Opinion ID: 3135181
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: The Knights Court declined to decide whether the defendant’s acceptance of a search condition constituted a complete waiver of his fourth amendment rights. Knights , 534 U.S. at 118, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 504-05, 122 S. Ct. at 591. We are asked in this case to determine whether defendant’s acceptance of a similar condition establishes such a waiver. During the events of November 8, 2002, defendant was on MSR from the Illinois Department of Corrections. The state legislature has established a set of conditions applicable to every term of parole and MSR. 730 ILCS 5/3–3–7 (West 2004). These were reflected in the “Notice of Conditions of Parole/Mandatory Supervised Release” that the defendant received. On December 12, 2001, the defendant signed an acknowledgment that he was required to comply with the listed conditions. The document read, in part: “Effective January 1, 2002, you are hereby obligated to comply with the following conditions: You shall not violate any criminal statute of any jurisdiction during the parole or release term; You shall refrain from possessing a firearm or other dangerous weapon; You shall report to an agent of the Department of Corrections;
You shall obtain the permission of an agent of the Department of Corrections before changing your residence or employment; You shall consent to a search of your person, property, or residence under your control; You shall refrain from the use or possession of narcotics or other controlled substances in any form, or both, or any paraphernalia related to those substances and submit to a urinalysis test as instructed by a parole agent or the Department of Corrections.” The notification that Moss signed warned him that “Failure to comply with these terms and conditions, in addition to any additional terms or conditions set by the Prisoner Review Board, may subject you to revocation of parole or mandatory supervised release.” The authorization for this is found in section 3–3–9 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3–3–9 (West 2004)), which establishes sanctions up to and including revocation of MSR when a defendant violates an MSR condition. Although the Prisoner Review Board is the disciplinary authority, law enforcement officers need not sit idly by when they witness a parole violation: “A sheriff or other peace officer may detain an alleged parole or release violator until a warrant for his return to the Department [of Corrections] can be issued.” 730 ILCS 5/3–14–2(c) (West 2004). The State argues that by signing the agreement acknowledging his parole conditions, the defendant expressly consented to being searched. We considered a similar argument in People v. Lampitok , 207 Ill. 2d 231 (2003). The probation condition at issue in Lampitok contained the following language: “ ‘11. That the Defendant shall submit to a search of her person, residence, or automobile at any time as directed by her Probation Officer to verify compliance with the conditions of this Probation Order.’ ” Lampitok , 207 Ill. 2d at 236. We determined that this provision did not constitute a waiver of fourth amendment protection or a prospective consent to all probation searches. Instead, we found that “the plain language of this probation search condition affirmatively required [the probationer’s] probation officer to ask her to consent–or submit–to a particular search prior to conducting it.” When asked, she could then decide whether to submit to the search or face the revocation of her probation. Lampitok , 207 Ill. 2d at 261-62. The State attempts to distinguish defendant’s MSR condition from the condition at issue in Lampitok . First, the State argues that defendant’s agreement provides for searches by any agent, while the probation condition in Lampitok provided for searches only by the probationer’s probation officer. Further, the State draws a distinction between the use of the phrase “shall submit” in the condition at issue in Lampitok and the use of the phrase “shall consent” in the search condition of defendant’s MSR. Whereas this court found that the phrase “shall submit” requires further action by the probationer, the State argues that the phrase “shall consent” amounts to a prospective waiver of rights. Defendant responds that, in either case, the operative word is “shall.” We agree with defendant. In Lampitok , the word “shall” indicated that by accepting the probation term, the probationer accepted an obligation to submit to a search when directed to do so. Similarly, defendant accepted an obligation to consent to a search when directed to do so. This conclusion is further supported by Lampitok ’s use of “submit” and “consent” in tandem. Lampitok , 207 Ill. 2d at 262 (search condition required probation officer “to ask her to consent–or submit–to a particular search prior to conducting it”). The greater breadth of the parole condition in the case at bar is irrelevant. Although defendant’s condition allows for a greater variety of searchers and searches, it still requires that he give his consent to each search before it is conducted. Other conditions of defendant’s MSR similarly use the word “shall.” For example, defendant “shall refrain” from possessing a firearm and “shall report” to the Department of Corrections. These conditions do not foreclose the opposite result. Defendant could choose to obtain a gun, or he could choose not to report to the Department of Corrections. Similarly, he can choose not to consent to a search. But if he makes any of these choices, he risks the revocation of his MSR. We hold that the search condition of defendant’s MSR does not establish prospective consent to all searches. We note that if Boyles had asked for defendant’s consent to a pat-down search, defendant very well may have refused. This refusal would have violated the conditions of defendant’s MSR. Faced with such a violation, Boyles would have been authorized to detain defendant. 730 ILCS 5/3–14–2(c) (West 2004). This authority gives weight to the search condition. It also gives officers a tool with which to address their safety concerns.
In the absence of consent, we next address whether the pat-down search of defendant was otherwise appropriate. First, we clarify that the “special needs” test of Griffin , 483 U.S. at 873-74, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 717, 107 S. Ct. at 3168, does not apply here. The special needs of the state’s MSR program are not at issue because the search of defendant was not performed for any supervisory purpose. See Knights , 534 U.S. at 118, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 505, 122 S. Ct. at 591. Instead, Trooper Boyles and Officer Lowe acted pursuant to their ordinary law enforcement responsibilities when they carried out a traffic stop of a speeding vehicle. Lacking a special need similar to the one found in Griffin , our analysis utilizes the totality of the circumstances test applied in Knights . Knights , 534 U.S. at 118, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 505, 122 S. Ct. at 591; see also Lampitok , 207 Ill. 2d at 248. In contrast to Knights , the case before us involves a vehicle stop. Traffic stops are more analogous to a Terry investigative stop than to a formal arrest. Knowles v. Iowa , 525 U.S. 113, 117, 142 L. Ed. 2d 492, 498, 119 S. Ct. 484, 488 (1998), citing Berkemer v. McCarty , 468 U.S. 420, 439, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 334, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3150 (1984). Therefore, we analyze such stops under the principles of Terry . People v. Jones , 215 Ill. 2d 261, 270 (2005); People v. Brownlee , 186 Ill. 2d 501, 518-21 (1999). A Terry analysis involves two steps. We consider, first, whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception and, second, whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. Terry , 392 U.S. at 19-20, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 905, 88 S. Ct at 1879. A vehicle stop based on an officer’s observation of a traffic violation is valid at its inception. People v. Gonzalez , 204 Ill. 2d 220, 228-29 (2003); Sorenson , 196 Ill. 2d at 433. We thus focus on whether the subsequent actions of Officer Lowe and Trooper Boyles were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the initial interference. The totality of the circumstances analysis applied in Knights guides our decision. The officers engaged in two separate actions that have fourth amendment significance. First, Officer Lowe requested and received consent to search defendant’s vehicle. Second, Trooper Boyles performed a pat-down search of defendant’s person. If the search of the vehicle was improper, it may taint the pat-down search that followed. See Wong Sun v. United States , 317 U.S. 471, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963). Thus, we consider each step separately to determine whether each action satisfied Terry ’s scope requirement. In Gonzalez , a majority of this court established the framework by which we apply the scope requirement to a police question during a traffic stop: “[W]e must consider, as an initial matter, whether the question is related to the initial justification for the stop. If the question is reasonably related to the purpose of the stop, no fourth amendment violation occurs. If the question is not reasonably related to the purpose of the stop, we must consider whether the law enforcement officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that would justify the question. If the question is so justified, no fourth amendment violation occurs. In the absence of a reasonable connection to the purpose of the stop or a reasonable, articulable suspicion, we must consider whether, in light of all the circumstances and common sense, the question impermissibly prolonged the detention or changed the fundamental nature of the stop.” Gonzalez , 204 Ill. 2d at 235. Defendant argues that Officer Lowe impermissibly changed the purpose of the stop when, instead of delivering the completed speeding citation to Sanders, he asked permission to search defendant’s truck. The State responds that the search was justified on grounds of officer safety. This response conflates the search of the truck with the search of defendant’s person. Officer Lowe testified that he requested permission to search the truck because he felt there might be drugs in the vehicle, not because he felt his safety was at risk. In light of this testimony, we agree with the defendant that Officer Lowe’s request for consent to search defendant’s vehicle was clearly unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop. However, defendant’s MSR status makes this situation distinct. The conditions of defendant’s MSR put him on notice that law enforcement officials may ask his consent to search his “person, property, or residence under [his] control,” including his pickup truck, with or without reasonable suspicion. While not reasonably related to the purpose of the traffic stop, the request to search was reasonable because of the defendant’s MSR. Under the conditions of that MSR, Officer Lowe properly asked for defendant’s consent to search his pickup. Defendant gave his consent. Therefore, the search of the truck was proper. We turn next to the pat-down search of defendant. Our case law has established the impropriety of “hard and fast” presumptions that authorize police officers to automatically pat down certain types of suspects. People v. Galvin , 127 Ill. 2d 153, 173 (1989). In Flowers , this court found an officer’s routine practice to be the “[m]ost problematic” factor when it invalidated a suspicionless pat-down search. Flowers , 179 Ill. 2d at 266. The officer in Flowers testified that he did not have any particular reason to think that the defendant had a weapon, but that he performed a pat-down search anyway, because “I do that as a common thing in my job, to pat people down for my safety as well as theirs.” Flowers , 179 Ill. 2d at 261. The court noted that this practice misapprehends the scope of the Terry exception. Flowers , 179 Ill. 2d at 266. It held that “[t]he limited exception recognized in Terry  clearly does not permit police officers to engage in a practice of routinely frisking individuals, without concern for whether a particular person poses a danger.” Flowers , 179 Ill. 2d at 267. Instead, we have said that an officer may frisk a defendant for weapons only if the officer reasonably believes that the person is armed and dangerous. Sorenson , 196 Ill. 2d at 433, citing Flowers , 179 Ill. 2d at 262. Thus, Trooper Boyles’ routine practice of patting down every person who is outside a vehicle at a traffic stop would be unlikely to withstand the scrutiny of Terry in the abstract. However, we judge the reasonableness of the search before us only by its particular facts and circumstances. See Galvin , 127 Ill. 2d at 173. An officer’s subjective feelings may not dictate whether a pat-down search is valid or invalid. Galvin , 127 Ill. 2d at 168. Rather, the test is objective: Would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the search “ ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate?” Terry , 392 U.S. at 21-22, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906, 88 S. Ct. at 1880, quoting Carroll v. United States , 267 U.S. 132, 162, 69 L. Ed. 543, 555, 45 S. Ct. 280, 288 (1925); Galvin , 127 Ill. 2d at 167 (test must be objective rather than subjective, or else “an officer who subjectively feels no fear in a situation where a reasonably prudent person in the same circumstances would fear for his or her own safety would never be justified in conducting a pat-down search of a suspect temporarily stopped pursuant to a valid Terry stop”). Again, this question must be answered with reference to the totality of the circumstances analysis employed in Knights . First, Trooper Boyles had a strong interest in ensuring defendant was not armed. He and his fellow officer were beside a rural road. The two officers were outnumbered by three men well known to law enforcement. Their identities alone suggested enough of a safety concern that Boyles offered his assistance to Officer Lowe as soon as he heard their names over the radio. He was aware through law enforcement circles that all three men were associated with weapons, and he had recently been involved in a weapons-related arrest of McGee. He was also aware that defendant was a parolee. (footnote: 2) Notably, the circumstances surrounding the pat-down search involved not just a traffic stop, but a consensual automobile search. This circumstance, which requires passengers to leave the vehicle and an officer to place himself in a compromising position, increases the government’s interest in ensuring those passengers are not armed. This court has recognized that the public has a strong interest in officer safety. People v. Gonzalez , 184 Ill. 2d 402, 418 (1998); People v. Harris , 207 Ill. 2d 515, 531 n.4 (2003) (concerns about officer safety are “legitimate and weighty”), citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms , 434 U.S. 106, 110, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331, 336, 98 S. Ct. 330, 333 (1977). The risk to an officer is increased by the presence of passengers ( Sorenson , 196 Ill. 2d at 437), particularly when those passengers are outside the vehicle. Although Trooper Boyles was not the sole officer at the scene, he and Officer Lowe were outnumbered, and Lowe was occupied with the vehicle search. Boyles was not just outnumbered–he was outnumbered by three men he believed to have histories involving weapons and drugs, three men with whom he and his fellow law enforcement officers were quite familiar. These officer safety circumstances contributed to the government’s interest in performing a pat-down search of defendant. The defendant’s MSR status also contributed to that interest. The state is justified in focusing greater attention on probationers because of their higher likelihood of recidivism. Knights , 534 U.S. at 120, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 506, 122 S. Ct. at 592; Lampitok , 207 Ill. 2d at 248. Persons on MSR, even more than probationers, present a risk to the public. See 730 ILCS 5/5–6–1(a) (West 2004); People v. Williams , 179 Ill. 2d 331, 336 (1997); People v. Spera , 303 Ill. App. 3d 834, 838 (1999). The objective officer safety concerns, combined with the defendant’s MSR status, established a significant governmental interest in performing a pat-down search to ensure that defendant was not armed. The defendant’s MSR status also impacts the other side of the balance. A parolee has a reduced expectation of privacy compared to ordinary citizens because he or she is a criminal offender. See Lampitok , 207 Ill. 2d at 250-51, citing People v. Adams , 149 Ill. 2d 331, 348 (1992). The search condition of defendant’s MSR further diminishes that already reduced expectation. We noted in Lampitok that the breadth of a search condition affects a probationer’s expectation of privacy. Lampitok , 207 Ill. 2d at 251. The probationer in that case was subject to a search condition that required her to submit to searches as directed by her probation officer for the purpose of determining her compliance with probation. Lampitok , 207 Ill. 2d 236. In contrast, the search condition in Knights required the probationer to submit to searches by any probation officer or law enforcement officer. Knights , 534 U.S. at 114, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 502, 122 S. Ct. at 589. The condition of defendant’s MSR is similarly broad. It requires that he consent to a search of his person, residence, or property under his control, with no limitation on what government agent may perform that search or what purpose they may have. Accordingly, defendant’s expectation of privacy is much more limited than that of the probationer in Lampitok . We note also that, in keeping with the differing purposes of MSR and probation, the statutory conditions attached to each status differ in type. The conditions of probation are fewer in number and include rehabilitative provisions such as community service and substance abuse treatment. 730 ILCS 5/5–6–3 (West 2004). In contrast, the conditions of MSR more extensively curtail the liberty of parolees, limiting where they may live, with whom they may associate, and what places they may frequent. 730 ILCS 5/3–3–7 (West 2004). These differences support the conclusion that a person subject to MSR has a lesser expectation of freedom from government intrusion than a probationer does. Balancing the defendant’s limited privacy interest with the government’s interest in performing a pat-down search to ensure officer safety, we hold that the pat-down search of defendant did not violate his fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. The vulnerable position of the officers, the trooper’s concerns about the histories of the men who were pulled over, the defendant’s MSR status, and his significantly reduced expectation of privacy make the pat-down search reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances. The limited scope of a pat-down search for weapons, as opposed to a full-fledged search for evidence, was appropriate where no individualized suspicion of illegal activity existed. In this particular case, objective concerns about officer safety, combined with the defendant’s status as a parolee subject to a search condition, shift the balance in favor of the reasonableness of a pat-down search. We emphasize that our holding is limited to circumstances in which MSR is a factor and does not address the appropriateness of pat-down searches in other situations.
Defendant argues that even if a pat-down search was reasonable at its inception, the extent of the pat-down exceeded the permissible scope of a search. He argues, first, that Trooper Boyles’ purpose was to search for contraband instead of weapons and, second, that the trooper impermissibly extended his search after determining the object in defendant’s pants was not a weapon. In support, defendant cites Minnesota v. Dickerson , 508 U.S. 366, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993), in which the Supreme Court invalidated a pat-down search when the officer discovered a lump of cocaine by “ ‘squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant’s pocket.’ ” Dickerson , 508 U.S. at 378, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 347, 113 S. Ct. at 2138, quoting State v. Dickerson , 481 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 1992). The State responds that Trooper Boyles was properly within the scope of a pat-down search because he was attempting to determine whether the hard object in defendant’s pants was a weapon. The purpose of a pat-down search is to protect the officer and others in the vicinity, not to gather evidence. Flowers , 179 Ill. 2d at 263, citing Dickerson , 508 U.S. at 373, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 344, 113 S. Ct. at 2136. The scope of the search must be limited to actions which are reasonably likely to discover weapons that could be used to harm the officer. Terry , 392 U.S. at 29, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 911, 88 S. Ct. at 1884. A search that exceeds this scope is constitutionally invalid. Dickerson , 508 U.S. at 379, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 348, 113 S. Ct. at 2139. As we have held above, Trooper Boyles was entitled to perform a pat-down search to learn whether defendant was armed. The record contains no evidence that his purpose was to search for drugs, rather than weapons. Boyles testified that his purpose was officer safety. The record similarly contains no indication that Boyles continued the search after he had assured himself that defendant was unarmed. Unlike the officer in Dickerson , who continued to manipulate the defendant’s pocket even after he determined it did not contain a weapon ( Dickerson , 508 U.S. at 378, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 347, 113 S. Ct. at 2138), Boyles testified that he could not identify the hard object he felt in defendant’s pants, but was aware of weapons that are a similar size. In light of this testimony, we hold that the search of defendant did not exceed the proper scope under Terry when Trooper Boyles continued his contact with defendant’s pants as he attempted to determine whether the object he felt was a weapon.