Opinion ID: 3134232
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the government's recommendations and guidelines

Text: governing the collection and processing and distribution of blood and blood products. Cf. IPI Civil 3d No. 105.03.01. In this court, each party specifically argues that the plain language of section 3 supports its interpretation. UBS claims that the provision's end phrase, according to the current state of the medical arts, modifies the dual obligation to both exercise[ ] due care and follow[ ] professional standards of care. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 111½, par. 5103. As one amicus curiae states it, [t]he overarching reference to the `current state of the medical arts' makes clear that the legislature intended negligence actions against blood banks and blood and plasma processors to be governed by a professional standard of care and that blood providers must exercise due care in conforming to that standard. Like UBS, plaintiff also argues that the express terms of section 3 impose dual obligations, but she interprets the phrase follow[ ] professional standards of care as professional rules, not legal standards of care. Plaintiff claims that UBS's interpretation renders superfluous the first obligation, to exercise due care, which result violates a basic statutory construction principle. The primary rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the true intent of the legislature and inquiry into legislative intent must begin with the language of the statute. People v. Lowe, 153 Ill. 2d 195 (1992). In order to determine legislative intent, a statute must be read as a whole and all relevant parts must be considered by the court. See Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391 (1994). In doing so, courts must give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning. See People v. Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d 450 (1994). A term of well-known legal significance can be presumed to have that meaning in a statute. See Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp., 111