Opinion ID: 171331
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedural Sentencing Errors

Text: French argues that the district court committed several procedural errors in the imposition of her sentence. “In reviewing the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines, this court reviews factual findings for clear error and legal determinations de novo.” United States v. Redcap, 505 F.3d 1321, 1322 (10th Cir. 2007).
French argues that the district court improperly considered hearsay evidence provided by Agent Abowd because the out-of-court statements to which he referred were made by drug dealers with numerous criminal convictions, and were thus unreliable. However, we have previously held that district courts may consider reliable hearsay testimony when sentencing. United States v. Bustamonte, 454 F.3d 1200, 1202 (10th Cir. 2006). French argues that the district court gave no reasoned explanation for admitting and considering Agent Abowd’s hearsay testimony. However, the district court noted at sentencing that the statements corroborated one -8- another and were supported by the fact that French attempted “to cover up what really happened at her residences.” ROA, Vol. XI, at 5. The district court’s ruling that the hearsay statements were sufficiently reliable is supported by the record, and, thus, the district court properly considered these statements at sentencing. 2. Witness Credibility and Drug Quantity Calculations The base offense level for the unlawful manufacturing, importing, exporting, trafficking or possession of illegal narcotics is based on the quantity of drugs for which a defendant is responsible. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. When narcotics are not seized, the district court may estimate the drug quantity for sentencing, “so long as the information relied upon has some basis of support in the facts of the particular case and bears sufficient indicia of reliability.” United States v. Verdin-Garcia, 516 F.3d 884, 896 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation and quotations omitted); see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. 12 (“Where there is no drug seizure . . . the court shall approximate the quantity of the controlled substance.”). The district court adopted the drug quantity findings in the revised PSR at resentencing. The revised PSR estimates . . . that Jason Read manufactured methamphetamine at the defendant’s residence approximately one hundred times. Fifty percent of the time, these cooks would produce at least 28 grams of methamphetamine (1,400 grams). The remaining cooks produced at least five grams of methamphetamine (250 grams). The defendant knowingly and intentionally offered this residence for, and was aware that, Read was manufacturing methamphetamine at her residence eighty percent of the time or on eighty occasions, and therefore is responsible for 1,320 grams of a mixture and substance containing a -9- detectable amount of methamphetamine. ROA, Vol. III, 2007 PSR, at 8 ¶ 18.2 In adopting the drug quantity suggested by the revised PSR, the district court based its finding on the 2004 sentencing testimony of co-defendant Jessica Gutierrez. ROA, Vol. XI, at 7. Gutierrez testified that Jason Read manufactured methamphetamine 100 times at French’s residence, that on 50-75% of those occasions Read manufactured at least 28 to 30 grams of methamphetamine, and that the other times Read produced between 5 and 10 grams at a time. ROA, Vol. VI, at 53-54. Gutierrez indicated that French became angry with Read for manufacturing methamphetamine about 20 times, but did not object on other occasions. Id. at 96. She also indicated that French would purchase and provide pseudoephedrine to be used in producing methamphetamine. Id. at 55. French objected to the revised PSR’s calculation, arguing that Gutierrez was not a credible witness and that the district court failed to offer a reasoned explanation for crediting Gutierrez’s testimony. In particular, French argues that Gutierrez was facing prison time and therefore had an incentive to lie to obtain a lesser sentence for herself. French also cites Gutierrez’s drug use as a reason for not crediting her testimony. 2 French argues for the first time in her reply brief that the district court should have used the estimate provided by Brandon Jones of six or seven cooks, rather than the one hundred cooks estimated by Jessica Gutierrez. Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief on appeal are deemed waived. See Stump v. Gates, 211 F.3d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 2000). -10- While French’s arguments regarding Gutierrez’s credibility are noted, this court has made clear that “the district court’s determination of a witness’s credibility at a sentencing hearing is virtually unreviewable on appeal,” and will only constitute grounds for reversal where testimony is “unbelievable on its face, i.e., testimony as to facts that the witness physically could not have possibly observed or events that could not have occurred under the laws of nature.” United States v. Mendez-Zamora, 296 F.3d 1013, 1018 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations and brackets omitted). Gutierrez’s testimony relates to events she could have heard, and it appears credible on its face. We have no basis for concluding the district court erred in considering her testimony when determining drug quantity. 3. Enhancement for Endangering a Minor The district court applied a six-level enhancement to French’s base offense level for committing an offense that “(i) involved the manufacture of . . . methamphetamine; and (ii) created a substantial risk of harm to the life of a minor[.]” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(8)(C). The district court adopted the following facts from the revised PSR: On August 26, 2003, a child between the age of one and two years was burned in a flash fire related to methamphetamine manufacture at French’s residence . . . . French, Read, and Gutierrez were outside of the residence when the child was burned. French had been boiling some used coffee filters in acetone in an attempt to recover a minuscule amount of methamphetamine which might be present in the filters. When the contents of the pan and the kitchen stove flared into -11- an open fire, Brandon Jones, Read’s friend and co-conspirator, was standing nearby and tried to put the burning pan in the kitchen sink. Some of the burning liquid sloshed out of the pan and landed on the child. French argued against taking the child to the hospital because authorities would recognize the child’s wounds as chemical burns. ROA, Vol. III, 2007 PSR, at 7 ¶ 14; see ROA, Vol. XI, at 6 (finding this account of events to be “accurate”). French argues that the district court’s factual finding that she did not want the child to be taken to the hospital was clearly erroneous.3 We disagree. Gutierrez testified that French was concerned the authorities would recognize a chemical burn and conduct a follow-up investigation. ROA, Vol. VI, at 63. Elsa Marlin testified that French was concerned about being “busted” if the child was taken to the hospital. ROA, Vol. VI, at 107-08. This corroborating testimony provided an adequate factual basis to support the court’s finding. French again argues that the district court made clearly erroneous witness credibility determinations. She argues that Gutierrez and Marlin were not credible, while the testimony of her sister and a co-worker, neither of whom were at the residence on the day the child was burned, should have been given more 3 French actually argues that the enhancement for endangering a child should not apply to French if it did not apply to Brandon Jones, who was also present when the child was burned. See Aplt. Br. at 53 (“On this record, the court cannot adopt Jones’ plea agreement and hold the burning of the child was unforeseeable to him but find the enhancement for injury to a minor child applied to [French].”). However, the district court based its decision to apply the enhancement on French’s insistence that the baby not be taken to the hospital for treatment of the burns, and not on whether the manufacture of methamphetamine foreseeably could cause injury to a minor. ROA, Vol. XI, at 6. -12- consideration by the district court. The testimony of Gutierrez and Marlin is credible on its face, and we will not disturb the district court’s credibility determinations. See Mendez-Zamora, 296 F.3d at 1018. 4. Enhancement for Obstruction of Justice The district court imposed a two-level enhancement against French because it found she (A) . . . willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede the administration of justice during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and (B) the obstructive conduct related to (i) the defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (ii) a closely related offense[.] U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The district court found at French’s initial sentencing that French threatened to burn down Elsa Marlin’s house if she told the police the truth about how her child was burned. The district court reaffirmed this finding on remand. ROA, Vol. XI, at 8. French contends that the district court erred in imposing this enhancement for two reasons. First, she claims that this court should use a beyond a reasonable doubt standard in imposing this enhancement. This argument is foreclosed by this court’s decision in United States v. Magallanez, 408 F.3d 672, 683-85 (10th Cir. 2005), which made clear that post-Booker sentencing courts may make factual findings by a preponderance of the evidence, so long as they do not apply the guidelines in a mandatory fashion. Second, she argues that the district court was -13- unreasonable in applying the enhancement based on Marlin’s testimony because she was not a credible witness. We disagree. The district court had the opportunity to hear Marlin’s testimony and to assess her credibility. French has not shown her testimony to be unbelievable on its face. See Mendez-Zamora, 296 F.3d at 1018.