Opinion ID: 668532
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Importance of Context

Text: Moldea (I) noted that, under the established case law, our analysis of this case is not altered by the fact that the challenged statements appeared in a 'book review' rather than in a hard news story. Moldea (I), 15 F.3d at 1145-46. This statement is correct insofar as it suggests that there is no per se exemption from defamation for book reviews. Even the Times concedes this point in its Petition for Rehearing. See Petition for Rehearing at 4 (No one doubts that a book review can be actionable.). A writer may not commit libel at will merely by labelling his work a review. Moldea (I) is short-sighted, however, in failing to take account of the fact that the challenged statements were evaluations of a literary work which appeared in a forum in which readers expect to find such evaluations. As the Supreme Court has recognized, writers must be given some leeway to offer rational interpretation of ambiguous sources. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 519, 111 S.Ct. 2419, 2434, 115 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991). Thus, when a reviewer offers commentary that is tied to the work being reviewed, and that is a supportable interpretation of the author's work, that interpretation does not present a verifiable issue of fact that can be actionable in defamation. The fundamental framework established in Moldea (I) for defamation actions is sound, and we do not modify it in this decision. As we stated in our initial opinion, the Supreme Court's decision in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990), and this court's decision in White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512 (D.C.Cir.1990), make clear that there is no wholesale exemption from liability in defamation for statements of opinion. Instead, statements of opinion can be actionable if they imply a provably false fact, or rely upon stated facts that are provably false. See generally Moldea (I), 15 F.3d at 1143-45. In Milkovich, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that an accusation of perjury was nonactionable merely because it was offered as the writer's opinion. In that case, a high school wrestling coach argued that an Ohio newspaper libeled him by printing a column which alleged that he had perjured himself in his testimony to a state court concerning his role in an altercation between his team and an opposing squad at a wrestling match. The column stated that: Anyone who attended the meet ... knows in his heart that Milkovich ... lied at the hearing. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 5, 110 S.Ct. at 2698. Although the statements at issue in Milkovich appeared in an opinion column in a newspaper sports section, the Court found no relevance in this fact in reaching its decision, apparently because an accusation of perjury is not the sort of discourse that even arguably is the usual province of such columns. 2 Sports columnists frequently offer intemperate denunciations of coaches' play-calling or strategy, and readers know this and presumably take such railings with a grain of salt; but an accusation of criminal conduct is a classic libel, and so Milkovich did not even pause to assess the effect that the column's context may have had on those who read it. In Moldea (I), this court observed that Milkovich made no mention of the fact that the statements at issue in that case appeared in a sports column, and took that fact to mean that context was irrelevant in the instant case. We now recognize, however, as has the First Circuit, that Milkovich did not disavow the importance of context, but simply discounted it in the circumstances of that case. Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publications, 953 F.2d 724, 729 n. 9 (1st Cir.1992) (holding newspaper theater column nonactionable in part because the context of each article rendered the language not reasonably interpreted as stating 'actual facts' about appellant's honesty.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2942, 119 L.Ed.2d 567 (1992). This conclusion is compelled by the logic of two Supreme Court cases expressly reaffirmed in Milkovich, and by the Court's decision in Masson, rendered the following term. First, Milkovich reaffirmed the vitality of Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 90 S.Ct. 1537, 26 L.Ed.2d 6 (1970), and Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 94 S.Ct. 2770, 41 L.Ed.2d 745 (1974). See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 16-17, 110 S.Ct. at 2704-05. In Bresler, a real estate developer had engaged in negotiations with a city council for a zoning variance, while simultaneously negotiating with the city over other land that the city wished to purchase from him. A local newspaper account stated that some people had characterized the developer's tactics as blackmail, and the developer sued for libel. The Court rejected the developer's argument that blackmail implied criminal activity, noting that the word 'blackmail' in these circumstances was not slander when spoken.... Bresler, 398 U.S. at 13, 90 S.Ct. at 1541 (emphasis added). In Letter Carriers, the Court held that the use of the word traitor to define a scab in the context of a labor dispute could not be the basis for a defamation action. 418 U.S. at 271-72, 284-86, 94 S.Ct. at 2775, 2781-82. Both Bresler and Letter Carriers rely in large part on the notion that the speech at issue in each case was intended as hyperbole, see Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20, 110 S.Ct. at 2706-07; however, this fact reinforces the importance of context, because it is in part the settings of the speech in question that makes their hyperbolic nature apparent, and which helps determine the way in which the intended audience will receive them. Thus, the lusty and imaginative expression of the contempt felt by union members for a scab may lawfully find hyperbolic expression during a strike, Letter Carriers, 418 U.S. at 286, 94 S.Ct. at 2782, because the context assures that no reader could understand the epithet traitor to be a charge that the scab has committed the criminal offense of treason. Id. at 285, 94 S.Ct. at 2781-82. Second, Masson, handed down in the term following Milkovich, is further evidence that the Supreme Court has not abandoned the consideration of context in defamation actions. In Masson, the Court addressed the question whether a writer's alteration of quotations attributed to the subject of an interview could establish the actual malice required for a defamation suit by a public figure. Masson observed that whether quotations will be interpreted by readers as the actual statements of a speaker depends on context--for example, whether there is an acknowledgment that the work is a so-called docudrama or historical fiction, or that it recreates conversations from memory, not from recordings.... Masson, 501 U.S. at 511-513, 111 S.Ct. at 2430-31. In Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 983 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127, 105 S.Ct. 2662, 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985), we recognized that courts have long considered the influence that ... well-established genres of writing will have on the average reader. Id. at 984 (emphasis in original). Given that Milkovich was decided against the backdrop of this settled principle, and that it expressly reaffirmed two of the Court's key precedents in this area, we are, on reflection, convinced that Moldea (I) erred in assuming that Milkovich abandoned the principle of looking to the context in which speech appears. The Court's decision in masson appeArs to confirm this interpretation of milkovich. whileMilkovich could be interpreted as we read it in our initial decision, we are unwilling to assume that the Court meant to sweep away so much settled law without a clearer indication that this was indeed its intent.