Opinion ID: 772102
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Level of Judicial Scrutiny

Text: 11 As an initial matter, we note that the Supreme Court has not set forth a framework for determining what level of scrutiny to apply to laws that require an individual to obtain a permit prior to going door-to-door. It has, however, established a framework for answering the question in the context of laws requiring an individual to obtain a permit prior to engaging in speech in a public forum. See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992). We conclude that the analytical framework set forth there applies to this ordinance as well. We reach this conclusion because, in discussing what standard applied to the County's ordinance, the Court characterized its analysis as one of whether the law's restrictions on speech were reasonable in the context of time, place, and manner. As that analysis applies to all laws through which government regulates oral or written expression, see Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 n.8 (1984), and the ordinance regulates oral and written expression, it is subject to the reasonable, time, place, and manner analysis 4 . 12 Under that framework, a law that is content based is subject to strict scrutiny. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). On the other hand, a law that is content neutral and of general applicability is subject to some form of intermediate scrutiny. See Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 293. 13 Using that framework, the district court determined that the ordinance was content neutral and of general applicability and therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny. Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred and urge us to review the ordinance under strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny applies, they argue, because the ordinance potentially infringes upon two constitutionally protected rights--freedom of speech and freedom of religion--thereby making their claim a hybrid rights claim. And, they continue, the Supreme Court in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990),established that such claims subject the law in question to strict scrutiny. Hybrid rights claims aside, they argue, strict scrutiny applies because the ordinance discriminates based on the content of the speech. That discrimination is evidenced by the reference to Jehovah's Witnesses in the No Solicitation Form and the Mayor's testimony that he would not furnish Jehovah's Witnesses with an exemption from the time restraints. In either case, they conclude, we must apply strict scrutiny when reviewing the ordinance. 14 We cannot agree. Our review of the ordinance leads us to conclude it is content neutral and of general applicability, and hence, subject to intermediate scrutiny. A law is content neutral and of general applicability if on its face and in its purpose it does not make a distinction between favored and disfavored speech. See Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 642-50. On its face, there is no indication that the ordinance distinguishes between favored and disfavored speech; it requires all individuals seeking to canvass to register irrespective of the content of their message. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649 (1981). Nor do we find any evidence that the Village's purpose in promulgating the ordinance was to regulate speech based on the message it conveys. Instead, our review indicates that the Village's principal objective in promulgating the ordinance was to prevent fraud and protect the privacy interests of the residents of the Village. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 792 (1989). 15 The evidence plaintiffs cite in support of their argument misses the mark. That the No Solicitation Form listed Jehovah's Witnesses is not evidence that the Village's purpose in promulgating the ordinance was to restrict their speech; rather, it is evidence of the Village's administration of the ordinance. And that evidence does not indicate that the Village applied the ordinance unequally. It may simply be that Jehovah's Witnesses, along with the other organizations listed on the form, canvassed or solicited more frequently than other groups, thereby making it efficient to place their name on the form. Likewise, the testimony of the Mayor that he would not grant Jehovah's Witnesses an exemption from the ordinance's hours restriction is not evidence of the purpose of the Village in promulgating the ordinance. Nor is it evidence of the Village's application of the ordinance, as plaintiffs have not applied for an exemption. We do note, as the district court did, that were we to find disparate treatment in the granting of exemptions from the time restraints, we would be troubled. However, as our review finds nothing of the sort, we believe the ordinance is neutral on its face and the Village's purpose in promulgating it was content neutral. Therefore, we hold that it is subject to intermediate scrutiny. 16 In so holding, we reject plaintiffs' assertion that the Supreme Court established in Employment Division v. Smith that laws challenged by hybrid rights claims are subject to strict scrutiny. While much debate has revolved around the Court's language in Smith, we do not believe the Court held there, nor has it ever held, that a different level of scrutiny applies to laws that potentially affect hybrid rights. In rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that 'prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]' includes requiring any individual to observe a generally applicable law, the Smith Court noted, 17 The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press . . . . 18 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878, 881. That language was dicta and therefore not binding. Further, as we held in Kissingerv. Board of Trustees of the Ohio State University, 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993), aside from the fact that the Smith Court did not hold that a hybrid rights claim subjects a law to a higher level of scrutiny, the Court did not explain how a hybrid rights claim would alter the level of scrutiny (we note that the one probably had a lot to do with the other). Based in part upon the lack of an explanation from the Court, we declined to alter the standard of scrutiny for laws affecting hybrid rights until the Supreme Court provided guidance. The Court has yet to provide such guidance, and therefore, we adhere to our decision inKissinger and continue to decline to alter the standard of scrutiny. Accordingly, the district court was correct to subject the ordinance to intermediate scrutiny in analyzing the merits of plaintiffs' free speech claims.