Opinion ID: 2116828
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: appeals 17805, 17816: trial court's award of attorney's fees.

Text: After the second trial, conducted in July 1991, Delores' attorney, Cain, itemized his time expended and expenses incurred during both trials defending the attacks made on the January 1990 will. The trial court entered an order authorizing the administrator to pay Cain $4,757.20 for the time and expense associated with the first trial, resulting in admission of the will to probate, and $6,034.63 for the time and expense associated with defending Boettner's petition to revoke probate of the will. Boettner argues Cain must claim payment of attorney fees and costs through Delores. Thus, the issue presented is whether payment of the attorney fees and costs out of the estate constitutes a benefit to Delores as a result of the decedent's death, within the meaning of SDCL 29-9-2. We conclude it does. SDCL 29-9-19 (1984) provides the framework for our analysis of this issue. It provides: This chapter [disqualification of willful slayer] shall not be considered penal in nature, but shall be construed broadly in order to effect the policy of this state that no person shall be allowed to profit by his own wrong. SDCL ch. 29-9, enacted by the legislature in 1937, is a codification of the common law of South Dakota which already provided for disqualification of willful slayers. DeZotell v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 60 S.D. 532, 245 N.W. 58 (1932), was decided before the adoption of the slayer statute. DeZotell implemented the following public policy against willful slayers: We think that the principle of sound public policy which demands that a sane, felonious killer should not profit by his crime should be applied as often as and whenever any claim is made by such killer, whether under contract, will, or statute.... We cannot persuade ourselves that there was ever any legislative intent that our statutes of descent and succession, general or special, however broad and unambiguous and lacking in exceptions in their terms, should operate in favor of a sane, felonious killer. We announce it as the law of this state that such statutes will not be permitted so to operate unless and until the Legislature shall specifically and affirmatively so enact. Id. 60 S.D. at 548, 245 N.W. at 65. In re Estates of Josephsons, 297 N.W.2d 444 (N.D.1980), the North Dakota Supreme Court was confronted with a somewhat similar dilemma. In that case, the minor son had caused the death of his parents by felonious means and was held not to be entitled to inherit from his parents under North Dakota's slayer statute. The minor argued that, even if he was disqualified from inheriting from his parents, he was nonetheless entitled to support from his parents under two North Dakota statutes, the first requiring a parent to support a child, and the second transferring such duty to the parent's estate upon the parent's death, if the parent left an estate sufficient for the child's support. The North Dakota Court rejected this argument and held: The controlling statute is Section 30.1-10-03(1), N.D.C.C., which provides that an heir who feloniously and intentionally kills the decedent `is not entitled to any benefits ...' Support payments from the estate, even until the age of majority, would constitute `benefits' from the estate and would be directly contrary to statute. Id. at 449-450. Delores claims attorney fees through SDCL 30-25-6 (1984), which provides for the allowance to the executor or administrator of all necessary expenses in the care, management and settlement of the estate. [6] In addition, she claims attorney fees pursuant to SDCL 30-7-8 (1984) which provides: The fees and expenses must be paid by the party contesting the validity or probate of the will, if the will in probate be confirmed. If the probate be annulled and revoked, the costs must be paid by the party who resisted the revocation, or out of the property of the decedent, as the court directs. The trial court confirmed probate of the January 1990 will concluding it was not a product of undue influence. However, the South Dakota slayer statute prevents Delores from receiving any benefit under that will. The payment of fees to the attorney who represented Delores' claim under the will would represent a benefit to Delores and violate SDCL 29-9-19. We therefore conclude the trial court erred in awarding to Delores her attorney fees and costs. We find appeal # 17336 is moot. Appeal # 17779 and Notice of Review # 17782 are affirmed in part. Appeal # 17805 and Notice of Review # 17816 are reversed in part. MILLER, C.J., and HENDERSON, SABERS and AMUNDSON, JJ., concur.