Opinion ID: 2551946
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interpretation of the Protection from Abuse Statute

Text: [¶ 16] Because the court must apply the protection from abuse statute on remand, we also address the issue of statutory interpretation that Jusseaume has raised on appeal. We review a court's interpretation of a statute de novo. See Hatch v. Anderson, 2010 ME 94, ¶ 11, 4 A.3d 904, 907. In interpreting a statute, we look first to the plain meaning expressed in the statute's language to discern the Legislature's intent. See id. [¶17] Maine's protection from abuse statute provides that a court may enter an order of protection after a hearing and upon finding that the defendant has committed the alleged abuse. 19-A M.R.S. § 4007(1) (2010). The Legislature has included in the statutory definition of abuse, [a]ttempting to place or placing another in fear of bodily injury through any course of conduct, including, but not limited to, threatening, harassing or tormenting behavior. 19-A M.R.S. § 4002(1)(B). [7] We have held, in interpreting this definition of abuse, that if the person seeking the protective order is in actual fear of bodily injury, that fear must be reasonable, considering all of the circumstances. See Smith v. Hawthorne, 2002 ME 149, ¶¶ 17-18, 804 A.2d 1133, 1139. [¶18] Thus, pursuant to section 4002(1)(B), a court may order protection from abuse if the defendant either (1) [a]ttempt[ed] to place . . . another in fear of bodily injury through [a] course of conduct, or (2) actually plac[ed] another in fear of bodily injury through that course of conduct, if the fear was reasonable. Id. The statute therefore authorizes a court to issue a protective order if a person, with or without the intent to induce fear, engaged in conduct that actually plac[ed] another in [reasonable] fear of bodily injury. Id.; Smith, 2002 ME 149, ¶¶ 17-18, 804 A.2d at 1139. A court need not determine whether the defendant intended to frighten another person if (1) the defendant's actions actually placed the person in fear, (2) the person was in fear of bodily injury, and (3) the person's fear was reasonable. See 19-A M.R.S. § 4002(1)(B); Smith, 2002 ME 149, ¶¶ 17-18, 804 A.2d at 1139. [¶ 19] Ducatt admittedly learned Jusseaume's new address and made their sons aware that he knew where they lived. Jusseaume alleged and testified that, as a result of this conduct, she was afraid that Ducatt was watching the house and would hurt her when he found her alone. This conduct occurred after Ducatt had assaulted Jusseaume in Oregon and had served a jail sentence as a result of his conduct. [¶ 20] Although the court did consider whether Ducatt intentionally attempted to place Jusseaume in fear of bodily injury through his course of conduct, and found that there was insufficient evidence of intent, the court did not determine whether Ducatt actually placed Jusseaume in reasonable fear of bodily injury through his course of conduct. See 19-A M.R.S. § 4002(1)(B); Smith, 2002 ME 149, ¶¶ 17-18, 804 A.2d at 1139. Because there are two possible means of establishing abuse pursuant to section 4002(1)(B), the court must consider on remand whether the evidence establishes abuse through either of these means. [¶ 21] We therefore remand the matter for the court to conduct a new trial during which both parties shall have the opportunity to offer their own evidence and challenge adverse evidence. The court shall then reach its findings and apply the statute as we have interpreted it today. The entry is: Judgment vacated. Remanded for a new trial.