Opinion ID: 1224487
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Reveal Exculpatory Evidence

Text: Due process requires the State to disclose evidence that is both favorable to the accused and `material either to guilt or to punishment.' United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)). There is no Brady violation, however, if the defendant, using reasonable diligence, could have obtained the information at issue. In re Personal Restraint of Benn, 134 Wash.2d 868, 916, 952 P.2d 116 (1998). Moreover, evidence is material and therefore must be disclosed under Brady only if `there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Benn, 134 Wash.2d at 916, 952 P.2d 116. In applying this reasonable probability standard, the question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995); Benn, 134 Wash.2d at 916, 952 P.2d 116. A `reasonable probability' of a different result is accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary suppression `undermines confidence in the outcome of trial.' Id. (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 105 S.Ct. 3375). Gentry contends the State failed to reveal evidence he could have used to impeach Dyste, Hicks, and Smith. Each of the witnesses was subjected at trial to extensive crossexamination and, in some instances, defense counsel impeached the witnesses with extensive criminal histories. Each witness denied receiving anything of value from the State in exchange for his testimony. Gentry's current counsel have appended several documents to the PRP that allegedly show Smith, Hicks, and Dyste lied when they said they received no benefit for testifying. The defense also argues Hicks and Smith conspired to give false testimony against Gentry. [8] The prosecution provided Gentry's trial counsel with the informant's criminal histories, including the cause numbers on their prior convictions. Gentry's current attorneys used that information to obtain many of the court documents they now characterize as  Brady materials. These additional documents were as accessible to trial counsel as they were to Gentry's current counsel. Significantly, the trial court authorized appointment of a defense investigator who, according to the bills submitted to the court clerk, spent some of his time interviewing the informants. The court records of their prior convictions, plea bargains and the like, were not withheld from the defense. The materials Gentry has provided with his PRP are not relevant, particularly with respect to the guilt phase verdict. Several of the documents he has obtained are pleadings filed in drug cases in which Dyste acted as an informant. These materials show only that Dyste was paid for his services in the drug cases and received some consideration in sentencing for at least one conviction because of his services as a drug informant. [9] Gentry interprets some of these documents to show Dyste also benefited because he testified in Gentry's case. There is evidence a Pierce County prosecutor in a 1994 case considered Hick's testimony in Gentry's case as a reason to recommend a low-end standard range term. It is entirely speculative that there was an agreement in 1991 Dyste would be compensated for his testimony against Gentry with a favorable sentencing recommendation should he commit and be convicted of another crime in the future. Moreover, this assertion is contradicted by the deputy prosecuting attorney's affidavit. Gentry also relies on a notation in the Pierce County prosecutor's file that Kitsap County Deputy Prosecutor Brian Moran recommended against leniency in the Pierce County case because Dyste had already benefited from his testimony in the Gentry case. That statement is hearsay, and therefore inadmissible even to obtain an evidentiary hearing. In re Personal Restraint Petition of Rice, 118 Wash.2d 876, 886, 828 P.2d 1086 (1992). Moran has responded with his own affidavit denying making the statement and also denying Dyste received or was promised any benefit for testifying against Gentry. There is also no circumstantial evidence the informants benefited from their testimony. All of the informants had already been sentenced before they made any statements about Gentry. Their agreements to testify therefore could not have been part of any plea or sentencing agreement. Because Dyste and Smith were serving determinate terms, the prosecutor could not have promised to seek their early parole. Hicks did ask the prosecutor to help him clarify his parole status (the relationship between his pre-SRA (Sentencing Reform Act of 1981) convictions and his determinate sentences). And the prosecutor did make an inquiry on his behalf. The Indeterminate Sentence Review Board then realized it had failed to take any action in Hicks' case since it suspended his parole several years earlier. The Board then reinstated his parole on the pre-SRA convictions, thus allowing the sentences for those crimes to run concurrently with his SRA terms. Although that ruling benefited Hicks, the Board did not reverse any prior decision, but simply acted on a long-pending parole matter. The benefit to Hicks from the Board's finally taking action was not a quid pro quo for his testimony in Gentry's case. The prosecutor neither asked the Board to grant Hicks leniency, nor did the Board base its decision on Hicks' role in Gentry's case. According to the Board itself, it reinstated his parole for several other, unrelated reasons including its failure to hold a timely parole revocation hearing. Gentry also notes Hicks was transferred to a less secure facility about the time of his testimony in Gentry's case, but the record indicates Hicks was transferred so he could complete his college degree at a nearby school, not because of his testimony against Gentry. Gentry's claim of a conspiracy between Hicks and Smith is supported by the statements of Donald Peck, who is currently an inmate at Walla Walla. Peck says he was at Shelton in late 1989 or early 1990, and he knew Gentry, Smith, and Hicks (who was using the name Doug Baker). Peck claims he heard Smith and Baker (Hicks) planning to get revenge against Gentry because he had failed to pay his poker debts. The State provides Smith's declaration denying any such conversation occurred, or that there was any such plan. Peck does not claim to have told the prosecutor or any other agent of the State about this alleged plot in time for Gentry's trial counsel to be informed of it, however. To the contrary, he says he was unaware the inmates had testified against Gentry until after the trial. At that point, Peck says, he wrote to Gentry explaining what he had overheard. Gentry does not say he passed this information on to his appellate counsel. Thus, as far as can be determined, no agent of the State was aware of Peck's allegations until Gentry filed his PRP. Brady requires only that prosecutors discover and disclose any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. at 437, 115 S.Ct. 1555. While the prosecution cannot avoid Brady by keeping itself ignorant of matters known to other state agents, United States v. Hamilton, 107 F.3d 499, 509 (7th Cir.1997), the State has no duty to search for exculpatory evidence. State v. Judge, 100 Wash.2d 706, 717, 675 P.2d 219 (1984). Thus, since no state agent ever possessed the information contained in Peck's affidavit, it is not  Brady material. Rice, 118 Wash.2d at 888, 828 P.2d 1086. [10] Moreover, proving Smith and Hicks planned to get revenge against Gentry only would have given the jury an additional reason to doubt their testimony regarding Gentry's admissions. The defense was able to impeach their credibility with their extensive criminal histories, including Hicks' conviction for perjury. Smith admitted Hicks named him as a person who was at the card table and had information about the murder. And Hicks admitted he could have learned many of the details about the murder from television and newspaper stories. The witnesses were, to that extent, effectively impeached. Whether because of that impeachment or simply because it found Hicks incredible, the jury did not credit his claim Gentry admitted having sex with the victim. It acquitted Gentry of the rape allegation, finding at most an attempted rape, which defense counsel conceded had been proven. In conclusion, some of the evidence Gentry has provided could readily have been discovered by trial counsel or was not known to the State. Some of the evidence could have been used to impeach one or more of the informants, but in the light of all the circumstances, we cannot say the unavailability of this minimal additional impeachment actually and substantially prejudiced Gentry. Lord, 123 Wash.2d at 303, 868 P.2d 835.