Opinion ID: 774603
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: issues

Text: 53 Styron complains that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial because of his counsel's failures to object (1) to certain voir dire statements by the State regarding punishment (the weighing of mitigating evidence against aggravating factors); (2) to Styron's trial pursuant to a capital murder statute not effective at the time all elements of the crime were committed or to jury instructions that did not expressly condition guilt upon the finding beyond a reasonable doubt that all elements were committed after the statute's effective date; and (3) to the State's impeachment of Clark. He further complains that on appeal his appellate counsel failed to pursue these issues or to allege ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, and that such failures constitute ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. 54 To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense--that the errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, that is, a trial the result of which is reliable. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Only a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment suffices. Id. This court has concluded that only if counsel's acts fell beneath an objective standard of reasonable professional assistance has he failed to function as counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Gray v. Lynn, 6 F.3d 265, 268 (5th Cir. 1993). 55 There is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance or sound trial strategy. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The petitioner must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged to be outside the bounds of reasonable professional judgment, and the court must then determine whether, in light of all of the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the range of professionally competent assistance. Id. at 690. 56 Because a criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to the effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal as of right,see Lombard v. Lynaugh, 868 F.2d 1475, 1479 (5th Cir. 1989), theStrickland standard applies to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel by both trial and appellate counsel. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; United States v. Merida, 985 F.2d 198, 202 (5th Cir. 1993). 57 We adopt the district court findings that in light of all of the circumstances and considering the affidavit of Styron's trial counsel, Gary W. Bunyard, 1 the identified acts and omissions were within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance or sound trial strategy. Styron has failed to show that counsel's trial performance was deficient, that it prejudiced his defense, or that he was deprived of a fair trial therefrom. 58 Each of the grounds underlying the alleged errors by counsel on appeal have been discussed previously and found to lack merit. Therefore, appellate counsel's failure to pursue relief on those bases does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel since no prejudice resulted therefrom and because the reliability of the result of the appeal was not undermined thereby. 59 Accordingly, as each of the grounds raised to establish ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal have been resolved against Styron by this court, Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing of the deprivation of a constitutional right. No COA will issue with respect to these issues.