Opinion ID: 1168687
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: giving the definition to the jury

Text: The Court of Appeals held that the trial court prejudicially erred in instructing the jury, after it had retired to deliberate, on a medical dictionary definition of the word transverse after the jury's request for a definition of the term transverse plane osteotomy. Providing the dictionary definition to the jury after it had commenced deliberations was improper for three reasons. First, to some extent, the giving of the definition to the jury was the presentation of evidence, and neither party had an opportunity to meet such evidence. As the Court of Appeals correctly noted, the term transverse is only relevant in this case in the context of the medical term transverse plane osteotomy. The six days of trial consisted, to a large extent, of expert testimony from both parties explaining the nature and propriety of the procedures performed by defendant, including the Austin bunionectomy, and the relationship of those procedures to plaintiff's condition following the surgery. There was defense testimony that the Austin bunionectomy does not require post-operative x-rays because of the inherently stable nature of the V-cut employed in the procedure. There was no indication during the testimony that defendant might not have performed this Austin procedure. However, during closing arguments, the plaintiff's attorney made the following remarks: In these hospital records that are in evidence, you can go through them page by page. There is no mention of the Austin bunionectomy at all, no such mention. As a matter of fact, the operative report that Dr. Hogan made out doesn't mention this Austin bunionectomy. Remember how it was drawn up here like this? I'll tell you why I think that might be important to the defendant's case in a moment. How did he describe it in here? He didn't give it that way. He calls it a transverse plane osteotomy. Our experts don't know either. They weren't at the operation so they don't know what kind of cutting was done. All we can go by is what is in the medical reports here. It would be a lot easier for them to argue to you people about the impossibility of a shift in this metatarsal head if they could say look what we did, we cut this thing in such a fashion that it couldn't move at all. That is more convincing than just cutting it in two. You can make what you want out of Dr. Hogan's chart, but you will find if you read it on August 4th, under the date of August 4th, that we find in his record the first mention of Austin, and you will find that it is entered there in a different color ink than the rest of the entries. In our recent decision in Bend Millwork v. Dept. of Revenue, 285 Or. 577, 592 P.2d 986 (1979), a tax case in which we were sitting as factfinder anew upon the record, we resisted the temptation to extend the record by such means as consulting a dictionary, saying, As we leave those fields, however, self-restraint must be exercised in order to avoid the taking of evidence from a source not subject to confrontation and cross-examination. We would not allow a jury during deliberation to send out for the opinion of an outside expert as to the true meaning of a term upon which the experts called as witnesses in open court had disagreed. It follows that we should not allow ourselves to do so when discharging our fact finding function. This is not to say that, given the different circumstances in which judges and juries discharge that function, judges cannot resort to outside reading in order to better understand the evidence, but the judge must be ever conscious that the material read is not to be considered as evidence itself unless the material is a proper subject of judicial notice. Even then the judge must be careful to recognize that he is actually receiving evidence by way of judicial notice and follow the governing procedural rules of law. 285 Or. at 584, 592 P.2d 986. The instruction of the jury as to the meaning of the term transverse, in the context of the medical term transverse plane osteotomy is analogous to the court's allowing an expert to present additional evidence on the type of procedure defendant indicated in his operative report that he had performed. We know of no case in which it has been held proper to reopen the case and receive new evidence after the jury has commenced its deliberations, and we do not commend the practice. The definition of transverse, in the context of its meaning as part of a surgical procedure, the character of which was either not explained or was imperfectly explained to the jury during the trial, may well have influenced the jury in considering the plaintiff's suggestion, in oral argument, that the defendant had not performed the inherently stable Austin bunionectomy and may also have influenced their conclusion in weighing the defendant's overall credibility. Second, the giving of the instruction violated ORS 17.255(1) (which was repealed by Or. Laws 1979, ch. 284, § 199, but which was in effect at the time of trial) which then provided: In charging the jury, the court shall state to them all matters of law which it thinks necessary for their information in giving their verdict, but it shall not present the facts of the case, but shall inform the jury that they are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact. Although the phrase within ORS 17.255(1) that    [the court] shall not present the facts of the case    is normally considered to be a prohibition against commenting on the evidence, [9] the presentation of evidence by means such as were involved here is prohibited, as well. Compare, Mayor v. Dowsett, 240 Or. 196, 222, 400 P.2d 234 (1965). Third, to the extent that the contents of a dictionary are subject to judicial notice under ORS 41.410, [10] the normal procedure under which evidence is adduced by way of judicial notice is for the party seeking judicial notice of a fact to request that judicial notice be taken of that fact, so that such evidence need not otherwise be produced. Normally, such a request is made during the presentation of evidence and at all events prior to the commencement of jury deliberations, so that the court can, when appropriate to do so, instruct the jury that the facts are as judicially noted by the court. The Court of Appeals concluded that the error was prejudicial. We adopt their analysis: In our view, the meaning of `transverse plane osteotomy' was as much a matter for proof by the parties rather than instruction by the court as were the meanings of `Austin bunionectomy,' `V-cut,' `hallux varus,' and the many other medical terms which were involved in this case. We do not agree with plaintiff that the word `transverse' is, in this context, something other than a `uniquely medical term.' The word's only possible relevance here is as part of the medical term `transverse plane osteotomy.' Indeed, the jury had requested that that entire term rather than the first word alone be defined by the court. It was error to instruct the jury on the meaning of `transverse.' The error was prejudicial. As earlier indicated, the closing argument of plaintiff's attorney had suggested to the jury  absent any then-existing evidentiary basis  that the words `transverse plane osteotomy' in the operative record referred to a surgical procedure other than the one defendant testified he performed. That suggestion reflected both on the substance of plaintiff's allegations and on defendant's credibility.    48 Or. App. at 688-689, 617 P.2d 1377. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. Remanded to the trial court for a new trial.