Opinion ID: 1801680
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claims of Errors During Jury Selection

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erroneously denied six of his challenges for cause during jury selection. None of these prospective jurors actually served on the jury, and the defense excused two of them by peremptory challenges. Defendant's failure to exhaust his peremptory challenges or to express dissatisfaction with the jury as selected forfeits this claim on appeal. ( People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 487 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754].) Moreover, the claim fails on the merits for lack of prejudice: Because none of the prospective jurors in question served on the jury, there is no basis for us to conclude that the jury empanelled was anything but impartial. ( People v. Alfaro (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1277, 1314 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 433, 163 P.3d 118]; see also People v. Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 487-488.) Defendant faults the trial court for overruling his objection to the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges to exclude seven people of color (five Hispanic-surnamed jurors, one unidentified Chinese-American juror, and one unidentified African-American juror) and ruling that defendant had failed to make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor had challenged the Hispanic-surnamed jurors because of group bias. (5) Both the state and federal Constitutions prohibit the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors based on group bias, such as race or ethnicity. (See Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 97 [90 L.Ed.2d 69, 106 S.Ct. 1712]; People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 276-277 [148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748] ( Wheeler ).) When the defense raises such a challenge, these procedures apply: First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case `by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.' [Citation.] Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the `burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion' by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes. [Citations.] Third, `[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide ... whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.' [Citation.] ( Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168 [162 L.Ed.2d 129, 125 S.Ct. 2410], fn. omitted; see also People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 469.) To make a prima facie showing of group bias, the defendant must show that under the totality of the circumstances it is reasonable to infer discriminatory intent. ( People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 779 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 531, 171 P.3d 548]; see also People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 341 [60 Cal.Rptr.3d 209, 160 P.3d 84].) When, as in this case, it is unclear whether the trial court used the recently disapproved strong likelihood standard, rather than the correct reasonable inference standard, we review the record independently to determine whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a juror on a prohibited discriminatory basis. ( People v. Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 779.) (6) Though proof of a prima facie case may be made from any information in the record available to the trial court, we have mentioned `certain types of evidence that will be relevant for this purpose. Thus the party may show that his opponent has struck most or all of the members of the identified group from the venire, or has used a disproportionate number of his peremptories against the group. He may also demonstrate that the jurors in question share only this one characteristictheir membership in the groupand that in all other respects they are as heterogeneous as the community as a whole. Next, the showing may be supplemented when appropriate by such circumstances as the failure of his opponent to engage these same jurors in more than desultory voir dire, or indeed to ask them any questions at all. Lastly, ... the defendant need not be a member of the excluded group in order to complain of a violation of the representative cross-section rule; yet if he is, and especially if in addition his alleged victim is a member of the group to which the majority of the remaining jurors belong, these facts may also be called to the court's attention.' ( People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 597 [54 Cal.Rptr.3d 453, 151 P.3d 292], quoting Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 280-281.) The trial court concluded that people of color was not a cognizable group for Wheeler analysis, and instead focused on the Spanish-surnamed jurors as a cognizable group. Based on the court's recollection of the jury selection, it ruled that defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case that the prosecution's exercise of peremptory challenges was motivated by group bias. At the outset, we reject defendant's contention that the trial court erred by ruling that people of color is not a cognizable group for Wheeler analysis. No California case has ever recognized people of color as a cognizable group. Even if such a group is cognizable, defendant has forfeited this claim, as he fails to identify on appeal the people of color whose excusals he challenged in the trial court, and we cannot discern their identity from the record. ( People v. Morris (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 402, 408-409 [131 Cal.Rptr.2d 872].) Accordingly, we will only review defendant's claim of Wheeler/Batson error based upon the prosecution's peremptory challenges of the five Hispanic-surnamed jurors. Based on our independent review, we agree with the trial court that defendant did not make a prima facie case that the prosecutor challenged the five prospective jurors in question because they were Hispanic. Initially, we note that the defense did not contest the prosecutor's assertion that three of the five challenged jurors appeared to be Caucasian with a possible Hispanic surname. Although we have held that Hispanic-surnamed jurors are a cognizable class for Wheeler/Batson purposes, even when no one knows at the time of challenge whether a particular individual who has a Spanish surname is Hispanic ... ( People v. Trevino (1985) 39 Cal.3d 667, 686 [217 Cal.Rptr. 652, 704 P.2d 719], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1219-1222 [255 Cal.Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047]; see also People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1123 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572]), the prosecutor's unrefuted description of three of the prospective jurors in question as Caucasian weakens any inference of group bias that can be drawn from his exercise of peremptory challenges against them. (See generally People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 655-657 [80 Cal.Rptr.3d 126, 187 P.3d 970] [prosecutor's challenge to White but Spanish-surnamed juror was not based on group bias].) More significantly, there were obvious race-neutral grounds for the prosecutor's challenges to the prospective jurors in question. Prospective Jurors E.M. and F.C. voiced strong opposition towards the death penalty. (See People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 317 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374] [the use of peremptory challenges to excuse prospective jurors who expressed scruples about imposing the death penalty is proper].) Prospective Juror L.F. also expressed scruples about imposing the death penalty by testifying that she would favor the possibility of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole over the death penalty in a murder special circumstance case, and by writing in her juror questionnaire that she considered imprisonment for life a more severe penalty than death. Finally, Prospective Jurors D.P. and D.G. had criminal records. (See People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 703 [27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289] [use of a peremptory challenge to excuse a prospective juror with negative experiences of the criminal justice system is proper].) Therefore, the trial court properly ruled that defendant had not met his burden of raising an inference of discrimination, and it did not err in denying defendant's Wheeler/Batson motion.