Opinion ID: 2633341
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Good Cause Instruction

Text: {12} The standard of review we apply to [the good cause instruction] depends on whether the issue has been preserved. State v. Benally, 2001-NMSC-033, ¶ 12, 131 N.M. 258, 34 P.3d 1134. If Defendant preserved the error, we review the given instructions under a reversible error standard. Id. If Defendant failed to preserve the issue for review, we review for fundamental error. Id. Thus, we must first address the State's claim that the good cause instruction should be reviewed only for fundamental error. {13} The State maintains that the jury instruction error now identified by Defendant was not preserved because after the State submitted the instruction drawn from Molenda, the defense maintained a general objection to the instruction but did not point to any fault in the instruction's failure to expressly address good faith. Defendant, however, took two significant steps which constituted adequate preservation. First, Defendant submitted the good cause definition found in the California custodial interference statute cited in Luckie that specifically states good faith is an element of good cause. Second, when Defendant's tendered instruction was refused, Defendant objected and argued alternatively that no instruction defining good cause should be given. By taking these two steps, Defendant fairly invoked a ruling by the trial court. Benally, 2001-NMSC-033, ¶ 26 (Baca J., dissenting) (With respect to jury instructions, a ruling or decision by the district court may be fairly invoked by either a formal objection to the instruction that is to be given to the jury by the court, or by tendering a correct instruction.). Therefore, we review the given instruction for reversible error. {14} In order to determine whether the good cause instruction given to the jury constitutes reversible error, it is first necessary to clarify both types of action prohibited by the custodial interference statute and the mental state a defendant must have to be subject to conviction for custodial interference. The custodial interference statute states: Custodial interference consists of any person, having a right to custody of a child, maliciously taking, detaining, concealing or enticing away or failing to return that child without good cause and with the intent to deprive permanently or for a protracted time another person also having a right to custody of that child of his right to custody. Whoever commits custodial interference is guilty of a fourth degree felony. Section 30-4-4(B) (emphasis added). The statute clearly sets forth two distinct ways that a person, having a right to custody of a child, can commit custodial interference: (1) maliciously taking, detaining, concealing or enticing away a child with the intent to deprive permanently or for a protracted period of time another person also having a right to custody; or (2) failing to return that child without good cause and with the intent to deprive permanently or for a protracted time another person also having a right to custody of that child of his right to custody. The first act constitutes taking interference, and the second, failing to return interference. To be guilty of custodial interference, a defendant need only engage in one of the acts prohibited by the statute, either taking interference or failing to return interference. {15} Both types of custodial interference require malice and the intent to deprive permanently or for a protracted time another person of his or her custodial rights. Luckie, 120 N.M. at 278, 901 P.2d at 209 ([W]e think it is clear that the term ` maliciously ' modifies all of the proscribed conduct in Section 30-4-4(B), and is an essential element of the alleged offense.). Only the second type, failing to return interference, requires a showing that a defendant acted without good cause. Thus, the good cause instruction in this case only pertains to the jury's finding with regard to failing to return interference. Having clarified the type of harm that is prohibited by the custodial interference statute and a defendant's requisite mental state, we now turn to the meaning of good cause in custodial interference cases in New Mexico. Defendant argues that a good cause instruction in custodial interference cases should include the concept of good faith. We agree. {16} Currently there is no uniform jury instruction defining good cause and no New Mexico case has defined good cause within the context of custodial interference. Cf. Luckie, 120 N.M. 274, 901 P.2d 205 (discussion of good cause limited to determining whether the term rendered our custodial interference statute unconstitutionally vague). Therefore, to determine what constitutes good cause in custodial interference cases, we must consider the objective of the custodial interference statute. The custodial interference statute is intended to prevent persons with custodial rights from disrupting another person's right to custody. Section 30-4-4(B). However, recognizing that there may be situations in which custodial interference is warranted, the legislature modified the custodial interference statute to include the requirement that the custodial interference must be perpetrated without good cause. Compare NMSA 1978, § 30-4-4 (prior to 1989 amendments), with NMSA 1978, § 30-4-4(B) (1989). Thus the statute punishes conduct effected without good cause and excuses conduct justified by good cause. {17} The Model Penal Code offers guidance as to what constitutes good cause in custodial interference cases. In the section on interference with custody, the Model Penal Code provides an affirmative defense when the actor believed that his action was necessary to preserve the child from danger to its welfare. MODEL PENAL Code § 212.4(1)(a) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1962). To prevent the willful defiance of a custody order, however, the Model Penal Code requires a defendant's belief to be a good faith belief. Id. at § 212.4 cmt. 3 (the Model Penal Code requires an honest belief that the actor's conduct was `necessary to preserve the child from danger to its welfare.'). Several other jurisdictions also excuse a defendant's conduct when his or her action is taken to protect a child from harm, so long as the action is based on a good faith belief, a reasonable belief, or both. [1] {18} We believe that the term good cause in our custodial interference statute similarly encompasses the concepts of subjective good faith and objective reasonableness. To avoid criminal sanctions for custodial interference, a defendant must have an honest belief that his actions are necessary to protect a child from harm and that honest belief must be reasonable. A defendant's unreasonable belief that custodial interference is necessary to protect children from harm will not satisfy the good cause requirement. {19} In custodial interference cases, an instruction defining good cause should communicate that a defendant's belief must be both reasonable and in good faith. Therefore, when a defendant requests an instruction defining good cause, good cause should be defined. A suggested definition is as follows: a good faith and reasonable belief that the defendant's actions were necessary to protect a child from physical or significant emotional harm. [2] We believe this suggested definition adequately describes our state's custodial interference law which excuses a defendant's actions when they are motivated by an honest and reasonable belief that custodial interference is necessary to prevent physical harm or significant emotional harm. Our uniform jury instructions committee should review this instruction and make a further recommendation. {20} We acknowledge that the good cause instruction given to the jury in this case did not accurately reflect New Mexico's custodial interference law because it failed to address the concept of good faith. When reviewing an erroneous jury instruction for reversible error, [w]e consider jury instructions as a whole, not singly, State v. Montoya, 2003-NMSC-004, ¶ 23, 133 N.M. 84, 61 P.3d 793, and we look to see whether a reasonable juror would have been confused or misdirected by the jury instructions. Id. {21} When the given jury instructions are examined as a whole, it becomes clear that the jury in this case could not have been confused or misdirected by the erroneous good cause instruction. The jury was instructed that to find the defendant guilty of custodial interference, [t]he State must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that . . . the defendant maliciously took [the children], and failed to return them without good cause. (Emphasis added.) As previously discussed, either taking interference or failing to return interference alone constitutes illegal custodial interference, however, the instruction in this case required the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant both maliciously took the children and failed to return them without good cause. In light of this instruction, Defendant's conviction for custodial interference meant that the jury found Defendant guilty of both taking interference and failure to return interference. {22} The erroneous good cause instruction only affected failure to return interference because good cause only modifies failure to return interference. Section 30-4-4(B) (failing to return that child without good cause). Thus, the incorrect definitional instruction had no bearing on the jury's finding that Defendant engaged in taking interference. Because the jury found Defendant guilty of taking interference, an error with regard to failure to return interference should not invalidate the jury's verdict that Defendant was guilty of custodial interference based on taking interference. Therefore, when the jury instructions are considered as a whole, the jury was not confused or misled as to taking interference and the good cause instruction error did not amount to reversible error.