Opinion ID: 4416812
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Judicial Role in Extradition

Text: The judicial branch plays a central but limited role in the extradition process, as laid out in statutes and case law. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3184−3195; Burgos Noeller v. Wojdylo, 922 F.3d 797, 4 No. 18-2529 802 (7th Cir. 2019); Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 508 (7th Cir. 1981). The process begins when a foreign government makes a formal request to the United States government through diplomatic channels. That request is forwarded to the Department of Justice, which then ordinarily ﬁles a complaint and seeks an arrest warrant from a judge. Burgos Noeller, 922 F.3d at 802. The person targeted by the request is entitled to a hearing before a judge pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3184. The scope of in- quiry at this hearing is limited: “the ‘judicial oﬃcer’s inquiry is conﬁned to the following: whether a valid treaty exists; whether the crime charged is covered by the relevant treaty; and whether the evidence marshaled in support of the complaint for extradition is suﬃcient under the applicable standard of proof.’” Skaftouros v. United States, 667 F.3d 144, 154−55 (2d Cir. 2011), quoting Cheung v. United States, 213 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2000). If the judge ﬁnds that these three conditions have been satisﬁed and the accused is extraditable, the judge must certify the extradition to the Secretary of State. The court has no discretion. See Burgos Noeller, 922 F.3d at 803; Santos v. Thomas, 830 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). “The Secretary of State has ‘sole discretion to determine whether or not extradition should proceed further with the issuance of a warrant of surrender.’” Burgos Noeller, 922 F.3d at 803, quoting Eain, 641 F.2d at 508; see 18 U.S.C. § 3186. In making this decision, the Secretary is authorized to consider factors that United States federal courts in extradition cases cannot take into account. The executive branch has sole authority to consider issues like the political motivations of a requesting country and whether humanitarian concerns justify No. 18-2529 5 denying a request. See Burgos Noeller, 922 F.3d at 808; Hoxha v. Levi, 465 F.3d 554, 563 (3d Cir. 2006). Generally, the Secretary of State’s extradition decision is not subject to judicial review. This circuit and others, however, have recognized an exception through which courts can, at least in theory, consider claims that “the substantive conduct of the United States in undertaking its decision to extradite … violates constitutional rights.” Burt, 737 F.2d at 1484; see also Martin v. Warden, 993 F.2d 824, 829 (11th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that constitutional rights are superior to treaty obligations, but ﬁnding no violation of constitutional rights in long-delayed extradition request); Plaster v. United States, 720 F.2d 340, 349 (4th Cir. 1983) (recognizing constitutional claims but vacating grant of writ of habeas corpus). We said in Burt: Generally, so long as the United States has not breached a speciﬁc promise to an accused re- garding his or her extradition and bases its ex- tradition decisions on diplomatic considera- tions without regard to such constitutionally impermissible factors as race, color, sex, na- tional origin, religion, or political beliefs, and in accordance with such other exceptional consti- tutional limitations as may exist because of par- ticularly atrocious procedures or punishments employed by the foreign jurisdiction, those de- cisions will not be disturbed. 737 F.2d at 1487 (internal citations omitted) (aﬃrming denial of writ of habeas corpus). Under the applicable statutes, the accused may not appeal directly a judge’s order to certify her for extradition, but case 6 No. 18-2529 law has long recognized a limited form of appellate review through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 368−69 (1920); Burgos Noeller, 922 F.3d at 803; Eain, 641 F.2d at 508; In re Assarsson, 635 F.2d 1237, 1240−41 (7th Cir. 1980). In such habeas corpus cases, however, courts generally may consider only “whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the oﬀence charged is within the treaty and, by a somewhat liberal extension, whether there was any evidence warranting the ﬁnding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty,” i.e., probable cause. DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 125 F.3d 1110, 1112 (7th Cir. 1997) (reversing writs of habeas corpus), quoting Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925). Under this probable cause standard, the judge must “determine whether there is competent evidence to justify holding the accused to await trial.” Sidali v. I.N.S., 107 F.3d 191, 199 (3d Cir. 1997), quoting Peters v. Egnor, 888 F.2d 713, 717 (10th Cir. 1989). It is not the magistrate’s role, however, “to determine whether the evidence is suﬃcient to justify a conviction.” Id. That is the job of the requesting country’s courts.