Opinion ID: 2332043
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Determining What Process Is Due.

Text: The due process clauses of the United States and Missouri constitutions prohibit the taking of life, liberty or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, sec. 1; Mo. Const. art. I, sec. 10. [7] The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that this prohibition imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of `liberty' or `property' interests. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). In determining what process is due in a particular case, a court first determines whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. Ky. Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989) (citations omitted). If so, a court then examines whether the procedures attendant upon the deprivation of that interest were constitutionally sufficient. Id. Under both the federal and state constitutions, [t]he fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard `at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333,, 96 S.Ct. 893 quoting, Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965); accord, Moore v. Bd. of Educ. of Fulton Public School No. 58, 836 S.W.2d 943, 947 (Mo. banc 1992). This does not mean that the same type of process is required in every instance; rather, due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972); accord State ex rel. Cook v. Saynes, 713 S.W.2d 258, 262 (Mo. banc 1986). Three factors must be considered in determining what procedures are constitutionally sufficient: [1] First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; [2] second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and [3] finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893; accord Belton v. Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 708 S.W.2d 131, 135, 137 (Mo. banc 1986). The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that some form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a [protectable] interest because the right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind . . . is a principle basic to our society.' Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333, 96 S.Ct. 893 (internal quotation omitted). When this hearing must be held and what procedural protections must accompany this hearing will vary depending on the interest at stake. Applying these principles here, this Court must first decide whether Ms. Jamison and Ms. Dotson have a protected liberty or property interest in not being listed in the Central Registry. If so, then this Court must determine whether the women were provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. If this process was inadequate, this Court must determine what alternative or additional protections are necessary to satisfy due process.