Opinion ID: 221702
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The IJ's Findings About The Petitioner's Alleged Role In Drug Trafficking Were Adequately Supported By The Evidence Presented

Text: The success of the petitioner's appeal depends on her challenge to the IJ's finding that the evidence presented gave rise to serious reason to believe she had committed drug trafficking crimes in Thailand. That finding, if affirmed, bars her from eligibility for asylum, cancellation of removal, and CAT protection. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii) (barring asylum); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii) (barring withholding of removal); and 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2) (barring withholding of removal under the CAT based on 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii)). Even though the evidence presented on remand included the testimony of a DEA officer and a Royal Thai police officer implicating her in drug activity, arrest warrants from both Thailand and the United States, and the petitioner's own testimony admitting that she had engaged in drug transactions, the petitioner still claims that there was insufficient evidence to meet the serious reason to believe standard. However, we agree with the IJ that the reasonable, substantial and probative evidence presented during the entirety of the petitioner's removal proceedings on remand establishes serious reason to believe she is or has been a trafficker of heroin. The petitioner claims that the overwhelming evidence of her involvement in the drug trade should be disregarded because hearsay statements were improperly entered into evidence. The statements the IJ relied upon were based in large part on personal knowledge. Even accepting the petitioner's argument that some of the statements amounted to hearsay, hearsay is admissible in removal proceedings, so this argument does not require further discussion. See Ogbolumani v. Napolitano, 557 F.3d 729, 734 (7th Cir.2009). She also disputes credibility determinations the IJ made in favor of the government's witnesses, even though specific reasons were given for making such determinations and many were supported by documentary evidence in the record. Since we defer to credibility determinations made below, this argument similarly merits no further discussion. See Shmyhelskyy v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 474, 479 (7th Cir.2007) (holding that [c]redibility determinations are questions of fact and should only be overturned in extraordinary circumstances); Capric v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1075, 1086 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that an IJ's credibility determinations enjoy highly deferential review when supported by specific cogent reasons that bear a legitimate nexus to the findings).