Opinion ID: 1224371
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ADA Background

Text: The current version of K.S.A. 58-1304 was enacted in 1994. Before 1994, cities were not obligated to enforce the ADA as to existing Title III buildings built solely with private funds. Our inquiry here is whether the 1994 legislation required cities to do so. Title III of the ADA grants rights to disabled customers of private businesses, enabling individuals with disabilities to participate more fully in mainstream society. 1 Perritt, Americans with Disabilities Act Handbook, p. 246 (3d ed. 1997) (ADA Handbook). K.S.A. 58-1301b(d) defines Title III: `Title III' means 28 CFR Part 36, nondiscrimination on the basis of disability by public accommodations and commercial facilities as required by section 301 et seq. of the Americans with disabilities act of 1990, 42 USCA 12,181 et seq. A broad spectrum of private and public entities are subject to Title III (for example, gas stations, hotels, health clubs, restaurants, theaters, and hospitals). A Title III facility has a prima facie duty: 1. To make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when such modifications are necessary to afford goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to disabled individuals. 2. To remove architectural barriers and communication barriers that are structural in nature in existing facilities when such removal is readily achievable. 3. To provide auxiliary aids and services necessary to ensure that disabled persons are not excluded, denied services, segregated, or treated differently from other individuals. 4. To make goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations available through alternative methods when such methods are readily achievable, and when the removal of a barrier is not readily achievable. ... 5. To design and construct new facilities and alterations in existing facilities to make the facilities readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities. ADA Handbook, p. 247 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(v) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 12183 (a)(1) (1994). Liability based on the above duties may be avoided by showing: (1) modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations; (2) removal of barriers is not readily achievable; (3) meeting the requirements is structurally impracticable; (4) cost is disproportionate to the accessibility benefit; and (5) the use of auxiliary aids and services would result in fundamental alteration or undue burden. ADA Handbook, p. 247-48 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), (iv), and (v); 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1). The legislature expressed its intent in K.S.A. 58-1303: This act is intended to prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability by Title II and Title III entities. All facilities covered by this act are to be designed, constructed and altered to be readily accessible to and usable by individuals with a disability. Our interpretive responsibility is to identify the City's role in the enforcement mechanism contemplated by the legislature. Link argues municipalities are the Title III enforcers for all public accommodations. The City disagrees. The City contends it is only charged with enforcing Title III as to municipal structures, construction of new facilities, and renovation of existing structures. Enforcement is effected by issuing or denying building permits. The district court observed that if the City is not responsible for enforcing Title III, then the enforcement of the majority of buildings would not be clearly dealt with by the act. Link is not without redress for the alleged Title III violations. The ADA provides an extensive mechanism of enforcement. Title III plaintiffs have a federal court remedy. They may sue owners of public accommodations who do not comply with the ADA. Specific relief requiring owners to make their goods and services accessible to the disabled is available. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) provides a private right of action for injunctive relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (1994). ADA plaintiffs may also seek attorney fees. Further, the United States Attorney General must investigate alleged violations of Title III, and may sue for pattern-and-practice violations or discriminatory acts presenting issues of general public importance. See 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(1)(A)(i) and § 12188(b)(1)(B). Civil penalties to vindicate the public interest may be assessed of up to $50,000 for a first violation and up to $100,000 for additional violations. ADA Handbook, p. 362 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12188[b][2][C]). The State of Kansas is allowed to supply additional methods of enforcement. State ADA enforcement responsibilities are controlled by K.S.A. 58-1304(a). Paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) deal with public schools and government facilities and are not at issue here. Enforcement in these areas is assigned to the State Board of Education and the Secretary of Administration, respectively. Paragraph (4) deals with new construction, placing enforcement on the building inspector or other agency or person designated by the governmental entity in which the facility is located. K.S.A. 58-1304(a)(4). The City acknowledges that it has this responsibility. K.S.A. 58-1304(b) states: The attorney general of the state of Kansas shall oversee the enforcement of this act. It is the remaining provision of the enforcement statute, K.S.A. 58-1304(a)(3), that must be interpreted to decide the issue here. Before the 1994 amendments, K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 58-1304(3) provided: For all construction or renovation where funds of a county, municipality or other political subdivision are utilized, the governing body thereof or an agency thereof designated by the governing body [shall be responsible for enforcement]. After the 1994 amendments, K.S.A. 58-1304(a)(3) provides: for all existing facilities, and the design and construction of all new, additions to and alterations of, any local government facilities where funds of a county, municipality or other political subdivision are utilized, the governmental entity thereof or an agency thereof designated by the governmental entity [shall be responsible for enforcement]. The district court reasoned that the 1994 amendments changed the City's K.S.A. 58-1304 duties. The effect of an affirmance of the district court's ruling would be that Kansas municipalities must bring all buildings open to the public into compliance with Title III of the ADA. The amicus emphasizes the broad impact of affirming the district court's mandamus writ. Link, although not arguing with the amicus' conclusion, asserts that the 1994 amendments to K.S.A. 58-1304 made a substantial change in existing law. Link's position is that all existing public accommodations shall conform to the [ADA] by being altered where it is readily achievable. The City of Hays has the responsibility for enforcing this law for existing facilities, and may refer evidence concerning ADA violations to the city attorney, who may then file a lawsuit asking for an injunction requiring a facility to perform alterations to comply with the ADA.... Although the result described by Link's position is commendable, we are limited to interpreting statutory law as it is, not as it should be; thus, we disagree with Link's conclusion. Preliminarily, we dispose of the City's contention that the Kansas Attorney General is responsible for enforcing Title III as to public accommodations built with private funds. In the federal scheme, the United States Attorney General must investigate alleged violations of Title III. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(1)(A)(i). Thus, the federal statute provides a mechanism of enforcement through the Attorney General. However, the Kansas Attorney General, who is not a party to this action, is only responsible for overseeing enforcement. Link does not contend Title III enforcement responsibility lies with the Kansas Attorney General. The role of the Kansas Attorney General in overseeing enforcement of the ADA is not before us in this case.