Opinion ID: 172312
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Comparison to Olsen

Text: Finally, Leifson acknowledges that the perjurious statements made by Olsen to the same grand jury were related to murder, but he argues that his case is distinguishable. See Aplt. Br. at 29-30 (While Olsen's perjurious statements about killing Davis and having information about her disappearance and burial are concededly related to murder, Leifson's perjurious statement about not being able to recall angrily confronting or threatening Olsen for spreading rumors is not.). Leifson appears to argue that because his statements were less material to Davis's murder investigation they were unrelated to Davis's murder investigation. However, Leifson cites no authority to support his contention that less material somehow means unrelated. Leifson pleaded guilty to perjury and thereby acknowledged that his statements were material to the investigation. Olsen's testimony may well be more related to Davis's disappearance and presumed death, but it does not follow that Leifson's testimony was unrelated to the murder investigation. See, e.g., Blanton, 281 F.3d at 774, 776 (where the perjury about storing a white Monte Carlo in the defendant's garage was related to bank robbery, even though the statement was not about robbing the bank); Suleiman, 208 F.3d at 40 (where the perjury about why the defendant traveled from Texas to Pakistan with another person was related to the bombing of a building, even though the statements were not about the defendant's direct involvement in the World Trade Center bombing). The district court did not clearly err when it determined that second degree murder, and not kidnaping, was the underlying criminal offense for the accessory-after-the-fact cross reference guideline. The district court is affirmed.