Opinion ID: 719642
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard of Review Employed by District Court

Text: 10 Aucutt first argues that the district court, in considering Six Flags' motion for summary judgment, failed to review the facts in a light most favorable to him, the party opposing the motion, and give him the benefit of all reasonable inferences supported by the facts. See Didier v. J.C. Penney Co., 868 F.2d 276, 279-80 (8th Cir.1989). More particularly, Aucutt contends that the district court, in considering his performance evaluations, gave undue weight to the portions describing his negative, militaristic attitude but failed to give sufficient weight to the portions stating that he had made progress as a security officer. Appellant's Add. 11; Joint App. 65. He also maintains that the district court improperly disregarded the statements allegedly made by Robertson and Hendricks in July 1991 as evidence of age-based discriminatory animus. 11 Plaintiff's arguments are without merit. Although the district court was required to consider all facts in the light most favorable to Aucutt, it was not required to ignore undisputed evidence in the record indicating that Aucutt had repeatedly demonstrated a hostile attitude towards park patrons. 12 Similarly, the district court properly disregarded the statements allegedly made by Robertson and Hendricks, in light of the principles set forth in Beshears v. Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1354 (8th Cir.1991) (Beshears ). In Beshears, we distinguished between [c]omments which demonstrate a 'discriminatory animus in the decisional process'  from  'stray remarks in the workplace,' 'statements by nondecisionmakers,' or 'statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process.'  Id. (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 1804-05, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)); Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc., 997 F.2d 444, 449 (8th Cir.1993) (Radabaugh ) (documents authored by company president emphasizing young age of managers as one of company's strengths constituted evidence of age-based discriminatory animus). In the present case, the alleged remarks of Robertson and Hendricks were made fourteen months before Aucutt's termination, and neither Robertson nor Hendricks was involved in the decision to terminate Aucutt in October 1992. Moreover, these statements do not evince any discriminatory animus with respect to age. Thus, even if made, these statements constitute stray remarks in the workplace [or] statements by nondecisionmakers and were therefore properly disregarded by the district court. Beshears, 930 F.2d at 1354. We therefore hold that the district court properly applied the summary judgment standard in the present case.