Opinion ID: 1958816
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: The Evidence Proffered and the Evidence Adduced

Text: At the time of the first hearing on Harris's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, the attorney then representing Harris was permitted to make a proffer of the evidence he sought to introduce in support of the motion. At the conclusion of the proffer, the trial judge ruled that he would not hear the proffered testimony because, in his view, he lacked authority to entertain the motion on its merits. (See The History of the Case portion of this opinion.) In Harris II, in vacating the order of the trial court denying the motion, we noticed the proffer and set out the substance of it as follows, Harris II [299 Md.] at 514-515, 474 A.2d 890: 1) Harris would testify that he pled guilty because Darrell Russell, his counsel in the prior proceeding, told him that if he continued to maintain his innocence and went to trial, he would receive the death penalty. According to the proffer, Harris would further testify that he believed that he was pleading guilty to felony murder only. 2) Russell would testify that he had come to realize that he had erred in urging his client to plead guilty. Russell would state that he improperly assessed the significance of a co-defendant's statement which named a third party as the actual killer of the victim. Russell would further testify that he had understood that his client was pleading guilty to felony murder only, that he had overestimated his power to convince the court not to impose death, and that he had inadequately prepared the case. 3) Harris's mother would testify that Russell had called Harris's home on two occasions to advise her that Harris should plead guilty to assure a life sentence and eventual parole. We indicated that in the evidentiary hearing on the motion which we directed to be conducted on remand, the trial court was to make factual findings with respect to such evidence as was adduced in accordance with the proffer. The judge hearing the motion on remand did so. We find evidence in the record which supports his factual findings. We accept them as not clearly erroneous. The judge found that the evidence presented did not measure up to the proffer. He was convinced that Harris was at all times ... aware of his exposure to the death penalty.... Harris wished to plead guilty. He wanted to get it over with, but of course, did not want the death penalty. The judge found as a fact that Russell did not at any time guarantee that [Harris] would get a life sentence, although [Harris] and his mother ... testified to that effect.... The judge did not believe that under the totality of the circumstances that Russell did more than say that your best shot is to plead guilty and put yourself on the mercy of the Court. The judge thought, Russell told [Harris] that he didn't have much of a chance either way, but probably the best chance he might have would be if he did just that. The trial judge found that it was true that Harris believed that he was pleading guilty only to felony murder and that he did plead guilty to it, but the Court accepted the plea on the basis that it didn't matter whether it was guilty of felony murder or first degree murder. Whatever it was, it was first degree, and the Court was going to view it as a first degree murder plea. The judge did not believe that Harris was ever told by his attorney that if he pled guilty he would be assured a life sentence and eventual parole. The judge observed that Russell did not testify that he had inadequately prepared the case. He did testify, the judge recalled, that he was striving to get ... the Court to recognize that his client was pleading guilty to felony murder only, and he did feel that he had a chance but not a certainty to persuade the Court not to impose the death penalty. The judge did not directly address the proffer that Russell would testify that he had come to realize that he had erred in urging his client to plead guilty and that he improperly addressed the significance of the Co-defendant's statement which named a third party as the actual killer of the victim. Regardless, it is clear from our conclusions set out supra that such admissions, if made by Russell, would not be sufficient to establish that Harris was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judge at the hearing on the motion here under review found from the evidence that Russell was faced with a horrible dilemma. He made a choice. He discussed it with his client. His client agreed to it. The client knew what was going on.... [H]e just happened to have guessed wrong. The judge opined, I don't think that's ineffectiveness of counsel. We agree.