Opinion ID: 1201975
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Jury's Verdict.

Text: Whether the government presented sufficient evidence to support a conviction is a legal question we review de novo. United States v. Dunmire, 403 F.3d 722, 724 (10th Cir.2005). In undertaking our review, we consider the record in the light most favorable to the government to determine whether a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the direct and circumstantial evidence, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id. (quotation omitted). Thus, [w]e may reverse only if no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Brown, 400 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir.2005) (quotations omitted). This is a restrictive standard of review, and it provides us with very little leeway. United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 671 (10th Cir.1992). As noted above, the jury found Mr. Hernandez guilty of conspiring with Mr. Tinajero to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. To prove the drug trafficking conspiracy alleged in this case, the government was required to prove that: (1) [Mr. Hernandez] agreed with [one] or more persons to import and possess with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana, (2) [Mr. Hernandez] knew at least the essential objectives of the conspirac[y], (3) [Mr. Hernandez] knowingly and voluntarily became a part of the conspirac[y], and (4) interdependence existed among the alleged coconspirators. United States v. Arras, 373 F.3d 1071, 1074 (10th Cir.2004). By necessity, the government may establish these elements by direct or circumstantial evidence. Evans, 970 F.2d at 668. But as we have repeatedly emphasized in our decisions in this area, we cannot sustain a conspiracy conviction if the evidence does no more than create a suspicion of guilt or amounts to a conviction resulting from piling inference on top of inference. United States v. Horn, 946 F.2d 738, 741 (10th Cir.1991). Assuming membership in the conspiracy is proven, however, the government need not produce evidence of direct participation in the commission of [each] substantive offense or other evidence from which participation might fairly be inferred. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946) (rejecting holding in United States v. Sall, 116 F.2d 745 (3d Cir.1940)). To the contrary, as the district court instructed the jury in this case, the doctrine of vicarious liability plays a critical role in the context of conspiracy cases. The court's vicarious liability instruction read as follows, and we note that Mr. Hernandez did not object to the instruction: Every conspirator is guilty of the illegal acts that are done as part of and in furtherance of the conspiracy even though those acts are done solely by coconspirators. If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that, at the time an alleged offense was committed, a Defendant had entered into and continued to be a member of an unlawful conspiracy as I have defined that for you; and if you further find beyond a reasonable doubt that a coconspirator of the Defendant committed the offense while the conspiracy continued to exist and in furtherance of that unlawful conspiracy or as an object of that conspiracy, then you may find the Defendant guilty of that offense even though he was not the person who actually committed or personally aided and abetted in the commission of the offense. R., Vol. 1, Doc. 47 at 51; see also id. at 37 (jury instruction stating that [o]nce a person becomes a member of a conspiracy, he is held legally responsible for the acts of the other members done in furtherance of the conspiracy, even though he was not present or aware that the acts were being committed); Evans, 970 F.2d at 678 n. 20 (Under Pinkerton, a defendant is liable for any crimes committed by a coconspirator if those crimes (1) were within the scope of the conspiracy or (2) were reasonably foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement.) (citing 328 U.S. at 646-48, 66 S.Ct. 1180). As the government has pointed out in its brief, Mr. Hernandez does not attack the conviction for conspiracy itself. Aplee. Br. at 6. Instead, he is attacking only the jury's finding that the conspiracy involved 100 kilograms or more of marijuana, a finding that subjects [him] to a statutory penalty of not less than 5 years nor more than 40 years of imprisonment under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(vii). Aplee. Br. at 6. Having carefully reviewed the evidence put forth by the government at trial, we conclude the jury's finding that the conspiracy involved 100 kilograms or more of marijuana was supported by the evidence. To begin with, Brian Long testified at trial that, from 2000 through 2004, he purchased large quantities of marijuana from Mr. Tinajero on a weekly basis and then distributed the marijuana to third persons. R., Vol. 3 at 237-45. In addition, Mr. Long identified Mr. Hernandez as a person he met through Mr. Tinajero, and he testified that Mr. Hernandez delivered marijuana to him on behalf of Mr. Tinajero. Id. at 252-53. Specifically, Mr. Long testified that Mr. Hernandez delivered approximately three to fifteen pounds of marijuana to him at a time, three or four times a month from early 2000 to the latter part of 2002. Id. at 253. Even viewing this testimony conservatively ( i.e., assuming it involved only eight months in 2000 and eight months in 2002 for a total of twenty-eight months, and that a total of only nine pounds of marijuana was being delivered each month, for a total of 252 pounds or 114.5 kilograms), this evidence was sufficient to establish that Mr. Hernandez was part of a drug distribution conspiracy involving 100 kilograms or more of marijuana. As noted by the government, Mr. Long also testified that [Mr. Hernandez] delivered the fifteen pounds of marijuana for Tinajero and that Long paid [Mr. Hernandez] $500 per pound for a total of $7,500 in cash at delivery, and [t]his transaction was the subject of Count 2 of the Indictment, on which the jury returned a verdict of not guilty. Aplee. Br. at 9. Although the not guilty verdict on Count 2 indicates the jury found that Mr. Long's testimony regarding this specific transaction was not credible, the not guilty verdict on Count 2 does not necessarily undercut the remainder of Mr. Long's testimony regarding the total amounts of marijuana that Mr. Hernandez delivered to him. Indeed, in reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence, [c]redibility choices are resolved in favor of the jury's verdict. Horn, 946 F.2d at 741. As a result, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, as we are required to do, we must assume the jury found that the remainder of Mr. Long's testimony was credible. [5] This is an important point because Mr. Long's testimony not only provided direct evidence of Mr. Hernandez's participation in a drug distribution conspiracy involving in excess of 100 kilograms of marijuana, but his testimony also linked Mr. Hernandez to the conspiracy as of December 2001 and thus the time of the transaction involving the 1,986 pounds of marijuana. Consequently, based on Mr. Long's testimony, and given the additional evidence showing that Mr. Tinajero used a telephone that had been subscribed in Mr. Hernandez's name to coordinate the transaction involving the 1,986 pounds of marijuana, the jury could reasonably have found that: (1) Mr. Hernandez was knowingly involved with Mr. Tinajero in a large-scale drug distribution conspiracy in December 2001; and (2) he is therefore vicariously liable for the transaction involving the 1,986 pounds of marijuana even if he did not participate in that transaction. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence concerning the marijuana transactions in which Mr. Hernandez was directly involved ( i.e., Mr. Long and the 114.5 kilograms), or, alternatively, the evidence concerning the transaction for which he could be found vicariously liable ( i.e., the December 2001 transaction and the 1,986 pounds or 902.7 kilograms), provided a sufficient evidentiary basis for the government to meet the 100-kilogram threshold.