Opinion ID: 4584100
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Convictions Qualify

Text: When the BIA has failed to address a particular issue “put before it, ‘the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.’” Id. at 1329 (quoting INS v. Ventura, 527 U.S. 12, 16 (2002)). In Calle, we determined that such a rare circumstance was present, such that remand was unnecessary, because the undecided issue was a legal issue with undisputed facts, a procedural one, and not one upon which the BIA could bring its expertise to bear and make an initial determination that would aid us in our later determination of whether the BIA had exceeded its leeway under the law. Id. at 1330-31 (declining to remand for BIA to consider petitioner’s motion to reconsider, which the BIA wrongly denied as numerically barred, 9 USCA11 Case: 17-15441 Date Filed: 11/05/2020 Page: 10 of 17 because the motion merely reiterated prior arguments and presented irrelevant or cumulative evidence). In relevant part, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), provides an alien is deportable if, any time after his admission, he “has been convicted of a violation of . . . any law or regulation of a State . . . relating to a controlled substance (as defined in [21 U.S.C. § 802]).” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Marijuana, cocaine, and MDMA are all controlled substances under § 802. See 21 U.S.C. § 802(6), 812. We have held a Florida conviction for cocaine possession under Fla. Stat. § 893.13(6)(a) is a conviction for a controlled substance offense under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), notwithstanding the fact Florida criminalizes possession of some substances that fall outside the federal definition of a controlled substance, because the Florida statute is divisible by the identity of the drug possessed, and cocaine is a federally controlled substance. Guillen v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 910 F.3d 1174, 1176, 1179-84 (11th Cir. 2018). Florida’s statute defining a possession offense uses the general term “controlled substance.” Fla. Stat. § 893.13(6)(a). At the time of Zaldivar’s convictions, it read: It is unlawful for any person to be in actual or constructive possession of a controlled substance unless [authorized by medically-related exceptions or as otherwise authorized in the chapter]. 10 USCA11 Case: 17-15441 Date Filed: 11/05/2020 Page: 11 of 17 Id. (2003). Marijuana, cocaine, and MDMA are all defined as controlled substances. See id. § 893.03(1)(c). In 1996, the Florida Supreme Court held in Chicone v. State, that the offense of possession of a controlled substance under Fla. Stat. § 893.13(6)(a) included an element of mens rea as to the illicit nature of the substance the offender possessed. 684 So. 2d 736, 743-44 (Fla. 1996). In January 2002, in Scott v. State, the Florida Supreme Court held that regardless of the defense raised or the affirmative defenses asserted, a defendant in a controlled-substance possession case is entitled to an instruction on the element of guilty knowledge as to the illicit nature of the substance because it is an element of the crime, and the failure to give the instruction was not harmless error. 808 So. 2d 166, 169-71 (Fla. 2002). In response, the Florida legislature passed Fla. Stat. § 893.101, which states that Chicone and Scott’s holdings were contrary to its legislative intent, that knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance is not an element of an offense under the chapter, and instead the lack of such knowledge was an affirmative defense. Fla. Stat. § 893.101. The statute became effective May 13, 2002. Id. Florida appellate courts have held that Fla. Stat. § 893.101 may not be applied retroactively to an offense occurring before May 13, 2002. See Sandifer v. State, 851 So. 2d 788, 790 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); see also, e.g., J.J.N. v. State, 877 So. 2d 11 USCA11 Case: 17-15441 Date Filed: 11/05/2020 Page: 12 of 17 806, 809 n.2 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); State v. Odom, 862 So. 2d 56, 58-59 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Gordon v. State, 858 So. 2d 359, 359-60 & n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). Remand is unnecessary because the undisputed facts show that Zaldivar’s offenses of conviction contained a mens rea element as to the illicit nature of the substances he possessed. Zaldivar committed his drug-possession offenses on November 16, 2001, before the effective date of Fla. Stat. § 893.101, which removed the illicit-nature-of-substance mens rea element, and the statute does not apply retroactively. Fla. Stat. § 893.101; Sandifer, 851 So. 2d at 790. Consequently, even if Zaldivar were correct that the lack of a mens rea element as to the illicit nature of the substance would make an offense not a controlled substance offense, his challenge would fail because his offenses had such an element. Thus, we deny Zaldivar’s petition as to this issue, notwithstanding the BIA’s failure to afford his claim reasoned consideration.