Opinion ID: 822842
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Facts And Pretrial Proceedings

Text: On October 21, 2006, Elizabeth Heynen (Heynen) fell on the exterior stairs of her second-floor rented apartment in Skagway. The apartment building was constructed by its owner, Leslie Fairbanks (Leslie), in 1990-91. In April 2006, Leslie leased the building to his daughter, Julene Fairbanks (Julene). Julene operated a specialty food store on the ground floor, where Heynen was an employee. Julene also rented the upstairs apartment to Heynen. -2- 6748 In June 2007, Heynen filed a complaint for personal injury. She alleged that she fell when she “exited her . . . apartment, intending to descend the outside stairway to take her dog for a walk” and “the edge of the first step below the upper landing crumbled underfoot causing her to fall down backwards, landing on her buttocks and severely striking her lower spine on the edge of the landing.” The complaint detailed Heynen’s medical problems following the fall, which she claimed caused immediate pain and permanent injuries and required her to have spinal surgery. Heynen further alleged that both Leslie and Julene had breached their duties as landlords to inspect, maintain, and repair the staircase and that their negligence had been a substantial factor in causing her injuries. Heynen sought general and special damages as well as fees and costs. Leslie and Julene each answered the complaint. They denied Heynen’s allegations and presented a number of affirmative defenses, including third-party negligence, failure to mitigate, and comparative negligence. Heynen filed an amended complaint on October 12, 2007, in which she argued that the defendants’ failure to maintain the premises as required by AS 34.03.100 1 constituted negligence per se. Heynen also filed a motion to establish, as “the law of the case,” that Leslie and Julene had a “duty to inspect, maintain and remedy dangerous conditions on the premises.” Leslie filed a motion for summary judgment on Heynen’s negligence per se claim. In January 2008, Superior Court Judge Philip M. Pallenberg issued an order granting both parties’ motions, though he made “no determination about whether Defendants’ statutory duties extended to the staircase at issue in this litigation,” which he noted would depend on whether or not the staircase was considered part of the rental premises or a “common area.” 1 AS 34.03.100 imposes a duty on landlords to “maintain fit premises.” -3- 6748 During discovery, Heynen filed a request for admissions in which she asked Leslie and Julene to “admit there are no genuine issues of fact to support your third Affirmative Defense that Plaintiff Elizabeth Heynen’s ‘injuries, if any[,] were caused by and/or contributed [to] by her own negligence.’ ” Leslie and Julene declined to make this admission, stating that there were “genuine issues of fact as to how the accident occurred,” that discovery was ongoing, and that the defendants “anticipate[d] being able to further respond to this request after plaintiff’s discovery deposition.” Heynen subsequently filed a request for supplementation from Julene, asking her to “provide any information which she intend[ed] to present at trial” regarding the affirmative defenses. Julene did not respond to this request. Heynen did not file a motion to compel. In October 2008, Heynen filed a motion for partial summary judgment on Leslie’s and Julene’s affirmative defenses of comparative negligence and failure to mitigate. The superior court denied the motion as to comparative negligence. The court noted that Heynen’s motion for summary judgment relied on the argument that the defendants had not disclosed facts supporting their affirmative defenses, and that although this failure to disclose could merit discovery sanctions, it did not provide a basis for granting summary judgment. In March 2009, Heynen filed a motion for discovery sanctions based on Leslie’s and Julene’s “failure to provide a factual basis [for,] or to respond to[,] repeated discovery requests as to their affirmative defense of comparative negligence.” As a sanction for these alleged discovery violations, Heynen requested that the superior court preclude Leslie and Julene from asserting the comparative negligence defense at trial. The superior court denied this motion, explaining that “sanctions . . . only come into play if there is an order compelling discovery which is violated” and noting that Heynen did not “point to any fact, or any document, that defendants have not produced.” But the court invited Heynen to move to compel disclosures if she felt that “defendant’s -4- 6748 disclosures [were] inadequate,” and noted that if “defendants attempt to introduce evidence at trial which was not [previously] disclosed, [Heynen] may object under Rule 37(c)(1).”2 Before trial, Heynen filed a series of motions in limine. Motion in limine No. 2, filed in September 2009, requested a court order prohibiting the defendants from raising any new factual defenses to Heynen’s claim that her fall was caused by the defendants’ failure to inspect, repair, and maintain the stairway. Motion in limine No. 4 requested an order prohibiting the defendants from presenting any facts not previously disclosed in support of their comparative negligence defense. On November 5, 2009, the superior court issued an order on Heynen’s motions in limine Nos. 2 through 6. The court granted three of Heynen’s motions, but denied motions No. 2 and No. 4. Heynen also filed motion in limine No. 8, which requested an order prohibiting defendants’ counsel from “miscommunicating the differing duties at issue” — specifically, the duties of landlords under the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act and the lesser duty of care imposed on tenants. The superior court denied the motion in an order that stated: “The parties are free to make arguments that note the similarities and the differences between their respective duties, as long as they do not 2 Alaska Civil Rule 37(c)(1) provides, in relevant part: A party that without substantial justification fails to disclose information required by Rules 26(a), 26(e)(1), or 26.1(b) shall not, unless such failure is harmless, be permitted to use as evidence at a trial, at a hearing, or on a motion any witness or information not so disclosed. In addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the court, on motion and after affording an opportunity to be heard, may impose other appropriate sanctions. . . . -5- 6748 misstate the law.” The court also noted that the parties’ “duties are different, and counsel should not argue that they are the same.”