Opinion ID: 784134
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Evidence Was Sufficient to Prove the Weapon Was a Firearm

Text: 51 Lawrence's final contention is that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the weapon involved was a firearm for purposes of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922 and 924. He relies on the fact that § 922 specifically excludes firearms manufactured before 1898 from the definition of firearms included under §§ 922 and 924. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3), (a)(16) (2003). 9 He notes that, not only did the government fail to introduce any evidence to establish that the gun that was used was manufactured after 1898, but that the government's own experts specifically acknowledged the possibility that the bullet fragments recovered from the scene were fired by a weapon manufactured before that date. Therefore, says the defendant, his convictions on counts two and three cannot stand. 10 52 The government argues that the exception for antique firearms in § 921 does not establish an additional element that it must prove, but instead provides an affirmative defense with the burden of proof on the defendant. Only after the defendant presents some evidence that the firearm was an antique, the government argues, does it have to prove that the firearm was not an antique beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the defense presented no evidence that the gun in question was an antique beyond raising the possibility through the government's experts. Although a fact can certainly be established though cross-examination as opposed to direct testimony, more is required than raising the specter of an ephemeral mathematical possibility to create an issue of fact. Thus, the government contends that Lawrence never established the affirmative defense of the date of manufacture for it to rebut. 53 We agree that the government can not be expected to engage in the litigational equivalent of shadow boxing by jabbing and striking at shadowy inferences that may arise from the ethers of testimony. Yet, Lawrence's position as to the government's burden of establishing the date of manufacture of a weapon that was never recovered would lead us down that road. Every circuit court of appeals that has considered this issue has agreed that establishing that a weapon is an antique firearm for purposes of §§ 921 and 922 is an affirmative defense that must initially be raised by sufficient evidence to justify shifting a burden of proof to the government. 54 In United States v. Mayo, 705 F.2d 62, 73-76 (2d Cir.1983), the court examined the legislative history of § 921(a)(3) and concluded that it allowed a defendant to raise the affirmative defense that he/she used an antique firearm when charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922. The court held that this did not create an additional element for the government to prove in order to win a conviction under the applicable statutes. Rather, using the Supreme Court's definition of an affirmative defense as a bar to a crime that does not serve to negative any facts of the crime, the Mayo Court found that the language in § 921 established an affirmative defense because one weapon could satisfy both the broad definition of firearm in § 921(a)(3) as well as the narrow exception for antique firearms in § 921(a)(16). Id. at 75 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206-07, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977)). This legislative scheme reflects Congress's policy of controlling the traffic in firearms, which is a significant factor in the prevalence of lawlessness and violent crime in the United States. Id. at 75-76 (internal citations omitted). Yet, in enacting this scheme, Congress clearly did not want to penalize or burden legitimate collectors of firearms or restrict their access to valuable antiques. However, requiring the government to prove that a given weapon was manufactured after a given date when the weapon has not been recovered would make law enforcement more difficult and thwart the policy of controlling the illegal firearms market. Id. at 76. 55 The court in United States v. Laroche, 723 F.2d 1541, 1543 (11th Cir.1984) reached the same conclusion. There, Laroche challenged his convictions under §§ 922 and 924 because the government failed to prove that the firearms involved were not antique firearms as defined by § 921. He claimed this statutory exception was an element of the offense that the government was required to disprove. Id. The court disagreed and followed the analysis of Mayo instead. See also U.S. v. Williams, 979 F.2d 186, 187 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (stating that the antique weapons exception in § 921 is an affirmative defense that must be raised by the defendant before the burden of disproving an antique weapon shifts to the government, citing Laroche ). 56 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit followed Laroche and Mayo in United States v. Smith, 981 F.2d 887, 891-92 (6th Cir.1992). There the court held that the defense contained in § 921 was an affirmative one that is waived if not raised by the defendant. Since Smith had not raised that defense at either his plea or sentencing, the court held that he had waived it and the government was under no obligation to establish that the weapon involved was manufactured after 1898. 57 These cases were followed by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Washington, 17 F.3d 230, 232 (8th Cir.1994). The court there concluded that the government did not have to establish that the weapon involved was manufactured after 1898 because the defendant presented no evidence about this issue. Id. 58 We agree. Based on the text of the statute, and the Congress's purpose of deterring trafficking in firearms while protecting the interests of legitimate antique weapons collectors, we hold that the exemption for antique firearms contained in § 921(a)(16) is an affirmative defense that must be raised by defendant and supported by some evidence before the government has to prove the contrary beyond a reasonable doubt. 59 Here, Lawrence established only the possibility that the firearm that fired the bullets that killed Hodge could have been manufactured before 1898. Since it was never recovered, there was no way of determining when it was manufactured. Accordingly, the evidence established only that the gun was manufactured at some point before it was used to kill Hodge; that is hardly a remarkable revelation. However, there was no evidence to suggest that the firearm actually was manufactured before 1898. This was not enough to carry his burden of raising the affirmative defense, which requires sufficient evidence to raise the exception as an issue. Laroche, 723 F.2d at 1543; see also U.S. v. Washington, 17 F.3d at 232. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions under counts two and three of the indictment.