Opinion ID: 2598779
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Defendant's Motions for New Counsel

Text: Three times during trial, defendant expressed concerns outside the presence of the district attorney about the representation he was receiving from his attorney, David Johnson. On the latter two occasions, he asked the court to appoint new counsel to represent him. The court denied both requests. Defendant argues the denials violated his state and federal constitutional rights to counsel. When a defendant seeks new counsel on the basis that his appointed counsel is providing inadequate representationโi.e., makes what is commonly called a Marsden motion ( People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44)โthe trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of inadequate performance. A defendant is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the appointed counsel is not providing adequate representation or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result. Substitution of counsel lies within the court's discretion. The court does not abuse its discretion in denying the motion unless the defendant has shown that a failure to replace counsel would substantially impair the defendant's right to assistance of counsel. ( People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 603, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683.) Defendant first complained about his attorney on the second day of the prosecution's guilt phase case-in-chief. He complained about what he considered inadequate cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, but he also said he did not really want to fire my attorney, because there's no personal conflict. The court told defendant that he had the right to request new counsel and explained what showing he would have to make. It also expressed concern that substitution at that time would impact the normal, orderly process of the trial that we are now undertaking. The court made no ruling because defendant made no motion, but it made clear that defendant could later move for new counsel if he wished. Defendant's first actual Marsden motion, in which he did seek new counsel, occurred after the jury had reached its guilt verdict and before the penalty phase began. Defendant stated a number of specific complaints about his attorney's representation, and the court allowed the attorney to respond. Defendant also stated, I think our relationship has broken down. He had no trust or confidence in counsel and complained that counsel did not follow his advice. The court asked the attorney to ponder whether the relationship had broken down such that he could no longer provide proper representation, but otherwise it found no basis on which to discharge counsel. It explained to defendant that his objections boil down to differences of opinion as to tactics ... which are the sole responsibility of counsel. Defense counsel then stated that, based on what defendant had said, he can't disagree that the relationship [has] broken down to the extent that I can no longer competently represent [defendant]. He asked for more time to consult with other attorneys to decide what he should do in this situation and how much information he should give the court. The court continued the hearing to the next day. The next day, defense counsel merely submitted the matter without further comment. The court then denied the motion for new counsel in a detailed ruling. It discussed defendant's specific complaints and found them insufficient because tactical decisions are within the sole prerogative of counsel, and [do] not in any way constitute grounds for dismissal on the basis of incompetency. It found that counsel was not only entirely competent, but [he] gave [defendant] an excellent representation presented in an understandable way, the only defenses which would be reasonably accepted to the jury. The evidence against the defendant was overwhelming, the record is free of prejudicial error. It also found that the apparent breakdown of the relationship was not controlling, because defendant could not have reasonably expected, based upon the law and the facts of this matter, defense counsel to have done anything other than what was done to this stage of the proceedings. Defendant made his second motion for new counsel after the presentation of evidence at the penalty phase and before jury arguments. The court permitted defendant to state further reasons why he believed counsel was providing inadequate representation. The court stated it needed no response from counsel as to all but one complaint because it had had the opportunity to observe counsel in court. It asked counsel to respond to defendant's complaint that he had failed to call certain character witnesses. Counsel stated it was his judgment that these witnesses would have been insufficiently beneficial to call them, and that in his professional opinion, he presented the best case in mitigation that the circumstances allowed. The court denied the motion. We find no abuse of discretion. Defendant asserts he was denied the opportunity to develop a record sufficient for this court to review the error in light of all of the evidence. On the contrary, the court gave defendant full opportunity to air all of his complaints, and counsel to respond to them. Defendant's specific complaints merely showed a disagreement as to tactics, not deficient performance. Disagreement concerning tactics, by itself, is insufficient to compel discharge of counsel. ( People v. Hart, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 604, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683.) Defendant cites his claim that his relationship with counsel had broken down and counsel's statement that he could not disagree that the relationship [has] broken down to the extent that I can no longer competently represent [defendant]. However, counsel's statement was based on what defendant had told the court and does not itself compel the court to grant new counsel. A defendant may not effectively veto an appointment of counsel by claiming a lack of trust in, or inability to get along with, the appointed attorney. ( People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1070, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40.) Moreover, the trial court need not conclude that an irreconcilable conflict exists if the defendant has not tried to work out any disagreements with counsel and has not given counsel a fair opportunity to demonstrate trustworthiness. ( People v. Burnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1086, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384.) Defendant did not show that defense counsel did anything to cause any breakdown in their relationship. [A] defendant may not force the substitution of counsel by his own conduct that manufactures a conflict. ( People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 696, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 863 P.2d 192.) The denial of a motion to substitute counsel implicates the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel .... ( Bland v. California Dept. of Corrections (9th Cir.1994) 20 F.3d 1469, 1475, overruled on other grounds in Schell v. Witek (9th Cir.2000) 218 F.3d 1017, 1024-1025 (in bank); see People v. Hart, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 603, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683.) On direct review of the refusal to substitute counsel, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considers the following three factors: `(1) timeliness of the motion; (2) adequacy of the court's inquiry into the defendant's complaint; and (3) whether the conflict between the defendant and his attorney was so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense.' ( Bland v. California Dept. of Corrections, supra, at p. 1475; see Schell v. Witek, supra, at pp. 1024-1025.) It found, and we agree, that these elements are consistent with California law under People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44, and its progeny. ( Bland v. California Dept. of Corrections, supra, at pp. 1475-1476.) [5] These factors demonstrate the court acted within its discretion. First, defendant's efforts to replace counsel came during trial. To grant the motion would have required either a significant delay or a mistrial. ( Hudson v. Rushen (9th Cir. 1982) 686 F.2d 826, 831.) It is within the trial court's discretion to deny a motion to substitute made on the eve of trial where substitution would require a continuance. ( Bland v. California Dept. of Corrections, supra, 20 F.3d at p. 1476.) This is even more true if the motion is made during trial. In this case, it is hard to imagine the trial court could have found new counsel who could have prepared for the capital penalty phase quickly enough to proceed with the same jury. Granting defendant's motion would no doubt have necessitated not just a continuance but a mistrial, which would have required selecting a whole new jury. A court may not automatically deny a motion for new counsel during trial no matter what the showing, but it should grant such a motion only when the defendant demonstrates that counsel is truly providing inadequate representation or that a total breakdown in the relationship has occurred that the defendant did not cause. Second, as we have seen, the court conducted a full inquiry into defendant's complaints. It allowed defendant to express himself fully. Its inquiry was as comprehensive as the circumstances reasonably would permit. ( Hudson v. Rushen, supra, 686 F.2d at p. 831.) The court invited defendant to make a statement, listened to defendant's reasons for desiring new counsel, and found them to be without merit. ( Ibid. ) Finally, defendant did not make such a compelling showing of a conflict between himself and counsel that the court had to grant the motion. In Hudson, after the trial court denied a motion for new counsel, the defendant refused to cooperate with counsel or participate further in the trial and simply remained in his holding cell. ( Hudson v. Rushen, supra, 686 F.2d at p. 829.) Nevertheless, the reviewing court found no abuse of discretion. The reason for this complete breakdown was the voluntary conduct of defendant, not any failure by the trial court to adequately inquire into the reasons for the conflict. ( Id. at p. 831.) In sum, the record is clear that the trial court provided defendant with repeated opportunities to voice his concerns, and upon considering those concerns reasonably found them to be insufficient to warrant relieving trial counsel. We therefore find no basis for concluding that the trial court either failed to conduct a proper Marsden inquiry or abused its discretion in declining to substitute counsel. ( People v. Hart, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 604, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683.)