Opinion ID: 2519640
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: date lease commenced

Text: ¶ 15 The first issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in holding that the lease agreement executed by Voest-Alpine and Mountain States commenced on March 1, 1994. According to the lease agreement, Voest-Alpine was required to obtain and keep in force during the term of this lease  an insurance policy that insured both Mountain States and Voest-Alpine against any liability arising out of the ownership, use, or occupancy of the leased premises, which the trial court concluded would have covered the injuries of Bakowski and Ramirez. [2] (Emphasis added.) If the lease term did not commence on or before March 4, 1994, the date of the man-basket incident that injured Bakowski and Ramirez, then Voest-Alpine would have no obligation to Mountain States for the settlement amounts paid to Bakowski and Ramirez because Voest-Alpine's contractual obligation to purchase liability insurance would not have been in effect on that date. Voest-Alpine contends that the lease term did not commence until Mountain States actually delivered possession of the premises. The parties do not dispute that Mountain States did not deliver possession of the premises until April 6, 1994, after Bakowski and Ramirez were injured. Voest-Alpine further contends that it would be inequitable for the lease term to commence before Mountain States delivered possession to Voest-Alpine because Voest-Alpine would be required to insure land that it did not possess. ¶ 16 The date on which the lease term commenced is a matter of contract interpretation. When interpreting a contract, a court first looks to the contract's four corners to determine the parties' intentions, which are controlling. Cent. Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, ¶ 12, 40 P.3d 599; see also Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991). If the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, then a court does not resort to extrinsic evidence of the contract's meaning, and a court determines the parties' intentions from the plain meaning of the contractual language as a matter of law. Cent. Fla. Invs., 2002 UT 3 at ¶ 12, 40 P.3d 599; Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Nat'l Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988). Unless extrinsic evidence regarding the interpretation of a contract was received by the trial court, we review a trial court's plain language contract interpretation for correctness. Gibbs M. Smith, Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 949 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah 1997); Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance & Furniture Co., 770 P.2d 88, 90 (Utah 1988); see also Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Constr., Inc., 1999 UT 69, ¶ 6, 983 P.2d 575. Moreover, a court will look to extrinsic evidence only when the contract language is ambiguous. Cent. Fla. Invs., 2002 UT 3 at ¶ 12, 40 P.3d 599; Winegar, 813 P.2d at 108. A contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of `uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies.' Winegar, 813 P.2d at 108 (quoting Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983)). ¶ 17 In the instant case, the contract language with respect to when the lease began is clear and unambiguous. Paragraph 2 of the lease agreement provides: 2.1. Term. The term of this lease shall be for a period commencing on the 1st day of March, 1994, and terminating twelve (12) months thereafter, unless sooner terminated or extended pursuant to any provision hereof. According to the plain language of paragraph 2.1, the lease term commenced on March 1, 1994, and was to terminate twelve months later unless extended by the lease agreement itself. In the event that the premises were not ready for Voest-Alpine's possession on March 1, 1994, another provision of the lease provides Voest-Alpine a remedy. Paragraph 2.3 states in pertinent part: 2.3. Delay in Commencement. The parties acknowledge that time is of the essence of this lease, particularly with respect to completion of improvements and commencement of occupancy. [Mountain States] agrees to make the improvements... set forth in Exhibit C and its attachments pursuant to the schedule for completion set forth therein .... If [Mountain States] fails to comply in any respect with the Completion Schedule, [Voest-Alpine] may, at its sole option, perform or cause to be performed any work or service and purchase or acquire any materials necessary to keep the [required improvements] on schedule.... If for any reason, [Mountain States] cannot deliver possession of the premises to [Voest-Alpine] on March 1, 1994, [Voest-Alpine] shall not be obligated to pay rent . . . until possession is delivered. Possession cannot be delivered until the completion of item numbers 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 15 of Attachment 1 to Exhibit C. (Emphasis added.) ¶ 18 This paragraph does not extend or alter the commencement date of the lease. Rather, paragraph 2.3 suspends only Voest-Alpine's duty to pay rent until possession is delivered in the event of delay. While the caption to paragraph 2.3 reads Delay in Commencement, the words are meaningless inasmuch as paragraph 15.5 unequivocally states that the captions are not a part of this lease. ¶ 19 In fact, it is reasonable that the duty to procure insurance commenced on March 1, 1994: On that date, Voest-Alpine had the option to either complete the improvements itself or assist Mountain States in completing the improvements in the event that Mountain States did not finish the improvements by the lease commencement date. If the parties intended that delay of possession would delay the commencement date of the lease instead of delaying only the payment of rent, the parties could have clearly drafted the contract to manifest that intent. We will not make a better contract for the parties than they have made for themselves. Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980). Nor will we avoid the contract's plain language to achieve an equitable result. See Utah Coal & Lumber Rest., Inc. v. Outdoor Endeavors Unlimited, 2001 UT 100, ¶ 12, 40 P.3d 581 (stating that equitable relief should not be used to `assist one in extricating himself from circumstances which he has created' (quoting Battistone v. Am. Land & Dev. Co., 607 P.2d 837, 839 (Utah 1980))). ¶ 20 Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that the lease term commenced on March 1, 1994. Consequently, paragraph 6.1 of the lease required Voest-Alpine to procure insurance that would have insured Mountain States for claims arising out of the ownership, use, or occupancy of the leased premises.