Opinion ID: 2378953
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the trial court err in denying the suppression of medical records obtained from Mr. Breazeale after assertion of his right to silence and counsel?

Text: [¶ 8] In the hospital after the wreck, a police officer asked to talk with Mr. Breazeale. Mr. Breazeale contends that he told the officer he did not want to talk without an attorney present. The officer nevertheless remained in the room with Mr. Breazeale, and later asked him to sign a form consenting to the release of his medical records. Mr. Breazeale agreed. In a pretrial motion, however, Mr. Breazeale claimed that it was improper for the police officer to continue talking with him after he invoked his right to counsel, and that his consent to release the medical records was coerced rather than voluntary. On that basis, he moved to suppress the evidence of his medical records, including the results of the blood and urine tests. The district court denied the motion, and Mr. Breazeale appeals that decision. When we review a district court's decision to deny motions to suppress, we defer to the district court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. The evidence is viewed in a light favorable to the district court's determination, because that court had the opportunity to hear the evidence and assess the credibility of the witnesses. The issue of lawwhether a search was unreasonable and in violation of constitutional rightsis reviewed de novo. Lovato v. State, 2010 WY 38, ¶ 11, 228 P.3d 55, 57 (Wyo.2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). [¶ 9] The district court found, and Mr. Breazeale admits, that he was not in police custody while he was in the hospital. The district court ruled that, because he was not in custody, Mr. Breazeale's right to counsel and his right to remain silent did not yet apply. This ruling is consistent with our precedent. Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, ¶ 41, 84 P.3d 320, 337 (Wyo.2004) ([T]his Court adheres to the principle that the rights recognized in Miranda, including the right to counsel, apply only in the context of custodial interrogation.). [¶ 10] On appeal, Mr. Breazeale concedes that he was not in custody, and that the police were not required to inform him of his right to counsel. He maintains, however, that he still had the right to counsel, and that the police officer was required to stop questioning him once he invoked his right to counsel. Once the officer refused to honor Mr. Breazeale's request to terminate the contact, he argues in his brief, his consent became coerced. [¶ 11] Mr. Breazeale's argument is directly contrary to our ruling in Hannon. In that case, Mr. Hannon was interviewed by a police officer, but was not in custody. At one point during the interview, Mr. Hannon said, Well, if I'm going to be charged I need to go see my lawyer. Hannon, ¶ 33, 84 P.3d at 335. On appeal, Mr. Hannon contended that the interview should have ceased after he invoked his right to counsel. Id., ¶ 39, 84 P.3d at 337. We considered federal precedent including Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 424 n. 3, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 1140 n. 3, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984) (A person has no right to have an attorney present during a non-custodial interview.), and cases from other states including People v. Villalobos, 193 Ill.2d 229, 239, 250 Ill.Dec. 17, 737 N.E.2d 639, 645 (2000) (It is the right to an attorney during custodial interrogation that Miranda and its progeny protects. That right does not exist outside the context of custodial interrogation. One cannot invoke a right that does not yet exist.). We concluded that, because Mr. Hannon was not in custody, he had no right to have counsel present during the interview, and the police officer was not required to terminate the interview when Mr. Hannon asked for counsel. Hannon, ¶ 49, 84 P.3d at 339. Similarly, in Mr. Breazeale's case, he was not in custody when he attempted to invoke his right to counsel, and it was not improper for the police to continue the interview. [¶ 12] In Hannon, we recognized that the question of whether a confession is voluntary may arise whether or not the defendant was in custody when it was given. Id., ¶ 50, 84 P.3d at 339. When such a claim is raised, it is the duty of an appellate court... `to examine the entire record and make an independent determination of the ultimate issue of voluntariness.' Id., quoting Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 348, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 1617, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976). To determine voluntariness, we consider the totality of the surrounding circumstances, including the atmosphere and events surrounding the interrogation, such as the use of violence, threats, promises, improper influence or official misconduct. Hannon, ¶ 51, 84 P.3d at 340. In Mr. Breazeale's case, the record is devoid of any suggestion that the police officer was coercive or threatening at any time during the interview. There is no basis to conclude that Mr. Breazeale's consent to release his medical records was coerced. We therefore affirm the district court's denial of Mr. Breazeale's motion to suppress the evidence contained in his medical records.