Opinion ID: 76199
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of evidence demonstrating conviction

Text: 15 In the administrative proceedings under review, the INS relied exclusively on a single piece of evidence in support of its charge that Adefemi was deportable on the basis of a firearms conviction. This was a two-sided, preprinted document that would be colloquially termed a traffic ticket. On the front appears a uniform citation form used to charge drivers with moving violations. On the reverse is boilerplate language for use in recording several types of action taken in the City Court of Atlanta, such as the receipt of a plea or the imposition of sentence. 16 The IJ determined that Respondent waived a trial by jury, pled guilty, and was convicted and directed to pay a fine of $330, [or in] default of such payment be confined for a term of 12 months. Oral Decision of the Immigration Judge, Nov. 10, 1999, at 3. The Board affirmed, but unlike the IJ, was silent as to whether Adefemi had pled guilty. In the proceedings before these tribunals, the only evidence presented by the INS was the two-sided document. Although Adefemi raises several challenges to the Board's decision, his central contention is that this ticket, the sole piece of evidence against him, was insufficient to demonstrate his deportability on the basis of a firearms conviction. See Petitioner's Supplemental Brief at 20-26. 3 17 Whether a conviction has been sustained is a question of fact on which we defer to the Board if its determination is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) (repealed 1996) (applicable to this case under IIRIRA § 309(c)(4)(1)(A)). Under this substantial evidence standard, we will not reverse the Board's determination unless a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude that no conviction has been proved. See Lorisme v. INS, 129 F.3d 1441, 1445 (11th Cir.1997) (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992)). 18 Although our own review is deferential, the INS must prove an alien's deportability by clear and convincing evidence. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286, 87 S.Ct. 483, 17 L.Ed.2d 362 (1966) (requiring clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds for deportation are true). Under this intermediate standard of proof, Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), the government bears a heavy burden. Berenyi v. District Director, INS, 385 U.S. 630, 636, 87 S.Ct. 666, 17 L.Ed.2d 656 (1967). As a court of review, we are well acquainted with the task of integrating our own deferential review of factual determinations with the heightened burden of proof borne by certain parties to litigation. For example, when a defendant in a criminal case argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to convict him, we ask whether a reasonable trier of fact, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, could find that the defendant's guilt was established beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., United States v. Miles, 290 F.3d 1341, 1355 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1089, 123 S.Ct. 707, 154 L.Ed.2d 634 (2002). Although this standard safeguards the role of the trier of fact, it also assures that application of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard to the evidence is not irretrievably committed to jury discretion. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 n. 10, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). 19 Here, our approach is of a similar form but different content: we ask whether the BIA could reasonably conclude that the government has shown Adefemi deportable by clear and convincing evidence. Hence we must determine whether the INS's evidence could justify the elevated degree of confidence corresponding to its intermediate standard of proof. 4 The Board was clearly cognizant of the heightened standard to which the INS is held, concluding its opinion by quoting the Supreme Court's directive in Woodby, 385 U.S. at 286, 87 S.Ct. 483, that deportability be established by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence. The Board found this standard satisfied by the two-sided, preprinted form relied upon by the INS as the exclusive evidence of a firearms conviction. 20 In order to review this determination, we must examine a somewhat inscrutable combination of signatures, stamps, and handwritten marks recorded on this document. We begin with the front side, on which appears a uniform citation form. On a blank space next to the word Offense, a handwritten entry states that Adefemi, in violation of Section 16-11-126 of the Georgia Code, had a 22 cal RG10 in console between seats. Although Ga. Code Ann. 16-11-126 proscribes the carrying of a range of concealed weapons other than firearms, Adefemi does not contend that a 22 cal RG10 is anything other than a firearm. Hence the citation form, which was signed by an arresting officer, alleges unlawful possession and/or concealment of a firearm. 21 It is the material contained on the document's reverse side, however, upon which the BIA focused in finding that the INS had shown Adefemi's conviction of a firearms offense by clear and convincing evidence. Although the BIA refers to the reverse side as a criminal court certificate of disposition, that phrase does not appear anywhere on the copy entered in the record. Near the top of the form appear two identical signatures. Both the first and the last names of the signature appear to begin with the letter A, and the remainder of each signature is consistent with the name Albert Adefemi. Since the front side of the document clearly charges Adefemi with an offense, and since Adefemi has never argued that the signatures are not his, we will treat them as such. One of the signatures appears to affirm that On Arraignment, The Defendant Pleads NOT GUILTY, whereas the other is entered in a section titled Plea of Guilty and Waiver. The form provides no means of discerning which of these signatures reflects Adefemi's actual plea in this case: there is no indication that he amended an initial plea of not guilty to one of guilty, nor has anything been written in a space provided for stating the charge to which Adefemi, if he did enter a guilty plea, in fact admitted. Consistent with this ambiguity, none of three boxes printed next to each of three possible pleas — guilty, not guilty, and nolo cont'd — have been checked in a separate section of the form. 22 Below the sections bearing Adefemi's signatures is another section titled Disposition and Sentence, in which the word Probation has been rubber-stamped. Still lower, in a separate section, the number 330.00 has been written on a space for designating a fine. The next line appears 5 to state that a term of confinement shall be served should payment be defaulted. However, the portion of the form titled Disposition and Sentence has been left entirely blank apart from the Probation stamp and a second stamp that reads State Case. Significantly, nothing has been written in spaces specifically reserved for identifying the Sentence: Amount Fine/Forfeiture $ and the number of Days (Months) probated. The failure of the Atlanta City Court to complete these sections makes it difficult to interpret the meaning of the Probation stamp, since the imposition of a probationary sentence would seem to require that a term of probation be set. By the same token, no ready explanation appears for the fact that a fine has been indicated, not on the appropriate line in the Disposition and Sentence section, but only in a separate section under an indiscernible heading beginning with the words Upon Trial, the Defendant. Unlike the Disposition and Sentence portion of the form, no reference is made in this other section to any adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence. Instead, the boilerplate printed on the form reads simply, It is considered, ordered and adjudged that the defendant pay a fine of ___ dollars and (in defa[indiscernible] of such payment) be confined for a term of ___ (days 6 /months) in the ___.... The confinement specified shal[indiscernible] be suspended on payment of the fine and on condition defendant does not again violate the laws of Georgia. 7 23 In the absence of additional evidence by which the INS might have clarified the meaning of the form, we do not think it may be said that this document, marked in this manner, provides clear and convincing evidence of a firearms conviction. The very ambiguity of the document does make it impossible to say, with absolute certainty, that Adefemi was not convicted of a firearms offense. But we think this same ambiguity makes it unreasonable to conclude that the document is clear and convincing evidence of such a conviction. Our conclusion rests on the highly tenuous nature of any inferences drawn from what is in essence nothing more than the front and back of a traffic ticket. 8 While the document does indicate a fine of $330, it fails to specify the basis for this penalty. Nowhere does it explicitly indicate either the fact of conviction or the offense for which any conviction was entered. It likewise fails to indicate whether Adefemi pled guilty or, if he did, the charge to which he admitted. 24 Even were we to assume that the clerical stamp reading Probation and the reference to a fine are clear and convincing evidence of some kind of conviction, we do not think it can be said that they are clear and convincing evidence of conviction of a firearms offense. The fact that the front side of the document charges such an offense does not mean Adefemi pled to or was convicted of one. Rather, the summary nature of the court record may well suggest that Adefemi pled guilty to a different, lesser offense that needn't be carefully memorialized because it gave rise to no enduring, collateral consequences. The reverse side simply fails to offer any clear guidance as to what this offense may have been. 25 One possibility is that Adefemi admitted to a lesser violation, i.e., an offense graded as less serious than a misdemeanor. Indeed, the court that processed Adefemi's case routinely affords such treatment in carrying out its primary function: the adjudication of traffic offenses. The Atlanta City Court's jurisdiction is limited to traffic violations and misdemeanors arising out of the same occurrence as a cited traffic offense. Act of Apr. 4, 1996, No. 791, § 3, 1996 Ga. Laws 627, 628; see also Wickham v. State, 273 Ga. 563, 544 S.E.2d 439, 441-42 & nn. 4-5 (2001) (reproducing provisions of Georgia Constitution similarly limiting jurisdiction of Atlanta City Court prior to 1996). In order to exercise this jurisdiction, the court has established a Traffic Violations Bureau (the traffic bureau). See Geng v. State, 578 S.E.2d 115, 116 (2003). Once submitted to the jurisdiction of the traffic bureau, an offense shall be characterized and classified as a traffic violation and shall not be considered as a misdemeanor, nor entered on the city court's separate misdemeanor docket. Ga.Code Ann. §§ 40-13-60, 40-13-61. Because the firearms offense with which Adefemi was charged is graded as at least a misdemeanor, see Ga.Code Ann. § 16-11-126, the traffic bureau has no jurisdiction over prosecutions for this offense. 26 Notably, the document submitted by the INS is consistent with a traffic bureau adjudication by which Adefemi avoided a weapons conviction through a summary disposition fining him $330. Several aspects of the document's reverse side support this interpretation. First, a line has been drawn through a space for identifying the charge to which a defendant pleads guilty. The failure to complete this section may indicate that the precise offense underlying Adefemi's fine did not require memorialization because it was a non-misdemeanor traffic violation to which no collateral consequences, apart from those relating to driving privileges, could attach. The form's silence as to other plea-related information — for example, nothing has been written in a space designated for confirming the voluntariness of any plea — is likewise suggestive of the relaxed constitutional standards applicable in the enforcement of rules of the road. Cf. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 115, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977) (finding no due process violation in Illinois regulatory scheme allowing driver's license to be revoked without prior administrative hearing); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 38 & n. 10, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972) (pointing out that adjudications of traffic offenses, even inasmuch as they technically fall within the category of `criminal prosecutions,' are often conducted in manner that prevents Sixth Amendment right to counsel from attaching). 27 Second, the certification at the bottom of the reverse side of the citation states that the information on this ticket is a true abstract of the record of this court or bureau in this case (emphasis added). This boilerplate recitation makes clear that the documentation is of a form routinely relied upon by the traffic bureau in its adjudication of non-misdemeanor violations. 28 Third, the location of Adefemi's signatures on the form are consistent with adjudication by the traffic bureau. As discussed above, the two signatures are seemingly to opposite effect because one is written above the words On Arraignment, the Defendant Pleads Not Guilty and the other appears in a section entitled Appearance, Plea of Guilty and Waiver. The first signature, however, not only accompanies a Not Guilty stamp but also fills a line following the words Waives Trial by Jury. At the time of Adefemi's adjudication, such a waiver was consistent with Georgia law providing that traffic offenses  shall be tried before a judge of the court which established the traffic violations bureau. Ga.Code Ann. § 40-13-60 (emphasis added); Geng, 578 S.E.2d at 116 (reading statute to restrict[] an offender whose case is disposed of in the traffic violations bureau to trial by a judge). 9 29 For all of these reasons, the form document supports the inference that Adefemi's case was adjudicated as a traffic violation, with the Probation stamp meaning simply that Adefemi remained subject to a possible sentence of confinement until such time as he paid the $330 fine imposed. The possibility that probation carried this meaning draws force from the document's silence as to the period of time for which probation was to continue. Regardless of whether the word was used in this sense, it is indisputable that the document fails to specify with any clarity what offense was the basis for any probationary sentence imposed. It is therefore unreasonable to regard it as clear and convincing evidence of a conviction on any specific charge, much less the firearms offense alleged by the INS as a basis for Adefemi's deportation. Our conclusion is in accord with those of our sister circuits that have considered claims based on the INS's failure to satisfy its burden of producing clear and convincing evidence of deportability. See Dashto v. INS, 59 F.3d 697, 701 (7th Cir.1995) (holding that clerk of court's certified statement of conviction indicating that Dashto had used a handgun to commit armed robbery was not satisfactory proof of unlawful use of firearm); Murphy v. INS, 54 F.3d 605, 610-12 (9th Cir.1995) (vacating BIA determination based on INS form document and immigration agent's hearsay statement). 30 If Adefemi was in fact convicted of a firearms offense, there exist a wide range of alternative means by which the INS might have established as much. The applicable provision of federal immigration law states that a conviction may be proved by official records of judgments, by docket entries from court records, by minutes of court proceedings, and by records of penal institutions. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3). Alternatively, the document at issue could have been explained by submitting affidavits or testimony from court officials describing the court's record-keeping practices and explaining the meaning of the form at issue here. 31 In sum, while the documentation retrieved from the Atlanta City Court does show that a police officer cited Adefemi for a firearms offense, it offers only a cryptic record of how this charge was ultimately disposed. We think the clear and convincing evidentiary standard applicable in deportation proceedings requires something more before an individual may be compelled by our Government to forsake all the bonds formed here and go to a foreign land where he often has no contemporary identification. Woodby, 385 U.S. at 285, 87 S.Ct. 483. Accordingly, we conclude that the INS has not carried the burden of proof it bore in establishing deportability on the basis of a firearms conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(C).