Opinion ID: 202030
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Overlap between Paragraphs 34 and 352

Text: 9 Mastera's first claim is that two of his prior convictions, those laid out in Paragraphs 34 and 35 of the PSI, were erroneously counted as two separate ACCA predicates instead of as just one. Paragraph 34 describes a conviction for breaking and entering in the daytime, and Paragraph 35 describes a conviction for stalking; both convictions were in 1998. 3 The crime of stalking 4 undoubtedly satisfies the ACCA's definition of a violent felony because it has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), and Mastera does not argue otherwise. 5 He contends, however, that it was improper to count his Paragraph 34 and 35 convictions as two separate ACCA predicates, because the two convictions do not arise from acts committed on occasions different from one another as required by 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The breaking and entering, the argument goes, was part of the same course of conduct that made up the stalking charge, and since Massachusetts law defines the crime of stalking to require multiple acts, the occasion underlying the stalking encompasses, and thus is not different from, the occasion underlying the breaking and entering. Whether two crimes occurred on separate occasions within the meaning of the ACCA requires a case-by-case examination of the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Stearns, 387 F.3d 104, 108 (1st Cir.2004). 10 Mastera correctly asserts that, under Massachusetts law, stalking requires a pattern of conduct or series of acts. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 43 (2000); see also Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 8, 712 N.E.2d 575, 581 (1999) (stalking by following requires more than two incidents of following); Commonwealth v. Kwiatkowski, 418 Mass. 543, 637 N.E.2d 854, 857-58 (1994) (stalking by harassment requires more than two incidents of harassment). 11 The record does not indicate that the September 7 breaking and entering was one of the incidents composing the stalking charge of which Mastera was convicted in 1998. Because there is no evidence that the acts underlying Paragraph 34 also underlie Paragraph 35, we need not decide what outcome that situation would require. Mastera has offered evidence only that the two crimes took place on consecutive days and had the same victim. Neither of these facts necessarily prevents a finding that the crimes occurred on separate occasions, see Stearns, 387 F.3d at 108-09, and in fact the record suggests that the breaking and entering had an endpoint, after which any subsequent crimes would be considered separate. See id. The district court did not err in concluding that the breaking and entering offense and the stalking offense occurred on two separate occasions and that each could be counted as a separate ACCA predicate conviction. 12