Opinion ID: 1949698
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The alleged bases for this action are the provisions of R.C.P. 42 which are as follows:

Text: 42. Class actions. If the persons composing a class are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring all before the court, such number of them as will insure adequate representation of all may sue or be sued on behalf of all, where the character of the right involved is: (a) joint or common, or held primarily by one who has refused to enforce it, thereby entitling the class or its members to do so; or (b) several, and the action seeks to adjudicate claims which do, or may, affect specific property; or (c) several, and a common question of law or fact affects the several rights, and a common relief is sought. Class actions have been divided through the years by judicial pronouncement. Paragraph a creates what is commonly known as a true class action. Paragraph b a hybrid class action. Paragraph c a spurious class suit. Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Company, 248 Iowa 710, 82 N.W.2d 151; Farmers Co-op Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 8 Cir., 133 F.2d 101. The typical class case in Iowa is the recent case of Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Company, supra. This was an action started by six plaintiffs on their own behalf and on behalf of about 2,000 other persons similarly situated, for abatement of a nuisance maintained by defendant in the form of emission of noxious fumes, smoke, particles, dust, grime and polluted air, which were carried by air upon and into the homes and premises of plaintiffs and others similarly situated   . [248 Iowa 710, 82 N.W.2d 153.] We held it was a spurious class suit, under Rule 42(c). We held the judgment in such action would be binding upon the named plaintiffs, the defendant and their privies. It would not bind others beyond the principle of stare decisis. It will readily appear that no situation similar to this pertains in the case at bar. III. The great body of law forming a precedent as to whether or not a certain state of facts create a class action appears in Federal decisions. They arise because of Federal Rule 23, 28 U.S.C.A., which is similar to our Rule 42. The case at bar is not a true class action. This is conceded by appellees in the following language: No attempt is made by plaintiffs to claim a `true' class action, since the character of the right involved is obviously not joint nor common nor derivative. Appellees contend: That the pleaded facts of the petition allege a `hybrid' class action, or at the very least a `spurious' class action. The petition does not contain allegations which constitute a hybrid class action. Rule 42(b) seeks to adjudicate claims which do, or may, affect specific property. (Emphasis supplied.) There is no allegation in plaintiffs' petition as to specific property. The claim is that because of our decision in the Huntsman case defendant owes the plaintiffs an amount of money, depending on what amount plaintiffs deposited under their written agreements, and what if any counterclaim defendant may hold. IV. Plaintiffs base their class action on the allegation that they, and all persons similarly situated, are entitled to the benefits of the decision in Huntsman v. Miller Inc. supra. On the present state of the record, we are restricted to the pleadings alone. Plaintiffs are not members of a group which can qualify under Rule 42(c) to maintain a spurious class action, for two reasons: 1st. Each plaintiff has a complete, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. 2nd. The only common question of law or fact arises through our decision in the Huntsman case. To the extent that plaintiffs' agreements, and others similarly situated, are identical with the Huntsman agreement, there is a common question. As to the amounts deposited by each plaintiff, and as to any damages which defendant can prove by breach of the agreements, each case is different, and the relief sought would vary. Pelelas v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 7 Cir., 113 F.2d 629; Farmers Co-op. Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 8 Cir., 133 F.2d 101; Davies v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 151 Ohio St. 417, 86 N.E.2d 603; Garfein v. Stiglitz, 260 Ky. 430, 86 S.W.2d 155; Johnson v. Riverland Levee District, 8 Cir., 117 F.2d 711, 134 A.L.R. 326; Fetherston v. National Republic Bancorporation, 280 Ill.App. 151; Associated Almond Growers of Paso Robles v. Wymond, 9 Cir., 42 F.2d 1; Michelsen v. Penney, D.C., 10 F.Supp. 537. In Pelelas v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., supra, class action relief was denied, the court saying [113 F.2d 632]: The action was essentially one to recover for plaintiff moneys claimed to be due him as moneys had and received   . In Farmers Co-op. Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., supra, plaintiff sued to recover for itself and 700 members for overcharges by defendant as established in a conspiracy suit. Judge Clark, a member of the Supreme Court advisory committee for revising rules, explained Rule 23 (Same as our Rule 42) as follows [133 F.2d 105]: Rule 23, Class Actions, represents an attempt which we have made to state the general equity rule of representative suits.    What we are trying to do is to classify the different forms of representative suits. `The first [clause, 23(a)(1),] is the case of a joint, common, or derivative right.    The second [clause 23(a)(2),] deals with the adjudication of claims to property. The third [clause, 23(a)(3),] is sometimes referred to as the spurious class suit, and is only a limited form of general joinder. To use terms sometimes applied, one is the true class suit; two is the hybrid class suit; and three is the so-called spurious class suit. The first two are really the proper cases of class suits, where the suing by the representative really should be binding and res adjudicate on those who are represented. In (3) it is not binding and this is, as I say, merely a short cut to cases where joinder is permissive.'    In the present case the rights, that is the causes of action sought to be enforced, are several, and there exist common questions of law and fact; but it cannot be said that common relief is sought. The damages sought to be recovered for plaintiff and its several stockholders are different.    Since in the present case the rights of the plaintiff and of its stockholders are not identical, it cannot be said that they belong to the same class nor that plaintiff can act for them. The court permitted plaintiff to amend its petition on the theory of permissive joinder. However this was under Federal Rule 20, of which we have no counterpart. In Davies v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 151 Ohio St. 417, 86 N.E.2d 603, 606, supra, a class case was denied. This was a suit for damages for diluting natural gas. The court said: As has been observed, there is no community of interest among those comprising the `class,' with a right of recovery based on the same essential facts. In Garfein v. Stiglitz, supra, the county clerk had overcharged all auto owners $3.20, and plaintiff sued for himself and all similarly situated. The court said: The mere numerousness of the injured parties was not sufficient ground for permitting some to sue for others, since their several claims were separate, distinct, and individual and did not present a community of interest. In Johnson v. Riverland Levee District, supra, plaintiff sued for himself and others who held $129,500 face value of delinquent bonds. On one of the grounds for dismissal the court held [117 F.2d 714]: It appears from the amended complaint that plaintiffs have a complete and adequate remedy at law   . Fetherston v. National Republic Bancorporation, supra, was an action by certain depositors against officers and directors for conspiracy on behalf of plaintiffs and all other depositors. It was held not to be a class suit. The court said: We find no cases deciding that mere numerousness of parties alone will confer jurisdiction upon a court of equity in a case that is properly cognizable at law. Associated Almond Growers of Paso Robles v. Wymond, supra, was a suit of 100 purchasers of tracts (out of 800) purchased under same misrepresentation as to all buyers. It was held it could not be maintained as a class suit, and was not of equitable cognizance. Michelsen v. Penney, supra, was an equity suit by some depositors, on behalf of all, against a director of a bank for misrepresentation and deceit as to solvency. Held each depositor had an adequate remedy at law, and a class suit was not maintainable. The court said [10 F.Supp. 540]: In an action at law based on deceit said to have been practiced on a large number of persons, a class suit cannot be maintained.