Opinion ID: 195990
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Impeachment of Powell with his Prior Felony Convictions

Text: 32 Powell next complains that the government's use of the number of his prior felony convictions for impeachment purposes (including its reference to the fact that, in one of these cases, Powell was convicted under a different name in another session of the district court) amounts to reversible error. Citing United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.1994) (en banc), Powell claims that his willingness to stipulate to the fact that he had been convicted of a felony should have precluded the government from pursuing this line of questioning. Powell misreads Tavares and overlooks Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)(1). 33 A conviction under Sec. 922(g)(1) requires proof of three elements: (1) that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm; (2) that the defendant had been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year at the time of the possession; and (3) that the possession was in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce. United States v. Tracy, 36 F.3d 187, 191 (1st Cir.1994). In Tavares, we held that if a defendant wishes to stipulate to the second of these three elements, evidence beyond the fact of the prior conviction is inadmissible absent adequate trial court findings that its noncumulative relevance is sufficiently compelling to survive the balancing test of Fed.R.Evid. 403. 21 F.3d at 5. Thus, if there is such a stipulation in a Sec. 922(g)(1) prosecution, the government ordinarily may not introduce evidence of the nature or number of prior convictions as part of its case-in-chief. See id. at 5-6. We were careful to point out in Tavares, however, that in some cases evidence concerning the nature of the prior conviction will be admissible for impeachment or other reasons, despite its lack of probative value on the prior element of the crime. Id. at 6. 34 Here, the government did not introduce evidence of the number of Powell's prior felony convictions in order to prove an element of its case; it introduced this evidence to impeach Powell after he took the stand in his own defense. We recently have made clear what we implied in Tavares: that Tavares does not control in the impeachment context. See Tracy, 36 F.3d at 191-92. Rather, the admissibility of the impeachment evidence must be evaluated under Rule 609(a)(1). This Rule provides: 35 General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, ... evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused. 36 The upshot is that the evidence at issue was properly admitted absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect to Powell. See Tracy, 36 F.3d at 193 (We review a district court's probative value/prejudicial effect decision under Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)(1) for abuse of discretion.). Powell has not argued that there was an abuse of discretion here; he has asserted only that Tavares is controlling. Our own independent review of the record reveals no abuse of discretion by the district court. Indeed, allowing the government only to inquire into the number, and not the nature, of Powell's prior felony convictions strikes us as an eminently fair way to balance the government's interest in impeaching Powell with Powell's interest in avoiding the unique risk of prejudice present whenever a testifying defendant is impeached with evidence of his/her prior convictions: the danger that convictions that would be excluded under Fed.R.Evid. 404 will be misused by a jury as propensity evidence despite their introduction solely for impeachment purposes. Fed.R.Evid. 609 advisory committee's note, 1990 amendment; see also Tracy, 36 F.3d at 192. 37 We therefore reject Powell's claim of reversible error in the introduction of this evidence. 38