Opinion ID: 854022
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Like Any Other Civil Caseor Unauthorized Deferral Program?

Text: The City initially cites Pridemore v. State, 577 N.E.2d 237, 238 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), for the proposition that: Traffic infractions are civil, as opposed to criminal, proceedings in nature. Infraction proceedings are to be conducted in accordance with the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure, the state must prove the commission of the infraction by only a preponderance of the evidence, and punishment for its commission is only a fine. There can be no imprisonment. In short, the City argues, an infraction case is like any other civil case. (Relator's Br. at 2.) This leads the City to cite Indiana Trial Rule 41(A)(1), which reads in pertinent part: (1) By plaintiffBy stipulation. Subject to contrary provisions of these rules or of any statute, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court: .... (b) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Because these are civil cases, says counsel, and because Trial Rule 41(A)(1) allows for voluntary dismissal of civil cases by stipulation without order of the court, the Respondent Court is without jurisdiction to do anything other than dismiss since stipulations have been duly filed. (Relator's Br. at 2.) The City asserts that Rule 41 leave[s] no room for interpretation. ( Id. ) Appearing for the trial court, the Attorney General argues in response that the City was running an unauthorized deferral program in violation of Indiana Code § 34-4-32-1(f). [2] (Respondent's Br. at 3-5.) This statute allows prosecuting attorneys and municipal corporations to institute a deferral program in which the prosecutor and defendant agree to certain conditions of dismissal, the defendant agrees to pay the court clerk an initial user's fee and a monthly user's fee, the terms of the agreement are recorded in an instrument signed by the parties and filed with the court, and the defendant pays court costs to the court clerk if the case involves a moving traffic offense. Ind.Code Ann. § 34-4-32-1(f)(1)-(5) (West Supp.1997). We think the Attorney General correctly characterizes the City's actions as an attempt to run an `informal' deferral program. (Respondent's Br. at 5.) The State Board of Accounts has reached a similar conclusion. [3] The disposition of this case does not require us to give the City's actions any specific moniker. [4] The City argues that it, like any other litigant, is at liberty to dismiss litigation which it has instituted. (Relator's Br. at 2.) While the City stresses latter portions of Rule 41, the opening clause of the Rule makes it clear that there is no absolute right to dismiss: Subject to contrary provisions of these rules or of any statute.... As the trial court correctly points out, our legislature has set forth statutory guidelines for dealing with traffic infraction complaints in Indiana Code § 34-2-32-1. Because Rule 41 explicitly recognizes contrary statutes, we look to section 34-4-32-1 for the rules that prosecuting attorneys and cities like New Haven must follow when disposing of traffic infraction complaints. [5] Whether or not the City actively tried to run an informal deferral program, we find that the program it did establish did not comply with the governing statute. The trial court noted that the City's program for dealing with traffic complaints violated the deferral program requirements in at least three ways. First, the City acknowledges that [t]he Settlement Agreement[s] accompanying such dismissals often require[ ] payment by the Defendant to the City of New Haven or a commitment by the Defendant to engage in, or not to engage in, described activity in the future. (Relator's Br. at 1.) Section 34-4-32-1 does not contemplate a payment made directly to the City, but does call for payment to the clerk of the court if the City opts to institute a deferral program. Thus, if the City were running a deferral program, it could require payments to the clerk of the court. Ind.Code Ann. § 34-4-32-1(f)(2), (4) (West Supp.1997). We find no authority for the City to require payments conditional to dismissal apart from those made to the court clerk. Second, the trial court points out that the joint motion to dismiss asked that the court dismiss the action without prejudice. (Respondent's Br. at 5; R. at 7.) The statute contemplates that conditional agreements or stipulations of dismissal such as those reached between the City and the defendant in this case, requiring as they do payment and/or a commitment to engage in or not to engage in some prescribed activity, will ultimately be dismissed with prejudice. [6] We find merit in the trial court's contention that the dismissal arrangements in cases like Schindler's create a risk that the action may be refiled, and thus [t]hey risk consuming more of the court's resources in the future and do so without compensating the [c]ourt for the costs of the proceedings. (Respondent's Br. at 5.) Third, the trial court also correctly points out that the statute requires agreements such as these to be filed with the court. The agreement in this case was apparently not filed. Of course, the City may dismiss traffic infraction cases outright under the statute and the trial rules. Ind.Code Ann. § 34-4-32-1(c)(1) (West Supp.1997); T.R. 41(A)(1)(b). If the City elects to prosecute these cases, it may also do that under the statute and according to the trial rules. If the City wishes to impose conditions precedent to dismissal, however, it must abide by the requirements of Indiana Code § 34-4-32-1(f). Here, the City attempted to require payment and/or continuing obligations as conditions of dismissal, but failed to meet several of the statute's other obligations.