Opinion ID: 41971
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Sentence Reduction

Text: Since this is an appeal from the final judgment of a district court in a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 civil case, we have jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The availability of habeas relief under § 2241 presents a question of law that we review de novo. Cook v. Wiley, 208 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 2000). According to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B), “[t]he period a prisoner convicted of a nonviolent offense remains in custody after successfully completing a treatment program may be reduced by the Bureau of Prisons, but such reduction may not be more than one year from the term the prisoner must otherwise serve.” The Court has held that this wording grants the BOP “the authority, but not the duty, . . . to reduce [the prisoner’s] term of imprisonment.” Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241, 121 S. Ct. 714, 722 (2001). Moreover, in exercising that authority, the BOP may “rely on rulemaking to resolve certain issues of general applicability,” and then may make categorical exclusions based on those rules. Id. at 244, 121 S. Ct. at 723-24 (internal quotations omitted). In exercising this discretion, the BOP promulgated a Program Statement, designed to define the statute. See 28 C.F.R. § 550.58. The Program Statement 6 includes “[i]nmates whose current offense is a felony . . . that involved the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon or explosives (including any explosive material or explosive device)” in its list of categories of inmates the BOP chose to exclude from eligibility. Id. § 550.58(a)(1)(vi) & (a)(1)(vi)(B). The Court has held that the BOP’s Program Statement is a reasonable exercise of administrative discretion because 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) manifests Congressional concern for preconviction behavior and the BOP is therefore justified in considering that behavior when making categorical exclusions. Lopez, 531 U.S. at 243, 121 S. Ct. at 723. When preconviction conduct indicates a willingness to endanger the lives of others, the BOP’s categorical exclusion is a reasonable interpretation of statutory intent because the statute states that only nonviolent offenders are eligible. See id. at 243-44, 121 S. Ct. at 723-24. We have held that the proper question when reviewing such a categorical exclusion is whether the BOP’s interpretation of the statute was reasonable. Cook, 208 F.3d at 1320. Upon review of the record and both parties’ briefs, we discern no error. Walther claims that the BOP’s determination was not reasonable because he used anhydrous ammonia, a chemical that is not traditionally recognized as an explosive, to make methamphetamine. For support, he relies on the definition of 7 “explosive material” contained in 18 U.S.C. § 841(c). However, the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 841(c) states that the definitions are for terms as used in Chapter 40 of Title 18. The BOP’s Program Statement is not part of Chapter 40 of Title 18, and so is not governed by the definitions therein. Moreover, Walther does not argue that there is no danger in making methamphetamine, and his PSI stated that he received an increase in his sentence because the risk that the anhydrous ammonia would explode, either in transport or while making methamphetamine, posed a cognizable danger to the public. Since Walther’s sentence accounted for his willingness to endanger others in order to make methamphetamine, it is reasonable for the BOP also to consider the dangerous nature of his offense, in light of the wording of 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B). Additionally, Walther, referring generally to the tools of statutory construction cited in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984), invokes the rule of lenity and argues that we should resolve any ambiguity in the definition of “explosive material” in his favor. The rule of lenity holds that “where there is an ambiguity in a criminal statute, doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant.” United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348, 92 S. Ct. 515, 523 (1971). Even assuming that 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) is a criminal statute, Congress has vested the BOP with express 8 discretion in the application and administration of this statute. See id. (“The period a prisoner convicted of a nonviolent offense remains in custody after successfully completing a treatment program may be reduced by the Bureau of Prisons”) (emphasis added). Thus, “[r]ather than apply a presumption of lenity to resolve the ambiguity, Chevron requires that we defer to the agency’s reasonable construction of the statute. [Chevron] deference is a tool of statutory construction whereby courts are instructed to defer to the reasonable interpretations of expert agencies charged by Congress to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, in the statutes they administer.” Yi v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 412 F.3d 526, 535 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). Having previously concluded that the BOP reasonably interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B), we therefore conclude that the rule of lenity is inapplicable. Walther also argues that the BOP deprived him of notice and the opportunity to comment before it applied the categorical exclusion included in the BOP Program Statement. However, a BOP Program Statement is analogous to an interpretative rule, and thus does not require notice and comment. Cook, 208 F.3d at 1319. For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not err in denying Walther’s § 2241 petition.