Opinion ID: 1822718
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial Court Discretion in Granting and Revoking Probation

Text: This Court has often stated that the grant of probation rests within the broad discretion of the trial judge and is a matter of grace rather than right. Bernhardt v. State, 288 So.2d 490, 494 (Fla. 1974); accord State ex rel. Roberts v. Cochran, 140 So.2d 597, 599 (Fla.1962). Because probation is a matter of grace, even where statutes authorize a grant of probation to those who have been found guilty of criminal violations, trial courts are not required to extend the privilege. Roberts v. State, 154 So.2d 695, 696-97 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963). Typically, a trial court exercises its discretion to grant probation to a criminal defendant on the basis of a pre-sentence investigation which suggests that he [or she] is not likely to repeat his [or her] criminal conduct and could, most likely, be rehabilitated while at liberty under supervision. Cochran, 140 So.2d at 599. This is because [t]he underlying concept of probation is rehabilitation rather than punishment. Bernhardt, 288 So.2d at 495. As we discussed in Bernhardt, [t]he purpose of the granting of probation . . . is rehabilitation of one who has committed the crime charged without formally and judicially branding the individual as a convicted criminal and without consequent loss of civil rights and other damning consequences. Id. Just as there is broad discretionary power to grant the privilege of probation, the trial court has equally broad discretion to revoke it. See Cochran, 140 So.2d at 599 (The trial judge who prescribes probation in lieu of immediate imprisonment is allowed a broad judicial discretion to determine whether the conditions of the probation have been violated, and, therefore, whether the revocation of probation is in order.); Bronson v. State, 148 Fla. 188, 3 So.2d 873, 874 (1941). As we noted in Cochran, the discretion to revoke probation is necessarily broad and extensive in order that the interests of society may be protected against a repeating offender or one who disregards the conditions stipulated for his [or her] remaining at large. 140 So.2d at 599 (emphasis supplied). Although the power of the trial court in the area of probation revocation is broad and extensive, it is not unbridled and should not be arbitrarily exercised. Id. This Court has repeatedly held, as early as 1947 in Brill v. State, 159 Fla. 682, 32 So.2d 607 (1947), and later in accordance with the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), that the power to revoke probation must be exercised in accordance with due process principles. See Bernhardt, 288 So.2d at 495; Cochran, 140 So.2d at 599. These principles require the trial court to provide a defendant with notice of the alleged violation and an opportunity to be heard prior to revoking probation. See Brill, 32 So.2d at 609. [6] In addition to the procedural due process that is required at the time of an alleged violation, the trial court and the probation order must also adequately place the probationer on notice of conduct that is both required and prohibited during the probationary period. See Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla.1978); see also Zachary v. State, 559 So.2d 105, 106 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (striking a condition for vagueness where the order did not sufficiently apprise [probationer] of what she must do or refrain from doing); Pratt v. State, 516 So.2d 328, 328 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (finding condition insufficient to apprise [probationer] of which otherwise lawful acts are prohibited); Mastick v. State, 409 So.2d 203, 204 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (A probation order must sufficiently instruct the probationer as to what he must do or refrain from doing while on probation.). As this Court stated in Hines, [f]undamental fairness requires that a defendant be placed on notice as to what he [or she] must do or refrain from doing while on probation. 358 So.2d at 185. The due process protection of adequate notice is not only found in the constitution, see art. I, § 9, Fla. Const., but also in the Florida Statutes. See, e.g., § 948.06(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005) (setting forth the process for assessment and resolution of probation violations). For instance, section 948.06(1)(a) authorizes the arrest of a probationer and subsequent revocation of probation upon adequate proof if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a probationer or offender in community control has violated his or her probation or community control in a material respect. Id. (emphasis supplied). Although the Legislature failed to define material violation, this Court has stated that a violation must always be willful and substantial to produce a revocation. State v. Meeks, 789 So.2d 982, 987 (Fla. 2001); accord Carter, 835 So.2d at 261. In essence, the right to receive adequate notice of the conditions of probation is in part realized through the requirement that a violation be substantial and willful to justify revocation. Indeed, a defendant could not willfully violate a condition of probation without being on adequate notice of the conduct that is prohibited. See Rothery v. State, 757 So.2d 1256, 1259 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (holding that a violation of probation could not be willful if the probationer had neither notice nor knowledge of the substance of the rule). As is evident from our precedent, the conflict issue and the certified question in this case require us to balance two competing interests: the due process interests of a criminal defendant in receiving adequate notice of what conduct will subject him or her to revocation of probation and the interests of the trial court in having broad discretion both to impose conditions and determine when those conditions have been violated. Accordingly, we next discuss how these competing interests come into play when a criminal defendant is placed on probation and ordered to complete a drug treatment program in lieu of imprisonment.