Opinion ID: 1385454
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Directed Verdict on Issue of Johnson's Comparative Negligence

Text: Johnson asserts that the trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict on the issue of her possible negligence. In denying Johnson's motion, the trial court stated that: the jury could find she's gone across that track before, was aware of the existence of the rails, the placement of the track, and a person of ordinary prudence could assume that that track would deviate a tire from the direct course of travel. That's what happened. Whether she should be charged with some greater responsibility in crossing that track or not, I think is up to the jury. Johnson argues that no evidence supported an inference of negligence on her part. She argues that unless she knew or should have known of the particular hazard posed by the sharp angle of the MUS crossing, she could not be negligent. Although no evidence established that Johnson was aware of the particular hazard that gave rise to her injury, we conclude that the trial court properly denied her motion. Viewed in the light most favorable to the city, [25] the evidence established the following. It rained the day of Johnson's accident. At the time of the accident, it was misting and the pavement was wet and slick. The rails were also wet. One witness testified that Johnson approached the track at a moderate speed; another indicated that she was traveling just fast enough to keep the bicycle upright and on balance. She was riding a ten-speed bicycle with regular tires, on the asphalt, on the right side of the roadway. She was seated upright with her hands on the handlebars. As she crossed the track, her bike suddenly caught something, her front wheel turned to the right, and she went over the bike, striking the pavement head first. Although she had owned the ten-speed bicycle involved for only two weeks, Johnson was an experienced bicyclist, having ridden since the age of six. She had taken previous long-distance bike trips, and had received an award from her 4-H club for a bicycling project, which included reading a bicycle safety pamphlet, leading younger children on bike trips, and teaching bicycle maintenance. She had ridden Phillips Field Road some ten to twenty-five times before and was aware of the four railroad crossings on that road. She testified that when crossing railroad tracks she would customarily rise off her seat to soften the ride. She testified that due to her studies and experience she was aware that various conditions, such as cars, animals, holes, wet roads, gravel, glass, and ruts, can be hazardous to bicyclists. She knew that holes, ruts, or gravel were dangerous because they could throw you. She testified that she never rode over manholes or drains because of the potential risk they presented to bicyclists. She was aware of the grooved slot in railroad tracks. No evidence showed any awareness that railroad tracks could catch and deflect a bicycle's front wheel. She testified that she had never read anything that referred to railroad tracks as a potential hazard to bicyclists and that she was unaware that railroad tracks could throw her. Finally, she testified that in all her previous crossings of the tracks on Phillips Field Road, she never experienced any problem or difficulty. Even so, we believe that reasonable minds could differ in their judgment of whether Johnson was negligent. She was in control of the bicycle and was actively operating it. Her conduct necessarily must be considered, and it is a factual question for the jury whether she should have known of the danger presented by the crossing. [26]