Opinion ID: 1708859
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: was the excusal for cause of several jurors who expressed qualms about the death penalty a violation of the sixth, eighth and fourteenth amendments of the united states constitution?

Text: In Fuselier v. State, 468 So.2d 45 (Miss. 1985), this Court recognized a recent pronouncement on this issue from the United States Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). Witt upheld the standard of Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980), and reiterated it, stating: That standard is whether the juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' ... This standard ... does not require that a juror's bias be proved with unmistakable clarity... . many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made `unmistakably clear.'... Witt, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852, 83 L.Ed.2d at 851-52. In applying this standard, the Supreme Court held that Deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror. Id. at 853. Where the trial judge's determination that a juror is biased is supported by the record, that determination will not be reversed. Stringer wishes this Court to review the excusal of fourteen (14) jurors, whom he alleges expressed scruples to the death penalty: Oswalt, Moran, DeFoe, Eubanks, Johnson, Payne, Gooch, Bilbrew, Cox, Nicholson, Harris, Green, Fields, and Polk. Of the fourteen (14) jurors which the appellant has challenged as being removed without cause, all but two (2) gave unequivocal answers that they were opposed to and could not vote for the death penalty. Jurors Oswalt and Moran seemed to equivocate somewhat. However, Oswalt eventually came to the conclusion that she could only vote for the death penalty if a member of her family were hurt or killed. Juror Moran initially stated that she was unequivocally opposed to the death penalty; however, she later stated that, under some circumstances, she could impose it. Under the holding of Fuselier, the excusal of Moran could have been reversible error. Absent a clear showing that the prospective juror would be unable to follow the court's instructions and obey the juror's oath, that juror's feelings regarding the death penalty do not constitute grounds for a challenge and the granting of such a challenge is reversible error. 468 So.2d at 55. However, under the standard of Wainwright where a juror's position is not unmistakably clear the decision of whether or not to excuse the juror is left to the trial judge's discretion. An examination of the record reveals that Moran was excused for other reasons. When the state challenged Moran, the defense attorney objected, on the grounds that she stated she could vote for the death penalty under certain circumstances. The court made the following statement: There's a weak possibility that she stated and the objection will be sustained. Mr. Peters then stated: I further challenge that juror your honor based upon the fact that just after the jury broke prior to the jury selection, she was in the jury room with the defendant and either she or Miss Oswalt handed the defendant a cup of coffee and they exchanged some minor conversation. I don't know what it was. The trial judge then replied: Alright. Let's move on to the next one. That is the last mention of Miss Moran in the record, until she is listed in the group of jurors who was to be excused. There was no constitutional violation in the excusal of jurors for cause because of their scruples against the death penalty. Cf. Lockhart v. McCree, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986).