Opinion ID: 2822110
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Díaz

Text: Díaz was a member of the conspiracy who agreed to cooperate with the government. According to Díaz, he was a seller in the organization and would also store guns for Christopher. After discussing his involvement, Díaz testified about three 18 Cummings makes a similar unpreserved argument regarding the jury instructions for these counts, alleging that it was error to instruct the jury on crack cocaine as opposed to cocaine base because crack and cocaine base were no longer synonymous under DePierre. For the same reasons discussed above, we reject this argument. -25- specific instances. The first two involved rounds with Juan. During these rounds, Díaz -- driving Cummings's car -- would take Juan to a specified location, find the person they were looking for, beat the person up, put the person in the trunk of Cummings's car, and then drive for a while before letting Díaz out and continuing to drive onward with the victim in the trunk. Díaz testified that he never knew in advance where they were going, who they were looking for, or why they were looking for that person. Rather, he just followed Juan's instructions, which were being carried out on Christopher's behalf. Díaz added that Juan was armed both times and that Christopher was the leader of the conspiracy. The third incident occurred one night in the Housing Project. According to Díaz, he had been on duty selling drugs late one night when he heard two shots. Shortly thereafter, Juan and Christopher appeared and enlisted Díaz's help putting a young man with a gunshot wound in his leg into a car. Díaz testified that he was later told that Juan had shot the young man -- who was not from the Housing Project -- twice at Christopher's behest.
Defendants contend that this testimony was irrelevant and thus should have been excluded. Because they made this objection at trial, we review for abuse of discretion. United States v. -26- Richardson, 421 F.3d 17, 37 (1st Cir. 2005). Contrary to Defendants' assertion, however, the testimony was relevant. We reject Defendants' suggestion that Díaz's testimony shows that the rounds were not part of the drug conspiracy. Though Díaz did testify about the rounds in response to questions from the prosecutor about actions aside from the drugs, a review of the transcript as a whole makes clear that the rounds were related to the drug organization. Given this relationship, there is little question that the testimony was relevant. See Fed. R. Evid. 401 (Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.). The testimony helped establish a connection between Defendants -- Juan, acting on Christopher's orders, used Cummings's car -- and between Defendants and the drug conspiracy -- the rounds, being conducted by Juan on Christopher's behalf, were in connection to the drug organization. It also helped to prove at least two allegations in the indictment -- that the roles of Christopher and Juan were leader and enforcer, respectively, and that the leaders of the organization would use force, violence, and intimidation in order to protect the conspiracy and maintain control. See United States v. Rivera Calderón, 578 F.3d 78, 95-96 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that evidence of murders was relevant to -27- show the existence of a single, overarching drug conspiracy and to prove the defendant's involvement in the conspiracy). As a fallback position, Defendants contend that even if the evidence was relevant, it should still have been excluded as unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Defendants never raised this objection below, and thus we review for plain error. Id. at 95; see also United States v. Ciresi, 697 F.3d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 2012). Under any standard, however, this argument fails. Evidence is only excluded under Rule 403 if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 'the danger of unfair prejudice.' United States v. Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113, 121 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403). And unfair prejudice is often reserved for evidence that invites the jury to render a verdict on an improper emotional basis or for evidence that is shocking or heinous and likely to inflame the jury. Id. at 122 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Díaz's testimony does none of these things, and thus its admission was not unfairly prejudicial.