Opinion ID: 2795994
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: United States v. Aguilar

Text: Supreme Court dictum describing § 1503(a) does not change my conclusion. 14 In United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995), the Court reversed a conviction of U.S. District Judge Robert Aguilar for obstruction of justice in violation of the omnibus clause of § 1503(a). A grand jury had been investigating a conspiracy to influence another district judge. One of the suspected conspirators, Abe Chapman, was a distant relation of Aguilar. When Aguilar learned that Chapman had been named in a federal wiretap authorization, Aguilar warned him. During a subsequent grand jury investigation, FBI agents questioned Aguilar about his knowledge of the wiretap and the underlying conspiracy. Aguilar falsely stated that he did not know about either. His false statements provided the basis for his conviction under the omnibus clause. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction because “[t]he action taken by the accused must be with an intent to influence judicial or grand jury proceedings; it is not enough that there be an intent to influence some ancillary proceeding, such as an investigation independent of the court’s or grand jury’s authority.” Id. at 599. “In other words, the endeavor must have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administration of justice.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). In dictum, the Court distinguished false statements made to an FBI agent from statements made directly to a grand jury. The Court assumed that such statements made to the grand jury would be covered by the omnibus clause. It 15 wrote that Aguilar’s conduct “falls on the other side of the statutory line from that of one who delivers false documents or testimony to the grand jury itself. Conduct of the latter sort all but assures that the grand jury will consider the material in its deliberations.” Id. at 601. If I were compelled to treat the Court’s dictum as a controlling statement of law, I would not be able to argue, consistent with the view of the Supreme Court, that the word “corruptly” in § 1503(a) means “by bribery.” But I do not believe I am so compelled. “We do not treat considered dicta from the Supreme Court lightly,” because “it serves as a prophecy of what that Court might hold.” McCalla v. Royal MacCabees Life Ins. Co., 369 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks and citations omitted). But the Court has instructed that while “dictum ‘may be followed if sufficiently persuasive,’ it ‘ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit.’” United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.17 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627 (1935)). I do not believe the Court’s dictum in Aguilar was “considered” in the requisite sense. The question whether false statements made directly to the grand jury violate the omnibus clause was not before the Court. In his opposition to certiorari, Aguilar had conceded that, “as the government notes, the courts have 16 routinely applied Section 1503 to false testimony to the grand jury.” Brief in Opposition at 18–19, Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (No. 94-270). The government highlighted that concession in its merits brief. Brief of Petitioner at 20, Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (No. 94-270) (“as respondent has conceded, ‘the courts have routinely applied Section 1503 to false testimony to the grand jury.’”). In the context of his suit, Aguilar’s concession makes sense, for it enabled him to focus his argument more narrowly, and to argue that even if the omnibus clause covered false statements made to a grand jury, his false statements to an FBI agent were not covered. The Court accepted without challenge the strategic concession that false statements to the grand jury were covered, and held that, even so, Aguilar’s conduct fell outside the omnibus clause. The Court was thus not asked to consider the question whether false statements were covered by the omnibus clause because that question had been taken off the table. The question presented in the case now before us — whether truthful but evasive statements are covered by the omnibus clause — was so remote from the contemplation of the parties that there had been no need even to take it off the table. No argument was made to the Court in Aguilar about the meaning of “corruptly” in 1831, when the obstruction of justice statute was enacted. Nor was any argument made to the Court about the disparity in sentencing between the 17 perjury statute and the obstruction of justice statute. Had the government sought a conviction under the omnibus clause based on a true but evasive or misleading statement to a grand jury, and had these arguments been presented to the Court, it is not at all clear that the Court would have read the statute as broadly as its dictum suggests. It is possible that I am wrong and that I am required to regard the Court’s dictum in Aguilar as controlling. I do not believe that this is so, but if it is I encourage the Court to revisit, either in this case or another, the question of the scope of the omnibus clause of § 1503(a). If the Court does revisit the question, I think it likely — perhaps very likely — that it will conclude, as I do, that the word “corruptly,” as used in § 1503(a), means “by bribery.” 18 FILED U.S. v. Bonds, No. 11-10669 APR 22 2015