Opinion ID: 2674677
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: except for mr. carlton’s claim for

Text: INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AGAINST ADOPTION CENTER, THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED MR. CARLTON’S TORT CLAIMS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ¶35 In his Amended Petition, Mr. Carlton asserted six tort claims against Adoption Center and Ms. Brown. These claims were for (1) fraud, (2) tortious interference with parental rights, (3) pattern of unlawful activity, (4) civil conspiracy, (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and (6) negligent infliction of emotional distress. In its order, the district court dismissed all of these claims due to lack of standing, or, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of all the tort claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, except for the claim for IIED against Adoption Center. As discussed below, because Mr. Carlton has failed to properly serve Ms. Brown with the Amended Complaint, either personally or via alternative service, the district court’s dismissal of the IIED claim against 14 Cite as: 2014 UT 6 Opinion of the Court Ms. Brown was proper. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of this claim. But we reverse the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Carlton’s IIED claim against Adoption Center. The district court’s ground for dismissal of that claim was Mr. Carlton’s failure to establish parental rights to the child. Our opinion renders this ground inadequate, however, because the question of whether Mr. Carlton may be able to establish his parental rights depends upon the outcome of the constitutional challenges that were also erroneously dismissed by the district court. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of Mr. Carlton’s IIED claim against Adoption Center and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. A. Mr. Carlton’s Fraud Claim Fails Because There Was No Detrimental Reliance ¶36 The district court dismissed Mr. Carlton’s fraud claims due to his failure to plead fraud with particularity, and because even if the cause of action was properly pled, Mr. Carlton had not suffered any injury, since the fraud occurred after Ms. Brown had already relinquished her parental rights to the child. Mr. Carlton argues that the district court’s dismissal was improper because “[t]here was considerable evidence of . . . fraud in the case.” We disagree and affirm the district court’s dismissal, except that we affirm the dismissal without prejudice. ¶37 In order to properly assert a claim for fraud, the plaintiff must show the following nine elements: (1) a representation; (2) concerning a presently existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage.25 25 Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, ¶ 53 n.38, 201 P.3d 966 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 15 CARLTON v. BROWN Opinion of the Court ¶38 Additionally, rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that “[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.” This means that “a complaint cannot survive dismissal by pleading mere conclusory allegations unsupported . . . by a recitation of relevant surrounding facts.”26 In other words, “the mere recitation by a plaintiff of the elements of fraud in a complaint does not satisfy the particularity requirement”27—only “a sufficiently clear and specific description of the facts underlying the [plaintiff’s] claim of [fraud] will satisfy the requirements of rule 9(b).”28 ¶39 We agree with the district court’s determination that even if the allegations in Mr. Carlton’s Amended Petition were sufficient to satisfy the requirement to plead fraud with particularity, his fraud claim would still fail because he has failed to plead detrimental reliance on such statements. Although Mr. Carlton alleges that his failure to file a timely petition to establish paternity was due to Ms. Brown’s fraud, it is undisputed that the fraudulent statements he identifies occurred after Ms. Brown had already relinquished her rights to Adoption Center. Thus, by the time the statements were made, Mr. Carlton’s petition would still have been untimely under Utah law, and thus he cannot show detrimental reliance. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of this claim, but without prejudice. B. Tortious Interference with Parental Rights ¶40 Mr. Carlton acknowledges that there currently is no cause of action for tortious interference with parental rights but nevertheless urges us to recognize that cause of action. We decline to do so for several reasons. ¶41 Mr. Carlton has not given us adequate reason to adopt a new tort. While it may be true that we have “the ability and 26 State v. Apotex Corp., 2012 UT 36, ¶ 21, 282 P.3d 66 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 27 Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ¶ 16, 70 P.3d 35. 28 Hill v. Allred, 2001 UT 16, ¶ 14, 28 P.3d 1271 (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 16 Cite as: 2014 UT 6 Opinion of the Court discretion to fashion a remedy where one may not already exist, based on sound principles of fairness and equity,” Mr. Carlton does not cite to any legal authority for his position, does not develop any preexisting authority, nor does he adequately demonstrate how the remedies that are currently available to him are inadequate to address his alleged injuries. In fact, Mr. Carlton does not even propose or discuss any legal standard for the tort he wishes us to adopt. Instead, he merely cites to a Virginia Supreme Court decision wherein the tort was recognized, referring to its “high persuasive value” but then fails to indicate why we should view it as persuasive or adopt the standard used therein. Therefore, due primarily to the inadequacy of Mr. Carlton’s brief, we decline to consider whether this tort ought to be recognized in Utah and affirm the district court’s dismissal of this claim, with prejudice. C. Pattern of Unlawful Activity Claim ¶42 Mr. Carlton argues that Adoption Center is liable for a pattern of unlawful activity because it “intentionally keep[s birth fathers] ‘in the dark’ about adoption plans” and “felonious[ly gifts] apartment, rent, utilities, various amenities, and most astonishingly ‘post placement’ case money of $3,000 - $4,000 to birth mothers.” The district court dismissed this claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We affirm the district court’s dismissal, but without prejudice. ¶43 Under Utah’s Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act (UPUA),29 the plaintiff must show injury due to a “pattern of unlawful activity,” which is defined by UPUA as follows: ’Pattern of unlawful activity’ means engaging in conduct which constitutes the commission of at least three episodes of unlawful activity, which episodes are not isolated, but have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics. Taken together, the episodes shall demonstrate continuing unlawful 29 UTAH CODE §§ 76-10-1601–76-10-1609. 17 CARLTON v. BROWN Opinion of the Court conduct and be related either to each other or to the enterprise.30 ¶44 With respect to this definition, we have clarified that “[t]he proper test for determining whether there was a pattern of unlawful activity is whether there was ‘a series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of time’ or a demonstrated threat of continuing unlawful activity and not whether there were multiple schemes.”31 ¶45 Additionally, UPUA requires plaintiffs to plead all claims with particularity: “In all actions under this section, the elements of each claim or cause of action shall be stated with particularity against each defendant.”32 This requirement is imposed “in order for the court to determine whether the facts as pleaded are sufficient to show that the alleged activity would be illegal in Utah and would fall into one of the [statute’s] enumerated categories.”33 Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of this claim for failure to state a claim, but dismiss it without prejudice. ¶46 The district court correctly observed that Mr. Carlton’s Amended Petition failed to (1) plead his claim for pattern of unlawful activity with particularity and (2) demonstrate “at least three episodes” of unlawful activity. Indeed, on appeal Mr. Carlton merely alleges that Adoption Center is involved in an “ill-conceived scheme to prevent birth fathers from exercising their parental rights and otherwise timely objecting to the adoption of their children.” He does not state with specificity who, when, where, or what has happened in furtherance of this scheme, nor has he shown how this activity satisfies UPUA’s definition of “unlawful activity.”34 30 Id. § 76-10-1602(2) (emphasis added). 31 Hill v. Estate of Allred, 2009 UT 28, ¶ 41, 216 P.3d 929 (quoting H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 242 (1989)). 32 UTAH CODE § 76-10-1605(7). 33Holbrook v. Master Prot. Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 302 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). 34 UTAH CODE § 76-10-1602(4)(a)–(jjjj). 18 Cite as: 2014 UT 6 Opinion of the Court ¶47 The district court also correctly noted that even if Mr. Carlton had adequately pled this claim with particularity, the actions he complains about were not unlawful. Mr. Carlton alleges that Adoption Center is guilty of fraud for keeping birth fathers “in the dark,” but this allegation ignores the fact that Utah law does not impose a duty upon Adoption Center to inform birth fathers who do not take action to preserve their right to notification of a pending adoption. Furthermore, Mr. Carlton’s second suggestion, namely that Adoption Center “feloniously” gives support to birth mothers, is also patently false since the Act permits Adoption Center to pay for certain expenses.35 For these reasons, the district court correctly dismissed Mr. Carlton’s claim for pattern of unlawful activity, and, accordingly, we affirm its dismissal, without prejudice. D. Civil Conspiracy Claim ¶48 With respect to his civil conspiracy claim, Mr. Carlton argues that “[i]n light of the pleadings and evidence presented . . . the Court [should] take action in this case to reverse the lower court.” Unfortunately, he does not inform us to which pleadings or evidence he is referring. Nor does he set forth the legal elements of this cause of action using relevant case law or show how the district court erred in assessing the facts of this case in light of those elements. In short, Mr. Carlton does not, in any fashion, engage the district court’s analysis of this cause of action. Accordingly, we refuse to consider this claim on appeal due to inadequate briefing and affirm the district court’s dismissal, without prejudice. E. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress ¶49 Mr. Carlton argues that the district court erred in dismissing his claims for IIED against both Ms. Brown and Adoption Center. We agree with Mr. Carlton with respect to his claim asserted against Adoption Center, but disagree with respect to the claim asserted against Ms. Brown. ¶50 In order to state a claim for IIED, a plaintiff must show that the defendant 35 See id. § 76-7-203(1)(a). 19 CARLTON v. BROWN Opinion of the Court intentionally engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiff, (a) with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or, (b) where any reasonable person would have known that such would result; and his actions are of such a nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality.36 ¶51 Furthermore, we have also observed that “[t]o be considered outrageous, the conduct must evoke outrage or revulsion; it must be more than unreasonable, unkind, or unfair.”37 And finally, “[w]here reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability.”38 1. The District Court’s Dismissal of the IIED Claim Brought Against Ms. Brown Was Proper Because She Was not Served with the Amended Petition ¶52 We conclude that the district court was correct to dismiss Mr. Carlton’s IIED claim against Ms. Brown because she was not properly served with the Amended Petition. “For a court to acquire jurisdiction, there must be a proper issuance and service of summons.”39 In his brief, Mr. Carlton admits that Ms. Brown has not been served with the Amended Petition: “Counsel for [Adoption Center] stated to the undersigned counsel in an email that [Adoption Center’s] social worker spoke with Brown on May 24, 2011, and Brown confirmed that she had not yet been served with the amended petition.” Mr. Carlton then states that 36 Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, ¶ 55, 116 P.3d 323 (internal quotation marks omitted). 37Cabaness v. Thomas, 2010 UT 23, ¶ 38, 232 P.3d 486 (internal quotation marks omitted). 38 Oman v. Davis Sch. Dist., 2008 UT 70, ¶ 52, 194 P.3d 956 (internal quotation marks omitted). 39 Jackson Constr. Co. v. Marrs, 2004 UT 89, ¶ 10, 100 P.3d 1211. 20 Cite as: 2014 UT 6 Opinion of the Court [s]ubsequent to [Adoption Center’s] communication with Brown, the Lycoming County Sheriff in Pennsylvania had [sic] been unable to serve Brown, on numerous occasions, even though her car was present at her home, where she was previously served with the original Verified Petition, and where she appeared to be home, peering out the window, but refused to come to the door. Efforts to serve Brown with the Amended Verified Petition were continuing for some time. ¶53 Despite his belief that Ms. Brown may have been avoiding service of the Amended Petition, Mr. Carlton did not file a motion “requesting an order allowing service by publication or by some other means”40 and has not demonstrated that service has been effectuated on Ms. Brown, either personally or by courtordered alternative means.41 Therefore, the district court’s dismissal of this claim was justified due to ineffective service, and, accordingly, we affirm its dismissal, but without prejudice. 2. Because We Conclude that Mr. Carlton’s Constitutional Challenges Were Erroneously Dismissed, the District Court’s Reason for Dismissing the IIED Claim Against Adoption Center Is Now Inadequate ¶54 The district court stated its primary reason for dismissing Mr. Carlton’s IIED claim against Adoption Center as follows: Because [Mr.] Carlton did not establish his parental rights to the child prior to the mother’s relinquishment of all her parental rights, [Mr.] Carlton was not injured by the adoption, nor was he injured by the acts of the Adoption Center . . . . [Mr.] Carlton failed to take timely action prior to the adoption to demonstrate that he intended to assume his parental responsibilities. Therefore, 40 UTAH R. CIV. P. 4(d)(4)(A). 41 See Jackson Constr. Co., 2004 UT 89, ¶ 22 (“Once alternative service is authorized, it must be reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of the pendency of the action to the extent reasonably possible or practicable.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 21 CARLTON v. BROWN Opinion of the Court [Mr.] Carlton’s [tort] claims are without merit, and Adoption Center’s motion [to dismiss] is granted. Because we today reverse the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Carlton’s constitutional claims, the question of whether he may be able to “establish his parental rights to the child” remains open. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Carlton’s claim for IIED against Adoption Center. F. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress ¶55 Finally, Mr. Carlton argues that the district court’s dismissal of his claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress against Adoption Center and Ms. Brown was in error. We disagree. ¶56 In order to prevail on a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must show the following: If the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress to another, he is subject to liability to the other for resulting illness or bodily harm if the actor (a) should have realized that his conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing the distress, otherwise than by knowledge of the harm or peril of a third person, and (b) from facts known to him, should have realized that the distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm.42 ¶57 We have held previously that it is not enough for a plaintiff to merely allege emotional distress. Instead, she must prove that distress by means of severe physical or mental manifestations.43 42Anderson Dev. Co., 2005 UT 36, ¶ 57 (internal quotation marks omitted). 43 E.g., Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 975 (Utah 1993) (observing that “either physical or mental illness may support the [negligent infliction of emotional distress] cause of action” and that the physical or mental illness must be such that “a reasonable [person], normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 22 Cite as: 2014 UT 6 Opinion of the Court ¶58 Here, we conclude that the district court correctly dismissed Mr. Carlton’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress because, in addition to the fact that Ms. Brown was not properly served with the Amended Petition, Mr. Carlton failed to allege that the distress he claimed to have suffered manifested itself through severe mental or physical symptoms. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of this cause of action for failure to state a claim but dismiss it without prejudice.