Opinion ID: 3036101
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: On Account of Imputed Political Opinion

Text: As the final step in establishing her asylum claim, Zhou must prove that her persecution would be on account of an imputed political opinion. “[O]ur analysis focuses on how the persecutor perceive[s] the applicant’s actions and allegiances, and what [will] motivate[ ] their abuse.” Agbuya v. INS, 241 F.3d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001). [13] The evidence shows that the Chinese government perceives Zhou’s actions as a threat to its political power—a threat that motivates the government to locate and arrest her. We have previously identified the political nature of the Chinese crackdown on the Falun Gong. In Zhang, we stated that “the government’s crackdown on Falun Gong practitioners is motivated by a perceived anti-government political opinion,” explaining in part that “the Chinese President announced that the anti-Falun Gong campaign was a major political struggle.” Zhang, 338 F.3d at 720. The current record contains similar indications. Amnesty International explains that the official ZHOU v. GONZALES 1395 crackdown on the Falun Gong was precipitated by a 10,000person, passive protest outside the Communist Party leadership compound in Beijing: The demonstrators’ purpose was to demand official status for Falun Gong and to request dialogue with the government. The authorities, however, are reported to have been mainly concerned by the capacity of the group to mobilize large numbers of followers, unnoticed, for a public demonstration. Subsequently, after some conflicting signals, they branded the Falun Gong a “threat to social and political stability.” Amnesty International, People’s Republic of China: The Crackdown on Falun Gong and other so-called “heretical organizations”, March 2000, available at . The Chinese military’s official publication, Liberation Army Daily, ran a front-page essay associating the “political ambitions” of Falun Gong’s founder with “Western anti-Chinese forces [who] have spared no effort to engage in ideological infiltration to achieve their goal of overturning our socialist system and subverting our state.” In Zhang, we acknowledged that the Chinese government imputes anti-governmental political opinions based on Falun Gong-related activities other than practice itself. In ultimately concluding that the petitioner in Zhang faced persecution based partially on an imputed anti-governmental political opinion, we repeatedly highlighted the fact that he mailed Falun Gong materials from the United States to relatives in China. See, e.g., Zhang, 388 F.3d at 718 (“The police . . . blamed [Zhang] for distributing anti-government materials . . . .”); id. at 719 (“Zhang would be arrested, imprisoned, and abused based on his practice of Falun Gong, and his distribution of Falun Gong materials to family and friends in China.” (emphasis added)). This is consistent with Professor de 1396 ZHOU v. GONZALES Lisle’s expert testimony in the present case that China perceives Falun Gong-related activities, such as leadership or distributing critical information, to constitute a greater political threat than individual practice, and punishes the different behaviors accordingly. [14] Zhou fears arrest and punishment pursuant to prohibitions that exist to punish those affiliated with the Falun Gong, whether through practice, leadership, or distribution of information. She stands accused not of practice, but of an importation and distribution activity the Chinese government views as a greater political threat. Police in China have attempted to locate and arrest Zhou for bringing into China “counterrevolutionary” (i.e., anti-governmental) materials—foreign news articles critical of the Chinese crackdown on the Falun Gong —which she gave to Su, an active Falun Gong practitioner. Consistent with our analysis in Zhang, we conclude that the arrest and punishment Zhou fears is on account of an antigovernmental political opinion imputed to her by the Chinese government. It is useful to contrast this situation with two we faced in prior cases: Abedini v. INS, 971 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1992), and Chanco v. INS, 82 F.3d 298 (9th Cir. 1996). In Abedini, we considered the Iranian government’s motive for prosecuting the petitioner for having distributed Western films. Although we acknowledged that the ban on propagating Western culture might have political undertones, we concluded that the petitioner failed to show “that the Iranian government’s potential act of persecution stemmed from its desire to single him out for unique punishment because of his actually-held or perceived-to-be-held political or religious beliefs.” Abedini, 971 F.2d at 192 n.1. We also noted: “Nor did [Abedini] testify that his movies were contrary to Islamic principles or even espoused Western beliefs, only that they were made in the West. There is no reason, therefore, for the Iranian government to attribute a special belief or opinion to Abedini.” Id. at 192. ZHOU v. GONZALES 1397 In the present case, the record shows that the Chinese government will likely arrest and imprison Zhou for importing and distributing material that criticizes the Chinese government and supports a perceived anti-governmental movement. Such activity is illegal in China precisely because the Chinese government views it as a direct political threat. There is ample reason, therefore, for the Chinese government to attribute a specific anti-governmental belief or opinion to Zhou. In Chanco, we analyzed the Filipino government’s motive for prosecuting a participant who sought asylum following a failed coup. See Chanco, 82 F.3d at 302. We cited Abedini for the proposition that “[p]ersons avoiding lawful prosecution for common crimes are not ordinarily deemed refugees.” We explained: “Participation in a coup may be distinguished from common crimes, however, in that it is usually a politically motivated act. Consequently, we must look beyond Abedini for an appropriate rule.” Id. at 301. Here, the prohibitions that exist in China for the sole purpose of stamping out the Falun Gong as a specific political opponent are not common crimes, in that their violation is perceived as a politically motivated act. We must again, therefore, look beyond Abedini for an appropriate rule. We ultimately concluded in Chanco that, because the Philippines tolerates diverse political views and peaceful protest, it did not aim to punish the petitioner’s anti-governmental political opinion, but, rather, the violent manner in which he chose to express that opinion. See id. at 302. China, by contrast, is so intolerant of criticism regarding its treatment of the Falun Gong that it has outlawed the importation of foreign news articles on the subject. As we recognized in Zhang, such prohibitions are politically motivated. [15] We conclude that the evidence compels a finding that if Zhou returns to China she faces persecution on account of an imputed anti-governmental political opinion. She has, 1398 ZHOU v. GONZALES therefore, produced compelling evidence of the final factor of her claim for asylum.