Opinion ID: 200035
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Direct and imputed contacts

Text: 18 The most important contact that Jet Wine alleges between BACO and New Hampshire is BACO's alleged assumption of Schieffelin's obligations under the Dewar's contract when BACO and Diageo signed the Dewar's Agreement. 5 As in Daynard, the question we face is not primarily whether BACO's assumption of the obligations constitutes a contact with the state of New Hampshire, or whether Jet Wine's claims arise out of that contact, but whether Jet Wine has made a prima facie showing that BACO did assume those obligations. 19 Although the burden of proof is light, Jet Wine may not rely on the mere allegations of its complaint, but must point to specific facts in the record that support those allegations. Daynard, 290 F.3d at 51. The primary fact produced is the provision in the Dewar's Agreement by which BACO assumed all liabilities and obligations that arise out of or relate to the Transferred Assets (including under any Contract) [or] the Dewar's Business. Jet Wine argues that its contract with Schieffelin creates an obligation that arises out of, and relates to, the Dewar's Business, defined as the marketing, sales and distribution of Scotch whisky under the trade names here at issue. 6 We agree that is a quite plausible interpretation, sufficient for a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. The merits of the interpretation may be resolved later. 20 BACO objects that this language does not include Schieffelin's obligations to Jet Wine because the Agreement enumerates the assumed Contracts in the Major Markets, and Jet Wine, although in a Major Market, is not on the list. BACO also points out that the language limits assumed obligations to those arising on or following the Closing of the transaction. Further, it relies on the testimony of several representatives of BL, some of whom were present at the negotiation, that BACO did not intend to assume Schieffelin's obligations to distributors such as Jet Wine. As to BACO's first argument about the definition of Contracts, first, the reference to Contracts uses the word including, indicating that BACO may have assumed obligations other than Contracts as defined; second, the reference to Contracts can be read to qualify only BACO's assumption of liabilities and obligations that arise out of or relate to the Transferred Assets, and not those that arise out of or relate to the Dewar's Business. If it can be read otherwise, BACO can attempt to prove that other reading as part of its defense on the merits. 21 As to BACO's second argument about the timing of the obligation, we find sufficient for a jurisdictional showing Jet Wine's answer that, because the disputed passage refers to obligations to deliver finished case goods following the Closing under purchase orders of, or commitments to, Persons other than Affiliates of Seller, it must encompass at least some contracts formed before the closing took place. Similarly, the testimony of those present at BACO's negotiations with Diageo may perhaps be helpful to BACO's defense on the merits but is insufficient in a prima facie inquiry to undermine Jet Wine's argument based on the language of the Agreement. 22 The second significant contact that Jet Wine alleges between BACO and New Hampshire is BUSA's termination of Jet Wine as the distributor of Dewar's in New Hampshire and BUSA's subsequent use of another distributor for Dewar's in New Hampshire. Jet Wine claims that the district court should have imputed these actions to BACO for jurisdictional purposes because BUSA acted as BACO's agent. A letter sent to a New Hampshire corporation, located in New Hampshire, terminating an agreement to distribute goods in New Hampshire, is a contact with the state of New Hampshire, and BACO does not dispute this. 23 A more complicated and genuinely disputed question is whether a court can fairly attribute the termination letter to BACO in assessing BACO's contacts with New Hampshire. Jet Wine argues at length that BACO's relationship with the other Bacardi companies is so intertwined as to justify treating the corporations as alter egos and their officers interchangeably. We do not adopt that premise today. Jet Wine's argument would fail even were we to assume that the standard for treating two corporations as one for jurisdictional purposes might be less burdensome to plaintiffs than the standard for piercing the corporate veil in order to impose liability. Cf. Donatelli v. Nat'l Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 465-66 (1st Cir. 1990) (discussing the presumption of corporate separateness and the evidence needed to overcome it). The argument would fail because Jet Wine has produced little record evidence to support it besides BACO's admission that the Bacardi companies share a few common officers and directors. Jet Wine has also, however, argued that even if BACO and BUSA are generally independent, the June 16 letter supports an inference that BUSA was BACO's agent for the purpose of distributing Dewar's in New Hampshire, because the letter identifies BUSA as BACO's exclusive brand agent and distributor and authorizes BUSA to take all legal steps necessary to effectuate the sale of our products in the United States of America. This second, narrower argument supports the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 24 BACO responds that the June 16 letter serves a specific purpose relevant only to the regulation of the liquor industry and not to broader concepts of agency. The letter, it explains, was intended only to identify BUSA as the primary source of supply for Dewar's and Bombay. That identification is useful to BUSA because it satisfies the requirements of state statutes or regulations that require wholesalers and distributors to purchase liquor products from their primary source. New Hampshire, as a control state, has an analogous statute, which requires the State Liquor Commission to purchase from primary sources and to explain any exceptions it makes. N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 176:17 (Supp.2001). Presumably to comply with this directive, the Liquor Commission has issued a regulation that requires any supplier seeking to sell to the Commission to state the primary source for its products, and to provide a copy of an exclusive agent agreement if the supplier is not itself the primary source. N.H.Code Admin. R. Ann. Liq 301.02(p) (defining primary source); id. 302.01(h)(2)(i)-(j) (stating requirements). None of this, says BACO, required it to make BUSA its agent as that term is generally used in the law, and neither BACO nor BUSA understood the June 16 letter to give BUSA general authority to bind BACO. 7 BACO supports this assertion with an affidavit from BUSA's general counsel. 25 In our view, the language of the letter, which authorizes BUSA to take all legal steps necessary to effectuate the sale of our products in the United States of America, including but not limited to, making any and all [regulatory] filings, is broader than BACO suggests. We would not expect the terms of an authorization limited to regulatory purposes to define its scope as including but not limited to those purposes. Moreover, for BACO to characterize the words used in the letter as terms of art specific to the industry (as opposed to terms of art general to the legal profession) it must produce more evidence of their specialized meaning than a conclusory affidavit by the general counsel of a related company and codefendant. Accordingly, we do not need to say that the letter must necessarily have been submitted to New Hampshire's State Liquor Commission, as Jet Wine argues. It is enough that the existence of the letter satisfies Jet Wine's burden to support with specific facts in the record its allegation that BUSA acted as BACO's agent in terminating Jet Wine as the Dewar's distributor for New Hampshire.