Opinion ID: 1152592
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Request for new penalty jury.

Text: (30a) After the guilty verdict was entered, defendant moved that a new jury be impaneled for the penalty trial, arguing that the court had conditioned the jury during voir dire to expect that defendant would present evidence in mitigation  an expectation the defense would disappoint, as it had determined to present no evidence. Defendant argues that the trial court's refusal to impanel a new jury for the penalty trial was an abuse of discretion, particularly as it was the court's error during voir dire that caused the potential for prejudice. The record discloses that during sequestered voir dire of several panels of prospective jurors and of two individual prospective jurors, the court explained the procedure involved in a capital trial, including the penalty phase of trial, noting that the prosecution would present evidence in aggravation, the defense would offer evidence in mitigation, and the court would instruct the jury as to the rules that would guide their penalty determination. Seven of the jurors who sat on defendant's jury heard this description. Defendant claims he objected to the court's characterization directly, but points to a portion of the record in which defendant objected to the prosecutor's use of questions that assumed defendant would present evidence in mitigation. The court explained, in response, that both counsel had a great deal of leeway in framing their questions. Defense counsel repeated he might or might not present evidence in mitigation, and the court directed him to prepare a typed statement signed by both counsel stating their reasons for not putting on any evidence in mitigation. Soon thereafter, defense counsel observed that the court had talked to two of the jurors about evidence in mitigation, and pointed out, that may or may not be presented. The trial court simply called the next juror. Defendant claims he repeatedly objected to the court's repetition of his early explanation of penalty phase procedure but he offers no citations to the record in support, nor do we observe any further objections. [14] (31) We review the trial court's decision not to impanel a second jury for the penalty trial under an abuse of discretion standard. ( People v. Rowland, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 268.) Section 190.4, subdivision (c), directs that the same jury shall consider the penalty as considered the guilt verdict, unless good cause is shown for separate juries. The section reflects the long-standing legislative preference for a single jury to determine both guilt and penalty. ( People v. Fauber, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 845; People v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 551, 574 [286 Cal. Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893].) In order to establish good cause, more than speculation or the desire of counsel is necessary. ( People v. Rowland, supra, 4 Cal.4th 238, 268; People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 252-253; People v. Fauber, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 846.) A new jury is not required, for example, simply because there is a deviation between defense strategy at the guilt trial and at the penalty trial ( People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 252; People v. Taylor (1990) 52 Cal.3d 719, 737-738 [276 Cal. Rptr. 391, 801 P.2d 1142]), or because the penalty jury may be disturbed by evidence of the capital crimes ( People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 252, People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 204 [222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480]). (30b) Here, defendant claimed he needed a new jury to avoid the potential for prejudice caused by the trial court's statements during voir dire that the defense would present evidence in mitigation at the penalty trial. He feared the jury would hold it against defendant that he presented no mitigating evidence. Defendant arguably could have avoided this potential by making a clearer contemporaneous objection to the court's statements. In any event, the potential for prejudice arising from the court's statements on voir dire is minimal. As in other cases in which we have analyzed the harm of misstatements of law during voir dire, the statements on voir dire long preceded the penalty phase, when the jury's attention would be focused on its sentencing responsibility. (See People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1242 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 628, 831 P.2d 1210] [district attorney's misstatements harmless in part because of time elapsed between voir dire and penalty trial]; People v. Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 915 [same]; People v. Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 182 [same].) In context, such statements would not be seen as instruction on the jury's function at the penalty trial, but merely as a brief introductory description or overview of the course of the trial. (See, e.g., People v. Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 182 [misstatement on voir dire small part of larger statement giving overview of voir dire procedure].) Any potential for prejudice was obviated by the jury instructions, which did not suggest that defendant had any obligation to present evidence at the penalty trial. (See, e.g., People v. DeSantis, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1243 [defects in voir dire cured by instructions and argument]; People v. Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 915-916 [same]; People v. Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 182-183 [same].) [15] And, of course, counsel could stress this point with the jury, and in fact, counsel here drew the jury's attention to the trial evidence as evidence in mitigation under section 190.3, factor (k). The prosecutor also listed defendant's guilt phase testimony about his condition on the night of the crimes as evidence that could be considered in mitigation. Under these circumstances, it was within the court's discretion to conclude that good cause had not been shown and to deny the motion for a second jury. [16]