Opinion ID: 2344370
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Objections arising during the evidentiary stage.

Text: Defendant alleges that, at several points during the evidentiary stage of the penalty phase trial, the State accused the defense of discovery violations. According to defendant, those accusations constituted disparagement of defense counsel of the type condemned in State v. Nelson, 173 N.J. 417, 461, 803 A. 2d 1 (2002). Defendant complains of four separate instances when defendant claims his counsel was disparaged by the State, each of which deals exclusively with cross-examination questions regarding the timing of required discovery disclosures from defendant to the State. The State responds that none of the questions accused defendant or his counsel of discovery violations and that the prosecution never accused defendant or defense counsel of collusion in the presentation of defendant's witnesses. In respect of the first instance claimed as error by defendantwhen the State cross-examined defendant's traumatic brain injury expert concerning a computer printout that the State received last weekthe State notes that defendant's focus on the timing of the disclosure is belied by the trial court's conclusion that I don't see the time of receipt of significance in the question posed to the witness. In respect of the second instance of error claimed by defendantwhen the prosecutor noted in his cross-examination of defendant's brother that the basis of his cross-examination was that he received today another detailed statementthe State explains that defendant specifically requested that the trial court instruct the jury that the comments of the Prosecutor with respect to suggesting that [the defense] had done something improper with this material is inappropriate and should be disregarded. Abiding by that request, the trial court instructed the jury that when we broke for recess the Court was dealing with a legal issue, which essentially centers around discovery obligations. Essentially, under our practice within limits each side is obliged to turn all their information over to the other side, and I made a determination that there was no delay or no impropriety in [the defense] turning over the information with respect to the supplemental report. Accordingly, you should disregard [the prosecutor's] comments with regard to it. Defendant neither objected to, nor requested any addition or modification to, this curative instruction. The third instance involved the State's cross-examination of defendant's expert in clinical neuropsychology. Highlighting a discrepancy between the raw data supporting that expert's report and the language in the report itself, the State sought to determine that the discrepancy only became clear when the State subpoenaed the expert's raw data. Defendant objected, but the trial court deemed the prosecution's questioning proper, ruling that: What this witness may have chosen to withhold may be relevant on the issue of credibility and meet the credibility relevance, so I will allow cross-examination as to whether he was initially willing to turn it over if that's where the Prosecutor wants to go and whether it took a subpoena to get it. And then counsel are free to make the arguments that counsel chooses to make from there. With regard to the mistrial, in light of what I have said, I would deny the application for a mistrial. I will invite an instruction with respect to the purpose of this, what it is for and what it is not, on the issue of credibility. I'll tell the jury something to that effect when they get back in, but if there's anything further, counsel, that will be addressed. Upon the jury's return to the courtroom, the trial court issued the following curative instruction: An issue has arisen, and I'll give you some instructions with respect to it. The comments with regard to discovery being provided or information being provided[,] I'll instruct you that there has been no discovery violation on behalf of defense counsel or the defendant[,] that there has been no violation of any duty they owed to either the Court or to opposing counsel. Having said that, you will perhaps and you have heard some information and may hear further cross-examination as to when and the circumstances under which the so-called raw data were supplied. That would be before you for a limited purpose and a limited purpose only, and that would be for your purpose in assessing any credibility issues or any credibility determinations that you would make concerning the testimony of this witness. Again, defendant did not object to or request any addition to or modification of this curative instruction. Defendant's final instance of counsel disparagement arises in the context of the direct examination of defendant's capital mitigation specialist. During that examination, defendant's capital mitigation specialist described conversations she had had with defendant's mother. The State objected, noting that it had not been provided any information in respect of those conversations. The trial court explained to defendant that he had a continuing obligation to provide witness statements and, in the absence of statements, witness summaries. As a result, the trial court issued an additional curative instruction: Yesterday, at the close of business, issues arose with respect to a continuing discovery obligation. And out of your presence the Court dealt with some further matters with respect to it; after that I am satisfied that no attorney in this case endeavored to mislead or consciously fail[ed] to follow what they thought was the appropriate obligation of counsel. Rather, we have as you know a hotly contested matter where each side is advocating from their position. Accordingly, whatever happened should not prejudice any side on that. I have taken the responsibility, as is my responsibility, to make sure that the discovery obligations are clear. I think they are clearly understood at this point in time and we're ready to proceed. That instruction, which also was accepted by defendant without objection, marks the end of defendant's objections to the State's questions concerning when and under what circumstances these defense witnesses defendant's traumatic brain injury expert, brother, clinical neuropsychology expert, and capital mitigation specialistdisclosed to the prosecution matters properly subject to discovery obligations. An overarching principle guides any inquiry into whether a prosecutor may disparage defense counsel: [P]rosecutors are prohibited from casting unjustified aspersions on the defense or defense counsel. State v. Nelson, 173 N.J. 417, 461, 803 A. 2d 1 (2002) (citing State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 86, 727 A. 2d 1 (1999)). As with each of defendant's earlier claims of prosecutorial misconduct or error, however, the issue for resolution is two-fold: whether the prosecutor committed misconduct, and, if so, whether the prosecutor's conduct constitutes grounds for a new trial. State v. Smith, 167 N.J. 158, 181, 770 A. 2d 255 (2001). We have explained that, in order to meet the second part of that test, the misconduct must have been `so egregious that it deprived defendant of a fair trial.' Ibid. (citations omitted). Stated differently, [t]o warrant a new trial the prosecutor's conduct must have been clearly and unmistakably improper, and must have substantially prejudiced defendant's fundamental right to have a jury fairly evaluate the merits of his defense. Id. at 181-82, 770 A. 2d 255 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We do not read those three cross-examination questions or one objection posed by the State as an assault on defense counsel. On the contrary, in each instance, the prosecution properly sought to question a witness in respect of materials either recently disclosed or not disclosed at all to the State. Therefore, to the extent that line of questioning or objection raises credibility issues concerning recent fabrication or bias, interest or prejudice, see generally N.J.R.E. 607 ([A]ny party including the party calling the witness may examine the witness and introduce extrinsic evidence relevant to the issue of credibility . . . .), the questions and objection are proper. See, e.g., State v. Silva, 131 N.J. 438, 442, 621 A. 2d 17 (1993) (holding that if a witness appears to know of the charges and would naturally be expected to have come forward with the alibi testimony, the witness may be cross-examined about those circumstances of non-disclosure); State v. Josephs, 174 N.J. 44, 127, 803 A. 2d 1074 (2002) (In assessing the worth of the defense's case, the jury is entitled to `consider whether it was receiving a full picture, as interest and bias are always relevant.' (quoting State v. Timmendequas (I), 161 N.J. 515, 594, 737 A. 2d 55 (1999), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed. 2d 89 (2001))). Furthermore, even if we were to credit defendant's allegations and condemn the State for implying that the defense was derelict in its discovery obligations, we nevertheless conclude that the State's conduct in posing the complained-of questions and objection does not rise to the level where it can be considered so egregious that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 83, 727 A. 2d 1 (1999); see also State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 566, 575 A. 2d 816 (1990) ([T]he test by which we shall evaluate the prosecutor's misconduct is whether it was so egregious as to deny defendant a fair trial.); State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 322, 524 A. 2d 188 (1987) (same). Therefore, we reject defendant's claim that the State disparaged defense counsel or that, even if so construed, that the State's actions warrant a new death penalty phase trial.
In respect of five separate instances during the penalty phase trial, defendant next claims that the State engaged in what defendant characterizes as unwarranted comments and accusationsin plain terms, cheap shotsthat distorted the record and greatly prejudiced the defendant. First, defendant contends that, in respect of defendant's expert in the area of traumatic brain injury, the State improperly focused on the expert's fees and failure to treat defendant by inquiring why that physician did not treat defendant. Second, defendant alleges that, in the cross-examination of defendant's clinical neuropsychiatrist, the State also focused on the limitations of the physician's engagement: as solely an expert witness for hire and not as a treating physician. Third, defendant complains that the State improperly examined on re-cross the director of the Atlantic County Youth Advocate Program [9] who, years before, had been assigned to work with defendant. In defendant's view, the State's inquiries as to what programs were in fact available to defendant after the witness was no longer responsible for defendant's care were not properly in response to the witness's admission on re-direct examination that she should have pushed harder on defendant's behalf when he was under the witness's care. This, defendant claims, represents an especially low form of attack: casting aspersions on the witness'[s] sincerity and dedication by forcing her to acknowledge that she `did not follow up with [defendant]' after leaving the job which was the basis for her contact with him. Fourth, defendant asserts that the prosecutor's rejoinder to the social worker who was retained on defendant's behalf to conduct a social history investigation of defendant was improper. Specifically, in response to the witness's statement to the prosecutor that she did not feel comfortable relying on what [the prosecutor was] saying[,] the prosecutor quipped that the feeling is mutual, ma'am. Finally, defendant argues that, in the cross-examination of defendant's developmental psychologist, who had a particular expertise in youth violence, the State improperly questioned the psychologist on the basis that his orientation is not to focus on the injustices that the murderer committed, but the injustices that he experienced. Defendant also claims that the cross-examination of the developmental psychologist based on his prior writings in respect of the attacks on September 11, 2001 were gratuitous, inappropriate and inflammatory. The challenged question and answer were: Q: Even in the context of the September 11th terrorist attacks, you wanted to uncover the injustices that the terrorists may have suffered, correct? A: I want to understand everyone who commits a violent act. And terrorists have a developmental history. It is worth trying to understand it, particularly if you want to prevent it in the future. Defendant contends that this exchange was aggravated by the fact that it had been reported in the newspaper that defendant was a Muslim. The State asserts that the prosecutor properly cross-examined [defendant's traumatic brain injury expert and clinical neuropsychiatrist] concerning their fees and their relationships with defendant because these matters were relevant to their partiality, bias, and motive, and hence, their credibility. In respect of the cross-examination of defendant's youth advocacy worker, the State argues that its questions focusing on the services made available to defendant after he was no longer in that worker's care were designed to challenge factually that witness's opinion, elicited by defense counsel, that defendant was failed by DYFS. The State does concede that its rejoinder to the social worker who was retained to conduct a social history investigation of defendant that the feeling is mutual[,] that is, that the prosecutor similarly did not feel comfortable relying on what [the witness was] saying[,] was unnecessary. The State asserts, however, that the comment was brief, was intended to respond to those instances where the witness claimed that, without verification, she was unwilling to accept the factual premise of any questions posed by the prosecutor, and was the subject of the following colloquy and curative instruction: [Defense Counsel]: Judge, I object. [The Prosecutor]: Judge, she said that two or three times. She made that reference to me. [Defense Counsel]: He has indicated two times in front of the jury and this witness of things that are on the records that were not in the records, so she said I don't feel comfortable relying on it, I want to look at my report. The fact the feeling is mutual is an inappropriate commentary. She wanted to look through her own records. I don't think she said anything disparaging to the Prosecutor. [The Prosecutor]: I took it differently. [Defense Counsel]: I don't think it matters how he takes it. It is inappropriate, and I object to that. The Court: Subject to that interpretation it is inappropriate comment of counsel and should be disregarded by the jury, and if counsel feels that [there are] inappropriate comments being made by the witness[,] that matter can be addressed to the Court for resolution. The State notes that defendant neither requested further relief nor objected to the curative instruction given. Finally, the State asserts that its cross-examination of defendant's developmental psychologist was proper because [t]he prosecutor was entitled to cross-examine this witness about his extreme philosophical positions and professional opinions because they were relevant to his bias, interest, and partiality. The State also remarks that, the fact that defense counsel indicated that he was going to move for a mistrial on this ground, but then never did and instead pursued an entirely different objection demonstrates that in the context of this trial, defense counsel did not believe that the prosecutor's question was improper or that it prejudiced defendant's right to a fair trial. Our review of the examination of these witnesses leads to the conclusion that the cross-examination of each of defendant's traumatic brain injury expert, clinical neuropsychiatrist, and developmental psychologist was proper inasmuch as it was geared towards developing whether each of these witnesses was biased or partial in favor of defendant, or whether any of these witnesses bore an interest in the litigation. We have made clear that [a] prosecutor may suggest to the jury that the defense's presentation of the evidence was unbalanced and incomplete. A prosecutor's statements on the deficiency of a defendant's defense and the inferences to be drawn therefrom are permissible as long as they are grounded in the record. In assessing the worth of the defense's case, the jury is entitled to consider whether it was receiving a full picture, as interest and bias are always relevant. [ State v. Josephs, 174 N.J. 44, 127, 803 A. 2d 1074 (2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).] Applying that standard, we hold that the cross-examination of defendant's traumatic brain injury expert, clinical neuropsychiatrist, and developmental psychologist properly addressed these witnesses' biases, interest and partiality and, hence, was proper. Defendant's objection to the cross-examination of the youth advocacy worker also is unpersuasive. That witness testified that, in her opinion, defendant was failed by DYFS, a matter made relevant by defendant's claim in mitigation that the State agencies responsible for protecting children from parental abuse and/or neglect did not succeed in protecting defendant. [10] In that context, cross-examination designed to elicit the knowledge this witness had of the services that in fact were offered to defendant after he was no longer directly in her care was crucial to the issue defendant himself placed in issue: the degree to which the State had failed defendant in his upbringing, a mitigating factor submitted by defendant under the catch-all mitigating factor provided in N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h) (Any other factor which is relevant to the defendant's character, or record or the circumstances of the offense.). Furthermore, as opinion testimony, that witness was particularly susceptible to cross-examination. We have made clear [t]hat the credibility of a witness may be impeached on cross-examination is well settled [and that t]he scope of cross-examination is a matter resting in the broad discretion of the trial court. State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 255, 619 A. 2d 1208 (1993) (citations omitted). Further, in respect of the cross-examination of an expert, we have held that an expert witness is always subject to searching cross-examination as to the basis of his opinion . . . . Id. at 259, 619 A. 2d 1208 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In that context, we have held: That the scope of cross-examination is a matter for the control of the trial court and an appellate court will not interfere with such control unless clear error and prejudice are shown is well settled. State v. Murray, 240 N.J.Super. 378, 394 [573 A. 2d 488] (App.Div.), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 334, 585 [ A. 2d 350] (1990). In addition, an expert witness is always subject to searching cross-examination as to the basis of his opinion. Glenpointe Assocs. v. Twp. of Teaneck, 241 N.J.Super. 37, 54 [574 A. 2d 459] (App.Div.), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 391[, 585 A. 2d 392] (1990). To determine the credibility, weight and probative value of an expert's opinion, one must question the facts and reasoning on which it is based. Johnson v. Salem Corp., 97 N.J. 78, 91 [477 A. 2d 1246] (1984). [ Id. at 263-64, 619 A. 2d 1208.] We address the State's concession that the prosecutor's rejoinder to the social worker who was retained to conduct a social history investigation of defendant that the feeling is mutual[,] that is, that the prosecutor similarly did not feel comfortable relying on what [the witness was] saying[,] albeit unnecessary, did not deprive defendant of a fair trial for the following reasons: the comment was brief; the comment was intended to respond to those instances where the witness claimed that, without verification, she was unwilling to accept the factual premise of any questions posed by the prosecutor; and the comment was the subject of an immediate curative instruction. To be sure, in this specific respect and in this context, we find the prosecutor's conduct to be, at the very least, unnecessary. However, we also acknowledge that defendant's penalty phase trial was feverishly contested, and emotions ran high throughout the proceedings. In that framework, we recognize that we must not be so idealistic as to close our eyes to the realities of human nature as they are continually portrayed during our trial process. Each criminal trial is a swiftly moving dramatic contest which often evokes strong emotions in the participants. The charged atmosphere created frequently makes it arduous for the prosecuting attorney to stay within the orbit of strict propriety. [ State v. Bucanis, 26 N.J. 45, 56, 138 A. 2d 739 (1958).] However unfortunate the exchange between the prosecutor and defendant's social worker may have been, we cannot ascribe to this limited and immediately corrected instance the far-reaching implications defendant seeks. We instead hold that, although the prosecutor's gratuitous comment is worthy of disapproval, and is to be avoided, the exchange was not so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial because that comment could not have substantially prejudiced defendant's fundamental right to have a jury fairly evaluate the merits of his defense. State v. Papasavvas (I), 163 N.J. 565, 625, 751 A. 2d 40 (2000) (quoting State v. Timmendequas (I), 161 N.J. 515, 575, 737 A. 2d 55 (1999), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed. 2d 89 (2001) (citations omitted)).
Defendant next objects to what he perceives as the prosecution's intentional obstruction of his cousin's direct examination. Defendant called his cousin [11] to the stand to plead for his life. At its core, defendant's complaint is that, although he ultimately was able to secure from his cousin all of the testimony he sought in an uninterrupted manner, defendant views the prosecution's earlier objections during her testimony as unvarnished obstruction, in an evident attempt to circumvent the trial court's allowance of the testimony by impeding its delivery. In response, the State claims that the prosecutor made appropriate, good faith objections to the testimony of defendant's cousin . . . when her plea for mercy exceeded the permissible scope of relevant mitigating evidence [because defendant's cousin], in connection with requesting the jury to spare defendant's life, . . . began discussing the difficulties of her own childhood. The exchange on which defendant bases this objection bears setting forth in full: [Defense Counsel # 1]: If you had the opportunity, as I think you have at this point, to ask [the] jury to do something in terms of their decision, what would you like to say to the jury? [The Witness]: To allow [defendant] to live because he hasn't really lived. He hasn't had a life growing up. None of us did. [The Prosecutor]: You Honor, I'm going to object I think it has gone [Defense Counsel # 2]: I would object to him interrupting this witness after the Court already made a ruling indicating that she would be allowed to do it. [The Prosecutor]: She's talking about her life, that is not relevant. [Defense Counsel # 2]: Judge, Judge [The Prosecutor]: This Counsel is [Defense # 1's] witness. [12] [Defense Counsel # 2]: Judge, I would like to finish my objection. The Court: She may finish her answer. [Defense Counsel # 1]: Judge, quite frankly I think it was inappropriate, and I will address thisfor [the prosecutor] to interrupt this after the side-bar, I think was done deliberately to take her off The Court: I would ask counsel not to get into personalities. There was a ruling as to the subject matter that did not preclude whether the scope of the ruling was exceeded sobut I have ruled she may finish her answer. [The Witness]: None of us did really. Uhm . . . at least he is able to eat three meals a day; finish school [The Prosecutor]: Your Honor, this goesJudge, I need to approach. This is [Defense Counsel # 1]: Judge, you made a ruling. And I think that we're supposed to be bound by the rulings that this Court made. And I would ask that the prosecutor be bound by the rulings as we are and let this witness finish her answer. He keeps interrupting the plea[ ] for life which is done, I submit, deliberately so that it doesn't have the import it would have. [The Prosecutor]: The witness can't say whatever she wants. She is limited to what she can say. The Court: I would agree, and you have the right to object on that subject matter. And my ruling on it is that the scope of the Court's ruling hasn't been exceeded yet, in any event. Immediately following that exchange, the witness provided her very brief testimony on this point without interruption. We agree with the trial court that the State properly sought to enforce the limitation placed on the scope of this witness's testimony, that is, that her testimony was to be limited to the claimed mitigating factor that defendant was raised in a home without structure, boundaries or positive role models which he could emulate, a mitigating factor also presented under the catch-all provision of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h). When there is a reasonable and good faith expectation that a witness's answer to a question will exceed what is deemed proper under the circumstances, no party is required to sit idly by and allow impermissible testimony to be spread on the record. On the contrary, to the extent possible, the obligation of an advocate is to avoid trying to undo what may be impermissibly done as [t]he failure to object promptly to questionable comments, although not fatal, may oft-times result in not having the benefit of the trial court's exercise of its remedial powers on the propriety of the statements in issue[,] State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 452 n. 14, 550 A. 2d 1172 (1988), and [t]he courts have always had the obligation of preventing a jury, at least on objection, from hearing inadmissible evidence[,] State v. Phelps, 96 N.J. 500, 515 n. 3, 476 A. 2d 1199 (1984).
In its cross-examination of defendant's clinical neuropsychiatrist, the State referenced the report prepared by that expert. The following exchange then took place: [The Prosecutor]: Did you know other people would be relying on your report? [The Witness]: Of course. [The Prosecutor]: Did you know that Dr. Gary Glass relied on your report, the defense psychiatrist? [Defense Counsel # 2]: Can we be heard, please? The Court: Counsel may approach. Defendant objected to any reference to Dr. Glass, claiming that defendant may never call Dr. Glass, and it is improper for him to be throwing names in front of this jury. The trial court then ruled as follows: The issue, as I see it, is a narrow one. You have asked on cross-examination whether he anticipated that others would be relying on his report, and he got an affirmative answer to that. You're now refining it with respect to Dr. Glass. The defense says Dr. Glass may or may not testify. He probably will, he might not, I guess is the fairest statement. I can't pin them down, but I have to act in a contextthat's the context in which I act. You have got this witness'[s] anticipation of reliance, and if Glass comes on you can ask him whether he relied upon it. The State made no further reference to Dr. Glass, [13] and defendant sought no curative instruction requesting that the jury disregard any mention of Dr. Glass. Although satisfied with that resolution then, defendant now claims that [b]y this maneuver, the State conveyed to the jury that the defense had consulted an expert but would not present him, with the clear implication that the defense was hiding an unfavorable opinion from the jury. Although it made no contemporaneous request for a jury instruction of any sort, defendant now claims that the trial court did nothing to negate or correct the implication of the question[ ] that was asked. Our review of this single, fleeting question and answer, in the context in which these events occurred, requires that we reject the result advanced by defendant. We fail to see how asking defendant's neuropsychiatrist whether he knew that another doctor had relied on the neuropsychiatrist's report results in the clear implication that the defense was hiding an unfavorable opinion from the jury as alleged by defendant. We are most persuaded by the fact that, at the time defendant objected to the question and the trial court sustained that objection, defendant did not seek a curative instruction. In the absence of a request for a contemporaneous curative instruction at trial, defendant's present complaint in respect of the absence of a curative instruction will not be heard. See, e.g., State v. Bucanis, 26 N.J. 45, 57, 138 A. 2d 739 (1958) (In most instances, under our system of jurisprudence, the onus is upon the lawyer to safeguard his client . . . through means available in the trial court. Defense counsel is not ordinarily free to scrutinize the record at his later leisure and to secure reversals upon the basis of what he thus discerns as error, unless it definitely comes within the scope of our plain error rule as we have interpreted it.).