Opinion ID: 1180863
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Former Section 190.3, Factors (c) and (g)[22]

Text: (89) Amicus curiae claims it was improper for the prosecutor to argue that the guilt and sanity verdicts indicated the jury did not believe defendant was acting under extreme mental illness or that he was unable to conduct himself in accordance with the law. We believe this constituted nothing more than vigorous argument under Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d 572, 580. We also note that defense counsel argued that the prosecutor's view was incorrect. He reminded the jury that the psychiatrists believed defendant was suffering from very serious mental problems and noted that merely because these problems did not reach the level of insanity or diminished capacity, that did not preclude consideration of defendant's mental state in determining the sentence. Counsel asserted that people do not commit the crimes defendant committed unless something [is] seriously wrong with them and argued that defendant was not in complete control when he committed the murders. In any event, any improper argument was clearly harmless. The jury was instructed  pursuant to factor (j)  to consider defendant's background and history in determining his sentence, and almost all relevant evidence of defendant's background concerned his mental state. Thus the jury undoubtedly considered defendant's mental state in determining the appropriate sentence; whether it did so under former factor (j) instead of former factors (c) or (g) is irrelevant. (See Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 776.) (90) Amicus curiae next attacks the constitutionality of former factor (c) on the ground it impermissibly limits the jury's consideration to  extreme mental or emotional disturbance. (Italics added.) We have rejected this claim in Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at page 776. (91) Amicus curiae finally claims former factor (g), which parallels the instruction on legal insanity, [23] is unconstitutional because it fails to instruct the jury that it may consider defendant's mental state even though it found him legally sane, and because it assertedly fails to allow for consideration of mental defect as well as mental disease. In People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21 [188 Cal. Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279], a plurality of this court noted that, under Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 98 S.Ct. 2954] and Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104 [71 L.Ed.2d 1, 102 S.Ct. 869], the standard instruction should not be understood by the jury as precluding consideration of mental defect as a mitigating factor. We cannot agree, however, that a reasonable jury would have been so misled here, or that the former provision is constitutionally deficient for the reasons advanced. Nothing in the former provision suggested the jury was not free to consider defendant's mental defect evidence, and as noted, the jury remained free to consider all such mental evidence under former factor (j).