Opinion ID: 694371
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was summary judgment proper on the Letterkenny switch?

Text: 27 The only switch as to which the district court reached the merits of the dispute was the one sold to Letterkenny Army Depot. Northern Telecom sent invoices to the Army for this switch in 1987 and 1989. Although the district court decided which law applied on the basis of when the claims were paid, we need not reach the question of whether the invoice date, the acceptance date or the payment date controls, because all dates relevant to the Letterkenny switch occurred after the 1986 law became effective. 28 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Northern Telecom, because Mr. Anderson failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Northern Telecom submitted a false claim in violation of the statute. We review de novo, Dowling, 19 F.3d at 447, and affirm. 29 One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims.... Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). It is not a disfavored procedural shortcut, but has replaced pre-1938 devices as the principal tool[ ] by which factually insufficient claims or defenses [can] be isolated and prevented from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private resources. Id. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2555. [T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original). 30 The judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. 31 Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512. If the facts make a claim implausible, the non-movant must present more persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary in order to defeat a summary judgment motion. California Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1006, 108 S.Ct. 698, 98 L.Ed.2d 650 (1988). Although the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the opponent of the motion, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in his favor, the inferences are limited to those upon which a reasonable jury might return a verdict. T.W. Elec. Svc., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th Cir.1987). 32 For a qui tam action to survive summary judgment, the relator must produce sufficient evidence to support an inference of knowing fraud. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1420. The requisite intent is the knowing presentation of what is known to be false, as opposed to innocent mistake or mere negligence. Hagood, 929 F.2d at 1421. Bad math is no fraud, proof of mistakes is not evidence that one is a cheat, and the common failings of engineers and other scientists are not culpable under the Act. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1420-21. The statutory phrase known to be false does not mean 'scientifically untrue'; it means 'a lie.'  Id. at 1421. 33 The gist of Mr. Anderson's claim is that all the switches to which his lawsuit refers lacked proper grounding, so they would not work properly, and could be dangerous if certain parts were touched at certain times. The grounding on a number of switches was changed by a later enhancement, after deficiencies in performance were discovered. Grounding the switch better apparently reduced noise and hum, reduced the error rate in transmissions of digital data, and gave better protection and isolation to switch components. 34 Northern Telecom's senior electrical engineer on the project stated in his declaration that the Letterkenny switch was different from the others, and had the new grounding feature built in from the beginning. Mr. Anderson's evidence included a Northern Telecom internal document called 1987 Enhanced Grounding Schedule which showed that something was planned for the Letterkenny switch in March 1987. Northern Telecom's engineer explained in his declaration that this was not the same grounding fix as was needed on the older switches, but was a different and simpler change. 35 The engineer's declaration does not show that the Letterkenny switch had no defects. But Mr. Anderson's proof does not show any knowing presentation of a false or fraudulent claim. All it shows is that Northern Telecom's engineers built a switch that was not satisfactory, and after installing it, they fixed it. Regardless of whether presentation of a claim for payment for the inadequately grounded switch would have been a violation of the statute, the evidence does not show any such presentation. These are the relevant dates: 36 Northern Telecom installs the Letterkenny switch--March 1986 37 Northern Telecom fixes the ground--March 1987 38 Army accepts the switch--October 1987, August 1989 39 Northern Telecom bills Army--November 1987, August 1989 40 Army pays Northern Telecom--December 1987, September 1989 41 Basically, the switch was installed, it had bugs, the bugs were fixed, and then the vendor billed the Army and was paid. The Army and Northern Telecom discovered the problems in the switch when it was put into service in March of 1986. At that point, Northern Telecom began a year and a half of work to bring this and other switches up to a level of performance satisfactory to the Army. An October 31, 1986 Northern Telecom internal memorandum says [t]he Letterkenny switch was cutover (in service) on March 14, 1986 with deficiencies, and [s]ince that time, we have been endeavoring to get the issues resolved ... such that we can accomplish the ... acceptance test and get the Army to agree to pay us. However, it took a long time to figure out whether the hum on the line was caused by fluorescent lights, the AC power supply, dirt, installation error, some aspect of the switches, or any number of other possibilities, and to figure out what to do about it. 42 Mr. Anderson offered no evidence to prove the contrary. He used the same materials outlined above to show that when the Letterkenny switch was installed, it was not as good as it should have been. But the qui tam action does not lie for the ordinary failings of engineers. It requires knowing presentation of a false or fraudulent claim. Mr. Anderson submitted affidavits of two people who worked on telecommunications purchases at different military bases, not Letterkenny Army Depot. Their bases received switches different from the Letterkenny switch. One said the Air Force usually approved Northern Telecom's proposed testing procedures. The other said if [Anderson's] allegations are true, I believe I should have been told. This evidence does not establish a genuine issue as to whether Northern Telecom knowingly presented a false claim for the Letterkenny Army Depot switch. 43 There is no direct evidence, and no evidence from which a jury could reasonably draw an inference, that Northern Telecom knowingly presented a false or fraudulent claim to the Army for the Letterkenny switch. There is evidence that, when installed, the Letterkenny switch did not work properly. But no reasonable jury could draw an inference of presentation of a false or fraudulent claim from that. The Army knew the switch was unsatisfactory, and expressed its dissatisfaction. There is no evidence in the record that Northern Telecom knowingly presented a false or fraudulent claim for the switch.