Opinion ID: 1848404
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of cruel and inhuman treatment.

Text: Defendant initially argues that the findings of fact made by the trial court are so inadequate and general as to require this court to review the record and make an independent determination whether there is credible evidence to support the ultimate fact findings of the trial court. [1] The defendant relies on Walber v. Walber (1968), 40 Wis. 2d 313, 161 N. W. 2d 898, wherein this court reviewed the record and found the judgment was supported by a preponderance of the evidence. However, in Walber no findings of fact were made by the trial court and this court stated: In cases involving family law, it is especially helpful to this court that adequate findings of fact are made. A trial court's duty only extends to finding ultimate facts upon which a judgment rests, Finkelstein v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. (1935), 217 Wis. 433, 259 N. W. 254, and there is no exception in the statute for divorce cases; nevertheless, more specific findings should be made upon request of counsel. (Emphasis added.) Walber, supra, 319. Unlike Walber, the trial court in this case made findings of fact. In the absence of request, the trial court's duty extends only to ultimate facts, and defendant cannot now complain of the lack of evidentiary detail in the trial court findings when no request was put to the trial court before this appeal. Ultimate findings of fact were made and it is well settled that these findings must be affirmed unless contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. It is settled law that the findings of fact of a trial court on appeal from a divorce judgment must be affirmed unless contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. Gauer v. Gauer (1967), 34 Wis. 2d 451, 454, 149 N. W. 2d 533. The plaintiff testified that defendant continuously argued, using foul language in belittling her, keeping her under strain and undermining her self-confidence; ignored her and the children; gave her the silent treatment; and attempted to hurt her while presenting a charming facade to the outer world. Plaintiff also testified that defendant on occasion physically abused the children and generally treated them in such derogatory fashion as to make plaintiff miserable and physically sick. Plaintiff sought medical treatment for ulcers and lower abdominal pain which the doctor attributed to home conditions. Plaintiff underscored her contentions with a number of specific examples which need not be discussed. Defendant testified extensively concerning his activities with the children: YMCA and church programs, together with accompanying them on fishing and`hunting trips. He also related a number of family parties, dinners and weekend trips. Defendant argues this evidence refutes much of plaintiff's testimony, and also claims the specific arguments referred to by plaintiff were trivial and ones in which the plaintiff usually had her way. Defendant did not deny that he belittled or degraded plaintiff, nor did he deny the instances of abusing the children and the physical impact all of this had on the plaintiff. In addition, the social activities of the defendant were not necessarily inconsistent with plaintiff's claims that defendant was making her life unbearable at home and that he conducted himself in an entirely different manner when away from home. Nor does the fact plaintiff often won arguments mean the defendant's conduct was reasonable, warranted and of no detrimental effect on the physical or mental health of plaintiff. The totality of the conduct must be considered. Heffernan v. Heffernan (1965), 27 Wis. 2d 307, 134 N. W. 2d 439. Defendant also cites Mecha v. Mecha (1967), 36 Wis. 2d 29, 34, 152 N. W. 2d 923, wherein this court stated: The plaintiff also contends that the conduct of the defendant toward her constituted calculated cruelty. Among other things, she supports this by his expression toward her of the `silent treatment' and such acts as his turning on the television to excessive volume when she attempted to sleep. An examination of the entire record confirms that these actions did not constitute calculated cruelty. It is true that a sullen, morose, and fretful temperament and disposition may make a spouse very uncompanionable, but it does not follow that the exhibition of those qualities in the temperament of a person is necessarily cruel and inhuman treatment within the meaning of the statute. Johnson v. Johnson (1900), 107 Wis. 186, 83 N. W. 291. However, this language was limited by further discussion in the same opinion: The trial court had ample opportunity to observe plaintiff and to form its own evaluation of her. On this record we must assume that it did not find her to be the type of person who was too much upset or disturbed by defendant's acts alleged to constitute cruel and inhuman treatment. The court's opinion herein should not be interpreted to mean that the acts of a husband of a like or similar kind to those before us in this case will never support a finding of cruel and inhuman treatment sufficient to warrant a decree of divorce. Such acts might support a finding of cruel and inhuman treatment, given a wife of a more sensitive nature and nervous temperament than the instant plaintiff. Mecha v. Mecha, supra, 35. In the present case, the trial court had ample opportunity to observe plaintiff and there is evidence that she is a sensitive person. The trial judge is in a far better position than this court to determine whether the acts of the defendant would be sufficient to constitute cruel and inhuman treatment. The weight of the evidence and the credibility thereof were matters entirely within the province of the court as the trier of the facts. Gordon v. Gordon (1955), 270 Wis. 332, 340, 71 N. W. 2d 386. It is apparent that the trial court in this action placed a great deal of importance on the credibility of the plaintiff and refused to accept his version of the facts in the face of the conflict in the testimony. The trial court is in better position than the supreme court to make a judgment concerning credibility and a judgment so made should not be disturbed. Moonen v. Moonen (1968), 39 Wis. 2d 640, 646, 159 N. W. 2d 720. Clearly this record presents a classic example of where the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the testimony must be left to the judicious determination of the trial court. The testimony offered by either side was not inherently incredible, but as stated by the able trial judge, `One almost cannot believe one without converting the other into being a prevaricator.' The trial court had as guides, imperfect as they may be, the appearance and demeanor of the witnesses in response to questions, the nature, reasonableness and probability of the testimony, their attitude and demeanor toward the court, officers of the court, the other party and witnesses, and other incidents and observations that tend to lend or detract credibility and weight in determining the truth of the matter. Heffernan v. Heffernan, supra, 314. The findings of the trial court are not against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.