Opinion ID: 357975
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: recognized hazard causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm

Text: 22 While petitioner concedes titanium's high flammability when in the form of dust or fines, it argues that the hazard posed thereby is not a recognized hazard that (is) causing or (is) likely to cause death or serious physical harm, as required by § 5(a)(1) in order to trigger the employer's duty to free its employees' place of employment from such a hazard. 23 Petitioner relies on the relative infancy of the titanium industry, which is less than thirty years old, the fact that no precise standards exist respecting what levels of accumulation of titanium dust and fines present such a hazard (to be discussed in the next section), and the fact that while there have been numerous fires in the Henderson plant and in Unit 11 in particular over the past eight years, many if not most attributable to or at least fueled by titanium dust and fines, none has been similar in magnitude or effect to the October 24, 1974, conflagration in which Kemp was fatally burned. Moreover, petitioner argues that no explosion had ever occurred before, that titanium burns not like gasoline or gunpowder but like a fuse, that the vast majority of the previous fires were minor and easily contained (most having been extinguished by employees before the private fire fighting contractor, who is routinely summoned no matter now small the fire, had arrived), and that there was no finding by the administrative law judge that titanium particles caused the explosion which, petitioner argues, was primarily responsible both for Kemp's death and for the unusually rapid spread of the blaze throughout Unit 11. Petitioner urges that the above conclusively demonstrates that while titanium dust and fines may have presented a recognized hazard, any such hazard was of a relatively minor nature and certainly not one causing or . . . likely to cause death or serious physical harm. 24 An activity or practice may be a recognized hazard even if the employer is ignorant of the existence of the activity or practice or its potential for harm. National Realty, supra, 489 F.2d at 1265 n. 32. 25 Here, there can be no doubt on this record that the fire hazard posed by titanium generally and by the accumulation of dust and fines in particular was recognized both throughout the industry and by petitioner itself. The National Fire Code, NFPA No. 481-1972, whose revision petitioner's plan engineer (Kraeger) was instrumental in drafting, its experience with numerous titanium fires and with employee complaints (of an informal nature) respecting both fire and other hazards (e. g., respiratory) resulting from excessive accumulations of dust and fines, and its adoption of a safety program at its Henderson plant all attest to the hazard posed by titanium as being one which is recognized. 26 Turning to petitioner's contention that the hazard presented by titanium dust and fines reasonably was believed not to be one likely to cause death or serious physical harm, the Court notes that (i)f evidence is presented that a practice Could eventuate in serious physical harm upon other than a freakish or utterly implausible concurrence of circumstances, the Commission's expert determination of likelihood should be accorded considerable deference by the courts. National Realty, supra, 489 F.2d at 1265 n. 33 (emphasis supplied). See California Stevedore & Ballast Co. v. OSHRC, 517 F.2d 986, 988 (9th Cir. 1975), Citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-18, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801-02, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965); Dunlop v. Rockwell Int'l, 540 F.2d 1283, 1289-90 (6th Cir. 1976); Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255, 1267 (4th Cir. 1974). Cf. Irvington Moore v. OSHRC, 556 F.2d 431, 434 (9th Cir. 1977) (Secretary's interpretation of his own regulations, affirmed by the Commission, to be accorded substantial weight). 27 The gravamen of the complaint was that petitioner had permitted excessive amounts of titanium dust and fines to accumulate, which created a serious hazard not only from the point of view of a fire igniting but also from the standpoint of its spreading (however started). The administrative law judge found: 28 (T)he widespread (sic) and heavy accumulation of titanium dust and fines in Unit 11 Outside the splitter was the recognized hazard; such accumulation enabled the fire to quickly spread throughout the unit, endangering the lives of many workmen, if not actually contributing to the death of Randall Kemp. The explosion in the splitter may not have been foreseeable as nothing like it before had occurred (although employees who had to unload the tote bins from the top deck of the splitter were fearful of what might happen), But the rapid spreading of the fire throughout the unit where there were heavy accumulations of dust was. 29 (First emphasis in original; other emphases supplied.) 30 There was ample testimony concerning the especially heavy dust and fines produced by code 7 sponge, the fact that bins of this grade sponge were split almost daily, the fact that the last washdown of Unit 11 had occurred six to eight weeks prior to October 24, 1974, the fact that sweepdowns required by petitioner's safety program after each shift were left largely unsupervised and uninspected and often were done, if at all, in a less than thorough manner, the fact that dust and fines could serve as fuel for a fire, however started, and the fact that non-sparking tools and equipment were not utilized in and around the splitter. The administrative law judge concluded: 31 Whatever the cause of the explosion, the several weeks' accumulations of dust and fines presented a dangerous situation that could well have resulted in death or serious injury to (petitioner's) employees. Once ignited, it was likely that the fire would spread quickly throughout the Unit 11 where the heavy accumulations were. 32 While it is beyond dispute that an accident need not occur for a violation of § 5(a)(1) properly to be found, Brennan v. OSHRC (Vy Lactos Laboratories ), 494 F.2d 460, 463 (8th Cir. 1974); National Realty, supra,489 F.2d at 1267; REA Express, Inc. v. Brennan, 495 F.2d 822, 825 (2d Cir. 1974); Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1975); Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 511 F.2d 864, 870 (10th Cir. 1975), conversely it has been held that while the occurrence of injury may be relevant to proving a violation, it is not conclusive. Cape Vineyard Division of New Bedford Gas & Edison Light Co. v. OSHRC, 512 F.2d 1148, 1150 (1st Cir. 1975). 33 The findings, previously set forth, indicate that his decision did not rest on the fact that Kempt was fatally burned in the October 24 explosion and fire. 34 We have held that where an employer's safety record is the only evidence offered concerning whether a reasonably prudent man would have found that further precautions against a particular hazard were necessary where certain precautions already existed, the Commission's order vacating a citation for a violation of § 5(a)(1) is not supported by substantial evidence. Brennan v. Smoke-Craft, Inc., 530 F.2d 843, 845 (9th Cir. 1976). See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. OSHRC, 542 F.2d 27, 31 (7th Cir. 1976), wherein the court stated: 35 (A)lthough the fact that petitioner had an accident-free or injury-free record could properly be considered in determining the gravity of the violation for which it was cited, we are not impressed with petitioner's argument that its past record is dispositive in light of the Commission's finding that there existed a general fall hazard, and in light of the Act's declared policy to prevent the occurrence of accidents and injury. 36 These cases answer petitioner's contention that its history of only minor incidents of fire demonstrate that the accumulation of titanium dust and fines did not pose a hazard causing or . . . likely to cause death or serious physical harm and that consequently the Commission's finding of a violation of § 5(a)(1) was not supported by substantial evidence and thereby erroneous as a matter of law. 37