Opinion ID: 2172649
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Plaintiffs' State Law Claim

Text: As noted above, the Director of the DSS is authorized to promulgate rules concerning the AFDC program. MCL 400.10; MSA 16.410. Pursuant to that authority, the Director of the DSS promulgated 1979 AC, R 400.12(10), which provides: Only income and resources which are available in fact for current use are to be considered in determining the need of individuals for assistance and the amount of payments to or for them. (Emphasis supplied.) In this Court, plaintiffs make a brief argument that the above-quoted rule more fully recognizes the actual availability requirement, and that the insertion of the phrase `in fact' clearly suggests that more than the nascent ability to use a resource is intended. I agree with the Court of Appeals that Michigan's regulatory scheme does not prohibit defendant from considering plaintiffs' nonhomestead real property in determining their eligibility for AFDC. 131 Mich App 426. The fact that the Michigan regulation has inserted the words in fact in the phrase available for current use does not alter our analysis under the federal regulation above. Plaintiffs' property is without legal impediment to immediate sale, and as such it is available in fact. Any other interpretation would not allow the inclusion of nonliquid assets as available in fact for current use. IV. CONCLUSION I conclude that the federal statute, the federal regulations, the Michigan statutes, and the Michigan Administrative Code do not require us to find that the DSS erred by determining, pursuant to Item 211 in the Assistance Payments Manual, that plaintiffs' equity interest in nonhomestead real property was actually available. Although the case law is not well developed, there is some authority for both plaintiffs' and defendant's positions. The statutory history preceding the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 inferentially reveals no pre-DRA requirement by the federal government that the states provide grace periods for the disposal of nonliquid assets. Indeed, after the 1984 amendment, 42 USC 602(a)(7) now provides statutorily for such grace periods. I decline to judicially create a grace period wherein plaintiffs' AFDC eligibility would not be determined by including assets that plaintiffs were making a good-faith attempt to sell. The Legislature, by statute, or the Director of the DSS, by regulation, could have provided explicitly for the situation that occurred here. The current federal statute provides for it, and certain states provided for this situation prior to the passage of the OBRA of 1981. Michigan chose not to provide a grace period, either by statute or regulation, for the sale of nonliquid assets. I decline to provide such a grace period judicially. The DSS' determination that the nonhomestead real property herein was available is not error requiring reversal. Accordingly, I would affirm the decision below.