Opinion ID: 1466497
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Fox Trot first argues it is entitled to the writ because the Letcher Circuit Court acted outside its jurisdiction by staying the enforcement of its own judgment. The basis of this claim is that the stay affects enforcement proceedings against the 82-acre tract, which is in another county. This Court disagrees that this deprives the Letcher Circuit Court of jurisdiction over its own judgment. The power of the court to stay enforcement of the judgment in this case comes from CR 62.01. That rule provides: In its discretion and on such conditions for the security of the adverse party as are proper, the court may stay the execution of or any proceedings to enforce a judgment pending the disposition of a motion for relief from a judgment or order made pursuant to Rule 60. This is precisely what happened here. DLX requested relief from the judgment under Rule 60. Its motion specifically cites CR 60.03, which gives the court the power to relieve a person from a judgment. . . on appropriate equitable grounds. It can also be reasonably construed as a request for relief under CR 60.02(f), which gives the court the power to relieve a party . . . from its final judgment for any other reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief. The motion cites, and clearly requests, relief under CR 60. Under CR 62.01, then, it was within the court's discretion to stay enforcement until it could rule on the motion. The court had jurisdiction to do so. In fact, the only court with jurisdiction to stay enforcement of a judgment is the court which rendered that judgmentin this case, the Letcher Circuit Court. This has long been the rule in Kentucky. KRS 454.080 provides that: An injunction to stay proceedings on a judgment shall not be granted . . . in any other court than that in which the judgment was rendered. Nor shall such injunction be granted, unless the party applying therefor make affidavit that no injunction has been previously granted to stay the proceedings on such judgment. This statute was enacted in 1952, and it is a verbatim recodification of Section 285 of the Civil Code of Practice, which dates back to the nineteenth century. Kentucky courts have long recognized that this language means [t]he court in which the judgment was rendered alone had the jurisdiction to enjoin it. McConnell v. Raive, 8 Ky. L. Rptr. 343, 1 S.W. 582, 582 (1886) (citing Section 285 of the Civil Code of Practice; Neeters v. Clements, 75 Ky. (12 Bush) 359 (1876); Davis v. Davis, 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 274 (1874)). This rule ensures that comity prevails among the various trial courts of the state. Orderly procedure and proper respect for courts requires that attacks upon their judgment should be made in the court rendering the judgment, rather than in other courts indiscriminately. Indeed, it would be unseemly for courts in one county to seek to control execution on a judgment validly entered in another jurisdiction. 30 Am.Jur.2d Executions and Enforcement of Judgments § 328 (2005) (footnotes omitted). Thus, a judgment debtor must, if it has an adequate basis for doing so, request the court in the county in which the judgment was entered to stay execution. Id. This is what DLX did. Fox Trot argues that the Letcher Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to issue the stay because the court's order affected its attempts to enforce the judgment against the 82-acre tract, which happens to lie in Estill County. This argument fails, however, because this Court has consistently applied the same rule for cases involving enforcement actions against real estate in other counties. In summarizing previous cases interpreting the language now in KRS 454.080, the Court said: In Kelly v. Kelly, [63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 363 (1866)], it was held that, notwithstanding the note on which judgment was rendered was given for land. . . , nevertheless it could be enjoined by no other than the quarterly court in which the judgment was rendered. . . . In Neeter [Neeters] v. Clements, [75 Ky. (12 Bush) 359 (1876)], it was held that, even when. . . an execution had been issued by the clerk of the circuit court, on a judgment of the quarterly court, and levied on real estate, the circuit court had no jurisdiction to enjoin such execution, the power to do so being alone in the court that rendered the judgment; and it was so decided at the present term of this court in McConnell v. Raive, [8 Ky. L. Rptr. 343, 1 S.W. 582, 582 (1886)] . . . where the same question was presented. Chesapeake, Ohio & Sw. R.R. Co. v. Reasor, 84 Ky. 369, 1 S.W. 599, 600, 8 Ky. L. Rptr. 374 (1886). Thus, the Letcher Circuit Court had the jurisdiction to stay enforcement of its own judgment. The Letcher Circuit Court entered the original judgment; DLX filed a motion, in Letcher Circuit Court, to modify this judgment under Rule 60; the Letcher Circuit Court then ordered briefing and temporarily stayed enforcement of its judgment, under CR 62.01, until it could rule on the motion. This is precisely what KRS 454.080 and prior Kentucky cases allow. See, e.g., McConnell, 8 Ky. L. Rptr. 343, 1 S.W. at 582. There is no valid reason to depart from such clear precedent, and this Court declines to do so.