Opinion ID: 2604613
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of Lemon

Text: A majority of the Court of Appeals in the opinion below declined to apply Lemon. [41] This was error. Concurring by special opinion, Chief Judge Seinfeld correctly stressed the United States Supreme Court, to date, has not overruled or limited the application of Lemon to the public school context [and] I believe that it is premature for us to do so. [42] We agree. The Supreme Court has indeed declined to apply the Lemon test in recent cases; [43] however, it has not overruled Lemon, Lemon's applicability is not limited to school cases as the Court of Appeals suggests. [44] We hold that until the Supreme Court abandons the Lemon test, it shall apply to establishment clause issues under the First Amendment. The dissent agrees. [45] Our continued adherence to the Lemon test conforms to every circuit court and every state supreme court case directly involving the establishment clause during the last two years. [46]
Lemon's first prong inquires into the secular purpose of the challenged act. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct. at 2111-12. Rather than require the purpose be entirely secular, this prong demands there be at least some valid secular purpose to ensure that religious concerns were not the sole motivation behind the [a]ct. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602-03, 108 S.Ct. 2562, 2571, 101 L.Ed.2d 520 (1988). In Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 599, 107 S.Ct. 2573, 2585, 96 L.Ed.2d 510 (1987) Justice Powell, concurring, explained [a] religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate [a state act]. The religious purpose must predominate. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680-81, 104 S.Ct. at 1362-63 (town's display of a Christmas creche is constitutional because it has a legitimate secular purpose in depicting the origins of the national holiday of Christmas); Carter v. Broadlawns Medical Ctr., 857 F.2d 448 (1988) (county hospital's hiring of a paid Christian minister as chaplain held constitutional because it had the secular purpose of enhancing a holistic approach to patient care), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1096, 109 S.Ct. 1569, 103 L.Ed.2d 935 (1989); cf. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41, 101 S.Ct. 192, 193-94, 66 L.Ed.2d 199 (1980) (statute requiring posting of the Ten Commandments in all schoolrooms is unconstitutional because it lacks any discernible secular purpose). The sheriff's department's chaplaincy program similarly has the valid secular purpose to provide secular counseling. The program therefore passes muster under the first prong of Lemon.
Lemon's second prong asks whether the primary effect of the act is to advance religion. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct. at 2111-12. In Bowen v. Kendrick , the Supreme Court considered whether aid, neutrally awarded to conduct teen pregnancy counseling, violated the establishment clause when awarded to a particular religious group. 487 U.S. at 612, 108 S.Ct. at 2575-76. The Court held that it would have a primary effect of advancing religion under the second Lemon prong if the grant inculcate[d] the views of a particular religious faith. Id. at 621, 91 S.Ct. at 2115. When determining the primary effect of a given government act, the religious affiliation of the actors is not determinative. On the contrary, the Court has held the fact that one of the actors is religiously affiliated or inspired is not enough to show that the act advances religion. See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 20 S.Ct. 121, 44 L.Ed. 168 (1899) (state may give money to Catholic sisterhood to run a hospital so long as the hospital is primarily secular and open to all); Carter, 857 F.2d 448 (use of a Christian pastor as a paid chaplaincounselor did not have the primary effect of advancing religion because the chaplain avoided proselytization [47] and was primarily a counselor with the versatility and training needed to help people of all religious backgrounds as well as those with no religious background at all). Voswinkel v. City of Charlotte, 495 F.Supp. 588, 595-97 (1980) held Charlotte police department's use of a Baptist minister as chaplain failed the second prong of the Lemon test because: the department contracted directly with the Providence Baptist Church, giving it a superior opportunity to disseminate its doctrine; the department paid half of the chaplain's $20,000 salary; and the position, by its terms, had to be filled by a minister, creating a per se unconstitutional religious test for public employment. However the primary effect of the police chaplaincy program is not advancement of religion under the second prong of the Lemon test, even if that counseling addressed religious issues in specific situations. [48] Barring counselors from entering the spiritual or religious realm would be hostile to those counseled who hold religious or spiritual beliefs. Additionally, barring ministers from volunteering in this secular setting simply because they are ministers would raise serious free exercise issues under the First Amendment. [49] The sheriff's chaplaincy program does not have the suspect characteristics which led to the invalidation of the chaplaincy in Voswinkel. Indeed, Voswinkel itself indicates its inapplicability here: the creation of a counseling position to which any counselor could apply and be considered on a religiously neutral grounds is not a government action that could reasonably be said to threaten `an establishment of religion.' 495 F.Supp. at 600. The chaplains here, unlike Voswinkel, were neutrally chosen through a bidding process open to all without regard to religious affiliation and the chaplains actually volunteering come from all denominations. The distinction is clear in Voswinkel that the court did not believe that a public employee, hired as a counselor through some neutral selection process, is constitutionally required to refrain from discussing `spiritual' or `moral' matters in the course of his counseling duties. Id. at 600. Our case is most analogous to the hospital chaplaincy in Carter because the police chaplains here do not proselytize but do provide broad-based counseling to people of all religions, and those with no religion at all, in a secular manner. Carter, 857 F.2d 448. The similarity continues in that the religious expertise of the chaplains is available to all as is their crisis intervention counseling. The Supreme Court has noted provision of benefits to [a] broad [ ] spectrum of groups is an important index of secular effect. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274, 102 S.Ct. 269, 277, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981). Like the Catholic nuns in Bradfield, 175 U.S. 291, 20 S.Ct. 121, 44 L.Ed. 168, the volunteers may be religiously inspired but run the operation free of proselytizing and open to all. The primary effect of this program is not to advance religion. Thus it passes the second prong of Lemon.
Lemon's third prong asks whether the challenged governmental action gives rise to an excessive entanglement between church and state. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct. at 2111-12. Some entanglement is permissible so long as it does not become excessive. Excessive entanglement occurs when the distinction between the state and the church functions becomes blurred and such functions noticeably overlap. In Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 127, 103 S.Ct. 505, 512, 74 L.Ed.2d 297 (1982), for example, the Supreme Court struck down a Massachusetts law authorizing churches to veto the state's issuance of liquor licenses because it enmesh[ed] churches in the process of government. The Court noted that one of the driving forces behind the establishment clause was the concern of political oppression through a union of civil and ecclesiastical control. Id. at 127 n. 10, 103 S.Ct. at 512 n. 10. In Voswinkel, the police chaplaincy case, the court found excessive entanglement resulting from the uncertainty over whether the chaplain was a church or state official, or both. The Baptist minister was paid by both church and state and answered to both. Voswinkel, 495 F.Supp. at 597. The services of the minister were provided by the Baptist Church yet the minister was staff assistant to the Chief of Police. Id. at 598. In Carter, the hospital chaplaincy case, the court upheld the program despite a finding that the presence of a minister in the hospital admittedly causes some entanglement. Carter, 857 F.2d at 456. The present case is most analogous to Carter in that the entanglement is not excessive. This case is distinguished from Voswinkel because the present program lacks Voswinkel's excessively entangling characteristics; notably, the chaplains are clearly under the authority of the sheriff's department alone, do not serve as representatives of their personal denominations, and are not paid a state salary. Voswinkel, 495 F.Supp. at 595-97. Here there is no impermissible union of ecclesiastical and state control nor is any church enmeshed in the processes of government. The sheriff's chaplaincy passes the third Lemon prong. The dissent claims the entanglement prong incorporates an endorsement of religion test. Dissent at 1292. It asserts such endorsement test is a refinement of Lemon's entanglement analysis, Dissent at 1293, and relies upon County of Allegheny. Dissent at 1292-93. However, County of Allegheny explicitly uses the endorsement test to analyze the first two Lemon prongs, prongs which the dissent already concedes are met. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592, 109 S.Ct. at 3100 (we have paid particularly close attention to whether the challenged governmental practice either has the purpose or effect of `endorsing religion'....). [50] Were the dissent to apply Lemon correctly, the third inquiry would instead be whether the program fosters `an excessive entanglement with religion,' Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613, 91 S.Ct. at 2112 (citations omitted), and it must conclude, as have we, the chaplaincy program does not foster excessive entanglement. [51] Thus, we conclude that the use of volunteer chaplains by Pierce County Sheriff's Department complies with the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. This chaplaincy program (1) has a valid secular purpose; (2) does not primarily effect the advancement of religion; and (3) does not result in excessive entanglement.