Opinion ID: 1362157
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Imputed Negligence

Text: The principal contention made on behalf of appellant Patricia Edwards was that the court's Instruction 8 permitted the jury to impute negligence on the part of Alva Edwards to her, his wife and passenger, when there was no basis in the evidence for such imputation. The questioned instruction was this: The court instructs the jury that in the event the plaintiffs were engaged in a business joint adventure at the time of the accident so that the plaintiff, Alva E. Edwards, acted as the agent of the plaintiff, Patricia H. Edwards, in the driving of the vehicle, then any negligence on the part of Alva E. Edwards which contributed in whole or part to the cause of the accident, bars the plaintiff, Patricia H. Edwards, from recovery, and in such event, you are instructed to bring in a verdict in favor of all defendants. However, in this regard, you are instructed that the joint adventure must be of such a nature that there was a common, or joint, business purpose between the parties at the time of the accident and that both parties had an equal right to the control of said vehicle. Without pausing to discuss at length the language employed in the instruction, we want to mention in passing that it is somewhat ambiguous to us and we believe the wording could be improved. Where the instruction says in such event you are instructed to bring in a verdict in favor of all defendants, it is not entirely clear what event is referred to. We think the instruction could be interpreted as saying in the event plaintiffs were engaged in a joint adventure the verdict should be in favor of all defendants, especially if the word event is thought of as being in the singular as it is written. That, of course, would be an erroneous statement of the law. Attorneys may realize the trial court in this instance must have meant to say in the event plaintiffs were engaged in a business joint adventure, then any negligence on the part of Alva E. Edwards, which contributed in whole or in part to the cause of the accident, would bar plaintiff Patricia H. Edwards from recovery; and in the event there was a joint adventure and also contributory negligence on the part of Alva Edwards, the verdict should be in favor of all defendants. Whether an instruction is misleading or confusing, however, depends upon how it would be understood by a jury composed of ordinarily intelligent laymen. Government Employees Insurance Company v. Davis, 5 Cir., 266 F.2d 760, 765; Smith v. Stanolind Pipe Line Co., 354 Mo. 250, 189 S.W.2d 244, 252. Instructions should be clear declarations of the law applicable to the facts, and if open to two or more constructions, one of which is at variance with the law, instructions should be refused, since instructions should be substantially correct in both form and circumstances. Hopkins v. Highland Dairy Farms Co., 348 Mo. 1158, 159 S.W.2d 254, 257; Schipper v. Brashear Truck Co., Mo., 132 S.W.2d 993, 996, 125 A.L.R. 674; McCarthy v. Sheridan, 336 Mo. 1201, 83 S.W.2d 907, 910-911. As far as our decision is concerned, in the case at bar, we cannot find fault with the statement of law involved in Instruction 8, if it can be understood as saying in the event plaintiffs were engaged in a business joint adventure and there was also some negligence on the part of Alva Edwards, which contributed to the accident, thus barring Patricia Edwards from recovery, the jury was to bring in a verdict in favor of all defendants. However, as will appear from our later discussion, we find no basis in the evidence adduced at the trial for the giving of such an instruction, and it still must be condemned for that reason. Instructions not sustained by evidence should not be given. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Ott, 33 Wyo. 200, 237 P. 238, 242, rehearing denied 238 P. 287, certiorari denied 269 U.S. 585, 46 S.Ct. 201, 70 L.Ed. 425; Shikany v. Salt Creek Transp. Co., 48 Wyo. 190, 45 P.2d 645, 647. The plaintiffs themselves testified the title to the Packard automobile driven by Alva Edwards was in his name and the name of his wife, Patricia, jointly. This was not disputed. There was no evidence tending to show, however, that the passenger, Patricia, actually exercised any control or supervision over her husband in the driving of the automobile during the trip on which the accident occurred, or that she influenced or directed the manner of driving. On the other hand, Mr. Edwards insisted during his examination on the witness stand that his wife had not done any of these things. In Porter v. Wilson, Wyo., 357 P.2d 309, 316, this court reviewed at length the decisions in other jurisdictions on the subject of negligence being imputed to a passenger-wife when the husband is driving a motor vehicle. In that particular case the automobile was in the wife's name only but was being driven by the husband. Despite a lack of uniformity in the decisions, this court concluded in the Porter case that, where a husband was in physical and actual possession of an automobile, driving as he desired without instruction or suggestion from anyone, and his wife who owned the automobile was a passenger therein but had no actual control whatever over the automobile, negligence of the husband was not imputable to his wife. We see no impelling reason to review again the authorities on the matter of imputed negligence where a husband is driving as he sees fit an automobile owned either by his wife or by himself and his wife, and where the wife is a passenger therein. Also, no valid reason has been shown for departing from the position taken in the Porter case. In the case at bar, the only testimony on the subject verified the fact that Alva Edwards was in physical and actual possession of the automobile driven by him; he was driving as he desired without instruction or suggestion from his wife and she had no actual control whatever over the vehicle. As was said in the Porter opinion at 357 P.2d 316, nothing was presented to the trial court showing the contrary. Thus, there would be no basis in this case for imputing negligence of Alva to Patricia, as far as ownership and operation of the automobile are concerned.