Opinion ID: 215941
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mr. Watson's Reasonable Accommodation Claim

Text: Mr. Watson next asserts that C.R. England violated the ADA by denying his request for home time. He claims that by refusing his request, C.R. England failed to provide the reasonable accommodations for his disability that the ADA requires. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of C.R. England on this claim because Mr. Watson had failed to show that he needed `home time' both prior to and following his arrival in Omaha, and because he made no reference to any disability in his request for `home time' that would put C.R. England on notice that a reasonable accommodation was being requested under the ADA. Id. at 25. Under ADA § 102(b)(5)(A), an employer can unlawfully discriminate against an employee by failing to mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an ... employee. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); accord Lowe v. Angelo's Italian Foods, Inc., 87 F.3d 1170, 1174 (10th Cir.1996). The statute thus establishes a cause of action for disabled employees whose employers fail to reasonably accommodate them. Selenke v. Med. Imaging of Colo., 248 F.3d 1249, 1261 (10th Cir.2001). The Act defines reasonable accommodation to include: (A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A)-(B); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (defining reasonable accommodation). We have held that, under the appropriate circumstances, [a]n allowance of time for medical care or treatment may constitute a reasonable accommodation. Rascon v. USW. Commc'ns, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1333-34 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Hudson v. MCI Telecommc'ns Corp., 87 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir.1996) (This court agrees with plaintiff that a reasonable allowance of time for medical care and treatment may, in appropriate circumstances, constitute a reasonable accommodation.). To facilitate the reasonable accommodation, `[t]he federal regulations implementing the ADA envision an interactive process that requires participation by both parties.' Bartee v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 374 F.3d 906, 916 (10th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Templeton v. Neodata Servs., Inc., 162 F.3d 617, 619 (10th Cir.1998)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). However, before an employer's duty to provide reasonable accommodationsor even to participate in the interactive processis triggered under the ADA, the employee must make an adequate request, thereby putting the employer on notice. See, e.g., Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1171 (In general, the interactive process must ordinarily begin with the employee providing notice to the employer of the employee's disability and any resulting limitations....); Woodman v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1330, 1345 (10th Cir. 1997) (The `employee's initial request for an accommodation ... triggers the employer's obligation to participate in the interactive process.' (quoting Taylor v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir.1996))); see also, e.g., Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 506 (3d Cir.2010) ([E]ither by direct communication or other appropriate means, the employee must make clear that the [he/she] wants assistance for his or her disability.  (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Conneen v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 334 F.3d 318, 332 (3d Cir.2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 23 (1st Cir.2004) (The request for accommodation must be sufficiently direct and specific, giving notice that she needs a special accommodation. (quoting Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 261 (1st Cir.2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Although the notice or request does not have to be in writing, be made by the employee, or formally invoke the magic words `reasonable accommodation,' it nonetheless must make clear that the employee wants assistance for his or her disability.  Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 313 (3d Cir.1999) (emphasis added). That is, the employer must know of both the disability and the employee's desire for accommodations for that disability. Id.; see Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir.2002) (An employee is not required to use any particular language when requesting an accommodation but need only `inform the employer of the need for an adjustment due to a medical condition.' (quoting Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1114 n. 5 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc), vacated on other grounds by 535 U.S. 391, 122 S.Ct. 1516, 152 L.Ed.2d 589 (2002))); see also Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 1999 WL 33305876, at  (Mar. 1, 1999) (When an individual decides to request accommodation, the individual ... must let the employer know that s/he needs an adjustment or change at work for a reason related to a medical condition. To request accommodation, an individual may use `plain English' and need not mention the ADA or use the phrase `reasonable accommodation.'). In this instance, Mr. Watson's accommodation claim fails because he did not make an adequate request for reasonable accommodation regarding his alleged disability. [17] Therefore, C.R. England's obligation under the ADA to provide reasonable accommodation was never triggered. The first time Mr. Watson requested home time, on February 11, 2003, the stated reason was family time. EEOC App. at 1035. Although C.R. England had been informed of his HIV-positive status by this time, a request for time off for family time would in no way put the company on notice that he needed time off due to his illness, if he in fact did. Furthermore, when C.R. England denied Mr. Watson's request because it was not made two weeks in advance in accordance with company policy, he did not object; more to the point, Mr. Watson did not indicate that the time off was needed for his medical impairmentto the contrary, Mr. Watson replied: Ok, just when ava[i]lable. Id. at 1038. Mr. Watson's second request for time off occurred during an exchange with a C.R. England employee over the Qualcomm system. During that communication, which took place the day after the initial request, Mr. Watson stated that [he] need[ed] home time, and [he] c[ould] not wait two more weeks. Id. at 426. Again, Mr. Watson gave no indication that he needed time off due to his HIV status. As with his initial request, Mr. Watson's second demand for time off was denied because he had failed to provide 2 weeks notice. Id. at 427. Following this second denial, Mr. Watson informed the C.R. England employee that he was leaving Omaha because couldn't handle the stress level and that he was dead heading to [his] family house in [Florida]; he further indicated that this was where [his] [doctor] is, and [he had] to see [his doctor]. Id. at 428. This fleeting reference to his doctorwhich was seemingly made in conjunction with his unmanageable stress level, not his alleged disabilityis insufficient to place the company on notice that he needed time off due to his alleged disability (i.e., his HIV-positive status). In some circumstances, an employee's reference to the need to see a physician may constitute significant proof that the employee was seeking a reasonable accommodation, especially when combined with an actual request for time off and some reference to the employee's disability. However, we need not endeavor here to detail those circumstances under which a physician reference would constitute such significant proof. It suffices for us to observe that Mr. Watson's physician reference does not come anywhere close to the mark. In sum, Mr. Watson's two requests for home timewhich were for family time, rather than his illnessand his after-the-fact, fleeting statement mentioning a need to see his doctor, did not put C.R. England on notice that Mr. Watson was requesting reasonable accommodation due to his HIV status. Therefore, his requests did not trigger the company's duty under ADA § 102(b)(5). Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of C.R. England on this claim.