Opinion ID: 3046977
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Regulation Is A Reasonable Construction

Text: of the Statute Every court of appeals to have considered the issue has concluded that the regulation constitutes a reasonable construction of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).1 We agree. Under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984), we are required to determine, as an initial matter, whether Congress “has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Congress has not done so here, for 1 See Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 493-94 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); Lorenzo v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1278, 1283-84 (10th Cir. 2007); Ochoa-Carrillo v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 842, 846 (8th Cir. 2006); De Sandoval v. Attorney General, 440 F.3d 1276, 1280-83 (11th Cir. 2006); Tilley v. Chertoff, 2005 WL 1950796, at  (6th Cir. Aug. 15, 2005); Lattab v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 8, 17-20 (1st Cir. 2004). 5 the statute does not specify the procedures to be used to reinstate a prior order of removal. Accordingly, we proceed to the second prong of Chevron, and determine whether the regulation promulgated by the Attorney General is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843. Ponta-Garcia’s primary complaint is that the regulation does not provide for a hearing before an immigration judge. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(a) (providing that an alien subject to a reinstatement determination “has no right to a hearing before an immigration judge”). He argues that the statutory scheme must be interpreted to provide for a hearing by an immigration judge because of the exclusivity clause of 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Indeed, § 1229a does state that “[a]n immigration judge shall conduct all proceedings for deciding the inadmissibility or deportability of an alien.” Moreover, § 1229a(3) provides that “[u]nless otherwise specified under this chapter, a proceeding under this section shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining whether an alien may be admitted to the United States, or, if the alien has been so admitted, removed from the United States.” On their face, these statutory provisions would appear to govern reinstatement determinations, as such determinations involve the “deportability of an alien” and can result in his or her “remov[al] from the United States.” Id. However, in line with the other courts that have considered this issue, see supra note 1, we conclude that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), the sole statute dealing with reinstatement determinations, is an “otherwise specified” exception to the exclusivity clause. Section 1231(a)(5) makes quite clear Congress’s intent to expedite and streamline reinstatement determinations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (providing that an order of removal is “not subject to being reopened or reviewed” at a reinstatement determination, disallowing “relief under this chapter,” and declaring that “the alien shall be removed under the prior order at any time after the reentry”). The Attorney General concluded that the goal of streamlining would be advanced by providing previously-removed aliens with review only by an immigration officer. 6 This conclusion is reasonable in light of the circumstances presented by reinstatement determinations: aliens subject to reinstatement have already been ordered removed, and thus have already been provided with the requisite procedures and review. The risk of error is much reduced under such circumstances, and the regulation properly reflects this reality. Section 1231(a)(5) has reasonably been interpreted as an exception to § 1229a.2