Opinion ID: 2512331
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Circuit Court Erred In Dismissing Young's IIED Claim.

Text: Young's final point of error on appeal is that the circuit court erred by dismissing her claim of IIED against Defendants where she was intentionally misled by Allstate, in an attempt to gain and exploit her trust ... [and] take advantage of her by settling her claim for next to nothing. She alleges that Allstate intentionally misled her and then, after she brought the suit, appealed the arbitration award and refused to settle the case for what it was worth. As a result, Mrs. Young asserts that she suffered unnecessary physical distress, severe shame, anxiety, worry, mental and emotional distress, fear, loss of time and expenses. Allstate counters that its conduct cannot qualify as `outrageous' or `beyond all bounds of decency' even under the most liberal interpretation. It contends that all [Young] alleges is that the defendants continued to defend her claims against [the insured] and engaged in ordinary litigation conduct after a point at which, she believes, liability and damages were clear. In our view, however, Young's first amended complaint sufficiently stated the second element of IIED-that the act was outrageous. As previously stated, the tort of IIED consists of four elements: 1) that the act allegedly causing the harm was intentional or reckless, 2) that the act was outrageous, and 3) that the act caused 4) extreme emotional distress to another. [26] Hac, 102 Hawai`i at 106-07, 73 P.3d at 60-61. The term `outrageous' has been construed to mean without just cause or excuse and beyond all bounds of decency. Enoka v. AIG Hawai`i Ins. Co., Inc., 109 Hawai`i 537, 559, 128 P.3d 850, 872 (2006) (citations and some internal quotation marks omitted). The question whether the actions of the alleged tortfeasor are unreasonable or outrageous is for the court in the first instance, although where reasonable people may differ on that question it should be left to the jury. Takaki v. Allied Machinery Corp., 87 Hawai`i 57, 68, 951 P.2d 507, 518 (App.1998) (quotations and quotation marks omitted). Here, the insured informed Allstate that he caused the traffic accident because he fell asleep at the wheel. Although Allstate was aware of its insured's liability, one of Allstate' claim representatives immediately contacted Young and assured her that it would treat her fairly and provide quality service on her claim. Thereafter, Allstate affirmed its commitment to provide her quality service in a letter from her claim representative. The letter also included the pledge which promised quality serviceÔÇö promising that it would (1) fully explain the process, take the time to answer all questions and concerns that [she] may have, and keep [her] informed throughout the claim process; (2) conduct a quick, fair investigation of the facts in [her] case; and (3) assist in the repair of her vehicle. A subsequent pledge promised her, If you qualify, we will make an appropriate offer of compensation for any injuries you may have suffered. (Emphasis in original.) This pledge of an appropriate offer of compensation served to reinforce Allstate's earlier representation that, because it would provide Young with quality service and treat her fairly, she did not need an attorney. Despite Young's medical expenses in excess of $6,000 and Allstate's repeated promises to treat her fairly, however, it offered her a mere $5,000 and then, upon Young's rejection of this offer, raised its offer to $5,300. Young, who was eighty-five years old at the time, and had sustained permanent injuries, rejected this offer. Subsequently, even after the arbitrator awarded Young $7,689.51 in medical damages and $37,000 in general damages, Allstate refused to increase its nominal settlement offer, again offering only $5,300 and rejecting Young's $25,000 offer of judgment. In light of Young's ultimate award of over $250,000, Allstate's promise to make an appropriate offer of compensation, and Allstate's highest pre-jury offer of $5,300, reasonable people could differ as to whether the Defendants acted without just cause or excuse and beyond all bounds of decency in the underlying case. [27] We believe that, upon reading Young's first amended complaint, average members of our community might indeed exclaim, Outrageous! See Dunlea, 83 Hawai`i at 38, 924 P.2d at 206. The circuit court should therefore have left the question of outrageousness to the jury. It erred in determining that the first amended complaint failed to state the second element of IIED. The remaining three elements are not in dispute. See Brooks, 113 Hawai`i at 415, 153 P.3d at 1100. The Defendants do not contend, and the circuit court did not conclude, that the first amended complaint failed to state the first, third, or fourth element of IIED. Indeed, we believe that the complaint plainly alleged those elements by averring that the Defendants' intentional conduct caused Young to experience severe anxiety, worry, fear, and mental and emotional distress. Thus, the first amended complaint sufficiently stated a claim of IIED. We therefore hold that the circuit court erred in dismissing Young's IIED claim.