Opinion ID: 2008036
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Availability of Small Claims Court or Regulatory Enforcement

Text: The final sentence of the arbitration clause in Cingular's standard service agreement provides that, notwithstanding the arbitration requirement, either party may bring an action in small claims court. Cingular argues that this option eliminates the possibility that a customer will lack a cost-effective means of vindicating a small claim. Cingular suggests that small claims court is often a better option than a class action for the resolution of small claims, citing Pulver v. 1st Lake Properties, Inc., 681 So.2d 965, 970 (La.App.1996) (noting that a class action may lead to a complicated lengthy legal embattlement, while an individual can resolve her claim in small claims court expeditiously and with minimum costs and fees). Pulver involved a failed attempt at class certification of a class 700 to 1,000 tenants who may or may not have had claims against their various landlords for damages as a result of a flood. The court affirmed the denial of class certification on the basis that the plaintiffs did not meet any of the requirements for certification of a class. The individual claims of the eight named plaintiffs were, however, within the jurisdiction of the small claims court. Pulver, 681 So.2d at 970. Pulver is thus inapplicable to the present case. Indeed, the quoted language from Pulver merely suggests a reason that an individual plaintiff might opt out of a class action to pursue an individual claim in small claims court. It does not support the argument that, in the present case, small claims adjudication is a cost-efficient means for plaintiff to vindicate her claim against Cingular. Cingular also relies on Jenkins v. First American Cash Advance of Georgia, LLC, 400 F.3d 868, 879 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that, under Georgia law, contract provision allowing access to small claims tribunal applies equally to both parties). Cingular does not explain, however, how the mutual availability of the small claims forum might render an otherwise unconscionable contract provision enforceable. Both parties call our attention to Iberia Credit Bureau. Cingular states that the court of appeals focused on the availability of small claims court when it rejected the plaintiff's argument that the class action waiver made it impossible for individuals to pursue individual small claims. Plaintiff disputes that this was a focus of the court of appeals since the availability of small claims adjudication was not discussed in the body of the opinion, but was merely referred to in a footnote. Iberia Credit Bureau, 379 F.3d at 175. We conclude that, given the particular facts and circumstances of this case, the availability of a judicial forum for individual small claims does not render the prohibition on class treatment of plaintiff's claim enforceable. In this case, the small claims forum has the same limitations as the arbitral forum. Plaintiff, whose actual damages total $150, would have to pay a filing fee and hire an attorney to litigate her claim that the early-termination fee is an illegal penalty. Indeed, the gravamen of her complaint is that Cingular drafted the contract terms with the intent to impose an illegal penalty for early termination in such a manner as to make any challenge to the fee cost-prohibitive in either arbitration or small claims court. Similarly, we are not persuaded that the ability of the Attorney General to bring an action under the Consumer Fraud Act (815 ILCS 505/7 (West 2002)) renders the class action waiver in the Cingular service agreement enforceable. Although the Attorney General could challenge the early-termination fee on behalf of the consumers of Illinois, she must allocate scarce resources to a variety of issues affecting consumers. There is no guarantee that the Attorney General would find the particular claim raised by plaintiff to be a high priority. If we were to conclude that the mere possibility of governmental action were sufficient to overcome the substantive and procedural flaws in Cingular's class action waiver, we would be denying plaintiff and other consumers any remedy for the allegedly illegal $150 penalty, at least until the Attorney General had the resources and the incentive to pursue the issue. See, e.g., Deposit Guaranty, 445 U.S. at 338-39, 100 S.Ct. at 1174, 63 L.Ed.2d at 440 (The aggregation of individual claims in the context of a classwide suit is an evolutionary response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of government and noting increasing reliance on the `private attorney general' for the vindication of legal rights via class actions).