Opinion ID: 2516058
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Burden of Proving a New Injury

Text: [¶ 12] The Employer first takes issue with the hearing examiner's statement that [i]t doesn't matter who has the burden of proof; that pre-existing condition has been established as a matter of fact. Employer claims that our decisions involving similar facts indicate this statement is an incorrect statement of the law and the hearing examiner's decision should be reversed. [¶ 13] The hearing examiner found: The Claimant was injured while working for Dan's Supermarket in 1996. She probably suffered from pre-existing lower spine weakness and degeneration which was worsened by lifting inventory at work for that employer. She underwent a series of back surgeries following that injury and received a permanent partial disability award. Employer refers us to Walsh v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Comp. Div., 931 P.2d 241 (Wyo.1997). In 1984, Walsh was hospitalized for back pain, and in 1989, he suffered a compensable work-related back injury. Walsh left that employment in 1990, and again injured his back in 1993 while working at his small farm baling hay. Walsh, 931 P.2d at 243. Walsh claimed that his symptoms were a continuation of the 1989 compensable injury and filed for benefits. This Court determined that he had the burden of proving that his work accident, not a preexisting condition, caused the condition and upheld the ruling that Walsh had not carried his burden. Id. [¶ 14] Employer asserts that Walsh establishes that Pate should have had the burden of showing that her condition before the 1996 work-related injury was not responsible for her present symptoms. However, our review of the record indicates that any pre-1996 condition was not properly at issue at the hearing. As the hearing examiner determined, the Division and Employer contended that Pate had suffered a new work-related injury and her remedy lay with the private insurer of the convenience store. The Division's denial letter and prehearing memorandum showed this was the basis for its denial. Further, the Employer's prehearing memorandum conceded that Pate was employed at Dan's when she injured her back in January, 1996, and contended that the issue to be determined at the hearing was whether Pate suffered a new injury at the convenience store. [¶ 15] We have previously ruled that [p]leadings are used to give parties notice of the nature of claims and defenses, to narrow the issues, and to guide the parties and the court in the conduct of the case. If the pleadings and notice of hearing are to mean anything in a contested case hearing, the hearing examiner must be limited to considering only those issues presented in the notice and pleadings. Ireland v. State ex. rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 998 P.2d 398, 401 (Wyo.2000) (citations omitted). Under these circumstances, the hearing examiner could not properly impose a burden upon Pate to prove that a condition preexisting before her 1996 work-related injury was not responsible for her present condition. Accordingly, the hearing examiner did not consider it and properly stated that the cause of the 1996 work-related injury was undisputed. We find the hearing examiner made no error in failing to consider any condition existing before 1996. [¶ 16] The Division contends that the hearing examiner erred in failing to assign Pate the burden of proving that she had not suffered a new injury, claiming that it and the Employer were given the burden of proving that the 1996 injury did not cause the 1999 symptoms. In support of this contention, it relies upon Corman, arguing that it dictates that the claimant must prove her pre-existing condition from the 1996 injury caused her symptoms in 1999, because that causal relationship goes to the . . . central factual issue. The hearing examiner's order found Pate did have this burden of proof, and the Division contends that burden included proving no material aggravation caused a new injury because causation is an essential element of Pate's claim. Concerning the complex burden-of-proof issue, we have said: The general term, burden of proof, identifies two separate legal doctrines: the burden of persuasion; and the burden of production, also termed the burden of producing evidence or the burden of going forward with the evidence. The burden of persuasion is attached to the party who runs the risk of nonpersuasion. During a trial, this means if the party with the burden of persuasion has not sustained it by a fair preponderance of the evidenceif the evidence is in equipoise or the opposing party's preponderatesthe party with the burden must fail. The burden of producing evidence is the obligation of the party to present at the appropriate time ... evidence on the issue involved of sufficient substance to permit the fact finder to act upon it. The burden of producing evidence shifts during the presentation of evidence. The burden of persuasion, which generally does not shift unless by the operation of a legal presumption, becomes operative only after all the evidence is submitted. Casper Iron & Metal, Inc. v. Unemployment Insur. Comm'n, 845 P.2d 387, 393 (Wyo.1993) (citations omitted); see also Bando v. Clure Bros. Furniture, 980 P.2d 323, 330 (Wyo. 1999). In determining which party bears the burden of proof, we consider the applicable substantive statutes. Casper Iron at 393. Here, the applicable statute is Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(F) (LexisNexis 2001): [2] (xi) Injury means any harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging and includes damage to or loss of any artificial replacement and death, arising out of and in the course of employment while at work in or about the premises occupied, used or controlled by the employer and incurred while at work in places where the employer's business requires an employee's presence and which subjects the employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the business. Injury does not include: