Opinion ID: 444533
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Application of the ADEA Standard

Text: 16 Neither party disputes the district court's ruling concerning the first two stages of the plaintiff's case. The district court held that Krodel established a prima facie case by demonstrating (1) that he belongs to the statutorily protected age group (40-70 years), (2) that he was, by the government's own admission, qualified for the position at issue, (3) that he was not promoted and (4) that the employee eventually promoted was outside the protected class. See ADEA Opinion at 26-28. This ruling comports with the governing law in this circuit, see Coburn, 711 F.2d at 342; Cuddy, 694 at 850-57, and it creates an inference that, absent any evidence to the contrary, the BHA acted for discriminatory reasons. The district court also held that the defendant articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action by stating simply that the agency selected the better candidate. ADEA Opinion at 28. 17 At this point, the parties were brought to the ultimate question of motive: the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant's proffered reason was merely a pretext for age discrimination. As the district court correctly stated, Krodel had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that age made a difference in the employer's decision not to hire him. ADEA Opinion at 27. This appeal thus hinges on the elements required to prove that the Bureau's explanation of the challenged promotion was a pretext for discrimination. The Bureau's argues that Krodel must discredit its explanation and provide particularized evidence of actual age discrimination in the specific employment decision at issue in order to meet this ultimate burden. Brief for Appellants/Cross-Appellees at 11. The district court, by contrast, concluded that Krodel could prevail by demonstrating that the Bureau's explanation was a sham and by offering additional circumstantial evidence of age discrimination in the BHA. See ADEA Opinion at 35-36. We conclude that the district court's approach was entirely correct. 18 In Burdine, the Court indicated that a discrimination plaintiff could satisfy his or her burden of proof in one of two independent ways:The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. She now must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision. This burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination. She may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. 19 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095 (emphasis supplied). In Aikens, moreover, the court clearly indicated that a discrimination plaintiff need not submit direct evidence of discriminatory intent. See Aikens, 103 S.Ct. at 1481 n. 3. Noting that trial courts should not treat discrimination differently from other ultimate questions of fact, id. at 1482, the court stated that the district court must decide which party's explanation it believes, id., on the basis of all the evidence before it. See Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 2794, 2799, 81 L.Ed.2d 718 (1984); see also Int'l B'hd of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n. 44, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1866 n. 44, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977) (Elimination of [the defendant's] reasons for the refusal to hire is sufficient, absent any other explanation, to create an inference that the decision was a discriminatory one.) 4 20 This circuit, in turn, has not required an ADEA plaintiff to offer particularized evidence of intentional discrimination in order to prove pretext. See Coburn, 711 F.2d at 344; Cuddy, 694 F.2d at 859; cf. Segar, 738 F.2d at 1302 (Edwards, J., concurring). In Cuddy, the court indicated that age discrimination plaintiffs almost necessarily have to rely on indirect evidence, including discrepancies in the defendant's proffered explanation, to prove that an employer was motivated by illegitimate concerns. 21 [W]hen weighing the evidence the District Court must keep in mind the difficulties plaintiffs face in proving ADEA violations. Employees and applicants for employment have great informational disadvantages: they cannot reach into the minds of decisionmakers, and therefore they usually can gather only circumstantial evidence of discriminatory motives. Hence, the trier of fact should take special care to require of plaintiff only that he present sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable person to draw from it the inference of the fact to be proved. Plaintiff-appellant should only have to show that age was a determining factor, as earlier defined, in the government's decision to hire someone else by a preponderance of the evidence. 22 Cuddy, 694 F.2d at 859 (citations and footnotes omitted). See also Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 597 (10th Cir.1980). At the very least, then, Burdine, Aikens and Cuddy make clear that an ADEA plaintiff who has established a prima facie case and has effectively discredited the employer's proffered justification need not, in all cases, submit additional evidence concerning the particular employment decision at issue in order to demonstrate that age was a determining factor in the employer's action. 5 23 In effect, the BHA argues that the plaintiff only proved, and the district court merely concluded, that the government made a poor promotion decision--a conclusion too weak to support a finding of pretext. Yet the district court clearly relied on more than a simple challenge to the soundness of the defendant's employment decision. Instead, it found that the government's version of the selection process was a virtual sham and inferred from this conclusion and the additional circumstantial evidence before it that age was a determining factor in the decision not to promote Krodel. We conclude, then, that the district court applied the correct legal standard to Krodel's age discrimination claim. The ADEA ruling can only be overturned if the district court committed legal error in considering the plaintiff's circumstantial evidence of age discrimination or if it made clearly erroneous factual findings. See Segar, 738 F.2d at 1272-73.