Opinion ID: 1388611
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Form of guilt verdicts.

Text: At the conclusion of the guilt trial, the court read its proposed instructions and verdict forms aloud to counsel, admonishing that [i]f I don't hear any objection, the Court will interpret [counsel's] silence as we go through these to mean assent. With respect to count two (the murder charge), instructions on three theories of first degree murder were proffered: felony murder in the commission of robbery, deliberate and premeditated murder, and murder by means of lying in wait. The court proposed that the jury be permitted to return any one or more of three separate verdicts of first degree murder against defendant. One specified that defendant was guilty of ... violation of section 187 ... (MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE UNDER THE FELONY MURDER RULE). A second stated that defendant was guilty of ... violation of section 187 ... (MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE OTHER THAN UNDER THE FELONY MURDER RULE.) A third declared that defendant was guilty of ... violation of section 187 ... (MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE UNDER BOTH OF THE AFORESAID THEORIES: to wit, UNDER THE FELONY MURDER RULE AND OTHER THAN UNDER THE FELONY MURDER RULE.) Defense counsel voiced no objection, and the verdict forms described above were submitted to the jury as proposed. The court instructed that the jury must agree unanimously on each form. The jury signed all three. A jury poll confirmed the result. Counsel never objected to the murder verdicts in the trial court. (22) Defendant now asserts they were defective. As he notes, in a criminal case, [t]he jury must render a general verdict, and may return a special verdict only when they are in doubt as to the legal effect of the facts proved, ... (§ 1150.) A general verdict upon a plea of not guilty is either `guilty' or `not guilty,' ... (§ 1151.) A special verdict is that by which the jury find the facts only, leaving the judgment to the Court. (§ 1152.) Defendant argues that a general verdict may not specify the theory of conviction, and a special verdict may not decide the ultimate issue of conviction or acquittal. Hence, he urges, the instant murder verdicts were neither general nor special, and were thus unauthorized. However, the point was waived by defendant's persistent failure to object or seek corrective measures below. We reject it for that reason alone. Furthermore, defendant cannot claim his counsel's failure to object constituted ineffective assistance warranting reversal. The forms returned by defendant's jury were not forbidden special verdicts, but general verdicts supplemented by special findings. (See People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 550 [257 Cal. Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244]; People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 537-538 [224 Cal. Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251].) We recently intimated that special findings may accompany a general criminal verdict, even if not expressly authorized by statute, so long as they do not interfere with the jury's deliberative process. ( People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 920 [254 Cal. Rptr. 508, 765 P.2d 940]; but see People v. Perry (1972) 7 Cal.3d 756, 783-784 [103 Cal. Rptr. 161, 499 P.2d 129].) Defendant identifies no deliberative harm that might arise from requiring the jury to agree on specific theories of first degree murder. In any event, technical defects in a verdict may be disregarded if the jury's intent to convict of a specified offense within the charges is unmistakably clear, and the accused's substantial rights suffered no prejudice. (§§ 1258, 1404; [20] see, e.g., People v. Radil (1977) 76 Cal. App.3d 702, 710 [142 Cal. Rptr. 233]; People v. Bratis (1977) 73 Cal. App.3d 751, 763-764 [141 Cal. Rptr. 45]; People v. McKinney (1945) 71 Cal. App.2d 5, 13-14 [161 P.2d 957].) The instant verdicts conclusively show the jury's intent to convict defendant of first degree murder as charged in count 2. Defendant's claim of prejudice is less clear. He implies that the special findings denied him the benefit of a long-established principle of appellate review. This rule holds that when the prosecution presents its case to the jury on alternate theories, some of which are legally [and factually supportable] and others legally [or factually defective], and the reviewing court cannot determine from the record on which theory the ensuing general verdict of guilt rested, the conviction cannot stand.... ( People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 69; see also id., at pp. 70-71.) But there is no substantial right to a verdict that is vulnerable in this respect. An accused suffers no cognizable prejudice when the trial court protects the record by directing the jury to agree unanimously on each alternate theory supporting the charge, and to disclose the results. Even if defendant's theory were correct, no prejudice would arise on these facts. Every first degree murder theory presented and found against defendant was amply supported. (See discussions ante and post. ) Hence, an undifferentiated verdict would not have changed the appellate outcome. No basis for reversal appears.