Opinion ID: 4555772
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Tentative Assessment of Facebook’s Policy

Text: Arguments In addition to contending that the statutory language supports its status as an entity that provides ECS or RCS, Facebook asserts that policy considerations demonstrate it must be found to so qualify because concluding otherwise would (1) unduly disrupt and impair technological innovation, (2) disappoint users’ settled privacy expectations, and (3) frustrate its ability to protect against malware. The first two contentions certainly should give a court pause before holding that Facebook and similar entities fall outside section 2702(a), and thus are not generally barred by that provision from voluntarily disclosing their users’ communications, including restricted posts and private messages. Nonetheless, for practical marketplace reasons, it may be doubted that such a holding would likely lead to such disruptions or voluntary disclosures by most internet entities, absent legal compulsion.12 Neither does it appear likely that law enforcement actors would attempt to compel entities to disclose users’ communications with, as Facebook asserts in its briefing, “a 12 Facebook posits that if disclosure is not prohibited by the SCA, a “provider could choose to disclose a communication to anyone.” Moreover, as Facebook observes, if an entity were to do so it might cause users to “quickly lose confidence in communications technology as their privacy rights disappear, undermining the stated intent of Congress in enacting the SCA.” Yet it appears that an entity that became known for disclosing its users’ communications on its own, without legal compulsion, would not long survive in the market — and hence would refrain from doing so in the first place. 19 FACEBOOK, INC. v. SUPERIOR COURT Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring mere subpoena”; other laws and authority already protect against that.13 Nor does it seem that a narrower construction of the phrase would leave Facebook and similar entities unable to protect against malware.14 Finally, as a matter of policy, a holding finding Facebook to lie outside the SCA might have the beneficial effect of spurring long-needed congressional adjustment of the outdated Act, as repeatedly advocated by courts and commentators. (See ante, pt. III.) 13 California’s Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 2015 (Pen. Code, § 1546 et seq.) generally requires a warrant or comparable instrument to acquire such a communication (id., § 1546.1, subd. (b)(1)–(5)), and in any event, it precludes use of a subpoena “for the purpose of investigating or prosecuting a criminal offense” (id., subd. (b)(4)). Moreover, federal case law requires a search warrant, instead of a mere subpoena or court order, before a governmental entity may obtain private electronic communications. (U.S. v. Warshak (6th Cir. 2010) 631 F.3d 266, 288 [pertaining to e-mail communications].) 14 Facebook asserts that it and similar entities should not be forced to “choose between the security and integrity of their service, and the privacy of the communications maintained on that service.” But this appears to be a questionable dichotomy. It would seem that protection against malware and viruses, etc., might be viewed as reasonably necessary to ensure the safety and integrity of any computer system, and in that sense, such monitoring and resulting measures to counteract malware might well be found to fall within a narrower definition of “computer processing,” even if that same term would not broadly encompass the sharing with third party advertisers of mined and analyzed information about content. In any event, Facebook or any similar entity might, presumably, revert to an old-school pay-for-service business model, and still undertake such services to scan and protect against malware, and viruses, etc., while at the same time avoiding sharing with third party advertisers mined and analyzed information about content. 20 FACEBOOK, INC. v. SUPERIOR COURT Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring V. CONCLUSION For reasons outlined above, the business model theory deserves additional and focused attention. Perhaps the issue will arise on remand below, if the trial court again determines — this time after full and open participation by the parties and consideration of the good cause factors discussed in the majority opinion — that the underlying subpoena, as it exists or as it might be revised, is viable. In any event, the business model issue deserves to be addressed when a similar issue arises in analogous future litigation. CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 21 FACEBOOK, INC. v. SUPERIOR COURT S245203