Opinion ID: 2618915
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the worker in the road instruction

Text: The worker in the road doctrine evolved at common law, based on the recognition that a person who is necessarily in the street to do a certain job cannot do his job adequately and still maintain the usual standard of care required of pedestrians, especially in terms of maintaining a lookout. Because of the demands of the job and the amount of concentration the job requires, a worker in this situation is held to a lesser standard of care than the average pedestrian. The only Oregon case to rely on the worker in the road doctrine was Graves v. Portland etc. Power Co., 66 Or. 232, 134 P. 1 (1913). The plaintiff, employed by the United Railways Company to lay street-paving blocks, was struck and injured by a streetcar while he was working. Defendant claimed error in the giving of the instruction to the jury that said that a worker in the street does not need to exercise the same high degree of care required of an ordinary pedestrian. The court approved the instruction, holding that those persons engaged in work upon the public streets are not called upon to exercise the same diligence in avoiding accidents as pedestrians who use the street merely as a medium of locomotion. 66 Or. at 244, 134 P. 1. This rule was cited approvingly in McCarty v. Hedges et al., 212 Or. 497, 518-519, 309 P.2d 186, 321 P.2d 285 (1958), even though the doctrine was not at issue. In that case the worker was near the ditch, rather than in the road. We believe that the worker in the road doctrine developed in order to protect workers in the road from the harsh results of contributory negligence. In 1913, when the doctrine was recognized in Oregon, if the fact finder had found that a worker was not exercising the same degree of care required of an ordinary pedestrian, the fact finder probably would have found the worker contributorily negligent. This finding would have barred the worker from recovering any damages whatsoever. Courts recognized that it would be unjust to prevent an injured worker from collecting damages because he was paying so much attention to his required employment that he could not maintain a sharp lookout. Because of this, the courts created the worker in the road doctrine, which lowered the duty of care required of the worker, and circumvented this complete bar to recovery. This potential for injustice was eliminated when the Oregon Legislature adopted the law of comparative fault in 1971. Oregon Laws 1971, ch. 668. Since the effective date of this statute, plaintiff's contributory negligence is not a complete bar to recovery, if the plaintiff's fault is no greater than the combined fault of the persons against whom recovery is sought. ORS 18.470. We hold that because the adoption of comparative fault eliminates the previous bar to recovery created by contributory negligence, the worker in the road doctrine is no longer necessary, and is hereby no longer recognized in Oregon. The general negligence instruction [1] adequately explains the standard of care that the jury should consider. The question that the fact finders had to decide in this case was: Did Minato act reasonably when he stood in the center of the road as part of his job? His counsel certainly could argue that under these circumstances, Minato acted entirely reasonably.