Opinion ID: 2570123
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The district court had the power to grant rescission as the equitable relief regardless if it was specifically plead by either party.

Text: I.R.C.P. 54(c) states that every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. If the trial court grants relief not specifically plead by the parties, then the issue must be tried by express or implied consent of the parties. I.R.C.P. 15(b); M.K. Transp., Inc. v. Grover, 101 Idaho 345, 349, 612 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1980). An issue must be tried by express or implied consent in order to give the parties notice and the opportunity to present evidence. Grover, 101 Idaho at 349, 612 P.2d at 1196. Harger expressly plead in his answer that the contract was unenforceable based on mutual mistake of fact. Rescission is a remedy for mutual mistake of fact. Murr, 113 Idaho at 777, 747 P.2d at 1306. In the district court's memorandum decision and order on motion for reconsideration the court states Harger agrees that the [c]ourt does have authority to grant rescission.... O'Connor continues to argue that Harger is not entitled to rescission, even though rescission was one of O'Connor's causes of action. The district court incorrectly states that rescission was one of O'Connor's causes of action. In O'Connor's complaint she makes a claim for restitution, but not for rescission. However, the issue of mutual mistake was raised expressly in Harger's answer, and the remedy of rescission was impliedly tried by consent. In O'Connor's direct examination, O'Connor was questioned at length regarding the mistaken easement. She was given the opportunity to state why she thought the easement was feasible and any other forms of access to the property which were contemplated. O'Connor also gave lengthy testimony of her willingness to continue negotiations and enforcement of the original contract. O'Connor was on notice that rescission was a possible remedy even though it was not specifically plead. She was given the opportunity to try the issue of whether a mutual mistake of fact existed between the parties, in which one of the potential remedies is rescission. In any event, rescission is ironically in her favor since if the contract is simply held unenforceable she forfeits her $40,000 deposit, whereas if it is rescinded, she is entitled to a refund of her deposit. The district court had the power to grant rescission in this instance. This Court affirms that decision.