Opinion ID: 7026974
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Weight of Evidence

Text: We review the district court’s denial of a Fed.R.Crim.P. 33 motion for a new trial under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Ashworth, 836 F.2d 260, 266 (6th Cir.1988). Rule 33 states that “the [trial] court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial if required in the interest of justice.” Fed. R.Crim.P. 33. When considering a Rule 33 motion for a new trial based upon the weight of the evidence, district courts can “consider the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence to insure that there is not a miscarriage of justice. It has often been said that he/she sits as a thirteenth juror.” United States v. Turner, 490 F.Supp. 583, 593 (E.D.Mich.1979), aff'd, 633 F.2d 219 (6th Cir.1980). However, such motions “are not favored” and should only be granted “in the extraordinary circumstance where the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.” Id. “[0]ur role on appeal [is] to examine the evidence to determine whether the district court’s ruling was a clear and manifest abuse of discretion.” United States v. Hernandez, 227 F.3d 686, 695 (6th Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Lutz, 154 F.3d 581, 589 (6th Cir.1998)). We review de novo the denial of a motion under Fed.R.Crim.P. 29 for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Keeton, 101 F.3d 48, 52 (6th Cir.1996); United States v. Gibson, 896 F.2d 206, 209 (6th Cir.1990). Fed.R.Crim.P. 29 requires the district court to grant the motion if “the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses.” The district court’s denial of a Rule 29 motion is reviewed by this Court to determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); accord United States v. Lloyd, 10 F.3d 1197, 1210 (6th Cir.1993).
Defendant contends that his convictions are against the weight of evidence. Defendant failed to move in the district court pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 33 for a new trial based on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. His failure to so move bars our consideration of the issue on appeal. Hernandez, 227 F.3d at 696. To the extent Defendant’s brief can be read to challenge the district court’s ruling on his Rule 29 motion, we may review this claim. In the district court, Defendant challenged his convictions with respect to Counts 4 and 6 of the indictment, use of a firearm in connection with a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C.’ §§ 924(c)(1) and 2. 1 Defendant argued that the testimony of Lanier, when considered with the Defendant’s testimony and alibi, was insufficient to sustain the convictions. The district court rejected this argument. We conclude that the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s Rule 29 motion. Under federal law, the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty. United States v. Gallo, 763 F.2d 1504, 1518 (6th Cir.1985); United States v. McCallie, 554 F.2d 770, 771-72 (6th Cir.1977); United States v. Ailstock, 546 F.2d 1285, 1287-88 (6th Cir.1976); Poliafico v. United States, 237 F.2d 97, 115 (6th Cir.1956). At trial below, Lanier testified that he used his gun, loaded with bullets supplied by Defendant, in the first and second robberies. Lanier testified that he obtained a gun at Defendant’s request for the third robbery, and that he showed Defendant that gun prior to the robbery. As we have stated previously. “[s]ufficiency-of-the-evidence appeals are ‘no place... for arguments regarding a government witness’s lack of credibility.’ ” United States v. Hernandez, 227 F.3d 686, 694-95 (6th Cir. 2000); accord United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989, 996 (6th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1137, 119 S.Ct. 1793, 143 L.Ed.2d 1020 (1999); United States v. Adamo, 742 F.2d 927, 934-35 (6th Cir.1984). Defendant’s trial counsel took full advantage of his opportunity to attack Lanier’s credibility on cross-examination and during his closing argument. The jury was clearly able to assess Lanier’s credibility at trial, and we conclude that, based on the evidence presented, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, we reject Defendant’s second claim of error.