Opinion ID: 197358
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Miniter's Remaining Claims

Text: 45 In addition to breach of contract, Miniter alleged breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional interference with advantageous relations, unjust enrichment, and violation of the Massachusetts unfair trade practices statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. Each of these claims rests in large part on the conduct which has failed to support Miniter's claim for breach of the no contact agreement. We find each of Miniter's arguments on appeal unpersuasive. For the sake of thoroughness, however, we discuss each of them in turn. 46
47 Miniter alleged that Ohio's breach of the no contact agreement violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ohio, determining that Ohio courts have declined to recognize the doctrine in an at-will employment context. On appeal Miniter argues alternatively that Ohio does recognize the implied covenant in this context and that the district court should have applied Massachusetts law, which recognizes the implied covenant in every contract. Appellee Ohio, by contrast, seeks to apply the law of the state of Ohio, arguing that Ohio law does not recognize Miniter's claim. 48 We need not determine which state's law governs. Even if, as Miniter contends, the common law of Ohio recognizes a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Miniter has not discussed how Ohio law would apply in this case. Instead, Miniter argues the merits of this claim only under the law of Massachusetts. We have indicated that issues adverted to on appeal in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some developed argumentation, are deemed to have been abandoned. Ryan v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 916 F.2d 731, 734 (1st Cir.1990); see also Williams v. Poulos, 11 F.3d 271, 285 (1st Cir.1993). We conclude, moreover, that Miniter cannot prevail under the law of Massachusetts. 49 As we have recognized, Massachusetts law implies a duty of good faith and fair dealing in every existing contract. F.D.I.C. v. LeBlanc, 85 F.3d 815, 822 (1st Cir.1996); see also Anthony's Pier Four v. HBC Assoc., 411 Mass. 451, 583 N.E.2d 806, 820 (1991). Under this implied covenant,  'neither party shall do anything that will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract.'  Anthony's Pier Four, 583 N.E.2d at 820 (quoting Druker v. Roland Wm. Jutras Assocs., 370 Mass. 383, 348 N.E.2d 763, 765 (1976)). The existence of the covenant in no way depends on the level of sophistication of the parties. Massachusetts law implies the covenant even in contracts between sophisticated business people. See id. 583 N.E.2d at 821. 50 According to Miniter, Ohio dealt directly with Shawmut in breach of the no contact agreement and falsely indicated to Shawmut a willingness to pay the lump sum with the purpose of excluding Miniter from any deal, thereby eliminating Miniter's commissions. Miniter claims that Ohio's actions were calculated and intended to subvert the relationship and to otherwise obtain the Shawmut account directly and eliminate Miniter's involvement and commission. 51 Miniter, however, fails to identify evidence in the record that would establish a genuine issue of material fact whether Ohio acted in bad faith. The record indicates that by the time Shawmut began negotiating with Ohio Grondin had informed Juredine that Shawmut was no longer working through Miniter. Juredine, moreover, informed Donley of the situation shortly after he received Grondin's call. In short, the record does not support Miniter's contention that Ohio acted to destroy or injure Miniter's rights to the fruits of the contract. See Anthony's Pier Four, 583 N.E.2d at 820. Assuming Massachusetts law governs this claim, Miniter fails to point to record evidence supporting its allegations that Ohio acted in bad faith. 4
52 Miniter contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Ohio on its claim for interference with advantageous relations. A claim for interference with advantageous relations depends upon the presence of four criteria: (1) a business relationship or contemplated contract of economic benefit; (2) the defendant's knowledge of such relationship; (3) the defendant's intentional and malicious interference with it; (4) the plaintiff's loss of advantage directly resulting from the defendant's conduct. Comey v. Hill, 387 Mass. 11, 438 N.E.2d 811, 816 (1982); see also Speen v. Crown Clothing Corp., 102 F.3d 625, 634 (1st Cir.1996). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has indicated that the third element requires merely an improper interference, and not a malicious one. See United Truck Leasing Corp. v. Geltman, 406 Mass. 811, 551 N.E.2d 20, 23 (1990). 5 Nevertheless, a successful claim must show something more than just the interference itself. See id. To the extent, therefore, that any of Ohio's actions could constitute an interference, that alone would not incur liability. Instead, Miniter must demonstrate wrongfulness beyond the interference itself. The interference must arise, for example, from improper motives or the use of improper means. See id. 53 Miniter bases this claim yet again on its contention that Ohio engaged in direct dealings with Shawmut in violation of the no contact agreement and made injurious misrepresentations about the lump sum payment and Miniter. Our examination of the record has revealed no such conduct. Miniter points to nothing in addition to the facts we considered in relation to Miniter's breach of contract claims that might support a claim for intentional interference with advantageous relations. In the absence of record evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find an improper interference, Miniter cannot survive summary judgment on this claim. 54
55 Finally, Miniter appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of Ohio on its claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A (93A) based on breach of fiduciary duty. Section 2(a) of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A provides that [u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful. Section 11 extends § 2's general protection to commercial parties. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A § 11; Industrial Gen. Corp. v. Sequoia Pac. Sys. Corp., 44 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir.1995). Whether a particular set of facts constitutes unfair or deceptive acts or practices ordinarily is a question of fact. See id. The parameters of conduct the factfinder may consider, however, is a question of law. See id. at 44. 56 To fall within these parameters, the conduct which undergirds the complaint must reside within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory or other established concept of unfairness, or rise to the level of immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous, and result in substantial injury to competitors or other business people. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). At bottom, a claim under 93A must rest on conduct that attained  'a level of rascality that would raise the eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and tumble of the world of commerce.'  See id. at 43 (quoting Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp. v. Garrity Oil Co., 884 F.2d 1510, 1513 (1st Cir.1989) (internal quotation omitted)). 57 Miniter contends that the agency agreement placed it and Ohio in a fiduciary relationship, the contours of which derive from the established obligations imposed in the industry that an insurer is obligated to refrain from interfering with an independent agent's property right in expirations [and] the concomitant prohibition against engaging in direct dealings with the insured while the agent remains the broker of record. 58 We agree with Miniter that breach of a fiduciary duty might constitute a 93A violation. See Sequoia Pac. Sys., 44 F.3d at 44. We conclude, however, that Ohio did not breach its duty. Miniter supports its 93A claim with mischaracterizations of the record upon which we have elaborated. In short, Ohio did not make the misrepresentations Miniter claims, nor did it violate its written or oral agreements. The record further reflects that Ohio adhered to the industry custom as described by Miniter's expert, Frederick England. As such, Ohio did not breach a fiduciary duty to Miniter. Miniter's 93A claim based on breach of fiduciary duty, therefore, fails. 59 Affirmed. Costs to appellee.