Opinion ID: 1366472
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: alternative position on aggregation issue

Text: My alternative position would be to approve in concept the trial court's having aggregated the negligence of the two defendant, but I would reverse and remand for new trial for the reasons which follow. As a complement to our comparative negligence system, Idaho has adopted Wisconsin's individual rule requiring that, when comparing percentages of negligence, the negligence of plaintiff must be compared against each individual defendant in determining whether the plaintiff may recover. We adopted the individual rule in Odenwalt v. Zaring, 102 Idaho 1, 624 P.2d 383 (1980), wherein we noted that Idaho had adopted its comparative negligence statute, I.C. ง 6-801, from Wisconsin (Wis. Stat. ง 895.045) in 1971. Therefore, in the absence of some other legislation which would clearly suggest a different result, [footnote omitted] we should follow the interpretation which the Wisconsin Supreme Court had placed upon their comparative negligence statute prior to 1971. Odenwalt, 102 Idaho at 5, 624 P.2d at 388. The majority in Odenwalt in adopting the individual rule rejected the unit rule, whereby a plaintiff's right to recover is established if the plaintiff's negligence is less than the combined negligence of all defendants. In rejecting the unit rule, [4] we noted that [i]t would be incongruous to suggest that where there is one defendant and one plaintiff, and both are found to be equally negligent (50%), the plaintiff recovers nothing; but where there are two defendants and one plaintiff, and all three are found to be equally negligent (33 1/2%), the plaintiff may recover 66 2/3% of his damages from either defendant. Odenwalt, 102 Idaho at 5, 624 P.2d at 387. We also noted that such incongruity frequently achieves a harsh and unjust result. Odenwalt, 102 Idaho at 5, 64 P.2d at 388. In short, we both adopted the case law of Wisconsin prior to 1971 and adhered to our own concept of fairness. (See also, Leliefeld v. Panorama Contractors, Inc., 111 Idaho 897, 728 P.2d 1306 (1986).) We must, then, look to pre-1971 Wisconsin law, and the logical extensions therefrom, to ascertain the boundaries of our case law concerning comparison and aggregation of negligence. Reber v. Hanson, 260 Wis. 632, 51 N.W.2d 505 (1972), sets the framework for our analysis. In Reber, the negligence of each parent was attributed to both so as to deny their cause of action against one defendant for harm to their child, relying upon the special relationship between, and special and joint duties of, parents. Dombeck v. Chicago Milwaukee St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Companies, 24 Wis.2d 420, 129 N.W.2d 185 (1964) succinctly stated the rule in Wisconsin subsequent to Reber: [T]he negligence of one of two joint venturers is imputed to the other in actions against third persons... Dombeck, 129 N.W.2d at 194. It is clear, then, that pre-1971 Wisconsin case law required the imputation or aggregation of negligence in actions against third persons provided there existed a special relationship so as to trigger liability. Therefore, we must determine whether Coast, as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Coleman, and Coleman itself, were engaged in such a special relationship.