Opinion ID: 2066513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Persuasive Sister State Precedent

Text: The majority of sister state courts that have addressed the issue also have concluded that gay persons are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class. See, e.g., Conaway v. Deane, supra, 401 Md. at 277, 932 A.2d 571; Hernandez v. Robles, supra, 7 N.Y.3d at 364-65, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770, 855 N.E.2d 1; Andersen v. King County, supra, 158 Wash.2d at 21, 24, 138 P.3d 963; see also State v. Limon, supra, 280 Kan. at 286-87, 122 P.3d 22 (court's reading of federal precedent led it to conclude that classification based on sexual preference was subject to rational basis review); Dean v. District of Columbia, supra, 653 A.2d at 308 (affirming in per curiam opinion trial court's refusal to afford gay persons heightened protection under fifth amendment to federal constitution). The California Supreme Court, however, recently determined that gay persons do qualify as a suspect class under the equal protection provisions of that state's constitution; In re Marriage Cases, supra, 43 Cal.4th at 840-41, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 683, 183 P.3d 384; and that the reasons given by the state of California for barring same sex couples from marrying were insufficient to justify the prohibition. Id., at 854-56, 76 Cal. Rptr.3d 683, 183 P.3d 384. [67] We conclude that the state court cases that have determined that gay persons do not constitute a quasi-suspect class, like the federal cases described in this part of the opinion, employed a flawed analysis, and, therefore, they do not constitute persuasive authority. In three of the cases concluding that gay persons do not constitute a protected class, the courts did so without applying the four-pronged test used by the United States Supreme Court for determining whether a group qualifies as a suspect or quasi-suspect class. In one such case, State v. Limon, supra, 280 Kan. at 275, 122 P.3d 22, the Kansas Supreme Court invalidated, on equal protection grounds, a criminal statute that resulted in punishment for unlawful voluntary sexual conduct between members of the opposite sex that was less harsh than the punishment for the same conduct between members of the same sex. [68] Id., at 276, 122 P.3d 22. Although ultimately concluding that the statute did not satisfy even rational basis review; id., at 301, 122 P.3d 22; the court first rejected the defendant's claim that heightened scrutiny was warranted on the basis of the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Lawrence v. Texas, supra, 539 U.S. at 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472, and Romer v. Evans, supra, 517 U.S. at 620, 116 S.Ct. 1620; see State v. Limon, supra, at 286-87, 122 P.3d 22; in which the United States Supreme Court struck down the legislation at issue in those cases as lacking a rational relation to a legitimate state objective. [69] See Lawrence v. Texas, supra, at 578, 123 S.Ct. 2472; Romer v. Evans, supra, at 634, 116 S.Ct. 1620. For the reasons set forth in part VI C of this opinion, we disagree that the court's apparent application of the rational basis test in Lawrence and Romer has any bearing on whether gay persons constitute a quasi-suspect class. In a second case, Hernandez v. Robles, supra, 7 N.Y.3d at 361, 365, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770, 855 N.E.2d 1, the New York Court of Appeals rejected an equal protection challenge to the state's prohibition against same sex marriage under the New York state constitution. In so doing, the court declined to decide whether, for purposes other than marriage, gay persons comprise a suspect or quasi-suspect class. See id., at 364, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770, 855 N.E.2d 1. Instead, the court concluded that [a] person's preference for the sort of sexual activity that cannot lead to the birth of children is relevant to the [s]tate's interest in fostering relationships that will serve children best; id., at 364-65, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770, 855 N.E.2d 1; and, therefore, it was appropriate to apply rational basis review to the state's ban on same sex marriage. Id. Because we fundamentally disagree with the court in Hernandez that a group seeking suspect or quasi-suspect class status is not entitled to a determination of whether it falls into one of those two categories unless the statutory classification at issue is first deemed to be irrational as applied to the group, however, we find the case unpersuasive. This approach is untenable because it turns the suspectness inquiry on its head: any group that is deemed to be entitled to heightened judicial protection because of past invidious discrimination has the right to have all statutes that discriminate against its members subjected to heightened scrutiny. In contrast to the Hernandez majority, Chief Judge Kaye, in dissent, engaged in the requisite suspectness inquiry, and explainedpersuasively, in our viewwhy statutes that discriminate against gay persons should be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. Id., at 387-89, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770, 855 N.E.2d 1 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). The final case to conclude that gay persons are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class without performing the four-pronged equal protection analysis is Dean v. District of Columbia, supra, 653 A.2d at 307, in which the District of Columbia Court of Appeals concluded that the applicable statutory scheme barring same sex marriage did not discriminate against gay persons, first, because marriage, by definition, is limited to opposite sex couples; id., at 361 (Terry, J.); and second, because the statute was not motivated by any invidious or discriminatory purpose. See id., at 362-63 (Steadman, J., concurring). Because the fact that marriage traditionally has been defined as a union between a man and a woman does not insulate from judicial review a statute that defines marriage in accordance with that definition, and because legislation that has a discriminatory effect may violate equal protection irrespective of the motivation underlying the enactment, we do not find Dean to be persuasive precedent. [70] In contrast to the foregoing cases, the Maryland Court of Appeals, in Conaway v. Deane, supra, 401 Md. at 278-94, 932 A.2d 571, and the Washington Supreme Court, in Andersen v. King County, supra, 158 Wash.2d at 19-24, 138 P.3d 963, did apply the four part test for determining whether a group is entitled to heightened protection in holding that gay persons do not qualify as a suspect or quasi-suspect class under the Maryland and Washington state constitutions, respectively. [71] In so concluding, both courts determined that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate, first, that homosexuality is a strictly immutable characteristic and, second, that gays and lesbians are politically powerless because of the enactment of state statutes prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination. See Conaway v. Deane, supra, at 286, 292-94, 932 A.2d 571; Andersen v. King County, supra, at 20, 21, 138 P.3d 963. For the reasons set forth in part V C and D of this opinion, we disagree with those cases because the distinguishing characteristic does not need to be strictly immutable and because legislation barring discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is insufficient to establish that gay persons possess political power adequate to counter the pervasive and extreme discrimination to which they historically have been subjected. Although the opinion of the California Supreme Court in In re Marriage Cases, supra, 43 Cal.4th at 757, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 683, 183 P.3d 384, represents the minority view, we agree fundamentally with the analysis and conclusion of that case that gay persons are entitled to heightened judicial protection as a suspect [72] class. Id., at 843, 847, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 683, 183 P.3d 384. In deciding that issue, the court first observed that the state had conceded that sexual orientation is a characteristic that (1) bears no relation to a person's ability to perform or contribute to society, (2) is associated with pernicious discrimination marked by a history of legal and social disabilities, and (3) is immutable for purposes of the suspectness inquiry. Id., at 841-42, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 683, 183 P.3d 384. Although California case law generally does not require a showing by the group seeking suspect class status that it is politically powerless, the state of California maintained that the court should adopt that requirement as a prerequisite to the recognition of a suspect class and, further, that gay persons did not meet that standard. Id., at 842-43, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 683, 183 P.3d 384. The court rejected the need for a definitive or categorical showing of political powerlessness, observing that such a requirement would be impossible to square with the fact that classifications based on gender and race continue to be treated as suspect. Id., at 843, 76 Cal. Rptr.3d 683, 183 P.3d 384. The court emphasized, rather, that the most important consideration in the determination of a group's entitlement to recognition as a suspect class is whether that group has been subjected to invidious and prejudicial treatment because of a distinguishing characteristic that bears no relation to the individual's ability to perform or contribute to society. Id. As the court explained, courts must look closely at classifications based on that characteristic lest outdated social stereotypes result in invidious laws or practices. (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. We agree with the California Supreme Court that [t]his rationale clearly applies to statutory classifications that mandate differential treatment on the basis of sexual orientation. Id. For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded by the logic or analysis of the courts that have declined to grant suspect or quasi-suspect status to gay persons. We are persuaded, rather, by the California Supreme Court in In re Marriage Cases, supra, 43 Cal.4th at 841-43, 76 Cal. Rptr.3d 683, 183 P.3d 384, and by the dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Kaye in Hernandez v. Robles, supra, 7 N.Y.3d at 387-89, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770, 855 N.E.2d 1 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). We reach this conclusion because, in our view, the California court and Chief Judge Kaye have applied the relevant criteria most objectively and with due regard for the manner in which those criteria have been applied to other quasi-suspect and suspect groups. Although the decision of the California Supreme Court and the dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Kaye reflect the minority position, we believe that they nevertheless represent the most persuasive sister state precedent. E