Opinion ID: 155628
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Medical and Psychiatric Evidence

Text: We reach the same conclusion as to the medical and psychiatric evidence that Mr. Demarest produced at the federal evidentiary hearing to demonstrate how his mental state during the period shortly after Mr. Hyams’s murder could have been explained to the jury. At the federal hearing, Mr. Demarest presented three witnesses on this subject who did not testify in the state court proceedings: (1) Dr. Kathy Vedeal, a toxicologist, who testified about the effects of medication taken by Mr. Demarest after the murder and stated that the medication could have blurred his thinking; (2) Dr. William Rehg, a psychiatrist, who testified about Mr. Demarest’s mental state when Mr. Demarest was questioned by law enforcement officers and explained that Mr. Demarest’s highly emotional state could have been caused by feelings of shock and grief over the death of a friend; and (3) Lee Foreman, Mr. Demarest’s legal expert, who testified that Mr. Demarest’s trial counsel should have introduced medical and psychological evidence such 34 as that given by Drs. Vedeal and Rehg to explain why Mr. Demarest had difficultly giving consistent and coherent answers when he was interrogated. According to Mr. Foreman, a competent defense attorney could have used this evidence to rebut the prosecution’s contention that Mr. Demarest’s confused answers and emotional reactions reflected consciousness of guilt and to establish that Mr. Demarest had acted as would someone who had recently learned that a friend had been murdered. See Rec. vol. III at 269-272 (Tr. of Evidentiary Hr’g of October 18, 1994). Like the new testimony of Ms. Bausch and Mr. Davidson and the new bloodspatter evidence, Mr. Demarest did not present this contention and supporting evidence to the state courts in the post-conviction proceedings. In the state proceedings, Mr. Demarest alleged that his trial counsel had failed to discover medical records that could have been used to challenge the voluntariness of his statements to the police, thereby providing the basis for a motion to suppress. However, Mr. Demarest never alleged in the state court proceedings that medical and psychiatric evidence could be used to explain his emotional state to the jury in a manner that supported his innocence. Thus, the testimony given by Drs. Vedeal and Rehg and by Mr. Foreman at the evidentiary hearing significantly strengthened Mr. Demarest’s contention that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present medical and psychiatric evidence to explain his emotional reactions to the jury. Thus, this aspect of Mr. Demarest’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was also not fairly presented to the state courts. 35 In summary, like the new evidence offered in the federal proceedings in Jones, Wise, Dispensa, and similar cases, the new evidence submitted to the district court by Mr. Demarest transformed his ineffective assistance of counsel claim into one that was “significantly different and more substantial.” See Jones, 681 F.2d at 693. In the state court proceedings, Mr. Demarest made general allegations concerning his trial counsel’s failure to investigate the case and interview witnesses. However, in the federal proceedings, those general allegations were supported by testimony of several witnesses concerning the prejudicial effect of his trial counsel’s deficient performance. Therefore, upon considering the new testimony of Ms. Bausch, Mr. Davidson and Mr. Foreman, and Drs. Kennedy, Vedeal, and Rehg, we conclude that Mr. Demarest has failed to exhaust his state court remedies regarding his ineffective assistance of counsel claim C. Procedural Bar Generally, when a habeas petitioner has failed to exhaust his state court remedies, a federal court should dismiss the petition without prejudice so that those remedies may be pursued. See Jones, 681 F.2d at 694 (affirming dismissal of habeas claim without prejudice for failure to exhaust); see also Dispensa, 826 F.2d at 381 (reversing the district court’s grant of a writ and remanding the case with instructions to dismiss without prejudice). However, in considering unexhausted claims, federal courts should consider whether, upon dismissal of the claims, the petitioner would then be able to raise them in 36 the state courts. “[I]f the court to which Petitioner must present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find those claims procedurally barred, there is a procedural default for the purposes of federal habeas review.” Dulin v. Cook, 957 F.2d 758, 759 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991)). Here, Mr. Demarest filed his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the state courts pursuant to Rule 35 of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 35 authorizes the state court to vacate a conviction that was imposed in violation of the laws or constitutions of the United States or Colorado. See Col. R. Crim. P. 35(c)(2)(I). Rule 35(c)(3) provides in part that “[t]he court need not entertain a second motion or successive motions for similar relief based upon the same or similar allegations on behalf of the same prisoner.” Col. R. Crim. P. 35(c)(3). Accordingly, in order to determine whether Mr. Demarest would now be procedurally barred from bringing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in state court based on the new evidence presented at the federal hearing, we must consider how the Colorado courts have interpreted Rule 35(c)(3)’s prohibition of second and successive motions. The Colorado Supreme Court has held that “‘[w]here a post-conviction application is filed, it should contain all factual and legal contentions of which the applicant knew at that time of filing, and failure to do so will, unless special circumstances exist, ordinarily result in a second application containing such grounds being summarily denied.’” 37 Turman v. Buckallew, 784 P.2d 774, 780 (Colo. 1989) (en banc) (emphasis added) (quoting People v. Scheer, 518 P.2d 833, 835 (Colo. 1974)) (emphasis added); see also People v. Hubbard, 519 P.2d 945, 948 (Colo. 1974) (en banc) (“If a second or successive motion is filed, it may be summarily dismissed without a hearing unless the trial judge finds that the failure to include newly asserted grounds for relief in the first Crim. P. 35(b) motion is excusable.”). Several Colorado decisions describe the kind of “special circumstances” that warrant the consideration of successive Rule 35 motions. The lack of counsel in post-conviction proceedings is one such special circumstance. The Colorado Supreme Court has held that “in the absence of a knowing and intelligent waiver, the assistance of counsel is essential in post-conviction proceedings, unless the asserted claim for relief is wholly unfounded.” Hubbard, 519 P.2d at 948 (citing Haines v. People, 454 P.2d 595 (Colo. 1969) and Kostol v. People, 447 P.2d 536 (Colo. 1968)). Given the convicted defendant’s right to post-conviction counsel, the Colorado Supreme Court reasoned, it is possible for a full review of the defendant’s claims to be accomplished in a single post-conviction proceeding and “no justification exists for condoning successive and often repetitive motions for postconviction relief.” Id. In contrast, when a defendant represents himself pro se, he or she cannot reasonably be expected to raise all of his or her claims in a single proceeding. See id. (“The case law recognizes that as a practical matter without the assistance of counsel, a convicted defendant would be hard-pressed to assemble into a single Crim. P. 35(b) 38 motion all of the legal arguments which might result in post-conviction relief.”). As a result, Colorado courts have allowed defendants to file successive petitions after the denial of earlier petitions filed pro se. See, e.g., People v. Naranjo, 738 P.2d 407, 409 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (“[S]ince [the] defendant did not have legal representation during the course of his first Crim. P. 35(c) proceeding, he is not necessarily precluded from relying upon other grounds for relief in his present motion.”). As the state here acknowledges, see Aplt’s Opening Br. at 30 n.7, another special circumstance that may warrant the consideration of a successive Rule 35 motion is the ineffective assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings. The Colorado Court of Appeals has held that the right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings includes the right to effective assistance of counsel under the standards established by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. See People v. Hickey, 914 P.2d 377, 379 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995). As a result, the Court of Appeals concluded, the failure to provide effective assistance of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is tantamount to failing to provide counsel at all. See id. Hickey thus suggests that, like the complete absence of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding, ineffective assistance of counsel in such a proceeding may constitute a special circumstance that allows allow the court to consider a second or successive Colo. Crim. P. 35(c) motion. Id. But see People v. Goldman, 923 P.2d 374, 374-75 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (refusing to follow procedure adopted in Hickey--remanding Rule 35(c) proceeding to the trial court to consider claim 39 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in the Rule 35(c) proceeding--because this claim was not first raised in the trial court). In addition to the complete lack of counsel and ineffective assistance of counsel, the Colorado courts have suggested several other circumstances that may justify the consideration of successive post-conviction motions. For example, the announcement of a new legal principle after the first motion has been filed may warrant consideration of a successive motion. See People v. Allen, 843 P.2d 97, 101 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (“Because the defendant did not know of the changed double jeopardy legal standard when he filed his first Crim. P. 35(c) motion . . . his application for relief is not barred. . . .”), rev’d on other grounds, 868 P.2d 379 (Colo. 1994). The discovery of new evidence may also constitute a special circumstance justifying consideration of a successive motion. See Hubbard, 519 P.2d at 948. In the instant case, Mr. Demarest has offered no explanation as to why his counsel in the Rule 35(c) proceeding in state court did not present the significant new evidence that was subsequently produced at the federal hearing. Accordingly, we are unable to determine from the record before us whether Mr. Demarest’s failure to present this evidence in the state court proceedings was caused by the kind of “special circumstances,” see Turman, 784 P.2d at 780; Scheer, 518 P.2d at 835, that would allow the filing of a second or successive post-conviction motion under Col. R. Crim. P. 35. (e.g., ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, the discovery of new evidence, or 40 a change in the law). We note that the state has requested that we remand the case to the district court for a determination of whether Mr. Demarest’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the new evidence would be procedurally barred under Colorado law. In light of the insufficient record before us, we agree that remand is warranted to address that issue.6 In the event that the district court finds that Mr. Demarest’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim (based on the new evidence discussed above) would not be procedurally barred under Colorado law, it should dismiss the claim without prejudice so that it may now be adjudicated in the Colorado courts. Alternatively, in the event that the district court finds that Mr. Demarest’s claim would be procedurally barred under Colorado law, 6 In his appellate brief, Mr. Demarest also argues that Colorado’s procedural rules should not bar federal habeas relief here because they have not been applied regularly and consistently by the state courts. See Aple’s Br. at 36-37. In order to preclude federal habeas review, a state’s procedural bar rules must be both “independent” and “adequate.” See Steele v. Young, 11 F.3d 1518, 1521-22 (10th Cir. 1993). A procedural bar rule is “independent” if it is based exclusively on state law. See id. at 1521. Although it is often difficult to determine whether a procedural bar rule is “adequate,” we have concluded that “state procedural bar rules [are] inadequate to preclude federal review where the state court has not applied the bar ‘strictly or regularly’ to the type of claim at issue.” Id. at 1522 (citing Gutierrez v. Moriarty, 922 F.2d 1464, 1469-71 (10th Cir. 1991)). Here, because the record does not indicate why Mr. Demarest did not present the testimony of Eileen Bausch, Mr. Davidson, and Drs. Vedeal, Kennedy, and Rehg in the initial state post-conviction proceedings, it is not clear whether Colorado’s procedural bar rules will apply to this case and, if they do apply, what particular rule will be triggered. Accordingly, we leave for the district court on remand the determination, if relevant, of whether the particular Colorado procedural bar rules at issue, if any, are sufficiently “adequate” and “independent” to preclude a successive ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the new evidence. 41 the district court should proceed to determine the federal question of whether there was cause for the default and actual prejudice resulting from a violation of federal law or whether a failure to consider Mr. Demarest’s claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Breechen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1353 (10th Cir. 1994). D. Cause and Prejudice; Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice A federal court may proceed to the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim if the petitioner establishes either cause for the default and actual prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice if the merits of the claim are not reached. Klein v. Neal, 45 F.3d 1395, 1400 (10th Cir. 1995); Brecheen, 41 F.3d at 1353. The determination of cause and prejudice and of fundamental miscarriage of justice are both matters of federal law. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 478, 489 (1984); Klein, 45 F.3d at 1400. Cause for a procedural default generally involves “some objective factor external to the defense [that] impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. Cause may be established by showing that “the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel” or that there was “‘some interference by officials that made compliance impracticable.” Id. (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 486 (1953)). However, ineffective assistance of counsel in the postconviction proceedings does not constitute cause under federal law. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 757 (1991) (“Because [petitioner] had no [federal constitutional] right to counsel 42 to pursue his appeal in state habeas, any attorney error that lead to the default of [his] claims in state court cannot constitute cause to excuse the default in federal habeas.”).7 If cause is established, the petitioner must then show that he suffered actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law. See Klein, 45 F.3d at 1400; Brecheen, 41 F.3d at 1353. Alternatively, a federal court may proceed to the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner establishes that a failure to consider the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Klein, 45 F.3d at 1400; Breechen, 41 F.3d at 1353. To come within this “very narrow exception,” Klein, 45 F.3d at 1400, the petitioner must supplement his habeas claim with a colorable showing of factual innocence. See id. Such a showing does not in itself entitle the petitioner to relief but instead serves as a “‘gateway’” that then entitles the petitioner to consideration of the merits of his claims. Brecheen, 41 F.3d at 1357 (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993)). In this context, factual innocence means that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995); see also Murray, 477 U.S. at 496 (“[W]e think 7 As noted above, under Colorado law (which the district court should apply to determine whether Mr. Demarest’s claim would now be procedurally barred), ineffective assistance of counsel in one collateral proceeding may authorize the filing of a second or successive proceeding. See Hickey, 914 P.2d at 379. In this respect, the Colorado law that the district court must initially apply in determining whether there is a procedural bar differs from the federal law that must be applied if the district court finds a procedural bar and is then required to proceed to a determination of cause and prejudice. 43 that in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default.”). Factual innocence requires a stronger showing than that necessary to establish prejudice. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 867. “[T]he habeas court must make its determination concerning the petitioner’s innocence ‘in light of all the evidence, including that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after the trial.’” Id. (quoting Judge Henry Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 160 (1970)). Accordingly, on remand, in the event that the district court finds that Mr. Demarest’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the new evidence discussed above would be procedurally barred under Colorado law, it should then determine whether Mr. Demarest has established cause for the default and prejudice resulting from a violation of federal law or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if his claim is not considered on the merits. In that event, if Mr. Demarest establishes either cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice, then the district court should grant his habeas petition.8 8 We note that although the state has challenged the district court’s conclusion that Mr. Demarest has exhausted his state court remedies, it has not challenged the district court’s conclusion on the merits that (in light of the new evidence) 44