Opinion ID: 4204464
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Deputies Committed an Obvious Violation of

Text: Sharp III’s Fourth Amendment Rights Even if Summers Applied to Arrest Warrants The deputies claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity, because it was not clearly established (at the time of Sharp III’s detention) that Summers did not apply to arrest warrants. The Majority agrees that this legal principle was not clearly established prior to this case. I disagree. 3 However, even if the deputies could have believed that the Summers exception applied to arrest warrants, Summers unequivocally proscribed the continuation of Sharp III’s arrest. The court in Summers concluded that a valid search warrant “implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.” Summers, 452 U.S. at 705. However, Summers made it abundantly clear that this exception does not apply to arrests. Id. at 697–98 “The central importance of the probable-cause requirement to the protection of a citizen’s privacy afforded by the Fourth Amendment’s guarantees cannot be compromised [by removing the probable cause 3 Unless there is a specific exception, the general Fourth Amendment rules apply. See Summers, 452 U.S. at 697-98. The Summers Court created such an exception for brief detentions made during the execution of a search warrant. However, by nature of being an exception, it applies only to those specific circumstances. Otherwise, the exception would swallow the general rule. Thus, a law enforcement officer cannot commit a Fourth Amendment violation and hope that a court will create or extend an exception covering that violation. The Majority’s reasoning would lead to the conclusion that there can never be a clearly established violation of the Fourth Amendment absent a factually analogous case; officers could always argue that they thought a court would create or extend an exception that covered their conduct. SHARP V. COUNTY OF ORANGE 49 requirement for arrests].” Id. at 697. In fact, the Court’s reasoning was explicitly based on the fact that the detention permitted under the exception would be “significantly less intrusive than an arrest.” Id. In this case, the Majority agrees Sharp III was arrested, so the exception in Summers could never apply. While a mere detention can turn into a de facto arrest, United States v. Baron, 860 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1988), the Majority does not go there. Further, I am aware of no case in which an arrest turned into a mere detention. 4 Consequently, Sharp III continued to be under arrest during his subsequent seizure in the patrol vehicle. Thus, Summers, even if it applied to arrest warrants, could never justify Sharp III’s continued seizure. Since the language in Summers is categorical and clear, any reasonable officer would know this.