Opinion ID: 2976663
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Vushaj’s Claim for Asylum

Text: An asylum applicant bears the burden of establishing that he or she is a “refugee” who is eligible for asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). A refugee is an alien who is unable or unwilling to return to his country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Id. § 5 1101(a)(42)(A)). “A well-founded fear of persecution does not require the applicant to show that he probably will be persecuted if he is deported; ‘one can certainly have a well-founded fear of an event happening when there is less than a 50% chance of the occurrence taking place.’” Perkovic v. INS, 33 F.3d 615, 621 (6th Cir.1994) (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987)). A showing of past persecution creates a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). The government may rebut this presumption by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that there is “a fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution in the applicant’s country of nationality.” Id. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A). As noted above, the sole issue before the Immigration Judge and the Board with respect to Vushaj’s claim for asylum was whether the government rebutted the presumption that Vushaj had a “well-founded fear of [future] persecution.” The Immigration Judge and the Board concluded that it did. Vushaj challenges this finding on due process grounds and as not supported by substantial evidence.
Vushaj’s first due process argument is that both the Immigration Judge and the Board applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating her asylum claim. Specifically, she contends that each failed to decide whether there had been a “fundamental change in circumstances,” id. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A) (emphasis added), so as to rebut the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. Rather, she argues, each applied a less stringent test. In the Immigration Judge’s opinion, she points to the following sentence as evidence that the wrong legal standard was applied: “The [Department of Homeland Security] argues, however, that there has been a 6 substantial change in country conditions and circumstances that adequately rebuts the regulatory presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution . . . .” JA 35 (emphasis added). And in the Board’s decision, she points to its statement that: “significant changes have occurred in that country that have rebutted the presumption that she has a well-founded fear of future persecution.” JA 5 (emphasis added). Vushaj’s argument is not persuasive. First, the Immigration Judge uses the term “substantial” merely to describe the government’s position, not to set forth the applicable legal standard. Moreover, although significant and substantial are not synonyms for fundamental, fundamental changes can certainly also be significant or substantial. Finally, there is nothing in either the Immigration Judge’s opinion or the Board’s order to suggest that the failure to use the word “fundamental” was based on a misunderstanding of the standard that applied. Vushaj’s second due process argument is that the Board did not give the Immigration Judge’s order the meaningful review which due process requires. She argues that the Board’s two-paragraph decision, consisting of only a brief procedural history, a statement that it affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision with a citation to its own decision in In re Burbano, 20 I & N Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994), and one substantive statement agreeing with the Immigration Judge’s finding that the changes in Albania rebutted the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution, was inadequate to satisfy due process. This argument is foreclosed by controlling precedent. See Gishta v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 972, 980 (6th Cir. 2005). In Gishta, as in the present case, the Board did not invoke its authority to affirm without opinion, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4), but rather exercised its authority to “issue a brief order affirming, modifying, or remanding the decision under review,” see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(5). The Board’s decision in 7 Gishta, like its decision in the present case, included a citation to In re Burbano and a brief statement addressing only one aspect of the Immigration Judge’s decision. In considering whether the Board thereby violated the petitioners’ due process rights, the Sixth Circuit held: The board’s independent review of the case is demonstrated by its citation of In re Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (BIA 1994), which states that a brief decision affirming the immigration judge’s decision does not mean that the board did not exercise its independent review authority over the case, but rather the board adopts or affirms the immigration judge’s decision when it is “in agreement with the reasoning and result of that decision.” Id. at 874. [Moreover,] the board’s specific finding that the Gishtas’ inadequate interpretation argument failed for lack of prejudice and provided no basis for reversing the immigration judge’s decision also demonstrates that the board independently reviewed the case. Gishta, 404 F.3d at 980. Accordingly, Vushaj’s second due process argument fails.
Vushaj also argues that the decision to deny her asylum – based on the finding that there had been a “fundamental change in circumstances such that [she] no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution,” 8 C.F.R. 208.13(b)(i)(A) – was not based on substantial evidence. She faults the Immigration Judge for relying too heavily on the 2003 Country Report and the 2001 and 2004 Profiles, for admitting the 2001 letter into evidence, and for not fully crediting the hearing testimony, particularly the testimony of the expert witness. However, given the record before us, we cannot say that it compels a contrary conclusion. Vushaj’s claim of political persecution is based on her and her family’s affiliation with and activities on behalf of the Democratic Party of Albania. However, the situation in Albania today, as evidenced by the 2003 Country Report, the 2001 and 2004 Profiles, and, even to some extent, the testimony at the hearing, is much different (and greatly improved) from when Vushaj left in 1992. Although violence and organized crime remain problems, affiliation with the 8 Democratic Party no longer leads to persecution. Notably, in 2002, “the Democratic Party resumed its participation in the Parliament,” and “the municipal elections in October 2003 were considered the most transparent in Albania’s short democratic history, with no police interference.” Shkulaku-Purballori v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 499, 503 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing 2004 Profile). Although this court has acknowledged that reports issued by the United States Department of State “may be problematic sources on which to rely,” Mullai v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 635, 639 (6th Cir. 2004), such reports are nonetheless “generally the best source of information on conditions in foreign nations,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Based on these reports, and the lack of any truly contradictory testimony, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the finding that there has been a “fundamental change in circumstances” such that Vushaj does not have a well-founded fear of persecution based on affiliation with the Democratic Party. See also Ramaj v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 520, 531 (6th Cir. 2006); Macotaj v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 464, 465 (6th Cir. 2005); Liti v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 631, 640 (6th Cir. 2005). Inasmuch as the denial of asylum is supported by substantial evidence without considering the 2001 letter, any error on the admissibility of the letter is harmless.