Opinion ID: 1100536
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: appeal of denial of 3.851 relief

Text: Of Anthony's various claims, we address only a few. Many of his claims are procedurally barred or legally insufficient, and therefore we deny them without discussion. [4] See Johnson v. State, 593 So.2d 206, 208 (Fla.1992) (Issues which either were or could have been litigated at trial and upon direct appeal are not cognizable through collateral attack.). Claim 6 (cumulative errors deprived Anthony of a fair trial) presents a conclusory argument insufficient to state an issue. See LeCroy v. Dugger, 727 So.2d 236, 240 (Fla.1998) (upholding the summary denial of a postconviction motion because the defense alleged no facts to substantiate its conclusory claims of ineffective assistance of counsel); see also Randolph v. State, 853 So.2d 1051, 1063 n. 12 (Fla.2003) ([T]he purpose of an appellate brief is to present arguments in support of the points on appeal.) (quoting Duest v. Dugger, 555 So.2d 849, 852 (Fla. 1990)). Other claims are clearly meritless. [5] Finally, some claims were raised on direct appeal and we decided them against Anthony. [6] We address Anthony's remaining three arguments, corresponding to claims 1(a), 1(b), and 3(c). These are: (A) that Jeffrey's life sentence is newly discovered evidence that warrants granting Anthony a new sentencing phase; (B) that the evidentiary hearing testimonies of four witnesses should exculpate him; and (C) that his counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to investigate and present evidence of Jeffrey's history of aggression and violence and domination of Anthony.
Anthony first claims that Jeffrey's life sentence is newly discovered evidence that warrants granting him a new sentencing phase. During resentencing in 1998, a jury unanimously recommended the death penalty for Anthony and Jeffrey. We later vacated Jeffrey's death sentence and reduced it to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years because he was 16 years old at the time of the crimes. See Farina v. State, 763 So.2d 302, 303 (Fla.2000) (citing Brennan v. State, 754 So.2d 1 (Fla.1999)). The circuit court construed this argument as a proportionality claim, which we rejected on direct appeal. See Farina v. State, 801 So.2d 44, 55-56 (Fla.2001). Thus, any such argument here would be procedurally barred. See Turner v. Dugger, 614 So.2d 1075, 1078 (Fla.1993) (barring claims for postconviction relief because they, or variations thereof, were raised on direct appeal). Nevertheless, Anthony insists that Jeffrey's life sentence is newly discovered evidence. To set aside a conviction based on newly discovered evidence, [f]irst ... the evidence must have been unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that defendant or his counsel could not have known [of it] by the use of diligence. Second, the newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial. Robinson v. State, 865 So.2d 1259, 1262 (Fla.2004) (citation omitted) (quoting Jones v. State, 709 So.2d 512, 521 (Fla.1998)). The two elements of a newly discovered evidence claim apply equally to the issue of `whether a life or death sentence should have been imposed.' Ventura v. State, 794 So.2d 553, 571 (Fla.2001) (quoting Scott v. Dugger, 604 So.2d 465, 468 (Fla. 1992)). Therefore, to succeed on a claim that a death sentence must be set aside because of a codefendant's subsequent life sentence the defendant must show: 1) the life sentence could not have been known to the parties ... at the time of trial; and 2) the codefendant's life sentence would probably result in a life sentence for the defendant on retrial. Id. (quoting Groover v. State, 703 So.2d 1035, 1037 (Fla.1997)). In Scott, we held that a codefendant's subsequent life sentence constitutes newly discovered evidence which would permit collateral relief. 604 So.2d at 468-69. We further held that in a death case involving equally culpable codefendants the death sentence of one codefendant is subject to collateral review under rule 3.850 when another codefendant subsequently receives a life sentence. Id. at 469. Anthony meets the first prong of the newly discovered evidence test because we reduced Jeffrey's sentence two years after they were sentenced to death. See Farina, 763 So.2d at 303. However, Anthony fails to meet the second prong. Although Jeffrey's life sentence would normally constitute newly discovered evidence under Scott, we reduced his sentence because he was not eligible as a matter of law to receive the death penalty. See Farina, 801 So.2d at 56 (citing Brennan, 754 So.2d at 5-6). Thus, as we stated in Anthony's direct appeal, Jeffrey's life sentence is irrelevant to Anthony's proportionality review because the aggravation and mitigation in their cases are per se incomparable. Id. Jeffrey's life sentence would not probably result in a life sentence for [Anthony] on retrial. See Ventura, 794 So.2d at 571. The dissent insists that the reason for Jeffrey's reduction in sentence is irrelevant. Dissenting op. at 636. It argues that [t]here is simply no meaningful distinction between [Anthony's] claim here and the decision in Scott. Id. at 636. We disagree. The mitigating evidence that Anthony sought to introduceJeffrey's life sentencewas not relevant to Anthony's character, his background, or the circumstances of the crime. We recognize a defendant's right to present any [mitigating] circumstance to a jury or judge for consideration as a reason to spare his life. Dissenting op. at 636 (citing Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 44, 125 S.Ct. 400, 160 L.Ed.2d 303 (2004)). As with all evidence, however, mitigating evidence must meet a threshold of relevance. Although the threshold is low, the evidence must tend logically to prove or disprove some fact or circumstance which a fact-finder could reasonably deem to have mitigating value. Id. (quoting Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 44, 125 S.Ct. 400, 160 L.Ed.2d 303 (2004) (quoting Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284, 124 S.Ct. 2562, 159 L.Ed.2d 384 (2004))). In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), the Supreme Court held that the sentencer must not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. Id. at 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954 (plurality opinion). Yet we have held that Lockett requires the admission of evidence that establishes facts relevant to the defendant's character, his prior record, and the circumstances of the offense in issue. Hess v. State, 794 So.2d 1249, 1269 (Fla.2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Herring v. State, 446 So.2d 1049, 1056 (Fla. 1984)). In this case, Jeffrey's life sentence does not meet this low threshold for relevance. In Scott, this Court vacated a codefendant's death sentence and remanded for a new sentencing proceeding before a jury. 604 So.2d at 468 (citing Robinson v. State, 487 So.2d 1040 (Fla.1986)). Upon the jury's recommendation, the codefendant was resentenced to life. Id. In this case, Jeffrey, too, originally received a death sentence. Farina, 763 So.2d at 303. As the dissent notes, the jury recommended death by a vote of nine to three, and the judge found five aggravating circumstances, including HAC and CCP. Farina v. State, 680 So.2d 392, 394 (Fla.1996). The reason he did not receive the death penalty, however, had nothing to do with the circumstances of the crime or the presence or absence of aggravating or mitigating factors. The basis was purely legal: we had held in Brennan, 754 So.2d at 1, that the imposition of a sentence of death on a sixteen-year-old defendant constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, and Jeffrey was sixteen years old at the time of these murders. See Farina, 763 So.2d at 303 (citing Brennan, 754 So.2d at 5-6). Thus, whereas in Scott, a jury analyzed the facts and, considering the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, recommended a sentence of life, in this case, despite a jury recommendation of a sentence of death, and the trial court's imposition of such a sentence, this Court concluded as a matter of law that Jeffrey was ineligible for the death penalty. See id. Unlike Scott, Jeffrey's sentence reduction has no connection to the nature or circumstances of the crime or to the defendant's character or record. Under Lockett, it is irrelevant as a mitigating circumstance in Anthony's case. We have held that a defendant fails to prove that his codefendant's life sentence would probably produce an acquittal or life sentence on retrial when the codefendant was less culpable. See, e.g., Marquard v. State, 850 So.2d 417, 423-24 (Fla. 2002) (affirming the defendant's death sentence even though his codefendant received a life sentence, because the defendant was more culpable); Ventura, 794 So.2d at 571 (denying the defendant's claim because he was the triggerman in the scheme and his codefendant was not equally culpable); Groover, 703 So.2d at 1037 (affirming the denial of the defendant's newly discovered evidence claim because the defendant and codefendant were not equally culpable). In this case, although Jeffrey was the triggerman, the basis for Jeffrey's reduction in sentence hinders Anthony's ability to satisfy the second prong of the test. If Anthony were allowed to introduce Jeffrey's life sentence, the State would be entitled to rebut the relevance of that evidence by showing that the sentence was not the result of a jury recommendation or a trial court's judgment but a matter of law. The evidence is certainly not so strong that it would probably result in a life sentence for Anthony. Accordingly, we deny this claim.
In his second claim, Anthony alleges that the evidentiary hearing testimonies of four witnesses should exculpate him. At the hearing, trial counsel testified that his theory for Anthony's defense stressed that Anthony was not the active participant in the crimes: He was not the one who fired the fatal shot .... and ... was not the one who wielded the knife. The testimonies of these witnesses, he argues, are newly discovered evidence proving that Jeffrey was the leader and the more violent and aggressive of the two brothers. The witnesses in question are Jeffrey, Susan Griffith (Anthony and Jeffrey's mother), Katrina Bergenty (Anthony and Jeffrey's sister), and Dr. Clifford Levin (a psychologist who evaluated Anthony). At the hearing, Jeffrey testified that he and Anthony did not have any defined older/younger brother attitude. They were [a]lmost like equals. He stated, If one of us wanted the other to do something... we would ask them. He never made Anthony do anything, although, in late 1991, he decided for Anthony that they would not move with their mother to Georgia. He also got a job for Anthony and helped him with work. In addition, Jeffrey testified that he could be very violent. One minute [he] could be laughing and joking and the next minute [he] could ... just start swinging on people. Anthony, however, was [v]ery laid back. Jeffrey refused to describe Anthony as the mastermind behind the crimes, which they never planned in great detail. Anthony did approach him about committing a robbery. Anthony asked him if he could borrow a knife, but Jeffrey refused. Jeffrey admitted that Anthony originally planned to rob the Taco Bell with someone else. Anthony had been an employee there and was familiar with its procedures and employees. Nevertheless, Jeffrey became involved, but they never discussed their roles. On cross-examination, Jeffrey testified that, when they arrived at the Taco Bell, Anthony went inside to see who was working. After he returned to the car, Jeffrey suggested cutting or injuring himself and using that as a way to get inside. Anthony advised against it because the employees would call the police, and Jeffrey agreed. Jeffrey stated, however, that he felt like he was in charge because, at one point, Anthony wanted to leave and Jeffrey persuaded him to stay. When they restrained Van Ness and Mason outside the restaurant, Jeffrey pointed a gun at one of them, and Anthony pointed a knife at the other. After gathering them with the other two employees inside, Jeffrey watched three of them while Anthony went with the manager to get the money. Jeffrey testified that Anthony knew where the money was kept, it's logical he would go get it. Anthony returned with the money in canvas bank bags. Jeffrey told him to take it out of the bags, and he complied. They then took turns tying up the employees and told them to sit on the floor while they went into the manager's office. Anthony was worried that the employees could identify him. Jeffrey offered to shoot them, and Anthony told him it was his decision. Jeffrey stated that Anthony could not have stopped him. Jeffrey told Anthony to move the employees into the freezer, and Anthony complied. Jeffrey followed them into the freezer while Anthony remained behind him. Jeffrey then fired three shots until the gun failed. He turned around, took the knife from Anthony, and stabbed one of the female employees twice. He stated that Anthony remained behind him but never attempted to stop him. Afterward, they walked out to the car, and Jeffrey directed Anthony to drive to Park's where he could dispose of the rope, gloves, gun and knife. Jeffrey decided they would tell their mother that they were at a party, and Anthony relayed that story to her. Griffith testified that Anthony was more of a follower while Jeffrey was more of a leader. Jeffrey would get mad faster, and Anthony would ... let him have his way. She also stated that Jeffrey used to own a gun and was fascinated with knives and collect[ed] large knives. By contrast, Anthony had no interest in weapons. On cross-examination, Griffith admitted that Jeffrey received counseling for his temper, which he became able to control for about a year and a half before the crimes. Nevertheless, Jeffrey punched things when he was angry, whereas Anthony never had such problems. Bergenty testified that Anthony was laid back while Jeffrey was more serious or not as laid back. Jeffrey had a shorter temper, and Anthony had a longer fuse before he [got] upset. He was easygoing ... instead of arguing ... he just went along with [Jeffrey]. She believed Jeffrey was more a leader. On cross-examination, she clarified that Anthony was not afraid of Jeffrey. Dr. Levin evaluated Anthony in 1992 and 1998 in preparation for penalty phase testimony. Before the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Levin also interviewed Jeffrey and reviewed the record of Jeffrey's psychologist. He concluded that Anthony was suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder. He stated that Anthony had an immature personality, a tendency to defer to others, withdraw into his family, ... a lack of ... a good sense of himself. He found that Jeffrey described himself as someone Anthony would defer to for major decisions. In addition, Jeffrey had a relationship with [Anthony] of interdependence and aggression. Anthony defer[red] to his brother in order to maintain peace. Dr. Levin added that Anthony made some independent thoughts in planning this robbery, but ... was the more passive... dependent personality. He believed that Anthony had difficulty planning and initiating the robbery and concluded that there was substantial domination of Jeffrey over Anthony. [T]he murder and attacks ... would not have taken place if Anthony was acting alone. Furthermore, Anthony had difficulty making everyday decisions .... difficulty ... expressing disagreement. [H]is decision making is not autonomous. Anthony argues that the circuit court erred in discrediting these testimonies. We disagree. The relevant standards are the requirements for newly discovered evidence. See Robinson, 865 So.2d at 1262 (First ... the evidence `must have been unknown ... at the time of trial ....' Second, the ... evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.) (citation omitted). In addition, the trial court is required to `consider all newly discovered evidence which would be admissible' at trial and then evaluate the `weight of both the newly discovered evidence and the evidence which was introduced at the trial.' Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Jones, 709 So.2d at 521). When reviewing a court's application of the above law to a rule 3.850 motion following an evidentiary hearing, we apply the following standard of review: As long as the trial court's findings are supported by competent substantial evidence, [we] will not substitute [our] judgment... on questions of fact, likewise of the credibility of the witnesses.... Blanco v. State, 702 So.2d 1250, 1252 (Fla.1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In denying relief, the circuit court found the testimonies of Jeffrey, Griffith, Bergenty, and Dr. Levin to be incredible because they contradicted the testimonies of the three surviving victims at resentencing. The victims in question were Derek Mason, Kimberly Gordon, and Gary Robinson. Mason testified that, once Anthony and Jeffrey brought them inside the restaurant, Anthony said, go inside and get the manager. He also stated that Anthony offered to let them smoke and directed those who were not smoking to stand so that their hands could be tied. Mason said that Anthony pretty much told Jeffrey what to do. Gordon, the manager on duty, testified that, when she saw Anthony and Jeffrey holding Mason and Van Ness, Anthony ordered them to the back of the restaurant. Anthony then told her that he knew she had the keys to the safe and ordered her to go to the front of the restaurant with him to get the money. Like Mason, Gordon also stated that Anthony offered to let them smoke and directed those who were not smoking to go with him. When asked who did most of the talking, Gordon replied, Anthony was doingI never heard Jeffrey talk. To her, [i]t appeared that Anthony was in charge .... [b]ecause he did all of the talking. She added that Anthony directed them into the freezer. Robinson also stated that Anthony led them into the freezer. When asked who he thought was in charge, Robinson replied, Anthony was doing most of the talking. Given this testimony at resentencing, the trial court found as follows: [T]he Court finds the exculpatory evidence... to be incredible. The defendant's brother has clear motive to fabricate or exaggerate now that he no longer faces the death penalty. On the other hand, if there was any reason for the victims [at resentencing] to contrive their testimony to prejudice one brother over the other, it would be contrived against Jeffrey.... Yet the victims testified without exception that it was the defendant who was in charge. After weighing all the evidence, the Court finds that there is no probability that the defendant would receive a recommendation of life from a jury upon retrial. The record shows that the circuit court properly applied the above law. Competent, substantial evidence supports its findings. Consequently, we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the court on this matter. We find no error.
In his third claim, Anthony alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to investigate and present evidence of Jeffrey's history of aggression and violence and domination of Anthony. The standard from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), governs this claim: First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient.... Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Valle v. State, 778 So.2d 960, 965 (Fla.2001) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052). To establish deficiency, the defendant must prove that counsel's representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. Id. (quoting Brown v. State, 755 So.2d 616, 628 (Fla.2000) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. 2052)). To establish prejudice, the defendant must show ... a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 965-66 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052)). Anthony argues that the testimonies of Susan Griffith (his mother) and Tina O'Neill (a family friend) at the evidentiary hearing demonstrate Jeffrey's history of aggression and dominance of Anthony. Anthony argues that this evidence would have established nonstatutory mitigation that [he] acted under the domination of his brother ... or even the statutory mitigating circumstance that [he] acted under extreme duress or the substantial domination of Jeffrey. At the hearing, Griffith testified that Anthony was more of a follower while Jeffrey was more of a leader. She also stated that, unlike Anthony, Jeffrey was fascinated with knives. O'Neill testified that Anthony was quiet while Jeffrey could be aggressive or violent. She added that there were times ... where [Jeffrey] would have ... this dark side. When this happened, she said, he would ... get an attitude. He ... deliberately pick[ed] fights with somebody or ... would ... storm out of the house. He picked fights with Anthony and usually won. She recounted certain instances in which Jeffrey punched walls and doors. She also stated that, unlike Anthony, Jeffrey owned a gun and collected knives. She concluded that Jeffrey usually was the leader. Anthony usually gave in to his wishes. Griffith's testimony and portions of O'Neill's testimony are cumulative to the evidence presented at the resentencing. We have held that counsel does not render ineffective assistance by failing to present cumulative evidence. See Cole v. State, 841 So.2d 409, 425 (Fla.2003) (holding that additional witnesses were not needed to corroborate the defendant's drug abuse problems because counsel had already introduced sufficient evidence of drug use) (citing Valle v. State, 705 So.2d 1331, 1334-35 (Fla.1997)); Marquard, 850 So.2d at 429-30 (failure to call additional witnesses to testify about the defendant's drug problems and child abuse was not ineffective assistance of counsel, where defense counsel had introduced this information through their expert witness). At the resentencing, trial counsel introduced through several witnesses evidence of Jeffrey's aggression and dominance. He simply did not rely exclusively on Griffith and O'Neill. At the time, Griffith testified about Jeffrey's interest in knives and weapons. Dr. Levin testified extensively about Anthony's dependent personality disorder. He stated that Anthony had difficulty making everyday decisions... relies on others to make decisions .... needs others to assume responsibility .... He also noticed a pattern throughout his childhood and adolescence of avoiding conflict... avoiding making decisions and difficulty initiating projects. In addition, he explained that Anthony stays very much dependently involved in a relationship, and his pattern of behavior is passivity. Counsel also called on Dale Heiser (the police officer who investigated Anthony's child abuse claim in 1987), who opined that Jeffrey was more of the leader and the instigator. In addition, Tammy Lewis (Anthony's former girlfriend) testified that Jeffrey was more daring while Anthony tried to lead him away from trouble. Finally, Dr. Harry Krop testified that, during the robbery, Anthony deferred to Jeffrey's wishes for tying up the victims, forcing them into the freezer, and shooting them. The only information not accounted for are the portions of O'Neill's testimony at the hearing discussing Jeffrey's aggression, dark side, attitude, and tendency to pick fights. However, the rest of O'Neill's testimony, as well as Griffith's testimony, is cumulative. Having called on Heiser, Lewis, Dr. Levin, Dr. Krop, and even Griffith at resentencing, counsel probably elected not to introduce additional testimony to corroborate Jeffrey's aggression and dominance. Like the attorneys in Cole and Marquard, counsel did not render ineffective assistance. Although the remainder of O'Neill's testimony at the hearing was not cumulative, Anthony still cannot demonstrate prejudice. In denying relief, the circuit court relied on the victims' testimony during resentencing and found it more credible than the testimonies of Griffith and O'Neill. The court stated: All of the victims testified that [Anthony], who did all or almost all of the talking at the crime scene, was in charge. This consistent and coherent presentation of Anthony's role stands in sharp contrast to O'Neill's testimony about Jeffrey's aggression and violence. Even if the jury were to find O'Neill's testimony more credible than the victims' testimonies, the additional mitigation established would not have outweighed the aggravating circumstances, of which two (HAC and CCP) were among the most serious aggravators set out in the statutory scheme. Larkins v. State, 739 So.2d 90, 95 (Fla.1999). There is no reasonably probabilityone sufficient to undermine our confidencethat O'Neill's testimony would have affected the jury's unanimous recommendation of the death penalty. Because we determine that no prejudice resulted from counsel's failure to introduce these portions of O'Neill's testimony, we need not consider whether counsel provided deficient performance. See Pietri v. State, 885 So.2d 245, 256 (Fla. 2004) ([A] court considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel `need not make a specific ruling on the performance component of the test when it is clear that the prejudice component is not satisfied.') (quoting Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927, 932 (Fla.1986)). Accordingly, we deny relief.