Opinion ID: 626014
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Seizure of the Keys

Text: Cowan concedes Detective Canas was permitted to detain and pat him down during the warranted search of the premises, but contends the search exceeded the constitutional bounds set by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005) (noting officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority `to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted' (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981))); United States v. Horton, 611 F.3d 936, 940-41 (8th Cir.2010) (Once a suspect is legally stopped, `an officer who has reason to believe the detained individual may be armed and dangerous may conduct a pat-down search for weapons to ensure officer safety.' (quoting United States v. Davis, 457 F.3d 817, 822 (8th Cir.2006))). The officers were executing a warrant at a place of suspected drug trafficking where weapons may have been present, and the officers were outnumbered by the suspects. Detective Canas could detain Cowan, temporarily handcuff Cowan, and pat Cowan down. A police officer lawfully pat[ting] down a suspect's outer clothing may seize any object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent as incriminating evidence. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993); United States v. Bustos-Torres, 396 F.3d 935, 944 (8th Cir.2005) (holding the plain feel exception of Dickerson applies to any incriminating evidence, not just contraband). The Supreme Court noted in Texas v. Brown that the phrase immediately apparent is misleading (very likely an unhappy choice of words) because it can be taken to imply that an unduly high degree of certainty as to the incriminatory character of evidence is necessary for an application of the `plain view' doctrine. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (plurality opinion). The Supreme Court clarified that an item's incriminatory nature is immediately apparent if the officer at that moment had probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity, id. at 741-42, 103 S.Ct. 1535 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)), meaning the facts available to the officer would `warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime. Id. at 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925)). It does not require any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false. A `practical, nontechnical' probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required. Id. (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)). When Detective Canas felt the keys in Cowan's front pocket, Detective Canas was justified in reaching into Cowan's pocket and seizing the keys (and the attached key fob) because Detective Canas immediately recognized the object as keys and the warrant specifically authorized seizing keys as indicia of occupancy or ownership of the premises. [2] The situation here was unlike Dickerson, in which the Supreme Court refused to validate a search and seizure where an officer conducting a Terry frisk determined a small, hard lump was crack cocaine only after squeezing, sliding, and otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant's pocket. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 378, 113 S.Ct. 2130. Here, Detective Canas did not conduct any further search ... not authorized by Terry or by any other exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 379, 113 S.Ct. 2130. At the time Detective Canas felt the keys in Cowan's pocket, Detective Canas reasonably could have believed the keys were apartment keys and, therefore, covered by the warrant. The district court excluded the keys because it found other than [Cowan's] mere presence at the home, officers had no reason to suspect that [Cowan's] keys were evidence of a crime. Mere presence in a location to be searched does not create probable cause. The district court relied on Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91-92, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979), in which the Supreme Court held mere presence as a patron in a public tavern at the time a search warrantauthorizing a search of the tavern and a bartender for controlled substanceswas executed did not give officers probable cause to search patrons. However, the Supreme Court later rejected an attempt to use the Ybarra reasoning and holding to invalidate the search of a car passenger during a traffic stop. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 372-73, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003) (deciding a reasonable officer who finds cocaine in a car could conclude that there was probable cause to believe [one of the car's occupants] committed the crime of possession of cocaine). In Pringle, the Supreme Court distinguished Ybarra, explaining a car passengerunlike the unwitting tavern patron in Ybarra will often be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing.... [I]t was reasonable for an officer to infer a common enterprise among the three men [in the car]. Id. at 373, 124 S.Ct. 795 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 304-05, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Sixth Circuit applied the probable cause reasoning of Pringle to officers arresting a man they found in a hotel room, whom they believed was associated with drug trafficking. See United States v. Romero, 452 F.3d 610, 617-18 (6th Cir. 2006). The Sixth Circuit noted: Like the enclosed space of the automobile in which the individuals were arrested in Pringle, the relatively small and confined space of the hotel room supports the conclusion that it was reasonable for the officers to infer from the facts known to them at the time of the arrest that [the defendant] was involved in a common illegal-drug enterprise with [another man who instructed an undercover police officer to come to the hotel room to buy drugs]. The officers had reasonably trustworthy information... that led the arresting officers to believe that the hotel room had been reserved and was being utilized for the purposes of drug dealing. It was reasonable for the officers to infer that [the defendant] was involved in the drug-dealing enterprise that was being conducted out of the hotel room, because drug dealing is an enterprise to which a dealer would be unlikely to admit an innocent person with the potential to furnish evidence against him. Id. at 618 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373, 124 S.Ct. 795). In Cowan's case, the officers had a warrant to search Booth's apartment based upon information that drug trafficking was occurring there. As with the car in Pringle and the hotel room in Romero, the officers had probable cause to believe Cowan, who was present in the apartment, was engaged in a common drug trafficking enterprise with the apartment's occupants. Cowan was unlike the unwitting tavern patron in Ybarra, whose reasons for being at the public tavern during the search probably were not connected to any illegal activity taking place at the tavern. See Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91, 100 S.Ct. 338; Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373, 124 S.Ct. 795. Cowan's presence in Booth's apartment, unlike the patron in the public tavern in Ybarra and more like the passenger in the private car in Pringle or the hotel room occupant in Romero, could lead a reasonable officer to infer [Cowan was part of] a common enterprise among the people in the apartment. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373, 124 S.Ct. 795. Although an apartment is a larger and more multipurpose space, Romero, 452 F.3d at 618 n. 2, than the hotel room in Romero, Detective Canas had additional reason to suspect Cowan was involved in the drug trafficking activity. After breaking down the exterior door to the building and before entering the apartment, the officers saw someone running inside, which reasonably suggested people present in the apartment were trying to conceal evidence of drug trafficking activity. When Cowan stated he was from Chicagothe reputed source of the crack cocaine used in the suspected drug trafficking operation occurring in the apartmentCowan gave Detective Canas particularized suspicion that Cowan himself was involved in the drug trafficking. The present case is further distinguishable from Ybarra because Detective Canas frisked Cowan's outer clothing pursuant to Terry, and the search of Ybarra was not a valid Terry frisk. See Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 92-93, 100 S.Ct. 338. Detective Canas did not violate Cowan's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by patting down Cowan's pockets and seizing the keys.