Opinion ID: 156361
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Circumstantial Evidence Under Fed.R.Evid. 1004

Text: 20 As the district court and the parties have noted, the evidence regarding the execution of the Form 870-AD was entirely circumstantial. However, under Rule 1004 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, [t]he original is not required, and other evidence of the contents of a writing, recording, or photograph is admissible if--(1) ... all originals are lost or have been destroyed, unless the proponent lost or destroyed them in bad faith. Fed.R.Evid. 1004(1); see Cartier v. Jackson, 59 F.3d 1046, 1048-49 (10th Cir.1995) (applying Fed.R.Evid. 1004(1)). Rule 1004(1) thus requires the court to undertake two related inquiries before admitting secondary evidence regarding a document: (1) whether the document in question was actually lost or destroyed, see United States v. McGaughey, 977 F.2d 1067, 1071 (7th Cir.1992), and (2) whether the party offering the document has acted in bad faith, see Seiler v. Lucasfilm, Ltd., 613 F.Supp. 1253, 1260-62 (N.D.Cal.1984), aff'd, 808 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir.1986). 21 As to the first inquiry, we note that  '[b]y far the most common means of prov[ing] loss or destruction is the use of circumstantial evidence showing a diligent but unsuccessful search and inquiry for the document.'  McGaughey, 977 F.2d at 1071 (quoting 5 Weinstein's Evidence p 1004(1) at 1004-18 (1983)). If the proponent demonstrates that such a diligent search has been conducted, courts have admitted the secondary evidence even though the proponent is unable to explain with absolute certainty what happened to the original document. See, e.g., United States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603, 633 (2d Cir.1979) (allowing secondary evidence after proponent testified that original was either returned to the defendant or lost); United States v. Standing Soldier, 538 F.2d 196, 203 (8th Cir.1976) (admitting secondary evidence after a witness testified that he had attempted to locate the original note by contacting the criminal investigator and the FBI, but had been unable to find it, although he thought that it probably did still exist). 22 As to the second inquiry, courts have concluded that the mere possibility that someone has tampered with the proffered secondary evidence is insufficient to establish the proponent's bad faith. See United States v. Balzano, 687 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir.1982). Similarly, the negligent destruction of documents has been held to be insufficient to establish bad faith. See Estate of Gryder v. Commissioner, 705 F.2d 336, 338 (8th Cir.1983). In contrast, the purposeful destruction or withholding of original documents and the fabrication of secondary evidence will support a finding of bad faith under Fed. R. Evid 1004(1). See Seiler, 613 F.Supp. at 1255-63. 23 In the instant case, both inquiries under Rule 1004(1) support the admissibility of secondary evidence. As to the loss or destruction of the original, the IRS has presented evidence that its officials have undertaken a diligent search for the Form 870-AD and have been unable to find it. See Aplts' App. at 62 p 11 (affidavit of Martin M. Shoemaker). This evidence has not been rebutted by the Crosses. As to the question of bad faith in the loss or destruction of the original, we note that the Crosses have not argued that the IRS acted in bad faith and that the record contains no evidence to support such a finding. Cf. Seiler, 613 F.Supp. at 1255-63 (describing evidence of bad faith and concluding that secondary evidence should not be admitted). 24