Opinion ID: 1184265
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Evidence of polygraph tests in general.

Text: Despite the fact that the polygraph, or lie detector, has been in use for many years, most courts still refuse to admit the results of polygraph tests of a defendant in a criminal case as substantive evidence on the issue of his guilt or innocence. [4] The principal reason for rejecting such evidence is that the polygraph has not yet attained general scientific acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of ascertaining truth or deception, as required as a prerequisite to judicial acceptance of new scientific techniques and devices. [5] Thus, the reluctance of the courts to accept lie detector evidence has not been entirely due to judicial inertia. [6] Nevertheless, polygraph examinations, or lie detector tests, are widely used today by police and by prosecutors in interrogating persons suspected of crimes, both as a means of clearing suspects who are innocent and as a means of obtaining confessions, provided that such persons agree to voluntarily submit to such examinations. [7] In turn, it is generally held that confessions are not rendered inadmissible because given following the taking of polygraph examinations, provided that they are shown to have been given freely and voluntarily. [8] The question remains, however, whether in such a case the state may offer in evidence before the jury the fact that the confession was given following a polygraph examination and, if so, whether the state may also offer in evidence either the results of the examination or details relating to the examination. Neither the fact of a polygraph test, its results, nor the details of such an examination may ordinarily be offered in evidence by the state in laying the foundation for the admission of a confession in evidence during the trial of a criminal case. In considering the admissibility of evidence relating to polygraph tests prior to confessions it must be kept in mind that the primary question of fact to be decided by the jury is whether the confession was voluntary. It must also be kept in mind that on this question, as on other questions in criminal cases on which the state has the burden of proof, the state has the right to offer evidence that is relevant to that question, including the circumstances under which the confession was given, subject to the usual qualification that the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the defendant. [9] In considering this question it must also be remembered that in the usual criminal case the credibility of the defendant and of his version of the facts relating to the crime for which he has been charged is also one of the primary questions to be decided by the jury. This may be true even though the defendant does not testify. Thus, in this case, although the defendant did not testify, the contention by his counsel that he was acting under extreme mental or emotional disturbance when he shot the girls depended upon the credibility of his version of the facts, as told by him to police officers and to the psychiatrists. As previously stated, evidence of the results of polygraph tests is not admissible as substantive evidence to prove that a person has lied or told the truth. Nevertheless, the jury is likely to infer from evidence of the fact that a criminal defendant was the subject of a polygraph test before making a confession that he lied in response to questions asked during a polygraph test and that he confessed because he was caught lying by the polygraph. As a result, there is danger that such evidence may unduly prejudice the jury in its consideration of the credibility of such a defendant. [10] The same is also true, in our opinion, and for the same reasons, of evidence of the results of a polygraph examination and evidence relating to the details of a polygraph examination, from which the jury is even more likely to draw the same inferences. For these reasons, it is our opinion that the danger of prejudice from the impact of such evidence upon the question of the credibility of a defendant is so great as to ordinarily outweigh the probative value of such evidence as one or more of the circumstances which the state may properly offer in evidence in laying the initial foundation for the admission of a confession during the trial of a criminal case. In addition, it must be recognized that there may be circumstances relating to the conduct of a polygraph examination prior to the giving of a confession which the defendant may desire to urge as grounds in support of a contention that the confession was not given voluntarily, but was the product of coercion and psychological pressure. [11] For all of these reasons, we agree with the rule as stated by Reid & Inbau, Truth & Deception: The Polygraph (Lie-Detector) Technique 254 (1966), as follows: In laying the legal foundation for the admissibility of a confession obtained before, during, or after a Polygraph examination, a prosecuting attorney is confronted with a task requiring considerable caution. He must seek to avoid any reference by prosecuting witnesses to the results of the Polygraph examination or even to the fact of the examination itself. The procedure that should be followed is to introduce as a witness the examiner, or someone else to whom the confession may have been made or repeated, and through him lay the foundation for the admissibility of the confession by merely proving its voluntary character (i.e., the absence of any threats, force, or objectionable promises); and all this without any mention of the fact that a Polygraph had been used or contemplated. In this way the prosecution will avoid any danger of reversible error occasioned by reference to the Polygraph. The choice, therefore, will rest with the defense attorney as to whether or not he wants to inject the Polygraph issue into the case for the purpose of attempting to show that it or the technique was a coercive factor which compelled the defendant to confess. (Emphasis added) Although there are few other authorities directly on point, this rule, we believe, is the better one. [12] We recognize, however, that there are some courts which have appeared to distinguish between the fact of the polygraph test and the results of such a test [13] and some which have affirmed convictions in cases in which the results of such examinations have been received in evidence, although under different circumstances. [14] It follows, in our opinion, that when the state undertakes to lay the foundation for the introduction into evidence of a confession at the trial of a criminal case by offering evidence to establish that the confession was given voluntarily, it may not at that time offer evidence of the fact, results or details of a previous polygraph examination. If, however, when the confession is offered in evidence, the defendant then objects to the confession upon the ground that the confession was not voluntary because of a preceding polygraph examination, the state may then offer in evidence not only the fact that the confession was given following a polygraph examination, but also such details of the polygraph examination, including evidence which may reveal the results of the examination, as may be relevant upon the question whether the confession was given voluntarily. The state may also offer such evidence in rebuttal, even if a defendant does not object when his confession is offered in evidence, if he then offers evidence to the effect that the confession was not given voluntarily because of a preceding polygraph examination or because of other facts of such a nature as to make it appropriate for the state to offer such evidence in order to show that the confession was given voluntarily. In this case, although defendant's confession was made following a polygraph examination, he was again warned of his constitutional rights. He then not only repeated the confession in detail in the presence of other witnesses, but then signed a transcript of the confession, including the statement that it was given freely and voluntarily. And when that confession was offered in evidence no objection was made by defendant upon the ground that it was not given voluntarily, either because of the preceding polygraph examination or for any other reason. The only objection to the confession was that defendant had not been properly informed of his rights, a contention without merit and one not assigned as error by the defendant on this appeal. On the other hand, defendant had previously objected to the introduction by the state of any polygraph evidence. Under these circumstances, we hold that it was error for the state to offer in evidence not only the fact of the two preceding polygraph examinations, but many of the details of both of the preceding examinations, including specific questions to which defendant gave answers which were untruthful answers, according to the polygraph. The state contends that under State v. Brewton, supra , until and unless the defendant was willing to waive the issue of voluntariness the prosecution had no choice but to disclose all the circumstances surrounding defendant's decision to confess his crimes. We do not so construe Brewton. We held in Brewton (238 Or. at 603, 395 P.2d at 880) that [t]he court in the absence of the jury should then hear all the evidence relevant to the voluntariness of the confession and that [t]hereafter    the state must again establish the voluntariness of the confession before the jury and the jury will hear all the evidence offered on that issue. We did not hold, in Brewton, however, that the state had the right to offer all evidence which, in its view is relevant on that question and regardless of prejudice to the defendant. On the contrary, we said in State v. Zimmerlee, 261 Or. 49, 54, 492 P.2d 795, 797 (1972):    Although we have held that the state may prove its case `to the hilt,' that privilege is not open to the state in circumstances where its exercise would unnecessarily expose a defendant to prejudice.    For reasons previously stated, if a defendant desires to offer evidence relating to a preceding polygraph examination, he may do so. Or if a defendant chooses to object to the admission in evidence of a confession upon the grounds that it was not voluntary because of a preceding polygraph test, the state may then do so. In other words, the choice whether evidence relating to a previous polygraph examination is to be received is ordinarily a choice to be made by the defendant. By this decision, however, we do not mean to hold that at the in camera hearing before the court, as required by Brewton, to determine whether a confession made following a polygraph examination was given voluntarily, so as to be admissible in evidence, the state may not show that fact, among other circumstances. That question, however, is not before the court in this case.