Opinion ID: 223145
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Deputy Price's Initial Contact with Rush

Text: Rush argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because his initial contact with Deputy Price was not consensual. Rush contends Deputy Price seized him in an investigatory stop and that Deputy Price's failure to articulate a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot renders the seizure unconstitutional. This court reviews the district court's factual determinations in support of its denial of a motion to suppress for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Hogan, 539 F.3d 916, 921 (8th Cir.2008). This court will affirm the district court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence, based on an erroneous interpretation of applicable law, or, based on the entire record, it is clear a mistake was made. Id. [A] seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions. So long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his business, California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 [111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690] (1991), the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required. The encounter will not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it loses its consensual nature. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). Rush argues Deputy Price's questioning was not consensual because (1) Deputy Price's cruiser followed the Caprice for almost two miles until it parked at the pharmaceutical company, (2) Rush did not have an opportunity to avoid Deputy Price when Rush exited the Caprice, (3) Deputy Price was in uniform, had a marked police cruiser, and had a holstered service weapon, and (4) Deputy Price asked Rush where they were from and going and what they were doing. Rush admits many of the factors commonly cited as objective evidence of coercion (i.e., display of weapon, physical touching) are not present, but argues that the way the situation played out in the parking lot ..., the instantaneous nature of the events, the length of time and the closeness at which the Chevy Caprice was followed by the deputy, all would lead one to conclude that [Rush] was not free to simply ignore Deputy Price. Although Rush may have subjectively felt the circumstances compelled him to speak to Deputy Price, the law is clear that absent a restraint of liberty, police questioning occurs with the citizen's consent, and does not constitute an investigative stop requiring reasonable suspicion. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves `seizures' of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a `seizure' has occurred.). Deputy Price followed the Caprice for some distance, did not use his lights or siren to stop the Caprice, did not obstruct the vehicle's exit from the parking lot when it stopped, and approached and asked Rush about his plans and purpose for being in the parking lot. Deputy Price did not use any physical force or issue any orders, and the deputy made no show of authority beyond that which an officer necessarily exudes whenever he or she engages in consensual questioning. See, e.g., United States v. Barry, 394 F.3d 1070, 1075 (8th Cir.2005) ([The officer's] conduct in approaching Barry's parked vehicle and knocking on the window did not amount to a show of authority such that a reasonable person would believe he was not at liberty to ignore [the officer's] presence and go about his business.). Rush does not cite any authority requiring police to provide an opportunity to avoid them before asking questions. The district court did not err in finding a consensual encounter under these circumstances.