Opinion ID: 2089638
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: One-Year Time Limit

Text: Ryan first argues that it satisfied the one-year time limit and properly commenced its action because it filed its summons and complaint within one year of December 16, 1997, its last day of work as listed on its lien statement. In making this argument, Ryan asserts that the fundamental requirement of section 514.12 is not the serving of the complaint, but the filing of the complaint. Ryan acknowledges that provisions that create a mechanics' lien are strictly construed. It argues, however, that the one-year service limit of section 514.12, subd. 3, is an enforcement provision to be liberally construed. We disagree. The requirements for the attachment and creation of a mechanics' lien are to be strictly construed. Dolder v. Griffin, 323 N.W.2d 773, 780 (Minn.1982). After a lien is created, however, we liberally construe the lien statutes as remedial acts. Id. The one-year limitation of the lien statutes is no ordinary statute of limitations; it puts a limit to the life and duration of the lien. Bauman v. Metzger, 145 Minn. 133, 138, 176 N.W. 497, 499 (1920). The statutes require that not only filing a complaint, but also making the defendant-landowner a party to the suit accomplished by serving the defendant-landowner with the summonsmust be done within one year. Minn.Stat. § 514.12, subd. 3; see Smith v. Hurd, 50 Minn. 503, 507, 52 N.W. 922, 922 (1892) (holding, in the context of a mechanics' lien action, that as to each defendant a lien action is commenced and is pending only from the time of service of the summons on him  [6] (emphasis added)). If these requirements are not met, the lien and any cause of action flowing therefrom cease to exist at the end of the year. Bauman, 145 Minn. at 138, 176 N.W. at 499. Contrary to Ryan's argument, then, we conclude that the one-year time limit on service, like the one-year time limit on filing the complaint, is not merely an enforcement provision of the statute but rather is a requirement for the creation of a lien action and must be strictly construed. Here, although Ryan filed its complaint within one year from its last day of work, it did not serve JAG within that one year. Therefore, Ryan's lien action against JAG ceased to exist one year from Ryan's last day of work. See, e.g., Thompson Yards, Inc. v. Standard Home Bldg. Co., 161 Minn. 143, 146-47, 201 N.W. 300, 302 (1924) ([O]ne is not a party to an action until he is in a position to be bound by the judgment therein. That does not come about until the court acquires jurisdiction of his person by the service on him of the summons or by his voluntary appearance.); Smith, 50 Minn. at 507, 52 N.W. at 922 ([W]hen [a lien] action is commenced as to any defendant there must be an existing cause of action against him, and the right to a remedy upon it.); Steinmetz v. St. Paul Trust Co., 50 Minn. 445, 447, 52 N.W. 915, 915 (1892) (Of course, no judgment to enforce a lien against the land could be rendered unless the owner is made a party by being brought into the action.); see also Guillaume & Assocs., Inc. v. Don-John Co., 336 N.W.2d 262, 264 (Minn.1983) (We have strictly interpreted the time limitations [of the lien statutes] insofar as they determine when a lien is established and when it terminates.). Ryan's second argument is that it satisfied the service requirements of section 514.12, subd. 3, because it served JAG within one year from its last day of work. Ryan claims that even though its lien statement and complaint list December 16, 1997, as its last day of work, its actual last day of work at the Fairway Hills property was September 13, 1998. By serving JAG on August 2, 1999, Ryan argues that it achieved service within the one-year limit. Applying the strict construction standard that we have determined is appropriate for the one-year time limit of section 514.12, we conclude that Ryan's argument is defeated by the plain language of that section. The statute requires that the complaint be filed, and that service be made, within one year after the date of the last item of the claim as set forth in the recorded lien statement.  Minn.Stat. § 514.12, subd. 3 (emphasis added). The statute expressly creates a one-year time limit that begins to run on the last day of work a lienholder records in the lien statement. This conclusion is supported not only by the plain language of section 514.12, subd. 3, but also by strong policy considerations: It has been the policy of our statutes creating mechanic's liens to fix a definite time when such liens should terminate, to the end that those interested in the property, or dealing with it, might know with certainty when it was free from such claims   . Bauman, 145 Minn. at 140, 176 N.W. at 500. For these reasons, we hold that the one-year time limit set forth in Minn.Stat. § 514.12, subd. 3, begins to run on the last day of work as listed in the recorded lien statement. Accordingly, Ryan had until December 16, 1998, to serve JAG and thus its August 1999 service was untimely.