Opinion ID: 416515
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Barrett's Motions for Continuance

Text: 9 Barrett contends that in view of the Government's last-minute production of a photographic expert witness, the trial court should have granted a continuance to enable his counsel to prepare for cross-examination and rebuttal of that expert. The Government first notified Barrett of its intention to call a photographic expert as a witness on July 28, 1981, eight days before trial. Barrett had earlier moved for a continuance because of his counsel's involvement in other trials. On July 31, 1981, Barrett supplemented this motion by submitting an affidavit by his counsel stating that a continuance was necessary in order for Barrett to prepare for the expert and possibly obtain a defense expert. 10 On August 3, 1981, two days before trial, the Government provided Barrett with the results of the expert's report. Although the record indicates that Barrett made a diligent effort to secure an expert to assist him before trial, he was unsuccessful. Barrett made numerous motions for continuance before and during trial which were all denied. 11 Barrett relies principally on the Second Circuit decision of United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1969), to support his argument that the trial court's failure to grant a continuance constitutes reversible error. The defendants in Kelly were two police officers who were charged with retaining and selling cocaine that they had seized in an earlier raid. At trial, the Government introduced the results of neutron-activation tests which tended to show that the cocaine sold by the defendant police officers came from the same batch seized in the earlier raid. The Government, in violation of a discovery order, had not informed the defendants of the tests, and the defendants first learned of the test results when they were introduced at trial. The defendants' motion for a continuance to carry out its own version of the tests was denied and the defendants were subsequently convicted. 12 In reversing the defendants' convictions, the Second Circuit held that fairness requires that adequate notice be given the defense to check the findings and conclusions of the government's experts. Id. at 29. The court ordered a new trial to give the defendants a fair opportunity to run their own neutron-activation tests. Id. 13 We conclude that the rule announced in Kelly applies to the present case. Thus, the question becomes whether Barrett was given adequate time to obtain an expert to assist him in attacking the findings of the Government's photographic expert. Under the circumstances of this case, we find that Barrett was not given adequate time to obtain an expert to assist him in attacking the Government's expert. 14 Barrett was first notified of the Government's intent to call a photographic expert eight days before trial. He received the results of the expert's tests only two days before trial. The record indicates that Barrett probably could have obtained an expert to assist him had he been given more time. 15 The denial of a continuance is within the trial court's discretion and should not be disturbed on appeal absent clear abuse. United States v. Hoyos, 573 F.2d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir.1978). In failing to grant the requested continuance to allow Barrett adequate time to obtain the assistance of an expert, the trial court clearly abused its discretion. Cf. United States v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823, 827-28 (2d Cir.1976) (failure to grant indigent defendant's request for fingerprint expert violates Criminal Justice Act); Barnard v. Henderson, 514 F.2d 744, 746 (5th Cir.1975) (defendant has right to have own ballistics expert examine evidence). 16 Our finding of error does not end our inquiry. We must also determine whether the error amounts to one requiring reversal of Barrett's conviction. In this context, it is important to note that our finding of error is based on our determination that Barrett should have been given additional time to secure a defense expert for the limited purpose of assisting him in attacking the credibility of the Government's expert through cross-examination and rebuttal. It is not based on a determination that Barrett was entitled to additional time to secure a defense expert witness to provide affirmative proof of his innocence by showing that his seized clothes and the clothes worn by the robber in the surveillance photograph were different. Barrett received general discovery in the case three weeks before trial; it was only notification of the Government's intention to call a photographic expert and the results of the expert's tests that were received late. If Barrett had desired a photographic expert to provide affirmative proof of his innocence, he had ample time to secure one. The prejudice resulting to Barrett from the denial of the continuance is thus limited to his difficulty in attacking the credibility of the Government's witness without the aid of an expert. 5 17 This prejudice could have been eliminated by excluding the testimony of the Government's expert witness. Therefore, the denial of the continuance would be harmless error if the improper admission of the testimony of the Government's expert under the facts of this case would be deemed harmless. 18 An error is considered harmless and shall be disregarded on review if it does not affect substantial rights of the defendant. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a). 6 This circuit has formulated a test requiring the determination of whether the prejudice resulting from the error was more probably than not harmless. United States v. Castillo, 615 F.2d 878, 883 (9th Cir.1980). 19 The Government introduced the testimony of the photographic expert for the purpose of identifying Barrett as the robber. We find that the other Government evidence introduced at trial identifying Barrett as the robber is so overwhelming that the improper admission of the expert's testimony would be deemed harmless error. United States v. Burke, 506 F.2d 1165, 1170 (9th Cir.1974) (erroneous admission of photographic expert's testimony harmless in view of other overwhelming evidence), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 915, 95 S.Ct. 1576, 43 L.Ed.2d 781 (1975); United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146, 150 (9th Cir.1974) (same), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975); United States v. Trejo, 501 F.2d 138, 143 (9th Cir.1974) (same). 7 The Government's considerable identification evidence included (1) four clear 8 8- by 10-inch bank surveillance photographs of the robber for the jury to examine and compare with two smaller photographs of Barrett taken before he had shaved his beard and mustache, Barrett's clothes seized by the FBI, and Barrett's physical appearance at trial; (2) a positive in-court identification by Bass, the teller, who had previously given a fairly accurate description 9 of the robber to the police and who also identified the clothing seized from Barrett as resembling that worn by the robber; and (3) the testimony of Lemon, Barrett's live-in girl friend, who identified Barrett as the person in the surveillance photo. Since the improper admission of the Government expert's testimony would be deemed harmless, it follows that the district court's failure to grant the continuance is harmless error. We hold that no substantial rights of Barrett were affected by the error.