Opinion ID: 783430
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Law to the Facts of Defendants' Motions to Suppress

Text: 34 As noted, the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's requirement of probable cause in this case are two. First, under Summers, the reasonable detention exception as to the occupants of a residence for which a valid search warrant has been issued applies. See Summers, 452 U.S. at 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587. Second, the stop and frisk exception under Terry also applies inasmuch as the officers not only detained Defendants, but made a decision prior to the search that they would invoke Terry and conduct a patdown for weapons on the belief that drugs may be on the premises. However, when officers from several different law enforcement agencies, including the INS, arrived on the scene with guns drawn, ordered the occupants to lie on the ground, forced their knees into the backs of the occupants (including both Defendants), and immediately handcuffed and questioned the individuals, all after the officers had blocked ingress and egress to the street on which the residence was located, the officers' actions exceeded the reasonableness of Summers and Terry. Instead, the officers' actions in this regard were tantamount to a de facto arrest inasmuch as the seizure had all of the attributes of a formal arrest. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870 ([A] person is `seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.); Summers, 452 U.S. at 698, 700, 101 S.Ct. 2587 (noting that the general rule [is that] every arrest, and every seizure having the essential attributes of a formal arrest, is unreasonable unless it is supported by probable cause and that Terry authorizes limited intrusions on an individual's personal security). 35 The case law from this circuit and our sister circuits support this conclusion. See United States v. Bohannon, 225 F.3d 615, 619 (6th Cir.2000) (Batchelder, J., dissenting) (A police officer's verbal command — if heeded — is often sufficient to seize a person for purposes of taking the matter out of the bounds of the limited and brief nature of Terry stops) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Butler, 223 F.3d at 374 (The brevity and limited nature of Terry- type stops have been repeatedly affirmed.) (citing United States v. Obasa, 15 F.3d 603, 607 (6th Cir.1994)); Richardson, 949 F.2d at 857-58 (finding that the scope and nature of the detention exceeded the bounds of Terry when officers restrained an individual in a police cruiser after he refused to consent to a search of a storage locker and truck); Oliveira, 23 F.3d at 642, 645-46 (2d Cir.1994) (finding that a Terry stop ripened into a custodial arrest when six police cruisers surrounded the suspects, ordered them from their vehicles at gunpoint, handcuffed the suspects, and placed them in separate police cruisers); United States v. Anderson, 981 F.2d 1560, 1566 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding that a Terry detention ripened into a custodial arrest when officers blocked suspect with cars and one officer approached the suspect with his gun drawn); United States v. Codd, 956 F.2d 1109, 1111 (11th Cir.1992) (finding that the Terry stop resulted in a custodial arrest when suspect was seized, handcuffed, and held for two and one-half hours); United States v. Ricardo D., 912 F.2d 337, 340 (9th Cir.1990) (finding that a custodial arrest occurred when officer gripped the arm of a juvenile, patted him down, ordered the juvenile not to run, and seated him in the back of a patrol car). 36 Thus, although the officers had a legal basis to detain the occupants of the residence, including Defendants, under Summers and Terry, the scope and nature of the detention was not reasonable in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870; see also Summers, 452 U.S. at 698, 101 S.Ct. 2587 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868). 37 It is true that the officers had made a decision prior to executing the warrant that any individuals found on the premises would be detained and frisked for weapons because of the marijuana seeds found in the trash pull conducted earlier that day; however, when asked whether by the term detained the officers meant arrested or just monitored, Secret Service Agent Monica Woods replied monitored. (J.A. at 143.) Specifically, the questioning of Agent Woods went as follows: 38 Q: [P]rior to the execution of the warrant, was there a meeting of the various agencies and individuals who're part of the search warrant execution team? 39 A: Yes. Everyone who was part of the search warrant was involved in a briefing just prior to the search warrant. 40 Q: Had the issue of whether or not people who were on the property, if people on the property, were encountered, what if anything would be done with those people during the execution of the warrant? 41 A: All of those people would be patted down for weapons and detained until we decided what steps to take next. 42 Q: Now, by detained, do you mean placed under arrest or just put to the side and monitored? 43 A: Yes, monitored. 44 (J.A. at 142-43 (emphasis added).) 45 Indeed, under the agent's own testimony, the scope and nature of the detention went well beyond that which had been agreed to prior to the time the search warrant was executed. Had the officers followed the plan attested to by Agent Woods — arriving on the scene, patting down the occupants of the home, and putting them to the side until the search had been completed, at which point the occupants may or may not have been arrested depending upon whether evidence of criminality had been found — the conclusion would be different inasmuch as the officers' actions would have been within the reasonableness of Summers and Terry.