Opinion ID: 150664
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: allen's sentence phase ineffective assistance claim

Text: Allen contends that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated in the sentencing phase because counsel conducted no mitigation investigation and failed to present any mitigating evidence to the sentencing court. Trial counsel did not present any mitigating circumstance evidence, and we take it as true that he did not conduct an investigation into mitigating circumstances either. See Allen I, 662 So.2d at 329 ([T]here was no indication that counsel had investigated Allen's background or history to determine whether particular mitigating evidence was available. Counsel also made no proffer of mitigating evidence that could be presented to the court.). Counsel, however, was following Allen's explicit instructions. Eight weeks before trial, Allen told his attorney not to investigate or present any mitigation evidence because, if convicted, he desire[d] to receive a death sentence in lieu of life in prison. Allen memorialized that instruction in a sworn document, which also set out that he understood the nature of the first degree murder charges and was aware that, if convicted, he would be entitled to present mitigation evidence. Allen's sworn statement said: With full understanding that should I change my mind at a later date my attorney will not have sufficient time to prepare . . . I nonetheless refuse to provide any information or assistance relating to mitigation of the death sentence. Allen also said that while counsel would represent him during the guilt phase, if he was convicted he wished to represent himself during the sentence phase so that I may offer no mitigation. He acknowledged that counsel had advised him not to waive mitigation and that, by representing himself in the penalty phase, he would be precluded from an appeal based upon ineffective assistance of counsel as to that phase. As he had insisted, after Allen was convicted of first-degree murder, he did represent himself before the advisory jury, and he did not present mitigating evidence there. See, e.g., Tr. at 740 (So there is not going to be any excuses today and there will not be any mitigating factors here.). Allen urged the jury to give him a death sentence, see, e.g., id. at 733 (I am also going to ask you for the death penalty but a little differently than [the prosecutor] did . . . . This is my trial and at this time we can do it my way.), and warned that he would try to escape [from prison] if given a chance because that is my job, id. at 740. As Allen demanded that they do, the jury returned an advisory verdict recommending a death sentence by a vote of 11 to 1. During the sentencing proceeding before the trial judge, which followed about two weeks later, Allen switched to being represented by counsel, but he continued to run things his way and refused to let his attorney present any mitigation evidence or arguments to the judge. Trial counsel explained to the judge that Allen had repeatedly requested that I not plead for life in his case. Allen I, 662 So.2d at 329. Counsel further stated that he was `biting his lip' because he was `not allowed to open up and say everything that I would like to say and argue everything that I want to argue,' but was instead respecting Allen's wishes on this matter and would `do exactly what [Allen] asked me to do.' Id. (alteration in original). The trial judge then questioned counsel regarding Allen's decision not to present mitigation evidence. THE COURT: Mr. Hooper, you indicated that Mr. Allen refused to present you with any mitigating factors. Is your client aware of the statutory mitigating factors available to him? MR. HOOPER: Yes sir, that was discussed with Mr. Allen and myself. As an extra measure, I brought up Mr. Mark Jones, an attorney in my office, and he independently discussed it with Mr. Allen to cover anything that I may have missed. It was discussed by two attorneys from the office. I also have the document signed by Mr. Allen .... [H]e can explain [that] he would be entitled to present mitigation. He does not wish any presented. As a matter of fact, he made it clear over and over again that while I was free to try the evidentiary phase as best I could, he did not want mitigating factors entered .... THE COURT: Is your client aware he is not limited to those statutory mitigating factors, and the court would consider virtually anything in mitigation of the sentence to be imposed? MR. HOOPER: Yes, I have discussed all mitigating factors with him. I have also presented him with a copy of the Public Defender's Annual Seminar called Life Over Death. That is a seminar we go to annually that updates us as to aggravating and mitigating factors and keeps us abreast of all of these. I gave him his own copy and discussed it with him. He is probably one of the most intelligent clients I have ever had. That is why I respect his opinion the way that I do. .... I don't want it to be interpreted that he is not cooperative[;] he is just clear on his reasons. Tr. 803-04. Removing any doubt that he might have changed his mind, Allen then told the judge: I hope that I am intelligent today and speak forcibly enough to you that we don't get into technicalities .... [W]e have eleven people here and these eleven people said let's give him the death penalty. I would hope we would do that. Id. at 807-08. With different counsel, Allen now argues that his trial counsel's failure to investigate and prepare mitigation evidence before Allen waived the right to present mitigation was deficient performance under Strickland and that his oral and written waivers of the right to present mitigating circumstances are invalid because he was not fully informed of what mitigation evidence he was giving up. He asserts that a reasonable probability exists that the trial court judge would not have sentenced him to death if he had heard about Allen's history of major depression, his turbulent childhood, and his alcohol abuse. The district court denied habeas relief on this claim because Allen chose to represent himself at [the] sentencing proceedings. Allen v. McNeil, 2009 WL 856017, at ; see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541 n. 46, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) ([A] defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of `effective assistance of counsel.'). The district court's reasoning, however, is based on an incorrect factual premise. Allen represented himself in the sentence proceeding before the jury, but he did not represent himself in the sentencing proceeding before the judge. See Allen I, 662 So.2d at 329 (distinguishing between the penalty proceeding before the advisory jury and the sentencing proceeding before the judge). Allen's ineffective assistance of counsel claim focuses on the sentence proceeding before the judge, not the one before the advisory jury. Allen is entitled to raise an ineffective assistance claim relating to the judge-stage proceeding, even though he has abandoned one relating to the jury-stage proceeding. See generally Hammond, 586 F.3d at 1324 n. 12 (An industrious effort on behalf of his client on other fronts does not bar a claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in one or more specific ways.); Jefferson v. Hall, 570 F.3d 1283, 1314 (11th Cir.2009) (Carnes, J., dissenting) (Adequate, or even stellar, performance in regard to one aspect of the trial does not bar a conclusion that counsel performed ineffectively in another regard.), vacated on other grounds, Jefferson v. Upton, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2217, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2010). Although the district court's rationale was incorrect, [11] we agree with its judgment dismissing Allen's federal habeas claim of ineffective assistance at the sentence phase. The Florida Supreme Court's decision rejecting this claim was not an unreasonable application of federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The United States Supreme Court has told us in no uncertain terms that if a competent defendant did instruct his counsel not to offer any mitigating evidence, counsel's failure to investigate further could not have been prejudicial under Strickland.  [12] Schriro, 550 U.S. at 475, 127 S.Ct. at 1941 (emphasis added); cf. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (In the context of guilty pleas, ... in order to satisfy [ Strickland 's] `prejudice' requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.). As we recently explained, the Schriro rule follows naturally from Strickland 's formulation of the prejudice prong, for there cannot be a reasonable probability of a different result if the defendant would have refused to permit the introduction of mitigation evidence in any event. Cummings v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 588 F.3d 1331, 1360 (11th Cir.2009) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068). Allen therefore must show thatbut for his counsel's supposedly unreasonable conducthelpful [mitigation] evidence actually would have been heard by the jury or the sentencing court. Gilreath v. Head, 234 F.3d 547, 552 n. 12 (11th Cir.2000). If Allen would have precluded its admission in any event, [he] was not prejudiced by anything that trial counsel did. Id. ; see also id. at 551-52. The Florida courts reasonably determined that Allen had waived the presentation of any and all mitigating circumstances, that he was entitled to control the overall objectives of his defense, including the decision to disavow mitigation, and that he had in fact decided not to present mitigating evidence. Allen I, 662 So.2d at 329-30. That determination of the facts was entirely reasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Schriro, 550 U.S. at 477, 127 S.Ct. at 1942. Allen's pre-trial waiver made clear that he did not want to present mitigation evidence, and the trial court was repeatedly informed of that. Allen himself stood before the jury and argued in favor of a death sentence, telling the jury that it would be torture if he had to sit in jailin a cage, as he put itfor 25 years. Allen also repeatedly instructed his counsel not to plead for his life in the hearing before the sentencing judge, Allen I, 662 So.2d at 329, making that position clear over and over again. Not once has Allen even alleged that he would have allowed trial counsel to present (or that he himself would have presented) mitigation evidence if only he had known about the evidence that his collateral proceedings counsel have since collected. Allen pleaded in his post-conviction motion that today he would be willing to present a mental health expert at an evidentiary hearing to testify that he suffers from severe depression, and we take that allegation as true. See App. Br. at 58; Post-conviction Record at 827. [13] Allen's willingness to present mitigation evidence today, however, does nothing to alter his steadfast desire at the time of his trial to seek the death penalty instead of life in prison. Having alleged no specific facts that, if true, would entitle him to federal habeas relief, Allen is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. See Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474, 477, 127 S.Ct. at 1940, 1942; Boyd, 592 F.3d at 1305. Allen argues that his waiver should be deemed invalid because counsel, having conducted no pre-waiver investigation, failed to inform Allen of the mitigating evidence that he was giving up. The United States Supreme Court's Schriro decision forecloses that argument. The Court held that it was not objectively unreasonable for that [state] court to conclude that a defendant who refused to allow the presentation of any mitigating evidence could not establish Strickland prejudice based on his counsel's failure to investigate further possible mitigating evidence. Schriro, 550 U.S. at 478, 127 S.Ct. at 1942. The Court also stated that it was not clearly established federal law that a defendant's refusal to allow the presentation of mitigating evidence must be informed and knowing. Id. (We have never imposed an `informed and knowing' requirement upon a defendant's decision not to introduce evidence.). [14] Moreover, it is apparent from the record that Allen knowingly and intelligently refused to present mitigating evidence. See id. at 479, 127 S.Ct. at 1943. We have already mentioned a number of statementsincluding Allen's pre-trial instructions to his counsel and his statements to the advisory jurythat indicate his understanding of the consequences of waiving mitigation. In addition, when counsel advised the trial court that Allen wanted to represent himself before the jury at the sentencing phase, the court conducted a Faretta inquiry in order to be sure that Allen fully understand, the possible consequences of his request. See Allen I, 662 So.2d at 329; see also Schriro, 550 U.S. at 479, 127 S.Ct. at 1943 ([W]e have never required a specific colloquy to ensure that a defendant knowingly and intelligently refused to present mitigating evidence.); Faretta, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562. Although the court did not doubt Allen's mental competence, it decided out of an abundance of caution to have Allen examined by two mental health experts, who testified that Allen was competent to represent himself. [15] See Allen I, 662 So.2d at 326-27. When it concluded that Allen's waiver of the right to counsel at the sentence proceeding before the jury was voluntarily and intelligently made, the trial court was fully aware of what Allen's counsel described as Allen's intent not to present mitigation and possibly to affirmatively request the death sentence. It necessarily follows that Allen's decision not to present any mitigating circumstances evidence, a decision he stuck to throughout the sentence proceedings, was also made voluntarily and intelligently. Because Allen has not shown that counsel could have done anything regarding mitigating circumstance evidence that would have led to the presentation of it, he has failed to establish the prejudice element of this ineffective assistance of counsel claim. As the Supreme Court concluded in Schriro, it was not objectively unreasonable for that [state post-conviction court] to conclude that a defendant who refused to allow the presentation of any mitigating evidence could not establish Strickland prejudice based on his counsel's failure to investigate further possible mitigating evidence. [16] 550 U.S. at 478, 127 S.Ct. at 1942. Allen, a mentally competent, intelligent defendant, having been convicted of a brutal murder, faced life imprisonment or death. Insisting on doing things his way, he chose death and prevented his counsel from attempting to secure a life sentence through the development and presentation of mitigating circumstances evidence. That is not a choice that most people would have made, but it is one that he had the right to make, and he made it voluntarily and with full awareness of the consequences. Cf. Sanchez-Velasco v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 287 F.3d 1015, 1033 (11th Cir.2002) (As a death row inmate, Sanchez-Velasco does not have many choices left. One choice the law does give him is whether to fight the death sentence he is under or accede to it. Sanchez-Velasco, who is mentally competent to make that choice, has decided not to contest his death sentence any further. He has the right to make that choice.). What Allen does not have is the right to escape the consequences of his own decision not to present any mitigating circumstances evidence by shifting the blame for it to someone else.