Opinion ID: 2086525
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of bullet-proof vest.

Text: Jones argues that evidence of his bullet-proof vest was irrelevant to the charge of gun possession and, therefore, should not have been admitted. Relevant evidence is that which makes the existence or nonexistence of a [contested] fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Punch v. United States, 377 A.2d 1353, 1358 (D.C.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955, 98 S.Ct. 1586, 55 L.Ed.2d 806 (1978). The test for relevance is not a particularly stringent one. Street v. United States, 602 A.2d 141, 143 (D.C.1992). For evidence to be relevant, it must be related logically to the fact that it is offered to prove . . . . the fact sought to be established by the evidence must be material . . . . [and] the evidence must be adequately probative of the fact it tends to establish. Freeman v. United States, 689 A.2d 575, 580 (D.C.1997) (quoting Reavis v. United States, 395 A.2d 75, 78 (D.C. 1978)). A trial court's evidentiary ruling concerning the relevance of evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, id. (citing Street, supra, 602 A.2d at 143), and will be upset . . . only upon a showing of grave abuse. Blakeney v. United States, 653 A.2d 365, 368 (D.C.1995) (citation omitted). While the bullet-proof vest alone might have limited probative value, viewed within the factual context of this case, the fact that Jones was wearing a bullet-proof vest supports the inference that he possessed a Tec-9 configuration gun, a matter in dispute at trial. In addition to the bullet-proof vest, there was evidence that Jones was seen by two officers with a Tec-9 configuration gun in his possession, and then fled at the sight of a marked police cruiser. Jones was apprehended shortly thereafter, but without a gun. A semiautomatic Tec-9 looking pistol was subsequently found in Jones' path of flight. Thus, the fact that Jones was wearing a bullet-proof vest, when combined with testimony that the officers saw Jones with a gun, Jones' flight and the location of the gun, was probative on the issue of whether Jones possessed the gun. See Punch, supra, 377 A.2d at 1358 (evidence of masks and hats in vehicle where guns were found was probative on the issue of guilty knowledge of weapons); United States v. Moore, 322 U.S.App.D.C. 334, 338, 104 F.3d 377, 381 (1997) (fact that defendant was wearing a bullet-proof vest and driving a bullet-ridden vehicle strengthens the inference that defendant possessed guns found in vehicle that fit his shoulder holster); see also Blakeney, supra, 653 A.2d at 368 (pager found in defendant's pocket at time of arrest, though not illegal, is relevant to the issue of intent as pagers are associated with distribution of illegal drugs); Morton v. United States, 620 A.2d 1338, 1340 (D.C.1993) (citing beepers found in apartment as relevant evidence of drug distribution). We do not imply that in every case a person is charged with gun possession it will necessarily be relevant that the person was wearing a bullet-proof vest. Based on this record, however, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the fact Jones was wearing a bullet-proof vest at the time was evidence relevant to whether he also possessed a Tec-9 configuration machine gun. Our conclusion on the relevance of the bullet-proof vest is not the end of the inquiry because, even if relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. ( William ) Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1099 (D.C. 1996) (en banc) (citing FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 403), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1148, 117 S.Ct. 1323, 137 L.Ed.2d 484 (1997) (emphasis added). Jones claims that evidence of the bullet-proof vest should have been excluded because any probative value of the bullet-proof vest is far outweighed by its prejudicial nature. [W]e recognize that the evaluation and weighing of evidence for relevance and potential prejudice is quintessentially a discretionary function of the trial court, and we owe a great degree of deference to its decision. Id. at 1095 (citations omitted). In this case, the trial court recognized that evidence of the bullet-proof vest was somewhat prejudicial, but concluded that its probative value weighed in favor of admission. [3] Jones further claims that any probative value of the bullet-proof vest is far outweighed by its prejudicial nature. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Freeman, supra, 689 A.2d at 580; (William) Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1100 (D.C.1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1148, 117 S.Ct. 1323, 137 L.Ed.2d 484 (1997). As with relevance, the weighing of probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice `is a decision committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.' Blakeney, supra, 653 A.2d at 368 (quoting Hawkins v. United States, 482 A.2d 1230, 1232 (D.C.1984) (per curiam)). In this case, the trial court recognized that evidence of the bullet-proof vest was somewhat prejudicial, but concluded that its probative value weighed in favor of admission. With respect to probative value, as defense counsel had challenged the government's direct evidence, namely the police officers' testimony that they saw Jones with a gun from a distance and late at night, the bullet-proof vest provided significant corroborative evidence of Jones' guilt. Contrary to appellant's suggestion, the fact that he wore a bullet-proof vest at the time of arrest does not show that he was somehow predisposed to possess weapons. Rather, it simply augments the picture that Jones possessed a Tec-9 configuration gun at the time he was wearing the vest. Blakeney, supra, 653 A.2d at 369. As noted supra, the bullet-proof vest strengthened the inference that the weapon found in Jones' path of flight had been in his possession as he ran through the alley. Although Jones complains that the bullet-proof vest increased the likelihood that he was convicted not for the charged crime, but because of his image as an urban warrior, the court specifically instructed the jury that wearing a bullet-proof vest in the District of Columbia is not illegal. [4] See Thompson v. United States, 546 A.2d 414, 426 (D.C.1988) (clear limiting instructions will reduce, if not dissipate, the danger of unfairness and prejudice.); Punch, supra, 377 A.2d at 1358 & n. 8 (concluding that the trial court did not strike an improper balance between probative value and risk of prejudicial impact where the court instructed the jury on the limited purpose for which they were to consider the evidence). We cannot say, therefore, that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the bullet-proof vest's probative value outweighed any danger that it would sway improperly the jury's deliberations. [5] Street, supra, 602 A.2d at 143-44; cf. Smith v. United States, 665 A.2d 962, 966 (D.C.1995) (concluding that remark that appellant always wore a bullet-proof vest was not so prejudicial as to require a mistrial).