Opinion ID: 807595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Allen Warnings

Text: This troubling case implicates both of Allen’s major holdings: the necessity of warning and reclamation of right. Taking first the question of warning, the state court found that no warning was required before Jones’s removal because he was taken from the courtroom only upon his “own request that he be permitted to leave.” Jones, 281 Conn. at 638-39. I am in full agreement with the majority opinion that such a conclusion based on the record was unreasonable, as the record unmistakably reflects that Jones was not originally removed pursuant to his request. Maj. Op. 17. The majority concludes that because the exclusion itself on February 3rd was harmless, further warning analysis is obviated. Maj. Op. 22 fn. 6. I agree that Jones’s removal that day was harmless, but even assuming the error in failure to warn on that day was subsumed by the harmlessness of the exclusion itself, the majority inexplicably fails to account for the fact that Jones was excluded again, without warning, on February 4 (and indeed, every other day of the trial). If warning is required before a defendant loses his right to be present, then a warning was required before Jones was deemed to have waived his right to be present in the courtroom the day after his initial wrongful exclusion. This, of course, raises the question of whether warning is required—or to be more precise, whether it has been clearly established by the Supreme Court that a defendant must be warned that he may lose his right to be present if he fails to comport himself in an appropriate manner. There is no doubt to my mind that it has. In Allen the Court “explicitly” held that a defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom. 3 397 U.S. at 343. This passage is completely unambiguous about what Allen requires in terms of warning. There is no doubt about its force (“we explicitly hold”) or what is required from it (“can lose his right to be present at trial, if, after he has been warned” (emphasis added)). A defendant can lose his right to presence if he has been warned about the consequences of inappropriate behavior. Jones never was. I am compelled, of course, to admit that our court has not always read Allen this way. In two cases, Gilchrist v. O’Keefe, 260 F.3d 87, 97 (2d Cir. 2001) and Norde v. Keene, 294 F.3d 401, 413 (2d Cir. 2002), we indicated that Allen does not require a warning before removal. In Gilchrist, we examined a state court’s determination that a defendant could “forfeit[] his right to counsel based on a single, apparently spontaneous violent incident,” without warning that such behavior might light to a loss of counsel. 260 F.3d at 97. We considered Allen in relationship to the warning question, and found that “while [it] stated that a defendant could be removed from the courtroom ‘after he has been warned by the judge,’ it did not indicate whether such a warning was a requirement in every situation.” Id. at 96. We concluded that Allen “stand[s] for the proposition” that “even absent a warning, a defendant may be found to have forfeited certain trial-related constitutional rights based on certain types of misconduct,” id., and so denied the petitioner relief. In Norde v. Keane, we cited to the “even absent warning” language in Gilchrist and upheld a removal where the court did not “explain to [the defendant] the potential ramifications of his removal” for misbehavior. 294 F.3d at 413. The judge in Norde did, however, warn the defendant that “he would be removed if he did not remain quiet.” Id. As an initial matter, these cases do not bind us in habeas. “‘Clearly established federal law’ refers only to the holdings of the Supreme Court.” Rodriguez v. Miller, 537 F.3d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 , 412 (2000)). Moreover, to the 4 extremely limited extent they are relevant, those precedents are themselves an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. 1 “[T]he warning requirement from Allen cannot be interpreted in any non-mandatory way, lest we substitute our own judgment of what the rule should be for that of the Court.” Gray v. Moore, 520 F.3d 616, 624 (6th Cir.), cert denied by Gray v. Moore, 555 U.S. 894 (2008). There is no way to read the Supreme Court’s holding in Allen as anything other than “requir[ing] a trial court to give the accused one last chance to comply with courtroom civility before committing the ‘deplorable’ act—in the Allen Court’s words—of removing that person from his own trial.” Id. Moreover, neither Norde nor Gilchrist’s view of Allen constitutes their holdings. The language in Gilchrist is dicta, since the question before the court was not whether warnings were required before a defendant was removed for disruptive behavior, but whether the right to counsel could be forfeited absent warning. Norde is also distinguishable by the crucial fact that the defendant there actually received the only warning— that misbehavior would lead to removal— that Allen requires. The majority opinion itself recognizes to some extent that warning is required prior to removal, Maj. Op. 18 fn. 3, though it fails to apply that warning to second day of Jones’s exclusion.2 1 The majority suggests “it is difficult to see how we could hold that the Connecticut courts unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent in not finding a warning an absolute prerequisite to continued exclusion from the courtroom, when we ourselves have read Allen exactly the same way.” Maj. Op. 29 fn. 9. But such a position suggests that while state courts might unreasonably apply Supreme Court law, this court never could— a statement with which, deeply respectful of my colleagues though I am, I cannot agree. We, no less than state courts, can and do make mistakes, including unreasonable ones. 2 It also misstates the Court’s decision in that case as holding “that a defendant must ordinarily be ‘warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior’ before he may be removed.” Maj. Op. 18 fn. 3 (emphasis added). The Court in Allen, it bears repeating, inserted no such qualifier, and instead “h[e]ld that a defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior.” 397 U.S. at 343. 5 Under the applicable Supreme Court precedent, a warning was required before Jones was not allowed to return to court on the second day. The failure to warn is particularly disturbing in the circumstances of this case. The record reflects that Jones’s behavior on February 4th sprung in part from his anger at being excluded from court the previous day, as well as his distress at the court’s (appropriate) refusal to let him proceed pro se without further discussion. The marshal told the court that Jones was “still talking about yesterday” and that he was “reliving the past.” The marshal further indicated that Jones did not think that he had done anything wrong the day before and believed that he had been treated unjustly. I do not disagree with the majority that “[t]he fact that [Jones’s] conduct may have been based on what he believed to be a compelling reason . . . does not excuse his misconduct,” Norde, 294 F.3d at 413, Maj. Op. 24, though I note that we are not confronting Jones’s mere belief that he had a compelling claim—this court apparently agrees with him that his initial removal was wrongful. But what concerns me is not whether Jones’s behavior could be excused in light of the previous day’s violation, but whether he had a right to be told that if he did not behave he would continue to be excluded. Under Allen, he clearly did.3. 3 Even if the majority is correct that there are situations in which a warning preceding removal is not required by Allen, nothing in this case after February 3 suggests it would be one. Nor does the majority even attempt to explain why this particular case so qualified. I concede that Jones’s behavior after the court’s initial wrongful removal of him may have necessitated an immediate emergency removal, and I do not read Allen to say that the judge was required to shout out a warning before safety could be restored to the courtroom. But once Jones was secured or the courtroom otherwise made safe, the court was required to warn the him before continuing to exclude him from the trial. Nothing in this case even remotely suggests that the court’s failure to warn Jones on the second day was necessitated by exigent circumstances. Accordingly, even if Allen does not, as the majority tells us, “create[] an absolute requirement of warning,” Maj. Op. 29 fn. 9, a warning was required here. 6 Allen warnings were not only required, but especially important in this case. Jones, who wanted to attend court and whose misbehavior was occasioned in part by the court’s previous initially wrongful removal, might have heeded the court’s warning that he had to behave appropriately or risk further exclusion, had one been given. Moreover, given that Jones’s initial removal was precipitated only by his “insist[ing] on speaking personally with the court despite being represented by counsel and . . . [his] persist[ance] in arguing with the court about its rulings,” Maj. Op. 21, Jones may not have made the connection between his violent behavior and his exclusion. From his perspective, the court was liable to remove him simply for insisting—correctly— that he had a right to represent himself. Maj. Op. 7-8. If he had been warned, however, about what sort of behavior actually warranted removal, he might have understood what was required of him to retain his right to presence, and the “deplorable” act of “remov[ing] a man from his own trial,” Allen, 397 U.S. at 347, avoided. Warnings are not ancillary under Allen’s framework; they are crucial. First, as just noted, warnings help prevent the loss of the right to presence where it can be avoided. Allen itself tells us that “courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against the loss of constitutional rights,” Id. at 343 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). Second, and most importantly, warnings ensure a defendant’s implied waiver by misconduct is both knowing and voluntary. As the majority notes a waiver of the right to be present at trial, “as the waiver of any constitutional right in a criminal proceeding, must be knowing and voluntary.” Polizzi v. United States, 926 F.2d 1311, 1319 (2d Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Lucky, 569 F.3d 101, 107-08 (2d Cir. 2009). A criminal defendant, who is not an expert in criminal procedure or constitutional law, must generally be advised of the consequences of waiving his rights, and be found by the court to have made a knowing and voluntary waiver, before being permitted to waive such an important right as presence at trial. Maj. Op. 17-18. Allen’s warning requirement and its reliance on Zerbst, which established the 7 knowing and voluntary waiver standard, tell us that even an implied waiver of the right to presence based on conduct must be knowing and voluntary— a contention with which the majority agrees. Maj. Op. 18 fn. 3. See also Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966) (“There is a presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights, and for a waiver to be effective it must be clearly established that there was ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” (internal citation omitted)); United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 768-69 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that while a defendant can implicitly waive his right to presence based on his conduct, under Allen, such a waiver must still be knowing and voluntary) (quoting Allen, 397 U.S. at 343); Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1258 fn. 45 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting Allen “supports retention of the knowing-and-voluntary waiver standard in right-to-presence cases”). If a defendant is warned that misconduct will lead to exclusion, and engages it in anyway, he has waived his right to presence knowingly and voluntarily. Not so with a defendant who has not been warned—especially one, like Jones, who was initially excluded wrongfully, and who cannot have been expected to connect his behavior to the loss of the right. Under Allen, as well as Zerbst and the Supreme Court’s continued jurisprudence on knowing and voluntary waiver of rights, a defendant must be warned before he is excluded from his trial.4 He must be 4 I note that, as a technical matter, Jones was not “removed” from the courtroom on February 4, but rather never allowed to enter. This distinction is completely irrelevant for Allen purposes, however, as the only question is whether a defendant must be warned before his right to be presence can be deemed waived and the trial continued in his absence. Whether the defendant is technically inside or outside of the courtroom at this point is of no moment, as the majority implicitly recognizes in finding that the marshal’s out-of-court assessment was sufficient for the court’s determination that Jones could not return. Moreover, any distinction between “removal” and “refusal to let enter” in this context would eviscerate Allen’s warning requirement, for all a judge would need to do to avoid it is, as here, effectuate a wrongful, but harmless removal and then refuse to let a defendant reenter the courtroom. I also note that the events of February 4th could to some extent be characterized as a second exclusion, rather than a refusal to let reclaim, since the judge initially determined that Jones could reenter, and then changed his mind based on Jones’s apparent change in behavior. 8 given an opportunity to comport himself appropriately, and more importantly, given the opportunity to do so with the knowledge that a failure to behave will lead to the loss of his right to be present. Without warning, we cannot say Jones’s misbehavior either on February 3rd in the courtroom or the next day with the marshal constituted a knowing waiver of his right to be present. The Supreme Court has clearly established that the right to presence cannot be implicitly waived without warning. A defendant edging towards or having already crossing the line of excludable behavior must be given a chance to step back—or if he fails to do so, knowingly and voluntarily face the consequences of his actions. Jones faced the consequences of his misdeeds without ever having been warned about what they would be. Continued trial in his absence based on the lack of warning alone was a violation of his right to be present and a violation of clearly established Supreme Court law.