Opinion ID: 1268078
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Negotiations on and after April 26, 1966; should this court modify the judgment?

Text: The next question is whether the agreement found by the court ultimately was reached by the parties, even though it was not complete as early as March 14, 1966. This question is answered by the court's findings that the negotiations on and after April 26, 1966 concerned a proposed amendment. The court thus recognized that the later negotiations deviated from the terms which the court had found comprised the agreement. Of course, if any term of the agreement still was under negotiation  and at least one was  all were open to negotiation when the parties met with their attorneys on April 26, 1966. On the record, the most that plaintiffs can hope for is modification of the judgment. Modification of the judgment would be possible only if this court could determine without additional findings that an agreement was reached as a result of the negotiations that occured on and after April 26, 1966, and the terms of that agreement. I am of the opinion that no such disposition of the case is possible. The record is clear up to a point. It shows that when the parties met with their attorneys on April 26, 1966, they worked out a new formula whereby Shinn could at any time fail or refuse to advance further capital without being excluded altogether from sharing in the profits; fixed Shinn's share in the profits at 37½% if he made all required payments instead of the 50% found by the court; and went into a number of other matters, with the result, according to the testimony of Yee and his attorney, Harold Yamada, that an oral agreement was reached. Yamada was instructed to draft the agreement. He presented his draft on July 12, 1966. Yee testified that this draft (herein referred to as Exhibit 3) contained [m]y oral agreement with Dr. Shinn. However, plaintiffs' attorney, Mr. Kashiwa, also presented a draft. He testified that Exhibit 3 was his understanding of the agreement that had been reached by the parties prior thereto except that there was some areas which I thought needed clarification, and, therefore, I wrote the letter of September 1st (herein referred to as Exhibit 4). Exhibit 3 did generally reflect what was agreed on at the April 26 meeting, he testified, and further testified that the two agreements [Exhibits 3 and 4] taken as a whole are acceptable to [Dr. Shinn]. He had Dr. Shinn sign them, though they were not delivered. The parties never did execute a written agreement. I am of the opinion that if the parties reached an oral agreement on all essential points at the meeting of April 26, 1966, the execution of a written contract was not a condition precedent to the taking effect of that agreement. See Williston on Contracts, §§ 28 and 28A (3d ed.); Restatement of the Law of Contracts, § 26; General Realty Corporation v. Douglas Lowell, Inc., 223 Or. 244, 354 P.2d 306 (1960); Annotations, 122 A.L.R. 1217, 165 A.L.R. 756. However, this being an action for specific performance in which a constructive trust of the assets held in Yee's name is sought, the evidence of the parol agreement must be clear, definite, and unequivocal. Poka v. Holi, 44 Haw. 464, 472, 357 P.2d 100, 106 (1960), rehearing denied, 44 Haw. 582, 358 P.2d 53; Kuwahara v. Kuwahara, 23 Haw. 273, 276 (1916); Ables v. Ables, 39 Haw. 598, 601 (1952); Kam Oi Lee v. King Fong Wong, 57 Haw. ___, 552 P.2d 635 (1976). This imposes a heavy burden on plaintiffs. Exhibit 4 when compared with Exhibit 3 raises questions as to whether the parties did, at the April 1966 meeting, agree on all essential points leaving only arguments as to phraseology. Moreover, there is conflicting evidence on important points and the credibility of that evidence has not been determined. These are questions for the trial court to resolve, as further developed below.