Opinion ID: 2451875
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Inadvertent Disclosure

Text: Granada produced 150,000 pages of documents for inspection by Freeman. Granada contends that the four memoranda, by which attorneys for Granada advised its officers, were inadvertently included. Freeman designated these memoranda for photocopying; the copies were sent initially to Granada and Bate-stamped prior to release to Freeman. Allowing that the memoranda were privileged as attorney-client communications, the salient issue is whether the privilege was waived by the disclosure. Rule 511 of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence provides in pertinent part: A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure waives the privilege if (1) he or his predecessor while holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the privileged matter unless such disclosure itself is privileged.... Granada argues that inadvertent production of privileged documents is necessarily involuntary and therefore does not effect waiver. We disagree. Inadvertent production is distinguishable from involuntary production. A party who permits access to unscreened documents may, due to inattention, unwittinglybut nonetheless voluntarilydisclose a privileged document. Disclosure is involuntary only if efforts reasonably calculated to prevent the disclosure were unavailing. Thus, although disclosure does not necessarily waive privileges, a party claiming involuntary disclosure has the burden of showing, with specificity, that the circumstances confirm the involuntariness of the disclosure. In addition to precautionary measures, other factors to be examined in determining involuntariness include the delay in rectifying the error, the extent of any inadvertent disclosure, and the scope of discovery. This standard is consistent with the approach adopted by numerous federal courts which now determine waiver by evaluating the circumstances of the disclosure. See Niagra Mohawk Power Corp. v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp., 125 F.R.D. 578, 587-88 (N.D.N.Y.1989); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323, 329 (N.D.Cal.1985); see also KL Group v. Case, Kay & Lynch, 829 F.2d 909, 919 (9th Cir.1987); Clady v. County of Los Angeles, 770 F.2d. 1421, 1433 (9th Cir.1985), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1109, 106 S.Ct. 1516, 89 L.Ed.2d 915 (1986). Many state courts also take this approach. See generally McGlynn v. Grinberg, 172 A.D.2d 960, 568 N.Y.S.2d 481 (1991); Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul v. Huether, 454 N.W.2d 710 (N.D. 1990); Kanter v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. App.3d 803, 253 Cal.Rptr. 810 (1988); Sterling v. Keidan, 162 Mich.App. 88, 412 N.W.2d 255 (1987). Further, this standard is consistent with the rule waiving privileges asserted by untimely objections to discovery requests absent a showing of good cause for the delay. Tex.R.Civ.P. 168(4). Good cause is established and the late filing excused only if the objecting party offers a satisfactory justification for the untimely objection. See Hobson and Lott v. Moore, 734 S.W.2d 340, 341 (Tex.1987). Similarly, a party may not present evidence not disclosed in response to a discovery request absent a showing of good cause. Tex. R.Civ.P. 215(5). With regard to that rule, we recently reaffirmed that, inadvertence of counsel alone is not good cause. Alvarado v. Farah Mfg. Co., 830 S.W.2d 911, 915 (Tex.1992) (citing Sharp v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 784 S.W.2d 669 (Tex.1990) (per curiam)). In accord with these rules, and the plain language of Tex.R.Civ.Evid. 511, a party seeking to preserve a privilege after disclosure must do more than show inadvertence; rather, the producing party has the burden of justifying preservation of the privilege by showing that the circumstances demonstrate the involuntariness of the disclosure. The trial court did find that Granada took reasonable precautions to prevent disclosure; but its order indicates that this finding was based solely on evidence of the relatively small proportion of documents inadvertently produced. While the scope of discovery and the extent of involuntary disclosure are relevant to a determination of waiver, they should not alone be determinative. By limiting review to these factors, the trial court's approach might encourage producing parties to flood the discoverer with documents in order to ensure that the number of documents disclosed in error is proportionately low. When deciding the issue of voluntariness, a court should evaluate all circumstances of the disclosure. Here, it is relevant that Granada did not avail itself of opportunities to prevent disclosure of the memoranda, although it had many. The memoranda were not segregated out in Granada's initial review of the documents opened to Freeman, nor were they detected when Freeman notified Granada of its designations for photocopying or when the copies were sent to Granada before distribution to Freeman. Granada had the opportunity to inventory the documents at many points before production; yet, it was not until the memoranda were tendered during depositions that Granada's counsel realized that they had been released to Freeman. Moreover, Granada only sought protection of the inadvertently disclosed documents after eleven months had passed. Granada's conclusory assertion that the disclosure was inadvertent and therefore involuntary offers no circumstantial justification for the disclosure. Under these circumstances, we hold that Granada has failed to sustain its burden of establishing that its disclosure of the documents was involuntary.