Opinion ID: 213384
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mental and Emotional Damages

Text: The district court did not address Harris’ claim that he suffered mental and emotional damages as a result of Matthews’ actions.6 Nor did Matthews address it in his 6 Harris informed the district court that it had failed to address his mental and emotional damages claim in his post-judgment motions. The district court denied these motions without explicitly addressing the mental and emotional damages claim or its failure to address it in its summary judgment order. -7- motion for summary judgment.7 However, it is clear throughout the record that Harris is claiming he suffered mental and emotional damages as a direct result of Matthews’ actions, irrespective of the assault.8 7 Matthews did not address the claim despite questioning Harris as follows at his deposition: Okay. Now there’s a second component to the injuries, and you talked about that a little bit. Just now you talked about there’s the mental health aspect, the emotional pain. And you gave a good description about that. You talked to me about the threat you feel that you’re under now, but I wanted to ask you about that because you mention it in your Complaint . . . . You said you’re under medication to treat anxiety. Are you still under medication to treat anxiety? (R. at 187 (emphasis added).) Matthews then proceeded with questions concerning the treatment Harris has received for his mental and emotional distress. 8 Harris alleged in his complaint: “Since [Matthews disclosed my state witness status] . . . I’ve been placed on medication to deal with the unrelenting fear that I suffer everyday.” (R. at 36.) In his response to Matthews’ summary judgment motion, he stated: The release of this information in the manner in which it was done, (to other inmates), placed the Plaintiff in greater danger than he previously suffered. “But for” [Matthews’] actions, the Plaintiff’s mental and emotional distress would not exist . . . . After [Matthews’ actions], the Plaintiff has since been placed on medication to cope with the turmoil that he lives with everyday since [Matthews’] actions. The Plaintiff has never been prescribed medication for excessive fear, or under the care of a mental health physician, until [Matthews’] actions . . . . (Id. at 127.) And in the Final Pretrial Order, he claimed: As a result of [Matthews’] actions, . . . Plaintiff has . . . suffered severe mental and emotional problems and has been placed under the care of a Mental Health Physician, and is undergoing treatment, and medications . . . . There is no question that [Matthews’] actions are the Cause[] of the Plaintiff’s mental and emotional distress, for which he is being treated. (R. at 139-41.) -8- “[P]rison officials have a duty [under the Eighth Amendment] to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (quotations omitted). In a number of cases, we have held that labeling an inmate a “snitch” or otherwise inciting other inmates to harm an inmate states an Eighth Amendment violation, regardless of whether the inmate is ever actually physically harmed. See, e.g., Benefield v. McDowall, 241 F.3d 1267, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding it is clearly established law that labeling an inmate a snitch and informing other inmates of that label with knowledge of the obvious risk of danger associated with that label violates the Eighth Amendment even though the inmate is never actually harmed; “a violation of the Eighth Amendment does not turn on the type [of] relief sought” and “may be implicated not only to physical injury, but also by the infliction of psychological harm”); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1525 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding plaintiff’s claim that he was assaulted by other inmates as a result of a jail guard telling inmates that he was a snitch stated an Eighth Amendment violation); Brown v. Narvais, 265 Fed. Appx. 734, 735-36 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (allegation that defendant disclosed plaintiff’s status as a child molester knowing such label would subject the plaintiff to serious bodily harm stated an Eighth Amendment violation even though the plaintiff was never actually physically attacked); Johnson-Bey v. Ray, 38 Fed. Appx. 507, 510 (10th Cir. 2002) (unpublished) (plaintiff’s allegations that correctional officer intentionally told another inmate that plaintiff had tried to set him up for a disciplinary violation in order to place plaintiff in danger stated an Eighth Amendment violation; “[t]he fact that plaintiff suffered no physical injury resulting from the officer’s alleged -9- action, although relevant to the issue of damages, does not require dismissal”) (citation omitted); Purkey v. Green, 28 Fed. Appx. 736, 745 (10th. Cir 2001) (unpublished) (“A prisoner states an Eighth Amendment violation by alleging that a prison official intended to cause him serious harm by inciting other inmates to do violence against him. While an idle threat of impending physical harm that is not carried out will not suffice to state an Eighth Amendment claim, an imminent threat of serious harm, even though injury never actually occurs, will suffice.”) (citation and quotations omitted). It is unclear from the current record whether Harris can prevail on his claim for mental and emotional damages or whether Matthews has any defenses to that claim other than 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), which does not preclude relief in this case.9 Therefore, we remand this matter to the district court to allow it to decide the issue in the first instance. See Pac. Frontier v. Pleasant Grove City, 414 F.3d 1221, 1238 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Where an issue has been raised, but not ruled on, proper judicial administration generally favors 9 Matthews finally addressed Harris’ mental and emotional damages claim in response to Harris’ motion for new trial and motion to alter or amend judgment, arguing those damages were barred under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). He repeats that argument on appeal. Section 1997e(e) provides: “No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” While § 1997e(e) bars compensatory damages for mental and emotional injuries suffered by a prisoner (regardless of the nature of the right asserted) unless he also suffered physical injury, it does not bar recovery of nominal or punitive damages for violations of a prisoners’ constitutional rights. See Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 878-79, 881 (10th Cir. 2001). Nor does it affect actions for declaratory or injunctive relief. See Perkins v. Kansas Dep’t of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 808 (10th Cir. 1999). In addition to seeking compensatory damages, Harris seeks a declaration that Matthews’ actions violated his constitutional rights. He also requests punitive damages. These damages claims would not be precluded by § 1997e(e). - 10 - remand for the district court to examine the issue initially.”); see also Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1209 (10th Cir. 2007) (remanding to the district court to decide a claim which the court failed to address in its summary judgment order). We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment in favor of Matthews on Harris’ claim that Matthews’ disclosure caused the August 2009 assault. We REMAND Harris’ mental and emotional damages claim for further proceedings consistent with this Order and Judgment. We GRANT Harris’ motion to proceed ifp on appeal and remind him that he is obligated to continue making partial payments until the entire fee has been paid. Entered by the Court: Terrence L. O’Brien