Opinion ID: 2581604
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Response to Jury Questions

Text: During penalty phase deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court asking, Life without the possibility of parole  how permanent is it? Can it be overturned by legal changes? (other than appeal.) Is there a chance for him to walk out of prison? EVER!! EXPLANATION?  Without objection from counsel, the court answered the jury by rereading the instruction that advised, A sentence of life without the possibility of parole means that Mr. Benavides will remain in state prison for the rest of his life and will not be paroled at any time. A sentence of death means that Mr. Benavides will be executed in state prison. The court then stated, That instruction answers your question. Defendant asserts that the court had a duty to admonish the jury it was not to speculate about how future changes in the law might affect defendant's sentence, and to guide the jury into consideration of only relevant evidence, and failed to do so. Defendant made no objection to the court's explanatory response to the jury's question, and, accordingly forfeited his present argument. ( People v. Martinez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 673, 698, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 648, 74 P.3d 748.) Had it been properly presented, it would fail on the merits. Our holding in People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 207 Cal.Rptr. 800, 689 P.2d 430, precludes either court or counsel from advising the jury regarding the Governor's power to commute both a sentence of death and a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Such advice violates the guarantee of a fair decisionmaking process because it invites the jury to speculate about the future actions of unknown persons, directs the jury's attention away from its proper function of weighing aggravating and mitigating factors, and renders arbitrary the decision regarding defendant's punishment. ( Id. at p. 157, 207 Cal.Rptr. 800, 689 P.2d 430.) When the jury makes a specific inquiry about how a postconviction proceeding such as commutation might affect defendant's sentence, we have suggested that trial courts issue a short statement emphasizing that it would be a violation of the jury's duty to consider the possibility of commutation in determining the appropriate sentence. ( People v. Ramos, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 159, fn. 12, 207 Cal.Rptr. 800, 689 P.2d 430.) But such an instruction is not mandatory (see People v. Bonillas (1989) 48 Cal.3d 757, 798, 257 Cal.Rptr. 895, 771 P.2d 844), and we have not required the trial court to address information generally relating to matters of common knowledge appreciated by every juror who must choose between a death sentence and a sentence of life without parole such as changes in the law ( Hovey, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 581, 244 Cal.Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776). The court's response did not, contrary to defendant's assertions, mislead the jury into improper speculation. By remaining silent on the question regarding the effect changes in the law might have on defendant's sentence and stating, That instruction answers your question, the trial court essentially focused the jury's attention on the choice they were charged with making  whether defendant was to remain in prison for the rest of his life, or be executed in prison. Defendant further argues the failure to admonish the jury violated his rights to due process and a reliable penalty determination under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and parallel provisions of the state Constitution. This claim fails because, as we have concluded, the court did not err.