Opinion ID: 2744274
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Traceable Ballots

Text: Analysis of the claims requires an understanding of the balloting practices in the six Colorado counties, Citizen Center’s theories, and the Secretary of State’s regulatory changes designed to enhance ballot secrecy.
Citizen Center complains of the potential for election officials in six Colorado counties to trace ballots to individual voters. This potential allegedly exists because: (1) each ballot has a unique number or barcode, (2) some ballots may be unique among the ballots cast on an electronic voting machine, and (3) some ballots may be unique within a batch of ballots. 3 R. vol. 1, at 25, 27-31, 33-34. According to Citizen Center, ballots are traceable when they bear unique numbers or barcodes. Unique numbers or barcodes are used in 3 The clerks state that traceable ballots are used to: “(1) prevent[] election fraud by ensuring that ballots are not duplicated or double counted; (2) prevent[] human error by establishing an electronic means of preventing double counting; (3) ensure[] that problematic ballots (such as those with improper marks, under-votes, and over-votes) can be quickly reviewed by bi-partisan election judges to determine the intent of the voter; (4) allow[] the processing of the [voluminous number of] ballots… submitted in a general election in a timely and orderly fashion; (5) allow[] a thorough and accurate post-election audit to help ensure that every vote[] [has] been properly counted; (6) and conduct[] an accurate canvass, required by law, in which election staff must execute a very detailed reconciliation of the election and ensure accurate accounting of ballots printed, received, and counted.” R. vol. 3, at 362; see id. at 351, 356. 4 three of the counties. Id. at 31, 33-34. In these counties, ballots are traceable because an election official who identifies a voter with a unique ballot can later identify the ballot as belonging to that particular voter. Id. at 27-34. Citizen Center also contends that election officials can trace ballots that are unique among those cast on an electronic-voting machine. In each of the six counties, officials record the date of voting, the machine’s unique identifier, and the precinct number or ballot style used by the voter. Id. at 27, 29-30, 32-33, 35. By comparing this information with available data, Citizen Center argues, election officials can trace a ballot whenever it is unique among the ballots cast on a particular voting machine. See id. at 27-30, 32-35. The potential for tracing also allegedly exists because some ballots may be unique within a single batch. Four of the counties (Mesa, Larimer, Jefferson, and Boulder) process and store mail-in (absentee) ballots in discrete batches. Id. at 25, 27, 29, 32. Each batch is associated with a batch sheet listing the names, voter identification numbers, precinct numbers, ballot styles, and other information for the voters whose ballots are included in the batch. Id. at 25, 27, 30, 32. Because batches are relatively small, some ballots may be unique within the batch. Thus, Citizen Center alleges that election officials will sometimes be able to 5 trace a ballot by comparing the content to information in the batch sheet. Id. at 25-26, 28, 30, 32.
Citizen Center’s members include voters from the six counties who intend to “freely vote their conscience[s]” in upcoming elections. Id. at 38. But the members allegedly fear that their ballots will be traced and that votes are “subject to being identified by government officials and others at any time after an election.” Id. at 41. Thus, Citizens Center fears that members may not “freely exercise their fundamental right to vote” because of the possibility of tracing. Id. at 42, 44. Citizen Center contends that the counties’ election procedures “substantially burden, infringe and chill” members’ constitutional rights to: (1) vote, (2) engage in free speech and association, (3) enjoy substantive and procedural due process, and (4) enjoy equal protection. Id. at 42, 44-48, 51, 53.
Colorado election officials must swear “not to inquire or disclose how any elector shall have voted.” Colo. Const. art. VII, § 8. Thus, all mail ballots are provided to voters with a secrecy envelope or sleeve to prevent officials from learning how a citizen voted. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1- 7.5-103(5). 6 Citizen Center alleges that election officials in three counties have either traced individual ballots or failed to adequately safeguard the secrecy of voters’ ballots. According to Citizen Center, officials in Mesa and Larimer counties traced the ballots of identified public officials and publicized the ability to trace ballots. R. vol. 1, at 26, 28. And Jefferson County allegedly published the electoral choices of 30 identifiable voters for nearly a year and a half. Id. at 30-31; R. vol. 2, at 210.
The Secretary of State bears responsibility for regulating election procedures for each Colorado county. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-1-110(1) (“The county clerk and recorder . . . shall . . . follow the rules and orders promulgated by the secretary of state pursuant to this code.”); see 8 Colo. Code Regs. § 1505-1:7.1 (requiring approval by the Secretary of State on all mail ballot plans). Citizen Center challenges the constitutionality of voting procedures in the 2012 election. R. vol. 1, at 41. But the Secretary of State has revised its election regulations. See 8 Colo. Code Regs. § 1505-1. The current regulations: (1) prohibit counties from printing ballots with unique numbers or barcodes, (2) require counties using rotating numbers to “print at least ten ballots of each ballot style for each number,” and (3) direct county clerks to “dissociate any batch number that could trace a ballot back to the specific voter who cast it from the counted ballots no later than 7 the final certification of the abstract of votes cast.” Id. §§ 1505-1:4.8.4(a), 1505-1:7.5.8.