Opinion ID: 3167561
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Deputy Maher’s Failure to Intervene

Text: Even if Deputy Lopez’s use of the Taser violated Kent’s right to be free from excessive force, Deputy Maher did not violate that right because the tasing lasted only five seconds, leaving Deputy Maher no realistic opportunity to intervene. Police officers may be liable for failing to protect a person from excessive force if the officer knew or should have known that excessive force would or might be used, and the officer had both the opportunity and means to prevent the harm from occurring. Turner v. Scott, 119 F.3d 425, 429 (6th Cir. 1997). No duty to intervene exists, however, where one officer’s act of excessive force occurs so rapidly that a second officer on the scene lacks “‘a realistic opportunity to intervene and prevent harm.’” Wells v. City of Dearborn, 538 F. App’x 631, 640 No. 14-2519 Kent v. Oakland Cnty., et al. Page 24 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ontha v. Rutherford Cnty., Tenn., 222 F. App’x 498, 507 (6th Cir. 2007)). The majority claims that Deputy Maher had the opportunity to prevent the tasing here because she was in the bedroom with Deputy Lopez and Kent, she saw Deputy Lopez point the Taser at Kent, and she was standing close enough to Kent to handcuff him after he was tased. Maj. Op. at 19-20. But our case law makes clear that where an instance of excessive force lasts only a matter of seconds, officers have no opportunity to intercede and therefore cannot be held liable for failing to prevent the violation. See, e.g., Amerson v. Waterford Twp., 562 F. App’x 484, 490 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding an officer had no opportunity to prevent two strikes to the plaintiff’s head because the span of time for intervention “could not have been more than a few seconds”); Wells, 538 F. App’x at 640 (finding no opportunity to prevent a knee strike and tasing where the acts were “rapid” and did not constitute an “extended string of abuses”); Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 476 (6th Cir. 2013) (finding no opportunity to prevent a “takedown” that lasted no more than ten seconds); Kowolonek v. Moore, 463 F. App’x 531, 539 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding that officers had no opportunity to stop a tasing that “could only have lasted for a fraction” of the entire altercation with police, which itself lasted only minutes); Ontha, 222 F. App’x at 506-07 (finding officer who was a passenger in a patrol car that ran over a fleeing suspect lacked opportunity to “implement preventative measures within a short time span of six to seven seconds”). Kowolonek v. Moore is particularly on point. In Kowolonek, the plaintiff alleged that one of the five officers attempting to detain him threatened to use a Taser and then did so after the plaintiff stated “a Taser would be the only way to get [me].” 564 F. App’x at 533. The court rejected the plaintiff’s “failure to intervene” claim against the officers who witnessed the tasing, ruling that “[e]ven if Kowolonek can show that the officers had reason to know a taser would be used against him” due to the tasing officer’s warning, the officers lacked the opportunity to stop the tasing because the entire altercation lasted only minutes, and the use of the taser “could only have lasted for a fraction of this time.” Id. at 539. This Court reached the same result in another tasing case, Wells v. City of Dearborn, 538 F. App’x at 640, because the tasing there occurred only once and at a “fleeting point[] in time.” The court reasoned that “in the absence of ongoing, No. 14-2519 Kent v. Oakland Cnty., et al. Page 25 repeated tasing, there was no way for [the officers] to intervene and prevent harm.” Id. As in Kowolonek and Wells, Deputy Lopez discharged his Taser only once, and the Taser application lasted only five seconds. Appellee Br. 10. And like the tasing officer’s warning in Kowolonek, Deputy Lopez’s warning that he would use the Taser did not change the brief duration of the force itself and, therefore, did not create an opportunity for Deputy Maher to intervene. For these reasons, the majority’s reliance on Goodwin is misplaced. There, we found that the plaintiff stated a constitutional violation where the officers confronted “a prolonged application of force”—a twenty-one-second initial tasing followed by an additional five-second tasing—because the officers could have interrupted the abuse or at least prevented its repetition. Goodwin, 781 F.3d at 319, 329. As stated, Deputy Maher could not have acted in five seconds. Thus, Deputy Maher is entitled to qualified immunity in any event. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.