Opinion ID: 1170931
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exclusion of Expert Witness Testimony.

Text: (12a) Defense counsel called a professor of psychology, Dr. Craig Haney, as an expert witness to give testimony on the factors that may affect the reliability of eyewitness identification. Dr. Haney planned to identify numerous factors in this case which, in his expert opinion, increased the likelihood of the misidentification of the defendant. He had hoped to expound on various experimental studies which have concluded that persons under stress do not perceive details well, that mistaken identifications may result from suggestion or unconscious influences, that victims of a crime in which a gun is used tend to focus on the gun rather than on the perpetrator, and that many people find it difficult to identify persons of another race. The prosecution objected to the introduction of this testimony, and after an in camera hearing the court ruled that it would be excluded. Although the court agreed that the listed factors may have played some part in the eyewitness identification in this case, it nevertheless concluded that the subject matter of the proposed testimony was common knowledge and would tend to usurp the basic function of the jury. Defendant now contends the court abused its discretion in excluding the expert testimony. The trial court relied on two Court of Appeal decisions which held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding expert testimony on eyewitness identification. ( People v. Guzman (1975) 47 Cal. App.3d 380, 385-386 [121 Cal. Rptr. 69]; People v. Johnson (1974) 38 Cal. App.3d 1, 6-7 [112 Cal. Rptr. 834].) The court, however, did not have the benefit of our later-filed opinion in People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351 [208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709, 46 A.L.R.4th 1011], wherein we criticized the reasoning of those decisions, and made it clear that in an appropriate case the exclusion of expert testimony would constitute not only an abuse of discretion, but reversible error. ( Id., at p. 376.) (13) In McDonald we held that in the usual case the appellate court will continue to defer to the trial court's discretion in this matter. ( Id., at p. 377.) We also characterized the unusual case in which the exclusion of such evidence may be an abuse of discretion: it is one in which an eyewitness identification of the defendant is a key element of the prosecution's case but is not substantially corroborated by evidence giving it independent reliability, and the defendant offers qualified expert testimony on specific psychological factors shown by the record that could have affected the accuracy of the identification but are not likely to be fully known to or understood by the jury. ( Ibid. ) (12b) The present case is one in which the trial court had discretion to admit or exclude the expert testimony. Although Dr. Haney offered to identify factors that might suggest the witnesses misidentified the defendant, ample circumstantial evidence linked defendant to the crimes and gave the identifications an independent source of reliability. As we noted earlier, defendant admitted possession of the gun that was used in both incidents; his car was identified as the possible getaway vehicle from the liquor store; Olveda's stolen vehicle was found parked less than a block from where defendant's sister lived; and defendant made numerous incriminating statements both to friends and police. Although the trial court, under these circumstances, had discretion to admit Dr. Haney's testimony, we find no abuse of discretion, and clearly no prejudicial error, in its decision to exclude that evidence.