Opinion ID: 1424620
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: anderson's state law claims

Text: As just explained, the city offered testimony that it was not negligent in its training and supervision of its officers, which testimony Anderson failed to contradict. Anderson further failed to allege as error the denial of his discovery motion, and failed to present a record containing any basis for this Court to consider the disposition of the discovery motion. The motion for summary judgment was properly granted. Id.
Anderson stated a claim for assault and battery against the officers. [6] The district court ruled that his claim was barred by I.C. § 6-904(4), which provides: Exceptions to governmental liability  A Governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent shall not be liable for any claim which: ... . 4. Arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights. There is no allegation that the officers acted outside the course and scope of their employment, or with criminal intent. In his brief, Anderson argues only that whether the officers acted with malice is a jury question. The presence of malice would render inapplicable the assault and battery exception. I.C. § 6-904. The term malice has been variously defined. See generally 52 Am.Jur.2d, Malice, § 1. At a minimum, malice involves the intentional commission of a wrongful or unlawful act without legal justification or excuse, whether or not the injury was intended. Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 485-86, 24 S.Ct. 505, 508, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1903). This is referred to as legal malice. 52 Am.Jur.2d, Malice, § 1. However, the use of the disjunctive term or in the phrase without malice or criminal intent indicates that malice as used here qualitatively differs from criminal intent. I.C. § 6-904. Criminal intent closely equates to the above definition of legal malice. Thus, the term malice as used in § 6-904 must refer to more than mere legal malice. Malice here must refer to actual malice. Accord, Ladnier v. Murray, 572 F. Supp. 544, 549-50 (D.C.Md. 1983), reversed in part on other grounds, 769 F.2d 195 (4th Cir.1985). Actual malice encompasses the common meaning of the word, which connotes ill will. 52 Am.Jur.2d, Malice, § 1. We conclude and hold that malice here means actual malice, which we define as the intentional commission of a wrongful or unlawful act, without legal justification or excuse and with ill will, whether or not injury was intended. An examination of the record belies the complaint's bare allegation of malice. [7] It is true that Anderson alleged facts concerning the circumstances of the shooting which make the question of whether the officers' actions were based on reasonable grounds an issue of fact for the jury. See part II.A., supra. However, Anderson alleges nothing in his affidavit, nor did he testify to anything at his criminal trial, from which one could reasonably infer any ill will on the part of the officers. The record reflects without dispute that the officers were responding (reasonably or unreasonably) to a rapidly evolving situation with apparent and imminent danger. In the face of this record, Anderson was not entitled to rest upon the allegation of malice in his pleadings but was required to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. I.R.C.P. 56(e). Anderson having failed in this regard, the district court properly granted the motion for summary judgment as to the assault and battery claim pursuant to I.C. § 6-904(4). Accordingly, the district court is affirmed on this issue. The judgment of the district court is affirmed in all respects save the § 1983 claim against the officers. That claim is remanded to the district court. There shall be no award of costs or attorney's fees. DONALDSON, C.J., and HUNTLEY, J., concur. SHEPARD, J., dissents without opinion.