Opinion ID: 2792506
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidentiary rulings. “We review a trial

Text: court’s rulings on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion, and we will only overturn an evidentiary ruling that is arbitrary and irrational.” Minter, 762 F.3d at 349 (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, we will not “set aside or reverse a judgment on the grounds that evidence was 9 erroneously admitted unless justice so requires or a party’s substantial rights are affected.” Creekmore v. Maryview Hosp., 662 F.3d 686, 693 (4th Cir. 2011). Preliminarily, we find that several of the claims of error advanced by RFT do not comply with Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A), and, therefore RFT has forfeited review of those claims. See Belk, Inc. v. Meyer Corp., U.S., 679 F.3d 146, 153 n.6 (4th Cir. 2012). Those claims that are properly presented for appellate review, in our determination, do not demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion in its evidentiary rulings. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying RFT’s motion for a new trial based on assertions of erroneous evidentiary rulings. B. Jury instructions. “[W]e review a trial court’s jury instructions for abuse of discretion, keeping in mind that a trial court has broad discretion in framing its instructions to a jury.” Bunn, 723 F.3d at 468 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Instructions will be considered adequate if construed as a whole, and in light of the whole record, they adequately informed the jury of the controlling legal principles without misleading or confusing the jury to the prejudice of the existing party.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Even if a jury was erroneously instructed, however, we will not set aside a resulting verdict unless the erroneous instruction 10 seriously prejudiced the challenging party’s case.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As an initial matter, we address whether RFT’s asserted errors have been properly preserved. “A party who objects to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction must do so on the record, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds for the objection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c)(1). “When challenging instructions on appeal, a party must furnish the court of appeals with so much of the record of the proceedings below as is necessary to enable informed appellate review.” Bunn, 723 F.3d at 468 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “a formal exception to a ruling or order is unnecessary. . . . [A] party need only state the action that it wants the court to take or objects to, along with the grounds for the request or objection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 46. Consequently, Rule 51 generally will not preclude appellate review “where the district court was fully aware of [a party’s] position and . . . obviously considered and rejected [it].” City of Richmond v. Madison Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 918 F.2d 438, 453 (4th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under these principles and the facts in the record, we find that RFT’s challenges to the jury instructions during the charge conference constitute objections for Rule 51 purposes. Nevertheless, we find that RFT failed to preserve a number of 11 the errors it asserts on appeal because either the district court’s ruling or RFT’s objection thereto is absent from the record. With one exception, we conclude that the assertions properly preserved and presented for appellate review either are meritless or assert only harmless error. With respect to the remaining asserted error, RFT contends that the district court erred by instructing the jury that conduct affecting only the parties involved cannot satisfy UTPA’s public interest requirement. We agree. Under South Carolina law, a plaintiff satisfies the public interest element of UTPA by proving that the conduct at issue had the potential for repetition; no further proof is required. See Crary v. Djebelli, 496 S.E.2d 21, 23 (S.C. 1998); Daisy Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Abbott, 473 S.E.2d 47, 50 (S.C. 1996). The court’s instruction placed an additional requirement of proof on RFT. This erroneous instruction constituted an abuse of discretion and seriously prejudiced RFT’s case. See Coll. Loan Corp. v. SLM Corp., 396 F.3d 588, 600 (4th Cir. 2005). Consequently, the court’s order denying RFT’s motion for a new trial on the UTPA claim constitutes an abuse of discretion. We therefore affirm the order denying a new trial as to the professional negligence claim, reverse as to the UTPA claim, and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 12 We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED 13