Opinion ID: 2267972
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The TPR factors.

Text: With the foregoing case law as background, we turn to the TPR factors set forth in D.C.Code § 16-2353(b), and reproduced at page 999-1000, supra. The trial judge, who appeared to be focusing, in part, on the issue of abandonment, did not explicitly invoke the statutory criteria, and the record thus contains no explicit findings with respect to each relevant provision. Nevertheless, we conclude that the judge made findings which satisfy each of these criteria, and that his findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence. (1) J.G. Jr.'s need for continuity of care and caretakers and for timely integration into a stable and permanent home. D.C.Code § 16-2353(b)(1). The judge heard and credited testimony indeed, it was undisputedthat J.G. Jr. had lived continuously with his great-aunt from the age of seven months. The judge also found that J.G. Jr. had made an excellent adjustment in the greataunt's home: This [c]ourt found from the content of [the great-aunt's] answers and her manner of responding that she was fully committed and dedicated to the child's welfare to the same extent one would expect of a birth mother in caring for her own child. The social worker, Donita King, testified that she had observed the child with the caretaker-petitioner and he had made an excellent adjustment in her care. She makes sure he sees the doctor as required and he is now healthy and thriving. She has him in Day School and he is now making excellent progress. She concluded that she has no concerns about the quality of care the Petitioner is giving the child and would recommend adoption. [18] By contrast, the boy had not lived with his mother since the shameful abuse to which he was subjected during the first seven months of his life. The record demonstrates beyond dispute that at the time of the hearing, and by her own admission, the mother was unable to provide a home for J.G. Jr. at all. Moreover, the prospects that she could offer J.G. Jr. continuity of care, stability, and permanence in the foreseeable future were so speculative as to be effectively non-existent. In the four years since J.G. Jr. was removed from her care, the mother had made virtually no effort or progress towards reintegrating her son into her home. She apparently hoped to lived with him in Section 8 public housing; the father, to whom the mother is married, contemplated that J.G. Jr. would live with him, with or without the mother, in Oxon Hill, Maryland. This critical difference in the expectations of the two parents demonstrates the speculative character of any plan to reunify J.G. Jr. with his parents or with either one of them. If the petition for adoption had been denied, J.G. Jr., who remained a neglected child for whom the mother was in no position to make a home, would have been left in legal limbo for an uncertain period of time, with no visible light at the end of the tunnel. The judge's findings, quoted at pages 998-99, supra, are consistent with this record, and his conclusion that the mother lacked the capacity to be an effective parent, while perhaps not compelled by the evidence, could reasonably be viewed in light of the record as a whole, as having been established by clear and convincing evidence. (2) The physical, mental and emotional health of all individuals involved to the degree that such affects the welfare of the child, the decisive consideration being the physical, mental and emotional needs of the child. D.C.Code § 16-2353(b)(2). The trial judge did not articulate his findings in terms of this criterion, but those that he did make leave no doubt as to how he viewed this issue. The finding, quoted at pages 1001, supra, that J.G. Jr. had made an excellent adjustment in the great-aunt's custody and that the great-aunt was fully committed to his welfare demonstrates that, in the judge's view, the physical, mental and emotional needs of the child were being fully met. There was evidence, on the other hand, that J.G. Jr. had been seriously abused in the home of his biological parents. [C]hild abuse[, like spousal abuse,] does not ordinarily consist of a single isolated act of molestation, L.L., 653 A.2d at 881 (quoting In re S. G., 581 A.2d at 778 n. 11), and, although several years had passed since the unconscionable treatment of J.G. Jr. during his infancy, the judge was obliged to include in his calculus the possibility that such conduct could recur. Moreover, where, as in this case, a small child has spent almost his entire life in the care of the prospective adoptive parent, and where his contact with his birth mother has been quite limited, it may be damaging to the child's welfare to extract him from the only home he has ever known. See L.W., 613 A.2d at 355; cf. In re Hazuka's Adoption, 345 Pa. 432, 29 A.2d 88, 90 (1942). The judge further found that the mother was intellectually limited, that she lacked parenting skills, and that her interest in her son was likewise limited; she contributed none of her claimed earnings to his support, never gave him a single gift (even the teddy bear suggested by the great-aunt), and, at least until shortly before the hearing, visited him only sporadically. Although the great-aunt acknowledged that J.G. Jr. and his mother loved each other testimony that the trial judge unaccountably failed to mention either in his oral decision or in his written findingswe conclude that the existence of love from a virtual stranger could not satisfy J.G. Jr.'s emotional needs. (3) The quality of the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parent[s], siblings, relative[s], and/or caretakers, including the foster parent. D.C.Code § 16-2353(b)(3). The evidence and the judge's findings relevant to this TPR criterion have largely been covered by our discussion of the other two criteria. The quality of the interaction between J.G. Jr. and his mother after the boy was removed from the mother's home could fairly be characterized as favorable but fragmentary. [19] Unfortunately, no evidence was introduced by either party as to the whereabouts of J.G. Jr.'s siblings or as to his relationship, if any, with them. As previously noted, and although this was not the focus of the hearing, there appears to be no question that the interaction between J.G. Jr. and his great-aunt was favorable. The foregoing discussion demonstrates, in our view, that the judge's findings and the evidence in the record are overwhelmingly favorable to the great-aunt's position with respect to the first two TPR criteria. The evidence as to the third is somewhat fragmentary, but what we have is likewise favorable to the great-aunt's position. Our task would certainly have been easier if the trial judge had expressly applied the criteria set forth in § 16-2353(b) and had framed his findings accordingly. Theoretically, we could remand the case for new findings more closely and explicitly linked to the provisions of the TPR statute. [20] But given the emphatic character of the judge's findingsbeyond a reasonable doubt rather than the required clear and convincing evidence and the compelling evidence that the mother offered no realistic alternative to adoption, we are satisfied that any rephrased findings on remand would not alter the result that the judge reached, so that a remand would be both unnecessary and futile. Simply stated, `the law does not require the doing of a futile act.' Hercules & Co. v. Shama Rest. Corp., 613 A.2d 916, 921 (D.C.1992) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980)); see also In re Melton, 597 A.2d 892, 908 (D.C.1991) (en banc). Accordingly, we do not believe that a remand is appropriate.