Opinion ID: 1247192
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Petitioner Was Denied Equal Protection of the Law

Text: Aside from the separation-of-power and due process infirmities apparent from the face of the statute, it is also clear that petitioner was denied equal protection of the law under section 6007, subdivision (c) as applied. As the majority accurately observes, petitioner was placed on involuntary inactive enrollment as the result of misconduct attributable to a severe cocaine addiction.... (Maj. opn. at p. 1111.) Section 6007, subdivision (b) expressly provides that the bar may place a member on involuntary inactive enrollment if it finds, [a]fter notice and opportunity to be heard ... that the member, because of ... the habitual use of intoxicants or drugs, is (i) unable or habitually fails to perform his or her duties or undertakings competently, or (ii) unable to practice law without substantial threat of harm to the interests of his or her clients or the public. Petitioner appeared to satisfy the criteria of section 6007, subdivision (b) in every respect. Indeed, his was virtually a textbook case of an attorney disabled and unable to practice competently or safely because of the habitual use of ... drugs. Why, then, did the bar not proceed against petitioner under this subdivision? Although the record is silent, one answer is perfectly obvious. Unlike subdivision (c), with its hurry-up 10-day notice rule, constricted discovery and anything-goes rules of evidence, subdivision (b) proceedings are conducted in the normal fashion, with the usual procedural safeguards of notice, discovery and evidentiary rules in place. Thus, under the statute as currently constituted, another attorney, identically situated to petitioner, identically addicted and disabled, and posing an identical risk of harm to the public, could nevertheless enjoy full due process protection if the bar decided to seek an involuntary enrollment under subdivision (b) rather than (c). It is well settled that the state cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ( Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners (1957) 353 U.S. 232, 238-239 [1 L.Ed.2d 796, 801-802, 77 S.Ct. 752, 64 A.L.R.2d 288]), nor arbitrarily foreclose to any person the right to pursue an otherwise lawful occupation. ( Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State of California (1969) 71 Cal.2d 566, 579 [79 Cal. Rptr. 77, 456 P.2d 645, 38 A.L.R.3d 1194]; accord Raffaelli v. Committee of Bar Examiners (1972) 7 Cal.3d 288, 293 [101 Cal. Rptr. 896, 496 P.2d 1264, 53 A.L.R.3d 1149].) There is nothing in the statute or the record to justify the bar's disparate treatment of petitioner. `Action is arbitrary not only when it is capricious, but also if it lacks adequate support in the record, when the facts do not justify the conclusion.' ( Bogacki v. Board of Supervisors (1971) 5 Cal.3d 771, 786-787 [97 Cal. Rptr. 657, 489 P.2d 537], quoting Hollon v. Pierce (1967) 257 Cal. App.2d 468, 478 [64 Cal. Rptr. 808].) The record and the statute in question yield absolutely no rational basis for the bar's decision to proceed against petitioner under the provisions of subdivision (c) rather than the more directly applicable provisions of subdivision (b). The only plausible reason for singling out petitioner was the fact that the bar was put to far less inconvenience under the relaxed notice, discovery and evidentiary rules of subdivision (c). That, in my estimation, does not constitute a legitimate basis of distinction. The majority strains to find a valid distinction in the purposes underlying subdivisions (b) and (c). The former, it is alleged, is merely aimed at preventing the risk that ... the attorney may not be able to perform competently or ... without ... danger to clients or the public. (Maj. opn. at p. 1117, italics added.) Under subdivision (c), the attorney must be found to have already caused ... harm ... and there must be a reasonable threat such harm will recur or continue.  (Maj. opn. at p. 1117, italics added.) These alleged distinctions, however, are at odds with the plain language of the statute. Subdivision (b) expressly provides that the bar may not institute proceedings unless it finds after preliminary investigation or during the course of a disciplinary proceeding, that probable cause exists therefor. It is reasonable to infer that such an investigation or disciplinary proceeding would be based on some prior misconduct. The bar must also find that the attorney is unable or habitually fails to perform his duties. Such a finding would be extremely improbable absent some tangible case or cases in which the attorney has already failed to perform his duties. Clearly, both subdivisions (b) and (c) contemplate proof of prior misconduct and harm to clients or the public. Equally unpersuasive is the assertion that only subdivision (c) requires proof of future misconduct. What would be the point of seeking involuntary enrollment under either subdivision unless the misconduct and risk of harm were likely to recur or continue? Though the majority purports to find no lack of justification for the different procedures under subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 6007 (maj. opn. at p. 1117), in point of fact the only justifications they offer are baseless. There was no legitimate reason to deny petitioner in this matter the full range of procedural protections otherwise accorded members of the bar under section 6007, subdivision (b). For this reason, I would hold that section 6007, subdivision (c) is invalid as applied.