Opinion ID: 2900172
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Insufficiency Challenges

Text: We review de novo a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge in a criminal case. United States v. Garcia, 758 F.3d 714, 718 (6th Cir. 2014). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we ask whether any rational trier of fact could have found the contested elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. “Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction under this deferential standard of review.” United States v. Fekete, 535 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2008). -8- No. 14-6051 United States v. Washington
Washington contends that, without former co-defendant Johnson’s testimony, there was insufficient evidence for the jury to convict him of participating in a drug conspiracy. He asserts that no rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly agreed with Johnson to possess with intent to distribute cocaine because only Johnson testified as to the conspiracy facts and Johnson’s testimony was “wholly unreliable” because it was motivated by desire to “get a lighter sentence and protect his cousin, Hampton.” Appellant Br. 27-28, 33. Problematic for Washington is that “[a]ttacks on witness credibility are simple challenges to the quality of the government’s evidence and not the sufficiency of the evidence.” United States v. Gibbs, 182 F.3d 408, 424 (6th Cir. 1999). When reviewing the denial of a motion for acquittal, this court “can neither independently weigh the evidence, nor make our own assessment of the credibility of the witnesses who testified at trial.” Garcia, 758 F.3d at 718. Defense counsel argued to the jury that Johnson was not believable. The jury could, and apparently did, reject this argument and its choice to do so was a rational one. See United States v. Arnold, 486 F.3d 177, 182 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (finding sufficient evidence to convict on a felon-in-possession charge, observing that “[a]s in all criminal trials, the jury did not have to draw these inferences. But it reasonably could have reached these conclusions–and when that is the case we must respect the jury’s inferences over our own . . . . our mandate is to affirm when the jury’s choice was a rational one.”). Another flaw in Washington’s argument is that Johnson was not the only witness to testify regarding Washington’s participation in the drug conspiracy; other witnesses testified that Washington was riding in the same vehicle as the person who arranged the deal, showed up at -9- No. 14-6051 United States v. Washington the time and place a two-kilogram cocaine sale was supposed to occur, and had in his possession a loaded firearm and a plastic bag of cut-up newspaper made to look like real money. Inconsistencies in Johnson’s testimony notwithstanding,5 any rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of a drug conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. § 846, 1) an agreement to violate drug laws, 2) knowledge and intent to join the conspiracy, and 3) participation in the conspiracy. United States v. Allen, 619 F.3d 518, 522 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Welch, 97 F.3d 142, 146, 148 (6th Cir. 1996).
Washington’s insufficiency argument as to his firearm convictions is the same as to the drug conspiracy conviction: that only Johnson’s testimony establishes that Washington possessed, used and carried a firearm in furtherance of a drug crime. He argues that without Johnson’s testimony, all that was established was that his presence at the scene was surplusage and that the crime would have transpired whether he was present or not. Appellant Br. 41-46. 5 Washington points to the following inconsistencies in Johnson’s testimony: (1) Johnson stated that in the parking lot of Wolfchase Mall, Johnson was actually talking to someone called “Big,” rather than his brother, PID 640, 694-95; (2) Johnson’s testimony that he told Washington and Hampton that Brewer was registered to carry a firearm, which contradicts the testimony of Agent Lytal, who testified that all parties knew that no weapons, money, or drugs would be present at the initial meeting at Wolfchase Mall, PID 585, and the testimony of Agent Brewer, who testified that though he patted Johnson down for a gun, Johnson did not request to pat Brewer down, PID 563; (3) Johnson was unable to provide an address for “Little Mike,” who lived only a couple of streets away from Johnson and from whom he secured a gun for Hampton; and (4) though Johnson said that Norton did not return to the Microtel with him because Norton needed to pick his girlfriend up, Agent Brewer testified to seeing two individuals in Norton’s car, one with long hair and likely a female. PID 656, 539. Washington asserts that the remaining testimony establishes that his name was never mentioned in the initial phone calls and meetings, that he was not present during the negotiations at Wolfchase Mall, and that no one definitively saw him in Johnson’s car the first time it arrived at the Microtel. -10- No. 14-6051 United States v. Washington To establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1),6 the Government must prove that Washington 1) carried or used a firearm, 2) during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, or that Washington 1) possessed a firearm, 2) in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. United States v. Gill, 685 F.3d 606, 611 (6th Cir. 2012). Washington challenges only the possessed or carried element. To establish a violation of § 922(g), the Government must prove that Washington had a previous felony conviction, knowingly possessed the firearm specified in the indictment, and that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce. United States v. Morrison, 594 F.3d 543, 544 (6th Cir. 2010). Again, Washington challenges only that he possessed the firearm. Detective Carter, as well as Johnson, testified that Washington had the firearm on his person and the jury properly could believe them. In addition, officers found the firearm on the floorboard of Johnson’s vehicle, where Washington was sitting. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the jury acted rationally in deciding that Washington possessed the gun and we affirm Washington’s firearm convictions.