Opinion ID: 2507041
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reference to Other Windstar Van Fires by Funkhouser's Experts

Text: Funkhouser also contends the circuit court erred in ruling that evidence of other Windstar van fires was inadmissible as a predicate for the testimony of his expert witnesses. Funkhouser's experts would testify on what the industry standard would be in response to at least seven reports of unexplained, key-off fires. As stated previously, Schulz is of the opinion that other similar occurrences should have placed Ford on notice that Ford's Windstar minivans manufactured between 1999 and 2003 were or were likely to be dangerous for the use for which they were sold because Ford knew or should have known that the electrical components in the instrument panel area of these vans had the potential to fail and result in a fire with the key in an `off' position. Pursuant to Code § 8.01-401.1, any expert witness may give testimony and render an opinion or draw inferences from facts, circumstances or data made known to or perceived by such witness at or before the hearing or trial during which he is called upon to testify. Furthermore, [t]he facts, circumstances or data relied upon by such witness in forming an opinion or drawing inferences, if of a type normally relied upon by others in the particular field of expertise in forming opinions and drawing inferences, need not be admissible in evidence. Id. However, this statute does not allow for introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence during direct examination of an expert witness merely because the expert relied on such evidence in formulating an opinion. See Commonwealth v. Wynn, 277 Va. 92, 100, 671 S.E.2d 137, 141 (2009). In Jones, after finding the circuit court properly excluded from trial evidence of the Updegrove Study, we held that plaintiff's expert witness could not testify about the Updegrove Study at trial. 263 Va. at 257, 559 S.E.2d at 602. Likewise, since we find that evidence of the Arencibia, Bryan, and Pell fires is inadmissible at trial, we further hold that Funkhouser's expert witnesses may not testify about or refer to those fires during their direct testimony at trial. Although Funkhouser's expert witnesses may not make reference to the Arencibia, Bryan, and Pell fires during their direct examination, Code § 8.01-401.1 expressly permits expert witnesses to rely upon inadmissible information in formulating their opinions if it is of a type normally relied upon by others in the particular field of expertise in forming opinions and drawing inferences. Thus, to the extent the circuit court's ruling purports to prohibit Funkhouser's experts from relying upon other Windstar van fires in formulating their opinions, the circuit court's ruling is inconsistent with the language of Code § 8.01-401.1. [11] Of course, Ford is entitled to cross-examine Funkhouser's experts at trial as to the basis for each opinion, including whether, in formulating such opinion, the expert relied on occurrences not shown to be substantially similar to the Funkhouser fire. See id. (providing that the expert may be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination). [12]