Opinion ID: 172342
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Kansas Supreme Court Applied the Correct Standard for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Text: Floyd argues that the Kansas Supreme Court used a legal standard for the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel analysis that is contrary to Strickland when it denied Floyd habeas relief. We disagree, and conclude, as did the federal district court, that the Kansas Supreme Court applied the correct standard for ineffective assistance of counsel. The challenged language from the Kansas Supreme Court opinion is as follows: On the record before us, this was a difficult case. Two brothers accused each other of vile crimes. There was ample evidence to support each accusation. The jury, after weighing all of its substance and the credibility of the many witnesses, was persuaded that the State prosecuted the right brother. Although, in the hands of another defense lawyer, the case may have been tried to another conclusion, may is not good enough. In order to reverse, we must be convinced that, but for counsel's deficiencies, there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome. [ State v. ] Gleason, 277 Kan. [624,] 644, 88 P.3d 218 [2004]. We are not so convinced. Floyd's trial, while not perfect, was fair. See State v. Johnson-Howell, 255 Kan. 928, 952, 881 P.2d 1288 (1994). 283 Kan. at 107, 150 P.3d 868. Floyd argues that the may is not good enough and while not perfect, was fair language is contrary to Supreme Court precedent. Applee. Br. at 34. Specifically, Floyd cites to Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 22, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002), to argue that the may is not good enough language implies a preponderance of the evidence standard for prejudice, when Woodford has made clear that the standard for prejudice is less demanding than the preponderance standard. Further, Floyd argues, `May' is exactly good enough; it establishes a `significant possibility,' which the Supreme Court has found good enough to establish a reasonable probability. Applee. Br. at 34 (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 298, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (Souter, J., concurring)). Justice Souter's concurrence opines that significant possibility is a better term than reasonable probability because the word probability often misleads courts into treating [the phrase `reasonable probability'] as akin to the more demanding standard, `more likely than not.' 527 U.S. at 298, 119 S.Ct. 1936. However, despite its may is not good enough language, the Kansas Supreme Court was not misled and did not use the more demanding standard of more likely than not. This is borne out by a full reading of the court's ruling. We agree with the district court when it reasoned that, despite its may is not good enough language, the Kansas Supreme Court applied the correct standard: If by may have been tried to another conclusion the Kansas Supreme Court meant that there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome, then may is good enough to warrant habeas relief. But, immediately thereafter the court stated that it was not convinced that there was such a reasonable probability. So, we assume that the court meant by may that there was a trivial probability, not a reasonable probability, that absent counsel's deficient performance, a juror would have found a reasonable doubt respecting [Floyd's] guilt. Mem. and Order at 27-28. The Kansas Supreme Court's opinion, when read in its entirety, correctly identifies Strickland as controlling precedent, applies the two prongs of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel, and concludes that it was not convinced that there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome had counsel not committed the errors identified. We note, as did the district court, that immediately after using the may is not good enough phrase, the Kansas Supreme Court stated: In order to reverse, we must be convinced that, but for counsel's deficiencies, there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome. 283 Kan. at 107, 150 P.3d 868. The Kansas Supreme Court, despite its may is not good enough language, does not impermissibly apply the stricter more likely than not standard for prejudice. Floyd also argues that the Kansas Supreme Court applied law contrary to Supreme Court precedent by injecting an impermissible overall fairness analysis into the ineffective assistance of counsel analysis. Floyd relies on Williams, 529 U.S. at 394-95, 120 S.Ct. 1495, to argue that it is impermissible to consider[ ] not only whether there was a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different, but also whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable. Applee. Br. at 36. We have held that this more onerous [fairness] standard was contrary to the Supreme Court's clearly established precedent in Strickland.  Spears v. Mullin, 343 F.3d 1215, 1248 (10th Cir.2003). However, as the district court stated, it must be acknowledged that Strickland also speaks in terms of fairness and reliability, as well as in having confidence in the outcome.... We believe the Kansas Supreme Court's reference to fairness was speaking to having confidence in the reliability of the outcome. Mem. and Order at 28 n. 2. The Kansas Supreme Court's use of the term fair, when the Strickland court explained that the very purpose of effective assistance is to ensure a fair trial, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (emphasis added), is a kind of permissible shorthand. Cf. Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 655, 124 S.Ct. 2736, 159 L.Ed.2d 683 (2004) (per curiam) (holding that it is permissible shorthand to use probable for the reasonable probability standard on the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis for ineffective assistance of counsel). Further, a readiness to attribute error is inconsistent with the presumption that state courts know and follow the law. Woodford, 537 U.S. at 24, 123 S.Ct. 357. Given that the Kansas Supreme Court correctly stated and applied the Strickland standard, the two phrases in the court's concluding paragraph, may is not good enough and while not perfect was fair, do not support a conclusion that the Kansas Supreme Court erred. The Kansas Supreme Court neither applied too strict a standard for prejudice, nor added an overall fairness requirement to the determination of whether counsel was ineffective. We do not read the ruling of the Kansas Supreme Court as applying a standard that is contrary to Supreme Court precedent.