Opinion ID: 542860
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Claim for Attorney's Fees

Text: 41 Finally, Steinegger contends that it was entitled to an award of attorney's fees under the lease for its successful defense of Prime's claims. The lease provided, in pertinent part, that 42 [i]f, on account of any breach or default by Lessee in Lessee's obligations under the terms and conditions of this lease, it shall become necessary or appropriate for Lessor to employ or consult with an attorney concerning or to enforce or defend any of Lessor's rights or remedies hereunder, Lessee agrees to pay any reasonable attorney's fees. 43 The district court noted that under this provision, fees are appropriate only when the lessee breaches or defaults under the terms of the lease. 1989 Decision at 31 (emphasis in original). Finding that the claims of Prime and Steinegger were neither mutually dependent nor inextricably intertwined, id. at 32, the court ruled that the lease did not authorize an award to Steinegger for its defense of Prime's claims because those claims were premised on an alleged breach of the agreement by Steinegger, the lessor. We see no error in this ruling. 44 In construing the terms of a lease, the court is generally required to give the document's language its ordinary meaning unless a technical or special meaning is clearly intended. See, e.g., Hatcho Corp. v. Della Pietra, 195 Conn. 18, 485 A.2d 1285, 1287 (1985); Ingalls v. Roger Smith Hotels Corp., 143 Conn. 1, 118 A.2d 463, 465 (1955). The language and placement of the lease's phrase on account of any breach or default by Lessee in Lessee's obligations under the terms and conditions of this lease, plainly sets the boundaries of the parties' agreement as to the lessee's obligation to pay the lessor's attorney's fees. The lease thus gives the lessor the right to recover attorney's fees only when it is forced to litigate because of a breach by the lessee. 45 Prime's suit did not involve any alleged breach by Prime. Rather, it alleged that the withholding by Steinegger of consent to Prime's assignment of the lease to Ramsinghani constituted (1) a breach by Steinegger, and (2) a tort by Steinegger. The issues raised by these claims were independent of any issues as to Prime's performance of its own obligations to pay rent. We conclude that the court properly denied Steinegger's claim for attorney's fees in connection with the defense of Prime's claims.