Opinion ID: 1272716
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment In Favor of the United States.

Text: Because the government filed its complaint before August 23, 2000, we apply 19 U.S.C. § 1615 rather than the subsequently enacted Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 983(c). United States v. $80,180.00 in U.S. Currency, 303 F.3d 1182, 1183-84 (9th Cir.2002). Under this framework, the government must first establish probable cause that the funds seized are associated with drug trafficking or money laundering. United States v. $129,727.00 U.S. Currency, 129 F.3d 486, 489 (9th Cir.1997). If probable cause is established, the burden of proof then shifts to the claimant, who must prove through a preponderance of the evidence that forfeiture is not appropriate. $80,180.00 in U.S. Currency, 303 F.3d at 1184. We review the district court's grant of summary judgment under this statute de novo. United States v. Ranch Located in Young, Ariz., 50 F.3d 630, 632 (9th Cir.1995). Determination of probable cause for forfeiture is based upon a `totality of the circumstances' or `aggregate of facts' test. $129,727,00 U.S. Currency, 129 F.3d at 489. Accordingly, for the government to meet its burden, it must demonstrate that it had reasonable grounds to believe that the [money] was related to an illegal drug transaction, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion. United States v. $22,474.00 in U.S. Currency, 246 F.3d 1212, 1215-16 (9th Cir.2001) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). To pass the point of mere suspicion and to reach probable cause, it is necessary to demonstrate by some credible evidence the probability that the money was in fact connected to drugs. United States v. $80,060.00 in United States Currency, 39 F.3d 1039, 1041 (9th Cir.1994) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). Credible hearsay or circumstantial evidence can be used to support probable cause. See United States v. 1982 Yukon Delta Houseboat, 774 F.2d 1432, 1434 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. 22249 Dolorosa St., 190 F.3d 977, 983 (9th Cir.1999). We have held that [e]vidence of a prior drug conviction is probative of probable cause in drug trafficking cases. $22,474.00 in U.S. Currency, 246 F.3d at 1217. The district court did not err in holding that the government established probable cause that the funds in question related to drug smuggling and money laundering. Hartog has twice been convicted on charges related to drug trafficking, first in 1979 and then again in 1993. The government presented statements from Hartog's ex-wife detailing her involvement in Hartog's marijuana smuggling escapades as early as 1974, including the exorbitant sums of money processed during their trade. Several of Hartog's former associates corroborate her recollection in statements to the F.B.I., likewise recounting the accumulated riches for those smuggling marijuana into the United States. Credible circumstantial evidence suggests that Hartog received millions of dollars from these shipments. Despite the interception of the smaller shipment in Hawaii, Hartog had told associates that they should still expect to distribute the larger shipment. Three months later, the government found $1.5 million in cash, along with kilograms of marijuana in the locker of a Hartog associate. Hartog's partner was arrested that same month trying to launder $7.6 million at a Nevada casino. Indeed, that Hartog, working under an alias, moved to Canada and then sought the famed secrecy of Swiss and Caribbean banks to hold his funds further supports the government's case that the money related to illegal activity. Hartog argues that the uncertainty that the second larger shipment ever reached American shores creates a question of material fact rendering summary judgment inappropriate. See United States v. Lot 4, Block 5 of Eaton Acres, 904 F.2d 487, 490 (9th Cir.1990) (A genuine issue of fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence on which a reasonable trier of fact could find in its favor, viewing the record as a whole in light of the evidentiary burden the law places on that party.) Had the second shipment never arrived, Hartog continues, then the money in question could not have derived from that shipment. However, to establish probable cause, the government need not prove that the money in question derives from a specific transaction. 1982 Yukon Delta Houseboat, 774 F.2d at 1435 n. 4 (There is no need to tie [the disputed assets] to the proceeds of a particular identifiable illicit drug transaction.) (emphasis in original). We have found that circumstantial evidence generally connecting funds to drug trafficking suffices to establish probable cause. See, e.g., $22,474.00 in U.S. Currency, 246 F.3d at 1216-17; $129,727.00 in U.S. Currency, 129 F.3d at 490. The government would succeed in demonstrating probable cause even if the second shipment never arrived. Hartog's prior previous drug trafficking convictions, the statements of his associates linking him to continuous drug smuggling, and his use of an alias and false identification while establishing foreign bank accounts all support probable cause independent of definitive proof of the second shipment's arrival. The district court also correctly determined that Hartog, after the burden shifted to him, could not prove by a preponderance of evidence that forfeiture was inappropriate. See $80,180.00 in U.S. Currency, 303 F.3d at 1184. Hartog must demonstrate that the seized funds are unrelated to an illegal drug transaction. See $129,727.00 U.S. Currency, 129 F.3d at 492. Hartog's assertion that he inherited the funds from his father's estate is not credible. As the district court correctly observed, Hartog was entitled to slightly less than $120,000 from his father's estateten times less than the amount he deposited into the accounts. To explain this discrepancy, Hartog asserts that his father, Richard Hartog, hid millions of dollars of cash that he then collected upon his father's death. In an ostensible effort to support his claim, Hartog submits a declaration from his late father's attorney, Edgar Wm. Dwire. Although Mr. Dwire's declaration colorfully details some of Richard's business ventures, it offers nothing to substantiate Hartog's tale. Indeed, Mr. Dwire disclaims any personal knowledge as to the location of Richard's personal assets: Richard never talked about money. He was, in fact, extraordinarily discreet about his affairs. As a result, the only information about his wealth that I can recount has to do with the investments in which I represented him. . . . Richard [Hartog] kept safe deposit boxes, and I assume that he used these to store cash and other liquid assets, but, as I have stated, Richard was not one to tell anyone more than he needed to. This complimented me, in that I never ask for more information than I need. Nor does Hartog provide any specific information, through his declaration or discovery responses, that help verify the amount or even the existence of the assets. [5] Hartog's bare assertion that he came into an unspecified amount of cash after his father's death falls well short of the requisite preponderance of the evidence standard. Nor does this inherently untrustworthy story create a genuine issue of material fact. United States v. Check No. 25128 in Amount of $58,654.11, 122 F.3d 1263, 1265 (9th Cir.1997). Therefore, the district court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of the government.