Opinion ID: 1670061
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lippolt's Immunity.

Text: We begin our review by considering the district court's ruling denying Lippolt's motion for partial summary judgment on Hook's negligence claim based on Lippolt's immunity defense under section 669.24. A. Statutory Provisions. At the time of the events giving rise to this lawsuit, chapter 669 required that any claim as defined in this chapter be submitted to the state appeal board for disposition. Iowa Code §§ 669.3, .5. Section 669.2(3) defines claim to include [a]ny claim against an employee of the state for money only ... on account of personal injury or death, caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any state employee while acting within the scope of the employee's office or employment. Id. § 669.2(3)( b ). An employee of the state is broadly defined to include agents ... of the state or any state agency ... and persons acting on behalf of the state or any state agency in any official capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service of the state of Iowa, whether with or without compensation. ... Id. § 669.2(4) (emphasis added). It is important to keep in mind that the term employee as used in chapter 669 includes unpaid volunteers as well as paid workers. We turn now to the indemnity and immunity provisions of this statute. At the outset, it is helpful to note the distinction between a right to be defended and indemnified by the State and immunity-the absence of personal liability. See Dickerson v. Mertz, 547 N.W.2d 208, 213 (Iowa 1996) (referring to statute providing that state employees are not personally liable for certain claims as granting such employees immunity). Chapter 669's indemnity provision is found in section 669.21, which provides that the State will defend and indemnify any employee against claims falling within chapter 669, subject to exceptions not pertinent to this case. Iowa Code § 669.21. Chapter 669 contains two immunity provisions, one covering all employees and one applicable to volunteers. See id. §§ 669. 23, .24. All employees are granted immunity for exempted claims, i.e., claims that do not fall within the State Tort Claims Act. See Iowa Code § 669.23 (Employees of the state are not personally liable for any claim which is exempted under section 669.14.); see also id. § 669.14 (exempting specified claims from the provisions of the State Tort Claims Act). Hook's claim is not exempted under section 669.14, so the immunity provided to employees by section 669.23 does not protect Lippolt from personal liability for Hook's damages. Lippolt's immunity defense is based on section 669.24, which grants broader immunity to volunteers: A person who performs services for the state government or any agency or subdivision of state government and who does not receive compensation is not personally liable for a claim based upon an act or omission of the person performed in the discharge of the person's duties, except for acts or omissions which involve intentional misconduct or knowing violation of the law, or for a transaction from which the person derives an improper personal benefit. For purposes of this section, compensation does not include payments to reimburse a person for expenses. Id. § 669.24. It is the applicability of this provision that is at issue here. B. Parties' Contentions. Although conceding Lippolt provided services to DHS without compensation, Hook seems to argue Lippolt cannot benefit from the immunity of section 669.24 due to a related statute governing DHS volunteers. Iowa Code section 217.13(3) states: All volunteers registered with [DHS] and in compliance with departmental rules are considered state employees for purposes of chapter 669. [3] It appears the plaintiff contends that, if Lippolt is considered an employee for purposes of chapter 669, he would not enjoy the protection from personal liability provided by section 669.24 to volunteers. Lippolt responds that the legislature surely did not intend to deprive DHS volunteers of the immunity available to other state volunteers. C. Discussion. We conclude Hook's argument rests on a faulty premise: that the terms employee and volunteer are mutually exclusive under chapter 669. As noted earlier, section 669.2(4) defines employee broadly to include volunteers. Consequently, the fact that Lippolt may be classified by section 217.13(3) as a state employee for purposes of chapter 669 does not preclude him from also qualifying as a volunteer for purposes of that chapter. We believe that, rather than intending to deprive DHS volunteers of immunity under section 669.24 by its enactment of section 217.13(3), the legislature intended to assume responsibility under chapter 669 for the torts of persons purporting to act for DHS only if such persons were registered with DHS and in compliance with departmental rules. Hook argues that, even if Lippolt is immune under section 669.24, he may still be sued for negligence in this lawsuit. We disagree. Section 669.24 states that a volunteer is not personally liable. Id. § 669.24. If Lippolt is not liable, there is no legal basis to support Hook's negligence suit against Lippolt. For the same reason, Hook's claim that she is entitled to sue Lippolt to reach his personal liability insurance must fail. The ability to sue an individual for damages depends not on the individual's purchase of insurance, but on his liability under the law, a liability Lippolt does not have. As a final matter, Hook argues the legislature must have contemplated suit against immune tortfeasors because such tortfeasors are included within the defense and indemnity provisions of section 669.21, and therefore, she concludes, immune volunteers are subject to suit. To the extent Hook's initial premise is accurate, it does not support her conclusion. Ironically, this lawsuit illustrates why the legislature would extend a defense and indemnity to immune volunteers. Notwithstanding Lippolt's immunity from personal liability, he has been required to defend this action. Thus, he has benefited from section 669.21 under circumstances not inconsistent with his personal immunity from suit under section 669.24. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Lippolt was entitled to summary judgment on Hook's negligence claim based on his statutory immunity. We now discuss the defendants' statute-of-limitations defense.