Opinion ID: 2676393
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bloomberg’s Cross‐Appeal

Text: Having resolved Swatch’s main appeal on the ground of fair use without reaching the issue of copyrightability, we must address Swatch’s motion to dismiss Bloomberg’s cross‐appeal. That motion is granted, for two reasons. First, it is axiomatic that “[i]n order to have standing to appeal, a party must be aggrieved by the judicial action from which it appeals.” Great Am. Audio Corp., 938 F.2d at 19. Here, the May 18, 2012 judgment identified in Bloomberg’s notice of appeal as the subject of the cross‐appeal provides simply: “[f]or the reasons stated in the Court’s Opinion and Order dated May 17, 2012, judgment is hereby entered in favor of [Bloomberg].” Special App. 13. The May 17, 2012 Opinion and Order, in turn, had explained that “since [Bloomberg]’s use qualifies as fair use, [Bloomberg] has not infringed, and [Swatch]’s Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed.” Swatch II, 861 F. Supp. 2d at 343. Bloomberg argues that it is aggrieved by the May 18, 2012 judgment because it seeks a decision not only as to whether its use was fair use, but also as to whether Swatch’s recording was validly copyrightable in the first place. To the extent Bloomberg contends that Swatch’s complaint should be dismissed on the 46 ground of copyright invalidity in addition to or instead of the ground of fair use, Bloomberg “is not urging that we alter the judgment in any way, but rather that we alter the reasons underlying it.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. A.A. McNamara & Sons, Inc., 1 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 1993). While Bloomberg “is entitled to urge that we affirm the district court’s decision on any basis submitted to that court and supported by the record,” id. (quoting Great Am. Audio Corp., 938 F.2d at 19), it is not aggrieved by the district court’s dismissal of Swatch’s complaint on the ground of fair use, and therefore “is not entitled to cross‐appeal,” id. Second, to the extent that Bloomberg challenges the district court’s dismissal of its counterclaim seeking a declaration that Swatch’s copyright is invalid, that ruling of the district court is not properly before us. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1)(B) provides that a notice of appeal “must . . . designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed.” This requirement is “jurisdictional in nature.” Gonzales v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 652 (2012) (quoting Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992)). Bloomberg’s notice of cross‐appeal, filed on June 28, 2012, designates only the district court’s May 18, 2012 judgment, which did not resolve Bloomberg’s counterclaim. As the May 17, 2012 Opinion 47 and Order incorporated into the judgment makes plain, the district court simply dismissed Swatch’s complaint on the ground of fair use, “assum[ing], without deciding, . . . that [Swatch]’s copyright is valid.” Swatch II, 861 F. Supp. 2d at 338. It was not until August 27, 2012, that the district court issued an order dismissing Bloomberg’s counterclaims as moot. Bloomberg never filed any additional or supplemental notice of appeal designating that subsequent order as the subject of a cross‐appeal. While “we construe notices of appeal liberally, taking the parties’ intentions into account,” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 256 (2d Cir. 1995), we cannot reasonably read Bloomberg’s notice of cross‐appeal to contemplate review of an order that did not issue until nearly two months afterwards. While Bloomberg may be aggrieved by the dismissal of its declaratory counterclaim, which arguably would have enlarged Bloomberg’s rights, we have no jurisdiction to review it in the absence of a proper cross‐ appeal. See Intʹl Ore & Fertilizer Corp. v. SGS Control Servs., Inc., 38 F.3d 1279, 1286 (2d Cir. 1994). Bloomberg’s cross‐appeal accordingly is dismissed for lack of standing and lack of jurisdiction. 48