Opinion ID: 1934548
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The exhortations to tell appellant something

Text: Two of the prosecutor's remarks during closing argument were improper because they both called upon the jury to consider what its verdict would tell appellant about his conduct on the night of November 23. During his initial summation, the prosecutor reviewed how appellant had mistreated his estranged wife and then asked the jury to tell Mr. Bowman that our society won't allow that kind of behavior. This comment brought no objection from defense counsel. Later, at the end of his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor said that to find Mr. Bowman not guilty in this case is to tell him that he can go on doing what he did, and that's okay. Defense counsel objected to this last remark on the ground that it was unreasonable, misleading, and inflammatory. While this objection could have been more clearly stated, we will assume for the sake of argument that it was sufficient to raise the claim of error that appellant, through new counsel, now presents on appeal. In our view, both of these remarks were improper. This court has stated repeatedly that an attorney must not ask a jury to send a message to anyone, and we now expressly hold that urging the jury to tell someone something is likewise improper, and for the same reason. Juries are not in the message-sending business. Their sole duty is to return a verdict based on the facts before them. Urging a jury to send a message is impermissible because it implies that there is a reason to find the defendant guilty other than what the evidence has shown. See, e.g., Coreas v. United States, supra, 565 A.2d at 604 ([a]rgument which encourages the jury to `send a message' has been found improper); Powell v. United States, 455 A.2d 405, 410 (D.C.1982) (holding that the comment Isn't it time that this jury, acting as the conscience of the community, stood up and sent a message to the defendant? was irrelevant and inappropriate). Thus we hold that it was improper for the prosecutor to ask the jury to send a message to appellant or to tell him anything at all, or even to consider what an acquittal would tell him. [13] As the late motion picture producer Samuel Goldwyn is reported to have said when someone asked why he did not make more message movies, If you want to send a message, call Western Union. We are satisfied, nevertheless, that neither of these comments requires reversal because appellant has not shown either plain error [14] as to the first or substantial prejudice [15] as to the second. The government's evidence was not only strong but uncontested. Appellant offered no evidence of his own; his defense was essentially that the government had failed to prove the intent required to convict him of burglary. The prosecutor's comments had no perceptible effect on that defense, nor did they enhance the government's case in any way that we can detect. On the record before us, we discern no plain error in the trial court's failure to intervene sua sponte and correct the prosecutor's first lapse, and no substantial prejudice in the court's overruling of counsel's objection after the prosecutor's rebuttal. See McGrier, supra, 597 A.2d at 40; Irick, supra, 565 A.2d at 33. The evidence of appellant's guilt was strong, and we are satisfied that the prosecutor's improper argument did not impermissibly sway the jury toward a guilty verdict. Morrison v. United States, 547 A.2d 996, 1000 (D.C.1988) (citations omitted).