Opinion ID: 1275751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Absent Party's Role in Comparative Negligence

Text: A somewhat related issue is plaintiff's argument that the trial court's instruction concerning plaintiff's contributory negligence was confined to the parties to the litigation, and did not extend to all the parties to the accident. Apparently, Syllabus Point 3 of Bradley, [10] has engendered some confusion, in particular, as to whether plaintiff's total contributory negligence is determined, not only with regard to the parties actually in the litigation, but with regard as well to those who, while not parties to the litigation, were parties to the accident. [11] The problem of whether persons not parties to the litigation but parties to the accident should be considered in ascertaining plaintiff's total contributory negligence has not received a great deal of discussion. [12] In the five other states [13] that have judicially abolished contributory negligence, only California has touched on this question, and then only by way of a footnote. In American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.3d 578, 146 Cal.Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899 (1978), the court concluded that plaintiff's degree of contributory negligence should be ascertained by looking to all parties to the accident, not just those in the litigation. [14] In other jurisdictions, the question has arisen in the context of a comparative negligence statute. For example, in Board of County Commissioners v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d 1174 (Wyo.1981), recovery was permitted by statute if such negligence (of the plaintiff) was not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought. 623 P.2d at 1180. Despite the fact that the phrase person against whom recovery is sought would suggest only a party to the litigation, the court held that the statute meant all parties to the occurrence. The Wyoming court acknowledged that its statutory language was similar to Wisconsin and relied upon the Wisconsin case of Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721, 727-28 (1934), which has consistently been reaffirmed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. See Reiter v. Dyken, 95 Wis.2d 461, 290 N.W.2d 510 (1980); Soczka v. Rechner, 73 Wis.2d 157, 242 N.W.2d 910 (1976). See also Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867 (1978); Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis.2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963). If the role of an absent party can be considered in the determination of the plaintiff's total contributory negligence, some problems of proof can arise. It is possible through the other parties, or independent witnesses, to establish some evidentiary basis of the absent tortfeasor's role and the plaintiff's possible contributory negligence in regard to it. However, this factual development may well lack the vigor and clarity which would be present if the absent party were actually in the litigation. In this jurisdiction, as a result of a defendant's ability under Haynes, supra, to bring in absent joint tortfeasors, both plaintiffs and defendants now have a large measure of control over who is a party to the litigation. Moreover, one of the basic underpinnings of Haynes as noted in Bradley was to moderate the inequity which existed in our law that enabled the plaintiff to cast the entire responsibility for an accident on one of several joint tortfeasors by deciding to sue only him. 256 S.E.2d at 886. Consequently, in the ordinary case, it might be expected that all parties to the accident will be parties to the litigation. Undoubtedly, there may be situations where the absent party cannot be brought into the suit, either because the party is beyond the court's jurisdiction, or has the benefit of some immunity, such as governmental immunity, or the benefit of the employer's defense of workmen's compensation. In these situations, it would appear to be unfair to preclude a consideration of the plaintiff's contributory negligence in regard to this absent party. To parallel the Haynes' rationale, the plaintiff should not be able to diminish his own contributory negligence by the inability to bring a particular party into the litigation. Bradley recognized that the rule which completely barred a plaintiff's recovery because of his contributory negligence was unduly harsh. The doctrine of contributory negligence was retained in Bradley to the extent that plaintiff's recovery is barred if his negligence or fault is equal [to] or exceed[s] the combined negligence or fault of the other parties involved in the accident. Syllabus Point 3, in part, Bradley, supra . The fundamental premise of Bradley was that the judicially-created bar of contributory negligence was too harsh but that the common law concept of contributory negligence in the tort law should not be completely abandoned so that where a party substantially contributes to his own damages, he should not be permitted to recover for any part of them. 256 S.E.2d at 885. We also stressed in Bradley that the calculation of the plaintiff's contributory negligence began with the assessment that the sum of the negligence of all the parties to a given accident cannot exceed 100 per cent. 256 S.E.2d at 885. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that in order to obtain a proper assessment of the total amount of the plaintiff's contributory negligence under our comparative negligence rule, it must be ascertained in relation to all of the parties whose negligence contributed to the accident, and not merely those defendants involved in the litigation. Therefore, the trial court's instructions were erroneous to the extent they confined the plaintiff's contributory negligence comparison to the defendant Railroad only.