Opinion ID: 848794
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: manslaughter is an inferior offense of murder

Text: Manslaughter is an inferior offense of murder because manslaughter is a necessarily included lesser offense of murder.
Common-law murder encompasses all killings done with malice aforethought and without justification or excuse. People v. Scott, 6 Mich. 287, 292-293 (1859). See also People v. Potter, 5 Mich. 1, 6 (1858)(Murder is where a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully kills any reasonable creature in being, in the peace of the state, with malice prepense or aforethought, either express or implied.). First-degree murder is defined in M.C.L. § 750.316. [6] All other murders are murders in the second degree. MCL 750.317. See also People v. Goecke, 457 Mich. 442, 463-464, 579 N.W.2d 868 (1998), which enumerated the elements of second-degree murder as (1) death, (2) caused by defendant's act, (3) with malice, and (4) without justification. Manslaughter is murder without malice. See Potter, supra at 9 (noting that without malice aforethought, a killing would be only manslaughter, if criminal at all). See also People v. Palmer, 105 Mich. 568, 576, 63 N.W. 656 (1895), remarking: Manslaughter is perfectly distinguishable from murder, in this: That though the act that causes death be unlawful or willful, though attended with fatal results, yet malice, either expressed or implied, which is the very essence of murder, is to be presumed to be wanting in manslaughter. [Quoting the trial court jury instructions.] The common law recognizes two forms of manslaughter: voluntary and involuntary. People v. Townes, 391 Mich. 578, 589, 218 N.W.2d 136 (1974). Common-law voluntary manslaughter is defined as: [T]he act of killing, though intentional, [is] committed under the influence of passion or in heat of blood, produced by an adequate or reasonable provocation, and before a reasonable time has elapsed for the blood to cool and reason to resume its habitual control, and is the result of the temporary excitement, by which the control of reason was disturbed, rather than of any wickedness of heart or cruelty or recklessness of disposition....[ Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 219 (1862).] See also Townes, supra at 590, 218 N.W.2d 136 (A defendant properly convicted of voluntary manslaughter is a person who has acted out of a temporary excitement induced by an adequate provocation and not from the deliberation and reflection that marks the crime of murder.). Thus, to show voluntary manslaughter, one must show that the defendant killed in the heat of passion, the passion was caused by adequate provocation, and there was not a lapse of time during which a reasonable person could control his passions. See People v. Pouncey, 437 Mich. 382, 389, 471 N.W.2d 346 (1991). [7] Significantly, provocation is not an element of voluntary manslaughter. See People v. Moore, 189 Mich.App. 315, 320, 472 N.W.2d 1 (1991). Rather, provocation is the circumstance that negates the presence of malice. Scott, supra at 295. Involuntary manslaughter is the unintentional killing of another, without malice, during the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony and not naturally tending to cause great bodily harm; or during the commission of some lawful act, negligently performed; or in the negligent omission to perform a legal duty. See Townes, supra at 590, 218 N.W.2d 136. See also People v. Heflin, 434 Mich. 482, 507-508, 456 N.W.2d 10 (1990)(opinion by RILEY, C.J.).
An examination of the historical development of homicide law informs this Court that manslaughter is a necessarily included lesser offense of murder because the elements of manslaughter are included in the offense of murder.
In early English common law, a killing was either justifiable homicide; excusable murder committed by misadventure or accident, or in self-defense; or capital murder, characterized by malice aforethought and punishable by death. See 2 Pollock and Maitland, The History of English Law (Cambridge: University Press, 1952), ch. VIII, Crime and Tort, § 2, p. 485. However, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, an exemption called the benefit of clergy was widely used as a device to mitigate mandatory death sentences. Hall, Legal fictions and moral reasoning: Capital punishment and the mentally retarded defendant after Penry v. Johnson, 35 Akron L. R. 327, 353 (2002). The benefit of clergy was an exemption that allowed an offender to be sentenced by the ecclesiastical courts, which did not impose capital punishment. [8] Though it was initially intended to benefit clergy, it also benefitted persons who could satisfy its literacy test. See Kealy, Hunting the dragon: Reforming the Massachusetts murder statute, 10 B. U. Pub. Int. L. J. 203, 205-206 (2001). Thus, it was not long before persons other than clerics claimed the exemption, so that the benefit of clergy exemption benefitted anyone who could read. See Justice Harlan's discussion in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 197, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971), noting that although all criminal homicides were prima facie capital cases, the benefit of clergy was available to almost any man who could read. In response to the exemption's widespread availability, statutes were passed throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries proclaiming the exemption unavailable for homicides committed under particularly reviled circumstances, collectively termed murder with malice aforethought. Moreland, The Law of Homicide (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1952), ch. 2, The Development of Malice Aforethought, p. 9. The benefit of clergy remained available, however, for offenders convicted of less culpable homicides. Id. Thereafter, unjustified and unexcused homicide was divided into two separate crimes: wilful murder of malice aforethought, a capital offense for which the benefit of clergy was unavailable, and manslaughter. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (New York: The Lawyers Co Operative Pub. Co., 1927), ch. 2, The Felonies, pp. 395-396. The critical difference between murder and manslaughter was the presence or absence of malice aforethought. Moreland, supra at 10.
The phrase malice aforethought has evolved over the centuries. During the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, malice aforethought meant that one possessed an intent to kill well in advance of the act itself. Id. at 10. Notably, the emphasis was on aforethought, so that the critical difference between capital and noncapital murder was the passage of time between the initial formulation of the intent to kill and the act itself. Moylan, Criminal Homicide Law (Maryland Institute for Continuing Professional Education of Lawyers), ch. 2, § 2.7. The term malice alone had little significance beyond meaning an intent to commit an unjustified and inexcusable killing. Id. The purpose of the malice aforethought element was to distinguish between deliberate, calculated homicides and homicides committed in the heat of passion. Kealy, supra at 206. As more and more defendants claimed they lacked an intent to kill before the act was committed, juries and courts increasingly rejected this argument. The result was a case-by-case semantic erosion of the term aforethought, until malice aforethought meant nothing more than the intent to kill had to exist at the time the act was committed. Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3rd ed.), Murder, § 1, p. 58 ([a]s case after case came before the courts for determination ... there came to be less and less emphasis upon the notion of a well-laid plan. And at the present day, the only requirement in this regard is that it must not be an after thought). There was, consequently, a parallel erosion of the distinction between capital murder, for which aforethought was required, and noncapital homicide, for which it was not. Interestingly, although the English courts grew weary of the oft abused lack of aforethought defense, it was nevertheless evident that there was still some interest in distinguishing between a homicide committed in cold-blood and one committed under circumstances that mitigated one's culpability. To express this distinction, the focus shifted from aforethought to malice. Moreland, supra at 11 ([t]he law of homicide seems thus to have now progressed from a place where the mental element was of no importance to a place where at the beginning of the seventeenth century it had become a factor of prime importance). Because there was a need to distinguish the most serious homicide from the rest, and because aforethought no longer had legal significance, malice evolved from being merely an intent to kill to also evidencing the absence of mitigating circumstances. Moylan, supra at § 2.7. Consequently, the presence of malice became both synonymous with the absence of mitigating circumstances and the sole element distinguishing murder from manslaughter. We glean from our examination of manslaughter's historical development that manslaughter is defined to reflect the absence of malice. Thus, the only element distinguishing murder from manslaughter is malice.
A necessarily lesser included offense is an offense whose elements are completely subsumed in the greater offense. Cornell, supra at 356, 646 N.W.2d 127. Regarding voluntary manslaughter, both murder and voluntary manslaughter require a death, caused by defendant, with either an intent to kill, an intent to commit great bodily harm, or an intent to create a very high risk of death or great bodily harm with knowledge that death or great bodily harm was the probable result. However, the element distinguishing murder from manslaughter-malice-is negated by the presence of provocation and heat of passion. See Scott, supra at 295. Thus, we conclude, the elements of voluntary manslaughter are included in murder, with murder possessing the single additional element of malice. Regarding involuntary manslaughter, the lack of malice is evidenced by involuntary manslaughter's diminished mens rea, which is included in murder's greater mens rea. See People v. Datema, 448 Mich. 585, 606, 533 N.W.2d 272 (1995), stating: [P]ains should be taken not to define [the mens rea required for involuntary manslaughter] in terms of a wanton and wilful disregard of a harmful consequence known to be likely to result, because such a state of mind goes beyond negligence and comes under the head of malice. Unlike murder, involuntary manslaughter contemplates an unintended result and thus requires something less than an intent to do great bodily harm, an intent to kill, or the wanton and wilful disregard of its natural consequences. [Citations omitted; emphasis added.] See also United States v. Browner, 889 F.2d 549, 553 (C.A.5, 1989), stating, In contrast to the case of voluntary manslaughter... the absence of malice in involuntary manslaughter arises not because of provocation induced passion, but rather because the offender's mental state is not sufficiently culpable to reach the traditional malice requirements. Thus, we conclude that the elements of involuntary manslaughter are included in the offense of murder because involuntary manslaughter's mens rea is included in murder's greater mens rea. Accordingly, we hold the elements of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter are included in the elements of murder. Thus, both forms of manslaughter are necessarily included lesser offenses of murder. Because voluntary and involuntary manslaughter are necessarily included lesser offenses, they are also inferior offenses within the scope of M.C.L. § 768.32. Consequently, when a defendant is charged with murder, an instruction for voluntary and involuntary manslaughter must be given if supported by a rational view of the evidence. Cornell, supra .
Today's holding is consistent with our courts' historical understanding of the law of murder. Michigan courts have historically concluded that a manslaughter instruction is appropriate on a murder charge if a manslaughter instruction is supported by a rational view of the evidence. See, e.g., Hanna v. People, 19 Mich. 316, 321 (1869)(in consideration of M.C.L. § 768.32's similarly worded predecessor, without this provision, the common law rule would, under the statute, dividing murder into degrees, have authorized a conviction not only for murder in the second degree, but for manslaughter also, under an indictment for murder in the first degree, all these being felonies included in the charge )(emphasis added). See People v. Treichel, 229 Mich. 303, 307-308, 200 N.W. 950 (1924), stating: This Court has repeatedly held, where the charge as laid includes murder in the first degree, and the proofs establish such degree, and no lesser degree, it is not error for the court to instruct the jury that, in order to convict, murder in the first degree must be found. But this court has not held, under a charge like here laid, the court must instruct the jury to find murder in the first degree or acquit. Whether such an instruction may be given or not depends upon the evidence. [Emphasis in original.] [In this case, the] information charged murder in the first and second degrees, and this was inclusive of manslaughter. The evidence left it open for the jury to find defendants guilty of manslaughter. See also People v. Droste, 160 Mich. 66, 78-79, 125 N.W. 87 (1910)(concluding that the trial court was clearly warranted in instructing the jury on manslaughter in a murder case because a jury could have concluded there was sufficient intoxication or passion to rob [defendant's] act of the necessary elements of murder); People v. Andrus, 331 Mich. 535, 546-547, 50 N.W.2d 310 (1951)(remarking that it was proper for the court to submit the lesser included offenses of second-degree murder and manslaughter because the evidence was sufficient to support the offense). It was not until this Court overlooked M.C.L. § 768.32, and introduced cognate lesser included offenses, that the relationship between manslaughter and murder became muddled. In People v. Jones, 395 Mich. 379, 236 N.W.2d 461 (1975), this Court, without consideration of M.C.L. § 768.32, recognized a new category of lesser included offenses called cognate offenses. Cognate offenses differed from necessarily included lesser offenses in that cognate offenses share with the higher offense several elements and are of the same class or category, but they contain elements not found in the higher offense. See Cornell, supra at 344-346, 646 N.W.2d 127. Faced with a category of lesser included offenses not previously recognized in Michigan, this Court, in Van Wyck, supra, concluded that manslaughter was a cognate lesser included offense of murder: We hold that manslaughter is not a necessarily included offense within the crime of murder but that it may nonetheless be an included offense if the evidence adduced at trial would support a verdict of guilty for that crime. As we noted in People v. Ora Jones, supra [395 Mich. 379, 236 N.W.2d 461 (1975)]: The common-law definition of lesser included offenses is that the lesser must be such that it is impossible to commit the greater without first having committed the lesser. [Citation omitted.]