Opinion ID: 682476
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Career Offender Provision

Text: 43 The appellant contends that the district court erred in applying the career offender provision in section 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, which states that: 44 A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time of the instant offense, (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense, and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. 45 U.S.S.G. Sec. 4B1.1. 46 The appellant first challenges the fact that the Guidelines commentary states that the term controlled substance offense includes the offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such offenses. Id. Sec. 4B1.2 comment. (n. 1). The appellant cites the case of United States v. Price, 990 F.2d 1367 (D.C.Cir.1993), for the proposition that the Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority by including conspiracy within the statutory definition of a controlled substance offense. However, another panel of this court very recently rejected Price and followed several other circuits in holding that the Sentencing Commission did in fact have authority to include conspiracy offenses under the career offender provision. United States v. Damerville, 27 F.3d 254, 256-57 (7th Cir.1994). Linnear has given us no reason to reconsider the well-reasoned decision in Damerville. We, therefore, find that section 4B1.1 applies to Linnear's conspiracy conviction. 47 The appellant next argues that he lacks the requisite prior felony convictions to qualify as a career offender. He acknowledges that his criminal history includes two adult 5 felonies involving controlled substances: the April 1986 sale of narcotic controlled substance and the September 1990 possession of marijuana for sale. However, he contends that only the first of those convictions occurred prior to the instant offense. This argument is based upon the fact that the indictment for the pending offense charged that the conspiracy existed from January 1, 1988, to August 25, 1992. Linnear argues that he was not sentenced for the 1990 offense until March 1992. Thus, in his view, his only prior conviction was on the 1986 charge. 48 This argument fails to recognize that section 4A1.2(a)(1) 6 defines the term prior offense to mean any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendre, for conduct not part of the instant offense. U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.2(a)(1). The Guidelines commentary further states that [a] sentence imposed after the defendant's commencement of the instant offense, but prior to sentencing on the instant offense, is a prior sentence if it was for conduct other than conduct that was part of the instant offense. Id. Sec. 4A1.2, comment. (n. 1). Linnear has presented no evidence that his conviction on the 1990 offense was in any way related to his conviction in the instant case. Thus, by the terms of section 4A1.2(a)(1) and its application notes, the appellant's argument must fail. 49 The appellant also argues that his 1990 drug conviction and the convictions on the two 1990 firearms charges should be counted as one offense because they were consolidated for plea and sentencing on March 19, 1992. This argument has no bearing on Linnear's status as a career offender, however, because Linnear would have the requisite two felonies even if the 1990 offenses were considered as one offense. 7 His argument could have a bearing on the calculation of his criminal history category under Sec. 4A1.1. But as the district court pointed out, this calculation would be immaterial because the career offender provision establishes a mandatory criminal history category of VI. See Sec. 4B1.1. Thus, even if Linnear's criminal history category was IV under Sec. 4A1.1, that determination would be superseded by the category VI mandated by Sec. 4B1.1. 8 50 In sum, we conclude that the district court correctly calculated Linnear's criminal history category at VI regardless of whether it is determined under the criminal history provisions of Sec. 4A1.1 or under the career offender provision in Sec. 4B1.1.