Opinion ID: 1622857
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether appellant was denied a fair trial by the introduction of other offense evidence without a cautionary instruction to the jury?

Text: At the trial of Appellant Frank Hudgins, Cornell Clark was called to testify concerning the various activities that he and Frank Hudgins had undertaken in the past. During this testimony, however, the following exchange took place between the prosecuting attorney and Cornell Clark: Q. Whose idea was it to plant the marihuana? A. Frank. Q. You said that you first met him three years ago. When did he first discuss planting marihuana? A. The first year I seen him. Second year after I met him. Q. I beg your pardon? A. I believe the first or second year after meeting him. Q. All right. Was marihuana, in fact, planted? A. We tried it but it didn't work. Q. Where did you try to plant it? A. That was on the place, first time. Q. Whose place? A. My daddy's. Q. All right, where did  BY MR. MOORE: Your Honor, we're going to object to this. This is a surprise. We're not prepared for any sort of farming activities on his place, three years before this. BY THE COURT: The objection is overruled. BY MR. SNYDER: (To the witness) Q. All right, after this did you try to plant some on Mr. Lehman's place? Appellant maintains that the admission of the above other offense testimony without a limiting instruction to the jury constituted reversible error. Although not raised as a direct issue, this alleged erroneous admission of evidence invokes Rule 103 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. Rule 103 provides in pertinent part: (a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and (1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; ... Miss.R.Evid. 103(a)(1). Under Rule 103, an admission of improper evidence will lead to reversal only when: 1) it affects a substantial right of the party, and 2) when an objection to the evidence appears on the record. Considering these two factors, this Court has held that the receipt of improper evidence by the trial court is reversible error when it affects a defendant's right to a fair trial. See Hall v. State, 539 So.2d 1338 (Miss. 1989); Darby v. State, 538 So.2d 1168 (Miss. 1989). Under this proposition, this Court would show that when faced with the objection to improper evidence, the trial judge had two choices. First, he could have sustained the objection and admonished the jury accordingly, or next, he could have allowed the evidence and given a specific cautionary instruction to the jury at trial's end. The lower Court did neither. Consequently, Appellant was prejudiced by the introduction of the other offense testimony which resulted in the denial of a fair trial. See Tobias v. State, 472 So.2d 398 (Miss. 1985). On these findings, the lower court must be reversed. Appellant's first assignment of error has merit. Because reversal is required on this ground, appellant's second assignment of error is moot. This Court does, however, note that the opinions given by Deputy R.W. Miller in the initial trial were improper. As such, this Court is in hope that Deputy Miller will restrain his testimony to the facts in the future proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON and BLASS, JJ., concur.