Opinion ID: 1939904
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Counsel's Alleged Ineffectiveness for Failing to Investigate Mitigation

Text: Brown first alleges that during the guilt phase, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present an intoxication defense and for failing to introduce evidence that this might have been a sex crime. These claims lack merit. As trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing, an intoxication defense would have been inconsistent with Brown's claims of innocence. Failure to present an intoxication defense cannot constitute ineffective assistance of counsel when the defendant asserts his innocence. See Rivera v. State, 717 So.2d 477, 485 (Fla.1998); Remeta v. Dugger, 622 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla.1993); cf. Rose v. State, 617 So.2d 291, 294 (Fla.1993) (When a defendant preempts his attorney's strategy by insisting that a different defense be followed, no claim of ineffectiveness can be made.) (quoting Mitchell v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 886, 889 (11th Cir.1985)). Counsel's decision not to present evidence that this might have been a sex crime was consistent with Brown's instructions. Counsel contemplated this line of evidence and discussed it with the defendant. Brown specifically rejected this defense because it might suggest that he was a homosexual and that the victim was as well. Brown did not want to subject the victim's wife to this sort of evidence. An attorney will not be deemed ineffective for honoring his client's wishes. See Waterhouse v. State, 792 So.2d 1176, 1183 (Fla.2001) (holding that counsel was not ineffective for failing to present certain mitigation evidence where the client instructed him not to pursue that evidence); Sims v. State, 602 So.2d 1253, 1257-58 (Fla.1992) ([W]e do not believe counsel can be considered ineffective for honoring the client's wishes.). Brown alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present and investigate mitigation evidence. When evaluating counsel's alleged deficiency courts are required to . . . make every effort to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight by evaluating the performance from counsel's perspective at the time. Blanco v. Wainwright, 507 So.2d 1377, 1381 (Fla.1987). Moreover, the reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions. Cherry v. State, 781 So.2d 1040, 1050 (Fla.2000) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Trial counsel did concede that if he could have presented more mitigation evidence, the jury might not have recommended death. However, counsel's ability to present sufficient mitigation was limited by the defendant's desire not to involve his family. At the penalty phase, trial counsel presented Dr. Dee's testimony and the testimony of the defendant's mother. This took place after trial counsel convinced Brown to reevaluate his initial decision not to present any penalty phase evidence. Trial counsel's inability to present further mitigation cannot be considered ineffective in light of Brown's limitations on counsel's penalty phase investigation. Brown also alleges that trial counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase for failing to pursue dozens of investigative leads contained in various medical records that diagnosed the defendant as schizophrenic and epileptic. Counsel was aware that Brown's medical records contained these diagnoses. These records were from two separate mental health centers that treated the defendant. The records contained statements that the defendant had a great propensity for violence, which concerned trial counsel. He noted that this language would have been helpful for the prosecution and damaging to the defendant's penalty phase efforts. After evaluating the records, trial counsel made a conscious decision to avoid this negative language by asking Dr. Dee questions that would elicit the documents' helpful content but not their damaging aspects. See Cherry, 781 So.2d at 1049-50 (upholding trial counsel's strategic decision to admit expert's report into evidence rather than call him as a witness at the penalty phase because it eliminated the State's ability to cross-examine the facts in the report). Strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel's decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct. See Rutherford v. State, 727 So.2d 216, 223 (Fla.1998); State v. Bolender, 503 So.2d 1247, 1250 (Fla.1987); Kenon v. State, 855 So.2d 654, 656 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (citing Maharaj v. State, 778 So.2d 944 (Fla.2000)). Brown also attacks trial counsel's decision to present only Dr. Dee and the defendant's mother at the penalty phase. [5] During his penalty phase testimony, Dr. Dee admitted he was relying on information Brown had provided and had few independent sources for his assessments other than the medical records and Dr. Garcia's records. [6] Dr. Dee also testified that Brown was an alcoholic, had an IQ of 117, had impaired memory function consistent with brain damage, and had organic personality syndrome and organic brain syndrome. He also noted Dr. Garcia's diagnosis that Brown was an epileptic. Thus, this does not appear to be a psychiatric evaluation so grossly insufficient that [it] ignore[s] clear indications of either mental retardation or organic brain damage, thereby warranting a new sentencing hearing. State v. Sireci, 502 So.2d 1221, 1224 (Fla.1987). Nonetheless, Brown claims that if counsel had properly investigated, he would have encountered other witnesses who could have testified about Brown's character and troubled background and that these independent sources could have verified Brown's statements to Dr. Dee, thereby enhancing the credibility of Dr. Dee's testimony. Brown argues that this enhanced credibility would have changed the outcome of the penalty phase because it could have convinced the jury that mitigation was appropriate. As stated above, the shortcomings of the penalty phase arose mainly from Brown's strict instructions to counsel not to speak to family members other than his mother. This lack of cooperation at the penalty phase undermines Brown's present allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Cherry, 781 So.2d at 1052 (finding that while counsel appeared to give mental health expert insufficient information upon which to base an evaluation, there was no deficiency given that lack of information was due to defendant's lack of cooperation); Sims v. State, 602 So.2d 1253, 1257 (Fla.1992). Moreover, even if there was some deficiency, there is no prejudice because the additional testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing contributes virtually no new information and is merely cumulative to the testimony presented at trial. See Gudinas v. State, 816 So.2d 1095, 1106 (Fla.2002) (finding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present evidence in mitigation that was cumulative to evidence already presented). Much of this testimony simply corroborated the background information presented at the penalty phase through Brown's mother and Dr. Dee. See Cherry, 781 So.2d at 1051 ([E]ven if trial counsel should have presented witnesses to testify about Cherry's abusive background, most of the testimony now offered by Cherry is cumulative. . . . Although witnesses provided specific instances of abuse, such evidence merely would have lent further support to the conclusion that Cherry was abused by his father, a fact already known to the jury.). At the penalty phase, Brown's mother testified that his father kidnapped him and his siblings; that Brown ran away as a child at least once; that Brown's father was capable of doing serious bodily damage and that he was an alcoholic; that Brown's father forced Brown and his siblings to work in the fields as migrant workers when they were children; that Brown's father would beat them and prevent them from going to school; that Brown's father tried to sexually abuse Brown's sister; that Brown protected his sister, Anita, from their father's physical abuse; and that Brown's father shot him in the head with a.22 caliber rifle. At the evidentiary hearing, Brown's sister testified that Brown protected her and the other siblings from their father's physical abuse; that Brown's father was sexually and physically abusive toward his daughters and possibly his sons as well; that the father once pulled a switchblade on Brown; and that Brown's father shot him in the head. The remaining non-expert witnesses testified about Brown's interaction with his stepchildren and his musical abilities. [7] At the evidentiary hearing Brown also presented the testimony of Dr. Pinero, but that testimony was essentially cumulative as well. Dr. Pinero did not examine or meet with Brown and used the same data available to counsel and Dr. Dee. The only notable difference between Dr. Pinero's testimony and Dr. Dee's is that Dr. Pinero spent more time discussing the severity of Brown's epilepsy, which he attributed to significant head trauma. Dr. Dee also testified about Brown's head trauma, but did not draw its connection to epilepsy. While there might be differences between these experts' testimony, that does not necessarily warrant relief. See Cherry, 781 So.2d at 1052 (stating that relief was not warranted even though the new expert reached different conclusions from those of the prior expert); Rose v. State, 617 So.2d 291, 295 (Fla.1993) (stating that the fact that defendant obtained a mental health expert whose diagnosis differed from that of the defense's trial expert did not establish that the original evaluation was insufficient). Finally, Brown argues that trial counsel's motion for attorney's fees indicates that he did not spend enough time on penalty phase preparation and that any waiver of mitigation evidence was not knowing and intelligent. Specifically, Brown argues that one cannot waive meaningful mitigation until his lawyer tells him what the investigation has uncovered and what sort of impact the evidence will have on the jury. Brown also argues that this waiver should be the subject of clear and unequivocal discussion between the defendant and the judge. Brown cites no authority for such a rule, but appears to argue for the retroactive application and extension of Koon v. Dugger, 619 So.2d 246 (Fla.1993), which held: When a defendant, against his counsel's advice, refuses to permit the presentation of mitigating evidence in the penalty phase, counsel must inform the court on the record of the defendant's decision. Counsel must indicate whether, based on his investigation, he reasonably believes there to be mitigating evidence that could be presented and what that evidence would be. The court should then require the defendant to confirm on the record that his counsel has discussed these matters with him, and despite counsel's recommendation, he wishes to waive presentation of penalty phase evidence. Id. at 250. In Koon, however, we clearly stated that this rule was prospective, thereby precluding its application here. Id. Moreover, in this case Brown did not seek to waive all mitigation evidence. Rather, he simply sought to limit trial counsel's access to certain types of mitigation evidence by limiting his contact with his family members. Cf. Gore v. State, 784 So.2d 418, 438 (Fla.2001) (finding no ineffective assistance where counsel acted reasonably in seeking out and evaluating potential mitigating evidence and the defendant himself thwarted counsel's efforts to secure mitigating evidence by refusing to cooperate with mental health experts). Regarding counsel's preparation for the penalty phase, Brown relies on State v. Lewis, 838 So.2d 1102 (Fla.2002), where we upheld a trial court's finding that counsel inadequately prepared for the penalty phase and rendered ineffective assistance. Id. at 1108. However, that case also stated that the finding as to whether counsel was adequately prepared does not revolve solely around the amount of time counsel spends on the case or the number of days which he or she spends preparing for mitigation and that it is a case-by-case analysis. Id. at 1113 n. 9. [8] The Court looks at a variety of factors, including the actual penalty phase and trial counsel's capital case experience. See Rose v. State, 675 So.2d 567, 573 (Fla.1996) (finding that although counsel had 79 days to prepare for a resentencing, this was not sufficient time, in part because counsel had never tried a capital case before). Trial counsel's experience in capital cases consisted of handling some death penalty appeals and several first-degree murder cases. Some of these murder cases were initially classified as death penalty cases, but the State ultimately decided not to pursue the death penalty. While this was the first time counsel had participated in a penalty phase proceeding, appellant has failed to demonstrate counsel's ineffectiveness. Contrary to the dissent's assertions, this case is not analogous to Lewis and does not warrant a new penalty phase. A comparison with Lewis is, however, instructive. In Lewis, counsel never sought out the defendant's background records, including hospitalization records, and never interviewed members of defendant's family. As a result, a significant amount of important mitigation evidence never reached the jury. [9] In this case, on the other hand, much of the information that was not presented in Lewis was presented to the jury when Brown's mother testified at the penalty phase. [10] At the penalty phase, Brown's mother testified that Brown's father kidnapped him and his siblings; that Brown ran away as a child at least once; that Brown's father was capable of doing serious bodily damage and that he was an alcoholic; that Brown's father forced Brown and his siblings to work in the fields as migrant workers when they were children; that Brown's father would beat them and prevent them from going to school; that Brown's father tried to sexually abuse his sister; that Brown protected his sister, Anita, from their father's physical abuse; and that Brown's father shot him in the head with a .22 caliber rifle. Moreover, counsel obtained the defendant's mental health records and was aware of their content. For strategic reasons, he attempted to introduce the substance of these documents through the testimony of Dr. Dee. In Lewis, trial counsel waited more than two weeks after the guilty verdict before he requested the trial court to appoint the mental health expert. Here, trial counsel's motion for reimbursement of costs indicates that he was in contact with Dr. Dee before the guilt phase ended. Moreover, he obtained copies of Brown's medical records before the penalty phase. Counsel also obtained valuable information about the defendant's background after he assumed responsibility for the case and reviewed the documents provided by the public defender's office, which represented Brown for several months before trial counsel inherited the case. The fact that other witnesses would have simply corroborated the basis underlying Dr. Dee's opinions and testimony does not mean that trial counsel's performance was deficient. See Valle v. State, 705 So.2d 1331, 1334 (Fla.1997) (rejecting the argument that counsel was ineffective for failing to call defendant's mother and former wife, who could have buttressed the expert's testimony regarding defendant's background because it would have been cumulative); Koon, 619 So.2d at 250 (holding that trial counsel's penalty phase performance was not ineffective where he investigated potential mitigation evidence before trial, knew about defendant's background, reviewed psychiatric reports, and talked to a mental health expert about penalty phase issues). Thus, Brown has failed to show that trial counsel was ineffective.