Opinion ID: 1176393
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Unanimity Requirement.

Text: (32a) Relying on People v. Dellinger (1984) 163 Cal. App.3d 284 [209 Cal. Rptr. 503], defendant contends that the court was obligated to instruct sua sponte that before finding defendant guilty of the murder of Ernest, the jurors had to agree unanimously on the act or acts which caused his death. Defendant maintains that the instruction was made mandatory by evidence that Ernest's death could have resulted from either the gunshot wound or the strangulation, or from the combined effects of both injuries. In Dellinger the defendant's conviction for the first degree murder of a two-year-old child was reversed on several grounds, one being the failure to give a unanimity instruction. Since the evidence showed multiple traumatic injuries as well as ingestion of a potentially lethal quantity of cocaine, the case was argued to the jury on both poisoning and traumatic injury theories. The court stated: ... there were several hypotheses as to which act or acts caused [the child's] death. As long as there are multiple acts presented to the jury which could constitute the charged offense, a defendant is entitled to an instruction on unanimity. ( People v. Dellinger, supra, 163 Cal. App.3d at p. 301.) Here, unlike Dellinger, there was no uncertainty as to whether defendant committed each of the potentially lethal acts: the evidence was undisputed that defendant both shot and strangled Ernest. The only plausible basis for requiring the unanimity instruction would be that the evidence regarding self-defense differed as to the two injuries. Under this hypothesis, a guilty verdict would require unanimous juror agreement on two points: first, that the particular act (either shooting or strangulation) was a cause (either sole or concurrent) of the death of Ernest and, second, that defendant did not have the privilege of self-defense when he committed the act. (33) The unanimity instruction is not required when the acts are so closely connected in time as to form part of one transaction. ( People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 282 [182 Cal. Rptr. 354, 643 P.2d 971]; People v. Thompson (1984) 160 Cal. App.3d 220, 224 [206 Cal. Rptr. 516]; People v. Turner (1983) 145 Cal. App.3d 658, 681 [193 Cal. Rptr. 614].) This branch of the continuous conduct exception ( People v. Diedrich, supra, at pp. 281-282) applies if the defendant tenders the same defense or defenses to each act and if there is no reasonable basis for the jury to distinguish between them. (See People v. Parsons (1984) 156 Cal. App.3d 1165, 1174 [203 Cal. Rptr. 412]; People v. Deletto (1983) 147 Cal. App.3d 458, 469 [195 Cal. Rptr. 233].) (32b) We need not decide in this case whether the self-defense evidence was sufficiently different as to each act, and of sufficient weight, to mandate the instruction on unanimity. Assuming arguendo that failure to give the instruction was error, no prejudice resulted. As previously mentioned, the jury found by its verdicts that Edward was killed by defendant, not by Ernest, and that defendant deliberated and premeditated both homicides. These verdicts necessarily imply a complete rejection of all the self-defense evidence presented by defendant. Thus any difference in the self-defense evidence as to the shooting and strangulation of Ernest was without significance and no prejudice could have resulted from the omission of a unanimity instruction.