Opinion ID: 2155958
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Edwards' motion to withdraw the plea.

Text: On November 12, 1997, a new attorney, retained for Mr. Edwards by his parents, filed a motion on Edward's behalf to withdraw his client's guilty plea. The motion was based in substantial part on an evaluation of Edwards by Bronson Levin, Ph. D., a clinical psychologist. In his evaluation report, Dr. Levin related that he was told by Edwards that in November 1994, Edwards suffered substantial brain damage as a result of an alleged beating by the police which followed a high-speed car chase. [6] Edwards' injuries resulted in marked changes in both his cognitive and emotional functioning and significantly affected his concentration and memory. According to Dr. Levin, Edwards had trouble remembering names, including very familiar names like that of his dog. Dr. Levin administered a number of tests which revealed that Edwards' IQ was 76 (in the bottom 5% of the population), [7] and that [h]is scores in two areas were in the bottom 2% and similar to a retarded level. Verbal expression showed impairment in blocked ability to express ideas that he apparently knew (I know it, but I can't put it out.). Spelling ability is only equal to a third grade student. On a test that is sensitive to the effects of brain-injury (Trial-Making), he showed both mild disruption of ability to follow a pattern and moderate impairment in ability to shift sequences, showing difficulty concentrating in circumstances that involve following more than one idea at a time.... These results are specific to brain impairment and are not due to depression from being incarcerated. Dr. Levin further reported that Edwards had continued to deny some aspects of the offense to which he had entered a plea of guilty, and that he had reiterated his claim of innocence not only at the plea hearing, but also at sentencing and in his statement to the writer of the pre-sentence report (PSI). [8] According to Dr. Levin, Edwards was still in the post-concussive phase of his injury when he was involved in deciding whether or not to plead guilty to these charges. Edwards reported to Dr. Levin that, since the injury, he loses track of the meaning of conversations if they become complicated. (`It don't comprehend to me like before'). Edwards further told the psychologist that at the court hearings, he was unable to sustain his attention to the process because [a]t first, it sounded good.... Then I just gave up and thought hopefully somebody will explain this to me later on. Finally, after noting that Edwards' attorney at the plea, Thomas Dyson, Esquire, had apparently been less than helpful in explaining relevant procedures and issues to his client, [9] Dr. Levin concluded as follows: Despite the [c]ourt's attempt to ascertain that he understood the process through its colloquy, Mr. Edwards was not comprehending the consequences of his plea. This incompetence was due to a post-concussive impairment in cognitive processing combined with inadequate and impatient handling by counsel. Finally, it should be noted that Mr. Edwards' disability, while significant, does not prevent him from entering a new plea if the present one is withdrawn, provided, of course, that present counsel is cognizant of the dysfunction and communicates accordingly. Relying heavily on Dr. Levin's evaluation, Edwards' new attorney argued in his motion that his client should be permitted to withdraw his plea. Emphasizing that Edwards was continuing to protest his innocence, counsel asserted that Mr. Edwards pled guilty despite his claimed innocence [because] in spite of the [c]ourt's careful attempt to ascertain that Mr. Edwards understood what was happening, he did not understand that by pleading guilty he would forfeit his right to assert his innocence. According to the motion, Edwards did not understand this basic concept because of his brain-injury induced limitations combined with his [previous] attorney's failure to take the time to explain matters carefully to Mr. Edwards. Finally, Edwards' new attorney claimed that his client's plea was motivated by advice received from counsel which fell short of the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases, McClurkin v. United States, 472 A.2d 1348, 1360 (D.C.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 838, 105 S.Ct. 136, 83 L.Ed.2d 76 (1984), and that the plea should therefore be vacated for that reason as well.