Opinion ID: 1057701
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 71

Heading: Victim Impact Jury Instruction was Coercive

Text: The Appellant next contends that [t]he jury instructions given by the trial judge with respect to the jury's consideration of victim impact evidence constituted a coercive instruction. In instructing the jury, the trial court provided the following instruction as to victim impact evidence: The prosecution has introduced what is known as victim impact evidence. This evidence has been introduced to show the financial, emotional, psychological or physical effects of the victim's death on the members of the victim's immediate family and close friends. You may consider this evidence in determining an appropriate punishment. However, your consideration must be limited to a rational inquiry into the culpability of the [Appellant], not an emotional response to the evidence. Victim impact evidence is not the same as an aggravating circumstance. Proof of an adverse impact on the victim's family or close friends is not proof of an aggravating circumstance. Introduction of victim impact evidence in no way relieves the State of its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to you at least one aggravating circumstance which has been alleged. You may consider this victim impact evidence in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty only if you first find the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence independent from the victim impact evidence and find that the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found outweigh the finding of one or more mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The Appellant, relying upon Johnson v. Hardin, 926 S.W.2d 236, 242 (Tenn.1996), asserts that the trial court's instruction amounts to an undue intrusion into the exclusive province of the jury. He adds that there is a reasonable probability that the instruction coerced a finding by the jury that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances because to find otherwise would require the jury to ignore the emotional victim impact evidence presented by the State. The Appellant's reliance upon Johnson is misplaced because in Johnson our supreme court addressed the issue of the trial court's deliverance of a dynamite charge to a deadlocked jury. The instruction in Johnson raised [to the deadlocked jury] the specter of the time, effort, and money that a new trial would entail. Johnson, 926 S.W.2d at 243. The charge suggested that the jurors had a duty to agree. In this regard, our supreme court held [n]othing should be done or said to a juror which can in any manner be taken by that juror to indicate that he or she should abandon an honestly held conviction in order to reach a verdict so that time and money will be saved. Id. (quoting Bass v. Barksdale, 671 S.W.2d 476, 486 (Tenn.Ct. App.1984)). Such a situation is not presently before the court, as the factual circumstances in Johnson are clearly distinguishable from those in the present case. In fact, the instruction provided to the jury in the present case was recommended by our supreme court in State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 892 (Tenn.1998), and was again approved in State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247, 283 (Tenn.2002). See also State v. Riels, 216 S.W.3d 737 (Tenn.2007); Reid, 164 S.W.3d at 336-37 (Appendix); Cole, 155 S.W.3d at 914 (approving Nesbit victim impact instruction). Moreover, in Reid, our supreme court specifically noted that any contradiction arising between the instruction and the statute inured to the benefit of the defendant and, thus, should not entitle a defendant to relief. Reid, 91 S.W.3d at 283. Accordingly, the Appellant is not entitled to relief on this issue.