Opinion ID: 1866788
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Confrontation Clause.

Text: Vaught's trial counsel objected to Dr. Lamberty's testimony on hearsay grounds but did not specifically object on Confrontation Clause grounds. Vaught asserted on appeal that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make this latter objection. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument. Vaught asserts on further review that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to make an objection on the basis of the Confrontation Clause. We conclude that the admission of Dr. Lamberty's testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause, that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object on confrontation grounds, and that the decision by the Court of Appeals regarding this issue was not in error. The Confrontation Clause, U.S. Const. amend. VI, provides, in relevant part: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . . Neb. Const. art. I, § 11, provides, in relevant part: In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right . . . to meet the witnesses against him face to face . . . . We have held that the analysis under article I, § 11, is the same as that under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. State v. Jacobs, 242 Neb. 176, 494 N.W.2d 109 (1993). We have previously stated that analysis of the issue of whether the Confrontation Clause prohibits admission of hearsay testimony is made by reference to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980). See State v. Sheets, 260 Neb. 325, 618 N.W.2d 117 (2000). In Sheets, we stated that in Roberts, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that when a witness is unavailable for cross-examination, his or her statements are admissible only if they bear adequate indicia of reliability. Reliability can be inferred, without more, in a case in which the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, absent a showing by the State of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Sheets, 260 Neb. at 336, 618 N.W.2d at 127. [2] However, in Crawford v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004), the U.S. Supreme Court recently altered the test enunciated in Roberts. Crawford was filed subsequent to the decision by the Court of Appeals, which decision is now on further review. In Crawford, the U.S. Supreme Court held that where testimonial statements are at issue, the Confrontation Clause demands that such hearsay statements be admitted at trial only if the declarant is unavailable and there had been a prior opportunity for cross-examination. 124 S. Ct. at 1374. Therefore, at least with respect to testimonial statements, the Court overruled the holding in Roberts that hearsay statements could be admitted despite the absence of a prior opportunity for cross-examination if the statements fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or the statements bore particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Because Crawford limited its holding to testimonial statements, our initial step is to determine whether the statements at issue in the present case were testimonial in nature. The U.S. Supreme Court in Crawford declined to provide a comprehensive definition of testimonial but stated that the term applied at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations. 124 S. Ct. at 1374. We note that Justice Thomas joined the opinion of the Court in Crawford and that further illumination of the term testimonial may be found in Justice Thomas' concurrence in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 112 S. Ct. 736, 116 L. Ed. 2d 848 (1992). In his concurrence in White, Justice Thomas noted that the United States, as an amicus, had suggested in White that the Confrontation Clause should apply only to those persons who provide in-court testimony or the functional equivalent, such as affidavits, depositions, or confessions that are made in contemplation of legal proceedings. 502 U.S. at 364. Justice Thomas proposed that the Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions. 502 U.S. at 365. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not fully defined testimonial, it did provide three formulations of the core class of testimonial statements which the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit described as follows: In the first, testimonial statements consist of ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalentthat is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially. . . . The second formulation described testimonial statements as consisting of extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions. . . . Finally, the third explained that testimonial statements are those made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. . . . While the Court declined to settle on a single formulation, it noted that, [w]hatever else the term [testimonial] covers, it applies . . . to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial, and to police interrogations. These are the modern abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was directed. (Citations omitted.) Horton v. Allen, No. 03-1423, 2004 WL 1171383 at  (1st Cir. May 26, 2004). We agree with the First Circuit's analysis. The victim's statement herein did not fit any of these formulations, nor did it share characteristics of these formulations. We believe on the facts of this case that the victim's statement to the doctor was not a testimonial statement under Crawford v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004). As discussed above, the victim's identification of Vaught as the perpetrator was a statement made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment. In the present case, the victim was taken to the hospital by her family to be examined and the only evidence regarding the purpose of the medical examination, including the information regarding the cause of the symptoms, was to obtain medical treatment. There was no indication of a purpose to develop testimony for trial, nor was there an indication of government involvement in the initiation or course of the examination. See Evans v. Luebbers, No. 03-1900, 2004 WL 1277980 (8th Cir. June 10, 2004). Compare Snowden v. State, 156 Md. App. 139, 846 A.2d 36 (2004) (stating in child sexual abuse case that where children were interviewed for express purpose of developing their testimony, statements of victims presented by social worker were testimonial under Crawford ). Our decision as to whether the statement at issue is testimonial under Crawford does not preclude a different conclusion based on a different set of facts. Because the U.S. Supreme Court specifically referred to testimonial statements in its holding in Crawford, the effect of the Confrontation Clause on the admission of nontestimonial hearsay statements post- Crawford is unclear. The Court in Crawford stated that [w]here nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay lawas does Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether. 124 S. Ct. at 1374. The Court made no explicit statement regarding nontestimonial statements but did suggest that either such statements required no Confrontation Clause scrutiny or that prior standards developed under Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980), or its progeny still applied to nontestimonial hearsay evidence. Our observation in this regard is consistent with post- Crawford jurisprudence. See, e.g., U.S. v. Reyes, 362 F.3d 536, 540 n.4 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that  Crawford did not provide additional protection for nontestimonial statements, and indeed, questioned whether the Confrontation Clause protects nontestimonial statements at all). Therefore, if after Crawford, nontestimonial statements require no Confrontation Clause scrutiny, the nontestimonial statement of the victim in this case was admissible under the hearsay rule analysis recited above. To the extent that after Crawford, the confrontation-based standards developed in Roberts and its progeny still apply to nontestimonial statements, as explained below, the admission of the statements in the present case did not violate the Confrontation Clause. In this regard, we note that subsequent to Roberts and prior to Crawford, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the effect of the Confrontation Clause on the admission of statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 112 S. Ct. 736, 116 L. Ed. 2d 848 (1992). We consider the possible impact of White upon this case. [3] In White, the Court analyzed medical diagnosis and treatment statements under the Roberts test and held that (1) a determination that a declarant was unavailable was a necessary part of the Confrontation Clause inquiry only when the challenged out-of-court statements were made in the course of a prior judicial proceeding and (2) that the hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment was a firmly-rooted hearsay exception. The Court held in White that the Confrontation Clause did not exclude the admission of medical diagnosis and treatment statements, whether or not the record showed that the declarant was unavailable. As we noted above, the victim's identification of Vaught in the present case was a statement made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Thus, to the extent White survives Crawford v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004), under White, whether or not the victim in this case was unavailable as a witness, the Confrontation Clause would not exclude the admission of such a statement. Given our analysis of confrontation law in the area of the medical diagnosis and treatment hearsay exception, we conclude that whether such nontestimonial statements are exempt from Confrontation Clause scrutiny after Crawford or whether pre- Crawford case law, including White, is still applicable, the admission of the statement in the present case did not violate the Confrontation Clause. Because there was no Confrontation Clause violation, Vaught's counsel was not ineffective for failing to object on confrontation grounds. We conclude that the Court of Appeals did not err in rejecting this assignment of error.