Opinion ID: 2262031
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The existence of a warrant, the danger of destruction of evidence, and the connection between drugs and weapons.

Text: This court has recognized that [t]he issuance of a warrant ... signifies that a judicial officer has made a determination that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the information underlying the warrant is true and of sufficient reliability and timeliness to justify a search for up to ten days. Williams, supra, 576 A.2d at 704. The warrant requirement guards against searches based on no more than officers' conclusions formed prior to the search. Bonner, supra, 277 U.S.App. D.C. at 274, 874 F.2d at 825. The government argues, based upon these authorities, that in the present case it was likely that drugs were in the apartment, and that the occupants would dispose of them unless the police moved with dispatch. There is no doubt that, in general, possession of a warrant enhances the officers' authority to conduct a search. Section 33-565(g), however, presupposes the existence of a search warrant, but nevertheless requires a showing of refusal of admittance. Accordingly, the government's argument simply proves too much. Whenever there are unlawful drugs (or other contraband) on the premises and the officers delay their entry until after they have been refused admittance, there is a danger that the delay will enable persons on the premises to destroy potential evidence. As the Supreme Court of Arizona explained in State v. Bates, 120 Ariz. 561, 563, 587 P.2d 747, 749 (1978) (en banc), however, [t]he mere fact that this search warrant was executed for the purpose of discovering narcotics does not necessarily create an exigent circumstance justifying immediate entry. In State v. Mendoza, 104 Ariz. 395, 399-400, 454 P.2d 140, 144-45 (1969), this court emphasized that, standing by itself, the easy destructibility of narcotics evidence is insufficient to provide reasonable cause for officers to believe that announcement of the purpose of their entry would frustrate the search, and therefore, relieve them of the necessity of announcing their identity and purpose. There must be substantial evidence to cause the police to believe evidence would be destroyed, irrespective of the evidence sought, otherwise A.R.S. § 13-1446(B) [26] would become a nullity in narcotics cases. Id. Accord, Newman, supra, 429 Pa. at 446-50, 240 A.2d at 798-99; United States v. Rodriguez, 663 F.Supp. 585, 588-89 (D.D.C. 1987); United States v. Doering, 384 F.Supp. 1307, 1311 (W.D.Mich.1974). Relying on Williams, supra, 576 A.2d at 701, the government claims that it is common knowledge that those trafficking in controlled substances often use firearms, and that in the interest of their own safety, the police were justified in effecting their forced entry without further delay. In Williams, however, the police had been informed that, along with unlawful drugs, there were several weapons in the house and that a man armed with an automatic gun was seated in the living room next to the front window. Id. Additionally, a departing visitor who had spotted the police ran back into the house, yelling police officers. Id. at 702. There were no such circumstances in the present case. Although, as we recently reiterated, drugs and weapons go together and their sinister association is a close one, Marshall v. United States, No. 89-CF-800, slip op. at 8, 1992 WL 143753 (D.C. Jun. 26, 1992) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), the existence of that unfortunate connection, without more, cannot lend any substantial support to the government's position. Were we to hold otherwise, then § 33-565(g) would be undermined to the point of inefficacy in any search warrant case involving alleged distribution of narcotics. See also Gomez, supra, 597 A.2d at 890-91; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1885, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).