Opinion ID: 2149805
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prior Lawsuit Against Hy-Vee.

Text: Before trial, the estate filed a motion in limine requesting an order prohibiting the defense from presenting any evidence regarding a lawsuit Whigham filed against Hy-Vee for a slip-and-fall injury that occurred at one of its grocery stores in 2000. In resisting the motion, defense counsel argued the Hy-Vee lawsuit was relevant to rebut the estate's contention Whigham intended to file the present case against Dr. Otoadese but was not able to do so before slipping into a coma. Counsel stated we think it is very relevant that [Whigham] found his way to a lawyer [after Dr. Otoadese removed his thyroid] and got a lawsuit on file, but it wasn't this one. It was a case against Hy-Vee. And that's what we want to offer it for. Counsel for the estate responded: this is an attempt to try to make it look like Mr. Whigham was [a] litigious person. . . . That's the danger here, and this is really more prejudicial than probative. . . . The court ruled Dr. Otoadese could offer evidence of the Hy-Vee lawsuit. On appeal, defense counsel now contends she was only trying to impeach Curry who testified about her brother and his life. Defense counsel attempted to show Curry did not know her brother as well as she claimed. After Curry acknowledged she did not know much about Whigham's other medical conditions, defense counsel asked Curry about her knowledge of the Hy-Vee lawsuit: Q. What did [Whigham] tell you about falling in a store? A. He said he just tripped over a banana peeling or something. I think that's what he said. He said no more to me about it. I don't know anything else about it. Q. Was that an incident involving that, you believe, occurred at the Hy-Vee store? A. I think so. . . . . Q. And that would have been in 2000, February of 2000. Are you aware that he filed a lawsuit about that?. . . . A. I don't know. . . . . Q. He didn't discuss whether or not he filed a lawsuit? A. Right. . . . . Q. So you don't know anything about Jerry filing a lawsuit in February 2002 about a fall at the Hy-Vee store. . . . . A. I have the same answer. I do not know anything about it. Q. And just so I'm clear, ma'am, in February of 2002 that was before Mr. Whigham had come to stay with you prior to his death; correct? A. I think so. We find the trial court abused its discretion in allowing defense counsel to cross-examine Curry about the Hy-Vee lawsuit. Whigham's lawsuit against Hy-Vee was not relevant because it did not hav[e] any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the [present] action more probable or less probable. . . . Iowa R. Evid. 5.401 (defining relevant evidence). On appeal, Dr. Otoadese argues the subject was properly broached because the estate raised the subject of Whigham's affairs on direct examination. See State v. Holmes, 325 N.W.2d 114, 117 (Iowa 1982) (Cross-examination may deal with matters inquired into on direct, and questions fairly within the area of those matters constitute proper cross-examination.). But that is not exactly true. Curry was on the stand describing Whigham as a person and explaining how he suffered after the surgery. She never testified she knew about his affairslegal, financial, or otherwise. It is a stretch for Dr. Otoadese to argue that simply because Curry testified about Whigham, his previous lawsuit concerning an injury completely unrelated to the present action is a proper subject on cross-examination. Curry's lack of knowledge concerning the lawsuit had little impeachment value. Moreover, even if the Hy-Vee lawsuit was somehow relevantwhich we doubtthe information should have been excluded under rule 5.403 (allowing relevant evidence to be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury). Nevertheless, the erroneous admission of evidence does not require reversal unless a substantial right of the party is affected. Iowa R. Evid. 5.103(a). In other words, the admission of evidence must be prejudicial to the interest of the complaining party. Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 183 (Iowa 2004). This requires a finding that it is probable a different result would have been reached but for the admission of the evidence or testimony. Mays v. C. Mac Chambers Co., 490 N.W.2d 800, 803 (Iowa 1992); accord State v. Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 244 (Iowa 2001); see also Mercer v. Pittway Corp., 616 N.W.2d 602, 612 (Iowa 2000) (`Although a presumption of prejudice arises when the district court has received irrelevant evidence over a proper objection, the presumption is not sufficient if the record shows a lack of prejudice.' (quoting McClure v. Walgreen Co., 613 N.W.2d 225, 235 (Iowa 2000))). We find the estate suffered no such prejudice with Curry's testimony concerning the Hy-Vee lawsuit under the unique facts of this case. Cf. Nepple v. Weifenbach, 274 N.W.2d 728, 734 (Iowa 1979) (granting a new trial due to the sufficient likelihood of prejudice to the plaintiff where the defense counsel questioned plaintiff on the amounts of past settlements). The questioning was brief in the context of a seven day trial. Both parties offered credible expert testimony to support their respective positions. Based upon our review of the record, the focus of the trial appeared to be the expert testimony. Consequently, we cannot say the result would have probably been different had the testimony regarding the Hy-Vee lawsuit been excluded. See Mays, 490 N.W.2d at 804 (finding defense counsel's questions concerning plaintiff's prior claims against other persons or companies were improper but not prejudicial). Thus, the court of appeals erred by granting a new trial on this ground. We note, however, that it is the duty of trial courts, upon timely objection, to prevent the introduction of evidence regarding unrelated prior claims. Such evidence can be very distracting and improperly impugn the merits of the case being tried. See Nepple, 274 N.W.2d at 733 (noting `litigiousness, in the eyes of most people, reflects upon character' and that `hostility is ordinarily felt against one who constantly requires services of a court of law for the adjustment of life's problems' (quoting Lowenthal v. Mortimer, 125 Cal. App.2d 636, 270 P.2d 942, 945-46 (1954))). Our ruling in this case should not be read as tacit approval for introducing inadmissible evidence on a pinch-of-salt basis. Our standard for reversal may prove inadequate in the event the trial bar continues to be successful at introducing inadmissible evidence of prior unrelated claims. At this time, we rely upon trial judges to resist creative efforts to inject potentially prejudicial, irrelevant evidence into the record.