Opinion ID: 2070372
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: committed to prison

Text: Section 29-2221(1) states in part: Whoever has been twice convicted of crime, sentenced and committed to prison ... for terms of not less than one year each, shall, upon conviction of a felony committed in this state, be deemed to be an habitual criminal.... Jackson claims that the district court erred in finding that he was a habitual criminal because Jackson was given credit for 2 days' jail time regarding his first felony conviction and 102 days' jail time toward the 1-year sentence on his second felony conviction. In view of such credit, Jackson argues, his prior convictions for which credit was given were for terms less than 1 year each, and, therefore, he has not been twice sentenced and twice committed to prison for a term of not less than 1 year as prescribed by § 29-2221(1). In State v. Nance, 197 Neb. 257, 248 N.W.2d 339 (1976), we construed language in the habitual criminal statute and stated: It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that if possible a court will try to avoid a construction which leads to absurd, unjust, or unconscionable results. A sensible construction will be placed upon a statute to effectuate the object of the legislation rather than a literal meaning that would have the effect of defeating the legislative intent. Id. at 260, 248 N.W.2d at 341. The statutory reference in § 29-2221(1) is to the term to which a defendant is sentenced, not the time or number of days the defendant is actually incarcerated. Therefore, it is the term of a defendant's prior sentences, not time actually served, which controls applicability of the habitual criminal penalty found in § 29-2221. See, State v. Robinson, 262 N.W.2d 270 (Iowa 1978); State v. Houston, 209 N.W.2d 42 (Iowa 1973). Also, the provisions in § 29-2221(1), namely, that a defendant has been committed to prison on conviction for prior crimes, does not necessitate a showing that the defendant was incarcerated for the entire term of a prior sentence but, rather, requires only that the defendant was delivered into the custody and control of the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services for incarceration according to the rules and regulations of that agency. See People v. Woodruff, 90 Ill. App.3d 236, 45 Ill.Dec. 589, 412 N.E.2d 1171 (1980).