Opinion ID: 764970
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Without Charge

Text: 9 The first prerequisite to applicability of the HRUS is that the landowner must not charge those entering onto his or her land for recreational use. See Haw. Rev. Stat. 520-5(2). The HRUS defines charge as the admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or permission to enter or go upon the land. See Haw. Rev. Stat. 520-2(4). 10 It is undisputed that the Government did not charge Howard or US Sailing a fee to enter upon or use the Harbor. It is also undisputed that the $ 175 fee that Howard paid to take the four-day sailing course was charged by, and paid exclusively to, US Sailing. 4 The Government did not receive any portion of this fee. Based on these undisputed facts, we hold that Howard was not charged an admission price or fee . . . in return for . . . permission to enter or go upon the [Government's] land. Haw. Rev. Stat. 520-2, 520-4, 520-5(2). 11 Our holding is consistent with those cases that have interpreted the HRUS. For example, in Viess v. Sea Enter., 634 F. Supp. 226, 226 (D. Haw. 1986), the plaintiff was injured while boogie-boarding off Wailea Beach. The plaintiff and his companions had stopped at a hotel for lunch and decided to go swimming before lunch. Id. at 227. They rented a boogie board from a concessionaire on the beach and took turns using the board while swimming. Id. The plaintiff went into the water with the board and while facing the shore, was struck from behind by a large wave which lifted him up and threw him on his head. The impact fractured his neck and rendered him quadriplegic. Id. 12 The plaintiff sued, among others, Wailea Development (Wailea), the owner of the shoreline property above the mean high-tide mark where the accident occurred. Id. The district court granted Wailea's motion for summary judgment on the basis of immunity under the HRUS. See id. at 229-32. 13 In response to the plaintiff's argument that Wailea has received economic benefit from allowing people to use the beach fronting its land, 5 the court stated: 14 [The charge] exception is much narrower than the general provision found in other recreational use statutes, which states that an owner may not escape liability where he receives consideration as a result of entry to his property. Such phrasing might permit the finding of liability where the defendant obtains some less obvious benefit from plaintiff's use of his land. 15 The Hawaii statute, in contrast, speaks only to the explicit quid pro quo arrangement whereby a landowner conditions admission to the land upon payment of a fee. In the instant case . . . from the time plaintiffs arrived at the hotel grounds to the time of the accident, the only fee solicited was from defendant [concessionaire] for the rental of the boogie board. That fee was in no way a prerequisite by Wailea for use of the public beach. Plaintiffs admit that defendant Wailea made no direct charge upon plaintiffs in return for access to the beach. The court, therefore, finds that the charge exception to [HRUS] immunity does not apply to defendant Wailea. 16 Id. at 229. 17 In Budde v. United States, 797 F. Supp. 731, 733 (N.D. Iowa 1991), the plaintiff was injured while sunbathing and swimming at the officer's club swimming pool at the Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, Hawaii. The plaintiff sued the Government to recover for the injuries she suffered. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Government, finding the Government immune from liability under the HRUS. Id. at 738. 18 The plaintiff argued that the Government was not immune under the HRUS because it had received a charge or fee. First, the plaintiff argued that the $ 6 perperson per night charge to stay at the Bachelor Officers' Quarters was a charge under the HRUS. Id. at 736. The court rejected this argument, stating: 19 This $ 6 fee was not a direct quid pro quo for the use of the swimming pool. In fact, [the plaintiff] was allowed the use of the pool because of her status as the dependent of an officer and not because she was paying to stay in her husband's quarters. She was eligible to use the pool regardless of where she was temporarily residing. 20 Id. 21 The district court similarly rejected plaintiff's second argument, that the sales of food and drink at the Officer's Club bar and restaurant constitutes an indirect charge for the use of the swimming pool. Id. at 737. 22 In the present case, as in both Viess and Budde, the Government did not charge Howard for the use of its property. The charge exception to HRUS immunity does not, therefore, apply. See Budde, 797 F. Supp. at 736-37; Viess, 634 F. Supp. at 229; see also Covington v. United States, 916 F. Supp. 1511, 1521 n.2 (D. Haw. 1996), aff'd, 119 F.3d 5 (9th Cir. 1997) (Although the Warrens paid to use the picnic area behind the beach, this fee does not trigger the charge exception because it was not a prerequisite to Joshua's entry onto the beach.). 23 Howard argues, however, that the Government imposed a charge within the meaning of the HRUS because she had to pay US Sailing $ 175 to take the course, and the Government received a direct financial benefit because US Sailing allowed two Government employees to take the course at a 50% discount. In so arguing, Howard misses the distinction between the two different types of recreational use statutes that have been passed in the various states: (1) charge or fee statutes and (2) consideration statutes.
24 Most states that have passed recreational use statutes have provided that the grant of immunity will not apply if the permission to enter the land for the recreational purpose was granted for a charge or fee. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. 18-11-305, 18-11-307; Colo. Rev. Stat. 33-41-103, 33-41-104; Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-557g, 52-557h; Del. Code. Ann. tit. 7, 5904, 5906; Fla. Stat. Ann. 375.251(2)(b); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, 477-4; Wash. Rev. Code 4.24.210. 25 Under these charge or fee statutes, most courts have declined to apply the exception to immunity unless an actual fee has been charged by the landowner for entry onto the land. For example, in Jones v. United States, 693 F.2d 1299, 1300 (9th Cir. 1982), the plaintiff was injured in Olympic National Park while snow-sliding on an inner tube she had rented from a concessionaire. The concessionaire, located in the park on Government property, paid the Government a fixed rental fee and a percentage of its gross receipts. Id. at 1303. 26 In holding that no fee had been charged which would deny the Government its immunity under Washington's recreational use statute, this court noted that members of the public were not charged a fee to enter onto the land or to use the land, and that the plaintiff could have used the slope or any other area of the park free of charge if she had brought her own tube. Id. at 1303-04. The fee that the plaintiff had paid was simply a fee for use of the tube, not for use of the Government's land. Id. at 1303. The Government was therefore immune from liability. See id. at 1303-04. 27 In Flohr v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 821 F. Supp. 301, 302 (E.D. Pa. 1993), the plaintiffs were fishing on the banks of a creek in a recreational area owned by the defendant when a tree fell and struck them. The fishing spot where the plaintiffs were injured was within the perimeter of the defendant's campground at which the plaintiffs were staying. Id. at 305. The court found that the defendant was entitled to immunity under Pennsylvania's recreational use statute despite the fact that the plaintiffs had paid a fee to use the campground. See id. at 305-06. 28 The court stated that its holding did not hinge upon what the fee paid by the [plaintiffs] covered or did not cover. Id. at 305. 29 Rather the . . . holding was based on the fact that the camping fee paid by plaintiffs was not a quid pro quo in exchange for permission to enter Otter Creek at the time plaintiffs were fishing. If plaintiffs had only come to Otter Creek for the day, it is undisputed that they could have used the recreational facilities and fished at the accident site free of charge. 30 Id. 31 In Zuk v. United States, 698 F. Supp. 1577, 1577 (S.D. Fla. 1988), the plaintiff was injured while visiting Fort Jefferson National Monument, a unit of the National Park System located in Florida. No fees were charged for entrance or admission to Fort Jefferson. Id. at 1578. The Government did charge a $ 50 biannual special use permit fee for chartered seaplanes and fishing and dive boats. Id. The Government did not, however, charge fees to boats bringing passengers to the Fort. Id. 32 The court held that the Government was immune from liability under Florida's recreational use statute. As to the plaintiff's argument that a charge was made because the air taxi service to the Fort charged $ 99 for a round trip, and the air taxi service (as well as twenty-five other boat and seaplane charterers) had to pay the Government a $ 50 biannual fee, the court stated: 33 This argument ignores the explicit language of the [charge exception]. There is no dispute that the [National Park Service], which operates Fort Jefferson, does not charge a fee for entry into the Park. The fact that licensing fees are charged to boat and seaplane charter operators or that fees are charged by private taxi services for transportation purposes does not change the fact that no charge is made for entering or using the park area. 34 Id. at 1582; see also Carlton v. Cleburne County, 93 F.3d 505, 510 (8th Cir. 1996) (Because there was no entrance fee, or any other fee of any kind, paid in the instant case, we conclude the 'charge' exception to [Arkansas's recreational use statute] does not apply.); Wilson v. United States, 989 F.2d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that $ 2 per person/per night fee paid by Boy Scout troop to spend the night at Army military post was not a charge to enter onto the land or for use of the land and therefore did not fall within the charge exception); Kirkland v. United States, 930 F. Supp. 1443, 1446 (D. Colo. 1996) (The [charge] definition suggests a quid pro quo arrangement whereby the owner conditions entry on the land upon payment of a fee.).
35 Other states have passed recreational use statutes that do not extend immunity to landowners where the permission to enter the land for the recreational purpose was granted for a consideration. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code 846; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 212:34(III)(c); N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:42A-4(b); Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.510(3)(a)(2). The use of the term consideration in these statutes suggests that the legislatures intended a broad reading of the exception to immunity. See Ducey v. United States, 713 F.2d 504, 510 (9th Cir. 1983). Under the consideration statutes, almost any form of benefit to the landowner will act to trigger the immunity exception. 36 For example, in Ducey, we held that the Government's receipt of 1-3/4% of a concessionaire's gross annual receipts from sales at a cafe-store and from boat slip and trailer space rentals located in a national recreational area owned by the Government were sufficient to be consideration under the Nevada recreational use statute immunity exception. See id. at 507, 514. This was true even though the plaintiffs had not paid a fee or charge to enter the recreational area. See id. at 507; see also Collins v. Martella, 17 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1994) (interpreting New Hampshire's recreational use statute immunity exception as requiring the defendant to somehow benefit from the consideration); Hallacker v. National Bank & Trust Co., 806 F.2d 488, 489-492 (3d Cir. 1986) (interpreting New Jersey's recreational use statute immunity exception as applying and thus not immunizing a landowner that was paid consideration by a friend of the plaintiff); Casas v. United States, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1105-08 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (interpreting California's recreational use statute to immunize the Government where the plaintiff, who had entered onto the Marine Corps Air Station to participate in a 5K race that was open to the public, did not have to pay consideration to enter onto the base and had not yet paid the $ 20 entry fee for the race at the time of her injury).
37 The HRUS clearly falls within the charge or fee category of recreational use statutes. As stated previously, the HRUS extends immunity to landowners who allow others to use their land without charge. See Haw. Rev. Stat. 520-4, 520-5(2). The HRUS defines charge as the admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or permission to enter or go upon the land. Haw. Rev. Stat. 520-2(4). This is the same definition that is used by several other states in their charge statutes. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-557f(1) ('Charge' means the admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or permission to enter or go upon the land.); Del. Code. Ann. tit. 7, 5902(4) (same); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, 477-2(4) (same); see also Colo. Rev. Stat. 33-41-102(1) ('Charge' means a consideration paid for entry upon or use of the land or any facilities thereon or adjacent thereto.). 38 Howard's reliance on cases interpreting consideration statutes in support of her argument that she was charged a fee is misplaced. As we have previously recognized, the consideration exception is much broader than the charge or fee exception: 39 The language of the consideration exception itself suggests a broad reading. . . . The exception is worded not in narrow terms of fee or charge, but rather in the far more encompassing terms, for a consideration. Consideration is a term of art, a word with a well-understood meaning in the law, embracing any right, interest, profit or benefit. Used in a statute, it should be accorded that meaning. The statutory exception, then, is itself literally applicable to situations well beyond those involving a strict charging of a fee for permission to recreate. 40 Ducey, 713 F.2d at 510 (citations and footnote omitted). 41 The interpretation of the various recreational use statutes is controlled by the precise language of each statute. Wilson, 989 F.2d at 956. Thus, the only cases that will be applicable in analyzing the charge exception to the HRUS are cases interpreting statutes with the same language, i.e., the charge statutes. We therefore look only to those cases interpreting charge statutes in determining whether the Government is entitled to immunity under the HRUS and reject Howard's arguments that rely on cases interpreting consideration statutes. 42 In summary, we agree with the district court: 43 It is not enough [under the HRUS] for a landowner to have received a benefit in return for a third-party's privilege to charge people. 44 [ ] Here, MWR did not charge the Plaintiff or US Sailing for entry onto the land. Although MWR did receive a reduced fee for two of its employees, Plaintiff was paying for a service provided by US Sailing, similar to the services provided by the surf board concessionaires in Viess, or the inner tube renters in Jones. 45 [ ] The statute's purpose prevents a private landowner who allows the public onto its land from actually running a business or other venture for commercial profit, injuring someone and then disclaiming liability. It is clear that even on the day in question, the Government itself did not charge anyone for the use of its facility, and in fact, could have made money if it had charged US Sailing. 46 Because the Government did not impose a charge or fee for Howard to enter upon and use Hickam Harbor, Howard's use of the Government's property was without charge under the HRUS. 47