Opinion ID: 214080
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Lack of Causal Connection

Text: O'Bryant's retaliation claim also fails for another independent reason. Specifically, O'Bryant has not established a causal connection between his earlier grievances and the disciplinary harm. In this regard, we review our recent prison-retaliation decisions that address the requisite causal connection: (1) Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir.2008); and (2) Moton v. Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir.2011).
In Mosley, a prison inmate (Smith) sued Warden Gwendolyn Mosley (Mosley), Assistant Warden Kenneth Jones (Jones), and Lt. Kenneth Sconyers (Sconyers) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging retaliation against him for engaging in protected speech. 532 F.3d at 1271-72. The inmate had sent a letter to Defendant Jones and the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) complaining about prison conditions. Id. at 1272-74. The Court determined that these two parts of inmate Smith's letter amounted to grievances protected by the First Amendment: (1) a statement that inmates with compromised immune systems who were susceptible to pneumonia were forced to go outside in the cold with substandard clothing and no protection; and (2) a statement that Smith was being fed a diet consisting of 95% starch when prison officials knew he was a diabetic. Id. at 1276. In contrast, the Court determined other allegations in inmate Smith's letter were not protected speech but were instead violations of prison rules. Id. at 1276-77. Smith's first non-protected statement violated a prison rule forbidding false statements to a DOC employee with intent to deceive or to prejudice another person, and read: Like that fiasco in 1999, where the administrative heads of this institution decided to vaccinate everyone in this institution against the venereal disease syphilis. Id. at 1274 (quotation marks omitted). Smith's second group of non-protected statements, which ran afoul of a prison rule forbidding insubordination, stated: Maybe you should be forced to stand around outside, unsheltered, in thirty-eight degrees, with a 10-15 MPH breeze blowing. See how you'd like it. Id. at 1276. Smith's letter also insinuated that getting prisoners sick would be a good way to limit the population in the prisons, and compared the prison's programs to the Tuskegee Study. Id. at 1276-77. Believing Smith's letter violated prison rules, Defendant Jones prepared an incident report and submitted it to his supervisor, Defendant Mosley. Id. at 1273. After meeting with Mosley, Defendant Jones met with Smith and informed Smith that he would have a disciplinary hearing to determine whether Smith had violated prison rules. Id. at 1273-74. Jones prepared separate disciplinary reports for each infraction. After separate hearings on the charges, hearing officer Davis found Smith guilty of each charge. Id. at 1274-75. A prison rule required that all determinations by hearing officers be reviewed by the warden or a designee. Id. at 1275. Warden Mosley designated Lt. Sconyers to serve as review officer. Id. Sconyers approved Davis's findings and recommendations. Id. Inmate Smith's § 1983 retaliation suit alleged that Defendants Mosley, Jones and Sconyers commenced the disciplinary hearing in retaliation against him for exercising his First Amendment right of free speech. Id. at 1275. This Court determined that the first two elements of a retaliation claim were met: (1) two of the grievances in Smith's letter were protected speech; and (2) the disciplinary action taken against him would likely deter his speech. Id. at 1276-77. [17] Thus, the main issue confronting the Court was whether there was a causal relationship between Smith's constitutionally protected speech (the two grievances) and the discipline meted out to Smith for the two disciplinary charges. The Court in Mosley explained that the causal connection inquiry asks whether the defendants were subjectively motivated to discipline because Smith complained of some of the conditions of his confinement. Id. at 1278. We stated that most courts determine actors' subjective motivation by applying the burden-shifting formula from Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). Mosley, 532 F.3d at 1278. Under Mt. Healthy, `[o]nce the plaintiff has met his burden of establishing that his protected conduct was a motivating factor behind any harm [i.e., disciplinary action], the burden of production shifts to the defendant.' Mosley, 532 F.3d at 1278 (quoting Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 399 (6th Cir.1999)). Then, `[i]f the defendant can show that he would have taken the same action in the absence of the protected activity, he is entitled to prevail on [his motion for summary judgment as a matter of law or prior to trial on] summary judgment.' Mosley, 532 F.3d at 1278 (quoting Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 399). In other words, if the official can show that he would have taken the disciplinary action in the absence of the prisoner's protected conduct, he cannot be held liable. Mosley, 532 F.3d at 1278 n. 22. Turning to the facts of Smith's case, the Court in Mosley stated that [w]hether a reasonable jury could find that Smith's grievances were the motivating factor behind the defendants' actions is a close question. Id. at 1278. Smith introduced no direct evidence that the grievances in the letter motivated the defendants' conduct about the other parts of the letter, and there is nothing in [Smith's] responses to Jones's allegations that even suggests that he thought the charges were a mere pretext.... Id. Although Smith pled guilty to the insubordination charge, Smith defended against the false statement charge, pointing out that the syphilis inoculations had actually taken place. Id. at 1274-75. Jones, however, pointed out (1) that the inoculations were carried out by the Alabama Department of Health, and (2) that Smith's statements in the letterthat the inoculations were given at the direction of the prison's administrationwere meant to prejudice the prison administration because Smith's letter was sent to the DOJ. Id. at 1275. The Court in Mosley then  assume[d] without deciding that a reasonable fact finder could infer from the circumstances,... that the letter's presentation of the grievances was a motivating factor in Mosley and Jones's decision to go forward with the charges, which also stemmed from the exact same letter. Id. at 1278-79 (emphasis added). The question under Mt. Healthy became whether a reasonable fact finder, a jury, would have to find that the defendants would have disciplined Smith even in the absence of the protected conduct, i.e., the submission of grievances. Id. at 1279 (quotation marks omitted). The Court determined that Defendants Mosley and Jones would have acted as they did even absent Plaintiff Smith's protected conduct (the grievances). Id. The Court stated that [o]bjective prison administrators standing in Mosley and Jones's shoes would assume that the gist of what Smith said in his letter, and the language he employed, which reeked of disrespect for the administrators' authority, would be noised about the prison's population and, if ignored, could seriously impede their ability to maintain order and thus achieve the institution's penological objectives. Id. As to Smith's retaliation claim, this Court thus affirmed the district court's entry of summary judgment for the defendant prison officials.
Retaliatory disciplinary conduct was also an issue in Moton v. Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir.2011), where this Court reversed the entry of summary judgment for the Defendant prison official, Captain Cowart. Inmate Moton had filed an October 30, 2004 grievance in which he wrote in large capital letters: REMEDY: RETURN MY REQUEST DATED 10-15-04 WITH APPROPRIATE ANSWER AS REQURED [sic]. Id. at 1339-40. Upon receipt, Defendant Cowart told Moton she would file a disciplinary report for disrespect. Id. Cowart contended Moton then told Cowart that `she would be hearing from his lawyer' and [y]ou will answer these grievances. Id. at 1340 (quotation marks omitted). Cowart filed two disciplinary reports alleging Moton violated prison rules prohibiting (1) disrespect to officials ... by means of words, gestures and the like and (2) making spoken, written or gestured threats against prison officials. Id. (quotation marks and brackets omitted). The disciplinary hearing team found Moton guilty, imposing disciplinary confinement and a loss of 60 days' gain time. Id. In Moton's appeal, the FDOC found him not guilty because Cowart's statement of facts did not support the charge. Id. After stating the same three elements of a retaliation claim set forth in Mosley, this Court in Moton pointed out [t]he district court assumed without deciding that Moton had satisfied the first two elements of his retaliation claim and had granted summary judgment upon finding Moton failed to establish a causal connection between his October 30 grievance and statements and Cowart's retaliatory action. Id. at 1342. Reversing in Moton, this Court concluded Moton had shown material issues of fact between his grievance and the discipline Cowart imposed. As to the grievance in capital letters, this Court found using large and upper case letters in a grievance, by itself, did not violate the prison rule prohibiting disrespect. Id. The Court also concluded as a matter of law that an inmate's statement that he wants or plans to contact his attorney does not constitute a punishable spoken threat and thus that prison rule was not violated, either. Id. at 1342-43 (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, Moton's conduct did not violate any prison rule, and no prison infraction supported the discipline imposed. This Court in Moton concluded (1) that the district court erred by finding that Cowart `reasonably' concluded that Moton's grievance violated the prison rule against disrespect because the grievance included large capital letters, id. at 1343, and (2) the district court erred by finding that Moton's statement could be reasonably construed as a spoken threat. Id. at 1343 (quotation marks omitted). Moton thus showed both that the FDOC had found him not guilty and also that no objective prison official could reasonably conclude that Moton had violated any prison rule. Given there was no reasonable basis to support Cowart's disciplinary action that instantly followed Moton's written grievance and verbal attorney statement, Moton had created a fact issue as to causal relationship between his grievance and the discipline Cowart imposed. Id. at 1342.
With this background, we turn back to O'Bryant's case. Even if O'Bryant's conviction under the DRs does not per se bar a retaliation claim, as suggested by the Eighth Circuit's precedent and now held by this Court above, O'Bryant's claim fails because he has not presented evidence of retaliatory animus on the part of either Defendant Herring or Defendant Baines. See Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11th Cir.1995) (affirming summary judgment for defendant Collins because plaintiff produced nothing, beyond his own conclusory allegations, suggesting that Collins' actions in compliance with the strip search regulations were motivated by a retaliatory animus); see also Moton, 631 F.3d at 1341 (To establish causation, the plaintiff must show that the defendant was subjectively motivated to discipline the plaintiff for exercising his First Amendment rights.) (quotation marks omitted). And even assuming arguendo that O'Bryant has shown that Defendants Herring and Baines were subjectively motivated to discipline O'Bryant because of his grievances, the record shows the defendants would have taken the same disciplinary actions in the absence of O'Bryant's protected activity. See Mosley, 532 F.3d at 1278 (stating [i]f the defendant can show that he would have taken the same action in the absence of the protected activity, he ... prevail[s] on ... summary judgment); Moton, 631 F.3d at 1342 (quoting same). The gist of O'Bryant's statements each time reeked of disrespect of, and profanity to, the Defendants, who would have disciplined O'Bryant even without any grievances. Here, O'Bryant was convicted of the disciplinary charges and he would have suffered the same adverse action even if he had not engaged in the grievances. Any possible causal connection between the protected activity (the grievances) and the harm (the disciplinary charges and sanctions) is severed since the harm is not in reaction to any protected activity, but directly due to an improper activity. Stated another way, even if some impermissible reason had entered into Herring and Baines's decision-making process to charge O'Bryant with prison disciplinary infractions, O'Bryant would have been disciplined anyway, as the hearing panels concluded he committed the charged conduct which violated prison rules.