Opinion ID: 2258987
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the landlords' claims of error

Text: In their motion for a directed verdict on the breach of contract claim, the landlords argued that the tenants had failed to produce any evidence of economic loss suffered as a result of the alleged breach of the Voluntary Agreement. Initially, the court granted the landlords' motion, but after reconsideration the court decided to allow this claim to go to the jury. The court ruled that a reasonable jury, given the amount of rent paid by each individual tenant plaintiff (which the tenants had proved in the course of the trial), could use those amounts as a basis for calculating damages if it found the landlords liable. On appeal, the landlords contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion for a directed verdict on the breach of contract claim. They make two arguments: (1) that the Voluntary Agreement was a contract separate from the tenants' leases, and therefore that an abatement of the rent, the amount of which was stated in those leases, could not properly be awarded as damages for any breach of the agreement; and (2) that, in any event, there was no evidence that the breach resulted in any economic loss to the tenants. We review a ruling on a motion for directed verdict in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. E.g., District of Columbia v. Cassidy, 465 A.2d 395, 397 (D.C. 1983). Applying that standard, we affirm the trial court's ruling.
The Rental Housing Act was enacted, in part, to protect tenants in the District of Columbia from potential economic abuses by their landlords, while at the same time enabling landlords to obtain a reasonable return on their investments. See D.C.Code § 45-2502 (1996). Relevant to the present case is section 45-2525(a) of the Act, quoted in part in note 2, supra, which authorizes landlords and tenants to enter into Voluntary Agreements of the sort at issue here. The Act further provides that, [i]f approved by the Rent Administrator, [a voluntary] agreement shall be binding on the [landlord] and on all tenants. D.C.Code § 45-2525(b). In this jurisdiction, leases of residential units are interpreted under general provisions of contract law rather than property law. See Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 138 U.S.App. D.C. 369, 373-375, 428 F.2d 1071, 1075-1077, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925, 91 S.Ct. 186, 27 L.Ed.2d 185 (1970). Contract principles established in other areas of the law provide a more rational frame-work for the apportionment of landlord-tenant responsibilities. . . . Id. at 378, 428 F.2d at 1080. Thus it is beyond dispute that the leases between the landlords and the tenants in this case are to be treated as contracts, and that the rights of the parties are contractual rights. What we must decide here is whether the Voluntary Agreement had any effect on those rights, so that a remedy for a breach of the Voluntary Agreement may be devised by looking to the lease. We know of no case exactly like this one, but a close analogy may be found in Vicki Bagley Realty, Inc. v. Laufer, 482 A.2d 359 (D.C.1984). In that case a prospective purchaser of a house agreed, in the contract of sale, to rent the house for three months before actually buying it. A separate lease was drawn up for a three-month term, and the purchaser moved into the house. After two of the purchaser's checks bounced, however, the homeowners filed suit for possession, and the tenant/purchaser moved out soon thereafter. The homeowners then sued the two real estate agencies which had brokered the deal for breach of their fiduciary duties. Addressing the issue of damages, this court held that the sale contract and the three-month lease together constituted a single contract because each referred to specific provisions within the other. When a written agreement incorporates a second writing, the two documents must be read together as constituting the contract between the parties.. . . We must also read the two documents in a manner that gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all their terms. Id. at 366 (citations omitted). We therefore held that a liquidated damages clause in the sale contract limited the damages available under the lease as well, which had no comparable provision. Although a Voluntary Agreement is a creature of statute and requires administrative approval before it may take effect, it is also a modification of an existing lease. In the case at bar, for example, the tenants' original leases provided for central heating and air conditioning, paid for by the Rittenhouse management. The Voluntary Agreement modified this lease provision by making the tenants themselves responsible for the costs of heating and cooling their apartments. Thus the two agreements must be read together as one because the second altered the mutual obligations of the parties as set forth in the first, and the second cannot be properly understood without reference to the first. The landlords' assertion that the Voluntary Agreement has an existence separate and apart from the leasehold relationship denies the very nature of a Voluntary Agreement as an alteration of the rights and duties of landlord and tenant under the lease. See D.C.Code § 45-2525. We hold, therefore, that Voluntary Agreements are not contracts separate from leases. Rather, once approved by the Rent Administrator, a Voluntary Agreement becomes an integral part of the now-modified lease, and the courts must read the two agreements together in a manner that gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all their terms. Laufer, supra, 482 A.2d at 366; cf. North Lincoln Park Neighborhood Ass'n v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, 666 A.2d 63, 66-67 (D.C.1995) (voluntary agreement which settled prior license renewal dispute became part of license, and breach of that agreement must be taken into account in future license renewal proceedings). Since a rent abatement is an accepted form of damages imposed upon a landlord for violating the terms of a lease, [3] we further hold that a rent abatement may also be awarded as damages for breach of a Voluntary Agreement.
The landlords do not seriously contend, nor could they, that there was no evidence of a breach of the Voluntary Agreement. The tenants and two expert witnesses testified in some detail that, contrary to the express terms of the Voluntary Agreement, the new heating and cooling units lacked sufficient power to heat or cool apartment rooms, were noisy, and had no automatic temperature controls. There was also evidence that the installation of many of these units left spaces around the edges where cold air and water leaked in from the outside. In addition, the tenants testified that the additional promises made by the landlords in the Voluntary Agreement (installation of an exercise room, the fountain in the courtyard, etc.) were never carried out. The landlords argue instead that the tenants failed to prove that they suffered any cognizable economic damage, since the Voluntary Agreement also provided for a three-year rent freeze and a minimal rent increase for two years thereafter, and those terms were fulfilled. It is settled law that a plaintiff in a civil action is not required to prove the exact amount of damages, but need only provide some reasonable basis on which to estimate damages. Romer v. District of Columbia, 449 A.2d 1097, 1100 (D.C.1982); see Bedell v. Inver Housing, Inc., 506 A.2d 202, 205 (D.C. 1986). If such a reasonable basis is shown, this court will not disturb a jury's award of damages. Columbus Properties, Inc. v. O'Connell, 644 A.2d 444, 447 (D.C.1994). This court has also held that the value of an apartment in good repair may be established by proof of the amount of the monthly rent. Bernstein v. Fernandez, supra note 3, 649 A.2d at 1072. Consequently, evidence that an apartment is not in good repair  e.g., that its heating and cooling system does not work properly  is sufficient to allow a jury to find a decrease in the value of that apartment, which would provide a basis for assessing damages. See Hsu v. Thomas, 387 A.2d 588, 589 (D.C.1978); Javins v. First National Realty Corp., supra, 138 U.S.App. D.C. at 378, 428 F.2d at 1080. In the instant case, several tenants and two experts testified to a variety of deficiencies in a number of apartments in the Rittenhouse in violation of the Voluntary Agreement, and documentary proof of the tenants' rents under the lease was introduced as evidence of the value of their apartments when in good repair. This combination of evidence, we hold, was sufficient to permit the jury to determine the proper amount of damages under the court's instructions, in which we can discern no error. The landlords maintain nevertheless that our recent opinion in Twyman v. Johnson, 655 A.2d 850 (D.C.1995), supports their contention that claims for damages under Voluntary Agreements approved by the Rental Housing Commission may be awarded only in the limited context of an administrative proceeding before that agency. We hold that Twyman is inapposite. In Twyman we had to decide whether the Rental Housing Act's anti-retaliation section, D.C.Code § 45-2552, which prohibits any retaliatory action against any tenant who exercises any right conferred upon the tenant by [the Rental Housing Act], or by any other provision of law, created for tenants an affirmative cause of action for civil damages in addition to a defense against an action for possession. We held that it did not, concluding that the language of section 45-2552 conferred on tenants an entitlement to damages only through an administrative proceeding before the Rental Housing Commission. Id. at 856-858. In the case at bar, however, the tenants' cause of action is rooted in common law. Unlike the tenant in Twyman, who argued that she had a statutorily based cause of action (because she had no common law claim, id. at 855), the tenants in this case alleged and proved that the landlords had breached their lease, as modified by the Voluntary Agreement, by failing to provide various promised and paid-for services. As we stated earlier, the Voluntary Agreement was itself a contract, and upon its ratification by the Rental Housing Commission, it became a modification of their original lease  another contract. Thus, upon the breach of the Voluntary Agreement, the tenants could properly seek common law damages by bringing an action for breach of contract, which is exactly what they did. The landlords' reliance on Twyman is misplaced.
During the period of pre-trial discovery, Mr. Cowan was requested to produce copies of all maintenance logs and service contracts for the Rittenhouse covering the years from 1986 through 1989. In response, he turned over a large number of records, and thereafter, through counsel, he assured the tenants that all extant maintenance documents had been produced. At trial, however, testimony from a maintenance worker employed by the Rittenhouse, as well as from Mr. Cowan himself, revealed that several maintenance records and service contracts in fact had not been provided. In response to a request from the tenants' counsel, the trial court directed Cowan to turn over any relevant documents that had been requested but not yet delivered. The next day, after the remaining documents had been produced, the court levied a monetary sanction against Cowan in the amount of $10,000, ruling that Cowan's willful and reckless failure to comply with the discovery request had hindered the development and preparation of the tenants' case. On the following day, however, the court sua sponte lowered this sanction to $6,000, stating that the amount originally imposed had been excessive. On appeal, Cowan contends that the imposition of any monetary sanction for his violation of the tenants' discovery request was error. In essence, Cowan argues (1) that the documents he did turn over during discovery were of the same character as the documents he failed to produce until trial; (2) that none of these documents were used by the tenants in their case in chief; and (3) that the trial court failed to give an adequate explanation for both the initial sanction and the later reduction of the amount. The tenants contend that Cowan failed to file a timely notice of appeal challenging the court's imposition of the discovery sanction. The order granting the tenants' Rule 60(a) motion to correct the judgment was docketed on January 21, 1994. Cowan had thirty days from that date within which to note an appeal, [4] but instead he chose to file a motion for reconsideration on January 31. That motion was denied on February 18, and from that denial he noted an appeal on March 18. Because the motion for reconsideration does not state the rule on which it is based  indeed, it cites no rule at all  the tenants argue that Cowan's time for noting an appeal expired thirty days after January 21, and that the notice of appeal filed on March 18 was therefore untimely. This court has repeatedly held that the denial of a motion for reconsideration is not an appealable order and that, absent specific authority, such a motion does not toll the time for noting an appeal. See Taylor v. United States, 603 A.2d 451, 458-459 (D.C.) (citing cases), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 852, 113 S.Ct. 155, 121 L.Ed.2d 105 (1992). Thus the tenants maintain that the notice of appeal was filed too late, and that this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain Cowan's second appeal. We are satisfied, however, that we do have jurisdiction. Because the amount of the discovery sanction was not set forth in any judgment or order until January 21, it was the January 21 order that was final and appealable, at least as to that sanction. See Dyer v. William S. Bergman & Associates, 635 A.2d 1285, 1287-1288 (D.C.1993); Trilon Plaza Co. v. Allstate Leasing Corp., 399 A.2d 34, 36 (D.C.1979). Cowan's motion for reconsideration was filed on January 31, ten days after the January 21 order, and thus it was timely under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 59(e). The motion asserted that the tenants had not made a sufficient showing of prejudice to justify a sanction, and also argued that the court had not adequately explained its reasons for imposing the sanction and had thereby abused its discretion. We therefore treat Cowan's motion as a motion under Rule 59(e) to alter or amend the January 21 order, even though the motion does not cite Rule 59(e) or, indeed, any rule at all. See In re Tyree, 493 A.2d 314, 317 n. 5 (D.C.1985); Wallace v. Warehouse Employees Union Local 730, 482 A.2d 801, 804 (D.C.1984) (The nature of a motion is determined by the relief sought, not by its label or caption). [5] Because it was timely, it terminated the time for filing a notice of appeal. [6] When the motion was denied on February 18, the full time for noting an appeal  thirty days  began to run again. See D.C. Ct.App. R. 4(a)(2). Cowan's second notice of appeal was timely filed on March 18, twenty-eight days after February 18. We conclude, therefore, that we have jurisdiction to consider Cowan's second appeal and accordingly turn to the merits of that appeal, which challenges only the discovery sanctions. A party's non-compliance with a pre-trial discovery request allows the trial court, in its discretion, to impose a variety of sanctions under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 37(b)(2) and (d). See Perry v. Sera, 623 A.2d 1210, 1217 (D.C.1993); Lyons v. Jordan, 524 A.2d 1199, 1201 (D.C.1987); Braxton v. Howard University, 472 A.2d 1363, 1365 (D.C.1984). When reviewing the imposition of such sanctions, this court will reverse only if the trial court has abused its discretion by imposing a penalty too strict or unnecessary under the circumstances. Dodson v. Evans, 204 A.2d 338, 341 (D.C.1964) (citation omitted). We can find no such abuse in this case. The court carefully explained its reasons for imposing the sanction and found, in addition, that Cowan's non-compliance was willful, a fact that weighs heavily in the tenants' favor. See Braxton, supra, 472 A.2d at 1365 & n. 3. In its order denying the motion for reconsideration, the court said that Cowan had offered no acceptable excuse for failure to comply with the [tenants'] legitimate discovery request and reiterated its finding of willfulness. Rejecting Cowan's argument that the tenants had failed to show prejudice, the court said: [Cowan's] argument that the [tenants] showed no prejudice has no merit inasmuch as the mid-trial production of the voluminous documents requested made it impossible for [the tenants] to show prejudice. To have shown prejudice, [the tenants] would have had to undertake mid-trial examination of the documents, an exercise that would have unduly disrupted the trial. The record amply supports this ruling and the court's imposition of a sanction. We find no abuse of discretion and hence no ground for reversal.