Opinion ID: 4528737
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: S.’s Testimony

Text: A.M.’s friend, B.S., testified next. According to B.S., A.M. went to S.R.’s home intending to have sex with J.K., and A.M. cajoled B.S. into giving Petitioner money to buy alcohol. B.S. recalled that A.M. drank “two if not more” cups of vodka and snorted 3 Oxycodone. At some point, A.M. went to the back room with J.K. According to B.S., A.M. was “a bit tipsey[,] but she could still walk . . . and talk pretty normally.” A.M. and J.K. returned from the back room, and J.K. left the party sometime later. A.M. resumed drinking and grew increasingly intoxicated. A.M. began telling Petitioner to “eff” her, and she began touching Petitioner. Petitioner grabbed her, touching her buttocks and breasts and pulling her pants down. B.S. and others protested because “the way he was grabbing her didn’t look okay.” Then the guys yelled, “[S]omeone . . . finish her already[,]” and S.R. said, “[J]ust have sex with her already[.]” According to B.S., Petitioner said, “[O]kay, I will,” and he and another young man, Z.P., carried A.M. to the back room. B.S. reported that Petitioner and Z.P. “had to carry her. . . . She was so intoxicated that she couldn’t walk herself back there.” B.S. assumed that Petitioner had sex with A.M., but she could not say so for sure. Two other young men, J.M. and Z.P., went to the back room “to watch[.]” Petitioner emerged from the room sometime later, as did Z.P. J.M. remained, however, and B.S. saw him “dry humping” A.M. when she entered the room. B.S. told J.M. to “get off her” and helped others “put her clothes back on.” B.S. reported that A.M. “was incoherent” and “didn’t understand” when she was spoken to or “know . . . what was going on.” B.S. and other young people helped A.M. to the living room, where A.M. “fell off the couch and . . . busted her eyebrow open[.]” A.G. called her mother, and A.M. was taken to the hospital. 4 On cross-examination, B.S. agreed that A.M. yelled “f— me, f— me, f— me” to J.K. and later yelled “f— me, f— me” to Petitioner. B.S. also conceded that Petitioner groped A.M. in “direct response to what she was communicating to him” and that Petitioner “push[ed] her back on the couch and . . . t[old] her to stop” “a couple times[.]” B.S. further admitted that, though she believed it was “inappropriate” for Petitioner and Z.P. to carry A.M. to the back room, she did not stop them because A.M. “was communicating a willingness to do something[.]” On redirect, B.S. testified that her opinion had changed since that night and that she did not believe A.M. was capable of consenting to sex. Yet, on further crossexamination, B.S. agreed that B.S. was “probably the soberest person” there and that, when “all this happened [she] didn’t think anything was wrong because [she] thought [A.M.] was communicating a willingness to act[.]” A.G.’s Testimony A.G. remembered being at S.R.’s home on April 23, 2016. A.G. denied any knowledge of whether A.M. had sex with anyone. According to A.G., A.M. “was mainly just laying on the couch and . . . being really loud with . . . moaning and groaning noises.” This included “saying . . . eff me or whatever . . . frequently but not . . . too much.” A.G. assumed that when Petitioner and Z.P. carried A.M. to the backroom they were placing her “in bed or something” so she could rest and “calm down[.]” Later, however, she recalled Petitioner asking “one specific time” “should I just go ahead and have sex with [A.M.] since she is screaming eff me anyway[?]” On cross-examination, A.G. agreed that A.M. 5 was “out of control yelling things like, f— me, f— me, f— me” before Petitioner and Z.P. carried her to the back room. S.R.’s Testimony S.R. hosted the April 23, 2016 gathering. S.R. testified that A.M. had sex with J.K., but she did not remember A.M. having sex with Petitioner. She told the police that Petitioner had sex with A.M. because she heard “moaning” coming from the back room, not because she witnessed the two having sex. At first, S.R. denied seeing Petitioner (or anyone else) carry A.M. to the back room. According to S.R., A.M. went to the back room with J.K. and was still there when Petitioner “went back to check on her[.]” Later, however, S.R. conceded that she had given previous sworn testimony that she saw Petitioner carry A.M. to the back room. J.M.’s Testimony J.M. remembered going to S.R.’s house in April 2016. He denied that either he or Petitioner had sex with A.M. There were few other things he professed to remember, and he invoked his right not to incriminate himself. Z.P.’s Testimony Z.P. testified pursuant to a plea agreement. According to Z.P., Petitioner bought vodka with money he received from A.M. A.M. “got really drunk” and then snorted some pills. She became drowsy and “wasn’t able to walk.” “[S]he was still talking, but . . . it wasn’t as . . . clear.” In time, “she couldn’t respond very well.” 6 Z.P. said that A.M. and J.K. started flirting on the couch after A.M. snorted the pills. At some point someone 5 said, “[I]f you’re going to have sex with her, just do it.” J.K. responded by carrying A.M. to the back room. J.K. emerged from the back room sometime later, and A.M. returned from the back room “on her own” minutes after that. J.K. left for home about 30 minutes later. Z.P. testified that A.M.’s intoxication had “intensified” still further by the time J.K. left. “[S]he was . . . almost incoherent . . . [and] couldn’t walk.” At this point, Petitioner began “flirting with her, grabbing her butt and her boobs.” “[I]t sounded like she was trying to say, f— me, but I am not for sure[.]” 6 She also “tr[ied] to bite at him[.]” Several people—including Z.P.—warned Petitioner to leave her alone. Instead, Petitioner carried A.M. to the back room with help from Z.P. According to Z.P., “nothing was said like, hey, help me take her back . . . [and] nothing like, you can have sex with her, nothing like that[. H]e was just . . . , help me.” Yet Z.P. did recall someone saying, “[J]ust go ahead finish her already[.]” Z.P. seemed to agree that this comment was what prompted Petitioner and Z.P. to act. Z.P. agreed that A.M. “couldn’t walk or stand up” when he carried her to the back room. According to Z.P., they laid A.M. on the floor, and Petitioner undressed her. Petitioner then—according to Z.P.—put his finger in A.M.’s vagina, performed oral sex on her, and attempted to penetrate her with his penis. Z.P. could not say whether Petitioner 5 Z.P. testified that both he and Petitioner “stated” this. 6 Seconds later, Z.P. was sure about this detail: “She was just saying, f— me[.]” 7 “penetrated or not because he just pulled back.” Z.P. testified that, when Petitioner pulled up his pants, he “told [J.M] to give it a go[;] . . . come on, it’s your turn.” J.M. penetrated A.M. with his penis. While all this was going on, Z.P. was in the room “[j]ust watching.” Z.P. professed remorse for his conduct, observing that “[w]hether she told us to have sex with her or not, she was not in the state to have this done.” On cross-examination, Petitioner’s counsel revealed several additional inconsistencies between Z.P.’s trial testimony and his statements to the police. Z.P. confessed that he had been untruthful with the police. Petitioner’s Recorded Statement Petitioner’s statement to the police was recorded on video, and the State played the video as part of its case in chief. Petitioner admitted that he bought “two bottles” of alcohol with $20 that he received from S.R. Petitioner said that A.M. was present and did a “line” of “hydros[.]” Everyone was drinking. Sometime after that, A.M. and J.K. walked to the back room to have sexual relations. According to Petitioner, “[W]e knew about it because we could hear them[.]” “She got into this weird mode where she is moaning and . . . writhing and just . . . being weird.” The sounds continued after J.K. left the back room, and A.M. eventually returned to the living room. According to Petitioner, A.M.’s “weird stuff” continued, and he approached her on the couch to see if she was okay. He stated that A.M. “reaches up and grabs me and tries to attack me.” Petitioner said that he “grabbed her and . . . put her back on the 8 couch[.]” Others told him to “[s]tay away[.]” Petitioner advised J.K. that A.M. was “freaking out” and that he “need[ed] to go and take care of this.” So, according to Petitioner, J.K. and A.M. returned to the back room to have sex. Petitioner stated that he went to the back room sometime later. He found A.M. on the floor “[f]ully clothed” and “making all this noise and stuff[.]” At that point, he was called away by the arrival of his “baby’s mother” and went across the street for a while. When he returned, A.M. was “rolling around” on the floor in the living room with a cut on her face. Petitioner insisted that A.M. be taken to the hospital, and he carried her “fireman style” to the vehicle. The police officer challenged Petitioner’s account, and it began to change. Petitioner said that he went to the back room twice—once when J.K. was having sex with A.M. and once when J.K. had left the room. When Petitioner went to the back room the second time, he went with Z.P. and J.M. However, Petitioner was “just checking on her.” “Nothing happened[,] . . . not while I was in the room, nothing.” Petitioner later changed his version of events. Soon he admitted that “[J.M.] f—ed her and [Z.P.] stuck his [penis] in her mouth[,]” but Petitioner “didn’t do anything.” He also denied “smacking” A.M.’s buttocks when they were on the couch. He admitted to touching “her back and stuff to try to chill her out” and to throwing her on the couch when she tried to “attack” him, but said he was not “being mean about it.” 9 He continued to deny carrying A.M. to the back room or sexually assaulting her, and he offered to provide a DNA “sample right now.” 7 Later he said, “I don’t remember carrying her into the back room, but if I did, it was only to lay her down. But she was laying down on the couch, so I don’t know why I would carry her there.” 8 When the police officer accused Petitioner of encouraging the other young men, he replied, “Yeah. I said to woo her, man. You don’t take advantage of them, but you can woo them.” “As a dude, if you go back there, I’m telling you that you can probably get with her tonight if you just lay with her.” The police officer eventually left the interview room, and Petitioner phoned his mother. 9 Describing what he told the officer, Petitioner said, “I told him that I did give [J.M.] . . . the encouragement to go back there and to f— her and everything and that stuff. I said that. I said, ‘[J.M.], you can f—ing go back there and get it.’” 7 At trial, expert testimony established that a mixture of DNA from J.M. and J.K. was recovered from A.M.’s body. Petitioner’s DNA, however, was not present in any of the samples analyzed by the State Police. 8 Later his position shifted still further: “If I carried her back to the room, I might have done that only (Indistinguishable words) but I didn’t carry her back there for . . . anything else to happen.” 9 The video camera evidently remained on and continued to record what transpired in the interview room. No objection to this portion of the video appears in the record. 10 Jury Instructions The parties proposed jury instructions before trial and discussed them with the court over the course of the trial. Sexual abuse in the first degree 10 and battery 11 were proposed as lesser included offenses under count one of the indictment. However, as of the end of the second day of trial, Petitioner’s attorney was still not sure whether he wanted the jury to be given the battery instruction. The State objected to a battery instruction, and the court said that it would “wait to hear the rest of the evidence[.]” This matter came up again early on the third day of trial, before the State had rested. Petitioner’s attorney argued that battery is an “offensive touching” and that “[a]ny 10 W. Va. Code § 61-8B-7(a) (2006) provides that “[a] person is guilty of sexual abuse in the first degree when . . . (2) [s]uch person subjects another person to sexual contact who is physically helpless[.]” 11 W. Va. Code § 61-2-9(c) (2017) defines battery as “unlawfully and intentionally mak[ing] physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature to the person of another or unlawfully and intentionally caus[ing] physical harm to another person[.]” We would note, however, that the statute was different when Petitioner committed his battery. The earlier version defined battery as “unlawfully and intentionally mak[ing] physical contact with force capable of causing physical pain or injury to the person of another or unlawfully and intentionally caus[ing] physical pain or injury to another person[.]” W. Va. Code § 61-2- 9(c) (2014). In their discussions about instructions, both the parties and the court assumed that the newer version of the statute applied, and the jury was instructed accordingly. No one has raised this issue on appeal, however, and Petitioner invited this error and benefitted from it. Syl. Pt. 6, in part, Lewis v. Ames, ___ W. Va. ___, 836 S.E.2d 56 (2019) (“A criminal defendant cannot invite the circuit court to give an erroneous instruction on a lesser included offense, benefit from that instruction, and then complain on appeal, or in a collateral attack, that such instruction should not have been given.”); State v. Shearer, No. 16-1209, 2018 WL 1659488, at  (W. Va. Apr. 6, 2018) (memorandum decision) (“It is apparent that petitioner reviewed the charge and assured the trial court that he was satisfied with its contents and had no objection. Therefore, petitioner knowingly and intentionally waived any right to have the jury differently instructed.”). 11 sexual assault is by nature probably carry[ing] that same element of an offensive touching.” He also noted evidence that Petitioner “smacked [A.M.] on the butt” and “pushed her back on the couch” and observed that Z.P. was pleading to battery. The State agreed that a person who sexually assaults a physically helpless person also commits battery but denied that any “evidentiary conflict” warranted a battery instruction. According to the State, there was no “reason to believe anything other than a sexual assault occurred.” Petitioner’s counsel replied that sexual abuse in the first degree requires “sexual contact, . . . an offensive touching but done . . . for purposes of sexual gratification.” He argued that a battery conviction might be warranted if the jury believed that Petitioner smacked, grabbed, and pushed A.M. on the couch but not for his sexual gratification. After hearing the parties’ arguments, the circuit court remained undecided. That afternoon, when both sides had rested, the circuit court rendered its decision. The circuit court determined that a battery instruction was necessary, reasoning that “[w]e do have a dispute . . . about whether the State has conclusively proven the greater offense.” 12 The court instructed the jury that it could reach one of four verdicts on count one of the indictment: “guilty of sexual assault in the second degree, guilty of sexual abuse in the first degree, guilty of battery or not guilty.” The court further instructed that the jury could convict Petitioner if they found that he perpetrated these crimes himself or aided and abetted the perpetrator. On these instructions, the jury found Petitioner not guilty of sexual 12 The circuit court based its decision on State v. Neider, 170 W. Va. 662, 295 S.E.2d 902 (1982). 12 assault in the second degree, not guilty of sexual abuse in the first degree, and guilty of battery. The jury could not reach a verdict on the conspiracy count. 13 Sentencing On June 14, 2018, the State filed a written motion asking the circuit court to find that Petitioner’s battery offense was sexually motivated and to require Petitioner to register as a sex offender. Petitioner filed a response on June 21, 2018, opposing the State’s motion. Petitioner argued, among other things, that he “contested and opposed a finding of sexual motivation[—]i.e. two separate sexual assault/abuse allegations[—]at trial and prevailed” and that it was “unclear” which conduct led to Petitioner’s battery conviction. He also objected, based on our decisions in State v. Whalen, 214 W. Va. 299, 588 S.E.2d 677 (2003) and State v. Seen, 235 W. Va. 174, 772 S.E.2d 359 (2015), 14 that he received no pre-trial notice that the State intended to seek a finding of sexual motivation. 13 This count was later dismissed with prejudice upon the State’s motion. 14 In Syllabus Point 1 of Whalen, we held that [i]n order for a sentencing judge to make a finding pursuant to W.Va.Code, 15–12–2(c) [2001] that a defendant who has been convicted of a criminal offense that is not specifically identified in the Sex Off[ender] Registration Act at W.Va.Code, 15–12–2(b) [2001]—after a trial or by means of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere—was “sexually motivated” in the commission of that offense, the defendant must have been advised prior to trial or the entry of a plea of the possibility of such a finding. We quoted this holding (mostly verbatim) in Syllabus Point 3 of Seen. 13 Petitioner appeared for sentencing on September 14, 2018. The circuit court imposed the maximum penalty of twelve months in jail 15 plus a $500 fine. After hearing from the parties and the victim’s father, the circuit court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner’s battery was sexually motivated and directed Petitioner to register as a sex offender. The court put this finding in a written order entered on September 19, 2018. According to the order, Petitioner “had actual notice to defend against a sexual charge . . . and clearly understood that he had to defend against the allegation that his motives were sexual in nature.” He also “had notice that if convicted, he would have to register as a sex offender.” On top of this, it was Petitioner who requested the court’s battery instruction. The court distinguished our holdings in Whalen and Seen, noting that neither of these cases involved a sex offense charge that was tried before a jury. As support for its conclusion that Petitioner’s battery was sexually motivated, the court noted, among other things, Petitioner’s own statements encouraging J.M. to have sex with A.M. and evidence that Petitioner helped carry the “obviously impaired” victim to the back room where Petitioner “encouraged [J.M.] to have sex with her.” The court further noted the intoxicating substances found in the victim’s system, Petitioner’s role in purchasing alcohol, and Petitioner’s relative age 16 in comparison to the victim and the “other teenage witnesses[.]” 15 Petitioner’s credit for time served exceeded twelve months. 16 Petitioner was 21 years old when he committed the offense. 14 Petitioner appeals from the circuit court’s September 19, 2018 order.