Opinion ID: 2602225
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: What Is the Standard for Reasonable Diligence for Walton Right Claims?

Text: [¶ 12] In order to resolve what the proper test is for determining reasonable diligence sufficient to qualify for a Walton right, we must examine the legal and historical context of reserved rights. All the Walton claimants acquired their Indian predecessors' shares of the federally reserved water rights. Reserved rights is a doctrine by which the federal government reserves public lands for particular purposes, it also impliedly reserves sufficient water to effectuate those purposes. 4 Waters and Water Rights § 37.01 at 218 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1996 Repl.). Having a unique nature, these reserved water rights are unlike riparian [4] rights or prior appropriation rights, although they contain elements of both. For example, like riparian rights, reserved rights are appurtenant to land; that is, land ownership is the basis of the right. Also like riparian rights, reserved rights are not lost by nonuse. But reserved water can be used on nonriparian lands. And like prior appropriation rights, reserved rights have priority dates which reflect the security of the right.... However, the priority date for reserved rights is the date of the reservation or earlier, not the date of diversion, as in the case of most appropriation rights. The chief characteristic of reserved rights is that they are federal rights, grounded on the (mostly implied) intent of the federal government to reserve water for its purposes. This characteristic serves to distinguish reserved rights from both prior appropriation and riparian rights. Id. at 218-19 (emphasis added). [¶ 13] The United States Supreme Court first recognized reserved rights for Indian reservations in Winters, 207 U.S. 564, 28 S.Ct. 207, 52 L.Ed. 340. Therein, the Supreme Court concluded the Indians reserved certain water rights necessary to accomplish the purpose of the treaty. Although no specific Congressional intent can be cited, the courts have agreed that Congress would have intended such a reservation. 207 U.S. at 576, 28 S.Ct. 207. Ultimately, the courts recognized the rights of individual Indians who had been allotted ownership of specific tracts of land within the reservation the right to just and equal distribution of the reserved water. United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527, 530, 59 S.Ct. 344, 83 L.Ed. 330 (1939). That right could not be lost by nonuse and was appurtenant to the allottee's land. [¶ 14] Thereafter, the right of the individual Indian allottees to convey their lands for full value with the appurtenant reserved water rights to non-Indians was recognized. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909; Skeem v. United States, 273 F. 93 (9th Cir.1921). The court in Hibner found the transferred reserved water right had a different status because the purpose of protecting the Indian does not apply to a non-Indian. The non-Indian, as soon as he becomes the owner of the Indian lands, is subject to those general rules of law governing the appropriation and use of the public waters of the state, and would, as grantee of the Indian allotments, be entitled to a water right for the actual acreage that was under irrigation at the time title passed from the Indians, and such increased acreage as he might with reasonable diligence place under irrigation, which would give to him, under the doctrine of relation, the same priority as owned by the Indians; otherwise, the application of any other rule would permit such grantee for an indefinite period to reclaim the balance of his land and withhold the application of the water to a beneficial use, which is against the policy recognized in the development of arid lands. 27 F.2d at 912. Thus, it can be clearly seen, from the beginning of the courts' recognition that reserved rights could be transferred to non-Indians, the overriding concern was that the rights be subject to those general rules of law governing the appropriation to ensure their prompt utilization consistent with the policy recognized in the development of arid lands. Id. That doctrine of prior appropriation, which encouraged water development in the arid West, was embraced by, and in fact born in, the State of Wyoming. Robert B. Keiter & Tim Newcomb, The Wyoming State Constitution, A Reference Guide at 9-10 (1993). [¶ 15] The only further articulation of the scope and nature of the reserved rights acquired by non-Indian successors to allottees is contained in the three Walton decisions of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Walton I, 460 F.Supp. 1320; Walton II, 647 F.2d 42; Walton III, 752 F.2d 397. The controlling maxim of those cases is the elusive, unarticulated but presumed Congressional intent. Unfortunately, [t]here is nothing to suggest Congress gave any consideration to the transferability of reserved water rights. To resolve this issue, we must determine what Congress would have intended had it considered it. Walton II, 647 F.2d at 49. The court then concluded Congress did not intend to limit the individual Indian's right to transfer the reserved water right. We suggest Congress also likely intended, once transferred to a non-Indian, that right would be subject to the generally applicable prior appropriation laws of the respective state. Hibner, 27 F.2d at 912. [¶ 16] A fundamental difference between a reserved right held by an Indian and one transferred to a non-Indian was that the Indian did not lose the right by nonuse. In contrast, under the prior appropriation doctrine adopted throughout the arid West, nonuse can affect the termination of a water right. The concept that these rights are created by federal law to protect the intent of the original treaties runs throughout the reserved rights cases, and, while in Indian hands, reserved rights cannot be abridged or diminished by state law unlike a water right held by a non-Indian. So, it is not surprising that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found the non-Indian must exercise the reserved right he receives upon purchasing Indian land to which the right is appurtenant by appropriating it with reasonable diligence after the passage of title. Walton II, 647 F.2d at 51. This requirement balanced the allottee's right to transfer with the non-Indian's obligation to comply with existing state law and policy to diligently put the right to use. Congress could not have intended the non-Indian to enjoy the perpetual nature of a right reserved to the Indian by treaty. While it is not necessary to speculate, it does appear logical that, irrespective of the standards articulated by the Walton cases, the non-Indian would be required to use reasonable diligence to maintain any right acquired under state law in any event. It is significant no federal court considering this issue has suggested Congress would have intended to impose further restrictions on the transferred reserved right than already existed under state law. [¶ 17] What guidance do we have, then, to determine what constitutes reasonable diligence in this context? In the series of Walton cases, Mr. Walton claimed federal reserved rights on 170 acres which had been acquired by his predecessor from an allottee. Ultimately, the court found only thirty of those acres had been diligently irrigated over the years. No specific number of years was announced as constituting a reasonable time or reasonable diligence. We believe it is significant the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held [i]t is appropriate to look to state law for guidance to determine diligence. Walton III, 752 F.2d at 400. Further, it was stated: If diligently applied, the priority date of the water right relates back to the initial diversion. The tests developed to determine whether or not an appropriator has been sufficiently diligent in applying water to a beneficial use to justify relating the priority date back to the initial diversion are appropriate to determine how much water Walton's predecessors appropriated with reasonable diligence, after the passage of title. 752 F.2d at 402 (citations omitted). That statement clearly reflects the federal court's determination that, if an appropriator was diligent enough to justify the application of the doctrine of relation back recognized in prior appropriation law, he demonstrated sufficient diligence to successfully preserve a Walton claim. The federal court concluded, citing Washington Supreme Court cases, Mr. Walton did not demonstrate the original irrigation of thirty acres was increased sufficiently to meet the state law standard for enlargement through gradual but sure increases which manifested an original intent to appropriate an increasing amount of water. Walton III, 752 F.2d at 402-03 (citing In Re Waters of Doan Creek, 125 Wash. 14, 215 P. 343, 347 (1923); In Re Water Rights in Alpowa Creek, 129 Wash. 9, 224 P. 29 (1924)). Clearly, had Mr. Walton met the standard for diligence established by state law, the court would likely have recognized a larger reserved right for him. [¶ 18] No precedent exists in state or federal law regarding how reasonable diligence in Walton claims should be evaluated when a large, multi-year irrigation project is under construction at the time of the transfer of the allotment and must be built in order to allow irrigation of the former Indian lands. This court has adopted and relied heavily on the above federal court precedent concerning the existence and the scope of federal reserved rights, including Walton rights. We continue to do so in resolving the proper standard for reasonable diligence in the context of those rights. That clear precedent leads us back to our own statutes and case law to determine whether relying upon the construction of a permitted, large irrigation project, when no other means of irrigation is available, constitutes reasonable diligence in putting the lands into irrigation.