Opinion ID: 1406050
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Fair Warning of Prohibited Conduct

Text: A statute whose terms are unduly vague violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Flipside, 455 U.S. at 497, 102 S.Ct. at 1192-93. To succeed in a vagueness challenge, the complaining party must show that the statute is impermissibly vague in all of its applications. Id. In Eckley v. Colorado Real Estate Commission, 752 P.2d 68 (Colo. 1988), we stated the standards and competing interests that underlie a void-for-vagueness challenge: A statute offends due process of law, however, if it is so vague that it does not provide fair warning of the conduct prohibited or if its standards are so ill-defined as to create a danger of arbitrary and capricious enforcement. E.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 843, 31 L.Ed. 2d 110 (1972); Exotic Coins, Inc. v. Beacom, 699 P.2d 930, 943 (Colo.1985), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892, 106 S.Ct. 214, 88 L.Ed.2d 214 (1985). A statute is not void for vagueness if it fairly describes the conduct forbidden, and persons of common intelligence can readily understand its meaning and application. E.g., Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127-28, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926); People v. O'Cana, 725 P.2d [1139] at 1141 [ (Colo.1986) ]; Exotic Coins, Inc., 699 P.2d at 943. The vagueness test is not an exercise in semantics to emasculate legislation; rather, it is a pragmatic test to ensure fairness. People v. Sequin, 199 Colo. 381, 388, 609 P.2d 622, 627 (1980). Accord, e.g., People v. Revello, 735 P.2d 487, 490 (Colo.1987). Statutory terms need not be defined with mathematical precision in order to pass constitutional muster. Exotic Coins Inc., 699 P.2d at 943. Instead, the statutory language must strike a balance between two potentially conflicting concerns: it must be specific enough to give fair warning of the prohibited conduct, yet must be sufficiently general to address the problem under varied circumstances and during changing times. E.g., Kibler v. State, 718 P.2d 531, 534 (Colo.1986); Colorado Auto & Truck Wreckers Ass'n v. Dep't of Revenue, 618 P.2d 646, 651 (Colo. 1980). Eckley, 752 P.2d at 73. Statutory words and phrases should be given their ordinary and accepted meaning unless they have acquired a technical meaning through legislative definition or judicial construction. Charnes v. Lobato, 743 P.2d 27, 30 (Colo.1987); Binkley v. People, 716 P.2d 1111, 1113 (Colo.1986); see § 2-4-101, 1B C.R.S. (1980). The phrases in subsection (6)(a) have not acquired a technical meaning under Colorado law, [10] so we will give them their ordinary and accepted meaning. The word charitable means generous in assistance to the poor. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 378 (1986). By implication, the charitable purposes described in subsection (6)(a) are limited to considerations of the ability of a particular patient to pay a required deductible or copayment. In that context, the immediate health and welfare and substantial financial hardship are readily comprehensible to persons of common intelligence. A health care provider may be generous in assistance to the poor by waiving any required deductible or copayment on a case-by-case basis under subsection (6)(a) without violating subsection (3) so long as a determination is made that a patient needs treatment immediately yet can't afford to pay the deductible or copayment because the payment would create a substantial financial hardship for the patient. Moreover, a clear designation of legislative intent can compensate for some imprecision in terms. Exotic Coins, Inc. v. Beacom, 699 P.2d 930, 944 (Colo.), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892, 106 S.Ct. 214, 88 L.Ed.2d 214 (1985). The general legislative intent behind section 18-13-119 is clearly expressed in subsection (1): The general assembly hereby finds, determines, and declares that: (a) Business practices that have the effect of eliminating the need for actual payment by the recipient of health care of required copayments and deductibles in health benefit plans interfere with contractual obligations entered into between the insured and the insurer relating to such payments; (b) Such interference is not in the public interest when it is conducted as a regular business practice because it has the effect of increasing health care costs by removing the incentive that copayments and deductibles create in making the consumer a cost-conscious purchaser of health care; and (c) Advertising of such practices may aggravate the adverse financial and other impacts upon recipients of health care. § 18-13-119, 8B C.R.S. (1986). We therefore conclude that, under the less strict Flipside vagueness test, the phrases for charitable purposes, the immediate health and welfare, and substantial financial hardship in subsection (6)(a) fairly describe the conduct permitted so that persons of common intelligence can readily understand their meaning and application. Therefore subsection (6)(a) is not unconstitutionally vague. 3.