Opinion ID: 1296917
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Effect of 1981 USDOJ Objection to Redistricting Plan and Decision of Federal District Court in Cavanagh v. Brock

Text: Focusing on correspondence received from the USDOJ during 1981 and 1982, defendants assert that the USDOJ's objection to the 1981 State legislative redistricting plans now renders the WCP unenforceable. They also contend that Cavanagh v. Brock, 577 F.Supp. 176, controls the resolution of this issue. Finally, they assert that plaintiffs' interpretation of the State constitutional provisions, when coupled with the effect of the VRA, will result in a rewrite of the State Constitution and a mechanical interpretation of the same. With regard to the USDOJ's objection to the 1981 proposed legislative redistricting plansplans that failed to include any majority-minority VRA districtsthe USDOJ indicated that it was unable to conclude that North Carolina's application of the WCP at that time did not have a discriminatory purpose or effect in the forty covered counties. In a letter dated 30 November 1981, the USDOJ pointed out that its analysis show[ed] that the prohibition against dividing the forty covered counties in the formation of Senate and House districts predictably require[d], and ha[d] led to the use of large, multi-member districts. Letter from William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice, to Alex Brock, Executive Secretary-Director, N.C. State Board of Elections (Nov. 30, 1981) [hereinafter 1981 USDOJ letter]. Thus, in reviewing the 1968 constitutional amendments, the USDOJ analyzed these amendments in the context of redistricting plans that included large, multi-member districts. The USDOJ further stated in this letter: This determination with respect to the jurisdictions covered by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act should in no way be regarded as precluding the State from following a policy of preserving county lines whenever feasible in formulating its new districts. Indeed, this is the policy in many states, subject only to the preclearance requirements of Section 5, where applicable. Id. In a subsequent letter dated 20 January 1982, the USDOJ specifically concluded that the use of large, multi-member districts effectively submerge[d] sizable concentrations of black population[s] into a majority white electorate. Letter from William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice, to Alex Brock, Executive Secretary-Director, N.C. State Board of Elections (Jan. 20, 1982) [hereinafter 1982 USDOJ letter]. On this basis, the 1981 plans were not precleared. It is apparent from the full context of these letters that the USDOJ concluded that the plans, as then submitted, would result in large multi-member districts having a retrogressive effect on minority voters. Nowhere in these letters is there a statement that the amendments themselves are considered either unconstitutional or unenforceable in conjunction with an acceptable redistricting plan having no retrogressive effect, and defendants have offered no authority supporting such a proposition. Our opinion that the 1981 and 1982 USDOJ letters do not abrogate the WCP is buttressed by the USDOJ's issuance of its administrative guidance for states concerning redistricting under the VRA. These guidelines provide: [C]ompliance with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act may require the jurisdiction to depart from strict adherence to certain of its redistricting criteria. For example, criteria which require the jurisdiction to ... follow county, city, or precinct boundaries ... may need to give way to some degree to avoid retrogression. Guidance Concerning Redistricting and Retrogression Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973c, 66 Fed.Reg. 5413 (Jan. 18, 2001) (emphasis added). The USDOJ Civil Rights Division clearly considers following political boundaries, including county lines, to be an acceptable criterion but one that may have to give way to some degree in order to avoid retrogression. Significantly, both the USDOJ's letters to the State of North Carolina and its own administrative guidelines reflect that states need only modify, not necessarily abrogate, the application of whole-county redistricting limitations. Thus, our review of the USDOJ's position on the WCP, as represented by its response to North Carolina's submission in 1981 and its administrative regulations concerning use of whole-county requirements, leads us to conclude that the WCP is not facially illegal or unenforceable relative to federal law. We believe our interpretation naturally flows from the language of the USDOJ's representation that its policy should in no way be regarded as precluding the State [of North Carolina] from following a policy of preserving county lines whenever feasible in formulating new districts. The 1981 USDOJ letter, by its own terms, merely disallows a redistricting plan that adheres strictly to a whole-county criterion without complying with the VRA. Defendants further argue that Cavanagh, 577 F.Supp. 176, voided the WCP. For the reasons set forth below, we respectfully disagree with the District Court's interpretation of the State Constitution. See Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Board of Comm'rs of Weld Cty., 247 U.S. 282, 287, 38 S.Ct. 510, 512, 62 L.Ed. 1110, 1117 (1918); see also Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 342 (4th Cir.1996) (Our holdings on questions of state law do not bind state courts), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1120, 117 S.Ct. 2511, 138 L.Ed.2d 1014 (1997); Preston, 325 N.C. at 449-50, 385 S.E.2d at 479; White v. Pate, 308 N.C. 759, 766, 304 S.E.2d 199, 203 (1983). As previously noted, North Carolina courts should first determine whether provisions of the State Constitution, as interpreted under state law, are inconsistent with federal law before applying a severability analysis. Where, as here, the primary purpose of the WCP can be effected to a large degree without conflict with federal law, it should be adhered to by the General Assembly to the maximum extent possible. [4] Also, in addressing the intent of the General Assembly, the District Court in Cavanagh apparently failed to consider the history of North Carolina's use of whole-county districts for nearly 200 years prior to 1964. The Court in Cavanagh cited no authority to support its conclusion that the General Assembly in 1968 would not have intended or desired to adopt the WCP if that provision could not be fully applicable in all counties. Furthermore, the Court's ruling in Cavanagh was not a necessary conclusion based on the 1981 USDOJ letter concerning whole-county districts. As discussed above, the USDOJ's objection to the 1981 redistricting plans does not stand for the proposition that the constitutional whole-county provisions are per se unenforceable. For all these reasons, we reject defendants' contention that the District Court's holding in Cavanagh should be followed in our interpretation of the North Carolina Constitution. We also reject defendants' assertion that enforcement of the WCP in some way rewrites the State Constitution. Defendants contend, among other things, that allowing the WCP to retain some measure of enforceability tacitly adds new words to these provisions, i.e., counties may not be split except to the extent required by federal law. Defendants overlook the fact, however, that compliance with federal law is not an implied, but rather an express condition to the enforceability of every provision in the State Constitution. Moreover, our holding accords the fullest effect possible to the stated intentions of the people through their duly adopted State Constitution, the subject provisions of which have remained in place without amendment since 1971. Defendants' all-or-nothing interpretation is inordinately mechanical in its application, leaving no room to carry out the spirit or intent of the State Constitution in contravention of time-honored principles of federalism. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 2377, 138 L.Ed.2d 914, 935-36 (1997). This construction needlessly burdens millions of citizens with unnecessarily complicated and confusing district lines. Since Cavanagh, many North Carolina legislative districts have been increasingly gerrymandered to a degree inviting widespread contempt and ridicule. See, e.g., Red-Light District: It's time to draw the line on gerrymandering, John Fund's Political Diary, WSJ.com Opinion Journal from the Wall Street Journal Editorial Page, at http://www.opinionjournal.com/ diary/?id= XXXXXXXXX (Mar. 13, 2002) ([e]lections in many semifree Third World nations routinely offer more choices than many North Carolina residents will have under the 2001 legislative redistricting plans); How to Rig an Election, The Economist, Apr. 27, 2002, at 29, 30 (In a normal democracy, voters choose their representatives. In America, it is rapidly becoming the other way around and asserting that North Carolina [has been] long notorious for outrageous reapportionment.) We thus hold that because the General Assembly enacted its 2001 legislative redistricting plans in violation of the WCP, N.C. Const. art. II, §§ 3(3), 5(3), these plans are unconstitutional and are therefore void. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on this claim.