Opinion ID: 4538314
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Common-Law Claims

Text: Holsapple also appeals the district court’s adverse summary judgment rulings on his state common-law claims for defamation of character, false light invasion of privacy, and breach of contract. Our analysis of pertinent Michigan law confirms the soundness of the district court’s grant of summary judgment against Holsapple on these claims as well. Kiely v. Heartland Rehabilitation Services, Inc., 359, F.3d 386, 389 (6th Cir. 2004). However, Judge Schmidt of the Bay County Circuit Court ultimately held that Holsapple could not establish a prima facie case under the PWDCRA, given that he failed to show that his alleged impairment and/or perceived impairment qualified as a disability. 18 Case No. 19-1455, Holsapple v. Cunningham In advancing his common-law counts, Holsapple again references the media statements of Davis-Johnson, Bay County corporation counsel and Cunningham’s attorney, described earlier. Holsapple contends that Cunningham defamed him through Davis-Johnson’s commentary. A prima facie case of defamation under Michigan law requires a plaintiff to show “(1) that the defendant made a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) that the defendant published the defamatory statement to a third party, (3) that the defendant was at least negligent in publishing the statement, and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm (defamation per se) or the existence of special harm caused by publication (defamation per quod).” Colista v. Thomas, 616 N.W.2d 249, 254 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Ireland v. Edwards, 584 N.W.2d 632, 636–37 (1998)). “A communication is defamatory if it tends to lower an individual’s reputation in the community or deters third persons from associating or dealing with that individual. However, not all defamatory statements are actionable. If a statement cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating actual facts about the plaintiff, it is protected by the First Amendment.” Ireland, 583 N.W.2d at 636; (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20, (1990) and Garvelink v. Detroit News, 522 N.W.2d 883, 886 (Mich. Ct. App.1994)). Thus, “at least some expressions of opinion are protected.” Ireland, 583 N.W.2d at 636 (citing Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18–20). Holsapple also claims false light invasion of privacy resulting from Davis-Johnson’s statements. To establish a false light invasion of privacy claim under Michigan law, he must show “that the defendant broadcast to the public in general, or to a large number of people, information that was unreasonable and highly objectionable by attributing to the plaintiff characteristics, conduct, or beliefs that were false and placed the plaintiff in a false position. In accordance with this standard, this cause of action cannot succeed if the contested statements are true.” Porter v. 19 Case No. 19-1455, Holsapple v. Cunningham Royal Oak, 542 N.W.2d 905, 909 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Duran Detroit News, 504 N.W.2d 715, 720–21 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993)). In the proceedings below the parties disputed (1) whether the statement of Davis-Johnson could be imputed to Cunningham based on agency principles, or whether Davis-Johnson was a true party in interest with respect to Holsapple’s claims; (2) whether Cunningham was entitled to absolute immunity for these statements; and (3) whether Holsapple could establish a factual question regarding malice. Without addressing these questions, however, the district court summarily dismissed Holsapple’s defamation and false light invasion of privacy claims on the ground that Davis-Johnson’s statements were subjective opinions that could not be proven false, as required to sustain either count. On appeal, Holsapple argues that the particular remark made by Davis-Johnson, stating “that [Holsapple] would not best serve the Bay County citizens,” represents a factual assertion. (Appellant Br., at 41 (citing MLive Article, RE 17-8, Page ID # 661-668)). We find Holsapple’s argument unpersuasive and agree with the district court that Davis Johnson’s comments, contingent as they were on subjective evaluation, were opinions that could not give rise to liability. As the district court noted, the main takeaways of Davis-Johnson’s comments can be summarized as follows: (1) Holsapple is wasting taxpayer dollars in his bringing of “unsubstantiated lawsuits” against Bay County and Bay County officials; and (2) Holsapple’s “past work ethic and performance” with the Bay County Police Department “suggest” he would not best serve the Bay County citizens. (emphasis added). We agree with the district court that Davis-Johnson’s characterizations of the lawsuits as “unsubstantiated” and a “waste of taxpayer money,” can neither be measured objectively nor definitively resolved. Rather, these characterizations represent the opinions of a public sector 20 Case No. 19-1455, Holsapple v. Cunningham attorney who, as a representative of Bay County and Cunningham, acted as an advocate of opinions in support of her positions. As noted by the district court, Davis-Johnson did not issue any objectively verifiable and current description of Holsapple’s “bad attitude,” “poor performance,” or “insufficient work ethic.” Rather, looking in retrospect at Holsapple’s history of employment for Bay County, DavisJohnson described his “past work ethic and performance” as “suggest[ing] [that] he would not best serve the Bay County citizens” (emphasis added). This language clearly constitutes an opinion that cannot be definitively resolved by a third-party source, one way or the other. The district court therefore appropriately granted summary judgment to Cunningham on the defamation and false light claims. Finally, Holsapple appeals the district court’s dismissal of his breach-of-contract claim. He argues that Cunningham breached the settlement agreement through his attorney’s commentary allegedly in violation of the non-disparagement clause. As with his defamation and false light claims, Holsapple argues that the remarks made by Davis-Johnson to the newspaper were “disparaging” and “defamatory” of his character. The court concluded that there was no breach because Davis-Johnson’s comments were subjective opinion, as opposed to facts that could be verifiably proven, and such opinion could not be reasonably interpreted by onlookers to be “defamatory” or “disparaging” of Holsapple’s character. Although the court’s conclusion is correct, there is more that can be said in support of its plain reading of the non-disparagement clause. Under Michigan law, issues of contractual interpretation are reviewed de novo. Holmes v. Holmes, 760 N.W.2d 300, 307 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008). When assessing the contract at issue, a reviewing court must determine the contracting parties’ intent by enforcing the document’s plain 21 Case No. 19-1455, Holsapple v. Cunningham and unambiguous language. Barclae v. Zarb, 834 N.W.2d 100, 220 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Woodbury v. Res–Care Premier, Inc., 814 N.W.2d 308 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012)). The key words from the non-disparagement clause at issue are “defaming or disparaging,” which represent the material portion of the Agreement. (Settlement agreement, RE 17-3, Page ID # 445). Although “defaming” is not defined in the settlement, Michigan law provides us a legal definition of “defamatory,” which, as noted, provides that “[i]f a statement cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating actual facts about the plaintiff, it is protected by the First Amendment.” Ireland, 583 N.W.2d at 636; see Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20. Based on Michigan’s legal definition, and our holding, where we affirmed the dismissal of Holsapple’s defamation and false light claims, it does not appear that Davis-Johnson’s statements were “defamatory.” Because they could reasonably be interpreted as exhibiting her opinion about Holsapple’s lawsuit and his past employment, they did not communicate “actual facts” that could objectively be verified as “false” by a third-party source. Therefore, based on Michigan law of defamation, Davis-Johnson’s comments were not “defamatory” as to constitute a breach of contract. However, that still leaves us to resolve the final question: Were Davis-Johnson’s comments “disparaging” of Holsapple? Only Holsapple offered the district court a definition of “disparaging,” which, incidentally, the court concluded, “suggest[ed] that disparaging remarks must also be false,” meaning no breach of contract occurred. (Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, RE 24, Page ID # 1089). However, in the appellate briefing, neither party has submitted any other definitions of “disparaging” to inform our analysis of Davis-Johnson’s statements. In situations where a term remains undefined in the contract, and the parties offer insufficient evidence of the intended meaning, we turn to definitions offered by secondary sources 22 Case No. 19-1455, Holsapple v. Cunningham and dictionaries. Although, not entirely analogous to the contract breach at issue here, the First Restatement of Torts offers the following discussion of “disparagement.” One who, without a privilege to do so, publishes matter which is untrue and disparaging to another’s property in land, chattels or intangible things under such circumstances as would lead a reasonable man to foresee that the conduct of a third person as purchaser or lessee thereof might be determined thereby is liable for pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the impairment of vendibility thus caused. Restatement (First) of Torts § 624 (1938) (emphasis added). Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) also offers several definitions for “disparagement”: “[a] derogatory comparison of one thing with another”; ““[t]he act or an instance of unfairly castigating or detracting from the reputation of someone or something”8; or “[a] false and injurious statement that discredits or detracts from the reputation of another’s character, property, product or business.” See Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Lundy Enterprises, LLC, No. 3:11-CV-0011-N, 2013 WL 12123949, at  (N.D. Tex. June 11, 2013). In turn, Webster’s Dictionary (2d ed. 2001) defines “disparage” as either: “to speak of or treat slightingly” or “to bring reproach or discredit upon; lower the estimation of.” See Pizza Hut, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-0011-N, 2013 WL 12123949, at . The Oxford English Dictionary defines disparaging as an adjective “[t]hat speaks of or treats slightingly, that brings reproach or discredit.” Disparage, Oxford English Dictionary (Online ed. 2020). The Meriam-Webster Dictionary defines it as “meant to belittle the value or importance of someone or something.” Disparaging, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Online ed. 2020). Unlike with “defamatory” statements, it is, admittedly, slightly less clear whether “disparaging” comments must be objectively verifiable. Moreover, there is a lack of state or 8 As to the second offered definition, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) does issue the following qualification: “Although may disparagements are untruthful or otherwise unfair, falsity is not a requirement. Any statement cast in a negative light may amount to a disparagement in the general sense.” 23 Case No. 19-1455, Holsapple v. Cunningham federal case law that speaks directly to this issue. Nonetheless, the description offered by the Restatement of Torts suggests that the necessary elements of the disparagement tort include that a given statement is “false . . . in a manner that can be measured.” Rawn Howard Reinhard, The Tort of Disparagement and the Developing First Amendment, 1987 Duke L.J. 727, 728 (1987). Similarly, in characterizing a “disparaging” statement as “false and injurious,” the Black’s Law definition also suggests that “disparaging” statements must be capable of being objectively verified—as opposed to simply representing an opinion offered by a party. We also consider the forum in which Davis-Johnson made her statements—an online newspaper article discussing the then-pending litigation—and her role as a legal advocate on behalf of Bay County and Cunningham. These considerations lead us to conclude that her comments fell in the category of opinionated advocacy rather than the bucket of factual statements about Holsapple’s job performance or potential. Even setting aside the question of objective verification, we agree with the district court’s reasoning that the statements made by Davis-Johnson were not “disparaging,” in that they were neither intended to “belittle” Holsapple’s “value” or “importance” as deputy in the community, nor intended to bring “reproach” or “discredit” to him in the community. Rather, once again, it is important to evaluate the context in which Davis-Johnson offered the statements—during an interview with a newspaper journalist. Although it is unclear from the record, it is likely that Davis-Johnson anticipated that the article would feature both her legal position as the attorney representing Cunningham and Bay County, as well as the legal position of Mastromarco as the attorney for Holsapple. In such an adversarial setting, it would have been appropriate for her to offer advocacy of her client’s legal position, which must be viewed as independent of her actually intending to speak for the purpose of “belittling” Holsapple’s “value” as a deputy in Bay County. 24 Case No. 19-1455, Holsapple v. Cunningham In fact, adversarial advocacy of this nature would very likely have been perceived by readers as inevitable, given the ongoing, and very public, contested nature of the parties’ legal battles.