Opinion ID: 2230827
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: date of last injurious exposure

Text: DeMarco argues that the trial court erred in finding that Olivotto's date of last injurious exposure to asbestos was september 30, 1980. DeMarco was unable to locate any of its insurance records for the period of 1954 through 1980. The records of the compensation court disclose only certain periods of coverage. The trial court found that Olivotto experienced a generalized exposure to asbestos in the work environment from the beginning of his employment until his retirement in 1980. It concluded that the last injurious exposure occurred on the final day Olivotto worked for DeMarco, which the court found was september 30, 1980. This court addressed the issue of the date of last injurious exposure in Morris v. Nebraska Health System, 266 Neb. 285, 664 N.W.2d 436 (2003). Barbara Morris ceased her employment with Nebraska Health system on october 9, 1998, when she suffered a reaction to latex that required her to seek emergency medical treatment. She had noticed symptoms later associated with an allergy to latex in the 1980's, but the allergy was not diagnosed until 1997, when her employer was the University of Nebraska Medical Center. In determining her date of last injurious exposure, we stated it was necessary to first determine the date of disability and then search backward to find the last causal relationship between the exposure and the disability. We determined that the date of disability was october 9, 1998, the date of the injury resulting in Morris' disability. We concluded that the record supported the trial court's findings that the exposure on october 9 bore the requisite causal relationship to her disability and that the trial court's finding that Nebraska Health system was responsible for her benefits was not clearly wrong. Because Morris' employment with Nebraska Health system on the date of her disability exposed her to latex, that employer was properly held liable for her compensation benefits under the last injurious exposure rule. In Osteen v. A.C. and S., Inc., 209 Neb. 282, 290-91, 307 N.W.2d 514, 520 (1981), we stated: The last injurious exposure, to be injurious, must indeed bear a causal relationship to the disease. However, according to the authorities, this means simply that the exposure must be of the type which could cause the disease, given prolonged exposure. As described in Mathis v. State Accident Insurance Fund, 10 Or.App. 139, 499 P.2d 1331 (1972), an exposure which will support imposition of liability under this rule need not be proved to have been a material contributing cause of the disease. Indeed, to so require would bring the employee back to square one by requiring proof of the unprovable and litigation of the unlitigable. Holden v. Willamette Industries, Inc., supra [28 Or. App. 613, 560 P.2d 298] at 301 [(1977)]. As Larson notes at 17-87: [o]nce the requirement of some contributing exposure has been met, courts . . . will not go on to weigh the relative amount or duration of the exposure under various employers. . . . as a result, in some cases carriers and employers that have been on the risk for relatively brief periods, perhaps only a few weeks, have nevertheless been charged with full liability for a condition that had developed over a number of years. In Hull v. Aetna Ins. Co., 247 Neb. 713, 529 N.W.2d 783 (1995), the employee suffered from contact dermatitis due to substances in the workplace in 1960 and 1987 through 1990. The occupational disease did not manifest itself to a level of disability until March 1989. We stated: Where an occupational disease results from the continual absorption of small quantities of some deleterious substance from the environment of the employment over a considerable period of time, an afflicted employee can be held to be injured only when the accumulated effects of the substance manifest themselves, which is when the employee becomes disabled and entitled to compensation. . . . thus, the date that determines liability is the date that the employee becomes disabled from rendering further service. . . . . . . . The mere date of disability, however, does not end the inquiry. The second issue is the nexus between the exposure to the injury and the disability. In the case of occupational disease, liability is most frequently assigned to the carrier who was covering the risk when the disease resulted in disability, if the employment at the time of disability was of a kind contributing to the disease. The employer or insurer at the time of the most recent exposure which bears a causal relation to the disability is generally liable for the entire compensation. Id. at 719-20, 529 N.W.2d at 789 (citations omitted). Olivotto was injured within the meaning of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation act when he became disabled and sought treatment on January 29, 2003. Because he was not employed on that date, the trial court relied on the last injurious exposure rule to determine the date of the last causal relationship between his disability and his work-related exposure. There was no evidence that Olivotto was exposed to asbestos in any situation not related to his work for DeMarco. The trial court therefore determined that the last injurious exposure was the final date of Olivotto's employment with DeMarco, september 30, 1980. This finding of fact has the effect of a jury verdict and will not be disturbed unless it is clearly wrong. See Ortiz v. Cement Products, 270 Neb. 787, 708 N.W.2d 610 (2005). Although DeMarco asks us to find that the last injurious exposure was December 31, 1979 (the last date of record that DeMarco had workers' compensation insurance on Olivotto before he retired), we decline to do so.