Opinion ID: 1782182
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Did District Court Err in Transferring Property?

Text: In its third assignment of error, the taxpayers argue that the freeholders should not have been permitted to file amended petitions before the district court; in their fourth assignment of error, the taxpayers more generally argue that the district court erred in transferring the property in question to the Hartington school district because of the various deficiencies in the petitions filed before the Board. The disposition of both these assignments of error is dependent upon an understanding of how the appeal provided by § 79-458(5) works. That subsection provides that appeals are taken in the same manner as appeals are now taken from the action of the county board in the allowance or disallowance of claims against the county. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 23-135 (Reissue 2007) provides for appeals from actions of a county board allowing or disallowing claims against the county. Case law under that section, as well as under § 79-458, provides that appeals are taken as a trial de novo before the district court. [14] In In re Covault Freeholder Petition, [15] we explained the trial de novo: When an appeal is conducted as a trial de novo, as opposed to a trial de novo on the record, it means literally a new hearing and not merely new findings of fact based upon a previous record. A trial de novo is conducted as though the earlier trial had not been held in the first place, and evidence is taken anew as such evidence is available at the time of the trial on appeal. Miller v. School Dist. No. 69 [16] and In re Covault Freeholder Petition both provide examples of the operation of a trial de novo. In Miller, certain property owners wished to transfer property from a school district in Pawnee County, Nebraska, an accredited school district, to a neighboring school district in Gage County, Nebraska, a nonaccredited school district. At that time, state law provided that property could not be transferred from an accredited district to a nonaccredited district. A statutory board composed of city officials from the counties at issue nevertheless approved the transfer, and that approval was upheld by the district court. We affirmed, noting the record showed that by the time of the district court's action upholding the transfer, the school district in Gage County had become formally accredited. We discussed Miller in In re Covault Freeholder Petition, an opinion consolidating three appeals, in which one appeal presented similar facts. The freeholders wished to transfer property from a school district in Table Rock, Nebraska, to a school district in Pawnee City, Nebraska. The transfer was ordered by the county board and upheld by the district court. At that time, the statute provided that property could only be transferred from a nonaccredited district to an accredited district; as of the date of the transfer, the Table Rock school districtthe district from which transfer was soughtwas not accredited, while the Pawnee City school district was accredited. The district court held that it could not consider the fact that Table Rock had been advised of its accreditation and would be accredited before the new school year began, but must instead consider the status of the district as it existed on the date on which the freeholder board met. The district court also held that it could not consider evidence as to the status of Table Rock on the date of the trial, but was only to determine whether Table Rock was accredited on the date the freeholder board met. [17] Citing Miller, this court disagreed: [W]hen the trial court considered this matter ... it should have taken into account the fact that the district was now accredited and that the [petitioners] did not meet the necessary requirements of [the statute]. . . . . In the instant case all of the requirements necessary to effect accreditation of the Table Rock school district had been met prior to the time that the statutory board ordered the transfer, and in fact the formal certification was granted prior to the time the children began school and prior to the time the district court acted on the appeal. It was therefore error for the district court not to consider those facts. [18] Against this backdrop, we consider the taxpayers' arguments that the freeholders should not have been allowed to amend their petitions and that the deficiencies of the original petitions precluded the district court from approving the transfer by the Board. Miller and In re Covault Freeholder Petition both make it clear that the district court is to consider the facts as they existed at the time of the trial before the district court in concluding whether the transfer was appropriate. And, aside from the various deficiencies discussed above, and contiguity, to be discussed below, there is no allegation that the transfers were not authorized under § 79-458. In fact, except for contiguity, the parties stipulated to each requirement under the statute. We also conclude that because the district court was allowed to accept new evidence and consider the question of transfer anew, it did not err in allowing the filing of new or amended petitions. The district court did not err in allowing the filing of new petitions or in transferring the property in question. The taxpayers' third and fourth assignments of error are without merit.