Opinion ID: 746790
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Law-Enforcement Opinion Testimony

Text: 18 Lopez contends that the district court abused its discretion by admitting without a proper foundation opinion testimony of law-enforcement officers that Lopez's actions were consistent with those of an experienced drug trafficker. Specifically, Lopez contends that the testimony improperly profiled him as a drug trafficker and was not the proper subject of lay opinion testimony. 19 As detailed above, at numerous points throughout Lopez's trial, law-enforcement officers testified: 20 that Lopez was engaging in countersurveillance driving; 21 that certain terms used by Lopez and informant Storm were code words for a drug deal, a common practice of narcotics dealers; 22 that Lopez's use of a rental car was consistent with the practices of an experienced drug trafficker; 23 that the manner of hiding the cocaine was consistent with the practices of experienced drug traffickers; and 24 that the large quantity and high purity of the cocaine indicated that Lopez was close to the source of the cocaine. 25 Lopez vigorously objected throughout this testimony. 26 A district court's evidentiary rulings during trial are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Sarno, 73 F.3d 1470, 1488 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 2555, 135 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1996). 27 If specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a qualified expert witness may provide opinion testimony on the issue in question. Fed.R.Evid. 702. The rule recognizes that an intelligent evaluation of the facts by a trier of fact is often difficult or impossible without the application of some ... specialized knowledge. Fed.R.Evid. 702 (advisory comm. n.). In this light, we have held that drug enforcement experts may testify that a defendant's activities were consistent with a common criminal modus operandi. United States v. Webb, 115 F.3d 711, 713-14 (9th Cir.1997) (emphasis added) (citing cases). This testimony helps the jury to understand complex criminal activities, and alerts it to the possibility that combinations of seemingly innocuous events may indicate criminal behavior. United States v. Johnson, 735 F.2d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir.1984). Further, we even allow modus operandi expert testimony in cases that are not complex. Webb, 115 F.3d at 714 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 28 The testimony in the instant case is similar to expert testimony properly admitted in other drug cases. See, e.g., United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 229-30, amended, Jan. 1997 (allowing expert testimony that a sophisticated drug dealer would not entrust large quantities of cocaine to an unknowing dupe); United States v. Espinosa, 827 F.2d 604, 611-12 (9th Cir.1987) (allowing expert testimony regarding the use of apartments as stash pads for drugs and money); United States v. Patterson, 819 F.2d 1495, 1507 (9th Cir.1987) (allowing expert testimony on how criminal narcotics conspiracies operate); United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 783 (9th Cir.1981) (per curiam) (permitting expert testimony that defendant's actions were consistent with the modus operandi of persons transporting drugs and engaging in countersurveillance). 29 In the above cases, the testimony was necessary to inform the jury of the techniques employed by drug dealers in their illegal trade, techniques with which an ordinary juror would most probably be unfamiliar. Thus, the testimony in the instant case could have been admitted as expert opinion testimony to inform the jury about the methods and techniques used by experienced drug dealers, if the law-enforcement agents had been called as experts and properly qualified as such pursuant to Rule 104 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In fact, Special Agent Larsen began his testimony with a recitation of his extensive training and experience with the DEA. It appears virtually certain that had the Government opted to do so, Larsen could have been formally qualified as an expert witness on the dispositive issue of whether Lopez's behavior suggested that he was an experienced-as contrasted with a fledgling-drug trafficker. However, this routine process did not occur. The testimony was neither offered nor admitted as expert testimony, but rather as lay opinion testimony. The Government concedes that it made no effort properly to qualify the witnesses as having the knowledge, experience, training, or education to render their testimony admissible under Rule 702. 30 The Government contends that the same analysis applies whether the witness is testifying as an expert or as a lay witness. In support of its argument, the Government relies primarily on two cases, United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1335-36 (9th Cir.1982), and United States v. VonWillie, 59 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir.1995). The Government's reliance is misplaced. 31 In Fleishman, a DEA agent testified as a lay witness that the defendant was acting as a lookout. Fleishman, 684 F.2d at 1335. A thorough foundation was laid that the agent had extensive training and experience in recognizing whether a person was performing countersurveillance. Id. On appeal, the Government argued that the agent's testimony was permissible lay witness testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 701. 1 The court never directly addressed this argument, stating rather that whether lay or expert, the testimony was admissible. Id. at 1335. 32 In VonWillie, an agent testified as a lay witness about the nexus between drug trafficking and the possession of weapons. VonWillie, 59 F.3d at 929. 33 Specifically, he testified that in his experience with the Drug Enforcement Bureau, (1) it was common for drug traffickers to possess and use weapons in order to protect their drugs and to intimidate buyers; (2) the MK-11, one of the guns found in VonWillie's bedroom, was a particularly intimidating gun and he knew of drug dealers who used that specific weapon; and (3) drug traffickers commonly kept a weapon near their drugs. 34 Id. The court concluded that [t]hese observations are common enough and require such a limited amount of expertise, if any, that they can, indeed, be deemed lay witness opinion. Id. 35 Fleishman and VonWillie remain good law, but both are distinguishable from the instant case. First, Lopez's case involved several agents testifying that Lopez's actions were consistent with those of an experienced narcotics trafficker. In fact, Agent Larsen alone testified more than seven times to this effect as to various aspects of Lopez's activity. In Fleishman and VonWillie, only one agent gave an opinion on very limited issues. 36 Second, the agents' observations in the instant case are not common enough to require such a limited amount of expertise. VonWillie, 59 F.3d at 929. Here, the agents testified that the following behaviors were consistent with an experienced drug trafficker: 1) countersurveillance driving; 2) use of code words to refer to drug quantities and prices; 3) use of a third-person lookout when attending a narcotics meeting; 4) use of a rental car to make the drug delivery; 5) hiding the cocaine in the door panels of a car; and 6) dealing in large amounts of very pure cocaine. These observations require demonstrable expertise; in fact, several times, the Government instructed the witness to answer questions based upon your training and experience. Additionally, one agent testified that his familiarity with the fact that narcotics traffickers sometimes speak in code is based upon the training that he had at the DEA Academy. 37 However, part of the testimony in this case does provide us with a clear example of when a witness may give his lay opinion as to the implications of his observations. INS Special Agent Rapp testified that the movements of the Monte Carlo were suspicious. Under VonWillie and Fleishman, such testimony related to matters common enough to qualify as lay opinion testimony. 38 The Government's argument simply blurs the distinction between Federal Rules of Evidence 701 and 702. Lay witness testimony is governed by Rule 701, which limits opinions to those rationally based on the perception of the witness. Rule 702, on the other hand, governs admission of expert opinion testimony concerning specialized knowledge. The testimony in this case is precisely the type of specialized knowledge governed by Rule 702. A holding to the contrary would encourage the Government to offer all kinds of specialized opinions without pausing first properly to establish the required qualifications of their witnesses. The mere percipience of a witness to the facts on which he wishes to tender an opinion does not trump Rule 702. Otherwise, a layperson witnessing the removal of a bullet from a heart during an autopsy could opine as to the cause of the decedent's death. Surely a civilian bystander, or for that matter a raw DEA recruit would not be allowed to interpret for the jury Lopez's behavior in the parking lot on May 25, 1995 as that of an experienced trafficker merely because that person was an eyewitness to the same. 39 In addition, the Government's argument subverts the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(E). Rule 16 requires the Government to disclose to the defendant a written summary of [expert] testimony the government intends to use ... during its case in chief. The Rule is intended to minimize surprise that often results from unexpected testimony, reduce the need for continuances, and to provide the opponent with a fair opportunity to test the merit of the expert's testimony through focused cross-examination. Fed.R.Crim.Proc. 16(a)(1)(E) (advisory committee's note). 40 In sum, rather than testimony based on the perceptions of the witness-as the district court described it when overruling Lopez's objections-the bulk of the above opinion testimony is properly characterized as testimony based on the perceptions, education, training, and experience of the witness. It requires precisely the type of specialized knowledge of law enforcement governed by Rule 702. Trial courts must ensure that experts are qualified to render their opinions and that the opinions will assist the trier of fact. This careful analysis was absent in this case. See also Webb, 115 F.3d at 714 (recognizing that the expert was particularly qualified to give his opinion). As judges who have heard such testimony many times, we must not forget that our familiarity with it does not bring it within Rule 701, especially given the purpose of Rule 16(a)(1)(E). 2
41 Finally, the Government contends that even if the opinion testimony was improperly admitted, it was harmless error. We agree. 42 We acknowledge that the repeated and extensive testimony that Lopez's actions were consistent with those of an experienced narcotics trafficker went to the heart of his entrapment defense. This is not a case where expert opinion testimony was relied on to nail a peripheral player, but a case where the Government had to overcome a defense of entrapment. The Government's burden in this regard was to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime. To do so, the Government relied extensively on the opinion testimony in closing arguments. For example, the Government argued that Lopez's use of code words during his conversations with Storm shows his experience with narcotics trafficking. Similarly, the Government contended that Lopez's use of countersurveillance, use of a rental car, and method of concealing drugs were indicative of an experienced narcotics trafficker. 43 Nevertheless, we conclude on this record that the error was harmless, and we do so on the basis of United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780 (9th Cir.1981). In Maher, the district court admitted opinion testimony from DEA agents that Maher's activities were similar to the modus operandi of persons conducting countersurveillance while transporting drugs. The trial court ruled that such evidence was admissible lay opinion testimony, and it was admitted in evidence without a determination by the court that the witness was qualified pursuant to Rule 104(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence as an expert. Notwithstanding this lapse, we concluded that any error in Maher was harmless because of the extensive and detailed explanation by one of the DEA agents regarding his experience with surveillance and countersurveillance techniques in narcotics operations. Id. at 784. Based on these manifest qualifications, we said, We think the witness was qualified to give an expert opinion on modus operandi in view of his testimony and experience.... Since the testimony was admissible expert opinion, any alleged error by the trial judge in admitting the evidence under the lay opinion rule was harmless. Id. 44 The same holds true here. Agent Larsen testified that he had been a special agent with the Drug Enforcement administration for five years. He had been extensively schooled for 16 weeks at the DEA Academy in Quantico, Virginia in all aspects of his profession, including the means utilized by drug traffickers to detect certain things, ... and their patterns and other activities. He had over 200 investigations under his belt prior to his testimony in this case which provided him with additional on-the-job training. At any one time, he was working on seven to eight investigations. Given this background, we are certain he was qualified to deliver the opinion testimony disputed in this case, and the failure formally to go through the usual process-although an error-was clearly harmless. 45 As for discovery, a violation of Rule 16 does not itself require reversal, or even exclusion of the affected testimony. United States v. Basinger, 60 F.3d 1400, 1407 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Baker, 10 F.3d 1374, 1398 (9th Cir.1993). Figueroa-Lopez must demonstrate prejudice to substantial rights to justify reversal for violations of discovery rules. Baker, 10 F.3d at 1398. The prejudice that must be shown to justify reversal for a discovery violation is a likelihood that the verdict would have been different had the government complied with the discovery rules, not had the evidence suppressed. Id. at 1398 n. 8. Figueroa-Lopez has not demonstrated how or why the verdict would have been different if he had been given notice that Agent Larsen planned to testify about his drug trafficking modus operandi. 46 Finally, the lay opinion testimony of Detective Jones was largely cumulative to that of Agent Larsen. As such, any error with respect to its foundation was also harmless. 47