Opinion ID: 70314
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Vacancy Exclusion

Text: 15 The policy provides that no coverage is afforded for a loss to a building if the building has been vacant or unoccupied for more than 60 consecutive days before that loss or damage. Nevertheless, Gas Kwick argues that the 60-day vacancy period began to run from the effective date of the insurance policy, so recovery for the loss was not barred by the vacancy exclusion. United Pacific argues that the policy is unambiguous, precluding coverage for a loss where the property has been vacant for 60 days immediately preceding the loss. 1 Under Florida law, interpretation of an insurance contract is a matter of law to be decided by the court. Gulf Tampa Drydock Co. v. Great Atlantic Ins. Co., 757 F.2d 1172, 1174 (11th Cir.1985). Furthermore, courts must construe an insurance contract in its entirety, striving to give every provision meaning and effect. Dahl-Eimers v. Mutual of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 986 F.2d 1379, 1382 (11th Cir.1993). When a term in an insurance policy is ambiguous, however, the court is required to construe it in favor of the insured and against the insurer. Davis v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 450 So.2d 549, 550 (Fla.App. 5th Dist.1984). An insurance contract is deemed ambiguous if it is susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations that can fairly be made. Dahl-Eimers, 986 F.2d at 1381. Courts may not, however, rewrite contracts or add meaning to create an ambiguity, and an ambiguity is not invariably present when a contract requires interpretation. Id. 16 Despite Gas Kwick's citation of authority to the contrary, the vacancy exclusion precluded recovery in this case, and the district court properly granted summary judgment for United Pacific. The cases relied upon by Gas Kwick in its brief concerning this issue are factually distinguishable from the instant case. For instance, in Thomas v. Industrial Fire and Casualty Co., 255 So.2d 486 (La.Ct.App.1971), the court indeed construed the sixty-day vacancy provision as running from the issuance date of the policy. Id. at 488. However, the language of the vacancy provision at issue in Thomas is significantly different from the language of the policy in this case. The vacancy clause in Thomas excluded coverage for buildings that are vacant or unoccupied beyond a period of sixty days. Id. at 488 n. 1. In contrast, the United Pacific policy excludes coverage for a building that has been vacant or unoccupied for more than 60 days before that loss or damage. (Emphasis added). Thus, as the district court reasoned, [t]he exclusion clause in United Pacific's policy clearly defines the vacancy period in retrospective terms--the period is to be measured by looking back from the date of the loss; the vacancy provision is not defined in prospective terms, whereby it would be measured by looking forward from the issuance date of the policy. District Court's Order at 7. 17 As in Thomas, the other cases cited by Gas Kwick involved policies employing prospective language distinguishable from the vacancy exclusion in the present case. See, e.g., Old Colony Insurance Co. v. Garvey, 253 F.2d 299, 302 (4th Cir.1958) (addressing prospective policy and stating that [i]f it had been intended that existing vacancy be taken into account, language to that effect should have been used ...); Bledsoe v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 341 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Mo.App.1960) (provision that company not liable for loss occurring while building is vacant or unoccupied beyond a period of sixty consecutive days); Home Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pierce, 240 Ark. 865, 402 S.W.2d 672 (1966) (exclusion for vacancy beyond a period of thirty days). Accordingly, the cases relied upon by Gas Kwick as persuasive authority are all distinguishable from the present case. 18 Second, Gas Kwick appears to misapprehend the issue in the case. According to Gas Kwick, the issue is whether the vacancy period began to run from the effective date of the insurance policy or from the prior date the building became vacant. On the contrary, the question of when the vacancy began to run appears to be irrelevant in light of the retrospective focus of the vacancy clause. That is, under the vacancy exclusion, when a loss occurs, the inquiry is whether the building has been vacant for the 60 consecutive days immediately preceding the loss. If so, recovery is precluded. There is no reference to the date of issuance of the policy, and there is no inquiry as to when the vacancy began. The only relevant question is whether the building was vacant for 60 days prior to the loss. 19 We see no ambiguity in the language of the vacancy exclusion. The policy clearly precludes coverage where the building has been vacant for 60 consecutive days before the loss. Moreover, the cases relied upon by Gas Kwick involve an exclusion where a building has been vacant beyond 60 consecutive days, defining the vacancy prospectively. Conversely, the vacancy exclusion in the present case is retrospective and unambiguous. For these reasons, it is our view that the district court properly granted summary judgment on this issue. 20