Opinion ID: 2586281
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Defense's For-cause Challenges

Text: The defense unsuccessfully challenged for cause the following five prospective jurors: R. L., P. G., S. K., M.. N., and D. V. [16] The defense later removed Prospective Juror R.L. using a peremptory challenge. Prospective Jurors P. G. and S. K. were chosen to sit as jurors. Preliminarily, the People contend that defendant has forfeited these claims because his trial counsel did not exhaust his peremptory challenges. [17] `To preserve a claim of trial court error in failing to remove a juror for bias in favor of the death penalty, a defendant must either exhaust all peremptory challenges and express dissatisfaction with the jury ultimately selected or justify the failure to do so.' ( Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1099, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, 129 P.3d 321, quoting People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 667, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752.) Defendant does not dispute the fact that-his trial counsel neither exhausted his peremptory challenges nor expressed dissatisfaction with the jury ultimately selected. Rather, he asserts that our discussion in People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pages 1220-1221, 255 Cal. Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047, concerning the dynamic nature of the process of exercising peremptory challenges, somehow undermines the exhaustion requirement. Defendant is mistaken. Our discussion in Johnson addresses how a party with fewer remaining peremptory challenges might exercise them more sparingly, but this does not relieve defendant of the exhaustion requirement in order to preserve his claim. Alternatively, defendant seeks to justify trial counsel's failure to exhaust all peremptory challenges by arguing that when counsel accepted the 12 jurors in the box, the venire contained several prospective jurors who may well have been worse than those in the box. Even assuming this argument could justify a failure to exhaust his peremptory challenges, it is mere speculation on this record. Defendant's contentions of erroneous jury inclusion are therefore forfeited. Even if he did not forfeit his claims, defendant can show no error with respect to the three prospective jurors who did not sit on the jury, that is, R. L., M. N., and D. V. [18] As to the two jurors who did sit on the jury, P. G. and S. K., as discussed below, the trial court properly denied each of defendant's challenges for cause. The same analysis applies to claims involving erroneous juror exclusion or inclusion. (See People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 975, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519.) `Applying Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 ..., we have stated that `[i]n a capital case, a prospective juror may be excluded if the juror's views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of the juror's duties.' [Citations.] `A prospective juror is properly excluded if he or she is unable to conscientiously consider all of the sentencing alternatives, including the death penalty where appropriate.' [Citation.] In addition, `[o]n appeal, we will uphold the trial court's ruling if it is fairly supported by the record, accepting as binding the trial court's determination as to the prospective juror's true state of mind when the prospective juror has made statements that are conflicting or ambiguous.' [Citations.]' ( Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 743, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145, quoting People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th, 900, 987, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.)
During the trial court's voir dire, P. G. stated he would be able to follow the law and procedures in capital cases. He did not believe his feelings either for or against the death penalty would affect his judgment. P. G. told defense counsel he thought the state should reserve the death penalty for the most brutal and severe crimes, but he did not have a specific list of such crimes in mind. P. G. stated that if he found the torture allegation in the conspiracy count to be true, he could impose the death penalty and he would place the burden on the defense in the penalty phase to produce evidence to get him to lean the other way. But in response to the prosecutor's questions, P. G. said he would consider the factors the trial court read when making his determination about the appropriate punishment, and he was not predisposed in the death penalty's favor based on the charges filed against the defendants. The record supports the trial court's conclusion that P. G. did not hold views that would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror. ( Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 743, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145.)
In his responses to the written questionnaire, S. K. indicated he thought there were circumstances, such as a planned murder, where a defendant should receive the death penalty automatically. During voir dire, S. K. confirmed his responses to the questionnaire but acknowledged he made them before the court instructed him about the two options in the penalty phase. S. K. noted that he could separate his personal beliefs and his ability to consider both sentencing options. He stated he would follow the court's penalty instructions, and that he would consider the alternative penalty of life without the possibility of parole. S. K. responded to defense counsel that he understood the trial court's instruction that the law did not have a preference for the death penalty and that its imposition was not automatic. He also stated he would make his decision on penalty after listening to both sides. Although the trial court concluded that S. K. gave equivocal answers, the court was satisfied that S. K. was capable of fulfilling his juror responsibilities. The record supports the trial court's conclusion that S. K. did not hold views that would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror. ( Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 743, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485,115 P.3d 1145.)