Opinion ID: 343307
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Plain Meaning Approach to Statutory Construction

Text: 31 I reject at the outset the notion that the literal terms or plain meaning of the statute obviates the need for further analysis. The literal meaning of a statute is, after all, no more than that meaning which is most linguistically probable. 1 The literal terms of a statute certainly do not preclude the very real possibility that Congress employed a particular collocation of words to effect a somewhat different purpose than that which might be inferred from the definitions of an unabridged dictionary. 2 This is particularly true where, as in the instant case, the scope of a fairly clear statutory provision is questioned. Thus, the Supreme Court has often tempered the literal force of all-embracing statutory language in order to avoid untoward results. For example, in Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285-86, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 1060, 92 L.Ed. 1356 (1948), the Court held that although the literal terms of 28 U.S.C. § 394 guaranteed all litigants an otherwise unqualified right to pro se appellate argument, that right could be circumscribed as to prisoners (seeking habeas corpus) where reasonable necessity so dictates. Similarly, in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63-70, 31 S.Ct. 502, 517, 55 L.Ed. 619 (1911), the Court announced the famous rule of reason and specifically rejected the argument that Sherman Act section 1 embraces every contract . . . in restraint of trade, and hence its text leaves no room for the exercise of judgment, but simply imposes the plain duty of applying its prohibitions to every case within its literal language. 32 The plain meaning approach to statutory construction simply begs the question. In every case where the scope or terms of a statutory provision are subject to reasonable dispute, the issue is which meaning is plain. To say, without elaboration, that one possible interpretation is plain and that another possible interpretation is not plain, obscures rather than clarifies the decisionmaking process. A court which employs the plain meaning approach and interprets the terms and scope of a statute literally, without inquiring whether that literal meaning is consistent with Congress' purpose in enacting the statute, fails to respect adequately Congress' lawmaking power. For these reasons, the Supreme Court repudiated the plain meaning approach nearly forty years ago: 33 Often (the words of a statute) are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the purpose of the legislation. In such cases we have followed their plain meaning. When that meaning has led to absurd or futile results, however, this Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the act. Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one 'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole' this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words. When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination.'  34 United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 1063, 84 L.Ed. 1345 (1940). 35 Any reliance on a literalist or plain meaning approach to section 2255 also ignores the history of the Supreme Court's construction of the statute. In the landmark decision of Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963), another case in which the scope of a fairly unambiguous provision of section 2255 was disputed, the Court refused to adopt a literal construction of language in section 2255 which provides that the sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner. Instead, the Court first noted that Congress' purpose had been to make the section 2255 motion remedy as broad as habeas corpus, and that the habeas corpus statute (section 2244) authorized summary disposition of successive applications only when the petition raised no new ground not theretofore presented. Sanders therefore held: 36 (T)here is an apparent verbal discrepancy (between section 2244 and 2255). Under § 2255, (the 'similar relief') language might seem to empower the sentencing court to apply res judicata at will, since even if a second motion is predicated on a completely different ground . . . the prisoner ordinarily will be seeking the same 'relief'. . . . But the language cannot be taken literally. . . . (because a section 2244 applicant) would not enjoy the 'same rights' as the habeas corpus applicant . . .. We therefore hold that the 'similar relief' provision of § 2255 is to be deemed the material equivalent of § 2244. 37 373 U.S. at 12-13, 83 S.Ct. at 1075-1076 (Emphasis added). 38 A substantial array of authority can be marshaled behind the proposition that no hearing is required when no issues of fact are controverted in a section 2255 proceeding. 3 This case is different, not because the facts are in dispute, but because in all other cases involving only issues of law, the prisoner lost, so that those decisions arguably fall within the statutory class of cases where it conclusively appears that the prisoner is entitled to no relief. In the instant case, no facts are contested, but far from showing that the Sosas are entitled to no relief the files and records conclusively demonstrate that the Sosas are entitled to full relief. 4 39 The statute's literal terms would seem to require a hearing in these circumstances. The Supreme Court, however, has rejected the plain meaning approach as a method of statutory interpretation, and has itself read another part of section 2255 in a fashion that was admittedly at odds with the literal terms of the statute. It may be that the scope of section 2255's hearing requirement is as broad as the statute's literal sweep. But if Price v. Johnston, Standard Oil Co. v. United States, United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, and Sanders v. United States teach us anything about statutory interpretation, their lesson must be that fidelity to Congressional purpose often requires that a statute be given a less expansive construction than its literal terms might otherwise permit. I therefore turn to the task of ascertaining the scope of section 2255's hearing requirement in light of the purpose of section 2255. 40