Opinion ID: 1254804
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Issues relating to the special circumstances allegations.

Text: Defendant raises several arguments attacking the use of multiple special circumstances in this case. Primarily, defendant contends that California statutory law and the federal Constitution prohibit the use of multiple special circumstances based on a unified course of conduct undertaken to further one principal criminal objective. Defendant urges that the functions and objectives of the special circumstances are not served by dividing a unified course of conduct into multiple special circumstances. In addition, their use in this case violates the statutory prohibition of double punishment embodied in Penal Code section 654. Finally, the charging of burglary (former Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (c)(3)(v)) and robbery (former Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (c)(3)(i)) special circumstances is improper in this case. Defendant's theory is that the special circumstances concept cured the constitutional infirmities of the California death penalty law by narrowing the class of murderers subject to capital punishment and by helping to guide sentencing discretion, but that multiple charging of special circumstances does not serve either of these objectives, and in fact undermines the attempt to limit and direct the jury's sentencing discretion. Since only one special circumstance is necessary to identify capital defendants and trigger the penalty phase, the additional special circumstances serve only to skew the decision-making process and unfairly prejudice the defendant before the penalty jury. (10) Defendant's argument is unpersuasive. First, we note that the death penalty statute itself expressly contemplates charging more than one special circumstance. Former section 190.2 establishes the mandatory penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree ... in any case in which one or more of the following special circumstances has been charged and specially found ... (italics added). Additionally, other sections of the death penalty law implicitly recognize the possibility of multiple special circumstances, with numerous references to special circumstances, and  each ... special circumstance. Defendant contends that this language may simply be recognition that two murders, each with its own special, can be joined.... If the Legislature had intended to limit special circumstances to one per murder count, it would have been a simple matter to so state. The plain words of the statute make clear that multiple special circumstances may be charged where there is supporting evidence. Defendant argues that even if the statute is construed to allow multiple charging, such a practice is violative of federal constitutional principles, because he is unfairly prejudiced by the explicit requirement of former section 190.3, subdivision (a) that when determining sentence the trier of fact consider [t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true pursuant to Section 190.1. According to defendant, the jury is already aware of the underlying circumstances of the crime, so that a direction that the same facts be considered as special aggravating circumstances serves only to stack the cards against him. Defendant does not dispute the obvious propriety of the penalty jury considering the circumstances of the murder (i.e., that it occurred in the course of a burglary, robbery, kidnaping, etc.; that it involved torture; that the victim was poisoned, and so on), but only takes exception to the designation of certain circumstances as special circumstances. Former section 190.3 simply lists factors to be taken into account by the jury in determining the penalty. Since a finding of special circumstances is what triggers the penalty phase to begin with, it seems clear that these circumstances are relevant to the penalty decision. In a related argument, defendant contends that designating multiple special circumstances to be considered by the penalty jury legislatively weights the sentencing factors, thus violating the Eighth Amendment requirement that a death sentence be decided only by the trier of fact. This argument is inconsistent with recent United States Supreme Court decisions and decisions of this court upholding death penalty statutes. Former section 190.3 simply lists mitigating and aggravating factors to be taken into account by the penalty jury if relevant to a particular case. One of the factors listed is any special circumstance found true pursuant to former section 190.1. This court discussed the listing of mitigating and aggravating circumstances as `aspects of the Georgia scheme which a majority of the [United States Supreme Court] considered essential to its constitutionality.' ( People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 176 [158 Cal. Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587] (plurality opn. of Richardson, J.); quoting Rockwell v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 420, 432 [134 Cal. Rptr. 650, 556 P.2d 1101].) In comparing the Florida statute upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Proffitt v. Florida (1976) 428 U.S. 242 [49 L.Ed.2d 913, 96 S.Ct. 2960], the lead opinion of this court recognized the appropriateness of including special circumstances in the section 190.3 list of factors: We find worthy of note that the aggravating and mitigating factors enumerated in the Florida statute are almost identical to the special circumstances, and the aggravating and mitigating factors, described in the California act.... Thus, although the California law would permit the trier of fact to consider evidence as to `any matter' relevant to mitigation or aggravation (§ 190.3), the trier of fact is not left wholly unchecked and unguided in its determination for, as in Florida, the California statute lists specific factors which must be considered in deciding whether or not to impose the death penalty. ( Frierson, supra, at p. 177.) It is therefore our view that multiple special circumstances may be charged in appropriate cases. (11a) Nevertheless, we conclude that the federal Constitution and California statutory laws prohibit the cumulative use of special circumstance allegations in this case. (12) The 1977 death penalty statute represents the California Legislature's attempt to comply with the high court's mandate in Furman v. Georgia (1972) 408 U.S. 238 [33 L.Ed.2d 346, 92 S.Ct. 2726] and Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153 [49 L.Ed.2d 859, 96 S.Ct. 2909] that the discretion of the jury to impose a sentence of death be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action. ( Gregg, supra, 428 U.S. at p. 189 [49 L.Ed.2d at p. 883] [opn. of Stewart, J., Powell, J. and Stevens, J.].) [T]hat guidance must be provided by objective sentencing standards designed to compel the jury to `focus on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendant.' (Fn. omitted; id., at p. 199 [49 L.Ed.2d at p. 889].) ( People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 48 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].) In California, that guidance is provided by limiting the potential imposition of a death sentence to those first degree murders involving one or more special circumstance. In those cases where the defendant has been found guilty of murder in the first degree, and a special circumstance has been charged and found to be true (former Pen. Code, § 190.3), the trial proceeds to the penalty phase for the jury to determine whether the sentence shall be death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole. In determining the appropriate sentence, the jury is directed to take into account [t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true ... (former Pen. Code, § 190.3, subd. (a)). Thus, particular special circumstances found to be true in the guilt phase become aggravating factors in the penalty phase. Because the jury is directed to take into account the existence of any special circumstances found to be true, the constitutionally mandated objective of focusing on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendant is undercut when the defendant's conduct is artificially inflated by the multiple charging of overlapping special circumstances or multiple special circumstances based on an indivisible course of conduct having one principal criminal purpose. The special circumstances of burglary with intent to commit larceny and robbery involve conduct with the same underlying intent: to steal the property of the victim. ( People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 54.) (11b) The evidence in this case supports the conclusion that defendant and his companions travelled to Long Beach for the purpose of robbing the victims. In the course of that robbery, the defendant committed a burglary and two murders to facilitate the robbery. Under these facts, the robbery and burglary special circumstances are necessarily overlapping because they both describe virtually the same conduct. The use in the penalty phase of both these special circumstance allegations thus artificially inflates the particular circumstances of the crime and strays from the high court's mandate that the state tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty. ( Godfrey v. Georgia (1980) 446 U.S. 420, at p. 428 [64 L.Ed.2d 398, at p. 406, 100 S.Ct. 1759].) The United States Supreme Court requires that the capital-sentencing procedure must be one that guides and focuses the jury's objective consideration of the particularized circumstances of the individual offense and the individual offender before it can impose a sentence of death. ( Jurek v. Texas (1976) 428 U.S. 262, at pp. 273-274 [49 L.Ed.2d 929, at p. 939, 96 S.Ct. 2950].) That requirement is not met in a system where the jury considers the same act or an indivisible course of conduct to be more than one special circumstance. This conclusion has been reached in other jurisdictions that have considered the propriety of charging overlapping special circumstance allegations to crimes involving the same conduct or intent. For example, in Provence v. State (Fla. 1976) 337 So.2d 783, cert. den. 431 U.S. 969 [53 L.Ed.2d 1065, 97 S.Ct. 2929] (1977), the Florida Supreme Court considered application of the two aggravating circumstances of murder in the commission of a robbery (Fla. Stat., § 921.141(5)(d)) and murder for pecuniary gain (Fla. Stat., § 921.141(5)(f)). In rejecting the contention that both aggravating factors could be applied to a murder committed in the commission of a robbery, the court explained that while in some cases, such as where a larceny is committed in the course of a rape-murder, subsections (d) and (f) refer to separate analytical concepts and can validly be considered to constitute two circumstances, here, as in all robbery-murders, both subsections refer to the same aspect of the defendant's crime. Consequently, one who commits a capital crime in the course of a robbery will always begin with two aggravating circumstances against him while those who commit such a crime in the course of any other enumerated felony will not be similarly disadvantaged. (337 So.2d at p. 786.) Similarly, the Alabama Supreme Court has disallowed the use of both a capital felony committed during a robbery (Ala. Code, § 13-11-6(4)) and a capital felony committed for pecuniary gain (Ala. Code, § 13-11-6(6)) as aggravating circumstances to a robbery-murder. The court held that in finding both aggravating circumstances, the trial judge misconstrued the latter aggravating circumstance, in effect condemning Cook twice for the same culpable act  stealing money. Subsection 6 would, of course, cover a variety of crimes committed with the hope of financial benefit, ranging from `murder-for-hire' to an heir killing his benefactor to gain his inheritance. But we do not think it appropriate to apply this aggravating circumstance to situations already condemned under subsection 4 which by definition involve an attempt at pecuniary gain. Thus, to avoid repetition, subsection 6 should not be applied to a robbery. ( Cook v. State (Ala. 1978) 369 So.2d 1251, 1256. The North Carolina Supreme Court has similarly limited the use of the aggravating circumstances of avoiding or preventing lawful arrest, and that the `capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws.' That court held that submission to the jury of both aggravating circumstances on substantially the same evidence was improper, since it amounted to an unnecessary duplication of the circumstances enumerated in the statute, resulting in an automatic cumulation of aggravating circumstances against the defendant. ( State v. Goodman (1979) 298 N.C. 1 [257 S.E.2d 569, 587].) These courts had a similar objective in limiting the use of overlapping aggravating circumstances  to guide and focus the jury's objective consideration of the particularized circumstances of the individual offense ( Jurek v. Texas, supra, 428 U.S. at p. 274 [49 L.Ed.2d at p. 939]) so as to avoid unnecessary and prejudicial inflation of aggravating circumstances based on one aspect of the defendant's crime. In each case, the goal is the same, to provide particular standards so as to avoid the risk of arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty condemned by the United States Supreme Court. The principles underlying California's prohibition of double punishment also support the conclusion that the charging of special circumstances should be limited in this case. (13) Penal Code section 654 [11] has been construed so as to limit punishment for multiple convictions arising out of either an act or omission or a course of conduct deemed to be indivisible in time, in those instances wherein the accused entertained a principal objective to which other objectives, if any, were merely incidental. ( People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 639 [105 Cal. Rptr. 681, 504 P.2d 905] fn. omitted.) In determining whether section 654 is applicable, the initial inquiry is to ascertain the defendant's objective and intent. ( Id. ) (11c) In this case, it is clear that defendant and his companions had but one principal objective. As we have noted, the evidence supports the conclusion that the acts underlying the special circumstances were committed during one indivisible course of conduct undertaken to further a principal criminal objective, the robbery of Mr. and Mrs. Crumb. To accomplish that objective, defendant and his companions entered the apartment of the victims, committed the robbery, and murdered the victims to avoid detection. Were this not a case involving special circumstances, the prohibition against double punishment would be clearly applicable. (14) A series of criminal acts with the objective of robbery which results in both a robbery and a murder ... of the same victim is within the rule of Penal Code section 654. ( People v. Lowe (1975) 45 Cal. App.3d 792, 795 [119 Cal. Rptr. 699].) The Attorney General argues that the finding of a special circumstance does not impose punishment, and therefore section 654 is inapplicable. In the words of the Attorney General, [m]ultiple special circumstances have no greater effect than the finding of one special circumstance, because whether one or more special circumstance is found to be true, the effect is the same  to trigger a penalty hearing. But the Attorney General underplays the dual role of the special circumstance allegations in a capital case. Special circumstance findings are used not only to determine whether a penalty hearing will be held, but also as an explicit factor for the jury to consider in the penalty phase. As we have stated, former Penal Code section 190.3 specifies that [i]n determining the penalty the trier of fact shall take into account ... [t]he circumstances of the crime ... and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true. ... Thus, the finding of more than one special circumstance has crucial significance in the penalty phase. Unlike cases where the punishment for multiple convictions is limited by a stay of sentence on the less severe offenses, no such limitation is possible where the jury determines the sentence and is instructed to consider the existence of any special circumstances found to be true. Although the finding of a special circumstance does not in itself impose punishment, such a finding has a direct effect on whether the jury imposes the ultimate punishment. (11d) It is in this respect that the finding of multiple special circumstances based on an indivisible course of conduct violates the prohibition of Penal Code section 654. [12] Having identified the problem created by charging multiple special circumstances, we must consider the appropriate procedure when defendant's single act or indivisible course of conduct constitutes separate substantive offenses which may form the basis for special circumstance allegations. Several solutions have been suggested. First is the recommendation that in such cases the prosecution must make an election between the special circumstance allegations. Thus, in this case, the prosecution could charge either the burglary or robbery special circumstances, but not both. The prosecution, however, has the discretion to charge those offenses that are supported by the evidence, and it would be unfair to require that the prosecution guess which offense the jury will decide has been committed. Another proposed solution is that in situations where the murder may have been committed during a burglary or robbery, the prosecution should charge those special circumstance allegations in the alternative. The prosecution may present evidence of either or both special circumstances, but the jury may choose only one. But, the jury must determine whether defendant committed the substantive offenses underlying the special circumstance allegations, and since in noncapital cases the jury could find that defendant committed both substantive offenses, it would be inconsistent for the jury to pick one or the other of these special circumstances at the guilt phase while concluding that defendant committed both substantive offenses. Moreover, it would be difficult if not impossible to instruct the jury how to rationally decide which special circumstance to choose. (15) We conclude that the appropriate procedure would be to allow the prosecution to charge those special circumstances supported by the evidence, and for the jury to determine in the guilt phase which special circumstances may have been committed. Assuming that overlapping special circumstances charged are found to be true, the doctrine of merger and the prohibition against multiple punishment should then operate in the penalty phase to prevent the improper cumulation of special circumstances to avoid the risk that a jury may give undue weight to the mere number of special circumstances found to be true. To avoid that risk, in those cases involving a single act or an indivisible course of conduct with one principal criminal objective, the jury should be instructed that although it found several special circumstances to be true, for purposes of determining the penalty to be imposed, the multiple special circumstances should be considered as one. In addition, the prosecution should be barred from referring to those multiple special circumstance findings which have been merged in the penalty phase. Such a procedure is necessary because of the dual nature of special circumstance allegations provided by California's death penalty law coupled with the unique role of juries in determining the appropriate sentence in capital cases. A similar problem is raised by the duplicative use of the multiple murder special circumstance in this case. In addition to the burglary and robbery special circumstances, defendant was charged with the multiple murder special circumstance (former Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (c)(5)) for each murder count. The multiple murder special circumstance is applicable where defendant has in the present or a prior proceeding been convicted of more than one offense of murder of the first or second degree. In this case, alleging this special circumstance with each murder count results in a finding of two special circumstances. (16) Since there must be more than one murder to allege this special circumstance at all, alleging two special circumstances for a double murder improperly inflates the risk that the jury will arbitrarily impose the death penalty, a result also inconsistent with the constitutional requirement that the capital sentencing procedure guide and focus the jury's objective consideration of the particularized circumstances of the offense and the individual offender. ( Jurek v. Texas, supra, 428 U.S. at pp. 273-274 [49 L.Ed.2d at pp. 939-940].) In our view, the appropriate charging papers would allege one multiple murder special circumstance separate from the individual murder counts. This procedure would properly guide the jury's objective consideration of the circumstances of the crime without hampering the prosecution's ability to seek what it considers to be the appropriate punishment.