Opinion ID: 657354
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 11 Boykins and Banks argue that their convictions under Count I of the indictment should be reversed by this court because the evidence offered by the government at trial was insufficient to support a conviction. Boykins seeks a reversal of his conviction under Count II of the indictment on identical grounds. The standard of review in a sufficiency challenge is well-established. We review the evidence in a light most favorable to the government to ascertain whether any rationale trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Tanner, 941 F.2d 574, 586 (7th Cir.1991). Neither Banks nor Boykins has met this burden. 12
13 To obtain a conviction for possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, the government must prove (1) the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed cocaine, (2) the defendant possessed the cocaine with the intent to distribute it, and (3) the defendant knew cocaine was a controlled substance. United States v. Olson, 978 F.2d 1472, 1479 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1614, 123 L.Ed.2d 174 (1993). Boykins and Banks testified that they were not in the van when the gunshots were fired and that they knew nothing about the cocaine. On appeal, they contend that the evidence failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that they knowingly or intentionally possessed cocaine. The government defends the verdict by using theories of constructive possession and aiding and abetting. 14 The theory of constructive possession requires the government to show that the defendant had dominion and control over a particular object. United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 784-85 (7th Cir.1984). The government's position is that the occupants of the van were in essence a drug trafficking enterprise with each person playing a specialized role in the venture. Banks, who was in possession of a shotgun, was in the van to provide security in case anything went wrong. Boykins, seated in the front passenger seat with measuring scales and an abundant amount of cash on his person, was in charge of weighing the cocaine and then selling it. According to the government then, although neither Banks nor Boykins was found with cocaine on their respective persons, their role in the enterprise was sufficient to support a finding of constructive possession. 15 Boykins and Banks argue that the possession of items that are commonly associated with drug trafficking, in this case firearms and the scale, is only relevant to the issue of distribution and has no bearing on the question of possession. Disregarding the presence of the firearms and the scales, they conclude that their convictions for possession were based solely on physical proximity and association, factors which have been deemed insufficient to sustain a finding of possession. See United States v. McKnight, 953 F.2d 898 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2975, 119 L.Ed.2d 594 (1992) (proximity); United States v. White, 660 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir.1981) (proximity); United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir.1986) (association). The cases cited in support of this premise do not, however, support such a limited probative value for weapons found on the scene along with illegal narcotics. United States v. Rush, 890 F.2d 45 (7th Cir.1989); United States v. Dunn, 846 F.2d 761 (D.C.Cir.1988). 16 In Rush, the defendant and an acquaintance were walking toward the defendant's parked vehicle when they were stopped by the police. The acquaintance consented to a search of his locked suitcase and gave the police his keys. The search revealed several packets of heroin. Rush, 890 F.2d at 46. Later, when searching the defendant's car, the police discovered a loaded pistol. Id. Though the narcotics were never actually in the defendant's car and there was no evidence of actual knowledge on the defendant's part, we held that the presence of a firearm in the defendant's parked vehicle was sufficient to support an inference that the weapon was in the car for the purpose of protecting the illegal cargo. Id. at 49. We added that the weapon was relevant to rebut the defendant's testimony that he was unaware of the suitcase's contents. Id. Outside of the defendant's proximity to the narcotics and his association with the owner of the suitcase, the pistol was the only inculpating evidence. Yet this was sufficient to uphold the conviction on a theory of constructive possession. 17 Dunn also fails to support Banks's position. In that case, the court wrote, presence, proximity, or association may establish a prima facie case of drug-possession when colored by evidence linking the accused to an ongoing criminal operation of which that possession is a part. Dunn, 846 F.2d at 763-64 (citing United States v. Staten, 581 F.2d 878, 885 (D.C.Cir.1978)). The court went on to state that possession of a loaded gun suggested that the defendant exercised control over drugs in the house where he was found. Dunn, 846 F.2d at 764. 18 Boykins and Banks have not succeeded in meeting their significant burden. Construed in a light most favorable to the government, the evidence in this case supports a finding of constructive possession. Banks was seated inside a van with a loaded shotgun and additional ammunition on his person. Boykins was within reach of two loaded weapons and was found to possess a large sum of cash and a set of scales commonly used by drug traffickers to measure quantities of narcotics. Also inside the van were a quantity of cocaine, a loaded handgun, and a semiautomatic weapon which had been fired while Banks and Boykins were present. The other two occupants of the van had varying quantities of cocaine on their persons and one possessed a loaded .22 caliber handgun. Given this evidence, the jury could reasonably have inferred that Banks, Boykins, and the other occupants of the van were trafficking cocaine and that Banks and Boykins were fully aware of the presence of narcotics in the van. 19 We also agree with the government's position that the jury could have based its conviction of Banks and Boykins on a theory of aiding and abetting. To successfully obtain a conviction for aiding and abetting, the government must prove that the defendant committed an act that encouraged or assisted another in committing the offense, and he must have had the intent to aid in its commission. United States v. Rodriguez, 831 F.2d 162, 167 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 965, 108 S.Ct. 1234, 99 L.Ed.2d 433 (1988). Proof of intent may be inferred from the circumstances. United States v. Gabriel, 810 F.2d 627, 636 (7th Cir.1987). 20 Given the evidence in this case, a rational trier of fact could reasonably have concluded that Boykins and Banks were not innocent passengers and that they were in fact present in the van when the gunshots were fired. Furthermore, the jury could have fairly concluded that Banks carried a firearm to protect the cocaine and that Boykins carried a measuring scale to facilitate the distribution of cocaine. 21 Finally, Boykins asserts that testimony by defense witness Melodie Lee so unequivocally impeached the testimony of Officer Bruce Wiemer that we should disregard the jury's credibility determination and reverse its findings of fact. However, our function is not to reweigh the evidence presented at trial nor to reassess witness credibility. United States v. DePriest, 6 F.3d 1201 (7th Cir.1993). The jury's determination that the evidence presented by Officer Wiemer and his fellow policemen was in fact credible is completely reasonable and will not be disturbed on appeal. 22 2. Use and Carrying of a Firearm During and in Relation to a Drug Trafficking Offense. 23 Boykins seeks to have his conviction under Count II of the indictment reversed for lack of sufficient evidence. To obtain a conviction for using and carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking offense, the government must prove (1) that the defendant used or carried a firearm and (2) that this use or carrying was during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense. United States v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir.1990). Boykins argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction on the first prong: that Boykins used or carried a firearm. 24 The law does not require that a defendant be found with a firearm on his person during the underlying offense before a conviction can be obtained. Courts in this jurisdiction and others have consistently sustained convictions on less evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Rosado, 866 F.2d 967 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 837, 110 S.Ct. 117, 107 L.Ed.2d 79 (1989); United States v. Coe, 718 F.2d 830 (7th Cir.1983); United States v. Munoz-Fabela, 896 F.2d 908 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 824, 111 S.Ct. 76, 112 L.Ed.2d 49 (1990). In Rosado, the defendant's conviction was affirmed even though he was outside of his car and the gun was in the trunk of his car. The defendant in Coe was convicted for carrying a firearm that was stowed in the glove compartment of a car in which he was riding as a passenger. Finally, in Munoz-Fabela, the presence of a gun on the floor of the car within the view and the reach of a defendant was sufficient to sustain a conviction for use and carrying of a firearm. The phrase using or carrying as defined by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924 is clearly broader than physical possession. 25 The evidence in this case placed Boykins in the front passenger seat of the van. Beside him on the floor of the van was a loaded .38 caliber handgun. Under the seat just behind him was a semi-automatic cobra handgun that had been fired while Boykins was present in the van. In light of Coe, the fact that Boykins neither owned nor operated the van is irrelevant. The evidence in this case permits the conclusion that Boykins used or carried firearms within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c).