Opinion ID: 2570810
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Valdez Therapeutic Treatment Program Appropriation

Text: The governor vetoed language in a bill appropriating funds to the Department of Corrections for a therapeutic treatment community program in Valdez. [101] The vetoed language refers to the efficiency of the program, apparently without legal effect. [102]
Applying the standard discussed in Part III.C.1, we first consider whether the vetoed language is an item. The council argues that it is not, because it directed the appropriation's use. Alternatively, we think this language may be read simply to describe the program. Either way, the vetoed language is not an item because it does not appropriate any sum of money to a particular purpose. The veto was therefore invalid.
The council argues that the governor's veto explanation is inadequate. [103] This appropriation was part of what became chapter 100. The question is whether the governor's general intent objection adequately explained his veto, the same question discussed in Part III.D.2 in context of the CRC appropriation. Applying the minimum-of-coherence standard described there, we conclude that it did. The vetoed passage can be characterized as intent language and the governor's objection coherently refers to the vetoed provision.
This bill appropriated $400,000 for an inmate program in Valdez where cost per inmate day (exclusive of treatment costs) will not exceed the statewide average cost per inmate day for correctional institutions. [104] The governor struck the quoted language. Did including the vetoed language violate the confinement clause? The correct answer is not obvious, primarily because it is not clear what effect, if any, this language has. It is unclear whether it conditions the way the Valdez facility was to be run or simply describes the program. The former reading would violate the confinement clause; the latter would not. Despite this ambiguity, we conclude that this language does not violate the confinement clause. Because one permissible reading of the language is constitutional, and because we think it preferable to choose the reading that avoids unconstitutionality, [105] we conclude that this language is descriptive and non-binding. We therefore hold that its inclusion did not violate the confinement clause.
The governor contends that the vetoed treatment program language impermissibly interferes with the administration's discretion in managing the program and therefore violates article III, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution and the separation-of-powers principle. The council counters that there is little point to this language, but that it is a legitimate attempt to minimize costs. We concluded above that this language did not violate the confinement clause because it could be read as a description of the program. The same reasoning applies here. Because this language can permissibly be read not to direct the executive branch to take any action, it does not interfere with executive discretion. We therefore conclude that this language does not violate the principle of separation of powers.