Opinion ID: 1296935
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Hobson's Choice [6]

Text: The Appellant raises an issue concerning the classic dilemma confronted by the individual encountering charges in both civil and criminal contexts. He exercised his Fifth Amendment right to silence in the underlying abuse and neglect proceedings in order to protect himself from incrimination in the pending criminal case. Based in substantial part upon his silence and the absence of treatment potential for an individual maintaining silence, the Appellant's parental rights were terminated. This scenario has been recurrently addressed, and definitive themes have emerged in the methods by which courts have resolved the Fifth Amendment allegations of individuals facing parallel issues in civil and criminal contexts. The Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed this dilemma in In re S.A.V., 392 N.W.2d 260 (Minn.Ct.App.1986), wherein a trial court had ordered the allegedly abusive parents to attend parenting classes and psychological counseling. The father contended on appeal that the order requiring his admission in psychological evaluation violated his privilege against self-incrimination. The Minnesota court rejected his argument based upon the fact that the termination of parental rights was not a sanction for refusal to testify and that the termination was simply the necessary result of failure to rectify parental deficiencies. Id. at 264. The Minnesota Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in In re J.W., 415 N.W.2d 879 (Minn.1987), in which the trial court had ordered psychological therapy to include an explanation of the death of the child in question. The prosecutor had indicated that refusal to cooperate would result in the filing of a termination petition. On appeal, the Minnesota court found that while the trial court could not directly require the parents to incriminate themselves in therapy, the state could require therapy generally. If the therapy was thereafter deemed to be ineffective, termination could proceed. These consequences lie outside the protective ambit of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 883. The court explained: What the parents would like to claim, although of course they cannot, is that their responsibility for the death of a child and the inferences arising therefrom is privileged and may not be considered in determining their suitability as parents. But to state this proposition is to refute it. Not only does the proposition ignore the fact that the evidence of responsibility has already been received but it ignores the best interests of the children. Id. at 884. The court reasoned: In the lexicon of the Fifth Amendment, the risk of losing the children for failure to undergo meaningful therapy is neither a `threat' nor a `penalty' imposed by the state. It is simply a consequence of the reality that it is unsafe for children to be with parents who are abusive and violent. Id; see also In re J.G.W., 433 N.W.2d 885 (Minn.1989). Similarly, in New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services v. S.S., 275 N.J.Super. 173, 645 A.2d 1213 (1994), the reviewing court held that requiring a mother to rebut prima facie evidence of abuse did not violate her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The New Jersey court relied upon In re S., 66 Misc.2d 683, 322 N.Y.S.2d 170 (Fam.Ct.1971), in which the following reasoning was utilized: There is no mandatory requirement that they take the stand and testify. That would be unconstitutional. The constraint upon respondent to give testimony arises here simply from the force of circumstances and not from any form of compulsion forbidden by the Constitution.... It may be a difficult decision for the respondents and their attorneys. [But] it is a question of procedure and legal options for the defense, not one of the constitutionality of incrimination.... Id. at 1217, 322 N.Y.S.2d 170 ( quoting In re S., 322 N.Y.S.2d at 177-78). The Nebraska court grappled with this issue of refusal to speak in an abuse and neglect proceeding based upon fear of incrimination in In re Clifford M., 6 Neb.App. 754, 577 N.W.2d 547 (Neb.1998). The Nebraska court held, in this issue of first impression for that court, that parental rights could not be terminated based solely upon the refusal to waive the right against self-incrimination. In so holding, the court noted that a review of other states' authority indicated: that there is a very fine, although very important, distinction between terminating parental rights based specifically upon a refusal to waive protections against self-incrimination and terminating parental rights based upon a parent's failure to comply with an order to obtain meaningful therapy or rehabilitation, perhaps in part because a parent's failure to acknowledge past wrongdoing inhibits meaningful therapy. The latter is constitutionally permissible; the former is not. Id. at 554. In examining possible accommodations for this testimonial dilemma, scholars have opined that the potential for continuing the abuse and neglect action until after the conclusion of the criminal case is not palatable for the obvious reason that prompt disposition of child abuse/neglect proceedings is essential. [7] See generally Jessica Wilen Berg, Note, Give Me Liberty or Give Me Silence: Taking a Stand on Fifth Amendment Implications for Court-Ordered Therapy Programs, 79 Cornell L.Rev. 700 (1994); William Wesley Patton, The World Where Parallel Lines Converge: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Concurrent Civil and Criminal Child Abuse Proceedings, 24 Ga. L.Rev. 473 (1990). This jurisdiction has definitively spoken to that issue, as manifested in Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect, wherein it is provided that [u]nder no circumstances shall a civil protection proceeding be delayed pending the initiation, investigation, prosecution, or resolution of any other proceeding, including, but not limited to, criminal proceedings. Commentators have observed that providing use immunity is the most practical and efficient method of protecting the privilege against self-incrimination while simultaneously advancing the best interests of the child by granting an inducement for full cooperation and disclosure during the child abuse and neglect proceedings. Patton, The World Where Parallel Lines Converge: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Concurrent Civil and Criminal Child Abuse Proceedings, 24 Ga.L.Rev. at 521-22. [8] In In re Jessica B., 207 Cal.App.3d 504, 254 Cal.Rptr. 883 (1989), a case in which the trial court had refused family reunification because the father had not acknowledged his wrongdoing, the appellate court found that use immunity would preserve the father's privilege against self-incrimination. The California court held as follows: The California Constitution requires that a person proceeding simultaneously in the criminal courts for child abuse and the juvenile court regarding a dependency of the abused minor should not only be granted use immunity for his or her testimony at dependency proceedings that constitutes an admission to the acts at issue in the criminal case against him or her but also for such statements made during court-ordered therapy. Under the circumstances of this case, such an immunity is essential to the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and facilitates the goal of protecting the best interest of the minor and achieving the reunification of the family at the earliest possible date. Id. at 893-94. Similarly, in In re Eduardo A., 209 Cal. App.3d 1038, 261 Cal.Rptr. 68 (1989), procedural protections were afforded to individuals caught in this labyrinth. In that case, the California court addressed the patient-psychotherapist privilege and found that the legislature had intended to abrogate the privilege only in the context of examinations ordered by the court as an initial investigative tool, but did not intend to abrogate the privilege in the context of psychotherapeutic treatment. Id. at 71. It would be unreasonable to expect a patient to freely participate in such treatment if he knew that what he said and what the therapist learned from what he said could all be revealed in court. Id. at 70. Protective or limiting orders may also be utilized in conjunction with the grant of use immunity. In State v. Decker, 68 Wash.App. 246, 842 P.2d 500 (1992), for instance, the court addressed the a tribunal's inherent authority to issue protective orders and affirmed the use of a protective order entered regarding a predisposition psychological evaluation. Id. at 503.