Opinion ID: 2790481
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Bowser

Text: Bowser challenges only his sentence, first arguing that the district court erred by relying on the nature of his plea of nolo contendere to the RICO charge (Count 1 of the Second Superseding Indictment) to deny him a sentencing reduction for acceptance of responsibility. A plea of nolo contendere, Bowser notes, “admit[s] every essential element of the Nos. 14-1237, 14-1585 & 14-1592 17 offense that is well pleaded in the charge” and thus “is tantamount to an admission of guilt for the purposes of the case.” Lott v. United States, 367 U.S. 421, 426 (1961) (quotation and alterations omitted). Bowser emphasizes that he pleaded guilty to ten underlying offenses and contends that the court applied a per se rule that a nolo contendere plea precludes the acceptance reduction—a rule, he says, that no circuit has adopted. He argues that the court instead should have addressed the factors listed in U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n.1, and considered how he saved judicial resources by avoiding trial. Under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), a district court is to provide a two-level reduction in a defendant’s offense level “[i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense.” The court here explained its reasons for denying the reduction as follows: [W]hile Mr. Bowser has admitted his guilt to the underlying acts involved in Count 1, because he neither admits nor disputes his guilt in Count 1 through his nolo contendere plea, … he’s not taken responsibility or accepted responsibility for his actions. Mr. Bowser has not admitted that the Outlaws Motorcycle Club was a criminal enterprise. He will not admit and accept responsibility for the fact that others did conspire with him. He just says others in general. So the Court is not going to give the two level. Bowser argues that everything in this explanation is simply a restatement of the nature of his nolo contendere plea. But we disagree. In our view, the court went beyond 18 Nos. 14-1237, 14-1585 & 14-1592 relying solely on the nature of Bowser’s plea by citing specific facts about how he refused to acknowledge the Outlaws as a criminal organization or identify his coconspirators. Bowser insists that his actions can be explained by the fact that he views the Outlaws as his family, and as the district court explained in accepting his plea, acknowledging the Outlaws as criminal would likely lead to his expulsion. But because the district court evaluated the facts surrounding Bowser’s plea and made specific observations about his refusal to acknowledge his association with a criminal organization, we are not persuaded that the court committed reversible error in denying Bowser the reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Even a defendant who pleads guilty “is not entitled to an adjustment under [§ 3E1.1] as a matter of right.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n.3; see United States v. Dachman, 743 F.3d 254, 259 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Panice, 598 F.3d 426, 435 (7th Cir. 2010). Rather, the sentencing judge is given discretion to make factual findings about the defendant’s credibility and conduct, and we review those findings for clear error, giving “great deference to the sentencing judge because [she] is in a ‘unique position to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility.’” Dachman, 743 F.3d at 260 (quoting United States v. Frykholm, 267 F.3d 604, 610 (7th Cir. 2001)). “The findings of the trial judge in sentencing will only be reversed if the decision lacks any foundation or the court is ‘left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” United States v. Seidling, 737 F.3d 1155, 1162 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Souffront, 338 F.3d 809, 832 (7th Cir. 2003)). Even considering Bowser’s motivation for pleading as he did, we are not convinced that Nos. 14-1237, 14-1585 & 14-1592 19 the court clearly erred in finding he had not accepted responsibility for purposes of § 3E1.1. This analysis is in line with our approach recently in Dachman, 743 F.3d at 261 n.2, in which we declined to decide whether a nolo contendere plea alone precludes a finding of acceptance of responsibility when “other facts were more than sufficient to justify the district court’s denial of acceptance of responsibility.” As the government notes, it also conforms with the approach of other circuits, which have upheld the denial of the § 3E1.1 sentencing reduction to defendants entering similar pleas when the trial court relied on additional facts beyond the nature of the plea. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 751 F.3d 123, 125, 127 (3d Cir. 2014) (upholding denial of acceptance reduction even though “a nolo contendere plea does not automatically preclude a district court from granting such a reduction”); United States v. Harlan, 35 F.3d 176, 181 (5th Cir. 1994) (upholding denial of acceptance reduction and noting that Alford plea was relevant, but not a disqualifying factor, for applying the reduction). Moreover, although Bowser emphasizes that he prevented the expense of trial, we have rejected the argument that a defendant is “entitled to the reduction because his nolo contendere plea saved the government and district court the time and expense of a long and complicated trial.” United States v. Boyle, 10 F.3d 485, 490 (7th Cir. 2010). It is true that one of the underlying purposes for the sentencing reduction under § 3E1.1 “is to reduce the burdens of trial to prosecutors, judges, victims, jurors, and witnesses by inducing defendants to plead guilty.” United States v. Gonzalez, 608 F.3d 1001, 1008 (7th Cir. 2010). But 20 Nos. 14-1237, 14-1585 & 14-1592 because the reduction serves many other purposes—“the societal interest in crime reduction, restitution, rehabilitation, early withdrawal from criminal activity and withdrawal of criminals from positions of trust and responsibility”—adopting a rule mandating the reduction solely for avoiding the costs of trial “would ignore these other purposes and emasculate the Guideline.” Boyle, 10 F.3d at 490. Bowser also argues that the district court erred in imposing a condition of supervised release authorizing suspicionless searches of his person, home, and effects. The government confesses error, acknowledging that United States v. Farmer, 755 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 2014), concluded that a condition of release authorizing suspicionless searches is improper when the court does not connect that condition to the underlying offense. Here, the court said only that the search condition was imposed based on “the nature of the instant offense,” without elaborating. Given the brevity of the court’s comment, we accept the government’s confession of error. We have considered the additional arguments presented in the appellants’ briefs, including Jordan’s arguments regarding his right to a speedy trial and inaccuracies in Stonebraker’s testimony about Stonebraker’s drug use, but we do not believe that these arguments warrant discussion beyond that of the district court in its rulings on those issues. Accordingly, the judgments against Jordan, Miller, and Bowser are AFFIRMED, with the exception that Bowser’s case is REMANDED to the district court for further consideration of the term of his supervised release authorizing suspicionless searches.