Opinion ID: 1098520
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: `combined and concurrent causes

Text: `If one is guilty of negligence which concurs or combines with negligence of another, and the two combine to produce (injury) or (damage), each negligent person is liable for the resulting (injury) or (damage) and the negligence of each will be deemed the proximate cause of the injury.' A.P.J.I.Civil 33.01. In arriving at a decision on whether the plaintiff has produced a scintilla of evidence as to proximate cause, we must consider both ... definitions contained in A.P. J.I. 33.00 and A.P.J.I. 33.01. This is true because the negligence of the defendants merely produced a static condition and the static condition was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's vehicle leaving the paved portion of the roadway. Then, we must consider the question of what other person's negligence, other than that of the plaintiff himself, caused the vehicle to leave the road. The plaintiff has the burden of proof to present a scintilla of evidence that his vehicle was caused to leave the roadway by the negligence of some person, other than himself, and [that] that person's negligence combined with the negligence of the defendants to proximately cause his injuries and damages. Any misconduct of the plaintiff amounting to contributory negligence would be the burden of the defendants. We are not now concerned with this issue [because it was not raised as a ground for the defendants' motions]. We are only concerned with the issue of negligence of persons other than the plaintiff himself. The Supreme Court of Alabama, in the case of Clendenon v. Yarbrough, 233 Ala. 269, 271, 171 So. 277, 278 (1936), adopted the proposition of the issue as found at 22 R.C.L. 132 et seq., and stated that original negligence is the proximate cause of injury where it `produces a dangerous condition of things, which does not become active for mischief until another person has operated upon it by the commission of another negligent act, which might not unreasonably be anticipated to occur. The original act of negligence is then regarded as the proximate cause of the injury which finally results.' This ruling was followed later in the case of Lawson v. General Telephone Co. of Alabama, 289 Ala. 283, 267 So.2d 132 (1972). This proposition was again followed and restated in Marshall County v. Uptain, 409 So.2d 423, 426 (Ala.1982): `The proximate cause of an injury is the primary moving cause without which it would not have occurred, but which, in the natural and probable sequence of events, produces the injury. City of Mobile v. Havard, 289 Ala. 532, 268 So.2d 805 (1972), appeal after remand, Havard v. Palmer & Baker Engineers, Inc., 293 Ala. 301, 302 So.2d 228 (1974). Negligence need not be the sole cause of injury in order to hold the negligent person liable. It is sufficient that his or her negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes ... is the proximate cause of the injury. Lawson v. General Telephone Co. of Alabama, 289 Ala. 283, 267 So.2d 132 (1972) (quoting Shepard v. Gardner Wholesale, Inc., 288 Ala. 43, 256 So.2d 877 (1972), and Chambers v. Cox, 222 Ala. 1, 130 So. 416 (1930). When the concurring cause is another person's negligence which might reasonably be anticipated or foreseen, the original act of negligence may be regarded as the proximate cause of the injury which results. [Citations omitted.]' In Saunders v. Register, 496 So.2d 752 (Ala.1986), it was the plaintiff's contention that potholes and a generally poor road surface caused the defendant to swerve into the opposing lane and injure the plaintiff. In Saunders, the plaintiff argued that the defendant's swerving into the southbound lane could be inferred from the existence of potholes in the northbound lanes and from the defendant's statement that she did not hit the potholes. The Saunders Court held that the plaintiff could not rest upon the allegations of the pleadings to defeat the defendant's motion for summary judgment, but must respond by setting forth specific facts to show that there was a genuine issue for trial. The Saunders opinion adopted the following quote from Folmar v. Montgomery Fair Co., 293 Ala. 686, 690, 309 So.2d 818, 821 (1975): `There is nothing wrong with a case built around sufficient circumstantial evidence, provided the circumstances are proved and not merely presumed.' In Vines v. Plantation Motor Lodge, 336 So.2d 1338 (Ala.1976), the Court held that the defendant truck owner's negligence per se, in leaving his truck unlocked with the keys in the ignition in violation of a municipal ordinance, was not the proximate cause of the alleged injuries and death in that the consequences of the theft of the truck were too remote to have been reasonably foreseen by the truck's owner. The key here is foreseeability. Then the question here under consideration should be as follows: Should the defendants have anticipated or foreseen that the plaintiff's vehicle would leave the roadway without any explanation whatsoever as to the cause? In Vines, supra, the Court concluded its decision with this statement: `In this case, we hold the negligent driving of the thief was the proximate cause of the injuries; defendant's negligence, if any, was too remote to be a proximate cause of those injuries. Therefore, violation of the ordinance, under the facts in this case, cannot be considered a proximate cause of the accident as a matter of law.' 336 So.2d at 1340. In Smoyer v. Birmingham Area Chamber of Commerce, 517 So.2d 585 (Ala.1987), the plaintiff claimed damages against a hotel for negligent design and maintenance of a driveway in failing to install a `stop sign.' The Smoyer Court held that there was no liability absent evidence of proximate cause: `This Court has held that no matter how negligent a party may have been in a particular instance, he is accountable only to those persons injured as a proximate result of such negligence. [Citations omitted.] In discussing the concept of proximate cause, this Court, in General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So.2d 1176, 1193 (Ala.1985), stated: `It is axiomatic that regardless of a tort-feasor's culpability, regardless of whether he failed to exercise reasonable care in carrying out a duty imposed upon him by law, he may not be held liable unless there is a causal connection between his action and the injury for which the aggrieved party seeks compensation.' `... Thus, even if we assume that the driveway was negligently designed, constructed, or maintained, there is no evidence that this negligence proximately caused Smoyer's injuries.'  Smoyer, 517 So.2d at 587-88.