Opinion ID: 555114
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: District Court Review of Jury Findings

Text: 17 Where a case has been submitted to the jury on special verdicts pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 49(a), the jury's findings are usually binding on the district court unless they are against the weight of the evidence. See, e.g., Ryan v. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc., 734 F.2d 385, 388 (8th Cir.1984) (affirming district court rejection of jury's special verdict as against the great weight of the evidence). Nor-West contends, however, that in cases involving the first amendment, the district court must review the jury's findings de novo and failed to do so in the present case. 18 In support of the first proposition, Nor-West relies on the case of Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984) (Bose ). In Bose, the defendant allegedly made false statements about loudspeakers manufactured by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff filed suit for product disparagement. The district court entered judgment for the plaintiff after a bench trial, holding that the plaintiff had proven, inter alia, that the defendant had published its statements with actual malice. 2 The First Circuit reversed, holding that its review of the district court's actual malice determination was not limited to the clearly erroneous standard traditionally governing factual determinations in bench trials. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that: 19 the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not prescribe the standard of review to be applied in reviewing a determination of actual malice.... Appellate judges in such a case must exercise independent judgment and determine whether the record establishes actual malice with convincing clarity. 20 Id. at 514, 104 S.Ct. at 1967. Thus, Bose stands for the proposition that appellate courts must review a district court's finding of actual malice de novo. This rule also applies to other cases involving restriction on the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment, particularly in those cases in which it is contended that the communication in issue is within one of the few classes of 'unprotected' speech, id. at 503, 104 S.Ct. at 1961, even if relevant issues were resolved by a jury rather than a judge. Id. at 508-09 n. 27, 104 S.Ct. at 1964 n. 27. 21 Nor-West argues that Bose required the district court to independently review the evidence on dispositive constitutional facts. Brief for Appellant at 33. Although Bose requires special scrutiny of jury verdicts, 466 U.S. at 510 n. 29, 104 S.Ct. at 1965 n. 29, it does not suggest that the district court rather than the court of appeals should review such verdicts de novo. Thus, Nor-West's argument is incorrect, and we find that the district court was not required to review the jury's special verdict answers de novo. 3