Opinion ID: 1196295
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Trivialization of the Jury's Task

Text: (40) Defendant asserts the trial court impermissibly trivialized the jury's sentencing function by instructing that [i]n weighing the various circumstances you simply determine under the relevant evidence which penalty is justifiable and appropriate by comparing the aggravating circumstances with the mitigating circumstances. [Italics added.] (See CALJIC No. 8.84.2.) According to defendant, the implication that the penalty determination was a simple task violated his Eighth Amendment rights as construed in Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320 [86 L.Ed.2d 231, 105 S.Ct. 2633], and in some manner created a mandatory sentencing formula. [22] In Caldwell, the prosecutor told the jury during closing argument, `[Y]our decision is not the final decision.... Your job is reviewable.' ( Caldwell v. Mississippi, supra, 472 U.S. at p. 325 [86 L.Ed.2d at p. 237].) The trial court also informed the jury that all that death penalty verdicts were automatically reviewed by the state supreme court. ( Id., at pp. 325-326 [98 L.Ed.2d at p. 237].) The Supreme Court reversed the sentence: Given such a situation, the uncorrected suggestion that the responsibility for any ultimate determination of death will rest with others presents an intolerable danger that the jury will in fact choose to minimize the importance of its role. ( Id., at p. 333 [98 L.Ed.2d at p. 242].) [I]t is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere. ( Id., at pp. 328-329 [98 L.Ed.2d at p. 239].) No such danger or impairment arose under the facts of this case. Defendant has isolated a single word, which he argues compromised the reliability of the penalty verdict. The instructions as a whole contained no suggestion the jury would be absolved of the ultimate consequences of its sentencing decision. Rather, it described the mechanics of the jury's normative process. In this context, simply most reasonably referred to the nature of the procedure, i.e., a step-by-step analysis of the law to be applied to the facts, not the nature of the decision itself. At no time did the court indicate the responsibility for that decision would shift or that the verdict was other than final. Nor did the arguments of counsel imply otherwise. (See, e.g., People v. Edelbacher, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 1039-1040; People v. Milner, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 254-255.) On the record, we may justifiably assume that `jurors confronted with the truly awesome responsibility of decreeing death for a fellow human [acted] with due regard for the consequences of their decision.' [Citation.] ( Lockett v. Ohio, supra, 438 U.S. at p. 598 [57 L.Ed.2d at p. 986].) Defendant has not demonstrated any reasonable likelihood the jurors failed to appreciate the significance of their responsibility or to individualize their assessment of his moral culpability. (See also People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 634 [268 Cal. Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127].) We also remain convinced of our well settled determination that the 1978 death penalty law does not create a mandatory sentencing formula. (See People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 540.) In fact, any mandatory implication clearly favored defendant: The court instructed the jury it had discretion (may) to impose death if aggravation outweighed mitigation but was obligated (shall) to impose life without parole if it concluded to the contrary.