Opinion ID: 2633651
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Asserted erroneous jury instructions special circumstance

Text: Defendant asserts the trial court erred in failing to instruct that the multiple-murder special circumstance, section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3), required a finding of intent to kill for both murders. He points out that these crimes took place in the window period between People v. Turner (1984) 37 Cal.3d 302, 208 Cal.Rptr. 196, 690 P.2d 669 and People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306, and therefore an intent to kill was required in order to impose the death penalty. He acknowledges the jury necessarily found he intended to kill Clark when it convicted him of deliberate and premeditated murder, but he asserts the implied malice instructions did not require the jury to find he intended to kill Benintende. In Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 153-154, 197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862, we construed the felony-murder special circumstance of the 1978 death penalty law, section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17), to require an intent to kill in all instances, even when the defendant was the actual killer. We did so in part to avoid potential Eighth Amendment and equal protection problems that might result from a construction not requiring such intent. ( Carlos v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 147-153, 197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862, discussing Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140.) In People v. Turner, a case involving two murders tried solely on a felony-murder theory, we applied the rationale of Carlos to hold that the multiple-murder special circumstance also requires an intent to kill. ( People v. Turner, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 328-329, 208 Cal. Rptr. 196, 690 P.2d 669.) In light of intervening United States Supreme Court authority ( Cabana v. Bullock (1986) 474 U.S. 376, 106 S.Ct. 689, 88 L.Ed.2d 704 and Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127), we partially overruled Carlos and Turner in People v. Anderson. We held in Anderson that intent to kill is not an element of the felony-murder or multiple-murder special circumstances, but that when the defendant is an aider and abetter rather than the actual killer, intent to kill must be proved. ( People v. Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1138-1150, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306.) We since have held that due process and ex post facto principles preclude applying Anderson to defendants who committed their crimes in the window period between Carlos and Anderson. ( People v. Haley (2004) 34 Cal.4th 283, 309, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 877, 96 P.3d 170; People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 227, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302.) We similarly have applied Turner in cases involving crimes committed between the decisions in Turner and Anderson. ( People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th 342, 430, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1; People v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 45, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673.) This is a window period case: the Benintende and Clark homicides occurred in January 1986 and February 1987, respectively, after we decided Turner but before our decision in Anderson. Accordingly, for the special circumstance of multiple-murder to be found true, the jury was required to find intent to kill for at least one of the murders. As defendant acknowledges, however, we previously have rejected the precise contention he now makes: that Turner required an intent-to-kill finding for both murders. ( People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 515-517, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035.) As we explained: We have never held that the multiple-murder special circumstance requires a jury to find the defendant intended to kill every victim. We also have never held that the intent to kill one victim and the implied malice murder of a second victim is insufficient to establish a multiple murder special circumstance. ( People v. Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 516, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035.) Dennis disposes of defendant's claims. Our state law never has required a jury to find intent to kill both victims in order for the multiple-murder special circumstance to be found true. [32] Defendant asks us to reconsider Dennis in light of federal constitutional principles, but we perceive no conflict between those principles and Dennis. Because the jury necessarily found defendant intended to kill Clark when it found him guilty of her premeditated murder, none of Turner's Eighth Amendment concerns about imposing the death penalty for an unintentional killing is involved. ( People v. Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 517, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035.)