Opinion ID: 2517375
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Dismiss the Drug Buy Case

Text: On March 22, 2004, Akau filed a motion to dismiss the drug buy case; pursuant to HRS §§ 701-111(1)(b) and 701-109(2). HRS § 701-111 provides in relevant part that: When prosecution is barred by former prosecution for a different offense. Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different statutory provision or is based on different facts, it is barred by a former prosecution under any of the following circumstances: (1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal which has not subsequently been set aside or in a conviction as defined in section 701-110(3) [(1993) [5] ] and the subsequent prosecution is for: . . . . (b) Any offense for which the defendant should have been tried on the first prosecution under section 701-109 unless the court ordered a separate trial of the offense[.] (Some emphases in original and some added.) In turn, HRS § 701-109, also known as the compulsory joinder of offenses requirement, State v. Aiu, 59 Haw. 92, 95, 576 P.2d 1044, 1047 (1978), provides in relevant part that: (2) Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section [(authorizing the court to order separate trials), quoted infra note 10,] a defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses based on the same conduct or arising from the same episode, if such offenses are known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement of the first trial and are within the jurisdiction of a single court. (Emphases added.) Based on these two statutes, Akau argued that the undercover drug buys were part and parcel of a search warrant and as such, both the purchase [of the drugs] and the issuance of a search warrant can and should be deemed `the same episode.' The prosecution opposed Akau's motion. A hearing was held on May 13, 2004 at which time Akau called Lawrence Grean, the head of the Screening Intake Division at the Prosecuting Attorney's Office, to testify regarding the circumstances under which undercover buys or sales of narcotics that lead to a search warrant are prosecuted or are not prosecuted. Specifically, the following testimony was elicited: Q: [By Akau's Counsel] . . . Now, in those cases where the undercover or the confidential informant sales/buys has resulted in search warrants, is it the practice of your office, Mr. Grean, to then prosecute the actual buys and/or sales in spite of the fact that the search warrant case has been prosecuted? Do you understand what I'm driving at? A: [By Grean] I  I think so. The answer to that is it depends. Q: All right. And will you please elucidate all of us as to why it depends? A: Well, if you have undercover police officers  let's take that scenario  Q: Thank you. A:  and they make three or four buys from a suspect, and then as a result of those buys the search warrant is prepared and executed,  Q: Yes? A:  it's quite possible that the undercover buys cannot go forward because the police officer, the undercover officer, is still working undercover and cannot surface at that time. Q: And then? A: So the prosecutor's office would go ahead with the search warrant case. And at a later date, when it's  when the undercover officer is going to be available and surface, then we would go ahead with those cases. . . . . Q: Now, with respect to the buys/sales involving an undercover officer, you mentioned a circumstance under which sometimes those cases would be postponed, to wit, that the officer is still serving in an undercover capacity and therefore your office has to wait until  until that  that person's undercover status has been lifted. Is that true? A: Right. . . . . Q: . . . Off the top of your mind, you cannot recollect a case where an undercover officer has done the buy and the sale and which then leads of course to a search warrant on a suspect; right? The suspect is  A: The answer is yes. Q: Right. And the suspect is prosecuted on the search warrant case but then is not prosecuted for the buys and sales, even though there was an undercover officer involved in the undercover buys and sales. . . . . A: Well, it  if the undercover officer has let's say made four buys and he can't surface at the  at the time of the buys, and he does surface later on, then there wouldn't be  unless there's some other reason I  I don't  I'm not aware of, he  he  the suspect would then be prosecuted for those four buys. . . . . Q: . . . Now, can you say as a matter of fact that in all circumstances when there is an undercover officer involved with the sales and the buys that  that, even though you've made a search warrant case on the suspect, that you always prosecute those buys and sales? A: Well, I would think so, yes. Additionally, the circuit court questioned Grean as follows: Q: [By the circuit court] Mr. Grean, in your mind, correct me if I'm not hearing you right, it's a matter of prosecutorial discretion if there's some buys and then later a search warrant and the undercover officer is able to surface, for lack of a better word, and they're prosecuting, it's prosecutorial discretion whether to charge separate charges? A: Absolutely. Akau also called HPD Officer Shellie Silva, who executed the search warrant on Akau, as a witness. Officer Silva testified, in relevant part, as follows: Q: [By Akau's counsel] Is there any reason why, Officer, you decided to get three or four purchases? A: [By Officer Silva] In order to get the search warrant, um, you need the purchases done, and the more purchases you have, the more days you have to execute the warrant from the last purchase. Q: Okay. Now, earlier this afternoon I asked you about that, and is it fair to say that, for instance, if you only made one undercover purchase, more likely than not the search warrant would be good for like one day? A: Yes. Q: Whereas, if you made three or four purchases, undercover purchases, then the search warrant would be good for perhaps ten days; is that correct? A: Maximum ten days, yes. [6] . . . . Q: And then finally, Officer Silva, the  to your knowledge, the search warrant that you executed on November 26[], 2002, did in fact result in a criminal case being brought against [Akau]? A: Yes. Q: The undercover officers that were used in this case for  with [Akau], do you recall for what length of time, if any, after the search warrant was executed on November 26[], 2002, that they stayed in an undercover capacity, if you will? A: One of the undercover officers is still in an undercover capacity, and the second undercover officer I would say, um, maybe approximately six months. I don't know exactly `cause there's other divisions and other teams that would use them. So for my case, I would say approximately six months for one, and one is still currently working with us. Q: In the police reports that were prepared regarding the purchases and sales in this matter with [Akau], their names are disclosed; is that correct? A: Um, in the criminal cases that  Q: Yeah, in the police reports. A: Yes, because I would believe they had to do a  a report on the actual transactions so their name would be signed at the bottom of the report. Q: Yeah. So it wouldn't be blacked out or something like that; right? A: No. (Emphases added.) Ultimately, on June 18, 2004, the circuit court issued its order denying Akau's motion to dismiss. Therein, the circuit court concluded that: 3. [Akau's] assertion that the distribution charges in the instant matter and his possession of an illegal narcotic and drug paraphernalia in [the search warrant case], were based on the same conduct or arising from the same episode is unsupported by the evidence presented to the court. HRS [§]701-109(2). . . . . 6. [Akau's] act of distributing crystal methamphetamine [(in the drug buy case)] and his act of possessing an illegal narcotic and drug paraphernalia [(in the search warrant case)] do not constitute the same conduct. 7. The evidence demonstrated that [Akau's] distribution of crystal methamphetamine were discrete acts committed and completed on the specific dates charged in the indictment. 8. Similarly, the evidence demonstrated that [Akau's] possession of the illegal narcotic and related drug paraphernalia were also discrete acts committed and completed on the specific date charged in the complaint and unrelated to the date of the distribution charges in the instant matter. 9. There is no basis to conclude the distribution offenses in the instant matter and the possession and drug paraphernalia offense charged in [the search warrant cases], arose from the same episode. HRS [§]701-109(2). Accord [] State v. Carroll, 63 Haw. 345, 627 P.2d 776 (1981). 10. Accordingly, [Akau] has failed to substantiate his contention that the instant prosecution is barred by operation of HRS [§§ ]701-111(1)(b) and 701-109(2). (Emphases and some brackets in original.) [7]