Opinion ID: 2595616
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The claim of equitable estoppel.

Text: Four elements are required in order to establish a claim for equitable estoppel: 1) there must be a false representation or concealment of a material fact made with actual or constructive knowledge of the truth; 2) the party asserting estoppel did not and could not have discovered the truth; 3) there was intent that the misrepresentation be relied upon; and 4) the party asserting estoppel relied upon the misrepresentation or concealment to his or her prejudice. Willig v. State, Dept. of Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 259, 261, 899 P.2d 969, 971 (1995); Tommerup v. Albertson's, Inc., 101 Idaho 1, 5, 607 P.2d 1055, 1059 (1980). All of the above factors are of equal importance and there can be no estoppel absent any of the elements. Tommerup, 101 Idaho at 6, 607 P.2d at 1060. Trinity reserved the right to make changes to the pension plan and to correct mistakes. The Summary Plan states that, Holy Cross Resources, Inc. reserves the right to terminate any kind of benefit not protected by law, or change or end this plan at any time, in its sole discretion. It cannot be said that Trinity made a false representation or concealment by attempting to enforce the language of the Plan when it discovered the Summary could be interpreted to incorrectly state the Plan's eligibility requirements for early retirement benefits. Sorensen was on notice that her retirement benefits were governed by the Plan and subject to modification. There is a flaw in the conclusion that Sorensen reasonably relied to her detriment on any representations made by Trinity. The interpretation of the Summary Plan resulted in a benefit flowing to Sorensen, i.e., the ability to receive early retirement benefits while continuing to work part-time. She was not entitled to this benefit under the Plan. She received a benefit, not a prejudice, by misinterpretation of the Plan. Sorensen was not prejudiced by Trinity's action and is unable to establish the fourth element of equitable estoppel.
Trinity has never asked that Sorensen return the early retirement benefits she received for nearly two years. Trinity seeks to enforce the terms of the Plan and correct the error it made in the Summary Plan. Trinity's desire to adhere to the terms of the contract between the parties, and in doing so protect the Plan from adverse action by the IRS, does not breach that contract. The summary judgment in favor of Sorensen on her breach of contract claim was improper. Summary judgment should have been granted in favor of Trinity. Sorensen's claim of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing fails since that claim depended for its existence on the success of Sorensen's contract claim.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Sorensen on claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence. To establish a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, plaintiff must establish that defendants owed plaintiff a fiduciary duty and that the fiduciary duty was breached. Tolley v. THI Co., 140 Idaho 253, 261, 92 P.3d 503, 511 (2004). In cases governed by ERISA, it is clear that a plan administrator is a fiduciary to plan participants and has a duty to provide full and accurate information to them. Abbruscato v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 274 F.3d 90, 102-03 (2nd Cir.2001). The Holy Cross Retirement Plan is a church plan and exempt from ERISA, but both the Plan and the Summary Plan refer to fiduciary obligations to the plan and to participants. Section 11.4 of the Plan, beginning at page 43, states: Neither the Plan Administrator, Plan Sponsor, Employer, Trustees, or any agent thereof or other party charged with responsibility under the Plan shall be liable for its own act, or failure to act, unless such individual or organization has caused actual loss to the Plan or to a Participant or beneficiary by failing properly to discharge a fiduciary duty or responsibility expressly imposed upon such individual or organization. The Summary Plan also states, [t]he people who are responsible for the operation of the Retirement Plan are called `fiduciaries' of the plan. They have a duty to operate your plan prudently and in the interest of you and other plan participants and beneficiaries. There was a fiduciary relationship between Trinity and Sorensen. Arguably Trinity breached a fiduciary duty to Sorensen. Trinity created the Summary Plan, which conflicted with the Plan, and interpreted the Summary Plan to provide early retirement benefits to Sorensen while she continued to work part-time. Trinity failed to provide Sorensen with complete and accurate information about her retirement benefits by drafting a Summary Plan that seemed to allow her to continue working part-time and then providing her with benefits to which she was not entitled for two years. The fact is she received more than she was entitled to receive. She was offered the option to lay off work for four months and then return to work part-time with her retirement benefits. She was an employee at will who could have been terminated in any event. Any loss of money during that four months was more than offset by the two years of benefits she received as a consequence of the misinformation she was provided. While it is not dispositive of Sorensen's right to recover, it is clear that Trinity had the obligation to proceed as it did once the mistake was discovered. It has a fiduciary duty to all participants in the Plan. Failure to rectify the error would have endangered the qualified status of the Plan with the IRS which would adversely impact other beneficiaries in violation of Trinity's duty to protect the Plan. With respect to Sorensen's negligence claim, summary judgment in her favor was also improper. In Gibson v. Hardy, 109 Idaho 247, 250, 706 P.2d 1358, 1361 (Ct.App.1985), the Court of Appeals noted that, [n]egligence arises out of some duty imposed by law, irrespective of any contract. Citing Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho 133, 483 P.2d 664 (1971). The court continued by stating that, `one owes the duty to every person in our society to use reasonable care to avoid injury to the other person in any situation in which it could be reasonably anticipated or foreseen that a failure to use such care might result in such injury.' Id. (quoting Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619, 619 P.2d 135, 137 (1980) (emphasis omitted)). In determining whether a party is negligent, his or her conduct is judged against that of an ordinarily prudent person acting under the same conditions and circumstances. Id. Trinity owed a duty to Sorensen that existed outside of their contract to use reasonable care in providing her with accurate information regarding her retirement benefits. It was negligent to provide Sorensen with inaccurate information in the Summary Plan and in the Benefits Specialist's interpretation of the Summary Plan. However, again, she received more benefits than those to which she was entitled. She was an employee at will. She had no contractual right to employment for the four-month period. The negligence was not a proximate cause of damage. Sorensen had choices. She could terminate her employment with St. Al's for a period of four months and receive the retirement benefits, after which time she could return to part time employment with retirement benefits. She could work full time without retirement benefits for approximately a year and then work full time, part time, or not at all and receive greater retirement benefits. After receiving benefits to which she was not entitled for two years it cannot be said that Trinity's negligence caused her damage.

When it appears to the reviewing court that the verdict is either not supported by substantial and competent evidenceor is against the clear weight of the evidence or, in other words, if upon its review of the evidence in the record the reviewing court determines that reasonable minds could not differ on issues of factthen those issues become questions of law upon which the court may freely rule. Boel v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 137 Idaho 9, 12, 43 P.3d 768, 771 (2002). What remains in this case is the claim for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. The initial act of misadvising Sorensen of her retirement/employment rights did not cause her emotional distress. It was the subsequent act of attempting to correct that misinformation. Sorensen testified about insomnia, anxiety, headaches and gastric problems. The fundamental problem in this claim is that Sorensen was an employee at will who could be terminated at any time with or without cause absent a violation of public policy. No violation of public policy is implicated in this case. She had no guarantee of part-time employment while she received retirement benefits. She cannot obtain emotional distress damages for being offered the option of leaving employment for four months when St. Al's could simply terminate her with no explanation. It appears that after the mistake was discovered she was actually offered more than she was ever entitled to  retirement and a job after a four-month break in employment with St. Al's. She cannot convert an employment at will into a guarantee of employment and obtain emotional distress damages for being told she needed to terminate employment with St. Al's for four months to continue receiving early retirement benefits.