Opinion ID: 2587884
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Availability of Injunction for Improper Use

Text: Winkel uses this issue to attack our long-standing precedent, recently reiterated in Schuck, 286 Kan. at 24, 180 P.3d 571, that injunctive relief will not be granted if there is an adequate remedy at law. Winkel argues that, as a practical matter, such a rule precludes injunctive relief ever being granted in a condemnation proceeding, because all takings are compensable with money damages. Accordingly, Winkel warns us that the practical result of the adequate remedy at law rule is that condemning agencies will have no incentive to comply with the eminent domain statutes because they can just do whatever they want, so long as they pay value for any property wrongfully taken. KDOT counters that this court has, in fact, enjoined the inappropriate use of eminent domain by a public utility, citing to McGinnis v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 231 Kan. 672, 647 P.2d 1313 (1982). In McGinnis, this court held that if the utility could not show compliance with statutory regulations for exercising its power of eminent domain, the injunctive relief issued by the district court should remain in place. 231 Kan. at 685, 647 P.2d 1313. We decline Winkel's invitation to engage in a theoretical debate on the public policy considerations of declining to grant injunctive relief in hypothetical scenarios. This case does not present an indiscriminate and obviously wrongful taking for an unnecessary purpose. Indeed, the case highlights the rationale for exercising restraint in granting injunctive relief. Before Winkel acquired ownership of the triangle tract, it was encumbered by an easement for highway right of way purposes. KDOT had a legally established dominant estate in the property, whereas Winkel's interest was the servient estate. One might be curious whether Winkel's predecessor in title received compensation for that easement equivalent to the total fair market value of the 1.52 acres in 1952, i.e., whether the landowner has already been fully paid for the land. Nevertheless, KDOT's use of the triangle tract to support its mixing strip was based upon a claimed legal right, emanating from its existing easement, which was neither frivolous nor contrary to any existing case precedent. In such a circumstance, the appropriate and legally sound remedy for KDOT's misreading of its legal rights to the property is to pay the landowner such additional compensation as may be appropriate for the increase in burden on the servient estate occasioned by the change in its use. Likewise, both parties were laboring under the misconception that the access tract was dedicated to the public's use as a roadway, i.e., Winkel was not possessing or using that land. To Winkel, the only practical change in circumstances is that KDOT will have the sole right to use the roadway, instead of everyone using it as such. Under that scenario, Winkel cannot show that irreparable future injury is likely; that his injury, if any, outweighs the damage of an injunction; or that the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. See Schuck, 286 Kan. at 24, 180 P.3d 571. To the contrary, any money damages Winkel receives for the .45 acre, half a roadway, will be more than an adequate remedy. In short, Winkel has not persuaded us that we need to change the entire body of law in this State that makes the existence of an adequate remedy at law a factor in assessing whether injunctive relief is appropriate.