Opinion ID: 2575737
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Zone District Ordinance

Text: Plaintiffs contend the zone district ordinance is preempted by section 4516.5(d) of the FPA. With exceptions not relevant here, section 4516.5(d) provides that individual counties shall not regulate the conduct of timber operations . . . or require the issuance of any permit or license for those operations. As neither ordinance at issue requires the issuance of any permit or license, this case concerns the import of the statutory phrase conduct of timber operations. In Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of San Mateo (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 418, 428, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 159 ( Big Creek v. San Mateo ), the Court of Appeal held that section 4516.5(d) does not deprive California counties of authority to zone timberland outside TPZ's for uses other than timber production. The Court of Appeal acknowledged that section 4516.5(d) mandates that the conduct of timber harvesting operations be governed exclusively by state law, but held that San Mateo County's ordinance, which restricted the location of non-TPZ commercial timber harvesting, did not offend the statute because it spoke not to how timber operations may be conducted, but rather [to] where they may take place. ( Big Creek v. San Mateo, at pp. 424-425, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 159.) The court also noted that numerous provisions of California forestry law reveal the Legislature's intention to preserve local zoning authority. (See id. at pp. 425-426, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 159, citing statutes.) Harmonizing the FPA and the TPA, the court concluded that the Legislature did not intend to preclude counties from using their zoning authority to prohibit timber cutting on lands outside TPZ's. ( Id. at p. 426, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 159.) For the following reasons, we agree.
Land use regulation in California historically has been a function of local government under the grant of police power contained in article XI, section 7 of the California Constitution. [8] We have recognized that a city's or county's power to control its own land use decisions derives from this inherent police power, not from the delegation of authority by the state. ( DeVita v. County of Napa (1995) 9 Cal.4th 763, 782, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 699, 889 P.2d 1019.) And the Legislature, when enacting state zoning laws, has declared its `intention to provide only a minimum of limitation in order that counties and cities may exercise the maximum degree of control over local zoning matters.' ( Ibid., quoting Gov.Code, § 65800.) [9] Thus, [t]he power of cities and counties to zone land use in accordance with local conditions is well entrenched. ( IT Corp. v. Solano County Bd. of Supervisors, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 89, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 513, 820 P.2d 1023.) In enacting zoning ordinances, the municipality performs a legislative function, and every intendment is in favor of the validity of such ordinances. ( Lockard v. City of Los Angeles (1949) 33 Cal.2d 453, 460, 202 P.2d 38.)
In the FPA, the Legislature directed the Board to divide the state into districts (4531) and adopt forest practice rules and regulations for each district (4551). [10] No timber operations may be conducted without submission of a timber harvesting plan and approval by the Director of Forestry and Fire Protection or by the Board on appeal. (4581-4582, 4582.7; see generally Big Creek v. San Mateo, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 424, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 159.) And, as noted, while individual counties may recommend regulations to the Board (4516.5, subd. (a)), they may not regulate the conduct of timber operations (4516.5(d)). The question of express preemption turns on whether the field the Legislature has occupied in so providing encompasses the County's zone district ordinance. (See Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 748, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 804, 872 P.2d 143.) Our primary task when interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature's intent. ( Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 724, 257 Cal.Rptr. 708, 771 P.2d 406.) We turn first to the statutory language, since the words the Legislature chose are the best indicators of its intent. ( Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 826, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 615, 823 P.2d 1216.) Section 4516.5(d) contains no express reference to zoning, nor does it bar localities in terms from regulating the location of timber operations. Rather, counties are forbidden to regulate the conduct of timber operations. As the court in Big Creek v. San Mateo pointed out, in common parlance an ordinance that avoids speaking to how timber operations may be conducted and addresses only where they may take place falls short of being a clear attempt to regulate the conduct thereof. ( Big Creek v. San Mateo, supra, 31 Cal. App.4th at p. 424, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 159; cf. Desert Turf Club v. Board of Supervisors (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d 446, 452, 296 P.2d 882 [that state has occupied field of horse racing regulation does not deprive county of right to adopt zoning restrictions on placement of racetracks].) Nevertheless, as the Court of Appeal below recognized, to the extent zoning by definition may have the consequence of excluding logging from some locations, it may in that sense be said to regulate that activity, at least in the excluded locations. When as here a statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, we look to `extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part.' ( Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 508, 519, 106 Cal. Rptr.2d 548, 22 P.3d 324; see also IT Corp. v. Solano County Bd. of Supervisors, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 98, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 513, 820 P.2d 1023.) In this case, such indicia support the construction of section 4516.5(d) adopted by the Court of Appeal in Big Creek v. San Mateo, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th 418, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 159. First, in many places where it addresses timberland zoning, general state forestry law expressly preserves and plainly contemplates the exercise of local authority. The actual designation of TPZ's, for example, is left to local action. (Gov.Code, § 51104, subds.(a), (c), (g); see, e.g., id., §§ 51112 [on or before March 1, 1977 (list A); on or before March 1, 1978 (list B)] and 51113 [current].) Owners of parcels desiring TPZ zoning must petition local authorities. ( Id., § 51113, subd. (a)(1).) If the parcel does not meet state timber stocking standards and forest practice rules, the owner must agree to do so within five years ( id., subd. (c)(3)(A)), and, if the owner fails to do so, local authorities are empowered to rezone the parcel ( ibid. ) and to specify a new zone for the parcel, which is in conformance with the county general plan and whose primary use is other than timberland ( id., subd. (c)(3)(B)). Additionally, local bodies are authorized in certain circumstances to rezone TPZ parcels (Gov.Code, § 51120, subd. (c)) or convert them to another use ( id., § 51133, subd. (b)). Thus, it is clear that the Legislature has deferred a number of important zoning decisions to local authority, even in the case of TPZ's. ( Big Creek v. San Mateo, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 425, 37 Cal. Rptr.2d 159.) Certainly neither the TPA nor the FPA suggests localities are restricted in what uses they may prohibit outside TPZ zones. ( Big Creek v. San Mateo, at p. 428, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 159.) Nowhere in the statutory scheme, in fact, has the Legislature expressly prohibited the use of zoning ordinances ( id. at p. 425, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 159). Second, section 4516.5(d)'s terminology is not so overshadowing that it obliterates all vestiges of local power as to a subject where municipalities have traditionally enjoyed a broad measure of autonomy. ( Waste Resource Technologies v. Dept. of Public Health (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 299, 306, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 422 [discussing authority to grant refuse disposal permits].) That the Legislature intended the phrase regulate the conduct in section 4516.5(d) to preclude only local regulations that affect how timber operations are conducted is borne out by the kinds of issues the Board, under the rubric of the conduct of timber operations, is in its rules and regulations statutorily required to address. (See § 4551.5.) Fire prevention and control, soil erosion control, site preparation, water quality and watershed control, flood control, disease prevention and control ( ibid. )these clearly are matters relating to the process of carrying out timber operations. (See Big Creek v. San Mateo, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 426, 37 Cal. Rptr.2d 159.) Third, the legislative history of the FPA does not support plaintiffs' expansive reading of section 4516.5(d). Although plaintiff Big Creek suggests the Legislature's purpose was to substitute for local regulation procedures whereby the Board would adopt rules addressing local concerns, the available legislative history contains no discussion of county zoning authority or its relation to regulation of the `conduct' of logging operations. ( Big Creek v. San Mateo, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at pp. 426-427, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 159.) Of greater import is that section 4516.5(d) was added to the FPA during the same legislative session in which the TPA was enacted. (See Stats.1982, ch. 1561, § 3, p. 6164 [adding § 4516.5] and id., ch. 1489, pp. 5748-5766 [adding TPA].) That the Legislature would, in the same legislative session, include in one general forestry statute numerous provisions that rely upon local zoning authority (see, e.g., Gov. Code, §§ 51113, 51133, 51120) and when amending another general forestry statute forbid localities' exercise of such authority seems unlikely. (See Garvey v. Byram (1941) 18 Cal.2d 279, 282, 115 P.2d 501 [concerning reenactment of former Pol. Code § 3817 with minor amendments during the same legislative session in which former Pol.Code § 3834.25 was enacted]; People v. Black (1982) 32 Cal.3d 1, 7-8, 184 Cal.Rptr. 454, 648 P.2d 104 [provisions relating to same subject enacted at same legislative session should be consistently construed].) The history of the legislation that added section 4516.5(d) to the FPA confirms that one of its purposes was to influence local zoning agencies in the exercise of their authority. A TPZ designation puts county residents on notice that timber operations are expected to occur on the parcel (Gov. Code, § 51115.1, subd. (b)), inter alia to discourage expansion of urban services into timberland ( id., § 51102, subd. (a)(3)). By restricting timber harvesting to timberland production, mineral extraction industrial, and park, recreation and open space zone districts, County's zone district ordinance encourages non-TPZ timberland owners who desire to harvest their timber to rezone their property to one of these permitted zone districts. This in turn advances the Legislature's objective of including all qualifying timberland in timberland production zones ( id., § 51103). Fourth, construing section 4516.5(d) so as to encompass every local regulation of timber operations without regard to whether the regulation purports to control the process or manner of carrying out such operations would not account for the Legislature's having included the phrase the conduct of in the FPA's express preemption provision. As the United States Supreme Court has reminded us, ` each phrase within [an express preemption provision] limits the universe of [local action] pre-empted by the statute.' ( Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly (2001) 533 U.S. 525, 550-551, 121 S.Ct. 2404, 150 L.Ed.2d 532, italics added.) Plaintiffs' proposed reading of section 4516.5(d) would give the phrase the conduct of no limiting effect on the universe of local action preempted by that statute. Plaintiffs' reading of section 4516.5(d) also would violate the fundamental rule that [c]ourts should give meaning to every word of a statute if possible, and should avoid a construction making any word surplusage ( Arnett v. Dal Cielo (1996) 14 Cal.4th 4, 22, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 706, 923 P.2d 1). One effect of plaintiffs' reading would be to render the FPA's definition of timberland (see § 4526) partly surplusage. As previously noted, for the purposes of the FPA (with exceptions not pertinent), timberland means land ... which is available for, and capable of, growing a crop of trees of any commercial species used to produce lumber and other forest products ( ibid. ). The phrase available for would be superfluous if the definition were read to include any land that is capable of growing qualified trees, but that is what plaintiffs implicitly urge by suggesting that section 4516.5(d) displaces counties' traditional power to declare which parcels among all those capable of growing trees are available for timbering. When the Legislature wishes expressly to preempt all regulation of an activity, it knows how to do so. For example, the Legislature has provided in the TPA that [p]arcels zoned as timberland production [i.e., located in TPZ's] shall be zoned so as to restrict their use to growing timber and to compatible uses. The growing and harvesting of timber on those parcels shall be regulated solely pursuant to state statutes and regulations.  (Gov.Code, § 51115, italics added.) One implication of this provision, of course, is that the growing and harvesting of timber on non-TPZ parcels need not be regulated solely pursuant to state statutes and regulations. Moreover, to read section 4516.5(d) as precluding all local zoning control over timber operations could lead to absurd results. Such a reading, for example, apparently would require cities and counties to allow commercial logging even in residential districts. Neither the language of the statute nor its legislative history supports such a reading. (See Big Creek v. San Mateo, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 427, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 159.) The Legislature has had ample opportunity over the past decade to amend section 4516.5(d) to abrogate or modify the Court of Appeal's construction of the statutory phrase regulate the conduct of timber operations in Big Creek v. San Mateo. Yet, notwithstanding it has amended the FPA in numerous other particulars every year since that decision was filed, it has not done so. Several California judicial decisions, moreover, have relied on Big Creek v. San Mateo in the intervening years. [11] `Where a statute has been construed by judicial decision, and that construction is not altered by subsequent legislation, it must be presumed that the Legislature is aware of the judicial construction and approves of it.' ( Wilkoff v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 345, 353, 211 Cal.Rptr. 742, 696 P.2d 134.) The Legislature's failure to amend section 4516.5(d), while not conclusive, may be presumed to signify legislative acquiescence in the Big Creek v. San Mateo decision. ( People v. Leahy (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587, 604, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 663, 882 P.2d 321, citing numerous authorities.) [12] For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the Court of Appeal in Big Creek v. San Mateo that the `conduct' of timber harvesting operations is exclusively governed by state law. `Conduct' [however] is not given a specialized definition in the FPA. Its ordinary meaning is `the act, manner, or process of carrying out (as a task) or carrying forward (as a business, government, or war).' ( Big Creek v. San Mateo, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 426, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 159.) Accordingly, local zoning ordinances, like the County's zone district ordinance, that speak to the location of timber operations but not to the manner in which they are carried out, are not expressly preempted by section 4516.5(d).
The Legislature's preemptive action in specific and expressly limited areas weighs against an inference that preemption by implication was intended elsewhere. ( IT Corp. v. Solano County Bd. of Supervisors, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 95, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 513, 820 P.2d 1023; see also Cipollone v. Liggett Group (1992) 505 U.S. 504, 517, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 [Congress' enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted].) In addition, and specifically pertinent here, [p]reemption by implication of legislative intent may not be found when the Legislature has expressed its intent to permit local regulations. Similarly, it should not be found when the statutory scheme recognizes local regulations. ( People ex rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino (1984) 36 Cal.3d 476, 485, 204 Cal.Rptr. 897, 683 P.2d 1150.) Both these bars to implied preemption are present. By expressly preempting local regulations targeting the conduct of timber operations, section 4516.5(d) implicitly permits local regulations addressed to other aspects of timber operations. And, as has been explained, general forestry lawin particular, the TPAexpressly recognizes local zoning authority. Notwithstanding we might, therefore, forgo applying the test for implied preemption applicable when state statutes do not recognize local regulations, applying that test buttresses our conclusion that County's ordinances are not preempted. In determining whether the Legislature has preempted by implication to the exclusion of local regulation we must look to the whole purpose and scope of the legislative scheme. ( People ex rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 485, 204 Cal.Rptr. 897, 683 P.2d 1150.) Implied preemption occurs when: (1) general law so completely covers the subject as to clearly indicate the matter is exclusively one of state concern; (2) general law partially covers the subject in terms clearly indicating a paramount state concern that will not tolerate further local action; or (3) general law partially covers the subject and the adverse effect of a local ordinance on transient citizens of the state outweighs the possible municipal benefit. ( Ibid. )
Plaintiffs contend the Legislature has demonstrated its intent to preempt all local restrictions on timber harvesting by fully occupying the field of timber harvesting regulation. Plaintiffs first note the Legislature's statement of intent, when enacting the FPA, to create and maintain an effective and comprehensive system of regulation and use of all timberlands. (§ 4513.) Invoking the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, they argue that certain provisions of the FPA recognizing limited local authority to regulate timber operations indicate that local authority is otherwise preempted. [13] But as County points out, the Legislature adopted section 4513 at the same time it adopted a provision authorizing counties to adopt timber harvest rules and regulations stricter than the state's rules (Stats.1973, ch. 880, § 4, pp. 1615-1616 [adding former § 4516]), so the general statement of intent in section 4513 cannot have been intended to preempt local restrictions by occupying the field. Moreover, plaintiffs'  expressio unius  argument implicitly assumes the statutory preemption of local rules that regulate the conduct of timber operations encompasses geographic zoning restrictions on the location of such operations. But because, as demonstrated, section 4516.5(d) does not have that broad meaning, the Legislature had no need to exempt traditional county zoning power from the section's preemptive scope; hence, the presence of statutory exceptions to FPA preemption demonstrates nothing about the Legislature's intent respecting counties' exercise of that power. To summarize, general forestry law preempts local regulation of the conduct of timber operations but otherwise expressly contemplates retention of local zoning authority. [L]ocalities must designate certain lands as TPZ's. These zones are dedicated to timber growing and harvesting, and localities may not prohibit logging on them. As to other lands that may contain timber, the TPA expressly reaffirms local authority to choose appropriate zoning. Local legislative bodies retain authority to exclude from the TPZ's certain parcels when they believe exclusion is in the public interest. [Citation.] Localities also retain the authority to choose the non-TPZ zones into which excluded or removed parcels are placed. ( Big Creek v. San Mateo, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 428, 37 Cal. Rptr.2d 159.) We observe, further, that California's Planning and Zoning Law (Gov.Code, § 65000 et seq.) contemplates the continuation of local government's traditional zoning authority in connection with timber resources. In adopting that law, the Legislature specified that localities should exercise the maximum degree of control over local zoning matters ( id., § 65800), inter alia by designating the location and extent of the uses of the land ( id., § 65302, subd. (a)) and including the conservation, development, and utilization of . . . forests in their general plans ( id., subd. (d)). The Planning and Zoning Law also requires counties to adopt in their general plans land use elements that [d]esignate, in a land use category that provides for timber production those parcels of real property zoned for timberland production pursuant to the [TPA] ( id., subd. (a)(1), italics added), thus implicitly acknowledging the potential for locally designated land use categories that do not provide for timber production. In sum, this is not a case in which the subject matter [of where logging can occur] has been so fully and completely covered by general law as to clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state concern. ( People ex rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 485, 204 Cal.Rptr. 897, 683 P.2d 1150.)
Plaintiffs argue that even if the state has not fully occupied the field of timber operations regulation, it has a paramount interest in determining the location of such operations. They point to the FPA's requirements that the Board adopt rules and regulations governing the conduct of timber operations (§ 4551.5), that any person seeking to conduct timber operations submit and have approved a timber harvesting plan (§ 4581), and that such plans contain a description of the land on which the work is proposed to be done (§ 4582, subd. (c)). They point also to the Board's enactment of several rules that restrict the harvesting activities that may be conducted in particular types of terrain. We disagree with plaintiffs that either the Legislature's having directed the Board to adopt rules governing the conduct of timber operations or the Board's having adopted such rules, impliedly displaces (any more than it expressly does so) traditional local authority to zone permissible (non-TPZ) locations for timber operations. Surely, [l]ogging, even when conducted according to state regulations, may have some impacts properly addressed by the [local] zoning authority. That the state has sought to reduce and control these same occurrences through general regulation does not preempt local zoning control, any more than the state and federal regulation of industrial air pollution would preclude a local zoning authority from relying on air pollution as a reason for excluding industrial plants from residential districts. ( Big Creek v. San Mateo, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 427, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 159.) The Attorney General reached a similar conclusion over 30 years ago, when addressing analogous circumstances. (See County Zoning Ordinances, 52 Ops.Cal. Atty.Gen. 138 (1969).) Asked whether a Marin County zoning ordinance purporting to bar commercial logging, mining, quarrying, and drilling, together with all associated uses, activities and structures, in certain areas of the county ( id. at p. 139) was preempted by general state laws (including forestry laws) governing the zoned activities, the Attorney General concluded it was not. It is true, the Attorney General reasoned, that California has numerous laws regulating each of the activities prohibited by the proposed ordinance. However, these laws do nothing to preclude an otherwise valid zoning ordinance which prohibits extraction of the resource in question. ( Id. at pp. 139-140.) Specifically with respect to the field of commercial logging ( County Zoning Ordinances, supra, 52 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. at p. 140), the Attorney General in evaluating Marin County's ordinance stated: The Forest Practice Act [then §§ 4521-4618], together with the forest practice rules ... comprehensively regulate forest practices [so as to] occupy the entire field [of forest practices] and local ordinances with respect to such general practices, are invalid due to such preemption.... In our opinion, however, this pre-empted area is not so broad as to invalidate a zoning ordinance which prohibits logging where such prohibition is otherwise reasonable. ( Ibid. ) For similar reasons we conclude that today's general forestry statutes and regulations fall short of indicat[ing] clearly that a paramount state concern will not tolerate further or additional local action ( People ex rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 485, 204 Cal.Rptr. 897, 683 P.2d 1150) respecting the location of timber operations.
Plaintiffs' overriding concern appears to be that localities may by locational zoning prohibit timber harvesting altogether. The ordinance before us does not have that effect, nor does it appear that any county has attempted such a result. [14] The zone district ordinance permits timber harvesting on parcels zoned timberland production, mineral extraction industrial, and parks, recreation and open space. To require that commercial timber harvesting occur on land in a timberland production or other specified zone is no more a ban on timber harvesting than a regulation requiring that industrial land uses occur on land zoned industrial is a ban on factories. County concedes that landowners wishing to harvest timber may apply to County for approval to rezone parcels to TPZ and that County may not deny TPZ rezoning to any qualifying parcel (Gov. Code, § 51113, subd. (a)(1)), nor may County prohibit timber harvesting in TPZ's. [15] We previously have explained that a local ordinance is not impliedly preempted by conflict with state law unless it mandate[s] what state law expressly forbids, [or] forbid[s] what state law expressly mandates. ( Great Western Shows, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 866, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 746, 44 P.3d 120.) That is because, when a local ordinance does not prohibit what the statute commands or command what it prohibits, the ordinance is not inimical to the statute. ( Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 4 Cal.4th 893, 902, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 215, 844 P.2d 534.) Here, County's ordinances are not impliedly preempted by conflict with state forestry law because it is reasonably possible for a timber operator to comply with both. The zone district ordinance does not mandate what general forestry law forbids or forbid what general forestry law mandates. While the forestry laws generally encourage maximum sustained production of high-quality timber products ... while giving consideration to competing values (§ 4513), they do not require that every harvestable tree be cut. Accordingly, County's zoning ordinance does not conflict with state law simply because it may have the effect of placing some trees, at least temporarily, off limits to logging. [16] Nor does it appear the Board has adopted for Santa Cruz, or any other county, rules that comprehensively address appropriate geographical locations within the county for timber harvesting. In sum, plaintiffs have not identified a clear statement by the Legislature of an intent, when enacting the FPA, to preempt traditional local zoning authority over the location of timber operations. Accordingly, and for all the foregoing reasons, we conclude, as did the Court of Appeal in Big Creek v. San Mateo, that the Legislature did not intend to preclude counties from using their zoning authority to prohibit timber cutting on lands outside the TPZ's ( Big Creek v. San Mateo, supra, 31 Cal. App.4th at p. 426, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 159).