Opinion ID: 3039060
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Corona-Sanchez Forecloses Use of Rodriquez’s

Text: Prior Drug Convictions as Predicate Offenses Under the ACCA We review de novo whether a prior conviction “may be used for purposes of enhancement under the ACCA . . .” United States v. Phillips, 149 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 1998). [10] Under the ACCA, a person who violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and has three prior convictions for a “violent felony” or a “serious drug offense” is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). One definition of a serious drug offense is “an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance . . . for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). Rodriquez was previously convicted of three drug offenses in violation of Washington Revised Code § 69.50.401, the maximum penalty for which is five years’ imprisonment. not have possession of it; the evidence still reasonably supports the inference that he did. Rodriquez provided an implausible explanation for how he arrived at the apartment, denied living in the apartment, and stated that “he didn’t have any belongings in apartment #36,” all of which could lead a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he was attempting to distance himself from the apartment because he was aware that he had put the gun under the couch. UNITED STATES v. RODRIQUEZ 17305 Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.20.021(1)(c). However, if a person is convicted of “a second or subsequent offense,” the maximum penalty is ten years. Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.408(1). The question, then, is whether the district court should consider the maximum penalty as provided in the five-year statute of conviction (which would not trigger the ACCA enhancement), or consider the maximum ten-year penalty resulting from the recidivism provision (which would trigger the ACCA enhancement).2 The district court correctly applied our decision in Corona-Sanchez, concluding that it could consider only the five-year maximum penalty provided in the statute of conviction. In Corona-Sanchez, we considered a similar issue: whether a defendant’s prior conviction for petty theft under California Penal Code § 484(a) qualified as an “aggravated felony.” 291 F.3d at 1208. To qualify as an aggravated felony, the term of imprisonment for the theft offense had to be at least one year. Id. On the face of California Penal Code § 484(a), the maximum possible sentence was six months. Id. However, the defendant “actually received a two year sentence . . . due to the application of California Penal Code § 666, which provides a sentence enhancement for recidivists.” Id. [11] In deciding Corona-Sanchez, we followed the “familiar analytical model constructed by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, [600] (1990).” Id. at 1203. For federal sentencing enhancement purposes, when we consider the prison term imposed for a prior offense, “we must consider the sentence available for the crime itself, without considering separate recidivist sentencing enhancements.”3 Id. 2 Neither party challenges the district court’s determination that Rodriquez’s two prior burglary convictions qualify as two predicate offenses under the ACCA. The only issue is whether Rodriquez’s prior drug convictions qualify as predicate offenses. 3 In general, federal courts apply this categorical approach to decide whether a defendant’s prior conviction qualifies as a particular type of 17306 UNITED STATES v. RODRIQUEZ at 1209 (reiterating that the court must examine the crime itself, “rather than any sentencing enhancements”); see also United States v. Moreno-Hernandez, 419 F.3d 906, 910 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that, in Corona-Sanchez, the court held that “the substantive offense is to be considered independently of any recidivist sentencing enhancement.”), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 636 (2005). We observed that this conclusion “is consistent with the Supreme Court’s historic separation of recidivism and substantive crimes. As the Court bluntly put it, ‘recidivism does not relate to the commission of the offense.’ ” Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d at 1209 (citations omitted). [12] The rationale articulated in Corona-Sanchez applies equally in this case,4 dictating the conclusion that the district court could consider only the maximum penalty as provided in the five-year statute of conviction, and not the maximum ten-year penalty resulting from the recidivism provision. The government attempts to distinguish Corona-Sanchez on several bases, none of which are persuasive. The government first posits that, unlike Corona-Sanchez, where the petty theft statute (Cal. Penal Code § 484) and the recidivism provision (Cal. Penal Code § 666) were “wholly separate,” the statpredicate offense (e.g., an “aggravated felony” or a “serious drug offense”), which, in turn, determines whether the defendant will receive an enhanced sentence. To decide whether a prior conviction counts as a particular type of predicate offense under the categorical approach, “federal courts do not examine the facts underlying the prior offense, but look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.” Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d at 1203 (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In Corona-Sanchez, we concluded that the categorical approach required us to “separate the recidivist enhancement from the underlying offense” and “consider the sentence available for the crime itself . . .” Id. at 1209-10. 4 “We apply the categorical approach in a variety of sentencing contexts.” United States v. Piccolo, 441 F.3d 1084, 1086 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). UNITED STATES v. RODRIQUEZ 17307 utes in this case “are both in the same article . . . and are codified in fairly close proximity . . .” However, this distinction is not convincing because, in Corona-Sanchez, we concluded that “we must separate the recidivist enhancement from the underlying offense.” Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d at 1210. We “must consider the sentence available for the crime itself, without considering separate recidivist sentencing enhancements.” Id. at 1209. We observed that our conclusion is consistent with, and based on, the Supreme Court’s historic separation of substantive crimes and recidivism, pertinent legislative history, and our own cases distinguishing between substantive offenses and recidivist sentencing enhancement statutes. Id. This rationale applies regardless of where the recidivist provision is located in the statutory framework. Cf. United States v. Arellano-Torres, 303 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 2002) (relying on Corona-Sanchez to disregard a sentencing enhancement located in the same section as the substantive offense).5 The government next argues that, in Corona-Sanchez, the issue was whether the defendant’s prior conviction was for a “theft offense . . . for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year.” Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d at 1204 (alteration, citation, and footnote reference omitted). The “theft offense” language, the government continues, suggests that Congress sought to include “only the punishment imposed for the theft offense itself.” In contrast, according to the government, the issue in this case is whether Rodriquez’s prior drug convictions were for “an offense . . . involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). The government contends that the language defining drug offenses is “more expansive and encompasses recidivist offenses . . .” 5 The government concedes that “the logic of Corona-Sanchez does not appear to be confined to separately codified sentencing schemes . . .” 17308 UNITED STATES v. RODRIQUEZ The government’s reliance on the “theft offense” characterization is misplaced, however, because Corona-Sanchez did not rely on or attach any particular significance to that term. Rather, Corona-Sanchez focused on the term of imprisonment for the theft offense in determining whether a conviction for theft qualified as an aggravated felony. See 291 F.3d at 1208. By urging us to conclude that the term “involving” is so broad as to “encompass[ ] recidivist offenses,” the government is, in effect, contending that the drug offenses should be interpreted as subsuming corollary recidivism enhancements. That interpretation would effectively render “offense” and “sentencing enhancements” coterminous, a result that is foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488, 496 (2000) (“[R]ecidivism does not relate to the commission of the offense.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rusz v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[S]entence enhancements . . . do not describe substantive criminal offenses . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d at 1211); Montiel-Barraza v. INS, 275 F.3d 1178, 1180 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (holding that California Vehicle Code § 23175 [now § 23550, which provides an enhanced penalty for successive convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol,] “is an enhancement statute; it does not alter the elements of the underlying offense.”) (citation omitted). Finally, the government postulates that Corona-Sanchez applies only where the underlying offense is a misdemeanor and applying the recidivism provision would transform the misdemeanor into a felony. Because Rodriquez’s prior drug offenses are already felonies, the government maintains, Corona-Sanchez does not apply, and the district court should have considered the maximum penalty applying the recidivism provision. We disagree. Corona-Sanchez applies irrespective of the nature of the underlying crime of which a defendant is conUNITED STATES v. RODRIQUEZ 17309 victed. In Corona-Sanchez, we held that “a crime may be classified as an ‘aggravated felony’ . . . without regard to whether, under state law, the crime is labeled a felony or a misdemeanor.” 291 F.3d at 1210 (emphasis in the original). In so holding, we agreed with our sister circuits that “it is irrelevant whether the state labels the underlying crime ‘misdemeanor’ or ‘felony’ . . . . The relevant question is whether the crime meets the definition of an ‘aggravated felony’ under federal sentencing law.” Id. (citation and footnote reference omitted). Likewise, Rodriquez’s three convictions for delivery of a controlled substance may be classified as “serious drug offenses” “without regard to whether, under state law, the crime is labeled a felony or a misdemeanor.” Id. As articulated in Corona-Sanchez, “it is irrelevant” whether Rodriquez’s underlying crimes are misdemeanors or felonies; the relevant question is whether his prior drug offenses meet the definition of a “serious drug offense.” Id. Under CoronaSanchez, whether application of a recidivism enhancement would transform a misdemeanor into a felony is simply of no import. However the government frames its argument, the essence of its request is that we consider the offense and the sentencing enhancement together. But that is precisely what is forbidden by Corona-Sanchez and its progeny. See MorenoHernandez, 419 F.3d at 911 (“Corona-Sanchez explained the cleaving of the recidivist enhancement from the underlying offense largely on the basis that the enhancement was measured by recidivism. Following the Supreme Court’s reiteration . . . that ‘recidivism does not relate to the commission of the offense,’ the en banc court regarded petty theft as a single, substantive offense, as to which various sentencing alternatives were available depending on the defendant’s past criminal history.”) (citations and emphasis omitted). 17310 UNITED STATES v. RODRIQUEZ [13] In sum, the government’s distinctions cannot overcome the language in, or the rationale of, Corona-Sanchez. Based on Corona-Sanchez, the district court properly concluded that it could consider only the five-year maximum penalty provided in the statute of conviction. Because Rodriquez’s prior drug convictions do not qualify as predicate offenses under the ACCA, the district court correctly declined to apply that enhancement.6 III