Opinion ID: 2545690
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to grant an accidental-shooting instruction.

Text: ¶ 22. Brown testified on direct examination during his case-in-chief that, after he and Bracey had made love, he lay on the bed with his back to Bracey. Here is Brown's account of what happened next: She was talking to me, she was asking me was I going to be with her or what, you know, and I was like I wasn't really just hearing what she was saying so she pushed me in the back of the head. And when she pushed me in the back of the head I seen the gun. She had a gun and I started laughing `cause I was looking at it like it was funny, you know. I'm like, know what I'm saying, and she's like you going to be with me or you going to be with that B you know,' cause if I can't have you can't nobody have you. ... I went to rubbing on her arm and I grabbed her arm and I come across her, you know, I come on top of her. I put her arm over her head. I made her drop the gun and when she dropped the gun I grabbed the gun but I didn't grab the handle of the gun. I had the part that turns or whatever. I was coming up with the gun, know what I'm saying and she grabbed my arm. When she grabbed my arm I snatched back from her and the gun went off. Brown continued by stating that he had panicked and had become scared; therefore, he left so he could go see his children, because he knew he was going to jail. Brown also stated that he did not know what Bracey had in mind because we done been in situations before and it ain't the first time ... we done been in this type of situation. But Brown also stated that he cared for Bracey and did not mean to hurt her. Without question, based on Brown's later testimony on direct examination, he laid out a self-defense theory, that he had acted in self defense when Bracey had pulled the gun on him, but then in the ensuing struggle over the gun, the gun accidentally had discharged, killing Bracey. On cross-examination by the prosecutor, Brown, for the most part, stuck with his story as to how the shooting had occurred. ¶ 23. At the time of the jury-instruction conference, by the time Brown submitted jury instruction D-1 to the trial judge for consideration, the trial judge had given jury instructions S-1 through S-5, inclusive, and S-7 and S-8. Jury instruction S-1 was the elements instruction concerning deliberate-design/depraved-heart murder. Jury instructions S-2 and S-3 informed the jury that it could consider the lesser crime of manslaughter. Jury instruction S-4 was a limiting cautionary instruction concerning the introduction of evidence for impeachment purposes, as to a previous crime committed by Brown. Jury instruction S-5 was a self-defense instruction. Jury instruction S-7 was another form of a self-defense instruction, and jury instruction S-8 was the form-of-the-verdict instruction, giving the jury the options of finding Brown (1) guilty of murder; (2) guilty of manslaughter; or (3) not guilty. ¶ 24. Then came the proffer of jury instruction D-1 for the trial court's consideration. Jury instruction D-1 stated: The Court instructs the jury that if you find from the evidence, or have a reasonable doubt therefrom that Johnny Brown while in the possession of the gun, a deadly weapon, and in the heat of passion during an altercation between Violar Bracey and Johnny Brown without any design or deliberation to cause the death of Violar Bracey, fired the fatal shot accidentally and though [sic] misfortune, upon sudden and sufficient provocation, then it is your sworn duty to find Johnny Brown not guilty. ¶ 25. We set out here verbatim the jury-instruction conference as it related to jury instruction D-1: THE COURT: D-1, any objections? [PROSECUTOR]: Yes, Your Honor. I don't think D-1 is a proper statement of the law and it is somewhat redundant of the State's instruction concerning murder, manslaughter, and not guilty. I think it's confusing because it doesn't even give the jury an option of anything but not guilty. I think all that's covered in the State's instruction that says if the State has failed to prove A, B or C then you find the Defendant not guilty. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, it's an instruction for an accidental shooting. [PROSECUTOR]: I thought we were having a self-defense case. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, this instruction has been given before. [PROSECUTOR]: It also comments on the actual evidence in the case. An instruction should not comment on the actual evidence in the case, not on one specific piece of evidence. And Your Honor, this instruction tries to combine an accidental shooting and self-defense. In line four it says fired the fatal shot accidentally and through misfortune and then it goes to self-defense language, upon sudden and sufficient provocation. It's combining a self-defense and accidental shooting and it's confusing. THE COURT: In S-3 I've given an instruction which talks about self-defense. [2] D-1 is refused. ¶ 26. The trial judge did give two jury instructions concerning self-defense. Jury instruction S-5 stated: The Court instructs the Jury that to make an assault justifiable on the grounds of self-defense, the danger to the defendant must be either actual, present and urgent, or the defendant must have reasonable grounds to apprehend a design on the part of the victim to kill him or to do him some great bodily harm, and in addition to this he must have reasonable grounds to apprehend that there is imminent danger of such design being accomplished. It is for the jury to determine the reasonableness of the ground upon which the defendant acts. Jury instruction S-7 stated: The Court instructs the Jury that a person may not use more force than reasonably appears necessary to save his life or protect himself from great bodily harm. The question of whether he was justified in using the weapon is for determination for the jury. The law tolerates no justification and accepts no excuse for an assault with a deadly weapon on the pleas of self defense except that the assault by the defendant on the victim was necessary or apparently so to protect the defendant's own life or his person from great bodily injury and there was immediate danger of such design being accomplished. The danger to life or of great personal injury must be or reasonably appears to be imminent and present at the time the defendant commits the assault with a deadly weapon. The term apparent as used in apparent danger means such overt, actual demonstration by conduct and acts of a design to take life or do some great personal injury as would make the assault apparently necessary to self preservation. ¶ 27. When this Court is confronted with issues concerning the granting or denying of jury instructions by the trial court, we are required to read and consider the jury instructions as a whole in order to determine if error was committed. Davis v. State, 18 So.3d 842, 847 (Miss. 2009) (citing Milano v. State, 790 So.2d 179, 184 (Miss.2001)). Likewise, jurors must be given appropriate instructions which fairly announce the law applicable to the case so as not to create an injustice against the defendant. Id. Unquestionably, this Court has stated that, while a defendant must be assured of the opportunity to present his theory of the case to the jury via appropriately worded jury instructions, the trial court has the discretion to refuse an instruction which contains an incorrect statement of the law, which already is covered adequately in other instructions already given, or which is unsupported by the evidence. Davis, 18 So.3d at 847 (citing Phillipson v. State, 943 So.2d 670, 671 (Miss.2006)). See also Higgins v. State, 725 So.2d 220, 223 (Miss. 1998). ¶ 28. We already have found that the evidence against Brown was legally sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict finding Brown guilty of the murder of Violar Bracey. Briefly stated, the evidence in favor of the State indicated Bracey's hands were under a blanket at the time the fatal shot was fired while she was lying in bed. David Whitehead, a forensic scientist assigned to the trace-evidence section of the MCL in Jackson, testified that his tests of the gunshot-residue kit generated by the autopsy of Bracey revealed no gunshot residue on Bracey's hands, which would thus contradict Brown's theory of an accidental shooting while Brown and Bracey were struggling over the gun. Although the weapon involved in Bracey's killing was never recovered, there appears to be no question that the weapon was a .38 caliber pistol. ¶ 29. Hathcock, a MCL forensic scientist specializing in firearms identification, identified the projectile recovered from the scene as bearing a .38 caliber class, meaning that the projectile was fired from either a .38 caliber revolver or a .38 caliber semi-automatic weapon. In fact, Brown testified that, when he was trying to wrestle the gun from Bracey, he did not grab the handle of the gun, but instead, he grabbed the part that turns or whatever. If Brown told the truth on the witness stand, this would indicate that the gun was a revolver. Hathcock informed the jury of the difference between a single-action trigger pull and a double-action trigger pull on a .38 caliber revolver. His testimony revealed that, while it could be relatively easy to have an accidental shooting with a.38 caliber revolver having a single-action trigger pull, the same could not be said about a .38 caliber revolver having a double-action trigger pull. In fact, Hathcock stated that it was very highly unlikely that a person could mistakenly fire a double-action revolver. ¶ 30. Dr. Hayne testified that the cause of Bracey's death was a contact penetrating gunshot wound to the right side of the head, and that the manner of death was homicide. ¶ 31. Certainly, the testimony of Whitehead, Hathcock, and Hayne would not support Brown's theories of self-defense or accidental shooting in the killing of Bracey. However, this fact is of no moment when considering the instructions of law to be given to the jury by the trial judge. ¶ 32. Brown's theory of accidental shooting is grounded in law. Mississippi Code Section 97-3-17 states: The killing of any human being by the act, procurement, or omission of another shall be excusable: (a) When committed by accident and misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means, with usual and ordinary caution, and without any unlawful intent; (b) When committed by accident and misfortune, in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation; (c) When committed upon any sudden combat, without undue advantage being taken, and without any dangerous weapon being used, and not done in a cruel or unusual manner. Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-17 (Rev.2006). Brown was relying on subsection (b) of this statute, based on his testimony. Brown testified that, immediately prior to the shooting in the motel room, he was lying in the bed with his back to Bracey when he suddenly felt the barrel of a pistol pressing on the back of his head. In the heat of the moment, he acted in self-defense by attempting to wrestle the pistol from Bracey, but it accidently discharged. Through jury instruction D-1, Brown was trying to have the jury instructed, consistent with Section 97-3-17(b), that if the jury found, among other things, that while he was in possession of the gun, he, in the heat of passion during the altercation with Bracey, and without any deliberate design to cause Bracey's death, accidently fired the fatal shot through misfortune, upon sudden and sufficient provocation (the unexpected tussle with Bracey over the gun), then the jury was to find him not guilty. ¶ 33. Brown's testimony on this point, if believed by the jury, met all the statutory elements of an accidental shooting. Whether or not a killing was the result of accident [or] misfortune is a question for the jury to decide after proper instruction. Miller v. State, 677 So.2d 726, 730 (Miss.1996) (citing Day v. State, 589 So.2d 637, 643 (Miss.1991)). ¶ 34. At the jury-instruction conference, the prosecutor opposed the proffered jury instruction D-1 for several reasons, including an argument that the instruction was confusing and improperly combined incompatible defenses of self-defense (related to an intentional shooting) and accidental shooting (related to an unintentional shooting). The trial judge's reasoning in denying jury instruction D-1 was that he already had given a self-defense instruction which had been submitted by the State. However, this Court has stated that [a] criminal defendant has a right to assert alternative theories of defense, even inconsistent alternative theories. Reddix v. State, 731 So.2d 591, 593 (Miss.1999) (citing Love v. State, 441 So.2d 1353, 1356 (Miss.1983)). This Court also has stated that [i]n homicide cases, the trial court should instruct the jury about a defendant's theories of defense, justification, or excuse that are supported by the evidence, no matter how meager or unlikely. Evans v. State, 797 So.2d 811, 815 (Miss.2000) (quoting Manuel v. State, 667 So.2d 590, 593 (Miss.1995)). ¶ 35. This Court found that an accidental-shooting instruction should have been given in Triplett v. State : As noted, under the testimony adduced at trial, the jury would have been warranted in returning a verdict either of murder, manslaughter, or not guilty because of accident. While [the defendant's] trial testimony was weak, disputed, and also contradicted by his statement to the sheriff, he was entitled to have the jury instructed by an instruction specifically embracing the facts which he and Bray testified occurred which would have made this killing an excusable accident. The defense was entitled to an instruction which told the jury that if [the defendant] had good reason to believe and did believe his life was in danger when he armed himself with the pistol handed to him by Gibson and then shot it into the air to frighten his attackers away, and the second shot was fired solely because Bray had unexpectedly grabbed him from behind and was tussling with him, and there was no intent on his part to fire the weapon the second shot, then he was not guilty of either murder or manslaughter. [3] Triplett v. State, 666 So.2d 1356, 1362 (Miss.1995). ¶ 36. Brown's alternative theory of defense, if not his main theory, that he accidentally had shot Bracey in the heat of passion and upon sudden and sufficient provocation, was supported by the evidence to the extent that the trial judge should have given the jury an accidental-shooting instruction. The ultimate responsibility of assuring that the jury is properly instructed on all relevant issues of law in a case falls upon the trial judge. Therefore, when the judge is confronted with what the judge perceives to be an improperly worded jury instruction attempting to set out a point of law on which the jury should be instructed, and which is not covered elsewhere in other jury instructions already given, the judge should take whatever remedial action necessary to present a properly worded instruction to the jury on that point of law. Davis, 18 So.3d at 849 (citing Duvall v. State, 634 So.2d 524, 526 (Miss.1994)). See also Kolberg v. State, 829 So.2d 29, 45 (Miss.2002) (in which this Court stated [t]here is no doubt that the trial court is ultimately responsible for rendering proper guidance to the jury via appropriately given jury instructions, even sua sponte. ). ¶ 37. We urge our trial judges to remember that if serious doubt exists as to whether an instruction should be included, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused. Davis, 18 So.3d at 847 (citing Stringfellow v. State, 595 So.2d 1320, 1322 (Miss.1992)). ¶ 38. In sum, we conclude in today's case that there was a sufficient evidentiary basis for giving an accidental-shooting instruction, and that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on Brown's theory that he accidentally had shot Bracey. Likewise, we are constrained to find from the record before us that this error was not harmless. We no doubt may find an error to be harmless when the record of a particular case reveals that such error was so insignificant or unimportant that an automatic reversal of a conviction is not required. Williams v. State, 991 So.2d 593, 599 (Miss.2008). However, in today's case, we cannot find harmless error in the trial judge's failure to give an accidental-shooting instruction to the jury. Certainly, a properly worded accidental-shooting jury instruction may have been the difference between a guilty verdict and a not-guilty verdict.