Opinion ID: 1379871
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Validity of reasonable doubt instruction.

Text: Lord's final assignment of error is that the instruction given on reasonable doubt, which followed the definition set forth in NRS 175.211, was improper because a similar instruction was held unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Cage v. Louisiana, ____ U.S. ____, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990). We do not find the instruction given in Cage to be similar to Nevada's standard definition contained in the instruction and therefore the Cage opinion is not controlling in this case. Preliminarily, we note that no objection was made to the instruction given on reasonable doubt. Normally, a proper objection is a prerequisite to our considering the issue on appeal. Riddle v. State, 96 Nev. 589, 613 P.2d 1031 (1980). However, since this issue is of constitutional proportions, we elect to address it now. Lord contends that the reasonable doubt jury instruction given in this case violates the due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Nevada Constitution. The jury instruction stated: The defendant is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This presumption places upon the State the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every material element of the crime charged and that the defendant is the person who committed the offense. A reasonable doubt is one based on reason. It is not mere possible doubt but is such a doubt as would govern or control a person in the more weighty affairs of life. If the minds of the jurors, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, are in such a condition that they can say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, there is not a reasonable doubt. Doubt to be reasonable must be actual and substantial, not merely possibility or speculation. If you have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty. This jury instruction was based on NRS 175.211. [1] We have held that a reasonable doubt instruction based on our statutory definition does not violate due process. See Cutler v. State, 93 Nev. 329, 566 P.2d 809 (1977). We must examine this conclusion in light of the recent Supreme Court decision. In Cage, the Court stated that [i]n state criminal trials, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment `protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.' In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). Cage, 111 S.Ct. at 329. The Court then went on to hold that the Louisiana trial court's reasonable doubt instruction was constitutionally defective because a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause. Id. The instruction provided in relevant part: If you entertain a reasonable doubt as to any fact or element necessary to constitute the defendant's guilt, it is your duty to give him the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict of not guilty. Even where the evidence demonstrates a probability of guilt, if it does not establish such guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, you must acquit the accused. This doubt, however, must be a reasonable one; that is one that is founded upon a real tangible substantial basis and not upon mere caprice and conjecture. It must be such doubt as would give rise to a grave uncertainty, raised in your mind by reasons of the unsatisfactory character of the evidence or lack thereof. A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt. It is an actual substantial doubt. It is a doubt that a reasonable man can seriously entertain. What is required is not an absolute or mathematical certainty, but a moral certainty. State v. Cage, 554 So.2d 39, 41 (La.1989) (emphasis added). Ibid. In construing the instruction, the Cage decision considered how reasonable jurors might have understood the charge as a whole. The Court stated that the words substantial and grave, coupled with moral certainty rather than evidentiary uncertainty could cause a reasonable juror to make a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below that required. Id. 111 S.Ct. at 329-330. After reviewing the instruction as a whole, the Court struck it down based on the combination of the three terms. Lord argues that both instructions contain comparable language; both contain the words actual and substantial. However, the language of the Louisiana instruction is distinguishable from that of Nevada. Although NRS 175.211 and the instruction in this case also includes the statement that doubt must be actual and substantial, taken as a whole, the instruction gives much different meaning to the words. This court has previously considered the substantial doubt language of NRS 175.211, rejecting the argument that it diluted the State's burden of proof. Buckner v. State, 95 Nev. 117, 590 P.2d 628 (1979). We do not believe the Nevada definition containing the substantial doubt language alone should make it unconstitutional. The Nevada instruction does not use strong language such as grave or moral certainty to quantify the uncertainty required for an acquittal. Rather, doubt must be actual and substantial in Nevada before an acquittal should be returned. This is a much less restrictive definition of reasonable doubt than Louisiana's. Lord similarly objects to the Nevada instruction's statement that there is no reasonable doubt if the juror has an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge. The Louisiana instruction on reasonable doubt did not state when a conviction should be returned, or put another way, when there is not a reasonable doubt. This is done by the Nevada standard instruction, but we do not think the abiding conviction of the truth of the charge language dilutes the definition of reasonable doubt or that it reduces the prosecutor's burden of proof to convict. This language in the Nevada instruction is not an attempt to quantify or define reasonable doubt, as was the language in the Louisiana instruction that the Supreme Court found objectionable. Because the Cage holding is limited to the interpretation of a single Louisiana instruction that is not similar to the instruction on reasonable doubt given in Nevada, we hold that the jury instruction given in this case and NRS 175.211 satisfy the due process requirements of both the United States and the Nevada Constitution.