Opinion ID: 1855652
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Condition of the Vehicle

Text: Chrysler and Brewbaker correctly state: Schiffer's case is totally dependent upon the concept of an implied representation that the truck ... was new. This concept had its genesis in Mathis v. Jim Skinner Ford, Inc., 361 So.2d 113 (Ala. 1978). Brief of Appellants, at 14. The concept was more recently discussed and applied in Hines v. Riverside Chevrolet-Olds, Inc., 655 So.2d 909 (Ala.1994), overruled on other grounds, State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Owen, 729 So.2d 834 (Ala.1998). The controversy in Hines began when Richard and Linda Hines purchased what was then a current-model Oldsmobile Calais from Riverside Chevrolet. Id. at 914. After several months, the Hineses discovered that upon delivery of the vehicle from the manufacturer, Riverside Chevrolet had `buffed out' some `beaded' or rough paint on the left rear quarter panel, id. at 915, which, apparently, had been repainted at the factory. Id. at 916. They sued the manufacturer and the dealer, alleging that the defendants had represented the [automobile] as a `new' car. Id. at 915. They alleged that, because the left rear panel had been repainted, that representation was false. Id. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the Hineses appealed. Thus, one question similar to the question presented in this present case was whether the Calais was new, as a matter of law, despite the factory's repainting, or the dealer's subsequent buffing, of the left-rear quarter panel. This Court answered that question in the affirmative. Id. at 923-24. In answering that question, this Court discussed the principles we consider applicable to this present case. It explained: Whether an automobile is `new' is determined by applying the `reasonable expectation' standard first enunciated in Mathis v. Jim Skinner Ford, Inc., 361 So.2d 113 (Ala.1978): `Purchasers have a right to assume that new automobiles will perform in accordance with reasonable expectations and in accordance with implied representations inherent in marketing such products. Absent express representation, implied representations are not uncommon in the sale of new products, and reliance thereon may be shown by the totality of the circumstances and the underlying nature of the transaction itself. These concepts have long been recognized in actions based upon breach of an implied warranty and, under proper circumstances, may support a tort action for misrepresentation.' 361 So.2d at 115. Under Mathis, implied representations that a vehicle is `new' may arise out of the mere sale of a vehicle not previously owned, and such representations, if false, may support a claim of fraud. Dodd [v. Nelda Stephenson Chevrolet, Inc., 626 So.2d 1288, 1291 (Ala.1993)]. Thus, Mathis states a special rule of fraud, which relieves the plaintiff of the burden of establishing a specific representation made by the seller to the plaintiff that a car was `new' when it was sold and the burden of establishing the plaintiffs specific reliance on that representation. Mathis, 361 So.2d at 115. The type of repair or alteration that may support a claim of fraud based on a misrepresentation that a car is `new' is a repair or alteration of such an extent and magnitude that an impartial trier of fact could reasonably infer from it either that the car had been previously sold or that it had been so damaged or altered that a reasonable person, in accordance with the reasonable consumer expectations standard, would not consider it to be a `new' product. `Except in rare circumstances, where a car has undergone repair or alteration so major that it is obviously not new or so minor that it ... undisputedly is new, the question of whether a car initially sold with repaired damage was new when it was sold is one of fact.' Dodd, 626 So.2d at 1292; Boulevard Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Richardson, 374 So.2d 857, 859-60 (Ala.1979). Contrary to the suggestion of the Hineses, the `reasonable expectations' rule of Mathis does not impose on sellers of new vehicles a general duty in tort to sell vehicles that meet reasonable consumer expectations; rather, it imposes a duty in tort not to pass off a vehicle as `new' when it has been previously sold or has been so damaged or altered that a reasonable person would not consider it a `new' product, in accordance with reasonable consumer expectations. After reviewing the evidence in favor of the Hineses and resolving all doubts in their favor, we hold that they failed to present substantial evidence that would support an inference that the Oldsmobile Calais was not `new' when it was sold to the Hineses. 655 So.2d at 923-24 (emphasis in original). Schiffer, of course, contends that he presented a jury question as to whether his truck was new. We agree with this contention, because, unlike the plaintiffs in Hines, Schiffer presented evidence that the truck had been so damaged or altered that a reasonable person, in accordance with the reasonable consumer expectations standard, would not consider it to be a `new' product. Id. at 923. Schiffer testified: (1) that after accepting delivery of his truck, he proceeded to drive it home; (2) that on the way home so much wind noise came from around the door on the driver's side that he could hardly hear the radio; and (3) that during the trip home, he ran into a rainstorm and got wet because water came in around the door. He testified that upon arriving at home and inspecting the truck, he discovered a gap between the top of the driver's door and the roof of the truck large enough to get your hand in, and several holes that had been drilled into the inside of the driver's door. Upon further examination, he said, he noticed that bolts holding the fender in place had evidently been loosened and the fender moved, and discovered that the door was crimped on the outside in an area roughly opposite the holes. Eventually, he said, he also discovered that the oil pan was dented and that the driveshaft was bent. At trial, Schiffer presented the expert testimony of Jerry Dennis, who had performed various tests on the driver's door. Dennis's tests suggested that a portion of the door had been repaired, or sanded or ground, and repainted. Dennis also testified that he found build-up material around the drilled holes that he said he believed was factory filler material. [3] As for the purpose of the holes, Dennis was able to say only that there appeared to be some relationship between the holes that were drilled on the inside of the door and the condition of the door on the outside. Specifically, he testified: Q. [Defendants' counsel:] What was your opinion about what happened with these holes before? A. [Dennis:] That was the first time I have seen anything like that. I was baffled. I've never seen anything like it. . . . . Q. Is there any evidence of the outer skin of the door being repaired? A. The paint thickness profile shows that in this particular area you have got real low readings, which is indicative of somebody trying to buff up scratch marks or something that would show on the external surface of the door. Q. So how is the outside and the inside connected in your opinion, or is it? A. It appears that they had a problem in this particular area on the inside and the outside of the door, and it appears somebody has made an effort to fix it. . . . . A. That is what all this evidence looks like. It is not consistent with any other door on this type truck that I have seen. If you have got a thousand trucks out there and all the doors are this way, then that's normal. This is not normal. Q. On page 43 [of previous deposition testimony] I asked you: `Is there any reason for these holes to be there at all?' You answered: `If you have an area that gets hit like the side of the door and it is concave, they usually drill holes and put a device in there and pull it back out smooth to get it as smooth as they can. And that's usually why they drill these holes. They have got a device they can stick in those holes and it is a spreader, and they can pull it back out and get it all even. Then they usually fill these holes in and buff them off and paint them. They have made a repair that's not factory.' Is that what it says? A. Yes, sir. That's correct. But they usually will just drill one hole that will suffice, and they won't have all these other little bitty holes associated with it. I have no idea what all those other little, small holes are for. Chrysler's own ad litem inspections essentially corroborate the damage alleged in this action. Specifically, Dennis Taljan, the defendants' expert witness, testified that his tests on the door revealed that it had been repainted at the plant. Also, James Dupree, a technical adviser for Chrysler, found evidence (1) that the fender had been moved, (2) that the oil pan had been bent, and (3) that the driveshaft had been damaged. Chrysler and Brewbaker offer no explanation for the damage, or for the delivery of the truck in a damaged condition. This lack of explanation apparently arises out of their litigation strategy, which appears to have been to avoid implicating one another. In that connection, they have shared the same counsel, both at trial and in this appeal. Moreover, Chrysler and Brewbaker have executed a contract whereby Chrysler agrees to indemnify Brewbaker for any judgment or settlement reached in [this action]. In lieu of offering alternative explanations for the damage, Chrysler and Brewbaker insist that any damage was so minor that the truck was still new, as a matter of law, and, consequently, that they owed no duty to disclose it. They criticize Schiffer for not settling for a replacement of the door, the oil pan, and the driveshaft with parts ordered from the factory. Similarly, they rely on a disclaimer paragraph in the consumer-credit contract Schiffer signed in ordering the truck. That provision states: Purchaser acknowledges and understands that certain new vehicles may be received from the manufacturer or by dealer transfer with minor damage to paint, body, trim, and glasses; or in the case of a used vehicle, damage may have occurred while in the hands of a previous owner. Purchaser hereby accepts such repairs, if any, as satisfactory and waives any and all claims or causes of action against the seller and manufacturer arising out of such repairs. (Emphasis added.) They overlook, however, the fact that the scope of this waiver is expressly limited to minor damage. Thus, it would cover a vehicle such as the one involved in Hines, supra, in which, despite the minor repairs, the vehicle was still new, as a matter of law. In such a case, this provision could be relevant to a claim alleging suppression. Where, however, the damage is so considerable as to present a jury question as to whether the vehicle is new, a provision like this one has no operation. The damage in this case was considerable. Schiffer presented evidence suggesting that the cost to replace the door, the oil pan, and the driveshaft would exceed $1,900. But even the damage to the door alone was more extensive than the damage to the quarter panel in Hines. Here, the very integrity of the door was compromised by the numerous holes drilled into it. The damage to Schiffer's truck was not so major that it is obviously not `new' or so minor that it ... undisputedly is `new.' 655 So.2d at 923 (emphasis in original). The question whether his truck was new was one to be resolved by a jury. Id. Thus, it was not within the scope of the waiver provision. The trial court properly denied the defendants' motions for a judgment as a matter of law.