Opinion ID: 1585304
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: should the evidence of the blood alcohol content of kevin king been admitted into the record?

Text: Without doubt, the most compelling and conclusive evidence that Kevin King was intoxicated was withheld from the jury. Although two highway patrolmen testified that in their opinion Kevin King was intoxicated, Alpha attempted to convince the jury that the intoxication of Kevin King did not cause the accident. The blood test taken some three (3) hours after the accident showed that Kevin King was more than 40% above the minimum legal level for determining intoxication. The alcohol level of Kevin King was .14 grams of ether alcohol per 100 mililiters of blood. This was the single most probative item of evidence on the intoxication issue. The Bryants argue that since King was not a party and did not object to the results of the test being admitted, there exists no justification for the trial court's refusal to permit this evidence to be considered by the jury. The issue is whether a non party to a civil suit may waive the privilege afforded him under Mississippi Code Annotated, Section 63-11-43 (1972). Chapter 11 of Title 63 of the Mississippi Code Annotated (1972), is commonly known as the Implied Consent Law and § 63-11-43 provides as follows: Neither results of a chemical test under the provisions of this chapter, nor the fact of submission to or refusal of such test shall be admissible in a civil case. Alpha Entertainment contends that this section is not a privilege and it may not be waived, but our case law is to the contrary. In Stong v. Freeman Truck Lines, Inc., 456 So.2d 698 (Miss. 1984), this Court held that the results of a blood test taken from a deceased motorist, under the provisions of MCA, §§ 63-11-7 and 63-11-43 (1972), were inadmissible in a civil trial resulting from a suit filed after the accident. In so holding we stated: We hold as a matter of law that Administratrix' inquiry into the basis of Freeman/Long's affirmative defense of intoxication constitutes no waiver of her right to invoke § 63-11-43 in opposition to the admissibility of the results of the blood test. (Emphasis added). Stong, supra, at 714. When Section 63-11-7, Mississippi Code Annotated (1972), is read in conjunction with § 63-11-43, Mississippi Code Annotated (1972), it becomes apparent that the results of the test may not be used in evidence against a person in any court without the consent of the person so tested, or, if deceased, such person's legal representative. (Emphasis added). It is our opinion that this statute creates the privilege for the benefit of the individual whose blood was taken and tested and this privilege may be waived or invoked. Even more persuasive is the language in the recent case of Clark v. City of Pascagoula, 507 So.2d 70 (Miss. 1987), where this Court addressed the question of admissibility of a blood sample taken from a deceased body pursuant to § 63-11-7, Mississippi Code Annotated (1972). We recognized that both § 63-11-7 and 63-11-43 are intended to protect the interests of the person submitted to a blood alcohol test, in a civil case. We found the tests admissible and further, any protection given... was waived by the decedent's representative. Clark, at 76. Therefore, if the intent of the legislature was to protect persons such as Kevin King, and this is a privilege to be invoked by Kevin King then he effectively waived the protection provided by the statute. [1] Kevin King testified that he had no objection whatsoever to the introduction of the BAC test results. In accord with our case law the extremely probative evidence of the results of the blood tests should then have been admitted. We find therefore, that the trial court committed reversible error when it refused to admit the blood test results after Kevin King had waived his privilege.