Opinion ID: 585811
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Immunity Framework

Text: 23 Congress enacted the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (Reform Act), which amended the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80, in response to Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 108 S.Ct. 580, 98 L.Ed.2d 619 (1988), which declined to accord absolute immunity from common law claims to federal Government employees acting in the scope of their employment. The Reform Act restored their absolute immunity by establishing an exclusive remedy against the United States under the FTCA for certain negligent or wrongful acts of federal employees acting within the scope of employment. See United States v. Smith, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1180, 1183-84, 113 L.Ed.2d 134 (1991). Upon certification of the Attorney General that the employee was acting within the scope of employment, the United States is substituted as defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1). The scope of employment determination is made in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). While the scope certification is conclusive for purposes of removal of a state court action to a district court, see 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2), 8 in Melo v. Hafer we held that the certification is subject to judicial review for purposes of substitution. 912 F.2d at 642. 9 But in Melo we did not indicate the means by which the district courts should make this inquiry. Instead we left it to the district court[s] ... to decide which factors are relevant to that determination. Id. 10 24 The appellants maintain that the district court's denial of substitution is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). Under Cohen and its progeny, an order is appealable as a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 if the order: (1) conclusively determines the disputed question; (2) resolves an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action; and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. See, e.g., Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 276, 108 S.Ct. 1133, 1136-37, 99 L.Ed.2d 296 (1988). The Supreme Court has held that the denial of a claim of absolute immunity is immediately appealable. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 741-43, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 2696-98, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982). The appellants argue that, since a denial of absolute immunity is immediately appealable, and the denial of a motion for substitution under the Reform Act is essentially a denial of absolute immunity, it follows that an order denying substitution is immediately appealable. 25 The appellants' argument is not without support as courts have indeed held that an order setting aside the Attorney General's certification is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. See, e.g. Wood v. United States, 956 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir.1992). Nevertheless, it is necessary to put the jurisdictional issue in this case into proper perspective by first reviewing the procedure district courts should employ in considering scope certifications. As we have noted above, the district court in this case determined that further discovery was required before it could definitively rule on the substitution motion, and therefore denied the motion without prejudice pending completion of further discovery. 26 The courts of appeals are beginning to formulate a procedure for reviewing scope certifications. Initially, when the Government or the defendant moves for substitution, the Attorney General's certification, although subject to judicial review, is prima facie evidence that the employee's challenged conduct was within the scope of employment. Brown v. Armstrong, 949 F.2d 1007, 1012 (8th Cir.1991); S.J. & W. Ranch, Inc. v. Lehtinen, 913 F.2d 1538, 1543 (11th Cir.1990), amended, 924 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 62, 116 L.Ed.2d 37 (1991). If the matter is disputed, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff, who must come forward with specific facts rebutting the certification. Brown, 949 F.2d at 1012; Hamrick v. Franklin, 931 F.2d 1209, 1211 (7th Cir.1991); Lehtinen, 913 F.2d at 1543. While the courts have engaged in limited fact finding for the review, it has been recognized that a jury trial on the issue would frustrate Congress' intent to protect federal employees from the uncertain and intimidating task of defending suits that challenge conduct within the scope of their employ. Brown, 949 F.2d at 1011. In furtherance of this principle, the court in Brown determined that, because prior to Westfall questions of official immunity were resolved through summary judgment or dismissal early in the case, challenges to the scope certification must be resolved before trial, as soon after the motion for substitution as practicable, even if an evidentiary hearing is needed to resolve relevant fact disputes. Id. at 1012 (footnote omitted). 27 In Wood v. United States the plaintiff brought an action against an officer of the United States Army for sexual harassment and assault and battery. The Attorney General certified that the defendant was acting within the scope of his employment. Nevertheless, the district court granted the plaintiff's motion to set aside the certification whereupon the Government filed an appeal. 956 F.2d at 9-10. In reviewing the certification, the district court considered the pleadings and various verified and non-verified documents. On appeal, the defendant contended that the district court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the acts alleged actually occurred. Id. at 11. Although the appellate court held that a hearing was not required and affirmed the order of the district court, it recognized that sometimes a hearing may be required, albeit in limited circumstances: 28 [I]n some instances an independent hearing may be required to determine whether an act is within the 'scope of employment' for Westfall Act purposes.... However, such a hearing is required only in those special rare circumstances where there is a factual dispute which would decide the scope of employment issue, as the crux of the certification dispute, even though it is incidentally coextensive with the merits of the case. 29 Id. at 11-12. 30 In Forrest City Machine Works, Inc. v. United States, 953 F.2d 1086 (8th Cir.1992), the court held that, where the plaintiffs did not come forward with any evidence contradicting the certification and the Government's supporting exhibits, the district court did not err in denying the plaintiffs' requests for discovery prior to review of the certification. 953 F.2d at 1088. 11 Similarly, in Woods v. McGuire, 954 F.2d 388 (6th Cir.1992), the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant the plaintiff additional time for discovery, since ample time had been provided. Further, discovery had already taken place, including the deposition of two of the defendants. Id. at 391. It is thus implicit in both Forrest City and Woods v. McGuire that pretrial discovery and a hearing may be required to resolve the scope of employment issue. Cf. Snodgrass v. United States, 957 F.2d 482, 487 (7th Cir.1992) (defendant claiming to have been within the scope of his employment at the time of an accident not entitled to hearing where the Attorney General refuses to certify that he was acting within the scope of employment, at least where there is no factual dispute). 31 Thus, inasmuch as most courts of appeals, including this court in Melo, agree that scope certifications are subject to judicial review, it is not surprising that the courts have also recognized that a limited amount of fact finding is necessary for this task. This undoubtedly requires an opportunity for limited discovery, and, if necessary, an evidentiary hearing. The difficulty lies in balancing the need for a meaningful review of the scope certification with the need to protect federal employees from burdensome discovery. To this end, although a definitive procedure has not emerged governing the review of scope certifications, the following principles have emerged from a synthesis of the cases addressing this issue. 32 The scope certification is prima facie evidence that the employee's challenged conduct occurred within the scope of employment, but it is not conclusive. Thus, a plaintiff challenging the certification has the burden of coming forward with specific facts rebutting it. If the facts can be determined without an evidentiary hearing, the court can rule on a pretrial motion to substitute or to set aside the substitution based on the certification, pleadings, documentary evidence, and affidavits. In the event that a substitution is set aside, the defendant may probably appeal under the collateral order doctrine. 33 On the other hand, if there is a genuine issue of fact material to the scope of employment question, the district court should permit discovery and conduct a hearing, if necessary. But the district court should ensure that both the discovery and the hearing are circumscribed as narrowly as possible, although these are matters within its discretion. See Country Floors, Inc. v. Gepner and Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1062 (3d Cir.1991) ([r]eview of questions ... concerning the scope or opportunity for discovery is for abuse of discretion). 12 We believe that these procedures are appropriate, for while absolute immunity generally confers immunity from suit and not just from liability, immunity resulting from substitution arises only after there has been a judicial determination that the defendant was acting within the scope of employment. Thus, the mere status of being a federal employee does not guarantee total immunity from the judicial process. 13 Cf. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988) (taking functional approach to judicial immunity).