Opinion ID: 2575997
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Alleged prosecutorial misconduct at closing argument

Text: Defendant cites as misconduct a number of statements the prosecutor made during closing argument to the jury. Defendant, however, did not object to any of the challenged statements and therefore cannot now raise them. ( People v. Crew, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 839, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 733, 74 P.3d 820.) In any event, we conclude that the statements either were not misconduct or did not prejudice defendant. During closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor stated that Manuel Acosta, the truck driver at the rest stop where the murder occurred, testified that defendant did not look like the man he saw come out of the restroom and commented, `Well, I guess I missed the beard.' The statement about missing the beard, however, was made not by Acosta but by Janet Madsen who testified that she saw defendant come out of the restroom right after the shooting. The jurors could not have been misled, because in her testimony eyewitness Madsen readily acknowledged miss[ing] the beard. This, coupled with defense counsel's closing argument to the jury that Acosta had testified that defendant was not the man he saw at the scene of the murder, support our conclusion that defendant has not shown a reasonable likelihood that the jury was misled by the prosecutor's attributing to Acosta the statement about defendant's beard. ( People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 553, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137.) Defendant complains about the prosecutor's description of defense counsel Leo Steidlmayer as a highly paid professional. In his closing argument to the jury, defense counsel said that he was in the position of acting as a 13th juror. The prosecutor responded he had difficulty with that description because defense counsel, unlike the jurors, is as much of aโof a highly trained and skilled lawyer as anybody who is sitting at counsel table here. A prosecutor's description of defense counsel as being a highly trained and skilled lawyer is not misconduct. Such a statement does not rise to the level of a deceptive or reprehensible attempt to improperly influence a jury. ( People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 120, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30; People v. Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 373, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769.) Defendant asserts that the prosecutor improperly vouched for his case by telling the jury that defense counsel's idea of blowin' smoke and roiling up the waters to try to confuse you is you put everybody else on trial. It is not misconduct for a prosecutor to argue that the defense is attempting to confuse the jury. ( People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1302, fn. 47, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1.) Here, the record does not support defendant's characterization of the prosecution's statement as attacking the integrity of defense counsel. We now turn to defendant's allegation that the prosecutor committed misconduct by misstating defense counsel's argument and the evidence. During closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor stated that defense counsel attributed eyewitness Madsen's statement, That man is the man I saw, to the morning after the murder when Madsen assisted Siskiyou County Sheriff's Sergeant Gary Perry with the composite drawing. The prosecutor asserted there was no evidence to support defense counsel's argument. Defense counsel's argument, however, referred to Madsen's in-court identification, not to her statement at the time of the composite drawing. Thus, the prosecutor confused defense counsel's statement pertaining to Madsen's in-court testimony with Madsen's testimony about the composite drawing. The misconduct, if any, was not prejudicial to defendant, however, because it is not reasonably likely that the jury misunderstood or misapplied the comment. It was clear that Madsen's in-court identification was the subject of defense counsel's argument. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the prosecutor's misstatement would not have led the jury to impute any impropriety to defense counsel. Defendant also accuses the prosecutor of misconduct in stating in closing argument to the jury that Ron Woods was not charged with any crimes arising out of the shoot-out at his apartment because of the lack of cooperation from victims Hancock and Kiyoka. There was no misconduct, for the prosecutor's comment correctly reflected the evidence produced at trial: No charges were filed against Woods because the victims did not report the shooting to the police. Nor was there misconduct when the prosecutor pointed out to the jury that after the defense said in its opening statement that it would call Jay Blaylock as a witness, it did not do so. Blaylock, who was with Janet Madsen at the public rest stop at the time of the murder, did not testify at trial. It is not misconduct for a prosecutor to comment on the failure of the defense to introduce material evidence or to call witnesses. ( People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 446, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388.) Defendant contends the cumulative effect of the alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct, which we discussed above, compels reversal of the judgment. We disagree. Any impropriety by the prosecutor, whether considered individually or together, did not rise to the level of misconduct that would require reversal of the judgment.
Defendant argues that the cumulative prejudice of the errors he alleges occurred at the guilt phase of the trial compel reversal of the judgment. But, as discussed above, any errors that occurred were of an insubstantial nature. Whether viewed either alone or in combination, the errors did not prejudice defendant.