Opinion ID: 468600
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Implicit Duty

Text: 9 The plaintiff points to the list of routine uses published by the Bureau (see supra note 3) to support his contention that the information must be necessary for the performance of the law enforcement officer's duties. Plaintiff then states that because he was not on parole or probation defendant Gahl had no duties toward Kimberlin as a probation officer, so that the information was not needed by Gahl. The plaintiff reads too much into subsection (d) of the routine use list. It is true that subsection (c), not applicable here (see 605 F.Supp. at 83), explicitly requires that employees of the Department of Justice need the information in performance of their duties before that routine use applies. However, there is no such requirement in subsection (d). Instead of a duty requirement, subsection (d) goes on to limit explicitly the uses of the information for law enforcement officials (e.g., investigations, possible criminal prosecutions, civil court actions, or regulatory proceedings) whereas subsection (c) does not provide for specific uses. Thus, unlike subsection (c), subsection (d) restricts the use of information obtained from the Inmate Commissary Account System to particular legal proceedings and a duty requirement is unnecessary under that subsection. We reject the plaintiff's argument that the disclosure must be pursuant to a specific duty of the law enforcement official under subsection (d).