Opinion ID: 213686
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appellate Jurisdiction and Standards of Review

Text: We have appellate jurisdiction over Jones' Sixth Amendment claim pursuant to our grant of a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (prohibiting appeals from final orders in habeas proceedings absent a certificate of appealability); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) ([U]ntil a [certificate of appealability] has been issued federal courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to rule on the merits of appeals from habeas petitioners.). Our appellate jurisdiction extends only to the Sixth Amendment claim described in that certificate. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3); Rittenhouse v. Battles, 263 F.3d 689, 693 (7th Cir.2001) (noting that a habeas petitioner may appeal only those issues for which a certificate of appealability has been granted). We pause briefly to note the district court's error in denying a certificate of appealability in this case. The statute provides that a certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The Supreme Court has interpreted this language to require a showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000), following Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983). When a state appellate court is divided on the merits of the constitutional question, issuance of a certificate of appealability should ordinarily be routine. A district court could deny a certificate of appealability on the issue that divided the state court only in the unlikely event that the views of the dissenting judge(s) are erroneous beyond any reasonable debate. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595. That prospect is likely rare enough to call for some explanation in the order denying the certificate of appealability, an explanation that was lacking here. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Jones must first show that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see Wilson v. Corcoran, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 13, 16, 178 L.Ed.2d 276 (2010) (per curiam) ([I]t is only noncompliance with federal law that renders a State's criminal judgment susceptible to collateral attack in the federal courts.). Second, Jones must also show that his detention was the result of a state court decision (1) contrary to, or involv[ing] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). We review the district court's legal conclusions de novo. Milone v. Camp, 22 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir.1994). The district court made no independent findings of fact (which would have been reviewed for clear error, Reeves v. Battles, 272 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir.2001)), so our review is limited to the state courts' findings of fact, which are presumed to be correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).