Opinion ID: 4525578
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Contours of the Inquiry.

Text: The burden of proving that personal jurisdiction may be exercised in the forum state lies squarely with the plaintiff. See Baskin-Robbins, 825 F.3d at 34. Where, as here, a district court dismisses a case for lack of personal jurisdiction based on - 8 - the prima facie record, rather than after an evidentiary hearing or factual findings, our review is de novo. Id. (quoting C.W. Downer & Co. v. Bioriginal Food & Sci. Corp., 771 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir. 2014)). In undertaking this tamisage, we are not married to the district court's reasoning but, rather, may uphold the judgment on any ground made manifest by the record. See id. Under the prima facie approach, an inquiring court must ask whether the plaintiff has proffer[ed] evidence which, taken at face value, suffices to show all facts essential to personal jurisdiction. Id. To make such a showing, the plaintiff cannot rely solely on conclusory averments but must adduce evidence of specific facts. Foster-Miller, 46 F.3d at 145. When deciding a motion to dismiss using the prima facie approach, the court must accept the plaintiff's properly documented evidentiary proffers as true and give credence to the plaintiff's version of genuinely contested facts. Baskin-Robbins, 825 F.3d at 34. At the same time, the court must consider undisputed facts proffered by the defendant that bear on jurisdiction. See id. This case comes to the federal courts through the medium of diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). When assessing whether personal jurisdiction exists with respect to a non-resident defendant, a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction acts as the functional equivalent of a state court sitting in the forum state. Baskin-Robbins, 825 F.3d at 34 - 9 - (quoting Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1387 (1st Cir. 1995)). Therefore, Chen must show that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over USSA in Massachusetts would satisfy not only the strictures of the Due Process Clause but also the strictures of the Massachusetts long-arm statute, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, § 3. Although the reach of the Massachusetts long-arm statute may not be entirely congruent with the reach of the Due Process Clause, see Copia Commc'ns, LLC v. AMResorts, L.P., 812 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2016), we need not parse any such distinctions here. Neither party has advanced any argument specific to the Massachusetts longarm statute and, thus, any claim that the long-arm statute is less elastic than the Due Process Clause has been waived. See id. As a result, we train the lens of our inquiry exclusively on the federal constitutional analysis. The Due Process Clause dictates that, as a prerequisite to the exercise of personal jurisdiction, an out-of-state defendant must have certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). This benchmark is flexible and fact-specific, 'written more in shades of grey than in black and white.' Baskin-Robbins, 825 F.3d at 35 (quoting Phillips - 10 - Exeter Acad. v. Howard Phillips Fund, Inc., 196 F.3d 284, 288 (1st Cir. 1999)). As long as due process concerns are satisfied, a federal court may exercise either general or specific jurisdiction over a defendant. Id. We outline here only the basic distinction between these two forms of personal jurisdiction, reserving a fuller elaboration for later discussion. See infra Parts II(C)- (D). When a defendant corporation's general business contacts with the forum, even if unrelated to the litigation at hand, are 'so continuous and systematic as to render [the defendant] essentially at home in the forum State,' that state holds general jurisdiction over the defendant as to all claims. Copia, 812 F.3d at 4 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919). In contrast, [s]pecific jurisdiction allows a court to hear a particular case as long as 'that case relates sufficiently to, or arises from, a significant subset of contacts between the defendant and the forum.' Baskin-Robbins, 825 F.3d at 35 (quoting Phillips Exeter, 196 F.3d at 288).3 3 Chen frequently alludes to the sliding scale analysis that some courts use to evaluate whether a defendant's online contacts with the forum state permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See Cossaboon v. Me. Med. Ctr., 600 F.3d 25, 36 n.5 (1st Cir. 2010) (describing sliding scale analysis as articulated in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997)). This court has never embraced that sliding scale analysis, and we have no occasion to consider the matter today. We note, though, that we previously have indicated that the sliding scale analysis — which was developed in a case involving specific - 11 -