Opinion ID: 524252
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was the DLA Required to Hold a Hearing?

Text: 46 Robinson next argues that, even if the evidence before the DLA established a prima facie case of cause of so serious or compelling a nature that it affects [FHC's] present responsibility, 48 C.F.R. Sec. 9.406-2(c), the company's responsive submissions raised a genuine dispute over facts material to the proposed debarment, see 48 C.F.R. Sec. 9.406-3(b)(2)(i), which entitled it to a hearing. 47 As an initial matter, we note that FHC apparently never requested that the DLA hold a hearing on the issue of its present responsibility; rather, in its submissions to the DLA, it took the position that the trust arrangement, along with the affidavits of its employees, were sufficient to preclude debarment. At oral argument, FHC's counsel took the position that the procurement regulations do not specifically require a contractor to request a hearing, but rather call upon the agency to conduct a hearing if there is a material issue of fact in dispute. Indeed, in its initial notice of proposed debarment, the DLA stated that if FHC's submissions raised a genuine dispute over any material fact, factfinding will be conducted to determine the disputed facts. (Emphasis added.) This ambiguous message could reasonably be understood to promise that a hearing will be held if it is warranted, without the necessity for counsel to make a further request. Because we hold, however (as discussed more fully below), that the DLA was not required to grant even a properly requested hearing in this case, we need not address the questions whether the company was required to make such a request, or whether, assuming it was, the company, by submitting evidence in response to the notice of proposed debarment, adequately voiced its desire for a hearing before any adverse decision. 48 With respect to a hearing on the issue whether the alleged conduct occurred at all, as we have seen, FHC proffered no evidence directly refuting Sherry's statement that Heydt committed the acts alleged; the affidavits of its employees indicated only that they were not aware of any improper conduct. We have already held that the debarring official could reasonably have concluded, taking the company's written evidence as true, that the alleged conduct occurred outside company channels. FHC has not shown how a hearing on this issue would have added anything material to the record before the debarring official. 49 Robinson argues that a hearing was required nonetheless because the company, in its submissions, pointed out several factual inaccuracies and inconsistencies in Sherry's statement. The company's evidence indicated, for example, that (1) the allegedly corrupted contract called for night-time camouflage pants at $50.00 per pair, rather than, as reported by Sherry, day-time pants at $52.00 per pair; and (2) Heydt could not have orchestrated bids in November 1985, as reported by Sherry, since prospective contractors were not informed of the availability of the contract until December 30, 1985. 50 These and the other factual inaccuracies Robinson identifies were insufficient to raise a material issue of fact, one going to the truth of that portion of Sherry's statement that mattered--i.e., his report that Heydt orchestrated bids and paid Sherry $10,000 for his help in obtaining the contract. The inaccuracies noted in the company's affidavits would at best raise a question as to Sherry's memory for minor details. Indeed, the DLA could reasonably have seen Sherry's having recalled that the contract was for camouflage pants, and putting FHC's bid at a price quite close to what the company reports it was, as tending to bolster his credibility. In any event, the minor inaccuracies in Sherry's statement certainly did nothing to impeach either his memory of, or his veracity with respect to, the corrupt transaction by which the contract came to be awarded to FHC. 51 Nor was a hearing required on the question of Sherry's veracity merely because of the possibility that he was motivated by a desire for a lenient sentence. In an analogous context, courts will credit, for purposes of summary judgment under Rule 56, affidavits of corporate officials denying allegations of misconduct that, if true, would describe a criminal violation, see, e.g., Scranton Construction Co. v. Litton Industries Leasing Corp., 494 F.2d 778, 782 (5th Cir.1974) (alleged price fixing and other conspiracies); McCaskill v. Texaco, Inc., 351 F.Supp. 1332, 1340 (S.D.Ala.1972), aff'd, 486 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir.1973) (alleged price fixing conspiracy), although one might equally well speculate that such denial is motivated by a desire to avoid self-incrimination. More generally, it is well settled that a party may not defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment merely by raising generalized questions as to the credibility of the movant's affiants. See, e.g., Schiavone Construction Co. v. Time, Inc., 847 F.2d 1069, 1084 (3d Cir.1988) (a generalized allegation of [an affiant's] self-interest does not suffice to raise a genuine question of material fact ... [;] 'neither a desire to cross-examine an affiant nor an unspecified hope of undermining his or her credibility suffices to avert summary judgment.' ) (quoting National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Argonaut Insurance Co., 701 F.2d 95, 97 (9th Cir.1983)). Cf. Strickland v. Watt, 453 F.2d 393, 394 (9th Cir.1972) (affiant's previous felony conviction did not undermine credibility so as to preclude summary judgment where non-moving party had introduced no evidence to contradict the essential facts stated by affiant). Finally, we note that the statutory penalty for making a false statement to a government agency, see 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001, provided Sherry with a strong disincentive to lie to the investigators when he implicated FHC in bribery and bidrigging. We therefore cannot conclude that the DLA acted unlawfully in finding that FHC had failed to raise a genuine issue as to the veracity of Sherry's statement. 52 Robinson also suggests that FHC was entitled to a hearing on the question whether, assuming Heydt committed the misconduct alleged, the trust arrangement nonetheless rendered the company presently responsible. We have already upheld as reasonable, however, the DLA's conclusion that it could not determine whether placement of the company in Robinson's hands would ensure that Heydt would not again circumvent corporate channels in order illicitly to obtain contracts for FHC. The efficacy of the trust arrangement was in doubt, therefore, because Heydt, by virtue of his beneficial interest, had the same incentive to act illicitly on the company's behalf, and nothing in the trust arrangement clearly diminished his ability to do so. In these circumstances, a hearing on the trust itself would have added nothing of relevance to the issue of FHC's present responsibility. 53