Opinion ID: 3150586
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: review of the post-conviction decision

Text: [¶55] A post-conviction petition must be denied if the petitioner fails to maintain his or her burden to demonstrate entitlement to relief on either element of the two-part test. Here, the post-conviction court, without reaching the competence of counsel issue, decided that its “analysis of the prejudice prong is determinative of this petition.” The post-conviction court stated generally, “If a post-conviction petitioner proves ineffective assistance, he must also demonstrate 18 Strickland was a death penalty case that included claims of incompetence of counsel in both the trial and the sentencing phase of the case. 34 that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different but for counsel’s performance,” a statement with which the Court takes issue. [¶56] The post-conviction court then proceeded to address many of Theriault’s specific challenges, finding, in each instance, that Theriault had not demonstrated prejudice—the term drawn from Strickland—resulting from trial counsel’s allegedly inadequate representation of him. The record indicates that for many of Theriault’s challenges, Theriault had offered no evidence whatsoever of how he was prejudiced by the alleged failures to hire a private investigator, investigate to find alternative suspect evidence, retain experts, or call unnamed witnesses to demonstrate additional inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony. [¶57] On Theriault’s challenges (1) through (9), listed above, the Court concludes, and I agree, that: “Theriault failed to demonstrate entitlement to post-conviction relief regardless of how one might characterize the element of prejudice, because the complete absence of any evidence of prejudice would preclude any prospect of proving that the guilty verdict was unreliable and not entitled to confidence.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 26. [¶58] That leaves for decision only issues (10), the failure to inquire further about the victim’s statement that she had used a PlayStation video game at Theriault’s home, and (11), the failure to cross-examine the victim about the inconsistencies in her statements during the Spurwink interview. Revising 35 Theriault’s argument, the Court recharacterizes issue (11) from a failure to cross-examine to a failure to present evidence, presumably by calling a witness from Spurwink to testify about the victim’s inconsistent statements in the Spurwink interview. The Court then decides on these two points, points that were not the primary points argued to the post-conviction court, that the post-conviction court’s improper wording of its decision as to the PlayStation issue is enough to require that the judgment be vacated. [¶59] On the PlayStation issue, the record has gaps identical to those the Court identifies in rejecting claims (1) through (9). The record does not indicate how evidence that Theriault did not have a PlayStation video game in his home could have been presented except (1) through further cross-examination of the victim—a tactical choice properly rejected based on the jury’s perceived sympathetic reaction to the victim, or (2) by calling Theriault to the stand, contrary to the tactical decision approved by the post-conviction court and affirmed in the Court’s opinion. The record is silent as to whether Theriault may have had other video games in his home and whether the nine-year-old victim, recalling playing a video game when she was six, used the term “PlayStation” as a generic reference to any video game, or whether she recognized and recalled the exact model of the game she was playing. 36 [¶60] The post-conviction court rejected the PlayStation challenge, noting that at trial evidence was presented that the victim told the nurse that Theriault had touched her over her clothing, which was inconsistent with the victim’s trial testimony that she was not wearing clothes at the time of the assault. The post-conviction court found that because the jury appeared to have accepted the victim’s testimony despite her contradictory statements about the incident itself, evidence on a collateral issue, that Theriault did not have a PlayStation or other video game—if that evidence existed—was not “likely to have produced a different result.” [¶61] The Court characterizes this statement as an erroneous “outcome determinative test” justifying vacating the judgment. Court’s Opinion ¶ 27. But the Court approves the post-conviction court’s rejection of the nine other claims, using similar, allegedly flawed language, where, like the PlayStation claim, there was no evidentiary support for entitlement to relief, regardless of how one characterized the element of prejudice. The record lacks any indication of how the PlayStation evidence, if it existed, might have been presented, or how the tactical choice not to cross-examine the victim about the presence of some video game “so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. 37 [¶62] The Court’s ruling on the absence of Spurwink statement cross-examination, as post-conviction counsel characterized it, or the absence of Spurwink statement evidence, as the Court recharacterizes counsel’s argument, is based on an even thinner reed. [¶63] As the Court’s opinion correctly recognizes: “The [post-conviction] court did not discuss this [Spurwink] evidence in its order, and neither party requested that the court issue findings on the issue.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 28. Thus, there is no improper use of words in the post-conviction court’s finding on this issue, and the lack of a request for findings suggests the limited attention the post-conviction court and Theriault gave to this issue in the post-conviction proceedings. [¶64] “In those circumstances”, the Court’s opinion states, “we ordinarily would infer that a court made factual findings sufficient to support its ultimate conclusion.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 28. That principle is well established in the jurisprudence of appellate review. See Pelletier v. Pelletier, 2012 ME 15, ¶ 20, 36 A.3d 903; Sutherland v. Morrill, 2008 ME 6, ¶¶ 4-5, 940 A.2d 192; Lyons v. Baptist Sch. of Christian Training, 2002 ME 137, ¶ 13, 804 A.2d 364; State v. Dodd, 503 A.2d 1302, 1307 (Me. 1986) (stating that when there has been no request for findings of fact pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(a), or M.R. Crim. P. 23(c) (now M.R.U. Crim. P. 23(c)), we will infer that the trial court found all the facts 38 necessary to support its judgment, if those inferred findings are supportable by the evidence in the record). [¶65] In its opinion, the Court abandons this sound principle of appellate review, stating: “In the specific circumstances of this case, however, the legitimacy of that inference is undermined, because it would attribute to the court the use of a legal principle that it misstated several times in its order.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 28. The Court’s “several times” reference must be to portions of the post-conviction order that it affirms or to the post-conviction court’s single comment deciding the PlayStation issue.