Opinion ID: 1058352
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unconsciousness Defense

Text: This Court has defined the term unconsciousness as a state of mind of persons of sound mind suffering from some voluntary or involuntary agency rendering them unaware of their acts. Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 714, 204 S.E.2d 414, 417 (1974). Where not self-induced, unconsciousness is a complete defense to a criminal homicide. [9] Id. Voluntary intoxication, however, is generally not an excuse for any crime. Swisher v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 471, 488, 506 S.E.2d 763, 772 (1998) (citing Wright v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 627, 629, 363 S.E.2d 711, 712 (1988)). [T]he only exception to this general rule is in cases involving deliberate and premeditated murder. Id. When asserting an affirmative defense, such as insanity, self-defense, or unconsciousness, the burden is on the defendant to present evidence establishing such defense to the satisfaction of the fact finder. Shifflett v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 760, 769, 274 S.E.2d 305, 310 (1981); see also Commonwealth v. Cary, 271 Va. 87, 99, 623 S.E.2d 906, 912 (2006) (recognizing that the burden of establishing the affirmative defense of self-defense rests on the defendant); Commonwealth v. Sands, 262 Va. 724, 729, 553 S.E.2d 733, 736 (2001) (same); Lucchesi v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 872, 883, 94 S.E. 925, 928 (1918) (stating that the defendant had the burden to prove his affirmative defense). In this case, Riley's unconsciousness defense was predicated on his assertion that he was in fact sleepwalking when the accident occurred. Thus, Riley had the burden to present evidence, to the satisfaction of the circuit court sitting as the fact finder, that he was sleepwalking at the time he committed the charged offenses. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' conclusion, Riley asserts that the circuit court did, in fact, find that he was sleepwalking at the time of the accident in question. Pointing to the hypothetical questions posed by the circuit court and the circuit court's comments about Riley's history of sleepwalking episodes and his bizarre behavior accompanying those episodes, Riley asserts,  none of this discussion would have mattered if the court did not believe Mr. Riley had been sleepwalking. Riley also emphasizes the circuit court's statement during sentencing that the worse case scenario did happen, not that you knew it was happening. He asserts that if the circuit court did not believe that Riley was actually sleepwalking, the court would specifically have made such a finding and held that Riley was in knowing operation of his vehicle. We do not agree with Riley's position. Riley's argument overlooks the significance of the circuit court's final statements before finding him guilty of the charged offenses: I find that he either knew or should have known what the probable consequences were or if he didn't, taking voluntarily such an overdose of a drug which he certainly knew or should have known had a lot of side effects including sleepwalking if, in fact, he was, was in itself reckless disregard. (Emphasis added.). This portion of the circuit court's ruling clearly indicates the court did not make a factual finding that Riley was sleepwalking. The circuit court's statement, if, in fact, he was sleepwalking, negates any argument to the contrary. At most, the circuit court made an alternative holding that if Riley was in fact sleepwalking, then his voluntary overdose of a medication he knew or should have known had side effects exhibited a reckless disregard for human life. The comments made by the circuit court concerning Riley's prior history of episodes described as sleepwalking and the bizarre behavior that accompanied those episodes support the court's alternative holding. The hypothetical questions posed to defense counsel were exactly that, hypothetical questions; and they do not in any way establish the circuit court made a factual finding that Riley was sleepwalking. Finally, the statement by the circuit court during the sentencing hearing that Riley did not know what was happening does not alter our conclusion. A voluntarily intoxicated individual may not be aware of what is happening but would nevertheless be responsible for his conduct while in such a state. See Chittum v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 12, 17, 174 S.E.2d 779, 782 (1970) (approving a jury instruction that stated, A person cannot voluntarily make himself so drunk as to become on that account irresponsible for his conduct during such drunkenness. He may be perfectly unconscious of what he does and yet be responsible.); Gills v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 445, 450, 126 S.E. 51, 53 (1925) (If a man voluntarily makes himself [intoxicated] he must take the consequences of his voluntary act, while [intoxicated], otherwise many crimes would go unpunished.). We thus hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the circuit court made no factual finding that Riley was sleepwalking at the time he committed the charged offenses. Riley, however, assumed that the circuit court did so and argued before the Court of Appeals he was entitled to an unconsciousness defense as a matter of law. Because the circuit court did not make a factual finding that Riley was sleepwalking, the factual predicate underpinning his unconsciousness defense was missing. In other words, Riley failed to meet his burden to present evidence, to the satisfaction of the circuit court, that he was in fact unconscious due to sleepwalking. See Shifflett, 221 Va. at 769, 274 S.E.2d at 310. Therefore, his defense was reduced, as the circuit court recognized, to merely voluntary intoxication. It is well settled that voluntary intoxication furnishes no excuse for the commission of a criminal offense. Swisher, 256 Va. at 488, 506 S.E.2d at 772 (generally, voluntary intoxication is no defense to any crime; the only exception being deliberate and premeditated murder); Wright, 234 Va. at 629, 363 S.E.2d at 712 (same); Director, Dep't of Corrections v. Jones, 229 Va. 333, 339, 329 S.E.2d 33, 36-37 (1985) (voluntary intoxication is no defense to the crimes of robbery or use of a firearm while committing robbery); Griggs v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 46, 52, 255 S.E.2d 475, 479 (1979) (voluntary intoxication, whether from drugs or alcohol, is no defense to a criminal charge); Jordan v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 490, 494, 25 S.E.2d 249, 250 (1943) (voluntary intoxication, even when it may have produced temporary insanity during the existence of which the criminal act was committed ... would afford no excuse); State v. McKeon, 201 Ariz. 571, 38 P.3d 1236, 1238-39 (App.2002) (temporary intoxication is not a defense for a criminal act or requisite state of mind if it results from the abuse of prescribed medications); People v. Turner, 680 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Colo. Ct.App.1983) (where no controverting evidence is presented, a trial court would be correct in finding that excessive use of a prescription drug constituted voluntary intoxication); Hicks v. State, 164 Ind.App. 235, 328 N.E.2d 219, 221 (1975) (approving, as an accurate statement of law, a jury instruction stating that, Temporary mental incapacity, as a result of being under the influence of a narcotic or dangerous drug taken voluntarily and not on the prescription of a physician, furnishes no legal excuse for the commission of a crime (internal quotation marks omitted)); Commonwealth, DOT, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Lello, 132 Pa.Cmwlth. 11, 571 A.2d 562, 563 (1990) (the person who exceeds his recommended dosage [of a prescription medication] is no different than the person who has had one drink too many.... In both cases there exists a situation where the prospective loss of mental and physical capacity was a foreseeable consequence when the driver undertook consumption. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, and contrary to Riley's argument on appeal, the circuit court did not err in rejecting his unconsciousness defense. [10]