Opinion ID: 2510597
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Issue Four Evidentiary Sufficiency

Text: [¶23] Miller was convicted of three counts of delivery of a controlled substance under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2005). With respect to each count, the district court instructed the jury that, in order to find Miller guilty, it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that, on or about the date specified, Miller delivered methamphetamine to another individual in Lincoln County, Wyoming. Instruction No. 19 defined the term deliver as an actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance. [¶24] Citing to the language of Instruction No. 19, Miller asserts that his convictions cannot stand under the principles espoused in Bush v. State, 908 P.2d 963 (Wyo. 1995), and its progeny. Miller claims that, because Instruction No. 19 contained three alternative theories for satisfying the delivery element, and because the general verdict form did not specify which alternative the jury based its verdict, sufficient evidence on all three alternatives must exist to sustain his conviction on each count. According to Miller, the evidence supports a finding of an actual delivery of methamphetamine to Justin on the dates in question, but fails to show a constructive or attempted delivery. Miller contends that the absence of evidence proving a constructive or attempted delivery mandates reversal of his convictions. Miller misreads the holding of those cases. [¶25] In the Bush line of cases, we held that when a crime may be committed in alternative ways, and the jury is instructed on each alternative and returns a general verdict of guilt, the verdict must be set aside unless sufficient evidence exists to support a finding of guilt as to each alternative. Bush, 908 P.2d at 966-67; Urbigkit v. State, 2003 WY 57, ¶ 42, 67 P.3d 1207, 1224 (Wyo. 2003); May v. State, 2003 WY 14, ¶ 13, 62 P.3d 574, 579 (Wyo. 2003); Tanner v. State, 2002 WY 170, ¶ 8, 57 P.3d 1242, 1244 (Wyo. 2002); King v. State, 2002 WY 27, ¶ 24, 40 P.3d 700, 706 (Wyo. 2002). The holding of those cases pertain to elements instructions which quote directly from a criminal statute containing alternative grounds for conviction of the crime charged. For example, Bush and Tanner concerned Wyoming's burglary statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301(a) (LexisNexis 2005). [2] In each case, the jury was instructed that it could find the defendant guilty of the crime of burglary if the evidence showed he entered a building without authority with the intent to commit larceny or the intent to commit a felony. Because the evidence was not sufficient to show entry with the intent to commit both larceny and a felony, we reversed the burglary conviction in each case. [¶26] The problem that existed in Bush and the other cases, however, does not exist in this case. Here, the elements instruction given to the jury on the charged offense did not contain alternative elements upon which Miller's convictions could be based. Miller's jury was only required to determine if the evidence proved Miller delivered a controlled substance to Justin Miller, nothing more. Instruction No. 19 merely defined the term deliver and did not have the effect of charging an alternative ground for conviction. Bush and its progeny simply are inapplicable to the definitional instruction given in this case. [¶27] Our review of the record in this case discloses ample evidence from which the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Miller delivered a controlled substance to Justin on the dates charged. We will not second-guess the jury's guilty verdict.