Opinion ID: 803838
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Schlup Gateway Standard

Text: As the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, “habeas corpus is, at its core, an equitable remedy.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 319 (citing cases); see also Gomez v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 654, 654 (1992) (per curiam); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963). For this reason, the Court has long instructed that statutes and rules governing habeas petitions must be applied with an eye toward “the ends of justice.” Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 12 (1963) (holding that a district judge may decline to entertain a successive § 2255 petition “only if he is satisfied that the ends of justice will not be served by inquiring into the merits” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As the Court stated in Engle v. Isaac, in “appropriate cases,” the principles of comity and finality that underlie federal habeas corpus review “must yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration.” 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982). In Murray v. Carrier, the Court limited the availability of the “miscarriage of justice” exception to “extraordinary case[s], where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986); see also Schlup, 513 U.S. at 321 (stating that Carrier “explicitly tied the miscarriage of justice exception to the petitioner’s innocence”). Though the Court has never expressly held that a petitioner may qualify for habeas relief based solely on a showing of actual innocence, see Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400–01 (1993),34 it has recognized 34 The Court has assumed that “in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief.” Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417. However, it has never explicitly recognized the existence of a freestanding actual innocence claim. But see In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2009) (Order) 41 that, in rare cases, an assertion of innocence may allow a petitioner to have his accompanying constitutional claims heard despite a procedural bar. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315; Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404. As the Court has described it, such an assertion is “‘not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.’” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315 (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404). Accordingly, a petitioner seeking access to a federal habeas court in the face of a procedural obstacle must advance both a legitimate constitutional claim and a credible and compelling claim of actual innocence. It is the combination of the two claims—that the petitioner is likely innocent and that his conviction was likely the result of nonharmless constitutional error—that permits a habeas court to review the petition notwithstanding procedural obstacles in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice. See id. at 316. A claim of actual innocence under Schlup is therefore procedural, not substantive. Id. at 315. The petitioner raising such a claim does not seek to have his conviction vacated on grounds of innocence; rather, he seeks to create sufficient doubt about his guilt that the habeas court will permit him to pursue his accompanying constitutional claims notwithstanding an otherwise applicable procedural bar. See id. at 316. For this reason, the Supreme Court in Schlup observed that a petitioner seeking passage through the gateway has “less of a burden” than a petitioner advancing a freestanding, substantive claim of innocence. Id. As the Court explained, in the latter case, “the evidence of innocence would have . . . to be strong enough to make [the petitioner’s] execution ‘constitutionally intolerable’ even if (transferring habeas petition to district court for determination of whether petitioner on death row could present evidence that “clearly establishes [his] innocence”). 42 his conviction was the product of a fair trial.” Id.35 For the gateway petitioner, in contrast, “the evidence must establish sufficient doubt about his guilt to justify the conclusion that his execution would be a miscarriage of justice unless his conviction was the product of a fair trial.” Id. Accordingly, to present a successful gateway claim of actual innocence a petitioner must present “evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error.” Id. To satisfy the Schlup standard, a claim of actual innocence must be both “credible” and “compelling.” See House, 547 U.S. at 521, 538. For the claim to be “credible,” it must be supported with “with new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324; see also House, 547 U.S. at 537. For the claim to be “compelling,” the petitioner must demonstrate that “more likely than not, in light of the new evidence, no reasonable juror would find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt—or to remove the double negative, that more likely than not any reasonable juror would have reasonable doubt.” House, 547 U.S. at 538. This standard, it must be said, is somewhat cryptic. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 339 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (deriding the standard as a “classic mixing of apples and oranges”). The Court has offered some clarity, however, by contrasting the gateway standard from others more familiar. Thus, “[t]he petitioner [raising a gateway innocence claim] . . . is required to make a stronger showing than that needed to establish prejudice. At the same time, the showing of ‘more likely than not’ imposes a Though Schlup involved a capital crime, the Supreme Court made clear in Calderon v. 35 Thompson, that the gateway standard applies to calms of actual innocence of any crime. See 523 U.S. 538, 560–66 (1998) (applying Schlup standard to a claim of actual innocence of noncapital rape conviction). 43 lower burden of proof than the ‘clear and convincing’ standard required under Sawyer [v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 336 (1992), which applies to claims of actual innocence of the death penalty].” Id. at 327 (internal citations omitted).36 The Court has also stressed that the gateway standard is “by no means equivalent to the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), that governs review of claims of insufficient evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 330 (parallel citations omitted). Under Jackson, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S. at 319 (emphasis in original). Whereas, “[u]nder Jackson, the use of the word ‘could’ focuses the inquiry on the power of the trier of fact to reach its conclusion,” and its ability to do so, the use of the word 36 The Schlup Court expressly rejected the more exacting Sawyer standard, which requires a petitioner to show “‘by clear and convincing evidence that, but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty.’” Schlup, 513 U.S. 326–27 (quoting Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 336). It bears noting that, with respect to both second and successive petitions and the availability of evidentiary hearings, Congress rejected the Schlup standard and reverted to the Sawyer standard when it enacted § 2244(b)(2)(B) and § 2254(e)(2). See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B) (“A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless . . . the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.”); id. § 2254(e)(2) (“If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing unless the applicant shows that — . . . (B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.”). The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that the Schlup standard remains in effect for first federal habeas petitions, like Rivas’s. See House, 547 U.S. at 539 (“Neither [§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) nor § 2254(e)(2)] addresses the type of petition at issue here—a first federal habeas petition seeking consideration of defaulted claims based on a showing of actual innocence.”). 44 “would” in the Schlup standard “focuses the inquiry on the likely behavior of the trier of fact.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 330 (emphases added). Moreover, the Schlup inquiry differs from Jackson in the mix of evidence that the reviewing court may consider, as well as its vantage point. A court reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction is limited to considering the evidence actually presented at trial, and must view that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. A court reviewing a gateway claim of actual innocence is not so constrained: Because a Schlup claim involves evidence the trial jury did not have before it, the inquiry requires the federal court to assess how reasonable jurors would react to the overall, newly supplemented record. If new evidence so requires, this may include consideration of the credibility of the witnesses to be presented at trial. House, 547 U.S. at 538–39 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The standard therefore requires reviewing courts to “consider all the evidence, old and new, incriminating and exculpatory,” and, viewing the record as a whole, to “make a probabilistic determination about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do.” Id. at 538 (internal citations omitted). Although the Schlup standard is “demanding and permits review only in the extraordinary case,” the Court has emphasized that the “standard does not require absolute certainty about the petitioner’s guilt or innocence.” Id. Indeed, as demonstrated in House, it may be enough for the petitioner to introduce credible new evidence that thoroughly undermines the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. Id. at 553–54. In House, the petitioner challenged his conviction for the murder of Carolyn Muncey, an acquaintance who lived near him in rural Tennessee. As in this case, the evidence against House was largely circumstantial, but not insignificant. The victim’s daughter testified that, on the night of the murder, her mother was lured out of the house by a man with a “deep voice,” like House’s. Id. at 45 523–24. A witness who participated in the search for Muncey’s body stated that he saw House emerge from an embankment near where Muncey’s body was found, wiping his hands on a rag. Id. at 524–25. Thereafter, when House was questioned by police, he told them that he had been with his girlfriend throughout the evening of the murder, but his girlfriend later revealed that House had in fact left her trailer to go for a walk at about 10:30 or 10:45 in the evening—during the period of time that the county medical examiner had determined Muncey likely died. Id. at 526–27. According to the girlfriend, when House returned to the trailer, he was “hot and panting, missing his shirt and his shoes.” Id. When police interviewed House, they noticed that he had scratches on his arms and legs, as well as a bruise on his right ring finger. Finally, testing by the Federal Bureau of Investigation revealed human blood of Muncey’s type on the pants House had been wearing the night of the murder and semen on Muncey’s nightgown that was consistent with House’s blood type. Id. at 528–29. Despite this and other evidence suggesting that House was in fact guilty, the Supreme Court held that he had succeeded in making a compelling showing of actual innocence because he had produced expert testimony that “called into question” the “central forensic proof connecting [him] to the crime,” namely, the blood and semen analyses, id. at 554, and had produced evidence in the form of new witness testimony that Muncey’s husband had confessed to killing her. Id. at 548–53. Applying the Schlup standard—and guided by Supreme Court’s application of that standard in House—we conclude that it is more likely than not, in light of the credible new evidence Rivas has presented in support of his habeas petition, that any reasonable juror would have had a reasonable doubt about his guilt. 46