Opinion ID: 4511395
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plea Deal

Text: ¶ 34. The PCR court concluded that petitioner’s trial counsel “fell short of minimal expectations for competent defense counsel” because he failed to accurately relate the State’s plea offer.4 However, the court concluded that this failure was “inconsequential” because “[a]s a matter of fact” petitioner would not have accepted the plea deal. On appeal, petitioner argues that the PCR court erred in this finding. We do not address this plea offer claim, however, because, based on the law-of-the-case doctrine, it is outside the scope of this Court’s 2007 remand order. ¶ 35. The law-of-the-case doctrine provides that a “decision in a case . . . of last resort is the law of that case . . . throughout all the subsequent proceedings therein, and no question then necessarily involved and decided will be reconsidered by the Court.” Coty v. Ramsey Assocs., Inc., 154 Vt. 168, 171, 573 A.2d 694, 696 (1990) (alterations in original) (quotation omitted). 3 Petitioner, acting pro se, argues that the Court should remand the case to the trial court so he can “address his original claims of police and prosecutorial misconduct.” We decline to do so. As the PCR court succinctly explained, “claims involving alleged prosecutorial and or law enforcement misconduct, including allegations over the complete and/or tardy failure to disclose various discovery and investigatory materials pretrial, are not within the mandate of the Supreme Court’s remand in this PCR action. Those issues and claims have been already resolved adversely to [petitioner], either on direct appeal, or in the affirmance of the prior summary judgment order.” 4 On February 21, 1994, trial counsel advised petitioner that the State would accept a guilty plea to charges of second-degree murder and burglary with a recommendation to the court for a sentence of thirty years to life. Judge Pearson concluded that trial counsel failed to accurately convey this plea offer because trial counsel did not specifically explain to petitioner that he “would be free to argue for less” under the terms of the plea agreement. On appeal, however, petitioner argues that, based on trial counsel’s representation, he “believed the State’s offer was a recommendation of thirty-years-to-life for second-degree murder with a consecutive sentence for burglary.” (Emphasis omitted.). Under petitioner’s understanding, he could have received a maximum sentence of fifty-five years if he accepted the plea offer, which is twenty years more than the presumptive sentence for first-degree murder. 15 Accordingly, absent “exceptional circumstances,” State v. Gomes, 166 Vt. 589, 591, 690 A.2d 351, 353 (1996) (mem.) (quotation omitted), when this Court remands a case, “our decision is the law of the case on the points presented throughout all the subsequent proceedings.” State v. Higgins, 156 Vt. 192, 193, 588 A.2d 1062, 1062 (1991) (quotation omitted). Therefore, “on remand the trial court is constrained to follow our specific directions as interpreted in light of the opinion.” Gomes, 166 Vt. at 590, 690 A.2d at 353 (quotation omitted). ¶ 36. In 1996, after this Court affirmed his conviction for first-degree murder, petitioner filed his first PCR petition, which raised at least thirty separate claims, including claims that trial counsel’s assistance was ineffective because he failed to prepare a defense, conduct a pretrial investigation, interview witnesses, or accurately convey the State’s plea offer. In April 2005, the PCR court granted summary judgment to the State on all the claims raised in petitioner’s PCR petition. On appeal, petitioner did not generally challenge the PCR court’s “disposition of any specific claim”; rather, he argued the PCR court erred in granting the State’s motion for summary judgment because the State failed to provide evidentiary support. In re FitzGerald, 2007 VT 51, ¶ 6. Rejecting this argument, we explained that the “State’s motion was supported by documentary evidence.” Id. However, we noted that petitioner specifically asserted that the “State’s motion was insufficient to refute his claims that trial counsel failed to conduct a pretrial investigation, prepare a defense, or interview witnesses.” Id. ¶ 11. We agreed, reversing and remanding only the portion of the judgment dismissing these three claims. Id. ¶¶ 11, 18. ¶ 37. The law-of-the-case doctrine dictates that the PCR court was “constrained” toconsider only these three remanded issues. See Gomes, 166 Vt. at 590, 690 A.2d at 353 (quotation omitted). On remand, however, the PCR court addressed the plea offer issue, reasoning that it “[a]rguably [fell] within the broad umbrella of the claim for ‘failure to prepare a defense.’ ” At oral argument, petitioner’s counsel also argued that the plea offer is included within trial counsel’s failure to prepare a defense. She explained: “When someone is facing life without parole 16 and the government, and the trial court, have found that the evidence is so overwhelming, there’s one job left in order to defend against being sentenced to the worst possible sentence and that is to convey a plea deal properly, advise the client as to the pros and cons, and let them make an informed decision.” ¶ 38. While it is undoubtedly true that attorneys should accurately convey plea offers, the plea offer in this case was outside the scope of this Court’s 2007 remand order. The record indicates that trial counsel’s failure to accurately convey the plea offer and trial counsel’s failure to prepare a defense were independent ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Of the eighteen claims presented in petitioner’s PCR petition, he specifically, and separately, alleged that trial counsel failed to “present a defense” and failed to accurately convey “the true terms of a plea offered by the State.” The PCR court evaluated them as separate claims, dismissing the failure to prepare a defense claim for lack of evidentiary support and addressing the failure to accurately convey the plea offer on the merits, concluding that it could not find that trial counsel’s “advice . . . regarding th[e] plea offer was . . . unreasonable.” It is accordingly clear that when this Court considered the PCR court’s decision and remanded the failure-to-prepare-a-defense claim, the Court did not consider whether trial counsel accurately conveyed the plea offer to be subsumed within the failure-to-prepare-a-defense claim. ¶ 39. To the extent petitioner nevertheless argues on appeal that somehow the plea offer issue is a subset of his claim that trial counsel failed to prepare a defense, we are unpersuaded: Consideration of a plea offer is not preparation of a defense.5 5 In his pro se reply brief, petitioner argues that “the interests of justice” and judicial economy would be served by addressing the plea offer because if the Court does not address it, he could pursue a federal habeas claim. Whatever the merits of petitioner’s habeas claim, the plea offer issue was not part of this Court’s 2007 remand order and is therefore not within the scope of this appeal. 17