Opinion ID: 1312308
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Inadequate Sympathy and Mitigating Instructions

Text: (24) At the conclusion of the guilt phase, the jury was instructed pursuant to CALJIC No. 1.00, that it must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling. At the penalty phase, the jury was instructed under former CALJIC No. 8.84.1 that it could consider as a sentencing factor any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime. (Former § 190.3, factor (j).) Defendant argues that because the guilt phase instruction was given to the jury only five days before the penalty phase began, the jury was misled regarding the mitigating factors it could consider in determining whether death was the appropriate sentence. We recently rejected a similar argument in People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1209 [240 Cal. Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301], in which we found no prejudicial carryover effect from the guilt phase no-sympathy instruction. ( Id., at p. 1209.) We reached the same conclusion in People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 777 [239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250]. In Ghent, however, we also recognized that the United States Supreme Court, upon reviewing our decision in California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538, 546 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 943, 107 S.Ct. 837, 842], stressed the necessity of analyzing the record in each case to determine whether the jury instructions, taken as a whole, and read in conjunction with the prosecutor's arguments, adequately informed the jury of its responsibility to consider all of the mitigating evidence in the case. ( Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 777.) After undertaking such a review of the record, we conclude the jury would not have been misled regarding the scope of its sentencing discretion. The record discloses the prosecutor specifically informed the jury that it was to consider sympathy as well as defendant's background and character evidence in reaching its sentencing determination. The prosecutor told the jury that in considering the possibility of the correctness of mercy versus judgment or death, you must take into account the humanity of the individual himself and the nature of his conduct and his life as it has meaning to you.... [¶] Consider that he has now professed the finding of his savior; consider and ask yourselves whether that is too little and by far too late. [¶] Consider he had a bad childhood and apparently his father did not treat him well or kindly at all and taught him to steal. Consider that. [¶] Consider he came from poverty and extreme poverty.... Similarly, defense counsel specifically told the jury to conside compassion, sympathy, passion, [and] mercy. After viewing the record as a whole, we are satisfied that a reasonable juror would have understood that it was to consider defendant's childhood and background as well as feelings of mercy engendered by such testimony in determining penalty. We therefore find no error.