Opinion ID: 2708854
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Gill’s Appeal

Text: Like Adams, Gill only challenges his sentence. He argues that the district court erred in enhancing his sentencing level by two for maintaining a stash house, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12). Specifically, Gill maintains that applying this enhancement in his case violated the Ex Post Facto clause of the Constitution because the conspiracy ended “on or about 14 Nos. 12-2125, 12-2379, 12-2759, and 12-2975 August 10, 2010” but the sentencing enhancement was not effective until November 2010. At the time the district court sentenced Gill, the controlling law in this circuit was that, because the guidelines were discretionary, there was no Ex Post Facto concern. See United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 2006). This court declined to overrule Demaree on several occasions, including in United States v. Peugh, 675 F.3d 736, 741 (7th Cir. 2012). However, the Supreme Court, overruled Demaree in Peugh v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2072, 2088 (2013), holding that “a court’s use of the Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing was an ex post facto violation, as the Guidelines had changed to the detriment of the defendant after he committed his offenses.” The government acknowledges that under Peugh, Gill’s sentence should be reversed and the case remanded. The parties disagree, though, on the scope of remand. The government argues that a limited remand is appropriate, citing United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 483–84 (7th Cir. 2005). A Paladino remand involves our “retaining jurisdiction of the appeal, [while] order[ing] a limited remand to permit the sentencing judge to determine whether he would (if required to resentence) reimpose his original sentence.” Id. A limited Paladino remand is not appropriate in this case. The Paladino line of cases did not involve the incorrect calculation of the guidelines range. United States v. Williams, No. 131260, 2014 WL 486244, at  (7th Cir. Feb. 7, 2014) (citing Paladino, 401 F.3d at 483–85). When a district court incorrectly calculates the guideline range, we normally presume the improperly calculated guideline range influenced the judge’s choice of sentence, unless he says otherwise. See, e.g., United States v. Goodwin, 717 F.3d 511, 520–21 (7th Cir. 2013). AccordNos. 12-2125, 12-2379, 12-2759, and 12-2975 15 ingly, we have concluded that where the error involves the incorrect guideline calculation, the Paladino procedure is not appropriate. Williams, 2014 WL 486244, at . Thus, in the case before us a Paladino limited remand is not appropriate. But we also do not accept Adams’s suggestion that we order a general remand, as defined in United States v. Barnes, 660 F.3d 1000, 1006 (7th Cir. 2011). In Barnes, “we conclude[d] that, upon a general remand for resentencing, a district court may permit new arguments and evidence as it deems necessary to re-fashion its sentence.” Id. (emphasis added). We added that a “[g]eneral remand does not, however, entitle the defendants to present new arguments and evidence beyond that pertinent to the issues raised on appeal.” Id. (emphasis added). While a general remand is the typical course of action, United States v. Simms, 721 F.3d 850, 852 (7th Cir. 2013), in some cases it has caused unnecessary confusion and wasted judicial resources. The confusion stems, in part, from the misperception that a general remand requires a district court to start from scratch. It does not. Barnes, 660 F.3d at 1006; Simms, 721 F.3d at 852. Further, even with a general remand, the district court’s discretion to consider new arguments is limited by “[t]wo related principles, the mandate rule and the law of the case doctrine, [which] prohibit a district court from revisiting certain issues on remand. The mandate rule requires a lower court to adhere to the commands of a higher court on remand.” United States v. Polland, 56 F.3d 776, 777 (7th Cir. 1995). For instance, where this court stated that “the sentence is Vacated, and the case is Remanded for resentencing on the issue of obstruction of justice,” we held based on the mandate rule that “the only issue properly before the district court was the appropriateness of an enhancement for obstructing justice.” 16 Nos. 12-2125, 12-2379, 12-2759, and 12-2975 Id. at 778. “The law of the case doctrine is a corollary to the mandate rule and prohibits a lower court from reconsidering on remand an issue expressly or impliedly decided by a higher court absent certain circumstances.” Polland, 56 F.3d at 779. Thus, the law of the case doctrine precludes a defendant from raising an argument not raised during his first appeal. See United States v. Sumner, 325 F.3d 884, 891 (7th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Whitlow, 740 F.3d 433, 438 (7th Cir. 2014) (“In assessing the scope of our initial remand, an issue that could have been raised on appeal but was not is waived and, therefore, not remanded.”). Unfortunately, a general remand may leave the parties and the district court to sort out the parameters of mandamus and the law of the case doctrine. As a result, this court has faced several successive appeals which focused mainly on the scope of the district court’s authority on remand. See, e.g., Whitlow, 740 F.3d at 438–40; Simms, 721 F.3d at 852; United States v. White, 406 F.3d 827 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Young, 66 F.3d 830, 835–37 (7th Cir. 1995); Polland, 56 F.3d at 777–79. These cases illustrate the waste of judicial resources sometimes stemming from a general remand. And it is an unnecessary waste given that Congress has authorized appellate courts, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2106,4 to “issue 4 Section 2106 provides: “The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.” That section applies in the sentencing context to allow us to limit remand to certain issues or order (continued...) Nos. 12-2125, 12-2379, 12-2759, and 12-2975 17 general or limited remands to the district courts.” Young, 66 F.3d at 835. But here we are speaking not of a Paladino jurisdiction-retaining limited remand, but of “a second type of limited remand, where the appellate court returns the case to the trial court but with instructions to make a ruling or other determination on a specific issue or issues and do nothing else.” Simms, 721 F.3d at 852. We find this type of limited remand appropriate here for reasons of efficiency and judicial economy because it expressly informs the parties of the scope of our remand, and thereby preempts unnecessary litigation concerning the district court’s authority on remand. Accordingly, we remand Gill’s case for resentencing for the limited purpose of sentencing him based on the correct guideline level of 38 and guideline range of 292 to 365 months’ imprisonment.5 This limited remand does not, however, limit the district court’s discretion to hold (or not hold) further proceedings and consider further arguments to determine Gill’s sentence based on the § 3553 factors. We merely limit its authority to reopen the guideline range calculation. We do so because Gill has already had one opportunity to present to the district court arguments concerning the guideline range calculation. He has already had one opportunity to challenge in this court the district court’s ruling on those arguments. On appeal, Gill challenged only one ruling—the stash house enhancement. Because Gill’s appeal presented no other sentencing issues, resentencing should 4 (...continued) complete resentencing. See Young, 66 F.3d 830, 835 (7th Cir. 1995). 5 The two-level stash house enhancement had raised Gill’s offense level to 40, which resulted in a sentence range of 360 months to life imprisonment. 18 Nos. 12-2125, 12-2379, 12-2759, and 12-2975 similarly be limited to correcting the Ex Post Facto violation and then sentencing him based on the proper guideline range. He should not be able to “use the accident of a remand to raise in a second appeal an issue that he could just as well have raised in the first appeal because the remand did not affect it.”6 United States v. Parker, 101 F.3d 527, 528 (7th Cir. 1996). However, we have no way of knowing (at least based on this record) whether a different guideline range would have prompted the district court to weigh the § 3553 factors differently. Accordingly, the district court may, if it believes it appropriate, allow new arguments and a new hearing on the § 3553 factors. We stress, though, that this is a may—not a must. As with a general remand, the district court need not hold further proceedings or consider further argument. One final note before closing: While we call this a limited remand, the remand is still very broad. But a court may fashion a limited remand as narrowly or broadly as it deems appropriate. Young, 66 F.3d at 835. It might also seem that our limited remand is no different than a general remand, given that the latter has the same limitations based on mandamus and the law of the case doctrine. In a sense that is true because we are merely stating explicitly (so as to avoid unnecessary litigation) what is implicit. See Husband, 312 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 2002) 6 In some cases, “vacating a part of a sentence may justify or even require a new sentencing hearing. …” See Simms, 721 F.3d at 853. “[T]he calculus is a practical one” and sometimes a de novo sentencing is necessitated because “enhancements are inter-connected and the district court's original sentencing intent may be undermined by altering one portion of the calculus.” White, 406 F.3d at 832. But this case does not present such a situation. The stash house enhancement was not interconnected with other aspects of the guideline range calculation. Nos. 12-2125, 12-2379, 12-2759, and 12-2975 19 (the court “may explicitly remand certain issues exclusive of all others; but the same result may also be accomplished implicitly”). In other words, our label is not important—our directive is.