Opinion ID: 1511906
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Refusal of Directed Verdict and Request for Charge.

Text: The questions raised by the appellant under this heading may be considered together. The alleged error in refusal to dismiss the indictment or to direct a verdict relates, so far as this point goes, to the matter of the government's proof and the charge which was requested and refused concerns the same matter. The statute which makes it unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a crime of violence to receive a firearm which has been shipped in interstate commerce provides that the possession of a firearm    by any such person shall be presumptive evidence that such firearm    was shipped or transported or received    by such person in violation of this chapter. § 902(f). The prosecution showed possession of the weapon already described [20] by the defendant at a date when the statute was in effect. Proof of prior conviction of a crime of violence was also shown. The prosecution then rested. The defendant introduced testimony by himself, his wife and his sister tending to show continuous possession of the gun from a date several years prior to the passage of the statute. Rebuttal testimony for the prosecution was confined to one witness, employed by the manufacturers of the gun, who showed its shipment in 1919 from the factory in Connecticut to a business firm in Illinois. The defendant by a timely motion asked for a directed verdict and a dismissal of the indictment on the theory that having offered evidence to show his possession prior to the effective date of the statute the presumption created by the statute disappeared and in the absence of additional evidence against that offered by him, he was entitled to have his motions granted. He backs that up with words from Wigmore to the effect that a presumption is merely to invoke a rule of law compelling the jury to reach a conclusion in the absence of evidence to the contrary, and if such evidence is offered, the presumption disappears as a rule of law, and the case is in the jury's hands free from any rule. [21] In addition the appellant cites one State decision which seems squarely to apply the rule as he would have it. [22] We think the answer to the appellant's point here is completely stated in the words of Professor Bohlen in The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden of Proof: [23] It is the duty of him against whom any presumption operates to produce evidence, not merely witnesses, and therefore he must satisfy the jury of the credibility of his witnesses. Simply causing words to be uttered is not enough. The two women witnesses offered by the defendant distinctly faltered in the certainty of their identification of the weapon made so readily upon direct examination. [24] Defendant stuck to his story, but it had some elements which certainly made a basis for doubting its truthfulness even without reference to his previous criminal record. We think the most the defendant was entitled to have was a fair submission of the question to the jury. And this, as will be pointed out presently, was given. The constitutionality of presumptions more difficult to rebut than the one here involved has been sustained by the Supreme Court. [25] Defendant asked an instruction, which was refused, That such presumption is never evidence and if you find that this presumption has been repelled by the evidence you must acquit. The presumption referred to is that in the statute already quoted. To give the instruction in the language asked for by the defendant would have been confusing to the jury. Statutory language is to the effect that possession of the weapon is presumptive evidence of violation. For the court, after having quoted the statute, to tell the jury that such presumption is not evidence would certainly have not tended to clarity in their minds. But the learned judge did much more than refuse an instruction which would have caused confusion. His charge on the point was clear and helpful. He told the jury at least twice that the burden was on the United States to establish defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and told them, too, that the burden did not shift. He left it to the jury to find whether the defendant obtained the gun subsequent to June 30, 1938 and emphasized to them that they were the sole judges of the facts concerning this statement especially as to the testimony offered by the defendant. Then he repeated the ultimate issue in the final paragraph of his charge. We think this left the matter clearly to the jury in a way in which they could understand and gave the defendant the full benefit of the testimony of his witnesses if that testimony was to be believed. More than this he cannot ask.