Opinion ID: 2997029
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Are Taylor’s claims independent?

Text: Taylor’s first claim is that a fraud was perpetrated on the state court that granted the judgment of foreclosure. 6 No. 03-3320 Although the relief Taylor prays for in her complaint with respect to all three of her claims is “to recover her home, or equal monetary value plus interest of 10% per annum, plus punitive damages,” (Appellant’s Appx. at 12, 13), the relief granted when a claim of fraud on the court succeeds is that the party claiming fraud is relieved from the judgment, i.e., the judgment is set aside. See Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)(3) (“On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from an entry of default, final order, or final judgment, including a judgment by default, for . . . fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party.”). The district court correctly determined that requesting the recovery of her home is tantamount to a request to vacate the state court’s judgment of foreclosure, the form in which Taylor’s complaint in state court was in fact styled, and that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred granting that relief. See Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 543 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that a plaintiff’s federal action seeking to “vacate” a state court judgment was a de facto appeal and thus barred under the RookerFeldman doctrine). Both of Taylor’s claimed federal statutory violations, on the other hand, allow for money damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(a)-(b) (allowing civil actions under the ECOA for actual and punitive damages); 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (a party claiming a conspiracy to deprive her of civil rights “may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation”). While recovery of her home is not available through these claims, the monetary damages Taylor claims are compensatory damages in the amount of the value of her home plus 10% interest per annum and punitive damages. The fact that Taylor is claiming compensatory damages in the amount of the value of her home (plus interest) demonstrates that her asserted injury is the loss of her home due to the foreclosure judgment, not an No. 03-3320 7 independent injury arising from acts of the Defendants.2 See Brokaw, 305 F.3d at 667 (noting, in discussing Long, 182 F.3d at 557, that since “absent the eviction order, Long would not have suffered the injuries for which she now seeks to be compensated,” her claims appeared to be barred under Rooker-Feldman); Wright v. Tackett, 39 F.3d 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1994) (in factually similar case, constitutional claims found to be inextricably intertwined with state court’s denial of plaintiff’s request to intervene in foreclosure action). Since the injury Taylor seeks to be compensated for did not arise until the judgment of foreclosure was obtained and she lost her home, her federal claims for money damages are inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment.