Opinion ID: 4516935
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interpreting “Public Need”

Text: [¶22] We apply a two-part inquiry “[w]hen reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute that is both administered by the agency and within the agency’s expertise.” Competitive Energy Servs. LLC v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, NextEra also asserts that the Commission failed to identify a public need for a certain number 13 of megawatts of energy, not contracted for, that the NECEC is capable of delivering. Because the statute requires a determination of public need only for the transmission line itself, and not for its particular capacity, we find this argument to be unpersuasive and do not address it further. 12 2003 ME 12, ¶ 15, 818 A.2d 1039. First, we determine de novo whether the statute is ambiguous. Id. Next, if the statute is unambiguous we apply its plain meaning, but if it is ambiguous we “review the Commission’s construction of the ambiguous statute for reasonableness.” Id. “Statutory language is considered ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations.” Scamman v. Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc., 2017 ME 41, ¶ 14, 157 A.3d 223 (quotation marks omitted). [¶23] Section 3132 provides, in part, that “a person may not construct any transmission line . . . unless the commission has issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity approving construction.” Pursuant to section 3132(6), “the commission shall make specific findings with regard to the public need for the proposed transmission line. . . . [I]f the commission finds that a public need exists, after considering whether the need can be economically and reliably met using nontransmission alternatives, it shall issue a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the transmission line.” (Emphasis added.) Although section 3132(6) does not define “public need,” it does at least provide factors for the Commission to consider to determine public need: In determining public need, the commission shall, at a minimum, take into account economics, reliability, public health and safety, scenic, historic and recreational values, state renewable energy generation goals, the proximity of the proposed transmission line 13 to inhabited dwellings and alternatives to construction of the transmission line, including energy conservation, distributed generation or load management. [¶24] Furthermore, the Commission rules do define “public need.” Chapter 330 of those rules establishes filing requirements pursuant to section 3132, and section 9(A) of Chapter 330 sets forth the standards for granting a CPCN, directing the Commission to make specific findings with regard to the need for the proposed transmission line in accordance with 3132(6). 65-407 C.M.R. ch. 330, § 9(A). Section 9(B) of Chapter 330 is titled “Public Need Defined.” It states: The Commission establishes public need by determining that ratepayers will benefit by the proposed transmission line. Benefits are determined based upon the electrical need for the line, taking into account [the section 3132(6) factors] . . . . Cost is an important consideration, but public need can be established for a proposed transmission line that is not the least cost alternative because aesthetic, environmental or other factors justify a reasonable cost increase. Id. § 9(B) (emphasis added). [¶25] The Commission interpreted the public need standard as “essentially a general standard of meeting the public interest,” requiring a careful weighing of the project’s benefits and costs to Maine ratepayers and residents. The Commission contends that, “[u]nder the circumstances of this proceeding,” its application of the public need standard was consistent with 14 section 3132(6) and Chapter 330. CMP maintains that the statute does not plainly compel a contrary result because the Commission’s “comparison of costs and benefits to Maine and Maine ratepayers is precisely what is required in the public need analysis, as reflected in section 3132(6), Chapter 330, and [this] Court’s previous definition of public necessity and convenience.” See Enhanced Commc’ns of N. New England v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 2017 ME 178, ¶ 11 n.4, 169 A.3d 408. [¶26] Given the breadth of the concept of “public need” combined with the absence of any legislative definition, we must conclude that the term is ambiguous, and we cannot say that the Commission erred as matter of law by concluding that the term “public need” is a general standard of meeting the public interest. “An agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute it administers is reviewed with great deference and will be upheld unless the statute plainly compels a contrary result.” Cent. Maine Power Co., 2014 ME 56, ¶ 18, 90 A.3d 451 (quotation marks omitted); see also Enhanced Commc’ns, 2017 ME 178, ¶ 7, 169 A.3d 408. The Commission’s interpretation of its own rules, regulations and procedures is similarly entitled to considerable deference. Enhanced Commc’ns, 2017 ME 178, ¶ 7, 169 A.3d 408; Cent. Maine Power Co., 2014 ME 56, ¶ 18, 90 A.3d 451. 15 [¶27] The Commission’s definition is consistent with its rules, the legislative intent reflected in the statute, and Maine jurisprudence. See Enhanced Commc’ns, 2017 ME 178, ¶ 11 n.4, 169 A.3d 408. In this context, the Commission’s interpretation of the term “public need” and the manner in which it is to be determined was not error.