Opinion ID: 6495152
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Gutierrez Plaintiffs’ Standing

Text: As noted, like MALC, the Gutierrez Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that H.B. 1 violates Section 26’s county-line rule. They also seek a declaratory judgment that both H.B. 1 and S.B. 4 violate Article III, Section 28. Because Section 28 requires the Legislature to apportion the senatorial and representative districts “at its first regular session after the publication of each United States decennial census,” the Gutierrez Plaintiffs assert that the Legislature violated that provision by undertaking the reapportionment process during an earlier special session. Although there are four Gutierrez Plaintiffs, they defend the standing of only two—one for each claim. See Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 152 n.64 (explaining that “where there are multiple plaintiffs in a case, who seek injunctive or declaratory relief (or both), who sue individually, and who all seek the same relief . . . the court need not analyze the standing of more than one plaintiff—so long as that plaintiff has standing to pursue as much or more relief than any of the other plaintiffs”). First, they argue that Ruben Cortez Jr., a candidate for House District 37, has standing to pursue the Section 26 claim. They contend that under H.B. 1, District 37 now comprises a much larger geographic territory than before, requiring a greater expenditure of campaign resources. They further argue that Cortez has standing as a resident of Cameron County and District 37, which is one of the districts that is not wholly contained within Cameron County. As discussed above with regard to the first element of MALC’s associational standing, we agree that Cortez has sufficiently alleged a particularized injury as a Cameron 20 County (and, notably, as a District 37) resident. We therefore need not address whether he has alleged a sufficient injury as a candidate for office. 4 Next, the Gutierrez Plaintiffs argue that Roland Gutierrez, a state senator elected in 2020, has standing to pursue a Section 28 claim. State senators are elected to serve four-year terms; however, following reapportionment, all senators must stand for reelection under the new district maps. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 3. The Gutierrez Plaintiffs assert that because “the first legitimate opportunity for the Legislature to reapportion is in 2023 [at the first regular session after the publication of the decennial census], Senator Gutierrez’s tenure is protected until 2024, when his four-year term expires.” The Legislature’s unconstitutional apportionment during a special session in 2021, they argue, requires Senator Gutierrez to run for reelection in 2022 and thus deprives him of his right to a four-year term. The State responds that Senator Gutierrez’s “injury” of being forced to run for reelection before the expiration of his current term is traceable not to any wrongdoing by the State, but to the Texas Constitution’s requirement that senators stand for reelection when districts are reapportioned. On this point, we agree with the Gutierrez Plaintiffs. It is true that the Texas Constitution requires Senator Gutierrez to run for reelection, but the basis of the Section 28 claim is that the circumstances giving rise to that requirement would not have arisen if not for the 4We note that during the pendency of this cause, Cortez lost the Democratic primary runoff election for House District 37. Accordingly, he no longer has standing as a candidate to pursue the prospective relief he seeks. 21 allegedly unconstitutional reapportionment. That is sufficient for standing purposes. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168–69 (1997) (explaining that traceability does not require the defendant’s actions to be “the very last step in the chain of causation”). The State further contends that the Gutierrez Plaintiffs’ alleged injury is not traceable to or redressable by the State of Texas itself—the only defendant against whom they asserted their claims—providing an additional reason that they lack standing to pursue the declaratory relief they request. Prior suits challenging reapportionment laws have typically been brought against state officials like the Governor, whose duties include ordering elections for officers of the state government and members of the United States Congress, TEX. ELEC. CODE § 3.003(a)(1), and the Secretary of State, who is the “chief election officer of the state,” id. § 31.001(a). See Clements v. Valles, 620 S.W.2d 112, 113 (Tex. 1981) (plaintiffs sought a declaration of the unconstitutionality of a reapportionment bill and an injunction restraining the Governor, Attorney General, and Secretary of State from conducting elections pursuant to the bill); Smith, 471 S.W.2d at 375–76 (plaintiffs sought a declaration of the unconstitutionality of a reapportionment bill and an injunction restraining the Governor, Secretary of State, Chairman of the Democratic Executive Committee, and County Judge and County Clerk of Midland County from conducting elections pursuant to the bill). 5 The lack of requested relief against “the State” in these cases makes sense 5In Perry v. Del Rio, another redistricting case, some of the plaintiffs named the State as a defendant but ultimately nonsuited it. 66 S.W.3d 239, 246 (Tex. 2001). 22 because the State itself does not enforce election laws. See Lewis v. Governor of Ala., 944 F.3d 1287, 1301 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding that the plaintiffs, in challenging the constitutionality of a statute voiding local laws requiring compensation higher than the minimum wage, lacked standing under Lujan as to their claims against the attorney general, who had no authority to enforce the complained-of statute). Though we have not been presented with the precise issue, our courts of appeals have generally held that challenges to the constitutionality of a statute are not properly brought against the State in the absence of an “enforcement connection” between the challenged provisions and the State itself. Paxton v. Simmons, 640 S.W.3d 588, 602–03 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2022, no pet. h.); Ector Cnty. All. of Bus. v. Abbott, No. 11-20-00206-CV, 2021 WL 4097106, at  (Tex. App.— Eastland Sept. 9, 2021, no pet.); see also Holt v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins.–Div. of Workers Comp., No. 03-17-00758-CV, 2018 WL 6695725, at  (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 20, 2018, pet. denied) (holding, in suit challenging the constitutionality of certain Labor Code provisions, that the State was not a proper party to the lawsuit and affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the State on a plea to the jurisdiction). In Paxton, the court reversed the trial court’s denial of the plea to the jurisdiction filed by the State and the Attorney General in a suit involving a constitutional challenge to a Texas Property Code provision. 640 S.W.3d at 592–93. The plaintiff argued that the “State of Texas, via its legislature, directly passed the challenged statute and thus appears to have the most relevant connection to defending the constitutionality of that law.” Id. at 603. However, in light of the absence of any enforcement authority 23 by the State, the court held that the plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to satisfy the traceability element of standing. Id.; see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (the injury must be “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s challenged action). Similarly, in Ector County Alliance, which involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the Texas Disaster Act and certain executive orders issued under it, the court of appeals held that the plaintiff lacked standing to seek relief against the State and the Governor where it “did not plead that the Governor or the State ever threatened to enforce any executive order [issued under the Act], and the Governor and the State have conceded that they do not have the authority to do so.” 2021 WL 4097106, at . Notably, Texas law requires that, in a lawsuit in which the constitutionality of a state statute is challenged and the attorney general is not a party or counsel, notice must be served on the attorney general, who may intervene in the suit without waiving the State’s immunity. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 402.010. Similarly, in a proceeding brought under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act to declare a statute, ordinance, or franchise unconstitutional, “the attorney general of the state must . . . be served with a copy of the proceeding and is entitled to be heard,” but neither the attorney general nor the State is required to be made a party to the proceeding. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.006(b). 6 This is consistent with the conclusion that the State 6 By contrast, “[i]n any proceeding [under the UDJA] that involves the validity of a municipal ordinance or franchise, the municipality must be made a party.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.006(b) (emphasis added); see Holt, 2018 WL 6695725, at  (discussing the meaningful distinction between the 24 is not automatically a proper defendant in a suit challenging the constitutionality of a statute merely because the Legislature enacted it. 7 Holt, 2018 WL 6695725, at ; cf. California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104, 2114–15 (2021) (holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge an unenforceable statute). We recognize that the Fifth Circuit has held to the contrary in addressing a challenge to a Texas statute establishing the requirements and procedures for a voter needing assistance to vote. OCA-Greater Houston v. Texas, 867 F.3d 604, 607, 613 (5th Cir. 2017). The plaintiff in OCA sued both the State and the Secretary of State, and the court held that the plaintiff had standing to sue both defendants, summarily stating that “[t]he facial invalidity of a Texas election statute is, without question, fairly traceable to and redressable by the State itself and its Secretary of State.” Id. at 613. But while the Fifth Circuit explained the basis for its conclusion as to the Secretary of State—the “enforcement connection” to the statute was satisfied considering the Secretary’s position as “the ‘chief election officer of the state’ [who] is instructed by statute to ‘obtain and maintain uniformity in the application, operation, and interpretation of this code and of the election UDJA’s requirement that a municipality be “made a party” and its requirement that the Attorney General be “served with a copy of the proceeding”). 7 In discussing the UDJA’s limited waiver of immunity for claims challenging the validity of statutes, we have explained that the waiver extends to “the relevant governmental entities.” City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 373 n.6 (Tex. 2009). The identity of the relevant governmental entity for waiver purposes necessarily depends on the statute being challenged. 25 laws outside this code’”—it provided no such analysis with respect to the State itself. Id. at 613–14 (internal citations omitted). Given the conclusory nature of the court’s determination of standing as to the claims against the State, as well as the fact that another defendant with the proper enforcement connection to the statute had been named in that case, we decline to follow OCA’s bare holding here. As the State itself has no enforcement authority with respect to election laws, and the State is the only defendant against which the Gutierrez Plaintiffs seek a declaration regarding the constitutionality of those laws, the Gutierrez Plaintiffs have failed to meet the traceability element of standing. However, if the pleadings “do not affirmatively demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction,” we allow plaintiffs an opportunity to amend. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226–27 (Tex. 2004). Declaratory-judgment claims challenging the validity of a statute may be brought against the relevant governmental entity. And again, our case law is replete with reapportionment challenges brought against proper defendants like the Governor and the Secretary of State. E.g., Clements, 620 S.W.2d at 113; Smith, 471 S.W.2d at 375–76. The State asserts that incurable defects in jurisdiction exist for three reasons, two of which we have already rejected (that the plaintiffs seek an advisory opinion and lack a cognizable injury in fact). We turn to the third—sovereign immunity—to determine whether the case must be dismissed rather than remanded. 26