Opinion ID: 1252380
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: interpretative background

Text: Two propositions are apparent when we look at the history of our Wrongful Death Act. The first is that in recent years the Legislature has liberalized the scope of the statute by increasing the amount of damages recoverable and by expanding the type of damages recoverable. The second proposition is that this Court has historically given the State's Wrongful Death Act [1] a liberal construction. Up until 1955, [2] the maximum amount that could be recovered in an action for wrongful death was ten thousand dollars. W.Va.Code, 55-7-6 (1931). Under this statute it was not necessary to show either pecuniary loss or dependency in order to recover. Utt v. Herold, 127 W.Va. 719, 34 S.E.2d 357 (1945); Kelly v. Ohio River Railroad Co., 58 W.Va. 216, 222, 52 S.E. 520, 523 (1905). The recovery under this statute was essentially for solatium, with compensatory damages permitted if shown, as long as the ten thousand dollar limit was not exceeded. In 1955, the amount of recovery was changed so that an additional ten thousand dollars could be recovered by showing evidence of financial or pecuniary loss sustained by a distributee or distributees. W.Va.Code, 55-7-6 (1955). In Lester v. Rose, 147 W.Va. 575, 130 S.E.2d 80 (1963), we concluded that this 1955 amendment permitted the recovery of an additional ten thousand dollars upon a showing of some pecuniary loss and that the initial ten thousand dollars could be recovered without a showing of pecuniary loss. In 1961, the Legislature increased the overall limit from $20,000 to $25,000. With that amendment, $15,000 could be recovered for pecuniary loss in addition to the initial $10,000 for solatium. W.Va.Code, 55-7-6 (1961). In 1965, the maximum amount of recovery for pecuniary loss was extended to $100,000. The statute also recognized for the first time recovery of the funeral, hospital, medical and such other expenses resulting from the wrongful death. W.Va.Code, 55-7-6 (1965). Finally, in 1976 the statute was substantially broadened to remove any maximum limit on the amount of recovery. The dependent distributee limitation was largely removed and the elements of recoverable damages were expanded. [3] W.Va.Code, 55-7-6 (1976). As we have noted, not only has the Legislature liberalized the wrongful death recovery statute through the years, but this Court has adopted a liberal construction of the statute from our earliest cases. Thus, in Richards v. Riverside Iron Works, 56 W.Va. 510, 515, 49 S.E. 437, 438 (1904), we said: The statute is remedial and should be construed liberally for the purpose of carrying out the legislative intent. See also Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W.Va. 431, 184 S.E.2d 428, (1971); Wilder v. Charleston Transit Co., 120 W.Va. 319, 197 S.E. 814 (1938). A review of our cases reveals we have given more than lip service to this rule of liberal construction. In Baldwin, we concluded that, despite a considerable split of outside authority on the point, an action could be brought under our 1965 wrongful death statute by the personal representative of a viable although unborn child. In Lester v. Rose, 147 W.Va. 575, 130 S.E.2d 80 (1963), we concluded that the 1955 wrongful death statute allowed $10,000 for damages whether or not a pecuniary loss was shown. Even though our 1955 wrongful death statute did not authorize the personal representative to collect funeral, hospital and medical expenses connected with the wrongful death, in Stamper v. Bannister, 146 W.Va. 100, 118 S.E.2d 313 (1961), we nevertheless held they were proper elements of damages. With this interpretative background, we address the issues raised by the appellant, namely, whether the court erred in granting summary judgment for the appellee, thereby denying the appellant an opportunity to prove claims for pecuniary losses, punitive damages and prejudgment interest.