Opinion ID: 2013901
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Standard for a Preliminary Showing

Text: ¶ 28. Both parties seek to clarify and further define the standard for a preliminary showing for an in camera review established in Shiffra. Green argues that it is sufficient for a defendant to show, as Shiffra contemplated, that the evidence contained in the records may be helpful to his or her defense. This showing is sufficient, he asserts, because the request is often made without the defendant's knowledge as to what information is specifically contained in the records. Therefore, a defendant should not be required to identify the exact information contained in the records that is material to his or her defense. In addition, the request is often made at the pretrial stage, when discovery is for the most part not yet completed and it is often impossible for the defendant to state that the information contained in the records will be necessary to the outcome of the case. It is a preliminary request to have the court simply look at the documents. Green also argues that there is no real difference between a requirement that the counseling records may be helpful and one that the records may be necessary because they both require a mere possibility that the records will assist the defendant. Green also points to State v. Hoag, 749 A.2d 331 (N.H. 2000) as setting forth an appropriate standard. Hoag states in relevant part: The threshold showing necessary to trigger an in camera review is not unduly high. The defendant must meaningfully articulate how the information sought is relevant and material to his defense. To do so, he must present a plausible theory of relevance and materiality sufficient to justify review of the protected documents, but he is not required to prove that his theory is true. At a minimum, a defendant must present some specific concern, based on more than bare conjecture, that, in reasonable probability, will be explained by the information sought. Id. at 333 (emphasis added to show relevant language relied on by Green). This plausible theory standard, Green contends, provides the appropriate balance between maintaining the privileged nature of these records and affording a defendant his or her right to present a complete defense. ¶ 29. The State argues that it is clear from Shiffra and subsequent cases interpreting Shiffra that the court of appeals intended to adopt the relevant and may be necessary to a fair determination of guilt or innocence standard, similar to the standard required for cases involving government informants. The State argues that, under this standard, the defendant is required to clearly articulate what information he or she is seeking and how this information ties in to his or her particular defense. A vague proffer of need by the defendant is insufficient. Further, the State contends that the mere assertion that information might be helpful or useful to the defendant's case is insufficient. The records must contain information that is likely exculpatory for the defendant. In reaching this conclusion, the State relies on Goldsmith v. State, 651 A.2d 866 (Md. 1995). It states in relevant part: We agree with the Supreme Court of Michigan that in assessing a defendant's right to privileged records, the required showing must be more than the fact that the records may contain evidence useful for impeachment on cross-examination. This need might exist in every case involving an accusation of criminal sexual conduct. People v. Stanaway, 446 Mich. 643, 521 N.W.2d 557, 576 (1994) (footnotes omitted).... We therefore hold that in order to abrogate a privilege such as to require disclosure at trial of privileged records, a defendant must establish a reasonable likelihood that the privileged records contain exculpatory information necessary for a proper defense. Id. at 876-77 (emphasis added to show relevant language relied on by the State). Based on this standard in Goldsmith, the State urges us to require a defendant to make a specific preliminary showing that the counseling records will produce evidence that is relevant to material issues in dispute and likely exculpatory of the defendant. ¶ 30. Before we set forth our standard, we note two things. First, we conclude that it is clear that the court of appeals has adopted the may be necessary standard as enumerated in Shiffra. See Walther, 2001 WI App 23, ¶ 10 (rejecting the argument that other court of appeals' cases imposed a heightened standard). We conclude that this is a correct interpretation of Shiffra and was certainly the standard that was in place, pursuant to Munoz, at the time of the motion hearing in Green's case. [5] ¶ 31. Second, we emphasize that the defendant in this case is trying to make a preliminary showing to compel an in camera review by the circuit court. As such, a defendant is not required to carry the same burden as that required of the circuit court when it conducts its in camera inspection to determine whether to disclose the records. We discussed the circuit court's role during its in camera review in State v. Solberg, 211 Wis. 2d 372, 564 N.W.2d 775 (1997). In particular, we stated that, [i]n conducting an in camera inspection of an alleged victim's privileged records, the circuit court must determine whether the records contain any relevant information that is `material to the defense of the accused.' Id. at 386-87 (emphasis added) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58, 107 S.Ct. 989, 1001-02, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987)). The preliminary burden for seeking an in camera review must be less stringent than the standard applied by the court during its in camera inspection. [6] ¶ 32. The Shiffra court appropriately rejected the materiality standard set forth in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987) (asking whether the evidence would have had an effect on the proceeding), as difficult to apply before trial. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 607; see also State v. Richard A.P., 223 Wis. 2d 777, 785, 589 N.W.2d 674 (Ct. App. 1999). Instead, the court appropriately looked to the standard for a defendant seeking to overcome the informant privilege. This standard requires that the defendant show that the informant's testimony may be necessary to a determination of guilt or innocence. A mere possibility (may be) is enough in informant cases. In light of the strong public policy favoring protection of the counseling records, however, we conclude that a slightly higher standard is required before the court must conduct an in camera review of privileged counseling records. For this reason, we conclude, consistent with other state standards, that a defendant must show a reasonable likelihood that the records will be necessary to a determination of guilt or innocence. See Goldsmith, 651 A.2d at 133-34 (a defendant must establish a reasonable likelihood that the privileged records contain exculpatory information necessary for a proper defense); People v. Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d 557, 574 (Mich. 1994) (a defendant must show a good-faith belief, grounded in some demonstrable fact, that there is a reasonable probability that the records are likely to contain material information necessary to the defense); State v. Pinder, 678 So. 2d 410, 417 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (a defendant must first establish a reasonable probability that the privileged matters contain information necessary to his defense); compare Commonwealth v. Fuller, 667 N.E.2d 847, 855 (Mass. 1997) (a defendant must show a good faith, specific, and reasonable basis for believing that the records will contain exculpatory evidence which is relevant and material to the issue of the defendant's guilt). [7-11] ¶ 33. Although we change this threshold showing requirement from Shiffra, we conclude that other requirements adopted by the court of appeals in similar cases remain applicable. In particular, a defendant must set forth a fact-specific evidentiary showing, describing as precisely as possible the information sought from the records and how it is relevant to and supports his or her particular defense. See, e.g., Navarro, 2001 WI App 225, ¶¶ 12, 17; Walther, 2001 WI App 23, ¶ 11. The mere contention that the victim has been involved in counseling related to prior sexual assaults or the current sexual assault is insufficient. Munoz, 200 Wis. 2d at 399. Further, a defendant must undertake a reasonable investigation into the victim's background and counseling through other means first before the records will be made available. From this investigation, the defendant, when seeking an in camera review, must then make a sufficient evidentiary showing that is not based on mere speculation or conjecture as to what information is in the records. See State v. Darcy N.K., 218 Wis. 2d 640, 645, 656, 581 N.W.2d 567 (Ct. App. 1998). In addition, the evidence sought from the records must not be merely cumulative to evidence already available to the defendant. A defendant must show more than a mere possibility that the records will contain evidence that may be helpful or useful to the defense. Munoz, 200 Wis. 2d at 397-98. [12, 13] ¶ 34. Based on the above considerations, we set forth the following standard: the preliminary showing for an in camera review requires a defendant to set forth, in good faith, a specific factual basis demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that the records contain relevant information necessary to a determination of guilt or innocence and is not merely cumulative to other evidence available to the defendant. We conclude that the information will be necessary to a determination of guilt or innocence if it tends to create a reasonable doubt that might not otherwise exist. See Fuller, 667 N.E.2d at 855. This test essentially requires the court to look at the existing evidence in light of the request and determine, as the Shiffra court did, whether the records will likely contain evidence that is independently probative to the defense. [14, 15] ¶ 35. In creating this standard, we intend to place the burden on the defendant to reasonably investigate information related to the victim before setting forth an offer of proof and to clearly articulate how the information sought corresponds to his or her theory of defense. A good faith request will often require support through motion and affidavit from the defendant. Our standard is not intended, however, to be unduly high for the defendant before an in camera review is ordered by the circuit court. The defendant, of course, will most often be unable to determine the specific information in the records. Therefore, in cases where it is a close call, the circuit court should generally provide an in camera review. See Walther, 2001 WI App 23, at ¶ 14. We have confidence in the circuit courts to then make a proper determination as to whether disclosure of the information is necessary based on the competing interests involved in such cases. See Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 611. A circuit court may always defer ruling on such a request or require a defendant to bring a subsequent motion if the record has not had time to develop. A motion for seeking discovery for such privileged documents should be the last step in a defendant's pretrial discovery.