Opinion ID: 1060459
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Prosecution's Reliance in Re-sentencing

Text: We also conclude that the prosecution was not barred from relying on this aggravating circumstance for the re-sentencing. In State v. Harris , we held that where a defendant is sentenced to death and then receives relief on appeal, the prosecution is not prohibited from again seeking the death penalty at re-sentencing. 919 S.W.2d 323, 330 (Tenn.1996). Moreover, we concluded that under the so-called clean slate rule, the prosecution is free to introduce proof of any aggravating circumstance which is otherwise legally valid. Id. We explained that a death sentence is not a series of mini-trials on each aggravating circumstance and that there is no such thing as an acquittal of an individual aggravating circumstance. Id. (citing Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 106 S.Ct. 1749, 90 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986)). Finally, we observed that there was no other legal impediment precluding the prosecution from relying on any aggravating circumstance and strengthening its case in any way it can by the introduction of new evidence. Id. at 331. The defendant's reliance on State v. Phipps, 959 S.W.2d 538 (Tenn.1997), is misplaced. In Phipps , the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment following a trial at which the State did not seek the death penalty. After the defendant successfully appealed his conviction and obtained a new trial, the prosecution filed notice of its intent to seek the death penalty. We held that since the prosecution had not sought the death penalty at the original trial, its decision to do so after the defendant's successful appeal created a presumption of vindictiveness. 959 S.W.2d at 546. Moreover, we held that the prosecution would have to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness with clear and convincing evidence that its decision was motivated by a legitimate purpose. Id. at 547. In contrast, the prosecution in the present case filed notice of its intent to seek the death penalty at the defendant's initial trial, and the jury did in fact impose a death sentence. After the case was remanded for re-sentencing, the prosecution again sought the death penalty, which it was entitled to do. Although the prosecution did not rely on the (i)(6) aggravating circumstance at the initial sentencing proceeding, our decision in Harris makes it clear that the clean slate rule applied to re-sentencing. Thus, the prosecution was not barred from relying upon the aggravating circumstance in Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-2-203(i)(6) (1982) in re-sentencing.