Opinion ID: 6317124
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Successive Representation Conflict

Text: Jones first claims error due to an alleged conflict of interest in his representation. Jones’s attorney realized, in the middle of trial, that one of the victim witnesses called to testify against Jones was the attorney’s former client. Jones’s attorney represented the witness, Smith, ten years prior in an unrelated matter. Smith was the Commonwealth’s witness and a victim from the home invasion burglary and robbery. Upon discovering the potential for a conflict of interest, Jones’s attorney approached the bench and sought advice. He ultimately called the Ethics Hotline, a call center responsible for counselling attorneys with issues regarding professional responsibility, which counseled him not to cross-examine the witness. As a result, the Commonwealth offered to withdraw the witness entirely so as not to prejudice Jones and proceed with 4 other witnesses. Jones’s attorney agreed to the solution, and Smith never testified. On appeal, Jones claims that the successive representation prejudiced him. Specifically, he alleges that if his attorney was able to cross-examine Smith zealously, Smith may have divulged some exculpatory evidence and weakened the Commonwealth’s case against him. Jones also argues that even if Smith had been able to testify, Jones still would have been prejudiced by his attorney sacrificing zeal in order to keep Smith’s confidentiality. In a final alternative, Jones argues that even if Smith had testified and Jones’s attorney had cross-examined him zealously, the attorney would have had to breach Smith’s confidentiality, violating his professional duty to a former client. We review successive conflicts of interest under the Strickland standard. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); see also, e.g., Steward v. Commonwealth, 397 S.W.3d 881, 883 (Ky. 2012). If there is error, because it was unpreserved, we must determine if the error is palpable.1 Palpable error must be both obvious and serious. Brock v. Commonwealth, 947 S.W.2d 24, 28 (Ky. 1997). The error must be so severe as to “seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Id. (citation omitted). 1 Jones argues as a threshold matter that conflicts resulting from successive representation are structural errors (defects “affecting the entire framework of the trial,” necessarily rendering a trial “fundamentally unfair”). McCleery v. Commonwealth, 410 S.W.3d 597, 604 (Ky. 2013) (citation omitted). We decline to consider successive representation to be categorically a structural error, especially where the presence of an actual conflict is contested, and therefore will not review it as such. See Commonwealth v. Douglas, 553 S.W.3d 795, 800 (Ky. 2018). 5 Palpable error is therefore a higher standard than mere reversible error, since palpable error must result in “manifest injustice.” Id. To determine whether manifest injustice was wrought upon Jones’s trial, we must first decide whether a conflict existed. If there is no conflict, then there is no error. Joint or concurrent representation amounts to a conflict and is impermissible (subject to some exceptions). SCR 3.130(1.7). Successive representation by contrast is less of a threat to the integrity of an attorneyclient relationship, since an attorney’s duties to former clients differ from those to current clients. See Steward, 397 S.W.3d at 883 n.3. For this reason, successive representation does not carry a presumption of prejudice. Mickens v. Taylor, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 1246 (2002). Under SCR 3.130(1.9)(a), A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. On the terms of this rule, we do not need to reach the Sixth Amendment question and Strickland analysis. In this case, the matters were not substantially related, as noted in SCR 3.130(1.9)(a). Jones was being represented for multiple robberies. Smith, by contrast, was represented in a drug trafficking case a decade before the events occurred for which Jones was charged. Furthermore, because the Commonwealth withdrew its witness, there was no opportunity for information gained from the prior client to affect representation of the current client. Even if there would have been overlap in the subject of the matters, any chance of that overlap affecting Jones’s 6 representation dissipated with the Commonwealth’s decision not to call the witness. Because the matters were not substantially related, and because the Commonwealth’s solution was effective in nullifying any risk of conflict, there is no error. Jones also argues that he did not waive his right to conflict-free counsel as required by statute. However, since we hold that no conflict exists, such a waiver was ultimately unnecessary. We therefore also find no error on this argument.