Opinion ID: 1348933
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Terry: Evidence of Drug Quantity & Coconspirator Statements

Text: Terry contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal and motion for a new trial because the government presented insufficient evidence to prove that he possessed at least five kilograms of cocaine. In support, he first argues that the court erred in admitting evidence of the October 7, 2004, telephone call between Jones and Ricky Dee. He also argues that the other trial evidence was insufficient to establish the drug quantity. The district court admitted the evidence of the Jones-Dee call as coconspirator statements under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). In the recorded conversation, Jones tells Dee that he had a five, five demo with my man. When Dee asked Jones where he got that lick, Jones said that one of my homies who, uh, you know be grabbing ten of them at a time and st. He decided to woo-wop this broad this time, you know? Presumably, the homie was Terry, the ten was ten kilograms, the broad was Townsend, and the five, five was the division between Jones and Terry of the seized drugs. Under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), a statement is not hearsay if ... [t]he statement is offered against a party and is ... a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. For coconspirator statements to be admissible, the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) a conspiracy existed, (2) the defendant and the declarant were members of the conspiracy, and (3) the statement(s) sought to be admitted were made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Alviar, 573 F.3d 526, 540 (7th Cir.2009). According to Terry, the government failed to prove the third prong. Whether the Jones-Dee statements were properly admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) turns on whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that Terry joined the overarching conspiracy charged in the indictment. As noted above, it was. That Jones was a member of that conspiracy is undisputedhe was the ringleader. So we consider whether the Jones-Dee statements were made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. The call was made on October 7, 2004, well within the time frame of the conspiracy, which continued at least until the end of November 2004, if not later. Thus, the statements satisfy the during requirement. Statements intended to recruit other conspirators qualify as statements in furtherance of a conspiracy. United States v. Skidmore, 254 F.3d 635, 638 (7th Cir.2001). In the call, Jones talks about prior ripoffs and arguably was trying to recruit Dee to buy drugs seized in the conspiracy. Though Dee was not a conspirator, his statements provided the full context for the conversation. Thus, the Jones-Dee statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy, and the district court did not err in admitting them. [8] Terry claims that the admission of the Jones-Dee call prejudiced him because it was the government's principal evidence that the Townsend ripoff occurred and involved more than five kilograms of cocaine. First of all, the drug quantity is not an element of the offenses. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 846; see also United States v. Kelly, 519 F.3d 355, 363 (7th Cir.2008). It is relevant to sentencing. If the evidence failed to establish that Terry possessed five or more kilograms of cocaine, and the district court sentenced him above the default twenty-year maximum applicable to any amount of cocaine, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), his remedy would not be a new trial but a remand for re-sentencing subject to the default statutory maximum term of twenty years. Kelly, 519 F.3d at 363. But the district court sentenced Terry to 168 months, which is below that statutory maximum, so  Apprendi [ v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000)] is not implicated, id., and Terry has not shown prejudice. Furthermore, as Terry acknowledges, the government presented other evidence of the quantity of drugs involved in the Townsend ripoff. This included the September 22, 2004 wiretap conversation between Jones and Joel Montgomery while Jones was planning the Townsend ripoff in which Jones discussed with Joel how much cocaine Terry should get from Townsend, and they discussed five, seven, ten and twenty kilograms of cocaine. The evidence also included Flagg's testimony that: (a) Jones told him that Jones and Terry had planned to order ten kilograms from Townsend; (b) inside the bag taken from Townsend's car Flagg saw two bricks of what he believed were cocaine and saw several additional objects of like shape beneath the bricks, large enough to be ten kilograms; (c) Flagg believed that the bag contained ten kilograms; and (d) Jones told Flagg that Jones had given five kilograms to Terry and kept five for himself. Terry asserts that because the Jones-Joel call occurred before the Townsend ripoff, it did not reflect the quantity of drugs actually stolen. True, the call did not reflect the historical fact of the quantity of drugs that was stolen from Townsend. But the statements about how much B should ask Townsend for support a reasonable inference as to the amount actually taken. The fact that Terry was going to try to buy X quantity from Townsend raises a reasonable inference that Townsend brought X quantity to the transaction with Terry which in turn raises a reasonable inference that X was the quantity that was stolen from her. Terry also suggests that the Jones-Joel call supports a finding that the drug amount involved in the Townsend ripoff was less than ten kilograms. But he does not dispute that every amount Joel mentioned was greater than five kilograms. And Terry ignores that Jones stated that Townsend could handle a dub, which Joel clarified meant twenty, (kilograms), and Joel answered that she could. The Jones-Joel phone call thus supports Flagg's testimony that he saw what he believed was ten kilograms of cocaine. Terry challenges the basis for Flagg's personal knowledge as to the drug quantity. However, Terry had the opportunity to cross-examine Flagg, and did so. Sure, Terry can claim that Flagg is incredible, and he may not be a choir boy, but it is not for us to judge his credibility. See Dean, 574 F.3d 836, 842-43. That was for the jury to decide. Terry asserts that Jones did not pay Flagg an amount commensurate with ripping off ten kilograms of cocaine. Terry claims it would be unreasonable to find that Jones skimped Flagg (who didn't get what he expected to get) and skimped Joel (who testified that he got nothing from the ripoff), but was generous to Terry. A jury could reasonably infer that Jones's generosity to Terry reflected Terry's role in the Townsend ripoff and Jones's trust of Terry. Anyway, Terry offers us nothing to show why it would be reasonable to expect Jones, a crooked cop, to treat his coconspirators fairly. Jones wasn't a man of principle. Terry also complains that the prosecutor asked numerous improper leading questions of Flagg, testifying as to the amount of drugs involved in the ripoff. For example, government counsel asked, Did you ever receive any more money from [Jones] after that ripoff of the 10 kilos of cocaine? Terry acknowledges that he did not object to any of the questions as leading. We have considered them and disagree that they were improper or leading. We also note that Flagg had already testified that he observed ten kilograms of cocaine before the government asked the allegedly improper questions. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Terry possessed five kilograms or more of cocaine.