Opinion ID: 2302568
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Counts 1, 5, 14, & 15)

Text: We now address the issue of whether the remedy of civil liability found in § 12-1.3-4 applies to Tarzia's case. After reviewing the facts and applicable statutes, we hold that it does not. The following statutory pronouncements are pertinent to our review. Section 12-1-12, which governs the destruction or sealing of records of people who have been acquitted or otherwise exonerated, reads in relevant part as follows: (a) Any fingerprint, photograph, physical measurements, or other record of identification, heretofore or hereafter taken by or under the direction of the attorney general, the superintendent of state police, the member or members of the police department of any city or town or any other officer authorized by this chapter to take them, of a person under arrest, prior to the final conviction of the person for the offense then charged, shall be destroyed by all offices or departments having the custody or possession within sixty (60) days after there has been an acquittal, dismissal, no true bill, no information, or the person has been otherwise exonerated from the offense with which he or she is charged, and the clerk of court where the exoneration has taken place shall    place under seal all records of the person in the case, including all records of the division of criminal identification   ; provided, that the person shall not have been previously convicted of any felony offense. Any person who shall violate any provision of this section shall be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100). [14] Section 12-1.3-4, which addresses the wrongful disclosure of previously expunged records, states, in pertinent part, as follows: (a) Any person having his or her record expunged shall be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the crime of which he or she had been convicted   .    (c) Whenever the records of any conviction and/or probation of an individual for the commission of a crime have been expunged under the provisions of this chapter, any custodian of the records of conviction relating to that crime shall not disclose the existence of the records upon inquiry from any source   . (d)    Any agency and/or person who willfully refuses to carry out the expungement of the records of conviction pursuant to § 12-1.3-2, or this section or willfully releases or willfully allows access to records of conviction, knowing them to have been expunged, shall be civilly liable. [15] In his appeal, Tarzia acknowledges that the sealing statute and the expungement statute each contain distinct and dissimilar remedies. Indeed, the sealing statute explicitly provides for a monetary fine not exceeding $100 to be imposed on any person who violates any provision of that section. Section 12-1-12(a). To the contrary, the expungement statute provides that any person who willfully refuses to expunge records or willfully allows access to previously expunged records, knowing them to be expunged, shall be civilly liable. Section 12-1.3-4(d). Despite this marked difference, however, Tarzia maintains that because both statutes deal with the same subject matter, and because both statutes fall under the rubric of the term `expungement[,]' the trial court should have harmonized the two chapters in such a way as to allow for the civil liability remedy found in the expungement statute to attach to a custodian of records who violates the sealing statute. In support thereof, Tarzia contends that it is absurd to imagine that the Legislature intended to provide a civil remedy to people who have been found guilty of crimes which are later expunged, but not provide the same civil remedy to people who have been charged with a crime, but who later have been exonerated. In further support of his argument, Tarzia relies on Billington v. Fairmount Foundry, 724 A.2d 1012, 1013-14 (R.I. 1999), in which we stated that [i]n construing the provisions of statutes that relate to the same or to similar subject matter, the court should attempt to harmonize each statute with the other so as to be consistent with their general objective scope. (quoting Kaya v. Partington, 681 A.2d 256, 261 (R.I.1996)). In that case, this Court was called upon to interpret a section of the workers' compensation statute that, if read literally, provided a surviving spouse with an annual cost of living increase, but was silent about whether a similar cost-of-living increase was provided to dependent children when no surviving spouse existed. [16] Id. at 1013. Noting the humanitarian goals of the Workers' Compensation Act, id. at 1014, and giving the statute what appear[ed] to be the meaning that is most consistent with its policy or obvious purposes[,] this Court held that the statute did, in fact, provide for an annual cost-of-living increase for dependent children. Id. (quoting Kirby v. Planning Board of Review of Middletown, 634 A.2d 285, 290 (R.I.1993)). The Billington case is distinguishable from the instant matter. In Billington, 724 A.2d at 1013, the two statutory provisions at issue were both subsections within the same section of G.L. 1956 chapter 33 of title 28. Here, however, the sealing statute and the expungement statute are not only found in separate sections, but in fact are located in different chapters of title 12. Because the sealing and expungement statutes are located in completely separate chapters that have distinct purposes, we are therefore unable to look to an overall guiding policy common to both statutory provisions, as we did in Billington, 724 A.2d at 1013-14. Furthermore, although this Court follow[s] the rule of construction that provides that provisions `relating to the same or similar subject matter should be construed such that they will harmonize with each other and be consistent with their general objective scope[,]' McKenna v. Williams, 874 A.2d 217, 243 (R.I.2005) (quoting Blanchette v. Stone, 591 A.2d 785, 786 (R.I.1991)), a necessary precondition to such construction is that the statutory provisions clearly relate to the same subject matter. We are unwilling to stretch our rules of construction in a search for a common legislative policy that is not readily apparent between the two provisions. In the case at hand, it is clear that the sealing statute and the expungement statute concern different subject matter and dissimilar temporal applications. As briefly discussed supra, the sealing statute applies specifically to the destruction or sealing of court and police records after an acquittal, dismissal, no true bill, no information, or other exoneration. Section 12-1-12(a). On the other hand, the expungement statute applies to records relating to any conviction and/or probation of an individual for the commission of a crime   . Section 12-1.3-4(c). It is clear from the language of the expungement statute that its available remedies apply only to people who have been convicted of a crime. Although Tarzia was arrested and charged for possession of cocaine, he was never convicted of the crimethus, the expungement statute does not apply. Additionally, the time frames involved with both statutes differ. Under the expungement statute, a person seeking to expunge any record of a prior conviction is required to wait a certain amount of time before filing a motion to expunge. See § 12-1.3-2. In particular, a person convicted of a misdemeanor can only file after five (5) years from the date of the completion of his or her sentence[,] and a person convicted of a felony must wait ten years. Id. If a person is exonerated, however, the sealing statute requires no minimum waiting period before the sealing and destruction of police or court records. [17] See § 12-1-12; see also § 12-1-12.1. Here, Tarzia was arrested in August 2002, and he filed his Motion to Expunge in October 2003a time period that would be insufficient to invoke the application of the expungement statute, if it applied. Thus, Tarzia is unable to avail himself of the remedy under that statute. Moreover, we find it noteworthy that, although Tarzia petitions this Court to read into the sealing statute the same civil liability remedy afforded under the expungement statute, he does not address the heightened standard of liability articulated in the expungement statute. The sealing statute specifically imposes a fine upon [a]ny person who shall violate any provision of this section   . Section 12-1-12(a). In contrast, however, the expungement statute requires willfulness and knowledge before its remedy of civil liability attaches. See § 12-1.3-4(d) (Any agency and/or person who willfully refuses to carry out the expungement of the records of conviction    or willfully releases or willfully allows access to records of conviction, knowing them to have been expunged, shall be civilly liable. (emphases added)). The issue of willfulness is left untouched by Tarzia in his appeal. At this point, we reiterate that, when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, [this Court] must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings. In re Tetreault, 11 A.3d at 639 (quoting State v. LaRoche, 925 A.2d 885, 887 (R.I.2007)). Having discerned no ambiguity in these statutes, it is our opinion that we are not obliged to embark on a search for legislative intent. Where there is no ambiguity, we are not privileged to legislate, by inclusion, words[, or remedies,] which are not found in the statute. Wayne Distributing Co. v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, 673 A.2d 457, 460 (R.I.1996). For these reasons, we hold that the expungement statute and its remedy of civil liability do not apply in this case. We therefore affirm the trial court's judgment on counts 1, 5, 14, and 15. 2