Opinion ID: 626570
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Construction of Screening Medium and Perforated

Text: We first consider the construction of the claim term screening medium and the related term perforated. AFT and J & L both agree that the court properly construed screening medium as a perforated barrier through which stock is passed to remove oversized, troublesome, and unwanted particles from good fiber. They disagree, however, on the meaning of the term perforated in that construction. AFT contends that the court erred by defining perforated as pierced or punctured with holes. According to AFT, the intrinsic evidence does not support the court's construction because the '940 patent nowhere states that the screening medium must be made by puncturing or piercing. AFT points out that the specification expressly describes the screening medium as including wedgewire, which, as the parties agree, is made by assembling wires, not by puncturing or piercing. AFT also argues that the court erroneously relied on extrinsic evidence, including dictionary definitions, that contradict the intrinsic evidence. J & L argues in response that AFT defined screening medium during prosecution to include perforated. J & L further contends that the court's construction of perforated conforms with the specification, which discloses a backing plate that comprises a perforated plate having a plurality of relatively large openings, '940 patent col.2 l.66-col.3 l.1, which may be punched or drilled through the material, id. col.8 l.52. J & L also asserts that the district court's interpretation of perforated is consistent with extrinsic evidence relied on by the district court, including dictionary definitions of perforation and perforate as well as prior art references indicating that one of ordinary skill would understand perforated to mean punctured or pierced. The disputed term at issue, perforated, appears not in the claims but rather in the district court's construction of a disputed claim term. We note, as an initial matter, that we do not ordinarily construe words that are not in claims. Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc., 582 F.3d 1322, 1334 (Fed.Cir. 2009); see also Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 339, 81 S.Ct. 599, 5 L.Ed.2d 592 (1961) ([T]he claims made in the patent are the sole measure of the grant.). However, in those cases in which the correct construction of a claim term necessitates a derivative construction of a non-claim term, a court may perform the derivative construction in order to elucidate the claim's meaning. Our opinion in Edwards is illustrative. 582 F.3d 1322. In that case, we reviewed a district court's claim construction in patents relating to intraluminal grafts. In accordance with the teachings of the specification, the district court construed particular claim terms to require a graft that includes at least one malleable wire. Id. at 1326. On account of the parties' disagreement over the meaning of malleablenot itself a claim termthe district court construed this term according to a statement in the specification indicating that malleable means that the wires do not expand[] by virtue of their own resilience. Id. at 1327 (internal quotation marks omitted). We disagreed with the appellant that the court erred by rejecting the plain meaning of malleable. Instead, we affirmed the district court's treatment of the non-claim term malleable, holding that the court correctly look[ed] to the specification to clarify its initial construction. Id. at 1334. As our holding in Edwards demonstrates, the claim construction analysis must follow the guiding principles set forth in Phillips. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 ([T]he specification necessarily informs the proper construction of the claims.). After all, whether we are construing a claim term or a disputed term within a claim construction, our ultimate goal is determining the meaning and scope of the patent claims asserted to be infringed. Markman, 52 F.3d at 976. Accordingly, in reviewing the district court's construction of the non-claim term perforated, we apply our established claim construction principles, summarized above. After doing so, we conclude that the district court erroneously construed perforated using extrinsic evidence that contradicts the intrinsic evidence of record. As an initial matter, we note that the court correctly relied on definitions provided by AFT during prosecution of the '940 patent to limit screening medium to a barrier that is perforated. The court observed that, during prosecution, AFT expressly defined screening as a process step involving the passage of stock through a perforated barrier. Advanced Fiber, 751 F.Supp.2d at 361. In concluding that the claimed screening medium must therefore be the medium employed in this `process step,' which is identified in the definition as a `perforated barrier,' the court correctly relied on a clear definition of a claim term set forth by AFT in the prosecution history. See CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366 ([I]f the patentee acted as his own lexicographer and clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term in either the specification or prosecution history, then that definition governs.); see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 ([T]he prosecution history can often inform the meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the course of prosecution.). The court's analysis went awry, however, in its interpretation of the term perforated. In construing perforated, the court relied solely on dictionary definitions of perforate and perforation. Advanced Fiber, 751 F.Supp.2d at 363; J.A. 2378, 2380. The parties' disagreement on appeal centers on the district court's choice of definitions: J & L asserts that the court correctly relied on the definitions of perforate and perforation to derive the requirement of being pierced or punctured with holes, whereas AFT contends that the court ignored the definition of perforated itselfhaving a hole or series of holes, J.A. 2380and thus improperly limited the meaning of this term. While we agree with AFT that the meaning of perforated may be better understood in the abstract by examining the definition of the adjective itself, rather than the verb perforate or the noun perforation, the court's fundamental error was not referencing the wrong part of speech. Rather, the district court's error lies in its reliance on extrinsic evidence that contradicted the patent's specification, including the claims and written description. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319 ([E]xtrinsic evidence may be useful to the court, but it is unlikely to result in a reliable interpretation of patent claim scope unless considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence.); see also OSRAM GmbH v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 505 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (The patent specification is the primary resource for determining how an invention would be understood by persons experienced in the field. (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13)). The claims themselves do not require the screening medium to be made by puncturing or piercing, they simply limit the screening medium to having a plurality of openings therethrough, '940 patent claim 1, or having a plurality of slots therethrough, id. claim 10. Likewise, the written description provides no basis for the court's pierced or punctured limitation. As noted above, the court began its analysis by construing screening medium (and its synonym, screening plate) as a perforated barrier. The court correctly recognized that the specification, in a one-sentence mention, disclosed one such perforated barrier that was made by assembling wires, not by puncturing or piercing. Advanced Fiber, 751 F.Supp.2d at 363. The court erred, however, by disregarding that embodiment. The district court did not perceive, nor does J & L allege on appeal, any fault in the '940 patent's wedgewire disclosure aside from its brevity. The fact that an embodiment is disclosed in a single sentence is not a license to ignore that disclosure. Indeed, as a general matter, brevity in a patent disclosure should be applauded, not impugned. In re Gay, 50 CCPA 725, 309 F.2d 769, 774 (1962) ([S]pecifications have often been criticized as too cluttered with details to give an easy understanding of what the invention really is.). A disclosed embodiment is a disclosed embodiment, no matter the volume of ink required to adequately describe it. See Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1366-67 (Fed.Cir. 2006) (No length requirement exists for a disclosure to adequately describe an invention.). Accordingly, we reject the district court's construction of perforated in view of intrinsic evidence providing for a screening medium formed by means other than piercing or puncturing. We are not persuaded by J & L's arguments to the contrary. While it is true, as we explained above, that during prosecution AFT defined screening using the term perforated, nowhere did AFT define perforated or discuss piercing or puncturing. Moreover, although J & L is correct in noting that the specification discloses a backing plate that comprises a perforated plate, '940 patent col.2 ll.66-67, that disclosure does not pertain to the claimed screening medium. Even if it did, the specification states only that the openings in the backing plate  may be punched or drilled, id. col.8 l.52 (emphasis added), a far cry from strictly limiting the invention to devices formed solely by piercing or puncturing. We therefore disagree with the district court's interpretation of perforated in its construction of the claim term screening medium. We hold that perforated in this context simply means having holes or openings. Construed in this manner, perforated is fully consistent with the language of claim 1, a screening medium having a plurality of openings therethrough, and claim 10, a screening medium having a plurality of slots therethrough. This construction is also consistent with the specification's explicit disclosure of wedgewire as one type of screening medium. As perforated was not defined during prosecution, this construction is also consistent with the file history of the '940 patent. Finally, we note this interpretation also accords with the ordinary definition of perforated as illustrated by extrinsic evidence of recordhaving a hole or series of holes. J.A. 2380. Because the district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement based on an incorrect construction of the asserted claims, we reverse that judgment.