Opinion ID: 2978116
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Felon in Possession

Text: The crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm has three elements: (1) the defendant had a previous felony conviction; (2) the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm specified in the indictment; and (3) the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce. United States v. Kincaide, 145 F.3d 771, 782 (6th Cir. 1998). Clements challenges the sufficiency of the evidence proving that he knowingly possessed the firearm. Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), a defendant may be convicted for either actual or constructive possession of a firearm. Grubbs, 506 F.3d at 439. Actual possession requires the defendant to knowingly have “immediate possession or control” of the object. United States v. Craven, 478 F.2d -6- 1329, 1333 (6th Cir. 1973). “Constructive possession exists when a person does not have actual possession but instead knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through others.” Id. “Presence alone near a gun . . . does not show the requisite knowledge, power, or intention to exercise control over the gun to prove constructive possession.” United States v. Arnold, 486 F.3d 177, 183 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Instead, “other incriminating evidence, coupled with presence” is required to “tip the scale in favor of sufficiency.” Id. This Court has held, for example, that constructive possession may be proved when the defendant had “dominion over the premises where the firearm is located.” United States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 713 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Indeed, “[w]hen the defendant is found in close proximity to a firearm at the time of the arrest, the inference of dominion2 and control is particularly strong, and thus the incriminating evidence needed to corroborate the conviction is less.” Grubbs, 506 F.3d at 440. Contrary to Clements’s argument, we conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence from which a rational factfinder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Clements both knew of the firearm and had constructive possession of it. The Government presented evidence that Clements owned the Cleveland Home where the gun was found and that Jessika Harris dropped off 2 Though our caselaw does not define “dominion,” this Court recently noted that a consensus “has developed in federal and state courts ‘that where the defendant is in nonexclusive possession of premises on which [illicit contraband] [is] found, it cannot be inferred that he knew of the presence of such [contraband] and had control of [it], unless there are other incriminating statements or circumstances tending to buttress such an inference.’” United States v. Bailey, 553 F.3d 940, 945, n.3 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Emile F. Short, Annotation, Conviction of possession of illicit drugs found in premises of which defendant was in nonexclusive possession, 56 A.L.R.3d 948, 1974 WL 35135, § 4 (1974)). -7- Clements’s son at the home about ninety per cent of the time. Clements told the booking officer that the Cleveland Home was his residence. Clements’s personal papers and mail were found in a bedroom and in the jacket hanging next to the front door. And Clements kept his dogs at the home and allowed friends to stay there. That evidence of Clements’s dominion over the home, coupled with his proximity to the firearm, was sufficient for a rational factfinder to find that Clements knowingly possessed the firearm. See Gardner, 488 F.3d at 713. 2. Possession of Controlled Substance With Intent to Distribute Clements also challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting the knowledge and intent elements of the crime of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Clements contends that the evidence is insufficient because: (1) he was never seen using or distributing narcotics, (2) no one testified that he lived at the home at issue, (3) there was no evidence that the jacket containing cocaine belonged to Clements, (4) Clements did not have prerecorded “buy money” in his possession or inside the home, and (5) Clements did not have narcotics on his person when the warrant was executed. The standard for possession under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) is the same as under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), so we reference our summary of actual and constructive possession above. See United States v. Hunter, 558 F.3d 495, 503 (6th Cir. 2009). Just as Clements had constructive possession of the firearm, the record demonstrates Clements’s ownership and use of the home, and ability to exercise dominion over the seized cocaine and other items, supports the jury’s finding that he constructively possessed that contraband. Further, a rational factfinder could have inferred that Clements had the specific intent to distribute cocaine given that cocaine was found in small, individually wrapped bags inside a jacket that also contained Clements’s personal papers. See United States v. Dotson, 871 -8- F.2d 1318, 1323 (6th Cir. 1989) (“[A] jury reasonably may infer intent to distribute drugs from the manner in which the drugs are packaged, or from the possession of drug packaging paraphernalia.”). That inference is strengthened by the discovery of a scale, a large amount of cash in a bedroom along with personal papers bearing Clements’s name, and the presence of firearms. See United States v. Hill, 142 F.3d 305, 311 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that intent to distribute could be inferred from the presence of “various items commonly used to conduct drug trafficking activity,” including, inter alia, “large sums of U.S. currency”); United States v. Rodriguez, 882 F.2d 1059, 1063 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding an inference of intent to distribute cocaine based on evidence of “scales, commonly used to weigh drugs; cash, arguably obtained from drug transactions; and the handgun, which would be consistent with the protection and coercion common in transacting narcotics”). Therefore, a rational factfinder could have found that Clements knowingly possessed cocaine with intent to distribute beyond a reasonable doubt.