Opinion ID: 2594728
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: instructions on a lesser included offense

Text: ¶ 11 Whether a trial court committed error in refusing to give a requested jury instruction is a question of law, which we review for correctness. See State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992). ¶ 12 When a lesser included instruction is requested by the defendant, the trial court must apply an evidence-based standard to decide whether the instruction is appropriate. See State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, 869 (Utah 1998) (citing State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 157 (Utah 1983)). This standard, clearly outlined by this court in Baker, provides a two-pronged analysis that mirrors the statutory framework set out in section 76-1-402. First, the court must determine whether the claimed lesser offense is an offense included in the charged offense. See State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 529 (Utah 1983); Baker, 671 P.2d at 158-59. An offense is included when it falls within one of the definitions of section 76-1-402(3), as interpreted by our case law. [2] See Crick, 675 P.2d at 529; Baker, 671 P.2d at 158. Section 76-1-402(3) states that a lesser offense is included when: (a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or (b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or (c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. ¶ 13 After determining that the offense is included under section 76-1-402(3), the court must decide whether there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. § 76-1-402(4); see also State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1350 (Utah 1997); State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986); Crick, 675 P.2d at 530-31 (holding that it is not enough to find that the evidence would support a conviction of the lesser offense, but that the evidence must provide a rational basis for both acquitting of the charged offense and convicting of the lesser included offense); Baker, 671 P.2d at 159. ¶ 14 In determining whether there is a rational basis in the evidence to support both acquittal of the greater and conviction of the lesser offense, a trial judge, though he or she cannot weigh the credibility of the evidence, must nevertheless decide whether there is a sufficient quantum of evidence to send this issue to the jury. Baker, 671 P.2d at 159. To make this determination, the trial court must view the evidence and the inferences that can be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the defense. Crick, 675 P.2d at 532 (citing State v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372, 376, 463 P.2d 811, 814 (1970)). ¶ 15 In sum, when a defendant requests a jury instruction on a lesser included offense, the evidence-based standard requires that the instruction be given when the trial court determines that (1) the lesser offense is included in the offense charged, and (2) there is evidence to justify acquittal of the greater offense and conviction of the lesser offense. ¶ 16 Though we have determined that manslaughter can be a lesser included offense of depraved indifference murder, see generally Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, we need not determine now whether manslaughter is a lesser included offense of felony murder under the first prong of Baker. Even were we to assume that it is, defendant's request for a manslaughter instruction fails under the second prong of the test. ¶ 17 Viewing the facts and reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to defendant, we conclude that Kruger did not adduce, as is required under the second prong of Baker, a sufficient quantum of evidence to create a jury question as to whether the shooting occurred while Kruger was in the act of doing something other than committing a robbery. The only evidence Kruger presented to support his argument that he was not attempting to rob Garcia was the testimony of his sister, Anne. She testified that Kruger told her he had shot somebody while attempting to commit robbery. Anne stated, however, that she did not believe Kruger's story because he often fantasized or exaggerated. Anne testified as follows: Mr. Scowcroft: You told the police that when you talked to Justin about this event, the shooting, you didn't believe Justin was telling you the truth. Anne: That's right. Mr. Scowcroft: And you told the police that Justin has a way of fantasizing? Anne: Fantasizing isn't the right word. It's his way of getting attention. Mr. Scowcroft: You used the word fantasizing, didn't you? Anne: I don't remember. Mr. Scowcroft: Okay. Let me try to refresh your memory in that regard. Let me direct your attention to page 8 lines 17 and 19 . . . . Let me just have you read that to yourself . . . . Have you had an opportunity to read that, Ms. Kruger? Anne: Um-hum. Mr. Scowcroft: Didn't you tell the police that Justin has a way of fantasizing about things? Anne: I did. Mr. Scowcroft: You did say that? Anne: Uh-huh. Mr. Scowcroft: Do you think there is some truth to that? Anne: Yeah. ¶ 18 Kruger argues that Anne's testimony regarding his tendency to exaggerate and make up stories refute[s] all evidence concerning aggravated robbery or attempted aggravated robbery and thus lays a basis for acquitting Kruger of felony murder. ¶ 19 We disagree. Anne's testimony about Kruger's habit of exaggerating does not constitute a sufficient quantum of evidence to provide a rational basis to acquit Kruger of attempting to rob Garcia and thus acquit him of felony murder. Given the totality of the evidence and facts of this case, no reasonable jury could disregard the testimony of four witnesses to whom Kruger confessed that he attempted to rob Garcia, just because Anne testified that Kruger often fantasized and exaggerated generally. Thus, there is not a rational basis in the evidence to acquit Kruger of felony murder.