Opinion ID: 1188883
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was the PPC's wiring the result of Deere's workmanship?

Text: The warranty covers Deere engines and components that are defective in ... workmanship. But we see no way to interpret workmanship to include the PPC's wiring. Grant Suhre, who is employed by Deere as a manager of its field service, stated in an affidavit that PPCs, which Deere sells and ships separately from its engines, leave the Deere manufacturing plant unconfigured, i.e., without wiring in the terminal pairs that would dictate a particular engine's ultimate use. The reason is obvious. Deere's engines (and, derivatively, its PPCs) may be used in any number of applications. Deere does not know a purchaser's intended use for one of its engines and therefore leaves the configuration to others. Deere's final product, as it leaves the company's hands, is an unconfigured, unwired PPC. This unconfigured PPC is the end result of, and the conclusion to, Deere's workmanship. If there were some defect in that product, Deere would likely be liable under the warranty. What happens after a PPC leaves Deere's plant, however, can only be called installation. In an attempt to characterize the PPC's wiring as the product of Deere's workmanship, Carlisle and Buszkiewicz cite two cases that deal with that term's meaning under Indiana law. See J.M. Foster, Inc. v. Spriggs, 789 N.E.2d 526 (Ind.Ct. App.2003); Schultz v. Erie Ins. Group, 754 N.E.2d 971 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). In J.M. Foster, Inc., the court stated that `workmanship' encompasses not only the quality of the finished product, but the manner of construction as determined by the art, skill, or technique of the worker. 789 N.E.2d at 533. The Schultz court stated that workmanship embraces both `process' and `product.' 754 N.E.2d at 976. We have no quarrel with these definitions. Note, however, that both are tied to a product. Deere's product, as we just discussed, is an unconfigured PPC, and against that product the plaintiffs have lodged no complaints. The plaintiffs' arguments highlight an important caveat that the Indiana appellate court discussed in Schultz: context matters. See id. ([T]o a great extent, the context of the policy gives meaning to the individual terms.). As one's perspective changes, so does the meaning of terms such as workmanship and installation. Consider, for example, the placement of a battery into vehicle. To the battery's manufacturer, its workmanship occurs during the process of creating the battery itself. From that manufacturer's perspective, installation would be the process of placing that battery into a particular vehicle, generally performed by a mechanic. To the mechanic, however, his workmanship is the act of installation. Thus, the same act can be two different things to two different people or entities, installation to one and workmanship to another. Applying our analogy to this case, Deere manufacturers the batteries. It does not install them in the cars. From Deere's perspective, the act of wiring the PPC was installation, not workmanship. As such, the first of our potential outcomes fails.