Opinion ID: 2088237
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Public Official Status and the Standard of Proof

Text: The defendants next contend that the trial court erred in ruling that True was not a public official within the meaning of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), and therefore was not required to prove his allegations with convincing clarity. We disagree. The first amendment as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment [5] requires that a public official who brings a defamation suit against critics of his official conduct prove actual malice, that is, that the defendants made the statements with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were true or false. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-83, 84 S.Ct. at 725-27; see also Michaud v. Town of Livermore Falls, 381 A.2d 1110, 1113 (Me.1978). This proof must be by convincing clarity. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285-86, 84 S.Ct. at 728-29; Michaud, 381 A.2d at 114-15. See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580A comment f (1976) (equating proof by convincing clarity with proof by clear and convincing evidence). In the instant case the court instructed the jury that because Ladner had a conditional privilege to make statements evaluating a teacher formerly employed by the school system of which Ladner was superintendent, True must prove that Ladner abused his privilege by having made the statements with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of their truth or falsity. Thus the instructions satisfied the actual malice requirement of New York Times, but the instruction that True must prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence did not satisfy the convincing clarity requirement. Therefore, if True is a public official, the judgment must be vacated. New York Times did not decide how far down the administrative ladder the designation of public official extends. See 376 U.S. at 283 n. 23, 84 S.Ct. at 727 n. 23. In Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966), the Supreme Court established criteria for the determination of whether a particular public employee is a public official. The Court noted that New York Times rested on two important interests: a strong interest in debate on public issues and a strong interest in debate about those persons who are in a position significantly to influence the resolution of those issues. Id. at 85, 86 S.Ct. at 675 (emphasis added). The Court then delineated the status of public official in the following terms: Criticism of government is at the very center of the constitutionally protected area of free discussion. Criticism of those responsible for government operations must be free, lest criticism of government itself be penalized. It is clear, therefore, that the public official designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs. ... Where a position in government has such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of a person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and performance of all government employees, both elements were identified in New York Times are present and the New York Times malice standards apply. Id. at 85-86, 86 S.Ct. at 675-76 (footnotes omitted). The test for public official status then is whether the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the person holding the office beyond the interest in the qualifications and performance of all government employees, see id. at 86, 86 S.Ct. at 676, and this independent interest may be found at the very least when an employee has substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs, see id. at 85, 86 S.Ct. at 675. More recently, the Supreme Court has noted that the status of public official cannot be thought to include all public employees. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 119 n. 8, 99 S.Ct. 2675, 2680 n. 8, 61 L.Ed.2d 411 (1979). [6] We turn then to the question whether a public school teacher is a public official within the meaning of New York Times. The principal rationale for the New York Times rule is the freedom of the governed to criticize the government and those responsible for its operations. See Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 85, 86 S.Ct. at 675. The governance or control which a public classroom teacher might be said to exercise over the conduct of government is at most remote and philosophical. Franklin v. Lodge 1108, Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 97 Cal.App.3d 915, 159 Cal. Rptr. 131, 136 (1979); see also McCutcheon v. Moran, 99 Ill.App.3d 421, 54 Ill.Dec. 913, 916, 425 N.E.2d 1130, 1133 (1981). On the facts of Roche v. Egan, 433 A.2d 757 (Me. 1981), we held that a police detective was a public official, and the complained of statements should be treated as affecting him in that capacity. In that case, we emphasized that law enforcement is a uniquely governmental affair and that the plaintiff was vested with substantial responsibility for the safety and welfare of the citizenry in areas impinging most directly and intimately on daily living, a responsibility punctuated by the fact that a firearm, no less than a badge, comes with his office. Id. at 762. By comparison, education is not uniquely governmental, and the authority exercised by a public school teacher is very limited. While the authority of a law enforcement officer potentially extends over all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the law enforcement agency and to all hours of a day, the authority of a public school teacher is normally limited to school children within the school building during ordinary school hours. Cf. Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So.2d 803, 808 n. 3 (Fla.1984). [7] We note that in the instant case there is no evidence True exercised substantial administrative or policymaking responsibilities or supervised substantial numbers of employees. We find, too, that there are countervailing considerations that militate against stripping a public school teacher of the protection afforded by the common law tort of defamation. The Supreme Court noted in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) that [p]ublic officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy. Id. at 344, 94 S.Ct. at 3009. We do not find that a public school teacher usually has this greater access. Like other private individuals, the teacher is vulnerable to injury from defamation, and the state interest in protecting the teacher is greater than the interest in protecting those with readier access to channels of communication. See id.; see also Franklin, 97 Cal.App.3d at 923, 159 Cal.Rptr. at 136 (application of the New York Times rule to a school teacher characterized as a real and intolerable danger to the freedom of intellect and of expression which the teacher must have to teach effectively). Moreover, we do not find any assumption of the risk: by accepting a public teaching position without more a private individual cannot be said to have voluntarily exposed [himself] to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 435; see also Nodar, 462 So.2d at 808. We hold therefore that the trial court did not err in ruling that True was not a public official. [8] Accordingly, there was no error in the court's instructions to the jury on the standard of proof.