Opinion ID: 3157592
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standard of Review for Habeas Relief

Text: Habeas corpus relief is the final judicial inquiry into the validity of a criminal conviction and functions to relieve defendants whose convictions violate fundamental fairness. Id. A habeas petitioner has the burden of showing that the petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief. State ex. rel. Winfield v. Roper, 292 S.W.3d 909, 910 (Mo. banc 2009). “[A] writ of habeas corpus may be issued when a person is restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the state or federal government.” Woodworth, 396 S.W.3d at 337 (internal quotations omitted). The available relief under a writ of habeas corpus is limited and generally cannot be utilized to raise procedurally barred claims, such as those that could be raised on direct appeal or in a post-conviction proceeding. Id. Habeas corpus can provide relief even for procedurally barred claims if the petitioner can show: (1) a claim of actual innocence or (2) a jurisdictional defect or (3)(a) that the procedural defect was caused by something external to the defense— that is, a cause for which the defense is not responsible—and (b) prejudice resulted from the underlying error that worked to the petitioner's actual and substantial disadvantage. State ex rel. Zinna v. Steele, 301 S.W.3d 510, 516-17 (Mo. banc 2010). Moreover, a petitioner may seek habeas relief for procedurally barred claims “in circumstances so rare and exceptional that a manifest injustice results.” State ex rel. Simmons v. White, 866 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Mo. banc 1993); see also State ex rel. Engel v. Dormire, 304 S.W.3d 120, 125 (Mo. banc 2010). Mr. Clemons seeks to overcome the procedural bar to his habeas corpus claim by showing “cause and prejudice.” “To demonstrate cause, the petitioner must show that an 27 effort to comply with the State’s procedural rules was hindered by some objective factor external to the defense.” Woodworth, 396 S.W.3d at 337. The factual or legal basis for a claim must not have been reasonably available to counsel or some interference by officials must have made compliance impracticable. Id. Evidence that has been deliberately concealed by the state is not reasonably available to counsel and constitutes cause for raising otherwise procedurally barred claims in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 222 (1988). Here, Mr. Clemons argues that he is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus because the state deliberately concealed Mr. Weeks’ observation of an injury to Mr. Clemons’ face and suppressed the information he recorded in the pretrial release form by altering Mr. Weeks’ record of his observation (collectively, “the Weeks evidence”). Even though the master did not separately analyze whether Mr. Clemons established “cause” sufficient to overcome the procedural bar to his habeas claims, the master’s findings and conclusions support the conclusion that Mr. Clemons has established sufficient cause. The master found that there was “no indication that the State ever informed the defense about what Weeks observed.” This finding is consistent with the fact that the description of Mr. Weeks’ report in Mr. Clemons’ IAD report is misleading in that the description does not include Mr. Weeks’ notation of a “bump” or “bruise” and, instead, notes that Mr. Weeks indicated that Mr. Clemons’ only health problem was asthma. Additionally, while the state endorsed Mr. Weeks as a witness in a memorandum sent to Mr. Clemons’ counsel on September 16, 1992, the state did not include the information that Mr. Weeks had observed that Mr. Clemons was injured. 28 Although Mr. Clemons knew of his own injuries and that Mr. Weeks inquired about an injury, Mr. Weeks did not tell Mr. Clemons that he was recording Mr. Clemons’ injury in his pretrial release report, so Mr. Clemons could not have known that this material existed. Additionally, although the state produced the pretrial release form, Mr. Weeks’ record of Mr. Clemons’ injury was scratched out. The master found Mr. Weeks’ testimony that he had recorded his observations on the pre-release form credible and that, although it was not known who had scratched out the notation, “it had to be someone who [did] it on behalf of the State.” The master concluded that the state had deliberately concealed the Weeks evidence. The existence of a written record created by an employee of the board of probation and parole noting a significant injury to Mr. Clemons’ face less than three hours after he was booked that was altered after the lead prosecutor for the state had knowledge of the report’s content and attempted to get the author of the report to change his statements is substantial evidence in support of the master’s conclusion that the state deliberately concealed the Weeks evidence and that this evidence was not, therefore, reasonably available to defense counsel due to an objective factor external to the defense. Accordingly, Mr. Clemons has established the cause needed to overcome the procedural bar to review of his habeas claim by showing that this evidence was not reasonably available to counsel because of a reason external to the defense. Under the “cause and prejudice” standard, however, Mr. Clemons must also show “that he is entitled to habeas review because this Court’s failure to review his claims 29 would prejudice him.” Engel, 304 S.W.3d at 126. The determination of whether prejudice resulted from the underlying error under a cause and prejudice standard is identical to this Court’s assessment of prejudice in evaluating Mr. Clemons’ Brady claims. Id. If Mr. Clemons “establishes the prejudice necessary to support his Brady claims, he will have shown the required prejudice to overcome the procedural bar for habeas relief.” Id. Accordingly, this Court turns to Mr. Clemons’ claims of the state’s Brady violations.