Opinion ID: 2636899
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Impact of sanity phase reference to prior violent act.

Text: Appellant contends that the jury was bound to infer from the sanity phase evidence of which he complained (that he had told Dr. Kaldor he had committed a prior act of violence in self-defense) that he had killed someone in circumstances similar to those in the present case. He claims that, as a result, he was forced to request an instruction to the jury that it should not consider that evidence. The jury was instructed: In the sanity phase testimony was offered concerning the defendant's alleged involvement in incidents of violence prior to the events of May, 1987.[¶] You are instructed that such testimony cannot be considered by you in reaching a verdict in the penalty phase. Appellant asserts that this instruction would not cure the impact of the sanity phase error. We found no error in permitting the sanity phase inquiry into whether appellant had told Dr. Kaldor about the Puerto Rico incident, and, since he had not done so initially, whether he considered that failure significant. Inasmuch as that evidence was relevant and admissible at the sanity phase, reversal is not required on appellant's theory that the jury might consider the evidence notwithstanding the court's instruction. Inasmuch as appellant requested the instruction, he may not now claim that the instruction heightened the possibility the jury would infer a prior, unexcused, killing. ( People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 152, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781.) We do not agree that it is not possible, through instructions, to unring the bell heard earlier. Rather, we assume the jury was capable of following the court's instruction here to disregard evidence of any uncharged crime that the People fail to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 949-950, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93.) The court had no obligation to go beyond the instruction requested and given, and to sua sponte give a broader instruction like that now proposed by appellant. [42] Indeed, by further emphasizing the sanity phase evidence, the instruction might have made it more difficult to ignore the evidence. We do not agree with appellant's additional claim that the jury would ignore the instruction given by the court to disregard the sanity phase evidence of a prior violent act because the court next instructed that the jury could consider all of the evidence introduced at any part of the trial except as you may hereafter be instructed. Reasonable jurors would understand the first, specific, instruction to bar consideration of the prior violent act evidence.