Opinion ID: 2585200
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Advisory counsel's alleged conflict of interest; alleged coercion of defendant into accepting advisory counsel despite conflict

Text: Defendant contends his advisory counsel, Robert Winston, labored under a conflict of interest stemming from his representation of prosecution witness Treva Coonce; defendant never waived the conflict, he further contends, but was coerced into accepting Winston as advisory counsel by virtue of the trial court's professed inability to find other advisory counsel for him under the circumstance that defendant refused to waive time. The conflict, defendant asserts, denied him due process, his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel, his right to a fair and reliable verdict under the Eighth Amendment, and his rights under parallel state constitutional provisions. We note that because there is no constitutional right to advisory counsel (see post, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 650, 38 P.3d at p. 491), defendant's claim must arise under the due process clause. Resolution of this issue requires a fairly extended recitation of the factual circumstances. Attorney Winston represented defendant on a charge of murdering Kenneth Stewart, with a kidnapping specialcircumstance allegation, from February 8, 1989, to the dismissal of the charges in April 1989. When the case was refiled, on May 1, 1989, defendant was represented by Ernest Kinney. On August 14, 1989, following the trial court's finding him competent to stand trial, defendant moved to dismiss Kinney and represent himself with the help of advisory counsel. At the same time, he told the court he did not want his trial postponed further and would not waive time. After warning defendant of the slim chance of finding an attorney to assist him without a waiver of time, and admonishing him of the dangers of self-representation, the court granted his request to proceed in propria persona and relieved Kinney as counsel. On August 17, 1989, the court appointed Winston as advisory counsel. On August 25, 1989, the prosecution notified the court of a possible conflict of interest in Winston's service as advisory counsel, in that on July 25, 1989, Winston had undertaken the representation of prosecution witness Treva Coonce in several factually unrelated cases. According to the prosecution, the disposition of Coonce's cases depended on her truthful testimony in defendant's trial. After a private discussion with defendant, Winston explained on the record the circumstances of his representation of Coonce as follows: The municipal court had requested him to represent Coonce on two felony and three misdemeanor matters, all factually unrelated to defendant's case. Winston had accepted the appointment and met Coonce in court, introduced himself to her, and told her they would talk at a later time. Before they ever discussed her cases, Coonce became seriously ill, was admitted to a hospital, and was not expected to recover. When Winston thereafter was appointed as defendant's advisory counsel, he recognized a problem in connection with his representation of Coonce, but he did not regard the problem as an actual conflict because he had never discussed her cases or any other case with Coonce. He appeared in municipal court the day after his appointment as defendant's advisory counsel, intending to conflict out on Coonce's cases, only to discover the district attorney's office had already dismissed four of the five cases filed against her. Winston informed the prosecutor handling the fifth Mr. McKenna, of the disposition of the other four; McKenna immediately dismissed the fifth case. Winston understood the reason for the dismissals was the county's desire to avoid responsibility for the cost of the medical and surgical treatment Coonce required to save her life. Winston further advised the court that he understood Coonce was not expected to live, and that if she did survive, she was likely to have suffered brain damage and severe disability and would be unable to testify in defendant's case. Winston was never informed of any immunity agreement between Coonce and the district attorney's office pertaining to defendant's capital case until the day the prosecution raised the issue of the potential conflict. The prosecutor then represented to the court and the defense that Coonce in fact had recovered more fully than had been anticipated and likely would be able to take the stand by the time her testimony was needed. The prosecutor expressed concern that Coonce had not waived any conflict arising from the prior representation. Defendant then declared he was not waiving any conflict. He further insisted he was not waiving time in order to find new advisory counsel. In view of the seriousness of the case and the potential conflict of interest, the trial court then discharged Winston as advisory counsel. On August 29, 1989, Winston moved the trial court to reconsider its ruling. He reiterated he had never received confidential communications from Coonce, the cases on which he was appointed to represent her were factually unrelated to defendant's capital case, and the only documents he received in her casespolice reports were available to any member of the public who cared to review the files. He explained: I feel no compunction or influence that would keep me from being an aggressive advisory counsel to Mr. Lawley. I certainly wouldn't pull any punches and my relationship, such as it was with Ms. Coonce, would not affect my representation or advisory representation to Mr. Lawley in any manner whatsoever. Winston stated that, during his initial representation of defendant, he recalled receiving no police reports or other documents even mentioning Coonce. [16] He acknowledged he would not undertake any future representation of Coonce and would resist any attempt to reappoint him to her cases, should they be revived. Winston also acknowledged that assisting defendant in thoroughly and actively cross-examining Coonce would be part of the job of advisory counsel, and that if Coonce lied on the stand and was subsequently recharged with a felony, such a scenario would not affect his ability to serve defendant. In response to inquiry by the trial court, defendant stated he could not judge whether Winston had a conflict, and was not waiving any conflict. The prosecutor opposed Winston's reappointment as advisory counsel, citing People v. Easley (1988) 46 Cal.3d 712, 250 Cal.Rptr. 855, 759 P.2d 490, in which a death sentence was reversed due to defense counsel's conflict of interest in simultaneously representing a prosecution witness in a civil lawsuit arising out of the same incident (an alleged arson) that formed the basis of the prosecution's penalty phase case. Based on all the circumstances, the trial court concluded Winston had no conflict in representing defendant in an advisory capacity. Consequently, the court reappointed Winston as advisory counsel nunc pro tunc, and Winston served in that capacity for the remainder of the trial. [17] Although, as the Attorney General notes, a self-represented defendant has no constitutional right to the appointment of advisory counsel (e.g., People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1368, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259), when such counsel is appointed the defendant is entitled to expect professionally competent assistance within the narrow scope of advisory counsel's proper role (see People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1164, fn. 14, 259 Cal.Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730). Professionally competent assistance comprises assistance unaffected by conflict of interest. ( Wood v. Georgia (1981) 450 U.S. 261, 271, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220; see People v. Easley, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 724, 250 Cal.Rptr. 855, 759 P.2d 490.) When the trial court knows, or reasonably should know, of the possibility of a conflict of interest on the part of defense counsel, it is required to make inquiry into the matter. ( People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 836, 254 Cal.Rptr. 298, 765 P.2d 460.) The court, upon inquiring, may decline to relieve counsel if it determines the risk of a conflict is too remote. ( Id. at pp. 836-837, 254 Cal.Rptr. 298, 765 P.2d 460, citing Holloway v. Arkansas (1978) 435 U.S. 475, 484, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426.) In making its determination, the court may rely on the representations of defense counsel that no conflict exists. ( U.S. v. Crespo de Llano (9th Cir.1987) 838 F.2d 1006, 1012.) To obtain relief on appeal, the defendant must establish the existence of an actual conflict that adversely affected counsel's performance. ( People v. Bonin, supra, at pp. 837-838, 254 Cal.Rptr. 298, 765 P.2d 460.) In the present case, the trial court found no conflict existed, presumably based on Winston's representation he had received no confidential information from Coonce. Defendant argues this finding was erroneous, pointing out that an attorney-client relationship exists from the moment counsel is appointed by the court ( Smith v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 547, 562, 68 Cal.Rptr. 1, 440 P.2d 65 [dicta]), regardless of the absence of substantive communication between attorney and client (cf. Morris v. Sloppy (1983) 461 U.S. 1, 14, fn. 6, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 [no 6th Amend, requirement of meaningful relationship between attorney and client]). While we agree Winston formed an attorney-client relationship with Coonce upon his appointment in her cases, and such relationship evidently did not terminate until after his appointment as advisory counsel to defendant, in order to find that Winston labored under a conflict of interest during the period when he was advising defendant, we would have to conclude that Winston's duty of loyalty to Coonce as a former client potentially could have hampered his performance as defendant's advisory counsel, such as by causing him to pull his punches in assisting defendant in cross-examining her. Winston disclaimed such a possibility, and we may reasonably rely on that disclaimer, especially given Winston's assurance he would not undertake any future representation of Coonce. ( U.S. v. Crespo de Llano, supra, 838 F.2d at p. 1012.) For this reason, defendant's insistence in the trial court that he was not waiving any conflict fails to bring this case within the rule in Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, 435 U.S. at page 488, 98 S.Ct. 1173, where the high court articulated a rule of automatic reversal in situations where a trial court requires the continuation of conflicted representation over a timely objection. In any event, assuming some potential conflict not apparent on this record, defendant fails to demonstrate it adversely affected Winston's performance as advisory counsel. ( People v. Bonin, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 837-838, 254 Cal.Rptr. 298, 765 P.2d 460.)