Opinion ID: 3065347
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The merits of the cross-motions

Text: Defendants’ summary judgment motion is premised on Plaintiffs’ having failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish a § 2 vote denial claim. The nub of Defendant’s argument is that all of the Senate Factors are relevant to Plaintiffs’ vote denial claim; that the district court was correct to consider them in its totality-of-the-circumstances analysis; and that, because Plaintiffs failed to produce probative evidence relating to Senate Factors other than 5, Plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient evidence to make out a § 2 vote denial claim. Thus, Defendants contend, they were entitled to summary judgment. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that, having concluded that racial discrimination exists in the Washington criminal justice system (Factor 5), the district erred in then requiring Plaintiffs to produce evidence regarding other Senate Factors not relevant to their vote denial claim. While those factors may be pertinent to a vote dilution claim, Plaintiffs contend that they “cast no light on Plaintiffs’ vote denial challenge.” We agree with Plaintiffs for the reason that, given the strength of their Factor 5 showing, the district court erred in requiring them to prove Factors that had little if any relevance to their particular vote denial claim. Although the district court was required to consider the “totality of the circumstances,” not all of the Senate Factors were equally relevant, or even necessary, to that analysis in this case. Some Senate FARRAKHAN v. GREGOIRE 135 Factors may be relevant as circumstantial evidence with respect to certain vote denial claims, but proof of those Factors was not required where, under Factor 5, Plaintiffs provided strong, indeed “compelling,” direct evidence of the alleged violation. There is indeed, as the Senate Report stressed, no requirement that any particular number of Factors support a particular claim. S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 29. Even one may be enough in some instances.20 We first address the district court’s treatment of the various Senate Factors to explain why that treatment was erroneous. We then consider whether the evidence produced by Plaintiffs was sufficient to preclude a grant of summary judgment to Defendants. Finally, we consider whether Plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment. a. The district court’s treatment of the Senate Factors
[14] In its listing of the Factors that typically may be relevant to a § 2 claim, the Senate Report made clear that “there is no requirement that any particular number of Factors be proved or that a majority of them point one way or the other.” S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 29; see id. at 29 n.118 (stating that the Factors were not intended “to be used[ ] as a mechanical ‘point-counting’ device”); see also Gomez, 863 F.2d at 1412 (noting the Senate Report’s emphasis that the “list of factors 20 Contrary to what the dissent contends, we do not “dictat[e] that a district court should not consider certain factors . . . in vote denial cases.” See Diss. at 160. We hold only that different factors will be of relevance in different cases, depending on the circumstances of those cases; that courts should consider each factor in light of the circumstances of the case before them; and that where, as here, plaintiffs provide compelling evidence of a law or system of laws that, as implemented, necessarily results in the discriminatory deprivation of racial minorities’ right to vote, that deprivation is sufficient, and the plaintiffs need not present additional evidence regarding other factors that are of less relevance to the plaintiffs’ claim. 136 FARRAKHAN v. GREGOIRE was not a mandatory seven-pronged test” but “only meant as a guide to illustrate some of the variables that should be considered by the court”). Thus, “while the basic ‘totality of the circumstances’ test remains the same, the range of factors that [are] relevant in any given case will vary depending upon the nature of the claim and the facts of the case.” Gomez, 863 F.3d at 1412. Where the evidence of one central Factor in a particular case is compelling, that Factor may be sufficient. Moreover, as the Supreme Court has recognized, the enumerated Factors are “particularly [pertinent] to vote dilution claims,” Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 45, and, it follows, not as pertinent, generally, in vote denial cases. Thus, in vote denial cases, there is even more flexibility in determining whether, under the totality of the circumstances test, a single factor is controlling and whether any weight may or should be given to the presence or absence of others. The district court acknowledged that it was “not bound by the list of Senate factors,” but found that several of the Factors were relevant to Plaintiffs’ vote denial challenge. Farrakhan, 2006 WL 1889273, at . Specifically, the district court found that Factors 7 and 8 — the extent of minority representation among elected officials, and the level of responsiveness of elected officials to minorities’ needs — were “certainly relevant to Plaintiffs’ VRA claim.” Id. at .21 We conclude, however, that, in light of its finding of “compelling evidence of racial discrimination and bias in Washington’s criminal justice system,” the district court erred in according any weight to Plaintiffs’ failure to introduce evidence regarding 21 The district court also noted that Plaintiffs had “failed to present any substantial evidence regarding” Senate Factors 2, 3, 4, and 6. Id. However, it then “admitted[ ]” that “several of these factors are not relevant in a VRA vote denial claim.” Id. Because we interpret this to mean that the district court did not rely on these factors in its totality of the circumstances analysis, we do not address these factors. In any event, we agree with the district court that these factors are not relevant to Plaintiffs’ vote denial claim. Therefore, to the extent the district court did weigh these factors in its analysis, we conclude that it erred. FARRAKHAN v. GREGOIRE 137 Factors 7 and 8. These factors are not essential to a § 2 vote denial claim and in this case, while their presence might be of some relevance, their absence is insufficient cause to justify in any respect the denial of Plaintiffs’ claim. To understand which Senate Factors might be relevant to deciding a vote denial claim, it is important to recognize the analytical distinction between vote denial and vote dilution theories. A vote dilution claim does not allege that minority voters are denied access to the polls; rather, the claim is that, although minority voters have the formal right to vote, the challenged voting scheme “operates to minimize or cancel out [the minority voters’] ability to elect their preferred candidates.”22 Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 48. In other words, the focus of a vote dilution challenge is on the effectiveness of the minority plaintiffs’ votes. Naturally then, the Factors most relevant to a vote dilution claim are those that examine whether minorities have the capacity to be politically influential as a group, and, if so, whether their political influence has been weakened — for example, whether the minority group is politically cohesive, whether the white majority votes in a bloc, whether voting is racially polarized, whether minorities have succeeded in being elected to public office, and whether elected officials have been responsive to the particularized needs of the minority group. See Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 48 & n.15. Vote denial claims, in contrast, challenge laws, as amici point out, “that directly exclude otherwise qualified voters from participating.” Whereas vote dilution claims “implicate the value of aggregation,” vote denial claims “implicate the value of participation.” Tokaji, supra, at 718 (emphasis added). Thus, the primary question in such cases is not whether a “denial or abridgement” occurs, but whether such 22 “Chief examples of vote-dilution practices include at-large elections and redistricting plans to keep minorities’ voting strength weak.” Tokaji, supra, at 691. 138 FARRAKHAN v. GREGOIRE denial is “on account of race.” In vote denial claims brought under the “results test,” the “on account of” element is proved by showing that a “discriminatory impact . . . is attributable to racial discrimination in the surrounding social and historical circumstances.”23 Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d at 1019. Consequently, factors that examine the political strength of minority voters in the jurisdiction are of lesser relevance. Given the analytical distinction between vote dilution and vote denial, it is clear that Senate Factors 7 and 8, while relevant to the former,24 are of lesser relevance to a vote denial claim. The “extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction” (Senate Factor 7) simply has no bearing on the question whether minorities are being denied the right to vote “on account of race.” Even if a majority of the elected officials in the jurisdiction were members of the minority group, it would still violate § 2 to deny minority citizens the right to vote on discriminatory grounds. The fact that minority candidates have had success in the state does not cure the discriminatory denial of the franchise to minority voters.25 Likewise, whether elected officials have been responsive to “the particularized 23 In the challenge under review, to felon disenfranchisement laws, the “social circumstance” is the operation of the criminal justice system. See Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d at 1012, 1019-20. In Salt River, the social circumstance at issue was land ownership. See 109 F.3d at 589. 24 The Supreme Court has, in fact, stated that Senate Factor 7 is an essential factor in a vote dilution challenge — that is, a factor that must be proved for the plaintiffs to succeed. See Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 48 n.15. As for Senate Factor 8, the Supreme Court explained that, while proving that factor “might be supportive of a [vote dilution] challenge,” it is “ ‘not essential to’ such a claim.” Gomez, 863 F.3d at 1413 (quoting Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 48 n.15) (emphasis in original). 25 The Senate Report strongly indicates that the Senate Committee included Senate Factor 7 to help § 2 plaintiffs prove vote dilution claims. See S. Rep. No. 94-417, at 29 n.115. This lends further support to the conclusion that although it may help them do so, the plaintiffs in a vote denial case are not required to produce evidence supporting Factor 7, and may not be penalized for failing to do so. FARRAKHAN v. GREGOIRE 139 needs of the members of the minority group” (Factor 8) may be probative of the minorities’ ability to influence the political process, but generally does not indicate whether minorities are being denied access to the polls on account of their race. If minorities are disproportionately deprived of their right to vote, and if that disparity is caused by racial discrimination, then whether the elected officials have been responsive to minority issues is simply of little relevance.26 [15] Accordingly, the district court erred in concluding that Plaintiffs’ “failure to produce any evidence” as to Factors 7 and 8 provided any support for its grant of summary judgment to Defendants. Farrakhan, 2006 WL 1889273, at . Plaintiffs’ failure to produce evidence regarding those factors is without legal significance because proof relating to them is not necessary to establish a vote denial claim. This is especially so in a case in which a “compelling” showing of discrimination has been made. Defendants, while contending that the district court was correct to rely on the absence of evidence regarding Factor 7 and Factor 8, do not even attempt to explain why such evidence is relevant to Plaintiffs’ vote denial claim. Their unsupported assertion that all of the Senate Factors are “relevant” does not make them so.27 26 Moreover, as with Senate Factor 7, Congress made clear that proving Factor 8 “is not an essential part of plaintiffs’ case.” S. Rep. No. 94-417, at 29 n.116. Even “Defendants’ proof of some responsiveness would not negate Plaintiffs’ showing by other, more objective factors enumerated here that minority voters nevertheless were shut out of equal access to the political process.” Id. Thus, the Senate Report makes clear that Factor 8 cannot negate Plaintiffs’ showing that the disproportionate disenfranchisement of minority voters in Washington is caused by racial discrimination in the state’s criminal justice system. 27 Because “the ingenuity of such schemes” to deny minorities the right to vote “seems endless,” S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 6, we do not imply that Senate Factors 7 and 8 are never relevant to establishing vote denial claims — only that the absence of such evidence may not serve as a justification for denying them. As we have noted, in cases in which the evidence of discrimination in the surrounding social and historical 140 FARRAKHAN v. GREGOIRE
Plaintiffs also argue that the district court erred in placing “near-dispositive weight” on Senate Factor 1 (“extent of any history of official discrimination in the state” in the area of voting). We agree. [16] The district court misperceived the relationship between Factor 1 and § 2 vote denial claims. Although Factor 1 may be supportive of a § 2 vote denial claim28 — especially where the plaintiff alleges that the voting qualification itself is discriminatory — proving Factor 1 is not necessary to succeed on such a challenge. Cf. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 48 n.15 (distinguishing between factors that are “essential” to proving a vote dilution claim and factors that are “supportive of, but not essential to,” such a claim) (emphasis in original). Showing that a state has a history of discriminating against minority voters can strongly support an argument that the state voting qualification being challenged was enacted with a discriminatory purpose. The failure to show that a state has a history of discriminatory voting practices, however, does not negate a showing that the current voting practice at issue is discriminatory. [17] Plaintiffs do not contend that Washington’s felon disenfranchisement law was enacted with a discriminatory purpose; their claim, rather, is that the provision interacts with a racially discriminatory criminal justice system and, as a result, circumstances is less “compelling,” these factors may provide circumstantial evidence that the disparate impact of a particular practice on minority voters is attributable to such discrimination. Here, we merely hold that, where plaintiffs provide direct evidence of racial discrimination under Factor 5, the absence of evidence regarding Factors 7 and 8 is irrelevant to the district court’s totality of the circumstances analysis. 28 In this way, Factor 1 differs from Factors 7 and 8, which are primarily relevant to vote dilution claims and generally do not lend as high a level of support to a § 2 vote denial claim. FARRAKHAN v. GREGOIRE 141 racial minorities are disproportionately denied the right to vote. If Plaintiffs adduce evidence that the disproportionate disenfranchisement in Washington is attributable to discrimination in the criminal justice system, they may show a violation of § 2 under the “results test” that was sufficient to survive summary judgment. Here, in fact, the district court found the evidence “compelling.” That Washington has not historically discriminated against minorities in voting does not negate a showing that this voting law has a discriminatory result. See Tokaji, supra, at 721 (“A court does not need to rely on . . . circumstantial evidence . . . when there is direct evidence that an electoral process has the result of disproportionately denying minority votes.” (emphasis in original)). This conclusion draws support from our precedent. In Gomez, the district court denied a § 2 vote dilution challenge to the city’s at-large election scheme. After determining that the district court had erred in its application of the factors “essential” to such a claim, we assessed the district court’s treatment of the “other factors,” including Factor 1. 863 F.2d at 1417-19. Although we were “troubled” by the district court’s conclusion that there had been no official discrimination against Hispanics, we did not believe “that the district court had committed clear error” in so concluding. Id. at 1418. Nevertheless, we concluded that “even without such a showing, plaintiffs have clearly established a violation of Section 2.” Id. at 1419 (emphasis added). Once the factors “essential” to plaintiffs’ vote dilution claim had been satisfied, it made no difference that they had not proved a history of official discrimination in voting. [18] As in Gomez, Plaintiffs here established a violation of § 2 by adducing evidence sufficient to establish a vote denial claim — that “there is discrimination in Washington’s criminal justice system on account of race,” Farrakhan, 2006 WL 1889273, at , and that such discrimination “clearly hinder[s] the ability of racial minorities to participate effectively in the political process,” id. (quoting Farrakhan I, 338 142 FARRAKHAN v. GREGOIRE F.3d at 1220 (internal quotation mark omitted) (alteration in original)). Plaintiffs’ evidence of racial discrimination in the Washington justice system was, the district court states, “compelling.” Accordingly, Plaintiffs were not required to produce further circumstantial evidence, and the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs’ failure to prove Senate Factor 1 “strongly favors a finding that Washington’s felon disenfranchisement law does not violate § 2 of the VRA” was erroneous.
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the district court’s conclusion that Senate Factor 9 favors Defendants was erroneous. Because, under the totality of the circumstances test, Plaintiffs established a § 2 violation based on the district court’s finding of racial discrimination in Washington’s criminal justice system, it does not matter whether, as Plaintiffs claim, the state’s policy justification for felon disenfranchisement is tenuous. [19] Like Factor 1, Factor 9 is a factor that could support Plaintiffs’ vote denial claim circumstantially but is not necessary to proving it. This conclusion draws direct support from the Senate Report’s discussion of Factor 9, which explains that “even a consistently applied practice premised on a racially neutral policy would not negate a plaintiff’s showing through other factors that the challenged practice denies minorities fair access to the process.” S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 29 n.117. It is also in line with Congress’ express objective in amending § 2 of “broaden[ing] the protection afforded by the Voting Rights Act.” Chisom, 501 U.S. at 404. Under this approach, the district court’s finding that Factor 9 “favors the defendants’ position” is erroneous. If Plaintiffs can prove that the denial of their right to vote was “on account of” race, it did not matter whether the state’s policy reasons were tenuous — a § 2 violation had been established. Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in concluding that Plaintiffs’ failure to demonstrate the tenuousness of the state’s felon disenFARRAKHAN v. GREGOIRE 143 franchisement policy weighed against finding a § 2 violation; to the contrary, in this case Factor 9 was simply neutral. b. Plaintiffs’ evidence that vote denial is “on account of race” [20] Ultimately then, the plaintiff’s burden in any § 2 case is to prove that the challenged voting qualification “results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a). In the case of automatic felon disenfranchisement, there is no question that the challenged provision constitutes a denial of the right to vote. Consequently, the sole remaining issue is causation — whether the denial of the right to vote is “on account of race or color.” As we explained in Farrakhan I, the “on account of” requirement may be met “where the discriminatory impact of a challenged voting practice is attributable to racial discrimination in the surrounding social and historical circumstances,” which include the state’s criminal justice system. Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d at 1019-20. Here, the district court repeatedly declared that Plaintiffs have presented “compelling” evidence of racial discrimination in Washington’s criminal justice system. Indeed, after considering Plaintiffs’ evidence, the district court concluded that it “has no doubt that members of racial minorities have experienced racial discrimination in Washington’s criminal justice system.” Farrakhan, 2006 WL 1889273, at . [21] Based on the uncontroverted facts, we reach the same conclusion as the district court. The expert reports, which were not refuted by the State, provide compelling circumstantial evidence of discrimination in Washington’s criminal justice system. Dr. Crutchfield’s report states that criminal justice practices disproportionately affect minorities beyond what can be explained by non-racial means. For example, African Americans in Washington State were over nine times more likely to be in prison than Whites, even though the ratio 144 FARRAKHAN v. GREGOIRE of Black to White arrest for violent offenses was only 3.72:1, suggesting that substantially more than one half of Washington State’s racial disproportionality in its criminal justice system cannot be explained by higher levels of criminal involvement as measured by violent crime arrest statistics. A study of the Washington State Patrol shows that Native Americans were more than twice as likely to be searched as Whites; African Americans were more than 70 percent more likely to be searched than Whites; and Latinos were more than 50 percent more likely to be searched. A study of the Vancouver, Washington Police Department (“VPD”) indicated that of those stopped for traffic violations by the VPD, African Americans are nearly twice as likely to be searched as Whites, and Latino were three times more likely to be searched. This, despite the fact that searches of Whites more frequently resulted in the seizure of contraband than searches of African Americans and Latinos. According to Dr. Crutchfield, these findings suggest that African Americans and Latinos are at greater risk for searches that could lead to felony charges, but because those searches are less fruitful then searches against Whites, it is likely that minorities are being placed at greater risk for no legitimate purpose. Dr. Crutchfield also indicated that the significant racial disparities in arrest rates are not fully warranted by race or ethnic differences in illegal behavior. The Seattle Police Department (“SPD”) arrested African Americans and Latinos for drug possession at rates much higher than their proportion among users. Whites, on the other hand, were arrested for drug possession at rates much lower than their proportion among users. The most significant cause of the racial disparity in Seattle drug arrests resulted from the SPD’s focus on crack cocaine, a focus that, according to Dr. Crutchfield, cannot be justified by drug use or distribution patterns. Dr. Crutchfield also reported that charging and bail practices are infected with racial disparities. Whites are less likely to have charges filed than minorities, a significant disparity FARRAKHAN v. GREGOIRE 145 that persists even after a number of legally relevant characteristics, such as offense seriousness, offenders’ criminal histories, and weapons charges, are taken into account. Minority defendants were less likely to be released on their own recognizance than others, even after adjusting for differences among defendants in the severity of their crimes, prior criminal records, ties to the community, and the prosecuting attorney’s recommendation. Whether defendants are released on their own recognizance, as opposed to being required to post bail, is important because defendants released on their own recognizance are likely to receive more lenient treatment in both charging and sentencing. Thus, to the extent that minorities are disadvantaged in pre-trial release, this has real potential for contributing to disparities in felony conviction rates. Likewise, Dr. Beckett reported that the disparity between whites and minorities (specifically, blacks and Latinos) in drug possession and delivery arrests is largely the result of three organizational practices — the police’s focus on crack cocaine, on outdoor drug venues, and on the downtown area — that are not “explicable in race-neutral terms.” Beckett Report at 2. Dr. Beckett stated that the focus on crack cannot be explained by the frequency of its exchange, by the level of violence in the crack market, or by the health problems associated with crack as opposed to other serious drugs, such as cocaine. Id. at 10-12. She also reported that the focus on outdoor drug activity cannot be explained by either greater citizen complaints or greater yield from such arrests, concluding that the outdoor focus is an “(ineffecient) policy choice” rather than “an organizational or legal necessity.” Id. at 13. Finally, Dr. Beckett explained that the concentration of law enforcement resources downtown is out of proportion to the level of drug crime there and is also not explainable vis-a-vis citizen complaints. Id. at 21-23. [22] On this uncontroverted record, the district court found that “there is discrimination in Washington’s criminal justice system on account of race,” Farrakhan, 2006 WL 1889273, 146 FARRAKHAN v. GREGOIRE at , and that such discrimination “clearly hinder[s] the ability of racial minorities to participate effectively in the political process, as disenfranchisement is automatic,” id. (quoting Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d at 1020). Having so found, the district court should not have required Plaintiffs to produce additional circumstantial evidence; they had presented evidence that, if accepted by a finder of fact, would establish a § 2 violation under the totality of the circumstances. Thus, the district court erred in granting Defendants summary judgment. c. Defendants’ challenges to the district court’s legal conclusions with respect to Plaintiffs’ evidence Defendants contend, however, that the district court erred in the conclusions it drew from the evidence adduced by Plaintiffs with respect to Factor 5. For that reason, they say, its result was correct, although its analysis was wrong. Defendants contend that the district court erred in finding that the Washington criminal justice system was racially discriminatory, and that, in the absence of such a determination, no basis whatsoever exists for challenging the felon disenfranchisement law. We agree that Plaintiffs’ challenge is founded on the premise that Washington’s criminal justice system is racially discriminatory and that, in the absence of evidence supporting that claim, Plaintiffs’ § 2 challenge would fail. We disagree, however, with Defendants’ contention that the district court erred in its conclusion that Plaintiffs introduced “compelling evidence of racial discrimination and bias in Washington’s criminal justice system.” Specifically, Defendants contend that the district court committed three distinct legal errors in analyzing Plaintiffs’ evidence of racial discrimination. None of these arguments has merit. [23] First, Defendants argue that the district court erred as a matter of law in extrapolating Dr. Beckett’s Seattle-specific findings to the whole of Washington state. However, it was FARRAKHAN v. GREGOIRE 147 not unreasonable to draw inferences from Dr. Beckett’s Seattle-specific findings. Dr. Crutchfield reported that “a large proportion of the minority population of Washington State resides in the City of Seattle or in the surrounding county, King County.” Crutchfield Report at 15; see also id. at 27 (stating that “King County has the largest minority population in the state and contains the state’s most diverse city, Seattle, so it is an opportune location in which to complete a study of racial and ethnic disparities in the prosecution of criminal cases”). Given that much of the state’s minority population resides in Seattle, it was reasonable for the district court to look to a Seattle-focused study in assessing racial discrimination in the state as a whole. Indeed, as Dr. Crutchfield reported, counties “with smaller minority populations were likely to produce larger racial disparities” in imprisonment, which suggests that the district court’s extrapolation from a Seattle-based study actually underestimated the racial discrimination in the state as a whole. And, as we have noted, Defendants presented no evidence to counter either Dr. Crutchfield’s or Dr. Beckett’s findings. Thus, the district court did not err in extrapolating the Seattle findings to the state as a whole. Second, Defendants contend that the district court erred in relying on statistical disparity alone, in contravention of Salt River. This is plainly incorrect. To be sure, Salt River made clear that “a bare statistical showing of disproportionate impact on a racial minority does not satisfy the § 2 ‘results’ inquiry” because causation cannot be inferred from impact alone. 109 F.3d at 595. In Salt River, the plaintiffs challenged a voting qualification which required voters to own property in order to be eligible to vote. The Salt River plaintiffs, however, demonstrated only that “proportionately fewer AfricanAmericans than non-Hispanic whites residing in the [voting] District live in owner-occupied homes.” 109 F.3d at 590. The plaintiffs “stipulated to the nonexistence of virtually every circumstance which might indicate that landowner-only voting results in racial discrimination,” id. at 595, and the district 148 FARRAKHAN v. GREGOIRE court concluded (and this Court agreed) that “the observed difference in rates of home ownership between non-Hispanic whites and African-Americans is not substantially explained by race but is better explained by other factors independent of race,” id. at 591. Thus, the Salt River plaintiffs’ evidence of statistical disparity alone was insufficient to prove that the racial disparity in voting was “on account of race.” Id. at 591, 595-96. In this case, by contrast, Plaintiffs have introduced expert testimony demonstrating that the statistical disparity and disproportionality evident in Washington’s criminal justice system arises from discrimination, and the State has failed to refute that showing. See Farrakhan, 2006 WL 1889273, at  n.7. If Plaintiffs in this case demonstrated only that African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans are disproportionately affected by Washington’s disenfranchisement law, that clearly would not be enough under Salt River. Unlike in Salt River, however, Plaintiffs have produced evidence that Washington’s criminal justice system is infected with racial bias. The experts’ conclusions are not “statistical disparity alone,” but rather speak to a durable, sustained difference in treatment faced by minorities in Washington’s criminal justice system — systemic disparities which cannot be explained by “factors independent of race.”29 Plaintiffs here have introduced evidence demonstrating what the Salt River plaintiffs could not. Plaintiffs have demonstrated that police practices, searches, arrests, detention 29 This, of course, stands in stark contrast to Salt River. In that case, the defendants presented an expert who analyzed the statistical disparity in home ownership using a multivariable analysis. Salt River, 109 F.3d at 590. The defendants’ expert in that case “testified that multiple regression analysis did not indicate a strong correlation between race and home ownership” and posited that the strongest indicator of home ownership was “persons per dwelling unit.” Id. The district court relied heavily on this expert’s testimony in concluding that the racial disparity in home ownership was “not substantially explained by race.” Id. at 591. FARRAKHAN v. GREGOIRE 149 practices, and plea bargaining practices lead to a greater burden on minorities that cannot be explained in race-neutral ways. The emphasis on crack cocaine and street drug trafficking is not proportional to its harm to the community or its share of the drug trade. The proportion of African Americans and Latinos arrested for drug possession bears no correlation the proportion of users among the races. Searching African Americans and Latinos at higher rates than Whites even though searches of African Americans and Latinos yield less seizures makes little sense in non-racial terms. Detaining minority defendants in disproportionate numbers to Whites even after accounting for differences among defendants in the severity of their crimes, prior criminal records, ties to the community, and the prosecuting attorney’s recommendation, cannot be understood as race neutral. [24] Plaintiffs’ evidence suggests not only that Washington’s criminal justice system adversely affects minorities to a greater extent than non-minorities, but also that this differential effect cannot be explained by factors other than racial discrimination. This method of proving racial discrimination is familiar in our antidiscrimination jurisprudence: The threestep analysis required by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1989), proves discriminatory intent through the same circumstantial inference from a lack of race-neutral explanations. See, e.g., Green v. Lamarque, 532 F.3d 1028, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 2008). Nothing in Salt River undermines the use of such circumstantial evidence of racial discrimination. Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs did not produce any evidence connecting asserted bias in the criminal justice system to the ability of protected minorities to participate effectively in the political process. According to Defendants, the district court’s finding of such a connection lowered Plaintiffs’ burden. The district court, however, relied directly on Farrakhan I’s explanation that a finding of discrimination in the criminal justice system would establish the requisite con150 FARRAKHAN v. GREGOIRE nection, because, under Washington law, “disenfranchisement is automatic.” Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d at 1020. [25] Finally, Defendants argue that, apart from these three asserted errors, the district court erred in concluding that Plaintiffs’ evidence demonstrates more than statistical disparity because, according to Defendants, “the evidence offered by Plaintiffs actually falls far short of any such showing.” As noted above, Plaintiffs’ experts concluded that many of the racial disparities in Washington’s criminal justice system cannot be accounted for by race-neutral explanations and Defendants did not refute those conclusions with contrary evidence. Although Defendants criticized the experts’ studies and the conclusions, the reports, when objectively viewed, support a finding of racial discrimination in Washington’s criminal justice system, and the district court did not err in so concluding. d. Defendants’ arguments that even if Washington’s criminal justice system is infected with racial bias, there is no § 2 violation Defendants also argue that even if Plaintiffs have demonstrated that Washington’s criminal justice system is infected with racial bias, Defendants are still entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiffs have failed to show a discriminatory intent or discriminatory motive. This, they plainly do not have to show under § 2, as amended. See S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 2 (“[P]roof of discriminatory intent is not required to establish a violation of Section 2.”). Defendants next argue that even if Washington’s criminal justice system is infected with racial bias and that such infection spreads to voting qualifications, Plaintiffs still have failed to show a § 2 violation because “[t]he simple fact is that the voter fully controls whether he or she will forfeit the right to vote under Washington’s felon disenfranchisement law. The voter need only refrain from committing a felony to retain his or her right to participate fully in the electoral process.” HowFARRAKHAN v. GREGOIRE 151 ever, Farrakhan I directly addressed and rejected this claim, holding that, “when felon disenfranchisement results in denial of the right to vote . . . on account of race or color, Section 2 affords disenfranchised felons the means to seek redress.” 338 F.3d at 1016 (emphasis added). Cf. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 223-24 (1985) (holding, in a case brought by two individuals convicted of presenting worthless checks, that a provision of the Alabama Constitution disenfranchising those convicted of crimes of moral turpitude violates the Equal Protection Clause because its enactment was motivated by racial bias). If Farrakhan I and Hunter, inferentially, had not already decided this question, we would nonetheless reject Defendants’ argument. Plaintiffs’ evidence demonstrates that in the total population of potential “felons,” i.e., those who have committed crimes, minorities are more likely than Whites to be searched, arrested, detained, and ultimately prosecuted. And they have introduced evidence showing that these disparities cannot be explained in race-neutral ways. Plaintiffs have demonstrated that in a total mass of potential “felons,” i.e., those that have committed crimes, minorities are more likely than Whites to be searched, arrested, detained, and ultimately prosecuted. And they have shown that these disparities cannot be explained away in race-neutral ways. To be sure, one of the early (if not the first) decision points in the process of becoming a felon is the decision by the person to commit a crime. Plaintiffs have not attempted to demonstrate that that decision point is infected by racial bias. Before one who commits a criminal act becomes a felon, however, numerous other decisions must be made by State actors. Police departments decide where to spend resources, officers decide which individuals to search and arrest, prosecutors decide which individuals to charge (including whether to charge a felony or a misdemeanor), detain, and prosecute. If those decision points are infected with racial bias, resulting in some people becoming felons not just because they have 152 FARRAKHAN v. GREGOIRE committed a crime, but because of their race, then that felon status cannot, under § 2 of the VRA, disqualify felons from voting.