Opinion ID: 1832278
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Allegedly Perjured Testimony of West Paul

Text: The second major item of the prosecutor's evidence was the testimony of West Paul, who conceded at trial that he was the driver of the getaway car, but implicated defendant as one of the two attackers who perpetrated the attempted robbery and murder. Defendant attacks the testimony of West Paul on several bases. First, defendant contends that the trial judge erred in allowing the state to call Paul as a witness after the state failed to supplement its discovery response to the defendant's request to reveal any deals and after the state led the defense to believe that Paul would not testify. When the prosecutor called West Paul to testify, defense counsel stated, If there have been any deals made to West Paul we need to know about them this morning. The prosecutor responded that she was going to put evidence of the deal in the record during Paul's testimony, and defense counsel indicated that he did not object to that method. [4] Consequently, defense counsel's argument that he was sandbagged by Paul's testimony at trial does not appear to be supported by the record and was not preserved by a contemporaneous objection. [5] Moreover, while discovery rules are intended to eliminate unwarranted prejudice arising from surprise testimony and evidence, the state's failure to comply with discovery rules does not bring automatic reversal, and prejudice must be shown. State v. Schrader, 518 So.2d 1024, 1031-32 (La.1988). A review of the record in this case reveals that the defense was able to cross-examine Paul thoroughly on his deal with the state, in which he received a sentence of twenty-five years in exchange for his testimony against defendant, and also on his substantive testimony regarding the murder of Officer Smothers. Next, defendant contends that West Paul should not have been allowed to testify at trial, because the state and the court knew Paul was going to perjure himself, as evidenced by the fact that Paul's former attorney withdrew from representation. This contention implicates the decision in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959). To prove a Napue claim, the accused must show that the prosecutor acted in collusion with the witness to facilitate false testimony. When a prosecutor allows a state witness to give false testimony without correction, a conviction gained as a result of that perjured testimony must be reversed, if the witness's testimony reasonably could have affected the jury's verdict, even though the testimony may be relevant only to the credibility of the witness. Id. at 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173. Furthermore, fundamental fairness to an accused, i.e., due process, is offended when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears. Id. When false testimony has been given under such circumstances, the defendant is entitled to a new trial unless there is no reasonable likelihood that the alleged false testimony could have affected the outcome of the trial. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). Defendant's argument is wholly unsubstantiated, as he failed to provide any evidence in support of his allegation and merely relies on his bare assertion. We accordingly reject the contention based on this record and relegate defendant to post-conviction relief if evidence in this regard is subsequently obtained. [6] Defendant also complains that the trial court failed to order the prosecutor to turn over evidence showing that the car, which according to West Paul was used in the commission of the crime, had been impounded by the police the day before the murder. In his testimony, Paul described the car used in the commission of the charged crime as a four-door Oldsmobile. At one point he referred to the car as a 1980s model, and at another time he described it as a '98 Oldsmobile. He said that it was in street terms known as a rental car, meaning it was given for use in exchange for drugs. When asked on cross-examination whether there was anything distinctive about the car, Paul stated that the back windshield was out. After Paul testified, the defense realized that the car described by Paul possibly matched the description of a car which had been impounded by the police on January 6, 1993, the day before the murder at issue. According to an article in the Baton Rouge newspaper, Kevan Brumfield admitted that he was one of two men who ran from the vehicle the day before the murder of Officer Smothers, and police suspected that West Paul was the other man. Based upon that information, defense counsel filed a supplemental motion for Brady and Giglio material, requesting documents relevant to the seizure of the vehicle and particularly a copy of the initial offense report in the matter. After hearing argument on the motion during a recess at trial and apparently after reviewing the police impoundment records, the judge ruled that the car could not be connected to Brumfield through the documents and denied the motion. The trial judge erred in refusing to order the prosecutor to turn over the police report regarding the seizure of the vehicle and the documents which showed that the vehicle was impounded from January 6 through January 15. The documents could have been used to impeach Paul's testimony in which he claimed he, Brumfield and defendant committed the charged crime using a car that was strikingly similar to the impounded vehicle, primarily because of the missing back window. Nevertheless, to be reversible, any error in refusing to order production of documents must undermine confidence in the verdict. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). Although the materials would have allowed the defense to attack Paul's recall of events and thereby question his credibility, the erroneous description of the vehicle does not really suggest that he fabricated his remaining testimony, in which he admitted he was a willing participant in the crime. Moreover, the surviving victim's positive identification and defendant's own inculpatory statement suggest that any error in this regard did not undermine confidence in the verdict. Defendant additionally contends that the trial court erred by not requiring the prosecutor to disclose the identity of the confidential informant who initially led the police to Kevan Brumfield and Eddie Paul. Detective Denicola testified that he received a phone call on the morning of the murder from a confidential informant, who told him that Brumfield was involved in the killing of Officer Smothers and that Eddie Paul knew the details of the crime. According to Denicola, the informant, who had been used in the past and had provided accurate information between thirty to forty times during the previous four or five years, identified Brumfield from a picture as the man he overheard telling Eddie Paul that he killed Officer Smothers. A confidential informant's identity is privileged, absent exceptional circumstances. State v. Oliver, 430 So.2d 650 (La.1983). However, the privilege is not absolute. The courts use a balancing test for determining when the confidential informant's name must be revealed to the defense. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957); State v. Davis, 411 So.2d 434, 436 (La.1982). Under this test, the public interest in protecting the flow of information must be balanced against the individual's right to prepare his or her defense. When an accused shows that disclosure of the informant's identity is essential for his or her defense, the identity must be revealed. State v. Davis, 411 So.2d at 436. However, the burden rests with the accused to set forth concrete reasons why the identity of the informant is crucial to the defense. Thus, the accused must convince the court that the informant may be able to give testimony which is necessary to a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. State v. Davis, 411 So.2d at 436-37. When an informant has played a crucial role in the criminal transaction and when his or her testimony is necessary to insure a fair trial, disclosure of the identity should be ordered. See State v. Theriot, 369 So.2d 708, 708-09 (La.1979). In the present case, defendant claims that the identity should have been revealed because the informant was present when Brumfield made the statement that he shot Smothers and Brumfield made no mention of defendant's involvement. He argues that the informant would have provided an independent witness to a statement against penal interest by Brumfield that exculpated the defendant. In addition, defendant contends that the informant's testimony could have been used to impeach West Paul. In Davis, the accused argued that disclosure was necessary because it is conceivable that the confidential informant, the only witness to the transaction, would have testified contrary to the state's interest. Id., 411 So.2d at 437. The court in Davis determined that the accused had failed to meet his burden of proving exceptional circumstances. In the present case, defendant's argument, similar to the one in Davis, is speculative at best. The fact that Brumfield, in his alleged admission to shooting Officer Smothers, did not mention defendant (or West Paul) does not indicate that defendant (or West Paul) was not involved in the crime. Accordingly, defendant has failed to provide the exceptional circumstances necessary to outweigh the public interest in protecting the informant's identity. Finally, defendant contends that the trial judge erred in denying production of Eddie Paul's and Deron Brooks' statements. However, defendant does not suggest what exculpatory information the statements contained and simply argues that the statements should have been turned over as an investigative tool for the defense just in case they might lead to some exculpatory or impeachment evidence. Consequently, defendant has failed to show that the statements constitute Brady evidence that should have been turned over to the defense.