Opinion ID: 797762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Ex Post Facto Clause and Retroactivity Doctrine

Text: 47 Finally, Serrato argues that BOP's cancellation of boot camp violated the Ex Post Facto Clause and was impermissibly retroactive. Article I, § 9, cl. 3, of the Constitution provides: No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed. The Supreme Court has stated: To fall within the ex post facto prohibition, a law must be retrospective — that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment — and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it, by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime. Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441, 117 S.Ct. 891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997) (citations omitted) (holding that state statute cancelling early release credits, and resulting in the rearrest and reincarceration of a former prisoner, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause). The Lynce opinion relied on Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981), which held that when a Florida statute reducing the amount of good credit time available to a prisoner was applied to a prisoner whose crime occurred before the statute's enactment, the Ex Post Facto Clause was violated: 48 As we recognized in Weaver, retroactive alteration of parole or early release provisions, like the retroactive application of provisions that govern initial sentencing, implicates the Ex Post Facto Clause because such credits are one determinant of petitioner's prison term ... and ... [the petitioner's] effective sentence is altered once this determinant is changed. 49 Lynce, 519 U.S. at 445-46, 117 S.Ct. 891 (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 32, 101 S.Ct. 960). 50 Assuming that BOP regulations terminating boot camp constitute a law, that law does not result in an Ex Post Facto Clause violation. Lynce and Weaver do not control this case. In those cases, prisoners with vested good time credits had those vested benefits revoked by statute. Here, by contrast, Serrato had only a recommendation by a judge that her eligibility for a discretionary program be evaluated. Serrato had not earned any early release privileges when informed that the program she wanted to attend had been terminated; thus, this case is unlike Lynce and Weaver. BOP regulations terminating boot camp did not alter the definition of criminal conduct or increase Serrato's punishment for the crime within the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 8 51 Quoting this court, Serrato argues that BOP's termination of boot camp was impermissibly retroactive agency action. 52 [T]his is not a game of Lucy and the football from the world of Charles Schulz. Rather, it is a serious administrative agency program to be administered in a consistent, coherent matter. An agency cannot provide participants with a determination of eligibility based on the purported examination of objective criteria, then subsequently deny them eligibility by exercise of whim. If we expect inmates to observe the rule of law, we must adhere to it ourselves. 53 Bowen v. Hood, 202 F.3d 1211, 1222 (9th Cir.2000). As this language shows, however, in Bowen — and in Cort, discussed supra Part I — BOP attempted to revoke prior determinations of eligibility for early release. Unlike the inmates in Bowen and Cort, Serrato was never officially notified of eligibility for boot camp. There is thus no basis for concluding that BOP has flouted the rule of law within the meaning of Bowen. Regional Director Haro informed Judge Brown that Serrato will be reviewed for [boot camp] when she is 24 months from her release. Judge Brown reduced Serrato's sentence to 30 months so that she could instead be placed directly into boot camp, but this does not change the fact — determinative to our retroactivity analysis — that BOP did not inform Serrato of her eligibility for boot camp. The boot camp program was terminated before any such determination was made by the competent authorities. Therefore, Serrato's retroactivity challenge fails.