Opinion ID: 2425009
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exceptions to the Privity Requirement

Text: This conclusion, however, does not end our analysis because the lawyer-immunity statute contains two exceptions to the privity requirement. First, no privity is required for [a]cts, omissions, decisions, or conduct that constitutes fraud or intentional misrepresentations. Ark.Code Ann. § 16-22-310(a)(1). This section is clearly inapplicable because the children did not assert fraud or intentional misrepresentations in their original or amended complaints. The second exception to the privity requirement provides that: (2) Other acts, omissions, decisions, or conduct if the person, partnership, or corporation was aware that a primary intent of the client was for the professional services to benefit or influence the particular person bringing the action. For the purposes of this subdivision, if the person, partnership, or corporation: (A) Identifies in writing to the client those persons who are intended to rely on the services, and (B) Sends a copy of the writing or similar statement to those persons identified in the writing or statement, then the person, partnership, or corporation or any of its employees, partners, members, officers, or shareholders may be held liable only to the persons intended to so rely, in addition to those persons in privity of contract with the person, partnership, or corporation. Ark.Code Ann. § 16-22-310(a)(2) (emphasis added). Even if we were to assume that Mr. Pettus was aware that a primary intent of drafting the codicils was to benefit or influence the children, and that the codicil was a writing to the client identifying those persons who are intended to rely on the services, there is no evidence in the record that Mr. Pettus ever sent the codicil to the children as required by section 16-22-310(a)(2)(B). The children attempt to avoid this problem by arguing that it is inequitable and against public policy to allow an attorney to avoid liability by not sending notice of his duty to the intended beneficiaries. It, however, is well settled that the determination of public policy lies almost exclusively with the legislature, and the courts will not interfere with that determination in the absence of palpable error. Adams v. Arthur, 333 Ark. 53, 969 S.W.2d 598 (1998); Owen v. Wilson, 260 Ark. 21, 537 S.W.2d 543 (1976). The legislature has clearly spoken in section 16-22-310(a)(2) as to when and under what circumstances an intended beneficiary may bring a legal-malpractice claim. The children have simply failed to meet those statutory requirements. Because the children have failed to satisfy the privity requirement or the exceptions contained in the lawyer-immunity statute, Ark.Code Ann. § 16-22-310, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the children's malpractice claims against Mr. Pettus.