Opinion ID: 2334960
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alternative remedies bar Heisey from Bivens-type relief.

Text: The State argues that Heisey is barred from Bivens -type relief because he had an alternative remedyhe could have brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, which allows plaintiffs to sue persons act[ing] under the color of state law for deprivations of constitutional rights. A § 1983 claim on its face admits of no immunities, [81] and the State could not have certified the officers against such a claim. Heisey contends that a § 1983 claim is not an alternative remedy under the meaning of Bivens for two reasons. First, he argues that a claim based on a violation of the Alaska Constitution cannot be asserted in federal court under that provision. Second, he asserts that the Alaska Constitution offers broader protections than the U.S. Constitution, arguing that this Court has an obligation to expand on state constitutional principles and to enforce and protect state constitutional rights. We disagree with Heisey's reading of the law. With regard to Heisey's first argument, it is true that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows claims against state officials for violation of the U.S. Constitution, not state constitutions. However, an alternative remedy may include federal remedies. In Hertz v. Beach, [82] we recognized that the availability of a federal constitutional remedy can block a state Bivens -type claim. In Hertz, an inmate sued two nurses and a dentist for failing to give him timely or adequate dental treatment. [83] The inmate claimed violations of both the federal and Alaska cruel and unusual punishment provisions. [84] We held that [m]edical malpractice and federal constitutional law provide adequate remedies for the inmate's alleged state constitutional violations, and declined to find a private cause of action under the Alaska constitution. [85] Because federal constitutional claims may provide adequate remedies for state constitutional violations, Heisey's argument fails. [86] Heisey's second main contention is that the Alaska Constitution offers broader protections than the U.S. Constitution, implying that a federal constitutional remedy offers weaker relief than a state constitutional remedy. However, an alternative remedy need not be an exact match. The pertinent question is whether a § 1983 claim would provide some type of relief for Heisey, even if it is not the equivalent of the relief he would get under a state Bivens claim. That is the case here. Facially, the federal constitutional provisions that Heisey cites either exactly or substantially match the wording of the Alaska Constitutional provisions he claims were violated. Thus, the rights that they guarantee are substantially the same. In his amended complaint, Heisey claimed that he had a constitutional right under [a]rticle 1, [s]ection 12 ... not to be subject to cruel and unusual punishment. This right includes the right not to be subjected to the use of excessive force by Correctional Officers. Heisey acknowledges that the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution would allow him to bring a similar federal constitutional claim for excessive force. Both the federal and state constitutions read, [e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. The amended complaint alleges a second state constitutional violationthat the failure to train and supervise the officers, and the inadequacy of the regulations governing the training, discipline, and supervision of Officers using force, violated Heisey's due process rights under article 1, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution, as well as his right to be free from the use of excessive force under article 1, section 12. Article 1, section 7, the Due Process Clause of the Alaska Constitution, states that [n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. The wording of the state provision mirrors the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. On appeal Heisey also argues that both article 1, section 14 of the Alaska Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protect against the unreasonable seizure of a person through the use of excessive force. By matching his state constitutional claims to federal constitutional claims, Heisey implicitly acknowledges that federal claims would, in fact, provide a remedy comparable to his state constitutional claims. While a § 1983 claim may not be a complete remedy, we hold that it is a sufficient alternative remedy. Finally, we note that our holding that the Attorney General's certification is judicially reviewable provides Heisey with at least one other possible remedya judicial challenge to the scope-of-employment certification.