Opinion ID: 1262796
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Blood Stain Pattern Analysis

Text: An investigator from the Bedford County Sheriff's Department first contacted Geoff Brown, a forensic evidence technician employed by the Lynchburg Police Department and an expert in blood stain pattern analysis (blood spatter evidence), on the Sunday evening before the trial was to begin. The investigator sought Brown's help in evaluating the blood stains shown on the photographs of the scene and the bodies of the victims. Brown came to Bedford County the following day and examined the photographs. That Monday afternoon Brown discussed his conclusions with the Commonwealth's Attorney but submitted nothing in writing. Tuesday, the first day of trial, was spent in empaneling a jury. Some time Wednesday morning, when opening statements were made and evidence was heard in the first phase of the trial, the Commonwealth's Attorney advised defense counsel that he planned to use Brown as a blood spatter expert to interpret the blood stains shown in the photographs taken of the victims and the scene. That evening, after telling defense counsel and his investigator substantially what he would say at trial, Brown also offered to furnish them with a list of other blood spatter experts in other police departments. They did not accept Brown's offer at that time. Later that Wednesday evening, defense counsel talked by telephone with a blood spatter expert in Alabama but not about anything substantive, because of a money problem. The following day, Stewart's counsel moved the court for a recess and for the appointment of our own expert to help us intelligently confront this evidence. The court denied both motions, but upon defense counsel's request that morning, Brown furnished the names and telephone numbers of several police officers in the area who had qualified as blood spatter experts. Defense counsel contacted one of those persons, Larry McGann of the Virginia State Police, that Thursday night, but made no effort to have him come to the trial the next day to assist him in evaluating Brown's testimony, scheduled the following day. Before Brown testified on Friday, Stewart again unsuccessfully moved for a continuance. Thereafter, Brown testified that a pattern of blood spatter stains on a flat surface can indicate whether the blood had been dropped straight down from a stationary source or had been dropped from a moving source. According to Brown, as blood travels through the air, it travels in a perfect circle and when it hits a surface, it flattens out. Brown further noted that if blood is dropped from a moving source, that movement will cause the blood to hit the surface at an angle, giving spur-like or spines off the stains [and] showing the direction in which that blood had been travelling as it fell to the surface where it was found. On the other hand, if blood is dropped from a stationary source, the spines would go out equally in each direction, causing the blood stain to form basically [a] perfect round circle. After examining the photographs of the blood stains on the steps leading to the second floor bedroom where Mrs. Stewart was shot, Brown was of the opinion that the pattern of the stains was consistent with the conclusion that the source of the blood (Jonathan, as shown by other evidence) was carried into the bedroom. Brown also called attention to the similarity of the heavy triangular staining on the bedspread near the foot of the bed and on Mrs. Stewart's forehead when Mrs. Stewart's body was found. Brown concluded that these similar stainings were consistent with the premise that Mrs. Stewart had been lying with her forehead on the lower part of the bedspread after she was shot. And, after examining the photographs of blood stains upon the headboard of the bed and extending up the wall above the headboard (Mrs. Stewart's blood, as shown by other evidence), Brown opined that the pattern of those stains was consistent with its source being thrown violently up toward the head of the bed after she had been lying with her forehead resting upon the lower part of a spread that covered the bed. Stewart contends that the court erred in several respects in admitting Brown's testimony. First, Stewart claims that because he was given no written summary or report of Brown's conclusions, Brown's testimony was inadmissible as a consequence of the Commonwealth's violation of Rule 3A:11(b)(1), which provides in pertinent part: Upon written motion of an accused a court shall order the Commonwealth's attorney to permit the accused to inspect and copy or photograph any relevant (i) written or recorded statements or confessions made by the accused ... or the substance of any oral statements or confessions made by the accused to any law enforcement officer, ... and (ii) written reports of autopsies, ballistic tests, fingerprint analyses, handwriting analyses, blood, urine and breath tests, other scientific reports, and written reports of a physical or mental examination of the accused. Rule 3A:11(b)(1) (emphasis added). Stewart does not contend that Brown made a written report. However, according to Stewart, an oral scientific report regarding blood spatter evidence is clearly discoverable [under this rule], because the word written does not modify the words other scientific reports, as in [a]ll other provision[s] of the rule. We find this argument unpersuasive because Stewart overlooks other language of the Rule permitting an accused to inspect and copy or photograph the documents described thereafter. Obviously, Stewart could not have inspect[ed], cop[ied] or photograph[ed] Brown's orally stated conclusions drawn from his inspection of the photographs. And, were the Rule intended to require the Commonwealth's Attorney to furnish Stewart with the substance of any [of an expert's] oral statements, it would so state as it does in the instance of an accused's unrecorded statements to a law enforcement officer. Next, Stewart argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for the appointment at public expense of an independent expert on the analysis of blood spatter evidence. Stewart cites no cases that indicate such assistance is required in order to provide the constitutionally required basic tools of an adequate defense, Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227, 92 S.Ct. 431, 433, 30 L.Ed.2d 400 (1971), and we find none. Consequently, we conclude that the Commonwealth is not required to provide funding for such assistance. See Townes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 307, 332, 362 S.E.2d 650, 664 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 971, 108 S.Ct. 1249, 99 L.Ed.2d 447 (1988). Next, Stewart argues that the court abused its discretion in denying his several motions for a continuance so that he could obtain an expert to assist in the cross-examination of Brown. On the morning Brown was to testify, Stewart's counsel advised the court that although he had talked to McGann the night before, he did not solicit McGann's assistance that morning in countering Brown's testimony because McGann had not seen the photographs, he was an agent of the Commonwealth, a friend of Brown's, and would have been of minimal help at best. After indicating that it could not assume that all agents of the Commonwealth will always testify for the Commonwealth, and hearing that Brown had disclosed the substance of his testimony to defense counsel two days before, the court denied Stewart's motion for a continuance to search for some other expert in the field. Considering these facts, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in this ruling. Next, Stewart contends that Brown's blood spatter analysis evidence should not have been admitted during the guilt stage of the trial because it was not relevant to that issue. We disagree. For many years, we have approved the principle that every fact, however remote or insignificant, that tends to establish a probability or improbability of a fact in issue is admissible. Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 269, 257 S.E.2d 808, 815 (1979) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972, 100 S.Ct. 1666, 64 L.Ed.2d 249 (1980). And, in view of the fact that Stewart contends he does not remember what he did in the house after shooting his wife and son, evidence which would indicate what he did with their bodies tends to establish that their murders were premeditated. We reject Stewart's contention concerning the admissibility of Brown's testimony. He argues that the general reliability of blood spatter evidence was not established in this case. We approved the use of such evidence in Compton v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 716, 727, 250 S.E.2d 749, 756 (1979).