Opinion ID: 2827981
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Graham’s Official Immunity Defense to Tort and

Text: Conspiracy Claims Graham’s immunity is a more complicated matter. As it does against LaKritz Adler, Banneker asserts claims against Graham personally for tortious interference with prospective business advantage and contract, and for civil conspiracy. 11 By virtue of his role as a member of WMATA’s Board, Graham enjoys absolute official immunity for discretionary conduct within the scope of his office. The district court dismissed all of Banneker’s claims against Graham as barred by immunity. We find that the district court committed three errors: The court failed to apply federal common law to Graham’s claim of immunity, it failed to place the burden on Graham to establish his entitlement to immunity, and it analyzed Graham’s conduct at too high a level of generality. Because the record and briefing before us do not enable us definitively to apply the correct immunity analysis to the claims against Graham, we vacate the district court’s dismissal of the claims against Graham and remand for further proceedings. “When officials are threatened with personal liability for acts taken pursuant to their official duties, they may well be induced to act with an excess of caution or otherwise to skew their decisions in ways that result in less than full fidelity to 11 Banneker asserted the same claims against Graham in his official capacity, but does not press those claims on appeal. 32 the objective and independent criteria that ought to guide their conduct.” Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 (1988). Absolute official immunity is thus meant “not to protect an erring official, but to insulate the decisionmaking process from the harassment of prospective litigation.” Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 295 (1988). Even so, immunity “comes at a great cost,” as it contravenes “the basic tenet that individuals be held accountable for their wrongful conduct.” Id. The Supreme Court “has generally been quite sparing in its recognition of claims to absolute official immunity,” Forrester, 484 U.S. at 224, and has held absolute official immunity “justified only when the contributions of immunity to effective government in particular contexts outweigh the perhaps recurring harm to individual citizens,” Westfall, 484 U.S. at 295-96 (internal quotation marks omitted). We are careful not to “lose sight of the purposes of the official immunity doctrine” when determining if an official is, in the context of a particular case, entitled to absolute immunity. Id. at 299-300. We have repeatedly held that the federal common law of absolute immunity governs the scope of immunity for WMATA officials. E.g., Griggs v. WMATA, 232 F.3d 917, 920 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Beebe, 129 F.3d at 1288. The district court here applied the law of the District of Columbia to determine whether Graham is entitled to absolute immunity. See Banneker II, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 246-48. That holding is in error, and requires reversal to the extent that District of Columbia immunity law produced a different result than that which would have obtained under federal law. 33 In weighing claims of absolute immunity, we apply the two-part test of Westfall v. Erwin. 12 WMATA officials enjoy absolute immunity when their conduct falls “within the scope of their official duties and the conduct is discretionary in nature.” Westfall, 484 U.S. at 297-98; see also Beebe, 129 F.3d at 1289. The Supreme Court has endorsed a “functional” approach to the inquiry. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 224; see also Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1959). The burden of establishing immunity must be borne by the official claiming it. Westfall, 484 U.S. at 299.
Banneker asserts that all of Graham’s allegedly tortious conduct fell beyond the scope of his official duties, and is thus not immunized under Westfall. 13 Our inquiry into the scope of an official’s duties depends “not [on] the title of [the] office but the duties with which [the official] is entrusted.” Barr, 360 U.S. at 573 (internal quotation marks omitted). Conduct that is at least “within the outer perimeter of [an official’s] line of duty” is shielded by absolute immunity. Id. at 575; see also Griggs, 232 F.3d at 922. By contrast, an official loses the protection of immunity when he crosses that line and acts in a manner that is “manifestly or palpably beyond his authority.” Simons v. Bellinger, 643 F.2d 774, 12 Westfall was superseded by statute for claims brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, but still applies to claims of personal liability against WMATA officials. See Beebe, 129 F.3d at 1289. 13 Banneker acknowledges the apparent tension between its theories that Graham acted within the scope of his employment for purposes of the contract claims against WMATA and beyond the scope of his official duties for purposes of immunity from his own personal liability for tort. We need not resolve that tension now, at the pleading stage, because Banneker is permitted to plead both in the alternative. 34 786 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896)). One way that an official acts manifestly beyond his authority is through the use of “manifestly excessive means,” even if he does so in the conduct of duties otherwise within his official purview. McKinney v. Whitfield, 736 F.2d 766, 769-70 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (emphasis omitted); cf. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 495 (1978). 14 The district court considered all of Graham’s alleged tortious conduct immune because it conceived of the inquiry at too high a level of generality. Rather than analyzing each challenged act, the district court read Banneker’s complaint as attempting to impose liability on Graham for his “involvement[] as a WMATA Board Member . . . in setting contract terms for the development of the Site.” Banneker II, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 248. The appropriate focus, however, is on the relationship between “the act complained of” and the corresponding “matters committed by law to [the official’s] control or supervision.” Barr, 360 U.S. at 573 (internal quotation marks omitted). At a high enough level of generality, almost any act that has any relationship to an overarching duty, such as the duty to vote on real estate projects, will be immunized. We must instead evaluate the relationship of each of the challenged acts to Graham’s relevant, official duties. With respect to each act, we ask 14 See also Griggs, 232 F.3d at 922 (officer empowered to make arrests was not immunized because he used manifestly excessive means when he commanded his dog to attack the plaintiff after the plaintiff complied with the officer’s order, and failed to command the dog to cease its attack); Bishop v. Tice, 622 F.2d 349, 359 (8th Cir. 1980) (supervisors empowered to make employment decisions were not immunized because they “did not simply misuse their authority but went clearly beyond it by threatening [their employee] with criminal charges [in order to force him to resign] instead of attempting to dismiss him for cause”). 35 whether it was among those entrusted to Graham and, if so, whether Graham’s means of accomplishing his official duties were manifestly excessive. Graham is entitled to immunity only if he persuades us that each alleged act was taken appropriately in performance of a corresponding official duty. Some of Banneker’s allegations are aimed at the core of Graham’s official duties. For example, Banneker alleges that Graham persuaded his fellow Board members to add an affordable housing requirement to the project when approving the original Term Sheet. That plainly constitutes an exercise of Graham’s authority as a Board member to urge a Board resolution to impose conditions on development projects, and there is no allegation that Graham pursued the affordable housing requirement through excessive means. Other allegations challenge conduct manifestly beyond Graham’s authority. Banneker alleged that Graham sought to barter a vote in his capacity as member of the D.C. Council for his vote as a WMATA Board member on the Florida Avenue project, and attempted to extort Banneker. Those acts are manifestly beyond the authority of a WMATA Board Member and so not immunized. That leaves allegations of particular acts by Graham that do not fall clearly within or without the outer perimeter of his official duties as we currently understand them. Banneker alleges that Graham exceeded the scope of his authority by leaking confidential bid information to LaKritz Adler in violation of applicable regulations, pressuring Banneker’s development partners to drop out, pressuring Banneker to add LaKritz Adler to its team, seeking to steer the project to LaKritz Adler in violation of Banneker’s exclusivity rights, and giving direction to WMATA staff in connection with the Florida Avenue project in violation of WMATA policy. 36 Banneker’s allegations, however, are not enough for us to decide the question. The scope of Graham’s duties is determined by “controlling law,” Butz, 438 U.S. at 489, which here includes the WMATA Compact and the regulations governing WMATA Board Members’ conduct. Graham bore the burden of establishing his entitlement to official immunity by reference to those sources of law and WMATA policy, but he made no effort in the district court to do so. The record does not contain, for example, any reliable information about the authority of a Board Member to direct WMATA staff, or to participate in or influence negotiations. Without that information, the district court was left only with Banneker’s allegations. Although the immunity issue may be identified through a motion directed to the pleadings, courts may, where appropriate, answer the question of whether an official has acted within the outer perimeter of official duties through limited evidentiary analysis focusing on the nature and scope of the job duties in question. The “functional analysis governing absolute immunity” may call for a “limited factual inquiry” to determine “in what role the challenged function was exercised” and “preclud[e] on occasion disposition at the Rule 12 stage.” Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 496 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). For example, in some cases, affidavits from superiors elucidating an employee’s duties are required to support “[t]his type of limited inquiry.” Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enters., Inc. v. Smithsonian Inst., 566 F.2d 289, 292 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In the context of the Federal Tort Claims Act, scope-ofemployment questions sometimes are resolved in that manner. We have held that, in cases in which factual disputes over the scope of employment arise at the pleading stage, “limited discovery” may be appropriate. See Stokes v. Cross, 327 F.3d 1210, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Such inquiries primarily 37 involve matters already known to the defendant official; they tend to be discrete inquiries, the general prospect of which is “unlikely to deter any official in the vigorous pursuit of his responsibilities,” Expeditions, 566 F.2d at 292 n.5, and comport with the essential character of official immunity questions as ones that “should be decided at the earliest opportunity,” Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 253 (2007). In light of these principles, we hold that Graham failed to bear his burden to establish the scope of his official duties and to situate his conduct within its outer perimeter. On the limited record we have, we have little trouble concluding that the allegations of extortion and the alleged attempt to barter a D.C. Council vote for a WMATA vote manifestly exceeded the scope of Graham’s official duties; we have equally little trouble concluding that Graham’s attempt to add an affordable housing requirement fell within the scope of his official duties. The remaining allegations are more difficult, however, and require more fact-specific inspection. We therefore vacate the district court’s dismissal and remand for the district court to consider in the first instance which of Graham’s other actions fell beyond the outer perimeter of his official duties and whether those actions that did fall beyond the outer perimeter, taken together, state claims against Graham for tortious interference and civil conspiracy.
Turning to the second part of the Westfall analysis, Banneker argues that, even if all of Graham’s conduct was within the bounds of his official duties, his conduct was not discretionary, and therefore not immune, because it violated the WMATA Standards of Conduct. As we have discussed in connection with WMATA’s claim of sovereign immunity, we apply a two-part test to determine whether a decision is 38 immunized as discretionary. See Beebe, 129 F.3d at 1289 (applying sovereign immunity discretionary/ministerial dichotomy to claim of official immunity). First, we ask whether “any statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow”; if so, the conduct is not shielded by immunity because it is not discretionary. KiSKA, 321 F.3d at 1159 (internal quotation marks omitted). If not, and the official has room to exercise discretion, we next ask “whether the exercise of discretion is grounded in social, economic, or political goals,” making it an exercise of governmental judgment and so immune. Id. The district court held that Graham had discretion in voting on Banneker’s project, and considered all of Banneker’s allegations as seeking to impose liability for the exercise of that discretion. Here, again, the district court reviewed the complaint at too high a level of generality. The correct analysis is whether “the alleged tortious conduct is discretionary.” Westfall, 484 U.S. at 296 (emphasis added). Banneker does not seek to impose liability for Graham’s vote on the project, but for various actions relating to the vote that Banneker alleges were prohibited by the regulations governing Board Members’ conduct. The district court must parse Banneker’s allegations at a finer level of specificity in order to address those claims of prohibited action and resolve Graham’s claim of immunity. The district court also held that the Standards of Conduct did not cabin Graham’s discretion for purposes of immunity because they do not “prescribe” a course of action for WMATA Board Members to follow: they “describe how not to act, not how to act.” Banneker II, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 246. We disagree. “[C]onduct cannot be discretionary unless it involves an element of judgment or choice.” Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988). “If [an] employee 39 violates [a] mandatory regulation, there will be no shelter from liability because there is no room for choice and the action will be contrary to policy.” United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 324 (1991). For example, we have observed that the limitation of an officer’s judgment during a high speed chase—such as the limitation of “the speed of a vehicle in hot pursuit—indicates that the [police department] already had made the decision to limit the officer’s exercise of discretion.” Biscoe v. Arlington Cty., 738 F.2d 1352, 1363 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Consequently, “effective law enforcement would not be hindered by enforced adherence to such regulations” through civil liability. Id.; see also Keller v. United States, 771 F.3d 1021, 1024 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding Federal Tort Claims Act discretionary function exception does not apply “if prison personnel violate a mandatory regulation”). We see no difference between a prescription by policy that leaves no room for choice and a proscription that does the same. In both cases, the public official’s discretion is cabined such that violation of the regulation cannot by definition “involve[] judgment, planning, or policy decisions.” KiSKA, 321 F.3d at 1159 n.9 (internal quotation marks omitted). Imposition of liability for operational actions that violate mandatory policies phrased as prohibitions, like liability for violation of policies phrased as affirmative duties, does not “pose threats to the quality and efficiency of government.” Biscoe, 738 F.2d at 1363 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Standards of Conduct are absent from the record, but Banneker alleges that the standards clearly prohibited Graham from leaking confidential information. Banneker also alleges that the Bondi Report concluded Graham violated the Standards of Conduct when he (1) created a conflict of interest by seeking to barter his D.C. Council vote on the lottery contract for his WMATA vote on Banneker’s project, 40 and (2) showed favoritism to LaKritz Adler “by appearing to continue to support LaKritz Adler’s proposal for, or inclusion in, the Florida Avenue Project while at the same time opposing Banneker Ventures.” Bondi Rpt. 6. The Bondi Report’s conclusions relied on and quoted portions of the Standards of Conduct that require Board Members to “strictly avoid engaging in actions which create conflicts of interest or the appearance of a conflict of interest” and state that it is “imperative that Board Members act impartially in their official conduct by avoiding any actions which might result in favored treatment or appearances thereof toward any individual, private organization, consultant, contractor or potential consultant or contractor.” Id. at 2. Those portions of the Standards of Conduct purport to cabin the discretion of Board Members. Graham’s alleged leaking of confidential information manifestly violated the Standards. But, unlike the alleged prohibition on the leaking of confidential information, the conflict of interest standards quoted in the Bondi Report capture a wide swath of conduct more susceptible of contextual judgment. Some actions may fall clearly within the prohibition, such that the prohibition leaves “no room for choice,” while others may fall into a gray area that cannot fairly be characterized as clearly “contrary to policy.” Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324. In the context of demarcating the scope of official duties, we have held that only conduct that is “manifestly or palpably beyond” the scope of official duties is unprotected by official immunity. Simons, 643 F.2d at 786 (quoting Spalding, 161 U.S. at 498). We hold that the same rule applies to the question of whether conduct is discretionary: Only alleged conduct that manifestly violates an ethical proscription or other statute, regulation, or policy that constrains the exercise of discretion may be subject to liability. Both the scope-of-duties and discretionary-conduct 41 inquiries thus leave unprotected only conduct that is plainly unauthorized. As we have noted, the complete Standards of Conduct are not in the record. It may be that Graham’s attempts to steer the project to LaKritz Adler manifestly contravened the regulations governing his conduct as a Board Member. It is also possible that the regulations were not so clear as to render Graham’s conduct plainly beyond his discretion. Because the burden was Graham’s to rebut Banneker’s allegations, dismissal was inappropriate. See, e.g., Keller, 771 F.3d at 1024-25 (reversing grant of summary judgment in FTCA suit on “scant record” of “what procedures and regulations applied” to employees for purposes of discretionary function exception because government bore burden of establishing entitlement to immunity). However, without the benefit of the full Standards of Conduct and briefing from the parties, together with appropriate factual development, if any, that would clarify the scope of the relevant Standards and place Banneker’s allegations in context, we cannot finally distinguish which of Banneker’s allegations are barred by official immunity and which are not. For the same reason, we cannot decide in the first instance whether any allegations that are not barred by official immunity, taken together, suffice to state a claim for tortious interference and civil conspiracy. We therefore vacate the district court’s dismissal of Banneker’s claims against Graham and remand for further consideration in light of the foregoing principles.