Opinion ID: 2467453
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: morgan's average weekly wage rate

Text: The amount of past due compensation benefits that an injured employee is entitled to recover is based, in part, on his average weekly wage rate; thus, he cannot recover any past due benefits in excess of the minimum statutory benefits unless he properly establishes his average weekly wage. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Gidden, 476 S.W.2d 664, 665 (Tex.1972). Standard argues that Morgan should not be allowed to recover past due compensation benefits because her average weekly wage rate was not legally established. We disagree. Pursuant to TEX.R.CIV.P. 169, Morgan requested Standard to admit, inter alia, the following two facts: (1) Standard employed at least one other employee of the same class as [Morgan], in the same or similar employment as [Morgan], in the same or a neighboring place, who worked at least 210 days during the year immediately preceding the date [of Morgan's injury], and (2) that employee had an average daily wage of at least $60 during the period that she worked in the year next preceding the date [of Morgan's injury]. Standard did not mail the answers to these requests to Morgan within 10 days of receiving them. Nor did Standard serve the answers to the requests on Morgan within 10 days of receiving them. Thus, under the rules of procedure in effect during the trial of this cause, Standard was deemed to have admitted the truth of the requests. TEX.R.CIV.P. 169(1). And, because Standard never requested the trial court to withdraw or amend the admissions, the admitted facts were conclusively established. TEX.R.CIV.P. 169(2). As incontestable facts, these admissions establish that Morgan's average weekly wage rate was, as a matter of law, at least $346. TEX.REV. CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 8309, § 1(2) (Vernon 1967). Of course, a jury could not award Morgan a greater average weekly wage rate than the rate she pleaded. E.g., Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. Aderhold, 150 Tex. 292, 300, 240 S.W.2d 751, 756 (1951) (judgment must conform to the pleadings). In her pleading, Morgan claimed her wage rate had been $60 a day. Thus, under her pleadings, a jury could not have awarded her a weekly wage rate in excess of $346. Therefore, because Standard could not argue that Morgan's average weekly wage rate was less than $346 and Morgan was not entitled to receive more than $346, we hold that Morgan's average weekly wage rate was established at $346 as a matter of law. At the time of Morgan's injury, an employee with an average weekly wage rate of $346 was entitled to receive $105 in compensation benefits for each week of total incapacity. TEX.REV.CIV.STAT. ANN. art. 8306, §§ 10, 29 (Vernon Supp. 1987). Thus, Morgan was entitled to $105 in benefits for each week she was totally incapacitated. And, given the jury's finding that Morgan only had a weekly earning capacity of $150 during the time she was partially incapacitated, Morgan was also entitled to receive $105 for each week she was partially incapacitated. TEX.REV. CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 8306, §§ 11, 29 (Vernon Supp.1987). The trial court's judgment that Morgan was entitled to $26,460 for past due compensation benefits was based on the jury's finding that Morgan's average weekly wage rate was $375. Using the average weekly wage rate of $375 in its calculations of Morgan's compensation benefits, the trial court determined that Morgan was entitled to receive $105 for each week she was either totally or partially incapacitated. The trial court then calculated the amount of benefits due Morgan by multiplying $105 times the number of weeks she was either totally or partially incapacitated. Although the trial court should have used the $346 wage rate established as a matter of law to calculate Morgan's compensation benefits rather than submitting an issue to the jury, the trial court correctly concluded that Morgan was entitled to receive $105 for each week she was partially or totally incapacitated. Accordingly, Standard had no basis for complaining against the trial court's calculation of the weekly benefits due Morgan. We therefore affirm, although on different grounds, the judgment of the court of appeals insofar as it upholds Standard's liability for Morgan's compensation benefits.