Opinion ID: 6333813
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excessive Force and Qualified Immunity

Text: Having completed the first step of our analysis, we turn to (1) whether there has been a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the officer’s alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. alKidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011).
But these questions, in turn, put first the question of which constitutional right, protects escaped prisoners from excessive force. The Supreme Court has rejected the “notion that all excessive force claims brought under § 1983 are governed by a single generic standard . . . In addressing an excessive force claim brought under § 1983, analysis begins by identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force.” Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (internal citations omitted). The Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard “governs a free citizen’s claim that law enforcement officials used excessive force,” in any search or seizure, id. at 388, while the Fourteenth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard protects pretrial detainees. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015). After conviction, “the Eighth Amendment, which is specifically concerned with the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in penal institutions, serves as the primary source of substantive protection to convicted prisoners.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986). To determine the applicable constitutional right in this case requires us to place escaped prisoners, like Hughes, on the custodial continuum, with free citizens on one end and convicted prisoners on the other. 16 HUGHES V. RODRIGUEZ We conclude that the Eighth Amendment applies equally to convicted prisoners inside or outside the walls of the penal institution. The logic of Whitley applies with equal force even in the case of an escaped convict, as “the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.” Id. at 318 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n. 40 (1977)). And although claims of excessive force brought by escaped prisoners are rare, our conclusion conforms to the law of our sister circuits. See Gravely v. Madden, 142 F.3d 345, 346–48 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that the Eighth Amendment applied to an excessive force claim brought by an escaped convict because “[t]he Fourth Amendment is not triggered anew by attempts at recapture because the convict has already been ‘seized,’ tried, convicted, and incarcerated.”). Thus, we analyze Hughes’s claim of excessive force under the Eighth Amendment.
With the relevant facts in hand and the proper constitutional standard identified, we proceed to determine whether Hughes’s testimony that was not “blatantly contradicted,” Scott, 550 U.S. at 380, by the bodycam footage creates a triable issue of material fact as to whether his Eighth Amendment right against excessive force was violated. In excessive force cases brought under the Eighth Amendment, the relevant inquiry is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320–21). This Court applies a five-factor test to determine whether the use of force was malicious and HUGHES V. RODRIGUEZ 17 sadistic: “(1) the extent of injury suffered by an inmate; (2) the need for application of force; (3) the relationship between that need and the amount of force used; (4) the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials; and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of the forceful response.” Furnace, 705 F.3d at 1028 (9th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). First, we examine the extent of Hughes’s injuries. Although not binding precedent, in Koley v. Williams, No. CV 19-08038-PCT-DWL (JZB), 2021 WL 806935 (D. Ariz. Mar. 3, 2021) (slip copy), the district court concluded that a dog bite with no lasting complications was a minor injury. Here, Hughes testified that he suffered dog bites to his left leg, abrasions to his head and face, and bruising on his upper right thigh. He claims he has scarring and residual soreness in his left leg, but he makes no allegations that these injuries interfere with his work or daily life. We conclude that these injuries are relatively minor, and this factor weighs slightly in favor of the defendant law enforcement officers. Next, we examine factors two through four—the proportionality factors. We note that the use of biting police dogs on hiding suspects has been repeatedly upheld under the more plaintiff-friendly Fourth Amendment excessive force standard. See Hernandez v. Town of Gilbert, 939 F.3d at 739; Mendoza v. Block, 27 F.3d 1357 (9th Cir. 1994); Miller v. Clark County, 340 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2003). If the officer’s conduct does not breach the lower Fourth Amendment standard, it does not breach the higher Eighth Amendment standard. 3 3 The test for a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim is whether the force used was “objectively reasonable under the circumstances.” 18 HUGHES V. RODRIGUEZ Indeed, this case bears a striking resemblance to Miller. In that case, the suspect was hiding in woods that were familiar to the suspect, but not to the officers, which afforded him “the opportunity to select a hiding place to maximize [his] strategic advantage.” Id. at 965. The same is true for Hughes, who was hiding within a home familiar to him, but unfamiliar to the officers. Like in Miller, the officers here did not know whether Hughes was armed and, given his prior convictions for weapons possession, had reason to suspect that he was. Just as in Miller, Hughes “remained defiant, having ignored [the officer’s] warning that he was about to release a police dog.” Id. “Under these objectively menacing circumstances,” Officer Michael Rodriguez was “entitled to assume” that Hughes “posed an immediate threat to his and to the other deputy’s safety.” Id. “Given the gravity of the risk to law enforcement,” we conclude that these factors weigh heavily in favor of the officers. Id. We conclude that the initial use of the police dog was proportional to the “threats to the safety of [the officers], as reasonably perceived by the responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to them.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 31. Finally, we look at efforts made to temper the severity of the law enforcement response. Hughes had three weeks to turn himself in. On the morning of his apprehension, officers used loudspeakers urging Hughes to come out of hiding. Officers knocked on the door of Ward’s home repeatedly. When officers opened the front door to the home, Officer Michael Rodriguez gave Hughes two warnings to come out or face a police dog. Hughes did not avail himself of any opportunity to turn himself in, respond to any of the officer’s Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. The test for an Eighth Amendment violation is whether the force was malicious and sadistic. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. HUGHES V. RODRIGUEZ 19 attempts to make their presence known, or heed any warning that force was coming. Thus, this factor weighs heavily in favor of the defendant officers. But Hughes’s Eighth Amendment claim does not rest solely on the initial use of the dog. If that were the case, our analysis could stop here. Instead, Hughes also testified that he was beaten and bitten after he was fully subdued, with his hands cuffed behind his back. Although Officer Michael Rodriguez insists that he threw the punch before Hughes was cuffed, “[a]t the summary judgment stage the trial judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). The portion of Hughes’s testimony that was not blatantly contradicted by the bodycam footage creates a triable issue of material fact as to whether Hughes was beaten and bitten after he was handcuffed in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Manley v. Rowley, 847 F.3d 705, 711 (9th Cir. 2017) (reversing summary judgment in favor of defendant corrections officers where the inmate plaintiff testified that the officers beat him after he was handcuffed); Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant corrections officers where the inmate plaintiff testified that officers kicked him in the shoulder and hit him in the back with a baton after he was handcuffed). While the initial use of the dog was clearly proportional to the threat posed by Hughes before he was handcuffed, whether the post-handcuff beating and dog-biting occurred, and whether it was proportional to the threat Officer Michael Rodriguez reasonably perceived by a handcuffed Hughes, are questions for the trier of fact. 20 HUGHES V. RODRIGUEZ
Participation Officers can be held liable for failing to intercede in situations where excessive force is claimed to be employed by other officers only if “they had an opportunity to intercede.” Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289–90 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding a failure to intervene claim failed because there was no realistic opportunity for officers to prevent a rapidly unfolding shooting). Furthermore, officers can be held liable for excessive force on a theory of integral participation only if they participate “in some meaningful way” in the specific actions that constituted the violation. Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773, 780 (9th Cir. 2004). Assuming arguendo that Officer Michael Rodriguez beat Hughes and allowed the dog to bite Hughes after he was handcuffed, the sole alleged acts which could rise to the threshold of an Eighth Amendment violation in this case, the video footage demonstrates that those acts took place during the rapidly unfolding chaos of the physical struggle to apprehend Hughes. Officer Molthen, who was on the other side of the home at the time, and Agents Chris Rodriguez and Casillas, who are not canine handlers, cannot be held liable for fleeting acts which they did not commit, came without warning, and could not have prevented. While the evidence against Officer Michael Rodriguez is sufficient to survive summary judgment as to the claim of his posthandcuffed punching and dog-biting, the excessive force claims against Officer Molthen, Agent Chris Rodriguez, and Agent Casillas, based on theories of failure to intervene and failure to intercede, fail as a matter of law. HUGHES V. RODRIGUEZ 21
Qualified immunity is proper unless the plaintiff can establish that “the [officers’] specific conduct violated clearly established federal law.” Sharp v. County of Orange, 871 F.3d 901, 909 (9th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). To overcome qualified immunity, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (quotation omitted). The plaintiff bears the burden of “point[ing] to prior case law that articulates a constitutional rule specific enough to alert these officers in this case that their particular conduct was unlawful.” Sharp, 871 F.3d at 911. In Hernandez, we found that to “defeat qualified immunity, [the plaintiff] must show that the state of the law as of [the events at issue] gave a reasonable officer ‘fair warning’ that using a police dog on a noncompliant suspect, who had resisted lesser methods of force to complete his arrest, was unconstitutional.” 989 F.3d at 744 (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)). If Officer Michael Rodriguez’s alleged unconstitutional conduct stopped at the use of the dog to subdue Hughes, he would certainly be entitled to qualified immunity under our precedents in Hernandez, Miller, and Mendoza. However, it is clearly established law that beating a handcuffed convict violates the Eighth Amendment. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 4. And “no particularized case law is necessary for a deputy to know that excessive force has been used when a deputy sics a canine on a handcuffed arrestee who has fully surrendered and is completely under control.” Mendoza, 27 F.3d at 1362. We hold that Officer Michael Rodriguez is not entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 as to the claimed posthandcuff beating and dog-biting. 22 HUGHES V. RODRIGUEZ