Opinion ID: 2625696
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Absurd Results Claim

Text: Defendants criticize the Court of Appeal's holding that a representative action seeking civil penalties under subdivision (a) of Labor Code section 2699, which is part of the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, need not satisfy class action requirements. According to defendants, that holding leads to absurd results. In support of their argument, defendants point to a difference in language between subdivision (a) and subdivision (g) of Labor Code section 2699. (5) Subdivision (a) of Labor Code section 2699 states that [n]otwithstanding any other provision of law an aggrieved employee may bring a representative action against the employer for civil penalties based on violations of Labor Code provisions that expressly provide for a civil penalty. In contrast, subdivision (g), which allows an aggrieved employee to bring a representative action against the employer to recover civil penalties for violations of any Labor Code provision that does not expressly provide for statutory penalties, does not contain subdivision (a)'s [n]otwithstanding any other provision of law language. Defendants read the Court of Appeal's decision as holding that class action requirements do not apply to actions under Labor Code section 2699, subdivision (a) only because class action requirements are provisions of law and subdivision (a) says that it applies regardless of, or notwithstanding, any other provision of law. Defendants then argue that because Labor Code section 2699, subdivision (g) does not contain subdivision (a)'s [n]otwithstanding any other provision of law language, it follows that actions under that subdivision must comply with class action requirements. According to defendants, to conclude that subdivision (g) actions must satisfy class action requirements but subdivision (a) actions need not is absurd and therefore the Court of Appeal's statutory construction must be wrong. We disagree. Defendants' argument assumes that class action requirements apply generally to any form of representative action unless the Legislature affirmatively precludes their application by inserting notwithstanding any other provision of law, or words to that effect, in the statute authorizing the representative action. This assumption is incorrect. For example, this court construed the unfair competition law, before its amendment in 2004, as authorizing representative actions that were not class actions (see, e.g., Kraus v. Trinity Management Services, Inc., supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 126, fn. 10; Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 561) even though that law contained no language affirmatively expressing a legislative intent to preclude application of class action requirements. Moreover, there is a more reasonable and persuasive explanation for the Legislature's failure to include the words notwithstanding any other provision of law, or similar language, in subdivision (g) of Labor Code section 2699. That subdivision says that no action may be brought for any violation of the Labor Code's posting, notice, filing, and reporting requirements, but the subdivision contains an exception for such requirements when they involve statutorily mandated payroll or workplace injury reporting. Given that structureâ a general prohibition subject to a specific exception that in turn was tied to specific statutory requirementsâ the addition of the words notwithstanding any other provision of law would have made the entire provision ambiguous and confusing because those additional words could be read as being inconsistent with, and therefore nullifying, the express exception incorporating other provisions of law. An intent to avoid this potential confusion and possible misinterpretation, rather than an intent to impose class action requirements, is the likely explanation for the absence of the words notwithstanding any other provision of law in subdivision (g) of Labor Code section 2699. Defendants also argue that if the [n]otwithstanding any other provision of law language in Labor Code section 2699, subdivision (a) exempts representative actions brought under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 from class action requirements, it must also exempt those actions from all other provisions of law, including statutes of limitation and pleading requirements set forth in the Code of Civil Procedure. Not so. The statutory phrase `notwithstanding any other provision of law' has been called a `term of art' [citation] that declares the legislative intent to override all contrary law. ( Klajic v. Castaic Lake Water Agency (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 5, 13 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 746], italics added.) Thus, by virtue of subdivision (a)'s notwithstanding clause, only those provisions of law that conflict with the act's provisionsâ not, as defendants contend, every provision of lawâ are inapplicable to actions brought under the act.