Opinion ID: 514801
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: two objects argument

Text: 14 The Government contends that a second reason that the decision of the district court should be reversed is that the conspiracy charged in Count I has a second, independent object; to knowingly and willfully make false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001. Because the second object of the Sec. 371 conspiracy is to violate a separate criminal statute, the Government argues that the court's ruling was erroneous, since it precludes the Government from presenting evidence as to this second object. 8 15 We reject this argument. Section 371 explicitly covers conspiracies to defraud the United States or commit any offense against the United States. Section 1001 proscribes the substantive offense of falsifying or covering up material facts in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States. A conspiracy to commit any offense against the United States (here a Sec. 1001 offense) is as much a violation of Sec. 371 as is a conspiracy to defraud the United States. 16 The Supreme Court in Tanner explained that the conspiracies criminalized by Sec. 371 are defined by the target of the conspiracy. The holding in Tanner thus applies with equal force to the any offense clause of Sec. 371 as it does to the defraud clause. Again, by specifically referring to county departments and agencies as the targets of the conspiracy, to the exclusion of departments or agencies of the United States, the overt acts section of the indictment precludes the Government from presenting evidence as to a Sec. 371 conspiracy, no matter what its object. To permit the Government to do so would allow the possibility that the defendant could be convicted of an offense with which he had not been charged. 17 AFFIRMED.