Opinion ID: 2035676
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Confession Was Admissible

Text: James contends that his pre-trial confession should have been held inadmissible. James was arrested at approximately 9:00 p.m. on the date of the crime and was advised of his rights at that time. He also signed a waiver card agreeing to a lineup the same day. At approximately 11:00 p.m., the police began questioning him. At 4:15 a.m., while the LaPorte County prosecutor was explaining to James that he would be charged with murder if the victim died, James inquired whether he had a right to an attorney. The prosecutor responded, Certainly, and pointed to a telephone in the room. James looked at the phone, then at the individuals in the room and indicated that he would give a statement after talking to a female friend. Some twenty minutes later, James admitted to shooting the victim. Pre-trial motions to suppress the statement were denied as were James' objections at trial. James acknowledges that the admissibility of a confession is controlled by determining, from the totality of the circumstances, whether the statement was given voluntarily. Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the defendant has the right to the presence and advice of counsel during custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. Once the right to counsel has been asserted by the defendant, the defendant may not be further interrogated until counsel has been made available, unless the defendant initiates further communication and thereby knowingly and intelligently waives the right previously invoked. Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378. These principles necessarily are followed by Indiana courts. See e.g., Bane v. State (1992), Ind., 587 N.E.2d 97, 103. James argues that even if his question to the prosecutor was not a clear request for counsel, the authorities should have continued to question him only about whether he actually wished to have counsel present. He argues that standing mute and pointing to a telephone was a wholly inadequate response under Sleek v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 751, 752. In Sleek, this Court held that the statement, I feel like I ought to have an attorney around, was sufficient to invoke the defendant's right to have counsel present, and the fact that the defendant gave a statement following that request could not be used to cast doubt on the clarity of his initial request for counsel. Id. at 754. We find the instant case is more like Pasco v. State (1990), Ind., 563 N.E.2d 587. In Pasco, the defendant, after being advised of his rights, stated, I don't know what to do ... I don't know if I should stop or if I should get a lawyer. This Court found those statements were not a definite request for the assistance of counsel and, therefore, the police were not required to stop their questioning. Id. at 591. Here, James had been advised of his right to an attorney and had signed a waiver of rights form indicating that he did not want an attorney at that time. When, during further questioning, he asked if he had the right to counsel, he was told that he did. We view his question as simply a reaffirmation of his own understanding; he reconfirmed that he had a right to an attorney if he wanted one. James made no request for counsel, even ambiguously. He was apprised of and understood, but did not invoke, his right to counsel. Id. at 592. His statement was properly admitted.