Opinion ID: 2628016
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the Superior Court Abuse Its Discretion by Reducing the Jury Verdict?

Text: This court reviews the superior court's setoff decision de novo. [17] Gibson argues that the superior court improperly reduced the jury verdict by $50,000. Gibson relies on AS 09.17.070, a statutory version of the collateral source rule that allows judges, in certain circumstances, to reduce awards to reflect unsubrogated payments from collateral sources. But AS 09.17.070 does not apply to this situation since payments from a tortfeasor's insurance company are not considered collateral payments. [18] Gibson agrees that UIM coverage may not duplicate amounts payable under bodily injury coverage. However, Gibson asserts that GEICO failed to show that the amount awarded by the jury duplicates the $50,000 paid by Kudlacik. Gibson argues that the jury verdict of $68,611 does not contain all of Gibson's past medical expenses, past wage loss, and future damages and that there was no double recovery because these uncompensated measures of damages by the jury were included in the funds received from the tortfeaser. Gibson asserts that the offset lacked a factual basis. The factual basis for a reduction of the jury award was established by Gibson's claim. The thrust of a UIM claim is that the insured suffered some quantifiable amount of damages and that the tortfeasor's insurance covered only a portion of those damages. The reason Gibson sued GEICO was to establish that the entire amount of her damages exceeded the $50,000 payment she had already received. Since the whole point of the trial was to determine the entire amount of damages, it was necessary to reduce the ultimate jury award by $50,000. The special verdict form indicates that the jury determined the damages suffered by plaintiff . . . as a legal result of the March 13, 2001 automobile collision[.] The jury was required to enter dollar amounts in each of the following categories: past medical expenses, future medical expenses, past wage loss, future wage loss, past pain and suffering, future pain and suffering, past emotional distress, future emotional distress, past loss of enjoyment of life, future loss of enjoyment of life, past inconvenience, and future inconvenience. It is unclear exactly what Gibson believes the jury might have overlooked given this comprehensive itemization of all damages from the accident.