Opinion ID: 1610742
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The misrepresentation and suppression claims

Text: The trial court correctly held that Collins's claims for misrepresentation and suppression were barred by the one-year statute of limitations. At the time of the transaction or occurrence that became the subject of this litigation, actions seeking relief on the ground of fraud were restricted by a one-year statute of limitations. Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-39 (now repealed). The statute begins to run when the plaintiff learns facts which would provoke inquiry by a person of ordinary prudence and by simple investigation of the facts. Miller v. SCI Systems, Inc., 479 So.2d 718, 719 (Ala.1985) (quoting the circuit court's Memorandum Opinion and Order of Dismissal); see § 6-2-3 (the saving clause). The trial court found that the Department of Labor's wage investigation, which began in June 1981, created facts sufficient to provoke inquiry by a person of ordinary prudence; that simple investigation by Collins would have revealed that it was paying the wrong wage rate; and that, since Collins did not file suit until September 27, 1983, its claim was barred. Collins argues that Krebs's failure to forward an EPA letter in January 1982, in addition to alleged representations by Mr. Harris that Collins was using the correct wage scale, constitute concealment by Krebs, tolling the statute. Indeed, § 6-2-3 provides that a claim must not be considered as having accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the fact constituting the fraud. Supporting this argument, Collins quotes our holding in Kenai Oil & Gas Inc. v. Grace Petroleum Corp., 512 So.2d 1347, 1351-52 (Ala.1987). While it is true that in Kenai we held that the statute was never meant to be interpreted so that the rule ... could be applied so as to defeat the ultimate purpose of the law, it is also true that we did not intend Kenai to be interpreted so as to allow plaintiffs to expand the period in which they may file an action beyond that time provided in the statute. As Kenai makes clear, A party ... is not required to presume fraud or suspect it, until something comes to him leading a just person to suspect and make inquiry. Id., at 1352 (quoting Williams v. Bedenbaugh, 215 Ala. 200, 204, 110 So. 286, 289 (1926)). Collins experienced an immediate decline in productivity following the Department of Labor's arrival at the jobsite on June 9, 1981. The Department of Labor did not hide the fact that it was investigating wage rates. The Department of Labor formally notified Collins in writing that it had failed to pay its laborers the proper pay scale in May 1982, although Collins's employees admit that they had known the investigation's outcome for months prior to this notification. Yet Collins waited until September 1983 before it filed suit against the defendants. Like the trial judge, we may conclude only that the Department of Labor's investigation was that something that should have led Collins to suspect and make inquiry. Collins argues that its failure to file suit earlier was caused by Krebs's suppression of material facts. Alabama Code 1975, § 6-5-102, provides: Suppression of a material fact which the party is under an obligation to communicate constitutes fraud. The obligation to communicate may arise from the confidential relations of the parties or from the particular circumstances of the case. This theory is inapplicable for two reasons. First, case law interpreting the statute requires that there be a duty on the part of the defendant to disclose the material fact. Jim Short Ford Sales, Inc. v. Washington, 384 So.2d 83, 86 (Ala. 1980). Collins failed to establish that the City or Krebs owed such a duty. Second, the statute requires the suppression of a material fact. The letter sent by the EPA in January 1982, is not such a fact, given that the Department of Labor's wage investigation began in June 1981. The letter merely asks that Krebs Be sure to double check promptly all payrolls, estimates, etc., and obtain any needed corrections to meet all Labor Standrads [sic] requirements. The Department of Labor's investigation had been underway for almost eight months at the time this letter was sent. If Collins had not double checked its payrolls by January 1982 to ensure that its wage scales complied with the Davis-Bacon Act, it is difficult for this Court to believe that this oneparagraph, pro forma letter, sent to Krebs by the EPA, would have compelled it to do so. The trial court properly directed a verdict with regard to the misrepresentation and suppression claims. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. TORBERT, C.J., and JONES, HOUSTON and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.