Opinion ID: 2591026
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: limited retroactive operation of merrill v. utah labor commission

Text: ¶ 12 In helping identify the effect of retroactivity, Respondent has presented several useful categories, on which we rely in narrowing the application of our Merrill ruling: (1) payments to injured workers made after publication of the April 24, 2009, decision (future payments); (2) payments made before publication (past payments); and (3) inactive and/or unspecified payments to claimants (inactive/unspecified payments). ¶ 13 Before examining each of these categories, we direct that our ruling be given full retroactive effect as it pertains to Mr. Merrill. He is entitled to compensation for his pursuit of this constitutional challenge.
¶ 14 For any future payments, as defined above, regardless of the date of injury, our ruling applies. At oral argument counsel informed the court that the Employers Reinsurance Fund has corrected its practice and is already making future payments in accordance with our ruling. It was represented to us, however, that the Workers Compensation Fund has, at least in some instances, continued the practice we held unconstitutional in Merrill. Instead of disregarding the unconstitutional offset, the Workers Compensation Fund is apparently still including the offset in calculating and making future payments to the affected class of injured workers. It defends this practice in reducing these future payments by reference to the date of the worker's injury, rather than by reference to the date of Merrill's publication. This practice misunderstands prospective operation. No one may take offsets for payments made after the date of our ruling. If an ongoing stream of future payments exists from and after April 24, 2009, our ruling applies to them.
¶ 15 In contrast, retroactive operation of Merrill to past payments requires us to draw a fine line, looking to the concepts of waiver and finality. ¶ 16 Respondent directs us to Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2001 UT 74, 34 P.3d 180. There, we discussed a petitioner's failure to raise a constitutional argument before the tax commission. Id. ¶¶ 15-24. We noted that despite the tax commission's lack of jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of legislation, the petitioner's failure to raise the constitutional argument constituted a waiver. Id. ¶ 24 n. 5. We have since narrowed this concept of waiver of a constitutional argument before state agencies. See ABCO Enters. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2009 UT 36, ¶¶ 8-12, 211 P.3d 382 (holding that where the sole issue on appeal is a facial constitutional challenge to a tax statute, we may address that challenge on appeal even if it has not been explicitly raised before the administrative agency). Nonetheless, the considerations underlying waiver have relevance as we exercise our discretion in this case. ¶ 17 Furthermore, there is a justified need for finality in administrative decisions. Nebeker, 2001 UT 74, ¶ 23, 34 P.3d 180 (internal quotation marks omitted). While the Labor Commission has continuing jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 34A-2-420, it lacks the authority to reopen workers compensation proceedings to consider legal arguments not previously made. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-420 (2005); see also Spencer v. Indus. Comm'n, 4 Utah 2d 185, 290 P.2d 692, 694 (1955) (noting that party cannot file a new application and have the Commission redetermine his cause on identical facts because he is dissatisfied with the former order). Also, we have noted that a judgment based upon an erroneous view of the law is not open to collateral attack, but can be corrected by a direct review and not by bringing another action upon the same cause [of action]. Collins v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 2002 UT 77, ¶ 18, 52 P.3d 1267 (alteration in original). ¶ 18 Arguing from the above principles, Respondent would have us draw the line on retroactivity to preclude application of Merrill to all cases that resulted in an administrative order in the Labor Commission, including both adjudicated cases and cases resulting in a settlement approved by order of an administrative law judge. While we agree to an extent, we believe that waiver and finality are most applicable to settled cases. Settlements, we believe, should not be upset, even because of a change in the law; the process of compromise they represent is too multifaceted and context-driven to permit unwinding. The parties to a settlement each bear the risk of a subsequent change in or clarification of the lawa risk that could cut either way. ¶ 19 Accordingly, for claimants who actively negotiated and settled their claims, and thus chose not to challenge the offset, our ruling will have no retroactive effect. But if a claimant's mere acquiescence or challenges on other grounds, constitutional or not, resulted in an administrative order, then our ruling will apply retroactively and allow recoupment regarding past payments from their inception.
¶ 20 Finally, we turn to the third category of inactive/unspecified payments. This category involves those claimants who are now deceased, who settled their claims for payment of a lump sum, or who disputed claims but settled without obtaining an express designation of permanent total disability. Again invoking the concepts of waiver and finality, we conclude that the claimants in this category have, for whatever reason, foregone the ability to recoup payments. We therefore prohibit retroactive application of our ruling to this category of individuals.