Opinion ID: 1391800
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Were the omissions material?

Text: The trial court apparently believed that the details of an anonymous informant's criminal record and police history are necessary to avoid a misleading impression of the informant's reliability and credibility. (12) (See fn. 10.) Under the circumstances of this case, we disagree. [10] Long settled law already creates a strong inference that information from police contacts is to be viewed with extreme caution. An affidavit which relies on information from a tipster must set forth underlying facts justifying the conclusion that the source is reliable or the information itself credible. ( Aguilar v. Texas, supra, 378 U.S. 108, 114 [12 L.Ed.2d 723, 728-729]; Alexander v. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.3d 387, 393.) An affiant's conclusory opinions of reliability or credibility are not enough, and mere quantity and detail in the tipster's statements do not render them worthy of belief. ( People v. Scoma (1969) 71 Cal.2d 332, 340 [78 Cal. Rptr. 491, 455 P.2d 419].) Reliability must be shown independently, as by corroboration of the information received ( Spinelli v. United States, supra, 393 U.S. 410, 417-418 [21 L.Ed.2d 637, 644]; Alexander, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 395), the informant's previous record of accuracy in similar situations ( Jones v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 257, 270-271 [4 L.Ed.2d 697, 707-708, 80 S.Ct. 725, 78 A.L.R.2d 233]), or indications that the informant has spoken against penal interest. ( United States v. Harris, supra, 403 U.S. 573, 583 [29 L.Ed.2d 723, 734].) If the affidavit includes insufficient details to permit a reasonable belief in probable accuracy, it fails to demonstrate probable cause as a matter of law. The rule that the affiant must demonstrate a tipster's probable reliability or credibility arises not only from the usual distrust of hearsay evidence but also from an assumption that information provided by customary police sources is inherently suspect. Accordingly, the rule does not apply to information from disinterested citizens who accidentally observe crime and report it forthrightly as a civic duty. Citizen informants, once identified as such, are presumptively reliable. (E.g., People v. Smith (1976) 17 Cal.3d 845, 850-851 [132 Cal. Rptr. 397, 553 P.2d 557]; People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263, 269, and fn. 4 [127 Cal. Rptr. 629, 545 P.2d 1333]; People v. Hill (1974) 12 Cal.3d 731, 761 [117 Cal. Rptr. 393, 528 P.2d 1], disapproved on other grounds, People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 896 [135 Cal. Rptr. 786, 558 P.2d 872]; Krauss v. Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 418, 421-422 [96 Cal. Rptr. 455, 487 P.2d 1023], disapproved on other grounds, Cook, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 98-99; People v. Guidry (1968) 262 Cal. App.2d 495, 497-498 [68 Cal. Rptr. 794]; People v. Lewis (1966) 240 Cal. App.2d 546, 549-550 [49 Cal. Rptr. 579].) In Smith the court explained that distinction by quoting this succinct statement in People v. Schulle (1975) 51 Cal. App.3d 809, 814-815 [124 Cal. Rptr. 585]: A `citizen-informant' is distinguished from a mere informer who gives a tip to law enforcement officers that a person is engaged in the course of criminal conduct. [Citations.] Thus, experienced stool pigeons or persons criminally involved or disposed are not regarded as `citizen-informants' because they are generally motivated by something other than good citizenship. [Citations.] ( Smith, supra, 17 Cal.3d at pp. 850-851; italics added.) Such persons frequently have criminal records and a history of contact with the police. Often they are free only on probation or parole or are themselves the focus of pending criminal charges or investigations. All familiar with law enforcement know that the tips they provide may reflect their vulnerability to police pressure or may involve revenge, braggadocio, self-exculpation, or the hope of compensation. (See United States v. Harris, supra, 403 U.S. 573, 599 [29 L.Ed.2d 723, 742-743] [dis. opn. of Harlan, J.]; United States v. Gonzalez (5th Cir.1974) 491 F.2d 1202, 1207-1208; United States v. Unger (7th Cir.1972) 469 F.2d 1283, 1287, cert. den. (1973) 411 U.S. 920 [36 L.Ed.2d 313, 93 S.Ct. 1546]; United States v. Kinnard (D.C. Cir.1972) 465 F.2d 566, 570; People v. Hambarian (1973) 31 Cal. App.3d 643, 655 [107 Cal. Rptr. 878]; People v. Cheatham (1971) 21 Cal. App.3d 675, 677, fn. 2 [98 Cal. Rptr. 670]; Moylan, supra, 25 Mercer L.Rev. at pp. 769-779.) The details of their criminal pasts are not necessary to place the magistrate on notice of their potential unreliability. ( People v. Webb, supra, 36 Cal. App.3d 460, 470.) Both an issuing magistrate and a reviewing court must initially assume that information from such sources is unreliable for purposes of probable cause. Such a rule alerts the magistrate to the very danger defendant urges  that the statements of tipsters from criminal society may receive unwarranted weight. (13a) We therefore conclude that, in most cases, the issue of possible unreliability is adequately presented to the magistrate when the affidavit reveals that the affiant's source of information is not a citizen-informant but a garden-variety police tipster. In such circumstances, predictable details of the informer's criminal past will usually be cumulative and therefore immaterial. Here, Matt's affidavit made clear that Z was not a citizen-informant. It recited that Z had supplied narcotics information in the past, was himself a former user of hard drugs, and was continuing to operate as a confidential police source. It detailed his association not only with defendant but with Steven Mendes, who the informant believed was also involved in narcotics. Thus Z was clearly identified as a more-or-less-regular police agent, useful for his drug connections; and the magistrate was alerted to draw adverse conclusions about Z's reliability. The details of Z's past revealed at the open suppression hearing would have added little to the magistrate's deliberations. Essentially they showed that Matt's efforts had contributed to Z's felony conviction, that Z was on probation, and that Z and Matt had discussed Z's cooperation as an informant. Even if those facts might support an inference of Z's dishonesty or vulnerability to police pressure, that inference was already inherent in Z's status as a confidential tipster. The omitted details provided no extraordinary indication that Z's information in this particular case was unreliable. [11] Defendant argues in particular that Z's 1974 felony conviction for receiving stolen property was necessarily material since it demonstrates a specific predisposition to dishonesty. (Pen. Code, § 496 [guilty knowledge is element of offense]; cf., People v. Spearman (1979) 25 Cal.3d 107, 114 [157 Cal. Rptr. 883, 599 P.2d 74].) We disagree. As we have said, the magistrate must assume, subject to rebuttal in the affidavit, that a police informant may be unreliable. Thus, evidence of general dishonesty which might be admissible at trial to impeach an otherwise convincing witness is not necessarily important to the fair portrayal of an undercover informant's reliability in a warrant affidavit. (14) We caution that when the affiant knows or should know of specific facts which bear adversely on the informant's probable accuracy in the particular case, those facts must be disclosed. For example, if police have actually threatened or coerced the informant, or the informant bears a grudge against the defendant or is seeking to avoid or mitigate personal difficulties with the authorities, concrete evidence on those issues is material for purposes of the affidavit. In addition, if the informant's statements are substantially contradicted by independent police investigation, or if the affiant knows or should know of other specific circumstances which do or should lead him to suspect the informant's current credibility, the affidavit must say so. (15) Similarly when the affidavit makes specific affirmative disclosures for purposes of buttressing the informer's general reliability, it must also include the equally specific adverse information necessary to prevent misrepresentation. (16) (See fn. 12.) For example, if the affidavit states that the informant has proved reliable in previous investigation it must also set forth similar instances of prior unreliability. (See Moylan, supra, 25 Mercer L.Rev. at p. 759.) [12] (13b) As we have explained, the suppression hearing in this case revealed no specific indicia of inaccuracy; and the affidavit set forth general facts sufficient to invoke the suspicion and scrutiny appropriate for police informants generally. Thus the record fails to show that material facts bearing on informant's credibility and reliability were omitted from the affidavit.