Opinion ID: 2739471
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Common Law Dedication and Acceptance

Text: ¶19. The statutory analysis is not dispositive, however. The common law of dedication and acceptance, which “operates by way of an equitable estoppel,” also must be considered. Conwill, 707 So. 2d at 1076. Instead of a creating a fee interest in the public, “a common law dedication usually creates a mere easement.” Id. We find that, while statutory dedication and acceptance are limited by plain statutory language to municipalities, the common law of dedication and acceptance can be applied more broadly to actions by counties. See Hearn v. Morrow, 272 So. 2d 645 (Miss. 1973); Armstrong v. Itawamba County, 195 Miss. 802, 16 So. 2d 752 (1944); Kinnare v. Gregory, 55 Miss. 612, 1878 WL 4511 (1878). According to this Court: 11 It is well-settled law in Mississippi that land sold according to a plat or map will dedicate the streets, alleys, squares, and other public ways marked on the map or plat to the public for public use. See, e.g., Luter v. Crawford, 230 Miss. 81, 92 So. 2d 348 (1957); Skrmetta v. Moore, 227 Miss. 119, 86 So. 2d 46 (1956); Panhandle Oil Co. v. Trigg, 148 Miss. 306, 114 So. 625 (1927); Indianola Light, Ice & Coal Co. v. Montgomery, 85 Miss. 304, 37 So. 958 (1904); City of Vicksburg v. Marshall, 59 Miss. 563 (1882); Briel v. Natchez, 48 Miss. 423 (1873); Vick and Rappleye v. Mayor and Aldermen of Vicksburg, 1 How. 379 (Miss. 1837). Conwill, 707 So. 2d at 1076. This rule has roots in the early jurisprudence of this state: The rule has obtained general sanction, that, if the owner of urban property has laid it off into lots intersected by streets and sells the same with reference thereto, or with reference to a map or plat dividing it into squares, streets and alleys, such action will amount to a dedication of the streets and alleys to the public. Irwin v. Lewis, 9 How. (U.S.) 10; Rowan v. Portland, 8 B. Monroe, 232; Vicks v. Vicksburg, 1 How. 379. Briel v. City of Natchez, 48 Miss. 423, 436, 1873 WL 4128 (1873). Even earlier than the 1873 Briel case, this Court stated that “when the owners of urban property have laid it out into lots with streets and avenues intersecting the same, and have sold lots with reference to such plat, it is too late for them to resume a general and unlimited control over the property, thus dedicated to the public.” Vick et al. v. The Mayor and Aldermen of Vicksburg, 1 How. 379, 2 Miss. 379, 432 (1837). ¶20. As to dedication and acceptance of roadways, this Court has opined that the landowner: . . . may grant to certain persons or to the public the easement of a highway over his land; not that the grant is technically by deed, but he may do those acts which unequivocally manifest an intention that the community shall have and enjoy a highway on his private property. When the public accepts his offer there has been consummated that which is of equal import with a contract or grant, and there has been accomplished what is expressed by the term “dedication.” The acceptance may be shown in two ways: first, by the formal act of the proper authority competent to speak and act for the public, or it may be implied 12 from circumstances such as user,1 etc. The People v. Jones, 7 Mich. 176, Fulton v. Mehronfield, 8 Ohio St. 440, Briel v. City of Natchez, 48 Miss. 436. Kinnare, 55 Miss. at 620-21. ¶21. We agree with the McBrooms that the Jackson County Board of Supervisors approved the final plat for the Spring Lake Subdivision in 1972 and that the final plat referenced the dam. The 1972 plat map approved by the Board not only references “DAM,” but also, the dam itself connects with Spring Lake Drive East. It is true that the Board sought to condition its approval of the Spring Lake Subdivision on the developer’s perpetual maintenance of “the entrance route into said subdivision along the dam” and expressly stated that “Jackson County does not accept said entrance route over the dam for maintenance.” But this disclaimer does not comport with the requirement of Section 404.4 of the Jackson County Subdivision Regulations of 1968 that “the subdividing of the land shall be such as to provide, by means of a public street, each lot with satisfactory access to an existing public street.” And the parties do not dispute that the roadway over the Spring Lake Dam was the sole means of access into the subdivision from 1972 until Lee Taylor Road was opened in 2006. ¶22. Because the dam provided the sole means of ingress and egress to and from the subdivision at the time of its approval, we find that the Board acted contrary to its own Subdivision Regulations in 1972 by attempting to disclaim maintenance of the roadway: Jackson County approved the plat with public streets therein and was required by its own regulations to provide a public means of access. The fact that an alternative roadway was 1 The term “user” refers to “[t]he actual exercise or enjoyment of any right, property, drugs, franchise, etc.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1383 (5th ed. 1979). 13 constructed in 2006, thirty-four years after the Board approved the final plat of the Spring Lake Subdivision, is of no moment to this Court’s consideration of the 1972 dedication to the public of the Spring Lake Dam. ¶23. With regard to the Subdivision Regulations, the chancellor, however, found that “Section 400.2 does not appear to require strict compliance.” Section 400.2 requires the following: The arrangement of streets in a subdivision shall either: a. Provide for the continuation of existing principal streets in surrounding areas; or b. conform to a plan for area development approved or adopted by the Planning Commission to meet a particular situation where topographical or other conditions make continuance or conformance to existing principal streets impracticable. The chancellor then cited Section 700.1 of the Subdivision Regulations, governing “Hardship and Modifications”: [w]here the Planning Commission finds that extraordinary hardships may result from strict compliance with these regulations, it may vary the regulations so that substantial justice may be done and the public interest secured, provided that such variance will not have the effect of nullifying the intent and purpose of the regulations.” The chancellor concluded that “[t]he County was clearly vested with the power to vary its acceptance of subdivision design regulations.” ¶24. We do not agree with the chancellor’s determination. First, while “Section 400.2 does not appear to require strict compliance,” it relaxes compliance to allow conformity to an adopted plan only “where topographical or other conditions make continuance or conformance to existing principal streets impracticable.” Jackson County, Miss., Subdivision 14 Regulation 400.2(b) (1968). No conditions, topographical or otherwise, were cited by the Board to allow it to require the developer to maintain the only roadway providing a means of ingress and egress to and from the Spring Lake Subdivision. Otherwise, Section 400.2 mandates “continuation of existing principal streets in a surrounding area,” the requirement which the roadway over Spring Lake Dam appears to satisfy as it provides a continuation of Spring Lake Drive East. Jackson County, Miss., Subdivision Regulation 400.2(a) (1968). Moreover, with regard to Section 700.1, the Board never made a finding, at the time of approval of the final plat, that strict compliance with Section 404.4 (requiring access to a public street) would create an “extraordinary hardship” such that a variance from the Subdivision Regulations was warranted. The chancellor’s holding that the 1968 Subdivision Regulations permitted a variance under these circumstances was erroneous. ¶25. Having ascertained that a common law dedication to public use occurred, we turn to a consideration of whether there was an acceptance by the county. According to this Court, “acceptance may be shown in two ways: first, by the formal act of the proper authority competent to speak and act for the public, or it may be implied from circumstances, such as user, etc.” Kinnare, 55 Miss. at 621 (citations omitted). ¶26. The McBrooms urge that Hurricane Frederic, in September 1979, exacted significant damage on Spring Lake Dam and the roadway over it. They cite a 1979 letter, dispatched in the aftermath of Hurricane Frederic, from Jon Bennett, Jackson County Planning Commission Director, to Charles Moore, the Governor’s authorized representative of the Mississippi Civil Defense Council. Copies of the letter were sent both to E.A. Khayat, president of the Jackson 15 County Board of Supervisors, and Mel Schneider of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Jackson County. The letter said: This letter has reference to the spillway at Spring Lake Village in Jackson County which was damaged by Hurricane Frederick [sic]. Please accept this letter as a request for a Damage Survey Report on this spillway, sometimes called the Lake O’ Pines dam [a/k/a Spring Lake Dam]. Even though this appears to be private property, it is a public way for use by the general public including the residents and future residences [sic] in a 48 lot subdivision, in addition to fishermen in the county. Jackson County did not accept maintenance of this spillway as part of the Spring Lake Village Subdivision, but the fact of the matter is that once the developer sells the lots, there is not one of responsibility to maintain the spillway. Therefore, Jackson County had no choice but to maintain this public way and has done so since it was constructed in 1973. I hope you will be able to assist us in this matter. (Emphasis added.) ¶27. As the chancellor noted, Michelle Coats, director of the Jackson County Planning Commission at the time of the present proceedings in 2012, testified that “[a] Damage Survey Report was what was previously used by FEMA, or by the county, to request funding from FEMA to make repairs to infrastructure damaged in a natural disaster or a declared natural disaster,” for “reimbursement for repairs made to damaged infrastructure.” The chancellor found that no evidence was presented by the McBrooms that Jackson County repaired the dam in the aftermath of Hurricane Frederic or received funds from FEMA as reimbursement for having done so. But, even without documentation of the actual performance of such work, the Bennett letter, quoted above, appeared on official Jackson County Planning Commission letterhead and was drafted and sent in an effort to obtain funds from FEMA, either to restore 16 the dam or to receive reimbursement for having done so. The letter acknowledged the public use of the roadway, both for the residents of the subdivision and for local fishermen and, moreover, recognized that Jackson County had maintained the roadway since its construction. ¶28. Reasonable minds may differ on the question of whether the Bennett letter rises to the level of the express acceptance contemplated by Kinnare, 55 Miss. at 621 (citations omitted), “by the formal act of the proper authority competent to speak and act for the public,” since a county planning commission is by statute an instrumentality of the county board of supervisors. Miss. Code Ann. § 17-1-11 (Rev. 2012). Nevertheless, Mississippi Code Section 17-1-11(3) (Rev. 2012) vests the local planning commission with the authority, “in the performance of its duties,” to “cooperate with, contract with, or accept funds from federal, state or local agencies or private individuals or corporations and may expend such funds . . . .” An official letter from the director of the Jackson County Planning Commission to a representative of the Governor of Mississippi, copied to the president of the Jackson County Board of Supervisors and to a FEMA official, evidences a representation by Jackson County both to federal and state authorities respecting the county’s need for funds either to repair the damage to Spring Lake Dam or to reimburse the county for having done so. This cannot be seen as anything other than an overture by local government to the federal government for public monies to be used for public purposes, not private purposes. ¶29. Further, this Court has held that acceptance can be manifested by failure to assess taxes on a street. City of Jackson v. Laird, 99 Miss. 476, 55 So. 41, 42 (1911). In Laird, the City of Jackson assessed blocks and lots in the “Split addition” area for taxation, but it did not assess the streets and avenues. Id. One particular street, “Convent [A]venue . . . has not been 17 graded nor worked by the city, but has been used to a limited extent by the public,” though other streets and avenues in the “Split addition” area had been “worked and kept in repair by the municipal authorities and used by the public.” Id. According to the Court, “[t]hese facts constitute an acceptance by the city of the dedication to public use of the streets and avenues of ‘Split addition,’ including those streets and avenues which have not been graded and kept in repair.” Id. (citations omitted). Here, Mary Ann Fontenot, from the Mapping Department of the Jackson County Tax Assessor’s Office, testified at trial that the roadway over Spring Lake Dam was “[n]ot being taxed” and that it had not been taxed since she began working with the Mapping Department in 1993. Fontenot further testified that, although she was not employed with Jackson County in 1972, the maps she was examining dated back to 1972. Thus, under Laird, the protracted failure of Jackson County to assess real estate taxes to the Spring Lake Dam demonstrates implied acceptance by the county of its dedication to public use. ¶30. Jackson County emphasized Mississippi Code Section 65-7-4(1) (Rev. 2012), which requires counties to “prepare and adopt an official map designating and delineating all public roads on the county road system.” Subsection 5 of Section 65-7-4 provides that “[t]he county road system register shall have priority in case of conflict between the register and the official map.” Citing an opinion of the Mississippi Attorney General, Jackson County argued that this provision clarified which roads were county roads and which roads were not county road for the purpose of maintenance. The chancellor agreed, finding that, “[a]lthough the Court finds the absence of taxes and inclusion of the roadway on the county road map index relevant,” the statute “clearly grants the county road register priority.” But the issue is not a “conflict 18 between the register and the official map,” to which Section 65-7-4(5) applies. What is at issue is whether the failure of Jackson County to tax the roadway and the Spring Lake Dam for more than three decades supports a finding of an implied acceptance under the common law of this State.2 We find that it does. See Richardson v. Warwick, 8 Miss. 131, 137 (1843) (“An act of the legislature, in derogation of the common law, is strictly construed, and is carried no farther than the words of the act carry it, and the remedy is always within legislative control.”) ¶31. Likewise, Jackson County recites that “it is settled in our state that mere user by the public, without more, is not sufficient to constitute an implied acceptance.” City of Columbus v. Payne, 155 Miss. 170, 124 So. 269 (1929). Jackson County contests the sufficiency of evidence presented by the McBrooms to support a finding of Jackson County’s acceptance of the dam’s dedication to public use. But, not only did the public use the roadway over Spring Lake Dam for more than thirty years as the sole means of ingress and egress in and out of the Spring Lake Subdivision; the county also represented to FEMA that it had accepted an obligation to maintain the property. Further, it is clear that Jackson County declined to assess taxes against the property since at least 1972. All support a finding that Jackson County accepted Spring Lake Dam and its roadway under the common law of this State. ¶32. Furthermore, with regard to implied acceptance, this Court clarified that “[c]ontinued user when taken in connection with the working of the road for nearly twenty years at public 2 Further, Section 65-7-4, which went into effect on July 1, 1998, required adoption of an official map “[o]n or before July 1, 2000.” The statute would have no relevance to an analysis of common law dedication and acceptance of a purported county road constructed in 1972. 19 expense should be deemed to have been a sufficient acceptance.” Armstrong v. Itawamba County, 195 Miss. 802, 16 So. 2d 752, 757 (1944). In Armstrong, this Court sustained an injunction against the Armstrongs, who had erected a gate in an effort to obstruct a road that Itawamba County claimed to have been dedicated to public use and had accepted. Id. at 758. The Court noted that “it does not appear that such traveled route has ever been designated as a public road by an order of the board of supervisors, so far as may affirmatively appear from the minutes of the board,” but that the evidence showed “that the roadway in question was used as a neighborhood or settlement road and worked by the local citizens of the community, when worked at all, for many years prior to 1924, and thereafter at public expense continuously until the year 1941, when such obstructions were placed therein . . . .” Id. at 753. ¶33. Likewise, in the 1973 case of Hearn v. Morrow, this Court held that a private road was dedicated to public use and accepted by the Rankin County Board of Supervisors where the roadway has been used by school buses and the lot owners; the road has been maintained by Rankin County by the installation of 13 culverts on the road; north of the roadway water and electric lines have been installed and south of the roadway a telephone line has been installed for the use of the property owners, all of the utility lines being within the 50 foot right-of-way designated by the plat; at the time of the trial two homes and five trailers were located on lots sold by the appellees; the lot owners, other than appellants, were using the road with no restrictions; an additional 228 acres was to be developed utilizing such road and from a totality of the circumstances shown by the proof in this case appellees manifested an intention for the public to have and enjoy a highway on their property. Hearn v. Morrow, 272 So. 2d 645, 647 (Miss. 1973) (emphasis added). The Court held that “a public road was established by implication from the circumstances shown by the evidence in this cause . . . .” Id. 20 ¶34. Here, Ralph McBroom testified without contradiction that the roadway crossing Spring Lake Dam was utilized by members of the public as the sole entry to the subdivision, at least until the 2006 construction of the Lee Taylor Road: “the garbage man, the mailman, everyone, UPS man. They all–well, matter of fact, he still comes over that thing. But no one had any problems with the road.” He further testified that the Spring Lake Dam “was mowed. It was kept clean. And I assumed someone did it and I assume it was the county.” McBroom then stated, “I saw one person that was maintaining it one time and he was on a Jackson County truck, pulling one of those lawn mowers and he was mowing the grass. But that’s the only one that I can swear to that I ever saw mowing the grass. But nevertheless the grass was mowed by someone.” However, Butch Loper, the present assistant road manager for Jackson County and previous road superintendent for the Jackson County Central Road Department, testified contrarily that he gave his road crews specific instructions not to mow the dam. The road crews “were to stop at each end of the dam.” Loper testified that he utilized the dam for ingress and egress to and from the Spring Lake Subdivision, but that “county end of maintenance” road signs were on the dam at least since the early 1990s. But Loper also testified that there were county road signs and a “Slow, Children at Play” sign that “would have been put up by the county.” ¶35. Geraldine McBroom testified that, from the time she and Ralph moved into their new home in 1987, she gardened a great deal outside and, like her husband, saw Jackson County personnel in Jackson County vehicles maintaining the dam. She stated that she saw Jackson County personnel cutting the grass “[w]ith a mower, with a side mower, and may have, on occasion, come with just the straight mower. I never had to really worry about the–outside our 21 property because they kept it mowed.” She testified further that the county once filled in pot holes along the roadway over Spring Lake Dam. Joe Neal, the current Jackson County road manager and former Jackson County West Division road superintendent, testified also that, some time between 2001 and 2002, “[o]ne of our crews accidentally patched some potholes” in the roadway over Spring Lake Dam. With regard to the county’s placement of “county end of maintenance” signs, Neal testified that “[t]he only signs I saw were some that were posted up, I don’t know, maybe a year ago that said the county didn’t maintain this section of the roadway.” ¶36. That Jackson County regularly maintained the roadway over Spring Lake Dam was contested at the bench trial. The chancellor held “the McBrooms’ testimony regarding isolated incidents of maintenance by the County to be insufficient to prove implied acceptance by the County.” The evidence presented by the McBrooms that Jackson County at least once had mowed the Spring Lake Dam, had erected county signs along the dam’s roadway, and once had filled in a pothole on the roadway, alone, is too attenuated to warrant a finding of implied acceptance by the county. But that evidence, viewed in conjunction with the Jackson County Planning Commission’s letter to FEMA in which it acknowledged maintenance responsibility for the dam and its roadway and the testimony that the dam never was taxed by the county, preponderate in favor of a finding of an implied acceptance by the county under the common law of this State. All essential public services, including mail services, fire, police, and anyone else desirous of entering or departing the Spring Lake Subdivision, were required for more than thirty years to use the roadway over Spring Lake Dam. Further, roads approved, accepted, and maintained by the county within the Spring Lake Subdivision were accessed by 22 county vehicles and work crews via the roadway over Spring Lake Dam. 3 Considering the totality of the circumstances, we find that “a public road was established by implication from the circumstances shown by the evidence in this cause . . . .” Hearn, 272 So. 2d at 647. ¶37. We agree with the dissent that “the chancellor had all of this evidence in front of her, as well as the benefit of observing the parties during the trial.” (Emphasis in original.) But in Skates v. Bryant, the only case upon which the dissent relies to support its position, this Court held that the chancellor committed no manifest error in finding that no common law dedication had occurred, since “there was absolutely no evidence that George Bryant intended to donate the road to public use or to benefit the public in any way. The road was intended to be used by the residents of the trailer park, a restrictive group of people, not the public in general.” Skates v. Bryant, 863 So. 2d 907, 911 (Miss. 2003) (emphasis added). Here, ample evidence was adduced that the land had been both dedicated to public use and accepted by Jackson County, but the chancellor’s analysis did not take into account the common law of dedication and acceptance. ¶38. We do not fault the chancellor for her findings of fact; but the application of the common law of dedication and acceptance constitutes a question of law, subject to de novo review by this Court. See Lowrey, 25 So. 3d at 625 (citing Chesney, 910 So. 2d at 1060). The chancellor held that “the McBrooms’ testimony regarding isolated incidents of maintenance by the County” was “insufficient to prove implied acceptance by the County,” since “Miss. 3 Jackson County’s brief states that “while the county accepted the roads within the legal description of the subdivision, when they approved the plat, they did not accept the roadway over the dam.” 23 Code Ann. § 65-7-4 mandates that the county road register shall have priority.” With utmost respect to the learned chancellor, that analysis does not appear to have taken into account the common law of dedication and acceptance. As we stated above, Section 65-7-4 applies to a “conflict between the register and the official map,” a scenario inapposite to the present one. The chancellor thus erred as a matter of law. ¶39. While the chancellor correctly concluded that Jackson County was not obligated to maintain the roadway over Spring Lake Dam by virtue of the dedication statutes, the chancellor erred by not finding that Jackson County was so obligated under the common law of dedication and acceptance.