Opinion ID: 2639312
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Same Action

Text: The City next argues that even if arbitration is deemed an action, attorney fees are only recoverable under RCW 49.48.030 in the same action in which the employee recovers wages or salary owed. [10] Pet. for Review at 8-9. Thus, the City contends that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding attorney fees here because they were sought in a separate action from that in which wages were awarded. Id. The City relies heavily on Hanson v. City of Tacoma, 105 Wash.2d 864, 719 P.2d 104 (1986). Id. The City asserts that the Hanson court's emphasis on in any action when discussing RCW 49.48.030 means in the  same action. Pet. for Review at 8-9. We disagree. The court's emphasis on in any action was in response to the defendant's argument in that case that the plaintiff should not recover attorney fees because his wage claim was inconsistent with the grounds for certiorari. 105 Wash.2d at 872, 719 P.2d 104. Thus, in determining that an award of attorney fees was appropriate, the court sought to emphasize that the statute did not preclude an award of attorney fees based on the nature of the proceeding. Id. The City also relies on Cohn v. Department of Corrections, 78 Wash.App. 63, 70-71, 895 P.2d 857 (1995). Pet. for Review at 9, 13-14. In Cohn, the plaintiff successfully challenged a decision by the Department of Corrections to discipline Cohn by reducing his pay by 10 percent for six months. 78 Wash.App. at 65, 895 P.2d 857. Cohn requested that the Personnel Appeals Board (Board) award attorney fees for the administrative action under RCW 49.48.030. Id. The Board refused concluding it had no authority to do so. Id. On appeal, the superior court similarly refused to award attorney fees. Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at 71, 895 P.2d 857. It held that because the Board had no authority to award attorney fees, the superior court could not award attorney fees on appeal. Id. at 69-70, 895 P.2d 857. It further held that even if the superior court had authority to award such fees, it could still not award attorney fees because it had merely affirmed the Board's order that the superior court had not entered a `judgment for wages or salary owed.' Id. at 70, 895 P.2d 857. In so holding, the court distinguished Hanson by asserting that attorney fees were only allowed in Hanson because the award had been modified by the superior court. Id. Because Cohn addressed an appeal from a government agency, not an arbitration proceeding, it is distinguishable. [11] In holding that the Board and the superior court had no authority to award attorney fees, Cohn was primarily relying on the statutory authority granted to the Board in chapter 41.64 RCW and Title 358 WAC. Id. at 67, 895 P.2d 857. These statutes and rules apply to proceedings before the Board and not to labor arbitration proceedings. In fact, the court in Cohn explicitly acknowledged Division One's extension of RCW 49.48.030 to arbitration proceedings, while still rejecting it in the context of the Board. Cohn, 78 Wash.App. at 65, 67 n. 5, 895 P.2d 857. Furthermore, we disagree with Cohn's reading of Hanson. As discussed above, the Hanson court made it clear that the nature of the proceeding did not affect the availability of attorney fees to an employee who is successful in recovering wages or salary owed. Hanson, 105 Wash.2d at 872, 719 P.2d 104. Hanson's position is consistent with the liberal construction doctrine that RCW 49.48.030 is subject to. Reading Hanson as limiting the recovery of attorney fees to the same action in which wages or salary owed are awarded would also be inconsistent with awarding attorney fees on appeal pursuant to RCW 49.48.030. See Hanson, 105 Wash.2d at 873, 719 P.2d 104 (remanding case to trial court to determine reasonable attorney fees on appeal); Kohn, 69 Wash. App. at 727, 850 P.2d 517 (holding that employee may receive attorney fees for successfully defending an award of wages or salary on appeal). The City also argues that the plain meaning of RCW 49.48.030 does not authorize a separate action for attorney fees. Pet. for Review at 12-13. The City comes to this conclusion by emphasizing the word in in the statute. Id. Thus it asserts that `reasonable attorney's fees' are to be assessed `In' the action in which the employee recovers a `judgment for wages or salary owed.' Id. The City's interpretation would seem to substitute the same for any in the statute. Thus, the statute would read In the same action in which any person is successful in recovery judgment for wages or salary owed to him, reasonable attorney's fees ... shall be assessed. This restrictive interpretation is contrary to the liberal construction doctrine and Washington courts' holdings in other cases. See Gaglidari, 117 Wash.2d at 450-51, 815 P.2d 1362 (recognizing statute's remedial nature and liberal construction requirement); Hanson, 105 Wash.2d at 873, 719 P.2d 104 (awarding attorney fees on appeal); Kohn, 69 Wash.App. at 727, 850 P.2d 517 (awarding attorney fees on appeal). Rather, the statutory language would seem to only require that an employee receive wages or salary owed in any action in order to recover attorney fees. The attorney fees, however, need not be awarded in the same action as that in which wages or salary owed are recovered. We therefore hold that RCW 49.48.030 does not require that for attorney fees to be awarded in any action, that action must be the same action in which wages or salary owed are recovered.