Opinion ID: 4486948
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The district court had federal-question jurisdiction over the § 1983 claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. And as the state-law claims arose from the same common nucleus of operative fact as No. 18-4157 Jones v. City of Elyria, Ohio, et al. Page 6 the federal claims, the district court had supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. Watson v. Cartee, 817 F.3d 299, 303 (6th Cir. 2016) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). That covers the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. But what about our appellate jurisdiction? Ordinarily, an order denying summary judgment is not a final order from which a party may appeal. Hoover v. Radabaugh, 307 F.3d 460, 465 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). In the § 1983 setting, however, the collateral order doctrine allows for an interlocutory appeal when a government actor is denied qualified immunity based on an issue of law. Chesher v. Neyer, 477 F.3d 784, 793 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we have appellate jurisdiction to consider questions of federal law at stake in this appeal. Because Jones’s state-law claims were before the district court on the basis of supplemental jurisdiction, we apply the substantive law of the forum state in evaluating them. Rishoi v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 552 F. App’x 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Super Sulky, Inc. v. U.S. Trotting Ass’n, 174 F.3d 733, 741 (6th Cir. 1999) (“A federal court exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims is bound to apply the law of the forum state to the same extent as if it were exercising its diversity jurisdiction.”)). Accordingly, our interlocutory appellate jurisdiction turns on a question of state law. That is, we have such jurisdiction only if the state whose law is at issue, here Ohio, has created “an underlying substantive right to the defendant official to be free from the burdens of litigation arising from acts taken in the course of his duties.” See Brent v. Wayne Cty. Dep’t of Human Servs., 901 F.3d 656, 691 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Marrical v. Detroit News, Inc., 805 F.2d 169, 172 (6th Cir. 1986)). As such, this question of Ohio law governs whether we may consider the state-law claims at this juncture. See Brent, 901 F.3d at 692 (internal citations omitted). Turning to that question, Ohio law affords its officials complete immunity from suit, where the officer has not performed her official duties “with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03(A)(6)(b). And Ohio law makes an order on that question a final one, available for immediate appeal: “[a]n order that denies a political subdivision or an employee of a political subdivision the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability as provided in this chapter or any other provision of the law is a final order.” Ohio No. 18-4157 Jones v. City of Elyria, Ohio, et al. Page 7 Rev. Code § 2744.02(C); see also Hubbell v. City of Xenia, 873 N.E.2d 878, 882 (Ohio 2007). Accordingly, we also have jurisdiction to consider the denial of state-law immunity to the officers.