Opinion ID: 1271220
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: SHOULD THE WISCONSIN COURTS RECOGNIZE A PROCURING AGENT OF THE BUYER DEFENSE TO THE CRIME OF PARTY TO THE POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DELIVER, CONTRARY TO SECS. 161.41(1m) AND 939.05, STATS.?

Text: As was stated above, the defendant was convicted as a party to possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, in violation of secs. 161.41(1m) and 939.05, Stats. Section 161.41(1m) provides: Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to possess, with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance.... The defendant argues that his conviction under sec. 161.41(1m), Stats., as a party to the crime, cannot be sustained because his conduct falls squarely within that of the appellant described in United States v. Moses, 220 F.2d 166 (3rd Cir. 1955). In Moses, the appellant introduced federal agents to a seller of drugs and also vouched for the agents' reliability. Id. at 168. She was not associated in any way with what occurred past this point. In that case, even though a sale of drugs eventually transpired, the court concluded that Moses' conduct was insufficient to convict her as party to the crime of selling, contrary to 18 U.S.C.A. sec. 2 and 26 U.S.C.A. sec. 2554. Therefore, Hecht argues that his conduct in the instant case is insufficient to sustain a conviction for party to the crime of possession with intent to deliver under the corresponding Wisconsin statutes. However, it is clear to us that Moses and its precursor, United States v. Sawyer, 210 F.2d 169 (3rd Cir. 1954), were decided prior to the 1970 enactment of the federal Controlled Substances Act, which appears at 21 U.S. C.A. sec. 801 (West 1981). [2] Before the enactment of the Controlled Substances Act, federal law recognized two separate and distinct offenses for transactions in controlled substances. The separate offenses consisted of buying and of selling. See, 26 U.S.C.A. secs. 2553 and 2554 (I.R.C. 1954). The Moses decision noted this distinction: Therefore, a participant in a particular transaction must be punished either as a seller or as a buyer. There is no general offense of participation in the transaction viewed as a whole. United States v. Moses, 220 F2d at 168. It is clear to us that Moses' conduct could not support a conviction for selling when she was acting on behalf of the buyers and when prior federal law did not recognize the offense of participation in the transaction. Of course, the Moses court did not address the issue of whether the appellant's conduct would have been sufficient to support a conviction for participation, had federal law recognized such an offense. The federal Controlled Substances Act brought about numerous changes in the law. 21 U.S.C.A. sec. 841 (West 1981) provides: (a) Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally (1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.... Utilizing the language of 21 U.S.C.A. sec. 841 (a) (1), the federal courts have addressed the issue of whether the procuring agent of the buyer or purchasing agent theory has survived this change in the federal law and remained a viable defense. In United States v. Pruitt, 487 F.2d 1241 (8th Cir. 1973), the defendant argued on appeal that the trial court had erred by its refusal to instruct the jury on this defense. The Pruitt court noted that the procuring agent defense was relevant under the prior statutes because of the separate treatment of the offenses of buying and selling controlled substances. However, after referring to the Moses opinion, the court stated the following: These prior concepts have been discarded in the Controlled Substances Act which contains no sale or buying requirement to support a conviction; there is now an offense of participation in the transaction viewed as a whole. The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 is extremely broad in scope, no longer restricted to the narrower concepts of buy and sell, but all inclusive in covering the entire field of narcotics and dangerous drugs in all phases of their manufacturing, processing, distribution and use.... Any individual who participates in any manner in the unauthorized distribution of such `controlled substances' is amenable to the Act and the sanctions provided therein. Congress undoubtedly intended by this new Act to make an all-out attempt to combat illicit drugs by subjecting any individual who knowingly participates in the distribution to substantial, and in some cases severe, penalties while dealing less severely with, and attempting to aid, the unfortunate individuals who are the ultimate users of the illicit drugs. Pruitt, 487 F.2d at 1245 (citation omitted). Subsequent federal decisions, including those of the seventh circuit, have affirmed this concept of viewing participation in the transaction as an offense under the statute. See, United States v. Banks, 687 F.2d 967, 977-78 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Winston, 687 F.2d 832, 835-36 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Tucker, 552 F.2d 202, 204 (7th Cir. 1977); and United States v. Snow, 537 F.2d 1166, 1168-69 (4th Cir. 1976). Other federal decisions have focused on the definitions of the terms deliver and distribute, as set forth in 21 U.S.C.A. sec. 802 (West 1981): . . . (8) The terms `deliver' or `delivery' means the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer of a controlled substance, whether or not there exists an agency relationship.  . . . (11) The term `distribute' means to deliver ... a controlled substance. The term `distributor' means a person who so delivers a controlled substance. The eighth circuit utilized these definitions to uphold a conviction under 21 U.S.C.A. sec. 841 (a) (1) in United States v. Collins, 552 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1977). In that case, the appellant claimed that his conduct as a conduit in a heroin sale was insufficient to support his conviction under the statute. The court found that the appellant was affirmatively involved in the transaction itself, even though he did not sell the drug, and that his conduct fit within the statutory definition of a delivery or distribution of a controlled substance. [3] The Collins court also noted that all circuits which had addressed similar arguments had concluded that such conduct facilitating an exchange could indeed result in a conviction for distribution of a controlled substance under 21 U.S.C.A. sec. 841(a) (1). Id., 552 F.2d at 246, citing United States v. Snow, 537 F.2d at 1169; United States v. Marquez, 511 F.2d 62, 64 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Oquendo, 505 F.2d 1307, 1310 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Pierce, 498 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Pruitt, 487 F.2d 1241; United States v. Hernandez, 480 F.2d 1044 (9th Cir. 1973); and United States v. Masullo, 489 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1973). Therefore, we must conclude that after reviewing the federal cases, it appears that all circuits which have addressed the issue have concluded that the procuring agent theory is no longer a valid defense under the federal law. This is because the federal statutes no longer treat buying and selling as a separate offense; therefore, the courts instead look to a defendant's participation in the transaction to determine whether or not an offense has been committed. Also, the language of 21 U.S.C.A. sec. 802(8) and (11), dealing with delivery and distribution in terms of the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer, regardless of an agency relationship between the defendant and the seller, lends further support to the conclusion that participation in a transaction involving controlled substances in any manner may potentially constitute an offense under the federal statutes. This court is aware that the language of sec. 161.41 (1m), Stats., is very similar to that of 21 U.S.C.A. sec. 841 (a) (1). We also note that the Wisconsin statutory definitions of delivery and distribution of a controlled substance are virtually identical to those of the federal statutes. Section 161.01 provides: . . . (6) `Deliver' or `delivery' means the actual, constructive or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance, whether or not there is any agency relationship. . . . (9) `Distribute' means to deliver ... a controlled substance. (10) `Distributor' means a person who distributes. We recognize that this is due to the fact that Wisconsin's statutes dealing with controlled substances are based upon the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. Laws of 1971, ch. 219, sec. 16, effective October 1, 1972. The Uniform Controlled Substances Act was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1970. [4] Its purpose has been characterized as follows: This Uniform Act was drafted to achieve uniformity between the laws of the several States and those of the Federal government. It has been designed to complement the new Federal narcotic and dangerous drug legislation and provide an interlocking trellis of Federal and State law to enable government at all levels to control more effectively the drug abuse problem. Uniform Controlled Substances Act, 9 U.L.A., Commissioners' Prefatory Note, p. 188 (1979). This court notes that almost every jurisdiction has now adopted some form of the act. 9 U.L.A., 1983 Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 78. When we review the decisions of those states which have adopted the act, we find that a majority of the jurisdictions have held that the procuring agent theory is no longer a valid defenses. [5] Based upon the similarity of the Wisconsin and federal statutes and the fact that this state has adopted in part the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, we hold that the procuring agent theory is not a valid defense in this state. [6] Our statutes, like the federal statutes, no longer distinguish between buying and selling as separate offenses. Rather, the statute instead addresses the act of possession with the intent to deliver, with no mention of the terms buying and selling. The transfer itself has become the prohibited act, and participation in this transfer may amount to an offense. This is evidenced by the language of sec. 161.01 (6), defining delivery in terms of the actual, constructive or attempted transfer of a controlled substance. There is no mention of the requirement of buying or selling. Accordingly, we hold that the procuring agent defense will not be recognized by this court.