Opinion ID: 774689
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plaintiff's Evidence of Disparate Treatment

Text: 19 By establishing the minimal prima facie case, a plaintiff creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated, and thus places the burden of production on the employer to proffer a nondiscriminatory reason for its action. James, 233 F.3d at 154 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the defendant did not contest the plaintiff's prima facie case, the defendant's failure to discharge the burden of production by presenting a nondiscriminatory reason would result in a judgment for the plaintiff. See id. If, however, the employer 20 articulates a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the presumption completely drops out of the picture. [T]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated... remains at all times with the plaintiff. Thus, once the employer has proffered its nondiscriminatory reason, the employer will be entitled to summary judgment... unless the plaintiff can point to evidence that reasonably supports a finding of prohibited discrimination. 21 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 22 Defendant has presented evidence that it offered less money to plaintiff than to Mitchell because Mitchell negotiated for his severance; because Mitchell retained counsel and threatened to bring legal claims; and because Mitchell had been highly recruited and faced poor job prospects because of a seasonal lull in hiring in the months following his discharge. Plaintiff, in turn, contends that the defendant's proffered reasons are false, pointing to evidence in the record indicating that defendant first offered Mitchell a severance package that included more money than it offered to plaintiff before Mitchell took the actions now asserted as justification for the differences between the offers, and before Mitchell raised his recruitment and job prospects. 23 Plaintiff has thus presented evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could decide that defendant's proffered reasons for offering plaintiff less money in her severance package are false. We recently explained in James that in some circumstances, a prima facie case plus falsity of the employer's explanation can, without more, be enough to support a reasonable finding that an employee was treated differently on the basis of race or gender. James, 233 F.3d at 156. [I]n other circumstances, however, a prima facie case, combined with falsity of the employer's explanation, will not be sufficient to establish disparate treatment on the basis of an illegal criterion. Id. Accordingly, the question at this stage of an employment discrimination case, as we have held repeatedly, is simply whether the evidence, taken as a whole, is sufficient to support a reasonable inference that prohibited discrimination occurred. Id. 24 The district court ruled that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a reasonable finding that defendant treated plaintiff differently on the basis of either her gender or her race. While we agree with the district court's conclusion in relation to gender, we disagree in relation to race. 25 On the record in this case, no reasonable trier of fact could determine that defendant treated plaintiff differently on the basis of her gender. Plaintiff has proffered absolutely no evidence of statements or conduct by defendant or its agents evincing hostile animus toward women. Nor does plaintiff point to any history or past practice of providing female employees with smaller severance packages than male employees. Indeed, it is undisputed that at least one additional male executive-level employee was discharged at the same time as plaintiff, and under approximately the same terms. Finally, in the months prior to defendant's discharge of plaintiff, defendant discharged its Executive Director, who was also a woman, and offered her a generous severance package. Though plaintiff contends that this severance package resulted from the fact that the Executive Director had an unexpired employment contract for a term, unlike defendant's other employees who were employees at-will, defendant's offer of a high severance payment in this instance nonetheless cuts against plaintiff's claims of gender discrimination in the provision of severance packages. 26 Plaintiff has presented considerably more evidence, however, on her claim that she was treated differently on the basis of her race. To be sure, plaintiff has proffered no evidence of statements by defendant's agents evincing hostile discriminatory animus against white employees. Nor has plaintiff presented any evidence of a history or past practice of discrimination against white employees by defendant. Nonetheless, the record is susceptible to a reasonable determination that the defendant offered employees different severance packages on the basis of their race. Turnley, who like plaintiff is white, was also offered a smaller severance package. And, in addition to plaintiff's evidence relating to Mitchell, plaintiff also proffered similar evidence of a severance package involving more cash offered to Dobbins, a high-level black employee discharged a month and a half after plaintiff. 27 A trier of fact could reasonably determine on the basis of these facts that defendant decided on the basis of race to offer black employees more significant severance payments. Accordingly, the district court erred in ruling that plaintiff had proffered insufficient evidence to establish that she was treated differently on the basis of her race. We therefore remand for further proceedings on plaintiff's race discrimination claim.