Opinion ID: 2971604
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The second section

Text: In the second section, the phrase “[r]egardless or [sic] degree of culpability or intent and without regard to:” is followed by a list of three possible attributes of the underlying claim. The first attribute is again quoted in full: A. Whether the acts are alleged to be or [sic] at the instruction or at the direction of the insured, his officers, employees, agents, or servants; or by any [sic] otherwise on, at or near premises owned or occupied by the insured; or any other person[.] The district court accepted the contention of Spanky’s that this second section contained an ambiguity, based on the argument that the position of “or any other person” in the sentence -8- No. 03-4277 Monticello Ins. Co. v. Hale suggested that it applied only to the immediately preceding phrase “premises owned or occupied by the insured.” Although the district court was correct in its ultimate conclusion that the policy did not provide coverage for Spanky’s, we disagree with its analysis of Paragraph A’s alleged ambiguity. The “or any other person” language does appear at the end of the sentence, but it is part of a list, with each item separated by a semicolon. These listed items, each of which is a potential completion for the phrase “at the instruction or at the direction of” are (1) “the insured, his officers, employees, agents or servants,” (2) “any [sic] otherwise on, at or near premises owned or occupied by the insured,” and (3) “any other person.” “[B]y,” as used at the beginning of the second item in the list, appears to be surplusage, but even if it is not, its only logical interpretation reinforces the idea that the three items separated by semicolons are items in a list, each of which is linked to the original phrase. In spite of a number of grammatical errors, then, the logical scheme of Paragraph A is evident, and no alteration of the text is required to see that “any other person” is the third item in a list of possible actors. The only ambiguity we see in the second section is determining the subject of the two prepositional phrases at the beginning (“Regardless or [sic] degree of culpability or intent” and “without regard to”). Something is true “without regard to . . . whether the acts are alleged to be . . . at the direction of . . . any other person,” but what? There are only two plausible answers to this question, and neither suggests that the policy covers Colter’s claims against Spanky’s. One answer —the most reasonable—is that the second section of the Endorsement simply amplifies the first section, in which case it simply means that the broad exclusion for claims arising from assault -9- No. 03-4277 Monticello Ins. Co. v. Hale applies “without regard to . . . whether the acts are alleged to be . . . at the direction of . . . any other person.” The only other plausible answer is that the “regardless of” and “without regard to” phrases modify nothing, making the entire second section of the Endorsement unintelligible. But even if that were the case, the broad exclusion of the first section would still apply, and Spanky’s would be unable to argue that the second section modified or limited the first. In sum, whether Paragraph A indicates that the policy specifically excludes claims for assaults committed by “any other person,” or simply leaves in place the first section’s comprehensive exclusion of assault-based claims, it does not lend itself to any plausible interpretation under which Colter’s claims against Spanky’s would be covered. The exclusions upheld in Negron and Sphere Drake provide further support for this conclusion, as both contained language similar to Paragraph A. See Negron v. Odeon Concert Club, Inc., No. 73156, 1998 WL 229498, at -3 (Ohio Ct. App. May 7, 1998) (unpublished) (upholding an exclusion that “the Company is under no duty to defend or indemnify an insured regardless of the degree of culpability or intent and without regard to . . . [w]hether the acts are alleged to be by or at the instruction or at the direction of the insured, his officers, employees, agents or servant; or by any other person lawfully or otherwise on, at or near premises owned or occupied by the insured or by any other person”); Sphere Drake Ins. Co. v. Ross, 609 N.E.2d 1284, 1285 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (upholding an exclusion for claims arising from assault and battery “whether caused by or at the instigation or direction of the insured, his employees, patrons or any other person”). -10- No. 03-4277 Monticello Ins. Co. v. Hale Spanky’s arguments as to Paragraphs B and C are equally unavailing. To the extent that Paragraph B is relevant at all, it harms Spanky’s case by indicating that the parties responsible for assaults can be individuals other than officers, employees, agents, and servants of the insured. The relevant language in Paragraph B provides that the exclusion applies “without regard to . . . the alleged failure of the Insured . . . in the hiring, supervision, retention or control of any other person whether or not an officer, agent, or servant of the insured.” As to Paragraph C, the district court correctly noted that it also undermines Spanky’s case, because it declares that the exclusion applies without regard to the failure of the insured to prevent or halt the conduct that gives rise to the claim. Id. We therefore agree with the district court’s conclusion that the Endorsement excludes claims based on bodily injury and property damages for assault. Because Colter’s complaints, both statutory and common law, fall within the Endorsement, Monticello has no duty to defend Spanky’s against Colter’s lawsuit, nor any obligation to pay any damages arising therefrom.