Opinion ID: 2270874
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Seizure and Search

Text: An encounter has been described as a fluid situation, and one which begins as a consensual encounter may lose its consensual nature and become an investigatory detention or arrest once a person's liberty has been restrained and the person would not be free to leave. Swift, 393 Md. at 152, 899 A.2d at 874-75. Officer Lewis's testimony indicates that his encounter with the petitioner proceeded quickly from an accosting, in which he shouted questions to the petitioner from the street, to a physical detention, when he grabbed the petitioner's hands. As the Supreme Court observed in Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. at 1879 n. 16, [w]hen the officer, by means of physical force or a show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen [we may] conclude that a `seizure' has occurred. In determining whether a person has been seized, the crucial test is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would `have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.' Swift, 393 Md. at 152-53, 899 A.2d at 875 (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2387, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 1977, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988))). The inquiry is fact-specific and based on the perception of a reasonable person under the totality of the circumstances. E.g., Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439, 111 S.Ct. at 2389, 115 L.Ed.2d at 401-02 (We adhere to the rule that, in order to determine whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all circumstances surrounding the encounter....). This Court identified factors that are probative of whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave in Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 377, 735 A.2d 491, 502 (1999), including the time and place of the encounter, the number of officers present and whether they were uniformed, whether the police removed the person to a different location or isolated him or her from others, whether the person was informed that he or she was free to leave, whether the police indicated that the person was suspected of a crime, whether the police retained the person's documents, and whether the police exhibited threatening behavior or physical contact that would suggest to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to leave. In the present case, it is clear that, once Officer Lewis grabbed the petitioner's hands and placed them over his head, a reasonable person in the petitioner's position would have understood that he was physically detained and thus not free to leave or go about his business. Thus, when Officer Lewis grabbed the petitioner's hands, he seized the petitioner for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Because the officer seized and searched the petitioner without a warrant, the seizure was presumptively invalid unless it was supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of a threat to officer safety or by an exception to the warrant requirement. Belote v. State, 411 Md. 104, 112, 981 A.2d 1247, 1252 (2009); Wilson v. State, 409 Md. 415, 439, 975 A.2d 877, 892 (2009). It is well established that the State has the burden of proving the legality of a warrantless search and seizure. Paulino v. State, 399 Md. 341, 348, 924 A.2d 308, 312 (2007) (citing Sifrit v. State, 383 Md. 77, 114, 857 A.2d 65, 86 (2004); State v. Bell, 334 Md. 178, 191, 638 A.2d 107, 114 (1994); Stackhouse v. State, 298 Md. 203, 217, 468 A.2d 333, 341 (1983)). We must consider whether this seizure of the petitioner was a temporary detention and protective frisk pursuant to Terry, as the Circuit Court found, or a lawful arrest of the petitioner, as the Court of Special Appeals held.