Opinion ID: 2055856
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: If the conduct by the Customs officer was a Customs search, was it an authorized search?

Text: However, if the Customs officer's examination of the envelopes in question was in fact a search, we believe that it was authorized by section 482 and reasonable under constitutional principles. 19 U.S.C.A. § 482 sets forth the statutory authority for warrantless Customs searches. This authority is sui generis, and has been interpreted and clarified through much application in case law. Courts have found that sound policy considerations support the special treatment which Congress and the courts have given these procedures. In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543, 551-552 (1925), Mr. Chief Justice Taft states clearly the rationale of the statute: . . . Travelers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self-protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in.. . . We find that the federal courts have used this rationale in applying the same standards for Customs officials to inspect incoming international packages and mail, for the authorizing statute includes the phrase: . . . any trunk or envelope, wherever found . . .. 19 U.S.C.A. § 482. There seems to be no reason why these principles should not apply to mail coming into the country, especially where, as here, there is a representation on the package that it contains merchandise. United States v. Beckley, supra, 335 F.2d at 89. . . . The minor intrusion upon the privacy of international packages must yield to our government's interest in protection of its borders and its revenue. United States v. Doe, supra, 472 F.2d at 984. Our study of federal decisions satisfies us, first, that the special authority to search granted to Customs officers is intended to apply only to border searches. It does not give blanket power to roving Customs officers to make domestic searches for contraband when they are, in time and space, unrelated to entry into the country. United States v. Majourau, 474 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1973). But the border search does not need to be made at the precise border line (Murgia v. United States, 285 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1960) ) and the courts have extended the border concept inward sufficiently to realistically implement authorized Customs procedure. [9] The border search appears to be a broad concept reaching not only such locations as a Customs station at the border itself, but also to functional equivalents of the border. In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 2539, 37 L.Ed.2d 596, 602 (1973) Justice Stewart, in writing the majority opinion, speaks in dictum to the issue of defining border searches: Whatever the permissible scope of intrusiveness of a routine border search might be, searches of this kind may in certain circumstances take place not only at the border itself, but at its functional equivalents as well. For example, searches at an established station near the border, at a point marking the confluence of two or more roads that extend from the border, might be functional equivalents of border searches. For another example, a search of the passengers and cargo of an airplane arriving at a St. Louis airport after a non-stop flight from Mexico City would clearly be the functional equivalent of a border search. See also United States v. Arroyave, 477 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1973). Customs officials may delay the search of the suspect vehicle until it has reached its destination and sweep the guilty parties in with the contraband. United States v. Caraway, 474 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1973). In other cases it has been held that even if there had been a break in the surveillance, reasonable certainty that the contraband had been in the vehicle when it crossed the border satisfies this requirement of a border search. Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1966). The vehicle itself need not have crossed if the Customs officers see a transfer of contraband to it from a vehicle which has crossed the border. United States v. Arroyave, supra; United States v. Weil, 432 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1970). It appears to us that the test of this aspect of a border search stated by Alexander v. United States, supra, 362 F.2d at 382 declares a standard of proof which if met is generally accepted as sufficient: Where, however, a search for contraband by Customs officers is not made at or in the immediate vicinity of the point of international border crossing, the legality of the search must be tested by a determination whether the totality of the surrounding circumstances, including the time and distance elapsed as well as the manner and extent of surveillance, are such as to convince the fact finder with reasonable certainty that any contraband which might be found in or on the vehicle at the time of search was aboard the vehicle at the time of entry into the jurisdiction of the United States. Any search by Customs officials which meets this test is properly called a 'border search'. . . . A second necessary element of the exceptional authority of officers is reasonable cause to suspect there is merchandise which was imported contrary to law. 19 U.S.C.A. § 482. Like any other term expressing a quantum of knowledge which is made the prerequisite for some resultant police action, the statute's phrase reasonable cause to suspect is evasive of precise definition. Nevertheless, it is clear that it states a standard which is something less than the quantum of probable cause to believe which would be necessary to justify warrantless searches and arrests for felonies by other law enforcement officers. . . . No question of whether there is probable cause for a search exists when the search is incidental to the crossing of an international border, for there is reason and probable cause to search every person entering the United States from a foreign country, by reason of such entry alone. That the customs authorities do not search every person crossing the border does not mean they have waived their right to do so, when they see fit. . . . (Emphasis original). Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389, 391 (9th Cir. 1961). The right of a border search does not depend on probable cause. (Citations omitted.) `[The] searches of persons entering the United States from a foreign country are in a separate category from searches generally . . . [and] are totally different things from a search for and seizure of a man's private books and papers. . . .' (Citations omitted.) Murgia v. United States, 285 F.2d 14, 17 (9th Cir. 1960). See also United States v. Wright, 476 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Thompson, 475 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1973); Landau v. United States Attorney for Southern District, supra; Mansfield v. United States, 308 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1962). But mere caprice is not equivalent to reasonable cause to suspect. United States v. Duffy, 250 F.Supp. 900, 903 (S. D.N.Y. 1965). Our study of the federal cases satisfied us that it was not intended by the statutory language that a higher standard of proof be required for searches of trunks and envelopes than for vehicles, beasts or persons. [10] This was the conclusion of the Judges of the Second Circuit in United States v. Doe, supra, 472 F.2d at 985, who pointed out that a search of trunks and envelopes is actually less intrusive than a search of the person. They said: We see no justification for a construction of the statute which would give customs agents less leeway in preventing importation of mailed contraband than when such merchandise is imported in person. A third and final necessary element of the special Customs' authority is reasonableness. Although this is an included aspect of reasonable cause to suspect, it reaches further as a final constitutional limitation on all searches, whether specially authorized or otherwise. Border searches are, of course, not exempt from the constitutional test of reasonableness. A true border search, however, is not regarded as unreasonable even though made without probable cause. Marsh v. United States, 344 F. 2d 317, 324 (5th Cir. 1965). We think that the nature of the intrusion is a factor which must be weighed in determining the reasonableness of the search; and that, for example, stronger suspicion will doubtless be required for a Customs search of a person's body cavities than would be expected to justify a search whereas herethe intrusion itself was minimal. [11] We are convinced that all three of the above described elements of an authorized sui generis Customs search were present in the case before us. First, we feel that the location of the interception of the Defendant's envelopes satisfied the principles of border searches accepted by the federal courts. It seems hardly feasible in most instances to segregate and examine envelopes coming to persons under suspicion of importing narcotics by mail anywhere but at the destination post office. [12] And as mail remains in the custody of Postal authorities from the time it enters the country until it is delivered to the addressee, continuity and integrity of condition are virtually assured. [13] We are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the contraband found at the time of the search in the letters mailed to this Defendant was contained in the envelopes at the time they entered the United States. A terminal or destination post office would appear to be a functional equivalent of the border, satisfying the standards of Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, as well as the test under Alexander v. United States, supra. Second, we believe that the Customs officer did have reasonable cause to suspect that the two envelopes contained merchandise which had been imported contrary to law. The Defendant made two attacks upon the validity of the Customs officer's searchfirst, by moving before trial to suppress the evidence resulting from the search and, again, by objecting to its introduction at trial. [14] His appeal presents both of these claimed erroneous rulings for our consideration (M.R.Crim.P. Rule 37(a)). The facts which support the State's position against the Defendant's two attacks on the search are not identical because the knowledge establishing reasonable cause to suspect presented in the pretrial hearing differs from that information which was brought forward in trial. The motion to suppress was apparently submitted to the Justice on the basis of Mr. Ashley's affidavit for the Maine search warrant, without testimony. Mr. Ashley's affidavit indicates that the Customs' officer knew that the Defendant had received the two previous envelopes from Viet Nam April 27; that they were thick and appeared to contain something other than ordinary correspondence; that the Defendant behaved in a very furtive manner when he took the envelopes from the mail box; that one of the two envelopes in question arrived on each of the next two succeeding days, mailed from a soldier in Viet Nam; that they were marked Photo. Do Not Fold; that one was marked Happy Birthday although the Defendant's birthday would not occur for more than four months. The motion to suppress was denied, correctly, we believe. The Defendant again attacked the validity of the Wakefield search when the State sought to introduce evidence concerning the heroin at trial. Although Officer Ashley's affidavit (not presented at trial) indicated that the Customs officer, before the Wakefield search, had been told by the Westbrook Postal employees the circumstances of the Defendant's receiving the previous Viet Nam letters and, although it appears likely that he had been told by the Westbrook police the other circumstances which caused their suspicion that he was receiving hard drugs from Viet Nam, rulings by the Justice severely limited the extent to which the record reflects the Customs officer's information. [15] The exclusion of this testimony left us with a scantybut sufficient, we believe trial record as to the extent of the Customs officer's background information concerning the envelopes. We know from his testimony only that he had in his hands two sealed envelopes each mailed from the same soldier in Viet Nam and addressed to Defendant. Each was thicker than ordinary letter mail and contained a slight hump or lump about 4 by 5 inches and a little less than ¼ inch thick. On each was written Photo. Do not Fold. We can assume that the Customs officer, like other citizens, was aware of the importance of Southeast Asia as an origin of importation of illegal drugs into this country. We are convinced that both the affidavit and the trial record demonstrate, respectively, that the Customs officer was in possession of sufficient information to give him reasonable cause to suspect that the envelopes contained merchandise which had been imported contrary to law. Third, and finally, we think that the conduct of the Customs officer satisfies the Fourth Amendment mandate that the authorized search be reasonable in every regard. Here, the procedure used by the Customs officer prior to obtaining the search warrant did not go beyond the minimal steps necessary to confirm his suspicions that the envelope contained merchandise which was imported contrary to law. While the examination was more sophisticated than an examination of an envelope which was made only through the use of one's physical senses, the effect of the violation of the Defendant's privacy was no more severe. The envelopes remained unopened, the contents were not damaged and the private thoughts expressed in the enclosed letters were not disclosed to the searcher. It did not violate the international channels of communication of thoughts and ideas.