Opinion ID: 2382857
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: The Frequency Analysis

Text: At the most transparent level, there appears to be an appalling disproportionality in sentencing Robert O. Marshall to death. Alone among the 246 death-eligible cases, his conviction of capital murder stands affirmed. [4] Sooner or later, however, that day had to come. But simply because Marshall may be the first does not mean that his death will be disproportionate under our statute. There may be more paradox than disproportion in his sentence. For no matter how upstanding or prominent his former life may have been, the data show that among those for whom death is a fitting punishment, contract killers, whether principal or agent, are among the more frequent recipients of the death sentence. As noted, we do not believe that an eighty-percent predictability rate is a prerequisite to a sentence of death. Nor do we believe that a fifty-fifty chance of life or death (as exemplified in this case by the stark contrast between Robert Marshall's death sentence and William Engel's life sentence, which is discussed infra at 179, 613 A. 2d at 1095), is a necessary prerequisite. We do find, however, evidence of the reliability of Robert Marshall's sentence in the frequency analyses performed under the three evaluative methods for assessing criminal culpability: the salient factors, the numerical preponderance of aggravating and mitigating factors, and the index of outcomes. Although acknowledging the difficulty of estimating reliable death-sentencing frequencies on the basis of a small sample of similar cases, David C. Baldus, State v. Robert Marshall, Death Penalty Proportionality Review Project: A Report to the New Jersey Supreme Court 1, 10 (Sept. 24, 1991) (hereinafter Marshall Report ), the Master nevertheless concluded that the frequency data are relevant and can be validated through close comparisons of the cases involved. Id. at 16. That procedure will provide a valuable supplement to the court's prior experience and knowledge. Id. at 16-17. There is a preliminary issue of whether Marshall's case should be considered in the count of death cases among similar cases for frequency-analysis purposes. Because the purpose of frequency calculations is to estimate death-sentencing rates among cases that are similar to the defendant's, it would seem that the subject case should not be included. On the other hand, because the case before the Court is a partial reflection of community values, even if aberrational, it should be considered. Because we do not attach a conclusive life/death determinant to a statistical analysis, we shall consider the frequency data under both theories. Finally, although we have chosen all death-eligible cases as our universe, we furnish the penalty-trial statistics for informational purposes. 1. The Salient-Factors Measure Because this facts-of-the-case type analysis has a presumptive objectivity (the criteria for inclusion are almost intuitive), it seems most persuasive here. The typologies of the data-gathering process were not an ad hoc construct for the Marshall case. These were, and are, the a priori, that is, not after-the-fact assumptions as to which cases are similar. Contract killings are the type of killings that prosecutors and juries have regarded as highly blameworthy. Thirty percent of contract murderers (principals and hitmen) have initially received a death sentence. That figure is significant considering only thirty-two cases of all death-eligible cases have received the death penalty.