Opinion ID: 585301
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Acts as Such

Text: 20 Defendants also challenge the indictment as insufficient for failing to allege that defendants engaged in overt acts beyond the mere impersonation of a federal officer. They claim that the acts as such language of section 912 requires an allegation of separate and additional overt acts. At least one court supports the defendants' position. United States v. Rosser, 528 F.2d at 657 ([T]he act that completes a violation of Section 912 must be something more than merely an act in keeping with the falsely assumed character). However, binding precedent from the old Fifth Circuit, as well as relevant Supreme Court authority, supports the government's argument that an indictment is sufficient to satisfy the acts as such language if it alleges any overt act consistent with the assumed character. United States v. Cohen, 631 F.2d 1223, 1224 (5th Cir.1980); United States v. Hamilton, 276 F.2d 96, 98 (7th Cir.1960); Lepowitch, 318 U.S. at 704, 63 S.Ct. at 916; Lamar v. United States, 241 U.S. 103, 114-115, 36 S.Ct. 535, 538-39, 60 L.Ed. 912 (1916). 21 In Lepowitch, the Supreme Court stated [t]he most general allegation of impersonation of a government official satisfies the act requirement of section 912. 318 U.S. at 704, 63 S.Ct. at 916 (emphasis added). In addition, the Court stated that an indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 912 is sufficient if it merely mimics the language of the statute. Id. 22 Lamar, a case decided before the statute was revised, directly addressed the question of what acts must be alleged to satisfy the acts as such language. In that case, as here, the indictment alleged no more than that the defendant acted in violation of the statute by impersonating a federal official 5 : 23 [the defendant] unlawfully, knowingly and feloniously did falsely assume and pretend to be an officer of the Government of the United States, to wit, a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States of America ... with the intent, then and there, to defraud Lewis Cass Ledyard ... and the said defendant, then and there, with the intent and purpose aforesaid, did take upon himself to act as such member of Congress. 24 Lamar, 241 U.S. at 111, 36 S.Ct. at 537-38. The Supreme Court held that this indictment sufficiently satisfied the acts as such language of the statute because this requirement designat[es] the character of the officer or employee whose personation the clause prohibits and does not serve to limit[ ] and define[ ] the overt act from which the criminality arise[s]. Id. at 115, 36 S.Ct. at 539. Therefore, the Supreme Court did not read into the statute a requirement that the indictment mention specific additional acts beyond the general allegation that the defendant acted consistently with his assumed identity. 25 In 1980, the former Fifth Circuit held that an indictment is sufficient if it alleges any overt act consistent with the assumed character. Cohen, 631 F.2d at 1224. Because this standard correctly states the liberal position taken by the Supreme Court in Lepowitch and Lamar, we uphold it as the standard for this court. An indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 912 is sufficient if it contains general allegations of impersonating and acting as a federal officer; an indictment need not allege additional acts beyond the general act of impersonation.