Opinion ID: 1621755
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: life imprisonment and parole eligibility

Text: Approximately fifteen minutes after deliberations began in the sentencing phase of this case, the jury sent a note to the trial court asking, How many years does the [defendant] serve if he gets life imprisonment and how long before parole? Counsel for Bush requested that the jury be instructed that under present law the defendant would have to serve a minimum of thirty calendar years before becoming eligible for parole. In addition, counsel requested that the jury be instructed that a life sentence is literally a life sentence since Bush has no absolute legal right to parole even though he might at some point become parole eligible. The trial judge denied defense counsel's request, and instead, instructed the jury that parole eligibility is not an issue in a capital case... . The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's action. Relying upon a recent United States Supreme Court decision, Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994), the defendant contends in this Court that the trial court's response to the jury question violated his right to Due Process. We disagree. In Simmons , the prosecution was allowed to argue future dangerousness to the jury as a basis supporting imposition of the death penalty. Simmons sought to rebut the prosecution's generalized argument in two ways. First, he attempted to introduce proof that due to his unique psychological problems, his future dangerousness was limited to elderly women and would not be a threat in a prison setting where he would have no contact with such individuals. Secondly, Simmons sought to introduce proof that under South Carolina law, he would not be eligible for parole if sentenced to life imprisonment and therefore would never pose a future danger to elderly women. The trial judge refused to allow Simmons to offer any rebuttal proof of his parole ineligibility and also refused Simmons requested jury instruction defining a life sentence as imprisonment in the state penitentiary for the balance of his natural life. After deliberating ninety minutes on the appropriate sentence, the jury sent a note to the judge asking, Does the imposition of a life sentence carry with it the possibility of parole? Over Simmons' objection, the trial judge instructed the jury not to consider parole or parole eligibility in reaching your verdict. That is not a proper issue for your consideration. The terms life imprisonment and death sentence are to be understood in their plan [sic] and ordinary meaning. Twenty-five minutes later the jury returned to the courtroom with a sentence of death. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Simmons claimed that the trial court's refusal to allow proof or instruction about his parole ineligibility violated his rights under the Due Process Clause. A majority of the Court in Simmons agreed and held that where the defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and state law prohibits the defendant's release on parole, due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 155-56, 114 S.Ct. at 2190. If parole is an option for a defendant sentenced to life imprisonment, however, the Simmons Court emphasized that it will not second-guess the refusal of a State to allow proof, instruction, or argument to the jury on the availability of parole. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 168-69, 114 S.Ct. at 2196; see also Simmons, 512 U.S. at 175-77, 114 S.Ct. at 2200 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (In a state in which parole is available, the Constitution does not require (or preclude) jury consideration of that fact.) Since Tennessee is a state in which defendants sentenced to life imprisonment are eligible for parole, Simmons does not require that the jury be given information about parole availability. [7] Indeed, the trial court's refusal to give defendant's requested response to the jury question was entirely consistent with prior decisions of this Court holding that the after-effect of a jury's verdict, such as parole availability, is not a proper instruction or consideration for the jury during deliberations. State v. Caughron, 855 S.W.2d 526, 543 (Tenn. 1993); State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 21 (Tenn. 1990). [8] Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err by refusing to respond to the jury's question as the defendant requested.