Opinion ID: 77938
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Whether, Even If the District Court Had Sufficient Evidence to Make a Ruling on Summary Judgment, Summary Judgment Was Properly Granted as to the FOIA Exemptions Claimed by the EPA

Text: Having determined that the district court had an adequate factual basis before it to judge the validity of the claimed exemptions, the court now turns to its analysis of the district court's decision to uphold the exemptions. The EPA's brief on appeal sets forth reasons why it withheld documents according to both the deliberative process, attorney-client, and attorney work product privileges pursuant to the Section 5 exemption. There is no reason for this court to conclude that the district court erred when it upheld the EPA's assertion of the attorney-client privilege and the work-product privilege. The attorney-client privilege applies to confidential communications between an attorney and his client relating to a legal matter for which the client has sought professional advice. Mead Data Central, Inc., 560 F.2d at 252. The Supreme Court has broadly construed this privilege in support of the underlying policy that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981). The EPA states that it withheld confidential communications between government attorneys and their clients. The attorney work product privilege generally protects documents prepared by an attorney in anticipation of litigation. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509-10, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947). Factual attorney work product enjoys sweeping exemption protection because it is not routinely or normally discoverable through civil discovery but likewise requires a showing of substantial need and undue hardship by the party seeking discovery. See F.T.C. v. Grolier, Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 27-28, 103 S.Ct. 2209, 76 L.Ed.2d 387 (1983). It is undisputed that some of the documents responsive to the Tribe's requests were prepared by attorneys and analyzed the defensibility of alternative courses of action under consideration by the EPA. To the extent that those documents contained legal discussions and analyses prepared by an attorney in anticipation of litigation, the documents or portions thereof were withheld pursuant to FOIA exemption 5 as attorney work product. Turning next to the issue of deliberative process, two requirements must be met for that privilege to apply. First, the material must be pre-decisional, i.e., prepared in order to assist an agency decision maker in arriving at his decision. Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 184, 95 S.Ct. 1491, 44 L.Ed.2d 57 (1975); Nadler v. United States Dep't of Justice, 955 F.2d 1479, 1490-91 (11th Cir.1992). Second, it must be deliberative, a direct part of the deliberative process in that it makes recommendations or expresses opinions on legal or policy matters. Vaughn, 523 F.2d at 1144; Nadler, 955 F.2d at 1490-91. The purpose of the deliberative process privilege is to protect the quality of the agency's decision-making process. Even factual material contained in a deliberative document may be withheld pursuant to the privilege where disclosure of the factual material would reveal the deliberative process or where the factual material is so inextricably intertwined with the deliberative material that meaningful segregation is not possible. See Nadler, 955 F.2d at 1490. In opposition to summary judgment, the Tribe contended that many documents in the Vaughn Index bore the name of Scheidt (a scientist), and concerned either e-mail correspondence between Scheidt and technical consultants Bill Walker and Bob Kadlec, or Scheidt's dissemination of Walker and Kadlec's comments. The Tribe maintains that, in light of its arguments raised concerning the improper withholding of scientific and technical material, summary judgment should not have been granted because the documents in the scientific or technical information category were not properly withheld nor properly segregated for the court to review. The EPA responds that, as is indicated in the Wright and Brown affidavits and the Vaughn Index, the documents (both full and redacted versions) withheld pursuant to this privilege were pre-decisional and deliberative in nature. Many of those were draft documents including memoranda, issue papers, briefing papers, e-mails and other communications, that contained or incorporated comparisons, analyses, and evaluations of legal and policy considerations. Based upon the Wright and Brown affidavits and the Vaughn Index, distribution of these documents was internal limited only to agency employees and contractors. The EPA emphatically maintains that release of any of those documents would have a chilling effect on the agency's decisionmaking process and would cause public confusion as to the reasons for agency decisions. The EPA avers that any non-exempt information contained within the documents which was reasonably segregable was released. Thus, with regard to the portions of three e-mails which were withheld in the EPA's supplemental response and about which the Tribe complains above, the EPA maintains that the redacted portions were protected under the deliberative process privilege and/or the attorney-client privilege (as outlined in the Brown Affidavit). The EPA provided the redacted portions of the three e-mails to the district court for in camera review, and the court held that the documents were properly exempt from disclosure. The district court found in its January 17, 2006 order: Upon review of the documents, the Court is able to conclude without reservation that each of the documents with-held by the EPA was done so properly and pursuant to an appropriate privilege either the deliberative process privilege, the attorney-client privilege, or the work product doctrine. Indeed, the Court notes that the EPA did an admirable and thorough job of disclosing as much information in the withheld documents as possible without waiving a privilege. The Court is aware of the Plaintiffs concern that the Defendant has withheld scientific and technical factual documents milder the guise of deliberative process or attorney-client privilege but based on its review of each document, this is not the case. Each document that the EPA withheld pursuant to the deliberative process privilege is pre-decisional and deliberative in nature. Furthermore, with respect to the applicability of the attorney-client privilege/work product doctrine, after reviewing the content of the documents that assert these privileges, the Court finds that the privileges were properly invoked. Likewise, following the viewing of three redacted Scheidt documents, the district court held in March 2006: Upon viewing these documents, once again, the Court finds that the Defendant acted properly in withholding portions of these e-mails pursuant to the deliberative process privilege and the attorney-client privilege. Defendant has explained its reasons for withholding portions of these three e-mails in an affidavit attached to its Supplement to Motion for Summary Judgment. We find no basis on which to reverse the district court's findings. Finally, in what appears to be a new argument articulated for the first time in its reply brief, the Tribe contends (relying on cases from the Ninth Circuit) that the district court's lack of findings staging] in reasonable detail the reasons for its decision as to each document in dispute requires remand in this case. Wiener v. FBI, 943 F.2d 972, 988 (9th Cir.1991) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Tribe asserts that the district court's opinion fails to explain the reasoning behind its rulings or delineate the specific exemption appropriate for each withheld document, instead simply setting forth its belief that the EPA's three claimed exemptionsthe deliberative process privilege, the attorney-client privilege, or the work product doctrinewere applicable [27] The Tribe further argues that because FOIA requires segregability and limits claims of exemption to discrete units of information (so that to withhold an entire document all units must fall within the statutory exemption 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)), the district court's failure to enunciate specific findings of segregability for each of the withheld documents at the least requires remand so that the district court can make clear its findings as to whether any segregable portions of the withheld documents should have been disclosed. Krikorian v. Department of State, 984 F.2d 461, 467 (D.C.Cir.1993) (It is reversible error not to make specific findings of segregability regarding each of the withheld documents.). Even if we were to consider the Tribe's eleventh hour argument regarding the inadequacy of the district court's findings in its order, the Tribe's contentions are, again, based on requirements established by other Circuits that have not been adopted by our court. In this Circuit, exacting requirements have not been placed on the district court's articulation of its reasons for sustaining a claim of exemption: Again, in the Eleventh Circuit, the review of a district court's finding of privilege for exemptions consists of two levels: (1) determine whether the district court had an adequate factual basis for the decision rendered; and (2) whether upon this basis the decision reached was clearly erroneous. Ely v. F.B.I., 781 F.2d at 1490. In light of the in camera review by the district court (a review that we find was correctly conducted), this case does not present us with the appropriate occasion to consider whether to require additional levels of analysis and more detailed findings when reviewing a claim of privilege under FOIA. For all these reasons, we find that contrary to the Tribe's arguments, the district court had more than an adequate basis to determine the propriety of the EPA's asserted privileges under Exemption 5 for the documents withheld. Just as there was extraordinary discovery in this case, there was extraordinary substantiation of the privileges. The EPA produced affidavits from Assistant Regional Administrator Wright and Assistant General Counsel Brown regarding the reasons for withholding documents. A detailed Vaughn Index was compiled, and at the Tribe's insistence, the district court conducted an in camera viewing of all of the withheld information. And while the Tribe insists that the district court should have compelled the EPA to describe the role of each specific document withheld in the decision making process, including the role of each author and recipient, the standard in this Circuit is whether the district court had an adequate basis to determine the exemption and whether this basis was clearly erroneous. Given the availability of affidavits and the Vaughn Index, combined with the in camera viewing, the district court had an adequate basis to determine the privileges asserted, and the Tribe has failed to demonstrate clear error in that decision.