Opinion ID: 398582
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Equitable Tolling Argument

Text: 40 Plaintiffs assert that their EEOC charges were timely filed because, for several reasons, the 180-day limit was equitably tolled. 41 The filing limits under Title VII are not jurisdictional and are subject to equitable tolling. Hart v. J. T. Baker Chemical Corp., 598 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1979); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C.Cir.1976); DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 520 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1975); Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1975). While recognizing that the filing limits of Title VII can be equitably tolled, we find no justification in equity to toll the filing limitation in this case. Cf. School District v. Marshall, 657 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1981). 42 Plaintiffs argue that they relied to their detriment on the established law prior to the Supreme Court case of United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977). This supposedly well-established law permitted them to file EEOC charges at any time while the violation continued. Evans, plaintiffs claim, reversed the prior law and precluded their reliance on the continuing violation theory. 25 Plaintiffs explain that if Evans is applied to this case, they will be unfairly penalized for relying on what had been clearly established law. Such an inequitable result, plaintiffs argue, is precluded by Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). 43 In Chevron, when the plaintiff initially filed suit, it was commonly recognized that the three-year admiralty statute of limitations controlled his cause of action. Defendants did not question the timeliness of the filing. During pretrial discovery, the Supreme Court decided a case which reversed the established law and held that the shorter, one-year state statute of limitations applied. Although plaintiff had filed suit more than a year after his cause of action arose, the Court exercised its equity powers and refused to apply the newly announced law on limitations retroactively to plaintiff's case. His filing was held to be timely. 44 Plaintiffs cannot rely on Chevron for two reasons. First, Evans did not reverse clearly established law. The continuing violations theory was in its embryonic stages at the time the plaintiffs supposedly relied on it in 1975. Since then, the theory has been presented to numerous courts but has been erratically and inconsistently applied. 26 Reliance on such an uncertain doctrine to delay filing, when such a delay was not mandated by other considerations, was not reasonable. Second, plaintiffs themselves admit that their delay in filing resulted, not from a reliance on the continuing violation law prior to Evans, but rather from their mistaken belief that the original court action, based on § 1981, § 1983 and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, would provide complete relief. 27 Plaintiffs apparently chose to rely on this court civil action rather than go through the often lengthy administrative proceedings which are a part of the Title VII process. 45 Equity does not provide for those who put all their eggs in one basket and refuse to take advantage of alternative avenues to relief. Plaintiffs should be encouraged to vindicate their rights, not only by means of the courts, but also by use of administrative processes. We therefore will not rely on the equitable principle utilized in Chevron to save plaintiffs' case. 46 Plaintiffs next argue that the filing period should be equitably tolled because the parties had been litigating the same issues ever since 1972. 28 This litigation, plaintiffs contend, gave notice to defendants of the employment discrimination charges and so satisfied one of the primary purposes behind the limited filing period-that of notifying the defendant so that necessary evidence and testimony could be preserved. Hart v. J. T. Baker Chemical Corp., 598 F.2d 829, 833 (3d Cir. 1979). We must, however, consider other purposes behind Title VII. Congress intended to limit an employer's liability by restricting the filing period. Ricks, supra, 449 U.S., at 257-59, 101 S.Ct. at 505-507. It also intended that, by having plaintiffs file with the EEOC before going to court, both parties would be subjected to the administrative pressure to reconcile their dispute. Here, by delaying filing, plaintiffs avoided the administrative pressures and, if they succeed, would expand the time period during which an employer is liable. These other purposes behind Title VII outweigh the purpose of notifying the defendant of upcoming litigation. Therefore, equity should not intervene. 47 Furthermore, the holding in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975), indicates that plaintiffs' equitable tolling argument is without merit. In Johnson, the Court concluded that the filing of Title VII charges with the EEOC does not toll the statute of limitations in a suit brought under § 1981. Id. at 461, 95 S.Ct. at 1720. This conclusion was based on the view that the remedies under Title VII and under § 1981, although related, and although directed to most of the same ends, are separate, distinct and independent. Id. Because the claims are independent, the filing of charges under § 1981 will not toll the filing limit under Title VII. 48 Courts often rely on equity in Title VII cases where complainants are lay persons unfamiliar with the complexities of the administrative procedures. Hart v. J. T. Baker Chemical Corp., 598 F.2d 829, 832 (3d Cir. 1979). Plaintiffs have been counseled since 1972 by able attorneys and so cannot rely on this as a basis for equity. 49 We do not decide whether, as defendants suggest, equitable tolling may only be invoked where the employer has, either through overreaching or concealment, impeded a plaintiff's prosecution of his Title VII claim. We simply hold that, under the facts of this case and for the reasons given above, the equities do not demand the tolling of the 180-day filing limitation. 50 Thus we affirm the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' Title VII claim as untimely. The effectiveness of the eligibility roster does not, standing alone, constitute a continuing violation of Title VII. Plaintiffs have not presented any justification for equitably tolling the 180-day filing period.