Opinion ID: 874247
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The agreement was sufficiently definite to allow enforcement.

Text: We are unable to agree with Griffith's and Porter's assertion that the district court erred in finding that the settlement agreement was sufficiently definite as to be enforceable. The record shows that the parties agreed to the following terms: the deed of trust, the requisite property, the interest and the amount to be paid, the time frame for payment, the release of the lis pendens, and the first priority status of the deed of trust. Griffith and Porter argue that two parcels were at issue and which property would be subject to the deed of trust was not specified. As the trial judge found that any loan would be collateralized by the property, it appears that he found that both parcels were intended to be subject to the deed of trust. Given the circumstances giving rise to this litigation, we find this to be a reasonable inference drawn from the evidence. Griffith and Porter further argue that the right to prepay, right to inspection, protection of trust beneficiary's rights in the event of litigation, payment of all charges that may become liens, assignment (or not) of condemnation proceeds, and whether successor and assigns are bound are all unknown terms of the deed of trust. This argument fails for two, interrelated reasons: first, because this Court gives deference to the findings made by the district court, Griffith and Porter must show that those terms are, as matters of law, essential parts of the agreement or that the findings are unsupported by the record. They have not done so. Second, the cases that Griffith and Porter cite, in particular, Lettunich v. Key Bank, 141 Idaho 362, 109 P.3d 1104 (2005), and Watson v. Watson, 144 Idaho 214, 159 P.3d 851 (2007), are materially different. Lettunich turned on questions including the amount of the loan and the interest rate which are essential terms of the agreement. 141 Idaho at 367, 109 P.3d at 1109. Here, those terms had been agreed to in the settlement. Watson centered on the property to be included in the sale. 144 Idaho at 218-19, 159 P.3d at 855-56. As discussed above, there is an implicit finding that both parcels were to be included in the deed of trust. The final case cited, Chapin v. Linden, 144 Idaho 393, 162 P.3d 772 (2007), is distinguishable because the parties continued to negotiate on two other terms that were important to them, namely, the partial deed-release provision and the pre-payment penalty provision. Id. at 397, 162 P.3d at 776. By requesting that the Lindens consider releasing their security in the Property incrementally as the loan was paid, the Chapins put the security term of the contract at issue. Id. That is, the Court found that those terms were essential terms to that particular agreement, not all agreements for real estate. There is no evidence that those terms were at issue in the negotiations here. For these reasons, we affirm the district court's conclusion that the settlement agreement was sufficiently definite as to be enforceable.