Opinion ID: 1526646
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the in-court identification by ronald stone

Text: During the course of trial, defendant sought to exclude an in-court identification by Ronald Stone, an eyewitness to the shooting, on the ground that the police had utilized suggestive procedures at the pretrial lineup and also at a photographic display which preceded the lineup. In support of his argument, defendant cites Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977) and Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). In both of these cases suggestive procedures had been used, but the court permitted incourt identification in both instances on the ground that the totality of circumstances supported the reliability of the identification. In Manson, an experienced undercover police officer had only been shown a single photograph, but the Supreme Court, concluding that reliability is the linchpin, determined that under all of the circumstances they could not say that there was `a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification,' 432 U.S. at 116, 97 S.Ct. at 2254, 53 L.Ed.2d at 155, citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). In Biggers, a showup where the defendant was presented to the victim alone was found to be suggestive, but the Supreme Court still permitted an in-court identification when the record indicated that there was sufficient reliability to overcome a substantial likelihood of misidentification. These cases applied principles first asserted in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), where an individual showup to a victim of a stabbing was held to be justified by necessity. We note that in all of the foregoing cases the element which triggered scrutiny by the Court was suggestiveness. The suggestiveness might have been overcome by other factors but was present in the first instance in order to provide the court with a reason for considering exclusion of an in-court identification. In the present case Ronald Stone was shown not a single photograph, but seven. The trial justice specifically found that the photographs were remarkably fair in terms of showing alternative persons who were similar in appearance. He did not find any suggestiveness in the photographic display. We have carefully reviewed the transcript of the preliminary hearing and agree wholly with the findings of the trial justice. Mr. Stone, in spite of searching cross-examination, testified unequivocally that he had known Cline prior to the shooting, knew his name, had seen him five or six times at the Chad Brown Project. He insisted that the police did not suggest to him whose photograph should be selected. It is apparent from the record that he picked Cline's photograph from the group without assistance from anyone. The lineup itself was practically a model of adherence to constitutional precepts. Indeed, no Sixth Amendment claim is made in respect to this pretrial confrontation, because it was conceded at the preliminary hearing that attorney Hoopis was present during the course of the lineup. There were four persons in the lineup, all others of whom were found by the trial justice to be reasonably similar in coloring and hair styles to defendant. The trial justice found nothing suggestive about the lineup. He further found that the officers were seeking to be scrupulously fair in refraining from making suggestions to Mr. Stone. In light of this record, we are of the opinion that none of the elements of suggestiveness were present which would have justified an exclusion of the in-court identification, even in the event that the witness had not indicated an independent source for such identification as was shown in this case. In short, the trial justice was correct in refusing to exclude Stone's identification.