Opinion ID: 1963952
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Cincinnati's Duty to Defend and Indemnify

Text: [18] Mortgage Express argues that Cincinnati was required to provide a defense because slander of title fits within the definition of personal injury in subsection d. of the policy. Subsection d. of the Cincinnati policy defines personal injury as an injury, other than `bodily injury', arising out of one or more of the following offenses: ... d. Oral or written publication of material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person's or organization's goods, products or services.... Whether slander of title fits within the definition of personal injury is an issue of first impression for this court. However, other courts have considered the issue and concluded that title to real estate is not a good, product, or service. [21] In Bank One v. Breakers Development, Inc., [22] condominium owners sued an insured for slander of title arising out of errors in the legal description of the condominium property, and the insured sought coverage from its commercial general liability insurer. The court construed policy language identical to the policy language contained in Cincinnati's policy and concluded that slander of title was not one of the offenses that gave rise to personal injury as defined in the commercial liability policy. [23] The court explained that a reasonable person would not liken a title to real estate as a good or product and that the terms good or product referred to tangible property. [24] In another case, Acme Const. Co., Inc. v. Continental Nat. Indem. Co., [25] an excavator filed a declaratory judgment action against its insurer seeking a determination from the court that its insurance contract provided coverage over a lawsuit with a property owner. The insurance policy in Acme Const. Co., Inc. defined advertising injury and personal injury as `[o]ral or written publication of material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person's or organization's goods, products or services.' [26] The court concluded that a slander of title claim did not fall within 'personal injury' or `advertising injury' as defined by the policy, thus the insurer had no duty to defend. In so concluding, the court reasoned that title to real estate is not a person, organization, good, product, or service as those terms are commonly understood, thus, slander of title did not fall within the policy coverage. [27] We find the reasoning of the foregoing cases persuasive and applicable to this case. We thus reject Mortgage Express' argument that Village's slander of title claim falls within subsection d. of the definition of personal injury found in the Cincinnati policy. [19] Mortgage Express' remaining argument is that Cincinnati must defend it in the underlying action because its lien is an invasion of the right to private occupancy of the premises as defined in subsection c. of the definition of personal injury, which states that [p]ersonal injury is [t]he wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, or invasion of the right of private occupancy of a room, dwelling or premises that a person occupies by or on behalf of its owner, landlord or lessor. Mortgage Express provides little in the way of authority to support its contention that slander of title falls within subsection c. of the definition of personal injury. Although this case is not directly on point, it provides guidance. In Columbia Nat. Ins. v. Pacesetter Homes, [28] the developer of a housing subdivision was sued by nearby property owners because the construction caused noise, dust, ground vibration, diminution in the value of their property, loss of trees, and increased traffic volume. [29] The developer's comprehensive general liability insurer brought a declaratory judgment action to determine whether it had a duty to defend the developer. [30] The developer's insurance policy defined personal injury as `wrongful entry or eviction or other invasion of the right of private occupancy.' [31] The developer contended that this clause insured it against liability from the nuisance and trespass suits brought by the nearby property owners. [32] We held that the personal injury provisions did not create a duty to defend and stated that the right of private occupancy is the legal right to occupy premises, not the right to enjoy occupying those premises. [33] [20] Mortgage Express merely asserted that it held a valid, unsatisfied security interest against the property. A security interest is an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation. [34] Mortgage Express' security interest on Village's property does not provide Mortgage Express with either legal title or the right to possession. [35] Rather, Village, as the mortgagor, retains both legal title and the right of possession. [36] Therefore, because the security interest held by Mortgage Express does not interfere with Village's legal right to occupy the premises, Mortgage Express' security interest does not fit within the subsection c. definition of personal injury. As such, Cincinnati has no duty to defend Mortgage Express and was properly granted judgment as a matter of law.