Opinion ID: 773406
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of the Continuing Violation Theory to Phase II

Text: 79 The district court ruled that Fitzgerald was not entitled to invoke the continuing violation theorybecause she has not alleged an ongoing discriminatory practice or policy in her administrative complaint.... Rather than detailing specific instances evincing a formal discriminatory practice or policy, Plaintiff merely alleges hostile behavior by Gerling directed solely at Plaintiff for rejecting Gerling's sexual advances. 80 36 F.Supp.2d at 502 (emphasis added); see also id. at 504 (no showing of a formal or widespread identifiable discriminatory policy or practice (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Insofar as Fitzgerald's claim alleging a hostile work environment from April 1995 through September 25, 1997, is concerned, we have doctrinal, factual, and procedural difficulties with this ruling. 81 Most fundamentally, we disagree with the assumption that Fitzgerald could not avail herself of the continuing violation theory unless she could prove that USPS had a formal discriminatory practice or policy. As discussed in Part II.B. above, even where there is no formal policy, the continuing violation theory may be used where there have been specific and related instances of discrimination, and the employer has permitted them to continue unremedied for so long that its inaction may reasonably be viewed as tantamount to a policy or practice of tolerating such discrimination. 82 In addition, we disagree with the view that Fitzgerald was not entitled to invoke the continuing violation theory without showing that the discrimination was widespread. Although evidence that other female employees were subjected to the same type of harassment would be relevant, see, e.g., Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d at 150-51, the continuing violation theory may be applied where there is a showing of specific and related instances of discrimination against a single plaintiff, see generally Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d at 697, 704; Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1311 (10th Cir. 1999) ([A] continuing violation may be based on either a series of related acts taken against a single individual or the maintenance of a company-wide policy or practice of discrimination.); Green v. Los Angeles County Superintendent of Schools, 883 F.2d 1472, 1480-81 (9th Cir. 1989) (A continuing violation may... be established not only by demonstrating a company[-]wide policy or practice, but also by demonstrating a series of related acts against a single individual.... In the latter instance, the question... boils down to whether sufficient evidence supports a determination that the alleged discriminatory acts are related closely enough to constitute a continuing violation. (internal quotation marks omitted)). 83 We also note that if there were a requirement that a plaintiff show a formal policy or that discrimination was 'widespread,' 36 F.Supp.2d at 504, we would conclude that the district court's reliance even in part on Fitzgerald's failure to make such a showing was at the very least premature. USPS's motion for partial summary judgment was made less than two months after Fitzgerald filed her amended complaint, and Fitzgerald requested that the motion not be decided before she had an opportunity to conduct discovery. The court denied her request, stating that Fitzgerald had personal access to all she needed to oppose summary judgment. Faulting Fitzgerald for failure to make a showing of a formal policy--or of other matters that would similarly be beyond her personal knowledge--was incompatible with the court's denial of discovery. 84 As to whether Fitzgerald made a showing of personal harassment sufficiently repetitious to support invocation of the continuing violation theory, we conclude that her sworn factual allegations of Gerling's constant stream of unjustified criticisms of her work described specific, related instances of harassment adequate to depict a continuity of allegedly unlawful conduct. Fitzgerald stated that [a]fter the incidents of April and May[] 1995, and continuing through 1996 and 1997, Gerling became increasingly hostile and abusive toward plaintiff. (Amended Complaint ¶ 90.) She stated that he unjustifiably berated her about her hours and productivity; he attempted to force her to work overtime when she was not scheduled to work, and he criticized her when she worked scheduled overtime; he treated her more harshly than male employees and than two female employees with whom he had had or was having a sexual relationship. Fitzgerald alleged that the harassment was ongoing, repeated, and continuing (EEO Complaint ¶¶ 10, 12, 20), occurring day to day (Amended Complaint ¶ 92), as Gerling regularly and unfairly criticized her work (id. ¶ 93) repeatedly and on a continuing basis (id. ¶ 91); she alleged that [t]hese acts of hostility, criticism and harassment were severe and persistent and occurred on a continuing basis from April 1995 through September 1997 (id. ¶ 121). Thus, although the final abusive incident on September 25, 1997, was separated from Gerling's final sexual advances by a gap of nearly 2½ years, Fitzgerald's assertions plainly alleged that there was no interruption in the allegedly unwarranted abuse to which she was subjected during that 2½-year Phase II period. 85 The district court's view that many of the allegations supporting Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim address actions that occurred only once or on a few occasions, 36 F.Supp.2d at 504, thus did not accept the above sworn statements in the light most favorable to Fitzgerald, either as to the quantity or as to the frequency of Gerling's abuse. We note also that it appears that Fitzgerald could, at trial, elaborate on the allegations of her pleadings. For example, in her answers under oath to interrogatories served by USPS (first submitted to the district court when Fitzgerald moved for reconsideration of the summary judgment decision), Fitzgerald gave additional examples of Gerling's abuse and disparate treatment of her, including constantly criticizing the length of time it took her to deliver her mail; yelling at her for parking improperly, when in fact her vehicles were properly parked; reprimanding her for leaving her work area, when she had a legitimate reason for leaving; and excluding her from work areas in which other employees were allowed. (Fitzgerald Response to USPS Interrogatory 11.) Fitzgerald also stated that she could not be more precise as to the dates on which specific types of abuse occurred because Gerling abused her on a daily basis. (Id.) Whether or not Gerling's harassment is ultimately found to have materially altered Fitzgerald's working conditions, that conduct surely is alleged to have been continuing. 86 The record is also clear that Fitzgerald sufficiently presented the continuing violation theory in her administrative proceedings before HRD. The agency described Fitzgerald's claim as asserting, inter alia, a hostile work environment after rejecting Supervisor TG's unsolicited and unwelcome advances... beginning in April 1995 continuing through September 25, 1997. (HRD Letter at 2 (emphasis added).) Although HRD declined to apply the continuing violation theory to Fitzgerald (see id. (you may not avail yourself of the Commission's continuing violation theory)), the agency plainly understood her to have invoked that theory. 87 Finally, although the amended complaint was vague as to when Fitzgerald first complained to King about Gerling's conduct, her Response to USPS Interrogatory 7 indicated that she had complained to Postmaster King during Phase I; and the amended complaint made clear that she complained to him at least three times during Phase II, asking him to halt Gerling's harassing conduct. According to Fitzgerald, King refused to intervene and stated, All you women do is complain. A jury would be entitled to credit Fitzgerald's testimony as to (a) Gerling's persistent harassment, (b) her repeated complaints to King, and (c) the lack of remedial action by King, whose sole response was to criticize the complainant for complaining. And it could infer from that evidence that the inaction and verbal response of the chief operating officer of the Lake Placid Post Office reflected a practice and policy of condoning sexual harassment. 88 We note that USPS, in its brief on appeal, faults Fitzgerald for failing to proffer admissible evidence as what Postmaster King may have said to Gerling after Fitzgerald complained of Gerling's conduct. For several reasons Fitzgerald's proffer of no more than her own understanding that King took no action against Gerling could not justify the entry of summary judgment against her. First, from the allegation that King took no action (Amended Complaint ¶ 70) it must be inferred that, if King took any action, Fitzgerald was not present. She was in no position to present evidence of events that occurred outside her presence, the district court having rejected her request for discovery. Further, if USPS contends that King in fact took remedial action in response to Fitzgerald's complaints of her supervisor's sexual harassment, that is a matter on which USPS, not Fitzgerald, has the burden of proof. See Part II.A.1. above. Finally, on the question of whether there was any remedial response to her complaints, Fitzgerald was not required to come forward with more evidence in opposing summary judgment unless USPS's motion was properly supported as envisioned by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). See generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); St. Pierre v. Dyer, 208 F.3d 394, 404 (2d Cir. 2000). She had no such obligation here, for, as noted in Part I.C. above, USPS proffered no relevant statement from Gerling and no affidavit whatever from King. 89 Not every sexual harassment claim will lend itself to a continuing violation theory, just as not every offensive incident will support a claim of harassment sufficient to alter the working conditions. But Fitzgerald's assertions of escalating harassment every day present an apt basis for application of the continuing violation theory. Thus, as to Phase II, we reject the district court's conclusion that Fitzgerald was not entitled to invoke the continuing violation theory with respect to her claim of hostile work environment. 90