Opinion ID: 43704
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Accomodation Retaliation Claim

Text: Roberts also claims that he was terminated in retaliation for seeking an accommodation for his alcoholism. Specifically, Roberts sought an exemption from Rayonier’s testing requirement. “It is well established in this circuit that to successfully allege a prima facie retaliation claim under . . . the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the adverse action was causally related to the protected expression.” Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002). “We review [ADA retaliation] claims under the same rubric used for Title VII retaliation claims.” Farley v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 197 F.3d 1322, 1336 12 (11th Cir. 1999); Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1287 (11th Cir. 1997). To prove the necessary element of protected activity, Roberts is not required to prove that he was seeking an accommodation for an actual disability covered by the statute. It is sufficient if he establishes that he had a reasonable belief that he was disabled or regarded as disabled and thus entitled to an accommodation. Our decision in Little v. United Technologies, 103 F.3d 956 (11th Cir. 1997), described such reasonable belief as follows: A plaintiff must not only show that he subjectively (that is, in good faith) believed that his employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices, but also that his belief was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and record presented. It thus is not enough for a plaintiff to allege that his belief in this regard was honest and bona fide; the allegations and record must also indicate that the belief, though perhaps mistaken, was objectively reasonable. Id., at 960 (emphasis in original). See Weeks, 291 F.3d at 1312 (employing the Little reasonable belief analysis in the ADA retaliation context.) “The objective reasonableness of an employee’s belief that her employer has engaged in an unlawful employment practice must be measured against existing substantive law.” Clover v. Total System Services, Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1351 (11th Cir. 1999); Harper v. Blockbuster Entertainment Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1388 n.2 (11th Cir. 1998). Where “reasonable minds could disagree on” the reasonableness 13 of a plaintiff’s belief, the issue is “an inappropriate candidate for judgment as a matter of law.” Lipphardt v. Durango Steakhouse of Brandon, Inc., 267 F.3d 1183, 1187 (11th Cir. 2001). “To prove a causal connection, we require a plaintiff only to demonstrate ‘that the protected activity and the adverse action were not wholly unrelated.’” Farley, 197 F.3d at 1337 (quoting Clover, 176 F.3d at 1354)(emphasis in original). “At a minimum, a plaintiff must generally establish that the employer was actually aware of the protected expression at the time it took adverse employment action. The defendant's awareness of the protected statement, however, may be established by circumstantial evidence.” Clover, 176 F.3d at 1354, quoting Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 996 F.2d 1155, 1163 (11th Cir.1993) (internal citations omitted). “We have plainly held that a plaintiff satisfies this element if he provides sufficient evidence that the decision-maker became aware of the protected conduct, and that there was a close temporal proximity between this awareness and the adverse employment action.” Farley, 197 F.3d at 1337. Once a prima facie case has been established, the employer has the burden of articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment decision. The plaintiff then must demonstrate that it will be able to establish at trial that the employer’s proffered non-discriminatory reasons are a pretextual ruse 14 designed to mask retaliation. Farley, 197 F.3d at 1336. “In an employment . . . retaliation case, even if the plaintiff provides evidence that the defendant, in making an adverse employment decision, was motivated in part by an impermissible consideration, the defendant can prevail if it can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even in the absence of the discriminatory consideration.” Pulliam v. Tallapoosa County Jail, 185 F.3d 1182, 1184 (11th Cir. 1999).3 The district court rejected Roberts’ retaliation claim because it did not view Ken Demarko and Roberts as similarly situated. The court also found the prima facie case lacking because the differences between Rayonier’s treatment of the two men were “de minimus”. In addition, the district court ruled against Roberts because it concluded that Rayonier had carried its burden of proof on its mixed motive defense, i.e. that Rayonier would in any event have terminated Roberts because it honestly believed that Roberts had previously disclosed confidential information to Thomas regarding Rayonier’s interactions with other employees. 3 In his reply brief, Roberts argues for the first time that the case should not be analyzed under McDonnell Douglas because the evidence of retaliation is direct evidence. Rayonier filed a motion to strike this portion of Roberts’ reply brief. We grant Rayonier’s motion. We will not entertain Roberts’ direct evidence argument for three reasons: (1) Roberts did not raise the argument below or in his principal brief; (2) Roberts stipulated that this was an indirect evidence case in the pre-trial order; and (3) the proper resolution of the case under a direct evidence framework is not “beyond dispute”. Polo Ralph Lauren L.P. v. Tropical Shippers & Const. Co., 215 F.3d 1217, 1224 (11th Cir. 2000). 15 We disagree with the district court’s analysis. As should be clear from our discussion of the elements of a prima facie retaliation claim, there is no requirement that plaintiff point to a similarly situated employee. All that is required is that Roberts show that (1) he engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the adverse action was causally related to the protected expression. Weeks, 291 F.3d at 1311 (11th Cir. 2002). With respect to the first prong, Rayonier has conceded that Roberts was entitled to request accommodation under the ADA.4 The second prong is undisputed. Roberts easily meets the third prong of the prima facie test because of the close temporal relationship between Roberts’ request for accommodation and Rayonier’s decision to terminate him, and because Rayonier itself stated in its termination letter that Roberts’ request for an exemption from the test was one of the reasons for his discharge. It is clear, in other words, that his discharge and his request for an accommodation were not “wholly unrelated”. Farley, 197 F.3d at 1337. 4 As already discussed, Roberts is required to show the objective and subjective reasonableness of his belief that he was entitled to statutory protection. Because Rayonier has conceded both below and on appeal that Roberts was entitled to request accommodation, we do not address the issue. Rayonier does not concede, however, that Roberts exercised his right to request accommodation in a reasonable way. As we discuss below, we decline to reach that issue, preferring that the district court make the determination in the first instance. 16 The closer question is whether or not Rayonier “would have made the same decision even in the absence of the discriminatory consideration.” Pulliam, 185 F.3d 1182, 1184 (1999). As discussed above, Rayonier claims that as a result of Farmer’s conversation with Thomas about Roberts’ desire not to take the assessment, Rayonier became aware of what it honestly believed were previous, independent breaches of confidentiality by Roberts. In particular, Rayonier claims that Thomas told Farmer that Thomas “had from time to time consulted with [Roberts] about problems with employees” and that this comment formed the basis of an honest belief that Roberts had previously breached his duty of confidentiality. Rayonier claims it would have fired Roberts for this reason even in the absence of any discriminatory reason. We conclude that there is sufficient evidence in Roberts’ favor on this point to render summary judgment inappropriate. The first piece of relevant evidence is the June 4 termination letter, which states: This termination for cause is based on the poor judgment you exercised in your recent efforts to question the requirement by the company that you attend a routine assessment as an executive of a company and a lack of trust that the company has in your ability to represent it in confidential employee relations matters as a result of your actions. Although the last line of the letter could possibly refer to disclosure to Thomas of confidential information regarding Rayonier’s “problems with 17 employees,” a reasonable juror could read the letter to imply that Rayonier terminated Roberts based on Roberts’ decision to resist the test, and to hire an attorney, and not because it believed that Roberts had previously made any improper disclosures regarding other employment cases. Rayonier’s honest belief that disclosure took place is also undercut by Ken Demarko’s testimony. Demarko testified that he was told by O’Grady that Roberts was fired because Roberts “refused to take the assessment, and . . . went out and hired outside counsel to write a letter for him basically saying that he doesn’t have to take that, and the counsel he chose was a counsel who was a ‘plaintiff’s attorney’ against Rayonier.” The previous disclosure of confidential information regarding other employees’ cases is not mentioned. Similarly, Rayonier’s statements during Roberts’ unemployment benefits proceeding emphasize Roberts’ resistance to the assessment and his decision to hire Thomas, rather than disclosure of confidential information regarding other cases. (“The claimant . . . felt he did not need to follow company policy, so he sought outside legal advice and brought in a letter from an outside lawyer regarding company business [sic]. Since he was the attorney representing the employer, he should not have seeked [sic] outside counciling [sic], regarding company related business issues.”) 18 Finally, a reasonable juror could infer that Rayonier was not motivated by an honest belief that such disclosures took place based upon the lack of evidence of significant investigation. In this regard we note that Farmer’s letter states only that “Archie . . . mentioned that he knew Terry somewhat in that he had from time to time consulted with Terry about problems with employees.” Rayonier has not pointed to any evidence indicating that it ever sought to determine which employees’ problems were discussed or the substance of the information disclosed. A reasonable juror could infer that Thomas was referring to entirely appropriate consultations between Roberts and Thomas relating to Rayonier employees whom Thomas was representing. A reasonable juror could infer pretext from the combination of the severity of Rayonier’s action (termination), the vagueness of Farmer’s original statement and Rayonier’s apparent lack of follow-up.5 Viewed as a whole, this evidence creates a material factual dispute on the issue of whether or not Rayonier would have fired Roberts for legitimate reasons. Rayonier has failed to carry its burden on summary judgment regarding the mixed 5 We recognize that the evidence would provide some support for another argument – that Rayonier would have fired Roberts anyway because he consulted an attorney who had recently filed lawsuits against the company and had one such case still pending. Rayonier might believe that such an attorney might reasonably be expected to receive information in representing Roberts which would be damaging to the company in other lawsuits that the lawyer might bring. Assuming that Rayonier argues this, in addition to the disclosure of confidential information argument, as a basis for its legitimate discharge, we decline to address the issue. The issue is related to the one addressed immediately below, which we also decline to address. We prefer for the issue to be addressed in the first instance by the district court. 19 motive defense. Summary judgment on this basis was in error, and must be vacated. As an alternative basis for affirming the judgment of the district court with respect to this accommodation retaliation claim, Rayonier argues that the manner in which Roberts exercised his right to oppose taking the medical test was unreasonable and therefore not statutorily protected activity. In this regard, Rayonier argues that Roberts never clearly communicated to Rayonier that his request was in the nature of an ADA accommodation, nor did he clearly apprise Rayonier of his opinion that the test as applied to him would violate the ADA. Most particularly, Rayonier argues that Roberts’ selection of Thomas as his attorney was unreasonable in light of the fact that Thomas and/or others in his office were plaintiffs’ lawyers who had recently brought employment discrimination cases against Rayonier, and actually had one matter still pending. Rayonier supports its argument by pointing to numerous cases in which courts have found that unreasonable exercise of actions that would otherwise be protected under Title VII is unprotected. See Rollins v. State of Fla. Dept of Law Enforcement, 868 F.2d 397 (11th Cir. 1981); Rosser v. Laborers’ Intern. Union of N.America, 616 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that although opposition to unlawful employment practices is protected, such protection is not absolute); Jeffries v. Harris County Community Assoc., 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980) (accord, 20 and applying a balancing test); see also Douglas v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 144 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 1998) (involving in-house counsel); Jones v. Flagship Int’l, 793 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 1986) (involving in-house counsel). Rayonier suggests that as an in-house attorney having duties of loyalty and confidentiality to Rayonier, Roberts was unreasonable in hiring Thomas, an attorney who had recently sued the company and who was likely to use in other cases against the company any confidential information which Roberts might appropriately reveal to him. At this stage of the case, we decline to address the issue because the district court has not addressed the issue; because developments in the case may make it unnecessary to address the issue; and because, if the issue is to be addressed, the district court may determine that the inquiry would be facilitated by additional development of the relevant facts.