Opinion ID: 1408222
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: admissibility of statement

Text: Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed.2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), established that statements made by a suspect in custody are not admissible as evidence unless the suspect is informed that he or she has the right to remain silent and the right to counsel before the suspect may be interrogated. 384 U.S. at 479. Miranda held that when a defendant indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. 384 U.S. at 473-74. A suspect may, by conduct or specific words, waive a previously invoked right to remain silent. Hickles was taken into custody while walking along a country road and transported to the Labette County jail in a deputy's patrol car. While en route to the police station, Hickles was advised of his Miranda rights. After arrival at the station, he was placed in a detective's office. Three law enforcement officers were present. Hickles was asked if he recalled being advised of his Miranda rights and if he recalled those rights. He responded that he understood and had no questions as to the Miranda rights. Agent Williams then began to interview Hickles regarding the events surrounding Whetstone's death. Agent Williams told the defendant he wanted to hear Hickles' side of the story. Williams then proceeded to ask Hickles three or four questions about the incident. In response to each question, Hickles stated, I don't have anything to say. Hickles then asked Agent Williams questions such as whether the agents had open minds and whether it would benefit him to tell his side of the story. Williams responded that the officers had open minds. Williams testified that during the interview, Hickles spent more time asking questions than Williams. After a few minutes, Hickles asked the officers, Is this when I get an attorney? Agent Williams testified that since he felt this question was ambiguous, he decided to clarify matters by asking, Are you asking for an attorney? When Hickles failed to respond, Agent Williams repeated the question. Hickles then responded that he was not requesting an attorney. At that point, approximately 5 to 7 minutes had passed since the questioning of Hickles had commenced. Hickles then asked the agent additional questions, such as why his girlfriend had been arrested. He then asked if officers were aware of a broken window at his residence and asked, Isn't that breaking and entering? Agent Williams informed Hickles that the police were aware of the broken window and then asked Hickles additional questions about that incident. The conversation then returned to the death of Whetstone. Hickles explained to the officers that he, Patton, and Christine had gone to the Martinez home looking for Whetstone. He stated Whetstone showed up later threatening everyone and after Whetstone asked Christine what she was doing fucking around with niggers, he and Whetstone went outside and [i]t just happened. Agent Williams then asked additional questions. Hickles responded that after his knife had fallen to the ground during the fight, he and Whetstone struggled for the knife and somehow Whetstone was stabbed. Agent Williams then summarized the conversation with Hickles and concluded the interview. The entire interview lasted from 15 to 30 minutes. The defendant did not file a motion to suppress his statements. During the trial, the State requested a Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 12 L. Ed.2d 908, 84 S. Ct. 1774 (1964), hearing to determine the voluntariness of the defendant's confession. At the hearing, Hickles argued that his statement to police that I don't have anything to say was an unequivocal invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to silence. He contended that all questioning by the officers should have ceased at that point. Hickles asserted, in the alternative, that because his statement to the officers was ambiguous, the officers were required to ask clarifying questions to determine whether his statement was an attempt to invoke his Fifth Amendment right to silence. The State's position at the Jackson v. Denno hearing was that Hickles had waived his right to remain silent and his statement, I don't have anything to say, was a response to specific questions asked by the officer rather than an invocation of Hickles' Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. The trial judge commented: The fairness of the officers in conducting the interrogationI don't believe there's anything being demonstrated [that] they did anything underhanded or deceptive. The statements that he made would seem to be somewhat equivocal. When you say, `I have nothing to say,' that might meanthat might mean he has nothing to say in response to a question. It doesn't necessarily mean that he has nothing to say for the rest of the day about the subject. When he stated that he wanted`Is this when I get a lawyer?' that's somewhat ambiguous in and of itself, and the officer, I believe, had to not onlythis case doesn't say that he had an obligation to ask a clarifying question. He says it's the better police practice to do so, and in this case, as a matter of fact, he did ask Mr. Hickles a clarifying question as to whether or not his statement meant that he wanted an attorney at that point in time, and it has been stated here on the record subsequently Mr. Hickles indicated he did not. So I can't find anything in this fact situation to indicate that the statements made by the defendant are anything but voluntary and would find them admissible based on that. The trial judge ruled that Hickles' statement was voluntary and admissible. In determining whether an accused's confession is voluntary, a court is to look at the totality of the circumstances. The burden of proving that a confession or admission is admissible is on the prosecution, and the required proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. Factors bearing on the voluntariness of a statement by an accused include the duration and manner of the interrogation; the ability of the accused on request to communicate with the outside world; the accused's age, intellect, and background; and the fairness of the officers in conducting the interrogation. The essential inquiry in determining the voluntariness of a statement is whether the statement was the product of the free and independent will of the accused. State v. Morris, 255 Kan. 964, Syl. ¶ 1, 880 P.2d 1244 (1994). On appeal, Hickles does not contend that his statement was an invocation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Hickles claims that his response, I have nothing to say, in answer to Agent Williams' initial questions constituted an affirmative assertion of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and was an invocation of that right which required a complete cessation of questioning by the agents. Defendant argues that the continued questioning by the agents after he invoked his right to remain silent vitiated the voluntariness of the statement. In other words, Hickles argues that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. The State asserts that the defendant's statement was merely an answer to a specific question, and neither an invocation of Hickles' Fifth Amendment right to silence nor an ambiguous and equivocal assertion of the right to remain silent. The State alleges that the admissibility of the statement is controlled by Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 129 L. Ed.2d 362, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994), followed by this court in State v. Morris, 255 Kan. 964. In Davis, the United States Supreme Court held that if an accused's reference to a Miranda right is ambiguous or equivocal to a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances, the officer is not required to ask clarifying questions or cease questioning and may continue questioning until the suspect clearly invokes a right. 129 L. Ed.2d at 373. Hickles asserts that Davis and its progeny apply only when an accused has made an ambiguous invocation of his or her Miranda rights after a knowing and voluntary waiver. Hickles argues that because he had not waived his Miranda rights, the officers were required to cease questioning when he stated, I have nothing to say, and clarify his willingness to talk before proceeding further. For authority, Hickles relies on State v. Leyva, 906 P.2d 894 (Utah App. 1995). In Leyva, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress his statement given to police after he was pulled over for a traffic stop. After the trooper had informed Leyva of his Miranda rights, the trooper asked Leyva if he understood the rights. Leyva responded that he did. The trooper then asked Leyva, Having these rights in mind do you wish to talk to us now? Leyva answered, I don't know. The trooper stated, You don't have to answer questions if you don't want to. It is up to you. Leyva nodded his head affirmatively. The trooper then asked, So why did you run? Leyva gave an incriminating response to the trooper. On appeal, Leyva argued the statement should have been suppressed because his equivocal invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to silence obligated the trooper to clarify his intention before asking further questions. The State argued that under Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, the trooper was not required to cease questioning unless Leyva had clearly asserted his Miranda rights. The Utah court agreed with Leyva, holding that Davis applied only to situations in which a suspect has ambiguously reasserted a Miranda right after a knowing and voluntary waiver. Because Leyva's initial waiver of Miranda rights was ambiguous, the Utah court held the arresting officer was required to clarify Leyva's intention to talk before proceeding further with the interrogation. 906 P.2d at 900-01. Significantly, for purposes of this case, Leyva did not involve questioning initiated by the suspect. As this court noted in State v. Matson, 260 Kan. 366, 373, 921 P.2d 790 (1996) (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 68 L. Ed.2d 378, 101 S. Ct. 1880 [1981]): `[W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights .... [A]n accused ... having expressed his desire to deal with police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85.' This court stated further in Matson: The same rules apply where the right to remain silent is exercised. In determining whether events subsequent to the exercise of a constitutional right constitute a waiver of the previously asserted right, the court must first determine whether the accused actually invoked the right and, if so, the court must then determine whether the accused (a) initiated further discussions with the police and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the previously asserted right. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 83 L. Ed.2d 488, 105 S. Ct. 490 (1984). Waiver of the right must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances. See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1046, 77 L. Ed.2d 405, 103 S. Ct. 2830 (1982). 260 Kan. at 374. In State v. Strayer, 242 Kan. 618, 625, 750 P.2d 390 (1988), we held that an accused may waive Miranda rights by his or her own acts and words in initiating conversation with police. In that case, after Strayer was placed under arrest and read his Miranda rights, he stated he understood his rights and could not discuss the specifics of the case with police. He then began questioning the officers regarding their apprehension of him, finally engaging in a lengthy conversation during which he made incriminating statements. We held that Strayer waived his Miranda rights by his own acts, words, and surrounding circumstances. 242 Kan. at 625. See also State v. William, 248 Kan. 389, Syl. ¶ 15, 807 P.2d 1292 (1991) (holding when a defendant initiates contact with the police after an assertion of a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, defendant waives that right and his or her statements are admissible). When a trial court conducts a full hearing on the admissibility of an extrajudicial statement by an accused, determines the statement was freely, voluntarily, and intelligently given, and admits the statement into evidence at the trial, an appellate court accepts that determination if there is substantial competent evidence to support the trial court's determination. State v. Johnson, 253 Kan. 75, 83-84, 853 P.2d 34 (1993). Prior to commencement of the interview, Hickles had been advised of his right to remain silent twice and had stated that he understood those rights. The record indicates that after stating he had nothing to say, Hickles immediately began questioning the agents. The entire interview with Hickles lasted only 15 to 30 minutes. When Hickles asked whether this was when he should get an attorney, the officer asked him several times whether he was requesting an attorney. Hickles said he was not. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Hickles' age, intellect, and background affected the voluntariness of his statement, nor is there anything to indicate that the officers conducted the examination in an unfair manner. When the totality of the circumstances is considered, we find there was substantial competent evidence to support the trial court's finding of voluntariness and admissibility of Hickles' statement to police.