Opinion ID: 4537244
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Possible cumulative error

Text: Under the doctrine of cumulative error, “an aggregation of non-reversible errors . . . can yield a denial of the constitutional right to a fair trial, which calls for reversal.” United States v. Delgado, 672 F.3d 320, 343–44 (5th Cir. 2012). Reversal is justified when the errors, considered cumulatively, violate the trial’s fundamental fairness. Id. Though this is possible in theory, arguments for cumulative error are “practically never found persuasive.” United States v. De Nieto, 922 F.3d 669, 681 (5th Cir. 2019). Nicholson argues alleged errors involving summary testimony, admission of a draft tax return, and comments from Lee regarding grand jury testimony and from Wright regarding burden of proof, when all considered cumulatively, require reversal. As explained, Luker’s testimony and the charts were permissible. The admission of a draft tax return to show the materiality of the change in Nicholson’s adjusted basis in Nicholson & Co. was similarly not an error because it related to the materiality of the change in adjusted basis. As to these arguments, there is no error to cumulate. See Delgado, 672 F.3d at 343–44. Any error arising from the comments by Lee and Wright were cured by the jury instructions that we discuss next. Finally, there were certain comments made at trial which Nicholson alleges violated its fundamental fairness. At the end of the Government’s case, the district court told jurors they would next hear Nicholson’s defense, at which 16 Case: 19-60365 Document: 00515431288 Page: 17 Date Filed: 05/28/2020 No. 19-60365 time defense counsel would call witnesses. Outside the presence of the jury, Nicholson’s counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that the district court had implied to jurors that Nicholson was obligated to present a defense case. The district court denied the motion. Upon the jury’s return, the court gave the following instruction: “I misspoke . . . when I sent you out. On Monday I told you . . . in my instruction that the defendant is allowed to but not required to call any witnesses, and that’s . . . the defendant’s right. . . . [N]ow I’m going to offer to the defendant the right to present his case-in-chief.” Nicholson’s defense counsel rested without calling witnesses. Before the jury began deliberations, the district court instructed the jury that “the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence” and that “summary charts and witnesses are no better than the underlying testimony and the documents upon which they are based and are not themselves independent evidence.” We conclude that the district court’s erroneous comments at the end of the prosecution’s case were cured by specific jury instructions, which we presume the jury followed. See United States v. Reed, 908 F.3d 102, 115 n.42 (5th Cir. 2018). AFFIRMED. 17