Opinion ID: 2593661
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: severing counts

Text: ¶ 54 Before trial, Mead moved to sever the murder and criminal solicitation counts brought against him, claiming they must be tried separately. The trial court denied the motion, ruling the two counts could properly be tried together as they were part of a single criminal episode and Mead would [not] be unfairly prejudiced by joinder of [the] offenses. Mead contends the trial court erred in failing to sever the counts because (1) the two offenses were not part of a single criminal episode, requiring severance of the counts under rule 9.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and (2) he was unfairly prejudiced by joinder in violation of section 77-8a-1 of the Utah Code. A denial of severance will only be reversed by this Court if it is affirmatively shown that a defendant's right to a fair trial has been impaired. State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 445 (Utah 1986) (footnote omitted). We conclude Mead's argument that the two offenses were not part of a single criminal episode is unavailing. We also conclude Mead was not unfairly prejudiced by the joinder of the counts against him.
¶ 55 Rule 9.5(1)(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as follows: Unless otherwise provided by law, complaints, citations, or informations charging multiple offenses, which may include violations of state laws, county ordinances, or municipal ordinances and arising from a single criminal episode as defined by Section 76-1-401, shall be filed in a single court that has jurisdiction of the charged offense with the highest possible penalty of all the offenses charged. A single criminal episode is defined as all conduct which is [1] closely related in time and [2] is incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (1999). Mead contends that the criminal solicitation and murder offenses were not part of the same criminal episode, and, therefore, the trial court erred in failing to separate the two counts against him. We disagree. ¶ 56 There can be no doubt that the solicitation and murder charges share an identical criminal objective: the death of Pamela Mead. As to the timing issue, the murder and solicitation charges represent separate manifestations of Mead's single, ongoing criminal objective. Mead solicited Hendrix to kill his wife several weeks before her actual murder. In light of Mead's overarching scheme to rid himself of his wife, a scheme that covered a period of years, the passage of mere weeks is negligible. [10] Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined the counts were part of a single criminal episode. ¶ 57 A further difficulty with Mead's contention is that, even accepting the truth of his argument, i.e., that the two counts were not, as the trial court ruled, part of a single criminal episode, it does not, therefore, follow that the trial court erred in failing to separate the murder and criminal solicitation counts. As the court of appeals has correctly noted, Rule 9.5 only dictates when informations charging multiple offenses arising from a single criminal episode must be joined. It does not address either when the trial court may join charges or when charges must be severed. State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377, 384 n. 6 (Utah Ct.App.1997). Accordingly, Mead's contention that the trial court erred in ruling that the two counts were part of a single criminal episode is unavailing.
¶ 58 As stated above, rule 9.5 is irrelevant to the issue of whether a court must sever charges brought against a defendant. This issue is governed, instead, by section 77-8a-1 of the Utah Code. Section 77-8a-1 provides, in relevant part, as follows: (1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged in the same indictment or information if each offense is a separate count and if the offenses charged are: (a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in their commission; or (b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan. . . . . (4) (a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by a joinder for trial together, the court shall order an election of separate trials of separate counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide other relief as justice requires. Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-1 (1999). ¶ 59 We begin our analysis by noting that it is uncontested that the murder and criminal solicitation counts were alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan. Id. § 77-8a-1(1)(b). Accordingly, to demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion in joining the two charges, Mead must show prejudice under section 77-8a-1(4)(a). As the court of appeals has correctly stated, The initial inquiry regarding whether a defendant is prejudiced by joinder is `whether evidence of the other crime would have been admissible in a separate trial.' State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 654 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (quoting State v. Lee, 831 P.2d 114 (Utah Ct.App.1992)); see also State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985) (determining joinder was unduly prejudicial where evidence of the other crime would not have been admissible in a separate trial). We conclude the evidence of either crime would be admissible in a separate trial. In a separate trial for murder, evidence of the solicitation charge would be admissible to demonstrate a common plan or scheme. Similarly, in a separate trial for solicitation, evidence of the murder charge would be probative of the earnestness of Mead's request that Hendrix kill his wife. Therefore, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mead's motion to sever the murder and criminal solicitation counts.