Opinion ID: 2567455
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Serious Potential Conflict

Text: ¶26 A conflict of interest exists for Sixth Amendment purposes if a lawyer's loyalties are divided in a way that adversely affects counsel's performance. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172 n.5 (2002); see also State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, ¶ 22, 984 P.2d 382. In other words, an actual or potential conflict threatens that 'counsel [may] . . . make choices advancing other interests to the detriment of his client.' State v. Taylor, 2007 UT 12, ¶ 124, 156 P.3d 739 (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 137 F.3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir. 1998)). Not all potential conflicts will justify the disqualification of counsel, and even some potential conflicts which might lead to disqualification of counsel may be waived. Only serious potential conflicts require disqualification without the possibility of waiver. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, ¶ 88. ¶27 The State's characterization of the potential conflict in this case has two components. First, the State contends that Mr. Mauro and Mr. Williams would be so consumed by the effort to defend themselves against the accusations stemming from their Spokane activities that they would have inadequate time and interest in Mr. Maughan's cause. Next, the State claims that the circumstances of Mr. Mauro's arrest and the allegations of witness tampering would likely arise during Mr. Maughan's trial. According to the State, a jury would likely come to hold unfavorable impressions of Mr. Mauro and Mr. Williams upon hearing of their activities, to the detriment of Mr. Maughan. ¶28 The district court did not cite in its memorandum decision the first of these arguments as a basis for finding a potential conflict. We find the claim that the attorneys will suffer from divided loyalty based on the presumed temptation to surrender Mr. Maughan's defense to their own to be too speculative to merit consideration as a reason to disqualify the attorneys. It is true, as the State points out, that the attorney for Mr. Mauro and Mr. Williams complained that the Spokane police had substantially interfered with the efforts to represent Mr. Maughan. To the extent, however, that Mr. Mauro and Mr. Williams might be compelled to expend resources in their own defense, that redirection of resources creates no more or less of a conflict of interest than would the demands of representing other clients in the course of conducting a criminal defense practice. The determination of whether a lawyer is too limited by time and resources to provide effective legal assistance is one in which an adversary party is entitled to little say. It is, rather, a matter best left to the judgments of the lawyer and the client. ¶29 The district court noted as the sole potential conflict the claim that the circumstances surrounding Mr. Mauro's arrest and Mr. Williams' Spokane activities could surface to the detriment of Mr. Maughan during his trial. Despite the State's attempts to describe this conflict, we remain both unable to fully comprehend it and skeptical of the significance of those features that we can grasp. ¶30 In an effort to establish Mr. Wagar's bias in favor of Mr. Maughan, the State suggests that it may attempt to extract testimony from Mr. Wagar that he complied with Mr. Mauro's alleged admonition not to talk to the police. Even were we to assume that Mr. Wagar's allegiance to Mr. Maughan would not have been made so clear by the time the State embarked on this line of cross-examination that it would not have been merely cumulative, we see little justification to expand the inquiry to include the claim that the admonition was unlawful or unethical. ¶31 Moreover, every witness Mr. Mauro allegedly instructed not to talk to the Spokane police ultimately did so, and Mr. Williams' instructions to the witnesses on December 8 undoubtedly played a part. We therefore find it difficult to accept the claim that disclosure of the alleged unlawful instruction would result in the infliction of material damage to the credibility of either lawyer or that any impaired credibility sustained by the two lawyers would infect Mr. Maughan. ¶32 Despite our puzzlement and skepticism, we defer to the district court's finding that the events in Spokane might generate a potential conflict and do not conclude that it was clearly erroneous. Our assessment that the potential conflict is not serious enough as to render it beyond the power of Mr. Maughan to waive is likewise in accord with the district court's approval of waiver implicit in its decision to permit one of Mr. Maughan's lawyers to continue to represent him. We depart from the district court only to the extent that we hold that the potential conflict identified by the district court was of so little consequence that Mr. Maughan should have been afforded the opportunity to waive it with respect to both Mr. Mauro and Mr. Williams. We therefore remand this matter to the district court for the purpose of inviting Mr. Maughan's waiver of the potential conflict relating to his disqualified counsel, Mr. Williams.