Opinion ID: 1198948
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Parties' Contentions on Exclusivity

Text: The Club advances the premise that a public utility or quasi-municipal corporation can only exercise the powers granted to it by statute, citing Water District No. 1 v. Robb, 182 Kan. 1, 14, 318 P.2d 387 (1957), and Wiggins v. Housing Authority of Kansas City, 22 Kan. App.2d 367, 369, 916 P.2d 718 (1996). The District does not assert a contrary rule. All concede that the Act never explicitly says that the District has an exclusive right to provide water by pipeline within its boundaries. The Club contends that the omission shows that the legislature did not intend to grant an exclusive service area to the District. The Club also argues that not only is there no express grant of an exclusive service area, but the Act does not imply an exclusive service area. However, the Club conceded in its submission to the trial court that the District had the right to exclude other water utilities from operating a water supply and distribution system within the District's boundaries. The Club points out that K.S.A. 19-3509 provides for a water district's board to have exclusive control of the water supply and distribution facilities. The Club reasons that the in this phrase refers to supply and distribution facilities belonging to the District, not to water pipelines owned by inhabitants of the District. Therefore, the Club contends, K.S.A. 19-3509 does not prohibit inhabitants from installing their own pipeline to obtain water. The District counters that the K.S.A. 19-3509 language means any water supply and distribution facilities, and, therefore, the District has the right to control a pipeline such as the Club's proposed connection to the Missouri meter. The District contends its right to control position is strengthened when considered in conjunction with K.S.A. 19-3517. K.S.A. 19-3517 sets out the procedure for purchase or acquisition of existing water supply and distribution systems. The Club responds that K.S.A. 19-3517 is discretionary only; the water District is not required to acquire water supply and distribution systems within its territory. We observe, however, that the discretionary power to choose is a significant power. The District argues that there is an implied legislative grant of an exclusive service area. Wiggins, relied on by the Club to support its no specific grant argument, acknowledges that powers are necessarily implied as well as specifically granted. 22 Kan. App. 2d at 369. (Wiggins took the necessarily implied phrase from a school district case, Wichita Public Schools Employees Union v. Smith, 194 Kan. 2, 4, 397 P.2d 357 [1964].) The Club argues against exclusivity by emphasizing the recent trend toward increased competition among utility companies. The District, however, is a quasi-municipal corporation. Recent relaxation of competition among private utilities is not an apt analogy.