Opinion ID: 1277687
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Chage of Venue Motion

Text: The defense moved for a change of venue prior to voir dire of prospective jurors, claiming that due to extensive pretrial publicity, defendant would not be able to obtain a fair trial in Alameda County. In support of this motion, it called Joie B. Hubbert, a venue specialist, who testified that a poll she had conducted disclosed that 65 percent of juryeligible individuals in Alameda County had heard of the case, and that of those approximately 78 percent, or about 50 percent of all those polled, had prejudged defendant to be guilty. The trial court denied the motion, but left open the possibility that it would reconsider the motion after voir dire was completed. The defense [8] renewed the motion after voir dire and the trial court again denied it. Defendant now contends that the trial court erred. A change of venue must be granted when the defendant shows a reasonable likelihood that in the absence of such relief, a fair trial cannot be had. Whether raised on petition for writ of mandate or on appeal from a judgment of conviction, `the reviewing court must independently examine the record and determine de novo whether a fair trial is or was obtainable.' ( People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 495, 268 Cal. Rptr. 126, 788 P.2d 640.) The de novo standard of review applies to our consideration of the five relevant factors: (1) nature and gravity of the offense; (2) nature and extent of the media coverage; (3) size of the community; (4) community status of the defendant; and (5) prominence of the victim. ( People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1236-1237, 283 Cal.Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163.) Applying these factors to the present case, we conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to grant the change of venue motion. The first factor, the nature and gravity of the offense, does indeed weigh in favor of granting the motion. The other factors do not. Although the media coverage was substantial at the time of the murders, two years had passed by the time that the change of venue motion was made. `Through the passage of time, any potential prejudice was thereby significantly reduced.' ( People v. Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1237, 283 Cal.Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163.) Defendant was a resident of the community, not an outsider, and there was no racial motivation for the crime that would augment its inflammatory nature. (See People v. Williams (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1112, 1129, 259 Cal.Rptr. 473, 774 P.2d 146.) In addition, Alameda County is the sixth largest in the state, with a geographically dispersed and economically diverse population ( Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1237, 283 Cal.Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163 [referring to San Mateo County, the eleventh most populous in the state].) The evidence weighing most heavily in favor of the change of venue is Hubbert's testimony that 62 percent of the potential jury pool had heard of the case and 50 percent had prejudged defendant guilty. But the import of this evidence is diminished by the fact that, according to jury questionnaires, less than 10 percent of the actual prospective jurors in this case (29 out of 294) reported any recollection of the case. Defendant argues that the only way to account for this discrepancy between the survey results and responses of the actual jury pool regarding recollection of the case is that the members of the jury pool must have been underreporting their recollection of the case and would have recalled it if their recollection had been refreshed. But based on the present record, we cannot draw such an inference. The voir dire process confirmed what the above factors suggest: that in a county as large and diverse as Alameda County, it was feasible to obtain an unbiased jury and a fair trial despite the pretrial publicity the crime received. We therefore conclude the trial court did not err in refusing to grant the defense request for a change of venue.