Opinion ID: 1452969
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Garcia's Motion to Suppress the Fruits of an Unlawful Arrest[2]

Text: When reviewing a motion to suppress, [we] must consider evidence in the light most likely to support the district court's decision[.] United States v. Marxen, 410 F.3d 326, 328 (6th Cir.2005) (internal quotation omitted). [A] district court's factual findings are accepted unless they are clearly erroneous; however, the district court's application of the law to the facts, such as a finding of probable cause, is reviewed de novo. United States v. Pasquarille, 20 F.3d 682, 685 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Thomas, 11 F.3d 620, 627 (6th Cir.1993)). After stopping the Suburban for investigatory purposes, the officers seized Garcia's pager during a patdown of his person. Thereafter the officers executed a canine narcotics sniff on the Suburban, and, based in part on the positive hits from the canine sniff, a judge issued a warrant to search the Suburban. In executing the search warrant, the officers seized Garcia's luggage, which contained his luggage tag and two bundles of $5,000. Garcia argues that the district court should have suppressed (1) the luggage tag and two bundles of currency, each in the amount of $5,000, seized from the Suburban and (2) the pager seized from his person. The district court refused to suppress the luggage tag and bundles of cash, finding that they were not the fruit of his arrest. The district court also determined that Garcia's pager was properly seized pursuant to a Terry patdown. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (permit[ting] a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer). We affirm the district court's refusal to suppress this evidence, although we do so for reasons different from those relied on by the district court.
The officers seized Garcia's luggage tag and bundles of money pursuant to a properly executed search warrant for the Suburban. Therefore, in order to suppress this evidence, Garcia must show that the warrant was obtained as a result of a prior illegality. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (noting that the exclusionary rule bars evidence obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion). Garcia contends that his arrest during the stop of the Suburban is the prior illegality that tainted the subsequent search warrant for the Suburban. According to Garcia's argument, because the illegal arrest allowed the officers to execute a canine narcotics sniff and because the results of the canine sniff were included in the supporting affidavit, the search warrant is a fruit of his illegal arrest and is thus invalid. Garcia's argument erroneously equates the investigatory stop of the Suburban with his allegedly illegal arrest. Even assuming he was illegally arrested at the time the Suburban was stopped, it was the investigatory stop  and not the illegal arrest  that produced the canine narcotics sniff and the resulting search warrant. So long as the officers acted properly in stopping the vehicle and executing the canine sniff, the resulting search warrant was not tainted by a prior illegality. The Supreme Court has recently recognized that a passenger of a stopped vehicle, like Garcia, is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and so may challenge the constitutionality of the stop. Brendlin v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2403, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007). We conclude that the stop of the Suburban was lawful. An officer may conduct an investigatory stop if it is supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Smoak v. Hall, 460 F.3d 768, 778 (6th Cir.2006) (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002)). Reasonable suspicion requires the officer to have `a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person . . . of criminal activity' based on `specific and articulable facts[.]' Id. at 778-79 (quoting Houston v. Clark County Sheriff Deputy John Does 1-5, 174 F.3d 809, 813-14 (6th Cir.1999)). Garcia does not challenge the stop of the Suburban for investigatory purposes, and we find that the officers indeed had reasonable suspicion to support the stop. The officers had been monitoring, following, and listening to Ovalle  the driver of the Suburban  for at least two days. During this time they had heard Ovalle and his companions discuss guns, kilos, and large sums of money. They also knew that Ovalle had left the Sheraton after complaining of too many people asking too many questions and that he had later returned to transport two individuals who claimed to work for him. These specific and articulable facts provided reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop of the Suburban. We turn next to whether the canine narcotics sniff exceeded the permissible scope or duration of the investigatory stop. [A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. United States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 345, 354 (6th Cir.2005) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)). The scope of activities conducted during an investigatory stop must reasonably be related to the circumstances that initially justified the stop. United States v. Richardson, 949 F.2d 851, 856 (6th Cir.1991). The officers reasonably suspected the Suburban's occupants of illegal drug trafficking, and the canine narcotics sniff is directly related to investigating this suspicion. Moreover, the duration of the stop was reasonable; the canine sniff was performed within a half hour of the stop, and we have previously upheld an investigatory stop that included a thirty-five minute wait for the canine unit. See United States v. Orsolini, 300 F.3d 724, 730 (6th Cir.2002) (finding a Terry detention reasonable where the entire investigation lasted less than one hour with approximately thirty-five minutes spent waiting for the canine unit to arrive). Thus the canine narcotics sniff was lawfully conducted as part of the investigatory stop. Garcia provides no evidence that his allegedly illegal arrest contributed to or in any way tainted the search warrant for the Suburban. Consequently, we need not determine the precise timing of Garcia's arrest or whether it was supported by probable cause. Because we find that the officers did not act unlawfully in stopping the Suburban or executing a canine narcotics sniff, and because Garcia has failed to show that the search warrant was the fruit of a prior illegality, we affirm the district court's refusal to suppress the evidence seized from the Suburban.
The officers seized Garcia's pager during a patdown of his person following the stop of the Suburban. The district court determined that the pager was legally seized pursuant to a Terry frisk for weapons. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 25-26, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (authorizing a strictly circumscribed search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest). Garcia argues that Terry does not justify the seizure of his pager because Terry permits only the seizure of items that reasonably appear to be weapons, not other evidence of crime. We agree with Garcia that the district court erred in concluding that Terry and its progeny authorize the seizure of his pager, but because we conclude that the pager would inevitably have been lawfully discovered, we affirm the district court's refusal to suppress the pager. If a police officer reasonably believes or suspects that the defendant is armed, he may conduct a patdown for weapons in the interest of his own safety. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979). The Terry doctrine permits only a search for weapons, not for evidence in general. See id. at 93-94, 100 S.Ct. 338 (Nothing in Terry can be understood to allow . . . any search whatever for anything but weapons.); United States v. Strahan, 984 F.2d 155, 158 (6th Cir.1993) ( Terry allows only an examination for concealed objects and forbids searching for anything other than weapons.). Upon stopping the Suburban, the officers reasonably suspected the occupants of drug trafficking because they had overheard them discussing kilos, guns, and large quantities of money. The officers also knew that the recently arrived occupants  Garcia and Rodriguez  claimed to work for Ovalle, a suspected drug dealer. Based on this and other information, the officers reasonably suspected that Garcia was armed, and they acted properly in conducting a patdown for weapons. Seizure of items during a patdown is warranted if the officer reasonably believe[s] that the [concealed item] could be a weapon. Id. Moreover, under the plain feel doctrine, an officer may seize an object whose contour or mass makes its identity as contraband immediately apparent. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375-76, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993); see also United States v. Walker, 181 F.3d 774, 778 (6th Cir.1999) (holding that police officers may seize nonthreatening contraband detected during a protective patdown search . . . so long as the officers' search stays within the bounds marked by Terry ). The government did not elicit testimony from the seizing officer claiming that he mistook the pager for a weapon, and even assuming that the officer knew that the concealed object was a pager, it is clear that a pager is not contraband. We conclude that the district court erred in finding the seizure of the pager justified under Terry. We nonetheless affirm the admissibility of the pager because it would inevitably have been lawfully discovered and, in any event, the district court's denial of the motion to suppress the pager was harmless error. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 n. 4, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) (noting that the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule is closely related in purpose to the harmless-error rule). The Fourth Amendment does not contain a provision that prohibits the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984)). But the judicially crafted exclusionary rule mandates suppression of evidence obtained from a constitutional violation. Id. at 10-11, 115 S.Ct. 1185. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (declaring that the exclusionary rule is essential in applying constitutional principles). The inevitable discovery doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule which allows unlawfully obtained evidence to be admitted at trial if the government can [show] . . . that the evidence inevitably would have been acquired through lawful means. United States v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 494, 497 (6th Cir.1995); see also Nix, 467 U.S. at 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501. The doctrine applies whenever there are compelling facts establishing that the disputed evidence inevitably would have been discovered. Kennedy, 61 F.3d at 499. More specifically, the doctrine applies where the facts indicate that the officers inevitably would have discovered and seized the tainted evidence by following routine procedures. United States v. Vite-Espinoza, 342 F.3d 462, 466 (6th Cir.2003). Had the police not seized Garcia's pager during the protective patdown, they inevitably would have seized it from his person during his subsequent arrest. After the search of the Suburban disclosed two bundles of cash in Garcia's luggage, the officers had probable cause to arrest him. As a part of this lawful arrest, the officers would have followed the routine procedure of searching Garcia prior to taking him into custody. See Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266, 94 S.Ct. 488, 38 L.Ed.2d 456 (1973) (holding that an officer who arrests a suspect and takes him into custody is entitled to make a full search of [his] person incident to that lawful arrest). The officers would have seized his pager during this search as evidence of his involvement in drug trafficking. The pager thus inevitably would have been seized from Garcia, and its introduction into evidence did not violate the exclusionary rule. Alternatively, even if we assume that the inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply and the district court erred in admitting the pager, we find that its admission was harmless. Some errors, when viewed in light of the particular facts, are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); see also FED.R.CRIM.P. 52(a) (Any error . . . that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.). [B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the [reviewing] court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824. The harmless error doctrine has been applied to a variety of constitutional errors, including the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 576-77, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986). The government did not introduce phone records from the pager at trial, and in fact used the pager merely to argue that Garcia was probably involved in drug trafficking because drug dealers are notorious for using pagers. In light of the other evidence supporting Garcia's conviction, we find that the government's use of the pager at trial did not contribute to the verdict and that its admission  assuming it was erroneous  was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.