Opinion ID: 1277687
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Prosecutorial Misconduct During Guilt Phase Closing Argument and Related Ineffective Assistance Claims

Text: Defendant asserts that the prosecutor committed several acts of misconduct during closing argument that deprived him of a fair trial, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the California Constitution. Defendant asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct by disparaging trial counsel's credibility. The prosecutor at one point referred to the contradiction in the defensethat on the one hand, defendant testified that he did not commit the murders, and on the other, trial counsel tried to prove that defendant did not premeditate and deliberate. The prosecutor stated: So, the basic defense is I'm not guilty because I wasn't there. But if you find me there and don't believe me, it is only second-degree murder because of my mental delusions and mental impairment.... Remember that. Remember that. They want it both ways. Trial counsel objected in a timely manner that the argument was improper. When a defendant makes a timely objection to prosecutorial argument, the reviewing court must determine first whether misconduct has occurred, keeping in mind that `[t]he prosecution has broad discretion to state its views as to what the evidence shows and what inferences may be drawn therefrom' ( People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 463, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537, 853 P.2d 992), and that the prosecutor may Vigorously argue his case'.... `[using] appropriate epithets warranted by the evidence.' ( People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 580, 189 Cal.Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144.) Second, if misconduct had occurred, we determine whether it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would have occurred absent the misconduct. ( People v. Strickland (1974) 11 Cal.3d 946, 955, 114 Cal.Rptr. 632, 523 P.2d 672.) It is misconduct when a prosecutor in closing argument denigrat[es] counsel instead of the evidence. Personal attacks on opposing counsel are improper and irrelevant to the issues. ( People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155,184, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862.) Here we find the prosecutor did not commit misconduct in making the above statements. It is no misconduct to pointedly highlight, as the prosecutor did here, the contradictions in a defendant's case. (See People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 1029-1030, 22 Cal. Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099.) Defendant also contends the prosecutor committed misconduct when he compared him to Ramon Salcido, a notorious multiple murderer whose trial occurred around the same time as his. Trial counsel did not object to this remark at trial. Therefore, defendant did not preserve the misconduct claim on appeal unless an objection would have been futile or an admonition ineffective. ( People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 159, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) In this case, an admonition would have cured any harm. (See People v. Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1213, 259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698.) Nor can we conclude that the remarks were prejudicial in light of the evidence against defendant. Next, defendant asserts that certain statements to which he personally objected at trial relating to the impact of the crime on the victims were improper. During closing argument, trial counsel recounted how he had thought of his closing argument during a barbecue for one of his children. The prosecutor, referring to that theme, stated: [Counsel] likes to pamper his daughter, and that really gave me a chill, because consider this. I'm sure Dellane would have loved to pamper Valencia. I'm sure she would have liked to have grown with her. Valencia will never be pampered again, ladies and gentlemen. Dellane can't pamper her and Valencia can't be pampered, because neither of them have all their heads left. Moochie took care of that. Defendant contends that such remarks were an unlawful appeal to the jury's passions and prejudices (see People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 362-363, 197 Cal.Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680). Trial counsel failed to object and the claim is, therefore not preserved on appeal. Nor can we conclude that the remarks were prejudicial in light of the evidence against defendant. Defendant also claims that failure to object in the above instances constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel stated on the record that his failure to object to the prosecutor's inflammatory statements was a matter of trial strategy. Counsel's decision was well within the bounds of professional norms. He could reasonably have determined that the risks of raising the objection and offending or annoying the jury outweighed whatever benefit might have been obtained from prosecutorial remarks that were little likely to prejudice his client. Therefore we find no ineffective assistance. Defendant also contends that counsel should have objected to the prosecutor's remarks that counsel had been unable to make the hard choice regarding his guilt or innocence, a play on counsel's statement in closing remarks regarding the hard choice the jury faced between first and second degree murder. But such argument was, again, not a disparagement of counsel but a pointed assertion of the inconsistency of the defense, and was not misconduct. It was therefore not ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object.