Opinion ID: 1708045
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: whether the evidence was sufficient to support a verdict of guilty or the result of prejudice and bias and the conviction should be reversed and the defendant discharged.

Text: ¶ 21. Sturdivant lastly contends that the testimony of Deputy Coleman was contradictory, inconsistent, and self-serving. Given this supposed confusing testimony, Sturdivant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. ¶ 22. In McClain v. State, 625 So.2d 774, 778 (Miss.1993), we summarized the standard of review for challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence: The three challenges by McClain (motion for directed verdict, request for peremptory instruction, and motion for JNOV) challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Since each requires consideration of the evidence before the court when made, this Court properly reviews the ruling on the last occasion the challenge was made in the trial court. This occurred when the Circuit Court overruled McClain's motion for JNOV. Wetz v. State, 503 So.2d 803, 807-08 (Miss.1987). In appeals from an overruled motion for JNOV the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law is viewed and tested in a light most favorable to the State. Esparaza v. State, 595 So.2d 418, 426 (Miss.1992); Wetz at 808; Harveston v. State, 493 So.2d 365, 370 (Miss.1986); May v. State, 460 So.2d 778, 780-81 (Miss.1984); Callahan v. State, 419 So.2d 165, 174 (Miss.1982). The credible evidence consistent with McClain's guilt must be accepted as true. Spikes v. State, 302 So.2d 250, 251 (Miss.1974). The prosecution must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence. Wetz at 808; Hammond v. State, 465 So.2d 1031, 1035 (Miss.1985); May at 781. Matters regarding the weight and credibility of the evidence are to be resolved by the jury. Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 758 (Miss.1984); Gathright v. State, 380 So.2d 1276, 1278 (Miss.1980). We are authorized to reverse only where, with respect to one or more of the elements of the offense charged, the evidence so considered is such that reasonable and fair-minded jurors could only find the accused not guilty. Wetz at 808; Harveston at 370; Fisher v. State, 481 So.2d 203, 212 (Miss.1985). 625 So.2d at 778. Here, the same standard applies as Sturdivant's last unsuccessful challenge was also a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (J.N.O.V.). ¶ 23. Sturdivant states that the first inconsistencies came when Coleman testified that [w]hen I rolled up, I said I need a 20. Right then and there he (Sturdivant) turned around to Mr. Ivy and the transaction took place. On cross-examination, Coleman admitted that in his official report he had stated that he talked to Ivy first. ¶ 24. Coleman also admitted that Jimmy Ivy was known to sell narcotics according to police intelligence reports. However, this particular undercover operation was initially targeted at another individual not involved in this case. When the original target was not there, Coleman made the purchase from whoever was on the corner, in this case Sturdivant and Ivy. ¶ 25. Coleman further testified that the standard procedure for identifying unknown suspects is to show other agents the video who then attempt to identify the suspect by face or by going back to the scene and asking locals. This procedure led to the identification of Sturdivant here. The problem lies in the fact that the task force agents who identified Sturdivant by going back to the scene presented Coleman with only one photograph of the suspect. Sturdivant argues that in effect the task force identified him on behalf of Coleman. ¶ 26. The leading Mississippi case on suggestive photograph identification is York v. State, 413 So.2d 1372, 1374 (Miss. 1982), which stated as follows: In February, 1967, the United States Supreme Court in three decisions initiated an in-depth search of the inherent problems with accuracy of identification testimony. It is a haunting question. When a false identification results in a conviction, two unfortunate developments follow: an innocent person is convicted, and a criminal remains loose in society. These three decisions, called by commentators the Wade trilogy, are: United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967); and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967). These cases and their progeny are the present guidelines this Court must follow in determining the competency of identification testimony, whenever this issue is called into question. York, 413 So.2d at 1374. Furthermore, this Court stated in Nicholson v. State, 523 So.2d 68, 72 (Miss.1988), that the Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199, 93 S.Ct. 375, 382, 34 L.Ed.2d 401, 411 (1972), factors are to be analyzed in assessing the validity of identification testimony, as follows: York goes on to set out the Neil factors to consider in determining whether these standards have been fulfilled: 1. Opportunity of the witness to view the accused at the time of the crime; 2. The degree of attention exhibited by the witness; 3. The accuracy of the witness's prior description of the criminal; 4. The level of certainty exhibited by the witness at the confrontation; 5. The length of time between the crime and the confrontation. 523 So.2d at 72. ¶ 27. Applying these factors to the present case, 1. Opportunity to view the accused. ¶ 28. Coleman had a good opportunity to view Sturdivant during this illegal narcotics transaction on January 8, 1997. Coleman first saw the suspect at a distance of only ten to fifteen feet and then saw him close-up when he approached the vehicle. 2. Degree of attention. ¶ 29. Coleman was carefully attentive to the suspect's physical characteristics which included the Band-Aid on the right side of his face. 3. Accuracy of prior description. ¶ 30. Coleman gave an accurate description of the suspect immediately after the buy which was used by the task force to locate Sturdivant as the seller. Moreover, Coleman's identification of Sturdivant was corroborated by Detective Walters who said that Coleman gave a detailed description of the suspect. 4. Witness's level of certainty at confrontation. ¶ 31. Coleman was equally sure that Sturdivant was the person involved when he first saw the photograph a few days after the incident. He had no doubt that Sturdivant was the one who sold him the cocaine. 5. Length of time between the crime and the confrontation. ¶ 32. Sturdivant was arrested less than two months later (March 3, 1997), and was identified by Coleman at trial on April 7 and 8, 1998. ¶ 33. The jury also had the brief image of Sturdivant on the video to weigh in their deliberations. Thus, the State has satisfied the Neil factors because there is ample record evidence to support a determination that there was no substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification in allowing the in-court identification, nor was there substantial likelihood of misidentification in allowing the testimony of the out-of-court identification itself. ¶ 34. In Smith v. State, 492 So.2d 260 (Miss.1986) (superseded on other grounds by the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act, Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-1 et seq. (Supp.1998)), this Court found that any error involving the in-court identification of the suspect, which was a result of the pre-trial photograph lineup, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 268. There, during the photograph lineup, the witnesses picked Smith's picture because they were allowed to see the names on the backs of the photographs. One witness alleged that he was left alone with the pictures. It was undisputed that the names were indeed on the backs of the five photographs used in the lineup. Id. Therefore, the suggestive nature of the pretrial identification of Sturdivant was harmless error, if any. ¶ 35. In Doby v. State, 532 So.2d 584, 591 (Miss.1988), we affirmed Doby's conviction for the sale of cocaine although four witnesses testified that Doby was in the State of Illinois at the time of the alleged incident. Id. at 590. On appeal, Doby contended the conviction to be against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Id. In affirming Doby's conviction, we recognized the rule that persons may be found guilty on the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, who happened to be an undercover officer. Id.; See also Ragland v. State, 403 So.2d 146 (Miss.1981); Clanton v. State, 279 So.2d 599 (Miss.1973); Holt v. State, 186 Miss. 727, 191 So. 673 (1939). Moreover, we have stated that a jury may accept the testimony of some witnesses and reject that of others. In other words, the credibility of witnesses is not for the reviewing court, but only for the jury. See Grose-close v. State, 440 So.2d 297, 300-01 (Miss. 1983). As to the question of the weight of the evidence, the strength or weakness of testimony is not measured by the number of witnesses produced by a particular party. Id. at 300; Bond v. State, 249 Miss. 352, 162 So.2d 510 (1964); Spiers v. State, 231 Miss. 307, 94 So.2d 803 (1957). ¶ 36. Under our criminal justice system, the jury is charged with the responsibility for weighing and considering conflicting evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Winters v. State, 449 So.2d 766, 771 (Miss.1984). There is sufficient record evidence to affirm the conviction when weighed in a light most favorable to the state. Therefore, this Court finds no merit to this assignment of error.