Opinion ID: 2332719
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Life Without the Benefit of Probation or Parole

Text: On August 14, 1998, Appellant was indicted for conduct which occurred in May and June of 1998. In July 1998, the provisions of HB 455 took effect, authorizing, in part, a sentence of life without the benefit of probation or parole (LWOP) in capital cases. Prior to trial, Appellant moved the trial court to apply the provisions of HB 455. The trial court ruled that the decision whether to apply the new sentencing provisions contained in HB 455 was controlled by KRS 446.110, which permits a newly enacted penalty to be applied retroactively if it is mitigating. However, in denying Appellant's motion, the trial court concluded that the old penalties, including a sentence of death, were not clearly mitigated by the new penalties. This Court subsequently held to the contrary in Commonwealth v. Phon, Ky., 17 S.W.3d 106 (2000), wherein we specifically stated that life without parole was, in fact, a lesser penalty than death and could be lawfully imposed for a capital offense committed prior to the effective date of the statute upon the unqualified consent of the defendant. Id. at 108. On appeal, the Commonwealth argues that although the trial court's rationale was erroneous, Appellant was not entitled to receive the life without parole instruction because he failed to provide the necessary unqualified consent. It is the Commonwealth's position that [g]iven the constitutional implications ... a request for the application of HB 455, and specifically the LWOP instruction, should be accompanied by a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver by Appellant. The language of KRS 446.110 provides, in part, If any penalty, forfeiture or punishment is mitigated by any provision of the new law, such provision may, by the consent of the party affected, be applied to any judgment pronounced after the new law takes effect. And as previously stated, we held in Phon, supra , that KRS 446.110 authorizes retroactive application of life without parole, with a defendant's consent, since life without parole mitigates the death penalty. Id. at 107. Appellant's motion requesting an instruction on life without parole stated: Obviously, the defendant could assert his right to be free from ex post facto application of an arguably more punitive law. He chooses to waive that right. Ultimately, the new KRS 532.025 does not increase the potential maximum punishment, for it is still death. It merely adds another alternative among the non-death options presented to this jury. In fact, defense counsel informed the trial court that Appellant was willing to make a knowing, intelligent and voluntarily (sic) waiver of any right to attack this statute as a violation of the ex post facto prohibition of the U.S. and Kentucky Constitutions. Yet, the Commonwealth argues that Appellant did not provide sufficient consent. We fail to discern what more Appellant could have done to make his consent any more clear. The Commonwealth alluded during oral argument that Appellant himself, not trial counsel, had to express his unqualified consent. Such is a ludicrous proposition. Without question, Appellant's motion satisfied the unqualified consent requirement we established in Phon, supra , and he was entitled to receive an instruction on life without parole. As such, this case must be remanded for a new penalty phase.