Opinion ID: 2108798
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Pocket Veto Power.

Text: Very closely related to the general veto power is the pocket veto power. This veto power operates almost identically to the general veto power except for special conditions that are triggered when a legislative body passes a bill near the end of its session or when its adjournment prevents the return of a bill by the executive to the legislative body for reconsideration. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 7; Del. Const. art. III, § 18; Haw. Const. art. III, § 16; Iowa Const. art. III, § 16. These conditions typically extend the length of time the executive has to consider a bill, alter the method by which the bill is returned by the executive, and in many cases, change the mechanism of automatic approval based upon inaction to a requirement of affirmative approval or automatic disapproval. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 7; Del. Const. art. III, § 18; Haw. Const. art. III, § 16; Iowa Const. art. III, § 16. This final, subtle alteration to the general veto power, [t]he provision that a bill shall finally fail if the Legislature, by adjournment, prevents such return is, in practical effect, a sort of penalty imposed upon the Legislature for depriving the Governor of the power of active veto. Wood v. State Admin. Bd., 255 Mich. 220, 238 N.W. 16, 20 (1931).