Opinion ID: 2268995
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: First motion to compel

Text: We first consider Sam's initial motion to compel. It made three requests: (1) return of the road fabric purchased for the Glacier property; (2) reimbursement for fuel Sam purchased for the Glacier property and imposition on Kathleen of an unpaid Glacier property fuel invoice; and (3) return of some 28 items of Azalea personal property. The superior court largely denied the three requests, but denial does not in itself establish that the requests were made vexatiously or in bad faith. The issue is not whether they were ultimately unsuccessful, but whether they were collectively or individually so lacking in merit that it is permissible to infer that Sam or his lawyer acted in bad faith or engaged in vexatious litigation conduct. [24] If a request was either legally or factually so deficient as to reasonably permit an inference of vexatious or bad faith litigation conduct, we must affirm the award as to that request. Conversely, to prevail on appeal, Sam must demonstrate that the request was neither legally nor factually so deficient as to permit such an inference. Although we have never said so explicitly, our cases suggest that a motion to compel is procedurally appropriate if the moving party has an established legal right to the relief sought. [25] The question is therefore whether it would have been unreasonable for a litigant in Sam's position to believe that he had an established legal right to the requested items. The disputed rolls of road fabric appear to have been part of the Glacier personalty, which the findings and conclusions had expressly awarded to Sam. Sam's road fabric request thus sought items that arguably had been awarded to him. This request was not so legally deficient as to warrant an inference of vexatiousness or bad faith. The road fabric request was also factually sufficient. The exhibits supporting the motion included letters between the parties' lawyers discussing the road fabric. Kathleen's lawyer's letters did not deny the existence of the rolls, or that they had been on the property, although one denied any concealment or interference with Sam's opportunities to recover the fabric. Admissible facts therefore reasonably permitted inferences that at least three rolls of road fabric were missing, that Kathleen possessed the Glacier property at relevant times, and that she might have somehow prevented Sam from recovering the missing rolls or knew what had happened to them. Whether Kathleen permitted Sam's brother to take the rolls or whether the rolls were still at the Glacier property during her possession, the request seeking an accounting of the road fabric was potentially meritorious. We turn to Sam's fuel request. Sam had argued at trial that he should get an offset for one-half the cost of a tank-load of fuel for the Glacier property, but his first motion to compel asserted that Kathleen was responsible for the cost of the entire tank-load, and that she should also pay for another billed, but unpaid for, delivery. The divorce findings and conclusions did not specifically mention Sam's reimbursement request; they instead generally provided that the utility obligations would simply go with their respective properties, and awarded the Glacier realty to Kathleen. That general provision could reasonably be read as imposing the fuel obligation, at least as to any unpaid fuel invoice, on Kathleen. Because it relied on that provision, Sam's post-trial fuel request was at least in part not so legally deficient as to give rise to a reasonable inference of vexatiousness or bad faith. [26] Sam's fuel request was also factually sufficient, at least in part. Trial testimony supported the request for reimbursement of the fuel Sam had paid for, and exhibits filed with his motion included the unpaid invoice and correspondence between the lawyers discussing the fuel dispute. Kathleen's memorandum in opposition did not even mention the unpaid invoice. Even though they denied any legal basis for Sam's fuel claims, the letters from Kathleen's lawyer did not deny any salient facts. The exhibits therefore reasonably permitted inferences that Sam had filled the tank after separation, and that when Kathleen took possession of the Glacier home following the divorce, she acquired fuel that Sam had paid for and fuel that no one had yet paid for. These facts would have supported the grant of his fuel request had Sam succeeded in convincing the court that the utility obligations that went with the Glacier property included either or both of the fuel bills. Finally, we turn to the sufficiency of the request for the Azalea items. Sam asserted below that they were non-marital or inherited. Even though the parties ultimately waived the opportunity to litigate the division of the Azalea personalty on that basis, [27] by ordering Kathleen to return the heirlooms if she had them, the superior court implicitly concluded that the heirlooms were indeed Sam's. Because neither party appealed the heirloom order, we do not independently inquire into that aspect of Sam's request; instead, we accept as law of the case the superior court's conclusion that Sam had a right to those items. [28] We therefore conclude that Sam's request was not so legally deficient as to warrant an inference of vexatious or bad faith litigation conduct. It is unclear whether the superior court used heirlooms rigorously [29] or as a shorthand reference to all of the items Sam sought. Some were not heirlooms, and Sam had no legitimate claim to others. [30] But it does not matter precisely what the court intended, because the heirloom order established the substantial legal sufficiency of Sam's request as to most of the disputed Azalea items. Nor was the Azalea request factually deficient. The heirloom order necessarily accepted Sam's contention that these items were his. Admissible facts reasonably permitted an inference that Kathleen either still had the items or knew what had happened to them. Sam's motion with respect to the Azalea items was therefore not so factually deficient as to give rise to an inference of vexatious or bad faith conduct. Thus, with minor exceptions, each of Sam's three requests had potential legal and factual merit. Because most of the requests actually or ostensibly sought to recover items Sam could have reasonably believed had been awarded to him in the property division, Sam's first motion to compel was not so legally deficient as to support an award of full fees. We do not need to consider whether a finding of vexatious or bad faith conduct could stand if a party's litigation efforts largely had no potential merit or were not fairly disputable. The three requests made in Sam's first motion to compel were not, individually or collectively, so lacking in legal or factual merit that full fees could be awarded under Rule 82(b)(3)(G). [31] The January 2009 order granting full fees also made findings under other subparagraphs of Rule 82(b)(3). But because full fees may not be awarded under Rule 82(b)(3) except under Rule 82(b)(3)(G), [32] these other findings could support an award of full fees only if they reasonably permit an inference of vexatious or bad faith litigation conduct satisfying Rule 82(b)(3)(G). The order states that a full fees award was also appropriate under Rule 82(b)(3)(G), for vexatious and bad faith litigation conduct, as set forth above.  (Emphasis added.) Several of these prior as set forth abovefindings were relevant. Thus, the order had found that the claims made by Sam in the motions at issue were not reasonable. And it had found that the first motion to compel was made long after trial, was largely an untimely reconsideration motion, and cited no order to be enforced. In a subsequent findingand thus not one set forth abovethe order characterized Sam's conduct as pursuing baseless and unsupported claims after trial. [33] To the extent these other findings pertain to the potential legal or factual merit of the first motion to compel, they do not warrant an award of full fees, for the reasons we discussed above. We therefore conclude that it was error to award full reasonable fees as to Sam's first motion to compel.