Opinion ID: 853946
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Was the Sentencing Order Adequate?

Text: In order for the State to seek a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, at least one aggravating circumstance listed in the pertinent section of the Indiana Code must be present. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(a) (West Supp.1998). Here, the State sought life without parole on the basis that the killing was intentional. The trial court did not find that Farber committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim while committing or attempting to commit ... [r]obbery. Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(b)(1) (West Supp. 1998). Instead, the trial court found that the [defendant] did intentionally commit the offense of robbery beyond [a] reasonable doubt in the commission of [a] murder. (R. at 2.) Thus, we remand to the trial court to determine if the defendant intentionally killed in the course of a robbery. If the trial court so finds, the sentence of life imprisonment without parole may be imposed. Furthermore, Farber alleges that the trial court considered aggravators not found within the life without parole statute including: (1) that any imposition of a reduced or suspended sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime, and (2) that correctional treatment can best be provided by commitment to a penal facility. These factors are not aggravating circumstances enumerated in the statute governing sentences of death or life without parole and are therefore not available to support such sentences. Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 955 (Ind. 1994). Of course, these circumstances may be considered in sentencing on the robbery. Finally, Farber urges that the trial court improperly considered as an aggravator that the offense was committed while he had been on probation. (Appellant's Br. at 20.) That the crime was committed while the defendant was on probation for a felony is a proper aggravator listed in Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9(b)(9)(C). However, the sentencing transcript does not clearly reveal whether the judge found that Farber was on probation at the time of the murder or whether the judge meant that Farber had previously been on probation. The timing of Farber's probation and its relationship to the sentence imposed also needs attention on remand. [1]