Opinion ID: 1826525
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 21

Heading: whether sanctions imposed upon judges destroy the independence of the judiciary.

Text: Judge Russell argues that because he enjoys judicial immunity from tort liability and damage awards, he likewise should be immune from judicial misconduct proceedings because he will be inhibited from making fearless judicial decisions if he may be fined, publicly reprimanded, or even removed from office. Judge Russell argues that decisions as to whether to suspend the execution of sentences is a judicial act, and therefore judges should enjoy both immunity from damages and disciplinary proceedings. Mississippi has long recognized the doctrine of judicial immunity. Bell v. McKinney, 63 Miss. 187 (1885); DeWitt v. Thompson, 192 Miss. 615, 7 So.2d 529 (1942). This Court recognizes that [p]ublic policy mandates that a judge should have the power to make decisions without having to worry about being held liable for his actions ... Loyacono v. Ellis, 571 So.2d 237, 238 (Miss. 1990). [T]his Court fully recognizes that the best interests of the people and public order require that judges be immune from civil liability. Id. There are other remedies for the correction of such behavior. Id. The primary remedy available to those who believe a judge has acted either contrary to or in excess of his/her authority is to file a complaint with the Commission. If cause exists for such complaint the Commission will then investigate and proceed formally with ultimate resolution taking place before this Court. The purpose of the Mississippi Judicial Performance Commission is set forth in Rule 1 B. of the Rules of the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance The Commission shall enforce the standards of judicial conduct, inquire into judicial disability and conduct, protect the public from judicial misconduct and disabled judges, and protect the judiciary from unfounded allegations. The functions of judicial disciplinary proceedings are varied. However, this Court, in reference to attorney discipline, held, the purpose of discipline is not to punish the `guilty' attorney, but to protect the public, the administration of justice, to maintain appropriate professional standards, and to deter similar conduct. Mississippi State Bar v. A Miss. Attorney, 489 So.2d 1081, 1084 (Miss. 1986)( citing In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968)). In addition, this Court has held that the role of the Mississippi State Bar with respect to the consideration of complaints against members of the Bar is to provide an official investigation thereof and a tribunal for the trial and disposition of such complaints... . Netterville v. Mississippi State Bar, 404 So.2d 1026, 1027 (Miss. 1981). To hold judges exempt from professional misconduct proceedings would deprive members of the public of any remedy. Moreover, to hold that judges may not be sanctioned for actions which exceed their lawful authority would totally disregard the protection of the public, the administration of justice, the maintenance of professional standards, and the deterrence of similar conduct. We discipline a judge to reassure the citizens ... that the judiciary of their state is dedicated to the principle that ours is a government of laws and not of men. In re Kneifl, 217 Neb. 472, 351 N.W.2d 693 (Neb. 1984). Judge Russell's argument fails to take into account that judges are elected officials, accountable to the public who elects them. Moreover, there is the need, as well as the duty to insure that those entrusted with the privilege of holding such an esteemed position, maintain that privilege with integrity and remain within the confines of their authority.