Opinion ID: 726754
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Supreme Court's decision in Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist.

Text: 14 The Supreme Court in Jett was faced with deciding whether the previous version of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provided an independent federal cause of action for damages against local governmental entities; and, if so, whether such an entity may be held liable for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 under a respondeat superior theory. 15 In Jett, a former high-school athletic director brought an action against a school district and its officials under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, alleging several violations of his civil rights. Included in his complaint was the allegation that the defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment right of equal protection and his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by removing him from his former job on the basis of his race. The trial court held the plaintiff's claim of racial discrimination cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It allowed him to pursue a respondeat superior theory of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 but not under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that municipalities cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior for the violation of rights guaranteed by 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 16 When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court articulated two important jurisdictional principles. It first held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not provide an independent federal cause of action for damages against local governmental entities; instead, where a claim is brought against a municipality, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for the violation of rights guaranteed by 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Jett, 491 U.S. at 731, 109 S.Ct. at 2720-21. The Court's second holding in Jett was that a plaintiff who sues a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, may not rely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983's policy or custom requirement must be satisfied. Id. at 735-36, 109 S.Ct. at 2722-23. 5 17 In announcing the first principle, the Court noted that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 was silent as to whether it created a cause of action for damages against municipal actors and others who violated it. Id. at 711, 109 S.Ct. at 2710. At the time Jett was decided, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provided: 18 All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other. 19 Justice O'Connor, writing for a plurality in Jett, derived Jett 's first limiting principle not from the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, but instead from the historical relationship between the precursor statutes to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, respectively. Justice O'Connor concluded that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 enumerated certain civil rights, but contained no remedial provision for a federal civil cause of action to enforce those rights. Instead, it was the role of the subsequently enacted Civil Rights Act of 1871 to enhanc[e] the protections of the 1866 Act by providing a new civil remedy for its enforcement against state actors. Jett, 491 U.S. at 724, 109 S.Ct. at 2717. On the basis of the comparative texts and history of the two acts, Jett concluded that Congress intended that the explicit remedial provisions of § 1983 be controlling in the context of damages actions brought against state actors alleging violation of the rights declared in § 1981. Id. at 731, 109 S.Ct. at 2721. 6 20 Jett 's second principle--the prohibition on respondeat superior liability for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981--was based on the Court's past decisions interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which held that Congress  'did not intend ... to impose vicarious liability on municipalities for violations of federal civil rights by their employees[.]'  Id. at 733, 109 S.Ct. at 2721 (quoting Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 710 n. 27, 93 S.Ct. 1785, 1796 n. 27, 36 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973)). See also Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2037-38. Past decisions such as Monell based this principle on the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which imposes liability only where a state actor under color of some official policy, 'causes' an employee to violate another's constitutional rights[,] Monell, 436 U.S. at 692, 98 S.Ct. at 2036, as well as on the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the precursor statute to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, wherein the 42nd Congress rejected a proposal to impose vicarious liability under that statute. Id. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036.