Opinion ID: 1450589
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bellevue Is Liable for Barfield's Overtime Pay Under the FLSA

Text: We review an award of summary judgment de novo, and we will uphold the judgment only if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom it is entered, demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the judgment was warranted as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Rubens v. Mason, 527 F.3d 252, 254 (2d Cir.2008). The record in this case satisfies this standard.
The overtime provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act states in pertinent part that no employer shall employ any of his employees ... for a workweek longer than 40 hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). In identifying the persons or entities who qualify as employers subject to this provision, statutory definitions sweep broadly. Employer includes any person other than a labor organization acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee. Id. § 203(d). With a number of exceptions not applicable here, employee references any individual employed by an employer. Id. § 203(e)(1). Employ is defined to include[ ] to suffer or permit to work. Id. § 203(g). Barfield concedes that the three agencies with whom she registered for placement in hospital health care positions each qualified as her employer. See Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1061 (2d Cir.1988) (holding that health care agency was employer of nurses whom it referred for various placements); see also Chao v. Gotham Registry, Inc., 514 F.3d 280, 286 (2d Cir.2008) (noting concession by agency that it qualified as employer of nurses whom it referred to hospitals for temporary assignments). She contends, however, that Bellevue also qualified as her employer and, as such, was obligated to comply with the FLSA overtime provision for any work she performed at the hospital in excess of 40 hours per week, even if no single agency ever referred her for that amount of time. Defendants acknowledge that federal regulations and our precedent recognize the possibility of joint employment for purposes of determining FLSA responsibilities. See 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a); Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d at 66. Indeed, § 791.2(a) speaks directly to joint employer responsibility for overtime, stating that all joint employers are responsible, both individually and jointly, for compliance with all the applicable provisions of the act, including the overtime provisions, with respect to the entire employment for the particular workweek, although [i]n discharging the joint obligation each employer may, of course, take credit toward minimum wage and overtime requirements for all payments made to the employee by the other joint employer or employees. Bellevue nevertheless contends that the district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that it qualified as Barfield's joint employer.