Opinion ID: 2576153
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Penalty phase asserted erroneous admission of evidence

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred by admitting, at the penalty phase, the testimony of his former chemistry instructor, Emily Maverick, assertedly in violation of his rights under state law and to due process of law, a fair trial, and a reliable penalty phase determination under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
On April 27, 1989, near the end of the guilt phase of the trial, the prosecutor informed the court and counsel that he had subpoenaed defendant's academic records from Los Angeles City College. The records showed that defendant had taken chemistry courses there shortly before Green was poisoned. The prosecutor said he was considering calling a chemistry instructor as a witness in rebuttal at the guilt phase, but he did not do so. At a May 8 hearing held between the guilt and the penalty phases, the prosecutor announced his intention to call Emily Maverick to testify that defendant had conducted an experiment with cyanide in one of her classes in the early 1980's. The prosecutor said he had just identified and spoken with Maverick the previous Friday. Defendant objected that the testimony was irrelevant and also that he had not received proper notice of the prosecutor's intent to present that evidence. The prosecutor argued that the evidence was relevant to the circumstances of the both the crime and the special circumstance, in that it showed that defendant was familiar with the murder weapon. The trial court overruled defendant's objections, stating: no notice need be given if [the testimony] is connected to the current offense. Because the defense was asking for a continuance on other grounds, however, the court granted a one-week continuance in an overabundance of caution. Just before Maverick was scheduled to testify, the defense on May 15, 1989, objected to her testimony as outside the scope of section 190.3, factor (a), in that it did not relate to the circumstances of the offense. The court disagreed. Defendant then offered to stipulate that he knows the effects of cyanide and that he knows some of the chemical reactions involving cyanide, but apparently defendant did not follow up on this proposal. Maverick testified that defendant had been a student in two of her chemistry classes at Los Angeles City College in 1982. In the organic chemistry class, defendant chose to conduct an experiment that involved dissolving cyanide in water in order to enlarge an organic molecule by adding a carbon atom. Maverick tried to discourage defendant from conducting this experiment, because of the hazardous nature of cyanide, but ultimately she gave her approval. She explained to defendant that cyanide was extremely toxic and taught him to handle it safely. In the course of the experiment, defendant weighed, handled, and moved the cyanide. On cross-examination, Maverick stated that defendant did a good job with the experiment and that he had been a chemistry tutor. During penalty phase closing arguments, the prosecutor argued that defendant's experience in Maverick's chemistry class made his crime all the more heinous because he had take[n] that knowledge and ability and do[ne] to Dorothy Green what was done to her in this case.
Under section 190.3, factor (a), the trier of fact may consider, in aggravation, evidence relevant to the circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true. The circumstances of the crime as used in section 190.3, factor (a), does not mean merely the immediate temporal and spatial circumstances of the crime. Rather it extends to `[t]hat which surrounds materially, morally, or logically' the crime. ( People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 833, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436, quoting 3 Oxford English Dict. (2d ed.1989) p. 240 [evidence that the police had conducted a massive search for defendant for several days after the killings was relevant and admissible under section 190.3 because it showed that defendant had the presence of mind to elude capture].) Defendant contends that Maverick's testimony should have been excluded because it was irrelevant to any aggravating circumstance. Specifically, he argues that the testimony was not admissible under section 190.3, factor (a), as a circumstance of the crime of which he was convicted or of the special circumstance which the jury found true. We disagree. Maverick's testimony was relevant because it tended to demonstrate that defendant was peculiarly interested in cyanide and familiar with its dangerous properties. As such, it established both that defendant could have been the individual who placed the cyanide in the gin bottle given to Miller and Green, and that defendant was aware that inserting cyanide into the gin bottle could cause their deaths. The evidence thus came within the set of facts that surround[ed] materially, morally, or logically' the crime ( People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 833, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436), and was admissible under section 190.3, factor (a). [25] Defendant contends that we have placed limitations on defendants who seek to introduce, at the penalty phase, evidence relevant to issues of guilt or innocence, and that parallel limitations should be imposed on prosecution evidence. Relying on People v. Miller (1990) 50 Cal.3d 954, 269 Cal.Rptr. 492, 790 P.2d 1289, defendant argues that Maverick's testimony did not fall within factor (a) of section 190.3, because it went squarely to defendant's guilt. In Miller, the defendant was convicted of four counts of first degree murder and four counts of attempted murder and was sentenced to death. On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court had erred in excluding, at the penalty phase, evidence that one of the attempted murder victims, while under hypnosis, had identified someone else as his possible attacker. ( People v. Miller, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1005, 269 Cal.Rptr. 492, 790 P.2d 1289.) The defendant claimed the evidence was admissible at the penalty phase as a mitigating `circumstance[ ] of the offense.' ( Ibid. ) We rejected the defendant's claim, because the trial court already had found the same evidence unreliable and on that basis had refused to admit it at the guilt phase. ( Ibid. ) We stated: [The victim's] pretrial statements are not `circumstances of the offense,' but rather, as defendant would have us find, indicia of innocence. Thus they bear not on aggravation versus mitigation, but on conviction versus acquittal. In essence, defendant contends he should have been allowed to relitigate his guilt during the penalty phase; indeed, he frankly admits that the sole purpose of introducing the statements at the penalty phase would have been to raise doubts about his guilt on the ... attempted murder count. The court, however, had already found the statements unreliable for that purpose during the guilt phase. We must uphold such findings when, as here, they are supported by substantial evidence. ( Ibid. ) Subsequent cases have agreed that evidence proffered on the issue of lingering doubt may be excluded because the evidence in question is otherwise inadmissible as hearsay or is unreliable. ( People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 704, 276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278.) Evidence such as prior plea negotiations, or the asserted misconduct of a prosecutor who interviewed a prosecution witness who did not testify, may be excluded as not relevant to the defendant's guilt or innocence. ( People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 989, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704.) We reject defendant's reliance upon People v. Miller, supra, 50 Cal.3d 954, 269 Cal.Rptr. 492, 790 P.2d 1289, because we do not read that decision as precluding the introduction of any and all evidence relevant to guilt or innocence at the penalty phase. Indeed, in many circumstances evidence related to guilt or innocence, and properly designed to raise a lingering doubt, will be relevant and admissible. [26] (See, e.g., People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1125, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 70 P.3d 359; People v. Davenport (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1193-1194, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 800, 906 P.2d 1068; People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 966-967, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 897 P.2d 574, overruled on other grounds in People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 110, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 999 P.2d 666; People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 675-677, 280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351; People v. Terry (1964) 61 Cal.2d 137, 145-148, 37 Cal.Rptr. 605, 390 P.2d 381, overruled on other grounds in People v. Laino (2004) 32 Cal.4th 878, 893, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 723, 87 P.3d 27; but see In re Gay (1998) 19 Cal.4th 771, 814, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 765, 968 P.2d 476.) Rather, Miller simply held that the trial court correctly ruled inadmissible at the penalty phase evidence it had found unreliable at the guilt phase. ( People v. Miller, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1005, 269 Cal.Rptr. 492, 790 P.2d 1289.) Defendant does not contend that Maverick's testimony was unreliable. Accordingly, Miller does not govern the present case. Here, Maverick's testimony was not introduced solely to reinforce the jury's conclusion that defendant was guilty of murder and that the alleged special circumstance was true. The evidence established not only defendant's ability to handle cyanide and his awareness of its hazardous nature, but also demonstrated that defendant had misused his educational opportunities for the nefarious purpose of poisoning Green and Miller. Accordingly, the evidence was relevant not only to defendant's guilt, but also to the reprehensibility of his conduct, a circumstance of the offense under factor (a) of section 190.3. Because the evidence was otherwise admissible under factor (a) to prove a circumstance of the offense, it was not rendered inadmissible simply because it also tended to prove defendant's guilt. [27] Defendant asserts that even if Maverick's testimony fell within the scope of factor (a) of section 190.3, the trial court should have excluded it because the prosecution failed to provide proper notice of its intent to present that evidence. Section 190.3 requires the prosecution to give notice to the defense of aggravating evidence it intends to introduce at the penalty phase within a reasonable period of time as determined by the court, prior to trial. ( Id., 4th par.) The purpose of the notice requirement is to allow the defendant sufficient opportunity to prepare a defense to the aggravating evidence. ( People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1070, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 230, 824 P.2d 1277.) Assuming the notice requirement applied to Maverick's testimony (but see § 190.3, 4th par. [notice provision inapplicable to evidence in proof of the offense or special circumstances which subject a defendant to the death penalty, italics added)], the trial court was not required to exclude this evidence. We have construed the phrase `prior to trial' [in section 190.3] to mean before the cause is called to trial. [Citation.] We have also held that where the prosecution learns of evidence it intends to use in aggravation at the penalty phase for the first time after trial commenced, exclusion of this evidence under section 190.3 is not necessarily compelled. [Citation.] Under such circumstances, the defendant is entitled to prompt notice of the newly discovered evidence, and, if necessary, to a reasonable continuance to enable him or her to prepare to meet that evidence. If the prosecution's delay in affording notice is unreasonable or unexcused, or if the delay would prejudice the defense, the court must exclude the evidence. [Citations.] ( People v. Mitcham, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1070, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 230, 824 P.2d 1277.) Here, it is undisputed that the prosecution did not provide defendant with notice of its intent to introduce the Maverick testimony before the cause [was] called to trial. Rather, the prosecutor on April 27, 1989, near the end of the guilt phase, first notified the defense that it might attempt to contact defendant's chemistry instructor and first notified the defense  on May 8, 1989, between the guilt and penalty phases  that it intended to call Maverick as a witness. The prosecutor did, however, give the defense prompt notice of the testimony once it was discovered. At that point, although the court found the testimony was not subject to section 190.3's notice requirement, it granted a one-week continuance of the penalty phase in order to allow the defense additional time to prepare for other aspects of the penalty phase. Defendant does not contend that this continuance was insufficient to allow him to prepare a defense to Maverick's testimony. Defendant had ample time to have his investigator meet with Maverick and to prepare his cross-examination. Because defendant does not demonstrate that he was prejudiced by any delay in giving notice, the trial court's refusal to exclude this testimony was not error. [28]