Opinion ID: 2830720
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Continuous Cohabitation

Text: Pedery argues that McKinney failed to meet her burden of proof with regard to her argument that Pedery continuously cohabitated with Hamby for purposes of section 20-3-130(B). We agree. Under section 20-3-130(B)(1) of the South Carolina Code, periodic alimony terminates on the continued cohabitation of the supported spouse. S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-130(B)(1). The party seeking modification has the burden to show by the preponderance of the evidence that a change has occurred. Miles v. Miles, 393 S.C. 111, 120, 711 S.E.2d 880, 885 (2011); Cartee v. Cartee, 295 S.C. 103, 104, 366 S.E.2d 269, 269 (Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Boney v. Boney, 289 S.C. 596, 597, 347 S.E.2d 890, 891 (Ct. App. 1986)); see Feldman v. Feldman, 380 S.C. 538, 670 S.E.2d 669 (Ct. App. 2008) (finding that testimony produced at trial supported the family court's conclusion that the husband failed to carry his burden of proof that the wife continuously cohabitated with her boyfriend under section 20-3-130(B)). For purposes of section 20-3-130, continued cohabitation means the supported spouse resides with another person in a romantic relationship for a period of ninety or more consecutive days. S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-130(B). We further defined continuous cohabitation in Strickland v. Strickland, 375 S.C. 76, 650 S.E.2d 465 (2007), stating that within this context, the term resides with sets forth a requirement that the supported spouse live under the same roof as the person with whom they are romantically involved for at least ninety consecutive days. Id. at 89, 650 S.E.2d at 472 (emphasis added). As we stated, [a]ny other interpretation essentially takes the 'cohabitation' out of 'continued cohabitation.' Id. This Court and the court of appeals have applied Strickland's rationale in several cases. See Eason v. Eason, 384 S.C. 473, 682 S.E.2d 804 (2009); Biggins v. Burdette, 392 S.C. 241, 708 S.E.2d 237 (Ct. App. 2011); Fiddie v. Fiddie, 384 S.C. 120, 681 S.E.2d 42 (Ct. App. 2009); Feldman, 380 S.C. at 538; 670 S.E.2d at 669; Semken v. Semken, 379 S.C. 71, 664 S.E.2d 493 (Ct. App. 2008). These cases demonstrate that since Strickland, this Court and the court of appeals have strictly interpreted the language of section 20-3-130(B). For example, in Biggins v. Burdette, the wife and her boyfriend spent approximately sixty nights together during their relationship; however the wife spent the night apart from him on several occasions, including when various family members visited and when she traveled out of town to care for her ailing mother. 392 S.C. at 243, 708 S.E.2d at 238. The court of appeals affirmed the family court's denial of the husband's motion to terminate alimony based on continued cohabitation because: the wife and her boyfriend testified that they did not spend ninety consecutive nights together; the boyfriend maintained his own residence where he kept most of his personal items; and the private investigator confirmed that they merely spent the night together on a recurring basis,. Id. at 245, 708 S.E.2d at 239; see also Fiddie, 384 S.C. at 124, 681 S.E.2d at 44 (upholding the family court's refusal to terminate a husband's alimony obligation where the husband contended that the wife continuously cohabitated with a male friend, but the wife maintained that she spent time with a friend at least twice a month and with her sister once a month so that she did not stay full-time with her male friend, and thus, wear out her welcome). Similarly, in Eason, the husband argued that the family court erred in not terminating the wife's alimony based on continuous cohabitation with her boyfriend. 384 S.C. at 482, 682 S.E.2d at 808. While the wife and her boyfriend admitted that they had lived together at times, they never cohabitated for more than two to four weeks at a time—a contention supported by other testimony at trial. Id. Therefore, citing the language in Strickland, we affirmed the family court's finding that the wife was not barred from receiving alimony based on continuous cohabitation with her boyfriend. 384 S.C. at 482, 682 S.E.2d at 808. Semken v. Semken involves facts similar to the present case. In Semken, the husband sought to terminate his obligation to pay permanent periodic alimony because he claimed that the wife had resided with her boyfriend for more than ninety consecutive days. 379 S.C. at 73, 664 S.E.2d at 495. In that case, the wife lived in one of her boyfriend's residences, paying him $500 per month in rent. Id. The boyfriend stored some of his belongings in the house and kept a car in the garage. Id. Although the family court found that the boyfriend maintained two residences—one of which was where the wife resided—and found that the wife and boyfriend had not spent every night together for more than ninety consecutive days, the family court terminated the husband's alimony obligation. See id. at 77, 664 S.E.2d at 497. The family court reasoned that the wife and her boyfriend resided together because both claimed the same home as a residence at the same time. See id. The court of appeals reversed, finding that while the wife and her boyfriend were romantically involved, they did not engage in continuous cohabitation as defined by Strickland. Id. at 77–78, 664 S.E.2d at 497. According to the court of appeals, the evidence showed that the boyfriend did not live under the same roof as the wife for ninety consecutive days, and therefore, the wife's relationship with her boyfriend did not amount to continuous cohabitation under Strickland. See id. Here, because McKinney sought termination of her alimony obligation to Pedery, she bore the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Hamby resided with Pedery for at least ninety days. See Miles, 393 S.C. at 120, 711 S.E.2d at 885; Cartee, 295 S.C. at 104, 366 S.E.2d at 269 (quoting Boney, 289 S.C. at 597, 347 S.E.2d at 891). We find that McKinney did not satisfy that burden; accordingly, the family court should have denied her motion for termination of her alimony obligation. We do not deny that the facts indicate that Pedery and Hamby's living situation is a permanent arrangement of a romantic nature. Rather, we focus on the specific requirement under the plain language of section 20-3-130(B). If the statute merely required the supported spouse to reside with his paramour, then termination of McKinney's alimony obligation would be proper. However, the statute mandates cohabitation for ninety consecutive days. The evidence presented at the hearing indicates that Hamby maintained two residences during the time in question. Before she began a relationship with Pedery, she lived in Duncan with her son, and apparently maintained a residence there even after she began seeing Pedery. For us to conclude that Hamby's only actual residence was with Pedery—arguably leading to the conclusion that she resided with Pedery for ninety or more days for purposes of section 20-3-130(B)— McKinney would have needed to show that Hamby had completely relocated from her son's house in Duncan to Pedery's house. McKinney presented no such evidence. Instead, according to Pedery's testimony, Hamby maintained enough possessions in Duncan such that she took only an overnight bag with her when she went from Pedery's house to her son's house in Duncan. During the time in question, Hamby lived at her son's house in Duncan approximately two days of every week, which means that under a literal interpretation of the statute, Pedery and Hamby could not have lived under the same roof for ninety consecutive days. See Strickland, 375 S.C. at 89, 650 S.E.2d at 472. Like the court of appeals found in Semken, the statute's ninety-day requirement—as interpreted in Strickland—controls any claim that residence was established in a particular place. The court of appeals essentially proclaimed a new definition under the statute when it considered whether Pedery and Hamby shared a home on a continuous and uninterrupted basis for substantially longer than ninety days. See McKinney, 406 S.C. at 9, 749 S.E.2d at 123. This definition is not consistent with Strickland and the plain language of section 20-3-130(B). Additionally, the court of appeals did not support its holding that Hamby's weekly departure from Pedery's house was more akin to a temporary absence for out-of-town travel than it was to routine separation based on separate residences with any authority, and this analysis does not further the inquiry required by the statutory test. See id. at 8, 749 S.E.2d at 123. Similarly, McKinney's interpretation of the statute would remove the word consecutive from the statute and would classify Hamby's time away from Pedery's house each week as analogous to work-related travel. However, neither McKinney's nor the court of appeals' interpretation is faithful to the language of the statute. If we were to uphold the court of appeals' analysis, our decision would render section 20-3-130(B) a nullity.3 The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. See Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) (Under the plain meaning rule, it is not the court's place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute. Where the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning. (citations omitted)). Therefore, because the ninety-day requirement under the plain language of the statute is not satisfied, we reverse the court of appeals' decision upholding the family court's termination of McKinney's alimony obligation. 3 We agree with the concurrence that the plain language of the statute makes it almost impossible for a family court to find continued cohabitation for purposes of section 20-3-130(B) and therefore terminate a supported spouse's alimony award. Regardless, the language of the statute is a choice made by the Legislature and creates a result to which we are confined, as the plain meaning of section 20-3- 130(B) cannot accord with the so-called common sense application of the statute.
The family court may also find that a continued cohabitation exists if there is evidence that the supported spouse resides with another person in a romantic relationship for periods of less than ninety days and the two periodically separate in order to circumvent the ninety-day requirement. S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3- 130(B).4 The family court found that Hamby's absences from Pedery's house were being used deliberately and intentionally because there was never any removal of her property to the other location and she returned on a regular basis . . . . Similarly, the family court stated that any absence[] from [Pedery's house] is in the line of her job and do[es] not constitute a stop in her residence and that the use of this at trial is clearly to circumvent the statute. In contrast, we find that McKinney presented no evidence that Pedery and Hamby periodically stayed apart from each other before the litigation began5 to circumvent the ninety-day requirement of section 20-3-130(B). According to Pedery's testimony, Hamby worked as a nanny for her grandchildren and lived with her son in Duncan prior to her relationship with Pedery,6 indicating that Hamby's travel to Duncan was unrelated to the ninety-day requirement of section 20-3- 130(B). Therefore, we find that Pedery and Hamby's weekly separation as a result of her work in Duncan did not amount to a separation intended to circumvent the ninety-day requirement of section 20-3-130(B). 4 Because the court of appeals found that McKinney established that Hamby and Pedery continuously cohabitated for longer than ninety days, it did not reach this issue. See McKinney, 406 S.C. at 9, 749 S.E.2d at 123. 5 Pedery acknowledged that after the litigation began, Hamby began staying at his house only on weekend nights. 6 While the family court found that Pedery's testimony was not wholly credible, the family court based that finding on the fact that he did not bring [Hamby] to the hearing to substantiate any of the allegations—reasoning which we find unpersuasive. Nevertheless, there was no testimony to refute Pedery's testimony on this point, and Greaves actually observed Hamby caring for children while she was in Duncan.