Opinion ID: 16329
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Intentionally Fraudulent Charge

Text: It is undisputed that for most, if not all, of Barnes’s interrogation, he was not specifically told that he was a suspect 11 for capital murder.1 In addition, when he was brought before Judge McSpadden, Barnes was told that he was being charged with “burglary of a habitation with intent to commit murder,” a charge that apparently does not technically exist. Barnes alleges that these two aspects of his interrogation--he was not told that he was a capital murder suspect and he was brought before Judge McSpadden on a “made up” charge--render his confession involuntary. We do not agree. While Barnes was not directly informed that he was a capital murder suspect, from the beginning of his interrogation Barnes was aware that a woman had died in the house he was alleged to have burglarized. Sergeant Calhoun mentioned Ms. Greb’s murder shortly after Barnes was arrested. Moreover, Barnes himself stated that he had seen on the television news that the woman living in the house he had burglarized had been killed. In Barnes’s first statement, he mentioned the death and attempted to divert attention from himself by mentioning someone that he had seen next door, stating “I think that this man had something to do with the old womans death.” Thus, it is clear that Barnes understood from the start that the police were investigating Ms. Greb’s murder, not just theft of property. He was also well aware that he was suspected of committing the murder. A suspect’s waiver of Miranda rights is not invalid merely 1 We assume for our purposes that this was an affirmative police decision made in an attempt to get Barnes to implicate himself in the murder. 12 because police interrogators did not advise him of the subject matter of the upcoming interrogation. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574, 107 S. Ct. 851, 857, 93 L. Ed. 2d 954 (1987). Similarly, the waiver is not invalid simply because the suspect did not have “a full and complete appreciation of all the consequences flowing from the nature and quality of the evidence in the case.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1297, 84 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1985). In light of Barnes’s clear understanding that the police were investigating a murder, the police’s decision not to inform Barnes specifically that he was a capital murder suspect does not render his third and fourth statements involuntary. Barnes’s further argument that he was coerced and deceived by the abnormal charge of “burglary of a habitation with the intent to commit murder” is equally without merit. Section 30.02 of the Texas Penal Code defines burglary of a habitation as follows: “(A) A person commits an offense if, without the effective consent of the owner, he: (1) enters a habitation . . . with intent to commit a felony or theft.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a)(1) (Vernon 1997). Thus, in identifying Barnes’s charge, the police added a superfluous phrase--”with the intent to commit murder”--to the crime of burglary of a habitation. All this phrase served to do, however, was to identify the particular felony that the police intended to use for the requisite “commit a felony or theft” element. The addition of this phrase cannot be said to have worked a deception upon Barnes. Indeed, the 13 inclusion of this phrase goes directly against Barnes’s claim that he was deceived and coerced into confessing the murder because he was not informed that he was a capital murder suspect. Finally, Barnes alleges that he was deceived and coerced by not being informed that he could receive the death penalty for the Greb’s murder. There is no Supreme Court law requiring that a suspect be informed that he is suspected of an offense that could result in the death penalty. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. at 574, 107 S. Ct. at 857, and Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 317, 105 S. Ct. at 1297, indicate just the opposite--a suspect need not be told that a statement or confession may expose him to the death penalty. In sum, Barnes’s claims of deceit and an “intentionally fraudulent charge” provide no support to his claim that the state court’s determination of voluntariness was either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or, alternatively, an unreasonable determination of the facts.