Opinion ID: 1277356
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Physical Evidence Derived from Defendant's Statements

Text: On May 4 and 5, 1986, Ronald Wade, a homicide investigator for the Riverside County Sheriffs Department, observed a vehicle in defendant's driveway that was similar to the suspect vehicle description given in the investigation of Diane's homicide. On May 6, Wade and another investigator visited defendant at the mobilehome on the property. Wade asked defendant to describe the nature of his employment; defendant responded that he was a construction worker who drove big rigs to landscape development property. In response to Wade's inquiry regarding where defendant had worked in March of 1986, defendant replied that he worked in the Riverside/La Sierra area around McKinley and Magnolia. To confirm the location of his jobsite, defendant offered to retrieve his appointment book, which he used to keep track of the money owed to him. Defendant opened the book for Wade, revealing the word MAG written on March 24, which defendant indicated meant that he had worked at McKinley and Magnolia on that day. Wade departed from defendant's residence without arresting defendant or seizing the appointment book. Defendant contends that the investigators improperly failed to advise defendant of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, prior to questioning him. As a result, according to defendant, he unknowingly provided the officers with evidence which later was used against him, including his statements and tangible evidence, such as the appointment book. Defendant alleges that such evidence was the fruit of the poisonous tree, and could have formed the basis for a meritorious challenge to the legality of defendant's arrest and the admissibility of all statements and evidence obtained as a result of the interrogation. (See Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441; People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 135 Cal.Rptr. 786, 558 P.2d 872.) He further contends that trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to challenge the admissibility of the physical evidence derived from the statements made by defendant to the investigators. Defendant's contentions are unavailing, because the record on appeal does not disclose the basis for trial counsel's failure to object to this evidence, and the matter is not one in which there could be no satisfactory explanation for counsel's conduct. (See People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th 264, 266, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134; People v. Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 926, 936, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212; People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d 572, 581, 189 Cal.Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144.) The evidence adduced at trial suggests that defendant's statements to the investigators were made voluntarily in a noncustodial setting, and indicates that all of the physical evidence in question, including defendant's appointment book, subsequently was seized pursuant to a valid search warrant. On the basis of the facts disclosed by the record, trial counsel reasonably could have concluded that an objection on Miranda grounds would lack merit (because the initial questioning of defendant occurred in a noncustodial setting) and that the investigating officers' failure to give a Miranda warning during this conversation thus provided no basis for excluding the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant. Accordingly, there is no merit in defendant's claim that trial counsel performed deficiently in this respect. [27]