Opinion ID: 1994101
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Verrill Dana's Motion to Quash

Text: [¶ 20] In order to decide the validity of the firm's argument on appeal, we must examine the single justice's order to see if the correct legal test was applied, and then examine the record to see whether it supports the single justice's conclusion that the crime-fraud exception applies on these facts to defeat the firm's claim of attorney-client privilege as to all of the documents at issue. We review the correctness of the Court's legal test de novo, and its findings of fact for clear error. See State v. Johnson, 2009 ME 6, ¶ 17 n. 4, 962 A.2d 973, 979. [¶ 21] In discussing the crime-fraud exception, the single justice found that: During Mr. Libby's investigation of the. . . complaint against the firm Mr. Libby may have uncovered criminal conduct by partners of Verrill Dana LLP. Pursuant to M.R. Evid. 502(d)(1) there is no privilege under Rule 502 pursuant to the furtherance of crime or fraud. This exception prevails here and all of the documents provided in camera to this Court fall under this exception. [¶ 22] We are unable to determine from the Court's findings whether it was referring to only past potential criminal conduct, which would weigh against the applicability of the exception, or to ongoing wrongdoing; whether it found that the firm intended to use Libby's services or advice to facilitate or conceal criminal or fraudulent activity; or whether it found that the crime-fraud exception applied by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, we must vacate the order of the single justice and remand for application of the appropriate standard as set forth in this opinion. On remand, the Court should consider for each of the firm's clients at issue whether documents concerning transactions with that client meet the test for application of the exception, or whether some or all of them remain privileged. The entry is: Order denying motion to quash vacated; remanded to the single justice for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ALEXANDER, J., dissenting. [¶ 23] I respectfully dissent. At this preliminary stage of the proceeding, Bar Counsel may seek information that appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. See M.R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The opposition to the subpoena did not demonstrate without doubt that compliance with the subpoena could not lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Accordingly, the Single Justice appropriately denied the motion to quash. Furthermore, the single justice appropriately made only limited findings, because the evidence is yet to be developed, and detailed findings might suggest prejudgment of issues that are not yet ready for fact-finding. [¶ 24] I would affirm the decision of the Single Justice, and I would not comment about facts and inferences from facts before discovery is completed and the facts can be addressed in an appropriate forum.