Opinion ID: 62562
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: Stroud began working for BMC on January 14, 2002, as a financial analyst. Stroud originally reported to manager Steve Duson (“Duson”), who in turn reported to Financial Director Ricardo Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”). From early in her tenure, Stroud ran into trouble with excessive absenteeism. By March 7, 2002, Stroud had accumulated nine unexcused absences from work. Stroud’s supervisor, Duson, met with Stroud and issued her a written warning detailing these absences. In October 2002, BMC transferred Stroud laterally to another financial analyst position, where she reported directly to Rodriguez. In July 2003, on Rodriguez’s recommendation, Stroud was awarded a stock option grant. In September 2003, Stroud was laterally transferred again and reported to Kim Dolan (“Dolan”), who was located in Waltham, Massachusetts. Because Stroud worked in Houston, Rodriguez supervised Stroud in Dolan’s place whenever necessary. Around the time of her second transfer, BMC allowed Stroud to work under a flexible work schedule, in which she would work eighty hours in nine business days, then take the tenth day off. But Stroud’s absenteeism persisted. Dolan verbally warned Stroud that between January 1, 2003, and October 24, 2003, Stroud had accumulated eleven “unapproved” sick days, on top of the eight approved sick days she took. At that time, Dolan suspended Stroud’s flexible work schedule and demanded that Stroud present a doctor’s note for any additional sick days. On March 25, 2004, Stroud received a written warning from Dolan and Rodriguez noting that Stroud had incurred two unapproved sick days in the first three months of 2004. The written warning emphasized that further violations of the attendance policy could result in “disciplinary action up to and including termination.” In or around April 2004, Stroud informed Dolan that she was pregnant. Subsequently, Stroud missed several days of work, which Dolan attributed to her 2 No. 07-20779 pregnancy and did not categorize as sick days. In other words, Stroud was neither disciplined nor penalized for taking those days off. Around this time, Stroud began reporting to Don Caramanico (“Caramanico”), then Vice President of Outsourcing Sales for BMC. Between April and October 2004, Caramanico voiced his dissatisfaction with Stroud’s job performance to Rodriguez and Dolan (though apparently not to Stroud). During this same period, Stroud received a performance report from Dolan (covering the year ending March 31, 2004) in which she scored an overall rating of three out of five, characterized as “meets expectations.” Stroud disagreed with this evaluation and filed a formal “rebuttal,” charging that the “meets expectations” rating was not accurate. The record reflects other evidence of BMC’s dissatisfaction with Stroud. In one episode recounted in differing versions by the parties, Stroud barely met a deadline on a quarterly accrued commissions report and reluctantly stayed late to finish the report after receiving a one-day extension. Although Stroud characterizes this event as a “non-issue” because she received no written reprimand, Rodriguez stated that this episode convinced him that “[i]n crunch time, [Stroud] wasn’t dependable.” Stroud’s subsequent supervisor, Caramanico, came to a similar conclusion, noting that Stroud was “not timely in her reporting.”1 Prior to Stroud’s maternity leave, Caramanico communicated these concerns to Dolan and Rodriguez and requested that Stroud be transferred to another department. 1 Caramanico elaborated in an affidavit: Stroud supported my group until she left for maternity leave in October 2004. During the time she supported my group, I had serious concerns regarding her performance. Overall, Stroud was not performing to the needs of my group and was adding very little value to my team. She often did not attend scheduled meetings and was not connected to the sales employees in my group. She was not timely in her reporting and did not appear to understand our business, nor did she express an interest or make an effort to do so. 3 No. 07-20779 On October 28, 2004, Stroud began an approved FMLA leave in the lead up to her delivery date of December 22, 2004. She remained on FMLA leave through March 26, 2005, when she returned to work. In her absence, Stroud’s department underwent significant organizational changes. Five new employees were hired, three employees (including Stroud) were assigned new roles, two employees transferred to other departments, and one employee resigned. Rodriguez reassigned Stroud to a “projects and reporting” position to replace an employee who transferred to another department. Meanwhile, BMC began a company-wide reduction in force. Rodriguez was asked to rank all of the employees working under him based on various criteria, such as skills or abilities, short-term impact, and long-term potential. Stroud ranked last. Thereafter, upper management informed Rodriguez that his department would be reduced by one employee and that two open positions would be frozen. Based upon the ranking he had prepared, Rodriguez selected Stroud for termination. On March 26, 2005, Stroud returned to work from FMLA leave. On April 14, 2005—three weeks later—she was terminated along with 800 other BMC employees in a company-wide reduction in force. BMC offered Stroud its standard separation package. In May 2005, Stroud filed a discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging discrimination on the basis of disability, gender, and pregnancy. After an investigation, the EEOC determined that Stroud was not a victim of discrimination, and it issued a right-to-sue letter. On April 21, 2006, Stroud filed this suit. Specifically, Stroud alleged gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.001 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”); an FMLA retaliation claim; and a state-law claim of intentional infliction of emotional 4 No. 07-20779 distress. On June 29, 2007, BMC filed a motion for summary judgment, and the district court granted the motion with respect to Stroud’s Title VII, ADA, FMLA, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. The court dismissed Stroud’s claim under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act. Stroud now appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment on her FMLA retaliation claim.2