Opinion ID: 2457
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court's Jury Instructions and Use of a General Verdict Form

Text: Because Bell failed to object to the jury instructions or to the District Court's use of a general verdict form, we review these claims on appeal under a plain error standardthat is, we will only grant relief if there was (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) affects substantial rights, and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Weintraub, 273 F.3d 139, 145 (2d Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). A jury instruction is erroneous if it misleads the jury as to the correct legal standard or does not adequately inform the jury on the law. United States v. Wilkerson, 361 F.3d 717, 732 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). We will only vacate a conviction if, viewing as a whole the charge actually given, [defendant] was prejudiced. United States v. Dove, 916 F.2d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). The District Court determined, sua sponte, that its definition of intentional in the jury charge was error warranting a new trial because the definition did not adequately distinguish intentional conduct from accidental or mistaken conduct. The instruction used at trial by the District Court was derived from United States v. Townsend, 987 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.1993), in which we expressly suggested a charge for intentionally to be used when appropriate, in order to forestall such problems [of distinguishing conduct] in the future. Id. at 930. The District Court charged the jury with the suggested language, stating in relevant part: defendant's act must have been the product of defendant's conscious objective rather than the product of a mistake or an accident. Id. (emphasis added) The District Court later insisted it should have used the words were not instead of rather than to communicate more adequately to the jury that it needed to find that defendant's acts were not an accident. We reject this finding of legal error. Not only did the District Court at trial use the very language of our relevant precedent (also found in L. Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions (2004)), but it also repeatedly distinguished between these degrees of culpability throughout the entire charge, making it abundantly clear that the jury needed to find that defendant's actions were the product of intent rather than accident. The Court's jury charge was not error, much less plain error that could have prejudiced defendant sufficiently to warrant a new trial. Nor can we conclude that the use of a general verdict formalso not contested by the partieswas error of any sort that could serve as the basis for ordering a new trial. The District Court, also sua sponte, posited that the jury should have been given a special verdict form to emphasize defendant's claim of self-defense. As it happens, there is a historical preference for general verdicts, and a traditional distaste for special interrogatories in criminal cases, United States v. Coonan, 839 F.2d 886, 891 (2d Cir.1988); accord United States v. Ogando, 968 F.2d 146, 148 (2d Cir.1992), and, in any event, special interrogatories were also unnecessary in this particular case. The District Court more than adequately addressed the issue of self-defense and its importance for deliberation in his charge to the jury: Because the charges on all four counts are based on a single set of events, if you find the Defendant acted in self-defense with respect to those events, that is, if you find that the Government has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant did not act in self-defense, then you must find the Defendant not guilty on all four counts. For this reason it may be helpful for you to resolve this question at the outset [of] your deliberations.  J.A. 874 (emphasis added). The District Court's instructions were clear and called attention to the very issue that it later determined was not sufficiently emphasized. The use of a general verdict form was, therefore, not an error of any species (plain or otherwise), and did not warrant a new trial.