Opinion ID: 788676
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Presence of Regular Education Teachers at IEP Meetings

Text: 93 The ALJ found (1) that no regular education teacher attended the February 19, 1999, IEP meeting; (2) that no regular education teacher of Zachary's attended the October 15, 1998, IEP team meeting even though it was clear that whether or not it would be appropriate for Zachary to participate in the regular education setting would be a subject of the meeting; (3) that the regular education teacher who attended the August 25, 1999, meeting left before the 1999-2000 goals and objectives were developed and before the issue of placement was decided; and (4) that no regular education teacher attended the August 20, 1999, IEP meeting. The ALJ found that the failure of the School System to have regular education teachers attend the IEP meetings was a troubling procedural violation, as well as strong evidence that the decision to place Zachary in a special education classroom for the 1999-2000 school year had been made before the IEP team convened. 94 The district court erroneously stated that the ALJ's findings only catalog two IEP meetings (October 1998 and February 1999) where a regular school teacher was not present. The district court then explained that the absence of a regular school teacher at these two meetings did not cause substantive harm to Zachary or his parents and thus did not deny Zachary a FAPE: 95 In October 1998, Zachary was four years old. He would not have been attending regular school during the 1998-1999 school year because he had not reached age five. It is difficult to see what meaningful contribution a regular school teacher could have made to this meeting. The February 1999 IEP meeting was held at a time when the IEP for the 1999-2000 school year had long been formulated, and during a time when Zachary was not even attending an HCDE school. Again, it risks stating the obvious to conclude that this had no effect on the welfare of Zachary or the Deals. 96 A school district is required to ensure that the IEP team for each child with a disability includes ... [a]t least one regular education teacher of the child (if the child is, or may be, participating in the regular education environment). 34 C.F.R. § 300.344(a). There appears to be no dispute that the School System technically violated the IDEA by failing to include regular education teachers at certain IEP meetings. The question is whether these violations caused substantive harm to either Zachary or his parents. There is little case law directly on point. 14 The Supreme Court clearly recognized the importance of the IDEA's procedural requirements in ensuring that a disabled student receives a FAPE. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034 ([A]dequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP.). The Court is mindful, however, that mere technical deviations do not render an IEP invalid. Dong, 197 F.3d at 800. 97 The district court unaccountably failed to consider the violations relating to the two August 1999 meetings-the meetings at which the 1999-2000 IEP that is the subject of this lawsuit was prepared. The Court agrees that the School System's failure to ensure the attendance of regular education teachers at the October 1998 and February 1999 meetings did not cause substantive harm. The very purpose of this requirement is implicated, however, by the August 1999 failures. The rationale for requiring the attendance of a regular education teacher is closely tied to Congress's least restrictive environment mandate. The input provided by a regular education teacher is vitally important in considering the extent to which a disabled student may be integrated into a regular education classroom and how the student's individual needs might be met within that classroom. One of the Deals' main objections to the 1999-2000 IEP developed for Zachary is that it did not provide for sufficient integration. The absence of the unique perspective that could have been provided by a regular education teacher therefore had a real impact on the decision-making process. 15 The Court therefore REVERSES the district court's decision based on this procedural violation, as well.