Opinion ID: 70335
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: THE BURDEN OF PROOF RELATING TO THE Sec. 921(a)(20) EXCEPTIONS

Text: 13 Felons are generally prohibited from possessing firearms by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1). Jackson's conviction under that statutory provision for being a felon who received and possessed a firearm was based upon his 1972 Texas conviction for felony assault. He contends that his Sec. 922(g)(1) conviction is due to be reversed because the government failed to prove that Texas law barred him from possessing a handgun. More specifically, he claims that the government failed to prove that his Texas felony assault conviction had not been expunged, pardoned, or set aside or his civil rights restored so that he could lawfully possess a firearm under Texas law. Section 922(g)(1) provides: 14 It shall be unlawful for any person--(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; ... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 15 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 922(g)(1) (West Supp.1994) (emphasis added). The statutory phrase crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year is defined as follows: 16 What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held. Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms. 17 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 921(a)(20) (West Supp.1994) (emphasis added). This definitional subsection was added in 1986. 18 Jackson contends that Sec. 921(a)(20), and especially the underscored language, adds new elements that the government must affirmatively prove--the government must prove that the prior felony conviction used as the predicate for a Sec. 922(g)(1) charge has not been expunged, set aside, or pardoned, and that the defendant has not otherwise had his civil rights restored so that he may possess firearms. In other words, it is Jackson's position that the government must prove a negative and affirmatively rule out the existence of what we will refer to collectively as the expungement exception. 19 While we have not explicitly addressed this precise issue before, in United States v. Laroche, 723 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1245, 104 S.Ct. 3521, 82 L.Ed.2d 829 (1984), we decided an issue that is closely analogous. The appellant in Laroche had been convicted under the predecessor statute to Sec. 922(g)(1) for being a felon in possession of a firearm. That statute, like the current statute, contained an exception in Secs. 921(a)(3) and (a)(16) which provided that, for purposes of the prohibition against felons possessing firearms, the term firearm does not include an antique firearm. The appellant argued that the government had, and had failed to carry, the burden of proving that the antique firearm exception did not apply in that case. This Court rejected that argument, reasoning that the firearm exception was an affirmative defense, and [w]here affirmative defenses are created through statutory exceptions, the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the prosecution, but the defendant has the burden of going forward with sufficient evidence to raise the exception as an issue. Id. at 1543. Because the appellant in Laroche had presented no evidence to establish that the firearm in question was an antique within the meaning of the statutory exception, the Court held that the government was under no obligation to disprove the existence of that exception. Id. 20 Our decision in United States v. Owens, 15 F.3d 995 (11th Cir.1994), is consistent with the reasoning and result in Laroche, and thus it is also inconsistent with Jackson's contention. Owens involved the very statutory provision, Sec. 922(g)(1), and expungement exception, Sec. 921(a)(20), at issue in this case. Owens, 15 F.3d at 997. The appellant argued that the government had failed to prove his guilt because under Florida law the civil rights of a felon were automatically restored after he had served the maximum term of the sentence imposed, and the record indicated appellant had. This Court rejected the state law predicate of that argument, and held that the restoration of civil rights was not automatic under those circumstances in Florida. Id. at 997-98. We then concluded that in view of Owens's failure to provide this court with any evidence that such a restoration of rights has already occurred, Owens's challenge to his conviction on this basis must fail. Id. Thus, a necessary premise of our Owens decision is that the defendant, and not the government, bears the burden--at least the burden of going forward with evidence--concerning the expungement exception. 21 The explicit holding in Laroche and the implicit holding in Owens make good sense. As the Tenth Circuit has explained: 22 As a practical matter, requiring the government to negate the possibility, in every Sec. 922(g)(1) case, that each defendant's prior convictions had been expunged or set aside, that a pardon had been granted, or that civil rights had been restored, would impose an onerous burden. A defendant ordinarily will be much better able to raise the issue of whether his prior convictions have been expunged or set aside, whether a pardon has been granted, or whether civil rights have been restored. 23 United States v. Flower, 29 F.3d 530, 535 (10th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 939, 130 L.Ed.2d 884 (1995). We have used similar reasoning in concluding that a defendant has the burden on any question about the validity of the prior convictions used to enhance his sentence under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(e): 24 [U]nder Sec. 924(e), the burden is properly placed on the defendant raising the challenge to show the constitutional invalidity of the prior convictions. Any given conviction might suffer any of a myriad of constitutional defects. It would approach the absurd to require the government to undertake to prove guilt all over again in every predicate conviction.... Instead, the government's burden is properly met when it introduces evidence that there are at least three prior violent felony convictions. The defendant must then point out any defects in a particular prior conviction. 25 See United States v. Ruo, 943 F.2d 1274, 1276 (11th Cir.1991). We analogized this burden to that placed on a defendant who must prove that a prior conviction used to compute his criminal history score under the Sentencing Guidelines was unconstitutionally obtained. Id. at 1276 n. 4; see also Custis v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994) (disallowing collateral attacks on validity of predicate convictions used for Sec. 924(e), except on grounds of lack of counsel). 26 Jackson's reliance upon United States v. Essick, 935 F.2d 28 (4th Cir.1991), is misplaced. In that case, the predicate conviction for the Sec. 922(g)(1) violation was from North Carolina, where a felon's civil rights are automatically restored upon his unconditional discharge as an inmate, probationer, or parolee. Id. at 30. Jackson's predicate conviction is from Texas, which does not automatically restore a felon's civil rights. See United States v. Thomas, 991 F.2d 206, 214 (5th Cir.) (Texas neither actively nor passively restores all or essentially all of the civil rights of criminals ... upon release from jail.... For purposes of the instant inquiry, then, Texas ... fails to meet muster under any of the approaches of the several circuits that have addressed the concept of restoration of civil rights as contemplated in Sec. 921(a)(20). (footnotes omitted)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 607, 126 L.Ed.2d 572 (1993). To the extent that the Fourth Circuit's Essick reasoning could be extended beyond its facts, we decline to do so. We are more persuaded by the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit in Flower and of this circuit in Ruo, and we are strongly guided by our decisions in Laroche and Owens. 27 The indictment put Jackson on notice that the 1972 Texas felony assault conviction would be used as the prior conviction element of the Sec. 922(g)(1) charge against him. He did not proffer any evidence to bring that conviction within the expungement exception of Sec. 921(a)(20). Accordingly, the government had no obligation to prove that that exception was inapplicable. 3 28