Opinion ID: 2804637
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Overview ofWashington's Anti-SLAPP Laws

Text: Anti-SLAPP statutes punish those who file lawsuits-labeled strategic lawsuits against public participation or SLAPPs-that abuse the judicial process in order to silence an individual's free expression or petitioning activity. Tom Wyrwich, A Cure for a Public Concern: Washington's New Anti-SLAPP Law, 86 WASH. L. REv. 663, 666-68 (2011). Such litigation is initiated [w]ith no concern for the inevitable failure of the lawsuit and instead only forces the defendant into costly litigation that devastate[s] the defendant financially and chill[s] the defendant's public involvement. Id. at 666-67. Though such suits are typically dismissed as groundless or unconstitutional, the problem is that dismissal comes only after the defendants are put to great expense, harassment, and interruption of their productive activities. LAWS OF 2010, ch. 118, § 1(1)(b). In 1989, Washington became the first state to enact anti-SLAPP legislation. LAWS OF 1989, ch. 234 (codified as amended at RCW 4.24.500-.520). This initial statute grants speakers immunity from claims based on the speaker's communication to a governmental entity regarding any matter reasonably of concern to the governmental entity. See RCW 4.24.51 0. However, this statute has come to be seen as having a limited effect because it applies only to -3- Davis, et al. v. Cox, et al., 90233-0 communications to governmental entities and it creates no method for early dismissal. Wyrwich, supra, at 669-70. In 2010, the legislature enacted. the anti-SLAPP statute at issue in this case. LAWS OF 2010, ch. 118 (codified at RCW 4.24.525). This statute is unique from its predecessor in that it creates an entirely new method for adjudicating SLAPPs, separate from the rules of civil procedure. The new statute did not amend or repeal the prior statute and instead codifies its new procedures in one new statutory section. See RCW 4.24.525. Subsections (1) and (2) define key terms. Subsection (3) provides that the law does not apply to prosecutors. Subsection (4) is the law's mainspring: it establishes a special motion to strike a claim and sets forth the evidentiary standard that trial courts must use to adjudicate the motion. Subsection (5) contains various procedural rules to halt discovery and ensure speedy adjudication of an anti-SLAPP motion. Subsection (6) provides the prevailing party on the motion statutory damages of $10,000, attorney fees, costs, and discretionary additional relief. Subsection (7) states the statute does not abridge any other rights the movants possess. The law's mainspring, subsection (4), provides that a party may bring a special motion to strike any claim that is based on an action involving public participation and petition. RCW 4.24.525(4)(a). That phrase-an action involving public participation and petition-is a defined term that uses capacious language in five nonexclusive examples. See id. at (2)(a)-(e). When a party brings such a motion, the moving party has the initial burden of showing by a -4- Davis, et al. v. Cox, et al., 90233-0 preponderance of the evidence that the claim is based on an action involving public participation and petition. !d. at (4)(b). If the moving party meets this burden, the burden shifts to the responding party to establish by clear and convincing evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim. !d. When a trial judge adjudicates such a motion, the court shall consider pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based. !d. at (4)(c). If the court determines the responding party has met its burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim, the substance of the determination may not be admitted into evidence at any later stage of the case, id. at (4)(d)(i), and the case proceeds toward trial. Upon the filing of a special motion to strike, subsection (5) freezes all other aspects of the litigation. Discovery is stayed, as are pending motions and hearings. !d. at (5)(c). The discovery stay remains in effect until the court rules on the special motion to strike, though on a party's motion and for good cause shown, the court may order that specified discovery or other hearings or motions be conducted. !d. Subsection (5) also ensures the special motion to strike will be resolved quickly. The motion must be filed within 60 days of service of the most recent complaint or at a later time in the court's discretion. !d. at (5)(a). The court must hold a hearing on the motion within 30 days, unless the docket conditions of the court require a later hearing and, regardless, the court is directed to hold the hearing with all due speed and such hearings should receive priority. !d. The -5- Davis, et al. v. Cox, et al., 90233-0 court must render its decision as soon as possible, but no later than seven days after the hearing. !d. at (5)(b). Every party has a right of expedited appeal from the trial court's order granting the motion, the trial court's order denying the motion, or the trial court's failure to rule on the motion in a timely fashion. !d. at (5)(d). When a party prevails on an anti-SLAPP motion, the court not only dismisses the other side's claim, but also must award the moving party costs, attorney fees, and $10,000 in statutory damages. !d. at (6)(a)(i)-(ii). The court may award [ s]uch additional relief ... as the court determines to be necessary to deter repetition of the conduct and comparable conduct by others similarly situated. !d. at (6)(a)(iii).