Opinion ID: 576259
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Determination of Severe Impairment

Text: 17 The Social Security Act (the Act), as amended, permits the payment of insurance benefits to persons who have contributed to the program and who suffer a physical or mental disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(D). The Act defines disability as the 18 inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). 19 A physical or mental impairment is in turn defined as an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). The suffering of some impairment does not establish disability; a claimant is disabled only if she is incapable of engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Milam v. Bowen, 782 F.2d 1284, 1286 (5th Cir.1986). The claimant has the burden to prove that she is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Fraga v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1296, 1301 (5th Cir.1987). 20 Pursuant to the express authorization of Congress, the Secretary has promulgated a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether a claimant is disabled: (1) If the claimant is presently working, a finding of not disabled must be made; (2) if the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, she will not be found disabled; (3) if the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the Regulations, disability is presumed and benefits are awarded; (4) if the claimant is capable of performing past relevant work, a finding of not disabled must be made; and (5) if the claimant's impairment prevents her from doing any other substantial gainful activity, taking into consideration her age, education, past work experience and residual functional capacity, she will be found disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 125 (5th Cir.1991). A finding that the claimant is disabled or is not disabled at any point in the five-step review terminates the analysis. Johnson v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 748, 751 (5th Cir.1988). 21 The second step of the Secretary's sequential analysis, which is here challenged, requires that the factfinder decide whether the claimant's impairment is severe, irrespective of age, education and work experience. The Secretary has issued regulations that define the scope of the term severe impairment: 22 If you do not have any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, we will find that you do not have a severe impairment and are, therefore, not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) & 416.920(c) (emphasis added). 23 If the claimant does not have a severe impairment under this definition, the Secretary, as well as the ALJ or Appeals Council, typically will deny the claim without consideration of the remaining steps in the sequential analysis. 24 In Stone v. Heckler, 752 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir.1985), this Court evaluated the Secretary's severity regulation, and determined that it was inconsistent with the statutory language and the legislative history of the Act. Id. at 1104. Noting that the severity regulation defined severe impairment to include far fewer conditions than apparently the statutory language intended, we warned that we could not condone the Secretary's use of the severity regulation to systematically deny benefits to claimants who otherwise satisfy the statutory criteria. Id. Although we recognized in Stone that the factfinder is entitled to follow a sequential process that disposes of appropriate cases at an early stage, we also recognized that it is impermissible to conduct the evaluation in such a manner as to deny benefits to individuals who are in fact unable to perform substantial gainful activity. Id. at 1103. In that regard, we emphasized the proper standard for determining whether a claimant's impairment is severe: 25  '[A]n impairment can be considered as not severe only if it is a slight abnormality [having] such minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual's ability to work, irrespective of age, education or work experience.'  Id. at 1101 (quoting Estran v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 340, 341 (5th Cir.1984)). 26 In disapproving the Secretary's use of the severity regulation, 5 we held that we would in the future assume that the ALJ and the Appeals Council have applied an incorrect standard to the severity requirement unless the correct standard is set forth by reference to this opinion or another of the same effect.... Id. at 1106. 27 In the case now before us, the ALJ's second opinion followed the dictates of Stone. However, the Supreme Court in the interim addressed for the first time whether the Secretary's severity regulation was valid. In Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2290-95, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987), a majority of the Court concluded that the severity regulation was facially valid, but reserved the question of whether the regulation would be valid as applied in certain circumstances. Id. 107 S.Ct. at 2298 n. 12. The Court reasoned that Congress had approved the Secretary's sequential evaluation process to ease the dismissal of claims in those meritless cases in which there is no reason for the Secretary to consider the claimant's age, education and work experience. Id. 107 S.Ct. at 2295. The Court refused, however, to either approve or disapprove the specific language in the Secretary's severity regulation. 28 In light of the Yuckert opinion, we called for additional briefing from the parties on the issue of whether the Supreme Court had altered the standard we announced in Stone. Our analysis of Yuckert convinces us that it has not. Yuckert simply upheld the facial validity of the severity regulation as an appropriate method of streamlining the review process. Yuckert did not conclude that the severity regulation properly interpreted the statutory requirements, and Yuckert did not purport to state the proper definition of the term severe impairment. Thus, Stone is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Yuckert; Stone merely reasons that the regulation cannot be applied to summarily dismiss, without consideration of the remaining steps in the sequential analysis, claims of those whose impairment is more than a slight abnormality. 29 Most courts agree that Yuckert does not displace prior limitations on the Secretary's reliance on the severity regulation. 6 See, e.g., Higgs v. Bowen, 880 F.2d 860, 863 (6th Cir.1988); Gonzalez-Garcia v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 835 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1987); Brown v. Bowen, 827 F.2d 311, 312 (8th Cir.1987). 7 30 Today, we join the First, Sixth and Eighth Circuits and conclude that our standards announced in Stone remain unchanged in the wake of Yuckert. Accordingly, we hold that the Secretary applied the proper legal standard in evaluating Anthony's disability claim. We turn now to the issue of whether the Secretary's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.