Opinion ID: 2376297
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Informed Consent Statute

Text: [¶ 5] The State contends that the court erred as a matter of law in excluding the results of Chase's blood-alcohol test on the basis of the officer's failure to give the informed consent warnings to Chase. The facts relevant to the motion are not disputed here. We review de novo the legal conclusions of the court on a motion to suppress. State v. Ullring, 1999 ME 183, ¶ 8, 741 A.2d 1065, 1067. [¶ 6] The Legislature has unequivocally established the duty of every driver to submit to a blood-alcohol test on probable cause to believe that he is operating a vehicle under the influence. 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2521(1) (1996). Serious consequences are imposed upon those drivers who refuse to submit to a test. See 29-A M.R.S.A. §§ 2411(5)(A)(3)(b), 2521(3) (Supp.2000). It is precisely because the consequences of a failure to cooperate can have such significant effects on the driver's life that the Legislature has required persons suspected of operating under the influence to be protected from unknowingly triggering those consequences. [¶ 7] Thus, the informed consent warnings are structured to inform the driver that he has a duty to take the test and that his failure to cooperate will result in serious sanctions. They are not intended to provide a driver with the choice of taking or refusing a blood-alcohol test. [3] This conclusion is reflected in the legislation in two ways. First, consistent with its purpose of warning the driver of the consequences of his actions, the refusal sanctions may not be imposed against a defendant unless the defendant has first been warned that his or her refusal will result in such consequences. 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2521(3) (Supp.2000); see also 29-A M.R.S.A. 2431(3) (1996). Second, the informed consent laws explicitly prohibit the courts from excluding actual test results based solely on the failure to administer the informed consent warning. 29-A M.R.S.A. §§ 2521(4), 2431(1) (1996). A test result may not be excluded as evidence in a proceeding before an administrative officer or court solely as a result of the failure of the law enforcement officer to comply with the notice of subsection 3. 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2521(4) (1996). Similarly, 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2431(1) provides: 1. Test results. Test results showing drug concentrations or blood-alcohol level at the time alleged are admissible in evidence. Failure to comply with the provisions of sections 2521 and 2523 may not, by itself, result in the exclusion of evidence of blood-alcohol level or drug concentration, unless the evidence is determined to be not sufficiently reliable. 29-A M.R.S.A. 2431(1) (1996). [¶ 8] In sum, limitations on the use of evidence of the refusal are tailored to address those circumstances in which a defendant does not cooperate in obtaining evidence of his blood-alcohol level or otherwise fails to take the test. With an intended purpose of protecting drivers from unwittingly incurring the more draconian penalties attendant to a refusal, the informed consent laws simply do not speak to the admissibility of a test that has, in fact, been completed. [4] [¶ 9] Recognizing this impediment to his argument, Chase also contends that the officer committed other errors independently requiring suppression of the test results, including: (1) the officer's mistaken reliance on section 2522; [5] (2) the officer's failure to afford Chase an opportunity to request that a physician draw his blood; and (3) the officer's failure to inform Chase that his blood was taken for criminal investigatory purposes. [¶ 10] We conclude that no basis alleged by Chase is sufficient to warrant exclusion of Chase's blood-alcohol test results by itself, nor are all the bases alleged cumulatively sufficient. Although Chase was not afforded an opportunity to request that a physician draw his blood as he should have been pursuant to section 2521(2), [6] section 2431(1) specifically forbids the exclusion of test results solely because of a failure to comply with the provisions of section 2521. 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2431(1) (1996). [¶ 11] Neither is exclusion the appropriate remedy for the officer's failure to inform Chase that his blood was being taken for a criminal investigatory purpose. Chase encourages us to conclude that when an officer fails to tell an OUI arrestee that a blood-alcohol test is being administered for criminal investigatory purposes, the exclusionary remedy for those test results is somehow implied in the collection of statutory provisions regarding blood-alcohol tests. We are unpersuaded by this argument. [¶ 12] Legislative policy strongly favors the admission of reliable blood-alcohol tests, and we have long recognized this policy. We have previously stated ... that `the Legislature has established a firm general policy of admissibility of blood-alcohol tests.' State v. Baker, 502 A.2d 489, 494 (Me. 1985) (quoting State v. Adams, 457 A.2d 416, 419 (Me.1983)). The State's interest in eradicating drunk drivers provides ample support for this policy. State v. Roche, 681 A.2d 472, 475 (Me. 1996). [¶ 13] Finally, we note that when the Legislature has concluded that the exclusion of evidence relating to driver intoxication is required, it has explicitly provided for such exclusion, such as the exclusion of a refusal when the defendant has not been notified of the consequences of refusing. See 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2521(3). On the facts before us, the statute neither provides for any duty to inform of an investigatory purpose, nor for the exclusion of test results for failure to so inform, and we will not infer such a duty or a remedy from these statutory provisions.