Opinion ID: 1378765
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: procedural facts and history

Text: ¶ 2 On August 22, 1990 Lorita Sneed executed a last will and testament. She died in March 1992. Under her will's terms all of her property, both real and personal, was devised to Michael Jestes, as trustee, with instructions that he distribute the same under the terms of Exhibit A to the will. ¶ 3 Although the exhibit attached to the will was dated August 20, 1990, there is evidence that its trust provisions were originally drafted on August 17, 1990. The exhibit purports to reflect the testatrix's living will wishes. Jestes testified that he acted as Sneed's scrivener in the exhibit's preparation and did nothing more than record her decisions about how her assets were to be distributed. [2] ¶ 4 The testatrix died without issue. Under the dispositive provisions [as found in Exhibit A] of the Sneed will her estate is devised to (a) the heirs of her deceased brother [Kenneth Hall], i.e., the contestant and her two children, (b) the children of her deceased step-brother [Marlin Marsh], (c) Jestes and his sister and (d) various other friends and her church. The contestant and her children were the principal beneficiaries under the decedent's will, although the devises to Marlin Marsh's children and Jestes and his sister were each close in amount to the quantum given the contestant and her children. ¶ 5 The decedent's will was prepared by her lawyer of many years and was executed in his office. Although Jestes was present when the will was executed, he did not serve as one of its witnesses. Since Exhibit A to the will contains the dispositive provisions for Sneed's estate and it is specifically referenced in the will, her lawyer obviously reviewed the exhibit's terms when he drafted the document. Nonetheless, the record does not reflect any discussions between the lawyer and the testatrix about the will or its exhibit's provisions except on the day of the will's execution when the testatrix acknowledged before its witnesses that the document represented her dispositive wishes. [3] ¶ 6 On October 19, 1993 Jestes petitioned the district court to probate Sneed's will. Hall objected to its admission urging (1) that her aunt was of diminished mental capacity and suffered from insane delusions and (2) that Sneed's free agency had been overborne by Jestes' undue influence. In the summer of 1994 the trial court, sitting in probate, conducted a hearing on Sneed's testamentary capacity and the issue of undue influence. This hearing was held before the exhibit in issue was bifurcated from the will. During this proceeding the contestant examined Jestes about (a) his relationship with Sneed, (b) his role in the preparation of Exhibit A, and (c) the execution of the decedent's last will and testament. It was also at this time that Jestes' counsel requested that Exhibit A be severed from the will and transferred to a division of the district court with the authority to determine if its provisions satisfied the requirements for the establishment of a valid inter vivos trust. In its August 30, 1994 order the trial court (sitting in probate) found that Exhibit A was  not being offered as either a testamentary disposition [or] as a residuary disposition under the residuary clause of Sneed's will. Also, it found that Exhibit A was not being offered as a testamentary trust under the will's terms and that it [the court sitting in probate] did not have the remedial capacity to ascertain the instrument's validity as an inter vivos trust. At the conclusion of the July 1994 hearing the latter issue was severed from the probate proceedings and transferred to the Chief Judge, Civil Division, Oklahoma County District Court. The district court  in an exercise of its remedial powers  concluded that the exhibit's provisions did not meet the statutory requirements necessary to establish an inter vivos trust. ¶ 7 After the district court ruled that the exhibit's provisions failed to create an inter vivos trust, the will's proponent moved to incorporate by reference the document's terms into Sneed's will. By its August 11, 1995 order the court allowed the requested incorporation and denied the contestant's motion for a hearing on the issue of the proponent's undue influence in the exhibit's preparation. It is from this latter order that Hall brings her appeal. The Court of Civil Appeals upheld the district court's decision. The appellant then sought certiorari which was granted.