Opinion ID: 2265144
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 26

Heading: PENALTY TRIAL CASES INVOLVING c(5)(g) MITIGATING FACTOR

Text: The Baldus Report indicates that the c(5)(g) factor has been charged in five cases prior to the defendant in Martini. The summaries of Felix Diaz' and Richard Redden's cases give no indication of why mitigating factor c(5)(g) was submitted to or found by the jury. In the other cases, however, the records clearly indicate that the threshold requirement of mitigating factor c(5)(g) was satisfied on evidence comparable to that present in the case before the Court. In State v. Miguel Melendez, the defendant was convicted of a contract killing. The defendant had been paid $5,000 for the murder. The victim was killed, in midday, in the presence of his ten year old daughter. Baldus Report, Detailed Narrative Summaries of Death Eligible Cases, Appendix B at 191. In April of 1986, the Essex County Prosecutor's Office had a lead on a suspect in the Cruz (Melendez's victim) murder. The Office contacted Investigator Velazquez and it was arranged for an informant (Luis) to bail out Melendez and engage him in conversation about the murder. Luis was wired to record the conversation. The plan worked and, in conversation with Luis, the defendant incriminated himself. The defendant also provided the first name, ethnicity, and general whereabouts of his partner, Lazaro Trimino. Immediately upon concluding these incriminating remarks, Melendez was placed arrested and placed in custody. At trial, the defense moved for a suppression of the taped conversation and April 11th confession of the defendant. Had the defense succeeded, the State would have been deprived of an assistance the statement provided. The defendant pled not guilty, but called no witnesses at his trial (nor did he testify for himself). There was some argument over the submission of factor c(5)(g). The defense urged a very liberal reading of substantial assistance  the sort of reading rejected by the Court today  including anything that helped in the arrest or indictment of a co-defendant. The State initially resisted, arguing that prosecution was the key to assistance, and Melendez had not assisted in the prosecution of the person who hired him, Trimino. Eventually a stipulation was made about the extent of Melendez's cooperation. Based on the information contained in the April 11, 1986 statement made by Miguel Melendez to Investigator William Velezquez, Lazaro Claro Trimino was arrested and indicted. The defendant, on April 11, 1986, also pointed out to law enforcement officers the apartment building where Mr. Trimino lived in East Orange. Lazaro Claro Trimino subsequently pled guilty to a criminal offense. As to the pointing out of Trimino's house, there is no evidence, in the record, of what this means. Melendez had given the full name of his co-defendant. He did not know the address. The police, however, had a photo of Trimino, who had earlier been held in custody on an unrelated matter. Moreover, the tape recorded conversation with the informant had revealed that the man who had been Melendez's partner was a Cuban named Lazaro. Melendez told the informant that Lazaro lived in East Orange. You know, where unemployment is at.... Up Central Avenue. During Melendez' formal statement to the police, when asked about Trimino's whereabouts, the following colloquy ensued: Q What's the number of the house and the block? A The number, the add ..., I know where he lives, but the number or the name of the street I don't know it. Q You're telling me that you don't know the number or the street where he lives. Do you know how to get to where he lives? A Yes. Presumably, because of the inadequacy of this statement, police thought it necessary to have the defendant show them where Trimino lived. One can only speculate that, at some point on the day of his statement, Melendez was driven up Central Avenue and pointed out Trimino's apartment building. But the question remains, given what they already knew, how much more did this actually add to the police efforts to identify where Trimino lived? The State did not agree, in fact it hotly disputed, the inference that Trimino pled guilty because of the assistance that Melendez had rendered. The trial court submitted factor c(5)(g) to the jury. The defense did not make much of the assistance. In its summation during the penalty phase, the defense effectively repeated the terms of the stipulation and argued that, whatever the motive, this constituted substantial assistance. The prosecutor characterized Melendez's assistance this way: As for any assistance rendered by Mr. Melendez to the State, the assistance rendered is what you got in the stipulation. When the State had him that night, he told on the man who owed him money. He ratted on him that night because he was mad at him. That's it. That's the extent of it. You want to find that that substantially aided the State? That's up to you. The State submits to you that it's not. The transcript of the conversation between the defendant and the informant supports this reading. The defendant was caught red-handed, so angry at Trimino that he was plotting to tie him up and rob him. When caught, he informed on Trimino. Hardly a picture of a compliant defendant aiding the State. In short, the only assistance Melendez rendered was to break down under questioning and admit to the facts presented by the police. Nevertheless, mitigating factor c(5)(g) was presented to and found by the jury. In State v. Michael Rose, A-4874-84T4 (Dec. 18, 1984), transcripts microformed at State Law Library, Box 4551, Reel 6263, the defendant was convicted of the brutal murder of a pregnant woman. Baldus, supra, Appendix B at 265-66. The defendant was convicted after a jury trial. At the penalty phase, the defense argued that Rose had offered substantial assistance to the State in the form of his agreement to aid in the prosecution of another person involved in the crime. That assistance consisted entirely of Rose's confession in which he identified Zoran Cveticanin as the person who had hired him to kill the victim. To the extent that Rose relied on the undue influence of Zoran Cveticanin as an integral part of his defense, the identification of Cveticanin hardly amounted to a major concession on the part of the defendant. Moreover, on the stand, Rose contradicted or retracted much of his confession. Nevertheless, the trial court in Rose permitted a c(5)(g) mitigating factor to go to the jury. In instructing the jury on that factor, the trial court described the relevant inquiry as whether Michael Rose voluntarily agreed to render assistance to the State to aid in the prosecution of other persons involved in the crime. [A-4874-84T4 (Dec. 18, 1984), transcripts microformed at State Law Library, Box 4551, Reel 6263.] Today, the Court, after asserting that Rose rendered substantially greater cooperation to the State than did Martini then proceeds to cite from the record several appealing facts about Rose's personal history. ( ante at 297, 619 A. 2d at 1271) These are utterly irrelevant to the issue of cooperation to the State, though they do mention Rose being helpful to neighbors. It is important to remember that, in Rose, the defendant was convicted of the brutal murder of a female victim. The victim was in an advanced state of pregnancy at the time and had died from a total of eighty-three stab wounds. The defendant had been paid $60 to murder his victim. How far different a person ( Ante at 298, 619 A. 2d at 1271) was Michael Rose from John Martini? Regardless of how one answers that question, it is totally irrelevant to the issue of defendant's cooperation to the State under the c(5)(g) factor. A review of the record in Rose supports the contention that defendant's assistance in this case was comparable to that provided by Rose. In State v. Di Frisco, 118 N.J. 253, 571 A. 2d 914, the defendant had been arrested, in New York, for various street crimes. While handcuffed to a railing, the defendant asked the arresting officer if there was anything that could be done to avoid jail time. The officer suggested turning over information on other crimes that the defendant might possess. Defendant asked who would be more guilty, the guy who shoots a guy or the guy who pays him to shoot a guy? The officer replied, the guy who pays him to shoot the guy. Defendant then waived his rights and confessed to the murder. DiFrisco pled guilty to murder and waived his right to a jury for the penalty trial. The trial court, finding that aggravating factors outweighed mitigating factors, sentenced the defendant to death. This Court, in reversing the defendant's death sentence, did so based on the absence of extrinsic evidence corroborating defendant's confession that he had been hired by a third party, and remanded the matter for retrial. In assessing mitigating factors, the trial court found that the defendant had rendered substantial assistance to the State. The assistance rendered by the defendant consisted of his implicating the person who had paid him (a Mr. Franciotti). The prosecutor suggested that the defendant call Franciotti. Defendant initially agreed but, after speaking with his father, decided not to make the call until defendant spoke with counsel. The prosecutor told the defendant that this was his last chance to cooperate because his arrest would be made public and he would not be given the chance to cooperate. The defendant decided not to cooperate and remained in jail. At the penalty phase, the State indicated that it had not presented a case against Franciotti to a grand jury. It did not have a pending prosecution against Franciotti and had not sought the cooperation of the defendant in prosecuting Franciotti. The trial court expressed perplexity at that, but the prosecutor explained that the evidence was insufficient and that the defendant had refused to cooperate. Although the prosecutor insisted that the defendant had refused further cooperation, although there was no corroborating evidence of the Franciotti's involvement, although no indictment ever issued from the information the defendant had provided, still the finder of fact was able to conclude that the threshold for mitigating factor c(5)(g) had been met. Justice O'Hern described the defendant's cooperation with the State as a play[ing] cat and mouse with the police. He would lead them to the bait, then withdraw it. Di Frisco, supra, 118 N.J. at 280, 571 A. 2d at 928. For affirmance in part; for vacation and remandment in part; for reversal in part  Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD, POLLOCK, GARIBALDI and STEIN  5. For reversal  Justices HANDLER and O'HERN  2.