Opinion ID: 532819
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rejection of Acceptance of Responsibility

Text: Guidelines Sec. 3E1.1 provides that: 22 (a) If the defendant clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct, reduce the offense level by 2 levels. 10 23    24 (c) A defendant who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to a sentencing reduction under this section as a matter of right. 25 In determining whether a defendant qualifies for an acceptance of responsibility adjustment, consideration may be given to voluntary termination or withdrawal from criminal conduct or associations. Application Note 1(a). In addition, Application Note 4 states that acceptance of responsibility is ordinarily not warranted where a defendant's sentence is being enhanced pursuant to Guidelines Sec. 3C1.1, as Jordan's is here. 11 26 The district court rejected Jordan's request for remorse points on the basis of Jordan's undisputed participation in what appeared to be two separate incidents of drug dealing involving minors while he awaited sentencing. There was no factual dispute regarding these incidents. The district judge exercised his discretion properly in finding that a defendant who took advantage of his status as a convicted drug dealer free on bond to pursue drug trafficking in the company of minors has not accepted responsibility for the criminal behavior for which he was convicted. Jordan does little more than point to his guilty plea to a single count of his three-count indictment as evidence of his acceptance of responsibility. The Sentencing Commission went out of its way in subsection 3E1.1(c) to suggest that a plea alone does not justify leniency; a district court may expect more than Jordan has provided in the way of visible acceptance of responsibility. Just as it is difficult to credit Jordan with acceptance of responsibility in light of his continued drug dealing, it is also hard to see how his use of cocaine while awaiting sentencing for dealing in that drug is consistent with acceptance of responsibility for that crime. C. Upward Departure 27 The sentencing court is not generally allowed to depart from a prescribed guidelines sentence on the basis of circumstances adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(b). The Sentencing Commission nonetheless decided to allow for departures for two primary reasons. First, the Commission recognized the difficulty of establishing within one set of categories and commentaries, particularly the first such set, a system that would adequately address the vast range of human conduct potentially relevant to a sentencing decision. Policy Statements, Manual at 1.6. Second, the Commission trusted sentencing courts to save their authority to depart for the truly atypical case. [T]hey will not do so very often. Id. at 1.7. 28 Thus if the Guidelines simply do not capture circumstances of a case which the district court determines are relevant to a proper sentence or if the circumstances are sufficiently unusual, the district court may in its discretion factor those circumstances into his or her sentencing decision. Guidelines Policy Statement Sec. 5K2.0, Manual at 5.42. Such occasional departures do not defeat the purpose of the Guidelines, which is to carve out a 'heartland,' a set of typical cases, against which each individual case must be measured. See Policy Statement 4(b), Manual at 1.6. 29 A district court may consider departure only after it has already computed the total offense level and criminal history category according to the Guidelines, as the court did here with painstaking care during the course of three hearings spread over a month's time. At that point, when the court is determining whether departure is warranted, the court may consider, without limitation, any information concerning the background, character, and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law. Guidelines Sec. 1B1.4 (citing 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3661); see also United States v. de la Cruz, 870 F.2d 1192, 1196 (7th Cir.1989). Thus, as the commentary of the Guidelines notes, [t]he range of information that may be considered at sentencing is broader than the range of information upon which the applicable sentencing range is determined. Background to Commentary of Sec. 1B1.3, Manual at 1.20. 30 Judge Stadtmueller explained his decision to depart beyond the sentence dictated by the Guidelines grid in open court in accordance with 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(c) and provided specific reasons for the departure in accordance with 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(c)(2). He stated that Jordan's was not a prototypical case falling within the heartland of such drug-dealing cases: 31 This is not a simple possession case in any sense of the word. The facts belie that. The facts speak out loud and clear that even once charged the defendant was found to have cocaine present in his body systems and involved juveniles in the further trafficking of cocaine. 32 And those facts as well as the defendant's record as a whole, coupled with the matter of the apprehension of the defendant on the occasion of his arrest for the offense with which he presently stands charged and convicted of, in the view of the court cry out for a sentence that goes a bit beyond that called for under the guidelines. 33 Tr. at 89-90. 34 Jordan objects that the district court: (1) did not inform him in advance that the court would be departing from the Guidelines range; (2) was not sufficiently specific in its statement explaining the decision to depart, thus violating the requirement that sentencing courts justify departure; (3) based its departure in part on offenses to which Jordan did not plead guilty; and (4) subjected Jordan to double punishment by relying on factors that already counted against him under the Guidelines. Keeping in mind the reasonableness standard cited above, we consider each objection in turn, treating the third objection as a subset of the second objection. 1. Notice 35 This objection is defeated by logic, the guidelines themselves, and the record in this case. First, the district court cannot announce what the court plans to order in advance of a hearing called for the purpose of soliciting testimony, weighing evidence, and reaching a final sentencing decision. A defendant and his or her defense counsel come to the final sentencing hearing prepared to seek the most favorable sentence possible, having been informed of the probation officer's recommendations. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(a)(1). 12 As long as they are not unfairly surprised with new evidence or information, the court is free to announce its sentence in compliance with the Guidelines and other applicable law. 36 Second, the Sentencing Commission stated that [t]he controlling decision as to whether and to what extent departure is warranted can only be made by the court at the time of sentencing. Sec. 5K2.0, Manual at 5.42 (emphasis added). This statement anticipates a sentencing moment during which the court makes a final determination about departure. That moment most logically falls at the close of a final hearing. 37 Finally, the district court gave Jordan innumerable opportunities to address the calculation of the sentence and the circumstances of the case, well in excess of any requirement of the Guidelines or due process. See United States v. Agyemang, 876 F.2d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir.1989) (government need not tell defendant whom it plans to call to testify, what evidence it plans to present, or even whether it plans to present evidence at sentencing hearing). That fact distinguishes this case from United States v. Palta, 880 F.2d 636, 640 (2nd Cir.1989), in which the court determined that the defendant was not given an adequate opportunity to be heard regarding departure from the Guidelines. If Jordan and his counsel harbored any false sense of security at the time of sentencing it was in spite of the record developed to that date, not because of it. See Tr. at 55-56 (Jordan's counsel referring to departure and possible departure). 2. Specificity and Reasonability 38 The sentencing court must state the specified reason for imposition of a sentence different from that described in the Guidelines. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(c). The district court explained that Jordan's case was extraordinary because he had continued to use and deal in cocaine while awaiting sentencing on a cocaine conviction, because he fled from the scene of his initial arrest, causing injury to a federal agent, and because he took these actions despite the fact that he had already compiled what should have been a sobering criminal record. The record reflects that Jordan and his counsel had ample opportunities before and during the final sentencing hearing to challenge and probe all of those findings. We take each of the district court's justifications for departure in turn, considering jointly Jordan's cocaine use and drug dealing while awaiting sentence. 39 a. Attempt to Flee Arrest and Assault on Officer. --As part of the plea agreement, the government dropped Count III of the indictment, charging Jordan with assaulting the federal agent during his flight from arrest on August 3, 1988. Jordan did not contest the government's description of his flight and the injury to the federal agent, but only denied that Jordan intended to injure the agent and that therefore the injury was self-inflicted. Defendant's Br. at 10. 40 The fact that the government decided not to pursue prosecution on a count returned by the grand jury as part of a plea agreement does not in itself preclude the district court from considering the facts involving that count as an aggravating circumstance of a kind ... that was not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(b). Just as a defendant who engages in a high-speed car chase while violating an unrelated federal law may justifiably receive an enhanced sentence for violating the federal law, see United States v. Ramirez-DeRosas, 873 F.2d 1177 (9th Cir.1989), so too a defendant who flees federal and state agents and causes serious injury to one of them may be sentenced more harshly. Such conduct is not part and parcel of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute it. It was within the discretion of the district court to consider the harm inherent in Jordan's flight from and struggle with armed agents, including the potential for even more serious injury to authorities and bystanders than occurred in this case. It was also of course within the authority of the district court to determine that the injury was not self-inflicted. 41 b. Use of Cocaine and Drug Dealing While Awaiting Sentence.--The charges arising out of the two arrests that occurred while Jordan was awaiting sentencing were still pending at the time of sentencing in this case. The record does not reflect any attempt to prosecute Jordan for illegal drug use in connection with the positive drug test. Regardless of the disposition of the state charges and the potential criminal liability for the drug use, however, Jordan was already in the highest criminal history category for purposes of sentencing in the present case. That fact distinguishes this case from those in which a sentencing court attempts to disregard the Guidelines based on a finding that the defendant's criminal history score inadequately accounts for past conduct, despite the fact that the court could adjust for the inadequacy by increasing the criminal history category one or more levels. Miller, 874 F.2d 466; see Taylor v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 265, 107 L.Ed.2d 215 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring with denial of certiorari). 42 According to the Guidelines Policy Statement regarding the adequacy of the criminal history category, departure is permissible where: 43 [R]eliable information indicates that the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes,.... Such information may include, but is not limited to, information concerning: 44    45    46 (e) prior similar adult conduct not resulting in criminal conviction. 47 Sec. 4A1.3. 48 The sentencing judge need not incant the specific language used in the guidelines. United States v. De Luna-Trujillo, 868 F.2d 122, 124 (5th Cir.1989) (discussing departure based on Guidelines Sec. 4A1.3). Strongly implicit in the district court's explanations of the departure was a finding that Jordan--who dealt in cocaine, abused cocaine, and then lied about his use when confronted with solid evidence to the contrary, all while awaiting sentencing in a cocaine-dealing case--clearly exhibited a propensity to commit future crimes. The federal prosecutor described Jordan during the final sentencing hearing as completely incorrigible. Tr. at 85. In explanatory remarks before pronouncing sentence, the district court stated, Clearly we have an individual who has not in any sense of the word seen the error of his ways when it comes to drug dealing and involvement in it. Tr. at 89. 49 The circumstances of Jordan's two presentencing arrests, together with his drug use, are uncontested and provide reliable information supporting a finding by the district court that the use of a Category VI criminal history in Jordan's case did not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes. See United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 50 (1st Cir.1989). There were clear indications in the two arrests that Jordan was not simply consuming illegal drugs, but was in fact trafficking in them. The district court made a reasonable decision in finding that such activities bespeak a potential for future criminal conduct far beyond the factors that went into reaching Jordan's total offense level and criminal history category. 50 c. Criminal Record.--Had the district court in this case not probed Jordan's criminal record in great detail during the series of hearings held in this case--largely to settle the career offender question not at issue in this appeal--the district court's reference to Jordan's record as a grounds for departure would be more troubling. See, e.g., United States v. Wells, 878 F.2d 1232, 1233 (9th Cir.1989) (Guidelines not satisfied by general recitation that defendant's criminal history category or offense level underrepresents defendant's criminal record); United States v. Michel, 876 F.2d 784 (9th Cir.1989) (same). In determining whether Jordan qualified as a career offender, however, the court had an opportunity to review and discuss his record in some detail. The district court did not simply rely upon the prior arrest record, which is discouraged by the Guidelines. Sec. 4A1.3, Manual at 4.9 ([A] prior arrest record itself shall not be considered under Sec. 4A1.3.). Instead, it found that Jordan both before and after his arrest in this case generated a record of criminal behavior that was not captured by the highest category of criminal history. That finding was not clearly erroneous. 51 Finally, Jordan suggests that a departure of well over 50% of the lower end of the range, in fact 71 percent, was unreasonable. Br. at 10. The degree of departure must be reasonable. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(e)(3); United States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604, 610 (3d Cir.1989). The facts supporting the district judge's decision to depart from the sentence dictated by the Guidelines also support his decision to make the departure substantial. It does not appear unreasonable. 52 3. Double Punishment 53 Finally, Jordan argues that the district court impermissibly relied on the same factors more than once in its various adjustments to the base offense level and in arriving at its decision to depart from the Guidelines. These claims misstate the district court's grounds for his various decisions and also misconstrue the Guidelines. 54 A factor listed as an adjustment or as a specific offense characteristic within the Guidelines may still provide grounds for departure if the court determines that, in light of unusual circumstances, the guideline level attached to that factor is inadequate. Policy Statement, Sec. 5K2.0. Moreover, a district court's determinations regarding adjustment for such factors as Acceptance of Responsibility are judgments made entirely separately from the decision regarding upward or downward departure from the Guidelines, though the two decisions probably will often involve use of the same underlying facts. Compare Sec. 1B1.3 and Sec. 1B1.4. 55 In departing from the Guidelines, the district court carefully considered the circumstances of Jordan's particular case and did not act out of generalized dissatisfaction with the Guidelines. Because the district court did not rely on any impermissible ground in deciding to depart, we need not decide whether any improper reasons would have called for reversal. Compare United States v. Nuno-Para, 877 F.2d 1409, 1414 (9th Cir.1989) (remand where improper and proper reasons given) with United States v. Rodriguez, 882 F.2d 1059, 1066-1068 (6th Cir.1989) (reasonable departure despite district court's use of impermissible rationale). The upward departure was warranted under the circumstances of Jordan's case and the amount of the departure was not unreasonable in light of his continuing criminal activity. III. 56 For the reasons discussed above, the sentence of the district court is affirmed.