Opinion ID: 1987047
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Is There Substantial Evidence of an Offer?

Text: Before turning to the issues raised, we note [i]nferences and presumptions are a staple of our adversary system of fact-finding. State v. Simpson, 528 N.W.2d 627, 632 (Iowa 1995) (quoting Ulster County Ct. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2224, 60 L.Ed.2d 777, 791 (1979)). The jury or fact finder may consider all of the evidence and derive any reasonable inferences therefrom. See id. at 632-33. Circumstantial and direct evidence is equally probative. See Iowa R.App. P. 14(f)(16); State v. Boley, 456 N.W.2d 674, 679 (Iowa 1990). Additionally, a district court's finding of guilt is binding upon us unless there is not substantial evidence to support the finding. State v. Abbas, 561 N.W.2d 72, 74 (Iowa 1997). In reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Id. We will give consideration to all the evidence, not just the evidence supporting the verdict. Id. Evidence is substantial if a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. With these general principles to guide us, we now consider Schmidt's arguments. Schmidt asserts she did not make an offer of sex for money to Hutcheson or, alternatively, she did not accept his offer to pay her for sex. For the following reasons, we conclude a reasonable fact finder could easily conclude she made an offer to sell her services for money. Iowa Code section 725.1 provides: A person who sells or offers for sale the person's services as a partner in a sex act, or who purchases or offers to purchase such services, commits an aggravated misdemeanor. (Emphasis added.) The key inquiry is whether Schmidt made an offer for the sale of her services as a partner in a sex act. She wishes us to view her statements in isolation, arguing her words do not constitute an offer because she made no reference to a specific sexual act but only stated they could have a really good or really nice time. Other jurisdictions, however, have concluded that an individual need not utter any magical words to constitute an offer: [A]n offer need not be explicit, but may be implied by the defendant's words and actions. State v. Oanes, 543 N.W.2d 658, 662 (Minn.Ct.App.1996); see also People v. DeBartolo, 242 Ill.App.3d 811, 182 Ill.Dec. 707, 610 N.E.2d 131, 138 (Ill.App.1993) (the offer or agreement may be implied from the words and actions of the defendant taken in context); Williams v. State, 254 Ind. 4, 256 N.E.2d 913, 913-14 (Ind.1970) (offer was implicit in appellant's words and actions taken in context); State v. Dodson, 222 Kan. 519, 565 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Kan.1977) (offer can be implicit from defendant's words and actions to sustain conviction for promoting prostitution); City of St. Louis v. Long, 395 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Mo.Ct.App.1965) (promise or agreement to engage in sexual intercourse need not be in any particular form of words). We disagree with Schmidt's assertion that she did not make an offer. Her conduct and statements when taken in context support the trial court's conclusion that she made an offer to sell her services. Schmidt got into a stranger's vehicle, repeatedly asked him if he was a police officer, prompted him to talk to her after he told her he was looking for a little fun, asked him how much he was willing to spend for fellatio, made an offer for forty dollars that was accepted by the officer, and gave him directions to a secluded place. Based upon this evidence, a reasonable fact finder could easily conclude Schmidt made an offer for the sale of her services. Concededly, Schmidt was very careful not to talk about any specifics; however, her responses taken in context with Hutcheson's inquiries show that her intentions were not innocent or ambiguous. Her statement that for forty dollars they could have a really good timewas in response to Hutcheson's direct and explicit proposition. The totality of the circumstances indicate Schmidt made an offer to sell her services. To require any magic words or the utterance of the word offer would permit the circumvention of section 725.1 and dilute its purpose of prohibiting the commercial exploitation of sexual gratification. See State v. Foster, 356 N.W.2d 548, 550 (Iowa 1984). In this case, common sense, the context of the statements, and the totality of the circumstances revealed to the trial court that Schmidt was offering her services for hire. We agree and affirm Schmidt's conviction on this ground.