Opinion ID: 884038
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Whether the owner of real property adjacent to a condominium development may use the roads running through the condominium property to access the adjacent land.

Text: Big Sky contends that the roads going through the Condominium are private and therefore HVI may not use them. HVI argues that the roads are public and in the alternative that HVI has an easement by implication and an easement by necessity to use the roads. As early as 1973, what is now Big Sky Hidden Village Condominium and HVI's remaining property was laced with a system of roads accommodating vehicles for use as an R.V. park. Therefore, in 1980, when Camper Village sought approval of the PUD, a series of roads already existed on the land to be developed. The roads extended through what is now HVI's remaining property and what is now the Big Sky Hidden Village Condominium. Those roads which predated the PUD approval, the filing of the declaration, and the construction of the first condominium unit, are the same roads that continue to serve the Condominium and HVI's land today. Additionally, in approving the PUD, the Gallatin County Board of County Commissioners found that to preserve to the maximum extent possible the natural characteristics of the land.... adequate access to all units should be provided even though the roads will be private ones. Camper Village, Inc., and HVI developed the Big Sky Hidden Village Condominium in phases. Camper Village, Inc., initially submitted to the declaration Tract I-A comprised of a few acres and 14 units. Camper Village Inc., and HVI continued to develop the Condominium in phases, adding small parcels of land to the declaration. During this phased development, unit owners had to cross property owned by Camper Village or HVI to obtain access to their condominiums. Similarly, to obtain access to the remaining land to construct additional units, Camper Village and HVI used the existing roads that cross the property that is already part of the Condominium. Thus HVI claims that it had an easement by necessity allowing it to use the existing road system. An easement by necessity is a subspecies of an easement by implication that arises through strict necessity for exit and access to a parcel of property. Graham v. Mack (1984), 216 Mont. 165, 175, 699 P.2d 590, 596; see also Schmid v. McDowell (1982), 199 Mont. 233, 237, 649 P.2d 431, 432. In Schmid, a property owner brought action against a neighboring property owner seeking a declaration of an easement by necessity. We defined an easement by necessity as follows: [w]here an owner of land conveys a parcel thereof which has no outlet to a highway except over the remaining lands of the grantor or over the land of strangers, a way of necessity exists over the remaining lands of the grantor. Similarly, a way of necessity is found when the owner of lands retains the inner portion conveying to another the balance, across which he must go for exit and access. Schmid, 649 P.2d at 433 (citations omitted); see also Peters v. Johnson (1983), 203 Mont. 120, 661 P.2d 24. Further, we distinguished an easement by necessity from other implied easements in noting an easement by necessity need not be in existence at the time of conveyance, but rather the conveyance gives rise to the easement. However, the tracts over which the easement is claimed must have had a common ownership or unity of title immediately prior to the severance giving rise to the necessity. Schmid, 649 P.2d at 433. Subsequently in Graham, we set forth two basic elements of an easement by necessity: 1) unity of ownership, and 2) strict necessity at the time the unified tracts are separated. Graham, 699 P.2d at 596. In Graham, we held that no implied easement existed absent unified title of the property involved. We reiterated the strong public policy against shutting off a tract of land and thus rendering it unusable. Where an owner of land conveys a parcel which has no outlet to a highway except over the remaining lands of the grantor or over the lands of strangers, a way of necessity exists over the remaining lands of the grantor. Graham, 699 P.2d at 596 (quoting Schmid, 649 P.2d at 433). However, the way granted may not be over the land of a third party or stranger to the title. Graham, 699 P.2d at 596-97; see also Woods v. Houle (1988), 235 Mont. 158, 163, 766 P.2d 250, 253. In Woods, the district court granted an easement by necessity. In reversing the district court, we held that the respondent was not able to meet the requirements of an easement by necessity as set forth in Graham. The easement by necessity did not give the respondent access to a public road but only to a third party's land, and as we held in Graham, a way granted may not be on the land of a third party. Moreover, the respondent had an easement by prescription which is incompatible with an easement by necessity. Woods, 766 P.2d at 253. In Smith v. Moran (1985), 215 Mont. 31, 38, 693 P.2d 1246, 1251, we considered the Gallatin County Subdivision Regulation 4.4.2, which provides that: [w]hen a new subdivision adjoins unsubdivided land and reasonable access thereto must pass through the new subdivision, streets and rights of way shall be provided to allow suitable access to the unsubdivided land. In Smith, there was evidence that plaintiffs had ample alternative access to their property, and there was no evidence to suggest that access across the subdivision was essential. We further noted that any unique property interest in abutting landowners is limited to the right only to adequate access necessary to connect the landowner to the general street system. Smith, 693 P.2d at 1251 (citing Wynia v. City of Great Falls (1979), 183 Mont. 458, 600 P.2d 802). In the instant case, HVI meets both the unity of title requirement and the requirement of strict necessity at the time the unified tracts were separated. Camper Village, HVI's predecessor, owned all of COS 1605 and conveyed part of that tract to the Big Sky unit owners. At the time Camper Village conveyed Tract I-A to the Big Sky unit owners, submitting Tract I-A to the declaration, the strict necessity of access and exit to the public roads arose. In his affidavit, Jack Schunke, an engineer, stated that if not afforded access across the existing roads, HVI will have great difficulty developing additional property, if it may do so at all. Moreover, he stated that the road some of the unit owners use to enter the Condominium crosses HVI's land. Carlisle Neithold, president of HVI stated in his affidavit that HVI does not own abutting land outside COS 1605, and cannot obtain access to its remaining land without using the existing roadways. Thus there is evidence that HVI does not have ample alternative access to its property. Big Sky's argument that the ten-year limitation in the declaration precludes an easement by implication and by necessity because it negates the presumed intent to reserve easements and the necessity for those easements does not persuade us. As stated above, the ten-year limitation in the declaration only addresses HVI's right to continue to add land or units to the Big Sky Hidden Village Condominium and does not address HVI's right to use the roads. Accordingly, the District Court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of HVI, determining that HVI has an easement by necessity. Because we hold that the District Court correctly granted summary judgment on the easement by necessity, we need not reach the issue of HVI's alleged easement by implication.