Opinion ID: 2109887
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Brendale Guidance

Text: Our principal guidance for adjudicating this thorny jurisdictional question comes from Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 2994, 106 L.Ed.2d 343 (1989), which was decided after the PSC decision in this case. It is the most recent decision of the United States Supreme Court on the convoluted question about the reach of state regulatory authority onto an Indian reservation. In Brendale the Court considered whether the Yakima Indian Nation or the county of Yakima in Washington had the authority to zone lands owned in fee by nonmembers of the tribe located within the boundaries of the Yakima Reservation. The Court, through a hodgepodge of divergent opinions, held that the Yakima Indian Nation had the exclusive authority to zone fee land owned by nonmembers of the tribe within what was termed the closed portion of the reservation, an area consisting mainly of trust property where only a small percentage of the land was held in fee. The Court also held, however, that the tribe lacked the authority to zone the fee land of nonmembers located within what was termed the open portion of the reservation, an area where approximately one-half of the land was held in fee. Justice White, joined by three other justices, began by examining whether the Yakima Nation has the authority, derived either from its treaty with the United States or from its status as an independent sovereign, to zone the fee lands. Brendale, supra, 109 S.Ct. at 3003. Justice White rejected the argument that the treaty with the Yakimas, which provided that the land retained by the Yakima Nation `shall be set apart ... for the exclusive use and benefit' of the Tribe, and no `white man, excepting those in the employment of the Indian Department, [shall] be permitted to reside upon the said reservation without permission of the tribe,' was the source for the tribe's authority over the fee lands. Brendale, supra [quoting 12 Stat. 951, 952]. To support his conclusion, Justice White relied on Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981), in which the Court held that the Crow Tribe had no authority to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on fee land within the reservation. Justice White determined that, because of the tribe's subsequent alienation of land to nonmembers through sale and inheritance under the Indian General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388, any regulatory power the tribe might have under the treaty could not apply to lands held in fee by non-Indians. Justice White also found that the tribe derived no authority to zone the fee lands from its inherent sovereignty because inherent sovereignty is divested to the extent it is inconsistent with the tribe's dependent status, that is, to the extent it involves a tribe's `external relations.' Brendale, supra, 109 S.Ct. at 3005 [quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 1087, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978) ]. Because express congressional delegation is required under these circumstances, and none was asserted, Justice White concluded that the tribe had no authority under the general principle enunciated in Montana  for zoning any of the fee lands at issue. Brendale, supra, 109 S.Ct. at 3007. Justice White then considered the Montana opinion's two exceptions to the general principle. First, `[a] tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.' 450 U.S., at 565, 101 S.Ct., at 1257. Second, `[a] tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.' Id. [450 U.S.] at 566, 101 S.Ct., at 1258. Brendale, supra . The parties agreed that the first exception did not apply, and Justice White rejected the Tribe's argument that it had authority to zone under the second Montana exception. Justice White concluded that the tribe could not complain or obtain relief against every use of fee land that has some adverse effect on the tribe. The impact must be demonstrably serious and must imperil the political integrity, economic security or the health and welfare of the tribe. Brendale, supra, 109 S.Ct. at 3008. Justice White concluded that the county's zoning of the open area of the reservation imperiled no interests of the tribe and therefore the tribe had no authority to zone fee lands in that area. With regard to the closed area, Justice White would have remanded to the lower court to determine if county zoning in that area imperiled any protectable tribal interests. Justice White's opinion for the plurality gave wide sway to state regulatory authority, in the form of county zoning, on that reservation. Justice Stevens, joined by one other justice, determined that the tribe's power to exclude nonmembers from its reservation derived not only from its treaty with the United States, but from its aboriginal sovereignty. Brendale, supra, 109 S.Ct. at 3010. According to Justice Stevens, this power of exclusion necessarily must include the lesser power to regulate land use in the interest of protecting the tribal community, and resolution of the case was dependent on the extent to which the Tribe's virtually absolute power to exclude has been either diminished by federal statute or voluntarily surrendered by the Tribe itself. Brendale, supra, 109 S.Ct. at 3009. Justice Stevens concluded that, under the specific facts, the tribe had authority to zone fee lands in the closed area of the reservation, reasoning that: [N]otwithstanding the transfer of a small percentage of allotted land the Tribe retains its legitimate interest in the preservation of the character of the reservation. The Tribe's power to control the use of discrete, fee parcels of the land is simply incidental to its power to preserve the character of what remains almost entirely a region reserved for the exclusive benefit of the Tribe. Brendale, supra, 109 S.Ct. at 3014. Justice Stevens also determined, however, that because the tribe had alienated about one-half of the land in the open area and no longer had the power to exclude nonmembers from a large portion of this area, it also lacks the power to define the essential character of the territory. Brendale, supra, 109 S.Ct. at 3015. Justice Stevens therefore concluded that the tribe had no authority to zone fee land in the open area. Where the Tribe's power to exclude had been diminished or surrendered, the state's regulatory power in the form of county zoning was sustained. Justice Blackmun, joined by two other justices, interpreted the Montana decision as recognizing the inherent authority of tribes to exercise civil jurisdiction over non-Indian activities on tribal reservations where those activities, as they do in the case of land use, implicate a significant tribal interest. Brendale, supra, 109 S.Ct. at 3018. Once the tribe's valid regulatory interest is established, according to Justice Blackmun, the nature of land ownership does not diminish the tribe's inherent power to regulate in the area. Brendale, supra, 109 S.Ct. at 3022. Justice Blackmun therefore concluded that the tribe had zoning authority over all the lands within its reservation. Brendale, supra, 109 S.Ct. at 3026. Justice Blackmun then addressed whether the county had concurrent zoning authority with the tribe over the areas in question. Justice Blackmun noted that a state can exercise concurrent jurisdiction over non-Indian activities on a reservation unless its authority is pre-empted by federal law or unless it infringes on the tribe's right to make their own laws and be ruled by them. Brendale, supra, 109 S.Ct. at 3026. Applying this test, Justice Blackmun stated that [w]hen it is determined that the tribe, which is the one entity that has the power to zone trust lands, also has the power to zone fee lands, the inherent unworkability of concurrent zoning requires the conclusion that the tribe's power to zone, once it chooses to exercise that power, is exclusive. Brendale, supra, 109 S.Ct. at 3027. Justice Blackmun therefore concluded that the county was without authority to zone the fee lands in both the closed and open areas of the reservation. State regulation of non-Indian activities, according to Justice Blackmun's minority view, must yield to the Tribe's inherent power to control and zone land use within the reservation, a valid regulatory interest of the tribe. Although there was no majority consensus on the rationale to support the result reached in Brendale, the decision underscores the importance of particular facts in determining whether a state may regulate non-Indian activities within an Indian reservation.