Opinion ID: 2548863
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: free speech analysis

Text: ¶ 53 Finally, Safe Havens argues that the challenged provisions violate free speech protections guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Safe Havens contends that the provisions burden core political speech, or at least impose severe restrictions upon rights of free speech and political expression, and thus are subject to strict scrutiny under federal free speech analysis. [4] We disagree. ¶ 54 Safe Havens bases its argument, in part, on Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 108 S.Ct. 1886, 100 L.Ed.2d 425 (1988), in which the appellants challenged a law regulating Colorado's initiative process. The law, which made it a felony to pay petition circulators, had the effect of reducing the number of circulators available for any particular initiative since initiative sponsors were limited to using volunteers. Id. at 417, 419, 108 S.Ct. 1886. In affirming the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed that the case involved core political speech, and that the law acted as a limitation on political expression and was subject to exacting scrutiny. Id. at 420, 108 S.Ct. 1886. The Court explained that the refusal to permit initiative sponsors to pay circulators limits political expression in two ways: First, it limits the number of voices who will convey appellees' message and the hours they can speak and, therefore, limits the size of the audience they can reach. Second, it makes it less likely that appellees will garner the number of signatures necessary to place the matter on the ballot, thus limiting their ability to make the matter the focus of statewide discussion. Id. at 422-23, 108 S.Ct. 1886 (citation omitted). Thus, the prohibition against the use of paid circulators ha[d] the inevitable effect of reducing the total quantum of speech on a public issue. Id. at 423, 108 S.Ct. 1886. Due to this limitation on political expression, the Court stated that the burden the state would have to overcome in order to justify the law was well-nigh insurmountable. Id. at 425, 108 S.Ct. 1886. ¶ 55 Safe Havens also cites Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 525 U.S. 182, 119 S.Ct. 636, 142 L.Ed.2d 599 (1999), in which the Court struck down three state initiative regulations requiring petition circulators to wear name badges and to comply with other disclosure requirements. The Buckley Court noted that petition circulation involved core political speech, but also recognized the principle that there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes. Id. at 186-87, 119 S.Ct. 636 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992) (finding that [e]lection laws will invariably impose some burden on individual voters, and that every voting regulation need not be subject to strict scrutiny). Thus, the Court upheld some of the state's regulations, but declared the disclosure requirements to be invalid because they infringed upon circulators' right to anonymous free speech, and therefore, as was the case in Meyer, reduced the number of people who were willing to spread the political message. Buckley, 525 U.S. at 194-200, 119 S.Ct. 636. ¶ 56 In the present case, both Meyer and Buckley are inapposite. Both cases involved provisions that regulated the manner in which initiative sponsors could disseminate their message and had the effect of limiting the number of messengers available to spread the political message. These cases do not stand for the proposition that every regulation of the initiative procedure impacts free speech and is thus subject to strict scrutiny. Rather, the right to free speech... [is] not implicated by the state's creation of an initiative procedure, but only by the state's attempts to regulate speech associated with an initiative procedure, which is not the case here. Save Palisade Fruitlands v. Todd, 279 F.3d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir.2002) (holding a Colorado law granting right of initiative to home rule counties and not to statutory counties did not infringe the fundamental right of free speech for purposes of equal protection analysis). Both Meyer and Buckley involved an unconstitutional regulation of speech that happened to occur in the context of an existing initiative scheme. Id. at 1212. ¶ 57 Contrary to Safe Havens' assertions, the provisions of the initiative statute do nothing to restrict speech. Initiative proponents are free, and even encouraged, to disseminate their message throughout the state. Nothing in the initiative statute serves to limit the number of messengers available to engage in this sort of political expression. While the regulations may arguably make it more difficult to place an initiative on the ballot, nothing ... suggest[s] that there is a protected right to have a particular initiative on the ballot. Skrzypczak v. Kauger, 92 F.3d 1050, 1053 (10th Cir.1996) (holding that the State of Oklahoma's refusal to place an unconstitutional initiative on the ballot did not infringe on free speech rights). Free speech protections guarantee[ ] neither success in placing an item on the ballot nor eventual ratification by voters. Rather, free speech is found in the interplay of ideas during the attempt to capture the voters' curiosity and support. Gallivan, 2002 UT 89 at ¶ 109, 54 P.3d 1069 (Thorne, J., dissenting); see also Skrzypczak, 92 F.3d at 1053 (Skrzypczak mistakenly conflates her legally-protected interest in free speech with her personal desire to have [her initiative] on the ballot.). Thus, the provisions challenged by Safe Havens do not limit free speech and do not violate First and Fourteenth Amendment free speech guarantees. ¶ 58 Even if regulation of the initiative process were found to infringe on Safe Havens' free speech rights, this does not lead to the conclusion that the provisions are subject to strict scrutiny review. The Supreme Court recognized in Burdick that a more flexible standard applies and that when a state election law provision imposes only reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, the State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions. 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059 (internal quotations omitted). As discussed above, the provisions at issue do not impose unreasonable or discriminatory burdens on the rights of voters to participate in the initiative process. Hence, the legislative purposes that we have discussed in connection with those provisions would be sufficient to justify any minimal restrictions arguably imposed by the provisions. ¶ 59 Safe Havens also challenges the provisions under the free speech protections guaranteed by article I, section 15 of the Utah Constitution. That section states, No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press. Utah Const. art. I, § 15. As already discussed, the regulatory provisions at issue in this case do not impinge on free speech rights. The Senate District Requirement, the Signature Removal Provision, and the One-Year Requirement do nothing to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech. [I]nitiative supporters are free to approach any citizen within any, and ideally all, of Utah's twenty-nine senate districts and express their views without restriction. See Gallivan, 2002 UT 89 at ¶ 145, 54 P.3d 1069 (Thorne, J., dissenting). Free and robust public debate ... can neither be equated with successfully communicating one's ideas, nor with successfully placing an initiative on the ballot, or with the proposal being adopted as law. Id. at ¶ 146. Rather, free speech protections guarantee Safe Havens' right to engage in discourse that is essential to [its] attempt to place the measure on the ballot, and this right is not contravened by any of the challenged provisions. Id.