Opinion ID: 895480
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conflict Among the Courts of Appeals

Text: Numerous appellate decisions have discussed the extent to which an expert report must examine every liability theory alleged. The cases reach varied results. Several courts of appeals, like the court of appeals in this case, have determined that a claimant’s expert report(s) need address only 2 The court of appeals also determined that the expert reports that Potts provided to Certified EMS sufficiently addressed her vicarious liability theory, but failed to address her direct liability theories. 355 S.W .3d at 686. Neither party has challenged those conclusions. 3 a single theory for the entire suit to proceed.3 Some of those decisions rely on Potts, either indirectly or explicitly.4 The Potts court focused on the Act’s plain language, specifically on the requirement that an expert report be served “[i]n a health care liability claim,” which the statute further defines as a “cause of action.” See 355 S.W.3d at 690–92; see also TEX . CIV . PRAC. & REM . CODE § 74.001(a)(13) (“‘Health care liability claim’ means a cause of action against a health care provider or physician for treatment, lack of treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted standards of medical care, or health care, or safety or professional or administrative services directly related to health care, which proximately results in injury to or death of a claimant, whether the claimant’s claim or cause of action sounds in tort or contract.”). Relying on our discussion of “cause of action” in In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d 416 (Tex. 2008), the Potts court reasoned that the Act requires an expert report only for each set of operative facts that give rise to one or more bases for suing. 355 S.W.3d at 691. Thus, if an expert report adequately addresses a single liability theory within a cause of action, the entire case may proceed. Id. 3 See Laurel Ridge Treatment Ctr. v. Garcia, No. 04-12-00098-CV, 2012 W L 3731748, at  (Tex. App.— San Antonio Aug. 29, 2012, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s motion to dismiss because an “expert report is required to be adequate with regard to only one liability theory within a cause of action in order for the claimant to proceed with the entire cause of action against the defendant”); Nexion Health at Duncanville, Inc. v. Ross, 374 S.W .3d 619, 626 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2012, pet. denied) (holding that an expert report need “not address each ‘specific act of negligence’ pleaded by a plaintiff . . . [to] satisfy the two intended purposes of the expert report requirement”); Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v. Qi, 370 S.W .3d 406, 415–16 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.)(referencing the Potts court’s reasoning when it held that an expert report need not address “every act or omission mentioned in the pleadings, so long as at least one liability theory within each cause of action is sufficiently addressed”); Clear Lake Rehab. Hosp., L.L.C. v. Karber, No. 01-09-00883-CV, 2010 W L 987758, at  5 n.7 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 18, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (suggesting that a report that is adequate as to one theory of liability can move an entire cause of action past the expert report stage). 4 See, e.g., Laurel Ridge Treatment Ctr., 2012 W L 3731748, at ; Nexion Health, 374 S.W .3d at 626–27. 4 Other courts insist that an expert report must specifically address each liability theory.5 Unsupported theories must be dismissed. Those courts also look to the statute’s language. Some interpret “health care liability claim” to mean a single theory of liability.6 Thus, when the statute requires that a “liability claim” be supported by an expert report, these courts reason that the report must address each liability theory. Other courts of appeals interpret “health care liability claim” to mean a cause of action, or set of operative facts, like the Potts court did. But unlike the Potts court, they reason that different theories of liability must be based on different sets of operative facts and each, therefore, requires its own expert report. In that respect, several cases have held that direct and vicarious liability theories involve different sets of operative facts because “the facts required to establish the defendant’s vicarious liability, i.e., the acts of [the agent and his relationship] to [the principal], differ from the facts required to establish the . . . defendant’s direct liability, i.e., [its] 5 See MSHC the Waterton at Cowhorn Creek, LLC v. Miller, No. 06-12-00056-CV, 2012 W L 6218001, at  (Tex. App.— Texarkana Dec. 14, 2012, no pet.) (holding that the claimant’s expert reports must address vicarious and direct liability claims separately because the theories were based on two different sets of operative facts, which were “qualitatively different from the facts necessary to establish [the employer’s] vicarious liability for the acts or omissions of its staff”); Fung v. Fischer, 365 S.W .3d 507 (Tex. App.— Austin 2012, no pet.) (finding that because the claimant’s theories of liability were both vicarious and direct and thus based on different sets of operative facts, the expert report that only addressed the employee’s conduct was not sufficient to impose direct liability on the employer); Hendrick Med. Ctr. v. Miller, No. 11-11-00141-CV, 2012 W L 314062, at  (Tex. App.— Eastland Jan. 26, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that direct and vicarious liability claims must be evaluated separately to determine whether each claim was sufficiently supported by an expert report); River Oaks Endoscopy Ctrs., L.L.P. v. Serrano, No. 09-10-00201-CV, 2011 W L 303795, at  (Tex. App.— Beaumont Jan. 27, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that a claimant alleging theories of direct and vicarious liability must provide an expert report that addresses all theories so that the defendant can be made aware of the specific conduct being called into question); Beaumont Bone & Joint, P.A. v. Slaughter, No. 09-09-00316CV, 2010 W L 730152, at –4 (Tex. App.— Beaumont Mar. 4, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that although vicarious liability claims were sufficiently addressed in an expert report, direct liability claims were not, and should have been dismissed); Azle Manor, Inc. v. Vaden, No. 2-08-115-CV, 2008 W L 4831408, at  (Tex. App.— Fort W orth Nov. 6, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that although vicarious liability claims against two doctors were sufficiently addressed in two expert reports, the direct liability claims were not, and thus the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the defendant doctors’ motion to dismiss the direct liability claims). 6 See, e.g., Hendrick Med. Ctr., 2012 W L 314062, at . 5 provision of particular policies and procedures.” Fung v. Fischer, 365 S.W.3d 507, 522 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.); see also MSHC the Waterton at Cowhorn Creek, LLC v. Miller, No. 06-12-00056-CV, 2012 WL 6218001, at  (Tex. App.—Texarkana Dec. 14, 2012, no pet.) (“The facts required to establish direct liability here are qualitatively different from the facts necessary to establish . . . vicarious liability . . . . ”). Still other courts have addressed questions that vary slightly from the one before us today. These courts have engaged in analyses that demonstrate the need to definitively resolve the question of how expert reports treat multiple theories of liability.7 These conflicts give us jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. TEX . GOV ’T CODE § 22.225(c).8 7 See Marino v. Wilkins, No. 01-11-00835-CV, 2012 W L 749997, at –10 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 8, 2012, pet. denied) (holding, under the Potts reasoning, that a health care liability suit may proceed under one liability theory if the defendant does not move to dismiss all theories of liability in his challenge to the expert reports); Petty v. Churner, 310 S.W .3d 131, 138 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2010, no pet.) (concluding that the trial court properly dismissed direct liability claims because the vicarious and direct liability theories were based on two different standards of care, and an expert report that only addressed the vicarious theory did not meet the statutory requirements); Obstetrical and Gynecological Assocs., P.A. v. McCoy, 283 S.W .3d 96, 105–06 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (deciding that a claimant need not provide an expert report addressing an employer’s conduct if the claimant only seeks to hold the employer liable under a vicarious liability theory, noting that there is a distinction between allegations of liability made against the employer based on the conduct of employees versus allegations of direct liability based on the conduct of the employer entity itself); Methodist Charlton Med. Ctr. v. Steele, 274 S.W .3d 47, 50–51 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2008, pet. denied) (holding that because the claimant failed to timely serve expert reports related to the direct liability claims against defendants that were added in an amended petition, those particular claims should have been dismissed; but, the vicarious liability claims, based on the conduct of a nurse employee, were addressed in a timely report and could move forward). 8 See also T EX . G O V ’T C O D E § 22.225(e) (noting that “one court holds differently from another when there is inconsistency in their respective decisions that should be clarified to remove unnecessary uncertainty in the law and unfairness to litigants”). 6