Opinion ID: 2639659
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: order denying motion for new trial or remittitur

Text: The parties presented this case to a jury in August 2007, resulting in a verdict in favor of Isabel Brower. She was awarded both non-economic damages and past and future economic damages based on the probable accumulations over the lifetime of her son, the decedent, rather than being limited to future economic damages that would occur during her own normal lifespan. The North Slope Borough argues that verdict improperly included the decedent's probable future accumulations and that the damages covered the decedent's entire lifespan. Since the Court's rulings implemented the legislative policy in the wrongful death act as to recovery by a statutory beneficiary, the Borough's motion for a new trial or remittitur is denied. Factual Background. The Court issued its Order Granting In Part Defendant's Motion to Limit Testimony of Plaintiffs Economic Expert (Order) on June 27, 2007. The decision agreed with the Borough's argument that Ms. Brower's economic expert Hugh Richards' report improperly combined into a lump sum the damages of the estate and damages of Ms. Brower. The Court required that Richards separately state damages suffered by the estate and damages suffered by Ms. Brower if she is found to be an `other dependent' of her son [1] so that the jury could see clearly the alternative damage amounts depending on its finding as to Isabel Brower's being a statutory beneficiary. For reasons discussed at length in the Order and based on the legislative policy expressed in Alaska Statutes 09.55.580, the court rejected the Borough's arguments about various limitations on Ms. Brower's potential recovery. The Order stated that The legislative policy that a dependent be eligible for full pecuniary damages that an estate would have recovered must be enforced. Therefore, the report and expert testimony may calculate Ms. Brower's pecuniary damages, if she is found to be a dependent of her son, based on the full life span of Alfred Brower. On the other hand, Ms. Brower's age in relation to her son is a valid factor in calculating the remaining categories of damages available to her if she is found to be dependent. [2] The Borough did not file a motion for reconsideration and the case proceeded to trial. Plaintiff's economic expert Hugh Richards offered testimony that the jury should find that the Past Economic Loss of Isabel Brower (loss of support and assistance and loss of past earnings of Alfred Brower) is the sum of $75,100 for her loss of past support and $4,200 for her loss of past net income from Alfred Brower for a total of $79,300. He also presented figures showing that the net present value of the future economic loss to Isabel Brower, assuming Alfred Brower became employed with the North Slope Borough, would be the sum of the value of his household help ($279,300) and subsistence activities ($422,700) (a total of $702,000present value $565,400) as well as Alfred Brower's future earnings ($1,607,300present value $877,700) for a total present value for future economic damages of $1,443,100. [3] On August 11, 2007, the jury returned its Special Verdict, finding that the Borough was negligent and that the Borough's negligence was a legal cause of the death of Isabel Brower's son Alfred Brower. The jury also found that he made significant contributions to supporting his mother for which she was actually dependent at the time of her son's death and that these contributions would have continued if the deceased had lived. [4] The jury found that Alfred Brower was also negligent, but that this negligence was not a legal cause of his death. [5] The Special Verdict form included two sections depending on whether Isabel Brower is a statutory beneficiary. If the answer to the question had been No, the jury would have filled out question 6 of the Special Verdict asking for the following categories of damages to the Estate of Alfred Brower: (a) Past Non-Economic Loss (pre-death pain and suffering of Alfred Brower); (b) Past Economic Loss; (c) Future Economic Loss (reduced to present value). [6] This question remained blank. Based on its answer of Yes that Isabel Brower is a statutory beneficiary of her son Alfred, the jury answered the categories in Question 5 of the Special Verdict Form, with the following results: (a) Past Non-Economic Loss to Alfred Brower (pre-death pain and suffering of Alfred Brower): $400,000 (b) Past Non-Economic Loss to Isabel Brower (including loss of consortium, affection, and companionship and pain and suffering): $250,000 (c) Past Economic Loss of Isabel Brower (loss of support and assistance and loss of past earnings of Alfred Brower): $62,250 (d) Future Non-Economic Loss of Isabel Brower (loss of consortium, affection and companionship, pain and suffering): $200,000 (e) Future Economic Loss of Isabel Brower (loss of support and assistance and loss of future earnings of Alfred Brower) (reduced to present value): $844,115. TOTAL: $1,756,365 [7] This amount was approximately $1 million less than the request of plaintiffs counsel during closing argument, with the major reductions occurring in subsections (d) and (e). [8] As a result of post-trial briefing, the parties agreed that Alaska Statutes 09.17.010(a) required that a cap of $8,000 times 54.54 years (the life expectancy of Alfred Brower) apply to all non-economic damages. The calculation is $436,560. [9] Therefore the original total of non-economic damages is reduced to $436,560 for a new total of $1,280,675. Including the attorney fees and costs and prejudgment interest, the Final Judgment was $1,564,071.70, plus post judgment interest at 9.25%. [10] Discussion. A new trial can be granted at the trial court's discretion if required in the interests of justice. [11] Alaska Civil Rule 59(a) is modeled on the corresponding Federal Civil Rule 59(a) which was intended to prevent the retrial of any issue already properly decided, and to limit any new trial to those issues which are incorrectly decided or not decided at all. [12] Another tool provided to the trial court is remittitur, for situations in which the trial was basically fair but the verdict is excessive. If the judge, using independent judgment as to the weight of the evidence, finds the verdict excessive, a lower amount can be entered. To preserve as much as possible the conclusion reached by the jury, the standard to be utilized by the judge is the `maximum possible recovery' a reasonable jury could have awarded. [13] This decision is in the discretion of the trial court. [14] The Borough is not arguing that the trial was generally unfair; instead, the motion contends the trial became unfair when the Court enforced its pretrial ruling concerning the potential damage claims that can be recovered by Isabel Brower as a statutory beneficiary. New Trial. The Borough first contends that the trial was unfair because a recovery was allowed to both the estate and to Ms. Brower as a statutory beneficiary, since Ms. Brower was allowed to recover the probable accumulations of her son. This argument was made by the Borough pretrial and rejected by the Court. [15] The Court's June 27, 2007 Order discussed the case of Kulawik v. ERA Jet Alaska [16] at length. For reasons set forth in the Order, the Court holds that the Kulawik case represents an acknowledgment by the Alaska Supreme Court of a policy judgment by the Alaska Legislature that when at least one statutory beneficiary is found to exist, the beneficiary must be able to recover all pecuniary damages to an estate. Regardless of the extent of the recovery, it is based on the rights of the beneficiary, not the rights of the estate. The Borough now contends that the later case of Gillispie v. Beta Construction Co. limits the holding in Kulawik because the Supreme Court held that the parents in that case could only recover the pecuniary loss to the estate of their children as personal representatives, unless they filed a separate cause of action pursuant to Alaska Statutes 09.55.580(a) for their own pain and suffering. [17] But the parents in Gillispie were not statutory beneficiaries of their children. The case has little relevance to Ms. Brower's case or to Kulawik. Moreover, the Gillispie court reaffirmed Kulawik for situations when the plaintiff is a statutory beneficiary by noting that Kulawik had held that damages may also be measured by the additional loss suffered by the decedent's estate which the statutory beneficiaries did not stand to inherit because of the provisions of the decedent's will. [18] If Ms. Brower had not been found to be statutory beneficiary of her son, she would still have been his sole heir under the intestate succession law since he had no wife or children. [19] She would have inherited all of the pecuniary loss of his estate which is the net accumulations over Alfred Brower's lifetime. [20] But this recovery is limited to the estate's pecuniary loss and would be subject to the claims of the creditors of the estate. The jury's decision that she was a statutory beneficiary of her son drastically changed this situation. First, the recovery is personal to her and is not an estate asset subject to creditors' claims. She was allowed to recover her prospective inheritance from her son, [21] as well as the additional amount of Alfred Brower's probable accumulations over his lifetime as allowed by the Supreme Court in the Kulawik case: [r]eview of our wrongful death statute convinces us that the legislature intended that statutory beneficiaries recover all of the deceased's probable accumulations. [22] As discussed in this Court's Order, state law also allows Isabel Brower to recover: (2) loss of contributions for support; (3) loss of assistance or services irrespective of age or relationship of decedent to the beneficiary or beneficiaries; (4) loss of consortium; (5) loss of prospective training and education; (6) medical and funeral expenses. [23] The jury was entitled to factor in Ms. Brower's age and statistical span of life in evaluating these additional categories of damages. [24] These same considerations answer the Borough's argument that any recovery must be measured by the lifetime of Isabel Brower, not of her son Alfred Brower. As stated in Kulawik, the statutory beneficiary can recover all of the probable accumulations of the deceased. [25] The Borough highlights the fact that there is a windfall to Isabel Brower of the difference between the recovery of the probable accumulations of her son during her life expectancy compared to the actual recovery which included the probable accumulations over the lifespan of her son. But if the recovery were limited to her lifespan, then the Borough (as tortfeasor) would have the windfall of only paying for the probable accumulations of Alfred Brower over a period less than his statistical lifespan because the statutory beneficiary happened to be his mother rather than someone his age or younger. Although other policy decisions could have been made, the Legislature has made a reasonable decision that the windfall should go to the beneficiary instead of the tortfeasor. The earlier decision of this Court, the Court's instructions at trial and the Special Verdict Form implement this legislative judgment. If the Borough has an issue with the Legislature's policy decision expressed in the wrongful death statute as interpreted by the Alaska Supreme Court, the Borough must seek a legislative solution. Remittitur. The Borough contends that there should be a remittitur to reduce the jury's award of $844,115 for Future Economic Loss of Isabel Brower (loss of support and assistance and loss of future earnings of Alfred Brower) (reduced to present value). The Borough points out that the plaintiffs economic expert identified a total of $701,995 for future subsistence support and for future household support from Alfred Brower and suggests that the award should be reduced to that amount. (The Borough apparently overlooked the fact that the expert later identified the present value of this category of damages as $565,400. By the Borough's logic, this portion of the judgment would have to be reduced to this present value amount [26] ). For reasons already discussed, this portion of the Special Verdict also required the jury to calculate the loss of future earnings of Alfred Brower. The expert assigned a total value of $1,607,300 for these future earnings, with a present value of $877,700. The total present value for future household support, future subsistence support and future earnings proposed by the expert was $1,443,100. The jury did not agree with these figures and reduced this proposed award to $844,115. As stated by the Supreme Court in City of Bethel v. Peters, a jury provides the insight of a reasonable person in evaluating damage claims. [27] The amount selected by the jury for this category of damages was about $600,000 less than evidence presented in the case could have allowed and is well within the jury's discretion. As noted above, the total verdict was about $1 million less than what the plaintiffs expert and plaintiffs counsel presented to them. The Borough's argument that the verdict is somehow inflated is without merit. Conclusion. The Borough contends that the recovery in this case violates the rule that there must be a choice in a wrongful death case between a recovery by an estate and recovery by a statutory beneficiary and that the verdict was excessive. But the estate did not recover anything in this case. Instead, since the jury found that Isabel Brower was a statutory beneficiary, she recovered as her personal recovery as a statutory beneficiary all the probable accumulations of Alfred Brower over his span of life plus the additional recovery appropriate for a statutory beneficiary. The verdict is well within a reasonable jury's discretion. Since the Borough has failed in its burden of showing a legal error in the pretrial ruling and the jury's verdict, neither a new trial or a remittitur is appropriate in this case. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the North Slope Borough's Motion for New Trial or Remittitur is DENIED. Effective Date: November 29, 2007 ENTERED AT Barrow, Alaska, this 29 day of November 2007. /s/ Michael I. Jeffery Superior Court Judge