Opinion ID: 1696327
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The remaining issue presented relates to instruction 8 by which the jury was told:

Text: A statute of this State provides that if there is evidence that a person operating a motor vehicle upon a public highway or street, had at the time of said operation, more than ten one-hundredths of one percentum by weight in his blood, the same shall be presumptive evidence that such person was then under the influence of an alcoholic beverage. The rule established by the foregoing statute permits the jury to infer that the defendant was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage if it is found by the jury that at the time defendant was driving an automobile on the public highway or street, his blood contained more than ten one-hundreths of one percentum by weight of alcohol. However, such inference is not conclusive, but it is rebuttable. It may be overcome or rebutted by evidence to the contrary. Defendant unsuccessfully objected thereto at trial time and by motion for a new trial. He thereby claimed and now argues the instruction, as given, takes away the presumption of innocence as guaranteed by the 14th Amendment and places the burden of proof on the defendant to disprove his guilt. The precise instruction quoted above was before us and held prejudicially erroneous in State v. Hansen, 203 N.W.2d 216, 218-223 (Iowa 1972). See also State v. Sloan, 203 N.W.2d 225, 226-227 (Iowa 1972). But the State contends other instructions given, placing the burden of proof on the prosecution at all trial stages, served to dissipate any error inherent in the controverted instruction. That is neither an unique nor persuasive contention. In fact it was effectively felled by our holding in State v. Hutton, 207 N.W.2d 581 (Iowa 1973). There the same instruction as here involved included this closing admonition, 207 N.W.2d at 582-583: `You are instructed that despite the permissible inference from the blood test, the burden remains at all times upon the State to establish each and every element of the crime and the crime itself beyond a reasonable doubt and the burden remains at all times upon the State to go forward with the proof of all matters in issue in the case. There is no burden upon the Defendant in a criminal case.' We reversed, however, and in so doing aptly stated, 207 N.W.2d at 583: In support of affirmance the State does not ask us to reconsider our holdings in Sloan and Hansen. Instead it seeks to distinguish this case on the basis of the additional final paragraph of instruction 11. Consequently, the only issue before us is whether the concededly erroneous part of instruction 11 was cured and rendered harmless by the additional final paragraph. We find the distinction and argument advanced by the State unpersuasive. As the dissent in Hansen noted, `Throughout the instructions the trial court put the burden on the State to prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' 203 N.W.2d at 224. Yet, the majority in both Hansen and Sloan, after considering all the instructions as a whole, including those clearly imposing the burden on the State, held the challenged instruction was bad. The mere fact trial court in the instant case inserted a paragraph on the State's burden in the same instruction, in addition to the other instructions on burden of proof, is an insignificant distinction. We cannot speculate whether the jury followed the erroneous part of instruction 11 or the curative part. See Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111 (8 Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1001, 89 S. Ct. 483, 21 L.Ed.2d 466 (1968). This instructional inconsistency is indistinguishable from Hansen and Sloan in which we had no way of knowing whether the jury followed the erroneous instructions or the proper instructions on burden of proof. Including tacitly contradictory parts in the same instruction would be just as confusing to a jury as submitting the contradictory concepts in separate instructions. See also United States v. Kenaan, 496 F.2d 181, 182 (1st Cir.) (opinion filed April 26, 1974); Carradus v. Lange, 203 N.W.2d 565, 570-571 (Iowa 1973), and citations. It is to us apparent our holdings in Hutton, Sloan and Hansen, all supra, dictate a reversal in this case. Reversed and remanded for a new trial.