Opinion ID: 1194882
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Failing to Establish Corpus Delicti of Oral Copulation

Text: (7a) Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to set aside the information under section 995 or to enter a judgment of acquittal for insufficient evidence under section 1118.1 on the grounds that the corpus delicti of oral copulation was not established. We review the ruling under section 995. [2] During his interrogation the day after Haro's murder, defendant stated that Trone had forced her to orally copulate him in the backseat of the car while defendant drove. Accordingly the felony complaint filed October 21, 1988, in Pasadena Municipal Court charged defendant, evidently as an accomplice, with one count of forcible oral copulation; it also alleged a felony-murder special circumstance on that basis. At the preliminary hearing the magistrate heard argument on the objection based on the lack of corpus [delicti] with respect to two of the special circumstances[,] that being the rape and the oral copulation. The prosecutor argued that he had established the corpus delicti for both counts and both special circumstance allegations, but conceded that it is a closer question with respect to the oral copulation special circumstance and the oral copulation count. Defense counsel replied, with regard to the oral copulation and the count involving oral copulation there is absolutely no evidence, independent of the statements[,] ... which would establish these allegations. None of the elements of [section 288a, subdivision (c)] are present in this record. Not one independent of the statements of the defendants. The magistrate determined at the preliminary hearing that the prosecution had not established the corpus delicti of oral copulation. Perhaps relying on a holding (not under review here) that the corpus delicti must be established at a preliminary examination before a defendant may be held to answer in the superior court ... ( Jones v. Superior Court (1979) 96 Cal. App.3d 390, 393 [157 Cal. Rptr. 809]; see also §§ 871, 872), the magistrate did not order that defendant be held to answer the oral copulation charge or special circumstance allegation in superior court. Nevertheless the information filed in superior court alleged an oral copulation offense and special circumstance. The magistrate acknowledged that under the circumstances of this particular case, and any case similar to it, the People are hard-pressed to be able to present a corpus of an oral copulation. The court is not unmindful of that. But he ruled that the law required a finding that the prosecution had not established the corpus delicti of oral copulation. The trial court had a different view. Applying a rule that only a slight showing of evidence need be made to establish the corpus delicti, it found, on the basis of the transcripts of the preliminary hearing and evidence admitted at such hearing, that [a]mong other things, there is extensive evidence indicating various sexual acts were perpetrated against the victim. Defendant's statements, highly corroborated by other evidence in other areas, can then be used to strengthen the evidence on the issue of oral copulation once the threshold is met, which I find was met in this case. Citing People v. Robbins (1988) 45 Cal.3d 867 [248 Cal. Rptr. 172, 755 P.2d 355], the court denied the motion under section 995. (8) We explained the standard of appellate review of a trial court's ruling on a section 995 motion in People v. Laiwa (1983) 34 Cal.3d 711 [195 Cal. Rptr. 503, 669 P.2d 1278]. [I]n proceedings under section 995 it is the magistrate who is the finder of fact; the superior court has none of the foregoing powers, and sits merely as a reviewing court; it must draw every legitimate inference in favor of the information, and cannot substitute its judgment as to the credibility or weight of the evidence for that of the magistrate. [Citation.] On review by appeal ... the appellate court in effect disregards the ruling of the superior court and directly reviews the determination of the magistrate holding the defendant to answer. ( Id. at p. 718.) (9) `The corpus delicti of a crime consists of two elements[:] the fact of the injury or loss or harm, and the existence of a criminal agency as its cause.' ( People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 985-986 [17 Cal. Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704].) In any criminal prosecution, the corpus delicti must be established by the prosecution independently from the extrajudicial statements, confessions' or admissions of the defendant. ( People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 403 [276 Cal. Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221]; People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 528-529 [11 Cal. Rptr.2d 353, 834 P.2d 1171] (lead opn.); accord, id. at p. 577 (conc. and dis. opn. of Mosk, J.); People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 364 [279 Cal. Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009].) Such independent proof may consist of circumstantial evidence ( Jennings, supra, at p. 364; People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 624 [205 Cal. Rptr. 775, 685 P.2d 1126], and need not establish the crime beyond a reasonable doubt ( Diaz, supra, at p. 529; Wright, supra, at p. 404). The purpose of the corpus delicti rule is to assure that the accused is not admitting to a crime that never occurred. ( People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 368.) The amount of independent proof of a crime required for this purpose is quite small; we have described this quantum of evidence as slight ( id. at p. 364) or minimal ( id. at p. 367). The People need make only a prima facie showing `permitting the reasonable inference that a crime was committed.' ( Id. at p. 364, quoting People v. Alcala, 36 Cal.3d supra, at pp. 624-625.) The inference need not be the only, or even the most compelling, one ... [but need only be] a reasonable one.... ( Jennings, supra, at p. 367.) (7b) As we explain, the People made such a showing in this case. The critical evidence supporting the corpus delicti was essentially the same at both the preliminary examination and at trial. Haro was found some 10 feet from the roadway on a dirt median. She had been shot in the head and was alive when found, but died shortly thereafter. Medical experts found bruises on her thighs, knees, legs, and perineal area. She also exhibited injuries on her hands. Results from the sexual assault kit revealed the presence of semen inside her vagina, on her external genitalia, and in her rectal area. No trace of semen was found in Haro's mouth; an expert testified, however, that negative test results were not inconsistent with oral copulation because the mouth's natural rinsing processes eliminate semen. Haro was not wearing underpants, a brassiere, or shoes. Evidence showed she customarily wore such clothing. As the facts are undisputed, in this case we are faced only with the legal question of whether there was sufficient evidence to establish the corpus delicti of oral copulation. Section 288a, subdivision (a), defines this crime as the act of copulating the mouth of one person with the sexual organ or anus of another person. Keeping in mind the low threshold of proof required to satisfy the corpus delicti rule, we conclude that the magistrate erred in finding this low threshold was not met by the evidence presented at the preliminary examination. The state of the victim's clothing (no underwear or shoes) and the forensic evidence (semen in the victim's vagina and on her external genitalia and anus) indicates multiple sexual acts occurred. That the victim was forcibly abducted, beaten, shot in the head, and left by the side of the road for dead gives rise to an inference that the sexual activity that occurred was against the victim's will. This circumstantial evidence of multiple forcible sexual acts sufficiently establishes the requisite prima facie showing of both (i) an injury, loss or harm, and (ii) the involvement of a criminal agency. Defendant, however, contends that the prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti of oral copulation because no semen was found in the victim's mouth. In other words, he argues that the lack of evidence of the specific loss or harm to this victim is fatal to the establishment of the corpus delicti. The law's requirements, however, are not so strict. Two previous cases involving application of the rule to a charged sexual assault are illustrative. In People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d 334, the body of the victim, a known prostitute, was found in an irrigation canal in a rural area. She was unclothed, and although forensic examination detected she had suffered a broken jaw, the advanced decomposition of her body made determining whether she had been sexually assaulted impossible. More specifically, there was no independent evidence that the defendant ever sexually penetrated the victim. (See § 263 [Any sexual penetration, however, slight, is sufficient to complete the crime [of rape].].) Despite the absence of any independent evidence of sexual penetration, we found that the trial court properly admitted evidence of the defendant's extrajudicial statement that he had raped the victim before killing her. Although we characterized the independent evidence of rape as `thin' ( People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 369), we nevertheless concluded that the unclothed condition of the victim's body, its location when found, and the evidence of a broken jaw, considered together, were sufficient to establish the corpus delicti of rape. People v. Robbins, supra, 45 Cal.3d 867, is in accord. The evidence in Robbins showed that the victim, a six-year-old boy, was last seen riding on a motorcycle with an unknown blond man. The boy's skeletal remains were found three months later. The victim's neck had been broken and his body was found unclothed. The defendant had been diagnosed as a pedophile. Although the decomposed remains of the victim could not establish whether he had been sexually assaulted before his death, the defendant made an extrajudicial admission that he abducted the victim and sexually assaulted him before strangling him. We found the trial court properly admitted this confession over a corpus delicti objection. ( Id. at pp. 885-886.) In view of the nature of the offense and the circumstances of the case (i.e, the body was not discovered for some time, hence it was impossible to verify the sexual conduct by scientific evidence, and there were apparently no eyewitnesses to the crime) we do not believe the corpus delicti rule can be interpreted to call for more; the law does not require impossible showings. ( Id. at p. 886.) People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d 334, and People v. Robbins, supra, 45 Cal.3d 867, require a similar result in the instant case. In all three cases, the victim's body was found unclothed (or partially clothed) in a location and condition suggesting the involvement of a criminal agency. In all three cases, independent evidence of a certain element of a sexual crime was lacking: penetration necessary for rape in Jennings, a touching of a child with lewd intent in Robbins, oral-genital or oral-anal contact in this case. As Jennings and Robbins demonstrate, we have never interpreted the corpus delicti rule so strictly that independent evidence of every physical act constituting an element of an offense is necessary. Instead, there need only be independent evidence establishing a slight or prima facie showing of some injury, loss or harm, and that a criminal agency was involved. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the court's ruling that the prosecution met its burden. Because we so decide, we do not address the issue, on which we solicited supplemental briefing, whether article I, section 28, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution abrogated the corpus delicti rule. ( People v. Riccio (1996) 42 Cal. App.4th 995, 1001, fn. 5 [50 Cal. Rptr.2d 52] [because court found corpus delicti rule satisfied, it need not consider whether or not the corpus delicti rule has been abrogated]; see People v. Culton (1992) 11 Cal. App.4th 363, 373-377 [14 Cal. Rptr.2d 189] (conc. opn. of Timlin, J.).) Finally, defendant contends that permitting the charge and allegation of oral copulation to proceed to the jury violated the due process clauses. He presents this claim perfunctorily and without supporting argument, and we reject it in similar fashion.