Opinion ID: 2631069
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether Martinez Could Perform the Essential Functions of Fast-Food Work and Whether Other Work Was Reasonably Available to Him Are Factual Questions We Review for Substantial Evidence

Text: ¶ 22 The court of appeals applied an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the Commission's conclusions that Martinez could perform the `essential functions' of a fast food worker and that other work was `reasonably available' for him. Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2005 UT App 308, ¶ 10, 117 P.3d 1074 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(1)(c)(iii), (iv) (2005) (amended 2006)). The court of appeals appears to have based its selection of this standard of review on its conclusion that (1) the Act impliedly grants discretion to the Commission to apply the facts to the Act; and (2) it would consequently review only the Commission's application of the facts that it found to the law. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. ¶ 23 We conclude that the court of appeals erred in applying an abuse of discretion standard of review because the provisions of Utah Code section 34A-2-413 call for a factual determination. As a result, the court of appeals actually reweighed the Commission's factual determinations under the guise of applying the undisputed facts to the law. Because determining the essential functions of prior employment and ascertaining whether other work is reasonably available are factual issues, we remand the matter to the court of appeals for consideration under a substantial evidence standard of review. ¶ 24 Although we reverse the court of appeals with respect to the standard of review, we acknowledge the difficult issue it presents. Judicial review of Commission decisions is governed by both Utah Code section 34A-2-801 and Utah's Administrative Procedures Act (the UAPA). Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801(7)-(8) (2005). Section 63-46b-16(4)(d) of the UAPA allows relief when the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law. Id. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) (2004). Subsection (4)(g) allows relief when the agency action is based on a determination of fact . . . that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court. Id. § 63-46b-16(4)(g). Finally, subsection (4)(h)(i) allows relief when an agency action is an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute. Id. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i); see also Ameritemps, Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 2005 UT App 491, ¶ 8, 128 P.3d 31 (finding that an abuse of discretion standard should be used when an agency has discretion to apply its factual findings to the law (citation omitted)). ¶ 25 The court of appeals is correct that agency actions are reviewed for abuse of discretion when there is an express or implied delegation within the statute. That truism, however, does not dictate the appropriate standard of review because codifying a factual issue does not transform an issue from one of fact to a mixed question of law and fact for purposes of determining the appropriate standard of review. Our task, therefore, is to determine, first, whether essential functions and reasonably available are factual, legal, or mixed issues and, second, the appropriate standard of review. ¶ 26 We discussed the distinctions between legal, factual, and mixed questions and their relationship to the appropriate standard of review in State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-37 (Utah 1994). There, we defined factual questions as entailing the empirical, such as things, events, actions, or conditions happening, existing, or taking place, as well as the subjective, such as state of mind. Id. at 935. In contrast, we defined legal determinations as rules or principles uniformly applied to persons of similar qualities and status in similar circumstances. Id. We also recognized a third category, the application of law to fact, which asks whether a given set of facts comes within the reach of a given rule of law. Id. at 936. ¶ 27 Because the court of appeals analyzed whether the undisputed facts adequately met the statutory requirements of essential functions and reasonably available, [4] we give this third category close consideration. See Martinez, 2005 UT App 308, ¶ 11, 117 P.3d 1074. We begin with the proposition that the existence of an articulable legal issue is a necessary element of a mixed question. Pena, 869 P.2d at 937; see, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 290 n. 19, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (defining a mixed question of law and fact as occurring when historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard, or . . . whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated). In other words, a mixed question is one in which we must determine when the articulated legal rule to be applied to a set of factsa rule that we establish without deference to the trial courtsembodies a de facto grant of discretion which permits the trial court to reach one of several possible conclusions about the legal effect of a particular set of facts without risking reversal. Pena, 869 P.2d at 937. ¶ 28 Therefore, when determining whether an issue presents a mixed question, we must first identify the legal principle at issue. Our decision in Drake v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997), is illustrative. There, we were asked whether the court of appeals appropriately reviewed for legal correctness the issue of whether the petitioner was injured in the scope of her employment. Id. at 180. The Labor Commission, along with the employee's insurer, argued that scope of employment determinations were factual and consequently subject to a substantial evidence standard of review. Id. at 181 & n. 7. We rejected this argument, holding that whether facts fall under the legal rule termed `special errands,' . . . requires some legal analysis. Id. Prior precedent and persuasive authority had established a legal, albeit highly fact dependent, rule for determining when a special errand fell within an employee's scope of employment. Id. at 183. Given the fact-dependent nature of the inquiry, however, we found that we could not spell out in detail a legal rule that will adequately anticipate the facts that should be outcome determinative for the policy behind the legal rule to be served. Id. at 182 (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, we determined that whether a special errand is within an employee's scope of employment is a mixed question of law and fact requiring some deference. Id. We further explained that when considering `whether a given set of facts comes within the reach of a given rule of law,' id. at 181 (quoting Pena, 869 P.2d at 936), deference to the lower court is created when a legal standard is defined `so that it actually grants some operational discretion to the trial courts applying it,' id. (quoting State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278, 282 (Utah 1994)). ¶ 29 In summary, factual issues are generally empirical, legal issues apply an abstract rule regardless of the specific facts, and mixed questions generally arise when the applicability of the legal rule turns on the combination of present facts. Having undertaken this attempt to flesh out the distinctions between questions of law, questions of fact, and mixed questions of law and fact, we turn to the issues presented here.
¶ 30 Whether certain tasks are essential functions varies from job to job and industry to industry. A judge is ill-equipped to determine, with his or her legal expertise, the essential elements of a fast-food job. Rather, that determination must be based on factual evidence and testimony from those with experience in the industry. Additionally, there is no legal rule that could create the basis for a mixed question of fact and law. While the adjective essential does introduce a level of abstraction into the fact-finder's determination, it does not create a mixed question any more than the modifier reasonable changes the reasonable man standard into a legal determination. Cf. Benson v. Ames, 604 P.2d 927, 929 (Utah 1979) (finding that negligence under a reasonable man standard is a factual determination disrupted on appeal only if substantial evidence fails to support the trial court's ruling). We consequently hold that the question of whether an employee can perform the essential functions of prior employment is a factual determination that should be overturned on appeal only if substantial evidence fails to support it.
¶ 31 The second issue, whether other work was reasonably available to Martinez, is a closer question. In different contexts, reasonableness has been considered both a legal and a factual question. See, e.g., Benson, 604 P.2d at 929 (finding that whether a defendant acted as a reasonable man in a negligence case is an issue for the trier of fact that should not be disturbed on appeal if it is supported by substantial evidence). But see, e.g., Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 179 (Utah 1998) (finding that reasonable cause was primarily a legal question in the antitrust arena, but that appellate courts should grant the fact-finder a measure of discretion); Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 892 (Utah 1996) ([T]he reasonableness of an award of attorney fees ordinarily presents a question of law with some measure of discretion given to the trial court.). Additionally, the Labor Commission has defined reasonably available as regular, steady, and readily available work, Utah Admin. Code r. 612-1-10(D)(1)(b), a definition that reads like a legal rule to be applied to a factual situation. ¶ 32 Despite these countervailing examples, we conclude that the question of whether other work is reasonably available is a factual determination. The statute asks the Commission to determine if other work is reasonably available, taking into consideration the employee's[] . . . age; . . . education; . . . past work experience; . . . medical capacity; and . . . residual functional capacity. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(1)(c)(iv). These factual considerations inform what is reasonable; its parameters are not further defined by an overarching legal principle, as in the case of reasonable suspicion, for example. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 939. ¶ 33 Our conclusion that essential functions and reasonably available are factual determinations is consistent with both our prior precedent and the applicable statutory language. First, we have traditionally viewed permanent total disability determinations as factual. Hodges v. W. Piling & Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 718, 721 (Utah 1986); Kerans v. Indus. Comm'n, 713 P.2d 49, 54 (Utah 1986); Brundage v. IML Freight, Inc., 622 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 1980); Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. Indus. Comm'n, 109 Utah 553, 168 P.2d 319, 322 (Utah 1946). Second, as discussed herein, the language of subsection (b) requires the employee to prove permanent total disability by a  preponderance of the evidence,  using the elements of subsection (c) to meet that evidentiary burden (emphasis added). ¶ 34 In sum, we conclude that the court of appeals erroneously applied an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing the Commission's factual findings that Martinez was capable of performing the essential functions of his prior job and that he was capable of performing other work reasonably available to him.