Opinion ID: 2139868
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 25

Heading: Specificity in Pleadings

Text: [19] Defendants next argue that the district court erred in failing to recognize that Street did not properly allege a civil conspiracy. To pursue a claim of civil conspiracy where, as here, the allegations involve a conspiracy between the corporation and its corporate employees, the petition must allege that the latter are acting outside the scope of their authority or other than in the normal course of their corporate duties. [35] Defendants believe Street failed to do so in his pleadings and was therefore estopped from pursuing that claim at trial. But the portion of Street's pleadings which set forth a claim of civil conspiracy is identical to the pleadings filed by each of the other plaintiffs in this case. In disposing of defendants' first appeal, we held that such language was sufficient to set forth a claim of conspiracy among all three defendants. [36] Defendants attempt to escape the force of that conclusion by arguing that it contradicts our decision in Upah v. Acona Bros. Co. [37] In Upah, we held that a plaintiff was estopped from pursuing a civil conspiracy claim due to a deficiency in the pleadings. But there is a notable difference between the pleadings at issue here and the pleadings in Upah. In Upah, the pleadings alleged that defendants' wrongful actions `were done within the scope of their corporate duties.' [38] This presented an obvious problem because, as explained above, a claim of civil conspiracy requires exactly the oppositean allegation that defendants' wrongful actions were done outside the scope of their authority. [39] But the pleadings involved in this case do not present such an inherent contradiction. The pleadings here allege that Bloemer and Hollingshead used the Mid America corporate entity as their alter ego and a conduit through which they defrauded the homeowners. Such allegations are sufficient to support a claim of civil conspiracy.