Opinion ID: 2601748
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Was the initial stop justified?

Text: [¶ 13] Mr. Lovato's initial contact with Trooper Cheser was an investigatory traffic stop, not an arrest. The distinction is significant because it takes less to justify a traffic stop than an arrest. For Fourth Amendment purposes, we recognize three tiers of interaction between police and citizens. Custer [ v. State, 2006 WY 72], ¶ 13, 135 P.3d [620,] 624-25 [(Wyo.2006)]. See also, Collins v. State, 854 P.2d 688, 691-92 (Wyo.1993). The least intrusive contact between a citizen and police is a consensual encounter. Custer, ¶ 13, 135 P.3d at 624-25. A consensual encounter is not a seizure and does not implicate Fourth Amendment protections. The second tier is the investigatory or Terry stop, named after the seminal case Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). An investigatory detention is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Custer, ¶ 13, 135 P.3d at 624-25. However, because of its limited nature, a law enforcement officer is only required to show the presence of specific and articulable facts and rational inferences which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a crime in order to justify the detention. Id., quoting Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 220 (Wyo.1994). The most intrusive encounter between police and a citizen is an arrest. An arrest `requires justification by probable cause to believe that a person has committed or is committing a crime.' Id. at 625, quoting Wilson, 874 P.2d at [220]. Flood v. State, 2007 WY 167, ¶ 14, 169 P.3d 538, 543-44 (Wyo.2007). Thus, Trooper Cheser was justified in stopping Mr. Lovato if he had reasonable suspicion that Mr. Lovato had committed or may be committing a crime. [¶ 14] Trooper Cheser readily admitted that this stop was prompted by the information provided by the confidential informant that Mr. Lovato was carrying illegal drugs. Trooper Cheser believed that this information, by itself, was insufficient to justify a stop. Accordingly, in his words, I knew I would have to develop my own probable cause. [1] However, as the district court accurately noted, an officer is permitted to make a traffic stop if he personally observes a traffic violation, without regard to his subjective intent. Hernandez v. State, 2010 WY 33, ¶ 8, 227 P.3d 315, 319 (Wyo.2010), citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), and Fertig, ¶ 28, 146 P.3d at 501. [¶ 15] Trooper Cheser testified that he observed two traffic violations. Almost as soon as he spotted Mr. Lovato's car, he could see the sunlight glinting off of a crack on the windshield on the upper left side of the windshield. This, Trooper Cheser testified, suggested a possible violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-955(a), which provides that No person shall drive any motor vehicle with any ... crack within the front windshield... which materially obstructs, obscures or impairs the driver's clear view. A short time later, Trooper Cheser observed that he was unable to read the car's rear license plate number because of a dark-tinted license plate cover on the rear license plate. This, Trooper Cheser testified, suggested a possible violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-2-205(a)(i), which requires license plates to be displayed and maintained so as to be plainly visible. [¶ 16] Mr. Lovato points out in his appeal, as he did vigorously to the district court, that there were inconsistencies in the testimony about the crack in the windshield. Trooper Cheser said it was on the upper left side of the windshield, and estimated it was approximately three to four inches long. Agent Bisceglia was uncertain about the location of the crack, but thought it was going down the center and possibly across the top. Mr. Lovato's wife testified that the crack was on the lower driver's side of the windshield [by] the window wipers, by where the defrost would be. She also testified that the crack was only about two inches long. Mr. Lovato also testified that the crack was on the lower windshield of the driver's side, and agreed that it was about two inches long. Neither the prosecution nor the defense offered a photograph or other evidence to resolve these conflicts in the testimony. [¶ 17] After hearing the evidence, the district court found that Trooper Cheser observed a crack in the Buick sedan's windshield. The district court acknowledged the conflicting testimony about the size and location of the crack, but wrote that: the exact position of the windshield crack is immaterial in determining whether Trooper Cheser possessed the necessary level of suspicion to stop [Mr.] Lovato. The uncontroverted fact is that a windshield crack existed that was noticeable from both the interior and exterior of the vehicle. We will defer to the district court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, even though substantial evidence supports it, the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. Campbell County School Dist. v. State, 2008 WY 2, ¶ 10, 181 P.3d 43, 49 (Wyo.2008). It is uncontroverted that the crack was there and visible. Trooper Cheser testified that he saw it. Given this evidence, we are not convinced that the district court made a mistake. [¶ 18] There was also conflicting evidence about whether the cracked windshield was actually one of the reasons Trooper Cheser made the traffic stop. The report prepared by the Trooper on the day Mr. Lovato was stopped made no mention of the crack in the windshield. Trooper Cheser testified that he told Mr. Lovato he was being stopped for an obscured license plate as well as a cracked windshield, but Mr. Lovato testified that Trooper Cheser mentioned only the license plate and never said anything about the windshield. In addition, Mr. Lovato's carbon copy of the warning ticket indicated that the warning was for a license plate violation, with the words window violation written in separately in ink. Trooper Cheser admitted that he initially wrote the ticket only for the license plate violation, and that he added the words window violation later. He did not specify how much later. Mr. Lovato testified that he received his copy of the warning ticket while he was in jail the day after he was arrested. [¶ 19] After considering the conflicting evidence, the district court found that the cracked windshield was one of the reasons Trooper Cheser had stopped Mr. Lovato. Again, we must defer to that finding unless it is clearly erroneous. The finding is consistent with the Trooper's testimony. Mr. Lovato's evidence to the contrary is sufficiently persuasive that the district court might reasonably have found in his favor. It did not, and as the appellate court, we cannot say that the finding is clearly erroneous. [¶ 20] Evidence about the license plate cover is also troublesome. According to Trooper Cheser, he could not read the license plate on the back of Mr. Lovato's car, but could read the one on the front just fine. According to both Mr. Lovato and his wife, there were identical license plate covers on the front and the back of the car. In addition, Trooper Cheser described the license plate as dark-tinted, and testified that the date sticker on the upper left corner of the license plate was covered by the frame of the license plate protector. The actual license plate cover was accepted into evidence during the suppression hearing, and it is contained in our record on review. It is the same translucent plastic material throughout, with no frame that could have blocked Trooper Cheser's view of the date sticker. While the plastic is not entirely transparent, it is a stretch to describe it as dark-tinted. [¶ 21] The plastic is shiny, however, and it is conceivable that in some angles of sunlight, the combination of glare and tinting could make the license plate harder to read. Trooper Cheser did not mention the angle of the sunlight or any other such details, but he did testify unequivocally that the license plate cover obscured his view of the license plate on the rear of Mr. Lovato's car. We are not in a position to assess the credibility of this testimony, or to weigh it against the conflicting evidence. The district court was in that position, and it found that: Trooper Cheser observed a crack in the Buick sedan's windshield. After passing the vehicle, Trooper Cheser watched the vehicle in his rearview mirror and observed a tinted cover over the license plate, preventing him from reading the license plate number in his rearview mirror, at least from that distance. We are not definitely and firmly convinced that these factual findings were mistaken. [¶ 22] Based on these findings of fact, the district court concluded that Trooper Cheser possessed more than the necessary reasonable suspicion to stop [Mr.] Lovato; Trooper Cheser possessed probable cause because he personally observed [Mr.] Lovato driving the Buick sedan in violation of two statutes. Having deferred to the district court's findings of fact, we conclude that they were sufficient to provide Trooper Cheser with the reasonable suspicion necessary to stop Mr. Lovato. The initial stop was justified.