Opinion ID: 868543
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: we adopt the sanctions recommended by

Text: THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSION ¶11 Judge Christensen stipulated that unless we found Utah Code section 78A-7-206(1)(e) to be unconstitutional, his actions constituted “conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings a judicial office into disrepute,” a sanctionable offense under article VIII, section 13 of the Utah Constitution and under Utah Code section 78A-11-105(1)(e). He also stipulated that if his constitutional claim failed, his actions constituted a violation of rule 1.1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides, “A judge shall comply with the law.” Finally, he stipulated that if his constitutional claim failed, censure and repayment were appropriate sanctions. ¶12 Despite these stipulations, Judge Christensen offers mitigating factors to persuade us to adopt a lesser sanction than that to which he stipulated. Ordinarily, parties are bound by their stipulations. Prinsburg State Bank v. Abundo, 2012 UT 94, ¶¶ 13–14, 296 P.3d 709. However, because of our plenary authority over judicial disciplinary matters, see In re Anderson, 2004 UT 7, ¶¶ 9–11, 82 P.3d 1134, and our constitutional duty to impose sanctions that we find to be “just and proper,” UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 13, we are not bound to enforce the Stipulation. ¶13 Nonetheless, even in a judicial discipline proceeding, we view a party’s stipulations to be highly indicative of the facts as they 3 Judge Christensen also seeks to challenge the constitutionality of section 78A-7-206(1) prospectively. However, a disciplinary proceeding is not the proper setting for such a challenge. The scope of the present matter is limited to whether Judge Christensen violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and, if so, what sanction is appropriate. 5 IN RE: THE HONORABLE KEVIN CHRISTENSEN Opinion of the Court actually occurred. Further, we recognize that stipulations often represent compromises and bargains. For example, the JCC may agree not to recommend more severe sanctions or not to allege an additional violation if a judge stipulates to certain facts or to the appropriateness of certain sanctions. Thus, we will generally give effect to stipulations between judges and the JCC unless our constitutional obligation to prescribe a “just and proper” sanction compels us to do otherwise. See Id. ¶14 Here, none of the mitigating factors offered by Judge Christensen persuade us that the sanctions to which he stipulated would be unjust or improper. First, Judge Christensen points out that the JCC did not hold a hearing and therefore did not “weigh the facts.” This factor is not mitigating because it does not reflect on Judge Christensen’s level of culpability. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1093 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “mitigator” as “[a] factor tending to show that [an actor], though guilty, is less culpable than the act alone would indicate”). Furthermore, because Judge Christensen has not identified any factual issues that were not resolved by the Stipulation, we see no reason why a hearing would have been necessary. ¶15 Second, Judge Christensen contends that he was “caught between two conflicting statutes”: Utah Code section 78A-7- 206(1)(e), which sets a statutory cap on the salaries of justice court judges, and Utah Code section 78A-7-207(2), which provides that “[t]he salary fixed for a justice court judge may not be diminished during the term for which the judge has been appointed or elected.” Below, we hold that section 78A-7-207(2) does not prohibit justice court judges from voluntarily accepting a lower salary in order to comply with section 78A-7-206(1)(e). Infra ¶¶ 18–19. We nonetheless recognize that if Judge Christensen were actually delayed in bringing his salary into compliance with the statutory cap because of the municipalities’ concerns about section 78A-7-207(2), this fact could potentially be mitigating. However, the record was not developed on this point because Judge Christensen stipulated that the proposed sanctions were appropriate. If Judge Christensen had raised this mitigating argument to the JCC, its investigators likely would have interviewed municipality officials to determine whether Judge Christensen was as diligent as he claims to have been and whether any concerns they may have had regarding section 78A-7- 207(2) resulted in delay. We decline to give Judge Christensen’s assertions the benefit of the doubt, or to reopen fact-finding in this case, see, e.g., In re Anderson, 2004 UT 7, ¶ 19 (appointing a special 6 Cite as: 2013 UT 30 Opinion of the Court master to engage in additional fact-finding in a judicial discipline case), because the paucity of evidence is a result of Judge Christensen’s decision to enter the Stipulation. ¶16 Finally, Judge Christensen argues in mitigation that (1) the proposed sanction “does not specify to whom or in what proportion each municipality should be ‘repaid,’” and that (2) “repaying the municipalities as recommended by the JCC is likely barred by [Utah Code section 78A-7-207(2)],” which provides that a justice court judge’s salary “may not be diminished” during his term. These are not mitigating factors because they do not reflect on Judge Christensen’s level of culpability. See supra ¶ 14. Rather, they pose questions about the logistics of complying with the repayment order. Because no sanction is final until adopted by this court, we can and will resolve these questions in this opinion. ¶17 Having considered the record and the arguments and having not been persuaded that the mitigating factors offered by Judge Christensen would render the proposed sanctions unjust or improper, we adopt the JCC’s factual findings, legal conclusions, and proposed sanctions. Judge Christensen is censured and ordered to repay the excess salary he received in 2009, 2010, and 2011. Repayments are to begin on July 1, 20134 and are to be completed within three years of that date. Repayments are not to include interest. Repayments should be made pro rata to the municipalities that employed Judge Christensen during the relevant years. We request that the Administrative Office of the Courts work with Judge Christensen to create a repayment plan and to monitor his compliance with that plan. ¶18 The ordered repayments will not violate Utah Code section 78A-7-207(2). Although section 78A-7-207(2)’s directive that “[t]he salary fixed for a justice court judge may not be diminished” could be read in isolation to prevent any person, including a judge, from reducing a judicial salary, in context, it is clear that the directive applies only to municipalities acting unilaterally. When interpreting a statute, we construe “each part or section . . . in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole.” Ivory Homes, Ltd. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2011 UT 54, ¶ 21, 266 P.3d 751 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We will not interpret section 78A-7-207(2) to make compliance with the 4 We modify the JCC’s order insofar as it required repayments to be completed within three years of its issuance date of May 31, 2012. 7 IN RE: THE HONORABLE KEVIN CHRISTENSEN Opinion of the Court salary cap in the preceding section nearly impossible5 for justice court judges who discover they are being overpaid. ¶19 Section 78A-7-207(2) was designed to prevent municipalities from exerting improper control over judges by threatening to reduce their salaries. Concerns of judicial independence are not present when a judge, seeking to comply with the law, requests a salary reduction. We therefore hold that Utah Code section 78A-7-207(2) is not violated when a municipality honors a justice court judge’s request to have his salary reduced to comply with Utah Code section 78A-7-206(1)(e).