Opinion ID: 2610194
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the 1964 civil rights act

Text: Petitioners urge that section 25656 conflicts with the nondiscriminatory hiring provision contained in title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)). (12) A state law, however clearly within a state's acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law is void under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2; Free v. Bland (1962) 369 U.S. 663, 666 [8 L.Ed.2d 180, 183, 82 S.Ct. 1089]; Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 11 [6 L.Ed. 23, 25]; Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills (D.Ore. 1969) 300 F. Supp. 338, 340; Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Company (C.D.Cal. 1968) 293 F. Supp. 1219, 1224). The Attorney General urges, however, that the federal Civil Rights Act does not apply because section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment to the United States Constitution precludes federal interference with state regulation of alcoholic beverages. Section 2 provides that [t]he transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited. (Italics added.) The Attorney General contends that this amendment cedes vast plenary powers to the states to regulate alcoholic beverages unfettered by the commerce clause. Since the 1964 Civil Rights Act was passed pursuant to Congress' commerce clause power, it is contended that a state's power to regulate liquor is also unfettered by the 1964 Civil Rights Act. This argument must fail. The Twenty-first Amendment clearly was not intended to work such a wholesale repeal of the commerce clause in the area of alcoholic beverage control. When national prohibition was terminated by section 1 of the Twenty-first Amendment, section 2 was added as a saving clause to protect the laws of states which chose to retain prohibition against a possible conflict with the commerce clause. (See United States v. Colorado Wholesale W. & Liq. Deal. Ass'n. (D.Colo. 1942) 47 F. Supp. 160, 162, revd. 144 F.2d 824, revd. 324 U.S. 293 [89 L.Ed. 951, 65 S.Ct. 661]; Joseph Triner Corporation v. Arundel (D.Minn. 1935) 11 F. Supp. 145, 146-147.) The language of the amendment clearly reflects the purpose, since it prohibits the importation or transporting of liquor only into states where such importation will be in violation of the laws thereof. Section 2 represents the incorporation of a somewhat narrowed version of the Webb-Kenyon Act (37 Stats. 699, 27 U.S.C.A. § 122 (1913)) into the Constitution. ( Washington Brewers Institute v. United States (9th Cir.1943) 137 F.2d 964, 967, cert. den. 320 U.S. 776 [88 L.Ed. 465, 64 S.Ct. 89]; Note, The Twenty-First Amendment Versus the Interstate Commerce Clause (1946) 55 Yale L.J. 815, 816-818.) The Webb-Kenyon Act was passed in 1913 under the title [a]n Act divesting intoxicating liquors of their interstate character in certain cases. Its purpose was to `prevent the immunity characteristic of interstate commerce from being used to permit the receipt of liquor through such commerce in States contrary to their laws, and thus in effect afford a means by subterfuge and indirection to set such laws at naught.' ( Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. North Carolina (1917) 245 U.S. 298, 303 [62 L.Ed. 299, 303, 38 S.Ct. 96].) Although some early cases painted state powers under section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment with a broad brush, later decisions have taken a position more in keeping with the original intent of the amendment. (See, e.g., Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter (1966) 384 U.S. 35, 42 [16 L.Ed.2d 336, 342, 86 S.Ct. 1254]; Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp. (1964) 377 U.S. 324 [12 L.Ed.2d 350, 84 S.Ct. 1293].) In Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., supra , the Supreme Court restated the effect of the Twenty-first Amendment: `Since the Twenty-first Amendment ... the right of a state to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating liquor is not limited by the commerce clause.' (Italics added.) ( Id., at p. 330 [12 L.Ed.2d at p. 355].) The court rejected the argument that the Twenty-first Amendment gave the states plenary power over alcoholic beverages: To draw a conclusion ... that the Twenty-first Amendment has somehow operated to `repeal' the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is concerned would ... be an absurd oversimplification. If the Commerce Clause had been pro tanto `repealed,' then Congress would be left with no regulatory power over interstate or foreign commerce in intoxicating liquor. Such a conclusion would be patently bizarre and is demonstrably incorrect. ( Id., at pp. 331-332 [12 L.Ed.2d at p. 356].) The court then went on to declare that [b]oth the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause are parts of the same Constitution. Like other provisions of the Constitution, each must be considered in the light of the other, and in the context of the issues and interests at stake in any concrete case. ( Id., at p. 332 [12 L.Ed.2d at p. 356].) [8] (13) Thus it is apparent that the Twenty-first Amendment not only does not reach all alcoholic beverage cases which would otherwise fall within Congress' commerce clause powers, but even in those situations covered by the express language of the amendment, some balancing and accommodation must take place. Section 25656 is not even tangentially related to transportation or importation of liquor into California, and therefore does not fall within the literal language of the Twenty-first Amendment. The statute merely regulates employment at the retail level, and has nothing to do with the flow of alcoholic beverages into the state. But even if the amendment were broadly construed to cover all state laws regulating the liquor business, the interests and issues at stake in employment discrimination cases present no conflict with the intent and purposes of the Twenty-first Amendment. (14) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act was passed to prevent the impact of racial and sexual discrimination in employment on interstate commerce. It was not enacted to regulate the flow of alcohol as a commodity in interstate commerce. Since the aim of the Civil Rights Act is so wholly different from that of the Twenty-first Amendment, the two provisions in no way clash with each other. This is an appropriate case for the accommodation suggested in Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., supra . We turn to the question whether section 25656 is in direct conflict with section 2000e-2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2.) Section 2000e-2(a) makes it unlawful to hire or to limit, segregate, or classify employees in any way which would tend to deprive an employee of employment opportunities on the basis of sex. [9] Section 2000e-2(e) permits an exception only where there is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise, ... [10] In determining whether prohibiting women from tending bar falls within the bona fide occupational qualification exception to the federal statute, we are necessarily influenced by the guidelines promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (29 C.F.R. § 1604.1.) (15) These guidelines, which are entitled to great deference ( Udall v. Tallman (1965) 380 U.S. 1, 16 [13 L.Ed.2d 616, 625, 85 S.Ct. 792]), state that assumptions of the comparative employment characteristics of women in general (29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a)(1)(i)) and sterotyped characterizations of the sexes (29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a)(1)(ii)) do not warrant the application of the bona fide occupational qualification exception. Thus, under the guidelines only an individual inquiry into a particular woman applicant's qualifications, or, at most, a clearly justifiable general classification with respect to a particular job category meets the requirements of section 2000e-2. [11] (16) Applying the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's guidelines, one court has stated the test of a bona fide occupational qualification is whether all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved. ( Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company (5th Cir.1969) 408 F.2d 228, 235.) Courts, following the guidelines, have invalidated weight-lifting restrictions for women ( Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Company (7th Cir.1969) 416 F.2d 711; Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, supra, 300 F. Supp. 338; Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Company, supra, 293 F. Supp. 1219), hours limitations ( Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Grabiec (S.D.Ill. 1970) 317 F. Supp. 1304) and exclusionary job categories ( Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company, supra, 408 F.2d 228 (switchman); McCrimmon v. Daley (E.D.Ill. 1970) 2 F.E.P. Cases 971 (barmaid ordinance)). McCrimmon specifically held that a Chicago ordinance permitting only women liquor licensees, or the wives, daughters, sisters or mothers of licensees to tend bar conflicts with title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Applying these standards to section 25656, we must hold that that statute is not based upon a bona fide occupational qualification necessary to the operation of a bar and is therefore in direct conflict with section 2000e-2 of the Civil Rights Act. Certainly, as we state above, women as a class are as capable as men of mixing drinks and are permitted to do so in many states. The technical capabilities of women are not, however, at issue here. The Legislature concedes this point when it exempts women licensees and wives of male licensees from the general prohibition without regard to their capacity to prepare spirits for consumption by patrons of liquor establishments. The more serious contention that a bartender must be physically strong enough to protect himself against inebriated customers and to maintain order in the bar, and that women as a class are unable to do so, must also be rejected. (17) Whether a condition constitutes a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise is a matter of evidence. ( Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. (1971) 400 U.S. 542 [27 L.Ed.2d 613, 91 S.Ct. 496].) The state has made no showing whatever that bartenders are endangered by their work and require physical strength, not possessed by women, for self defense and to maintain order. The reason for the lack of such a showing is apparent. As we have pointed out, the saloon days of the Wild West are long gone. Nowadays the typical bar does not provide a setting for violence and danger, if in fact it ever did. At most, the dangers feared by the Attorney General may justify discrimination only in a particular establishment where, first, the employer can prove that such problems arise, and, second, that substantially all women lack the requisite strength to deal with such problems. ( Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra, 408 F.2d 228, 235.) Such perils cannot serve as the basis for a blanket statewide statutory prohibition against the employment of women bartenders. (18) We conclude that section 25656 conflicts with section 2000e-2 of the Civil Rights Act. As to those liquor licensees who employ the requisite 25 employees and otherwise come within the prohibition of section 2000e-2, section 25656 is invalid and must fall. [12]