Opinion ID: 2343923
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Attorney's Fee Statutory Mandate

Text: This Court has held that the word shall in a statute authorizing attorney's fees is mandatory and leaves no room for the exercise of judicial discretion regarding that right. Heil v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., Del.Supr., 371 A.2d 1077 (1977). In Heil, this Court held that a statute, worded similarly to Section 2127, permitted discretion over the amount of the attorney's fees to be awarded depending upon the circumstances of a given case. However, the discretion permitted by the statute's dictate that attorney's fees shall be awarded did not extend to the absolute denial of attorney's fees. The legislative history of Section 2127 supports our conclusion that the Board may not completely deny the award of an attorney's fee. In 1962, Section 2127 provided that the Board may award attorney's fees to successful claimants. 53 Del.Laws Ch. 381. In 1966, the General Assembly amended the statute to its present form, directing that the Board shall award attorney's fees to successful claimants. When a legislative body amends a prior enactment by a material change in the language, it is presumed that a change in the meaning was intended. Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., Del.Supr., 449 A.2d 232, 237 (1982); Daniel D. Rappa, Inc. v. Engelhardt, Del. Supr., 256 A.2d 744, 746 (1969). The present version of the statute is unambiguous. It must be held to mean that which it plainly states. See A & P Stores v. Hannigan, Del.Supr., 367 A.2d 641, 642 (1976); Balma v. Tidewater Oil Co., Del.Supr., 214 A.2d 560, 562 (1965). We hold that the Board's decision to award Simmons no attorney's fee on the permanent impairment claim violated Section 2127. Accord Heil v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 371 A.2d at 1078.