Opinion ID: 1447881
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Additional Penalty Phase Instructional Issues

Text: Defendant argues there were several additional instructional errors, each of which requires reversal of the penalty phase judgment. 1. Mercy Instruction (34) Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in failing to give his proffered mercy instruction. The trial court did, however, instruct the jury it was to consider, if applicable, any sympath[y] ... that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death.... The prosecutor did not argue to the jury that it should not consider sympathy or mercy. Under these circumstances, there was no error. ( People v. Caro, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 1067; People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 781-782 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297].) 2. Nonpertinent Factors According to defendant, the trial court reversibly erred when it failed to delete nonpertinent factors under section 190.3 from the penalty phase instructions. We have repeatedly rejected this contention in other cases. ( People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d 771, 843; People v. Malone, supra, 47 Cal.3d 1, 47.) 3. Constitutionality of Factor (a) Instruction (35) In conformance with section 190.3, the trial court instructed the jury to consider, take into account and be guided by the following factors, if applicable: [ถ] (a) the circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding.... Defendant contends that this instruction is so vague as to render the sentencing determination unreliable, arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, and that the trial court improperly refused a proffered clarifying instruction. (See Godfrey v. Georgia (1980) 446 U.S. 420 [64 L.Ed.2d 398, 100 S.Ct. 1759].) [12] We considered a similar argument in People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 444-446 [276 Cal. Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221]. There, the defendant argued that the trial court's refusal to give an instruction clarifying the meaning of the phrase circumstances of the crime permitted the jury to impose the death penalty based on constitutionally irrelevant factors, such as whether the crime was particularly gruesome. We held that the standard jury instruction on `circumstances of the crime' required no further characteriz[ation] or elaborat[ion]. ( Id. at p. 446.) More recently, in People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 595 [15 Cal. Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142], we held that section 190.3, factor (a) was not `illusory' or otherwise impermissibly `vague'.... Accordingly, we reject defendant's argument. 4. Jury Instruction on Possibility of Deadlocked Jury (36) Defendant faults the trial court for its refusal to instruct the jury, on his request, that it was not required to reach a penalty verdict, and that [t]he possibility of a hung jury is an inevitable by-product of the requirement that a verdict must be unanimous. We have previously rejected the proposition that when a jury asks the trial court what will happen if it fails to reach a penalty verdict, the court must explain to the jury the consequences of its failure to agree. ( People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 227 [279 Cal. Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949].) It follows that there is no duty to instruct a jury regarding its possible failure to reach a verdict in the absence of a request by the jury for an explanation.