Opinion ID: 70781
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Causation—Promotion of Cancer

Text: The trial court gave two alternative grounds for granting summary judgment on the issue of causation (i.e., whether Mr. Joiner's exposure to dielectric fluid promoted his cancer): (1) the experts' testimony did not fit because they assumed Mr. Joiner was exposed to furans and dioxins and (2) the experts did not show how the studies they relied on fit this case. Regarding the former ground, I am not prepared to reverse the trial court due to Mr. Joiner's failing to disclose the critical passage regarding the temperature of the transformers which would have provided the fit required to admit evidence about furan and dioxin exposure. Moreover, I would affirm the trial court on the latter ground because it did not abuse its discretion in finding the experts failed to show how the proffered studies fit this case. 1. Mice Studies.—The trial court found the experts' reliance on mice studies was questionable because (1) there were only two studies; (2) the studies used massive doses; and (3) the studies yielded only preliminary results. Joiner at 1323. The trial court excluded the studies because Mr. Joiner did not respond to these concerns, but merely proceed[ed] as if the only issue is whether animal studies can ever be [proper]. Joiner at 1324 (emphasis added). The majority opinion apparently adopts Mr. Joiner's argument, stating that it is improper to find research unreliable solely because it uses animal subjects. However, this ignores the trial court's concern that the experts have not demonstrated how these mice studies fit this particular case. In discussing fit, the Supreme Court stated, The study of the phases of the moon ... may provide valid scientific knowledge about whether a certain night was dark, and if darkness is a fact in issue, the knowledge will assist the trier of fact. However ( absent creditable grounds supporting such a link ), evidence that the moon was full on a certain night will not assist the trier of fact in determining whether an individual was unusually likely to have behaved irrationally on that night. Daubert at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2796 (emphasis added). In explaining the concept of fit, the Paoli court stated, [Expert] testimony will be excluded if it is not scientific knowledge for the purposes of this case.... [I]n order for animal studies to be admissible to prove causation in humans, there must be good grounds to extrapolate from animals to humans, just as the methodology of the studies must constitute good grounds to reach conclusions about the animals themselves. Paoli, 35 F.3d at 743 (emphasis in original). The trial court's ruling was not that animal studies are inadmissible per se, but that Mr. Joiner's general response that experts generally rely on animal studies fails to show the reliability and fit of these particular animal studies. Joiner at 1324 n. 25. The trial court's concern is that the proffered studies (1) were on mice, not humans; (2) were of substantially higher doses of PCBs than Mr. Joiner's exposure; (3) resulted in a different form of cancer than Mr. Joiner's; (4) yielded only preliminary results and (5) were not accompanied by other studies (there were only two studies). Because Mr. Joiner failed to address the latter two concerns, the trial court found the studies were unreliable. Regarding the other concerns about fit, the trial court found that Mr. Joiner did not present creditable grounds for supporting the link between these mice studies and Mr. Joiner's cancer.2 It is incumbent on the proponent of scientific evidence to fill the analytical gap between a proffered study and the particular facts of the case (i.e., fit). Daubert at ---- n. 10, 113 S.Ct. at 2796 n. 10 (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2778-79, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987)); see also, Deimer, 58 F.3d at 345 (The expert had the responsibility to apply his analysis to the facts of this case.); American & Foreign Insurance Co., 45 F.3d at 139 ([T]he burden is on the [party seeking to admit expert testimony] to persuade this court that the testing was reliable and supported by raw data.). The trial court exercises its discretion to determine whether such a showing has been made, weighing several factors including the liberal thrust toward admitting expert evidence, the adversarial system's ability to scrutinize admitted evidence, and the powerful influence of expert opinion.3 Daubert at ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2 Had this law suit involved mice exposed to high doses of PCBs who developed some type of lung cancer, the fit would have been self-evident. However, the relationship between the studies and the facts of this case is much more tenuous. 3 In this regard, the Daubert Court stated, Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of 2794, 2798. Where no other scientific evidence is offered to fill the analytical gap, the trier of fact is required to take the expert simply on his word, placing blind faith in his expertise. However, if the trial court finds the expert testimony requires too great a leap of faith across the analytical gap, it may properly request good grounds to bridge the gap before admitting the testimony. See, Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1360-61 (6th Cir.1992) (Regarding animal studies used to show the cause of birth defects, the court found [t]he analytical gap between the evidence presented and the inferences to be drawn on the ultimate issue ... is too wide. Under such circumstances, a jury should not be asked to speculate on the issue of causation.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 826, 113 S.Ct. 84, 121 L.Ed.2d 47 (1992). This is not too onerous a request because the expert should certainly have reasons for drawing his conclusions from the study, else his testimony is inadmissible as the subjective belief or unsupported speculation that Daubert requires the trial court gatekeeper to screen out. 4 Daubert at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2795. proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.... Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge in weighing possible prejudice against probative force under Rule 403 ... exercises more control over experts than over lay witnesses. Daubert at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2798. 4 Common law precluded an expert from testifying at all about an ultimate fact in issue, relegating his role to guiding the trier of fact up to the ultimate fact without taking the final step. Although an expert may now testify to an ultimate fact, this permissiveness certainly does not permit an expert to testify solely to an ultimate fact without guiding the trier of fact to that conclusion. For example, an expert could not give a Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling the mice studies testimony inadmissible where Mr. Joiner completely failed to respond to the trial court's concerns. 2. Epidemiological Studies.—The trial court disregarded the experts' reliance on epidemiological studies because in every case ... the studies are either equivocal or not helpful and simply do not support the experts' position that PCBs more probably than not promoted Joiner's lung cancer. Joiner at 1324, 1326 (emphasis in original). The majority reverses the trial court on this issue, alleging the trial court improperly decided whether the experts' conclusions were correct instead of limiting its analysis to whether the studies were reliable. I respectfully disagree; the trial court's concern is with fit, not whether the experts are correct. The Paoli court recognized that the distinction between focusing on an expert's methodology instead of his conclusion has only limited practical import. Paoli at 746. The court explained, When a judge disagrees with the conclusions of an expert, it will generally be because he or she thinks there is a mistake at some step in the investigative or reasoning process of that expert.... [A] challenge to fit is very close to a challenge to the expert's ultimate conclusion about the particular case, and yet it is part of the judge's admissibility calculus under Daubert. one sentence testimony, Mr. Joiner's lung cancer was promoted by his exposure to dielectric fluid, you can take my word for it. Nor would he save his testimony by adding, I've heard of studies that show saccharine causes cancer in laboratory animals. In order to assist the trier of fact, the expert must further explain his reasoning by testifying about what studies he relies on to form his opinion, how reliable are the studies, and how the studies relate to this particular case. Paoli at 746. By directing attention away from the trial court's choice of terminology and toward its actual analysis, I conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling each study inadmissible. The trial court found the Bertazzi capacitor manufacturers study inadmissible because its results showed no grounds for linking exposure to lung cancer, and the specific excerpts relied on by the experts merely show the plausibility, not probability, that exposure could cause cancer. Joiner at 1324 n. 26. These concerns alone are not dispositive because an expert may analyze a study and draw different conclusions than the study. However, an expert should have reasons for differing with the study or for finding that the study supports his conclusion notwithstanding language in the study to the contrary. Because Mr. Joiner failed to respond and provide supporting grounds, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling this evidence inadmissible. The trial court ruled the Zack & Musch Monsanto study inadmissable where the study itself stated that the results were not statistically significant. Joiner at 1325. The trial court ruled the Norwegian cable manufacturers study inadmissible because it never mentions PCBs, involves mineral oil exposure, and the study itself concludes that [f]urther follow up ... studies ... are needed before any firm conclusions may be drawn. Joiner at 1325. The trial court also ruled the Yusho accidental toxic exposure study inadmissible because the study was a preliminary report, the study involves persons exposed to furans and dioxins, and Mr. Joiner's own expert testified that the study is not very convincing as the Japanese lifestyle is different ... [it is] suggestive but not convincing. Joiner at 1326 (quoting Deposition of Dr. Teitelbaum). As with the Bertazzi study, the trial court did not abuse its discretion where Mr. Joiner failed to respond to the trial court's concerns and provide further grounds for relying on these studies.