Opinion ID: 2599976
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Solomon's Claims Are Eligible for Equitable Tolling.

Text: Solomon argues that this court should equitably toll the statute of limitations to allow his claims to proceed. He maintains that his active pursuit of the claims in federal court represented diligent prosecution of those claims. IRHA argues that Solomon chose a specific litigation and appellate strategy that did not work, and . . . now wants this court to rescue him from his statute of limitations predicament through . . . misapplication of an equitable remedy. In our view, Solomon's actions are redolent of diligent and good-faith pursuit of his claims rather than strategy. Alaska adopted the doctrine of equitable tolling in Gudenau & Co. v. Sweeney Insurance, Inc. [9] The need for equitable tolling arises, we stated, when a plaintiff has multiple legal remedies available to him. Courts will not force a plaintiff to simultaneously pursue two separate and duplicative remedies. [10] We adopted a three-part test for equitable tolling: (1) the alternative remedy must give notice to the defendant; (2) there must not be prejudice to the defendant; and (3) the plaintiff must have acted reasonably and in good faith. [11] In Gudenau, we declined to invoke equitable tolling where the plaintiff made only private complaints insufficient to give the defendant notice of existence of a legal claim against him. We stated that the statute of limitations is tolled only for those who initially pursue their rights in a judicial or quasi-judicial governmental forum. [12] We have subsequently characterized the equitable tolling rule as look[ing] only to the claimant's circumstances  whether he has pursued an alternative remedy that proved unavailing. [13] In Dayhoff v. Temsco Helicopters, Inc., we invoked equitable tolling because the plaintiff had pursued her wage-and-hour claim with a state agency before seeking the assistance of the state court. [14] In Fred Meyer of Alaska, Inc. v. Bailey, we invoked equitable tolling when the plaintiff pursued an individual action for the same unpaid wages he had sought initially in a class action. [15] Solomon's initial action was an alternative remedy to pursuit of the claims in state court. There is no dispute here that the federal courts constitute a judicial . . . governmental forum, [16] or that Solomon initially filed his state law claims in the federal courts. IRHA argues, however, that Solomon failed to appeal the dismissal of his state law claims to the Ninth Circuit and thus gave up his pursuit of alternative remedy at that point. We disagree. Even though Solomon did not explicitly appeal the dismissal without prejudice, a prayer for reinstatement of the state law claims was implied in Solomon's appeal to the Ninth Circuit, much as reversal of the judgment of attorney's fees is implied in the present appeal. [17] We read IRHA's argument as suggesting, in effect, that this case turns on mere inclusion of a boilerplate sentence in Solomon's appeal. As the superior court noted, Solomon could have written one more sentence in [his] brief and it would have been there. To bar Solomon's claims for something so ministerial, we believe, would be an unnecessary exaltation of form over substance. Whether Solomon's state claims were carried up to the Ninth Circuit or not, his appeal to the Ninth Circuit is an alternative remedy under our equitable tolling doctrine. Gudenau's three additional requirements for equitable tolling are met. First, IRHA had adequate notice of the claim against it. Where a claim with essentially the same facts is being litigatedeven on a threshold basis  in the federal courts between the same parties, the defendant cannot claim not to be on notice. Even while the case was being litigated before the federal courts, IRHA knew of the distinct possibility that the state claims would be reinstated at the district court level upon a Ninth Circuit reversal. As such, it was on notice to be prepared to litigate them. Second, IRHA does not have a colorable claim of prejudice. It appears instead that IRHA fully investigated the matter, at least in regard to the position for which Solomon applied in 1998. It told Solomon's counsel that Mr. Solomon was not selected for the position of Tribal Housing Counselor based on an evaluation of his qualifications and experience. The fact that Mr. Solomon had filed a workers' compensation claim was not the reason that he was not hired. At oral argument, counsel for IRHA indicated that he had no information indicating prejudice to IRHA. Third, the record indicates that Solomon acted reasonably and in good faith. IRHA's allegations of bad faith allege only that Solomon failed to file his complaint within the applicable statute of limitations. As Solomon's counsel noted at oral argument, Solomon has been actively litigating his claims except for periods totaling six months in the six years since his claims accrued. Solomon's federal case was one of first impression; thus, even though he had no federal cause of action, his lawsuit was far from frivolous. In Fred Meyer we held that filing the complaint within the statutory period was evidence of good faith; the same is true here. [18] IRHA argues that, even if equitable tolling is to be applied, Solomon should be granted only the remainder of his two-year statute of limitations rather than an additional two years as the plaintiff received in Dayhoff and Fred Meyer. [19] This remainder, IRHA argues, would be twenty months from the date of the federal district court's dismissal without prejudice of Solomon's state law claims, since Solomon filed his original action four months after the cause of action accrued. Twenty months from June 22, 2001, is February 22, 2003, four months before Solomon filed his action in the superior court. Solomon argues that he should be granted a full two years from the Ninth Circuit's denial of his motion for reconsideration on April 21, 2003. Although we have uniformly applied a new full statutory period in equitable tolling cases, IRHA argues that the cases in which we did that may be distinguished from the present case. We need not decide in this case whether a plaintiff will always have the full statutory limitations period in which to file once the circumstances that justify equitable tolling abate, because here we agree with Solomon that the earliest equitable tolling should cease is the date of the Ninth Circuit's denial of his motion for reconsideration. Four months passed between the accrual of Solomon's claim on September 9, 1999 and the filing of the federal complaint on January 13, 2000. At the time tolling ceased, on April 21, 2003, twenty months remained on the statute of limitations even under IRHA's restrictive reading. Since Solomon's complaint was filed on June 22, 2003 he is well within the statutory period, however it is calculated, and his claims were timely filed. [20]