Opinion ID: 772395
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Meaning of Direct Evidence in Context of Discrimination Claim

Text: 62 For the reasons that follow, we hold that where there is an affirmative action plan in effect that relates to the employer's actions which are the subject of a discrimination claim, the affirmative action plan constitutes direct evidence of discrimination if there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to permit a jury reasonably to conclude that the employer was acting pursuant to its plan in taking the employment action in question. 63 Because we believe that the phrase has been a source of confusion, we begin by discussing the meaning of direct evidence in the context of a Title VII race discrimination claim. First, we note that the phrase direct evidence, when used in the context of discrimination claims, does not refer to whether evidence is direct or circumstantial in the ordinary evidentiary sense in which we normally think of those terms. Instead, direct evidence refers to a type of evidence which, if true, would require no inferential leap in order for a court to find discrimination. We do not believe that the status of evidence as direct in this context, however, changes simply because a defendant contests the validity of the evidence, thereby requiring the plaintiff to offer proof related to the disputed evidence through other means. Therefore, an affirmative action plan may constitute direct evidence, even when a defendant denies having acted pursuant to its stated plan. 64 This view of direct evidence is supported by this Court's case law addressing other types of direct evidence of discrimination. We have held that [w]here the non-movant presents direct evidence that, if believed by the jury, would be sufficient to win at trial, summary judgment is not appropriate even where the movant presents conflicting evidence. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). Furthermore, [w]e have defined direct evidence as `evidence, which if believed, proves the existence of fact in issue without inference or presumption.' Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1528 n.6 (11th Cir. 1987)) (emphasis added). Therefore, direct evidence of discrimination may be disputed, and it may well be that a plaintiff will have to establish the direct evidence by introducing circumstantial evidence. For example, in Merritt, we considered whether an alleged statement by an employer constituted direct evidence in support of the plaintiff's retaliation claim. Merritt, 120 F.3d at 1189-91. In that case, the employer denied that a decisionmaker had made a statement which, if true, clearly showed a retaliatory motive behind the termination of the plaintiff's employment. Id. Nonetheless, we concluded that because the plaintiff could prove - whether by circumstantial evidence or any other means - that the decisionmaker did make the statement, there was direct evidence of retaliation precluding summary judgment. Id. Given this approach, we hold, for the following reasons, that Bass has put forth direct evidence of discrimination in the form of the County's affirmative action plans even though there is conflicting evidence concerning whether the Division acted pursuant to those plans. 65