Opinion ID: 460324
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Testimony Concerning the Statements of Chester Sala

Text: 80 Each of the appellants has advanced the argument that one Chester Sala had committed the crimes of which they stood accused. They proffered the testimony of Agnes Williams and her son Leslie, that Sala, who had been the boyfriend of Agnes Williams' daughter Kathy, had stated that he intended to rob the Cal-Ed Credit Union, and the Finleyville and Bentleyville banks. The district court sustained the prosecutor's objection to the proffered evidence on the ground that it was inadmissible hearsay. It did, however, allow one member of the Williams family to testify that the driver of the green pickup truck on the day of the Cal-Ed robbery looked like Sala, and that she had seen Sala hiding in the bushes in the vicinity of the robbery shortly after the police chase. The court agreed to issue a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum to enable the defendants to produce Sala, then an inmate at the Rockview (Pa.) State Correctional Institution, for examination concerning his role in the robberies, but stated that it would forbid impeachment of Sala through the introduction of the Williams' testimony regarding his alleged statements. The defendants then elected not to call him. 81 Appellants contend that the district court erred in not permitting the statements to come in under Fed.R.Evid. 803(3) which provides for the admissibility as an exception to the hearsay rule of statements of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design ...). 24 See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 12 S.Ct. 909, 36 L.Ed. 706 (1892); Advisory Committee Notes on Proposed Rule 803(3); McCormick on Evidence Sec. 271 at 577-78. We agree that evidence of the statements, which would have corroborated earlier evidence linking Sala to the crime, should have been admitted. The erroneous exclusion of the statements was harmless, however. There is no reason to believe that the inference suggested by the statements--namely, that Sala was also involved in the robberies--would have altered the outcome of their trials. Sala might have been the second robber at Finleyville, the fourth at Bentleyville, or the driver of the getaway car at Cal-Ed. Establishing Sala's complicity in these robberies would in no way establish the innocence of any of the appellants. Moreover, as the district court noted, evidence did come in linking Sala to the Cal-Ed robbery. The exclusion of further evidence linking Sala to these crimes did not prejudice defendants. 25 82 Finally, appellants object to the district court's ruling under Fed.R.Evid. 607, that they would not be permitted to impeach Sala by the testimony from the Williams. Assuming that they have standing to raise this issue even though they decided not to call Sala, cf. Luce v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984) ([To] raise and preserve for review the claim of improper impeachment with a prior conviction, a defendant must testify), the district court was correct to rule that, if Sala testified, his testimony could not be impeached by the Williams' testimony, for when appellants moved to subpoena Chester Sala, they did so with the expectation that he would deny making such statements to the Williams. The express purpose for calling Sala was thus to impeach him with the Williams' testimony, thereby providing the jury with the details and substance of Sala's alleged prior inconsistent statements. It is well established, however, that witnesses may not be called for the purposes of circumventing the hearsay rule by means of Rule 607. See United States v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.1984). See also United States v. Miller, 664 F.2d 94, 97 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854, 103 S.Ct. 121, 74 L.Ed.2d 106; United States v. DeLillo, 620 F.2d 939, 946 (2d Cir.1980); Whitehurst v. Wright, 592 F.2d 834, 839 (5th Cir.1979); United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 497 (8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918, 97 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 229) (1977); United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 190 (4th Cir.1975).