Opinion ID: 1690710
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the trial court erred in allowing the statement of anthony doss into evidence, in violation of the united states and mississippi constitutions and mississippi law.

Text: ś 74. Doss contends that the trial court erred here by admitting into evidence his Statement made to Grenada County law enforcement officers while he was in the custody of the Memphis, Tennessee police for an unrelated murder charge. Said statement was the subject of a pre-trial suppression motion which was argued by both parties in chambers. During the suppression hearing, the trial court heard testimony from the interviewing officer, James Buster Grantham, Anthony Doss himself, and Bruce Patridge, the other interviewing officer. ś 75. The bottom line from the pre-trial hearing was that there were people on opposite sides of the table testifying to exactly opposite stories about the same event. Doss complained that the statement he gave was the result of being denied his request to have his attorney present, gas chamber threats, promises of leniency, and thus that his statement was not freely, voluntarily and knowingly made. In support of his position that the police had committed such acts before the official interview began, Doss points to the fact that the written statement notes that the interview began at 5:31 p.m. and that the audio taped interview did not begin until 6:00 p.m. ś 76. The interviewing officers testified about the events of the interview and testified to the exact opposite of Doss. That is, they testified that Doss signed a waiver of rights form prior to being questioned, that they did not make any threats or promises, and that he did not ask for his attorney. When asked what occurred during the first twenty-nine minutes, Officer Patridge and Officer Grantham did not recall the tape recorder being turned on and off, and just could not remember exactly what happened other than about it being down here, and where it happened, and going to Memphis, and all this before the tape started. ś 77. After hearing all of the above-mentioned testimony, the trial court made the following pre-trial ruling: The Court having heard the evidence on the motion, which is a motion to suppress the statement, finds that the evidence, as it usually is on these motions, is directly in conflict between the officers who took it and the person who gave it. But, the Court, as the finder of fact on this motion, having heard the evidence on this case and the â reviewing the same, and weighing the same, finds that the statement so given was given by the defendant Doss after he had been fully advised of his rights, as provided in the Miranda case; that the statement was knowingly given, and freely and voluntarily given without threat or reward, or promise of reward, and that the same is admissible. The motion to suppress is overruled. ś 78. Doss maintains that, based upon the totality of the circumstances test from Miller v. State, 243 So.2d 558, 559 (Miss. 1971) [23] , his statement was involuntary and thus inadmissible. The State asserts that Doss's statement was not a confession within the ordinary sense of the word because Doss originally denied shooting anyone, denied knowing that someone might get shot, and denied that he even had a gun. Doss subsequently admitted during trial that the latter fact was a lie. The State maintains that Doss has merely recited law and facts and has failed to present any argument about what induced him to make the statement. ś 79. This Court, in Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660, 668 (Miss. 1991), was confronted with almost the exact identical argument as Doss's which was rejected and Miller found to be inapplicable. Willie tried to use Miller in the same manner as Doss, but this Court found the argument unpersuasive because Willie actually denied the charges subsequent to the alleged inducement. Id. Doss's statement was a denial for the most part as well [24] because he alleged that he was merely present and that another person, whom Doss eventually admitted during the trial was not at all involved, was the trigger man in the robbery of Sparks. Therefore, Doss's use of Miller is inapplicable in light of Willie. As was stated in Willie and as appears to be the case here, the defendant's statement was not overly influenced by the alleged promises of leniency or benefit. Willie, 585 So.2d at 668. ś 80. As urged by the State in their brief, the Willie Court stated that: Once the evidence indisputably showed that the sheriffs told Willie that it would be best or better for him to tell the truth, the trial court should have determined whether these statements were mere exhortations to tell the truth or were inducements or implied promises of leniency. See Layne v. State, 542 So.2d 237, 240 (Miss. 1989); Willie, 585 So.2d at 668. ś 81. The State contends that there was no indisputable fact that Doss ever received an inducement because there were consistent conflicting stories as to whether the statements were ever made. Therefore, according to the State, the trial court did not have to go the next step and determine if this was or was not an inducement under Willie and Layne. Doss's argument is without merit as the trial court's pre-trial suppression ruling is supported in the record by substantial credible evidence in this case. Therefore, Doss's request for reversal on this basis is denied as there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court.