Opinion ID: 2159727
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Denial of the Motion for Continuance

Text: Jones contends that the trial court's denial of his motion for continuance on the day trial was scheduled to begin was error. Ordinarily, the decision to grant or deny a continuance rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Thompson v. Thompson, 559 A.2d 311, 314 (D.C.1989); accord, e.g., Edelen v. United States, 627 A.2d 968, 972 (D.C.1993) (the trial judge [has] wide latitude as to whether to grant or deny a motion for continuance). When, as in this case, the request for continuance is not made until the day of trial, we are especially reluctant to reverse the denial of that request. Esteves v. Esteves, 680 A.2d 398, 405 (D.C.1996); Taylor v. Washington Hospital Center, 407 A.2d 585, 594 (D.C. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 921, 100 S.Ct. 1857, 64 L.Ed.2d 275 (1980). On the present record, which shows that Dr. Jones waited until a few days before the scheduled date of trial to obtain counsel and failed to notify the court of his situation until the very day of trial, and in light of the cases cited (and many others that say the same thing), we find no abuse of discretion.