Opinion ID: 383662
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the children's constitutional claims

Text: 48 As outlined in part I, the children, like Leonhard, assert that the acts of the defendants violated their constitutional rights. The district court drew no distinction between the claims of Leonhard and those of the children. The children's constitutional claims against each group of defendants were held barred by the statute of limitations; in addition their claims against the federal defendants were held barred by principles of collateral estoppel, their claims against the state defendants were held barred by the Eleventh Amendment and dismissed for failure to state a claim, and their claims against the city defendants were held barred by the principle of Monroe v. Pape, supra. We disagree with certain of these rationales, although not with the results. 49 While the claims of Leonhard himself are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, the constitutional claims of the children are not. As noted above, for both Bivens -type actions and § 1983 actions we must borrow the most appropriate state statutes of limitations. In addition, however, to the extent not inconsistent with the policies underlying the federal claims, we must borrow any restrictions placed by the state on the running of the statutes. See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, supra; Johnson v. Railway Express, supra. New York CPLR § 208 provides that the running of the statute of limitations is tolled if the person possessing the cause of action is under a disability because of infancy. A three-year or longer statute of limitations is tolled until three years after the disability ends. Since the record indicates that the oldest of the Leonhard children did not reach the age of 18 until six months before this suit was commenced, 25 we conclude that the assertion of their claims is timely. 50 Nor should the children's claims have been dismissed on grounds of collateral estoppel. The district court felt that the denial of mandamus in Leonard I presupposed a finding that the defendants owed no duty to the children. While there may be ground for differing views as to whether the claims of Leonhard himself are barred by the decision in Leonhard I, 26 there is no question that the claims of the children are not so barred. The children were not parties to Leonhard I, and the duties in issue there were those allegedly owed to Leonhard and not to the children. Some litigants-those who never appeared in a prior action-may not be collaterally estopped without litigating the issue. They have never had a chance to present their evidence and arguments on the claim. Due process prohibits estopping them despite one or more existing adjudications of the identical issue which stand squarely against their position. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 1443, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971); see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329, 99 S.Ct. 645, 650, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979). 51 This leaves for analysis the contentions that the children have failed to state a constitutional claim upon which relief can be granted. We consider this contention with respect to each group of defendants in turn.
52 The complaint alleges that the acts of Kennelly and other agents of the Department of Justice in removing the children in 1967 and concealing them from Leonhard deprived the children of their constitutional rights to visitation, companionship and rearing by their natural father, without due process of law. 27 Our analysis of the interests and status of the children and of the governmental functions involved persuades us that the children have failed to state a constitutional claim. 53 It has long been recognized that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected. E. g., Quilloin v. Wolcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 554, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1541-42, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626-627, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923); cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944). The Due Process Clause limits the power of the state to take action which ruptures or impinges upon the parent-child relationship. As the Supreme Court stated in Quilloin v. Wolcott, supra : 54 We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended (i)f a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best interest. 55 434 U.S. at 255, 98 S.Ct. at 555 (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 2119, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment)). Cf. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-06, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1937-39, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) (plurality opinion) (state may not arbitrarily prevent members of an extended family from living together). Thus, the state may not constitutionally withhold children, properly taken into temporary custody by the state in an emergency, from their mother without her consent and without judicial authorization. Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 828 (2d Cir. 1977); see Morrison v. Jones, 607 F.2d 1269, 1276 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 962, 100 S.Ct. 1648, 64 L.Ed.2d 237 (1980). Nor may it deprive a divorced father of notice and an opportunity to be heard before his child is adopted by his marital successor. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed. 62 (1964). Even in cases of child neglect, the Due Process Clause places limits on the state's power to terminate the parent-child relationship. See generally Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Scope of State Child Neglect Statutes, 79 Colum.L.Rev. 719 (1979). 56 In analyzing the applicability of such precepts to the children's claims in the present case it is important at the outset to identify certain contentions that are not pertinent here. First, the visitation rights of Leonhard are not involved. Even assuming that Leonhard had a constitutionally protected interest in visiting his children, a question we have not reached because Leonhard's claims are time-barred, the children do not have standing to complain of abridgement of Leonhard's rights. Second, the theory that the removal and concealment of the children consigned them to the company of a convicted criminal has no factual basis. The children were committed to Calabrese's company when Rochelle married him, and they lived with him before he commenced to serve his prison term. Rochelle had custody of them when she separated from Leonhard, and her custody was not altered when she married Calabrese. While the early release of Calabrese accelerated the return of the children to the company of Calabrese, plaintiffs cite no authority, and, we know of none, to suggest that this violated any right guaranteed them by the Constitution. Finally, we are not dealing with a governmental rupture of a family unit. The family unit that once was comprised of Leonhard, Rochelle and their children, had already been ruptured by Leonhard and Rochelle. Upon their divorce, Leonhard was deprived of custodial rights and was awarded only visitation rights. All of this occurred well in advance of the involvement of the federal defendants in the lives of the children. 57 The crux of the children's claim is simply that they were placed beyond the reach of their father. The fact that this occurred without a hearing did not implicate the children's constitutional rights because it was done in the course of the defendants' official duties, was done for the protection of the children, and was done with Rochelle's consent. 58 The most critical fact in determining whether the rights of the children were violated is the fact that Rochelle had sole custody of them. She was the parent who had been entrusted with their care, their education, their health and safety. There is no question that Rochelle consented to the removal and concealment of the children, nor that they remained in her custody for the entire time that they were concealed from their father. It is to be presumed that she was properly concerned for their welfare. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 2504-05, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979). There is no indication in her affidavit, nor any suggestion by the plaintiffs, that this was not so. And surely the presumption is reinforced by the circumstances, which were instinct with the risk of harm to the children the minute Calabrese became a potential witness against organized crime figures; the risk would increase substantially when the fact that Calabrese might testify became known to the accused criminals, as the children could become targets of premonitory or retaliatory acts, or could be the incidental victims of acts directly against Calabrese. It was Rochelle's right and her duty to weigh the interest of the children in being available for periodic visits from their father against their exposure to possible kidnapping or bodily harm. Her decision appears to be unassailable. 59 It is also important to note that the officials involved were attempting to carry out two official functions: first, to stamp out organized crime, and second, to protect witnesses, and the families of witnesses, who would testify or had testified against members of organized crime. There is no question that the officials' decision to remove and conceal Rochelle and the children was made in pursuit of these functions. The plaintiffs' attorney described the decision as part of their efforts to deal with a very serious problem, organized crime, and to make an agreement, a deal, with a government informant. In deciding to protect the family of such an informant the officials must be entitled to rely on the consents of the family members to be removed and concealed. The Leonhard children, of course, were not old enough to make such decisions for themselves; their ages ranged from three to seven. Had they been old enough to make their own decisions, the officials could have relied on their consents and the children would obviously have no claim against those officials. Given their actual infancy, their mother made the decision. The fact that the decision was made by only one parent rather than both 28 is of no legal consequence since custody resided solely with the consenting parent. See Parham v. J.R., supra, 442 U.S. at 589, 99 S.Ct. at 2497 and passim; Boone v. Wyman, 295 F.Supp. 1143 (S.D.N.Y.) (Mansfield, J.), aff'd, 412 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1024, 90 S.Ct. 600, 24 L.Ed.2d 518 (1970). See also Duchesne v. Sugarman, supra. Thus we conclude that the federal officials' removal and concealment of the children on the consent of their mother and sole custodian, did not violate the children's constitutional rights; given the fact of Rochelle's consent, no hearing as to the rights of the children was required. 60 Indeed, considering the uncivilized nature of the risks against which the removal and concealment of the children sought to forfend, it is difficult to envision the possibility of a hearing, either before or after the fact, which would be useful ( ) . . . in the given circumstances, and which would not entail adverse consequences. See Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1267, 1278 (1975). If a hearing had been held prior to the removal and concealment of the children, and Calabrese either remained willing to testify or the alleged criminals believed, even erroneously, that there remained any possibility that he would testify, the children would be exposed to the danger of abduction or other harm as leverage against Calabrese to prevent his testimony. A hearing after Calabrese testified could hardly be more meaningful since it would expose the children to the danger of retaliatory acts, undoubtedly designed in part to discourage other potential witnesses against organized crime. And, as we have discussed above, for the government officials to reveal the whereabouts of the children after testimony has been given and before the officials feel the dangers have abated would be the very essence of bad faith. We are thus compelled to conclude that due process did not require a hearing on the decision by Rochelle and the government officials to remove and conceal the children. 61 This conclusion finds support in the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Parham v. J.R., supra. Involved there was the question whether the state could constitutionally rely on a decision by a child's parent or guardian to commit the child to a mental institution without a hearing before or after the commitment. The Court held that despite the child's substantial liberty interest in not being confined, he has no constitutional claim when his parent or guardian has decided that he should be placed in a mental hospital and the hospital psychiatrists have determined that he needs treatment. Id. at 606-13, 99 S.Ct. at 2506-2510. The liberty interest in Parham was clearly more substantial than the interest of the children here in the possibility of periodic visits from their father. And the effect of the parents' decision in Parham, i. e., the complete removal of the child from any family environment, was far more drastic than the effect here of the children's relocation accompanied by their mother. Since, as was held in Parham, a child has no right to a hearing when his parent decides to obtain needed medical treatment for him by transferring him from the family to the confinement of a mental institution, a fortiori children have no cause to complain when their custodial parent and the government officials charged with such functions decide to protect their safety by relocating and concealing them, with their parent. 29 If the more drastic intrusion does not require a hearing, surely the less drastic intrusion does not. 62 In sum, since (w)hat process is constitutionally due cannot be divorced from the nature of the ultimate decision that is being made, id. at 608, 99 at 2507, we conclude that the officials' exercise of their discretion and their reliance on Rochelle's consent to the removal and concealment of the children to protect them from organized crime, did not deny the children due process of law. 30 The children's constitutional claims were properly dismissed.
63 The single assertion against the state defendants is that two state agencies, the Department of Correctional Services and the Parole Board, and certain of their officials, released Calabrese from custody in violation of the law. The children's complaint against these defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was properly dismissed on grounds of immunity and failure to state a claim. 64 To the extent that the children assert claims for damages against agencies of the state, 31 they run squarely into the barrier of the Eleventh Amendment. It is well established that that Amendment bars a suit for damages absent the state's consent. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 98 S.Ct. 3057, 57 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1978); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464, 65 S.Ct. 347, 350, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945); see Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.54, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035, n.54, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). While the Eleventh Amendment may permit certain types of prospective injunctive relief, Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), we find no demand for injunctive relief against the state defendants in this action. 65 Moreover, even assuming that the release of Calabrese violated state law and that the removal of the children violated their constitutional rights, no claim upon which relief can be granted has been stated against either the state agencies or the state officials. Although the complaint asserts that in releasing Calabrese the state defendants acted in concert with the federal defendants, it is not alleged that any of these defendants participated in the removal or concealment of the children from Leonhard. Any connection between the mere release of Calabrese and the injuries alleged would be far too tenuous to support a claim against these defendants. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 100 S.Ct. 553, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980); Sostre v. McGinnis 442 F.2d 178, 189-90 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049, 92 S.Ct. 719, 30 L.Ed.2d 740, 405 U.S. 978, 92 S.Ct. 1190, 31 L.Ed.2d 254 (1972).
66 Giambrone, unlike the state defendants, is alleged to have participated in the removal and concealment of the children. He is alleged to have done so under and by the full authority of the City of Buffalo. For the reasons stated in part A above, however, the complaint fails to state a claim against Giambrone and the City for violation of the children's constitutional rights. 67 Moreover, even if a viable constitutional claim had been asserted against Giambrone, the dismissal of the action against the City would have been proper because the complaint does not allege that Giambrone acted pursuant to any official policy, regulation or custom of the city. A municipality cannot be held liable on a § 1983 claim under a respondeat superior theory; it is liable only if federal rights are violated pursuant to its official policy or custom. Monell v. Department of Social Services, supra, 436 U.S. at 663 n.7, 98 S.Ct. at 2022; Monroe v. Pape, supra. The assertion that Giambrone acted on the authority of the City is merely an allegation of agency, and is insufficient to support a claim against the City.