Opinion ID: 2538207
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Validity of the Plan under the Missouri Constitution

Text: Plaintiffs' primary substantive challenges to the plan filed by the nonpartisan reapportionment commission are that it violates art. III, sec. 2 of the Missouri Constitution because the districts are not sufficiently equal in population, compact, or contiguous. Plaintiffs specifically claim that the trial court erred in: (1) applying an incorrect standard when it found that Plaintiffs failed to prove the plan was not as nearly equal in population as possible, in that the trial court considered the federal requirement of a total deviation range of 10.00 percent in legislative redistricting plans, district compactness, political subdivision lines, and the federal voting rights act when determining the possible population equality in each district; (2) applying an incorrect standard to find that Plaintiffs failed to prove that the districts are not contiguous under Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 2 when various districts are divided by a major river without a connecting bridge; (3) incorrectly applying a standard based on a lack of motive to gerrymander and a lack of compactness in other maps to find that Plaintiffs failed to prove that the districts are not as compact as may be because compactness should be sacrificed only to achieve population equality; and (4) declaring that the plan does not violate Mo. Const. art. I, secs. 2 and 25 when the impact of Plaintiffs' vote is affected by the lack of contiguousness, compactness, and population equality among the districts. Constitutional challenges to the plan filed by the nonpartisan reapportionment commission present a justiciable claim for which this Court has jurisdiction. `It is well settled that courts have jurisdiction and authority to pass upon the validity of legislative acts apportioning the state into senatorial or other election districts and declare them invalid for failure to observe nondiscretionary limitations imposed by the Constitution.' Teichman, 357 S.W.3d at 606 (quoting Preisler v. Hearnes, 362 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Mo. banc 1962)). This Court, therefore, properly considers the merits of Plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to the plan. The enactment of Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 2 was a direct result of a successful equal protection challenge to the previous constitutional provisions relating to legislative reapportionment. Prior to 1966, the constitution apportioned the Missouri House of Representatives by requiring that each county in the state have at least one representative. See Mo. Const. art. IV, sec. 2 (1959). In 1964, the United States Supreme Court, in Reynolds v. Sims , held that the Equal Protection Clause requires both houses of a state legislature to be apportioned on a population basis. 377 U.S. 533, 576, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). Later that year, in Jonas v. Hearnes, four Missouri citizens and voters brought an action in federal court claiming that the reapportionment standards for House of Representative districts in Mo. Const. art. III, secs. 2 and 3 (1959) and Senate districts in Mo. Const. art. III, secs. 5 and 7 were unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 236 F.Supp. 699, 701 (W.D.Mo.1964). The United States District Court for the Western District held that the reapportionment of the House and Senate districts was not in accordance with constitutionally permissible standards as laid down in Reynolds v. Sims, supra , and with the guarantees of equal protection of law insured by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 704, 708. Instead of invalidating the provisions as unconstitutional, the court reserved jurisdiction and permitted the General Assembly to promptly devise and pass legislation creating and establishing a system of legislative districting and apportionment of the House of Representatives and the Senate thereof, in accordance with federal constitutional standards.... Id. at 709. In response to the Jonas decision, the General Assembly submitted to the people proposed amendments to the provisions relating to reapportionment of the House and Senate districts. In January 1966, the people amended the constitution by adopting the provisions in Mo. Const. art. III, secs. 2, 5, and 7. The provisions adopted in 1966 for the reapportionment of districts for the House of Representatives in art. III, sec. 2 require that the districts be, equal in population as nearly as possible, contiguous, and as compact as may be. In pertinent part, the provision states: The commission shall reapportion the representatives by dividing the population of the state by the number one hundred sixty-three and shall establish each district so that the population of that district shall, as nearly as possible, equal that figure. Each district shall be composed of contiguous territory as compact as may be. Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 2. The standards adopted in 1966 for the reapportionment of Senate districts are enumerated in art. III, secs. 5 and 7. [6] These requirements in the constitution for drawing a reapportionment map are mandatory and objective, although the language used in the requirements themselves creates a level of flexibility in their compliance. See Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d at 40. Specifically, the plan reapportioning House districts must: (1) have population equality as nearly as possible; (2) have contiguous territory; and (3) be as compact as may be. Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 2. Although adopted in response to equal protection concerns, these three requirements also work together to guard against the evil of gerrymandering. See Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d at 38 (quoting Barrett, 146 S.W. at 61). Under these requirements, the starting point for drawing a valid map is the requirement that the district must be contiguous because the standard for this requirement is absolute. The language that each district shall be composed of contiguous territory is free of any phrase that could broaden the meaning of contiguous. In contrast, the standards for the requirements of population equality and compactness are not absolute. For population equality, the reapportionment commission must divide the state population by 163 and make each district, as nearly as possible, equal that figure. Under this standard, the ability to attain population equality is dependent upon that which is possible. Similarly, the requirement that the map be as compact as may be allows some flexibility, although, as noted above, satisfaction of the requirement itself is mandatory. The compactness standard, unlike the one for contiguity, requires consideration of other factors, necessarily including the boundary lines of neighboring districts from the one in question. [7] The standards for compactness and population equality also are inherently interrelated. It is impossible to consider whether the map is as compact as may be without also considering whether the population is as nearly as possible, equal. One determination cannot be made without consideration of the other. This Court summarized the interrelationship between the standards in Pearson I: [T]he provision requiring compactness of territory, subject, as it may be, to other more definitely expressed rules, may also, in application, be modified by the requirement of equality in population... that `compactness, being of less importance, may, to some extent, yield in aid of securing a nearer approach to equality of representation. Id. (quoting State ex rel. Barrett, 146 S.W. at 61 (internal citations omitted)). By virtue of this interrelatedness, it is more important to attain population equality in each district than compactness. Id. Because multiple district configurations can meet the constitutional requirements, there is no perfect map. See id. at 39. If that were required by the constitutional standards, there would be no finality in the redistricting process. Additionally, the variation permitted under the as nearly as possible, equal and as compact as may be standards shows that the constitution does not require absolute perfection in a map because compactness and numerical equality cannot be achieved with absolute precision. See id. The primary disagreement by the parties in this case, however, is the amount of variation permitted by the as nearly as possible and the compact as may be language in the standards. Particularly, the parties disagree as to the meaning of the word possible within the standard for population equality. Although Plaintiffs concede that the term possible does not require perfect precision in population equality, they contend that a strict definition should apply, such that the map should attain the highest degree of population equality possible. Plaintiffs assert that this Court should require population deviations similar to the near-zero-tolerance rule for congressional districts provided in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler , in which the United States Supreme Court held that a deviation of less than 3 percent from the ideal population figure was invalid. 394 U.S. 526, 528-30, 89 S.Ct. 1225, 22 L.Ed.2d 519 (1969). Defendants and the intervenors assert the contrary, stating that the meaning of possible should broadly allow for flexibility in the level of population equality based on permissible factors. They contend that this Court should follow federal decisions finding that population deviations of 10.00 percent or less are prima facie evidence of constitutional validity for the reapportionment of state legislative districts. See generally Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 161, 113 S.Ct. 1149, 122 L.Ed.2d 500 (1993); Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 842-43, 103 S.Ct. 2690, 77 L.Ed.2d 214 (1983); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 764, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973). In ascertaining the meaning of the word possible in the standard for population equality, the primary rule is to give effect to the intent of the voters who adopted the Amendment by considering the plain and ordinary meaning of the word. Keller v. Marion Cnty. Ambulance Dist., 820 S.W.2d 301, 302 (Mo. banc 1991); StopAquila.org v. City of Peculiar, 208 S.W.3d 895, 902 (Mo. banc 2006). The plain and ordinary meaning of a word used in a constitutional provision is the meaning that the people commonly understood the word[] to have when the provision was adopted. Buechner v. Bond, 650 S.W.2d 611, 613 (Mo. banc 1983). If the voters' intent cannot be ascertained from the plain and ordinary meaning of the language due to duplicity, indistinctness or uncertainty of meaning of an expression, it is ambiguous. See J.B. Vending Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 54 S.W.3d 183, 188 (Mo. banc 2001) (stating the definition of ambiguous). The commonly understood meaning of a word can be found in the dictionary. StopAquila.org, 208 S.W.3d at 902. If a word has more than one dictionary definition that applies in the context of the provision, it is ambiguous. See Auto Owners (Mut.) Ins. Co. v. Sugar Creek Mem'l Post No. 3976, 123 S.W.3d 183, 188 (Mo.App.2003). Considering the dictionary definition of the disputed term in this case, the word possible has a variety of potential meanings. The relevant definitions of possible in the dictionary are: 1 [a]: falling or lying within the powers (as of performance, attainment, or conception) of an agent or activity express or implied: being within or up to the limits of one's ability or capacity as determined by nature, authority, circumstances, or other controlling factors [b]: falling within the bounds of what may be done, occur, be conceived, or be attained within the framework of nature, custom, or manners [c]: being such to the utmost degree[.] 2: Able[.] 3 [a]: that may or may not occur: that may chance: dependent on contingency: neither probable nor impossible [b]: likely, probable  usually used with an adverb expressing doubt 4: having an indicated potential by nature or circumstances: able or fitted to become, be used, or otherwise serve 5: capable of being surmounted, traversed, or dealt with: neither unacceptable nor intolerable  often used with an adverb expressing doubt[.] Syn practicable, feasible: Possible is used to dispel doubt that something may or does occur or exist or may come to exist[.] Practicable refers to what may be readily effected, executed, practiced, used, or put into operation[.] Feasible may designate what is likely to work out or be put into effect successfully or what in a difficult situation seems the expedient least liable to fail[.] WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1771 (1993) (internal notations omitted). In light of these dictionary definitions, and in the context of art. III, sec. 2, there are several definitions that could apply, so the plain and ordinary meaning of the word possible is uncertain and the term is ambiguous. In the context of the population standard, the meaning of possible could range from the narrow definition of being such to the utmost degree to the broader definition of falling within the bounds of what may be done, occur, be conceived, or be attained within the framework of nature, custom, or manners. Id. To resolve such ambiguity, the rules applicable to the construction of statutes are also applicable to the construction of constitutional provisions. Buechner, 650 S.W.2d at 613. In considering which of the potential dictionary definitions should apply, the term possible, in the context of the population standard, cannot mean population equality to the utmost degree as urged by Plaintiffs. Such a construction is precluded on constitutional grounds. If a constitutional provision can be interpreted in different ways, one constitutional and the other unconstitutional, the constitutional construction shall be adopted. See Blaske v. Smith & Entzeroth, Inc., 821 S.W.2d 822, 838-39 (Mo. banc 1991). Although art. III, sec. 2 is a provision in the Missouri Constitution, it nonetheless must comply with the United States Constitution because of the Supremacy Clause. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. [8] Under the Supremacy Clause, state laws and constitutional provisions are preempted and have no effect to the extent they conflict with federal laws. See State ex rel. Proctor v. Messina, 320 S.W.3d 145, 148 (Mo. banc 2010). By operation of the Supremacy Clause, the nonpartisan reapportionment commission must comply with the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and the Voting Rights Act in determining what population equality is possible. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against racial gerrymandering in reapportioning districts. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993). Similarly, subsection 2(a) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibits states from imposing any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure ... which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color. 42 U.S.C. section 1973(a). A valid map must comply with the Voting Rights Act. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Interpreting possible to mean strictly to the utmost degree in population equality would exclude consideration of these additional factors, including the factors mandated by the Supremacy Clause. Therefore, possible must be construed broadly enough to permit consideration of additional factors by a reapportionment commission. See Blaske, 821 S.W.2d at 838-39. Although constitutional considerations preclude a narrow construction, the context of the word possible in the phrase as nearly as possible also precludes an overly broad meaning. The phrase as nearly as, modifying possible, is not given effect under the broadest dictionary definition, which would require population equality only within the bounds of what may be done, occur, be conceived, or be attained within the framework of nature, custom, or manners. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1771 (1993). Instead, a dictionary definition falling between the two extremes is more reflective of the standard necessary to meet constitutional requirements and intended by the phrase as nearly as possible. The definition of being within or up to the limits of one's ability or capacity as determined by nature, authority, circumstances, or other controlling factors, id., permits compliance with the mandatory requirements of federal law and is consistent with use of possible as a synonym for practicable in the dictionary definition set out above. In this regard, in determining the meaning of possible for the reapportionment of House districts, this Court also considers the identical language used for the reapportionment of Senate districts. Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 7 says the commission shall establish each district so that the population of that district shall, as nearly as possible, equal that figure yet also says that, where county lines must be crossed in the case of a multi-district county, the resulting cross-county district must be  as nearly equal as practicable in population. (emphasis added). Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 5, similarly to its House counterpart, says that the state shall be divided into convenient districts of contiguous territory, as compact and nearly equal in population as may be. The use of all three terms practicable, possible and as may be in sections 5 and 7 of article III in referring to the population requirement for Senate districts, along with the fact that practicable is a synonym of possible, WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1771 (1993), both reinforce the conclusion that the term possible is not used in the strict sense of equal to the absolute degree. This intermediate definition of possible is consistent with this Court's precedent recognizing that other factors are inherently included within the constitutional standards governing the reapportionment process, although not expressly articulated as a separate requirement in the constitution. These factors were identified by this Court in Preisler v. Doherty, 365 Mo. 460, 284 S.W.2d 427 (1955), Hearnes, 362 S.W.2d 552, and Preisler v. Kirkpatrick, 528 S.W.2d 422, 426 (Mo.1975). In Doherty, this Court distinguished the process of city officers dividing St. Louis into districts from the process of redistricting the state because it is obvious that it is much easier for them to make compact districts than for a legislature or commission restricted to county lines (or following town, ward or other district lines).... 284 S.W.2d at 432. In Hearnes, a case challenging congressional districts, this Court stated that [C]ounties are important governmental units, in which the people are accustomed to working together. Therefore, it has always been the policy of this state, in creating districts of more than one county (congressional, judicial or senatorial) to have them composed of entire counties.... We must hold that it was proper for the legislature to follow this policy. In fact, to do otherwise would lead to the most vicious kind of gerrymander. The only departure therefrom in the 1961 Act was in our two largest cities, St. Louis and Kansas City.... Urban conditions may justify this treatment. 362 S.W.2d at 556-57. The Court also stated that it is not improper to consider the precedents of allocation of counties to existing districts in deciding the composition of new enlarged districts. Id. at 557. Later, this Court in Preisler v. Kirkpatrick cited the United States Supreme Court in Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, to recognize that districting, without any regard for political subdivision or natural or historical boundary lines, may be little more than an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering. 528 S.W.2d at 425 (internal quotations omitted). This Court also recognized that population density may affect boundary lines, stating that population density of the state is, of course, uneven and any effort to accomplish both the overriding objective of [population equality] and the preservation of county lines reasonably may be expected to result in the establishment of districts that are not aesthetically pleasing models of geometric compactness. Id. at 426. As provided in these cases, the language used in the constitutional requirements implicitly permits consideration in the redistricting process of population density; natural boundary lines; the boundaries of political subdivisions, including counties [9] municipalities, and precincts; and the historical boundary lines of prior redistricting maps. [10] This Court recently affirmed the continued propriety of recognized, unenumerated factors in Pearson I. See 359 S.W.3d at 40 (recognizing the importance of preservation of the integrity of the existing lines of our various political subdivisions. despite not expressly stated as a separate consideration in the constitution). [11] Interpreting the language as may be and as possible as allowing for consideration of other recognized factors is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's requirement for congressional districts to have population equality as nearly as is practicable under its interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause in the United States Constitution. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). The federal standard permits minor variations which `are based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy.' Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 444, 87 S.Ct. 569, 17 L.Ed.2d 501 (1967). [12] As with this Court, the United States Supreme Court recognizes that legitimate considerations include recognition of natural boundary lines, recognition of historical district boundary lines, and respect for boundaries of political subdivisions. [13] See id.; Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740, 103 S.Ct. 2653, 77 L.Ed.2d 133 (1983). [14] The Supreme Court also identifies other factors that may justify variances, which this Court does not recognize, such as maintaining communities of interest and avoiding contests between incumbents. See Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740, 103 S.Ct. 2653. Similar to the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the as nearly as is practicable standard under the Equal Protection Clause, this Court interprets the requirements in the Missouri Constitution to implicitly permit the legislature to comply with federal laws and consider recognized factors yet still comply with the requirements of the Missouri Constitution. The requirements for population equality as nearly as possible and compactness as may be allows for consideration of these recognized factors. See Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d at 39. The concurring opinion both misinterprets the law and seeks to overrule portions of this Court's precedent which, for the last century, has defined the language used in the Missouri Constitution to include consideration of these factors, despite not being expressly stated. See id. (counties as important governmental units); Kirkpatrick, 528 S.W.2d at 426 (political subdivisions, historical boundary lines, and population density); Hearnes, 362 S.W.2d at 556-57 (counties as important governmental units); and Doherty, 284 S.W.2d at 432 (county, town, ward or other district lines). These cases do not hold that constitutional requirements can be disregarded to consider other factors but, instead, recognize that the constitutional requirements themselves incorporate such considerations by use of the standards as may be, and as possible. As part of the standards for the constitutional requirements, federal law and the previously recognized factors are in fact of constitutional significance, and this Court recognizes that in its precedent. Plaintiffs' burden of proving that the current plan is unconstitutional, therefore, must account for the additional factors that the reapportionment commission must consider and those that it is permitted to consider. For the contiguousness requirement, it is an absolute standard that either is satisfied or not satisfied by the challenged map. The population equality and compactness requirements, on the other hand, have interrelated standards that are impacted by the existence of other possibilities. For these requirements, proof that the standards for population equality and compactness are not met requires the party challenging the map to present evidence that greater population equality and compactness are feasible in that the plan deviates from those principles. But showing the ability to attain greater mathematical precision is not enough. The plaintiff also must prove that any minimal and practical deviation from population equality or compactness in a district does not result from application of recognized factors that may have been important considerations in the challenged map. In this regard, the issue of whether the constitutional requirements are satisfied is determined objectively, requiring no proof of the subjective intent of the reapportionment commission. See Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d at 40. To meet the objective standard, a plaintiff must present evidence that greater population equality and compactness is feasible in one or more districts. But that is not all. The plaintiff must also show that federal laws or other recognized factors did not affect the district boundary. This showing is not burdensome on the plaintiff: the plaintiff needs only to submit maps or other evidence that objectively shows that county lines, political subdivisions, or historical boundary lines were not a basis for the district boundary or that it goes beyond a minimal and practical deviation[.] See id. at 40. So long as the evidence persuades the trial court that the challenged map clearly and undoubtedly contravenes the constitution, the plaintiff will prevail. See Barton Cnty., 311 S.W.3d at 740-41. In this case, Plaintiffs must satisfy this burden to prove that the plan is unconstitutional. Because the plan is unconstitutional if it fails to meet any of the requirements enumerated in art. III, sec. 2, this Court first addresses Plaintiffs' showing for the absolute requirement of contiguity, followed by the interrelated requirements of population equality and compactness. Plaintiffs claim that six districts in the map of the nonpartisan reapportionment commission are not contiguous because rivers make a portion of each district inaccessible so that it can only be reached by traveling through one or more other districts. Under art. III, sec. 2, the House districts shall be composed of contiguous territory[.] The plain and ordinary meaning of contiguous is provided by the dictionary definition of touching or connected throughout. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 492 (1993). In addition, the dictionary definition of territory references a geographic area without regard to whether the portions of the land within the geographic area are split by large rivers or other bodies of water. Id. at 2361. The constitutional requirement of contiguous territory does not depend on the particular geographical characteristics of the territory circumscribed within a district. As a result, a district is composed of contiguous territory when the territory within the district is touching or connecting throughout the entire district. See id. at 492. This Court ruled consistently when construing the term contiguous in the context of a municipal annexation. In State ex rel. Kansas City v. North Kansas City, this Court held that the contiguity of a proposed annexation area was not broken by the Missouri River where the city limit was the center of a river that constituted the boundary line of two counties. 360 Mo. 374, 228 S.W.2d 762, 773 (1950), abrogated on other grounds by State ex inf. Hannah v. City of St. Charles, 676 S.W.2d 508, 512 (Mo. banc 1984) (finding that the enactment of a charter statute makes prior caselaw discussing charter amendments obsolete). [15] Similarly, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected an argument nearly identical to Plaintiffs' under a similar requirement that legislative districts be contiguous in In re Constitutionality of House Joint Resolution 1987, 817 So.2d 819 (Fla.2002). See Fla. Const. art. III, section 16. There, a district boundary crossed a large lake to include a population center in one county with a population center in another county, without including any connecting territory on the lakeshore. Id. at 828. The court found that the district complied with the contiguity requirement under the state constitution. Id. The court reasoned that the contiguity requirement does not mean that a paved, dry road must connect all parts of a district, nor does it require convenience and ease of travel or travel by terrestrial rather than marine forms of transportation. Id. The separation of one part of a district from another part of a district by a large river does not violate Missouri's constitutional requirement that the district be composed of contiguous territory. The map filed by the commission satisfies the constitutional requirement of contiguity. For the population equality and compactness requirements, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of proof in challenging the constitutional validity of the plan. The evidence submitted by Plaintiffs consists of the parties' joint stipulation of facts and the affidavit of Mr. Girouard with supporting exhibits. As part of the affidavit, Mr. Girouard included a proposed map with greater population equality, which Plaintiffs also contend meets the compactness requirement. Plaintiffs' proposed map and other evidence, however, fails to prove that the nonpartisan reapportionment commission's map is unconstitutional, because the creator of the proposed alternative map, Mr. Girouard, did not take into consideration federal law and other recognized factors when drawing the proposed map. Mr. Girouard used only three criteria in creating his proposed map. In his affidavit, Mr. Girouard specifically stated that: The instructions I was given to prepare [the proposed map] were to create a map with (a) the smallest possible population deviation range, (b) every district comprised of contiguous territory, and (3) and [sic] each district as compact as possible given the prior two criteria. Using my expertise with Maptitude, and influenced by these criteria and no others, Exhibit F is the best I could do. (Emphasis added). In contrast, the plan filed by the nonpartisan reapportionment commission indicates that it considered numerous factors in creating its map. The plan consisted of approximately 1,270 pages of supporting documents and maps, including data about and statistical analysis of Missouri's population figures, voting age topography, racial demographics, and other factors. The population figures were provided by the census bureau in the form of Voter Tabulation Districts, comprised of blocks, block groups, census tracts, and counties, which limit the ability to attain precise population figures when drawing boundary lines. Each of these considerations, as evidenced by the 1,270 page plan filed with the secretary of state, impacts the ability of the nonpartisan reapportionment commission to as nearly as possible, equal the ideal population figure. None of Plaintiffs' evidence, however, addresses these additional factors. First, Plaintiffs' evidence fails to address whether the higher population equality and compactness as shown by the proposed map is possible when considering the other recognized factors. Plaintiffs failed to utilize the 1,270 pages of supporting documents and maps filed with the commission's plan, for example, to show whether the boundary lines in the commission's map were drawn to maintain boundaries of counties, cities, or other political subdivisions. See Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d at 40. Nor did Plaintiffs use prior-existing maps to show whether natural boundaries in the territory or historical boundary lines were a consideration. See Kirkpatrick, 528 S.W.2d at 426. Plaintiffs failed to utilize any such evidence or other analysis. Second, Plaintiffs' evidence does not include any data or analysis showing that it complies with federal law requirements, most notably the Voting Rights Act. In fact, Mr. Girouard's affidavit expressly states that he considered no other factors in creating his proposed map. While the joint stipulation of facts provides that there was no intent to disfavor any citizens in a suspect class, that stipulation only addresses the map filed by the nonpartisan reapportionment commission, not Plaintiffs' proposed map. Consequently, the record supports the trial court's finding that Plaintiffs failed to prove that it is possible to achieve greater population equality and compactness when considering federal law requirements and other factors. Because Plaintiffs' claim that the plan violates Mo. Const. art. I, secs. 2 and 25 is based on an alleged failure to meet the requirements in art. III, sec. 2, Plaintiffs also have failed to prove clearly and undoubtedly that the plan is unconstitutional on that ground.