Opinion ID: 2507854
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Defendant's Gang Affiliation

Text: Defendant claims that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his membership in the West Side Anaheim gang as well as evidence of the gang's activities and the motivations of gang members to participate in criminal activities. In his view, this evidence was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. We disagree. Defendant argues first that the trial court erred in permitting Officer Floyd Smith, who testified about defendant's involvement in the November 30, 1989, assault near Anaheim High School, to testify also that defendant was a hardcore gang member, that the assault was preceded by mad dogging (a slang term referring to the practice of staring down the other gang when the two are too far apart to communicate), and that aggressiveness and violence earn a gang member respect from other gang members. Inasmuch as both defendant and the victim of the assault admitted to Smith that they were members of rival gangs, defendant contends that the remainder of Smith's testimony was irrelevant. But the point of Smith's testimony was not merely to show, as defendant assumes, that defendant had committed an act of violence in fighting with the other young man. The prosecution sought to demonstrate instead that defendant had led a group of West Side Anaheim gang members to a confrontation with a rival gang, that the confrontation was deliberately planned, and that defendant had been the aggressor in the assault on the rival gang. Evidence concerning defendant's role in the gang as well as the motivations and common practices of gang members tended to corroborate Smith's eyewitness account and aided the jury in understanding what might have otherwise seemed like a personal grievance or random attack. ( People v. Gurule, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 654, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224; People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 588, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142.) Likewise, evidence concerning Smith's training and experiences with the West Side Anaheim gang aided the jury in understanding the bases for Smith's opinions. (See People v. Coleman (1985) 38 Cal.3d 69, 92, 211 Cal.Rptr. 102, 695 P.2d 189.) Defendant's claim that this evidence was unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352 is fatally undermined by his failure to recognize its relevance. Defendant challenges next the testimony of prosecution gang expert Alfonso Valdez concerning the vandalism of the Marshalls' van. As discussed in the preceding section, Valdez opined that the motivation for vandalizing the vehicle was to intimidate the Marshalls. To explain why defendant and the other gang members would leave identifying gang markings on the vandalized van, Valdez explained that defendant and the others were unconcerned about being identified because gangs operate on fear and use that fear to dissuade witnesses from testifying. Valdez also testified that gangs are highly territorial, as evidenced by the O.C. tattoo (referring to Orange County) on defendant's arm, and that gang members are fiercely loyal to the gang, as evidenced by another tattoo of a happy face and a sad face (signifying have fun now cry later). This evidence helped explain why defendant committed the assault on a member of a rival gang and vandalized the Marshalls' van and why defendant committed these crimes without fear of being identified. ( People v. Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 588, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142; People v. Sandoval, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 175, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862.) Defendant contends that even if this evidence was relevant, it was cumulative and extremely prejudicial, given that the trial court believed the vandalism itself (without the assistance of any expert testimony) to be so obviously an attempt ... [to] intimidat[e] people. That the trial court believed the vandalism was clearly an implied threat against the Marshalls without the assistance of an expert, however, did not mean that it was equally evident to a lay jury. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing expert testimony to explain the significance of the vandalism, especially since defendant's cross-examination of Claudia Marshall, by focusing on the absence of a verbal threat during the incident, put in issue whether a threat was intended. Defendant also challenges Valdez's testimony concerning his Puro tattoo. Valdez testified that this tattoo was almost racist. Based on defendant's comments to other Hispanic males at the Circle K, Valdez further concluded that defendant basically does not like other ethnic people. People from other ethnic origins. This evidence was relevant to show a motivation for  and the circumstances of  the murder of Singh (and perhaps Patel) and thus was relevant under factor (a) of section 190.3. With little direct evidence as to why defendant singled out Singh to murder, he can hardly complain that the probative value of this evidence was substantially outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect. Finally, we reject defendant's claim that admission of the gang evidence violated the First Amendment and various other constitutional provisions. Because he failed to object on this ground below, he has forfeited the claim. ( People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 250, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710.) Even if it had been preserved, the relevance of the challenged evidence defeats his constitutional objection. ( Dawson v. Delaware (1992) 503 U.S. 159, 164, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 117 L.Ed.2d 309; accord, State v. Fanus (2003) 336 Or. 63, 79 P.3d 847, 863-864.)