Opinion ID: 2570587
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: application of the kansas uniform premarital agreement act

Text: Although the postnuptial agreement contains a provision which expressly states that [t]he parties agree that this Agreement is fair, just and reasonable, and comports with all legal requirements so as to be fully enforceable under the Kansas Uniform Premarital Agreement Act under K S.A. 23-801 et seq., (emphasis added) and although the parties had the advice of counsel before signing the agreement, and although both parties knew the contents of the postnuptial agreement, Davis argues that the KUPAA cannot be applied to the postnuptial agreement. The interpretation and legal effect of contracts are matters of law, and an appellate court exercises unlimited review. City of Topeka v. Watertower Place Dev. Group, 265 Kan. 148, 152-53, 959 P.2d 894 (1998); Friday v. Trinity Universal of Kansas, 262 Kan. 347, 348-49, 939 P.2d 869 (1997). The Kansas Legislature passed the KUPAA on July 1, 1988. L. 1988, ch. 204, § 1. The Act was modeled after the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA), which was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1983. 9B U.L.A. 371 (1987). The Prefatory Note to the UPAA states that the Act is limited in scope and that it does not provide for postnuptial or separation agreements. The ULA Comment to § 1 of the Act specifically notes that postnuptial or separation agreements are outside the scope of this Act. 9B U.L.A. 371. K.S.A. 23-801, K.S.A. 23-802, and K.S.A. 23-811 limit the application of the Act to premarital agreements and define a premarital agreement as one made in contemplation of marriage. See also 1 Elrod and Buchele, Kansas Law and Practice: Kansas Family Law § 2.1, p. 92 (West 1999) (noting that the KUPAA does not cover nonmarital or postnuptial agreements). The KUPAA does not apply to postmarital agreements and was not enacted for that purpose. Parties entering into a postmarital agreement are in a vastly different position than parties entering into a premarital agreement. See Pacelli v. Pacelli, 319 N.J. Super. 185, 190, 725 A.2d 56 (1999) (noting that the dynamics and pressures involved in a mid-marriage context are qualitatively different than a pre-marriage situation). Despite the legislative intent and the clear language of the KPAA, parties can bind themselves to the provisions of an otherwise inapplicable act by incorporating choice of law provisions in an enforceable contract. As long as application of a statute or act is not contrary to public policy, a court will uphold application of an otherwise inapplicable statute or act. The parties agreed in paragraph 29 of the settlement agreement to apply the KUPAA to their postmarital contract. The clear intent of the parties was to apply the KUPAA to their agreement. There is no public policy reason to prevent the parties from incorporating the provisions of the KPAA to their postmarital agreement. The district court correctly ruled that the parties had incorporated the provisions of the KPAA into their postmarital agreement and that they are thereby bound by the terms of the contract. Although our analysis of the KUPAA may involve case law concerning the UPAA or prenuptial agreements, its application is only appropriate, given the parties' choice of applying the KUPAA to their postnuptial agreement. Otherwise, the KUPAA and case law concerning prenuptial agreements would not apply. The purpose of the KUPAA is to create a uniform set of rules regarding the enforceability of premarital agreements. K.S.A. 23-810. The KUPAA contains an enforcement provision in K.S.A. 23-807 which reads in pertinent part: (a) A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought proves either of the following: (1) That party did not execute the agreement voluntarily; or (2) the agreement was unconscionable when such agreement was executed and, before execution of the agreement, all of the following applied to that party: (A) Such party was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party; (B) such party did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party beyond the disclosure provided; and (C) such party did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate knowledge of the property or financial obligations of the other party. Davis argues that she is not seeking to declare the postnuptial agreement to be unenforceable pursuant to K.S.A. 23-807, but that this litigation is collateral to the divorce and that she is affirming the agreement but seeking tort damages for fraud and breach of warranty. The district court correctly held the KUPAA controls this case.