Opinion ID: 2570772
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standing in Legal Malpractice

Text: Over a century ago, the United States Supreme Court held that a third party not in privity of contract with an attorney may not maintain a legal malpractice action against an attorney for negligence absent fraud or collusion. See National Sav. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 205-206, 25 L.Ed. 621 (1879). Although the strict privity requirement remains prevalent in many factual circumstances of legal malpractice, the trend in estate planning is to allow a legal malpractice cause of action brought by non-clients. See generally 1 R. Mallen and J. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 7.12 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter, Legal Malpractice] (noting that, with rare exception, modern decisions have favored expanding privity beyond the confines of the attorney-client relationship only if the plaintiff was intended to be the beneficiary of the lawyer's retention). Hawaii's case law is silent as to whether privity of contract precludes non-clients from bringing a legal malpractice action against an attorney arising from estate planning. The case law outside Hawaii addressing the liability of an attorney to a non-client in connection with estate planning generally employs one or two of three approaches: (1) strict privity theory; (2) balancing factors method under a negligence theory; and (3) breach of contract theory as a third-party beneficiary. Currently, the majority of jurisdictions have weakened the strict privity rule in legal malpractice actions and have adopted varying, expanded concepts of privity, see generally 4 Legal Malpractice § 31.4, while a handful of states adhere to the strict privity theory, see, e.g., Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575, 580 (Tex. 1996).
In those jurisdictions adhering to the strict privity rule, courts have noted several policy reasons for refusing to grant standing to a non-client intended beneficiary regardless of whether a malpractice action is brought under contract or tort theories. See, e.g., Lilyhorn v. Dier, 214 Neb. 728, 335 N.W.2d 554, 555 (1983) (noting that the duty to exercise reasonable care and skill which a lawyer owes his client ordinarily does not extend to third parties). First, without the strict privity rule, some jurisdictions reason that clients would lose control over the attorney-client relationship, and attorneys would be subject to almost unlimited liability. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d at 577 (citation omitted). Second, strict privity jurisdictions believe that allowing a broad cause of action in favor of beneficiaries would create a conflict of interest between an attorney's client and third-party beneficiaries during the estate planning process, thereby limiting the attorney's ability to zealously represent his or her client. See id. at 578. Lastly, strict privity jurisdictions fear that suits by disappointed beneficiaries would cast doubt on the deceased testator's intentions. [5] See id.
Despite the foregoing reasons for adhering to the strict privity rule, many jurisdictions have either modified or created an exception to the strict privity requirement and, thus, have allowed a legal malpractice action by a non-client against an attorney based either on a negligence or a third party beneficiary theory or both. See generally 4 Legal Malpractice § 31.4.
The policy reasons given to modify or abolish the strict privity requirement in the context of negligence claims focus on whether an attorney owes a duty to the beneficiary of an estate. In Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal.2d 583, 15 Cal.Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987, 82 S.Ct. 603, 7 L.Ed.2d 525 (1962), the California Supreme Court addressed whether a legal malpractice action against an attorney by his client's trust beneficiaries could be maintained for negligently drafting a pour-over will. [6] In its analysis, the Lucas court stated that whether a particular defendant can be liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of public policy, requiring the balancing of several factors: (1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of harm to him; (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; (4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury; (5) the policy of preventing future harm; and (6) whether imposing liability placed an undue burden upon the legal profession. Lucas, 15 Cal.Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d at 687-88 (citation omitted); see also Pizel v. Zuspann, 247 Kan. 54, 795 P.2d 42, 50, clarified by, 247 Kan. 699, 803 P.2d 205 (1990) (holding that whether an attorney may be liable to a non-client would be determined by the six-factor balancing test set out in Lucas ); Donahue v. Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, P.C., 900 S.W.2d 624, 629 (Mo.1995) (en banc) (holding that the issue whether an attorney owes a legal duty to non-clients is determined by weighing the Lucas factors under a modified balancing test). In concluding that public policy favored a malpractice cause of action against the drafting attorney, the Lucas court stated: [O]ne of the main purposes which the transaction between [attorney] and the testator intended to accomplish was to provide for the transfer of property to [the beneficiaries]; the damage to [the beneficiaries] in the event of invalidity of the bequest was clearly foreseeable; it became certain, upon the death of the testator without change of the will, that [the beneficiaries] would have received the intended benefits but for the asserted negligence of [the attorney]; and if persons such as [the beneficiaries] are not permitted to recover for the loss resulting from negligence of the draftsman, no one would be able to do so, and the policy of prevent[ing] future harm would be impaired. Lucas, 15 Cal.Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d at 688. Subsequently, in Bucquet v. Livingston, 57 Cal. App. 3d 914, 129 Cal. Rptr. 514 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976), the California Court of Appeals held that public policy favored a malpractice cause of action against an attorney who failed to advise his client of adverse tax consequences for an inter vivos trust and, thus, could be held liable by the trust beneficiaries if the testamentary intent is frustrated due to the attorney's professional negligence and the designated beneficiaries lose their legacy as a direct result of such negligence. Id. at 921, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 518. In so holding, the court in Bucquet stated that the recognition of the existence of a cause of action in the instant case also advances the judicially approved policy of preventing future harm and the standards of the legal profession, a matter that has been of great concern in recent years, both to the general public and to the profession, as well as the courts . . . . Arguably, the interests of a beneficiary are even greater than those of the testator or settlor. After the death of the testator or settlor, a failure in the scheme of disposition works no practical effect except to deprive his intended beneficiaries of the intended bequest. The executor of an estate has no standing to bring an action for the amount of the bequest against an attorney who negligently prepared the estate plan since, in the normal case, the estate is not injured by such negligence, except to the extent of fees paid; only the beneficiaries suffer the real loss. Thus, the fact that [client's] estate was not a party is of no significance here. Unless the beneficiaries can recover against the attorney, no one could do so and the social policy of preventing future harm would be frustrated. Id. at 925-26, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
In addition to a negligence theory, a third party beneficiary theory is commonly advanced to establish liability to a non-client who is not in strict privity with an attorney. See generally, 4 Legal Malpractice § 31.4. This approach focuses upon whether the primary purpose of the client-attorney relationship was to benefit the non-client. Donahue, 900 S.W.2d at 628 (holding, inter alia, that, as an exception to the general rule that an attorney is only liable to his client for negligence, a non-client may maintain a legal malpractice action based upon a third party beneficiary claim) (citations omitted). The essence of a third-party beneficiary's claim is that others have agreed between themselves to bestow a benefit upon the third party but one of the parties to the agreement fails to uphold his portion of the bargain. Copenhaver v. Rogers, 238 Va. 361, 384 S.E.2d 593, 596 (1989). Thus, [t]he third party beneficiary approach focuses the existence of a duty entirely on whether the plaintiff was the person intended to be benefitted by the legal services and does not extend to those incidentally deriving an indirect benefit. Donahue, 900 S.W.2d at 628. In other words, the non-client must have been an intended beneficiary, not merely an incidental beneficiary. In Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d 744 (1983), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court articulated a two-part test for determining whether a person is an intended third party beneficiary under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302. In part one of the test, the trial court possesses the discretion to confer standing under a third party beneficiary theory by determining whether the recognition of the beneficiary's right [is] `appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties[.]' Id. at 751. Under part two, the performance must `satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary' or `the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.' Id. The court in Guy applied this test to beneficiaries under a will as follows: The underlying contract is that between the testator and the attorney for the drafting of a will. The will, providing for one or more named beneficiaries, clearly manifests the intent of the testator to benefit the legatee. Under Restatement (Second) § 302(1), the recognition of the right to performance in the beneficiary would be appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties since the estate either cannot or will not bring suit. Since only named beneficiaries can bring suit, they meet the first step standing requirement of § 302. Being named beneficiaries of the will, the legatees are intended, rather than incidental, beneficiaries who would be § 302(1)(b) beneficiaries for whom the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance. In the case of a testator-attorney contract, the attorney is the promisor, promising to draft a will which carries out the testator's intention to benefit the legatees. The testator is the promisee, who intends that the named beneficiaries have the benefit of the attorney's promised performance. The circumstances which clearly indicate the testator's intent to benefit a named legatee are his arrangements with the attorney and the text of his will. 459 A.2d at 751-52 (footnote omitted). [7]
Although many jurisdictions allow a non-client to bring a legal malpractice action in the context of estate planning, the jurisdictions are split as to which legal theory should apply to allow the claim. We are aware of only one jurisdiction that has specifically allowed a claim for relief sounding in negligence, but, at the same time, has denied a claim based on a third party beneficiary theory. See Donahue, 900 S.W.2d at 629 (holding that a claim for relief is limited to negligence because the breach of duty is based upon negligent performance of duty, not breach of contract). In rejecting the third party beneficiary theory, the Missouri Supreme Court stated that, [w]hile one element of one of their malpractice claims requires a showing that [the client] intended to benefit plaintiffs, a careful reading of the pleadings discloses that liability hinges not on contract but on an attorney's alleged negligence toward a client. The duty allegedly breached was not the violation of the contract . . ., but that [the attorney] was negligent in performing professional obligations to [the client]. Plaintiffs' third party beneficiary claim is merely one of attorney malpractice, clothed in a contract theory. Id. at 629. Compare Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal.2d 223, 74 Cal.Rptr. 225, 449 P.2d 161 (1969) (superceded by statute, see Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.6 (West 1982), as recognized by, Laird v. Blacker, 2 Cal.4th 606, 7 Cal. Rptr.2d 550, 828 P.2d 691, 693 (1992)) (noting that, even though California recognizes both negligence and third party beneficiary claims, recovery based upon a third party beneficiary claim by a non-client is conceptually superfluous [to a tort claim] since the crux of the action must lie in tort in any case; there can be no recovery without negligence); Gerald P. Johnston, Legal Malpractice in Estate PlanningPerilous Times Ahead for the Practitioner, 67 Iowa L.Rev. 629, 629-30 n.1 (1982) (noting that, although a legal malpractice action may be based on two separate legal theories, the precise [legal] theory on which a legal malpractice claim is posited is largely irrelevant, for in either instance a lawyer is required to exercise due care in representing clients consistent with a lawyer's training and profession). On the other hand, we are aware of only two jurisdictions that have specifically limited a non-client's cause of action to a third party beneficiary claim against a testator's or settlor's attorney. See Guy, 459 A.2d at 746-47; Noble v. Bruce, 349 Md. 730, 709 A.2d 1264, 1275-76 (1998). [8] In Guy, a plurality opinion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court deemed it appropriate to grant standing under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302 (1981) to a narrow class of third party beneficiaries where the intent to benefit was clear and the promisee ( i.e., the testator) was unable to enforce the contract. 459 A.2d at 751. However, the court in Guy specifically rejected the idea of a malpractice action by a third party under tort principles, noting that important policies underlying the privity requirement and the dangers of adopting negligence concepts of dutyanalyzed in terms of scope of the risk or foreseeabilityprecluded a negligence claim for professional malpractice by a non-client. Id. at 750; see also Noble v. Bruce, 709 A.2d at 1271 (criticizing the balancing factors approach as being too broad). Citing the line of California cases following Lucas, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court emphasized the unworkability of a tort based action by non-clients which led to ad hoc determinations and inconsistent results under a complicated, case-by-case six part balancing test. Guy, 459 A.2d at 749; Noble, 709 A.2d at 1271 (agreeing with the reasoning in Guy and, therefore, declining to apply the balancing factors approach in that case). Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court believed that the inability to distinguish between a negligence claim and third party beneficiary is based on a common confusion of negligence doctrines relating to standard of care with those relating to scope of the risk, i.e., the class of persons to whom a duty is owed, analyzed in negligence in terms of foreseeability. Thus, although a plaintiff on a third party beneficiary theory in contract may in some cases have to show a deviation from the standard of care, as in negligence, to establish breach, the class of persons to whom the defendant may be liable is restricted by principles of contract law, not negligence principles relating to foreseeability or scope of risk. Guy, 459 A.2d at 752 (limiting claim to third party beneficiary theory). Still, several jurisdictions recognizing a malpractice action by a non-client allow the action to proceed on a negligence theory, in addition to a third party beneficiary theory. See, e.g., Lucas, 15 Cal.Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d at 688 n.2, 689; Hale v. Groce, 304 Or. 281, 744 P.2d 1289, 1290 (1987) (holding that an intended will beneficiary may enforce an attorney's contractual duty to his client to include the beneficiary in the client's will and that the same contract also creates a legal duty of care to the beneficiary, the negligent performance of which may give rise to a negligence claim); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Iowa 1987); Ogle v. Fuiten, 102 Ill.2d 356, 80 Ill.Dec. 772, 466 N.E.2d 224, 227 (1984); Simpson v. Calivas, 139 N.H. 1, 650 A.2d 318, 322-23 (1994); Mieras v. DeBona, 452 Mich. 278, 550 N.W.2d 202 (1996) (plurality opinion). In our view, the Appellants' negligence and third party beneficiary claims are not irreconcilable even though each is grounded in a distinct theory of recovery. As the Missouri Supreme Court observed in Donahue: The first factor of the balancing test addresses the extent to which the transaction was intended to benefit the plaintiff and bears a remarkable resemblance to the third party beneficiary theory. The question of whether the client had a specific intent to benefit the plaintiff plays an important role in determining if a legal duty exists under the balancing of factors test. 900 S.W.2d at 628. Maryland, which only allows a third party beneficiary claim, recognizes that the scope of duty concept in negligence actions may be analogized to the third party beneficiary concept in the context of attorney malpractice cases. Thus, regardless of whether a tort theory or a contract theory is pled, a plaintiff in an attorney malpractice action must first allege and prove the existence of a duty between the plaintiff and the defendant. Noble, 709 A.2d at 1272 (citation omitted). Although this court has never specifically determined that legal malpractice is actionable under both tort and contract theories, we have generally characterized legal malpractice actions brought by clients as hybrids of tort and contract[.] Higa v. Mirikitani, 55 Haw. 167, 173, 517 P.2d 1, 5 (1973) (holding that the statute of limitations applicable to contract claims, HRS § 657-1(1), governs legal malpractice claims). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's distinction between the two legal theories appears to be heavily based upon its policy of limiting the potential liability of an attorney to a non-client by restricting such actions to a third party beneficiary theory that limits damages to the expectancy of the non-client beneficiary. Guy, 459 A.2d at 756. See generally Martin D. Begleiter, Attorney Malpractice in Estate PlanningYou've Got to Know When to Hold Up, Know When to Fold Up, 38 U. Kan. L. Rev. 193, 255 (1989) (discussing the tension between expanding the scope of malpractice liability to a non-client under a broader rule of negligence law and limiting that liability to specific situations under a third party beneficiary theory). Although we are cognizant of the need to balance the liability placed upon the legal profession against the need to provide a remedy to an intended beneficiary, we believe that the remedies available in tort that are generally over and above those available in contract, e.g., punitive damages and emotional distress, do not place an unreasonable burden upon the legal profession. Established tort principles appropriately limit the recovery available in a legal malpractice action brought by non-clients under a negligence theory. For example, punitive damages are generally unavailable absent wanton, malicious, or fraudulent conduct. See, e.g., Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 71 Haw. 1, 11, 780 P.2d 566, 572 (1989) ([Punitive] damages may be awarded in cases where the defendant `has acted wantonly or oppressively or with such malice as implies a spirit of mischief or criminal indifference to civil obligations'; or where there has been `some wilful misconduct or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences.') (citation omitted); Goo v. Continental Cas. Co., 52 Haw. 235, 239, 473 P.2d 563, 566 (1970) (concluding that, at trial, appellant had failed to adduce sufficient evidence that appellees acted maliciously, oppressively, wantonly, or fraudulently for the question of punitive damages to be submitted to the jury). In a case of legal malpractice in the estate planning context, it is difficult to conceive of circumstances where an attorney would be sued based on malicious or wanton drafting of a testamentary document. Nevertheless, if the requisite facts were properly established, an instruction on punitive damages might be warranted. Likewise, damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress are generally unavailable for purely economic losses. See HRS § 663-8.9 (1993). [9] Consequently, the damages for a legal malpractice claim arising in the estate planning context based upon negligence will rarely, if ever, include damages other than consequential damages. Therefore, we hold that, where the relationship between an attorney and a non-client is such that we would recognize a duty of care, the non-client may proceed under either negligence or contract theories of recovery. [10]
We now address whether, in the present case, the Appellants have alleged facts sufficient to show that, if proven, Ing owed a duty of care to them. The Appellants contend that, as the intended beneficiaries of the Hughes Trust, Ing owes them a duty of care. Ing, however, contends that, because the Hughes Trust is a valid trust, a cause of action should not be recognized under the facts of this case as a matter of policy. We observe that [t]he general rule with respect to the liability of an attorney for failure to properly perform his duties to his client is that the attorney, by accepting to give legal advice or to render other legal services, impliedly agrees to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the performance of the tasks which they undertake. Lucas, 15 Cal.Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d at 689 (holding that an attorney who drafted a will that violated the rule against perpetuities was not liable to non-client beneficiaries under either a negligence or third party beneficiary theory). An attorney cannot be held liable for every mistake made in his or her practice, especially for an error as to a question of law on which reasonable doubt may be entertained by well-informed lawyers. See id; see also Bucquet v. Livingston, 57 Cal.App.3d 914, 921, 129 Cal.Rptr. 514, 518 (Cal.Ct.App.1976) (noting that [l]iability to testamentary beneficiaries not in privity is not . . . automatic). Such a blanket duty would possibly amount to a requirement to draft litigation proof legal documents. This unlimited liability . . . would result in a speculative and almost intolerable burden on the legal profession . . . . Ventura County Humane Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children and Animals, Inc. v. Holloway, 40 Cal. App. 3d 897, 905, 115 Cal.Rptr. 464, 469 (1974). Regarding the imposition of a duty of care, this court has noted generally that: In considering whether to impose a duty of reasonable care on a defendant, we recognize that duty is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection. Waugh v. University of Hawaii, 63 Haw. 117, 135, 621 P.2d 957, 970 (1980); Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 56 Haw. 204, 207, 532 P.2d 673, 675 (1975). Legal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for damage done. Id. (quoting Tarasoff [v. Regents of the Univ. of California], . . . 17 Cal.3d 425, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d [334,] 342 [(Cal.1976)]). In determining whether or not a duty is owed, we must weigh the considerations of policy which favor the appellants' recovery against those which favor limiting the appellees' liability. Waugh, 63 Haw. at 135, 621 P.2d at 970; Kelley, 56 Haw. at 207, 532 P.2d at 675. The question of whether one owes a duty to another must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Waugh, 63 Haw. at 135, 621 P.2d at 970. However, we are reluctant to impose a new duty upon members of our society without any logical, sound, and compelling reasons taking into consideration the social and human relationships of our society. Birmingham v. Fodor's Travel Publications, Inc., 73 Haw. 359, 370-71, 833 P.2d 70, 76 (1992) (holding that a publisher of a work of general circulation, that neither authors nor expressly guarantees the contents of its publication, has no duty to warn the reading public of the accuracy of the contents of its publication); Johnston v. KFC Nat'l Management Co., 71 Haw. 229, 232-33, 788 P.2d 159, 161 (1990) (declining to impose a duty upon non-commercial suppliers of alcohol, i.e., social hosts, to protect third parties from risk of injuries that might be caused by adults who consume the social hosts' alcohol). Lee v. Corregedore, 83 Hawai`i 154, 166, 925 P.2d 324, 336 (1996). In addition to the foregoing general principles, this court regarded several factors espoused in Nally v. Grace Community Church, 47 Cal.3d 278, 253 Cal.Rptr. 97, 763 P.2d 948 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007, 109 S.Ct. 1644, 104 L.Ed.2d 159 (1989), as relevant in determining whether to impose a duty in Lee: whether a special relationship exists . . ., the foreseeability of harm to the injured party, the degree of certainty that the injured party suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendants' conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendants, the policy of preventing harm, the extent of the burden to the defendants and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. Lee, 83 Hawai`i at 164, 925 P.2d at 334, 336. Analogously, whether to impose a duty upon an attorney to a non-client for malpractice requires the balancing of several factors in light of the policies favoring recovery versus those limiting liability. As previously noted, the Lucas court promulgated a six-factor test, analogous to that used in Lee, to address this particular issue. Lucas, 15 Cal.Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d at 687-88 (citation omitted). Inasmuch as the Lucas test is analogous to the test relied upon in Lee, we adopt the Lucas factors as relevant to the determination whether to impose a duty upon attorneys to non-client beneficiaries in the estate planning context. Applying the foregoing Lucas factors in the present case, the Appellants argue that: (1) because one of the primary purposes in drafting the Hughes Trust using an A-B trust plan was to distribute or transfer the Hugheses' assets to the Appellants with the least possible tax consequences, the Hughes Trust was intended to affect the Appellants; (2) in drafting the Hughes Trust, it was foreseeable that the Appellants, the intended beneficiaries, would suffer damage in the form of a diminished inheritance if the Hugheses' property was not properly disposed of using a bypass trust in accordance with the Hugheses' alleged intent; (3) but for Ing's alleged failure to include a provision in the trust plan to fund the bypass trust, which caused the Hugheses' entire estate to be subject to taxation, they would have received the intended benefits, i.e., a greater inheritance; and (4) the policy of preventing future harm caused by negligent drafting of testamentary documents in estate planning would be impaired if the Appellants were unable to recover for the loss resulting from Ing's alleged failure to fulfill the Hugheses' intent, notwithstanding the fact that the Hughes Trust was not declared invalid. Ing, however, contends that the imposition of a legal duty will create unlimited liability to an unlimited class of individuals and will unduly burden the legal profession. In our view, although the imposition of a duty may possibly subject an attorney to greater liability, the potential liability is properly limited by the narrow application of the Lucas balancing test under a claim of negligence and third party beneficiary principles under a contract claim. See Donahue, 900 S.W.2d at 628. For example, a benefit that is merely incidentally conferred upon the beneficiary will not meet the first factor of the Lucas balancing test or the third party beneficiary principle that the contract be entered into with the intent to benefit the non-client. See id. (noting that the predominant inquiry has generally involved the criterion of whether the principal purpose of the attorney's retention to provide legal services was for the specific benefit of the plaintiff) (citation omitted). The class of individuals who may bring a malpractice action is limited to a client's intended beneficiaries, provided no other remedy exists to prevent future harm. Although previously noted, we emphasize that our holding today does not create a blanket duty of care to all non-client beneficiaries in every case. Ing further contends that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Appellants' amended complaint because the Hughes Trust had never been challenged. By allowing the present lawsuit to proceed, Ing contends that a conflict of interest would arise if he were held liable to the Appellants because the Appellants' interests may be adverse to that of his clients', i.e., the Hugheses' interests. Ing further contends that allowing a cause of action under these circumstances requires that he disclose client confidences in contravention of Hawaii Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 503(d)(4) and Hawaii Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(c)(3). In sum, Ing essentially contends that, because there is no express provision in the Hughes Trust declaring their intent to minimize taxes, the Appellants should not, as a matter of policy, be allowed to introduce extrinsic evidence to contradict the Hugheses' intent as demonstrated on the face of the trust. Several jurisdictions that permit a legal malpractice action by a non-client subscribe to a rule that precludes the use of extrinsic evidence. Thus, where the testamentary instrument is valid on its face, these jurisdictions deny a non-client's malpractice cause of action. See, e.g., Espinosa, 612 So. 2d at 1380; Schreiner, 410 N.W.2d at 683; Noble, 709 A.2d at 1276; Mieras v. DeBona, 452 Mich. 278, 550 N.W.2d 202, 209 (1996). However, several other jurisdictions do not follow such a rule. See, e.g., Hale v. Groce, 744 P.2d at 1289 (holding that the complaint sufficiently alleged a negligence claim where the will and related trust instrument did not include the plaintiff's gift); Teasdale v. Allen, 520 A.2d 295, 296 (D.C.1987); Simpson v. Calivas, 139 N.H. 1, 650 A.2d 318, 322 (1994). In Ogle v. Fuiten, 102 Ill.2d 356, 80 Ill.Dec. 772, 466 N.E.2d 224, 227 (1984), the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the use of extrinsic evidence in a legal malpractice action brought by a non-client. There, the testators' nephew and niece brought a malpractice suit against an attorney who negligently drafted the testators' wills by failing to include the plaintiffs as beneficiaries. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the plaintiffs should be required to show, from the express terms of the will, that they were intended beneficiaries of the attorney-testator relationship to maintain a cause of action. Id. The court noted that the only remedy for intended beneficiaries who are negligently omitted from a testamentary document due to the fault of the drafting attorney is through malpractice. Id. Thus, the court distinguished a malpractice action by the non-clients from a collateral attack upon the will, noting that if plaintiffs here are successful in their action, the orderly disposition of the testators' property is not disrupted, and the provisions of the wills, and the probate administration, remain unaffected. Id.; see also Hamilton v. Needham, 519 A.2d 172, 175 n.7 (D.C. 1986) (declining to adopt the holding that liability to intended beneficiaries for legal malpractice can lie only if `the testamentary intent as expressed in the will, is frustrated[,]' because, where the will is silent as to the disposition of the testator's residuary estate, a finding that [the testator] intended that it pass to [the beneficiary plaintiff] is in no way contradictory to, nor does it frustrate, the language of the will itself). We are persuaded by the reasoning of Ogle and, therefore, adopt it in the present case. Here, the Appellants' cause of action would not prevent the enforcement of the trust document itself or vary its terms in contravention of the statute of wills. See In re Christian's Estate, 65 Haw. 394, 401, 652 P.2d 1137, 1142 (1982) (noting that courts will not rewrite the will of the testator nor vary its provisions) (citing Hawaiian Trust Company, Ltd. v. Wilder, 46 Haw. 436, 444, 382 P.2d 61, 65 (1963)). Thus, by seeking to enforce the terms of the agreement between Ing and the Hugheses that were not fulfilled by the trust document in accordance with the Hugheses' intent, the Appellants could, if successful, recover from Ing, not the trust estate, the benefits they would have received under the Hughes Trust but for the allegedly negligent drafting by Ing. To limit a malpractice cause of action by a non-client to the face of the testamentary document that does not reflect the testator's true intent would render the recognition of a cause of action meaningless. See Hamilton, 519 A.2d at 175. In other words, [t]o have any real meaning, our holding . . . that [the Appellants] could bring this legal malpractice action must sanction as a corollary [their] use of evidence outside the will to support [their] claim . . . . Without the use of such extrinsic evidence, [their] case would be rendered unprovable. Id. We emphasize, however, that our allowance of the use of extrinsic evidence in this legal malpractice action is wholly separate from cases in which courts interpret testamentary documents. In the latter instance, the cardinal rule to which all other rules must bend is that the intention of the testator controls and must be given effect unless it be contrary to some rule of law or against public policy. . . . Such intention, however, is to be ascertained from the language of the will itself as far as the language employed permits and resort should not be had to rules of construction unless and until from the ambiguity of the language used the intention of the testator cannot be fairly and reasonably ascertained. In re Campbell Estate, 33 Haw. 799, 801-02 (1936) (citations omitted). Moreover, imposition of a duty will not create the potential conflict of interest argued by Ing. As stated by the concurrence in Mieras: First, because beneficiaries of a will have no rights under the will before the testator's death, a disgruntled beneficiary's cause of action does not ripen until the death of the testator. [M]erely drafting and executing a will creates no vested right in the legatee until the death of the testatrix. Stowe v. Smith, 184 Conn. 194, 198, 441 A.2d 81, [83] (1981). Second, the only obligation owed by the attorney to named beneficiaries is to exercise the requisite standard of care in fulfilling the intent of the testator as expressed in the will. An attorney would never face conflicting obligations to the testator and the beneficiaries by drafting a document that properly fulfills the testator's intent as expressed in that document. Further, the testator is always free to change the beneficiary of the will, and the displaced beneficiary will have no cause of action. As noted in the concurring opinion in Guy, supra : The contract upon which the obligation arises required the scrivener to fulfill the intention of the testator expressed to him at the time of the drafting. The fact that the testator could subsequently change the proposed testamentary disposition is of no moment. The scrivener's obligation was to provide that which he undertook to do and the failure to do so constituted the breach which justified the recovery. [459 A.2d at 753 n.2.] The duty owed to named beneficiaries is narrowly circumscribed and only requires the attorney to draft a will that properly effectuates the distribution scheme set forth by the testator in the will. 550 N.W.2d at 212 (Boyd, J., concurring, joined by Brickley, C.J., and Cavanagh, Riley, Mallett, and Weaver, JJ.) (some brackets original, some deleted, and some added). Thus, there is no conflict of interest under circumstances, such as the present case, where a beneficiary seeks to enforce an attorney's duty to fulfill his or her client's intent. Ing contends that allowing the use of extrinsic evidence in the present case adversely affects the attorney-client privilege by forcing attorneys into a position where they would have to reveal a client's confidences in actions such as the instant case. We acknowledge that an underlying principle in the attorney-client relationship is that the attorney must maintain confidentiality of information relating to the representation, thereby encouraging full and frank communication with the attorney. See Hawai`i Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6, cmt. 4 (1995). However, the attorney-client privilege is qualified and does not extend to a communication regarding whether an attorney has breached his or her duty to the client. See Hawai`i Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 503(d)(4). [11] Balancing the policy of full and frank communication fostered by the attorney-client privilege against the policy of preventing future harm by granting a cause of action in limited circumstances, we believe that, under the circumstances of the present case, the effect upon the privilege is minimal. We therefore believe that, on balance, the fact that an intended beneficiary is otherwise left without a remedy far outweighs such a minimal, adverse effect upon the attorney-client privilege. But see Noble v. Bruce, 709 A.2d at 1277-78. Compare Sapp v. Wong, 62 Haw. 34, 38, 609 P.2d 137, 140 (1980) (noting that, [b]ecause the privilege works to suppress otherwise relevant evidence, the limitations which restrict the scope of its operation . . . must be assiduously heeded). Therefore, we hold that the Appellants have alleged facts that, if proven, would show that Ing owed them a duty of care to draft the Hughes Trust in accordance with the Hugheses' alleged intent to transfer their assets to the Appellants with the least taxation possible using an A-B trust plan. Alternatively, the Appellants' complaint asserts a third party beneficiary theory against Ing. When reviewing a circuit court's dismissal under HRCP Rule 12(b)(6), this court must view the plaintiff's complaint in a light most favorable to him or her to determine whether the allegations could warrant relief under any alternative theory. Touchette v. Ganal, 82 Hawai`i 293, 298, 922 P.2d 347, 352 (1996). Here, the complaint alleged that a primary purpose of the contract between Ing and the Hugheses was to transfer the Hugheses' assets to the Appellants, as the intended beneficiaries, with the least taxation possible using an A-B trust plan. Additionally, the complaint alleged that Ing breached the contract by failing to fulfill the Hugheses' intent when he neglected to draft a provision that funded the bypass trust. Under the circumstances, recognition of a cause of action under a third party beneficiary theory may be appropriate to fulfill the intention of the contract. See Guy, 459 A.2d at 751. Thus, we hold that the Appellants have alleged facts in their complaint that, if proven, would show that they were the intended third party beneficiaries, entitling them to recovery. Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, we hold that, because the Appellants' complaint sufficiently alleges a negligence claim in Count I and a third party beneficiary claim in Count II, the circuit court erred when it dismissed the complaint against Ing.