Opinion ID: 770552
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: ,The Prosecutor's Statements During Closing Argument

Text: 33 Lastly, Clarke argues that in discussing the credibility of Gosha and Hart, the prosecutor impermissibly vouched for them during closing argument. Because Clarke did not object to the prosecutor's statements at that time, we review this claim for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); Renteria, 106 F.3d at 766. At the very least, under this standard, unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct must relate to conduct that is clearly (or obviously, or, for that matter, plainly) improper. Renteria, 106 F.3d at 766-67. 34 Claims that a prosecutor has tainted a trial with improper remarks are met in this circuit with a two-step inquiry. We first consider the remarks in isolation. If they are improper in the abstract, we then regard them in the context of the entire record and ask whether they denied the defendant a fair trial. Only if the remarks undermined the fairness of the proceedings below will we overturn a conviction. Id. at 766. As to the first step, we have grouped two related evils under the rubric of 'vouching.' Id. at 767. It is improper for a prosecutor to express her personal belief in the truthfulness of a witness, and it is improper for a prosecutor to imply that facts not before the jury lend a witness credibility. Id. 35 Clarke first complains that the government made overt statements of personal belief as to the credibility of Hart and Gosha. We disagree. With respect to Gosha, the government said I submit to you, based on the evidence that you heard from him, from Jason Hart, from the police officers in this case, [and from] the physical evidence that Gosha did just that[;] good, bad and indifferent, he told how it was[;] he testified truthfully. (Emphasis added.) Clearly, then, the government was arguing that Gosha told the truth based upon what was in the record, not upon the prosecutor's own personal belief. Earlier in his argument the prosecutor made a similar statement. He said that the two witnesses described both their own involvement and Clarke's, rather than embellishing Clarke's role and minimizing their own. And the reason why they didn't, I submit to you, is that they told you the truth just as it was . . . good, bad, indifferent--about Mr. Clarke's involvement. Similarly, the government argued that Hart's testimony was credible by giving specific examples where his testimony was corroborated by Gosha and then saying [s]o, clearly he's telling the truth about Donell Gosha. (Emphasis added.) It then argued that Hart is equally credible with regard to Donell Gosha as he is with Osmund Clarke by immediately showing how Gosha corroborated Hart's testimony about Clarke's actions. It is not accurate to say then--and at any rate, it is not patently obvious--that the prosecutor was expressing his personal belief. 36 Clarke also complains that the government improperly referred to Gosha's obligations under the plea agreement to tell the truth. We have repeatedly upheld the government's ability to point out that its witnesses, under their plea agreements, are required to testify truthfully. See Renteria, 106 F.3d at 766-67 (not vouching to argue that witnesses testified truthfully in compliance with their plea agreements so that they would not lose benefits of the agreements); see also Thornton, 197 F.3d at 252 (The proffer letters and plea agreements merely laid out the terms and conditions of the agreements. Each side could urge competing inferences--as indeed the defendants did--but the jury's role as independent fact finder was not undermined.); United States v. Griffin, 194 F.3d 808, 823 (7th Cir. 1999) ([T]he prosecutor committed no vouching misconduct by eliciting testimony from [the witness] that the plea agreement required him to tell the truth.). But Clarke argues that the government here went further and guaranteed that Gosha in fact told the truth by stating that under the plea agreement, Gosha has to testify truthfully. 37 We do not see much of a difference, though, between on the one hand introducing plea agreements into evidence and reading that their terms require the witnesses to tell the truth, and on the other stating that under a plea agreement's terms, a witness is required to tell the truth. And this is what the government did. The plea agreement was in evidence, and this statement was both immediately preceded and followed by pleas to the jury to look at the evidence in the record to see if, as required by the agreement, Gosha told the truth: [I]n jury selection you all said that you would look into the agreement that he made and listen to all the evidence. And take a look at the agreement Donell Gosha made. He has to testify truthfully. Review his plea agreement. And I submit to you, based on the evidence . . . he testified truthfully. We agree with the government that the way to interpret this statement is that the evidence showed that Gosha complied with the plea agreement, not that Gosha told the truth simply because he entered into the agreement. At any rate, because Clarke did not object below to this statement, it is not plainly obvious that the statement in question means what he says it does. 38 Furthermore, even if the remark about the plea agreement was improper, Clarke does not satisfy the second step in the inquiry in the context of the entire record, the remark did not deprive him of a fair trial. Renteria, 106 F.3d at 766. To determine the remark's effect on the fairness of the trial, we look at five factors: 1) the nature and seriousness of the prosecutorial misconduct; 2) whether the conduct of the defense counsel invited the prosecutor's remarks; 3) whether the trial court's instructions to the jury were adequate; 4) whether the defense was able to counter the improper arguments through rebuttal; and 5) the weight of the evidence against the defendant. Cusimano, 148 F.3d at 831-32. Here, the prosecutor's comment about the plea agreement was not egregious. Id. at 832. Furthermore, Clarke invited this comment by repeatedly attacking Gosha's truthfulness due to the fact that he entered into a plea agreement. Id. Because Clarke did not object at the time, the trial court did not instruct the jury specifically in regard to the prosecutor's comments. However, the court did instruct the jury that closing arguments are not evidence . . . . Id. It stated that 39 Closing arguments will be for the purpose of discussing the evidence. Mere assertions alone by any of the lawyers in opening statements or closing arguments do not constitute any evidence whatsoever in this case. You should not consider the opening or closing statements as proof of any facts. You should only consider them as they might be confirmed or disconfirmed by evidence that you heard during the testimony in the case. 40 We have already stated that such an instruction can effectively cure prosecutor's statements about the truthfulness of witnesses who have signed plea agreements. See United States v. Robbins, 197 F.3d 829, 843 (7th Cir. 1999). Since the government made its statement about Gosha's plea agreement in its initial remarks during closing argument, Clarke had the opportunity to rebut this comment, and in fact did so by again challenging Gosha's motives due to his plea agreement. Finally, the weight of the evidence supports Clarke's conviction. Cusimano, 148 F.3d at 832. In light of the above factors, Clarke cannot persuade us that the prosecutor's remarks deprived him of a fair trial. Id. (assuming government's statement that its witnesses are bound by written plea agreements which require them to tell the truth was improper, the statement did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial).