Opinion ID: 1141693
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Stewart & Fritz Appeal

Text: Fill was to be hauled by Castle with its trucks from two places, one located about one mile from the job site, referred to as the short haul, and the other, somewhat less than three miles from the job site, referred to as the long haul. There was no dispute as to the number of truck loads hauled to the job site, there being 3,208 short hauls and 2,288 long hauls. The dispute arose over the amount Castle was to be paid for hauling the fill. Stewart & Fritz's version of the agreement was that Castle was to be paid 50 cents a yard on the short haul and 90 cents a yard on the long haul, with quantities to be measured after the fill was in place and compacted. On the other hand, Castle's version of the agreement was that he was to be paid $5.00 a load for the short haul and $9.00 a load for the long haul, with quantities to be measured as they were placed in the trucks prior to compaction at the fill site. According to Stewart & Fritz's version of the agreement, the total amount due Castle for gravel hauling was $19,829.00. According to Castle's version of the agreement, the total amount due would have been $36,632.00. The jury's verdict reflected that the total recovery attributable to gravel hauling was $32,969.00. This latter figure could be arrived at, Stewart & Fritz contend, only by the jury rejecting both Stewart & Fritz's and Castle's versions of the agreement, and by computing Castle's recovery on the basis of 9 uncompacted yards per truckload, at the price of 50 cents a yard for the short haul and 90 cents a yard for the long haul. [1] Stewart & Fritz argue that since the jury rejected the two theories of the agreement that had been presented by the parties, it was pure speculation on the jury's part and the remaking of the contract to compute Castle's recovery on the basis that the jury appears to have used. In short, the point made by Stewart & Fritz on this appeal is that the verdict and judgment should be set aside because the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. To hold that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence is equivalent to saying that under the evidence the jury could not reasonably have decided as they did. [2] To reach such a conclusion it would have to appear that evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust. [3] We cannot reach that conclusion. Castle testified that there was to be paid $5.00 a load for the short haul and $9.00 a load for the long haul. But he also testified that his understanding of the agreement was for 50 cents a yard for the short haul and 90 cents a yard for the long haul, and he had converted this into certain amounts for each load apparently on the basis that each load consisted of 10 yards. The evidence was in dispute as to the number of yards of fill in a truckload. Evidence on behalf of Stewart & Fritz tended to show that each load consisted of 3 loader buckets, and that this amounted to 7 yards of fill. On the other hand, Castle testified that each loader bucket held 3 yards, which would mean that with 3 loader buckets for each load a load would consist of 9 yards. This evidence, together with Castle's testimony as to the 50 cents and 90 cents a yard payments to be made for the short and long hauls, respectively, would mean that the jury had reason for finding that payment was to be made on the basis of 9 yards for each load at the 50 cents and 90 cents figures testified to. Furthermore, this also shows an evidentiary basis for a determination that payment was to be made on the basis of uncompacted yardage, i.e., on the basis of the number of yards of loose fill in each truckload. Castle's testimony that payment was to be made on the basis of a certain amount per yard, which he converted into a certain amount for each load, could be construed by the jury as meaning that Castle understood the agreement as contemplating payment on the basis of each truck load of fill before it was dumped at the job site and compacted. Unless this is what Castle understood the agreement to be, there would be no point to his converting the price per yard to a certain sum per load. This could indicate to the jury that Castle understood that payment was to be made on the basis of the number of yards of fill that was contained in a truck at the time the truck was loaded, and not the number of yards of fill after dumping and compaction. There was an evidentiary basis for the jury's decision, which turned upon disputed facts. We hold that the verdict was not contrary to the weight of the evidence. As to Stewart & Fritz, the judgment must be affirmed.