Opinion ID: 3014074
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Liability for the negligence of 10.

Text: Whether the government owed a duty Kotor’s supervisors and coworkers to Matsko must be resolved under the The District Court also dismissed law of Pennsylvania, because that is Matsko’s claim that the United States was where the incident occurred. See 28 (continued...) 6 As in Sheridan, this duty is entirely and were mere bystanders by virtue of the separate from any respondeat superior fact that the MSHA offices were an open claim for Kotor’s actions. Therefore, even floor plan. Because Matsko has if the United States cannot be held liable sufficiently alleged that the MSHA for Kotor’s actions based on its status as employees were acting within the scope of his employer, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), it may their employment, and it is at least be without sovereign immunity for arguable that they were negligent,11 the negligence by other MSHA employees, District Court erred by holding that the who were within the scope of their own FTCA did not waive sovereign immunity. employment, in not stopping the injurious The question of actual negligence should behavior. Sheridan, 487 U.S. at 402-03. be resolved on the merits, rather than in a jurisdictional challenge.12 See Mortensen As discussed in the prior section, it is clear that Kotor was acting outside the scope of his employment. Taking 11. One could question whether the United Matsko’s allegations as true, however, States, by and through the MSHA under § 228 the other MSHA employees officers, knew that Kotor had a were within their scope of employment at propensity for violence or whether the the time Matsko was attacked. Kotor’s MSHA officials had time to intervene to su p ervisors and cow orkers we re stop Kotor. Under the uncontested facts, performing their jobs to further the however, M atsko has sufficiently MSHA’s mission at the time of the assault, pleaded the existence of the duty, breach, and causation elements of his negligence claim. 10. (...continued) 12. U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). In Pennsylvania, The parties disagree about whether it the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 was appropriate for the District Court to makes a possessor of land liable to consider factual issues before the invitees to his property for “physical government had filed an answer. harm caused by the accidental, negligent, Compare Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & or intentionally harmful acts of third Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891-92 (3d persons.” Moran v. Valley Forge Drive- Cir. 1977) (noting that a “12(b)(1) In Theater, Inc., 246 A.2d 875, 878 (Pa. factual evaluation may occur at any stage 1968). in the proceedings, from the time the Contrary to the government’s answer has been served”) (emphasis argument, Matsko’s negligence claim is added) with Berardi v. Swanson Mem’l not a subterfuge to mask an otherwise Lodge No. 48, 920 F.2d 198, 200 (3d Cir. precluded claim. Matsko’s premises 1990). We need not resolve this issue, liability theory does not stem from because on the record before us, we have negligent hiring, training, or supervision, no indication that facts pertinent to the but arises solely out of the § 344 duty. (continued...) 7 v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 892 (3d Cir. 1977) (“it is incumbent upon the trial judge to demand less in the way of jurisdictional proof than would be appropriate at a trial stage”). We hold, therefore, that the District Court erred by dismissing the claim as barred by the governmental immunity and, accordingly, will reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.