Opinion ID: 2078729
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: proper mode of appeal

Text: Before reaching the McNallys' assignments of error, we first consider which statute controls the McNallys' appeal. The resolution of this question determines the jurisdictional prerequisites for perfecting the appeal, as well as the applicable standard of review. The history of this case presents some confusion as to whether the appeal from the Board was brought pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 14-813 (Reissue 1997), Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1901 (Cum. Supp.2006), or even the catchall provision, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1937 (Reissue 1995). We conclude that the McNallys' appeal is controlled by § 25-1901. Section 25-1901 states in relevant part that [a] judgment rendered or final order made by any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions and inferior in jurisdiction to the district court may be reversed, vacated, or modified by the district court . . . . Accordingly, where a board or tribunal decides no question of adjudicative fact and no statute requires it to act in a judicial manner, the orders are not judicial and are not reviewable by error proceedings. [1] But, when the board or tribunal is required to conduct a hearing and receive evidence, it exercises judicial functions in determining questions of fact. [2] As relevant to this case, § 43-65 of the Code, Conduct of hearing, states in part that [t]he board shall hear all arguments and review all evidence submitted by the applicant, the building official, and any other person(s) interested in the case, and shall render its opinion. Thus, § 43-65 required the Board to conduct a hearing and receive evidence. The Board did, in fact, receive photographs and other evidence concerning the alleged violations of the McNallys' duplex. The Board also considered the statements of Thomas McNally and of city officials before making its determination of whether violations were in fact presented. We conclude that the Board exercised judicial functions. While we have said that a petition in error may not be applicable where the Legislature has adopted another specific method for appeal, [3] we find that § 14-813 does not apply to the McNallys' appeal. Section 14-813 describes the mode of appeal for claims against the city that are described by Neb.Rev.Stat. § 14-804 (Reissue 1997). Claims under § 14-804 are claims filed with the city comptroller seeking monetary compensation. [4] The McNallys simply appealed a determination by the city that they were in violation of the Code. This is not a claim under § 14-804. [5] In order to perfect a petition in error, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1903 (Reissue 1995) directs the petitioner to file the petition to the district court setting forth the errors complained of. In addition, Neb. Rev.Stat. § 25-1905 (Reissue 1995) directs the petitioner to file with his or her petition a transcript of the proceedings or a praecipe directing the tribunal, board, or officer to prepare the transcript of the proceedings. We have held that compliance with §§ 25-1903 and 25-1905 is jurisdictional. [6] Under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1931 (Cum.Supp.2006), the filings required by §§ 25-1903 and 25-1905 must be made within thirty days after the rendition of the judgment or making of the final order complained of. While the parties debate whether a written order was rendered by the Board, we have repeatedly held that it is the administrative body's pronounced vote that is the final order to be appealed from, not any entry of that vote on the record. [7] The record shows that within 30 days of the Board's pronouncement, the McNallys filed with the district court a praecipe for a transcript directing the Omaha city clerk and the Board to prepare a transcript of the Board's proceedings. In River City Life Ctr., [8] we explained: After the 1991 amendment [to § 25-1905], filing of the praecipe for transcript with the clerk of the district court satisfied the 30-day appeal requirement, even if the tribunal did not timely prepare and furnish the transcript to the appellants for filing with the clerk of the district court. We determine that the jurisdictional requirements for the timely filing of a petition in error were met for the McNallys' appeal to the district court, and this court has jurisdiction over the McNallys' timely appeal from the district court.