Opinion ID: 1810711
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: dui and the presumption of impairment

Text: The statute criminalizing DUI currently provides that a defendant can be charged and convicted under three alternative theories: (1) A person is guilty of the offense of driving under the influence and is subject to punishment as provided in subsection (2) if the person is driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle within this state and: (a) The person is under the influence of alcoholic beverages, any chemical substance set forth in s. 877.111, or any substance controlled under chapter 893, when affected to the extent that the person's normal faculties are impaired; (b) The person has a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 or more grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood; or (c) The person has a breath-alcohol level of .08 or more grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. § 316.193(1), Fla. Stat. (2003). Section 327.35, Florida Statutes, (1995), the BUI statute under which Cardenas was convicted, is identical to the DUI statute in regard to the alternative elements of impairment and unlawful blood-or breath-alcohol level. [5] Thus, subsection (1)(a) requires proof of impairment, while the strict liability approach of subsections (1)(b) and (1)(c) requires proof of driving with an unlawful blood-or breath-alcohol level, otherwise known as DUBAL. [6] The blood-alcohol evidence that proves DUBAL may be admitted under either the common law governing scientific test results or the implied consent law. Under the common law, a scientific test result on intoxication is admissible if a proper predicate established that (1) the test was reliable, (2) the test was performed by a qualified operator with the proper equipment and (3) expert testimony was presented concerning the meaning of the test. State v. Bender, 382 So.2d 697, 699 (Fla.1980). Admission of blood-alcohol evidence under the common law predicate does not trigger any presumption regarding impairment. The State may rely on the presumption of impairment only if the additional requirements of the implied consent law for quality assurance of the blood sample are met. See Robertson v. State, 604 So.2d 783, 792 (Fla.1992). [7] Following Robertson, we held in Miles that the administrative rule governing blood collection and testing procedures under the implied consent law was invalid because it did not adequately provide for the preservation of blood-alcohol evidence. We further held in Miles that noncompliance with these strict quality assurance requirements precludes the State from relying on the presumption of impairment. See 775 So.2d at 953-57. Because the implied consent provisions are identical in all material respects for DUI and BUI, Miles, which involved DUI, applies in BUI cases as well. See Cameron v. State, 804 So.2d 338, 342 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (It is true that Miles and Robertson arose under the motor vehicle statutes and not the boating statutes, but the two statutory schemes are identical and the result under the latter should be no different than the result under [the] former.). The State does not contend otherwise. In certifying the question in Cardenas, the First District calls upon this Court to determine whether improperly instructing the jury on the presumption of impairment, contrary to Miles, is fundamental error, which can be raised for the first time on appeal. The certified conflict in Bonine relates to properly preserved error and requires us to determine whether an erroneous instruction on the presumption of impairment can be subjected to a harmless error analysis or, instead, is harmful per se.