Opinion ID: 1278599
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Funds for Ancillary Defense Services Ordered Pursuant to Other Statutes and Authority

Text: (2a) The thrust of Corenevsky's petition in L.A. 31723 may be simply summarized: assuming that state funding under Penal Code section 987.9 is no longer available, and in light of the board of supervisors' demonstrated and avowed intention to refuse to authorize any ancillary funding at county expense, a fair trial has been rendered impossible and mandate must issue directing the trial court to dismiss all charges. [5] We find it unnecessary to reach this issue, however, because as the People suggest, the question of dismissal is premature: the appropriate inquiry is whether the trial court's orders regarding ancillary defense services were proper, and further, whether they are enforceable.
Both Corenevsky and the People observe that Evidence Code section 730 explicitly provides for court-appointed expert witnesses, [6] and that Evidence Code section 731, subdivision (a), [7] and Government Code section 29603 [8] clearly state that the county must pay those court-ordered expenses. Of course, these statutes do not directly provide for court-ordered investigators, law clerks, or enumerated experts other than expert witnesses generally. (3) However, as we observed in Sand, the right to such services is to be inferred from at least two statutes respecting an indigent defendant's statutory right to legal assistance; [9] and more fundamentally, such court-ordered defense services may be required in order to assure a defendant his constitutional right not only to counsel, but to the effective assistance of counsel. (4) It cannot be doubted that the right to counsel guaranteed by both the federal and state Constitutions [10] includes, and indeed presumes, the right to effective counsel ( United States v. Cronic (1984) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [80 L.Ed.2d 657, 669, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2044]; Strickland v. Washington (1984) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064]; McMann v. Richardson (1970) 397 U.S. 759, 771, fn. 14 [25 L.Ed.2d 763, 773, 90 S.Ct. 1441]; People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 581-583 [189 Cal. Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144]; Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) supra, 31 Cal.3d 424, 428; People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 423-425 [152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859, 2 A.L.R.4th 1]), [11] and thus also includes the right to reasonably necessary ancillary defense services. ( Keenan, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 428 [The right to effective counsel also includes the right to ancillary services necessary in the preparation of a defense]; In re Ketchel (1968) 68 Cal.2d 397, 399-400 [438 P.2d 625] [`A fundamental part of the constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel is that his attorney ... is obviously entitled to the aid of such expert assistance as he may need ... in preparing the defense']; Puett v. Superior Court (1979) 96 Cal. App.3d 936, 938-939 [158 Cal. Rptr. 266] [the right to counsel encompasses the right to effective counsel which in turn encompasses the right of an indigent and his appointed counsel to have the services of an investigator]; People v. Faxel (1979) 91 Cal. App.3d 327, 330 [154 Cal. Rptr. 132] [The due process right of effective counsel includes the right to ancillary services necessary in the preparation of a defense]; cf. Mason v. State of Arizona (9th Cir.1974) 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 [the effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the allowance of investigative expenses or appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants].) A right to ancillary defense services will thus arise if Corenevsky has demonstrated the need for such services by reference to `the general lines of inquiry he wishes to pursue, being as specific as possible.' ( Faxel, supra, 91 Cal. App.3d at p. 330; People v. Worthy (1980) 109 Cal. App.3d 514, 520-521 [167 Cal. Rptr. 402].) [12] Although such motions can be granted only if supported by a showing that the investigative services are reasonably necessary ( Puett, supra, 96 Cal. App.3d at p. 939), it has been recognized that because of the early stage at which the request typically arises, it will often be difficult for counsel to demonstrate a clear need for such funds. ( Mason v. State of Arizona, supra, 504 F.2d at p. 1352.) Therefore the trial court should, in appropriate circumstances, view with considerable liberality a motion for such pre-trial assistance. ( Ibid. ) [13] (5a) In the present case the trial court granted Corenevsky's requests for expert witnesses and a jury selection expert, and denied his request for law clerks. Although the record is ambiguous, it reveals that the court also initially denied, but subsequently granted, some funds for investigative services. Neither party has directly questioned the propriety, amount, or enforcement of the latter order; moreover, the current state of the record would not permit us to resolve any issues arising from that order. We therefore do not address any issues relating to Corenevsky's requests for investigator services. The People claim that the trial court erred in granting Corenevsky's request for a jury selection expert. Corenevsky, on the other hand, claims the court erred in denying his request for law clerks. [14] (6) Of course, a trial court's order may be set aside only if it constitutes an abuse of discretion. An order is presumed correct; all intendments are indulged in to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. ( Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [86 Cal. Rptr. 65, 468 P.2d 193].) (5b) Although Corenevsky's motion was entitled to have been heard in camera, and would therefore not normally be subject to disclosure, we note that former defense counsel consented to a hearing in open court. Moreover, the record indicates that former counsel also supplied the People with copies of the written motion for defense services, apparently as an appendix to one of the myriad other motions filed in this case. We therefore refer to and quote from those transcripts and written motions in determining whether the trial court erred in granting and denying the requested defense services. Corenevsky's request for $8,740 for a jury selection expert was based on his former counsel's belief that the difficulty of selecting a jury in a murder case with special circumstances alleged demands the assistance of an expert. The record also contains other confidential information, not disclosed to the People, but which was known to the trial court, and which indicates the necessity for special attention to jury selection in this case. Although we should not be interpreted as generally approving of public funds being paid for a so-called jury selection expert, in this instance the trial court had ample basis on which to grant Corenevsky's request; we conclude that it was well within its discretion in doing so. (7) Defendant also set out in great detail the basis for his request for continuing funding of two law clerks. His written motion for funds declared: The need for two law clerks: Ms. Judith A. Descalso has clerked for the Public Defender on this matter for several months and is very familiar with the legal aspects of the pretrial matters and has assisted in preparing several of the trial motions. She has also been researching and preparing voir dire and jury instructions. Her assignment will be to assist in court during the trial of the matter and this assistance has two aspects. First, she will ready and make available to counsel pleadings and transcripts tabbed to specific pages from the voluminous materials required at trial. This includes five trial index binders, an index to those binders, the trial motions and notes for factual argument, and the case boxes of discovered reports and memoranda. Second, she will conduct legal research as needed during the trial and prepare copies of cases and memoranda as needed. As this is a very complex case in re the expected testimony, the lack of this performance would [impair counsel's adequacy]. Mr. Steven Joffe has clerked on this matter for about four months. He has continually worked on the research and preparation of memoranda and written objections to the multitude of tangible and intangible evidence that is expected to be offered by both the People and the defendant. His detailed knowledge of this is an invaluable asset at trial. His primary assignment will be to provide further memoranda as needed regarding specific research needing elaboration for argument on which he completed work. The remainder of his primary assignment will be to study the daily transcripts with counsel during evening sessions so that needed research may be completed. It is expected that various motions will be made during trial that will arise only as trial is ongoing. These matters will need research and preparation and this will be Mr. Joffe's secondary assignment to be worked with Ms. Descalso. It is expected these motions will include motions to strike the testimony of witnesses, dismissal and mistrial. The motions may also be as to exclusion or suppression of tangible or intangible evidence as facts unfurl. Both law clerks will be expected to apportion the task of arranging the travel and accommodations of witnesses and expert witnesses. The clerks will be expected to brief the witnesses on the proceedings and conduct an initial interview with the witnesses. A report will then be made to counsel who will cover the important aspects with each witness and individually prepare the experts as well. Counsel also argued that the volume of documents generated by both parties required the assistance of the law clerks in order to sort and organize the materials. He concluded that without their assistance this defendant could not receive adequate or effective assistance of counsel. This showing would be sufficient to support a trial court's conclusion that the requested services would be not merely convenient but reasonably necessary. ( Puett, supra, 96 Cal. App.3d 936, 939; Mason v. State of Arizona, supra, 504 F.2d 1345, 1352.) The question posed by Corenevsky, however, is whether the trial court erred in denying such funds. If the court had explicitly found the requested services were not reasonably necessary, we would not now second-guess that determination; as the People observe, an appellate court will reverse such an order only when the circumstances shown compelled the [trial] court to exercise its discretion only in one way, namely, to grant the motion. ( Puett, supra, 96 Cal. App.3d at p. 941.) The record, however, demonstrates on its face that the trial court denied Corenevsky's motion, not on the basis of lack of need, but because the court felt the request related to staffing problems[,] and that is something that you should be taking up with your public defender and his budget instead of the court simply saying that in addition to whatever budget you already have the court is going to expand that budget. Whether you like it or not ... there are budgetary constraints. The record clearly demonstrates that such an attempt through the public defender's office would have been futile. Moreover, the court's order is suspect because it fails to address the key issue posed by defendant: whether such ancillary services are reasonably necessary. Furthermore, the record reveals that the court made its order under the assumption  perhaps reasonable at the time, but as we shall explain, mistaken  that the court could order funds for expert witnesses under Evidence Code section 731, [15] but had no authority to order other needed ancillary services. Because the trial court erroneously failed to base its order on a finding of the reasonableness of Corenevsky's request for law clerks, [16] and because it apparently held a mistakenly limited view of its authority to authorize services, its order in this respect was error.
(8) Titsworth was apparently advised by county counsel that he could not disburse funds to cover court-ordered services unless there existed sufficient allocated monies in an appropriate account in the county budget. Reasoning that disbursement in excess of appropriated funds is prohibited and would subject him to personal liability (Gov. Code, §§ 29120, 29121), [17] and reasoning that only the county board of supervisors has the authority to appropriate funds or order a sufficient transfer from contingency funds ( id., § 29130) [18]  but had expressly refused to do so in this case  Titsworth apparently believed the court's order could not legally be paid ( id., § 29125). [19] As we shall explain, Titsworth's position ignores provisions of the Government Code that allow the auditor, on his own, to issue a warrant to cover the services ordered in this case. Furthermore, his argument is premised on an erroneous view of both the auditor's and the board of supervisors' role with respect to court-ordered defense services. As previously observed, both the statutes and the constitutional right to effective counsel authorize the court to appoint experts and order other defense services. In all such cases the court-ordered services are expenses necessarily incurred in the support of persons charged with or convicted of crime and committed to the county jail ... and for other services in relation to criminal proceedings for which no specific compensation is prescribed by law. ... (Gov. Code, § 29602, italics added.) Expenses under Government Code section 29602 are county charges that shall be paid by the county auditor without regard to the existence of a specific appropriation to the same extent that the county board of supervisors may do so. (Gov. Code, § 29741, subd. (d).) [20] This raises the question of what role the board of supervisors, and hence the auditor, may play in regard to court-ordered defense services. Titsworth asserts that the separation of powers doctrine (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3) precludes a court order that might intrude into the county's power to weigh the best financial interests of the county against [the benefit to the defendant from] payments for ancillary defense services. However, although the separation of powers doctrine may preclude the court from directly ordering the board of supervisors to appropriate funds (cf. Mandel v. Myers (1981) 29 Cal.3d 531, 539 [174 Cal. Rptr. 841, 629 P.2d 935], and cases cited holding a court may not compel the Legislature to appropriate funds), the doctrine is of no assistance to Titsworth. The above-cited provisions of the Government Code demonstrate that the Legislature has itself imposed on both the auditor and the local legislative body  the board of supervisors  the duty to pay court-ordered county charges. The court transgresses no constitutional barrier when it orders a county auditor to proceed in accordance with those statutory provisions. Indeed, to accept Titsworth's view would result in violating the very constitutional principle he purports to champion. Pursuant to the separation of powers doctrine the trial court alone has authority to determine  in camera  whether reasonable need for defense services has been shown, and the county is powerless to review confidential defense requests or to modify or veto that determination. (Cf. Ex parte Widber (1891) 91 Cal. 367, 370 [27 P. 733] [The act of the board of supervisors in auditing such demands would be an idle thing, purely pro forma; for it would have no authority to reduce or increase the amount of the demand as certified by the judge]; Mandel, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 547 [Our Constitution assigns the resolution of such specific controversies to the judicial branch of government (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 1) and provides the Legislature with no authority to set itself above the judiciary by discarding the outcome or readjudicating the merits of particular judicial proceedings].) Although the county is free to challenge court orders in the courts, [21] it is impotent to review and reject such orders on its own. To hold otherwise would be to encourage and facilitate local government intrusion into exclusive powers of the judiciary. As stated above, it is solely a judicial question whether a given defendant shall be afforded requested defense services. Moreover, it is no answer to suggest, as does Titsworth, that if court-ordered defense services are not forthcoming the court can simply dismiss the charges; that solution would not only intrude into the court's power to require services authorized by statute and compelled by the constitutional right to effective counsel, it would also effectively vest the auditor and the board of supervisors with power to compel dismissal of a criminal case by unilateral veto of court-ordered defense services in that case. Under no theory would that serve the public interest. For similar reasons we reject Titsworth's contention that he lacked authority to disburse funds in excess of specific budget appropriations therefor, or that mandated compliance with such orders would violate the separation of powers doctrine. The cited statutes that prohibit disbursement in excess of appropriations expressly except their application to situations otherwise provided by law. As we have explained above, Government Code section 29741, subdivision (d), together with Government Code section 29602, otherwise provide. First, we note that Government Code section 29741, subdivision (d), contains no limitation on the auditor's authority to act independently of the board. (Fn. 20, ante. ) Moreover, we observe that Government Code section 29122 provides in relevant part: The board shall approve no claim and the auditor shall issue no warrant for any expenditure in excess of the budget appropriation therefor, except upon an order of a court of competent jurisdiction, for an emergency, or as otherwise provided by law. As we have explained above, neither the board of supervisors nor the auditor has authority to approve or disapprove court-ordered defense services. As section 29122 makes clear, a county auditor may not decline to disburse funds ordered by the county superior court to cover ordered services merely because such disbursement would be in excess of the budget appropriation therefor. Indeed, even if there is no specific appropriation to cover such orders, section 29122 authorizes the county auditor to immediately issue warrants against any appropriate budget fund  including the county general fund. Finally, compliance with the court order in this case  even if it requires disbursal of funds in excess of specific appropriations  does not violate, but sustains, the separation of powers doctrine. The right to such funds is established by statute and compelled by the Constitution; disbursal in such situations is authorized by statute. Again, a court transgresses no constitutional barrier when it orders a county auditor to proceed under the statutes. We thus must conclude that Titsworth possessed the power and the duty to comply with the court's order. (2b) Now that his role has been explicated, we have no reason to believe the county auditor will again fail to comply with such an order; we therefore deny Corenevsky's petition for a writ of mandate directing dismissal in L.A. 31723.