Opinion ID: 779503
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: National Wildlife Refuge Systems Improvement Act (NWRSIA)

Text: 55 The district court permitted the Audubon plaintiffs to amend their complaint to add the NWRSIA as an additional ground of preemption. The court permitted the amendment more than a year after the case was filed, and after discovery had closed, finding prejudice to be minimal because Audubon was merely adding a new legal basis for preemption (which it had pled from the beginning), and because the amendment required additional legal research but not additional fact-gathering. We review a district court's grant of leave to amend for abuse of discretion. See United States v. McGee, 993 F.2d 184, 187 (9th Cir.1993). Given the district court's careful discussion and weighing of the advantages and disadvantages of granting leave, and the fact that additional factual discovery was not necessary to respond to the new legal argument, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the amendment. 56 The district court held that § 3003.1(c) both (1) violates the Property Clause of the Constitution, and (2) is preempted by the NWRSIA, which derives its authority from the Property Clause. Neither Audubon nor the federal parties, however, defend on appeal the district court's holding that § 3003.1(c) violates the Property Clause. Because the trapping at issue occurs on NWRs, and appellees' injuries would thus be adequately addressed under NWRSIA preemption, we do not address the district court's broader holding under the Property Clause but consider only whether § 3003.1(c) is preempted by the NWRSIA. 7 57 A recent decision by the Tenth Circuit provides guidance as to the relative scope of federal and state authorities under the NWRSIA. See Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir.2002). That court rejected Wyoming's attempt to vaccinate elk living in the National Elk Refuge, holding that the Tenth Amendment did not reserve to the State an unrestricted right to manage wildlife on public lands. The court held that Congress invoked federal power under the Property Clause when it enacted the NWRSIA, and that the NWRSIA plainly vest[s] the FWS with authority to administer the Act and manage the NWRs. Id. at 1228. We agree. Because NWRs are federal government land, Congress has the authority under the Property Clause to preempt state action with respect to NWR management and has done so through the NWRSIA. We therefore hold that the NWRSIA preempts § 3003.1(c)'s regulation of federal trapping on NWRs in California because the ban on leghold traps conflicts with FWS's statutory management authority on those federal reserves. 58 The Tenth Circuit interpreted NWRSIA's savings clause, § 668dd(m), as reflecting Congress's intent for ordinary principles of conflict preemption to apply in cases such as this. Id. at 1234. That clause provides: 59 Nothing in the Act shall be construed as affecting the authority, jurisdiction, or responsibility of the several States to manage, control, or regulate fish and resident wildlife under State law or regulations in any area within the System. Regulations permitting hunting or fishing of fish and resident wildlife within the System shall be, to the extent practicable, consistent with State fish and wildlife laws, regulations, and management plans. 60 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(m) (emphasis added). We agree with the Tenth Circuit that the first sentence of the savings clause was not meant to eviscerate the primacy of federal authority over NWR management. Rather, to the extent that actual conflict persists between state and federal policies, state law is preempted by the NWRSIA. 61