Opinion ID: 883813
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the element of voluntariness

Text: When the District Court defined the elements of deliberate homicide, it gave the following jury instructions: INSTRUCTION NO. 3 To convict the defendant of Deliberate Homicide ... the State must prove the following elements: 1. That the defendant caused the death of Aubrey Bradley ... and 2. That the defendant acted purposely or knowingly. If you find from your consideration of the evidence that all of these elements have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty. If, on the other hand, you find ... that any of these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt then you should find the defendant not guilty. INSTRUCTION NO. 4 A material element of every offense is a voluntary act, which includes an omission.... Although the District Court instructed the jury that a material element of every offense is a voluntary act (Instruction No. 4), Patton contends that the District Court erred when it failed to include the element of voluntariness in its jury instruction which set forth the statutory elements of deliberate homicide (Instruction No. 3). He claims that the separate instructions could have misled the jury with regard to the extent of the State's burden of proof, and that the element of voluntariness should have been listed with the elements of the statutory offense in a single jury instruction. In support of his contention, Patton cites several federal court decisions. However, this Court has previously addressed this issue, and we conclude that our prior cases are controlling. In State v. Zampich (1983), 205 Mont. 231, 667 P.2d 955, the defendant submitted a proposed jury instruction which incorporated the term voluntarily alongside the mental state elements of purposely and knowingly. The district court struck the term voluntarily from the proposed instruction, and instead, gave a separate instruction which stated that a material element of every offense is a voluntary act. On appeal, we concluded that the district court's other instructions adequately established the State's burden to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the instructions, when read together, properly instructed the jury. On that basis, we held that the district court did not err when it failed to include the element of voluntariness in its jury instruction which set forth the statutory elements of the charged offense. In State v. Byers (1993), 261 Mont. 17, 861 P.2d 860, the defendant asserted that the district court erred when it gave separate jury instructions on (1) the element of voluntariness, and (2) the statutory elements of the crime. He claimed that the separate instructions confused the jury, and that they might not have fully considered the voluntary act requirement. On appeal, we held that the separate instructions correctly reflected the law, and adequately established the State's burden of proof. Furthermore, we concluded that the separate instruction on voluntariness did not prejudice the defendant. In this case, the separate jury instruction on voluntariness did not prejudice Patton. He did not claim to have acted involuntarily during the commission of the offense, and the element of voluntariness was never an issue in the case. Rather, his entire defense was that a third party committed the crime. Therefore, based on our prior holdings, we conclude that the separate instructions (Instruction Nos. 3 and 4), when read together, fully and fairly instructed the jury on the law applicable to the case. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not err when it failed to include the element of voluntariness in its jury instruction which set forth the statutory elements of deliberate homicide.