Opinion ID: 2321422
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Public Trust Rights in the Intertidal Zone

Text: [¶ 33] Just as solidly established, however, is the public's uninterrupted right to make appropriate use of those lands. See Marshall, 93 Me. at 536, 45 A. at 498. As was clarified in 1845, the upland owner has no exclusive right to the portion of the flats on which there is no wharf or pier, and the public have the same rights to the open space, which they had before, provided they do not interfere with his permanent erections. Deering v. Proprietors of Long Wharf, 25 Me. 51, 65 (1845). [¶ 34] Thus, neither the establishment of private ownership rights through the Colonial Ordinance, nor the consequent recognition in common law of private ownership rights, has diminished the public trust rights in the intertidal lands. See Gerrish v. Proprietors of Union Wharf, 26 Me. 384, 392 (1847). The challenge, of course, has been to define the extent of the public activities that are subsumed within the trust. We explored this question extensively in Bell II, in both the majority and the dissent, see 557 A.2d at 173, 185, and we do so again here because declaring the parameters of the common law requires review and evaluation of past uses to provide a context for current uses. See Pendexter, 363 A.2d at 749 (Dufresne, C.J., concurring). [¶ 35] Important to this analysis is our conclusion that nothing in the Colonial Ordinance, or the pronouncements of the common law that followed in the decades after the expiration of the Ordinance, evidenced an intent to change or limit the jus publicum  the public's rights in the intertidal landsexcept to the extent that those rights might interfere with the right of the landowner to wharf out. See Storer, 6 Mass. at 438; see also Marshall, 93 Me. at 536, 45 A. at 498; Gerrish, 26 Me. at 392 (The right to use the waters covering flats between high and low water marks, for the purposes of navigation, was not intended to be abridged by the ordinance of 1641.); Lapish, 8 Me. at 93. [¶ 36] These uses reserved to the public before the adoption of the Colonial Ordinance were described in various ways. As Sir Matthew Hale described them, For the jus privatum of the owner or proprietor is charged with and subject to that jus publicum which belongs to the king's subjects; as the soil of an highway is, which though in point of property it may be a private man's freehold, yet it is charged with a publick interest of the people, which may not be prejudiced or damnified. Sir Matthew Hale, A TREATISE, IN THREE PARTS. PARS PRIMA: De Jure Maris et Brachiorum ejusdem. From a Manuscript of Lord Chief-Justice Hale 13, 35 (Francis Hargrave ed., 1st ed. 1787). [¶ 37] Were it not for the specific and somewhat contradictory language contained in our most recent discussion of the public's rights, see Bell II, 557 A.2d at 173, we would have no difficulty in determining that the judicially accepted expansive definition of the public's rights would readily accommodate the right to walk across the intertidal zone to scuba dive. Indeed, well before Bell II, our courts had consistently acknowledged that the public trust rights in the intertidal land adapted to reflect the realities of use in each era. See id. at 173 & n. 16; Marshall, 93 Me. at 536-37, 45 A. at 498. [¶ 38] Until our decision in Bell II, 557 A.2d at 173, we had never treated the language of the Colonial Ordinance as permanently defining or circumscribing the sum of the public's rights to the intertidal zone. For example, the Colonial Ordinance referred to the right of free fishing as available to Everie Inhabitant who is an hous-holder. See Whittlesey, Law of the Seashore, Tidewaters and Great Ponds in Massachusetts and Maine at xxxvi; see also Duncan v. Sylvester, 24 Me. 482, 486 (1844); Parker v. Cutler Milldam Co., 20 Me. 353, 357-58 (1841). Later, however, we construed the right as one belonging not just to householders but also to the public. See Andrews, 124 Me. at 363-64, 129 A. at 299; Marshall, 93 Me. at 536-37, 45 A. at 498 ([T]he public may enjoy all these rights in common with the owner [of intertidal land].). We similarly declined to give effect to the language of the Colonial Ordinance that restricts free fishing to locations within the precincts of the town where [householders] dwell. See State v. Leavitt, 105 Me. 76, 80-82, 72 A. 875, 877-78 (1909) (upholding legislation that excepted inhabitants of towns from restrictions on clamming, but noting that, where towns did not issue permits or otherwise take action, there is free fishing for every one). [¶ 39] Just as we have not treated the Colonial Ordinance as defining or restricting which member of the public would receive the benefit of the jus publicum, we had not, until Bell II, restricted the activities allowed by the jus publicum to the specific references in the Colonial Ordinance: free fishing and fowling, and unhindered passage of boats or other vessels. The Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts at 35. Rather, we have adopted a broad understanding of fishing, fowling, and navigation, as well. See Parker, 20 Me. at 357-58; French, 18 Me. at 433, 434-35 (1841) (discussing the public trust right of navigation). We held that these activities could be undertaken for pleasure, as well as for business or sustenance, Barrows, 73 Me. at 449-50; see Andrews, 124 Me. at 363-64, 129 A. at 298-99 (holding that the public trust rights also include commercial navigation and allow a person who operates a power boat for hire to land the boat on the intertidal land). We construed the term fishing in the Colonial Ordinance to include digging for worms, State v. Lemar, 147 Me. 405, 409, 87 A.2d 886, 888 (1952), clams, Leavitt, 105 Me. at 78-80, 72 A. at 876-77, and shellfish, Moulton v. Libbey, 37 Me. 472, 489-90 (1854). We interpreted navigation to allow the public to travel over frozen waters, see French, 18 Me. at 434-35, and to moor a vessel, discharge passengers, and take on cargo, see Wilson, 42 Me. at 24-25. [¶ 40] Pursuant to our broad understanding of the public trust rights, we have authorized public uses that are somewhat related to, but not coextensive with, fishing, fowling, and navigation. For example, upon landing a boat on the intertidal land, we held that the operator, no longer navigating on the water, also may pass freely to the lands and houses of others besides the owners of the flats. Deering, 25 Me. at 65; see Andrews, 124 Me. at 363, 129 A. at 299. We even concluded, without a direct connection to fishing, fowling, and navigation, that the public may lawfully cross intertidal lands by riding or skating when that land is covered with ice. [12] See Marshall, 93 Me. at 536-37, 45 A. at 498. Moreover, our interpretation of the public trust rights has recognized that some intertidal activities have come into favor and eventually fallen out of usemany of which are not directly connected to fishing, fowling, and navigationsuch as the use of the intertidal lands for pre-automobile travel and the use of those lands for driving and resting cattle. See Bell II, 557 A.2d at 173 n. 15. [¶ 41] Despite our expanding interpretation of the rights of the public in relation to private ownership of intertidal lands, an interpretation we characterized as sympathetically generous in Bell II, 557 A.2d at 173, we also defined the public's rights in a manner that did not unreasonably interfere with the rights of the riparian owner. See McFadden v. Haynes & DeWitt Ice Co., 86 Me. 319, 325, 29 A. 1068, 1069 (1894) (stating that the public trust rights do not include cutting ice on the intertidal flats); Moore v. Griffin, 22 Me. 350, 356 (1843) (holding that the public trust rights do not include the taking of mussel-bed manure from the intertidal land of another). Similarly, the public trust rights have excluded the use of the intertidal land for hygienic, bathing-related purposes. See Butler v. Attorney General, 195 Mass. 79, 80 N.E. 688, 689 (1907). Thus, until the decision in Bell II, 557 A.2d 168, the common law developed along lines that were generous to the public, but continued to balance that expansive approach against the upland owners' rights.