Opinion ID: 2465757
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sanctions/Spoliation of Evidence

Text: [¶ 33] On the second day of trial, Ms. Majors filed a motion for sanctions based upon the State's failure to provide the defense with access to a blue-green bottle shown in photos of the contents of the black bag. She sought dismissal of the charges and/or suppression of all evidence connected with the black bag. In a hearing held outside the jury's presence, Ms. Majors argued that she became aware of the bottle during the trial when reviewing the State's blown up color photographs showing the contents of the bag. She stated that she had not been able to see it before because the copies of the photographs provided by the State prior to trial were small and in black and white. She further stated it appeared from the photographs that there was something in the bottle. The defense argued the bottle was potentially exculpatory because it could have had a label with someone else's name on it or contained another person's fingerprints. [¶ 34] The prosecutor responded that the bottle was not collected during the search. The chief investigating officer testified at the hearing and stated that he did not recall the blue pill bottle. He stated, [m]y focus was more on any kind of drug paraphernalia identification, anything that would relate to our case at the time. He also stated that he did not deliberately leave anything out. The district court denied the motion for sanctions, stating the defense had not demonstrated that there's clearly exculpatory evidence within the purse, the bottle, or otherwise. The court stated, however, that it would allow fair comment on the contents of the photographs and the failure to collect or disclose the evidence contained within the purse, that this is not a complete inventory of what was in the purse, and fair comment would be that this was not completely done as an inventory. [¶ 35] Ms. Majors claims that the district court erred by denying her motion for sanctions against the State. A district court generally has discretion in determining whether sanctions should be granted for an alleged violation of discovery responsibilities. State v. Naple, 2006 WY 125, ¶ 8, 143 P.3d 358, 360-61 (Wyo.2006). However, because Ms. Majors asserts her right to due process was violated when the State failed to collect or preserve the evidence, our review is de novo. Grady v. State, 2008 WY 144, ¶ 29, 197 P.3d 722, 732 (Wyo.2008), citing Wilkening v. State, 2007 WY 187, ¶ 6, 172 P.3d 385, 386 (Wyo.2007). [¶ 36] We discussed the State's obligation to preserve and disclose potentially exculpatory evidence in Grady. The victim's husband had found a letter in her jewelry box after her death. The letter was reportedly written by the victim's former boyfriend ten to fifteen years before the victim was murdered. The State Crime Lab examined the letter and determined it was not written by the defendant. The State thereafter misplaced the letter and it could not be examined by the defendant. Grady, ¶¶ 25-27, 197 P.3d at 730-31. [¶ 37] Following the United States Supreme Court decisions in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988) and California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984), we rejected Grady's claim that the State violated his due process rights by failing to preserve the letter and provide it to him. In California v. Trombetta , the United States Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause does not require law enforcement agencies to preserve breath samples in order to introduce the results of breath-analysis tests at trial. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 491, 104 S.Ct. at 2535. In doing so, the Court noted the officers were acting in good faith and in accord with their normal practice. Id. at 488, 104 S.Ct. at 2533. The Court concluded that whatever duty the Due Process Clause imposes on the government to preserve evidence, it is limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense. Id. at 488, 104 S.Ct. at 2534. Under Trombetta, the government violates due process when it destroys evidence (1) whose exculpatory value is apparent before its destruction and (2) is of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. Id. at 489, 104 S.Ct. at 2534. In Arizona v. Youngblood , the Supreme Court extended Trombetta, holding that where the government fails to preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said than it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant, no due process violation occurs unless the defendant demonstrates the government acted in bad faith. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57, 109 S.Ct. at 337. To establish a due process violation under Youngblood based on the government's failure to preserve evidence, the defendant must show (1) the evidence was potentially useful and (2) the government acted in bad faith. Id. at 58, 109 S.Ct. at 337. The inquiry into bad faith must necessarily turn on the [government's] knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed. Id. at 56 n. , 109 S.Ct. at 336 n. . Grady, ¶¶ 30-31, 197 P.3d at 732. [¶ 38] Using the Youngblood analysis, we must consider whether Ms. Majors made a showing that the blue bottle was potentially useful evidence and the State acted in bad faith by failing to preserve the bottle. Ms. Majors suggests that the State's actions in failing to collect the bottle prevented her from showing that the evidence was potentially useful. She argues, nevertheless, that the evidence would have been potentially useful if it contained evidence identifying it as belonging to Ms. Smith, such as fingerprints or a label. Even if we accept that the bottle may have contained such evidence, we do not know how useful that would have been to Ms. Majors. It was already established that there was money in the bag which had originally been given by the confidential informant to Ms. Smith during the controlled buy. There was clearly a relationship between the items in the bag and both Ms. Smith and Ms. Majors. Moreover, the damning evidence of Ms. Major's fingerprint on the marijuana bottle would not have been discounted regardless of the attributes of the blue bottle. [¶ 39] Ms. Majors' efforts to establish the second element of the Youngblood analysis are even more inadequate. There is absolutely no evidence that the officers had any idea of the exculpatory value of the bottle or had a nefarious intent when they failed to collect it. In Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58, 109 S.Ct. at 337, the Supreme Court stated that the due process clause does not impose on the police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution. The chief investigating officer testified that he could not really remember the bottle, but he would have collected it if he felt it had any significance. There is simply no basis in the record to conclude that law enforcement acted in bad faith by failing to collect the bottle. [¶ 40] Moreover, we are unable to discern any prejudice as a result of the State's failure to collect the bottle. The bottle was presumably still at the residence, which was in the possession of Ms. Smith and/or Ms. Majors. Had Ms. Majors considered it crucial evidence, she could have collected it. In addition, the district court allowed the defense to question witnesses about the missing bottle and argue that the State failed to collect all potentially relevant evidence. Defense counsel took full advantage of that opportunity and it obviously did not sway the jury. The district court did not err by concluding that the State did not violate Ms. Majors' due process rights or denying her motion for sanctions.