Opinion ID: 6342649
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Venue Was Proper in Crawford County

Text: In civil cases, venue is a procedural matter, not a jurisdictional one. Shutts, Executor v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 222 Kan. 527, 546, 567 P.2d 1292 (1977). The KJRA's venue provision, K.S.A. 77-609(b), governs the proper venue for judicial review of an agency order. That statute provides that venue is in the county in which the order or agency action is entered or is effective or the rule and regulation is promulgated. 17 (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 77-609(b). Thus, under the plain language of K.S.A. 77609(b), venue may properly lie in more than one county. Rhodenbaugh, 52 Kan. App. 2d at 626. Where venue for a KJRA proceeding is proper in more than one county, the district court should give due consideration to the plaintiff's right to choose the place of the action when ruling on a change of venue motion. 52 Kan. App. 2d at 628. The district court may also consider which forum better serves the convenience of the parties and witnesses and the interests of justice. See K.S.A. 60-609(a). 'But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.' Gonzales, Administrator v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Rly. Co., 189 Kan. 689, 693, 371 P.2d 193 (1962). BOTA's order was entered in Shawnee County, so venue was proper there. But this conclusion does not end the analysis. Instead, we must determine (1) whether venue would also lie in Crawford County under K.S.A. 77-609(b), and (2) if so, whether the district court erred by refusing KDOR's request to transfer venue to Shawnee County. To answer the first question, we must determine whether BOTA's order was effective in Crawford County. See K.S.A. 77-609(b). The Bicknells argue that BOTA's order is effective in Crawford County because it imposes continuing burdens and risks on their interests there. As the Bicknells see it, the only way they can avoid more tax assessments is to sever all ties with Crawford County. The Court of Appeals held that BOTA's order was not effective in Crawford County. The panel reasoned that BOTA's determination that Gene was a Kansas resident in 2005 and 2006 was simply a reflection of Kansas domicile law and did not alter Gene's ability to visit or operate in Crawford County. Bicknell III, 59 Kan. App. 2d at 530. It 18 added that Gene alleged in his petition for judicial review that he lived in Florida in 2017, the year BOTA issued its order. 59 Kan. App. 2d at 530. The panel thus concluded that the district court erred in finding Crawford County was a proper venue because Gene does not live in Crawford County nor has he shown that the order will have any particular effect on him there. 59 Kan. App. 2d at 532. In reaching this holding, the Court of Appeals relied on two Kansas Court of Appeals decisions addressing venue under the KJRA. First, in Karns v. Kansas Bd. of Agriculture, 22 Kan. App. 2d 739, 742, 923 P.2d 78 (1996), the Court of Appeals held that an agency order denying a crop duster's business license and revoking his commercial applicator certification would be effective in any county in which the crop duster had been operating. And in Rhodenbaugh, the Court of Appeals held that an agency order denying unemployment benefits to a nurse would be effective in the county where the nurse lived and would have received her benefits. 52 Kan. App. 2d at 628. The Court of Appeals found that the facts the Bicknells rely on are far removed from those in [Karns and Rhodenbaugh]. Bicknell III, 59 Kan. App. 2d at 529. We agree that the facts here differ from those in Karns and Rhodenbaugh, but we do not find that difference to be dipositive. While both Karns and Rhodenbaugh explain how to determine whether venue lies in a particular county under K.S.A. 77-609(b), neither case definitively establishes when an order may be considered effective under the statute. We conclude that the particular facts of this case establish that BOTA's order was effective in Crawford County under K.S.A. 77-609(b). BOTA's order, which KDOR attached to its motion to dismiss, determined that Gene was a Kansas resident and that he needed to pay income taxes as a Kansas resident. That residency determination hinged on Gene's former contacts with Crawford County. When an agency determines that an 19 individual is a Kansas resident for income tax purposes based on his or her connections to or contact with a particular Kansas county, a sufficient nexus exists between the order and that county to render the order effective there. Thus, no matter where Gene was domiciled in 2017, BOTA's determination that he was a Kansas resident based on his connections to or contact with Crawford County provided a basis for venue there. Based on this analysis, venue was proper in either Shawnee County or Crawford County under K.S.A. 77-609(b). This conclusion leads us to the second question: whether the district court still erred in denying KDOR's request to transfer venue to Shawnee County. While the KJRA contains no provision for transferring venue, the Code of Civil Procedure does. And the Code of Civil Procedure may be used by the district court to supplement the KJRA if the provision is a logical necessity that is not addressed within the KJRA. Pieren-Abbott v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 279 Kan. 83, 97, 106 P.3d 492 (2005). Under K.S.A. 60-609(a), [u]pon the motion of a party, a district court may transfer any civil action to any county where it might have been brought upon a finding that a transfer would better serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and the