Opinion ID: 6335188
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: negligent entrustment by ean

Text: Again, our review is de novo, so we apply the same standard as the circuit court: that “[a] motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law.” 33 Petitioners assign fourteen errors to the circuit court’ s grant of summary judgment to EAN on their claims of negligent entrustment and negligence and five to the grant of summary judgment to Mr. Jesurum on their claim for negligent entrustment—excluding the assignment of error regarding the timing of summary judgment, addressed above. These assignments of error can be condensed into this fundamental point: had the circuit court considered Petitioners’ evidence, it would have found that they have raised genuine issues of material fact so that their 30 Id. at 545, 363 S.E.2d at 132. 31 Id. at 544, 363 S.E.2d at 131. 32 Remand to the circuit court to apply West Virginia law is not necessary, however. EAN argued below that under Kentucky law, negligent entrustment hinges on a vehicle owner’s actual knowledge of the entrustee’s incompetence. See Cox v. Waits, No. 2002-CA-002357-MR, 2004 WL 405811, at  (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2004) (“The common law theory of negligent entrustment is that one who entrusts her vehicle to another whom she knows to be inexperienced, careless, or reckless, or given to excessive use of intoxicating liquor while driving, is liable for the natural and probable consequences of the entrustment.”). And while the circuit court quoted that standard in its order granting summary judgment to EAN, it defined its inquiry as follows: “in order for the Plaintiffs to overcome the motion for summary judgment there must be facts which could show that at the time of the rental, EAN knew or should have known that Herrera was inexperienced, incompetent or a reckless driver.” Similarly, in granting summary judgment to Mr. Jesurum, the court considered whether he “knew or should have known that Herrera was incompetent to drive the rental vehicle” when he entrusted the Town & Country in Tennessee and whether Petitioners had “offer[ed] any evidence that Jesurum or EAN should have known that Herrera was incompetent at the time of the entrustment” in Kentucky. Those inquiries mirror the negligent entrustment standard set forth in Syllabus Points 11 and 12 of Payne v. Kinder, infra, so the circuit court’s order contains analysis sufficient for purposes of this review. 33 Syl. Pt. 3, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co. of New York, 148 W. Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963). 10 negligence-based claims should have been presented to a jury. 34 We begin by examining the negligent entrustment claim again EAN. West Virginia adopted the following formulation of negligent entrustment in Payne v. Kinder: Liability for the negligence of an incompetent driver to whom an automobile is entrusted does not arise out of the relationship of the parties, but from the act of entrustment of the motor vehicle, with permission to operate it, to a person whose incompetency, inexperience, or recklessness is known or should have been known by the owner. An owner who entrusts his motor vehicle to a person whom he knows, or from the circumstances is charged with knowing, to be incompetent or unfit to drive it is liable for injury inflicted which results from the use of the automobile by the driver if the injury was proximately caused by the disqualification, incompetency, inexperience, intoxication or recklessness of the driver.[35] “[L]iability for the negligent use of a motor vehicle cannot generally be predicated against the owner at common law, merely because of the ownership of the vehicle.” 36 Instead, owner 34 Petitioners argue that the circuit court granted summary judgment to EAN before they had a full and fair opportunity to conduct discovery. For support, Petitioners cite to two Rule 56(f) affidavits—one included in the Hammetts’ response to EAN’s original motion for summary judgment and one included in Mr. Caudill’s response to EAN’s renewed motion for summary judgment. In the most recent affidavit, counsel for Mr. Caudill attests that additional discovery is needed regarding the investigation as to how Mr. Herrera came to be listed in EAN’s computer as an “authorized driver” of the Town & Country; whether Mr. Bradshaw or his counterpart at EAN Tennessee had discretion to “disregard” certain policies and guidelines; the degree of autonomy of each branch to determine its rental practices; and EAN’s employee training programs. As the following analysis demonstrates, those topics are not relevant to Petitioners’ negligent entrustment claim against EAN. And Petitioners’ negligence claim against EAN fails as a matter of law in view of the specific duty owed by EAN to Petitioners, so the relevance of those topics to the negligence claim is moot. 35 Syl. Pts. 11 and 12, Payne v. Kinder, 147 W. Va. 352, 127 S.E.2d 726 (1962). 36 8 Am. Jur. 2d AUTOMOBILES & HIGHWAY TRAFFIC § 614 (Feb. 2022). The vehicle owner may still be liable for injury caused by another’s negligent operation of the owner’s vehicle under other common law doctrines. See id. (vehicle owner not held liable for injuries caused by other’s negligent operation of owner’s vehicle “unless the operator was acting as his or her agent or servant, the owner was present in the vehicle and maintained some control over its operation or entrusted its operation to an incompetent or unfit person, or unless the owner and driver were engaged in a joint enterprise or partnership activity”) (internal notes omitted). 11 liability “‘rests upon the combined negligence of the owner and the driver—negligence of the owner in entrusting the vehicle to an incompetent driver, and negligence of the driver in its operation.’” 37 “[T]he critical element of a negligent entrustment cause of action is the initial improper loaning of the vehicle—improper in the sense that it is given to a person who is known to be likely to cause an unreasonable risk of harm to others.” 38 In support of its motion for summary judgment, EAN offered evidence showing that Mr. Bradshaw requested and reviewed Mr. Herrera’ s driver’s license, interacted with Mr. Herrera, did not observe signs of impairment or intoxication, and was unaware of Mr. Herrera’s driving or criminal history when he entrusted the Explorer to him. The circuit court relied on that evidence to find that Petitioners had not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Bradshaw knew or should have known that Mr. Herrera was incompetent to operate a vehicle—assuming Mr. Herrera was, in fact, incompetent and the incompetency caused Petitioners’ injuries. Petitioners contend that they have “come forward with affirmative evidence [i.e., a list of twenty-four bulleted facts] that both calls into question the veracity of the evidence offered by EAN, [and] additional evidence of EAN’s tortious conduct . . . .” According to Petitioners, this evidence shows “that under EAN’s own standards, contained in both the Rental Agreement and internal operating procedures, Herrera should never have been given the [Explorer]. These facts demonstrate that EAN’s employee Brent Bradshaw had a wealth of information in front of him telling him that Herrera was not fit to drive.” Contrary to Petitioners’ assertion, few of the facts they point to are related to Mr. Herrera’s competency to operate a vehicle in a manner that was likely to cause an unreasonable risk of harm to others. Seventeen of the twenty-four pieces of affirmative evidence relate to Mr. Herrera’s status as an “authorized additional driver” on the rental agreement, EAN employees’ alleged failure to follow internal policies, and EAN’s alleged failure to adopt them. 39 Petitioners do not articulate how that evidence supports their claim for negligent entrustment, other than to argue that the Explorer should never have been entrusted to Mr. Herrera. 37 Payne, 147 W. Va. at 370, 127 S.E.2d at 738 (quoting 5A Am. Jur., AUTOMOBILES & HIGHWAY TRAFFIC, § 580). 38 Huggins v. Tri-Cty. Bonding Co., 175 W. Va. 643, 649, 337 S.E.2d 12, 17 (1985). 39 Drummond v. Walker, 643 F. Supp. 190, 192 (D.D.C. 1986), aff’d, 861 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (reasoning that “[t]he fact that [the driver] was under the age of 21, or lacked adequate identification or credit does not reflect directly on his ability to operate a car competently” so rental car company “would not be on notice by virtue of these facts that [the driver] was not a safe driver”). Mr. Caudill’s bulleted list includes two points related to Mr. Herrera and Mr. Jesurum’s alleged criminal activities between March 13 and 21. Mr. Caudill has not offered any evidence that Mr. Bradshaw was aware of those alleged activities when he entrusted the Explorer to Mr. Herrera on March 21, 2015. Therefore, even assuming those activities are indicative of Mr. Herrera’s competency to drive, they cannot raise a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to evade summary judgment on this claim against EAN. 12 This is not sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact to preserve their claim for negligent entrustment. Payne v. Kinder conditions a vehicle owner’s liability on the entrustment of a vehicle to one “whom he knows, or from the circumstances is charged with knowing, to be incompetent or unfit to drive[.]” Petitioners have not pointed to any evidence that the at-issue policies and rental agreement terms implicate Mr. Herrera’s competency to operate a vehicle without causing an unreasonable risk of harm to others. Petitioners intimate throughout their briefing that Mr. Herrera’s inability to rent a car from EAN and to qualify as an “additional authorized driver” on the rental agreement are relevant to his competency to operate a vehicle, safely. They are not: Mr. Herrera initially was denied a rental car because he did not have a credit card or proof of permanent address. Neither circumstance is material to his competency to operate a vehicle without creating an unreasonable risk of harm. 40 In short, Petitioners’ evidence related to EAN’s alleged violations of internal policies, failure to adopt internal policies, and failure to enforce the terms of the rental agreement is not material to the question of whether Mr. Herrera was competent to operate a vehicle safely on March 21, 2015. Petitioners’ remaining four bulleted points of affirmative evidence relate to their contention that Mr. Bradshaw should have known that Mr. Herrera was so exhausted on March 21 that he was incompetent to operate a vehicle safely based on Mr. Herrera’s appearance or the number of miles accrued on the Town & Country between March 13 and 21. 41 To support those assertions, Petitioners point to an opinion by human-factors expert Dr. Kevin A. Rider that “7,707 miles driven in 8 days will predictably result in driver fatigue, impair the driver’s ability and be unfit [sic] to safely operate his vehicle . . . .” Petitioners also highlight the opinion of sleep expert Dr. Charles A. Czeisler that Mr. Herrera was “impaired by profound fatigue and excessive sleepiness” upon his arrival at the EAN Kentucky office. These experts’ reports are insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact. The materiality of Dr. Rider’s opinion to Mr. Bradshaw’s putative knowledge of Mr. Herrera’s competency to operate a vehicle safely is dubious. First, Dr. Rider opines that it is predictable that driving roughly 7,700 miles in eight days will result in driver fatigue. Dr. Rider does not opine that such a driver will appear so fatigued that an observer would (or should) know 40 Cf. Amparan v. Lake Powell Car Rental Co., 882 F.3d 943, 949 (10th Cir. 2018) (rental car company’s violation of minimum age policy was not evidence of driver’s incompetence); Eagle Express Lines, Inc. v. Nyazee, No. 4:18-CV-01152-AGF, 2018 WL 6445623, at  (E.D. Mo. Dec. 10, 2018) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim for negligent entrustment where “drivers’ youth and resultant inability to rent a car in their own names does not alone establish incompetence”); Byrne v. Collins, 77 A.D.3d 782 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (rental car company’s “failure to provide copies of any internal policies as to investigation of potential renters with restricted licenses constitutes an insufficient basis upon which to deny [rental car company’s] motion for summary judgment” of plaintiff’s negligent entrustment claim). 41 Petitioners also argue that Mr. Bradshaw was “required to look beyond mere appearances to evaluate whether or not [Mr. Herrera was] fit to drive.” Confusingly, they later assert that “West Virginia negligent entrustment law imposes no duty on EAN to affirmatively look for evidence of a prospective renter’s fitness to operate a motor vehicle.” 13 that he is incompetent to operate a vehicle safely. Second, Dr. Rider did not observe Mr. Herrera on March 21, so his opinion does not account for Mr. Herrera’ s actual appearance. That is, Mr. Rider has not opined (nor can he) that Mr. Herrera, particularly, appeared so fatigued on that day that a reasonable observer would have known him to be incompetent to drive safely. 42 Dr. Czeisler’s opinion suffers similar infirmities. 43 For that same reason, Petitioners’ assertion that Mr. Bradshaw should have known that Mr. Herrera was incompetent to drive on March 21, 2015 based on the mileage accrued on the Town & Country between March 13 and 21 fails. Petitioners’ theory relies on the following inferences: Mr. Bradshaw’s observations of Mr. Herrera’s appearance were not accurate; Mr. Herrera’s admission that he gave EAN employees no information that would lead them to believe he was incompetent to drive is untrue; and Mr. Herrera was the only driver of the Town & Country van between March 13 and 21. Courts have rejected similar evidence, such as knowledge of an employee’s work schedule and lengthy commute, as sufficient to charge a vehicle owner with constructive knowledge of an entrustee’s incompetence to operate a vehicle safely. 44 For these reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment to EAN on Petitioners’ claim for negligent entrustment. 42 Cf. Weber v. Budget Truck Rental, LLC, 254 P.3d 196, 199 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (finding expert testimony that rental car agency employees should have seen signs that prospective renter was intoxicated based on his methamphetamine use earlier in the day was insufficient to create question of fact for trial because expert opinion went to renter’s assumed appearance and not actual appearance). 43 In addition, both experts acknowledge in their reports that their opinions are predicated on the assumption that Mr. Herrea had been the only person to drive the Town & Country between March 13 and 21. The evidence Petitioners proffer to fill that gap is limited to a portion of Mr. Bradshaw’s deposition in which he states that “the only person he saw driving was during the switch-out was Mr. Herrera. He arrived in the Town & Country and left in the Ford Explorer.” Petitioners have not directed the Court to another portion of the record to support the assumption that Mr. Herrera was the only driver of the Town & Country between March 13 and 21, and Mr. Bradshaw’s deposition testimony supports only the conclusion that Mr. Herrera was the driver of the van for a limited period on a single day. As Mr. Bradshaw stated in his deposition, to his knowledge, Mr. Jesurum was also a possible driver of the van because his name was on the rental agreement. 44 See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 758 (Tex. 2007) (reasoning that employer’s “knowledge of [employee]'s work schedule and his commute, without more, does not raise a fact issue that he was [incompetent], or that [employer] knew or should have known that he was, an incompetent driver due to insufficient sleep”); Eagle Express Lines, 2018 WL 6445623, at  (concluding that plaintiff failed to state a claim for negligent entrustment premised, in part, on allegation that driver was unfit due to sleep deprivation where plaintiff “fail[ed] to supply authority for the premise that drowsiness is tantamount to incompetence in an entrustment context” and the “potentially infinite application of this theory in this particular context”). 14