Opinion ID: 1764161
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Six-Month Suspension

Text: Next, Nevin contends that the punishment imposed was not commensurate with his conduct or comparable with punishments imposed in similar cases. Specifically, he asserts that he should have received a reprimand instead of a suspension because he did not intentionally engage in misconduct and no one was harmed by his conduct. He relies on Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility v. Maddux, 148 S.W.3d 37, 41 (Tenn.2004), in which this Court observed that suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in criminal conduct. He also relies on, among other cases, Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. McKinney, 668 S.W.2d 293, 299 (Tenn.1984), in which this Court upheld a public censure for misconduct that was grossly negligent but not intentional. The Board argues that the six-month suspension was supported by the evidence in this case and is consistent with similar cases. The Board cites Milligan v. Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility, 166 S.W.3d 665, 667 (Tenn.2005), in which this Court imposed a two-year suspension for a lawyer who misappropriated funds. We noted that [w]hether one concludes that Milligan's conduct was `criminal' . . . or a series of inadvertent mistakes . . . Milligan's conduct seriously and adversely reflected on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. Id. at 674 (emphasis added). Although Nevin's conduct was not as extreme as that in Milligan, there is no requirement that an attorney's actions be criminal before a suspension may be imposed. See Sneed v. Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility, 37 S.W.3d 886, 891 (Tenn.2000) (six-month suspension upheld for the attorney's negligent conduct). In Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility v. Bonnington, 762 S.W.2d 568 (Tenn.1988), an attorney served as the administrator of an estate and improperly withdrew funds from the estate for his personal use. We affirmed a four-year suspension even though the attorney self-reported the misappropriation to his firm, the probate judge, and the Board and made restitution to the client. Id. at 569-71. Similarly, in Dockery v. Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility, 937 S.W.2d 863, 863-64 (Tenn.1996), the attorney negotiated an automobile accident claim to settlement and deposited the funds in his escrow account. Upon settlement, the attorney failed to provide the client with an accounting or a statement showing how the funds had been disbursed. The hearing panel imposed a two-year suspension after finding that the attorney had commingled entrusted funds with his personal funds, had misapplied and misappropriated to his own use and benefit the funds entrusted to him, and had failed to maintain his records in a professional manner. This Court affirmed. Id. at 865, 867. In short, the evidence in this case supports the six-month suspension imposed by the Hearing Panel. The evidence showed that Nevin knew or should have known that his actions were improper and potentially harmful. Given Nevin's repeated misconduct in all three cases, one may infer that his conduct was grossly negligent, if not reckless. Moreover, as described above, the evidence supports the Hearing Panel's finding of aggravating circumstances and its finding that these circumstances far outweigh[ed] the mitigating circumstances. Although no cases are identical, our review of the case law reveals that the punishment imposed in this case is consistent with punishments imposed on attorneys for similar misconduct.