Opinion ID: 1898475
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the Prosecution Impermissibly Comment on Defendant's Failure to Testify?

Text: Under this assignment, Monroe argues that the assistant district attorney made what amounted to an impermissible comment on his failure to testify when cross-examining accomplice Jethro Jones. Jones, who prior to Monroe's trial had been convicted of robbery, did not testify in his own trial but took the stand on behalf of Monroe. Monroe points to this exchange: Q. It's a yes or no question. Do you have a problem taking the stand, taking an oath and telling people what happened over there? A. Oh, no, mam. Q. So I guess you would have taken the stand and taken the oath and told all those people who were the jury in your own trial, isn't that right, Jethro? A. Pardon? Q. I guess you would have no problem taking the stand, taking an oath and telling the Jury in your own trial what happened, isn't that right? A. Well, my lawyer didn't want me to take the stand. Q. Oh, your lawyer didn't want you to take the stand. You didn't get up there and testify in your own trial, did you? A. No, mam, I didn't. Q. Does your lawyer want you to take the stand today? A. Does he want me to take the stand today? Q. Right. A. Well, this isn't the same lawyer that I got. Q. Does your lawyer want you to take the stand today? A. Well, he advised me that, you know, of my rights, you know, about it. Q. Yes or no, Jethro. Did your lawyer tell you he thought it would be a good idea for you to take the stand today? A. Well, he just advised me of my rights. He said, you know, maybe, you know, something could be `criminating against me, you know. I had the own choice myself. Q. Did he tell you yes or no would it be a good idea for you to testify? A. Well, like I'm saying, he gave me the choice. Q. Well, did your lawyer in your own trial give you a choice? A. Well, he asked me, told me say it would be, you know, to  to my advantage if I didn't take the stand. Q. The lawyer in your own trial advised you the same way that this lawyer did, didn't he? A. He didn't say the same thing. Q. Are you telling the ladies and gentlemen of this Jury that when you sat over there in your own trial the Judge that sat on bench didn't take you aside and say, Jethro, you have the right to testify if you want to.? A. He told me that I had the right to testify if I want to. The Judge did. Here, contemporaneous objection was not made at trial; therefore, this Court could apply our procedural bar to prevent Monroe from arguing this error on appeal. However, this Court has characterized commenting on a defendant's failure to testify as violating an elementary and long established principle of law. West v. State, 485 So.2d 681, 687 (Miss. 1985) (citations omitted). Further, since the criminal defendant's right not to testify on his own behalf is protected by both the State and the United States Constitutions, we are not precluded from reviewing alleged constitutional violations even though defense counsel fails to make contemporaneous objections. Griffin v. State, 504 So.2d 186, 193 (Miss. 1987) We hold that even reaching the merits of Monroe's claim, he cannot prevail. In the recent case of Bridgeforth v. State, 498 So.2d 796, 797 (Miss. 1986), this Court stated: Mississippi Code Annotated, § 13-1-9 (1972), says The accused shall be a competent witness for himself in any prosecution for crime against him. The failure of the accused, in any case, to testify shall not however operate to his prejudice or be commented on by counsel.  (Emphasis added.) This statute was cited as far back as 1893 in the case of Yarbrough v. State, 70 Miss. 593, 12 So. 551 (1893), in which this Court stated: The word comment as employed in the statute, does not mean to criticize or condemn or anathematize the accused on his failure to testify. It forbids, in unmistakable language, any comment, friendly or unfriendly. It forbids any remark, of any character, in any words, upon the failure of the accused to testify. The attention of the jury is not to be called to the fact at all by counsel. Yarbrough, 70 Miss. at 594, 12 So. 551. (Emphasis added.) This rule forbids insinuation and innuendo as well as direct comments. Wilson v. State, 433 So.2d 1142, 1146 (Miss. 1983). Intent might be enough in and of itself, see United States v. Chisem, 667 F.2d 1192, 1195 (5th Cir.1982); see also, United States v. Eiland, 741 F.2d 738 (5th Cir.1984). Objectively, there appears to be no intent here, however, since the prosecution and Monroe's counsel both were under the impression that Monroe was going to testify. Intent to violate the rule is not necessary if the prosecutor's statement can reasonably be construed by a jury as a comment on the defendant's failure to testify. Griffin v. State, 504 So.2d 186, 193 (Miss. 1987); Davis v. Smith, 406 So.2d 795 (Miss. 1981); Reddick v. State, 72 Miss. 1008, 16 So. 490 (1895). Cf. Russell v. State, 506 So.2d 974, 976 (Miss. 1987). The only question here is whether the exchange between the assistant district attorney and Jethro Jones could be construed by a reasonable jury as a comment on Monroe's failure to testify. There can be no question that the comments were directed principally toward Jones. For Monroe to prevail, this Court must find that this questioning also commented on Monroe's failure to testify. In Griffin, 504 So.2d at 193, the Court found no error in the following comment made by the prosecution in closing argument during defendant's trial for murder: ... the defendant's niece. The only person  on voir dire said I said, Tell us who your witnesses are going to be. She's the only name we were given. And why? Why? We found out yesterday, didn't we? Because he had called her and said, Tell him Debra brought the gun out there. And she played along with him. And we found out about it. And we confronted her with it. And she said, Okay, I'll tell the truth. And she took the stand and did. And all of a sudden they don't have that witness any more. That one great witness they told us that they were going to call. We couldn't imagine why they were going to call her. But we found out. If he's so innocent, if that's another witness that didn't have anything to say, why did he bother to call her? Why did he bother to ask her to lie? In Bridgeforth this Court again found no error in allowing the following comment during voir dire: Now I want you all to understand that this trial will not be like the ones you see on TV. So don't expect anyone to jump up in the back of the courtroom and admit to committing the crime. I don't expect that to happen any more than I expect the defendant to confess committing the crime. 498 So.2d at 797 (reversed on other grounds). Though this comment was not reversible error in Bridgeforth, this second comment made during closing argument was: [T]he respectable citizens of DeSoto County don't know what Alonzo Bridgeforth, Jr., does and he (Bridgeforth) doesn't tell the good folks what he does. 498 So.2d 797. Most recently in Russell v. State, 506 So.2d 974, 976 (Miss. 1987), this Court found no reversible error in the following comment made during argument at the close of defendant's trial for gratification of lust: It's time for you to stand up for the system of your community  to take a listen to a child like [the victim]  and not to mention [the victim's sister]. Let them come up here and say [the victim's sister] was lying. All you are left with is what you heard from those two little girls, from their mother and from the police officer who arrested the defendant. And, in all their testimony  The numerous cases cited by Monroe are easily distinguished. All involve either direct comments, or comments in which the prosecuting attorney pointed out to the jury that evidence was not denied or disputed when the only other potential witness would have been the defendant. See Peterson v. State, 357 So.2d 113 (Miss. 1978); Hines v. State, 339 So.2d 56 (Miss. 1976) (proof not denied); Harris v. State, 96 Miss. 379, 50 So. 626 (1909) (same); Smith v. State, 87 Miss. 627, 40 So. 299 (1906) (same); Sanders v. State, 73 Miss. 444, 18 So. 541 (1895); Reddick v. State, 72 Miss. 1008, 16 So. 490 (1985); Wilson v. State, 433 So.2d 1142 (Miss. 1983) (defendant did not explain away state's incriminating evidence); Brown v. State, 340 So.2d 718, 719 (Miss. 1976) (state's proof undisputed); Chatman v. State, 244 Miss. 659, 145 So.2d 707 (1962) (same); Prince v. State, 93 Miss. 263, 46 So. 537 (1908) (uncontradicted out-of-court confession); Harwell v. State, 129 Miss. 858, 93 So. 366 (1922) (direct comment); Gurley v. State, 101 Miss. 190, 57 So. 565 (1912) (same); Yarbrough v. State, 70 Miss. 593, 12 So. 551 (1893) (same). Each case suggesting an improper comment must be decided on its own facts. Peterson v. State, 357 So.2d at 117. We have reviewed the examination of Jethro Jones with great care. While it might be a close question, we think the questioning was a legitimate attempt to impeach Jones' credibility and was not calculated to raise Monroe's silence in the jurors' minds. The questioning does not carry an automatic implication that Monroe has remained silent, and we hold that the questioning cannot reasonably be so construed. This assignment of error is denied.