Opinion ID: 2208459
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Challenge to Jury Instructions

Text: The defendant argues that the trial judge erred in the instructions given to the jury in declining not to give a Fifth Amendment instruction, and declining to instruct the jury that defendant could rely on advice of counsel. We respectfully disagree with defendant's contentions on these grounds because they raised issues of law and not of fact. As we have noted above in the opinion, there was no Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applicable to this case. Similarly, we noted that defendant had no right to disobey an order of the court merely because his attorney advised him to do so. Therefore, these issues could not have justified a jury finding that defendant was absolved of his obligation to obey the court orders. It is the function of the court to decide issues of law. The jurors are the judges of the facts. See Chapin v. Stone, 77 A. 826 (R.I.1910) (per curiam). Issues of law should not be presented to the jury for its decision. See Kuzniar v. Keach, 709 A.2d 1050, 1055 n.6 (R.I.1998). The defendant also suggests that the trial judge erred in declining to instruct that he had a right to rely on the actions of the Family Court if they indicated to him that he need not comply with the orders of the court. The trial judge did instruct the jury that a defendant has a right to rely on the actions of the state. He further admonished the jury that the Family Court was an arm of the state. He went on to tell the jury that if it found that defendant had relied on the Family Court, it could take this evidence into consideration in determining defendant's guilt or innocence. We are of the opinion that this instruction was sufficient to submit this issue of fact for consideration to the jury. The defendant also challenges the instruction relating to vagueness, the instructions on the meaning of contempt, and the instruction on reexamining their views. As required, we have examined the court's instructions in their entirety. State v. Perry, 770 A.2d 882, 886 (R.I.2001) and State v. Tooher, 542 A.2d 1084, 1088 (R.I.1988). In considering the instructions of the court in their entirety, we are of the opinion that they covered the factual issues to be submitted. The court defined the nature of contempt and set forth every element necessary to a finding of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995) (holding that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require criminal convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged). Counsel for defendant has challenged phrases and portions of sentences in the course of this lengthy charge to the jury. We are of the opinion that these challenges are without merit. We have often stated that a trial justice may give instructions in his or her own words as long as those instructions adequately meet the requirements of the law. The trial justice need not accept the suggested language of a defendant as long as his or her charge gives an adequate expression to the required definitions and propositions of law applicable to the case. Tooher, 542 A.2d at 1088. As an illustration of this principle, the challenge to the instruction on the reexamining of views by jurors is instructive. The court instructed the jury as follows: Approach the questions with common sense and with honesty. Address yourselves to the issues forthrightly and courageously. You should neither be stubborn nor should you bend to the whims or desires of any other person. In other words, if you have an abiding conviction one way or the other, you should not sway from that conviction until you have been reasonably persuaded or convinced that you were wrong. In objecting to this instruction, counsel for defendant seems to confuse this instruction with an instruction on reasonable doubt. This was clearly not the focus of this instruction. We are of the opinion that no juror would have construed this instruction on considering the opinion of his orher fellow jurors as diminishing in any way the burden of proof on which the trial judge gave a full instruction which has not been challenged by defendant. Having considered all defendant's challenges to the trial judge's charge, we conclude that they are without merit and disclose no prejudicial error.