Opinion ID: 2514209
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statements reflecting the DPA's personal opinions

Text: The final four statements that Valdivia posits constitute prosecutorial misconduct all involve the DPA allegedly asserting his personal opinions during rebuttal argument. First, the DPA remarked: Ladies and gentlemen, these charges are not trumped up because officers are lying or that this is some blue wall of conduct, that they're trying to get even for what this guy did to some of their officers. Remember, the person he almost killed was the person that was in that green car. Maybe he should have been charged with attempted murder. Defense counsel's objection was sustained, and the circuit court ordered the statement stricken and instructed the jury to disregard it. Second, Valdivia asserts that the DPA once again offered his personal opinion when arguing that Officer Heatherly had not lied during his testimony: Fairness, integrity, respect. You heard the [dispatch] tape, listen to the tapes, listen to what they did that day. When I look at those injuries [.] Defense counsel's objection was sustained, but the DPA's statement was not stricken, nor did defense counsel request that it be, and no curative instruction was given. Third, Valdivia notes that the DPA, after asserting, in response to defense counsel's objection to the foregoing statement, that he would rephrase his argument, then opined that Valdivia should have been shot by the police: Take a look at those injuries; you see some bruising. Those pictures were taken the day after in cellblock. You know that if you get hit in the head, what happens  in the eye? Officer Kawelo said, yeah, there was something around the eye, maybe some redness, some abrasion. Not that bruising. Bruising doesn't show up for a day or so. Anybody's who's had a bruise has seen a bruise get worse and worse and worse over time. They're not trying to hide the fact that [Valdivia] got injured, and it's not the fact that he got beaten up. But where's the bullet hole? Do you see any bullet holes in his head? Because he should have had one. Defense counsel's objection was sustained, and the circuit court ordered the DPA's statement stricken and instructed the jury to disregard it. Finally, Valdivia asserts that the DPA improperly asserted that he was attempting to deceive the jury. In discussing the inconsistencies in the testimony adduced during trial, the DPA argued: Officer Kailihou, I didn't see the other guy get maced. The other officers? Yeah, we maced him. Does it make any difference in the scheme of things? No. Are they lying about everything, do you throw out their testimony? No, okay? That's what Defense wants you to do. They want you to say, you know what, you believe the officers for these traffic-type offenses that we just can't argue our way out of, and then  Defense counsel's objection was sustained, and the circuit court ordered the DPA's statement stricken and instructed the jury to disregard it. After the DPA completed his rebuttal argument, defense counsel requested surrebuttal and, in the alternative, moved for a mistrial. The circuit court denied both defense counsel's request for surrebuttal and her motion for a mistrial because the DPA's [c]omments. . . for which the objections were sustained were stricken, and the jury was told to disregard it[.] The DPA's comments that Valdivia should have been charged with attempted murder and shot in the head were flagrantly improper and clearly constituted inflammatory assertions of the DPA's personal opinion. See, e.g., State v. Marsh, 68 Haw. 659, 660-61, 728 P.2d 1301, 1302 (1986). However, objections to both comments were sustained, they were immediately stricken, and the jury was promptly instructed to disregard them. In addition, as we noted supra in section III.C.1, the jury was instructed no less than three times that statements and arguments of counsel were not evidence and should not be considered as such. Moreover, as we also noted supra in section III.C.1, the evidence against Valdivia was not so weak as to favor finding the remarks harmful. Accordingly, given the prompt curative instructions and the circuit court's general instructions, we cannot say that the DPA's comments, although unprofessional, contributed to Valdivia's convictions. We hold, therefore, that the DPA's statements were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. With regard to the DPA's remark, When I look at those injuries, the DPA impliedly conceded, in agreeing to rephrase his argument, that rendering his personal opinion about what he thought when he viewed Valdivia's injuries was improper. Id. Although no curative instruction was promptly given, we note that the remark, left unfinished, does not appear on the record before us to have contributed to Valdivia's convictions. As noted above, the evidence against Valdivia was not so weak as to favor holding this inchoate remark prejudicial, and the circuit court more than adequately instructed the jury that statements and arguments of counsel were not evidence and should not be considered as such during its deliberations. Thus, we hold that this particular remark was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Regarding the blue wall of conduct comment that, according to Valdivia, constitutes prosecutorial misconduct, we hold that it was not an improper assertion of personal opinion regarding Valdivia's credibility. See Clark, 83 Hawai`i at 304-306, 926 P.2d at 209-211 (remark characterizing defendant's testimony as a cockamamie story held to be well within the limits of propriety). Valdivia did not testify, and, thus, his credibility as a witness was not before the jury. To the extent that the comment urged the jury not to credit the defense's blue wall theory urging the jury to find the testimony of the officers unbelievable, we do not believe that the comment was improper. See id. Accordingly, it did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct in the first instance, and we need not consider whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Given that any improper remarks by the DPA were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, their cumulative effect was similarly harmless and did not deprive Valdivia of a fair trial. Thus, the DPA's misconduct in the present matter, not warranting reversal of any of Valdivia's convictions, does not implicate the Rogan holding or the double jeopardy clauses of either the United States or Hawai`i Constitutions. Cf. Rogan, 91 Hawai`i at 415-24, 984 P.2d at 1242-50.