Opinion ID: 2976392
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Circumstances of Luqman’s Arrest

Text: Having determined that the record fails to establish that North Hill is a neighborhood of frequent prostitution activity, I turn now to the crux of Luqman’s case. In determining whether police had reasonable suspicion that a suspect is engaged in criminal activity, this Court must examine the “totality of the circumstances” observed by police—thus, “courts must consider all the officer[’]s observations, and not discard those that may seem insignificant or troubling when viewed standing alone.” Martin, 289 F.3d at 398. Accordingly, this case rests upon whether, considering all of the events observed by the arresting officers, those officers had reasonable suspicion to believe Luqman might be guilty of soliciting prostitution. The events which Officer Donohue witnessed were as follows: while driving in an area where prostitution is not particularly common, Donohue observed a woman speaking with the driver of a pickup truck. Donohue turned his car around to further observe the conversation, and as the police car approached at the scene of the conversation, the woman quit the conversation and returned to a nearby street corner. The woman was not dressed provocatively, and, other than speaking to a member of the opposite sex, she took no actions that were particularly evocative of a prostitute soliciting a client. Neither Officer Donohue nor Officer Falcone were able to identify her as a known prostitute. I know of no Sixth Circuit case, and the majority cites none, which has made a finding of reasonable suspicion based on such a flimsy justification. In United States v. Byrd, No. 94-5301, 1995 WL 72299 (6th Cir. Feb. 21, 1995), this Court upheld a Terry stop which took place after police observed a “known prostitute approach the car and lean into the passenger side window to talk to the driver of the car.” Id. at . In so holding, Byrd explained that reasonable suspicion was established by the combination of several facts: the woman was known to be a prostitute; she leaned into the car to speak to its driver; the arresting officer had warned her earlier that night to “get off the streets;” and the car was committing a likely traffic offense by sitting parked in the middle of a street. Id. at . In United States v. Martin, a divided panel considered a more difficult set of facts involving a Terry stop and alleged prostitution. In Martin, officers observed a woman enter a vehicle driven by the defendant. 289 F.3d at 394. In holding that police had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, the panel majority said that four facts combined to allow a Terry stop of the vehicle. First, the majority found that the woman’s “dress and attire were typical of prostitutes.” Id. at 399. Second, they noted that she was in an area “known for prostitution activity.” Id. Third, the police testified that they recognized her as a woman who had previously been convicted of prostitution; and fourth, before entering the vehicle, the woman made a hand gesture associated with prostitutes