Opinion ID: 4543042
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hinkle’s strip search was unreasonable.

Text: Having concluded that Florence does not authorize the County’s strip-search policy, we must still decide whether Hinkle suffered an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. The district court did not reach that issue, concluding that this case “fits within Florence.” Appellant’s App. vol. 6 at 1425. The County follows suit, largely resting its case on Florence. With Florence not sanctioning his bodycavity strip search, we must determine what legal standard governs Hinkle’s strip search. Hinkle argues that we should use our circuit’s pre-Florence strip-search cases to determine the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of his strip search. He contends that those cases bar “indiscriminate strip searches of pre-trial detainees.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 22. Indeed, those cases required reasonable suspicion of contraband, including weapons, before permitting a strip search. See, e.g., Archuleta v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278, 1285 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[W]hether a strip search is permissible is a separate inquiry based on whether a detainee will be placed in the general prison population and whether the officer has reasonable suspicion that a detainee has hidden drugs, contraband, or weapons.” (citations omitted)); Warner v. Grand County, 57 F.3d 962, 964 (10th Cir. 1995) (“On [January 24, 1991], it was clearly established in this circuit that a brief intermingling with the general jail population does not justify a strip search absent reasonable suspicion of drugs or contraband.” (citation omitted)); Cottrell v. Kaysville City, 994 F.2d 730, 732, 734–36 (10th Cir. 59 1993) (per curiam) (concluding that a body-cavity search of a detainee who was not “held with any other prisoners” was unreasonable when the arresting officer testified that “he did not suspect Ms. Cottrell of having drugs on her person” and “saw no indication she was carrying any weapons”); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 392, 394 (10th Cir. 1984) (concluding that a strip search of a traffic offender who “was briefly intermingled with the prison population” was unconstitutional because “[t]here were no circumstances . . . indicating that [he] might possess either a weapon or drugs”).41 But because the jail officials never decided that Hinkle “will be” housed at the county jail, no one had any reason to fear that Hinkle might have secreted contraband that he could take into the jail’s general population. In this circumstance, even our pre-Florence cases do not apply—they too concerned the problem of detainees taking contraband into the general population. But for detainees like Hinkle who will not be housed in the jail’s general population, the County needs far more to justify a bodycavity strip search—probable cause that detainee is secreting evidence of a crime. See Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1447–49 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that outside of the “jail context,” detainees “may only be subjected to [body-cavity searches] if 41 Archuleta, Warner, and Hill were not body-cavity strip search cases. Archuleta, 523 F.3d at 1282; Warner, 57 F.3d at 963; Hill, 735 F.2d at 393–94. Thus, Hinkle’s search was more invasive. We view Hinkle’s search as comparable to the body-cavity search in Cottrell, during which the plaintiff was “required to take off all her clothes and bend over while the deputies inspected her.” 994 F.2d at 732. We have characterized such body-cavity searches as “demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, embarrassing, [and] repulsive[.]” Levoy v. Mills, 788 F.2d 1437, 1439 (10th Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 564 (1st Cir. 1985)). 60 there is probable cause to believe that [they] ha[ve] secreted the item sought in a body cavity”). The County has not argued that it ever had such probable cause.42 Thus, we conclude that Hinkle was subjected to an unlawful strip search.