Opinion ID: 1881923
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Co-conspirator Hearsay Exception

Text: Brooks also argues that the trial court erred in admitting other statements made by Davis under the co-conspirator hearsay exception because the State failed to prove the existence of a conspiracy. At trial, Mark Gilliam testified that on the Monday evening before the murders, Davis had said that a woman was pestering him for money, that she should be killed in the ghetto and that he would choke her. In response to Davis's statements, Gilliam testified that Brooks suggested that she should be shot, but then Gilliam himself interjected that she should be stabbed instead. He also testified that Davis offered to pay him $500 for driving them to Crestview to kill Carlson because it was a slow town, and that Brooks would get paid between $4000 and $8000 for his participation. On cross-examination, Gilliam testified that he thought none of these statements were serious and the discussion was all a joke. Additionally, Brooks alleges that even assuming the existence of a conspiracy, the trial court erred in allowing Davis's statements made to Rochelle Jones after the murders had occurred. At trial, Jones testified that after the murders, Davis confronted her on several occasions and told her, You ain't seen me and asked her whether she was still cool. Moreover, on Saturday evening after the murders, she testified that Davis had told her that they [Brooks and Davis] had went out there [Crestview] to rob this guy and that they shot at him and they took his money and they said that the guy probably killed Rachel because she had set him up. Finally, Brooks alleges that the trial court erred in allowing Officer Glenn Barberree to testify about the contents of his interview with Davis after the murders. Over Brooks' objection, Barberree testified that Davis had told him that he was at his home in Eglin with Brooks on the evening of the murders. As with Jones' statements, the trial court admitted this testimony under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. The State contends that the testimony of these witnesses was properly admitted under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. We must again review that exception. Section 90.803(18)(e) provides that [a] statement by a person who was a co-conspirator of the party [made] during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy is not inadmissible as evidence even though the declarant is unavailable as a witness. In order to admit evidence under this exception, the State must establish: (1) that a conspiracy existed; (2) that the declarant/coconspirator and the defendant against whom the statements are offered were members of the conspiracy; and (3) that the statements were made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. State v. Edwards, 536 So.2d 288, 292 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); see also Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 803.18e (2000 ed.). The State must prove the existence of the conspiracy and each member's participation in it by a preponderance of the evidence independent of the hearsay statements sought to be admitted. See Foster v. State, 679 So.2d 747, 753 (Fla.1996). In the instant case, we conclude that a review of the record reflects sufficient independent evidence to establish a conspiracy between Gilliam, Davis and Brooks beginning on the Monday evening after their return from Atlanta. In addition to the statements already discussed, Gilliam also testified that he witnessed Brooks and Davis try on some latex gloves that evening to see if they fit and that he saw a buck knife on the speaker of the stereo. He also testified concerning his own statements that they should stab Carlson, and Brooks' testimony that she should be shot. We conclude that this evidence was sufficient to establish their intent to conspire to kill Carlson. Additionally, independent and direct evidence placed Brooks and Davis together in Crestview on the night of the murders. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that the State met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of a conspiracy to murder Carlson, and as a result, we agree that the statements Davis made in furtherance of the conspiracy in the presence of Gilliam and Brooks were properly admitted by the trial court. See Larzelere v. State, 676 So.2d 394, 406 (Fla.1996) (holding that defendant's calculated plan to murder the victim involving conspirational association with her son was sufficient to establish the existence of a conspiracy and made her son's hearsay statements admissible against the defendant under section 90.803(18)(e)); Romani v. State, 542 So.2d 984, 986 (Fla.1989) (holding that sufficient evidence existed to find that a conspiracy existed for purposes of section 90.803(18)(e) where co-conspirator's statement that defendant offered to pay $10,000 to anyone who would commit the murder was corroborated by evidence that the defendant withdrew $10,000 from her bank account, deposited it into another account and later withdrew it again). Notwithstanding the finding of a conspiracy, however, we find it was error to admit Davis's statements to Jones and Barberree made after the murders. As noted previously, to be admissible under section 90.803(18)(e), statements must be made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Florida courts have consistently held that for purposes of section 90.803(18)(e), a conspiracy ordinarily ends when the crime has been committed. See, e.g., Calvert v. State, 730 So.2d 316, 319 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Burnside v. State, 656 So.2d 241, 245 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Usher v. State, 642 So.2d 29, 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Moore v. State, 503 So.2d 923, 924 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); Wells v. State, 492 So.2d 712, 719 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). The State has demonstrated no basis in the record for a contrary holding here. In Wells, the First District specifically held that statements made which tend to shield `coconspirators' after the objective of the conspiracy is completed do not give rise to an additional conspiracy to cover up the original crime. Id. at 719 (citing Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 444, 69 S.Ct. 716, 93 L.Ed. 790 (1949)). Applying this rule, the First District held that the trial court had erred in admitting statements under section 90.803(18)(e) that were made after the crimes were committed in the absence of evidence demonstrating that the statements were made during the continuation of the conspiracy and the agreement it encompassed. As a result, the admission of Davis's statements to Jones and Barberree was error.