Opinion ID: 1977406
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Ring Based Argument

Text: Gattis next argues that the Superior Court erred when it determined that the presiding judge properly applied a preponderance of the evidence standard rather than a beyond a reasonable doubt standard in determining the finding of fact that the aggravating circumstances outweighed those offered in mitigation. Specifically, Gattis argues that Apprendi v. New Jersey [56] requires that the finding that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances be made not by a preponderance of the evidence, but beyond a reasonable doubt. To support this argument, Gattis cites to this passage in Apprendi : Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. With that exception, we endorse the statement of the rule set forth in the concurring opinions in [ Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999)]: [I]t is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  [57] Applying this language, Gattis argues that the Delaware capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because the finding that aggravating circumstances outweigh those offered in mitigation is an element necessary to the imposition of death and, thus, must be subject to the reasonable doubt standard. Our review for a statute's constitutionality is de novo. [58] On Gattis's direct appeal, this Court pointed out that the jury unanimously concluded that the State had established beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of two statutory aggravating circumstances. [59] Subsequently, by a vote of ten to two, the jury found by a preponderance of the evidence that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. [60] The presiding trial judge independently determined the existence of the same statutory aggravating factors found by the jury and, after concluding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, imposed the death penalty. [61] The constitutionality of Delaware's capital sentencing scheme has been challenged since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona, [62] and this Court has repeatedly upheld it as constitutional. [63] Gattis's argument that the aggravating circumstances must outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubtnot, as 11 Del C. § 4290(c)(3)(b.2) allows, by a preponderance of the evidenceoverstates the Apprendi holding and has already been answered negatively. [64] As we have explained: Although a judge cannot sentence a defendant to death without finding that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, it is not that determination that increases the maximum punishment. Rather, the maximum punishment is increased by the jury's unanimous finding beyond a reasonable doubt of the statutory aggravator. At that point a judge can sentence a defendant to death, but only if the judge finds that the aggravating factors outweigh the [mitigating] factors. Therefore, the weighing of aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances does not increase the punishment. Rather, it ensures that the punishment imposed is appropriate and proportional. [65] Thus, the Sixth Amendment, as applied through Ring and Apprendi, permits the dual-scheme established by Delaware's sentencing statute. [66] The Superior Court found that Gattis's argument was procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(1) and 61(b)(2). We agree with the Superior Court's conclusion that the issue is controlled by well-settled Delaware law. [67] Further, Gattis has not shown that a colorable claim that a miscarriage of justice has occurred for purposes of invoking the fundamental fairness exception of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(5). Under Rule 61(i)(5), the defendant bears the burden of proving the existence of a constitutional violation. [68] This Court has held that the fundamental fairness exception is extremely narrow and is only applicable in limited circumstances such as when the right relied upon has been recognized for the first time after direct appeal. [69] Those circumstances are not present here. Gattis's argument has no merit.