Opinion ID: 1436706
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Board Signatures and Issuance of the Second Statement

Text: We turn next to Walton's third regulatory argument regarding the Board's second statement, filed on July 2, 1993. He contends that this statement is fatally defective because it contains only two hearing board member signatures, instead of three; and because it was not issued within three working days of his January 28, 1992, hearing. [20] There is a threshold question as to whether the exhaustion of remedies doctrine applies to Walton's third argument, or whether he has properly raised two new issues generated by the Board's second statement. This question need not detain us. We need not decide whether Walton sufficiently exhausted his administrative remedies in light of the particular facts of this case, or whether, under the circumstances, he should be permitted to raise issues in the Superior Court which were not argued to the agency, because even if his substantive contentions are properly before us, they fail on the merits. Walton's third argument simply has no merit. The explanation for only two signatures on the second Walton statement is clear and the absence of one signature has not resulted in any prejudice to Walton, or any miscarriage of justice. The third member of the Board had left the Department by the time the second written statement was released. Moreover, the second statement is not remarkably different from the documents that comprised the first one, except with respect to form. Furthermore, the only reason the second statement was issued more than three days after Walton's hearing is Walton's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to find him guilty. On the facts before us, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the Board's disciplinary decision should be reversed on such a ground. Accordingly, we reject Walton's third regulatory argument, and affirm the trial court's ruling that the Department complied with its regulations.