Opinion ID: 1744716
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: guarantee of venue

Text: The venue problem in this appeal could have been easily avoided by the court's merely granting the State's motion to withdraw its rest and present evidence on venue. Even in criminal prosecutions the withdrawal of a rest in a trial on the merits is within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Putnam, 178 Neb. 445, 448-49, 133 N.W.2d 605, 608 (1965). Unfortunately, however, instead of allowing the State to recall Edwards to answer a single, simple question identifying venue, the court chose to try to remedy the evidential situation and created the venue problem presented in Vejvoda's appeal. Vejvoda claims that an accused is guaranteed the right to be tried in the county where the offense is committed by Article 1, Section 11 of the Constitution of the State of Nebraska. Brief for appellant at 3. Vejvoda, however, incorrectly interprets the constitutional guarantee in article I, § 11, of the Nebraska Constitution, which grants to a criminal defendant the right to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed. We have characterized the preceding constitutional language as too plain to require interpretation. Marino v. State, 111 Neb. 623, 625, 197 N.W. 396, 397 (1924). Article I, § 11, of the Nebraska Constitution relates to an impartial jury in a criminal case for which a jury trial is constitutionally guaranteed, but does not grant a defendant a constitutional right to be tried in a particular county. In the present case, Vejvoda was convicted in a bench trial. Therefore, article I, § 11, of the Nebraska Constitution concerning a jury trial is inapplicable to Vejvoda's case. Vejvoda's right to be tried in the county in which the criminal offense is alleged to have been committed is secured by statute rather than by the Nebraska Constitution. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-1301 (Reissue 1985) provides that [a]ll criminal cases shall be tried in the county where the offense was committed ... unless it shall appear to the court by affidavits that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had therein. While proper venue in a criminal case may be established by circumstantial evidence, we have held that the State must prove proper venue beyond a reasonable doubt. Union P.R. Co. v. State, 88 Neb. 547, 130 N.W. 277 (1911); Keeler v. State, 73 Neb. 441, 103 N.W. 64 (1905). It is clear from Nebraska decisions that a defendant may waive the statutorily designated venue for the trial of a criminal case in accordance with § 29-1301 concerning a change of venue. See Kennison v. State, 83 Neb. 391, 119 N.W. 768 (1909). Whether venue is an element of the substantive offense charged against an accused is apparently an unresolved issue in Nebraska. See, however, State v. Harris, 48 Wash.App. 279, 281-82, 738 P.2d 1059, 1061 (1987): As a general rule, proof of venue is necessary in a criminal prosecution. [Citations omitted.] However, venue is not an element of the crime [citations omitted], and it need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt [citation omitted]. See, further, State v. Graycek, 335 N.W.2d 572, 574 (S.D.1983): Venue, not being an integral part of a criminal offense, does not affect the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused [and may be proved] by a preponderance of the evidence.... Cf., State v. Barnes, 7 Ohio App.3d 83, 84, 454 N.E.2d 572, 574 (1982): Venue with respect to the situs of a crime is ordinarily considered an element of the offense which must be proved along with the other elements; State v. Hester, 145 Ariz. 574, 703 P.2d 518 (1985) (venue is an essential element).