Opinion ID: 6333570
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Divorce Action

Text: Summer Smith and Geary Simon married in 2006. They have two minor children of the marriage. They separated in 2016, and Smith filed for divorce in October 2017. Her complaint portrayed a difficult marriage in which Simon insisted she not work and “exclusively controlled” their finances and resources, including the management of the Virginia condo. The complaint alleged that this control was in part accomplished through a number of “trusts and other financial arrangements” that Simon presented to Smith as “documents she must sign for their family’s and/or children’s protection, . . . often with representations about the effect of the documents that were inconsistent with the language of the documents themselves.” 3 The complaint included further allegations that Simon “refused to return to [Smith] her premarital property,” identifying specifically the Virginia condo. Smith requested inter alia that the court “[a]ward Plaintiff her sole and separate property” and “[d]etermine which property is marital property, value it and distribute it in a manner that is equitable, just and reasonable, in accordance with D.C. Code § 16910(b).” Simon did not object to a determination that the Virginia condo was Smith’s sole premarital property, but he claimed his wife had assigned him the rights to manage and receive rents from the property. The two agreements at issue in this appeal (a lease and a transfer of property and management rights) were submitted to the court as exhibits during a pendente lite hearing extending over several days in March and April of 2018. Ms. Smith claimed they were invalid, testifying she did not recall signing them and first learned of their existence after the parties’ separation. During the same hearing, Simon testified that Smith owed him over $170,000 to reimburse him for money he had contributed to the Virginia condo. In its April 2018 order on Smith’s request for pendente lite support, the court noted that it “did not receive sufficient evidence at this juncture to rule on the validity” of the agreements and that it would “resolve the issue of ownership and/or control of this condo at trial.” In the interim, the pendente lite order suspended operation of the 4 agreements and directed that “starting May 1, 2018, Plaintiff shall receive all rental proceeds generated by her condo in Virginia.” Over a four-day trial held on September 10, 11, and 13, and October 25, 2018, the judge heard testimony from Smith and Simon, and from one of Simon’s attorneys, Gary Wright. The judge also reviewed the two agreements themselves, photographs of the Virginia condo, and evidence regarding the expenses Simon claimed he had incurred managing the property (for which he claimed the right to place a lien on the condo in order to be reimbursed). The evidence presented at the pendente lite hearing was incorporated in the trial record. During the trial, Simon orally objected on procedural grounds to the court’s determination of the validity of the challenged agreements in the divorce proceeding, particularly in the absence of two trusts that were parties to the agreements. Following the trial, the judge issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a judgment of absolute divorce. The judgment awarded Smith the Virginia condo as her sole and separate property. It declared the two agreements invalid “because they are unconscionable” under the applicable law, and ordered Simon to “cease exercising any control over the [Virginia condo] immediately.” We address the 5 judge’s rulings on those agreements first, as his findings regarding them inform our disposition of the main procedural issues that Simon presents on appeal. II. The Validity of the Lease Agreement and the Property Agreement
Smith purchased the Arlington, Virginia condo in December 2003 with funds she received upon the death of her father. Smith testified that during her subsequent marriage, Simon tried to persuade her to transfer ownership of the condo to one of his trusts or to a family trust. She refused to do so, but she did entrust the management of the Virginia condo to him because she thought that Simon, a real estate professional with far more business acumen than she had, was better suited to the task and that his decisions would be in her best interest. In 2009, Smith also agreed to transfer title to the condo to a trust in her name – the Summer Smith Simon Revocable Trust (“SSS Revocable Trust”). Smith is the settlor, beneficiary, and trustee of this Trust. Simon testified that he established two other trusts in 2009, the “GSS Revocable Trust” and the “GSS Irrevocable Trust.” The trust documents were not introduced in evidence, nor were their terms read into the record. According to Simon, he is the settlor of the GSS Revocable Trust and, with his children, one of its 6 beneficiaries. 1 Smith is not a beneficiary. Simon testified that he was the sole trustee of the GSS Revocable Trust until September 2016, when he claims to have resigned and appointed one of his “professional advisors” as the successor trustee. As for the GSS Irrevocable Trust, Simon testified it has two trustees, his brother and cousin. 2 The trusts are referenced in the agreements the trial court held to be invalid. The first agreement, dated January 1, 2010, is entitled “Residential Lease Agreement” (hereinafter referred to as the “Lease Agreement”). The Lease Agreement names Smith and her SSS Revocable Trust as lessors of the Virginia condo and the GSS Revocable Trust as lessee. It grants the GSS Revocable Trust a lease on the Virginia condo for a period of ten years, with two five-year extensions of the term available to the Trust at its option, for the fixed rent of $750 per month. Should the Trust “remain in possession” of the property “after the expiration” of the lease, the agreement provides for continuation of the lease month-to-month. The Lease Agreement grants the GSS Revocable Trust “an irrevocable right to assign 1 In his testimony at trial Simon identified his two minor children as the beneficiaries of the GSS Revocable Trust, but his brief on appeal to this court states he “named himself trustee and beneficiary” of that Trust. We come away with the understanding that both Simon and the children were beneficiaries. 2 However, as described below, one of the agreements at issue in this appeal identifies Smith as a trustee of the GSS Irrevocable Trust. The record does not appear to contain any explanation for this discrepancy. 7 [the] lease” and states that the Trust may assign the lease “or sublet or grant any concession or license to use the premises” without Smith’s consent. The Lease Agreement also includes a purchase option giving the Trust the right to purchase the property at a “fixed and agreed sum” of $290,000 “at any time during the initial [tenyear] term” of the lease (i.e., regardless of the fair market value of the property at the time). (That option was not exercised during the initial term, however, and thus it is undisputed that the Virginia condo remains the premarital property of Smith.) The apparent signatories on the Lease Agreement are Smith, on behalf of both the SSS Revocable Trust and herself individually, and Simon, as trustee on behalf of the GSS Revocable Trust. The Lease Agreement states it is to be “interpreted and enforced pursuant to the laws of The Commonwealth of Virginia.” The second agreement, dated September 2, 2010, is entitled “Agreement Regarding Personal and Real Property” (hereinafter, the “Property Agreement”). The Property Agreement purports to be made “by and between” Geary Simon, the GSS Revocable Trust, and the GSS Irrevocable Trust, and Summer Smith Simon, the SSS Revocable Trust and the SSS Irrevocable Trust. (Smith disclaimed any knowledge of an “irrevocable” trust in her name, and it plays no part in the disputes at issue.) The Property Agreement bears the apparent signatures of Smith and Simon, but solely as individuals. Although the agreement lists the trusts as parties, 8 it is not signed by anyone on behalf of any of the trusts. The Property Agreement states that it “shall be interpreted and enforced pursuant to the Laws of the District of Columbia.” With the sole exception of the Virginia condo, the Property Agreement transfers to the GSS Revocable Trust “all [Smith’s] interest in any and all tangible personal property that [she] may own, including but not limited to [her] household furniture, furnishings, collectibles, clothing, linen, china, silverware, books, jewelry and art.” 3 Although the Property Agreement does not purport to deprive Smith of her ownership of the Virginia condo, it does not leave that property untouched. Instead, the agreement gives Simon, “individually, or through such entity as he determines,” the right to manage the Virginia condo on Smith’s behalf. It states that “[s]uch management shall include collection of rents or other income generated by the property and payment of all associated expense.” After paying Smith “[f]rom the 3 In addition, among other things, the Property Agreement takes note of a term life insurance policy on Simon’s person for the benefit of the GSS Irrevocable Trust, “of which [Smith] is the Trustee,” and provides that Smith authorizes Simon “to alter, restructure, change or otherwise revise the beneficiary” of the policy. This appears to be the only provision in the agreement pertaining to the GSS Irrevocable Trust. 9 proceeds of income . . . a sum equivalent to the monthly mortgage for the property,” the “excess sum shall be retain[ed] by [Simon] and used for the expenses.” But the agreement further provides that “any deficiency between the income and expense of the property shall constitute a reimbursable expense” to Simon that Smith must repay “on demand, or upon sale or other disposition of the property.” The Agreement grants Simon an irrevocable power of attorney to record a lien against the property for any “accumulated deficiency,” as well as “an assignment of rents to secure the repayment of the deficiency amount.” Smith testified that the Lease Agreement and the Property Agreement were fabricated or forged by her ex-husband and his longtime friend and attorney, Gary Wright. She claimed she never signed them and that she did not understand their terms or implications. 4 The signatures that appear on the agreements as Smith’s are reproduced below (the Lease Agreement on the left and the Property Agreement right): As noted below, the trial judge ultimately did not resolve the factual issue 4 of whether Simon’s signatures on the Lease Agreement and the Property Agreement were genuine. However, the judge considered it “entirely possible” that Smith may never even have seen the Property Agreement. 10 Smith testified that she had trusted Simon fully to manage and make financial decisions for her regarding the Virginia condo, as he was a real estate professional and her husband, someone she felt would act in her best interest. After he assumed that responsibility, Simon gave her between $750 and $1000 each month out of the rent he collected on the condo, which she referred to as her “allowance” from her husband. Smith testified that she always used the money she received from Simon to pay her mortgage on the Virginia condo, which was approximately $940 per month. Smith also said that after their separation, she attempted to take possession of the Virginia condo by changing its locks. Her husband then changed them again, preventing her from entering the unit. Simon testified that Smith was present, agreed to, and signed both agreements, and that an attorney, Gary Wright, witnessed the signing of the Lease Agreement and actively represented Smith in negotiating the Property Agreement. Simon maintained that his wife fully understood the terms and implications of both agreements, which he described as being drafted for “estate planning” purposes. When asked by the court why the Lease Agreement’s purchase option, in particular, 11 was necessary between a married couple, Simon responded, “[I]t’s a standard lease agreement, I have an option to buy [in] every lease agreement I’ve ever written in my life . . . and I wanted a fixed price.” Simon further testified that he rented the Virginia condo to tenants for around $1,650 a month and covered all of the expenses for maintaining the apartment. He claimed that the cumulative deficiency that Smith owed him under the Property Agreement for his unreimbursed expenses amounted to “about $170,000” at the time of the trial. He estimated that the condo could be sold for $320,000. Gary Wright’s testimony regarding the formation of the two agreements conformed to Simon’s. Wright testified that he witnessed the signing of the Lease Agreement but did not represent either party in its negotiation. He claimed that he did represent and advise Smith in negotiating the Property Agreement with Simon’s lawyer. Wright acknowledged that he was a longtime friend of Simon and that he and Simon had an “arrangement” under which he had provided various legal services to Simon for nearly fifteen years — an arrangement that was continuing at the time he claimed to have represented Smith in connection with the Property Agreement. Wright also acknowledged that he later filed a lawsuit for the Simon Family Trust against Smith in 2016 to evict her from one of Simon’s properties after the couple’s separation. And in 2014 and 2018, at Simon’s request, Wright represented Smith’s 12 Revocable Trust without her knowledge or consent in lawsuits against it by the Arlington Village Townhouse Association for the non-payment of fees assessed against the Virginia condo. Wright said he did so based on his understanding that Simon “had control of the trust that managed the condo.”
In rendering judgment, the trial judge began by expressing serious concerns about the credibility of each of the witnesses whose testimony he had heard. Of pertinence here, the judge found Simon’s testimony regarding the expenses he incurred in managing the Virginia condo to be “simpl[y] incredible” and “less than forthright.” 5 As for Smith, the judge found her somewhat inconsistent testimony 5 As one of several examples of Simon’s lack of credibility, the judge cited his “assertion at trial that he has poured $175,000 into Ms. [Smith’s] Virginia condo and has operated at a deficit for almost ten years on the property.” This testimony was “simpl[y] incredible,” the judge explained: The photographs admitted as Plaintiff’s Exhibit 21 do not reflect a property that has had $175,000 of improvements made to it, further inspection of the documentation of these expenses shows that it is unlikely that Mr. Simon has spent nearly that much on improvements to the property, and finally, it is not credible that someone would invest $175,000 into a property that is only worth about $200,000 and continue to lose money on that property—the rental income for the Virginia condominium is only $1,675 per month, not enough to break even. 13 regarding whether she signed the Lease Agreement and the Property Agreement “concerning.” However, although the judge did not make a finding as to whether Smith actually had signed the agreements, he expressed doubt about it. The judge specifically credited Smith’s testimony that she had fully trusted Simon to manage the property in her best interests and did not critically question any documents she may have signed at his behest during the marriage. The judge was most alarmed by Wright’s testimony. He found that Wright’s admitted status as Simon’s attorney posed a clear conflict of interest to his representation of Smith in connection with the Property Agreement. The court also found that Simon could not authorize Wright to appear as counsel for the SSS Revocable Trust (in the litigation brought by the townhouse association), as Smith was the only trustee with the authority to hire an attorney to represent it, and therefore Wright had held himself out improperly as Smith’s attorney without her knowledge or consent. Because of Wright’s history of representing Simon and Examining Simon’s documentation of his expenditures, the judge found his claim of a $175,000 lien against the Virginia condo for management expenses to be greatly inflated by charges for meals, car payments, and so forth, that had nothing to do with the condo. The judge concluded that “Mr. Simon simply charged anything he wanted as part of the lien against the condo, and expected Ms. [Smith] to be required to reimburse him later.” In fact, the judge found, “after subtracting invalid charges to the lien, it appears that there is actually a $16,000 credit on the condo in favor of Mr. Simon. Therefore, there is no lien for which Ms. [Smith] owes Mr. Simon any money.” 14 Smith without regard to ethical rules, the judge “[did] not find Mr. Wright’s testimony that he zealously represented [Smith’s] interests in negotiating [the Property Agreement] credible.” The judge found the Lease Agreement (which contained a Virginia choice-oflaw provision) to be unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable, under either Virginia or District of Columbia law. 6 He found the Property Agreement (which contained a District of Columbia choice-of-law provision) unconscionable and unenforceable under this jurisdiction’s law (without considering whether it would reach the same result under Virginia law). With regard to the Lease Agreement, the judge found that Smith had carried her burden under Virginia law by showing “a gross disparity in the division of assets and clear and convincing evidence of overreaching or oppressive conduct.” The terms of the agreement, the judge explained, left Smith with “essentially no control over her only premarital property, and even contemplate[d] Mr. Simon taking it from her in the form of an option to purchase.” In addition, the judge found, Smith entered 6 The judge found that, as applied in this case, there was no true conflict between Virginia and District of Columbia law. This is undisputed on appeal. 15 into the agreement without counsel or bargaining power, trusting in her husband to act in her best interests. 7 For much the same reasons, the judge found both an “absence of a meaningful choice on the part of one party, and unreasonably favorable terms for the other party,” which rendered the Lease Agreement unconscionable under D.C. law. 8 7 As the judge elaborated, The agreement was signed at a time when Mr. Simon and Ms. [Smith] were presumably happily married, in 2010, and when they would have had the highest fiduciary relationship between them. Ms. [Smith] trusted Mr. Simon to conduct all business related to the properties properly and to manage her property in a way that would further her interests. When presented with an agreement as to this property, it only makes sense that Ms. [Smith] would have implicitly trusted Mr. Simon, and that Mr. Simon would have known that Ms. [Smith] trusted him, giving her very little bargaining power. Additionally, there is no evidence that any attorneys negotiated this contract on Ms. [Smith’s] behalf, nor were there any attorneys present on her behalf when she signed it. In fact, the only parties present were Mr. Simon, the husband with whom she had a fiduciary relationship and a high level of trust, and Mr. Wright, Mr. Simon’s long-time friend and attorney in many cases. 8 As the judge reiterated, Ms. [Smith] had very little meaningful choice in signing this agreement—she was presented a contract by her husband, whom she trusted with all of the parties’ financial documents and property management, and was told to sign it in the presence of his long-time friend and 16 As for the Property Agreement, the judge was of the view that it “could be invalid on grounds of fraud,” as there was reason to believe Ms. Smith had never signed or even seen the agreement. 9 The judge declined to decide whether the Property Agreement was fraudulent, however, for he concluded that “the agreement is certainly invalid because it is unconscionable.” Like the Lease Agreement, the judge explained, the Property Agreement contained terms that unreasonably favored Simon. And Smith did not have a meaningful choice in acceding to the agreement, the judge found, because she was represented by Wright, a friend of Simon’s who attorney. Ms. [Smith] had very little bargaining power in this situation because of her trust in Mr. Simon to do the right thing with regard to her property and to manage her property in a way that would align with her best interests. 9 The judge explained: [T]here is some evidence of fraud within this document. Mr. Wright testified that he acted as Ms. [Smith’s] attorney in negotiating this contract with . . . Mr. Simon’s attorney. However, Mr. Wright . . . has falsely acted as Ms. [Smith’s] attorney before. He has signed legal documents as her attorney without her knowledge in Virginia. This fact renders Ms. [Smith’s] signature on this document suspicious, and the Court questions the validity of the entire agreement. It is entirely possible, due to Mr. Wright’s involvement, that Ms. [Smith] may never have seen nor had an opportunity to read this document. Therefore, the Court finds that the Agreement Regarding Personal and Real Property could be invalid on grounds of fraud. 17 “clearly has a conflict of interest,” and because she would have trusted her husband to be acting in her best interest. Based on the foregoing findings and conclusions of law, the judge ordered Simon in the Judgment of Absolute Divorce to “cease exercising any control over [the Virginia condo] immediately,” and not to interfere with Smith’s future use of the condo “as she wishes.” By its terms, this order applied only to Simon; the judge did not purport to exercise jurisdiction over, or enter judgment or an order against, the GSS Trusts or their trustees. 10
On appeal, Simon maintains that the Property Agreement and the Lease Agreement implemented a fair bargain between himself and Smith. He asserts that she was uninterested in managing the Virginia condo herself, willingly transferred those duties to Simon, and benefitted from receiving rental income on the property for no work on her part while retaining ownership over the property — and that the trial judge therefore erred in finding the agreements unconscionable. In our view, 10 As we discuss below, however, to the extent Simon retained ultimate control of the Trusts as their settlor, the divorce judgment applied to his exercise of control over the Virginia condo through them. 18 the credited evidence in the record refutes these claims and supports the judge’s ruling. Unconscionability of a contract is ultimately a legal conclusion, dependent on proof and findings of facts supporting such a determination. Thus, while we treat the relevant factual findings as presumptively correct unless they are clearly erroneous or without foundation in the record, we review de novo the trial court’s ultimate holding that a contract is unconscionable. 11 The doctrine of unconscionability works to prevent a party burdened by an oppressive and plainly one-sided contract from being bound by its terms. Under District of Columbia law, a contract is unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable, if there is “an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties” and the contractual terms are “unreasonably favorable to the other party.” 12 “These two elements are often referred to as procedural unconscionability and substantive 11 See, e.g., Duffy v. Duffy, 881 A.2d 630, 634 (D.C. 2005); Urban Invs., Inc. v. Branham, 464 A.2d 93, 100 n.8 (D.C. 1983) (“The court determines unconscionability as a matter of law.”). 12 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 19 unconscionability,” respectively. 13 Virginia courts similarly will find an agreement unconscionable where “oppressive influences affected the agreement to the extent that the process was unfair” (procedural unconscionability) and there was a “gross disparity in the value exchanged” (substantive unconscionability). 14 Generally, we require that the party seeking to avoid the contract prove both elements. 15 This calls upon the factfinder to make “a strongly fact-dependent inquiry” 16 that is sensitive to context and especially to the relationship between the parties and the power dynamics at play. 17 Where, as here, the parties to a contract were married at the time the contract was formed, courts scrutinize the agreement “more carefully than an ordinary 13 Branham, 464 A.2d at 99. 14 Derby v. Derby, 378 S.E.2d 74, 79 (Va. Ct. App. 1989); see also Galloway v. Galloway, 622 S.E.2d 267, 271 (Va. Ct. App. 2005). On the facts of this case, we agree with the trial judge that the issue of the enforceability of the Lease Agreement presents no conflict between Virginia and District law. 15 See Curtis v. Gordon, 980 A.2d 1238, 1244 (D.C. 2009). “[I]n an egregious situation,” however, a showing of “one or the other may suffice.” Branham, 464 A.2d at 99. 16 Keeton v. Wells Fargo Corp., 987 A.2d 1118, 1121 (D.C. 2010). 17 Walker-Thomas Furniture, 350 F.2d at 449. 20 contract,” recognizing that spouses owe a fiduciary duty to each other during marriage and often (wisely or not) place a high degree of trust in one another. 18 Because marriage is a confidential relationship in which the parties are not necessarily dealing with each other “at arm’s length,” it is ripe with opportunity for one spouse to take advantage of the assumed fidelity between them to establish an objectively oppressive agreement. 19 In our view, the judge’s findings in this case are amply supported by the evidence, and they demonstrate that Simon did take unfair advantage of his wife by means of the Lease and Property Agreements. For present purposes, we focus 18 Burtoff v. Burtoff, 418 A.2d 1085, 1089 (D.C. 1980); see also Derby, 378 S.E.2d at 78 (“Marriage is a confidential relationship of trust imposing the highest fiduciary duty upon the spouses in their intermarital dealings.”). 19 Burtoff, 418 A.2d at 1089; see also Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17, 27 (Conn. 2011) (“Because of the nature of the marital relationship, the spouses . . . are certainly less cautious than they would be with an ordinary contracting party. With lessened caution comes greater potential for one spouse to take advantage of the other.”); Derby, 378 S.E.2d at 79 (“[T]he relationship between husband and wife is not the usual relationship that exists between parties to ordinary commercial contracts. Particularly when the negotiation is between the parties rather than between their lawyers, the relationship creates a situation ripe for subtle overreaching and misrepresentation. Behavior that might not constitute fraud or duress in an arm’s-length context may suffice to invalidate a grossly inequitable agreement where the relationship is utilized to overreach or take advantage of a situation in order to achieve an oppressive result.”). 21 primarily on the effects of the agreements on Smith’s sole premarital property interest at issue, the Virginia condo. Turning first to the Lease Agreement, we conclude that whether it is evaluated under the law of the District or that of Virginia, its unconscionability was established. Simon claimed he crafted “a standard lease agreement” like “every lease agreement [he had] ever written in [his] life,” containing the fixed purchase price he “wanted.” As the judge perceived, however, in doing so Simon took advantage of his unrepresented wife’s naiveté and trust (assuming she did know about and sign the agreement) to obtain her assent to an unreasonably one-sided arrangement — a residential lease agreement that, we frankly think, no landlord would make in an arm’s length transaction. 20 The Lease Agreement locked Smith into what was essentially a twenty-year lease of the Virginia condo to Simon’s GSS Revocable Trust at a fixed rental rate of 20 See Derby, 378 S.E.2d at 81 (procedural unconscionability proved where neither party represented by counsel and wife abused husband’s trust and hope they would reunite to convince him to sign agreement with grossly unfair terms to him); Williams v. Williams, 508 A.2d 985, 990 (Md. 1986) (separation agreement procedurally unconscionable where husband unrepresented and terms of the agreement were never discussed); Stoner v. Stoner, 819 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. 2003) (“[M]arriage contracts should not be treated as mere ‘business deals’” given that the parties “stand in a relation of mutual confidence and trust.”). 22 $750 per month. This was about $200 less than Smith’s monthly mortgage payment and less than half the monthly rent paid by the tenants who resided at the condo. (On top of that, the agreement’s holdover clause meant that unless Smith was willing to make the maritally challenging choice to evict her own husband from the Virginia condo, he could maintain the lease indefinitely beyond its twenty-year term.) The Lease Agreement also gave the Trust the options to assign the lease or sublet the premises without Smith’s consent, and to purchase the Virginia condo during the initial ten-year term at a fixed price below its fair market value. In short, for minimal consideration, the Lease Agreement allowed Simon, through the GSS Revocable Trust (of which he was the sole trustee, at least until 2016) as lessee, to control all rental activity at the unit for at least twenty years without yielding Smith a cent of profit, and to purchase it from her at any time during the first ten years at a bargain price. We agree with the trial judge that these terms were unreasonably favorable to Simon and resulted in a gross disparity in the exchange. The Property Agreement that followed the Lease Agreement gave Simon personally the right to manage and encumber the Virginia condo with expenses as he alone saw fit, with no control or oversight by Smith (or the trustees of his Trusts, for that matter). Not only did the Property Agreement entitle Simon to collect and retain all income from the condo (and thus keep any and all profits), it also provided 23 that Smith would be obligated to reimburse Simon if the income from the condo did not cover whatever expenses he unilaterally incurred (a provision susceptible to abuse, and that the trial judge found Simon did abuse by claiming Smith owed him over $170,000 for expenditures that had nothing to do with managing the condo). To ensure his right to that reimbursement, the agreement gave Simon an irrevocable power of attorney to encumber the property with a lien and an assignment of rents. For her (alleged) acquiescence in this arrangement, Smith received only enough money every month to keep the condo’s mortgage current. Thus, under the terms of the Property Agreement, the mortgage debt remained in Smith’s name, expenses not covered by the income were chargeable to Smith and against her equity, but any benefits of ownership accrued to Simon. In effect, the Property Agreement reduced Smith to an owner only of the liabilities, an owner in name only. 21 21 In the Property Agreement, Smith also transferred to the GSS Revocable Trust all her interest in any and all tangible personal property she owned. The rationale for that seemingly extraordinary transfer (or an explanation of how it could have been in Smith’s interest) is murky at best on the existing record. For present purposes, though, we find it unnecessary to address this aspect of the Property Agreement. 24 We are satisfied that the trial judge did not err in finding the terms of the Property Agreement to be unreasonably favorable to Simon and substantively unconscionable. 22 The evidence at trial also supports the judge’s determination that the Property Agreement, like the Lease Agreement, was procedurally unconscionable due to the absence of a meaningful choice on the part of Smith. As the judge found, the playing field was not a level one. The attorney who supposedly represented her in the transaction was employed by and aligned with her husband; his primary loyalty was to Simon, not Smith. There is no evidence Wright did anything at all to look out for Smith’s interests, to negotiate terms for her benefit or protection, or to ensure that she understood the Property Agreement. 23 (Indeed, the judge considered it “entirely 22 See, e.g., Williams, 508 A.2d at 987 (terms of separation agreement so inequitable that they should not be enforced where they “call[ed] for all the assets of any consequence to go to the wife” and “the obligations of supporting those assets to continue to be that of the husband”); Hale v. Hale, 539 A.2d 247, 250 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (terms of separation agreement substantively unconscionable where they left wife with only four percent of couple’s net worth); Holler v. Holler, 612 S.E.2d 469, 476-77 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) (premarital agreement “so oppressive that no reasonable person” would agree to it where agreement required both parties to pay rent and real estate taxes on property owned by husband’s mother, any interest in the increase in value of the real estate would accrue to the husband, and agreement provided for no financial support for either spouse, even though wife did not work). 23 Compare with Henderson v. Henderson, 206 A.2d 267, 270 (D.C. 1965) (settlement agreement between divorcing couple made voluntarily and fairly where 25 possible, due to Mr. Wright’s involvement, that Ms. [Smith] may never have seen nor had an opportunity to read this document.”) It was surely evident to Simon that Smith, a real estate novice, simply deferred to his greater professional expertise and trusted that her husband and father of her children was acting for their mutual benefit. 24 Simon’s contention — that Smith actually benefitted from the Property and Lease Agreements because they ensured that she kept title to the condo and obtained a monthly income from it without having to manage the condo herself — did not persuade the trial judge and it does not persuade us. We are mindful of the fact that Smith rejected Simon’s request that she transfer the Virginia condo to one of his trusts, and we see the Property Agreement and the Lease Agreement as accomplishing Simon’s goal indirectly. The agreements leave her with no control over her own property. Under them, she cannot use, rent, or profit from the Virginia condo, she cannot oversee or terminate his management of the property, her title is “[t]he parties were dealing at arm’s length through competent counsel”) (emphasis added). 24 See Walker-Thomas Furniture, 350 F.2d at 449 (“[W]hen a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real choice, signs a[n] . . . unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that [her] consent, or even an objective manifestation of [her] consent, was ever given to all the terms.”). 26 subject to encumbrance at Simon’s “irrevocable” privilege, and her ability to dispose of it at a fair price has been curtailed. The agreements appear to leave Smith with formal title and attendant obligations, but deprive her of virtually every stick in the bundle of rights and benefits associated with ownership. Had the trial court not intervened before the end, in 2020, of the initial ten-year term of the lease, Simon could have exercised the right in the Lease Agreement to purchase the Virginia condo outright during the initial term at a below-market price ($290,000). Moreover, the Property Agreement would have enabled him to set off against that price his unreimbursed expenses incurred in managing the condo (which he claimed came to over $170,000), to satisfy Smith’s contractual obligation to reimburse such expenses “on demand, or upon sale or other disposition of the property.” We will not disturb the trial court’s conclusion that the arrangements were one-sided and oppressive. We uphold the court’s determination that the Property and Lease Agreements are unconscionable. 27