Opinion ID: 2513966
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issues Concerning Child Support

Text: We reverse child support awards only if the superior court abused its discretion or applied an incorrect legal standard. [2] We will find an abuse of discretion when our review of the record leaves us with a definite and firm conviction based on the record as a whole that a mistake has been made. [3] Whether the superior court applied the right legal standard in making its child support determination is a question of law that we review de novo. [4] The superior court's factual findings regarding a party's income for calculating child support are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. [5]
John argues that the superior court erred by failing to use the prescribed guidelines under Civil Rule 90.3(a) to determine John's interim child support obligation, instead pulling a figure out of thin air. John never challenged the correctness of the interim child support award before the superior court. As such, he failed to preserve this claim for appeal. [6] Even if John had preserved this claim, the interim award was well within the court's discretion. The only evidence of John's income before the court when it issued the interim child support order in December 1999 was his child support guidelines affidavit, which indicated that his monthly net income was $4,938.75 and that his corresponding child support obligation would be $987.75. Kristeen is thus correct in asserting that the information before the court could have justified an award of $987.75, let alone an award of $750. Granted, John's income figures were based on the assumption that John would be returning to his position in New Mexico, which never occurred. John provided no new income figures for the court, however, and did not submit a new child support guidelines affidavit. [7] Accordingly, even if John had preserved this argument for appeal, setting the interim award at $750 was well within the court's broad equitable powers to fashion a child support award. [8]
The day after granting John and Kristeen shared physical custody of Noah, the superior court issued its October 4, 2000 order setting prospective child support. Since John and Kristeen had joint physical custody, the court traditionally would have applied the Rule 90.3(b) formula. Instead, the court based its award on Rule 90.3(c)(1)(A), finding that manifest injustice would result if the standard calculation was utilized in this instance. The court found that the increased award was justified by Kristeen's move from Karluk to Kodiak so that Noah could spend time with John and by the concomitant sacrifices in her lifestyle and increases in her expenses. The court fulfilled its Rule 90.3(c)(1)(A) obligation to specify ... the amount of support which would have been required but for the variation four months later in its order on motions for reconsideration, when it modified its October 4 order to include the following: Based on the parties' prior income earning capacity, I find that Dr. Koller should make net income in excess of $84,000 per year, and Kristeen's is about $12,000 per year. Assuming they split custody, which they will soon, Rule 90.3(b) would normally require John to pay Kristeen $10,800 per year, or $900 per month. John challenges the court's estimation of his child support obligation.
John first argues that the court had no basis for finding his net income to be in excess of $84,000. It was certainly understandable that the court intuited that John could make more than $84,000 as a physician in a town the size of Kodiak. Some circumstantial evidence supported this intuition, such as the fact that John had previously received the employee of the year award and was made chief of staff at the hospital. However, given that John notified the court of his difficulties finding work, the court needed to base John's income figure on stronger evidence. In determining earning capacity under Alaska Civil Rule 90.3, a trial court has the discretion to choose `the best indicator of ... future earning capacity' based on the evidence before it. [9] The only income documents of John's that the court had before it on October 4, 2000 were his child support guidelines affidavit and the attached wage statement from New Mexico, which showed his net income to be $59,265.48. [10] His gross income, derived from those forms, was $78,396. A trial court is required to make specific findings to support a determination of adjusted income under Civil Rule 90.3, [11] but the court issued no findings explaining how it arrived at the $84,000 figure. Because there was no evidentiary support for the court's finding that John's income was in excess of $84,000, we vacate the prospective child support award and remand for additional findings. On remand, the court can take additional evidence and testimony at its discretion concerning the availability of jobs in the area, how much other similarly situated doctors earn, John's historical earnings, and what John actually earned. [12]
John next contends that the court erred by imputing his income under Rule 90.3(a)(4). Because we are vacating the prospective child support award, we need not determine whether the court in fact imputed John's income or merely determined John's future earning capacity. [13] However, to provide guidance to the court should it decide on remand that John was unreasonably underemployed, we now address John's principal argument, namely that the court was prohibited from imputing his income because he was caring for a child under the age of two. Rule 90.3(a)(4) states: A determination of potential income may not be made for a parent ... who is caring for a child under two years of age to whom the parents owe a joint legal responsibility. John's argument is relevant only for the period from October 2000, when the court ordered prospective child support, to July 2001, when Noah turned two. John owed a legal responsibility to Noah, since a parent's duty of support `commences at the date of the birth of the child.' [14] Because there was shared physical custody, both Kristeen and John could also be said to be caring for Noah. However, although Rule 90.3(a)(4) applies to cases of shared custody, [15] the caring for a child exception is not meant to apply to situations like the present one. If each of the parents sharing physical custody of a child under the age of two could stop working and claim that his or her income could not be imputed under Rule 90.3(a)(4), then no support would be provided for that child. This result would be contrary to the very purpose of the Rule 90.3 guidelines, namely to ensure that child support orders are adequate to meet the needs of children, subject to the ability of parents to pay. [16] Cases and guidelines from other states support the view that caring for a child exceptions are only intended to prevent the penalization of one parent who stays home virtually full-time to act as the primary caregiver. [17] The court below may thus impute John's potential income should it deem such action necessary on remand, although it can of course consider John's care of Noah and his difficulty in finding employment when determining whether John was voluntarily and unreasonably ... unemployed or underemployed. [18] c. The court's use of the manifest injustice exception was not an abuse of discretion. John contends that the court exacerbated its error by increasing to $1,000 under Rule 90.3(c) the $900 award it had estimated under Rule 90.3(b). [19] Rule 90.3(c)(1) permits variance from the usual Rule 90.3 calculations for good cause upon proof by clear and convincing evidence that manifest injustice would result without the variance. The good cause inquiry  must focus first and foremost on the needs of the children. [20] John maintains that the court's findings of manifest injustice and good cause were insufficient and that the court's focus on Kristeen's move from Karluk to Kodiak resembled alimony more than child support because it focused on Kristeen's needs instead of Noah's. John alleges that Kristeen had to move to Kodiak anyway for her older son's schooling and that the court's findings fail to consider the sacrifices that John made to spend time with Noah. The court's findings, however, are not clearly erroneous. Rule 90.3(c)(1)(A) states that good cause could include a finding of unusual circumstances; the Rule's commentary notes that examples of unusual circumstances could include extraordinary expenses. [21] In an affidavit, Kristeen estimated her expenses for moving to and living in Kodiak. John countered the assertions in Kristeen's affidavit in an e-mail to his lawyer, but although the subject line of this e-mail was affidavit, it cannot be considered one. [22] Regardless, it was within the court's discretion to find Kristeen's affidavit to constitute clear and convincing evidence that her expenses for moving to Kodiak would be extraordinary, particularly factoring in Kristeen's income as required by Rule 90.3(c)(1)(A). [23] Furthermore, the court acknowledged the distinction between child support and alimony, noting that Dr. Koller has a duty to financially support Noah, not Ms. Reft. The court's recognition that Kristeen's move was so that Noah can be with his father about half the time further manifests the court's awareness of the child's needs. [24] Accordingly, because the court recognized the distinction between child support and alimony and acted within its discretion in finding Kristeen's moving expenses to constitute unusual circumstances, we conclude that the court did not err in varying the award under Rule 90.3(c)(1)(A). [25] If the court determines on remand that such a variation is still required to avoid manifest injustice, it may again use Rule 90.3(c)(1)(A) to vary the award to an amount it believes is just and proper for [John] to contribute toward the nurture and education of [his] child[ ]. [26]