Opinion ID: 2303018
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The State of Fourth Amendment Challenges to Analogous Federal and other State Statutes

Text: Courts have upheld overwhelmingly against Fourth Amendment challenges federal and state statutes authorizing warrantless, suspicionless DNA collection from convicted criminals, including incarcerated prisoners, parolees, and probationers. Federal and state courts are divided, however, on the constitutionality of requiring mere arrestees to submit to DNA sample collection. At the heart of this debate (and the present case) is the presumption of innocence cloaking arrestees and whether legitimate government interests outweigh the rights of a person who has not been adjudicated guilty of the charged crime, and is somewhere closer along the continuum to a person who is not charged with a crime than he or she is to someone convicted of a crime. In People v. Buza, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d 753, 755 (Cal.Ct.App.2011), cert. granted, ___ Cal.4th ___, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 616, 262 P.3d 854 (2011), the First Appellate District, Division Two, of the Court of Appeal of California held unconstitutional facially the section of California's Forensic Identification Database and Data Bank Act of 1998 (California DNA Collection Act) (Cal.Penal Code § 296 (2011)), that authorized the taking of a DNA sample from all adults arrested or charged with a felony. [19] Mark Buza was arrested for arson and vandalism and asked to provide a DNA sample, as required by the California Act; he refused. Id. Buza was informed that, under the California Act, refusal to provide a DNA sample after arrest was itself a misdemeanor offense. Buza, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d at 756. The State charged Buza, on information, with arson, vandalism, and refusal to provide a DNA sample under the California DNA Collection Act. Id. Buza moved for an acquittal on the charge of failure to provide a DNA sample, contending that being charged with a felony was not a sufficient basis for the state to require a DNA sample. Id. His motion was denied, yet he continued to refuse to provide a DNA sample. Id. Buza was convicted on all charges. Id. The court ordered law enforcement to use reasonable force to extract the DNA sample. Id. Buza was sentenced to 16 months, including six months for his refusal to provide DNA. Id. He was informed his DNA would be uploaded into the database. Id. Buza appealed his conviction for failure to provide a DNA sample, arguing that, as an arrestee, he was entitled to the presumption of innocence and had the right, under the Fourth Amendment, to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. Buza, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d at 755. In analyzing Buza's facial attack on the constitutionality of the statute authorizing DNA collection from arrestees, the court summarized relevant cases upholding DNA collection of convicted offenders, highlighting the narrow grounds on which these cases were decided or the divided views expressed by the deciding courts. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr.3d at 762 (noting the limited nature of the holding in United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 836 (9th Cir.2004), applying only to lawfully adjudicated criminals whose proven conduct substantially heightens the government's interest in monitoring them, and the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 948-49 (9th Cir.2007), because its holding did not apply to arrestees). The Buza court looked also to opinions that evaluated DNA collection from arrestees or pre-trial detainees. 129 Cal. Rptr.3d at 763. In Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847, 851 (9th Cir.2009), a Montana law enforcement officer requested a DNA sample (under a Montana statute authorizing collection from convicted felons) from a pre-trial detainee who had been convicted, sentenced, and served time to completion in Nevada previously for an unrelated crime. [20] The Friedman court concluded that, despite the state's assertions that pretrial detainees have a limited expectation of privacy and that the government has a legitimate interest in collecting DNA samples for its database, forcible extraction of DNA, without a warrant and in the absence of individualized suspicion, or for the purposes of solving unsolved crimes, was unconstitutional as applied to Boucher. 580 F.3d at 851, 856. The court noted that government interests that would offset the expectation of privacy in certain circumstances (prison security or supervision and integration of parolees) are not present with pre-trial detainees and, additionally, Montana's constitution provides greater privacy protections than the Fourth Amendment. Friedman, 580 F.3d at 858 (citing government interests in Samson, 547 U.S. at 856, 126 S.Ct. at 2202, 165 L.Ed.2d at 262). In response to the government's argument that the search was reasonable because of the reduced privacy rights of pre-trial detainees, the court responded by noting that the Supreme Court has not allowed suspicionless searches of pre-trial detainees for reasons other than prison security. Friedman, 580 F.3d at 856-57. Quoting from Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1835, 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 919 (1966), the court emphasized [t]he importance of informed, detached and deliberate determinations of the issue whether or not to invade another's body in search of evidence of guilt is indisputable and great. Friedman, 580 F.3d at 857. The Friedman court distinguished the holdings in Kincade and Kriesel, discussed supra, because those cases addressed convicted criminals and Friedman was only a pretrial detainee for the purposes of the Montana statute. Id. In United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir.2010), a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the holding of a federal magistrate judge who found constitutional, against an as-applied challenge, provisions of the Bail Reform Act of 1966 (18 U.S.C. § 3142(b), (c)(1)(A) (2009)), and the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. § 14135a (2009)) requiring Pool, as an arrestee, to provide a DNA sample as a condition of his pre-trial release. [21] , [22] The majority opinion in Pool, adopting the magistrate judge's approach, applied the totality of the circumstances test and concluded that a judicial or grand jury finding of probable cause is a watershed event that tips the scales in favor of the government's interest in definitively determining the defendant's identity, at the expense of a defendant's privacy interest in giving a DNA sample as a condition of pre-trial release .... 621 F.3d at 1219, 1226. The magistrate likened the DNA sample requirement to other conditions of pre-trial release that limit liberty, including electronic monitoring and mandatory curfews. Pool, 621 F.3d at 1217. The appeals-court-panel majority concluded that Pool had not shown any greater privacy interest in his DNA than had Kinkade (a convict), supra, because the DNA statute required that only identifying numbers be used in the reporting system. Pool, 621 F.3d at 1222. The competing government interests included allowing the government to ensure that the defendant did not commit some other crime[;] ... discourage[d] a defendant from violating any condition of his or her pretrial release; and served the same purpose of identifying potentially dangerous individuals to the public, whether arrestees or convicts. Pool, 621 F.3d at 1223. In dissent, Judge Schroder countered that United States v. Brown, 563 F.3d 410, 414-15 (9th Cir.2009), required that the government bear the burden of showing that searches and seizures are reasonable under a Fourth Amendment exception. Pool, 621 F.3d at 1237. Under its application of the balancing test, the dissent concluded that Pool's expectation of privacy had not been reduced by a conviction and, therefore, the government's asserted interest in Pool was obliged, in order to overcome Pool's expectation, to be even more significant than those recognized with regard to convicts; the government may not rely on a generalized interest in preventing the commission of crimes by pretrial defendants. Pool, 621 F.3d at 1237, 1238. The dissent remarked also on the difference between the DNA profile and the DNA sample; although the former contains numeric identifiers only, the latter contains the entire genetic makeup of an individual. Id. In United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387 (3rd Cir.2011), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1741, 182 L.Ed.2d 558 (2012), a divided Third Circuit, sitting en banc, reached a similar conclusion as did the majority in Pool, supra . [23] Mitchell was indicted for one count of attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 398. While in pre-trial detention, he refused to give a DNA sample demanded pursuant to the federal DNA Collection Act (42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A) (2011)). Id. His refusal was upheld by the federal district court. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 398. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 402. Mitchell argued that collection of DNA samples from arrestees and pre-trial detainees under the DNA Collection Act constituted an unreasonable search and seizure, violating the Fourth Amendment. Id. The parties disagreed whether Mitchell had mounted a facial or as-applied constitutional challenge in the trial court, so the appellate court, following the guidance in United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 273 (3rd Cir.2010), considered both types of challenge. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 405. [24] The court, following the direction in Connection Distributing Co. v. Holder, 557 F.3d 321, 327-28 (6th Cir.2009), that [t]he usual judicial practice is to address an asapplied challenge before a facial challenge, considered first the constitutionality of the statute as applied to the facts in Mitchell's case. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 405 (internal quotation omitted) (internal citation omitted). Using the Knights totality of the circumstances test, the Mitchell court majority concluded that there are two separate searches when DNA is collected. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 406. The first is the physical collection, usually via a buccal swab or a blood draw. Id. The court concluded that the physical intrusion was quick and painless (relatively so) and, therefore, a minimal invasion, and did not weigh in the defendant's favor. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 407 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625, 109 S.Ct. at 1417, 103 L.Ed.2d at 665; Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 656 n. 5 (2d Cir.2005)). The second search is the processing of the DNA sample and creation of the DNA profile. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 407. Mitchell's challenge pointed to the vast amount of personal data contained within a DNA sample and the potential for misuse of the data. Id. The court, however, was not persuaded by Mitchell's argument, relying on the numerous statutory protections of the data and the junk nature of the 13 loci used to create the profile. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 408. The court embraced an analogy between fingerprints and DNA profiles, treating both as routine booking procedures, and concluded that pre-trial detainees have a diminished privacy interest relative to means to ascertain and confirm their identities. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 411 ([I]t is `elementary' that blanket fingerprinting of individuals who have been lawfully arrested or charged with a crime does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment.) (quoting Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879, 882 (D.C.Cir.1963)). The court in Mitchell conceded that the government's interests in obtaining DNA from an arrestee are not as strong as with convicts, probationers, or parolees. 652 F.3d at 413. Mitchell maintained that the interest in law enforcement is equally well served by collecting DNA samples post-conviction, however, the court was persuaded by the government's argument that there is a strong interest in identifying arrestees. Id. Quoting from United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 185 (3rd Cir. 2005), the Mitchell court reiterated that a criminal may take unusual steps to conceal not only his conduct, but also his identity by using disguises, changing names, or changing physical features. 652 F.3d at 414. Such attempts by criminals to obfuscate their identities amplify the government's need to use DNA to identify accurately pre-trial detainees or arrestees, concluded the court. Id. The majority, however, made no mention of evidence that Mitchell had attempted to conceal his identity or that the government had any difficulties determining Mitchell's identity without resorting to a DNA profile. The Mitchell majority, quoting from Haskell v. Brown, 677 F.Supp.2d 1187, 1199 (N.D.Cal.2009), perceived two components to identity: who that person is (the person's name, date of birth, etc.) and what that person has done (whether the individual has a criminal record, whether he is the same person who committed an as-yet unsolved crime across town, etc.). Id. The court placed great weight on the second component, noting that a person's criminal record has important ramifications for pre-trial release considerations. Id. The court conceded, however, that in comparison to the probationer cases, the interests in supervision and prevention of recidivism are much diminished, if not absent, in the context of arrestees and pretrial detainees. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 415 n. 25 (quoting United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 874 (9th Cir.2006) (That an individual is charged with a crime cannot, as a constitutional matter give rise to any inference that he is more likely than any other citizen to commit a crime if he is released from custody.)). Concluding that the government's interest in identifying arrestees was sufficient to render the DNA Act constitutional, as applied to Mitchell, the court resolved that Mitchell's facial challenge to the statute failed. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 415-16. A strongly worded dissent criticized the Mitchell majority's conclusions, asserting that it gave short shrift to an arrestee's privacy interest by reducing it only to an interest in identity. 652 F.3d at 416 (Rendell, J., dissenting). Judge Rendell maintained that statutory limitations on the use of DNA profiles, though not wholly irrelevant, are not panaceas, ... and cannot offset the severe invasion of privacy that takes place when an arrestee's DNA is seized and searched. Id. The dissent described the privacy interest of arrestees, while diminished in certain, very circumscribed situations, are not so weak as to permit the Government to intrude into their bodies and extract the highly sensitive information coded in their genes. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 421 (Rendell, J., dissenting). Objecting to the majority's characterization of the government interest as simply identification, Judge Rendell countered that the purpose of collecting arrestee and pre-trial detainee DNA is not to identify the arrestee in the sense of allowing law enforcement to confirm that the correct person has been arrested or keeping records of who has been in federal custody, but to use those profiles and the information they provide as evidence in the prosecution and to solve additional past and future crimes. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 422-23 (Rendell, J., dissenting). Quoting the dissenting opinion in Kincade, Judge Rendell argued that [t]he collection of a DNA sample ... does not `identify' an [arrestee or pre-trial detainee] any more than a search of his home doesit merely collects more and more information about that [arrestee or pre-trial detainee] that can be used to investigate unsolved past or future crimes. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 423 (Rendell, J., dissenting) (quoting Kincade, 379 F.3d at 857 n. 16 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)). Relying on the presence of the expungement provision in the statute, the dissent bolstered its argument against a simplistic identification purpose being the sole government interest, stating that [i]f the Government's real interest were in maintaining records of arrestees' identifies, there would be no need to expunge those records upon an acquittal or failure to file charges against the arrestee. Indeed, this statutory provision serves as an admission that the fact of conviction, not of mere arrest, justifies a finding that an individual has a diminished expectation of privacy in his DNA. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 423 (Rendell, J., dissenting). Attacking further the purported identification only usage of the DNA sample offered-up by the government, Judge Rendell likened the process to the Government seiz[ing] personal medical information about you but ... only us[ing] the subset of that information that serves to identify you. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 424 (Rendell, J., dissenting). The dissent dissected also the analogy between fingerprints and DNA, quoting from Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 197-98, which opined that collecting DNA requires production of evidence below the body surface which is not subject to public view, as opposed to fingerprints which are accessible readily on the surface of the skin. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 424-25 (Rendell, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted). Judge Rendell rejected the reasoning of the majority in Pool, that probable cause for a particular crime is a watershed event, observing that Pool never explains why a finding of probable cause in connection with a particular crime justifies the collection of DNA profiles for use in connection with other crimes for which, by definition, there has been no finding of probable cause or, indeed, any suspicion at all. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 427 (Rendell, J., dissenting). Finally, the dissent attacked the foundation of the majority's Fourth Amendment analysis by noting that there are clearly defined exceptions to the general prohibition on warrantless searches, including reasonable suspicion of imminent danger and prison and jail searches. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 428 (Rendell, J., dissenting) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 909 (1968); Florence v. Burlington Cnty., 621 F.3d 296, 307 (3rd Cir. 2010); see generally Kincade, 379 F.3d at 822-24). Concluding that none of those exceptions were applicable and that the majority opinion should not have accepted nonspecific, broad government goals of fighting crime to justify a Fourth Amendment violation under an analysis that seemed more like a First Amendment rational basis review, the dissent advocated the more stringent approach required for Fourth Amendment analyses. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 428 (Rendell, J., dissenting). The final major case considered by the Buza court was Haskell, 677 F.Supp.2d at 1187, which denied a preliminary injunction to enjoin collection of a DNA sample pursuant to the California DNA Collection Act. Buza, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d at 753. Plaintiffs in Haskell mounted a facial challenge to the California Act under the Fourth Amendment. 677 F.Supp.2d at 1192. The Haskell court, tracking the reasoning generally of Kincade and Kriesel, concluded that, although arrestees have a greater privacy interest than prisoners, that interest is less than that of a member of the general population; therefore, arrestees are subject to a broad range of restrictions. Haskell, 677 F.Supp.2d at 1196. The court adopted the fingerprint/DNA analogy accepted by other courts and concluded that an arrestee's privacy interest is not weighty. Haskell, 677 F.Supp.2d at 1198. Following the reasoning of Mitchell, the Haskell court concluded that identification has two components and that the government has a legitimate interest in not only the name and date of birth of an arrestee, but also his or her criminal history (even criminal acts as yet undiscovered). Haskell, 677 F.Supp.2d at 1199. The court was concerned that [a]n individual might wear gloves at some point, thwarting fingerprint identification, or wear a mask, thwarting the use of photographs, and, therefore, DNA sampling was a more accurate and necessary form of identification. Id. In its sifting of the relevant cases, the Buza court rejected the DNA/fingerprint analogy relied upon in Mitchell, Pool, and Haskell. Buza, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d at 768. Similar to the dissent in Mitchell, Buza focused on whether the use of the DNA profile could overcome the full extent of the search that has taken place. Buza, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d at 768 (citing Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 416 (Rendell, J., dissenting)). The search referred to was the extraction of the entire human genome, which is necessary to develop the DNA profile uploaded to CODIS. Buza, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d at 769. The court, although acknowledging that the so-called junk DNA is not thought currently to code for genetic information, predicted advances in scientific technology which, along with the perpetual preservation of the DNA sample (not just the DNA profile), creates privacy concerns. Id. Noting that requiring fingerprinting after arrest has never undergone Fourth Amendment scrutiny, the Buza court rejected the notion that simply because fingerprinting is commonplace that DNA should take its place readily as a routine booking procedure, without additional scrutiny. [25] Id. As to the governmental interest in identification touted by the Haskell court, the court in Buza countered that the purpose of DNA sampling was investigation actually. 129 Cal.Rptr.3d at 770-71. Fingerprints taken for identification verify that the person who is fingerprinted is really who he says he is, while those taken for investigatory purposes are taken to connect [the person fingerprinted] to a crime with which he was not already connected. Buza, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d at 770 (quoting United States v. Garcia-Beltran, 389 F.3d 864, 864 (9th Cir.2004)). Fingerprints obtained for identification are admissible in court, while those obtained for investigatory purposes must be suppressed if their purpose was to connect [the arrestee] to alleged criminal activity. Id. (quoting Garcia-Beltran, 389 F.3d at 865; citing Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 105 S.Ct. 1643, 84 L.Ed.2d 705 (1985); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969)). Addressing the far-reaching, two-component definition of identification advanced in Haskell, the Buza court reasoned that the very nature of the second component (the criminal history of, or as-yet-unsolved crimes committed by, that person) implies an investigatory purpose. 129 Cal.Rptr.3d at 753. The realities of the DNA processing system mean that identification does not happen immediately (noting an average processing time of 31 days) and the DNA database does not contain identification information. Buza, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d at 772-73. Collection and processing of DNA samples in California requires that fingerprints be used alongside the DNA sample to identify the subject specifically, lending further support to the conclusion that the purpose of the collection is not identification. Buza, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d at 773 (quoting FAQs: Collection Mechanics, question 1.1, http://ag.ca.gov/bfs/content/ faqphp# mecahnics (last visited 4 Aug. 2011)). The identity-obscuring initiatives of concern in Haskell and the comment in Kincade that there is no way to avoid leaving DNA at the scene of the crime were deemed by the Buza court as weighing heavily in favor of concluding that DNA sampling is actually for investigatory purposes, as these relate directly to crime scene investigation. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr.3d at 773-74 (noting that an arrestee cannot mask his or her identity by wearing gloves while being fingerprinted or by wearing a mask while being photographed during routine booking procedures). The court concluded, from the text of the California DNA Collection Act, that the purpose of the Act was unquestionably consonant with the second component of identification, which is an investigatory process essentially. Buza, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d at 774. The California Act involves a programmatic warrantless search of all arrestees' DNA, without individualized suspicions and prior to any judicial determination of probable cause, much less guilt. Buza, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d at 780. Because the purpose is to determine whether the arrestee can be connected to a past unsolved crime and to create a databank through which he or she may now or in the future be connected to a new offense, the California DNA Collection Act did not meet any of the special needs exceptions and a generalized interest in crime fighting did not outweigh the privacy interests of mere arrestees. Id. The Court of Appeals of Minnesota weighed-in on the topic, in a certified question context, finding facially unconstitutional a Minnesota statute that required charged defendants to provide a DNA sample, after a judicial finding of probable cause, but prior to a conviction. In re Welfare of C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484, 486 (Minn.Ct.App.2006). In C.T.L., a juvenile was charged with fifth-degree assault and aiding and abetting a first-degree aggravated robbery. Id. The State of Minnesota ordered the juvenile to provide a biological specimen for DNA analysis pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 299C105 (Supp.2005). [26] Id. The juvenile moved for an order certifying the question of the statute's facial constitutionality. [27] Id. The court began its analysis with the premise that outside of a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions, searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate[,] are per se unreasonable. C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d at 488 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-45, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 576 (1971)). Drawing on the holding of Schmerber, [28] the Minnesota court concluded that establishing probable cause to arrest a person is not, by itself, sufficient to permit a biological specimen to be taken from the person without first obtaining a search warrant. C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d at 490 (noting the holding in Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70, 86 S.Ct. at 1835, 16 L.Ed.2d at 919, that [t]he interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained). The State in C.T.L. advanced a Pool watershed event argument as regards the initial finding of probable cause, to which the Minnesota court responded that the argument fails to recognize ... that probable cause to support a criminal charge is not the same thing as probable cause to issue a search warrant. 722 N.W.2d at 490. The court explained that probable cause [for charging purposes]... exists when the evidence worthy of consideration brings the charge against the prisoner within reasonable probability. Id. (internal citations omitted). On the other hand, probable cause to support a search warrant is found when there is a fair probability that contraband evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Id. (internal citation omitted). Conflation of the two standards of probable cause, the C.T.L. court concluded, dispenses with the Fourth Amendment requirement that, in order to conduct a search, law-enforcement personnel must obtain a warrant based on a neutral and detached magistrate's determination that there is a fair probability that the search will produce contraband or evidence of a crime. 722 N.W.2d at 491. Relying on the expungement provision in the Minnesota statute (which allowed those found not guilty ultimately or had charges dropped to have their DNA samples destroyed), the court reasoned that those persons found not guilty had an expectation of privacy greater than the State's need for DNA and, therefore, this interest should be applied reasonably to all persons charged, but not convicted yet. C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d at 491-92. Finally, the C.T.L. court concluded that the privacy interest of a person who is charged, but not convicted, is not outweighed by the state's interest in collecting DNA samples. 722 N.W.2d at 492. In United States v. Purdy, No. 8:05CR204, 2005 WL 3465721, , 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40433,  (D.Neb.2005), a federal district court, against the recommendation of its magistrate judge, granted a defendant's motion to suppress DNA evidence collected under the Nebraska Identifying Personal Characteristics Act (Nebraska Act), which allowed law enforcement, without a court order, to collect DNA samples from arrestees. [29] Purdy was arrested on an outstanding warrant and, at arrest, found to possess a firearm. Purdy, 2005 WL 3465721, at , 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40433, at . After his arrest, correctional officers collected forcefully DNA samples, causing physical injuries to Purdy that required medical treatment. Id. Conceding that the Fourth Amendment does not protect a characteristic that a person knowingly exposes to the public, like fingerprints or visual likeness, the court distinguished DNA as not exposed to the public and able to reveal medical facts for which individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Purdy, 2005 WL 3465721, at -4, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40433, at . Beginning with the Katz premise that a search without a warrant is per se unreasonable, the court concluded that none of the special needs exceptions were applicable and used the totality of the circumstances balancing test to evaluate Purdy's challenge. Purdy, 2005 WL 3465721, at -5, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40433, at -15. The Nebraska Act did not provide a constitutional basis for the search of Purdy because the statute would allow warrantless DNA sampling of anyone arrested, without the showing of any nexus between the alleged crime and the information that a DNA test would reveal. Purdy, 2005 WL 3465721, at -7, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40433, at -22. Comparing the expectation of privacy and the government interest in convicts, parolees, and probationers to that of arrestees, the court resolved that an arrestee's expectation of privacy outweighs the government desire for warrantless searches. Purdy, 2005 WL 3465721, at -7, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40433, at -21. Because probable cause for arrest is not the same as required for a search, [a] person arrested, but not convicted, for a certain crime cannot be forced to provide DNA identification evidence without a showing that such evidence would identify him as the perpetrator of the crime. Purdy, 2005 WL 3465721, at , 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40433, at . The court noted also that its holding did not prevent all arrestees from being subjected to DNA sampling; rather, law enforcement officers would need to obtain a search warrant from a neutral and detached judicial officer. Purdy, 2005 WL 3465721, at -7, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40433, at . A fractured, three-judge panel of the Arizona intermediate appellate court upheld an Arizona statute allowing a judge to condition pre-trial release upon collection of a DNA sample. Mario W. v. Kaipio, 228 Ariz. 207, 265 P.3d 389 (Ariz.Ct.App. 2011). Five juveniles were charged [30] and an advisory court concluded there was probable cause for bringing the charges. Mario W., 265 P.3d at 392. Pre-trial release was conditioned on the giving of DNA samples. Mario W., 265 P.3d at 395. The juveniles contended that the Arizona statute violated the United States and Arizona constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures and their rights to privacy. Id. Using the totality of the circumstances test, the Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division One, weighed the following factors in balancing the juveniles' privacy rights against the government interest: whether there was a judicial finding of probable cause that the juvenile committed the charged offense, the level of intrusion in relation to the other pre-adjudicative procedures, the degree and nature of physical intrusion required by the test, statutes restricting the use of test results, and any evidence in the record regarding improper uses of the results. Mario W., 265 P.3d at 396. Agreeing with the conclusion in Pool, that a finding of probable cause is a watershed event, the court determined that the five juveniles were distinguishable from the general public in such a way that permitted an exception to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against warrantless searches. Id. Other statutory restrictions placed on pretrial detainees, including GPS tracking, supported the court's conclusion that the juveniles had a reduced expectation of privacy. Mario W., 265 P.3d at 397 (citing Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 23(E)). The government interest served was an enhanced interest in crime prevention and deterrence, based on the post-arrest finding of probable cause. Mario W., 265 P.3d at 397. The court noted also that the level of physical intrusion of a buccal swab was minimal. Id. The government had a strong interest in determining accurately the juvenile's past criminal history in order to set the proper pre-trial release conditions. Id. Moreover, taking an arrestee's DNA sample aids the government in solving crimes and expands the DNA database. Mario W., 265 P.3d at 398. The court relied also upon the purpose of identification, agreeing with Mitchell that arrestees do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their identity. Mario W., 265 P.3d at 399. A concurring judge wrote separately to advance the fingerprint-to-DNA analogy as the basis for upholding the statute. Mario W., 265 P.3d at 401 (Orozco, J., concurring). The third judge, in a dissenting opinion, rejected the analogy of DNA-to-fingerprints and, focusing on the arrestees' presumption of innocence, concluded that the State failed to meet its burden to provide justification for abrogating the juveniles' expectation of privacy. Mario W., 265 P.3d at 404 (Norris, J., dissenting). The dissent criticized the majority for misapplying the totality of the circumstances test when it concluded that the juveniles had little if any expectation of privacy in their DNA because they have been arrested and a court has found probable cause to hold them for trial. Mario W., 265 P.3d at 405 (Norris, J., dissenting). Rather, argued the dissent, under Supreme Court jurisprudence, the conviction is what alters meaningfully the expectation of privacy, not the mere charging. Mario W., 265 P.3d at 405 (Norris, J., dissenting) (citing Knights, 534 U.S. at 118, 122 S.Ct. at 591, 151 L.Ed.2d at 504) (emphasis added). Criticizing also the majority's likening of DNA sampling to other pre-trial release conditions, Judge Norris maintained, as the better reasoned approach, that DNA sampling under prevailing collection techniques is distinguishable because it is a physical intrusion into the body and the juveniles' privacy was further invaded when the DNA sample is analyzed and the profile extracted. Mario W., 265 P.3d at 406 (Norris, J., dissenting). Rejecting the fingerprint/DNA analogy, Judge Norris noted that a fingerprint is an impression left by the depositing of oil upon contact between a surface and the fission ridges of the fingers, while DNA stores massive amounts of personal, private data about an individual. Mario W., 265 P.3d at 407 (Norris, J., dissenting) (quoting Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 221; Kincade, 379 F.3d at 842 n. 3 (Gould, J. concurring)) (internal quotations omitted). The dissent took pains also to protest subsuming DNA sampling into routine booking practices, countering that fingerprinting became routine prior to the evolution of modern reasonable expectation of privacy jurisprudence and [t]hat today we accept fingerprinting as a routine practice without Fourth Amendment implications does not mean we must accept DNA sampling as being the same. Mario W., 265 P.3d at 407-08 (Norris, J., dissenting). Finally, Judge Norris criticized the majority's characterization of the statute's purpose as identification only, pointing out that, if that were the case, expungement upon the dismissal of charges would not be necessary. Mario W., 265 P.3d at 408 (Norris, J., dissenting). Noting that the State failed to produce any evidence that there was any difficulty in obtaining accurate identification of any of the juveniles, which might require another method of identification, the dissent argued that DNA itself provides no identifying information; a DNA sample is only useful when it can be compared to a prior DNA sample obtained from the same person ... [i]f the arrestee's DNA is not in a DNA database, there can be no comparison and thus no verification of identity. Id. The dissent closed with its concern that the majority opinion will contribute to the downward ratchet of privacy expectations, and that [a] highly expansive opinion [authorizing a warrantless search], one that draws no hard lines and revels in the boon that new technology will provide to law enforcement, is an engraved invitation to future expansion. Mario W., 265 P.3d at 409 (Norris, J., dissenting) (quoting Scott, 450 F.3d at 867; Kincade, 379 F.3d at 873 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting)). We conclude our survey of relevant opinions with Anderson v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 469, 650 S.E.2d 702, 703 (2007). The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld, against an as-applied Fourth Amendment challenge, a Virginia statute that authorized DNA collection from individuals upon arrest. Anderson, 650 S.E.2d at 703. In 2003, Anderson was arrested for rape and sodomy and his DNA sample was collected pursuant to Va.Code Ann. § 19.2-310.2:1 (2007). Anderson, 650 S.E.2d at 704. Anderson's DNA profile was uploaded to the DNA databank, resulting in a match to a forensic sample collected from an unsolved 1991 rape. Id. Based on the database hit, detectives obtained a search warrant for an additional DNA buccal swab, the analysis of which provided the primary evidence at Anderson's trial for the 1991 rape as well as the 2003 crimes. Id. His motion to suppress the DNA evidence was denied. Id. He was convicted of rape, robbery, and sodomy, and sentenced to two life terms, plus ten years. Id. The Virginia Supreme Court concluded that, although a DNA sample is more revealing, it is no different in character than acquiring fingerprints upon arrest. Anderson, 650 S.E.2d at 705. Adopting the fingerprint-to-DNA analogy advanced in Nicholas, Sczubelek, and this Court's decision in Raines, the Virginia court concluded that DNA collection is acceptable as part of the routine booking process as a way of obtaining an arrestee's identification. Anderson, 650 S.E.2d at 705-06. In doing so, the court rejected Anderson's reliance on City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47, 121 S.Ct. 447, 457, 148 L.Ed.2d 333, 347 (2000), standing for the proposition that general crime control purposes can only be justified by some quantum of individualized suspicion, and Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 121 S.Ct. 1281, 149 L.Ed.2d 205 (2001), stating that general law enforcement searches are not exempt from the requirements of probable cause. Anderson, 650 S.E.2d at 706. The Virginia court relied upon the reasoning in Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir.1992), which considered only application of the Virginia DNA collection statute to convicted felons, but extended the rationale to routine booking procedures, and as such, no additional finding of individualized suspicion, much less probable cause, must be established before the sample may be obtained. Anderson, 650 S.E.2d at 706.