Opinion ID: 2782886
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Everett’s Prejudice Claim

Text: We conclude that the Florida Supreme Court also reasonably determined that Everett had failed to establish the prejudice requirement of his ineffective counsel claim. Three reasons support our conclusion.
First, the Florida Supreme Court reasonably concluded that the evidence presented during Everett’s post-conviction evidentiary hearing was largely cumulative to the evidence presented during his penalty phase trial. See Everett II, 54 So. 3d at 480, 484-85; see also Belmontes, 558 U.S. at 22, 130 S. Ct. at 387 (reasoning that some of the evidence that the defendant argued his trial counsel should have presented at sentencing was “merely cumulative” of the evidence that counsel actually presented and that “adding it to what was already there would 83 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 84 of 87 have made little difference”). As to Everett’s childhood and upbringing, the testimony of his mother and sisters showed both at trial and during the postconviction phase that Everett’s father was an alcoholic and had not always acted appropriately toward Everett; Everett experienced difficulties as a result of his family’s frequent moves and his parents’ divorce, remarriage, and second divorce; and Everett was loving and non-violent as a child. Indeed, the trial court found Everett’s family background was a statutory mitigating circumstance, noting that although his childhood could not be considered a “deprived one,” his “upbringing” was not “ordinary.” Some of the post-conviction evidence of Everett’s drug use was also cumulative. During the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Everett’s mother and sister offered the same nonspecific testimony that Everett had a history of drug use that was offered during the penalty phase hearing.
As to prejudice, Everett relies heavily on Dr. Mhatre’s testimony in the postconviction phase. While some of his testimony was covered at the penalty phase, Dr. Mhatre admittedly provided more specific, detailed testimony about Everett’s drug use and the resulting paranoia at the time of the crimes than was offered at trial. Yet, to the extent that Dr. Mhatre offered non-cumulative testimony, the Florida Supreme Court reasonably determined that Everett failed to show a reasonable probability of a different result with Dr. Mhatre’s testimony. See 84 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 85 of 87 Everett II, 54 So. 3d at 482-83. Dr. Mhatre’s testimony was speculative and unpersuasive because he conceded that he was not able to corroborate Everett’s claim that he was in a drug-induced psychosis at the time of the murder through police officers’ reports or other witnesses. Furthermore, drug use evidence can act as a “two-edged sword,” and additional evidence of Everett’s drug use at the time of the murder would not necessarily have been favorable to him. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1410 (2011) (recognizing that evidence of addiction can be mitigating, but also can have aggravating aspects). And, in any event, even without Dr. Mhatre’s testimony, the jury heard Everett’s claim that he was “tripping on acid” at the time of the murder through the admission of Everett’s November 27 confession. Indeed, the trial court considered Everett’s claim that he committed the murder while under the influence of a hallucinogenic drug and rejected it as inconsistent with the factual circumstances of Everett’s crimes and his ability to accurately recall the details of Bailey’s house and her murder. Everett admitted he left the motel with a fish bat and went out looking for money—all intentional and controlled behavior. The Florida Supreme Court reasonably concluded that there was not a reasonable probability that Dr. Mhatre’s uncorroborated testimony would have changed the state trial court’s finding as to this mitigating circumstance. See Everett II, 54 So. 3d at 482-83.
85 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 86 of 87 Third, given the powerful strength of the aggravating factors in this case, the Florida Supreme Court reasonably decided that Everett did not show a reasonable probability that his proposed mitigation evidence would be strong enough to outweigh them. As the Florida Supreme Court reasoned, “the evidence in the record indicates that the mitigating evidence presented during the postconviction evidentiary hearing would not alter the balance of aggravation and mitigation.” Everett II, 54 So. 3d at 482. The state trial court found as statutory aggravating circumstances that the murder: (1) was committed while Everett was under a sentence of imprisonment for a previous felony conviction; (2) was committed while Everett was engaged in the commission of a sexual battery or a burglary; and (3) was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. With regard to the latter two circumstances, the evidence showed that Everett entered Bailey’s home, severely beat her and broke her neck, and raped her as she slowly lost consciousness and suffocated to death. Thus, with the strength of the aggravating circumstances and the relative weakness of the scant non-cumulative evidence presented in Everett’s post-conviction hearing, the Florida Supreme Court reasonably determined that there was not a reasonable probability that Everett would have received a life sentence had his proposed additional evidence been presented. Cf. Belmontes, 558 U.S. at 20, 130 S. Ct. at 386 (“[T]o establish prejudice, [the petitioner] must show a reasonable probability that the jury would have rejected a capital sentence after it 86 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 87 of 87 weighed the entire body of mitigating evidence . . . against the entire body of aggravating evidence.”).