Opinion ID: 220719
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Competency Determination

Text: We begin with first principles. The Constitution provides criminal defendants with the right to be competent during trial. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 170, 128 S.Ct. 2379, 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008) (citing Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (per curiam), and Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975)). At all times before his conviction, a defendant must have a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him and sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. Id. (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). If a defendant fails to satisfy either of those requirements, then the proceedings against him may go no further. Id. And the competency right does not end at a conviction. In addition, a defendant must have the `capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice' whether to challenge his conviction or sentence on appeal or in post-conviction proceedings. Miller ex rel. Jones v. Stewart, 231 F.3d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 313, 86 S.Ct. 1505, 16 L.Ed.2d 583 (1966) (per curiam)). That standard applies as well when a defendant decides to abandon an appeal after having properly filed it. Id. The difficulty in this case arose when Defendant decided to exercise two other rights given to him by the Constitution. First, he chose to waive his right to counsel and to represent himself during his penalty phase trial. Second, he decided to waive his right to appeal his sentence. Neither of those decisions is valid if not competently made. Id. Here, we must decide whether the district court properly found Defendant competent with respect to the appeal waiver without having held a hearing on the matter before making its decision. Congress has set out specific procedures for determining a criminal defendant's mental competence. 18 U.S.C. § 4241. Those procedures apply here because Defendant's lawyers moved for a competency hearing before the trial. See id. § 4241(a) (governing motions for competency hearings made [a]t any time after the commencement of a prosecution . . . and prior to the sentencing of the defendant). The statute compels the district court to hold a competency hearing, either on defense counsel's motion or on its own motion, if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense. Id. We must decide whether the evidence established reasonable cause to believe that Defendant lacked the competence required to represent himself and to waive his right to an appeal. We think that it did and, thus, that the district court erred when it concluded otherwise. [2] Standby counsel produced reports from three experts, all well established and highly regarded in the field of neuropsychiatry, who had examined Defendant personally and had found him to suffer from in the words of one of the expertsdelusional beliefs, paranoia, grandiosity, and psychotic breaks with reality. All three experts formed the same opinion thatin the words of another of the expertsDefendant's mental diseases and defects render him incapable of rationally understanding and participating in the proceedings, and therefore incompetent. Standby counsel also produced results from a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) study and positron emission tomography (PET) scan of Defendant's brain. The results of those tests, according to one of Defendant's experts, showed an unusual brain structure consistent with behavioral deficits in the ability to make rational plans and modulate emotions. The expert opined that Defendant's brain dysfunction contributes to his severe psychosis and elaborate delusional system, which render[ ] him unable to have a rational understanding of the proceedings or to waive his right to counsel and to represent himself. Defendant's other two experts agreed with that conclusion. In addition to the expert evidence, the district court had before it several letters written by Defendant in prison while waiting for his day in court. Often in those letters, Defendant made philosophical observations and arguments rooted in his religious beliefs. Some of those arguments appear rational. For example, Defendant implored his family members not to testify in his defense because, in his words, there simply is no excuse or mitigating evidence to justify or minimize what I did. That Defendant wants to accept punishment for his crimes does not necessarily imply incompetence. See Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 645 (9th Cir.2004) (concluding that, even though the defendant was recalcitrant and acted in ways that were detrimental to his case, the trial judge was not compelled to hold a competency hearing). But others of Defendant's statements are unusual, and his writings suggest that those unusual beliefs played a significant role in his decisions about how to conduct his defense. It does not surprise us that different experts interpreted Defendant's beliefs differently. Defendant's experts all think that his beliefs fall too far beyond mainstream religious thought to be considered rational. The court-appointed experts both disagreed. While recognizing that Defendant's beliefs fall at the outer reaches of mainstream theology, those experts did not find the beliefs unusual enough to be considered delusions. We express no opinion on which of the experts has the better of the argument. That decision rests in the first instance with the district court. We hold only that the evidence described above creates a reasonable doubt about Defendant's competence, such that § 4241(a) required a full competency hearing before the district court could reach a decision.