Opinion ID: 1501012
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: constitutional right to free speech

Text: The Petition for Discipline charged the Appellant with making four impermissible remarks to the public that were gross, disrespectful, knowingly false, derogatory, and damaging to the legitimacy of, and trust in, the judicial system  in violation of DR 1-102(A)(5) and [DR] 8-102(B). [5] The Petition also charged that Appellant's remarks constituted conduct adversely reflecting upon [his] fitness to practice law, unprofessional conduct, and conduct rendering [him] unfit to be a member of the bar in violation of DR 1-102(A)(1)(5) and (6) and T.C.A. § 23-3-201(5). [6] The remarks were as follows: 1. On February 23, 1979, Appellant was reported as having stated to The Oak Ridger: My bottom line is that the judge is mucking up my cases and I can't stand for that. 2. On October 24, 1979, Appellant was reported as having said to The Oak Ridger: I don't have time for this horse manure. 3. On March 30, 1981, Appellant wrote to The Guiness Book of World Records requesting inclusion in same as The District Attorney with most contempt and disciplinary actions filed against him. 4. On December 3, 1981, Appellant was reported by The Clinton Courier News as having said of [the November 1981 recommendation by a hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility that he be suspended for 90 days]: When I find that I'm suspended by Almighty God, I'll know that I'm guilty of wrongdoing, not before. The Hearing Panel found that although the statements are crude and unbecoming of any licensed lawyer ... we do not believe they should be found to be violative of the Rules of Discipline. The right of free speech may not be absolute, but it does appear to be broad enough to protect these expressions. The Chancellor found, however, that the remarks are simply not privileged nor constitutionally protected. Disciplinary Counsel candidly points out that the remarks of Appellant are more impressive as indications of lack of remorse than as individual violations of the disciplinary rules. Disciplinary Counsel contends that lack of remorse is an aggravating factor in determining the type of discipline imposed or the degree of sanctions to be meted out. Appellant admits making the above cited, out of court, public statements; however, he avers that the quote about the judge is mucking up my cases was creative journalism on the part of the reporter. He states that I did not say those words. I do feel that's the case, however. The remarks made by Appellant were disrespectful, ill-advised, and, as the Hearing Panel stated, they were crude and unbecoming of any licensed lawyer. Appellant's principal argument is that each of his remarks is fully protected under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Freedom of Speech clause of the Tennessee Constitution, Article I, Section 19. [7] In dealing with First Amendment questions, we must balance the right of the speaker to communicate and the right of the listener to receive his expressions with the need of the courts to enforce attorney discipline to the end that a lawyer will not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, DR 1-102(A)(5), or degrading to a tribunal, DR 7-106(C)(6), and thereby diminishes the confidence of the public in our courts. There is thus a delicate balance between a lawyer's right to speak, the right of the public and the press to have access to information, and the need of the bench and bar to insure that the administration of justice is not prejudiced by a lawyer's remarks. In balancing these rights, we must ensure that lawyer discipline, as found in Rule 8 of the Rules of this Court, does not create a chilling effect on First Amendment rights. The right of free speech and free discussion as it relates to the institution of the law, the judicial system and its operations, is of prime importance under our system and ideals of government. A lawyer has every right to criticize court proceedings and the judges and courts of this State after a case is concluded, so long as the criticisms are made in good faith with no intent or design to willfully or maliciously misrepresent those persons and institutions or to bring them into disrepute. As stated by this Court in In re Hickey, 149 Tenn. 344, 386, 258 S.W. 417, 429 (1923), the members of the bar have the best opportunity to become conversant with the character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench. The rule contended for by the prosecution, if adopted in its entirety, would close the mouths of all those best able to give advice, who might deem it their duty to speak disparagingly. Recently, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in addressing the free speech issue stated, In keeping with the high trust placed in this Court by the people, we cannot shield the judiciary from the critique of that portion of the public most perfectly situated to advance knowledgeable criticism, while at the same time subjecting the balance of government officials to the stringent requirements of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan [376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964)]. State ex rel. Okla homa Bar Ass'n v. Porter, 766 P.2d 958, 968-69 (Okla. 1988) . Statements made by a lawyer designed to willfully, purposely and maliciously misrepresent the judges and courts of this State, and to bring those persons and institutions into disrespect, will not be tolerated or condoned. There is no First Amendment protection for remarks critical of the judiciary when those statements are false. A statement shown to be false will subject a lawyer to disciplinary sanctions. False statements with reference to judges and courts can be prejudicial to the administration of justice and subject to disciplinary action under DR 1-102(A)(5). It is the duty of an attorney to refrain from doing anything which will tend to destroy the confidence of the public in the courts, or to bring the courts into disrepute... . It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain toward the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. Judges not being wholly free to defend themselves, are peculiarly entitled to receive the support of the bar against unjust criticism and clamor. This is a duty which the attorney owes to his profession; an obligation to which he should subordinate his personal animus toward the particular individual who happens to be filling the office. In re Hickey, 149 Tenn. at 389, 258 S.W. at 430. The remarks made by Appellant were disrespectful and in bad taste; however, we agree with the Hearing Panel that the right of free speech is broad enough to protect these expressions made by the Appellant. Use of the Disciplinary Rules to sanction the remarks made by General Ramsey in this case would be a significant impairment of First Amendment rights.