Opinion ID: 172597
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other Claims and Total Exhaustion

Text: In addition to his unexhausted ineffective assistance claim, Mr. Fairchild has brought several other claims that are exhausted. He argues that (1) the jury instructions failed to adequately explain the possible sentence of life without possibility of parole; (2) application of Oklahoma court decisions regarding the applicable mens rea for child abuse murder violates the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) Oklahoma's mens rea requirement for child abuse murder violates the Eighth Amendment; and (4) the exclusion of lesser-included or lesser-related offense instructions violated federal rights. We must decline to address on the merits these arguments because of the total exhaustion doctrine. Congress has emphatically directed us that habeas petitioners seeking relief in federal court must first exhaust all available state court remediesthat is, unless doing so would be futile because of `an absence of available State corrective process' or because `circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.' Magar v. Parker, 490 F.3d 816, 818 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)). Under this requirement, federal district courts may not adjudicate mixed petitions for habeas corpus, that is, petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 273, 125 S.Ct. 1528 (summarizing Rose, 455 U.S. at 518-19, 102 S.Ct. 1198); see also Allen, 568 F.3d at 1201 n. 7 (discussing mixed petitions and Rhines ). When a district court is presented with a petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims and addresses all of the claims on the merits, the proper approach on appeal ordinarily is to vacate[ ] the order ... and remand[ ] the case to the district court so that it [can] do one of four things: (1) dismiss the mixed petition in its entirety, Rhines, 544 U.S. at 274, 125 S.Ct. 1528; (2) stay the petition and hold it in abeyance while the petitioner returns to state court to raise his unexhausted claims, id. at 275, 125 S.Ct. 1528; (3) permit the petitioner to dismiss the unexhausted claims and proceed with the exhausted claims, id. at 278, 125 S.Ct. 1528; or (4) ignore the exhaustion requirement altogether and deny the petition on the merits if none of the petitioner's claims has any merit, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). Harris v. Lafler, 553 F.3d 1028, 1031 (6th Cir.2009) (emphasis omitted); see, e.g., Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 625 (9th Cir.2005) (instructing the district court on remand to consider, consistent with Rhines, whether to stay the proceedings, hold in abeyance [the] exhausted petition, and dismiss without prejudice his unexhausted... claim so that he can present it to the ... state courts). Under the unique circumstances of this case, we have determined that in the first instance upon remand the district court should examine the second option noted above viz., it should give Mr. Fairchild the opportunity to establish that the use of the stay-and-abeyance procedure concerning his potentially meritorious ineffective assistance claim would be appropriate on these facts. The inefficiencies of this course of action are not lost on us. The district court addressed Mr. Fairchild's exhausted claims on the merits and the parties have fully briefed them on appeal. Moreover, if the district court determines that use of the stay-and-abeyance procedure is not warranted in this case, then the court may simply allow Mr. Fairchild to dismiss and abandon [his] unexhausted claim and then reenter the very judgment that is now before us. Rockwell v. Yukins, 217 F.3d 421, 425 (6th Cir.2000). Nevertheless, it is AEDPA that requires us to remand without addressing these claims on the merits. See id. (It is AEDPA, however, that mandates our decision, not the whims of this panel.). Moreover, the Court has made it abundantly clear that before you bring any claims to federal court, be sure that you first have taken each one to state court. Rose, 455 U.S. at 520, 102 S.Ct. 1198. While the decision to remand without addressing the exhausted claims on the merits is admittedly inefficient in the present case, we believe that this approach will promote overall judicial efficiency and other important values. Rockwell, 217 F.3d at 425; see Rose, 455 U.S. at 518-19, 102 S.Ct. 1198 (requiring the dismissal of mixed petitions in order to preserve comity and reduce the temptation of district courts to consider unexhausted claims).