Opinion ID: 6112808
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: kentucky law

Text: The forum state here is Kentucky, so its substantive law applies. Under Kentucky law, “[i]n any negligence case, a plaintiff must prove the existence of a duty, breach of that duty, causation between the breach of duty and the plaintiff’s injury[,] and damages.” Hayes v. D.C.I. Props.-D KY, LLC, 563 S.W.3d 619, 622 (Ky. 2018). The parties do not dispute that Costco owed Nelson a duty because he was a customer in its store. Specifically, he was a business invitee, so Costco “owe[d] a duty to [Nelson] to discover unreasonably dangerous conditions on the land and either eliminate or warn of them.” Shelton v. Ky. Easter Seals Soc’y, Inc., 413 S.W.3d 901, 909 (Ky. 2013) (quoting Ky. River Med. Ctr. v. McIntosh, 319 S.W.3d 385, 388 (Ky. 2010)). To survive summary judgment, Nelson “must at least show that there is a material dispute over whether [the curb] was unreasonably dangerous.” Littleton v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., LLC, No. 21-5033, 2021 WL 4058004, at  (6th Cir. Sep. 7, 2021) (applying Kentucky premises-liability law). If he cannot, we must “dismiss[ his] claim on summary judgment” because “there is no negligence as a matter of law, the plaintiff having failed to show a breach of the applicable duty of care.” Shelton, 413 S.W.3d at 904. A great deal of briefing here and at the district court addresses the burden Nelson bears at summary judgment. In the slip-and-fall context, the Supreme Court of Kentucky has held that a plaintiff may “create[] a rebuttable presumption sufficient to avoid a summary judgment” and “shift[] the burden of proving the absence of negligence” to the defendant. Martin v. Mekanhart Corp., 113 S.W.3d 95, 98 (2003) (citing Lanier v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 99 S.W.3d 431, 435, 437 (2003)). Doing so requires three showings: (1) the plaintiff “had an encounter with a foreign -7- No. 21-5666, Nelson v. Costco Wholesale Corp., et al. substance or other dangerous condition on the business premises,” (2) “the encounter was a substantial factor in causing the accident and the customer’s injuries,” and (3) “the business premises were not in a reasonably safe condition for the use of business invitees . . . by reason of the presence of the substance or condition.” Id. (citing Lanier, 99 S.W.3d at 435–36). Costco argues that this burden-shifting framework should apply here. But in Nelson’s view, the Supreme Court of Kentucky altered that framework in cases clarifying the use of the open-and-obvious doctrine. A recent opinion issued by the Supreme Court of Kentucky clarifies that, at least in the slip-and-fall context, the Lanier framework is alive and well. See Phelps v. Bluegrass Hosp. Mgmt., LLC, 630 S.W.3d 623, 628 (Ky. 2021). However, as we recently noted, “no post-Lanier Kentucky Supreme Court decision has applied the Lanier framework in cases involving something other than trips or slips and falls,” and “we are left with mixed signals regarding” its “exact scope.” Littleton, 2021 WL 4058004, at . We decline to decide this “close and unresolved question” of Kentucky law here. Id. Instead, we affirm because Nelson has not presented evidence that Costco’s curb was unreasonably dangerous. See Phelps, 630 S.W.3d at 628–29 (“It has long been the rule in this state that no recovery can be had in such cases where the evidence is so unsatisfactory as to require surmise or speculation as to how the injury occurred, and that there will be no presumption of negligence.” (quoting Weidekamp’s Adm’x v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 159 Ky. 674, 167 S.W. 882, 884 (Ky. 1914))); see also id. at 629 (“Belief is not evidence and does not create an issue of material fact.” (cleaned up) (quoting Sparks v. Trustguard Ins. Co., 389 S.W.3d 121, 124 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012))). -8- No. 21-5666, Nelson v. Costco Wholesale Corp., et al.