Opinion ID: 2810788
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Caveats for Plaintiffs

Text: 26 No. 2012AP1493 ¶64 The broad applicability of the discovery rule does not guarantee that plaintiffs receive an advantage in tort cases. In most cases, plaintiffs will benefit from filing their claims sooner rather than later. We emphasize the following points. ¶65 First, the discovery rule requires reasonable diligence on the part of the injured party. This requirement applies in various ways to decedents, personal representatives, special administrators, and wrongful death beneficiaries. For example, if a decedent, with reasonable diligence, should have discovered his injury——including the identity of the defendant—— prior to his death, then any survival claims pursued on his behalf by his estate would have accrued prior to his death. Likewise, if the decedent's wrongful death beneficiary should have discovered the identity of the defendant shortly after the decedent's death, the beneficiary's actual knowledge will be irrelevant——the claim will accrue. ¶66 The burden is on the defendant to raise the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. See Robinson v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 137 Wis. 2d 1, 16-17, 402 N.W.2d 711 (1987). However, once the defense has been raised, the circuit court will need to determine whether the plaintiff has, in fact, satisfied the statute of limitations. See TJ Auto LLC v. Mr. Twist Holdings LLC, 2014 WI App 81, ¶¶14-15, 355 Wis. 2d 517, 851 N.W.2d 831. This may require the court to make a factual determination of when a claim accrued, including when the claim reasonably should have been discovered. As a practical matter, plaintiffs filing suit more than three years after a decedent's 27 No. 2012AP1493 death will often have to make a showing that the delay in their discovery of the claim was reasonable. ¶67 Second, a plaintiff has the burden of proving his case. That burden is not relaxed in older cases kept alive by the discovery rule. A plaintiff will often find that proving his case has become more difficult because time has passed. ¶68 Third, the fact that the discovery rule is grounded in public policy considerations means that its application in a specific case may be weighed against competing public policy considerations. In the past, this court has identified six public policy considerations that courts may use to limit liability: (1) the injury is too remote from the negligence; or (2) the injury is too wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent tortfeasor; or (3) in retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that the negligence should have brought about the harm; or (4) because allowance of recovery would place too unreasonable a burden on the negligent tortfeasor; or (5) because allowance of recovery would be too likely to open the way for fraudulent claims; or (6) allowance for recovery would enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point. Cole v. Hubanks, 2004 WI 74, ¶8, 272 Wis. 2d 539, 681 N.W.2d 147 (quoting Becker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 141 Wis. 2d 804, 817-18, 416 N.W.2d 906 (Ct. App. 1987)). ¶69 The fact that survival and wrongful death claims can accrue after death does not mean that those claims can always be pursued after an extended period of time. The discovery rule notwithstanding, requiring alleged tortfeasors to defend against very old claims may sometimes place too unreasonable a burden 28 No. 2012AP1493 on those parties. See id. The discovery rule does not state that such claims will always proceed; it is up to the courts to balance the equities in such cases. ¶70 We make no determination as to the balance of the equities in this case. The record is not sufficiently developed for us to determine whether the defendants should have to defend against these claims. Rather, our decision is simply that it is possible that the plaintiffs' claims accrued after the deaths of the decedents. E. Summary Disposition and Constitutional Claims ¶71 Finally, the defendants contend that the court of appeals' decision to summarily reverse the circuit court's grant of summary judgment violated their constitutional rights. The defendants' argument on this point does not seem to be fully developed, so we address it only briefly. ¶72 As the plaintiffs point out, the defendants' argument presupposes that the court of appeals was incorrect. Because the court of appeals was correct that the circuit court used the wrong legal standard in its application of the discovery rule to the facts of this case, the only question is whether the defendants' constitutional rights were somehow violated by the case being reversed summarily. ¶73 The court of appeals may dispose of a case summarily by order if the panel unanimously agrees on the decision; unanimously agrees the issues involve no more than the application of well-settled rules of law or the issues are decided on the basis of unquestioned and controlling precedent or the issues relate to sufficiency of evidence or trial court discretion and 29 No. 2012AP1493 the record clearly shows sufficient evidence or no abuse of discretion; and the issues may be resolved by merely stating the reasons for the decision without a detailed analysis. Wis. Ct. App. IOP VI-1 (Nov. 30, 2009). ¶74 In this case, the court of appeals determined that its recent decision in Beaver, which presented the same legal question and nearly identical facts, made this case appropriate for summary disposition. See Christ, No. 2012AP1493, at 3. Given the court's recent ruling in Beaver, we see no reason why this case was not appropriate for summary disposition. Accordingly, we hold that summary disposition did not violate the defendants' constitutional rights.