Opinion ID: 1801833
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Duty to Plaintiff

Text: Did defendants owe plaintiff a duty of care? In defendants' view, absent some special relationship between the parties, or some specific and known threat of harm to plaintiff, defendants had no duty of care toward her, and no obligation to disclose in their letters any facts regarding the charges against Gadams. (See Rest.2d Torts, § 315 [generally no duty to warn those threatened by third person's conduct]; Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 799, 806 [205 Cal. Rptr. 842, 685 P.2d 1193] [same]; Thompson v. County of Alameda (1980) 27 Cal.3d 741, 758 [167 Cal. Rptr. 70, 614 P.2d 728, 12 A.L.R.4th 701] [duty to warn readily identifiable victim]; Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 433-435 [131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334, 83 A.L.R.3d 1166] [special relationship creates duty to warn or control another's conduct]; cf. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 692-693 [254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373] [declining to extend special relationship test to employer-employee relationship].) Plaintiff does not argue that a special relationship existed between defendants and her or Gadams. Instead, she relies on Garcia, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pages 735-736, where we held that, under section 311 of the Restatement Second of Torts, a parole officer had a duty to exercise reasonable care in giving the victim information regarding the parolee who ultimately killed her. We noted that although the parole officer had no duty to volunteer information regarding the released criminals he supervised, ... the absence of a duty to speak does not entitle one to speak falsely. ( Garcia, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 736.) We concluded that the parole officer, having chosen to communicate information about [the parolee] to [the victim], had a duty to use reasonable care in doing so, and that the officer either knew or should have known that the victim's safety might depend on the accuracy of the information imparted. ( Ibid., citing Rest.2d Torts, § 311, com. b, p. 106.) Plaintiff acknowledges that Garcia is distinguishable, and that no California case has yet held that one who intentionally or negligently provides false information to another owes a duty of care to a third person who did not receive the information and who has no special relationship with the provider. Accordingly, the issue before us is one of first impression, and we apply the general analytical principles used to determine the existence of duty in particular cases. (3) In this state, the general rule is that all persons have a duty to use ordinary care to prevent others from being injured as the result of their conduct. ( Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112 [70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496]; see Civ. Code, § 1714.) As we have observed,  Rowland enumerates a number of considerations ... that have been taken into account by courts in various contexts to determine whether a departure from the general rule is appropriate: `the major [considerations] are the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.' (Italics added.) (69 Cal.2d at p. 113.) The foreseeability of a particular kind of harm plays a very significant role in this calculus [citation], but a court's task  in determining `duty'  is not to decide whether a particular plaintiff's injury was reasonably foreseeable in light of a particular defendant's conduct, but rather to evaluate more generally whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that liability may appropriately be imposed on the negligent party. ( Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 572-573, fn. 6 [224 Cal. Rptr. 664, 715 P.2d 624].)
(2b) Applying these factors here, we first examine whether plaintiff's injuries were a foreseeable result of defendants' representations regarding Gadams's qualifications and character, coupled with their failure to disclose to the Fresno Pacific College placement office information regarding charges or complaints of Gadams's sexual misconduct. Could defendants reasonably have foreseen that the representations and omissions in their reference letters would result in physical injury to someone? Although the chain of causation leading from defendants' statements and omissions to Gadams's alleged assault on plaintiff is somewhat attenuated, we think the assault was reasonably foreseeable. Based on the facts alleged in the complaint, defendants could foresee that Livingston's officers would read and rely on defendants' letters in deciding to hire Gadams. Likewise, defendants could foresee that, had they not unqualifiedly recommended Gadams, Livingston would not have hired him. And, finally, defendants could foresee that Gadams, after being hired by Livingston, might molest or injure a Livingston student such as plaintiff. We must assume, for purposes of demurrer, that plaintiff was indeed injured in the manner she alleges, and that a causal connection exists between defendants' conduct and the injury suffered. As plaintiff's complaint alleges, her injury was a direct and proximate result of defendants' fraud and misrepresentations.
Whether defendants were guilty of any moral blame would depend on the proof adduced at trial, although it is certainly arguable that their unreserved recommendations of Gadams, together with their failure to disclose facts reasonably necessary to avoid or minimize the risk of further child molestations or abuse, could be characterized as morally blameworthy.
Next, we may assume that standard business liability insurance is available to cover instances of negligent misrepresentation or nondisclosure as alleged in count three of the complaint, but is not available for the fraud or intentional misconduct alleged in count four. (See Ins. Code, § 533; Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 16-18 [44 Cal. Rptr.2d 370, 900 P.2d 619].) Perhaps more significantly, defendants had alternative courses of conduct to avoid tort liability, namely, (1) writing a full disclosure letter revealing all relevant facts regarding Gadams's background, or (2) writing a no comment letter omitting any affirmative representations regarding Gadams's qualifications, or merely verifying basic employment dates and details. The parties cite no case or Restatement provision suggesting that a former employer has an affirmative duty of disclosure that would preclude such a no comment letter. (4) As we have previously indicated, liability may not be imposed for mere nondisclosure or other failure to act, at least in the absence of some special relationship not alleged here. ( Garcia, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 734; see Rest.2d Torts, § 315.)
(2c) As for public policy, the law certainly recognizes a policy of preventing future harm of the kind alleged here. One of society's highest priorities is to protect children from sexual or physical abuse. (See, e.g., Barela v. Superior Court (1981) 30 Cal.3d 244, 254 [178 Cal. Rptr. 618, 636 P.2d 582] [duty of all citizens to protect children from sexual abuse]; Pen. Code, § 11166 [duty to report suspected child abuse].) Defendants urge that competing social or economic policies may disfavor the imposition of liability for misrepresentation or nondisclosure in employment references. They observe that a rule imposing liability in these situations could greatly inhibit the preparation and distribution of reference letters, to the general detriment of employers and employees alike. We have recently stated that [w]hen deciding whether to expand a tort duty of care, courts must consider the potential social and economic consequences. [Citations.] ( Macias v. State of California (1995) 10 Cal.4th 844, 859-860 [42 Cal. Rptr.2d 592, 897 P.2d 530]; see Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 146 [271 Cal. Rptr. 146, 793 P.2d 479, 16 A.L.R.5th 903]; Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728, 734 [69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912, 29 A.L.R.3d 1316] [duty is expression of the total policy considerations leading to conclusion that plaintiff is entitled to protection].) Defendants argue that a rule imposing tort liability on writers of recommendation letters could have one very predictable consequence: employers would seldom write such letters, even in praise of exceptionally qualified employees. In defendants' view, rather than prepare a recommendation letter stating all material facts, positive and negative, an employer would be better advised to decline to write a reference letter or, at most, merely to confirm the former employee's position, salary, and dates of employment. According to defendants, apart from the former employer's difficulty in deciding how much negative information to divulge, an employer who disclosed more than minimal employment data would risk a defamation, breach of privacy, or wrongful interference suit from a rejected job seeker. (See, e.g., Jensen v. Hewlett-Packard Co. (1993) 14 Cal. App.4th 958, 965 [18 Cal. Rptr.2d 83] [libel action may be based on false accusations in employee evaluation form of criminal conduct, dishonesty, incompetence, or reprehensible personal characteristics or behavior]; Marshall v. Brown (1983) 141 Cal. App.3d 408, 412 [190 Cal. Rptr. 392] [wrongful interference liability based on negative comments in former employer's evaluation letter]; see also Nelson v. Upsala College (3d Cir.1995) 51 F.3d 383, 387-388, and cases cited; Smolla, Law of Defamation (1995 ed.) § 15.01[2][a], p. 15-3, and cases cited [Traditionally, defamation suits brought against former employers by disgruntled employees arise in the context of unfavorable reference letters or other communications to third parties concerning the employee's job performance ....]; Lab. Code, §§ 1050 [misdemeanor to misrepresent facts regarding former employee to prevent employee's further employment], 1054 [treble damages for misrepresenting employment facts].) Defendants contend that the threat of potential tort liability will inhibit employers from freely providing reference information, restricting the flow of information prospective employers need and impeding job applicants in finding new employment. One writer recently explained that [m]any employers have adopted policies, sometimes referred to as `no comment' policies, under which they refuse to provide job references for former or departing employees.... [T]hese policies work to the detriment of both prospective employers and prospective employees. (Saxton, Flaws in the Laws Governing Employment References: Problems of Overdeterence and a Proposal for Reform (1995) 13 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 45; see also id. at pp. 46-52 [citing evidence of increasing use of no comment letters, and deploring resultant restriction on flow of information]; Note, Negligent Referral: A Potential Theory for Employer Liability (1991) 64 So.Cal.L.Rev. 1645 [observing that [m]ore and more employers ... are refusing to provide employee references]; Note, Employer Defamation: Reasons and Remedies for Declining References and Chilled Communications in the Workplace (1989) 40 Hastings L.J. 687, 688-690; Note, Defamation in the Workplace: The Impact of Increasing Employer Liability (1989) 72 Marq. L.Rev. 264, 265 & fn. 9, 275-276, 300-301.) In response, plaintiff asserts it is unlikely that employers will decline to write reference letters for fear of tort liability, at least in situations involving no foreseeable risks of physical injury to someone. Plaintiff observes that an employer would be protected from a defamation suit by the statutory qualified privilege for nonmalicious communications regarding a job applicant's qualifications. (See Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (c).) This provision was amended in 1994 to provide that the qualified privilege available for communications to and by interested persons applies to and includes a communication concerning the job performance or qualifications of an applicant for employment, based upon credible evidence, made without malice, by a current or former employer of the applicant to, and upon request of, the prospective employer. (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (c).) As plaintiff suggests, the existence of this privilege may encourage more open disclosure of relevant information regarding former employees. (See also Jensen v. Hewlett-Packard Co., supra, 14 Cal. App.4th at pp. 964-965 [acknowledging public policy disfavoring libel suits based on comments in employee evaluation forms].) We note that, although defendants have not argued the point, an amicus curiae has contended that the privilege under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c), extends beyond defamation actions by former employees and would provide a defense to plaintiff's misrepresentation action. As we have previously acknowledged, a similar qualified privilege for communications made in judicial proceedings (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)(2)) applies to virtually all torts except malicious prosecution. [Citations.] ( Kimmel v. Goland (1990) 51 Cal.3d 202, 209 [271 Cal. Rptr. 191, 793 P.2d 524].) Legislative materials submitted by this amicus curiae, however, indicate that Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c), was primarily intended to provide employers with a defense to actions by former employees, rather than to insulate them from all tort liability arising from employment disclosures. Assuming arguendo that Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c), would afford a defense in negligent or intentional misrepresentation actions brought by injured third persons, by its terms the new privilege pertains only to communications made upon request of the prospective employer. Defendants do not claim that they wrote in response to Livingston 's request, and, accordingly, the privilege is inapplicable. (5) In light of these factors and policy considerations, we hold, consistent with Restatement Second of Torts sections 310 and 311, that the writer of a letter of recommendation owes to third persons a duty not to misrepresent the facts in describing the qualifications and character of a former employee, if making these misrepresentations would present a substantial, foreseeable risk of physical injury to the third persons. In the absence, however, of resulting physical injury, or some special relationship between the parties, the writer of a letter of recommendation should have no duty of care extending to third persons for misrepresentations made concerning former employees. In those cases, the policy favoring free and open communication with prospective employers should prevail. (2d) Having concluded that defendants owed plaintiff a duty not to misrepresent Gadams's qualifications or character in their letters of recommendation, we next must determine whether defendants' letters indeed contained misrepresentations or false information within the meaning of Restatement Second of Torts section 310 or 311. If defendants made no misrepresentations, then as a matter of law they could not be found liable under those provisions.