Opinion ID: 1190274
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Denial of Singh's Request for a Continuance

Text: Third and finally, Singh argues that the IJ exceeded his allowable discretion in refusing to grant a continuance so that he could continue to pursue his FOIA request regarding his original entry into the United States in 1992. In response to Singh's continuance request, the government argued that there would likely not be any documents regarding Singh's 1992 entry because, as Singh admitted during his testimony, he had used a false name and discarded his passport en route. Assuming without deciding that we have statutory jurisdiction to review the IJ's denial of Singh's continuance request, we conclude that his arguments on this issue are without merit. See Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 338 n. 2 (2d Cir.2006) (Our assumption of jurisdiction to consider first the merits is not barred where the jurisdictional constraints are imposed by statute, not the Constitution, and where the jurisdictional issues are complex and the substance of the claim is, as here, plainly without merit.). We review such a denial for an excess of allowable discretion. See Pedreros v. Keisler, 503 F.3d 162, 164 (2d Cir.2007) (per curiam). An IJ may grant a continuance for good cause shown. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29. In addition, IJs are accorded wide latitude in calendar management, and we will not micromanage their scheduling decisions any more than when we review such decisions by district judges. Morgan v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 549, 551 (2d Cir.2006). An IJ would, however, abuse his discretion in denying a continuance if (1) his decision rests on an error of law (such as application of the wrong legal principle) or a clearly erroneous factual finding or (2) his decisionthough not necessarily the product of a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual findingcannot be located within the range of permissible decisions. Id. at 551-52 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Here, after several adjournments resulting in removal proceedings that lasted over two years, the IJ denied Singh's continuance request on May 16, 2005. Singh admitted before the IJ that he had used a false name and discarded his passport before his 1992 arrival, thereby complicating any search by the government for any documentation reflecting that event. It is unclear from the record whether Singh even remembered what false name he might have provided to immigration officials in 1992. Moreover, Singh admitted that he discarded whatever paperwork he received from immigration officials upon his arrival in 1992. Based upon Singh's testimony, the IJ concluded that it failed to show that he had been admitted in any status, as required by statute to be eligible for cancellation of removal. Given the circumstances of Singh's 1992 arrival and the extent to which Singh's removal proceedings had already been prolonged, we cannot conclude that the IJ exceeded his allowable discretion in denying Singh's continuance request to gather more evidence. See id. at 553. Accordingly, we deny this portion of Singh's petition for review.