Opinion ID: 1466055
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Voir Dire Statement

Text: Appellant next alleges that his conviction should be reversed because of the prosecutor's allegedly impermissible remarks concerning the reasonable doubt standard during voir dire. The entire voir dire statement, including, for context, the ensuing bench conference and the conclusion of that portion of the Commonwealth's presentation, is as follows: Attorney for the Commonwealth: Now ladies and gentlemen, this defendant, as he sits here, is entitled to the presumption of innocence. Every criminal defendant anywhere in the United States, including Kentucky, is entitled to the presumption of innocence. We in the Commonwealth, the prosecutor's office, we have no problem with that. We're all for it. That's been one of the main tenets of the criminal justice system in the Anglo-Judeo-American law since the Middle Ages, since the Magna Carta. We don't have any problem with that. Now, since he is entitled to the presumption of innocence, then it isthe burden is on the Commonwealth, if it can, to prove the case against Mr. Johnson, Eugene Paul Johnson. Now, since we have that burden of proof we have to prove the case against him, and since he is entitled to the presumption of innocence, which the Judge will instruct you later that he is entitled to, we have to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. Now, everything is interactive these days. Let's try an interactive thing. Let me get a show of hands. How many have heard the term Beyond a shadow of a doubt? [Prospective jurors respond.] I think it's safe to say everybody raised their hand. Not surprisingly because this week, especially since I've mentioned it, you'll see it on the TV or you'll hear it on the radio, or you'll read it in the newspaper, or you'll read it in a novel or a book or somethingbeyond a shadow of a doubt. Now listen carefully. There ain't no such thing in the criminal justice system in the United States of America. That's one of the myths that has arisen. Nobody has to prove anything beyond a shadow of a doubt. Attorney for Appellant: Judge, can we approach? Judge, the law in Kentucky is clear that nobody can describe a reasonable doubt ... by saying that there is no such thing as a shadow of a doubt. That is defining reasonable doubt by ruling out alternatives, and I object to it. Trial Judge: The voir dire question ishe isn't saying what reasonable doubt is. He's just saying what the law is not. Attorney for Appellant: But, by implication, he's Trial Judge: I understand. And if I felt like he were going to cross that line I would sustain it. However, having heard this colloquy before, I know that we fall well short of that. But I understand the nature of that. Attorney for Appellant: Well, you understand that I haven't heard this colloquy before. Trial Judge: I understand that. And that's why I say I will overrule it. Attorney for the Commonwealth (continuing voir dire to the jury pool): As I was saying, the shadow of a doubt, I don't care how many times you've heard it, it's myth. What the Commonwealth has to prove is the case beyond a reasonable doubt. Now, I can't tell you what a reasonable doubt is. The law won't let me. It won't let Mr. Brown. Believe it or not, even the Judge can't tell you what a reasonable doubt is in his instructions. That's up to you to determine. Whether or not the Commonwealth proves the case beyond a reasonable doubt. (Emphasis added). In Commonwealth v. Callahan, 675 S.W.2d 391 (Ky.1984), we held: trial courts shall prohibit counsel from any definition of reasonable doubt at any point in the trial, and any cases in this jurisdiction to the contrary are specifically overruled. Id. at 393 (emphasis in original). We reiterate that holding today. In that same decision, however, we noted that the prosecutor stated: Now I submit to you that [defense counsel's definition] is not reasonable doubt. Now, the judge has instructed you in the instructions on what reasonable doubt is. There is a little doubt about whether we are even here today. When I went to college I had some teachers that could practically prove to you that we weren't even here today. But that's not what reasonable doubt is. The judge has instructed you in the instructions as to what reasonable doubt is and you read that and follow it. Id. at 392. (emphasis added). We concluded that the prosecutor's statement did not constitute any attempt to define the phrase `reasonable doubt,'.... Id. Thus, in the very case that announced the prohibition against defining reasonable doubt, we held that the prosecutor's allegedly improper statement, which, at most, attempted to show what reasonable doubt was not, did not amount to a violation of the rule against defining reasonable doubt. There is no difference between the prosecutor's discussion of reasonable doubt in Callahan and the prosecutor's short statement in this case that beyond a shadow of a doubt is not the same as beyond a reasonable doubt. Notably, in this case the prosecutor went on to tell the jury pool that he could not define reasonable doubt because such a definition was up to them to determine. Appellant also cites to Marsch v. Commonwealth, 743 S.W.2d 830 (Ky.1987). The comments in Marsch , however, differ significantly from those in this case. In Marsch , the prosecutor engaged at length in a discussion of reasonable doubt. He asked [prospective juror] Kirk if he equated beyond a shadow of a doubt with reasonable doubt. He provided an example using himself as a hypothetical witness to an accident and suggested to the prospective juror that his hypothetical testimony would satisfy the reasonable doubt standard, but might not eliminate any possibility of doubt. Finally, the attorney for the Commonwealth explained that there was a significant distinction between being convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and being convinced beyond all or a shadow of a doubt. Id. at 832. In Marsch , the prosecutor spoke at long length about the reasonable doubt standard. He even went so far as to provide a hypothetical, in which he was a witness, stating that while his testimony alone might satisfy the reasonable doubt standard, it could never eliminate all doubt. It should also be noted that the reversal in Marsch was not based on this error alone; we found multiple other errors in the jury selection. In contrast, the prosecutor in this case simply informed the jury that the Commonwealth did not have to prove its case beyond a shadow of a doubt and that the proper standard was proof beyond a reasonable doubt. He offered no hypothetical to explain beyond a reasonable doubt and did not engage in a lengthy discussion of the standard. Furthermore, the prosecutor in this case told the jury that he could not define reasonable doubt. He stated: Now, I can't tell you what a reasonable doubt is. The law won't let me. It won't let Mr. Brown. Believe it or not, even the Judge can't tell you what a reasonable doubt is in his instructions. That's up to you to determine. Whether or not the Commonwealth proves the case beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, even if his prior discussion of beyond a shadow of a doubt approached error, any prejudice was alleviated by this follow-up statement. Additionally, even if one is convinced that the statement by the prosecutor in this case constituted error, that error was harmless. We have applied harmless error on this precise issue, even in capital murder cases, each time affirming a conviction and sentence of death. In Sanders v. Commonwealth, 801 S.W.2d 665, 671 (Ky.1990), we considered an objection under Callahan to a prosecutor's voir dire question. The question was: In a criminal trial, do you realize that the Commonwealth has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, that does not mean beyond all doubt or a shadow of a doubt? We concluded, [a]ssuming, without deciding, that an error would have occurred had objection been raised and overruled, we are wholly unconvinced, considering the circumstances, that absent this putative error the defendant may not have been found guilty of a capital crime, or the death penalty may not have been imposed. Id. at 671 (internal footnote omitted). Sanders was quoted approvingly in Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635 (Ky.2003), another capital case, wherein we noted that [t]he prosecutor's statement that `just because there is a question or some unanswered part of the case, that there is automatically reasonable doubt' did not impermissibly define `reasonable doubt.' Id. at 675. Given our long-standing treatment of this issue, even in the most serious of cases, we conclude that the error alleged in this case was, at worst, harmless. Finally, the dissent's suggestion that we have departed from the rule set forth clearly in Callahan is mistaken. To the contrary, this opinion explicitly reiterates that standard while concluding, just as the court did in Callahan , that the prosecutor's statements were not an impermissible definition of reasonable doubt. Likewise, our decision does not question the correctness of the cases which have relied on Callahan . Quite simply, the foregoing is little more than the application of Callahan , and we neither reverse nor alter its rule today. Notwithstanding the suggestion of the dissent, trial counsel would be loathe to conclude otherwise.