Opinion ID: 4237873
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: presendieu’s appeal

Text: Because Presendieu challenges his guilty plea, we review his indictment, his plea colloquy, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b), and relevant case law. A. Presendieu’s Indictment and Plea Agreement After being indicted on 15 federal charges relating to the check-cashing scheme, Presendieu pled guilty to only two charges: (1) conspiracy to commit bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (Count 1), and (2) aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (Count 31). In the written plea agreement, the 10 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 11 of 50 government agreed to dismiss the remaining thirteen counts in the indictment, and Presendieu waived his right to appeal his sentence, so long as it did not exceed the statutory maximum penalty and was within the advisory guidelines range established by the district court at sentencing. In addition to the plea agreement, Presendieu signed a seven-page, detailed “Factual Proffer in Support of Guilty Plea.” As outlined above, in the factual proffer, Presendieu admitted that he used Habib’s illicit check-cashing services and that Habib maintained business checking accounts at federally insured banks. Presendieu further admitted to cashing through Habib many stolen, fraudulent, or unlawfully obtained checks, forging endorsements on them, and using false identification documents to cash them. B. Plea Colloquy On August 6, 2015, the district court held a change-of-plea hearing pursuant to Rule 11(b). The district court explained to Presendieu that “Count 1 charges you with conspiracy to commit bank fraud in violation of [18 U.S.C. § 1349]” and “Count 31 charges you with aggravated identity theft in violation of [18 U.S.C. § 1028A].” When the district court asked whether Presendieu intended to plead guilty to these charges, Presendieu responded, “Correct, sir.” By way of personal background, Presendieu stated that he was 33 years of age and had a high school diploma. When asked whether he was “under the 11 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 12 of 50 influence of any alcohol, narcotics or medication,” Presendieu responded in the negative. When asked whether he had “ever been diagnosed or treated for a mental illness,” Presendieu responded, “No, sir.” When asked by the district court, Presendieu confirmed that he had signed his written plea agreement and was “able to read and understand all of [its] terms.” Presendieu further confirmed that he had “enough time to discuss everything that’s contained in the written plea agreement with [his] attorney.” Turning to the specific terms of the written plea agreement, the district court asked whether Presendieu was aware that, in exchange for pleading guilty to Counts 1 and 31, the government would dismiss the remaining counts against him. Presendieu stated that he understood. As to the possible punishments, Presendieu acknowledged his understanding that Count 1 carried a maximum sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment, that Count 31 carried a mandatory minimum of two consecutive years’ imprisonment, and that he would be responsible for restitution in excess of $2,500,000. The district court also confirmed that Presendieu understood the application of the sentencing guidelines and had an opportunity to discuss those matters with his attorney. When the district court asked whether he had “any questions at all about anything that is set forth in [the] written plea agreement,” Presendieu responded, “No, not at all, sir.” When asked again whether he had “had enough time to speak 12 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 13 of 50 to [his] attorney about everything that’s set forth in the written plea agreement,” Presendieu replied in the affirmative. Presendieu confirmed that no one had promised him anything in return for his plea other than what was set forth in the written agreement and that no one had threatened him or forced him to enter the plea. The district court then reviewed with Presendieu all of the rights he was waiving and losing by entering a guilty plea. Presendieu affirmed his understanding that he was forgoing his rights to a jury trial, to be represented by an attorney during trial, to have the government prove the charges against him beyond a reasonable doubt, to cross-examine the government’s witnesses, and to call his own witnesses and compel their appearance by subpoena. Presendieu also confirmed his understanding that an adjudication of guilt on Counts 1 and 31 would deprive him of certain rights, including the rights to vote, to hold public office, to serve on a jury, to possess a firearm, to reside in certain public housing, and to maintain certain professional licenses. When asked whether he discussed these consequences with his attorney, Presendieu responded, “Yes, sir.” The district court again asked whether Presendieu had “had enough time to discuss this case and this plea with [his] attorney,” to which Presendieu replied, “Yes, sir.” Presendieu stated that he and his attorney discussed all possible defenses that he might have raised to the charges in the indictment and that he had 13 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 14 of 50 no trouble communicating with his attorney. Presendieu averred that his attorney carried out his wishes and that he was fully satisfied with his attorney’s representation. As to the factual basis for the plea, Presendieu affirmed that he had signed the factual proffer accompanying his written plea agreement. The district court asked whether Presendieu was “able to read and understand everything contained in the written factual proffer,” to which he responded, “Yes, sir.” Presendieu also answered affirmatively that he had had “enough time to discuss what’s contained in the proffer” with his attorney. When the district court asked Presendieu whether all of the information in the factual proffer was accurate, Presendieu consulted with his attorney, who informed the district court that Presendieu could not specifically recall making the statement appearing in the first paragraph on page five of the proffer. The government stated to the district court that defense counsel might be referring to the paragraph about the October 7, 2013 meeting, during which Presendieu discussed how long he had known Habib and recalled that the early checks he brought to Kwik Stop were cashier’s checks and that he started bringing “statue” checks in the summer. Presendieu’s attorney then clarified that although Presendieu could not recall making specific statements during that meeting, it was entirely possible that he had made them. Presendieu confirmed that all other facts 14 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 15 of 50 in the written proffer were true and accurate, and Presendieu’s attorney stipulated that there was a factual basis for the guilty plea. When asked how he pled to Counts 1 and 31, Presendieu responded, “Guilty.” Based on the plea agreement, the factual proffer, Presendieu’s responses to the district court’s questions, and its observation of Presendieu during the proceedings, the district court made these findings of fact: (1) that Presendieu “freely, voluntarily and intelligently waived [his] rights[;]” (2) that he “knowingly and voluntarily” entered his guilty plea; (3) that he “underst[ood] the nature of the charges and the consequences of [his] plea[;]” and (4) that there was “a factual basis for the plea.” The district court thus accepted Presendieu’s plea and adjudicated him guilty on Counts 1 and 31. Presendieu did not object to the district court’s findings or to its acceptance of his plea. The district court sentenced Presendieu to a total term of 212 months’ imprisonment—188 months for conspiracy to commit bank fraud (Count 1) and a consecutive term of 24 months for aggravated identity theft (Count 31). The district court also ordered Presendieu to pay $2,594,839.33 in restitution.2 2 In his plea agreement, Presendieu agreed to restitution in the amount of $2,594,839.39, which is effectively the same amount. The district court also used this $2,594,839.39 sum for the loss amount in calculating Presendieu’s guidelines range. However, the actual written final judgment uses the figure $2,594,839.33, and thus we use that $2,594,839.33 figure in the text of the opinion. 15 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 16 of 50 Presendieu initially appealed his convictions and the validity of his sentence. On the government’s motion, this Court dismissed the sentence portion of Presendieu’s appeal pursuant to the sentence appeal waiver in his written plea agreement. Before the Court now is only Presendieu’s challenge to the validity of his convictions. Presendieu complains that his guilty plea is procedurally defective under Rule 11 and unconstitutional because the district court failed to inform him of the nature of the charges, never outlined separately each element of his two offenses, and never asked him whether he understood those elements. Presendieu acknowledges that he raised no constitutional or Rule 11 objections before the district court. Instead, for the first time on appeal, he objects to the plea colloquy and his plea as defective. C. Standard of Review When a defendant raises issues for the first time on appeal, we review these issues for plain error only. United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1018–19 Presendieu’s conduct included both his checks and the checks cashed by his coconspirators. For example, codefendant Pharr allowed Presendieu to establish a fraudulent tax preparation service, B.D. Tax Services, Inc., in Pharr’s name. Pharr also had her own tax preparation service, which operated under the name Pharr’s Taxes Inc. Both of these tax preparation services used stolen identification information to file fraudulent tax returns. The PSR indicated that, in 2012 alone, with Pharr’s help, Presendieu presented more than $250,000 in fraudulent checks for Habib to cash. During a recorded phone call, Pharr told Habib that Presendieu cashed $253,000 worth of her checks without paying her for them, and bank records revealed that around $256,000 in B.D. Tax Services checks were cashed at Kwik Stop in 2012. 16 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 17 of 50 (11th Cir. 2005). Presendieu bears the burden of showing that “there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.” Id. at 1019 (citation omitted); see United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 62–63, 122 S. Ct. 1043, 1048 (2002) (holding that plain-error review, not harmless-error review, applies when reviewing whether a Rule 11 error affected substantial rights). Even if Presendieu can satisfy these conditions, we may recognize the forfeited error only if it “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Moriarty, 429 F.3d at 1019 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1776 (1993)). In other words, under plain-error review in a Rule 11 challenge, a defendant who was silent below has the burden to show not only that the error is plain and prejudicial but also that it is “disreputable to the judicial system.” Vonn, 535 U.S. at 65, 122 S. Ct. at 1050. D. Due Process and Rule 11 Principles The foundational principles governing guilty plea procedures derive from constitutional notions of due process. Because a guilty plea involves the relinquishment of several constitutional rights and privileges, it must be entered voluntarily and knowingly. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 1171 (1969). A guilty plea is voluntary in the constitutional sense where the defendant “received ‘real notice of the true nature of the charge against him.’” 17 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 18 of 50 Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645, 96 S. Ct. 2253, 2257 (1976) (quoting Smith v. O’Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334, 61 S. Ct. 572, 574 (1941)). Building upon these fundamental constitutional principles, Rule 11(b) sets out procedures that district courts must follow when accepting guilty pleas. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b). These procedures are designed to address the three “core objectives” necessary for a knowing and voluntary guilty plea: (1) that the defendant enters his plea free from coercion, (2) that he understands the nature of the charges, and (3) that he understands the consequences of his plea. See Gordon v. United States, 518 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Monroe, 353 F.3d 1346, 1354 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Camacho, 233 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Mosley, 173 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1999). Addressing the second of those core objectives, Rule 11(b) provides that the district court must assure that the defendant is informed of and understands “the nature of each charge,” as follows: (b) Considering and Accepting a Guilty or Nolo Contendere Plea. (1) Advising and Questioning the Defendant. Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the defendant must be placed under oath, and the court must address the defendant personally in open court. During this address, the court must inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, the following: .... (G) the nature of each charge to which the defendant is pleading . . . . 18 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 19 of 50 Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G). There is no rigid formula or “mechanical rule” for determining whether the district court adequately informed the defendant of the nature of the charges. Camacho, 233 F.3d at 1314. Importantly, Rule 11 does not specify that a district court must list the elements of an offense. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G); see also United States v. Wiggins, 131 F.3d 1440, 1442–43 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). Rather, what constitutes an adequate plea colloquy varies from case to case depending on the complexity of the charges and the defendant’s intelligence and sophistication. See United States v. Telemaque, 244 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); Camacho, 233 F.3d at 1314; Mosley, 173 F.3d at 1323–24; United States v. DePace, 120 F.3d 233, 237 (11th Cir. 1997). As this Court has explained, the Rule 11 “colloquy may be done in different ways depending on various factors.” Wiggins, 131 F.3d at 1443; see Telemaque, 244 F.3d at 1249; United States v. Lopez, 907 F.2d 1096, 1099 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Byrd, 804 F.2d 1204, 1206–07 (11th Cir. 1986). District courts must ensure, one way or another, that the defendant knows and understands the nature of the offenses to which he or she is pleading guilty. In simple cases, for example, the district court may only need to read the indictment and afford the defendant an opportunity to ask questions. Camacho, 233 F.3d at 1314. The district court may be required to give a more detailed explanation, however, in more complex cases, such as those involving “esoteric 19 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 20 of 50 terms or concepts unfamiliar to the lay mind.” United States v. James, 210 F.3d 1342, 1345 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (quoting DePace, 120 F.3d at 237). Notably too, in some cases, a factual proffer may set forth in such detail the facts of the crime that it effectively incorporates the substance of the elements of the offense. See Wiggins, 131 F.3d at 1442. In Wiggins, the district court prefaced a recitation of the proffer by telling the defendant to “listen as [the prosecutor] tells me what she contends you did to take by force or violence from the possession of a person or a federally insured bank money of a certain amount.” Id. at 1441. Although this preface, in effect, covered the elements of the offense, the defendant argued on appeal that this preface was “only a ‘passing reference to elements of the crime of bank robbery’ at a time in the colloquy when the defendant was hearing the facts in the case and thus would not understand the significance of what he was being told by the district court.” Id. at 1442. In finding no plain error in Wiggins, this Court pointed out that (1) the district court at least incorporated the substance of the elements of the charge when it told the defendant to listen to the government’s factual proffer, (2) the defendant unequivocally admitted to committing the crime, and (3) based on its observation of the defendant, the district court made a factual finding that the defendant entered an informed guilty plea. Id. Here the district court did not explicitly state the elements of the charge in its own 20 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 21 of 50 voice, but all of the necessary factual material was contained in the proffer as recited. Yet, this Court has held that the district court plainly errs where its plea colloquy is so deficient that it results in a total or abject failure to address Rule 11’s core principle, to wit that a defendant understands the nature of the charges against him. 3 See, e.g., Telemaque, 244 F.3d at 1249–50; James, 210 F.3d at 1343–46; United States v. Quinones, 97 F.3d 473, 474–75 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam), abrogated in part by Vonn, 535 U.S. at 74–75, 122 S. Ct. at 1054–55 (holding that courts may consider the whole record when considering whether a Rule 11 violation occurred or resulted in prejudice). In Monroe, this Court distinguished these plain-error-reversal cases as “involv[ing] not only violations of explicit requirements of Rule 11, but also violations that resulted in a total or almost total failure to address a Rule 11 core concern.” 353 F.3d at 1355. Importantly, in making the foregoing determination, a district court’s fact findings—that the defendant understood the nature of the charges and that the 3 To show that a plain error under Rule 11 warrants relief, the defendant must also show a reasonable probability that, if not for the error, he would not have entered a guilty plea. United States v. Evans, 478 F.3d 1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83, 124 S. Ct. 2333, 2340 (2004)); Moriarty, 429 F.3d at 1020. Presendieu has not made this showing because he has not cited any evidence showing that he otherwise would not have pled guilty. Furthermore, even if there was plain error in the Rule 11 colloquy, we conclude that given the factual proffer, which was admitted by Presendieu, the error did not affect the integrity of the proceeding. 21 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 22 of 50 defendant had entered a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty—are subject to review only for clear error. Wiggins, 131 F.3d at 1443; Lopez, 907 F.2d at 1099. This is because “[t]hese matters are better committed to the good judgment of the district judge, who observes the defendant’s demeanor, life experience, and intelligence.” Mosley, 173 F.3d at 1323 (citations omitted). Our task here, then, is to review the record as a whole and determine, under the particular factual circumstances presented, whether Presendieu “‘understood what he was admitting and that what he was admitting constituted the crime charged.’” Id. at 1324 (quoting Lopez, 907 F.2d at 1099). E. The District Court Did Not Plainly Err Here, Presendieu has not shown plain error. We discuss the elements of Presendieu’s two crimes and then explain why the district court’s questions and findings, along with Presendieu’s admission to the detailed factual proffer, establish that Presendieu understood the nature of the charges and that his plea was knowing and voluntary, as the district court explicitly found. To convict for the substantive offense of bank fraud, the government must prove “(1) that a scheme existed to obtain moneys, funds, or credit in the custody of a federally-insured bank by fraud; (2) that the defendant participated in the scheme by means of material false pretenses, representations or promises; and (3) that the defendant acted knowingly.” United States v. McCarrick, 294 F.3d 22 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 23 of 50 1286, 1290 (11th Cir. 2002); see 18 U.S.C. § 1344. To convict for a conspiracy to commit bank fraud, the government must establish that “(1) a conspiracy existed; (2) the defendant knew of it; and (3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily joined it.” United States v. Moran, 778 F.3d 942, 960 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted); see 18 U.S.C. § 1349. To convict for aggravated identity theft, the government must prove “that the defendant: (1) knowingly transferred, possessed, or used; (2) the means of identification of another person; (3) without lawful authority; (4) during and in relation to a felony enumerated in [18 U.S.C.] § 1028A(c).” United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1192 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Hurtado, 508 F.3d 603, 607 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)); see 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. Bank fraud is one of the predicate felony offenses enumerated in § 1028A(c). See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c)(5). Presendieu contends that these two crimes are so complex as to require a listing and explanation of each element of the offenses. We disagree for several reasons. First, Presendieu points to no decision that treats conspiracy to commit bank fraud or aggravated identity theft as complex or complicated, and our research reveals none. Cf. James, 210 F.3d at 1345–46 (concluding the Travel Act racketeering offense at issue was so complex as to require a detailed explanation of the charge before accepting a guilty plea). 23 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 24 of 50 Second, after our own review of the statutory elements of these two crimes, we conclude they are not crimes of “extreme complexity.” See id. at 1345. These two offenses do not include any concepts so esoteric or unfamiliar to the layperson as to require a detailed listing or explanation of each element of the offense. Third, even if these crimes are considered to be more complex than the simplest crimes, the detailed nature of the seven-page factual proffer accompanying Presendieu’s written plea agreement and his express assent to that proffer show that Presendieu well understood the nature of the two charges against him. As to conspiracy to commit bank fraud, Presendieu admitted facts in his proffer amply sufficient to prove that he knowingly and voluntarily participated in an illegal check-cashing scheme with Habib, Jean, and others to obtain money by means of false endorsements and false identification documents and by cashing unlawfully obtained checks. The proffer even included the factual detail that Habib’s business checking accounts, which were used to process and cash the illicit checks, were maintained at “FDIC insured financial institutions.” As to aggravated identity theft, the admitted facts showed that Presendieu knowingly used falsified identification information of other persons, without lawful authority, during and in relation to his bank fraud scheme. There can be no question that the proffer established an adequate factual basis for Presendieu’s guilty pleas and that it contained all of the elements of his two offenses. 24 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 25 of 50 Fourth, nothing in the record here indicates that Presendieu lacked the intelligence or sophistication to understand the nature of the offenses to which he was pleading guilty. Indeed, the record and the mechanics of his fraudulent scheme show just the opposite is true. Presendieu knew his actions were unlawful and he never indicated any misunderstanding of the charges. Presendieu said, “Yes, sir,” when asked if he was “able to read and understand everything contained in the written factual proffer” and whether he had “enough time to discuss what’s contained in the proffer” with his attorney. In fact, Presendieu had the presence of mind to point out a particular factual statement that he could not recall, but clarified by counsel that he may well have made that statement. As to all other statements in the factual proffer, Presendieu agreed that they were accurate. This exchange demonstrates the clarity of Presendieu’s understanding of the nature of the charges against him and the way that the facts applied to those charges. See Wiggins, 131 F.3d at 1442–43 (stating that there is no requirement that the district court list each element of the charged offense seriatim and that “there is no one mechanical way or precise juncture that a district court is required to inform the defendant of the nature of the charges in the Rule 11 colloquy”). 4 4 This case is distinguishable from Gaddy v. Linahan, 780 F.2d 935 (11th Cir. 1986), where the district court failed to explain the elements of “malice murder,” and specifically the 25 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 26 of 50 Fifth, the district court here made the express findings that Presendieu entered his pleas voluntarily and intelligently and that, at the change of plea hearing, Presendieu demonstrated an understanding of the nature of the charges against him. See Wiggins, 131 F.3d at 1441–43. Even without plain-error review, Presendieu has not carried the burden of showing that these findings are clearly erroneous. See id. at 1443. In summary, the record as a whole establishes that Presendieu: (1) was aware of the charges to which he was pleading guilty, (2) was sufficiently intelligent to understand the nature of those charges, (3) understood that the facts set forth in the factual proffer established that he was guilty of those two particular offenses, (4) had discussed the two charges and the facts in the proffer with his attorney, and (5) unequivocally and intelligently pled guilty to both charges in the plea agreement. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the district court did not plainly err, either as a matter of constitutional due process or under Rule 11, in accepting Presendieu’s guilty plea. Accordingly, we affirm Presendieu’s convictions for conspiracy to commit bank fraud (Count 1) and aggravated identity theft (Count 31).5 term “malice aforethought,” to a criminal defendant who was shown to be “not very intelligent,” “illiterate,” and “mentally retarded to some degree.” See id. at 941, 943, 945. 5 The task of performing a Rule 11 colloquy is important. To help judges, the Federal Judicial Center publishes the Benchbook for U.S District Court Judges, which is “an ongoing 26 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 27 of 50