Opinion ID: 2599714
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Trial Court Erred in Refusing to Give the Requested Jury Instruction

Text: {19} We review jury instructions de novo `to determine whether they correctly state the law and are supported by the evidence introduced at trial.' Chamberland v. Roswell Osteopathic Clinic, Inc., 2001-NMCA-045, ¶ 11, 130 N.M. 532, 27 P.3d 1019 (quoting Gonzales v. N.M. Dep't of Health, 2000-NMSC-029, ¶ 28, 129 N.M. 586, 11 P.3d 550). Trial courts are required to instruct the jury on the applicable rules of law using the Uniform Jury Instructions, unless the instructions are waived by the parties. Rule 1-051 NMRA; see also First Nat'l. Bank in Alb. v. Sanchez, 112 N.M. 317, 322, 815 P.2d 613, 618 (1991) (Under [Rule] 1-051(D), published uniform jury instructions must be used unless under the facts or circumstances of the particular case they are erroneous or otherwise improper, and the trial court states its reasons for refusing to use them.); Sutherlin v. Fenenga, 111 N.M. 767, 810 P.2d 353 (Ct.App.1991) (Uniform jury instructions are to be given when justified by the facts, and a refusal to give such instructions when accompanied by the slightest prejudice to a party constitutes reversible error.). A party is entitled to instructions on all of his or her correct legal theories of the case if there is evidence in the record to support the theories. Adams v. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO, 97 N.M. 369, 374, 640 P.2d 475, 480 (1982). Failure to submit requested instructions to the jury constitutes reversible error, if the complaining party can show that it was prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to give the requested instruction. Id. Even the slightest evidence of prejudice will suffice, and all doubt is resolved in favor of the complaining party. Id.; Kennedy v. Dexter Consol. Sch., 2000-NMSC-025, ¶ 26, 129 N.M. 436, 10 P.3d 115 (We compel the reversal of errors for which the complaining party provides the slightest evidence of prejudice and resolve all doubt in favor of the complaining party.). {20} Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in refusing to give the basic slip-and-fall instruction, UJI 13-1318. The court refused the instruction because, according to the court, it was ambiguous and redundant. The court instructed the jury regarding the City's duty using jury instruction UJI 13-1317, which provides: A city has a duty to use ordinary care to maintain [alleys] in a safe condition. Plaintiff asserts that this instruction is a general instruction regarding the duty of a municipality with respect to its sidewalks and streets regardless of the type of injury, whereas UJI 13-1318 is an instruction specifically intended for slip-and-fall cases; therefore, both instructions should have been given. Plaintiff requested UJI 13-1318 because it includes the element that the City's duty applies whether or not a dangerous condition is obvious, and charges the City with knowledge of any condition that it would have discovered upon reasonable inspection. Plaintiff argues that this instruction is not ambiguous and clearly articulates the duty of the City in this case. We agree. {21} In Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp., 113 N.M. 153, 157, 824 P.2d 293, 297 (1992), this Court held that an owner or occupier of a premises cannot avoid liability for injuries that are obvious, abolishing the doctrine that landowners incur no liability for hazards that are open and obvious. This rule applies to all landowners, whether private or governmental. See Lerma by Lerma v. State Highway Dep't of New Mexico, 117 N.M. 782, 785, 877 P.2d 1085, 1088 (1994) (The fact that the danger may have been open and obvious would not obviate a duty on the part of the Department to protect the public from the public's own foreseeable negligence.). Therefore, in the present case, the duty of the City applies whether or not the hazard is obvious. {22} Further, the City's duty applies whether or not the hazard is known to the City. See Jacobo v. City of Albuquerque, 2005-NMCA-105, ¶ 14, 138 N.M. 184, 118 P.3d 189 (holding that plaintiff did not have to prove city's knowledge of dangerous condition on sidewalk); Cardoza v. Town of Silver City, 96 N.M. 130, 134-35, 628 P.2d 1126, 1130-31 (Ct.App.1981) (finding that town was negligent in failing to install and maintain properly fitting manhole cover, even though it had no actual or constructive notice of defect). [3] Therefore, the City has a duty to use ordinary care to maintain its sidewalks, streets, and alleys in a safe condition, and this duty applies whether or not a dangerous condition is obvious and whether or not the City has notice of any condition of which they would have discovered upon reasonable inspection. {23} This is a slip-and-fall, or trip-and-fall, case and Plaintiff was a visitor. Plaintiff presented the case as such, and the evidence at trial supported this theory. UJI 13-1317 states the general duty of a city to maintain its alleys in a safe condition, but UJI 13-1318 states the specific duty of owners in slip-and-fall cases. See Brooks v. K-Mart Corp., 1998-NMSC-028, ¶ 5, 125 N.M. 537, 964 P.2d 98 (This Court has approved a uniform jury instruction for use in negligence actions involving a slip and fall. . . . UJI 13-1318 NMRA 1998.). The Directions for Use for this instruction provide that it should be used in slip and fall cases involving visitors. Because UJI 13-1317 does not fully state the applicable law in this case, both instructions should have been given. {24} Concluding that it was error for the trial court to refuse Plaintiff's request for UJI 13-1318, we must now determine whether the error was harmless. In Adams, 97 N.M. at 374-75, 640 P.2d at 480-81, the plaintiff sued his union, the United Steelworkers of America, for breach of duty of fair representation. At trial, the court instructed the jury that: The duty of fair representation is a union's duty to represent all of its members honestly, in good faith, and without hostility or arbitrary discrimination. A breach of that duty may be found only where the union's conduct toward a member working under the union's contract or collective bargaining agreement is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. Id. at 374, 640 P.2d at 480. The court refused some of the union's requested jury instructions which correctly stated the applicable law that an employee has no absolute right to have his or her grievance arbitrated and that honest, mistaken conduct by the union cannot be considered arbitrary. In finding that the error prejudiced the union, this Court determined that without the requested instructions the jury might have decided that even if the union made an honest mistake in failing to file the plaintiff's grievance on time, its actions were arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. Id. We concluded that: Without a clear statement that honest but mistaken conduct may not be considered arbitrary, the jury might well have overlooked the [u]nion's most valuable theory. The [u]nion relied heavily on this principle to support its defense and therefore was entitled to an instruction which apprised the jury of its theory of the case. Id. at 375, 640 P.2d at 481. {25} Similarly, in the present case, without an instruction that the City's duty applies whether the hazard is obvious and whether the City has notice, Plaintiff is deprived of an important part of her theory that the City was negligent. Plaintiff is entitled to instructions that not only clearly, but also fully, instruct the jury regarding the applicable law. See Kirk Co. v. Ashcraft, 101 N.M. 462, 465, 684 P.2d 1127, 1130 (1984) (finding reversible error because defendant was entitled to have the jury fully informed on the law). Without Plaintiff's requested jury instruction specifically stating that the City's duty applies even if the hazard was obvious, the jury might have improperly determined that the City was not negligent because the meter was open and obvious. This is true, especially in light of the fact that evidence was presented at trial that the meter was an obviously dangerous condition. In Adams, we also found that [a]rgument of the principle by the [u]nion's lawyer did not suffice to cure the defect. Adams, 97 N.M. at 375, 640 P.2d at 481. In the present case, the fact that Plaintiff's attorney was allowed to argue the additional elements of UJI 13-1318 in closing argument does not eliminate the prejudice. Statements made during closing arguments are not evidence or rules of law, and the jury is free to disregard any statements made by counsel. See UJI 13-2007 NMRA. We conclude that it was not harmless error for the trial court to refuse Plaintiff's requested instruction, UJI 13-1318, and we reverse on this issue.