Opinion ID: 2977233
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pickaway County and Commissioners

Text: The Appellants assert that the County “played a substantial role in the revocation of [Appellants’] permits.” (Appellants’ Br. 35). They assert two arguments for the County’s liability. First, they argue that the County Prosecuting Attorney, the County, and the County Engineer’s office were part of a committee that was formed to investigate the problems of ponding surface water; and it was the committee that decided to suspend the sewage permit. (Appellants’ Br. 33). Second, they argue that the permits “were suspended . . . on the advice of the Pickaway County Prosecutor,” ibid., and that when Appellants appealed directly to the Board of Health at the public meeting, the -7- No. 06-3869 Crosby v. Pickaway County Gen. Health Dist. Board denied their request on the advice of the County Prosecutor. The Appellants give no argument as to why the Commissioners are liable. The Appellants brought their takings and due process claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. The Supreme Court held in Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), that municipalities cannot, in general, be held vicariously liable under § 1983: [T]he language of § 1983, read against the background of [its] legislative history, compels the conclusion that Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort. In particular . . . a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor–or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. Id. at 691. For a “policy” to give rise to liability under § 1983, “it is not enough . . . merely to identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality.” Bd. of the County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the “moving force” behind the injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights. Ibid. -8- No. 06-3869 Crosby v. Pickaway County Gen. Health Dist. While in general a plaintiff must prove a “direct causal link” between municipal action and deprivation, the Supreme Court has identified a narrow exception as to when a municipality may be held vicariously liable for an official’s action. In Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, the Court held that “municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where–and only where–a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.” 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986). To proceed on their claim, the Appellants must identify either: (1) a direct causal link that would confer direct liability on the County and Commissioners; or (2) action on the part of municipal employees that amount to a “final policy” that promoted or condoned constitutional wrongs.
The Health District is a creature of Ohio law. Ohio Rev. Code § 3709.01. Each health district is governed by a board of health consisting of five members, four of whom are appointed by a body known as the district advisory council. Ohio Rev. Code §§ 3709.02(A), 3709.03(A). By law, the district advisory council has sixteen members, only one of whom is a commissioner, and only this commissioner is a county employee. The council has only one regular meeting a year, at which it makes the necessary appointments to the board of health, receives and considers the annual or special reports from the board of health, and makes recommendations to the board of health or to the department of health in regard to matters for the betterment of health and sanitation within the district or for needed legislation. Ohio Rev. Code § 3709.03(A). The County and Commissioners thus have only the slightest of connection to the Health District. The district court was therefore -9- No. 06-3869 Crosby v. Pickaway County Gen. Health Dist. correct to conclude that the County and Commissioners could not be liable because there was “no causal link between those defendants and the suspension of approval of Appellants’ applications.”
The Appellants also allege that the County can be held liable under Pembaur because the Health District relied on the advice given by two Pickaway County employees: the County Engineer and the County Prosecutor. The question is whether either the Engineer’s or the Prosecutor’s advice amounted to an assertion of “final policy.” Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 482-83. “[W]hether a particular official has final policymaking authority is a question of state law.” Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Appellants provide absolutely no argument that the advice given by the Engineer amounted to official policy. Ohio law does not confer any such authority. Ohio Rev. Code § 315.08 (describing the duties of the County Engineer). Appellants’ only attempt at an argument is their claim that the County Engineer was part of the committee formed in spring 2004 to investigate the problems of ponding surface water. (Appellants’ Br. 33). This is clearly not enough to confer liability on the County. - 10 - No. 06-3869 Crosby v. Pickaway County Gen. Health Dist.
The Appellants’ argument concerning the County Prosecutor, though slightly better articulated, also fails. The Appellants rely heavily on Pembaur. In Pembaur, a sheriff attempted to execute an arrest warrant for several of Pembaur’s employees at Pembaur’s place of business. Pembaur refused to allow the police to enter. The sheriff contacted the county prosecutor, who in turn “instructed” the sheriff to “go in and get” the employees. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 472-73. The police then used an axe to chop down the door in order to execute the arrest warrants. Pembaur sued under § 1983, arguing that the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The Court held that Pembaur’s rights had been violated because the Fourth Amendment prohibits police, absent exigent circumstances, from searching an individual’s home or business without a search warrant even to execute an arrest warrant for a third person. Having acknowledged a violation of rights, the only question was whether the municipality could be held liable under § 1983. The Court ultimately held that it could, basing its decision on the fact that the county prosecutor authorized the sheriff to take the illegal actions. Because the county prosecutor “was acting as the final decisionmaker for the county,” the sheriff’s action represented the municipality’s official policy. Id. at 485. The facts of Pembaur are far different from those in the case at hand. The record shows that Prosecutor Gene Long was only an advisor to the Health District. The Appellants argue that Long was acting in more than an advisory role and point to certain portions of Dallas Hettinger’s and Denise Minor’s deposition testimony as evidence. The relevant portion of Minor’s testimony is as follows: - 11 - No. 06-3869 Crosby v. Pickaway County Gen. Health Dist. Q. I’m going to hand you [the notes from the September 28, 2004 regular public meeting of the Board of Health] and you can take a look at it. It’s a two-page document. ... Q. In here, it mentions the Pickaway County Prosecutor Gene Long and his advice and I believe earlier you said you met with– or you spoke with the prosecutor; is that correct? A. Yes. Q. And that was Mr. Long? A. Yes. Q. And did he give you certain advice? A. Yes. ... Q. Did you rely on his advice– A. Yes. Q. –in taking–could you tell me what his advice was to you? Ms. Courtwright: Objection. Mr. Holloway: Objection, privileged. Don’t answer the question. Q. We have sort of touched this but I wanted to give you an opportunity to say–why exactly, in your mind, was–were the permits suspended? A. Public health issues. The relevant portion of Hettinger’s testimony is: Q. When you say, “Per prosecutor Gene Long,” what role did the prosecutor, Gene Long, have in this? - 12 - No. 06-3869 Crosby v. Pickaway County Gen. Health Dist. A. Denise Minor, the [H]ealth Commissioner, and I discussed this with Gene Long to discuss what proceedings we would need to take in order to do this suspended permit. . . . Q. I’m not going to ask you what went on in the meetings. I’m asking you for what you did in this case. Did you rely on the advice Mr. Long gave you in taking the actions to suspend the permits? A. I discussed it with the Health Commissioner. We evaluated what the situation was with the rules and then we took that information to the prosecutor for advice on how to proceed. Q. But I guess my question is, whatever advice he gave you–I don’t want to know what it is, but whatever advice he gave you did you rely on that in suspending the permits? Mr. Holloway: Objection. Go ahead and answer the question. A. Yes. The Appellants’ argument that Long, like the prosecutor in Pembaur, “was acting as the final decisionmaker for the county” is unconvincing. Though the record does not detail the exact nature of Long’s advice, there is nothing in the record to suggest that his advice related to the Board’s (and through it, the Health District’s) evaluation of Lots 4 and 5 or to its decision that the installation of septic tanks and leach beds posed “public health issues.” What the record does demonstrates is that: (1) it was the “public health issues” that motivated the Board to revoke the permits; (2) these same issues led the Board to deny Cummings’s request for an issuance of a permit at its public meeting; and (3) Long’s advice in these matters was sought only after the Board had formed its opinion regarding the health concerns. The record also suggests that the Board sought Long’s advice regarding how to execute its decision to revoke the permit. Long’s role in this matter is clearly - 13 - No. 06-3869 Crosby v. Pickaway County Gen. Health Dist. different from that of the prosecutor in Pembaur. There, the prosecutor instructed the police to take action; here the Board decided to take action and asked the prosecutor for advice on how it could best execute its decision. Our circuit has not directly addressed the distinction between an attorney’s role in creating policy and in giving legal advice, but the Fifth Circuit has examined the issue, concluding that these roles are distinct and that only the former role may give rise to municipal liability. In Bennett v. Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 769 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc), the Fifth Circuit rejected a claim against a city based upon the actions of the city attorney, even though it affirmed the personal liability of the attorney. Id. at 765. In that case, the city attorney deliberately delayed his review of the plaintiff’s liquor license application for a nightclub and then advised the city council to delay the application as well. Allegedly, the attorney was influenced by the city auditor, who had a personal stake in the matter. Despite the fact that the attorney was personally liable, the Fifth Circuit held that the attorney did not have “policymaking authority” because he was “employed only to give legal advice.” Id. at 769. The court emphasized that under Louisiana law, only the city council has the authority to issue liquor licenses. Ibid. Similarly, Ohio law clearly distinguishes between the role of the County Prosecutor and that of the Health District. Under Ohio law, “the prosecuting attorney of the county constituting all or a major part of such district shall act as the legal advisor of the board of health.” Ohio Rev. Code § 3709.33. It is the Health District (acting through the Board of Health), however, that makes the ultimate decision to grant or deny sewage permits. Ohio Rev. Code § 3718.02 (A)(3)(d)(5). Regardless of whether the Board listened to the advice of county officials such as the County - 14 - No. 06-3869 Crosby v. Pickaway County Gen. Health Dist. Prosecutor or County Engineer, the record displays no evidence that the Health District abdicated its ultimate decisionmaking authority or handed over such authority to the County, its Commissioners, or any other county employee. As such, neither the County, its Commissioners, nor any other county employee can be the source of any official policy that resulted in the suspension or denial of Appellants’ sewage permits. The district court was therefore correct to grant summary judgment to these defendants, and we accordingly affirm the district court’s decision and order on this point.