Opinion ID: 2633370
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Discussion: Trial Issues

Text: The information Ricky Gibson provided police regarding defendant's inculpatory statements about the murders of Radford and Levoy led to the discovery that Levoy's body was buried in defendant's backyard. This in turn led police to defendant, who was at that time serving a sentence for unrelated crimes in San Quentin State Prison. Police spoke to defendant on July 27 and 28, 1982, and on August 2, 1982. The interviews on the latter two dates were tape-recorded. In those interviews, defendant essentially confessed to the crimes of which he now stands convicted. He claims on appeal that admission at trial of his statements to police on those dates violated his rights under the state and federal Constitutions. His primary claim is that police violated his rights as set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ( Miranda ). As we explain, he is mistaken.
Sergeants Gary Davis and Glen Johnson of the Kern County Sheriffs Department testified they went to San Quentin State Prison on July 27, 1982, to speak to defendant about a double homicide. Prison officials placed the two officers alone with defendant in the security squad office. Sergeant Davis testified that at the beginning of the 30-minute interview, he advised defendant of his Miranda rights, reading from a preprinted form from the sheriffs office. Defendant replied verbally that he understood his rights and would speak with the officers. In this first interview, defendant stated he was not involved in the homicides. Sergeant Davis advised defendant that this was his chance to talk to them, but that they would be filing a report with the district attorney's office for a possible complaint against defendant charging him with the murders. Davis also told defendant he already had spoken with defendant's wife, son, mother, and father about the crimes. Defendant then told Davis he wished to speak with his mother and that, after doing so, he would advise Davis whether he wished to continue their conversation. Defendant then requested that the interview cease, and the officers withdrew. According to Sergeant Davis, defendant appeared alert and coherent, and his answers were responsive to Davis's questions. At no time did he indicate a desire to have an attorney present. Following this first interview, Davis called defendant's parents' home and informed his father that defendant wished to speak to his mother. Sergeant Davis did not tape-record this first interview because he was not allowed to enter the prison with his recording equipment, as the prison was in full lockdown due to an in-prison disturbance. At the end of the interview, he spoke with prison officials about his inability to record the interview with defendant. The prison offered Davis the use of its own recording equipment should he return for future meetings with defendant. The next day, July 28, 1982, Davis and Johnson returned to the prison in the morning but were unable to see defendant because he was meeting with his mother. The officers eventually met with defendant in the afternoon, again in a security squad office. This second interview was tape-recorded using the prison's recording equipment. Davis testified that he again read defendant his Miranda rights and defendant again stated he understood his rights and wished to speak to the officers. He told the officers that he wanted to make a statement and would do so whether an attorney was present or not, and that he later wanted to testify in court about how he had committed the homicides. Sergeant Davis denied threatening defendant or promising him any benefits should he decide to speak with them. The officers promised only to listen to defendant's entire story. During this second interview, defendant admitted his involvement in the Radford and Levoy murders. Defendant did not appear drowsy or sleepy, and his answers were responsive to the officers' questions. On cross-examination, Sergeant Davis specifically denied threatening to arrest defendant's son if defendant refused to talk to them, denied threatening to arrest someone close to defendant's family, and denied saying that he would not have defendant's mother come to see him if defendant would not, afterwards, agree to talk to police. Davis stated he advised defendant of his rights on the second day while the tape recorder was running and did not advise him of his rights before the tape recorder began. He repeated that defendant did not appear drowsy and that defendant's speech was not slurred or slow. Sergeant Glen Johnson essentially confirmed Sergeant Davis's testimony. Johnson specifically corroborated Davis's testimony that Davis had read defendant his Miranda rights before the interviews on July 27 and 28, 1982, and that defendant did not appear sleepy or otherwise under the influence of drugs, although Johnson recalled defendant had said he was sedated. Sergeant Johnson further testified that he alone conducted a third interview with defendant on August 2, 1982. The interview occurred in the same place as the first two interviews. Johnson read defendant his Miranda rights from a card and obtained defendant's agreement to talk. During this third interview, defendant appeared fully aware of his surroundings and did not exhibit any excessive movements or unusual perspiration. He was alert and responsive. Sergeant Johnson testified he did not threaten to arrest defendant's son or other family members. He did not recall hearing defendant say anything about wanting an attorney present. The defense called defendant's mother, Dorothy Weaver, to the stand. She testified she had just visited her son in late July when police visited her and informed her of defendant's possible involvement in the Radford and Levoy murders. She decided to visit him again to hear the truth; she denied police contacted her by telephone. She drove to San Quentin the next day with defendant's sister, Katie S. When Mrs. Weaver spoke to defendant, he told her police had informed him that if he did not cooperate, they would arrest his son as well as another close loved one. His sister told defendant he should consult an attorney before speaking with the police, but Mrs. Weaver simply urged defendant to tell the truth. The defense then called Katie S. to the stand. She confirmed her mother's testimony regarding their visit with defendant, including Mrs. Weaver's testimony that defendant said police had threatened to arrest defendant's son and a close loved one unless he cooperated. In addition, she testified that when her mother left to use the restroom, defendant told her the close loved one police had threatened to arrest was his mother. Defendant seemed very agitated, and his body was shaking. She told defendant not to talk to anyone until he conferred with a lawyer. He replied that he had no choice and repeated that police would arrest his son and mother. Defendant's son was 12 years old at the time. Defendant then testified. He asserted that when the police first came to talk to him at the prison, he was taking 600 milligrams of Mellaril a day to calm himself down. The officers did not inform him of his Miranda rights at any time during that first interview. When defendant denied having anything to do with the crimes, the officers told him they did not have time to mess around and that they would go to Oroville and arrest his son and another member of his family. Not wishing to have his son arrested, defendant told them he wanted to speak with his mother. If the police would arrange it, he agreed to speak to the officers after speaking to his mother. He acknowledged the police officers did not tape-record that first interview. His mother and sister visited him the next day. While his mother was away from the table, defendant told his sister that he believed police intended to arrest his mother. After their visit, he met with the two officers. Before the tape recorder was turned on, they read him his Miranda rights and he indicated he would like to have an attorney present. He also said he wanted his invocation of his right to counsel on the tape. Sergeant Johnson told him it was not necessary to put that information on the tape because everybody knows that you want an attorney present. Defendant then went ahead without an attorney and gave a statement because he did not want police to arrest his son or other family member. On cross-examination, defendant confirmed he never put his invocation of his right to counsel on the tape. He believed that had he done so, police would have terminated the interview and arrested his son. He did not know of any reason why police would arrest his son. He believed the threat to arrest a close family member referred to his mother because she is the only one that I am real close to. He did not know of any reason why police would arrest his mother. Defendant testified that on the second day of interviews, police advised him of his rights twice, once before the tape recorder was running and once after. Before the tape was turned on, the police officers told him what to say in response to each Miranda advisement. After the tape was turned on, defendant testified, he repeated each response as instructed. Defendant admitted he knew he had the right to an attorney and that one would be provided him should he so desire. Defendant admitted the third interview was somewhat his idea and that he did not invoke his right to counsel. Defendant did not remember whether the officer had advised him of his rights, but he knew better than to ask [for an attorney] on tape. He stated: I wanted to make sure that they had everything they wanted so they wouldn't arrest my son and other members of my family. On redirect, defendant stated that his son had helped him dig the hole in which Levoy was buried and that was the reason he believed police might arrest him. He averred the main reason he gave a statement to police was to protect his family. The prosecutor then recalled Sergeant Davis, who reaffirmed that defendant had never asked for an attorney and that he had never threatened defendant by saying he would arrest his son. Sergeant Johnson, also recalled, similarly denied threatening defendant with the arrest of his son. After listening to the tapes and considering the briefing, the trial court ruled that defendant had been properly advised of and waived his Miranda rights; that despite his ingestion of prescribed drugs, his mental state was such that he could, and did, give his statement intelligently, freely and voluntarily; and that such statement was not the product of any coercion stemming from a threat to arrest defendant's family members. The court stated it was convinced of the voluntariness of defendant's statement beyond a reasonable doubt.
The law is well settled. When reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion that a statement was collected in violation of the defendant's rights under Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, we defer to the trial court's resolution of disputed facts, including the credibility of witnesses, if that resolution is supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1032-1033, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544.) Considering those facts, as found, together with the undisputed facts, we independently determine whether the challenged statement was obtained in violation of Miranda 's rules ( Bradford, supra, at p. 1033, 60 Cal. Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544), that is, whether (assuming the defendant was in custody) the statement was preceded by the now-famous admonition of Miranda rights: the defendant has the right to remain silent, any statement he might make can be used against him, he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and an attorney will be provided at state expense if he cannot afford one. ( Dickerson v. United States (2000) 530 U.S. 428, 435, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405.) If a custodial defendant requests counsel, all questioning must cease. ( Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378.) Statements made by a custodial defendant in the absence of Miranda warnings are inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief. ( People v. Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1033, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544.) There is no dispute in this case that police were interrogating defendant (see, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297) or that defendant was in custody. The only issues are whether defendant was given Miranda warnings before giving his statements on July 28 and August 2, 1982, whether he invoked his right to counsel, and whether he was coerced into waiving his rights by threats to arrest his son and another family member. We turn to those issues now.
The difference in the testimony regarding whether Sergeants Davis and Johnson read defendant his Miranda warnings was striking. The officers testified they read defendant the Miranda warnings from a preprinted card. Defendant testified they either did not read him his rights, or they suggested to him (while the tape recorder was off) that should he invoke his rights, they would arrest his son. Defendant's story was supported by the testimony of his mother and his sister. The officers expressly denied such threats. We assume the trial court considered the demeanor of the witnesses, as well as the interests each party had to tell the truth. We also assume the trial court considered such factors as the likelihood that police would threaten to arrest a 12-year-old boy for a double murder, the likelihood they would threaten to arrest defendant's mother in the absence of any evidence she was at all involved in the crimes, the inability of defendant to explain why he believed the officers' alleged threat to arrest a close family member was a threat to arrest his mother, the fact defendant waived his Miranda rights on the tape recording, the tone of his voice on the tape, the evidence of his medication, and the testimony describing his behavior, mood, and emotional state during the interviews. All things considered, we conclude substantia] evidence supports the trial court's decision to credit the testimony of Sergeants Davis and Johnson that, before interrogating defendant, they properly  Mirandized  him and obtained a waiver of his rights. Substantial evidence also supports the trial court's decision to disbelieve defendant, his sister and his mother that police coerced defendant into waiving his rights. This was a simple credibility determination for which we defer to the trial courts. Defendant raises a number of counterarguments, but all are speculative and do not undermine the substantial nature of the evidentiary support for the trial court's decision. He suggests the short duration of the first interview on July 27, 1982, was somehow suspicious. Not at all: police testified that, on that day, defendant denied involvement but agreed to speak with them again if he could first talk to his mother. Defendant also argues the fact the first interview was not tape-recorded is also suspicious. But Davis and Johnson explained the problem they had bringing their own recording equipment into the prison, a problem that was solved by the next day when they were able to use the prison's own recording equipment. Nor is it suspicious that Sergeant Davis states at the beginning of the tape of the July 28 interview that one of the things we talked about was advising you of your rights and at this time I'm gonna advise you of your rights. (Italics added.) By saying at this time Davis did not, as defendant argues, necessarily mean that he had failed to read defendant his Miranda rights on the previous day. Defendant further argues that the interviews on July 28 and August 2 were inextricably connected with the interview on July 27 and, because police did not read him his Miranda warnings on July 27, the subsequent interviews were tainted by that illegality. The trial court found, however, that the officers had read defendant his Miranda warnings on July 27, and substantial evidence supports that decision, namely, the testimony of Sergeants Davis and Johnson. This argument thus fails. Defendant also contends that because he invoked his right to counsel on July 27, subsequent interrogations without counsel were prohibited even if he was re- Mirandized. But implicit in the trial court's ruling that defendant executed a sufficient waiver of his rights on July 27 is the conclusion that defendant did not invoke his right to counsel at that time. Subsequent interrogations, therefore, were permissible, provided defendant was re- Mirandized. That he was readmonished before each interview with police is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the rule against interrogations following an invocation of counsel is inapplicable.
Miranda aside, defendant also contends admission at trial of the statements he made to police on July 28 and August 2, 1982, violated his constitutional rights because they were involuntarily made. An involuntary confession is inadmissible under the due process clauses of both the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution ( Jackson v. Denno (1964) 378 U.S. 368, 385-386, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908) as well as article I, sections 7 and 15 of the California Constitution ( People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 778, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330). Threats to arrest family members, as defendant claims occurred here, can render a subsequent confession involuntary. ( Lynumn v. Illinois (1963) 372 U.S. 528, 534, 83 S.Ct. 917, 9 L.Ed.2d 922; People v. Matlock (1959) 51 Cal.2d 682, 697, 336 P.2d 505.) Under both state and federal law, courts apply a `totality of circumstances' test to determine the voluntariness of a confession. ( Withrow v. Williams (1993) 507 U.S. 680, 693-694 [113 S.Ct. 1745, 123 L.Ed.2d 407]) ( People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 576, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816, 967 P.2d 29.) Defendant raised the voluntariness issue below, and the trial court denied his motion to suppress on this ground. Although at present the state's burden is to prove the voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of the evidence, defendant's crimes occurred before the enactment of article I, section 28, subdivision (d) of the state Constitution, the so-called Truth in Evidence provision that was added to the state charter by passage of Proposition 8 in 1982. Accordingly, at defendant's trial the state was required to show the confession was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 770 & fn. 1, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330; People v. Markham (1989) 49 Cal.3d 63, 65, 260 Cal.Rptr. 273, 775 P.2d 1042.) [5] On appeal, our role when reviewing the trial court's determination that a confession was voluntary is similar to the standard applied in the Miranda context: we independently examine the record, but, to the extent the facts conflict, we accept the version favorable to the People if supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 394, 243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279.) Defendant's argument that his statements to police on July 28 and August 2, 1982, were involuntary is brief and no more persuasive than his Miranda -related claims. He contends the threats to arrest his son, as well as a close family member (that he took to be a threat to arrest his mother) overcame his free will, causing him to confess his crimes. In denying the motion to suppress, however, the trial court implicitly disbelieved the testimony of defendant, his mother and his sister and instead credited that of Sergeants Davis and Johnson that no such threats were made. There is substantial evidence supporting this implied finding: both officers directly and strongly denied issuing such threats, no such threats appear on the tape recording of the interrogations, and the implausibility that police would arrest a 12-year-old boy or Dorothy Weaver in the absence of any evidence of their complicity in the crimes all support the trial court's decision. Although defendant does not expressly make the argument here, to the extent he suggests his statements were involuntary because at the time of the interviews with police he was under the influence of medication, we reject that claim as well. The due process inquiry focuses on the alleged wrongful and coercive actions of the state, here Sergeants Davis and Johnson, and not the mental state of defendant. ( Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157, 165, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473.) Because the trial court determined that neither officer engaged in wrongful conduct, the mere fact defendant was taking medication prescribed by the prison medical staff is insufficient to establish a claim of involuntariness. (See Clabourne v. Lewis (9th Cir.1995) 64 F.3d 1373, 1379 [defendant's confession not involuntary despite being under the influence of prison-prescribed Thorazine]; see also People v. Hendricks (1987) 43 Cal.3d 584, 591, 238 Cal.Rptr. 66, 737 P.2d 1350 [consumption of alcoholic beverages during interrogation did not render confession involuntary].)
Finally, defendant contends that because his statements to police on July 28 and August 2, 1982, constituted a full confession of guilt, those statements should be deemed inadmissible because police failed to obtain specific waivers as to each constitutional right he was forfeiting by confessing, analogizing to the legal requirements applicable to guilty pleas. ( Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449.) [6] No state or federal authority exists for extending the protections of Boykin and Tahl to extrajudicial confessions. Nor is such extension necessary. The warning required by Miranda adequately informs an accused of his right against compelled self-incrimination under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, and police here obtained a waiver of that right from defendant. The other rights an accused waives by pleading guiltythe right to a jury trial and to confront one's accusers ( Boykin v. Alabama, supra, 395 U.S. at p. 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709)are not lost by providing police with an out-of-court confession. The confession thus did not necessitate a prophylactic Boykin -type warning.
Defendant moved to suppress the body of Barbara Levoy and other evidence flowing from the discovery of her body, such as clothing, autopsy reports and dental comparison evidence, claiming the search police conducted exceeded the scope of the consent given by defendant's ex-wife, Barbara Weaver. [7] A hearing on the suppression motion was held on September 1, 1983. Sergeant Glen Johnson testified that he and Sergeant Gary Davis traveled to defendant's Oroville home after learning from inmate Ricky Gibson that defendant had told Gibson he was guilty of a double murder and that one of the victims was buried in his yard. They contacted Barbara Weaver at her home, explained the purpose of their visit, and asked whether defendant had done any digging in the yard early in 1981. She replied in the affirmative. Davis told defendant's exwife that police proposed to dig in her yard to attempt to find the victim's body, and she consented orally. She then signed the standard sheriffs office consent form, which states: I consent that Officer _____ of the Kern County Sheriffs Department and deputies under his control enter my residence and/or my motor vehicle(s) to search for evidence pertinent to his investigation. [¶] I am giving this written permission to these officers freely and voluntarily, without any threats or promises having been made, and after having been informed by said officer that I have a right to refuse this search and/or seizure. The form is signed by Barbara Weaver; the names of Sergeants Davis and Johnson are inscribed in the blank space. On cross-examination, Sergeant Johnson testified he had, on a few previous occasions, added handwritten modifications to the standard consent form and had the consenting person initial the changes. No particular reason existed why he failed to modify the form in this case to specify he intended to dig up the yard. Barbara Weaver, defendant's ex-wife, also testified. She stated she signed the consent form and that some discussion took place about digging in the yard, but [i]t was just talk. She understood her consent to include searching her residence only. On cross-examination, she admitted the officers had told her they suspected a body was buried in her yard and that they wished to search her yard, but she did not remember telling the officers they could dig up her yard. Once the officers began digging, she was afraid to ask them to stop. The trial court denied the suppression motion, saying: I find the testimony of [Barbara] Weaver to be incredible in certain aspects about the officers asking to search the house for a body and she thought well, maybe there could possibly be a body in the house but not in the yard when there was evidence that the defendant had done some digging in the yard and she knew about the digging and even pointed it out to the officers and cooperated with the officers in showing them places where he had done some digging. Then her answers to some of the specific questions as to what she said specifically, she would tense up each time and then take quite a bit of time to answer those questions. [¶] I do not feel that she was being truthful in answers to many of those specific questions as to what she said, [¶] . . . [¶] I believe the officer's testimony. I don't believe her testimony in certain particulars when she indicates that she does not remember telling the officer specific things and that she did not consent to the search of the yard, orally at least, and so the motion to suppress is denied. Defendant contends the trial court erred, and that the search exceeded the scope of Barbara Weaver's consent. He also contends her consent was involuntary. We disagree. The standard of appellate review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial court's factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment. [Citations.] ( People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425, 902 P.2d 729.) As with the Miranda issue discussed above, this issue turns on a credibility determination made by the trial court. Sergeant Johnson testified Barbara Weaver gave her consent to search the yard; she testified she gave no such consent. After hearing both witnesses testify, the trial court specifically credited Sergeant Johnson, noting Barbara Weaver tensed up and then took a long time to answer certain questions. Evaluating such nonverbal factors in determining the credibility of witnesses is a task uniquely for the trial court, as such factors are not apparent from the face of the record. We thus defer to the trial court's decision in this matter and find substantial evidence supports the court's decision that Barbara Weaver consented to a search of her yard. Defendant further contends his suppression motion should have been granted because Barbara Weaver's consent to the search was involuntary. We agree with respondent that defendant did not preserve this issue for appeal. A claim based on the voluntariness of Barbara Weaver's consent appears nowhere in defendant's moving papers, defense counsel's oral argument at the suppression hearing, or in the trial court's oral decision. The issue is thus not properly before us. ( People v. Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1038, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544.) Assuming the issue was preserved, we reject it on the merits. Six or seven officers presented themselves at Barbara Weaver's home (Sergeants Davis and Johnson, as well as four or five other officers who were there to dig), and defendant suggests they were an intimidating force. Although the state has the burden of proving that Barbara Weaver's consent was . . . freely and voluntarily given, and the burden cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority ( Bumper v. North Carolina (1968) 391 U.S. 543, 548-549, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797), the prosecution satisfied this burden with evidence of Barbara Weaver's signed consent form and her testimony that she freely consented to a search of her house. Nothing in this record suggests Barbara Weaver's free will was overborne by the searching officers. We thus reject defendant's claim that her consent to search the yard was involuntary.
At the guilt phase of the trial, defense counsel defended the charge that defendant was guilty of murdering Radford in the first degree by attempting to persuade the jury that defendant did not intend to kill Radford, but only to knock him unconscious. As to Levoy, counsel argued both that the killing did not occur during the commission of the rapes because the sexual assaults had long since terminated by the time defendant killed her, and that defendant had strangled Levoy when she bit him on the thumb, enraging him and causing him to lose contact with reality. As to Levoy, then, counsel argued the criminal homicide was not elevated to first degree murder on either a felony-murder or a premeditation theory. Despite possession of a large amount of expert evidence related to defendant's mental condition, counsel chose not to present a defense of diminished capacity. [8] Defendant claims this decision demonstrates he was not afforded the effective assistance of counsel. We disagree. `[I]n order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must first show counsel's performance was deficient because his representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . under prevailing professional norms. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra ,] 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674]) Second, he must also show prejudice flowing from counsel's performance or lack thereof. ( Strickland, supra, at pp. 691-692 [104 S.Ct. 2052]) Prejudice is shown when there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. ( In re Sixto [, supra , ] 48 Cal.3d 1247, 1257 [259 Cal.Rptr. 491, 774 P.2d 164]; Strickland, supra, at p. 694 [104 S.Ct. 2052])' ( People v. Jennings [ supra, ] 53 Cal.3d 334, 357 [279 Cal.Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009]) ( In re Avena, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 721, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 909 P.2d 1017, first ellipsis in Avena. ) Reviewing courts defer to counsel's reasonable tactical decisions in examining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (see People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 412 [276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221]), and there is a `strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.' ( People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 436-437, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373, quoting Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052.) [W]e accord great deference to counsel's tactical decisions ( People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 979, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183), and we have explained that courts should not second-guess reasonable, if difficult, tactical decisions in the harsh light of hindsight ( People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1212, 65 Cal. Rptr.2d 240, 939 P.2d 354). Tactical errors are generally not deemed reversible, and counsel's decisionmaking must be evaluated in the context of the available facts. ( People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 333, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374.) In the usual case, where counsel's trial tactics or strategic reasons for challenged decisions do not appear on the record, we will not find ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal unless there could be no conceivable reason for counsel's acts or omissions. ( People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 896, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15; see also People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 581, 189 Cal.Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144 [on appeal, a conviction will be reversed on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel only if the record on appeal affirmatively discloses that counsel had no rational tactical purpose for his act or omission].) In this case, however, counsel set forth on the record specific reasons for deciding to forgo a diminished capacity defense. [T]here are many tactical considerations that the defense has to review prior to commenting on evidence and taking a basic theory of defense when arguing the case at the conclusion of the evidence. We made a determination that we didn't want to attack diminished capacity or use diminished capacity as an argument, although we felt it was necessary as a jury instruction because of some of the evidence brought up; however, if we had argued the fact that there was diminished capacity, we would have not had proceeded [ sic ] on argument that we did, which is [defendant] looked at the possibility of personally attempting to kill someone, reflected [on] that [possibility] and ma[d]e the decision, a thinking decision of only attempting to knock the man out. We couldn't have faithfully argued that to the jury if we had the counter argument that he didn't have the ability to deliberate and premeditate so we decided to go with the strongest evidence we had, which was no intent to kill. [¶] . . . [¶] Further, we decided not to submit any evidence of diminished capacity by way of medical testimony, reserving that defense for the insanity phase rather than coming in and destroying whatever evidence we were presenting relative to his ability to decide and make a logical conclusion as to his actions. We felt that there would be an inconsistent argument which would water down our credibility with the jury if we were to go both ways, so we decided to go and approach it one way. Those were tactical decisions and I am not saying that what we did was right, looking at the results, but it was a decision that we had to make and we believe that they were considered opinions predicated upon the evidence, [and the] state of the law as we knew it to be. As is clear, counsel had a reasoned explanation for their decision to forgo a diminished capacity defense at trial and to rely on what they considered their stronger arguments, namely, that defendant did not premeditate the killings and that Levoy's killing came after the rape had terminated. Defendant makes a number of arguments why he believes counsel's admittedly tactical decision was deficient, but none is availing. He claims counsel were mistaken in believing that a diminished capacity defense would have been inconsistent with the defense that defendant made a thinking decision to knock Radford out but not to kill him. Yet defendant admits that in his pretrial statement to police, he said he intended merely to knock Radford out. At trial, moreover, defendant testified he did not think Radford would suffer serious injury. Defendant also contends trial counsel were mistaken in concluding a diminished capacity defense would have been inconsistent with their defense that Levoy's killing did not occur during the commission of the rapes. But in making the temporal argument that the rapes had terminated, defense counsel David Huffman may well have believed that reliance as well on a diminished capacity defense would have undercut the thrust of the main defense theory of the case. We take counsel's statement that he could not have faithfully argued his chosen defense theory if he also used a diminished capacity argument to mean as much. We reach the same conclusion with respect to defendant's claim that the unconsciousness defense, that is, that defendant became enraged and lost consciousness when Levoy bit his thumb, was not inconsistent with a diminished capacity defense. That may be true, but counsel's decision to reserve the mental evidence for the sanity phase so as not to blunt its impact was not unreasonable. (See People v. Miller (1972) 7 Cal.3d 562, 572, 102 Cal.Rptr. 841, 498 P.2d 1089 [evidence of mental incapacity would lose much of its impact at the sanity phase if presented earlier].) Although the case was governed by the pre- Pope legal standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, [9] People v. Miller, supra, 7 Cal.3d 562, 102 Cal.Rptr. 841, 498 P.2d 1089, posed the exact issue we confront in this case: was counsel ineffective for deciding to forgo presentation of mental incapacity evidence at the guilt phase and to reserve it instead for the sanity phase? We found counsel's tactical decision there was not unreasonable, explaining: We touch here on a difficult tactical problem facing every defense counsel who possesses psychiatric evidence bearing on his client's condition at the time of the crime. Since the development of the Wells-Gorshen line of cases, [10] this evidence is usually admissible at both the guilt phase and the sanity phase. Counsel's dilemma is, therefore, at which phase should he introduce this evidence? In People v. Coogler (1969) . . . 71 Cal.2d 153, 169 [77 Cal.Rptr. 790, 454 P.2d 686], we upheld the competency of counsel who chose to introduce such evidence at the guilt phase only: `His decision not to enter an insanity plea may have been based upon a fear that such a plea would prejudice his client's claim of diminished capacity; if the jury knew that an insanity hearing would follow in the event of defendant's conviction, it might treat summarily the psychiatric testimony as to whether defendant could form the requisite intent to commit the crimes charged.' Even more certain than this conjecture, however, is that a trier of fact would tend to `treat summarily' such evidence if it were introduced at the sanity phase after the same trier had already rejected it at the guilt phase. It follows that when, as here, counsel concludes his client has a valid defense of not guilty by reason of insanity, it might be unwise for him to prematurely expose that evidence to the scrutiny of the trier of fact at the guilt phase. It is no solution to this dilemma for us to engage in the perilous process of second-guessing whichever of the alternatives counsel chooses. . . . Nothing is seen more clearly than with hindsight. The most that can be fairly said on this record, however, is that counsel's decision to delay introducing his evidence of defendant's mental state until the sanity phase was a debatable trial tactic. Yet as we reminded the bench and bar not long ago, even `debatable trial tactics' do not `constitute a deprivation of the effective assistance of counsel' ( People v. McGautha (1969) 70 Cal.2d 770, 784 [76 Cal.Rptr. 434, 452 P.2d 650], affd. sub nom. McGautha v. California (1971) 402 U.S. 183 [91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed.2d 711]) When, as here, `there is no showing that counsel did not research the facts or the law, or that he was ignorant of a crucial defense' ( In re Hawley (1967) . . . 67 Cal.2d 824, 829 [63 Cal.Rptr. 831, 433 P.2d 919]), and counsel makes a tactical choice to withhold certain evidence for a later stage of trial, sound policy reasons persuade us to defer to counsel's judgment in the matter. ( People v. Miller, supra, 7 Cal.3d at pp. 572-574, 102 Cal.Rptr. 841, 498 P.2d 1089, fns. omitted.) We agree and conclude the record does not demonstrate that counsel were constitutionally ineffective under either the state or federal Constitution because they chose to withhold the evidence of defendant's alleged diminished capacity until the sanity phase of the trial.
Based on his statements to police, defendant originally was charged with felony-murder special-circumstance allegations based on kidnapping, rape, and sodomy. Because the decomposition of Levoy's body was too advanced to confirm that she had been sexually assaulted, the only evidence of these sexual assaults came from defendant himself. Defendant moved to strike the two sex-crime-based special-circumstance allegations, citing the corpus delicti rule, and the trial court granted the motion. As to the charged murder of Levoy, however, the prosecution proceeded on the dual theories that defendant killed her after premeditating the crime and killed her during the commission of a rape, i.e., on a felony-murder theory. Defendant now contends the corpus delicti rule should prohibit permitting the jury to rely on a felony-murder theory to elevate the degree of a homicide to the first degree, when the only evidence of the sole qualifying felony (in this case, rape) comes from the defendant's own statements. In the alternative, he claims that using his uncorroborated admission he raped Levoy to establish the degree of the homicide violates his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. The corpus delicti rule requires that the corpus delicti of a crime be proved independently from an accused's extrajudicial admissions. [Citations.] `The corpus delicti of a crime consists of two elements, the fact of the injury or loss or harm, and the existence of a criminal agency as its cause.' [Citation.] Such proof, however, may be circumstantial and need only be a slight or prima facie showing `permitting the reasonable inference that a crime was committed.' [Citation.] ( People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 364, 279 Cal.Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009.) When the People have established the corpus delicti of murder, a defendant's extrajudicial statements may be admitted to prove an underlying felony for felony-murder purposes even if the felony cannot be proved by evidence other than such statements. ( People v. Cantrell (1973) 8 Cal.3d 672, 680-681, 105 Cal.Rptr. 792, 504 P.2d 1256, disapproved on another ground by People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684, fn. 12, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1.) [11] Defendant concedes a long line of decisions has found the corpus delicti rule inapplicable to felonies used to establish the degree of a homicide ( People v. Cooper (1960) 53 Cal.2d 755, 765, 3 Cal.Rptr. 148, 349 P.2d 964; People v. Miller (1951) 37 Cal.2d 801, 806, 236 P.2d 137 [The corpus delicti of the crime of murder having been established by independent evidence, . . . extrajudicial statements of the accused . . . may be used to establish the degree of the crime committed]), but he contends the need for heightened reliability in capital cases demands that we extend the protection of the rule to cases such as his. He also argues the rule established by these decisions permitted the prosecution in his case to circumvent the stated policy [of the corpus delicti rule] of protecting an accused from possibly fabricated testimony. (See People v. Cullen (1951) 37 Cal.2d 614, 625, 234 P.2d 1.) Defendant's contentions are unpersuasive. The United States Supreme Court's well-known admonition, on which defendant relies, about the need for heightened reliability in capital cases, refers to the determination of penalty, not the degree of the homicide. ( Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (lead opn. of Powell, J.) [Because of that qualitative difference [between a sentence of life and death], there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case].) We are unaware of any holding by the high court, and defendant cites none, requiring this court to modify its long-standing state-law-based rules governing the admissibility of evidence at the guilt phase merely because in a particular case the death penalty is a possible outcome. The motivating idea of the corpus delicti ruleto protect an accused from his or her own fabricated statementshas little application in this situation, where the corpus delicti of murder is established by ample evidence of a homicide committed by a criminal agency. Defendant is sufficiently protected from the possibility of his own folly, his possible mental impairment, or police overreaching by the rule rendering his statements inadmissible to prove the substantive sex crimes that he admitted having committed. Application of the corpus delicti rule to the charge that he committed murder also protects him. He finally is protected by his ability, should he so desire, to attempt to exclude his statements by proving they were the product of his mental impairment or of police misconduct. (See Colorado v. Connelly, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 167, 107 S.Ct. 515 [coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not `voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment].) Once the criminal agency has been established by prima facie evidence that a murder was committed, permitting a defendant's own statements to help establish the degree of the crime does not violate his rights to due process, a fair trial, or to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, or other constitutional guarantee. Although it is unclear whether defendant is relying on any asserted state constitutional basis for his claim, we reject such claim as well, finding no reason to interpret the state Constitution differently in this context.
Defendant next contends his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to move to exclude on corpus delicti grounds his extrajudicial statements that he kidnapped Levoy. We disagree. Counsel is not ineffective for failing to make a frivolous motion. We reiterate that the proof necessary to satisfy a corpus delicti challenge need only be a slight or prima facie showing `permitting the reasonable inference that a crime was committed.' ( People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 364, 279 Cal.Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009.) Here, Levoy was known to be traveling with Radford, and witness James Powell saw the two stranded by car trouble on the side of the road. Shortly thereafter, Radford was found with grievous and ultimately fatal injuries and Levoy had disappeared. A search failed to reveal her whereabouts. Her body was discovered 18 months later buried in defendant's yard, hundreds of miles from the scene of her disappearance, in the opposite direction from which she was known to have been traveling, and still clad in the clothes she had been wearing on the night she disappeared. Because this evidence permits the reasonable inference Levoy was taken from the crime scene against her will and moved a substantial distance, the evidence establishes a prima facie showing that a kidnapping occurred. Any motion to exclude defendant's statements on the ground the corpus delicti for kidnapping had not been shown would have been denied. (See People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 624-625, 205 Cal.Rptr. 775, 685 P.2d 1126 [finding corpus delicti of kidnapping on similar facts].) Counsel was thus not ineffective under either the state or federal Constitution for failing to make the motion.
Prior to trial, defendant moved on corpus delicti grounds to dismiss the charge he murdered Levoy, contending the prosecution had not demonstrated a prima facie case that Levoy had been murdered. The trial court denied the motion. Defense counsel renewed the issue at trial, claiming defendant's extrajudicial statements should be excluded on corpus delicti grounds. When the trial court overruled the objection, defendant testified and explained that he killed Levoy, but the killing was not intentional. Defendant now claims the trial court erred in overruling his motion to exclude his statements and that this error induced him to testify at trial. Respondent argues that defendant did not adequately preserve the issue for appeal, having raised a slightly different claim below. We do not resolve that question, however, because even assuming the issue was preserved, we find the corpus delicti for Levoy's murder was more than adequately established by the evidence independent of defendant's statements. The fact of the injury is obvious: Levoy's lifeless body, unearthed in defendant's yard, is proof of that. The existence of a criminal agency as the cause of her death is reasonably inferable from the suspicious circumstances of her disappearance, including the fact Radford was killed at the same time she disappeared, as well as from the fact her body was buried in the same clothes she had been wearing when she disappeared, suggesting her death was not from natural causes. The trial court held as much: [T]he fact that Barbara Levoy disappeared abruptly after her companion had been killed by homicide, and that she stayed disappeared [sic ] until she was discovered some eighteen months later, that she was discovered in a grave four feet approximately underground, [there is] just . . . a great deal of circumstantial evidence that she died by means of homicide. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . It is obvious that it was not an accidental death, there was not a suicide, but in any event, I am amply convinced that the death has been proved and it has been proved to have been committed by criminal means. We agree and conclude the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion, based on the corpus delicti rule, to exclude his statements implicating him in Levoy's murder. Accordingly, defendant could not have been improperly induced to testify as a result of the trial court's decision denying his motion. To the extent defendant claims that admission of his statements to prove he murdered Levoy violated his rights to a fair trial, due process, and a fair and reliable penalty verdict under the federal Constitution, we deny those claims as well.
Defendant next claims the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the admission into evidence of two photographs. Exhibit 7 is a photograph portraying a pool of blood on the ground where Radford was found. Exhibit 16 is an autopsy photograph of Radford's head with the scalp and hair removed. Defendant moved to exclude both photographs, arguing they were irrelevant, cumulative, and more prejudicial than probative. We recently addressed the admission of gruesome photographs in People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 65 Cal. Rptr.2d 348, 939 P.2d 748. There we explained that only relevant evidence is admissible ( id. at p. 13, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 939 P.2d 748), and the trial court has broad discretion in determining the relevance of evidence [citations], but lacks discretion to admit irrelevant evidence ( id. at p. 14, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 939 P.2d 748). After examining the photographs, we agree with the trial court that the challenged photographs were relevant and therefore admissible. Exhibit 7 shows the scene where Radford was found, his body having been removed and represented in the picture by a chalk outline. Although defendant suggests the photograph was cumulative to exhibits 24 and 25, which were also admitted and show the blood splatter patterns in more detail, we agree with respondent that exhibit 7 better shows the blood in spatial perspective, arguably demonstrating the brutality of the attack. Exhibit 7 shows blood splattered several feet from where Radford lay, a fact not demonstrated by the other photographs. Although defendant further argues the prosecution did not use exhibit 7 for the purpose for which it was intended, instead relying on other exhibits, that fact does not render exhibit 7 irrelevant. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in admitting exhibit 7. Exhibit 16 depicts Radford's skull with the scalp removed. Although this is gruesome business indeed, it was important to demonstrate an important point to the jury: the picture showed the victim's skull was fractured in multiple places like an eggshell, indicating the assailant had used tremendous force in his attack. The amount of force portrayed in the picture tends to rebut defendant's claim he struck Radford without the intent to kill him. The photograph was thus relevant, and the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion. Defendant further contends, however, that the trial court should have excluded exhibit 16 as cumulative because Dr. Comparini, the Kern County deputy forensic pathologist, testified as to the amount of force used and was not challenged on this point. As we explained in People v. Scheid, supra, 16 Cal.4th 1, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 939 P.2d 748, in response to a similar argument, photographs corroborative of a witness's testimony need not be excluded as cumulative merely because the witness's testimony was not challenged. ( Id. at p. 14, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 939 P.2d 748.) The state is not required to prove its case shorn of photographic evidence merely because the defendant agrees with a witness or stipulates to a fact. Similarly, the jury was entitled to see the physical details of the crime scene and the injuries defendant inflicted on his victims. ( People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 133, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) Defendant also contends the admission of the photographs had a deleterious effect on the fairness of the penalty phase. The prosecutor urged the jury at that phase to consider the photographs when setting the appropriate penalty, and defendant contends the photographs created a significant risk of . . . undue influence [on the jury] in violation of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. Because we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs, we reject these constitutional claims as well. Although admission of gruesome photographs theoretically can deprive a defendant of a fair trial ( People v. Cavanaugh (1955) 44 Cal.2d 252, 268-269, 282 P.2d 53), and trial courts should be alert to how photographs may play on a jury's emotions, especially in a capital case, we rely on our trial courts to exercise their discretion wisely, both to allow the state fairly to present its case as well as to ensure that an accused is provided with a fair trial by an impartial jury. After examining the photographs in question, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion. Even were we to assume to the contrary, we are not persuaded a reasonable probability exists that the results of the guilt, sanity, or penalty phases would have been different had the evidence been excluded. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243.)