Opinion ID: 1175246
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the state is immune on the same ground as the individuals

Text: The State is immune to the same extent as its agents because the caseworkers' defense of immunity is not a personal one, but rather relates directly to their role as agents of the State. As a preliminary matter, we note that the State has no general defense of sovereign immunity, since it was abolished in this State by RCW 4.96.010. That statute which provides that the State and its officers: shall be liable for damages arising out of their tortious conduct ... to the same extent as if they were a private person or corporation ... One exception to RCW 4.96.010 which this court has recognized is the discretionary function exception, under which state officials engaged in the formulation of public policy are immune from suits based on basic policy determinations. Chambers-Castanes v. King Cy., 100 Wn.2d 275, 669 P.2d 451, 39 A.L.R.4th 671 (1983). However, it would stretch that doctrine well past its limit to say that the social workers involved here were engaged in the formulation of basic policy. Therefore, the discretionary function exception to the abolition of sovereign immunity does not apply here, as many other courts have held in similar suits. See National Bank v. Leir, 325 N.W.2d 845 (S.D. 1982); Koepf v. County of York, 198 Neb. 67, 251 N.W.2d 866, 90 A.L.R.3d 1205 (1977); Little v. State Div. of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983); Elton v. County of Orange, 3 Cal. App.3d 1053, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1970); Bartels v. County of Westchester, 76 A.D.2d 517, 429 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1980). [3] According to the very terms of RCW 4.96.010, however, the State still is not liable here. The State is liable only to the extent a private defendant in a similar situation would be. The State acted in this case only through the caseworkers. As principal, the State may be liable for those agents' actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior. However, like any principal, the State may take advantage of the defenses of its agent to the extent those defenses are not purely personal to that agent. Vern J. Oja & Assocs. v. Washington Park Towers, Inc., 89 Wn.2d 72, 77, 569 P.2d 1141 (1977). The defense of immunity asserted by the caseworkers here is not a personal defense. On the contrary, it is intimately related to their status as agents of the State. The whole theory behind the immunity we recognize here is to permit DSHS caseworkers to more effectively carry out their statutory duties under RCW 13.34.120. The State is therefore equally entitled to assert the same defense. This is no more than common sense. Suppose the caseworkers were immune but the State were not. The grant of immunity would enable the caseworkers to pursue their statutory duties without the adverse effects associated with the threat of liability, as discussed above. However, if the State were not similarly immune, the restraints on the caseworkers and the consequent constraints on the flow of information to the juvenile court would be imposed as a matter of Department policy. Nothing is gained by holding the individuals immune if the State is not also immune. Therefore, we affirm the trial court in its grant of summary judgment to the State as well as to the individual defendants.