Opinion ID: 72034
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Scope of the Biological Assessment Rendered the Decision Arbitrary and Capricious

Text: MCEAA argues that the STB's Decision was arbitrary and capricious because it relied on a biological assessment that assessed only the proposed rail and Phase One area. MCEAA contends that to satisfy § 7 of the ESA and the accompanying regulations, the STB and FWS should have analyzed the effects of the proposed development of the entire 1,760-acre tract before concluding that the proposed rail was not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the golden-cheeked warbler. The respondents counter that the scope of the biological assessment was appropriate because it encompassed only those actions associated with the proposed rail that were reasonably certain to occur. The ESA § 7 regulations leave the contents of a biological assessment (which here was conducted as part of the EIS) to the discretion of the evaluating agency. The biological assessment may include [a]n analysis of the effects of the action on the species and habitat, including consideration of cumulative effects, and the results of any related studies. 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(f)(4). The effects of the action include direct and indirect effects, together with the effects of other activities that are interrelated or interdependent with that action. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. MCEAA contends that the proposed development of the entire tract should have been evaluated as an interrelated action, a cumulative effect, and an indirect effect of the proposed rail. [17]
MCEAA first contends that the biological assessment should have evaluated the proposed development of the entire tract because the entire proposed quarry is an interrelated action with the proposed rail. The ESA regulations define an interrelated action as being part of a larger action and depend[ing] on the larger action for [its] justification. Id. Our circuit has not yet interpreted the term interrelated action, but the FWS's Endangered Species Consultation Handbook clarifies that the larger action is the proposed action for which the agency has been called upon to grant approval: It is important to remember that interrelated... activities are measured against the proposed action. That is, the relevant inquiry is whether the activity in question should be analyzed with the effects of the action under consultation because it is interrelated to ... the proposed action. Be careful not to reverse the analysis by analyzing the relationship of the proposed action against the other activity. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Section 7 Consultation Handbook at 4-26 (1998) (emphasis in original) (hereinafter FWS Handbook). [18] The FWS's comments to the regulations further indicate that the `but for' test should be used to assess whether an activity is interrelated with ... the proposed action. 51 Fed.Reg. at 19,932. The Ninth Circuit, the only circuit to have interpreted the term, has adopted this definition. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1387 (9th Cir.1987) (The test for interrelatedness ... is `but for' causation: but for the [proposed action], these activities would not occur. (citing 51 Fed.Reg. at 19,932)). Although interpretations contained in agency manuals and comments are not entitled to the highest level of deference, a court may nevertheless defer to an agency's interpretation of its own regulation, depending upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-30, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying this standard, we conclude that the FWS's interpretation is a reasonable construction of the regulation and entitled to deference. We adopt this interpretation. MCEAA contends that the proposed development of the entire tract is an interrelated action with the proposed rail because [t]he rail line has no independent utility without all of the phases of the quarry. But this contention reverses the relevant analysis. [19] The larger action is the proposed rail, the activity that the STB was called upon to approve. The issue, for purposes of determining whether proposed development of the entire tract was an interrelated action, is whether, but for the proposed rail, development of the tract as a quarry would occur. If development of the tract would not depend on the proposed rail, then the tract does not qualify as an interrelated action. The STB specifically found, after considering detailed submissions by SGR, that Vulcan feasibly could operate the quarry without a rail, using trucks to remove the limestone. The STB also found that Vulcan likely would take this course if the rail exemption were not granted. The respondents' refusal to consider the proposed development of the entire tract as an interrelated action did not render the Decision arbitrary and capricious.
MCEAA next argues that the proposed development of the entire tract should have been evaluated as one of the cumulative effects of the proposed rail. The ESA regulations define cumulative effects as those effects of future State or private activities, not involving Federal activities, that are reasonably certain to occur within the action area of the Federal action subject to consultation. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. MCEAA contends that [o]nce the rail line is in place, it is certain that production from all phases of the quarry will use it over the remainder of the quarry's operation. The respondents counter that only Phase One is reasonably certain to occur. The proposed phases of later development, the respondents contend, are simply too speculative to allow the agencies to conduct a meaningful review. The respondents point out that although Vulcan has suggested a five-phase course of development, it has not explicitly la[id] out any plan for [later] phases of development or operations and has not specified when such development might occur, except that if it does occur, it will do so in the next twenty to fifty years. The respondents also note that future development will likely depend on economic conditions, which are of course beyond the control or predictive ability of either the [FWS] or STB. The Endangered Species Handbook explains that [i]ndicators of actions `reasonably certain to occur' may include: approval of the action by State, tribal or local agencies or governments (e.g., permits, grants); indications by State, tribal or local agencies or governments that granting authority for the action is imminent; project sponsors' assurance the action will proceed; obligation of venture capital; or initiation of contracts. The more State, tribal or local administrative discretion remaining to be exercised before a proposed non-Federal action can proceed, the less there is a reasonable certainty the project will be authorized. Speculative non-Federal actions that may never be implemented are not factored into the cumulative effects analysis. At the same time, reasonably certain to occur does not require a guarantee the action will occur. The action agency and the Services should consider the economic, administrative, and legal hurdles remaining before the action proceeds. FWS Handbook at 4-30. Our circuit has not interpreted the term reasonably certain to occur, but it has interpreted the reasonably foreseeable standard for assessing cumulative impacts under NEPA, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7, a standard that applies in a broader set of circumstances but encompasses the cumulative effects standard under the ESA actions reasonably certain to occur are also reasonably foreseeable. See 51 Fed.Reg. at 19,933. Our case law shows that even the broader reasonably foreseeable standard requires a substantial degree of certainty before a cumulative impacts analysis will be required. In Gulf Restoration Network v. United States Department of Transportation, 452 F.3d 362 (5th Cir.2006), for example, we concluded that the federal agency's decision was not arbitrary and capricious when the agency had refused to consider, as part of its cumulative impacts analysis for a liquefied underwater natural gas facility, three similar facilities that were proposed to be built in the same area. Applications for federal regulatory approval of these facilities had been filed, and we acknowledged that these applications contained substantial detail about the potential scope of the projects. We nevertheless deferred to the agency's conclusion that until final approval was granted on those applications, there was insufficient certainty about the [facilities'] future construction and environmental consequences to include [them] in the cumulative impact calculus. Id. at 369. We noted that the applications could ultimately be denied or approved contingent upon substantial modifications, and that even if approved, the projects might not go forward because of financing issues. Id. at 371-72. As the petitioner, MCEAA has the burden of showing that the proposed development of the entire tract should have been treated as a cumulative effect because its development as a quarry is reasonably certain to occur. MCEAA argues that development of the entire tract is reasonably certain to occur because Vulcan has entered into long-term leases for it. But the fact of the long-term leases is not tantamount to a reasonable certainty that financial incentives will exist in the future to develop the landcertainly not in any way sufficiently specific for the respondents to conduct a meaningful scientific assessment of the development's effects. MCEAA also argues, for the first time in its reply brief, that a map that Vulcan submitted to the TCEQ as part of its proposed WPAP shows specific plans for development of the entire tract. The map identifies karst features on the property and shows where those features are in relation to proposed quarry pits over the entire tract. We need not address this argument, as it is raised for the first time in a reply brief, see Alaniz v. Zamora-Quezada, 591 F.3d 761, 777 (5th Cir.2009) (citing Peteet v. Dow Chem. Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1437 (5th Cir.1989)), but in any event, this argument is not persuasive. SGR clarified at oral argument that the TCEQ required a review of the proposed plans for the entire tract before awarding regulatory approval to begin quarry activities on the site, and that the plans submitted merely reflected Vulcan's best guess about how the tract would be developed, if it were developed. MCEAA also overlooks one significant contingency to the development of future quarry phases: If golden-cheeked warblers or karst invertebrates are found to live on this land, then Vulcan will be obligated under § 9 to avoid any take, which may in turn preclude or inhibit development of the land. In this respect, time may work in the MCEAA's favor: warblers may move on to the unsurveyed portions of the property before any survey work is done. There is every indication that if future surveys reveal the presence of warblers, Vulcan's § 9 obligations will be strictly enforcedthe FWS is monitoring Vulcan in an ongoing capacity, and the MCEAA may bring a citizens' suit to enforce compliance. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g). The STB's and FWS's refusal to consider the proposed development of the entire tract as a cumulative effect of the proposed rail did not render the Decision arbitrary and capricious. As in Gulf Restoration, MCEAA has not shown that the future phases of the quarry are free from regulatory and financial contingencies such that their occurrence would be reasonably foreseeable, much less reasonably certain. We are persuaded that the respondents' refusal to consider the proposed development of the entire tract as a cumulative effect of the proposed rail did not render the Decision arbitrary and capricious.
Finally, MCEAA contends that the proposed development of the entire tract should have been evaluated as an indirect effect of the proposed rail. The ESA regulations define indirect effects as those that are caused by the proposed action and are later in time, but still are reasonably certain to occur. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. MCEAA cites National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.1976), in support of this contention, but Coleman is readily distinguishable. Coleman involved the proposed expansion of Interstate 10 through a stretch of designated critical habitat for the Mississippi sandhill crane, a federally-listed subspecies. Despite the presence of a listed species and critical habitat in the action area, the Federal Highway Administration (FHA) approved the project without ever initiating a consultation with the FWS. The FWS in fact opposed the project on the grounds that the project would jeopardize the continued existence of the cranes. Id. at 372-73. Our court reversed the FHA's approval and remanded with directions that the agency properly consult with the FWS and consider, as an indirect effect of the action, the effects of future private development along the highway, which the FWS urged  always accompanies the construction of a major highway. Id. at 373 (emphasis added). [20] In the present case, by contrast, the STB concluded after extensive analysis that the proposed action was not likely to jeopardize any listed species and the FWS concurred in that conclusion. And, as discussed in the above analysis as to cumulative effects, the STB and FWS reasonably determined that the development of the remaining phases of the quarry is not reasonably certain to occur the same standard applicable to indirect effects. The record, in sum, does not support the conclusion that the STB's and FWS's refusal to consider the proposed development of the entire tract as an indirect effect rendered the Decision arbitrary and capricious. The complexities of the regulatory arguments on this issue also obscure a fundamental point: The STB has no authority to stop development of the quarry, which the evidence shows could and would be developed regardless of whether the rail were built. The STB had two choices: Grant the exemption and allow the railthe environmentally preferable alternativeto go forward, or deny the exemption, in which case quarry development would progress, serviced by a more environmentally disruptive fleet of trucks. We cannot say that the STB abused its discretion in choosing the former.