Opinion ID: 2443365
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Appellant's Status as a Pro Se Plaintiff

Text: Finally, we note that appellant has repeatedly asserted, before this court and the Superior Court, that his claims should be treat[ed] favorably because he is a pro se litigant. It has long been recognized that pro se litigants can face considerable challenges in prosecuting their claims without legal assistance, see, e.g., Hudson v. Hardy, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 44, 47, 412 F.2d 1091, 1094 (1968), [9] and we are aware that appellant, in addition to representing himself, was incarcerated during some portion of these proceedings. In Hudson, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged that the requirements of the summary judgment rule may not fairly be applied `with strict literalness' to a prisoner unrepresented by counsel and subject to the `handicaps ... detention necessarily imposes upon a litigant.' 134 U.S.App.D.C. at 47, 412 F.2d at 1094 ( quoted in MacLeod v. Georgetown Univ. Med. Ctr., 736 A.2d 977, 981 (D.C.1999)); see also Padou v. District of Columbia, 998 A.2d 286, 292 (D.C.2010) (noting that we have followed the District of Columbia Circuit in requiring trial judges to exercise special care with a pro se litigant in special circumstances). An incarcerated appellant has neither the facilities nor has he had the opportunity to provide the documentary evidence that would have been necessary, by ordinary standards, to defeat appellees' motion for summary judgment. Hudson, 134 U.S.App.D.C. at 47, 412 F.2d at 1094. Therefore, before dismissing an appellant's claim under Rule 56(b), as a bare minimum the trial court should provide the appellant with fair notice of the requirements of the summary judgment rule. Id. The record before us shows that appellant had a fair opportunity to present his claims to the court. Cf. Hudson, 134 U.S.App.D.C. at 47, 412 F.2d at 1094 (quoting Phillips v. United States Bd. of Parole, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 235, 238, 352 F.2d 711, 714 (1965)). The trial court gave appellant leave to plead a viable claim in an amended complaint and informed appellant that he should describe with specificity why th[e] court has personal jurisdiction over each of the Defendants, especially if the conduct about which Plaintiff complains occurred in Maryland. Appellant did not include any further relevant information that established personal jurisdiction when he re-plead his claims. Moreover, when appellee opposed the amended complaint by filing a motion for summary judgment, appellant filed an opposition labeled, A 28 U.S.C. § 1746 Affidavit in Contesting Hardesty's Affidavit Combined with Opposition to Defendant's 56(a) Motion (Summary Judgment). Appellant's opposition contains numerous attachments which, although irrelevant to the issue of the court's personal jurisdiction over appellee, do establish that he was apprised of the requirements of the summary judgment rule. Thus, this is not a case where a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss was treated as a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment without notice to appellant, cf. Hudson, 134 U.S.App.D.C. at 46, 412 F.2d at 1093; Neal v. Kelly, 295 U.S.App.D.C. 350, 352, 963 F.2d 453, 455 (1992), or where summary judgment was granted after the plaintiff failed to respond to the opposing party's motion for summary judgment. Cf. Malik v. District of Columbia, 387 U.S.App.D.C. 420, 425, 574 F.3d 781, 786 (2009). We think that the trial court showed proper consideration for appellant's lack of formal legal training and circumstances, and we reiterate that, where a litigant is seeking a monetary award, we do not believe pro se status necessarily justifies special consideration ... [and] he cannot generally be permitted to shift the burden of litigating his case to the courts. ... MacLeod, 736 A.2d at 979 (quoting Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 227 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 6, 702 F.2d 1189, 1194 (1983)). The judgment of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia is hereby Affirmed.