Opinion ID: 480248
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: juror misconduct and bias

Text: 10 Jury trial began on July 1, 1982, 2 in Marin County Superior Court. At trial Bayramoglu sought a verdict of either not guilty by reason of insanity, or manslaughter. At some point prior to the jury's deliberations, and without the court's knowledge, one juror, Virginia Digesti, visited the courthouse law library to solve some questions in [her] mind, apparently about the distinction between first and second degree murder and the attendant penalties. 3 11 On August 6, the jury retired to deliberate. On Monday, August 9, the jury sent the trial judge a note stating that the jury had unanimously agreed on the presence of intent and malice, and therefore could agree that the defendant was guilty of at least second degree murder, but appeared to be deadlocked on the issues of premeditation and deliberation. 12 A portion of this note had been crossed out. The second sentence, before the crossing-out, read as follows: However, the jury is divided on premeditation and deliberation, and several of them feel that they could not agree on a verdict other than first degree murder, and we may be deadlocked on this point. (Stricken language emphasized.) 13 The next morning, August 10, the judge told counsel that he had learned that a juror may have asked the courthouse law librarian about the law, capital punishment, degrees of murder, parole eligibility, et cetera. The judge ordered the jury to cease deliberating, and then conducted an in camera conference with the law librarian, Meyer Halprin. Halprin, under oath, testified as follows: 14 A I answered the telephone. A woman's voice asked me if there was capital punishment in the State of California. 15 Q What time was this, about? 16 A This occurred about--approximately 10 after 10:00, somewhere around there.... 17 The telephone conversation--the caller said, Is there capital punishment in California? I said, Yes. The caller said, Can you tell me the difference between first and second degree murder? I said, That depends on the circumstances. We then had an exchange about the difficulty to tell the difference between first and second degree murder, because there sometimes isn't the agreement between the experts. Yes she agreed, and then she asked me directly in second degree murder if a person is eligible for parole. I said, That's up to the parole board to decide. She said, You know, I was in yesterday.... 18 I think she said, yesterday[.] 19 ... and couldn't get the answer to this question. It is very difficult for me to get an answer to this question. I need to know this, she said, because she wants to do the right thing, and she wants to help others also to understand it better, and she said, Since I can't get an answer, I'll go back to my business, and then I said, What is your business?, and she said, I'm a Marin--a juror here in Marin, and I said, In a murder case?, and she said, Well, then, I--I can't say that. I would be discussing it with you. I said, Well, I see. Actually this matter should be brought before the Court, because they can give you the proper answer to your question, and she said that she would then send an inquiry into the Court. She would then ask for the Judge, she said, to give them a definition of first and second degree murder. 20 After Halprin had testified to this conversation, the trial judge, with counsel's consent, spoke privately with all of the jurors as a group. The judge told counsel later that he had asked, gently, whether anyone had spoken to the law librarian and that all had denied taking part in such a conversation. The judge then questioned the jury foreman alone, who related that one of the jurors, whom he identified by first name, physical appearance and position in the jury box, had during deliberations mentioned that first degree murder would be, in this instance--could be anywhere from 15 years to life, if I recall correctly; 15 years to something, whether it is life or--or another number. 21 Digesti was then brought into chambers and questioned by the judge, in counsel's presence. In response to the judge's questions, Digesti admitted that she had spoken to the librarian, and explained her motives and the extent to which she had shared this information with her fellow jurors: 22 JUROR DIGESTI: [Y]ou know, to make a decision of first and second degree, I didn't know that that was so bad to ask a question. I wanted to ask you about this, because if you say, Is it first degree, and if I don't know what the penalty maybe [sic]--I'm not supposed to be concerned about this, but I am concerned in my heart that I want to know.... 23 THE COURT: Let me just tell you the law says that you cannot be concerned with that, and we were having a discussion, the two attorneys and myself, just the other day about this kind of a problem, when the jurors are required to make a decision, you know, and not knowing the impact of it, which is what you were concerned about-- 24 JUROR DIGESTI: Yes. 25 THE COURT:--as you have indicated, and it is a very natural concern, but it is one of the things that the law does not permit, whether it is natural or not, and the law has reasons why it does not permit decisions to be based, or factors to be considered, such a factor of punishment. It is just that you can't consider it. 26 Could you tell me where you got that information, and what was the amount of the sentence? What information did you get? 27 JUROR DIGESTI: Yes. What bothers me so badly is if I--if in our discussion, just openly--if in our discussion we decide on first degree murder, in my mind, I read someplace before ever this happened, that first degree involves the death penalty, and the death penalty is still available in California, but it involves 15 years to life. These facts just hit me in the back of the head. I kind of pulled it out for first degree, but I never did remember anything about reading about what second degree-- 28 THE COURT: Did you find out anything? 29 JUROR DIGESTI: No, nothing different than that. 30 THE COURT: The only information you disclosed to the jury was the information of 15-- 31 JUROR DIGESTI: I didn't really do that. I asked the question when I went in this morning. I wanted somebody to help me with that, and I couldn't find it, and I said, Could somebody tell me what the difference is between first and second degree?, and nobody said, and then a little lady in there said she thought 15 years to life, and I had remembered reading that, and I said, I do remember reading that, but is second degree?, and nobody knew. 32 .... 33 THE COURT: [Y]ou were more concerned, then, with finding out what second was? 34 JUROR DIGESTI: I wanted to know that. Nobody knew. I asked if we could send a note to ask, and they told me, and then I realized, this is bad, because they said, It is not your concern. You are not to be concerned about that. It is so hard not to be concerned. 35 THE COURT: We understand it is a very natural response to be concerned. It is just that they are right, the law says you cannot consider that. 36 Digesti went on to say that there had been no prior discussions among the jurors concerning the possible penalties for different degrees of murder. She also admitted that she had visited the law library once but had not found anything and had not disclosed anything about this event to any of the other jurors. 37 After Digesti had left the judge's chambers, defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on her misconduct. The judge offered to remove Digesti and replace her with an alternate, but counsel argued that the jury was contaminated. 38 After lunch this same day, Digesti was again questioned in camera, and stated that she could put the issue of penalty out of her mind in her deliberations, and that she would not again seek any such information during the deliberations. Defense counsel renewed his motion for a mistrial. He stated that if his motion were denied, he requested that all of the jurors be voir dired as to their ability to sit fairly. The judge agreed to question each juror, and told counsel that after those interviews he would rule on the mistrial motion. 39 Each juror was then brought into chambers, in the presence of counsel. The judge asked each juror (1) whether he or she had heard Digesti make any remarks about penalties; (2) whether anyone had responded to Digesti's remarks; and (3) whether he or she could refrain from considering penalties when deliberating over the defendant's guilt or innocence. All jurors said they had heard Digesti's remarks, most said they had heard responses to the effect that the jury was not supposed to consider the penalty in reaching a verdict, and all swore they could be fair and impartial notwithstanding this mention of penalties. 40 After these interviews were completed, defense counsel renewed his mistrial motion. The judge again denied the motion, but offered to excuse Digesti from the jury. Defense counsel, after consulting with Bayramoglu, declined the court's offer, arguing again that the jury had been contaminated. Defense counsel also explained that because the jury foreman had apparently indicated that Digesti was one of the jurors who is not agreeing to a first degree verdict, he could not agree to her removal because he had to insulate my client from a conviction of first degree murder. 41 Because neither counsel wished her to be removed, the court did not at that time excuse Digesti as a juror. The judge again instructed the jury not to discuss or consider the subject of penalty or punishment, and they resumed deliberations. 42 On the morning of August 11, the jury heard a readback of the testimony of Dr. Blinder, a psychiatrist who had testified for the defense. At 2:30 the judge received a note from the jury foreman which indicated that all jurors had agreed that the elements of second degree murder had been proved, but that one juror is opposed to such a verdict, maintaining that premeditation and deliberation has also been established. This juror will agree only to a first degree verdict, period. The judge denied defense motions for a mistrial and for a polling of the jury, and the prosecution's offer to amend the indictment to charge only second degree murder was rejected. The judge sent the jury a note suggesting that they continue deliberating. 43 On Friday morning, August 13, the judge called counsel into chambers. He informed counsel:Last night I got a call, about 9:00 o'clock from our juror, Mrs. Digesti. She had just had a call from Fikri [Bayramoglu], who indicated that she has his life in her hands, et cetera, et cetera. I then told her to forget the statement, and not to worry about it, not to consider it in her deliberations, ... not to discuss the matter with any other jurors, ... and to reject the contents of the call. 44 At 9:50 this morning Miss Brown, one of our regulars, and she was an earlier alternate, came in very upset, and said she just had to talk to me, and this is what she disclosed to me: 45 On the first day of deliberations one of the members of the jury emphatically stated that she would not accept anything other than first degree murder. Then after we had our upset about the sentencing a couple of days ago, and interviewed all of them individually, and went through the problems of mistrials, et cetera--after that discussion the same juror who had indicated that the juror would not accept anything, or vote for anything other than first degree, related the following to the jury: 46 Several years before her husband had been killed in an accident; wasn't sure it it was an automobile, or what. As a result of the emotional distress of that incident that juror could not sleep, et cetera, for several days. As a result of that she put a gun under her shirt, her blouse, went into the bathroom of the family residence, where her son was shaving, took the gun out, and aimed it at her son, and I guess--it wasn't clear, but he somehow became aware of it, turned around and said, Go ahead and shoot, mom. She did not do it. I guess the statement or something prevented her from doing it. 47 Yesterday this same juror indicated, I guess during their deliberations, to the effect, quote, psychiatrists should be out of the legal system, unquote. She agreed with Doctor Coleman [a psychiatrist who testified for the prosecution]. 48 The bottom line of these two contacts by jurors to the Court was, when I asked Miss Brown this morning who that juror was about whom she related all this to me, that juror was Mrs. Digesti. 49 Later that day, Brown was brought into chambers and asked about what had occurred. She reported Digesti's remarks about psychiatrists and about her son essentially as the judge had related them. 4 Bayramoglu's attorney renewed his motion for a mistrial, arguing that as a practical matter there is no way that [the jury] can begin deliberations without being influenced by what has already happened. They have been contaminated by Mrs. Digesti's presence, by her bias. The Court denied the motion for mistrial but excused Digesti from the jury pursuant to Cal.Penal Code section 1123. 5 50 The judge and counsel discussed various procedures for resuming jury deliberations with an alternate in Digesti's place. The court decided to instruct the jury regarding their general duties when an alternate is added, and their specific duty to disregard any consideration of punishment or penalty. An alternate juror was then selected, and the court instructed the jury as he had indicated. 6 51 The reconstituted jury began its deliberations at 11:39 a.m., and at about 3:20 p.m. returned a verdict of guilty of second degree murder. The sanity phase of the trial began on August 17. After counsel had argued, the jury retired to deliberate at 11:25 a.m. At 2:25 p.m., the jury announced its finding that Bayramoglu was legally sane at the time he committed the murder. 52 Bayramoglu's motion for a new trial was denied on September 21. He was sentenced to state prison for a term of fifteen years to life. The California Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, and the California Supreme Court declined to hear his appeal. Bayramoglu then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court denied his petition. Bayramoglu now appeals from the district court's judgment.