Opinion ID: 1244142
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: The Court of Appeals held that, because Reynolds did not bring to the trial court's attention the requirement to set forth specific findings in refusing to transfer the case to juvenile court, he had waived the right to have specific findings made. In making its decision, the appeals court relied upon State v. Highly, 195 Neb. 498, 238 N.W.2d 909 (1976). In that criminal case, the defendant appealed the district court's decision to overrule his motion to transfer his case to juvenile court. The defendant's age was not specified in our opinion, only the fact that he was under the age of 18. The defendant in Highly contended that the district court failed to comply with its statutory obligation to set forth findings on the record to support its decision to retain jurisdiction. This court refused to reverse the judgment based upon the trial court's failure to set forth findings because no record of the hearing upon the defendant's motion to transfer the case to juvenile court was filed in this court. We further held that the judgment would not be reversed because the defendant did not at any time, by motion for new trial or otherwise, direct the attention of the trial court to the requirement of the statute. Without the record of the proceedings upon the motion to transfer, it was not possible to determine if the findings had been announced from the bench. The present case is distinguishable from Highly because a record exists of the hearing on Reynolds' motion to transfer the case to juvenile court upon which this court can determine whether specific findings were set forth on the record by the trial court. Thus, the holding in Highly is not applicable in this case. Reynolds' case is controlled by our holding in State v. Phinney, 235 Neb. 486, 455 N.W.2d 795 (1990) ( Phinney I ). In that case, we held that when a juvenile requests that the juvenile's case be transferred to juvenile court it is mandatory for a trial court to set forth on the record its findings supporting its determination that there is a sound basis for refusing to transfer the juvenile's case. The State essentially argues that Phinney I stands for the proposition that the district court is required to set forth specific findings only when a juvenile defendant is under 16 years of age. We disagree. The juvenile court has concurrent original jurisdiction with the district court as to any juvenile who has committed an act which would constitute a felony. See Neb. Rev.Stat. § 43-247 (Reissue 1993). Neb. Rev.Stat. § 43-245 (Reissue 1993) defines a juvenile as any person under the age of 18. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 43-276 (Reissue 1993) provides that in cases involving any juvenile who has committed a felony, when the juvenile is under the age of 16, the county attorney is required to consider certain enumerated factors in making the determination whether to file a criminal charge or a juvenile court petition. Thus, the county attorney was not required by § 43-276 to consider these criteria in making his determination with respect to Reynolds because Reynolds was 16 years old at the time he committed the acts in question. However, this age restriction does not apply to the requirement that the district court must set forth its reasons for not transferring a case to juvenile court. The general rule is that on request by a juvenile, the district court must transfer a juvenile case involving a felony from district court to juvenile court, unless a sound basis for retaining jurisdiction exists. See §§ 43-261 and 29-1816. See, also, State v. Doyle, 237 Neb. 60, 464 N.W.2d 779 (1991); State v. Phinney, 236 Neb. 76, 459 N.W.2d 200 (1990) ( Phinney II ). In deciding whether to grant a requested waiver of the district court's jurisdiction and to transfer the case to juvenile court, the district court having jurisdiction over a pending criminal prosecution is required to consider the juvenile's request in light of the criteria set forth in § 43-276. See § 29-1816. See, also, Doyle, supra ; Phinney II, supra. This requirement of the district court is not statutorily limited to cases in which the juvenile is under the age of 16. The record fails to reflect that the trial court considered the criteria set forth in § 43-276 in denying Reynolds' motion to transfer his case to juvenile court. Therefore, the record does not provide a sufficient basis for a meaningful review to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant Reynolds' motion for transfer. As in Phinney I, because the record before this court does not provide an adequate basis for a meaningful review, we reverse the Court of Appeals' holding and remand the cause to that court with direction to remand the cause to the district court with direction to that court to review the record made on the motion to transfer to juvenile court and to set forth its findings in the matter as provided by §§ 43-261 and 29-1816. Such findings shall then be certified to this court for further consideration of the appeal. REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTION.