Opinion ID: 2174046
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Further Relief from Child Support Based on Equitable Considerations

Text: We also agree with Mr. P. that he is entitled to equitable relief from a portion of his retroactive child-support obligation. Mr. and Mrs. Y. not only voluntarily supported T.K.Y. from birth, but also actively interfered with Mr. P.'s ability to parent T.K.Y. and vigorously opposed his efforts to legitimate T.K.Y. Under these unique circumstances, as explained below, some relief from retroactive child support is appropriate. The decision to award retroactive child support lies within the discretion of the juvenile court. State ex rel Coleman v. Clay, 805 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Tenn.1991). However, the trial court's discretion is cabined by the statutory requirement that it must presumptively apply the Child Support Guidelines. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) (2005). The trial court's discretion is further limited by Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-2-311(a)(11)(A) (2005), which states a presumption that child support shall be awarded retroactively to the date of the child's birth. See also Child Support Guidelines, Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-2-4-.06 Section 36-2-311(a)(11)(A), governing retroactive child-support orders, sets forth only three factors to be considered as a basis for awarding less than full retroactive support: the father's lack of knowledge of the existence of the child; the mother's intentional failure to inform the father of the existence of the child; and the mother's attempts to notify the father of the existence of the child. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-2-311(a)(11)(A)(i)-(iii). In other words, the statute only contemplates excusing retroactive child support to the date of birth in circumstances where the father was not aware of the existence of the child. Because this is not a case where the father was unaware of the child's existence, the trial court awarded back support to the date of T.K.Y.'s birth. The statute further provides, however, that the court may consider the equity between the parties. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1)(A). Although this section, which governs support awards, provides that the court shall apply, as a rebuttable presumption, the child support guidelines, it also states that, If the court finds that evidence is sufficient to rebut this presumption, the court shall make a written finding that the application of the child support guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in that particular case, in order to provide for the best interest of the child or children, or the equity between the parties. Findings that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate shall state the amount of support that would have been ordered under the child support guidelines and a justification for the variance from the guidelines. Id. (emphasis added). In Hoyle v. Wilson, 746 S.W.2d 665 (Tenn.1988) (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in O'Brien v. Bainbridge, 1992 WL 156036,  (Tenn.Ct.App. July 8, 1992)), for example, this Court affirmed the trial court's forgiveness of the father's child-support obligation on equitable grounds. In Hoyle , the mother removed the children from the state and the father was unable to locate them for two years. The father had faithfully paid support up until that time even though the mother had thwarted his attempts at visitation, and he resumed paying support as soon as he was notified of the children's whereabouts. The Court held that the equities of the case, where the father's failure to pay support was due to the mother's willful violation of the visitation order, supported the trial court's remedy. Id. at 672. We note that in Hoyle , unlike in this case, the father sought retroactive relief from a child-support order. Three years after Hoyle , the Supreme Court held that a trial court may not grant retroactive relief from a child-support order, even upon equitable grounds, because of a statutory revision making child-support orders final judgments not subject to modification. Rutledge v. Barrett, 802 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tenn.1991) (citing Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(5) (1989)). Rutledge limited Hoyle to the extent that a court may not consider equitable defenses to relieve an obligor from a previous child-support order. In this case, however, there was no previous order, so the limits on equitable relief in Rutledge do not apply. In our view, the unique facts in this case support Mr. P.'s argument that he is entitled to equitable relief from his child-support obligation during the time that Mr. and Mrs. Y. interfered with his ability to parent T.K.Y. We emphasize that this is not a case where the father seeks relief from an existing child-support order, or where the custodial parents violated an existing visitation order. Here, Mr. P. was not adjudicated to be T.K.Y.'s parent until September 2, 2003, over four years after Mr. P. initiated his parentage petition and nearly six years after the birth of the child. Because Mr. P. did not have the benefits or responsibilities flowing from an adjudication of parenthood, or the rights flowing from court-ordered visitation, his ability to form a parental relationship was entirely dependent upon the willingness of Mr. and Mrs. Y. to permit him to do so. They vigorously denied him that opportunity. From the time that Mr. and Mrs. Y. first petitioned for a restraining order, on October 14, 1999, through the date of the juvenile court's first decision on March 13, 2002, Mr. P. was prevented from seeing T.K.Y., first by the threat of a restraining order and then by the actual entry of a restraining order. In addition, Mr. P. was rebuffed in his attempt to send the child a birthday gift after he had filed his petition to establish parentage. In short, we believe that equity demands that Mr. P. be relieved of child-support obligations for this period under the unique facts of this case. In reaching this conclusion, we emphasize that we do not intend to permit relief from existing child-support orders upon mere allegations that a custodial parent has interfered with visitation. As we observed in Rutledge , the custodial parent's conduct cannot extinguish the non-custodial parent's legal responsibility. Under well-recognized principles of Tennessee law, the obligation of support and the right of visitation are both intended for the benefit of the child, and the two are not interdependent. 802 S.W.2d at 607. In this case, however, there was no support order; rather, Mr. P. was actively opposed in his efforts to establish paternity and support. Additionally, our holding should not be construed as allowing a parent to reject or waive child-support payments without careful consideration of the interests of the child for whose benefits such payments are made. In this case, for instance, T.K.Y. was supported by Mr. and Mrs. Y., notwithstanding their interference with Mr. P.'s efforts to parent the child. The record does not show that T.K.Y. suffered for lack of support from Mr. P. during the time that Mr. and Mrs. Y. interfered with Mr. P.'s ability to form a relationship with T.K.Y. Although the purpose of the payment is to fulfill the non-custodial parent's obligation to contribute to the child's support, the actual payment goes, directly or indirectly, to the custodial parent or guardian of a child. Id. (citation omitted). In this case, it would be inequitable to require Mr. P. to pay retroactive support to Mrs. Y. during the time that she and her husband actively prevented Mr. P. from establishing his paternity and taking responsibility for supporting T.K.Y. In contrast, we reject Mr. P.'s argument that he should also be relieved of support from the time of the child's birth through the date of the first petition for a restraining order. Although Mr. P. acquiesced in Mrs. Y.'s wishes that he cooperate in keeping the affair and T.K.Y.'s true parentage a secret during that time, and that he not pay support, he appears from the record to have been a willing and equal participant in the arrangement. Equity does not require that he be relieved of support during that time.