Opinion ID: 1824168
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: refusal to follow precedent

Text: In its order, the district court noted that this court has held that malice is an element of second degree murder and that malice must be a part of the jury instructions, citing State v. Jones, 245 Neb. 821, 515 N.W.2d 654 (1994); State v. Grimes, supra ; State v. Manzer, supra ; and State v. Ladig, supra . The district court, aware of and citing binding precedent controlling the outcome of this case, went on to decide this case contrary to that controlling law. The district court opined gratuitously that this court has been in error the past 11 years when it has read a scienter requirement into the statutory definition of the crime of second degree murder. The district court announced that this court was legislating. The district court went on to deny relief and held that the jury instruction for second degree murder was appropriate despite the fact that the jury instruction did not include the element of malice. Apparently, the district court is ignorant of an appellate court's practice to read criminal intent into a statute when necessary. As a general rule criminal statutes are interpreted to require criminal intent. 3 Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction # s 59.04 at 118 (5th ed. 1992). See, also, Staples v. U.S., ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994); Ratzlaf v. U.S., ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952); U.S. v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955 (1st Cir.1994); U.S. v. Schnell, 982 F.2d 216 (7th Cir.1992); U.S. v. Singleton, 946 F.2d 23 (5th Cir.1991); U.S. v. Semenza, 835 F.2d 223 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121 (6th Cir.1985). We are now again asked to overrule longstanding decisions of this court requiring criminal intent for second degree murder. The fact that some lower courts and prosecutors were unaware of or ignorant of this court's decisions since 1983 should not thereby force this court to ignore stare decisis and change the law to accommodate such error in order to secure or uphold a conviction. Stare decisis is a fundamental principle of law. See Muller v. Nebraska Methodist Hospital, 160 Neb. 279, 70 N.W.2d 86 (1955). Judges must be faithful to the law. Canon 3B(2) of the Nebraska Code of Judicial Conduct. The preamble to the Code of Judicial Conduct states that the law denotes all court rules adopted by this court, as well as statutes, constitutional provisions, and decisional law. A judge shall respect the law and must act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. Canon 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct. This is not the first time that the district court for Douglas County has ignored binding precedent. State v. Plant, 248 Neb. 52, 532 N.W.2d 619 (1995); State v. Wilson, 247 Neb. 948, 530 N.W.2d 925 (1995); State v. Williams, 247 Neb. 931, 531 N.W.2d 222 (1995). Failure to follow precedent can be a violation of the judge's sworn duty. The integrity of the judicial system dictates that courts follow binding precedent. Conscious failure to do so constitutes contempt for the system. This court is bound to act, and will when we deem it appropriate, when a judge continues to ignore decisions of this court. In re Complaint Against Staley, 241 Neb. 152, 486 N.W.2d 886 (1992). As a result of the prejudicial jury instructions, we must and do grant Lowe the relief that the district court willfully and erroneously denied.