Opinion ID: 1191734
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Public peace, health or safety much narrower than general police power

Text: The majority's basic fallacy is its assertion that public peace, health or safety means the same as anything the Legislature is authorized to do under its broad police power. Majority at 1065. The question of whether an act is necessary for the immediate preservation of public peace, health or safety is often expressed in shorthand as whether the Act is an emergency. Common sense dictates that a tax, much less a stadium, is not an emergency, at least in the sense of being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, [or] support of the state government and its existing public institutions. Even the majority admits that losing a major league baseball franchise cannot be said to be an emergency of apocalyptic dimensions. Majority at 1067. Moreover, this Act does not legally prohibit that loss in any event. The test as to whether or not a statute is within the police power is much broader than the test as to whether the statute fits within the narrow exception of the referendum clause. If the question of whether the statute falls within the police power were the same as whether or not the statute is subject to referendum, we would never have a referendum to consider since, as a general matter, the state may not constitutionally legislate beyond its police power in any event. Washington Kelpers Ass'n v. State, 81 Wash.2d 410, 502 P.2d 1170 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982, 93 S.Ct. 2274, 36 L.Ed.2d 959 (1973). Contrary to the majority's claim, we have consistently held that the emergency exception is much narrower than the police power. For example, in State ex rel. Case v. Howell we explained, the [emergency] exception does not extend to all things touching the general welfare. It does not extend to things relating to mere public expediency or public convenience. It is not as broad as the police power, which is so broad and so variant with time and circumstance that its limits cannot be defined.[ [10] ] Howell 85 Wash, at 285, 147 P. 1162. State ex rel. Robinson v. Reeves, 17 Wash.2d 210, 135 P.2d 75, 146 A.L.R. 280 (1943) struck down the emergency clause in a statute that was passed to purchase several large utility companies. There we explained `[p]romotion of the public welfare' is not a criterion by which we may be guided in determining whether or not an emergency exists which defeats the right to refer the Act to the peopleโthis, very simply, because it is not a criterion set up in ง 1(b) of the seventh amendment. Id. at 217, 135 P.2d 75. Instead, the court [r]evert[ed] to the constitutional provision and required that the law go directly to the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety. Id. at 215, 216, 135 P.2d 75. [11] And, indeed, acquiring public utilities is more akin to the proper role of government than imposing a tax to perhaps build a baseball stadium [12] by what appellants characterize as the confiscation of property to assist private corporations or enterprises, (quoting Journal of the Washington State Constitutional Convention 1889 at 682 (B. Rosenow ed. 1962) (quoting J.Z. Moore)). Appellants Amended Br. at 20. [13] We have held [p]eace, health and safety..... refer to perils which may beset the state or its citizens.... State ex rel. Blakeslee v. Clausen, 85 Wash. 260, 274, 148 P. 28 (1915). In 1945, State ex rel. Kennedy v. Reeves, 22 Wash.2d 677, 681, 157 P.2d 721 explained the intended scope of the emergency exception: During a legislative session, it might appear that legislation was immediately required to avert immediate danger to the public peace. An epidemic of vast proportions might be threatening the public health, or some great catastrophe might require immediate relief. The amendment, wisely and indeed necessarily, guarded against such contingencies.... The true definition of the phrase necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, to which we have long adhered, is its ordinary, obvious one. I cannot stretch the ordinary meaning of these words far enough to honestly conclude that this tax is truly necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, for the immediate preservation of public safety, or for the preservation of public health. The constitutional exception to referendum is not so infinitely broad that this Act and almost everything else will fit within it.