Opinion ID: 1902767
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: statutory hearsay exception

Text: With this constitutional framework in mind, we analyze whether the hearsay exception for elderly adults is facially violative of the Confrontation Clause. It is uncontroverted that but for the recently passed statute, section 90.903(24), a narrative statement by any victim of a crime to a police officer not falling into any traditional hearsay exception would be inadmissible hearsay. See Chariot v. State, 679 So.2d 844, 845 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). The victim's initial statement in this case was not made under oath. Neither of the victim's statements was ever subjected to cross-examination and neither statement falls within any traditional hearsay exception, such as an excited utterance. See id. Thus, the newly enacted elderly hearsay statute is the only basis for admissibility of the victim's hearsay statement. The elderly hearsay exception is not firmly rooted because the Legislature enacted the exception in 1995. See ch. 95-158, § 1, at 1588-89, Laws of Fla. (codified at § 90.803(24)). In addition, no other state has a similar exception. [6] Therefore, hearsay admitted under section 90.803(24) is presumptively unreliable. Wright, 497 U.S. at 818, 110 S.Ct. 3139. In order to meet the constitutional requirements of the Confrontation Clause when the State seeks to admit hearsay evidence under an exception that is not firmly rooted, the State must show that the hearsay testimony is reliable because it has particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531. Such evidence must thus be so trustworthy that adversarial testing would add little to its reliability. Wright, 497 U.S. at 821, 110 S.Ct. 3139 (emphasis supplied). Because the Second District in Conner relied on this Court's approval of the child hearsay exception, we examine our analysis of the child hearsay statute that we have upheld against a Confrontation Clause challenge. See Townsend, 635 So.2d at 956-58; Perez, 536 So.2d at 209. In Townsend, this Court upheld the constitutionality of the child hearsay exception, section 90.803(23), in the context of a prosecution for sexual battery on the defendant's two-year old daughter. The State and defendant stipulated that the child was incompetent to testify due to her age [7] so that, but for the hearsay exception, the child's statements would have been excluded. We found that, as applied to child victims of abuse with a physical, mental, emotional, or developmental age of 11 or less, section 90.803(23)(a), the child hearsay exception was constitutional as long as trial courts found, before admitting statements under this exception, that particularized guarantees of trustworthiness ensured the reliability of the statements. See Townsend, 635 So.2d at 956-58. In making this reliability determination, the court must examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief. Wright, 497 U.S. at 819, 110 S.Ct. 3139. The court cannot consider whether other evidence corroborates the hearsay when making this initial determination of reliability. See Townsend, 635 So.2d at 956. The statute pertaining to the child hearsay exception requires courts to consider the following factors in determining the reliability of the statement: [T]he mental and physical age and maturity of the child, the nature and duration of the abuse or offense, the relationship of the child to the offender, the reliability of the assertion, the reliability of the child victim, and any other factor deemed appropriate. § 90.803(23)(a)(1). In Townsend, in an effort to ensure the reliability of any statement that would be admissible, we set forth additional factors that may be considered by the court including the statement's spontaneity; whether the statement was made at the first available opportunity following the alleged incident; whether the statement was elicited in response to questions from adults; the mental state of the child when the abuse was reported; whether the statement consisted of a child-like description of the act; whether the child used terminology unexpected of a child of similar age; the motive or lack thereof to fabricate the statement; the ability of the child to distinguish between reality and fantasy; the vagueness of the accusations; the possibility of any improper influence on the child by participants involved in a domestic dispute; and contradictions in the accusation. 635 So.2d at 958. These factors are tailored to the child abuse context and in this limited situation can guarantee the reliability of the child victim's hearsay statement. Although the Second District relied heavily on the fact that the statutory language of the hearsay exception tracks the hearsay exception for statements by child victims of abuse or neglect, the elderly person hearsay exception is much broader than the child hearsay exception. There are some very significant differences between these exceptions that are critical to our analysis. The most obvious difference between the hearsay exceptions in section 90.803(23) and (24) is that the exceptions apply to different victim declarants. While the hearsay exception for child declarants applies only to statements made by children with a physical, mental, emotional, or developmental age of 11 or less, section 90.803(23)(a), the hearsay exception for elderly adults applies to a much broader class of adult declarants. In fact, any adult over the age of sixty potentially qualifies as an elderly person under this definition. Another critical difference is the scope of the testimony admissible under the hearsay exceptions. While the child hearsay exception is limited to statements describing acts of child abuse, child neglect or sexual abuse, see section 90.803(23)(a), the hearsay statements of the elderly adult declarants may describe any act of abuse or neglect, any act of exploitation, the offense of battery or aggravated battery or assault or aggravated assault or sexual battery, or any other violent act, committed against them. § 90.803(24)(a). Thus, the elderly hearsay exception would be broadly applicable to a wide variety of crimes and is not restricted to the elder abuse context. Despite these differences between the two hearsay exceptions, the elderly adult hearsay exception contains a list of factors to be considered when assessing the reliability of the hearsay statement that tracks the language of the child hearsay exception. The court may consider the mental and physical age and maturity of the elderly person or disabled adult, the nature and duration of the abuse or offense, the relationship of the victim to the offender, the reliability of the assertion, the reliability of the elderly person or disabled adult, and any other factor deemed appropriate. § 90.803(24)(a)1. However, unlike the child hearsay context, these factors do not guarantee the reliability of a statement when applied to an elderly adult. In addition to listing certain statutory factors to be considered when assessing reliability, section 90.803(24) states that the court can consider any other factor deemed appropriate. In the child hearsay context, we formulated a permissive list of additional factors that would assist the courts in determining the reliability of child hearsay statements. See Townsend, 635 So.2d at 957-58. However, unlike the child hearsay context, we are unable to formulate a list of permissible considerations that would ensure the reliability of a hearsay statement made by an elderly adult to the extent that adversarial testing would add little to its reliability. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 818, 110 S.Ct. 3139. The circumstances that might necessitate the use of the statementsuch as the mental infirmity or physical infirmity of the elderly personwould be the very circumstances that would render the statement less reliable. In this context, adversarial testing would significantly add to the reliability of the trial. In addition to the fact that the statutory factors in the elderly adult hearsay exception fail to ensure the reliability of the hearsay statement, the reach of the statute is far broader than the child hearsay exception. The United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts stated that though competing societal interests may justify the admission of hearsay evidence, those interests must be closely examined. 448 U.S. at 64, 100 S.Ct. 2531. We find that the policies that supported upholding the narrowly drawn child abuse hearsay exception are not present in the elderly adult context. Young child victims may be incompetent to testify and be cross-examined, as was the two-year-old child in Townsend, due to the inability to understand the abstract concept of taking an oath. Further, we have previously observed that the Legislature enacted the child hearsay exception in response to the need to establish special protections for child victims in the judicial system. State v. Jones, 625 So.2d 821, 825 (Fla.1993). For example, in the child abuse context, we have recognized the importance of the State's interest and public consideration of sparing child victims of sexual crimes the further trauma of in-court testimony. Harrell, 709 So.2d at 1369 (quoting Glendening v. State, 536 So.2d 212, 217 (Fla.1988)). [8] The Supreme Court of Arizona reasoned, in the case of a child victim of abuse: A young child's spontaneous statements about so unusual a personal experience, made soon after the event, are at least as reliable as the child's in-court testimony, given months later, after innumerable interviews and interrogations may have distorted the child's memory. State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 735 P.2d 801, 814 (1987). In the context of a dependency case, we noted the observations of commentators that: [T]he victim's out-of-court statements may, in fact, be more trustworthy than his or her in-court testimony due to the stress and trauma of rehashing bad memories, hostile attacks on the child's credibility, facing the alleged perpetrator again, and testifying against a close relative. In this situation, children, if they reply at all, often give confused and inaccurate answers ... are susceptible to leading questions and often tailor their replies to appease the examining attorney. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. M.B., 701 So.2d 1155, 1158 n. 4 (Fla.1997) (citations omitted) (quoting Judy Yun, A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases, 83 Colum.L.Rev. 1745, 1751 (1983)). [9] In contrast to the child abuse context, section 90.803(24) broadly applies to statements describing a wide range of crimes not necessarily unique to adults over the age of sixty. [10] Because the hearsay exception for elderly adults neither ensures the reliability of the hearsay statements admitted at trial, nor in its broadly worded form is supported by the competing policy interests present in the child abuse context, we conclude that section 90.803(24) is facially violative of the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation. While we as a court condemn in the strongest terms acts of exploitation or violence committed against persons who are elderly, any state interest in prosecuting crimes against the elderly cannot constitutionally justify the abrogation of a defendant's most basic constitutional right. If the need to prosecute crimes constituted a sufficient interest to justify the admission of the hearsay statements of witnesses and victims, the state and federal constitutional rights of confrontation would be substantially eviscerated. For the reasons explained in this opinion, we hold that the hearsay exception for elderly adults in criminal cases is unconstitutional. [11] We quash the Second District's decision in Conner, and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. HARDING, C.J., SHAW, ANSTEAD and LEWIS, JJ., and OVERTON, Senior Justice, concur. WELLS, J., concurs in result only.