Opinion ID: 2751482
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Moss’s Indictment

Text: The applicable guideline for Moss’s crime of conviction, USSG § 2D1.1, provides for a range of base offense levels depending on, among other factors, the quantity of drugs involved. Section 1B1.3(a) of the Guidelines states: “Unless otherwise specified, . . . the base offense level where the guideline specifies more than one base offense level . . . shall be determined on the basis of . . . all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant.” An application note adds that, “With respect to offenses involving contraband (including controlled substances), the defendant is accountable for all quantities of contraband with which he was directly involved . . . .” USSG § 1B1.3 cmt. n. 2. Moss has attempted to frame the absence of a specific indictment for conspiracy to possess and distribute oxycodone as a “non-statutory mitigating factor” that affects his sentence and is thus part of a challenge for substantive reasonableness. However, the commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines explicitly states that “[t]ypes and quantities of drugs not specified in the count of conviction may be considered in determining the offense level.” USSG § 2D1.1, cmt. n.5 (citing USSG § 1B1.3(a)(2)). This commentary, which is authoritative, see Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 42-43 (1993), makes it clear that the aggregation of quantities of an indicted drug type together with quantities of an unindicted drug type is part of the sentencing process. Therefore, it cannot be presented as a mitigating factor that the district court was obliged to consider, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to consider it. No. 14-5250 United States v. Moss 5 The district court’s sentencing decision was in no way substantively unreasonable. The court did not fail to consider relevant § 3553(a) factors—on the contrary, it was scrupulous in its efforts to review all the factors, even those that had little or no impact on the final sentence. It did not rely on any impermissible factors, and there is no suggestion that it placed an unreasonable emphasis on any permissible factors. II. Moss’s Inability to Obtain Proffer Statements Through Discovery At sentencing, Moss’s counsel stated that, prior to the sentencing hearing, he did not have information that indicated Moss’s involvement in the distribution of oxycodone. This statement was partially contradicted by counsel’s knowledge of a phone call between Moss and Kelley discussing a theft of oxycodone from Moss and Moss’s subsequent efforts to retrieve his property. Counsel’s main concern appears to have been his inability to review the proffer statements of Jones and Hopkins, because as he put it, “[M]y clients don’t have the benefit of proffered testimony regarding certain things and the right to confront those individuals that have . . . rendered proffered testimony.” On appeal, Moss does not point to any law or procedural rule that would entitle him to discovery of the Jones and Hopkins proffer statements. That omission is not surprising. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) provides that: In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or report in the possession of the United States which was made by a Government witness or prospective Government witness (other than the defendant) shall be the subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case. Any disadvantage that accrued to Moss is the result of a generally applicable statute addressing criminal procedure. It is not, therefore, a mitigating factor, let alone the sort of factor that the sentencing judge was obliged to consider under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). No. 14-5250 United States v. Moss 6 AFFIRMED.