Opinion ID: 769838
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cuoco's Cross-Appeal

Text: 47 While the district court allowed Cuoco's suit to proceed against Barraco,Moritsugu and Quinlan, it entered a partial final judgment dismissing Cuoco's complaint as to defendants Hershberger, Malik, Moore and Salamack. Such piecemeal litigation is generally disfavored. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980). But pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court may enter a final, immediately appealable, partial judgment upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Since the certification is to be reviewed for abuse of discretion, it must be accompanied by a reasoned, even if brief, explanation... that there is no just cause for delay; a certification that is conclusory or merely quotes the words of the Rule is insufficient. L.B. Foster Co. v. America Piles, Inc., 138 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 1998); see also National Bank v. Dolgov, 853 F.2d 57, 58 (2d Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (dismissing appeal for lack of a final judgment where certification merely recited the words of Rule 54(b)). 48 The district court offered no explanation for entering a partial final judgment here, stating conclusorily that it perceives no just reason for delay in the entry of judgment of dismissal in favor of those defendants. Ordinarily, this insufficiency would prevent us from exercising appellate jurisdiction over this cross-appeal. See L.B. Foster Co., 138 F.3d at 86. However, this case presents the unusual situation in which the entire case is before us via the Defendants- Appellants' interlocutory appeal. The reason we require a district court to justify entry of a partial judgment is in order to limit piecemeal litigation and maximize judicial efficiency. Under the present circumstances, however, where we can resolve the case in its entirety in this single appeal, those goals militate in favor of relaxing our interpretation of the district court's discretion under Rule 54(b). Otherwise, we would be sending the cross-appeal back to the district court to await a final judgment as to the claims against the Defendants-Appellants, a final judgment that we are today directing be entered on their behalf. We therefore assert jurisdiction over the cross-appeal. 2
49 Cuoco cross-appeals from the district court's dismissal of her claims against Hershberger, Moore, Malik, and Salamack. She argues that dismissal was inappropriate and that material questions of fact exist that should have precluded summary judgment in their favor. In the alternative, she asserts that as a pro se litigant she should have been afforded the opportunity to revise her complaint in the district court. These arguments are without merit. 50 The district court dismissed the claims raised on appeal as to defendants Hershberger, Moore, Malik, and Salamack for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). It did so because these defendants were not involved in the decision to deny estrogen treatments to Cuoco. 51 Defendant Moore was the Health Services Administrator at FCI Otisville at the time of the allegations; defendant Hershberger was the Warden. The district court held that [t]he absence of a factual predicate for the allegations against defendants Hershberger and Moore leads to the conclusion that these defendants are named in the action solely because of their supervisory positions. In a Bivens action, such a respondeat superior theory will not suffice. On appeal, Cuoco claims that these defendants were named not in their supervisory capacity, but because each of the defendants was in a position to intervene in the denial of estrogen, and, instead of doing so, treated her with deliberate indifference.The district court did not consider this construction of the complaint. Cuoco's failure to intervene claim should have survived the defendants' motion to dismiss. 52 Although it was error to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, we nevertheless affirm the judgment in favor of the defendants because they each were entitled to have their motions for summary judgment granted on qualified immunity grounds. There is no evidence that Hershberger or Moore, neither one a medical doctor, had the authority to intervene in an admittedly medical decision made by Drs. Barraco and Moritsugu. Nor on the undisputed facts could either have prescribed estrogen treatments for Cuoco, no matter how attentive to her problems and symptoms they were. They are therefore entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds both because (a) the conduct attributed to them is not prohibited by federal law, see section I.D.1, above, and (b) these defendants were non-doctors whose failure to intercede in the medical treatment of an inmate was, if wrongful, not objectively unreasonable, see section I.D., above. 53 Cuoco was under medical treatment. Cuoco suggests no basis on which to conclude that Moore or Hershberger should have challenged the responsible doctors' diagnosis. One can imagine the repercussions if non-medical prison officials were to attempt to dictate the specific medical treatment to be given to particular prisoners -- for whatever reason. It was, as a matter of law, objectively reasonable for Moore and Hershberger not to have done so with respect to Cuoco. 54 Defendant Malik's 3 status as a psychiatrist -- a medical doctor -- puts him in a slightly different position. But although he thus had the ability to prescribe medication, he had no responsibility for the treatment of Cuoco. Indeed, Cuoco accuses Malik only of refusing to discuss her medical problem and suggesting to her that he could do nothing about the denial of the estrogen tablets. It is undisputed that Malik was told that Baracco and Moritsugu, his superiors, had not diagnosed Cuoco as a transsexual. A doctor associated with a prison cannot be held responsible for failing to intercede in the treatment of a prisoner simply because the prisoner button-holes him and insists that he do so. The chaos that would ensue if doctors were to rush about treating prisoners who are not their patients in order to avoid such liability counsels otherwise. Malik's refusal to intervene in the medical treatment of another doctor's patient simply because the patient demanded it was objectively reasonable as a matter of law. 55 Cuoco's allegations against Salamack are more extensive. When Cuoco first met him, Salamack, a psychologist without a medical doctor's ability to prescribe drugs, told her that there was nothing he could do about her medication and warned her not to attempt to manipulate the system. Then, after being notified that Cuoco was contemplating suicide, Salamack placed Cuoco on suicide watch. 56 According to Cuoco, Salamack callously disregarded her requests for estrogen and eventually had her restrained after she had started being disruptive... by making noise and requesting medical treatment. Cuoco apparently argues that because Salamack witnessed the withdrawal symptoms that she was experiencing first hand he was deliberately indifferent to her needs by denying her estrogen or not explaining to the other defendants that she needed estrogen. But Salamack, having no medical degree, had no authority to decide what medical treatment was appropriate for Cuoco. He could, of course, have suggested a course of estrogen treatment assuming he knew enough medicine to do so and thought it the better course. But Salamack had been told that Cuoco was not a transsexual. Disregarding Cuoco's requests for estrogen, placing her on suicide watch, and telling her there was nothing he could do about her medication were, as a matter of law, not objectively unreasonable.
57 Cuoco argues on appeal that the district court should not have dismissed her complaint for failure to state a claim without granting leave to replead. A pro se complaint is to be read liberally. Certainly the court should not dismiss without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated. See Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir. 1991)) (alteration omitted). But we do not find that the complaint liberal[ly] read[], id. at 795, suggests that the plaintiff has a claim that she has inadequately or inartfully pleaded and that she should therefore be given a chance to reframe. Cuoco, speaking through counsel on appeal, has suggested no new material she wishes to plead. The problem with Cuoco's causes of action is substantive; better pleading will not cure it. Repleading would thus be futile. Such a futile request to replead should be denied. See Hunt v. Alliance N. Am. Gov't Income Trust, 159 F.3d 723, 728 (2d Cir. 1998). 58 Cuoco asserts, finally, that under the rule of McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 1999), and Vital v. Interfaith Med. Ctr., 168 F.3d 615, 621 (2d Cir. 1999), summary judgment against her must be reversed because, as a pro se litigant, she was entitled to notice at the time of the summary judgment motion of the consequences of not responding to it. Even if Cuoco did fail to receive the requisite notice, there is no basis for reversal. In connection with her motion seeking reargument, she filed a detailed affirmation setting forth in evidentiary form her version of the facts of this case. This is precisely the document she could have filed previously had she been properly informed of her responsibilities in response to a summary judgment motion and been so inclined. We find that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law even assuming as we must that the assertions in Cuoco's affirmation are true. There is no purpose to be served by remanding the case to the district court simply to require that it rehear the motion for summary judgment and deny it. 4