Opinion ID: 2823797
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The 404(b) Evidenceâs Danger of Unfair Prejudice Was High

Text: Â¶26Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The court of appeals determined that the trial court in this case improperly admitted unfairly prejudicial 404(b) evidence for the purpose of showing Perezâs intent to commit sexual assault for the enticement count only. When applying the four-part Spoto test, the court of appeals reasoned that the first Spoto factor was satisfied because the trial court admitted O.D.âs testimony to prove Perezâs intent to sexually assault C.B., which goes to an element of the enticement count. Perez, slip op. at 8. The court determined, however, that under the second Spoto factor, the 404(b) evidence has little logical relevance to Perezâs intent to sexually assault C.B. because the prior incidents with O.D. âare so dissimilar to the facts of the charged crime that [their] probative value, if any, was minimal.â Id. at 8â9. Thus, the court of appeals concluded that the fourth Spoto factor was not satisfied because the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the evidenceâs ânegligible probative value.â Id. at 9. Because the evidence did not satisfy the fourth Spoto factor, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court abused its discretion. 5 Id. Furthermore, the court of appeals held that the erroneous admission was not harmless because âthere is a reasonable probability that the prior acts evidence contributed to [Perezâs] conviction for enticement.â Id. at 9â10. The court of appeals therefore reversed Perezâs enticement-of-a-child conviction andÂ remanded the case to the trial court on that count. Id. at 1. The prosecution elected not to seek certiorari review on this issue. Â¶27Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â While the People did not appeal whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence of Perezâs prior incidents with O.D., we nevertheless need to consider the evidenceâs prejudicial nature in light of its minimal probative value. Even though Rule 404(b) has no requirement of similarity, its probative value may include factors such as the other actsâ âdistinctivenessâ and âtheir relationship to the charged offense in terms of time and similarity.â Rath, 44 P.3d at 1041. Here, as the court of appeals correctly noted, there was a âsubstantial dissimilarityâ between the facts of the 404(b) evidence and the facts of the charged crimes. Perez, slip op. at 9. Unlike C.B., O.D. testified that Perez did not sexually assault her, did not touch her, and did not offer her any drugs. O.D. acknowledged that she was âafraidâ of Perez but did not testify as to what she thought would happen had she not sought help. Though Perezâs behavior was disturbing, intrusive, and resulted in a stalking conviction, it is important to note that he was never charged with a sexual offense for these incidents. Additionally, C.B.âs testimony concerning the alleged offenses lacked most of theÂ Â âdistinctivenessâ of Perezâs prior incidents with O.D. O.D. testified that Perez brought herÂ flowers and peered in her window on multiple occasions. C.B. never mentioned flowers or Perez looking in her window. The only common distinctive feature among O.D.âs and C.B.âs testimonies was that Perez complimented both on their appearances. Moreover, while O.D. testified as to multiple encounters with Perez over a period of time, C.B. met Perez only once. Therefore, based on these factors, the 404(b) evidence was only minimally probative of his intent to commit sexual assault on C.B. and wasÂ little more than propensity evidence. Â¶28Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In contrast, the 404(b) evidenceâs danger of unfair prejudice was high. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, such as O.D.âs testimony concerning her prior incidents with Perez, âhas a distinct and unmistakable potential for unfair prejudice.â Rath, 44 P.3d at 1043. Unfair prejudice refers to ââan undue tendency on the part of admissible evidence to suggest a decision made on an improper basis.ââ Id. at 1043 (quoting People v. Gibbens, 905 P.2d 604, 608 (Colo. 1995)). In this case, the 404(b) evidence portrayed Perez as âundesirable,â Kaufman, 202 P.3d at 552, and likely biased the jury against Perez and the defenseâs theory of the case because of how it portrayed Perezâs character. See People v. Dist. Court, 869 P.2d 1281, 1286 (Colo. 1994) (ââUnfair prejudice refers to the tendency of the proposed evidence to adversely affect the objecting partyâs position by injecting considerations extraneous to the merits of the lawsuit, such as the juryâs bias, sympathy, anger or shock.ââ (quoting People v. Goree, 349 N.W.2d 220, 225Â (Mich. Ct. App. 1984))). As a result, there is a strong possibility that the evidence influenced the jury to convict Perez for the count of enticement of a child for an improper purpose. Therefore, even though trial courts retain significant discretion under the fourth prong of the Spoto test, and reviewing courts must give the evidence its maximum probative value and minimum unfair prejudice, Rath, 44 P.3d at 1043, the 404(b) evidenceâs danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed any probative value that the evidence had concerning Perezâs intent to commit sexual assault on C.B.Â Â¶29Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â We now turn our attention to the impact the improper 404(b) evidence had on the two remaining convictions.