Opinion ID: 2215876
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Credit under sec. 973.04, Stats.

Text: Next, Avila asserts that under sec. 973.04, Stats., he is entitled to credit against his confinement as a condition of probation for the time he spent serving his original two-year sentence before withdrawing his plea. Section 973.04 provides: When a sentence is vacated and a new sentence is imposed upon the defendant for the same crime, the department shall credit the defendant with confinement previously served. The State contends that confinement as a condition of probation is not a sentence for purposes of this statute, and therefore, Avila is not entitled to credit. [5,6] Resolution of this issue requires us to interpret sec. 973.04, Stats. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law which we review de novo. Revenue Dept. v. Milwaukee Brewers, 111 Wis. 2d 571, 577, 331 N.W.2d 383 (1983). We first consider the plain language of the statute to determine whether its intent is clear on its face. Voss v. City of Middleton, 162 Wis. 2d 737, 749, 470 N.W.2d 625 (1991). [7] We conclude that intent of the statute is clear on its face. The statute provides that credit shall be granted when a new sentence is imposed. We have long held that confinement as a condition of probation is not considered a sentence. See Prue, 63 Wis. 2d at 114; State v. Gloudemanns, 73 Wis. 2d 514, 519, 243 N.W.2d 220 (1976). In Prue, we were asked to determine whether a defendant who had been confined in a reforestation camp as a condition of probation under sec. 973.09(1), Stats., was entitled to good time credits pursuant to sec. 56.07. Prue, 63 Wis. 2d at 111-12. Section 56.07 provided: Inmates of a reforestation camp sentenced to such camp for less than one year or in lieu of a county jail sentence shall be subject to [the good time credit statute]. Relying in Prue on several sources which recognized the difference between a sentence and probation, id. at 114, we concluded that the term sentence in sec. 56.07 did not include confinement as a condition of probation in a reforestation camp. As such, a defendant confined in a reforestation camp pursuant to probation was not entitled to good time credits under sec. 56.07. We stated: Probation is an alternative to a sentence; ... There are public policy considerations why a committing court should have a wide choice in dealing with a convicted person in regard to his punishment and rehabilitation. The trial court should have leeway if probation is to be an effective tool of rehabilitation. Id. [8] This same reasoning is applicable to sec. 973.04, Stats. We distinguish between confinement as a condition of probation and a sentence within the context of this statute in order to recognize the respective goals of each: rehabilitation and punishment. Unlike a prison sentence, probation is designed to permit the offender to `prove' himself or herself without being punishedto foster rehabilitation and to `help the probationer become a useful member of society.' State v. Meddaugh, 148 Wis. 2d 204, 212, 435 N.W.2d 269 (1988) (citing Wagner v. State, 89 Wis. 2d 70, 77, 277 N.W.2d 849 (1979). As stated in depth earlier in this opinion, this is accomplished by affording the circuit court latitude in determining appropriate conditions of probation such as a temporary period of confinement. Consistent with this reasoning, we conclude that confinement as a condition of probation is not a sentence for purposes of sec. 973.04. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the circuit court. We do not address Avila's argument that denying credit for the earlier time spent in prison could force a person in his position to be incarcerated longer than the maximum sentence for the crime. Avila has already completed his time in county jail, and thus the issue is moot as applied to him. Furthermore, a probationer would not be forced to spend more time in jail (while on probation) than the maximum sentence for the crime because the probationer retains the right to refuse probation. See Garski v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 62, 77, 248 N.W.2d 425 (1977). Finally, the total time Avila spent incarcerated did not exceed the maximum sentence under the statutes. Accordingly, we affirm this portion of the circuit court's order.