Opinion ID: 198362
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Allen Franklin's Testimony Regarding Geneva Franklin's Tape-recorded Statements

Text: 11 Gaines assigns error to testimony that concerned the CI's controlled purchase of crack cocaine from Allen Franklin on May 21, 1996. On that day, the CI arrived at 21 Lambert Avenue and spoke with Geneva Franklin until Allen Franklin arrived with crack cocaine. The conversation was tape recorded by the CI. The transcript of that tape recording, which the parties stipulated could be used as an exhibit to clarify the tape recording itself, reads in pertinent part: 12 G. Franklin: Who is it? 13 CI: Bugs, Mama. 14 G. Franklin: Hey, Bugs. 15 CI: Hey, girl. 16 G. Franklin: Nobody's here, but they told me what to tell you when you come. 17 CI: Okay. 18 G. Franklin: I gotta go, uh, call the house. 19 ... 20 CI: How you doing? 21 G. Franklin: I called the house. 22 CI: Uh huh. 23 G. Franklin: And uh Lisa said Chico and Frankie and Dawn had gone to meet the guy to get the stuff. 24 ... 25 G. Franklin: I don't know what's happening Bugs. Half the customers stopped coming here. I don't know why cause-- 26 CI: Maybe the quality of, the quality of the stuff he's been havin' lately ain't all, ain't, ain't up to, to par, not what Chico usually has. 27 G. Franklin: Ain't what he usually has. 28 CI: No. 29 G. Franklin: 'Cause he usually has the best. 30 CI: Yep. 31 G. Franklin: But now, uh, uh, uh, he can't get the best stuff 'cause he ain't got that money the man want (unintelligible) get something else fast to get that man with the good stuff the money, you know. 32 CI: Uh huh. That's right. 33 ... 34 G. Franklin: Yeah. The man called, Mr. Corwin Gaines, the other day. We'll definitely get you stuff, 'cause this might be good. 35 CI: Wow.G. Franklin: (unintelligible) But the man don't get nothing but the good stuff. 36 After this excerpt was played for the jury, the prosecutor had the following exchange with Allen Franklin: 37 Q: Did you recognize the voices on the excerpted tape? 38 A: Yes, I do. 39 Q: Who is speaking? 40 A: My mother, Geneva Franklin, and Bugsy. 41 Q: When Geneva Franklin mentions Mr. Corwin Gaines, what is she referring to? 42 Defense: Objection. 43 The Court: Overruled. 44 A: She's referring to me going to his house to go pick up the crack. 45 Q: And what is she referring to when she says the man wants the money? 46 A: She was --- what she was referring to by that was I already owed him some money so I had to go over there and pay him that money. 47 Q: And who was that? 48 A: Corwin. 49 Gaines contends that the district court committed reversible error in permitting Allen Franklin to express his opinion on what Geneva Franklin was referring to when mentioning Mr. Corwin Gaines and saying the man wants money. Being a lay witness, not an expert, Allen Franklin could give his opinion only if it was rationally based on his perception and was helpful either to an understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. Fed.R.Evid. 701; United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 780 (1st Cir.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1105, 116 S.Ct. 1322, 134 L.Ed.2d 474 (1996). 1 A strong case can be made that Allen Franklin's challenged testimony was rationally based on his perception: he recognized his grandmother Geneva's taped voice; she stated in the tape that he (Chico) had gone with Frankie and Dawn to meet the guy to get the stuff. From this and other parts of his own and the taped testimony, it was clear he was taking part at the time of the taped conversation in the events Geneva was describing. Extensive other evidence further indicated that Geneva and Allen Franklin were co-conspirators who worked closely together. The judge could conclude, therefore, that Allen was uniquely able, on the basis of his first-hand perception, to explain the particular references that day by Geneva, both of which, in fact, related to him. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 994 F.2d 1499, 1505-06 (10th Cir.1993); United States v. Simas, 937 F.2d 459, 464-65 (9th Cir.1991). Federal courts have often allowed lay witnesses with similar inside knowledge to give their opinions as to the meanings of code words used by fellow conspirators in taped conversations. See, e.g., United States v. Elder, 90 F.3d 1110, 1134 (6th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S.Ct. 993, 136 L.Ed.2d 873 (1997); United States v. Flores, 63 F.3d 1342, 1359 (5th Cir.1995); United States v. Saulter, 60 F.3d 270, 276 (7th Cir.1995); United States v. DePeri, 778 F.2d 963, 977 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1110, 106 S.Ct. 1518, 89 L.Ed.2d 916 (1986). 50 Gaines seeks to distinguish the code word case law by arguing that, in asking Allen Franklin what Geneva was referring to when she mentioned Corwin Gaines and said the man wants money, the prosecutor went beyond seeking the witness's explanation of a co-conspirator's use of certain words. We are not so sure. See Garcia, 994 F.2d at 1505-06; Simas, 937 F.2d at 464-65. As noted, Allen Franklin was intimately familiar with, and had himself taken part in, the relevant events. He had also associated closely with his grandmother in the conspiracy as well as in the matters she was discussing. While we do not say the court was required to have allowed the prosecutor's question in the form put, it is hard to say the district court committed a manifest abuse of discretion in allowing the question, given the evidence of Allen Franklin's first-hand familiarity with the surrounding events and conduct. See Alexis v. McDonald's Restaurants of Massachusetts, Inc., 67 F.3d 341, 347 (1st Cir.1995) (admissibility of lay opinion testimony subject to review for manifest abuse of discretion). 51 Even, moreover, if the court were found to have abused its discretion in allowing the question, there would be no reason to reverse. It is doubtful, to begin with, whether Gaines's unexplained objection preserved the issue he now argues. See Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(1). Clearly, it is not obvious how and whether Federal Rule of Evidence 701 should be applied in this context. It is hard to say, therefore, that the specific ground for objection was apparent from the context, obviating any need to state the specific ground for objection. If so, our review is solely for plain error, and Gaines clearly loses out. 52 But beyond that--even if we were to rule that lodging an unexplained objection sufficed to preserve the point and that the district court had erred in admitting the testimony--the error would be harmless. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a). Harmless error analysis focuses on whether the error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict, O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436, 115 S.Ct. 992, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995); compare Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993); Harry T. Edwards, To Err is Human, But Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated, 70 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1167 (1995). 53 In contending that the jury's verdict was seriously affected, Gaines makes much of the fact that the prosecutor stated during closing argument that If [Gaines was] not involved in any way, why would his name be mentioned? Why would Allen Franklin's grandmother name him as the supplier? According to Gaines, this statement demonstrates the importance placed on the improperly admitted testimony, both by the prosecutor and, by inference, the jury. However, even without Allen Franklin's explanation, Geneva Franklin's statements on their face implied that Gaines was the supplier and that Allen owed him money. She explicitly explained Chico's (Allen Franklin's) inability to get the best stuff as resulting from a lack of that money the man want. She then said, [t]he man called, Mr. Corwin Gaines, the other day. Being the man, Gaines would be the supplier. Hence, even without Allen Franklin's gloss, the prosecutor could permissibly have argued directly from her statements, and the jury could have believed, that Geneva had named Gaines as the supplier. 2 Moreover, the prosecutor emphasized to the jury that Geneva Franklin's words were but one piece of the puzzle to be considered along with, inter alia, the tape-recorded statements of co-conspirators Frank Turner and Larry Eason (who also made mention of Gaines); the testimony of Allen Franklin, Dana Franklin, and Amy Hatch (each of whom named Gaines as the supplier); the testimony of the surveillance officers concerning Allen Franklin's visits to Gaines; and the stash of drugs uncovered in Gaines's apartment. 54 In the circumstances, Allen Franklin's permitted explanation of Geneva Franklin's references in her taped remarks was hardly of great moment. Given Allen Franklin's strongly corroborated testimony of his visits to Gaines to procure crack cocaine and of the fact that he was indebted to Gaines, his opinion that Geneva was referring to Gaines and to Allen's indebtedness to Gaines added little overall to the weight of the evidence before the jury.