Opinion ID: 2166953
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: motion to suppress appellant's statements

Text: Appellant next argues that the lower court erred in denying a motion to suppress all statements made by him to the police. He asserts that the trial judge erred in finding some of his statements admissible, arguing instead that they were the result of improper inducements and in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States, Articles 22 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Maryland common law. We do not agree with this contention and hold that there was sufficient attenuation between the improper inducements and Johnson's statements. Johnson was arrested by the Maryland State Police on April 20, 1995, at a house in Essex, Baltimore County, at approximately 4:00 p.m. Upon his arrest he was advised of his Miranda [3] rights and was then transported to the Golden Ring barracks. At approximately 8:30 p.m. that day, Trooper Michael Grant of the Maryland State Police began to question the Appellant after again giving him the Miranda warnings. During the course of the interview, which lasted about one hour, Trooper Grant indicated to appellant that if he confessed to the murder he might be able to receive some sort of medical treatment at Perkins instead of being locked up for the rest of your life and the key thrown down the sewer. In addition, in response to a question from Johnson, Trooper Grant intimated that if appellant confessed, his mother's live-in boyfriend, who had driven Johnson to Baltimore County, would likely be released from custody. Johnson refused to talk about the murder and instead indicated that he wanted a lawyer. At that point, Trooper Grant discontinued the interrogation. The following day, April 21, 1995, Detective Craig Robertson and Corporal Jon B. Dudiak, both of the Allegany Sheriff's Department, arrived at the Golden Ring barracks at approximately 2:00 p.m. to take custody of Johnson and to transport him to the Cumberland Police Department in Allegany County. He arrived at about 5:00 p.m. and, after being photographed and fingerprinted, he was again read his Miranda rights. He continued to refuse to talk about the murder but he gave a statement on an unrelated robbery. Appellant was then transferred to the Allegany County Detention Center in Cumberland, Maryland. Two days later, on April 23, 1995, Detective Robertson went to the Allegany Detention center on an unrelated matter, and he saw Appellant in the hallway talking on the telephone. A correctional officer told Detective Robertson that Appellant wanted to speak with him. While speaking to the detective, Johnson indicated that he wanted to make a deal and that he intended to ask for the death penalty at trial. Detective Robertson advised Johnson that he did not have the authority to make a deal and that the Appellant should speak to his lawyer about it. He further advised Johnson that it would have to be worked out between his lawyer and the State's Attorney. Detective Robertson had to leave for a meeting, but he told Appellant he would come back if Appellant still wanted to talk. Upon his return, Detective Robertson had a correctional officer ask Johnson if he still wanted to talk, and Appellant responded that he did. Detective Robertson again advised Johnson that he should contact his lawyer. Appellant stated that he wanted to talk without a lawyer. Detective Robertson and Corporal Dudiak then transported Johnson back to the Cumberland Police Department where he was again advised of his Miranda rights. Johnson executed a written waiver of his Miranda rights at 8:27 p.m. He then confessed to being at the murder scene but he indicated that he could not remember everything about that night. When he began to hyperventilate while reducing his statement to writing, the detectives stopped the interview. The abbreviated written statement was admitted at trial along with Detective Robertson's oral summary of the interview. The trial court granted Appellant's motion to suppress all other statements made, including those made at the Golden Ring barracks to Trooper Grant, those made while the defendant was being transported to the Cumberland Police Department on April 21, 1995, and those made at the Allegany County Detention Center on April 23, 1995, prior to being transported back to the Cumberland Police Department. The trial judge refused to suppress the statement made to Detective Robertson and Corporal Dudiak at the Cumberland Police Department on the evening of April 23, 1995, even though defense counsel argued that the improper inducements made at the Golden Ring barracks on April 20 by Trooper Grant were still influencing the defendant. The trial judge ruled that because the Appellant initiated the contact with Detective Robertson and there was sufficient attenuation between the two events, the statements were admissible. We agree and we shall affirm the trial judge's ruling. As a threshold matter, we must decide whether Johnson's request for an attorney at the Golden Ring barracks requires exclusion of the statements at issue. Under the facts of this case, we hold that it does not. In State v. Conover, 312 Md. 33, 38, 537 A.2d 1167, 1169 (1988), we recounted the constitutional requirements regarding custodial interrogation of a defendant by reiterating that [w]hen an individual in custody requests an attorney, interrogation must cease until an attorney is present, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-85, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). (Emphasis added). In this case, the trial judge found that the evidence revealed that Appellant did in fact initiate contact with Detective Robertson two days after being transported to the detention center. Turning to the merits of Appellant's argument, we hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to exclude the statements made by Appellant after he initiated contact with Detective Robertson. When discussing voluntariness of a confession under common law principles, in Reynolds v. State, 327 Md. 494, 509, 610 A.2d 782, 789 (1992) we observed [o]ne common thread that runs through our cases is that the promise must have caused the suspect to confess. If a suspect did not rely on an interrogator's comments, obviously, the statement is admissible regardless of whether the interrogator had articulated an improper inducement. (Emphasis added). Thus, it is the trial judge's responsibility to determine not only if an inducement was made, but to ascertain further whether or not the defendant was influenced by the inducement. Ralph v. State, 226 Md. 480, 486, 174 A.2d 163, 166 (1961). In this case, the trial judge found and the State agreed that the promises made at the Golden Ring barracks by Trooper Grant were very likely improper inducements, and any inculpatory statements made as a result were properly suppressed. In addition, statements made the following day while being transported to Cumberland, although still not a confession to the murder, were also deemed to be inadmissible as a result of the possible lingering effect of the inducements made the prior day. As we further reasoned in Reynolds, supra, the Supreme Court made it clear that constitutional voluntariness does not require that all promises, threats, or inducements render a confession involuntary; instead, the federal constitution requires only that courts consider promises, threats, or inducements as part of the totality of the circumstances that courts must look at to determine voluntariness. Citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). The trial court found, and we agree, that the statements made two days later, in a different environment and in the presence of completely different interrogators, were not the result of the inducements made earlier. The defendant had the opportunity and time for deliberate reflection, and he did not manifest any behavior at the time of his confession indicating that he believed that his confession would be beneficial to someone else or that he believed he would receive any special treatment from the authorities. In Burch v. State, 346 Md. 253, 696 A.2d 443 (1997), the defendant was convicted of multiple offenses, including first degree murder for which the death penalty was imposed. On appeal he sought to have certain statements that he made to police suppressed based on allegations of police brutality at the time of his arrest. According to the defendant, the arresting officers inflicted several types of abuse during his arrest, although none of those officers was involved in the interrogation. Instead, the interrogation was conducted by a detective who was not involved with the arrest. We affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress, holding that even if abuse by the arresting officers did occur, the interrogating detective did nothing on his own to induce a statement. In fact, the confession was given in a secure environment and the defendant made no complaint about the abuse allegedly inflicted nor did he appear to be suffering from or under the influence of it. Id. at 268, 696 A.2d 443. The same reasoning can be applied to the case sub judice. Here, Appellant argues that the improper inducements made two days earlier, in a different location and by a different police officer, caused him to confess. At the time of his confession, however, not only did Appellant initiate the contact with Detective Robertson, he was fully aware that Detective Robertson was not present during the prior interrogation at the Golden Ring barracks, yet Appellant did not ask the detective a single question regarding any possible treatment in lieu of incarceration, nor did he acknowledge or comment on his possible motives for wanting to speak with the detective. All of the statements made by Johnson that may have been the result of improper inducements made at the Golden Ring barracks were properly suppressed, but Appellant's assertion that these inducements were still acting on him two days later, in a different environment, while dealing with a different individual, simply is unpersuasive. There was no error.