Opinion ID: 1909356
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Was the Joint Tenancy Severed in this Case?

Text: The surrounding circumstances in this case inevitably point to a void deed. Under the common law, a void deed could not work a severance, but only because a failed conveyance could not disturb the original unities of time, title, interest and possession. See Helmholz, Severance of Joint Tenancies, 77 Neb. L.Rev. at 9 (recognizing that in cases of void deeds the conclusion that there is no severance follows as a matter of course under the common law). Of course, we must decide if this same result occurs under an intent-based approach. Emogene's incompetence rendered the conveyance of her interest invalid. See 23 Am.Jur.2d Deeds § 23, at 89-90 (2d ed. 2002) (A competent grantor is essential for a proper deed.). Additionally, the homestead nature of the property rendered the conveyance of Roy's interest invalid because Emogene did not provide her competent approval. [9] Normally, Emogene's incompetence would not prohibit Roy from conveying his own property interest held in joint tenancy with her. However, the interest of a spouse in homestead property is protected by statute. Iowa Code section 561.13 provides [a] conveyance . . . of . . . the homestead, if the owner is married, is not valid, unless and until the spouse of the owner executes the same or a like instrument, or a power of attorney for the execution of the same or a like instrument. Iowa Code § 561.13 (2005). Roy was clearly attempting to convey the homestead, albeit his own interest to himself. Thus, the plain language of the statute prohibited Roy from doing so unless Emogene joined in the pursuit pursuant to the statute. The deed was totally void. Notwithstanding, Roy's estate argues, as the district court held, a deed that is void or ineffective as a conveyance may nevertheless remain a viable source of intent to sever a joint tenancy with a spouse in homestead property because mere severance of the joint tenancy in homestead property only creates a tenancy in common and does not jeopardize or destroy the statutory homestead rights of the spouse. Instead, severance would only change the form of ownership without compromising the spouse's right of possession provided under the homestead statute. Roy's estate claims the application of the intent-based test in this manner is consistent with the proposition we recognized over a century ago that a spouse may unilaterally contract with another person for a right-of-way across homestead property without the consent of the other spouse because the right-of-way is not a destruction of the homestead, [n]or [did it] defeat[] its occupancy as such. Ottuma, Cedar Falls & St. Paul Ry. v. McWilliams, 71 Iowa 164, 169, 32 N.W. 315, 318 (1887). We reject this application of the intent-based test for two core reasons. First, it is obvious that Roy's intent under the deed in this case was to take sole title to the homestead, and the joint tenancy would have been destroyed, not severed, as a consequence of that intent. Under an intent-based test, it is fundamental that the underlying instrument must effectuate the intent to sever. At least one other court has found this distinction significant. See Hayes, 338 N.E.2d at 105 (The purpose of this attempt on behalf of defendant was not to sever the joint tenancy relationship so as to make the parties tenants in common. It was rather an attempt to eliminate entirely any interest on the part of plaintiff by vesting the entire ownership of the stock in defendant.); see also Nelson v. Albrechtson, 93 Wis.2d 552, 287 N.W.2d 811, 817 (1980) (Joint tenants do have the right to sell their individual interest and thereby sever the joint tenancy. However, it is clear here that no such partial sale was contemplated. (Citation omitted.)). We conclude it would be inappropriate to utilize an intent-based approach to achieve a result the parties never intended. [10] As a result, Roy's lack of intent to sever the joint tenancy to create a tenancy in common with Emogene makes it unnecessary for us in this case to decide whether a spouse can unilaterally sever a joint tenancy in homestead property by means of a proper self-conveyance. See Taylor, 92 P.3d at 967 (permitting a unilateral severance by self-conveyance); Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d at 976 (same). [11] The deed relied upon to supply intent did not express an intent to sever the joint tenancy. Secondly, we are convinced an intent to sever a joint tenancy under the intent-based test must normally, if not in every instance, be derived from an instrument that is legally effective to carry out the intent. While we have always recognized a conveyance will sever or terminate a joint tenancy, see Baker's Estate, 247 Iowa at 1385, 78 N.W.2d at 866, we have never recognized an invalid conveyance, i.e., a void deed, will do so. A relatively recent law review article stated that even under an intent-based approach when the joint tenant's intent is clear, if the deed is void [t]he law has long been, and still is, that there is no severance. Helmholz, Severance of Joint Tenancies, 77 Neb. L.Rev. at 27-28. We find ample support for this statement from other jurisdictions. See Chrystyan, 109 Ill.Dec. 412, 510 N.E.2d at 36 (holding an invalid deed could not be used to establish intent to sever because the intent was not exercised in a way consistent with the law); McBee v. Crosby, 632 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Colo.Ct.App. 1981) (holding the court's intent in dissolution decree that required parties to hold home in joint tenancy trumped joint tenant's attempt to quitclaim his interest to family and sever the joint tenancy, as quitclaim deed was a nullity in light of decree); cf. Hockett, 742 F.2d at 1125-26 (declaring a deed partially valid, and holding that the transfer under the valid part of the deed effectively severed the joint interest, but the attempted transfer under the invalid part of the deed could not work a severance). But see In re Baumann, 201 Cal.App.3d 927, 247 Cal.Rptr. 532, 536-37 (1988) (holding a quitclaim deed was void as it related to a third party creditor because the joint tenant grantor fraudulently attempted to protect the property from his creditors, but that it nevertheless severed the joint tenancy between the joint tenants). We also find support for the proposition that an attempted conveyance by a void instrument, not necessarily a void deed, will not sever the joint tenancy despite an intent to do so. See Hayes v. Lewis, 33 Ill.App.3d 186, 338 N.E.2d 102, 105-07 (1975) (holding that invalid transfers of stock in joint tenancy and other indications that joint tenant wished to depart with property in joint tenancy did not sever joint tenancy). The requirement for the intent under an intent-based analysis to be derived from a valid deed or similar instrument adds symmetry to the law and is consistent with our general principles governing property rights. In particular, we have never allowed a tenancy of any kind to be created without a valid deed or similar instrument. The same should hold true for the severance of a joint tenancy. See, e.g., Bates, 492 N.W.2d at 707 (permitting a severance under a valid but unexecuted mutual agreement); Hendrickson, 161 N.W.2d at 691 (permitting a duly executed Declaration of Election to Sever Survivorship of Joint Tenancy to sever the joint tenancy). [12]