Opinion ID: 1697401
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Condemnation Proceedings in 2001

Text: ¶ 12. Under Mississippi law, the DFA has authority to acquire real property through eminent domain proceedings. If the [Department of Finance and Administration] [3] shall be unable to agree with the owner or owners of any such land or real property which is necessary or desirable for the public use in connection with any such project, [the Department of Finance and Administration] shall have the power and authority to acquire any such land or real property by condemnation proceedings in the manner otherwise provided by law and, for such purpose, the right of eminent domain is hereby conferred upon and vested in said [Department of Finance and Administration]. Miss.Code Ann. § 31-11-25 (Rev.2005) (emphasis added). ¶ 13. The DFA initiated condemnation proceedings against the Estate on June 12, 2001, which was after the fee had transferred to the State of Mississippi. Thus, argues Smith, DFA had the wrong sow by the ear. We agree. The fee holder (the State of Mississippi) was not named as a party to the condemnation proceedings. Because the condemnation was filed against the Estate, DFA stood only to acquire that which was held by DFA, that is, the temporary rights of redemption and possession held by the Estate. These rights expired on August 28, 2002, and thereafter, neither the Estate nor the DFA had any interest or rights in the Property. ¶ 14. Furthermore, Smith argues that the condemnation proceeding was null and void because the Secretary of State was not notified or made a party to the proceeding. His argument is based on this Court's ruling in Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Casey, 253 Miss. 685, 178 So.2d 859, 863 (1965), which stated that a tax-sale purchaser was a necessary party to the eminent domain proceeding initiated before the redemption period was over. ¶ 15. In Casey, the plaintiff purchased land at a tax sale. Casey, 178 So.2d at 859. Prior to the expiration of the redemption period, the Mississippi State Highway Commission filed condemnation proceedings. Id. at 859-860. The Highway Commission did not redeem the tax sale, and a tax deed was duly executed and delivered to the plaintiff. Id. The Court held that the plaintiff was a necessary party to the condemnation proceedings, and since he was not joined, his tax title was sufficient to entitle him to enjoin the Highway Commission from entering the property. Id. at 863. The Court emphasized that [c]learly Casey not only had an interest in the property, but such also entitled him to be recognized in the eminent domain proceedings. Id. ¶ 16. Moreover, Section 11-27-7 expressly provides the method of acquiring property by eminent domain, including the notice requirements. [4] In New v. State Highway Commission, this Court found that the purpose of this provision of law is to give all persons interested in the property sought to be acquired by eminent domain proceedings an opportunity to be heard at one time, so as to prevent subsequent litigation by interested persons who were not notified. New v. State Highway Comm'n, 297 So.2d 821, 823 (Miss.1974) (emphasis added). The Court held in New that: [T]he Legislature intended to set out in detail the method of acquiring property by eminent domain; that the requirement of the law that all parties of interest be made parties and be duly notified by proper process is not directory, but is part of the procedure and must be strictly followed. Id. (citing Miss. Power Co. v. Leggett, 197 So.2d 475 (Miss.1967) (emphasis added)). Also, in Mississippi State Highway Commission v. West, this Court stated that a condemner must determine, at his peril, the names of the owner and other persons having an interest in, or lien on, the premises sought to be condemned ... [and] the reason underlying such rule is to protect the right both of the condemner and of parties having a beneficial interest in the premises ... Miss. State Highway Comm'n v. West, 181 Miss. 206, 218, 179 So. 279, 282 (1938). ¶ 17. We find these cases on point here. Like the plaintiff in Casey, the Secretary of State had a clear interest in the property. Pursuant to the Mississippi Code Annotated Section 7-11-11, which enumerates the duties and powers of the Secretary of State, the property was to come under the Secretary of State's charge once the redemption period was over. This entitled the Secretary of State to be recognized in the eminent domain proceedings. Casey, 178 So.2d at 863. If the DFA had strictly followed the procedural requirements of Section 11-27-7, it would have named the Secretary of State as a defendant. [5] The Secretary of State's refusal to object after the fact to the Condemnation Order is of no value. Had the Secretary of State been notified or named as a defendant, this case would not be here.