Opinion ID: 1935782
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: WHETHER THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ADDUCED TO SUPPORT VIOLATIONS BY THE BROKER OF MISS. CODE ANN. SECTION 73-35-21(a)(b)(m).

Text: The MREC argues that there was substantial evidence to permit it to suspend Ruby's license. Naturally, Ruby argues that there was not. The burden of proof placed upon the MREC to legally suspend Ruby's license is the familiar clear and convincing evidence standard. Mississippi Real Estate Commission v. White, 586 So.2d 805, 808 (Miss. 1991). On review however, the circuit court ha[s] no authority to intervene lest it finds the commission's decision was arbitrary and capricious, a standard we have equated with our familiar substantial evidence rule limiting our scope of review of court findings of evidence and ultimate facts. Mississippi Real Estate Commission v. White, 586 So.2d 805, 808 (Miss. 1991), citing Harris v. Mississippi Real Estate Commission, 500 So.2d 958, 962 (Miss. 1986); Smith v. Sullivan, 419 So.2d 184, 187-188 (Miss. 1982); Mississippi Real Estate Commission v. Ryan, 248 So.2d 790, 793-94 (Miss. 1971). Therefore, in order for the Court to affirm the circuit court it must find that the decision of the MREC was arbitrary and capricious. We do not find this to be the case. Rather, we find that there was substantial evidence to support the MREC suspension which is reinstated. Specific findings of fact are not reflected in the record from the MREC hearing. However, the trial court's opinion sets forth several findings of fact. Among those, which are supported by the record, are the following. Ruby acted in this matter in at least two positions, as president and owner of the seller corporation and as realtor and listing agent. The sale contract [is] signed by Appellant as Ruby Hennessee in the spaces for realtor and listing agent. The warranty deed was executed as grantor by Queen City Construction Company, Inc., Ruby Hennessee, President. The address shown on the warranty deed for grantor is the same as that of the Appellant as realtor. [15] As for the issue of whether there was substantial evidence to support the commission's suspension, the following facts were set forth in the trial court's opinion and order. After restating the commission attorney's closing statements, the trial court emphasized the fact that the commission recommended that Ruby comply with paragraph 13, the termite certification clause, which was a clause of performance for the seller, not the realtor. The trial court further found that the purchaser, Davis, was told by the respondent that she had a termite certificate and throughout the investigation, respondent states that she would get a copy of the termite certificate but failed to forward one. Then, the trial court took notice that [t]here was unrebutted proof by Appellant that her records on the property were destroyed by fire and further that she attempted to have the property inspected and any termite damage repaired but was prevented from doing so by the purchaser. Finally, in making his decision, the trial court made the following ruling: This Court is well aware that it must not substitute its judgment from that of the board but a review of the record fails to reveal any substantial evidence that the appellant as a realtor made any representations that were misleading or false on the issue of termite inspection or certification. To the contrary the purchaser's statement indicates that they were well aware that Appellant was acting as the seller in any statement concerning termites. The parties take exact opposite approaches to the ruling. The MREC argues that implicit within the trial court's ruling is that misrepresentations were in fact made by Ruby, just that the trial court thought that because she was acting as the seller, that Ruby was exempt from the disciplinary statutes. On the other hand, Ruby argues that implicit within the ruling is that the trial court found that there was no substantial evidence that any misrepresentations were made in her capacity as a realtor which, in conjunction with the evidence about the certificate being lost in the fire, would impliedly mean that the trial court did not find that Ruby misrepresented any fact regarding the termite certificate. The Court finds that the evidence reveals that Ruby promised a termite certificate before the sale, promised one on the date of sale, did not deliver one within a reasonable time afterwards, had a fire, developed amnesia afterwards as to who did the certification, eventually never delivered the certificate, and did not offer to have the home inspected until after a complaint was filed against her with the MREC. With the above referenced findings in mind, which are all supported by the MREC hearing testimony and evidence, together with the determination that a realtor should not be exempt from disciplinary actions when selling private property, we find that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the suspension. Accordingly, this issue is completely without merit.