Opinion ID: 2627706
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The hospital may be found vicariously liable under Idaho's doctrine of apparent authority for the negligence of independent personnel assigned by the hospital to perform support services.

Text: Appellants argue that Ms. Kurtz was an apparent agent of TVH, and therefore the hospital should be held vicariously liable for her negligence attributable to Mrs. Jones's death. Generally, a principal is immune from liability for the negligence of `an independent contractor, or that of its employees, in the performance of the contracted services.' Estate of Cordero v. Christ Hosp., 403 N.J.Super. 306, 958 A.2d 101, 104 (Ct. App.Div.2008) (quoting Basil v. Wolf, 193 N.J. 38, 935 A.2d 1154, 1169 (2007)). Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 409 (1965). However, there are exceptions to the general rule, one being the exception at issue referred to as apparent authority. [4] Under section 429 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, liability is imputed to a principal who employs an independent contractor to perform services for another which are accepted in the reasonable belief that the services are being rendered by the employer or by his servants.... Id. at § 429. When determining liability in a situation such as this when an agency relationship is alleged, the Restatement (Second) of Torts defers to the Restatement of Agency. Id. at § 429, comment c. Section 2.03 of the Restatement (Third) of Agency defines apparent authority as the power held by an agent or other actor to affect a principal's legal relations with third parties when a third party reasonably believes the actor has authority to act on behalf of the principal and that belief is traceable to the principal's manifestations. Restatement (Third) of Agency, § 2.03 (2006). The rationale for imposing liability under apparent authority is so [a] principal may not choose to act through agents whom it has clothed with the trappings of authority and then determine at a later time whether the consequence of their acts offers an advantage. Id. at § 2.03, comment c. Based on case law from the majority of jurisdictions that have extended apparent authority to medical malpractice claims, TVH argues that apparent authority does not extend beyond the hospital/physician context. However, we see no reason why hospitals should be treated differently from any other entity for the purposes of imputing liability under the doctrine of apparent authority. To begin with, there is nothing in the language from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 429 or the Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.03 that suggests hospital liability is limited to the negligence of physicians. In fact, comment (c) to Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.03 sets forth that apparent authority applies to  any set of circumstances under which it is reasonable for a third party to believe that an agency has authority, so long as the belief is traceable to manifestations of the principal. Id. at § 2.03 (emphasis added). Furthermore, other jurisdictions have recognized that a hospital may be found vicariously liable for the negligence of other individuals performing support services necessary to complete the patient's treatment. In York v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 222 Ill.2d 147, 305 Ill.Dec. 43, 854 N.E.2d 635 (2006), the Illinois Supreme Court stated: If ... a patient does select a particular physician to perform certain procedures within the hospital setting, this does not alter the fact that a patient may nevertheless still reasonably rely upon the hospital to provide the remainder of the support services necessary to complete the patient's treatment. Generally, it is the hospital, and not the patient, which exercise control not only over the provision of necessary support services, but also over the personnel assigned to provide those services to the patient during the patient's hospital stay. To the extent the patient reasonably relies upon the hospital to provide such services, a patient may seek to hold the hospital vicariously liable under the apparent agency doctrine for the negligence of personnel performing such services even if they are not employed by the hospital. 305 Ill.Dec. 43, 854 N.E.2d at 661-62 (emphasis added). The Kentucky Court of Appeals also recognized that liability extends beyond the hospital/physician context, stating: [I]t appears to us that when a hospital has received a patient, under whatever circumstance, and has undertaken treatment, that patient is owed a duty by the hospital through its employees and staff, including independent staff personnel, to exercise appropriate care to provide for the patient's well-being and to promote his cure. A breach of this duty may expose the hospital to liability in tort. Any lesser rule would be insensible to the true role of a hospital as an institution in present day society. Williams v. St. Claire Med. Ctr., 657 S.W.2d 590, 597 (Ky.Ct.App.1983) (emphasis added). In Williams, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's award of summary judgment in favor of the hospital, holding the appellant had presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment dismissal of appellant's claim that the hospital was vicariously liable for the negligence of a nurse anesthetistsa non-physicianunder the doctrine of apparent authority. Id. at 596. More recently, the Superior Court of New Jersey noted that courts of other jurisdictions recognize hospital liability under the doctrine of apparent authority when the hospital has established and staffed facilities or departments through which patients receive specialized care from medical professionals with whom they do not have a prior or ongoing relationship-emergency rooms, operating rooms and anesthesiology and radiology departments. Estate of Cordero v. Christ Hosp., 403 N.J.Super. 306, 958 A.2d 101, 107 (Ct.App.Div.2008) (emphasis added). TVH raises various arguments in opposition to this Court extending Idaho's doctrine of apparent authority to medical malpractice claims in general. First, TVH argues that the extension of apparent authority will defeat the purpose of Idaho's Medical Malpractice Act (Act). I.C. §§ 6-1001 to1013. TVH argues that although I.C. § 6-1012 mentions vicarious liability, the legislature did not contemplate that a hospital could be held vicariously liable for negligence committed by those not under the hospital's control. TVH contends that a more reasonable inference is that the legislature intended that a hospital could be held vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior rather than the doctrine of apparent authority. However, there is no language in the statute limiting the basis from which vicarious liability claims may be made. Idaho Code § 6-1012 states that a claimant may bring an action against a healthcare provider or any person [5] vicariously liable for the provider's negligence. Although the term vicarious liability is not defined under the Act, it is defined generally as [l]iability that a supervisory party bears for the actionable conduct of a subordinate or associate based on the relationship between the two parties. Blacks Law Dictionary 934 (8th ed.2004). Section 429 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which imposes tort liability to a principal under the doctrine of apparent agency, states as follows: One who employs an independent contractor to perform services for another which are accepted in the reasonable belief that the services are being rendered by the employer or by his servants, is subject to liability for physical harm caused by the negligence of the contractor in supplying such services, to the same extent as though the employer were supplying them himself or by his servants. Restatement (Second) of Torts 429 (1965). Pursuant to this section, the hospitals liability arises out of the apparent agency relationship it creates with its independent contractor and thus falls under the definition of vicarious liability. Furthermore, the Restatement (Third) of Agency specifically states that a principal is vicariously liable for a tort committed by an agent acting with apparent authority. Restatement (Third) of Agency 7.08 (2006). As such, we find that the extension of apparent agency to medical malpractice claims is consistent with the Acts provision for vicarious liability. TVH also argues that if the Court extends the doctrine of apparent authority, plaintiffs will no longer have to prove that health care providers breached the applicable standard of care through expert testimony as required by sections 6-1012 and 1013 of the Act. However, our extension of the doctrine does not change the standard for establishing negligence on the part of a healthcare provider; rather, it provides an additional basis from which the hospital's liability can arise. When a hospital is being sued in its capacity as an individual healthcare provider, the plaintiff is still required to prove that the hospital breached the applicable standard of care through expert testimony. On the other hand, when a hospital is being sued in its capacity as the principal, the plaintiff is required to prove that the hospital's agent is a healthcare provider as required under the statute, and that the agent breached the applicable standard of care. Thus, the hospital is held vicariously liable for its agent's negligence to the same extent as if the hospital itself breached the standard of care under the Act. Therefore, we find that our extension of apparent authority does not conflict with the Act's standard for establishing negligence on the part of the healthcare provider. In addition, TVH argues that if the doctrine of apparent authority is extended to medical malpractice claims, it would effectively reinstate joint and several liability. In support of its argument, TVH directs our attention to I.C. § 6-803, under which the Idaho legislature has limited the application of joint and several liability to two situations: 1) where a party was acting in concert with another, or 2) where a party was acting as an agent or servant of another party. I.C. § 6-803(3), (5). In respect to the latter, TVH argues that the legislature only intended that joint and several liability be extended to actual agents. However, the statute only requires that the person be acting as an agent. I.C. § 6-803(5) (emphasis added). Because the statute does not define agent, we must apply the plain meaning of the term. This Court has recognized that there are three types of agencyexpress authority, implied authority, and apparent authority, see Bailey, 109 Idaho at 497, 708 P.2d at 902. Therefore, the term agent encompasses express agents, implied agents, and apparent agents under Idaho law. As such, we find TVH's argument to be without merit. Based on our analysis set forth in Parts III.A and III.B, we hold that a hospital may be found vicariously liable under Idaho's doctrine of apparent authority for the negligence of independent personnel assigned by the hospital to perform support services. Therefore, we reverse the district court award of summary judgment in favor of TVH.