Opinion ID: 2653451
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Placement Discretion

Text: On certiorari, DHS’s first question presented is 1. In ruling that DHS, as the permanent custodian of a child, did not have the discretion to determine a child’s placement, did the ICA commit grave errors of law by: a) Disregarding (and overturning) the Hawaii Supreme Court’s ruling in In re Doe, 100 Haw. 335, 346 & [n.]19, 60 P.3d 285, 296 & [n.]19 (2002) that held when DHS is appointed the permanent custodian of a child, DHS has the discretion to determine the child’s permanent placement? b) Violating the rules of statutory interpretation when it erroneously held that while HRS § 587A-15(d)(2) gave DHS, as a child’s permanent custodian, the duty and authority to determine a child’s placement, DHS had no discretion because of the absence of the word “discretion?” Does the ICA’s holding create absurd results, such as making the Judiciary, instead of DHS, the primary child-placing agency when children are placed in temporary foster, foster and permanent custody, notwithstanding contrary statutory language and legislative intent? DHS characterizes the ICA’s observation (that HRS § 587A-15(d)(2) does not contain the word “discretion”) as separate from the ICA’s holding that the family court does not review DHS’s permanent placement determinations under an abuse of discretion standard. When read in context, however, the ICA’s statement arose as part of its discussion about the standard under which DHS’s placement determinations are to be reviewed by the family court. In re AS, 130 Hawai#i at ____, 312 P.3d at 1215. Therefore, we reject DHS’s argument that the ICA’s opinion stripped DHS of its discretion, in the first instance, to place children in the agency’s foster and permanent custody. In order 23  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI #I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  to exercise its statutory “duty” and “right” to determine “where and with whom the child shall live,” pursuant to HRS § 587A15(d)(2), DHS must necessarily be free as an agency, with its particular expertise in child welfare, to make choices among living arrangements, subject to an independent best interests review by the family court. As such, we agree with DHS that In re Doe, 100 Haw. 335, 346, 346 n.19, 60 P.3d 285, 296, 296 n.19 (2002), has already held that DHS has the discretion to make permanent placement decisions. That case noted the following: “[U]pon the termination of parental rights, discretion to determine an appropriate custodian is vested in DHS. . . . After termination of rights, custody is given to DHS which is charged with finding a suitable home for the child.” Id. (citation omitted). As explained, supra, in Section III.A, this placement determination is, however, subject to review by the family court, which is authorized and required by law to determine whether the placement is in the child’s best interests. C. Relative Placement Preference in State and Federal Law On certiorari, DHS’s third question presented is 3. Did the ICA commit grave errors of law in ruling that Federal and Hawaii law did not create relative/family placement preferences for children in foster care, including those in the permanent custody of DHS? 24  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI #I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
On certiorari, DHS argues, “Congress enacted legislation granting the States money on the condition that they comply with Federal child protection/welfare laws. . . .” We now discuss whether the federal authorities DHS cites (Title IV-E of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 670 to 679c (2011)); Section 5 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, P.L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105; the Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, P.L. 110-351, 122 Stat. 3949; or 45 C.F.R. § 1355.34 (2012)) condition the receipt of federal funds upon permanent placement with relatives. We hold they do not. First, DHS argues that one section of Title IV-E, 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(19)(2011), which was added via Section 5 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, P.L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, contains the federal relative placement preference. That statute provides that “the state shall consider giving preference to an adult relative over a nonrelated caregiver when determining a placement for a child, provided that the relative caregiver meets all relevant State child protective standards[.]” The word “consider” indicates that relative placement must factor into a placement decision, but it does not mandate relative placement. Therefore, 42 U.S.C. 25  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI #I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  § 671(a)(19) does not condition the receipt of Title IV-E funds on relative placement. Second, as relevant to this appeal, the amendments made to Title IV-E by the Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, P.L. 110-351, 122 Stat. 3949, do not condition Title IV-E funds upon relative placement. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) (2011) states, “In order for a State to be eligible for payments under this part [42 USCS §§ 670 et seq.], it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary. . . .” Features of this “State plan for foster care and adoption assistance” include “a waiver of [certain foster home standards] made only on a case-by-case basis for non-safety standards (as determined by the State) in relative foster family homes for specific children in care. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(10); child abuse and neglect and criminal records checks on any relative guardian before kinship guardian assistance payments are made, 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(20)(C); “kinship guardianship assistance agreements to provide kinship guardianship assistance payments on behalf of children to grandparents and other relatives who have assumed legal guardianship of the children for whom they have cared as foster parents and for whom they have committed to care on a permanent basis. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(28); and “notice to all adult grandparents and other adults relatives of the child” that the 26  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI #I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  child has been removed from parental custody and explaining options for kinship care. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(29). None of these provisions for State plans conditions receipt of federal funds on a relative placement preference. Further, 42 U.S.C. § 673(d)(2011), as amended by the Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, created kinship guardianship assistance payments for relatives providing foster care. That section makes eligibility for such payments dependent upon the child’s attachment to the relative, and the relative’s strong commitment towards the child, but does not reflect a relative placement preference.6 Next, 42 6 42 U.S.C. § 673(d) reads in full as follows (with emphasis added): (d) Kinship guardianship assistance payments for children.
(A) In general. In order to receive payments under section 474(a)(5) [42 USCS § 674(a)(5)], a State shall--
kinship guardianship assistance agreement with the prospective relative guardian of a child who meets the requirements of this paragraph; and (ii) provide the prospective relative guardian with a copy of the agreement. (B) Minimum requirements. The agreement shall specify, at a minimum-- (i) the amount of, and manner in which, each kinship guardianship assistance payment will be provided under the agreement, and the manner in which the payment may be adjusted periodically, in consultation with the relative guardian, based on the circumstances of the relative guardian and the needs of the child;
the child and relative guardian will be eligible for under the agreement; (iii) the procedure by which the relative guardian may apply for additional services as needed; and (continued...) 27  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI #I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  6 (...continued) (iv) subject to subparagraph (D), that the State will pay the total cost of nonrecurring expenses associated with obtaining legal guardianship of the child, to the extent the total cost does not exceed $ 2,000. (C) Interstate applicability. The agreement shall provide that the agreement shall remain in effect without regard to the State residency of the relative guardian. (D) No effect on Federal reimbursement. Nothing in subparagraph (B)(iv) shall be construed as affecting the ability of the State to obtain reimbursement from the Federal Government for costs described in that subparagraph. (2) Limitations on amount of kinship guardianship assistance payment. A kinship guardianship assistance payment on behalf of a child shall not exceed the foster care maintenance payment which would have been paid on behalf of the child if the child had remained in a foster family home. (3) Child’s eligibility for a kinship guardianship assistance payment. (A) In general. A child is eligible for a kinship guardianship assistance payment under this subsection if the State agency determines the following: (i) The child has been-- (I) removed from his or her home pursuant to a voluntary placement agreement or as a result of a judicial determination to the effect that continuation in the home would be contrary to the welfare of the child; and (II) eligible for foster care maintenance payments under section 472 [42 USCS § 672] while residing for at least 6 consecutive months in the home of the prospective relative guardian. (ii) Being returned home or adopted are not appropriate permanency options for the child. (iii) The child demonstrates a strong attachment to the prospective relative guardian and the relative guardian has a strong commitment to caring permanently for the child. (iv) With respect to a child who has attained 14 years of age, the child has been consulted regarding the kinship guardianship arrangement. (B) Treatment of siblings. With respect to a child described in subparagraph (A) whose sibling or siblings are not so described-- (i) the child and any sibling of the child may be placed in the same kinship guardianship arrangement, in accordance with section 471(a)(31) [42 USCS § 671(a)(31)], (continued...) 28  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI #I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  U.S.C. § 675(1)(E) (2011) envisions permanent placements with persons other than relatives, with placement decisions explained in the child’s case plan.7 In the case of a child permanently placed with relatives, 42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(F) (2011) requires a written case plan describing the rationale behind the child’s placement as well.8 None of these federal statutory provisions 6 (...continued) if the State agency and the relative agree on the appropriateness of the arrangement for the siblings; and (ii) kinship guardianship assistance payments may be paid on behalf of each sibling so placed. 7 42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(E) reads in full as follows (with emphasis added): (1) The term “case plan” means a written document which includes at least the following: . . . (E) In the case of a child with respect to whom the permanency plan is adoption or placement in another permanent home, documentation of the steps the agency is taking to find an adoptive family or other permanent living arrangement for the child, to place the child with an adoptive family, a fit and willing relative, a legal guardian, or in another planned permanent living arrangement, and to finalize the adoption or legal guardianship. At a minimum, such documentation shall include child specific recruitment efforts such as the use of State, regional, and national adoption exchanges including electronic exchange systems to facilitate orderly and timely in-State and interstate placements. 8 42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(F) reads in full as follows: (1) The term “case plan” means a written document which includes at least the following: . . . (F) In the case of a child with respect to whom the permanency plan is placement with a relative and receipt of kinship guardianship assistance payments under section 473(d) [42 USCS § 673(d)], a description of-- (i) the steps that the agency has taken to determine that it is not appropriate for the child to be returned home or adopted; (ii) the reasons for any separation of siblings during placement;
fit and willing relative through a kinship guardianship assistance arrangement is in the child’s best interests; (continued...) 29  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI #I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  reflects a relative placement preference. DHS overstates the impact of the Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, which amended each of the foregoing sections. Third, the regulations implementing Title IV-E do not show that Title IV-E funds are conditioned upon relative placement. It is true that 45 C.F.R. § 1355.34(b)(ii)(B) (2012) provides the following: “(b) Criteria related to outcomes. . . . (ii) In the area of permanency for children: . . . (B) The continuity of family relationships and connections is preserved for children. . . .” This language encourages continuous family relationships but does not mandate relative placement. Moreover, 45 C.F.R. § 1355.25 provides, with emphasis added: The following principles, most often identified by practitioners and others as helping to assure effective services for children, youth, and families, should guide the States . . . in developing, operating, and improving the continuum of child and family services. (a) The safety and well-being of children and of all family members is paramount. 8 (...continued)
eligibility requirements for a kinship guardianship assistance payment;
adoption by the child’s relative foster parent as a more permanent alternative to legal guardianship and, in the case of a relative foster parent who has chosen not to pursue adoption, documentation of the reasons therefor; and
discuss with the child’s parent or parents the kinship guardianship assistance arrangement, or the reasons why the efforts were not made. 30  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI #I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  Thus, like Hawaii’s CPA, Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, along with its implementing regulations, encourages relative placements but considers the child’s safety to be an overriding concern. Lastly, even Title IV-E recognizes the authority of State courts over protected children under their jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. § 678 states, “Nothing in this part [42 USCS §§ 670 et seq.] shall be construed as precluding State courts from exercising their discretion to protect the health and safety of children in individual cases. . . .” In sum, there is no federal relative placement preference that DHS was compelled to carry out under Congress’s spending power.
We agree with the ICA’s conclusion that there is no relative placement preference in HRS §§ 587A-29, -710, 1011, and 26(e)(2)12. 9 HRS § 587A-2 provides the following: Purpose; construction. This chapter creates within the jurisdiction of the family court a child protective act to make paramount the safety and health of children who have been harmed or are in life circumstances that threaten harm. Furthermore, this chapter makes provisions for the service, treatment, and permanent plans for these children and their families. The legislature finds that children deserve and require competent, responsible parenting and safe, secure, loving, and nurturing homes. The legislature finds that children who have been harmed or are threatened with harm are less likely than other children to realize their full educational, vocational, and emotional potential, and become law-abiding, productive, self-sufficient citizens, and are more likely to become involved with the mental health system, the juvenile justice system, or the criminal justice system, as well as become an economic burden on the State. (continued...) 31  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI #I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  9 (...continued) The legislature finds that prompt identification, reporting, investigation, services, treatment, adjudication, and disposition of cases involving children who have been harmed or are threatened with harm are in the children’s, their families’, and society’s best interests because the children are defenseless, exploitable, and vulnerable. The legislature recognizes that many relatives are willing and able to provide a nurturing and safe placement for children who have been harmed or are threatened with harm. The policy and purpose of this chapter is to provide children with prompt and ample protection from the harms detailed herein, with an opportunity for timely reconciliation with their families if the families can provide safe family homes, and with timely and appropriate service or permanent plans to ensure the safety of the child so they may develop and mature into responsible, selfsufficient, law-abiding citizens. The service plan shall effectuate the child’s remaining in the family home, when the family home can be immediately made safe with services, or the child’s returning to a safe family home. The service plan shall be carefully formulated with the family in a timely manner. Every reasonable opportunity should be provided to help the child’s legal custodian to succeed in remedying the problems that put the child at substantial risk of being harmed in the family home. Each appropriate resource, public and private, family and friend, should be considered and used to maximize the legal custodian’s potential for providing a safe family home for the child. Full and careful consideration shall be given to the religious, cultural, and ethnic values of the child’s legal custodian when service plans are being discussed and formulated. Where the court has determined, by clear and convincing evidence, that the child cannot be returned to a safe family home, the child shall be permanently placed in a timely manner. The policy and purpose of this chapter includes the protection of children who have been harmed or are threatened with harm by: (1) Providing assistance to families to address the causes for abuse and neglect; (2) Respecting and using each family’s strengths, resources, culture, and customs; (3) Ensuring that families are meaningfully engaged and children are consulted in an age-appropriate manner in case planning; (4) Enlisting the early and appropriate participation of family and the family’s support networks; (5) Respecting and encouraging the input and views of caregivers; and (6) Ensuring a permanent home through timely adoption or other permanent living arrangement, if safe reunification with the family is not possible. (continued...) 32  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI #I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  We agree with the ICA that HRS § 587A-9 expresses a relative preference in emergency, temporary foster care placements. In re AS, 130 Hawai#i at ___, 312 P.3d at 1218. That statute provides the following, with emphasis added: Temporary foster custody without court order. (a) When the department receives protective custody of a child from the police, the department shall: (1) Assume temporary foster custody of the child if, in the discretion of the department, the department determines that 9 (...continued) The child protective services under this chapter shall be provided with every reasonable effort to be open, accessible, and communicative to the persons affected by a child protective proceeding without endangering the safety and best interests of the child under this chapter. This chapter shall be liberally construed to serve the best interests of the children affected and the purpose and policies set forth herein. 10 Specifically, DHS argues that HRS §§ 587A-7(a)(10) and (11) express a relative placement preference. HRS § 587A-7(a)(10) and (11) direct the family court to consider the following factors when determining whether a child’s family is willing and able to provide the child with a safe family home: “Whether there is a support system available to the child’s family, including adoptive and hanai relatives, friends, and faith-based or other community networks[,]” and “[a]ttempts to locate and involve extended family, friends, and faith-based or other community networks[,]” respectively. 11 HRS § 587A-10 provides the following: Relatives; foster placement. (a) The department shall provide the child’s relative an application to be the child’s resource family within fifteen days of the relative’s request to provide foster placement for the child. If the application is submitted and denied, the department shall provide the applicant with the specific reasons for the denial and an explanation of the procedures for an administrative appeal. (b) The department and authorized agencies shall make reasonable efforts to identify and notify all relatives of the child within thirty days after assuming foster custody of the child. 12 HRS § 587A-26(e)(2) provides the following at a temporary foster custody hearing: “The court may further order that: . . . The child’s family members who are parties provide the department or another authorized agency the names and addresses of other relatives and friends who are potential visitation supervisors or resource families for the child[.]” 33  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI #I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  the child is subject to imminent harm while in the custody of the child’s family; (2) Make every reasonable effort to inform the child’s parents of the actions taken, unless doing so would put another person at risk of harm; (3) Unless the child is admitted to a hospital or similar institution, place the child in emergency foster care while the department conducts an appropriate investigation, with placement preference being given to an approved relative; (4) With authorized agencies, make reasonable efforts to identify and notify all relatives within thirty days of assuming temporary foster custody of the child; and (5) Within three days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays: (A) Relinquish temporary foster custody, return the child to the child’s parents, and proceed pursuant to section 587A-11(3), 587A-11(4), or 587A-11(5); (B) Secure a voluntary placement agreement from the child’s parents to place the child in foster care, and proceed pursuant to section 587A-11(5) or 587A-11(7); or (C) File a petition with the court. (b) Upon the request of the department and without regard to parental consent, any physician licensed or authorized to practice medicine in the State shall perform an examination to determine the nature and extent of harm or threatened harm to the child under the department’s temporary foster custody. We also note that HRS § 587A-11 reflects a relative preference in emergency, temporary foster care placements. That statute provides the following, with emphasis added: Investigation; department powers. Upon receiving a report that a child is subject to imminent harm, has been harmed, or is subject to threatened harm, the department shall cause such investigation to be made as it deems to be appropriate. In conducting the investigation, the department may: (1) Enlist the cooperation and assistance of appropriate state and federal law enforcement authorities, who may conduct an investigation and, if an investigation is conducted, shall provide the department with all preliminary findings, including the results of a criminal history record check of an alleged perpetrator of harm or threatened harm to the child; (2) Interview the child without the presence or prior approval of the child’s family and temporarily assume protective custody of the child for the purpose of conducting the interview; (3) Resolve the matter in an informal fashion that it deems appropriate under the circumstances; 34  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI #I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  (4) Close the matter if the department finds, after an assessment, that the child is residing with a caregiver who is willing and able to meet the child’s needs and provide a safe and appropriate placement for the child; (5) Immediately enter into a service plan: (A) To safely maintain the child in the family home; or (B) To place the child in voluntary foster care pursuant to a written agreement with the child’s parent. If the child is placed in voluntary foster care and the family does not successfully complete the service plan within three months after the date on which the department assumed physical custody of the child, the department shall file a petition. The department is not required to file a petition if the parents agree to adoption or legal guardianship of the child and the child’s safety is ensured; provided that the adoption or legal guardianship hearing is conducted within six months of the date on which the department assumed physical custody of the child; (6) Assume temporary foster custody of the child and file a petition with the court within three days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, after the date on which the department assumes temporary foster custody of the child, with placement preference being given to an approved relative; or (7) File a petition or ensure that a petition is filed by another appropriate authorized agency in court under this chapter. HRS §§ 587A-9(a)(3) and -11(6) reflect a relative preference in emergency, temporary foster care placements. As such, these provisions of the CPA carry out 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(19)’s requirement that the States “consider giving preference to an adult relative over a non-related caregiver when determining a placement for a child, provided that the relative caregiver meets all relevant State child protective standards[.]” No such relative preference exists, however, with regard to permanent placements like the one at bar. Instead, HRS § 587A-31 (Supp. 2010), which governs permanent placement, provides for a best interests review of the child’s current placement, and 35  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI #I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  envisions future placement options as within an adoptive home, with a legal guardian, or with the department or an authorized agency, but not expressly with a relative: Permanency hearing. (a) A permanency hearing shall be conducted within twelve months of the child’s date of entry into foster care or within thirty days of a judicial determination that the child is an abandoned infant or that aggravated circumstances are present. A permanency hearing shall be conducted at least every twelve months thereafter for as long as the child remains in foster care under the placement responsibility of the department or an authorized agency, or every six months thereafter if the child remains in the permanent custody of the department or an authorized agency. (b) The court shall review the status of the case to determine whether the child is receiving appropriate services and care, that case plans are being properly implemented, and that activities are directed toward a permanent placement for the child. (c) At each permanency hearing, the court shall make written findings pertaining to: (1) The extent to which each party has complied with the service plan and progressed in making the home safe; (2) Whether the current placement of the child continues to be appropriate and in the best interests of the child or if another in-state or out-of-state placement should be considered; (3) The court’s projected timetable for reunification or, if the current placement is not expected to be permanent, placement in an adoptive home, with a legal guardian, or under the permanent custody of the department or an authorized agency; (4) Whether the department has made reasonable efforts, in accordance with the safety and well-being of the child, to: (A) Place siblings who have been removed from the family home with the same resource family, adoptive placement, or legal guardians; and (B) Provide for frequent visitation or other ongoing interactions with siblings who are not living in the same household; (5) The appropriate permanency goal for the child, including whether a change in goal is necessary; (6) Whether the department has made reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency goal in effect for the child and a summary of those efforts; (7) The date by which the permanency goal for the child is to be achieved; (8) In the case of a child who has attained sixteen years of age, the services needed to assist the child with the transition from foster care to independent living; and 36  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI #I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  (9) Consultations with the child in an age-appropriate manner about the proposed plan for permanency or transition from foster care to independent living. (d) At each permanency hearing, the court shall order: (1) The child’s reunification with a parent or parents; (2) The child’s continued placement in foster care, where: (A) Reunification is expected to occur within a time frame that is consistent with the developmental needs of the child; and (B) The safety and health of the child can be adequately safeguarded; or (3) A permanent plan with a goal of: (A) Placing the child for adoption and when the department will file a motion to set the matter for the termination of parental rights; (B) Placing the child for legal guardianship if the department documents and presents to the court a compelling reason why termination of parental rights and adoption are not in the best interests of the child; or (C) Awarding permanent custody to the department or an authorized agency, if the department documents and presents to the court a compelling reason why adoption and legal guardianship are not in the best interests of the child. (e) At each permanency hearing where a permanent plan is ordered, the court shall make appropriate orders to ensure timely implementation of the permanent plan and to ensure that the plan is accomplished within a specified period of time. (f) A permanency hearing may be held concurrently with a periodic review hearing. (g) If the child has been in foster care under the responsibility of the department for a total of twelve consecutive months or an aggregate of fifteen out of the most recent twenty-two months from the date of entry into foster care, the department shall file a motion to terminate parental rights, unless: (1) The department has documented in the safe family home factors or other written report submitted to the court a compelling reason why it is not in the best interest of the child to file a motion; or (2) The department has not provided to the family of the child, consistent with the time period required in the service plan, such services as the department deems necessary for the safe return of the child to the family home. (h) Nothing in this section shall prevent the department from filing a motion to terminate parental rights if the department determines that the criteria for terminating parental rights are present. (Emphasis added). 37  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI #I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  We also expand upon the ICA’s opinion to explain how HRS § 587A-2 (the purpose and construction section of the CPA) has changed through time and thus cannot be the current state statutory source of any relative placement preference. As originally codified in 1983, the CPA’s purpose clause called for reunification of foster children with their families where possible: Purpose; construction. This chapter creates within the jurisdiction of the family court a child protective act in order to safeguard, treat, and provide permanent planning for children who have been harmed or threatened with harm. The legislature finds that children deserve and require competent and responsible parenting and safe and secure homes. The legislature finds that children who have been harmed or threatened with harm are less likely than other children to realize their full educational, vocational, and emotional potential, and become law-abiding, productive, self-sufficient citizens, and are more likely to become involved with the mental health system, the juvenile justice system, or the criminal justice system, as well as become an economic burden on the State. The legislature finds that prompt identification, reporting, investigation, adjudication, treatment, and disposition of cases involving children who are harmed or threatened with harm are in both the children’s and society’s best interests because such children are defenseless, exploitable, and vulnerable. The policy and purpose of this chapter is to provide children with prompt and ample protection from the harms detailed herein, with an opportunity for timely reconciliation with their families where practicable, and with timely and permanent planning so they may develop and mature into responsible, self-sufficient, law-abiding citizens. This permanent planning should effectuate placement with a child’s own family when possible and should be conducted in an expeditious fashion so that where return to the child’s family is not possible as provided in this chapter, such children will be promptly and permanently placed with responsible, competent, substitute parents and families, and their place in such families secured by termination of parental rights, adoption, guardianship, long-term foster custody orders, if no other option is available, by other order of the court, or arrangement as best provides for permanency. 38  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI #I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  This chapter shall be liberally construed to serve the best interests of the children and the purposes set out in this chapter. HRS § 587-1 (1985)(emphases added). In 1989 Doe, the ICA held that HRS Chapter 587 (1985) “accords priority to the child’s family. . . .” 7 Haw. App. at 556, 784 P.2d at 879. In re Doe Children, 73 Haw. 15, 20-21, 827 P.2d 1144, 1146-47 (1992), also construed HRS § 587-1 (1985) as stating “a clear preference for keeping families together if possible where the difficulties being faced by the families can be resolved,” and as having as its stated purpose “an emphasis on maintaining the family unit.” In November 2003 Doe, however, we observed that the legislature “substantially amended HRS § 587-1 and the policy of the law” in 1998. 103 Hawai#i at 136, 80 P.3d at 26. The 1998 amendment was based on the following legislative finding: Recent trends across the country in dealing with [child abuse] have been to provide alternatives to the traditional philosophy of returning the abused child to the natural family, which may not be in the best interests of the child’s safety. Providing a child with a safe home should be the ultimate concern, regardless of whether a safe home be the natural family, adoptive family, or foster family. 1998 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 134, § 1 at 504. In line with its new focus on the child’s safety, the following language was added to HRS § 587-1, supplanting family reunification as the CPA’s goal: “to make paramount the safety and health of children who have been harmed or are in life circumstances that threaten harm.” 1998 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 134, § 6 at 506. 39  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI #I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  DHS argues that 2008 amendments to HRS § 587-1 restored the family placement preference. It is true that the 2008 legislature added the following language to HRS § 587-1: “The legislature recognizes that many relatives are willing and able to provide a nurturing and safe placement for children who have been harmed or are threatened with harm.” 2008 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 199, § 3 at 738. It is also true that the legislature amended HRS §§ 587-21 (“Investigation”) and -24 (“Temporary foster custody without court order”) to authorize DHS to give placement preference to an appropriate relative in emergency, temporary foster care cases. 2008 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 199, §§ 4- 5 at 738-39. See HRS § 587-21(b)(3) (2006 & Supp. 2008)(“[DHS] shall . . . [a]ssume temporary foster custody of the child . . . provided that placement preference shall be given to an appropriate relative identified by the department[.]”); HRS § 587-24(c) (2006 & Supp. 2008)(“Upon assuming temporary foster custody of a child under this chapter, the department shall place the child in emergency foster care, . . . provided that placement preference for emergency foster care shall be given to the appropriate relative identified by the department.”). The legislative history of these changes demonstrates that the legislature envisioned grandparents, hanai parents, or lawe hanai parents as foster placements. See S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 40  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI #I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  2146, in 2008 Senate Journal, at 932 (“The purpose of this measure is to establish a grandparent preference for out-of-home placement of children needing child protective services. . . . [A] preference may be given to other appropriate family members who are identified by the Department of Human Services[.]”); S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 2869, in 2008 Senate Journal, at 1232 (“The purpose of this measure is to establish a preference for grandparents or family members, when making out of home placements for children needing child protective services. . . . This includes seeking out blood relatives such as grandparents, and hanai and lawe hanai parents.”); H. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1190-08, in 2008 House Journal, at 1450 (“The purpose of this bill is to establish a preference for certain relatives, lawe hanai, or hanai parents for out-of-home placement of children involved in child protective proceedings.”); H. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1602-08, in 2008 House Journal, at 1594 (“The purpose of this bill is to establish a preference for certain relatives, including hanai relatives, for out-of-home placement of children involved in child protective proceedings.”) As the bill progressed through the Senate to House committees, however, one concern about relative placement emerged: Your Committee understands that temporary placement of a child with a relative or other person who is familiar with the child’s family and circumstances may be better for the child than placement in foster care with persons unfamiliar 41  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI #I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  to the child. However, there are concerns that while foster parents are licensed and have undergone extensive prescreening, relatives and other persons close to the child may need to undergo a similar level of in-depth screening prior to receiving placement. Id. at 1595. It is perhaps for this reason that the relative placement preference was codified in 2008 to apply only to emergency, temporary foster care placements. To the extent HRS § 587-1, as amended in 2008, reflected a relative placement preference, it must be read in the context of the CPA as a whole to confine such preference to emergency, temporary foster care placements. See Ko#olau Agric. Co., Ltd. v. Comm’n of Water Res. Mgmt., 83 Hawai#i 484, 488, 927 P.2d 1367, 1371 (1996)(“[W]e must read statutory language in the context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose.”) (citation omitted). When Chapter 587 was repealed and the CPA was overhauled in 2010, the purpose section (re-codified as HRS § 587A-2) remained substantially similar13 to HRS § 587-1, as amended in 2008. See 13 The major change to the purpose clause consisted of the addition of the following language: The policy and purpose of this chapter includes the protection of children who have been harmed or are threatened with harm by: (1) Providing assistance to families to address the causes for abuse and neglect; (2) Respecting and using each family’s strengths, resources, culture, and customs; (3) Ensuring that families are meaningfully engaged and children are consulted in an age-appropriate manner in case planning; (4) Enlisting the early and appropriate participation of family and the family’s support networks; (continued...) 42  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI #I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  2010 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 135, §§ 1, 8 at 283, 314. The emergency, temporary foster care relative placement preference was also retained in newly codified, renumbered sub-sections HRS §§ 587A-9 and -11, as quoted in full, supra. As explained, supra, however, there is no relative preference in permanent placement cases under the current CPA. There being no state statutory relative preference in permanent placement cases, we disapprove of DHS’s Policy Directives PA Nos. 2005-5, -7, and -8, which directed the CWSB to give preference to relatives in determining a foster child’s permanent placement, to the extent that those policies imply that DHS may do so without regard to the child’s best interests, which are always paramount. As the legislature has recognized, there are possible advantages to the placement of a child with relatives or with others who are familiar with the child’s family and circumstances. But to the extent the policy directives suggest to DHS social workers that a relative placement priority takes precedence over other significant factors bearing on a child’s best interests, such as a child’s attachment to a longterm primary caregiver, as in this case, such directives 13 (...continued) (5) Respecting and encouraging the input and views of caregivers; and (6) Ensuring a permanent home through timely adoption or other permanent living arrangement, if safe reunification with the family is not possible. 2010 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 135, § 1 at 282-83. 43  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI #I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  impermissibly alter the provisions of the Child Protective Act. We discuss the policy directives in greater detail next. DHS Policy Directive PA No. 2005-5, entitled “Supporting, Strengthening, and Maintaining Family Connections through Kinship Placement of Children Active with Child Welfare Services Branch (CWSB),” provides the following: This policy directive affirms CWSB’s policy to seek and assess relatives or kin as foster, adoptive, and/or permanent placement resources for children under the Department’s voluntary, court-ordered foster or permanent custody and that relatives or kin placement is preferred to maintain family connections. . . . In the absence of safety factors, . . . placement with kin meeting CWSB licensing requirements shall be a priority in order to maintain family connections and as a permanent resource for children. (First, second, and fourth emphases added; third emphasis in original.) DHS Policy Directive PA No. 2005-7, entitled “Standards for Kin Placement of Children Under the Department of Human Services’ (DHS) Placement Responsibility,” makes the same statement that “placement with kin meeting CWSB licensing requirements shall be a priority in order to maintain life-long and enduring family connections and as a permanent resource for children.” (Emphasis in original.) DHS Policy Directive PA No. 2005-8, entitled “Permanent Plan Approval,” states that it is DHS’s “policy to seek and assess kin as foster, adoptive, and/or permanent placement for children under the Department’s custody and that kin placement shall be a priority to maintain life-long 44  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI #I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  family connections.” (First emphasis added; second emphasis in original.) Nothing in Chapter 587A reflects a relative preference in permanent placement cases. In spite of clear statutory language, DHS’s Policy Directives PA Nos. 2005-5, -7, and -8 state that relative placement “shall be a priority” in temporary foster, foster, and permanent placement cases. Chapter 587A and its legislative history indicate that a relative placement preference applies only to emergency, temporary foster care cases. See HRS §§ 587A-9 and -11. Hence, DHS’s policy directives impermissibly alter the provisions of the Child Protective Act. See In re Doe, 73 Haw. At 19, 827 P.2d at 1146 (opining that “the authority of the DHS . . . is ‘limited to enacting rules which carry out and further the purposes of the legislation and to not enlarge, alter, or restrict the provisions of the act being administered.”)(citing Puana v. Sunn, 69 Haw. 187, 189, 737 P.2d 867, 870 (1987)). Limited in this way, DHS was authorized to direct CWSB to give relatives placement preference only in emergency, temporary foster care cases. As such, we hereby disapprove of DHS’s Policy Directives PA Nos. 2005-5, -7, and -8, to the extent a relative preference is mandated in permanent placement cases, as beyond DHS’s authority to implement under Chapter 587A. 45  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI #I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  D. Revocation of DHS’s Permanent Custodianship On certiorari, DHS’s fourth question presented is 4. Did the ICA commit grave errors of law by ruling that the family court was not required to remove DHS as the child’s permanent custodian after ruling that DHS abused its placement discretion? The ICA did not err in holding that DHS misused March 2003 Doe, 101 Hawai’i at 229, 65 P.3d at 176 to support its argument that the family court should have revoked DHS’s permanent custodianship once it had determined that DHS abused its discretion in recommending A.S. be placed with Maternal Aunt. In re AS, 130 Hawai#i at ____, 312 P.3d at 1223-24. March 2003 Doe did not hold that DHS’s permanent custodianship should be revoked. In that case, the family court ordered DHS to maintain a concerned child’s placement with her aunt in an unlicensed foster home, against DHS’s foster placement determination. 101 Hawai’i at 228, 65 P.3d at 175. DHS argued on appeal that the family court “cannot award foster custody to an authorized agency and simultaneously restrict that agency’s statutory placement authority as a foster custodian.” Id. It argued, “(1) that HRS § 587-2 (1993) expressly vests in a foster custodian the duty and right to determine where and with whom a foster child shall be placed in foster care and, therefore, (2) that where the family court 46  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI #I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  usurps the authorized agency’s right to place a foster child under its care, the authorized agency cannot be the foster custodian as a matter of law.” Id. In other words, DHS argued that because “(1) DHS could not license Aunt’s home as a foster family boarding home and (2) the family court concluded . . . that it was in [the child’s] best interests to remain in the care of Aunt, the family court should have revoked its award of foster custody to DHS and vested foster custody in Aunt.” 101 Hawai’i at 229, 65 P.3d at 176. This court stated, “[W]e . . . agree with DHS.” Id. DHS argues that this court’s statement, “We agree,” signaled this court’s agreement with DHS’s request to have its foster custodianship revoked; however, the rest of the opinion makes no such statement. Rather, the focus of the rest of the opinion was on whether the family court had the discretion to override DHS’s non-licensure of the aunt to order placement of the child with the aunt. 101 Hawai#i at 229-31, 65 P.3d at 176-78. This court noted that the family court abused its discretion in ordering placement with the aunt, who was not licensed, thereby forcing DHS to “violate its own rules and regulations.” 101 Hawai#i at 231, 65 P.3d at 178. However, this court further noted that DHS could have licensed the aunt’s foster home because denial of a foster care license based on the aunt’s background 47  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI #I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  was merely discretionary. 101 Hawai#i at 230, 65 P.3d at 177. It consequently remanded the case to the family court to order it to direct DHS to exercise its discretionary licensing power to license (or not license) the aunt as a foster care provider. 101 Hawai#i at 231, 65 P.3d at 178. If DHS licensed the aunt upon remand, this court noted that the family court may order DHS to place the concerned child with her aunt. Id. If DHS did not license the aunt upon remand, this court noted that the family court could override that decision and order licensing, or it could place the concerned child in another licensed foster boarding home. Id. The revocation argument was not addressed because of the remand. Therefore, March 2003 Doe does not stand for, and we hereby reject, the proposition that once the family court has disagreed with DHS’s placement decision, DHS must be relieved of its custodianship over the concerned child.