Opinion ID: 852369
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Evidence to Support Forcible Resistance

Text: The statute under which Graham was charged provides that a person who knowingly or intentionally: (1) forcibly resists, obstructs, or interferes with a law enforcement officer or a person assisting the officer while the officer is lawfully engaged in the execution of the officer's duties ... commits resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor.... Ind. Code Ann. 35-44-3-3(a)(1) (West 2004 Repl.). This Court's opinion in Spangler v. State, 607 N.E.2d 720 (Ind.1993), examined the elements of the crime of resisting. Justice DeBruler noted that the word forcibly modifies resists, obstructs, or interferes and that force is an element of the offense. He explained that one forcibly resists when strong, powerful, violent means are used to evade a law enforcement official's rightful exercise of his or her duties. Id. at 723. Spangler had refused to accept service of process from an officer, walking away from the officer in the face of demands that he accept a protective order. This Court held that such action was resistance to authority but not forcible resistance. It is error as a matter of law to conclude, we said, that `forcibly resists' includes all actions that are not passive. Id. at 724. Spangler's conviction was reversed. The force involved need not rise to the level of mayhem. In Johnson v. State, 833 N.E.2d 516, 517 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), a defendant in custody pushed away with his shoulders while cursing and yelling when the officer attempted to search him. As officers attempted to put him into a police vehicle, Johnson stiffened up and the police had to get physical in order to put him inside. Id. The Court of Appeals correctly held that Johnson's actions constituted forcible resistance. We conclude that a fair reading of the evidence in this case does not reflect even the modest level of resistance described in Johnson. The weight of the debate on appeal has been whether refusing to present one's arms for cuffing constitutes use of force. While even stiffening of one's arms when an officer grabs hold to position them for cuffing would suffice, there is no fair inference here that such occurred. Finally, the State has argued that Graham's resisting conviction should instead be affirmed because he turned around on the porch to return inside the house, thus fleeing within the meaning of another subsection of the statute on resisting law enforcement, Ind.Code Ann XX-XX-X-X(a)(3) (West 2004 Repl.) The charging information alleged only forcible resistance and it cited only subsection 3(a)(1). On this occasion, we are not prepared at this late stage to affirm on what might have been charged and tried. On the other hand, Graham's claims of error about the other convictions were correctly rejected by the Court of Appeals. We summarily affirm their disposition of those claims. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).