Opinion ID: 1704647
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Seibert

Text: The postconviction court denied relief on this claim, explaining: [E]ven if Seibert applied retroactively, it does not entitle Defendant to relief. In Seibert, the United States Supreme Court stated that [t]he threshold issue when interrogators question first and warn later is thus whether it would be reasonable to find that in these circumstances the warnings could function `effectively' as Miranda requires. Seibert, 542 U.S. at [611, 124 S.Ct. 2601]. The Florida Supreme Court considered the voluntariness of Defendant's confession on direct appeal and concluded that, the circumstances surrounding Davis's warned confession properly `cured' the condition that rendered the unwarned statement inadmissible. [ Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 311, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985)].... The officers in no way attempted to downplay the significance of Davis's Miranda rights. Davis, 859 So.2d at 472. Based on the Florida Supreme Court's reasoning under Elstad, which was the law in effect at the time of Defendant's direct appeal, analysis under Seibert would render the same result. It is reasonable to find that the warnings [Davis] received functioned effectively as Miranda requires. Postconviction Order at 10-11. We agree with the postconviction court that our direct appeal decision in this case is consistent with the opinions of the majority of justices in Seibert and that application of Seibert would not result in the suppression of Davis's confession. In Seibert, a plurality opinion, the United States Supreme Court held that when an officer intentionally questioned a suspect without giving Miranda warnings in order to elicit an unwarned confession and then used that unwarned confession to elicit a second warned confession, Miranda was violated. The plurality explained: The inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably `conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda. ' The threshold issue when interrogators question first and warn later is thus whether it would be reasonable to find that in these circumstances the warnings could function effectively as Miranda requires. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 611-12, 124 S.Ct. 2601 (citation omitted) (quoting Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 106 L.Ed.2d 166 (1989)). Concurring in result only, Justice Kennedy stated that he would apply a narrower test than the plurality. Instead of subjecting all question-first procedures to the plurality's test, he would apply that test only in the infrequent case, such as [in Seibert ], in which the two-step interrogation was used in a calculated way to undermine the Miranda warning. Id. at 622, 124 S.Ct. 2601 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added). Otherwise, Justice Kennedy stated that he would apply the Court's earlier decision in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), as the four dissenters in Seibert stated they would do in all cases. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 620, 124 S.Ct. 2601 (In my view, Elstad was correct in its reasoning and its result.) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 628, 124 S.Ct. 2601 (I would analyze the two-step interrogation procedure under the voluntariness standards ... reiterated in Elstad. ) (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and Thomas, JJ.). On Davis's direct appeal, we held that [t]he officers in no way attempted to downplay the significance of Davis's Miranda rights. Davis, 859 So.2d at 472. Thus, we have already held that the officers did not use the question-first method in a calculated way to undermine the Miranda warning, as Justice Kennedy required. Because this is not a situation where Justice Kennedy agreed the plurality's test would apply, Elstad applies, as the four dissenting justices and Justice Kennedy stated. We specifically relied upon Elstad on direct appeal and under it denied Davis's claim. Davis, 859 So.2d at 471-72. Accordingly, Davis is not entitled to relief under Seibert. Davis further maintains that we should not reject his claim based on our holding in Davis because he has brought pertinent facts to this Court's attention that we were not aware of in his direct appeal. We disagree. The record does not support this claim, and despite repeated invitations to do so at oral argument, Davis's counsel could not identify any circumstances surrounding his confession of which this Court was unaware in Davis. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of this claim. [9]