Opinion ID: 844257
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged taint of preadvisement questioning

Text: Defendant was arrested and asked some questions before he was advised of his Miranda rights. Some of the inquiries involved standard booking information. However, he was also asked about his hobbies. Defendant said they included martial arts. The officers asked a series of followup questions, culminating in defendant's statement that he practiced various elements of the martial arts with a teacher at night in a park, including the art of invisibility, the art of escape, and the art of tools, the art of climbing, the art of . . . how to kill somebody and stuff like that. At the suppression hearing, the court excluded all of the incriminating, nonbooking statements that defendant made before he was advised of his Miranda rights. [23] Defendant contends that the incriminating statements he made after waiving his Miranda rights should also have been suppressed because they were tainted by the earlier Miranda violation. This contention fails. (8) Even when a first statement is taken in the absence of proper advisements and is incriminating, so long as the first statement was voluntary a subsequent voluntary confession ordinarily is not tainted simply because it was procured after a Miranda violation. Absent `any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free will,' a Miranda violationeven one resulting in the defendant's letting `the cat out of the bag'does not `so taint[] the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period.' ( Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298, 309, 311 [84 L.Ed.2d 222, 105 S.Ct. 1285]; see also People v. Storm (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1007, 1033 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 110, 52 P.3d 52].) Rather `there is no warrant for presuming coercive effect where the suspect's initial inculpatory statement, though technically in violation of Miranda, was voluntary. The relevant inquiry is whether, in fact, the second statement was also voluntarily made.' ( Oregon v. Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 318, fn. omitted; see also People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 639 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 612, 101 P.3d 509] [`A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement.'].) ( People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 448 [111 Cal.Rptr.3d 589, 233 P.3d 1000] ( Williams ); accord, People v. Haley (2004) 34 Cal.4th 283, 303-304 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 877, 96 P.3d 170]; People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1033 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544].) Defendant does not contend that his preadvisement statements were involuntary. Rather, relying on People v. Honeycutt (1977) 20 Cal.3d 150 [141 Cal.Rptr. 698, 570 P.2d 1050] ( Honeycutt ), he contends his subsequent statements should have been suppressed because the police softened him up with the earlier questions, employ[ing] the tactic of ingratiating themselves with [him] by asking him seemingly innocuous questions about his school, his roommates, his hobbies. . . . [24] Honeycutt, supra, 20 Cal.3d 150, is distinguishable on its facts. Detective Williams, whom Honeycutt called Mr. Johnnie, had known Honeycutt through police contacts for 10 years. By contrast, Honeycutt was hostile to the other interrogating officer, calling him racist epithets and spitting at him. After that officer left the interrogation room, Williams engaged defendant in a half-hour unrecorded discussion. Williams testified that they discussed unrelated past events and former acquaintances and, finally, the victim. Williams mentioned that the victim had been a suspect in a homicide case and was thought to have homosexual tendencies. Although he stated that he did not expect defendant to talk about the offense, Williams testified that `It was my duty to continue the efforts to try to get him to talk. And I was successful in it.' In the course of their interview Williams `could see that [defendant] was softening up.' Williams said that they stayed away from a discussion of the offense, but by the end of the half-hour defendant indicated that he would talk about the homicide. ( Honeycutt, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 158.) After being advised of his Miranda rights, Honeycutt waived them and confessed to the killing. ( Honeycutt, at p. 159.) This court ruled the confession inadmissible in any retrial because the waiver resulted from a clever softening-up of a defendant through disparagement of the victim and ingratiating conversation . . . . ( Id. at p. 160.) Here the preadvisement interrogation was recorded. Reviewing it, we find neither of the two salient features of Honeycutt. The interrogating officers, who apparently had no prior relationship with defendant, did not seek to ingratiate themselves with him by discussing unrelated past events and former acquaintances. ( Honeycutt, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 158.) Nor did they disparage his victims. ( Ibid. ) Defendant's reliance on Honeycutt, therefore, is misplaced ( People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 602 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224]; People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 511 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032]), as is his reliance on Missouri v. Seibert (2004) 542 U.S. 600 [159 L.Ed.2d 643, 124 S.Ct. 2601]. Unlike Seibert, there is no evidence here that the officers were following a policy of disregarding the teaching of Miranda.  ( Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 448.)