Opinion ID: 3011843
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Bridge Commission Compact Before Us

Text: The cases discussed above all address the interpretation of bi-state compacts that expressly authorize the compacting states to amend the compact through legislation concurred in by the other. As we have noted, the Compact before us contains no such language, nor did the relevant laws of each state evince an intent to apply to the Compact as such. The only case to address a bi-state compact in a similar setting is International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 68 v. Delaware River & Bay Authority, 688 A.2d 569 (N.J. 1997). In Local 68, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that New Jersey and Delaware’s collective bargaining laws were complementary and parallel with regard to collective negotiations for public employees and therefore applied to the Delaware River and Bay Authority. Id. at 576. The court so held in spite of the fact _________________________________________________________________ 4. The fact that Lodge 30 involved the interpretation of a bi-state compact, a question of federal law, by a state court made no difference to our preclusion analysis. As Judge Scirica explained: State courts may answer federal questions. The unions and the DRPA agreed to litigate this issue of federal law in New Jersey courts. If those courts answered federal questions erroneously, it remained for state appellate courts, and ultimately for the United States Supreme Court, to correct any mistakes. Lodge 30, 290 F.3d at 576. 5. Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court characterized our ruling in Lodge 30 as having endorsed New Jersey’s view that express statements are not required to modify bi-state compacts. Ballinger v. Del. River Port Auth., 800 A.2d 97, 102 (N.J. 2002). We do not read our ruling as having reached the merits issue. 10 that the compact did not clearly authorize modification through legislation concurred in by both states, and neither New Jersey nor Delaware had expressed any intent to amend the compact or apply state labor laws to the Authority.6 The court found that because both states had a public policy endorsing collective bargaining, the legislatures had in effect . . . modified the Compact. Id. Here, Local 542 urged before the District Court that Local 68 was controlling and persuasive, but the Court rejected its reasoning. The District Court reviewed the New York and New Jersey views and the federal case law, and found that the New Jersey view has not been accepted as a matter of federal law. The District Court also considered Local 542’s argument that the lack of concurred in language in the Compact provides a basis to distinguish it from, and therefore a basis to reject, the New York and Second Circuit approaches. But the District Court concluded thatrather than distinguishing those, it substantially weakens[Local 542]’s position, because absent concurred in, there would be no basis, whatsoever, to look to any parallel legislation. Since there had been no showing that either the New Jersey or the Pennsylvania statutes were intended, by the legislatures, to be applicable to this particular commission, the court awarded summary judgment to the Commission. Having reviewed the state of the law on this issue, we agree with the District Court that, given the facts of this case and the unique nature of this Compact, New Jersey and Pennsylvania have not exhibited any express intent to amend the Compact or apply their collective bargaining laws to the Commission’s employees. We are persuaded, first, by the fact that the Compact does not contain any provision enabling either state to modify it through legislation concurred in by the other, and second, by the _________________________________________________________________ 6. Curiously, earlier in the same opinion, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the New Jersey PERC does not have jurisdiction over the Delaware River and Bay Authority because [s]uch jurisdiction ‘must be expressly given to the [PERC] by the Legislatures of New Jersey and Delaware, and not inferred by the courts.’  Local 68, 688 A.2d at 574. This view does not appear consistent with the court’s later holding applying New Jersey and Delaware labor laws to the Authority when no expression of intent was present. 11 logic of the reasoning underpinning the New York express intent standard, which the District Court here found to be persuasive. First, we can find no language in the Compact authorizing New Jersey and Pennsylvania to permit amendment of the terms of their agreement simply by each states’ passing similar legislation. Judicial restraint dictates that we not divine a way for them to do so. Ourfirst and last order of business is interpreting the compact, Texas, 462 U.S. at 567-68; we may not read into it language or intent that is simply not there. Principles of statutory interpretation also require us to strictly construe surrenders of sovereignty. As noted above, a party wishing to make a claim of right or entitlement against a state must prove that the state has expressly relinquished that measure of sovereignty in terms too plain to be mistaken. Skelly, 66 U.S. at 446. Neither New Jersey nor Pennsylvania has expressed any intent to allow the modification of this Compact through the passage of legislation concurred in by the other, let alone legislation of one state that bears a resemblance to the other. We cannot subscribe to the view espoused by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Local 68 that the mere existence of similar public policies set forth in each state’s collective bargaining laws is enough to imply an intent on the part of both states to amend the Compact and apply those laws to the Commission. Nor do we agree with Local 542 that the absence of a provision enabling the states to modify the Compact through legislation concurred in by the other means that no express intent is required. Rather, we agree with the District Court that the absence of concurred in language actually weakens Local 542’s argument. This is because the concurred in provision introduces the issue of, and mechanism for, modification, without which there is absolutely no authority for, let alone specific means of accomplishing, a modification of the Compact by passing similar laws.7 Thus the absence of the _________________________________________________________________ 7. We do not need to reach the issue of whether the presence of concurred in language would be a sufficient demonstration of intent nor whether Congress would also have to consent to any modifications. Judge Roth is of the opinion that in the case of a bi-state compact that contains no provision for amendment, Congressional consent to any modification would be required. 12 concurred in language is fatal. We find that in this case New Jersey and Pennsylvania have not expressed any intent to amend the Compact. We will not amend it for them. We find further support for our decision in the observation made by Judge Robreno in his Lodge 30 opinion, that the New Jersey complementary or parallel standard appears to be based on a misinterpretation of compact law. The New Jersey Supreme Court based the complementary or parallel test articulated in Local 68 and Bunk on Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Association, Inc. v. Camden, 545 A.2d 127 (N.J. 1988) and Nardi v. Delaware River Port Authority, 490 A.2d 949 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985). See Local 68, 688 A.2d at 575; Bunk, 676 A.2d at 122. A closer reading of these two cases, however, reveals that neither stands for the proposition that express legislative intent is unnecessary.8 Rather, both cases lend further support to the New York express intent test governing the application of the concurred in language, asking first whether the two states have passed legislation that expressly applies to the bi-state entity, and then whether that legislation is substantially similar. See Malverty, 524 N.E.2d at 422. In Nardi, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court examined Pennsylvania and New Jersey’s employee benefits laws, both of which expressly stated that they applied to the Delaware River Port Authority (the bi-state agency at issue), to determine whether they were substantially similar. Nardi, 490 at 950-51. The court found that the laws were not identical and refused to apply either one. Id. at 952. Similarly, in Eastern Paralyzed, the court refused to unilaterally impose New Jersey’s Uniform Construction Code on the Delaware River Port Authority -- even though the code expressly stated that it applied to all bi-state agencies -- without some showing of agreement by both states to the enforcement of the [Code]. Eastern Paralyzed, 545 A.2d at 133-34. _________________________________________________________________ 8. New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Garibaldi expressed similar concerns in her strongly worded dissent in Local 68. See Local 68, 688 A.2d at 576-77 (finding the majority’s result an unwarranted expansion of the dicta in Eastern Paralyzed) (citation omitted). 13 Principles of federalism further caution against inferring an intent to amend in this case. A bi-state entity, created by compact, is not subject to the unilateral control of any one of the States that compose the federal system. Hess, 513 U.S. at 42. Also, although Pennsylvania courts have not spoken on this specific issue, they have noted reluctance to equate the state’s individual action with action on behalf of, or that binds, a bi-state agency. See, e.g., Aveline v. Penn. Bd. of Probation & Parole, 729 A.2d 1254, 1257 n.10 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) (a compacttakes precedence over the subsequent statutes of signatory states and, as such, a state may not unilaterally nullify, revoke or amend one of its compacts if the compact does not so provide) (citing Jill E. Hasday, Interstate Compacts in a Democratic Society: The Problem of Permanence, 49 Fla. L. Rev. 1 (1997)); Nardi, 490 A.2d at 950 (neither creator state can unilaterally impose additional duties, powers, or responsibilities upon [a bi-state agency]). Looking to the relevant statutes and the plain language of the Compact, we find no intent on the part of either state legislature to amend the Compact and impose collective bargaining laws upon the Commission. The Compact grants the Commission the authority to appoint employees, determine their qualifications and duties, and fix their salaries. N.J. Stat. Ann. S 32:8-1, Art. II (f)-(h); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 36 S 3401, Art. II (f)-(h). The Compact neither gives Commission employees the right to bargain collectively nor imposes any requirement on the Commission to bargain collectively with employee unions. Neither New Jersey nor Pennsylvania’s collective bargaining laws mention the Commission or state that the legislation is intended to apply to bi-state agencies. To read into the Compact any collective bargaining requirements would be to rewrite the agreement between the two states without any express authorization to do so. That is simply not our role.