Opinion ID: 1954826
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether a trial judge who hears a guilty plea which is later overturned is qualified to sit for the subsequent trial where bias is alleged in the record

Text: ¶ 5. Farmer contends that Judge Evans erred in refusing to recuse himself from the trial in this matter. Though he admits that there is no per se rule against a judge presiding at the trial of a matter in which he previously heard a guilty plea, Farmer maintains that where there is evidence of bias in the record, the judge may not properly preside at trial. He relies upon Canon 3(C)(1)(a) of the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct which provides as follows, A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where: (a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.... Farmer cites the following as examples of Judge Evans's bias against him: (1) At the hearing on his Motion for Recusal, Judge Evans claimed he vaguely remembered the facts of the case, yet when he sentenced Farmer following trial, he recalled in great detail particular statements made by Farmer. (2) Judge Evans delayed the trial of his own accord until November 2, 1998, election day. Farmer claims that this is highly suggestive of bias due to political motives and the attempt to garner votes. (3) Judge Evans shares a court administrator with the prosecutor. Moreover, the administrator is the sheriff's wife. (4) Farmer's counsel was not allowed to cross-examine the victim as vigorously as he could have. (5) Judge Evans refused to allow Farmer to introduce evidence of the victim's blood alcohol content on the night of the assault. Farmer claims this was done out of sympathy for the victim. (6) During the sentencing hearing, Judge Evans improperly allowed into evidence hearsay testimony harmful to Farmer. (7) Judge Evans sentenced Farmer to the maximum sentence despite voluminous evidence of his rehabilitation. ¶ 6. A judge is required to disqualify himself if a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about his impartiality. Rutland v. Pridgen, 493 So.2d 952, 954 (Miss. 1986). However, the presumption is that a judge, sworn to administer impartial justice, is qualified and unbiased. To overcome the presumption, the evidence must produce a `reasonable doubt' (about the validity of the presumption) . Turner v. State, 573 So.2d 657, 678 (Miss.1990). When a judge is not disqualified under the constitutional or statutory provisions, the propriety of his or her sitting is a question to be decided by the judge, and on review, the standard is manifest abuse of discretion. Ruffin v. State, 481 So.2d 312, 317 (Miss.1985). In determining whether a judge should have recused himself, the reviewing court must consider the trial as a whole and examine every ruling to determine if those rulings were prejudicial to the complaining party. Hunter v. State, 684 So.2d 625, 630-31 (Miss.1996). ¶ 7. Though this Court has not addressed the propriety of a judge presiding at the trial of a matter in which he previously heard a guilty plea, we have recognized that [i]t is not unusual for a judge to sit on successive trials following mistrials or to hear on remand a case where he previously has heard and ruled on the evidence.... Garrison v. State, 726 So.2d 1144, 1151 (Miss.1998). This Court has applied the same rule where a judge who previously tried a civil action hears a subsequent criminal case involving the same party and stemming from the same transaction. Adams v. State, 220 Miss. 812, 72 So.2d 211, 214 (1954). See also Steed v. State, 752 So.2d 1056, 1062 (Miss. Ct.App.1999); Wallace v. State, 741 So.2d 938, 942 (Miss.Ct.App.1999) (trial judge is not required to recuse himself from hearing a case in which he issued a search warrant absent a showing of prejudice or bias). In recognizing the undue burden which would attend adopting a contrary rule, we explained: [i]f we should hold that a trial judge is disqualified merely because he has previously presided at the trial of a case involving the same evidence and transaction, then it would be necessary for him to stand aside and turn the duties of his office over to a special judge in every case in which there has been a mistrial, in every case where on appeal a new trial has been ordered, in every case where he himself has granted a new trial, and in every case growing out of the same transaction or based upon the same facts. The Legislature has not so enacted and we decline to adopt such a rule. Garrett v. State, 187 Miss. 441, 455, 193 So. 452, 456 (1940). ¶ 8. Farmer's concerns regarding Judge Evans's supposed recollection of the facts surrounding his guilty plea are no different from those raised by a trial judge presiding at a second trial on remand by an appellate court. Though Judge Evans was privy to Farmer's earlier admission of guilt, the version of events recounted by Farmer at the hearing on his guilty plea is no different than the version he espoused at trial. Accordingly, absent some showing of actual prejudice or bias, we find no error in Judge Evans presiding at Farmer's trial. We turn now to Farmer's allegations of bias.