Opinion ID: 2338759
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Fifth and Sixth Amendments.

Text: Littlejohn's right to call witnesses in his own defense is an essential attribute of our adversarial system, fundamental to a fair trial, and basic to due process of law. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 407-09, 108 S.Ct. 646, 652-53, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988); Wilson v. United States, 558 A.2d 1135, 1140 (D.C. 1989). A criminal trial at which the defendant is unable to present relevant testimony tending to show that he is innocent is haunted by the spectre of unfairness and the appearance thereof. The right to call witnesses, however, is not absolute. [N]o man may vindicate his constitutional rights by requiring another to forego his own. Wilson, supra, 558 A.2d at 1140 (citation omitted). This court recently reiterated en banc that a criminal defendant's right to present witnesses in his own defense is a fundamental one. Wilson v. United States, [supra ], 558 A.2d [at] 1140. Nevertheless, in the crunch, when all else fails, the Fifth Amendment privilege of the witness prevails over the defendant's right to compel him to testify. Id. Because both rights are so precious ... and because a forced election is so painful, it is the responsibility of the trial judge to take all reasonable steps to avoid a direct collision. Id. Carter II, supra, 684 A.2d at 336 (quoting Harris v. United States, 614 A.2d 1277, 1281-82 (D.C.1992)). When the protections of the two amendments come into conflict, the court must attempt to preserve them both to a reasonable extent. Wilson, supra, 558 A.2d at 1140 (citing, inter alia, In re Willie, 25 Fed. Cas. 38 (Cir.Ct.D.Va.1807) (Marshall, C.J.) (trial of Aaron Burr); Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 364, 37 S.Ct. 621, 622, 61 L.Ed. 1198 (1917) (quoting In re Willie )). In the present case, Bishop was not the defendant but a prospective witness. [10] The [Fifth Amendment] privilege of a witness is narrower than that of a defendant, and extends only to specific questions; it does not encompass a refusal to take the stand at all. Harris, supra, 614 A.2d at 1282; see also Collins v. United States, 596 A.2d 489, 491 (D.C.1991). Although a criminal defendant has the absolute right not to testify, a witness may invoke the privilege only as to those specific questions to which his answers would incriminate him. Wilson, supra, 558 A.2d at 1141 (citations omitted). [A] witness does not have the broader Fifth Amendment right that an accused does to decline even to take the stand. In re D.R., 673 A.2d 1259, 1262 (D.C.1996) (citations omitted). Accordingly, when a Fifth Amendment claim is asserted by someone other than the defendant, the court must ordinarily permit examination of the witness (out of the presence of the jury in a jury trial) and rule on the claim of privilege one question at a time. Harris, supra, 614 A.2d at 1282 (citations omitted). A blanket privilege may be granted to the witness only when it is evident to the court that anything less will not adequately protect him. Wilson, supra, 558 A.2d at 1142; Jackson v. United States, 490 A.2d 192, 196 (D.C.1985). The privilege [against self-incrimination] not only extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction under a federal criminal statute but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 818, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951) (citation omitted). [11] It must be perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness [seeking to invoke the privilege] is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have [a] tendency to incriminate. Id. at 488, 71 S.Ct. at 819 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Fifth Amendment protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 1656, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). This protection must, however, be confined to instances where the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer. Hoffman, supra, 341 U.S. at 486, 71 S.Ct. at 818 (citations omitted). The privilege against self-incrimination is confined to real danger and does not extend to remote possibilities out of the ordinary course of law. Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 144, 33 S.Ct. 226, 228, 57 L.Ed. 450 (1913); see also Wilson, supra, 558 A.2d at 1141. [I]t would be to convert a salutary protection into a means of abuse if it were to be held that a mere imaginary possibility of danger, however remote and improbable, was sufficient to justify the withholding of evidence essential to the ends of justice. Mason, supra, 244 U.S. at 366, 37 S.Ct. at 622 (quoting The Queen v. Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311, 329-30 (1861) (Cockburn, J.)).