Opinion ID: 790216
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Hammel's Failure to Demonstrate Reasonable Accommodations

Text: 33 At trial Hammel's vocational expert, Richard Davis, recommended that EGC could have implemented some questionable accommodations that he believed would have enabled Hammel to perform the essential functions of a general laborer. Among these proposed accommodations were four that involved Hammel's use of adaptive techniques that he had previously been trained to utilize during periods of training at Blind Incorporated (a vocational training school) prior to his employment at EGC such as using: 1) a feel technique to help him properly stack the cheese wheels; 2) a flipping technique to ensure that the cheese wheels were flipped and turned correctly; 3) a foot-shuffling technique to avoid tripping; and 4) a technique which had him intentionally bump into and feel objects in order to understand physical space. However, Hammel needed no accommodation from EGC to make use of these adaptive techniques. 34 Reasonable accommodations under the ADA are defined in part as modifications or adjustments to the work environment [by the employer]... that enable a[n] ... individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of a position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2( o ) (emphasis added). These adaptive techniques are skills and know-how that Hammel stated that he had been trained to incorporate into his work routine prior to his employment with EGC. They are not modifications or adjustments to the work environment [by the employer]... that enable him to perform the job's essential functions. Instead, Hammel's proposed adaptive techniques were nothing more than modifications or adjustments to his own work performance that he was expected to utilize without prodding or accommodation from his employer. Cf. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999) ([I]f a person is taking measures to correct for, or mitigate, a physical or mental impairment, the effects of those measures ... must be taken into account when judging [a disability].); Siefken, 65 F.3d at 667. Thus, we agree with the trial judge's determination that these adaptive techniques were not reasonable accommodations within the meaning of the ADA. 35 Davis proposed additional accommodations that, in his opinion, EGC supposedly could have undertaken to facilitate Hammel's performance of some of the job's essential functions. Among these proposed accommodations, 9 Davis suggested that Hammel could learn to stamp the cheese wheels correctly by having a co-worker check on [his] stamping and teach him how to hold the stamp to make sure that it printed. Hammel, 2003 WL 21665133, at , 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11380, at . As the trial judge properly determined, this is not a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. The courts have been reticent, as they should be, to require employers to provide accommodations that necessitate the enlistment of another employee to assist an ADA claimant in performing the essential functions of his job. Id. at 2003 WL 21665133, at , 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11380, at  (citing Peters v. City of Mauston, 311 F.3d 835, 845-46 (7th Cir.2002)). To be sure, the ADA does not require an employer to accommodate a disabled employee by making special, individualized training or supervision available in order to shepherd that employee through what is an essential and legitimate requirement of the job. Williams, 253 F.3d at 282 (the employer is not required to give the disabled employee preferential treatment, as by giving her a job for which another employee is better qualified, or by waving his normal requirements for the job in question); Sieberns v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 125 F.3d 1019, 1022 (7th Cir.1997). In this regard, let us make clear that the ADA is not an affirmative action statute in the sense of requiring an employer to give preferential treatment to a disabled employee merely on account of the employee's disability, see Williams, 253 F.3d at 282, although it does provide disabled persons an opportunity to work assuming accommodations exist which allow them to perform a job as would any other employee. Accommodations which require special dispensations and preferential treatment are not reasonable under the ADA, thus Davis's recommendation that Hammel be given special training and provided with a person to check up on him does not qualify as a reasonable accommodation. 36 Davis also proposed that Hammel and his fellow EGC laborers could employ verbal cues to avoid bumping into each other. However, we are of the opinion that it borders on the absurd to even suggest implementing a measure of this nature in a factory setting of this type. The particular work environment at EGC is excessively noisy and many employees, out of necessity, are found to wear ear-plugs while performing their duties. Because he would be unable to hear them due to the excessive noise level, it is antithetical and unreasonable to propose that based on verbal cues Hammel could be prevented from colliding with walls, equipment and other employees near the production line on the busy work floor. 37 What's more, Hammel's proffered accommodations address only a small portion of EGC's legitimate concerns with Hammel's careless, unacceptable work performance, such as his inability to legibly stamp the cheese wheels, avoid collisions with machines and other employees and a myriad of other problems. More importantly, these proposed measures do not address Hammel's inability to perform a significant number of his essential assignments, duties and responsibilities at EGC, such as forming, stacking, and flipping the cheeses. In Miller v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, this court addressed a similar situation in which a woman who had suffered injuries in a car accident, resulting in an almost complete loss of vision, was discharged from her position as a prison guard. Miller, 107 F.3d at 484. Allegedly, she was told by the warden that she was being fired because there was no way a blind person would ever work in his Prison. Id. We upheld the district court's conclusion that the guard was not a qualified person within the meaning of the ADA, regardless of the allegedly distasteful and irrational motivation behind her termination, because there was no way that she could perform the essential duties of a corrections officer. Id. at 485. In coming to this conclusion we found persuasive evidence that, even with accommodations, this woman could fulfill only two out of over ten job requirements of the position. Id. In turn we rejected her contention that she should have been allowed to rotate between the two functions which she could perform because the reason for having multiple able workers who rotate through the different positions is to be able to respond to unexpected surges in the demand for particular abilities. Id. Because Miller was unable to perform the duties of her position as a correctional officer and the prison officials could not offer her reasonable accommodations that would allow her to fulfill those duties, we held that she was not entitled to the protections of the ADA. Id. 38 As was the situation in Miller, Hammel and his vocational expert failed to recommend to this court reasonable accommodations that would allow him to perform the essential duties required for employment as a laborer at EGC. Id. In addition, Hammel was an insubordinate, reckless, and thus undesirable employee, and we agree with the trial judge's conclusion that [n]o accommodation would make a difference for an employee unwilling to exercise care, accept instruction or take responsibility for getting his work done properly. Hammel, 2003 WL 21665133, at -9, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11380, at , 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11380, at  (emphasis added). Also, we agree with the district court's conclusion that Hammel is not a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA, and thus is not entitled to the protections thereof. Basith, 241 F.3d at 927; Bay, 212 F.3d at 973; DePaoli, 140 F.3d at 674. As Judge Crabb noted, perhaps [EGC's] business manager should have told [Hammel] exactly why he was being fired rather than try to sugar coat the news .... [but this] failing [does not] make [EGC] liable to [Hammel] under the ADA. Hammel, 2003 WL 21665133, at -9, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11380, at , 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11380, at . The district court did not commit clear error in concluding that EGC did not discriminate against Hammel because of his disability when it terminated him. 10 39