Opinion ID: 1751995
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issues Arising from the Summary Judgment

Text: In the first trial, the jury found that the quarry did not constitute a nuisance. The trial court then ordered that the claims of all the remaining plaintiffs alleging a public nuisance and/or seeking injunctive relief were barred. The remaining plaintiffs argue that this order deprived them of their day in court on those issues; Hanson and Oldcastle respond that the trial court's order is justified either under the doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel or because of an agreement between the parties. Res judicata bars relitigation of a claim only in a subsequent action. Interstate Truck Leasing, Inc. v. Bender, 608 So.2d 716, 718 (Ala.1992), overruled on other grounds, State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Owen, 729 So.2d 834 (Ala.1998). When a case is divided into separate trials pursuant to Rule 42, Ala. R. Civ. P., those trials remain part of a single action and the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to the later trials. 608 So.2d at 718. Neither does collateral estoppel apply: [S]ince separate trials do not individually produce final judgments, any attempt to apply collateral estoppel to the remaining . . . trials would be invalid under a Rule 42(b) regime. Acevedo-Garcia v. Monroig, 351 F.3d 547, 560 (1st Cir.2003). [7] The approach in Acevedo-Garcia is consistent with our approach in Interstate Truck Leasing, as well as with hornbook law stating that collateral estoppel bars relitigation in a subsequent action. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27; see also 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2387 (1995)(Rule 42(b) allows the court to order a separate trial of any claim. . . . Separate trials usually will result in one judgment. . . . ). As a result, in a single action involving separate trials under Rule 42(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., a result in one trial will typically not be binding on parties not involved that trial, absent an agreement of the parties or an order of the court. In this regard, Hanson and Oldcastle argue that all the plaintiffs agreed to be bound by the jury's verdict in the first trial as to whether the quarry constituted a public nuisance. The parties, with the trial court's approval, certainly could have agreed to structure the case that way. The trial court, by order, could also have so structured the case. However, the record does not reveal such an agreement or order. During pretrial conferences, the parties made a number of statements concerning what effect a verdict in the first trial might have on subsequent trials. Interestingly, the parties' pretrial positions were essentially the opposite of their positions on appeal: the plaintiffs suggested that the first trial might have a preclusive effect on subsequent trials, and Hanson disagreed (Oldcastle had not yet been joined as a defendant). The parties were unable to agree, and these statements thus amount to nothing more than ideas about how the case might have been tried. The parties also submitted competing written trial plans. The plaintiffs' proposed trial plan summarizes the scope of the first trial as follows: 1. Plaintiffs will identify 6-8 families as Parties Plaintiff to the first trial. In addition, the City of Opelika, the Opelika Utilities Board, and the Beauregard Water Authority[ [8] ] will be Plaintiffs during the first trial. Therefore, the jury will only have to consider the claims of between 9 and 11 Plaintiffs rather than 64. . . . . 4. The jury would be informed that another 20 families have the same or similar claims, that those families [sic] claims will be tried separately, and that some of those homeowners would be allowed to testifyespecially those that have complained in writing or in person to Hanson. (Emphasis added.) Hanson's proposed trial plan stated: Hanson submits that plaintiffs' attorneys should select one family unit from each geographic area and that the defendants' attorneys jointly should select one family unit from each geographic area for trial of their damages and injunctive relief claims based on quarry operations (noise, dust, blasting). Thus, the first trial would resolve the claims of six of the 27 family units. The results in this first trial would serve as a benchmark for the possible resolution of the quarry operations claims of the remaining individual plaintiffs. As stated, there would be little, if any overlap between the two phases.  (Emphasis added.) Neither of the proposed trial plans shows an agreement to bind all plaintiffs in subsequent trials to the verdict in the first trial. According to the plaintiffs' plan, the jury would consider the claims of between 9 and 11 plaintiffs; the claims of the remaining plaintiffs would be tried separately. According to Hanson, the jury would hear the claims of six family units, leading to possible resolution of the remaining claims. The parties failed to agree on how the case should proceed, and the trial court entered the following scheduling order: Regarding the Proposed Trial Plan submitted by the parties, it is the Court's decision that the Water Authorities along with (6) other Plaintiffs' cases will be tried in July. The parties are to meet and determine whether or not they can agree as to which six (6) individual Plaintiffs should be tried at that time. [9] This order did nothing more than identify which plaintiffs would participate in the first trial. It did not state that the first trial would dispose of all public-nuisance claims; nor did it state that any other plaintiff would be bound by any part of the result of the first trial. Because the trial court's scheduling order shall control the subsequent course of the action unless modified by a subsequent order, Rule 16(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., Hanson and Oldcastle's argumentthat plaintiffs who did not participate in the first trial are bound by the verdict in that trial finding that the quarry is not a nuisanceis unpersuasive. That verdict cannot bar the nuisance claims of the remaining plaintiffs, and the summary judgment therefore must be reversed. [10]