Opinion ID: 622096
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Meaning of the Sentencing Guideline

Text: Greenough pled guilty to violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) which make it illegal to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance. § 841(a)(1). Greenough's PSR applied U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(2) which provides for a higher Guidelines range when an individual is convicted under Section 841(b)(1)(C) and the offense of conviction establishes that death or serious bodily injury resulted from the use of the substance. Similar to her argument under Apprendi, Greenough alleges that it was error to apply the higher Sentencing Guideline for death resulting in the absence of an indictment alleging death. The government counters that the Sentencing Guidelines permit a judge to consider all relevant conduct and outcomes in determining the proper sentence regardless of the wording in the indictment. The government further argues that evidence of death allegedly caused by a heroin overdose was relevant to the Guideline adjustment under § 2D1.1. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4 ([i]n determining the sentence to impose within the Guideline range, or whether a departure from the guidelines is warranted, the court may consider, without limitation, any information concerning the background, character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law). The question for this court is whether U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(2) permits relevant conduct not intrinsic to the offense of conviction to be considered by the sentencing court in calculating the Guidelines level. This court has not previously addressed the meaning of the phrase the offense of conviction establishes in § 2D1.1(a)(2), but has recognized other circuits' attempts to clarify the phrase's meaning. See Carbajal, 290 F.3d at 284 n. 9. Relying on application note 1 to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, which defines offense as the offense of conviction and all relevant conduct, the Third Circuit has held that the definition of `offense of conviction' is narrower than `offense.' Pressler, 256 F.3d at 157 n. 7. While this conclusion was in dicta, the Third Circuit more recently cited Pressler for the proposition that the phrase `offense of conviction' includes only the substantive crime for which a particular defendant was convicted. United States v. Aquino, 555 F.3d 124, 129 (3d Cir.2009). The Tenth Circuit has read this phrase in a similarly narrow fashion. See United States v. Blackwell, 323 F.3d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir.2003). Other circuits, however, have sentenced individuals in a manner that would imply a broader interpretation of the phrase. See United States v. Shah, 453 F.3d 520 (D.C.Cir.2006) (holding that a death resulting Sentencing Guideline may be applied to an individual who pled guilty to conspiracy to import, distribute, and possess with intent to distribute heroin when one of his drug couriers died from ingesting the heroin to smuggle it and the written plea agreement conceded the death); United States v. Rodriguez, 279 F.3d 947, 951 (11th Cir.2002) (when the plea agreement admits selling drugs, concedes a purchaser died with the drugs in his system, but the defendant questions whether an intervening cause breaks the chain of causation, it was not clear error to apply § 2D1.1(a)(2)); United States v. Deeks, 303 Fed.Appx. 507, 509 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying § 2D1.1(a)(2) to enhance a drug importation charge when a customer died using the cocaine); see also United States v. Bradford, 499 F.3d 910, 919 (8th Cir.2007) (while § 2D1.1(a)(2) did not figure into the determination of Bradford's base offense level, the court is permitted to consider uncharged relevant conduct to justify a departure from the Sentencing Guidelines when an individual pleads guilty to conspiracy to distribute heroin and a buyer dies from the heroin distributed). Our interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines is subject to the ordinary rules of statutory construction. Carbajal, 290 F.3d at 283. Thus, we first analyze the text of the Guideline. § 2D1.1 does not define offense of conviction, but § 1B1.2(a) provides guidance on the phrase's meaning. Determine the offense guideline section in Chapter Two (Offense Conduct) applicable to the offense of conviction (i.e., the offense conduct charged in the count of the indictment or information of which the defendant was convicted). However, in the case of a plea agreement (written or made orally on the record) containing a stipulation that specifically establishes a more serious offense than the offense of conviction, determine the offense guideline section in Chapter Two applicable to the stipulated offense. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a) (emphasis added). The commentary background to § 2D1.1 further explains [t]he base offense levels in § 2D1.1 are either provided directly by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 or are proportional to the levels established by statute, and apply to all unlawful trafficking. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 applies to drug convictions under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)-(C) and 960(b)(1)-(3). Greenough pled guilty to violating § 841(b) which contains a decision tree prescribing statutory penalties. In the case of a controlled substance in schedule I or II, gamma hydroxybutyric acid ... or 1 gram of flunitrazepam, ... such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than 20 years and if death or serious bodily injury results from the use of such substance shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than twenty years or more than life, a fine not to exceed the greater of that authorized in accordance with the provisions of Title 18, or $1,000,000 if the defendant is an individual or $5,000,000 if the defendant is other than an individual, or both. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Under the statute, the first determination is the quantity of drugs which are tied to specific minimum and maximum penalties. § 841(b). The second determination triggers a higher penalty if death or serious bodily injury results from the use of such substance. § 841(b)(1)(A)-(C), (E). Subsection 841(b)(1)(C) specifically provides a statutory maximum of 20 years if death does not result, but a statutory minimum of 20 years and maximum of life if death results. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that § 2D1.1(a)(2) follows a similar pattern. See Deeks 303 Fed.Appx. at 509 (citing United States v. Houston, 406 F.3d 1121, 1122-24 (9th Cir.2005), as a model for interpreting § 2D1.1(a)(2) because it interprets 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) which contains language nearly identical to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(2)). The Sentencing Guidelines instruct that the base offense level should be the greatest level specified in the Drug Quantity Table, § 2D1.1(a)(5), or a higher amount if the offense of conviction establishes that death or serious bodily injury resulted from the use of the substance. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(2). The similarities between the language indicate that the offense level was intended to mirror the criminal statute. We now hold that U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(2) applies only when the second prong of the statute, i.e. that death or serious bodily injury results, is also part of the crime of conviction. Greenough pled guilty only to possession with intent to distribute under § 841(b) without the statutory enhancement for resulting death or serious bodily injury. Further, the Statement of Reasons clearly stated that her statutory maximum sentence was 20 years, the maximum if resulting death was not charged under § 841(b)(1)(C). Thus, her offense of conviction does not establish[ ] that death or serious bodily injury resulted from the use of the substance and § 2D1.1(a)(2) should not have applied to Greenough.