Opinion ID: 179337
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lay Opinion Voice Identification Testimony

Text: We review the district court's admission of Officer Toy's voice identification testimony for abuse of discretion. United States v. Neighbors, 590 F.3d 485, 492 (7th Cir.2009). Cruz-Rea argues that Officer Toy's voice identification testimony was improper because the government laid insufficient foundation under Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(5). Rule 901(b)(5) provides that the identification of a voice, whether heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmissions or recording, may be established by opinion testimony that is based upon hearing the voice at any time under circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker. Fed. R.Evid. 901(b)(5). We have consistently interpreted this rule to require that the witness have only minimal familiarity with the voice. Neighbors, 590 F.3d at 493; United States v. Recendiz, 557 F.3d 511, 527 (7th Cir.2009). Once the court admits voice identity testimony, opposing counsel may cast doubt upon the witness' opinion through cross-examination, additional testimony, or other evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 600 F.3d 847, 857-58 (7th Cir.2010); Neighbors, 590 F.3d at 494. It is ultimately the trier of fact's responsibility to determine the accuracy and reliability of the identification testimony, and when reaching its determination, the trier of fact may consider circumstantial evidence that tends to corroborate or contradict the identification. Neighbors, 590 F.3d at 493-94; United States v. Mansoori, 304 F.3d 635, 665 (7th Cir.2002); United States v. Degaglia, 913 F.2d 372, 376 (7th Cir.1990). We cannot say as a matter of law that the low bar of minimal familiarity was not met in this case. Officer Toy testified that she became familiar with Cruz-Rea's voice by listening to an approximately fifteen second voice exemplar at least fifty to sixty times. Officer Toy then identified Cruz-Rea's voice on twenty-four wiretapped telephone conversations, including a conversation in which Cruz-Rea offered to sell cocaine that was good for the frying pan and a conversation in which Cruz-Rea discussed his plan to ship cocaine to Indianapolis via a car hauler carrying a Ford Explorer. Two different witnesses testified to having these exact conversations with Cruz-Rea on the telephone. Although neither of the two witnesses offered any voice identification testimony in court, their corroborating testimony tends to establish the accuracy of Officer Toy's voice identification. Given the length of the voice exemplar and the number of times that Officer Toy listened to the exemplar, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the government had laid sufficient foundation for Officer Toy's voice identification testimony under Rule 901(b)(5). See Neighbors, 590 F.3d at 493-94. The accuracy and reliability of the testimony was a question for the jury to weigh, and the court properly admitted the corroborating testimony to aid the jury in this role. Jones, 600 F.3d at 858. We stress, however, that we arrive at this conclusion without the benefit of empirical evidence on the reliability of voice identifications, and as previously cautioned by this court in Jones, we can imagine a case in which the foundation for the voice identification testimony was so flimsy as to be deemed insufficient. Id. Cruz-Rea also argues that Officer Toy's voice identification was unhelpful and therefore inadmissable under Federal Rule of Evidence 701 because the jury could have listened to the tapes and identified the voices without the aid of Officer Toy's opinion. Rule 701 states that lay opinion is proper when it is (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. Fed. R.Evid. 701 (emphasis added). Although Rule 701 requires that testimony be helpful, we have never held that testimony is unhelpful merely because a jury might have the same opinion as the testifying witness. See, e.g., United States v. Noel, 581 F.3d 490, 496 (7th Cir.2009); United States v. Towns, 913 F.2d 434, 445 (7th Cir.1990). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's ruling on this issue.