Opinion ID: 2566670
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Ex Post Facto/Due Process

Text: {26} Defendants Gonzales and Montoya also argue that even if we conclude that the legislature intended to give HB 117 the force of law, then nonetheless this Court may not retroactively apply that decision to these Defendants consistent with the state and federal constitutions. They contend that the HB278 (repealing HB117) was in effect between July 1, 2003 and the effective date of any opinion from this Court to the contrary, and therefore it would be unconstitutional to apply any law other than HB 278 to their sentencing. This argument does not persuade us. {27} At the time Defendants committed their crimes, in each case between March 28 and July 1, 2003, HB 117 and its harsher penalty provisions for repeat DWI offenses was undeniably in effect in New Mexico. Thus, the prohibition against ex post facto laws in Article II, Section 19 of the New Mexico Constitution is not at issue here, because HB 117 went into effect immediately under its emergency clause. {28} Defendants also are wrong to complain that applying the increased penalties deprives them of a right of fair warning consistent with their rights to due process. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 455, 121 S.Ct. 1693, 149 L.Ed.2d 697 (2001) (due process prohibits retroactive application of any judicial construction of a criminal statute [that] is unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which has been expressed prior to the conduct in issue) (internal quotation marks and quoted authority omitted). Defendants rely on Devine v. New Mexico Department of Corrections, 866 F.2d 339 (10th Cir.1989), which reviewed this Court's decision in Quintana, 100 N.M. 224, 668 P.2d 1101. In Quintana, we examined the effect of two acts passed in the same legislative session amending parole eligibility requirements. One enactment repealed a 1955 law that made prisoners serving a life sentence eligible for parole after serving ten years, and instead provided that capital felons must serve a minimum of 30 years. Another enactment, passed later that same day, amended the 1955 law by enacting a victim restitution law, but restated the same parole eligibility requirements as the 1955 law prior to amendment. Seeking to take advantage of that perceived inconsistency, one prisoner argued that under Section 12-1-8, when two acts of the same legislative session conflict, the statute enacted last repeals the previous enactment. Quintana, 100 N.M. at 226, 668 P.2d at 1103. {29} In response, this Court held that the legislature intended to provide stricter parole eligibility requirements because the first act repealed the 1955 law, while the second law merely amended it, and thus the first act was in effect when the defendant committed his crime. Id. at 226-27, 668 P.2d at 1103-04. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that our decision upholding the stricter parole eligibility requirements violated the due process clause, because it applied retroactively without providing fair notice. See Devine, 866 F.2d at 339. {30} Devine was driven by special facts. The notice issue in Devine involved a defendant's ability to be fully informed of the consequences of a guilty plea. The Tenth Circuit concluded that at the time the defendant entered his guilty plea, he had no indication from the official compilation of statutes that the mandatory prison term was thirty years and not ten years. Id. at 345. Thus, this Court's decision in Quintana was unforeseeable to the defendant negotiating his plea, and its retroactive application violated due process. Id. (stating that a decision is unforeseeable if it is unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue (internal quotation marks and quoted authority omitted)). {31} Unlike the situation in Devine, however, it is entirely foreseeable that the penalty provisions of HB 117 applied to these Defendants. Not only were the increased penalty provisions in force at the time Defendants committed their repeat DWI offenses, but Defendants had additional notice not present in Devine, 866 F.2d 339. In Devine, the last law signed by the governor, restating the easier parole eligibility requirements, was set forth in the 1978 compilation, and the conflicting act providing stricter parole requirements was only mentioned in the compiler's notes. Id. at 340, 345. The Tenth Circuit concluded that this oblique reference was unforeseeable. Id. at 345. {32} In contrast, all three amendments to Section 66-8-102 were noted and printed in the compilation. In full compliance with due process requirements, HB 117 was enacted in a public forum before Defendants committed their crime, published in the session laws, and set forth in full in the New Mexico Statutes Annotated. Therefore, Defendants had adequate notice that the increased penalty provisions controlled their sentences.