Opinion ID: 591862
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Complaints Regarding Hearing Process

Text: 6 Turner alleges three complaints regarding the hearing process utilized by the City of Reno.
7 Turner claims the City breached his employment contract by applying the 1988 sexual harassment policy procedures, rather than the 1982 sexual harassment policy procedures. Because the 1988 policy was promulgated by the City Manager, rather than the City Council, and because the 1988 policy procedures materially deviated from the 1982 policy procedures, Turner was robbed ... of the opportunity for the non-adversarial and impartial proceedings contemplated by Reno's 1982 procedure. Turner specifically complains of not being provided promptly with a copy of the sexual harassment complaint; not being allowed to prepare his own written statement; not being afforded an informal non-adversarial fact finding process; failure to use a three member panel for the fact finding; failure to allow him to challenge the choice of the fact finder; the participation of two City attorneys in the fact finding hearing; and the use of a peer review committee. 8 Regardless of the sexual harassment policy in place at the time in question, we find that Turner was not injured by the use of the 1988 policy. The application of either sexual harassment policy was only of borderline importance to the whole termination procedure. Only one of the six charges brought against Turner implicated the sexual harassment policy procedures, and that charge proved to be the least crucial to the termination determination. 9 Moreover, the application of the 1988 policy provided Turner with more procedural safeguards than the 1982 policy would have provided. For example, the 1988 policy gave Turner the right to have an attorney present at all times. Nowhere does Turner show how the use of the 1982 policy would have altered the outcome of the termination determination. He complains of not promptly receiving the complaint; the record shows, however, that he received the complaint three days after he was notified of the charges. The additional peer review committee and adversarial fact-finding hearing (in which he was represented by an attorney and was allowed to provide witnesses and cross-examine the City's witnesses) added to, not detracted from, his rights. The remaining complaints are equally frivolous. Turner does not justify his complaint with the presence of the City's attorneys at the fact-finding hearing. Nor does he explain how the use of a one-person fact finder, rather than a three-member panel, affected the proceedings; and the fact that the fact finder was the University of Nevada Director of Affirmative Action does not taint the proceedings. 10
11 Turner relies on the same facts to justify his § 1983 claim. As above, we find that this claim does not raise a genuine issue of material fact. 12 A failure to follow internal administrative termination procedures is not a per se due process violation. In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), the Supreme Court established the minimum due process requirements: 13 The essential requirements of due process ... are notice and opportunity to respond. The opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not be taken is a fundamental due process requirement. The tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story. To require more than this prior to termination would intrude to an unwarranted extent on the government's interest in quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee. 14 Id. at 546 (citations omitted); see also, Matthews v. Harney County, 819 F.2d 889, 892 (9th Cir.1987). 15 Turner had written an oral notice of the charges against him, written notice of each step of the termination process, copies of the findings and reports issued, and three hearings. The hearings included a ten day fact finding hearing, a pre-termination hearing before the City Manager, and the final hearing before the City Council. At all three hearings, Turner was given an opportunity to argue, present evidence, and refute the evidence brought against him. 16 Turner's allegations that the hearing by the City Council was tainted through ex parte contacts between the City Manager and members of the City Council prior to the hearing is meritless. Our review of the record shows that the City Manager did not seek improperly to influence the City Council members. Turner's allegation that the timing of the City Council meeting fails for the same reason. Turner's avowal that intervening circumstances had drained the process of any element of fairness is not supported by the record.
17 Finally, no genuine issue is raised by Turner's claim that the City Manager's gag order prevented him from publicly discussing the termination proceedings, violating his rights under the First Amendment. No gag order was issued against Turner. The City Manager, in a memorandum informing Turner of the complaint, merely requested Turner not publicly discuss the pre-termination proceedings. Undoubtedly, the request was issued to protect not only the party filing the complaint against Turner, but to protect Turner himself. More importantly, we can find no instance of Turner being prevented from speaking out on his behalf. He was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings, and his counsel spoke out on his behalf at each stage.