Opinion ID: 492687
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reasonableness of Hourly Rates

Text: 27 Finally, the state challenges the hourly rates awarded to Flynn and Grossman. 9 In determining an hourly rate, the court's objective is to find the rates 'prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.'  Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. at 1547 n. 11. Both parties submitted evidence in an attempt to establish the prevailing rates. The plaintiffs' expert, Bronstein, testified that two attorneys in his office have experience in complex civil rights litigation comparable to that of Grossman and that Grossman could therefore command a similar rate of $125 per hour. He further opined that Flynn's efforts in this case were compensable at $95 to $100 per hour. In addition, Jerome Schlicter, a civil rights attorney in the Southern District of Illinois, testified on behalf of the plaintiffs that an attorney with Grossman's skill and experience would receive $125 per hour for his work in this case. John Bauman, an insurance defense attorney in the Southern District of Illinois, testified on behalf of the state that $75 per hour is the going rate in that locality. On cross-examination, however, he admitted that his associates sometimes bill as much as $100 per hour for non-specialized work and that he himself had never handled a civil rights case. In addition to the expert's testimony, the attorneys submitted affidavits setting forth hourly rates they had charged or had been awarded. After considering all of the evidence presented, the district court found reasonable both Grossman's rate of $115 per hour and Flynn's rate of $85 per hour. 28 Flynn's affidavits show that the top rate he had been paid in private practice was $70 per hour, yet Bronstein opined that Flynn could command a rate of $95 to $100 per hour for work in prisoners' civil rights litigation. The state argues that Flynn's top rate should serve as a rate ceiling and urges that Bronstein's testimony be disregarded since he is unfamiliar with rates paid attorneys practicing in the Southern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs' attorneys assert, on the other hand, that Flynn's $70 rate was for work in an area of law other than civil rights and performed in a locality other than the Southern District of Illinois and thus is not conclusive with respect to the rate Flynn should be paid for his work in this case. We agree that Flynn's $70 rate should not be used as a ceiling in these circumstances. As counsel argues, the $70 rate is not necessarily the prevailing rate since it was paid to Flynn for work outside of the market and outside of his specialty. The rate might serve as a starting point, however, enabling the district court to assess such variables as Flynn's experience and reputation. See, e.g., Chrapliwy, 670 F.2d at 769. It was also proper for the court to consider both Bronstein's testimony as to the national rate paid to civil rights attorneys with Flynn's experience and reputation handling a case such as this and Bauman's testimony as to the rate which Flynn might command for a similar case in the Southern District of Illinois. Finally, the court properly considered this evidence in light of its own knowledge of prevailing rates in the area. See Lynch v. City of Milwaukee, 747 F.2d 423, 428 (7th Cir.1984). Unfortunately, courts do not have the benefit of charts or grids into which all of the variables which go into determining a rate can be neatly fitted. A court is thus required to engage in a necessarily imprecise determination. Here the $85 per hour awarded for Flynn's work falls somewhere between the rates testified to by the experts. We agree with the district court that this is a reasonable rate and thus we will not disturb the court's judgment on appeal. 29 We similarly approve the court's award of $115 per hour for work done by Grossman. The court, which is in a better position than we to assess an attorney's skill and experience, recognized Grossman as superior in this type of complex litigation. Moreover, the rate awarded falls somewhere between the rates testified to by the parties' experts and is comparable to the rates Grossman has received under Sec. 1988 in other civil rights cases. The state asserts, however, that this rate is too high for the 198.3 hours Grossman claimed for his work in the fee litigation. The state argues that Grossman had no particular expertise in this area and that, since its own attorneys were paid only $85 per hour, that $85 per hour is the prevailing rate. We disagree. Grossman was, as the district court put it, uniquely qualified to litigate the fee petition. Although Grossman had to merely review the massive underlying litigation, another attorney would have been required to completely familiarize himself with it in order to carry counsels' burden of showing that the number of hours claimed was reasonable. Grossman's intimate knowledge of this litigation no doubt saved numerous hours otherwise chargeable to the state. Moreover, Grossman has had experience in litigating fee petitions in other civil rights cases. We therefore find that the court's award of $115 per hour for all of the hours claimed by Grossman was not an abuse of discretion.