Opinion ID: 1155733
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Granting Hardship Excuses

Text: (1a) Defendant contends his federal and state constitutional rights to a jury drawn from the vicinage were violated by the trial court's policy of excusing all prospective jurors claiming hardship caused by residing more than an hour and a half from the Mendocino County courthouse in Ukiah. (See Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 4.5(d)(2).) In defendant's view, he was entitled to jurors from the immediate vicinity of the crime scene. We reject defendant's argument. First, as the People observe, defendant made no vicinage challenge to his jury; his only objection to the court's excusal rulings was that they prevented getting jurors from all over the county, an objection which failed to invoke defendant's present crime scene/vicinage argument. (See former § 1060.) In any event, defendant was not denied his vicinage right. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law.... Included in this constitutional guarantee is the right to a trial by a jury residing in the vicinage, applicable in state courts through the Fourteenth Amendment. (See Williams v. Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78, 96 [26 L.Ed.2d 446, 457-458, 90 S.Ct. 1893]; Hernandez v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 713, 721-724 [263 Cal. Rptr. 513, 781 P.2d 547] [ Hernandez ].) We have held, however, that for purposes of Sixth Amendment challenges to prosecutions in California courts, the boundaries of the vicinage are coterminous with the boundaries of the county. ( Hernandez, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 729, fn. omitted.) Thus, our decision in Hernandez is dispositive of defendant's federal constitutional claim, for he does not assert that the jurors in his case were drawn from outside the county wherein the murders were committed. Defendant contends that ex post facto or due process principles would preclude application of Hernandez to his case, which was tried before Hernandez was decided. Had defendant raised a vicinage challenge at time of trial, based on pre- Hernandez law, the foregoing issue would be squarely raised. But as we have seen, no such challenge was presented. Defendant also asserts a violation of his right under the state Constitution to a jury drawn from the vicinage. (2) Although the California Constitution does not contain an explicit vicinage requirement, it nonetheless does provide an independent guarantee of the right to a jury drawn from the vicinage. (See Hernandez, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 721; People v. Guzman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 915, 935 [248 Cal. Rptr. 467, 755 P.2d 917]; People v. Powell (1891) 87 Cal. 348 [25 P. 481].) (1b) However, for purposes of state constitutional challenges to the proper selection of jurors in criminal trials in state courts, the boundaries of the vicinage are also coterminous with the boundaries of the county. ( People v. Powell, supra, 87 Cal. at pp. 354-357.) Thus, our decision in Powell is dispositive of defendant's state constitutional claim. We note defendant has asked that we take judicial notice of the contents of a standard map of Mendocino County. Although such a countywide map is a proper subject of judicial notice (Evid. Code §§ 452, subd. (h), 459, subd. (a)), this evidence is unnecessary in light of our conclusion that vicinage covers the entire county.