Opinion ID: 1935115
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Merger of Defendant's Other Convictions

Text: The State contends that the court erred in merging defendant's convictions for the first-degree armed robbery of Alice Skov and the first-degree armed robbery of John Bell, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(3), and unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5c(2), with his felony-murder convictions, which in turn had been merged with the purposeful and knowing murder convictions. The State claims that those were conceptually distinct offenses and that their merger was contrary to the weight of judicial authority. Defendant concedes the State's claim, and we agree. We follow a flexible approach in merger issues that requires us to focus on `the elements of the crimes and the Legislature's intent in creating them,' and on `the specific facts of each case.' State v. Cole, 120 N.J. 321, 327, 576 A. 2d 864 (1990) (quoting State v. Miller, 108 N.J. 112, 116-17, 527 A. 2d 1362 (1987)). The overall principle guiding merger analysis is that a defendant who has committed one offense `cannot be punished as if for two.' Miller, supra, 108 N.J. at 116, 527 A. 2d 1362 (quoting State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 77, 342 A. 2d 841 (1975)). Convictions for lesser-included offenses, offenses that are a necessary component of the commission of another offense, or offenses that merely offer an alternative basis for punishing the same criminal conduct will merge. Applying those principles here, the merit of the State's position is clear. Once defendant had been convicted of purposeful and knowing murder for the criminal homicide of each victim, his conviction for felony murder became surplusage because that offense imposes criminal liability for the homicide committed in the course of a felony in the event that intent for the homicide cannot be proved. See State v. Stenson, 174 N.J. Super. 402, 406-07, 416 A. 2d 944 (Law Div. 1980), aff'd, 188 N.J. Super. 361, 457 A. 2d 841 (App.Div. 1982), certif. denied, 93 N.J. 268, 460 A. 2d 671 (1983). Furthermore, because defendant's felony-murder convictions merge into his convictions for purposeful and knowing murder, the armed-robbery convictions do not merge because proof of the armed-robbery offenses is not necessary to sustain defendant's convictions for purposeful and knowing murder. See State v. Russo, 243 N.J. Super. 383, 411, 579 A. 2d 834 (App.Div. 1990), certif. denied, 126 N.J. 322, 598 A. 2d 882 (1991). In respect of the convictions for first-degree robbery and unlawful possession of the rifle, we note that merger might have been appropriate had defendant been convicted of first-degree robbery solely on the basis of counts seven and eight of the indictment, which alleged that defendant had committed a theft while inflicting bodily injury with a deadly weapon, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(1), b. Compare State v. Best, 70 N.J. 56, 61-68, 356 A. 2d 385 (1976) (holding that possession-of-dangerous-weapon charge merges with robbery charge) with Russo, supra, 243 N.J. Super. at 411-12, 579 A. 2d 834 (holding that charge of possession of weapon for unlawful purpose does not merge with other offenses because defendant had unlawful purpose in mind apart from those offenses). However, defendant was also convicted of first-degree armed robbery on the basis of counts nine and ten of the indictment, which alleged that he had committed the theft from the victims while committing a crime of the first degree, namely the murders. See N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(3), b. Conceptually, the possession of the weapon was not a requirement for the robbery conviction. Cf. State v. Mirault, 92 N.J. 492, 457 A. 2d 455 (1983) (holding that aggravated-assault conviction merged with first-degree robbery charge where assault had elevated theft to robbery). Furthermore, because the essence of the offense of unlawful possession of a weapon pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5 is possession of the weapon without a permit,    it will rarely merge with a conviction for a substantive offense committed with the weapon   . Cannel, New Jersey Criminal Code Annotated, comment 5 on N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5 (1994). On remand, the trial court is directed to resentence defendant in accordance with the foregoing principles.