Opinion ID: 1968177
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rights to Counsel of Choice and To Present A Case

Text: Under the Guardianship Act, an individual alleged to be incapacitated has the right to `be represented by counsel and is entitled to present evidence and to cross-examine witnesses. . . .' In re Orshansky, 804 A.2d 1077, 1093 (D.C.2002) (quoting D.C.Code §§ 21-2041(h), -2054(e) (2001)). After a petition is filed, the court is required to appoint counsel for the alleged incapacitated person unless that individual is represented by counsel. D.C.Code § 21-2041(d); see also Super. Ct. Prob. R. 321(d) (requiring the court to appoint counsel concurrently with scheduling a hearing). If the petition discloses that the subject [i.e., the alleged incapacitated person] is represented by counsel, the Court shall appoint such person unless good cause to the contrary exist[s]. Super. Ct. Prob. R. 321(d). An attorney retained by the subject after the appointment of counsel by the court must file a notice of appearance and serve a copy of same on all persons entitled to notice and appointed counsel, among others. Super. Ct. Prob. R. 305(b). The rule provides a procedure for the filing of objections to retained counsel and an ex parte hearing on any objections filed. Super. Ct. Prob. R. 305(b)(2), (3) and (4). The appearance of appointed counsel terminates if and when the notice of appearance of retained counsel becomes effective. Super. Ct. Prob. R. 305(b)(5). In this case, consistent with D.C.Code § 21-2041(d) and Super. Ct. Prob. R. 321(d), the court appointed counsel to represent appellant at the same time that it scheduled a hearing on the petition for a general proceeding to appoint a conservator for him. Appellees contend that there is no showing that any lawyer appeared who was prepared to replace court appointed counsel and represent appellant generally in opposition to the petition of appellant's guardian to appoint, a conservator, the sole issue scheduled for trial. Appellees' contention is borne out by the record. On the date of the scheduled initial hearing, C. Sukari Hardnett filed an application for admission pro hac vice; however, her application stated that it was for the limited purpose of asking [the] Court to transfer Antoine McMillan's, estate to Maryland. . . . The issues raised by the pending petition for the appointment of a conservator concerned whether appellant is an incapacitated individual as defined in D.C.Code § 21-2011(11) and whether a conservator of his estate should be appointed because he had property that [would] be wasted or dissipated unless property management is provided. See D.C.Code § 21-2051(b)(1) (2001). There is no indication that Ms. Hardnett sought to represent appellant in addressing these issues. Appellant does not dispute that no attorney, purporting to be retained by him ever filed a notice of appearance in compliance with Super. Ct. Prob. R. 305(b). Nevertheless, he contends that he demonstrated adequately his request to have counsel of his choice through a pleading filed in his guardianship case, the pro hac vice petition of Ms. Hardnett, and the request of Ms. Hardnett's local sponsoring attorney, Coleman Foster, made in open court to have her admitted pro hac vice. Appellant argues that these representations are tantamount to the notice of appearance required under Super. Ct. Prob. R. 305(a)(2). Under the circumstances presented, we are not persuaded that the trial court erred by not treating these actions as tantamount to notice under Rule 305. First, Rule 305 sets forth procedures related to the appearance of counsel for an alleged incapacitated person in an intervention proceeding. Ms. Hardnett did not purport to be seeking to be counsel for that purpose. Second, Rule 305 requires counsel to file a notice of appearance with copies to persons listed therein, who then have an opportunity to file objections, which triggers the requirement for a hearing. See Super. Ct. Prob. R. 305(b). That did not occur here. A pleading filed by Mr. Foster in the separate guardianship proceeding shows that he represented appellant's mother, Linda McMillan, who filed the complaint seeking to remove the guardian as appellant's next friend. [1] The guardianship case involved appellant's estate when he was a minor which would be terminated when he reached majority. The petition pending before the trial court in this case concerned an alleged adult incapacitated person who required a conservator to protect his property. Even assuming that the pleading in the guardianship case could be considered as a request to represent appellant in the intervention proceeding, and we do not so conclude, the pleading in the guardianship case does not suggest that anyone was seeking to appear for appellant and address all the issues raised in the intervention proceeding. While that pleading stated that appellant had developed a trusting relationship with the attorneys at Hardnett and Associates and requested the appointment of William D. Jackson of the same firm to replace appellant's court appointed guardian, it did not indicate that either Foster, Jackson or Hardnett was prepared to represent appellant in this general intervention proceeding. The trial court was in the second day of hearings on the petition to appoint a conservator when Mr. Foster appeared in court to move Ms. Hardnett's admission pro hac vice. At that time, he represented that Ms. Hardnett was appellant's legal representative in Maryland, having drafted on his behalf a living trust and health care proxy, but he did not indicate that Ms. Hardnett sought to change the limited scope of the representation as stated in her application for admission pro hac vice. Thus, it does not appear that the court had before it any counsel retained by appellant who was ready to enter an appearance on appellant's behalf to replace court appointed counsel in this general intervention proceeding. Under these circumstances, the requirement for an ex parte hearing under Rule 305 was never triggered. Therefore, we find no error in the court's failure to hold a hearing under Super. Ct. Prob. R. 305(b)(3) and in allowing court appointed counsel to continue to represent appellant in the intervention proceeding. The trial court did undertake an inquiry to determine whether to grant Ms. Hardnett's application to appear pro hac vice. That inquiry included testimony from appellant concerning whether an attorney-client relationship existed or whether he had, in fact, selected Ms. Hardnett as his attorney. [2] The trial court concluded that appellant had not selected Ms. Hardnett as his counsel and that she had been selected by and represented appellant's parents, which presented a conflict of interest. Appellant argues that the trial court applied an improper standard in determining whether to permit Ms. Hardnett to appear as counsel pro hac vice. He contends that the trial court failed to evaluate whether he had the capacity to contract for Ms. Hardnett's legal services. Appellant also argues that there was no evidence to support a finding that he did not possess sufficient understanding to contract for legal representation. Appellees respond that the issue was not whether appellant had a general right to retain counsel, but whether Ms. Hardnett should be admitted pro hac vice for a limited purpose, which was not an issue in the trial that was underway. They also contend the evidence was sufficient to support the court's ruling. A person alleged to be incapacitated has the right to counsel. D.C.Code § 21-2054(a) and (e). The statute contemplates that this person may select his or her own counsel. See D.C.Code § 21-2054(a) (stating that [u]nless the individual to be protected has chosen counsel, the court shall appoint an attorney to represent the individual); see also Super. Ct. Prob. R. 305(b) (setting forth procedure when retained counsel seeks to appear for the incapacitated person). The trial court acknowledged appellant's rights in this regard, but stated that it wanted to assure that appellant had in fact selected counsel and that there was a basis for that conclusion. The trial court determined that: (1) appellant had not selected Ms. Hardnett as his attorney; (2) Ms. Hardnett was actually his parents' attorney; (3) he signed no retainer agreement for her services; (4) he did not know what a living trust was ( i.e., one of the documents that the attorney had allegedly prepared for him); and, (5) he did not have the ability to secure an attorney on his own. The court then denied Ms. Hardnett's application for admission pro hac vice. Appellant contends that some of these findings are erroneous or irrelevant or insufficient to support the conclusions reached. In a non-jury case, we address legal issues de novo, but the judge's findings of fact can be reversed only if they are `plainly wrong or without evidence to support [them].' Jemison v. National Baptist Convention, 720 A.2d 275, 281 (D.C.1998) (quoting D.C.Code § 17-305(a)) (other citations omitted). Applying that standard, we conclude that the court's factual findings are supported by the evidence. Specifically, appellant testified that his parents called the lawyer and had taken him to see Ms. Hardnett, which he thought occurred about three years earlier. At that time, he would have been a minor child of approximately fifteen years of age. He testified that he did not know how much the lawyer cost or whether he had signed an agreement for legal representation. Further, he stated that he did not know what a living trust was ( i.e., the document that Ms. Hardnett allegedly prepared for him). The court noted that Mr. Faster, who represented that he was of counsel at the Hardnett firm, filed on behalf of appellant's mother a complaint to remove the guardian in the guardianship proceeding and a motion to appoint a new guardian. Mr. Foster acknowledged that the firm represented appellant's parents in such filings because appellant was not eighteen years old at the time, and suit had to be filed by his parents or his legal guardian. The court also referenced information from appellant's school records, guardianship file, and the examiner's report, which indicated that appellant functioned overall at the second grade level and that he was easily influenced as a consequence of his cognitive limitations. The evidence supports the trial court's factual findings. [3] Appellant argues that the trial court did not evaluate properly his capacity to make a contract for legal services with the attorney he allegedly selected. He contends that the court did not make the proper inquiry in determining to deny Ms. Hardnett's pro hac vice application. It is his position that the court should have determined whether he had the mental capacity to contract for legal services, instead of inquiring into the mechanics of how his attorney, was selected. Appellees argue that the issue actually decided by the probate court was whether Ms. Hardnett should be admitted pro hac vice for the limited purpose requested. They contend that the showing of a conflict of interest, one ground upon which the trial court relied, is a valid reason for denying the request. `The test of mental capacity to contract is whether the person in question possesses sufficient mind to understand, in a reasonable manner, the nature, extent, character, and effect of the particular transaction in which [he] is engaged, whether or not [he] is competent in transacting business generally.' Uckele v. Jewett, 642 A.2d 119, 122 (D.C.1994) (quoting Butler v. Harrison, 578 A.2d 1098, 1100 (D.C.1990)). The party asserting incompetency must establish that the mental condition asserted `rendered the person incompetent to execute the particular transaction according to the standard set forth above.' Id. (quoting Butler, 578 A.2d at 1101) (emphasis added). In this case, the trial court determined factually that appellant had not contracted for Ms. Hardnett's services and that he had not selected her as counsel. There is evidence to support these findings. Since the court found that the appellant had not selected or contracted for a lawyer's services, it was not required to determine whether any infirmity rendered him incapable of entering the contract or transaction. See id. The court also found that Ms. Hardnett had a conflict of interest. Conflict of interest is recognized as a valid reason for striking retained counsel in intervention proceedings. See Super. Ct. Prob. R. 305(b)(4) (permitting the court to strike the appearance of the subject's retained counsel when there is a conflict of interest that will prevent zealous representation); see also Alston v. United States, 838 A.2d 320, 324 (D.C.2003) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (in a criminal context, noting that [t]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel . . . encompasses a `correlative right' to representation that is free from conflicts of interest.). Here, there was evidence that in addition to his own expenses, appellant's funds had to be used to support his entire household while he was a minor child and that his mother consulted with attorneys, including Ms. Hardnett, from time to time in an effort to secure additional funds or purchases from the guardianship estate. The court also had evidence that a lawyer with Ms. Hardnett's firm represented appellant's mother in a complaint seeking to remove the guardian and appoint him as the guardian's successor. In that complaint, Mrs. McMillan averred under oath that the McMillan family had requested that the guardianship be managed by the Hardnett firm. The trial court could conclude on this record, as it did, that a lawyer who represented appellant's parents would have a conflict of interest in representing zealously the interests of their son upon whom they depended for support. Thus, contrary to appellant's argument, there is a factual basis for the trial court's ruling. Our review of the trial court's determination of whether a conflict of interest exists is a `deferential one,' presenting a mixed question of law and fact. Id. (quoting Derrington v. United States, 681 A.2d 1125, 1132 (D.C. 1996)) (other citations omitted). Against that standard, we find no error in the trial court's findings and its ruling based thereon. [4] There is no contention that appointed counsel failed to discharge the statutory responsibilities to represent appellant zealously. [5] See D.C.Code § 21-2033(b) (2001) (specifying the duties of counsel in a protective proceeding). While stating that his primary complaint is with the trial court's rulings and not his attorney, appellant contends that counsel of his choice would have presented his case better. He contends that he never had a chance to present his comprehensive plan for the protection of his assets without the appointment of a conservator. This plan, he asserts, included utilization of the services of an investment advisor, William D. Jackson, an attorney also with the Hardnett, firm. The record shows that appointed counsel zealously opposed the petition alleging that appellant was an incapacitated person and required the appointment of a conservator to protect his assets. She presented an expert witness on his behalf and the testimony of his mother in support of his position. She insisted on his right to remain silent. See Part II. B., infra. Counsel prevailed finally on that issue after persuading the court upon reconsideration to strike appellant's testimony. She cross-examined petitioner's witnesses, and insisted on his right to cross-examine the court appointed examiner after he filed his report. [6] These issues were central to the proceeding before any consideration could be given to who should be appointed. See D.C.Code 21-2051(a) and (b) (2001). It was appellant's position in the trial court that no conservator was required. Nevertheless, appointed counsel represented at the end of the hearing that appellant wanted to have Mr. Jackson designated as his conservator. The court did not accord this stated preference controlling weight because appellant had never met him, and Mr. Jackson had not presented himself to the court as a nominee. We cannot say on this record that the appointment of a disinterested member of the bar over the proffered Maryland attorney resulted from some failing by appellant's court appointed counsel. [7] Contrary to appellant's argument, the record fails to demonstrate that appellant was denied improperly the right to counsel of his choice or prevented from presenting his case. [8]