Opinion ID: 2495848
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Consent

Text: ¶ 75. I disagree with the majority opinion's recognizing that an eleven-year-old child has the capacity to consent to sexual intercourse, as such a recognition is at odds with the established public policy of this state that children of L.R.'s age cannot consent to sexual intercourse. See Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-65 (Rev.2006) (defining statutory rape). When a child is under the age of consent, [i]t is immaterial whether the rape was accomplished by force or violence or against the will of the child. Brooks v. State, 242 So.2d 865, 867 (Miss.1971). At the heart of these [statutory rape] statutes is the core concern that children should not be exploited for sexual purposes regardless of their `consent.' They simply cannot appreciate the significance or the consequences of their actions. Collins v. State, 691 So.2d 918, 924 (Miss.1997). Although I agree that Federation properly was allowed to adduce evidence that L.R. had allowed Kelly entry to the building, as this was relevant to causation, evidence of her subjective consent to sexual intercourse was not relevant and was far too prejudicial to have been admissible. M.R.E. 402, 403. The majority refuses to adopt a blanket rule allowing such evidence in all civil trials, but surely the facts of the present case would favor exclusion: the defendants knew that an eleven-year-old child was being sexually assaulted by a thirty-six-year-old man on property that was under their control and was home to many vulnerable adults, whose safety depended, in large part, on the defendants providing them and their families a safe environment. ¶ 76. The defendants argue that consent is relevant to causation because if [L.R.] and Kelly were actively concealing their relationship, then Defendants had no reason to know about it, and thus, could not be held liable. . . . Yet, this argument fails because it is undisputed that both managers, Miller and Gray, knew that L.R. was being sexually assaulted in the stairwell. Because their knowledge is imputed to their employers, the defendants, as a matter of law, knew about the assaults. Glover v. Jackson State Univ., 968 So.2d 1267, 1276 n. 9 (Miss.2007) (plurality opinion). ¶ 77. The defendants also argue, with apparent agreement from the majority, that, had L.R. been forcibly raped, her damages would be greater. As Dr. Hiatt testified, an eleven-year-old does not have the capacity to understand sex, and the psychological and emotional damages to an eleven-year-old who thought she was consenting would be not be lessened. Even were we to accept that L.R.'s damages would be greater had she been forcibly raped, the difference would be too minimal to outweigh the prejudice of arguing that an eleven-year-old may consent to sexual activity with another. M.R.E. 403. ¶ 78. The majority opinion cites Stavroula S. v. Guerriera, 193 A.D.2d 796, 797, 598 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1993), which involved a civil action for battery brought against the rapist. That Court held that consent could be litigated because the issue of whether he touched the plaintiff without her consent. . . is the gravamen of the tort of battery. Id. The present case involves a negligence, premises-liability claim, against a third party to the rape, and consent is not an element of or a defense to this tort. ¶ 79. Furthermore, the Tennessee case relied on by the majority applied the mature minor rule or the Rule of Sevens, meaning under the age of seven, no capacity; between seven and fourteen, a rebuttable presumption of no capacity; between fourteen and twenty-one, a rebuttable presumption of capacity. Doe v. Mama Taori's Premium Pizza, LLC, 2001 WL 327906, at  (Tenn.Ct.App. Apr. 5, 2001) (quoting Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 745 (Tenn.1987)). If we were to apply Tennessee's mature minor rule to the present case, there would be a rebuttable presumption that L.R. was incapable of consenting to sexual contact. ¶ 80. Bjerke v. Johnson, 727 N.W.2d 183 (Minn.Ct.App.2007), cited by the majority opinion, recognized that [a] majority of jurisdictions adopt the Restatement's position and exclude consent as a defense in civil actions arising out of statutory rape. Id. at 193 (citing Christensen v. Royal Sch. Dist. No. 160, 156 Wash.2d 62, 124 P.3d 283, 286 (2005); Wilson v. Tobiassen, 97 Or.App. 527, 777 P.2d 1379 (1989)). According to the Bjerke court, [t]hese jurisdictions have reasoned that the enactment of statutes criminalizing sexual activity with minors evidences the legislature's intent to protect minors from sexual exploitation and that allowing civil defenses premised on a minor's consent would be inconsistent with such intent. Id. at 193-94 (citing Christensen, 124 P.3d at 286; Doe v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 323 S.C. 33, 448 S.E.2d 564, 566 (1994)). Certainly, these same considerations should govern in Mississippi and extend to the issue of damages. ¶ 81. Under Mississippi law, an eleven-year-old child does not have the capacity legally to consent to sexual intercourse. See Phillipson v. State, 943 So.2d 670, 672 (Miss.2006); Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-65 (Rev.2006). And the limitations on capacity are not limited to sexual intercourse or to the context of criminal cases. For example, she may not bring a lawsuit on her behalf. See Lawler v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 569 So.2d 1151, 1153 (Miss.1990); Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-59 (Rev.2003). She is not capable of being held criminally liable. Miss.Code Ann. § 43-21-151(3) (Rev.2009). In the case of a custody dispute, a chancellor cannot consider an eleven-year-old's preference as to the parent with whom she wishes to live. Miss.Code Ann. § 93-11-65(1)(a) (Rev.2004). She would not be considered a competent juror. Miss.Code Ann. § 13-5-1 (Rev.2002). She cannot enter into a valid contract. See Johnson Motors, Inc. v. Coleman, 232 So.2d 716, 720 (Miss.1970); Miss.Code. Ann. § 15-3-11 (Rev.2003). She cannot obtain an abortion absent parental consent or a court order. Miss.Code Ann. § 41-41-53 (Rev.2009). A minor's capacity is legally limited in both civil and criminal contexts, and contrary to the majority's holding otherwise, this case provides no exception. ¶ 82. I respectfully disagree with the majority's blanket holding that [d]eterrence and punishment for criminal conduct are within the general province of our criminal law, and that [t]he public's interests are sufficiently protected by imposition of criminal sanctions. It cannot be denied that civil actions also can have deterrent effects and sometimes punish the wrongdoer, for example, in the case of punitive damages. Criminal conduct often has economic consequences, and our legal system allows victims to recover for their injuries. In this case, L.R. has suffered extensive damages that cannot be fully redressed by a criminal conviction and punishment of her attacker. ¶ 83. For the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred in allowing evidence of L.R.'s consent to be one of the focal points of this litigation, and based on this error, I would reverse the case and remand for a new trial.