Opinion ID: 2607111
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: efforts to prevent breakup of indian family

Text: The trial court's memorandum decision terminating the father's parental rights focused on the requirements of 25 U.S.C. §§ 1912(d) and 1912(f). Section 1912(d) provides in pertinent part: Any party seeking to effect a ... termination of parental rights to[] an Indian child under State law shall satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d). The trial court concluded that active efforts were made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family. Two subsidiary issues exist here: (i) what is the burden of proof, and (ii) were adequate remedial services provided?
The tribe argues it must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that rehabilitative efforts were offered and were futile, citing In the Matter of the Welfare of M.S.S., 465 N.W.2d 412 (Minn.Ct.App.1991). However, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) does not expressly establish the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, but rather appears to provide a lesser standard: shall satisfy the court that active efforts.... (emphasis added). Our review of the statute's language and the legislative history has convinced us that Congress never intended a beyond a reasonable doubt standard to apply in 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d). Starting first with the language of subsection (d) itself, we note that the word satisfy, as used, has a distinct meaning. The definition which seems most consistent with this context is to persuade by argument or evidence. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2017 (1971). Unless a contrary purpose is clearly indicated, ordinary words are given their ordinary meaning when construing a statute. E.g., Ada County v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 123 Idaho 425, 428, 849 P.2d 98, 101 (1993). We cannot say that the ordinary meaning of the word satisfy is to convince beyond a reasonable doubt. The beyond a reasonable doubt standard connotes a higher evidentiary burden than the ordinary meaning of satisfy. Furthermore, the legislative history reveals that Congress meant in subsection (d) to impose a Federal requirement similar to those in state laws, which require agencies involved in child placements to resort to remedial measures before initiating termination proceedings: Subsection (d) provides that a party seeking foster care placement or termination of parental rights involving an Indian child must satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to provide assistance designed to prevent the breakup of Indian families. The committee is advised that most State laws require public or private agencies involved in child placements to resort to remedial measures prior to initiating placement or termination proceedings, but that these services are rarely provided. This subsection imposes a Federal requirement in that regard with respect to Indian children and families. H.R.Rep. No. 1386, 95th Cong.2nd Sess. 22 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7545 (emphasis added). Idaho's statutes require judicial findings that reasonable efforts to prevent the placement of the child in [foster or shelter] care ... were provided but were not successful.... See I.C. § 16-1610(b)(2), I.C. § 16-1614. However, those statutes do not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We doubt Congress meant to establish a more stringent evidentiary standard in subsection (d) than found in state laws after which it was patterned. Moreover, Congress knew how to place a more stringent evidentiary standard in subsection (d) if it wished. In reviewing other sections of the statute, it is apparent Congress established stricter evidentiary standards in 25 U.S.C. § 1912 subsections (e), clear and convincing, and in (f), beyond a reasonable doubt. The legislative history of subsections (e) and (f) shows that Congress knew when it was inserting evidentiary standards, and was sensitive to the burdens imposed by different standards: Subsections (e) and (f) establish evidentiary standards for foster care placement or termination of parental rights. As introduced, H.R. 12533 required a beyond a reasonable doubt standard for both actions. While the committee feels that the removal of a child from the parents is a penalty as great, if not greater, than a criminal penalty, it amended the bill to reduce the standard to clear and convincing in the case of foster care where parental rights are not terminated. H.R.Rep. No. 1386, 95th Cong.2nd Sess. 22 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7545 (emphasis added). By amending subsection (e) to reduce the standard from beyond a reasonable doubt to clear and convincing, Congress displayed considered precision in articulating the evidentiary burdens it was imposing. In summary, the shall satisfy language itself, the legislative history of subsection (d), and a comparison of the shall satisfy terminology with the stricter clear and convincing and beyond a reasonable doubt standards of subsections (e) and (f), convince us that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is not properly applied in subsection (d), but that a lesser standard is appropriate. Compare People in Interest of S.R., 323 N.W.2d 885, 887 (S.D.1982) (applying beyond a reasonable doubt standard under subsection (d)); see also In the Matter of the Welfare of M.S.S., 465 N.W.2d 412 (Minn.Ct. App.1991); In re L.N.W., 457 N.W.2d 17, 19 (Iowa Ct.App.1990); Matter of Morgan, 140 Mich.App. 594, 364 N.W.2d 754, 758 (1985).
Although the beyond a reasonable doubt standard does not apply to subsection (d), the trial court's finding of adequate remedial efforts must be supported by substantial and competent evidence to endure on appeal. The trial court concluded that active efforts were made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family, but had been unavailing. The trial court listed four ways active services were given. First, the adoptive parents' attorneys gave the father notice under I.C. § 16-1513 regarding his right to file a paternity claim for the child and an opportunity to indicate willingness to support the child. The tribe filed a paternity claim on the father's behalf, but the father has never taken any action to support or initiate contact with the child. Second, the mother asked the father to attend counselling with a church social worker before the child's birth, but the father refused. Third, the state of Utah attempted to encourage the father to support his children by initiating a wage withholding for child support, and the father has continued to refuse to pay support. And fourth, an attorney was appointed to represent the father, but over the past four years he has failed to cooperate in any way with his attorney or participate in these proceedings. The trial court then found that: [u]nder the circumstances, those efforts were all that were reasonably available. [The father] consistently and persistently refused and failed to cooperate in any manner with any attempts by any person to provide him with remedial or rehabilitative services and that [sic] any other attempts would have been futile. All remedial and rehabilitative efforts have been totally unsuccessful. This Court must uphold the above finding if supported by substantial competent evidence. We believe it is. Perhaps most telling is the trial court's observation that the father has failed over the past four years to cooperate in any way with his attorney or to participate in these proceedings. We believe that the types of remedial and rehabilitative services to be required under subsection (d) depend on the facts of each case. If the services necessary under the circumstances of this case should be those aimed at preventing dissolution of the legal parent-child relationship, it seems there could be no better services than appointment of an attorney at public expense, and the many hours of attorney time spent by representing the tribe in defending the father's interest. Yet, the father has consistently exhibited indifference. We hold that under the circumstances of this case, the trial court's finding of adequate remedial services is supported by substantial competent evidence.