Opinion ID: 722112
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: strable

Text: 2 At sentencing, the district court concluded that Strable is a career offender; granted him a two-level reduction for accepting responsibility; granted the government's motion for a substantial-assistance departure from the applicable Guidelines range of 168 to 210 months; found no other grounds for departure; and sentenced Strable to 114 months in prison. 3 Strable contends that the district court erred in treating him as a career offender. We disagree. As pertinent here, a defendant is a career offender if he has at least two prior convictions of a crime of violence. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. A crime of violence includes an offense under state law punishable by a prison term of more than a year that is burglary of a dwelling ... or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. Strable's prior conviction for attempted burglary of a commercial building qualifies as a crime of violence. See United States v. Hascall, 76 F.3d 902, 904 (8th Cir.1996) (burglary of commercial building seriously risks physical injury to another); United States v. Carpenter, 11 F.3d 788, 790 (8th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1570 (1994) (crime of violence includes attempts). 4 Turning to Strable's remaining contentions, the district court did not clearly err in awarding Strable a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, rather than a three level reduction, because he absconded for three months after agreeing to plead guilty. See United States v. Thompson, 60 F.3d 514, 517 (8th Cir.1995). Strable failed to prove that he is entitled to a mitigating role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. See Thompson, 60 F.3d at 517. He did not argue to the district court that he deserves a departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 because his criminal history was overstated, and the court's failure to grant that departure was not plain error. See Fritz v. United States, 995 F.2d 136, 137 (8th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 887 (1994). Finally, we may not review either the district court's discretionary refusal to depart, see United States v. Jackson, 56 F.3d 959, 960 (8th Cir.1995), or the extent of its substantial-assistance departure, see United States v. Goodwin, 72 F.3d 88, 91 (8th Cir.1995).