Opinion ID: 2572750
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: declaratory judgment issues

Text: [¶ 61] Billings filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-37-101 to 1-37-115 (LexisNexis 2003)) within the same document as his Petition for Review of Agency Action. In that complaint, he set forth nine counts alleging constitutional infirmities concerning various state statutes and rules promulgated by the Board, and that the Board lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate particular issues. The district court found that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-416(a)(v) was unconstitutionally vague, but otherwise rejected Billings' declaratory judgment allegations. The Board did not cross-appeal the district court's ruling. [¶ 62] In his appellate brief, Billings begins his discussion of the declaratory judgment issues by summarizing each of the nine counts contained in the original complaint. These summaries are not accompanied by any citations to pertinent legal authority. We have consistently held that we will not consider claims unsupported by cogent argument or pertinent authority. Barkell v. State, 2002 WY 153, ¶ 32, 55 P.3d 1239, 1245 (Wyo.2002). [¶ 63] Several more specific arguments follow these summaries. Billings first contends that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-416(a)(v), which statute provides that the Board may suspend or revoke a license for [u]nethical or dishonorable conduct, is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The Board utilized this statutory provision in finding that Billings acted unethically and dishonorably in: (1) calling a former client a son of a bitch and threatening the client with physical violence by expressing a desire to settle their dispute face to face and with our fists in an October 29, 1997, letter; and (2) challenging Eric Ryan to a fight and shoving him when Ryan and Ditzler returned to the trailhead in October 1997. [¶ 64] Billings advances this argument on appeal to preserve the issue in light of a potential ambiguity in the district court's orders. In its August 15, 2002, Order On Declaratory Judgment, the district court found that the statutory language unethical or dishonorable conduct was unconstitutionally vague. The district court otherwise rejected Billings' declaratory judgment arguments. In its November 27, 2002, Findings and Order Affirming Order of the Board, the district court referred to its prior determination that the statutory language was unconstitutional and proceeded to consider the merits of the issues Billings raised in his petition for review. The district court ultimately ordered that the Board be affirmed and for the reasons given in the August 15, 2002 order of this Court, the declaratory judgment action is dismissed. Although this quoted language is imprecise, it remains clear from the totality of both the district court's orders that the district court did not intend to deviate from, or alter, its finding that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-416(a)(v) was unconstitutionally vague. We need not consider the merits of the issue on appeal because the Board did not cross-appeal the district court's ruling on the issue. [¶ 65] Billings next asserts that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-416(a)(iv), which statute allows the Board to suspend or revoke a license for a [v]iolation of any significant federal or state law or related regulations pertaining to wildlife, game and fish, is unconstitutionally vague on its face. He contends that the provision does not sufficiently define the terms significant laws or regulations or violation. Billings also argues generally that willful endangerment, as utilized by the Board in the instant case, does not establish an adequate standard for measuring one's conduct, although he does not cite any pertinent legal authority in advancing this argument. [¶ 66] We addressed these arguments in our prior opinion in this matter: Despite Billings' complaints that the Board has provided no definition of which regulations will be considered significant, that is not a concern in this case.... ... Billings also complains that certain statutory provisions require definition. He complains that the Board must define willfully endangering found in § 23-2-416(a)(ix). We are of the opinion that those terms are not so technical that further definition is required.... Billings also complains that the Board must define the term violation found in § 23-2-416(a)(iv). However, we agree with the State that this term needs no further definition. Violation in this context simply means non-compliance with the law or regulation in question. Billings I, 2001 WY 81, ¶¶ 27, 34-35, 30 P.3d at 569, 571. [¶ 67] Billings argues that Chapter 3, Section 1(n) of the Board's rules is similarly vague. That provision states that a licensee shall maintain neat, orderly and sanitary camps at all times and shall provide clean, fresh drinking water, protect all food from contamination and dispose of all garbage, debris and human waste. Livestock facilities shall be separate from camp facilities. Streams shall be protected from contamination. Billings' three-paragraph argument (primarily in the form of a series of questions based on the rule's language) on this issue does not constitute cogent argument, and Billings does not cite to any pertinent legal authority in advancing this particular argument. [¶ 68] Billings' final argument is that several subsections of a Code of Ethics (Chapter 3, Section 2 of the Board's rules) the Board promulgated and filed of record in 2001 (after the contested case hearing and our prior opinion in this matter) are unconstitutionally vague. [23] Billings challenges the prospective application of these rules because a future violation may result in the denial, suspension or revocation of his outfitter's license, and his expected future business will be affected by the rules. He also expresses concern that the new rules will serve as a convenient vehicle for retribution for the lengthy and expensive battle that Mr. Billings has mounted against the Board. The Board counters that Billings lacks standing to challenge the new rules and that the rules are not constitutionally infirm. [24] [¶ 69] `Standing is a concept utilized to determine if a party is sufficiently affected to insure that a justiciable controversy is presented to the court.' Memorial Hosp. of Laramie County v. Department of Revenue and Taxation of State of Wyo., 770 P.2d 223, 226 (Wyo.1989) ( quoting Washakie County School Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 316 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S.Ct. 86, 66 L.Ed.2d 28 (1980)). A party has standing only if he has a tangible and legally protectible interest at stake in the litigation; his interest must be injured or threatened with injury by the administrative action of which he complains. Memorial Hosp. of Laramie County, 770 P.2d at 226. Further, [d]eclaratory relief should be liberally administered if the elements of a justiciable controversy exist to give the trial court jurisdiction. Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 577 (Wyo.1974). For that controversy to exist, a genuine right or interest must be at issue between adversarial parties, and the trial court must be able to make an effective judgment which will finally determine the rights of the parties. Id. at 578. Even these prerequisites, however, may properly be avoided or relaxed when matters of great public interest or importance are presented to the trial court. Memorial Hosp. of Laramie County, 770 P.2d at 226. The Declaratory Judgments Act `gives the courts no power to determine future rights or anticipated disputes or controversies.' State Dept. of Revenue and Taxation v. Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 1169 (Wyo.1994) ( quoting White v. Board of Land Com'rs, 595 P.2d 76, 79 (Wyo.1979)). [¶ 70] In Pacificorp, 872 P.2d at 1164-65, taxpayers sought a declaratory judgment regarding rules the State Department of Revenue and Taxation promulgated pertaining to the ad valorem tax exemption for pollution control property, claiming that the State exceeded its statutory authority when it promulgated the rules. The rules took effect in February 1992, and the taxpayers filed for declaratory relief in June 1992. Id. The taxpayers acknowledged that the tax exemption issues were `not the subject of a direct dispute in the 1992 valuation determination,' but argued that the `threat of harm and improper taxation [was] present and real' and that a justiciable controversy existed because they may apply in the future for the exemption ... and the State may deny the request. Id. at 1168. We concluded that no justiciable controversy existed, stating the following: The taxpayers contend that the threat of harm and improper taxation was present and real. We disagree. The taxpayers did not present any evidence which indicated that their interests had actually been injured or that an imminent threat of such an injury existed. If we were to rule on the validity of the [rule's] language, our ruling would not effectively operate to terminate an actual controversy. The taxpayers rely on Memorial Hospital of Laramie County as authority for their argument that a justiciable controversy existed in this case. In Memorial Hospital of Laramie County, the controversy centered around the sales and use taxation of materials which were used in the construction of an addition to a hospital. The Department of Revenue and Taxation notified a subcontractor who supplied materials through a direct contract with the hospital while providing labor relating to those materials through a separate labor subcontract with [the construction manager] that the materials were subject to taxation. [ Memorial Hospital of Laramie County, ] 770 P.2d at 225. The hospital filed a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that its tax-exempt status precluded taxation of the materials. Id. It also paid, under protest, the taxes which were assessed against the subcontractor. Although the hospital may not have been immediately obligated to pay the tax, the Court held that a justiciable controversy existed because the injury [was] sufficiently imminent as to warrant judicial consideration. 770 P.2d at 227. The Memorial Hospital of Laramie County situation is different from the situation in the case at bar. In that case, the Department of Revenue and Taxation had already notified the subcontractor that the materials were subject to taxation. Even if, as the Court suggested, the hospital may not have been immediately obligated to pay the tax, the parties had taken certain material steps which presented a real and imminent threat to the hospital's interest. In this case, the State had neither made nor threatened to make a demand for payment of a tax on uncapitalized property. In fact, the taxpayers concede that the [rule's] language was not the subject of a direct dispute in the 1992 valuation determination. The threat was not real at that point. This case did not present a matter of great public interest or importance and, therefore, did not warrant relaxation of the justiciability requirement. This Court stated in Brimmer that the great public interest or importance exception to the justiciability requirement must be applied with caution and its exercise must be a matter where strict standards are applied. 521 P.2d at 578. Since an exemption for uncapitalized property was not requested or denied, our refusal to entertain this action will not put the taxed entities or the public coffers at risk. Pacificorp, 872 P.2d at 1169 (footnote omitted). [¶ 71] We similarly conclude in the instant case that no justiciable controversy exists as to the Board's Code of Ethics at this time because any decision regarding the validity of certain sections of the new rules would not effectively operate to terminate an actual controversy. Billings was not subject to the new rules at the time he filed for declaratory relief, and we have upheld the Board's revocation of Billings' outfitter's license. Further, the only administrative action at issue is the Board's issuance of the new rules. The Board promulgated the new rules well after this matter commenced, the Board did not utilize the new rules as a basis to sanction Billings, and there is no evidence constituting a real and imminent threat of any such action. Billings admittedly challenges the prospective application of the new rules which may result in some future action by the Board and Billings does not argue that this case presents a matter of great public interest or importance. Such a challenge does not meet our criteria for standing, especially considering our decision in Pacificorp.