Opinion ID: 788147
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Suppression of Brady Material

Text: 244 In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. The Court subsequently held that a defendant's failure to request favorable evidence did not leave the Government free of all obligation, and a Brady violation might arise where the Government failed to volunteer exculpatory evidence never requested, or requested only in a general way. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). In addition, impeachment evidence, as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule, see Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), because [s]uch evidence is `evidence favorable to an accused.' United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194). Thus to establish a Brady violation requiring relief, a defendant must show that (1) the government withheld evidence, either willfully or inadvertently; (2) the evidence was favorable, either because it was exculpatory or of impeachment value; and (3) the withheld evidence was material. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 124 S.Ct. 1256, 1272, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166 (2004); United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 970 (3d Cir.1991). 245 The PCRA Court found that Lambert had not made either of the latter two showings. With respect to the second prerequisite, the Court found that Bayan's statement was not the type of evidence that fell within the government's duty to disclose under Brady. Specifically, the Court held that [a]bsent a specific request by the defendant for exculpatory evidence, a prosecutor has a duty to make evidence available to the defense that is truly exculpatory rather than merely favorable. PCRA Decision 170. And it found that the evidence was not truly exculpatory in part because Lambert's lawyer told the prosecution that Lambert planned to contend at trial that Yunkin had picked her up on Oak View Road. Id. at 171-72. We review this legal determination under § 2254(d)(1) to determine whether it was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See Hollman v. Wilson, 158 F.3d 177, 179 (3d Cir.1998). 246 This portion of the Court's decision was contrary to federal law, because the Supreme Court has disavowed any difference between exculpatory and impeachment evidence for Brady purposes. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375). Here, as in United States v. Pelullo, [w]e have no hesitation in concluding that the government inexplicably failed to abide by its obligation under Brady to disclose potential impeachment evidence. 105 F.3d 117, 122 (3d Cir.1997). While Bayan's statement did not exculpate Lambert, it was inconsistent with Yunkin's testimony regarding his whereabouts during the crime. Bayan could have been called, therefore, to contradict at least one aspect of Yunkin's testimony, and perhaps, therefore, to cast a larger doubt on his credibility. And while Bayan's own credibility might have been open to challenge, resolution of these kinds of credibility disputes should take place in the courtroom, and not through the prosecutor's unilateral decisionmaking. 247 The PCRA Court concluded, however, that even if the government had erred by not disclosing the evidence, the withheld evidence was not material for Brady purposes. [A] showing of materiality does not require a demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant's acquittal. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555. Rather, [t]he evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375. 35 In other words, the relevant question is: when viewed as a whole and in light of the substance of the prosecution's case, did the government's failure to provide ... [the] Brady impeachment evidence to the defense prior to the [] trial lead to an untrustworthy guilty verdict... ? See Pelullo, 105 F.3d at 123; see also Banks, 124 S.Ct. at 1276-77. 248 Because it is contrary to overwhelming evidence, the PCRA Court held, her story would have had no impact. PCRA Decision 175. In other words, it did not so undermine the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. Id. Since this too was a legal determination, we review it also under § 2254(d)(1). We conclude that it was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 249 The potential value of Bayan's statement as impeachment evidence was negligible. There was substantial evidence at trial, including the testimony of Lambert herself, that tended to show Yunkin picked up Lambert and Buck on Oak View Drive. In any case, there existed far stronger evidence regarding Yunkin's truthfulness (or lack thereof). Indeed, the government conceded in its closing that it believed Yunkin was not fully truthful in his testimony. See App. 1315; supra, at Section IV.C. Suppressed evidence is not material when it `merely furnishes an additional basis on which to impeach a witness whose credibility has already been shown to be questionable.' United States v. Amiel, 95 F.3d 135, 145 (2d Cir.1996) (internal citation omitted). 250 Moreover, the materiality of the statement is negligible even if it would have conclusively established that Yunkin picked up Lambert within the condominium complex instead of on Oak View Road. Assuming that Bayan's statement had that probative value, it would have placed Yunkin somewhat closer to the scene of Show's murder. But despite Lambert's assertions to the contrary, placing Yunkin driving within the condominium complex does not establish that he entered the Show apartment and committed the murder. 251 Finally, even if evidence showed that Yunkin was in the apartment, the evidence was sufficient to conclude that Lambert was guilty of murdering Show. The evidence at trial overwhelmingly showed that Lambert had the motivation (she hated Show), she supplied the murder weapon, and she entered Show's apartment that morning. Thus even if Bayan's statement fully implicated Yunkin in Show's murder, it would not have sufficed to exculpate Lambert. There is no reasonable probability that evidence showing Yunkin was driving within the condominium complex, rather than on a road adjacent to the complex, would have changed the result of the trial. 252