Opinion ID: 2796318
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Winfield Evidence

Text: Jenkins and Bates assign error to the trial court’s exclusion of evidence that Warren had engaged in five other shootings around the same time as the charged crimes. In each case, judging from admissions he made in unrelated proceedings, Warren was acting alone or with accomplices other than a defendant here and “for his own reasons” unrelated to the TPC/TSC feud, and more than once using a firearm “focused upon by the government as [a] tool[] of [the] Todd Place [Crew]” (Brief for Jenkins at 38). Their argument that this evidence should have been admitted under Winfield v United States, 676 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1996) (en banc), or as “reverse Drew evidence,”9 see Newman v. United States, 705 A.2d 246 (D.C. 1997), did not impress the trial judge and does not persuade us. The argument is essentially that Warren was a serial, free-lance shooter needing no motive tied to the shooting of TPC leader Foster or help from TPC _________________________ (…continued) to show that evidence of drug-dealing assumed any place at all in the jury’s evaluation of the charges involving murder and other crimes of violence. 9 Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1964). 18 members for his depredations – both facts supporting a reasonable inference that he did the Gary English and Antonio Ingram shootings alone or with confederates other than Jenkins or Bates. But, as Judge Leibovitz recognized, those same facts (as well as Warren’s use elsewhere of the gun he was shown to have used in shooting Ingram) squared entirely with his having acted with the defendants here in the two shootings alleged. Nothing in Jenkins’ proffer to the judge about Warren’s accomplices elsewhere identified them rather than Jenkins and Bates (and Anderson) as his confederates in the April 15 and May 10 shootings; nor was anything in his demonstrated proclivity to shoot people “for his own reasons” inconsistent with his having joined with fellow TPC members on these occasions to avenge Foster’s death. Third-party perpetrator evidence offered under Winfield must “tend to indicate some reasonable possibility that a person other than the defendant committed the charged offense.” Bruce v. United States, 820 A.2d 540, 543 (D.C. 2003) (quoting Winfield, 676 A.2d at 4). Even then the judge may exclude the proffered evidence if it is, inter alia, “too speculative with respect to the [alleged] third-party[] [perpetrator’s] guilt” instead of the defendants’. Resper v. United States, 793 A.2d 450, 460 (D.C. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 19 trial judge correctly reasoned that “the fact that Mr. Warren . . . shot at other people with combinations of people who were not Mr. Jenkins or any other charged defendant or by himself or for reasons unrelated to the conspiracy does not . . . logically advance the proposition that Mr. Jenkins did not commit . . . the [Ingram] shooting . . . or other [crimes alleged] in this case.”10 And the proffered facts of the other shootings likewise shared no motive or modus operandi similarity with the charged ones enough to make them plausible candidates for “reverse Drew” admissibility. See Newman, 705 A.2d at 256-57. The judge thus properly exercised her discretion in refusing to let the jury draw speculative inferences from Warren’s violent proclivity, linked to the charged crimes by nothing more than contemporaneity and his use of “tools of Todd Place” to practice those instincts elsewhere. IV. Admissibility of Recorded Jail Telephone Conversations
10 See, e.g., Gethers v. United States, 684 A.2d 1266, 1271 (D.C. 1996) (“[T]he defense must establish a reasonable possibility that an actual person other than the defendant committed the crime or was otherwise responsible for it, not just a hypothetical, unidentified person who may have had a motive.”). 20 As related at the outset, insider Davenport gave important testimony for the prosecution describing the existence and motives of the Todd Place Crew including appellants at the relevant times, in particular their angry reaction to Foster’s murder and plan to retaliate against those held responsible, the TSC. The government sought to corroborate Davenport’s testimony partly by recorded conversations between unindicted co-conspirator Andre Harvey, in jail at the time, and Ismail Watkins, also a member of the TPC, that discussed the Foster shooting, Gary English’s resulting murder, additional actions Harvey might take inside jail as further retaliation, and generally the current “score” of violence between the rival crews stemming from the Foster killing and other “beefs.” The trial judge examined transcripts of the proffered recordings and admitted some conversations as statements by co-conspirators in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. The statements, she explained, involved “members of the conspiracy talking about the events on the outside, the violent events that . . . are the charged events in this case” – i.e., the “events comprising [Foster’s] death and other[s] . . . that are the beef between Todd Place and T Street” – “and plotting revenge, plotting acts against other T Street members both in jail and outside and keeping each other abreast of the events going on, both inside and outside the jail.” 21 Appellants Jenkins and Bates dispute the admissibility of the statements, contending that “a lot of” what Watkins reported to Harvey, and vice-versa, was “simple gossip” reporting events of which neither speaker had “direct knowledge,” so that much of their conversations was “double hearsay” with no foundation laid for the first “level” – the unwitnessed accounts, for example, of “the April 18 bailout [near the cemetery], including who ran and who got away” (Brief for Jenkins at 39).11 These appellants rightly do not dispute the general principle that statements by co-conspirators among themselves during and in furtherance of a conspiracy are admissible as non-hearsay. See Butler v. United States, 481 A.2d 431, 439 (D.C. 1984) (adopting Fed. R. Evid. 801 (d)(2)(E)). Nor do they question the evidence of Watkins’ and Harvey’s involvement in the alleged TPC conspiracy. Although appellants are right that the “in furtherance of” requirement is intended to “exclu[de] . . . statements that were casual conversation, idle gossip, or mere narratives of past events,” (Brian) Williams v. United States, 655 A.2d 310, 313 11 It might be thought unnecessary to consider this issue given the jury’s acquittal of appellants of conspiracy and rejection of vicarious liability, but appellants argue that the conversations were also prejudicial on the issue of retaliatory motive to commit the substantive crimes. 22 (D.C. 1995), ample authority supports the admission of statements “made [inter se] to keep conspirators abreast of an ongoing conspiracy’s activities . . . .” United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1535-36 (9th Cir. 1988); see United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1412-13 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (statements by conspirator detailing drug transactions and profits to participant in conspiracy were not “mere narrations” of remote events but rather statements close in time to the transactions that helped keep co-participant current on status of the conspiracy, hence were in furtherance of it).12 So long as statements further the conspiracy’s goals in this sense, courts considering the issue have rejected “double hearsay” or lack-of-personalknowledge objections to their admission. See United States v. McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098, 1105-06 (6th Cir. 1984) (“Rule 801 (d)(2)(E) . . . exempts co-conspirator’s statements from the hearsay rule. The requirement that the declarant have personal knowledge of his statements in such a case is waived.”); United States v. Ammar, 12 And see United States v. McKay, 431 F.3d 1085, 1094 (8th Cir. 2005) (statement that was made to keep co-conspirator abreast of changes in the conspiracy that had taken place while he was in prison was a statement in furtherance of the conspiracy); United States v. Roberts, 14 F.3d 502, 515 (10th Cir. 1993) (“Statements made . . . to keep co-conspirators abreast of an ongoing conspiracy’s activities satisfy the ‘in furtherance’. . . requirement [under Rule 801 (d)(2)(E).”] (internal citation omitted)). 23 714 F.2d 238, 254 (3d Cir. 1983) (the drafters of the federal co-conspirator rule did not intend “the personal knowledge foundation requirement of Rule 602” to apply to “admissions (including co-conspirator statements) admissible under Rule 801 (d)(2)”); United States v. Cogwell, 486 F.2d 823, 832 n.5 (7th Cir. 1973). Having satisfied herself as a preliminary matter of the existence of the conspiracy and the participation of Watkins and Harvey in it, the trial judge properly exercised her discretion in admitting their statements keeping one another abreast of the TPC’s completed or planned retaliatory acts as well as efforts (such as the April 18 jettisoning of the guns) designed to cover the crew’s tracks.
Bates argues that the procedures the police used to have Davenport identify the voices heard in recorded jail telephone calls, particularly Anderson’s and Jenkins’ voices, were unnecessarily suggestive. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) Officer Habeebullah testified that she had listened to the recordings with Davenport, and when he was 24 able to identify voices he recorded the results on voice-identification sheets that she and Davenport signed. Bates’ undue suggestivity argument stems from the detective’s acknowledgment on cross-examination that the names at least of Anderson and Jenkins had been typed at the bottom of the voice identification sheets before they were handed to Davenport. Neither Bates, however, nor any other defendant made a suggestivity objection in the trial court, so our review on the point is for plain error. See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 52 (b); Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 46667 (1997) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)). At most the detective’s testimony about the sequence of these events is ambiguous,13 and appellants thus cannot show “obvious” error in the judge’s admission of the identifications. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. Moreover, since the record shows that 13 A. Well, before he [Davenport] saw the sheet he said the name of the person. So that wasn’t suggestive. He supplied me the names first before he wrote this name on this piece of paper. Q. But you had already handed him the piece of paper as you’ve already told us and right on the piece of paper its says Boogie [Jenkins] and Peanut [Anderson] continue their conversation, right? A. Correct. Q. So he was filling out this paper, as he listened to the tapes, right? A. Yes. 25 Davenport had known Anderson and Jenkins for years, appellants are equally hardpressed to dispute that the voice identifications, suggestivity aside, were reliable in all the circumstances. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).