Opinion ID: 1557922
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Improper and Prejudicial Character Comments

Text: Defendant next complains the State, in its guilt phase rebuttal argument, made an improper and prejudicial comment about the number of times [] defendant had been arrested. Specifically, the prosecutor invited the jury: [L]et's examine Shedran, who's been arrested more times than probably everyone in this whole courtroom; in the court building maybe. Defendant further asserts the prosecutor asked improper questions of the defense expert, made improper comments during the guilt and penalty phases regarding defendant's future dangerousness, and voiced his opinion that death was the appropriate penalty on facts outside of the record. We find no reversible error with regard to these comments and questions by the prosecutor. Defense counsel failed to preserve the claims by raising a contemporaneous objection when the prosecutor made the comments above. La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 841; State v. Wessinger, supra . In any event, notwithstanding the procedural bar, a review of the claims reveals that they are baseless, because defendant's arrest record as well as his present and possible future dangerousness were introduced to the jury by the defendant's own witness, Dr. Cenac, as well as the defendant's own testimony. Thus, the prosecutor's comments do not fall outside the scope of proper closing argument as they were reasonably restricted to the evidence admitted, to the lack of evidence, and to conclusions of fact that may be drawn therefrom. La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 774. With regard to defendant's prior arrests, during Dr. Cenac's direct examination, defense counsel framed the question to his expert witness: You mentioned that he had 21 arrests, I believe on his rap sheet. Dr. Cenac went on to summarize defendant's criminal history of convictions, detailing seven of the prior arrests. Defendant himself admitted to having been arrested several times. Given that defendant opened the door to his criminal record by taking the stand, and his expert specifically detailed in his direct examination a number of arrests occurring before defendant's arrest for the murder of Lt. Wax, we find nothing in the State's guilt phase rebuttal argument exceeded the scope of proper closing argument. La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 774. Similarly, we find no merit to the claim that the prosecutor posed improper questions to Dr. Cenac on cross-examination about defendant's dangerousness, or, during the State's closing argument, improperly referred to Dr. Cenac's observations on the defendant's dangerousness. Specifically, defendant argues that, by asking, So what you're telling the ladies and gentlemen of the jury is that he's a very dangerous person?, the State introduced improper evidence of bad moral character and other crimes, wrongs or acts under La.Code Evid. art. 404(B), thereby requiring reversal. The context in which the state's question was posed demonstrates that the defense expert initiated the discussion of defendant's dangerousness. The prosecutor had been asking about various jobs defendant was able to hold down, notwithstanding his purported mental limitations, including lawn maintenance work and completing a course study at the culinary arts institute that led defendant to search for a job as a cook. The State asked Dr. Cenac if that information would color his opinion: A. I think he's capable of doing many jobs in a kitchen environment. And I think that's a good location for that percentage of our population, who can do repetitive work like that. It's a good idea, to place him in such a position, save for the fact that there are knives. Q. So what you're telling the ladies and gentlemen of the jury is he's a very dangerous person? A. I think he's an extraordinarily dangerous person. Q. And the only way tothere is no way to insure prison guards' safety, is that correct? A. I think there's a high risk for officers.... Defense counsel remained silent and voiced no objection to the candid remarks and responses that defendant's own expert yielded on cross-examination. Dr. Cenac brought up the notion of dangerousness when he pondered that defendant would be suited to kitchen work, except for the access to knives, i.e., dangerous weapons. Contrary to defendant's assertions, the prosecutor's follow-up question to Dr. Cenac was neither exploitive nor improper. [23] Thereafter, the State was entitled to argue dangerousness in its closing arguments, because testimony to that effect had been admitted at trial. La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 774. In its guilt phase rebuttal argument, the prosecutor told the jury: Dr. Cenac was right that he is extremely dangerous, because he is, in fact, a hard core criminal. In its penalty phase rebuttal argument, the prosecutor argued: His own expert tells you [defendant is] an extremely dangerous man. We do not construe anything in the prosecutor's brief remarks as a tactic of turning the defense expert's testimony against defendant. The prosecutor's statements did not exceed the bounds of La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 774. Defendant further asserts the prosecutor's theme of defendant's future dangerousness in his penalty phase rebuttal argument interjected an arbitrary factor into the jury's sentencing determination. Specifically, defendant points to the following passage as prejudicial: What will protect anyone in prison? What will protect the other inmates? There is nothing. Actually, I was wrong. There is one thing that will protect the other people, his death. That's the only thing that will protect the world from [defendant]. While a prosecutor may not advert to his own opinions as to the appropriateness of the penalty at the sentencing stage of a capital case, State v. Kaufman, 304 So.2d 300, 306-07 (La.1974), he will avoid interjecting an arbitrary factor into the proceedings by basing his comments on the same evidence that jurors have also heard and may evaluate for themselves. Here, the jurors had been well-versed in defendant's outbursts of rage, not only by the eyewitnesses to the murder of Lt. Wax, but also from defendant himself, who admitted on the stand to getting into tussles with law enforcement. At the penalty phase, defendant's step-father also testified that defendant could become out of control when angered. Additionally, his own mental health expert pronounced him extraordinarily dangerous and questioned the safety of any prison personnel surrounding him. With this background, jurors would not have been surprised or shocked to hear that the State's prosecution team favored the death penalty as to defendant, and certainly the State had alerted jurors as early as voir dire that it would be asking for such a verdict. The instant record shows clearly that the prosecutor's remark about defendant's death being the only way to protect other people from him referred to the evidence presented and did not merely express the prosecutor's personal opinion based on information not disclosed to the jurors. Furthermore, we do not find that the prosecutor's comment interjected an arbitrary or prejudicial factor into the penalty phase deliberations. Accordingly, we find no merit to these arguments.