Opinion ID: 1111189
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: the state's closing argument in the sentencing phase was improper.

Text: Here Pinkney raises the prosecutor's argument which has previously been reproduced in this opinion. Pinkney argues that this is an appeal to the community conscience of the jurors and thus improper. He also charges the prosecutor's statement to the jury that it is not your place to forgive this man on the basis that this statement was an instruction to exclude sympathy from their considerations. See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987). Pinkney finally challenges the prosecutor's identification of a certain instruction as a defense instruction in violation of Rule 5.03, Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice. Pinkney asks us to reverse the entire trial, or at least the penalty phase. The prosecution raises once again the argument of procedural bar. In the alternative, it is argued that this assignment is meritless. Pinkney's argument that the remark it is not your place to forgive this man is an instruction to disregard, in toto, sympathy, is without merit and procedurally barred. See California v. Brown, supra ; Cole, supra ; West, supra. There is a practical, as well as a metaphysical, difference between sympathy and forgiveness. Although a jury may not be instructed to disregard, in toto, sympathy, a prosecutor may argue that a defendant is not deserving of sympathy. This assignment of error is procedurally barred and without merit. Finally Pinkney challenges the following ruling by the trial court: And we know that's true because defense Instruction 10 that I've just read to you from with all the mitigating circumstances, they didn't put one down here on the bottom that says, consider this following mitigating circumstance, that being that the defendant is sorry, he is remorseful. That's not even on this sheet. MR. STRIBLING: Your Honor, we're going to object to her singling out instructions, such as saying it's defense instructions. THE COURT: That will be overruled. MR. STRIBLING: Ask the Court to instruct  the jury be instructed to disregard it. THE COURT: She's on closing argument. The State concedes that the prosecutor's comment was erroneous, Shelby v. State, 402 So.2d 338, 341 (Miss. 1981), and Forrest v. State, 335 So.2d 900 (Miss. 1976), but contends that the error was harmless. In Forrest this Court stated: An error is harmless only when it is apparent from the face of the record that a fair minded jury could have arrived at no verdict other than that of guilty. Forrest, 335 So.2d at 903; See also, Rule 11, Rules of Mississippi Supreme Court. The proper standard of review for such an error is whether the error undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. Malone v. State, 486 So.2d 367, 368 (Miss. 1986). Or, whether the ruling denied the defendant a fundamentally fair trial. Lockett v. State (I), 517 So.2d 1317, 1333 (Miss. 1987). This case is different from Forrest, supra, in which an evidentiary error together with the prosecutor's telling jurors how to identify defense instructions required the reversal of a conviction. Forrest, 335 So.2d at 903. The comments of the district attorney in the case at hand are improper but not as egregious as those in Forrest. 335 So.2d at 900. However, in Forrest, unlike the case at hand, the trial judge quickly, emphatically, and properly sustained the defense objection to the argument. Forrest, 335 So.2d at 901-02. In this case the prosecutor very clearly violated a long established rule by specifying to the jury the origin of various instructions. If the objection had been sustained and the jury properly admonished there would be nothing to this assignment. The prosecutor was in error, the defense attorney properly objected and the trial court erroneously refused to sustain the objection and instruct the jury to disregard the comments. However, the comments by the prosecutor were made in an effort to show that no mitigating circumstances had been shown. Mitigating circumstances instructions are always offered to the court by the defendant. While the conduct of the prosecutor was clearly improper and a ruling of the trial judge was clearly wrong, the error does not undermine our confidence in the outcome of the trial and did not deny the defendant a fundamentally fair trial. There is therefore, no merit to this assignment of error.