Opinion ID: 1908179
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: necessary findings of fact

Text: The appellant contends that the language of 19 M.R.S.A. § 691, namely, the marital differences are irreconcilable and the marriage has broken down (emphasis supplied), legally mandates two specific and individual findings by the Court, first, that irreconcilable marital differences exist and, second, a breakdown in the marriage as a result thereof. Absent the second finding, so appellant continues, no valid divorce may be decreed. We disagree. The term irreconcilable marital differences is one that necessarily lacks precision and should not be circumscribed by a strict definition. Experience has demonstrated that each marital relationship is as unique as are the human personalities involved. Therefore, a lack of definitiveness is often desirable in order that each case may receive the individual attention of the court, which should not be unnecessarily inhibited in its approach to any case. See Strater v. Strater, 159 Me. 508, 518-19, 196 A.2d 94, 99 (1963). Strict statutory definitions in areas such as divorce often become unworkable as applied to the universe of human activity which this area of litigation often discloses. See Riley v. Riley, 271 So.2d 181 (Fla.App.1972). In attempting to apply such a provision we are aided by existing policy. We have often stated that the involvement of public policy in divorce actions is an element not present in other forms of litigation. See Deblois v. Deblois, 158 Me. 24, 177 A.2d 199 (1962). It is due to the State's policy interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage relationship that it, in effect, becomes a third party to divorce proceedings. Reville v. Reville, 370 A.2d 249 (Me.1977); Belanger v. Belanger, 240 A.2d 743 (Me.1968). Other state courts have interpreted statutes similar to ours. [3] It seems clear that trivial or minor irreconcilable marital differences should not be sufficient to justify the dissolution of a marriage. See In Re Marriage of Walton, 28 Cal.App.3d 108, 104 Cal.Rptr. 472 (1972). In order to grant a decree for divorce on this basis, the court must find that in the particular case the marital differences cause cohabitation to become intolerable. See Riley v. Riley, 271 So.2d 181 (Fla.App. 1972). Such differences contemplate a greater degree of disparity between husband and wife than mere unhappiness, for which a divorce cannot be granted. Dresser v. Dresser, 225 A.2d 395, 398 (Me.1967). Once a finding is made that there are irreconcilable differences of such a degree as to make living together intolerable in the particular case, a breakdown in the marriage in legal contemplation is implicit. The necessity of a breakdown in the marriage is a legislative substitute for a required finding of fault in one of the parties in a divorce action. McKim v. McKim, 6 Cal.3d 673, 100 Cal.Rptr. 140, 493 P.2d 868, 871 (1972). The focus is shifted from the individual partners to the marriage itself. Id. Just as the fault of one partner must exist whenever a divorce is granted on any other grounds, a breakdown in the marriage must necessarily exist if the court finds the required degree of irreconcilable difference on which to premise granting a divorce. No one would contend that a specific and individual finding of fault is necessary whenever other grounds for divorce are alleged. Therefore, we conclude that a separate finding of a breakdown in the marriage is not essential for a divorce on grounds of irreconcilable marital differences.