Opinion ID: 3012685
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Specificity of the Indictment

Text: Finally, Schofield argues that the District Court erred by using the general term “controlled substance,” rather than the precise substance charged in the indictment, in the jury instructions.6 In other words, Schofield contends that the Government must demonstrate that he was engaged in a conspiracy specifically to distribute crack cocaine. That misses the mark. The Government must prove only that the defendant conspired to 6 The variance between the indictment and the jury instructions is not reversible error. “To show prejudice, a defendant must generally show that the indictment either did not sufficiently inform him of the charges against him so that he could prepare his defense and not be misled or surprised at trial or that the variance created a danger that the defendant could be prosecuted a second time for the same offense.” United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 441 (3d Cir. 1996). Cf. United States v. Sheppard, 219 F.3d 766, 770 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[A] defendant may be convicted of a drug conspiracy violation without proof that he knew the precise drug he conspired to possess and distribute. . . . The district court’s instructions required the jury to find that the drug in question was methamphetamine, and that Sheppard knew it was a controlled substance. . . . There was no material variance because the instructions only took away a ‘non-defense’--that Sheppard knew it was a controlled substance, but not the controlled substance, methamphetamine.”). 14 distribute a controlled substance. The indictment charged a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute “in excess of 50 grams or more of cocaine base in the form commonly known as crack.” Given this indictment, Schofield’s theory of defense was that he did not know the box contained crack cocaine, but rather thought that it contained powder cocaine. Schofield’s efforts at trial were misplaced. “[T]he structure and plain text of § 841 affords no support for a requirement that the Government must prove more than the defendant’s knowledge that he was trafficking in a controlled substance.” United States v. Barbosa, 271 F.3d 438, 458 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1049 (2002). Schofield argues that this analysis applies only to the mens rea (or intent) portion of the substantive offense. A conspiracy conviction, he contends, requires something more. We disagree. Section 846 specifically states that “any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt of conspiracy.” Every Court of Appeals that has addressed this issue has extended the reasoning underlying Barbosa to conspiracy cases. See United States v. Villarce, 323 F.3d 435, 439 n.1 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Collazo-Aponte, 281 F.3d 320, 326 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 869 (2002); United States v. Carrera, 259 F.3d 818, 830 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Sheppard, 219 F.3d 766, 768 n.22, 770 (8th Cir. 2000). To be sure, there can be no conspiracy where there is no meeting of the minds. 15 However, a co-conspirator need not be aware of the precise details of the scheme as long as the Government can establish a common purpose. See United States v. Russell, 134 F.3d 171, 183 (3d Cir. 1998). The District Court thus did not err by charging the jury to determine whether Schofield conspired to distribute a controlled substance. The jury found that Schofield and his co-conspirators sought to advance the common unlawful object of distributing controlled substances in violation of § 841, and Schofield was properly convicted on that charge.