Opinion ID: 1146183
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of material change in circumstances

Text: ¶ 15. In a modification proceeding, the burden is on the non-custodial parent to prove by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that a substantial change in circumstances has transpired since issuance of the custody decree; (2) that this change adversely affects the child's welfare; and (3) that the child's best interests mandate a change of custody. Id. (citing Bubac v. Boston, 600 So.2d 951, 955 (Miss. 1992)). ¶ 16. The crux of the Court of Appeals' analysis was that the material changes in circumstances in Miller's home life that would have an adverse affect on Miller were not continuous and no longer existed at the time of the trial. [T]he chancellor should find that the overall circumstances in which a child lives have materially changed and are likely to remain materially changed for the foreseeable future. McSwain, 944 So.2d at 52, 2005 WL 2979678 at ¶ 12 (quoting Tucker v. Tucker, 453 So.2d 1294, 1297 (Miss.1984)) (emphasis in original). The Court of Appeals stated that the chancellor abused his discretion because he focused on the potential for future problems rather than presently-existing circumstances and, because Ginger was drug and alcohol free at the time of the hearing, the material change in circumstances was not contemporaneous and could not mandate a change of custody. Id. at ¶ 13. The Court of Appeals went on to say that it appeared that the chancellor mistakenly used past misconduct on Ginger's part to trigger a re-weighing of the Albright factors. Id. at ¶ 15. ¶ 17. This Court recently dealt with a very similar case in Johnson v. Gray, 859 So.2d 1006 (Miss.2003), where a mother (Johnson) appealed a chancellor's order that custody of her child be transferred from her to her ex-husband, the child's natural father (Gray). Johnson was an alcoholic, had at least one car accident where she was driving under the influence of alcohol, and even had an incident where she got into a fight with her boyfriend and knocked a window out of his truck. Id. at 1008-09. However, as in the case presently before the Court, Johnson sought treatment from a rehabilitation facility and was released prior the custody hearing in her case, and she was attending aftercare twice every week. Id. at 1014-15. She had also married, started attending church, and was building a home before the hearing. Id. Under the Court of Appeals' reasoning, Johnson should have retained custody of her child. However, this Court upheld the chancellor's decision to transfer custody from Johnson to Gray, stating that hardly enough time had passed to determine if [Johnson] [would] be able to remain sober. Id. at 1015. This Court upheld the chancellor's decision to use the possibility of a future relapse as a factor weighing against Johnson. ¶ 18. Here, the chancellor cited numerous reasons for his decision to modify custody of Miller. The factors considered included Ginger's depression and the fact that she had suicidal thoughts. Ginger's drug and alcohol addiction, her failure to attend aftercare, and the fact that Ginger still associates with her former drug partner also weighed heavily in the chancellor's decision. ¶ 19. The Court of Appeals held that because Ginger was not using drugs or alcohol at the time of the hearing, Ginger's addiction could not be considered a continuing change in circumstance. However, by Ginger's own admission on the witness stand, she will always be an addict, and, as the chancellor mentioned in his judgment, she continues to suffer from the negative feelings that accompany an addiction. Ginger's drug addiction transpired after the custody arrangement to which she and Charles agreed was incorporated into their irreconcilable differences divorce decree. It is most certainly a material change that adversely affects Miller, and because her drug addiction is something that Ginger will likely have to endure for years, if not the rest of her life, it continues. Ginger's drug addiction satisfies the first two prongs of the test for modification of child custody. ¶ 20. Also cited by the chancellor was the discord in Ginger's marriage with Joe Hartfield. The Court of Appeals stated that because the tension between Hartfield and Ginger at the time of trial was not as fierce and contentious as it had previously been, that the circumstances that might have mandated a change in custody had subsided. McSwain, 2005 WL 2979678 at ¶ 17. As discussed earlier, the fights that took place between Hartfield and Ginger were often extremely heated and very violent. These types of fights constituted a material change in circumstances that would adversely affect Miller. ¶ 21. Taken in the aggregate, the factors considered by the chancellor obviously constitute sufficient circumstances to warrant a change in custody would be in Miller's best interests. The chancellor thoroughly examined the evidence and made a finding of fact using the Albright factors. He determined that Miller's best interests would be served by a modification of the original custody agreement, and awarded custody of Miller to Charles McSwain. We find no error in this regard.