Opinion ID: 77711
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: In-Court Identification by Young

Text: 29 Douglas next argues that Young's in-court identification was unduly suggestive and lacking in reliability as he was the only African-American seated at the defense table, and, therefore, the identification violated his right to due process. In making this argument, Douglas refers back to the photographic arrays shown to Young during the investigation, where Young identified several individuals other than Douglas as the perpetrator. Douglas also notes that Young helped investigators create a computer sketch of the suspect, which he argues does not resemble him. 30 Constitutional questions are reviewed de novo. United States v. Brown, 364 F.3d 1266, 1268 (11th Cir.2004). Under Simmons v. United States, convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on that ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S.Ct. 967, 971, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 1253 (1968); see also United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1293-94 (11th Cir.2006). Douglas, however, does not argue that the prior photographic line-ups were impermissibly suggestive, but, rather, he argues that Young's identification of others in these line-ups indicates that her in-court identification was unreliable and tainted by the fact that he was the only African-American at the defense table. For Douglas to prevail, he must demonstrate that the identification process was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of misidentification. Code v. Montgomery, 725 F.2d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir.1984); see also Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384, 88 S.Ct. 967. In making this determination, we consider the totality of the circumstances, including the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Code, 725 F.2d at 1320; see also Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200, 93 S.Ct. 375, 382, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). 31 Examining the factors above, we conclude that Young's in-court identification of Douglas was properly admitted. First, Young spent a considerable amount of time, approximately twenty minutes, with the perpetrator during the crime. Second, Young's attention was certainly focused on the perpetrator during the incident as she was attempting to ensure not only her own safety, but the safety of her child. Third, that Young identified another individual in the March 1, 2005, photographic arrays does not preclude her from making an in-court identification of Douglas. See United States v. Johnson, 741 F.2d 1338, 1340 n. 2 (11th Cir.1984) (The in-court identification was admissible; it was based on the teller's opportunity to observe Johnson at the time of the crime, which was substantially independent of the show-up. Defense counsel could, and did, attack the weight of the identification by pointing out the teller's prior failure to identify Johnson.); United States v. Pollack, 427 F.2d 1168, 1169-70 (5th Cir.1970) (rejecting an argument that a witness, who had been unable to identify the defendant from pictures, should not have been permitted to make an in-court identification). 4 McKee testified that Young focused almost immediately on Douglas and another individual, and then spent thirty-five minutes making a selection. Furthermore, with regard to the earlier photographic arrays, Young testified that she believed she was merely identifying the individual who looked most like the perpetrator. Also, whether the computer sketch created by investigators with the help of Young resembled Douglas was an issue for the jury to consider in weighing the strength of her in-court identification. Fourth, Young made a clear and unambiguous identification of Douglas at trial, and, when subjected to cross examination, explained her decisions during the photographic arrays in a reasonable manner. Fifth, the length of time between the crime, February 10, 2005, and the in-court identification, October 17, 2005, was not so long as to lead to the conclusion that the identification was unreliable.