Opinion ID: 1971395
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Wage Attachment Claim

Text: Gamles next claims that the Superior Court erroneously held that the wage attachment had terminated as a consequence of the judgment having expired. That claim presents a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. [12] The Superior Court terminated Gamles' wage attachment after finding that Gamles' 1994 judgment had expired under 10 Del. C. § 4711, on the basis that the attachment proceedings rely on the validity of the underlying judgment. [13] As we have held above, the judgment did not expire by operation of 10 Del. C. § 4711. Therefore, the wage attachment brought. to execute on the judgment did not terminate either. The Gibsons respond that the wage attachment must be construed as a general lien and, as such, expired under a 1955 amendment to 10 Del. C. § 4711. That 1955 amendment relevantly provides as follows: No judgment which is a general lien, including judgments for costs and judgments in favor of the State or any political subdivision thereof, shall remain' a lien for more than the 10 year period hereinabove provided, unless renewed for a further 10 year term in accordance with the provisions of the section. [14] The Gibsons claim that through the 1955 amendment, the Delaware Legislature expanded the scope and application of § 4711 to include all judgments that operate not only as liens on real estate but also as liens for all purposes. Therefore, Gamles' wage attachment, which is a general lien, was required to be renewed within 10 years, and because it was not, the wage attachment expired. The Gibsons' argument fails under 10 Del. C. § 4716, which carves out an exception to Section 4711. Section 4716(a) provides that: The provisions of this subchapter shall not operate to defeat the due enforcement of any writ of execution under any judgment for the recovery of money entered or recorded in the Superior Court, by virtue of which real estate is seized or taken, if such writ of execution is issued before the expiration of the said term of ten years. They shall not apply to any judgment upon a mortgage or mechanics lien. [15] Gamles argues that the first sentence of Section 4716(a) precludes Section 4711 from operating to defeat its wage attachment, because the wage attachment is a writ of execution that was filed within the 10-year statutory period. We agree with Gamles' conclusion, although not its reasoning. Strictly speaking, the first sentence of Section 4716(a) states that the 10-year limitation does not apply to defeat enforcement of execution writs issued before the expiration of the 10-year period by virtue of which real estate is seized or taken. Gamles' attachment was upon the wages of Gibson, Sr. It was not upon a writ of execution by virtue of which real estate is seized or taken. [16] Therefore, the first sentence of Section 4716 does not apply. But, the second sentence of Section 4716(a) further provides that [the provisions of this Chapter] shall not apply to any judgment upon a mortgage or mechanics lien. [17] That is, if the underlying judgment is based upon a mortgage, then the 10-year limitation period does not apply to that judgment. Here, Gamles' 1994 judgment was obtained as a result of Gibson, Jr.'s default on a mortgage loan to finance the purchase of a house. Thus, Gamles' judgment was upon a mortgage, and under Section 4716, is exempt from the 10-year limitations period. As a result, the wage attachment was not affected by the operation of 10 Del. C. § 4711 and did not terminate. We conclude, for those reasons, that the Superior Court erred in ordering the termination of Gamles' wage attachment.