Opinion ID: 2095304
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: affidavits for purpose of impeaching the jury's verdict

Text: Before addressing these issues, we feel compelled to comment on Redmond's reliance on affidavits of counsel as support for his posttrial motion. The motion was accompanied by an affidavit from his attorney stating that he had spoken with unidentified jurors after the trial. The attorney reported the jurors' belief that the parties were equally at fault. Socha did not object to the admission of the affidavit, but challenged the accuracy of its contents. A second affidavit, filed with Redmond's reply to Socha's memo in opposition to the motion, reported that three unnamed jurors told Redmond's attorney that they could not agree on who should be awarded damages. These affidavits represent an attempt by Redmond to impeach the jury's verdicts. Although this court has frequently addressed this issue in the criminal context (see, e.g., People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill.2d 444, 467-69, 275 Ill.Dec. 838, 793 N.E.2d 609 (2002)), we have not discussed the attempted impeachment of a jury verdict via affidavit in a civil case since Chalmers v. City of Chicago, 88 Ill.2d 532, 534, 59 Ill.Dec. 76, 431 N.E.2d 361 (1982). In Chalmers, the plaintiff made claims of negligence and willful and wanton misconduct against the city after her car was hit by a police squad car. The jury awarded $1,705.99 in damages, which represented her medical expenses, no damages for her disability and pain and suffering, and $13,000 in punitive damages. In answer to a special interrogatory, however, the jury found that the officer who had been driving the squad car was not guilty of willful and wanton misconduct. The trial court entered judgment for the lesser amount only. Chalmers, 88 Ill.2d at 534, 59 Ill. Dec. 76, 431 N.E.2d 361. In his closing arguments, Chalmers's attorney had asked the jury to award total damages of $14,500 for her medical expenses plus her temporary disability and pain and suffering. Thus, the amount sought in noneconomic damages was approximately $13,000. Chalmers, 88 Ill.2d at 536, 59 Ill.Dec. 76, 431 N.E.2d 361. His posttrial motion sought one of several remedies: an order conforming the verdict to the apparent intention of the jury; reassembly of the jury so that its members could be polled to determine their intentions; an order for additur; or a new trial solely on the issue of damages. Chalmers, 88 Ill.2d at 534, 59 Ill.Dec. 76, 431 N.E.2d 361. The motion was supported by affidavits of 11 of the 12 jurors ( Chalmers, 88 Ill.2d at 534, 59 Ill.Dec. 76, 431 N.E.2d 361), in which they explained that they had been confused by the verdict form and that it was their intention to award $13,000 in compensatory damages for disability and pain and suffering. Chalmers, 88 Ill.2d at 536, 59 Ill.Dec. 76, 431 N.E.2d 361. The trial court refused to alter the verdict or to grant a new trial. This court noted: It is well established in this State, and almost universally recognized, that a jury may not impeach its verdict by affidavit or testimony which shows the motive, method, or process by which the verdict was reached. [Citations.] Thus, it is impermissible to challenge a verdict following the jury's discharge by explaining the basis for the jury's findings [citation] or by asserting that the jury was mistaken. Chalmers, 88 Ill.2d at 537, 59 Ill.Dec. 76, 431 N.E.2d 361. After considering the plaintiff's argument that the jurors' affidavits should be deemed a competent basis for the correction of an error that was essentially clerical in nature, this court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion for a new trial based on its conclusion that: It is apparent to us that under the facts before us plaintiff seeks to impeach the verdict not because of a `clerical' mistake in recordation but because of the jury's misapprehension of the instructions or the effect of their findings. This type of impeachment is clearly impermissible. Chalmers, 88 Ill.2d at 539, 59 Ill.Dec. 76, 431 N.E.2d 361. Further: [T]he testimony or affidavits of jurors cannot be used to show that the jury misunderstood the instructions or the law [citation], [or] the effect of a particular finding or of their verdict. [Citations.] The meaning and effect of the verdict must be judged from its terms alone. Chalmers, 88 Ill.2d at 539, 59 Ill.Dec. 76, 431 N.E.2d 361. The law in Illinois is clear on the subject of the use of juror testimony or affidavits for the purpose of impeaching a verdict. Juror testimony or affidavits will not be admitted to show the motive, method, or process by which the jury reached its verdict, but may be offered as proof of the existence of improper extraneous influences on the jury. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill.2d at 468, 275 Ill.Dec. 838, 793 N.E.2d 609. See also Carroll v. Preston Trucking Co., 349 Ill.App.3d 562, 285 Ill.Dec. 611, 812 N.E.2d 431 (2004) (rejecting juror affidavits offered to support assertion that the jury used an impermissible quotient process to reach its verdict). This rule serves to protect not only the finality of judgments but also the privacy of the jury room. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill.2d at 468, 275 Ill.Dec. 838, 793 N.E.2d 609. In addition, the inadmissibility of such affidavits protects jurors from being `harassed and beset by the defeated party' ( Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill.2d at 468, 275 Ill.Dec. 838, 793 N.E.2d 609, quoting Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120, 107 S.Ct. 2739, 2747, 97 L.Ed.2d 90, 106 (1987), quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267, 35 S.Ct. 783, 784, 59 L.Ed. 1300, 1302 (1915)), in an effort to have an unfavorable verdict set aside. In the present case, the trial court was not presented with juror affidavits, but with affidavits from plaintiff's counsel describing statements made to him by individual jurors. Opposing counsel disputed the accuracy of the description and offered her own version of the jurors' statements. In the end, the trial court was faced with a swearing contest between attorneys that could have been resolved only by the testimony or affidavits of the jurors themselves. We see no reason to treat an attorney's affidavit purporting to reveal jurors' opinions on motive, method, or process any differently than juror affidavits. In both instances, the party proffering the affidavits is making an improper attempt to impeach the verdict and the jurors themselves, having done their civic duty, are subjected to questioning by a disappointed litigant. We conclude that the contents of the affidavits could not properly be considered in ruling on the posttrial motion. We are unable to determine from the record how much weight, if any, the trial court gave to the affidavits. The appellate court made no mention of the affidavits in its opinion. Because the affidavits impermissibly seek to impeach the jury's verdict, this court will not consider the affidavits as we determine whether the verdicts were legally inconsistent or against the manifest weight of the evidence.