Opinion ID: 2626424
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: legislative invasion of judicial power

Text: ¶ 61 Mr. Jensen also argues SHB 3055 invades the article IV judicial power because it prevents the courts from determining the admissibility of BAC tests once the State has met its prima facie burden under subsection 4(4)(a) of SHB 3055. ¶ 62 [T]here is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control . . . . [5] An independent and vigilant judiciary is essential to the preservation of individual rights in the face of governmental encroachment, constituting what James Madison described as `an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive.' [6] Thus, the separation of powers doctrine ensures fundamental functions of each branch remain inviolate. Carrick v. Locke, 125 Wash.2d 129, 135, 882 P.2d 173 (1994). Echoing the Founders' vision of an independent judiciary, the United States Supreme Court has explained, [T]he judicial Power of the United States vested in the federal courts by Art. III, § 1, of the Constitution can no more be shared with the Executive Branch than the Chief Executive, for example, can share with the Judiciary the veto power, or the Congress share with the Judiciary the power to override a Presidential veto. Any other conclusion would be contrary to the basic concept of separation of powers and the checks and balances that flow from the scheme of a tripartite government. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974) (quoting THE FEDERALIST, NO. 47, at 313 (S. Mittell ed.1938)), superseded by statute on other grounds by Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 179, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). ¶ 63 Our constitution exclusively vests the judicial power in the courts, not the legislature: The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court . ... WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The judicial power is the power to do that which the courts have traditionally done. [7] This court has recognized the inherent power and obligation of the judiciary to control all its necessary functions to promote the effective administration of justice. State v. Wadsworth, 139 Wash.2d 724, 740, 991 P.2d 80 (2000). This inherent power includes determining the admissibility of evidence. See, e.g., State v. Demery, 144 Wash.2d 753, 758, 30 P.3d 1278 (2001) (trial court has wide discretion to determine the admissibility of evidence); State v. Atsbeha, 142 Wash.2d 904, 913, 16 P.3d 626 (2001) (Admissibility of evidence generally is within the sound discretion of the trial court.) (citing State v. Ellis, 136 Wash.2d 498, 504, 963 P.2d 843 (1998)). If the legislature attempted to ... abolish or abridge the power of the courts, such an attempt would be unconstitutional and void. Deskins v. Waldt, 81 Wash.2d 1, 2-3, 499 P.2d 206 (1972) (citing Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, 63 P.2d 397 (1936)). Yet surrender of judicial independence is precisely what the majority does when it upholds a bill shackling the power of the courts to do that which the courts have traditionally done: Determine the admissibility of evidence. ¶ 64 Courts are vested with the inherent power to govern court procedures. State v. Fields, 85 Wash.2d 126, 129, 530 P.2d 284 (1975). [8] When a court rule and a statute conflict, the nature of the right at issue determines which one controls. State v. W.W., 76 Wash.App. 754, 758, 887 P.2d 914 (1995). If the right is substantive, then the statute prevails; if it is procedural, then the court rule prevails. Id. The admissibility of evidence is a procedural matter. [9] The resolution of this claim turns on whether the language of SHB 3055 is permissive, preserving the courts' authority to exclude BAC test results under the rules of evidence, or mandatory, in which case it would be invalid. State v. Zwicker, 105 Wash.2d 228, 238, 713 P.2d 1101 (1986). SHB 3055 provides: Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent the subject of the test from challenging the reliability or accuracy of the test, the reliability or functioning of the instrument, or any maintenance procedures. Such challenges, however, shall not preclude the admissibility of the test once the prosecution or department has made a prima facie showing of the requirements contained in (a) of this subsection. Instead, such challenges may be considered by the trier of fact in determining what weight to give to the test result. SHB 3055, subsection 4(4)(c) (emphasis added). ¶ 65 According to the majority SHB 3055 is permissive because it does not state [BAC] tests must be admitted if a prima facie burden is met; it states that such tests are admissible.  Majority at 18. This conclusion is untenable when one considers the plain text of subsections 4(4)(a) and 4(4)(c). Subsection 4(4)(a) of SHB 3055 provides breath tests shall be admissible at trial once the State produces prima facie evidence to meet certain enumerated criteria concerning the administration of such tests. [10] Under subsection 4(4)(c), once the State meets its prima facie burden, a defendant may not challenge the admissibility of the BAC test results on the grounds of reliability or accuracy of the test, the reliability or functioning of the instrument, or any maintenance procedures. ¶ 66 The sole recourse under this statute for a defendant confronted with an inaccurate and unreliable test result is to argue diminished weight should be given by the trier of fact, not to contest its admissibility. [11] These provisions clearly preclude challenges to the admissibility of BAC test results on reliability and accuracy grounds once the requirements of subsection 4(4)(a) are met. Consequently, these provisions conflict with the courts' judicial power to determine the admissibility of evidence pursuant to our rules of evidence. ¶ 67 To bolster its assertion SHB 3055 is permissive in nature, the majority relies on Zwicker and State v. Long, 113 Wash.2d 266, 778 P.2d 1027 (1989). This reliance is misplaced. The statutory provision at issue in those cases, RCW 46.61.517, read, The refusal of a person to submit to a test of the alcoholic content of his blood under RCW 46.20.308 is admissible into evidence at a subsequent criminal trial. Laws of 1983, ch. 165, § 27. Critically, and unlike SHB 3055, the above language did not restrict the courts' ability to exclude evidence on the basis of its relevance or its probative value if outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice by restricting such challenges only to the question of the weight of the evidence. In Zwicker we held the statute at issue was valid, interpreting is admissible as permissive and not mandating admissibility in all cases. Zwicker, 105 Wash.2d at 238, 713 P.2d 1101. However, we also cautioned that any conflict with ER 401 and 403 ... would require invalidation of the statute.  Id. (emphasis added). ¶ 68 SHB 3055 strips the court of its essential judicial power to exclude inadmissible evidence. We must defend the power and independence of the judiciary, not rush to surrender it to the legislative or executive branch. [12]