Opinion ID: 806239
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Changes to the Master Deed

Text: The complaint also alleges that RBW breached § 9(e) of the p & s agreement by substantively modifying the Master Deed of the Master Condominium to add patios to the limited common areas of the Battery Wharf complex for the exclusive use of the Hotel Unit, 7 Section 8(a) of the Master Deed of the Master Condominium provides that [t]he Building and the Master Units may be used for any lawful purpose not otherwise prohibited by the terms and provisions of this Master Deed, . . . including, without limitation, use for a hotel (including restaurants, bar and meeting rooms), spa, health or fitness club, restaurants, parking garage . . . and retail facilities, multi-family residences and time-share hotel units. (Emphasis added). In addition, § 8(b)(8) restricts the uses of the Commercial Unit, stating that it shall be used only for restaurants and food service, retail facilities selling goods (but not services) at retail, spa, health or fitness club and parking garage . . . and uses accessory thereto. (Emphasis added). Similarly, § 8(a) of the Master Deed of the Commercial Condominium states that [t]he portion of the Building constituting the Commercial Condominium and the Units are intended to be used primarily for hotel (including restaurants, bar and meeting rooms), spa, health or fitness club, restaurants, parking garage . . . and retail facilities and related purposes not otherwise prohibited by the terms and provisions of this Master Deed . . . . (Emphasis added). -11- and that RBW did this without giving the plaintiff required notice. Section 9(e) of the p & s agreement states in relevant part: The Seller reserves the right, upon notice and delivery of a copy to Buyer, prior to the Closing Date, to make such modifications, additions or deletions in or to any of the Residences Condominium Documents, Master Condominium Documents, Deed or Parking Documents as Seller may reasonably determine to be desirable in connection with the development and marketing of the Project or to meet the requirements of any applicable law or regulation, . . . provided that no such modification, addition or deletion shall (i) impose any additional restrictions on the use of the Unit; (ii) require a material physical modification of the layout, location, size or features of the Unit; or (iii) eliminate the right to use any area designated for the exclusive use of the Unit. (Emphasis added). Section 15 states that [a]ny notice . . . shall be in writing and shall be deemed to have been properly given when mailed, . . . or when hand delivered or sent by a recognized overnight courier service, or when sent by facsimile by confirmed transmission . . . . Whatever the plaintiff's frustration with these changes, we do not see how they were impermissible under § 9(e): they do not impose any additional restrictions on the use of [his units]; require a material physical modification of the layout, location, size or features of [his units]; or eliminate the right to use any area designated for the exclusive use of [his units or the Residential Unit as a whole]. (Emphasis added). Furthermore, sections 5(d), (e) and (f) of the p & s agreement are consistent with RBW's right to burden the master deeds and to modify its -12- obligations under those deeds upon proper notice to buyers. Those sections provide that RBW's promise to convey the individual unit deeds in the form presented in the Condominium Presentation, as well as free from liens and encumbrances, is subject to the rights, obligations, easements and restrictions and all other provisions contained in the master deeds (and related by-laws and regulations) of the Master Condominium, Residences Condominium, and Commercial Condominium. The question, at least so far as concerns the unit as to which the closing never took place, is whether the complaint plausibly alleges that RBW failed to meet its obligation to noti[fy] and deliver a copy of the modifications to Edlow prior to the scheduled closing. We conclude that it does not. First, Edlow does not assert that he never received a copy of the modified Master Deed.8 Rather, he argues that he was not effectively notified, for the modifications were obscurely buried in the text of the Master Deed . . . and the accompanying plans and were not clearly featured or otherwise mentioned to [him]. But this constructive non-delivery argument ignores the definition of satisfactory notice included in § 15 of the p & s agreement, which 8 The parties enthusiastically dispute whether Edlow received a copy of the modified Master Deed in conjunction with the purchase of the first unit. The complaint, however, does not allege that Edlow never received a copy, and he did not attempt to correct this alleged misinterpretation by clarifying the facts in his proposed Amended Complaint. -13- states nothing about having to feature[] or otherwise mention[] to him the individual changes in order to effectuate notice; it simply calls for a copy . . . of the . . . Documents that have been modified to be delivered to him. Second, the closing was not scheduled to occur until August 15, and under § 9(e) RBW's obligation was only to notify Edlow of the modifications before that date. Id. § 9(e) (notice and delivery must occur prior to the Closing Date (emphasis added)). Even were we to assume that Edlow did receive a copy of the modified Master Deed in conjunction with the closing on the first unit but that such delivery did not satisfy the notice requirements of § 9(e) regarding the closing on the second unit, at the time that Edlow balked RBW still had an entire week remaining to act before it would have been in breach. The plaintiff cannot now successfully complain that RBW breached its notification obligations under § 9(e) because it failed to act before a closing that he effectively cancelled. Although, on a motion to dismiss, we review the well pleaded facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we need not 'swallow [his] invective hook, line, and sinker.' Palmer v. Champion Mortgage, 465 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996)). Because the complaint does not plausibly allege that RBW failed to honor its duty to provide notice under § 9(e) prior to the aborted -14- closing on the second unit, no claim of a breach of § 9(e) has been stated as to that unit. The claim with respect to the unit on which Edlow did accept delivery of title also, as noted in footnote 8 above, amounts to a challenge to the adequacy of the notice received, rather than an allegation that no notice was given. But again the agreement did not require any highlighting, featuring, or any specific mentioning of the changes made. Whether or not there is a conceivable case for relief, this is not a plausible one, and thus the complaint similarly fails to state a claim regarding this unit. Sepúlveda-Villarini v. Dep't of Educ. of P.R., 628 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2010) (The make-or-break standard . . . is that the combined allegations, taken as true, must state a plausible, not a merely conceivable, case for relief.).9 9 Along with his breach of contract claims, the plaintiff also seeks to rescind his purchase of the first unit. Massachusetts expects actions for rescission to be brought with reasonable promptness, Elias Bros. Rests., Inc. v. Acorn Enters., Inc., 831 F. Supp. 920, 927-28 (D. Mass. 1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), yet the plaintiff waited almost a year and a half from the time that he purchased the first unit to file his claims. Moreover, he has not averred that the p & s agreement for either unit lacked consideration or that RBW had repudiated it. See Worcester Heritage Soc'y, Inc. v. Trussel, 577 N.E.2d 1009, 1010 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (There is ample authority for refusing rescission where there has been only a breach of contract rather than an utter failure of consideration or a repudiation by the party in breach.). Having failed to state even a breach claim as to either unit, Edlow is not entitled to rescission as a remedy. -15-