Opinion ID: 178112
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sanction for Breach of Trust

Text: Dantzler argues that the District Court committed a procedural error by considering the need to “punish [him] for what [he had] done.” (App. at 201.) Dantzler reads the Court’s pronouncement to reflect an intention to punish him for his violation conduct, i.e., the assault on his wife, instead of for violating the terms of his supervised release. In support of his argument, Dantzler contends that, because 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) does not expressly incorporate § 3553(a)(2)(A), which instructs a court to consider the need to “to provide just punishment for the offense,” the District Court erred in 5 considering that factor. The government, on the other hand, argues that the District Court solely intended “to punish Dantzler for the breach of trust represented by his violation of supervised release.” (Gov’t’s Ans. Br. at 24.) When sentencing a defendant for violating the terms of supervised release, § 3583(e) instructs a sentencing court to consider certain factors listed in § 3553(a), including the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant. Furthermore, our precedent is clear that, consistent with the policy behind supervised release, “[a] district court’s primary consideration in handing down a revocation sentence is the defendant’s breach of trust.” United States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847, 853 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Bungar, 478 F.3d at 546 (finding the District Court’s imposition of a 60month sentence upon revocation of supervised release reasonable in light of the defendant’s return to criminal activity, extensive history of violent crimes, and recent evidence of domestic violence, which constituted a “significant breach of the trust that the Court reposed in him” during its original sentencing); U.S.S.G. Manual Ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt. 3(b) (“[A]t revocation the court should sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust ... .”). Indeed, Dantzler himself recognizes that “revocation courts may certainly punish breaches of trust... .” (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 7.) Reading the District Court’s pronouncement in its entirety, we understand the Court to be punishing Dantzler for his breach of trust, not his violation conduct. The District Court first identified Dantzler’s violation conduct (“I think that you have engaged 6 in the abuse of your wife, assault on your wife, battering your wife... .”). (App. at 201.) The Court then shifted focus to address the relevant § 3553(a) factors in determining the appropriate sentence to impose in order to fulfill its obligation to “adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007). Specifically, the District Court made findings concerning: the need for the sentence to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct (“I think you have engaged in the abuse of your wife, assault on your wife, battering your wife, and this type of conduct has got to stop.”) (App. at 201 (emphasis added)), and the need for the sentence to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant (“And in order to protect society, and not only Ms. Dantzler but the public in general from your conduct....”).5 (Id.) The District Court then acknowledged its ability to punish Dantzler which, as noted above, is appropriate. While the language on this point is less clear than it could have been, we decline to assume that the Court failed to appreciate the distinction between sentencing for criminal conduct and sentencing for a violation of supervised release. In short, Dantzler=s assertion that the 5 While the sentencing court is required to “meaningfully consider” the relevant § 3553(a) factors, there is no requirement that the judge “make findings addressed to each of the relevant factors at the risk of having the sentence vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.” United States v. Hale, 107 F.3d 526, 530 (7th Cir. 1997). Rather, § 3583(e) is satisfied when the sentencing court “[makes] comments reflecting that the appropriate factors were considered.” Id. 7 District Court punished him for the underlying criminal conduct rather than for the breach of trust represented by his violation conduct is unpersuasive.6