Opinion ID: 2560385
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Motion for New Trial and Sentencing

Text: On July 28, 2008, the jury found defendant guilty of count 1. [7] Kizekai subsequently filed a motion for a new trial based on Rule 33 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure that was argued before the trial justice on September 19, 2008. Kizekai first propounded that the entirety of the state's case against him turned on Sampson's testimony, which he alleged was incredible. He maintained that on a major issue, the jury improperly credited Sampson's testimony about the car switch in the PCU parking lot instead of accepting Kizekai's more believable testimony that he drove Sampson to the PCU as a favor to her. Kizekai's counsel mused to the court, [w]hy would [he] devise this elaborate scheme to cash a stolen check by using Ms. Sampson and then drive his own car through the drive-[through]   ? Why wouldn't he convince [Sampson] to use her car [which was, according to her, parked in the PCU lot] if he convinced her to do all of the other things that he [allegedly] convinced her to do in terms of cashing the check? He also doubted the jury's fact-finding ability because the jurors seemingly did not appreciate the lack of evidence, beyond Sampson's testimony, that Kizekai ever received any of the money from this check. Finally, Kizekai disputed Sampson's accusation that he threaten[ed] her in the courthouse by arguing that [i]t doesn't make sense and it's not credible considering the pair see each other around, outside of the earshot of sheriffs, marshals, [and] police officers, interactions that Kizekai apparently considered to be more appropriate times for intimidation. The defendant concluded that Sampson shouldn't be given more credibility simply because she cooperated with law enforcement authorities [by agreeing to testify against him] and that overall, the jury misconstrued the testimony of Ms. Sampson. In its objection to the new-trial motion, the state concurred that [t]he sum and substance of the case does turn largely on the credibility of Ms. Sampson, but it contended that Sampson was a most credible and candid witness. The state explained that Sampson without hesitation, responded to the police department['s investigation] and provided a detailed statement as to her involvement in the negotiation of that check. Then, countering Kizekai's musings as to why he would drive his own car through the drive-through to pass a knowingly bad check, the state asked the reciprocal question of why Sampson, if she[, instead of Kizekai,] was the perpetrator of this offense,    would    contact an individual to simply witness her commit a crime. The state also questioned why in the world Sampson would knowingly deposit a stolen check in her own account knowing that of course the check would be traced back to her. As for defendant, the state maintained that he was not credible given the evasive[ness] in his answers and his illogical testimony. After hearing the parties' arguments, the trial justice rendered a bench decision denying defendant's motion for a new trial. He acknowledged his role as a 13th or super juror articulating that his determination is whether or not the evidence placed before the [c]ourt was sufficient to substantiate and sustain the verdict that the jury achieved. Even in the event that he disagreed with the jury's result, the trial justice explained, if the verdict was a probable and reasonable result after a review of the evidence,    [he] must affirm. Then, based on Kizekai's criticisms, the trial justice again summarized that [t]his is simply a case of credibility. He recalled that Sampson went into great detail as to the preliminaries of meeting Kizekai in the parking lot of the bank and the events that transpired before the check was passed. The trial justice stated that he considered Sampson far more credible than Mr. Kizekai and assessed that [s]he was duped [by him] more likely than not. He reasoned that Sampson was more believable because Kizekai's version of the events required the trial justice to accept that Sampson was stupid. He refused to suppose, in accordance with Kizekai's testimony, that Sampson was so foolish that she brought Kizekai to the PCU to witness her crime and knowingly deposit a bad check into her own account that undoubtedly would be traceable to her. In his further evaluation of Kizekai as a witness, the trial justice explained that Kizekai didn't seem to be forthright in his answers and [h]e was evasive in some and sometimes he was a little bit aggressive. Noting that an aggressive demeanor would have been fine if he was telling the truth, the trial justice also stated that he didn't believe [Kizekai's] version of the events. Going a step further than was required because the trial justice did believe Ms. Sampson's [version of the events], the trial justice also concluded that even if the [c]ourt felt that Mr. Kizekai was more credible, he did not believe he could disturb the verdict anyway. Accordingly, see[ing] no reason to overturn the jury, the trial justice denied the motion for a new trial. Sentencing occurred on November 21, 2008. The trial justice imposed a two-year suspended sentence, with three years probation. [8] Kizekai filed a notice of appeal on December 8, 2008. [9] The judgment of conviction was entered on December 15, 2008.