Opinion ID: 1828790
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the lower court erred in granting MDPS's Motion for Summary Judgment which required Stallworth to continue to register as a sex offender.

Text: ¶ 18. In an effort to avoid the non-criminal consequences of his behavior, Stallworth filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, as opposed to a Petition for Relief from Duty to Register. Mississippi Code Annotated Section 45-33-47 establishes various requirements for relief from the duty to register. [2] See, e.g., Miss.Code Ann. § 45-33-47(2)(b)(ix)(Supp.2007) (If the offender has been convicted of one (1) of the following offenses, the offender is subject to lifetime registration and shall not be relieved of the duty to register: (ix) Any conviction for violation of a similar law of another jurisdiction or designation as a sexual predator in another jurisdiction). See also Miss.Code Ann. § 45-33-47(3) (Rev.2007), ([t]he offender will be required to continue registration for any sex-offense conviction unless the conviction is set aside in any post-conviction proceeding, the offender receives a pardon, or the charge is dismissed. Upon submission of the appropriate documentation to the department of one (1) of these occurrences, registration will continue). ¶ 19. In support of its motion for summary judgment, the state filed Stallworth's deposition testimony from a civil action based on the same underlying facts. Mississippi Code Annotated Section 45-33-47 establishes the standard of proof and factors to be considered by the trial court on a Petition for Relief from Duty to Register. In determining whether to release an offender from the obligation to register, the court shall consider the nature of the registrable offense committed and the criminal and relevant noncriminal behavior of the petitioner both before and after conviction. The court may relieve the offender of the duty to register only if the petitioner shows, by clear and convincing evidence, that the registrant properly maintained his registration as required by law and that future registration of the petitioner will not serve the purposes of this chapter and the court is otherwise satisfied that the petitioner is not a current or potential threat to public safety. The district attorney in the circuit in which the petition is filed must be given notice of the petition at least three (3) weeks before the hearing on the matter. The district attorney may present evidence in opposition to the requested relief or may otherwise demonstrate the reasons why the petition should be denied. If the court denies the petition, the petitioner may not again petition the court for relief until one (1) year has elapsed unless the court orders otherwise in its order of denial of relief. Miss.Code Ann. § 45-33-47(3) (Supp.2007) (emphasis added). ¶ 20. Following the statutory mandate, the lower court was presented with the facts surrounding Stallworth's crime. It is clear from the trial court's opinion that the trial judge considered Stallworth's sworn testimony from the related civil proceeding. That testimony provides compelling evidence which cannot be ignored. ¶ 21. Pertinent portions of Stallworth's deposition taken on February 5 and 6, 2003, reveal the following: ATTORNEY: Had [the victim] asked you to come into the bed? STALLWORTH: She had not.... I put my hands in her pajamas and I started to  I guess massaging her clitoris.... STALLWORTH: I kept ... my finger on her clitoris for I would suspect about more than ten minutes.... ATTORNEY: Are you having vaginal intercourse or anal intercourse? STALLWORTH: Vaginal ... ATTORNEY: You're saying that you would have vaginal intercourse and then oral, and go back and forth? STALLWORTH: Right.... STALLWORTH: And I just turned over and laid on the bed and she pulled the cover and said, What was that? What were you doing? And she said, That was not consensual.... ¶ 22. Mississippi Code Annotated Section 97-3-95(1)(a) (Rev.2006) states, A person is guilty of sexual battery if he or she engages in sexual penetration with (a) another person without his or her consent. ¶ 23. Even if one were to ignore Stallworth's sworn testimony in the civil proceeding, Stallworth's actions, which he admitted in the Maryland plea colloquy, clearly satisfy the definition of attempted sexual battery, a registerable offense in this state pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated Section 45-33-25(1). ¶ 24. Mississippi Code Annotated Section 97-1-7 (emphasis added) states, Every person who shall design and endeavor to commit an offense, and shall do any overt act toward the commission thereof, but shall fail therein, or shall be prevented from committing the same, on conviction thereof, shall, where no provision is made by law for the punishment of such offense, be punished as follows: If the offense attempted to be committed be capital, such offense shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding ten years; if the offense attempted be punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, or by fine and imprisonment in the county jail, then the attempt to commit such offense shall be punished for a period or for an amount not greater than is prescribed for the actual commission of the offense so attempted. ¶ 25. This Court has held, In general, Section 97-1-7 (1972) requires a showing of three elements: (1) an attempt to commit a particular crime, (2) a direct ineffectual act done toward its commission and (3) the failure to consummate its commission. McGowan v. State, 541 So.2d 1027, 1030 (Miss.1989) (citations omitted). ¶ 26. Stallworth admitted in his plea that he placed his hands on the victim's vagina without her consent. We are constrained to understand how a person placing his hands on the genitals of another person without her consent would not be an attempt to commit the crime of sexual battery and a direct ineffectual act toward its commission. Therefore, even in the absence of Stallworth's deposition testimony, Stallworth's conduct and plea satisfy the elements of attempted sexual battery in Mississippi, a registerable offense in this State. ¶ 27. We find no error in the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of MDPS, which requires Stallworth to continue to register.