Opinion ID: 1695545
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: lawyer discipline

Text: The determination to remove respondent judge from office has raised the question whether the disciplinary board of the state bar association may bring lawyer disciplinary charges against him as well. In order to serve as a judge, a person must first be admitted to the practice of law in this state. Yet, while he was a district judge, respondent was prohibited from practicing law. 1974 La. Const. art. 5, § 24. The question of the appropriate discipline for a judge who has been removed from office is not a new one. Previous constitutions have provided various discipline, including removal from judicial office, disqualification from holding public office, and disbarment. In the Constitutions of 1845, 1852, 1864, 1868 and 1879 there was not any provision disqualifying a judge from holding public office and from practicing law, in the event there was a judgment against him removing him from office. These additional penalties were imposed only in cases where the judge was impeached. There is provided in Articles 221 of the Constitutions of 1898 and 1913 a three-fold penalty, in cases of removal of a judge from office: (1) Removal from office; (2) disqualification from holding any office of honor, trust, or profit under the State; and (3) disbarment from the practice of law. In re Meraux, 202 La. 736, 12 So.2d 798, 801 (1943); see also In re Jones, 202 La. 729, 12 So.2d 795, 797 (1943). In the Constitution of 1921, the framers intentionally and deliberately made the sole penalty for official misconduct of a judge to be removal from office. Only in cases of impeachment were the further penalties of disbarment and disqualification from holding public office imposed. In re Meraux, supra . In In re Meraux and In re Jones, disbarment proceedings were brought against former district court judges for alleged misconduct and unethical acts. The grounds upon which their disbarments were sought were the same as those for which they had been removed from judicial office. The disbarment proceedings were dismissed by this court after finding that the sole constitutional penalty available was removal from office: There can be no doubt that the failure of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention to repeat in Section 5 of Article IX of the Constitution of 1921 the penalties of disqualification from holding office and disbarment from practicing law as contained in Articles 221 of the Constitutions of 1898 and 1913, where a judge was removed from office for official misconduct, was not an oversight but was deliberate and, therefore, clearly manifests the intention to make divestiture of or removal from office the sole penalty for official misconduct by a judge. In re Meraux, 12 So.2d at 801; see also In re Jones, 12 So.2d at 797. In dicta the court stated a constitutional amendment was necessary to amend the penalty provisions for removal from judicial office. In re Meraux, supra . In the 1974 Constitution, the framers made provision that lawyer discipline could be brought against a judge for misconduct. 1974 La. Const. art. 5, § 25(D) provides that [a]ction against a judge under this Section shall not preclude disciplinary action against him concerning his license to practice law. Constitutional authority has established separate agencies to administer the conduct of judges and lawyers. Pursuant to 1974 La. Const. art. 5, § 25, which created the judiciary commission and authorized the court to adopt rules pertinent thereto, the court adopted Rule 23, Rules of the Supreme Court, to provide the procedures for all complaints, investigations, hearings, and proceedings before the judiciary commission concerning judges. Pursuant to 1974 La. Const. art. 5, § 5 and its inherent power, the court adopted Rule 19, Rules of the Supreme Court, to provide rules for enforcement of lawyer discipline and established a statewide agency, the disciplinary board, to administer the lawyer discipline and disability system. Because judges are also lawyers, Rule 19, § 6, Rules of the Supreme Court, describes the jurisdiction of the disciplinary board over former judges and incumbent judges: B. Former Judges. A former judge who has resumed the status of a lawyer is subject to the jurisdiction of the board not only for conduct as a lawyer but also for misconduct that occurred while the lawyer was a judge and would have been grounds for lawyer discipline, provided that the misconduct was not the subject of a judicial disciplinary proceeding as to which there has been a final determination by the court. Misconduct by a judge that is not finally adjudicated before the judge leaves office falls within the jurisdiction of the lawyer disciplinary agency. C. Incumbent Judges. Full-time incumbent judges shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of the agency; however, if an incumbent judge is to be removed from office in the course of a judicial discipline or disability proceeding, the court shall first afford the board and the respondent an opportunity to submit a recommendation whether lawyer discipline should be imposed, and if so, the extent thereof. Once respondent is removed from office, he becomes a former judge under Rule 19, § 6(B). As such, he is subject to the jurisdiction of the disciplinary board, but the disciplinary board is precluded from bringing charges against him based on the same misconduct which was the subject of judicial disciplinary proceedings. Since respondent has not yet been removed from office, the first sentence does not apply here. As an incumbent judge, respondent was not subject to lawyer disciplinary proceedings under Rule 19, § 6(C). Yet because he is to be removed from office in the course of a judicial disciplinary proceeding, the court must afford the disciplinary board and respondent an opportunity to submit a recommendation whether lawyer discipline should be imposed and the extent of that discipline. The final sentence of Rule 19, § 6(B) and the provisions of Rule 19, § 6(C) appear to try to give effect to the constitutional mandate of 1974 La. Const. art. 5, § 25(D). If the disciplinary board acts before a final adjudication is made of a judge during the proceedings which remove him from his judicial office, then both the judiciary commission and the disciplinary board may bring proceedings against a judge as both a judge and a lawyer. As demonstrated in this case, however, the rules are unworkable within the constraints of the constitutional mandate. There are different procedural mechanisms for the judiciary commission and the disciplinary board for investigations, hearings, and actions. These procedural mechanisms provide due process to judges and lawyers who are the subject of disciplinary proceedings. As demonstrated in this case, it will not always be possible or advisable to have both judicial and lawyer disciplinary procedures completed prior to submission of a matter to this court. The record before the judiciary commission is complete and has been submitted to this court. Rule 23, § 12, Rules of the Supreme Court. Oral argument has been held. Rule 23, §§ 14, 15. This court is ready to issue its decision on judicial discipline. There has not been time to implement the procedures of the disciplinary board, yet to delay action on judicial discipline would be a dereliction of this court's duty to police the judiciary. The purpose of a judicial disciplinary proceeding is not simply to punish an individual judge but to purge the judiciary of any taint. In re Chaisson, 549 So.2d at 267. Thus, to the extent that Rule 19 §§ 6(B) and 6(C), Rules of the Supreme Court, conflict with 1974 La. Const. art. 5, § 25(D), which directs that [a]ction against a judge under this Section shall not preclude disciplinary action against him concerning his license to practice law, they must yield to the constitutional provision and must be disregarded. To give effect to the constitutional mandate of 1974 La. Const. art. 5, § 25(D), this court reserves to the disciplinary board the right to institute lawyer discipline proceedings against respondent if appropriate.