Opinion ID: 1998522
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Heading: Alleged Conflict Between Iowa Code Sections 321J.2 and 321G.13.

Text: 1. A person commits the offense of operating while intoxicated if the person operates a motor vehicle in this state in either of the following conditions: a. While under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or other drug or a combination of such substances. b. While having an alcohol concentration as defined in section 321J.1 of .10 or more. (Emphasis added.) Iowa Code section 321G.13(3) provides: A person shall not drive or operate an all-terrain vehicle or snowmobile: .... 3. While under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotics or habit-forming drugs. (Emphasis added.) Violation of section 321J.2 is an aggravated misdemeanor for a second offense. Iowa Code § 321J.2(2)(b). Violation of section 321G.13(3) is a simple misdemeanor. Iowa Code § 321G.14. B. Analysis. Peters concedes that a snowmobile meets the definition of motor vehicle in Iowa Code section 321.1(2)(a). He so stipulated in the district court. But, he argues, the snowmobile statute is separate and distinct from the general motor vehicle provisions of chapter 321. For that reason, he says, the legislature intended the snowmobile statute to supplant the operating while intoxicated statute. So, he concludes, even though a snowmobile meets the definition of a motor vehicle in chapter 321, the legislature did not intend a motor vehicle in section 321J.2the OWI statuteto include a snowmobile. The gist of Peters' argument is this. Section 321G.13(3) and section 321J.2 involve the same subject matteroperating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Section 321G.13(3) specifically regulates operation of snowmobiles, while section 321J.2 regulates operation of all motor vehicles. Section 321G.13(3) is a special statute that conflicts with the general provision, section 321J.2. Under well-recognized rules of statutory construction, section 321G.13(3) should prevail. See Iowa Code § 4.7 (where irreconcilable conflict exists between general and special provisions, special provision prevails as exception to general provision). The State counters that a choice between allegedly competing statutory provisions is required only when they cannot be reconciled. The State argues that the statutes heresection 321J.2 and section 321G.13(3)are not irreconcilable, and for that reason the prosecutor was free to charge Peters under either statute. Section 321J.2the OWI statuteprohibits a defendant from operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. For purposes of section 321J.2, a motor vehicle is a vehicle which is self-propelled, but not including vehicles known as trackless trolleys which are propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires and are not operated upon rails.