Opinion ID: 6971839
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claim 2U

Text: The district court also determined that as a matter of law the USSC staplers did not infringe claim 24 by equivalents. The court first noted that USSC’s lockout did not literally meet the “during staple firing” limitation. See Ethicon III, slip op. at 15. The court then rejected Ethicon’s theory of infringement by equivalents, that the combination of USSC staplers’ restraint and cam bar retainer are the equivalent of the claimed restraining structure, based on the “said restraining structure being movable by said pusher assembly” claim limitation. The court reasoned that Ethicoris theory required the cam bar retainer .to be simultaneously part of the pusher assembly and the restraining structure and that logically such a unitary structure could not “be movable by itself,” as required' by the claim. Id. at 16. Ethicon again argues that the district court misapplied our case law and erred in failing to consider Dr. Collins’ declaration. Specifically, regarding the “during staple firing” limitation, Ethicon argues that USSC’s restraint is equivalent to the claimed restraining structure because USSC’s restraint (1) may properly be viewed as working in conjunction with the cam bar retainer to hold the barrier out of the path of the pusher assembly and (2) holds the barrier out of the path of the pusher assembly by itself until immediately prior to staple firing. Ethicon asserts that these are insubstantial differences compared with a restraint that holds out the barrier “during staple firing.” As Collins explained by analogy to the length of the pusher bars, if the several-inch long pusher bars of the Multifire GIA 80 stapler were just 13.5 millimeters longer, or those of the Multifire GIA 60 were just 16.5 millimeters longer, the USSC staplers would literally meet the “during staple firing” limitation and thus literally infringe. Ethicon analogizes this ease to Wright Medical Technology, Inc. v. Osteonics Corp., 122 F.3d 1440, 43 USPQ2d 1837 (Fed.Cir.1997), and asserts that we should remand for a jury determination of equivalence. USSC responds that the district court correctly applied the All Limitations rule, emphasizing that its restraint does not perform substantially the same function as the claimed retraining structure in substantially the same way, viz., blocking the barrier during staple firing by physically contacting the barrier during the initial forward movement of the pusher assembly. USSC also argues that its lockout is substantially different from the claimed lockout because “[i]t locks out even if no staples have been fired, because the lockout clip is released [by the restraint] before.any staples have been fired.” (emphasis in original) USSC also asserts that Dolly and Sage require that we reject Ethicon’s theories of infringement by equivalents. We agree with Ethieon that summary judgment of non-infringement by equivalents was improper with respect to claim 24. The district court erroneously reasoned that the “said restraining structure being movable by said pusher assembly” limitation requires as a matter of law that the cam bar retainer be distinct from the restraint. We have stated that “[o]ne-to-one correspondence of components is not required, and elements or steps may be combined without ipso facto loss of equivalency.” Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 989, 10 USPQ2d 1338, 1347 (Fed.Cir.1989), overruled on other grounds, A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1038-39, 22 USPQ2d 1321, 1333 (Fed.Cir.1992). In other words, two physical components of an accused device may be viewed in combination to serve as an equivalent of one element of a claimed invention, as long as no claim limitation is thereby wholly vitiated. Thus, with respect to claim 24, the cam bar retainer (a part of the pusher assembly) and the restraint may be considered to act in combination, although not physically combined, to form an equivalent of the claimed restraining structure if the combination does not wholly vitiate the “movable by” limitation. Because that limitation requires only that the restraining structure move together with the pusher assembly- during the staple firing stroke, and because the cam bar retainer and the restraint of the USSC staplers clearly move together during the staple firing stroke, Ethicon’s assertion that the cam bar retainer and restraint act in combination does not wholly vitiate the “movable by” limitation. See, e.g., Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609, 70 S.Ct. 854, 94 L.Ed. 1097, 85 USPQ at 331 (“Consideration must be given to the purpose for which an ingredient is used in a patent, the qualities it has when combined with the other ingredients', and the function which it is intended to perform.”). Accordingly, the district court’s reasoning, standing alone, does not compel rejection of Ethicon’s theory of infringement by equivalents. Further analysis indicates that summary judgment with respect to claim 24 must be reversed. The facts in this ease are not analogous to those in Dolly, Wiener, or Sage. Rather, as Ethicon asserts, they are more closely analogous to those in Wright Medical. In that case, we reversed a summary judgment of non-infringement by equivalents and remanded for a factual determination whether the allegedly infringing device’s intrame-dullary rod was equivalent to the claimed rod, a rod “adapted to closely fit in and extend through the narrowest portion [the isthmus] of the human femur.” Wright Med., 122 F.3d at 1442, 1446, 43 USPQ2d at 1839, 1842. We remanded because we could not determine as a matter of law that the allegedly infringing device’s rod was not equivalent to the claimed rod even though it extended to, but not “through,” the isthmus. While the structural difference between the accused and claimed rod supported summary judgment of lack of literal infringement, see id. at 1444, 122 F.3d 1440, 43 USPQ2d at 1841, that difference was not clear enough on summary judgment to conclude that no reasonable fact-finder could find that the rods were equivalent. This was especially true, given the patentee’s evidence suggesting that the rods performed substantially the same function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same result. See id. at 1445-46, 122 F.3d 1440, 43 USPQ2d at 1841-42. Similarly, in this case, only a few millimeters in the length of the pusher bars distinguishes the claimed restraining structure, which contacts the barrier “during- staple firing,” from the USSC stapler’s restraint, which loses contact with the barrier just prior to staple firing. As counsel for USSC acknowledged during oral argument, this physical difference translates into a “very slight,” “very quick” temporal difference, a period that is perhaps as short as a few thousandths of a second. Thus, we cannot say as a matter of law that this difference is substantial. It is a subtle difference in degree, not a clear, substantial difference or difference in kind, as was the case regarding claim 6. In light of this small difference in length and time, the Collins declaration raises genuine issues of material fact as to equivalence, issues that must be resolved by the finder of fact. Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment of non-infringement by equivalents of claim 24 and remand for the finder of fact to determine whether the USSC staplers’ restraint and the claimed restraining structure are equivalent. Generally, the fact-finder should consider, inter alia, whether the restraint and the restraining structure substantially differ physically or temporally in their interaction with their respective barriers and whether the USSC staplers’ restraint performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same result as the claimed restraining structure. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. 17, 117 S.Ct. at 1054, 137 L.Ed.2d 146, 41 USPQ2d at 1875 (“There seems to be substantial agreement that, while the triple identity test may be suitable for analyzing mechanical devices, it often provides a poor framework for analyzing other products or processes.”). More particularly, the fact-finder should consider whether, as USSC asserts, the USSC restraint in practice provides the lockout function in the absence of staple firing.