Opinion ID: 2609845
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Official Capacity Actions

Text: Appellant Sheriff Dovala argues that the plain language of the State Self-Insurance Act does not distinguish between official capacity and individual capacity § 1983 actions and, therefore, the act covers him whether the action is brought against him in his individual or in his official capacity. Appellee, the risk manager of the State Self-Insurance Act (risk manager), asserts that a § 1983 action against a governmental agent in his or her official capacity is no different than suing the governmental entity whom the governmental agent represents and since local governments, like Natrona County, are not covered by the State Self-Insurance Act, then the act does not cover the sheriff of Natrona County when sued in his official capacity. The United States Supreme Court, in Kentucky v. Graham, explained that a § 1983 action against a governmental officer in his or her official capacity is to be treated as a suit against the government agency, who is the real party in interest. 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). That court reaffirmed the holding in Graham when it said, the real party in interest in an official-capacity suit is the governmental entity and not the named official   . Hafer v. Melo, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 358, 361, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991). Therefore, based on the United States Supreme Court's construction of the federal legislation 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the suit against Sheriff Dovala in his official capacity should be treated as a suit against the governmental entity for which he is an agent. Sheriff Dovala counters this conclusion by asserting that the plain language of the State Self-Insurance Act does not exclude coverage of official capacity claims and that federal case law should not control the interpretation of a state statute. The section of the act which grants coverage of peace officers sued under § 1983, 1-41-103(c)(iv), states: Expenditures shall be made out of the self-insurance account for the following claims which have been settled or reduced to final judgment:       (iv) Claims against a peace officer employed by    a local government arising under 42 U.S.C. 1983   [.] We agree that federal case law has no binding effect on the construction of a Wyoming statute. We are, however, bound by federal case law in determining what types of claims may arise under 42 U.S.C. 1983. As was previously noted, a claim which is brought against a peace officer in his or her official capacity is actually against a governmental entity not a claim against a peace officer. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165, 105 S.Ct. at 3105, Hafer, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. at 361. Therefore, the only claim against a peace officer which can arise under 42 U.S.C. 1983 is a suit against the peace officer in his or her individual or personal capacity. Since a § 1983 suit against a peace officer in his or her official capacity is a claim against his or her county, not a claim against the peace officer, it is not covered by the State Self-Insurance Act. It is undisputed that the State Self-Insurance Act does not provide coverage to local governments, including county governments. Natrona County is the entity which Sheriff Dovala represents. Sheriff Dovala is a county sheriff, and a county sheriff is a county officer. W.S. 18-3-102 (Cum.Supp.1993). A county officer has his or her office in the county and is paid by the county. W.S. 18-3-103 and -107 (Cum.Supp.1993). The county sheriff manages the county jail for the county commissioners, but the county commissioners control the construction, necessary repairs and the settling of expenses for the jail. W.S. 18-6-201, 18-6-302, 18-6-303 (1977 & Cum.Supp.1993). Therefore, a § 1983 action against Sheriff Dovala in his official capacity is really a § 1983 action against Natrona County, which is not covered by the State Self-Insurance Act.