Opinion ID: 2614963
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Good Faith as an Element

Text: Respondent argues that the focus of a disciplinary proceeding is subjective and discipline is not warranted so long as the attorney had a good faith belief that what [the attorney] did was right at the time. Respondent's Opening Brief at 30. He argues that our holding in In re Myers, 164 Ariz. 558, 795 P.2d 201 (1990), supports the proposition that professional discipline is not appropriate unless the attorney knowingly and intentionally committed professional misconduct. Respondent maintains that because he was acting in good faith, there is not clear and convincing evidence that he knowingly and intentionally committed professional misconduct and therefore Myers mandates that no discipline be imposed. We disagree. First, Myers is distinguishable from this case. In Myers, the lawyer was disciplined under our former Code of Professional Responsibility. See former Rule 29(a). [6] Two of the three rules that were alleged to be violated required that the violation be intentional. See Disciplinary Rule (DR) 7-101(A)(1) and DR 7-101(A)(3). Moreover, the State Bar in that case expressly charged the lawyer with intentional misconduct. In re Myers, 164 Ariz. at 559, 795 P.2d at 202. [7] In the present case, Respondent is charged with violating the current Rules of Professional Conduct. Unlike Myers, Respondent is not charged with an intentional violation of the disciplinary rules, nor do the rules at issues expressly require that intentional misconduct be shown. See ER 1.1, ER 1.3, and ER 1.4. Second, Myers cannot be interpreted as broadly as Respondent claims. In Myers, the attorney's conduct at issue (failing to appear on behalf of his client at a scheduled deportation hearing) could not be attributed to either a lack of desire or effort to serve his client. 164 Ariz. at 560, 795 P.2d at 203. Rather, the lawyer, after researching the issue, concluded that his appearance might confer jurisdiction and thus subject his client to deportation; therefore, he deliberately chose not to appear. Id. In reaching our decision in Myers, we recognized the complexity of the rules in immigration court and that the lawyer had to deal with legitimate uncertainties. Id. at 560 n. 2, 561, 795 P.2d at 203 n. 2, 204. Consequently, because the lawyer was charged with intentional misconduct, whether he had a good faith belief [in a strategy] based on some tenable legal argument became our central inquiry. Id. at 561, 795 P.2d at 204. Although an attorney's good faith may be an important consideration in a disciplinary proceeding, it need not always be the controlling issue, as in Myers. Cf. Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 88-90 (1986) (discussing the mens rea requirement in disciplinary proceedings, noting that an improper motive generally is not required to impose discipline). We now turn to the merits of this case.