Opinion ID: 1907350
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Failure to Call Dr. Lewis

Text: As stated by this Court following the announcement of the United States Supreme Court's seminal decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to succeed, the claimant must satisfy both prongs of the following two-part test: First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably competent performance under prevailing professional standards. Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927, 932 (Fla.1986). In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court will defer to the trial court's findings of fact and review as questions of mixed law and fact whether counsel's performance was ineffective and whether the defendant was prejudiced by that ineffective performance. See Ragsdale v. State, 798 So.2d 713, 715 (Fla.2001). To fairly assess counsel's performance, the reviewing court must make every effort to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Elledge contends that trial counsel Laswell's decision not to utilize Dr. Lewis as a witness was unreasonable because it was predicated on a personality clash and resulted in the reliance on two unqualified, improperly prepared, and conflicting experts. Elledge contends that Dr. Lewis would have offered substantial mitigating evidence pertaining to Elledge's mental health, but that Elledge was denied the benefit of this evidence because Laswell failed to establish the necessary rapport with Dr. Lewis and delegated her trial preparation to an attorney not familiar with her work. The trial court determined that Laswell's failure to present Dr. Lewis as a witness in the 1993 proceeding was a direct result of Dr. Lewis's reluctance to testify. On this point, the trial court found: Based upon the testimony adduced at the evidentiary hearing, this Court finds that Dr. Lewis did not have any intention of appearing and testifying on behalf of the Defendant at the trial in 1993. Her failure to appear was not the fault of Mr. Laswell or Dr. Ongley, but rather by her lack of preparedness and her reluctance to undergo cross-examination, perhaps of the kind she had experienced during the federal habeas corpus hearing by the same State Attorney, Michael Satz.... Having heard the testimony and reviewed the evidence, this Court finds that Dr. Lewis' testimony was totally devoid of credibility and that it was Dr. Lewis's [sic] complete lack of cooperation which resulted in her failure to testify. In rendering this determination, the trial judge had the unique insight gained from two separate on-the-record conversations with Dr. Lewis during the course of the 1993 penalty phase proceeding. The record of both the postconviction evidentiary hearing and the 1993 penalty phase support the trial court's determination. In 1983, Dr. Lewis had evaluated Elledge as a part of a study she, together with a neurologist, Dr. Pincus, conducted with death row inmates in an effort to link homicidal tendencies to temporal lobe epilepsy. Laswell testified during the evidentiary hearing that he contacted Dr. Lewis in the summer of 1993 and stated that she initially expressed a willingness to provide assistance. Laswell further testified that despite this initial willingness she had expressed, she failed to review her prior file from the 1983 evaluation. Laswell stated that Dr. Lewis consistently requested additional testing and evaluation of Elledge even though he had informed her that he wanted her to testify regarding her original evaluation of Elledge, which, in his view, came closest in time to the murder and would provide the most forceful evidence. As the 1993 penalty phase approached, Dr. Lewis's status as a testifying witness was uncertain. Laswell testified during the evidentiary hearing that his final conversation with Dr. Lewis occurred two days after opening remarks had been presented in the penalty phase and ended in frustration with Laswell concluding the conversation with the doctor when she informed him that she could not appear as scheduled on November 8. Laswell subsequently obtained a court order compelling Dr. Lewis to appear to testify on Monday and Tuesday, November 8 and 9. Laswell's characterization of the material events is fully supported by the transcript of the on-the-record phone conversation between the trial court, the parties, and Dr. Lewis during a recess in the proceedings on November 8 for which Dr. Lewis had failed to appear. Dr. Lewis blamed her failure to appear on the fact that she had received a message from Laswell's office on the preceding Thursday that the November 8 proceeding had been cancelled, and that by the time she received word on Friday that the proceeding would go forward, she had already made plans for the 8 and 9. Tellingly, however, when the trial judge inquired as to whether she had reviewed her file in the case, she responded that she had not reviewed the file in many years, that she usually reviews for a case the day before she testifies, and that she did not have Elledge's file with her at home when she received word that the proceeding would go forward. After some discussion, Dr. Lewis agreed to appear as a witness on Monday the 15th. Prior to ending the telephone conversation, Laswell informed her that Ongley would conduct her direct examination. Dr. Lewis did not, however, appear on November 15. During this evidentiary hearing, Dr. Lewis testified that she did not appear because she believed Ongley was not capable of preparing her and had advised her that it was against Elledge's interests for her to testify. This testimony was largely contradicted by that of Ongley. Ongley conceded that he did not know the full content of the testimony of all other witnesses, and that preparing Dr. Lewis the weekend before her testimony would have been difficult, but disagreed with Dr. Lewis's contention that he had stated that it would not be in Elledge's best interests if she testified. According to Ongley, Dr. Lewis had already decided that she was not going to testify in the matter and there was nothing that he could say to change her mind. Ongley's characterization of Dr. Lewis as a thoroughly reluctant witness is fully supported by the transcript of the second on-the-record telephone conversation between the trial court, the parties, and Dr. Lewis, which occurred on November 15, 1993. During the course of that conversation, Dr. Lewis stated that she did not feel it was appropriate for her to testify if Laswell did not think she would be an asset. This contention rings hollow, however, because Laswell had informed her during the course of the November 8 conversation that he had advised Elledge against calling her as a witness, but she nonetheless agreed to appear on the 15th. She also relayed that Ongley had advised that he felt unable to prepare her because he was unfamiliar with her work and did not know the substance of the testimony of the other expert witnesses. This contention was undermined, however, when the trial court informed her that the rule of sequestration had been invoked in the case, thus precluding her from being informed of the content of other witnesses' testimony. [12] In response to a question directly from Elledge regarding what additional information she would need to testify, she responded that she would need to review old records and possibly interview him and his family members again. Dr. Lewis attested to the need for an updated evaluation of Elledge despite the fact that Laswell had informed her that he wanted her to testify regarding her 1983 evaluation of Elledge, which was the evaluation that had occurred nearest in time to the murders. Toward the close of the November 15 on-record conversation, Dr. Lewis's lack of intent to be involved in the case was totally clear. She restated her recommendation that Dr. Pincus submit Elledge to further sensitive EEG testing. She indicated that once Dr. Pincus conducted and interpreted the tests, she would testify if still needed, but continued to underscore her need to completely reevaluate Elledge. [13] Incredibly, when asked by the trial court whether  in the event that Elledge continued to want her to testify  she would be able to testify in the near future if she were given time to test Elledge as she saw fit and prepare as she wanted, she responded that her daughter was getting married the following week and that her schedule was booked on other matters until February. [14] Clearly, on the basis of this record, defense counsel's failure to call Dr. Lewis can be attributed to no other cause than Dr. Lewis's construction of numerous insurmountable and unreasonable barriers to testifying in this case. Dr. Lewis presented a constantly evolving story of why she could not testify in Elledge's case, which, as found by the trial court, thinly guised a lack of intention to testify from the start. Trial counsel's performance in failing to secure the testimony of such an impossibly recalcitrant witness can hardly be characterized as deficient. Although Elledge's ineffective assistance of counsel claim can be determined on the basis that trial counsel's performance was not deficient, see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ([T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim ... to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one), Elledge similarly cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by Dr. Lewis's failure to testify during his 1993 penalty phase. Notably, one reviewing court has already determined that Elledge would have likely received the death penalty even with the addition of Dr. Lewis's testimony. In his petition for habeas relief in federal district court, Elledge argued that counsel in his second penalty phase proceeding (which occurred in 1977) was deficient in failing to advance any mental health mitigating evidence. In support, Elledge offered the testimony of Dr. Lewis, who opined that he suffered from organic brain dysfunction, episodic rages, and paranoid behavior. She testified that the combination of organic brain dysfunction, psychotic paranoia, and childhood abuse caused a disorder that affected Elledge during the Strack homicide. See Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d at 1445 n. 12. In agreeing with the district court's conclusion that Elledge was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to secure mental health testimony such as that produced by Dr. Lewis, the circuit court stated: The value of Dr. Lewis's testimony was undercut in part by the revelation that her analysis largely relied on Elledge's recitations and had not been fully corroborated by independent follow-up investigation. In addition, the two court-appointed psychiatrists who examined Elledge each gave damaging evaluations that would have diluted Dr. Lewis's impact. [N.18] [N.18.] Of all the several experts who examined Elledge over the years, only Dr. Lewis found him to be operating under extreme emotional or emotional disturbance caused by organic brain damage. The great weight of expert testimony clearly cut against Dr. Lewis's testimony and made it less persuasive. Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d at 1447 & n. 18. Dr. Lewis offered conclusions in this evidentiary hearing that were substantially similar to those offered in the federal habeas proceeding. She testified that if she had been called as a witness she would have opined that both statutory mental health mitigators (extreme emotional disturbance and inability to conform conduct to the requirements of law) applied to Elledge. However, as discussed in the trial court's order denying Elledge's 3.850 motion, the State's cross-examination of Dr. Lewis during the evidentiary hearing exposed many weaknesses in her testimony. The State's questioning revealed numerous inconsistencies between her testimony in the federal habeas proceeding and the statements Elledge himself gave police; the failure to corroborate the background and history provided by Elledge; the findings of numerous other mental health experts who had diagnosed Elledge as having an antisocial personality disorder; [15] and the findings of neuropsychologist Dr. McMahon, who evaluated Elledge along with Drs. Lewis and Pincus in 1983, and determined that the results of his neuropsychological test battery were essentially within normal limits. Another factor which surfaced during cross-examination was Dr. Lewis's admission that it required nearly three years for her to heal emotionally from the controversy associated with her participation in a case that originated in Rochester, New York, [16] and that Elledge's 1993 penalty phase proceeding occurred during this recovery period. This record supports the conclusion that Elledge was not prejudiced by the absence of Dr. Lewis's testimony. The Strickland elements have not been satisfied on this claim.