Opinion ID: 779652
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Burden on Defendant to Prove Mitigating Factors

Text: 5 On appeal, Valdovinos-Soloache first contends that his prior sentence of ten years imprisonment was improperly used as a factor under the U.S.S.G. to adjust his base offense upward. The government presented evidence of Valdovinos-Soloache's previous ten-year sentence for his 1988 conviction for delivery of a controlled substance. At sentencing, the district court imposed a 16-level upward adjustment in the defendant's base offense pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, which provides for such an adjustment when a sentence of more than thirteen months imprisonment for drug trafficking has been imposed previously on the offender. 6 Valdovinos-Soloache contests this upward adjustment, arguing that because he was released from prison five months into his sentence and immediately deported, his prior sentence should be viewed as a sentence of less than thirteen months, and therefore subject under the U.S.S.G. to only a 12-level upward adjustment. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 (b)(1)(B)(2001). The Guideline states that (I)f the defendant previously was deported, or unlawfully remained in the United States, after — (A) a conviction for a felony that is (I) a drug trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed exceeded 13 months the court should increase the base offense level by 16 levels. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). The same section also provides a lesser upward adjustment if the previously imposed sentence was for less than 13 months. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B). In a clarification, the commentary indicates that: (I)f all or any part of a sentence of imprisonment was probated, suspended, deferred or stayed, `sentence imposed' refers only to that portion that was not probated, suspended, deferred or stayed. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 (b)(1)(A), app. note 1(A)(iv). 7 Generally, the government bears the burden of proving facts relevant to sentencing. See United States v. Williams, 247 F.3d 353, 358 n. 7 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that the government's proof of cocaine in defendant's possession was insufficient to show intent to distribute). However, the party seeking to benefit from a particular fact or facts often bears the burden of persuading the court. See, e.g., See United States v. Butler, 970 F.2d 1017, 1027 (2d Cir.1992)(after government's prima facie showing of applicability of the career offender sentencing guideline, burden shifted to defendant to show that prior crimes were common plan or scheme and therefore career offender enhancement was inapplicable).; United States v. Garcia, 920 F.2d 153, 156 (2d Cir.1990)(per curiam)(defendant sought downward adjustment but failed to convince court of his minor role in the offense); see also United States v. Font-Ramirez, 944 F.2d 42, 49 (1st Cir.1991)(government bore the burden of proving sufficient facts to justify sentence enhancement). This is especially true where, as here, a defendant seeks to qualify for an exception to an otherwise applicable provision that would increase his sentence. We need not decide whether that burden is fully one of persuasion or only a burden of production, sufficient to put the matter in issue, at least as to facts to which the government generally has easier access. See Butler, 970 F.2d at 1026 (noting significance of access to facts as relevant to burden of proof issues). 8 Valdovinos-Soloache produced no evidence that any part of his 1988 sentence was probated, suspended, deferred or stayed. The government showed the fact of his prior conviction and sentence using a Certificate of Conviction from the relevant court. The Certificate recorded the ten-year sentence for delivery of a controlled substance, but made no mention of any probation, suspension, deferral or stay of that sentence. The PSR summarized Valdovinos-Soloache's criminal history, corroborating his sentencing in September of 1988 to ten years incarceration and reflecting the short length of time served for that sentence. Additionally, the PSR characterized the 1989 release and deportation of the defendant as parole on February 20, 1989 and deportation the following day. Acting on the evidence before it, the district court found that the sentence imposed on Valdovinos-Soloache exceeded thirteen months imprisonment and adjusted his base offense level upward accordingly. 9 Valdovinos-Soloache challenges the PSR as insufficient evidence that his release in 1989 was actually parole rather than probation, suspension, deferral or a stay of his sentence. He further asserts that the government failed to prove that his 1988 sentence was not probated, suspended, deferred or stayed. Without probing the meaning of each of these terms, we can put his argument to rest. 10 Because the defendant was seeking an exception to a guideline enhancement that the government had proven was prima facie applicable, he bore at least the burden of production, if not the burden of persuasion, to show that his prior ten-year sentence, established by official court documents to have been imposed, was subject to one of the exceptions that would qualify him for a lesser enhancement. Butler, 970 F.2d at 1026. Thus, he needed to at least produce some evidence suggesting that all or some part of his 1988 sentence was probated, suspended, deferred, or stayed — resulting in his release after serving only five months. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, app. note 1(A)(iv). Had he met this burden, the Guidelines would have prescribed only a 12-level upward adjustment from his base offense level. However, since the defendant produced no such evidence, we find no error in the court's finding that the sentence previously imposed on Valdovinos-Soloache was a ten-year sentence of imprisonment. Accordingly, we also find no fault with the court's subsequent application of the Guidelines. 11