Opinion ID: 1309317
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Validity of Rape and Robbery Felony-murder Special-Circumstance Findings

Text: (8a) Defendant initially contends the three felony-murder special-circumstance findings  two robberies and one rape  must be reversed for instructional error. In instructing on all of the felony-murder special-circumstance allegations, the trial court informed the jury, in the language of the 1977 statute, that a special circumstance would be established if, inter alia, the jury found the murder was committed during the commission of the separate felony, i.e., the robbery or the rape. [15] Defendant maintains the court erred in failing to give, sua sponte, an additional instruction to explain the clarifying interpretation of the felony-murder special-circumstance provisions embodied in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 59-62 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468] and People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 321-325 [165 Cal. Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883]. We find defendant's argument unpersuasive. In Green, one of the first cases to consider the meaning of the felony-murder special-circumstance provisions of the 1977 death penalty law, the defendant  before intentionally killing his wife  had taken all of her clothing at gun point in order to attempt to conceal the crime. As we later explained in People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21 [188 Cal. Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279]: Although the taking of his wife's clothing by force constituted a technical robbery, we concluded [in Green ] that the circumstances of that case did not constitute `a murder in the commission of a robbery but the exact opposite, a robbery in the commission of a murder.' [Citation.] Recognizing that `[a]t the very least ... the Legislature must have intended that each special circumstance provide a rational basis for distinguishing between those murderers who deserve to be considered for the death penalty and those who do not,' we concluded that such a goal `is not achieved ... when the defendant's intent is not to steal but to kill and the robbery is merely incidental to the murder ... because its sole object is to facilitate or conceal the primary crime.' [Citation.] In holding such an `incidental' robbery would not provide a proper basis for a special-circumstance finding, we specifically contrasted that case with one in which a defendant `kill[s] in cold blood in order to advance an independent felonious purpose, e.g., ... carrie[s] out an execution-style slaying of the victim of or witness to a holdup, kidnaping, or a rape.' [Citation.]) ( Id., at p. 52, italics added.) In Thompson, we applied the principle of Green in a different factual setting. There the evidence revealed quite clearly that the defendant had come to the victims' house, at the behest of another, in order to kill the victims; during his confrontation with the victims he refused their offers of jewelry and money and asked for and took only their car keys. In concluding that the evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to sustain a robbery felony-murder special-circumstance finding under Green, we explained: [T]he determination as to whether or not a murder was committed during the commission of robbery or other specified felony is not `a matter of semantics or simple chronology' ... [but] [r]ather ... involves proof of the intent of the accused. A murder is not committed during a robbery within the meaning of the statute unless the accused has `killed in cold blood in order to advance an independent felonious purpose, e.g., [has] carried out an execution-style slaying of the victim or witness to a holdup, a kidnaping, or a rape.' ( Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 322 [quoting Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 60, 61; italics added in Thompson ].) Noting the evidence in Thompson suggested the defendant may have taken the car keys simply to effect his getaway from the shootings, we found that [w]hen the whole record is viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, it establishes at most a suspicion that [defendant] had an intent to steal independent of his intent to kill. (27 Cal.3d at p. 324.) Under such circumstances, we concluded the special-circumstance finding could not be upheld. ( Id., at pp. 324-325.) (9a), (10) Preliminarily, we reject the dissent's novel suggestion that Green's clarification of the scope of felony-murder special circumstances has somehow become an element of such special circumstances, on which the jury must be instructed in all cases regardless of whether the evidence supports such an instruction. Our cases have never treated Green in this fashion. (See Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 62; Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 332-325; Robertson, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 52.) Nor have we so treated other clarifying holdings in analogous settings. (See, e.g., People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1139-1140 [80 Cal. Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225, 43 A.L.R.3d 677] [clarifying the asportation element of section 209, kidnapping]; People v. Thomas (1970) 3 Cal. App.3d 859, 866 [83 Cal. Rptr. 879] [affirming pursuant to Daniels although no clarifying instruction was given]; People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 768 & fn. 20 [114 Cal. Rptr. 467, 523 P.2d 267] [same].) These cases disclose that the mere act of clarifying the scope of an element of a crime or a special circumstance does not create a new and separate element of that crime or special circumstance. (9b) (See fn. 16.), (8b) We therefore proceed to determine whether, on this record, the court's instructions adequately explained the general principle of law requiring a jury determination of whether the murder was committed during the commission of a felony. [16] As defendant apparently concedes, there was substantial evidence from which the jury could have found the rape and robberies were not incidental to the murders within the meaning of Green or Thompson. Because the burglary of the stereo store followed so closely after the theft of the store keys from the Margulies' home, the jury could reasonably have found that the crimes at the house were planned to obtain those keys. The jury could also have found that in order to carry out his planned theft of the keys  and perhaps other items [17]  defendant had brought the handcuffs, bicycle lock and cable, and adhesive tape in the briefcase to inmobilize the victims and to minimize their ability to identify him as he committed the crimes. Finally, the jury could have found that after defendant handcuffed and tied up the victims, applied the adhesive tape and raped Avone, one of the victims managed to set off the alarm system, and that thereafter defendant shot the two victims quickly, either out of panic or as a result of a conscious decision to attempt to eliminate the potential witnesses to his crimes. If the jury found that the crimes occurred in this fashion, Green and Thompson would clearly pose no obstacle to finding that the murders were committed to advance an independent felonious purpose and thus that the felony-murder special circumstances had been adequately established. It is true that the prosecutor relied on a theory that the murders were committed for revenge, [18] but this does not alter the fact that the evidence clearly showed a concurrent intent to rape Avone and steal the stereo store keys. Further, as defense counsel suggested in his closing argument, there was no direct evidence presented at trial to support the prosecutor's revenge-killing theory. No one testified that there had been any previous contact between defendant and any members of the Margulies family, nor was there any direct evidence that defendant had any reason for hating them or seeking vengeance against them. In light of all this, defendant asserts the court was under a sua sponte duty to give clarifying instructions. We disagree. (11) Sua sponte instructions are required only `on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. [Citations.] The general principles of law governing the case are those principles closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, and which are necessary for the jury's understanding of the case. [Citation.]' ( People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 323 [185 Cal. Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311] italics added.) (8c) In the present case, there was little more than speculation to support the prosecutor's proposed scenario. On the other hand, as explained above, there was abundant evidence that the rape and robberies were not incidental to the murders. ( Ante, p. 502.) In the absence of evidentiary support for the People's speculative theory, and in view of the actual evidence in the case, the court was under no sua sponte obligation to instruct concerning that theory or its limitations. In sum, we conclude the court's instructions correctly and adequately explained the general principle of law requiring a determination whether the murder was committed during the commission of a felony. (12) Because the evidence, as opposed to mere speculation, raised no issue with respect to the application of the special circumstance law, and because the trial court correctly instructed the jury regarding that law, it was defendant's obligation to request any clarifying or amplifying instruction on that subject. ( People v. Anderson (1966) 64 Cal.2d 633, 639 [51 Cal. Rptr. 238, 414 P.2d 366].)