Opinion ID: 2638116
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Court's Treatment of Holdout Juror

Text: Defendant contends the court erred in its response to a jury note regarding an 11-to-1 impasse in guilt phase deliberations and erred again by inadequately investigating the holdout juror's later claims of intimidation. These errors, defendant claims, led to the juror's discharge and the return of guilt verdicts by the reconstituted jury. We disagree; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in either respect. The claim's factual background is as follows: The jury began its guilt phase deliberations at 2:20 p.m. on Tuesday, November 16, 1993, and was excused for the day at 4:00 p.m. The next day, Wednesday, November 17, deliberations began at 9:00 a.m. At 9:40 the jury sent out a note (jury note No. 19) asking for clarification of the phrase accomplished by in the court's instruction that one element of the robbery charge was that the taking of property was accomplished either by force, violence, fear or intimidation. With the agreement of counsel, the court told the jury it could not further define the instructional phrase. At 10:39 a.m. the jury withdrew to resume deliberations, which continued until 4:00 p.m. On Thursday, November 18, the jury again resumed deliberations at 9:00 a.m. At 1:45 p.m. the jury sent out a note (jury note No. 20) indicating an impasse in the deliberations. The note, which was signed by the foreman, Juror Mark D., read: We have not been able to arrive at a verdict. Specifically, we have one jury member who can not find `the taking was accomplished either by force, violence, fear or intimidation.'  Out of the jury's presence, the court proposed to have the jury resume deliberations with the following admonition, which the court observed was based on one approved in People v. Rich (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1036, 1116-1117, 248 Cal.Rptr. 510, 755 P.2d 960: This has been a long trial. The evidence was extensive. The legal issues are complex. Reasonable people could disagree. However, at the time I received your note the jury had been deliberating less than three days. In my opinion you may not have been deliberating long enough to discuss this case fully and to understand fully each other's viewpoint. Please continue your deliberations. Defense counsel objected, urging the court instead to inquire of the jurors whether they believed themselves hopelessly deadlocked and, if they did, to declare a mistrial. Otherwise, counsel suggested, the court risked setting the stage for the jury majority to coerce the holdout juror into a verdict. If the court was not willing to inquire of the jurors, counsel concluded, the defense asked for a mistrial. The prosecutor pointed out the jury had been deliberating less than two days after a month and a half of trial, and urged the court not to consider a mistrial. The trial court overruled the defense objection, denied the mistrial motion, and admonished the jury as proposed, while correcting the reference to deliberation time from less than three days to less than two. The jury returned to the jury room at 2:20 p.m. At 4:00 p.m. they were excused for the day. At the same time, the court received an additional note (jury note No. 21). This note, from juror number 11, Aron G., stated: Sir, I am in psychological pain. I wish to be excused from this jury. I feel the level of intimidation from a couple of jurors toward me that make this process impossible. I am emotionally battered by this situation and can no longer tolerate the strain. I am very sorry but I can no longer function in this environment. Discussing jury note No. 21 after the jury had left, the trial court agreed with defense counsel that the jury should not be asked to deliberate further until the court decided how to respond. Because of the court's schedule of other matters, however, it was impossible to research and discuss the proper response until the afternoon of the next day. With agreement of counsel for both sides; the court decided to excuse the jury the next morning for the weekend, giving them a cooling-off period, and to meet with counsel later on Friday for discussion. At 9:00 a.m. the next day (Friday, November 19), over defense objections that it could increase the; pressure on Juror Aron G., the court examined her briefly without the other jurors present, asking if her position has changed from the note you left us last night. The juror answered, No, and left the courtroom. Defense counsel then requested that the court admonish all the jurors to show each other respect and courtesy, so they would have the weekend to mull that over. Denying that request, the court excused the jurors until Monday morning, telling them that a legal issue concerning deliberations has come up. On the afternoon of Friday, November 19, the court and counsel discussed Aron G.'s allegation of intimidation by other jurors and her request to be excused from the jury. The defense again requested a mistrial, which was again denied. Alternatively, the defense requested that the court admonish the jurors to listen to each other and use a reasoned approach, to be civilized and reasonable and fair. While indicating it would consider that request, the court also stated that it wished counsel to be prepared with questions they would like asked of Aron G. and, if further inquiry proved necessary, of the other jurors, regarding the course of deliberations. By the time court next convened, however, at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, November 22, 1993, the situation had changed again: the court had received a two-page typed letter (jury note No. 22) from the holdout juror, Aron G. Apologizing for the trouble she had caused the court, the juror explained that she was as close to an emotional breakdown as I have ever been in my life, which is very frightening and disorienting for me. She then revealed that on the previous Thursday night, I broke down and discussed the case and deliberation process with my husband. She knew doing so violated the court's directions, but in an extremely traumatic; and emotional state she felt she had to confide in someone, Or just go crazy. In the letter, Aron G. then gave some background regarding the course of deliberations. The jury, she wrote, had quickly resolved all the elements of robbery except the fourth one listed in the instruction, whether the taking was accomplished by force or fear;, the remaining deliberation time was taken on this one question. While most of the jurors were sensible and fair, as time went by a couple became increasingly impatient and frustrated, which eventually precipitated the personal attack and conveniently overheard sarcastic and demeaning comments about my intelligence and decision making skills. She also overheard jurors talking about the time waste, cost and inconvenience of the continuing deliberations; these remarks, though not directed at her, made her feel more `isolation and duress. When Aron G. confronted the parties involved, she was told she had `misunderstood'  and that if remarks were made, they were `unintentional.' Although she continued to believe the remarks were indeed most pointedly intended, she also acknowledged that she could be, as her husband suggested, naive about the ways of the civilian and judicial world [13] and that intimidation, the term she had used in her prior note, might be a harsh and excessively powerful word to describe the other jurors' behavior. The defense renewed its request for a mistrial. The court stated it would either have to declare a mistrial or substitute an alternate for Aron G.; her misconduct and emotional state made it impossible for the court to retain her as a juror. The court decided to examine Aron G. and the jury foreman, Mark D., in an attempt to discover whether any jurors besides Aron G. had committed misconduct. Questioned by the court, Aron G. said that despite getting some prescription drugs that helped calm her down over the weekend, she still felt as described in her letter. She did not believe she would function well as a juror and I just don't think I would be impartial at this phase any more. She clarified that she had discussed the facts of the case, as well as the deliberations, with her husband. With regard to the intimidationa term she acknowledged some people might not find applicableshe explained that after a long period of building tension between her and the other jurors, the comment that pushed me over the brink was made by Juror S. While the jury was examining a photographic exhibit showing the victim's stab wounds, Juror S. said something like: You think this is crazy. What's really crazy is anyone who can look at all this and not see that a robbery was committed. That's what's really crazy. In response, Aron G. yelled back that she would not tolerate personal attacks. At that point, there was a lot of yelling and screaming until everybody kind of calmed down. Jury foreman Mark D., also questioned by the court, denied there had been any intimidation during deliberations. Although Mark D. admitted that he and Juror S. were both very strong opinionated individuals, he denied S. had said anything intimidating to Aron G.: in fact ... there was one instance that specifically gave rise to this whole situation that was totally misinterpreted by Ms. [G.] The court refused a defense request to ask Mark D. about jurors' comments concerning waste of time and money. At the completion of its inquiry, the court decided not to declare a mistrial but instead to excuse Aron G. and swear an alternate juror to replace her. The court's not convinced that there was any misconduct by way of intimidation in the jury room. Gosh, if anything, it sounds like typical deliberations. And the problem is the only misconduct we're left with is Ms. G[.] discussing the case with her husband. Defense counsel objected that the court's inquiry had been insufficient: given that Aron G. had referred to a couple of jurors intimidating her, and that Mark D. admitted that he and Juror S. were the most aggressive jurors, the court cannot turn its back on the possibility that Mr. [D.] perhaps was intimidating her as well. Counsel urged the court to interview all the jurors about possible intimidation. Denying the defense request for further investigation, the court excused Aron G., finding good cause (§ 1089) in her failure to follow the admonition not to discuss the case with others and in her statements that she could no longer be impartial and was emotionally unable to continue. The court then swore in an alternate juror and instructed the jury to begin deliberations anew. At 11:07 a.m. the jury resumed deliberations. By 2:02 p.m. the same day (Monday, November 22, 1993) they had reached their guilt and special circumstance verdicts. Defendant contends the trial court erred in several respects. First, he asserts the court abused its discretion when, in response to jury note No. 20, the court denied a mistrial without inquiring of the jurors whether they were hopelessly deadlocked. As defendant acknowledges, the question whether to declare a hung jury or order further deliberations rests, as both statute and case law provide, in the trial court's sound discretion. (§1140 [jury may be discharged without reaching a verdict if, at the expiration of such time as the court may deem proper, it satisfactorily appears that there is no reasonable probability that the jury can agree]; People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 539, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100; People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 775, 230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113.) Although the court must take care to exercise its power without coercing the jury into abdicating its independent judgment in favor of considerations of compromise and expediency [citation], the court may direct further deliberations upon its reasonable conclusion that such direction would be perceived `as a means of enabling the jurors to enhance their understanding of the case rather than as mere pressure to reach a verdict on the basis of matters already discussed and considered.' ( Proctor, at p. 539,15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340,842 P.2d 1100.) We conclude the denial of a mistrial without further inquiry was not an abuse of discretion on the facts here. While the trial court has a duty to avoid coercing the jury to reach a verdict, we have held that inquiry as to the possibility of agreement is not a prerequisite to denial of a motion for mistrial. ( People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 777, 230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113.) Moreover, the jury in this case had deliberated less than two full days, around 10 hours; we have upheld courts' denials of mistrials even after fruitless deliberations for longer periods. (See People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 194-197, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862 [jury had deliberated for more than 14 hours over five days]; Rodriguez, at pp. 774-775, 230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113 [11th day of deliberations].) Defendant asserts that the guilt phase trial in his case was not long, the evidence voluminous, and the issues complex as in People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at page 775, 230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 Pd 113. We disagree. While not extraordinarily long for a special-circumstances murder trial, defendant's guilt phase trial featured extensive and complicated testimony by toxicological, pharmacological, and psychological experts called by both sides, who differed sharply with one another over both their technical conclusions and their overall assessments of defendant's mental state at the time of the crimes. The question of fact on which the jury was troubledthe relationship between defendant's theft of the television and boom box and his killing of Joeywas at the center of this complex expert debate. For the trial court to conclude that extended deliberations might be necessary was not unreasonable. Defendant also argues the order for further deliberations was coercive because the trial court knew (from the foreman's unprompted revelation in jury note No. 20) that the jury was split 11 to 1 for conviction and that the split involved an issue (whether the taking of property was accomplished by force or fear) that had troubled the jury since early in its deliberations. But while we have recognized the increased potential for coercion once the trial judge has learned that a unanimous judgment of conviction is being hampered by a single holdout juror ( People v. Sheldon (1989) 48 Cal.3d 935, 959, 258 Cal. Rptr. 242, 771 P.2d 1330), we have rejected the view that denial of a mistrial in that circumstance is inherently coercive ( ibid ); Despite the 11-to-l split, the trial court could reasonably believe further deliberations would lead to a unanimous understanding of the case among the jurors. With hindsight, we know that the court's hopeful expectation was not to be fulfilled. But the trial court's failure to guess correctly how the further deliberations would go does not make its order an abuse of discretion. Second, defendant contends the trial court, in its instruction ordering further deliberations so that the jurors could come to understand fully each other's viewpoint, impliedly suggested the holdout juror should change her mind. The court, defendant argues, should instead or in addition have instructed the jury that the jurors [have] an individual duty to deliberate and to reach their own conclusions, rather than merely acceding to the majority view. We disagree; the court's admonition was not of a character that would expressly or impliedly coerce a verdict. (Cf. People v. Sheldon, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 959-960, 258 Cal.Rptr. 242, 771 P.2d 1330 [giving examples of coercive admonitions].) Nor, for reasons already explained, do we agree with defendant that the court erred in telling the jury: This has been a long trial. The evidence was extensive. The legal issues are complex. While there were differences between this case and People v. Rich, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pages 1116-1117, 248 Cal.Rptr. 510, 755 P.2d 960, in which we approved a similar explanation of the need for further deliberations, the trial court's explanation here was tailored to the case before it and did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Third, defendant faults the trial court for an inadequate investigation of matters mentioned in Juror Aron G.'s letter. Specifically, defendant contends the court should have sought more detail from Aron G. as to the contents of her discussion with her husband about the case and the effect of the incident on her, and should have interviewed jurors besides Aron G. and Mark D. regarding intimidation during deliberations. As to the contents of Aron G.'s conversation with her husband and her ability to continue deliberations, we disagree more inquiry was needed. Asked whether she and her husband had discussed the facts of the case or only the deliberation process, Aron G. answered: I gave him the background as to why the problems were occurring, so yes, I discussed the facts concerned [ sic ] the points I addressed in there about the robbery and the problems, I mean, my sense of the problems within the room, yes, sir. With regard to her ability to continue, Aron G. volunteered that she was sorry for what she had done, but I just don't think I would be impartial at this phase any more. No further questioning was necessary in order to conclude that Aron G. had intentionally violated the court's admonition against discussing the case with outsiders and could no longer serve as an impartial juror. As to other jurors' views of whether intimidation had occurred, the trial court acted within its sound discretion in concluding that further questioning would be an unwarranted intrusion into the secrecy of jury deliberations. (See People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 878-879, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1; People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, 475-476, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 313, 21 P.3d 1225.) Though Aron G. initially (in jury note No. 21) referred to intimidation by a couple of jurors, in her subsequent letter she volunteered that that description might have been harsh and excessively powerful. Interviewed by the court, she repeated that her perception of intimidation might have been idiosyncratic and naive. When pressed for actual instances, she gave only one, a comment by Juror S. to the effect that Aron G. was herself crazy for accepting the defense psychological theory. In response, she recounted, she had yelled that she would not tolerate personal attacks, which led to generally raised voices until eventually the jurors kind of calmed down. The foreman, Mark D., agreed there was one instance with Juror S. that gave rise to Aron G.'s complaints, but insisted she had misinterpreted it and that apologies had been made. With this information, the trial court could reasonably conclude there had been no actual intimidation of Aron G. by S. or other jurors, but only the type of heated discussion common to jury deliberations, and that to interview all the jurors, as the defense urged, would be to risk `depriv[ing] the jury room of its inherent quality of free expression. [Citation.]' ( Cleveland, at p. 476, 106 Cal. Rptr.2d 313, 21 P.3d 1225.) [14] The trial court reasonably found Aron G.'s emotional reaction to the deliberations led to her own misconduct and inability to continue deliberating. Unfortunate as these events may have been, they were not the result of judicial error. The court did not, as defendant contends, effectively coerce a verdict in violation of his rights to due process, a fair jury trial, and a reliable determination of penalty under the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, sections 15, 16 and 17 of the California Constitution.