Opinion ID: 1796752
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Whether Clinton Bailey's entire deposition should have been allowed

Text: The trial court granted a motion in limine limiting proof to matters before February 3, 1989, which was the last day of the Thompson-Wallace consulting agreement. Thompson wished to admit parts of Clinton Bailey's deposition concerning his opinion of Wallace working for Barton while consulting. Wallace moved to have Bailey's separation package introduced to help explain Bailey's opinion. However, Bailey had left Thompson in June 1989, and admission of the separation package would have violated the motion in limine. The trial court resolved the problem by admitting the entire deposition, over objection. Thompson argues that the trial judge committed error by admitting evidence which earlier would have been excluded under the motion in limine. The trial court reserves the right to revisit any motion in limine ruling if the evidence develops in a manner which the court could have concluded that other evidence is relevant. Gifford v. Four-County Elec. Power Ass'n, 615 So.2d 1166, 1172 (Miss. 1992). See also State v. Swann, 322 N.C. 666, 370 S.E.2d 533, 545 (1988). The standard of review regarding admission of evidence is abuse of discretion. Parties may liberally cross-examine proffered witnesses regarding bias and interest. Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So.2d 856, 875 (Miss. 1985). Likewise, a party may cross-examine a witness on the basis of his opinion. Morley v. Jackson Redevelopment Auth., 632 So.2d 1284, 1294 (Miss. 1994); State Highway Comm'n of Mississippi v. Havard, 508 So.2d 1099, 1102 (Miss. 1987). This Court cannot say that the trial evidence of Bailey's separation package was irrelevant, because it may have either created an issue of bias or interest or formed a basis of Bailey's opinion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in reconsidering its earlier ruling on the motion in limine.