Opinion ID: 1152610
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Excusing Accomplices from Testifying

Text: Suarez next claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed two co-defendants, Reyes and Sory, to refuse to testify on grounds of self-incrimination without first determining the extent and validity of their fifth amendment claims. Reyes and Sory had initially been scheduled to be tried with Suarez in the same trial. However, the trial judge severed Reyes and Sory's trial from the trial sub judice early in the proceedings. Suarez attempted to call Reyes and Sory as witnesses to support his assertion that he had acted in self-defense, apparently grounded on a theory that the police had unjustifiably used deadly force by firing their weapons at the fleeing suspects. Attorneys for Reyes and Sory objected, stating that their clients would exercise their fifth amendment privilege to remain silent. Defense counsel accepted this assertion as to Sory, but requested that Reyes' attorney consult with his client. Reyes' attorney briefly consulted with his client and assured the court that he would invoke his fifth amendment privilege. Defense counsel requested that the jury be advised that these witnesses had been called and that they had refused to testify. This the court declined to do. No request for a record voir dire was made. It is well settled that a person is normally exempt from answering questions which may directly or indirectly incriminate him. State ex rel. Benemovsky v. Sullivan, 37 So.2d 907 (Fla. 1948). However, the matter of deciding what answers may be incriminating is not solely up to the witness, but is one requiring the exercise of the trial court's discretion. State ex rel. Mitchell v. Kelly, 71 So.2d 887 (Fla. 1954). Suarez urges us to conclude that in order for the court to properly exercise its discretion, it must conduct an on the record voir dire to determine the extent to which the fifth amendment privilege applies. Appellant relies on the case of Faver v. State, 393 So.2d 49 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). In Faver, a voir dire inquiry was made of a witness outside the presence of the jury at which the witness refused to answer all questions after giving his name and address. Obviously, voir dire of such a witness is one way for the court to ensure that a witness is properly excluded when he elects to invoke his fifth amendment privilege. However, the question before the court in Faver was not whether a voir dire was required. We can find only one case where this question was directly before a Florida court, and we agree with the decision in that case, that voir dire is not required when it would constitute an idle exercise of judicial labor to indulge in such inquiry. Lopez v. State, 349 So.2d 1198, 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 359 So.2d 1216 (Fla. 1978). The facts in the Lopez case are nearly identical to those here. Lopez sought to call his co-defendant, who, as in this case, had been charged in the same indictment as the defendant and who also was subject to trial subsequent to the trial of the complaining defendant. The co-defendant's counsel stated that his client would refuse to answer any questions on fifth amendment grounds. The co-defendant was never voir dired before the court and on appeal the defendant complained that the trial judge incorrectly allowed co-defendant's counsel to be the judge of whether the co-defendant should testify. The Second District Court of Appeal wrote: We agree with appellant that ordinarily the trial judge initially must make a direct inquiry on voir dire to determine a witness' claim of privilege. In the determination of this threshold question a witness who claims the privilege against self-incrimination has the burden of establishing his entitlement and this, of course, ... is a matter for the court to determine. Under the circumstances here, however, it would have been an idle exercise of judicial labor to indulge in such inquiry. The facts before the court, and patent from the four corners of the case at the critical posture involved, clearly supported the court's conclusion that [the co-defendant] was entitled to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. It was not error to forego the voir dire examination which, under other circumstances, may ordinarily have been required. Id. at 1199-1200. The district court noted that the defendant could have established a predicate to compel testimony under appropriate safeguards devised within the discretion of the trial judge sufficient to insulate the witness from the incriminating effects of what he may be compelled to say. Id. at 1200. This apparently would have occurred had defense counsel demanded and conducted a voir dire. No such voir dire was requested in Lopez or in the instant case. Absent a grant of immunity, we can conceive of no way in which the co-defendants could have given useful information without incriminating themselves, because they would have had to admit their presence at the scene of the murder. Defense counsel may well have had the right to insist on a voir dire, but it was not the trial court's obligation to conduct one, absent a defense request.