Opinion ID: 1134905
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: denial of constitutional right to due process

Text: Petitioner argues that she has been denied constitutional due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment [62] because she did not receive notice of nor have an opportunity to respond to the 1987 dissolution and has consequently been deprived of surviving spouse benefits from the Navy. She argues the service by publication in this case was invalid because Victor P. Himes filed a false affidavit and the trial court therefore did not have jurisdiction of the parties. Petitioner asserts that the judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction [63] and a motion to vacate the decree could therefore be brought at any time. [64] Petitioner asserts that both the trial court [65] and the Court of Appeals erred in concluding the decree was voidable and not void. Citing Wenatchee Reclamation Dist. v. Mustell, [66] which relied on Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., [67] Petitioner contends that regardless whether the trial court had in rem or in personam jurisdiction, the service by publication was invalid because Victor P. Himes knew the New Bethlehem, Pennsylvania home address at which she had been living for 21 years and made no effort to serve her there. In Wenatchee, this Court observed that prior to Mullane, due process rights tended to vary depending on whether an action was in rem or in personam: Personal service was considered essential when a state court based its jurisdiction upon its authority over a defendant's person; constructive notice to nonresidents satisfied the requirements of due process when jurisdiction was based upon the court's authority over property within its territory....The Mullane Court, however, rejected this distinction between in rem and in personam actions for purposes of determining the sufficiency of notice, stating we think that the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment ... do no depend upon a classification for which the standards are so elusive ... 339 U.S. at 312, 70 S.Ct. 652. In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has adhered to the principle announced in Mullane.... Notice by publication and posting is constitutionally inadequate where the name and address of the owner are known or can be discovered ... with minimal effort; personal service or mailed notice is required. Petitioner concludes that because the judgment is void, the trial court has a nondiscretionary duty to grant relief [68] by vacating the judgment under CR 60(b)(5) and thus the judgment has no effect and the rights of the parties are left as though the judgment had never been entered. [69] Respondent argues that the judgment is voidable and not void because the trial court had in rem jurisdiction to grant the dissolution based on proper service by publication. Respondent contends that Petitioner's due process argument embellishes the distinction between void and voidable with constitutional import. According to Respondent, principles of equity, and not constitutional law, determine whether a judgment is void or voidable. [70] Respondent asserts that the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that [t]he decree obtained is thus voidable, not void as Frances contends. This voidable status of the decree results in abatement on the death of one of the parties as is the case here. This result preserves the validity of Victor's second marriage, an important policy under Washington law. Respondent contends that the decision of the Court of Appeals recognizes a strong public interest in maintaining the finality and integrity of dissolution decrees to protect interests of reliance on the judgment. Respondent cautions that allowing courts to vacate decrees after the death of one of the parties would open a Pandora's box of vacated judgments. Relying on In re Marriage of Johnston, [71] the Court of Appeals in this case held that [d]espite Victor's false affidavit, the family court had in rem jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage. In Johnston, the husband had moved to an unknown location in another state. The wife published a summons in the newspaper and obtained a default decree of dissolution and an order of child support. The court determined the notice by publication was sufficient compliance with RCW 4.28.100 for a dissolution decree because it concerned in rem action affecting the status of the marital relationship, but not sufficient where additional relief is sought requiring in personam jurisdiction, such as support. There was no false affidavit in Johnston. In this case Victor P. Himes filed a false affidavit which did not comply with the service by publication statute, RCW 4.28.100. Notice by publication and posting is constitutionally inadequate where the name and address ... are known or can be discovered ... with minimal effort; personal service or mailed notice is required. [72]