Opinion ID: 2633488
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: interpretation of purports to marry in section 76-7-101

Text: ¶ 135 The majority concludes that Holm may be found guilty of purport[ing] to marry another person while already having a wife because he entered a religious union with Ruth Stubbs that the two of them referred to as a marriage, even though neither believed, represented, or intended that the union would have the legal status of a state-sanctioned marriage. [1] In doing so, the majority deems irrelevant the distinction between the word marry when used in a legal context and the same word's idiosyncratic meaning when used as a label for a relationship recognized as significant by a particular individual or group, but not by the state. ¶ 136 This view is first evident in the majority's preference for the definition of marry that appears in Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary rather than the definition that appears in Black's Law Dictionary. The former work acknowledges the reality that individuals may use the term marry to refer to a union formed according to law or custom. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 761 (11th ed.2003) (emphasis added). In contrast, the latter, concerned as it is with what words mean when they are vested with legal import, defines marriage as [t]he legal union of a couple as husband and wife. Black's Law Dictionary 992 (8th ed.2004) (emphasis added). [2] ¶ 137 I do not believe it is appropriate to interpret the term marry when it appears in a state statute as providing what is essentially an anthropological description of human relationships. To do so is to ignore the fact that the law of our state and our nation has traditionally viewed marriage as denoting a legal status as well as a private bond. [3] ¶ 138 I also do not believe that the legislature, having so carefully structured the various prerequisites of marriage in state law, as well as the rights, duties, and obligations that state law accords married persons, would use the term marry in section 76-7-101, alone among all statutory provisions, to mean not only entry into a legally recognized marriage but also entry into any relationship that is accepted as marriage in whatever custom or tradition the parties consider applicable. [4] Beyond Merriam-Webster's, the only authorities cited by the majority are Utah's unsolemnized marriage statute, Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (1998 & Supp.2005), and the cohabits prong of Utah Code section 76-7-101. However, Utah Code section 30-1-4.5, which provides an adjudicatory alternative to statutory licensing and solemnization requirements, itself demonstrates that only legally recognized, licensed marriages are marriages under Utah law; so-called common law marriages have not been recognized in Utah since statehood. [5] ¶ 139 As for the cohabits prong of section 76-7-101, the majority fails to explain why the breadth of that provision should conclusively determine our interpretation of the parallel purports to marry prong. I perceive no justification for judicial speculation that the legislature intended a uniquely expansive definition of marry in section 76-7-101, see supra ¶ 22, especially given the legislature's express statement to the contrary in another Utah Code provision, section 30-1-4.1 (Supp.2005). That provision explains that Utah recognize[s] as marriage only the legal union of a man and a woman as provided in this chapter. Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.1(1)(a); see also Utah Const. art. I, § 29 (Marriage consists only of the legal union between a man and a woman.). As a matter of simple grammatical extrapolation, if only a legal union of a man and a woman is marriage, then purporting to marry, must be purporting to enter into such a legal union. [6] ¶ 140 The majority also refers to the well-documented history of this State's attempts to prevent the formation of polygamous unions as evidence that section 76-7-101 was intended to criminalize attempts to form duplicative marital relationships that are not legally recognized. Supra ¶ 26. This invocation of legislative history seems somewhat ironic in light of this court's recent refusal to consider the same history in analyzing whether section 76-7-101 impermissibly targeted religiously motivated practices. See State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, ¶¶ 24-25, 99 P.3d 820. Moreover, as far as I am aware, the well-documented history to which the majority refers ended long before 1973, when section 76-7-101 was originally enacted. State v. Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630, 632 (Utah 1986) (recognizing that in 1973 our legislature repealed wholesale all the prior substantive criminal statutes ... and enacted a sweeping new penal code that departed sharply from the old common law concepts). The majority fails to explain how that history could be relevant to our interpretation of section 76-7-101. ¶ 141 The majority adopts the position that an unlicensed, solemnized marriage can serve as a subsequent marriage that violates the bigamy statute. Supra ¶ 26. The majority then concludes that Holm entered such a solemnized marriage with Ruth Stubbs by participating in an FLDS ceremony in which (1) a religious leader officiated, (2) vows typical of a traditional marriage ceremony were exchanged, and (3) the woman wore a white dress. Supra ¶ 30. This position conflates solemnization with participation in a ritual of union specific to one's customs or religious beliefs. ¶ 142 The majority defines solemnization as the steps, whether ritualistic or not, by which two individuals commit themselves to undertake a marital relationship. Supra ¶ 32. A more accurate conception of the term, however, recognizes solemnization as the formal undertaking, before witnesses, of the legal obligations of marriage. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-11, 8 S.Ct. 723, 31 L.Ed. 654 (1888) ([M]arriage ... does not require any religious ceremony for its solemnization.... [W]hen the contract to marry is executed by the marriage's [solemnization], a relation between the parties is created which they cannot change. Other contracts may be modified, restricted, or enlarged, or entirely released upon the consent of the parties. Not so with marriage. The relation once formed, the law steps in and holds the parties to various obligations and liabilities.); accord Hernandez v. Robles, 7 Misc.3d 459, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579, 588 (Sup.Ct. 2005); cf. Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed.2004) (defining solemnization as [t]he performance of a formal ceremony (such as a marriage ceremony) before witnesses). The parties' intent to assume these legal obligations is what distinguishes a ceremony properly considered a solemnization from one that is merely a private religious ritual. ¶ 143 Had Holm and Ruth Stubbs intended to marry under state law and to assume the concomitant legal obligations, a sealing ceremony of the type in which they participated would satisfy the state's solemnization requirement, assuming that all other requirements, such as licensure, were met. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-6 (Supp.2004); cf. Hilton v. Roylance, 25 Utah 129, 69 P. 660, 670 (1902) (holding that a sealing ceremony performed by an LDS Church official in 1872 effected a marriage cognizable at common law). This fact indicates an accommodation by state law of the personal preferences of individuals regarding the context in which marriage solemnization occurs. Members of a particular religion may combine solemnization with the ritual of union traditionally practiced within their faith. Thus, under the relevant Utah Code section, marriages may be solemnized by ministers, rabbis, or priests of any religious denomination who are (i) in regular communion with any religious society; and (ii) 18 years of age or older, Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-6(1)(a), as well as by Native American spiritual advisors. Id. § 30-1-6(1)(b). ¶ 144 It does not follow, however, that every ceremony performed by one of these individuals, who are not public officials, that is designed to unite two individuals in some way meaningful within a particular religion constitutes solemnization whenever it is indistinguishable from a [typical] marriage ceremony. Supra ¶ 30. The majority's interpretation will subject religious leaders to criminal sanction for performing religious ceremonies that are not intended by anyone involved to have significance beyond the community in which they occur. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-15 (imposing criminal penalties on the solemnization of marriages prohibited by state law). For example, a minister officiating in a commitment ceremony involving a same-sex couple may now be held in violation of section 30-1-15(2) (though perhaps only if at least one partner is wearing a white dress). Such a result turns the purpose of Utah Code section 30-1-6 on its head. Cf. In re Estate of Litzky, 296 So.2d 638, 639 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1974) (recognizing that the union of a couple for whom an Orthodox Jewish rabbi had performed a religious ceremony was equivalent to a common law marriage, which involves no solemnization, where no marriage license had been obtained). ¶ 145 The majority claims that [t]he crux of marriage in our society, perhaps especially a religious marriage, is not so much the license as the solemnization, and that [t]he presence or absence of a state license does not alter th[e] [marital] bond or the gravity of the commitments made by Holm and Stubbs. Supra ¶ 32. It is apparent that the majority wishes to emphasize the importance of the private commitment between two partners who pledge to each other lifelong love, companionship, and support. The majority also alludes to the sanctification such a commitment receives when the partners participate in a religious ceremony in accord with their faith. Undoubtedly, a couple may feel it is their commitment before God that gives their relationship its legitimacy or permanence. However, it is beyond dispute that such private commitments alone, even when made before God, do not constitute marriage in our state or in our legal system. Any two people can make private pledges to each other, with or without the assistance of a religious official, but these private commitments are not equivalent to marriage absent a license or an adjudication of marriage. Likewise, such commitments are not enforceable under state law unless additional steps are taken to set forth mutual obligations in a written contract. Rather, despite the majority's assertion, a state license does indeed alter the bond between two people, and the gravity of their commitments, by making the state a third party to the relationship. See Palmer v. Palmer, 26 Utah 31, 72 P. 3, 7-8 (1903) (recognizing that [m]arriage differs from ordinary contracts in that the State, to every marriage contract entered into within its jurisdiction, makes itself a party (internal quotation omitted)). When a marriage occurs, no separate contract is needed in order for marital rights and duties to be enforceable; rather, the parties' private commitments are overlaid by a comprehensive legal framework set forth, in part, in a state's statutory law. [7] ¶ 146 The majority points to the fact that Holm and Stubbs referred to themselves as married in a religious sense as further evidence that they purport[ed] to marry within the meaning of section 76-7-101. However, the law has no monopoly on particular language. In my view, those who choose, for religious or other personal reasons, to refer to themselves as married, even though they know the law does not so regard them, are free to do so within their private sphere and cannot by that act alone fall subject to criminal penalties. Imposing criminal penalties on such a basis is equivalent to disciplining an individual who goes by the name of Doctor W, but who is not, in fact, a licensed physician, for violation of state licensing requirements even though he has never professed to be a legally licensed doctor or to have the medical expertise which that status is designed to ensure. ¶ 147 I therefore interpret the purports to marry prong of section 76-7-101 as referring to an individual's claim of entry into a legal union recognized by the state as marriage. The phrase does not encompass an individual's entry into a religious union where there has been no attempt to elicit the state's recognition of marital status or to procure the attendant benefits of this status under the law, and where neither party to the union believed it to have legal import. I therefore believe it was error for the district court to submit to the jury the question of Holm's guilt under that prong of section 76-7-101. ¶ 148 I next address the majority's treatment of Holm's state and federal constitutional claims and explain why I consider Holm's conviction for engaging in private religiously motivated conduct unconstitutional. [8]