Opinion ID: 2230049
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Unconstitutionally Vague Aggravating Factor

Text: The defendant argues that the jury was allowed to consider an unconstitutionally vague statutory aggravating factor at the aggravation-mitigation phase of the hearing. As noted, one of the three statutory aggravating factors found to exist by the jury at the eligibility phase was that the defendant committed murder in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or design to take a human life by unlawful means. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) (West 1995). At the close of the aggravation-mitigation phase, both the prosecutor and the trial court told the jurors they should consider this aggravating factor in their deliberations. The defendant claims that section 9-1(b)(11) of the Criminal Code of 1961 is unconstitutionally vague and was therefore improperly considered by the jury at his death sentencing hearing. As the defendant acknowledges, this court in People v. Johnson, 154 Ill.2d 356, 372-73, 181 Ill.Dec. 926, 609 N.E.2d 294 (1993), rejected the argument that the aggravating factor contained in section 9-1(b)(11) is unconstitutionally vague. The defendant asks us to reconsider our holding in Johnson in light of the Florida Supreme Court's more recent decision in Jackson v. State, 648 So.2d 85 (Fla.1994). Subsequent to the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Jackson, however, this court has reaffirmed the Johnson holding that section 9-1(b)(11) is not unconstitutionally vague. People v. Mulero, 176 Ill.2d 444, 223 Ill.Dec. 893, 680 N.E.2d 1329 (1997); People v. Williams, 173 Ill.2d 48, 89-90, 218 Ill.Dec. 916, 670 N.E.2d 638 (1996). We therefore decline the defendant's invitation to reconsider our holding on this issue.