Opinion ID: 3037973
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: admissibility of the 1994 fingerprints

Text: [6] Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) excludes evidence of prior acts when offered to prove that the individual acted in conformity with those prior acts. However, the rule allows admission of prior acts when offered for other purposes, such as to show “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” In making admissibility decisions, the court will admit Rule 404(b) evidence if (1) the evidence tends to prove a material point; (2) the prior act is not too remote in time; (3) the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the defendant committed the other act; and (4) (in cases where knowledge and intent are at issue) the act is similar to the offense charged. United States v. Verduzco, 373 F.3d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir. 2004). Estrada challenges admission of the evidence under the first three prongs of this test, arguing that the evidence of his fingerprints on the triple-neck flask from the 1994 storage 7840 UNITED STATES v. ESTRADA locker seizure did not prove a material point, that ten years was too remote in time, and that there was insufficient evidence to show that he committed any prior act. We review the district court’s decision to admit evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Lillard, 354 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). [7] There is no merit in Estrada’s argument. The fingerprints do help to prove a material point, because his connection to this prior methamphetamine manufacturing operation tends to show that he knew or had reasonable cause to believe that the pseudoephedrine would be used to make methamphetamine. Courts have allowed Rule 404(b) evidence to be admitted where ten years or longer periods of time have passed. See United States v. Martinez, 182 F.3d 1107, 111011 (9th Cir. 1999) (ten years); United States v. Ross, 886 F.2d 264, 267 (9th Cir. 1989) (thirteen years); United States v. Spillone, 879 F.2d 514, 519 (9th Cir. 1989) (ten years). And while the fingerprints on the flask are insufficient to conclusively show that Estrada committed any prior act, the standard for admissibility is only that the evidence is sufficient to “support a finding that the defendant committed the other act.” Verduzco, 373 F.3d at 1027; see also United States v. Ogles, 406 F.3d 586, 592 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that “conclusiveness is not the relevant standard”). Here, Estrada was able to argue the sufficiency of the fingerprint in terms of the weight that the jury should give this evidence. The district court also gave a limiting instruction as to this evidence, telling the jurors that they could consider it only as it related to the defendant’s intent or knowledge. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.