Opinion ID: 2380792
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: mootness in the civil actions

Text: Defendant [6] argues on appeal that this case is moot because the May 15 order has been fully executed, the Sweatts now have possession of the tourmalines, and the Law Court cannot order relief under such circumstances. He further asserts that in consequence of these events, the stay granted by this court on May 22, 1981, could only maintain the status quo, namely, possession of the tourmalines by the Sweatts. Although defendant has characterized his objection as a mootness question, his challenge is to the power of the Court to fashion a remedy. It is an established principle of equity that A person who has conferred a benefit upon another in compliance with a judgment, or whose property has been taken thereunder, is entitled to restitution if the judgment is reversed or set aside, unless restitution would be inequitable or the parties contract that payment is to be final; if the judgment is modified, there is a right to restitution of the excess. (emphasis added) Restatement of Restitution § 74 (1937). On the reversal of the judgment, the law raises an obligation in the party to the record, who has received the benefit of the erroneous judgment, to make restitution to the other party for what he has lost. Bank of the United States v. Bank of Washington, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 8, 17, 8 L.Ed. 299 (1832). The facts that the appeal had not been perfected and a stay had not been granted at the time the tourmalines were returned to the Sweatts do not render this appeal moot for lack of a remedy. In Haebler v. Myers, 132 N.Y. 363, 30 N.E. 963 (1892), the New York Court of Appeals was presented with a similar case. The plaintiff had obtained an attachment, which upon order of a state court was dissolved, and a sheriff returned the attached property to the defendant. The sheriff had acted while the court order was in full force. Although on appeal the court had before it a judgment on the merits in favor of plaintiff, it stated that [i]f the situation were the same as it was when the money [the attached property] was paid [i.e., returned to the defendants], repayment to the sheriff would be required, because he would be entitled to possession of the fund under the restored attachment. Id. at 369, 30 N.E. at 965. The court inferred a promise of restitution because the defendants, when they accepted return of the attached property, knew ... that it might ultimately be decided that they were not entitled to it. Id. See also Atlantic Coast Line RR v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301, 55 S.Ct. 713, 79 L.Ed. 1451 (1935); Silverman v. Lichtman, 296 So.2d 495 (Fla.App.1974); Badigan v. Badigan, 290 N.Y.S.2d 577, 30 A.D.2d 522 (1968). We conclude that this Court under its powers may order the tourmalines returned to the Deputy Sheriff of Cumberland County who attached the property, should equity demand that the attachment be reinstated.