Opinion ID: 993747
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard of Review of Grant of Summary Judgment

Text: A district court's grant of summary judgment, as a question of law, is reviewed de novo. See, e.g., Sempione v. Provident Bank of Maryland, 75 F.3d 951, 954 (4th Cir. 1996). A summary judgment movant must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [it] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court should view the evidence in light of the pleadings, drawing all facts and inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (citing Adickes v. Kress, 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)); Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1979). The non-moving party is entitled to have the credibility of all its evidence presumed. Miller v. Leathers, 913 F.2d 1085, 1087 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991). Before the non-moving party must face the burden of demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact, the movant must meet its burden of showing the absence of evidence to support the non-movant's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; see also Cray Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Systems, Inc., 33 F.3d 390, 393-94 (4th Cir. 1994). There must be more than a scintilla of evidence to support the nonmovant's case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247. Rather, the evidence must be sufficient to return a verdict at trial for the party opposing the entry of judgment. Id. at 249. The non-moving party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another. Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985). Moreover, the existence only of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion. See Thompson Everett, Inc. v. National Cable Adv., 57 F.3d 1317, 1323 (4th Cir. 1995) ([I]f the evidence is `merely colorable' or `not significantly probative,' it may not be adequate to oppose entry of summary judgment.). 18