Opinion ID: 2978801
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: To be eligible for asylum, an alien bears the burden of establishing that he or she is a “refugee” as Congress has defined that term for the purposes of asylum determinations. INS v. EliasZacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)). According to the relevant statute, a “refugee” is a person outside of his or her country of nationality who is unable or unwilling to return to that country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of” one or more of five possible grounds: “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Under this standard, the applicant must show that he or she has a well-founded fear of future persecution or that he or she suffered actual persecution in the past. Mullai, 385 F.3d at 638. A showing of past persecution entitles an alien to a rebuttable presumption that he or she has a well-founded fear of future persecution. Id.; 8 C.F.R. 11 § 208.13(b)(1). That presumption can often be rebutted, however, if the government shows that conditions in the alien’s home country have changed. See, e.g., Liti v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 631, 639 (6th Cir. 2005). An applicant’s own testimony, if credible, can be sufficient in and of itself to support an asylum application. See Dorosh v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 379, 382 (6th Cir. 2004). Thus, in cases where the applicant testifies on his or her own behalf, the immigration judge’s determination of the applicant’s credibility is not only important but can be dispositive.6 Although we review this determination under the deferential “substantial evidence” standard, the IJ must at least provide specific and cogent reasons for its adverse credibility finding. Chen v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 468, 472 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Sylla, 388 F.3d at 926). Affirmative inconsistencies, as well as omissions, may form the basis of an adverse credibility determination, so long as they are “substantially related to the asylum claim.” Liti, 411 F.3d at 637 (internal citations omitted). But an adverse credibility finding cannot be based entirely on minor discrepancies that do not “go to the heart of the case.”7 Sylla, 388 F.3d at 926. In other words, “[i]f discrepancies cannot be viewed as attempts by the 6 Indeed, the testimony of the applicant is often the principal evidence, or the only evidence, in asylum cases. Logically, the more crucial the testimony of the applicant is to the resolution of the case, the more important the credibility determination becomes. See, e.g., Gjolaj v. Keisler, No. 063877, 2007 WL 3104800, at  (6th Cir. Oct. 23, 2007) (noting importance of credibility determinations). 7 Congress’ enactment of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302, changed this standard. Now, an IJ can base an adverse credibility determination on any inconsistencies, “without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also El-Moussa v. Holder, 569 F.3d 250, 256 (6th Cir. 2009). However, this new standard only applies to applications for asylum, withholding of removal, or other such relief that were filed on or after May 11, 2005. See El-Moussa, 569 F.3d at 256. Because Perlaska’s application was filed before this date, the pre-REAL ID Act standard still applies to her case. 12 applicant to enhance his claims of persecution, they have no bearing on credibility.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). If an immigration judge does make an adverse credibility finding, the judge may require corroborating evidence to justify granting asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(B). 1) Credibility Determination In its review of the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, the Board specifically relied on three of the inconsistencies identified by the IJ among Perlaska’s various statements. First, there are inconsistencies in the record with respect to Perlaska’s alleged rape. As noted above, Petitioner did not even mention the rape to immigration officials during either the airport interview or the credible fear interview. Perlaska first indicated that she had been raped when she amended her asylum petition on the day of her hearing before the IJ. Then when she testified to the incident during the merits hearing, her account contained some inconsistencies with respect to what happened, how she knew she was raped, and whom she told about the assault. Second, Perlaska gave untruthful statements regarding the whereabouts of her passport. She stated first that it had been burned during the war, and later that it had been confiscated by police. Finally she admitted that nothing had happened to it and that it was in her possession all along. Third, regarding the events surrounding her grandfather’s death, Perlaska did not mention the presence of her cousins (and the fact that they, too, were beaten by police) in her brief credible fear interview. She did, however, note her cousins’ presence during the more thorough merits hearing. Though we do not necessarily agree with the Board that all of these discrepancies are substantial and go to the heart of Perlaska’s claim, we cannot conclude that any reasonable 13 adjudicator would be compelled to find that Perlaska is credible. See Singh v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 396, 402 (6th Cir. 2005) (court not compelled to find petitioner credible where “several of the grounds upon which the IJ relied are somewhat questionable,” but two central inconsistencies were legitimate). Two discrepancies in particular – 1) the fact that Perlaska did not mention the rape until the date of her hearing and 2) the fact that Perlaska lied twice upon entering the country about her passport being destroyed – lend support to the IJ’s credibility determination. Perlaska offers several reasons why these discrepancies should be disregarded. She claims that her post-traumatic stress disorder explains her reluctance to reveal the fact of the rape and the details of it. Perlaska also points out that she had been in jail for more than a week before her credible fear interview, making it reasonable that she did not provide exhaustive detail concerning events which caused her trauma and fear. However, we are not reviewing the facts de novo or making our own determination as to Perlaska’s credibility and overall asylum merit. We only determine whether there is substantial evidence on the record as a whole to support the immigration judge’s finding in these respects. See Ivezaj v. INS, 84 F.3d 215, 220 (6th Cir. 1996). Thus, even if Perlaska’s explanations for failing to mention the rape are reasonable, we cannot conclude that the IJ could not weigh the omission in determining Perlaska’s credibility. Compare Koulibaly v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d 613, 624 (6th Cir. 2008) (adverse credibility determination not clearly erroneous where petitioner failed to mention being beaten in her asylum application). The same is true with regard to Perlaska’s lies about her passport. And, because these discrepancies go to the heart of Petitioner’s claim, we cannot rule that any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to rule differently. 14 2) Corroborating Evidence Perlaska also challenges the ruling by the Board that her failure to call corroborating witnesses who were available weighed against her with respect to her credibility and underlying burden of proof. We note first that the Board was within its rights to consider the lack of such corroborating evidence where the IJ found that her testimony was not credible. See Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 954 (6th Cir. 2004) (affirming an alien’s failure to provide corroborating evidence as “further support” for adverse credibility finding); see also Steinberga v. Holder, No. 084260, 2009 WL 3644628, at  (6th Cir. Nov. 2, 2009) (“[W]hen doubts arise concerning credibility, corroborating evidence becomes particularly important in meeting the alien’s burden of proof.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Petitioner argues that the Board was wrong to weigh against her the failure to call the witnesses on witness list that she provided. According to Perlaska, her witnesses did not testify only because they did not have personal knowledge of the facts about which she testified. Petitioner’s argument, however, fails to address the Board’s concern. The problem is that no one testified on behalf of Petitioner to corroborate her claims, not that she created a list of witnesses who did not end up testifying. Petitioner also relies on a letter written by the New York psychiatrist who examined her that describes Perlaska’s account of her “traumatic experiences” in Kosovo, including the rape, and concludes that her “very serious psychic disability” is due to those traumas. The relevance of this document is somewhat limited, however, because the doctor could not corroborate Perlaska’s allegations of persecution–allegations of which he has no personal knowledge. Finally, Petitioner also submitted documents describing the past violence in Serbia, the pictures showing the damage done to the home she formerly shared with her grandmother, and the asylum applications of Perlaska’s father, mother, and two brothers that confirm her relationship to 15 Mikel Marku. Even if this evidence is helpful to Perlaska’s petition, we cannot say that it is sufficient, in light of the discrepancies in her statements, to convince us that a reasonable adjudicator would have been compelled to rule differently. 3) Rebuttable Presumption In its decision to dismiss Perlaska’s appeal, the Board opted not to address the IJ’s alternative ruling that the government had also proven country conditions have changed, thereby rebutting the presumption that Petitioner has a well-founded fear of future persecution upon return to Kosovo. We also find it unnecessary to reach this issue because the BIA did not rely on this theory and because the issue has not been briefed to this Court.