Opinion ID: 2285399
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Exceptions Taken to the Evidentiary Rulings made in the Court of Defendant's Trial on Indictment Number 35699 (possession of a stolen motor vehicle).

Text: As more minutely narrated in State v. Maloney, supra , the car in defendant's possession, and alleged to have been stolen, was the property of a Massachusetts car rental agency. It was in checking out the registration of the car that the arresting officers were informed that the car being operated by defendant had been reported stolen by its owner. At trial, the state produced the rental agency's security manager for the purpose of establishing the corpus delicti. He, over objection by defendant, was permitted to testify how the theft of the car was brought to his attention. The defendant's objection to such testimony was that it consisted of the witness' recounting how, by checking the agency's records, said witness determined that the car had been stolen. The trial justice admitted such testimony apparently on the ground that since he found the records to have been kept in the regular course of business, such records were admissible under G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 9-19-13. However, the records regarding the contents of which the witness had testified were never received in evidence. When the case came on for further argument in accordance with our order, the state, in its oral argument and brief, made clear that it was relying on the cited statute to support the admissibility of the security officer's testimony. When the case was originally argued before this court, defendant surprised the state by arguing that § 9-19-13 was without application in criminal cases, citing State v. Guaraneri, 59 R.I. 173, 194 A. 589 (1937). We say surprised because neither defendant nor the state had cited either the statute or State v. Guaraneri, supra , in their respective briefs. Since, if the testimony objected to by defendant should not have been admitted, there would have been no proof of the corpus delicti, we concluded that the ends of justice would be better served, as heretobefore noted, by directing the parties to submit supplemental briefs and further orally argue the point. In its supplementary brief and oral argument the state acknowledged that § 9-19-13 is not applicable to criminal cases. Nevertheless, it strenuously contended that the clear implication of State v. Guaraneri, supra , was that, apart from the exception as authorized by the cited statute, records kept in the regular course of business could be received in a criminal trial if a proper foundation were laid. We agree that the state's reading of our implied holding in State v. Guaraneri, supra , is correct. Indeed in State v. Jamgochian, 109 R.I. 46, 280 A.2d 320 (1971), we so held. But, such holding is unavailing to the state in the instant case. This is so because the exception to the hearsay rule applies only to the admissibility of the records themselves, and not to testimony which would be accepted for the purpose of laying a foundation. Here, the records regarding which the security officer's testimony was received were never introduced. Consequently, such testimony, being hearsay, and not falling within any exception to the hearsay rule, should not have been received into evidence over the defendant's objection; his exceptions thereto must be sustained, and the case remitted to the Superior Court for a new trial. The opinion of Mr. Justice Powers in this case was approved by the court prior to the effective date of his retirement but was announced thereafter. Mr. Justice Doris did not participate in the decision.