Opinion ID: 2637986
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The circuit court's rulings with respect to character evidence about Thomas

Text: Culkin also argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by precluding admission of certain character evidence about Thomas. HRE Rule 404(a)(2) provides an exception to the general rule that character evidence is not admissible to show conformity therewith and allows [e]vidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused[.] This exception allows the defense to introduce general character evidence as well as specific prior acts. State v. Basque, 66 Haw. 510, 514, 666 P.2d 599, 602 (1983). Culkin contends that the circuit court committed reversible error by excluding: (1) evidence that Thomas had been in prison; and (2) testimony about Thomas's prior reckless use of the handgun that was stored in Culkin's bedroom on the morning of the stabbing. [16]
Culkin contends that the circuit court abused its discretion by excluding evidence that Thomas was incarcerated in federal prison for ten years. [17] Thomas was apparently convicted of a drug offense and released approximately nine months prior to the stabbing. At an evidentiary hearing, defense counsel argued that the prison time demonstrated that Thomas had a belief system obtained from being with hard core federal inmates. She argued that this hard core belief system was relevant to show Culkin's reasonable apprehension that, once the fight began, Thomas would not stop and that, [i]f you crossed him, he was going to take you down. Although not expressly setting forth the basis for its ruling, the circuit court disallowed any reference to Thomas being in prison. Initially, it is not apparent that the fact that Thomas had spent time in prison was relevant to the reasonableness of Culkin's apprehension or the issue of first aggressor. No offer of proof was made to the effect that prison automatically instills a hard-core belief system in all those who enter its walls. Although defense counsel suggested that Thomas engaged in assorted violent conduct while imprisoned, she made no offer of proof in this regard. See HRE Rule 103(a)(2) (1993). Assuming, however, that such evidence was relevant, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by excluding it in this case. Absent any offer of proof as to violent conduct while in prison, the probative value of Thomas's imprisonment is questionable. And the circuit court declined to allow defense witnesses to testify about Thomas's belief system, opting instead to permit testimony about specific instances of conduct from which jurors could draw their own inferences. Meanwhile, the danger of undue prejudice from such evidence is readily apparent. The fact of imprisonment raises the possibility that jurors might believe the victim was a bad person who got what he deserved. See E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence at 572 (3d ed.1984). Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion.
Culkin also contends that the circuit court erred by excluding testimony about four instances in which Culkin witnessed Thomas act in a reckless manner with the handgun that Culkin was holding for Thomas on the morning of the stabbing. [18] The circuit court allowed testimony about Thomas's behavior during these episodes, but permitted no reference to the revolver. The court's decision apparently turned on its determination that the revolver was not relevant to the encounter between Culkin and Thomas. On appeal, Culkin argues that his testimony regarding Thomas's dangerous and irrational use of the revolver was critical to substantiate his concern that Thomas might obtain the weapon and also to explain why Culkin removed the weapon from the bedroom following the stabbing. A trial judge's determination of relevancy is reviewed on appeal under the right/wrong standard. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Hawai`i 97, 183, 9 P.3d 409, 495, reconsideration denied, 94 Hawai`i 97, 9 P.3d 409 (2000); State v. Staley, 91 Hawai`i 275, 281, 982 P.2d 904, 910 (1999); State v. Hanapi, 89 Hawai`i 177, 181, 970 P.2d 485, 489, reconsideration denied, 89 Hawai`i 177, 970 P.2d 485 (1999); State v. Richie, 88 Hawai`i 19, 36, 960 P.2d 1227, 1244 (1998); State v. Alston, 75 Haw. 517, 538, 865 P.2d 157, 168 (1994). Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. HRE Rule 401 (1993). The reasonableness of Culkin's apprehension that Thomas might seriously harm him was certainly a fact in issue. See section III.A.1, supra. To demonstrate that his fear was reasonable, Culkin sought to admit evidence of Thomas's prior conduct. The circuit court permitted Culkin to testify, and Culkin did testify, about specific instances of conduct. For example, Culkin testified about an incident in which Thomas locked himself inside Culkin's bathroom for two hours. When Culkin finally gained entrance, he discovered not only drug paraphernalia, but that the windows were shut, the blinds were down, and the room was like a steam bath. Thomas was standing next to the window, peering out, advising Culkin to be quiet because somebody's up on the roof. Certainly the fact that Thomas was also armed with a loaded revolver was significant. Even if Thomas was not armed on the morning of July 27, 1997, Culkin's knowledge of Thomas's past conduct when under the influence of drugs, combined with the risk to life that Thomas posed, was certainly relevant to the reasonableness of Culkin's claimed apprehension on that morning. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court erred by ruling that Thomas's past use of the handgun was not relevant. [19]