Opinion ID: 1709709
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Analysis of the Instant Case

Text: We must determine whether General Shale Products, LLC, is subject to liability for the damage caused to the third parties as a result of DG Trucking's negligence to properly maintain its truck. [6] Applying the principles stated above to the facts presented in these certified questions, in order to find General Shale subject to liability for DG Trucking's negligence, we must find (1) that General Shale owed a nondelegable duty to those third parties injured as a result of DG Trucking's negligence; or (2) that General Shale caused DG Trucking to engage in an inherently dangerous activity. We first consider the nondelegable-duty theory. We note that the legislature has enacted statutory limits applicable to the hauling of an oversized load by motor carrier. Chapter 9 of Title 32 of the Alabama Code 1975 addresses Trucks, Trailers and Semi-Trailers. Specifically, § 32-9-20, Ala.Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part: It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or move on any highway in this state any vehicle or vehicles of a size or weight except in accordance with the following: (1) Width. Vehicles and combinations of vehicles, operating on highways with traffic lanes 12 feet or more in width, shall not exceed a total outside width, including any load thereon, of 102 inches, exclusive of mirrors or other safety devices approved by the State Transportation Department. The Director of the State Transportation Department may, in his or her discretion, designate other public highways for use by vehicles and loads with total outside widths not exceeding 102 inches, otherwise; vehicles and combinations of vehicles, operating on highways with traffic lanes less than 12 feet in width, shall not exceed a total outside width, including any load thereon, of 96 inches, exclusive of mirrors or other safety devices approved by the State Transportation Department. No passenger vehicle shall carry any load extending beyond the line of the fenders. No vehicle hauling forest products or culvert pipe on any highway in this state shall have a load exceeding 102 inches in width. Section 32-9-29, Alabama Code 1975, is also applicable to this case; that section reads as follows: (1) The Director of the Department of Transportation or the official of the department designated by the director may, in his discretion, upon application and for good cause being shown therefor, issue a permit in writing authorizing the applicant to operate or move upon the state's public roads a vehicle or combination of no more than two vehicles, and loads whose weight, width, length or height, or combination thereof, exceeds the maximum limit specified by law; provided, that the load transported by such vehicle or vehicles is of such nature that it is a unit which cannot be readily dismantled or separated; provided however, that bulldozers and similar construction equipment shall not be deemed readily separable for purposes of this chapter; and further provided, that no permit shall be issued to any vehicle whose operation upon the public roads of this state threatens to unduly damage a road or any appurtenances thereto. Finally, the penalties imposed for violation of Chapter 9 are set forth in § 32-9-5, Ala.Code 1975. That section provides:  The operation of any truck, semitrailer truck or trailer in violation of any section of this chapter or of the terms of any permit issued under this chapter, shall constitute a misdemeanor, and the owner thereof, if such violation was with his knowledge or consent, and the operator thereof shall, on conviction, be fined not less than $100.00 nor more than $500.00 and may also be imprisoned or sentenced to hard labor for the county for not less than 30 days nor more than 60 days. (Emphasis added.) In Heathcock v. State, 415 So.2d 1198 (Ala.Crim.App.1982), the Court of Criminal Appeals discussed the purposes underlying these statutes: We have no doubt that one intention of the Legislature in enacting the law as now found in Code of Alabama 1975, § 32-9-20, a lengthy section governing the size and weight of trucks, trailers, and semi-trailers traveling on highways of Alabama, was, as appellant says, `to prevent injury to the roads,' but we do not agree with appellant that this was the only intention of the Legislature: `The obvious purposes for enacting truck weight laws is for the safety of the public, and keeping highways in good condition for the traveling public. Travel upon the highways must be as safe as it can reasonably be made consistent with their efficient use. Any overloaded truck creates a safety hazard upon the public highway as well as contributing to a bad state of repair.' 415 So.2d at 1203, quoting State Dep't of Public Safety v. Scotch Lumber Co., 293 Ala. 330, 302 So.2d 844, 846 (1974). See also Leonard v. State, 38 Ala.App. 138, 142, 79 So.2d 803, 807 (1955) (`The purpose of statutes prohibiting the use of public highways by motor vehicles of excessive weight is to prevent injury to the public property in the form of damage to roads, bridges, etc., and further to insure the safety of persons traveling such highways.') Thus, as did the legislature in Boroughs v. Joiner and General Finance Corp. v. Smith, supra , the legislature found it appropriate to regulate the activity at issue in this case: the transport of oversized loads by motor carrier. However, the express language of the statutes does not impose any duty upon the shipper of that oversized load. The relevant statutes impose a duty of compliance upon the operator of the truck, semitrailer truck, or trailer, and possibly upon the owner of such truck or trailer. See § 32-9-5, § 32-9-20, and § 32-9-29, Ala.Code 1975. Thus, we conclude that General Shale was not subject to a nondelegable duty as a result of Chapter 9 of Title 32 of the Alabama Code 1975. Because we find no other duties imposed upon General Shale by statute, caselaw, or common law that are relevant to the issues before us, we must conclude that General Shale is not subject to liability for the negligence of its independent contractor on the basis of a nondelegable duty. [7] We next consider whether this case involves an inherently dangerous activity, thereby imposing liability upon General Shale for the negligence of DG Trucking in the performance of that inherently dangerous activity. An intrinsic danger or inherent danger in an undertaking `is one which inheres in the performance of the contract and results directly from the work to be done, not from the collateral negligence of the contractor, and important factors to be understood and considered are the contemplated conditions under which the work is to be done and the known circumstances attending it.' Boroughs v. Joiner, 337 So.2d at 342 (quoting 41 Am. Jur.2d, Independent Contractors § 41). When considering the other activities previously recognized in this State as inherently dangerous  the aerial spraying of pesticides and insecticides, the use of a highly caustic chemical, and the use of dynamite as an explosive  we must conclude that the shipping of an oversized load does not rise to the same level. We agree with the statement in the brief submitted by the amicus curiae in support of Peace: There is nothing to suggest that if the proper precautions are in fact taken in regard to [the shipping of an oversized load], that this activity is hopelessly fraught with danger, no matter how skillfully or carefully it is performed. (Brief of amicus curiae Alabama Defense Lawyers Association at p. 9.) We find the analysis and reasoning of Inland Steel v. Pequignot, 608 N.E.2d 1378 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), particularly on point. In that case, Inland Steel contracted with a motor carrier to ship a 48,000-pound coil of steel from Illinois to Ohio. While hauling the steel coil, the motor carrier's driver ran a red light and collided with Pequignot, who was on a motorcycle. Pequignot was seriously injured. Pequignot sued Inland Steel, asserting, among other theories, that because of the size and weight involved, the hauling of the steel coil was an inherently dangerous activity for which Inland Steel was vicariously liable. In analyzing the liability issue, the Indiana Court of Appeals stated: Although the parties use the terms `inherently dangerous or intrinsically dangerous' interchangeably, it is apparent to us they are alluding to what the First Restatement of Torts § 519 (1938) referred to as `ultra-hazardous' activity and which the Restatement (Second) §§ 519 & 520 (1977), calls `abnormally dangerous' activity to impose strict liability. . . . This doctrine, which evolved from Rylands v. Fletcher (1868), L.R. 2 H.L. 330, provides: `(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm. `(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which makes the activity abnormally dangerous.' Restatement (Second) § 519. Section 520 of the Second Restatement provides: `In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors are to be considered: `(a) Existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of another; `(b) Likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; `(c) Inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; `(d) Extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; `(e) Inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; `(f) Extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.' Restatement (Second) § 520. `The general principle derived from Rylands is that where a person chooses to use an abnormally dangerous instrumentality, that person is strictly liable without a showing of negligence for any injury proximately caused by that instrumentality.' 57A Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 396 (1989). . . . . We find that § 520(c) as well as our reasoning in Erbrich Products [Co. v. Wills, 509 N.E.2d 850 (Ind.Ct.App. 1987),] is dispositive of this question. Hauling steel, or any other heavy load, is not `inherently dangerous,' `intrinsically dangerous,' `ultra-hazardous' or `abnormally dangerous' as these terms are used in strict liability. It is readily apparent that if the driver of the truck, Hinds, had used reasonable care, this tragic accident would not have happened. It is undisputed that Hinds ran a red light at 40 [miles per hour.] It is also clear to us that the coil of steel was not the proximate cause of Pequignot's injuries. While riding a motorcycle, he hit a tractor-trailer carrying 48,000 pounds of steel and traveling at 40 mph. He hit the trailer  the coil of steel did not fall off the trailer and hit him. It would make no difference if the tractor-trailer was carrying 48,000 pounds of steel or sand or even wood chips. When a motorcycle strikes or is struck by a tractor-trailer running a red light, especially one traveling at 40 mph, the motorcyclist is going to come out the loser  if at all. 608 N.E.2d at 1384-85. For these reasons, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that Inland Steel was entitled to a summary judgment on Pequignot's claims of liability. Like the accident in Inland Steel, supra, the accident in this case was not caused by the oversized load but by the collateral negligence of the owner and/or operator of the tractor-trailer. See Boroughs v. Joiner, 337 So.2d at 342 (quoting 41 Am. Jur.2d, Independent Contractors § 41); see Inland Steel, 608 N.E.2d at 1385 (referring to the independent contractor's failure to use reasonable care). It is undisputed that the brakes on Peace's truck failed and that an inspection of Peace's truck after the accident revealed numerous violations of the applicable Federal Department of Transportation regulations, including a failure to properly adjust the brakes. The fact that Peace was hauling an oversized load played no role in the accident, and there is no evidence to indicate that this accident would have occurred if Peace or DG Trucking had maintained the brakes on the tractor-trailer, as they had a duty to do. Thus, the hauling of this heavy load does not meet the definition of an inherently dangerous activity because the major risk of harm from the oversized load could have been alleviated if Peace and DG Trucking had used reasonable care.