Opinion ID: 2393443
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Threshold Inquiry

Text: Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals concluded that the pre-trial delay in this case was sufficient to trigger analysis of the Barker factors. That conclusion is correct. However, we note that the Court of Appeals erred in calculating the delay in this case as the time elapsed from the November 12, 2000 date of Porter's arrest [to] his initial trial date, December 9, 2008 and in stating that generally a delay of eight months or longer is presumptively prejudicial, citing State v. Giddens, 280 Ga.App. 586, 587, 634 S.E.2d 526 (2006). Porter, 300 Ga.App. at 129, 684 S.E.2d 299. Where a trial has not occurred, the delay should be calculated from the date of arrest or other formal accusation to the date on which a defendant's speedy trial motion was granted or denied (here, February 11, 2009), rather than any initial date set for the trial. See Ruffin, 284 Ga. at 55, n. 15, 663 S.E.2d 189. Otherwise, delays due to continuances of an original trial date would be excluded regardless of their length or cause. Moreover, the case law from this Court and the United States Supreme Court states that one year, not eight months, generally marks the point at which delay becomes presumptively prejudicial. See id. at 55, 663 S.E.2d 189; Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652, n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2686.