Opinion ID: 835750
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Oregon Constitutional Debate, Indiana Constitutional Debate, and Other State Constitutional Provisions

Text: As to the adoption of Article I, section 27, itself, the historical evidence of the drafters' intent  or of the people's intent in adopting the Oregon Constitution of 1859  is limited. There are no reported debates on that provision from Oregon's constitutional convention, and the convention delegates adopted it as the drafters originally proposed it. Claudia Burton and Andrew Grade, A Legislative History of the Oregon Constitution of 1857  Part I (Articles I & II), 37 Willamette L. Rev. 469, 545-46 (2001). As this court explained in Kessler, 289 Or. at 363, 614 P.2d 94, the drafters of the Oregon Constitution derived Article I, section 27, almost verbatim from Article I, sections 32 and 33, of the Indiana Constitution of 1851. [19] W.C. Palmer, The Sources of the Oregon Constitution, 5 Or. L. Rev. 200, 202 (1926). The convention debate respecting the adoption of the Indiana Constitution of 1851 sheds some light on the question whether or not the wording that the people of Oregon eventually adopted as Article I, section 27, implicitly deprived the legislature of the authority to regulate the bearing of arms. See generally Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or. 250, 265, 959 P.2d 49 (1998) (although not as helpful as history or case law revealing the intent of framers of Oregon Constitution, information demonstrating intent of framers of Indiana Constitution of 1851 can be instructive when interpreting Oregon constitutional provision patterned after Indiana Constitution). By way of background, Article I, section 20, of the Indiana Constitution of 1816 contained an arms provision that is virtually identical to Article I, section 27, of the Oregon Constitution. [20] In 1833, the Indiana Supreme Court held that it was permissible under that 1816 provision for the state legislature to prohibit the wearing or carrying of concealed weapons. State v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229 (Ind.1833). At the 1850 Indiana constitutional convention, a standing committee proposed revised wording for that state's arms provision; as originally introduced, the revised guarantee would have provided that [n]o law shall restrict the right of the people to bear arms, whether in defence of themselves or of the State. Journal of the Convention of the People of the State of Indiana to Amend the Constitution 188 (Ind. Hist. Bureau 1936). After a second reading, a delegate asked whether the proposed wording was intended to permit or prohibit the wearing of concealed weapons. 2 Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the Revision of the Constitution of the State of Indiana 1850 1385 (1850). Another delegate responded that, if the drafters wished to reserve such power in the legislature, then they must revise the original wording of Article I, section 20, of the 1816 constitution; [21] For if it were declared by Constitutional provision that the people should have the right to bear arms, no law of the Legislature could take away that right. Id. Suggested amendments then were offered and rejected, to the following effect: (1) replacing the words [n]o law shall restrict the right of the people with no law shall deprive the people of the right; (2) inserting the words in an open and unconcealed manner respecting the bearing of arms; and (3) striking all words after arms (that is, all defence references). Id. When the provision again came up for consideration, a delegate moved that it be amended to read as follows: No law shall be passed restricting the right of the people to carry visible arms. Journal of the Convention of the People of the State of Indiana to Amend the Constitution at 580. As the minutes from the debate report it: As the section now stood, [the delegate] thought that it gave a direct license to every desperado and ruffian in the State to carry concealed weapons. He did not think, however, that this was the opinion of the Convention, or that they would restrict the Legislature from passing any law for carrying concealed weapons. 2 Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the Revision of the Constitution of the State of Indiana 1850 at 1391. Another delegate then moved to strike the proposed wording and to insert the wording from Article I, section 20, of the Indiana Constitution of 1816, that is, that the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and the State[.] Id. According to the minutes, that delegate was desirous whenever the words of the old Constitution were unobjectionable, and had received judicial construction, to retain them in the old form. He was opposed to the reported section from a fear it might possibly be so construed as to deprive the Legislature of power to prohibit the carrying of concealed weapons. The practice of carrying concealed weapons was one of the most dastardly, odious, and murderous practices that was ever tolerated in the civilized world, and unquestionably there was not a gentleman on that floor who would not feel shocked at the idea that no such prohibition could be passed. Id. The proposed revision was recommitted for the purpose of replacing the proposed wording with the original 1816 wording. The convention eventually adopted the provision in that form as Article I, section 32. Journal of the Convention of the People of the State of Indiana to Amend the Constitution at 873. The foregoing debate is helpful to our analysis here, because it demonstrates that the framers of the Indiana Constitution of 1851  while generally protective of the right to bear arms  nonetheless did not intend that the right extend so far as to preclude legislative regulation respecting the carrying of concealed weapons. Stated differently, in rejecting proposed wording that expressly prohibited legislative restriction, and in adopting the wording previously construed in Mitchell, the drafters of the Indiana Constitution of 1851 demonstrably did not intend to deprive the state legislature of the authority to regulate a particular aspect of the right to bear arms that related to public safety. That, in turn, supports this court's conclusion in Kessler that the guarantee set out in Article I, section 27, of the Oregon Constitution was subject to certain regulatory authority on the legislature's part  at the least, the authority to prohibit the carrying of concealed weapons and, possibly, a broader authority to act to prevent threats to public safety. However, the Indiana history does not conclusively demonstrate whether that regulatory authority extends to exclude certain groups of persons from the constitutional guarantee. As to the basis of the arms provision of the Indiana Constitutional of 1816, we note that Indiana patterned that provision on the Ohio Constitution of 1802 and the Kentucky Constitution of 1792. [22] Robert Twomley, The Indiana Bill of Rights, 20 Ind. L.J. 211, 212 (1944). The Ohio and Kentucky provisions, in turn, likely were patterned on the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790. [23] See Steven H. Steinglass and Gino J. Scarselli, The Ohio State Constitution: A Reference Guide 16 (2004); Robert M. Ireland, The Kentucky State Constitution: A Reference Guide 2 (1999). Pennsylvania, among other states, patterned its expression of the right to bear arms on the English Bill of Rights of 1689, which we discuss further below. See Kessler, 289 Or. at 363-65, 614 P.2d 94 (discussing origins of right to bear arms). The Kentucky Constitution of 1792 generated what appears to be the first appellate decision construing a state constitutional arms provision. Article XII of that constitution provided in part that the right of the citizens to bear arms in defence of themselves and the State shall not be questioned. In 1822, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that that provision prohibited legislation that criminalized the carrying of concealed weapons, reasoning that such legislation unconstitutionally restrained the citizenry's right to bear arms: The right [to bear arms] existed at the adoption of the constitution; it had then no limits short of the moral power of the citizens to exercise it, and it in fact consisted in nothing else but in the liberty of the citizens to bear arms. Diminish that liberty, therefore, and you necessarily restrain the right; and such is the diminution and restraint, which the act in question most indisputably imports, by prohibiting the citizens wearing weapons in a manner which was lawful to wear them when the constitution was adopted.    [I]n principle, there is no difference between a law prohibiting the wearing of concealed arms, and a law forbidding the wearing such as are exposed; and if the former be unconstitutional, the latter must be so likewise. Bliss v. Commonwealth, 2 Litt. 90, 92, 12 Ky. 90 (1822). The people of Kentucky thereafter amended their constitution expressly to allow prohibitions on the carrying of concealed weapons. See Ky. Const. of 1850, Art. XIII, § 25 ([T]he rights of the citizens to bear arms in defence of themselves and the State shall not be questioned; but the general assembly may pass laws to prevent persons from carrying concealed arms.). [24] The protective view of the state constitutional arms guarantee expressed in Bliss is rare; to the contrary, most courts addressing challenges to statutory restrictions have concluded that state constitutional arms guarantees generally are subject to reasonable restraints. See generally John Levin, The Right to Bear Arms: The Development of the American Experience, 48 Chi-Kent L. Rev., 148, 159 (1971) (so noting). [25] Most significantly for our purposes here, as discussed above, the Indiana Supreme Court construed Article I, section 20, of the Indiana Constitution of 1816  which was virtually identical to Article I, section 27, of the Oregon Constitution  to allow legislative prohibition of the wearing or carrying of concealed weapons. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. at 229. [26] As to the wording of the various state constitutional arms provisions in effect in 1859  all of which theoretically were available as resources to the drafters of the Oregon Constitution  we note that none of those provisions expressly prohibited felons or criminals from possessing arms. Further, none expressly demonstrated any intent respecting legislative authority to regulate the bearing of arms, although one  the Kentucky Constitution of 1850  expressly authorized the general assembly to regulate the carrying of concealed arms. [27] Notwithstanding the absence of express provisions, as discussed above, a number of state courts had construed their constitutional provisions to authorize such restrictions. Most significantly for our purposes here, the Indiana Supreme Court had construed its 1816 arms provision to allow legislative restrictions on the carrying of concealed weapons, notwithstanding the absence of any wording to that effect, and the 1850 Indiana constitutional convention delegates recognized the necessity for such a restriction when they incorporated the 1816 provision into the Indiana Constitution of 1851.