Opinion ID: 1673857
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: was the verdict of $25,000 actual damages and $50,000 punitive damages against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and so grossly excessive as to be shocking, evincing bias, passion and prejudice?

Text: C & C and Lambert's argument pertaining to the damages awarded by the jury is subject to our oft stated scope of review: Our general rule is that a damage award may be altered or amended only when it is so excessive that it evinces passion, bias and prejudice on the part of the jury so as to shock the conscience. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 483 So.2d 254, 278 (Miss. 1985); Jesco, Inc. v. Shannon, 451 So.2d 694, 705 (Miss. 1984); City of Jackson v. Locklar, 431 So.2d 475, 481 (Miss. 1983). We are not authorized to disturb a jury verdict regarding amount of damages because it seems too high or seems too low. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 483 So.2d 254, 278 (Miss. 1985); Toyota Motor Co., Ltd. v. Sanford, 375 So.2d 1036, 1037 (Miss. 1979). Motions challenging the quantum of damages and seeking a remittitur are by their very nature committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Where the trial judge acts upon these matters, we reverse only if he has abused or exceeded his discretion. Dorris v. Carr, 330 So.2d 872, 874 (Miss. 1976). Royal Oil Co., Inc., 500 So.2d at 449. Prior to his arrest for embezzlement, a crime involving moral turpitude, Smith possessed an excellent reputation for honesty and community service. He was known for his church work and was often requested to pray and sing solos, taking an active part in congregation activities. Smith was known for his outgoing personality. He was talkative and bursting with energy, being a healthy individual with a happy marriage of more than thirty-four years. His arrest and incarceration for the crime of embezzlement started rumors in the small community where he resided. As a result, he ceased to participate in church affairs. He became withdrawn, having little to do with former friends and neighbors. He lost weight. Marital problems escalated between Smith and his wife. He became depressed and no longer found any joy in living. His attitude and feelings were shown in the following statement: Q Tell the jury how it affected you. A Because I feel like some of the people, not all of them, of course, but some of the people actually believed the allegations that I was guilty of something... . It affected my character, and I felt real ashamed that my friends would think  be forced to think that of me, even though it wasn't true. It would be difficult to visualize or describe the mental anguish and emotional distress suffered by Smith. Smith was entitled to recover damages for harm to his reputation resulting from the criminal proceedings brought against him. He was also entitled to recover for mental anguish and distress causally resulting from the proceedings. Royal Oil Co., Inc., 500 So.2d at 448; Gandy v. Palmer, 251 Miss. 398, 169 So.2d 819 (1964); State Life Ins. Co. of Indianapolis v. Hardy, 189 Miss. 266, 195 So. 708 (1940). The very nature of damages often sustained in malicious prosecution actions makes such damages difficult to quantify in monetary terms. We have carefully reviewed the evidence of damages suffered by Smith and, keeping in mind the nature of damages in malicious prosecution actions as well as the difficulty in quantifying such damages in monetary terms, we find the jury verdict of $25,000 for actual damages is supported by the evidence. In considering the assertion of an excessive punitive damage award, we remain mindful of our former expressions that we are not authorized to disturb a jury verdict regarding punitive damages because it seems too high or seems too low. Only where the verdict is so excessive that it evinces passion, bias and prejudice on the part of the jury so as to shock the judicial conscience may we interfere. Life Insurance Co. of Mississippi v. Allen, 518 So.2d 1189, 1194 (Miss. 1987); Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 483 So.2d 254, 277-79 (Miss. 1985). We also observe that the factors related in Whittington, Mutual Life Ins. v. Estate of Wesson, 517 So.2d 521, 532 (Miss. 1987), and Bankers Life and Casualty Co. for consideration by a jury in determining the quantum of punitive damages are inclusive and not exclusive. In 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 807, p. 854, (1988) the following rule is stated: In assessing exemplary damages, the trier of fact should consider the nature, extent, and enormity of the wrong, the intent of the party committing it, and, generally, all the circumstances attending the particular occurrence. Other factors have been approved. In Ford Motor Co. v. Durrill, 714 S.W.2d 329 (Texas Civ.App. 1986), the Texas Appeals Court considered the following factors in arriving at the award: (1) nature of the wrong; (2) character of the conduct involved; (3) degree of culpability of wrongdoer; (4) situation and sensibilities of parties concerned; (5) extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of justice and propriety; and (6) the proportion that the punitive award bears to the compensatory damages. The exigency of each case determines the parameters of appropriate factors for jury consideration. No formulation of precise rules of law have been made to determine whether an award of punitive damages is excessive. No fixed legal ratio between actual and punitive damage exists. No bright line of demarcation tells us when exemplary damages are excessive. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to state a rule with absolute precision. Redden, Punitive Damages, § 2.1(C), p. 23 (2d ed. 1989) tells us: Punitive damages are accepted or rejected on policy grounds... . In most jurisdictions, the court will award punitive damages because of the positive public policy to punish the defendant and to serve as a warning or example to others who may commit similar outrageous acts in the future. These public policy grounds are also found to be in the interest of society and for the public benefit. After careful consideration of the record, we cannot say that the verdict is so excessive that it evinces such passion, bias, and prejudice on the part of the jury that our judicial conscience is shocked. We find the errors assigned by C & C and Lambert on appeal to be without merit and affirm on direct appeal. However, we find merit in Smith's cross-appeal. Because the trial court erred in granting Lambert a JNOV, this action by the trial court is reversed and the jury verdict is reinstated. AFFIRMED ON DIRECT APPEAL; REVERSED AND RENDERED ON CROSS-APPEAL. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ. and PRATHER, PITTMAN, BANKS and McRAE, JJ., concur. ROBERTS, J., not participating.