Opinion ID: 1104877
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Compact Violates the Separation of Powers

Text: The House claims that the Compact violates the separation of powers on a number of grounds. [8] We find one of them dispositive. The Compact permits the Tribe to conduct certain Class III gaming that is prohibited under Florida law. Therefore, the Compact violates the state's public policy about the types of gambling that should be allowed. We hold that, whatever the Governor's authority to execute compacts, it does not extend so far. The Governor does not have authority to agree to legalize in some parts of the state, or for some persons, conduct that is otherwise illegal throughout the state. We first discuss whether state laws in general, and gaming laws in particular, apply to Indian tribes. We next discuss Florida law on gaming. We then address the House's argument that IGRA prohibits compacts from expanding the gaming allowed under state law. Finally, we explain why the Governor lacked authority to bind the State to a compact, such as this one, that contradicts state law.
Generally, state laws do not apply to tribal Indians on Indian reservations unless Congress so provides. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 170, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973). Therefore, the extent to which a state may enforce its criminal laws on tribal land depends on federal authorization. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310, 312 (5th Cir.1981). Congress has, however, conferred on the states the authority to assume jurisdiction over crimes committed on tribal land, see Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub.L. No. 280 § 6, 67 Stat. 588, 590 (1953), and Florida has assumed such jurisdiction. See ch. 61-252, §§ 1-2, at 452-53, Laws of Fla. (codified at § 285.16, Fla. Stat. (2007)); see also § 285.16(2), Fla. Stat. (2007) (The civil and criminal laws of Florida shall obtain on all Indian reservations in this state and shall be enforced in the same manner as elsewhere throughout the state.); Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 94-45 (1994) (discussing the state's jurisdiction over Indian reservations). The state's law is therefore enforceable on tribal lands to the extent it does not conflict with federal law. See Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 94-45 (1994); see also Hall v. State, 762 So.2d 936, 936-38 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (holding that the circuit court had jurisdiction over a vehicular homicide on an Indian reservation); State v. Billie, 497 So.2d 889, 892-95 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (holding that a Seminole Indian was properly charged under state criminal law with killing a Florida panther on tribal land). In regard to gambling in particular, federal law provides that, except as provided in a tribal-state compact, state gambling laws apply on tribal lands. See 18 U.S.C. § 1166(a) (2000). Based on these state and federal provisions, what is legal in Florida is legal on tribal lands, and what is illegal in Florida is illegal there. Absent a compact, any gambling prohibited in the state is prohibited on tribal land.
It is undisputed that Florida permits limited forms of Class III gaming. The state's constitution authorizes the state lottery, which offers various Class III games, and now permits slot machines in Miami-Dade and Broward Counties. See art. X, §§ 7, 15, Fla. Const. For a long time, the State also has regulated pari-mutuel wageringfor example, on dog and horse racing. See ch. 550, Fla. Stat. (2007) (governing pari-mutuel wagering). It is also undisputed, however, that the State prohibits all other types of Class III gaming, including lotteries not sponsored by the State and slot machines outside Miami-Dade and Broward Counties. Florida law distinguishes between nonbanked (Class II) card games and banked (Class III) card games. [9] A banking game is one in which the house is a participant in the game, taking on players, paying winners, and collecting from losers or in which the cardroom establishes a bank against which participants play. § 849.086(2)(b); see § 849.086(1), Fla. Stat. (deeming banked games to be casino gaming). Florida law authorizes cardrooms at pari-mutuel facilities for games of poker or dominoes, but only if they are played in a nonbanking manner. § 849.086(2), Fla. Stat.; see § 849.086(1)-(3). Florida law prohibits banked card games, however. See § 849.086(12)(a), (15)(a). Blackjack, baccarat, and chemin de fer are banked card games. They are therefore illegal in Florida.
Contrary to Florida law, the Compact allows banked card games such as blackjack, baccarat, and chemin de fer. The House argues that the Compact therefore violates IGRA itself, which permits Class III gaming only if the state permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1). The Governor, on the other hand, contends that, once state law permits any Class III gaming, a compact may allow all Class III gaming. The meaning of the phrase permits such gaming has been heavily litigated. The question is whether, when state law permits some Class III games to be played, a tribe must be permitted to conduct only those particular games or all Class III games. See Kathryn R.L. Rand, Caught in the Middle: How State Politics, State Law, and State Courts Constrain Tribal Influence Over Indian Gaming, 90 Marq. L.Rev. 971, 983 (2007) (citing cases). The Secretary's interpretation of this provision supports the House's argument. See Class III Gaming Procedures, 63 Fed. Reg. 3289, 3293 (Jan. 22, 1998) (Proposed Rules) (IGRA thus makes it unlawful for Tribes to operate particular Class III games that State law completely and affirmatively prohibits.). So do a majority of federal courts. See, e.g., Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250, 1258 (9th Cir.1994) ([A] state need only allow Indian tribes to operate games that others can operate, but need not give tribes what others cannot have.); see also Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273, 279 (8th Cir.1993) (stating that IGRA does not require the state to negotiate with respect to forms of gaming it does not presently permit); but see Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 770 F.Supp. 480, 486 (W.D.Wis. 1991) (Congress did not intend the term `permits such gaming' to limit the tribes to the specific types of gaming activity actually in operation in a state.). Our Attorney General has agreed with the majority interpretation. See Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 2007-36 at 3 (2007) ([I]n light of the greater weight of federal case law and the Department of the Interior's interpretation of IGRA, Class III gaming activities subject to mandatory negotiations between a state and an Indian tribe do not include those specifically prohibited by state law.). Whether the Compact violates IGRA, however, is a question we need not and do not resolve. Given our narrow scope of review on a writ of quo warranto, the issue here is only whether the Florida Constitution grants the Governor the authority to unilaterally bind the State to a compact that violates public policy. We conclude that even if the Governor is correct that IGRA permits the expansion of gaming on tribal lands beyond what state law permits, such an agreement represents a significant change in Florida's public policy. It is therefore precisely the type of action particularly within the Legislature's power. We now discuss that issue.
Article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution prohibits the executive branch from usurping the powers of another branch. Enacting lawsand especially criminal lawsis quintessentially a legislative function. See State v. Barquet, 262 So.2d 431, 433 (Fla.1972) (The lawmaking function is the chief legislative power.). By authorizing the Tribe to conduct banked card games that are illegal throughout Floridaand thus illegal for the Tribethe Compact violates Florida law. See Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So.2d 260, 264 (Fla.1991) (This Court has repeatedly held that, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the legislature may not delegate the power to enact laws or to declare what the law shall be to any other branch.). The Governor's action therefore encroaches on the legislative function and was beyond his authority. Nor does it matter that the Compact is a contract between the State and the Tribe. Neither the Governor nor anyone else in the executive branch has the authority to execute a contract that violates state criminal law. Cf. Local No. 234, United Assoc. of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipefitting Industry v. Henley & Beckwith, Inc., 66 So.2d 818, 821 (Fla.1953) ([A]n agreement that is violative of a provision of a constitution or a valid statute, or an agreement which cannot be performed without violating such a constitutional or statutory provision, is illegal and void.); City of Miami v. Benson, 63 So.2d 916, 923 (Fla.1953) (The contract in question, that is, the acceptance by the City of the proposal made by its agent, employee or advisor, to purchase the bonds, is contrary to public policy and is, therefore, void.).