Opinion ID: 1434460
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Jury Instruction Defining Materially Adverse

Text: Lewis also claims that the district court erred by submitting to the jury the question of whether the actions of the City amounted to a materially adverse employment action under the discrimination claim. She claims that submitting the issue to the jury ignores this Court's holding in Lewis I. Here's the relevant paragraph of the discrimination instruction as it was read to the jury: To succeed on this claim, Plaintiff Lewis must first prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the denial of the opportunity to participate in the IMF Detail in Washington, D.C. was a materially adverse employment action. Not everything that makes an employee unhappy is a materially adverse employment action. It must be something more than a minor or trivial inconvenience. For example, a materially adverse employment action exists when someone's pay or benefits are decreased; when her job is changed in a way that significantly reduces her career prospects; or when job conditions are changed in a way that significantly changes her work environment in an unfavorable way. The denial of an opportunity to earn overtime is a materially adverse employment action if the overtime is a significant and recurring part of an employee's total earnings. On the other hand, if the opportunity to earn overtime is insignificant and nonrecurring, it will not be a materially adverse employment action. Lewis contends that the actions taken against her were materially adverse as a matter of law, and so the court should not have posed the question to the jury. Whether the denial of Lewis's placement on the IMF detail constituted a materially adverse action was undeniably in dispute. This Court in Lewis I said it was a genuine issue of material fact. Lewis, 496 F.3d at 654. At trial, the City presented evidence that Lewis did not know how much overtime she would have earned, that there were several other equally beneficial details available to her, that the IMF detail was unglamourous while better training exercise opportunities existed in Chicago, and that she was not denied any subsequent assignments or promotions as result of not being able to participate. Lewis's reliance on Henry v. Milwaukee County, 539 F.3d 573, 585-86 (7th Cir.2008), is misplaced because, in contrast to this case, the overtime opportunity in Henry was a significant and expected component of the plaintiffs' compensation. It is true that some cases present obvious examples of materially adverse actions being taken against employees. For example, courts should not generally task juries with determining whether terminations, demotions or salary cuts are materially adverse actions. But there are times where the question is not so obvious, and this case presents one of those instances. See SEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION § 3.01, Comment E (noting that if a fact issue arises as to whether the plaintiff suffered a materially adverse employment action, a court should modify the instructions to provide the jury with guidance as to what this term means.). Because the degree of adversity suffered by Lewis was substantially in doubt, the jury was appropriately presented with the issue.