Opinion ID: 1206965
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Public Use in This Taking.

Text: The landowner contends that the taking does not involve a public use of the property. Lands cannot be condemned for other than a public use of the same. The meaning of that term as applied in the law of eminent domain must therefore be ascertained. The term public use is an elastic one and must keep abreast of changing social conditions, and the question is one of fact in each particular case. Gasque v. Town of Conway , 194 S.C. 15, 8 S.E. (2d) 871. From the nature of the case, there can be no precise line. The power requires a degree of elasticity to be capable of meeting new conditions and improvements and the ever-increasing necessities of society. The sole dependence must be on the personal wisdom of the sovereign authority, supervised, and in cases of gross error or extreme wrong controlled by the dispassionate judgment of the courts. Olmstead v. Camp , 33 Conn. 532, 551, 89 Am. Dec. 221. In Riley v. Charleston Union Station Co. , 71 S.C. 457, 461, 51 S.E. 485, our Supreme Court confirmed a circuit court decree which used this language: What constitutes a public use? `The term public use is flexible and cannot be confined to public use known at the time of framing the Constitution. All improvements that may be made, if useful to the public, may be encouraged by the exercise of eminent domain. Any use of anything which will satisfy a reasonable public demand for facilities of travel, for transmission of intelligence or commodities, would be public use. Trenton, etc. Turnpike Co. v. American, etc., Commercial News Co. , 43 N.J.L. 381, 384,    In Edens v. City of Columbia , 228 S.C. 563, 91 S.E. (2d) 280, 282, our Court said:    In still other states the power of eminent domain may be exercised for a public purpose, benefit or the public welfare, as contrasted with the requirement of our constitution that it be for a public use. Redevelopment Agency, etc. v. Hayes , 1954, 122 Ga. App. (2d) 777; Schenck v. City of Pittsburgh , 1950, 364 Pa. 31, 70 A. (2d) 612; State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich , 1953, 159 Ohio St. 13, 110 N.E. (2d) 778; Nashville Housing Authority v. City of Nashville , 1951, 192 Tenn. 103, 237 S.W. (2d) 946; Velishka v. City of Nashua , 1954, 99 N.H. 161, 106 A. (2d) 571, 44 A.L.R. (2d) 1406; Gohld Realty Co. v. City of Hartford , 1954, 141 Conn. 135, 104 A. (2d) 365, 368. From the last cited we quote: In this state [Connecticut] it is settled that public use means public usefulness, utility or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit, so that any appropriating of private property by the state under its right of eminent domain, for purposes of great advantage to the community, is a taking for public use. A park for the use of the public has long been recognized as a public use. Wright v. Walcott , 238 Mass. 432, 131 N.E. 291, 292, 18 A.L.R. 1242; United States v. Dieckmann , 7 Cir., 101 F. (2d) 421, 424; Johnson v. City of Corpus Christi , Tex. Civ. App., 416 S.W. (2d) 504; Johnson City v. Cloniger , 213 Tenn. 71, 372 S.W. (2d) 281. Thus a public use was recognized in a Mississippi case where the land was condemned for pollution control, control of access, public park and picnic areas, and as a wild life sanctuary. Pearl River Valley Water Supply District v. Brown , 248 Miss. 4, 156 So. (2d) 572, 576, 158 So. (2d) 694. As long as the use is of benefit, utility or advantage to the public, the use is a public one within the meaning of the law of eminent domain. Public health, recreation and enjoyment are recognized public uses. Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County, Cal. , 262 U.S. 700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 67 L.Ed. 1186. Even though the lands could not be adapted for use as a park, the taking of a portion of the palisades on the Hudson River adjoining a state park for the purpose of preserving the scenic beauty of the river and of the park was for a public use. Bunyan v. Commissioners of Palisades Interstate Park , 167 App. Div. 457, 153 N.Y.S. 622, 627. Parking, not a problem in most areas before the advent of the automobile is now a recognized public use for which properties may be condemned. City of Richmond v. Dervishian , 190 Va. 398, 57 S.E. (2d) 120, 124. The fact that such a parking area would benefit nearby stores did not prevent the condemnation for a public use. Even though a public parking area might be of special benefit to private individuals, off-street parking facilities in public ownership constitutes a public use in an eminent domain proceeding. Ermels v. Webster City , 246 Iowa 1305, 71 N.W. (2d) 911, 912. The condemnation of a site of historical significance, such as the Star Spangled Banner Flag House has been recognized as a public use. Flaccomio v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore , 194 Md. 275, 71 A. (2d) 12, 14. Preserving and marking the site of the Battle of Gettysburg was held to be a public use of lands and therefore subject to condemnation. United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co. , 160 U.S. 668, 16 S.Ct. 427, 429, 40 L.Ed. 576. So also the taking of lands for a memorial to the sailors of Salem, Mass., was for a public use in the constitutional sense. In re opinion of the Judges, 297 Mass. 567, 8 N.E. (2d) 753. The landowner contends that there is no public use in this taking and cites the case of Edens v. City of Columbia , 228 S.C. 563, 91 S.E. (2d) 280, and Tuomey Hospital v. City of Sumter , 243 S.C. 544, 134 S.E. (2d) 744, in support of that position. Both of these case involved condemnation for private uses; here the use is a public one, for a public purpose and of public benefit. In Edens , the lands were being condemned for clearance of a slum area and resale to private persons or corporations for commercial and industrial development. The Court properly held that this was a condemnation for a private use. No such plan is involved here; in fact, the contract by which the lands are being acquired with HUD funds and the legislative enactment specifically restrict the use of the property indefinitely to public park purposes. In Tuomey Hospital, the establishment which sought the protection of public use was an eleemosynary hospital corporation created under a will; the court held that a factual issue as to the public or private nature of the hospital had to be resolved at trial. There is no question about the status of The South Carolina Tricentennial Commission; it is a public body, a part of the State of South Carolina itself. That the uses for which this property, along with other sites for the Tricentennial exhibits, are being taken are public purposes was recognized in the case involving the bond issue with which these lands in part are being purchased. Historical and recreational purposes are recognized public uses. See Mims v. McNair , S.C. 165 S.E. (2d) 355, 363. Nothing in this record shows that the property is being taken for any private use; in fact the contract with HUD and the legislative enactment of 1968 preclude anything save a public use of the block, including the lands of this landowner. In most cases there are no such stringent requirements, but here there can be no use of this property other than a public use. This lot is being taken for a public use under the specific enactments of the General Assembly; any private use of the property would be in direct contravention of the legislative direction. The taking of this property is for a public use, and there is no basis for granting an injunction on this ground.