Opinion ID: 2646079
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the gregg trust appeal

Text: The Marie Gregg Trust opted out of the Hershey class, and is therefore not subject to the appeal-bond order. Consequently, we address the merits of the Trust’s appeal. Because the Gregg Trust opted out, the district judge concluded it was free to pursue its own claims against ExxonMobil. But the judge also found its co-trustees, John Eldon Gregg and Keith Thomas Gregg, had not opted out and were, therefore, bound by the settlement agreement. He found the same to be true of the Trust’s attorneys, who evidently were also members of the class. Thus, he concluded the Trust would not be able to pursue its claims against ExxonMobil using its current trustees and counsel. 8 The Gregg Trust appeals this part of the district court’s order. It argues the judge erred by “ignor[ing] the fundamental distinction between a principal and its agent.” (Appellants’ Br. at 50.) Before we address the Trust’s argument, it is important to note what it is not arguing. It is not arguing the district court lacked authority to permanently enjoin all class members from pursuing the claims released in the settlement agreement. In any event, such an argument is unlikely to succeed. See Fed. Judicial Ctr., Manual for Complex Litigation, ' 20.32, at 340 (4th ed. 2004) (“[W]here a class has been certified under [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 23(b)(3), and where class members have failed to avail themselves of their right to opt out and litigate their claims independently in state or federal court, a district court may enjoin those members from initiating or proceeding with civil actions in other state or federal courts”); see also 7B Charles Alan Wright et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1798.1 (3d ed., April 2013 update) (“[A]n injunction . . . may be particularly appropriate once a [class action] settlement has been reached and judgment entered as a part of that settlement”). Nor is the Trust arguing its trustees are free to pursue their own claims against ExxonMobil. To the contrary, it concedes “the co-trustees of the Gregg Trust are also class members . . . who chose not to opt out of the class and are, therefore, subject to the injunction.” (Appellants’ Br. at 50.) Finally, it does not dispute that at least some of its attorneys are members of the class. Instead, it argues only that the district court’s order infringes on its “fundamental 9 right” to choose its own lawyer. (Id. at 51 (quoting Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 442-43 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting))).6 The Trust’s appeal actually turns on whether a district court has the authority to enjoin a class member from pursuing a non-class member’s claim. It says the district court had no such authority here, but we disagree. The district court had the authority to enjoin class members from pursuing released claims either as principals or as agents. To begin, the Trust does not offer any legal authority to the contrary. Its only authority stands for the uncontested proposition that a court cannot enjoin a party not before it. But that is not what the district court did here. The court enjoined parties who are members of the class, some of whom also happen to be the Trust’s agents. The Trust’s legal authority is not on point. 6 Indeed, the Trust concedes that two of its attorneys are members of the class. (See Reply Br. 20 n.15.) Admittedly, it also argues there was insufficient evidence to show its other attorneys were class members. But it makes this claim for the first time in a footnote in its reply brief. (See id.) And “[a]rguments raised in a perfunctory manner, such as in a footnote, are waived.” United States v. Berry, 717 F.3d 823, 834 n.7 (10th Cir.) (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 495 (2013). What is more, it never explains which of its attorneys are class members and which are not. Worse, it never actually claims that some of its attorneys are not class members. “We will not manufacture arguments”—or claims—“for an appellant.” Craven v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 260 F.3d 1218, 1226 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] bare assertion”—let alone no assertion—does not “preserve a claim, particularly when, as here, a host of other issues are presented for review.” Id. We decline to consider whether any of the Gregg Trust’s attorneys are not class members. 10 Moreover, the Trust’s position is inconsistent with the settlement agreement. According to the agreement, by remaining members of the class, each of the trustees and counsel “acknowledge[d] and agree[d] that he, she, or it is concluding the Litigation, and accepting their share of the Settlement Fund and other consideration described herein, as a full, final, and complete compromise and settlement of claims and controversies.” (Appellants’ App’x Vol. II at 362 (emphasis added).) In the agreement, the term “Litigation” included “all facts, contentions, allegations, disputes, and other matters related to . . . Willie Jean Farrar, et al. vs. Mobil Oil Corporation, Case No. 01-CV12”Cthe very case where, prior to the Hershey settlement, the Trust, its trustees, and its counsel had been litigating their claims. Id. at 347B48. Further, the trustees and counsel agreed to “not, . . . on [their] own behalf or by or through others, sue, instigate, or assert against [ExxonMobil] any claims or actions on or concerning the Released Claims,” id. at 362 (emphasis added), which include “any and all causes of action, . . . that are, were, or could have been asserted in the Litigation,” id. at 349Ce.g., the Trust’s claims against ExxonMobil in the parallel state court class action. Thus, by not opting out, the trustees and counsel agreed to not participate any further in the Trust’s or any other entity’s related litigation against ExxonMobil. Furthermore, the district court unquestionably had the power to enjoin not only parties to the litigation before it but also those acting in concert with such parties. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2)(C); see also Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 13-14 (1945) (explaining that the purpose of this rule is to keep parties from “nullify[ing] a 11 decree by carrying out prohibited acts through aiders and abettors”). The district court did precisely that: it enjoined not only class members (i.e., the individual trustees and the attorneys) but also those acting in concert with them (i.e., the Trust if it still was being run by trustees who are class members or still being represented by attorneys who are class members). Specifically, the judge explained, “Absent any appointment of new trustees and employment of different counsel, any action by the Trust necessarily reflects action in concert [with] persons subject to the court’s jurisdiction.” (See Appellants’ App’x Vol. XI at 3681.) Accordingly, even accepting Appellants’ premise that the Trust is a distinct legal entity from its trustees and counsel, absent a change in its composition to remove the latter entities, the district court’s injunction would bar the Trust’s litigation activity as an aider and abettor of its constituent trustees and counsel who are class members. The Trust counters that this result infringes on its “fundamental right” to choose its own lawyer. (Appellants’ Br. at 51.) But the order does not bar the Trust from choosing its own lawyer. The Trust remains free to hire whatever eligible lawyer it wants. Present counsel’s own decision makes them ineligible to represent the Trust. In this case, present counsel chose to remain in the Hershey class, with all the costs and benefits attending class membership. Their choice renders them unavailable to pursue this litigation any further, and the Trust may not act in concert with them if it prosecutes any released claims. 12 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s order as to the Gregg Trust’s trustees and counsel.