Opinion ID: 335494
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Timber Cases.

Text: 16 As an alternative to the Indian title defense, the timber appellants contend that they cannot be convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 641, but only under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1852, 1853. Section 641 is a general statute covering theft of government property; sections 1852 and 1853 specifically prohibit cutting, removing, injuring, or destroying timber on public and other government lands. 17 At common law, growing trees were considered to be real, rather than personal property (5 American Law of Property § 19.15 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952)), and thus not the subject of larceny until severed from the land. (52A C.J.S. Larceny § 3(3)a(b)-(c) (1968).) If severance was effected by natural causes, or by someone other than the thief, the timber became personal property and asportation by the thief constituted larceny. When the thief himself cut the trees, the line between larceny and simple trespass on real property was drawn on the basis of whether severance and asportation were separate and independent acts or different parts of a continuous act. If the latter, there was no larceny because the trees retained their character as realty. (Id.; cf. United States v. Wagner (C.C.D.C.1806) 28 F.Cas. 386 (No. 16,630) (severance and carrying away of fence rails in one continued act constitutes trespass).) Not surprisingly, this distinction has been criticized as subtle and illogical. (52A C.J.S., supra.) 18 Counsel for appellants seems to argue that the cutting and taking of the trees were one continuous act, that unless altered by statute the common law defines the offense as trespass, that sections 1852 and 1853, but not section 641, changed the common law rule, and that therefore appellants could only be prosecuted under sections 1852 and 1853, or, presumably, a trespass statute. 19 We have previously rejected the argument that severance and asportation can be merged to convert theft into trespass and thereby foreclose prosecution under section 641. Although Magnolia Motor & Logging Co. v. United States (9th Cir. 1959) 264 F.2d 950, paid lip service to the common-law doctrine in finding distinct acts (id. at 954), our opinion in United States v. Cedar (9th Cir. 1971) 437 F.2d 1033, excluded the possibility of there being only one continuous act in a timber theft situation. The defendant there cut and removed Christmas trees and was convicted of unlawful cutting (§ 1853) and theft (§ 641). On appeal he claimed that the sentences should run concurrently since the one crime merged into the other. We rejected his claim and held that the two statutes serve distinct public purposes and create separate offenses: cutting and theft. (Id. at 1036.) 20 The appellants in this case not only cut the trees but also carried them away. The latter act is a separate offense under section 641. 21 The final contention of the appellants in the timber cases is that the trial judge abused his discretion in imposing the maximum period of confinement for each of the adult offenders and in sentencing Wilson under the Federal Youth Corrections Act. An appellate court will not normally review sentences. (United States v. Stockwell (9th Cir. 1973) 472 F.2d 1186, 1187; Gollaher v. United States (9th Cir. 1969) 419 F.2d 520, 530.) The sentences of the adult offenders were within the statutory range of penalties, and the trial court provided for concurrent rather than consecutive sentences for both appellants. No fine was imposed, although section 641 authorizes a fine of up to $1000. The district court found that Wilson was 19 years of age at the time of conviction and suitable for sentencing under the Federal Youth Corrections Act. (Cf. Dorszynski v. United States (1974) 418 U.S. 424, 442-45, 94 S.Ct. 3042, 3052, 41 L.Ed.2d 855, 867.) Although the sentences might be considered severe under the circumstances of these cases, they are within the limits of discretion committed to the district court. 22