Opinion ID: 2010460
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Strickland Controls When Counsel Chooses a Legal Strategy

Text: In Strickland v. Washington , the United States Supreme Court held that under the Sixth Amendment, the defendant has a right to reasonably effective assistance of counsel. [135] The Court there emphasized that [t]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. [136] To establish that counsel violated his Sixth Amendment right, a defendant must demonstrate not only that counsel's performance was deficient but also that the deficiency was so serious as to deprive [him] of a fair trial. [137] Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance is highly deferential, and any ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury. [138] Generally, there is a presumption of defense counsel's competence, with the burden to establish a Sixth Amendment violation resting on the defendant. [139] In U.S. v. Cronic, however, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a Sixth Amendment violation is presumed where counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing or where there are circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified. [140] The Nixon Court specifically recognized the presumption of a violation only where there is a complete denial of counsel [141] to the defendant or where counsel is either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding. [142] In Florida v. Nixon , the U.S. Supreme Court held that Strickland, rather than Cronic, was the appropriate standard for reviewing defense counsel's failure to obtain the defendant's express consent to a strategy of conceding guilt in a capital trial. [143] The Court began its analysis by noting that, although counsel has a duty to consult with the client regarding `important decisions,' including questions of overarching defense strategy[,] [144] counsel need not obtain the defendant's consent to `every tactical decision.' [145] The Court distinguished the strategic choice of conceding guilt in the guilt phase, which may be tactically advantageous for the defendant, from actually pleading guilty. The latter choice, unlike the former, waives the defendant's constitutional rights to trial by jury, the protection against self-incrimination, and the right to confront one's accusers. [146] The Court concluded that counsel lacks authority to consent to a guilty plea on a client's behalf [147] and that a defendant's tacit acquiescence in the decision to plead is insufficient to render the [guilty] plea valid. [148] The Nixon Court distinguished a concession of guiltwhere the defendant retain[s] the rights accorded a defendant in a criminal trial including the rights to cross-examine witnesses for the prosecution... [to] endeavor ... to exclude prejudicial evidence and the right to appeal in the event of errors in the trial or jury instructionsfrom a guilty plea, where the prosecution need not present evidence establishing the essential elements of the crimes with which [the defendant] was charged. [149] The Court pointedly refused, however, to require a defendant's affirmative, explicit acceptance of counsel's tactical decision to concede guilt, because conceding guilt is not the equivalent of a guilty plea. [150] Although in Nixon, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that Strickland applies where a defendant neither expressly consents nor expressly objects to his counsel's tactical decision to concede guilt, [151] the Court did not address whether the Strickland standard applies whereas here the defendant clearly and consistently objects to counsel's defense strategy. Unlike the defendant in Nixon, Cooke consistently and expressly objected to his counsel's presenting a Guilty But Mentally Ill (GBMI) defense. Thus, Nixon, does not reach the facts of this case. It is at this juncture that we and the Majority part company. Nixon holds that ... a lawyer must both consult with the defendant and obtain consent to the recommended course of action concerning whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal. [152] That is all that Nixon holds. The Majority, however, extends Nixon to support their claim that, even though Cooke's counsel consulted and obtained Cooke's consent concerning his fundamental rights, counsel undermine[d] and deprived Cooke of his constitutional right to make fundamental decisions regarding his case. The Majority must rely on their expanded Nixon holding to construct support for their foundational proposition counsel is per se ineffective if counsel fails to pursue the innocence objective that they believe follows from pleading not guiltyeven where asserting innocence at trial despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary would enhance the risk of receiving the death penalty. The Majority's proposition (and expansive interpretation of Nixon ) is flawed because a defendant's choice to plead not guilty may result in either asserting innocence or challenging the State to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, Cooke's counsel pursued this latter corollary objective of pleading not guilty, while at the same time they presented a strategy of using GBMI in order to save their client's life. We must decide, therefore, with little guidance from federal case law, whether Strickland or Cronic applies where the defendant explicitly disagrees with counsel over defensive strategy. In our view, Strickland, not Cronic, should apply to this situation, because Cronic applies only where counsel does nothing or next to nothing to discharge his duty to present a vigorous defense. [153] Cronic is an exception to Strickland, and permits a presumption of a Sixth Amendment violation only where there is a complete denial of counsel, where counsel is absent or is prevented from assisting the defendant during a critical stage of the proceeding, or where counsel fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing. [154] None of these circumstances is presented here.