Opinion ID: 1674429
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: does mayfield's two-part conviction violate the state and federal prohibitions against double jeopardy?

Text: Mayfield argues that § 63-11-30, the provision under which he was convicted, proscribes the act of drunk driving, not the act of killing. The reference to negligent killing in § 63-11-30(4), Mayfield contends, merely points to a circumstance which makes the crime of drunk driving more egregious and subject to greater punishment. The jury convicted Mayfield on two counts of violating § 63-11-30, one for each fatality in the April 29, 1989, accident. This, Mayfield reasons, amounts to double jeopardy since he committed only one act of drunk driving. The viability of Mayfield's double jeopardy argument turns on whether § 63-11-30(4) is truly a homicide statute or a statute which merely proscribes the act of driving while intoxicated. If § 63-11-30(4) proscribes the crime of negligent killing while driving drunk, then Mayfield's two-count conviction satisfies the constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy. See Burton v. State, 226 Miss. 31, 79 So.2d 242 (Miss. 1955) (where defendant's culpable negligence in operating motor vehicle results in death of multiple persons, each homicide constitutes separate offense for which defendant may be tried without being twice put in jeopardy for same offense). On the other hand, if § 63-11-30(4) merely prescribes punishment for an act of driving while intoxicated in which human life is incidentally extinguished, then Mayfield's argument may have merit. See Barnette v. State, 478 So.2d 800 (Miss. 1985) (double jeopardy clauses of federal and state constitutions proscribe multiple punishments for same offense). Section 63-11-30(4), as it was worded at the time of Mayfield's wreck, stated: Every person who operates any motor vehicle in violation of the provisions of subsection (1) of this section [ i.e., while under the influence of intoxicating liquor] and who in a negligent manner causes the death of another or mutilates, disfigures, permanently disables or destroys the tongue, eye, lip, nose or any other limb or member of another shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a felony and shall be committed to the custody of the State Department of Corrections for a period of time not to exceed five (5) years. As the State suggests, the foregoing can be read as a homicide statute under which each death constitutes a separate and distinct violation. It is noteworthy that the statute speaks in the singular (death of another ). If the legislature had intended to merely criminalize drunk driving which results in one or more fatalities, it could have so specified. On the other hand, there are several factors which commend Mayfield's reading of the statute. Section 63-11-30 is styled Penalties for operation of vehicle while under influence of intoxicating liquor or other substance that impairs ability to operate vehicle; where violation causes injury or death to another person. The emphasis is clearly on drunk driving, not the effect on another person. Further, the term violation refers to the act of driving while under the influence of intoxicants. The phrase where violation causes injury or death suggests that injury or death constitutes an exacerbating circumstance, not a separate and independent crime. Section 64-11-30(4) appears to emphasize the act of drunk driving over and above the act of killing since the drunk driving clause precedes the death or injury clause. If the legislature had intended to designate the causing of death or injury as a separate crime, the statute might better have been phrased: Every person who in a negligent manner causes the death of another ... while operating any motor vehicle in violation of the provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall be guilty of a felony... . Lastly, it is curious that § 63-11-30(4) prescribes the same punishment regardless of whether the victim suffers death or a relatively minor injury. A person who drives drunk and negligently causes the mutilation or disfigurement of a victim's tongue, eye, lip, nose or any other limb or member (including, one may presume, a pinkie or earlobe) is subject to five years imprisonment just as if the victim had died. This lumping together of death and injury indicates a legislative intent to treat such incidents as collateral to the principal offense of drunk driving. If so, then Mayfield is correct in arguing that he violated § 63-11-30(4) only once on the occasion of the fatal crash. One thing is certain: Section 63-11-30(4) is ambiguous with regard to whether it proscribes the act of killing while driving drunk (an act Mayfield committed twice) or whether it merely prescribes a penalty for the act of driving drunk where death results (an act Mayfield committed only once). Dealing with a similar situation, the United States Supreme Court adopted a policy of lenity under which the less onerous interpretation prevails. In Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 79 S.Ct. 209, 3 L.Ed.2d 199 (1958), the defendant was convicted on two counts of violating a federal statute which prohibited assault on a federal officer. The proof showed that the defendant had fired his weapon only once, but that the bullet had struck two officers. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court found that the statute was ambiguous concerning whether a single act which affected two officers constituted one offense or two. The Court held that the defendant had committed only one offense and reasoned: It is apparent that § 254 [the statute under which the defendant was convicted] may as reasonably be read to mean that the single discharge of the shotgun would constitute an assault without regard to the number of federal officers affected, as it may be read to mean that as may assaults would be committed as there were officers affected. Neither the wording of the statute nor its legislative history points clearly to either meaning. In that circumstance the Court applies a policy of lenity and adopts the less harsh meaning. [w]hen choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite. We should not derive criminal outlawry from some ambiguous implication. [Citations omitted].... When Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity. [Citations omitted]... . This policy of lenity means that the Court will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intended. Ladner, 358 U.S. at 177-78, 79 S.Ct. at 214. The policy of lenity set out in Ladner is a rule of construction which the Court expressly limited to federal statutes. Therefore, it does not control our interpretation of § 63-11-30. This Court has, however, adopted a similar policy in analogous contexts. See Johnson v. State, 260 So.2d 436, 438-39 (Miss. 1972) (where facts which constitute criminal offense fall under either of two statutes, or where there is doubt as to which statute should apply, statute prescribing lesser penalty will govern); accord Burns v. State, 438 So.2d 1347, 1353 (Miss. 1983); Grillis v. State, 196 Miss. 576, 17 So.2d 525 (1954). In our view, it is fairly clear that § 63-11-30 proscribes the act of drunk driving, not the act of killing. Consequently, Mayfield's second conviction constitutes double jeopardy and must be reversed. Since the statute is hopelessly ambiguous, we further hold that under Johnson the interpretation which affords the lesser penalty must prevail.