Opinion ID: 2982360
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: LeFever’s Cross-Appeal

Text: LeFever’s cross-appeal challenges the district court’s conclusion that qualified immunity shielded Ferguson from her Brady claims. Because we agree with Ferguson and amicus that the district court improperly certified the claim, we dismiss the cross-appeal. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) permits a district court to certify a partial judgment for immediate appeal by “direct[ing] entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The partial judgment must still be “final” as to the certified claim or 3 Though Ferguson’s appellate brief asks us to dismiss “all claims against him,” he offers no specific argument about the state-law version of the fabrication claim (IIED) or applicable state-law immunities. Accordingly, we offer no opinion on that aspect of the district court’s judgment. -9- Case Nos. 13-3935, 13-4075 LeFever v. Ferguson claims for this court to have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Corrosioneering, Inc. v. Thyssen Envtl. Sys., Inc., 807 F.2d 1279, 1282 (6th Cir. 1986). This limited certification process permits courts to “alleviate hardship resulting from unnecessary delay without undermining the historic federal policy against piecemeal appeals.” Gen. Acquisition, Inc. v. GenCorp, Inc., 23 F.3d 1022, 1027 (6th Cir. 1994) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Two inquiries guide this court’s review of the propriety of Rule 54 certification: (1) whether the district court’s order constituted a “final” judgment on a separable claim, a legal question reviewed de novo; and (2) whether the district court abused its discretion in finding “no just reason” to delay appeal. Id. Here, the certification falters at the second step because the court’s premature certification, without the benefit of timely opposition briefing, precluded appropriate consideration of the finality and unjust delay issues. Courts in this circuit consider the following in determining whether to certify a partial judgment: (1) the relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims; (2) the possibility that the need for review might or might not be mooted by future developments in the district court; (3) the possibility that the reviewing court might be obliged to consider the same issue a second time; (4) the presence or absence of a claim or counterclaim which could result in set-off against the judgment sought to be made final; (5) miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense, and the like. Corrosioneering, Inc., 807 F.2d at 1283. Generally, we give “substantial deference” to the district court’s weighing of unjust-delay factors, recognizing its greater familiarity with a case’s procedural posture, Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 10 (1980), but the district court’s failure to consider substantial arguments raised in timely opposition briefing - 10 - Case Nos. 13-3935, 13-4075 LeFever v. Ferguson diminishes the deference owed, see Corrosioneering, Inc., 807 F.2d at 1282–83. We must “scrutinize the district court’s evaluation of such factors . . . so as to prevent piecemeal appeals in cases which should be reviewed only as single units.” Curtiss-Wright Corp., 446 U.S. at 10. Here, the district court made two erroneous conclusions that render its certification decision unreasonable. See id. Addressing the first factor, the court stated that the dismissed Brady claims and surviving fabrication claims involved “the same issue of qualified immunity,” and concluded that “it would serve the interests of judicial economy to allow Plaintiff to take an appeal from the decision granting qualified immunity at the same time as Ferguson’s appeal from the Court’s denial of qualified immunity.” Yet, Ferguson’s preserved defenses to the fabrication claim— insufficient pleadings and evidence of fabrication, and absolute immunity—differ from a qualified-immunity analysis; he makes no argument concerning whether the fabrication of incriminating evidence violates clearly established constitutional rights. Second, speaking to the third and fifth factors, the court concluded that LeFever’s crossappeal would “streamline the appeal process.” Not really, because LeFever maintains similar claims against other defendants, including her Brady claim against Dr. Raker, which the district court dismissed using a similar qualified-immunity analysis. LeFever acknowledges that there “might” be a second appeal on this issue, but blames the situation on Ferguson’s interlocutory appeal. (See Cross-Appeal Reply Br. at 10–11.) At bottom, LeFever primarily argues that fairness requires our consideration of her immunity appeal simultaneously with Ferguson’s immunity appeal. The distinct jurisdictional bases for these appeals justify separate timing. That is, only an interlocutory appeal can preserve the benefits of immunity, as is Ferguson’s right. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525. LeFever, on the - 11 - Case Nos. 13-3935, 13-4075 LeFever v. Ferguson other hand, bears the burden of justifying certification under Rule 54(b). See, e.g., Braswell Shipyards, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 2 F.3d 1331, 1335 (4th Cir. 1993). The grant of immunity on fewer than all claims generally does not constitute a final, appealable decision. E.g., Coe v. Ziegler, 817 F.2d 29, 30 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). The district court’s premature ruling on the certification motion precluded meaningful review of the certification factors. That, combined with the admitted possibility of a future appeal on the same qualified immunity issue, persuades us that the district court abused its discretion. We therefore dismiss LeFever’s cross-appeal as improperly certified.