Opinion ID: 2831452
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Grounds for the Attorney’s Fee Award

Text: Wells Fargo’s first contention—that both parties’ pleadings support the fee award—requires us to analyze the pleadings and determine whether the parties pleaded cognizable claims for declaratory relief. Generally, a party may not recover attorney’s fees unless authorized by statute or contract. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. v. Nat’l Dev. & Research Corp., 299 S.W.3d 106, 119 (Tex. 2009). The UDJA authorizes a trial court to award “reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees as are equitable and just.” TEX . CIV . PRAC . & REM . CODE § 37.009. Absent 4 exceptions not applicable here, the party requesting attorney’s fees must affirmatively plead for them to be eligible for a judgment containing a fee award. See TEX . R. CIV . P. 301. In the body of its first amended answer and counterclaim, Wells Fargo pleaded that it “is entitled to recover its attorney’s fees. . . pursuant to Section 37.009 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code.” Well Fargo’s prayer for relief generally requested that its attorney’s fees be assessed against the Murphys. Accordingly, Wells Fargo satisfied Rule 301’s requirement that it affirmatively plead for an attorney’s fee award. On appeal to this Court, the Murphys contend that, despite the pleadings, Wells Fargo may not recover its attorney’s fees because neither party pleaded a cognizable claim for declaratory relief. For the first time, the Murphys argue that their own pleadings did not state a cognizable claim for declaratory relief. The Murphys also argue, as they did in the trial court, that Wells Fargo’s claim should be re-characterized as being for something other than declaratory relief. “Parties are restricted on appeal to the theory on which the case was tried.” Davis v. Campbell, 572 S.W.2d 660, 662 (Tex. 1978). Appellate courts are similarly restricted and may not overlook the parties’ trial theories. See id. Likewise, in the summary judgment context, “[i]ssues not expressly presented to the trial court by written motion, answer or other response shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal.” TEX . R. CIV . P. 166a(c). A court of appeals commits reversible error when it sua sponte raises grounds to reverse a summary judgment that were not briefed or argued in the appeal. San Jacinto River Auth. v. Duke, 783 S.W.2d 209, 209–10 (Tex.