Opinion ID: 799074
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Counsel's advice to plead guilty to armed kidnaping

Text: At Stephens' state post-conviction evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Stephens' lawyer was deficient for advising Stephens to plead guilty to armed kidnaping because this was not a reasonable strategy, and the Florida Supreme Court agreed. Stephens II, 975 So.2d at 419. However, the Florida Supreme Court also found that Stephens could not demonstrate Strickland prejudice. In order to show that counsel's deficiency prejudiced him, Stephens must show that but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). Stephens cannot meet this standard. The record reflects that the plea to the kidnaping charge was made knowingly and voluntarily. Furthermore, Stephens conceded his involvement in the kidnaping during his own testimony, admitting that he took the victim from the house. Counsel utilized Stephens' pleas in his argument at the penalty phase, arguing that the jury should consider them as evidence of Stephens' remorse and rehabilitation potential. Moreover, throughout the trial, counsel argued that Stephens did not intentionally kill the victim, which was the primary point of contention at trial. We cannot say that the Florida Supreme Court's determination that Stephens failed to show that his counsel's deficient strategy prejudiced these proceedings was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.