Opinion ID: 164582
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Credibility of Petitioner's Testimony Regarding Ethnicity

Text: 38 As recounted above, the IJ did not credit Petitioner's claim that he was ethnically Chinese, saying: [W]e have not received any evidence whatsoever, other than his testimony that he is, in fact, of this particular race. The Court is not satisfied with the evidence that was presented regarding that particular matter. Oral Decision at 9. We hold that the IJ failed to state a substantial basis for rejecting Petitioner's claim that he is ethnically Chinese. The IJ did not provide any reasoning for finding Petitioner's testimony, on its own, insufficient to establish his ethnicity. Corroborating documentary evidence is not required. See Kourski v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1038, 1039 (7th Cir.2004) (noting that under 8 C.F.R. § 208.13, [f]ailure to tender a birth certificate to prove that one was a Russian Jew would ... not be decisive evidence that one was not Jewish); In re S — M — J —, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 1997 WL 80984 at . We remand for a redetermination of Petitioner's claim that he is ethnically Chinese. 39 Because the IJ found that Petitioner had not established his Chinese ethnicity, the IJ did not proceed to examine the evidence that persons of Chinese ethnicity face persecution in Indonesia. Nor did the government address the matter in its brief to this court. (Although the IJ mentioned that any claim of a threat to Petitioner on the basis of his ethnicity was undercut by the fact that he still had family living in Indonesia, there is no evidence of this in the record. All that is known of Petitioner's family in Indonesia is his testimony that the only relatives he might still have there are his uncle's family, with whom he does not have any contact ... at all. R. at 110.) If on remand Petitioner is found to be ethnically Chinese, it will then be necessary to make the findings regarding persecution that are required to resolve Petitioner's claims for asylum and restriction on removal. We note that because more than five years have passed since Petitioner's original asylum hearing, current conditions in Indonesia may be taken into account in resolving this issue. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 17-18, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (ordering remand of asylum case to BIA for consideration of changed country conditions); Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 313 (2d Cir.2003) (after concluding that IJ had made a baseless credibility determination at asylum hearing, remanding the case to allow the IJ to reach the secondary question of country conditions in light of evidence on current country conditions). Subsequent events in Indonesia may well undercut Petitioner's claims. See, e.g., Limerta v. Ashcroft, 88 Fed.Appx. 363, 366 (10th Cir.2004); Lauw v. Ashcroft, 85 Fed.Appx. 871 (3d Cir. Nov. 4, 2003) 2003 U.S. LEXIS App. 22742 at .