Opinion ID: 1268035
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Categorical Exemption

Text: (10a) Amicus curiae Pacific Legal Foundation argues that the commission's activity in setting hunting and fishing seasons is included within one of the categorical exemptions provided in sections 21083 and 21084 of CEQA. These sections direct the Office of Planning and Research to develop and the secretary to adopt guidelines for determining whether or not a proposed project may have a significant effect on the environment. If it is concluded that the project has no such effect then it is categorically exempt from CEQA. Among the projects which have been designated as categorically exempt pursuant to these provisions are ... actions taken by regulatory agencies ... to assure the maintenance, restoration, or enhancement of a natural resource where the regulatory process involves procedures for protection of the environment. (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 14, § 15107.) The section describes as an example ... the wildlife preservation activities of the State Department of Fish and Game. Amicus asserts that this express exemption includes the setting of hunting and fishing seasons by the commission. We note first that the commission is not, of course, the Department of Fish and Game (the department). (11) The commission is a constitutionally created agency with general regulatory powers over the taking or possession of birds, mammals, fish, amphibia and reptiles. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 20; Fish & G. Code, §§ 101, 200.) The department, in contrast, is a statutorily created agency whose director is responsible to the commission in enforcing the policies and provisions of the Fish and Game Code. (Fish & G. Code, §§ 700-703.) (10b) More significantly, several sections granting powers and duties to the department contemplate projects specifically designed for the preservation of wildlife. The code mandates the acquisition by the department of land [f]or purposes of propagating, feeding and protecting birds, mammals, and fish (§ 1525) and ecological reserves (§ 1580). Other sections provide for the establishment of rearing facilities for salmon and steelhead (§ 1200), wildlife feeding programs (§§ 1502, 1503), and other projects specifically aimed at the conservation and propagation of wildlife (see, e.g., § 1870 et seq.). The wildlife preservation activities of the State Department of Fish and Game described in section 15107, in our view, more accurately refer to the foregoing types of departmental functions than the commission activities at issue in this litigation. The fixing of hunting seasons, while doubtless having an indirect beneficial effect on the continuing survival of certain species, cannot fairly or readily be characterized as a preservation activity in a strict sense. Another consideration moves us to our conclusion that the commission is not categorically exempt from CEQA. Even if section 15107 was intended to cover the commission's hunting program, it is doubtful that such a categorical exemption is authorized under the statute. (12) We have held that no regulation is valid if its issuance exceeds the scope of the enabling statute. (See Gov. Code, § 11374; Whitcomb Hotel, Inc. v. Cal. Emp. Com. (1944) 24 Cal.2d 753, 757 [151 P.2d 133, 155 A.L.R. 405].) The secretary is empowered to exempt only those activities which do not have a significant effect on the environment. (Pub. Resources Code, § 21084.) It follows that where there is any reasonable possibility that a project or activity may have a significant effect on the environment, an exemption would be improper. No party herein has suggested that the setting of hunting and fishing seasons may not have a significant effect on the environment. (13) Rather, amicus Pacific Legal Foundation argues that the categorical exemption is available as long as a project does not have a significant adverse impact on the environment. The argument, however, is not consistent with the statutory pattern. The terms of section 21083 establishing the categorical exemptions do not limit application of the section to projects having a significant adverse effect. While two of the sections's criteria for determining whether a project has a significant effect on the environment refer to adverse environmental effects (§ 21083, subds. (a), (c)), the remainder of the section, including a third criterion (§ 21083, subd. (b)), contains no such limitation. (10c) We conclude that the setting of hunting and fishing seasons has the potential for a significant environmental impact, both favorable and unfavorable. There inheres in the fixing of hunting seasons and the issuance of hunting permits a serious risk of overkill and depletion of the affected species. When the impact may be either adverse or beneficial, it is particularly appropriate to apply CEQA which is carefully conceived for the purpose of increasing the likelihood that the environmental effects will be beneficial rather than adverse. As previously indicated, we have consistently held that CEQA must be interpreted so as to afford the fullest possible protection to the environment. ( Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Com., supra, 13 Cal.3d 263, 274; Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 8 Cal.3d 247, 259.) We will not abandon that principle by unreasonably expanding statutory and regulatory language to imply an exemption for the commission when it enacts hunting regulations. We cannot conclude that the Legislature so intended. Both the express language and the apparent intent of CEQA require its application to the adoption of hunting regulations by the commission. We find no constitutional barriers to such a conclusion, and further determine that the commission is not rendered exempt under the act from CEQA's categorical exemption provisions. Defendants have requested that we stay the effective date of this opinion for 90 days in order to permit them to apply for and obtain the limited exemption from CEQA's EIR requirements, pursuant to section 21080.5 of the Public Resources Code, discussed above. Defendants also request additional stays in order to preserve the validity of existing hunting and fishing regulations not directly challenged in this proceeding. We believe that a 90-day stay is sufficient for defendant's purposes, for most of the regulations referred to by defendants will have become final, and protected from challenge under CEQA, by that time. (See Pub. Resources Code, § 21167.) Any regulations which are not final properly should be subject to any valid challenge under CEQA or upon any other basis. Accordingly, the effective date of this opinion shall be December 22, 1976. Plaintiffs have asked us to direct the superior court to determine their motion for attorneys' fees for services performed in connection with the appeal in this action. Although the question whether attorneys' fees are recoverable in proceedings such as the present one is unresolved, we have in the past acknowledged that such motions should be addressed to the trial court, whose ruling thereon may thereafter be reviewed on appeal. (See Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 483 [119 Cal. Rptr. 215, 531 P.2d 783]; No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1975) 13 Cal.3d 486 [119 Cal. Rptr. 216, 531 P.2d 784].) Accordingly, we direct the trial court to hear and determine plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees, and if it concludes that plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees for services performed on appeal to be assessed against defendants, to fix the amount thereof. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.