Opinion ID: 875381
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Part I Claims

Text: As to Deborah’s claims, the MJ recommended dismissal without prejudice for lack of standing. The district court adopted that recommendation and dismissed her claims without prejudice. The MJ concluded the Melvin’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), were time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations. See Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1522 (10th Cir. 1988) (observing a two-year statute of limitations period for § 1983 claims under Oklahoma law); Young v. Davis, 554 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2009) (same regarding Bivens claims). He explained the alleged wrongdoings stemming from Melvin’s prosecution and conviction would have been complete by the time of sentencing 2 The second Rule 59(e) motion did not further toll the time. See Ysais, 603 F.3d at 1178. -5- on November 8, 2005, but Melvin (and Deborah) waited until April 26, 2011, to file a complaint. Neither offered an applicable tolling theory to extend the time. Additionally, the MJ determined Melvin’s statutory claims failed and his claims against a state judge were time-barred and foreclosed by judicial immunity, leaving only claims against the OBA, OBA attorney Loraine Farabow, OBA executive director John Morris Williams, OBA contract attorney Scott Adams, unidentified OBA employees, and defense attorneys Emmit Tayloe and Michael Gassaway. As to these defendants, the MJ issued six additional R&Rs concluding they should be dismissed or granted summary judgment because the OBA enjoyed Eleventh Amendment immunity; Ms. Farabow, Mr. Williams, and Mr. Adams owed Melvin no legal duty; the unidentified OBA employees were not served; the statute of limitations had run on all the claims against Mr. Tayloe; and the complaint failed to contain a short and plain statement showing Melvin’s entitlement to relief against Mr. Gassaway as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The district judge agreed, adopted these recommendations, and dismissed with prejudice all but the statutory claims, which were dismissed without prejudice.3 3 We clarify two aspects of the district court’s disposition. First, the MJ recommended dismissal of the claims against the unidentified OBA employees without prejudice. The district court dismissed these claims without specifying whether its dismissal was with or without prejudice because the OBA employees owed Melvin no legal duty, even if they had been identified and served. The court’s dismissal of these claims was effectively with prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (providing that an unexcepted involuntary dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits). Second, the court dismissed with prejudice the claims against Mr. Gassaway, finding any amendment futile, with the exception of a potential state-law breach of contract claim, which would warrant dismissal without prejudice. -6- We review the district court’s dismissals for failure to state a claim de novo. See Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Wenker, 353 F.3d 1221, 1227 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating standard of review for dismissals under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)); McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, 1289 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating standard of review for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). Likewise, our review of a dismissal pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment is de novo, see Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir. 2013), as is our review of standing questions, see WildEarth Guardians v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 690 F.3d 1174, 1181-82 (10th Cir. 2012). We also review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, which “is proper if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Peterson, 707 F.3d at 1207. The Kerchees here advance no less than fourteen general arguments and numerous sub-arguments, challenging either Melvin’s state convictions or the district court’s judgment on completely meritless and often frivolous grounds. Indeed, despite the breadth of their allegations, the Kerchees have identified no basis for reversing the district court’s judgment. We have reviewed the parties’ materials, the relevant legal authorities, and the record on appeal, and agree with the MJ’s thorough and well-reasoned analyses, all of which were, for the most part, adopted by the district judge. We do part company with the order dated September 27, 2011; it should have dismissed the claims in Part II of the complaint without prejudice. Likewise the -7- order dated November 21, 2011, which dismissed the claims against the OBA for lack of jurisdiction on Eleventh Amendment grounds, also should have specified that dismissal was without prejudice. So modified, the district court’s judgment is affirmed for substantially the same reasons stated by the MJ in his R&Rs dated July 6, 2011, October 24, 2011 (both R&Rs entered on this date), October 26, 2011, November 17, 2011, January 11, 2012, and January 13, 2012, which were, with the exceptions noted, adopted by the district court on September 27, 2011, November 21, 2011, December 7, 2011, and February 1, 2012. Appellees’ motions to dismiss are denied, as are all other outstanding requests for relief. Entered for the Court Terrence L. O’Brien