Opinion ID: 147192
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Oaks's Conviction for Unlawfully Driving Away an Automobile

Text: Finally, Oaks argues the district court erred when it used his Michigan conviction for unlawfully driving away an automobile as one of the predicate felonies necessary to enhance his sentence under ACCA. The government concedes under United States v. Williams, 537 F.3d 969 (8th Cir. 2008), the conviction for unlawfully driving away an automobile is not a violent felony for purposes of ACCA. See Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008). (holding that driving under the influence of alcohol is not a violent felony under ACCA). However, ACCA only requires three prior felony convictions for its provisions to apply. Walker, 555 F.3d at 721. Aside from his unlawfully driving away an automobile conviction, Oaks had felony convictions for attempted breaking and entering, assault in the third degree, and aggravated robbery in the first degree. Oaks only challenges the first of these convictions, which, as discussed above, qualified under ACCA. Accordingly, any error committed by the district court in considering Oaks's unlawfully driving away an automobile conviction was harmless because he maintained at least three other qualifying ACCA predicate offenses. See United States v. Comstock, 531 F.3d 667, 679 (8th Cir.2008) (holding any error by the district court in considering a conviction that did not qualify as a violent felony was harmless where the defendant had at least three other qualifying convictions). Because any error by the district court did not affect Oaks's substantial rights, we reject his argument. Oaks's remaining arguments are without merit. First, the district court was not required to apply a beyond a reasonable doubt standard, rather than a preponderance of the evidence standard, in determining his sentencing enhancements. See Pirani, 406 F.3d at 551 n. 4 (Nothing in Booker suggests that sentencing judges are required to find sentence-enhancing facts beyond a reasonable doubt under the advisory Guidelines regime.). See also U.S.S.G.  6A1.3, cmt. background (The Commission believes that use of a preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate to meet due process requirements and policy concerns in resolving disputes regarding application of the guidelines to the facts of a case.). Second, Oaks's rights were not violated by any lack of reasonable notice regarding the allegation of three prior convictions and the increased sentence under section 924(e). Notice by the government of its intention to seek an enhanced sentence is not required under ACCA. United States v. Zuniga, 553 F.3d 1330, 1336 (10th Cir.2009); United States v. Mauldin, 109 F.3d 1159, 1162 (6th Cir.1997). Moreover, Oaks did have notice of the enhanced sentence by way of the indictment and the PSR, which specifically cited section 924(e) and listed his prior convictions which the government considered violent felonies. Finally, Oaks asserts the district court violated his due process rights by failing to provide him a hearing to determine the existence of the three prior convictions. We reject this argument because the district court discussed the application of ACCA during the sentencing hearing, during which Oaks was provided an opportunity to object to the factual findings contained in the PSR. The district court properly adopted those findings in the PSR as facts for its consideration after Oaks failed to object. Accordingly, Oaks was not denied his due process rights and was not entitled to a separate hearing. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.