Opinion ID: 2977233
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pickaway County Health District

Text: The district court granted summary judgment to the Health District on the grounds that Appellants’ claims were unripe. Federal courts have jurisdiction only over those suits that present an actual “case” or “controversy.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; see also Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997). “No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than [this] constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction.” Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968)). Ripeness is not just a procedural question, but one that is determinative of jurisdiction. Arnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552, 562 (6th Cir. 2002). As the Court has made clear in several decisions: [A] claim that the application of government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue. Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985) (collecting cases). - 15 - No. 06-3869 Crosby v. Pickaway County Gen. Health Dist. Furthermore, a state’s action in a takings claim “is not ‘complete’ in the sense of causing a constitutional injury” until the property owner has used the proper state procedures and the state has failed to provide just compensation for the taking. Id. at 195. The only situation in which Appellants are exempted from this requirement of seeking state remedies is if they can demonstrate that available state procedures are inadequate. Ibid. Appellants argue that Williamson County is no longer good law. As evidence of this, they cite the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco: Finally, Williamson County’s state-litigation rule has created some real anomalies, justifying our revisiting the issue. For example, our holding today ensures that litigants who go to state court to seek compensation will likely be unable later to assert their federal takings claims in federal court. And, even if preclusion law would not block a litigant’s claim, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine might, insofar as Williamson County can be read to characterize the state courts’ denial of compensation as a required element of the Fifth Amendment takings claim. As the [majority opinion] recognizes, Williamson County all but guarantees that claimants will be unable to utilize the federal courts to enforce the Fifth Amendment’s just compensation guarantee. 545 U.S. 323, 351 (2005) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). Appellants also point to two cases outside this circuit: Kottschade v. City of Rochester, 319 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 2003), and Wilkinson v. Pitkin County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 142 F.3d 1319 (10th Cir. 1998). In Kottschade, the court acknowledged that “[t]he requirement that all state remedies be exhausted, and the barriers to federal jurisdiction presented by res judicata and collateral estoppel that may follow from this requirement, may be anomalous.” 319 F.3d at 1040-41. But it concluded that “[n]onetheless, Williamson controls the instant case.” Id. at 1041. Likewise, the Wilkinson court - 16 - No. 06-3869 Crosby v. Pickaway County Gen. Health Dist. noted its “concern that Williamson’s ripeness requirement may, in actuality, almost always result in preclusion of federal claims, regardless of whether reservation is permitted.” 142 F.3d at 1325 n.4. It nevertheless concluded that Williamson County was still good law. Ibid. These three cases do nothing to undercut the validity of Williamson County. The Supreme Court’s majority decision in San Remo is predicated on Williamson County. Moreover, the Court has not yet accepted Chief Justice Rehnquist’s invitation to reexamine Williamson County’s exhaustion requirement. Until it does so, Williamson County remains good law. Thus, to proceed on their takings claim, Appellants must demonstrate that: (1) the Health District reached a final decision; and (2) either they used the proper state proceedings and the state denied them just compensation or they were exempt from using those state proceedings because they were inadequate. While the decision of the Health District was arguably final at the time the district court issued its opinion, the Appellants had not availed themselves of the state procedures, nor did they demonstrate the required inadequacy. Therefore, the district court was correct to conclude, at that time, that the Appellants’ claims were unripe. Nevertheless, on October 5, 2006, after the district court issued its decision, the Ohio Court of Common Pleas granted the Health District’s motion for summary judgment and denied the Appellants’ petition for a writ of mandamus. Crosby, No. 2005-CI-352. That decision was subsequently affirmed on December 14, 2007, by the Ohio Court of Appeals. Crosby, 2007 WL 4395154. Because “ripeness is peculiarly a question of timing, it is the situation now rather than the situation at the time of the District Court’s decision that must govern.” Reg’l Rail Reorganization - 17 - No. 06-3869 Crosby v. Pickaway County Gen. Health Dist. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 140 (1974); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 114-18 (1976); Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846, 850 (7th Cir. 1982).
Though the determination of finality is informed by state law, it is ultimately a mixed question of fact and law that must be decided under the standards of federal law. Williamson County prong-one ripeness is a factual determination,[6] taking into account all relevant statutes, ordinances, and regulations, that the decisionmaker has arrived at a final determination with respect to the permit applicant’s use of her property, and that that determination is one which will allow a court to determine whether a regulatory taking has taken place. DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 525 (6th Cir. 2004). As the Supreme Court has explained: Williamson County’s final decision requirement “responds to the high degree of discretion characteristically possessed by land-use boards in softening the strictures of the general regulations they administer.” Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 738 (1997). While a landowner must give a land-use authority an opportunity to exercise its discretion, once it becomes clear that the agency lacks the discretion to permit any development, or the permissible uses of the property are known to a reasonable degree of certainty, a takings claim is likely to have ripened. 6 Though the court uses the term “factual,” we should not interpret this to mean that finality is a pure question of fact. Of course, questions of fact may arise; for example, there might be a dispute over whether a party actually sought a variance. In those cases, a court may very well be unable to decide the issue without first submitting the question to a finder of fact. Nevertheless, the ultimate determination of finality is itself is a question of law determined by the court. In the case at hand, there is no dispute over the circumstances surrounding Appellants’ attempts to receive a permit, and therefore we review the district court’s determination of finality based on the undisputed facts de novo. - 18 - No. 06-3869 Crosby v. Pickaway County Gen. Health Dist. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 620 (2001); see also DLX, Inc., 381 F.3d at 525-26 (describing the inquiry into state law). Appellants must give the administrative authority the “opportunity to exercise its discretion”; however, once “the permissible uses of the property are known to a reasonable degree of certainty,” the decision should be considered final. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 620. In Palazzolo, the Supreme Court distinguished ripe takings cases from those that “challenged a land-use authority’s denial of a substantial project, leaving doubt whether a more modest submission or an application for a variance would be accepted.” Ibid. Our circuit has interpreted this to mean that “a zoning determination cannot be deemed final until the plaintiffs have applied for, and been denied, a variance.” Seguin v. City of Sterling Heights, 968 F.2d 584, 587 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 187-88). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court also cautioned that “[g]overnment authorities, of course, may not burden property by imposition of repetitive or unfair land-use procedures in order to avoid a final decision.” Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 621 (citing Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 698 (1999)).7 7 We emphasize the particular roles of federal and state courts in determining finality because the state court also made a determination of the “finality” of the Health District’s decision under an Ohio state law that requires would-be Appellants to receive a “final” order or decision before pursuing a writ of mandamus. The state court concluded that Monty Cummings (and presumably his co-owners, Cathy Cummings and Jeremiah Rayburn) had received a final order but that the Crosbys had not, basing its determination on the fact that: (1) Cummings had, at the September 28, 2004, meeting of the Board of Health, received an official resolution denying his request for a sewage permit; and (2) the Crosbys had not sought any review of the Health District’s decision. Although the district court and state court came to different conclusions about “finality,” the district court was not obliged to adopt the state court’s definition of finality nor was the state court obliged to defer to the district court’s earlier determination of the matter. The reason is that the two standards of “finality” are actually distinct legal inquiries. Thus, there is no need to delve into the complicated subjects of issue preclusion, comity, or deference. - 19 - No. 06-3869 Crosby v. Pickaway County Gen. Health Dist. The district court did not explicitly analyze Ohio law in making its factual determination regarding finality. For example, the court did not note that the Health District provided both a process of review and an opportunity to request a variance; nor did it note that Appellants failed to avail themselves of those remedies. Appellants’ April 2004 drainage plan, submitted after the suspension of their health permit, was also rejected by the Health District. Though the district court did not clearly state this, it seems that it analogized the submission of a drainage plan to a request for a variance. Evoking the language of Palazzolo, the court observed that, “[t]heoretically, Plaintiffs could submit plans ad infinitum only to be told that each plan was unacceptable, but that Defendant Health District was willing to consider yet another plan.” As noted above, a single rejected variance request is enough to satisfy Williamson County finality. Seguin, 968 F.2d at 587. Thus, the court did not err in concluding that the rejected drainage plan is also enough to satisfy the first prong of Williamson County.
Both parties agree that the applicable state procedure for seeking just compensation is a writ of mandamus seeking an order compelling the government to initiate an appropriation action, as authorized by Chapter 163 of the Ohio Revised Code. See Levin v. City of Sheffield Lake, 637 N.E. 2d 319, 322-23 (Ohio 1994). At the time the district court was considering Appellants’ federal takings claim, Appellants had initiated such action, but the state court had not yet issued a decision. In order to avoid dismissal of their federal claims, Appellants argued that the state proceedings were irrelevant because under the inadequacy exception of Williamson County they were not actually - 20 - No. 06-3869 Crosby v. Pickaway County Gen. Health Dist. required to pursue those remedies. The district court was unconvinced by the inadequacy argument and held that Appellants’ federal claims were unripe because the state court had not issued a decision denying them compensation. Subsequently, the state court dismissed Appellants’ complaint for mandamus. The Appellants brought this argument to the attention of the district court by filing a supplement to their previous Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment. In denying the Appellants’ Rule 60(b) motion, the district court did not mention the state court decision. On appeal before this court, Appellants assert two parallel lines of argument. First, they argue that the district court erred in holding that the state proceedings were adequate. Second, Appellants argue that the district court erred in denying their Rule 60(b) motion. There is no evidence in the record that Appellants appealed the denial of their Rule 60(b) motion; thus, Appellants’ second argument is not properly before this court. See, e.g., Green v. Union Foundry Co., 281 F.3d 1229, 1233 (11th Cir. 2002) (declining to consider the district court’s ruling on post-judgment motion that was not properly appealed). Nor are we convinced by the Appellants’ argument that the state proceedings were irrelevant because they were exempt from pursuing them under the inadequacy exception of Williamson County. In general, the second prong of Williamson County requires that property owners first seek and be denied compensation in state court proceedings. This requirement is waived if the property owner can show that the state court proceedings are inadequate. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 195. Appellants argue that Ohio’s proceedings are inadequate because Appellants “cannot recover all of their damages in an appropriation action under state law,” but they would be able to “collect - 21 - No. 06-3869 Crosby v. Pickaway County Gen. Health Dist. . . . damages in federal court that are not allowed in state court.” (Appellants’ Br. 38, 41). This argument is specious. Appellants estimate the value of their allegedly taken property to be $345,000. In addition to this, they also seek consequential damages “due to delay” in the amount of $280,000. (Appellants’ Br. 39-40). They also demand $50,000, which is the interest on incurred construction loans, utilities, insurance, and real estate taxes during the period of time after the permits were revoked. Appellants argue that under Ohio law they can recover only the value of the property and not any consequential damages. Assuming that Appellants are correct in asserting that Ohio law prevents them from collecting these kind of consequential damages in an appropriation proceeding, this fact is irrelevant because Appellants are also barred from collecting those damages in federal court. The Supreme Court has consistently held that consequential damages are not available in § 1983 takings cases. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379-80 (1945) (“We are not to be taken as departing from the [case law] laid down, which we think sound. . . . [D]amage to . . . rights of ownership does not include losses to [one’s] business or other consequential damage.”); United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 33 (1984) (“This view is consistent . . . with our prior holdings that the Fifth Amendment does not require any award for consequential damages arising from a condemnation.”). Just as condemnation practice “provide[s] little guidance” to the question of whether § 1983 Appellants are entitled to a jury, § 1983 remedies provide little guidance to determining whether condemnation proceedings are adequate. The only inquiry we should make is whether Ohio’s proceedings can adequately provide just compensation for takings. This circuit has previously held - 22 - No. 06-3869 Crosby v. Pickaway County Gen. Health Dist. that Ohio’s scheme is adequate. In Coles v. Granville, we recognized that “Ohio has reasonable, certain, and adequate procedures for plaintiffs to pursue compensation for an involuntary taking.” 448 F.3d 853, 865 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Appellants provide no cogent argument as to why we should revisit this holding. The district court held that though the Health District had issued a final decision in regard to their property, Appellants had not sought and been denied compensation for the alleged regulatory taking. The district court did not err in these determinations, and thus did not err in dismissing Appellants’ § 1983 claims for an uncompensated taking as unripe under Williamson County. The district court’s determination was correct at the time of its decision, but circumstances have since changed with the state court rulings. Although the Ohio Court of Appeals based its decision on Appellants’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies and was not a decision on the merits, its resolution of the mandamus petition provides the requisite denial of compensation through state procedures. See DLX, Inc., 381 F.3d at 518-19 (holding that administrative exhaustion is not required to establish prong-two ripeness under Williamson in a § 1983 takings case). Appellants’ claim is now ripe. We therefore vacate the grant of summary judgment to the Health District and remand for further proceedings.