Opinion ID: 2569285
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Legal Standard Applied to This Case

Text: Bechtel has shown that Guz had a full opportunity to discover and present all available evidence, and that he nonetheless has not stated a prima facie case of age discrimination. This showing meets Bechtel's burden of establishing that Guz cannot state a prima facie case, thus entitling it to summary judgment on this cause of action. Despite extensive discovery, Guz can point to no comments by anyone during his entire lengthy history with Bechtel suggesting age played a role in employment decisions in general, or in his case in particular, no meaningful statistical evidence, no evidence even of a possible financial or other motive for Bechtel to get rid of its older workers. He cites no evidence suggesting that age was a significant factor in Bechtel's layoff decision. [2] It is true that Guz was a member of the protected class, but that fact alone proves nothing. In a reduction in force, many qualified, productive workers, both within and outside a protected class, lose their positions. Older workers may be laid off just like younger ones. The laws against age discrimination do not `require[ ] that younger employees be fired so that employees in the protected age group can be hired.' ( Earley v. Champion Intern. Corp. (11th Cir.1990) 907 F.2d 1077, 1083; see also Vaughan v. Metrahealth Companies, Inc. (4th Cir.1998) 145 F.3d 197, 204 [age discrimination laws are not something akin to a strict seniority protection system]; Jameson v. Arrow Co. (11th Cir. 1996) 75 F.3d 1528, 1532-1533.) Accordingly, the decision to discharge a qualified, older employee is not inherently suspicious.... In a [reduction in force], qualified employees are going to be discharged. ( Brocklehurst v. PPG Industries, Inc. (6th Cir.1997) 123 F.3d 890, 896.) Like the concurring and dissenting opinion, Guz relies largely on two circumstances to support the age discrimination claim. The first is that, of three positions that employees other than Guz filled while Guz was on holding status, younger employees filled two, and an older employee filled only one. This fact is meaningless. Even aside from the minuscule size of the sampling (see post ), Guz does not tell us the average age of persons eligible or considered for these positions. If a majority of those persons were younger than Guz, a majority of those given the positions would likely also be younger. Guz did not even attempt to place his figures in a relevant context so as to make them meaningful.... [¶] ... [H]e neglects vital information regarding the pool of applicants and whether, for example, qualified older employees were available or applied for those jobs.... [E]mployee statistics unaccompanied by evidence regarding qualified potential applicants from the relevant labor market ... lack[] probative value. ( Simpson v. Midland-Ross Corp. (6th Cir. 1987) 823 F.2d 937, 943.) Guz's related arguments regarding his qualifications relative to those retained does not aid him. As courts are not free to second-guess an employer's business judgment, this assertion [that plaintiff was equally or more qualified than the people retained] is insufficient to permit a finding of pretext. ( Branson v. Price River Coal Co. (10th Cir.1988) 853 F.2d 768, 772.) Thus, plaintiffs general dispute concerning his job performance, in the absence of any other evidence of age discrimination, does not provide a sufficient basis for a jury to infer that [the employer] terminated plaintiff on the basis of his age. ( Fallis v. Kerr-McGee Corp. (10th Cir.1991) 944 F.2d 743, 747.) The second circumstance Guz cites comes closest to presenting evidence that might suggest age discrimination: Of the six persons in his unit, Bechtel retained the youngest two. This fact also fails to arouse suspicion for several reasons. First, a group of six is simply too small to be statistically significant. For [the plaintiff] to show a prima facie case of disparate treatment based solely on statistics he must show a `stark pattern' of discrimination unexplainable on grounds other than age. ( Palmer v. United States (9th Cir.1986) 794 F.2d 534, 539; Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co. (9th Cir.1990) 902 F.2d 1417, 1423.) In Mayor v. Educational Equality League (1974) 415 U.S. 605, 94 S.Ct. 1323, 39 L.Ed.2d 630, the United States Supreme Court found of no significance statistics based on a group of 13, [i]n large part ... because the number of positions ... was too small to provide a reliable sample. ( Id. at p. 611, 94 S.Ct. 1323; see also id. at p. 612, 94 S.Ct. 1323.) A change of only one person meant an 8% change in racial composition. ( Id. at p. 611, 94 S.Ct. 1323.) Here, the numbers are even smaller. A single change retaining the 50 year old and laying off the 34 year oldwould not have affected Bechtel's actions towards Guz in the slightest but would have made the statistics show action favoring older persons. Many cases have found no statistical significance with groups larger than six. (E.g., Vaughan v. Metrahealth Companies, Inc., supra, 145 F.3d at p. 203 [a sample of seven employees ... is too small for reliable analysis]; Brocklehurst v. PPG Industries, Inc., supra, 123 F.3d at p. 897 [group of 14 is too small]; Fallis v. Kerr-McGee Corp., supra, 944 F.2d at p. 746 [group of nine is too small to provide reliable statistical results]; Simpson v. Midland-Ross Corp., supra, 823 F.2d at p. 943 & fn. 7, and cases cited [reliance on a sample of 17 is suspect]; Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. (9th Cir.1986) 804 F.2d 1072, 1076 [group of 28 is too small].) Second, Bechtel did not systematically replace older persons with substantially younger ones. Of the six in Guz's group, all but one were in their 40's (or 50); one was 34. The replacement of a worker with another substantially younger than the plaintiff ( O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., supra, 517 U.S. at p. 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307) might look suspicious, but not these actions. Hartley v. Wisconsin Bell, Inc. (7th Cir.1997) 124 F.3d 887 considered the question: how much older than a replacement does a plaintiff have to be in order to pass O'Connor's, test? ( Id at p. 892.) While we suspect that the answer depends to some extent on the circumstances in a case, we consider a ten-year difference in ages (between the plaintiff and her replacement) to be presumptively 'substantial' under O'Connor. In cases where the disparity is less, the plaintiff may still present a triable claim if she directs the court to evidence that her employer considered her age to be significant. In that instance, the issue of age disparity would be less relevant.... [¶] ... Ten years is a reasonable threshold establishing a `significant' and `substantial' gap, which is what O'Connor demands. Yet the line we draw is not so bright as to exclude cases where the gap is smaller but evidence nevertheless reveals the employer's decision to be motivated by the plaintiffs age. ( Id at p. 893.) This assessment seems reasonable. In a given case, the plaintiff might be able to show that an age difference of less than 10 years was significant to the employer. For example, if some important contractual right vested at the age of 50, then replacing a 49 year old with someone younger, even if less than 10 years younger, might be replacing a person with someone substantially younger. But no such evidence exists here. Absent any evidence that Bechtel considered the age differences of persons in their 40's to be significant, I would find them insignificant. Without more, choosing among various persons in their 40's gives no cause to suspect age discrimination. Specifically, replacing a 49 year old with a 41 year old is not, by itself, replacing a person with someone substantially younger. Only one person in the group in this casethe 34 year old-was substantially younger than Guz. Third, the members of the group of six had different qualifications and performed different duties. [A] plaintiffs statistical evidence must focus on eliminating nondiscriminatory explanations for the disparate treatment by showing disparate treatment between comparable individuals. ( Fallis v. Kerr-McGee Corp., supra, 944 F.2d at p. 746.) [T]here must be evidence that [those over 40] had positions and performance ratings that were comparable to [those under 40] who were retained. ( Id at p. 747.) Here, the group was quite disparate. One, for example, was a secretary, who had duties not remotely similar to Guz's. Fourth, any slight weight we may give to plaintiffs statistics is negated by the fact that Guz's own duties were largely assumed by someone older than he. (Maj. opn, ante, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 386, 8 P.3d at p. 1120.) This fact, even if not itself dispositive, eliminates any suspicious inference that may be drawn from Bechtel's retaining the two youngest of Guz's group. [T]he fact that [the employer] replaced [plaintiff] with [an] even older [employee] contradicts [plaintiffs] claims of discriminatory animus. ( Brocklehurst v. PPG Industries, Inc., supra, 123 F.3d at p. 897.) Guz also argues that Bechtel did not follow its own fair layoff procedures, and that this circumstance supports his discrimination claim. The argument is factually dubious but even if correct would fail to suggest age discrimination. A mere failure to follow formal internal policies does not support a discrimination claim. In Vaughan, the employer had an elaborate Downsizing Policy ... memorialized in a 144-page Downsizing Manual. ( Vaughan v. Metrahealth Companies, Inc., supra, 145 F.3d at p. 200.) ... Cooper, who made the decision to discharge [the plaintiff], admitted he was not familiar with the Downsizing Manual, [and] had never read it.... ( Ibid. ) Thus, the district court noted ... various differences between the Downsizing Manual and Cooper's actual decision-making process. ( Id. at p. 201.) But this showing was not sufficient to support the discrimination claim. The plaintiff must have developed some evidence on which a juror could reasonably base a finding that discrimination motivated the challenged employment action. ( Id at p. 202.) The employer's failure to follow its own Manual ... does not even hint that the real motive was age discrimination. `The mere fact that an employer failed to follow its own internal procedures does not necessarily suggest that the employer was motivated by illegal discriminatory intent.' Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 454 (10th Cir.1995). Federal courts cannot ensure that business decisions are always informed or even methodical. ( Id at p. 203; see also Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., supra, 902 F.2d at p. 1422; Moore v. Eli Lilly & Co. (5th Cir. 1993) 990 F.2d 812, 819.) Guz's inability to present any credible evidence to establish his age discrimination claim supports the superior court's grant of summary judgment in Bechtel's favor. BROWN, J, concurs. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion By KENNARD, J. California statutory law prohibits employers from discriminating against workers over the age of 40. In this case, an employee sued his employer after it eliminated his job in the wake of a corporate reorganization and then passed him over in favor of younger workers when other positions became available. At the time of his discharge, the employee had worked for his employer 22 years, and he was 49 years old. The employee's various causes of action included one for age discrimination, on which the trial court granted summary judgment for the employer. The Court of Appeal disagreed. Unlike the majority here, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. I agree, however, with the majority's resolution of the employee's other causes of action.