Opinion ID: 2207912
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Common Carrier

Text: Appellant urges us to find liability on the part of the District, under the facts presented here, by adopting the so-called common carrier doctrine which essentially imposes no-fault liability, and by extending that liability to include ambulance services. Because under our precedents, unlike the rule in a handful of other jurisdictions, common carriers are not subject to a wider scope of liability than others, we find no need to reach the question of whether an ambulance is a common carrier for those purposes. In one jurisdiction that recognizes broad common carrier liability, the highest court has observed that [c]ommon carriers ... are held liable for the negligence or the wilful wrongs of their employees, under the rule that a carrier is under an obligation to use a very high degree of care to prevent injuries that might be caused by the wilful misconduct of others. Worcester Ins. Co. v. Fells Acres Day Sch. Inc., 408 Mass. 393, 558 N.E.2d 958, 967 (1990) (citations and internal punctuation and quotations omitted). [4] In addition, other jurisdictions hold common carriers liable for the misconduct of their employees regardless of whether or not the tortious conduct is within the scope of employment. See, e.g., Rabon v. Guardsmark, Inc., 571 F.2d 1277, 1280 (4th Cir.1978) (observing that South Carolina has recognized the non-delegable duty exception to the general rule of respondeat superior  for cases involving common carriers); Commodore Cruise Line, Ltd. v. Kormendi, 344 So.2d 896, 898 (Fla. Dist.Ct.App.1977) (common carrier is liable to a passenger for the wrongful acts of his or her employees ... notwithstanding the fact that said acts are not within the scope of the employees employment); Co-Op Cab Co. v. Singleton, 66 Ga.App. 874, 19 S.E.2d 541, 542 (1942) (cab company held liable for rape of passenger by cab driver because passengers are entitled to be protected against the wanton and wilful act of violence wrongfully committed... by the servant of the company); Hairston v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 220 N.C. 642, 18 S.E.2d 166, 170 (1942) (Since the carrier owes a high duty to a passenger to protect him from assault from any source, a malicious or wanton assault committed on a passenger by an employee while on duty, whether within the line of his employment or not, constitutes a breach of duty directly imposing liability). [5] This court, however, has never imposed a higher duty on common carriers or extended liability beyond standard negligence or scope of employment respondeat superior principles. Although [precedent] speak[s] of a common carrier as being held to the highest degree of care, there are no categories of care, i.e., the care required is always reasonable care. What is reasonable depends upon the dangerousness of the activity involved. District of Columbia Transit Sys., Inc. v. Carney, 254 A.2d 402, 403 (D.C.1969). See also Missile Cab Ass'n v. Rogers, 184 A.2d 845, 847 (D.C.1962) (No rule is better established than that which holds a common carrier to the highest degree of care toward its passengers for hire and creates liability upon proof of even slight negligence.... The injured party is not relieved from the burden of proving negligence....); Bray v. District of Columbia Transit Sys., Inc., 179 A.2d 387, 388-89 (D.C.1962) (a common carrier must exercise highest degree of care; however, before it can be held liable there must be proof of negligence); District of Columbia Transit Sys., Inc. v. Smith, 173 A.2d 216, 217 (D.C.1961) (We have ruled that the high degree of care owed by a common carrier to its passengers extends to them when boarding and alighting; but a carrier is not an insurer and before it can be held liable for injury to a passenger there must be proof of negligence ... on the part of the carrier. No presumption of negligence on the part of the carrier arises ... [and it] is liable only when it is shown that it had notice....) (footnote omitted); Lindsey v. District of Columbia Transit Co., 140 A.2d 306, 309 (D.C.1958) (For the safety of its passengers, a common carrier is held to the highest degree of care commensurate with the particular hazards involved. Thus all the care ... of reasonable skill, foresight, and prudence... is expected....) (footnote omitted). In short, although the language in our cases speaks of the high degree of care required of a common carrier, the cases all hold that a common carrier is subject to essentially the same standard as any other alleged tortfeasor, i.e., an obligation to exercise due care. See McKethean v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. (WMATA), 588 A.2d 708, 712 (D.C.1991) (holding that WMATA, as a common carrier, owes a duty of reasonable care to its passengers) (citations omitted). Moreover, we recently considered anew the scope of liability of common carriers and held that [a] common carrier is required to protect its passengers against assault or interference with the peaceful completion of their journey. WMATA v. O'Neill, 633 A.2d 834, 840 (D.C.1993) (citation omitted). The protection required, however, is not all-encompassing, because where a special relationship exists, such as between a common carrier and its passengers, the carrier ... has a duty to protect its passengers from foreseeable harm arising from criminal conduct of others. Id. at 840 (emphasis added and citation omitted). In resolving O'Neill, and the cases preceding it, on grounds of duty and foreseeability, this court has never imposed a duty of care on common carriers that approach[es] that of an insurer, Worcester, supra, 558 N.E.2d at 968 (citation omitted), or that amounts to strict liability. [6] Rather, in order to prevail in a cause of action against a common carrier, a plaintiff must either meet the same burden of proof required for any negligence action or establish liability on traditional respondeat superior grounds. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Coron, 515 A.2d 435, 437-38 (D.C. 1986); Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 987 (D.C.1984); Johnson v. Weinberg, 434 A.2d 404, 408 (D.C.1981). In sum, because we have not adopted the so-called common carrier doctrine, we reject appellant's claim that, as the owner of an ambulance, the District may be vicariously liable for intentional torts committed by an ambulance attendant, which were outside the scope of employment. [7]