Opinion ID: 867236
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Exclusion of Diary Evidence

Text: ¶ 40 Dixon argues that the trial court erroneously excluded an entry from Deana's diary, which he claims stated that she had been sexually assaulted in Europe and would fight back if assaulted again. Dixon argues that the evidence should have been admitted under Arizona Rule of Evidence 803(3) to show that his sexual contact with her was consensual, as she likely would have forcibly resisted an assault. ¶ 41 Before trial, Dixon moved in limine to allow evidence that Deana was sexually active. This motion did not mention the diary or the trip to Europe. The court denied the motion, citing the rape shield law, A.R.S. § 13-1421(A) (2010). ¶ 42 At trial, after Dixon asked Deana's mother about the diary, the prosecutor sought to exclude evidence from the diary on relevance and hearsay grounds. Dixon responded that he wanted to elicit the information from Deana's boyfriend, and added, I doubt seriously I will use the diary itself. The court ruled that Dixon could inquire about a witness's first-hand knowledge of Deana's state of mind, but not about what was in the diary. ¶ 43 Dixon then claimed for the first time that the diary referred to a sexual assault in Europe, and the court stated that it had ruled under the rape shield law that her sexual activity or conduct is irrelevant, immaterial, and specifically excluded by statute unless you can fit it into one of the narrowly defined exceptions under the rule. You haven't given me a reason why this should now come in. Whether you call it an experience, a rape, a molestation, whether you call it consensual activity, whatever you call it, it's still sexual conduct under the statute. The judge subsequently allowed Dixon to ask Deana's boyfriend if she carried a knife for personal protection. ¶ 44 The State contends that Dixon did not preserve any objection to exclusion of evidence from the diary because the record does not disclose what the document actually says. See Ariz. R. Evid. 103(a)(2) (requiring offer of proof to preserve objection to exclusion of evidence); State v. Towery, 186 Ariz. 168, 179, 920 P.2d 290, 301 (1996) (requiring, [a]t a minimum, an offer of proof stating with reasonable specificity what the evidence would have shown). We agree. Although Dixon and counsel discussed what they claimed was in the diary, no offer of proof was made, nor was the diary marked for identification. We thus have no basis for determining precisely what evidence was excluded. ¶ 45 Even had the issue been properly preserved for appeal, and assuming the contents of the diary were as Dixon claimed, however, we would find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling. See State v. Villalobos, 225 Ariz. 74, 82, ¶ 33, 235 P.3d 227, 235 (2010) (rulings excluding evidence are reviewed for abuse of discretion). The alleged statements had minimal probative value. Deana's state of mind years before the murder hardly establishes that she surely would or could have used a knife or other weapon to prevent this assault. ¶ 46 The diary evidence was also properly excluded under the rape shield law, which categorically prohibits evidence of a victim's reputation for chastity, and allows evidence of instances of the victim's prior sexual conduct only in limited circumstances not applicable here. A.R.S. § 13-1421(A). ¶ 47 Dixon argues that a prior sexual assault is not prior sexual conduct because a sexual assault is a crime of violence, and thus also does not reflect on the victim's chastity. The majority view, however, is that sexual assaults qualify as sexual conduct under rape shield laws. See Grant v. Demskie, 75 F.Supp.2d 201, 211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (collecting cases). We agree; it would be anomalous to protect rape victims from questions about prior consensual conduct, but subject them to cross-examination about assaults. Cf. State v. Oliver, 158 Ariz. 22, 27, 760 P.2d 1071, 1076 (1988) (applying common law rape shield doctrine to child molestation victims).