Opinion ID: 853732
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Prior Statement

Text: The State called Gregory Anderson to testify at trial about events surrounding Coffman's murder. Anderson testified that Sturgeon told him Hauk had started to mess with Coffman and that he [Sturgeon] had to mess [Coffman] up. (R. at 1446-47.) Sturgeon also said that [Hauk] had started this and he had to finish it. (R. at 1454.) Anderson further testified that he helped Sturgeon move the body from Sturgeon's home to the trunk of Coffman's car. On cross-examination, the defense impeached Anderson with inconsistencies between his trial testimony and a police statement given on March 11, 1995. The defense also implied that Anderson's testimony was influenced by favorable treatment from the State. [1] In response, the State offered Anderson's March 11th statement as evidence of a prior consistent statement. Sturgeon contends that the testimony was inadmissible under the prior consistent statement rule because, at the time Anderson made the statement, he had a motive to fabricate. Under Indiana Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(B), a statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is consistent with the declarant's testimony, offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, and made before the motive to fabricate arose.... Ind. Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(B); see also Evans v. State, 643 N.E.2d 877, 882-83 (Ind.1994). We review trial court rulings on the admissibility of arguably hearsay statements for abuse of discretion. Horan v. State, 682 N.E.2d 502, 511 (Ind.1997). Sturgeon clearly challenged Anderson's credibility with inconsistencies between Anderson's prior statement and his trial testimony. Sturgeon further implied that Anderson's testimony was influenced by favorable treatment from the State. Also, Anderson's police statement was consistent with his trial testimony and offered to rebut Sturgeon's charges of recent fabrication and improper influence. The remaining question is whether Anderson's statement was made before the alleged improper motive to fabricate arose. Since Anderson was involved in the circumstances of the crime both before and after the crime occurred, Sturgeon asserts that Anderson had motive to shift blame away from himself and toward Sturgeon when questioned by the police. (Appellant's Br. at 32.) Sturgeon relies upon Bouye v. State, 699 N.E.2d 620 (Ind.1998), and Thompson v. State, 690 N.E.2d 224 (Ind.1997). In Bouye, the trial court admitted a prior statement by the defendant's co-conspirator implicating the defendant in a murder. The co-conspirator had already been arrested in connection with the murder when he made the statement. Bouye, 699 N.E.2d at 624-25. A few months later, the co-conspirator pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement with the State and agreed to testify against Bouye. Id. at 625. After being impeached by the defendant at trial, the co-conspirator's second statement was admitted and was identical to his trial testimony. Id. Bouye objected to the admission of his co-conspirator's prior statement, asserting the statement was made when the co-conspirator had a motive to fabricate. This Court agreed the statement was made after his motive to fabricate arose and, therefore, the statement... does not qualify under Rule 801(d)(1) for exclusion from the definition of hearsay evidence. Id. at 626. In Thompson, the court admitted a statement made by the defendant's alleged co-conspirator, Percy, through the testimony of Percy's friend. Thompson, 690 N.E.2d at 232. This statement implicated the defendant in a murder and was offered to rebut the defendant's charge of improper motive. Id. at 232 n. 8. Although this Court determined the statement was inadmissible on relevancy grounds, we also noted: To be admissible under [801(d)(1)(B) ], Percy's motive to fabricate had to have arisen after the prior statement was made. Arguably this prerequisite is not satisfied here. Percy's motive to implicate Thompson arose instantaneously because Percy essentially admitted to an accomplice role in the murders; Percy had every reason to shift culpability to Thompson while minimizing his own involvement. Id. The State contends Anderson's statement was given before his motive to fabricate arose because the statement was given before the State levied charges against him. (Appellee's Br. at 12.) In so contending, the State relies on Evans, 643 N.E.2d 877. In that case, Evans sold drugs to Decker. Decker's statement implicating Evans was admitted at trial to rebut charges of improper motive. Id. at 881. Decker made the statement after he had been arrested, but before reaching a plea agreement with the State. Id. The defendant objected to the statement as hearsay. Id. We disagreed and held the statement was admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B). In so holding, we stated: Decker's statement to the police came before he reached a plea agreement with the State and so satisfies all of the requirements for admission under Rule 801(d)(1)(B). Id. at 883. Based on this reasoning, the State now argues Anderson's statement was given before a motive to fabricate arose because the statement was made before the State levied charges against Anderson and well before he pled guilty or entered into a plea bargain. We cannot agree with the State that Evans stands for the proposition that a motive to fabricate arises only where the declarant has been charged, pled guilty, or entered into a plea bargaining agreement. Nor do we agree with Sturgeon that Bouye and Thompson require us to find a motive to fabricate, automatically, at the time the crime occurred or where the declarant has been questioned by the police in connection with the matter. Rather, whether a motive to fabricate has arisen remains a fact-sensitive issue. A review of our case law reveals that most of the opinions addressing the timing of a motive to fabricate involve two situations: (1) where the declarant was the victim, see, e.g., Craig v. State, 630 N.E.2d 207 (Ind.1994); Parmley v. State, 699 N.E.2d 288 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied; Caley v. State, 650 N.E.2d 54 (Ind. Ct.App.1995), trans. denied; Marshall v. State, 643 N.E.2d 957 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied; Allen v. State, 636 N.E.2d 190 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied, or (2) where the declarant was the defendant or equally culpable to the defendant in the crime, see, e.g., Bouye, 699 N.E.2d 620; Thompson, 690 N.E.2d 224; Brown v. State, 671 N.E.2d 401 (Ind.1996); Willoughby v. State, 660 N.E.2d 570 (Ind. 1996); Evans, 643 N.E.2d 877; see also United States v. Fulford, 980 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir.1992); United States v. Lewis, 954 F.2d 1386 (7th Cir.1992); United States v. Davis, 890 F.2d 1373 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1092, 110 S.Ct. 1165, 107 L.Ed.2d 1068 (1990). Here, Anderson was neither a victim, nor an accomplice in Coffman's murder. He was, however, involved in the events leading up to Coffman's death, and he assisted Sturgeon in moving the body and removing evidence following the murder. Among the advantages we have gained by adopting our rules of evidence is a greater ability to receive wisdom from elsewhere. Thus, we turn to other jurisdictions in an effort to find cases similar to ours. In State v. Brown, 126 N.M. 338, 969 P.2d 313 (1998), defendants Brown and Smith were convicted of murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Lucero was a main witness for the prosecution. Id. at 317. At trial, Lucero's prior statements to a third party were admitted to rebut charges of improper influence flowing from prosecutorial immunity pursuant to New Mexico's version of Rule 801(d)(1)(B). [2] The defendants objected to the statements, arguing that Lucero made them when he had a motive to fabricate. Id. at 323. The evidence presented at trial regarding Lucero's involvement in the murder was conflicting. The murder took place at Lucero's house while he was in the room and he admitted to helping dispose of the body. A search of Lucero's home revealed a hammerhead, plastic garbage bags, duct tape, and cords, all of which could have been used in the murder. Id. at 324. At trial, a witness testified that Lucero admitted killing the victim. Id. Lucero maintained, however, that he was not involved in the murder. Id. at 317-18. Based on the foregoing, the defendants argued Lucero had a motive to fabricate from the date of the murder. In analyzing the timing of the motive to fabricate, the New Mexico Supreme Court observed: It may be argued that a declarant whom a defendant accuses of being involved in the crime and who witnesses that crime may possess a motive to fabricate as soon as the crime takes place because he or she fears prosecution. We cannot so conclude without eviscerating the rule. While we may recognize that a declarant may have a motive to lie immediately following the crime, due to the declarant's involvement in the crime, failure to report the crime, and fear of prosecution, such a conclusion must necessarily be a fact-based inquiry. The mere witnessing of a crime does not give rise to a presumption or conclusion that a motive to fabricate existed at the time of the crime. Id. at 324. Based on the evidence adduced at trial, the court concluded that Lucero had a powerful motive to lie because of his involvement in the murder and the police suspicion that had begun to focus on him. Id. Turning to the present case, Sturgeon argues that Anderson had a motive to fabricate because Anderson, by his own account, bought drugs for Coffman prior to the murder and drove Coffman's car to get drugs. Following the murder, Anderson helped move Coffman's body. Also, the police informed Anderson that he could be charged in connection with Coffman's murder before he gave the statement. Thus, Sturgeon argues, Anderson's involvement before Coffman's death and the events following the death provided him with a motive to fabricate, at least from the moment he helped move Coffman's body. (Appellant's Br. at 34.) The purpose behind the temporal requirement in 801(d)(1)(B) has been explained as follows: `[T]he prior consistent statement has no relevancy to refute the charge [of recent fabrication] unless the consistent statement was made before the source of the bias, interest, influence or incapacity originated.' Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 156, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (quoting E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 49 (2d ed.1972)). Indeed, the fact that the declarant's story did not change from the time he was questioned until trial does nothing to rebut the charge of recent fabrication or bias if the declarant already had a motive to lie when he made the initial statement. We agree with the New Mexico Supreme Court that every person involved in the criminal activity at issue or who witnesses a crime arguably has a motive to fabricate for fear of prosecution for his involvement or for failing to report the crime. New Mexico is also right to observe that automatically imputing a motive to fabricate might so envelop the prior consistent statement rule as to prevent the admission of the prior statement of any person able to provide first-hand knowledge of the crime. In cases where the declarant was the defendant or co-defendant, we have been willing to conclude that a motive to fabricate likely arises immediately upon the commission of the crime. See Bouye, 699 N.E.2d 620; Thompson, 690 N.E.2d 224. In a case where the declarant became involved in the crime after it was committed, however, the role of timing is not as clear. Our review of the record reveals no evidence implicating Anderson in Coffman's murder, only evidence that Anderson sold drugs to Coffman earlier in the evening of the murder and assisted Sturgeon following the murder. [3] We acknowledge the possibility of a motive to fabricate on Anderson's part since he knew he could be charged in connection with the murder and since he participated in certain criminal acts surrounding the murder. However, there is no evidence tending to implicate Anderson in Coffman's murder and therefore no evidence he had a motive to lie about Sturgeon's involvement when questioned. Without any concrete evidence to this effect, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Anderson's prior consistent statement.