Opinion ID: 1752951
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: when it comes to lowering their prices, most lawyers' hands are tied.

Text: When it comes to lowering the prices they charge, most lawyers' hands are tied. Their rent is high. Their volume is low. And their overhead is almost out of sight. Which means that when you retain a regular attorney, one way or another you're going to pay the price. It isn't fair. But since law firms traditionally charge by time and expenses, it's little wonder they're so expensive. Are you paying for your law firm's mistakes? Simply put, we believe that one reason some lawyers' fees are so great, is because their overhead is so high. We're smart enough to know that there's no way to keep your prices in check, when your expenses are way out of line. So before we ever opened our doors, we decided to open our eyes. We took a look at the extra cost of downtown rents. We looked at the extravagance of client entertainment. And after we saw all the fancy desks and the overstuffed chairs, we knew how we could trim the rates. And trim our rates we did. Competent work at competitive prices. When you come to Marcus and Tepper, the first thing you'll find is a competent lawyer. The second is competitive prices. In most cases, fixed fees determined by the task at hand. Not by the hands of a clock. At an average saving which is quite substantial. To be specific, our fee for an uncontested Divorce is $275. An Adoption is $150. And a simple Will is a mere $30. (Exclusive of normal court costs, of course.) And if you're buying a house, the closing cost is $100, regardless of the cost of the home. In short, anything a regular-priced lawyer does, Marcus and Tepper will do. And we'll do it for a good deal less. Why some lawyers are fit to be tied. If there's one thing some lawyers resent more than our reasonable rates, it's the way we promote them in full page ads. What's more they'd like to put an end to this practice. At Marcus and Tepper, we strongly disagree. We believe in aggressively advertising to generate a high volume of work. And staying open evenings and Saturdays to see it gets done. And the more business we tend to do, the lower the price we can afford to charge. Which makes it more equitable for all. After all, justice may be blind in the eyes of the law. But it's expensive in the hands of a lawyer. Copyright © November 1978 Marcus & Tepper Attorneys, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. All rights reserved. Marcus & Tepper Attorneys At Law 5325 W. Burleigh, Milwaukee, Wis. 449-9700 Hours: Mon. and Thurs., 8:30 until 8 PM; Tues., Wed., and Fri., 8:30 to 5. Saturday til Noon. Several attorneys complained orally and in writing to persons associated with the Board and various bar associations that the ads were offensive. Following a preliminary investigation, the Board filed a complaint with this court charging respondents with professional misconduct for causing to be published a false, misleading and deceptive ad. This court appointed Hon. William C. Sachtjen, Reserve Judge, as referee. A hearing was held on May 26 and 27, 1981. At that hearing, counsel for the Board introduced the ads and the fee schedule of the law firm. The Board's case consisted of the above documents, excerpts from answers to interrogatories and a deposition of Mr. Marcus, and the testimony of Mr. Tepper, who was called adversely. The following evidence was adduced. The ads were formulated by Mr. Marcus and an advertising executive. Mr. Marcus based the statements in the ads on his law and business experience, and on conversations with other attorneys. He could not recall any specific sources of the information. Mr. Tepper reviewed the ads prior to their publication and approved them. The Board introduced no other evidence. Two witnesses testified on behalf of respondents. The first was Professor Gerald Thain, a professor of law at the University of Wisconsin Law School. Professor Thain had been an attorney with the Federal Trade Commission whose responsibilities included review of advertising by national advertisers and making an initial determination as to whether the advertising was unfair or otherwise contrary to trade regulations. He has appeared twice before this court in connection with the adoption of rules governing attorney advertising. Professor Thain stated that to a reasonable degree of advertising probability, the ads were not false, misleading or deceptive. Respondents also called attorney James Brown, the director of the Center for Consumers Affairs in Milwaukee. Mr. Brown is president of the Wisconsin Consumers League and has served as a consumer representative on state bar committees. He stated that, based upon his experience as a Milwaukee attorney and consumer advocate, the ads were not false, misleading or deceptive. Mr. Tepper also testified, on his own behalf, that seventy-five to eighty percent of the firm's business was in the items listed in the ad and that those items did represent a fifty percent savings from the usual fees charged by attorneys for those services. He testified that he believed that the firm provided a high quality of representation, but that if he felt that a particular case called for expertise that the firm did not have, they would refer the case to outside counsel. Mr. Tepper also stated that, to his knowledge, no client had complained of the legal services provided by the firm. Following the hearing the referee, Judge Sachtjen, issued a twenty-eight page report, containing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and ordered that the complaint be dismissed on its merits. The Board appealed to this court. This is a case of first impression as to the issue of attorney advertising in this state. The Board urges us to interpret the rule governing attorney advertising so as to place upon attorneys the burden of proving the veracity of statements in advertisements which they cause to be published. Respondents argue that, in order to support a finding that they have engaged in professional misconduct, the Board must prove that the ads are false, misleading or deceptive. We first must determine who should bear the burden of establishing the truthfulness or lack thereof of the ad, and then determine whether the party upon whom the burden rests has sustained that burden. The rule is a part of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Generally, in a disciplinary proceeding, the state has the burden of showing a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility by clear and satisfactory evidence. State v. Wildermuth, 76 Wis. 2d 476, 481, 251 N.W.2d 779 (1977). The rule at issue does not explicitly allocate the burden of proof. The state argues that the traditional burden should be shifted in advertising cases because of the difficulty of enforcing the rule if the state must shoulder the burden. Furthermore, requiring attorneys to ascertain the truth of advertisements which they place is appropriate in light of attorneys' status as officers of the court. [1] Given a choice of reasonable interpretations of a rule, this court should select a construction which renders the rule constitutional. Basinas v. State, 104 Wis. 2d 539, 546, 312 N.W.2d 483 (1981); State ex rel, Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 526, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978). In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), the United States Supreme Court ruled that in light of the first amendment guaranty of free speech, a state may not forbid the publication in newspapers of truthful information regarding the provision of legal services. Prior to Bates, many states, including Wisconsin, had severely circumscribed the content and permissible placement of advertisements by attorneys. [5] The Bates case involved a newspaper advertisement placed by the Arizona law firm of Bates and O'Steen. The ad proclaimed Legal Services at Very Reasonable Rates, set forth set fees which the firm charged for certain services, such as uncontested divorces, adoptions, name changes and nonbusiness bankruptcies. The Arizona State Bar initiated disciplinary proceedings against Bates and O'Steen and, after a hearing, recommended that they be suspended from the practice of law for one week. Bates and O'Steen appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court, which upheld the ban on advertising, but reduced the discipline to a censure. Bates and O'Steen then petitioned for review in the United States Supreme Court, which granted their petition and overturned the Arizona Supreme Court decision. The United States Supreme Court held that the severe restriction on the dissemination of information which was accomplished by the rule constituted a violation of the first amendment notwithstanding the substantial state interest in regulating attorney advertising. The United States Supreme Court also held that the specific statements in the advertisement constituted speech protected by the first amendment to the United States Constitution. 433 U.S. at 381-82. The Bates decision did not explicitly allocate the burden of proof in disciplinary proceedings arising out of advertisements by attorneys. However, the following passage concerning the allegation that the ad was misleading because it did not disclose that a name change could be accomplished without an attorney implies that sufficient evidence must be introduced to support a finding that the advertisement is improper in order to justify discipline. The record does not unambiguously reveal some of the relevant facts in determining whether the nondisclosure is misleading, such as how complicated the procedure is and whether the State provides assistance for laymen. The deposition of one appellant, however, reflects that when he ascertained that a name change required only the correction of a record or the like, he frequently would send the client to effect the change himself. App. 112. We conclude that it has not been demonstrated that the advertisement at issue could be suppressed. 433 U.S. at 382 (Emphasis added.) The United States Supreme Court recently clarified permissible scope of regulation of attorney advertising in In the Matter of R.M.J., 455 U.S. ___, 71 L. Ed. 2d 64, 102 S. Ct. 929 (1982). [6] In that case, an attorney published advertisements which violated the Missouri Supreme Court Rules governing attorney advertising. [7] The ads, which appeared in newspapers and the yellow pages of telephone books, listed areas of practice which were not among the categories permitted by the rule. The advertisement also failed to include a disclaimer of special expertise in those areas, as required by the rule, and stated that the attorney was admitted to practice before the United States Supreme Court, which was not provided for in the rule. The Advisory Committee of the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri, which was charged with enforcing the Code of Professional Responsibility in that state, charged the attorney with unprofessional conduct. The Missouri Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the rule and privately reprimanded the attorney. In the Matter of R.M.J., 609 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. 1981). The attorney petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review of that decision. The United States Supreme Court granted that petition and, in a unanimous decision, reversed the Missouri Supreme Court.