Opinion ID: 1218704
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: illegalities in a plea bargain are disregarded

Text: In a criminal setting, courts disregard a legally impermissible condition. Palermo v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 545 F.2d 286, 294-97 (2d Cir.1976); People v. Macrander, 756 P.2d 356, 359-61 (Colo. 1988); State v. Miller, 110 Wash.2d 528, 756 P.2d 122, 126 (1988); See also State v. Schaupp, 111 Wash.2d 34, 757 P.2d 970, 972 (1988) (false explanation of basis of agreement). Many courts employ contract analysis as a bottom line in this phase of a plea-bargain case. As a recent federal decision states: Given the relative interests implicated by a plea bargain, we find that the costs of an unclear agreement must fall upon the government. While we affirm the general applicability of contract law principles, we hold that the government must shoulder a greater degree of responsibility for lack of clarity in a plea agreement. United States v. Giorgi, 840 F.2d 1022, 1026 (1st Cir.1988). See United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir.1986). For state cases, see, e.g., Ex Parte Yarber, 437 So.2d 1330, 1334 (Ala. 1983); State v. Georgeoff, 163 Ariz. 434, 437, 788 P.2d 1185, 1188 (1990) (breach of a plea agreement must not be raised for the first time on appeal); People v. Shepeard, 169 Cal. App.3d 580, 586, 215 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1985) (plea agreement is, in essence, a contract between the defendant and the prosecutor to which the court consents to be bound), disapproved on other grounds People v. Martin, 42 Cal.3d 437, 229 Cal. Rptr. 131, 141 n. 13, 722 P.2d 905, 915 n. 13 (1986); People v. Macrander, supra, 756 P.2d at 359-61; Shields v. State, 374 A.2d 816, 819 (Del.), cert. den. 434 U.S. 893, 98 S.Ct. 271, 54 L.Ed.2d 180 (1977); Lopez v. State, 536 So.2d 226, 229 (Fla. 1988); State v. Yoon, 66 Haw. 342, 662 P.2d 1112, 1116 (1983); State v. Rutherford, 107 Idaho 910, 693 P.2d 1112, 1116 (Ct.App. 1985); People v. Wolfe, 156 Ill. App.3d 1023, 109 Ill.Dec. 524, 527, 510 N.E.2d 145, 148, appeal denied 117 Ill.2d 552, 115 Ill.Dec. 408, 517 N.E.2d 1094 (1987); Spivey v. State, 553 N.E.2d 508 (Ind. App. 1990); Parker v. State, 542 N.E.2d 1026, 1028 (Ind. App. 1989); Boge v. State, 309 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Iowa 1981); State v. Smith, 244 Kan. 283, 767 P.2d 1302, 1303-04 (1989); State v. Wills, 244 Kan. 62, 765 P.2d 1114, 1120 (1988) (even an ambiguous plea agreement must be strictly construed in favor of defendant); Com. v. Reyes, 764 S.W.2d 62, 65 (Ky. 1989); State v. Lewis, 539 So.2d 1199, 1204 (La. 1989); State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 357 A.2d 376, 383 (1976); State v. Williams, 418 N.W.2d 163, 168 (Minn. 1988); Wright v. McAdory, 536 So.2d 897, 901 (Miss. 1988); State v. Jones, 789 S.W.2d 856 (Mo. App. 1990) (if there is a claim of ambiguity costs of an unclear agreement must fall upon the government (quoting United States v. Giorgi, supra, 840 F.2d at 1026)); State v. Dinndorf, 202 Mont. 308, 658 P.2d 372, 373 (1983); State v. Thomas, 61 N.J. 314, 294 A.2d 57, 60-61 (1972); State v. Collins, 300 N.C. 142, 265 S.E.2d 172, 176 (1980); State v. Thorstad, 261 N.W.2d 899, 902 (N.D.), cert. den. 436 U.S. 906, 98 S.Ct. 2237, 56 L.Ed.2d 404 (1978); State v. Malone, 568 A.2d 1378, 1380 (R.I. 1990); State v. Turner, 713 S.W.2d 327, 330 (Tenn.Cr.App.), cert. den. 479 U.S. 933, 107 S.Ct. 407, 93 L.Ed.2d 360 (1986); Ex Parte Williams, 637 S.W.2d 943, 947 (Tex. Cr.App. 1982), cert. den. 462 U.S. 1108, 103 S.Ct. 2458, 77 L.Ed.2d 1336 (1983); State v. Byrne, 149 Vt. 224, 542 A.2d 276, 277 (1988); State v. Hall, 104 Wash.2d 486, 706 P.2d 1074, 1076 (1985); Myers v. Frazier, 319 S.E.2d 782, 796 n. 21 (W. Va. 1984); State v. Rivest, 106 Wis.2d 406, 316 N.W.2d 395, 399 (1982); cf. Jones, Negotiation, Ratification, and Rescission of the Guilty Plea Agreement: A Contractual Analysis and Typology, 17 Duq L Rev 591 (1978-1979); Comment, Where Promises End: Prosecutorial Adherence to Sentence Recommendation Commitments in Plea Bargains, 52 U Chi L Rev 751 (1985). But see, e.g., People v. Reagan, 395 Mich. 306, 235 N.W.2d 581, 585 (1975) (here the analogy to contract law is inappropriate to evaluate agreement not to prosecute which was enforced nonetheless); State v. Doe, 103 N.M. 178, 704 P.2d 432, 435 (App. 1984) (rejecting contract law as basis for interpreting agreement not to prosecute, relying on Selikoff, infra ); People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623, 633-35, 318 N.E.2d 784, 791-92 (1974), cert. den. 419 U.S. 1122, 95 S.Ct. 806, 42 L.Ed.2d 822 (1975) (application of contract law to plea negotiations is incongruous because [t]he strong public policy of rehabilitating offenders, protecting society, and deterring other potential offenders presents considerations paramount to benefits beyond the power of individuals to `contract.' However, the result is consistent with contract analysis, and the opinion employs contract terminology). [7] Oregon courts considering plea agreements have employed contract terminology. State v. Snider, 296 Or. 168, 172, 674 P.2d 585 (1983) (referring to plea agreement as the contract); Brock v. Wright, 98 Or. App. 323, 326, 778 P.2d 999 (1989) (meeting of the minds required for enforceable plea agreement). But cf. State v. Allen, 79 Or. App. 674, 720 P.2d 761, rev. den. 301 Or. 765, 726 P.2d 377 (1986) (finding, inexplicably, no authority for proposition that contract law applies to review of plea agreement and noting that the plea agreement did not grant immunity from prosecution for murder even if the parol evidence rule applied). Oregon disregards the illegality and enforces the contract. W.J. Seufert Land Co. v. Greenfield, 262 Or. 83, 87, 496 P.2d 197 (1972) (where part of contract contrary to public policy is separable, remaining provisions of contract will be enforced); Eldridge et al. v. Johnston, 195 Or. 379, 405, 245 P.2d 239 (1952) (where a contract is partly legal and partly illegal, the legal part of the contract will be enforced where separable from the illegal part); Fisher v. Lane, 174 Or. 438, 448, 149 P.2d 562 (1944) (where refusal to enforce illegal contract provision would produce harmful effect on party for whose protection law making contract provision illegal exists, enforcement or rescission, whichever is appropriate, is allowed); Hagen v. O'Connell, Goyak & Ball, 68 Or. App. 700, 704, 683 P.2d 563 (1984) (where entire agreement is not contrary to public policy, severable provision which is so contrary is invalid but remaining provisions may be enforced); cf. Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401, 408, 97 S.Ct. 679, 685, 50 L.Ed.2d 641 (1977) (ambiguously worded contracts should not be interpreted to render them illegal and unenforceable where the wording lends itself to a logically acceptable construction that renders them legal and enforceable).