Opinion ID: 751707
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: legality of seizure of marijuana by detective croft and other police officers

Text: 34 Paige next contends that Croft violated his Fourth Amendment rights by not securing a warrant before the marijuana was seized and hauled away. The Supreme Court recently made clear that the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment extends to an individual's possessory interests in property, even if his expectation of privacy in that property has been completely extinguished. Soldal, 506 U.S. at 62-63, 113 S.Ct. at 544. Indeed, seizures of property are subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny even though no search within the meaning of the Amendment has taken place. Id. at 68, 113 S.Ct. at 547; see also Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113, 104 S.Ct. at 1656 (defining seizure of property as some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property). Although it has been established that Paige's privacy interest in the marijuana had been extinguished prior to its seizure, see supra discussion, his possessory interest in it continued to survive. As such, the government's seizure of the marijuana invoked the protections of the Fourth Amendment. 35 Determining whether the Amendment was in fact violated, however, is a different question, and requires the weighing of various factors to ascertain the reasonableness of the government's conduct. Generally, seizures conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment--subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2135, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Here, the government argues that the seizure of the marijuana was excused from the warrant requirement because it met all the dictates of Fourth Amendment reasonableness expressed in Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 120-22, 104 S.Ct. at 1660-61. 36 In Jacobsen, as discussed supra note 11, Federal Express employees tore open a package that had been inadvertently damaged. Observing plastic bags containing a white powder, they contacted a federal agent, who--after arriving without a warrant--removed the plastic bags from the box and performed a field test on its contents, which proved to be cocaine. Acknowledging that the agent's assertion of dominion and control over the package and its contents ... consitute[d] a 'seizure,'  id. at 120, 104 S.Ct. at 1660, the Court nonetheless found the seizure to be reasonable under the circumstances. The Court first reasoned that the package could no longer support any expectation of privacy and that such packages [can] be seized, at least temporarily, without a warrant. Id. at 121, 104 S.Ct. at 1660-61. In addition, the Court noted that it was apparent that the ... bags contained contraband and little else and that law enforcement officials may make warrantless seizures of  'effects' that cannot support a justifiable expectation of privacy ..., based on probable cause to believe they contain contraband. id. at 122-22, 104 S.Ct. at 1661. 37 Against this backdrop, the government claims that the prior conduct of Willard, Windell, W.R. Cox, and Croft, as well as Paige himself (i.e., there's fifty pounds of marijuana up there), extinguished any privacy interest Paige had in the marijuana. We have accepted this contention above. Moreover, we acknowledge that probable cause to believe the packages contained marijuana existed, as the attic had been viewed by W.R. Cox and Detective Croft, the latter being an experienced narcotics investigator. Because Paige no longer possessed a privacy expectation in the marijuana, and it was apparent that the [packages] contained contraband and little else, the government concludes that Jacobsen sanctified the warrantless seizure executed in this case. 38 We disagree with the government's argument, and in so doing, refuse to extend the holding in Jacobsen to cases involving permanent seizures. Unlike the seizure at issue in Jacobsen--which was designed only to be a temporary one for the purpose of investigating, seizing, and testing the package's contents--the seizure in the instant case was intended to be permanent from the outset. That the holding in Jacobsen was not intended to apply to permanent seizures--but only to temporary investigatory detentions of property--is made clear by the language used by the Court: Such containers [i.e., ones having no justifiable expectation of privacy] may be seized, at least temporarily, without a warrant[,] ... based on probable cause to believe they contain contraband. Id. at 121, 104 S.Ct. at 1662 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983) (finding that temporary, warrantless investigative detentions of luggage are justified under the Fourth Amendment, provided they are based at a minimum on a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the luggage contains contraband). Our interpretation of Jacobsen is consistent with its facts, as the officer in that case seized the package only for the time necessary to observe the bags contained therein and to perform a field test on a trace amount of the contents. After the test was completed, the package was rewrapped, a warrant was obtained to search the place to which it was addressed, and the warrant was executed. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 112, 104 S.Ct. at 1656. Although it is quite possible that the results of a temporary seizure may thereafter justify a more permanent seizure, see Place, 462 U.S. at 708-11, 103 S.Ct. at 2645-47, the Jacobsen Court did not address this possibility (with respect to the package at issue therein), and the government does not make that argument here. 12 As such, Jacobsen, which evaluated the reasonableness of an officer's warrantless, temporary seizure of a package, is distinguishable on its facts, and we refuse to apply it to the permanent seizure executed in this case. 39 We nonetheless find the government's permanent seizure of the marijuana in this case justified under the plain view doctrine. It is well established that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2307, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2037, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)). The Supreme Court has explained that the plain view doctrine reflects an application of the Fourth Amendment's central requirement of reasonableness to the law governing seizures of property. Soldal, 506 U.S. at 64, 113 S.Ct. at 546. 40 To ensure that the protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment are not eviscerated by the plain view doctrine, see Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465, 91 S.Ct. at 2037 ([I]t is important to keep in mind that, in the vast majority of cases, any evidence seized by the police will be in plain view, at least at the time of seizure.), the Supreme Court has identified several conditions that must be satisfied before a plain view seizure of an object is upheld: (1) the officer conducting the seizure must lawfully arrive at the position from which the object is plainly seen; (2) the object must be in plain view; (3) the object's incriminating character must be immediately apparent--i.e., the officer must have probable cause to believe the object is contraband or evidence of a crime; and (4) the officer must have a lawful right of access to the object itself. Horton, 496 U.S. at 136-37, 110 S.Ct. at 2307-08; Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 374-75, 113 S.Ct. at 2136-37; see also Buchanan, 70 F.3d at 825. After carefully reviewing the record, we find that each of these elements was satisfied in this case. 41 As explained above, we are satisfied that Detective Croft did not violate the Fourth Amendment in reaching the place from which the marijuana could be seen. While making this determination ordinarily involves analyzing whether a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement justified the officer's arrival at the plain-viewing position, we see no reason why this factor should not be applied literally to the unique factual circumstances of this case. Detective Croft's initial plain viewing of the marijuana sufficiently fell within the protective umbrella of the prior private-party searches. 42 Photographs of the attic introduced at trial show that Croft observed numerous packages--wrapped in an opaque, cellophane-like covering--aligned between the ceiling joists, and a scale stationed nearby. As the storing of marijuana in this manner is to be expected--i.e., rarely will the police come upon such a large quantity of marijuana and find it bare and unwrapped--we find that a further search of the packages to verify their contents was unnecessary--especially in light of the fact that the officer making the plain view was an experienced narcotics investigator who recognized the smell in the attic to be that of marijuana. In short, the packages were sufficiently exposed for the plain view doctrine to apply. 43 The next requirement for a valid plain view seizure is that the incriminating nature of the evidence must be immediately apparent, such that it gives rise to probable cause. Buchanan, 70 F.3d at 825-26 (citation omitted). Probable cause does not require certainty[,] ... and in reviewing probable cause determinations, we must consider the totality of the circumstances--including the officers' training and experience as well as their knowledge of the situation at hand. Id. (citations omitted). Here, Detective Croft was an experienced narcotics investigator working for the narcotics division of the Liberty County Sheriff's Department. Prior to his arrival at Paige's property, he was informed by W.R. Cox that Paige's attic likely contained marijuana. Croft's testimony reveals that as soon as he got to the top of the ladder, he recognized that he was viewing compacted, packaged marijuana for transport. Under these circumstances, we find that Detective Croft had probable cause to seize the packages of marijuana when he observed them. 44 The final requirement for a plain view seizure is that the officer have a rightful access to the evidence. One Circuit has stated that this prong of Horton is best understood as emphasizing that even though contraband plainly can be seen and identified from outside the premises, a warrantless entry into those premises to seize the contraband would not be justified.... G & G Jewelry, Inc. v. City of Oakland, 989 F.2d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir.1993). This factor[, therefore,] is [ordinarily] implicated in situations such as when an officer on the street sees an object through the window of a house, or when officers make observations via aerial photography or long-range surveillance. In those cases, the officers cannot use the plain view doctrine to justify a warrantless seizure, because to do so would require a warrantless entry upon private premises. United States v. Naugle, 997 F.2d 819 (10th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 997, 114 S.Ct. 562, 126 L.Ed.2d 462 (1993). 45 Although our decision in United States v. Whaley, 781 F.2d 417 (5th Cir.1986), predates the Supreme Court's holding in Horton, our reasoning therein is consistent with current interpretations of this factor. In Whaley, we held unlawful a warrantless seizure of marijuana growing on the curtilage of a home, despite the fact that an officer saw the marijuana in plain view from a lawful position on an adjacent road. Although it was unclear whether the officer had made a positive identification of the marijuana prior to his entry onto the property, our holding was not based on this factor. Instead, we observed that a warrantless seizure of objects from a residence is not authorized upon the mere off-premises sighting of on-premises contraband, Whaley, 781 F.2d at 420, and that there is a rightful distinction made between the seizure of property in plain view where there is no invasion of privacy and the situation where the sighted contraband is situated on private premises to which access is not otherwise available for the seizing officer. Id. at 421 (quotations and citations omitted). 46 In the instant case, not only did the marijuana no longer support an expectation of privacy, but Detective Croft's presence on the premises--up to and including his viewing of the marijuana--was lawful under the umbrella of the prior private-party searches. Consequently, we find that Detective Croft had a rightful access to the packages of marijuana. All the necessary conditions for a plain view seizure having been satisfied, the seizure of the forty-six (46) pounds of marijuana from Paige's attic was reasonable under the circumstances. 47 In summary, we hold that (1) Detective Croft's initial viewing of the marijuana did not rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment search, and (2) the officers' subsequent seizure of the marijuana, although not justified under the Supreme Court's holding in Jacobsen, was valid under the plain view doctrine. 13 Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Paige's motion to suppress.