Opinion ID: 163863
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Factor 1: Prejudice to the Tribe or the parties

Text: 31 Plaintiffs challenge the district court's conclusion that the Tribe's interest would be prejudiced if the case were to proceed in its absence. They describe the Tribe's interest as an interest in excluding the Estelusti from the Judgment Fund, Aplt. Br. at 21, and argue that such an interest is legally frivolous when evaluated in light of the district court's alleged findings that (1) Congress intended the Judgment Fund to benefit all members of the Seminole Nation, including the Estelusti, and (2) the BIA colluded with certain Tribal leaders to exclude the Estelusti from enjoyment of the Judgment Fund. Aplt. Br. at 15. They assert that the illegitimacy of the interest is significant because (1) without a legitimate interest, the Tribe is not a necessary person and thus cannot be an indispensable one; and (2) an illegitimate interest cannot be legally prejudiced under the first Rule 19(b) factor. 32 We reject the challenge. Plaintiffs' argument amounts to asking us to decide that the Tribe's interest is not worthy of consideration because its position is wrong on the merits. But Rule 19's concern is with a  claimed interest. Fed. R.Civ.P. 19(a) (emphasis added). [T]he underlying merits of the litigation are irrelevant to a Rule 19 inquiry, Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Norton, 248 F.3d 993, 998 (10th Cir.2001), at least unless the claimed interest is patently frivolous. Davis I, 192 F.3d at 959 (internal quotation marks omitted). In Davis I we responded as follows to virtually the same argument that Plaintiffs make here: 33 Plaintiffs' narrow interpretation of the term legally protected interest inappropriately presupposes Plaintiffs' success on the merits. Under the interpretation advanced by Plaintiffs, the Tribe would have no legally protected interest in the monies used to fund Judgment Fund Programs that exclude the Estelusti Seminoles only if Plaintiffs prevail on the merits. Consequently, if this court adopted Plaintiffs' interpretation of the term legally protected interest, the district court would be required to determine the merits of Plaintiffs' Judgment Fund Award claim before ruling on Defendants' motion to dismiss. Such an approach is untenable because it would render the Rule 19 analysis an adjudication on the merits. 34 Davis I, 192 F.3d at 958. Davis I made this statement in the context of Rule 19(a). We are now addressing the issue in the context of Rule 19(b). The same reasoning applies here, however, because the prejudice inquiry under Rule 19(b) is essentially the same as the inquiry under Rule 19(a)(2)(i) into whether continuing the action without a person will, as a practical matter, impair that person's ability to protect his interest. Enter. Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. Hodel, 883 F.2d 890, 894 n. 4 (10th Cir.1989). Even if our prior decision on the Rule 19(a) issue is not strictly speaking the law of the case with respect to the Rule 19(b) issue, see Weston v. Harmatz, 335 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir.2003), we see no reason to abandon here the cogent reasoning in Davis I. 35 We note that in some cases the interests of the absent person are so aligned with those of one or more parties that the absent person's interests are, as a practical matter, protected. See, e.g., Sac & Fox Nation of Mo. v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1250, 1260 (10th Cir.2001); Kansas v. United States, 249 F.3d 1213, 1227 (10th Cir.2001). Here, however, the district court explicitly found that [t]he BIA is not representing the Seminole Nation's interest in this lawsuit, Davis II, 199 F.Supp.2d at 1176, and Plaintiffs do not challenge that finding on appeal.
36 Plaintiffs argue that the district court should not have considered the risk of subjecting Defendants to inconsistent legal obligations because such obligations are entirely speculative. Specifically, they point out that the BIA need not comply with a Tribal regulation that might conflict with a ruling in favor of the Estelusti. More important, however, is that the Tribe would not be bound by the judgment in this case and could initiate litigation against Defendants if the BIA withheld funds. Thus, Defendants might well be prejudiced by multiple litigation or even inconsistent judgments if this litigation were to proceed without the Tribe. See Patterson, 390 U.S. at 110, 88 S.Ct. 733 (defendant's interest in avoiding multiple litigation is proper consideration under Rule 19(b)). 37 This possibility is not speculative. Plaintiffs themselves recognize the substantial likelihood of subsequent litigation when they state (while addressing another issue): [T]he Tribe reacts swiftly when the BIA cuts off federal funding.... The notion that [the] Tribe will not react to losing access to the $56 million Judgment Fund is absurd. Aplt. Br. at 26. 38 We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that under Rule 19(b), both the Tribe and Defendants have interests that would likely be prejudiced by litigation in the Tribe's absence. 39