Opinion ID: 2411780
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: application of the rational basis test

Text: The purpose of this provision as we discussed in applying the Anderson balancing test under First Amendment analysis, is to stamp-out nepotism, a clear mandate from our opinion in Rose, supra , and the obvious intent of the General Assembly in earlier statutes enacted prior to KERA. See Hall v. Boyd County Board of Education, supra ; Letcher v. Commonwealth, supra, Ky., 414 S.W.2d 402. KRS 160.180(2)(i) directly addresses the appearance of nepotism by prohibiting persons from serving on a school board who have relatives employed in that school district. Such prohibitions have consistently been upheld under the rational basis test of Equal Protection Clause analysis. 63A Am.Jur.2d § 102; 11 ALR 4th Nepotism in Public Service, § 5[a]. In these cases, courts have determined that the challenged statutes remove the threat of nepotism from public employment, an irritant to taxpayers, [that] can create conflicts of interest and adversely affect the morale of other employees in the school system. See Whateley v. Leonia Board of Education, 141 N.J. Super. 476, 358 A.2d 826, 828 (1976); See also Keckeisen v. Independent School District 612, 509 F.2d 1062, 1066 (8th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 833, 96 S.Ct. 57, 46 L.Ed.2d 51 (1975). Such statutes, one court has reasoned, reflect the state's interest in providing its children with a meaningful education, [an interest that] is fully and directly served by preventing conflicts in the administration of the educational system. Hamilton v. Board of Trustees of Oconee School District, 282 S.C. 519, 319 S.E.2d 717, 720 (Ct.App.1984). KRS 160.180(2)(i) serves to aid in the avoidance of conflicts of interest and favoritism in the context of hiring employees for the school districts. The structure of KRS 160.180(2)(i), thus bears a rational relationship to eliminating nepotism, and therefore passes constitutional muster. See Parsons v. County Del Norte, 728 F.2d 1234, 1237 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 846, 105 S.Ct. 158, 83 L.Ed.2d 95 (1984).
Appellants assert that KRS 160.180(2)(i) is underinclusive because it does not apply to board members serving on July 13, 1990, whose relatives were not initially hired while they were in office. Appellants argue that KRS 160.180(2)(i) leaves open an entire class of relative-employees who are just as open to conflicts of interest and favoritism as those covered by the statute. The Fourteenth Amendment allows legislatures wide leeway to enact laws that appear to affect similarly situated people differently. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs., supra, 394 U.S. at 807, 89 S.Ct. at 1408. It is clear that relatives hired before board members were elected, will pose much less suspicion of favoritism, and thus they will be much less likely to affect the morale of their co-workers, an implicit intent of anti-nepotism statutes. The statutory classification that KRS 160.180(2)(i) creates between board members with relatives hired during their tenure in office, and board members with relatives not hired during their tenure in office, thus has a reasonable basis, and therefore is not violative of equal protection principles. Estridge v. Stovall, Ky. App., 704 S.W.2d 653 (1985).
Appellants claim that the trial court erroneously characterized the exemption in KRS 160.180(2)(i), as a grandfather clause, because the exemption is not predicated on years of service, merit, or the effective date of the statute. Acknowledging that grandfather exemptions are granted extreme deference by the courts in social and economic legislation, appellants distinguish the challenged statute, arguing that it imposes a significant burden on appellants' candidacy. The exemption found in KRS 160.180(2)(i) is not incorrectly characterized by the trial court as a grandfather clause. We have already noted that reasonable restrictions on candidacy are valid under the First and Fourteenth Amendment. Because the exemption classifies persons as either qualified or unqualified to be candidates for the school board, depending on the date when their relatives were employed by the same school district, we must ask what purposes the exemption serves, and whether those purposes are legitimate. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976); Kentucky Association of Chiropractors, Inc. v. Jefferson County Medical Society, supra . It is clear that the purpose of the grandfather provision is to prevent undue disruption of the school boards. In situations such as this, where relatives of board members were hired before the board members were elected to their posts, and before enactment of KERA, there is hardly any likelihood that favoritism was involved. Thus the intent behind the entire provision, to eliminate nepotism, is not activated. The exemption rationally promotes continuity within the school system. Since the grandfather clause is narrowly tailored to fit this interest, it passes muster under the rationality test of the Equal Protection Clause. Estridge v. Stovall, supra.