Opinion ID: 158563
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: within 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred; or

Text: 83 (2) in a case to which section 633(b) of this title applies, within 300 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred, or within 30 days after receipt by the individual of notice of termination of proceedings under State law, whichever is earlier. 84 Subsection (b)(2) extends the time period to 300 days if section 633(b) applies. Section 633(b) applies to states that have statutorily prohibited age discrimination. Here, 633(b) applies because the State of Colorado has statutorily prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of age, see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-402, and, therefore, the 300-day limitation period of subsection (d)(2) applies in this case. See 29 U.S.C. § 633(b). 85 The appellants accepted their benefit packages and resigned from Coors between September 8 and October 28, 1993. Coors argues that the latest date that any of the appellants could have been constructively discharged was November 5, 1993 the last date the seven-day revocation period ended for any of the appellants. Using November 5, 1993, as the latest possible date for the alleged unlawful practice by Coors, the 300-day filing period mandated by 29 U.S.C. 626(d)(2) would have expired on September 1, 1994. Appellants (except Ms. Simpson) filed their claims with the EEOC between September 7 and 16, 1994. Coors argues, therefore, that appellants' claims are untimely and barred by the statute because none of appellants filed charges with the EEOC before September 1, 1994. 86 In response, appellants first argue that their claims did not arise until January 31, 1994, the date that Coors allegedly hired its first replacement employee. Therefore, appellants had until November 27, 1994 (300 days from January 31, 1994) to file their claims with the EEOC. In the alternative, appellants argue that even if November 5, 1993 is the date on which their causes of action accrued, the 300-day filing period should be equitably tolled because Coors fraudulently concealed their ADEA claims. 87 Addressing appellants' first argument, we find that November 5, 1993 was the latest date on which their constructive discharge claims could have arisen. In Hulsey v. KMart, Inc., 43 F.3d 555, 557 (10th Cir. 1994), we held that a cause of action accrues under the ADEA on the date the employee is notified of an adverse employment decision by the employer. In Hulsey, the plaintiffs, two KMart employees, were demoted from their positions as store managers and transferred to different stores. Two years later, the plaintiffs viewed a television program, A Current Affair, which purportedly revealed that their demotions were motivated by age discrimination. The plaintiffs thereafter filed suit and argued that their cause of action did not accrue until the time that they watched the television program. The court rejected this argument: 88 A cause of action accrues under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) on the date the employee is notified of an adverse employment decision. Generally, an employee is notified of an adverse employment decision when a particular event or decision is announced by the employer. 89 It is undisputed that the allegedly discriminatory actions by Kmart against Employees were the demotions and transfers. As such, Employees' cause of action accrued on the dates Kmart notified them of their new assignments. 90 Hulsey, 43 F.3d at 557 (emphasis added) (quotations omitted) (further holding that the plaintiffs' allegation of constructive discharge was not sufficient to invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling). 91 Applying Hulsey, we agree with Coors that the very latest date any of the appellants' claims could be considered to have arisen was on November 5, 1993. As stated by appellants, [t]his is an employment discrimination case in which [appellants] . . . allege that [Coors] violated the [ADEA] by constructively discharging them because of their age. Aplts' Br. at 1. The allegedly discriminatory action by Coors was the constructive discharge of appellants because of their age. At the latest, this discharge occurred on November 5, 1993, the last day the seven-day revocation period ended for any of the appellants. While the hiring of new, younger employees might be evidence of Coors' alleged discriminatory intent at the time appellants left Coors, it is the alleged discriminatory discharge that appellants seek to redress. Appellants admit as much when they state that their claims are primarily based on misrepresentations made by Coors which occurred on October 12, 1993 (elimination of 9.36 FTEs), October 14, 1993 (outsourcing still being considered), and November 5, 1993 (concealment of discriminatory intent at time of termination). Aplts' Reply Br. at 6-7. Thus, November 5, 1993 is the very latest date any of the appellants' constructive discharge claims could be considered to have arisen and none of the appellants filed an administrative claim within 300 days of this date. 92 Alternatively, appellants argue that even if their ADEA claims arose on November 5, 1993, the 300-day filing period should be equitably tolled because of Coors' fraudulent concealment of their claims. Equitable tolling, like equitable estoppel, provide[s] for tolling of the statute of limitations when a plaintiff's unawareness of his ability to bring a claim -- either unawareness of the facts necessary to support a discrimination charge or unawareness of his legal rights -- is due to defendant's misconduct. Christopher v. Mobil Oil Corp., 950 F.2d 1209, 1215 (5th Cir. 1992). It is well settled that equitable tolling of the ADEA . . . is appropriate only where the circumstances of the case rise to the level of active deception . . . where a plaintiff has been lulled into inaction by her past employer. Hulsey v. KMart, Inc., 43 F.3d at 557 (quotations omitted). When such deception is alleged on the part of an employer, the limitations period will not be tolled unless an employee's failure to timely file results from either a deliberate design by the employer or actions that the employer should unmistakably have understood would cause the employee to delay filing his charge. Id. (quotations omitted). Equitable tolling is not warranted where an employee is aware of all of the facts constituting discriminatory treatment but lacks direct knowledge of the employer's subjective discriminatory purpose. Christopher, 950 F.2d at 1216. 93 For example, in Meyer v. Riegel Prods. Corp., 720 F.2d 303, 307 (3d Cir. 1983), a case very similar to the present action, the court held that the 300 day limitation period could be equitably tolled. In Meyer, Mr. Joseph W. Meyer brought suit against Riegel Products Corporation, Inc., claiming age discrimination under the ADEA. Mr. Meyer had been dismissed from Riegel four years before he would be entitled to full pension benefits, when the company was purchased and reorganized by the James River Corporation. The Third Circuit held that Riegel's alleged misrepresentation, that Mr. Meyer had been dismissed as part of a reorganization, furnished grounds for equitable tolling. After stating the rules regarding equitable tolling discussed above, the court reasoned that [g]iven plaintiff's allegations, either of these phenomena [the alleged pretextual reorganization and the alleged surreptitious plan to replace plaintiff with a younger worker] viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff could have caused him to temporarily defer filing with the Department of Labor. Id. at 307. Thus, the court concluded, Mr. Meyer has surmounted his initial hurdle: alleging acts that, taken as alleged, could persuade a court to activate the doctrine of equitable tolling. Id. at 308. 94 Appellants' claims closely resemble the claims of Mr. Meyer. They claim that Coors' reorganization of the security department was a pretext to replace older workers with younger workers. Moreover, appellants claim that Coors actively deceived them by making fraudulent representations concerning the proposed downsizing and potential outsourcing. Thus, we conclude, as did the court in Meyer, that appellants have alleged acts that, taken as alleged, could persuade a court to activate the doctrine of equitable tolling. However, as with appellants' fraud claims, the record is not sufficiently developed to determine, as a matter of law, whether appellants were actively deceived. We therefore leave it to the district court to determine on remand whether the circumstances of the case rise to the level of active deception, sufficient to invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling. Hulsey, 43 F.3d at 557.