Opinion ID: 1822828
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: motion of state finance commission.

Text: The first motion is that of the Finance Commission, wherein they argue that the order entered by the Finance Commission on appeal to it by the Board of Education of Benton County is final, because (a) an appeal to the courts is not a right but a statutory privilege  an appeal must be based upon a statute granting an appeal and that in this case there is no such statute; (b) the Finance Commission points out that there is no appeal to the chancery court and thence to the Supreme Court because the section granting an appeal (Sec. 6246-12, supra, has been repealed by implication) because Sec. 6248-07, Miss. Code 1942, Rec., as amended by Chap. 296, Laws 1960, contains the following language: In case the two (2) Boards are unable to agree or in case there is a popular objection to the decision of the respective boards in the matter, appeals shall lie to the state educational finance commission whose decision shall be final, (Emphasis supplied.) which is alleged to prevent an appeal to the courts. This Court pointed out in the case of Adams County Mississippi Board of Education v. State Educational Finance Commission of Mississippi, 229 Miss. 566, 91 So.2d 524, that This appeal is authorized by Sec. 12 (c) of Chapter 11, Laws of Mississippi, Extraordinary Session 1953; and this is the same section (Sec. 6246-12, Miss. Code 1942, Rec.) on which an appeal was granted in the case at bar, and in our opinion settles the question of appeal in this case. This Court has from time to time found it necessary to advise school authorities acting in a legislative capacity that the phrase The Board's decision shall be final does not mean that the parties involved in school disputes are prevented from having their day in court. In the case of Hobbs, et al. v. Germany, et al., 49 So. 516 (Miss. 1909), a child was expelled from school by the trustees under a rule requiring all pupils of the school to remain at their homes and study between designated hours in the evening. The Court said: The sole question presented by the record is as to the power of the school authorities to make and enforce this rule. The first contention is that the chancery court is without jurisdiction to entertain this proceeding,    And again section 4487 provides: `The board of education shall decide all appeals from decisions of county superintendents, or from the decisions of the state superintendent;   ' It is argued that under these two sections all controversies which in any way involve any question connected with the government of the schools must be first submitted to the county superintendent, and from his decision an appeal can be taken to the state board of education; but, where the state board of education decides it, the decision is final.    (Emphasis supplied.) Thereupon, the Court held, as follows: Whenever a question arises as to whether or not the power of the school authorities to make a certain rule or regulation is reasonably within the scope of the power conferred on them by law, the question is undoubtedly subject to inquiry by the courts. This case is in point as to the finality of the orders of school authorities. In the case of Moreau, et al., School Trustees v. Grandich, et ux, 114 Miss. 560, 75 So. 434, the Court pointed out that an appeal under the school laws is not a judicial determination; that trustees are administrative bodies and are not judicial officers and do not exercise judicial functions; and while appeals lie from the decision of the trustees to the county superintendent, and from the superintendent to the state board of education, these appeals deal with administrative matters and do not constitute res judicata. (Hn 1) It is a general rule of law, the Legislature will not delegate the power to decide legal questions to administrative officers. 12 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, Sec. 576, p. 272; People of the State of Illinois v. Belcastro, 92 A.L.R. 1223. In the case of McCulloch, et al. v. Stone, Auditor, 64 Miss. 378, 8 So. 236, where a petition was filed seeking a writ of mandamus requiring the auditor to give the petitioners a deed, the auditor refused on the ground that his decision in the matter was final. The Court pointed out in its opinion that this was a legal question, depending upon the construction of statutes, and it was a question for the courts. (Hn 2) In the case of Walters v. Blackledge, 220 Miss. 485, 71 So.2d 433, it was said: This Court has long since recognized that the Legislature may constitutionally create administrative agencies and confer upon such agencies fact finding and quasi-judicial powers, the exercise of which is subject to judicial review, citing Western Union Tel. Company v. Miss. Railroad Commission, 74 Miss. 80, 21 So. 15; Dixie Greyhound Lines v. Miss. Public Service Commission, 190 Miss. 704, 200 So. 579, 1 So.2d 489. The phrase whose decision shall be final, does not mean that there can be no appeal to the courts. It means that the matter is final insofar as action of school authorities is concerned. We are therefore of the opinion that Sec. 6246-12, Miss. Code 1942, Rec., gives the parties a clear right of appeal to the chancery court from the decision of the Finance Commission. The claim on the part of appellees that the foregoing Sec. 6246-12 was repealed by implication is based upon the fact that Chap. 11, Laws 1953, created the State Educational Finance Commission effective December 28, 1953, and Chap. 14 with reference to the transfer of children from one district to another also became effective on that date; and moreover this was an amendment of Chap. 25, Laws 1925, giving the children and parents a right to appeal to the State Educational Finance Commission, and it is claimed that such appeal was final. It was further argued that this chapter permitting transfer was amended by Chap. 296, Laws 1960, which provides for an appeal to the Finance Commission and it also provides that the decision of the State Educational Finance Commission is final. It is therefore argued that because the 1954 and 1960 acts were enacted by the Legislature subsequent to Chap. 11, Laws 1953, it clearly establishes that it was not the intention of the Legislature to permit an appeal to the chancery court. (Hn 3) It is the duty of this Court to follow the intention of the Legislature in determining whether it repealed one law by enacting another. The textwriters have pointed out this duty, by the language found in 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, Sec. 535, p. 541, as follows:    one statute will not be held to repeal another by implication unless it appears, from the terms and provisions of the later act, that it was the intention of the legislature to enact a new law in the place of the old. It is also pointed out in the same text in Sec. 538, p. 543, that: Repeals by implication are not favored, and there are many instances in which particular statutes are held not to be repealed by implication. As a general rule, the legislature, when it intends to repeal a statute may be expected to do so in express terms or by the use of words which are equivalent to an express repeal, and an intent to repeal by implication, to be effective, must appear clearly, manifestly, and with cogent force.    The courts will not hold to a repeal if they can find reasonable ground to hold to the contrary;    See Pons v. State, 49 Miss. 1; Ex Parte McInnis, 98 Miss. 773, 54 So. 260; Seward v. Dogan, 198 Miss. 419, 21 So.2d 292; In Re Savannah Special Consolidated School District of Pearl River County, 208 Miss. 460, 44 So.2d 545; U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Company v. Higdon, Admr., 235 Miss. 385, 109 So.2d 329; Branton v. O.B. Crittenden & Co., 145 Miss. 531, 111 So. 150. (Hn 4) We are of the opinion, and so hold, that Sec. 6246-12, Miss. Code, Rec., was not repealed by implification because of the subsequent enactment of the above-mentioned laws and that this section granting an appeal is now in force, and an appeal may be taken from the State Educational Finance Commission to the chancery court. The motion of the State Educational Finance Commission to dismiss the appeal is therefore overruled.