Opinion ID: 204764
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: purpose and scope of remand

Text: That brings us to what should have been the focus of this critical aspect of the case: did officer Schum have reasonable suspicion that Mr. Romero was or had been engaged in criminal activity when he was arrested for concealing his identity. In the district court proceedings, officer Schum argued that Mr. Romero could have been suspected of one crime: contributing to the delinquency of a minor, in connection with Eve Maesta’s stay at his home the night before the arrest, in violation of N. M. Stat. Ann. § 30-6-3. While there is no indication that officer Schum actually suspected Mr. Romero of this crime, 5 the analysis of 5 Officer Schum did not indicate any suspicion of Mr. Romero for this offense in the incident report he prepared in connection with the arrest. See R. vol. I at 90-93. Nor did he testify to any such suspicion. Rather, as his affidavit reflects, officer Schum sought identification from Mr. Romero “so [he] [could] properly identify him in [his] report as he was a witness with information concerning a missing minor.” R. vol. I at 39 (emphasis added). It came out at trial that, months after the incident, when Mr. Romero filed a complaint with the department, officer Schum prepared a memo to his supervisor in which he stated that he had been told by Louisa Maestas that Eve and Kevin had been hiding out with the Romeros, who let Eve and Kevin stay at their home for several days before the arrest, thus meeting the elements of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. But he went on to admit that the memo misstated these facts, which are contradicted by his contemporaneous incident report and his testimony at trial, showing that all he had been told was that Eve and Kevin had been allowed to stay just the one night and then were required to leave. He conceded there was no evidence that the Romeros had encouraged Eve to stay at their home. Indeed, the videotape of his conversations with the Romeros reflects vexation and disapproval from Mr. Romero regarding Kevin bringing Eve to their home. -12- reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is not constrained by the officer’s state of mind; rather, the question is whether the facts known to the officer objectively support reasonable suspicion of a crime–contemplated by the officer or not–that would justify the challenged detention. United States v. Laville, 480 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2007) (making this point as to reasonable suspicion and probable cause); see also Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1156 (10th Cir. 2008) (making this point as to probable cause). But the district court never determined whether the evidence established reasonable suspicion of this crime. And that task is not lightly undertaken in the first instance by an appellate court, as it entails a mixed question of fact and law appropriately left to the district court here: “the district court must determine how the [New Mexico] courts would interpret [N. M. Stat. Ann. § 30-6-3] in like circumstances” and then “ evaluate [the evidence] to determine if [it shows] the reasonable suspicion of a violation required under the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th Cir. 2005) (remanding for district court to determine reasonable suspicion in first instance). Deferring this determination is especially appropriate in a civil rights case, where it may even prove to be a matter only a jury can resolve. See generally Bruner v. Baker, 506 F.3d 1021, 1028 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting in civil rights context “that where there is a question of fact or room for a difference of opinion about the existence of probable cause, it is a proper question for a jury, even though [in criminal -13- cases] it is normally determined by a court during the warrant application process”). If officer Schum was not authorized to arrest Mr. Romero for concealing his identity due to the lack of reasonable suspicion of an underlying crime, the arrest was unconstitutional regardless of whether there was probable cause for the concealing-identity offense itself (see supra note 3) and whether the arrest was effected outside or inside the home. We therefore decline to consider the latter issues at this point. Accordingly, we remand this case for a determination whether the facts known to officer Schum afforded reasonable suspicion that Mr. Romero was, or had been, engaged in criminal activity when he was arrested for concealing his identity. Following that determination, the aggrieved party may, of course, appeal and challenge the disposition of any aspect of the case that has remained or has become adverse to his interest. The judgment of the district court is VACATED in part and the cause is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order and judgment. Entered for the Court Monroe G. McKay