Opinion ID: 377942
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Coverage of Simons

Text: 27 Transport contends that the district court erred in concluding that Simons was an executive officer for the purposes of this contract. The district judge found that Simons was a general manager of production in charge of supervising plant managers, that he reported directly to Rice, and that on the date of the accident he attended a meeting on budgeting with top management. He relied on Guillory v. Aetna Ins. Co., 415 F.2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1969), for the conclusion that executive officer implies some . . . managerial responsibility for the affairs of the corporation . . . and a close connection with the (top) officers of the company, but is not restricted to corporate officers. 28 Transport distinguishes this case from Guillory on grounds that this is an arm's length manuscript contract to which the rule of construing insurance contracts against the carrier does not apply. But it fails to offer any reason for concluding that something more restrictive was intended by the use of executive officer here. Moreover, in contrast to Transport's reliance on a single case generally distinguishing officers and agents, Vardeman v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 125 Ga. 117, 54 S.E. 66, 67 (1906), Liberty cites several other cases liberally construing executive officer as used in this type of insurance contract. Vega v. Southern Scrap Material Co., 517 F.2d 254, 257-58 (5th Cir. 1975); Strickland v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 481 F.2d 138, 148 (5th Cir. 1973); Galloway v. Employers Mut. of Wausau, 286 So.2d 676, 679 (La.App.1973); Berry v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 240 So.2d 243, 246 (La.App.), writ refused, 256 La. 914, 240 So.2d 374 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1005, 91 S.Ct. 1255, 28 L.Ed.2d 541 (1971). We cannot say the district judge was wrong in concluding that, under Oregon law, the contract is clear and unambiguous.