Opinion ID: 2013396
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: established precedent

Text: ¶ 53. Any analysis of the known danger exception must begin with Cords v. Anderson, 80 Wis. 2d 525, 259 N.W.2d 672 (1977). Although the court in Cords discussed a ministerial duty and did not use phrases such as known and compelling danger or known danger, over time Cords became the cornerstone for the known danger exception. The majority agrees that [t]he [known danger] exception was first announced in Cords.  Majority op. at ¶ 32. ¶ 54. The plaintiffs in Cords fell into a deep gorge at a state park, sustaining severe injuries. One of them fell while on a hiking trail only one foot from a steep drop-off into the gorge. Cords, 80 Wis. 2d at 532. The park manager, Anderson, had neither marked the trail with warning signs nor informed his superiors of the danger, even though it was his job to make sure the trails were in a safe condition and to give reports to his superiors as to any steps to be taken to reduce safety hazards. Id. at 536-37. ¶ 55. This court in Cords set up its analysis using the standards that describe the ministerial duty exception to immunity. 80 Wis. 2d at 541. However, the court's application of the these standards and its holding marked the beginning of the known danger exception as a distinct exception to immunity. The court explained as follows: Anderson knew the terrain at the glen was dangerous particularly at night; he was in a position as park manager to do something about it; he failed to do anything about it. He is liable for the breach of this duty. Id. The court then concluded: We hold that the duty to either place warning signs or advise superiors of the conditions is, on the facts here, a duty so clear and so absolute that it falls within the definition of a ministerial duty. Id. at 542. ¶ 56. Thus, in Cords, it was not that the park manager failed to perform a specific act for which the law imposes, prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion for its performance with such certainty that nothing remains for judgment or discretion. Rather, it was that the park manager failed to act in the face of a dangerous situation that clearly required him to take action. ¶ 57. After Cords, subsequent decisions solidified the known danger exception as an exception separate from the ministerial duty exception with overlapping but different contours. For example, in C.L. v. Olson, 143 Wis. 2d 701, 715, 422 N.W.2d 614 (1988), this court acknowledged the relationship of the two exceptions: a public officer's duty is ministerial where a danger is known and of such quality that the public officer's duty to act becomes absolute, certain and imperative. It then indicated the difference: [W]here a public officer's duty is not generally prescribed and defined by law in time, mode, and occasion, such that nothing remains for judgment or discretion, circumstances may give rise to such a certain duty where, as in Cords, the nature of the danger is compelling and known to the officer and is of such force that the public officer has no discretion not to act. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). ¶ 58. Similarly, in Kimps v. Hill, 200 Wis. 2d 1, 546 N.W.2d 151 (1996), the court related the two exceptions, but characterized the known danger exception as involving the failure to act: a public officer's duty becomes ministerial only `where, as in Cords, the nature of the danger is compelling and known to the officer and is of such force that the public officer has no discretion not to act.' Id. at 15 (emphasis added). The Kimps court also noted that the facts in Cords warranted a special exception be made to the general rule of public employee immunity. Id. ¶ 59. In short, the duty to act in a known danger case need not be prescribed and defined by law in time, mode, and occasion such that `nothing remains for judgment or discretion.' C.L., 143 Wis. 2d at 715. Rather, liability attaches because the danger is of such a quality that the public officer has no discretion not to act. Id. ¶ 60. To put it simply, the distinction between the two exceptions is this: the foundation for liability in the ministerial duty exception is that the defendant failed in performing (or failed to perform) a highly particularized and prescribed task whereas the foundation for liability in the known danger exception is that the defendant failed to act in the face of a danger clearly requiring action.