Opinion ID: 1831360
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: liability of angelina casualty co.

Text: The final assignment of error is Socorro's contention that the lower courts erred in failing to enter judgment against the City's primary liability insurer, Angelina Casualty Company (Angelina). In this respect, plaintiff is correct. In his original petition, Socorro named several defendants, one of which was the City of New Orleans. At the time of filing the petition, Socorro was not aware of the identity of the City's primary liability insurance carrier; accordingly the petition included an allegation against DEF Insurance Company, which was identified as the City's principal liability insurer. Through discovery, Socorro eventually learned that the City's insurer, DEF, was Angelina Casualty Company. Although the petition was not thereafter amended to name Angelina as a defendant, that company filed a motion for summary judgment through the same attorney who served as counsel for the City. Angelina specifically came into court and moved for entry of summary judgment in their favor and against the plaintiff. The pleading was signed by the attorney, with the designation of his law firm as Attorneys for the City of New Orleans and Angelina Casualty Company. That motion for summary judgment on behalf of the City and Angelina was denied. The court of appeal concluded that because Angelina was not properly named and served, it could not be considered a party capable of making a general appearance as contemplated by Article 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure: A. Except as otherwise provided in this Article, a party makes a general appearance which subjects him to the jurisdiction of the court and impliedly waives all objections thereto when, either personally or through counsel, he seeks therein any relief other than: (1) Entry or removal of the name of an attorney as counsel of record; (2) Extension of time within which to plead; (3) Security for costs; (4) Dissolution of an attachment issued on the ground of the nonresidence of the defendant; or (5) Dismissal of the action on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the defendant. La.Code Civ.Proc. art. 7 (West Supp.1991). Because the filing of a motion for summary judgment is not included in this list, Angelina made a general appearance which subjected it to the jurisdiction of the court and impliedly waived all objections to the exercise of the court's jurisdiction. [13] The court of appeal's contrary determination rests entirely on its rather strict reading of Article 7, which refers at the outset to a party (making a general appearance and subjecting himself to the jurisdiction of the court if he seeks any non-excepted form of relief). The court of appeal determined that to be covered by Article 7, one must first be a party, a term which it chose to narrowly define as only those who are named in the petition and served with legal process. It could not have been intended that the article should be read so strictly. See La. Code Civ.Proc. art. 5051. It is true that there are named parties not yet served who are meant to be made subject to the jurisdiction of the court by appearing and pleading for any non-excepted relief. See, e.g., Payne v. Old Hickory Ins. Co., 532 So.2d 956 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988), writ denied, 536 So.2d 1241 (La.1989); Dupont v. Poole, 335 So.2d 764 (La.App. 3d Cir), writ denied, 339 So.2d 19 (La.1976). But so are there unnamed parties, such as intervenors, who are allowed to come into the case by entering a general appearance, although not cited or served. La.Code Civ. Proc. arts. 1091-1094. Once Angelina appeared in court as the City's insurer and entered a general appearance by filing a motion for summary judgment, it became evident that Angelina was indeed the same defendant identified in plaintiff's pleadings as DEF Insurance Company. Angelina has offered no argument that it has been in any way prejudiced or adversely affected by not having been served apart from service on the City. It has been represented all along by the same attorneys who represent the City, and has never taken any position contrary to the fact that it owes the identical obligation which the City would ultimately be bound for if and when cast in judgment. [14] Plaintiff's neglect to amend the petition to substitute Angelina for DEF is of no moment under these circumstances. The answer filed on behalf of the City by the attorney also representing its insurer, protesting no fault on the part of the City, sufficiently joined issue such that it is proper that we enter judgment against both the City and Angelina. Furthermore, if we were to conclude that Angelina has submitted to the jurisdiction of the court but cannot be cast in judgment until such time as plaintiff amends his petition and Angelina joins issue by answering, then the lawsuit, still pending below as regards Angelina, would require disposition after remand and supplemental pleadings and proceedings, an obviously time consuming and unnecessary extension of this litigation. In the courts below, plaintiff's judgment should have been against both the City and its liability insurer, Angelina Casualty Company, in solido. Accordingly, we will reverse the court of appeal on this issue and order that Angelina Casualty Company be cast in judgment in its capacity as the City's principal liability insurer.