Opinion ID: 2088220
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Four Civil Lawsuits in Which Respondent's Alleged Misconduct Occurred.

Text: The Respondent is charged with misconduct in handling four civil lawsuits on behalf of Mr. Oliver. Since Mr. Oliver's second discharge by DOT was the focal point of each of these lawsuits, all four of them were treated as related cases and assigned to Judge Norma Johnson of United States District Court for the District of Columbia. A brief description of these lawsuits is set out below: 1. Oliver v. Bell, CA 79-2514 (complaint filed 9/19/79). The Complaint in this lawsuit was filed a few months after Mr. Oliver had been acquitted of criminal charges, and this was ten months prior to the final decision of the Merit System Protection Board in the administrative proceedings. The lawsuit was against 12 present or former employees of the Department of Justice, Department of Transportation and the District of Columbia, plus three members of the Metropolitan Police Department. The allegations of the complaint asserted three main claims: (1) that the criminal prosecution of Mr. Oliver by the District of Columbia had been conducted allegedly in bad faith pursuant to a conspiracy; (2) that certain of the DOT defendants had made defamatory statements against Mr. Oliver; and (3) that DOT's termination of Mr. Oliver's employment was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. In an order and opinion of December 31, 1981, Judge Johnson granted a motion to dismiss the complaint under F.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(b) as to all three of the alleged claims: First, the claim for alleged bad faith prosecution of the criminal case was based solely on vague and conclusory allegations that did not include any alleged overt acts and totally failed to meet the specificity requirements of F.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), and this claim was also legally defective as to some of the federal officials because there was no allegation whatsoever to show their personal responsibility for any of the alleged illegal acts of subordinates. Second, as to the defamation claim, the federal defendants had absolute immunity insofar as the claim was based on the common law tort of defamation, and had a qualified immunity for any tort based on an alleged constitutional violation. Third, the claim for monetary damages for arbitrary and capricious action was improper because no such claim is allowed under the Administrative Procedure Act and, assuming arguendo that this claim was also predicated on an alleged due process violation of the Fifth Amendment, the court refused to imply a constitutional damage remedy. [3] The Hearing Committee found that Respondent, or someone working at his direction, prepared the complaint in the Bell case based on information supplied by Mr. Oliver. There was no evidence concerning the time devoted to preparing the complaint. Nor did Respondent attempt to provide any explanation of possible legal theories on which the complaint could have been sustained. 2. Oliver v. Goldschmidt, CA 80-0458 (complaint filed 2/13/80). This lawsuit was commenced five months prior to the final decision of the Merit System Protection Board in the administrative proceedings. The defendants were 28 present and former DOT employees who were sued in their official and individual capacities for alleged racial discrimination in employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The complaint also included alleged violations of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. In an opinion and order dated December 31, 1981, Judge Johnson granted the defendants' motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and further ruled the suit could proceed only against the Secretary of DOT in his official capacity based on certain conduct in two of the DOT administrative proceedings. See BX-12. Judge Johnson's opinion described the complaint in this lawsuit as woefully deficient, because it did nothing more than list the name, race, sex, citizenship and position of 22 of the 28 defendants and contained only vague and conclusory allegations against the other six defendants. For these reasons, Judge Johnson concluded that there was a complete failure to indicate why the pleader is entitled to relief in any of the claims against government officials sued in their individual capacities. Moreover, Judge Johnson ruled that this lawsuit was time-barred insofar as it was based on action in those administrative proceedings wherein final DOT action had been taken on November 30, 1979, because no appeal to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) had been filed within the applicable 15-day period and because this lawsuit in federal court was not commenced within the applicable 30-day period following the orders entered in the administrative proceedings. Judge Johnson also dismissed the complaint against several defendants for lack of service of process or insufficient service of process. Six of the defendants were not served by any means of process. Of the remaining 22 defendants, 20 were dismissed because of insufficient service of process. For these 20 defendants, the complaint and summons had apparently been served on DOT employees authorized to accept service on behalf of the named DOT officials in matters concerning their official capacities, but not in matters where, as here, they were being sued in their individual capacities. Judge Johnson therefore dismissed the lawsuit as to these 20 defendants for the reasons set out in her opinion in Oliver v. MSPB, which relied on the authority of Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 100 S.Ct. 774, 65 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980), and Lamont v. Haig, 590 F.2d 1124 (D.C.Cir. 1978). Evidence at the disciplinary hearing indicated that the complaint in Oliver v. Goldschmidt was prepared in large part, if not entirely, by Mr. Oliver. Then it was filed by Respondent with little or no revision or even review, of its substance. The testimony of Respondent's Office Manager indicated that the complaint as drafted by Mr. Oliver may have been retyped in Respondent's office, apparently to satisfy style or form requirements of the court, and that Mr. Oliver was upset and objected. 3. Oliver v. The Merit System Protection Board, CA 80-1918 (complaint filed 8/1/80). The thrust of this lawsuit was that MSPB, in its order of July 18, 1980, had violated Mr. Oliver's Constitutional and statutory rights by upholding the administrative decisions of DOT to terminate employment. The complaint asked for a declaratory judgment, for a judicial order directing the appropriate authority to initiate criminal prosecution of members of the Merit Board, and to award $6 million in compensatory and punitive damages as well as counsel fees. On October 9, 1981, Judge Johnson entered a final judgment, in the form of a memorandum and order, granting the defendants' motion to dismiss the entire case because of numerous legal deficiencies: insufficient service of process on defendants sued in their personal capacities; absolute immunity of the defendants for conduct in performance of their administrative or adjudicatory duties; sovereign immunity of MSPB and officials thereof; and failure to state a claim. The request for a court-ordered criminal prosecution of the defendants was denied by Judge Johnson because such an order would violate the Constitutional Doctrine of Separation of Powers. [4] The complaint in this case was also prepared by Mr. Oliver and filed by Respondent with little or no revision or review for substantive matters. According to the testimony of Respondent's Office Manager, Mr. Oliver had discovered that some changes for style or form had been made in this complaint and was upset and said he didn't want us to retype them, and thereafter they weren't retyped. Tr. 266. After Judge Johnson had entered the judgment on October 9, 1981 dismissing the entire complaint, Respondent and Mr. Oliver disagreed on the appropriate step to take thereafter. Three possibilities were apparently considered: filing an amended complaint to cure the pleading defects noted by Judge Johnson; filing a motion for reconsideration; or possibly filing an appeal from the judgment. In fact, Respondent did nothing until October 26, 1981, which was the date he filed a motion for enlargement of time in which to file a motion for reconsideration. This motion was denied on December 4, 1981 because of the untimeliness of both the motion for enlargement of time and the underlying motion for reconsideration. Under Fed.R. Civ.P. 59(e), a motion to amend a judgment must be filed within ten days after entry of the judgment, and this rule applied because the underlying motion for reconsideration amounted to a motion to alter or amend the judgment entered by Judge Johnson on October 9, 1981. Thus, the motion for enlargement of time related to an untimely motion for reconsideration that would be a nullity, and the enlargement motion was therefore denied. Prior to the court's order of December 4, 1981 denying the motion for enlargement of time to file a motion for reconsideration, Respondent on November 6, 1981 filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. Three days later, on November 9, 1981, Respondent filed two additional motions, i.e., a substitute motion for leave to file an amended complaint, and a motion for reconsideration of the judgment of dismissal entered on October 9. Thereafter, on January 20, 1982, Judge Johnson entered an order that on its face addressed the substitute motion for leave to file an amended complaint. However, this order was apparently intended to dispose of all then pending motions inasmuch as it appeared to the Court that there is no discernible basis for vacating its [prior] judgment of dismissal [and] . . . the presentation of theories of relief in seriatim fashion is antithetical to the requirement that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure `be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.' 4. Oliver v. EEOC, et al., CA 81-038 (complaint filed 2/17/81). This lawsuit requested a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief from an EEOC decision that sustained DOT's orders in some of the administrative proceedings initiated by Mr. Oliver. The complaint alleged that plaintiff's claim was brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for alleged violations by EEOC of both Title VII and regulations pursuant thereto, as well as violations of the Fifth Amendment and other Federal statutes. As in both the Goldschmidt and Merit System Protection Board cases, the complaint in this suit against EEOC was prepared by Mr. Oliver, and was filed by Respondent exactly as furnished by Mr. Oliver. As described in the Hearing Committee's Report, the complaint is a long, rambling recitation of seemingly irrelevant or conclusory allegations. Hearing Comm. Report, at 15. [5] The record in this disciplinary proceeding does not indicate the disposition of this lawsuit. The record does include an order entered by Judge Johnson on November 2, 1981 that established March 1, 1982 as the discovery cut-off date and required any dispositive motions to be filed on or before March 15, 1982.