Opinion ID: 201450
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Agency regulations

Text: 15 Appellants first argue that the Corps has a regulation, 33 C.F.R. § 325.1(d)(7), that requires that the applicant actually have necessary property rights in the area of the project and make an affirmation to that effect. The regulation states: The application must be signed by the person who desires to undertake the proposed activity.... The signature of the applicant ... will be an affirmation that the applicant possesses or will possess the requisite property interest to undertake the activity proposed in the application.... Id. Of course, the regulation does not say that the applicant must actually possess, or possess in the future, the requisite property rights, but only that the applicant must make an affirmation to that effect. 16 The Corps responds to appellants' argument by referring to another of its regulations, which provides that: 17 A [Corps] permit does not convey any property rights ... or any exclusive privileges. Furthermore a [Corps] permit does not authorize any injury to property or invasion of rights or any infringement of Federal, state or local laws or regulations. The applicant's signature on an application is an affirmation that the applicant possesses or will possess the requisite property interest to undertake the activity proposed in the application. The [Corps] will not enter into disputes but will remind the applicant of the above. The dispute over property ownership will not be a factor in the Corps public interest decision. 18 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(g)(6) (emphasis supplied); see also Environmental Assessment and Statement of Findings at 13 (Aug. 19, 2002) (paraphrasing § 320.4(g)(6) in response to comments about Cape Wind's lack of property interest). 19 The Corps indicated in its response to comments about Cape Wind's lack of a property interest, and articulated more fully during the course of this litigation, that it deems § 320.4(g)(6) to require only that it remind applicants of their need to possess all requisite property interests. In the Corps's view, § 320.4(g)(6)'s requirement that a dispute over property ownership will not be a factor in the Corps public interest decision applies to preclude consideration of a dispute over the adequacy of an applicant's property interests in the project site. See Environmental Assessment at 14. 20 Appellants argued before the district court that the requirement that applicants affirm possession of the requisite property interests for the proposed activity, 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(g)(6), means that such property interests must, in fact, be possessed by the applicant. Because Cape Wind had no property interest in the proposed data tower site, nor could it obtain such an interest under current law, its Section 10 permit application ought to have been denied. The district court rejected this argument, deferring instead to the Corps's interpretation that § 320.4(g)(6) requires only an affirmation from the applicant, which Cape Wind provided. According to the district court, § 320.4(g)(6), as interpreted by the Corps, fit in as part of a [regulatory] scheme designed to keep the Corps out of property disputes. Alliance, 288 F.Supp.2d at 77. Accordingly, not only did the regulation relieve the Corps of any obligation to consider the sufficiency of Cape Wind's property interests, but it precluded such consideration altogether. Id. at 77-78. 21 The face of § 320.4(g)(6) evidences the Corps's intent not to be involved in private property disputes. And as to disputes over public land, § 320.4(g)(6), by its own terms, says that a permit does not convey any property rights... or any exclusive privileges. Thus, the regulation does not purport to address disputes over public property, but rather attempts to insulate the Corps from addressing those disputes. Appellants' argument that the regulations impose an obligation on the Corps in a Section 10 case to resolve disputes over the ownership of public (or private) property is simply wrong. 22 Even if the regulation did not clearly support the Corps's interpretation on its face, the Corps's interpretation would nonetheless be entitled to deference. See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512, 114 S.Ct. 2381, 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (holding that agency's interpretation during administrative adjudication of its own regulations must be given controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation) (internal quotation marks omitted); South Shore Hosp., Inc. v. Thompson, 308 F.3d 91, 98 (1st Cir.2002) (deference appropriate where language of regulations admits of differing interpretations, and the [agency] chooses reasonably among them). Deference would be appropriate even though the interpretation was offered in a less formal session than the interpretation in Thomas Jefferson. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997) (deferring to agency interpretation contained in amicus brief submitted in dispute between private parties); see also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (2000) (limiting Auer deference to ambiguous regulations); United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558, 567 (1st Cir.2004) (affording some weight to Justice Department's interpretation of its regulation even though the Department's gloss is offered only in a brief rather than in some more formal manner). 5 23 We find that the Corps's reading of § 320.4(g)(6) is a reasonable one: the regulation's text states first that an applicant must affirm possession of the requisite property interests, then that the Corps will not enter into disputes but will remind the applicant of the above — that is, the Corps will remind the applicant of its need to possess the requisite property interest. The regulation next states that [t]he dispute over property ownership will not be a factor in the Corps public interest decision. The dispute refers back to the category of disputes that result in a reminder of the need to obtain all required property interests. It is reasonable, in this context, to determine that the dispute over property ownership into which the Corps may not enter includes a dispute over whether the applicant has acquired all requisite property interests — that is, a dispute over the sufficiency of the applicant's property interests. Further, the goal of preventing the Corps from expending its resources on evaluating the legal question of the sufficiency of property interests is a reasonable one. This is so whether the dispute is over the sufficiency of the applicant's interests as opposed to those of other private property holders in the area, or as opposed to those of the federal government, especially since the Corps is permitted to consider the potential impact of the project on others' property interests during its public interest review. See 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1) (listing considerations of property ownership as factor to consider in determining whether, and under what conditions, to grant permit). Accordingly, we find that the district court did not err in deferring to the Corps's interpretation of its regulations and its decision not to evaluate the sufficiency of Cape Wind's property interests in the OCS.