Opinion ID: 1249829
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the trial court err in failing to apply the McDonnell Douglas framework to the instant case?

Text: In Smith v. FDC Corp., 109 N.M. 514, 787 P.2d 433 (1990), we used the evidentiary methodology developed in McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-05, 93 S.Ct. at 1824-26, to provide guidance in interpreting the New Mexico Human Rights Act. [3] Under the framework adopted in Smith, the plaintiff in an employment discrimination case must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Smith, 109 N.M. at 518, 787 P.2d at 437. The plaintiff meets this burden if he or she shows (1) that he or she is a member of a protected class; [4] (2) that he or she was qualified to continue employment; (3) that his or her employment was terminated; and (4) that his or her position was filled by someone not in the protected class. Smith, 109 N.M. at 518, 787 P.2d at 437. If the plaintiff is successful in establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden `shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason' for the employment decision. Id. at 517 n. 1, 787 P.2d at 436 n. 1 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824). If the defendant articulates a nondiscriminatory reason for the termination, the plaintiff has the opportunity to show that the articulated reason was merely a pretext for a discriminatory action. Id. The burden of showing that the employer's actions were a pretext merges with the plaintiff's ultimate burden of proving a discriminatory employment practice. Id. (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1095, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)). Our opinion in Smith rejected the idea that the McDonnell Douglas framework was the only method of proving employment discrimination. As we stated in Smith, [t]his framework, however, is not a required method of proof; it is only a tool to focus the issues and to reach the ultimate issue of whether the employer's actions were motivated by impermissible discrimination.    A prima facie case may also be made out through other means; not all factual situations will fit into any one type of analysis, although unlawful discrimination may nevertheless be present   . [T]he entire McDonnell Douglas framework may be bypassed through a showing of intentional discrimination; the purpose of the test is to allow discriminated-against plaintiffs, in the absence of direct proof of discrimination, to demonstrate an employer's discriminatory motives   . [I]f a plaintiff    can show through direct evidence that he was discriminated against because of an impermissible categorization, that is all that is required for him to prevail. 109 N.M. at 518, 787 P.2d at 437 (citations omitted). Thus, in Smith we approved of at least two possible methods of proving employment discrimination  direct proof of a discriminatory motive or indirect proof of a discriminatory motive under the McDonnell Douglas framework. [5] In the instant case, the trial court did not explicitly apply the McDonnell Douglas framework as adopted in Smith. However, as our discussion below demonstrates, the trial court's findings are consistent with a proper application of the McDonnell Douglas/Smith employment discrimination framework. Thus, appellant's first contention is groundless.