Opinion ID: 3034999
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: decision to conduct a removal action in libby

Text: The EPA’s initial decision to conduct a removal action must be upheld unless Grace can demonstrate on the administrative record that the decision was arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(j)(2). Grace has not met this burden. [2] The National Contingency Plan requires the EPA to consider a series of factors15 to determine that it was appropri14 Grace attributes the timing and scope of the EPA’s cleanup to intense media attention regarding conditions in Libby. We have previously rejected an “ulterior motive” analysis in a challenge to whether CERCLA response costs incurred by a private landowner were necessary: “The issue is not why the landowner decided to undertake the cleanup, but whether it was necessary. To hold otherwise would result in a disincentive for cleanup.” Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 87172 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (citation omitted). This logic applies with equal force when the EPA is a party. We therefore do not inquire into the EPA’s subjective motives behind the cleanup, but rather ask if the objective evidence supports the response. 15 40 C.F.R. § 300.415(b)(2) provides that “[t]he following factors shall be considered in determining the appropriateness of a removal action . . . :” (i) Actual or potential exposure to nearby human populations, animals, or the food chain from hazardous substances or pollutants or contaminants; (ii) Actual or potential contamination of drinking water supplies or sensitive ecosystems; 15550 UNITED STATES v. W.R. GRACE & CO. ate to initiate a removal action. Cf. Chapman, 146 F.3d at 1171-73 (holding that the EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in ordering a removal action after considering the § 300.415(b)(2) factors). The EPA did so and its findings are extensively documented. The First Action Memo discusses five of the eight factors16 in concluding that the conditions in Libby presented an imminent and substantial threat to human health and the environment that met the regulatory criteria. Chief among the factors was that complete exposure pathways existed through which people were being exposed to asbestos. The First Action Memo details specific threats, including that “there are over 3000 three gallon buckets of unexpanded Libby vermiculite” being used at a mushroom farm at the former screening plant, and that surface soils contained visible vermiculite that could readily migrate. The magnitude of the current and potential impact on public health resulting from the widespread use of vermiculite by Libby residents led the EPA in its Second Action Memo to (iii) Hazardous substances or pollutants or contaminants in drums, barrels, tanks, or other bulk storage containers, that may pose a threat of release; (iv) High levels of hazardous substances or pollutants or contaminants in soils largely at or near the surface, that may migrate; (v) Weather conditions that may cause hazardous substances or pollutants or contaminants to migrate or be released; (vi) Threat of fire or explosion; (vii) The availability of other appropriate federal or state response mechanisms to respond to the release; and (viii) Other situations or factors that may pose threats to public health or welfare of the United States or the environment. 16 Specifically, the memo invokes the first, third, fourth, fifth, and seventh factors listed in 40 C.F.R. § 300.415(b)(2). UNITED STATES v. W.R. GRACE & CO. 15551 invoke the catch-all eighth factor—“[o]ther situations or factors that may pose threats to public health or welfare of the United States or the environment,” 40 C.F.R. § 300.415(b) (2)(viii): The sheer magnitude of the medical impact in Libby dictates the need for an expedient and thorough response. Unfortunately, because of the latencies of asbestos related diseases there is no easy way to directly correlate exposure to amphibole asbestos today to the direct development of an asbestos related disease. The only way to determine this for certain is to observe an individual for 10 to 40 years after exposure to see if they become sick. However, waiting for this type of certainty is unconscionable. CERCLA was designed and enacted to prevent ill- ness and death resulting from exposure to hazardous substances, not wait for its occurrence to prove a threat. [3] Finally, the Third Action Memo cites several factors in support of the EPA’s decision to expand the removal action and asserts that “[t]he significant medical impact of asbestos exposure in Libby dictates the need for an expedient and thorough response.” In light of the EPA’s carefully documented reasoning in the three Action Memos, we agree with the district court that the EPA’s decision to approve a removal action was not arbitrary and capricious. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(j)(2). This threshold decision does not, however, end our inquiry. We must consider how to classify the EPA’s action.