Opinion ID: 501814
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Wire Fraud Conspiracy.

Text: 43 Having concluded, supra section B, that the substantive wire fraud offense does not include a mens rea requirement as to the jurisdictional element, we also conclude that conviction for conspiracy 13 to commit wire fraud does not require foreseeability of the interstate nature of the wire communication by a third party. The Supreme Court has held that, with an exception not here relevant, where knowledge of the facts giving rise to federal jurisdiction is not necessary for conviction of a substantive offense embodying a mens rea requirement, such knowledge is equally irrelevant to questions of responsibility for conspiracy to commit that offense. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 696, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 1269, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975). See United States v. LeFaivre, 507 F.2d 1288, 1299 (4th Cir.1974) ([t]he jurisdictional element should be viewed for purposes of the conspiracy count exactly as we view it for purposes of the substantive offense--simply as a jurisdictional peg on which to hang the federal prosecution), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004, 95 S.Ct. 1446, 43 L.Ed.2d 762 (1975); United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 891-92 (9th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924, 91 S.Ct. 883, 27 L.Ed.2d 828 (1971). 44 We also conclude that the conspiracy convictions need not be reversed because of prejudicial spillover from the instructions concerning retroactive and vicarious liability, discussed supra section B. While we have concluded that the judge's instruction on retroactive liability for actions of coconspirators prejudiced the defendants as to the substantive wire fraud counts, there could be no such prejudice as to the conspiracy count. The reason is that, for purposes of conviction for conspiracy (as opposed to conviction for substantive offenses), a coconspirator is liable for acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy prior to his entry into the conspiracy. United States v. Ebner, 782 F.2d 1120, 1127 (2d Cir.1986); United States v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986, 1002 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825, 100 S.Ct. 47, 62 L.Ed.2d 32 (1979); United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743, 751 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 839, 98 S.Ct. 132, 54 L.Ed.2d 102 (1977); United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099, 1107-08 (D.C.Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961, 96 S.Ct. 1743, 48 L.Ed.2d 206 (1976). As applied to the conspiracy count, the judge's instruction on retroactivity was accordingly correct and could not have misled the jury. 45 Similarly, the trial court's charge concerning vicarious Pinkerton liability for substantive offenses did not prejudice the defendants as to the conspiracy count. Regardless of the confusion between instructions as to mandatory and discretionary conviction for substantive offenses, see supra section B, the jury was repeatedly and unambiguously instructed that even to convict under Pinkerton, it must first find that the government had established the existence of a single overall scheme and that each defendant was a member of that scheme. J.App. 131-32. Moreover, from the note submitted to the court by the jury, it does not appear that the jury had any questions about the conspiracy count, but only about vicarious liability for the substantive offenses. Further, there is no suggestion that Judge Haight's instruction concerning the conspiracy count itself was in any way deficient. We accordingly see no basis for reversal of the conspiracy conviction. 46 One Second Circuit precedent, not cited to us by the parties, gives us pause in reaching this conclusion. In United States v. Cantone, 426 F.2d 902 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 827, 91 S.Ct. 55, 27 L.Ed.2d 57 (1970), we said: 47 The trial judge's erroneous submission to the jury of the issue of Rosen's guilt on the substantive count and the giving of the Pinkerton charge undoubtedly influenced the jury's finding of Rosen's guilt on the conspiracy charge. We conclude that the errors with respect to the substantive count so tainted Rosen's conspiracy conviction that we must also reverse that count. 48 Id. at 905. 49 In Cantone, however, the defendant in question did not personally participate in the substantive offense, and was held responsible therefor only on a Pinkerton theory, which we determined to be error because the evidence on this issue was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant] had joined with [codefendant] in [the relevant] conspiracy before July 28, 1964, the date when the substantive offense was committed. Id. at 904. See United States v. Vargas, 615 F.2d 952, 961-62 (2d Cir.1980) (substantive and conspiracy convictions affirmed despite challenge to Pinkerton instruction, Cantone distinguished because evidence [in Cantone ] insufficient to prove conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt); United States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323, 1343 n. 29 (2d Cir.1974) (also construing Cantone as finding insufficient proof [defendant] was a member of the conspiracy in furtherance of which the substantive offense was committed), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1351, 43 L.Ed.2d 439 (1975), 421 U.S. 949, 95 S.Ct. 1682, 44 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975). 50 There is no challenge here to the sufficiency of the evidence that these defendants were members of the conspiracy charged in count one of the indictment. We accordingly regard Cantone as distinguishable, and not controlling our decision here. 51 Defendant-appellant Stephens raises an additional issue, pertinent to his conviction for conspiracy, that merits our attention. Stephens contends that the trial court erroneously admitted hearsay evidence--in the form of testimony from Blackmon's former girlfriend, Constance Tryban--concerning statements made by Blackmon to Tryban. Tryban testified that she had asked Blackmon how we were going to come up with the money for the live bank to count down to the lame, and that Blackmon had told me between Sidney [Jones], Tyrone [Stephens] and Derek [Blackmon], they would come up with a live bank. Tryban also testified that Blackmon later told her that Stephens did not leave New York with Cecilia Roland because Stephens was sticking around to bankroll anything that we needed so far as the lame. Judge Haight initially decided that this testimony was not admissible as statement[s] by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy, Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), but thereafter admitted it as statements against Blackmon's penal interest, Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(3). The judge subsequently decided that the testimony as further developed was admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), as well, during his rulings on defendants' Rule 29 motions at the end of the government's case. 52 Stephens argues that Blackmon's statements to Tryban were not made in furtherance of the conspiracy within the meaning of 801(d)(2)(E). Stephens cites the rationale of the trial court's initial determination: 53 A statement is in furtherance of a conspiracy if its intent is to cause something to happen or to cause someone to do something which would further the course of the conspiracy and achieve its purposes.... In the case of Miss Tryban, I was not persuaded by the government that references to funding from other people, Mr. Stephens or anyone else, were said to Miss Tryban with the purpose of inducing her to do anything.... [O]n the present record, my perception of Miss Tryban is that she was on board, she was a member of the crew, she was doing ... and she was prepared to go on doing what she was told. 54 And consequently I see nothing in the testimony which I excluded which could fairly be regarded as inducing any action on the part of Constance Tryban. 55 Trial transcript at 1419-21. 56 This court has several times observed that statements that apprise a coconspirator of the progress of a conspiracy, United States v. Rahme, 813 F.2d 31, 36 (2d Cir.1987), or that brief [a coconspirator] on the scheme, United States v. Mangan, 575 F.2d 32, 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931, 99 S.Ct. 320, 58 L.Ed.2d 324 (1978), are statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy. See United States v. Paone, 782 F.2d 386, 391 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 3261, 97 L.Ed.2d 761 (1987). See also United States v. Persico, 832 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir.1987). The Third Circuit has likewise observed that statements by coconspirators that inform each other of the current status of the conspiracy further the ends of the conspiracy and are admissible so long as the other requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) are met. United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 252 (3d Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936, 104 S.Ct. 344, 78 L.Ed.2d 311 (1983). At the very least, the statements made by Blackmon to Tryban apprised her of the current status of funding for the cash packages that were vital to the pigeon drop game. 14 This court has found, for example, that statements indicating a steady source of supply for illegal drugs, United States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603, 632 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 2163, 64 L.Ed.2d 795 (1986), are in furtherance of a conspiracy to distribute narcotics. See also United States v. Rahme, 813 F.2d at 36. 57 Such statements, like Blackmon's response to Tryban's question about live bank sources, promote cooperation among coconspirators by emphasizing the availability of essential prerequisites for the success of the criminal enterprise. See id. at 35-36 (statements that provide reassurance or serve to maintain trust and cohesiveness among coconspirators further the ends of the conspiracy); United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d at 252. Blackmon's statements were not  'merely narrative' declaration[s] of a past fact, United States v. Birnbaum, 337 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir.1964), but [t]hey looked rather to the future. United States v. Mangan, 575 F.2d at 43. Moreover, the remarks about continued future funding were not statements pertaining to incidental facts that were relatively unimportant to the aims of the alleged conspiracy. Cf. United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 520-21 (9th Cir.1979) (conversation between conspirators that did nothing to advance aims of conspiracy inadmissible). 58 Under these circumstances, and despite the trial judge's initial ruling, we agree with his ultimate conclusion that the statements were admissible under 801(d)(2)(E). 15 As for Stephens' claim that the declarations do not bear adequate indicia of reliability to satisfy the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment, we find the matter to be settled by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Bourjaily v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987), finding the requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and the confrontation clause coextensive. 16 59 We therefore affirm the convictions of all defendants on count one, conspiracy to commit wire fraud. 60