Opinion ID: 761499
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Denial of the Union's Motion to Intervene

Text: 34 The Union did not move to intervene in the District Court until October 3, 1997, several weeks after the District Court issued its decision in ABC II. The District Court ruled that it was constrained to deny the Union's motion for want of jurisdiction, because both Grinnell and DOL had already appealed to this court. We decline to decide whether the District Court had jurisdiction to grant the Union's motion. Compare Nicol v. Gulf Fleet Supply Vessels, Inc., 743 F.2d 298, 299 (5th Cir.1984) (holding that district court was without jurisdiction to grant motion to intervene once appeal had been filed), with Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 612 F.2d 131, 134 (3d Cir.1979) (en banc) (holding that filing of appeal did not divest district court of jurisdiction to grant motion to intervene). Instead, we affirm the denial of the Union's motion on the ground that the motion was untimely. 35 Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that any motion for intervention must be timely. FED R. CIV. P. 24(a). The Supreme Court has said that [t]imeliness is to be determined from all the circumstances. And it is to be determined by the court in the exercise of its sound discretion; unless that discretion is abused, the court's ruling will not be disturbed on review. NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366, 93 S.Ct. 2591, 37 L.Ed.2d 648 (1973) (footnote omitted). If the motion was not timely, there is no need for the court to address the other factors that enter into an intervention analysis. See id. at 369, 93 S.Ct. 2591. Where, as here, the District Court has not made any factual findings with respect to the timeliness issue (because it denied the motion on jurisdictional grounds), we must make our own determination. Cook v. Boorstin, 763 F.2d 1462, 1468 (D.C.Cir.1985). 36 A motion for intervention after judgment will usually be denied where a clear opportunity for pre-judgment intervention was not taken. Dimond v. District of Columbia, 792 F.2d 179, 193 (D.C.Cir.1986); see also Massachusetts Sch. of Law v. United States, 118 F.3d 776, 783 n. 5. (D.C.Cir.1997) ([S]ome would-be intervenors may inexcusably neglect to try to enter the proceedings before judgment, at a time when notice of their arguments would have enabled the district court to avert the alleged errors. Then, post-judgment intervention for the purpose of challenging those supposed defects on appeal would rightly be denied as untimely.). Here, the Union offers no reason whatsoever for its failure to intervene prior to judgment. 37 The Union cites two cases that reversed denials of motions to intervene, United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 97 S.Ct. 2464, 53 L.Ed.2d 423 (1977), and Dimond. In those cases, however, the necessity of intervention did not arise until after judgment had been entered. In United Airlines, the would-be intervenor found out only after final judgment that the plaintiffs did not plan to appeal the denial of class certification. See United Airlines, 432 U.S. at 393-94, 97 S.Ct. 2464. In Dimond, the potential inadequacy of [the existing parties'] representation came into existence only at the appellate stage. Dimond, 792 F.2d at 193. In this case, the Union sought to intervene simply because it wished to advance a particular argument on appeal that DOL had not explicitly advanced in the District Court. The Union has offered no reason, and no reason is apparent from the record, why it could not have sought intervention prior to judgment. Accordingly, given the presumption that post-judgment motions to intervene will be denied, we affirm the District Court's denial of the Union's motion. If the Union wishes to intervene in further proceedings, i.e., on remand, it may raise the issue at the appropriate time.