Opinion ID: 2575849
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The 1976 senate committee report

Text: In determining that buyer-initiated transactions fell outside the purview of HRS ch. 481C, the circuit court also relied on a summary of amendments to the draft bill contained in the Senate Committee on Consumer Protection's report on Senate Bill 1780-76, which was ultimately codified as HRS ch. 481C. The report stated in relevant part that the Committee amended the bill by removing from the definition of a door-to-door sale any transaction: ... (d) in which the buyer had initiated the contact. Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 25-76, in 1976 Senate Journal, at 918. The circuit court, however, misinterpreted the legislature's intent behind the changes to the draft law. By removing the language regarding buyer-initiated transactions from earlier general definitions of door-to-door sales, while retaining them in the two specific exclusions discussed supra in part III.A.1, it appears that the legislature drafted the law, not to exclude all buyer-initiated transactions, but to include all buyer-initiated transactions except those laid out in two carefully crafted exclusions. [4] See also Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 778-76, in 1976 House Journal, at 1651 (recommending Senate Bill 1780-76 as a way of harmonizing federal and state law on door-to-door sales, retaining those federal and state provisions, respectively, that offer the greater protection to consumers). In light of the statutory provisions excluding two specific types of buyer-initiated transactions from the purview of HRS ch. 481C, as well as the consumer protection policies underlying it, the circuit court erred to the extent that it relied on the fact that the buyer initiated the transaction to determine that no solicitation had occurred.