Opinion ID: 2195647
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Mr. Dyson first contests the trial court's rulings and instructions to the jury regarding the District's territorial jurisdiction over the sexual assaults occurring in the van after the group left the apartment. The government generally supports the trial court's conclusions regarding the District's jurisdiction and argues that the trial transcript contains ample testimony which places the acts of sexual abuse in the District. The trial court's analysis of the jurisdictional aspect of the case is reflected in its discussion with counsel and its consideration of Mr. Dyson's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all the evidence. After hearing defense counsel's theory regarding jurisdiction, and his emphasis on the government's burden of proving jurisdiction beyond a reasonable doubt, a standard echoed by the prosecutor as well, see Mitchell v. United States, 569 A.2d 177 (D.C.1990), the trial judge reviewed pertinent case law pertaining to territorial jurisdiction and summarized his conclusions relating to that law prior to ruling on the defense motion: [I]t is presumed that the offense charged was committed within the jurisdiction of the court in which the charge is filed, unless the evidence affirmatively shows otherwise[.][T]he crime may be a single act and immediate in all of its consequences .... On the other hand, the crime may be the result of a series of acts or a result of a single act and the direct consequences may be made to occur in various times and in different localities. In that instance, the criminal act and the cause and effect are part of a complete transaction. Wherever any part is done[,] that becomes the locality of the crime as much as where it may have culminated. In this case I think it really is a classic situation that it is a continuing, ongoing offense. The court has concluded, under the circumstances regarding the kidnapping, that the women were kidnaped for in part the purpose of committing sex acts on them, as  at least from the government's viewpoint, that's exactly what happened. The cases also make clear that this is a jurisdictional question of law and not one . . . that should be submitted for the jury's consideration. Having distilled the legal principles from the case law, and reflecting the government's undisputed burden to demonstrate the District's jurisdiction beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial judge proceeded to explain his reasons for denying Mr. Dyson's motion for judgment of acquittal on jurisdictional grounds: The Court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts set forth in this case indicate an ongoing crime or series of crimes which ultimately ended in Maryland. And the Court notes parenthetically that it is also not crystal clear to me at all that these crimes didn't occur in the District ... [T]here is only a short period of time in terms of distance, I believe a mile, from the Pepsi Cola plant where they were subsequently let off. And the facts, as I understand them, although clearly not very precise on this particular point, do not unmistakably show that they took place in Maryland at all. Indeed, the weight of the evidence is that they probably took place in the District .... [T]he standard the Court has to apply is whether or not these are a series of ongoing offenses and, therefore, the Court's jurisdiction is properly exercised in having these counts filed and prosecuted in this court. Thus, the trial court's view of the jurisdictional question centered on its conclusion that the first-degree sexual offense charged against Mr. Dyson was part of an ongoing crime that began, at the latest, when Ms. Allsbrook and Ms. Thomas were forced to lie down on the back seat upon entering the van, and the force continued thereafter. This view is in contrast to the defense counsel's trial view of the jurisdictional issue  that the sexual activity in the van did not occur until the van was in Maryland. Indeed, defense counsel appeared to concede that if the offense is regarded as an ongoing one, the District has territorial jurisdiction. [4] We conclude that the trial court's contextual view of the case as an ongoing offense was proper as was its application of correct jurisdictional legal principles. As we made clear in Adair v. United States, 391 A.2d 288 (D.C.1978), the question of jurisdiction is not one of fact for the jury. Id. at 290 (citing United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3d Cir.1973)); see also Mitchell v. United States, 569 A.2d 177, 180 (D.C.1990). Hence, the jurisdictional question, involving the application of law to the trial court's factual findings, is a legal issue which we review de novo. See District of Columbia v. Stokes, 785 A.2d 666, 670 (D.C.2001). We begin with the presumption, as did the trial court, that an offense charged was committed within the jurisdiction of the court in which the charge is filed unless the evidence affirmatively shows otherwise. Adair, supra, 391 A.2d at 290 (citation omitted). But we also are mindful that the Superior court [of the District of Columbia] has jurisdiction of any criminal case under any law applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia. D.C.Code § 11-923(b)(1) (2001). In that regard it is insufficient to show that part of the crime in question took place outside the District's boundaries since a crime may be the result of a series of acts . . . [and][t]he direct consequences may be made to occur at various times and in different localities. Adair, supra, 391 A.2d at 290 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, the trial court determined that Mr. Dyson engaged in an ongoing crime or series of crimes which ultimately ended in Maryland. Its conclusion was drawn after the court heard the government's theory as to the District's jurisdiction. Prior to the trial court's ruling denying Mr. Dyson's motion for judgment of acquittal, the prosecutor stated in part: With regard to this issue about proof of jurisdiction beyond a reasonable doubt, I think the Adair case makes clear that's an issue that should not necessarily go before the jury. The jurisdiction is a question of law more properly addressed by the Court . . . . [T]he government's position is that when these women were taken into the van, clearly the kidnapping had begun. They were under gunpoint. They were told to lay down in the back of the van. The defense is stating that it's their position that the sex occurred once the van had traveled to Maryland . . . . I think it's a question that, . . . as an ongoing enterprise, it's not even an issue the Court really needs to consider because of the elements of the kidnapping and then the sex continuing on in the van. Regardless of whether or not they crossed the line I do believe that's the context of all of these cases . . . . In stating its conclusions on the jurisdictional issue, it is significant that the trial court began with its theory of an ongoing offense. That ongoing offense commenced with the use of force to get Ms. Allsbrook and Ms. Thomas into a prone position on the back seats. D.C.Code § 22-3002 specifies that a person is guilty of first-degree sexual abuse if [he] engages in or causes another person to engage in or submit to a sexual act ... (1)[b]y using force against that other person; [or] (2)[b]y threatening or placing that other person in reasonable fear that any person will be subjected to death, bodily injury, or kidnapping. Force is an element of first-degree sexual abuse. Ms. Allsbrook was subjected to force when she was ordered into a prone position on a back seat of the van upon exiting the apartment where other sexual activity had taken place and where she learned that Mr. Roots had a gun. This act of force clearly occurred in the District. In addition, soon after she entered the van and assumed the prone position upon order, liquor was poured on her when she raised her head and remarked that the van was not moving in the direction of her home. Whether or not the actual sexual abuse acts occurred in the District or in Maryland, when Ms. Allsbrook was instructed to move to the front of the van, noticed Mr. Roots had a gun, and heard his threat, that we [are] going to kill [Ms. Allsbrook and Ms. Thomas] and bury them, is of no moment, so long as it is clear that the force element of the crime of sexual abuse began within the District beyond a reasonable doubt. [5] This was the thrust of the trial court's ruling on Mr. Dyson's motion for judgment of acquittal. Just as the threat in Adair occurred in the District, so too, the use of force and threat in the instant case took place in the District. Thus, as we recognized the existence of jurisdiction in Adair, we hold here that the trial court had territorial jurisdiction because an element of first-degree sexual abuse, the use of force for the purpose of compelling sexual activity, occurred within the boundaries of the District of Columbia. Adair, supra, 391 A.2d at 290; see also United States v. Baish, 460 A.2d 38, 40 (D.C.1983) (Where [the criminal act] serves as one of several constituent elements to the complete offense, we have found jurisdiction to prosecute in the Superior Court, even though the remaining elements occurred outside of the District.) (citing Adair, supra, 391 A.2d at [290]; other citations omitted). [6]