Opinion ID: 203644
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Offense level increase for semi-automatic firearms

Text: Marceau first argues that the eight-level offense level increase (from twelve to twenty) for theft of semi-automatic weapons should not have been applied because Congress allowed the statutory proscription against possessing such weapons to expire in 2004. Thus, Marceau argues, the Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority in April 2006 when it voted to retain the enhancement. We disagree. Before detailing our reasoning, we sketch the relevant background. The Violent Crime Control and Enforcement Act of 1994 [5] made possession of various semi-automatic firearms illegal, but contained a sunset provision under which the ban expired September 13, 2004, ten years after its implementation. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(v)(declaring weapons unlawful)(repealed 2004); 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(30) (defining semiautomatic assault weapon)(repealed 2004); see also 26 U.S.C. § 5845 (defining firearm). Responding to directives within the 1994 Act, the Sentencing Commission adopted Amendment 522, which amended U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 to enhance base offense levels for possession of statutorily-defined semi-automatic assault weapons, without regard to their use in another offense. Also enacted was Amendment 531, which prescribed an upward departure for semi-automatic firearms with a capacity exceeding ten cartridges possessed in connection with a crime of violence or controlled substance offense. Both amendments became effective November 1, 1995. Courts responded to the expiration of the weapons ban in different ways. Some questioned whether the expired ban could continue to support sentence enhancements, see, e.g., United States v. Serna, 435 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir.2006) (questioning whether possession of an assault weapon was a crime of violence for Guidelines purposes), while others applied the enhancement without regard to the present legality of the weapon, see, e.g., United States v. Ray, 411 F.3d 900 (8th Cir.2005); United States v. Vega, 392 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir.2004). In response to what it described as inconsistent application of the enhanced base offense level following the expiration of the weapons ban, the Commission subsequently adopted Amendment 691, which deleted the explicit statutory reference to the now-expired weapons ban, and instead applied the enhanced offense level in § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) to a semiautomatic weapon capable of accepting a large capacity magazine. Amendment 691 took effect November 1, 2006, and was in effect at the time of Marceau's sentencing. Marceau argues that enactment of Amendment 691 after the expiration of the assault weapon ban violated the Commission's obligation to promulgate Guidelines consistent with all pertinent provisions of any Federal statute. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1). While it is true that Congress has granted the Commission broad discretion with respect to Guideline formulation, the Commission must nevertheless bow to the specific directives of Congress. United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757, 117 S.Ct. 1673, 137 L.Ed.2d 1001 (1997); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 377, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989). Thus, if Amendment 691 is at odds with [a statute's] plain language, it must give way. LaBonte, 520 U.S. at 757, 117 S.Ct. 1673. In this case, however, we agree with the district court that the enhanced BOL in Amendment 691 is not at odds with any statute because it does not penalize the mere possession of legal firearms, but only possession by certain prohibited persons. The district court approvingly cited Ray, in which the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's application of the section 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) enhancement to a defendant who possessed a semi-automatic weapon which remained legal due to a grandfather clause in the 1994 Act. Rejecting the argument that the enhancement could only be applied to illegal weapons, the Ray court concluded that [t]hrough § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B), the sentencing commission decided to punish more severely the possession of semiautomatic firearms, even those of the pre-ban variety, by those who have lost the right to possess firearms. Id. at 906; see also U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n. 2 (2007); 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), (n). We took a similar approach in United States v. Laureano-Velez, 424 F.3d 38 (1st Cir.2005). There, we rejected the defendant's argument that possession of a grandfathered, pre-ban weapon could not form the basis of a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug offense. Instead, following the course laid by Ray, we concluded that the grandfather clause created an exception only with respect to the separate crime of simple possession of such weapons under § 922(v)(2). Id. at 41 ( citing Ray, 411 F.3d at 905-06; Vega, 392 F.3d at 1282-83). We follow a similar course here. We find no conflict between the lapse of the statutory assault-weapon ban and the imposition of a higher offense level for use of such a weapon by anyone in a class of prohibited persons. [6]
Alternatively, Marceau argues that he is not a prohibited person within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B)(ii)(I). The Guidelines define prohibited person as any person described in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) or 922(n). U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n. 3 (2007). The district court found that Marceau fit within § 922(g)(3), which bars firearm possession by a person who is an unlawful user of ... any controlled substance. We agree. In order to avoid unconstitutional vagueness, courts have held that the critical term unlawful user requires a temporal nexus between the gun possession and regular drug use. United States v. Edwards, 540 F.3d 1156, 1162 (10th Cir.2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 964, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2009). Refined further, an unlawful user is one who engages in regular use over a long period of time proximate to or contemporaneous with the possession of the firearm. United States v. McCowan, 469 F.3d 386, 392 n. 4 (5th Cir.2006). The district court was presented with ample evidence to support its finding that Marceau was a prohibited person. For example, the PSR noted that Marceau explained that even after his stay at a drug treatment facility, he was unable to remain drug-free, and that the MMS robbery was the first step in a plan to sell the stolen firearms to get money for drugs. In addition, an FBI agent testified that Tamiso told him that Marceau had smoked marijuana daily in the days before the robbery, stopping only when he exhausted his supply. Finally, the record shows that Vermont officials recognized Marceau's name from two marijuana-related arrestsone before and one after the instant robbery. Marceau makes three arguments in response to this record evidence. First, he states that the record did not establish regular drug use after he completed the treatment program. The record includes, however, his admissions that he was unable to remain drug-free after his treatment and that he stole the weapons to raise money to buy drugs. Next, Marceau argues that the two arreststhe first for illegal alcohol consumption during which he was found in possession of marijuana, and the other for possession of marijuana and scales should be discounted because neither instance resulted in a probation revocation or positive urinalysis. At most, he claims, this evidence creates an inference of possession, and not use. The district court was free to rely upon Marceau's marijuana possession, in combination with the other evidence, to draw an inference of use. See e.g., United States v. Mack, 343 F.3d 929, 933-34 (8th Cir.2003) (evidence of defendant's possession of small, user quantity of marijuana, where arresting officer smelled marijuana and where defendant had previously been in a dispute over marijuana, is sufficient to support conviction for unlawful use). Finally, the district court was not required to reject the FBI agent's testimony as hearsay, as urged by Marceau, because the Rules of Evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings; a district court may consider any relevant evidence so long as the evidence `has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.' United States v. Green, 426 F.3d 64, 66 (1st Cir.2005)( quoting U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a)). Whether any particular evidence is sufficiently reliable is within the broad discretion of the district court. Id. We detect no abuse of that discretion here. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court's finding that Marceau was a prohibited person within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B)(ii)(I), and therefore the eight-level enhancement under section 2K2.1(4) was properly applied to him.