Opinion ID: 295788
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: statements of the principal witness, miller.

Text: 28 In our remand to the district court, we noted Rhinehart's claim that perjured testimony was knowingly used by the state. 4 and ordered an evidentiary hearing on this point because the adequacy of previous state court findings has been subjected to serious doubt by new evidence contained in the principal witness' latest retraction. 5 29 The district court went somewhat beyond the scope of the remand order in its inquiry into matters other than the retraction by Miller. We shall, however, examine in detail the numerous statements which Miller has given during the course of these proceedings to illustrate our conclusion that the statements themselves do not substantiate Rhinehart's claim that Miller perjured himself with the knowledge of the state. 30 All told, Miller has related his side of this story six times! In addition to his testimony at trial as recounted above, he has signed five statements which alternately affirm and deny the charge that an act of oral sodomy took place. 31 (a) First statement, April 13, 1965, confirming the act. 32 Miller's first statement was given to Seattle police on April 13, 1965, while he was in the Seattle Youth Center awaiting placement in a proper home. It is consistent with his trial testimony, reciting his meeting with Rhinehart, the act of sodomy, the payment of $15, and a detailed description of Rhinehart and his apartment. 33 (b) Second statement, May 17, 1965, denying the act. 34 His second statement was given at the office of Rhinehart's trial counsel on May 17, 1965, prior to Rhinehart's trial, following his contact by Mrs. Lemmon. Miller there denied any sexual act with Rhinehart and stated that he had signed the original statement because of police pressure. Miller said he had gone to Rhinehart's home, confided his problems and received advice. This conflicts with Rhinehart's trial testimony to the extent that Rhinehart testified that while he did give Miller a ride in his car he did not take Miller to his apartment for any purpose. 35 (c) Third statement, June 11, 1965, confirming the act. 36 Miller gave his third written statement to the police on June 11, 1965, a month before the trial began. He reaffirmed the facts originally given as to the commission of the sexual act, etc., and explained the second statement by the promise of the ticket to Alaska. He said he had copied and signed a statement prepared by someone else. Subsequently he was told that he would not get the Alaska trip but instead was given $80 worth of new clothing and some cash. He repeated this explanation when he testified at Rhinehart's trial. 37 (d) Fourth statement, September 26, 1966, denying the act. 38 Miller's fourth statement was also given to Rhinehart's attorney on September 26, 1966, following the conviction but during the pendency of the appeal to the Washington Supreme Court. It is somewhat more consistent with Rhinehart's trial testimony in that Miller denied ever having been to Rhinehart's home. He said that he gave the statement to Mrs. Lemmon because it was true. This does not, however explain why he indicated to Mrs. Lemmon that he had gone to Rhinehart's home for counseling and now denies ever having been there. 39 This fourth statement was thus a part of the record before us when Rhinehart appealed the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus and it was this latest retraction that formed the basis of our remand to the district court. 40 (e) Fifth statement, October 28, 1969, confirming the act. 41 Miller's fifth statement was given to two members of the staff of the Washington Attorney General on October 28, 1969, following our remand to the district court. At that time, Miller was in the Oregon State Correctional Institution. Miller reaffirmed his trial testimony, and explained that he gave the September 26, 1966 statement to Rhinehart's attorney because he had gone to Rhinehart's apartment at the urging of a friend who said that Rhinehart had given him a car to search for Miller and that if Miller would go to Rhinehart's apartment, he (the friend) had been told that the car would be his to keep. 42 In fairness to counsel, we hasten to point out that Miller's fourth statement (September 26, 1966) stated that counsel had questioned him hard about all this and repeatedly warned him that he wanted only the truth, no matter how it affected his client. While Miller subsequently denied the majority of that statement, he specifically reaffirmed this conduct of counsel and we feel compelled to point out that there is no suggestion whatever that Rhinehart's present attorney who has handled this matter with considerable skill and diligence had anything to do with the substantive content of Miller's fourth statement. 43 At the conclusion of this fifth statement, Miller said it was made of his free will without coercion or promise of leniency. We think that statement is entitled to considerable weight since Miller was at that time in custody in Oregon. While he may not have been happy with it, Rhinehart apparently decided not to pursue Miller further since counsel stipulated that Miller's most recent statement would be admitted at the evidentiary hearing before the district court in lieu of a deposition where both parties might examine him. 44 (g) Conclusion. 45 At this point in the proceedings, we believe that the record before the district court, by stipulation of counsel, was such that further inquiry was unnecessary and that any doubt created by Miller's 1966 statement was dispelled. 6 On this basis alone we believe that the record fails to show either perjured testimony or knowing use by the state and that Rhinehart's writ of habeas corpus should have been denied. However, since the district court inquired further, we consider the remaining questions raised by the evidentiary hearing which ultimately led to the district court's order of retrial or release. 46