Opinion ID: 1397664
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The trial court properly denied Cheadle's request for granting immunity to Archie.

Text: Cheadle claims that the jury instructions, NMSA 1978, UJI Crim. 39.30, 39.31, and 39.33 (Repl.Pamp. 1982), were incomplete and confusing, thereby providing the jury with inadequate objective standards for weighing their decision as to whether death or life imprisonment was appropriate. At the instructions' conference, the trial court asked both the State and Cheadle whether there were any objections to the proposed instructions to be given to the jury in the sentencing phase. Cheadle made no objections. On appeal, Cheadle, for the first time, objected to the giving of the three jury instructions. We have repeatedly held that absent fundamental error that is jurisdictional, objections to jury instructions cannot be raised for the first time on appeal when the defendant did not object to the instructions at trial. State v. Garcia, 99 N.M. 771, 664 P.2d 969, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 2464, 77 L.Ed.2d 1341 (1983); State v. Noble, 90 N.M. 360, 563 P.2d 1153 (1977). We still adhere to this procedure in death penalty cases. State v. Garcia ; see Vaught v. State, 410 So.2d 147 (Fla. 1982). We point out that in State v. Garcia , we reviewed two of the challenged instructions and found no fault with them. We also point out that the United States Supreme Court has recently held that there is no requirement that a state adopt specific standards for the weighing process in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. In Zant v. Stephens, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235, 258 (1983) (citations omitted) (emphasis added), the United States Supreme Court stated that: [W]e note that in deciding this case we do not express any opinion concerning the possible significance of a holding that a particular aggravating circumstance is `invalid' under a statutory scheme in which the judge or jury is specifically instructed to weigh statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances in exercising its discretion whether to impose the death penalty.    [T]he Constitution does not require a State to adopt specific standards for instructing the jury in its consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances   . Therefore, although New Mexico has adopted the standard that a defendant cannot be sentenced to death if the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the Constitution does not require the adoption of a specific standard for instructing the jury in its consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
Cheadle was charged with two aggravating circumstances. N.M.S.A. 1978, §§ 31-20A-5(B) and (G) (Repl.Pamp. 1981). Both aggravating circumstances were submitted to the jury. The jury unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstance Section 31-20A-5(B) existed and that Cheadle should be sentenced to death. The jury also unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstance Section 31-20A-5(G) existed and that Cheadle should be sentenced to death for that crime also. Cheadle does not dispute that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the submission of Section 31-20A-5(B) to the jury. Section 31-20A-5(B) provides that: [T]he murder was committed with intent to kill in the commission of or attempt to commit kidnaping, criminal sexual contact of a minor or criminal sexual penetration. Cheadle does assert that aggravating circumstance Section 31-20A-5(G) was not justified by the evidence; therefore, he should be granted a new sentencing proceeding. Section 31-20A-5(G) provides that: [T]he capital felony was murder of a witness to a crime or any person likely to become a witness to a crime, for the purpose of preventing report of the crime or testimony in any criminal proceeding, or for retaliation for the victim having testified in any criminal proceeding. The jury was instructed on murder of a witness as follows: Before you may find the aggravating circumstance of murder of a witness to a crime or a person likely to become a witness to a crime, you must find that the state has proved to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements: 1. Gabe Nava was a witness to a crime or likely to become a witness to a crime; and 2. Gabe Nava was murdered to prevent Gabe Nava from reporting the crime. Accord, NMSA 1978, UJI Crim. 39.20 (Repl.Pamp. 1981). Cheadle raises this objection for the first time on appeal. Objections to jury instructions cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Garcia ; Vaught v. State . Therefore, since this objection was not raised at the trial court level, Cheadle is precluded from raising it now. However, even if he were correct, when two or more aggravating circumstances are found, the invalidation of one will not invalidate the sentencing proceeding unless the invalidation is due to constitutionally protected conduct. Zant v. Stephens .
A deeply rooted principle is that a punishment should be proportionate to the crime. Solem v. Helm, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). If not, then the punishment is considered cruel and unusual in violation of the United States and New Mexico Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. VIII and XIV; N.M. Const. art. II, § 13. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), held that the imposition of the death penalty for a deliberate murder is neither the purposeless imposition of severe punishment nor punishment grossly disproportionate for the crime. Under New Mexico's Capital Felony Sentencing Act, Section 31-20A-4(C), we are to review the sentence of death to determine if it is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. In State v. Garcia 99 N.M. at 780, 664 P.2d at 978 (1982), we set up guidelines for such review. These guidelines are to apply prospectively to cases that were decided in any court within New Mexico after the mandate in State v. Garcia . Because Cheadle's case was already before this Court when State v. Garcia was decided, we contacted the State and the defense requesting their submission of cases for comparisons. Two cases have been brought to our attention. State v. Hutchinson, 99 N.M. 616, 661 P.2d 1315 (1983), and State v. Garrison, No. 14,313. We will also consider the recently decided cases of State v. Simonson, 22 SBB 1125 (1983), and State v. Gilbert, 22 SBB 1173 (1983). In State v. Hutchinson , the defendant was charged with aggravating circumstances Section 31-20A-5(B) and (G). The jury found both aggravating circumstances existed, but did not impose the death sentence. Hutchinson was convicted of first degree murder for which he received life imprisonment, of first degree kidnapping for which he received eighteen years imprisonment, and of armed robbery for which he received nine years imprisonment. Cheadle urges us to also compare State v. Garrison, No. 14,313, which was disposed of by unpublished decision. Garrison was charged with one aggravating circumstance. § 31-20A-5(G). The jury did not find that this aggravating circumstance existed. Therefore, pursuant to our standard in State v. Garcia , State v. Garrison is not to be compared and is not applicable to this analysis. In State v. Simonson, aggravating circumstance Section 31-20A-5(G) was given for two separate murders. The jury found that each aggravating circumstance existed but after weighing the mitigating and aggravating circumstances and considering the defendant and the crime, the jury did not impose the death penalty. Simonson was convicted of two counts of first degree murder for which he received two life sentences, and he was also convicted of attempted murder for which he received nine years. In State v. Gilbert, aggravating circumstance Section 31-20A-5(B) was given for two separate murders. Section 31-20A-5(G) was also given. The jury found that all three aggravating circumstances existed and unanimously voted to impose the death penalty. Gilbert's death penalty was recently upheld. State v. Gilbert. Proportionality review in New Mexico is first and foremost directed to the particular circumstances of a crime and the specific character of the defendant. State v. Garcia . It is our duty to review the determination by the jury; we will not retry the case for what may be a better result. Id. We have compared the sentences imposed in Hutchinson, Simonson and Gilbert to see if Cheadle's sentence is excessive or disproportionate. The facts, circumstances and crimes in each case are different, as well as the defendants and their histories. After a thorough review of the record and transcripts in Cheadle's trial, we find that Cheadle's sentence of death for the deliberate murder of Nava is neither excessive nor disproportionate.
Cheadle contends that the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the United States' and New Mexico's Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. VIII and XIV; N.M. Const., art. II, § 13. [1] In State v. Garcia , we held that pursuant to Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), the punishment of death does not violate the United States Constitution. We also held in State v. Garcia , that pursuant to State v. Rondeau, 89 N.M. 408, 553 P.2d 688 (1976), the death penalty is not cruel and unusual punishment per se within the prohibition of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article II, Section 13 of New Mexico's Constitution. New Mexico's current capital punishment statutes, Sections 31-20A-1 through 31-20A-6, are modeled after Florida's, Georgia's and Texas' [2] death penalty statutes, which havewithstood United States Supreme Court scrutiny. [3] Therefore, we again find that New Mexico's Capital Felony Sentencing Act is constitutional.
After having carefully reviewed the record and transcript in the case before us, we conclude that there was no error committed on the issues presented in this case and that the death sentence was validly imposed. Therefore, the judgment of the jury that Cheadle be punished by death is affirmed. This case is remanded to the trial court to set the date of execution, not less than sixty days nor more than ninety days from the issuance of the mandate on our judgment. IT IS SO ORDERED. PAYNE, C.J., and FEDERICI, J., concur.