Opinion ID: 2197765
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Assertion of Speedy Trial Right

Text: The third Barker factor we must consider is whether the defendant has timely and vigorously asserted his right to a speedy trial. [19] Dabney's arguments are not aided by the fact that his trial counsel did not specifically demand a speedy trial under the United States or Delaware Constitutions or even remind the State or court of the speedy trial guidelines. Defense counsel did, however, object to further continuance of the trial after the initial seven months from arrest to the scheduled trial date. The Superior Court sua sponte, put the State on notice that it recognized the prejudice caused by the delay and that a further continuance would be inappropriate and unreasonable without releasing Dabney from custody. Once an objection is made and the trial judges are thereby focused on the issue, repeated incantations demanding a trial are not required or even contemplated by our State's speedy trial guidelines or by the federal and Delaware constitutions. No facts of record suggest that after the first seven months Dabney ever acquiesced in any delay. Therefore, we find that Dabney did preserve his speedy trial argument before the Superior Court. [20] Even if the specific words Dabney's right to a speedy trial were not used, all parties and the court were and should have been keenly aware of the speedy trial issue, and mindful that Dabney remained incarcerated on all charges while the parties contested the issues relating to DNA, the Rape Second Degree charges, and the reassignment of prosecutors. Although this one factor disfavors Dabney slightly, it does not outweigh the remaining factors, all of which weigh heavily in Dabney's favor.