Opinion ID: 2552144
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the chancellor erred by awarding custody to Finnegan.

Text: ¶ 22. Bell and Morse argue that the chancellor erred by awarding custody to Finnegan because (a) he dismissed the action and, thus, cannot rule on the merits of the case; and (b) he failed to make any findings of fact. Finnegan maintains that: (a) when the chancellor dismissed the case, no custody orders were in effect; and (b) because Bell and Morse did not move forward with their petition, no findings of fact were necessary. The Court finds that the chancellor erred by dismissing the action and then ruling on the merits of the case. The chancellor should have proceeded with a full custody hearing, determining the best interest of the child.
¶ 23. Bell and Morse moved for dismissal under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Rule 12(b)(1) allows the parties to file a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. M.R.C.P. 12(b)(1). Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action or transfer the action to the court of proper jurisdiction. M.R.C.P. 12(h)(3). The question of subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. Burnette v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 770 So.2d 948, 951 (¶ 7) (Miss.2000) (citing M.R.C.P. (12)(h)(3) cmt.). ¶ 24. First, Bell and Morse argue that the chancellor had dismissed the action and thus could not rule on the merits of the case. They cite the definition of subject-matter jurisdiction to support their position, stating that: Black's Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2005), defines subject-matter jurisdiction as [j]urisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief sought; the extent to which a court can rule on the conduct of persons or the status of things. They cite no other authority to support their position. ¶ 25. The Court finds that the chancellor could not dismiss the action with prejudice and, after doing so, proceed to rule on the merits of the case. In Rayner v. Raytheon Company, 858 So.2d 132 (Miss. 2003), this Court held that a dismissal with prejudice indicates a ruling on the merits, which is not appropriate for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction. In Rayner, Rayner sued Raytheon in state court. Id. at 133 (¶ 2). Raytheon removed the case to federal court. Id. Rayner then filed a motion to remand. Id. The federal court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and denied the request for remand. Id. Rayner later sought relief in state court. Id. at 133 (¶ 3). The circuit court dismissed the case, with prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 26. On appeal, this Court determined that the circuit court did lack jurisdiction based on removal. Id. at 133 (¶ 5). [O]nce removed to federal court, a case remains within the jurisdiction of the federal courts until an order is entered remanding the matter back to the state court. Id. at 133 (¶ 6). The Court also determined that a dismissal with prejudice indicated a ruling on the merits, which was improper. Id. at 134 (¶ 9). The Court stated: We modify the decision of the circuit court only to the extent that dismissal was with prejudice. Generally, a dismissal with prejudice connotes an adjudication on the merits. See generally Foundry Sys. & Supply, Inc. v. Indus. Dev. Corp., 124 Ga.App. 589, 185 S.E.2d 94, 95 (1971) (The phrase with prejudice in [the context of when an action is dismissed with prejudice] means an adjudication on the merits and final disposition, barring the right to bring or maintain an action on the same claim or cause. Pulley v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R., 122 Kan. 269, 251 P. 1100 (1927). Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 555). Thus, lacking jurisdiction, the circuit court was without authority to address the merits. The circuit court should have simply dismissed this case for lack of jurisdiction. Id. The Court reiterated its conclusion in Cook v. Children's Medical Group, P.A., holding, in pertinent part, that: If a court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a case, then it cannot have jurisdiction to decide issues of fact and law.... Cook v. Children's Med. Group, P.A., 756 So.2d 734, 743(37) (Miss.1999). ¶ 27. Thus, the chancellor could not dismiss Bell's and Morse's petition based on the question of subject-matter jurisdiction and then rule on the merits of the case.
¶ 28. The youth-court order, which transferred the case to chancery court, stated that the youth court's orders would remain in effect until the chancellor rendered a decision. The chancellor granted the motion to dismiss and regarded the dismissal as a termination of the youth-court orders. Concerned that the custody of Baby Dennis would have been left in limbo, the chancellor awarded custody to Finnegan as the natural parent. ¶ 29. Under the natural-parent presumption, it is presumed that it is in the best interest of a child to remain with the natural parent as opposed to a third party. In re Dissolution of Marriage of Leverock and Hamby, 23 So.3d 424, 429(19) (Miss.2009). But that presumption may be rebutted by evidence that the parent relinquished the right through abandonment, desertion, or other unfitness, and if it is otherwise overcome by an overriding concern for the best interest and welfare of a child. Id. We do not suggest that Finnegan is unfit to have custody of Baby Dennis. But with these allegations, Finnegan is not automatically entitled to custody without some on-the-record findings. ¶ 30. Based on this Court's review of the record, the chancellor failed to consider the history of this case before making his decision. The hearing transcript shows that the chancellor neither reviewed the youth-court record nor Finnegan's Written Request for Release of Custody before rendering judgement: COURT: Before you got here, Mr. Stewart, I asked Mr. Baker if heI should have asked y'all earlier, but Ido you have a copy of the youth court file? MR. STEWART: I do not, Your Honor. COURT: What's the word? Are we going to be able to get it? MR. ROBERTS: The word is it's on the way. ... COURT: Do you want to join in his Motion to Dismiss? MR. BAKER: Yes, Judge, we do. COURT: All right. Court grants it. Dismissed. I'm also going to award sanctions to the defendant in the sum of $750 to be payable MR. BAKER: Your Honor, will the Court duly note that a decision has been rendered in this matter? COURT: Yes. MR. BAKER: In accordance with the order of the corrected review hearing officer order. So I don't want there to be any argument that youth court orders are still in effect. COURT: No. I'm getting a copy of that youth court file delivered and it's going to be made a part of this record. Let me see the Order that you have. You represent to me as an officer of the court, sir, that this is a good, valid, and authentic copy of the Final Order that was entered by the youth court? MR. BAKER: Yes, Your Honor. COURT: Okay. All right. The matter is dismissed. MR. BAKER: Okay, Your Honor. COURT: And I'm going to award the defendant $750 in attorney's fees forthis matter is frivolous. The whole way it has been handled has been frivolous. I had to sit here and listen to a lawyer read to me a motionhe essentially read it to me verbatim for abouthow long was it? almost 30 minutes. This is the most frivolous conduct I've seen, that you would go to the youth court and ask for the matter to be transferred here and then file the guardianship here and then turn around and ask for it to be dismissed, but you're getting what you want, and that iscustody, by the way, needs to go to this lady. MR. BAKER: Thank you, Your Honor. And I want to make sure the Order indicates Ms. Wanda Bell has no further COURT: It's dismissed with prejudice. MR. BAKER: Okay. MR. STEWART: Your Honor, if I may, please, I would like COURT: Don't argue with the Court after the Court has ruled. MR. STEWART: I'm not arguing with the Court, Your Honor. I just want to make a record thatnever mind, strike it. MR. BAKER: Thank you, Your Honor. COURT: I do nowI have handed to me a copyan entire copy of the youth court [sic], and the Order previously presented to me by Mr. Baker is very clear that it is the same one. These will be placed under seal inasmuch as they are youth court records. ¶ 31. As reflected by the trial transcript, the chancellor did not receive a copy of the youth-court file, which included Finnegan's Written Request for Release of Custody, until after he had ruled on the matter. Because the chancellor had not seen the youth court file, it was impossible for him to give any consideration to its contents in making his decision. The chancellor abused his discretion by dismissing the case and then awarding custody to Finnegan without any on-the-record findings. ¶ 32. In youth court, the primary goals are to protect the child and also facilitate reuniting the family, if found to be in the child's best interest. See Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-103 (Rev.2009). In every child-custody matter, the polestar consideration is the best interest of the child. Albright v. Albright, 437 So.2d 1003, 1005 (Miss.1983). Thus, the best interest of Baby Dennis is more important than Finnegan's natural-parent status. Several years have elapsed since Finnegan has had custody of Baby Dennis, and it was inappropriate for the chancellor to grant Finnegan custody without evidence that she has rehabilitated herself and other relevant factors. The chancellor should not have awarded custody to Finnegan without determining whether she was suitable to regain care, custody, and control of Baby Dennis. See In the Interest of R.D., 658 So.2d 1378, 1387-1389 (Miss.1995). Additionally, the best interest of Baby Dennis far outweighs Bell's and Morse's desire to have their petition dismissed or the chancellor's desire to teach them a lesson. ¶ 33. Because the matter was properly before the chancellor, and Baby Dennis's future was in question, the chancellor should have proceeded with the custody hearing. The allegations in this case necessitate a thorough review of the youth-court record, a hearing on the matter, and possibly a guardian ad litem to represent the child's best interest.