Opinion ID: 2972565
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to disclose informants’ identities.

Text: We review the district court’s decision to deny a motion to disclose the identity of a confidential informant for abuse of discretion. United States v. Moore, 954 F.2d 379, 381 (6th Cir. 1992). “A district court abuses its discretion when it applies the incorrect legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard, or relies upon clearly erroneous findings of fact.” United States v. Pugh, 405 F.3d 390, 397 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Schenck v. City of Hudson, 114 F.3d 590, 593 (6th Cir. 1997)). Accordingly, we will reverse the district court’s decision only if we are firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. Id. (citing United States v. Kingsley, 241 F.3d 828, 835 n.12 (6th Cir. 2001)). 13 Dexta argues that the district court erred when it adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation denying the motion to disclose the identities of the confidential informants, and prevented Dexta from receiving a fair trial. Specifically, Dexta claims that he demonstrated that disclosure was relevant and helpful to his defense under the standard set forth in Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). Dexta asserts that the confidential informants participated in, witnessed, and obtained detailed information about Bailes’s conspiracy in July 2002. Dexta also argues that the informants had been to Bailes’s residence where Bailes conducted drug transactions, and could assist the defense in cross-examining and impeaching Bailes, a two-time convicted felon. The government enjoys the privilege of withholding the identities of persons who provide information concerning violations of the law. United States v. Johnson, Nos. 00-5195, 00-5277, 2002 WL 818229, at  (6th Cir. Apr. 29, 2002) (citing Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 59). The defendant bears the burden of showing how disclosure of the informant’s identity would substantively assist his defense. Moore, 954 F.2d at 381. “Mere conjecture or supposition about the possible relevancy of the informant’s testimony is insufficient to warrant disclosure.” United States v. Sharp, 778 F.2d 1182, 1187 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1030 (1986) (citation omitted). “An informant must be disclosed only upon a showing by the defendant that disclosure is essential to a fair trial.” Moore, 954 F.2d at 381 (citation omitted). The decision of whether to require disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant is generally left to the discretion of the trial court. United States v. Cummins, 912 F.2d 98, 103 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Raddatz, 100 S. Ct. 2406, 2414-15 (1980)). The U.S. Supreme Court has cautioned against applying any fixed rule with respect to disclosure. Moore, 954 F.2d at 381 (citing Roviaro, 353 U.S. 53). Rather, in making its determination, the district court must 14 balance the public interest in protecting the flow of information to the government against the defendant’s need for the disclosure of information in preparing his defense. United States v. Elguezabal, No. 97-5643, 1999 WL 717978, at  (6th Cir. Sept. 9, 1999). “Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer’s testimony, and other relevant factors.” Moore, 954 F.2d at 381 (quoting Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 62). Disclosure has usually been required where the informant was an active participant in the events underlying the defendant’s potential criminal liability. Sharp, 778 F.3d at 1186 n.2. Disclosure has usually been denied where the informant was not a participant, but a mere tipster or introducer. Id. Importantly, if the evidence on which the defendant was convicted was obtained personally by the government agents who testified, disclosure is not required. United States v. Jenkins, 4 F.3d 1338, 1341 (6th Cir. 1993). See also Moore, 954 F.2d at 380-81. In the present case, the information provided by the informants concerned Bailes, not Dexta. Furthermore, the evidence offered at trial concerning Bailes was obtained personally by the government agent who testified. Detective Narramore personally witnessed Bailes place a pound of methamphetamine underneath his shirt before meeting with one of the informants for a prearranged drug buy. Although the informants were involved in setting up the drug buy with Bailes, they did not personally witness the transaction and the government did not rely on their testimony at trial. Detective Narramore also testified at trial that the confidential informants had no interaction with Dexta. The testimony of a law enforcement officer that the government’s informants had no contact with the defendant is more likely to persuade a jury than the same testimony offered by a 15 drug dealing informant. Furthermore, as the government correctly notes, because the proof offered at trial demonstrated that the informants were not acquainted with Dexta, Dexta was free to argue that the informants did not know him as part of Bailes’s drug ring. We are also not persuaded by Dexta’s argument that there is little public interest in protecting the identity of the deceased informant. In fact, disclosure of the deceased informant’s identity might lead to retribution against members of his/her family. Dexta also alleges that the Magistrate Judge did not consider the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informant’s testimony, and other relevant factors prescribed by Roviaro in reaching his finding. Contrary to Dexta’s contentions, the Magistrate Judge adequately considered these factors in determining whether disclosure was warranted in this case. The Magistrate Judge considered the possible significance of the informants’ testimony when he noted that the informants did not provide the government agent with any evidence inculpating Dexta; he considered the possible defenses when he acknowledged Dexta’s argument that the absence of inculpatory evidence implies that the defense might be able to question the informants and elicit evidence tending to exculpate Dexta; and he considered the crime charged when he found that most drug dealers will not introduce their suppliers to their customers. Although Dexta makes a number of claims regarding the possible assistance that the informants could provide to his defense, these claims are unsubstantiated. As the district court aptly stated, this type of conjecture is insufficient to satisfy the defendant’s burden of demonstrating that disclosure would substantively assist his defense. Accordingly, the district court did not err when it denied Dexta’s motion to disclose the identities of the government’s confidential informants.