Opinion ID: 6111825
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims Against the Federal Agencies

Text: In these claims, plaintiffs assert that the federal agencies violated both RFRA and the Stafford Act by distributing COVID-19 relief aid to Colorado while Colorado was imposing and enforcing COVID-19 restrictions that violated plaintiffs’ freeexercise rights. RFRA prohibits the federal government from substantially burdening the exercise of religion—even if the burden results from a neutral law of general 22 Appellate Case: 20-1391 Document: 010110636013 Date Filed: 01/24/2022 Page: 23 applicability—except in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest that is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1, 2000bb-3. And the Stafford Act—which authorizes the president to provide disaster relief in certain emergency situations, see Barbosa v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 916 F.3d 1068, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2019)—includes a nondiscrimination clause, under which “relief and assistance activities shall be accomplished in an equitable and impartial manner, without discrimination on the ground[] of . . . religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 5151(a); see also 44 C.F.R. § 206.11. The district court did not reach the merits of these claims because it concluded that plaintiffs likely lacked standing to bring them. “Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or controversy. The doctrine developed in our case[]law to ensure that federal courts do not exceed their authority as it has been traditionally understood.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). To establish the standing necessary to invoke federal jurisdiction under Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement, a plaintiff must demonstrate, at an “irreducible minimum,” three elements: (1) an actual or threatened injury that is both (2) traceable to the defendant’s challenged conduct and (3) likely to be redressed by the relief requested. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); see also Aptive Env’t, LLC v. Town of Castle Rock, 959 F.3d 961, 973 (10th Cir. 2020) (listing these three elements as necessary “[t]o satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement”). The district court accepted that plaintiffs had shown the required injury, 23 Appellate Case: 20-1391 Document: 010110636013 Date Filed: 01/24/2022 Page: 24 describing it as “the deprivation of their ability to freely practice their religion due to the restrictions imposed by the” executive and public-health orders. App. vol. 6, 1445. But the district court concluded that this injury was likely not traceable to the federal agencies because “nothing in the record indicates that any action by the [f]ederal [agencies] caused or induced the State . . . to issue the challenged publichealth orders” or to keep such orders in place. Id. at 1445–46. Instead, the evidence showed that Colorado issued several of the relevant orders “before receiving any federal disaster funds” and that the federal agencies did not “condition[] their approval or distribution of aid on the issuance of orders that mandate” any particular COVID-19 restrictions. Id. at 1446. The district court also concluded that plaintiffs likely could not show redressability because no evidence demonstrated “that an injunction against future federal aid would lead Colorado to rescind any unlawful” orders. Id. On appeal, plaintiffs first assert that the district court erred by applying the standing test from Valley Forge because that case involved taxpayer standing and this case involves RFRA, which Congress enacted “to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.” Aplt. Br. 48 (quoting § 2000bb(b)(2)). But as the federal agencies point out, the standing test recited in Valley Forge derives from Article III of the Constitution and remains the same, no matter the type of case. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472 (explaining that Article III “requires” three-part standing test). Nevertheless, plaintiffs contend that RFRA itself establishes their standing, 24 Appellate Case: 20-1391 Document: 010110636013 Date Filed: 01/24/2022 Page: 25 asserting that “the words ‘traceability’ and ‘redressability’ are not part of RFRA.” Aplt. Br. 53. Yet RFRA itself expressly provides that “[s]tanding to assert a claim or defense under this section shall be governed by the general rules of standing under [A]rticle III of the Constitution.” § 2000bb-1(c). In line with this statutory command, we conduct the usual three-part standing inquiry in RFRA cases. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1126 (10th Cir. 2013) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S 682 (2014). Thus, to establish standing here, plaintiffs must show injury, traceability, and redressability. Like the district court, we assume the alleged free-exercise violations constitute the required injury. But plaintiffs fail to show either traceability or redressability. At best, they provide conclusory assertions about the federal agencies’ alleged participation in the State’s free-exercise violations. For instance, they state that the federal agencies “approv[ed]” Colorado’s restrictions. Aplt. Br. 52. But even assuming such approval would establish both traceability and redressability, plaintiffs cite no record evidence supporting the existence of such approval. Indeed, on the contrary, plaintiffs do not challenge the district court’s finding that Colorado imposed some of the challenged restrictions before the federal agencies awarded any relief funds. And this finding negates any implication that Colorado imposed the challenged restrictions as a result or condition of receiving such federal aid or that it would rescind such restrictions if the aid were halted.13 13 Plaintiffs cite a variety of inapposite authority that has little to do with standing, including Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, which governs preliminary 25 Appellate Case: 20-1391 Document: 010110636013 Date Filed: 01/24/2022 Page: 26 Thus, because plaintiffs point to no record evidence that the State imposed unconstitutional restrictions as a result or condition of receiving federal COVID-19 aid or that enjoining such federal aid would cause the State to amend or rescind its orders, plaintiffs have not met their burden to establish either traceability or redressability. Accordingly, plaintiffs lack standing and therefore fail to make the requisite strong showing of a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claims against the federal agencies.