Opinion ID: 2378811
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: 1002 F. Reinstatement of Appeal

Text: Next, the Thyes contend that Newcastle's appeal, after being dismissed by the trial court, was never properly reinstated under Supreme Court Rule 5.01 (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 33) and Rule 5.051 (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 36). Therefore, the Thyes argue that the present appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The right to appeal is purely statutory, and if the record shows that the appellate court does not have jurisdiction, the appeal must be dismissed. Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Pastine, 281 Kan. 1266, 1271, 136 P.3d 457 (2006). Whether jurisdiction exists is a question of law over which an appellate court's scope of review is unlimited. Shipe v. Public Wholesale Water Supply Dist. No. 25, 289 Kan. 160, 165, 210 P.3d 105 (2009). An appellate court has a duty to question jurisdiction on its own initiative. When the record discloses a lack of jurisdiction, it is the duty of the appellate court to dismiss the appeal. State v. Gill, 287 Kan. 289, 294, 196 P.3d 369 (2008). Here, Newcastle filed its notice of appeal from the trial court's March 17, 2009, written decision granting summary judgment to the Thyes on April 20, 2009. On July 15, 2009, the Thyes moved to dismiss Newcastle's appeal based on Newcastle's failure to timely file the docketing statement. The Thyes argued that as of the date of the filing of their motion to dismiss, Newcastle's docketing statement was over 2 months out of time. On October 8, 2009, the trial court filed a journal entry in which it dismissed Newcastle's appeal based on its failure to timely file a docketing statement. On September 23, 2009, Newcastle filed a second notice of appeal from the trial court's March 17, 2009, decision. On October 14, 2009, Newcastle filed its docketing statement. On November 20, 2009, the Thyes moved for an involuntary dismissal of Newcastle's appeal. The Thyes argued that this court should dismiss Newcastle's appeal because Newcastle had not objected to the dismissal of its appeal and had not moved for reinstatement of its appeal under Rule 5.051. In its written response to the Thyes' motion for involuntary dismissal, Newcastle contended that when it filed its April 2009 notice of appeal, such notice was premature as there were still claims pending against Dressler and Alpha Homes in the case. Indeed, Dressler was not dismissed from the action until May 13, 2009. The remaining claims against Alpha Homes were resolved by default and were reduced to a judgment on August 28, 2009. This court denied the Thyes' motion to dismiss and determined that this court did not obtain jurisdiction until a final judgment was entered on August 28, 2009. This court further noted that the Thyes' motion to dismiss was unsigned. K.S.A.2009 Supp. 60-2102(a)(4) gives this court jurisdiction to review [a] final decision in any action, except in an action where a direct appeal to the supreme court is required by law. A final decision generally disposes of the entire merits of the case and leaves no further questions or the possibility of future directions or actions by the court. Varney Business Services, Inc. v. Pottroff, 275 Kan. 20, 29, 59 P.3d 1003 (2002). In addition, in any appeal or cross-appeal from a final decision, any act or ruling from the beginning of the proceedings shall be reviewable. See K.S.A.2009 Supp. 60-2102(a)(4). K.S.A.2009 Supp. 60-2102(c) sets out a procedure for making application for an interlocutory appeal, and this court has the discretion to permit or deny the application. Rodriguez-Tocker v. Estate of Tocker, 35 Kan.App.2d 15, 24-25, 129 P.3d 586, rev. denied 281 Kan. 1379 (2006). Nevertheless, no application for an interlocutory appeal was made in this case. Moreover, although the trial court has the option of granting a K.S.A. 60-254(b) certificate, that is, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment, the court did not issue a K.S.A. 60-254(b) certificate in this case. As a result, the time for Newcastle to file an appeal in this case was 30 days from the entry of the final judgment.  Here, the final judgment disposing of all claims in the case was not entered until August 28, 2009, when the trial court entered a default judgment against Alpha Homes. Thus, when Newcastle filed its first notice of appeal on April 2009, there was no final judgment from which to appeal. Under Rule 2.03 (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 10), a premature notice of appeal is to be treated as if the notice of appeal had been filed simultaneously with the entry of judgment: A notice of appeal filed subsequent to an announcement by the judge of the district court on a judgment to be entered, but prior to the actual entry of judgment as provided in K.S.A. 60-258, shall be effective as notice of appeal under K.S.A. 60-2103 if it identifies the judgment or part thereof from which the appeal is taken with sufficient certainty to inform all parties of the rulings to be reviewed on appeal. Such advance filing shall have the same effect for purposes of the appeal as if the notice of appeal had been filed simultaneously with the actual entry of judgment, provided it complies with K.S.A. 60-2103(b). Our Supreme Court has extended Rule 2.03 to hold that if a judgment is entered disposing of all claims against one of multiple parties, and a premature notice of appeal has been filed and has not been dismissed, then a final judgment disposing of all claims and all parties validates the premature notice of appeal concerning the matters from which the appellant appealed. Honeycutt v. City of Wichita, 251 Kan. 451, 462, 836 P.2d 1128 (1992). Thus, under Honeycutt, Newcastle's April 2009 notice of appeal, if it had not been dismissed by the trial court, would have been validated when the trial court filed its final judgment that finally disposed of all claims in the case on August 28, 2009. Because the trial court in this case dismissed Newcastle's April 2009 notice of appeal, it was proper for Newcastle to file a new notice of appeal after the trial court entered a final judgment in the case. Newcastle's September 2009 notice of appeal was properly filed within 30 days from entry of the judgment as required by K.S.A. 60-2103(a) and adequately satisfied the requirements of K.S.A. 60-2103(b). Under such circumstances, this court had jurisdiction over Newcastle's appeal. Affirmed.