Opinion ID: 2976089
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of 104-Year Sentence

Text: Cowherd asserts that the 104-year prison sentence imposed upon him is so grossly disproportionate to the crimes he committed that it violates the proscription of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution against cruel and unusual punishment. Specifically, he argues that the jury recommended a sentence of only 18 years and, thus, the state trial court’s decision to run his six sentences consecutively so as to result in a sentence almost six times as long should be considered unreasonable, especially when viewed in relation to the sentence he could have received under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. As we noted in United States v. Marks, 209 F.3d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 2000), however, “[t]he Supreme Court has determined that strict proportionality between a crime and its punishment is not required.” (Citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 959-60 (1991) -7- No. 06-5610 Cowherd v. Million (upholding a sentence of life without parole for possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine)). Instead, “[t]he Supreme Court has articulated a ‘narrow proportionality principle’ whereby it held that only ‘extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime are prohibited.’” United States v. Flowal, 163 F.3d 956, 963 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 995-97). In implementing this “narrow proportionality principle,” the Sixth Circuit has recognized that “only an extreme disparity between crime and sentence offends the Eighth Amendment.” Marks, 209 F.3d at 583. No such “extreme disparity” exists in this situation. The petitioner readily admits that the jury’s recommended sentence of 18 years for a rape or for sodomy would not be constitutionally suspect and falls within the applicable statutory sentencing ranges for the Class B felony offenses of rape in the first degree, see K.R.S. § 510.040(2), and sodomy in the first degree, see K.R.S. § 510.070(2). See also K.R.S. § 532.020(1)(c) (setting the penalty for Class B felonies at “[a]t least ten (10) but not more than twenty (20) years).” In this case, Cowherd committed six separate acts that each constituted a prohibited sexual offense. See, e.g., Van Dyke v. Commonwealth, 581 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Ky. 1979) (Kentucky legislature “intended to punish each separate act of rape or sodomy” where “evidence clearly discloses . . . three distinct offenses [of] rape, sodomy and a second rape when [the defendant] penetrated [the victim’s] vagina to accomplish the first act of intercourse, penetrated her mouth to accomplish the act of sodomy, and thereafter penetrated her vagina to accomplish the second act of intercourse”). Unlike a situation in which one crime (for example, a rape) occurs during the pendency of another (for example, -8- No. 06-5610 Cowherd v. Million a burglary), Cowherd serially committed the six violent offenses, even taking time after the commission of three of the offenses to cook and eat a meal before resuming his criminal acts. Moreover, each of the offenses was accompanied by physical restraint of the victim and by the threat of imminent use of force. Had Cowherd imposed himself sexually upon the victim only briefly, only once, and under different circumstances before ceasing his violent, criminal activities, the lengthy, 104-year sentence might have been more difficult to justify. However, because the petitioner continued to restrain the victim by binding her hands and legs throughout the ordeal, because Cowherd maintained his dominant position in the encounter through the continued threat of deadly force, and because he refused to avail himself of the opportunity to end the assaults, but instead engaged in repeated prohibited acts, the state court determination that the 104-year prison sentence did not create “an extreme disparity between crime and sentence” was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court.1 In his appellate brief, Cowherd also intimates that the lengthy prison term imposed upon him must be considered disproportionate to the crimes committed because, had he been punished under the federal sentencing guidelines, his incarceration would likely have lasted only 188 to 210 months. The Supreme Court has not, however, ever held or 1 Further inform ing our conclusion that the 104-year sentence does not create “an extrem e disparity between crim e and sentence” is the representation of the warden’s counsel at oral argum ent that Cowherd m ay be eligible for parole after serving 20 years of his sentence, and possibly as early as the spring of 2008. -9- No. 06-5610 Cowherd v. Million suggested that state sentences and federal sentences must approximate each other in order to pass constitutional muster. Similarly, we recently rejected an argument that a federal sentence was unreasonable simply because it provided for a lengthier period of imprisonment than did applicable state sentencing principles. See United States v. Malone, 503 F.3d 481, 485-86 (6th Cir. 2007). Instead, the Malone panel joined other circuits in holding that the requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) that district judges consider unwarranted disparities in sentences refers only to disparities in sentences imposed upon federal defendants and not those that may exist between federal and state court sentences. See id. at 486. Because of the parallel, non-intersecting nature of the state and federal criminal justice systems and sentencing frameworks, the petitioner is not entitled to relief based on this argument.