Opinion ID: 1058201
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Tests for Legal Maternity in Other Jurisdictions

Text: In the absence of express guidance from the legislature, the Court of Appeals looked to case law from other jurisdictions to resolve the dispute of maternity in this case. Among the few jurisdictions which have addressed cases like this one, where a gestational carrier implanted with donated eggs seeks parental status of the resulting children and where legislation does not clearly resolve the matter, two tests for maternity have arisen. Some courts have focused on intent, holding that under such circumstances the intended mother is to be deemed the legal mother. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal.4th 84, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 494, 851 P.2d 776 (1993); In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 61 Cal.App.4th 1410, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 280 (1998); McDonald v. McDonald, 196 A.D.2d 7, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (N.Y.App.Div.1994). Other courts have instead focused on genetics and gestation, holding that genetic connection to the children is of paramount importance in determining legal maternity. See, e.g., Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 435 Mass. 285, 756 N.E.2d 1133 (2001); Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc.2d 54, 644 N.E.2d 760 (1994). The intent test has developed primarily in California. In Johnson , a married couple was unable to have children naturally because the wife had undergone a hysterectomy, yet the wife could still produce eggs. 851 P.2d at 778. The couple entered into a surrogacy agreement with a third-party female who agreed to give birth to a child on their behalf in exchange for $10,000 and other consideration. One of the wife's eggs was fertilized with her husband's sperm and was successfully implanted in the surrogate's uterus. However, when the relationship between the couple and the surrogate deteriorated, litigation over maternity and custody ensued. Id. Under California's version of the Uniform Parentage Act, both genetic consanguinity and giving birth were equally cognizable bases for establishing maternity. Id. at 780-81. The Court declined to recognize two legal mothers. Id. at 781 n. 8. In order to break the tie, the California Supreme Court held that when gestation and genetic consanguinity do not coincide in one woman, she who intended to procreate the childthat is, she who intended to bring about the birth of the child that she intended to raise as her ownis the natural mother under California law. Id. at 782. [8] The Johnson Court justified its holding in part by strongly affirming the validity of surrogacy contracts. Id. at 784. The genetic test has been set forth most thoroughly by the Ohio Court of Common Pleas in Belsito . In Belsito , a married couple wanted children, and the wife could produce eggs but could not sustain a pregnancy. 644 N.E.2d at 760-61. By agreement, one of the wife's eggs was fertilized with the husband's sperm and then implanted in the uterus of a gestational surrogate (the wife's sister). Without objection from the surrogate, the couple sought a declaratory judgment of maternity and paternity. Id. at 761-62. Like California, Ohio had adopted a version of the Uniform Parentage Act which provided that maternity can be established by identifying the natural mother through the birth process or by other means, including DNA blood tests, as provided by statute. Id. at 763 (citing Ohio Rev.Code Ann. ch. 3111). Also declining to recognize two legal mothers, id., the court applied a two-stage analysis for establishing maternity. First, if the male and female genetic providers have not waived parental rights, they must be declared the legal parents. Second, if the female genetic provider has waived her parental rights, then the gestator is the legal mother. See id. at 767. On this basis, the court held that the married couple, as the child's genetic progenitors, were the legal parents. Id. at 767. Significantly, Tennessee's statutory framework for establishing maternity differs markedly from the California and Ohio statutes under consideration in Johnson and Belsito . Compare Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-2-302(4) (defining mother as the biological mother of a child born out of wedlock) and Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-102(10) (defining biological parents as the woman and man who physically or genetically conceived the child) with Cal. Civ.Code § 7003(1) (West 1983) (The parent and child relationship may be established... [b]etween a child and the natural mother ... by proof of her having given birth to the child, or under this part.), repealed by 1992 Cal. Stat. c. 162 (A.B.2650), § 4 and Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 3111.02 (West 1992) (The parent and child relationship between a child and the child's natural mother may be established by proof of her having given birth to the child or pursuant to [other sections of the Ohio Revised Code].). Consequently, neither California's intent test nor Ohio's genetic test is strictly apposite to our statutory scheme. Further, both the intent test and the genetic test suffer from inadequacies. For example, in Johnson the California Supreme Court crafted an unnecessarily broad rule which could afford maternal status even to a woman who failed to qualify under either of California's two statutory bases for maternity. See Johnson, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 494, 851 P.2d at 783. According to Belsito , the intent formulation of Johnson has discarded both genetics and birth as the primary means of identifying the natural maternal parent, Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 764, and provides for, in effect, a private adoption process that is readily subject to all the defects and pressures of such a process, id. at 766. In Tennessee, unlicensed and unregulated adoption is statutorily prohibited and subject to criminal penalties. See Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 36-1-108 to -109 (2001). However, the genetic test of Belsito also has significantly broad implications. In the event that a dispute were to arise between an intended mother who had obtained eggs from a third-party donor and a gestational surrogate in whom the eggs had been implanted, the genetic test would implicitly invalidate any surrogacy agreement. The genetic test could also have practical effects similar to the adoption-default model criticized by In re Marriage of Buzzanca, see 72 Cal.Rptr.2d at 289, in that an intended mother who employs techniques for assisted reproduction including egg donation would by default have to submit to government-controlled adoption procedures to attain a secure legal status as mother. Policy-wise, the requirement of such regulation may or may not be sound. Consequently, we decline to adopt either the intent test or the genetic test as a general rule for resolving this case. We thus vacate the adoption of the intent test of Johnson by the courts below.