Opinion ID: 1907350
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Remaining Claims 3.850 Appeal

Text: The remainder of the claims presented in Elledge's 3.850 appeal [24] are either procedurally barred or meritless and will not be addressed at length. [25] Elledge's contention that his now thirty-one-year stay on death row violates international law is procedurally barred as it could have but was not raised on direct appeal and is also meritless. See Knight, 746 So.2d at 437 (summarily denying the claim that Florida had forfeited its right to execute Knight under binding norms of international law). The ineffective assistance of counsel claim predicated on trial counsel's failure to object to the trial court's instruction regarding expert testimony fails because the trial court provided the standard jury instruction. [26] See Thompson v. State, 759 So.2d 650, 665 (Fla.2000) (holding that it is not deficient performance when counsel fails to object to a standard instruction which has not been invalidated by this Court). With regard to Elledge's claim regarding the constitutionality of the rule governing an attorney's ability to interview jurors, we determine that the substantive constitutional challenge to the rule governing juror interviews is procedurally barred as it was not raised on direct appeal. [27] See Rose v. State, 774 So.2d 629, 637 n. 12 (Fla.2000) (holding that the claim attacking the constitutionality of the Florida Bar Rule of Professional Conduct governing interviews of jurors [was] procedurally barred because Rose could have raised this issue on direct appeal). Procedural bar notwithstanding, Elledge's claim lacks merit. See Johnson v. State, 804 So.2d 1218, 1224-25 (Fla.2001) (rejecting contention that Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-3.5(d)(4) conflicts with defendant's constitutional rights to a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel). Elledge's contention that he is innocent of the death penalty was decided adversely to Elledge on direct appeal and is not cognizable in the postconviction proceeding. This Court affirmed Elledge's sentence of death, specifically concluding that the trial court had not erred when it independently weighed the aggravation and mitigation and explained that the four statutory aggravating factors, which were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, substantially outweighed the three non-statutory mitigating factors. Elledge IV, 706 So.2d at 1346. On this basis, Elledge's nested argument that the death sentence is disproportionate in his case similarly fails. The related contention regarding the trial court's misstatement of Dr. Caddy's conclusion was decided adversely to Elledge on direct appeal. See Elledge IV, 706 So.2d at 1347 (determining that the trial court's misstatement of Dr. Caddy's views constituted harmless error). Elledge's contention that Florida's capital sentencing statute fails to prevent the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty and violates the due process guarantees against cruel and unusual punishment comprises several subparts. [28] With the exception of the constitutional challenges to the murder in the course of a felony aggravator and the allegedly inconsistent application of aggravating factors, each of the discrete constitutional challenges raised is procedurally barred because it was not raised on direct appeal. Moreover, each has been decided adversely to Elledge. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255-56, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976) (upholding constitutionality of Florida's death penalty statute against multiple challenges, including challenge based on vagueness and overbreadth of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the lack of guidance for the jury in weighing such factors); Lugo v. State, 845 So.2d 74, 119 (Fla.2003) (reiterating that this Court has rejected the contention that the death penalty system is unconstitutional as being arbitrary and capricious because it fails to limit the class of persons eligible for the death penalty); Freeman v. State, 761 So.2d 1055, 1067 (Fla.2000) (rejecting as meritless the argument that the same felony underlying a felony murder conviction cannot be used as an aggravating factor); Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784, 794 n. 7 (Fla.1992) (rejecting as meritless claim regarding the lack of an independent reweighing of aggravating and mitigating factors). Elledge also claims that execution by electrocution or lethal injection constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. This claim has been decided. See Elledge IV, 706 So.2d at 1342 n. 4 & 1347 n. 9; see also, e.g., Sochor v. State, 883 So.2d 766, 789 (Fla.2004); Provenzano v. Moore, 744 So.2d 413, 415 (Fla. 1999). Finally, Elledge's contention that the postconviction trial judge failed to conduct a proper cumulative review analysis fails. In denying Elledge's Brady claim pertaining to the State's purported failure to disclose a copy of the EEG report prepared by Dr. Norman, the trial court stated: Based upon the evidence received at the hearing, and this Court's review of the record, the Defendant has failed to establish any Brady violation with regard to Dr. Norman's report. (Emphasis supplied). This statement undermines Elledge's contention that the trial court erred in not reviewing all of the evidence presented to determine the impact of the State's alleged failure to disclose the report. Moreover, this Court has determined that where individual claims are meritless, there is no cumulative effect to consider. See Johnson v. State, 769 So.2d 990, 1006 (Fla.2000) (holding that there is no cumulative effect where alleged errors are either procedurally barred or meritless).