing the jury trial. We conclude, therefore, that it is the status as of the time of the request which is determinative. The Court should not anticipate or await the outcome of the annulment suit because this would serve to nullify the jury demand alsoin view of the 30 day limitation on holding the hearing.