Opinion ID: 1738699
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: additional comment

Text: ถ 93 The City argues that this plain reading analysis is radical and cannot be supported by the legislative history. I disagree. ถ 94 Courts have often said that the rule against consequential or incidental damages should be addressed by Congress or by state legislatures. The advice from Justice Douglas on this point is quoted in Luber, 47 Wis.2d at 277, 177 N.W.2d 380 (quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 385, 65 S.Ct. 357, 89 L.Ed. 311 (1945) (Douglas, J., concurring)). Both Congress and the Wisconsin Legislature have acted on this advice, and in the process they have made a valiant effort to head off costly litigation on the scope of just compensation. ถ 95 In 1970 Congress passed the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act, P.L. 91-646, 84 Stat. 1894; 42 U.S.C. งง 4621-4638. This legislation provided in part that the head of a federal agency could not approve any grant to a state agency for any program which will result in the displacement of any person unless the agency head had received satisfactory assurance that fair and reasonable relocation payments and assistance would be provided to or for the displaced person. The Wisconsin Legislature rushed to comply with this federal law and, in most respects, it strengthened existing relocation benefits. See Ch. 103, Laws of 1971; 61 Op. Att'y Gen. 49 (1972); 61 Op. Att'y Gen. 197 (1972). In 1974 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws also promulgated a Uniform Eminent Domain Code that included liberalized provisions on just compensation and relocation benefits. ถ 96 Wisconsin had begun statutory modification of the business losses rule in 1959. See ง 1, ch. 639, Laws of 1959. Section 32.19 was created in 1961. See ง 18, ch. 486, Laws of 1961. Thus the subject of additional compensation and assistance was not new to the legislature. But the federal act as well as the Luber decision generated substantial additional legislative activity. ถ 97 At the beginning of the 1981 legislative session, the declaration of purpose for relocation benefits in Wis. Stat. ง 32.19(1) [10] and the definitions of comparable dwelling, comparable replacement business, and comparable replacement farm operation were already in place. Wis. Stat. ง 32.19(1), (2)(f), (g), and (h) (1979-80). But Wis. Stat. ง 32.05(8) was much different from what it is today, because it made no reference to comparable replacement property. It read: (8) Occupancy; Writ of Assistance; Waste. The condemnor shall allow any person occupying the property on the date that title vests in the condemnor to continue to occupy the property for at least one month after that date. The condemnor may not charge rent for any property occupied after the date that title vests in the condemnor by a person who occupied the property on that date. Any person occupying the property after the date that title vests in the condemnor shall be liable to the condemnor for all waste committed or allowed by the occupant on the lands condemned during the occupancy. The condemnor shall have the right to possession when the persons who occupied the property on the date that title vests in the condemnor vacate, or one month after the date that title vests in the condemnor, whichever is sooner. This time period may be extended by the circuit court, if the court deems it reasonable under the circumstances. If the condemnor is denied the right of possession, the condemnor may, upon 48 hours' notice to the occupant, apply to the circuit court where the property is located for a writ of assistance to be put in possession. The circuit court shall grant the writ of assistance if all jurisdictional requirements have been complied with and if the award has been paid or tendered as required. Wis. Stat. ง 32.05(8) (1979-80). ถ 98 During the 1981 session, the Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations (DILHR) asked Senator Jerome Van Sistine to introduce legislation amending Wis. Stat. ง 32.05(8) and several other provisions in Chapter 32. See 1981 S.B. 562. The bill analysis read in part: (1) Current law is unclear and contradictory in regard to the conditions and terms of continued occupancy by displaced persons during the period after acquisition but before displacement. This bill provides that no person may be required to move without at least 90 days' written notice from the condemnor and until a comparable replacement property is made available. (2) Current law provides that if a comparable dwelling is not available within the statutory monetary limits, the condemnor may exceed the limits and make payments necessary to provide a comparable replacement dwelling. This bill requires the condemnor to exceed the monetary limits under these circumstances. (Emphasis added.) ถ 99 Senator Van Sistine's bill did not pass, but Governor Anthony Earl submitted DILHR's comparable replacement property language in his first biennial budget, and it was approved without change. See 1983 Wis. Act 27, ง 877; see also 1983 Wis. Act 27, ง 878. ถ 100 In short, the requirement to make a comparable replacement property available was submitted to the legislature by the executive branch, first under Governor Lee Dreyfus, then under Governor Anthony Earl. The language emanated from and was approved by DILHR which was charged with the responsibility of administering a major portion of the relocation provisions in the law. Presumably, after years of working with state and federal laws on relocation, state regulators knew what they were doing. ถ 101 The DILHR package of proposals did not require a condemnor to exceed statutory payment limits for a comparable replacement business as it did for a comparable dwelling. But the continuing caps on relocation payments for businesses and farm operations are mitigated somewhat by forcing the condemnor to strictly comply with the law. [11] Strict compliance requires a condemnor to identify a comparable replacement property that exists. Strict compliance may nudge the parties to negotiate time to turn a potential comparable replacement property into an available comparable replacement propertyโ current availability being a condition precedent to issuance of a writ. This is precisely what the statute requires. ถ 102 The City argues that the court of appeals' plain reading analysis is unreasonable because it may prevent the condemnor from ever removing the condemnee. Again, I disagree. ถ 103 A party seeking a writ of assistance is required to make available a comparable replacement property. Wis. Stat. ง 32.05(8). Whether a nominated property is a comparable replacement property is a question to be resolved by the circuit court. If the condemnor prevails in court, it obtains a writ and forces the condemnee's removal. [12] Hence, compliance with the requirement greatly benefits the condemnor. If the condemnor does not prevail, it will look anew for comparable replacement propertyโwith more precise information on what is requiredโor it will negotiate an agreement with the condemnee. ถ 104 A municipality should make a realistic assessment of whether a comparable replacement property is available early on and develop an appropriate strategy. A comparable replacement property may not always be available. If the municipality is able to purchase the underlying property instead of condemning it, the municipality ought to be able to assume the original owner's rights under a lease. Thereafter, it may seek to evict tenants under normal landlord-tenant law. See Wis. Stat. งง 704.17, 704.19. If the municipality is required to condemn the property instead of purchasing it, it may be necessary to condemn the entirety of any business that would have occupancy rights on the property under Wis. Stat. ง 32.05(8) and pay accordingly. The cost would be borne by the public, which presumably benefits from the taking. ถ 105 If the law is not interpreted in a way that requires the availability of a comparable replacement property tied to the definitions in Wis. Stat. ง 32.19(2), it is likely to destroy existing businesses or leave individuals without a home. ถ 106 The majority is simply not prepared to apply clear statutory language. Its injection of ambiguous parameters into the statutory scheme may help the condemnor but does absolutely nothing to help the condemnee. Its apparent reliance on potential comparable replacement properties is a direct contradiction of the statutory language. ถ 107 For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent. ถ 108 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J. ( dissenting ). I agree with and adopt, for purposes of this opinion, Justice Wilcox's concurring opinion, [1] and its discussion of comparable replacement business pursuant to Wis. Stat. ง 39.19(2)(c). There is no need to repeat that analysis here. Applying his analysis of the statute to the facts of this case, I strongly disagree with his conclusion that the property at 1700 East Delavan Drive in Janesville constituted a comparable replacement business. [2] Accordingly, I dissent. ถ 109 The affidavit of Michael Ryan, the terminal manager for CC Midwest, stressed the need for a cross-docking [3] arrangement for the loading and unloading of trucks. The affidavit pointed out that the loading and unloading of freight is accomplished with forklifts, and that by far the most time efficient way to load and unload is with a cross-dock operation. This arrangement allowed CC Midwest to minimize traffic jams between forklifts. ถ 110 Without a cross-dock operation, according to Ryan, forklifts must loop out of the back of one truck and into the back of another. This type of operation causes interference between forklift operators and results in not only a loss of time and efficiency, but presents a safety hazard as well. This is because freight is stacked on pallets up to seven feet high and eight and one-half feet wide. Thus, the operator has virtually no visibility to the front. ถ 111 Ryan made it clear that cross-dock capabilities were essential to their less-than-truckload (LTL) process, and that any property that was to meet CC Midwest's needs must have this process, as their then-existing terminal did. A total of twenty docks were needed, the same number CC Midwest then had in place. ถ 112 The 1700 East Delavan Property does not qualify as a comparable replacement business under Wis. Stat. ง 32.19(2)(c). Without cross-docking capabilities, the property was not adequate for the needs of the business, was not reasonably similar in all major characteristics, was not functionally equivalent with respect to its condition, and was not suited for the same type of business conducted by the acquired business at the time of the acquisition. See Wis. Stat. ง 32.19(2)(c). Compare Justice Wilcox's concurrence, ถ 56. ถ 113 The majority opinion dismisses CC Midwest's cross-docking needs, indicating that CC Midwest offered no reason why cross-docks could not be constructed. Majority op., ถ 45. Taking that logic to its ultimate conclusion, a vacant lot would be adequate under the lead opinion's rationale. ถ 114 Wisconsin Stat. ง 32.05(8)(c) provides that the condemnor may not require the persons who occupy the premises on the date that title vests in the condemnor to vacate until a comparable replacement property is made available. Given that the City failed to provide a property that satisfied the criteria of a comparable replacement business, it failed to make a comparable replacement property available. Accordingly, the City should not have been granted a writ of assistance pursuant to ง 32.05(8)(c). CC Midwest should not have been forced to vacate the premises. ถ 115 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.