Opinion ID: 1421558
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the concept of self-defense

Text: Examination of self-defense as a concept of tort law is helpful in determining how to interpret an insurance policy which indemnifies against tort damages and contains an exclusionary clause for injuries expected or intended by the insured. In discussing the evolution of the concept of fault in tort law, Prosser offers some important historical insights. Originally the man who hurt another by pure accident, or in self-defense, was required to make good the damage inflicted. In all civil acts, it was said, the law doth not so much regard the intent of the actor, as the loss and damage of the party suffering. There was ... a rule, undoubtedly supported by the general feeling in the community, that he who breaks must pay. Prosser, Handbook on the Law of Torts § 75 at 492 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted). As social policy and community sentiment, much of this may still be true today, but modern tort law does seek to characterize the behavior of the actor as either blameworthy or morally faultless. In tort law, therefore, there is usually a need to distinguish between negligence and intent. This is a matter of line drawing. [T]he mere knowledge and appreciation of a risk, short of substantial certainty, is not the equivalent of intent. The defendant who acts in the belief or consciousness that he is causing an appreciable risk of harm to another may be negligent, and if the risk is great his conduct may be characterized as reckless or wanton, but it is not classed as an intentional wrong. In such cases the distinction between intent and negligence obviously is a matter of degree. Apparently the line has been drawn by the courts at the point where the known danger ceases to be only a foreseeable risk which a reasonable man would avoid, and becomes a substantial certainty. Prosser, supra, § 8 at 32 (emphasis supplied) (substantially quoted in Gray v. Zurich, supra); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 8A, especially comment (b). This understanding of intent and negligence has particular relevance for understanding the privilege of self-defense in tort law. One may use only reasonable force (which, of course, might injure the aggressor) to prevent harm to his person. Prosser, supra., § 19 at 108. The defendant is not privileged to inflict a beating which goes beyond the real or apparent necessities of his own defense. If he does, he is committing a tort as to the excessive force, and it is entirely possible that each party may have an action against the other. Id. at 109-10 (emphasis supplied). The tort of excessive force in the course of self-defense is apparently nonintentional tortious conduct, to use the phrase of the California court in Gray v. Zurich, supra. By using this term the California court seems to be balancing the scales to fix minimal blame on one who overreacts in self-defense because it implicitly recognizes that the mental state induced in one repulsing an attack is different from that of the attacker (who commits an intentional tort). Id. Thus, tort law recognizes an inherent distinction in the quality of intent. The attacker commits an intentional tort; the defender, though he strikes intentionally, may not act with wrongful intent. This distinction is a recognition in tort law that the basic or underlying intent of the actor is more important in characterizing the conduct than the immediate intent accompanying the act which produced the injury. B  ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW Meere claimed in his deposition that, while he intentionally struck Pruitt, his purpose was only to defend himself. Meere desired no harm to Pruitt but sought only to prevent harm to himself. As we have noted, in such a case the word intent operates at different levels and has different connotations. However, Transamerica (citing Clark v. Allstate Insurance Company, supra ) argues that Meere's subjective intent is of no moment because one is held to have intended the natural and probable consequences of his act, whatever they are and regardless of actual subjective feeling. We have recognized that [A]n act may be so certain to cause a particular injury that the intent to cause the harm is inferred as a matter of law and the subjective intent of the actor is immaterial. Farmers Insurance Company of Arizona v. Vagnozzi, 138 Ariz. 443, 449, 675 P.2d 703, 709 (1983). This statement in Vagnozzi is based on the holdings in Steinmetz v. National American Insurance Co., supra and Clark v. Allstate Insurance Co., supra . Both of these cases, however, are easily distinguished. In Clark, for instance, the intentional blow was entirely unprovoked. Clark came to his fight; Meere's fight came to him. Clark may be presumed to have had the detached reflection which is not expected of a person faced with an uplifted fist or with an unprovoked attack. Cf. Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343, 41 S.Ct. 501, 502, 65 L.Ed. 961 (1921). Under the Steinmetz  Clark rule the insured is conclusively presumed to have intended to injure when he commits an act calculated to cause some injury. However, we also recognized in Vagnozzi that the Steinmetz  Clark rule is not applicable in all cases. The presumption that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary actions, used in determining responsibility for the consequences of voluntary acts, has no application to the interpretation of terms used in insurance contracts.       ... [the insured] stated in his deposition that he intended to hit Vagnozzi but also stated he did so in order to knock Vagnozzi out of the way and pursue the ball. The policy definition of accident as an event resulting in injury [neither] expected or intended by the insured makes the subjective intent of the insured a question of fact to be determined after listening to the testimony. The two interpretations which can be drawn from [the insured's] testimony create enough question as to his intent that the Steinmetz exception does not apply. For purposes of determining that a resulting injury was so certain to occur that the actor intended the harm as a matter of a law, we find that intentionally throwing an elbow in an attempt to get the ball during a heated basketball game is distinguishable from deliberately punching a person in the face. Whether the injury was the intended result of [the insured's] act or whether the act constituted negligent or grossly reckless conduct is a matter upon which reasonable minds can differ. Vagnozzi, 138 Ariz. at 449-50, 675 P.2d at 709-10. We believe the blow struck in self-defense is analogous to that struck in an attempt to get to the basketball. In both cases the insured must be aware that his act possibly or even probably may cause injury. In neither case does the insured necessarily have a primary desire to injure the victim. The unprovoked blow, such as that struck in Steinmetz or Clark, however, is different. The unprovoked (unprivileged) act of striking someone in the face with a fist is an unequivocal manifestation of a basic purpose or desire to cause some injury and the law will not allow the insured to evade the applicability of the exclusions by protestations of innocence. The blow was volitional, the event was in the control of the insured, and no accident or calamity beyond his control occurred. The law presumes he intended the result which was the natural consequence of his intentional act. In summary, in Clark and Steinmetz, the insured controlled the loss and thus fell within the category of risks which both the insurance contract and public policy consider uninsurable. In the case at bench, however, there is evidence from which the finder of fact may decide that Meere was confronted with a risk over which he had little control. His blow may not have been the result of a cognitive process, and his action may not have been voluntary. Although his act was intentional, and its natural consequence was to cause injury, his basic desire or purpose may not have been to injure. The Steinmetz-Clark presumption does not apply. Substantial authority supports such an analysis. The Nebraska Supreme Court, after analyzing a number of cases concluded: The cases, as evidenced by those already cited, point out that when one acts in self-defense the actor is not generally acting for the purpose of intending any injury to another but, rather, is acting for the purpose of attempting to prevent injury to himself. It can easily be said that such act, though resulting in bodily injury to another, was neither expected nor intended within the terms of the policy.... An injury resulting from an act committed by an insured in self-defense is not, as a matter of law, an expected or intended act ... Allstate Insurance Company v. Novak, 210 Neb. 184, 192-93, 313 N.W.2d 636, 640-41 (1981); see also Patrons-Oxford Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dodge, supra ; Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Sipple, 255 N.W.2d 373 (Minn. 1977); Hanover Insurance Group v. Cameron, 122 N.J. Super. 51, 298 A.2d 715 (1973). Analogous situations exist in which inquiry into the insured's basic subjective intent has not been limited to cases of sports injury, where some degree of force is to be expected, or to cases of self-defense. It extends to other situations in which the insured acted intentionally but did not control the risk. For instance, where the insured commits an intentional act causing injury but lacks the mental capacity to act rationally, the clause does not apply because its application would be inconsistent with a primary purpose for incorporating intentional injury exclusions ..., i.e., to preclude individuals from benefiting financially when they deliberately cause injury. Globe American Casualty Co. v. Lyons, 131 Ariz. at 339-40, 641 P.2d at 253-54. Where the insured intentionally injures the victim because of mistaken identity, the clause does not apply. Curtain v. Aldrich, 589 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. App. 1979) (the insured beat a burglar over the head with a crowbar, only to find that the burglar was his brother-in-law; the court held that if the jury found a case of mistaken identity and further found that there was no specific intent to injure the brother-in-law, the exclusion would not be applicable even though the insured intentionally struck blows intending to injure a burglar). Case authority to the contrary exists. See, e.g., Home Insurance Company v. Neilsen, 165 Ind. App. 445, 450, 332 N.E.2d 240 (1975). We believe, however, that when the factors involving public policy and the purpose of the contractual exclusion are considered, the proper interpretation of the clause in question is that it excludes indemnification or coverage when the insured intentionally acts wrongfully with a purpose to injure. When he acts wrongfully, he commits an intentional tort by performing an act designed to inflict injury. He will not be allowed under such circumstances to deny a basic intent demonstrated by his acts. Steinmetz, supra ; Clark, supra . Nor will he be allowed to escape from the exclusionary clause by claiming that he did not intend the precise injury  in character or magnitude  that in fact occurred. However, if the insured can show facts which might establish that he acted with privilege (as in a sports injury case, for instance) or under claim of right recognized by law (as in self-defense), he will be permitted to explain his subjective intent, and it will be for the fact finder to determine whether he had an underlying purpose to injure. The basic question is whether the conduct which led to the blow was intentionally wrongful from the view-point of the law of torts. Such an interpretation comports with the intent of the exclusionary clause in a policy which insures against tort damages; it is consistent both with the public policy which forbids indemnification against wrongful acts and with the better reasoned authority. [I]ntent in an action for assault requires merely that the defendant intend to do the wrongful act. See W. Prosser, The Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964) § 8 at 31. In order to constitute intent in an intentional acts exclusion or in the definition of occurrence, however, the insured must desire to harm the plaintiff. 11 Couch on Insurance 2d § 44:289 (Rev. ed 1982). Berg, Losing Control of the Defense  The Insured's Right to Select His Own Counsel, 26 For the Defense (No. 7) 10, 16 (July 1984) (Defense Research Institute). Thus, if the trier of fact determines that Meere was the aggressor and acted wrongfully by striking Pruitt without legal justification, the basic intent to injure will be presumed and the exclusion will apply. Steinmetz, supra . If the finder of fact determines that Meere's conduct was not intentionally wrongful, but that he acted instead in self-defense with no basic purpose to injure, the exclusion will not apply. Of course, in such circumstances one would expect that the judgment in the tort case will be in Meere's favor, and Transamerica's purse will be spared. If the jury finds that Meere acted in self-defense with no basic desire or intent to harm Pruitt, but negligently used force greater than necessary in self-defense, Meere may be liable for damages to Pruitt. In such an event, the true situation is one of negligence. Gray v. Zurich, supra. It is the only real exposure for Transamerica and it is, we believe, within the coverage of the policy and not within the exclusion. Since the complaint alleges facts which may be within the policy coverage, the insurer is obligated to assume the defense. Kepner v. Western Fire Insurance Co., 109 Ariz. 329, 331, 509 P.2d 222, 224 (1973). Of course, further discovery may reveal uncontested facts which obviate the self-defense theory which Meere has raised. If these facts plainly take the case outside policy coverage, there is no duty to defend. Id.; Granite State Insurance Corp. v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 117 Ariz. 432, 573 P.2d 506 (App. 1977). We hold, therefore, that the court erred in granting summary judgment to Transamerica. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, the opinion of the court of appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. GORDON, V.C.J., and HAYS and CAMERON, JJ., concur.