Opinion ID: 2516837
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Inverse Condemnation Suit

Text: In November 1997 the landowners filed their inverse condemnation complaint against the state, alleging de facto takings of and damage to their properties. [2] They moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that no material facts were in dispute as to their claim that DOT's pre-condemnation publicity had reduced the economic value of their properties and required just compensation. In support of their motion, the landowners submitted evidence of lost property value, public announcements of the Illinois Street project, and the state's acquisition of the Rose Building. DOT opposed the motion and cross-moved for summary judgment. In support of DOT's opposition and motion, John Miller, DOT's Chief Right-of-Way agent in Fairbanks at relevant times, swore in an affidavit that DOT has never announced an unequivocal intention to acquire any of the particular real properties along Illinois Street. DOT argued that the landowners' claims failed because the landowners did not provide evidence of DOT's intent to condemn their specific properties and did not rebut Miller's statement. At oral argument on the motions, the landowners attempted to supplement their exhibits with copies of letters DOT wrote the landowners addressing the future acquisition of their specific properties. The state objected to introducing these supplemental exhibits. The superior court ruled that it would not consider the exhibits unless an appropriate motion were filed. The landowners never filed a motion asking the court to accept the exhibits. In March 2000 the superior court denied the landowners' motion for summary judgment and granted the state's cross-motion for summary judgment. The court first reasoned that the publicity complained of could not be considered a de facto taking because it did not amount to either a physical invasion of property or a direct legal restraint on its use. The court further reasoned that the condemnation blight doctrine did not apply because the property was never actually condemned. [3] The superior court then ruled that the claim was properly evaluated under precedents establishing an inverse condemnation cause of action based solely on pre-condemnation publicity. [4] The court concluded that the Jackovich landowners could not establish an essential element of this cause of action: proof of a public statement of the state's concrete intention to acquire specific property. [5] The court determined that the landowners' claims contain no allegation of any public expression of intent to use a specific piece of property. The court concluded by reasoning that this requirement properly accommodated the public interest in community planning while protecting the landowners' constitutional right to just compensation. The landowners moved for reconsideration and attached the disputed supplemental exhibits to their reconsideration motion. The superior court denied their reconsideration motion. It appears that as of April 4, 2000, when the superior court entered final judgment, the state had commenced no condemnation proceedings for any of these particular properties. The landowners appeal.