Opinion ID: 160639
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Removability by Reason of Having Committed a Criminal Offense

Text: 16 Because Mr. Tapia-Garcia does not dispute that he is an alien, the only jurisdictional fact left for our review under 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C) is whether Mr. Tapia-Garcia is removable by reason of having committed an aggravated felony under the relevant statutes. 4 The BIA affirmed the immigration judge's decision that Mr. Tapia-Garcia is deportable by reason of having committed an aggravated felony as provided in 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). In the immigration context, the term aggravated felony is defined by the various offenses described in 8 U.SC. 1101(a)(43). The definition specifically includes a crime of violence . . . for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), and incorporates the definition of crime of violence in 18 U.S.C. 16. The immigration judge concluded that Mr. Tapia-Garcia's state conviction under section 18-8004(5) 5 of the Idaho Code satisfies the definition of crime of violence in 18 U.S.C. 16(b), which defines a crime of violence as any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. Concluding Mr. Tapia-Garcia's DUI offense satisfies this definition, the immigration judge and BIA held he was deportable by reason of having committed an aggravated felony. 17 Mr. Tapia-Garcia argues that Idaho's DUI offense does not satisfy the statutory definition of crime of violence because it does not by its nature involve[] a substantial risk that physical force . . . may be used in the course of committing the offense. 18 U.S.C. 16(b) (emphasis added). He argues that section 18-8004(5) of the Idaho Code broadly encompasses both violent and nonviolent crimes, so we may look beyond the Idaho DUI statute to determine whether his offense constitutes a crime of violence. He cites United States v. Smith, 10 F.3d 724 (10th Cir. 1993), in which we considered whether a burglary offense constitutes a crime of violence under the career offender Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 731-34. Smith does not however apply to this case. First, although we acknowledged in Smith that some courts look only to the statutory elements of the conviction while others analyze the underlying facts, we declined to adopt either approach because under either approach the outcome was the same. Id. at 731. In addition, the Sentencing Commission's definition of crime of violence included only burglary of a dwelling, but the statute under which the defendant was convicted included both dwellings and non-dwellings. Id. at 733-34. We therefore looked beyond the statute only to determine whether the defendant had been convicted of burglary of a dwelling as required by the Commission's interpretation of what constitutes a crime of violence. Id. at 734. 18 Unlike the statute in Smith, the Idaho statute as interpreted by the BIA does not create any ambiguity; the BIA's decision encompasses all the conduct covered by the statute. We will not therefore inquire into the underlying factual circumstances of Mr. Tapia-Garcia's conviction, applying instead a categorical approach that considers only the generic elements of the offense. See United States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377, 379 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that, in analyzing what constitutes a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), a court must only look to the statutory definition, not the underlying circumstances of the crime, to make this determination.); Lopez-Elias v. Reno, 209 F.3d 788, 791 (5th Cir. 2000) (To determine whether an alien has committed an aggravated felony, courts look to the text of the statute violated, not the underlying factual circumstances.). 19 The BIA also applies a categorical approach in analyzing whether a conviction constitutes a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), requiring first that the offense be a felony and, if it is, that the 'nature of the crimeas elucidated by the generic elements of the offenseis such that its commission would ordinarily present a risk that physical force would be used against the person or property of another' irrespective of whether the risk develops or harm actually occurs. Matter of Magallanes-Garcia, Interim Decision 3341, l998 WL 133301 (BIA Mar. 19, 1998) (quoting Matter of Alcantar, 20 I. & N. Dec. 801 (BIA 1994), available in 1994 WL 232083). The BIA's determination of whether the generic elements of the offense satisfy the statutory definition of crime of violence does not therefore include analysis of the underlying circumstances of the conviction. Id. 20 In a decision applying and clarifying its categorical approach, the BIA later held that a state offense for operating a vehicle while under the influence constitutes a crime of violence, provided it rises to a felony under state law. Matter of Puente-Salazar, Interim Decision 3412, 1999 WL 770709 (BIA Sept. 29, 1999). In so holding, the BIA emphasized that the statutory definition of crime of violence in 18 U.S.C. 16(b) does not require intentional conduct. Focusing instead on the nature of the crime, the BIA concluded the operation of a vehicle while under the influence is a crime that 'by its nature involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used.' Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. 16(b)). Thus, relying on its precedent, the BIA concluded that the elements of Idaho's DUI offense clearly constitute a crime of violence, rendering Mr. Tapia-Garcia deportable for commission of an aggravated felony. 21 We hold the BIA reasonably construed 18 U.S.C. 16(b) to include an offense for driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. In analyzing the definition of crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines, the federal courts, including this court, have recognized the inherent danger in driving under the influence: '[T]he risk of injury from drunk driving is neither conjectural or speculative. Drunk driving is a reckless act that often results in injury, and the risks of driving while intoxicated are well known.' United States v. Farnsworth, 92 F.3d 1001, 1008-09 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding the crime of grossly negligent driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol is a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines); accord United States v. DeSantiago-Gonzalez, 207 F.3d 261, 264 (5th Cir. 2000) (following the reasoning of United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 376 (7th Cir. 1995), in holding the nature of drunk driving presents a serious risk of physical injury and is therefore a crime of violence under the Guidelines). Although these cases hold that drunk driving constitutes a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines (rather than the immigration statutes), the language of the relevant Guideline provision, USSG 4B1.2, is similar to that of 18 U.S.C. 16(b). 6 While 18 U.S.C. 16(b) differs slightly from USSG 4B1.2, the well-documented danger inherent in drunk driving supports the conclusion that a DUI offense may also constitute a crime of violence under 16(b) because the generic elements of the offense present a substantial risk that physical force . . . may be used. See United States v. Coronado-Cervantes, 154 F.3d 1242, 1244 (10th Cir. 1998) (recognizing the definitions differ but finding the rationale of a case involving 18 U.S.C. 16(b) persuasive in analyzing whether an offense constitutes a crime of violence under USSG 4B1.2). 22 Because Mr. Tapia-Garcia's DUI offense constitutes a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b) and is therefore an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), he is deportable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Having determined that Mr. Tapia-Garcia is an alien subject to deportation for commission of an aggravated felony, we must DISMISS the case for lack of jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C).