Opinion ID: 4461213
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: violation of martinez’s

Text: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Because Martinez alleges that the individual officers deprived her of liberty by affirmatively placing her at greater risk of abuse, Martinez’s claims are rooted in the substantive component of the Due Process Clause. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194–95 (1989). The Due Process Clause is a limitation on state action and is not a “guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security.” Id. at 195. Simply failing to prevent acts of a private party is insufficient to establish liability. See Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 2011). “The general rule is that a state is not liable for its omissions” and the Due Process Clause does not “impose a duty on the state to protect individuals from third parties.” Id. (alterations omitted) (first quoting Munger v. City of Glasgow Police MARTINEZ V. CITY OF CLOVIS 15 Dep’t, 227 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000), then quoting Morgan v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2007)). There are two exceptions to this general rule. First, a special relationship between the plaintiff and the state may give rise to a constitutional duty to protect. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198–202. 15 Second, the state may be constitutionally required to protect a plaintiff that it “affirmatively places . . . in danger by acting with ‘deliberate indifference’ to a ‘known or obvious danger.’” Patel, 648 F.3d at 971–72 (quoting L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 1996)); see also Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1063 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the officer “affirmatively created a danger to [the plaintiff] she otherwise would not have faced” by informing her assailant of the accusations her family had made against him before they “had the opportunity to protect themselves from his violent response to the news . . . [thus] creat[ing] ‘an opportunity for [him] to assault [the plaintiff] that otherwise would not have existed’” (alterations omitted) (quoting L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 121 (9th Cir. 1992))). Martinez argues that the state-created danger doctrine applies because Hershberger, Yambupah, and Sanders affirmatively exposed her to a greater risk of a known danger. To succeed on this claim, Martinez must establish three elements. First, she must show that the officers’ affirmative actions created or exposed her to an actual, particularized danger that she would not otherwise have faced. Second, she must show that the injury she suffered 15 Martinez passingly references a special relationship between herself and the police officers, but does not advance the argument and did not allege it in her complaint. We therefore only address the statecreated danger exception. 16 MARTINEZ V. CITY OF CLOVIS was foreseeable. Third, she must show that the officers were deliberately indifferent to the known danger. See Hernandez v. City of San Jose, 897 F.3d 1125, 1133 (9th Cir. 2018). We analyze these elements and the officers’ conduct below.
Martinez must first show that the officers affirmatively exposed her to “an actual, particularized danger.” Id. (citing Kennedy, 439 F.3d at 1063). We do “not look solely to the agency of the individual . . . or what options may or may not have been available to her.” Id. (alterations omitted) (quoting Munger, 227 F.3d at 1086). Instead, we consider “whether the officers left the person in a situation that was more dangerous than the one in which they found” her. Id. (quoting Munger, 227 F.3d at 1086). Whether the danger already existed is not dispositive because, “by its very nature, the doctrine only applies in situations in which the plaintiff was directly harmed by a third party—a danger that, in every case, could be said to have ‘already existed.’” Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (emphasis in original). The relevant question is whether “state action creates or exposes an individual to a danger which he or she would not have otherwise faced.” Kennedy, 439 F.3d at 1061 (citations and footnote call number omitted).
Martinez argues that Officer Hershberger placed her in greater danger by failing to inform her of her rights or options, failing to provide her with the Clovis PD’s handout for domestic violence victims, and failing to make an arrest. MARTINEZ V. CITY OF CLOVIS 17 Although these failures may have been a dereliction of Hershberger’s duties, they were not “an affirmative act [that] create[d] an actual, particularized danger.” Hernandez, 897 F.3d at 1133 (citing Kennedy, 439 F.3d at 1063). In other words, Hershberger did not make the situation worse for Martinez. Hershberger simply left Martinez in the same position she was in before the police had arrived. Martinez also maintains that Hershberger failed to separate her from Pennington, causing her to recant her allegations of abuse out of fear of Pennington. But this alleged failure did not expose Martinez to a danger that she would not otherwise have faced. See Henry A., 678 F.3d at 1003. Failing to affirmatively separate Martinez from Pennington left her in the same position she would have been in had Hershberger not responded to the 911 call. At least under these circumstances, Hershberger did not violate Martinez’s right to due process. However, the record also reveals that Hershberger told Pennington about Martinez’s testimony relating to his prior abuse, and also stated that Martinez was not “the right girl” for him. A reasonable jury could find that Hershberger’s disclosure provoked Pennington, and that her disparaging comments emboldened Pennington to believe that he could further abuse Martinez, including by retaliating against her for her testimony, with impunity. The causal link between Hershberger’s affirmative conduct and the abuse Martinez suffered that night is supported by Martinez’s testimony that Pennington asked Martinez what she had told the officer while he was hitting her. That Martinez was already in danger from Pennington does not obviate a state-created danger when the state actor enhanced the risks. See Hernandez, 897 F.3d at 1135 (explaining that an officer cannot avoid liability merely 18 MARTINEZ V. CITY OF CLOVIS because the plaintiff had already been in a dangerous situation before contact with the officer). Because a reasonable jury could infer that Martinez was placed in greater danger after Hershberger disclosed Martinez’s complaint and made comments to Pennington that conveyed contempt for Martinez, the first requirement of the statecreated danger doctrine is satisfied.
Officer Yambupah failed to separate Martinez from Pennington when conducting the interview, did not arrest Pennington despite Martinez’s complaints of abuse, 16 did not provide Martinez with information that may have allowed her to escape further abuse, and did not issue an emergency protective order. These were not “affirmative acts[s] [that] create[d] an actual, particularized danger.” Id. at 1133 (citing Kennedy, 439 F.3d at 1063). Martinez was left in the same position she would have been in had Yambupah not acted at all. See Henry A., 678 F.3d at 1003. Yambupah’s failure to protect Martinez against private violence thus did not violate the Due Process Clause. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196.
Several of Martinez’s allegations against Sergeant Sanders mirror those against Yambupah. With respect to Martinez’s claims that Sanders did not separate her from Pennington, provide her with information, or issue an emergency protective order, we conclude that Sanders’s 16 Yambupah failed to arrest Pennington because she was ordered not to do so by Sanders. This is discussed below as part of Sanders’s conduct. MARTINEZ V. CITY OF CLOVIS 19 conduct, like Yambupah’s, does not support a § 1983 claim. But, in other respects, Sanders’s conduct materially differed from Yambupah’s. Knowing that Pennington was an officer with the Clovis PD, Sanders ordered Yambupah not to arrest Pennington. This decision, on its own, did not leave Martinez in a more dangerous situation than the one in which he found her, and thus was not itself unconstitutional. See Hernandez, 897 F.3d at 1133; see also Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005) (holding that “the benefit that a third party may receive from having someone else arrested for a crime generally does not trigger protections under the Due Process Clause”). But the record contains evidence of more than just Sanders’s order not to arrest Pennington. In instructing Yambupah not to arrest Pennington, which he did in Pennington’s presence, Sanders also expressed that the Penningtons were “good people.” 17 Sanders spoke positively about the Penningtons against the backdrop that everyone involved, including Sanders, knew that Pennington and his father were police officers. While hearing Sanders speak 17 While Martinez did not expressly testify that Sanders was the officer who had said that the Penningtons were “good people,” the context supports the inference that Martinez’s testimony pertains to Sanders. Pennington testified that he did not hear the “good people” comment. However, Martinez testified that Pennington was within earshot when Sanders ordered Yambupah not to arrest Pennington. She also characterized the “good people” comment as Sanders’s final comment before leaving. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Martinez, a jury could infer that Pennington heard both Sanders’s order not to arrest and heard Sanders say that the Penningtons were “good people.” 20 MARTINEZ V. CITY OF CLOVIS positively about the Penningtons, Martinez also “heard Sanders telling [Yambupah] that, you know, ‘We’re not going to arrest him. We’re just going to turn it over to Clovis PD,’ whatever.” (emphasis added). Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Martinez, a jury could reasonably find that Sanders’s positive remarks about the Penningtons placed Martinez in greater danger. The positive remarks were communicated against the backdrop that Sanders knew that Pennington was an officer and that there was probable cause to arrest 18— which the jury could infer Pennington, as a police officer, understood. A reasonable jury could find that Pennington felt emboldened to continue his abuse with impunity. In fact, the following day, Pennington abused Martinez yet again. Under these circumstances, the first requirement of the statecreated danger doctrine is satisfied.
To invoke the state-created danger doctrine, Martinez must next show that her “ultimate injury” was “foreseeable.” Hernandez, 897 F.3d at 1133 (citing Lawrence v. United States, 340 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2003)). This does not mean that the exact injury must be foreseeable. Rather, “the state actor is liable for creating the foreseeable danger of injury given the particular circumstances.” Kennedy, 439 F.3d at 1064 n.5. As a matter of common sense, the assaults Martinez suffered after the police interventions on May 2, 2013, and June 4, 2013, were objectively foreseeable. See Hernandez, 18 Again, that there was probable cause to arrest and no arrest was made is not the basis for the constitutional violation. MARTINEZ V. CITY OF CLOVIS 21 897 F.3d at 1133 (citing Lawrence, 340 F.3d at 957); Grubbs, 974 F.2d at 121 (concluding a § 1983 claim was viable when state employees “knowingly assigned [the plaintiff] to work with [an inmate] despite their knowledge” of his history of violence toward women, the likelihood that she would be left alone with him, and the fact that she would not be prepared to defend against or avert an attack); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 590 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating “the inherent danger facing a woman left alone at night in an unsafe area is a matter of common sense”) (citation omitted).
Under the state-created danger test, Martinez must finally show that the officers acted “with ‘deliberate indifference’ to a ‘known or obvious danger.’” Hernandez, 897 F.3d at 1133 (quoting Patel, 648 F.3d at 974). This is “a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Patel, 648 F.3d at 974 (quoting Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997)). The standard is higher than gross negligence, because it requires a “culpable mental state.” Id. (citing Grubbs, 92 F.3d at 898–900). “The state actor must ‘recognize an unreasonable risk and actually intend to expose the plaintiff to such risks without regard to the consequences to the plaintiff.’” Id. (alterations omitted) (quoting Grubbs, 92 F.3d at 899). In other words, the state actor must have known that something was going to happen, but “ignored the risk and exposed the [plaintiff] to it anyway.” Hernandez, 897 F.3d at 1135 (alterations omitted) (quoting Patel, 648 F.3d at 974). Given the foreseeability of future domestic abuse here, a reasonable jury could find that disclosing a report of abuse while engaging in disparaging small talk with Pennington, 22 MARTINEZ V. CITY OF CLOVIS and/or positively remarking on his family while ordering other officers not to make an arrest despite the presence of probable cause, constitutes deliberate indifference to a known or obvious danger. See Hernandez, 897 F.3d at 1136. That Pennington was already under investigation by the Clovis PD for allegations of abuse against an ex-girlfriend also suggests that future abuse was a known or obvious danger. By ignoring the risk created by Pennington’s violent tendencies, the officers acted with deliberate indifference toward the risk of future abuse. We hold that a reasonable jury could find that Hershberger and Sanders violated Martinez’s due process right to liberty by affirmatively increasing the known and obvious danger Martinez faced.