Opinion ID: 2102966
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: C. XX-XX-X-X [Burns 1979 Repl.] provides:

Text: Standard of proof  Defendant's burden to establish insanity.  (a) A person may be convicted of an offense only if his guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), the burden of proof is on the defendant to establish the defense of insanity (I.C. XX-XX-X-X) by a preponderance of the evidence. Appellant cites Patterson v. New York, (1977) 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281, and Leland v. Oregon, (1952) 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302, in support of his argument subsection (b) of the statute quoted above is unconstitutional. We considered the constitutionality of this statute in Price v. State, (1980) Ind., 412 N.E.2d 783 and concluded the statute does not impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the defendant on an element of the crime. In that case we indicated our awareness of the Patterson and Leland cases. We are still unpersuaded those United States Supreme Court cases are to be read in such a way as to require a holding that the statute challenged here is unconstitutional. Notwithstanding that belief in the continued vitality of Price, supra, we will address appellant's argument here, as it is somewhat different than that raised by the appellant in the Price case. Appellant claims Patterson, supra, and Leland, supra, may be read to stand for the proposition the State may not require the defendant to prove an affirmative defense that specifically negates an element of the crime. If the affirmative defense does negate an element of the crime, the State bears the burden of proving its absence. We would first point out the Supreme Court was careful in the Patterson case to decline to unilaterally require the State to prove the absence of facts tendered to establish whatever affirmative defenses they chose to recognize. We thus decline to adopt as a constitutional imperative, operative countrywide, that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all affirmative defenses related to the culpability of the accused. Patterson, supra, 432 U.S. at 210, 97 S.Ct. at 2327, 53 L.Ed.2d at 292. Nevertheless, we concede the validity of appellant's reading of the Patterson and Leland cases that if the affirmative defense specifically negates an element of the crime, then the burden of proof lies on the State to establish ... beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of an affirmative defense or a mitigating factor... . Appellant's Brief at page 22. We concede there is a difference between affirmative defenses that establish separate and distinct facts in mitigation of culpability and affirmative defenses that negate an element of the crime. However, we do not agree with appellant that the defense of insanity, as our legislature has defined it, falls in the latter category; namely, the knowingly element of the crime of murder. Under I.C. XX-XX-X-X [Burns 1979 Repl.], a person commits murder if he [k]nowingly ... kills another human being... . (Emphasis added.) Under I.C. XX-XX-X-X(b) conduct is engaged in knowingly if the actor is aware of a high probability that he is doing so. In I.C. XX-XX-X-X(a) the legislature has provided for the defense of insanity by stating: A person is not responsible for having engaged in the prohibited conduct if, as a result of mental disease or defect he lacked the substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct... . Appellant asserts if one is unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, he cannot be aware of a high probability the conduct is causing the death of another, i.e., that being insane negates one's ability to knowingly kill another. Justice Hunter speaking for this Court in Hill v. State, (1969) 252 Ind. 601 at 607, 251 N.E.2d 429 at 433 stated: Many states, like Indiana, have modified the M'Naghten test to include the irresistible impulse test, the general concensus of opinion among psychiatrists being, as noted by Dean Keedy, that there are cases where a person, suffering from a mental derangement, knows that it is wrong to inflict bodily harm upon another person, but owing to a mental derangement is incapable of controlling the impulse to commit such an act. Keedy, Irresistible Impulse as a Defense in the Criminal Law, 100 U.Pa.L.Rev. 956 (1952) Thus, we see the test in Indiana does not require the action of the defendant to be entirely unknowing to afford the defense of insanity. Even though the defendant may have the knowledge of what he is doing, he may be found not guilty if he, in fact, suffers from mental derangement to the extent of possessing an irresistible impulse. Thus, although knowingly is an element necessary in the perpetration of a murder, the presence of that element does not negate the defense of insanity. We, therefore, hold the statute is not unconstitutional as claimed by the appellant because it does not shift the burden of proof of one of the elements of the crime to the defendant, but simply shifts the burden of establishing his affirmative defense of insanity. Proof required of the State that appellant committed the act knowingly is not tantamount to proof that the defendant is sane. Appellant claims the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Amend and Correct Judgment. He argues the evidence adduced is sufficient only to support a conviction for voluntary manslaughter. He claims the State failed to meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of sudden heat that would reduce the crime here from murder to voluntary manslaughter. Voluntary manslaughter is defined in I.C. XX-XX-X-X(a) [Burns 1979 Repl.]: A person who knowingly or intentionally kills another human being while acting under a sudden heat commits voluntary manslaughter... . This Court has held where the defendant introduces evidence of sudden heat that would reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter, the State bears the burden of proving its absence if the murder conviction is to be upheld. Palmer v. State, (1981) Ind., 425 N.E.2d 640. Where the issue of sudden heat is present, the State may meet its burden of disproving its presence either in its case in chief or in rebuttal. Palmer, supra . The state of mind of a killer may be established by evidence of the circumstances surrounding the killing and the method of killing. Anthony v. State, (1980) Ind., 409 N.E.2d 632. Appellant contends evidence of sudden heat was introduced, by virtue both of his own testimony and that of psychiatrists to the effect that at the time of the killing appellant was acting impulsively, perceived the decedent as a threat to him, or was acting out of control, depending on which psychiatrist's testimony was believed. Conceding appellant presented evidence to raise the issue, the question remains whether the evidence introduced by the State was sufficient to rebut the inference appellant was acting under sudden heat. As we stated in Palmer, supra : [T]he presence of the sudden heat claim does not mean the [factfinder] was bound to believe the evidence favoring the defendant, nor does it mean that the [factfinder] could only consider the evidence supporting the presence of sudden heat in Palmer's conduct. The [factfinder] was bound to consider all of the evidence including any that negated the defense, and to resolve any conflicting evidence. Ind., 425 N.E.2d at 645. This Court will not reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Palmer, supra . We hold there is ample evidence in this record from which the Court could find the State met its burden of proving the absence of sudden heat and that there is sufficient evidence to support appellant's conviction for murder. Appellant claims the verdict is contrary to law, in that the preponderance of the evidence shows he was insane at the time the offense was committed. Where the sufficiency of the evidence of insanity is questioned by an appellant who has suffered a negative judgment on the question, we will reverse only where the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion. Thomas v. State, (1981) Ind., 420 N.E.2d 1216. In the case at bar the evidence as to appellant's sanity is in conflict. Two psychiatrists testified appellant was insane at the time of the offense. Two psychiatrists testified appellant was sane at the time of the offense. As can readily be seen the evidence does not lead only to a conclusion appellant was insane. In addition to the psychiatrists, a police officer who observed appellant immediately after he was arrested, some five hours after the offense was committed, testified in his opinion appellant was sane then. We hold there is ample evidence in this record to sustain the trial court on the issue of insanity. The trial court is in all things affirmed.