Opinion ID: 3031993
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sentencing Post-Booker

Text: Even if the majority could cite any legal precedent supporting its approach, the abbreviated sentencing determination it requires of the district court is not a substitute for the sentencing proceeding required after Booker. In the post-Booker world, district courts must consider the factors provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in fashioning the appropriate sentence for the individual defendant. As stated by Justice Breyer in his remedial opinion for the Court: Without the “mandatory” provision, the [Sentencing Reform Act] nonetheless requires judges to take account of the Guidelines together with other sentencing goals. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (Supp. 2004). The Act nonetheless requires judges to con- sider the Guidelines “sentencing range established . . . for the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant,” § 3553(a)(4), the pertinent Sentencing Commission policy statements, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims, §§ 3553(a)(1), (3), (5)-(7) (main ed. and Supp. 2004). And the Act nonetheless requires judges to impose sentences that reflect the UNITED STATES v. AMELINE 6385 seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect the public, and effectively provide the defendant with the needed educational or vocational training and medical care. § 3553(a)(2) (main ed. and Supp. 2004). Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 764-65. District courts now also have the discretion to weigh a multitude of mitigating and aggravating factors that existed at the time of mandatory Guidelines sentencing, but were deemed “not ordinarily relevant,” such as age, education and vocational skills, mental and emotional conditions, employment record, and family ties and responsibilities. See U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1-6; see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 95 (1996) (“Discouraged factors . . . are those not ordinarily relevant to the determination of whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range. Examples include the defendant’s family ties and responsibilities, his or her educational and vocational skills, and his or her military, civic, charitable, or public service record.” (quotations and citations omitted)). Indeed, district courts may even consider factors that were precluded from consideration altogether prior to Booker, such as drug and alcohol dependence, lack of guidance as a youth, and personal financial difficulties and economic pressures. See U.S.S.G. §§ 5H1.4, 5H1.12, and 5K2.12; see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 95 (“The Commission lists certain factors that never can be bases for departure, [such as] lack of guidance as a youth; drug or alcohol dependence; and economic hardship . . . .” (citations omitted)). The majority leaves open the possibility that these factors —now essential to sentencing consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and its directive that the sentence be “sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of sentencing”—might come to light in a sentencing hearing, but it does not require that a district court hold a hearing before 6386 UNITED STATES v. AMELINE deciding against resentencing the defendant. Indeed, “[i]n all too many instances, the process scripted by the [majority] will serve as an invitation for [a] district court to give only a superficial look at [an] earlier unconstitutionally[ ] imposed sentence.” United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 486 (7th Cir. 2005) (Ripple, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Because under the majority’s approach the appellate court will not perform plain error review, such a “quick look” sentencing decision would be subject only to the lesser “reasonableness” standard of review. Defendants should be accorded the benefit of the complete discretion district courts now enjoy. They should have the opportunity to be heard on § 3553 and its newly relevant factors. Briefs of counsel are not a substitute for testimony, evidence, and argument. The majority fails to explain how, without an evidentiary hearing and briefing tantamount to resentencing by normal vacatur and remand procedures, a district judge could ever accurately answer the question as to whether he would have imposed a materially different sentence had he known that the Guidelines were advisory. For example, Ameline’s trial counsel made the strategic decision to focus on drug quantity and gun possession at Ameline’s sentencing hearing because only those factors could have significantly decreased Ameline’s offense level under the mandatory Guidelines. By contesting drug quantity and gun possession, Ameline potentially could have reduced his sentence by over 10 years because the drug quantity and gun possession determinations fixed the range within which Ameline was sentenced. By contrast, evidence as to Ameline’s “background, character and conduct,” see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4, could have only affected the point within the Guidelines range at which Ameline would be sentenced. After Booker, however, a defendant’s “background, character and conduct” are the very factors that might convince a judge to exercise his discretion to disregard the advisory Guidelines range, but only if, upon plain error review, we notice the UNITED STATES v. AMELINE 6387 error, vacate the defendant’s sentence, and remand for resentencing. “In short, what the panel substitutes for the usual judicial reaction to an unconstitutionally[ ] imposed sentence is a process that simply is inadequate to the task.” Paladino, 401 F.3d at 486 (Ripple, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). UNITED STATES v. AMELINE 6389 Volume 2 of 2 6390 UNITED STATES v. AMELINE