Opinion ID: 362254
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Shepard Transaction Conspiracy Count

Text: 13 The first three issues raised by appellant concern the Shepard transaction. The only count upon which appellant was convicted that concerns the Shepard transaction is count one, the conspiracy count. 14 Wedelstedt argues that the Shepard transaction as it occurred involved no violation of federal law, either as a substantive offense under § 2315, or as a conspiracy to commit that offense. He objects to the lack of an interstate nexus, his argument being that these particular films never left the state, never entered interstate commerce, and only traveled between two points in Iowa. 15 On this basis, the trial court initially dismissed all counts emanating from the Shepard transaction the count for the substantive crime (count 5), and that portion of the conspiracy count (count 1) which related to the Shepard films. Later, however, the court reinstated the conspiracy count. 3 16 Appellant's contention that an interstate nexus is lacking in the Shepard transaction is certainly not frivolous, but it is an allegation we feel it is unnecessary to reach in this case. 17 The conspiracy was alleged in a single count under the general federal conspiracy statute. Wedelstedt received but one sentence on that count, despite the fact that several illegal objects of the conspiracy, that is violations of several federal statutes, were alleged. Therefore, proof that Wedelstedt agreed to commit one of the multiple illegal objectives of the conspiracy sufficed to sustain the conviction on that count. 18 It has always been the law that where an indictment alleges a conspiracy to commit several offenses against the United States, the charge is sustained by adequate pleadings and proof of conspiracy to commit any one of the offenses. (Citations omitted.) 19 United States v. James, 528 F.2d 999, 1014 (5th Cir.), Cert. denied, 429 U.S. 959, 97 S.Ct. 382, 50 L.Ed.2d 326 (1976). See also United States v. Mackey, 571 F.2d 376, 387 n. 14 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Frank, 520 F.2d 1287, 1293 (2d Cir. 1975), Cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087, 96 S.Ct. 878, 47 L.Ed.2d 97 (1976). But see United States v. Baranski, 484 F.2d 556, 560-61 (7th Cir. 1973). Though this principle is usually applied in the context of a failure of proof as to one object of the conspiracy, it is as applicable where one of the objectives charged is not a criminal act: 20 In United States v. Mack, 112 F.2d 290 (2 Cir. 1940), this court, speaking through Judge Learned Hand, held that where an indictment charged a conspiracy to engage in three offenses and only one was proved, the conviction could still stand. We have recently followed that decision in United States v. Papadakis, 510 F.2d 287, 297 (2 Cir.), Cert. denied, 421 U.S. 950, 95 S.Ct. 1682, 44 L.Ed.2d 104 (1975), subject to a caveat not here applicable, and in United States v. Frank, 520 F.2d 1287, 1293 (2 Cir. 1975). Although in these cases all the objectives charged in the conspiracy count were crimes and the defect was a failure of proof as to some, other circuits have reached the same result when some of the objectives were not crimes, Moss v. United States, 132 F.2d 875 (6 Cir. 1943); United States v. Tanner, 471 F.2d 128, 140 (7 Cir.), Cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949, 93 S.Ct. 269, 34 L.Ed.2d 220 (1972). Although the Seventh Circuit, speaking through Judge Pell, has recently questioned the correctness of this line of authority on the ground that a reviewing court cannot tell what offense or offenses alleged in a conspiracy indictment were found by the jury, United States v. Baranski, 484 F.2d 556, 559-61 (1973), here we know from the conviction on Count II that the jury found that Dixon had committed the offense validly charged in the conspiracy count. Cf. United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2 Cir.), Cert. denied, 385 U.S. 974, 87 S.Ct. 514, 17 L.Ed.2d 437 (1966); United States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270, 282-84 (2 Cir.), Cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821, 94 S.Ct. 116, 131, 38 L.Ed.2d 53 (1973). There is thus no basis for questioning the conviction on the conspiracy count. 21 United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1401-02 (2d Cir. 1976). See also United States v. Tanner, 471 F.2d 128, 139-40 (7th Cir.), Cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949, 93 S.Ct. 269, 34 L.Ed.2d 220 (1972). 22 In this case three illegal objects were alleged: two clearly dealt only with the Chicago transaction; the other, a conspiracy to violate § 2315, could relate to either the Shepard or the Chicago thefts. Significantly, however, appellant Wedelstedt was also convicted of the Substantive crime under section 2315 for the Chicago theft. 23 The only caveat in such cases is that an overwhelming amount of evidence relevant only to the unproved part of the conspiracy may have prejudiced the jury. United States v. Papadakis, 510 F.2d 287, 297 (2d Cir.), Cert. denied, 421 U.S. 950, 95 S.Ct. 1682, 44 L.Ed.2d 104 (1975). In this case a considerable amount of evidence relevant to the Shepard transaction was introduced; this evidence, however, was separate and distinct from the proof of the Chicago conspiracy, which in any event formed the basis for most of the allegations in the conspiracy count. Wedelstedt does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the Chicago conspiracy allegations, and in fact the proof appears adequate. Accordingly, we sustain the count one conviction, and do not reach the federal issue presented by the solely intrastate transfer of the Shepard films. 4 24