Opinion ID: 1172016
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 21

Heading: Defendant's Motion to Modify the Sentence

Text: (25) Defendant contends that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion in considering defendant's motion for modification of the sentence. According to defendant, the court instead relied entirely upon the jury's verdict. The record illustrates the contrary to be true. In denying the motion to reduce the sentence to life without possibility of parole, the court observed, It is not the function of the Trial Bench and the State of California to determine the social propriety of the death penalty. It only determines when a particular case is one which falls within the guidelines established for its imposition. And in this case, the facts of the case ... the factors of the crimes themselves are such that it would be an abuse of this court's discretion not to impose the death penalty in this case, and the court will impose the death penalty. The court further explained, I am not personally familiar with any crime more heartless or coldblooded [than the machine gun murder of Kevin Thorpe]. The court concluded that, one of the special allegations is that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity in violation of Penal Code [section 190.2, subdivision] (a)(14). [¶] There has been some argument that those terms are vague and indefinite; it should be noted specifically for the record that they are. And the Court specifically finds that that particular allegation is not and was not necessary to the appropriateness of the sentence imposed in this case. [¶] And clearly this murder was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity, but it was not and is not, this court finds, necessary for the imposition of the death penalty. There are other allegations which were found to be true; they were more than sufficient to justify the imposition of the death penalty. We believe that the record clearly shows that the court exercised its discretion rather than relying upon the jury's verdict. Defendant also asserts that the court considered improper aggravating circumstances in independently sentencing defendant to death, specifically, the murder of Laura. He bases this conclusion upon the court's statement that, It ... cannot be denied [that] the young people forfeited their lives as soon as [defendant] and his companions saw them at the gas station. From that point on they had no chance [of] surviving more than a few days. It is clear from a reading of the entire record that the court was fully aware that defendant had been acquitted of Laura's murder, and that the court did not rely upon that offense in imposing the death penalty. We therefore reject defendant's claim that the court improperly considered Laura's murder as an aggravating circumstance; nowhere in the record does the court indicate or imply that it was doing so. I. Proportionality Review Defendant's final contention is that his sentence was arbitrary, discriminatory, and disproportionate and, therefore, unconstitutional. He provides no factual basis for this claim. In essence, defendant urges that we adopt some system of proportionality review. We have previously declined to do so. ( People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 777-778 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].) Moreover, the facts of this case clearly indicate the death penalty is not disproportionate punishment for this defendant. ( People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 [194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697].)