Opinion ID: 181032
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Four Flagrancy Factors

Text: Having determined that a number of Kadon's remarks were improper, we must now proceed to the flagrancy analysis, which involves the application of the four factors delineated above. None of the four factors is dispositive. Galloway, 316 F.3d at 632. On balance, it appears that the prosecutor's remarks, though improper, were not flagrant enough to render [the] trial fundamentally unfair. Carson, 560 F.3d at 574.
The first factor requires us to consider whether the remarks in question were misleading or prejudicial. Carter, 236 F.3d at 783. As an initial matter, it must be noted that the defendants did not immediately object to any of the remarks. In some cases, the defendants did not object at all. That cuts in favor of a finding that the remarks were not particularly prejudicial, as anything significantly deleterious would presumably prompt a swift objection from experienced defense counsel. See United States v. Trutenko, 490 F.2d 678, 680 (7th Cir.1973) (We are inclined to believe[,] however, that if the comment were sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal, counsel who was present at the time either would have objected forthwith or else would have requested the trial judge to give a curative instruction.). [45] Setting aside the failure to lodge an immediate objection, it seems evident that a number of the improper remarks would tend, in isolation, to prejudice the defendants. The perceptions of the jury were surely impacted to some extent when the prosecutor suggested that he believed the defendants to be weak, greedy, and capable of criminal designs. See Bess, 593 F.2d at 755. Furthermore, it is plain that Kadon's military anecdote was likely to stir the patriotic fibers of at least several jurors, shifting their focus, if only slightly, away from the critical issue of whether the defendants were actually guilty. In addition, the defendants were surely injured when Kadon suggested that the grand jury had formed an opinion as to their guilt. See Bess, 593 F.2d at 754 (indicating that a prosecutor commits an egregious error when he opines that a defendant is guilty merely because he ... has been indicted). Thus, in a vacuum, Kadon's remarks would appear to entail a certain measure of prejudicial force. [46] However, to the sting of potential prejudice was applied the salve of forceful curative instructions. Once closing arguments were completed, and following a brief recess, the district court warned the jurors that the closing arguments were not evidence. The district court also stated, [I]t is not appropriate for the lawyers ... to express a personal opinion about the truthfulness of a witness' testimony. That is for you to decide. In addition, the district court commanded the jurors to disregard any personal opinions or personal backgrounds of counsel. The district court also touched on the issue of Kadon's references to the grand jury. In light of these ameliorative instructions, any prejudice precipitated by Kadon's comments was either extinguished entirely or diminished drastically. See Carson, 560 F.3d at 576 (holding that any prejudice resulting from the comments was `cured, or at least minimized, by curative instructions to the jury'); Carter, 236 F.3d at 787 (Ordinarily, a court should not overturn a criminal conviction on the basis of a prosecutor's comments alone, especially where the district court has given the jury an instruction that may cure the error.). [47] Accordingly, the first factor does not cut in favor of the defendants.
The second factor requires this court to assess the pervasiveness of the improper remarks; that is, this court must determine whether the remarks were isolated or extensive. If a prosecutor's comments were simply isolated remarks made during the course of a long trial, then the error caused by such misconduct may be harmless. Carter, 236 F.3d at 788 (citing United States v. Leon, 534 F.2d 667, 679 (6th Cir.1976)). In this case, it is tempting to describe the remarks as isolated, as they were confined to a single portion of the trial. Indeed, when the remarks are viewedas they must beagainst the backdrop of the trial as a whole, they are certainly fairly localized. See Macias v. Makowski, 291 F.3d 447, 453 (6th Cir.2002) (The prosecutor's statement took place during rebuttal closing argument, and Macias does not contend that the prosecutor acted inappropriately at any other point during the trial. Because the comments were isolated, this factor does not weigh in Macias's favor.); Cobleigh, 75 F.3d at 247 (holding that there was no prosecutorial misconduct where the defendants complained of a few unrelated statements and events from an eight-defendant trial that lasted one month and involved the testimony of dozens of witnesses and the presentation of more than 200 exhibits). However, the fact that the remarks were confined to the rebuttal argument does not mean that they are sufficiently isolated to merit a finding of harmlessness. In some instances, a single forbidden comment is sufficient to poison the entire trial. See United States v. Smith, 500 F.2d 293, 297 (6th Cir.1974) ([E]ven a single misstep on the part of the prosecutor may be so destructive of the right of the defendant to a fair trial that reversal must follow. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Ultimately, we think the remarks, though confined to the rebuttal argument, were numerous enough to escape categorization as isolated. But, at the same time, the remarks were not plentiful enough to merit a finding that they were pervasive. Thus, the second factor is a wash.
Next, this court must consider whether the remarks were deliberate or accidental. Carter, 236 F.3d at 783. Here, only two sets of allegedly improper remarks appear to have been deliberatethe statements regarding the good intentions of the prosecution team and the statements regarding Kadon's experiences as a JAG officer. The remaining remarks appear to have been made on the spur of the moment, sometimes coming in the middle of wholly unrelated sentences. As a consequence, it does not appear that either side benefits tremendously from this factor. In any event, the prosecutor's intent in making certain remarks is a fairly rough proxy for the ultimate question, which is whether the remarks at issue contaminated the trial with unfairness.
The final factor is the strength of the evidence. Ibid. In this case, the force of the government's evidentiary presentation weighs heavily against a finding of flagrancy. The government introduced the testimony of multiple Berkeley executives, each of whom testified that the company knowingly attempted to deceive its customers. The executives also testified that the company was manipulating its financial information in order to remain in relationships with its banking partners. The case against the defendants also included copious emails. In short, the evidence against the defendants was extensive. Thus, the fourth and final factor militates in favor of the conclusion that Kadon's remarks, though imprudent, were ultimately harmless. Accordingly, we hold that, on balance, Kadon's improper comments did not rise to the level of flagrancy.