Opinion ID: 2582262
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cross-examination of Defendant with Were They Lying Questions

Text: Defendant challenges the following portions of the prosecutor's cross-examination: Over defense counsel's objection the question was argumentative, the prosecutor asked defendant why Tina Whaley and Rosalind Wathel, who live in two different states in the United States, 1500, 2,000 miles apart, both claim that you said to them that you drove a brown Seville? Defendant responded that he did not know. The prosecutor asked whether he thought the women were lying. He responded, My opinion, yes. Then the prosecutor asked, Do you think that these women bear a grudge against you? Defendant said, Yes. Without objection, the prosecutor asked if defendant had any idea how Rosalind is able to come into Court and tell us these things about a Photo Drive-up when she's been living for the last eight years in Harris County, Houston, Texas? Defendant responded, Yeah, somebody obviously had to tell her. Over defense counsel's objection that speculation about somebody else is irrelevant, the prosecutor asked, Do you think [Wathel] dislikes you now? Defendant answered, Yes. The prosecutor asked, Do you think based upon that she's willing to come out to California several times to lie about you? Defendant answered, Yes. Defense counsel objected and moved to strike the answer on the basis that it's irrelevant what he thinks. The prosecutor responded, I'm trying to understand, because he knows her better than anyone else in this courtroom. And he said what she says is not true, so I'm trying to understand why he thinks she's lying. Without objection, the prosecutor asked, You don't know how this woman [Wathel] . . . knows that you went to a Photo Drive-Up booth with your son and murdered a young girl? Defendant answered, Yes, because me and her never had that conversation. The prosecutor asked, Just one of those awful coincidence[s] that she knows those things? Defendant answered, Somebody told her what had happened. Me and her never had that conversation whatsoever. Defendant denied that he was bragging about the killing despite Whaley and Wathel's testimony to the contrary. The prosecutor then asked whether Whaley was lying in this regard. When he answered, Yes, the prosecutor asked why she was lying. He answered, That I can't say. Maybe they took it as the way I was telling them. Maybe to them I was bragging, I don't know. To me I wasn't bragging because I had a serious look on my face, and I was basically crying about it. So I don't see how they could take it as bragging. The prosecutor asked, Did something happen in your relationship with Tina Whaley that perhaps might cause her to feel poorly about you? Defendant answered, It may have. The prosecutor asked, Do you think that's why she's lying about you? He answered, Could be. The prosecutor asked, Mr. Chatman, you seem to have a lot of people who are lying about you. Why do you think that is? He answered, That I can't really say. The prosecutor asked, Do you think perhaps that you're the cause of these people, that that's why they're saying these things about you? Defense counsel objected under 1101 (i.e., Evidence Code section 1101) and also speculation. The court overruled the objection, and defendant answered, I would say no. Without objection, the prosecutor questioned defendant about William Speed's testimony: There's another person who's come and lied about you? Was there a reason why, that you know of, why he is coming in and lying about you? and Well, why do you think? Defendant said he could not speculate, I don't know. The prosecutor asked, Why do these people keep coming in and saying these things about you? Defendant answered, I cannot say why they would say them things. They have their reasons for what they're doing, but he did not know what they were. Without objection, the prosecutor three times asked whether a particular item of evidence was another example of someone lying. [13] Each time, defendant answered, Yes. Without objection, the prosecutor asked how the safe was opened. Defendant said he could not say; he never touched the safe. The prosecutor asked, Well, is the safe lying about you? Again, defendant said he did not know, and that he could only say I never touched it. Defendant argues the prosecutor committed misconduct by repeatedly asking [him] to comment on the veracity of other witnesses. He claims that the questions invaded the province of the jury, elicited improper lay opinion about the veracity of witnesses, and constituted misconduct by intentionally eliciting inadmissible testimony. At the outset, we question whether this issue is properly considered one of misconduct. Although it is misconduct for a prosecutor intentionally to elicit inadmissible testimony ( People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 689, 250 Cal.Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217), merely eliciting evidence is not misconduct. Defendant's real argument is that the evidence was inadmissible. ( People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1218, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 240, 939 P.2d 354.) Although the prosecutor in this case certainly asked the questions intentionally, nothing in the record suggests he sought to present evidence he knew was inadmissible, especially given that the court overruled defendant's objections and, as discussed below, the applicable law was unsettled at the time of trial. But whether we label the issue misconduct or the erroneous admission of evidence does not greatly matter, for defendant's argument is essentially identical under either characterization. Because the cases generally discuss the issue under the rubric of misconduct, we will do so also. The Attorney General argues first that the claim is not cognizable because defendant did not properly object. As a general rule a defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely fashionand on the same groundthe defendant made an assignment of misconduct and requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the impropriety. ( People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2 ( Samayoa ).) Defense counsel did object to a number of were they lying questions as argumentative, speculative, and irrelevant. The court overruled these objections, indicating generally that it would permit this line of questioning. Thus, with one exception, [14] we conclude a request for a jury admonition or the lodging of further objections would have been futile. Additional objections were not necessary to preserve the claim. ( People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) Defendant may argue on appeal that the questions were improper for the reasons asserted at trial; that they were irrelevant, speculative, or argumentative. Before turning to those grounds, we address defendant's argument that the questions invaded the province of the jury. It is a truism that it is for the jury to determine credibility. Questions that legitimately assist the jurors in discharging that obligation are proper. The legal cliché used by many courts, [that evidence] would `invade the province' or `usurp the function' of the jury is, as Dean Wigmore has said, `so misleading, as well as so unsound, that it should be entirely repudiated. It is a mere bit of empty rhetoric,' and `remains simply one of those impracticable and misconceived utterances which lack any justification in principle.' ( People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351, 370, 208 Cal.Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709, quoting 7 Wigmore on Evidence (Chadbourne rev. ed.) 1978, §§ 1920, 1921, pp. 18, 22.) Defendant cites to such cases as People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 744, 244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741, for the proposition that [l]ay opinion about the veracity of particular statements by another is inadmissible on that issue. Melton and similar cases involved lay opinion from those who had no personal knowledge of the facts. Such opinions are of little assistance in deciding the credibility of testimony by percipient witnesses who do have personal knowledge. There is a difference between asking a witness whether, in his opinion, another is lying and asking that witness whether he knows of a reason why another would be motivated to lie. We now turn to defendant's claim that the prosecutor's questions were argumentative, or called for irrelevant or speculative testimony. People v. Zambrano (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 228, 238, 21 Cal. Rptr.3d 160 ( Zambrano ) was the first California case to determine the propriety of such questions, [15] and provides an example of improper were they lying questions. Zambrano was arrested for selling cocaine to two undercover officers. At trial, both officers testified to the circumstances of the transaction. Zambrano testified that he had been working at the business where the sale allegedly took place, but denied involvement in any drug transaction. Instead, he testified that one of the officers approached, put a gun to his neck, threw him on the ground and handcuffed him. ( Id. at p. 233, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 160.) On cross-examination, the prosecutor repeatedly asked defendant if the officers were lying and whether `everybody is lying except for you?' ( Id. at p. 235, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 160.) As the Zambrano court held, the district attorney's questions called for irrelevant and speculative testimony. It was clear that the defendant was testifying to a diametrically different set of circumstances from that recounted by the officers. The differences could not have been attributed to mistake or faulty recall. Defendant, a stranger to the officers, had no basis for insight into their bias, interest, or motive to be untruthful. Had the prosecutor asked why they might lie, which she did not, it would have been apparent that any answer would have been speculative. Under these circumstances, the questions did not develop facts regarding defendant's own testimony. They merely forced defendant to opine without foundation, that the officers were liars. ( Zambrano, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 241, 21 Cal. Rptr.3d 160.) Courts from various jurisdictions have treated were they lying questions differently. One line of cases concludes they are always improper, while another concludes they are never so. ( People v. Foster, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 384, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 535.) Zambrano joins a third line of cases that counsels a trial court to consider these questions in context. ( Zambrano, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 239, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 160.) If a defendant has no relevant personal knowledge of the events, or of a reason that a witness may be lying or mistaken, he might have no relevant testimony to provide. No witness may give testimony based on conjecture or speculation. (See Evid.Code, § 702.) Such evidence is irrelevant because it has no tendency in reason to resolve questions in dispute. (Evid. Code, § 210.) In challenging a witness's testimony, a party implicitly or explicitly urges that because a witness is lying, mistaken, or incompetent, the witness should not be believed. A party who testifies to a set of facts contrary to the testimony of others may be asked to clarify what his position is and give, if he is able, a reason for the jury to accept his testimony as more reliable. The permissible scope of cross-examination of a defendant is generally broad. When a defendant voluntarily testifies, the district attorney may fully amplify his testimony by inquiring into the facts and circumstances surrounding his assertions, or by introducing evidence through cross-examination which explains or refutes his statements or the inferences which may necessarily be drawn from them. [Citation.] A defendant cannot, by testifying to a state of things contrary to and inconsistent with the evidence of the prosecution, thus indirectly denying the testimony against him, but without testifying expressly with relation to the same facts, limit the cross-examination to the precise facts concerning which he testifies. [Citation.] ( People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 822, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865 ( Cooper ).) A defendant who is a percipient witness to the events at issue has personal knowledge whether other witnesses who describe those events are testifying truthfully and accurately. As a result, he might also be able to provide insight on whether witnesses whose testimony differs from his own are intentionally lying or are merely mistaken. When, as here, the defendant knows the other witnesses well, he might know of reasons those witnesses might lie. Any of this testimony could be relevant to the credibility of both the defendant and the other witnesses. There is no reason to categorically exclude all such questions. Were a defendant to testify on direct examination that a witness against him lied, and go on to give reasons for this deception, surely that testimony would not be excluded merely because credibility determinations fall squarely within the jury's province. Similarly, cross-examination along this line should not be categorically prohibited. Here defendant took the stand and put his own veracity in issue. He urged that a number of witnesses should not be believed, but that he should be. The jury had to determine whose testimony to credit. It is one thing for a witness to assert that he had a better vantage point from which to observe an event, or that his memory is superior to one who was inattentive or has given inconsistent accounts. It is another thing entirely for a witness to claim that witness after opposing witness has lied. Defendant was not asked to opine on whether other witnesses should be believed. He was asked to clarify his own position and whether he had any information about whether other witnesses had a bias, interest, or motive to be untruthful. It was permissible for the prosecutor to clarify defendant's own position in this regard. It was also permissible to ask whether he knew of facts that would show a witness's testimony might be inaccurate or mistaken, or whether he knew of any bias, interest, or motive for a witness to be untruthful. The cross-examination was legitimate inquiry to clarify defendant's position. The questions sought to elicit testimony that would properly assist the trier of fact in ascertaining whom to believe. Defendant had personal knowledge of the conversations he had with the other witnesses, and they were all friends or relatives. He could provide relevant, non-speculative testimony as to the accuracy of their information and any motive for dishonesty. If he provided a reason for one of them to have testified inaccurately, the jury could consider that reason for whatever value it believed it had. If he provided no reason, the jury might also consider the fact that not even defendant, who, as the prosecutor pointed out knew the witnesses better than anyone else in the courtroom, could think of any reason why their testimony should not be credited. The were they lying questions regarding other witnesses generally called for and received an actual answer. For example, in answering a question regarding the witnesses' testimony that defendant was bragging, he provided an alternative reason for the discrepancy. He said that he was not bragging, but because of his demeanor, someone may have erroneously thought he was. Moreover, the were they lying questions were brief and generally precursors to follow-up questions as to whether defendant knew of any reason the witnesses had to lie. At least when, as here, the defendant knows the witnesses well, we think questions regarding any basis for bias on the part of a key witness are clearly proper. The prosecutor's question about whether the safe was lying requires a different analysis. The question was argumentative. [16] An argumentative question is a speech to the jury masquerading as a question. The questioner is not seeking to elicit relevant testimony. Often it is apparent that the questioner does not even expect an answer. The question may, indeed, be unanswerable. The prosecutor's question whether the safe [was] lying is an example. An inanimate object cannot lie. Professor Wigmore has called cross-examination the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth. (5 Wigmore on Evidence (Chadbourne rev. ed.1974) § 1367, p. 32.) The engine should be allowed to run, but it cannot be allowed to run amok. An argumentative question that essentially talks past the witness, and makes an argument to the jury, is improper because it does not seek to elicit relevant, competent testimony, or often any testimony at all. Defendant had already explained he had no explanation for the safe being open. Asking whether the safe was lying could add nothing to this testimony. Defendant claims his attorney was incompetent for not objecting to this question. However, deciding whether to object is inherently tactical, and the failure to object will rarely establish ineffective assistance. ( People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 502, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754 ( Hillhouse ).) Deficient performance has not been shown. Further, it is not reasonably probable that a determination more favorable to defendant would have resulted had the question been objected to and disallowed, particularly since the jury acquitted defendant of robbery. ( People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1126, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1 ( Rodrigues ).) In sum, courts should carefully scrutinize were they lying questions in context. They should not be permitted when argumentative, or when designed to elicit testimony that is irrelevant or speculative. However, in its discretion, a court may permit such questions if the witness to whom they are addressed has personal knowledge that allows him to provide competent testimony that may legitimately assist the trier of fact in resolving credibility questions.