Opinion ID: 4514230
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Surveillance Footage

Text: Next, we turn to appellant’s contention that the Bureau failed to justify withholding the surveillance footage under FOIA Exemptions (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(E), and that, even if withholding was proper, at least some portion of the video was segregable. On these points, we agree with appellant that the Bureau failed to justify withholding the footage on this record. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s judgment as to those issues and remand for further proceedings. We begin the analysis of the Bureau’s claimed exemptions regarding the entirety of the videotape with the underlying principles stated above. That is, the congressional philosophy in the adoption of FOIA favors disclosure, not concealment. To exercise the exceptions warranted by the statute, the government bears the burden of proving the applicability of the statutory exemption. See Summers, 140 F.3d at 1080. With respect to the claimed exemption under (b)(7)(C), in order to be entitled to summary judgment, the Bureau needed to establish beyond any genuine dispute that the disclosure of the withheld records “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (emphasis added). As discussed above, an agency claiming a FOIA exemption may carry this burden by the production of affidavits. Hayden, 608 F.2d at 1387. However, we remind the government that such “affidavits must show, with reasonable specificity, why the documents fall within the exemption.” Id. Further, we have long held that “[t]he affidavits will not suffice if the agency’s claims are 14 conclusory, merely reciting statutory standards, or if they are too vague or sweeping.” Id. The affidavit relied upon by the Bureau fails on all counts. It lacks specificity; it is conclusory; and it recites statutory language without demonstrating its applicability to the information withheld. More specifically, statutory Exemption (b)(7)(C) requires that, to be exempted, information must “constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). With respect to that claimed exemption, the Bureau stated that the “footage contained the images of approximately 70 or more other individuals” and, thus, disclosure of the footage “may constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy.” J.A. 27 (emphasis added). This will not do. To shelter otherwise responsive data under the protection of Exemption (b)(7)(C) by the terms of the statute, the government agency must show that the disclosure “could reasonably be expected to constitute an . . . invasion of personal privacy,” and that this invasion is “unwarranted.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). The language of the affidavit that the disclosure of the video recording “may” constitute an unwarranted invasion is far too vague and unspecific to remove all factual issue as to whether it could reasonably be expected to invade personal privacy and that such invasion would be unwarranted. So far as we know from the current affidavit, all information that would be revealed is that seventy or so inmates were eating a meal in a place where they were not only expected to be, but were required by law to reside. It is true that we have discouraged serial summary judgment motions after the government’s first loss. See Maydak v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 218 F.3d 760, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2000). We recognize, however, that responding to a request for videotape rather than printed data may have been a novel experience for the Bureau. 15 Therefore, it may be that on remand, the district court will permit more flexibility than in the customary case. It is further possible that the Bureau will be no more able to make a showing entitling it to withholding than it has so far. That of course leaves open the possibility that the court might grant a summary judgment in favor of Evans. Unusual as it may be, this may be the rare FOIA case that results in a trial in which the court would have to find facts as to the applicability of the exemptions. If in possible further proceedings, the Bureau is able to produce additional evidence supporting this claimed exemption, it needs to do so with specificity and without vagueness in such a fashion that the courts can say with confidence that the statutory standard has been met. In other words, as we stated above, the government may carry its burden by the introduction of affidavits, but only if “affidavits . . . show, with reasonable specificity, why the documents fall within the exemption.” Hayden, 608 F.2d at 1387. Even if we were to accept the Bureau’s current affidavit as adequately bringing the document within the protection of this exemption, we are still confronted with the vagueness of the government’s claim of inability to segregate unprotected data. As we discussed with the government at oral argument, if we assume that the video record does constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy as to individuals in the record, it is not at all clear from the government’s affidavit why it cannot segregate the portions of the record that do not do so. More specifically, we live in an era in which teenagers regularly send each other screenshots from all sorts of video media. Presumably, most of these teenagers have fewer resources than the United States government. It is not at all clear why the government could not at least isolate some screenshots that 16 would meet the same sort of segregability standards typically applied to printed material. The government further does not explain why it cannot by use of such techniques as blurring out faces, either in the video itself or in screenshots, eliminate unwarranted invasions of privacy. The same teenagers who regale each other with screenshots are commonly known to revise those missives by such techniques as inserting cat faces over the visages of humans. While we do not necessarily advocate that specific technique, we do hold that the government is required to explain why the possibility of some similar method of segregability is unavailable if it is to claim the protection of the exemption. The Bureau’s affidavit supporting its claim to protection of the data under Exemption (b)(7)(E) suffers from the same shortcomings as the other exemption claim. The Bureau argued that releasing the footage “would reveal the specific law enforcement methods employed in responding [to] and/or conducting the investigation into the prohibited conduct” and would “demonstrate[] the location of video cameras.” J.A. 27. Thus, prisoners could “modify[] their criminal behavior to prevent detection and circumvent the methods law enforcement officers use to discover the existence of and investigate the conduct of prisoners.” Id. We do not question the government’s good faith on this subject. However, we do note its vagueness and lack of specificity. For example, the affidavit does not even make clear whether the location of video cameras would be visible to inmates in the prison dining hall. Moreover, it does not address the field of view of any or all of the cameras so as to reveal potential blind spots—a concern first raised in the Bureau’s briefs. And it is not possible from the words of the affidavit to 17 determine whether the government is actually describing anything in the way of technique or placement of cameras that is sufficient to overcome the statutory presumption in favor of disclosure. Summary judgment on this issue would require that the Bureau show that there is no genuine dispute as to whether the placement and visibility of cameras is such that exposure of the video recording would in fact provide any new information not already available through observation by prisoners physically present in the dining room. Even if exposure of the cameras’ field of view would result with respect to some cameras, the affidavit does not establish that it would make an exempt exposure if only the views from one specific camera were shown; that is to say one camera location of which is readily visible, for example. Similarly, as to law enforcement techniques, if all the Bureau is able to show is that, when a prisoner does something violent, guards respond to the location of the violence and take action to control the prisoner, that is not likely to fall within the exemption. We understand that the Bureau may be concerned that if an affidavit were more detailed and specific, it might reveal information protected by the FOIA exemptions. This is not an insurmountable problem. True, we have many times reminded litigants that it is not necessary for district courts to conduct an in camera inspection in every FOIA case. Quiñon v. FBI, 86 F.3d 1222, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[I]n camera review should not be resorted to as a matter of course.”). However, this case may constitute an exceptional circumstance warranting such inspection if the Bureau continues to insist on the applicability of this exemption after remand. Indeed, as the present record is not sufficient to support summary judgment, such an examination by the court may be necessary should this case result in a rare FOIA trial. That is, in such a trial, the district court would need to make findings of fact as to the exemptions, and it is difficult to see how this could be done without more 18 than what the Bureau has offered in the affidavit. In summary, the agency’s declaration is too unspecific on its own to establish that withholding the footage under the exemptions is justified.