Opinion ID: 1521791
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fourth Amendment Inquiry

Text: In taking a close look at the evidence to determine whether Ruffin went with the officers to the police station as a volunteer or as a captive, one is struck, initially, by how elusive the answer to that question is. This is not as compelling a case for reversal as others where the fourth amendment has been violated. E.g., Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 812, 105 S.Ct. 1643, 1645, 84 L.Ed.2d 705 (1985) (suspect transported to the station house for fingerprinting, without his consent and without probable cause or prior judicial authorization); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 203, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2251, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979) (detectives ordered simply to `pick-up' petitioner and `bring him in.'); United States v. Allen, 436 A.2d 1303, 1309 (D.C.1981) (suspect frisked and told `you have to come to homicide with us'). [2] On the other hand, the evidence of Ruffin's voluntary compliance with the police request is less convincing than in other cases where police actions have survived a fourth amendment challenge. E.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547-48, 557-58, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1873-74, 1878-79, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (federal agent simply asked, without threats or show of force, if suspect would accompany him to office for further questions, and suspect did so without resistance); Giles v. United States, 400 A.2d 1051, 1052 (D.C.1979) (suspect responded by telephone to message from police and agreed to meet with them at police station). [3] We therefore review the record of the suppression hearing in considerable detail to determine on what side of the fourth amendment line this case falls: consent or seizure.
Initially, we note the approach the trial court must use to resolve this issue, as well as the standard of review this court must apply to the trial court's decision. According to the Supreme Court in Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 557, 100 S.Ct. at 1879: The question whether the respondent's consent to accompany the agents was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is to be determined by the totality of all the circumstances, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. [218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)], and is a matter which the Government has the burden of proving. Id. at 222, [93 S.Ct. at 2045], citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 [88 S.Ct. 1788, 1791, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1986)]. In applying this approach to the present case, the trial court confronted a significant difference from Mendenhall: Ms. Mendenhall did not testify at the supression hearing; Ruffin did. Accordingly, in contrast with Mendenhall, where only the government's evidence was under scrutiny, the trial court confronted the question whether the government carried its burden of proving voluntariness when, at the suppression hearing, there was sharply conflicting testimony about why Ruffin had agreed to go to police headquarters. [4] Although we are bound to accept the trial court's resolution of conflicting testimony, United States v. Alexander, 428 A.2d 42, 49-50 (D.C.1981), the ultimate question  whether Ruffin's actions in accompanying the police to the precinct were voluntary  is one of law for this court to decide on the record. United States v. Gayden, 492 A.2d 868, 872 (D.C.1985); cf. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 106 S.Ct. 445, 450-51, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985) (voluntariness of confession is legal question, not issue of fact presumed, under statute, to be correct in federal habeas corpus proceeding). [5] We therefore owe no deference to the trial court's ultimate conclusion that Ruffin voluntarily accompanied the officers to the precinct.
We turn to the evidence. In the government's case in chief at the suppression hearing, Detective Dyson testified that he had called [Ruffin's] home address and asked him to come down to the office in reference to our investigation. The prosecutor then inquired, And did he do so voluntarily? Dyson replied, Yes, sir. Dyson, therefore, did not report Ruffin's response as such; he merely testified as to his own opinion that Ruffin had come voluntarily. [6] When asked on cross-examination whether Ruffin was brought to headquarters in handcuffs, Dyson answered, Not to my knowledge. The government then called Detective Clarence Muse, who recounted what had happened after he had seen Ruffin in the interview room, after the oral statement to Dyson. Muse stated on cross-examination that he was unsure whether Ruffin had been handcuffed  he could have been  and then testified about taking Ruffin's written statement. Although he could have done so, Ruffin did not ask for a ruling after Dyson and Muse had testified. Instead, he took the stand and testified that the police had called my sister's house and stated that they put out a bench warrant for my arrest and that I should give myself up. And I stated that I would come down to the station, and they stated they would send a police car after me. And they sent the police car to my [other] sister's house and two policemen handcuffed me and took me down to homicide division. On cross-examination, the prosecutor elicited from Ruffin, initially, that a police officer had spoken over the phone only to Ruffin's sister, not to Ruffin, and that this sister was the one who had told him a bench warrant had issued for his arrest. Q. And somebody from homicide called you [at your sister's home]? A. They called her and told her that it was  Q. Well, did they speak to you? Did you speak to anybody on the phone? A. No sir. Q. So that anything that you testified to before [about the bench warrant] was what you say your sister told you? A. Yes sir. [Emphasis added]. Ruffin's next response, however, indicated  as he had on direct examination  that Ruffin himself had spoken with the police before being picked up for the trip to the police station. Q. And after you got this telephone call somebody came to pick you up? A. No sir. Q. Well, what happened then? A. Well, they said they were  would send a scout car. I said I would come down to the precinct. They said, no, they would send a scout car for me. So they sent the scout car to the scene of the incident. I met them back at my [other] sister's house.       Q. Did you tell them that you would meet them there? A. Yes, sir. Q. You made arrangements to meet them there? A. They made arrangements to meet me there. [Emphasis added.] Ruffin acknowledged that he had been at his sister's house when the police first called there, arguably implying  contrary to his initial answer on cross-examination  that Ruffin had spoken with a police officer at that time. Ruffin also acknowledged that he could have asked his sister to testify in order to clarify the situation, but did not. On the other hand, Ruffin's testimony on direct and cross-examination, taken as a whole, was arguably not internally inconsistent. He may have meant that he had not spoken with Dyson when Dyson called the first time about the warrant  that he had personally spoken with the police only when responding to a phone call after the first one. [7] Moreover, Detective Dyson had not expressly stated that he had made only one telephone call to solicit Ruffin's cooperation. [8] Nor did the prosecutor attempt to find out, during cross-examination, whether Ruffin could explain his possible inconsistency about personally speaking with the police or whether Ruffin had discussed the supposed warrant with Dyson or any other police officer. Accordingly, Dyson's and Ruffin's testimony to this point, taken together, was inconclusive. There are at least two plausible interpretations: (1) two telephone conversations had taken place  Dyson or some other police officer with Ruffin's sister about a bench warrant, followed by Dyson or some other officer with Ruffin making arrangements for a trip to headquarters  or (2) only one conversation had taken place, between Dyson and Ruffin, in which case Ruffin's testimony about his sister's reference to a bench warrant would have been a lie. See also supra note 7. From the transcript itself, neither interpretation of the Dyson-Ruffin testimony is compelling. Moreover, Ruffin did specifically articulate circumstances  a threat of arrest  which caused him to feel constrained to surrender for questioning. Ruffin's testimony, if believed, thus tended to rebut whatever inference of voluntary consent could legitimately be attributed to Dyson's generalized opinion testimony. Dyson had not testified as to Ruffin's verbal response at the time of the police request; nor had Dyson testified that Ruffin, in any way, had manifested an understanding he was free to say no and thus was accompanying the police voluntarily. Dyson, therefore, provided no factual basis for disbelieving Ruffin's testimony. Nor did the prosecutor probe Ruffin deeply enough on cross-examination to establish, to a reasonable certainty, that Ruffin had testified inconsistently. By the time Ruffin completed his testimony, therefore, the evidence arguably was in equipoise, with the burden of production as to voluntariness thus shifting back to the government. In rebuttal, Officer Williams testified that she had gone to pick up Ruffin and, at that time, had asked him if he would go down with us because they wanted to talk to him at homicide branch. Like Dyson, she did not mention Ruffin's response. Instead, she merely added that Ruffin was not placed under arrest or handcuffed. She did not testify that she had told Ruffin he was not under arrest. Also in rebuttal, Officer Brown, who had driven Ruffin to headquarters, testified that [a]pparently someone at the Homicide Branch had in fact talked to Mr. Ruffin and apparently he was voluntarily coming down. Brown further testified that he had been asked to inquire whether Ruffin was willing to voluntarily go down to the Homicide Branch. Like Dyson and Williams, however, Brown did not report Ruffin's response; at most, he provided vague, question-begging hearsay confirmation that Ruffin apparently was willing to come to headquarters voluntarily. Furthermore, like Williams, Brown added that Ruffin was not under arrest and that he had no reason to handcuff Ruffin. But also, like Williams, Brown did not testify that he had told Ruffin he was not under arrest. Brown further testified that he would have let Ruffin out of the squad car if Ruffin had asked to leave. But Brown did not testify that he had told Ruffin he was free to decline to come along or was free to change his mind and leave the car before arriving at headquarters. In sum, the government established through its own witnesses  at most  that the police had asked, not told, Ruffin to come to headquarters; that Ruffin had done so without a fuss; that one or more officers believed Ruffin had done so voluntarily; that Ruffin had not been handcuffed; that the officers had not considered Ruffin to be under arrest (although no one had told him he was not); and that Ruffin could have asked to leave the squad car without consequence before he arrived for questioning (although no one had told him he could do so). None of the police officers, however, was examined or cross-examined about what Ruffin had said, if anything, when asked to go voluntarily to the police station. Moreover, the prosecutor did not recall Detective Dyson or call any other officer explicitly to rebut Ruffin's testimony that he had gone with the police because he had learned from his sister (who had learned from Dyson or some other officer) that an arrest warrant had issued  testimony reflecting the nonconsensual mind set the Supreme Court recognized in Haynes. [9] On the other hand, Ruffin appeared to have given inconsistent testimony during cross-examination, at first denying and then acknowledging he had spoken with a police officer. Defense counsel did not attempt on redirect to reconcile these statements. Nor did Ruffin call his sister to the stand to clarify and buttress his testimony. The trial court, altogether disbelieving Ruffin, denied the motion to suppress. In commenting on Ruffin's testimony describing what transpired from his transportation to the precinct until his release at 6:00 p.m. the same day, the court stated: The Court does not credit the defendant's version of the facts. They are inherently... incredible. They just don't logically follow. The Court finds as a matter of law he was not arrested. I distinguish the Allen case where he was frisked, he was constantly guarded. He was although given a ride downtown. The Court does not credit the fact that he was in handcuffs at any time, was permitted to leave. Clearly not custodial at all under Oregon v. Mathiason . ...
In evaluating the trial court's ruling, we must decide whether the trial court, on this record, could legitimately credit the government's witnesses, altogether disbelieve Ruffin's bench warrant testimony, and thereby conclude that the government had sustained its burden of proving voluntary consent. [10] Particularly important to the analysis is an awareness that, although the question of voluntariness is ultimately one of law for this court, that question turns, in this case, on a factual finding as to whether the police told Ruffin they had issued a bench warrant for his arrest. If the trial court had credited Ruffin's statement about the bench warrant, it could not have concluded that he voluntarily had accompanied the police officers to the precinct. See supra note 9. One the other hand, by altogether disbelieving Ruffin's bench warrant testimony, the way was clear for the court to find on the basis of police evidence alone that Ruffin had accompanied the police voluntarily. Thus, we are dealing, fundamentally, with the question whether the trial court's finding that Ruffin's bench warrant testimony was inherently incredible is entitled to deference  leading to an appellate court conclusion that Ruffin voluntarily had gone to the police station  even though the government was clearly in a position, but failed, to impeach or otherwise refute Ruffin's testimony with direct evidence. Initially, we note that the Supreme Court's decisions in Dunaway and Mendenhall are not determinative. In each, the facts were undisputed; neither decision concerned review of a trial court's factual findings. Our dissenting colleague argues that the facts in Dunaway are nearly identical to those here. Infra at 713. The key distinction the dissent fails to note, however, is that in Dunaway the trial court apparently credited the defendant's factual account of what had taken place as a predicate for its legal conclusion that the police had detained him involuntarily. 442 U.S. at 207 n. 6, 99 S.Ct. at 2253 n. 6. Here, in contrast, the trial court found appellant's factual presentation incredible while finding the government's evidence of voluntary consent persuasive. This case, therefore, is not nearly identical to Dunaway if appellant's testimony does not prevail. Nor is Mendenhall dispositive. Noting that [t]he material facts are not disputed, 446 U.S. at 552 n. 5, 100 S.Ct. at 1876 n. 5, the Supreme Court sustained the trial court's determination of voluntary consent. The court stressed the respondent was not told that she had to go to the office, but was simply asked if she would accompany the officers for further questioning. There were neither threats nor any show of force. 446 U.S. at 557-58, 100 S.Ct. at 1879. In response, [s]he did so, although the record does not indicate a verbal response to the request. 446 U.S. at 548, 100 S.Ct. at 1874. [11] In the present case, therefore, if the police testimony alone had reflected the totality of all the circumstances, 446 U.S. at 557, 100 S.Ct. at 1879, Mendenhall would justify a determination of voluntary consent; without regard to Ruffin's testimony, the two cases are similar. It is useful to note, however, that the four dissenting Justices in Mendenhall stressed that Ms. Mendenhall did not testify at the suppression hearing and the officers presented no testimony concerning what she said, if anything, when informed that the officers wanted her to come with them to the DEA office. 446 U.S. at 576, 100 S.Ct. at 1888 (White, J., dissenting). It follows, said the dissenters, [o]n the record before us, the Court's conclusion can only be based on the notion that consent can be assumed from the absence of proof that a suspect resisted police authority. This is a notion that we have squarely rejected. 446 U.S. at 577, 100 S.Ct. at 1888 (White, J., dissenting). While the Court majority in Mendenhall did not specifically eschew this generalized interpretation of its holding, the majority did note, in evaluating the evidence, that [t]he respondent herself did not testify at the hearing. 446 U.S. at 557, 100 S.Ct. at 1879. The Court thus made clear that its ruling was limited to evaluating the uncontradicted implications of the police testimony itself, as well as the circumstantial factors. [12] The question, then, is whether the trial court can reject the testimony of a defendant who, as in Dunaway, asserts coercion, and then find voluntary consent on the basis of the police testimony and circumstantial factors, as in Mendenhall, as though the defendant had not taken the stand (or, perhaps more significantly, had taken the stand and lied). We begin with Staton v. United States, 466 A.2d 1245 (D.C.1983), where the defendant, on appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, challenged on fifth amendment grounds the trial court's ruling that his confession had been voluntary. We rejected the argument that the trial court was required to credit his unrebutted testimony concerning coercive police utterances. 466 A.2d at 1251. We stated that [t]he trier need not believe the testimony of a witness even though the witness' testimony is uncontradicted [citations omitted], particularly where the witness has a personal interest in the result. 466 A.2d at 1252. We added, however, that appellant's allegations [of coercive police tactics], if true, raise grave questions about the voluntariness of his confession. Id. Accordingly, we said, although the trial court ordinarily `need not make formal findings of fact or write an opinion' when ruling upon such motions to suppress, id. at 1253 (quoting Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 544, 87 S.Ct. 639, 643, 17 L.Ed.2d 593 (1967)), the trial court's determination `must be reliable and clear-cut and [its] conclusion that the confession is in fact voluntary must appear from the record with unmistakable clarity.' Id. (quoting Wells v. United States, 407 A.2d 1081, 1089 (D.C.1979)). Because it was not clear in Staton whether the trial court concluded that (1) appellant's uncorroborated testimony concerning coercion was incredible, although unrebutted, or (2) some or all of the coercive statements were in fact made, but given the totality of the circumstances, did not render appellant's statements involuntary, id., we remanded the record for further findings and for an explanation of how the trial court had reached its conclusion, in order that we could afford meaningful review. In the present case, however, it is clear that the trial court credited the police testimony and altogether rejected Ruffin's uncorroborated bench warrant testimony as inherently incredible. Thus, no remand is necessary to ascertain the basis for the court's ruling. Staton, however, should not be read so broadly as to stand for the proposition that, under all circumstances, a trial judge may disregard a defendant's uncontradicted testimony. For example, in Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963), the Supreme Court held a confession involuntary as a matter of law where (before the Miranda decision) (1) the defendant was not advised of his right to remain silent, warned that his answers might be used against him, or told of his rights respecting consultation with an attorney, 373 U.S. at 511, 83 S.Ct. at 1341; (2) the written confession itself contained a reference to coercive tactics (a form of corroboration of the defendant's testimony to that effect), 373 U.S. at 512, 83 S.Ct. at 1342; and, of considerable significance, (3) the allegedly overreaching officers, who were in court and heard the defendant's testimony, did not deny the accusations. 373 U.S. at 509-10, 83 S.Ct. at 1340-41. Under these circumstances, as a matter of law the confession could not have been voluntary, even though the trier of fact may have disbelieved the defendant. In contrast, in Staton  also a coerced confession case  the defendant was repeatedly given Miranda warnings, 466 A.2d at 1252, and there was absolutely no corroboration of the defendant's claim of coercive police tactics. Further distinguishing Haynes, this court pointed out that the tenor of police testimony implied the defendant had given a voluntary statement, in contrast with the trial court's apparent perception that the defendant's self-serving testimony about coercive police tactics, although unimpeached and unrebutted, was incredible and thus altogether unworthy of serious consideration. See 466 A.2d at 1252. The instant case is different from both Haynes and Staton in at least one significant respect: because we are considering voluntariness as it relates to accompanying police officers to the precinct station  a fourth amendment inquiry  in contrast with the voluntariness of giving the statement itself, Miranda warnings are not at issue. [13] It is clear, however, that no government witness told Ruffin he was free not to go with the officers. Accordingly, whatever the implications of Staton for voluntariness analysis when a defendant's inculpatory statement is at issue after Miranda warnings have been given, Staton is not necessarily dispositive of cases, such as this one, where Miranda (or analogous) warnings are not part of the calculus. Mendenhall and other cases, supra note 11, establish the proposition that, when there has not been a show of force by the police, a mature suspect's voluntary consent to come to headquarters may be inferred merely from a police request followed by the suspect's acquiescence if there is no evidence that the suspect resisted police authority or otherwise reasonably perceived he or she was, or would be, under arrest. When, however, a testifying defendant does allege such coercion as the basis for accompanying the police to headquarters, the logic of Haynes would have a court attribute significance to the failure of the State, after listening to the [defendant's] direct and explicit testimony, to attempt to contradict that crucial evidence, especially in light of the availability and willing cooperation of the policemen who, if honestly able to do so, would have readily denied the defendant's claims. 373 U.S. at 510, 83 S.Ct. at 1341. This point is telling. We do not believe a trial court's mere perception that a defendant's unimpeached, though uncorroborated, testimony is incredible should be enough to defeat a claim of coercion to accompany the police to the precinct for questioning when (1) the government has the burden of persuasion, (2) there is no evidence either that the police have told the defendant he or she is free to decline the request, or that the defendant clearly understands he or she may do so, and (3) the prosecutor has not called available rebuttal witnesses to refute the defendant's assertions. We reach this conclusion for two reasons. First, a defendant usually will not be in a position to offer evidence directly corroborating alleged police coercion, for typically there will be no disinterested defense witness to the alleged police conduct. Thus, failure of corroboration should not be significant when, commonly, the defendant's own word will be the only direct evidence of coercion available. Second, given the government's burden of persuasion, a trial court's mere disbelief of the defendant should not be a conclusive basis for saving a circumstantial government case when it is clear to everyone that available police witnesses, in a position to discredit the defendant, have elected not to take the stand to do so. That failure of government witnesses to present direct evidence when there is no impediment to such testimony speaks more loudly to an appellate court reviewing a transcript  alert, as we must be, to the shifting burdens of evidentiary production  than does the weight of a trial court's credibility determination altogether rejecting a witness's testimony. The government's unwillingness to put on rebuttal testimony is indirect but objective corroboration of the defendant's story that an appellate court, ruling on voluntariness as a matter of law, cannot properly ignore in favor of a trial court's subjective credibility finding.
Accordingly, the final question is whether the prosecutor's cross-examination of Ruffin, coupled with the police officers' testimony in rebuttal, was sufficient impeachment and/or rebuttal of Ruffin's bench warrant testimony to permit the trial court to disbelieve his claim and thereby compel a conclusion that he went to the police station voluntarily. As noted earlier, when Ruffin completed his testimony the burden of production as to voluntariness shifted back to the government, since the prosecutor had not probed deeply enough on cross-examination to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Ruffin had testified inconsistently about speaking with the police and thus had lied about the bench warrant. Obviously, Ruffin's testimony created some doubt about his veracity but not enough to say, in fairness, that the government had carried its burden of persuasion without need for rebuttal. This case is especially difficult because of inadequacies in the government's rebuttal. Neither Williams' nor Brown's testimony directly refuted Ruffin's testimony that he had felt compelled to accompany the officers because of his understanding that a bench warrant had been issued for his arrest. Nor was Detective Dyson recalled (or any other officer called) to discredit Ruffin's assertion that he had learned from his sister (who allegedly had spoken with the police) that a bench warrant had been issued. Moreover, not one of the government's three witnesses testified that Ruffin had been told he was not under arrest or had a choice in the matter. Finally, no officer testified that Ruffin had indicated an understanding he was free to decline the police request. [14] Accordingly, despite Ruffin's bench warrant testimony  and despite the officers' own knowledge of what Ruffin had said to them and of what the police had, or had not, said to Ruffin's sister  all the officers left out a vital testimonial link between the police requests and Ruffin's willingness to accompany them. [15] There was, however, a direct clash between Ruffin's and the police officers' testimony about whether Ruffin had been handcuffed during his trip to the police station. Consistent with his testimony about a bench warrant, Ruffin said he had been handcuffed; Officers Brown and Williams testified that he had not. [16] The trial court believed the police, expressly stating that the Court does not credit the fact that [Ruffin] was in handcuffs at any time. Although the absence of handcuffs would not necessarily imply that Ruffin had not been told about a bench warrant for his arrest, the trial court's finding of no handcuffs (a typical arrest procedure) suggests not only that Ruffin was not under arrest but also that his lying about handcuffs cast doubt on the very premise of his coercion testimony: that he had heard from the police through his sister about an arrest warrant. The trial court, therefore, reasonably could have concluded on the basis of the government's rebuttal of Ruffin's handcuffs testimony, coupled with the apparent inconsistencies in Ruffin's own testimony about talking with the police, that the bench warrant story was a lie. Whereas neither Ruffin's cross-examination nor the government's rebuttal was enough in itself to refute Ruffin's bench warrant testimony, they were enough taken together to permit the inference that Ruffin had lied. Thus, the trial court had a reasonable basis for disbelieving Ruffin's factual allegations concerning the bench warrant. Accordingly, applying the analysis in Mendenhall to the other facts legitimately found by the trial court  the police testimony by Dyson, Brown, and Williams, combined with no credible contrary assertions  we must conclude that Ruffin accompanied the police to the precinct voluntarily.