Opinion ID: 751346
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tankleff's Absence from the In-Chambers Questioning of Potential Jurors

Text: 36 A criminal defendant is entitled to be present at all stages of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533 n. 15, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970). It is well-established that the impaneling of the jury is one such stage. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 873 F.2d 516, 518 (2d Cir.1989). Tankleff claims that his constitutional right to attend all material portions of his trial was violated by the procedure employed by the trial court in screening potential jurors. 37 Because of extensive pretrial publicity, the court followed a special process in impaneling the jury. First, approximately 500 potential jurors were questioned in open court about 1) whether they had already formed an opinion about Tankleff's guilt based on newspaper and television reports and 2) whether they wished to be excused due to the length of the trial. Tankleff was present at this stage of the screening. The field was thus narrowed to roughly 150 prospective jurors, who were then individually questioned in chambers by the trial judge and attorneys for both the prosecution and defense. These interviews focused on the potential jurors' ability to be fair and impartial in light of the media coverage of the case. Tankleff did not attend these interviews, but his trial counsel did and raised no objection to the process. Finally, the jurors who remained after the in-chambers interviews were placed in the jury box and subjected to the usual voir dire, which Tankleff attended. 38 As an initial matter, the state contends that Tankleff is barred from advancing this claim because he failed to object to the procedure at trial. Tankleff did, however, raise these arguments in his briefs on direct review in the state courts. The Appellate Division rejected the claim without discussion, stating simply, We have examined the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Tankleff, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 711. Similarly, the Court of Appeals of New York said only, We have examined defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be either meritless or unpreserved. Tankleff, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 505, 646 N.E.2d 805. 39 The Supreme Court has held that a procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on habeas review unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case clearly and expressly states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2557, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (In habeas, if the decision of the last state court to which the petitioner presented his federal claims ... did not clearly and expressly rely on an independent and adequate state ground, a federal court may address the petition.). It is unclear whether the New York Court of Appeals rejected Tankleff's jury selection claim because it was unpreserved or because it was deemed meritless as a matter of federal constitutional law. The Second Circuit may therefore address the claim. 40 An analytically distinct issue from the procedural bar is whether, as a matter of substantive law, Tankleff waived his right to be present during this particular stage of voir dire. Because the judge discussed the process in open court several times while Tankleff was present, it is reasonable to conclude that Tankleff knew what was going on. There is no indication that he or his lawyers were under the mistaken belief that he could not attend the in camera sessions. The far more likely explanation for his absence is that he and his lawyers did not think it was important for him to be present at this tedious, routine screening designed to eliminate jurors who had been prejudiced by pretrial publicity. Under the circumstances, we think waiver may properly be inferred from the conduct of the defendant and his attorneys. See Hernandez, 873 F.2d at 518 (The right to be present at one's trial is ... subject to waiver. A defendant can waive that right expressly, or can do so effectively by failing to appear at trial.); Government of the Virgin Islands v. George, 680 F.2d 13, 15 n. 4 (3d Cir.1982) (defendant may waive his right to be present during the period of often routine voir dire questioning) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 528, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 1485, 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985) (noting that a district court need not get an express 'on the record' waiver from the defendant for every trial conference which a defendant may have a right to attend). We, therefore, reject Tankleff's claim that his rights were violated by the pre-screening procedure.