Opinion ID: 2586480
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to obtain defendant's personal waiver of his right to a jury trial

Text: (2) A defendant enjoys a statutory right to a jury trial in a competency proceeding. ( People v. Masterson (1994) 8 Cal.4th 965, 969 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 679, 884 P.2d 136]; § 1369.) Defendant contends the trial court was required to obtain his personal waiver of this right because he and Peters were cocounsel under the terms of Peters's appointment on April 15, 1996. He claims the court's failure to obtain his personal waiver deprived him of his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. We disagree. (3) Before addressing defendant's argument directly, it is necessary to clarify the status of defendant's representation. It is settled that a criminal defendant does not have a right both to be represented by counsel and to participate in the presentation of his own case. Indeed, such an arrangement is generally undesirable. ( People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 97 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561]; see also People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1368 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259].) If [a criminal defendant] chooses professional representation, he waives tactical control; counsel is at all times in charge of the case and bears the responsibility for providing constitutionally effective assistance. Upon a `substantial' showing [citation], and entirely subject to counsel's consent ..., the court may nonetheless permit the accused a limited role as cocounsel. Even so, professional counsel retains complete control over the extent and nature of the defendant's participation, and of all tactical and procedural decisions. ( People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1164, fn. 14 [259 Cal.Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730], original italics.) [N]one of the `hybrid' forms of representation, whether labeled `cocounsel,' `advisory counsel,' or `standby counsel,' is in any sense constitutionally guaranteed. ( People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1218 [259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698].) Here, during the April 15, 1996, closed proceeding, the court approved a form of hybrid representation for defendant in which he was both represented by counsel and permitted to act as cocounsel. Specifically, in granting defendant's request for cocounsel status, the trial court advised defendant that his role would be limited to filing motions and examining witnesses at trial about his janitorial business practices, and that he would retain in propria persona privileges in jail. Peters consented to defendant's cocounsel status and was appointed counsel of record to conduct the trial proceedings. Turning to the merits, there is nothing in the record that suggests defendant's hybrid representation extended to the November 13, 1996, competency hearing. The reporter's transcript of the competency hearing reflects that only Peters appeared as counsel of record on behalf of defendant. In addition, whereas the minute order for the proceedings held on November 13, 1996, does not indicate defendant's cocounsel status during the competency hearing, it does reflect that defendant and Peters appeared as cocounsel in the proceedings that followed this hearing, when criminal proceedings were reinstated. Further, defendant's conduct during the competency hearing confirms that he in fact did not participate as cocounsel. Peters made an opening statement, examined the two defense experts, cross-examined the prosecution's expert, and provided closing remarks. Defendant, on the other hand, did not speak or otherwise participate, with two exceptions. First, defendant acknowledged a greeting by the court when the hearing was called to order. Second, during counsel's examination of Dr. Fischer, defendant attempted to ask the witness a question. The court interrupted defendant, stating, We're in a proceeding where you. Counsel interrupted the court and said, I'll ask it. Defendant remained silent throughout the rest of the competency hearing. Importantly, defendant never expressly asserted his cocounsel status or participated in the hearing in accordance with the limited cocounsel responsibilities the court had conferred on him in the criminal proceedings. In sum, the record fails to support the factual predicate to defendant's claim: that the hybrid representation extended to the competency hearing. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by accepting Peters's waiver of defendant's statutory right to a jury trial at the competency hearing. ( People v. Masterson, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 974 [counsel may waive a jury trial in a competency proceeding, even over the defendant's objection].) [13]