Opinion ID: 1169826
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant's Representation

Text: More than two years elapsed between defendant's arraignment in superior court in this matter and the commencement of trial. The pretrial proceedings were prolonged in part because of defendant's ambivalence about and dissatisfaction with his various counsel. Even when he secured pro se status, he made repeated motions for advisory or second counsel, and these motions required repeated continuance of trial. The record discloses evidence of manipulation on defendant's part, as well as a certain antipathy to commencing trial. Some account of the pretrial proceedings is necessary. Defendant was represented by a public defender at the beginning of the proceedings. Commissioner Cowell, sitting as a judge pro tempore by stipulation (hereafter Judge Cowell), presided at defendant's arraignment and at various pretrial hearings. At his first appearance after arraignment, on July 15, 1986, defendant declared that I need another counsel. When the court explained the limited grounds for removal of appointed counsel, defendant raised the possibility of removing counsel by moving to relieve counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 124 [84 Cal. Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44] ( Marsden ) or by making a Faretta motion ( Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562]). The court examined defendant regarding his dissatisfaction with counsel and denied the Marsden motion. The court then engaged defendant in an extensive colloquy regarding the many risks and dangers of self-representation. After a discussion that spreads over 20 pages of transcript, defendant withdrew his motion to proceed pro se. The motion and defendant's withdrawal of the motion are reflected in the clerk's minutes as well as in the reporter's transcript. After several more pretrial hearings, including a motion to set aside the information pursuant to section 995 and four defense motions for continuance for further investigation, on December 19, 1986, defendant again moved to represent himself. Judge Cowell again advised him exhaustively of the risks involved, but on this occasion defendant decided to proceed pro se. The court honored his request, and granted his motion for continuance until February 20, 1987. Again, the nature of the motion and the ruling thereon appear in both the reporter's transcript and the clerk's minutes. At a January 26, 1987, hearing, the defendant moved for the appointment of one Ray Newman as advisory counsel, arguing that [s]ince it is a death penalty case, I should be entitled to my  a counsel of my choice. The court agreed to ask the attorney named by defendant whether he might be available. The court was unable to locate the attorney and thereafter denied the motion for advisory counsel. Defendant made a motion for second counsel under authority of Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 424 [180 Cal. Rptr. 489, 640 P.2d 108], which the court denied. At a hearing held on February 2 and 3, 1987, defendant renewed his motion for the appointment of Mr. Newman as cocounsel, whom he described as the only attorney he could get along with. Defendant explained that since it was a capital case, he needed assistance from someone with experience, [b]ecause I can't handle this alone, by myself. [¶] I mean, that's my right, to have a co-counsel. Later, he explained: I need a co-counsel because I need somebody to speak for me in general, in law, layman terms. When the court was not inclined to appoint Mr. Newman, defendant asked if he could give up his pro se status and have Newman appointed as his attorney. The court responded that if he gave up his pro se status, the public defender would be appointed. The court denied defendant's renewed motions for cocounsel or advisory counsel, expressing concern that defendant was attempting to manipulate the court by seeking self-representation in order to secure the dismissal of the public defender's office, and then giving up pro se status in order to have a certain attorney appointed. The court granted defendant's motion for continuance until March 25, 1987. On February 12, 1987, defendant renewed his motion for second counsel, stating that I thought it wouldn't be no problem, you know, me having an assistant attorney, or something. The court observed that defendant had made no showing that the complexity of the case indicated that one attorney would not suffice and suggested that the problem was defendant's decision to proceed pro se. The court stated: Again, I reiterate, so the record is quite clear, what you are telling me here in this motion, and in your words, basically, is that you personally can't handle this, and you want an attorney. [¶] Well, an attorney is not the same as additional counsel. [¶] If you want the court to regard this as a motion to appoint counsel, I will do so, but I'm not going to appoint second counsel on the basis of the showing made before the court. [¶] Now, do you wish to have counsel appointed, in which case the court will reappoint the public defender's office? Defendant suggested the public defender's office would have a conflict, and he retained his pro se status. On February 27, 1987, defendant challenged the court for cause pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, in part because, he alleged, Judge Cowell had unjustly threatened to deny defendant his choice of counsel by reason of unfounded accusations. At the hearing on the challenge for cause held before another judge, Judge Cowell explained again that he feared defendant was using his pro se status to secure the dismissal of the public defender and the appointment of a particular counsel. The court denied the challenge for cause. When the matter returned to Judge Cowell on March 27, 1987, defendant reiterated his request for advisory counsel or second counsel, suggested the case could not go forward without such assistance, and asked for a further seven-month continuance in order to secure a ruling from the Court of Appeal on his challenge to Judge Cowell's ruling on defendant's request for advisory counsel. The court granted a continuance to May 26, 1987. On May 13, 1987, five months after he had been granted the right to proceed pro se, defendant sought to relinquish his pro se status, declaring, I realize now that I can't accept my status as pro per in my case. When the court referred him to the public defender's office, defendant advised the court of what defendant urged was a likely conflict of interest arising from defendant's civil lawsuit against the public defender's office. Thereafter the public defender's office declared a conflict, and a private attorney, Ira Kaufman, was appointed. Kaufman successfully moved for a continuance on six occasions. On the last occasion, the court cautioned counsel that the matter was calendared for trial setting on December 14, 1987, and that it expected a firm trial date to be selected at that time because the case was so old. The record discloses that defendant's interchanges with the court and his written filings as a pro se litigant were coherent until December 17, 1987, when defendant made a bizarre, rambling statement to the court, and the matter was continued to January 8, 1988, for trial setting. On that date, defense counsel asked that the matter trail because of concerns over defendant's competency. On January 13, 1988, pursuant to section 1368, defense counsel moved for a hearing as to competency. On February 10, 1988, the matter was transferred to Judge Kalustian's department for all purposes. After a competency hearing was held before Judge Kalustian, the court found defendant competent. At the next hearing before Judge Kalustian, on February 23, 1988, defense counsel Kaufman announced he would be ready for trial the week of March 28, 1988, and with the prosecutor's concurrence the court set trial to commence at that time. Defense counsel then made an ex parte motion for an order that defendant provide blood, saliva, hair, and fingernail samples. Counsel explained that defendant had refused repeatedly to provide such samples. Counsel requested an order from the court to secure the samples, stating that upon being told this, Mr. Marshall says I am not helping him and he would like to go in pro per at this point. [¶] Is that correct Mr. Marshall? The following colloquy ensued. Defendant asked: Could I say something, your honor? The court responded: No, let me do the talking. [¶] To start with, your request for an order ordering Mr. Marshall to submit to withdrawal of blood and saliva sample, a fingernail sample and hair sample, the court orders him to do that. You are ordered to give those samples, Mr. Marshall. Defendant asked: Could I say something, your honor? The court responded: Not on that subject. The defendant then stated: I would like to fire this attorney and go pro per because this is not  my right is being violated in this courtroom department P right now. [¶] And the court orders, after I done told him just a few minutes ago that I would like to go pro per before you made that order, now I really don't know what to say because I am thinking I am being a victim used by this court, the Norwalk court where I should be downtown, LA or either in Compton. I don't know how this case got out here in Norwalk court from downtown. [¶] And maybe I should have maybe a few more minutes then just to think, and then I can come back and really tell you what my mind, the back of my head is telling me to tell you because all this stuff, it happened so fast, I am fighting a capital case. And this man have been trying to get me to do things. But I am on trial for my life as against other things and measures that have happened in the past dealing with people inside this court. [¶] I don't care to mention names right now, but other people is watching over this case, this magnitude of case. Lot of things done happened in this court, Norwalk courts over the past. The Legislature want this court closed. Take that for whatever it's worth. That's a saying I got in the county jail. This lawyer know it. I had some dealing with his family, other people in this court. [¶] Like I said, if you give me time to come back and talk to you in a few minutes, if you want to know the circumstances behind all this stuff, I will let you know in a way round about. The court responded: Now is the time, Mr. Marshall, to let me know. Defendant said: Now you asking me right now to explain to you the circumstances behind all this? The court responded: No. I am asking you to tell me why you want me to fire your lawyer and allow you to go in pro per. Defendant replied: If you give me another lawyer, it still won't do me no good on this capital case because I believe I am being used by this court in order to keep this court open for future. [¶] But let me say this, then I will be finished. I will take the pro per status. I will die in the county jail because I am not given anything contradict to my death, and that's my final words, and that just the honest truth. [¶] I don't believe in any god or nothing like that. If it is my time to die, I will die here or the county jail because I am not going to do that. If you do that, my rights is being violated because this is my attorney. [¶] The court don't have no right in saying so court order to tell my attorney or give my attorney reference which will be returning to deputy, I mean district attorney Bazanich right here which I had dealing in his family lifestyle, too. [¶] So if you going to fight the case, just fight my case on merit from that murder book, from the evidence they got. If he any kind of attorney, he should have stayed in medical school to get by license and practicing law, and that's the truth. [¶] I got that on everybody in here from this lady here, this lady here, this man here, this gentleman here, I used to work with and he not in here today. But I am going to just leave it alone. Let me decide. [¶] Like I said, other people watching over this case and it is not a joke. Life is for real and you know it from the place you came from, where you came from back south or whatever, but you do what you want to do because it's your court. The court responded: Thank you, Mr. Marshall. [¶] Request to relieve Mr. Kaufman is denied. And your request to proceed in pro per is denied. [¶] The pretrial and trial, the pretrial motion dates and the trial date will stand. On the day set for trial, defendant was not present, and the matter was continued to the next day. The following day, the bailiff reported that on the trial date defendant had flipped out in the county jail. At defense counsel's request, the court ordered another competency hearing under section 1368. The jury heard unanimous expert testimony that defendant was incompetent, with the experts expressing cautious reservations on the ground that defendant might be faking his symptoms. Lay witnesses reported instances of defendant's normal behavior. The jury determined that defendant was competent to stand trial, a verdict lending some support for the view that defendant was faking his psychiatric symptoms. On May 11, 1988, at the conclusion of the competency trial, defendant's attorney, Kaufman, withdrew on the ground he had been appointed to a public defender post in another county. Kaufman had secured the appointment of cocounsel, Ron Slick, and at this hearing Slick was appointed to represent defendant as sole counsel. Defendant declared that he understood the action taken by the trial court. Trial was continued until September 7, 1988. On that date, when trial commenced in Judge Kalustian's department, defendant again voiced dissatisfaction with counsel, this time asking for substitution of counsel. He declared: You can go on with the trial, but I don't want him as the lawyer. I'd like to have me another attorney appointed. See can I call some attorney, maybe Reese or something about that because I got about two billion dollars in the bank. I want to see can I hire Sammy Weiss or somebody going to go pay more close attention to this case. The court denied the motion, and trial proceeded, apparently without further motions related to defendant's representation by counsel.
(1) A defendant in a criminal case possesses two constitutional rights with respect to representation that are mutually exclusive. A defendant has the right to be represented by counsel at all critical stages of a criminal prosecution. ( United States v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 223-227 [87 S.Ct. 1926, 1930-1932, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149]; Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335, 339-345 [83 S.Ct. 792, 793-797, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 93 A.L.R.2d 733]; Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U.S. 45, 71 [53 S.Ct. 55, 65, 77 L.Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527].) At the same time, the United States Supreme Court has held that because the Sixth Amendment grants to the accused personally the right to present a defense, a defendant possesses the right to represent himself or herself. ( Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. 806, 819 [95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533] ( Faretta ).) The United States Supreme Court has concluded in numerous cases and a variety of contexts that the federal Constitution requires assiduous protection of the right to counsel. (2) The right to counsel is self-executing; the defendant need make no request for counsel in order to be entitled to legal representation. ( Carnley v. Cochran (1962) 369 U.S. 506, 513 [82 S.Ct. 884, 888-889, 8 L.Ed.2d 70].) The right to counsel persists unless the defendant affirmatively waives that right. ( Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464-465 [58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357].) Courts must indulge every reasonable inference against waiver of the right to counsel. ( Brewer v. Williams (1977) 430 U.S. 387, 404 [97 S.Ct. 1232, 1242, 51 L.Ed.2d 424].) The high court has not extended the same kind of protection to the right of self-representation. In Faretta itself the court noted that a trial court may appoint advisory counsel for a pro se defendant even over objection ( Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835, fn. 46 [95 S.Ct. at p. 2541]), and advisory counsel's unsolicited intervention at trial does not necessarily violate the defendant's right to present his or her own defense. ( McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) 465 U.S. 168, 187-188 [104 S.Ct. 944, 956, 79 L.Ed.2d 122].) The high court also warned that the right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom, but a right that can be lost through deliberate, serious misconduct. ( Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 834, fn. 46 [95 S.Ct. at p. 2541].) Furthermore, unlike the right to be represented by counsel, the right of self-representation is not self-executing. In Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, the court held that a knowing, voluntary, and unequivocal assertion of the right of self-representation, made weeks before trial by a competent, literate defendant, should have been recognized ( id. at pp. 835-836 [95 S.Ct. at p. 2541]); subsequent decisions of lower courts have required expressly that the defendant make a timely and unequivocal assertion of the right of self-representation. (See People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 127-128 [137 Cal. Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187]; Hamilton v. Groose (8th Cir.1994) 28 F.3d 859, 861; U.S. v. Treff (10th Cir.1991) 924 F.2d 975, 978-979; United States v. Smith (9th Cir.1986) 780 F.2d 810, 811; United States v. Weisz (D.C. Cir.1983) 718 F.2d 413, 425-426 [231 App.D.C. 1] [court applies a stringent standard for judging the adequacy of the defendant's invocation because of the strong presumption against waiver of the right to counsel]; see also Dorman v. Wainwright (11th Cir.1986) 798 F.2d 1358, 1365-1366 [noting that unlike other constitutional rights, the right of self-representation readily can be waived if the defendant fails to invoke it properly].) As one court observed: [T]he right of self-representation is waived unless defendants articulately and unmistakably demand to proceed pro se.  ( United States v. Weisz, supra, 718 F.2d at p. 426.) The United States Supreme Court has provided little direct guidance on the question of what a trial court should consider in determining whether the defendant unequivocally has invoked the right of self-representation. It has not spoken on the question whether the trial court may deny a timely request for self-representation if the motion is insincere, ambivalent, or unconsidered, although the high court's emphasis in Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, on the defendant's knowing, voluntary, unequivocal, and competent invocation of the right suggests that an insincere request or one made under the cloud of emotion may be denied. Several lower courts have declared that a motion made out of a temporary whim, or out of annoyance or frustration, is not unequivocal  even if the defendant has said he or she seeks self-representation. ( Reese v. Nix (8th Cir.1991) 942 F.2d 1276, 1281 [the defendant stated well I don't want no counsel then, but this was deemed a mere impulsive response to the trial court's denial of a request for new counsel]; Jackson v. Ylst (9th Cir.1990) 921 F.2d 882, 888-889; Hodge v. Henderson (S.D.N.Y. 1990) 761 F. Supp. 993, 1001-1002; People v. Hacker (1990) 167 App.Div.2d 729 [563 N.Y.S.2d 300, 301]; Reese v. State (Iowa Ct. App. 1986) 391 N.W.2d 719, 724.) As one court expressed it, a court properly may deny a request for self-representation that is a `momentary caprice or the result of thinking out loud.' ( Jackson v. Ylst, supra, 921 F.2d at p. 888.) In People v. Hacker, supra, 563 N.Y.S.2d 300, for example, in response to defendant's request, the trial court inquired whether the defendant was certain he wanted to proceed pro se, and he responded affirmatively. The reviewing court nonetheless found the record as a whole did not reflect an unequivocal request, but rather a spur of the moment decision prompted by the denial of defendant's motion for substitute counsel. (563 N.Y.S.2d at p. 301.) And in Jackson v. Ylst, supra, 921 F.2d 882, 889, the defendant stated: `I want to fight it in pro per then. Relieve him and I do this myself.' The reviewing court considered the record as a whole, including the defendant's failure to assert the right of self-representation at a later hearing, and independently determined that the defendant's request for self-representation was an impulsive response to the trial court's denial of his request for substitute counsel. Examining the question whether the defendant in fact wanted to represent himself, the court stated: Jackson's emotional response when disappointed by the trial court's denial of his motion for substitute counsel did not demonstrate to a reasonable certainty that he in fact wished to represent himself. ( Ibid., italics omitted.) Some courts have held that vacillation between requests for counsel and for self-representation amounts to equivocation or to waiver or forfeiture of the right of self-representation. ( Williams v. Bartlett (2d Cir.1994) 44 F.3d 95, 100-101; Brown v. Wainwright (5th Cir.1982) 665 F.2d 607, 611; United States v. Bennett (10th Cir.1976) 539 F.2d 45, 49-51; Olson v. State (Ind. 1990) 563 N.E.2d 565, 570; State v. Lewis (1986) 104 N.M. 677 [726 P.2d 354, 359].) And another court has advised that the defendant's conduct, as well as words, must be taken into account, stating: Equivocation, which sometimes refers only to speech, is broader in the context of the Sixth Amendment, and takes into account conduct as well as other expressions of intent. ( Williams v. Bartlett, supra, 44 F.3d at p. 100.) Other courts have declared that a timely motion for self-representation made for the purpose of delay or to disrupt the orderly administration of justice need not be granted. ( U.S. v. George (9th Cir.1995) 56 F.3d 1078, 1084; U.S. v. Flewitt (9th Cir.1989) 874 F.2d 669, 674.) Many courts have explained that a rule requiring the defendant's request for self-representation to be unequivocal is necessary in order to protect the courts against clever defendants who attempt to build reversible error into the record by making an equivocal request for self-representation. Without a requirement that a request for self-representation be unequivocal, such a request could, whether granted or denied, provide a ground for reversal on appeal. This problem has irked many courts, and some of their opinions have given examples of such abuse. ( People v. Williams (1990) 220 Cal. App.3d 1165, 1170 [269 Cal. Rptr. 705] [referring to the  Faretta game]; Reese v. Nix, supra, 942 F.2d at p. 1280; U.S. v. Treff, supra, 924 F.2d at p. 979; Cross v. U.S. (8th Cir.1990) 893 F.2d 1287, 1290; Tuitt v. Fair (1st Cir.1987) 822 F.2d 166, 177 [collecting cases]; Meeks v. Craven (9th Cir.1973) 482 F.2d 465, 467-468.) We share the concern that some assertions of the right of self-representation may be a vehicle for manipulation and abuse. It is not only the stability of judgments that is at stake, however, when we require a defendant to make an unequivocal request for self-representation. The defendant's constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel also is at stake  a right that secures the protection of many other constitutional rights as well. (See Jackson v. Ylst, supra, 921 F.2d at p. 889; Adams v. Carroll (9th Cir.1989) 875 F.2d 1441, 1444; United States v. Weisz, supra, 718 F.2d at pp. 425-426; Hodge v. Henderson, supra, 761 F. Supp. at p. 1001.) The high court has instructed that courts must draw every inference against supposing that the defendant wishes to waive the right to counsel. ( Brewer v. Williams, supra, 430 U.S. at p. 404 [97 S.Ct. at p. 1242].) It follows, as several courts have concluded, that in order to protect the fundamental constitutional right to counsel, one of the trial court's tasks when confronted with a motion for self-representation is to determine whether the defendant truly desires to represent himself or herself. ( Jackson v. Ylst, supra, 921 F.2d at p. 889; Adams v. Carroll, supra, at p. 1444; Hodge v. Henderson, supra, 761 F. Supp. at p. 1001 [the court must `determine whether a defendant genuinely means what he says']; State v. Williams (1993) 334 N.C. 440 [434 S.E.2d 588, 595-597], reaffirmed 339 N.C. 1 [452 S.E.2d 245, 253] following remand by United States Supreme Court on another point [refusing to find an assertion of the Faretta right if the defendant's statements or actions create any ambiguity as to his desire to represent himself (italics added)].) The court faced with a motion for self-representation should evaluate not only whether the defendant has stated the motion clearly, but also the defendant's conduct and other words. Because the court should draw every reasonable inference against waiver of the right to counsel, the defendant's conduct or words reflecting ambivalence about self-representation may support the court's decision to deny the defendant's motion. A motion for self-representation made in passing anger or frustration, an ambivalent motion, or one made for the purpose of delay or to frustrate the orderly administration of justice may be denied. (3a) The United States Supreme Court has not explained what standard a reviewing court should apply to a claim that the trial court violated the defendant's rights in denying  or granting  a motion for self-representation. The defendant argues that we should review only the facts before the court ruling on the motion, and that in determining whether the motion was unequivocal, we should be bound by the trial court's apparent understanding that the defendant was making a motion for self-representation. As we explain, we reject this position. (4) Some reviewing courts treat the question whether the defendant has made a knowing and voluntary assertion of the right to self-representation as a question of fact, according deference to the trial court's determination. ( Fields v. Murray (4th Cir.1995) 49 F.3d 1024, 1032; Cain v. Peters (7th Cir.1992) 972 F.2d 748, 749.) Most courts, including our own, however, review the entire record  including proceedings after the purported invocation of the right of self-representation  and determine de novo whether the defendant's invocation was knowing and voluntary. ( People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1224-1225 [259 Cal. Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698]; U.S. v. Stewart (8th Cir.1993) 20 F.3d 911, 917; Hendricks v. Zenon (9th Cir.1993) 993 F.2d 664, 669-670; Strozier v. Newsome (11th Cir.1991) 926 F.2d 1100, 1104-1105; U.S. v. Campbell (1st Cir.1989) 874 F.2d 838, 846; U.S. v. McDowell (6th Cir.1987) 814 F.2d 245, 249; Evans v. State (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) 822 P.2d 1370, 1374-1375.) Even when the trial court has failed to conduct a full and complete inquiry regarding a defendant's assertion of the right of self-representation, these courts examine the entire record to determine whether the invocation of the right of self-representation and waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and voluntary. ( Hendricks v. Zenon, supra, 993 F.2d at pp. 669-670 [limiting rule to exceptional circumstances]; Strozier v. Newsome, supra, 926 F.2d at p. 1105; U.S. v. McDowell, supra, 814 F.2d at p. 249 [collecting cases]; Evans v. State, supra, 822 P.2d at pp. 1374-1375.) On the separate issue of whether the invocation was unequivocal, we have found no California authority directly on point. The issue could be treated as one of fact, as to which the trial court's order is accorded deference if supported by substantial evidence, or it could be treated as primarily a question of law, subject to de novo review. Cases from other jurisdictions of which we are aware indicate that de novo review of the entire record is common. ( U.S. v. Treff, supra, 924 F.2d at pp. 978-979; Cross v. U.S., supra, 893 F.2d at p. 1291 [reviewing the record to determine the defendant's actual intent]; Jackson v. Ylst, supra, 921 F.2d at pp. 888-889; Meeks v. Craven, supra, 482 F.2d at pp. 467-468; State v. Langford (1994) 267 Mont. 95 [882 P.2d 490, 493-494] [standing alone, the defendant's request appeared unequivocal, but viewing the record as a whole, the reviewing court concluded it was not]; State v. Williams, supra, 434 S.E.2d at p. 597; Reese v. State, supra, 391 N.W.2d at pp. 723-724; see also Dorman v. Wainwright, supra, 798 F.2d at pp. 1366-1367 [applying an objective standard, the defendant has invoked the right of self-representation when a reasonable person would find that his or her request was a clear and unequivocal invocation of that right]; but see Fields v. Murray, supra, 49 F.3d at pp. 1032-1034 [treating equivocation as a question of fact].) [2] We have found no case that declares that unless the trial court made a factual finding on the record explaining its reason for denying a motion for self-representation, the reviewing court must conclude that no proper basis existed for denying the motion or that the defendant's right of self-representation was infringed. (See State v. Williams, supra, 434 S.E.2d at pp. 595-597 [defendant's words and actions rendered his motion equivocal; reviewing court approved the denial of a motion for self-representation even though the trial court clearly treated defendant's motion as a Faretta motion and rejected it on other, improper grounds].) (3b) In any event, there is no support for the defendant's narrowly formulated standard of review. We need not determine whether de novo review or substantial evidence review is appropriate, for under either standard, defendant's claim fails. The statements of defendant at the February 23, 1988, hearing do not constitute an unequivocal invocation of the right of self-representation simply because the trial court described the motion as one for self-representation, or because the trial court failed to make an express finding on the record that the request was equivocal, insincere, or made for the purpose of delay. When we examine the record of the hearing at which defendant assertedly invoked his right of self-representation, we conclude that the request was ambivalent in the context of that hearing and also was made to delay and disrupt the proceedings. Defendant's statement indicates he was upset over the court's order that he supply blood and other samples of bodily tissue, and over his counsel's role in securing that order. He attempted to secure counsel's dismissal before the order could be entered, and it appears that his request for self-representation was advanced simply as a means to avoid being required to supply the samples, rather than out of a sincere desire to forego counsel and represent himself. Certainly, defendant's statement also contains language suggesting that he had decided that if he was going to die, he would die on his own terms, and that he wanted to take the pro per status. The court understood his words; it asked why defendant wanted to relieve counsel and defend himself, and it ultimately denied that motion, which it characterized as being for self-representation. But, as we have explained above, the court's duty goes beyond determining that some of defendant's words amount to a motion for self-representation. The court should evaluate all of a defendant's words and conduct to decide whether he or she truly wishes to give up the right to counsel and represent himself or herself and unequivocally has made that clear. The quoted statement offered by defendant in the present case was rambling and laced with requests for time to think and allusions to extraneous matters such as the funding of the Norwalk court and the order for tissue samples. It does not convey an unmistakable desire to forego counsel and resume the duties defendant had found impossible to shoulder earlier in the proceedings. We may assume that the judge to whom the case had been assigned for trial, and who already had conducted a hearing with regard to defendant's competency, was also aware of the clerk's docket entries from the previous hearings indicating that defendant had once invoked his right of self-representation and then immediately changed his mind, that he had later invoked the right to counsel, then after five months of continuances had relinquished it. These docket entries also reflected defendant's repeated request for advisory counsel while he was representing himself, indicating further ambivalence on his part about waiving the right to counsel. There was not only equivocation, but also evidence that defendant's purpose was delay and disruption of the proceedings, and that after his failed experience in representing himself, he no longer had a sincere interest in waiving his right to counsel. During most of the period in which he represented himself, he made persistent efforts to secure the assistance of advisory counsel or cocounsel because, as he perceived, he was unable to handle his own case effectively. Judge Cowell's concern that defendant was employing the assertion of Faretta rights as a way station in his attempt to get rid of the public defender and secure private counsel appears to have been well founded. Defendant's asserted mental crises, occurring just when the much-delayed trial actually was to begin, support the inference that delay of the trial was one of defendant's objectives. That defendant ultimately accepted the substitution of Mr. Slick as counsel, and that defendant's eleventh hour attack on Mr. Slick on the day of trial was for the purpose of obtaining a further substitution of counsel rather than self-representation, reinforces our view that defendant's motion for self-representation on February 23, 1988, was not unequivocal or premised upon a sincere desire to act as his own counsel. [3] Rather, it appears defendant attempted to subvert the orderly administration of justice by juggling his Faretta rights with his right to counsel interspersed with Marsden motions ( People v. Williams, supra, 220 Cal. App.3d at p. 1170), along with possible efforts to mislead the court with respect to his mental competency. We conclude that defendant's statements did not represent an unequivocal and sincere invocation of the right of self-representation, and that they were made for the purpose of delay rather than in a sincere effort to secure self-representation. Accordingly, the trial court's February 23, 1988, ruling provides no basis for reversing the judgment.