Opinion ID: 658820
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: indemnification claim as future claim

Text: 21 We next reject Vitkus' contention that the Release could not have barred his indemnification claim because the claim did not arise until after the Release was executed. It is true that under Illinois law, a release will not bar claims that originate subsequent to its execution ... absent a clear expression of intent to that effect. Chubb v. Amax Coal Co., Inc., 125 Ill.App.3d 682, 80 Ill.Dec. 917, 920, 466 N.E.2d 369, 372 (1984). 22 However, Vitkus did not only release causes of action under the Release; he also discharged existing financial obligations that Beatrice owed to him. 5 A releasor may relieve the obligor of existing contractual duties and other obligations, even where those obligations have not yet come due and before a claim concerning a breach of those obligations has as yet arisen. See Frank Rosenberg, Inc. v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 28 Ill.2d 573, 192 N.E.2d 823, 826 (1963) (holding that release discharged releasee of future obligations under a contract that he had with the releasor). 23 At the time Vitkus signed the Release on January 5, 1987, any obligation that Beatrice had to indemnify Vitkus already existed under Beatrice's By-laws, the Merger Agreement, or the common law. That Vitkus did not have a claim for indemnity until after he signed the Release is thus irrelevant to the question of whether he released Beatrice of its obligation to indemnify him that existed on January 5, 1987. 6 We therefore conclude that Beatrice's financial obligation to indemnify Vitkus existed at the time Vitkus signed the Release and could not be considered at that time as a future obligation. 24