Opinion ID: 1379772
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: voir dire assignment of error

Text: During voir dire, the state, over defendant's timely objections, questioned potential jurors individually regarding their willingness to consider in the penalty phase of the trial [3] whether defendant had a past criminal history in assessing the probability of defendant's future dangerousness, i.e., the probability that he would commit acts of violence in the future. With the exception of the incident involving Randy Brown, evidence concerning defendant's prior criminal history was neither proffered by the state nor admitted in the guilt phase of defendant's trial. Additional evidence of defendant's prior criminal history was, however, relevant to the jury's assessment of defendant's future dangerousness and, therefore, was properly admitted in the penalty phase of the trial. State v. Montez, 309 Or. 564, 610-12, 789 P.2d 1352 (1990); State v. Pratt, 309 Or. 205, 210, 785 P.2d 350 (1990); State v. Moen, 309 Or. 45, 70-76, 786 P.2d 111 (1990); State v. Wagner, 305 Or. 115, 178, 752 P.2d 1136 (1988), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 492 U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 3235, 106 L.Ed.2d 583 (1989). The prosecutor asked 10 of the 12 jurors who ultimately sat in both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial questions similar in content to that asked of Juror Colburn: Q. [Prosecutor:] One of the things in this case that you may be called upon to do is to determine whether this man, if he committed an aggravated murder, is likely to cause future violence. That kind of involves a future prediction. In doing that, would you be willing to consider whether he has been convicted of crimes in the past ? (Emphasis added.) A. [Juror Colburn:] I think that is an important consideration. Defendant contends that those questions impermissibly suggested evidence of his bad character to the jury before its determination of his guilt on the charged offenses and that, because his past criminal history was not admissible in the guilt phase of his trial, the jury improperly might have inferred that he was guilty of the present charges because he is a bad person. Defendant argues, therefore, that the trial court erred when it allowed the questioning over his objections. Although we agree that the court erred in permitting the questions, the error does not require reversal in the circumstances of this case. Although the issue presented by the assignment of error arises on voir dire, some discussion of pertinent evidence rules is helpful to an understanding of that issue. Evidence of other crimes, sometimes referred to as uncharged misconduct evidence, [4] is one form of evidence generally known as bad-character evidence. The general rule is that the prosecutor is prohibited from introducing evidence of other crimes or bad acts by the accused unless the evidence is introduced for some relevant purpose other than to suggest that, because the accused is a person of criminal character, he or she is more likely to have committed the charged crime. OEC 404(2) and (3); McCormick on Evidence 557-58, § 190 (3d ed. 1984). [5] That general rule is often described as the propensity rule, Lempert & Saltzberg, A Modern Approach to Evidence: Text, Problems, Transcripts and Cases 215-16 (2d ed 1982), or the rule that generally prohibits the use of character as circumstantial evidence, or as it is sometimes called, character to prove conduct. Wright & Graham, 22 Federal Practice and Procedure 342, § 5232. OEC 404(2), which sets forth the propensity rule, provides in part: Evidence of a person's character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that the person acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion   . The propensity rule also is restated in the first sentence of OEC 404(3) that precludes a prosecutor from introducing evidence of an accused's other crimes to prove the [accused's bad] character    in order to show that the [accused] acted in conformity therewith. Evidence first introduced by the prosecution that the accused has committed another crime or wrongful act that is offered as circumstantial evidence of conduct violates two rules: (1) the rule, OEC 404(2)(a), [6] that evidence of good character must be introduced by the accused before evidence of bad character can be used by the prosecution to prove conduct; and (2) the rule, OEC 405(1), [7] that character to prove conduct cannot be proved by specific instances of conduct. Although other crimes evidence generally may not be used as circumstantial evidence to show how the accused acted on a particular occasion, such evidence may be admissible for various other purposes: first, situations in which character itself is an essential element of a charge, claim or defense, OEC 404(1); second, the use of character evidence to impeach or support the credibility of a witness pursuant to OEC 607, [8] OEC 608 [9] and OEC 609 [10] (a use of character evidence expressly recognized in OEC 404(2)(c)); and third, the use of other crimes evidence to prove relevant facts other than conduct, such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident (noncharacter uses of such evidence), OEC 404(3). [11] Bad character evidence (such as other crimes by the accused) is excluded under the propensity rule, not because it is irrelevant, but because of the risk of unfair prejudice [12] to the accused. The propensity rule's general prohibition of bad character evidence, codified in OEC 404(2) and OEC 404(3), is a specific application of OEC 403. [13] The theory is that the risk that the jury will convict for crimes other than those charged, or because the accused deserves punishment for his past misdeeds, outweighs the probative value of the inference that he's done it before, he's done or will do it again. Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein's Evidence Manual 7-6, ¶ 7.01[01] (Student ed. 1987). It is also feared that the jury will give more weight to the evidence than it deserves in assessing guilt of the crime charged. Louisell & Mueller, 2 Federal Evidence 128-29, § 136. One court graphically described the danger of unfair prejudice of other crimes evidence: A drop of ink cannot be removed from a glass of milk. Government of Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 283 (1979). [14] Another reason for the propensity rule in criminal cases is that it is viewed as unfair to require an accused to be prepared not only to defend against the immediate charge, but also to defend or explain away unrelated acts from the past. [15] Louisell & Mueller, supra, at 130-31, § 136. Additionally, courts are concerned with confusion of issues and undue consumption of time through what may be, in effect, a trial within a trial to ascertain the relationship between the purported other crime and the defendant. Wright & Graham, supra, at 437; Imwinkielreid, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence 4, § 8.01. The state argues: ORS 163.150 mandates a bifurcated trial in a capital murder case with a single jury panel. Penalty-phase issues must be addressed in the voir dire of prospective jurors before the commencement of the trial. One of the primary issues to be resolved by the jury in the penalty phase is the probability of defendant's future dangerousness. ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B). See supra note 3. The state argues, therefore, that it is necessary for both parties to question prospective jurors during voir dire fully concerning that issue. According to the state, questions during voir dire that seek to assess a potential juror's willingness to consider a defendant's past criminal history are pertinent and proper, provided that the state intends to offer evidence of criminal history in the penalty phase of the trial, as the state did in this case. The state's argument misses the mark. Admittedly, the state's need to present evidence of defendant's past criminal history in the penalty phase of the trial is significant. Its right to introduce such evidence is, as previously stated, clearly established. But, with the exception of crimes involving Brown, the state did not, as it concedes, have a legitimate basis for introducing evidence of defendant's prior criminal history in the guilt phase of the trial. To secure the integrity of a fair trial, Oregon has chosen to require a bifurcated trial when an accused is charged with aggravated murder. See ORS 163.150. First, evidence that is relevant and admissible to the determination of the charged offense is admitted, and the jury is asked to determine innocence or guilt based solely on that evidence. Second, if the jury returns a guilty verdict on the charged offense, then it hears relevant evidence regarding the penalty phase issues. The two-tier trial is a procedural safeguard to insulate the jury from unduly prejudicial evidence. One of the purposes of the two-tier trial is to require the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused by lawful evidence without improperly informing the jury, directly or by innuendo, of the defendant's prior criminal record. One of the purposes of the bifurcated trial is, in other words, to prevent the jury's verdict on innocence or guilt from becoming tainted by evidence of defendant's bad character that is admissible only in the penalty phase. The objective of a bifurcated trial was thwarted by the prosecutor's questions during voir dire, to 10 of the 12 jurors who ultimately decided the case, which implied that defendant had previously been convicted of other crimes. Asking a prospective juror a question containing inadmissible matter is an improper use of voir dire. [16] OEC 103(3) expresses a policy of preventing inadmissible evidence from being described to the jury during the course of the trial. OEC 103(3) provides: In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of the jury. The policy adopted in [OEC 103(3) ] is of sufficient importance that it is also addressed in two other rules. See Rules 104(3) and 513(2). Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence 25 (2d ed. 1989). See also OEC 102 (The Oregon Evidence Code shall be construed to secure fairness    to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined). In allowing the prosecutor's questions during voir dire over defendant's timely and appropriate objections, the trial court erred. The state also argues, however, that any error that resulted from the voir dire questioning is harmless. In the circumstances of this case, we agree. First, the evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming. Second, as we hold below, the trial court properly admitted evidence, during the guilt phase, of defendant's crimes involving Randy Brown. Because the jury heard substantial evidence of defendant's other crimes in the guilt phase, any prejudice that may have resulted from the impermissible voir dire questions was minor. We find, therefore, that there was little, if any, likelihood that the error affected the jury's verdict. See State v. Isom, 306 Or. 587, 595-96, 761 P.2d 524 (1988) (explaining standard).