Opinion ID: 2778687
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Uncharged Child Molestation Evidence

Text: At trial, the district court admitted, over objection, testimony from three other victims, MT, NT, and SJ. Joubert argues that, notwithstanding Federal Rule of Evidence 414, the district court erred, under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, by admitting this uncharged child molestation testimony. He contends that the testimony was unfairly prejudicial, that it invite[d] the jury to render a verdict on an improper emotional basis. United States v. Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113, 122 (1st Cir. 2000). Where, as here, an evidentiary objection is preserved, we review the district court's decision for abuse of discretion, reversing if we are 'left with a definite and firm conviction that the court made a clear error of judgment.' United States v. Burdulis, 753 F.3d 255, 263 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Trenkler, 61 F.3d 45, 57 (1st Cir. 1995)). An appellate court gives great deference to a district court's balancing of probative value versus unfair prejudice. United States v. Breton, 740 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2014). Ordinarily, the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibit using a person's prior acts to prove a person's character in order to 2 Finding the search warrant affidavit sufficient, we necessarily reject Joubert's second argument, that the affidavit was so patently lacking in probable cause that it cannot fall within the good faith exception of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). -12- show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1); see also United States v. Gonyer, 761 F.3d 157, 162 (1st Cir. 2014). The rule prohibits the prosecution from introducing evidence that is extrinsic to the crime charged solely for the purpose of showing villainous propensity. Gonyer, 761 F.3d at 162 (internal quotation marks omitted). Rule 414 provides an exception to this general rule in child molestation cases. See Martínez v. Cui, 608 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 2010) (applying Rule 415, Rule 414's counterpart for civil cases); see also United States v. Davis, 624 F.3d 508, 511–12 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Rogers, 587 F.3d 816, 822 (7th Cir. 2009) (Congress has said that . . . it is not improper to draw the inference that the defendant committed this sexual offense because he has the propensity to do so.). Rule 414 provides that [i]n a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of child molestation, the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed any other child molestation. The evidence may be considered on any matter to which it is relevant. This Rule 414 evidence remains subject to Rule 403's balancing between probative value and unfair prejudice. United States v. Jones, 748 F.3d 64, 70 (1st Cir. 2014); see generally Fed. R. Evid. 403 (The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, -13- misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.). District courts are to apply Rule 403 to Rule 414 evidence with a recognition that Rule 414 reflects a congressional judgment to remove the propensity bar to admissibility of certain evidence. Cui, 608 F.3d at 59. Joubert argues that the uncharged child molestation testimony's prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value for three reasons: (1) the allegations are old,3 and thus not particularly probative; (2) the evidence was of limited probative value in light of the central contested issue at trial; and (3) the uncharged molestation testimony overshadowed the evidence of charged conduct, overwhelming the jury and resulting in unfair prejudice to Joubert. First, the age of MT, NT, and SJ's allegations does not necessarily mean that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence. Other courts have admitted testimony from decades earlier where that testimony showed that the defendant sought a similar type of sexual gratification. See, e.g., Davis, 624 F.3d at 512 (admitting evidence of a child molestation that occurred 19 years prior). In the context of the evidence here, the 3 The abuse against MT allegedly occurred 6–9 years prior to the charged conduct. The abuse against NT allegedly occurred about 10 years prior to the charged conduct. The abuse against SJ allegedly occurred about 18–20 years prior to the charged conduct. -14- age of the allegations alone is insufficient to prove the district court abused its discretion. Second, because Joubert's defense was that he did not commit the crimes against KC, evidence bearing on KC's veracity was probative to determining whether Joubert indeed produced and possessed the illicit recording. The uncharged child molestation testimony was probative of KC's veracity because it corroborated aspects of KC's testimony, particularly the nature of the abuse and Joubert's modus operandi in approaching his victims. Given these corroborating aspects of the witnesses' testimony, the district court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 403 in finding that the uncharged molestation testimony's probative value outweighed any unfair prejudicial effect. Third, although the district court's admission of testimony from three other victims strikes us as potentially cumulative, the district court is in much better position to make such judgments. [T]he balancing act called for by Rule 403 is a quintessentially fact-sensitive enterprise, and the trial judge is in the best position to make such factbound assessments. United States v. Vizcarrondo-Casanova, 763 F.3d 89, 94 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Martin, 695 F.3d 159, 165 (1st Cir. 2012)). The district court's decision here is far from the type of 'exceptional circumstance' that calls for reversal based on such -15- an evidentiary ruling. Id. (quoting United States v. Houle, 237 F.3d 71, 77 (1st Cir. 2001)).4 To be sure, the testimony was very prejudicial. But in light of Rule 414, we cannot say it was unfairly so. See United States v. Morales-Aldahondo, 524 F.3d 115, 120 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that [i]n balancing the scales of Rule 403, it is important to note that only unfair prejudice is to be avoided, as by design, all evidence is meant to be prejudicial) (internal quotation marks omitted).