Opinion ID: 848632
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Compatibility of the Two Doctrines

Text: Defendants urge us to find that the two doctrinesthe common work area doctrine and the open and obvious doctrineare compatible and can be applied harmoniously. However, as noted above, for a general contractor to be held liable under the common work area doctrine, a plaintiff must show that the general contractor has failed to guard against readily observable and avoidable dangers.... Ormsby, supra at 54, 684 N.W.2d 320. Yet, one could replace the phrase readily observable and avoidable as used in Ormsby with the phrase open and obvious without significantly changing the meaning of this passage. Thus, an irreconcilable conflict immediately arises: one doctrine (common work area) imposes an affirmative duty to protect against hazards that are open and obvious, while the other (open and obvious) asserts that no duty exists if the hazards are open and obvious. [2] Because of this logical conflict, we have no difficulty in concluding that the open and obvious doctrine and the common work area doctrine are incompatible. The Court of Appeals recognized in this case that Michigan courts have not expanded the open and obvious doctrine into a general-contractor liability context. Ghaffari, supra at 614, 676 N.W.2d 259. However, the Court then proceeded to conclude that there is nothing in the history of the open and obvious danger doctrine ... to suggest that the doctrine should not apply in other contexts. Id. With this conclusion, we respectfully disagree. In addition to the logical conflict noted above, we recognize that there are several critical distinctions between the two doctrines that demonstrate that they serve different objectives. First, our jurisprudence makes clear that the two doctrines are applicable in entirely different contexts. The open and obvious doctrine is specifically applicable to a premises possessor. Lugo, supra at 516-517, 629 N.W.2d 384. The common work area doctrine, meanwhile, is not applicable to the premises possessor, but rather to a general contractor whose responsibility it is to coordinate the activities of an array of subcontractors. See, generally, Funk and Ormsby. In Perkoviq v. Delcor HomesLake Shore Pointe, Ltd., 466 Mich. 11, 643 N.W.2d 212 (2002), this Court recognized the distinction inherent in these two contexts. In Perkoviq, the plaintiff worker was injured when he fell from the roof while painting a partially constructed house. He brought suit against the defendant, the owner and general contractor of the subdivision development, on both premises liability and contractor liability theories. In reversing the Court of Appeals conclusion that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the plaintiff's premises liability claim, we observed: The Court of Appeals seems to have confused general contractor liability with the liability of a possessor of premises. In explaining its conclusion that defendant could be liable on a premises liability theory, the Court used analysis that was irrelevant to that theory and would be applicable only to a claim against a general contractor.... The fact that defendant may have additional duties in its role as general contractor, however, does not alter the nature of the duties owed by virtue of its ownership of the premises. [ Id. at 19, 643 N.W.2d 212.] Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals analysis, Perkoviq makes clear that different duties are owed under each doctrine, and that the legal analyses employed in the two contexts are distinct. Moreover, Ormsby itself implicitly recognized the fundamental difference between these two contexts. While a premises owner who hires an independent contractor is generally not liable for injuries that the contractor negligently causes, [3] we noted in Ormsby that a premises owner may still be liable for injuries to workers under limited circumstances. Where the premises owner retains sufficient control over the construction project, the owner steps into the shoes of the general contractor and is held to the same degree of care as the general contractor. Ormsby, supra at 49, 684 N.W.2d 320. In such a case, the owner would face liability under the retained control doctrine, which we described as standing for the proposition that when the Funk common work area doctrine would apply, and the property owner has sufficiently retained control over the construction project, that owner steps into the shoes of the general contractor and is held to the same degree of care as the general contractor. Thus, the retained control doctrine, in this context, means that if a property owner assumes the role of a general contractor, such owner assumes the unique duties and obligations of a general contractor. [ Id. (emphasis added).] Ormsby made clear that the owner's liability in such a situation would stem not from the owner's status as the premises possessor, but from his or her status as the de facto general contractor. In making such a distinction, Ormsby recognized the distinction between the duties a premises possessor owes by virtue of his or her status as a possessor, and the duties owed by virtue of retaining control as a contractor over a common work area. Because these dutiesarticulated in the open and obvious doctrine and the common work area doctrine, respectivelyare distinct, so too must be the doctrines that articulate such duties. [4] A second distinction between the two doctrines that our cases make apparent concerns the issue of worker safety. [5] We note that the application of the open and obvious doctrine in the construction setting would conflict with the reasoning underlying this Court's holding in Hardy, because it would largely nullify the doctrine of comparative negligence in the construction setting, and effectively restore the complete bar to a contractor's liability abolished when Hardy eliminated contributory negligence in that setting. In Hardy, supra at 39, 323 N.W.2d 270, this Court addressed whether the Funk policy of promoting safety in the workplace would be undermined or enhanced by the application of the principles of comparative negligence. In adopting comparative negligence, we observed: In Funk, this Court found the total bar of contributory negligence to be inconsistent with the public policy of promoting safety in the workplace. The Court refused to allow a general contractor and a landowner to avoid liability by pointing to the concurrent negligence of the injured worker in using the [unsafe] equipment. Before Funk, the contractor could entirely avoid liability by convincing the finder of fact that the plaintiff was even 1% negligent. Apparently it was feared that some contractors might succumb to the temptation of employing skilled defense counsel instead of adequate safety devices.... To allow defendants in this case to invoke the protection of the contributory negligence doctrine would be tantamount to subverting the very safety concerns that the ... Funk court[] extolled as of paramount importance. Such a position might allow a manufacturer to escape its duty of due care....    In stark contrast, the defense of comparative negligence never allows a contractor to entirely avoid liability and thus escape the duty of due care. Under Placek [v. Sterling Hts., 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979)], the defendant must pay the full percentage of damages caused by his negligence. [ Id. at 39-40, 323 N.W.2d 270 (citations omitted).] The adoption of the open and obvious doctrine in the general contractor setting would tend to thwart the goals of workplace safety advanced by our decisions in Funk and Hardy. If we were to adopt the rule set forth below by the Court of Appeals, we would effectively return to a contributory negligence regime. In such a case, no matter how negligent the general contractor was in creating or failing to ameliorate the hazard, the employee would be barred from recovery because the hazard was open and obvious. Hardy recognized that such bars to recovery provide a strong financial incentive for contractors to breach the duty to undertake reasonable safety precautions. Id. at 41, 323 N.W.2d 270. Indeed, such a rule might lead to a paradoxical result the more egregious (i.e., obvious) the safety violation, the less incentive the contractor would have to ameliorate the hazard, because of the knowledge that obviousness of the hazard would bar the contractor's liability for the resulting injury. Instead, Hardy adopted a comparative negligence rule on the grounds that such a rule retains a strong incentive for general contractors to maintain workplace safety. [6] Accordingly, we believe that Hardy supports the conclusion that the open and obvious doctrine should remain distinct from the common work area doctrine. As a third distinction between the two doctrines, we offer a final observation grounded in the nature of the different harms confronted in the realms in which each doctrine is applicable. In particular, there exist unique and distinct attributes of the construction setting that would make the rules applicable in the typical premises liability setting inappropriate. Construction sites typically involve the comings and goings of multiple subcontractors and their materials, a physical venue that is constantly being subjected to alteration, with any number of open hazards that are evolving by the moment. The hazards existing at construction sites are numerous and may typically come from any one of three dimensions, including from above. These hazards may often be in motion. Loud and sudden noises may surround and distract the construction worker, with many of these noises emanating from the dangerous activities carried out by fellow workers who may be near. Nonetheless, at the same time that he or she is confronted with such an environment, the construction worker must move at a business-like pace in order to carry out his or her jobone that may require considerable physical exertion, and require attention to detail and compliance with demanding professional standardsin a timely manner. This is in contrast to the typical premises liability case in which the open and obvious hazard is found on or near ground level, and in which distractions, although they may sometimes exist, are of a considerably less urgent and persistent character than those faced by the construction worker. While the construction worker still bears the responsibility of carrying out his or her work in a reasonable and prudent manner, the worker will typically encounter more dangers of a more diverse character, and more distractions coming from more directions, than will persons shopping in retail establishments or walking in parking lots or visiting the residences of others, and will generally be less able to avoid a given hazard than the typical invitee or licensee, even if the hazard may be seen after the fact as open and obvious. It is the general contractor who has the coordinating power and supervisory authority to ensure that this unusual array of physical risks does not devolve into chaos, and it is the general contractor upon whom ultimate responsibility for the safe completion of a project rests. As the overall coordinator of this activity, the general contractor is best situated to ensure workplace safety at the least cost. Because of this position, the duty to keep common work areas safe reasonably falls on the general contractor. As our analysis today attempts to make clear, the two doctrines at issue are independent of and distinct from one another. The open and obvious doctrine serves as an integral part of the definition of the duty a premises possessor owes invitees, Lugo, supra at 516, 629 N.W.2d 384, while the common work area doctrine is an exception to the general rule of nonliability for the negligent acts of independent subcontractors and their employees, under which an injured employee of an independent subcontractor [may] sue the general contractor.... Ormsby, supra at 49, 684 N.W.2d 320. The two doctrines involve completely distinct sets of plaintiffs and defendants, and therefore, as noted in Perkoviq, different sets of duties. Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals conclusion, this Court's cases have not suggested that the two doctrines are compatible, but rather have made clear that the rationale and practical considerations underlying the open and obvious doctrine are separate and distinct from those that underlie the common work area doctrine. Because we reaffirm that the two doctrines are, in fact, distinct, we hold that the open and obvious doctrine has no applicability to a claim under the common work area doctrine, and therefore the trial court erred in granting summary disposition in favor of defendants on the basis that the pipes at issue were an open and obvious hazard.