Opinion ID: 1173371
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Testimony of the public defender

Text: The public defender initially assigned to represent the defendant, Michael Edwards, withdrew from the case in January, 1980. His motion stated: Within the last week counsel has become aware of the following: certain information of an exculpatory nature as to the defendant Lamb is in the hands of the Public Defender's Office. The problem arises because this information which was gained solely through representation of another client, tends to be inculpatory as to the other client through whose representation the information was obtained. The defendant, at the hearing on his motion to compel discovery, attempted to learn the factual circumstances behind that motion. Edwards testified the other client communicated information to another attorney in the office, and Edwards learned of the information while working in the office. He would not reveal the name of the other client but did admit his source was twofold, he had seen a police report and he had spoken with an investigator in the Public Defender's Office about the client. The defendant asked whether a specific police report of an assault (with a baseball bat) by a Mr. J. was the report in question, but Edwards claimed the attorney-client privilege. The trial court took the matter under advisement and later ruled the communication and identity of the other defendant were privileged, stating: IT IS ORDERED sustaining claims of privilege as to unknown defendant's identity; FURTHER ORDERED sustaining claim of privilege to all questions which would tend to reveal identity of said unknown defendant. Later at trial the defendant attempted to introduce Edwards' motion to withdraw, but the trial court sustained the prosecution's objection to admission of the motion. The trial judge indicated he did not allow the introduction of the motion to withdraw because he thought it involved mere conclusions of the witness. The defendant claims the motion should have been admitted and Edwards should have been ordered to testify as to the facts surrounding his withdrawal. We believe the trial court was correct for two reasons. First, the information about the conflict in interest came from a communication within the public defender's office with the other client, and this communication was privileged. The police report, though not in itself privileged, if admitted, would reveal the name of the Public Defender's Office's client. We had reason to consider a similar question: At trial, it was alleged that another individual had confessed to the crime for which Macumber was being tried. This confession had been made to two attorneys who were willing to testify at the trial of the appellant, the person said to have confessed having died. The court refused the evidence finding, sua sponte, that it was privileged. ARS § 13-1802 provides that an attorney shall not be examined as to any communication made to him by his client without the consent of his client. The privilege is that of the client and only he or someone authorized by law to do so on his behalf may claim it.    However, in the absence of the privileged individual, the privilege may be asserted by another including the trial court itself.   The privilege does not terminate with death.    It has been commonly suspended only in cases where the communication would be logically thought to further the interests of the deceased such as a will,    or where a person normally able by statute to invoke the privilege for another does so to exclude evidence in a prosecution for a crime against that person. The attorney-client privilege is statutory and an attorney is not allowed to waive the privilege under the circumstances of this case. The legislature has presumably weighed the possibility of hampering justice in originally providing for the privilege. State v. Macumber, 112 Ariz. 569, 571, 544 P.2d 1084, 1086 (1976) (citations omitted). Defendant claims, however, that at least he should be able to know the name of the client. Generally, the name of a client is not privileged. Dunipace v. Martin, 73 Ariz. 415, 242 P.2d 543 (1952); State v. Alexander, 108 Ariz. 556, 503 P.2d 777 (1972). In the instant case, however, the attorney, in order to properly give the court sufficient facts upon which it could rule on the motion, said more than he would normally have said. He need not be required to say more. Second, the motion was based on mere conclusions. The motion to withdraw included the unsupported claim the attorney had learned evidence exculpatory [in] nature as to defendant Lamb    [but] inculpatory as to [another] client. Edwards gave very few supporting facts concerning this broad allegation, and the motion to withdraw itself, without background information, was unreliable and prejudicial. We find no error.