Opinion ID: 2971283
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant was denied a fair trial by the

Text: prosecutor’s numerous instances of misconduct, 3 Petitioner also argued that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to impeach a witness with testimony from his 2 preliminary examination; to make app ropriate motions, both before and The only plausible way for the jury to make the necessary during trial; to cross-examine a witness concerning her in-court connection would have been to compare the list of witnesses mentioned identification of defendant with her prior stateme nt that she could not during the voir dire with the actual witnesses called. W hether the jury identify the perpetrator; and to pre pare petitioner’s alibi defense made that connection is unknown. adequately. No. 03-1124 Hicks v. Straub 7 8 Hicks v. Straub No. 03-1124 assistance of trial counsel. The Michigan Court of Appeals claims that he had presented to the Michigan Court of affirmed petitioner’s conviction and sentence. People v. Appeals. Petitioner also filed a motion to remand the case to Hicks, No. 171833 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 1996). As to the the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on his ineffectivefirst claim, the court found that trial counsel, by failing to assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. On November 7, 1997, the object to the alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct at Michigan Supreme Court denied petitioner leave to appeal trial, had failed to preserve this claim for review absent a and denied the motion for remand on the ground that it was miscarriage of justice. Id. Noting that only a miscarriage of “not persuaded that [it should review] the questions justice would excuse this failure, the court further found that presented.” People v. Hicks, 456 Mich. 884 (Mich. 1997). there was “no manifest injustice in the prosecutor’s comment during his opening statement that defendant allegedly C. State Collateral Review confessed to the crime to a fellow inmate, even though the prosecution later failed to produce that witness.” Id. The On January 29, 1999, petitioner filed a motion for relief court reasoned that the trial judge’s instruction to the jury that from judgment in the trial court, pursuant to M.C.R. 6.500.4 it “could assume that the witness the prosecution was unable The record indicates that petitioner made the following two to produce would have testified unfavorably to the claims, among others, in that motion: prosecution, and that . . . [it was] not to consider defendant’s alleged out-of-court admission as evidence of his guilt” I. [Petitioner was] denied his constitutional right to remedied any potential prejudice that may have resulted from confront witnesses against him when the prosecutor this comment. advised the jury during opening statement that defendant had confessed to the murder, where the After noting that the defendant failed to properly preserve prosecutor without even the pretense of due the issue, the court of appeals nonetheless decided to address diligence failed thereafter to produce the witness to the merits of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, the alleged confession, where defense counsel never and found that he “failed to overcome the presumption that he responded to the issue of the “confession” in any was afforded effective assistance of counsel.” Id. way, and where the trial court’s instructions failed Specifically, the court held that “in each instance, the action [that] defendant suggests that counsel should have taken[] would have either been futile, or a matter of strategy that th[e] 4 Petitioner had previously filed–on January 26, 1999–a writ of [c]ourt is unwilling to second-guess on appeal.” The habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Conceding that his petition Michigan Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion to contained unexhausted claims, petitioner explained that he had filed the remand on the ground that petitioner “failed to identify an petition to avoid a perceived violation of the applicable statute of limitations. Petitioner stated that he wanted to pursue state collateral issue sought to be reviewed on appeal and demonstrate by review so as to exhaust these claims as well as to raise claims based upon affidavit or an offer of proof regarding the facts to be a denial of his right to confrontation and upon a denial of his right to the established at a hearing,” as M.C.R. 7.211(c)(1)(a)(ii) effective assistance of counsel. The district court dismissed the petition requires. People v. Hicks, No. 171833 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. without prejudice on Sep tember 2 9, 199 9, pursuant to the p arties’ 6, 1995). stipulation that 28 U.S.C. § 2 244 (d)(1 )’s one-year statute of limitations would be tolled during the pendency of state collateral review, and that any re-filed § 2254 petition would not constitute a “successive Petitioner then filed a delayed application for leave to petition” under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). Hicks v. Straub, No. 99appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, presenting the same 70299 (E.D. Mich. September 29, 1999). No. 03-1124 Hicks v. Straub 9 10 Hicks v. Straub No. 03-1124 utterly to remedy the enormous prejudice to the petitioner argued that, although his Confrontation Clause and defendant. Due Process Clause claims are grounded on the same factual predicate, they are legally distinct. Therefore, he argued the II. [Petitioner was] deprived of the effective assistance Michigan Court of Appeals decided only the latter, but not the of counsel when trial counsel failed to object or former claim.6 Petitioner further argued that the ineffective move for mistrial based upon an obvious deprivation assistance of appellate counsel had prevented him from of the right to confront witnesses following the presenting his Confrontation Clause claim to the court of prosecutor’s unsupported statement to the jury that appeals. He asserted that both trial counsel and appellate the defendant had confessed, and where appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to identify and to raise the counsel failed to frame the issue properly as the Confrontation Clause claim at trial and on direct review, deprivation of the right to confront witnesses in respectively. violation of the Sixth Amendment. The trial court noted that the Michigan Court of Appeals In support of his claims, petitioner argued, for the first time, had held that trial counsel was not ineffective. Nevertheless, that the trial court’s jury instruction on Brand was incapable it stated that, “[b]ecause this is a first degree murder of curing the prosecutor’s statement to the jury that petitioner conviction and a felony firearm conviction, . . . [it was] had confessed to a jail inmate because that statement never willing to address the underlying substance of the motion.” disclosed the name of that jail inmate while the court’s The court stated that, because defendant testified that he had instruction only referenced Brand by name, not by his role as an alibi defense and completely denied having anything to do the jail inmate to whom petitioner allegedly confessed. with the murder, the defense “clearly contradicted the Petitioner further argued that, had Brand testified, defense [p]rosecutor’s opening statement [that defendant had counsel would have had substantial evidence with which to confessed].” The trial court then noted that it had instructed impeach his testimony. the jury that the lawyers’ arguments and statements are not evidence and that the jury’s decision must be based upon only In an order dated March 16, 2000, the state trial court evidence. The court concluded that, “technically,” there is no denied petitioner’s motion for relief from judgment. People “confrontation issue” because, absent the prosecutor’s v. Hicks, No. 93-2188FC (Calhoun County Circuit Court statement, “there was no evidence brought into play against March 16, 2000). The court outlined its reasons for that the defendant.” While reading onto the record the Michigan denial at a hearing on March 6, 2000.5 During that hearing, Court of Appeals’ opinion denying petitioner’s ineffective- 5 During an earlier hearing, at which only the prosecutor appeared, the prosecutor argued that the Michigan Court of Appeals had decided all of add ressed , so that motion is denied. the claims in petitioner’s motion for relief from judgment. The trial judge then stated: Petitioner’s counsel failed to attend this hearing due to a scheduling error. The state co urt re-scheduled the hearing on p etitioner’s motion for That’s what I tho ught. I read the Court of Appeals opinion March 6 , 200 0, at which hea ring bo th counsel were pre sent. again, the ineffective assistance, the alleged prosecutorial 6 misco nduc t, the comments made in the opening statement that Presumably in response to this contention, the prosecutor argued were never followed up about the jail compatriot claiming the that petitioner should not be permitted to prese nt an arg ument that is [d]efendant made statements. In any event all of these have been simply worded differently. No. 03-1124 Hicks v. Straub 11 12 Hicks v. Straub No. 03-1124 assistance-of-counsel claim, the trial court underscored the I. The trial court was clearly erroneous in rejecting following excerpt as the most important in its view: defendant[]’s claim that he was denied his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him [T]he record provides no support for [d]efense’s when the prosecutor advised the jury during opening proposition that counsel’s failure to object to the statement that defendant had confessed to the admission of evidence, his failure to request a pretrial murder, where the prosecutor without even the lineup, his failure to extensively cross-examine an pretense of due diligence failed thereafter to produce eyewitness, or his presentation of the [d]efendant’s the witness to the alleged confession, where defense defense fell below the objective standard of counsel never responded to the issue of the reasonableness. We find that defendant has failed to “confession” in any way, and where the trial court’s overcome the presumption that he was afforded effective instructions failed utterly to remedy the enormous assistance of counsel. prejudice to the defendant. Based upon this excerpt, the trial court concluded that II. The trial court was clearly erroneous in rejecting petitioner had not presented a “specific discrete allegation of defendant[]’s claim that he was deprived of the ineffective assistance.” Rather, according to the trial court, effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel petitioner’s allegation “was wide-ranging” and involved a failed to object or move for mistrial based upon an “number of different areas . . . to demonstrate ineffective obvious deprivation of the right to confront assistance.” As a result, the trial court also agreed with the witnesses following the prosecutor’s unsupported court of appeals that trial counsel’s assistance was not statement to the jury that the defendant had ineffective, reasoning that defendant had posited an alibi confessed, and where appellate counsel failed to defense before the jury, and that the court had instructed the frame the issue properly as the deprivation of the jury that lawyers’ statements are not evidence. The court then right to confront witnesses in violation of the Sixth denied petitioner’s motion.7 Amendment. Petitioner filed a delayed application for leave to appeal the The Michigan Court of Appeals denied petitioner leave to trial court’s denial of his motion for relief from judgment in appeal on the ground that petitioner had failed “to meet the the Michigan Court of Appeals, presenting these claims: burden of establishing entitlement to relief under M.C.R. 6.508.” People v. Hicks, No. 226074 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2000). Petitioner then filed a delayed application for leave to 7 appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, presenting the same W e note that the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision, on direct claims that he had presented to the Michigan Court of review, necessarily addressed only petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We further note that, while the trial court, in Appeals. The Michigan Supreme Court denied petitioner denying petitioner’s post-conviction motion, did no t expre ssly articulate leave to appeal, ruling that petitioner had failed “to meet the its reasoning for the denial of petitioner’s claim tha t appellate counsel was burden of establishing entitlement to relief under M.C.R. ineffective for failing to raise a Confrontation Clause challenge on direct 6.508(D).” People v. Hicks, 463 Mich. 978 (Mich. Feb. 26, review, such a holding implicitly follows from its express finding that trial 2001). counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise such a challenge at trial. No. 03-1124 Hicks v. Straub 13 14 Hicks v. Straub No. 03-1124 D. Federal Collateral Review Before the District Court 1. Procedural Default Consideration on State Collateral Review On March 9, 2001, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner presented On state collateral review, the Michigan Supreme Court the following claims as grounds for relief: denied petitioner leave to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion for relief from judgment on the ground that petitioner I. Petitioner was denied his constitutional right to failed “to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief confront witnesses against him when the prosecutor under M.C.R. 6.508(D).” People v. Hicks, 463 Mich. 978 advised the jury during opening statement that (Mich. Feb. 26, 2001). In so holding, the state court did not petitioner had confessed to the murder, where the specify whether it was relying upon a particular subsection of prosecutor without even the pretense of due M.C.R. 6.508(D). Before the district court, petitioner and diligence failed thereafter to produce the witness to respondent argued about whether the Michigan Supreme the alleged confession, where defense counsel never Court’s denial rested upon an adequate and independent state responded to the issue of the ‘confession’ in any procedural law and, in particular, about whether it relied upon way, and where the court’s instruction failed utterly subsection (3) of M.C.R. 6.508(D). M.C.R. 6.508(D)(3) to remedy the enormous prejudice to the petitioner. provides: II. Petitioner was deprived of the effective assistance of The court may not grant relief to the defendant if the counsel when trial counsel failed to object or move motion . . . alleges grounds for relief, other than for mistrial based upon an obvious deprivation of the jurisdictional defects, which could have been raised on right to confront witnesses following the appeal from the conviction and sentence or in a prior prosecutor’s unsupported statement to the jury that motion under this subchapter [of post-appeal relief], the petitioner had confessed, and where appellate unless the defendant demonstrates (a) good cause for counsel failed to frame this issue properly as the failure to raise such grounds on appeal or in the prior deprivation of the right to confront witnesses in [post-appeal] motion, and (b) actual prejudice from the violation of the Sixth Amendment. alleged irregularities that support the claim for relief. On October 15, 2002, the district court conducted an Respondent argued that, in denying petitioner relief under evidentiary hearing in which it found trial counsel was M.C.R. § 6.508(D), the Michigan Supreme Court implicitly ineffective, and conditionally granted petitioner a writ of relied upon subsection (3). Respondent argued that habeas corpus on petitioner’s Confrontation Clause claim.8 subsection (3) applied because, although petitioner had presented the factual predicate for his Confrontation Clause claim to the Michigan courts on direct review by virtue of his prosecutorial misconduct claim, he had not presented the legal argument for that claim until state collateral review. Petitioner concedes that he did not expressly present his 8 Confrontation Clause claim on direct review. However, The district court determined that habeas corpus relief was not petitioner does argue that he “fairly presented” his warranted for his claims based on a witness’ in-court identification of Confrontation Clause claim to the Michigan Court of Appeals him. No. 03-1124 Hicks v. Straub 15 16 Hicks v. Straub No. 03-1124 on direct review based solely on his presentation of the against the defendant in a prior appeal or proceeding factual predicate. Accordingly, petitioner argues that there under this subchapter [of post-appeal relief], unless the was no basis for procedural default under M.C.R. defendant establishes that a retroactive change in the law 6.508(D)(3). Alternatively, petitioner argued that appellate has undermined the prior decision; counsel’s failure to raise the Confrontation Clause claim on direct review constituted ineffective assistance so as to excuse In so holding, the district court reasoned that, although such default. In support, petitioner claimed that appellate “[p]etitioner could have presented his Confrontation Clause counsel buried the Confrontation Clause issue, the “most claim in a clearer manner,” he “fairly presented [it] to the significant constitutional deprivation in th[e] case,” in a Michigan state courts on direct review.” Id. at 706. The “garden-variety prosecutorial misconduct claim,” and that, to district court underscored that petitioner, in his brief to the the extent that his Confrontation Clause claim is meritorious, Michigan Court of Appeals, argued that the prosecutor such ineffective assistance sufficiently prejudiced him. engaged in misconduct by relaying in his opening statement Respondent countered that petitioner’s appellate counsel did petitioner’s alleged confession to the murder and then not render ineffective assistance by framing the underlying subsequently failing, because of a lack of due diligence, to factual predicate as a prosecutorial misconduct claim – the produce that inmate as a witness at trial. Id. Relying upon “normal” and “accepted” legal theory – rather than as a McMeans v. Brigano, 228 F.3d 674, 681 (6th Cir. 2000), the Confrontation Clause claim – an “unusual” and “creative” district court concluded that the facts underlying the legal theory. Petitioner also asserted that the Michigan “prosecutorial misconduct claim . . . [that petitioner Supreme Court’s “arbitrary and ambiguous” form order presented] in his state court briefs were ‘well within the denying him leave to appeal his post-conviction motion for mainstream of constitutional law’ [on the Confrontation relief from judgment did not constitute an adequate state Clause] such that the Michigan state courts should have procedural ground. recognized and addressed the Confrontation Clause issue.” Id. In further support, the district court posited that petitioner The district court held that the Michigan Supreme Court, in had expressly presented his Confrontation Clause claim, as denying petitioner leave to appeal his motion for relief from such, on state collateral review, and that the Michigan trial judgment under M.C.R. 6.508(D), relied upon subsection (2), court, on such review, had agreed with the prosecutor that not (3).9 Hicks v. Straub, 239 F. Supp. 2d 697, 706-07 (E.D. petitioner’s motion for relief from judgment only presented Mich. 2003). M.C.R. 6.508(D)(2) provides: claims that he had previously presented to the state courts on direct review.10 Id. According to the district court, because The court may not grant relief to the defendant if the motion . . . alleges grounds for relief which were decided 10 Resp ondent’s brief states that “[t]he trial court, perceiving no difference in the claim from what had been presented during [p]etitioner’s 9 Petitioner asserted that because the Michigan courts had not decided appeal of right, denied the m otion on the ground that [p]etitioner co uld his Confrontation Clause claim on direct review, the Michigan Supreme not collaterally attack his conviction on grounds already presented in a Court, on co llateral review, could not have relied upon M.C.R. prior appeal.” Thus, both the district court and respo ndent seem to 6.508(D)(2) in denying petitioner lea ve to appe al his mo tion for relief contend that the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for relief from from judgment. Th us, petitioner conceded – albeit implicitly – that the judgment rested on this ground . W hile the prosecutor made this argument Michigan Supreme Court denied him such leave pursuant to M.C.R. before the trial court in the initial ex parte hearing, and while portions of 6.508(D )(3). the subse quent hearing, on March 6, 2000 , reveal that the trial court No. 03-1124 Hicks v. Straub 17 18 Hicks v. Straub No. 03-1124 petitioner fairly presented his Confrontation Clause claim to petitioner had procedurally defaulted his prosecutorial the Michigan courts on direct review, the courts, not misconduct claim by failing to object at trial to its underlying petitioner, bear the blame for their failure to recognize and to factual predicate – the prosecutor’s opening statement rule upon that claim. Id. The district court found that the relaying petitioner’s purported confession. Respondent state courts’ failure to recognize and to address petitioner’s further argued that trial counsel’s failure to object to this fairly-presented Confrontation Clause claim in denying alleged Confrontation Clause violation did not constitute petitioner relief on direct review constituted a constructive ineffective assistance of counsel so as to excuse any such denial of that claim for purposes of M.C.R. 6.508(D)(2). Id. default. Respondent asserted that petitioner’s trial counsel at 707. After finding that the Michigan Supreme Court chose not to object or move for a mistrial when the state denied petitioner leave to appeal under M.C.R. 6.508(D)(2), failed to produce Brand as a matter of trial strategy. the court held that this state procedural law is inadequate to Specifically, respondent maintained that the failure of Brand bar federal habeas review because it is “simply a rule of res to appear was a fortunate turn of events because Brand’s judicata barring a defendant from re[-]litigating claims in a testimony would only have strengthened the prosecution’s motion for relief from judgment which were decided case. Moreover, according to respondent, had trial counsel adversely to him in a prior state court decision.”11 Id. Thus, objected and received a mistrial, there would have been the the district court found that petitioner had not procedurally risk that the government, at the re-trial, would have been able defaulted his Confrontation Clause claim on state collateral to produce Brand as a witness. review. Id. The district court held that, in case the Michigan Court of 2. Procedural Default Consideration on Direct Review Appeals, on direct review, found petitioner’s Confrontation Clause claim procedurally defaulted due to his trial counsel’s Before the district court, respondent argued that, to the failure to object to that underlying violation at trial,12 that extent petitioner fairly presented his Confrontation Clause failure constituted ineffective assistance and, thus, excused claim to the state courts on direct review by virtue of any such procedural default. After conducting an evidentiary presenting the factual basis underlying his prosecutorial hearing on the matter, the district court agreed with petitioner misconduct claim, petitioner, nevertheless, procedurally that trial counsel’s assistance was objectively unreasonable defaulted that claim. As respondent pointed out, the for the following reasons: 1) it should have been obvious to Michigan Court of Appeals, on direct review, found that 12 examined the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision, the trial court, On direct review, the M ichigan Court of Ap pea ls held that at that subsequent hearing, expressly considered the merits of petitioner had failed to p reserve his prosecutorial misconduct claim based petitioner’s claims. In its order denying petitioner’s motion for upon the prosecutor’s opening statement on the ground that petitioner had failed to object to this statement at trial, and that, because the jury relief from judgment, the trial court adopted its reasoning at the instructions remedied any prejudice resulting from this statement, no subsequent hearing as the basis for that denial. manifest injustice existed to excuse this failure. T hus, as respondent aptly 11 argued, to the exte nt that petitioner had raised his Confrontation C lause In so holding, the district court relied upon Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d claim on direct review by virtue of presenting the sam e facts underlying 1246, 1253 (9th Cir. 1996), which held that a state court’s application of his prosecutorial misconduct claim, the Michigan Court of App eals’ the rule of res judiciata is not an adequate proce dural bar to foreclose procedural-de fault ruling would apply with equal force to that claim as federal habeas relief. well. No. 03-1124 Hicks v. Straub 19 20 Hicks v. Straub No. 03-1124 him that the prosecutor’s failure to produce Brand at trial to address it, a federal court must conduct an independent violated petitioner’s right to confrontation; 2) he had no review of that state court’s decision under 28 U.S.C. strategic reason not to object to this Confrontation Clause § 2254(d). Id. at 707. The court reasoned that such a denial violation; 3) his purported reason for failing to object–that he constituted an adjudication on the merits – albeit without any did not want the prosecution to produce Brand as a witness at reasoning – for purposes of triggering § 2254(d). Id. any re-trial–was “unreasonable” and “wholly unsupported by the record” due to the availability of substantial impeachment In reviewing petitioner’s Confrontation Clause Claim, the material against Brand;13 and 4) he did not even obtain an district court found that the prosecutor’s opening statement adequate curative instruction because the instruction that the relaying petitioner’s purported confession violated trial court gave did not reference Brand as the jail inmate to petitioner’s right to confrontation, and that this violation was whom petitioner allegedly confessed. Id. at 712-13. The not harmless error. Id. at 711. The district court further district court found that, because the prosecutor’s unsupported found, pursuant to § 2254(d), that the prior state-court denial opening statement violated petitioner’s right to confront the of petitioner’s Confrontation Clause claim on the merits was witnesses against him, trial counsel’s deficient representation an unreasonable application of the pertinent, clearlysufficiently prejudiced petitioner. Id. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. established Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 712; see § 2254(d), the district court further found that the prior-state generally Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965), Bruton court adjudication denying petitioner’s ineffective-assistance- v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), and Frazier v. Cupp, of-trial-counsel claim on the merits constituted an 394 U.S. 731 (1969). Consequently, the district court unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 conditionally granted petitioner’s application for a writ of U.S. 668 (1984), the pertinent, clearly-established Supreme habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on his Confrontation Court precedent. Id. Thus, the district court found the Clause claim. Id. at 714. procedural default doctrine did not bar its review of petitioner’s Confrontation Clause claim on the merits. Id. II. Analysis 3. Adjudication on the Merits The provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 Relying upon Harris v. Stoval, 212 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. (“ADEPA”), apply to petitioner’s habeas petition, which 2000), the district court held that, where, as here, the petitioner filed after the effective date of the act. “In a habeas petitioner fairly presented his federal constitutional claim of corpus proceeding, we review de novo a district court’s legal a violation of the confrontation clause to the state courts on conclusions and its factual findings for clear error.” Lott v. direct review, and those courts, in denying that claim, failed Coyle, 261 F.3d 594, 606 (6th Cir. 2001). We review de novo a district court’s determinations regarding a habeas petitioner’s procedural default of any of his claims. Id. We 13 review de novo a district court’s determinations concerning a According to petitioner, such impeachment evidence includes Bra nd’s admissions that he anticipated that the prosecutor “m ight” help habeas petitioner’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a him out with charges that he was facing at the time, that the alleged mixed question of law and fact. Id. confession occurred within feet of a large sign warning that everything was being recorded , and the implausible nature of petitioner having confessed to a complete stranger at the very beginning of their conversation. No. 03-1124 Hicks v. Straub 21 22 Hicks v. Straub No. 03-1124 A. Procedural Default Cir. 2000). If, pursuant to these standards, a petitioner procedurally defaulted his federal claim in state court, the Subject to two exceptions, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) petitioner must demonstrate either: 1) cause for his failure to prohibits a federal court from granting “[a]n application for a comply with the state procedural rule and actual prejudice writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody flowing from the violation of federal law alleged in his claim, pursuant to the judgment of a [s]tate court ... unless . . . the or 2) that a lack of federal habeas review of the claim’s merits applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts “will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” of the [s]tate.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) provides that an applicant Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; see Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. has exhausted the remedies available in state courts only if he 478, 496 (1986) (specifying that a ‘fundamental miscarriage no longer has the right to raise the question presented by any of justice’ will result “where a constitutional violation has available procedure under state law. The procedural default probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually doctrine applies to bar a federal court’s review of a state innocent”). prisoner’s federal claim where that prisoner failed to give the state courts a “full and fair” opportunity to resolve that 1. Direct Review claim–as the exhaustion doctrine requires–and the prisoner cannot cure that failure because state-court remedies are no We find that, contrary to the district court’s conclusion, longer available. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, petitioner procedurally defaulted his Confrontation Clause 848 (1999) (holding that the procedural default doctrine claim by failing to fairly present it to the Michigan courts on preserves the integrity of the exhaustion doctrine, which “a direct review.14 A petitioner must fairly present to the state prisoner could evade . . . by ‘letting the time run’ on state remedies”); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991) (holding that a “habeas petitioner who has defaulted his 14 The district court and petitioner make much of the fact that federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements respo ndent, in an ex parte hearing before the Michigan trial court on for exhaustion . . . [because] there are no state remedies any petitioner’s motion for relief from judgment, argued that petitioner had longer ‘available’ to him,” and, thus, that the procedural presented his Confrontation Clause claim to the state courts on direct default doctrine prevents a habeas petitioner from review, and that the state courts had decided that issue. In his brief here, circumventing the policy underlying the exhaustion doctrine). petitioner contends that the doctrine of judicial estopp el should op erate to bar respondent from now asserting that petitioner had not fairly presented his Co nfrontation Clause claim to the state co urts on direct review. In deciding whether a petitioner procedurally defaulted a Howeve r, as discussed below, the supreme court denied petitioner federal claim in state court, we must determine whether: leave to appeal under M .C.R. 6.508(D)(3) on the ground that petitioner 1) the petitioner failed to comply with an applicable state had improperly failed to raise his Confrontation Clause claim on direct procedural rule; 2) the last state court rendering judgment on review. Alterna tively, to the extent that p etitioner suggests that the claim at issue, in fact, enforced the applicable state respo ndent’s prior inconsistent po sition was “successful” because the state trial court had relied upon it in denying petitioner’s motion, the actual procedural rule so as to bar that claim; and 3) the state order denying that motion does not support such a claim. Attached to that procedural default is an adequate and independent state order is not the transcript from the ex parte hearing, but the transcript ground properly foreclosing federal habeas review of the from the subsequent hearing, in which the trial court expressly stated that petitioner’s federal claim at issue. Seymour v. Walker, 224 it would address the claim’s merits. Moreo ver, petitioner’s brief concedes F.3d 542, 554-55 (citing Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 that the trial court did not find a procedural default, but rather addressed the merits of his Confrontation Clause claim. (6th Cir. 1986)); Simpson v. Jones, 238 F.3d 399, 406 (6th In any even t, we note that, in his habeas petition–and on state No. 03-1124 Hicks v. Straub 23 24 Hicks v. Straub No. 03-1124 courts either the substance of or the substantial equivalent of pertinent] constitutional law.” McMeans, 228 F.3d at 681 the federal claim that he is presenting to a federal habeas (holding that “[g]eneral allegations of the denial of rights to court. A petitioner fairly presents a federal habeas claim to a ‘fair trial’ and ‘due process’ do not ‘fairly present’ claims the state courts only if he “asserted both the factual and legal that specific constitutional rights were violated.”) However, basis for his claim.” McMeans, 228 F.3d at 681. See also a petitioner need not cite “book and verse on the federal Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 277-78 (1971) (holding constitution.” Picard, 404 U.S. at 278 (quotation marks and that petitioner’s challenge to the legality of the indictment citations omitted). was neither the “substantial equivalent” of nor entailed the same “ultimate question for disposition” as his equal Because his prosecutorial misconduct and Confrontation protection claim even though it relied upon the same factual Clause claims rest upon the same factual predicate, petitioner, basis, and, thus, that the state courts had no sua sponte duty by presenting his prosecutorial misconduct claim on direct to consider whether that factual basis resulted in a equal review, also presented the factual basis underlying his protection violation). As this Court has previously explained, Confrontation Clause claim. Thus, the issue is whether the exhaustion doctrine requires the petitioner to present “the petitioner, on direct review, presented either the substance of same claim under the same theory” to the state courts before or the substantial equivalent of the legal basis for his raising it on federal habeas review. Pillette v. Foltz, 824 F.2d Confrontation Clause claim. We find that he did not. 494, 497 (6th Cir. 1987). In determining whether a petitioner “fairly presented” a federal constitutional claim to the state Petitioner referenced the underlying factual predicate courts, we consider whether: 1) the petitioner phrased the neither in terms relating to legal precedent on the federal claim in terms of the pertinent constitutional law or in Confrontation Clause nor in terms of a specific violation of terms sufficiently particular to allege a denial of the specific his right to confrontation. See Newton v. Million, 349 F.3d constitutional right in question; 2) the petitioner relied upon 873, 877 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that petitioner fairly federal cases employing the constitutional analysis in presented his federal claim to the state courts where he question; 3) the petitioner relied upon state cases employing phrased his claim in terms of the specific denial of a the federal constitutional analysis in question; or 4) the constitutional right–his right to due process of law under the petitioner alleged “facts well within the mainstream of [the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments–and alleged the underlying facts upon which that claim was based even though he cited no cases employing federal constitutional analysis). Notably, collateral review–petitioner conceded that he ha d not raised his petitioner never mentioned the terms confrontation or crossConfrontation Clause claim on direct review–that it was “distinct from the examination. Rather, petitioner argued only that the general prosecutorial misco nduc t claim that” petitioner brought on direct prosecutor’s opening statement amounted to the “argu[ing] review. In fact, petitioner made this contention so as to persuade the trial facts not in evidence,” and that this instance of prosecutorial court that the state courts had not previously decid ed this claim and to misconduct violated his constitutional right to a fair trial. prompt the trial court to address its merits. Moreo ver, petitioner also conceded to the district court, regarding his prior § 2254 p etition, that the Confrontation Clause claim that it presented had not been exhausted on In addressing the underlying factual foundation in his state direct review. Indeed, this representation prompted the parties to enter court briefs, petitioner did not rely upon any federal legal into a stipulation to dismiss that petition so that petitioner could exhaust precedent analyzing a claim under the Confrontation Clause, that claim. T hus, petitioner’s co ntention that the eq uities compe l us to and only one case upon which he relied discussed the app ly the doctrine of judicial estopp el against respo ndent is not we lltaken. No. 03-1124 Hicks v. Straub 25 26 Hicks v. Straub No. 03-1124 Confrontation Clause.15 Petitioner’s single reference to one considered a habeas petitioner’s claim that the prosecutor’s case discussing the Confrontation Clause–where that case, conduct violated his right to confrontation. Id. at 734. In that unlike here, involved the admission into evidence of case, the prosecutor, during his opening statement, transcripts of the former witnesses’ incriminating summarized the anticipated testimony of Rawls, a witness testimony–is insufficient to fairly present a Confrontation who had pleaded guilty to the same offense for which the Clause claim based upon the prosecutor’s opening statement, petitioner was being tried. Id. at 733. The summary “took which is not evidence. See McMeans, 228 F.3d at 682 only a few minutes to recite and was sandwiched between a (holding that, even though isolated state cases upon which summary of [the] petitioner’s own confession and a petitioner relied contained “a few brief references to the description of the circumstantial evidence [that] the [s]tate Confrontation Clause,” petitioner had not “fairly presented” would introduce.” Id. Thus, the prosecutor did not his Confrontation Clause claim to the state courts on direct emphasize that summary in any particular way. Id. review because, during that review process, petitioner focused Although, “[a]t one point[,] the prosecutor referred to a paper entirely on the state’s rape shield law, failed to cite any that he was holding in his hands to refresh his memory about