Opinion ID: 485697
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: teacher certification

Text: 29 Plaintiffs also challenge the requirement in Iowa Code Sec. 299.1 that parents of children ages 7 to 16 must send their children to public school or to a private school that utilizes certified teachers until the children complete the eighth grade. Plaintiffs allege the certification requirement violates the free exercise clause, the establishment clause, the due process clause and plaintiff teachers' freedom of expression. Plaintiffs allege these violations stem primarily from the certification requirement's interference with a teacher's calling by God to teach, the supervision of certified teachers by the Iowa Professional Teaching Practices Commission, and the human relations course required to obtain or maintain certification. The district court upheld the certification requirement, and plaintiffs have emphasized their free exercise objections to it on appeal, arguing that the administration of achievement tests represents the least restrictive means of achieving the state's interest in ensuring a quality education. 30 A brief outline of the provisions of Iowa law regarding certification may help to place plaintiffs' arguments in their proper context. Because section 299.1 is directed only to parents of compulsory school age children, compliance affects only teachers in grades one through eight. 4 To obtain a certificate to teach, an applicant must have received a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution or must graduate from a nonrecognized institution and have completed not less than three courses in professional education from a recognized institution. Iowa Admin.Code 670-13.1, 13.10 to 13.12. Temporary certificates are available for those who graduate from nonrecognized institutions. Id. 670-13.12. In addition, each initial applicant as well as those seeking to renew their certificate must take a human relations course designed to contribute to the development of sensitivity to and understanding of the values, beliefs, life styles and attitudes of individuals and the diverse groups found in a pluralistic society. Id. 670-13.18. The general components of an approved program for an elementary school level teacher include courses in liberal arts, professional education (training in teaching methods), and student teaching. Id. 670-15.3, 19.14 to 19.15. 31 After hearing all the evidence in the case, the district court found that certification was the best method now available to satisfy the state's prime interest in seeing that its children are taught by capable persons. 620 F.Supp. at 316. The court stated: 32 The importance [of the certificate] lies, not in the piece of paper itself, but in the education a person must receive to become eligible for the certificate. Courses in child psychology, how children learn, various methods of conveying information and developing the learning process and knowledge of the subject matter will prepare a person to be a better teacher.... This kind of knowledge is essential if one is to become a good teacher. 33 Id. The record amply supports the district court's findings in this regard. 34 Plaintiffs argue strenuously on appeal that their religious beliefs cannot be reconciled with the state having any role in the certification or approval of teachers in their schools. They urge that standardized testing be substituted for certification, asserting that many other states do not require certification. 35 We recognize the sincerity of plaintiffs' beliefs and the burden which they believe the certification requirement imposes upon them. We agree with the Supreme Court of Iowa, however, that plaintiffs' position is not altogether consistent on this matter. Johnson v. Charles City Community Schools Board of Education, supra, 368 N.W.2d at 78. Plaintiffs believe that licensure wrongfully interferes with a teacher's calling by God to teach, yet they apparently do not object to the licensure of those in their church called by God to other occupations, such as doctor or lawyer, nor do they object to obtaining a driver's license for those serving in their bus ministry, even though Pastor Jaspers testified that none of the churches' ministries could properly be regulated by government. 5 36 Moreover, while plaintiffs attempt to analogize their situation to that of the Amish in the Yoder case, the burden the certification requirement imposes upon the plaintiffs is not nearly as great as the burden placed upon the plaintiffs in Yoder. See Sheridan Road Baptist Church v. Department of Education, 426 Mich. 462, 396 N.W.2d 373, 381-82, 394-95 (1986); State v. Rivinius, 328 N.W.2d 220, 227 (N.D.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1070, 103 S.Ct. 1525, 75 L.Ed.2d 948 (1983); State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883, 893-94 (N.D.1980). The Yoder Court found that requiring the Amish to attend public school after the eighth grade would ultimately result in the destruction of the Old Order Amish church community as it exists in the United States today. Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. at 212, 92 S.Ct. at 1531. The Court also found that the Amish believed that by sending their children to high school, they not only would expose themselves to the censure of the church community, but would also endanger their own salvation and that of their children. Id. at 209, 92 S.Ct. at 1530. 37 Unlike the Old Order Amish in Yoder, plaintiffs expect and encourage their children to attend college, and have no objection to college-educated teachers per se. The certification requirement applies only to teachers in grades one through eight, and plaintiff schools in fact each employ a teacher who is certified. Iowa's certification process does not prevent teachers in plaintiff schools from teaching from a Biblical perspective nor does it prevent plaintiff schools from hiring only those teachers who meet their religious criteria. Dr. Nearhoof, the State's Director of Teacher Certification, testified that many church-affiliated schools produce certified teachers, and teachers from nonrecognized institutions may become certified by taking a few additional courses. 38 Under these circumstances, the Yoder Court's admonition that courts move with great circumspection in performing the sensitive and delicate task of weighing a State's legitimate social concern when faced with religious claims for exemption from generally applicable education requirements is particularly instructive. Id. at 235, 92 S.Ct. at 1543. [C]ourts are not school boards or legislatures, and are ill-equipped to determine the 'necessity' of discrete aspects of a State's program of compulsory education. Id. See Johnson v. Charles City Community Schools Board of Education, supra, 368 N.W.2d at 80; State v. Shaver, supra, 294 N.W.2d at 899-900. 6 39 In evaluating plaintiffs' claims, we must determine whether, in light of the importance of the state's interest in the education of its children and the nature of the burden the certification requirement places on the plaintiffs' religious beliefs, plaintiffs' proposed testing alternative would adequately serve the state's interest. After carefully considering all of the evidence presented, the district court found it would not. 40 Plaintiffs object because the certificate requirement relies upon the process (education of the teacher) rather than the product (Is the child learning?). Historically, the emphasis has been on the process. Iowa has required some sort of certificate since 1863. It has been assumed that if the process is followed the children will learn. Recently there has been more interest in attempting to determine if the children are learning.... While testing is a valuable tool, it is not sufficient in and of itself to determine whether a student is receiving an adequate education. Tests primarily determine knowledge of content of the subject matter. They do not test other aspects of education necessary to prepare a student for life in today's society. 41 620 F.Supp. at 316. 42 The court also approved of the Iowa Supreme Court's observations that 43 mere testing would be wholly inadequate to protect the state's rightful interests. A test looks only backward. It can, to a limited extent, measure whether a child has been receiving an education. The state is entitled to the assurance that the child is receiving an education. 44 368 N.W.2d at 81. See Sheridan Road Baptist Church v. Department of Education, supra, 396 N.W.2d at 382-83, 394; State v. Rivinius, supra, 328 N.W.2d at 229; Nebraska ex rel. Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d 571, 579, appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 803, 102 S.Ct. 75, 70 L.Ed.2d 72 (1981). 45 These findings concerning the limited effectiveness of testing are well-supported by the testimony of, inter alia, Dr. Nearhoof, Dr. Benton, Dr. Bradley, Dr. Cameron, Dr. Feldt, and Sister Josephine Oldani. These individuals expressed their concerns about the reliability and validity of testing as the sole measure of a quality education, concerns which are shared by others in the educational profession. See, e.g., Comment, Regulation of Fundamentalist Christian Schools: Free Exercise of Religion v. The State's Interest in Quality Education, 67 Kentucky L.J. 415, 427-29 (1978-1979). 46 We agree on the basis of the record in this case that the state has met its burden of demonstrating that testing would not adequately serve its interests. Not only do certified teachers receive training in child development and methods of instruction, but they are also mandatory child abuse reporters and take courses on identifying those children with special needs. All of these qualities, as plaintiffs' own expert witnesses conceded, are desirable characteristics for a good teacher. Admittedly, there is a lack of empirical evidence concerning the relationship between certified teachers and a quality education, due to the difficulty of research on this issue, but there is a similar lack of empirical verification concerning plaintiffs' proposed alternative, and we do not believe such evidence is required in this case. For all of these reasons, we agree with the district court that the state's choice of certification as the best means available today to satisfy its interest in the education of its children does not violate plaintiffs' right to the free exercise of their religion. 47 Plaintiffs also challenge the certification requirement under the establishment clause, but we hold that section 299.1 of the Iowa Code does not violate this clause. Plaintiffs concede the statute has a secular purpose, and we find, contrary to plaintiffs' allegations, that its effect neither advances nor inhibits religion, nor does it foster an excessive entanglement with religion. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 2111, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971). Plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary are based primarily on their view of the human relations course required for certification and the possibility of review of teachers' actions upon a complaint being filed with the Professional Teaching Practices Commission. 48 As the district court found, however, nothing in the certification statute or regulations requires agreement or acceptance of the beliefs or values of others. Plaintiffs' objection to the human relations course thus appears to be based solely upon the exposure of college-level students to viewpoints other than their own. But, as the district court also found, the president of one of the Bible colleges approved by plaintiffs indicated that his students were made aware of and discussed diverse viewpoints, because in the president's opinion the best way to test one's faith was to compare it with the beliefs and values of others. Nothing prevents a prospective teacher taking Iowa's human relations course from evaluating others' viewpoints from their own religious perspective. See 620 F.Supp. at 315. We thus conclude the effect of the human relations course neither advances nor inhibits religion. 49 Plaintiffs also claim excessive entanglement results from the continuing jurisdiction of the Professional Teaching Practices Commission, but plaintiffs distort the Commission's function and practice. The Commission's jurisdiction is limited, see Iowa Code Secs. 272A.1 et seq.; Iowa Admin.Code 640-2.3, and testimony by officials revealed that the Commission does not in any way interfere with private school teachers' religious beliefs or teachings. The Commission acts only upon complaints, such as allegations of breach of contract brought by school officials, allegations of improper conduct by teachers towards students (disciplinary or improper sexual advances, for example) brought by parents, and allegations of unprofessional conduct by administrators towards teachers brought by a teacher or the teacher's representative. Neither the plaintiffs' schools nor representatives from other private schools who testified at trial had ever had any contact whatsoever with the Commission. In fact, the evidence revealed the Commission had been presented with only one case in its entire history involving a private school teacher. This case was initiated by a complaint from the principal of a private school which alleged that the teacher had breached a contract, and it was dismissed by the Commission for lack of jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, we must conclude that the teacher certification requirement does not result in excessive entanglement or otherwise violate the establishment clause. 50 Plaintiffs' other alleged violations are equally unavailing. Iowa Code Sec. 299.1 is addressed to parents of compulsory school aged children; it does not prohibit teachers from expressing their religious views to anyone at any time nor does it deny them due process. 51 Nothing we have said herein is intended to diminish plaintiffs' religious views or to suggest that the State of Iowa could not legislatively choose to accommodate their beliefs. We hold simply that based on the record before us, the district court properly held that the constitution does not compel the accommodation regarding the state's certification requirement which the plaintiffs have requested.