Opinion ID: 1161511
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Evidence of Abandonment: Weber Plaintiffs

Text: As to the Weber plaintiffs, we uphold the trial court's finding of abandonment. Before discussing the sufficiency of the evidence of abandonment, however, we dispose of plaintiffs' contention that the judgment in Brandt's quiet title suit of 1917 renders the issue of abandonment res judicata. (Action 1870.) In his action to quiet title to the Syncline Ranch, Brandt named as defendants the stockholders in several corporations, including those in Ashurst and COP when those corporations forfeited their charters. All of these defendants defaulted, except that a purported trustee for COP filed an answer. The judgment stated that the named shareholders became coowners of the interests held by the corporations at the times the charters were forfeited. [34] [13] Even if we assume that the judgment in action 1870 conclusively determined that the shareholders had not abandoned their interests on the judgment date, [35] the judgment would not preclude a finding of abandonment at a later date. Moreover, we may consider the actions and circumstances preceding the prior decree as well as subsequent facts in determining whether plaintiffs have abandoned their interests. ( People v. Ocean Shore R.R., Inc., supra, 32 Cal.2d 406, 418-419; Lake Merced Golf & Country Club v. Ocean Shore R.R. Co., supra, 206 Cal. App.2d 421, 434-435; Ocean Shore R.R. Co. v. Doelger, supra, 179 Cal. App.2d 222, 234.) The trial court examined the totality of facts and circumstances not to disprove the findings in the previous case, but to test the present force and validity of the intent in the light of its previous history. ( Ocean Shore R.R. Co. v. Doelger, supra, 179 Cal. App.2d 222, 234.) [36] [14] The trial court found that the Weber plaintiffs are the successors of the children of Charles M. Weber, who died in 1912. In 1914 the probate court entered its order and decree finally closing Weber's estate; it recited: The following personal property belonging to said estate and inventoried and appraised therein as of no value ... has been tendered and offered for delivery and distribution to said distributees [his children: Helen M. Kennedy and Charles M. Weber] but the receipt and acceptance of the same have been refused by the distributees[ [37] ] on account of said stocks being worthless and of no value, to wit [33,527 shares of Ashurst and 264,400 shares of COP]. In rejecting the stock the heirs thereby gave a positive indication of an intent to renounce their rights [38] (see Lake Merced Golf & County Club v. Ocean Shore R.R. Co., supra, 206 Cal. App.2d 421, 435, 438; Ocean Shore R.R. Co. v. Doelger, supra, 179 Cal. App.2d 222, 228; Rest., Property, ง 504, com. c.) Even if we should conclude that these plaintiffs did not in fact abandon their interests by specifically rejecting the shares of Ashurst and COP, we cannot ignore the trial court's finding of corroboration of an intent to abandon by their subsequent conduct. Like the predecessors of plaintiffs in the other actions, they made no use whatsoever of the property for an extended period of time that lengthened into almost a half century. We cannot hold unreasonable the trial court's determination that in light of their earlier decision the nonuser indicates and confirms their intent to abandon. A further factor demonstrating such intent as to the interests conveyed to COP was that the interests continued to be subject to the COP mortgage, which, the court in action 1870 found, constituted an extant lien on the corporate assets. (Cf. 13 Cal.Jur.2d, Cotenancy, งง 29, 30.) Our holding that the trial court properly found that the Weber plaintiffs abandoned their interests in the oil and gas and other fugacious minerals underlying section 31 does not completely dispose of that appeal. The grants to Ashurst and COP included Abrams' and Brandt's interest in certain specified hydrocarbon substances other than oil and gas. Although most of these substances are liquid or semiliquid in their natural state, one such substance possesses nonfugacious qualities. [39] We have pointed out, supra, that the partnership's deed purports to convey a complete possessory estate in the specified minerals, but, because of the fugacious nature of oil and gas, our courts could not give effect to a transfer of the latter substances as corporeal real property but would instead treat the deed as conveying ownership of an unlimited profit a prendre in the fugacious minerals. As to any nonfugacious minerals underlying section 31, however, Abrams and Brandt had title to them in place and therefore could convey them as corporeal real property. [40] [15] We have concluded, however, that the grantors, in conveying their rights in the enumerated minerals in a single deed to each corporation, did not intend to convey two different types of estate in the same instrument. The grantors had the power and right to convey a profit a prendre in the nonfugacious minerals. (See Civ. Code, ง 802; see also the discussion in Miller v. State, supra, 121 Conn. 43, 46-48.) In making the conveyance they were primarily concerned with transferring the oil and gas rights to the corporations, as is evidenced by the then extant oil boom in the area and by the names of the corporations (Ashurst Oil, Land and Development Company and California Oil Products Company). In treating the incidental conveyance of the asphalt as a conveyance of a profit a prendre we are in accord with Callahan v. Martin, supra, 3 Cal.2d 110, and Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v. Walden, supra, 4 Cal.2d 637, in which the interests disputed were rights in oil, gas, and other hydrocarbons; yet this court did not distinguish, or even mention, nonfugacious hydrocarbons in its analysis of the nature of the interests in question.