Opinion ID: 2906310
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Intended loss amount

Text: Both Defendants argue the district court erred in calculating the intended loss caused by the St. Johns. The base offense level for fraud offenses is calculated, in part, pursuant to the table at Section 2B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1). The greater the loss, the larger the enhancement in offense level recommended by the Guidelines. See id. In calculating the Defendants’ sentence, “loss is the greater of actual loss or intended loss,” § 2B1.1 cmt. 3(A), where actual loss “means the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense,” and intended loss “means the pecuniary harm that was intended to result from the offense[] and . . . includes intended pecuniary harm that would have been impossible or unlikely to occur . . . .” § 2B1.1 cmt. 3(A)(i), (ii). 8 Case: 14-10406 Document: 00513187204 Page: 9 Date Filed: 09/09/2015 No. 14-10406 The PSR calculated the St. Johns’ intended loss to be $11,196,911.34, warranting a 20 base offense level increase. 3 See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(K). The PSR also calculated the actual loss to be $9,611,240.05, but it adopted the larger number for the purpose of sentencing. See § 2B1.1 cmt. 3(A). The district court accepted the PSR’s loss calculations and sentenced the St. Johns accordingly. Dale St. John raises several objections to the “intended loss” calculation. 4 Jeffrey St. John raises one. However, they both fail to brief any objection to the “actual loss” calculation in their initial briefing. 5 To the extent they intended to appeal the actual loss determination, they failed to adequately brief it, so it is abandoned. United States v. Charles, 469 F.3d 402, 408 (5th Cir. 2006). As a result, we conclude that any error in the district court’s intended loss calculation was harmless. “Loss” for the purpose of sentencing is the greater of actual or intended loss. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. 3(A). Both the Defendants’ actual and intended loss warrant a 20 base offense level increase. Even if the district court erred in calculating the Defendants’ intended loss, the Defendants have not properly contested the district court’s “actual loss” determination. An error that does not affect the Defendants’ offense level is harmless. See United States v. Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 462 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Moreover, because the relevant conduct finding challenged here did not affect 3To reach this conclusion, the PSR added the total value of claims A Medical submitted to Medicare, $1,463,716.14, to the total value of claims submitted by HHAs to Medicare on behalf of patients certified as homebound by A Medical, $9,733,195.20. 4 Jeffrey St. John addresses only whether he subjectively intended the loss, while Dale St. John also makes various arguments premised upon the notion that the district court included amounts in the intended loss that exceed the scope of the offenses proven. 5 Dale St. John discusses actual loss only as part of his restitution challenge, and did not substantively address these issues until his reply brief, which is not sufficient. See Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 281 (5th Cir. 2004). Jeffrey St. John does not take issue with the actual loss calculation at all. 9 Case: 14-10406 Document: 00513187204 Page: 10 Date Filed: 09/09/2015 No. 14-10406 [the defendant’s] combined adjusted offense level, any error was harmless.”); United States v. Chon, 713 F.3d 812, 822 (5th Cir. 2013) (similar); United States v. Salinas, 310 F. App’x 632, 633–34 (5th Cir. 2009) (similar). Even if we were to construe their briefs more liberally, Jeffrey St. John’s arguments were relevant only to intended loss, and we conclude, therefore, that any error as to his offense level is harmless. Dale St. John made two arguments under an issue attacking only the “intended loss” calculation that are arguably relevant to both actual and intended loss: that the loss sum included sums that were not “relevant conduct” and that the district court should have reduced the amount of any loss by the value of legitimate services provided. Even if we were to construe these arguments to attack the actual loss calculation (which are murky at best, given the framing of the issue), we conclude that Dale St. John is not entitled to relief. We conclude that the HHA amounts were properly included as “relevant conduct” as part of the same “common scheme” as the offense of conviction. See United States v. Ocana, 204 F.3d 585, 589 (5th Cir. 2000). We also conclude that the district court did not err in assessing the entire amount of actual loss despite Dale St. John’s argument (asserted for the first time on appeal) that the district court should have subtracted the value of any legitimate services under United States v. Klein, 543 F.3d 206, 214 (5th Cir. 2008). We conclude that this case is governed by the rule discussed in United States v. Hebron, 684 F.3d 554, 563 (5th Cir. 2012), that where the fraud is so pervasive that separating legitimate from fraudulent conduct “is not reasonably practicable, the burden shifts to the defendant” to prove any legitimate amounts. In this case, the fraud is so pervasive that the district court did not plainly err in failing to subtract any amounts from the actual loss calculation in the absence of evidence from the defendant as to specific legitimate services. 10 Case: 14-10406 Document: 00513187204 Page: 11 Date Filed: 09/09/2015 No. 14-10406