Opinion ID: 195655
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: legal standard used by the

Text: COURT AND GOVERNMENT IN DETERMINING WHAT EVIDENCE SHOULD BE DISCLOSED TO APPELLANT FLYNN
Appellant Flynn has framed much of his argument on appeal in terms of a Brady violation. Brady v. Maryland, 373 -9- U.S. 83 (1963)(holding that a prosecutor's suppression of evidence favorable to and requested by a defendant violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt or to punishment). Appellant points to statements in the record indicating that the Government attorney harbored an erroneously narrow view of what materials were exculpatory and should have been disclosed to the defense pursuant to Brady and its progeny. Flynn acknowledges that the Government provided certain disputed materials to the trial court for in camera review. However, he argues that the Government's erroneous view of what qualified as Brady, as a threshold matter, most likely resulted in the withholding of many other exculpatory materials from the court. He requests this Court to unseal the documents that were turned over, remand the case for further hearing in the district court, and order that the Government disclose all other Brady material in its possession. A careful and thorough review of the record supports Appellant's assertion that the Government attorney misunderstood the reach of Brady.3 However, in virtually every instance of 3 In one example of this misunderstanding, Appellant's counsel inquired whether any Brady material existed with respect to Richard Ferguson, a co-conspirator who cooperated with the Government. The Government attorney replied: First of all, it's not Brady material. If it's anything, it's impeachment material, if it is even that. Tr. (October 19, 1992) at 115. In a second incident, the Government attorney stated that: Prior inconsistent statements are not -10- dispute pointed out by Appellant and the Government, the Government attorney indicated on the record that all materials related to the witness in question were being turned over to the district judge for review.4 Appellant makes no argument that Brady. I'll be happy at some point to give Mr. Wilson a lesson in the difference between Brady and impeachment material, but there is a difference all the way up to the United States Supreme Court. Tr. (October 20, 1992) at 77. These statements reflect a misunderstanding on the Government's part of the Brady rule. The Supreme Court has clearly stated that impeachment evidence may well qualify as Brady material. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). As the Court explained in Giglio: When the 'reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,' nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within th[e] general rule [of Brady]. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154. The significance of the Government's failure to appreciate the nature of exculpatory evidence under Brady is demonstrated by its evaluation of materials related to the witness James Fitzpatrick, who was testifying about a robbery of his home. Tr. (October 28, 1992) at 115. The court reviewed these materials, which the Government had claimed did not fall under Brady, and disclosed them to the defense because it found that the materials contained exculpatory evidence. Id. at 121. The defense was able to use the materials quite effectively in the cross-examination of Fitzpatrick. Id. at 123-24 and 126-44. 4 All materials were supplied for the court's review regarding Brady or Jencks Act requests with respect to witnesses Laura MacPherson, Tr. (October 8, 1992) at 119-21; Anita Ramsdell, Id. at 217; Richard Ferguson, Tr. (October 9, 1992) at 225-26, Tr. (October 14, 1992) at 153; Sergeant Coleman Forbes, Tr. (October 15, 1992) at 123, Tr. (October 16, 1992) at 142; Terrence Kinneen, Tr. (October 16, 1992) at 91; Douglas Scamman, Tr. (October 19, 1992) at 172-74; Arthur Cosgro, Tr. (October 20, -11- the district judge erred in his understanding of Brady, other than pointing out that the judge never corrected the Government attorney when he mischaracterized Brady's mandate. Our reading of the record satisfies us that the district judge conscientiously reviewed all materials in question. Because Appellant points to no other evidence to indicate that exculpatory evidence was withheld in violation of Appellant's Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial, we affirm the district court's Brady rulings.
Appellant's other argument, that the Government attorney too narrowly construed the reach of the Jencks Act, has much more bite because the record indicates that the district judge adopted the Government's misinterpretation and ruled against several Jencks Act requests on an erroneous legal ground. Before discussing the legal error in detail, it is necessary to consider the purpose and provisions of the Act. The Jencks Act establishes procedures whereby a criminal defendant may exercise his limited right to obtain previous statements made by government witnesses that are in possession of the United States Government to be used for impeachment purposes. 18 U.S.C. 3500. Subsections (a) and (b) of the Act provide that prior statements are not subject to 1992) at 74; Linda Sherouse, Tr. (October 27, 1992 -- afternoon session) at 87; Thomas McQueeney and Brian Raineri, Tr. (October 28, 1992) at 17, Tr. (November 2, 1992) at 3-4, Tr. (November 3, 1992) at 219-20; James Fitzpatrick, Tr. (October 28, 1992) at 115, 121. -12- disclosure until the witness has testified on direct examination and are available only to the extent that the statements relate to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified. 18 U.S.C. 3500(a) and (b). The Act further requires the defendant to make a motion for production. 18 U.S.C. 3500(b). Subsection (e) defines statements subject to the Act as follows:
witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him;
electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said witness and recorded contemporaneously with the making of such oral statement; or
recorded, or a transcription thereof, if any, made by said witness to a grand jury. 18 U.S.C. 3500(e). At issue in this case is the reach of subsections (e)(1) and (e)(2) which first came into dispute on the third day of trial. 18 U.S.C. 3500 (e)(1) and (e)(2). Appellant's counsel was conducting cross-examination of Laura MacPherson, a teller for First N.H. who had witnessed the bank robbery. MacPherson testified that while she was being questioned by police at the scene of the crime, an officer was taking notes based on what she was saying. Appellant's counsel then called for a sidebar requesting that the Government turn over these notes pursuant to the Jencks Act: -13- Court: It isn't [Jencks] unless she's seen it and adopted it. Counsel: But if 18 3500 controls [18 U.S.C. 3500], as I read it, a statement that is taken down by anybody, she doesn't have to adopt it. If it's a written statement taken down by a person dealing with the subject matter in question, I'm entitled to it. And I refer to 18 3500(e)(2). Government: As I understand the application of the cited rule under Jencks, what counsel is referring to under (e)(2) is a mechanical recording or a transcription of a recording of some kind, either stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording or transcription of that recording; that is, a transcript. There is no such material as the statement is defined under Jencks as I read the statute in that rule. Court: That was my understanding of the interpretation of the statute, sir, and there are none of those stenographic recordings [or] transcriptions. Tr. (October 8, 1992) at 118, 121-22. While the Government attorney mentioned other recording, it is clear from a reading of the entire interchange that the court and Government attorney disagreed with counsel's argument that subsection (e)(2) of the Jencks Act encompasses oral statements made by witnesses that are written down by government agents as they are taking notes on the conversation, so long as such statements are substantially verbatim accounts. Further, the trial record is replete with statements by the court indicating that it viewed subsections (e)(1) and (e)(2) as limited to statements that are either adopted by a witness or -14- recorded through stenographic or some kind of mechanical means.5 This legal basis, cited as the ground for many of the court's Jencks Act rulings, is erroneous. Since 1959, the United States Supreme Court has held that the phrase other recording in subsection (e)(2) was meant to encompass more than mere automatic reproductions of oral statements. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 352 (1959); 18 U.S.C. 3500(e)(2). Following the Supreme Court's lead, this Court has stated that [a] longhand writing which the court found fairly followed the witness' words, subject to minor, inconsequential errors would fall within (e)(2). Campbell v. United States, 296 F.2d 527, 532 (1st Cir. 1961), on remand, 199 F. Supp. 905 (D. Mass. 1961), and supplemental op., 303 F.2d 747 (1st Cir. 1962), vacated on other grounds, 373 U.S. 487 (1963)(Campbell II); see also Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85 (1961)(Campbell I)(finding that typed interview report prepared by FBI agent based on notes taken during a pretrial meeting with a government witness may qualify as Jencks Act statements under subsection (e)(1), if it was adopted by the witness, or subsection (e)(2), if the report closely followed notes that included verbatim statements); United States v. Harris, 543 F.2d 1247, 1250 (9th Cir. 1976)(handwritten or rough interview notes taken by a government agent during a criminal investigation may contain 5 See Appendix I for examples of various Jencks Act rulings by the court that were, or could possibly have been, based on an erroneous legal ground. The examples in this Appendix are not meant to be exhaustive but only to point out on remand the more obvious rulings that were arguably based on legal error. -15- substantially verbatim recitals of witness statements producible under the Jencks Act). The Supreme Court has indicated, however, that Congress intended to limit subsection (e)(2) to: only those statements which could properly be called the witness' own words . . . . It [is] important that the statement could fairly be deemed to reflect fully and without distortion what had been said to the government agent.6 Id. at 352-53. 6 The remaining portion of this quotation in Palermo is worth citing here to provide the court below with guidance, on remand, in determining whether the disputed statements fall under subsection (e)(2) of the Act: Distortion can be a product of selectivity as well as the conscious or inadvertent infusion of the recorder's opinions or impressions. It is clear from the continuous congressional emphasis on 'substantially verbatim recital,' and 'continuous, narrative statements, made by the witness recorded verbatim, or nearly so . . .' that the legislation was designed to eliminate the danger of distortion and misrepresentation inherent in a report which merely selects portions, albeit accurately, from a lengthy oral recital. Quoting out of context is one of the most frequent and powerful modes of misquotation. We think it consistent with this legislative history, and with the generally restrictive terms of the statutory provision, to require that summaries of an oral statement which evidence substantial selection of material, or which were prepared after the interview without the aid of complete notes, and hence rest on the memory of the agent, are not to be produced. Neither, of course, are statements which contain the agent's interpretations or impressions. Palermo, 360 U.S. at 352-53. -16- In United States v. Newton, 891 F.2d 944, 953-54 (1st Cir. 1989), this Court rejected an argument that the district court erred by not conducting an inquiry into whether disputed notes were substantially verbatim statements by the witness pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3500(e)(2). We rejected the argument on two grounds: first because Appellant failed to make a motion on the basis of that subsection to the court below and, second, there was no testimony in the record to indicate that the agent [had been] recording the exact words of the witness. Id. at 954. In this case, however, Appellant's counsel elicited from a number of witnesses that agents had been taking notes as the witnesses were making statements; at sidebars, counsel specifically cited (e)(2) as the basis for his Jencks Act motions; and he registered, on the record, his disagreement with the court's and the Government's interpretation of the statute. Appellant clearly raised this issue to the court below and on appeal. After examining the record, we find that the district judge likely ruled against a number of Appellant's Jencks Act requests on an erroneous legal ground.7 Rather than 7 In all honesty, this Court has not always been as clear as it should have been in pointing out the distinctions between 18 U.S.C. 3500 (e)(1) and (e)(2). In United States v. Sep lveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1179 (1st Cir. 1993), this Court indicated that to be discoverable under the Jencks Act, a statement must be substantially a verbatim account and signed or otherwise verified by the witness himself. The statements in question satisfied neither requirement. It is clear from a reading of the authorities cited in Sep lveda, however, that this Court interprets the Jencks Act as requiring either a showing that the statement is a substantially verbatim account or that it was adopted by the witness. See, e.g., United States v. Newton, 891 F.2d 944, 953-54 (1st Cir. 1989)(concerning statement that -17- vacate the court's Jencks Act rulings, we choose to remand the case for the limited purpose of the taking of additional evidence while retaining appellate jurisdiction in the interim. We have previously noted the usefulness of such a limited remand, see United States v. Levy, 897 F.2d 596, 599 (1st Cir. 1990) (endorsing limited remand for purposes of clarification where ambiguities lurk in the sentencing record), and have employed the practice in several cases. See, e.g., U.S. v. Qui ones, No. 93- 1601, slip op. at 16-17 (1st Cir. May 20, 1994)(remanding for evidentiary hearing to determine whether sentencing departure was warranted while retaining appellate jurisdiction); United States v. Parra-Iba ez, 936 F.2d 588, 598 (1st Cir. 1991)(remanding for evidentiary hearing to determine whether error during Rule 11 colloquy was harmless while retaining appellate jurisdiction), remanded, 951 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1991). On remand, the district court should hold an evidentiary hearing and report its findings back to us within ninety (90) days. The hearing should be limited to determining whether Appellant Flynn's motions for production, which were denied on the basis of the erroneous legal ground identified in this opinion, should have been granted, and documents produced, under the Jencks Act. We intimate no view on whether disclosure of any of these materials was required. The district court arguably fell under 18 U.S.C. 3500(e)(2)); United States v. Gonz lez-S nchez, 825 F.2d 572, 586-87 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, Latorre v. United States, 484 U.S. 989 (1987)(concerning statement that arguably fell under 18 U.S.C. 3500(e)(1)). -18- should conduct this hearing, applying the legal standards articulated in this opinion and limited to examining whether the disputed materials contain substantially verbatim recitals of witness statements as defined under subsection (e)(2). If the court determines that the materials in question do not contain producible statements or that the nondisclosure of certain statements, while legal error, was harmless, it should supplement the record by setting forth its findings and explaining why a new trial is not required. If, on the other hand, the court concludes that the Government should have been required to deliver certain materials, or portions of materials, pursuant to subsection (e)(2), and that the error of nondisclosure was not harmless, it should vacate the judgment of conviction and grant Appellant Flynn a new trial. II. THE COURT'S ORDER OF $266,500 IN RESTITUTION AGAINST APPELLANT NEAL Appellant Neal alone challenges the court's restitution order of $266,5008 to First N.H. pursuant to the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. 3663, 3664. He argues that the district court erred, as a matter of law, by ordering him to pay full restitution of First N.H.'s losses from the robbery when those losses were not fully attributable to his offenses of being an accessory after the fact and money laundering. We review this claim of legal error de novo. See United States v. Savoie, 985 F.2d 612, 618 (1st Cir. 1993). 8 Appellants Flynn and Kenney were also ordered to pay restitution to First N.H. in the amount of $266,500. -19- In cases where a defendant has been convicted of specific federal offenses, section 3663 of the VWPA authorizes a sentencing court to order, in addition to or . . . in lieu of any other penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make restitution to any victim of such offense. 18 U.S.C. 3663(a). The following section, 18 U.S.C. 3664(a), directs the court to consider a number of factors, including loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense, in determining the amount of restitution to be ordered against a defendant.9 In Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 413 (1990), the United States Supreme Court interpreted these provisions as setting a maximum limit whereby restitutionary awards under the VWPA are not to exceed the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction. In objecting to the restitutionary award in proceedings below, Neal argued that he was compensated no more than $5000 by the armed robbers for assisting them in evading law enforcement officials and laundered about $14,000 of the robbery proceeds by purchasing a getaway vehicle that was later confiscated by the Government. In an order dated February 22, 1993, the district 9 18 U.S.C. 3664(a) directs the court to consider the following factors: . . . the amount of the loss sustained by any victim as a result of the offense, the financial resources of the defendant, the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's dependents, and such other factors as the court deems appropriate. -20- court summarily dismissed Neal's argument that he should not be required to make restitution in an amount greater than the proceeds that he personally obtained from the robbery. Order (Docket No. 302) at 3-4. While the court was correct in its view that the VWPA does not require restitutionary awards to be limited to the amount obtained by the defendant, the record gives no indication of whether the court calculated, pursuant to Hughey, the portion of First N.H.'s losses that were actually caused by the specific criminal conduct forming the basis for Neal's convictions. The VWPA, itself, does not require the court to make explicit findings to justify restitutionary awards. This Court has held that a district judge need not make open-court findings on the statutory factors when issuing a restitution order so long as the record on appeal reveals that the judge made implicit findings or otherwise adequately evinced his consideration of those factors. Savoie, 985 F.2d at 618. The record here indicates that the court ordered the same restitutionary amounts of $266,500 against Appellants Neal, Kenney, and Flynn. The record also indicates that in connection with the bank robbery, Kenney and Flynn were convicted of conspiracy to rob First N.H., conspiracy and interference with commerce by threats or violence in violation of the Hobbs Act, and the use of firearms during crimes of violence. Kenney was also convicted for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in committing the bank robbery, and Flynn was convicted of money laundering. In comparison with -21- Flynn and Kenney, Neal was convicted of being an accessory after the fact and money laundering. Given these factors indicating the disparate nature of Neal's criminal conduct, there is not an adequate basis in the record to determine whether the district judge found that the full amount of losses suffered by First N.H. was caused by the specific conduct that [was] the basis of Neal's convictions. Hughey, 495 U.S. at 413. Such a determination was required in this case even though Congress amended certain provisions of the VWPA soon after the Hughey decision as part of the Crime Control Act of 1990. See Pub. L. No. 101-647, 2509, 104 Stat. 4789, 4863 (1990). One of the amended subsections, codified at 18 U.S.C. section 3663(a)(2), expanded the definition of victim for purposes of restitution, providing in pertinent part that: a victim of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity means any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 18 U.S.C. section 3663(a)(2)(emphasis added). This broadening of the definition of victim appears to apply to cases involving mail fraud, racketeering, or other federal crimes that require proof of a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal conduct. This Court faced such a case in U.S. v. Cronin, 990 F.2d 663 (1st Cir. 1993) and decided that where defendants had committed various mail fraud offenses prior to enactment of section 3663(a)(2), restitution should be limited to the amounts alleged in the specific counts on which each defendant was found guilty -22- and not awarded for the full amount of losses stemming from the mail fraud scheme of which each defendant was a part. While the bank robbery alleged in the indictment in this case occurred subsequent to the VWPA amendments, section 3663(a)(2) does not appear to support the restitutionary award entered against Appellant Neal. Neal was convicted of money laundering and of being an accessory after the fact. Neither of these offenses involves proof of a scheme, conspiracy or pattern of criminal activity as an element. See 18 U.S.C. section 1956 (laundering of monetary instruments) and 18 U.S.C. section 3 (accessory after the fact). Accordingly, we remand the case with instructions that the court hold a hearing to determine whether the full amount of damages suffered by First N.H. are attributable to the conduct underlying Appellant's convictions.10 We leave the dimensions of the hearing, as well as the necessity vel non for taking additional evidence, in the sound discretion of the district court. Similar to the limited remand that we ordered with respect to Appellant Flynn's Jencks Act challenge, see pp. 16-17 10 We do not mean to suggest that on remand there is no possible basis for holding Neal accountable for the full amount of losses suffered by First N.H. We are only suggesting that the record, as it stands, does not indicate whether, and upon what evidentiary basis, the trial judge determined that the full amount of losses are attributable to Neal's criminal conduct. If on remand, for example, evidence is presented indicating that Neal played a significant role in helping the other defendants escape and that but for his actions, there was a substantial likelihood that the full proceeds would have been recovered, the court could well be within its statutory authority in imposing the full $266,500 in restitution. -23- supra, we will retain appellate jurisdiction and order the court to report its findings to us within ninety (90) days. If the court determines that the full amount of First N.H.'s damages were caused by Appellant's criminal conduct, it should supplement the record with these findings. If the court concludes that the full restitutionary award is not supported by facts presented at the evidentiary hearing, it should vacate the award and enter a new restitutionary order based upon a determination of that amount of damages suffered by First N.H. which is attributable to the conduct underlying Appellant's convictions.