Opinion ID: 1253121
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the District Court Err in Refusing to Suppress the Incriminating Statements Made by the Defendant?

Text: A. Scope of review. The defendant claims his alleged custodial interrogation conducted without the benefit of a Miranda warning violated his Fifth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV. Our review of a district court's refusal to suppress statements allegedly made in violation of constitutional guarantees is de novo. See State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Iowa 1997). Under this review, we make an independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire record. State v. Howard, 509 N.W.2d 764, 767 (Iowa 1993). We give deference to the district court's fact findings due to its opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by those findings. [2] See State v. Gravenish, 511 N.W.2d 379, 381 (Iowa 1994). B. Admissibility of inculpatory statements. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part, No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.... U.S. Const. amend. V. This right against self-incrimination is incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus applies to the States. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6-11, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1492-95, 12 L.Ed.2d 653, 658-61 (1964). In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court stated that a citizen's privilege against self-incrimination is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right `to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.' 384 U.S. at 460, 86 S.Ct. at 1620, 16 L.Ed.2d at 715 (quoting Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8, 84 S.Ct. at 1493, 12 L.Ed.2d at 659). The Court further noted that because of the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from [a] defendant can truly be the product of his free choice[,] unless adequate protective measures are employed. Id. at 458, 86 S.Ct. at 1619, 16 L.Ed.2d at 714. Thus, the Court held that before an individual who is in custody can be subjected to any interrogation, he must be advised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have appointed counsel present prior to any questioning. Id. at 478-79, 86 S.Ct. at 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d at 726. The requirements of Miranda are not triggered unless there is both custody and interrogation. State v. Davis, 446 N.W.2d 785, 788 (Iowa 1989). The Court stated in Miranda that custodial interrogation is questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706. We now examine the trial court's findings that Turner was not in custody and that his statements were not in response to interrogation by law enforcement personnel. C. Was the defendant in custody so as to be entitled to Miranda warnings? The initial question that must be answered is whether Turner was in custody at the time the inculpatory statements were made. See State v. Smith, 546 N.W.2d 916, 920 (Iowa 1996). We employ an objective test: the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3151, 82 L.Ed.2d 317, 336 (1984). [A]ll of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation are examined. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 1529, 128 L.Ed.2d 293, 298 (1994). This court's decision in In re J.D.F., 553 N.W.2d 585 (Iowa 1996), is helpful in evaluating the circumstances of the case before us. In In re J.D.F., a police officer stopped a juvenile to investigate a report that a juvenile had been seen carrying a weapon. 553 N.W.2d at 587. The juvenile ran, but was apprehended. Id. The officer handcuffed the juvenile, placed him in the back of the squad car, and questioned him about his knowledge of a gun. Id. The juvenile eventually led the officer to a loaded pistol hidden under a tree. Id. After delinquency charges were filed against him, the juvenile moved to suppress his statements on the ground that he had not been given Miranda warnings. Id. This motion was denied, and the juvenile was adjudicated to have committed a delinquent act. Id. In ruling on the juvenile's appeal, this court held that upon [b]eing handcuffed and placed in the police car by the police officers, JDF was clearly in custody. Id. at 588. A very similar situation exists here. Officers handcuffed Turner, secured him with the other two individuals being detained, and later placed him in an unmarked police vehicle to conduct further investigation. This detention clearly curtailed Turner's freedom of movement in a significant way. Even the officers themselves characterized Turner as being arrested and being in custody at this time. The trial court, however, concluded that once Turner's handcuffs were removed in the apartment, he was no longer in custody and therefore no Miranda warnings were required. We disagree. Turner's handcuffs were not removed until it was necessary to allow him to sign the consent form. Thereafter, three officers were always present in the apartment while it was searched. There was no evidence that Turner was told he was free to leave. We do not think the mere fact Turner's handcuffs were removed so he could sign the consent form would lead a reasonable person in his position to believe that his custodial status had changed. We conclude, therefore, that Turner was in custody at the time he made the incriminating statements. D. Were the statements made by the defendant the product of interrogation? As previously noted, in order for Miranda rights to attach, there must not only be custody, but interrogation, as well. See Davis, 446 N.W.2d at 788. Statements made after a person is taken into custody are not automatically considered the product of interrogation. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 299, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689, 64 L.Ed.2d 297, 307 (1980). Thus, statements that are volunteered, spontaneous and freely made by an arrested person do not come within the scope of Miranda. See State v. Brown, 176 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Iowa 1970); accord Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d at 726 (Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is... admissible in evidence.). Consequently, inculpatory statements that were made prior to any police questioning are generally admissible. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01, 100 S.Ct. at 1689-90, 64 L.Ed.2d at 307. Turning to the present case, the district court found that Turner volunteered the statements with respect to ownership of the gun. We interpret this finding to mean that the court found the statements to be spontaneous and not the product of interrogation. The evidence in the record on this issue came from Officers Westlake and Blad, who were present during the search of the apartment. Officer Westlake testified that the defendant was not questioned and just started saying that it [the gun] wasn't his. Officer Blad's testimony on direct examination was not as clear. She said that [t]here was just a question as to whose gun is it, but she did not recall whether the defendant was asked any questions before he started talking. On cross-examination, Blad testified that Officer Cretsinger came into the living room with a gun that he had found in the microwave. She said that somebodyeither Westlake or Cretsingersaid to Turner, Whose gun is this? She acknowledged that it was at that point that Turner started blabbing on about various explanations for what he knew about the gun. Apparently, the trial court found Officer Westlake to be more credible, but the court did not state this conclusion in its ruling nor give any reason for why Westlake's testimony was more believable. Common sense would point in the other direction. See generally State v. Frake, 450 N.W.2d 817, 819 (Iowa 1990) (stating that reasonableness of a witness's testimony may be considered in determining believability of testimony). Under Westlake's version of the events, Turner, simply upon seeing the gun, blurted out denials of ownership and assertions about who owned it. It seems more plausible that the officer who discovered the weapon came into the living room in order to investigate the ownership of the gun and at that point asked Turner what Turner knew about it. In fact, this is exactly what Officer Blad said happened. Adding to Blad's credibility is the fact that her testimony was given at the suppression hearing where the focus was on whether Turner's statements should be held inadmissible because they were the result of a custodial interrogation. Blad knew when she testified that her version would be damaging to the prosecution's ability to use the challenged evidence. If the officers had any motive to color the facts in one direction or another, it would be in the direction of the statements preceding any questioning, not as Blad testifiedthat the questions came first. Whether a witness has any personal interest, motive or purpose to remember so as to shade meanings of words and actions relating to the testimony is highly relevant to the witness's credibility. Gregory v. Gregory, 248 Iowa 672, 678, 82 N.W.2d 144, 148 (1957); accord Frake, 450 N.W.2d at 819 (stating court may consider the witness's interest in the trial to assess witness's credibility). Thus, the fact that Blad's testimony was contrary to the State's interest heightens her credibility. The State bears a heavy burden to establish the admissibility of statements made by an individual while in custody. See State v. Cullison, 227 N.W.2d 121, 127 (Iowa 1975). We do not think it has met that burden here. We hold, therefore, that Turner's statements were the product of a custodial interrogation. Because he had not been given his Miranda warnings, the statements were inadmissible. E. Was the erroneous admission of this evidence harmless error? The State argues that even if Turner's statements should not have been admitted, any error was harmless. In order for a constitutional error to be harmless, the court must be able to declare it harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Deases, 518 N.W.2d 784, 791 (Iowa 1994). If substantially the same evidence is in the record, erroneously admitted evidence is not considered prejudicial. Id. In the present case, Turner's statements were used by the State to prove that he was in dominion and control of the firearm. Although Turner denied ownership of the gun, his statements indicated that he knew the gun was in the apartment. In addition, his conflicting statements about who did own the gun were another indication of guilt. See State v. Mayberry, 411 N.W.2d 677, 682 (Iowa 1987) (stating that guilt may be inferred from defendant changing his story); State v. Blair, 347 N.W.2d 416, 422 (Iowa 1984) (stating that a defendant's inconsistent statements are probative circumstantial evidence from which the jury may infer guilt). Finally, assuming that Turner volunteered the statements as the trial court believed, his statements could indicate a consciousness of guilt. State v. Cox, 500 N.W.2d 23, 25 (Iowa 1993) (Admissions may be implied by the conduct of the defendant subsequent to a crime, including fabrication, when such conduct indicates a consciousness of guilt.). Thus, the erroneously admitted statements were prejudicial to Turner's defense. The State argues, nonetheless, that any prejudice was harmless because Turner's dominion and control of the gun was established without his inculpatory statements based on his dominion and control of the apartment. We have long held that dominion and control may be shown by constructive, as well as actual, possession. See State v. Reeves, 209 N.W.2d 18, 22 (Iowa 1973) (addressing possession of illegal substances). Constructive possession exists when, although the contraband is not on one's person, he or she controls the contraband or has the right to control it. See id. This court discussed in Reeves the circumstances under which such control or right to control may be proved by inference. There are two. If the premises on which such substances are found are in the exclusive possession of the accused, the jury may infer constructive possession. Id. at 23 (emphasis added). We specifically noted that joint possession of the premises would not be sufficient to support an inference of control or knowledge of the contraband. Id.; accord United States v. Morrison, 991 F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir.1993); White v. State, 47 Ark.App. 127, 129, 886 S.W.2d 876, 878 (1994); State v. Mercado, 887 S.W.2d 688, 691 (Mo.Ct.App.1994); Puente v. State, 888 S.W.2d 521, 526 (Tex. App.1994). The second situation in which we recognized an inference of possession was when the contraband is found in a place which is immediately and exclusively accessible to the accused and subject to his [joint or sole] dominion and control. Reeves, 209 N.W.2d at 22 (emphasis added); accord State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 270 (Minn. 1985) (requiring exclusive access); Marshall v. State, 110 Nev. 1328, 1332, 885 P.2d 603, 606 (1994) (applying same rule stated in Reeves ). It is important to note that this second scenario focuses on the place where the drugs are found as contrasted to the premises in which they are found. With these principles in mind, we now turn to the facts of this case. The record shows that Turner resided at the apartment, but there is no evidence that he was the sole resident of the apartment. To the contrary, Officer Westlake testified at the suppression hearing that Turner might have said that he was not on the lease. Officer Blad testified there was some comment by Turner that the apartment was his and his girlfriend's. This evidence tends to indicate that Turner was not the sole resident of the apartment. As stated in Reeves, joint possession of the premises will not support an inference of dominion and control of contraband found on the premises. 209 N.W.2d at 23. Here, there is not sufficient evidence to prove sole possession of the premises and, hence, constructive possession of the gun under the first Reeves scenario. Nor is there any evidence that the microwave where the gun was found was immediately and exclusively accessible to Turner. Turner was in the living room of the apartment; the gun was found in a different room. Therefore, there are no facts from which the court could find constructive possession of the gun by Turner under the second Reeves scenario. In summary, the record would not support a finding of constructive possession under the rules announced in Reeves. Therefore, the only evidence supporting a finding that Turner had dominion and control of the gun were his incriminating statements indicating his ownership of the weapon. Thus, the erroneous admission of these statements was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.