Opinion ID: 2141043
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Federal Fourth Amendment

Text: In addressing the defendant's claim of federal Fourth Amendment violations, we note that Fourth Amendment rights are personal and may not be vicariously asserted. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34, 99 S.Ct. 421, 425, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 394 (1978). A defendant aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by the search of a third person's premises has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed. Id. at 134, 99 S.Ct. at 425, 58 L.Ed.2d at 395. [I]n order to challenge a search as unconstitutional, a defendant must have a legitimate expectation of privacy in that which is searched. Livingston v. State, 542 N.E.2d 192, 194 (Ind.1989) (citing Rakas v. Illinois ). In reviewing whether a privacy expectation exists under a Fourth Amendment analysis, this Court also looks to whether the defendant has control over or ownership in the premises searched. Lee v. State, 545 N.E.2d 1085, 1091 (Ind.1989); Livingston, 542 N.E.2d at 194; Stout v. State, 479 N.E.2d 563, 566 (Ind.1985). The burden is on the defendant challenging the constitutional validity of a search to demonstrate that he had a legitimate expectation in the premises searched. Livingston, 542 N.E.2d at 194. In ruling that the search was valid, the trial court stated: I find that the defendant does haveor did have standing to object to any unlawful search and seizure of the apartment. However that issue is moot because I find that the defendant's mother gave her voluntary consent to the search of that apartment and that that consent is binding on the defendant. Supplemental Record at 1093. The defendant stresses that he had been living in and had property in the searched room. Brief of Appellant at 56. However, there exists substantial uncontradicted evidence contrary to the trial court's ruling. While the defendant had previously lived in the room which was searched, at the time of the search, the defendant had no control or ownership in the premises searched. On the day before the search, his mother had informed him that he could not live at the residence any longer, helped him pack his belongings, and took him to his girlfriend's house to stay with the understanding that he was to turn himself in for being AWOL from the Marines. Consequently, the defendant was no longer living at the apartment and thus had no expectation of privacy. See Myers v. State, 454 N.E.2d 861, 864 (Ind.1983) ([O]nce defendant's rental period had expired, he no longer had an expectation of privacy.). Even had the defendant continued to exhibit some control over the bedroom closet where the shotgun was found, such control was completely defined by, subordinate to, and dependent upon the will of his mother and her right to control the entire premises. Livingston, 542 N.E.2d at 194; see also Murrell v. State, 421 N.E.2d 638 (Ind.1981). The apartment was leased to his mother and sister. His mother paid the rent. His mother had the sole determination as to whether or not he could reside at the apartment. His mother testified that she often searched the bedroomincluding the closet where the evidence was locatedlooking for drugs the defendant may have hidden. His mother also allowed other persons to reside in the apartment and, significantly, the defendant's sister sometimes shared the bedroom at night, further diminishing any expectation of privacy he may have had. See Humes v. State, 426 N.E.2d 379, 381 (Ind. 1981). In addition, the defendant is hard-pressed to claim a privacy expectation in light of the fact that no fewer than six separate individuals had keys to the apartment [2] and the defendant's friend, Antoine McGee, exercised access and control over the defendant's bedroom when the defendant was not at the apartment. There is no reasonable expectation of privacy under these circumstances. Notwithstanding our deferential review of trial court rulings, the evidence does not support the conclusion that the defendant had standing to challenge the search of his mother's apartment. Moreover, the cursory treatment of the standing issue by the trial court and its characterization of standing as being moot implies that the trial court chose to deny the defendant's motion on the merits of the consent issue rather than on standing. Because we find that, as a matter of law, the defendant lacked standing to challenge the search, we reject his claim that the admission of the shotgun violated his Fourth Amendment rights.