Opinion ID: 1060390
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: in-house counsel and the tort of retaliatory discharge

Text: Tennessee has long adhered to the employment-at-will doctrine in employment relationships not established or formalized by a contract for a definite term. See, e.g., Bennett v. Steiner-Liff Iron & Metal Co., 826 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tenn.1992). Under this employment at will doctrine, both the employer and the employee are generally permitted, with certain exceptions, to terminate the employment relationship at any time for good cause, bad cause, or no cause. See Sullivan v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp., 995 S.W.2d 569, 574 (Tenn.1999). This relationship recognizes (1) that employers should be free to make their own business judgments without undue court interference, see Mason v. Seaton, 942 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Tenn.1997), and (2) that employees may refuse to work for a [person] or company and may exercise [their rights] in the same way, to the same extent, for the same cause or want of cause as the employer, see Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. (13 Lea) 507, 518-19 (1884), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 544, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (1915). Indeed, this Court has noted that an employer's `ability to make and act upon independent assessments of an employee's abilities and job performance as well as business needs is essential to the free-enterprise system.' Mason, 942 S.W.2d at 474 (quoting Clifford v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 419 Mich. 356, 353 N.W.2d 469, 474 (1984)). However, an employer's ability to discharge at-will employees was significantly tempered by our recognition in Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn.1984), of a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. Since that time, we have further recognized that an at-will employee generally may not be discharged for attempting to exercise a statutory or constitutional right, or for any other reason which violates a clear public policy which is evidenced by an unambiguous constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision. See Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714, 716-17 (Tenn.1997). Therefore, in contrast to the purposes typically justifying the employment-at-will doctrine, an action for retaliatory discharge recognizes that, in limited circumstances, certain well-defined, unambiguous principles of public policy confer upon employees implicit rights which must not be circumscribed or chilled by the potential of termination. Id. This Court has not previously addressed the issue of whether a lawyer may pursue a claim of retaliatory discharge against a former employer. At least initially, we must recognize that this case differs significantly from the usual retaliatory discharge case involving non-lawyer employees. When the discharged employee served as in-house counsel, the issue demands an inquiry into the corporation's expectations as the lawyer's sole employer and client, the lawyer's ethical obligations to the corporation, and the interest of the lawyerin her character as an employeein having protections available to other employees seeking redress of legal harm. Therefore, because this issue is one of first impression in this state, it is perhaps helpful to examine how other jurisdictions have addressed it.