Opinion ID: 752168
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mental Health Expert

Text: 85 The Supreme Court in Ake required the State to assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83, 105 S.Ct. at 1096. The Court also stated, [t]his is not to say, of course, that the indigent defendant has a constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own. Id. Rather, he need only have access to a competent psychiatrist. Id. 86 The expert who assisted in Mr. Castro's defense, Dr. Steven Caldwell, evaluated Mr. Castro and testified in the guilt/innocence, but not the penalty, phase of the trial. However, he was the last defense witness called, and his testimony occurred three days before the sentencing proceeding. 11 In Castro I, we held that Mr. Castro's due process rights were violated under Ake where there was no psychiatric testimony in either the guilt/innocence or the penalty phase of trial. In Brewer v. Reynolds, 51 F.3d 1519, 1525 (10th Cir.1995), we criticized trial counsel's failure to recall during sentencing a mental health expert who had testified as to the defendant's sanity during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial: 87 Dr. Gagliano's testimony was given at a point in the proceedings when the jury was focused on guilt or innocence rather than the sentence to be imposed. Furthermore, the testimony centered on Mr. Brewer's sanity at the time he committed the offense, and only tangentially touched upon the more chronic mental health problems.... 88 Id. Although counsel in Brewer moved to introduce that testimony into the penalty phase, counsel did little more to focus the jury's attention on it: Counsel waived opening statement and directed his closing argument toward his disagreement with the jury's verdict of guilt and his generalized opposition to the death penalty. Id. We hold that this case is distinguishable from both Castro I and Brewer. 89 In this case, as indicated, Dr. Caldwell testified at the end of the guilt/innocence phase, just three days before the sentencing phase. The testimony itself related both to Mr. Castro's sanity at the time of the murder, which was relevant to the guilt/innocence phase, and to his more chronic mental health problems, which would be relevant to sentencing. 12 Additionally, Mr. Castro's counsel moved to introduce all evidence from the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, including Dr. Caldwell's testimony, into the penalty phase. Moreover, he recalled Dr. Caldwell's testimony several times in his closing arguments, and urged the jury to review it. Thus, the jury was not left rudderless, the way it was in Brewer, by the failure to recall Dr. Caldwell to testify in the penalty phase of the trial. Nor was the jury without any expert mental health testimony, as was the jury in Castro I. Accordingly, we perceive no error in the failure to recall Dr. Caldwell to testify again in the penalty phase. 90 We also conclude that no Ake error occurred by virtue of the substance of Dr. Caldwell's testimony. Mr. Castro specifically states that he has no complaint about the quality of Dr. Caldwell's services. Appellant's Opening Br. at 71. 13 Rather, his complaint is about the State's refusal to provide for adequate psychological or psychiatric assistance, and then impeaching the services that were rendered on the basis that they were insufficient. Id. Dr. Caldwell was paid $500 for his evaluation of Mr. Castro, and he testified that he was to receive his customary hourly fee for his testimony. R. Vol. XXIV at 3494. Dr. Caldwell's testimony concerning Mr. Castro's mental status in substance conforms to the psychological evaluations done in connection with his habeas petition in the Pappan murder case, which we detailed in Castro I, and which we held needed to be presented to the sentencing jury. While not quite as detailed, and although it did not include a finding of organic brain damage, as did the evaluations described in Castro I, the testimony adequately conveyed to the jury the nature of Mr. Castro's mental problems, their origin in his past, and why they would make him particularly prone to violence towards females. The evidence of organic brain damage, while obviously relevant, is not so different in kind from the evidence Dr. Caldwell presented as to require us to find Mr. Castro's due process rights violated. In sum, this case is distinguishable from Castro I. 91 Were we to conclude that it was error for the jury not to have heard expert psychiatric testimony during the penalty phase, we would find it harmless error. As we held in both Castro I and Brewer,  'the denial of a psychiatric expert in violation of Ake is trial error, and thus, subject to harmless-error analysis.'  Castro I, 71 F.3d at 1515 (quoting Brewer, 51 F.3d at 1529). We apply the Kotteakos harmless-error standard, asking whether the error 'had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'  Id. at 1515-16 (quoting Brewer, 51 F.3d at 1529 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1253, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946))). 92 In Castro I we held the failure to present expert mental health testimony to the sentencing jury was Ake error which was not harmless. We held it was not harmless for three reasons: (1) the jury indicated, through a question it submitted during its deliberations, that it was not self-evident to the jury whether Mr. Castro's crime warranted the death penalty, Castro I, 71 F.3d at 1516; (2) the State relied on the continuing threat aggravator, which directly placed Mr. Castro's mental status at issue, id.; and (3) the other aggravator upon which the State relied in Castro I, that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel was struck down by the state court on direct review, which seriously altered the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, id. Two of those three circumstances are not present in this case. The jury in this case evidenced no doubt about the imposition of the death penalty, returning its verdict after only two hours of deliberation. Furthermore, no major alteration in the relative weight of aggravating and mitigating evidence materialized after the jury's verdict--the only aggravating factor upon which the State relied (the continuing threat aggravator) remains amply supported by evidence, 14 and the additional mitigating evidence Mr. Castro argues was erroneously excluded is largely cumulative or only marginally helpful. We are confident that the omission of the additional mitigating evidence Mr. Castro argues should have been presented to the jury did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Brewer, 51 F.3d at 1529 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776, 66 S.Ct. at 1253). Thus, if there was error, it was harmless.