Opinion ID: 678830
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lack of Substantial Evidence

Text: 13 Bowling contends that the Secretary's finding that he was not disabled is not supported by substantial evidence. Appellate review of the Secretary's denial of disability benefits is limited to determining whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the proper legal standards were used in evaluating the evidence. Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir.1990). In applying the substantial evidence standard, we may not reweigh the evidence in the record, nor try the issues de novo, nor substitute [the Court's] judgment for the Secretary's, even if the evidence preponderates against the Secretary's decision. Harrell v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 471, 475 (5th Cir.1988). This is so because substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but more than a scintilla. Id. 14 A claimant is not entitled to disability benefits unless he establishes that he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of [a] medically determinable physical or mental impairment ... which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. Secs. 416(i), 423(d)(1)(A). In determining whether a claimant is capable of engaging in any substantial gainful activity, the Secretary applies a five-step sequential evaluation process. 15 The rules governing the steps of this evaluation process are: (1) a claimant who is working, engaging in a substantial gainful activity, will not be found to be disabled no matter what the medical findings are; (2) a claimant will not be found to be disabled unless he has a severe impairment; (3) a claimant whose impairment meets or is equivalent to an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations will be considered disabled without the need to consider vocational factors; (4) a claimant who is capable of performing work that he has done in the past must be found not disabled; and (5) if the claimant is unable to perform his previous work as a result of his impairment, then factors such as his age, education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity must be considered to determine whether he can do other work. Villa, 895 F.2d at 1022. 16 A finding that a claimant is disabled or not disabled at any point in the five-step process is conclusive and terminates the Secretary's analysis. Harrell, 862 F.2d at 475. The burden of proof is on the claimant for the first four steps, but shifts to the Secretary at step five. Anderson v. Sullivan, 887 F.2d 630, 632-33 (5th Cir.1989). 17 This case reached step five. We cannot discern, though, whether in determining that the Secretary had carried her burden the ALJ was relying on the medical-vocational guidelines (the Grid) or the vocational expert's testimony. To establish that work exists for a claimant, the Secretary may rely on the Grid, only if the guidelines' evidentiary underpinnings coincide exactly with the evidence of disability appearing in the record. Scott v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 33, 34-35 (5th Cir.1994); 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt.P, App. 2 Sec. 200.00(a) (1994) (Where any one of the findings of fact does not coincide with the corresponding criterion of a rule [within the Grid], the rule does not apply in that particular case and, accordingly, does not direct a conclusion of disabled or not disabled.). 18 If on the one hand the ALJ here relied solely on the Grid, the Secretary did not meet her burden of proof because the ALJ found that Bowling was not capable of performing a full range of any particular category of work, see Fields v. Bowen, 805 F.2d 1168, 1170-71 (5th Cir.1986) (citation omitted); and the evidentiary underpinnings pertaining to the application of the Grid do not coincide with the evidence of disability found in the record. See Scott, 30 F.3d at 34-35. If on the other hand the ALJ was not relying on the Grid but on the vocational expert's testimony, the Secretary still may not have carried her burden. Although there is a dearth of applicable jurisprudence establishing the applicable standard in such situations, the issue appears to be whether the hypothetical question used reasonably incorporates the disabilities recognized by the ALJ. See Morris v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 333, 336 (5th Cir.1988); Rodriguez v. Shalala, No. 93-8712 (5th Cir. Aug. 25, 1994) (unpublished). 19 Morris concerned, inter alia, a contention that the hypothetical question posed by the ALJ to the vocational expert was too abstract to reflect Morris's particular disabilities. Id. at 336. The ALJ posed such a question in which he asked what employment would be available to someone having the disabilities which [the ALJ] found Morris to have. Id. at 335. Morris's representative was allowed to mention[ ] to the vocational expert additional disabilities, although those disabilities were not recognized in the ALJ's findings. Id. The vocational expert narrowed his list of available jobs in order to accommodate the additional limitations. Id. 20 In Morris, we determined that no reversible error occurred, in that the hypothetical [question] reasonably incorporated the disabilities recognized by the ALJ, and that Morris's representatives had an opportunity to correct any defect in the hypothetical by mentioning additional limitations to the vocational expert. Id. at 336. This reasoning was reiterated in Rodriguez, op. at 10 n. 3. 21 From the teachings of Morris and Rodriguez, then, this circuit's test for determining when a defective hypothetical question will produce reversible error becomes clear: Unless the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert by the ALJ can be said to incorporate reasonably all disabilities of the claimant recognized by the ALJ, and the claimant or his representative is afforded the opportunity to correct deficiencies in the ALJ's question by mentioning or suggesting to the vocational expert any purported defects in the hypothetical questions (including additional disabilities not recognized by the ALJ's findings and disabilities recognized but omitted from the question), a determination of non-disability based on such a defective question cannot stand. See also Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1456 (9th Cir.1984) (Unless there is record evidence to adequately support [assumptions made by a vocational expert], the opinion expressed by the vocational expert is meaningless.). 22 In the instant case, the hypothetical question does not appear reasonably to incorporate Bowling's disabilities. And, as discussed below, Bowling was never given any real opportunity to correct any defects in the hypothetical. Under the test just enunciated, the ALJ committed reversible error. 23 The ALJ specifically found that Bowling had the residual functional capacity to perform the physical exertion and nonexertional requirements of work except for no lifting of more than 20 pounds. The hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert, however, assumed that Bowling could occasionally lift and carry 50 pounds and could frequently lift and carry 20 pounds. That question also assumed that Bowling has some degree of problem with his kidneys; however, according to his own testimony this has been resolved. Regrettably, there is simply no record support for that statement. 24 The ALJ's findings state that the medical evidence establishes that [Bowling] has severe kidney problems. The record medical evidence indicates that, due to left vesicoureteral reflux, Bowling underwent a left ureteral reimplant in his left kidney, performed by Dr. Robert Kidd on May 22, 1989. On June 8, 1989, Dr. Kidd expressed the opinion that Bowling had an extensive and long past urological history consisting of a problem with urinary incontinence at birth requiring a bladder neck reconstructive procedure, and that he also had a horseshoe kidney, which required division of the isthmus, and also a left lower pole heminephrectomy for stone disease and chronic pyelonephritis. 25 Dr. Kidd further stated that due to the May 1989 surgery, which was performed nearly two years after the end of Bowling's closed period of benefits, Bowling would be essentially without the ability to find gainful employment for at least the next six months as he recovers from both this surgery and from his multiple urological abnormalities. Dr. Kidd was also of the opinion that, on August 25, 1989, Bowling had developed a pattern of chronic infection (of the kidneys), which may or may not be curable. Additionally, prior to the surgery, Dr. Kidd ventured that Bowling would probably be disabled as a result of the up-coming surgery and may or may not recovery [sic] enough function to return to active status. 26 On July 29, 1991, more than two years after the kidney surgery, Dr. Kidd reported that although Bowling underwent surgery to correct his reflux problems: 27 due to significant damage from his long history of reflux, and a possibility of him [sic] losing both his kidneys, he has been left essentially a urinary cripple, as far as urinary tract infections are concerned. He has had multiple episodes of cystitis and polyneuritis which again are taking much of his renal capacity from him. 28 Further, in Dr. Kidd's opinion, Bowling has a problem with long term renal insufficiency on [the] basis of chronic infections and more than likely will be hampered in performing of routine physical activities. Id. (emphasis added). 29 In posing the subject hypothetical question to the vocational expert, the ALJ stated that, according to Bowling's own testimony, the kidney problems had been resolved. 1 That, however, is a mischaracterization of Bowling's testimony. Concerning the May 1989 kidney operation, Bowling testified that Dr. Kidd had performed the operation and had repaired the reflux, and stated that [w]e're pretty sure that it works now. This comment, when taken in context and combined with the medical opinions rendered by Dr. Kidd, shows that the ALJ was simply wrong in determining that Bowling's testimony indicated that his kidney problems were resolved. Therefore, in addition to the mischaracterization of Bowling's lifting capacity, the ALJ, when posing the hypothetical question, also misrepresented the actual condition of Bowling's kidneys. 30 In light of the foregoing, we must vacate the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Secretary. But as the third ALJ's grant of a closed period of benefits, from May 28, 1986, to July 7, 1987, is not challenged by the Secretary, we do not disturb the rendition of benefits for that closed period. 31 Nevertheless, we must remand this matter to the Secretary to determine whether Bowling is entitled to benefits after July 7, 1987. It is reasonable to conclude that Bowling was disabled at least from the date of his kidney surgery, May 22, 1989, through July 1, 1991, the date of Dr. Wilson's orthopedic evaluation, although in light of Dr. Kidd's opinion of July 29, 1991, Bowling's disability may well have continued beyond the July 1, 1991, date and may still be ongoing.