Opinion ID: 1058670
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: A court has discretion in the exercise of its contempt power. Sapp v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 415, 425, 559 S.E.2d 645, 650 (2002); see also Leisge v. Leisge, 224 Va. 303, 309-10, 296 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1982). It is within the discretion of the trial court to conduct civil contempt proceedings, Arvin, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 215 Va. 704, 706, 213 S.E.2d 753, 755 (1975), thus we review the exercise of a court's contempt power under an abuse of discretion standard. Tonti v. Akbari, 262 Va. 681, 687, 553 S.E.2d 769, 772 (2001). Because the judicial contempt power is a potent weapon, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1291 v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64, 76, 88 S.Ct. 201, 19 L.Ed.2d 236 (1967), our centuries-old jurisprudence has long provided that contempt lies for disobedience of what is decreed, not for what may be decreed. Taliaferro v. Horde, 22 Va. (1 Rand.) 242, 247 (1822). Additionally, before a person may be held in contempt for violating a court order, the order must be in definite terms as to the duties thereby imposed upon him and the command must be expressed rather than implied. Winn v. Winn, 218 Va. 8, 10, 235 S.E.2d 307, 309 (1977). Thus, there must be an express command or prohibition which has been violated in order for a proceeding in contempt to lie. French v. Pobst, 203 Va. 704, 710, 127 S.E.2d 137, 141 (1962). The March 14, 2005 rule to show cause stated that Petrosinelli apparently violated the circuit court's prior orders of January 24, 2005, April 16, 2004 and December 9, 2004 (the three orders) by issuing the Kendall subpoena. The August 26, 2005 order finding contempt simply stated, Joseph G. Petrosinelli is adjudged in contempt but did not identify which order or orders were found to be the source of the contempt. At the May 25, 2005 hearing on the rule to show cause, the circuit court discussed the three orders but emphasized the January 24, 2005 order as a particular order Petrosinelli violated because that order was a clear order denying access to discovery and what was done with this subpoena to Kendall was precisely an attempt to access discovery in [PETA I]. . . . That's what it was, just a blatant violation of that order. The court then concluded that there was contempt pursuant to Virginia Code Section 18.2-456(5). We therefore review the language of the three orders to determine whether the circuit court abused its discretion in adjudging Petrosinelli in contempt. Each of the three orders is short, with the pertinent adjudication of the court stated in one sentence. The January 24, 2005 order provides only that Feld's Motion to Access is DENIED for the reasons stated from the bench. The April 16, 2004 order states only that Feld's Motion to consolidate the matter for trial and discovery is denied. The December 9, 2004 order states only that Feld's Motion to Consolidate is granted as to trial, but denied as to discovery. Petrosinelli contends, as he did in the circuit court, that he did not violate any of the three orders. Petrosinelli argues that no order of the court barred a subpoena to depose Kendall in PETA II. Because Kendall was a Pennsylvania resident, Petrosinelli avers that the distinct possibility existed in which Feld would be unable to depose Kendall at all if he failed to act when he did. By issuing the subpoena in PETA II, Petrosinelli argues he was attempting in good faith to follow the court's orders while also preserving Feld's right to take the deposition of a key witness. As Kendall would agree to sit for only one deposition, Petrosinelli contends Feld faced the likely result that a Pennsylvania court would protect Kendall from multiple depositions on essentially the same subject matter as represented by PETA I and PETA II. If that occurred, Petrosinelli argues, PETA would have the benefit of Kendall's deposition in PETA I to use in PETA II, but Feld would have been foreclosed from that information. Petrosinelli also contends that the circuit court inappropriately relied on a mere implication that he could not depose Kendall as its basis for holding him in contempt. Petrosinelli insists that by issuing a separate subpoena deposition to Kendall, he was in compliance with the circuit court's ruling that discovery be separate between PETA I and PETA II. In response, PETA asserts that Petrosinelli was found in contempt because he engineer[ed] a consolidated deposition with Kendall for PETA I and PETA II in direct violation of the three orders. PETA insists that it is crucial to consider the context of the circuit court's third denial of consolidated discovery in the January 24, 2005 order, when examining whether Petrosinelli acted contemptuously. PETA avers that the three orders provided Petrosinelli with explicit notice of what was required of him, yet Petrosinelli willfully defied the orders and effectively attempted to consolidate discovery. Because the circuit court's January 24, 2005 order included language that the court had denied consolidated discovery for the reasons stated from the bench, PETA contends this provided Petrosinelli with sufficient notice of what was required. Finally, PETA argues that even if Petrosinelli did not violate explicit orders of the circuit court, his egregious misbehavior in obstructing the administration of justice by causing the Kendall deposition subpoena to be issued at the same date and time but at a different location as the deposition for PETA I, constitutes contempt. We agree with Petrosinelli. In reviewing the three orders, we do not find an express prohibition on the issuance of a subpoena to Kendall by Feld or any other party. The three orders did not expressly command or prohibit Petrosinelli from acting to depose a witness, and Petrosinelli issued the subpoena only in PETA II. The text of the three orders is devoid of any prohibition regarding the issuance of a subpoena to Kendall or any other person. A court generally speaks through its written orders. McMillion v. Dryvit Sys., 262 Va. 463, 469, 552 S.E.2d 364, 367 (2001). We presume that the written orders accurately reflect what transpired during the court's proceedings. Waterfront Marine Constr. v. North End 49ers Sandbridge Bulkhead Groups, 251 Va. 417, 427 n. 2, 468 S.E.2d 894, 900 n. 2 (1996). While a court's contempt power encompasses written orders as well as oral orders, commands and directions of the court, Robertson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 520, 537, 25 S.E.2d 352, 359 (1943), a duty that arises by implication cannot sustain a finding of contempt. See, e.g., Winn, 218 Va. at 10-11, 235 S.E.2d at 309. If there was any prohibition upon Petrosinelli against subpoenaing Kendall for a deposition in PETA II, such a duty was, at best, an implication from general remarks of the court made in prior hearings. Petrosinelli was never explicitly prohibited by a court order from issuing the Kendall subpoena. Mere implication of a duty cannot form the basis of a contempt judgment. Id. Rather, the three orders, each of which denied joint discovery in PETA I and PETA II, merely declare[d] the rights of the parties without an express command or prohibition. French, 203 Va. at 710, 127 S.E.2d at 141. As we stated in French, there must be an express command or prohibition to support a finding of contempt. Id. No such express command or prohibition exists that prohibited Petrosinelli from issuing the subpoena to Kendall. Thus, after a review of the three orders, we hold that the circuit court abused its discretion when it adjudged Petrosinelli in contempt of court. Petrosinelli's subpoena to Kendall in PETA II was not a violation of any express order of the court and thus could not be an act of contempt as a matter of law.