Opinion ID: 562670
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Distribution of information to selected employers.

Text: 18 The Plan also provided that Realtor shall not take any action which prohibits, restricts, narrows or limits the housing choice of any client on the basis of race. Century 21 was further required to maintain a list of all persons, by race, who are shown the Apache Street home.... 19 The Realtors became involved when Century 21-Host Realty listed the Apache Street homes with GSSBR's multiple listing service. The AMP created a conflict between Century 21 salesperson William Motluck and the Realtors, as the Realtors believed it was inappropriate under the fair housing laws to affirmatively market homes to one particular race, in this instance whites, in the absence of prior discrimination. Motluck initially became aware of the problem when he received a letter from GSSBR asserting that its legal counsel was concerned with the legality of the affirmative marketing plan and furthermore that it was contrary to the voluntary affirmative marketing agreement entered into between HUD and the National Association of Realtors. Motluck upon being so advised asked for a copy of GSSBR's legal counsel's opinion. Rather than forward a copy of the opinion, they sent Motluck a letter stating that the provision requiring advertising in newspapers with a predominantly white circulation provides for racial steering and is in violation of current Federal law. The letter further opined that the data collection provisions of the AMP are in direct violation of the Multiple Listing rules ... [and] may constitute a combination in restraint of trade under the Sherman Anti[-]Trust Act. 20 On the basis of Century 21's agreement to implement the affirmative marketing plan, GSSBR's private Equal Opportunity Commission (EOC) voted to file a complaint against Motluck under Article 10 of the NAR's Code of Ethics 1 with the Professional Standards Committee of the Illinois Association of Realtors. 21 The EOC voted to file its complaint against Motluck because the Apache Street agreements called for 'special outreach ... to whites rather than to minorities.' The EOC's position, based upon the HUD/NAR [voluntary affirmative marketing agreement], was that special outreach to white home seekers gave rise to a violation of Article 10. 22 South-Suburban Housing Center, 713 F.Supp. at 1078 (citations omitted). After conducting a hearing, the Professional Standards Committee determined that there was insufficient evidence to hold Motluck liable for a violation of Article 10, as, in the words of the counsel for the hearing panel, the evidence produced at the hearing indicated that [in attempting to market the Apache Street homes, Motluck] did nothing other than he normally did in the operation of his office in processing the listing which he obtained conditioned upon the affirmative marketing plan. 23 After the EOC decided to file its complaint against Motluck, Robert Turpin, the person responsible for the administration of GSSBR's multiple listing service, withdrew the three Apache Street homes from the MLS. (Turpin was present at the EOC meeting). Subsequently, GSSBR proposed to condition the listing of the homes in its multiple listing service upon Century 21's and SSHC's agreement to indemnify GSSBR and its member realtors from damages, costs or attorneys' fees which might be incurred as a result of any legal proceedings that might result from the AMP. The Realtors' justification for the indemnification requirement was a belief that 24 the listings could lead to 'legal liability' or 'potential exposure' of the MLS or MLS participants under legal prohibitions against steering. 25 The justification advanced by defendants for thus conditioning MLS access for the Apache Street listings was [William] North's [then Senior Vice-President and General Counsel of NAR] asserted belief that the listings called for actions which 'likely' were racial steering and therefore could lead to 'legal liability' or 'potential exposure' for the MLS or MLS participants. 26 Id. at 1078-79. The court found that this justification was made in good faith and was not a pretense for discrimination. Id. at 1079. 27 SSHC asserts that the Realtors' removal of the Apache Street properties from the multiple listing service as well as the decision to file a complaint against Motluck because of the AMP's requirement of directing special sales efforts toward white home buyers violated Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 et seq. (the Fair Housing Act) in that it discriminated on account of race. The district court concluded as a matter of law that the Realtors neither intended to discriminate against SSHC nor did their actions have a discriminatory effect. Thus, the court found no violation of the Fair Housing Act. Id. at 1079-80. B. Anti-Solicitation Ordinances 28 The second major area of the parties' litigation concerned the propriety of municipal ordinances prohibiting real estate brokers from soliciting real estate listings from persons who had stated their unreceptiveness to receiving solicitations. The City of Country Club Hills and the Villages of Glenwood, Hazel Crest and Matteson, Illinois have enacted ordinances regulating realtor solicitation that are similar to one another. 2 The Hazel Crest ordinance reads as follows: 29 No person shall solicit any owner or occupant of a dwelling to sell or rent, or list for sale or rental, such dwelling at any time after such owner or occupant has notified the Hazel Crest Village Clerk that he does not desire to be so solicited. 30 The Clerk shall publish and make available, without charge, appropriate forms which may be executed by any owner or occupant of a dwelling to provide such notice. The Clerk shall prepare a list of the names and addresses of such owners and occupants and shall publish the same as follows: 31 A. By maintaining a copy of said list in the office of the Village of Hazel Crest Clerk and making it available for inspection; 32 B. By furnishing a copy of said list annually to every real estate firm belonging to the local multiple-listing service; 33 C. By furnishing a copy of said list upon request and payment of reproduction cost to any person having an interest in the sale or rental of any dwelling in the Village of Hazel Crest. 34 In addition, any owner or occupant of a dwelling may notify, in writing, any real estate agent that such owner or occupant does not desire to be solicited. Upon such notice a real estate agent shall not solicit such owner or occupant to sell or rent, or list for sale or rental, such dwelling. 3 35 The ordinances of all four municipalities define solicit or solicitation as follows: 36  'Solicit' or 'solicitation' means any communication by or on behalf of a real estate agent with the owner or occupant of a dwelling (i) which is intended to induce the sale, rental or listing for sale or rental of such dwelling; (ii) which is intended to offer or promote services in connection with the sale, rental or listing of such dwelling; and (iii) which is carried out by means of: 37 (a) in-person contacts at the dwelling; 38 (b) written material mailed or delivered directly to the dwelling, such as direct mail, leaflets or pamphlets; or 39 (c) telephonic contacts with owners or occupants of the dwelling. 40 For purposes of this Ordinance the term 'solicit' or 'solicitation' shall not refer to communication carried out by means of print or electronic media of general circulation, such as a newspaper, radio, television or the yellow pages. 4 41 The ordinances of the four municipalities considered in this section closely resemble the State of Illinois' restrictions upon real estate brokers' solicitation of unwilling persons that are contained in Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38 p 70-51(d), whose constitutionality we sustained in Curtis v. Thompson, 840 F.2d 1291 (7th Cir.1988). 5 One difference between the ordinances of the four municipalities and the state statute is that the municipal ordinances call for the city or village not only to compile but also to publish the non-solicitation list. The other differences are that the municipal ordinances are more limited in that they specifically define solicit or solicitation, restrict their application to types of contacts that occur in the home or a residence and provide for fines only. 42 The trial court found that the municipalities had two bases for their anti-solicitation ordinances. First, the ordinances are 43 based on the desire to protect residents from exposure to advertising because this information might cause homeowners to question the racial stability of their communities or re-evaluate their decisions to live there. As with 'for sale' sign bans, the ordinances are designed to keep residents from moving, to maintain the status quo and to reduce the ability of homeseekers to find homes in the municipalities. 6 44 The second purpose of the anti-solicitation ordinances is to provide a method for a resident to obtain a measure of privacy by avoiding annoying and intrusive inquiries about residential plans. South-Suburban Housing Center, 713 F.Supp. at 1094. Although the Realtors urge that the no solicitation ordinances violated the Fair Housing Act in that they had a discriminatory impact upon black individuals, the trial court stated that the record is devoid of substantial evidence tending to show that the ordinances were intended to discriminate against blacks or any other racial group, or that the ordinances have had a racially discriminating effect. Id. at 1094. 45 Shortly before trial each of the four municipalities involved sent almost identical letters to real estate brokers which stated that: 46 [T]he terms 'solicit' or 'solicitation' in the ordinance include any business or promotional communication by a real estate agent to a homeowner in his or her home which is not carried out by media of general circulation, and the Village will treat such a communication to a resident on the list as a violation of the Ordinance. 7 47 The trial court held that this definition including every business communication not carried out by media of general circulation despite the ordinances' requirement that a communication must be intended to induce a sale or listing for sale, rendered the ordinances constitutionally invalid: The text of the ordinances provide insufficient warning that 'indirect' solicitation is prohibited and thus they are unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 1096 (emphasis original). C. Real Estate For Sale Signs 48 Four municipalities in the south suburbs have enacted limitations on the display of real estate for sale signs. The City of Country Club Hills and the Villages of Matteson and Park Forest regulate the size of these signs. These three municipalities as well as the Village of University Park have enacted regulations on the number of for sale signs that may be displayed on a piece of real estate as well as the placement of the signs. 49 Each of the municipalities that regulate the size, number and placement of for sale signs states in the preamble or in the text of the ordinance that its purpose is to advance the aesthetics of the community. The district court made a factual finding that there was little evidence that the sign regulations resulted in measurable lost income for realtors, that the regulations had a discriminatory impact on black home seekers, or that they denied access to housing to anyone. South-Suburban Housing Center, 713 F.Supp. at 1090-91. Thus, the court held that the ordinances do not violate the Fair Housing Act. The trial judge further rejected the Realtors' constitutional challenge to the ordinances on the basis that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. Id. at 1093. 50 Country Club Hills is the only one of these municipalities that further requires that persons displaying a for sale sign obtain a city permit costing $60.00 for a six month period. The Realtors' claim is that this fee exceeds the costs of administering the City's regulations. Although neither the parties nor the district court cite to any specific dollar figures which are attributable to the administration and enforcement of the for sale sign permit program, the district court found that [t]here was no evidence that the fees charged exceeded the administration costs. Id. at 1103. 51 In contrast to the other municipalities regulating real estate for sale signs, Glenwood, Illinois enacted an ordinance enforcing a ban on these signs in 1972. Prior to 1982 Glenwood ceased enforcing its sign ban as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 S.Ct. 1614, 52 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977), which sharply curtailed a municipality's ability to enforce a ban on for sale signs. In spite of the advice of Glenwood's village attorney that enforcement of a sign ban would be unconstitutional, Glenwood again decided to enforce its ordinance prohibiting for sale signs on March 1, 1984. On the advice of its counsel, Glenwood repealed its for sale sign ban just prior to trial. Even though the issue of Glenwood's enforcement of its ban on for sale signs was raised in the pleadings and was the subject of evidence introduced at trial, the district court failed to make specific findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding the issue. But, we hasten to point out that the Realtors failed to call this issue to the court's attention at trial much less challenge the lack of specific findings and conclusions of law in their post-trial motions in the district court. 52