Opinion ID: 535307
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: FELA Claim

Text: 17 MoPac argues that there is insufficient evidence of its own negligence. MoPac asserts that Lockard's injuries were caused by unforeseeable weather conditions occurring on property owned and maintained by Ray. Thus, MoPac argues, to sustain liability here would make it an absolute insurer of its employees whether an employee was on or off railroad property, and whenever there was a dangerous change in the weather. 18 We respectfully disagree. It is clear MoPac had a duty to make its workplace safe, and lodging facilities, in certain circumstances, can be part of the workplace. In addition, any negligence of MoPac's statutory agent, Rosella Ray, could be imputed to MoPac. 19 The FELA imposes a nondelegable duty upon the railroad to provide its employees with a safe place to work. 10 See Shenker v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 374 U.S. 1, 7, 83 S.Ct. 1667, 1671-72, 10 L.Ed.2d 709 (1963); Ackley v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 820 F.2d 263, 267 (8th Cir.1987). This duty is broader than a general common law duty of care. See Ackley, 820 F.2d at 267. The railroad's nondelegable duty extends to the property of third parties and includes an obligation to inspect the premises of the third party and to protect the railroad's employees from dangerous conditions. See Empey v. Grand Trunk W.R.R., 869 F.2d 293, 296 (6th Cir.1989). 20 MoPac had a long-term lodging contract with Ray. The first contract was executed in 1972, and MoPac and Ray continued to enter new agreements until the contract at issue was signed in November of 1984. Pursuant to these agreements, five out of the eight rooms at Rosella Ray's Boarding House were reserved for MoPac's employees. Lockard testified that he always stayed at Rosella Ray's because it was approved by MoPac. Ray was therefore an agent of MoPac. See Sinkler v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 356 U.S. 326, 331-32, 78 S.Ct. 758, 762-63, 2 L.Ed.2d 799 (1958) (when employee's injury caused by third party performing contractual operational activities of railroad, third party is agent of railroad under FELA). When the railroad provides lodging for its employees, this is an operational activity for which negligence may be imputed to the railroad. See Empey, 869 F.2d at 296-97. 21 A jury's verdict should not be overturned unless there is no basis for finding that the employer's negligence played a part in the employee's injury. See Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 506-07, 77 S.Ct. 443, 448-49, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957). This circuit has stated that under the FELA, the right of the jury to pass upon the question of fault and causality must be most liberally viewed.    [T]he jury's power to engage in inferences must be recognized as being significantly broader than in common law negligence actions. Ybarra v. Burlington N., 689 F.2d 147, 149 (8th Cir.1982) (quoting Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. v. Melcher, 333 F.2d 996, 999 (8th Cir.1964)). Our review of the record indicates that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that MoPac's negligence contributed to Lockard's injury. There was also sufficient evidence for the jury to determine that Ray was negligent, and that this negligence was imputable to MoPac. 22 MoPac also asserts that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that Lockard was an employee as a matter of law, and that any negligence of Ray could be imputed to MoPac. We find these claims to be without merit. In Empey, the court held that an employee who is injured while he avails himself of housing which his employer has provided and implicitly encouraged him to use is within the scope of his employment for the purposes of the FELA. 869 F.2d at 295. The trial court's instruction on imputed negligence was approved in Empey, 869 F.2d at 296-97, and Payne v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 309 F.2d 546, 549 (6th Cir.1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 827, 83 S.Ct. 1865, 10 L.Ed.2d 1051 (1963). Thus, we find that the district court did not err in its instruction to the jury.