Opinion ID: 1206395
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: testimony of fingerprint comparisons expert

Text: The next issue is whether the trial court erroneously allowed Honolulu Police Sergeant Francis Williams, a fingerprint comparisons expert, to testify to matters beyond the scope of Williams's expertise. Williams was permitted to state several conclusions based upon his inspection of appellant's latent fingerprints, which were found on the toilet seat cover and around the top edge of the bathtub at the scene of the murder. Appellant does not quarrel with Williams's qualifications as a fingerprint comparisons expert. However, appellant maintains that the testimony objected to went to matters beyond the scope of Williams's expertise in comparing and identifying fingerprints. The following items of opinion testimony given by Williams were objected to by appellant: (1) The various positions which appellant's hands were in at the time that his latent finger- and palmprints were impressed on the bathroom surfaces. [10] (2) The determination that some of the latent finger- and palmprints were impressed simultaneously, or in one motion, and, therefore, were made by the same hand. (3) The comparative degree of pressure applied by appellant when the latent prints were impressed, [11] thereby giving rise to two further conclusions by Williams: (a) Appellant was apparently trying to pull himself forward at the time the prints were impressed; and (b) Appellant's body was fairly low in relation to the floor at that time. (4) Appellant's arm was in an extended, horizontal position at the time that some of the prints along the top edge of the bathtub were made. [12] We find that with regard to items (1) and (2) above, no error was committed by the trial court when it allowed Sgt. Williams to testify to the matters relating thereto. The court concluded that based upon William's training and experience, he was an expert qualified to give those opinions. The determination of whether or not a witness qualifies as an expert is a question for the trial court to determine. Bulatao v. Kauai Motors, Ltd., 49 Haw. 1, 13, 406 P.2d 887, 893-94 (1965). Moreover, the general rule is that admissibility of expert testimony is a matter within the broad discretion of the trial judge, and his decision will not be overturned on appeal unless manifestly erroneous or clearly an abuse of discretion. United States v. Bolts, 558 F.2d 316, 322 (5th Cir.1977); United States v. Cyphers, 553 F.2d 1064, 1072 (7th Cir.1977); People v. Stapelton, 4 Ill. App.3d 477, 480, 281 N.E.2d 76, 78-79 (1972). We are of the opinion that the trial judge could rightfully have found that the opinion testimony relating to the positions of appellant's hands at the time the latent finger- and palmprints were made, as well as the fact that certain prints were impressed simultaneously by the same hand, fell within the scope of Williams's expertise in comparing and identifying fingerprints and palmprints. There was no error of law or abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge with regard to items (1) and (2) above. With respect to items (3) and (4), appellant forwards the additional argument that this evidence was prejudicial and inflammatory. [13] He contends that the evidence tended to suggest to the jury that he was in a prone position on top of the victim and was engaged in the act of rape at or about the time that the prints were made. Although we find it somewhat difficult to agree with the trial court that Sgt. Williams was qualified to give the opinions referred to in items (3) and (4), we find that the evidence was, in any event, not prejudicial to appellant. Williams's opinion testimony merely indicated that appellant's body was fairly low in relation to the floor and that appellant was trying to pull himself forward at the time that the prints were impressed on the bathroom surfaces. There was no testimony whatsoever that appellant had been in a prone position. Williams's testimony was actually supportive of appellant's claim at trial that he either had bent over or had squatted to remove one of his sandals in the bathroom, and, in doing so, may have lost his balance. Appellant's testimony indicated that in order to regain his balance, he may have stretched his arms out and pulled himself forward by grabbing onto the bathtub. Thus, more than anything else, Williams's testimony was consistent with appellant's own claims regarding what took place. It would be overly speculative to conclude from this evidence that appellant was in a prone position on top of the victim and was thus engaged in the act of rape at or about the time the latent prints were made. We hold that the trial court's error, if any, in allowing Sgt. Williams to testify with regard to items (3) and (4) was non-prejudicial to appellant. Assuming that Sgt. Williams was not qualified to give this testimony, the entire record leads us to believe that the jury could not reasonably have returned a verdict other than the one it did, even if the incompetent testimony had not been admitted. See State v. Hashimoto, 46 Haw. 183, 377 P.2d 728 (1962).