Opinion ID: 146224
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rotation of Responsibilities

Text: Next, Morales asserts claims for both discrimination and retaliation arising from the incident in which plaintiff's duties and responsibilities were awarded to a female employee and he was given window clerk duties to perform. Morales I, 339 F.3d at 18. We hold that this temporary rotation of Morales's preferred distribution duties to a female clerk fails to qualify as an adverse employment action for purposes of either claim. Morales was required to perform window duties rather than distribution duties for only a limited period of time, those duties fell within his job description (indeed, which he bid for), and there was evidence that on other, albeit rare, occasions he had performed window duties in the normal course of his employment. Cf. Butler v. Ala. Dep't of Transp., 536 F.3d 1209, 1215 (11th Cir.2008) (Requiring an employee to perform her job is not a change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment.). Morales himself testified that, I was trained for [window duties]. I could do [them]. I was prepared to do [them]. Such a minor disruption in the tasks Morales preferred to perform cannot, as a matter of law, sustain his claim for damages under Title VII's antidiscrimination provision. See Marrero, 304 F.3d at 23 (secretary's permanent, lateral reassignment to work in same capacity for different boss did not rise to level of an adverse employment action where her general job description and salary remained the same, notwithstanding the fact that she was required to do more work, subjected to `extreme supervision,' and forced to undergo a period of probation); see also Washington v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir.2005) (explaining that a lateral transfer that does not affect pay (or significantly affect working conditions) cannot be called discriminatory). [15] Nor can this temporary rotation of responsibilities qualify as an adverse employment action for purposes of his retaliation claim. In appropriate circumstances, disadvantageous work assignments may qualify as materially adverse, but Morales's temporary reassignment is a far cry from those situations where we have found actionable retaliation. See generally Valentín-Almeyda v. Municipality of Aguadilla, 447 F.3d 85, 95 (1st Cir.2006) (finding a totality of assignments, which included a police officer's transfer for an unusually long duration to a remote and solitary duty site that was regarded as punishment by officers, to constitute adverse employment action). While Morales testified that the window duties presented certain physical difficulties in light of his arm condition, he made it crystal clear that he was able to perform those duties as long as it was not for a long time and he did not state that he experienced any unique hardship as a result of performing window tasks. There is no evidence that window duties were more difficult, less prestigious, or objectively inferior to Morales's distribution duties; rather, the gravamen of Morales's complaint is that he preferred his regular assignment. Compare Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 71, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (holding that permanent reassignment of a female forklift operator to track laborer was a materially adverse action where there was considerable evidence that the track laborer duties were `by all accounts more arduous and dirtier'; that the `forklift operator position required more qualifications, which is an indication of prestige'; and that `the forklift operator position was objectively considered a better job and the male employees resented [the plaintiff] for occupying it'). Under the circumstances, we hold that the temporary rotation of Morales preferred window duties does not qualify as materially adverse and cannot support his claims under Title VII.