Opinion ID: 1272597
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: statutory grounds for termination of parental rights

Text: The State first argues that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that there was not clear and convincing evidence that Andrew abandoned Chance under § 43-292(1) and (9). In relevant part, § 43-292 provides: The court may terminate all parental rights between the parents ... and [a] juvenile when the court finds such action to be in the best interests of the juvenile and it appears by the evidence that one or more of the following conditions exist: (1) The parents have abandoned the juvenile for six months or more immediately prior to the filing of the petition. For purposes of § 43-292(1), abandonment is a parent's intentionally withholding from a child, without just cause or excuse, the parent's presence, care, love, protection, maintenance, and the opportunity for the display of parental affection for the child. [5] The question of abandonment is largely one of intent, to be determined in each case from all the facts and circumstances. [6] To prove abandonment, the evidence must clearly and convincingly show that the parent has acted toward the child in a manner evidencing a settled purpose to be rid of all parental obligations and to forgo all parental rights, together with a complete repudiation of parenthood and an abandonment of parental rights and responsibilities. [7] Whether a parent has abandoned a child within the meaning of § 43-292(1) is a question of fact and depends upon parental intent, which may be determined by circumstantial evidence. [8] The time period for abandonment in this section is determined by counting back 6 months from the date the juvenile petition was filed. [9] In this case, the supplemental petition was filed on February 14, 2008. The crucial time period for our analysis, therefore, is August 14, 2007, through February 14, 2008. The record clearly shows that Andrew had no contact with Chance during this 6-month time period. In fact, Andrew's only pre-petition contact with Chance, ever, was immediately following his birth in April 2006. Both foster mothers and the two DHHS workers involved testified that Andrew had no contact with Chance during the relevant 6-month period, or at any time before or after the 6-month period. Andrew himself admitted to having no pre-petition contact with Chance after April 2006. In addition, Andrew has not provided Chance any financial support and has not provided any cards, gifts, or letters to Chance. In short, the evidence shows a complete abandonment of parental rights and responsibilities. Given these undisputed facts, the question before us is whether Andrew had just cause or excuse to withhold his presence, care, love, protection, maintenance, and the opportunity for the display of parental affection of Chance. Andrew argues that he had just cause or excuse, because prior to genetic testing, he believed that he was not Chance's father. In agreeing with Andrew, the Court of Appeals relied on In re Interest of Dylan Z., [10] in which it had held that a father's lack of contact with his minor child was directly attributable to his lack of knowledge that he was the child's father. In that case, the Court of Appeals concluded that the father's failure to connect with his child was due to just cause and excuse, because DHHS and the protection safety worker made no attempts to contact the father during the relevant 6-month period. [11] In re Interest of Dylan Z., however, dealt with a significantly different set of circumstances than the situation in the present case. First, Dylan's parents were not married or in a relationship at the time of Dylan's birth. Here, Andrew and Miranda were, even at the time of the hearing on Andrew's parental rights, still legally married. It has long been the law that children born to the parties in a marriage are presumed legitimate until proved otherwise or decreed otherwise by the court. [12] But more importantly, in In re Interest of Dylan Z., Dylan's alleged father was not present at Dylan's birth. Here, Andrew was informed of the birth and traveled to California to witness it. Andrew testified that after seeing Chance shortly after his birth, Andrew did not believe the child was his. The Court of Appeals concluded that there was nothing in the record to indicate that Andrew had actual knowledge that Chance was his child until the genetic testing was completed in April 2008, and therefore, Andrew could not have intentionally abandoned Chance because he did not know Chance was his child. We conclude, however, that paternal uncertainty based on physical appearance of a child or suspicions of infidelity is not just cause or excuse for abandoning a child born into wedlock, especially when there are ample means to verify one's paternity. In fact, just cause or excuse for a parent's failure to maintain a relationship with a minor child has generally been confined to circumstances that are, at least in part, beyond the control of the parent. [13] But there is nothing in the record in this case indicating that Andrew did not have the means or opportunity to confirm his suspicions that Chance was not his child, at the hospital, or anytime thereafter. Andrew concedes that he did not try to ascertain his paternity or assert any parental interest in Chance, despite the fact that Chance was born of his marriage to Miranda. Only after the State filed a petition to terminate his rights, nearly 3 years after Chance was born, did Andrew attempt to take any responsibility for Chance. The obligations of parenthood cannot be set aside that easily, based on nothing more than mere physical appearance or unconfirmed suspicions. We will not set the bar so low for responsible parental involvement. We conclude, based on our de novo review of the record, that Andrew has intentionally withheld from Chance, without just cause or excuse, his presence, care, love, protection, maintenance, and opportunity for the display of parental affection. Furthermore, the physical appearance of a child or suspicions of infidelity are not just cause or excuse for abandoning a child born into wedlock. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Andrew did not abandon Chance. Because we have concluded that Andrew abandoned Chance within the meaning of § 43-292(1), we need not address Andrew's conduct under § 43-292(9).