Opinion ID: 1933585
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mobile's Liability For Loss

Text: The defendants admit, for purposes of this appeal, that Mobile having been paid to safeguard and deliver the goods, was bound to exercise at least ordinary care in the undertaking. After proof of the delivery of the goods to Mobile and the failure by Mobile to redeliver them, defendants had the duty to come forward with evidence to show how the goods were lost and that the loss was not the result of Mobile's negligence. Since defendants failed to introduce such evidence their liability has been made out. However, they contend that they may assert the limitation on liability provisions contained in the bills of lading under which the missing cargo was shipped as a complete defense to their liability for any loss. The Panama's bills of lading contain the following clauses: 15. The carrier's liability for loss and damage shall be restricted to the actual pecuniary loss or damage sustained . . . but in no case shall such compensation exceed the market price at destination on day of arrival . . . and the maximum sum to be paid . . . in respect of any package . . . shall be $100, Except in the case of a package or piece declared in writing at time of shipment, as exceeding $100 in value, the full value . . . being also stated . . . and extra freight ad valorem, being paid . . . in accordance with the carrier's tariffs for goods of special value. . . . 17. Claims for loss or damage shall be presented to the carrier in writing within sixty days after the shipment concerned arrives or should arrive at destination. Any claim not so presented . . . shall be considered waived. . . . No suit for loss or damage shall be maintainable against the carrier unless instituted within six months after the shipment concerned arrives or should arrive at destination.  (Emphasis supplied). If the bills of lading were in effect after the goods were landed on Mobile's pier then, so the defendants' argument runs, Mobile as the agent for the carrier was entitled to the benefit of the above-quoted restrictive provisions, and since the owners' claims were barred by the terms of these provisions at the time when the plaintiff paid them, the plaintiff cannot recover indemnity for such payments. We need not consider the effect of these clauses under the relevant federal statutes, (Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 49 Stat. 1207 (1936), 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 1300-1315; Harter Act, 27 Stat. 445 (1893), 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 190-195), because of paragraph 22 contained in the bills of lading. 22. In the event of the steamer being prevented by . . . some . . . cause beyond the carrier's control, from reaching the port of delivery, then the carrier shall have the right and option of . . . landing the goods at the nearest available port, such . . . landing to be considered a full and proper accomplishment of his contract, and all additional expenses so incurred shall be paid by the consignee or receiver of the shipment. (Emphasis supplied). Both parties concede that the strike in progress at the New York Port was a justification for the departure from the contract of carriage, and for the call made at Philadelphia to discharge cargo. See Accinanto Ltd. v. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co., 99 F. Supp. 261 (D.C. Md. 1951), aff'd, 199 F. 2d 134 (4th cir. 1952). However, as the defendants point out, [u]ntil receipt by the consignee, the carrier, despite any terms to the contrary in its bill of lading, continues to hold goods unloaded by it as a bailee. . . . and, as such, it is bound to exercise ordinary care in the protection of the goods. Standard Brands, Inc. v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 42 F. Supp. 43, 44 (D.C. Mass. 1941). For this reason defendants argue that the landing referred to in the bills of lading must include the loading, necessary storage, and delivery of the goods to the forwarding carrier, and that therefore, the bills were still in effect at the time the loss of the goods occurred. Apparently defendants overlook the fact that a contract of carriage (bill of lading) may or may not apply to all facets of the carrier's duty towards the owners of its cargo. The Bellingham, 49 F. 2d 442 (D.C.N.J. 1931), rev'd on other grounds, 57 F. 2d 1015 (3rd cir. 1932); Federal Insurance Co. v. American Export Lines, 113 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Whether it does apply in any given situation depends upon the wording of the individual contract. In the present case the parties provided that the landing of the goods was to be considered an accomplishment of the contract of carriage. Giving the word landing its ordinary meaning, and applying that meaning to the context of the carriage contract, we believe that the term refers to the physical placing of the cargo upon Mobile's pier. Certainly, landing would not mean to act as a warehouseman, or to hold, and to deliver as the defendants suggest that it should. The defendants introduced no evidence to show that by usage, convention of the trade, or under the surrounding circumstances that landing had a meaning different from its ordinary meaning. In effect, the defendants attempt to create an ambiguity where no ambiguity exists, and under this guise, vary the plain meaning of clause 22. This they may not do. See 3 Williston, Contracts 1750 n.10 (rev. ed. 1936); Anstead v. Cook, 291 Pa. 335, 140 Atl. 139 (1927). We hold, therefore, that although the termination of the contract did not relieve the carrier of its common law duties as bailee to deliver the goods to the consignees, its contractual duties under the bills had ceased. Defenses created by these bills, which would have been effective had the cargo loss occurred during the voyage, were no longer available to Mobile after the landing of the cargo. See The Bellingham, supra; Federal Insurance Co. v. American Export Lines, supra.