Opinion ID: 48708
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: but by a reasonable-officer standard.8 The

Text: When courts review a search justified by consent, there are four distinct issues. United States v. Dilley, 2007 WL 624207, at  (5th 4 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, Cir. Mar. 2, 2007). First, as a threshold mat- 222 (analyzing voluntariness under a totality-ofter, the government must demonstrate that the the-circumstances test). defendant did consent.2 If he consents, proba- 5 ble cause analysis is inapplicable, and the Id. search is measured against the general Fourth 6 Amendment requirement of reasonableness.3 See United States v. Ibarra, 965 F.2d 1354, Existence of consent is determined based on 1356 n.2 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (per curiam) the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., (affirming by equally-divided court) (“Government has the burden of proving the search was conduct- Price, 54 F.3d at 345. ed within the scope of the consent received.”). Once the government has demonstrated 7 See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169-71 (1974) (considering whether police can rely on consent of third party); Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 2 See United States v. Price, 54 F.3d 342, 346 183-89 (same). (7th Cir. 1995) (examining whether a defendant 8 who responded “Sure” meant “Sure you can See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 search” or “Sure, I mind if you search”); United (1991) (“The standard for measuring the scope of States v. Barrington, 210 F. Supp. 2d 773, 778 a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment (E.D. Va. 2002) (same). is that of “objective” reasonablenessSSwhat would the typical reasonable person have understood by 3 See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183 the exchange between the officer and the sus- (1990) (“What [the defendant] is assured by the pect?”); Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186-88 (“Whether Fourth Amendment itself, however, is not that no the basis for such authority [to consent] exists is government search of his house will occur unless the sort of recurring factual question to which law he consents; but that no such search will occur that enforcement officials must be expected to apply is ‘unreasonable.’”). Even where police have ob- their judgment, and all the Fourth Amendment retained a search warrant, if the suspect consents quires is that they answer it reasonably. . . . they need not execute the warrant. United States Would the facts available to the officer at the mo- v. Lee, 356 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 2003). (continued...) 3 burden of proof remains on the government. United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1470 (5th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). Because all four issues are factual, we re- view the district court’s determinations for The district court made a finding of volunclear error.9 We review its ultimate Fourth tariness after an oral hearing, so our review Amendment conclusions de novo. United under the clearly erroneous standard is particStates v. Gonzalez, 328 F.3d 755, 758 (5th ularly deferential. Id. Freeman and Chan have Cir. 2003). not made the necessary showing.