Opinion ID: 147424
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Germain Application

Text: We agree with Meihao and the district court that Leviton's failure to disclose the Germain application was material. Leviton argues that its failure to disclose Germain was not material for any of the reasons cited by the district court, contending that: (1) Leviton did not copy claims under 37 C.F.R. § 10.23(c)(7); (2) the disclosure of Germain would not be material to inventorship; (3) the disclosure of Germain would not be material to double patenting; and (4) the disclosure of Germain would not be material to written description. We consider each of these arguments below. Leviton first challenges the district court statement that information on `copying' of claims is essentially material per se under the PTO regulations, citing 37 C.F.R. § 10.23(c)(7) (2004). [1] Section 10.23(c)(7) requires identifying to the PTO a patent or patent application of another from which one or more claims have been copied. Leviton alleges that § 10.23(c)(7)'s reference to copying is only directed to the interference context because it refers to provisions that address a request for an interference. In this context, Narcisse's interpretation of another meant another patent owner, and not another inventive entity. Leviton further argues the concept of copying is a term of art used exclusively in the interference context. Meihao responds that copying means copying and there is no language that limits it to the interference context. Moreover, Meihao responds that the rules do not apply solely to interferences involving different patent owners, but also explicitly apply to interferences involving different patent applicants. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.41(a) (Unless the contrary is indicated the word `applicant' when used in these sections refers to the inventor or joint inventors who are applying for a patent.). We agree with Leviton that § 10.23(c)(7) is primarily directed to the interference context. Section 10.23(c)(7) specifically refers to § 1.604(b) and § 1.604(7)(c), both of which address a request for an interference. Leviton did not request declaration of an interference in this case. Indeed, an interference generally cannot be declared between applications by a single party. Thus, we agree with Leviton that § 10.23(c)(7)'s express prohibition on the copying of claims is not applicable to the instant situation. Second, Leviton argues that the Germain application was not material to inventorship. Leviton contends that if the '766 claims are supported by the common specification of the '766 and '558 patents, then Germain and his coinventors could not have conceived the inventions in the '766 claims, because those inventions were described several years earlier in the '558 patent. Meihao responds that a reasonable examiner would want to know if two different applications had two different sets of inventors that both claimed to make the same invention. Meihao contends that an examiner would not automatically discount the Germain application in determining inventorship simply because it had a later priority date because no person may patent an invention that he did not himself invent. 35 U.S.C. § 102(f). We agree with Meihao that the Germain application was material to inventorship. Even if one application had an earlier priority date, the examiner would have to evaluate which set of inventors actually conceived of the invention. See Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1063 (Fed.Cir.2005) (Conception of an invention is the formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice.); Hitzeman v. Rutter, 243 F.3d 1345, 1358-59 (Fed.Cir.2001) ([A]n inventor who failed to appreciate the claimed inventive features of a device at the time of alleged conception cannot use his later recognition of those features to retroactively cure his imperfect conception.). It is not enough for Leviton to claim that the earlier specification does in fact support the claims. Neither an inventor nor his counsel may graft claims onto an earlier specification if those claims do not reflect what the inventor actually invented at the time of the earlier application. The copying of certain claims from the Germain application with one set of named inventors into the '766 patent application with another set of inventors suggests that the named inventors may not have, in fact, invented the claimed subject matter. Here, Leviton submitted patent applications and sworn inventorship declarations from two different sets of inventors, both attesting that they were inventors of the claimed subject matter. Had the examiner been aware that different Leviton employees each claimed to be first inventors of the same subject matter recited in the same claims, it would have raised serious questions regarding inventorshipan issue that is clearly material to patentability. Moreover, as we have acknowledged, whether the inventorship of the patents as issued is correct does not determine the materiality of the statements in this case, just as whether concealed prior art would actually invalidate the patent is irrelevant to materiality. See PerSeptive, 225 F.3d at 1322; Larson, 559 F.3d at 1327. Even if the examiner might have ultimately concluded that DiSalvo and Zeigler invented the claimed subject matter, the nearly identical claims raise a substantial inventorship question that would have required additional investigation by the examiner. Thus, we hold that Leviton's failure to disclose the Germain application during the prosecution of the '766 patent was material. Third, Leviton argues that the district court erred by considering the Germain patent material to double patenting. According to Leviton, the intent of the double-patenting rule is to allow the PTO to prevent two patents from issuing at different times with the same claims. Leviton contends that Narcisse gave the PTO the information to evaluate the double-patenting issue during the prosecution of the later-priority (but earlier-filed) Germain application. Moreover, Leviton contends that the PTO could not use the Germain application to make a double-patenting rejection in the '766 patent prosecution because the examiner would have allowed the earlier priority patent to issue if there were no other rejections remaining. Meihao responds that a reasonable examiner would consider Germain material to double patenting. Moreover, Meihao points out that, under Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) Section 804, the PTO examiner would first issue a provisional double patenting rejection to both the application for the '766 patent and the Germain application before withdrawing one of those rejections. We hold that the copying of claims would be material to the issue of double-patenting because a reasonable examiner would want to consider both applications. Although it is unlikely that the examiner would ultimately apply the double patenting rejection to the application with an earlier priority date, the double patenting issue would typically lead to an immediate provisional rejection as to each application. See MPEP Section 804. Once all other rejections are resolved, the provisional rejection can be withdrawn to one application, which will then issue as a patent. While the rejection may be withdrawn as to the application with the earlier filing date, it is not required by the MPEP Guidelines. Thus, the PTO could have rejected the '766 patent for double-patenting. Accordingly, we conclude that knowledge of the Germain application during the '766 patent prosecution would be material. Finally, Leviton argues that the disclosure of the Germain application during the '766 prosecution would not have affected the examiner's conclusion that the claims were supported by the specification. Leviton notes that the examiner stated (in the context of the double-patenting issue) that the '766 patent disclose[s] everything claimed [in Germain] except the use of a latched reset lockout with the interrupting device. Leviton argues that nobody has had trouble recognizing that the claimed movable bridge is described in the '766 specification as the movable contact arms 50 and 70. Leviton argues that the written description issue only concerns whether the description would allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that the inventor invented that which is claimed. Meihao responds that this is improper but for argument of what the examiner would have done. Meihao argues that in not disclosing Germain, Leviton withheld the very reference that would have caused any reasonable examiner to question the '766 patent application's compliance with the statute. We agree with Leviton that the Germain application is not material to the written description requirement. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1, the '766 patent specification must support its claims. The Germain application does not affect whether the '766 patent specification supports its claims, and thus should not affect a reasonable examiner's assessment. Nevertheless, because a reasonable examiner would want to consider the Germain application with respect to inventorship and double patenting, the district court correctly concluded that the failure to disclose the Germain application during the '766 patent prosecution was material.