Opinion ID: 164240
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Streamlining Regulations and Due Process

Text: 24 An INS (now USCIS) regulation permits a single member of the BIA to: 25 affirm the decision of the Service or the Immigration Judge, without opinion, if the Board Member determines that the result reached in the decision under review was correct; that any errors in the decision under review were harmless or nonmaterial; and that 26 (A) the issue on appeal is squarely controlled by existing Board or federal court precedent and does not involve the application of precedent to a novel fact situation; or 27 (B) the factual and legal questions raised on appeal are so insubstantial that three-Member review is not warranted. 28 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7)(ii) (now codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(7) (2003)). Once the Board Member makes that determination, the Board shall issue an order that reads as follows: `The Board affirms, without opinion, the result of the decision below. The decision below is, therefore, the final agency determination. See 8 CFR 3.1(a)(7).' 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7)(iii). The regulation goes on to state: 29 An order affirming without opinion, issued under authority of this provision, shall not include further explanation or reasoning. Such an order approves the result reached in the decision below; it does not necessarily imply approval of all of the reasoning of that decision, but does signify the Board's conclusion that any errors in the decision of the Immigration Judge or the Service were harmless or nonmaterial. 30 Id. 31 This provision, part of the streamlining regulations originally promulgated in 1999, was initially used sparingly. Its use increased dramatically since early in 2002, in an effort to reduce the backlog of cases pending before the BIA. A single member of the BIA invoked this regulation to summarily affirm, without opinion, the IJ's denial of petitioners' applications. Petitioners argue that this summary affirmance procedure violates both administrative law and their due process rights. We disagree. 32 Petitioners allege the summary affirmance violates principles of administrative law because (1) it is only available if a case meets the regulatory criteria, but, because the BIA member is prohibited from explaining his decision, it is impossible to tell whether the member adhered to the regulation in deciding to use the summary affirmance procedure; (2) it violates the principle that litigants are entitled to an explanation of the reasons for a decision, discourages thoughtful decision making, prevents litigants from being assured of an individualized review of their case based upon the evidence presented, prevents effective appellate review of the ruling, and allows the final agency decisionmaker, the BIA, to issue its final decision without explanation. They argue it violates principles of due process because it deprives them of their due process right to an individualized and meaningful review of their case. 33 A number of other circuit courts have recently addressed this argument. All have upheld the summary affirmance regulations against challenges that they violate principles of administrative law and/or due process. See Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228 (3rd Cir.2003) (en banc); Denko v. INS, 351 F.3d 717 (6th Cir.2003); Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 2003 WL 22770121 (9th Cir. Nov.24, 2003); Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962 (7th Cir.2003); Mendoza v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 327 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir.2003); Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830 (5th Cir.2003); Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365 (1st Cir.2003). The Fourth Circuit has rejected due process challenges to the summary affirmance procedure in a series of unpublished opinions. See, e.g., Wibowo v. Ashcroft, 75 Fed. Appx. 161 (4th Cir.2003); Zengui Goma v. Ashcroft, 71 Fed. Appx. 263 (4th Cir.2003); cf. Dominguez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 678, 680 (8th Cir.2003) (citing Albathani in rejecting an argument that the BIA abused its discretion in summarily affirming the IJ's decision). We join those circuits and uphold the validity of those regulations. 34 Albathani was the first decision to address this issue, and its analysis has been widely followed. See, e.g., Falcon Carriche, 350 F.3d at 850 (holding that Albathani 's careful reasoning is persuasive and, like the other courts of appeal that followed, we embrace its rationale); Mendoza, 327 F.3d at 1288 (agreeing with Albathani 's analysis); Soadjede, 324 F.3d at 832 (same). We generally follow it as well. 35 The Albathani court began by noting that [a]n alien has no constitutional right to any administrative appeal at all. 318 F.3d at 376 (citing Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977) (holding there is no constitutional right to appeal in criminal cases)). Thus, [s]uch administrative appeal rights as exist are created by regulations promulgated by the Attorney General. Id. at 376 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (2002)). Accordingly, the INS had the power to promulgate the summary affirmance regulations and include therein the procedures it deemed appropriate. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 543, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978) ([A]dministrative agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous duties.) (internal quotation marks omitted); Dia, 353 F.3d at 238 (noting that the Vermont Yankee 's `basic tenet of administrative law' has even more force in the immigration contest where our deference is especially great.) (internal citation omitted). 36 Petitioner and amici argue, as they did in Albathani, that the BIA's decision is the final agency decision, that a summary affirmance without opinion by the BIA does not provide a reasoned basis for review, and that the summary affirmance without explanation prevents courts from determining whether the BIA is following the regulation. We disagree. 37 First, the summary affirmance regulations specifically provide that the IJ's decision is the final agency action. The IJ's decision contains a reasoned explanation for the result reached. That is permissible. In support of their argument that the BIA's decision, not the IJ's decision being reviewed, must contain a reasoned explanation, petitioners and amici rely on the following passage from SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947): 38 If the administrative action is to be tested by the basis upon which it purports to rest, that basis must be set forth with such clarity as to be understandable. It will not do for a court to be compelled to guess at the theory underlying the agency's action; nor can a court be expected to chisel that which must be precise from what the agency has left vague and indecisive. 39 Id. at 196-97, 67 S.Ct. 1575. As the First Circuit observed, petitioners and amici 40 overlook the plain language of Chenery, which refers to agencies in their entirety, not individual components of agencies. Here, the relevant agency — the INS — has presented a statement of reasons for its decision, albeit from the IJ rather than the BIA. Chenery does not require that this statement come from the BIA rather than the IJ. 41 Albathani, 318 F.3d at 377; see also Dia, 353 F.3d at 241. Thus, there is nothing improper under Chenery in making the IJ's decision the final agency decision. 42 Furthermore, as our circuit and many others have previously held, the BIA may adopt an IJ's opinion without further analysis. See Panrit v. INS, 19 F.3d 544, 546 (10th Cir.1994) (We ... hold that where the Board explicitly recites that it has reviewed the record and the immigration judge's decision and that it is content to rest its decision on the immigration judge's reasoning, adoption of the immigration judge's decision does not present any difficulty in terms of the sufficiency of the Board's articulation of its reasoning.); see also Chen v. INS, 87 F.3d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1996) ([W]e join eight of our sister circuits in ruling that the Board need not write at length merely to repeat the IJ's findings of fact and his reasons for denying the requested relief, but, rather, having given individualized consideration to a particular case, may simply state that it affirms the IJ's decision for the reasons set forth in that decision.) (listing cases). In that situation, we effectively review the IJ's decision, just as we do under the streamlining summary affirmance regulations. 43 Petitioners and amici respond that the summary affirmance without opinion procedure creates a particular and unique problem because, unlike an affirmance expressly adopting the IJ's decision, as in Panrit and similar cases, the summary affirmance permits an affirmance even if the BIA disagrees with the IJ's reasoning. This is possible because, as the regulation expressly states, the summary affirmance is only of the result of the IJ's decision, not necessarily its reasoning. Thus, a reviewing court may not in fact know the basis for the BIA's decision affirming the IJ. 44 While noting the problem, the First Circuit stated that it does not render the scheme a violation of due process or render judicial review impossible because courts will continue to have the IJ's decision and the record upon which it is based available for review. Albathani, 318 F.3d at 377-78. Courts will therefore still be able to carry out an intelligent review. Id. at 378; see also Denko, 351 F.3d at 729 ([Petitioner's] argument that the summary affirmance without opinion permitted by § 1003.1(a)(7) [formerly § 3.1(a)(7)] violates the mandate that agencies must set forth reasons for their decisions also fails because the IJ's opinion becomes the reasoned explanation needed for review.); Falcon Carriche, 350 F.3d at 851 ([T]he streamlining procedures do not compromise our ability to review the INS's decision... because we can review the IJ's decision directly.); Georgis, 328 F.3d at 967 (Since we review directly the decision of the IJ when a case comes to us from the BIA pursuant to § 1003.1(a)(7), our ability to conduct a full and fair appraisal of the petitioner's case is not compromised, and the petitioner's due process rights are not violated.). As the Third Circuit recently stated en banc, [a]ll that is required for our meaningful review is that the agency — as represented by an opinion of the BIA or IJ — put forth a sufficiently reasoned opinion. Dia, 353 F.3d at 243. 45 Additionally, as a practical matter, if the BIA does not independently state a correct ground for affirmance in a case in which the reasoning proffered by the IJ is faulty, the BIA risks reversal on appeal. Albathani, 318 F.3d at 378. Thus, there would be little incentive for the BIA to summarily affirm without an opinion the result of an IJ's decision if it did not also agree with the IJ's reasoning. See Falcon Carriche, 350 F.3d at 851 (Although the streamlining procedures allow a board member to affirm the IJ's decision based on different reasons than those set forth by the IJ, the BIA is cognizant of this possibility and knows the risk it takes in declining to articulate a different or alternate basis for the decision.). In sum, the IJ's decision provides the reasoned explanation for the agency's decision, its existence enables us to review the agency decision, and the BIA knows that faulty or inadequate reasoning in the IJ's decision will lead to the reversal of a BIA summary affirmance of that decision. 46 Petitioners also make a variety of arguments to the effect that the lack of explanation by the BIA member means that we cannot tell whether the member properly followed the regulation in summarily affirming the IJ's decision and we cannot tell if the BIA member conducted the kind of careful review he or she should. They argue that this problem is particularly acute because of statistics suggesting that, in some instances, BIA members appear to spend as little as ten to fifteen minutes per case. As the First Circuit acknowledged, this is a serious argument ... that the very nature of the one-line summary affirmance may mean that BIA members are not in fact engaged in the review required by regulation and courts will not be able to tell. Albathani, 318 F.3d at 378. 47 The First Circuit's response to this argument was that there was no reason in the case before it to suspect that the BIA member had not done his job properly, as [t]here was a basis for affirmance and for summary affirmance. Id. Moreover, there was no evidence of systemic violation by the BIA of its regulations. Id. Given that lack of evidence, the court was unwilling to infer from these numbers alone that the required review is not taking place. Id. at 379; see also Denko, 351 F.3d at 729 (We will not assume such a complete break-down in the system in the absence of tangible evidence to support such a conclusion.); Mendoza, 327 F.3d at 1289 (That a one-sentence order was entered is no evidence that the BIA member did not review the facts of Mendoza's case.). We agree with that analysis. In view of the presumption of regularity attaching to administrative procedures, see Bar MK Ranches v. Yuetter, 994 F.2d 735, 740 (10th Cir.1993), we will not assume, without any evidence, that BIA members do not follow the regulations or do not perform their jobs properly. Indeed, as the First Circuit noted, a BIA summary affirmance is not unlike the summary affirmance or summary disposition procedures employed by courts, which are workload management devices that acknowledge the reality of high caseloads. They do not, either alone or in combination with caseload statistics, establish that the required review is not taking place. Albathani, 318 F.3d at 378. In short, petitioners received a meaningful and thorough review of their claims, and, in the IJ's decision, they received a reasoned explanation for the agency's decision, which we can, in turn, review. Due process and principles of administrative law require nothing more. 48 We therefore agree with the analysis of Albathani and those other courts and join them in holding that the summary affirmance procedures do not violate principles of administrative law or due process. 7