Opinion ID: 813403
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mr. Race’s Admission to Selling Drugs

Text: Mr. Race argues that the district court improperly admitted the statement, “I meet ‘em afterwards sometimes and sell ‘em dope,” without any consideration of Rule 404(b). The court held the statement was admissible as a party admission under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A), that Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) was inapplicable, and that the evidence was -8- properly admitted under Fed. R. Evid. 403 because the probative value of the statement outweighed any prejudice.
Before trial, the Government indicated that it intended to introduce the “I sometimes sell ‘em dope” statement as evidence that Mr. Race possessed the narcotics with the intent to distribute them. Mr. Race objected because the statement did not refer to selling drugs on the day he was arrested, but instead referred to earlier activities. As such, the evidence would improperly suggest that Mr. Race was acting in conformity with past conduct. The court declined to rule in advance on this issue. Mr. Race renewed his objection at trial. He argued that it was not clear from the conversation when the events referred to in the statement occurred, and that the statement could refer to events that occurred long before the day Mr. Race was arrested. The testimony would therefore “invite the jury to conclude . . . that Mr. Race was simply acting in conformity with past conduct,” in violation of Rule 404(b). ROA, Vol. 2 at 510-11. The court stated, “I’m not so sure it’s a 404(b) issue. What we’re really talking about is a direct statement made by Race. . . . And the real question is whether or not the prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value because these are the actual words of the defendant.” Id. at 511. The court subsequently ruled, “I’m going to let it in. I find under 403 that the probative value of the words . . . outweighs any prejudicial effect or confusion of the issue. So under 403 I’ll let that come in over objection.” Id. at 513. -9-
“We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, and pay deference to the trial court’s familiarity with the case and experience in evidentiary matters.” Abraham v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 685 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2012). “A district court abuses its discretion where it commits a legal error or relies on clearly erroneous factual findings, or where there is no rational basis in the evidence for its ruling.” Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 703, 709 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted). If we find that there has been an abuse of discretion, we must determine whether the error was harmless. James River Ins. Co. v. Rapid Funding, LLC, 658 F.3d 1207, 1212 (10th Cir. 2011). “An erroneous admission of evidence is harmless unless it had a substantial influence on the outcome or leaves one in grave doubt as to whether it had such effect.” Id. (quotations omitted). We have also stated that “error in the admission or exclusion of evidence is harmless if it does not affect the substantial rights of the parties, and the burden of demonstrating that substantial rights were affected rests with the party asserting error.” United States v. Arutunoff, 1 F.3d 1112, 1118 (10th Cir. 1993); see also Okland Oil Co. v. Conoco Inc., 144 F.3d 1308, 1327 (10th Cir. 1998). The district court erred in concluding that, because the statement came from Mr. Race, Rule 404(b) was not applicable.1 We have held that “[a]lthough . . . statements are 1 Rule 404(b) states: “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). -10- party admissions under Rule 801(d) and thus not hearsay, they must nevertheless also be analyzed for admissibility under Rule 404(b) [when] they reveal or suggest prior criminal conduct.” United States v. Oberle, 136 F.3d 1414, 1418 (10th Cir. 1998). Although Mr. Race’s statement may have referred to criminal conduct on the day he was arrested, it more strongly suggests prior criminal conduct. The district court should therefore have analyzed the statement’s admissibility under Rule 404(b). Mr. Race, however, fails to demonstrate that the error was harmful in light of the substantial evidence against him. When he was arrested, baggies containing 3.592 grams of methamphetamine, additional baggies, a loaded handgun, two loaded magazines, over $600 in cash, and a small digital scale were taken from him. In addition, when speaking by phone with an unidentified woman while in prison, she told him that she had “thought [he was] just getting high.” Aplee. Br. Attachment 4. He responded, “Well, how do you get high? It ain’t free.” Id. In another call with an unidentified woman, he spoke about “hook[ing]” others up and “g[etting] ‘em all high.” Id. Finally, in a recorded interview with an investigator while in prison, he stated, “You saw how much money and dope I got caught with.” Id., Attachment 2. Given this evidence of guilt, we are not convinced that the error in the admission of Mr. Race’s statement “had a substantial influence on the outcome,” and we are not left “in grave doubt as to whether [the error] had such effect.” James River, 658 F.3d at 1212 (quotations omitted). Although the district court erred in failing to apply Rule 404(b) to the admissibility of Mr. Race’s statement, the error was harmless. -11-