Opinion ID: 4513537
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Frye is the more applicable precedent.

Text: Mr. Orozco relies on Lee, asserting that he need show only a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors he would not have entered the same plea and that such a decision would have been rational. Thus, he faults the district court for relying on Frye and requiring him to show a reasonable probability that entering an open plea would have resulted in a lower sentence. But we agree with the district court that Frye is the more applicable precedent in these circumstances. Lee, like Hill, Flores-Ortega, and Garza, addresses circumstances in which a defendant was entirely deprived of a proceeding—the defendants in Lee and Hill of a trial, and the defendants in Flores-Ortega and Garza of an appeal. But Mr. Ortega does not claim that he would have proceeded to trial had he been counseled accurately; instead, he asserts that he would have entered an open guilty plea rather than accepting the government’s plea offer. Based on Mr. Orozco’s own description of what he would have done, he was not entirely deprived of a proceeding. Either way, he would have entered a guilty plea. Thus, this case is more like one “involving mere attorney error,” in which “we require the defendant to demonstrate that the errors actually had an adverse effect on the defense.” Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 482 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 (“Even if a 14 defendant shows that particular errors of counsel were unreasonable, . . . the defendant must show that they actually had an adverse effect on the defense.”). Analogizing to Mr. Lee’s primary interest in avoiding deportation, see Lee, 137 U.S. at 1963, Mr. Orozco submits that he had a primary interest in having his imperfect duress defense adequately presented to the court. The record, however, does not support an inference that Mr. Orozco had an interest in presenting the duress argument for its own sake. Rather, the argument was merely a means of achieving his ultimate goal of the lowest possible sentence. This ultimate goal—lowering the sentence—distinguishes Mr. Orozco’s circumstances from Lee, where the length of the sentence was collateral to Mr. Lee’s primary goal of avoiding deportation. See id. at 1967. In these circumstances, Frye is the more analogous precedent. Like this case, Frye involved two competing guilty pleas, one under a plea offer and the other an open plea. See Frye, 566 U.S. at 139. Consistent with Hill, the Frye Court could have required the defendant to show nothing more than a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the earlier-offered plea agreement instead of entering an open plea. But it chose to go beyond that requirement, also specifically making it “necessary to show a reasonable probability that the end result of the criminal process would have been more favorable by reason of a plea to a lesser charge or a sentence of less prison time.” Id. at 147. Although Mr. Orozco’s circumstances are the inverse of those in Frye, the Court’s determination that a more favorable outcome 15 is a necessary component of the analysis logically extends to this competing-plea scenario as well. For these reasons, we agree with the district court that to establish prejudice, Mr. Orozco must show a reasonable probability that entering an open guilty plea would have been more favorable to him than continuing with the plea agreement.