Opinion ID: 1420164
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: {19} Defendant claims that his convictions must be reversed because they are not supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See State v. Baca, 1997-NMSC-059, ¶ 14, 124 N.M. 333, 950 P.2d 776. In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence used to support a conviction, we resolve all disputed facts in favor of the State, indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the verdict, and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Id. Contrary evidence supporting acquittal does not provide a basis for reversal because the jury is free to reject Defendant's version of the facts. See State v. Salazar, 1997-NMSC-044, ¶¶ 44, 46, 123 N.M. 778, 945 P.2d 996. However, determining the sufficiency of evidence `does require appellate court scrutiny of the evidence and supervision of the jury's fact-finding function to ensure that, indeed, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential facts required for a conviction.' Baca, 1997-NMSC-059, ¶ 13, 124 N.M. 333, 950 P.2d 776 (quoting State v. Garcia, 114 N.M. 269, 274, 837 P.2d 862, 867 (1992)). We apply these principles to our review of the evidence used to support Defendant's convictions for murder, tampering with evidence, and kidnapping.
{20} Defendant was convicted of first degree murder under NMSA 1978, § 30-2-1(A)(1) (1994), for the willful, deliberate and premeditated killing of the victim without lawful justification or excuse. The jury was instructed on the elements of willful and deliberate murder in accordance with UJI 14-201 NMRA 1998. These elements are: 1. The defendant killed [the victim]; 2. The killing was with the deliberate intention to take away the life of [the victim]; 3. This happened in New Mexico on or about the 20th day of December, 1994. We conclude that there is sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to have found each of the essential elements of this crime beyond a reasonable doubt. {21} At trial, several witnesses testified that they saw the victim alive on the morning of December 20, 1994. The State presented evidence that the victim's body was discovered in a dumpster in Albuquerque between 10:30 and 11:30 p.m. that evening, and that the victim probably was killed within hours of the discovery of her body. This evidence is adequate to support the conclusion that the killing happened on or about the 20th day of December 1994. {22} The State presented several witnesses whose testimony connected Defendant with the crime by establishing that: (1) Defendant was the last person seen with the victim on the date of the killing; (2) the victim was given several hundred dollars in cash the night before she met with Defendant for the last time; (3) Defendant was seen with several hundred dollars in cash after his last meeting with the victim; (4) Defendant told a friend he obtained the cash after killing someone and throwing the body in the trash; (5) Defendant told the arresting officer that he had killed someone in New Mexico; (6) Defendant's recent break-up with the victim provided him with a motive for killing her; (7) prior to the killing, Defendant had threatened to kill the victim after seeing her with another man; (8) on the date of the killing, Defendant told a friend that the victim had gone to Mexico; and (9) Defendant fled New Mexico shortly after he was informed that the victim's body had been discovered. {23} When viewed as a whole in the light most favorable to the State, this evidence is adequate to support the conclusion that Defendant killed the victim. Just because the evidence supporting the conviction was circumstantial does not mean it was not substantial evidence. State v. Duran, 107 N.M. 603, 605, 762 P.2d 890, 892 (1988). Further, just because each component may be insufficient to support the conviction when viewed alone does not mean the evidence cannot combine to form substantial, or even overwhelming, support for the conviction when viewed as a whole. See State v. Motes, 118 N.M. 727, 730, 885 P.2d 648, 651 (1994). {24} The State's medical investigator testified that the victim was killed by ligature strangulation, taped into a fetal position, covered with plastic bags, and placed in a dumpster without identification. According to the medical investigator, it takes at least several minutes to kill a person in this manner. When combined with the evidence concerning Defendant's motive for the killing, this evidence concerning the method used to kill the victim provides adequate support for the conclusion that the killing was with the deliberate intention to take away the life of the victim. See Motes, 118 N.M. at 729-30, 885 P.2d at 650-51 (reasoning that evidence concerning method and motive supported the conclusion that the defendant acted with deliberate intent); cf. State v. Smith, 76 N.M. 477, 482, 416 P.2d 146, 149-50 (1966) (noting that jury may consider the relationship of the parties and the animus of the accused toward the deceased). Thus, there is sufficient evidence to support each element required to sustain Defendant's conviction for first degree murder under Section 30-2-1(A)(1), and we need not consider felony murder as an alternative basis for affirming Defendant's murder conviction.
{25} Defendant was convicted of tampering with evidence under NMSA 1978, § 30-22-5 (1963). The jury was instructed on the elements of this crime in accordance with UJI 14-2241 NMRA 1998. These elements are: 1. The defendant hid or placed the body of [the victim] in a dumpster; 2. The defendant intended to prevent the apprehension, prosecution or conviction of himself; 3. This happened in New Mexico on or about the 20th day of December, 1994. We conclude that there is sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to have found each of the essential elements of this crime beyond a reasonable doubt. {26} According to one of the State's witnesses, on the date the victim's body was discovered, Defendant stated that he had killed someone and thrown the body in the trash. Combined with the other evidence linking Defendant to the murder, it was reasonable for the jury to infer from this statement that Defendant not only killed the victim, but also placed her body in the dumpster. Cf. Duran, 107 N.M. at 605, 762 P.2d at 892 (circumstantial evidence may provide adequate support for first degree murder conviction); Motes, 118 N.M. at 729, 885 P.2d at 650 (same). Further, based upon the evidence that the victim's nude body was found without identification, covered with plastic bags and duct tape, inside a dumpster, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that Defendant intended to prevent his own apprehension, prosecution, or conviction as the victim's murderer. See State v. Roybal, 115 N.M. 27, 33-34, 846 P.2d 333, 339-40 (Ct.App.1992). Thus, there is sufficient evidence to support each element required to sustain Defendant's conviction for tampering with evidence under Section 30-22-5.
{27} Defendant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony under NMSA 1978, § 30-4-1(A) and (B) (1973, prior to 1995 amendment), for the unlawful taking, restraining, or confining of the victim by force or deception with the intent that she be held for ransom, confined as a hostage, or held to service against her will, suffering great bodily harm. The jury was instructed on the elements of this crime in accordance with UJI 14-404 NMRA 1996 (withdrawn 1997). [1] These elements are: 1. The defendant took or restrained or confined [the victim] by force or deception; 2. The defendant intended to hold [the victim] for service against her will; 3. The defendant inflicted great bodily harm on [the victim]; 4. This happened in New Mexico on or about the 20th day of December, 1994. During closing arguments at trial, the State asserted that Defendant used force or deception to remove the victim's clothing, and that the held to service requirement was met because [n]obody gets wrapped in duct tape like that for fun. {28} On appeal, the State presents several alternative theories to support Defendant's kidnapping conviction. In particular, the State asserts that when Defendant met with the victim on the morning of December 20, he got her to go along with him through deception or used force to incapacitate her in some way. Also, to satisfy the held to service requirement, the State asserts that Defendant took the victim by force or deception to rob her, rape her, or convince her to break up with Antillon. {29} Applying the kidnapping statute in effect prior to the 1995 amendment, we determine that the evidence is not sufficient to support Defendant's conviction for kidnapping under any of the State's theories. Under this version of the statute, the incidental movement of a victim to a remote location for the purposes of facilitating a murder does not by itself constitute kidnapping. State v. Baca, 120 N.M. 383, 393, 902 P.2d 65, 75 (1995) (citing State v. Vernon, 116 N.M. 737, 741, 867 P.2d 407, 411 (1993)). See generally Timothy J. Snider, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Hold to Service Provision of Kidnapping Statute, 28 A.L.R.5th 754, 760-61 (1995). The legislature... did not intend that this scenario be construed as kidnapping, as evidenced by the specific enumeration of elements in our kidnapping statute prior to the 1995 amendment. Vernon, 116 N.M. at 741, 867 P.2d at 411. In particular, the benefit conferred on a defendant by killing a victim, or moving the victim to a location where there are fewer witnesses, is not the kind of service contemplated by the kidnapping statute. See id. {30} The State contends that a reasonable juror could still conclude that Defendant benefitted from kidnapping the victim by obtaining money, sexual gratification, or the opportunity to convince her to rekindle their relationship. See State v. Kersey, 120 N.M. 517, 520-21, 903 P.2d 828, 831-32 (1995). The present case is distinguishable from Kersey, however, because there is not substantial evidence that Defendant intended to hold the victim for service, or that he used force or deception to effectuate such an intention prior to the killing. In Kersey, 120 N.M. at 519, 903 P.2d at 830, there was evidence that the kidnapper purchased a pair of handcuffs and a security guard badge prior to the kidnapping. The kidnapper then took the victim from school and handcuffed him under the pretense of being a police detective. Id. The victim was later taken to a remote location where he was stabbed with an ice pick and strangled with an electrical cord. Id. Thus, the jury could reasonably infer from the purchase of the badge and handcuffs that, prior to taking the victim from the school in handcuffs, the kidnapper formed the intent to hold the victim by force or deception. Also, there was conclusive evidence that the force used to take the victim from school was not the same as the force used to kill him. {31} In the present case, however, there is no evidence of when Defendant acquired the means of incapacitating or deceiving the victim, nor is there evidence of how such incapacitation or deception was accomplished. Thus, one can only speculate that, prior to the killing, Defendant formed the intent to hold the victim for service against her will or used force or deception for this purpose. A conclusion based on mere conjecture or surmise will not support a conviction. State v. Bankert, 117 N.M. 614, 618, 875 P.2d 370, 374 (1994); see also State v. Benton, 118 N.M. 614, 615-16, 884 P.2d 505, 506-07 (Ct.App.1994) (The rule requiring that we indulge in all reasonable inferences supporting the conviction still does not permit us to speculate....) (citations omitted); UJI 14-6006 NMRA 1998 (instructing jurors that [y]our verdict should not be based on speculation, guess or conjecture). {32} The fact that there were no defensive wounds on the victim's body, without more, is not adequate to support the conclusion that she was incapacitated and held to service prior to her death. The State's medical investigator admitted that the bruise underneath the victim's scalp probably was too small to support the inference that someone knocked her unconscious, and that he could not tell from the physical evidence whether a separate strangulation, that only rendered the victim unconscious, preceded the victim's death. The medical investigator only discussed the possibility that the victim was bound in duct tape after the killing, not before. {33} The evidence that the victim engaged in sexual activity within twenty-four hours of her death also is not adequate to support the State's kidnapping theories. Unless the victim was incapacitated at the time of the attack, the lack of evidence of defensive wounds or forced removal of the victim's clothing is consistent with consensual sex, and the State admitted during its closing argument that the killing might have begun as a consensual sexual encounter. Further, the State's DNA analysis could not establish that Defendant had sex with the victim on the day of her death. Given the lack of physical evidence presented at trial, a reasonable jury could not have found that Defendant held the victim to service for sexual purposes without relying on speculation. {34} Finally, Defendant's kidnapping conviction does not find adequate support in the fact that the money the victim had received was missing from her body when it was discovered in the dumpster. When robbery is used to satisfy the held to service requirement for kidnapping, the State must show that robbery was the goal of the kidnapping. See Vernon, 116 N.M. at 740, 867 P.2d at 410; State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554, 570-71, 817 P.2d 1196, 1212-13 (1991). In this case, the testimony of Defendant's friend, Camacho, was used to support the inference that Defendant had taken the money from the victim. According to Camacho, however, the purpose of the job Defendant told him about was murder, not robbery. Thus, Camacho's testimony supports Defendant's conviction for murder, not kidnapping. {35} As in Benton, 118 N.M. at 616, 884 P.2d at 507, we cannot articulate the analysis by which a rational jury could have found the[ ] elements [of kidnapping] on the basis of the bare-bones evidence presented below. Therefore, we must reverse Defendant's conviction and sentence for kidnapping. Our reversal of Defendant's conviction and sentence for kidnapping makes it unnecessary for us to reach the question of whether Defendant's constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy was violated, or whether any of the other issues raised by Defendant affect his kidnapping conviction.