Opinion ID: 1355690
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: south carolina wrongful death statute construed

Text: The precise question presented to this Court is whether a nonviable fetus may be considered a person for purposes of the wrongful death statute. In addressing this issue, I would begin with the question left open by this Court in Hall, supra : whether a cause of action lies for injuries to a nonviable fetus that is later born alive and survives. Under our wrongful death statute, an action may be brought Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof.... S.C.Code Ann. § 15-51-10 (1976). Thus, it must be decided whether, in the instant case, the nonviable fetus could have maintained a cause of action in tort if it had continued to develop and was born alive with the injuries sustained during the nonviability stage. As noted above, it is generally recognized that a child may recover for prenatal injuries incurred either before or during viability, so long as the child is born alive. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 869 and cmt. Subsection 1(d) at 267-77 (1977); 62A Am.Jur.2d Prenatal Injuries: Wrongful Life, Birth, or Conception § 18 (1990). I agree with this view because an injury sustained prior to viability is no less meritorious than a claim for one sustained afterward. 62A Am Jur.2d, supra § 19 at 413. It would be illogical to provide a cause of action to a child born with a defect arising out of an injury sustained during viability, while denying the same cause of action to a child whose injury occurred only a few weeks earlier during the nonviability stage. See Farley v. Sartin, 195 W.Va. 671, 466 S.E.2d 522, 532 (1995). Thus, I believe that a cause of action would lie for an injury suffered by a nonviable fetus that is later born alive. Having decided that a child injured during the nonviability stage of fetal development could maintain a cause of action if born alive, I would hold that a nonviable fetus must also be considered a person for purposes of the wrongful death statute since, had death not ensued, the fetus would have been able to maintain an action. See Fowler, 244 S.C. at 614, 138 S.E.2d at 45. (The wrongful death act would have entitled the `party injured to maintain an action ... if death had not ensued,' and under the plain words of the death statute we think the action survives, or permits the parents to recover, notwithstanding the death of the child.) (citation omitted). A wrongful death cause of action should cover death at any point during fetal development beginning with conception. I recognize that nonviable fetuses, like fetuses that have reached the viability stage, may not always arrive at a successful birth. [13] However, in cases where it can be shown that a defendant's wrongful conduct terminated the fetus' normal progression, I find no logical basis for attaching legal importance to the concept of viability. [14] Significantly, my conclusion only removes the arbitrary hurdle of viability for those seeking recovery. As noted above, although proving a causal relationship between prenatal injury and the loss of the fetus is no longer an insurmountable task, the law still requires a plaintiff to prove traditional but for causation. By rejecting the loss of chance doctrine, this Court has refused to lessen the burden a plaintiff must meet in a tort action. See Jones v. Owings, 318 S.C. 72, 456 S.E.2d 371 (1995) (declining to adopt the loss of chance doctrine). A plaintiff cannot recover for the mere possibility that a tortfeasor's negligence was a cause of the ultimate harm. Id., 318 S.C. at 77, 456 S.E.2d at 374. Plaintiffs would still have to show that the defendant's actions most probably caused the death of the fetus. I recognize that we would join a minority of jurisdictions that define person in this way for purposes of the wrongful death statute. However, such a holding in this respect is consistent with our reasoning in Fowler. As discussed above, when Fowler was decided in 1964 we departed from the majority view which held that the stillbirth of a viable fetus did not give rise to a wrongful death action. The fact that we were in the minority did not prevent this Court from refusing to follow the illogic of requiring that a fetus be born alive before a cause of action could be brought for prenatal injuries. And, in fact, this view has now become one shared by the majority of jurisdictions. Thus, it is in keeping with this reasoning that I would decline to allow a defendant to escape liability when a nonviable fetus dies in the womb, but not when the fetus is injured and later born alive. Such a holding is also consistent with our rules of statutory construction. At common law, there was no remedy in tort for a wrongful killing. Hubbard & Felix, The South Carolina Law of Torts, at 595 (2d ed.1997). In 1859, the legislature enacted the wrongful death statute to provide a remedy in tort for a wrongful killing. As with any remedial statute, we are bound to construe the law liberally to effectuate its purpose. South Carolina Dep't of Mental Health v. Hanna, 270 S.C. 210, 241 S.E.2d 563 (1978). I believe an interpretation of person that includes life from the point of conception is necessary to make the wrongful death statute consistent with its purpose. The wrongful death statute was originally enacted to avoid the harsh result of allowing a tortious wrongdoer to avoid liability where the victim died from the wrongful conduct. To preserve the statute's purpose, this logic must also be applied to prenatal injuries. If, under my approach, we allow a survivor of prenatal injuries to bring a cause of action regardless of when during fetal development the injuries were sustained, then we should also permit a wrongful death action if the injury resulted in immediate death. The majority argues our wrongful death statute is in derogation of the common law and therefore should be strictly construed. Initially, it should be noted that despite being in derogation of the common law, our wrongful death statute is a remedial statute. See Morris v. Spartanburg R. Gas & Elec. Co., 70 S.C. 279, 49 S.E. 854, 855 (1904) (The [wrongful death] statute is remedial, and should be liberally construed, so as to accomplish its object.). Furthermore, we have long recognized that every remedial law must, of necessity, be in derogation of the common law. Flenniken v. Marshall, 43 S.C. 80, 20 S.E. 788, 789 (1895). As a result, The rule that remedial statutes are construed liberally is one of the most common exceptions to the rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be construed strictly. Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 61.03, at 191 (5th ed.1992). Accordingly, the majority's narrow approach would serve to defeat the purposes behind enacting the statute. In addition, my position is in line with the concept that tort liability is fault-based. See Fitzer v. Greater Greenville South Carolina Young Men's Christian Assoc., 277 S.C. 1, 3, 282 S.E.2d 230, 231 (1981) (There is no tenet more fundamental in our law than liability follows the tortious wrongdoer.). In fact, this Court has in recent decisions followed a trend of abolishing well-established tort doctrines which inhibit the proper apportioning of liability based on fault. See Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Property Regime, 333 S.C. 71, 508 S.E.2d 565 (1998) (abolishing the doctrine of assumption of risk as an absolute defense); Spahn v. Town of Port Royal, 330 S.C. 168, 499 S.E.2d 205 (1998) (abolishing the common law doctrine of last clear chance). Similarly, in the instant case, it is antithetical to our fault-based tort system to allow a negligent party to escape liability based solely on the blurred line of fetal viability. See Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 533 ([J]ustice is denied when a tortfeasor is permitted to walk away with impunity because of the happenstance that the unborn child had not yet reached viability at the time of death.). I realize that, if adopted, my position would be examined for its implications beyond the context of the wrongful death statute. For instance, it may be argued that my approach to the interpretation of person under the wrongful death statute could erode a woman's reproductive rights in the abortion context. However, I caution against any such inferences. My interpretation of person in this case is unique to the wrongful death statute and is further informed by principles of tort law. The United States Supreme Court has addressed the abortion controversy by balancing a woman's reproductive rights under the federal Constitution against the state's interests in protecting unborn children. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147. In balancing these interests, the Supreme Court has held that, prior to viability, the state may not prohibit a woman from making the choice to terminate her pregnancy. See Planned Parenthood, supra . However, the Court has expressly acknowledged that where there is no protected liberty interest at stake, the government can adopt any view of life it desires: It is conventional constitutional doctrine that where reasonable people disagree the government can adopt one position or the other. That theorem, however, assumes a state of affairs in which the choice does not intrude upon a protected liberty. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 851, 112 S.Ct. at 2806-07, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (citations omitted). Unlike the abortion cases, wrongful death actions do not automatically implicate any countervailing, constitutional liberties. No one can argue in this case that the state or federal constitution shields the defendants' allegedly wrongful conduct. Without any protected liberty interest to balance, we are free to define person under the South Carolina wrongful death statute in a way that conforms with the law's purpose. In keeping with this Court's prior decisions which have liberally construed the wrongful death statute, I believe a definition of person that includes life from the point of conception comports with the statute's goal of affording a remedy to parties who could have sued if they had survived. Our decisions in Hall and Fowler have already modified the holding of West. Today, I would overrule West and hold that a cause of action lies for the wrongful death of a nonviable fetus. My refusal to recognize a distinction between viability and nonviability is based on the same logical reasoning this Court used in refusing to recognize a distinction between viable fetuses which are born alive then die and viable fetuses killed in the womb. See Hall, supra ; Fowler, supra . The logical underpinnings of those opinions have been a part of South Carolina's jurisprudence for four decades now. My dissent today is not formed by any new approach toward the definition of person. Instead, this decision is the result of applying the logic of the relevant precedential cases in this area to the current issue at hand. In this case, the concerns and justifications supporting our previous decisions militate toward an interpretation of person that will make the wrongful death statute consistent in its application. I note that it is within the power of our legislature to make the law more specific if it so chooses. Based on the foregoing, I would REVERSE the trial court's grant of summary judgment. BURNETT, J., concurs.