Opinion ID: 5288
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Use and possession

Text: The district court felt compelled to apply section 3583(g) because its determination based on the laboratory analysis that Courtney used crack cocaine ineluctably led to the conclusion that he possessed the substance. Courtney complains that he need not be found to be in possession of an illegal substance based on the mere evidence of a positive drug test. He argues that a positive result might be evidence of use but one could not conclude that this evidence of use required a finding of possession. Therefore, the district court had the choice of only finding use and applying section 3583(e)2 while avoiding the requirements of section 3583(g). In determining Courtney's complaints, we review the district court's interpretation of the statutes de novo. United States v. Headrick, 963 F.2d 777, 779 (5th Cir. 1992). Courtney relies on United States v. Blackston, 940 F.2d 877 2 Section 3583(e) provides in part that: The Court may . . . (1) terminate a term of supervised release and discharge the person released at any time after the expiration of one year of supervised release . . . (2) extend a term of supervised release if less than the maximum authorized term was previously imposed, and may modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of supervised release . . . (3) revoke a term of supervised release, and require the person to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release without credit for time previously served on postrelease supervision . . . (4) order the person to remain at his place of residence during nonworking hours . . . . 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). 5 (3d Cir. 1991), for the proposition that there exists a distinction between use and possession, and that although evidence of the former can serve as a basis for finding the latter, the district court is not required to conclude that the use constituted possession. The Blackston court found such a distinction based on the overall structure of section 3583. This section requires as a condition of supervised release that the defendant not possess illegal controlled substances. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). This section also makes reference to 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(8) which authorizes courts to order as a condition of supervised release that the defendant refrain from . . . any use of a narcotic drug or other controlled substance . . . without a prescription by a licensed medical practitioner. We disagree that these two supervised release conditions create a meaningful distinction for purposes of § 3583(e) & (g) between use and possession of a controlled substance. As the Blackston court notes, possession, as used in criminal offense statutes, has a settled meaning of actual physical control or of the power and the intent to exercise dominion or control. Id. at 883. It is further settled that in this context possession must be knowing. See FIFTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL CASES, INSTRUCTION NO. 1.31 (West 1990). The Blackston court does not define use but merely states that use and possession are somehow different. Id. at 884. The court exhaustively reviews the legislative history behind section 3583(g) and finds it inconclusive on this issue. Id. at 884-86. In addition, the court 6 acknowledges that other federal circuits have uniformly found use to necessarily require possession. Id. at 887-88. See, United States v. Dillard, 910 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Graves, 914 F.2d 159, 161 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Kindred, 918 F.2d 485, 487 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Ramos-Santiago, 925 F.2d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1991). The act of simple knowing possession of a controlled substance is a federal criminal offense. 21 U.S.C. § 844.3 There is no federal statutory provision which in terms criminalizes use or consumption of a controlled substance. However, it is not a defense to an otherwise established simple possession offense that the defendant did not possess the substance because he merely used or consumed it. United States v. Schocket, 753 F.2d 336, 340 (4th Cir. 1985) (defendant had possession over the cocaine since he had the ability to use it, remove it, and therefore to exercise dominion and control over the substance) (italics added). Had Congress chosen to separately criminalize use and simple possession, then the argument would be stronger that use is separately defined from simple possession with separate legal elements. But, under the present statutory scheme for criminal offenses, use is subsumed within possession. This conclusion would still exclude passive inhalation from 3 Section 844(a) provides in relevant part that: It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled substance unless such substance was obtained directly, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order, from a practitioner, while acting in the course of his professional practice . . . . 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). 7 both possession and use. Possession requires the knowing exercise of dominion or control. Similarly, in a sentencing or revocation context it is clear that use requires knowing and voluntary ingestion. But once the court finds a substance has been voluntarily and knowingly ingested, then, at least in almost any imaginable circumstance, it necessarily follows that the defendant has possessed the substance. In short, there is no use exception to possession: if one knowingly and voluntarily exercises dominion and control over a substanceSQas by putting it in one's mouth and swallowing it knowing what it isSQone possesses it, and this conclusion is in no way altered by the fact that the same facts may constitute one's use of the substance. By the same token, it would not, for sentencing or supervised release purposes, be either use or possession if one believed the ingested substance was some other (non-controlled) substance or ingested it involuntarily or unknowingly. If evidence establishes that a positive result from a drug test is at a level such that passive inhalation or similar phenomenon may not reasonably account for it, then the district court may find that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily had, alone or jointly with others, actual physical control over the drug, or the power and intent to exercise dominion or control over it, and was hence in possession of it.4 The district court may 4 This holding is in accord with the Sentencing Commission which in Application Note 5 to Guidelines § 7B1.4 states that it leaves to the court the determination of whether evidence of drug usage established solely by laboratory analysis constitutes 'possession of a controlled substance' as set forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3565(a) and 3583(g). Id. (emphasis added). The Ninth 8 ordinarily rely solely on this evidence,5 but being the trier of fact, its duty, of course, is to draw the appropriate inferences and determine factual contentions and whom to believe. Hall v. United States, 404 F.2d 1368, 1369 (10th Cir. 1969). Jackson's undisputed and unobjected to testimony established that the two positive tests for cocaine were the result of two separate incidents of cocaine inhalation and that the positive results contained at least 300 nanograms per milliliter of cocaine metabolite.6 But, there was no evidence as to the significance of a 300 (or more) nanogram reading, as distinguished from any other Circuit has also recognized that the Sentencing Commission explicitly grants to the district court discretion to determine whether positive laboratory analyses evidences possession. United States v. Baclaan, 948 F.2d 628, 630 (9th Cir. 1991). This also accords with cases decided under 18 U.S.C. § 3565, the counterpart to section 3583(g), for probation revocation. Section 3565 also requires revocation for possession of a controlled substance. Under this section, courts have determined that a positive result from laboratory analysis supports a finding of possession. United States v. Gordon, 961 F.2d 426 (3rd Cir. 1992); United States v. Granderson, 969 F.2d 980 (11th Cir. 1992). 5 Here there appears to exist evidence corroborating the positive laboratory analyses. The district court could take into account Courtney's prior use of the drug and his drug addiction, his admission that he did not take seriously Jackson's warning to avoid drug users, and his inconsistent explanations concerning the alleged passive inhalation. An admission by the defendant is not required. 6 Jackson's testimony established that cocaine will only cause a positive result within seventy-two hours of ingestion. Tests were taken on July 1, and July 9, which are periods that are more than seventy-two hours apart. Therefore, the district court could have determined from the evidence that Courtney was exposed to cocaine from two separate incidents. See, United States v. Kindred, 918 F.2d 485, 486-87 (5th Cir. 1990) (allowing as evidence the admission of urinalysis tests in a probation revocation hearing through the testimony of a probation officer). 9 positive reading, or whether it, or any other aspect of the test results, were such as could not reasonably be accounted for by passive inhalation.7 The district court, in finding that the level of cocaine metabolite from the urinalysis tests could not be the result of passive inhalation, merely relied, sua sponte, on his general recollection of unspecified testimony, in unidentified prior cases from unidentified witnesses, that only a maximum of 100 nanograms per milliliter of cocaine can result from passive inhalation. In this respect, the district court erred. Revocation hearings are not formal trials and the usual rules of evidence need not be applied. See Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(2); Kindred, 918 F.2d at 486-87. Nevertheless, the district court here simply went an informality too far. Unspecified testimony by unidentified witnesses in unidentified prior cases may properly form no material part of the preponderance of the evidence on which the district court must base its section 3583(e) decision, and critical reliance thereon 7 In an analogous Texas state court case, the trial court revoked the defendant's probation for possession of marihuana based solely on a positive urine sample. Brown v. State, 760 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Ct. App.SQTyler 1988). The defendant argued that the positive result was caused by passive smoke inhalation. The appellate court upheld the revocation relying on the expert testimony indicating that the positive test result required a level of at least 100 nanograms per milliliter and that passive inhalation of marijuana smoke would not produce a result of 100 nanograms per milliliter. Id. at 749. The court concluded that the State established by a preponderance of the evidence that Brown violated the laws of this State by possessing a usable quantity of marihuana since Brown's urine tested positive for marihuana at a level greater than is found for passive inhalation. Id. at 750. 10 denies the defendant the character of hearing contemplated by Rule 32.1(a)(2) and prevents this courtSQwhich has nothing before it (either as part of anything includable in the record below or otherwise) tending to indicate that test results positive for cocaine with levels of not less than 100 (or any other number of) nanograms may not be accounted for by passive inhalationSQfrom meaningful exercise of its duty of review. On remand, the district court should have a proper record basis for concluding that a positive result on the tests may not reasonably be accounted for by passive inhalation. This could be adequately established through expert testimony, or by the probation officer's testimony, see Kindred, 918 F.2d at 487, or perhaps through judicial notice based on an adequately developed foundation and prior notice and opportunity to rebut. See Rule 32.1(a)(2) & Fed. Rule Evid. 201. If such a record is developed, then the district court needs to determine if Courtney voluntarily and knowingly ingested the cocaine and thus possessed it. If so, the district court must apply section 3583(g). Kindred, 918 F.2d at 488 (holding once possession is found, the district court had no alternative but to revoke his supervised release under § 3583(g)).