Opinion ID: 1239184
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Accidentologist

Text: During the trial, defense counsel called two witnesses to testify as experts on behalf of the defendant. One of the witnesses, Officer Franco, had conducted the investigation of the scene of the accident minutes after the accident occurred. The trial court recognized Officer Franco's qualifications as an expert but, nevertheless, refused to let him testify as to the point of impact. The court's ruling was predicated on the absence of skid marks and the fact that prior to Officer Franco's arrival at the scene, the two automobiles had been moved slightly in an attempt to free the deceased from his vehicle. In accordance with our holding in McNelley v. Smith, 149 Colo. 177, 368 P.2d 555 (1962), the officer should have been allowed to testify as to the point of impact on the basis of the existing physical facts at the scene of the accident. The officer found a gouge mark in the roadway, which he used as part of the foundation for his opinion. Under ideal circumstances, additional evidence, such as skid marks, might be available to lend further support to the officer's opinion. However, the lack of such evidence is not a proper ground for excluding the officer's testimony. The absence of skid marks or other physical facts is a proper subject for cross-examination. The trial judge should decide whether a witness is a qualified expert on a subject appropriate for expert testimony, but the basis of his opinion and the weight to be given the opinion should be left for advocates to challenge and for the jury to determine. Similarly, the movement of the automobiles which occurred prior to the officer's arrival at the scene was not a proper basis for denying admissibility of the officer's opinion. The extent of the movement of the vehicles was fully testified to by a competent witness before defense counsel attempted to elicit Officer Franco's opinion as to the point of impact. Such testimony, together with the officer's observations at the scene, provided factual foundation for the officer's proffered opinion and for formulating a hypothetical question relating to the point of impact. The other defense witness, Professor Richard Crawford, was also recognized by the court as a qualified expert in the field of accident reconstruction. Professor Crawford was prepared to offer expert testimony concerning the collision based on the testimony of witnesses to the accident, physical facts admitted into evidence, and numerous photographs of the accident scene and the vehicles after impact. All of the photographs had been previously identified by competent witnesses as accurate portrayals of those facts which Professor Crawford elected to rely upon to give an opinion on how the accident occurred. The trial court held that the opinion of Professor Crawford was inadmissible because his opinion would resolve the ultimate question of fact which was to be decided by the jury. The court also noted that the inference from the circumstances in this case was within the competency of the jurors and that Professor Crawford's testimony was founded on the examination of only one of the automobiles and was conducted over one year after the accident. This Court has said that evidence of the opinion of experts is admissible only when the subject matter of the controversy renders it necessary or proper to resort to opinion evidence. Blackburn v. Tombling, 148 Colo. 161, 365 P.2d 243 (1961); accord, McNelley v. Smith, supra . Here Professor Crawford was prepared to testify regarding the absence of metal smearing and the extreme penetration of the defendant's vehicle into the right side of the plaintiff's vehicle which occurred at the time of impact. The testimony sought to be introduced was not a reconstruction of the accident, but an expert's opinion based upon physical facts that the collision could not have occurred in accordance with the plaintiff's contention. This testimony was relevant to the defendant's case and was based on photographs that were properly admissible into evidence. The court refused the testimony and was obviously concerned about the fact that Professor Crawford failed to personally examine the scene of the accident and the two vehicles involved within a short time after the accident occurred. A similar concern was voiced in Miller v. Pillsbury Co., 33 Ill.2d 514, 211 N.E.2d 733 (1965). There, the court, in affirming the competency of the expert to testify, said: [I]t would have been ideal if the picture taking and the expert's examination could have been at the scene immediately following the accident. However, the question is whether the truck when photographed was in substantially the same condition as it was following the collision. The evidence that the removal from the scene of the accident did not inflict damage and that the photograph accurately portrayed the damage prior to such removal was sufficient to make the pictures admissible. Hence, the photographs were proper subjects to be used by the expert in his reconstruction testimony. Accord, Woyak v. Konieske, 237 Minn. 213, 54 N.W.2d 649, 33 A.L.R.2d 1241 (1952); Cf. Tiemeyer v. McIntosh, Iowa, 176 N.W.2d 819 (1970); see Bridges v. Lintz, 140 Colo. 582, 346 P.2d 571 (1959). See, generally, 3 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 790-798(a); McCormick, Evidence § 181; Belli, Modern Trials § 225; Lacy, Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction, p. 8.