Opinion ID: 1109157
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the trial court erred in overruling the farris motion to dismiss based upon collateral estoppel and lack of jurisdiction.

Text: ¶ 30. Farris argues that this criminal prosecution based on his chancery court awarded fees as guardian ad litem for Diamond will have a chilling effect on the administration of estates, guardianships, and conservatorships throughout this State. He submits that either the Circuit Court of Forrest County lacked jurisdiction to review official activities surrounding the Diamond conservatorship in Pearl River Chancery Court or, since Chancellor Taylor's orders are final, the Forrest County Circuit Court was collaterally estopped from re-litigating the issue of whether the orders were fraudulent or part of a criminal conspiracy. ¶ 31. Article 6, § 159 of the Mississippi Constitution places full jurisdiction of matters testamentary, as well as cases of idiocy, lunacy, persons of unsound mind, and minor's business with the chancery court. Conservatorships are controlled by all laws relative to the guardianship of a minor. Miss.Code Ann. § 93-13-259 (1972). Article 6, Section 157 of the Mississippi Constitution requires that all causes that may be brought in the circuit court where the chancery court has exclusive jurisdiction shall be transferred to the chancery court. ¶ 32. Farris alleges that since no evidence at trial rendered Chancellor Taylor's orders void, Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) requires the district attorney or present conservator to first file a motion against him in chancery court alleging fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct. Miss.Code Ann. § 93-13-77 allows for a petition to be filed in the chancery court alleging fraud and payment for services not rendered. The standard of proof in these proceedings would be clear and convincing evidence. Iuka Guar. Bank v. Beard, 658 So.2d 1367 (Miss.1995). Pointing to the lower probable cause standard of proof necessary for a proper indictment, Farris argues that the prosecutor usurped the proper jurisdiction of the Pearl River County Chancery Court by obtaining a grand jury indictment on a lesser standard of proof. Therefore, Farris submits that Chancellor Taylor's orders approving his fees can't be challenged in the Forrest County Circuit Court. ¶ 33. Rule 60(b) does not mandate that a district attorney or a conservator file a chancery court civil motion in lieu of presenting a criminal indictment to a grand jury. The authority for a Rule 60(b) motion in chancery court alleging fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct does not mean that the higher burden of proving the civil action precludes a district attorney from using the familiar probable cause necessary for a conspiracy indictment. It is simply a non-exclusive civil remedy available to private persons in addition to the criminal powers of the State. This rule does not limit the power of the State to prosecute criminal acts which may also be civil wrongs. It is a fundamental principle of our criminal justice system that a prosecutor is afforded prosecutorial discretion over what charge to bring in any criminal trial. Watts v. State, 717 So.2d 314, 320 (Miss.1998)(citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979)). ¶ 34. We have repeatedly held that orders of a court having competent jurisdiction are presumed valid. Roussel v. Hutton, 638 So.2d 1305, 1319 (Miss.1994)(citing Kirk v. Koch, 607 So.2d 1220, 1223 (Miss. 1992)); see also Vinson v. Johnson, 493 So.2d 947, 949 (Miss.1986); Jackson v. State, 199 Miss. 853, 25 So.2d 483 (1946). While there was a presumption that Chancellor Taylor's orders were facially valid, the prosecution introduced evidence at trial which overcame that rebuttable civil presumption by proving beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury's satisfaction that those orders were part of a criminal conspiracy involving Ike Farris. To the extent Chancellor Taylor's orders played a part in the conspiracy trial, the issue of whether those orders were valid was a question of evidence, not jurisdiction. ¶ 35. Accepting Farris's argument that he was entitled to a higher standard of proof under Rule 60(b) would mandate a holding that chancery courts are the proper forum for all criminal charges related to actions under exclusive chancery jurisdiction. Chancery courts, under Article 6, Section 159, clearly do not have jurisdiction to try criminal matters. This untenable reasoning was not contemplated in Article 6, Section 156, and it is not our duty to implement folly in the law under the guise of strained logic. ¶ 36. We reject Farris's argument on lack of jurisdiction. While it is true that the Mississippi Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction of conservatorships in the chancery court, Article 6, § 156 also vests original jurisdiction for criminal matters in the circuit court. The vesting of jurisdiction for conservatorships in chancery court, simply put, does not preclude circuit court jurisdiction for criminal matters that happen to coincide with civil matters in chancery court, regardless of whether those criminal matters happen to involve a conservator, guardian ad litem, or even a chancellor. To hold otherwise would be to allow chancellors and unethical chancery practitioners insulation under Article 6, § 159, safe in the knowledge that their actions, however corrupt or criminal, could not be reviewed under the circuit court's original jurisdiction of criminal matters in Article 6, § 156. ¶ 37. Farris also argues that his criminal proceedings were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel provides that an issue of ultimate fact which was a valid and final judgment may not be re-litigated between the same parties in a subsequent suit. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). This doctrine is a practical civil extension of the Double Jeopardy Clause in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states that nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put into jeopardy of life or limb.... U.S. Const. amend. V. In State ex rel. Moore v. Molpus, 578 So.2d 624, 642 (Miss.1991), we held that: The public interest in stability and repose is so paramount that collateral estoppel protects competent judgments which are subsequently thought to be erroneous. Where the elements of estoppel have been satisfied, the court's inquiry is not whether the court's order was erroneous, but only that it was the final judgment of the case.... Our law rebuffs subsequent attempts to impeach or attach the initial judgment even where, for example (a) Additional evidence has been discovered, Cotton v. Walker, 164 Miss. 208, 224, 225, 144 So. 45, 47 (1932); (b) The substance of law has [been] incorrectly decided and applied, Fisher v. Browning, 107 Miss. 729, 739 66 So. 132, 136 (1914); or (c) Where constitutional questions have been erroneously decided. (citation omitted & emphasis added) ¶ 38. The elements of collateral estoppel have not been satisfied in the instant case. The district attorney's office did not file a motion to intervene in the conservatorship. The issue tried in the Circuit Court of Forrest County was whether Ike Farris was guilty of conspiring with others to defraud the conservatorship of Jack Diamond. Whether Chancellor Taylor had exclusive jurisdiction to issue orders for attorney fees was a question of civil law, and as such, was independent from the criminal proceedings on the conspiracy indictment. ¶ 39. Collateral estoppel, as a defensive bar, does not apply in this case since the State was not a party to any civil suit against Farris. Moreover, the issues which were adjudicated in chancery court were not the same issues subsequently litigated in the circuit court trial. Finally, a final judgment of conspiracy was certainly not entered in the chancery court matters leading up to the issuance of the indictment. This assignment of error lacks merit.