Opinion ID: 590717
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Juror Partiality

Text: 4 Seagrave argues that he was tried by a partial jury because the trial court forced him to expend a peremptory challenge on a juror who should have been dismissed for cause. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that the loss of a peremptory challenge [in a state trial] constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 2278, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988). So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean that the Sixth Amendment was violated. Id. The focus is on the impartiality of the jurors who actually sat, not on the juror whom the defendant successfully dismisses with a peremptory challenge. Id. at 86, 108 S.Ct. at 2277. 5 Under Ross the proper focus of Seagrave's claim is on the qualifications and bias of Juror Sevy, who became a member of the jury, rather than on Juror Waydick, who was dismissed by a defense peremptory challenge. At voir dire, Seagrave challenged Sevy for cause on the basis of her Mormon religious convictions and her statement that she would have trouble with the language. The partiality of an individual juror is a question of fact entitled to a presumption of correctness on federal habeas review. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 524-26 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 974, 112 L.Ed.2d 1059 (1991). A juror should be dismissed for cause only if her views would prevent or substantially impair her ability to perform the duties of a juror in accordance with the instructions and her oath. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980). Sevy reiterated several times that she would try to put aside her aversion to the strong language, that she could consider the evidence, and that she could be impartial. The trial judge directly questioned her on her ability to remain impartial, to which she affirmatively responded. Based on the totality of Sevy's responses, the court did not erroneously conclude that Sevy was a fair and impartial juror. See Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1237 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 838, 105 S.Ct. 137, 83 L.Ed.2d 77 (1984). Therefore, the denial of the defense's challenge for cause of Juror Waydick did not violate Seagrave's constitutional rights.