Opinion ID: 171393
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Bankruptcy Court Properly Addressed Timeliness of Rejection

Text: Rafter Seven claims the bankruptcy court incorrectly decided the case because Rafter Seven's objection to Brown's claim was based on Ochs' complete failure to deliver the sprinklers described in the leases, see Aplt.App. at 108 (The debtor contends that the irrigation sprinklers which were the subject of the leases . . . were never delivered. . . . What was delivered to Rafter Seven was basically 'a pile of junk.'), while the bankruptcy court's decision was based on Rafter Seven's failure to seasonably reject the sprinkler systems. Rafter Seven contends the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in deciding the case on an issue not identified in the pretrial order or other pleadings. We do not agree. We are persuaded by our review of the record that the bankruptcy court's decision was based on the general issues and principles articulated by the parties in the pretrial order and the proceedings thereafter. The parties were well aware that the law governing this matter is Article 2A of the U.C.C., as codified in Wyoming. While Rafter Seven took the position that delivery of conforming goods was never made, the UCC makes clear that nonconforming goods may be accepted or rejected, and that any rejection must be done within a reasonable time with notice to the lessor. See WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 34.1-2.A-509(b) & 34.1-2.A-515. The record clearly reveals that the trial of the matter revolved around acceptance or rejection of the goods, and Rafter Seven did not object to that course of events. Under FED.R.CIV.P. 15(b)(2) [w]hen an issue not raised by the pleadings is tried by the parties' express or implied consent, it must be treated in all respects as if raised by the pleadings. The bankruptcy court clearly saw timeliness of rejection as the key to this case, see Aple. Supp.App. 201-22, and Rafter Seven gives us no grounds to hold that the court abused its discretion in so doing. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM. LUCERO, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with my respected colleagues that Rafter Seven Ranches accepted the first sprinkler system and used it in an attempt to mitigate its damages. [1] But I cannot accept that by leaving sprinkler parts in Rafter Seven's field in September, Ochs delivered the second and third systems. Were we to assume delivery, as the majority does, a reasonable opportunity to inspect includes the ability to test, which Rafter Seven never had during the six weeks before it notified Brown on November 1. Because the majority applies an unduly inflexible view of the U.C.C. that misapprehends the realities of this transaction, I respectfully dissent.