Opinion ID: 848572
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prima Facie Showing of Discrimination Based on Race

Text: Here, defense counsel had already exercised several peremptory challenges and was attempting to challenge juror ten when the trial court interrupted and requested that counsel for both parties proceed to chambers. While in chambers, the trial court stated that it was going to disallow the challenge because defense counsel had based his challenges on the race of the juror. The trial court reached this conclusion because defense counsel had established a pattern of excusing Caucasian males. [7] After defense counsel's peremptory challenge of juror five, the prosecution objected, reasoning that juror five was Caucasian and the two previous challenges by defense counsel were of Caucasian males. The trial court agreed and disallowed the challenge. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred by raising Batson sua sponte to question defense counsel's reasons for peremptorily challenging juror number ten. Defendant further maintained that neither the trial court nor the prosecution established a prima facie showing of discrimination based on race for either challenge. The Court of Appeals held that a trial court may raise a Batson issue sua sponte, noting that virtually all state courts have concluded that a trial court may raise a Batson issue sua sponte. The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that because the record did not reveal the racial identities of the prospective jurors, it could not determine whether a prima facie case of discrimination had been established. We have not previously addressed the question whether a trial court may raise a Batson issue sua sponte. The rationale underlying Batson and its progeny, however, supports the Court of Appeals position that the trial court may make an inquiry sua sponte after observing a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination through the use of peremptory challenges. Batson and its progeny [8] make clear that a trial court has the authority to raise sua sponte such an issue to ensure the equal protection rights of individual jurors. See Batson, supra at 99, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (In view of the heterogeneous population of our Nation, public respect for our criminal justice system and the rule of law will be strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury service because of his race.); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 49-50, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992), quoting State v. Alvarado, 221 N.J.Super. 324, 328, 534 A.2d 440 (1987) (`Be it at the hands of the State or the defense,' if a court allows jurors to be excluded because of group bias, `[it] is [a] willing participant in a scheme that could only undermine the very foundation of our system of justiceour citizens' confidence in it.'). The United States Supreme Court, in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991), held that a criminal defendant has standing to object to a prosecutor's peremptory challenges. It reasoned: The barriers to a suit by an excluded juror are daunting. Potential jurors are not parties to the jury selection process and have no opportunity to be heard at the time of their exclusion. Nor can excluded jurors easily obtain declaratory or injunctive relief when discrimination occurs through an individual prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges. Unlike a challenge to systematic practices of the jury clerk and commissioners such as we considered in Carter [ v Jury Comm. of Greene Co., 396 U.S. 320, 90 S.Ct. 518, 24 L.Ed.2d 549 (1970)], it would be difficult for an individual juror to show a likelihood that discrimination against him at the voir dire stage will recur. And, there exist considerable practical barriers to suit by the excluded juror because of the small financial stake involved and the economic burdens of litigation. The reality is that a juror dismissed because of race probably will leave the courtroom possessing little incentive to set in motion the arduous process needed to vindicate his own rights. [ Id. at 414-415, 111 S.Ct. 1364 (citations omitted).] The Powers Court further stated: The statutory prohibition on discrimination in the selection of jurors, enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment's Enabling Clause, makes race neutrality in jury selection a visible, and inevitable, measure of the judicial system's own commitment to the commands of the Constitution. The courts are under an affirmative duty to enforce the strong statutory and constitutional policies embodied in that prohibition. [ Id. at 416, 111 S.Ct. 1364 (citation omitted).] The Supreme Court's rationale for allowing a defendant to raise a Batson issue supports our conclusion that a trial court may sua sponte raise a Batson issue. Trial courts are in the best position to enforce the statutory and constitutional policies prohibiting racial discrimination. Further, wrongly excluded jurors have little incentive to vindicate their own rights. We thus conclude, for the foregoing reasons, that a trial court may sua sponte raise a Batson issue. We reject the Court of Appeals assertion that it could not establish whether a prima facie case of discrimination had been made regarding the challenges because of the inadequacy of the record. It is undisputed that defendant is an African-American male. While the challenged jurors were not of defendant's racial group, it is equally harmful to challenge only members outside a defendant's racial group. Powers, supra at 415-416, 111 S.Ct. 1364. The trial court specifically stated that it was disallowing the challenges because defense counsel, for the better part of the day, had only excused Caucasian male jurors. [9] Defense counsel did not dispute that he had only excused Caucasian males. Instead, he pointed to the racial make-up of the remaining jurors to justify his challenges. The trial court rejected defense counsel's challenge of juror ten because defense counsel had exercised seven of nine peremptory challenges against Caucasian males. The prosecution objected to defense counsel's challenge of juror five because defense counsel consecutively excused three Caucasian male jurors. In both instances, defense counsel's challenges created a pattern of strikes against Caucasian males. This pattern was sufficient to raise an inference that defense counsel was indeed excluding potential jurors on the basis of their race. See Batson, supra at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (a pattern of strikes against jurors of a specific race may give rise to an inference of discrimination). We thus conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to find a prima facie showing of discrimination based on race.