Opinion ID: 4526150
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sell a controlled substance; or

Text: (4) Possess a controlled substance with intent to manufacture, deliver or sell the controlled substance. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-417(a) (2019). Section 39-17-402(6) defines “‘deliver’ or ‘delivery’” as “the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled 5 No. 19-5963, United States v. McClain substance, whether or not there is an agency relationship.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-402(6) (2019) (emphasis added).1 To determine whether a prior conviction is a controlled-substance offense under § 4B1.2(a), we apply the categorical approach. Havis, 927 F.3d at 384. First, we consider “the least of the acts criminalized by the elements of [the] statute,” not McClain’s actual conduct. Id. 384–85 (citing Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190–91 (2013)). We “then determine whether even those acts are encompassed by the” Guidelines definition of a controlled-substance offense. Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 190–91. “[I]f the least culpable conduct falls outside [the Guidelines] definition, then the statute is too broad to qualify,” meaning that the statute does not “categorically qualif[y] as a controlled substance offense.” Havis, 927 F.3d at 385. Identifying the least culpable conduct, however, is not a theoretical exercise. There must be “a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside” the Guidelines definition of a controlled-substance offense. Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007). A modified categorical approach is utilized when the prior offense statute is divisible, meaning it “encompasses multiple alternative elements, not all of which are within the generic definition of the [offense], thus making the [ ] crime [of the prior conviction] broader than the predicate offense.” United States v. Goldston, 906 F.3d 390, 394 (6th Cir. 2018). Put differently, a statute is divisible when the statutory provision “contain[s] several different crimes.” Moncrieffe, 1 When McClain pleaded guilty, the versions of the statutes in place in 2002 were applicable. However, neither § 39-17-417(a)(4) nor § 39-17-402(6) have been altered in subsequent amendments. Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-417(a)(4)(2019) with TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-417(a)(4) (2002); compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 39417-402(6) (2019) with TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-402(6) (2002). 6 No. 19-5963, United States v. McClain 569 U.S. at 191. Under those circumstances we look to certain documents, Shepard documents, to “determine which particular offense the [defendant] was convicted of.” Id. A modified categorical approach serves only to focus the federal court’s analysis of the prior offense, meaning that courts apply the same steps set forth above to the relevant portion of the divisible statute. See id. We have held that § 39-17-417(a) is divisible, Goldston, 906 F.3d at 394, but we have not concluded whether subsection (a)(4) is further divisible. With these basic concepts in mind, we proceed to the two issues on appeal.