Opinion ID: 1651524
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Free Speech and Political Association Claims

Text: [14] Lemon contends on cross-appeal that in interpreting the resubmission clause, this court must consider the First Amendment concepts of overbroad administrative discretion and balancing the actual burdens on speech and association against proven interests of government. Brief for appellee on cross-appeal at 47-48. He contends that [o]nly a narrowly tailored and necessary remedy is available to the government under this test. Brief for appellee on cross-appeal at 48. Although the district court did not reach this issue, we do so here because of Lemon's claim that any interpretation of the resubmission clause which would prevent the two initiative measures from being placed on the ballot in 2006 would violate his rights of free speech and political association guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 5, of the Nebraska Constitution. The parameters of the constitutional right to freedom of speech are the same under both the federal and the state Constitutions. Pony Lake Sch. Dist. v. State Committee for Reorg., 271 Neb. 173, 710 N.W.2d 609 (2006); State v. Rabourn, 269 Neb. 499, 693 N.W.2d 291 (2005). [15,16] [T]he right to a state initiative process is not a right guaranteed by the United States Constitution, but is a right created by state law. Dobrovolny v. Moore, 126 F.3d 1111, 1113 (8th Cir. 1997). See, also, Taxpayers United for Assessment Cuts v. Austin, 994 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1993). 'States allowing ballot initiatives have considerable leeway to protect the integrity and reliability of the initiative process.' Pony Lake Sch. Dist., 271 Neb. at 190, 710 N.W.2d at 624, quoting Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 119 S. Ct. 636, 142 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1999). But if a state has conferred the right of initiative and referendum, it is 'obligated to do so in a manner consistent with the Constitution.' Pony Lake Sch. Dist., 271 Neb. at 190, 710 N.W.2d at 624, citing and quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 108 S. Ct. 1886, 100 L. Ed. 2d 425 (1988). Buckley held that Colorado's requirements that circulators be registered voters and wear identification badges violated free speech principles. Meyer held that a prohibition against paid circulators violated First Amendment protections of free speech. Unlike Buckley and Meyer, this case does not involve statutes or procedures affecting the exercise of the initiative power conferred by a state constitution. As we have noted, the resubmission clause is a self-imposed limitation on the constitutionally reserved power of initiative which defines its scope. In that sense, it is analogous to constitutional requirements regarding the number of signatures required to place an initiative measure on the ballot. In holding that our resolution of that issue in Duggan v. Beermann, 245 Neb. 907, 515 N.W.2d 788 (1994), did not violate the free speech rights of petition organizers, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted that the organizers can claim no constitutionally-protected right to place issues before the Nebraska electorate; any opportunity to do so must be subject to compliance with state constitutional requirements. Dobrovolny, 126 F.3d at 1113. See, also, Biddulph v. Mortham, 89 F.3d 1491 (11th Cir. 1996). In a memorandum and order affirmed by the court of appeals in Dobrovolny, the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska noted an important categorical difference between granting and defining the right to an initiative process in the state constitution and statutory procedures enacted to implement the right so defined by the state constitution. Dobrovolny v. Moore, 936 F. Supp. 1536, 1541 (D. Neb. 1996), affirmed 126 F.3d 1111 (8th Cir. 1997). The federal district court concluded that our opinion in Duggan did not interpret a regulation or statute that would limit the right to the initiative procedure, but, rather, ascertained what the right itself meant and what the will of the people was in enacting the constitutional amendment interpreted. Id. at 1542. The resubmission clause as interpreted herein is a limitation on the initiative process itself, but does not restrict speech or expression because it does not regulate the process of advocacy itself by dictating who can speak or how they must go about speaking. See Initiative and Referendum Institute v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082 (10th Cir. 2006). We conclude that its application does not impair any rights to free speech under the federal or state Constitution. Nor are we persuaded that the application of the resubmission clause presents a ballot access issue implicating a First Amendment right to political association. In this regard, Lemon relies on Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 103 S. Ct. 1564, 75 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1983), in which the U.S. Supreme Court applied a flexible balancing test in determining that a state statute which required an independent candidate for the office of President of the United States to make certain filings in March in order to appear on the November 1980 ballot placed an unconstitutional burden on voting and associational rights of his supporters. Lemon argues that the same test should be applied here. However, because the question whether an initiative measure should appear on the ballot is determined solely by a state's constitution, we conclude that Anderson is inapplicable. See, Initiative and Referendum Institute, supra ; Dobrovolny v. Moore, 126 F.3d 1111 (8th Cir. 1997); Biddulph, supra ; Taxpayers United for Assessment Cuts v. Austin, 994 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, we reject Lemon's assignments of error on cross-appeal relating to First Amendment issues.