Opinion ID: 2602055
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction over the bnsf dismissal in the kilpatrick case

Text: ¶9 The first issue is whether we have jurisdiction over Mrs. Kilpatrick's appeal of the order dismissing her claims against BNSF. After the district court entered its memorandum decision and its order dismissing BNSF, Mrs. Kilpatrick moved to certify the BNSF dismissal under rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. BNSF did not oppose the motion, and the district court certified the decision in June 2006. The district court's order stated in its entirety, Plaintiff's unopposed motion to enter final judgment as to [BNSF] and to certify matter as ready for appeal is granted. Plaintiff's counsel is directed to prepare the appropriate order. (Emphasis removed.) Mrs. Kilpatrick's counsel never prepared the order. ¶10 Three months later, the district court dismissed Bullough, the final defendant in the Kilpatrick case. The court's minute order relied on the reasons set forth in the memorandum decision dismissing BNSF and designated the dismissal as a final order. The minute entry clarified that [n]o further order [was] required. Mrs. Kilpatrick filed a notice of appeal five days later. Her notice of appeal indicated that she was appealing the Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss which extinguished all claims against Bullough Abatement, Inc. Although the notice of appeal referenced the court's decision regarding BNSF, the notice did not explicitly state that Mrs. Kilpatrick intended to appeal the dismissal of BNSF. [2] ¶11 BNSF argues that we do not have jurisdiction over the appeal because it was untimely and because the notice did not indicate an intent to appeal the dismissal of BNSF. `Whether appellate jurisdiction exists is a question of law which we review for correctness, giving no deference to the decision below.' [3]
¶12 Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. In Code v. Utah Department of Health, we clarified that the time for appeal begins to run with the entry of the prepared order, unless the court either approves a proposed order submitted with the initial memorandum or explicitly directs that no order is required. [4] Thus, the minute entry or the memorandum decision alone does not trigger the time for appeal. [5] If the prevailing party fails to enter an order within the fifteen-day period prescribed by rule 7(f)(2), the time for appeal does not begin to run. In such a case, any party interested in finality . . . may submit an order. [6] Thus, if BNSF had desired finality, it could have submitted the necessary order. In its absence, however, no finality is ascribed to the court's minute entry. [7] Because the final order was never prepared in compliance with rule 7(f)(2), the order never became final; thus, the time for appeal did not begin to run until the district court's final order dismissing Bullough, the final defendant in the case.
¶13 BNSF also argues that Mrs. Kilpatrick did not perfect her appeal of the BNSF dismissal because she did not explicitly state that she intended to appeal the court's minute entry dismissing BNSF. We hold that Mrs. Kilpatrick did perfect her appeal because her notice of appeal sufficiently indicated her intent to appeal the dismissal of BNSF and because BNSF was not prejudiced. ¶14 The purpose of the notification requirement is to advise the opposite party that an appeal has been taken from a specific judgment in a particular case . . . [because the opposing party] is entitled to know specifically which judgment is being appealed. [8] Rule 3(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that the notice of appeal specify the parties taking the appeal; the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from; the court from which the appeal is taken; and the court to which the appeal is directed. In determining whether the notification requirement has been met, we have long adhered to the policy that where the notice of appeal sufficiently identifies the final judgment at issue and the opposing party is not prejudiced, the notice of appeal is to be liberally construed. [9] ¶15 Where the appealing party's intent is clear and the appellee suffers no prejudice, the notice of appeal is sufficient. For example, in Hardinger v. Scott (State ex rel. B.B.), the appellant did not identify the orders appealed from by name. [10] We reasoned that although the notice of appeal was not a model of clarity, it adequately notified the [appellees] of the issues to be reviewed. [11] Moreover, the appellees did not claim that they were misled or in anyway prejudiced by the failure to list the orders separately. [12] Similarly, in Speros v. Fricke, we held that a notice in which the appellant used an incorrect date in reference to the final order was sufficient. [13] We reasoned that the order appellant intended to appeal was evident in context and that no prejudice occurred as a result of the error. [14] ¶16 In this case, Mrs. Kilpatrick's intent was clear and BNSF has not argued that it was prejudiced by her failure to explicitly reference BNSF in the notice. In context, Mrs. Kilpatrick's notice of appeal provided sufficient notification of her intent to appeal the dismissal of BNSF for four reasons. First, it would be worthless to appeal the Bullough dismissal without appealing the BNSF dismissal because the district court relied on the memorandum decision dismissing BNSF to dismiss Bullough. Second, Mrs. Kilpatrick served BNSF with her notice of appeal in accordance with rule 3(e), which requires that all parties to the judgment or order being appealed be served a copy of the notice of appeal. [15] If Mrs. Kilpatrick did not intend to appeal the dismissal of BNSF, there would be no reason for her to serve her notice of appeal on BNSF. Third, Mrs. Kilpatrick referenced the BNSF memorandum decision in her notice of appeal. Finally, BNSF has not shown any way in which it was prejudiced by Mrs. Kilpatrick's omission. [16] We therefore reject BNSF's claim that Mrs. Kilpatrick did not perfect her appeal.