Opinion ID: 2230457
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the standard of proof in guardianship proceedings.

Text: We first turn to the threshold issue raised by the guardian ad litem in his contention that the findings supporting the judge's conclusions are clearly erroneous if not established by credible evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. In support of this contention the guardian ad litem cites Doe v. Doe, 377 Mass. 272, 280-281 (1979), and Fazio v. Fazio, 375 Mass. 394, 400-402 (1978). Were we to accept this contention we would establish an exception to the general rule in civil cases that the proof must be by a preponderance of the evidence. 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2498 (3d ed. 1940). We have hesitated to make such exceptions in the past. Custody of a Minor (No. 1), 377 Mass. 876, 885 (1979). Such an exception should not be applied too broadly or casually in noncriminal cases. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979). As we examine the relevant Massachusetts cases the reasons for our previous exceptions to the general rule will become apparent, and it will be seen that these reasons are inapposite here. We confronted this issue, but did not decide it, in Fazio v. Fazio, supra , where we stated, We do not think it necessary to have protracted discussion of the applicable standard of proof in guardianship proceedings which do not necessarily or directly involve or result in a commitment, because, in the particular circumstances of this case, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, does not warrant the findings mandated by G.L.c. 201, §§ 6 and 14, regardless of which standard of proof is applicable. Fazio v. Fazio, supra at 401-402. Since this question was not argued in Doe v. Doe, supra , we expressly stated that we left the question open. Id. at 280. General Laws c. 201, §§ 6 and 14, the statutes concerning the appointment of permanent and temporary guardians, do not address the question. Our cases under G.L.c. 201 and similar statutes, however, establish the principle that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required when a person (1) receives a stigma at least as great as that flowing from a criminal conviction, and (2) faces a potential loss of liberty. Andrews, petitioner, 368 Mass. 468, 489 (1975). Since the ward here does not face a potential loss of liberty, Doe v. Doe, 377 Mass. 272 (1979), we must decide whether the stigma of being adjudicated unable to care for oneself by reason of mental illness is sufficient alone to require that it be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. For the same reasons that we articulated in Custody of a Minor (No. 1), 377 Mass. 876, 884-886 (1979) (determination that individual is an unfit parent is insufficient to entitle the individual to benefit of criminal standard), we think that it is not. Much of the confusion regarding the appropriate standard of proof to be applied in civil cases involving mental illness was recently resolved in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). In Addington, eight members of the United States Supreme Court held that a State must apply a standard of proof greater than a preponderance of the evidence in civil commitment proceedings in order to meet due process guarantees. Addington, supra at 432-433. Individual States, of course, remained free to establish standards of proof higher than this constitutional minimum, as we did in Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v. Hagberg, 374 Mass. 271, 276 (1978), where we required proof beyond a reasonable doubt in such a case. As we did in Hagberg, supra, we again state that we doubt the utility of employing three standards of proof when two seem quite enough. The clear and convincing standard suggested by the Supreme Court often serves as the functional equivalent for the more familiar `reasonable doubt' standard. Custody of a Minor (No. 1), supra at 885. We therefore decline to adopt an intermediate standard. While we recognize the vast differences between the appointment of a guardian for a mentally ill ward and the involuntary civil commitment of a mentally ill person, much of the Court's discussion in Addington of the nature and function of standards of proof is relevant here. The function of a standard of proof is to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). The standard allocates the risk of error between the litigants and indicates the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision. Addington v. Texas, supra at 423. In considering what standard should govern in a guardianship proceeding, we must assess both the extent of the proposed ward's interest in not being erroneously subjected to guardianship and the State's interest in protecting those who might erroneously be denied the benefits of guardianship under a more stringent standard of proof. This court repeatedly has recognized that confinement for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires society to bear the risk of error, and so has required the application of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in such situations. See, e.g., Andrews, petitioner, 368 Mass. 468 (1975) (beyond a reasonable doubt standard applied to possible commitment as sexually dangerous person under G.L.c. 123A, § 6); Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v. Hagberg, 374 Mass. 271 (1978) (commitment to mental health facility under G.L. c. 123, §§ 7, 8, may only be effected upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt). However, in cases involving no possibility of commitment but which might seriously impinge upon personal rights we have refused to apply either the beyond a reasonable doubt standard or the clear and convincing standard. In Custody of a Minor (No. 1), 377 Mass. 272 (1979), we held that the personal rights involved in a determination of parental incapacity and subsequent termination of child custody rights did not entitle the parent to the protection of either the clear and convincing standard or the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. We instead retained our traditional preponderance of the evidence standard but required an extra measure of evidentiary protection. Id. at 884. We required the judge to enter specific and detailed findings demonstrating that close attention has been given the evidence and that the necessity of removing the child from his or her parents has been persuasively shown. Id. at 886. We resolved that case in this manner because we felt that the adoption of the intermediate standard would add confusion and might serve no useful purpose, and that the adoption of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard might jeopardize the welfare of the child. Id. at 885. For identical reasons we feel that the preponderance of the evidence standard is the appropriate standard to be applied in this case. Similarly, although we decline to set forth any specific formula, we feel that a conscientious judge, being mindful of the adverse social consequences which might follow an adjudication of mental illness, will subject an individual to guardianship only after carefully considering the evidence and entering specific findings indicating those factors that persuade him that a guardian is needed. Cf. King v. King, 373 Mass. 37 (1977); Rice v. Rice, 372 Mass. 398 (1977). If we adopted the criminal standard of proof in guardianship proceedings, the appointment of a guardian would be precluded for all but those whose mental illness and inability to care for themselves could be established beyond a reasonable doubt. This preclusion would doubtless apply to many individuals whose mental illness could be established by a preponderance of the evidence. It is our concern for this group of individuals  who are more probably than not unable to care for themselves by reason of mental illness, but whose incapacity is not provable beyond a reasonable doubt  which prohibits the adoption of the criminal standard. We do not feel that more harm will befall an individual who is erroneously subjected to guardianship than to an individual who is in need of a guardian but is erroneously denied one. If an individual is erroneously subjected to guardianship, then G.L.c. 201, § 13A, allows such a ward to file a petition for the removal of his guardian. Moreover, were we to apply the criminal standard to the appointment of guardians, it would be exceedingly difficult to meet the standard even in the most extreme cases. The subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnosis render certainties virtually beyond reach in most situations. The reasonable-doubt standard of criminal law functions in its realm because there the standard is addressed to specific, knowable facts. Psychiatric diagnosis, in contrast, is to a large extent based on medical `impressions' drawn from subjective analysis and filtered through the experience of the diagnostician. This process often makes it very difficult for the expert physician to offer definite conclusions about any particular patient. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979). For all of these reasons, we conclude that a permanent guardian may be appointed pursuant to G.L.c. 201, § 6, upon proof that it is more likely than not that an individual is unable to care for himself by reason of mental illness, and a temporary guardian may be appointed pursuant to G.L.c. 201, § 14, upon proof that it is more likely than not that the welfare of a mentally ill person requires the immediate appointment of a temporary guardian.