Opinion ID: 783771
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 71 Finally, Jenkins argues that the Government failed to present sufficient evidence with which a reasonable jury could have found her to be guilty of the charged offense. Specifically, Jenkins asserts that the Government failed to present substantial evidence that she was aware that the express mail package which was sent to her home contained crack cocaine. As stated supra, Jenkins contends that her statement to Kramer ( i.e., that she obtained her crack cocaine from someone other than Ingram) was not probative on the issue of whether she was aware that he was a crack cocaine dealer and, thus, that the packages which she was receiving on his behalf contained crack cocaine. Jenkins claims that the fact that she received money in exchange for receiving an unopened box at her residence is an insufficient basis upon which to find her guilty of possession with the intent to distribute crack cocaine. At most, Jenkins argues that the Government showed that she may have thought that the express mail packages contained something illegal, but it did not prove that she knew that the packages contained cocaine base. 72 The Government argues that it presented sufficient evidence at trial in order to support Jenkins' conviction. The Government asserts that, during the trial, it offered evidence that Jenkins received express mail packages at her home for which she signed, and in return, Ingram paid her $50.00 per package. In addition, Jenkins lied to law enforcement officers regarding the intended recipient of the package and, then, recanted. When asked by Gibson about the package, Jenkins responded, What do you think it is? Gibson responded, I know what it is. It is a delivery of drugs, illegal drugs. And I am very surprised that you are the one that it is being delivered to. Jenkins replied, Yeah. 73 Furthermore, the Government offered: (1) Jenkins' written statement which she made at the Obion County Jail after her arrest, (2) her admission that she was a crack cocaine user, and (3) her statement that she obtained her crack cocaine from someone other than Ingram. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to it, the Government contends that a reasonable jury could find Jenkins to be guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the charged offense. This Court has held: 74 In determining whether the evidence supporting [the defendant's] conviction is sufficient, we must ask whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Humphrey, 279 F.3d 372, 378 (6th Cir.2002) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). We view both circumstantial and direct evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, id., and we draw all available inferences and resolve all issues of credibility in favor of the [factfinder's] verdict, United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438, 446 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 916, 122 S.Ct. 263, 151 L.Ed.2d 192 (2001), and cert. denied, 534 U.S. 936, 122 S.Ct. 306, 151 L.Ed.2d 228 (2001). 75 United States v. Wade, 318 F.3d 698, 701 (6th Cir.2003). `A defendant claiming insufficiency of the evidence bears a very heavy burden.... Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction and such evidence need not remove every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.' United States v. Stines, 313 F.3d 912, 919 (6th Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Warwick, 167 F.3d 965, 971 (6th Cir.1999)). 76 In the case sub judice, we find that, even when taking all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the Government, the Government did not present sufficient evidence at trial with which a reasonable jury could have found Jenkins to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged offense. As noted supra, the Indictment returned against Jenkins charged her with knowingly and intentionally possessing, with the intent to distribute, at least fifty grams of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and therefore, the district court properly charged the jury that it must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Jenkins knew that the contents of the express mail package was cocaine base. See United States v. Harris, 293 F.3d 970, 974 (6th Cir.2002) (listing the essential elements which must be established in order to sustain a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)). 77 Despite the jury's finding to the contrary, we do not believe that the Government presented sufficient evidence on this element. In order to establish this element, the Government relied principally upon the testimony of Kramer, who testified that Jenkins had admitted that she was a crack user and that she obtained her crack from someone other than Ingram, and upon the testimony of Gibson, who testified about his conversation with Jenkins regarding her receipt of the express mail packages. 78 We have already concluded that the district court abused its discretion in allowing Kramer to offer testimony regarding Jenkins' prior crack cocaine usage, and 79 we will presume that the district court's error was reversible unless we can say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.... Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). Whether the jury was substantially swayed by the improper admission of evidence of other acts in a criminal trial generally depends on whether the properly admissible evidence of the defendant's guilt was overwhelming. 80 Haywood, 280 F.3d at 724. Here, there was a clear absence of evidence (let alone overwhelming evidence) establishing Jenkins' knowledge as to the contents of the express mail packages. As such, the Court finds that, not only did the district court abuse its discretion, it committed reversible error in admitting evidence of Jenkins' prior crack cocaine usage. 81 The Government also points to Gibson's testimony in order to establish Jenkins' alleged knowledge that the express mail packages contained crack cocaine. At trial, Gibson testified that he had the following colloquy with Jenkins at her home on the day of her arrest: 82 Q. All right. And what happened when you and Investigator — or Inspector Kramer went to the rear bedroom with Ms. Jenkins? 83 A. Well, of course, she had been advised of her constitutional rights not to make any statement once the search warrant was presented and served. And then she signed the consent to search. And once myself and Inspector Kramer were in the back, I just plainly asked her. I said, Candy, what are you doing here? What is this? 84 And she said something like, What do you think it is? 85 And I said, I know what it is. It's delivery of drugs, illegal drugs. And I'm very surprised you're the one it's being delivered to. 86 And she said, Yeah. 87