Opinion ID: 1172214
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: 1994 Amendment Legislative History and Intent

Text: The rules of statutory construction have been oft-repeated in our opinions. A typical recitation emphasizing our search for legislative intent is found in State v. Gonzales, 255 Kan. 243, 248-49, 874 P.2d 612 (1994). We embark on that search. The first sentence in K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 8-255(c) refers to action by the Division in suspending or revoking driving privileges based on a report of conviction or convictions. Is this language broad enough to include habitual violator revocations under K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 8-286? We believe it is. The 1994 amendments to 8-255(c) and 8-286 were both contained in the same bill, H.B. 2579. L. 1994, ch. 353, §§ 1, 5. The legislature has a history of including amendments germane to the broad area of alcohol/drugs, public welfare, driving, and habitual violators in the same act. See State v. Reves, 233 Kan. 972, 666 P.2d 1190 (1983) (holding that 1982 S.B. 699 did not contain more than one subject and did not violate art. 2, § 16 of the Kansas Constitution; K.S.A. 8-255 [Weeks] and K.S.A. 8-285 [Weeks], among other statutes, were amended in that act; see L. 1982, ch. 144, §§ 1-2). Before the 1994 amendment, the administrative review language in K.S.A. 8-255(c) had been restricted to administrative action based upon convictions for certain specified offenses listed in the statute. The 1994 amendment to K.S.A. 8-255(c) eliminated the references to specific statutes in favor of the following language: When the action by the division suspending, revoking or disqualifying a person's driving privileges is based upon a report of a conviction or convictions from a convicting court.... (emphasis added). L. 1994, ch. 353, § 1(c). The language conviction or convictions was substituted for conviction. The 1994 change shows legislative intent to broaden the applicability of administrative remedies to include habitual violator revocations, which are based on three or more convictions. The pre-1994 version of K.S.A. 8-286 required the court to direct such person by appropriate order not to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways in this state. The district court took action concerning the habitual violator's driving privileges, not the Division, and the word revoke was not used in K.S.A. 8-286. Insertion of the word revoke in K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 8-286 thus links into the K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 8-255(c) language action by the division ... revoking ... a person's driving privileges. Although no due process issues were raised in Proffitt, we described the 1994 amendment to the HVS, in that opinion saying: This streamlined statutory scheme eliminates the prior judicial role in determining habitual violator status and in revoking or restoring driving privileges. No hearing is now statutorily provided for in either the revocation of driving privileges or their restoration. In fact, there is no hearing or proceeding to determine if an individual is a habitual violator. 261 Kan. at 529. We call on the familiar maxims of statutory construction expressed in Taylor v. Peredition Minerals Group, Ltd., 244 Kan. 126, 133, 766 P.2d 805 (1988), ([I]t is the duty of the court, as far as practicable, to reconcile the different provisions so as to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible.) and McCarthy v. City of Leawood, 257 Kan. 566, 578, 894 P.2d 836 (1995) ([W]e must consider the whole Act and not read one statute in isolation from the other.). K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 8-286 should not be read in isolation from K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 8-255(c). Heironimus argues that to construe K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 8-255(c) as applying to habitual violators will produce an absurd result. He observes that 8-255(c) only authorizes habitual violators to request a post-revocation administrative review without a hearing, but persons subject to revocation under K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 8-255(a)(1), (2), (3), or (5) are entitled to an administrative hearing (K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 8-255[d]). Also, he reasons the suspension or revocation under 8-255(d) may, in certain situations, not take effect until after the hearing. We disagree with his absurd result characterization. We hold that the administrative review procedures in K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 8-255(c) apply to K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 8-286 revocations. The K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 8-255(c) administrative review procedure applies to a person whose license has been suspended or revoked based upon a report of a conviction or convictions from a convicting court. This includes not only habitual violators but also persons receiving suspensions or revocations based on ministerial determinations from convictions shown on the driving records, under any of the applicable categories listed in K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 8-255(a) (as in 8-255[a][1], [2], or [4]), or under any other applicable statutes.