Opinion ID: 2411780
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: EMPLOYEE CHALLENGE OF KRS 160.380(2)(f)

Text: KRS 160.380(2)(f) prohibits the superintendent from employing a relative of a school board member of the same district. KRS 160.380(2)(f) contains two exceptions: 1) school employees employed during a board member's tenure may continue to serve the remainder of the board member's term; and 2) school employees retained prior to their relative taking office to serve on the school board, may continue in their position. KRS 160.380(2)(f) is the flip-image of KRS 160.180(2)(i). When both provisions are read together, as the trial court noted, there is a clear understanding of the prohibition against nepotism. Employee appellant, V. Carolyn Chapman, challenges the validity of KRS 160.380(2)(f), asserting that: 1) all the challenged provisions, including KRS 160.380(2)(f), are animated by an unconstitutional purpose of banishing board members having relatives employed by their school district, and therefore should be invalidated; 2) procedural due process is denied because employment is terminated without an appropriate hearing; 3) substantive due process is denied because, a) appellant's property interest in employment is arbitrarily and irrationally denied; and b) familial relationships implicating privacy interests are denied; and 4) equal protection is denied because the provision is overinclusive since all school employees with relatives on the school board are not beneficiaries of illicit favoritism. Total invalidation of the challenged provisions because they are animated by an unconstitutional purpose is a meritless claim. No improper purpose is infused in these statutes which necessitates our striking them under Kentucky Milk Marketing v. Kroger Co., Ky., 691 S.W.2d 893 (1985). In Kentucky Milk Marketing, supra , we held that provisions of a milk marketing law were not severable because the entire purpose of the act was enforcement of an unconstitutional section. Unlike Kentucky Milk Marketing, supra , the case at bar contains no unconstitutional provisions. Therefore, the question of severability is unwarranted. No procedural or substantive due process is denied, because when both KRS 160.180(2)(i), and KRS 160.380(2)(f), are applied, the result, as the trial court held, is that a school board member is disqualified from serving an additional term, as long as his relative is employed by the school district. Under both sections, related school board members and employees, serving or employed on the statute's effective date, may continue until expiration of the board member's term. The fact that a related school board member is disqualified from serving an additional term, under KRS 160.180(2)(i), thus does not deprive appellant, V. Carolyn Chapman, of her present employment. Appellant's reliance on Backman v. Bateman, 1 Utah 2d 153, 263 P.2d 561 (1953), is misplaced. Unlike the case at bar, Backman v. Bateman, supra , reviewed the constitutionality of an anti-nepotism statute that prohibited continued employment of a relative who was hired before the school board member was elected. Exemptions in both challenged provisions protect against the scenario invalidated in Backman v. Bateman, supra . Constitutional privacy protections of familial relationships are likewise not impinged, because KRS 160.380(2)(f) does not remove appellant from her position. Similarly, the provision is not invalid as overinclusive, nor does it provide for arbitrary classifications under appellant's equal protection claims.