Opinion ID: 2023639
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Last Employed

Text: Section 604 of the Act states in pertinent part: Labor Dispute. An individual shall be ineligible for benefits for any week with respect to which it is found that his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed. 820 ILCS 405/604 (West 1994). The controlling principles are familiar: `It is a primary rule in the interpretation and construction of statutes that the intention of the legislature should be ascertained and given effect. [Citations.] This is to be done primarily from a consideration of the legislative language itself, which affords the best means of its exposition, and if the legislative intent can be ascertained therefrom it must prevail and will be given effect without resorting to other aids for construction. [Citations.] There is no rule of construction which authorizes a court to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute imports.' ( Western National Bank v. Village of Kildeer (1960), 19 Ill.2d 342, 350 [167 N.E.2d 169].) Illinois Power Co. v. Mahin, 72 Ill.2d 189, 194, 21 Ill.Dec. 144, 381 N.E.2d 222 (1978). Further: `Where the language of the act is certain and unambiguous the only legitimate function of the courts is to enforce the law as enacted by the legislature. [Citations.] It is never proper for a court to depart from plain language by reading into a statute exceptions, limitations or conditions which conflict with the clearly expressed legislative intent. [Citations.]' Certain Taxpayers v. Sheahen (1970), 45 Ill.2d 75, 84 [256 N.E.2d 758]. Harvey Firemen's Ass'n v. City of Harvey, 75 Ill.2d 358, 363, 27 Ill. Dec. 339, 389 N.E.2d 151 (1979). In Dienes, the appellate court concluded that the section 604 disqualification refers simply and only to the establishment where a claimant was last employed. Thus, the disqualification is removed when a claimant acquires subsequent employment. Section 604 did not require such a claimant to show that the interim employment was bona fide or permanent. Dienes v. Holland, 64 Ill.App.3d 109, 113-114, 20 Ill.Dec. 947, 380 N.E.2d 1156 (1978). This court affirmed, holding that the appellate court was correct in reading the statute just as it was enacted. Dienes, 78 Ill.2d at 14, 34 Ill.Dec. 292, 397 N.E.2d 1358. This court could not perceive any legislative intent to add any additional conditions to section 604 to qualify a claimant for benefits. Thus, this court refused to read into the section 604 disqualification the additional conditions that the interim employment be bona fide or permanent. Dienes, 78 Ill.2d at 14-15, 34 Ill. Dec. 292, 397 N.E.2d 1358. This court lastly noted that its decision was based on the facts of that case. This court expressly stated: We need not consider here whether every succeeding or `last' employment, whatever the circumstances, will qualify a claimant for unemployment benefits. Dienes, 78 Ill.2d at 17, 34 Ill.Dec.292, 397 N.E.2d 1358. In the present case, the Department and the circuit court, both relying on Dienes, found two different interpretations of section 604 of the Act. The Department relied on Dienes in awarding unemployment benefits to claimants, whether or not the interim employment was bona fide or meant to be permanent. The circuit court pointed to the caveat at the end of Dienes in concluding that a striking employee's good faith in obtaining interim employment was a condition to removing the section 604 disqualification, which required a case-by-case determination. Examining the entire act (see Castaneda v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 132 Ill.2d 304, 318, 138 Ill.Dec. 270, 547 N.E.2d 437 (1989)), the appellate court found a third interpretation of section 604. The appellate court relied on section 1502.1 of the Act, which the legislature enacted subsequently to Dienes. That section sets out detailed rules governing whether benefits to a claimant will in turn be charged to the claimant's former employer. The initial subsections of section 1502.1 determine the particular employer that will be charged, which in most cases is the employer for which the claimant most recently worked for a minimum of 30 days. 820 ILCS 405/1502.1 (West 1994). One year after adding section 1502.1 to the Act, the legislature added subsection (E). Pursuant to section 1502.1(E), the claimant's last employer means the employer that    is charged for benefit payments which become benefit charges under this Section. 820 ILCS 405/1502.1(E) (West 1994); see 284 Ill.App.3d at 364-65, 219 Ill.Dec. 871, 672 N.E.2d 379. According to the appellate court, section 1502.1 links a claimant's eligibility for benefits to an employer's benefit charges: Until a claimant becomes employed to the extent that his new employer becomes chargeable for benefits (basically 30 days), the claimant remains `last employed' with (and barred from receiving benefits from) the employer with whom he was originally embroiled in a labor dispute. The appellate court concluded that [s]ection 1502.1 of the Act accordingly now sets out a required length of employment before disqualification under section 604 is ended. 284 Ill.App.3d at 365, 219 Ill.Dec. 871, 672 N.E.2d 379. We disagree with the appellate court. Section 604 of the Act was unambiguous in 1979 when this court decided Dienes and remains so. We conclude that Dienes controls the outcome of this case. However, the appellate court looked to section 1502.1 of the Act to read section 604 other than in the way it was written. This attempt fails. Section 1502.1(E) plainly states that its definition of last employer is [f]or the purposes of Sections 302, 409, 701, 1403, 1404, 1405 and 1508.1. 820 ILCS 405/1502.1(E) (West 1994). Further, those sections contain cross-references to section 1502.1. 820 ILCS 405/302, 409, 701, 1403, 1404, 1405, 1502.1(E), 1508.1 (West 1994). The appellate court was properly troubled by the fact that section 604 of the Act is not listed in section 1502.1(E). 284 Ill.App.3d at 365, 219 Ill.Dec. 871, 672 N.E.2d 379. We repeat that the statutory language itself gives the best indication of legislative intent. Where a statute lists the things to which it refers, there is an inference that all omissions should be understood as exclusions. Burke v. 12 Rothschild's Liquor Mart, Inc., 148 Ill.2d 429, 441-42, 170 Ill.Dec. 633, 593 N.E.2d 522 (1992). This rule of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, is based on logic and common sense. It expresses the learning of common experience that when people say one thing they do not mean something else. The maxim is closely related to the plain language rule in that it emphasizes the statutory language as it is written. 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 47.24, at 228, § 47.25 at 234 (5th ed.1992). The appellate court cited two reasons for reading the requirements of section 1502.1 of the Act into section 604, despite the fact that section 1502.1(E) does not list section 604. First, the appellate court stated that [t]here is no indication this list was intended to be exclusive. 284 Ill.App.3d at 365, 219 Ill.Dec. 871, 672 N.E.2d 379. However, the inference that all omissions should be understood as exclusions stands despite the lack of any negative words of limitation. Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill.2d 76, 82, 196 Ill.Dec. 655, 630 N.E.2d 820 (1994); City Savings Ass'n v. International Guaranty & Insurance Co., 17 Ill.2d 609, 612, 162 N.E.2d 345 (1959). Thus, the absence of section 604 from section 1502.1(E)'s list infers the legislative intent that section 1502.1's definition of last employer is exclusive to the sections cited in the list. An explicit statement of such intent is unnecessary. Second, the appellate court reasoned that if it did not apply section 1502.1's definition of last employer to the term last employed in section 604, these substantially same terms would have different meanings in the same statute. The appellate court invoked the principle that where the same or substantially the same words or phrases appear in different parts of a statute, they should be given a consistent meaning unless a contrary legislative intent is clearly expressed. 284 Ill.App.3d at 365, 219 Ill.Dec. 871, 672 N.E.2d 379; see Moran v. Katsinas, 16 Ill.2d 169, 174, 157 N.E.2d 38 (1959). However, the legislature did clearly express a contrary intent. Sections 604 and 1502.1 address different subjects. In section 604, the legislature prohibited an employee from receiving unemployment benefits based on a labor strike at the place where the employee was last employed. The legislature subsequently created in section 1502.1 a detailed test to determine an employer's benefit charges. After enacting section 1502.1, the legislature specifically enacted subsection (E), which lists the other sections of the Act to which it refers. The legislature also specifically cross-referenced those sections to section 1502.1. The legislature's use of certain language in one instance and different language in another indicates that the legislature intended different results. Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 Ill.2d 69, 100,199 N.E.2d 769 (1964). If the legislature had intended to apply section 1502.1's definition of last employer to section 604, it would have expressly done so, as it did with several other sections of the Act. The fact that the legislature did not cannot be deemed to be inadvertent. See, e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 22-23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 300, 78 L.Ed.2d 17, 23-24, (1983); Peoria Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Jefferson Trust & Savings Bank, 81 Ill.2d 461, 469-70, 43 Ill.Dec. 712, 410 N.E.2d 845 (1980); Siciliano v. Village of Westchester Firefighters' Pension Fund, 202 Ill.App.3d 964, 967, 148 Ill.Dec. 288, 560 N.E.2d 885 (1990). We recognize that the principle that the expression of one thing in a statute excludes any other thing is only a rule of statutory construction, not a rule of law. It is merely a rule that courts use to help them ascertain the intent of the legislature where such intent is not clear from the statute's plain language. The maxim is applied only when it appears to point to the intent of the legislature, not to defeat the ascertained legislative intent. The rule may be overcome by a strong indication of legislative intent. Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Franklin County, 387 Ill. 301, 313-14, 56 N.E.2d 775 (1944); accord Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 147 Ill.2d 548, 555, 169 Ill.Dec. 254, 591 N.E.2d 427 (1992). In the present case, however, we find that section 1502.1(E)'s specific reference to other sections of the Act, which cross-references to section 1502.1, reveals a clear legislative intent to exclude any other section of the Act which section 1502.1(E) does not list. See, e.g., City Savings Ass'n, 17 Ill.2d at 612,162 N.E.2d 345. The appellate court noted that an interpretation of section 604 that defined last employed as not imposing any durational or good-faith requirement was the minority view in the country. 284 Ill.App.3d at 363-64, 219 Ill.Dec. 871, 672 N.E.2d 379. Further, after it incorporated section 1502.1 of the Act into section 604, the appellate court explained that [s]ection 1502.1 of the Act provides an objective, bright-line method of determining whether an individual has requalified for unemployment benefits and avoids the subjectivity inherent in any type of `good-faith' inquiry. 284 Ill.App.3d at 366, 219 Ill.Dec. 871, 672 N.E.2d 379. The appellate court essentially rewrote sections 604 and 1502.1(E) of the Act to remedy perceived shortcomings in section 604. However, where the language of a statute is unambiguous, the only legitimate function of the courts is to enforce the law as enacted by the legislature. Certain Taxpayers v. Sheahen, 45 Ill.2d 75, 84, 256 N.E.2d 758 (1970); Belfield v. Coop, 8 Ill.2d 293, 307, 134 N.E.2d 249 (1956); see Boaden v. Department of Law Enforcement, 171 Ill.2d 230, 239, 215 Ill.Dec. 664, 664 N.E.2d 61 (1996). This cardinal rule applies even though the statutory language may be considered unwise or as impairing the statute as a whole. Buckellew v. Board of Education of Georgetown-Ridge Farm Community Unit School District No. 4, 215 Ill.App.3d 506, 511, 159 Ill.Dec. 58, 575 N.E.2d 556 (1991). A court may not inject provisions not found in the statute, however desirable they may appear to be. Western National Bank v. Village of Kildeer, 19 Ill.2d 342, 349-50, 167 N.E.2d 169 (1960). We reverse the judgment of the appellate court.