Opinion ID: 1796866
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Nebraska Wage Payment and Collection Act

Text: Howard argues that the district court erred in failing to find that the jury's award of 25 percent of the fee in the Jurado case was an award of wages under the NWPCA and thus erred in failing to award him costs and attorney fees on the claim. [23] Howard further argues that the district court erred in not ordering Law Offices to pay an additional amount to the common schools fund pursuant to the NWPCA. [24] Law Offices argues that we lack jurisdiction to resolve these issues because of a deficiency in Howard's notice of appeal. We conclude that we have jurisdiction to address the NWPCA issues presented in this appeal. Under the NWPCA, [a]n employee having a claim for wages which are not paid within thirty days of the regular payday designated or agreed upon may institute suit for such unpaid wages in the proper court. [25] If the employee has an attorney, the employee shall be entitled to recover an amount for attorney's fees assessed by the court, which fees shall not be less than twenty-five percent of the unpaid wages. [26] The district court refused to award attorney fees on the amount the jury awarded Howard as his share of the fee in the Jurado case, reasoning that this amount did not qualify as wages under the NWPCA. Under the NWPCA, [w]ages mean compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee ... when previously agreed to and conditions stipulated have been met by the employee, whether the amount is determined on a time, task, fee, commission, or other basis. [27] A bonus can qualify as wages if the employer and employee agreed to it in advance. [28] Howard argues on appeal that the jury award of the fee in the Jurado case meets the definition of wages under the statute because it was a bonus agreed to by the parties for which all conditions were met. He contends that it is unreasonable not to treat his claim to 25 percent of that fee as a bonus in the same manner as his claim to 25 percent of the fee in the Christiansen case. He further argues that the fact that the money at issue was held by the Phelps County Court is irrelevant because Palagi denied the existence of the 2002 oral agreement, and that thus, even if Law Offices had received the fee in the Jurado case, it would not have paid Howard a 25-percent share. The oral agreement between Howard and Law Offices with respect to division of the fee in the Jurado case, as described by Howard, had not ripened into a claim for wages at the time of trial. Howard's own testimony indicates that he was not paid his share of the fee in the Barker case until the fee was actually received by Law Offices. His testimony also clearly indicates that he did not expect to receive a share of the fee in the Christiansen case until it was received by Law Offices. In characterizing his successful NWPCA claim on that fee, Howard's brief states that Law Offices received the fee in December 2004 and failed to pay [him] 25% of the fee within thirty (30) days of said date. [29] As we view the record, Howard had no viable claim to a portion of the fee in the Jurado case until it was received by Law Offices, which has not yet occurred because both parties agreed that it would be held in the Phelps County Court pending resolution of their litigation. The district court did not err in denying Howard's NWPCA claims with respect to the fee in the Jurado case. Because Howard did receive an award of attorney fees and costs as to his share of the fee in the Christiansen case, we address his argument that the court should have ordered Law Offices to pay an additional amount to the common schools fund. The NWPCA provides that if an employee secures judgment on a wage collection claim, the court may order the employer to pay an amount equal to one or two times the amount of the judgment to the common schools fund. [30] It is within the court's discretion whether to order such a payment. [31] Whether or not the parties had an agreement whereby Howard would receive a percentage of the fee in the Christiansen case was disputed at trial. Although the jury resolved this issue in Howard's favor, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to order Law Offices to pay an amount to the common schools fund under § 48-1232.