Opinion ID: 433837
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Restraining Order

Text: 12 Title 21 U.S.C. Sec. 848(a)(2) provides that a person convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 848(a)(1) shall forfeit to the United States profits obtained from the enterprise, and any interest in property or contractual rights affording a source of influence over the enterprise. The district courts are empowered to enter appropriate restraining orders covering property or other interests subject to such forfeiture. 21 U.S.C. Sec. 848(d). 13 In February 1982 the district court granted an ex parte order restraining Ray, his wife, and Task, Inc., a corporation controlled by Ray, from disposing of their property, excepting expenditures for the necessities of life for Ray and his wife. 2 The district court denied Ray's motion to modify the restraining order to allow use of some of his funds to pay for his defense. In April 1982 the district court denied Ray's alternative motions for reconsideration and for a hearing on the appropriateness of the restraining order. Ray now argues that the denial of a hearing violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process, and that the restraining order interfered with his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. We address these in turn.
14 Ray claims that freezing his assets violated his Sixth and Eighth Amendment rights to prepare adequately for trial. There are two aspects to Ray's right to counsel claim. First, he alleges that the restraining order prevented him from hiring more experienced counsel. Second, he claims that the restraint prevented his counsel from conducting a financial analysis necessary to counter the government's case. 15 Apart from his implicit claim that the rich can afford better lawyers than the poor, Ray essentially contends in his first claim that he was denied the right to retain counsel. This court has recognized that individuals who can afford to retain counsel have a qualified right to obtain counsel of their choice. Releford v. United States, 288 F.2d 298, 301 (9th Cir.1961). 3 Other circuits are in accord. See, e.g., United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485 (D.C.Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069, 99 S.Ct. 837, 59 L.Ed.2d 34 (1979); Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir.1978); United States v. Inman, 483 F.2d 738 (4th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 988, 94 S.Ct. 2394, 40 L.Ed.2d 766 (1974). Denial of this qualified right is reversible error regardless of whether prejudice is shown. Releford, 288 F.2d at 301. 16 However, we need not decide whether a Sec. 848(d) restraining order that prevents a person who could otherwise afford to do so from retaining counsel violates this qualified right to retain counsel, because Ray was represented by the counsel of his choice. In his motion for modification of the restraining order, Ray admitted that he had told Wayne, his lawyer, that he wanted Wayne to represent him. When it became apparent that Ray could not pay Wayne's fee because of the restraining order, the district court appointed Wayne to represent Ray under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, as amended. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3006A. In the district court Ray did not repudiate Wayne as his chosen counsel. Rather, he contended that the restraining order should be lifted because Wayne might wish to associate more experienced counsel, and because the restraining order would prevent Ray from hiring new counsel should he become dissatisfied with Wayne. Ray has not shown that the restraining order actually restricted his ability to retain counsel of his choice. 17 Ray also contends that the restraining order prevented him from conducting a net worth analysis to counter the government's argument that his increased wealth came from drug sales. In essence, Ray contends in this second argument that the restraining order denied him effective assistance of counsel because it prevented his counsel from preparing adequately for trial. Even assuming that lack of the net worth analysis prevented adequate preparation, Ray is not entitled to relief because he has not made the required showing of prejudice. Ewing v. Williams, 596 F.2d 391 (9th Cir.1979). The government made only two passing references in the course of a lengthy closing argument to Ray's apparent lack of a legitimate source of income. Ray's lack of detailed financial information with which to counter these limited references did not prejudice his defense.
18 Due process requires a district court to hold a hearing to determine the propriety of a restraining order under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 848(d) immediately after its issuance. United States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir.1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3394 (Nov. 15, 1982). The district court's failure to hold a hearing on the propriety of the restraining order thus temporarily deprived Ray of his property without due process of law. The question is how this due process violation should be remedied. 19 Crozier had no occasion to address a post-trial remedy for denial of a hearing. Crozier was an interlocutory appeal, decided before the district court entered final judgment. Consequently, the Crozier court could easily remedy the lack of a hearing by simply remanding the case with instructions to hold a hearing. In this case, the damage to Ray, if any, has been done. After he was denied a hearing on the restraining order, he was convicted and his property declared forfeited. 20 Reversing Ray's criminal conviction, if otherwise free from error, is not an appropriate remedy for the district court's failure to grant Ray a hearing on the restraining order. The lack of a hearing did not in any material way affect Ray's preparation of his legal defense and therefore violated only Ray's property rights. Accordingly, it had nothing to do with the determination of his guilt or innocence. An attack on the conviction is an attack on the wrong target. 21 Crozier was decided just two days before the district court denied Ray's motion for a hearing on the restraining order, and apparently was not cited to the district court. We doubt that the question of an appropriate remedy for violation of Crozier's hearing requirement will arise again, for we fully expect that the district courts of this circuit will heed Crozier's teaching and hearings will be allowed.