Opinion ID: 2798934
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Katz Exception

Text: In this case, EON does not dispute that the ’757 pa- tent discloses no algorithms. It is uncontested that the only structure disclosed in the ’757 patent is a microprocessor. For this reason, EON relies on an exception to the algorithm rule created in In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litigation, 639 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Katz held that a standard microprocessor can serve as sufficient structure for “functions [that] can be achieved by any general purpose computer without special programming.” Katz, 639 F.3d at 1316. In Katz, claim terms involving basic “processing,” “receiving,” and “storing” functions were not necessarily indefinite because a general purpose computer need not “be specially programmed to perform the recited function.” Id. However, other claim terms involving conditionally coupling calls were indefinite because those functions required special programming and no algorithm was disclosed. Id. at 1315. This court has since analyzed the “narrow” Katz exception once, finding that it did not apply. See Ergo Licensing, LLC v. CareFusion 303, Inc., 673 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2012). A representative example of one of the means-plus-function terms at issue in Ergo follows: programmable control means coupled with said adjusting means for controlling said adjusting means, said programmable control means having data fields describing metering properties of individual fluid flows. U.S. Patent No. 5,507,412 claim 1 (filed June 14, 1998). The Ergo court explained that “[i]t is only in the rare circumstances where any general-purpose computer without any special programming can perform the function that an algorithm need not be disclosed.” Id. at 1365. The court found that an algorithm was needed to lend sufficient structure to the terms at issue because “[t]he EON CORP. IP HOLDINGS LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY LLC 9 ‘control means’ at issue in this case cannot be performed by a general-purpose computer without any special programming. The function of ‘controlling the adjusting means’ requires more than merely plugging in a generalpurpose computer.” Id. EON asserts that the functions claimed in the ’757 patent do not involve “special programming”—and thus fall within the Katz exception—because they are relatively simple to implement. However, the Katz exception is not so broad. As we stated in Katz, a microprocessor can serve as structure for a computer-implemented function only where the claimed function is “coextensive” with a microprocessor itself. Katz, 639 F.3d at 1316. Examples of such coextensive functions are “receiving” data, “storing” data, and “processing” data—the only three functions on which the Katz court vacated the district court’s decision and remanded for the district court to determine whether disclosure of a microprocessor was sufficient. Katz’s “special programming” language has its origins in WMS Gaming. As mentioned above, WMS Gaming held that the corresponding structure for a software algorithm is the algorithm. In WMS Gaming, disclosure of a general purpose computer was insufficient because “[a] general purpose computer, or microprocessor, programmed to carry out an algorithm creates ‘a new machine, because a general purpose computer in effect becomes a special purpose computer once it is pro- grammed to perform particular functions pursuant to instructions from program software.’” WMS Gaming, 184 F.3d at 1348 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d but criticized sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010))). As the foregoing citation demonstrates, WMS Gaming borrows language from Alappat. Alappat, which was predominantly a § 101 case, held that the recited algorithm claimed patenteligible subject matter because its combination with a 10 EON CORP. IP HOLDINGS LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY LLC general purpose computer created a new “machine” for the purposes of § 101. 33 F.3d at 1545. Specifically, Alappat reasoned that “a general purpose computer in effect becomes a special purpose computer once it is programmed to perform particular functions pursuant to instructions from program software.” 2 Id. The Alappat court used this explanation to justify an expansive view of § 101 under which nearly any algorithm was patentable so long as the claim was written to a computer loaded with the software. Id. (“[A] computer . . . is apparatus not mathematics.”). By way of WMS Gaming, the “special programming” language in Katz derives from Alappat’s legacy. After WMS Gaming, a number of cases held means-plus- function claims indefinite for failure to disclose a sufficient algorithm. See, e.g., Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn, Inc., 574 F.3d 1371, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340–41 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1338. For the “processing,” “receiving,” and “storing” claim terms, Katz distinguished those cases using WMS Gaming’s vocabulary, which culminated in Katz’s “special programming” phrase: Those cases involved specific functions that would need to be implemented by programming a gen- eral purpose computer to convert it into a special purpose computer capable of performing those 2 Building on Alappat, WMS Gaming reasoned that “[t]he instructions of the software program that carry out the algorithm electrically change the general purpose computer by creating electrical paths within the device. These electrical paths create a special purpose machine for carrying out the particular algorithm.” WMS Gaming, 184 F.3d at 1348. EON CORP. IP HOLDINGS LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY LLC 1 1 specified functions. See, e.g., Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1333–34; Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc., 417 F.3d 1241, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2005); WMS Gaming, 184 F.3d at 1349. By contrast, in the seven claims identified above, Katz has not claimed a specific function performed by a special purpose computer, but has simply recited the claimed functions of “processing,” “receiving,” and “storing.” Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms “processing,” “receiving,” and “storing,” discussed below, those functions can be achieved by any general purpose computer without special pro- gramming. Katz, 639 F.3d at 1316. Taken in context, then, “special programming” does not denote a level of complexity. On this point, the district court erred in holding that “special programming” does not encompass commercially available off-the-shelf software. To the contrary, and as originally described in Katz, “special programming” includes any functionality that is not “coextensive” with a microprocessor or general purpose computer. Id. In other words—to use the language of Alappat—the general purpose computer becomes a special purpose computer when loaded with the special programming, so a general purpose computer or microprocessor no longer lends sufficient structure to the claim. Therefore, as is plain from this review, the Katz exception is a necessary corollary to the general rule stated in WMS Gaming and further elaborated in Aristocrat and other later cases. A microprocessor or general purpose computer lends sufficient structure only to basic functions of a microprocessor. All other computer-implemented functions require disclosure of an algorithm. Before moving on, we note that Alappat has been su- perseded by Bilski, 561 U.S. at 605–06, and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). Nonetheless, 12 EON CORP. IP HOLDINGS LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY LLC WMS Gaming and Katz remain correctly decided. WMS Gaming and Katz are consistent with recent Supreme Court precedent, including Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., which warned against “diminish[ing] the definiteness requirement’s public-notice function and foster[ing] the innovation-discouraging zone of uncertainty against which this Court has warned.” 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2130 (2014) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The disclosure of structure under § 112 ¶ 6 serves the “purpose of limiting the scope of the claim to the particular structure disclosed, together with equivalents.” Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1336. A general purpose computer is flexible—it can do anything it is programmed to do. Id. at 1333. Therefore, the disclosure of a general purpose computer or a microprocessor as corresponding structure for a software function does nothing to limit the scope of the claim and “avoid pure functional claiming.” Id. As such, when a patentee invokes means-plus- function claiming to recite a software function, it accedes to the reciprocal obligation of disclosing a sufficient algorithm as corresponding structure.