Opinion ID: 150495
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State Consumer Protection and Unjust Enrichment Law

Text: A similar problem exists with regard to the District Court's certification of consumer protection and unjust enrichment claims for class-wide treatment. Consumer protection and unjust enrichment laws are no more uniform among the fifty states than are antitrust statutes. In fact, they are less so. Some states without Illinois Brick repealers allow indirect purchasers to invoke consumer protection statutes to gain antitrust relief. See, e.g., Mack v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 673 So.2d 100, 107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1996); Ciardi v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd., 436 Mass. 53, 762 N.E.2d 303, 312 (2002); Arthur v. Microsoft Corp., 267 Neb. 586, 676 N.W.2d 29, 37-38 (2004). Other states preclude indirect purchasers from doing so because they have adopted Illinois Brick standing requirements and view any utilization of consumer protection statutes to recover for antitrust harm as circumventing that policy decision. See, e.g., Sickles, 877 A.2d at 277; Major, 60 P.3d at 517; Vacco v. Microsoft, 260 Conn. 59, 793 A.2d 1048, 1064-66 (2002); Blewett v. Abbott Labs., 86 Wash.App. 782, 938 P.2d 842, 844 (1997). A third group requires indirect purchaser consumer protection actions to proceed as parens patriae suits. Blewett, 938 P.2d at 847, while other statutes lack such requirements, see, e.g., D.C.CODE § 28-4509(a); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.778(2); N.D. CENT.CODE § 51-08.1-08(3). The common law of unjust enrichment likewise varies among the states, with some jurisdictions mandating proof of elements not required by others. Evidence of antitrust activity may provide a basis for an unjust enrichment claim in some states. See Freeman Indus. LLC v. Eastman Chem. Co., 172 S.W.3d 512, 524-26 (Tenn.2005) (allowing an indirect purchaser price-fixing claim to proceed under an unjust enrichment theory); see also D.R. Ward Constr. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 470 F.Supp.2d 485, 507-08 (E.D.Pa.2006) (same with respect to Arizona law). Other states preclude recovery for antitrust injuries on an unjust enrichment theory. Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 8 N.Y.3d 204, 831 N.Y.S.2d 760, 863 N.E.2d 1012, 1018 (2007); cf. Coastal Envt'l. Specialists, Inc. v. Chem-Lig Int'l, Inc., 818 So.2d 12, 19 (La.Ct.App.2001) (holding that a plaintiff may not invoke unjust enrichment principles to obtain a remedy for a harm that is adequately redressed by other areas of law). With respect to the substantive elements of unjust enrichment, some states require plaintiffs to prove that the defendant's conduct rises to the level of fraud. See Mantiply v. Mantiply, 951 So.2d 638, 655 (Ala.2006); Heldenfels Bros., Inc. v. City of Corpus Christi, 832 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex.1992). Others do not. See Rhue v. Rhue, 189 N.C.App. 299, 658 S.E.2d 52, 59 (2008); Anderson v. DeLisle, 352 N.W.2d 794, 796 (Minn.Ct.App.1984). Some allow an unjust enrichment claim only if the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. Harris Group, Inc. v. Robinson, 209 P.3d 1188, 1205 (Colo.Ct.App.2009); Harvell v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 164 P.3d 1028, 1035 (Okla.2006). Others lack that requirement. Jones v. Sparks, 297 S.W.3d 73, 78 (Ky.Ct.App.2009); Williams Twp. Bd. of Supervisors v. Williams Twp. Emerg. Co., Inc., 986 A.2d 914, 923 (Pa.Cmwlth.Ct.2009). In short, the claim of unjust enrichment is packed with individual issues and therefore precludes a finding of predominance in this nationwide class action context. Clay v. Am. Tobacco Co., 188 F.R.D. 483, 501 (S.D.Ill.1999). Amidst the welter of differing statutes and decisions across the country on these issues, at least one thing emerges clearly: evidence of price-fixing and monopolization does not give rise in every state to an unjust enrichment or consumer protection claim for indirect purchasers. Thus, while De Beers's price-control activity, as a practical matter, may have harmed all indirect purchasers, that injury cannot provide a basis for the certification granted here because it does not give rise to a legal right to recovery in all of the jurisdictions implicated by a nationwide class. See Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 256, 273 (3d Cir.2004) (In order to predominate, the common issues must constitute a `significant part' of the individual cases. (quoting Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472 (3d Cir.1986))). The District Court therefore abused its discretion when it found that consumer protection and unjust enrichment laws were sufficiently similar to warrant certification as a class. [14] Cf. Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 547 F.3d 742, 746-48 (7th Cir.2008) (reversing class certification order in a consumer deception case because, while all consumers had purchased the alleged deceptively marketed product, differences among state law precluded a finding of common legal issues).