Opinion ID: 2344370
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Objections to the State's Summation.

Text: We recently held that, while a prosecutor's summation is not without bounds, `[s]o long as he stays within the evidence and the legitimate inferences therefrom the Prosecutor is entitled to wide latitude in his summation.' State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 330, 873 A. 2d 511 (2005) (quoting State v. Mayberry, 52 N.J. 413, 437, 245 A. 2d 481 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1043, 89 S.Ct. 673, 21 L.Ed. 2d 593 (1969)). We underscored that `[a] prosecutor may comment on the facts shown by or reasonably to be inferred from the evidence. There is no error so long as he confines himself in that fashion. Ultimately it was for the jury to decide whether to draw the inferences the prosecutor urged.' Ibid. (quoting State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 125, 449 A. 2d 1280 (1982) (citations omitted)). Isolating small portions of the prosecutor's summation, defendant claims he was denied a fair trial. We disagree. When read in its entirety, the fair import of the State's closing argument is that the prosecutor exhorted the jury to arrive at its decision, beyond a reasonable doubt, by balancing the aggravating and mitigating factors. We therefore reject all of defendant's challenges to the State's summation. [14] a. Equating the death penalty with justice. Defendant alleges that, in its summation, the State equated the imposition of the death penalty with the exaction of justice. Specifically, defendant complains of the following passages at the beginning of the State's summation: I thank you for your attention and your service in this case. At this moment I'm humbled with the responsibility to ask for justice on behalf of Richard and Shirley Hazard. We've seen their photographs to see how they once were, but they are not here. So I'm privileged to ask for justice. . . . . I'm sure you have an idea of the things I'm going to say. You probably have an idea of the things I'm going to ask you to do and based upon what we heard in this courtroom, I submit you know what your answers should be. You know what your answers must be. Based upon these Aggravating Factors this [d]efendant has gone too far. He has gone too far over the line. Society is entitled to make laws to protect citizens, to punish people who break those laws. Laws that talk about what a person can do and what a person can't do. I suggest the [d]efendant, based on these Aggravating Factors, has crossed that line beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant also complains of the following passage at the conclusion of the State's summation: From what we heard had occurred in that house [we] couldn't imagine worse nightmares. Who could have the stomach to watch what [defendant] did on video tape if there's a video tape available. He did it, he carried it out and he did it purposely and consciously. We suggest that the Aggravating Factors call out for death. [Defendant] says choose life. [Defendant] chose death twice over. You are not responsible for the choices that [defendant] made. Your commitment is to follow the law and render the truth. Only the twelve of you can do justice. Only the twelve of you can recognize the Aggravating Factors. Only the twelve of you can have the courage to make the right decision in this case. [The] State suggests the right decision is death. We ask you, as you promised that you would, to follow your oath. Follow the instructions of the Court wherever, wherever they may lead. You gave that commitment and we know how you've been following this case and we expect that you will do so. Despite [defendant's] total disregard of life, liberty, justice, he' s received a fair trial. Members of the community will judge him on his behavior. Unlike Richard and Shirley Hazard, he receives justice. I ask you to impose the death penalty because it is the only sanction that will serve truth and justice. I urge you to impose it. Defendant argues that the equation of death with `justice' violates the noted prohibitions against encouraging a death verdict on the basis of a duty to society, as does the insinuation that jurors who did not vote to impose death would not be following their oaths. The State responds that [t]he overriding and unmistakable message was that the jury should sentence defendant to death based on evidence actually produced concerning aggravating and mitigating factors[,] and that the prosecutor argued to the jury that the jurors [should] `not feel guilty' for following their oaths, and to have the courage to follow the court's legal instructions, `wherever they may lead.' According to the State, [t]he prosecutor did not tell the jurors that they would violate their oaths if they failed to return a death verdict, but instead emphasized that the jurors must faithfully apply the law as instructed by the court, whatever the result. Ruling on defendant's motion to set aside the death sentence, the trial court considered and rejected this argument. The trial court distinguished between what the prosecutor argued in summation in this case from those at issue in State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 575-76, 575 A. 2d 816 (1990), and held that [t]he references by the prosecutor were unrelated to the substantive issues in the case. They were not extensive, they were not inflammatory  it was the second sentence of his closing argument  and would not reflect any intention[ ] `to divert the jury from the material facts as to the worthiness of the victim[.]' State v. Marshall[(I), 123 N.J. 1, 162, 586 A. 2d 85 (1991) (quoting State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 571, 575 A. 2d 816 (1990))]. The State is allowed under State v. [Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23, 678 A. 2d 164 (1996)], to make appropriate comment with respect to the uniqueness of the victims in balancing those issues against the non[-]statutory aggravating factors as the jury was instructed. So I don't find any overreaching by the prosecutor with regard to that. And I don't conclude that the prosecutor in anyway turned the victim impact evidence into non[-]statutory aggravating factors. Rather, the Court concludes that the prosecutor's conduct was not clearly and unmistakably improper so as to result in any substantial prejudice to the defendant or fundamental right to have a jury fairly assess the persuasiveness of the case; that simply doesn't exist here. . . . . There was no suggestion, the Court holds, that the jurors would violate the oaths. At issue here [are] the statements made by the prosecutor that, [t]he juror[s] should not feel guilty for what they are about to do if they were following their oaths. . . . The prosecutor's comments did not cross the bounds of propriety by telling the jurors that they needed a sense of courage to impose the death penalty. Instead here the prosecutor's statement emphasized to the jury that they should deliberate with courage and dignity, such encouragement is not inconsistent, I would hold, with our capital jurisprudence. The prosecutor's comments reinforced to the jurors that they have a grave task and did not in any way impermissibly minimize or otherwise prejudice the jury's decision making process. . . . . With regard to the argument [in respect of] defendant's lack of remorse, the prosecutor did comment on what was argued to be a lack of remorse and, accordingly, the absence of that as any appropriate mitigating factor. . . . The prosecutor responded[,] and I would hold[,] the appropriate way as to whether or not there was any true remorse. Upon the defendant placing remorse at issue, the State did not deprecate what the defense was doing, but [the State] deprecated the quality, the significance of the remorse in the closing argument[,] and that's appropriate. . . . . The prosecutor here in no way of course, in the Court's estimation, in anyway sought to diminish the jury's responsibility. The prosecutor I think said these words: You are not responsible for the choices that he made. Your commitment is to follow the law and render the truth. Only the 12 of you can do justice. Only the 12 of you can recognize aggravating factors. In this particular case I would hold that there were no inferences from the statements which [the prosecutor] made that the prosecutor was in any way diminishing any of the jurors' responsibilities. I would say, rather, in the context of what he said, he did the opposite: he focused on the serious nature of their responsibilities. We agree with the trial court's careful and thoughtful analysis. As we noted in respect of a similar challenge where the prosecutor uttered almost the exact words used by the State in this case, [15] the prosecutor's comments did not jeopardize defendant's right to a fair trial and to individualized sentencing. Unlike the prosecutor whose statement we objected to in State v. Purnell, 126 N.J. 518, 545 [601 A. 2d 175] (1992), the prosecutor did not tell the jury that the only way to demonstrate courage would be to vote for death. To the contrary, he urged the jurors to have the courage to render a verdict in accordance with the evidence, however the verdict turned out. Specifically, he told them at one point during summation, whatever your verdict is, we will all leave this courtroom with our heads held high. Moreover, the statements did not urge the jury to send a message to society, nor did they scare the jury into believing that a death sentence was needed to protect society from a man like defendant. See [ State v.] Rose , 112 N.J. [454,] 521 [548 A.2d 1058] [(1988)] (criticizing prosecutor's statement to send a message to society); [ State v.] Ramseur , 106 N.J. [123,] 321 [524 A.2d 188] [(1987)] (condemning prosecutor's statement that suggested that jury should impose death penalty to protect society from crime). We are satisfied that that statement by itself, or in conjunction with other statements, see State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 218 [478 A. 2d 364] (1984) (stating that sum of statements may amount to reversible error, even where one would not by itself), was not so egregious as to warrant reversal. [ State v. DiFrisco (II), 137 N.J. 434, 476, 645 A. 2d 734 (1994).] b. Explanation that the jury should not feel guilty about imposing a death sentence. Defendant also takes issue with the following portion of the State's summation: You're not going to hear any discussion from me or from the Court about whether or not we should have a death penalty or not. Whether it's appropriate in our society. That's not what we're here for. We're here to apply the law of the State of New Jersey. The death penalty is the law of the State of New Jersey. So whether you agree or disagree with the death penalty, that's not the issue here. Do not feel guilty for what you are about to do in this courtroom. What you're doing is following your oath, doing your job. In defendant's view, the prosecutor's exhortation that the jury not `feel guilty for what [it was] about to do' is merely the flip side of the illegitimate `courage' argument. In response, the State argues that the prosecutor properly reminded the jurors to abide by their oaths to follow the law. He told the jurors to `not feel guilty' for following their oaths, and to have courage to follow the court's legal instructions `wherever they may lead.' By way of contrast, the State notes that [t]he prosecutor did not tell the jurors that they would violate their oaths if they failed to return a death verdict, but instead emphasized that the jurors must faithfully apply the law as instructed by the court, whatever the result. We reject the notion that the State's summation was improper. In light of the mitigating factors claimed by defendant  the overwhelming majority of which sought mitigation of defendant's confessed crimes based on elements of defendant's life, supra, 190 N.J. at 424-25, 921 A. 2d at 969-70 (2007)  it was fitting and proper for the State to remind the jurors that they need not feel guilty if they returned a death sentence. c. Mischaracterization of death penalty phase as concerning what defendant deserved. Defendant challenges a portion of the prosecutor's summation claiming that the prosecutor thereby encouraged the jury to believe that imposing a death sentence was a matter of deciding what the defendant `deserved.' The closing argument language challenged by defendant follows on the heels of the State's argument that the jury need not feel guilty if it returned a death sentence and, placed in context, is as follows: Just so there's no misunderstanding, the death penalty is a greater punishment than life without parole. Some people may think maybe life without parole is the worse sentence. The law says it is not. The death penalty is the maximum sentence [defendant] can receive. So when it's all said and done, if you think [defendant] deserves the maximum sentence, he should get the death penalty. If you think he deserves the minimum sentence, he should receive some form of life imprisonment. [You] can't say he deserves the maximum sentence and give him life without parole. That can't be done based upon what the Judge tells you what the maximum sentence is here. Some of you may be thinking even though he deserves the maximum sentence, life imprisonment would be a greater punishment, a greater hell because every day he would think about what he did. You have heard about [defendant] and that would be a mistake because while he looks like an ordinary person, he thinks differently. He has no guilt. He has no guilt. So thinking that he will be thinking about what he did every day for the rest of his life is a mistake. In response, the State argues that the prosecutor used the word `deserves' as a means of discussing the `appropriate' sentences for defendant based on the aggravating and mitigating factors. In the State's view, [t]he prosecutor's use of the word `deserves' in this context could not possibly have encouraged the jury to impose death on the basis of `revulsion,' or any other impermissible ground, particularly because the prosecutor did not use that word in conjunction with any discussion of defendant's `unsympathetic' qualities. We cannot give this portion of the State's closing argument the construction advanced by defendant. In our view, the prosecutor in summation properly asked the jury to weigh the proofs before it in their relevant context: the aggravating and mitigating factors identified by the State and defendant. State v. Papasavvas (I), 163 N.J. 565, 628, 751 A. 2d 40 (2000) (In capital sentencing each juror must individually determine whether each mitigating factor exists, and then individually decide whether the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. The death penalty is imposed only if the jurors unanimously agree that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors.) (citations omitted). Read in its proper context, the prosecutor's argument in summation in respect of whether defendant deserved the death penalty was innocuous and, therefore, no error is present. d. Comments concerning defendant's age. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(c) provides that, among the mitigating factors which may be found by the jury or the court [is] . . . [t]he age of the defendant at the time of the murder[.] Defendant was twenty-three years old when he committed the crimes to which he pled guilty and for which he was sentenced to death. As a result, defendant listed his age among the mitigating factors to be considered by the death penalty phase jury and, in his summation to the jury, defendant argued that his age should be a mitigating factor because defendant was only twenty-three at the time of the murders, because defendant's maturity had been adversely affected by his upbringing, and because his adolescent development had been interrupted by several incarcerations. Defendant contends that the State's summation distorted the nature of that factor when the State argued that [The defense] suggests you should give [defendant's age at the time of the murders of Richard and Shirley Hazard] some weight. We ask you, in deciding whether that has any weight, that you compare [defendant with] people in his peer group, people that are twenty-three years old. I would suggest that out of the people who are serving their country in Iraq, putting their lives on the line, a number of them are under twenty-three years old. I would suggest that people outside of that scenario that are twenty-three years old, that they're law-abiding. They work. They take care of their family. I suggest age is not a Mitigating Factor that should hold much, if any, weight. What about the psychological age[,] maybe that means something because of his upbringing. He knew right from wrong and his experiences, the Judge is going to tell you, should play into it, experiences. Well, we know he started to get in trouble at a young age. He knew the consequences of getting in trouble. He knew getting in trouble[,] from experience[,] will land you in jail. He knew it. He didn't care. Consider that when you consider age. Defendant asserts that [t]o contrast the defendant with generalizations concerning other people of the defendant's age is, in fact, to argue that age, per se, is not relevant, because others of the same age are doing good or great things. He also argues that by implying that only chronological age matters, the argument served to preclude consideration of relative maturity. Defendant concludes by claiming that the introduction of Iraq in this context, to explicitly contrast the defendant with the most admirable people of his chronological age, is highly inflammatory. According to defendant, the prejudice he suffered as a result of the State's distortion of this mitigating factor is readily evident in the jury's unanimous rejection of that mitigating factor. The State responds that the prosecutor's comments were a direct and measured response to defense counsel's closing arguments regarding defendant's relative youth. As interpreted by the State, [t]he prosecutor never suggested that defendant's age, per se, was not relevant. By way of contrast, the State argues that the prosecutor's comments suggested the exact opposite  that defendant's age was indeed a relevant consideration, but that in this particular case it did not carry much, if any weight, given the magnitude of his crimes and his ability to distinguish right from wrong. The State notes that `the prosecutor was free to depreciate the significance of defendant's mitigating evidence' by comparing him to his peers[.] State v. Bey (III), 129 N.J. 557, 621, 610 A. 2d 814 (1992), supplemented by 137 N.J. 334, 645 A. 2d 685 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164, 115 S.Ct. 1131, 130 L.Ed. 2d 1093 (1995) (quoting State v. Marshall (I), 123 N.J. 1, 164, 586 A. 2d 85 (1991), supplemented by, 130 N.J. 109, 613 A. 2d 1059 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929, 113 S.Ct. 1306, 122 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1993)). The State concludes that the prosecutor appropriately focused the jury's attention on defendant's chronological age, as well as on his experiences and maturity, in urging the jury to reject defendant's age as a mitigating factor, or at least give it little weight. Following the State's summation and defendant's motion for a new trial, the trial court rejected defendant's accusation that the State distorted the age mitigating factor. Denying defendant's motion for a mistrial immediately before the jury charge, the trial court held that my understanding of the prosecutor's arguments is that his comments that were objected to were made in [the] context [of discussing the mitigating factors], so I would hold that it is within the bounds of fair comment. More specifically, denying defendant's motion for a new trial, the trial court held as follows: With regard to the arguments concerning defendant's age, this case and what occurred here [are] quite distinct from State v. Bey. For example, in State v. Bey, the prosecutor said, contrary to what the law is, Quote: So age, per se, is just not relevant. End quote. The Court does hold that age per se is relevant, and the statute makes it clear that age per se has some relevance. Here what the prosecutor did was endeavor to compare the defendant to his peers and was not telling the jury to reject age per se but was making an argument as to what weight and effect that should have on the jury's balancing process. We have interpreted mitigating factor c(5)(c) as requiring juries to consider both chronological age and maturity in determining the applicability of the age mitigating factor to relatively young defendants. State v. Bey (III), supra, 129 N.J. at 613, 610 A. 2d 814. We have cautioned, however, that the statutory language makes clear that juries should give greater weight to a defendant's chronological age. Ibid. As the State correctly notes, the comparison of defendant with those in his age cohort serving in the armed forces stationed in war zones abroad also was proper. Id. at 621, 610 A. 2d 814 (endorsing comparison between eighteen-year-old defendant and the fifty thousand people who are stationed in Saudi Arabia in our military, many of them are eighteen). We fail to see how the prosecution's comments concerning defendant's age at the time of the murders in any way distorted the jury's application of the mitigating factor claimed by defendant under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(c). On the contrary, we embrace the trial court's reasoning when it held that what the prosecutor did was endeavor to compare the defendant to his peers[,] that the prosecutor was not telling the jury to reject age per se [,] but that, instead, the prosecutor was making an argument as to what weight and effect that should have on the jury's balancing process. In that context, defendant's claim of distortion of the age mitigating factor must be rejected. e. Name-calling. Defendant asserts further prosecutorial misconduct or error in the State's summation claiming that the prosecution engaged in impermissible name-calling when he argued that [f]rom what we know about [defendant] and Shirley and Richard Hazard, this is the case of the wolf taking the lives of the two helpless sheep and the facts cry out for death. Distinguishing the conduct we roundly condemned in State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 576-77, 575 A. 2d 816 (1990), the State replies that the prosecutor, on one single, isolated occasion, alluded to the `wolf and sheep' metaphor to collectively refer to defendant and the victims and that, in doing so, [t]he prosecutor did not unfairly single-out and demean defendant with a degrading epithet, nor did this remark substantially prejudice defendant's fundamental right to have the jury fairly evaluate the merits of his defense. We have explained that [b]y no stretch of the imagination can it be said that describing defendant as a coward, liar, or jackal is not derogatory. . . . It is not fair to employ degrading epithets such as [a] cancer, and parasite upon society, animal, butcher boy, young punk, hood, punk, and bum[.] . . . Epithets are especially egregious when, as here, the prosecutor pursues a persistent pattern of misconduct throughout the trial. [ State v. Pennington, supra, 119 N.J. at 577, 575 A. 2d 816 (citations omitted).] We have also condemned references to a defendant as the guest of honor, an equal opportunity shooter, and, in respect of an African-American capital defendant, a brother. State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 484, 575 A. 2d 435 (1990). We have, therefore, caution[ed] prosecuting attorneys that derogatory name-calling will not be condoned[,] and we have admonish[ed] prosecutors to be circumspect in their zealous efforts to win convictions. State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 456, 550 A. 2d 1172 (1988). That said, the proper yardstick in this context remains whether the prosecutor's statement was improper and, if so, whether the misconduct `was so egregious that it deprived defendant of a fair trial[ ]' [including the] penalty phases of a capital trial[.] State v. Pennington, supra, 119 N.J. at 565, 575 A. 2d 816 (citations omitted). When measured against that standard, the prosecution's single metaphor comparing the relationship between defendant and his murdered victims to that of the wolf taking the lives of the two helpless sheep did not violate the proscription against name-calling and simply does not rise to the level where defendant's right to a fair trial is implicated. Therefore, we reject defendant's claim that the State engaged in impermissible name-calling. f. Improper focus on defendant's character. Again isolating discrete statements in the State's summation, defendant argues that, in three instances, [t]he prosecutor further diverted the jurors from their proper function, and greased the skids towards aggravating factors and away from mitigating factors, by focusing the juror's attention toward the non-issue of the defendant's character. Placed in their respective context, defendant complains of the following highlighted statements: Now we heard from the testimony of the Hazard children, what that house represented to Richard and Shirley. It was home. It was about family. It's about safety. It's about children. What did that home represent to [defendant]? We suggest that home represented only an opportunity, an opportunity to take, an opportunity to steal, an opportunity to destroy. He didn't look at that home as other people looked at it. This home was a way for [defendant] to get the things that he wanted. Whether taking a car, getting something to eat, buying new clothes, buying new jewelry, renting a hotel room for his friends. That's what this home represented to [defendant]. Because in [defendant's] world everything is about him. This isn't the case  something else we ask you to consider. This isn't a case where [defendant] chose to burglarize a home, an empty home. He wants surpri[s]e by the occupants. We suggest that [when defendant] chose, that he chose to burglarize an occupied home and why he did that was because it made this crime easier for him. . . . . How does it relate to Mrs. Hazard? Again, Mr. Hazard and Mrs. Hazard are separate Aggravating Factors. We talked about her coming home for the last time. [We s]uggest that [defendant] had some advanced notice. She wasn't able to get her groceries down that she had bought. She was assaulted from behind. What does [defendant] do to try and obtain the property of Shirley Hazard, to obtain the valuables? First of all, he picks her up, looks her in the eye and carries her over to the basement and throws her down the basement steps. Doesn't he realize this is a human being? He doesn't care. It's all about the property. He gets downstairs he follows her down there and she's in a ball. She's curled up. Must be in pain and for some reason he stretches her out, pulls her over to where her husband is, who has the [plastic] garbage bag [over his head]. Imagine she looks over and sees her husband with a garbage bag over his head. Defendant decides he's going to inflict some more violence upon her, but before he can do that, the dog, the loyal family dog sees what is happening and has a response that a dog would have. Goes over and starts barking or growling and [defendant] has a dilemma here. What do I do? I don't want to get bitten. Thinking, how do I solve this dilemma? He runs upstairs, gets that wooden spoon and starts to beat the dog with it. He knows what's going on here. He's thinking. It's not a seizure. . . . . What happens at that time [when defendant writes a letter to his friends after he has been arrested]? [Defendant] suggests that he is upset. Starts banging his head again. He's banging his head. I'm going to Ancora [a State psychiatric facility]. I'll put on the act of despondent, talking about suicide. This letter is written before Sergeant Bennett gets down there. He's going to Ancora. Two and a half days after the murder. I suggest that all human beings have some kind of light in them, some kind of compassion, some kind of remorse. [Defendant] never had the light. It is out. He's incapable of remorse. He's not going to be remorseful today, one year from now or sixty years from now, he's not going to have any remorse. [(emphasis supplied).] In defendant's view, [s]uch trial by invective is improper, particularly in light of the State's declining to claim the depravity aggravating factor under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(c). The State responds by pointing out that defendant's contention that his character was a `non-issue' is starkly contradicted by his urging that mitigating factor (5)(h)  which permits the jury to consider `any other factor which is relevant to the defendant's character or record or to the circumstances of the offense'  was applicable. The State emphasizes that [h]ere, where defendant alleged 14 separate (5)(h) mitigating factors, certain aspects of his character certainly were at issue, and the prosecutor was entitled to comment on them in his summation. Taken in context, each of the challenged comments was fair comment in response to defendant's presentation. In respect of the first challenged comment, that in defendant's world everything is about him[,] the State's reference was to the burglary of the Hazard home to which defendant pled guilty and which formed an explicit part of the aggravating factors urged by the State. In respect of the second challenged comment of whether, while he was brutalizing Mrs. Hazard, defendant realize[d] that this is a human being and that he did not care, as well as the third comment that defendant does not have the light of compassion or remorse in him, we hold that, because defendant placed his character at issue by virtue of several of the mitigating factors he placed before the jury, it is entirely relevant, and proper, for the prosecution to respond as it did. In sum, we hold that none of the challenged comments improperly placed defendant's character in issue and, hence, defendant's objections thereto are unavailing.