Opinion ID: 614361
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Access to Documents After the Raid

Text: On March 5, two days after the raid, Hawley wrote to Hoover informing him that the raid had occurred, and that [c]opies of documents will be obtained as soon as possible. Later that same day, he wrote to Hoover, Director Lukban providing copies of all documents found. All information may be used openly. Between March 7 and 16, Hawley wrote several more memoranda to Hoover attaching copies of cables and letters from the raid that were of interest in a criminal Bill of Lading Act case against Blaustein. The first two memoranda do not specify how Hawley obtained the documents, but the last memorandum specifies that they were furnished by the NBI. Over the following months, Hawley sent several more such memoranda forwarding documents obtained in the raid, presumably provided to him by the NBI. Chandler's post-raid memoranda show that he was more involved than Hawley in negotiating access to the seized documents. In a March 16, 1962 memorandum to OIO, he notes that the local authorities asked him to provide space for storage of the Stonehill records in order that we could have full access to them and both of us would have an opportunity to fully determine and appraise what had been acquired. Chandler described how he initially thought it would be necessary to rent space, but he had since been able to secure a donation of private space from an American and the records were moved to that location yesterday. They are now fully available whereas previously physical conditions considerably limited our access. Presumably without hearing that the question was moot because Chandler had obtained storage space for free, a DOJ attorney had researched whether paying for the storage of the records seized by the NBI would create problems for the government's planned silver platter doctrine defense. The attorney concluded that the proposed payment would not jeopardize the criminal case and recommended that the payment be made. Chandler initially complained that he did not have sufficient equipment to copy the documents. However, by March 21 he had obtained a copier from another agency, and IRS Agent Powers reported receiving splendid cooperation from the local authorities. In a progress report filed by Powers covering the period of March 21 to April 20, Powers reported that the NBI had over 100 employees working 12 hours a day six days a week . . . trying to inventory and index these records. Powers reported that they were working as quickly as possible because of concern that Stonehill might convince the Supreme Court of the Philippines that the NBI should return the documents. A memorandum from IRS Agent Ragland to OIO on October 10, 1962, paints a slightly different picture of American access. Ragland wrote, We have not had free access to the records since June 27. He further stated that the American officials have never actually had unlimited access to the records, and our photographed documents were obtained only after patiently dealing with individual groups of agents. Further, The NBI did not attempt to audit or put the records in any order, but merely indexed them for their own specific purpose. Some further details are contained in a long report by Lewis Gleeck, the Consul General at the U.S. Embassy in Manila. Gleeck divided the document work into three phases. The first was from March 3 to March 22, during which Gleeck reported frantic work by both the NBI and Stonehill's lawyers. Gleeck noted that the NBI had not expected to get so much material. The second phase began on March 22, when the Philippine Supreme Court issued a preliminary injunction against the use of the documents. This caused a lull in document review. The third phase began on June 30, when the Supreme Court lifted the injunction. Gleeck did not describe the U.S. involvement in great detail. Most of his memorandum recounted the disappearance (and presumed murder) of Spielman, and the subsequent investigation and trial of Spielman's alleged abductors. Gleeck's report does, however, create the impression that, at least from the perspective of the U.S. Embassy, the raid and investigation were an NBI operation. The only discussion of U.S. activity in the memorandum concerned efforts to protect Stonehill's rights as an American citizen. Gleeck congratulated the Embassy on its policy of watchful vigilance, as opposed to direct interference in the case. The only other mention of access to documents is contained in a memorandum from Donald Durkin, the Chief of the IRS Intelligence Division, to Chandler. This memorandum was not sent until October 17, 1962. Durkin told Chandler that Lukban had visited his office and had told him that Mr. Chandler and Mr. Powers could have access to any information that was in the possession of the National Bureau of Investigation. He further stated that his agents had been instructed to cooperate with Mr. Chandler and Mr. Powers. Because this memorandum referenced a request from the Manhattan District, it was likely related to the criminal Bill of Lading Act case against Blaustein.