Opinion ID: 1909356
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Determining the Existence of Joint Tenancies in Iowa.

Text: Traditionally, questions concerning the existence of joint tenancies were answered by resorting to the four unities of interest, title, time, and possession. See, e.g., 48A C.J.S. Joint Tenancy § 8, at 240 (2004) ([I]n order that a joint tenancy may exist, there must coexist four unities: unity of interest, unity of title, unity of time, and unity of possession.). To create a joint tenancy the four unities had to be present[t]hat is, one and the same interest arising by the same conveyance, commencing at the same time and held by the one and the same undivided possession. Switzer v. Pratt, 237 Iowa 788, 791, 23 N.W.2d 837, 839 (1946). To sever or terminate [5] a joint tenancy, a joint tenant simply had to destroy one of the unities. See Stuehm v. Mikulski, 139 Neb. 374, 297 N.W. 595, 597 (1941) (The four unities heretofore listed must not only come into being with the creation of such an estate, but must also continue to exist while the estate exists, and the destruction of any one of them as to all holders will destroy the estate. . . . ). This common-law approach to the existence of joint tenancies began losing steam over fifty years ago. See R.H. Helmholz, Realism & Formalism in the Severance of Joint Tenancies, 77 Neb. L.Rev. 1, 1-2 (1998) [hereinafter Helmholz, Severance of Joint Tenancies ]. Critics derided the approach as too formalistic, and declared it to be outdated. See Paul Basye, Joint Tenancy: A Reappraisal, 30 Cal. St. B.J. 504, 507 (1955) (describing the four unities as an outstanding example of persisting medieval formalism); Robert W. Swenson & Ronan E. Degnan, Severance of Joint Tenancies, 38 Minn. L.Rev. 466, 503 (1954) (describing the four unities as useless concepts today). Moreover, critics recognized the four unities often worked, typically in conjunction with the common-law rule that a grantor could not also be a grantee, see Riddle v. Harmon, 102 Cal. App.3d 524, 162 Cal.Rptr. 530, 531-34 (1980) (recognizing how the four unities operate in conjunction with the two-to-transfer rule, and refusing to adher[e] to [these] cumbersome feudal law requirements), to frustrate the legitimate expectations of too many joint tenants [or would-be joint tenants], and for no discernable purpose, Helmholz, Severance of Joint Tenancies, 77 Neb. L.Rev. at 2. As a result, courts began adopting an alternative intent-based approach to determine the existence of joint tenancies. Id. at 9, 162 Cal.Rptr. 530. We recognized this approach many years ago, and have gravitated towards it since that time. See, e.g., In re Baker's Estate, 247 Iowa 1380, 1384, 78 N.W.2d 863, 865 (1956) (noting cases in which we primarily relied on the intention of the parties rather than the four unities to determine the existence of a joint tenancy). Today, the approach generally enjoys favorable acceptance among other courts and scholars as the more appropriate and realistic means for determining the existence of joint tenancies. See Taylor v. Canterbury, 92 P.3d 961, 966 (Colo.2004) (Thus, in determining whether a joint tenancy has been created or severed, we look not to the four unities, but rather to the intent of the parties.); Nicholas v. Nicholas, 277 Kan. 171, 83 P.3d 214, 225 (2004) (recognizing the modern trend of looking to the parties' intent as the operative test of whether a joint tenancy has been severed rather than depending upon the traditional doctrine of the four unities); In re Estate of Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969, 975 (Utah 1996) (There is substantial support for the concept that it is the intent of the parties, not the destruction of one of the four unities, that should govern.); Helmholz, Severance of Joint Tenancies, 77 Neb. L.Rev. at 9 (A survey of the decisions on the subject during the past forty years . . . leaves one with the distinct sense of the traditional approach's substantive irrelevance.). While we have not formally and expressly adopted the intent-based approach, we do so today. Our review of the case law and commentary confirms our position that strict reliance on the four unities is not the proper test for determining the existence of joint tenancies in Iowa. Instead, the intent of the parties should prevail when possible. See In re Estate of Bates, 492 N.W.2d 704, 706 (Iowa Ct.App. 1992) (stating Iowa does not follow the `four unities' common law rule, because [i]n Iowa the intent of the parties prevails). In addition, we see no reason to distinguish our approach based on whether the joint tenancy is sought to be created, severed, or terminated. But see Hyland v. Standiford, 253 Iowa 294, 299, 111 N.W.2d 260, 264 (1961) (The common law unities of interest, title, time and possession necessary for the creation or determination of joint tenancies have lost their importance. There has been no comparable diminution of importance in questions of termination or severance.  (Emphasis added.)). The modern case law clearly suggests uniformity under an intent-based approach. See, e.g., Chrystyan v. Feinberg, 156 Ill.App.3d 781, 109 Ill.Dec. 412, 510 N.E.2d 33, 36 (1987) (Severance should not be governed more strictly than the creation of joint tenancies.). Although an intent-based test is the best and more realistic approach, we recognize it is not without its own difficulties, as this case illustrates. When and under what circumstances a joint tenancy can be created, severed, or terminated remains a subject of great debate, and we must enter this discourse to consider the extent to which the intent-based analysis may alter the resolution of these questions provided under the common law. See Helmholz, Severance of Joint Tenancies, 77 Neb. L.Rev. at 24. Indeed, abandonment of the theoretical litmus test provided by the four unities may sacrifice some of the clarity it presumably provided. [6] Clarity in the law is necessary, but we see no reason why it cannot be achieved under an intent-based approach when proper attention is paid to the individual facts and circumstances of each case. Yet, this goal also requires us to properly frame the intent-based concept, something we have not fully accomplished in the past. In drawing the contours of the intent-based test, it is important to recognize this approach does not simply permit a court to determine the intent of a party under the facts and then fulfill it. [7] See Nicholas, 83 P.3d at 225 ([I]ntent alone will not sever the joint tenancy. Sheryl's intent is irrelevant if he took no effective action.). In fact, we know of no court that has ever held intent alone is enough to determine the existence of a joint tenancy. [8] Instead, it seems fundamental that intent must be derived from an instrument effectuating the intent to sever the joint tenancy. Thus, we begin with the premise that intent unaccompanied by some action or instrument sufficient to corroborate and give effect to that intent will not create, sever, or terminate a joint tenancy. This approach, of course, leads us back to the district court holding that derived intent to sever from a deed characterized as a self-conveyance of one joint tenant.