Opinion ID: 1454621
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Immunity Agreements for the Testimony of Accomplices Allison Eckstrom and Avette Barrett

Text: Defendant's girlfriend, Avette Barrett, and her sister, Allison Eckstrom, testified for the prosecution pursuant to written immunity agreements that ultimately spared them from being tried for the murder of Rickey Van Zandt. The agreements provided in part that the prosecutor would dismiss all charges pending against each woman if, among other things: (1) her statements to authorities that she did not personally inflict any injuries on Rickey Van Zandt were true and correct; and (2) she testified completely and truthfully at the preliminary hearing and at trial. The first of these conditions was deleted as to Barrett before trial, but remained in effect as to Eckstrom. Barrett's agreement further required that she take and pass a lie detector test, a condition that was also waived by the prosecutor before trial. Defendant challenges the testimony of the two women, arguing that it was tainted by coercive conditions imposed by the prosecutor. The Attorney General argues that defendant has waived any error by failing to object when the two women testified. Defendant did, however, make a motion in limine to exclude their testimony on the same ground he urges here, i.e., the alleged existence of coercive conditions in their plea bargains. The motion was denied. The Attorney General responds that, notwithstanding the motion, defendant must repeat his objection when the evidence is actually offered to preserve an assignment of error. (11) A party desiring to preserve for appeal a challenge to the admission of evidence must comply with the provisions of Evidence Code section 353, which precludes reversal for erroneous admission of evidence unless: There appears of record an objection to or a motion to exclude or to strike the evidence that was timely made and so stated to make clear the specific ground of the objection or motion. The reason for the requirement is manifest: a specifically grounded objection to a defined body of evidence serves to prevent error. It allows the trial judge to consider excluding the evidence or limiting its admission to avoid possible prejudice. It also allows the proponent of the evidence to lay additional foundation, modify the offer of proof, or take other steps designed to minimize the prospect of reversal. (See Bundy v. Sierra Lumber Co. (1906) 149 Cal. 772, 776 [87 P. 622].) Evidence Code section 353 does not exalt form over substance. No particular form of objection or motion is required; it is sufficient that the presentation contain a request to exclude specific evidence on the specific legal ground urged on appeal. (Assem. Com. com., 29B West's Ann. Evid. Code (1966 ed.) § 353, p. 245; see also 3 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d ed. 1986) § 2018, p. 1979; People v. Gibson (1976) 56 Cal. App.3d 119, 137 [128 Cal. Rptr. 302].) (12) Motions in limine are a commonly used tool of trial advocacy and management in both criminal and civil cases. Such motions are generally brought at the beginning of trial, although they may also be brought during trial when evidentiary issues are anticipated by the parties. In either event, they are argued by the parties, either orally or in writing or both, and ruled upon by the trial judge. The usual purpose of motions in limine is to preclude the presentation of evidence deemed inadmissible and prejudicial by the moving party. A typical order in limine excludes the challenged evidence and directs counsel, parties, and witnesses not to refer to the excluded matters during trial. (3 Witkin, Cal. Evidence, supra, § 2011 at p. 1969.) The advantage of such motions is to avoid the obviously futile attempt to `unring the bell' in the event a motion to strike is granted in the proceedings before the jury. ( Hyatt v. Sierra Boat Co. (1978) 79 Cal. App.3d 325, 337 [145 Cal. Rptr. 47].) Motions in limine serve other purposes as well. They permit more careful consideration of evidentiary issues than would take place in the heat of battle during trial. They minimize side-bar conferences and disruptions during trial, allowing for an uninterrupted flow of evidence. Finally, by resolving potentially critical issues at the outset, they enhance the efficiency of trials and promote settlements. (See Cotchett & Haight, Cal. Courtroom Evidence (3d ed. 1988) p. 28-3.) Under appropriate circumstances, a motion in limine can serve the function of a motion to exclude under Evidence Code section 353 by allowing the trial court to rule on a specific objection to particular evidence. In Sacramento, etc. Drainage Dist. ex rel. State Reclamation Bd. v. Reed (1963) 215 Cal. App.2d 60, 68 [29 Cal. Rptr. 847], defendant made a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of an expert on the ground that he was not qualified. The trial court denied the motion and allowed the expert to testify, although it limited the scope of his testimony. Although defendant did not renew his objection when the expert testified, the Court of Appeal considered his assignment of error, observing: The motion in this case was precisely directed at a well-defined issue. It was an entirely proper mode of objection. Once the trial court ruled on it, no further objections or motions were necessary to preserve the point for appeal purposes. However, in a series of recent cases, we have stated: Generally when an in limine ruling that evidence is admissible has been made, the party seeking exclusion must object at such time as the evidence is actually offered to preserve the issue for appeal. ( People v. Jennings (1988) 46 Cal.3d 963, 975, fn. 3 [251 Cal. Rptr. 278, 760 P.2d 475]; see also People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 708 [268 Cal. Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887]; People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 849-850 [268 Cal. Rptr. 802, 789 P.2d 983]; People v. Boyer (1989) 48 Cal.3d 247, 270, fn. 13 [256 Cal. Rptr. 96, 768 P.2d 610].) In contrast, relying primarily on Sacramento, etc. Drainage Dist. ex rel. State Reclamation Bd. v. Reed, supra, 215 Cal. App.2d 60, Witkin states: If the motion [ in limine ] is denied, the ruling may be reviewed on appeal without making an objection to the prejudicial matter at the trial. (3 Witkin, Cal. Evidence, supra, § 2011 at p. 1971.) The apparent contradiction in these general statements can be reconciled by focusing on the provisions of Evidence Code section 353. In some cases, a specific objection to a particular body of evidence can be advanced and ruled upon definitively on a motion in limine, thus satisfying the requirements of the statute. In this case, for example, defendant made a motion in limine to exclude all of the testimony of the two female witnesses based on allegedly coercive terms in their written plea agreements. The motion was clearly and unequivocally denied. The objection was specific, it was directed to an identifiable body of evidence, and it was advanced at a time when the trial judge could give fair consideration to the admissibility of the evidence in its context. Moreover, the Attorney General does not point to any event in the trial occurring after the in limine ruling and before the evidence was offered that so changed the context as to constitute a basis for reconsideration of the ruling. Under these circumstances, defense counsel was justified in concluding that a mere repetition of the same objection advanced on the motion in limine would serve no useful purpose. The objection having been made and ruled upon, the issue was preserved for appeal. ( Sacramento, etc. Drainage Dist. ex rel. State Reclamation Bd. v. Reed, supra, 215 Cal. App.2d at pp. 67-68.) In other cases, however, a motion in limine may not satisfy the requirements of Evidence Code section 353. For example, it may be difficult to specify exactly what evidence is the subject of the motion until that evidence is offered. Actual testimony sometimes defies pretrial predictions of what a witness will say on the stand. Events in the trial may change the context in which the evidence is offered to an extent that a renewed objection is necessary to satisfy the language and purpose of Evidence Code section 353. As we observed in People v. Jennings, supra , [U]ntil the evidence is actually offered, and the court is aware of its relevance in context, its probative value, and its potential for prejudice, matters related to the state of the evidence at the time an objection is made, the court cannot intelligently rule on admissibility. (46 Cal.3d at p. 975, fn. 3.) In these kinds of circumstances, an objection at the time the evidence is offered serves to focus the issue and to protect the record. As one trial practice text advises: An unsuccessful motion [ in limine ] can serve the same purpose as an objection at trial in preserving the record on appeal.... However, the motion should be sufficiently clear and specific to allow the appellate court to determine whether it would have been redundant to have also objected at the time the evidence was going to be introduced. (Cal. Trial Objections 2d (Cont.Ed.Bar 1984) § 1.7, p. 11.) (13) In summary, we hold that a motion in limine to exclude evidence is a sufficient manifestation of objection to protect the record on appeal when it satisfies the basic requirements of Evidence Code section 353, i.e.: (1) a specific legal ground for exclusion is advanced and subsequently raised on appeal; (2) the motion is directed to a particular, identifiable body of evidence; and (3) the motion is made at a time before or during trial when the trial judge can determine the evidentiary question in its appropriate context. When such a motion is made and denied, the issue is preserved for appeal. On the other hand, if a motion in limine does not satisfy each of these requirements, a proper objection satisfying Evidence Code section 353 must be made to preserve the evidentiary issue for appeal. Our holding in this regard is necessarily confined to classic in limine motions, i.e., those motions heard at the beginning of or during trial by the trial judge. Other kinds of pretrial motions not heard by the trial judge, e.g. those made under section 1538.5, will continue to be governed by their own particular rules and standards regarding the preservation of error for appeal. Notwithstanding our holding, the better practice in handling motions in limine is undoubtedly for the parties to stipulate to the effect of the court's rulings (as they did in People v. Jennings, supra, 46 Cal.3d 963) or for the trial judge to make it clear to counsel at the end of in limine arguments not only what the ruling on the motion is, but whether further objection or argument is desired when the evidence is presented. If this is done, the stipulation or order of the trial court will be respected in the appellate court's determination whether error has been properly preserved. As one commentator has cautioned: [W]hen an in limine motion to exclude evidence is denied, counsel should get a clear understanding on the record that counsel need not object when the evidence is sought to be introduced during trial so as to preserve the right to argue the point on appeal. If this is not done, counsel should consider objecting during trial when the evidence is sought to be introduced so as to avoid any possibility of waiving the right to argue the point on appeal. (1 Cal. Civil Procedure During Trial (Cont.Ed.Bar 1982) § 6.48, p. 246.) As we have noted, defendant's in limine motion satisfied the requirements of Evidence Code section 353 as we have described them. Therefore, we will consider his argument on the merits. (14a) Relying on the rule of People v. Medina (1974) 41 Cal. App.3d 438, 455 [116 Cal. Rptr. 133], defendant initially argues that conditioning the grant of immunity to Eckstrom on the fact that she did not personally injure Van Zandt necessarily tainted her testimony. (15) As we observed in People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1251-1252 [232 Cal. Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115]: `[A] defendant is denied a fair trial if the prosecution's case depends substantially upon accomplice testimony and the accomplice witness is placed, either by the prosecution or the court, under a strong compulsion to testify in a particular fashion.' ( People v. Medina (1974) 41 Cal. App.3d 438, 455 [116 Cal. Rptr. 133].) Thus, when the accomplice is granted immunity subject to the condition that his testimony substantially conform to an earlier statement given to police ( id., at p. 450), or that his testimony result in the defendant's conviction ( People v. Green (1951) 102 Cal. App.2d 831, 837-839 [228 P.2d 867]), the accomplice's testimony is `tainted beyond redemption' ( Rex v. Robinson (1921) 30 B.C.R. 369) and its admission denies the defendant a fair trial. On the other hand, although there is a certain degree of compulsion inherent in any plea agreement or grant of immunity, it is clear that an agreement requiring only that the witness testify fully and truthfully is valid. ( People v. Fields [(1983)] 35 Cal.3d 329, 361 [197 Cal. Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680]; People v. Lyons (1958) 50 Cal.2d 245, 266 [324 P.2d 556].) (Italics added, fn. deleted.) (14b) Barrett's testimony was admissible because the only condition remaining at the time of trial was that she testify completely and truthfully. As to Eckstrom's testimony, we need not reach the issue whether the no-injury-to-the-victim condition in her plea agreement is impermissibly coercive under the rule of Medina, supra, 41 Cal. App.3d 438. (See People v. Knox (1979) 95 Cal. App.3d 420, 430-431 [157 Cal. Rptr. 238].) Defendant has not shown any prejudice from the allegedly coercive condition. The prosecution's case did not depend substantially on Eckstrom's accomplice testimony. Defendant's several detailed pretrial admissions of guilt were the cornerstone of the case against him. The accomplice testimony served primarily to supply details and to clarify occasional vagueness in defendant's admissions. In view of the abundant corroborating circumstances showing that Eckstrom was testifying truthfully, including defendant's pretrial admissions, Barrett's testimony, and the physical evidence, there was no reversible error in allowing the testimony. ( People v. Watson (1979) 89 Cal. App.3d 376, 381-382 [152 Cal. Rptr. 471]; People v. Sepeda (1977) 66 Cal. App.3d 700, 708-709 [136 Cal. Rptr. 119].) (16) Defendant attacks the immunity agreements on other grounds as well. He suggests improper conduct by the prosecutor, cryptically observing that James Reichle, the attorney who negotiated the immunity agreement on behalf of Barrett, became Sierra County District Attorney shortly thereafter and before defendant's trial. Defendant's suggestion ignores the fact that his case was not prosecuted by Mr. Reichle or anyone on his staff, but by Special Prosecutor Gary Rossi, a former San Joaquin County deputy district attorney, who was specifically appointed to handle this prosecution. Defendant made no motion to recuse the prosecutor. He points to no evidence that Mr. Reichle or anyone under his supervision or direction either influenced or was in a position to influence the prosecution of defendant in any unfair way. In the absence of such evidence, we will not indulge in any speculation that the prosecutor did not exercise his discretion in an evenhanded manner or that personal animus, bias, or improper receipt of confidential information played any role in defendant's prosecution. (See People v. Hamilton, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 140-141; In re Charles L. (1976) 63 Cal. App.3d 760, 764-765 [132 Cal. Rptr. 840].) (17) Finally, defendant urges that Barrett and Eckstrom's testimony should have been excluded not only because they were accomplices, but because they were teenage sisters. Defendant cites no authority for the proposition that teenage sisters are incompetent or inherently unreliable witnesses. Although we have observed that minor accomplices may face parental pressure to testify and to blame others, including the accused ( In re Miguel L. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 100, 108-109 [185 Cal. Rptr. 120, 649 P.2d 703]), there was no evidence of any such pressure in this case. In any event, the jury was allowed to consider fully the credibility of Barrett and Eckstrom after full disclosure of their sibling relationship, their immunity agreements, their prior statements, and other factors relevant to their trustworthiness as witnesses. Because their testimony was not subject to any blanket rule of exclusion, their credibility was a matter to be weighed and evaluated by the jury. [5]