Opinion ID: 60256
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disciplinary Report and Transfer

Text: Prison officials may not retaliate against inmates for filing lawsuits or administrative grievances. Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 968 (11th Cir. 1986). An inmate raises a constitutional claim of retaliation if he establishes that the prison disciplined him for filing a grievance or lawsuit concerning the conditions of his imprisonment. Wildberger v. Bracknell, 869 F.2d 1467, 1468 (11th Cir. 1989). To establish a claim for retaliation, the inmate must show a causal connection between his protected conduct and the harm complained of. Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1248-49 (11th Cir. 2003). While state defendants sued in their official capacity for monetary damages under § 1983 are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, they are not immune from claims seeking prospective declaratory or injunctive relief. See Powell v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1288, 1308 & n.27 (11th Cir. 2007); Fla. Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities v. Fla. Dep’t of Health and Rehabilitative. Serv., 225 F.3d 1208, 1220 (11th Cir. 2000). Smith’s claims against McNeil in his official capacity sought prospective injunctive and declaratory relief. 4 We do not recognize vicarious liability, including respondeat superior, in § 1983 actions. Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1331 (11th Cir. 2007). In Goebert, we noted that, in order to establish that a defendant committed a constitutional violation in his official and supervisory capacities, a plaintiff must show that the defendant instituted a custom or policy resulting in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights or directed his subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so. Id. While a policy is an officially adopted decision, “[a] custom is an unwritten practice that is applied consistently enough to have the same effect as a policy with the force of law,” and “[d]emonstrating a policy or custom requires showing[ing] a persistent and wide-spread practice.” Id. at 1332 (third alteration in original) (quotation omitted). Smith has failed to state a claim for retaliatory disciplinary proceedings against both defendants because the disciplinary order he challenges was properly filed after Smith disobeyed an order to cooperate with the transfer, and not because he had filed lawsuits or administrative grievances. Further, Smith has not stated a claim for retaliatory transfer against Barriner because Smith has not alleged that Barriner was in any way responsible for the decision to transfer him. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision as to those claims. 5 However, because Smith alleged facts sufficient to state a claim against Sec. McNeil for supervisory liability for permitting widespread retaliatory transfers, we vacate the district court’s decision as to that claim and remand for further proceedings. Smith alleged that he filed an increasing number of grievances and complaints, and was transferred in retaliation for such First Amendment activity. Smith also alleged a widespread practice and custom of transferring inmates in retaliation for exercising their First Amendment rights, thus putting Sec. McNeil on notice thereof. B. Constitutionality of Fla. Admin. Code. r. 33-601.314, § 6-1 “Unlike the strict standards of scrutiny applicable to the constitutional rights of persons in free society, the Supreme Court has adopted a deferential standard for determining whether a prison regulation violates an inmate’s constitutional rights,” and “[a] prison regulation, even though it infringes the inmate’s constitutional rights, is an actionable constitutional violation only if the regulation is unreasonable.” Hakim v. Hicks, 223 F.3d 1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2000). In examining the reasonableness of the regulation, we use the standard announced by the Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261, 2263, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), and consider the following factors: (1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection” between the 6 regulation and a legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it; (2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the asserted constitutional right that remain open to the inmates; (3) whether and the extent to which accommodation of the asserted right will have an impact on prison staff, inmates, and the allocation of prison resources generally; and (4) whether the regulation represents an “exaggerated response” to prison concerns. Hakim, 223 F.3d at 1247-48. The district court properly dismissed Smith’s facial constitutional challenge to the rule. First of all, there is a rational connection between the regulation and the legitimate governmental interest of maintaining secure prisons. Additionally, Smith’s complaint demonstrates there are alternative means by which he can exercise his First Amendment rights. Amending the rule to require prisoners to obey only “legal” orders could lead to a strain on guards and resources, and Smith does not suggest that the disobeying order rule is an exaggerated response to the overriding need to maintain secure prisons. Moreover, because the disciplinary report was issued for his refusal to follow an order, and not for an arbitrary reason or in retaliation for exercising his right of free speech, the disobeying order rule was not applied in an unconstitutional manner.