Opinion ID: 2180953
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Transfer and Consolidate

Text: The defendant moved to transfer this case to Monroe County and to have the charges consolidated with other charges already pending there. The motion was purportedly filed pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-32-2-5(a) and (c) and Ind. Code § 35-32-2-4(c)(2). He now challenges the trial court's denial of that motion. We note first that Ind. Code § 35-32-2-5(a) deals with transfer when an action is filed in an improper county, and, as discussed previously, venue was proper in Morgan County. Subsection (c) involves transfer of cases when the court is without jurisdiction, and the defendant fails to support any contention that the court was without jurisdiction here. Indiana Code § 35-32-2-4(c) provides that [i]n a prosecution for an attempt to commit a crime, the offender may be tried in any county in which: ... (2) The underlying crime was to have been completed. The wording clearly indicates that it was merely designed to afford an alternative forum in which to try the case and does not bestow upon the defendant any statutory right to be tried in a particular county. The thrust of the defendant's argument seems to be that fairness dictated that the instant offenses should have been consolidated with the offenses charged in Monroe County because they all stemmed from the same continuing series of acts. Citing Chief Justice Bobbitt's separate opinion in Boyle v. State (1960), 241 Ind. 565, 170 N.E.2d 802, the defendant suggests that the series of offenses for which he was charged was but a single continuing crime, and that the State was precluded from separating the offenses and trying him for the same offense in one venue after failing to convict him in another venue. He asserts that he was unduly prejudiced in this case because the State, in essence, was allowed to have two bites at the apple. Despite whatever appeal this argument has at first glance, we are convinced that the trial court's failure to transfer and consolidate the charges did not constitute error. First, the charges pending in Monroe County were one count of perjury involving the defendant's procurement of a fraudulent driver's license and two counts of forgery (uttering) for passing forged checks at a Bloomington bank. Although the instant charges appear related in the sense that they were part of a comprehensive criminal scheme, the offenses here were based on distinct criminal acts occurring in Morgan County and punishable separately from the offenses charged in Monroe County. Moreover, the consolidation of actions is governed by Trial Rule 42(A): When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. In Figg & Muller Engineers, Inc. v. Petruska (1985), Ind. App., 477 N.E.2d 968, our Court of Appeals held that this rule does not authorize transfer of actions from one court's jurisdiction to that of another for consolidation. We see no basis to disturb that holding as it comports with the plain language of the statute; thus, the defendant's argument on this issue must fail.