Opinion ID: 411734
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Submission to the Jury of Reduced Count 2

Text: 33 Defendants renew on appeal their objections to the trial court's decision to submit to the jury a charge of simple possession of heroin, without intent to distribute, as a lesser offense included within the original count 2, viz., possession with intent to distribute. They contend that the modification of count 2 by the court constituted an impermissible variance in the indictment handed down by the grand jury; that the court had no power to submit an uncharged lesser-included offense to the jury without also submitting the greater offense; that since the court had dismissed count 2, it no longer had the power to submit the lesser-included offense; and that even if the power existed, submission of the reduced count after dismissal of the greater offense violated their rights not to be subjected to double jeopardy. We find no merit in any of these contentions. 34
35 The decision of the district court to submit the reduced count 2 to the jury was well within the court's authority. Fed.R.Crim.P. 31(c) provides that [t]he defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense charged ..., i.e., a lesser-included offense. 3 The trial judge may implement Rule 31(c) in a number of ways. He may instruct the jury that it may find the defendant guilty of either the greater or the lesser-included offense. See United States v. Giampino, 680 F.2d 898 (2d Cir.1982). If the jury returns a verdict of guilty on the greater offense, the judge may enter a judgment of guilty on the lesser offense alone. Virgin Islands v. Josiah, 641 F.2d 1103, 1108 (3d Cir.1981); cf. United States v. Swiderski, 548 F.2d 445, 452 (2d Cir.1977). Or, prior to submitting the case to the jury, the trial judge may decide to give effect to the provisions of both Rule 31(c) and Rule 29(a), see note 1 supra, and submit to the jury only the lesser offense if he has determined that the evidence is insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that element of the greater offense which is not an element of the lesser offense. United States v. Blackwell, 515 F.2d 125, 126-27 (4th Cir.1975) (per curiam). The last described method was that adopted here. 36 We are unpersuaded by the defendants' contention that the trial court's power in the present case to submit the lesser-included offense pursuant to Rule 31(c) was extinguished by the court's oral announcement that it was dismissing count 2 on defendants' motions pursuant to Rule 29 for judgments of acquittal. Although Rule 31(c) would have had no application if there were no pending charge under count 2, that was not the circumstance here. The court's oral granting of defendants' motions for acquittal on count 2 was no more than an interlocutory order, and count 2 remained pending since no judgment had been entered pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(b)(1). While the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure contain no explicit provisions granting the court authority to modify or rescind its orders before a judgment has been entered, Rule 2 states that [t]hese rules are intended to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding, and Rule 57(b) provides that [i]f no procedure is specifically prescribed by rule, the court may proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules or with any applicable statute. A district court has the inherent power to reconsider and modify its interlocutory orders prior to the entry of judgment, whether they be oral, e.g., United States v. Green, 414 F.2d 1174, 1175 (D.C.Cir.1969) (trial judge had authority to withdraw oral decision granting defendant's motion to dismiss indictment), or written, e.g., United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600, 604-05 (3d Cir.1973) (district court had authority to rescind written order improvidently permitting defendant to withdraw guilty plea); cf. United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 306-07, 51 S.Ct. 113, 114, 75 L.Ed. 354 (1931) (stating general rule that judgments, decrees, and orders in civil or criminal cases may be modified by court within the term in which they were entered), and there is no provision in the rules or any statute that is inconsistent with this power. As the court in United States v. Jerry stated, 37 [n]othing in the Rules limits the power of the court to correct mistakes made in its handling of a case so long as the court's jurisdiction continues, i.e., until the entry of judgment. In short, the power to grant relief from erroneous interlocutory orders, exercised in justice and good conscience, has long been recognized as within the plenary power of courts until entry of final judgment and is not inconsistent with any of the Rules. 38 487 F.2d at 604. Thus, 39 whether the case sub judice be civil or criminal[,] so long as the district court has jurisdiction over the case, it possesses inherent power over interlocutory orders, and can reconsider them when it is consonant with justice to do so. 40 Id. at 605. 41 We conclude that the action of the trial court here in promptly deciding to submit a reduced count 2 to the jury, thereby modifying its oral decision to dismiss count 2 entirely, was well within the court's authority and was properly designed to ensure the just determination of the charges brought against these defendants.
42 Notwithstanding the trial court's authority under the rules and its inherent power to modify its interlocutory decisions, a change in decision would be impermissible if it violated a defendant's constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense. We find no such constitutional violation here. 43 The Double Jeopardy Clause provides three fundamental protections: 44 It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishment for the same offense. 45 United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 1021, 43 L.Ed.2d 232 (1975) (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969)). The phrase the same offense encompasses both the offense charged and any lesser offense necessarily included therein. Thus an acquittal of a greater offense precludes a subsequent prosecution for a lesser-included offense. See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 670, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 1195, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896). The principle underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause 46 is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. 47 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88, 78 S.Ct. 221, 223, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957). 48 These protections have been viewed in a commonsense fashion, and where there is no threat of either multiple punishment or successive prosecutions, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended. United States v. Wilson, supra, 420 U.S. at 344, 95 S.Ct. at 1022 (footnote omitted). For example, although the right of the government to appeal an adverse judgment in a criminal case is quite limited, see, e.g., id. at 352, 95 S.Ct. at 1026; United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 12 S.Ct. 609, 36 L.Ed.2d 445 (1892), a statutorily authorized appeal by the government is constitutionally permissible if a reversal will not require that the defendant be tried a second time: 49 Although review of any ruling of law discharging a defendant obviously enhances the likelihood of conviction and subjects him to continuing expense and anxiety, a defendant has no legitimate claim to benefit from an error of law when that error could be corrected without subjecting him to a second trial before a second trier of fact. 50 United States v. Wilson, supra, 420 U.S. at 345, 95 S.Ct. at 1022. Inversely, 51 [a] judgment of acquittal, whether based on a jury verdict of not guilty or on a ruling by the court that the evidence is insufficient to convict, may not be appealed and terminates the prosecution when a second trial would be necessitated by a reversal. 52 United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2193, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978). 53 By parity of reasoning, we see no reason why the trial court in the present case was not free before the entry of judgment to amend its own ruling since it did so without subjecting the defendants to a second trial. 4 Normally a judgment of acquittal of a charge, entered prior to verdict on the ground that the evidence was insufficient, would terminate the prosecution on that charge and bar retrial of the defendant on that, or any lesser-included, charge. Where no judgment has been entered, however, and there has been no dismissal of the jury (nor any indication to the jury of a ruling that could prejudice the defendant on such counts as are eventually submitted), there appears to be no constitutional impediment to the court's modification of its oral decision to dismiss the original count. 54 We do not suggest that entry of a judgment pursuant to Rule 32(b)(1) is a prerequisite to the termination of the prosecution for double jeopardy purposes. [A] verdict of acquittal, although not followed by any judgment, is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. United States v. Ball, supra, 163 U.S. at 671, 16 S.Ct. at 1195. And had the jury been dismissed following the court's oral decision, the absence of a judgment would have been irrelevant to the constitutional issue. Rather, we advert to the absence of a judgment merely to emphasize the inchoate nature of the oral decision seized on by the defendants. Cf. United States v. Chinchic, 655 F.2d 547, 549-50 (4th Cir.1981) (jury's initial verdict of acquittal, which was not fully announced in open court, was merely preliminary and not binding on the jury; consequently, retrial of defendant after a change in juror vote resulted in deadlocked jury did not constitute double jeopardy). In the circumstances of this case, where the court's oral decision was followed promptly by the modification providing for the reduction instead of the elimination of count 2, and where the reduced count could be, and was, submitted in the normal course of the trial to the original jury, we conclude that the action of the trial court did not violate principles of double jeopardy. 55