Opinion ID: 1347322
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: preemption under lmra

Text: If a state-law cause of action does not exist independently of a labor contract, it is pre-empted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985); Nash v. AT & T Nassau Metals, 298 S.C. 428, 381 S.E.2d 206 (1989); Butts v. AVX Corp., 292 S.C. 256, 355 S.E.2d 876 (Ct.App.1987). In Nash v. AT & T Nassau Metals, 298 S.C. 428, 381 S.E.2d 206, 208 (1989), we stated: This test is one of whether the state claim exists independently of the collective bargaining agreement or whether it is inextricably intertwined with a consideration of the terms of the agreement. If the state claim does not exist independently of the agreement, it is preempted by federal law. The Court of Appeals found Lewis' claim was substantially dependent upon an analysis of the IBEW constitution because interpretation of the constitution was essential to a determination of whether Lewis had any property rights in the pension benefit fund. We agree. Lewis' tort claim intrinsically relates to the nature of the IBEW constitution. His complaint states that the IBEW, in violation of the Right-To-Work Act, attempted to interfere with [Lewis'] exercise of his Right-To-Work and did, thereby cause him to lose his pension benefits, and that as a result Lewis has suffered the loss of his pension benefits. It is impossible to ascertain, without reference to IBEW's constitution, whether the union acted properly in denying Lewis his pension benefits. Accordingly, we concur with the Court of Appeals' analysis that resolution of the case was substantially dependent upon the union's constitution so as to be preempted under the LMRA. [9] Finally, Lewis relies on this Court's opinion in Layne v. Int'l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, 271 S.C. 346, 247 S.E.2d 346 (1978), in which we held, under similar facts, the plaintiffs state law claim under the Right-To-Work Act was not preempted by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. s 411 et seq. Layne dealt with Section 413 of the LMRDA which specifically states, Nothing contained in this subchapter (29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415) shall limit the rights and remedies of any member of a labor organization under any State or Federal law or before any court or other tribunal, or under the constitution and bylaws of any labor organization. However, Section 413 of the LMRDA limits its application to that subchapter of the LMRDA. [10] Section 413 of the LMRDA does not apply to Section 301 of the LMRA. To hold otherwise would completely eviscerate the preemption provisions of Section 301 of the LMRA. [11]