Opinion ID: 31923
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Extrajudicial Bias

Text: 20 The Andrade Appellants specify fifteen events which, they argue, constitute their case for recusal. By Appellants' own admission, eight of these are intrajudicial, thus requiring a more deferential review than that applicable to the seven of extrajudicial origin. We turn first to the extrajudicial events. 2 21 1. Events and Circumstances Beyond Judge Smith's Control 22 Two of the seven extrajudicial events — both beyond Judge Smith's control — may be dismissed without exhaustive consideration. One is trivial, the second moot. 23 The Andrade Appellants complain that over the course of the trial, government counsel occasionally gave T-shirts, food, beverages, cookies, and candies to employees in the federal clerk's, marshal's, and court reporter's offices. In ruling upon the recusal motion, Judge Smith found that the T-shirts were part of a prank played on a deputy marshal, and none of the recipients were members of the Court's staff. While Appellants maintain that the receipt of these gifts created an appearance of impropriety, they do not challenge the accuracy of Judge Smith's findings. We accept the uncontested findings of the district court, and fail to see how these small courtesies to the court's non-judicial staff could be viewed by any objective observer as compromising Judge Smith's independence. 24 The other allegation is that Judge Smith's longstanding relationships with two of the dismissed defendants, William Sessions and William Johnston, gave rise, at the very least, to the appearance of impropriety. As an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Texas, Johnston made frequent appearances before Judge Smith. Sessions, formerly the Director of the FBI, had served on the federal district court for the Western District of Texas from 1974-87; Judge Smith served with Sessions from 1983-87 while Sessions was Chief Judge. This issue is moot, as both Sessions and Johnston were dismissed from the case in July 1999. In any event, no facts are proven to suggest that either prior relationship evinces characteristics that would even suggest, much less mandate recusal. See Parrish v. Bd. of Comm'rs., 524 F.2d 98, 104 (5th Cir. 1975). 2. Comments Made By Judge Smith 25 The five other extrajudicial events can be divided into three categories: (a) the judge's alleged in camera statements to trial counsel, (b) his public comments regarding government attorneys Johnston and James Touhey, and(c) his alleged ex parte comments to reporter Lee Hancock. a. Judge Smith's Alleged in camera Comments 26 Judge Smith's alleged in camera statements, though said to violate §§ 455(a) and (b)(1), are unproblematic. On June 22, 2000, Appellants prepared to offer into evidence documents showing the FBI's failure to develop adequate plans to extinguish fire at the compound. These documents had been the subject of extensive pretrial wrangling. When Judge Smith announced his decision not to allow admission, the Andrade Appellants' counsel approached the bench and requested an in camera conference. During the conference, Judge Smith said that he had not read Appellants' proffered evidence. Somewhat later, as the litigants discussed the empaneling of an advisory jury, Judge Smith told Mr. Caddell that, if you don't think I've got the guts to disregard the [advisory] jury's verdict, you're wrong. Appellants argue that these two statements contribute to their case for recusal. 27 Judge Smith's declaration that he had not read the evidence prior to denying its admissibility is of no legal import. Appellants offered the evidence to advance the proposition that the FBI could have — in fact, should have — planned for the possibility of fire. Such an argument is almost surely barred from consideration, however, by the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000). Although the FTCA permits, in general, suits against the United States, it exempts the government from liability for acts that are discretionary in nature, those involv[ing] an element of judgment or choice. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991) (quoting Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536, 108 S.Ct. 1954, 100 L.Ed.2d 531 (1988)). Judge Smith had no need to examine the evidence supporting this claim, because the applicability of the discretionary function exception does not turn on evidence of the actual decisions made by the defendants, but, rather, on whether the decision is or is not susceptible to policy analysis. Id. at 325, 111 S.Ct. 1267; see also Baldassaro v. United States, 64 F.3d 206, 209 (5th Cir.1995). In light of the law on this point, Judge Smith's preference not to read the evidence — and his declaration — cannot constitute evidence of bias or even the appearance of such. 28 This being said, Appellants were not without options. They might have appealed Judge Smith's decision to exclude this evidence and sought direct review of the applicability of the discretionary function exception. But they did not do so. Issues not raised on appeal are waived. United States v. Valdiosera-Godinez, 932 F.2d 1093, 1099 (5th Cir.1991). 29 Equally unavailing is Appellants' allegation that Judge Smith's statement regarding his willingness to disregard the advisory jury's verdict manifests an impermissible judicial bias. The FTCA does not grant plaintiffs the right to a jury trial. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (2000). Notwithstanding the clear congressional mandate that claims against the federal government are to be tried to the bench, Appellants moved for the empaneling of an advisory jury; over the government's objection, Judge Smith honored the request. But he was under no obligation to accept its verdict. Sullivan v. Rowan Cos., 952 F.2d 141, 147 (5th Cir.1992). His statement accurately, if bluntly, reflected the status of the advisory jury verdict. Even if Appellants found this in-chambers statement offensive, their claims are to be judged by an objective standard. The statement is neither grossly inappropriate nor patently offensive, as required by our precedent. In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 121 F.3d 163, 165-67 (5th Cir.1997). b. Judge Smith's Public Comments 30 Appellants also point out Judge Smith's comments regarding William Johnston and his compliment toward James Touhey to advance their case for recusal. We reject the arguments. 31 As mentioned above, Johnston was one of the original defendants to this lawsuit. While the case was before the district court, a Special Counsel from within the Justice Department investigated Johnston for allegedly withholding evidence from defendant Davidians during their criminal trial. According to a newspaper report, Judge Smith was upset by the investigators' treatment of Johnston (the article used the term witch hunt to describe Judge Smith's view). In response, Judge Smith told several investigators in September 2000 that he would no longer cooperate with the inquiry and that he would not permit the investigators to carry firearms into the courthouse. The Special Counsel subsequently visited Judge Smith in his chambers to repair the rift. The judge's comments, however, are irrelevant to Appellants' case for recusal, as Johnston had been dismissed from this case in July 1999 — 15 months before this incident occurred. 32 Appellants argue that Judge Smith's public compliment of James Touhey, a government attorney, supports mandatory recusal under §§ 455(a) and (b)(1). According to Appellants, Touhey conducted a particularly vicious cross-examination of Davidian witness Clive Doyle, in which Doyle was reduced to tears. During the subsequent recess and outside the presence of the jury, Appellants' counsel observed Judge Smith enter the courtroom, pat Touhey on the back, shake his hand, and congratulate him, saying Good job, Mr. Touhey! 33 Appellants acknowledge that a judge's compliments in the course of legal proceedings should not ordinarily support a partiality challenge, Certain Underwriters at Lloyds London v. Oryx Energy Co., 944 F.Supp. 566, 568 (S.D.Tex.1996), but they view the relationship reflected here between Touhey and Smith as exceptional. Doyle had been charged with murder, tried before Judge Smith, and acquitted by the jury in the Davidians' criminal trial. With his compliment, Appellants argue, Judge Smith conveyed his gratitude to Touhey for Doyle's belated humiliation. 34 Appellants' argument fails for two reasons. First, not only does their brief omit citing the most prominent Supreme Court statement on point, Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147 (judicial remarks that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel for the parties or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge), but they also neglect to discuss two relevant Fifth Circuit cases cited by the government. See United States v. Landerman, 109 F.3d 1053, 1066 (5th Cir.1997) (affirming denial of motion to recuse where district judge allowed the Government more leeway during its questioning and did interrupt defense counsel's questioning more often than the Government's questioning); Garcia v. Woman's Hosp. of Texas, 143 F.3d 227, 230 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming denial of motion to recuse where district judge had made unflattering comments about plaintiff's ability to prove her case). Second, in attributing to Judge Smith's compliment something more than just a compliment, Appellants overlook that it is with reference to the well-informed, thoughtful and objective observer, rather than the hypersensitive, cynical, and suspicious person that inappropriate or wrongful bias is established. Jordan, 49 F.3d at 156. This court sees a compliment, not a subliminal message of wrongful bias. Accordingly, we find no grounds for recusal here. c. Judge Smith's Alleged ex parte Comments 35 On September 13, 2000, one week before Judge Smith issued his initial findings of fact and judgment denying Appellants' FTCA claims and two weeks before he ruled upon Appellants' Second Motion for Recusal, the Dallas Morning News published a story reporting Appellants' filing of their second recusal motion. The article quotes attorney Caddell, describes his view of Judge Smith as biased, states that Caddell changed his earlier-expressed decision not to appeal because of the bias, and paraphrases at length the allegations in the recusal motion. Before assessing the likelihood that the motion would succeed, the article briefly speculates on the outcome of the case, based upon several of Judge Smith's alleged comments. The passage, in its entirety, reads as follows: FINAL RULING 36 Judge Smith has offered some indications that his final ruling will mirror the jury's decision. 37 Late in the four-week trial, he told a reporter that sect members broke the law by resisting the federal search and by refusing to surrender during the 51-day siege. He said those violations probably trumped plaintiffs' arguments that government agents acted negligently in efforts to end the standoff. 38 The judge noted he might be in one hell of a position with his decision to impanel an advisory jury for the type of civil case normally decided by a judge alone. 39 During the civil trial, the judge sometimes reacted emotionally to graphic evidence. After spending a weekend reviewing the government's excerpts from surveillance recordings made in the compound during the siege, he remarked during a break in the case that the tapes would blow the plaintiffs out of the pond. 40 Lee Hancock, Davidians' Attorney Vents Anger at Judge; Appeal Now Planned in Wrongful Death Suit, Dallas Morning News, Sept. 13, 2002, at 25A. 41 Appellants contend that Judge Smith's alleged ex parte comments violated Canons 2(A), 3A(4) and 3A(6) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. 3 Conceding that violations of the Code do not necessarily give rise to a violation of § 455(a), they nevertheless argue that courts consistently take a hard line for those involving judicial commentary on pending cases. Three cases exemplify their position that reviewing courts have set a standard for unacceptable judicial misbehavior and mandatory recusal that readily encompasses Judge Smith's comments. In re Boston's Children First, 244 F.3d 164 (1st Cir.2001); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 114 (D.C.Cir.2001); United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 988 (10th Cir.1993). These are serious charges, but because Appellants never brought this article to the district court's attention, their fulminations lack record support and context. We cannot review this claim. 42 Two full weeks passed between publication of the article and Judge Smith's final ruling on Appellants' motions for reconsideration and recusal, but Appellants never moved to supplement their motion. Nonetheless, they included a copy of the article in their Record Excerpts submitted to this court, in violation of Fed. R.App. P. 10(e)(2)(C). See United States v. Page, 661 F.2d 1080, 1082 (5th Cir. Nov.1981). We retain discretion to grant Appellants' motion to supplement the record in this court, 4 but exercising that option raises another procedural hurdle, because untimely motions to recuse are ordinarily rejected. Sanford, 157 F.3d at 989. This aspect of Appellants' recusal claim is untimely, as Sanford holds, because it was raised only after an adverse judgment and for the first time on appeal. 5 43 Cognizant of such problems, Appellants seek to compare their situation with that of Microsoft and its district judge, who repeatedly spoke with reporters concerning the merits of the case on the condition that the conversations be embargoed until the court released its decision. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 108. Because Microsoft had not learned of the court's ventures until opportunity for objection had passed, the Court of Appeals permitted Microsoft to raise the recusal issue on appeal and does not appear to have subjected it to a more stringent standard of review. Id. 44 Any comparison with Microsoft is wholly unpersuasive. There is no evidence that if Judge Smith gave an interview, he enforced silence on the Dallas Morning News reporter. On the contrary, his comments were published, it appears, shortly after they were made and sufficiently before the district court's final ruling. Even more obvious is that Appellants' counsel had given an interview to the reporter to highlight the filing of his second motion to recuse. Mr. Caddell is prominently and directly quoted in the article. It is near impossible to believe that notwithstanding his willingness to publicize the filing of the second motion to recuse, on the eve of the court's expected ruling on the merits, Appellants' counsel did not even bother to check whether the reporter (who covered the case throughout trial) had written an article. The Dallas Morning News enjoys an excellent reputation and is read statewide; the paper had been diligently covering the trial; the article was at least constructively available before Judge Smith ruled. These circumstances distinguish the instant case from Microsoft. 45 Appellants' argument ultimately asks this court to judge the judge based exclusively on the fact of publication of his remarks, without context and without verification of their accuracy. It is hardly clear whether Judge Smith actually gave an interview or spoke off the cuff, and whether his comments were made in chambers or on the bench, ex parte or to a group of listeners, yet Appellants have jumped to the conclusion that he violated the judicial Code of Conduct in several ways by giving an interview. But there is no way of knowing what generated the article, and it represents multilevel hearsay. These circumstances emphasize the wisdom behind the procedural rules — limiting supplementation of the appellate record; deeming waiver or forfeiture of issues not raised in the trial court; and restricting the scope of appellate review — that are designed to confine appellate review to factfinding that occurs in the trial court. Because Appellants' complaint about the newspaper article was not properly preserved for appellate review, we deny the motion to supplement the record with this article and reject this point of error.