Opinion ID: 2453269
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Mere Allegation of Property Ownership Relating to Takings and Eminent Domain Disputes Is Sufficient to Invoke the Authority of the Ombudsman's Office

Text: ¶ 25 The Ombudsman Act provides that the Ombudsman's Office is authorized to mediate or arbitrate takings and eminent domain disputes [i]f requested by the private property owner. [17] Box Elder County contends that this language requires that ownership be undisputed before the authority of the Ombudsman's Office may be invoked. We disagree. The plain language of the Ombudsman Act supports the determination that a mere allegation of property ownership in takings and eminent domain disputes is sufficient to invoke the authority of the Ombudsman's Office. ¶ 26 The Act provides, The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman shall issue a written statement declining to arbitrate or to appoint an arbitrator when, in the opinion of the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman: (i) the issues are not ripe for review; (ii) assuming the alleged facts are true, no cause of action exists under United States or Utah law; (iii) all issues raised are beyond the scope of the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman's statutory duty to review; or (iv) the arbitration is otherwise not appropriate. [18] ¶ 27 The language of this provision indicates that there are situations where the Ombudsman's Office may initially accept a case to arbitrate and then later determine that the case involves an area outside the scope of the statutory authority of the Ombudsman's Office. But to make that determination, the Ombudsman's Office must have the authority to receive and hear evidence on matters that might, depending on their resolution, divest the Ombudsman's Office of authoritysuch as when a party asserting a takings claim does not actually have any interest in the property involved. ¶ 28 Here, the Selmans and Box Elder County both allege ownership of the trail. In addition, the Selmans assert ownership of the property abutting the trail. The Selmans argue that Box Elder County effected a taking when it began road construction activities on the trail and widened the trail by cutting into portions of the Selmans' surrounding property. In contrast, Box Elder County claims that its actions do not constitute a taking because it has always owned the trail. Consequently, if the Ombudsman's Office finds that the Selmans have no protectable interest in either the trail or the abutting property, the plain language of the Act would require the Ombudsman's Office to decline to arbitrate the case because the Selmans could not prevail on a takings claim. We pause to note that, in this case, regardless of who is adjudged to own the trail, takings issues may remain regarding the surrounding property. [19] Therefore, in order to divest the Ombudsman's Office of authority, the Ombudsman's Office must find that the Selmans have no protectable interest in either the trail or the surrounding property. In contrast, if the Ombudsman's Office finds that the Selmans have a protectable interest in either the trail or the abutting property a necessary determination in their takings claimthe Ombudsman's Office would have the authority to further arbitrate the takings dispute. ¶ 29 Box Elder County argues that allowing the Ombudsman's Office to arbitrate the issue of property ownership would be prejudicial because it requires the arbitrator to assume that the Selmans own the trail, thereby creating a presumption in favor of ownership. The county reasons that because the language of the Act states that only a property owner can request the assistance of the Ombudsman's Office, allowing the arbitrator to hear the case would indicate his tacit agreement with the Selmans that they have ownership of the trail. We disagree. The situation here is not unlike that which is found in courts of general jurisdiction. ¶ 30 In Utah, merely alleging a claim upon which relief can be granted is sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of a district court. The law does not require that all facets of the complaint be proven before a district court can hear the issue; rather, mere allegations are sufficient to invoke the court's jurisdiction and initiate litigation. Just as a court of general jurisdiction does not have to tacitly agree that all of the allegations in a complaint are true in order to hear the complaint, the Ombudsman's Office does not have to tacitly agree that the Selmans own the trail in order to arbitrate this matter. Rather, the Ombudsman's Office has authority to arbitrate a takings or eminent domain issue so long as the allegations, if proven, would provide a right to relief. ¶ 31 Accordingly, we hold that the mere allegation of property ownership in a takings or eminent domain dispute is sufficient to invoke the authority of the Ombudsman's Office.