Opinion ID: 2600070
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Admission of evidence of prior unadjudicated criminal activity

Text: (32) The prosecution devoted part of its case in aggravation to defendant's past violent conduct and threats of violence. More specifically, the prosecutor presented testimony regarding three incidents: (1) Defendant's forcible sodomy and oral copulation of Jason L., (2) his threat to fuck . . . up a plainclothes officer, and (3) his assault on sheriff's deputies during transfer from one cell to another in the county jail. The prosecution introduced the evidence pursuant to section 190.3, factor (b) (factor (b)), which permits the jury at the penalty phase to consider [t]he presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. Defendant asserts, as he did below, that the admission of evidence of these three prior unadjudicated incidents of violence or threats of violence as factors in aggravation under factor (b)and an instruction expressly permitting the jury to consider such evidenceviolated his federal and state constitutional rights.
Defendant presents a multipronged general attack on section 190.3, factor (b)'s constitutionality. He asserts first that admission of evidence under factor (b) does not withstand constitutional scrutiny because our interpretation of that provision treats death differently, by lowering rather than heightening the reliability requirements in a manner that cannot be countenanced under the federal Constitution. In prior decisions, we have rejected the identical argument. (See, e.g., People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1315 [78 Cal.Rptr.3d 295, 185 P.3d 727] [nothing in the high court's decisions requires penalty phase procedures to be more rigorous than other criminal procedures].) We have also found that the use of unadjudicated offenses in capital proceedings, but not in noncapital matters, does not violate equal protection or due process principles. ( People v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 701 [76 Cal.Rptr.3d 208, 182 P.3d 543] [capital and noncapital defendants are not similarly situated and may be treated differently without offending equal protection or due process guarantees].) Likewise, we have found no requirement under the Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment that the jury unanimously agree on the existence of unadjudicated criminal conduct beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 893 [48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135].) And we have previously rejected defendant's assertion here that the high court's recent decisions on the Sixth Amendment's jury trial right call for a different result on that issue. (See, e.g., People v. Hoyos, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 926 [juror unanimity on the existence of aggravating factors is not required under the reasoning of Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, and its progeny]; People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 212 [59 Cal.Rptr.3d 196, 158 P.3d 763] [ Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [166 L.Ed.2d 856, 127 S.Ct. 856] does not compel a different conclusion].) Defendant further claims that use of the same jury at both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial deprives the accused of an impartial and unbiased jury, and undermines the reliability of any determination of guilt, because a jury which already has unanimously found a defendant guilty of capital murder cannot be impartial in considering whether similar but unrelated violent crimes have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant has no standing to complain that the same jury decides both guilt and penalty because the jury that decided his penalty was not the same jury that decided his guilt. (16 C.J.S. (2005) Constitutional Law, § 111, p. 143 et seq. [to raise a constitutional question, the party complaining must show that his or her rights are injuriously affected].) In any event, we have repeatedly concluded there is no constitutional infirmity in using the same jury that decided guilt to weigh evidence of unadjudicated crimes. ( People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 894; People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1207-1208 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d 112, 105 P.3d 487].) Contrary to defendant's assertion, we have also rejected the argument that use of a single jury prevents defense counsel from adequately questioning prospective jurors as to their potential biases with respect to the alleged unadjudicated crimes without forfeiting a defendant's right to keep such evidence from the jurors during the guilt phase. As in People v. Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th 1269, the unadjudicated conduct at issue here was no more inflammatory than the charged offenses. ( Id. at p. 1316.) Moreover, because the jury that decided penalty was selected solely for that phase of trial, defense counsel here did not face an assertedly impermissible choice between adequate examination into juror bias and the presentation of prejudicial evidence of crimes other than those charged in the case.
Over trial counsel's renewed objection, the prosecutor called 20-year-old Jason L. to testify about being sexually assaulted by defendant as a youth. Jason testified that while home one day after school when he was eight years old and defendant was 12 or 13, defendant threatened him with a steak knife, forced him to orally copulate defendant, and then sodomized him. (33) As defendant acknowledges, we have long held that although the fact of a juvenile adjudication is inadmissible as a factor in aggravation, juvenile criminal activity involving force or violence is admissible as aggravating evidence under factor (b). ( People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 378 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34]; People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 295 [247 Cal.Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052].) Defendant urges us to reconsider this holding, arguing that because a juvenile court adjudication affords more procedural safeguards than does the factor (b) admission processwhich demands neither juror unanimity nor instruction on the elements of the unadjudicated crimeit is inherently illogic[al] to allow the prosecutor to present the underlying facts of criminal activity but not the fact of the activity's adjudication. Contrary to defendant's assertion, there is no illogic in the rule prohibiting admission of the fact of a juvenile adjudication while permitting evidence of violent juvenile criminal activity. Juvenile adjudications are inadmissible as evidence in aggravation, not because of their evidentiary weight or reliability, but because they are not prior felony convictions within the meaning of section 190.3, factor (c). ( People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 861-862 [258 Cal.Rptr. 184, 771 P.2d 1270]; see also Welf. & Inst. Code, § 203 [order adjudging minor a ward of the court shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose].) Factor (b), on the other hand, involves evidence of violent conduct other than the capital crimes, regardless of when the misconduct occurred or whether it led to a criminal conviction. ( People v. Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1052.) Such evidence is permitted because it  `enable[s] the jury to make an individualized assessment of the character and history of the defendant to determine the nature of the punishment to be imposed.' [Citation.] ( People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 544 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119].) Thus, although the fact of the juvenile adjudication is inadmissible, the conduct underlying the adjudication is relevant to the jury's penalty determination and admissible as violent criminal activity under factor (b). ( People v. Lucky, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 295-296, fn. 24 [It is not the adjudication, but the conduct itself, which is relevant.].) Defendant's claim of an internal inconsistency fails. [24] Defendant argues that the high court's decision in Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 [161 L.Ed.2d 1, 125 S.Ct. 1183], precludes admission of his juvenile criminal activity. As we recently explained, however, Roper does not compel exclusion of such evidence. ( People v. Bramit (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1239 [96 Cal.Rptr.3d 574, 210 P.3d 1171] [ Roper 's holding that the 8th Amend. prohibits the execution of a condemned prisoner younger than 18 years old at the time of the capital offense says nothing about the propriety of permitting a capital sentencing jury to consider the defendant's violent conduct as a juvenile].) Defendant asserts finally that in instructing the jury regarding the Jason L. incident, the trial court erred by not setting forth the elements of the crimes of forcible sodomy and oral copulation. We have repeatedly held, however, that absent a request, a trial court has no duty to instruct on the elements of unadjudicated crimes admitted under factor (b). ( People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1147 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, 129 P.3d 321]; People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 588 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347] [rule recognizes the defense concern that such instructions may lead the jury to place undue emphasis on unadjudicated crimes, rather than on the question of penalty].) We also have rejected defendant's further argument that recent high court decisions on the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial call that rule into question. Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at page 490, holds that a fact, other than a prior conviction, that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. As we have explained, however, because death is no more than the statutory maximum once a special circumstance allegation is found true, the penalty determination in a capital case falls outside of Apprendi 's rule. ( People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 589, fn. 14.)
In the notice of evidence in aggravation, the prosecution indicated it intended to introduce under factor (b) eight incidents involving defendant's use or threats of violence, including [a]ll evidence, facts underlying, statements of witnesses and the defendant related to the defendant's use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence on Sheriff's Deputies on March 3, 1996. By written motion, defendant objected to all of the proposed other crimes evidence on various grounds and sought a hearing on its admissibility. The trial court conducted the requested hearing in conjunction with the parties' numerous other pretrial motions. At the outset of that hearing, the trial court heard extensive argument on a defense motion, pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 [113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305], seeking the personnel files of the six named sheriff's deputies who were involved in the March 3 incident, and granted the motion as to the files of one officer. Later in the hearing, the trial court ruled it would allow the prosecution to present the evidence of the county jail incident in its case in aggravation, stating simply, We already litigated that. [25] At the penalty retrial, and over trial counsel's renewed objection, the prosecution called three sheriff's deputies to testify about the March 3, 1996, incident at the San Diego County jail while defendant was awaiting trial in the case. According to the officers' testimony, on that date, six sheriff's deputies wielding pepper spray and a shock-emitting shield extracted defendant from his jail cell after he refused directions to relocate to a more secure unit. When defendant finally emerged from his cell and deputies moved closer to handcuff him, he started cursing, then charged at them with his head down and fists raised. Defendant ran down the hallway for about 500 feet before he was subdued. As a result of the incident, defendant was housed in the cell used for disciplining inmates and charged with a rules violation. Noting that evidence of violent conduct or threats of violence admitted under factor (b) must amount to an actual crime ( People v. Phillips, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 72), defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting the evidence of the county jail incident because the prosecutor made no effort to tie those events to a violation of any particular penal statute. He claims, furthermore, that the trial court compounded its evidentiary error by giving CALJIC No. 8.87, which told the jury how to consider evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity in making its penalty determination but failed to identify, or instruct on, the elements of the crime defendant allegedly had committed. [26] Defendant argues that the failure to specify and instruct on the elements of the particular crime at issue in that incident rendered meaningless the rule that the jury may consider evidence of unadjudicated crimes as a factor in aggravation only when such criminal activity is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (34) Defendant is correct that the penalty jury could not properly consider other crimes evidence as an aggravating factor unless it was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt he committed the criminal activity, and the trial court had a sua sponte duty to so instruct. ( People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 584; People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 53-56 [188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279].) But defendant points to no case imposing a duty on the prosecutor or the trial court to identify for the jury the actual offense defined by the criminal activity admitted as factor (b) evidence. Indeed, to the contrary, we have held that absent a request, the trial court has no duty to specify the names or elements of the unadjudicated crimes when instructing the jury on factor (b) evidence. ( People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 591-592 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142]; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 205-206 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781].) The premise of this rule is that, for tactical reasons, most defendants prefer not to risk having the jury place undue emphasis on the prior violent crimes. ( People v. Tuilaepa, supra, at p. 592.) Contrary to defendant's suggestion, the failure to identify an actual crime does not undermine the reasonable doubt standard for considering an unadjudicated crime as an aggravating factor. As we have explained, that standard is a foundational requirementwhich California law, not the Constitution, imposesto ensure that before a sentencing juror weighs the culpable nature of such other violent criminal conduct on the issue of penalty, he or she must be highly certain that the defendant committed it. ( People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 589.) Here, the trial court properly determined the legal question whether the prosecution's proposed evidence in aggravation was an actual crime involving violence or the threat of violence [27] ( People v. Loker (2008) 44 Cal.4th 691, 745 [80 Cal.Rptr.3d 630, 188 P.3d 580]), and informed the jurors they had to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the alleged unadjudicated criminal act before they could consider such evidence as a factor in aggravation. Therefore, the failure to identify or define the specific crime constituting the criminal activity did not render meaningless the reasonable doubt requirement or otherwise skew the jury's normative determination of the appropriate penalty. ( People v. Anderson, supra, at p. 589.)
Over defense objection, the prosecution presented evidence of an encounter between defendant and Officer John Cherski. On August 11, 1994, less than one year before committing the capital crimes, defendant was in downtown San Diego cleaning up the sidewalk with his coworkers from an urban renewal project. Officer Cherski was in the vicinity working on a plainclothes detail. As the urban renewal group passed the officer, defendant stopped and began to stare at him. When Cherski looked back and made eye contact with defendant, defendant asked what Cherski was staring at. Cherski responded that he was not staring at anything. Defendant approached Cherski and told him, I will fuck you up. Cherski then identified himself as a police officer and arrested defendant. Characterizing the encounter involving Officer Cherski as nothing more than a non-specific future threat, defendant contends the evidence was not admissible under factor (b) as criminal activity involving the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. The record shows otherwise. (See §§ 240 [defining crime of assault], 422 [elements of criminal threats].) As he did in challenging the evidence concerning the county jail incident, defendant asserts it was error to allow the jury to consider evidence of the encounter with Officer Cherski when the actual crime was not identified and the jury was not instructed on its elements. As previously discussed, ante, in part II.D.4.c., these omissions neither rendered the evidence inadmissible nor constituted instructional error.