Opinion ID: 2223336
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Inherent Judicial Authority

Text: Statutory authority aside, respondent argues that he has the inherent authority to manage his courtroom and the court's calendar. Petitioner responds by citing In re General Order of March 15, 1993, 258 Ill.App.3d 13, 196 Ill.Dec. 128, 629 N.E.2d 673 (1994). In In re General Order, a circuit court judge announced from the bench that a particular assistant public defender was barred from appearing in his courtroom on any future case. This announcement followed a particularly contentious probable cause hearing in which the judge warned the attorney several times that her conduct bordered on contempt. In re General Order, 258 Ill.App.3d at 14-17, 196 Ill.Dec. 128, 629 N.E.2d 673. The appellate court rejected the suggestion that the judge was exercising his inherent authority to control his courtroom and to ensure that attorneys appearing before him exhibit[ed] proper respect for the authority of the court ( In re General Order, 258 Ill.App.3d at 17, 196 Ill.Dec. 128, 629 N.E.2d 673), stating that the trial court's inherent power to control its courtroom and maintain the proper decorum extends no further than its ability to find someone in contempt. In re General Order, 258 Ill.App.3d at 17, 196 Ill.Dec. 128, 629 N.E.2d 673. The appellate court also considered whether a judge has the authority under section 6 of the Attorney Act (705 ILCS 205/6 (West 1992) (any judge of a Circuit Court shall, for like cause, have the power to suspend any attorney or counselor at law from practice in the court over which he presides, during such time as he may deem proper)), to suspend an attorney from practice in a particular circuit or courtroom. The appellate court found this section unconstitutional on the basis that the Illinois Supreme Court has the sole authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on attorneys, which it exercises through the mechanism of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. In re General Order, 258 Ill.App.3d at 21, 196 Ill.Dec. 128, 629 N.E.2d 673. [1] In reaching this result, the appellate court relied on this court's decision in People ex rel. Brazen v. Finley, 119 Ill.2d 485, 116 Ill.Dec. 683, 519 N.E.2d 898 (1988). In Finley, this court considered the validity of a circuit court rule intended to enforce compliance with certain rules of professional responsibility. After noting that this court `possesses the inherent and exclusive power to regulate the practice of law in this State and to sanction or discipline the unprofessional conduct of attorneys admitted to practice before it' ( Finley, 119 Ill.2d at 493, 116 Ill.Dec. 683, 519 N.E.2d 898, quoting In re Mitan, 119 Ill.2d 229, 246, 116 Ill.Dec. 179, 518 N.E.2d 1000 (1987)), this court stated that the power to prescribe rules governing attorney conduct, and to discipline attorneys for violating those rules, rests solely in this court ( Finley, 119 Ill.2d at 494, 116 Ill. Dec. 683, 519 N.E.2d 898). Thus, the circuit court was without authority to promulgate the local rule at issue, as it intrude[d] upon this court's exclusive judicial authority. Finley, 119 Ill.2d at 495, 116 Ill.Dec. 683, 519 N.E.2d 898. Respondent attempts to distinguish In re General Order on the basis that he did not enter a general order banning an assistant public defender from appearing in his courtroom. Thus, he asserts that he has not encroached upon this court's exclusive power to discipline attorneys. Although respondent did not enter a general order or purport to suspend K.T. from the practice of law in his courtroom, he did remove K.T. from representing at least 15 defendants and he recused himself in over 50 other cases. The effect on the public defender's ability to manage his office and his staff and on the disposition of the caseload in the Fourth Municipal District was indistinguishable from the entry of a general order. In the absence of a finding of contempt or other cause, the actions taken by respondent were not within his inherent power to manage his courtroom and calendar. Rather, they were directed at an individual attorney and infringed upon the statutory authority of petitioner.