Opinion ID: 1595336
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Number 1-A, circumstantial evidence instruction.

Text: ¶ 100. Ross also argues that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the case against Ross was based entirely on circumstantial evidence. When all of the evidence tending to prove the guilt of a defendant is circumstantial, the trial court must grant a jury instruction that every reasonable hypothesis other than guilt must be excluded in order to convict. Manning v. State, 735 So.2d 323, 338 (Miss.1999) (citing Givens v. State, 618 So.2d 1313, 1318 (Miss.1993)). Circumstantial evidence is evidence which, without going directly to prove the existence of a fact, gives rise to logical inference that such fact does exist. Id. If direct evidence is before the jury, then a circumstantial evidence instruction is inappropriate. Ladner v. State, 584 So.2d 743, 750 (Miss. 1991). Direct evidence may consist of a confession by the defendant, including a defendant's admission to a person other than a law enforcement officer. Id. ¶ 101. Ross concedes that Jones' testimony regarding Ross' statements to her constitutes direct testimony, but argues that Jones' testimony was so thoroughly discredited by other evidence that its weight was negligible. Therefore, he argues, the jury should have considered Ross' case to be based on circumstantial evidence. However, issues regarding weight and credibility of the evidence are for the jury to resolve. Hughes v. State, 735 So.2d 238, 276 (Miss.1999). The trial court did not err in refusing to treat Ross' case as a de facto circumstantial-evidence case.