Opinion ID: 2208979
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: There have been a host of court decisions involving the sufficiency of statutory definitions or designations and they are far from harmonious.

Text: We exhaustively reviewed the authorities in State v. Coppes, 247 Iowa 1057, 78 N.W. 2d 10. Repetition here is unnecessary. A few statements therefrom and from International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 216, 34 S.Ct. 853, 58 L.Ed. 1284, and Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 will suffice. The International Harvester Company case involved a price fixing statute and a charge of selling above real value pursuant to agreement. The statute was held invalid. Mr. Justice Holmes, in concluding his opinion, said: To compel them to guess, on peril of indictment, what the community would have given for them if the continually changing conditions were other than they are, to an uncertain extent; to divine prophetically what the reaction of only partially determinate facts would be upon the imaginations and desires of purchasers, is to exact gifts that mankind does not possess. The Connally case involved a statute requiring payment of wages `not less than the current rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work is performed.' The court reviewed the various uncertainties and concluded: The result is that the application of the law depends, not upon a word of fixed meaning in itself, or one made definite by statutory or judicial definition, or by the context or other legitimate aid to its construction, but upon the probably varying impressions of juries as to whether given areas are or are not to be included within particular localities. The constitutional guaranty of due process cannot be allowed to rest upon a support so equivocal. Our opinion in State v. Coppes, supra, involved the reasonable and proper speed restrictions in section 321.285, Code of Iowa. The statute was upheld against a constitutional attack. After extensive analysis this conclusion appears: The words of it are simple and their meaning well known to anyone having, or qualified to have, a motor-vehicle operating license. The section is sufficiently clear and specific to inform all motorists of what conduct on their part will subject them to the penalties of section 321.482 of the Iowa Code of 1954, I.C.A. Preceding this conclusion these statements appear: The general rule respecting the sufficiency of the statement of statutory crimes and there are no others in Iowais well expressed in Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391-392, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322, towit: `That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties is a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law. And a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law. International Harvester Co. [of America] v. [Commonwealth of] Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221, 34 S.Ct. 853, 58 L.Ed. 1284, [1287]'.    `It is axiomatic that statutes creating and defining crimes cannot be extended by intendment. Purely statutory offenses cannot be established by implication. There can be no constructive offenses. Before a man can be punished, his case must be plainly and unmistakably within a statute.' (247 Iowa loc. cit. 1061 and 1062, 78 N.W. 2d) On page 1081 of 274 Iowa, on page 14 of 78 N.W.2d, of State v. Coppes, supra, it is noted that the statute being considered was directed primarily to operators of motor vehicles on public highways. The statute had general application to all and operators know or should know what speed is proper and reasonable under different traffic conditions. With that statement we agree but it does not follow that it can be determined with reasonable certainty what is ethical in the practice of medicine, dentistry, nursing, veterinary medicine, or pharmacy in the absence of some standard or guide. We repeat that we do not suggest what defendant is charged with doing could by any stretch of imagination be considered necessary, ethical and legal. However, we must construe the statute as it is written and not according to our reaction to the present situation. We hold that the statute relied upon by the State is not a proper vehicle to support the charge made here. It is void for unworkability. In our opinion it was never intended to cover the factual situation disclosed here. V. Our conclusion that the statute is unworkable for the purpose sought by the State does not vitiate the statute when used where applicable. In Davidson Building Company v. Mulock, 212 Iowa 730, 756, 235 N.W. 45, this appears: Our holding that the aforesaid sections of Chapter 205, Acts 43d G. A., are void for unworkability, shall not be construed as affecting the validity of the remainder of said chapter, which is not under attack. It is a rule of universal application that a statute may be valid in part, and invalid in another part, and if the invalid part is severable from the remainder, the portion which is valid may stand while that which is void may be stricken out and rejected, if, after the elimination of the void portion, the remaining provisions are sufficient to be effective and accomplish their purpose in accordance with the legislative intent deducible from the act construed in the light of contemporary events.