Opinion ID: 2624500
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony of Dr. Lipson

Text: Defendant's second argument is the court erred in limiting the testimony of Dr. Lipson, a clinical and forensic psychologist who would have testified he consulted with defendant and suggested that the police should have conducted more investigation into Terry Buchanan as a possible suspect. At a hearing in limine, Dr. Lipson testified that Terry Buchanan had a juvenile record, a Navy record that reflected some events related to alcohol abuse, and a police record from Las Cruces, New Mexico, related to a documented event of domestic violence involving his second wife. He also testified that police reports revealed Terry told his mother he had a recurring dream in which Fran was being tortured with a knife to her throat. The trial court ruled the proffered evidence had little probative value and was not admissible as evidence of third party culpability. Defendant now argues the trial court erred, in that he offered Dr. Lipson's testimony not simply to establish Terry Buchanan's possible guilt, but to raise a lingering doubt by showing that the unusual circumstances of this crime made it unlikely that defendant was the killer and that the police conducted an inadequate investigation in focusing solely on defendant. (16) We disagree. `Relevant evidence is defined in Evidence Code section 210 as evidence `having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.' The test of relevance is whether the evidence tends `logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference to establish material facts such as identity, intent, or motive. [Citations.]' [Citation.] The trial court has broad discretion in determining the relevance of evidence [citations] but lacks discretion to admit irrelevant evidence. [Citations.]' ( People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1166-1167 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 759, 117 P.3d 476].) (17) The trial court correctly concluded that none of the proffered evidence would have been relevant to defendant's efforts to raise a lingering doubt as to his guilt. Contrary to defendant's argument, the proffered evidence would not have established that Terry Buchanan was a viable third party suspect. [T]he standard for admitting evidence of third party culpability [is] the same as for other exculpatory evidence: the evidence [has] to be relevant under Evidence Code section 350, and its probative value [cannot] be `substantially outweighed by the risk of undue delay, prejudice, or confusion' under Evidence Code section 352. ( People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 685 [276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278], citing People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 833 [226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99].) To be admissible, the third-party evidence need not show `substantial proof of a probability' that the third person committed the act; it need only be capable of raising a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt. At the same time, we do not require that any evidence, however remote, must be admitted to show a third party's possible culpability.... [E]vidence of mere motive or opportunity to commit the crime in another person, without more, will not suffice to raise a reasonable doubt about a defendant's guilt: there must be direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the crime. ( People v. Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 833.) The proffered evidence regarding Terry Buchanan did nothing to connect him to the crime in any manner. It therefore was inadmissible as evidence of third party culpability and irrelevant to the issue of lingering doubt. Further, the proffered evidence would not have established that good reason existed for the police to suspect someone other than defendant. Contrary to defendant's assertions, the circumstances of the crime point to no one other than defendant as the killer of Eleanore Buchanan. Defendant admitted he stole her van near the place and time her classmates last saw her alive. Sheriff's deputies found her blood on his shoe inside the van. The route defendant drove from San Diego to Terrell, Texas, passed near the site where Harry Piper, the target shooter, discovered her dismembered body. Defendant claimed he never saw Eleanore Buchanan, alive or dead, yet in early interviews with the police, he accurately described the clothing she wore the night of her murder. None of the proffered evidence from Dr. Lipson challenged any of the evidence against defendant or otherwise raised a lingering doubt by suggesting that someone other than he was responsible for the murder.