Opinion ID: 2744920
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Procedural Obstacle: Cause and Prejudice

Text: In Shepard v. United States, 533 A.2d 1278, 1280 (1987), we established a procedural bar to a § 23-110 motion where “appellant demonstrably knew or should have known” of a potential collateral claim but did not raise it by a § 23110 motion as part of the direct appeals process. Otherwise put, in bringing a subsequent attack in a § 23-110 motion for collateral relief, the movant must establish cause for the failure to raise the claim at the time of direct appeal as well as resulting prejudice. See id.9 In the instant case, the motions court rejected appellants’ motion because it found that appellants had “actual knowledge” that Crawford’s testimony was contrary to the proffer and, by failing to raise the issue on direct appeal, were barred from making such a claim at this late date. Citing, inter alia, Bruce v. United States, 617 A.2d 986, 992-93 (D.C. 1992), the motions court reasoned that appellants had waived their Napue claim and could not satisfy cause and prejudice. 9 Subsequently, in Doe v. United States, 583 A.2d 670 (D.C. 1990), we made clear that part of appellate counsel’s duties is to consider whether the client’s interests require the filing of a § 23-110 motion based on ineffectiveness of counsel and, if so, to take steps to that end in addition to pursuing the direct appeal. 12 We must disagree with this conclusion in the context of a Napue claim and hold that, to the contrary, appellants have established cause and prejudice sufficient to overcome any procedural obstacle presented by Shepard.10 A fuller exposition of the facts relating to the Crawford testimony will put the issue in perspective. 10 Appellants urge that the Shepard holding is limited to situations where the claim is ineffectiveness of trial counsel and further note that a Napue claim involves a need to develop information outside of the record on appeal. In the instant case, we will assume that Shepard applies and, given our ultimate holding, we need not reach the issue of whether this potential procedural bar of Shepard applies to all collateral claims of which an appellant knew or should have known. Furthermore, whether or not appellants’ knowledge vel non was sufficient to trigger the Shepard cause and prejudice requirement, as we shall explain infra, appellants for this Napue claim have satisfied the cause and prejudice requirements of Shepard to warrant collateral consideration here. 13 The first mention of the Crawford testimony came in the government’s written opposition to Gathers’s motion to suppress certain evidence relating to the Gregory Gathers case. In its opposition, the government stated that among other things, it planned to introduce evidence that, at a preliminary hearing in the Gregory Gathers case, Ballard’s identity as the sole government eyewitness was disclosed and that he was cooperating with the government. As already noted, the government asserted that evidence establishing that appellants knew about Ballard’s cooperation against Gregory Gathers was “crucial to the government’s theory . . . that Ballard was executed because he was a cooperating witness.” Subsequently, at a pretrial hearing on the motion to suppress, the prosecutor reiterated that he intended to call Crawford to testify about his prior testimony in the Gregory Gathers case. The prosecutor said that Crawford had earlier testified that “the driver of the car that Carlton Gillis was in when he was killed” was the “sole Government eyewitness” to Gillis’s murder. In the course of a somewhat rambling discussion about what the government intended to show, the following colloquy ensued: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I have one question, Your Honor, I want to—I’m not clear about. Was Wayne Ballard identified by name at the preliminary hearing of 14 Gregory Gathers? I think [the prosecutor] needs to just tell us that again. [PROSECUTOR]: No. That’s why it's important that— [THE COURT]: He was identified as the driver of the car? [PROSECUTOR]: Right. Which is why I think it's relevant to show that 5:40 in the afternoon and he is driving down the middle of an unbusy street when the shooting takes place. That is to show that Gregory Gathers knew who the driver of the car was. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, let me just ask something. I’m still not clear. Was the testimony of Gregory Gathers’ preliminary hearing that the driver of that car in which Gillis was killed was the only eyewitness to the Gillis shooting? Is that in effect the — [THE COURT]: That’s what I understood. [PROSECUTOR]: The only eyewitness that was offered that we had, that was offered at that point to hold Gregory Gathers, yes. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: But it’s also true that Mr. Ballard himself was not identified by name as the driver of that car when that hearing took place? [PROSECUTOR]: That’s right. (Emphasis added). However, as already set forth, at the trial itself, Detective Crawford’s testimony was squarely to the contrary and was not corrected in any way by the prosecutor but instead was used extensively to convict. 15 An argument that appellants were on notice of the falsity of the Crawford testimony rests on the exchange at the pretrial hearing. The critical difficulty, however, is in equating knowledge of inconsistency with knowledge of actual falsity. Unlike the prosecutor, the defense counsel would be, at best, only on inquiry notice. It would not have been totally unthinkable for defense counsel at trial and on appeal to accept that the first-hand testimony from Detective Crawford on the stand, which conformed to the government’s written proffer at the preliminary hearing, was accurate rather than that of the prosecutor made orally in a somewhat confused earlier discussion, especially in light of the ongoing use by the government of the false testimony both in the course of the trial and on appeal.11 And any such lapse by defense counsel pales as against that of the government. The knowledge of the prosecutor markedly exceeded that of defense 11 This case is quite distinct from Bruce, supra, 617 A.2d at 992-93, cited by the motions court and the government, where both parties were indubitably aware of the actually falsity of the testimony that gunshots were fired and, unlike here, the prosecutor unfailingly presented the government’s case on the basis of the true fact of an inoperable gun. No obvious reason appears here why Gathers’s trial counsel would not have corrected the untruth so adverse to his client had counsel been aware of the falsity, or why appellate counsel, if aware, would not have raised the issue on direct appeal. The fact that counsel attempted to use Detective Crawford’s testimony to his client’s advantage by rhetorically asking why Lindsay was not killed as well as Ballard appears to be a matter of playing the hand one is dealt. 16 counsel,12 and it is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the motions court’s finding as to defense counsel with its failure to find actual knowledge on the part of the prosecutor, rather than simply that he should have known. The knowledge of the prosecutor was of the statement’s actual falsity, while that of the defense counsel was at best of inconsistency. It is also noteworthy that the judge at the actual trial was also present at both the motion hearing and the trial and yet apparently overlooked the discrepancy, as may have been the actual case of counsel on both sides. But any negligence by defense counsel was utterly outweighed by that of the government. Moreover, a more fundamental principle is at stake, even in the context of prosecutorial “should have known.” “The presumption, well established by tradition and experience, that prosecutors have fully discharged their official duties is inconsistent with the novel suggestion that conscientious defense counsel have a procedural obligation to assert constitutional error on the basis of mere suspicion 12 See supra note 3. Moreover, although the Gregory Gathers transcript was technically available as a public record, the government did not actively share it with Gathers and Mitchell until 2010. The failure formed part of appellants’ Brady claim. While the government asserts that it is possible that appellants could have had access to the transcript at an earlier point in time, every indication is that this was not the case. 17 that some prosecutorial misstep may have occurred.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 286-87 (1999) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Further, “[o]rdinarily, we presume that public officials have properly discharged their official duties. We have several times underscored the special role played by the American prosecutor in the search for truth in criminal trials. Courts, litigants, and juries properly anticipate that obligations to refrain from improper methods to secure a conviction plainly resting upon the prosecuting attorney, will be faithfully observed.” Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 696 (2004) (internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted).13 Although judgment finality is undoubtedly of great importance, it must sometimes yield to higher considerations.14 The legislature has specifically chosen not to set any time limits on challenging a conviction on constitutional grounds in § 23-110 (“A motion for such relief may be made at any time.”). It is markedly 13 In the analogous context of Brady violations, this court has consistently upheld the rule that a prosecutor must seek justice before victory. “Brady does not authorize the government to engage in a game of hide-and-seek, or require the defense to scavenge for hints of undisclosed Brady material.” Vaughn, supra note 2, 93 A.3d at 1256 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 14 As the Supreme Court has noted, “The procedural-default rule is neither a statutory nor a constitutional requirement” but is rather “a doctrine adhered to by the courts to conserve judicial resources and to respect the law’s important interest in the finality of judgments.” Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003). 18 disquieting to think that appellants should stand convicted on what is plainly false evidence highly prejudicial to the outcome where the government knew or should have known of the falsity, however belatedly this falsity may have come to the forefront. We must conclude that, at least in this Napue context, sufficient cause exists to excuse the delay in raising the claim.15 For the foregoing reasons, we deem ourselves compelled to reverse the denial of the motion for a new trial and to remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. 15 For the reasons already stated, prejudice to appellants here cannot be gainsaid, even with a burden on appellants rather than the government. The trial court equated the prejudice standard for procedural purposes to be equivalent to that on the merits, an approach that has some support in our case law. See McCrimmons v. United States, 853 A.2d 154, 161 (D.C. 2004). We agree with this approach for a Napue claim.