Opinion ID: 2559480
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Denial of the Motions to Suppress

Text: Our review of a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress is limited. Jones v. United States, 972 A.2d 821, 824 (D.C.2009); see also Brown v. United States, 590 A.2d 1008, 1020 (D.C.1991). We take care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). Moreover, [w]e view the evidence presented at the suppression hearing in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below, and we draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Womack v. United States, 673 A.2d 603, 607 (D.C.1996) (citing Peay v. United States, 597 A.2d 1318, 1320 (D.C. 1991) (en banc)). Nevertheless, we review the trial court's legal conclusions de novo. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 700, 116 S.Ct. 1657. It is well established that [t]he Fourth Amendment permits a police officer to stop an individual for investigatory purposes so long as the officer possesses a reasonable suspicion supported by specific and articulable facts that the individual is involved in criminal activity. Milline v. United States, 856 A.2d 616, 619 (D.C. 2004) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868). While articulable suspicion is ... substantially less than probable cause [and] ... considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence[,] United States v. Turner, 699 A.2d 1125, 1128 (D.C.1997) (quoting Brown, 590 A.2d at 1014), an officer must have more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch to justify a stop. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). Moreover, that reasonable suspicion must be particularized as to the individual stopped. In re A.S., 614 A.2d 534, 537 (D.C.1992). In evaluating the legality of a stop, we do not examine each factor in isolation from [the] other[s], United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 275, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002), but instead consider the totality of the circumstances. Turner, 699 A.2d at 1128. Those circumstances are to be viewed through the eyes of a ... cautious police officer on the scene guided by his experience and training. Cousart v. United States, 618 A.2d 96, 100 (D.C.1992) (en banc) (quotations omitted). In other words, the evidence must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). Even if each specific act by a suspect could be perceived in isolation as an innocent act, the observing police officer may see a combination of facts that make out an articulable suspicion. Peay, 597 A.2d at 1320 (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990)); see also Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9-10, 109 S.Ct. 1581 (same). Mr. Hampleton asserts that Officer Antoine did not have particularized suspicion to justify the stop in this case. His argument rests on the admittedly vague language of the first lookout given after the robbery, which described the suspects as black males in dark clothing. Mr. Hampleton contends that, because this description could apply equally to large numbers of people, the lookout could not have provided a meaningful basis for an investigative stop. See In re T.L.L., 729 A.2d 334, 340 (D.C.1999). To support this argument, he principally relies on two cases from this court, In re T.L.L. and In re A.S., 614 A.2d 534 (D.C.1992). In In re T.L.L., we reversed a conviction because the broadcast description for black teenagers wearing dark clothing ... could have fit many if not most young black men. 729 A.2d at 340. In In re A.S., we held that the stop was unlawful because the description (which contained no information of height, weight, build, facial hair or features) matched a number of black males in the immediate area. 614 A.2d at 539-42. Although Mr. Hampleton correctly asserts that the descriptions broadcast in In re T.L.L. and In re A.S. were similar to the lookout in his case, his reliance on those cases is misplaced for two reasons. First, a substantial factor underlying our reasoning in both cases was that they involved dragnet-style seizures of many individuals who matched the same general description. See In re A.S., 614 A.2d at 540 ([T]he kind of dragnet seizure of three youths who resembled a generalized description cannot be squared with the long-standing requirement for particularized, individualized suspicion.). In our case, in contrast, Mr. Hampleton was the only one in the immediate area who fit the lookout description, and the only person whom Officer Antoine stopped. Secondly, and more fundamentally, Mr. Hampleton's focus on the vague nature of the lookout in his case overlooks the force of our well established precedent that the reasonableness of a stop is to be judged based on the totality of the circumstances. As we noted in In re T.L.L., the fact that a description is vague does not foreclose a finding of reasonable suspicion. 729 A.2d at 340. Instead, [w]hile a description applicable to large numbers of people will not suffice to justify the seizure of an individual ... other circumstances can provide sufficient particularity to support a stop. Turner, 699 A.2d at 1128-29 (citing Brown v. United States, 590 A.2d at 1017). Numerous cases in this jurisdiction illustrate the kinds of other circumstances that can contribute to a finding of reasonable suspicion. [9] In United States v. Turner , we examined a trial court's decision to suppress the fruits of a Terry stop conducted after a lookout was broadcast for a black male ... wearing a black jacket and blue jeans near a particular address. 699 A.2d at 1127. We reversed, concluding that the trial court had focused too narrowly on the lack of detail in the lookout. Id. at 1128. We held there was sufficient evidence of criminal activity to support the stop because there was a close spatial and temporal proximity between the reported crime and seizure. Id. at 1129. Similarly in United States v. Smart, 321 U.S.App. D.C. 216, 219-22, 98 F.3d 1379, 1382-85 (1996), the D.C. Circuit upheld a stop based on a lookout for a black man, wearing a black jacket, black shirt, and a black pair of pants, even though there were other people in the area and the police stopped another person at the same time. The court held that the officer had particularized suspicion because the defendant was the only person who matched the description and he was stopped twenty-five to thirty seconds after it was broadcast. Id. In contrast, in In re T.L.L., there was no evidence at all that T.L.L. personally matched the lookout and no showing of immediacy, either temporal or spatial. 729 A.2d at 340-41. Taking into account the totality of the circumstances, we are satisfied that this recordlooked at in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court's judgmentsupports a finding of reasonable articulable suspicion. Although, considered in isolation, the broadcast for black males in dark clothing might well have fallen short of the individualized suspicion that Terry and its progeny require, [10] the surrounding circumstances provided the particularity needed to stop Mr. Hampleton. At the moment he spotted Mr. Hampleton, Officer Antoine was responding to a broadcast for five or six suspects who had perpetrated an armed robbery. He knew that the suspects had crashed their Jeep, bailed out, and fled into and around the grounds of Archbishop Carroll High Schoola short distance from where Mr. Hampleton was found ten to fifteen minutes later. Moreover, seconds before seeing Mr. Hampleton on North Capitol Street, Officer Antoine heard Officer Neffon's broadcast that she had spotted at least one suspect attempting to climb the fence around Archbishop Carroll to get from the school grounds onto that street. In the midst of this chaotic and ongoing criminal investigation, Mr. Hampleton appeared, walking alone on a deserted grassy area along North Capitol Street at 10:30 p.m. Not only did he match the description of the robbery suspects as a black male in dark clothing, but Mr. Hampleton was the only person in the area that Officer Antoine saw at all. Given this connection, the closeness in time and area of the bailout and the stop, and the clear indication that at least one of the robbers had fled across the high school grounds toward North Capitol Street, we agree with the trial court's ruling. See Tetaz v. District of Columbia, 976 A.2d 907, 914 n. 7 (D.C. 2009) (In a case concerning `a fast-moving sequence of events involving a number of law enforcement officers at several different locations,' this court applies the doctrine of collective knowledge in deciding whether police action was justified. (quoting McFerguson v. United States, 770 A.2d 66, 72-74 (D.C.2001))); Umanzor v. United States, 803 A.2d 983, 995 (D.C.2002) (upholding a stop conducted by an officer who faced circumstances during a `swiftly developing situation' which warranted the minor intrusion of an investigative detention in order to dispel his suspicions (quotations and citations omitted)). In light of our responsibility to refrain from `indulg[ing] in unrealistic second-guessing' of the police officer's judgment, we affirm the trial court's decision to deny the motions to suppress. See ( Chauncy) Turner v. United States, 623 A.2d 1170, 1173 (D.C.1993) (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985)); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 15, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (discussing the imprudence of a rigid, unthinking application of the exclusionary rule). Although Officer Antoine theoretically might have satisfied his duties by attempting to engage Mr. Hampleton in a consensual encounter before initiating a Fourth Amendment seizure, he was not required to do so. See Womack, 673 A.2d at 613 (whether there is a `least intrusive' alternative available to the officers ... is not the appropriate Fourth Amendment inquiry); see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 n. 12, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976) (The logic of such elaborate less-restrictive-alternative arguments could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all search-and-seizure powers.). Moreover, given that Officer Antoine was looking for fleeing armed robbers, he did not act unreasonably by proceeding cautiously under these circumstances.