Opinion ID: 1877633
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: specificity and amendment of pleading

Text: A Decisions concerning the meaning and scope of pleading, and decisions granting or denying motions to amend pleadings, are within the sound discretion of the trial court and reversal is only appropriate when the trial court abuses that discretion. Dacon v. Transue, 441 Mich. 315, 328, 490 N.W.2d 369 (1992); Ben P Fyke & Sons v. Gunter Co., 390 Mich. 649, 658, 213 N.W.2d 134 (1973). B We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion in holding that plaintiff's complaint did not sufficiently plead a claim for pain and suffering from her pulmonary injury. MCR 2.111(B)(1) requires that a complaint be specific enough to reasonably inform the adverse party of the nature of the claims against him. This Court, in Dacon, supra at 329, 490 N.W.2d 369, explained that [t]his rule is designed to avoid two opposite, but equivalent, evils. At one extreme lies the straightjacket of ancient forms of action. Courts would summarily dismiss suits when plaintiffs could not fit the facts into these abstract conceptual packages. At the other extreme lies ambiguous and uninformative pleading. Leaving a defendant to guess upon what grounds plaintiff believes recovery is justified violates basic notions of fair play and substantial justice. Extreme formalism and extreme ambiguity interfere equivalently with the ability of the judicial system to resolve a dispute on the merits. The former leads to dismissal of potentially meritorious claims while the latter undermines a defendant's opportunity to present a defense.... Neither is acceptable. In medical malpractice actions, a plaintiff must allege, with reasonable definiteness and certainty, every fact necessary to constitute a cause of action. Dacon, supra at 332-333, 490 N.W.2d 369; Simonelli v. Cassidy, 336 Mich. 635, 644, 59 N.W.2d 28 (1953). To establish medical malpractice, a plaintiff must establish the following elements: (1) the applicable standard of care, (2) breach of that standard, (3) injury, and (4) proximate causation between the alleged breach and the injury. Locke, supra at 222, 521 N.W.2d 786. C Turning to the case before this Court, plaintiff argues that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that her complaint did not sufficiently plead a claim for pain and suffering from her pulmonary injury. We disagree and hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Plaintiff's first amended complaint was not specific enough to reasonably inform defendants of a claim for pulmonary injury. Paragraph 29, the section of plaintiff's complaint addressing the proximate cause and injury elements of plaintiff's malpractice claim, did not mention pulmonary injury. Rather, it only addressed the injury of plaintiff's kidneys: As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned acts of negligence and malpractice as described in paragraphs 26 and 28, Plaintiff, Kimberly Weymers, has suffered and continues to suffer severe and grievous injuries and damages, including, but not limited to, the following: A. Significant medical expenses, past, present and future. B. Loss of earnings and earning capacity. C. Severe physical and mental pain and suffering, anxiety, emotional anguish, embarrassment, humiliation and loss of natural enjoyments of life. D. Permanent loss of all renal [ [21] ] function requiring periodic and frequent dialysis. [ [22] ] [Emphasis added.] We are not persuaded by plaintiff's argument that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to recognize that plaintiff's general allegation of pain and suffering encompassed her claim for pulmonary injury. A plaintiff in a malpractice action cannot make a general allegation of pain and suffering and expect the defendant to determine without any guidance from the plaintiff which injury formed the basis of the pain and suffering. See Dacon, supra at 330, 490 N.W.2d 369 (concluding that pleadings that alleg[e] everything... allege[ ] nothing [and] ... are not proper under MCR 2.111). Moreover, unlike plaintiff's claim for pulmonary injury, defendants were on notice of plaintiff's claim for pain and suffering resulting from her kidney failure because plaintiff specifically alleged in paragraph 29 of her complaint that she suffered injury to her kidneys. The only arguable mention of pulmonary injury in plaintiff's complaint were in the sections addressing defendants Dr. Khera's and Walled Lake Medical Center's alleged breach of the standard of care: Failure [of Dr. Khera] to obtain appropriate consultations in a timely manner, including a nephrology consult and a pulmonary consult. [¶ 32.][ [23] ] Failure [of Walled Lake Medical Center] to refer Kimberly Weymers for appropriate consultation in light of her presenting [sic] history, signs and symptoms, including a consultation with an internist, pulmonologist or nephrologist. [¶ 28.][ [24] ] We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that this hint of pulmonary injury was insufficient to put defendants on notice. [25] Thus, the trial court's determination that plaintiff's claim for pulmonary injury was not sufficiently pleaded was not an abuse of discretion. D We next address whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow plaintiff to amend her complaint to include a claim for pain and suffering from her pulmonary injury. If a court grants summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8), (9), or (10), the court must give the parties an opportunity to amend their pleadings pursuant to MCR 2.118, unless the amendment would be futile. MCR 2.116(I)(5). MCR 2.118(A)(2) provides that leave to amend a pleading shall be freely given when justice so requires. Under subrule A(3), the court can order the amending party to compensate the opposing party for the additional expense caused by the late amendment, including reasonable attorney fees. A motion to amend ordinarily should be granted, and should be denied only for the following particularized reasons: [1] undue delay, [2] bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, [3] repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, [4] undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and 5] futility.... [ Fyke, supra at 656, 213 N.W.2d 134.] If a trial court denies a motion to amend, it should specifically state on the record the reasons for its decision. Id. at 656-657, 213 N.W.2d 134. Delay, alone, does not warrant denial of a motion to amend. Fyke, supra at 663-664, 213 N.W.2d 134. However, a court may deny a motion to amend if the delay was in bad faith or if the opposing party suffered actual prejudice as a result. Id. Prejudice in this context does not mean that the allowance of the proffered amendment may cause the opposing party to ultimately lose on the merits. Id. at 657, 213 N.W.2d 134. Rather, prejudice exists if the amendment would prevent the opposing party from receiving a fair trial, if for example, the opposing party would not be able to properly contest the matter raised in the amendment because important witnesses have died or necessary evidence has been destroyed or lost. Id. at 663, 213 N.W.2d 134. In Fyke, we suggested that there may be some cases in which the delay is so long and the amendment so substantial that the opposing party would be denied a fair trial by the delay, and therefore be prejudiced: The litigation may proceed to a point where the opposing party cannot reasonably be expected to defend against the amendment; this is an especially pertinent factor on the eve of, during, or after trial. [ Id. ] We reaffirm this principle, but clarify its application. We hold that a trial court may find prejudice when the moving party seeks to add a new claim or a new theory of recovery on the basis of the same set of facts, after discovery is closed, just before trial, and the opposing party shows that he did not have reasonable notice, from any source, that the moving party would rely on the new claim or theory at trial. [26] We recognize that parties ought to be afforded great latitude in amending their pleading before trial, however, that interest must be weighed against the parties' and the public's interest in the speedy resolution of disputes. As Judge John L. Coffey of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explained: While Fed.R.Civ.P. 15[ [27] ] favors amendments when required by justice, it is not a license for carelessness or gamesmanship. Parties to litigation have an interest in speedy resolution of their disputes without undue expense. Substantive amendments to the complaint just before trial are not to be countenanced and only serve to defeat these interests. The district court must consider the harm when deciding whether to grant leave. Defense of a new claim obviously will require additional rounds of discovery, in all probability interview of new witnesses, gathering of further evidence, and the identification of appropriate legal arguments. All this necessarily takes time. The parties must have an opportunity for preparation if trial is to be meaningful and clear. Some delay of trial therefore is inevitablea natural consequence of allowing claims to be brought at all. In this sense, delay alone is not a sufficient basis for refusing an amendment. On the other hand, amendments near the time set for trial may require postponement when the same allegations made earlier would have afforded ample time to prepare without delay. Plaintiff is not entitled to impede justice by imposing even reasonable preparation intervals seriatim. Cf. Ins v. Abudu, [485 U.S. 94, 95], 108 S.Ct. 904, 913, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988) (strong public interest in bringing litigation to a close as promptly as is consistent with the interest in giving the adversaries a fair opportunity to develop and present their respective cases). Whether it results from bad faith or mere absentmindedness, a district judge may act to deter such artificial protraction of litigation, and its costs to all concerned, by denying the amendment. Zenith Radio Corp. [ v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. ], 401 U.S. [321], 330, [91 S.Ct. 795, 802, 28 L.Ed.2d 77 (1971) ]; Bohen [ v. City of East Chicago, Ind. ], 799 F.2d [1180], 1184-1185 [C.A.7, 1986]. [ Feldman v. Allegheny Int'l Inc., 850 F.2d 1217, 1225-1226 (C.A.7, 1988).] The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit further explained in Priddy v. Edelman, 883 F.2d 438, 446-447 (C.A.6, 1989): A party is not entitled to wait until the discovery cutoff date has passed and a motion for summary judgment has been filed on the basis of claims asserted in the original complaint before introducing entirely different legal theories in an amended complaint.... In complex cases such as this one, ... it is particularly likely that drastic amendments on the eve of trial will prejudice the defendants.... Putting the defendants through the time and expense of continued litigation on a new theory, with the possibility of additional discovery, would be manifestly unfair and unduly prejudicial. [Citations omitted.][ [28] ] E Turning to the case now before this Court, plaintiff attempted to amend paragraph 29 of her complaint to add the following subparagraph: Physical and mental pain and suffering resulting from the aggravation of the pulmonary pathology. Defendants opposed the motion, asserting that they would be prejudiced by the amendment because plaintiff was introducing her claim for pulmonary injury for the first time just before trial was scheduled to begin. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion, focusing on the length of the delay and on defendants' lack of notice of plaintiff's new claim: The Court is satisfied that this is a 1991 case. The Defendants did not have notice that the general damage element of pain and suffering was specific to the damages arising out of pulmonary pathology. Defendants prepared for trial and the Defendants prepared for mediation, the Court is satisfied, due to the loss of renal function. And despite the Plaintiff's contentions, the Court's [sic] satisfied that the Motion for Amendment of the Complaint, Second Amended Complaint, should be denied, and I do so. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, holding that it abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to amend because the evidence established that defendants had notice of potential pulmonary complications and thus would not have been unduly prejudiced.... 210 Mich.App. at 241, 533 N.W.2d 334. In doing so, the Court of Appeals rejected defendants' argument that plaintiff's amendment sought to add a new theory to the case. Id. at 242, 533 N.W.2d 334. Contrary to the Court of Appeals assertion, we hold that plaintiff's amendment did seek to introduce a new theory or claim into the case and that defendants did not have reasonable notice that plaintiff would rely on that new theory at trial. Plaintiff argues that her amendment sought to change the type of damages sought, not add a different claim or theory to the case, and that, therefore, on the basis of Sherrard v. Stevens, 176 Mich.App. 650, 654, 440 N.W.2d 2 (1988), she was entitled to the amendment. In Sherrard, supra at 655, 440 N.W.2d 2, the Court of Appeals held: While we note that the amendment came shortly before trial, we also note that the amendment did not raise new factual allegations, but merely claimed new types of damages arising from the same set of factual allegations. Accordingly, we do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion to amend the complaint. Plaintiff's argument is unpersuasive because her case is distinguishable from Sherrard. In Sherrard, the plaintiffs sought to amend their legal malpractice complaint to add a prayer for exemplary damages. Plaintiff Weymers, on the other hand, sought to amend her complaint to change the type of injury she claimed was proximately caused by defendants' negligence. [29] Therefore, plaintiff's amendment is more appropriately characterized as raising a new claim or theory, not a new type of damages. Plaintiff's argument that defendants had reasonable notice of her pulmonary claim is also unpersuasive. Although deposition testimony, [30] medical records, [31] and the mediation summary [32] suggested that defendants had knowledge that Goodpasture's syndrome causes pulmonary injury and that plaintiff suffered such injury, defendants had no notice that plaintiff was intending to assert a claim for pulmonary injury at trial. [33] This distinction is significant. If defendants had no notice that plaintiff was intending to assert an independent claim for pulmonary injury, the brief mention of pulmonary injury during the discovery process cannot reasonably be said to automatically make its later appearance as a claim nonprejudicial against defendants. Given the wide latitude of the discovery rules, see MCR 2.302(B), as far as defendants were concerned, the sporadic mention of pulmonary injury during discovery could have been simply fortuitous. Plaintiff also relies on Terhaar v. Hoekwater, 182 Mich.App. 747, 752, 452 N.W.2d 905 (1990), in support of her contention that defendants had reasonable notice of her claim for pulmonary injury. Plaintiff's reliance on Terhaar is misguided because in Terhaar, unlike the case now before us, the plaintiff not only investigated and pursued her new theory during discovery, she also notified the defendant during discovery that she would pursue that theory at trial. [34] Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to amend because the amendment sought to introduce a new claim just before trial, after discovery had closed, and defendants demonstrated that they did not have knowledge that plaintiff was intending to rely on the new claim at trial.