Opinion ID: 1995436
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Causation Instruction

Text: Owens also argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that A person causes the death of another person if his actions are a substantial factor in bringing about death and if death is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of his actions. Death is reasonably foreseeable if it is something which should have been foreseen as being reasonably related to the defendant's actions. The government must prove causation beyond a reasonable doubt. Owens argues that [t]he emphasized portion of [this] instruction reduced the government's burden of proof on the homicide counts, permitting the jury to convict appellant of murder based on a finding consistent with involuntary manslaughter. While Owens acknowledges that he requested the same instruction he now objects to, he argues that the request was made in the context of a reasonable expectation of an instruction on criminal negligence involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of second degree murder. But Owens failed to object to the final jury instructions even though he was aware at that point that no involuntary manslaughter instruction had been or would be given. Owens' claim of error is thus barred because he requested the instruction that was given. We have repeatedly held that a defendant may not take one position at trial and a contradictory position on appeal. Brown v. United States, 627 A.2d 499, 508 (D.C.1993) (holding that [b]ecause defense counsel specifically asked the court not to give an instruction on this point, we will not consider appellant's present claim that the court erred in failing to give it.). Moreover, if we applied plain error analysis, the result would be the same: Owens has not shown how the causation instruction undermined (as he says it did) the requirement for the government to prove the malice necessary for conviction of second-degree murder, on which the jury was also instructed.