Opinion ID: 766904
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Quantity of Illegal Substances

Text: 43 The defendants-appellants each argue that the district court erred in calculating the quantity of drugs attributable to them. Lipscomb, Pigee, and Webb argue that the court erred by estimating that Frye and Lipscomb had sold Reagan Jones at least 15 grams of crack cocaine. Further, Pigee and Webb each claim that the district court wrongly attributed all transactions of their co- conspirators to them for sentencing purposes. Finally, Pigee argues that the district court erred in its ruling that he sold the crack form of cocaine base. 44 When choosing the base offense level in a narcotics case, the district court must take into consideration not only the drug amounts involved in the offense of conviction, but any 'that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction.' United States v. Howard, 80 F.3d 1194, 1202 (7th Cir. 1996), quoting U.S.S.G. sec. 1B1.3(a)(2) & comment (n. 2). See also United States v. Beler, 20 F.3d 1428, 1431 (7th Cir. 1994). This Court reviews the sentencing court's calculation of the drug amount only for clear error. See Howard, 80 F.3d at 1202 (citation omitted). We must be satisfied, however, that the calculation is based on reliable evidence; speculation and unfounded allegations will not do. Id.
45 The defendants first take issue with the fact that the trial judge calculated the quantity of crack cocaine constituting their relevant conduct based on estimates taken from Reagan Jones' testimony. Jones testified that he had bought crack literally hundreds of times from Frye and Lipscomb at various locations throughout Alton, and that he had bought crack hundreds of times from Frye and Lipscomb at their home at 539 Highland Avenue. Jones said that each time he bought crack from Frye and Lipscomb, he paid no less than $5-$10 and no more than $80-$100. Witness testimony established that, on average, $10 buys .065 grams of crack in Alton, Illinois. 46 The judge determined that Jones had purchased crack from Frye and Lipscomb at least 210 times and calculated that Jones had bought not less than 15 grams of crack from Frye and Lipscomb, noting that if we use the most conservative figures in applying them to the sales, it comes to a sum of approximately 52 grams. If Jones had spent only $11 each time he bought crack (which we know to be a conservative figure, considering Jones' testimony that he sometimes spent $80- $100, and never less than $5-$10), then he would have purchased no less than 15 grams of crack. 47 This Court has held that estimates of drug quantity are acceptable if they are based on evidence possessing sufficient indicia of reliability and not 'nebulous eyeballing.' Howard, 80 F.3d at 1204 (citations omitted). It is permissible for a court to take witness' estimates of the amount of drugs they purchased and multiply that by the minimum quantity sold on each occasion. See id. A court may also extrapolate drug quantities from the amount of money used to purchase the drugs. See id. 48 The sentencing court's calculations find sufficient support in the record before us. We therefore hold that the trial court was not clearly erroneous in its calculation of the amount of crack sold by Frye and Lipscomb to Jones.
49 As a co-conspirator, a defendant can only be held responsible for other transactions in which he did not participate that were reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. See United States v. McEntire, 153 F.3d 424, 438 (7th Cir. 1998). Pigee and Webb both contend that the district court erred in finding foreseeable, and thereby attributing to them, all of the offenses of their co-conspirators. 50 This Court reviews findings of fact made in a sentencing hearing under a clearly erroneous standard. See United States v. Purchess, 107 F.3d 1261, 1265-66 (7th Cir. 1997). 51 Webb argues that he was involved in 20 transactions. He claims that the trial court erred in its conclusion that the transactions between Frye, Lipscomb, and Jones were reasonably foreseeable to Webb because there is no evidence that Webb knew of, or was present at, those transactions. 52 Along the same lines, Pigee contends that the court erred in determining that any of the drug transactions at 539 Highland Avenue were foreseeable to him. Pigee asserts that there was no evidence presented to establish that he shared or pooled income with his co-defendants. 53 The record supports the trial judge's finding that the crack transactions involving Lipscomb and Frye were reasonably foreseeable to Webb and Pigee even if they were not actually present at each and every transaction. Melton Thomas' testimony established that Pigee supplied crack to Frye, and Jones' testimony indicated that the same is true of Webb. Therefore, the record suggests that not only did Webb and Pigee know of these transactions, but that they were working behind the scenes to ensure that Frye and Lipscomb had enough drugs to sell. Because the drug transactions involving Frye and Lipscomb were reasonably foreseeable to all individuals involved in the charged conspiracy, we hold that the district court did not commit clear error in holding Pigee and Webb accountable for the crack sold by their co-conspirators. 54
55 Finally, Pigee argues that the judge erred in sentencing him for distributing the crack form of cocaine. We apply the clearly erroneous standard to the trial court's finding. See United States v. Purchess, 107 F.3d 1261, 1265-66 (7th Cir. 1997). 56 The government is not required to perform scientific testing to determine if the cocaine base in question is crack. See United States v. Story, 137 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 143 (1998). Witness testimony alone may provide a sufficient basis for a trial judge to conclude that the form of cocaine base sold by the defendant was indeed crack. See id. In fact, this Court recently held that the testimony of addicts may establish whether crack was the drug involved in the transactions at issue, explaining that those who smoke, buy, or sell this stuff are the real experts on what is crack. United States v. Bradley, 165 F.3d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 1999). 57 In the instant case, Jason Dorner, an admitted crack addict, testified that he bought crack from Pigee at least 15 times. Because a court is permitted to rely on witness testimony in determining what illegal substances were sold, we hold that the court's relevant conduct determinations with respect to Pigee were not clearly erroneous.