Opinion ID: 1830892
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: other counterclaims and defenses

Text: Burgess Mining and Burgess Brothers argue that the other counterclaims filed by them should have been allowed and not dismissed by the special master. The other counterclaims made by Burgess Mining were for: (1) The fair market value of ammonia nitrate over Burgess Mining's cost$46,766.64; (2) the rental value of a lowboy on the basis of quantum meruit$17,110.00; and (3) haul road maintenance cost and use on the basis of quantum meruit $4,360.00. Burgess Brothers had but a single counterclaim, which totaled $10,878, and that was for ad valorem taxes for which it claimed it was due reimbursement under the terms of the equipment leases. Addressing the counterclaim for ad valorem taxes first, Burgess Brothers states that the equipment leases between it and DTK, executed on December 31, 1974, and April 1, 1977, include the following typewritten provision: ... Lessee (DTK) further agrees to reimburse lessor (Burgess Brothers) for any ad valorem taxes paid by lessor on a pro rata basis for the time the equipment is in possession of lessee. Burgess Brothers asserts that of the seventy-two months covered by the final assessment, DTK had possession of the equipment from January 1, 1975, through October 1977, and that it is thus due to recover from DTK $10,878 of the $23,037.41 in taxes it paid. Following the special master's filing of his report and recommendations, Burgess Brothers raised a question about DTK's obligation to pay the state taxes due on the equipment. In its supplemental objections to the special master's report, Burgess Brothers referred to the taxes as lease taxes and not as ad valorem taxes. The circuit court, however, overruled all the exceptions raised by all the defendants, including this one raised by Burgess Brothers. It was established many years ago by this Court that a master is not authorized to make a report more extensive than the allegations and proofs warrant, Levert v. Redwood, 9 Port. 79, 94 (1830), and that exceptions to a master's report which have no foundation in the record or otherwise cannot be sustained. See Pearson v. Darrington, 32 Ala. 227, 238 (1858). The equipment lease required DTK to pay ad valorem taxes. The taxes assessed by the Alabama Department of Revenue against Burgess Brothers, however, were not ad valorem taxes levied on the equipment but a privilege or license tax levied on Burgess Brothers' leasing or renting tangible, personal property, pursuant to §§ 40-12-220 through XX-XX-XXX. Because the circuit court properly refused Burgess Brothers' objection to the fact that the special master's report did not include lease taxes assessed by the Revenue Department, Burgess Brothers was not entitled to the relief requested by its counterclaim. The special master made no findings as to the haul road portion of Burgess Mining's claim; however, he did make the following conclusion and recommendation: On various occasions Burgess Mining used equipment of DTK's and DTK used equipment of Burgess Mining. Except where charges were made, there was no intent to charge rent and the uses offset each other. Any materials purchased by DTK from Burgess Mining, including ammonia nitrate, were paid for at a reasonable price. Burgess Mining is not entitled to recover on any of the remaining claims in its counterclaim. Burgess Mining predicated its counterclaims for the market value of ammonia nitrate, lowboy rental, and haul road maintenance on the theory of quantum meruit. It has been said: In the absence of an express agreement, the obligation, if any, to pay for work and labor rests on a quantum meruit, and may arise by legal implication without regard to the assent of the parties, on the theory or doctrine of unjust enrichment, or performance by one not a mere volunteer of a legal duty resting on another, or may result from a contract inferred or implied, in fact, or as a matter of law, or from quasi-contract. In determining the intention of the parties with respect to compensation for the labor performed, the court may consider the justice or injustice of a claim therefor. 98 C.J.S. Work & Labor § 1, at 719-720 (1957); See also Green v. Hospital Bldg. Authority of City of Bessemer, 294 Ala. 467, 318 So.2d 701 (1975). There was no finding by the special master that DTK was unjustly enriched to the detriment of Burgess Mining by DTK's purchase of ammonia nitrate or the use of the lowboy so as to entitle Burgess Mining to recover on its quantum meruit claims. Instead, the special master concluded from the facts, and we agree, that since DTK paid Burgess Mining a reasonable price for the ammonia nitrate and there was no intent on the part of Burgess Mining to charge rent on the lowboy, Burgess Mining was not entitled to recover on these claims. Although the special master made no findings or recommendation as to the haul road compensation claimed by Burgess Mining, a review of the facts and circumstances involved here convinces the Court that there was no reasonable expectation by either party that DTK would pay Burgess Mining for haul road maintenance, 98 C.J.S. Work & Labor § 8 (1957), and that Burgess Mining's attempt to now obtain compensation constitutes nothing more than a change of mind for a service that was originally rendered gratuitously. Id. at 728. Consequently, the Court finds no implied contract, and sees no reason or justification to find an implied contract under the circumstances. See Green, supra, 294 Ala. at 470, 318 So.2d at 704; therefore, recovery was properly denied on this counterclaim. Collectively, the defendants raised as a defense, or at least a partial defense, the one-year statute of limitations. They assert: Any claim arising against [A.E.] Burgess or Burgess Brothers or Burgess Corporation as a result of the acts of [A.E.] Burgess fall under the category of claims arising from `breach of fiduciary duty,' `breach of trust,' or fraud, and the one-year of statute of limitations should prevent recovery for any damages beyond those sustained during the period commencing October 19, 1976. Lees filed suit on October 19, 1977, and withdrew from the partnership on October 26, 1977. The statute of limitations does not run in favor of one partner or against another. Moore v. Moore, 255 Ala. 393, 400-401, 51 So.2d 683, 689 (1951). Furthermore, there was no indication of undue delay on Lees's part in seeking redress against any of the named defendants that would operate as a bar to any remedy to which he is otherwise entitled. See Moore v. Moore, supra, 255 Ala. at 401, 51 So.2d at 690. Consequently, the defendants' argument as to the defense of the statute of limitations fails.