Opinion ID: 1351145
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Admissibility of the Vaught/Scheffler other crimes evidence

Text: As noted above, defendant admitted killing Miller, but denied an intent to kill, asserting he experienced diminished capacity at the time. He denied killing Sowers, and denied his motive was to rape Sowers. In order to prove defendant's intent and motive, and to disprove his diminished capacity claim, the prosecution sought to introduce evidence of the Vaught/Scheffler killings. After extensive hearings, the court ruled it would admit the other crimes evidence for the stated purposes (to prove intent and motive, and to disprove diminished capacity), but not to prove identity. Defendant presented rebuttal evidence tending to show that others  two Black men in a maroon Firebird  committed the Vaught/Scheffler killings. (17a) He now asserts the court erred in holding admissible the evidence concerning the Vaught/Scheffler killings. We recently considered similar claims in People v. Robbins (1988) 45 Cal.3d 867, 879 [248 Cal. Rptr. 172, 755 P.2d 355], in which the defendant similarly admitted the act of killing his victim, but denied intent to kill or intent to engage in lewd conduct with his victim. (18a) We held, `[a]s with other types of circumstantial evidence, ... admissibility [of other crimes evidence] depends upon three principal factors: (1) the materiality of the fact sought to be proved or disproved; (2) the tendency of the uncharged crime to prove or disprove the material fact; and (3) the existence of any rule or policy requiring the exclusion of relevant evidence.' ( Id., at p. 879, italics in original, quoting People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 315 [165 Cal. Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883].) (17b) Defendant admitted the Miller killing but denied intending to kill him because of diminished capacity; he asserted his sole intent was to rob. Under these circumstances, defendant's intent and motivation were disputed material issues. (See People v. Kelly (1967) 66 Cal.2d 232, 242-243 [57 Cal. Rptr. 363, 424 P.2d 947].) The evidence was also relevant to those disputed issues. (18b) As we explained in Robbins, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pages 879-880, [T]o be relevant, an uncharged offense must tend logically, naturally and by reasonable inference to prove the issue(s) on which it is offered. [Citations.] We have long recognized `that if a person acts similarly in similar situations, he probably harbors the same intent in each instance' [citations], and that such prior conduct may be relevant circumstantial evidence of the actor's most recent intent. The inference to be drawn is not that the actor is disposed to commit such acts; instead, the inference to be drawn is that, in light of the first event, the actor, at the time of the second event, must have had the intent attributed to him by the prosecution. (45 Cal.3d at p. 879; see id., at pp. 879-880, quoting Wigmore's explanation of the use of other crimes evidence.) (17c) The Vaught/Scheffler crimes were substantially similar (see Robbins, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 880) to the charged offenses, and hence sufficient to raise an inference that the charged offenses were committed with the charged intent(s). First, and contrary to defendant's suggestion, the fact that the trial court believed the crimes insufficiently similar to justify their use to prove identity, did not preclude the court from concluding they were sufficiently similar to establish intent. As we noted in Robbins, supra, when evidence of an uncharged offense is introduced to prove intent, the prosecution need not show the same quantum of `similarity' as when uncharged conduct is used to prove identity. ( Ibid. ) Second, as to both sets of crimes, the evidence showed defendant forced Charlene to drive to a mall in Sacramento to undertake a hunt for young women and lure the victims into his vehicle; he tied the victims' hands behind their backs; he took them to rural locations, removed them from Charlene's presence, and took them to a separate spot for execution. Each victim was shot in the head at point-blank range with a handgun, and each time defendant and Charlene threw the gun into the Sacramento River on the day after the killings. This evidence amply supports the trial court's implicit conclusion that the uncharged crimes tended logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference to prove defendant's intent and motive in the charged crimes. (See Robbins, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 880.) Finally, we reject defendant's suggestion the trial court abused its discretion in failing to exclude the other crimes evidence under Evidence Code section 352, or any other similar rule or policy. We specifically reject defendant's suggestion that the evidence was inadmissible simply because there may have existed independent evidence sufficient to sustain the People's claim that defendant had the intent to kill. (See Comment, A Proposed Analytical Method for the Determination of the Admissibility of Evidence of Other Offenses in California (1960) 7 UCLA L.Rev. 463, 482.) Defendant admitted killing Miller, but denied any intent to kill, and presented a formal diminished capacity defense. Under these circumstances we are not prepared to say the trial court erred in its implicit conclusion that the other crimes evidence was necessary to prove defendant's intent; nor are we prepared to say, as defendant appears to suggest, that the other crimes evidence was cumulative on this point, or that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding the probative value of the evidence on this crucial point outweighed its prejudicial effect.