Opinion ID: 1910680
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: 1-B Issue of Severance

Text: During the course of the trial Fisher moved for severance based upon the argument that the defense of Colomy had become antagonistic to his position. We conclude that the justice acted within the bounds of his discretion [1] when he denied the motion for severance. His action is supported by the facts. The alleged antagonism arose when defendant Colomy, after the State had rested, elected to testify and announced his intent to call a witness for the purpose of depicting Fisher as the assaulter. The State then was allowed to reopen and, on direct, examine the witness Colomy had proposed to call. This witness was cross-examined by both defendants. Colomy did testify, the substance of his testimony being to deny contact with Morton, asserting that the physical acts constituting the assault were committed only by Fisher. Colomy was cross-examined by both the prosecutor and Fisher's counsel. The evidence is undisputed that prior to the assault both Colomy and Fisher went to the locus of the assault with the avowed purpose of assaulting the victim. Colomy had learned that Morton was visiting Fisher's former girlfriend (who was also the mother of Fisher's illegitimate child) and had communicated this information to Fisher. Both men then repaired to the scene which was the apartment where Fisher's father lived. Colomy was directed by Fisher to position himself at the front door to prevent Morton's escape. Fisher then entered at the back door, observed Morton's presence, and opened the front door to admit Colomy. The assault ensued, followed by the victim's flight from the premises. There was evidence from which the jury could conclude that both defendants had personal motives for this assault. Morton was accused of having burglarized a cottage owned by Colomy's parents and, additionally, was suspected of having amorous relations with Fisher's former girlfriend. The facts demonstrate that even if Colomy struck no blows, he was an accomplice of Fisher in a pre-planned assault, thus becoming equally responsible for the crime. We construed 17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 57(1), (2)(C), (3)(A) [2] in State v. Porter, Me., 404 A.2d 590, 594 (1979), and held that one who aids another in planning the methodology for illegal conduct is legally accountable for the ensuing crime even though the other person does the physical acts required for the commission of the crime. The presiding justice acted within the guidelines set forth in State v. Elwell, Me., 380 A.2d 1016, 1020 (1977), by keeping a watchful eye over the proceedings, being sure that a severance was not necessary to protect the defendant from undue prejudice. See State v. Cuddy, Me., 366 A.2d 858, 860 (1976); Commonwealth v. French, 357 Mass. 356, 376, 259 N.E.2d 195, 213 (1970); see also Commonwealth v. Horton, ___ Mass. ___, 380 N.E.2d 687, 694 (1978). The jury was fully instructed on the liability of an accomplice under 17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 57(1), (2)(C), (3)(A). With this background in mind, it was irrelevant whether Fisher or Colomy actually caused the bodily injury to Morton. Porter, supra, at 594; Horton, 380 N.E.2d at 694. As we have pointed out, no Bruton problem existed, and defendant Colomy was available for full cross-examination by Fisher. Under those circumstances there was no abuse of discretion in refusing to grant Fisher's motion for severance. State v. Wing, Me., 294 A.2d 418, 424 (1972). Since it was not denied that Fisher and Colomy were accomplices in committing the assault, Colomy's defense (if such it was) cannot be seen as antagonistic to that of Fisher.