Opinion ID: 4529727
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tina Jimerson

Text: We conclude that the factual predicate for Jimerson’s Brady claim, Youngblood claim, and actual innocence claim developed at different times. Jimerson discovered the vital facts of her actual innocence claim when Early confessed in December 2015 to being the sole perpetrator of the crime. Jimerson brought her actual innocence claim in an amended petition filed just over a month after Early signed an affidavit confessing to the crimes. To the extent that a freestanding actual innocence claim may be recognized in a habeas proceeding,8 Jimerson filed her actual innocence claim within one year of the date the factual predicate was discovered, so the claim, if cognizable, would be timely under § 2244(d)(1)(D). To establish a Brady violation, Jimerson must show that the prosecution suppressed evidence that was favorable to her and material to either guilt or punishment. Keys v. United States, 943 F.3d 1152, 1154 (8th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Evidence is material “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (quoting United States v. Ladoucer, 573 F.3d 628, 636 (8th Cir. 2009)). Before Jimerson’s private investigator spoke with Sheriff Ford on January 7, 2014, Jimerson had no way of knowing that law enforcement recruited the assistance of another prisoner to act as an informant in jail, that law enforcement provided the means to record conversations with Vaughn, and that the informant’s 8 McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 392 (2013) (affirming actual innocence exception may be invoked to overcome the AEDPA statute of limitations, but declining to decide whether it should be recognized as a freestanding claim). -11- cooperation would result in the complete dismissal of the informant’s pending charge. Jimerson’s counsel served broad discovery requests on the prosecutor regarding informants and anyone else who had been offered leniency, sentence or charge concessions, or other inducement. In response, the prosecutor disclosed Taura Bryant (“Sam”). He did not disclose the existence of Prescott, a prisoner-turned-informant who actually had his pending charges dismissed in exchange for his assistance in the investigation of Holmes’ murder. The prosecutor’s file did not contain the tape recording made by Prescott or any information indicating law enforcement had used Prescott to obtain information from Vaughn about Holmes’ murder. As found by the magistrate judge in Jimerson’s case: “There is no question that the prosecutor’s responses to trial counsel’s discovery requests in this case were misleading at best, and arguably untruthful.” After the meeting on January 7, 2014, Stimis and Jimerson’s counsel pieced together more information about the undisclosed informant, including his identity, over the next several months. On June 24, 2014, Jimerson’s counsel talked directly with Prescott on the telephone. Prescott confirmed that he was the informant who spoke with Vaughn and reinforced that he had made a recording of his conversations with Vaughn. Since the identity of the informant was still unknown to Jimerson in January 2014, Jimerson had not yet obtained vital facts surrounding her Brady claim. It is indisputable, however, that once Jimerson’s counsel identified the informant by name and talked directly with him, Jimerson had discovered the factual predicate for her Brady claim. See Martin v. Fayram, 849 F.3d 691, 697 (8th Cir. 2017) (explaining the fact that a petitioner may have wanted to develop additional evidence does not mean she was not actually aware of the vital facts to present her claim). Jimerson has not shown anything that would have prevented her from filing a petition alleging a -12- Brady violation after she spoke with Prescott, and amending it later if additional information became available. The limitations period for Jimerson’s Brady claim started to run on June 24, 2014. She filed her petition on June 30, 2015, after the one-year limitations period had expired. Counsel’s negligence in failing to file a timely petition is not an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling. Rues v. Denney, 643 F.3d 618, 622 (8th Cir. 2011) (refusing to apply equitable tolling when attorney missed the deadline for filing habeas petition under § 2254 by fourteen days). Jimerson’s Brady claim is time-barred. The timeliness of Jimerson’s Youngblood claim presents a much closer question. Under Youngblood, the prosecutor has a duty to preserve potentially useful evidence for trial. Ferguson v. Roper, 400 F.3d 635, 638 (8th Cir. 2005). Youngblood applies to the bad faith loss or destruction of evidence before trial. Id. At the meeting on January 7, 2014, Jimerson’s investigator learned that a recording was made of Prescott’s conversations with Vaughn, but it likely no longer existed. Jimerson had no evidence to support a claim that the loss or destruction of this evidence was in bad faith. A failure to preserve evidence resulting from mere negligence does not give rise to a Youngblood violation. United States v. Houston, 548 F.3d 1151, 1155 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Iron Eyes, 367 F.3d 781, 786–87 (8th Cir. 2004)). In February 2014, when the ASP responded to Jimerson’s request for the file, there was a note that a handwritten statement was taken from Prescott, but the statement was not turned over to Jimerson. It was not until January 7, 2015, when Jimerson’s counsel met with ASP Captain Steven Coppinger, that Jimerson was able to gain access and review Prescott’s statement. The handwritten statement contained -13- Prescott’s signature, former Chief of Fordyce Police Ronnie Poole’s signature, and ASP Lieutenant Jerry Bradshaw’s signature. It indicated that Vaughn initiated conversations with Prescott and Vaughn eventually confessed. It does not mention that the Sheriff had incentivized Prescott to elicit a confession. Although it was known by law enforcement and the prosecution that Prescott had recorded conversations with Vaughn, the statement made no mention of this fact. Jimerson’s original trial counsel confirmed on April 26, 2015, that the evidence was not made available before trial and was suppressed by the prosecution. Bad faith can be shown by proof of an official animus or a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence. United States v. Bell, 819 F.3d 310, 318 (7th Cir. 2016) (quotations and citations omitted); United States v. Collins, 799 F.3d 554, 569 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Jobson, 102 F.3d 214, 218 (6th Cir. 1996)). Without the recording, we cannot ascertain its significance. We do not know what Prescott said to Vaughn to elicit the confession. We do not know if Prescott suggested details to Vaughn. We do not know if the recorded confession was consistent with the in-court confession. We do not know if Vaughn reluctantly and nervously confessed and implicated others, or if he willingly and confidently confessed and implicated others. It could be that the recording was merely cumulative and corroborative of Vaughn’s in-court statements. It could be that the recording demonstrated Vaughn was coerced or influenced to implicate others out of fear that he would be put to death if convicted. What we can conclude on this record is the failure to make any mention of the fact that Prescott recorded conversations with Vaughn in a handwritten statement prepared by one of the law enforcement officers for Prescott’s signature combined with the failure to disclose the recording is evidence of a conscious effort to suppress evidence. The deliberate omission is indicative of bad faith. Because of the successful efforts of law enforcement and the prosecutor to conceal and destroy the recording, Jimerson lacked any evidence of bad faith, or in other words a good faith basis to pursue a Youngblood claim, until her -14- counsel was given access to Prescott’s handwritten statement. The factual predicate for her Youngblood claim was developed on January 7, 2015, at the earliest. She asserted her Youngblood claim within the one-year limitations period. We conclude that Jimerson’s Youngblood and actual innocence claims are timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), but her Brady claim is not.