Opinion ID: 61009
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Review of Summary Judgment Evidence

Text: Title VII prohibits an employer from discharging or otherwise discriminating against any individual because of that individual’s sex or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). “The Title VII inquiry is whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.” Roberson v. Alltel Info. Servs., 373 F.3d 647, 651 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Such discrimination can be demonstrated through either direct or circumstantial evidence. Nasti v. CIBA Specialty Chems. Corp., 492 5 No. 07-30950 F.3d 589, 593 (5th Cir. 2007). Because Murungi presents no direct evidence of discrimination, we analyze his claim using the burden-shifting framework originally set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973): [A] plaintiff must first create a presumption of intentional discrimination by establishing a prima facie case. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. The burden on the employer at this stage is one of production, not persuasion; it can involve no credibility assessment. If the employer sustains its burden, the prima facie case is dissolved, and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish either: (1) that the employer’s proffered reason is not true but is instead a pretext for discrimination; or (2) that the employer’s reason, while true, is not the only reason for its conduct, and another motivating factor is the plaintiff’s protected characteristic. Alvarado v. Texas Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, Murungi must show that: “(1) [he] is a member of a protected class; (2) [he] was qualified for the position [he] sought; (3) [he] suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) others similarly situated but outside the protected class were treated more favorably.” Id. Reviewing the summary judgment record de novo, we find that Murungi has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Although there may be some evidence of the first three elements, Murungi has failed to present competent summary judgment evidence on the fourth element of establishing that others were similarly situated but were treated more favorably. Although Murungi baldly asserts that several faculty members within his division received poor student evaluations without attendant notices of impending termination, he has presented no competent summary judgment evidence that any of these faculty members had a sustained record of poor evaluations similar to his or that they had problems similar to his issues with Ochsner. 6 No. 07-30950 Further, as the district court found, even assuming arguendo that Murungi met his initial burden, Xavier would still be entitled to summary judgment. Xavier has articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for not promoting Murungi and for not renewing his contract, including his longstanding history of poor student evaluations, his students’ recurrent complaints about his teaching, and his unprofessional response to the Ochsner complaint. Although Murungi may not believe his student evaluation scores warrant non-renewal of his contract, employment discrimination laws are 'not intended to be a vehicle for judicial second-guessing of employment decisions nor . . . to transform the courts into personnel managers.' EEOC v. La. Office of Cmty. Servs., 47 F.3d 1438, 1448 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Bienkowski v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503, 1507–08 (5th Cir. 1988)). Once Xavier proffered non-disciminatory reasons for its actions, the burden shifted back to Murungi, who was required to present evidence of either pretext or intentional discrimination on Xavier’s part. Murungi testified that because he was the professor with the lowest salary in his division, he was the only professor who was not invited back after Hurricane Katrina, and he was the only professor who was Kenyan, Xavier’s actions “cannot be anything else” but discrimination. Because Murungi could offer nothing more than his subjective belief that Xavier discriminated against him and gave pretextual reasons for its actions, summary judgment was appropriate on this alternative ground. See Ray v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 63 F.3d 429, 435 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[B]ald assertions of . . . discrimination are inadequate to permit a finding that proscribed discrimination motivated [defendant’s] actions against [plaintiff].”); see also Grizzle v. Travelers Health Network, Inc., 14 F.3d 261, 268 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that employee’s “self-serving generalized testimony stating her subjective belief that discrimination occurred . . . is simply insufficient to support a jury verdict in plaintiff’s favor”). 7 No. 07-30950