Opinion ID: 4574284
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Title VII & FCRA Discrimination Claims

Text: Smith also cannot establish a prima facie case of sex-based discrimination under Title VII and the FCRA. On appeal, Smith contends that FAMU discriminated against her on the basis of sex by neglecting to apply its “new salary formula” to her during the 2016 one-time salary adjustment in order to bring her salary to $138,000. 8 We disagree. 7 Smith relies heavily upon Board of Regents of University of Nebraska v. Dawes, 522 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1975), to challenge the 2016 salary adjustment. Dawes is inapposite because there the university explicitly set out to overhaul its salary system by making adjustments based on sex. 522 F.2d at 381. Here, the evidence clearly shows that sex played no part in FAMU’s 2016 onetime salary adjustment, or in any other change to faculty salaries since the verdict in Smith I. 8 Smith also contends that the 2017 EOP Report’s statement that “gender was not the sole or primary factor for any disparities in the August 2015 study” is dispositive proof that FAMU discriminated against her on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII and the FCRA by paying her less than comparator Brown. This argument fails to appreciate the force of collateral estoppel. The 2015 pay-inequity study examined the exact same data the jury used to conclude that Smith’s pay disparity was not based on gender. See Smith, 687 F. App’x at 889 (“FAMU’s [pay-inequity] study was based entirely on publicly available data that Professor Smith drew upon in her presentation to the jury. Indeed, she persuaded the jury that she was paid less than comparable male professors.”). Thus, regardless of how the EOP office characterized the 2015 pay-inequity 13 USCA11 Case: 19-12560 Date Filed: 10/08/2020 Page: 14 of 18 Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating “against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The FCRA makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate on the basis of sex. Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a).9 We review discrimination claims under Title VII and the FCRA that involve circumstantial evidence under the framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Johnson v. MiamiDade Cty., 948 F.3d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Harper v. Blockbuster Entm't Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387, 1389–90 (11th Cir. 1998)). To establish a prima facie case under that framework, a plaintiff must show that she was a qualified member of a protected class and subjected to an “adverse employment action” in contrast to similarly situated employees outside of the protected class. Butler v. Ala. Dept. of Transp., 536 F.3d 1209, 1215 (11th Cir. 2008). To demonstrate an adverse employment action, “an employee must show a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir.2001). Importantly, “the employee's subjective view of the significance and adversity of the employer's study, that study simply cannot overcome the jury’s finding in Smith I that any pay differential between Brown and Smith at that time was not based on sex. 9 Florida’s unlawful employment practices statute makes it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation . . . because of such individual’s . . . sex.” Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a). 14 USCA11 Case: 19-12560 Date Filed: 10/08/2020 Page: 15 of 18 action is not controlling; the employment action must be materially adverse as viewed by a reasonable person in the circumstances.” Id. Here, Smith has not met her burden to show that FAMU committed any materially adverse employment action against her since Smith I, and therefore she cannot establish a prima facie case of sex-based discrimination. Smith’s bald allegation that FAMU did not apply its “new salary formula” to her during the 2016 one-time salary adjustment ignores the evidence. Smith received a nearly $10,000 increase—which resulted in a final salary that was $5,000 greater than any other associate professor who had similarly been affected by the adjustment. Smith’s assertion that her salary should have been raised to $138,000 to match Brown falls flat because Brown was not affected by the one-time adjustment. No other associate professor—male or female—received a salary increase to match Brown’s. And because the Smith I jury determined that the disparity between Brown and Smith’s salaries at that time was not based on sex, FAMU was under no obligation to raise her salary to match his. Thus, as compared to every other associate professor who was affected by the one-time adjustment, Smith was not treated adversely. We therefore conclude that Smith’s Title VII and FCRA claims necessarily fail.