Opinion ID: 1738234
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the withrow matter

Text: With respect to the first-degree murder charge in the Withrow murder, we are faced with a somewhat different situation. Initially, the defendant was charged with the Withrow murder in Federal court. After an investigation disclosed a lack of Federal jurisdiction, the charge was dropped. Three days prior to the date on which the Federal charge was dismissed, defendant filed his petition in the state court requesting a criminal sexual psychopath determination in connection with the Brown murder. Although a murder charge in the Withrow matter was pending at the time the criminal sexual psychopath petition was filed, the charge had been brought in the Federal court rather than in the state circuit court. Consequently, later criminal prosecution of the defendant for the Withrow murder was not barred by § 8 of the Criminal Sexual Psychopath Act which provides: No person who is found in such original hearing to be a criminal sexual psychopathic person and such finding having become final, may thereafter be tried or sentenced upon the offense with which he originally stood charged, or convicted, in the committing court at the time of the filing of the original petition. (Emphasis supplied.) Although § 8 of the repealed Criminal Sexual Psychopath Act does not bar the prosecution of the defendant for the Withrow murder, principles of due process [9] may require dismissal of the charge against him if there is evidence that an unjustified delay between the commission of the offense and the filing of the information substantially prejudiced his right to a fair trial. United States v Marion, 404 US 307, 324-326; 92 S Ct 455; 30 L Ed 2d 468 (1971); United States v Feinberg, 383 F2d 60 (CA 2, 1967); Woody v United States, 125 US App DC 192; 370 F2d 214 (1966); Ross v United States, 121 US App DC 233; 349 F2d 210 (1965). In 1967, before the final criminal sexual psychopath determination was made in his case, the defendant, apparently recognizing the inapplicability of the § 8 bar to prosecution in the Withrow matter, filed a pleading in the Washtenaw Circuit Court notifying the court that the Federal charge had been dropped in the Withrow case and demanding a speedy trial in both the Withrow and the Brown cases. Despite this request and the fact that the Washtenaw County prosecutor already had possession of defendant's confession in the Withrow murder, the prosecutor did not charge defendant with Withrow's murder until January 17, 1975, almost eight years later, more than a year and a half after his parole from confinement as a criminal sexual psychopath. Apparently the prosecutor reasoned that as long as the defendant was detained pursuant to a commitment as a criminal sexual psychopath, there was no practical benefit to the prosecution to pursue the Withrow matter. Aside from this practical consideration the prosecutor suggests no justification for his failure to file charges against Nuss, especially in view of Nuss' demand to be speedily tried for the Withrow killing. As discussed above, § 8 of the Criminal Sexual Psychopath Act did not bar the institution of criminal proceedings nor is there any allegation on the part of the prosecutor that there was insufficient evidence upon which to proceed. In fact, given the strength of the case which derives from the defendant's detailed confession, the prosecutor had little to lose from the delay. In view of the foregoing, we are persuaded that the lengthy delay between the offense and the filing of the information was unjustifiable. Against this backdrop of unjustifiable delay we review the record for a showing of prejudice to defendant by reason thereof. United States v Marion, supra, at 325; United States v Feinberg, supra, at 65. The witnesses who testified at the preliminary examination concerning defendant's confession admitted that they could not recall many of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's statement, including the number of police officers who were present. In addition, Dr. Alexander Dukay, one of the psychiatrists who examined defendant and testified at defendant's criminal sexual psychopath hearing, is now deceased. While the prosecutor argues that Dr. Dukay's transcribed testimony would be admissible at a subsequent murder trial under MRE 804(b)(1) as former testimony, it is not at all clear that he is correct. [10] Even if it be assumed that Dr. Dukay's testimony is now admissible, its probative value is minimal. Dr. Dukay testified at the Criminal Sexual Psychopath Act hearing that Nuss was reacting to an irresistible impulse, a form of insanity. But there was absolutely no development of that point and no defense motive to develop it since a finding of insanity would have precluded a determination that Nuss was a criminal sexual psychopath under the act. Consequently, the witness was not examined fully upon a matter which would now be absolutely crucial to a successful defense. The purpose for which Dr. Dukay's expertise was sought and his testimony received in 1967 was wholly different than would be the case today. Moreover, as experienced trial attorneys are so well aware, the probative force of the testimony of an expert being examined and cross-examined before the jury is immeasurably greater than that which is generated by the reading of an eight-year-old transcript of his testimony dealing with a distinctly different aspect of the defendant's mental state. For all practical purposes, Dr. Dukay's death has deprived the defendant of probably favorable testimony crucial to his defense. There can be little question that any expert opinion testimony concerning the defendant's 1967 mental state which is obtained and presented in 1979 is of severely diminished value. As Judge Bazelon observed in Williams v United States, 102 US App DC 51; 250 F2d 19, 23 (1957): Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult. When the fact at issue is as subtle as a mental state, the difficulty is immeasurably enhanced. See, also, Dickey v Florida, 398 US 30, 40; 90 S Ct 1564; 26 L Ed 2d 26 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). When the passage of time is eight years, during which the subject has undergone six years of treatment and has been pronounced recovered, the difficulty of proof of the earlier mental state is still greater. Finally, and most importantly, if the defendant had been charged with the murder of Withrow within a reasonable time after the commission of the offense, he would in all likelihood have successfully invoked the provisions of the now repealed Criminal Sexual Psychopath Act and future criminal proceedings on the Withrow charge would have been barred by § 8 of the repealed act. Record evidence suggests that the circumstances surrounding both murders were extremely similar and Nuss had already been found to be a criminal sexual psychopath in connection with the Brown murder. As the situation now stands, defendant is denied statutory protections which otherwise would have been available to him. In so doing we conclude that the defendant was substantially prejudiced by the eight-year delay. This prejudice to defendant was the direct consequence of the prosecutor's failure to reasonably charge defendant with the Withrow murder. We hold that the substantial prejudice resulting from the unjustifiable delay in commencing criminal proceedings against the defendant precludes a trial on the Withrow matter. The Court of Appeals is affirmed. COLEMAN, C.J., and KAVANAGH, WILLIAMS,