Opinion ID: 894693
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Right Standard: What Must This District Do?

Text: The school districts cannot establish a violation of Article VIII by proving that their current budgets are customary, or even reasonable; the tax cap they challenge is unconstitutional only if they proved they were forced to tax at that rate. By definition, districts are not forced to make discretionary or voluntary expenditures. Of course, some expenditures may be mandatory de facto, even though not mandatory de jure. [73] For example, Texas school boards or administrators who cut football programs or drill teams (as the State's attorneys bravely suggest) may soon find themselves looking for other occupations. But the Court adopts a standard far too low by holding that districts are forced to tax at maximum rates whenever their professional judgment and experience suggests they should. [74] Undoubtedly, school districts want to give their students the best education possible, and an educator's professional judgment would deem anything less to be undesirable. But in Edgewood IV, we rejected a claim that districts were forced to transfer revenues because the various alternatives are all undesirable. [75] By equating professional preferences with coercion, my colleagues again follow the dissent rather than the majority in Edgewood IV. [76] The districts did offer examples of expenditures that were mandatory, and programs that were cut. But as proof that districts are forced to tax at maximum rates, both are non sequiturs. Proving that some programs are mandatory does not prove that all others are too. Nor does it follow from cuts in one program that no further cuts can be made. To the contrary, the reluctance the superintendents expressed at trial about such cuts served to prove, if anything, their reluctance to cut any programs at all. Moreover, the State's trial evidence of discretionary spending did not focus on remedial-reading or bilingual-education programs. Instead, the State pointed to undisputed expenditures for swimming pools, nature trails, athletic stadiums, tennis courts, and unconventional classes such as broadcast journalism, ceramics, power lifting, ballet, film critique, lego robotics, advanced mariachi, and culinary arts. It is true that several superintendents testified that all these programs were needed to keep students in school. But if we take these claims at face value then nothing schools spend is discretionary. [A] claim will not stand or fall on the mere ipse dixit of a credentialed witness. [77] These opinions alone cannot support the trial court's judgment, both because they are conclusory, [78] and because the question is a legal one. [79] This Court is not usually so generous in treating such testimony as facts, not opinions. [80] Further, none of the school districts explained why they were forced to maintain athletic facilities or library services that local governments often provide, or unconventional classes that might be available through local community colleges or the internet. No one would suggest that communities can run their fire, police, or utility departments through a school district's budget, thus shifting those costs to the State or richer districts. The trial court could not simply assume there were no alternative providers; the school districts had to prove it. Similarly, several superintendents conceded paying the highest starting salaries in their region, or special stipends to attract particular types of teachers. Considering the importance of what they do, no one can begrudge teachers higher salaries; but these contribute to a violation of Article VIII only if school districts had no choice. If surrounding public or private schools pay less, it was the districts' burden to prove why they could not. When pressed to explain such expenses, district witnesses repeatedly pointed to the demands of their local communities. But again, local demand must be proved, not merely asserted. As no students or families testified at trial, the only proof was the conclusory assurances of school administrators. In a democracy, community demand is proved by elections, not anecdotal hearsay. In many instances, schools can buy property using school bonds (which require electoral approval) or the general operations budget (which does not). We cannot tell from this record which programs had been approved at an election, or what percentage of the community actually participated. Surely a district cannot avoid elections on expensive programs, or schedule them to ensure low voter turnout, [81] and then claim they were forced to adopt those programs by their community. [82] Without such proof here, we simply cannot tell. Finally, because fundamental reforms were never considered, we do not know whether they might allow districts to drop rates below the tax ceiling. School districts cannot spend money inefficiently (subverting Article VII) to force themselves to the tax ceiling (subverting Article VIII), as these articles must be construed consistently to give effect to both. [83] School districts may have good reasons to avoid consolidating, or starting school later in the year, or increasing class size so that teachers' salaries could be increased too. But they are forced to make current expenses only if saving money through such alternatives was impossible, not just unpopular. Of course, had the trial judge required specific evidence that the districts were forced to incur substantially all their current expenses, it would have been much more difficult for the districts to prove an Article VIII violation. But proving a statute unconstitutional is not supposed to be easy. We must presume the current system is constitutional, and interpret it whenever possible in a manner that renders it so. [84] This presumption is especially strong when statutes relate to taxation, [85] and especially important when we deal with politically charged subjects like the schools. [86] There was plenty of evidence at trial that public schools are being asked to carry increasingly heavy burdens, burdens that private schools often do not bear. For example, as one superintendent noted, it is not easy to remove employees in the public sector. Accountability and testing systems have raised expectations that somehow all schools and school children can be at or above average. Teachers and administrators face the risk that the failure of their students will cause their own professional efforts to be labeled academically unacceptable. And as all the witnesses agreed, a growing stream of immigrants with little formal schooling or English proficiency requires that public schools not only leave no child behind, but go back at great expense and pick up more as soon as they arrive. [87] Nevertheless, the Article VIII standard is not whether educational expenditures are reasonable, or important, or far-sighted, or what a community would prefer, but whether a district is forced to make them. Before the courts can declare the State's school-finance system unconstitutional, each and every district must prove it had no other choice. Here, none did. IV. Equity & Overbroad Relief Permanent injunctions must be narrowly drawn, [88] and the record must contain evidence supporting each injunctive provision. [89] This one meets neither standard. It is neither true nor worth repeating that these standards can be ignored because the State asks for no injunction rather than a narrower one. A court must craft an equitable injunction even if it is not precisely what either party wants. [90] If the rule were otherwise, the Court should not postpone the injunction here until June 2006as neither party asked for that. Hopefully, today's rule is once again good for today's case only.