Opinion ID: 165332
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the March 13 Order was a final decision

Text: 15 For a ruling to be final, it must end the litigation on the merits, and the judge must clearly declare his intention in this respect. FirsTier Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269, 273-74, 111 S.Ct. 648, 112 L.Ed.2d 743 (1991) (internal quotations and citations omitted). A final order is one that leave[s] nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. Albright, 59 F.3d at 1092 (internal quotations omitted). As a general rule, the touchstone of a final order is a decision by the court that a party shall recover only a sum certain.  Id. (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 58) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, an order that determines liability but leaves damages to be calculated is not final. Id. However, pursuant to an exception to the general rule, an order is final even if it does not reduce the damages to a sum certain if the order sufficiently disposes of the factual and legal issues and any unresolved issues are sufficiently ministerial that there would be no likelihood of further appeal. Id. at 1093 (quotations omitted). 16 For example, in Albright v. UNUM Life Insurance Co. of America, the plaintiff had requested in his motion for summary judgment the monthly benefit of 66 2/3% of his preinjury basic monthly earnings less other income benefits such as workers' compensation and Social Security Disability. Id. at 1092 (quotation omitted). The district court granted his motion but did not address the issue of benefits. Id. We stated that both determining the correct amount of monthly benefits and the proper deductions for other income benefits may prove to be complicated and disputed calculations and were not likely to be simply ministerial. Id. at 1093. Accordingly, we held that the district court's order was not final, and we dismissed the defendant's appeal. Id. at 1094. 17 In this case, the district court awarded Plaintiff back pay, front pay, liquidated damages, interest, costs, and attorney fees. Specifically, the district court set total back pay in the amount of $84,778.80, to be reduced by the amount [Plaintiff] has earned [since her termination] through other employment together with interest on the net amount at the legal rate. The district court set total front pay in the amount of $102,374.40, to be reduced by the amount of compensation [Plaintiff] would earn from Conoco [until her 65th birthday], calculated at her present rate of earnings per week plus any guaranteed raises or cost of living increases. 18 The district court then ordered the parties to meet and confer within[ ] 20 days from the date hereof to determine the precise amounts to be set forth in the judgment in accordance with the above stated findings and conclusions. The district further directed, If counsel can agree, they shall prepare a judgment in accordance herewith. If counsel are unable to agree, they shall notify the court within the following ten days and the matters not agreed upon will be set for hearing. 19 The various components of the damages award were not sufficiently fixed to satisfy the standard we set forth in Albright. The amount of Plaintiff's past and future earnings was not determined, and calculation of those amounts could have proven complicated and disputed. For example, nothing in the order indicates whether Plaintiff's weekly compensation at Conoco is fixed or varies, and nothing in the order defines a guaranteed raise or cost of living increase. As such, the process of calculating damages in this case was no more ministerial than it was in Albright itself. 20 Moreover, the district court must have contemplated the possibility of a contentious process because it provided in its order that if the parties could not agree on the amount of the award, the disputed issues would be set for hearing. By so providing, the district court did not clearly declar[e] his intention to end the litigation on the merits in the March 13 Order. FirsTier, 498 U.S. at 273-74, 111 S.Ct. 648. For these reasons, we hold that the court's March 13 decision was not a final decision. 21 B. Whether the March 13 Order became final when the district court disposed of the remainder of the case 22 In Lewis v. B.F. Goodrich Co., we held that an otherwise nonfinal decision becomes final and appealable if the district court adjudicates all remaining claims against all remaining parties before the appellate court acts to dismiss the appeal on the merits for lack of jurisdiction. 850 F.2d 641, 645 (10th Cir.1988) (en banc); see also Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Durango Air Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir.2002); Dodd Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 935 F.2d 1152, 1154 n. 1 (10th Cir.1991); Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Huff, 851 F.2d 316, 317-18 (10th Cir.1988) (en banc); Moore's Federal Practice, § 54.25[3], at 54-87 (If an order is not certified under Rule 54(b), but a notice of appeal is nevertheless filed, any subsequent order of the district court that completely adjudicates the remaining claims is sufficient to validate the otherwise premature notice of appeal.). Accordingly, a decision that is otherwise nonfinal because it leaves damages unresolved becomes final and appealable if post-appeal adjudications in the district court precisely fix damages and dispose of the case. Gen. Motors Corp. v. New A.C. Chevrolet, Inc., 263 F.3d 296, 311 n. 3 (3d Cir.2001). 23 Here, subsequent to the notice of appeal, the district court entered a judgment fixing damages. All claims against all parties are now resolved. The district court's nonfinal decision therefore became final as a result of the post-appeal proceedings in the district court. We hold that the notice of appeal filed in this case was effective to confer appellate jurisdiction over the district court's March 13 Order. See Lewis, 850 F.2d at 645; Gen. Motors Corp., 263 F.3d at 311 n. 3.