Opinion ID: 4348461
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A Literal Reading of ICARA Produces an Absurd

Text: Result “[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then this first canon [of statutory construction] is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’”59 Only when a statute is ambiguous and includes disputed language “reasonably susceptible to different interpretations” should a court go beyond interpreting the text of a provision.60 Thus, Castellanos argues that the District Court here erred by prematurely ending its inquiry after 54 Id. at art. 20. 55 Id. at art. 12. 56 Id. at art. 13a. 57 Appellant Br. 13 (emphasis added). 58 Id. at 18. 59 Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)). 60 In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Dobrek v. Phelan, 419 F.3d 259, 264 (3d Cir. 2005)). 14 concluding that H.C. was well settled. According to him, “[t]he plain language of section 9003 (e)(2)(A) of ICARA requires that the respondent also prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that one of the exceptions set forth in article 13b or 20 of the Convention [also] applies.”61 Castellanos’s conjunctive reading of § 9003(e)(2) appears, at first glance, to be correct. Congress’ use of the conjunctive certainly suggests that it intended to require respondents to present an affirmative defense under both § 9003(e)(2)(A) and its counterpart, § 9003(e)(2)(B), by the prescribed burdens of proof. However, the result of that literal reading not only contradicts the underlying principles of the Convention and ICARA, it produces a patently absurd result.62 “The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”63 Here, the broader context of the statute strongly suggests that the “and” in § 9003(e)(2) is misleading insofar as it means that Congress intended that both prongs need to be satisfied. “Statutory context can suggest the natural reading of a provision that in isolation might yield contestable interpretations.”64 Hence the Supreme Court’s reminder that “[s]tatutory construction . . . is a holistic endeavor.”65 Logic dictates that the text of the Convention and its discussion of the affirmative defenses be interpreted as establishing that Congress intended them to apply 61 Appellant Br. 13 (citing 22 U.S.C.A. § 9003(e)(2)(A)). 62 See First Merchants Acceptance Corp. v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 198 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly absurd results and ‘the most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions’ justify a limitation on the ‘plain meaning’ of . . . statutory language.”) (citing Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984)). 63 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997). 64 In re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 369 (3d Cir. 2004). 65 United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988). 15 individually.66 The State Department itself suggested in its (albeit pre-ICARA) legal analysis of the Convention that only one of the defenses need be shown. Its analysis stated: “a finding that one or more of the [affirmative defenses] provided by Articles 13 and 20 are applicable does not make refusal of a return order mandatory. The courts retain the discretion to order the child returned even if they consider that one or more of the [defenses] applies.”67 Moreover, the Convention clearly establishes that certain defenses can defeat a demand for repatriation, and they can do so without any additional showing. Article 12 provides that the well-settled exception controls, even in the absence of other considerations that mitigate in favor of a petition for the return of the child. It commands: “The judicial or administrative authority, even where the proceedings have been commenced after [the lapse of one year from the date of the child’s wrongful removal], shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment.”68 The Convention also includes what appears to be a standalone defense to a child’s repatriation in Article 20: “[t]he return of the child under the provisions of Article 12 may be refused if this would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”69 66 See Appellee Br. 16. 67 Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 FR 10494-01. While the State Department’s own understanding of the Convention is persuasive, it should be noted this particular analysis was not, in fact, contemporaneous with the passage of ICARA. The former was published in 1986, whereas the latter was codified in 1988. Note, this discretion applies despite the one-year provision. 68 Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 12 (emphasis added). 69 Id. at art. 20. In its public statement analyzing the Convention, the State Department offered what it characterized as its “best explanation” for Article 20’s “unique formulation”: that “the Convention might never have been adopted without it.” Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 FR 16 Castellanos’s reading of § 9003(e)(2) would mean that even proof of an especially compelling defense could never, by itself, prevent a child’s return under the Convention.70 For example, even if it were proven by clear and convincing evidence the child faced a “grave risk . . . [of] physical or psychological harm”71 upon return, or that return of the child would violate “fundamental principles . . . of human rights,”72 a court would be powerless to deny return unless it also found that the child was settled in its new residence. Our conclusion that the inclusion of “and” was not intended to suggest the conjunctive is not a cavalier attempt to reconcile inconsistences between ICARA and the Convention. Courts repeatedly resolve conflicts between treaties and Acts of Congress by the doctrine of implied repeal, with the latter in time prevailing; here, that is ICARA.73 Thus, although federal 10494-01. The State Department specifically noted that the negotiating countries had been divided on the inclusion of Article 20, which it characterized as a “public policy exception in the Convention” allowing a court to excuse itself from returning a child “under some extreme circumstances not covered by the exceptions of Article 13.” Id.; see also Souratgar v. Lee, 720 F.3d 96, 108 (2d Cir. 2013) (“The defense is to be invoked only on the rare occasion that return of a child would utterly shock the conscience of the court or offend all notions of due process.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 70 See Griffin v Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982) (“[I]nterpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available.”); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 515 (1989) (“Interpreting . . . literally would produce an absurd result, which the Legislature is strongly presumed not to have intended”) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 71 Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 13(b). 72 Id. at art. 20. 73 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957); United States v. Enger, 472 F. Supp. 490, 542 (D.N.J. 1978) (“[C]onflicts between [treaties and Acts of Congress] are resolved by the doctrine of implied repeal, with the later in time prevailing.”). 17 statutes and treaties are accorded the same weight, when a treaty conflicts with provisions of subsequently enacted legislation, the offending provisions of the treaty are deemed null and void.74 The Supreme Court has explained that ICARA “does [not] purport to alter the Convention,” and “Congress’ mere enactment of implementing legislation did not somehow import background principles of American law into the treaty interpretation process, thereby altering our understanding of the treaty itself.”75 Moreover, Congress has declared that ICARA does not abrogate any of the remedies under the Convention. Congress explained that “[t]he remedies established by the Convention and this chapter shall be in addition to remedies available under other laws or international agreements.”76 Accordingly, notwithstanding Congress’ use of the conjunctive “and” in relation to burdens of proof and affirmative defenses in drafting ICARA, logic and the fundamental principles underlying ICARA and the Convention preclude us from concluding that Congress thereby intended to alter the Convention in a way that would contradict fundamental principles of human rights. Therefore, we will not interpret ICARA in a manner that results in a statutory scheme that diverges from, and creates remedies inconsistent with, basic concepts of human rights, decency, and child welfare by adopting Castellanos’s reading of § 9003(e)(2). 2. Precedent Supports a Disjunctive Reading of Section 9003(e)(2) We have consistently allowed prevailing parties to demonstrate only one affirmative defense to petitions under the 74 Reid, 354 U.S. at 18. 75 Lozano, 572 U.S. at 13. 76 22 U.S.C. § 9003(h); see also § 9003(d) (“The court in which an action is brought [for a petition for return of the child] shall decide the case in accordance with the Convention.”). 18 Convention.77 We have pronounced, for example, that “[a]fter a petitioner demonstrates wrongful removal or retention, the burden shifts to the respondent to prove an affirmative defense against the return of the child to the country of habitual residence.”78 Other circuit courts of appeals agree.79 For example, the 77 See, e.g., Tsai-Yi Yang, 499 F.3d at 278 (“[E]ven if the respondent meets his or her burden of proving the affirmative defense, the court retains the discretion to order the return of the child if it would further the aim of the Convention which is to provide for the return of a wrongfully removed child.”) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted); In re Application of Adan, 437 F.3d 381, 389 (3d Cir. 2006) (“A wrongful removal may nonetheless be justified if one of the following exceptions applies . . . .”) (emphasis added); Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363, 368 (3d Cir. 2005) (“If the court finds wrongful removal or retention, the burden shifts to the respondent to prove an affirmative defense to the return of the child to the country of habitual residence under article 13 of the Convention. The respondent must prove the defense of consent or acquiescence to the removal or retention by a preponderance of the evidence, or the defense of a grave risk of harm by clear and convincing evidence.”) (emphases added). 78 Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, 445 F.3d 280, 288 (3d Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). 79 See, e.g., Rydder v. Rydder, 49 F.3d 369, 372 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that a respondent who opposes a child’s return “may advance any of the affirmative defenses to return listed in Articles 12, 13, or 20 of the Hague Convention.”) (emphasis added); Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d 392, 402 (4th Cir. 2001) (“In fact, the courts retain the discretion to order return even if one of the exceptions is proven.”) (emphasis added; internal citations omitted); Ohlander v. Larson, 114 F.3d 1531, 1534 (10th Cir. 1997) (the Hague Convention “provides for several exceptions to return if the person opposing return can show any” of the listed exceptions) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis added); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1067 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Once a plaintiff establishes that removal was 19 Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that if a petitioner has established a prima facie case under the Convention, the child must be returned to his or her place of habitual residence unless the respondent can establish one of four narrow defenses.80 It elaborated: Two [defenses] may be established only by “clear and convincing evidence” —either that “there is a grave risk that [the child's] return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation,” pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Convention, or that return of the child “would not be permitted by the fundamental principles . . . relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms,” pursuant to Article 20. In contrast, the other two exceptions to the presumption of repatriation need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence—either that judicial proceedings were not commenced within one year of the child’s abduction and the child is well-settled in the new environment, pursuant to Article 12 of the Convention, or that the plaintiff was not actually exercising custody rights at the time of the removal, pursuant to Article 13(a) of the Convention.81 Accordingly, the District Court for the Southern District of New York, in Lozano, denied a petition for return of a five year-old child upon a finding that the respondent demonstrated that the child had become settled in her new environment.82 Not only did the court deny the petition based solely on a finding of only one affirmative defense, the court also specifically ruled that the respondent had not established either of the other three affirmative defenses.83 Thus, one defense wrongful, the child must be returned unless the defendant can establish one of four defenses.”) (emphasis added). 80 Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 245 (2d Cir. 1999). 81 Id. (internal citations omitted). 82 In re Lozano, 809 F.Supp.2d 197, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 83 Id. 20 was sufficient. That decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,84 and thereafter the Supreme Court upheld the district court’s refusal to return the child based solely on the “now settled” exception and a finding that equitable tolling of the one-year period was not available.85