Opinion ID: 2829984
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct: Vouching

Text: As noted above, defendant was charged jointly with codefendants Jay Palega, Tony Iuli, and Tautai Seumanu with the murder, aggravated kidnapping, and robbery of Nolan Pamintuan. As described in more detail below, the 6 Thus, the jury was instructed: ―I have not intended by anything I have said or done, or by any questions that I may have asked, or by any ruling I may have made, to intimate or suggest what you should find to be the facts, or that I believe or disbelieve any witness. [¶] If anything I have done or said has seemed to so indicate, you will disregard it and form your own conclusion.‖ 26 prosecutor offered Palega and Iuli a plea deal: in exchange for their testimony against defendant, they would be allowed to plead guilty to reduced charges. Both Palega and Iuli took the deal and testified against defendant. In his opening argument, defense counsel mentioned the plea deal, noted the prosecutor offered the deal after defendant withdrew his speedy trial waiver (time waiver), and suggested the jury could infer the prosecutor did not believe she had a strong enough case to convict defendant without Palega‘s and Iuli‘s testimony. The parties thereafter agreed to a set of stipulated statements (stipulations) informing the jury the prosecutor‘s decision to offer the plea deals was unrelated to defendant‘s decision to hasten his trial, and that she independently decided that Palega and Iuli bore reduced moral culpability for the crimes. Defendant now contends the evidence of the prosecutor‘s subjective motivation for offering the plea deals was inadmissible, and her closing argument referencing that evidence was misconduct because she thereby improperly vouched for the credibility of her witnesses. As we explain, defendant forfeited these arguments by failing to object, and the claims are meritless in any event.
At the time of the crimes, Tony Iuli was 16 years old. By that time he had had multiple contacts with the justice system and knew, when arrested, he would not be treated as a juvenile. He also knew he was facing life in prison without possibility of parole for the crimes against Pamintuan. Jay Palega was 18 years old when Pamintuan was killed and learned while in pretrial detention that the prosecution did not intend to pursue the death penalty against him. The prosecution filed the information in this case on June 19, 1997. Deputy District Attorney Angela Backers was assigned to prosecute the case on or around December 28, 1997. Attorney Michael Berger represented Iuli and 27 approached Backers at least three times in 1999, attempting to obtain a plea bargain for his client. He was at that time unsuccessful. Defendant withdrew his time waiver on March 3, 2000, requiring that trial begin no later than May 2, 2000. Around this time the prosecution offered, and Iuli rejected, two plea bargains. The first deal required that he plead guilty to first degree murder, accept a sentence of 25 years to life in prison, and testify against defendant at the guilt phase of trial. The second deal required that he plead guilty to second degree murder, accept a sentence of 15 years to life in prison, and testify against defendant at both the guilt and penalty phases of trial. Iuli rejected both of these offers because he believed prisoners with life terms would never be paroled by prison authorities. Palega, who was represented by Attorney William Muraoka, subsequently rejected the same offers for the same reason. The prosecutor then offered a different deal, which Iuli accepted on April 26, 2000. Pursuant to this new deal, Iuli agreed to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter, simple kidnapping, and attempted robbery, and to admit a firearm use enhancement, in return for a determinate prison sentence of 16 years, eight months. The plea deal also required Iuli to testify truthfully against defendant at both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. Iuli wrote a letter to Palega urging him to accept the same deal, which Palega did on May 15, 2000. Both men eventually testified against defendant and identified him as the one who shot Pamintuan. Defendant was represented at trial by Attorneys Michael Ciraolo and Deborah Levy. In Ciraolo‘s opening statement, he referred to the plea deals Iuli and Palega received: ―And one thing I want you to remember is a particular day, and that is March 3d of this year. Because what occurred on that day is my client withdrew his time waiver, which meant he had to commence this trial within 60 28 days. And after that date, the prosecution realized that they cannot make the case against my client, that they had to get him by testimony. ―The prosecution‘s case revolves around two people, Tony Iuli and Jay Palega. These men were former co-defendants of the defendant. They were charged with the same charges that my client was charged with, only the prosecution was not seeking the death penalty. The prosecution was only seeking, and has only sought, the death penalty against my client. Those two men were faced with prison, with life without possibility of parole. They were to die in prison. ―The prosecution approached them, through their counsel, and offered them, what we say in the criminal vernacular, deals. And the deal was that if they testify against my client on the guilt phase of the trial, they would receive firstdegree murder convictions. They had to plead to first degree, which meant 25 years to life. If they testified against my client at the penalty phase of the trial, they would get a second degree plea bargain, which was 15 years to life. ―Both those men refused that offer. ―The prosecution was compelled to renegotiate her position and ultimately offer both these men a fixed term of a maximum of 17 years in prison, 16 years, eight months. So no matter what happened, they would get no more than 17 years for their testimony. ―When these men testify—they had given statements previously to the police. The prosecution worked with them with considerable time and effort to get their statements here in court. When they testify, they are testifying under complete distrust by the prosecution because they have not been sentenced yet.‖ (Italics added.) The prosecutor did not object to this argument. But later, she expressed concern that defense counsel had misled the jury in two ways: (1) by suggesting 29 she believed she had a weak case; and (2) by asserting that when she realized that defendant‘s withdrawal of his time waiver would require her to go to trial, she approached counsel for Iuli and Palega and offered them a deal. Contrary to these assertions, she explained, ―The truth of the matter is that I never approached Mr. Berger or Mr. Iuli, his client, with a deal until the defense had approached me asking for a deal. ―Mr. Berger, for over one year, was asking me for a deal that would include Tony [Iuli] testifying against the remaining three codefendants and identifying the shooter in the murder. [¶] . . . [¶] And the offer of proof is that after the [section] 1538 [suppression hearing] in this case, . . . Mr. Berger approached me, no less than three times, probably more, whenever he would see me, basically he would say: Have you put together an offer for my client, Mr. Iuli?‖ Prosecutor Backers explained that she had been busy trying an unrelated capital case when Mr. Berger approached her about a deal and she had not had the time to consider a plea deal for Iuli until after that trial. But after defense counsel‘s opening statement, she became concerned the jury had been misled about the pertinent events. Accordingly, she proposed a stipulation, explaining: ―So the impression left with the jury that I got desperate because I thought I couldn‘t prove my case against this defendant, and approached them for deals, is absolutely not true. ―And I am trying to correct that misimpression by a series of stipulations that I have offered that indicate that I had been working on the case for two years providing discovery, and by the time they pulled [their] time [waiver] on March 3d, I had, during the same week, provided them with 1,174 pages of penalty phase discovery, which obviously indicated that I had already worked up a penalty phase, because I was giving them almost 1,200 pages in penalty phase discovery. 30 ―And I would anticipate calling Mr. Berger, and Mr. Muraoka, and having them testify—well, as far as Mr. Berger is concerned, that Mr. Berger is the one who approached me, not me approaching him. ―And the question I would propose to ask Mr. Iuli when he is on the stand is: You and your lawyer had an agreement that you would take a deal from the prosecution that included you testifying against the others, and you had that agreement that you would take that deal for over a year before you actually pled guilty. And that is the substance of the question I would ask Mr. Iuli. ―And there is a series of questions I would ask Mr. Berger, basically that would prove the offer of proof that I just made; that he came to me and was asking for a deal for quite a long period of time before I made him an offer.‖ (Italics added.) Defense Counsel Ciraolo protested, arguing his opening statement was ―a fair inference on what we believe the evidence would show,‖ and ―[w]hat is critical here is that an offer was not made until after we withdrew the time waiver. And the offer that was made by Ms. Backers was rejected. They had—there had to be a further offer. The subsequent offer was accepted. ―Whether Ms. Backers had a case or not, what her rationale was or was not for making an offer, I believe is fair comment in opening statement and outline and final argument. ―If she wants to put her credibility on the line, the evaluation of the case, she is doing so here. And I don‘t think that is appropriate.‖ The court found Mr. Ciraolo‘s argument was permissible, but that the prosecutor should also be permitted to rebut the argument with evidence. The court agreed with defense counsel, however, that the prosecutor‘s proposed stipulation was ―fairly inartful, both the way the stipulation is presented and also the way—the question Ms. Backers wants to pose [to Berger, Iuli‘s attorney]. It is 31 probably not the best way to approach it.‖ The court then deferred judgment on the matter until a later time, saying: ―I think there are other ways to put the information in front of the jury without opening an entire Pandora‘s box. And what I foresee is the focus of this case being transferred, either intentionally or unintentionally, from the facts of the ultimate issue to prosecutorial conduct and credibility. And I don‘t think that serves the interest of justice here. ―So let me see if I can come up with something else . . . and then readdress this [later].‖
The trial court thereafter proposed a stipulation that stated: ―The information in this case was filed in the Superior Court of Alameda County on June 19th of 1997. At that time, California law provided that the defendant had a statutory right to demand a trial on the charges contained in the information within 60 days of June 19th, 1997, or on or before August 18th of 1997. ―The defendant entered a general time waiver waiving his right to a trial within 60 days of June 19th, 1997. ―The defendant withdrew that general time waiver on March 3d of the year 2000. This required that the trial in this case commence on or before May 2d of the year 2000. ―Deputy District Attorney Angela Backers was first assigned this case on or about December 28th of 1997. ―Mr. Michael Ciraolo and Ms. Deborah Levy became attorneys of record for the defendant on or about December 11th of 1998. ―There has been ongoing discovery and the providing of information on the guilt and possible penalty phases of this case by Ms. Backers to Mr. Ciraolo and Ms. Levy since December 11th of 1998. 32 ―Mr. Michael Berger, who is the attorney sitting over there, has represented Mr. Tony Iuli in this matter from on or about May 27th of 1996. ―During the year 1999, Mr. Berger approached Ms. Backers on at least three occasions regarding a possible plea agreement which would involve Mr. Iuli being allowed to plead to a lesser offense in consideration for Mr. Iuli providing testimony in this trial. ―Mr. Iuli entered such a plea agreement on April 26th of the year 2000.‖ Defendant‘s attorney, Ciraolo, expressly agreed to this stipulation, which was read to the jury. Later, the trial court proposed two additional stipulations covering the circumstances of Palega‘s plea. The first one provided: ―On May 5th of the year 2000, during an interview with Ms. Backers, defendant Tony Iuli wrote a letter to defendant Jay Palega. The letter was reviewed by Ms. Backers and Mr. Iuli‘s attorney, Mr. Michael Berger. Mr. Berger placed a phone call to Mr. Muraoka to inform him about the letter. Mr. Muraoka came to the courtroom to pick up the letter. At that time, Ms. Backers informed Mr. Muraoka that the same plea agreement offered and accepted by Mr. Iuli was now being offered to Mr. Palega. Mr. Palega accepted the offer and entered into the plea agreement by pleading guilty on May 15th of the year 2000.‖ The second Muraoka stipulation provided: ―If called to testify, Mr. William Muraoka, an assistant public defender in Alameda County, would testify that on or about May 15th of the year 2000 he had a conversation with Ms. Backers regarding the plea agreement entered into by his client. Ms. Backers indicated to Mr. Muraoka that based on her evaluation of the evidence as the deputy district attorney assigned to this case, that while she believed all four defendants were legally guilty of the murder, her review and evaluation of the evidence led her to believe it was appropriate for her to exercise her discretion as 33 the prosecutor of the case, to enter into the plea agreements which have been stated on the record.‖ Defendant‘s attorney expressly agreed to both Muraoka stipulations, which were read to the jury.
Iuli and Palega were both questioned about the circumstances of their plea bargains on direct and cross-examination. In her closing argument, the prosecutor addressed the deals she made with them in exchange for their testimony, saying: ―[T]here are some major differences between the men in that van. ―And the differences are this: the two men in the front seat of that van [i.e., Iuli and Palega] wanted to let [Pamintuan] go. They wanted to let him live. They didn‘t believe [defendant] should shoot him. They even told [him] not to shoot him. . . . ―If somebody gives up their stuff, you let them go. But [defendant] broke their rule, too. Instead of letting [Pamintuan] go, like they told him to, like they thought they should, he blew [the victim‘s] chest apart. ―There is a moral difference, not a legal difference, but a moral difference between the two in the front seat and the two in the backseat. And that is why there were different offers made. And that is the only reason why.‖ (Italics added.) Further: ―So the offers that were made, which you now have heard so much about, and you heard the actual conditions of the offer read to the witnesses while they were on the stand, is that those two men in the front seat who wanted to let [the victim] go, let him live, got 16 years, eight months. ―And clearly, after seeing Tautai testify, I think you can see why there is such a difference between the two in the front seat and the two in the backseat. I 34 am sure you can see that that discretion was exercised with a proper amount of integrity. Because once you met Tautai, and you saw his lack of moral fiber, I am sure that you could see that there was a big difference between the two in the backseat and the two in the front seat. ―What you were told is that the reason those offers were lowered from a life top to a determinate term was because after [defendant] pulled [his] time [waiver] on March 3d, I couldn‘t prove my case. That is what you were told. I want you to think about the evidence I have in this case and that you now know is true.‖ (Italics added.) The prosecutor then listed all the evidence of guilt, aside from Iuli‘s and Palega‘s testimony. She then continued: ―You know how compelling and how strong the evidence is in this case. So now you know the truth about why those offers were made to Tony and Jay.‖ Defendant did not object to this argument.
Defendant mounts a two-pronged attack on the evidence of Prosecutor Backers‘s subjective motivation for offering plea deals to Iuli and Palega. First, he contends the evidence was inadmissible because it was irrelevant and immaterial. As we have already explained, challenges to the admission of evidence must be preserved for appellate review with a timely and specific objection at trial. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a); People v. Hinton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 894.) Here, defendant not only failed to object but his counsel stipulated to the Berger and Muraoka stipulations. Under the circumstances, he may not now be heard to complain, because ―when a party enters into a voluntary stipulation, he generally is precluded from taking an appeal claiming defects in the stipulation.‖ (People v. Gurule, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 623; cf. People v. Duff 35 (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 540 [―a stipulation to the excusal of jurors forfeits any subsequent objection to their omission from the jury pool‖].) Second, defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by improperly vouching for the truthfulness of her witnesses, Tony Iuli and Jay Palega, citing three separate incidents: Her direct examination of Iuli, the admission of the Muraoka stipulation,7 and her closing argument. None of these claims was properly preserved for our review. It is well settled that making a timely and specific objection at trial, and requesting the jury be admonished (if jury is not waived), is a necessary prerequisite to preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for appeal. (People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 426; People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1201.) ―The primary purpose of the requirement that a defendant object at trial to argument constituting prosecutorial misconduct is to give the trial court an opportunity, through admonition of the jury, to correct any error and mitigate any prejudice.‖ (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 254.) Defendant appears to acknowledge that he failed to object but contends any objection would have been futile. ―A defendant will be excused from the necessity of either a timely objection and/or a request for admonition if either would be futile. [Citations.] In addition, failure to request the jury be admonished does not forfeit the issue for appeal if ‗ ―an admonition would not have cured the harm caused by the misconduct.‖ ‘ [Citation.] Finally, the absence of a request for a curative admonition does not forfeit the issue for appeal if ‗the court 7 The nature of defendant‘s complaint regarding the Muraoka stipulation is unclear. To the extent he complains the stipulation should not have been admitted, he forfeited that claim when his trial attorney agreed to the stipulation. To the extent defendant means to attack the prosecutor‘s closing argument, he forfeited that claim as well by failing to object on that ground. 36 immediately overrules an objection to alleged prosecutorial misconduct [and as a consequence] the defendant has no opportunity to make such a request.‘ ‖ (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820.) To the extent the prosecutor‘s questioning of Iuli and her closing argument simply relied on information contained in the stipulations, we agree an objection would have been futile, for by counsel agreeing to the stipulations, they became fair game for questioning and argument. To the extent the prosecutor‘s arguments went farther than merely relying on the stipulations, such as when she argued there was a ―moral difference‖ between Iuli and Palega, on the one hand, and defendant and Tautai, on the other hand, or when she opined that she exercised the ―proper amount of integrity,‖ a timely objection would not have been futile, for it would have provided the trial court an opportunity to prevent the prosecutor from injecting her subjective views into the case. Under the circumstances, we find defendant‘s claim of prosecutorial misconduct regarding these latter claims was forfeited.
Were we to overlook defendant‘s failure to preserve his misconduct claim and address its merits, we would find the prosecutor did not engage in ―deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the trial court or the jury.‖ (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 44.) As a general matter, ―[i]mpermissible ‗vouching‘ may occur where the prosecutor places the prestige of the government behind a witness through personal assurances of the witness‘s veracity or suggests that information not presented to the jury supports the witness‘s testimony.‖ (People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 211.) Similarly, evidence of a prosecutor‘s subjective motivations when prosecuting a case is not 37 relevant,8 for ―[i]t is misconduct for prosecutors to bolster their case ‗by invoking their personal prestige, reputation, or depth of experience, or the prestige or reputation of their office, in support of it.‘ [Citation.] Similarly, it is misconduct ‗to suggest that evidence available to the government, but not before the jury, corroborates the testimony of a witness.‘ [Citation.] The vice of such remarks is that they ‗may be understood by jurors to permit them to avoid independently assessing witness credibility and to rely on the government‘s view of the evidence.‘ [Citation.]‖ (People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 336.) The prosecutor‘s questioning of Iuli and Palega did not violate these rules. The credibility of these witnesses was, of course, of vital importance and the prosecutor appropriately touched on the circumstances of their plea bargains during her questioning of them on direct examination. (People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 337.) We find nothing in the exchanges defendant identifies between the prosecutor and the witnesses to suggest the prosecutor vouched for the truthfulness of either Iuli or Palega. Although defendant also points to passages in Ciraolo‘s cross-examination of Iuli, it is unclear how defense counsel’s questioning is relevant to whether the prosecutor improperly vouched for Iuli‘s credibility. On this record, then, we find the prosecutor did not, in her questioning of either Iuli or Palega, improperly vouch for their credibility. 8 Defendant quotes from People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1 (disapproved on another ground in People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 17), but the reference is inapt. There, we stated: ―The prosecutor‘s opinion about the various coparticipants‘ relative culpability is not relevant to any issue at trial.‖ (Cain, at p. 64.) But in Cain, a case in which the jury was informed the defendant‘s accomplice had received a lesser sentence, we merely held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence at the penalty phase that the prosecution had initially offered the accomplice an even shorter sentence, but later withdrew the offer. 38 We turn finally to whether the prosecutor improperly vouched for Iuli and Palega during her closing argument. The rules are well settled: A criminal prosecutor has much latitude when making a closing argument. Her argument may be strongly worded and vigorous so long as it fairly comments on the evidence admitted at trial or asks the jury to draw reasonable inferences and deductions from that evidence. (People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 215.) ― ‗[S]o long as a prosecutor‘s assurances regarding the apparent honesty or reliability of prosecution witnesses are based on the ―facts of [the] record and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, rather than any purported personal knowledge or belief,‖ her comments cannot be characterized as improper vouching.‘ ‖ (People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 337.) Both defendant and the People quote large portions of the prosecutor‘s closing argument in which she refers to the information contained in the Berger and Muraoka stipulations. We have examined the prosecutor‘s argument and conclude her comments were permissible because her ― ‗assurances regarding the apparent honesty or reliability of prosecution witnesses [were] based on the ―facts of [the] record and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, rather than any purported personal knowledge or belief.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Ward, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 215.) To be sure, at one point the prosecutor refers to her decision to offer plea deals to Iuli and Palega and tells the jury ―I am sure you can see that that discretion was exercised with a proper amount of integrity,‖ but even this argument was based on her express assessment of the evidence showing a significant difference between defendant and Tautai (whom she referred to as the men in the backseat of the van) and Iuli and Palega (who were in the front of the van and urged defendant not to shoot Pamintuan). After listing the evidence of defendant‘s guilt aside from Iuli‘s and Palega‘s testimony, she finished the thought: ―You know how compelling and how strong the evidence is in this case. 39 So now you know the truth about why those offers were made to [Iuli and Palega].‖ To the extent defendant complains the prosecutor obliquely referred to her personal motivation in offering the deals, no misconduct occurred because the trial court had previously ruled such evidence was admissible. Defendant urges us to find improper vouching despite the prosecutor‘s reliance on the evidence presented to the jury, arguing that even under such circumstances, her argument may be considered impermissible vouching if she placed the prestige of the government behind the testimony of the two witnesses. We find no such improper vouching here. Ms. Backers never suggested she had other evidence, unpresented to the jury, to support Iuli‘s and Palega‘s credibility (see People v. Turner (2004) 34 Cal.4th 406, 433 [prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of expert witness by referring to the prosecutor‘s personal knowledge of the witness and his prior use of the witness]), or that she personally believed them independent of the evidence (see People v. Guzman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 915, 941, overruled on another point in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13 [having district attorney testify why he offered witness immunity ―may well raise‖ a meritorious vouching claim]). Instead, her argument referred specifically to evidence and inferences drawn from that evidence. We also reject defendant‘s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor‘s closing argument. Not only do we find her argument permissible, we also observe the record suggests Mr. Ciraolo made a deliberate tactical decision to enter into the Berger and Muraoka stipulations. Once those matters were before the jury, the prosecutor could fairly rely on them in closing argument, for prosecutors are given wide latitude during argument and may urge the jury to draw any reasonable inference from the evidence. (See People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 819.) By declining to object, we assume Ciraolo fairly determined that the prosecutor‘s argument was permissible and not subject to 40 objection. Finally, we reject defendant‘s federal constitutional claims as both forfeited for lack of an objection, and meritless as a substantive matter. ― ‗A prosecutor‘s conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution when it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process. Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the trial court or the jury.‘ ‖ (People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 305.) Defendant made no objections expressly or even impliedly referring to the federal Constitution and thus forfeited the issue. Were we to address these claims despite their forfeiture, we would find that (1) because there was no improper vouching under state law, defendant‘s due process claim is also meritless; (2) because the prosecutor‘s closing argument was based on the evidence admitted at trial, there was no denial of defendant‘s confrontation or cross-examination rights under the Sixth Amendment (see People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1083–1084); and (3) because there was no improper vouching under state law, defendant‘s trial was not rendered insufficiently reliable under the heightened standards demanded by the Eighth Amendment for capital cases (People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 623; see Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625, 638).9 9 We address defendant‘s further claim the prosecutor‘s alleged improper vouching infected the penalty phase of trial, post, in part II.B.1. 41