Opinion ID: 846038
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: reasonable control of the right-of-way

Text: The Michigan Constitution provides at article 7, section 29: No person, partnership, association or corporation, public or private, operating a public utility shall have the right to the use of the highways, streets, alleys or other public places of any county, township, city or village for wires, poles, pipes, tracks, conduits or other utility facilities, without the consent of the duly constituted authority of the county, township, city or village; or to transact local business therein without first obtaining a franchise from the township, city or village. Except as otherwise provided in this constitution the right of all counties, townships, cities and villages to the reasonable control of their highways, streets, alleys and public places is hereby reserved to such local units of government. Conducting private business on public streets is not a right. `The use of public streets for private enterprise may be for the public good, but, even so, it is a privilege that may be granted, regulated, or withheld.' Red Star Motor Drivers' Ass'n v. Detroit, 234 Mich. 398, 409, 208 N.W. 602 (1926), quoting Schultz v. City of Duluth, 163 Minn. 65, 68, 203 N.W. 449 (1925). In fact, this Court has stated that such use of the right-of-way is special and extraordinary because it differs radically from the ordinary use of streets, which is for travel. Fostini v. Grand Rapids, 348 Mich. 36, 40-41, 81 N.W.2d 393 (1957), quoting 64 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, § 1774, pp. 224-225. The right to deny or limit the use of streets reposes in the local unit of government. If the municipality decides to grant permission to use the streets, it may do so under such terms and conditions as it sees fit. Fostini, supra at 41, 81 N.W.2d 393. The only limitation on the municipality is that its control be reasonable. Const. 1963, art. 7, § 29. Through the last century, Michigan courts uniformly applied this rule to utilities. Our appellate courts consistently held that a municipality may require a utility to relocate its poles and facilities at the utility's own expense. In fact, Edison has repeatedly been the subject of these cases. Its struggle against the constitutionally protected right of reasonable control has been unsuccessful until now. By way of illustration, nearly 90 years ago, this Court dealt with a remarkably similar case, City of Monroe v. Postal Tel. Co., 195 Mich. 467, 162 N.W. 76 (1917). There, the city of Monroe issued an ordinance requiring various utilities to relocate their lines and facilities underground at their own expense. This Court stated that a utility's use of the right-of-way cannot `incommode the public in its use.' Id. at 472, 162 N.W. 76 (citation omitted). The Court further stated that the cost of relocation cannot be a deciding factor in whether the control of the right-of-way is reasonable. We wrote: The mere fact that the route designated by the municipality is less convenient or involves on the part of the telephone company a larger expenditure is of no consequence so long as the company is not thereby prevented from reaching all those it desires to serve or who desire service from it. The record before us fails to disclose this condition. Where a municipality, in the exercise of its inherent police power, adopts an ordinance reasonably regulating the manner, character, or place of construction of a contemplated line, the telephone company must comply with such regulations and exercise its right of entry under the general powers conferred by the State subject to them. [ Id. at 473-474, 162 N.W. 76, quoting Village of Jonesville v. Southern Michigan Tel. Co., 155 Mich. 86, 90, 118 N.W. 736 (1908).] In 1952, this Court followed in the footsteps of the Monroe case. The city of Detroit sought to install and expand its public sewer system in an area where Edison had installed its facilities. Detroit Edison Co. v. Detroit, 332 Mich. 348, 349-350, 51 N.W.2d 245 (1952). We held that the designated area was equivalent to those dedicated to the city for streets or alleys. Id. at 354, 51 N.W.2d 245. That being the case, we concluded, Edison must bear the cost of removing and replacing its facilities located there pursuant to Const. 1908, art. 8, § 28. [1] Edison conceded as much. Both it and the majority have failed to explain why Edison should not be bound in this case by its earlier concession. In fact, the majority uses this concession as a reason to distinguish Detroit Edison Co. from this case. Given that Edison made this concession in a case involving similar facts, I see no reason why it should not be bound by its clearly stated former position. In 1965, this Court again addressed an issue involving the relocation of utility facilities. The city of Detroit vacated previously dedicated streets and alleys as part of an urban redevelopment plan for a blighted area. Detroit v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 374 Mich. 543, 548, 132 N.W.2d 660 (1965). Both the Michigan Bell Telephone Company and Edison sought reimbursement from the city for the relocation of their lines and facilities. Id. at 549-550, 132 N.W.2d 660. Detroit's plan called for the utilities to relocate facilities both aboveground and underground. Id. at 557, 132 N.W.2d 660. Again, this Court stated that the city had a legal right to require the utilities to relocate their facilities at their own expense. As in the Monroe case, we made no distinction between relocation aboveground and relocation underground. The Court of Appeals picked up the baton after being asked repeatedly to address the question of relocating utility lines. It has consistently found that the utility must bear the cost of relocation as long as the relocation is required in the course of the discharge of a governmental function. See City of Pontiac v. Consumers Power Co., 101 Mich.App. 450, 300 N.W.2d 594 (1980), Detroit Edison Co. v. Southeastern Michigan Transportation Auth., 161 Mich.App. 28, 410 N.W.2d 295 (1987), Detroit Edison Co. v. Detroit, 180 Mich.App. 145, 446 N.W.2d 615 (1989), Detroit Edison Co. v. Detroit, 208 Mich.App. 26, 527 N.W.2d 9 (1994), and City of Taylor, 263 Mich.App. 551, 689 N.W.2d 482. [2] This long line of cases discussing reasonable control under Const. 1963, art. 7, § 29 is supported by the common law. And the control exercised by Taylor here is also in accord with the common law. Under the traditional common-law rule, utilities have been required to bear the entire cost of relocating from a public right-of-way whenever requested to do so by state or local authorities. 12 E. McQuillin, Law of Municipal Corporations § 34.74a (3d ed.1970); 4A J. Sackman, Nichols' Law of Eminent Domain § 15.22 (rev.3d ed.1981). This rule was recognized and approved by this Court as long ago as New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Drainage Comm'n of New Orleans, 197 U.S. 453, 462, 25 S.Ct. 471, 49 L.Ed. 831 (1905) (holding that the injury sustained by the utility is damnum absque injuria [3] ). [ Norfolk Redevelopment & Housing Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 464 U.S. 30, 35, 104 S.Ct. 304, 78 L.Ed.2d 29 (1983).] Far from abandoning the common law, this state's constitution specifically retains it. Const. 1963, art. 3, § 7; Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug 184, 188-189 (Mich., 1845). Nothing in article 7, § 29 of the Michigan Constitution is inconsistent with the common law in this area. Instead, as shown earlier in this opinion, this Court has underlined the consistency in repeatedly requiring utilities to bear the cost of relocation. Therefore, the common law remains in this state. [4] Under its general rule, the Taylor ordinance represents a reasonable control of the city's right-of-way. [5] Given that the control is reasonable, it is constitutionally protected by Const. 1963, art. 7, § 29, and the Court of Appeals decision should be affirmed. The majority relies on People v. McGraw, 184 Mich. 233, 150 N.W. 836 (1915). In McGraw, the Court stated, Taking the sections [of the Constitution] together, they should be so construed as to give the power to municipalities to pass such ordinances and regulations with reference to their highways and bridges as are not inconsistent with the general State law. Id. at 238, 150 N.W. 836. The majority treats this general statement of the law as if it overrides all other precedent in the area, even precedent directly on point. [6] This is inaccurate. Moreover, it is inconsistent with McGraw. As noted earlier, the common law remains viable law in this state. Stout, 2 Doug. at 188-189. Under the common law, utilities have been required to bear the entire cost of relocating from a public right-of-way whenever requested to do so by state or local authorities. Norfolk Redevelopment & Housing Auth., 464 U.S. at 35, 104 S.Ct. 304. In creating the PSC, the Legislature did not explicitly overrule the common law. To the contrary, the PSC's jurisdiction is limited as otherwise restricted by law. MCL 460.6(1). The common law of the state is part of that restricting law. Therefore, unless the common law is expressly overruled, it controls, even with respect to the jurisdiction of the PSC. Applying this to the case at hand, McGraw did not change the common-law rule that a municipality may require a utility to bear the cost of relocating its facilities. The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have consistently followed this rule. In continuing in this case its adherence to the common law, the Court of Appeals did not err, and its decision should be affirmed.