Opinion ID: 2323065
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Detective Springer's Testimony

Text: The defendant assigns error to the admission of opinion testimony by Det. Springer that he believed that the state's only eyewitness was not truthful when he told Det. Springer that he could not identify the individuals in the vehicle. The defendant argues that the trial justice erred in permitting Det. Springer to give an opinion that Williams, in fact, knew the identity of his assailants when he gave his first statement shortly after the murder. Lassiter contends that Det. Springer impermissibly bolstered the testimony of Williams by opining that, notwithstanding Williams's statement that he was unable to identify the shooters, he believed that Williams was withholding that information thus implying that Williams, in fact, knew the identity of the shooters. Detective Springer was permitted to explain the basis of that belief as follows: [Williams] was very specific as to what happened as he was walking down the street and what he saw approach. When it came to the point that I tried to be specific as to the faces in the car or the people in the car, he became vague at that point and all he would give was a black face. I felt basically at the distance he was away from the car and his opportunity to view who was in the car, I felt he was not completely honest at that point when he told me all he saw was a black face. (Emphasis added.) In ruling this evidence admissible, the trial justice declared that Det. Springer was entitled to render his opinion concerning his present state of mind at the time he took this statement. Lassiter contends that the admission of this testimony had the effect of vouching for the witness's credibility on the crucial issue of Williams's identification of defendant as one of the shooters. According to Lassiter, the admission of Det. Springer's opinion testimony that Williams was not completely honest when he first told the police that he was unable to identify the shooters implied that Williams was being honest when he gave the second statement in which he named Lassiter as one of the gunmen. Thus, defendant contends that Det. Springer not only expressed his belief that the witness's first statement was untruthful, but he also explained why he felt [the witness] was not completely honest   . The vouching was particularly prejudicial here, Lassiter argues, because Williams was the only witness to identify the shooters at trial, and the vouching was accomplished by an experienced police detective. Further, because Williams's credibility in the eyes of the jury on that point probably was dispositive of the charges against defendant, Lassiter contends that such impermissible vouching amounted to reversible error. In light of our previous holdings condemning this practice, we are constrained to agree. The determination of the truthfulness or credibility of a witness lies within the exclusive province of the jury. State v. Webber, 716 A.2d 738, 742 (RI. 1998) (quoting State v. Haslam, 663 A.2d 902, 905 (R.I.1995)). Bolstering or vouching occurs when one witness offer[s] an opinion regarding the truthfulness or accuracy of another witness' testimony. Id. Impermissible bolstering may occur even if the witness does not literally state an opinion concerning the credibility of another witness's testimony. Id. ; Commonwealth v. Montanino, 409 Mass. 500, 567 N.E.2d 1212, 1214 (1991). If one witness's testimony has the same substantive import as if it addressed another witness's credibility, it is inadmissible. Webber, 716 A.2d at 742. In State v. Miller, 679 A.2d 867 (Rd. 1996), a college coach was charged with sexually assaulting one of his players. One assault allegedly took place in 1990, the other in 1991. Id at 869. The complainant did not report the alleged assaults to the police in a timely fashion, but testified at trial that she disclosed the first assault to her mother the summer after it happened and did not identify her assailant. Id. at 872. A year later, when the mother spoke with a police officer, she failed to mention her daughter's prior disclosure. Id. Over defendant's objection at trial, the police officer was permitted to testify, first, that it was not uncommon for the police to have to draw out important information from witnesses, and second, that witnesses often fail to appreciate the importance of the information they possess when they first speak to the police because information that may not seem that important to them could be very important for me to know. Miller, 679 A.2d at 872. This Court deemed the officer's testimony impermissible vouching because it suggested that the witness's failure to mention the first assault should not be viewed as adversely affecting her credibility. Id. We reiterated that the [d]etermination of the truthfulness or the credibility of witnesses is the exclusive province of a jury. Id. A witness is therefore not permitted to offer an opinion concerning the truthfulness of the testimony of another witness, even when the opinion given does not literally address another witness's credibility. Id. (citing Haslam, 663 A.2d at 905). Although Det. Springer's testimony was not a literal comment on the truthfulness of Williams's in-court testimony that Lassiter was one of the gunmen, the detective was permitted to give an opinion concerning Williams's initial veracity. The effect of this testimony was to inform the jury that Det. Springer believed that Williams could identify his assailants and, therefore, that Williams's subsequent statement disclosing their identity was, in fact, worthy of belief. Further, Springer was permitted to testify about the basis of his opinion: that because Williams spoke with specificity about the events leading up to the shooting and the short distance between Williams and the vehicle, he felt that [Williams] was not completely honest    when he told me all he saw was a black face. This opinion testimony undoubtedly bolstered the state's primary contention that Williams was being honest when he identified Lassiter as one of the gunmen in his second police statement and during his in-court testimony. See In re Jessica C., 690 A.2d 1357, 1362-63 (R.I. 1997) (holding statement by witness that a child's allegations of abuse came across as very credible amounted to vouching). This case is also similar to Webber. In that case, Matty, a police dog trained to detect the presence of flammable accelerants, was used during a search of defendant's motor vehicle. Webber, 716 A.2d at 739-40. John B. Fiore (Fiore), a Rhode Island State fire marshal investigator, was permitted to testify that a member of the Connecticut State Police and his dog, Matty, assisted in an arson investigation at defendant's home. Id. Neither the trainer nor the curator of the dog testified and the state failed to offer any evidence concerning the dog's training. Id. at 740-41. According to Fiore, Matty alerted to the presence of a flammable accelerant in the vehicle's floor mat. Id. at 739-40. The floor mat was seized and subsequently tested utilizing gas chromatograph technology at the Rhode Island State Crime Laboratory. That test did not detect any flammable accelerant on the mat. Id. at 740. However, the state called Thomas Haynes, a certified fire marshal in Rhode Island and Connecticut, who testified as an expert witness. When questioned concerning the results of tests comparing the relative sensitivity of trained dogs and gas chromatographs to the presence of flammable substances, Haynes testified that studies demonstrated that canines were more sensitive than gas chromatographs at detecting the presence of weak samples. Id. at 742. The jury, which had been presented with two pieces of conflicting, yet highly probative evidence  the presence or absence of a flammable substance in defendant's vehicle  was thus aided in determining the credibility of this evidence by expert witness opinion that dogs were more accurate at detecting weak samples of accelerants. We ruled that this testimony impermissibly bolstered the evidence concerning Matty's alert to the presence of an accelerant by vouching for the accuracy of the dog's response. Id. We are satisfied that as in Miller and Webber, the state presented the testimony of Det. Springer to explain away damaging evidence by suggesting that Williams's initial statement that he was unable to identify the shooters should not be viewed as adversely affecting his credibility. That is, because Det. Springer believed that Williams knew the identity of his assailants when he gave the first statement, the jury should too. We are thus satisfied that Det. Springer's opinion testimony constituted impermissible vouching because it squarely addressed and bolstered another witness's credibility. Miller, 679 A.2d at 872. Because Det. Springer's testimony supported the credibility of the state's only eyewitness, its admission could be construed by the jury only as an endorsement of the witness's credibility. Id. at 873. Opinion evidence that tends to corroborate another witness's testimony or substantiate a disputed fact is admissible in limited circumstances. In State v. Gough, 810 A.2d 783, 786 (R.I.2002) (per curiam), the admission of testimony by the investigating officer that the marks he observed on the complainant's wrists were consistent with the improper use of handcuffs was upheld by this Court. We rejected the argument that this evidence constituted bolstering. Although the officer's opinion corroborated the complainant's testimony that handcuffs had been employed to restrain him, a photograph depicting the circular marks on the complainant's wrists was also admitted into evidence. Id. The jury was thus provided with enough facts upon which the officer's opinion was based to assess whether the conclusions drawn possessed sufficient probative force or, rather, were grounded in mere speculation or conjecture. Id. In the case at bar, Det. Springer's testimony was not based on objectively manifested observations. Rather, he simply stated his belief and the basis of that belief that Williams was not being truthful when he said that he was unable to identify the gunmen. This testimony was not based on any objectively measurable criteria, such as physical injury, but on his instincts and assumptions as an experienced officer. In this case, because Williams was the key prosecution witness, his credibility was of paramount importance. Montanino, 567 N.E.2d at 1214. His contradictory statements to the police concerning his ability to identify the gunmen had placed his credibility in question and afforded defendant fruitful grounds for cross-examination. Because the state's case against Lassiter depended on Williams's credibility, Det. Springer's opinion that the witness knew the identity of the assailants all along probably was accorded great weight by the jury. Miller, 679 A.2d at 873; see also State v. Desmarais, 479 A.2d 745, 748 (R.I.1984) (acknowledging influential nature of police testimony). Accordingly we conclude that the improper introduction of testimony bearing on Williams's credibility was prejudicial error warranting reversal of the conviction.