Opinion ID: 2982593
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Heading: Crimes of Violence Under Section 2L1.2

Text: The Guidelines require higher sentences for defendants previously deported who have been convicted of a “crime of violence.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). Section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) defines a “crime of violence” as any of the following offenses under federal, state, or local law: murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses (including where consent to the conduct is not given or is not legally valid, such as where consent to the conduct is involuntary, incompetent, or coerced), statutory rape, sexual abuse of a minor, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit, burglary of a dwelling, or any other offense under federal, state, or local law that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii). With respect to § 2L1.2, there are two approaches to determine whether a conviction qualifies as a crime of violence: the elements approach and the enumerated-offense approach. See United States v. Cooper, 739 F.3d 873, 878 (6th Cir. 2014). The elements approach applies when the statute has a specific element—“the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” United States v. McFalls, 592 F.3d 707, 712 (6th Cir. 2010). Under the enumerated-offense approach, an offense is not a predicate offense if the statute “encompasses more conduct than the generic definition” of the enumerated-offense crime. Id. Under the categorical approach mandated by the Supreme Court, an offense qualifies as a predicate offense if “the elements of the statute forming the basis of the defendant’s prior conviction . . . are the same as, or narrower than” the elements of the offense as it is commonly 5 No. 14-5613 United States v. Lara understood—the “generic crime.” Descamps v. United States, --- U.S. ---, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013) (ACCA case); see also Cooper, 739 F.3d at 878 (Guidelines § 4B1.2(a) case). If the statute criminalizes conduct that the generic crime does not, then a conviction is not a predicate offense under the categorical approach. United States v. Taylor, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990). It is important to note the difference between the definitions of a “crime of violence” in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 and in § 4B1.2(a). Section 4B1.2(a) includes the so-called “residual clause,” under which a conviction qualifies as a crime of violence if the offense “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Section 2L1.2 contains no comparable language. Compare U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, with § 4B1.2(a). Thus, the residual-clause analysis is not applicable to § 2L1.2. We “analyze a crime of violence under the career-offender guideline just as we do a ‘violent felony’ under the [ACCA],” and therefore we typically rely on ACCA cases to assist our analysis of § 4B1.1 and § 4B1.2. See Denson, 728 F.3d at 607. We cannot do so in this case with respect to the enumerated-offense analysis because § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii) lists “burglary of a dwelling” as a crime of violence, whereas the ACCA includes “burglary” as a violent felony. Compare U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) & cmt. n.1(B)(iii), with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). Accordingly, although § 39-14-403 qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA, Nance, 481 F.3d at 888, Nance does not control our analysis of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) because we must decide whether § 39-14-403 qualifies as a generic burglary of a dwelling. In addition, the government does not argue that Lara’s conviction includes a use-of-force element, and therefore we do not 6 No. 14-5613 United States v. Lara address whether § 39-14-403 is a crime of violence under the elements approach. Finally, we note that § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii) does not have a residual clause, so we do not consider whether the offense “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a); Cooper, 739 F.3d at 878. Thus, the only issue before us is whether Lara’s conviction is an enumerated offense. We must decide for the first time whether Tennessee’s definition of “habitation”—and therefore burglary of a habitation—is broader than the generic definition of “burglary of a dwelling” in § 2L1.2 & cmt. n.1(B)(iii).