Opinion ID: 2291751
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Insurance Evidence

Text: Szelenyi next claims that the Superior Court improperly denied his motion in limine to exclude all references to his insurance coverage. This contention requires us to construe M.R.Evid. 411 to determine what discretion the trial court has under the rule to admit or exclude evidence of lack of insurance. By denying Szelenyi's motion in limine, the trial court ultimately allowed in evidence Szelenyi's testimony that he directed that Mrs. Miller not be defibrillated because his malpractice insurance did not cover his treatment of Pineland employees. We hold that under the unusual facts of this case the court's ruling admitting evidence of Szelenyi's lack of insurance was not an abuse of its discretion. Rule 411 states that [e]vidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue whether he acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. The rule, which became effective in 1976, is in accord with Maine law. M.R.Evid. 411 advisers' note, reprinted in Field & Murray, Maine Evidence 135 (1987). Pre-rule Maine case law, cited in the advisers' note, recognizes that the prohibition against insurance evidence is not absolute, that the [d]ecision of whether to permit it ... must repose in the discretion of the presiding Justice, guided by the general standard that it is to be avoided unless extraordinary special circumstances require it. Duguay v. Pomerleau, 299 A.2d 914, 916 (Me.1973). The advisers' note to Rule 411 explicitly recognizes the trial court's discretion to admit or exclude insurance evidence when that evidence is relevant for a purpose other than the issue of liability. M.R.Evid. 411 advisers' note, reprinted in Field & Murray, Maine Evidence 135 (1987). Even when insurance evidence may affect the issue of liability, however, we do not read Rule 411 as a flat prohibition admitting of no discretion whatsoever. Rather, Rule 411 is a codification of the general standard that insurance evidence should be excluded, unless extraordinary special circumstances require it. Duguay, 299 A.2d at 916. The trial court denied the motion in limine and admitted the evidence apparently on the theory that the evidence was admissible for another purpose other than liability in that it explained or provided a motive for Szelenyi's action or lack of action. The court instructed the jury that it could consider the evidence in order to understand the motivation of the parties, but not to determine whether or not somebody is responsible because he might have insurance or might not have insurance. At that time, the court had not bifurcated the case. Thus, the jury could properly consider this evidence in connection with the plaintiffs' section 1983 claims, for which they sought punitive damages. Whether punitive damages should be awarded depends largely on the defendant's motive. Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1361 (Me.1985). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Szelenyi's motion in limine.