Opinion ID: 1767013
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Reasonable opportunity to cure.

Text: ¶ 57. The Mississippi UCC provides that sellers shall have a reasonable opportunity to cure defects in their products. Fitzner Pontiac-Buick-Cadillac, Inc. v. Smith, 523 So.2d 324, 325 (Miss.1988). The period of time which constitutes a reasonable opportunity, however, is nowhere defined as a matter of law, because it is an issue of fact. The phrase `reasonable opportunity to cure' is necessarily a flexible one, and its meaning is dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case. Tucker v. Aqua Yacht Harbor Corp., 749 F.Supp. 142, 147, 144-46 (N.D.Miss.1990). Indeed [w]hat is a reasonable time for taking any action depends on the nature, purpose and circumstances of such action. Id. It is clear, therefore, that whether a seller is given a reasonable opportunity to cure is a fact question properly left for the jury's determination under correct instructions. Royal Lincoln-Mercury Sales, 415 So.2d at 1027; see also Tucker, 749 F.Supp. at 144-46. In the present case, the jury below was instructed as follows: Before there can be a recovery for a breach of warranty, the plaintiff must show by the preponderance of the evidence (1) that the goods were nonconforming, (2) that the seller was given a reasonable opportunity to cure the defects, and (3) that the seller failed to cure the defects within a reasonable time or within a reasonable number of attempts. ¶ 58. The evidence in this case established three instances of motor failure, and five repair attempts. The jury could have reasonably concluded therefore, as it did, that these motors were materially defective, or rather, in UCC parlance, nonconforming. The jury also could have reasonably found, as it did, that while in the first two instances of motor failure, Mercury lived up to its provided remedy, although not without a great deal of challenge, it did not do so in the final instance even though it was given a reasonably opportunity to do so. Additionally, although Mercury repaired the motors the first two times, it could have also replaced them or refunded Travis's money, which it did not do. ¶ 59. Specifically, in the final instance of motor failure, 48 hours were remaining before the final tournament when Travis notified Mercury that one of the motors had completely failed. During that 48 hour period, Mercury did nothing. The question before this Court, therefore, which was also before the jury, was whether Mercury had a reasonable opportunity under the circumstances of this case to effect the remedy it guaranteed to Travisto replace or repair the motors, or, at its option, to refund the price Travis paid for themin other words, to cure. ¶ 60. As this Court held in Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Evans, 406 So.2d 15, 17 (Miss.1981), at the very least: A warranty by a seller that goods will be repaired or replaced if found to be in defective condition implicitly provides that the seller has the capability of making such repairs or replacement within a reasonable time. This capability means that the seller has reasonably available personnel qualified to make the repairs and that any parts necessary for such repairs are readily available. Id. (emphasis added). ¶ 61. Travis testified that he was willing to take his boat to a Mercury dealer for motor repair and alternatively requested that Mercury ship a new motor. Travis also testified that Mercury did not even return his phone calls while he was thirty miles off shore. Mercury did not contradict this testimony. And nowhere does the record indicate that Mercury was barred by an impossibility to help Travis. Rather, the evidence indicated that Mercury was not in any way available, ironically while sponsoring competitive fishermen, such as Travis, across the country during time-sensitive weekend tournaments. Mercury simply said there was nothing it could do, would do, or would even attempt to do until the following weekafter the tournament. This type of performance does not match the bargain made between these parties. And again, the majority entirely misses this legal point. It does not even in one single sentence address the circumstances of the bargain made hereupon which Mercury's cure right dependsto justify reversing the judge and jury in this case. ¶ 62. The entire agreement centered around Travis's tournament successes. And in fact, the evidence that preceded the sale of the motors overwhelmingly speaks to the importance of the tournaments to Travis. Ultimately the bargain was this: Travis would succeed, as he had in the past, and Mercury Marine would benefit from it. To Travis, the bargain he made with Mercury meant reduced costs through sponsorship, more wins, more money, and reputable, reliable motors. To Mercury, the bargain meant more exposure and thus the sale of its products. Mercury was fully aware of the nature of this bargain, as is indicated in the various promotional materials it provided to Travis prior to shipping the motors. ¶ 63. Mercury's right to cure therefore turns entirely on the reasonableness of Travis's decision not to withdraw from the final tournament instead of waiting around for Mercury to effect repair, replacement, or a refundin other words, to cure. ¶ 64. Withdrawing from the final tournament and waiting for Mercury to assist would have been, without question, unreasonable for Travis, a competitor of consistent top-ten standings in his tournament division, who had been out there in the field living up to his end of the bargain with Mercury-promoting its name and products. Indeed, the evidence in this case shows exactly how much Travis had to lose, and that Mercury was fully aware of the magnitude of those potential losses. The final tournament was Travis's last chance to regain first place or at least a top ten position as he had promised to his sponsors, including Mercury Marine. Moreover, this was Travis's last chance to qualifyas he had the previous yearfor the SKA National Championship and the Ringmaster 100, with top prizes of over $50,000. In fact, Travis's success in his division the previous year inspired him to seek Mercury's promotional support in the first place. It also earned him the distinguished invitation to the National Championship in North Carolina where the first of Mercury's motor defects occurred in this case. These facts are clearly pertinent to whether Travis's decision not to sit out of the final tournament, and thus afford Mercury an opportunity to cure the next week, was reasonable. ¶ 65. This evidence and issue were properly submitted to the jury and resolved in Travis's favor. Implicit in the jury's verdict is that Mercury was indeed given a reasonable opportunity to cure under the circumstances, but failed to do so. The jury's verdict should not be disturbed. ¶ 66. Notwithstanding affirmation of the jury on this basis, the doctrine of shaken faith, or of loss of confidence, is also applicable here, which limits a seller's broader right to cure. [6] See, e.g., Rester v. Morrow, 491 So.2d 204 (Miss.1986) (a seller's right to cure is not unlimited; the time may come when enough is enough.). This Court has consistently held that a seller's right to cure is not unlimited ... There comes a time `when enough is enough' and a purchaser is entitled to seek revocation `notwithstanding the seller's repeated good faith efforts ...' Guerdon Indust., Inc. v. Gentry, 531 So.2d 1202, 1208 (Miss.1988) (citing Rester v. Morrow, 491 So.2d 204, 210 (Miss.1986)). ¶ 67. Our leading shaken faith case is Rester in which the buyer repeatedly brought his automobile back to the seller for repairs. Equally as repeatedly, the repair efforts failed. Id. We held that the seller's right to attempt cure was not without limit, that there comes a point where the buyer is not required to continue returning the car to the seller and experiencing the attendant inconveniences of having his car out of operation. Our law does not allow a seller to postpone revocation in perpetuity by fixing everything that goes wrong with the automobile. There comes a time when enough is enoughwhen an automobile purchaser, after having to take his car into the shop for repairs an inordinate number of times and experiencing all of the attendant inconvenience, is entitled to say: That's all ... notwithstanding the seller's repeated good faith efforts to fix the car. Id. ¶ 68. Indeed, where a buyer's confidence in the dependability of a machine is shaken because of the defects and possibly because of a seller's ineffective attempt(s) to cure, revocation can be justified. Id. See also Hemmert Agr. Aviation, Inc. v. Mid-Continent, 663 F.Supp. 1546 (D.Kan. 1987); Lathrop v. Tyrrell, 128 Ill.App.3d 1067, 84 Ill.Dec. 283, 471 N.E.2d 1049, 39 UCC Rep. 1653 (1984); Haverlah v. Memphis Aviation, Inc., 674 S.W.2d 297, 40 U.C.C.Rep. 1263 (Tenn.Ct.App.1984); Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J.Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968)(attempted cure held ineffective; Once [the buyers] faith is shaken, the vehicle loses not only its real value in their eyes, but becomes an instrument whose integrity is substantially impaired and whose operation is fraught with apprehension.); Orange Motors of Coral Gables v. Dade County Dairies, 258 So.2d 319 (Fla.App.1972) (The buyer of an automobile is not bound to permit the seller to tinker with the article, indefinitely in the hope it may ultimately be made to comply with the warranty ... [citations omitted] At some point in time, if major problems continue to plague the automobile, it must become obvious to all people that a particular vehicle simply cannot be repaired or parts replaced so that the same is made free of defect.) ¶ 69. The evidence at trial indicated that Travis's confidence in both these motors and in Mercury's ability to provide adequate warranty service was lost. One of the motors was defective at the outset, and continued to manifest subsequent defects. And one cannot minimize the fact that the dealer could not even completely install and repair one of the motors due to its defective condition, which caused Travis to spend two days searching for a Mercury mechanic in the Eastern half of North Carolina who had the acumen to do so. Moreover, the motors failed in two consecutive tournaments, each of which literally, and figuratively, left Travis out to sea. When the motor failed during the prefishing day of the final tournament, Travis was under no further obligation, under the doctrine of shaken faith, to allow Mercury an opportunity to cure or repair. Even if, once again, Mercury had offered to repair, Travis justifiably would have had no confidence in the future performance of these motors. Travis was therefore entitled to declare, in the parlance of our shaken faith jurisprudence: That's all. A jury of Travis's peers, applying the correct legal standards, affirmed his having done so.