Opinion ID: 776954
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the washington supreme court's objectively unreasonable brady errors

Text: 42 In Brady, the Supreme Court held that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Id. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. Supreme Court cases following Brady clearly established that the defendant must prove three elements in order to show a Brady violation. First, the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or impeachment material. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). Second, the evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). Third, prejudice must result from the failure to disclose the evidence. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 105 S.Ct. 3375. 43 Evidence is deemed prejudicial, or material, only if it undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Agurs, 427 U.S. at 111-12, 96 S.Ct. 2392. 9 For purposes of determining prejudice, the withheld evidence must be analyzed in the context of the entire record. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112, 96 S.Ct. 2392. Moreover, we analyze all of the suppressed evidence together, using the same type of analysis that we employ to determine prejudice in ineffective assistance of counsel cases. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); 10 see also United States v. Shaffer, 789 F.2d 682, 688-89 (9th Cir.1986) (analyzing collectively the prejudice resulting from the state's suppression of four different pieces of impeachment material). 44 The Supreme Court has not limited the Brady rule to cases in which the defense has made a pretrial request for specific evidence. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103-07, 96 S.Ct. 2392. In Agurs, the Court held that Brady applies where the defense makes a general request for exculpatory evidence and even where the defense does not make a request for such evidence at all. See id. at 106, 96 S.Ct. 2392. Thus, the terms suppression, withholding, and failure to disclose have the same meaning for Brady purposes. Similarly, the disclosure requirements set forth in Brady apply to a prosecutor even when the knowledge of the exculpatory evidence is in the hands of another prosecutor. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (The prosecutor's office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman for the Government.). 45 Here, the state does not contest that it was required to disclose the extensive impeachment evidence pertaining to Patrick. It simply contends, as did the Washington Supreme Court, that the failure to produce that evidence did not result in prejudice under Brady. We conclude that the state court erred in that determination. Similarly, we conclude that it erred in holding that there was no Brady violation resulting from the prosecution's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence about the cause of the fire at Benn's trailer. Because we conclude that the suppressed impeachment evidence and the suppressed exculpatory evidence are each, standing alone, sufficiently prejudicial to merit relief under Brady, they are a fortiori sufficiently prejudicial when analyzed together. We therefore hold that the state court erred when conducting its Brady analysis. We also hold that the state court ruling was clearly erroneous and constitutes an unreasonable application of Brady and its progeny. Therefore, Benn is entitled to habeas relief. 46 B. THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE CRITICAL IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE THAT COULD HAVE BEEN USED TO UNDERMINE PATRICK'S CREDIBILITY IS SUFFICIENT, STANDING ALONE, TO CONSTITUTE A BRADY VIOLATION. 47 The prosecution failed to disclose multiple pieces of critical impeachment information that could have been used to undermine the credibility of Patrick, a prosecution witness whose testimony was crucial to the state's claims of premeditation and common scheme or plan, as well as to the state's theory regarding Benn's principal motive for killing the two individuals. Because Patrick is a witness whose `reliability ... may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,' nondisclosure of evidence affecting [his] credibility falls within [the Brady ] rule. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. 763 (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959)); see also Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 479 (9th Cir.1997) (Material evidence required to be disclosed includes evidence bearing on the credibility of government witnesses.); Shaffer, 789 F.2d at 689 ([E]vidence affecting the credibility of a government witness has been held to be material under the Brady doctrine.).
48 The prosecution failed to disclose evidence of Patrick's persistent misconduct while acting as an informant, even though the trial judge explicitly ordered the state to disclose all such information to the defense. Specifically, the state failed to disclose: that Patrick, while acting as an informant, had stolen both drugs and money during drug busts and had lied to police about it; that a detective had written a deactivation memo stating that Patrick could no longer work as an informant because he could not be trusted to follow departmental rules; that Patrick, while acting as an informant, had broken into an evidence room and stolen drugs, resulting in burglary and obstruction of justice charges being filed against him; that Patrick had smuggled guns into a prison where he was housed, concealed his own involvement, and then told prison officials of the presence of the weapons in an effort to have his sentence reduced; and that although Patrick testified at trial that he did not ever use drugs, he continually did so during his time as an informant. 49 The state does not contest that this evidence was impeachment material that was suppressed by the prosecution. Rather, it contends that the suppressed material was cumulative and its suppression harmless because Patrick was sufficiently impeached by questions about his history as a paid informant in drug cases, his prior convictions, the reduction in his arson sentence, and the fact that the state was paying his motel and food bills. See United States v. Vgeri 51 F.3d 876, 880 (9th Cir.1995) (undisclosed impeachment evidence is immaterial and cumulative when the witness is already sufficiently impeached); see also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 936 (9th Cir.1998) (same). 50 The undisclosed impeachment evidence in this case was substantial and was far more damaging to Patrick's credibility than the impeachment evidence available to the defense at trial. If anything, the police—sanitized version of Patrick's fifteen years of work as an informant increased his credibility in the eyes of the jurors. The jury was told only that the police routinely relied on Patrick for help with drug investigations. Information demonstrating that Patrick had regularly lied to the authorities while acting as an informant, was untrustworthy and deceptive, and was even willing to fabricate crimes in order to gain a benefit for himself would have severely undermined his credibility. The mere fact that a prosecution witness has a prior record, even when combined with other impeachment evidence that a defendant introduces, does not render otherwise critical impeachment evidence cumulative. See, e.g., United States v. Steinberg, 99 F.3d 1486, 1489-92 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that the government's failure to disclose that an informant had been involved in two illegal transactions involving counterfeit currency was material even though the informant had been impeached through questioning about a plea agreement that he had made with the government). In cases in which the witness is central to the prosecution's case, the defendant's conviction indicates that in all likelihood the impeachment evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to persuade a jury that the witness lacked credibility. Therefore, the suppressed impeachment evidence, assuming it meets the test for disclosure, takes on an even greater importance. 51 For example, in Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d at 479, we held that information that an informant had been unreliable in the past constituted material impeachment evidence for Brady purposes. Like Patrick, the informant in Carriger came to the police with an offer of information and received a benefit for providing the information. Id. at 465. We stated that [w]hen the state decides to rely on the testimony of such a witness, it is the state's obligation to turn over all information bearing on that witness's credibility. Id. at 480. As we said, [t]his must include the witness's criminal record, including prison records, and any information therein which bears on credibility. Id. Like Patrick, the informant in Carriger was impeached at trial with evidence of prior convictions. In fact, the defense's impeachment of the informant in Carriger was more extensive than Benn's impeachment of Patrick. At Carriger's trial, it was shown that the informant was a career burglar with six previous felonies, see id. at 480, whereas here, Patrick was impeached with only three previous convictions. 52 In holding that the suppressed evidence was material in Carriger, we stated that: 53 The district court erred when it concluded that Carriger had not been prejudiced by the withholding of the information because the jury already knew [that the informant] was a burglar testifying with immunity. The telling evidence that remained undisclosed included the length of [the informant's] record ... and, more important, his long history of lying to the police. 54 Id. at 481. Here, the defense was not informed of Patrick's burglary and obstruction of justice charges, his fraudulent attempt to smuggle guns into a prison, or his multiple thefts of drugs and money; nor was it informed of the fact that Patrick provided false information to law enforcement. As a result, the jury was not told about Patrick's record of criminal misconduct while acting as an informant, nor that he had repeatedly lied to the police. 55 The present case is also similar to United States v. Brumel-Alvarez, 991 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir.1992), in which the government's principal witness was a police informant who had been involved in illegal drug operations for twenty-five years. The government withheld a memorandum that detailed false claims that the police informant had made to government agents. Id. at 1459. We stated that the informant's credibility was an important issue in the case and that [e]vidence that he lied during the investigation ... would be relevant to his credibility and the jury was entitled to know of it. Id. at 1463; see also United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 335 (9th Cir.1993) ([A] lie to the authorities paying for [an informant's] services... would be relevant evidence as to the informant's credibility.). 56 Evidence that Patrick continually used drugs while acting as an informant and that the police knew about this but chose not to prosecute him would also be relevant to show his bias. If Patrick was continually receiving a benefit from the prosecution — the ability to use drugs without fear of criminal repercussions — that would have given him a motive to provide the prosecution with inculpatory information, even if he had to fabricate it. 57 Finally, evidence that Patrick was using drugs during the trial would reflect on his competence and credibility as a witness. There was no evidence at trial to impeach Patrick's competence or his ability to recollect or perceive the events. Thus, evidence of his drug use would have provided the defense with a new and different ground of impeachment. 58 Were there no other pieces of withheld evidence in this case, we would hold that the suppression of impeachment evidence about Patrick's criminal misconduct and repeated lies to the police, while acting as an informant, is, standing alone, sufficiently prejudicial to establish a Brady violation. The fact that other impeachment evidence was introduced by the defense does not affect our conclusion. Where, as here, there is reason to believe that the jury relied on a witness's testimony to reach its verdict despite the introduction of impeachment evidence at trial, and there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed impeachment evidence, when considered together with the disclosed impeachment evidence, would have affected the jury's assessment of the witness's credibility, the suppressed impeachment evidence is prejudicial. We need not further address the prejudice issue at this point, however, given our holding that the withheld impeachment evidence, when analyzed collectively, materially undermines our confidence in the verdict. See discussion of prejudice infra Section IV.B.5.
59 There is one specific lie of Patrick's that, standing alone, would be sufficient to constitute a Brady violation. The prosecution failed to disclose that Patrick approached the police a week before trial claiming that he had a videotape showing that Benn was involved in a killing that was part of a notorious unsolved murder case (the Green River murders) unrelated to the Dethlefsen-Nelson killings. The prosecution also failed to disclose that Patrick was given $150 to produce the tape, that he never did so, and that the detectives concluded that he was lying about the tape's existence and about Benn's involvement in the other murders. This evidence could have been used to show that Patrick was willing to lie about Benn and even to accuse him falsely of murder, if doing so would result in even a minimal benefit to him. In Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d at 336, we described the difference between general evidence of untrustworthiness and specific evidence that a witness has lied as follows: All the other evidence used by the defense to punch holes in [the informant's] credibility amounted only to circumstantial reasons why[the informant] might alter the truth to continue to feather his own nest. A lie would be direct proof of this concern, eliminating the need for inferences. 60 The evidence regarding the non-existent videotape would have seriously impeached Patrick in a way that the evidence presented at trial could not, and even that the evidence of other lies could not. It provided direct proof that Patrick was willing to lie specifically about Benn's involvement in a murder and to accuse him falsely of a capital offense. Patrick, when confronted with his lies at the state habeas evidentiary hearing, confessed that I would lie — I would always lie about me. I would always do that. I was a liar. The jury, however, never heard that Patrick had lied about anything. The evidence regarding Patrick's tale of the videotape was direct proof of his lack of credibility, and the failure to disclose his fabrication was prejudicial.
61 The Brady rule requires prosecutors to disclose any benefits that are given to a government informant, including any lenient treatment. See, e.g., Giglio, 405 U.S. at 150, 92 S.Ct. 763 (failure to disclose promise of immunity). During Benn's trial, Patrick was stopped for a traffic offense and arrested because he had outstanding warrants. He called the prosecutor from jail and the prosecutor arranged for him to be released without being charged. This benefit was never disclosed to the defense. Also during Benn's trial, the Fife police department asked the prosecution to charge Patrick with burglary, but the prosecutor's office dismissed the charges. Once again, this information was withheld from the defense. The prosecution also arranged to postpone the filing of a warrant that was supposed to issue because Patrick had violated his probation. The warrant was delayed for two weeks — until after the Benn trial ended. The government failed to inform defense counsel about this benefit as well. 62 We have explained the reason why information regarding prosecution-provided benefits constitutes Brady material. In Singh v. Prunty, 142 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.1998), we stated: 63 Disclosure of an agreement to provide such benefits, as well as evidence of the benefits themselves, could have allowed the jury to reasonably conclude that [the informant] had a motive other than altruism for testifying on behalf of the State. Such a finding could have substantially impeached [the informant's] credibility as a witness. 64 Id. at 1162. Here, too, a jury could have reasonably concluded that Patrick had a motive other than altruism. 65 The state contends that the information regarding benefits was cumulative and immaterial because the defense cross-examined Patrick about his immunity from arrest during the trial and about the reduced sentence he received in exchange for his testimony. The reduced sentence that Patrick received did not provide any significant benefit to him. With good time credits for his work in prison, Patrick would have served only an additional 35 days had he received the longer sentence originally sought by the prosecutors. In addition, the state effectively downplayed the importance of this benefit in closing arguments by stating, [t]he reward that he got was that in a 6 to 12 month sentence, he got six months instead of nine months. Big reward. 66 Moreover, as we pointed out earlier, the state cannot satisfy its Brady obligation to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence by making some evidence available and asserting that the rest would be cumulative. Rather, the state is obligated to disclose `all material information casting a shadow on a government witness's credibility.' Carriger, 132 F.3d at 481-82 (internal citations omitted). Here, the number and nature of the undisclosed benefits was such that they would have impeached Patrick more effectively than the evidence that he was immune from arrest during the trial. The undisclosed benefits that Patrick received added significantly to the benefits that were disclosed and certainly would have cast a shadow on Patrick's credibility. Thus, their suppression was material.
67 At trial, Patrick denied that he had ever previously been an informant in a murder case, but in fact he had. The state argues that this undisclosed evidence about Patrick's history was not material; however, in Shaffer, 789 F.2d at 689, we stated that undisclosed evidence that an informant had previously participated in a heroin investigation was important impeachment evidence that could have been used to discredit the informant's trial testimony that he had not previously participated in that type of investigation. The circumstances in Benn are identical.
68 In determining whether the suppression of impeachment evidence is sufficiently prejudicial to rise to the level of a Brady violation, we analyze the totality of the undisclosed evidence in the context of the entire record. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112, 96 S.Ct. 2392; see also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375 (opinion of Blackmun, J.). 11 69 Because the withheld impeachment evidence would not simply have been cumulative of the impeachment evidence introduced at trial, but would have created substantial doubt as to Patrick's credibility, it is important to analyze the significance of Patrick's testimony to the prosecution's case. Patrick's testimony was critical because it directly contradicted Benn's evidence that he acted in self-defense and that he did not premeditate the killings. Moreover, it provided the only direct evidence of the aggravating factor of common scheme or plan. Patrick was the only witness to testify to the state's primary theory that Benn killed Dethlefsen and Nelson for threatening to reveal an arson-insurance-fraud scheme. He was also the only witness to suggest that Benn wanted to kill Dethlefsen because Dethlefsen changed his will so as to remove Benn as a beneficiary. Without those theories (and it is difficult to believe that the jury would have accepted the will theory), the only motive the prosecution suggested was that Benn was upset because he thought that Dethlefsen was harassing his ex-girlfriend — a motive that supported the defense's theory (that Benn became upset when he saw a note with his ex-girlfriend's phone number on it in Dethlefsen's house and a spontaneous argument ensued) as much as the prosecution's. 70 Moreover, Patrick's testimony that Benn attempted to hire someone to kill Hartman while in prison undercut Benn's defense, because the jury was more likely to believe that Benn was guilty of premeditating the murders of Dethlefsen and Nelson after being told that he plotted to kill Hartman from prison. 71 The state's failure to disclose to the defense that Patrick was a potential witness prior to the day before trial exacerbated the harm that resulted from its failure to provide impeachment information about him, because the defense did not have sufficient time to investigate Patrick and prepare for cross-examination. 72 The dissenting justices in the Washington Supreme Court's state habeas case stated that the withheld information concerning Patrick was so significant that a new trial was required. See In re Benn, 952 P.2d at 155-56. The district court agreed with the Washington Supreme Court's dissent that [t]he significance of Patrick's testimony cannot be over-stated. Benn v. Wood, 2000 WL 1031361, at  (W.D.Wash.2000). Both statements are correct. 73 Analyzed collectively, the withheld impeachment evidence reveals that Patrick, a critical witness for the state, was completely unreliable, a liar for hire, [and] ready to perjure himself for whatever advantage he could squeeze out of the system. Id. We hold that the suppression of the impeachment evidence undermines confidence in the outcome of Benn's trial and was therefore prejudicial. We further hold that the Washington Supreme Court's decision to the contrary was clearly erroneous and constitutes an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law. 74 C. THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE THAT THE FIRE AT BENN'S TRAILER WAS ACCIDENTAL AND NOT THE RESULT OF ARSON IS SUFFICIENT, STANDING ALONE, TO CONSTITUTE A BRADY VIOLATION. 75 The prosecution failed to disclose that Deputy Fire Marshal Ted Thompson and Electrical Inspector Walter Erickson both conclusively determined that the fire in Benn's trailer was accidental. The state did disclose its March 30, 1988 report stating on the basis of these experts' investigation that there was no fault or failure of the lead electrical wire and no evidence of tampering with the fuse panel. The report did not state that the deputy fire marshal and electrical inspector had concluded that arson was not the cause of the trailer fire; that the furnace was the same type that Erickson had in his own home; or that there had been a manufacturer's recall of this type of furnace because it tended to cause fires. Rather, the report suggested that Coleman furnaces did not cause fires. 76 The experts' conclusion that the fire was accidental, and the reasons therefor, was material evidence that could have served to rebut the arson-insurance-fraud theory that the prosecution offered to prove motive, premeditation, and the aggravating circumstance of common scheme or plan. We reject the Washington Supreme Court's conclusion that the cause of the fire was not critical to the prosecution's insurance fraud theory because, as the state trial court stated, the arson-insurance-fraud theory evidence was the kind of evidence that the State must and needs to prove if it's going to prove the aggravating factor that is involved in this case.... Without it, the State doesn't have a case for aggravated murder.... The district court reiterated this point when it stated that evidence of the accidental nature of the fire, if presented to the jury, would have gravely undercut[] the fear of police exposure that the prosecution asserted led Benn to kill Dethlefsen and Nelson. Benn v. Wood, 2001 WL 1031361, at 3113  (W.D.Wash.2000). 12 The prosecutor also stressed the importance of the arson-fraud-insurance theory to the jury. In his closing argument, he stated: And aggravating circumstances exist ... the common scheme or plan, the single act.... [H]e indeed wanted both men dead. He told the persons he confided in about the fact that Mike was threatening over the fire insurance money as well as Jack. 13 77 The state argues that its failure to disclose this exculpatory information did not constitute a Brady violation because Benn was aware of the February 12, 1988 report in which the deputy fire marshal tentatively concluded that the fire was accidental. The February report's tentative conclusion, however, was displaced by the conclusions in the later March 30, 1988 report. The March report suggested that, after further investigation, the experts had reached a different conclusion. Specifically, the report stated that Al Pearson, a furnace technician, said that he could find and think of no situation in which a furnace [such as a Coleman] had caused a fire in a mobile home. 78 The state, relying on United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724 (9th Cir.1990), and United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir.1991), asserts that there was no Brady violation because Benn could have discovered the experts' conclusions by interviewing them. Marashi does not support the state's position. There, we simply held that the prosecution's failure to disclose an IRS agent's notes revealing the identity of a private detective was not prejudicial to the defense because the defendant's own conduct showed that the evidence was not material. We relied in part on the fact that the defendant had access to and chose not to interview the individual who hired the private detective as support for that holding. Marashi, 913 F.2d at 733-34. Here, contrary to Marashi, there is no doubt of the materiality of the suppressed evidence. 79 Aichele involved the obligation of a United States Attorney to turn over California State Department of Corrections files that were under the exclusive control of California officials. We held that because the United States Attorney had no control over the state's files there was no Brady violation. See also United States v. Santiago, 46 F.3d 885, 894 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that the federal government did have an obligation to turn over information in the possession of the Bureau of Prisons and limiting the principle in Aichele to federal prosecutions in which material is held exclusively by a state agency). The Aichele court then added, by way of dictum, that if a defendant can ascertain the material on his own, there is no suppression. Certainly, that observation is overbroad, at the very least. We need not consider, however, whether the dictum in Aichele accurately states the law, particularly after Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995), or what the limitations on that dictum might be. For whatever its merit, and we express no view, the Aichele dictum would not apply in circumstances such as those present here. 80 In Paradis v. Arave, 130 F.3d 385 (9th Cir.1997), a post- Aichele case, our Brady analysis was not affected by the defendant's knowledge of and ability to interview the prosecution's expert and obtain the undisclosed material. There, the medical expert testified at trial that the victim was killed in a creek where her body was found. That testimony contradicted the defense theory that the victim was killed by others at Paradis' house when Paradis was not home and that Paradis then just helped dump the body in the creek. After the trial, defense counsel discovered that the prosecutor had written notes of the briefing conducted by the medical expert shortly after he performed the autopsy. The written notes showed that at that time the medical expert had expressed the opinion that the victim did not die in the creek. The prosecution did not disclose this fact. We held that the undisclosed material constituted impeachment evidence, although the defendant obviously knew of the expert's existence and could have obtained the suppressed information from him. Paradis, 130 F.3d at 392. 81 The facts in Benn are similar. Benn, like Paradis, knew of the experts' existence but had been supplied with evidence by the state that the experts' view supported the state's theory. A defendant furnished with such inculpatory evidence by the state is not required to assume that the state has concealed material information and has thereby obligated him to ascertain the Brady material on his own. In the case before us, moreover, the state not only failed to disclose the crucial information about the accidental nature of the fire, but it actually misled the defense by disclosing a part of the experts' findings that, read alone, would lead to a conclusion directly opposite to the one they reached. 82 Evidence that the fire in Benn's trailer was not caused by arson and had been determined by fire officials to be accidental would have substantially undermined the state's principal theory of motive and its main support for the aggravating factor of common scheme or plan, as well as its contention that the killings were premeditated. Thus, we hold that the state's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence about the nature of the fire constitutes a Brady violation, independent of the Brady violation that resulted from the state's suppression of impeachment evidence. We also hold that the state court ruling regarding the exculpatory evidence was clearly erroneous and thus constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent.