Opinion ID: 806935
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defaulted Miranda Claim

Text: Petitioner argues that his Miranda rights were violated by the detectives who interrogated him on November 13, 2000, and that his confession should therefore have been suppressed. This claim was evidently not raised to the state courts on direct appeal,11 and is therefore both unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). Petitioner accordingly must “demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law” in order for us to review the defaulted claim. Id. Because our Certificate of Appealability specifically referred to the prejudice prong of Coleman, we limit our review to petitioner’s claim that he was prejudiced by the alleged violation of his Miranda rights. See Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that the Court of Appeals should address only claims included in certificate of appealability). A finding that a defendant’s Miranda rights were violated prior to his confession is not sufficient, in and of itself, to establish that the admission of a later, “Mirandized,” confession prejudiced the defendant. As the Supreme Court has held, although “Miranda requires that the unwarned admission 10 Petitioner appears to claim that Huntley counsel’s alleged refusal to allow him to testify at the hearing constituted so-called “structural error,” and was therefore inherently prejudicial. See, e.g., Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 140–41 (2009); Gibbons v. Savage, 555 F.3d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[S]tructural errors are those to which the harmless error analysis does not apply, as they are deemed to render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair.”). Although the Supreme Court has stated that a defendant has the absolute right to testify at trial, and that trial counsel’s refusal to permit the defendant to testify at trial may constitute constitutional error, Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), the Supreme Court has never explicitly extended that absolute right to pre-trial hearings. Accordingly, even if trial counsel did prevent Hawthorne from testifying at the Huntley hearing, the state court’s determination that trial counsel’s actions did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel would not constitute a “decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added). 11 Petitioner did not petition for state collateral review of his conviction. 7 must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985). It is indisputable that both petitioner’s written and videotaped statements were made after he had heard, and waived, his Miranda rights: while the written Miranda waiver was signed at 8:45 p.m., the written statement was not signed until 9:45 p.m., and the videotaped statement was made at some point later that night or early the next morning. Accordingly, the only remaining question is whether petitioner’s inculpatory statements made after he signed the Miranda waiver were “knowingly and voluntarily made.” Id. Petitioner’s Miranda claim can be resolved by reference to our holding on his primary claim―that his Huntley counsel was not prejudicially ineffective by failing to demonstrate at the Huntley hearing that the confessions were involuntary.12 As discussed above, New York’s appellate courts have already determined, on direct review of the conviction, that the trial court’s finding that the confessions were voluntary did not violate the Constitution. Absent a misapplication of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, we may not disturb their determination of this matter. Accordingly, we hold that petitioner cannot show that the alleged violation of Miranda rendered his written and videotaped confessions inadmissible. Because petitioner cannot show that he was prejudiced by the alleged Miranda violation, we affirm the District Court’s holding that the Miranda claim is procedurally barred.13 12 Although a “Mirandized” confession that closely follows an un-Mirandized confession may itself be constitutionally suspect, see Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 621 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring); United States v. Moore, 670 F.3d 222, 227–29 (2d Cir. 2012), petitioner does not argue that the evidence shows that the written or videotaped confessions came as a result of a “deliberate two-step interrogation technique,” Moore, 670 F.3d at 227; see also United States v. Williams, 681 F.3d 35, 40–41 (2d Cir. 2012). 13Petitioner argues that his Miranda claim was in fact presented to the state court when, in his brief to the Appellate Division, he argued that “there is a reasonable likelihood that counsel would have succeeded in proving a violation of his Miranda rights.” Assuming, arguendo, that that argument was sufficient to present the issue to the Appellate Division, we would deny habeas relief because the state court would have decided the Miranda claim on its merits. See Part A, ante. 8