Opinion ID: 1952326
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Jury Charge Regarding Defendant's Statement

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury that the State had to prove the credibility of defendant's statement beyond a reasonable doubt had the clear capacity to bring about an unjust result, thus requiring a reversal of his conviction. Because defendant did not object to the challenged instruction he has waived any challenge to the instruction on appeal. R. 1:7-2. This Court may reverse only if it finds plain error. R. 2:10-2. Under federal plain error review, defendant has the burden to show that there is an error, that the error is clear or obvious, and that the error has affected substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1777, 123 L.Ed. 2d 508, 519 (1993). Our law is the same. In State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409, 688 A. 2d 97 (1997), we stated that in considering a jury charge, plain error is [l]egal impropriety in the charge prejudicially affecting the substantial rights of the defendant sufficiently grievous to justify notice by the reviewing court and to convince the court that of itself the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result. [ Id. at 422, 688 A. 2d 97 (citations omitted).] At trial, defendant asked that the court instruct the jury as required by State v. Hampton, 61 N.J. 250, 272, 294 A. 2d 23 (1972). The court gave the model jury charge created in response to Hampton. In Hampton, this Court held that it is for the trial court to determine the admissibility and voluntariness of a statement, considering the precepts of Miranda. However, the Court also instructed courts that if the statements were found legally admissible, juries still had to be provided with the opportunity to reject the credibility of those statements. The Hampton rule was codified in former Evid. R. 8(3), now N.J.R.E. 104(c). The Rule, in pertinent part, directs that: [i]f the judge admits the statement the jury shall not be informed of the finding that the statement is admissible but shall be instructed to disregard the statement if it finds that it is not credible. N.J.R.E. 104(c). In Jordan, supra, we reaffirmed the Hampton rule, although we noted that a failure without objection, to give a Hampton charge is not per se reversible error. Defendant received a Hampton charge. He asks now for a rule that the State must establish beyond a reasonable doubt the credibility of a defendant's statement. Hampton does not require that the State carry such a burden. The principle could be counterproductive to a defendant. In this case the defendant's statement was partially exculpatory. He never admitted to knowing or purposeful murder of Theresa. It would be anomalous to require the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the truthfulness of that part of the statement. In State v. Bowman, 165 N.J. Super. 531, 398 A. 2d 908 (App.Div. 1979), the court had reasoned that a jury should be told that the State must establish the credibility of conflicting statements beyond a reasonable doubt. However, in State v. Jordan, 285 N.J. Super. 589, 667 A. 2d 1094 (1995), aff'd, 147 N.J. 409, 688 A. 2d 97 (1997), the Appellate Division rejected the Bowman suggestion, reasoning that even the Hampton charge was dispensable when the State offered two conflicting statements because [t]he jury had to know and understand that they would have to decide which of these versions was credible. 285 N.J. Super. at 595, 667 A. 2d 1094. We thus reject defendant's argument.