Opinion ID: 167957
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lopez-Mendoza and related lower-court cases

Text: 29 In Lopez-Mendoza, the Court reviewed two civil deportation proceedings that took place following unlawful arrests. 468 U.S. at 1034-35, 104 S.Ct. 3479. In the first case, respondent Adan Lopez-Mendoza (Lopez) argued that the immigration court did not have personal jurisdiction over him by virtue of the fact that his arrest had been unlawful; he did not object to the specific evidence offered against him: namely, his oral and written admissions to law enforcement officers concerning his identity and citizenship. Id. at 1035, 104 S.Ct. 3479. The immigration court held that the legality of Lopez's arrest was irrelevant to its jurisdiction and overruled the objection. Id. 30 In the second case, respondent Elias Sandoval-Sanchez (Sandoval) argued that incriminating statements regarding his nationality and identity were fruit of an illegal arrest and should be suppressed. Id. at 1037, 104 S.Ct. 3479. Ultimately, the lower courts held that Sandoval's detention violated the Fourth Amendment and held that the statements could not be used against him in his civil deportation proceedings. Id. 31 Thus, by the time the cases came to the Supreme Court, two questions readily presented themselves for review: (1) whether an illegal arrest deprived the immigration court of jurisdiction over the respondent's person; and (2) whether the exclusionary rule, which is typically a remedy in criminal cases, would be extended to apply to civil deportation proceedings. 32 Dealing with the Lopez claim first, the Court held that the immigration court retained jurisdiction because [t]he mere fact of an illegal arrest has no bearing on a subsequent deportation proceeding. Id. at 1040, 104 S.Ct. 3479 (quotation omitted). It was in this context in which the Court noted that the body or identity of a defendant is never suppressible as fruit of an unlawful arrest. Id. at 1039-40, 104 S.Ct. 3479 (citing, inter alia, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) and Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522, 72 S.Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed. 541 (1952)). Based on the cases the Court cited, it appears that the majority was referencing the long-standing rule, known as the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, that illegal police activity affects only the admissibility of evidence; it does not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court or otherwise serve as a basis for dismissing the prosecution. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 443, 7 S.Ct. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421 (1886) (holding that the constitution does not prevent criminal jurisdiction over a defendant who was forcibly abducted from another country); Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522, 72 S.Ct. 509 (This Court has never departed from the rule announced in [ Ker ] that the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a `forcible abduction.'); see also Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 119, 95 S.Ct. 854 (reiterating the Court's established rule that illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent conviction). 33 The Lopez-Mendoza Court then turned its attention to Sandoval's claim, which was not directed to the jurisdiction of the immigration court, but rather to the admissibility of statements regarding Sandoval's citizenship and identity that were made following the illegal arrest. 468 U.S. at 1040, 104 S.Ct. 3479. The Court first undertook to decide if the exclusionary rule itself extended to non-criminal, civil deportation proceedings. Id. at 1041, 104 S.Ct. 3479. After applying the factors in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976), the Court held that the exclusionary deterrent should not apply to civil deportation proceedings. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050, 104 S.Ct. 3479. 34 The language in Lopez-Mendoza concerning the suppressability of a defendant's body or identity has been the cause of much consideration by the lower courts. The Ninth Circuit has relied upon this language to justify denying suppression of either a defendant's identity or his governmental files in prosecutions brought under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. See United States v. Guzman-Bruno, 27 F.3d 420, 422 (9th Cir.1994). The Eighth Circuit, on the other hand, upheld the suppression of physical fingerprint evidence obtained after an illegal arrest, but not in the context of a routine booking, and further concluded that the identity language in Lopez-Mendoza referred only to jurisdictional challenges and did not foreclose suppression of all identity-related evidence. United States v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 754 (8th Cir.2001). We find the Eighth Circuit's analysis persuasive.