Opinion ID: 20794
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: Dillingham filed his section 2254 application for habeas relief on July 7, 1998, which was after the April 24, 1996 effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Therefore, his application is subject to the AEDPA. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2068, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). Under the AEDPA, a petitioner must obtain a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). As set forth above, the district court granted Dillingham a COA with respect to the issue he now raises on appeal. The state court adjudicated Dillingham’s instant claim on the merits. Accordingly, we cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” § 2254(d)(1). Dillingham’s claim is purely legal--there are no facts in dispute. We review pure questions of law under § 2254(d)(1). Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 767-68 (5th Cir. 1996). Under § 2254(d)(1), “an application of law to facts is unreasonable only when it can be said that reasonable jurists considering the question would be of one view that the state court ruling was incorrect.” Drinkard, 97 F.3d at 769. Thus, this court “can grant habeas relief only if a state court decision is so clearly incorrect that it would not be debatable among reasonable jurists.” 4 Id.