Opinion ID: 3065418
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Amount of Damages Sought and Recovered

Text: The first factor looks to the difference between the amount of damages sought and recovered. In her first amended complaint, Mahach-Watkins did not specify an amount of damages. Relevant to the § 1983 excessive force claim, she sought only general and punitive damages “in an amount to be determined according to proof at trial.” At the end of the damages phase trial, the court instructed the jury on the § 1983 claim that, as a matter of law, it “must award nominal damages of no more than one dollar.” The jury returned a verdict of one dollar, the maximum allowed under the instruction. The court also instructed the jury that it could award punitive damages on the § 1983 claim if it found that Depee’s conduct was “malicious, oppressive or in reckless disregard” of Watkins’s rights. The jury declined to award punitive damages. Mahach-Watkins had argued for a jury instruction that would have allowed the jury to award compensatory damages to her son’s estate on the § 1983 excessive force claim for pain and suffering between the time he was shot and the time he died. In justifying its instruction allowing only nominal damages, the district court wrote, “The Ninth Circuit has not addressed the question of what damages are available under a Section 1983 wrongful death claim.” In the absence of a Ninth Circuit holding on the point, the district court concluded that the available damages on the § 1983 excessive force claim were “those set forth in California’s survival statute, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.34, [which] does not allow recovery for the decedent’s loss of enjoyment of life, or the decedent’s pain and suffering.” Mahach-Watkins has not appealed that ruling. We therefore assume without deciding that as a matter of law compensatory damages were not available to the estate on the § 1983 excessive force claim. 1836 MAHACH-WATKINS v. DEPEE In Romberg v. Nichols, 48 F.3d 453, 454 (9th Cir. 1995), plaintiffs had sought $2 million dollars in compensatory and punitive damages. However, in closing argument to the jury, plaintiffs requested only “some sum like one dollar.” Id. We denied attorney’s fees. We wrote, “An attorney cannot avoid Farrar’s mandate by waiting until the close of trial and then, when he perceives that his clients have little chance of success, asking for only nominal damages to justify an attorney’s fee award.” Id. at 455. The case now before us is not on all fours with Romberg. In Romberg, the plaintiffs’ problem was that their evidence did not support their damages claim for $2 million dollars. Here, by contrast, Mahach-Watkins did not seek a specified amount of damages. Rather, she sought only an award of compensatory damages “according to proof at trial.” Further, and more important, the district court determined that evidence of actual harm was irrelevant to Mahach-Watkins’s § 1983 claim, instructing the jury as a matter of law that she was entitled to nominal rather than compensatory damages. We do not read Romberg to hold that in a § 1983 case in which only nominal damages are available as a matter of law a verdict awarding such damages is less than a complete success. See, e.g., Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115 (“When a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted)). But the case before us is not one in which it was clear from the outset that only nominal damages would be available as a matter of law. First, Mahach-Watkins brought several § 1983 claims. She obtained a verdict on only the excessive force claim. Second, the district court believed that the law in the Ninth Circuit was unclear as to the availability of compensatory damages to an estate on a § 1983 excessive force claim resulting in death. Mahach-Watkins sought to persuade the district court that compensatory damages were available. She was unsuccessful MAHACH-WATKINS v. DEPEE 1837 in that attempt and has not appealed the district court’s adverse ruling. [5] In sum, Mahach-Watkins sought an award of an indeterminate amount of compensatory and punitive damages on her § 1983 claims. She obtained a verdict on her § 1983 excessive force claim and then obtained an award of only nominal damages. As we discuss below, her success in achieving a liability verdict was significant, independent of any damage award. But the first factor looks only to the difference between the damages sought and obtained. In the circumstances of this case, that factor somewhat disfavors an award of attorney’s fees. 2. Significance of the Legal Issue on Which MahachWatkins Prevailed The second factor looks to “the significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff claims to have prevailed.” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 121 (O’Connor, J., concurring). We have repeatedly noted the relevance of this second factor. See, e.g., Benton, 421 F.3d at 905; Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1996). Other circuits have also done so. See, e.g., Mercer v. Duke Univ., 401 F.3d 199, 206 (4th Cir. 2005) (“This factor is concerned with the general legal importance of the issue on which the plaintiff prevailed.”); Maul v. Constan, 23 F.3d 143, 145 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[W]e understand the second Farrar factor to address the legal import of the constitutional claim on which plaintiff prevailed.”); Cartwright v. Stamper, 7 F.3d 106, 110 (7th Cir. 1993) (“The second factor considers the significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiffs prevailed. This factor looks not at the relief obtained but to the extent the plaintiffs succeeded on their theory of liability.”). [6] The district court emphasized the importance of the legal issue in this case, whether state-sanctioned force result1838 MAHACH-WATKINS v. DEPEE ing in death was excessive. The importance of the issue may be assessed by comparing it to other issues that our sister circuits have held to qualify as important under this factor. See, e.g., Mercer, 401 F.3d at 206 (right to be free from discrimination in school sponsored contact sports); Piper v. Oliver, 69 F.3d 875, 877 (8th Cir. 1995) (right to be free from illegal detention); Jones v. Lockhart, 29 F.3d 422, 424 (8th Cir. 1994) (right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment). We have difficulty imagining a more important issue than the legality of state-sanctioned force resulting in death. It is obviously of supreme importance to anyone who might be subject to such force. But it is also of great importance to a law enforcement officer who is placed in a situation where deadly force may be appropriate. We therefore conclude that the second factor supports the award of attorney’s fees. 3. Public Goal The third factor looks to whether the plaintiff accomplished some public goal. Depee contends that no public goal was accomplished because his employer, the CHP, investigated the shooting and concluded that his use of force was legally justified. Depee relies on our opinion in Wilcox v. City of Reno, 42 F.3d 550, 555 (9th Cir. 1994), where we wrote: If the [§ 1983] lawsuit achieved other tangible results—such as sparking a change in policy or establishing a finding of fact with potential collateral estoppel effects—such results will, in combination with an enforceable judgment for a nominal sum, support an award of fees. In support of Depee’s opposition to an award of attorney’s fees, the Chief of the CHP’s Northern Division provided a sworn declaration to the district court. He stated, inter alia: MAHACH-WATKINS v. DEPEE 1839 Officer Larry Depee was not disciplined as a result of the shooting on December 9, 2003 or this litigation. The CHP investigation determined that Officer Depee’s use of force was legally justified and consistent with CHP’s use of force policy. . . . Whether or not claims of excessive force are filed, the CHP investigates every shooting incident involving an officer to review policies and practices and to determine issues of employee misconduct. The CHP investigated the shooting in this case. It did not alter or change any of its law enforcement policies and practices as a result of the investigation or this lawsuit. In its experience, the vast majority of excessive force complaints are fact-specific claims which, like the instant litigation, do not result in policy or practice changes. [7] We are unwilling to conclude that no public goal was served by Mahach-Watkins’s § 1983 verdict merely because the CHP disagreed with the jury’s conclusion that its officer used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and because the CHP has refused either to discipline the officer or to change its policies. The CHP has come to its own conclusions about the legality of Depee’s use of force. But the CHP’s exoneration of Depee does not mean that his action was, in fact, appropriate. Indeed, we are bound to conclude otherwise, given the unappealed jury verdict that Depee used unconstitutionally excessive force in killing Watkins. [8] It is possible that the CHP will continue, as it has said it will, to follow its current “policies and practices” concerning the use of force despite the jury’s conclusion that Officer Depee acted unconstitutionally. However, this does not mean that Mahach-Watkins’s § 1983 suit, and the jury’s verdict that Depee used excessive force, accomplished no public goal. With respect to Depee, the district court wrote: “The Court . . . finds that, in addition to obtaining nominal damages, 1840 MAHACH-WATKINS v. DEPEE plaintiff achieved other ‘tangible results’ in that the jury’s verdict will likely deter defendant Depee from engaging in future unconstitutional conduct.” Further, the verdict had the deterrent effect we described in Morales, 96 F.3d at 364-65: “[T]he verdict established a deterrent to . . . others who establish and implement official policies governing arrests of citizens. Thus, it served the public purpose of helping to protect Morales and persons like him from being subjected to similar unlawful treatment in the future.” The CHP’s stated choice to ignore that deterrent does not minimize the importance of the case to others. We therefore conclude that the third factor favors the award of attorney’s fees. 4. Summary [9] The core of Mahach-Watkins’s suit has always been her contention that Depee acted improperly in killing her son. The jury agreed with her, holding under § 1983 that Depee used unconstitutionally excessive force. The jury’s liability verdict on the § 1983 claim was hardly a hollow victory for a mother suing for the death of her son. The jury did not give MahachWatkins everything she asked for, but it gave her enough to entitle her to an award of attorney’s fees under § 1988.