Opinion ID: 1587732
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defining the Test

Text: ¶ 38 This is the fourth case challenging the validity of an amendment under the separate amendment rule. The dispute between the parties can be broken down into three issues. First, the parties disagree about the proper way to test the validity of an amendment under the separate amendment rule. Second, while both parties agree that the general purpose of the amendment is an important element of the test, they diverge over the method the court should use to determine the purpose. And third, the parties disagree over how the amendment in this case fares under the applicable test. [12] ¶ 39 First, the parties offer dramatically different versions of the operative test arising from these cases. McConkey focuses on the anti-logrolling purpose [13] of the separate amendment rule and contends that, in order to survive review, the various propositions in an amendment must be aimed at a single purpose and be interrelated and interdependent such that if the propositions had been submitted as separate questions, the defeat of one proposition would destroy the overall purpose of the multi-proposition proposal. The Attorney General, quoting Milwaukee Alliance, counters that [i]t is within the discretion of the legislature to submit several distinct propositions as one amendment if they relate to the same subject matter and are designed to accomplish one general purpose. 106 Wis.2d at 604-05, 317 N.W.2d 420. He rejects the claim that propositions must be mutually dependent in order to be submitted as a single amendment. ¶ 40 We agree with the Attorney General. We reaffirm this court's repeated holdings that the constitution grants the legislature considerable discretion in the manner in which amendments are drafted and submitted to the people. The inquiry is whether the legislature in the formation of the question acted reasonably and within their constitutional grant of authority and discretion. Milwaukee Alliance, 106 Wis.2d at 604, 317 N.W.2d 420. An otherwise valid amendment will therefore be construed as more than one amendment only in exceedingly rare circumstances. ¶ 41 The proper test is laid out in Milwaukee Alliance: It is within the discretion of the legislature to submit several distinct propositions as one amendment if they relate to the same subject matter and are designed to accomplish one general purpose. Id. at 604-05, 317 N.W.2d 420. As we stated in Thomson, all of the propositions must tend to effect or carry out the purpose. Thomson, 264 Wis. at 656, 60 N.W.2d 416. ¶ 42 McConkey's position is inconsistent with the constitution's grant of discretion to the legislature, and is irreconcilable with these prior holdings. The distinct propositions need not be, as McConkey urges, interconnected and dependent upon one another such that if one proposition failed, the total purpose would be destroyed. While Hudd uses the phrase dependent upon, the Hudd court did not use it to suggest an interdependency requirement as McConkey asserts. Instead, Hudd established the principle that the propositions must relate to the same subject and be dependent upon or connected with  the same general purpose. Hudd, 54 Wis. at 336, 11 N.W. 785 (emphasis added). In Hudd, we explicitly rejected the notion that the propositions had to be interdependent; we required only a connection between the provisions. Hence, the legislative pay raise did not doom the amendment in Hudd because, though it was less intimately and necessarily connected with the change to biennial sessions, it was nonetheless clearly connected with it and proper. Id. at 337, 11 N.W. 785. McConkey's approach undoubtedly would have required striking down the legislative pay raise in Hudd, and likely would have also doomed the amendment challenged in Milwaukee Alliance because of some of its specific provisions. [14] The propositions, then, need only relate to the same subject and tend to effect or carry out one general purpose. [15] ¶ 43 This, of course, raises the second issue on which the parties spend considerable timehow should the general purpose of an amendment be determined? McConkey proposes that the best method for determining the purpose is to look to the relating to clause in the title of the joint resolution. In this case, the joint resolution states the amendment relates to providing that only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in this state. Going further, McConkey argues that this is the only source the court can use to determine purpose. This approach, he asserts, is consistent with the approach used in Article IV, Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution [16] relating to private bills, and utilizes the rules of statutory construction by focusing on a plain reading of the joint resolution's title. The Attorney General counters that an amendment's purpose should be determined from its text and the context in which it was adopted following the constitutional interpretive approach outlined in Dairyland Greyhound Park v. Doyle. [17] ¶ 44 The general purpose of a constitutional amendment is not an interpretive riddle. Text and historical context should make the purpose of most amendments apparent. A plain reading of the text of the amendment will usually reveal a general, unified purpose. A court might also find other extrinsic contextual sources helpful in determining what the amendment sought to change or affirm, including the previous constitutional structure, legislative and public debates over the amendment's adoption, the title of the joint resolution, the common name for the amendment, the question submitted to the people for a vote, legislative enactments following adoption of the amendment, and other such sources. ¶ 45 This appears to have been the general approach followed in Hudd. In that case, this court identified the four propositions contained in the amendment from its text, and the general move from an annual to biennial legislature was apparent. The amendment was also known to the public as the biennial sessions amendment. Hudd, 54 Wis. at 325, 11 N.W. 785. ¶ 46 In Milwaukee Alliance, the court described the purpose of the amendment with particularity: The purpose of the amendment was to continue the guarantee of bail to those entitled to it, to allow release of some persons without requiring money bail but with other reasonable conditions, and at the same time, under a structured system, to hold persons for limited periods without the option of bail when a court determines that such action is necessary to protect the community from serious bodily harm or to protect society's interest in the administration of justice by preventing the intimidation of witnesses. Milwaukee Alliance, 106 Wis.2d at 608, 317 N.W.2d 420. This purpose appears to be gleaned from the text of the amendment. The court also described a general purpose of changing from the limited concept of bail to the concept of `conditional release.' Id. at 607, 317 N.W.2d 420. The court appeared to decipher this purpose by comparing the previous constitutional structure with the provisions in the new amendment. [18] ¶ 47 The method for determining the purpose advocated by McConkeyadopting verbatim the relating to clause in the title of the joint resolutionis supported neither by case law nor by common sense. None of our cases follow McConkey's approach. Neither Hudd nor Thomson even discuss the title of the joint resolution. In Milwaukee Alliance, we noted the statement of purpose contained in the title of the joint resolution, but did not adopt it as McConkey suggests we must do here. ¶ 48 McConkey's analogies to the restrictions on private bills in Article IV, Section 18 are also inapposite. The text of that provision itself states that private or local bills may encompass only one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title. Wis. Const. art. IV, § 18. The separate amendment rule, however, contains no similar stricture, strongly suggesting the joint resolution's title should not be the conclusive, much less exclusive, statement of purpose. See Weber v. Town of Saukville, 209 Wis.2d 214, 231, 562 N.W.2d 412 (1997) (stating the rule of construction that when the terminology of similar provisions is different, an inference is drawn that different meanings are intended). ¶ 49 Finally, while the statement of purpose in the title is relevant and helpful, limiting review to the title alone makes little practical sense. McConkey argues that limiting review to the text of the title is akin to statutory construction. It is not. McConkey's approach does not even allow the court to read the text of the amendment itself, much less the text of the entire joint resolution! Far from being comparable to statutory construction, McConkey's approach requires the court to put on blinders with regard to the amendment's content. ¶ 50 In summary, It is within the discretion of the legislature to submit several distinct propositions as one amendment if they relate to the same subject matter and are designed to accomplish one general purpose. Milwaukee Alliance, 106 Wis.2d at 604-05, 317 N.W.2d 420. The general purpose of an amendment may be deduced from the text of the amendment itself and from the historical context in which the amendment was adopted. And all of the propositions must tend to effect or carry out that purpose. Thomson, 264 Wis. at 656, 60 N.W.2d 416.