Opinion ID: 518096
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proffered waivers.

Text: 31 Once the decision was made to admit Harper's testimony, it was inevitable that Simels would become a witness--either sworn or unsworn--in the proceedings, thus requiring the disqualification of Simels as Brooks Davis' counsel under Disciplinary Rule 5-102(A). Brooks Davis contends, however, that the disqualification of Simels, and consequently the declaration of a mistrial, could have been avoided by a series of proposed waivers. Specifically, defendant argues that he has the right, under the sixth amendment, to retain Simels as counsel and to waive any direct challenge to Harper's testimony in order to prevent Simels from becoming a witness. Defendant further argues that the district court abused its discretion in declining to honor his waiver of conflict-free counsel. We find these contentions to be without merit. 32 We have recognized that the right to retain counsel of choice is a right of constitutional dimension. United States v. Wisniewski, 478 F.2d 274, 285 (2d Cir.1973). The right, however, is not absolute. As the Supreme Court has recently stated, the essential aim of the [Sixth] Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers. Wheat v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1697, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). 33 Relying on Cunningham and United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881 (2d Cir.1982), defendant asserts that he is entitled to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to be represented by conflict-free counsel, and thus retain Simels as counsel. Defendant's argument, however, evinces little appreciation for the nature of the conflict enveloping Simels. The conflict here is not the more usual one of multiple representation. United States v. Cancilla, 725 F.2d 867, 870 (2d Cir.1984). Rather, counsel has been placed in the position of having to worry about allegations of his own misconduct. As we noted in Cancilla, [w]hat could be more of a conflict than a concern over getting oneself into trouble with criminal law enforcement authorities? Id. 34 In the district court's view, 35 Mr. Simels ... has exposed himself to charges of the greatest misconduct. He has a personal stake in the matter. Whether he is ever indicted for a criminal violation, I don't know. But he certainly has a problem which will eventually go before the grievance committee of this court as to whether he is to be disciplined in this court. And in any event, he is and he knows it and it has been stated by the court, he is now accused of very serious misconduct, potentially criminal in nature. 36 Thus, if the court had accepted Brooks Davis' proffered waiver of conflict-free counsel, he would have been represented by counsel encumbered with a strong incentive to conduct the trial in a manner that would minimize counsel's own exposure. This conflict would continue to exist even if all references to Simels were redacted from Harper's testimony, or if Brooks Davis waived the presentation of any direct rebuttal to Harper's testimony. 37 The extent to which a district court may override a defendant's waiver of his attorney's conflict of interest has recently been explored by the Supreme Court. In Wheat, the Court recognized that [f]ederal courts have an independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them. 108 S.Ct. at 1697. To this end, a district court should not be required to tolerate an inadequate representation of a defendant. Id. at 1698 (quoting United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1184 (3d Cir.1978)). Consequently, where a court justifiably finds an actual conflict of interest, there can be no doubt that it may decline a proffer of waiver. Id. 38 The testimony of Harper was very powerful evidence against Brooks Davis. As the district court explained, by waiving the right to call Simels, Brooks Davis would be foregoing the presentation of the most relevant evidence on the point, evidence that would be of great assistance to Brooks Davis if it were true. Furthermore, this waiver was offered by Brooks Davis in order to retain the representation of an attorney saddled with a serious conflict of interest. While the prospect of allowing someone to defend himself with one hand tied behind his back may present an interesting spectacle in a wrestling ring, the court's institutional interest in the rendition of just verdicts in criminal cases, id., and the proper administration of justice require that a criminal defendant not be so encumbered. 39 Since we agree with the district court's decision declining Brooks Davis' proffered waiver, we find the disqualification of Simels to have been proper, and thus the declaration of a mistrial as to Brooks Davis to have been a manifest necessity. 40