Opinion ID: 2638704
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: De Lancie

Text: De Lancie was the result of a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief from the practice of monitoring and recording inmates' [9] conversations for the purpose of gathering evidence for use in prosecutions. ( De Lancie, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 867, 183 Cal.Rptr. 866, 647 P.2d 142.) [10] The De Lancie court recalled the Harrell standard, under which inmate rights could `be limited only in accordance with legitimate penal objectives,' ( De Lancie, at p. 871, 183 Cal.Rptr. 866, 647 P.2d 142, quoting Harrell, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 702, 87 Cal.Rptr. 504, 470 P.2d 640) but found that standard was superseded by the 1975 amendment to section 2600. We quoted the amended provision, italicizing the words ` necessary in order to provide for the reasonable security of the institution ' to emphasize the shift in the law away from the former standard. ( De Lancie, at p. 870, 183 Cal.Rptr. 866, 647 P.2d 142.) [11] The De Lancie majority observed the recordings violated this standard if, as the complaint alleged, they are intended not to enhance or preserve prison security, but rather to obtain evidence for use by investigatory and prosecuting agencies in search of convictions. (Id. at p. 873, 183 Cal.Rptr. 866, 647 P.2d 142.) Although the plaintiffs had alleged violations of the federal and California Constitutions, as well as the federal wiretap law (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520), we based our ruling solely on a ground omitted from the complaint: sections 2600 and 2601. [T]he provisions of Penal Code sections 2600 and 2601 are dispositive of the issues presented [here]. ( De Lancie, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 870, 183 Cal.Rptr. 866, 647 P.2d 142.) Nothing in the decision otherwise altered the traditional understanding that inmates do not enjoy a justifiable expectation of privacy in their custodial conversations. On the contrary, as Justice Mosk's dissent observed, The concept of one purporting to enjoy privacy while he is under legally authorized supervision would appear to be a monumental anomaly. ( De Lancie, supra, 31 Cal.3d 865, 882, 183 Cal.Rptr. 866, 647 P.2d 142 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) [12] We thus decided in De Lancie that the 1975 statutory amendments established a policy that prisoners retain the rights of free persons, including the right of privacy, except to the extent that restrictions are necessary to insure the security of the prison and the protection of the public. ( De Lancie, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 868, 183 Cal.Rptr. 866, 647 P.2d 142.) [13] We have also recognized that the decision shifted the law: [U]nder settled federal precedent and under the California decisions prior to De Lancie ... the secret monitoring and recording of unprivileged conversations in prisons, jails, and police stations did not constitute an unlawful search. ( Donaldson, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 27, 196 Cal.Rptr. 704, 672 P.2d 110.)