Opinion ID: 575203
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Propriety of Summary Judgment Grant

Text: 29 We address below each issue in the district court's grant of summary judgment. However, Hartford also argues that the grant of summary judgment was improper and unfair in a more general sense. 30 Hartford claims that summary judgment was awarded precipitously, on issues not briefed by either party. Quoting Cool Fuel, Inc. v. Connett, 685 F.2d 309, 312 (9th Cir.1982), it argues that it has been deprived of a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues involved in the motion. 31 In the Notice of its Motion for Summary Judgment, Intel presented the grounds for its motion thus: 32 This motion is made on the grounds that the insurance coverage issues raised by this Motion are issues of law, proper for adjudication by summary judgment, and that insurance coverage exists under the comprehensive general liability policy of insurance issued by HARTFORD to INTEL for INTEL's reasonable and necessary costs incurred in the investigation and clean-up of the hazardous chemicals where INTEL undertook the investigation and cleanup in order to prevent or mitigate claims or possible claims of personal injury or property damage to third parties. 33 Intel described the issues on which it sought decision in expansive terms. Yet the Notice clearly advised Hartford that Intel sought an answer to the broad question of whether insurance coverage exists under the policy. As its opinion shows, to answer this question the district court was required to answer a number of smaller questions. Neither party chose to break the broad question down and focus on every one of these sub-questions in its brief. However, Hartford cannot complain that it was not warned of what was at stake in the summary judgment, and that it had no opportunity fully to present its position. 3 34 Hartford also suggests that summary judgment was improper because it did not have sufficient opportunity to conduct discovery and develop the facts in the case. Yet Intel filed its original suit against Hartford in May, 1986. It had first notified Hartford of contamination problems at the Middlefield Road site in 1981. Hartford thus had ample time to undertake more informal factfinding and, once the suit was filed, to conduct formal discovery. Hartford has not been shortchanged on discovery. See Beneficial Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Madariaga, 851 F.2d 271, 277 (9th Cir.1988) (affirming summary judgment where there was more than six months between appellant's initial appearance and grant of summary judgment). Additionally, if it could have identified specific information it needed to respond adequately to the summary judgment motion, Hartford could have moved for a continuance of discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). 35 Thus, because Hartford had sufficient notice of what was to be decided, and opportunity to conduct discovery or request additional time for discovery, we find no merit in its claims of unfairness. 36