Opinion ID: 1579381
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Harassment

Text: Evans was convicted of two counts of first-degree harassment in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.7(2) and 708.7(1)( b ). In order to address Evans' sufficiency challenge, we review Iowa Code section 708.7(1)( b ), which states, in relevant part: A person commits harassment when the person, purposefully and without legitimate purpose, has personal contact with another person, with the intent to threaten, intimidate, or alarm that other person.... Iowa Code § 708.7(1)( b ). Evans claims that, as a published photographer, his sole purpose in contacting Arnold was to take her picture. Moreover, the defendant maintains he never threatened Arnold; he points out we have yet to sustain a conviction for harassment in the absence of a showing of a threat on the part of the defendant, and therefore ought not to do so here. We are satisfied a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty on the charges of harassment beyond a reasonable doubt. Threatening the victim is not a necessary element of our harassment statute. To conclude otherwise would ignore the disjunctive language of section 708.7(1)( b ), which forbids a person from personally and without legitimate purpose... [having] personal contact with another person, with the intent to threaten, intimidate, or alarm that other person. Iowa Code § 708.7(1)( b ) (emphasis added); see State v. Anderson, 636 N.W.2d 26, 37 (Iowa 2001) (We avoid interpreting a statute to render any part of it superfluous.). There is substantial evidence in the record Evans intended to alarm, if not intimidate, Arnold. Our court has not previously had occasion to define alarm for the purposes of Iowa Code section 708.7(1)( b ). In the absence of a legislative definition of a term or a particular meaning in the law, we give words their ordinary meaning. State v. White, 563 N.W.2d 615, 617 (Iowa 1997). To ascertain the ordinary meaning of a word, we may consult the dictionary. Id. The dictionary defines alarm as to cause (someone) to feel frightened, disturbed, or in danger.... The New Oxford American Dictionary 36 (2001). Evans correctly points out harassment is a specific intent crime. State v. Button, 622 N.W.2d 480, 483 (Iowa 2001). Intent is seldom capable of direct proof, however, and a trier of fact may infer intent from the normal consequences of one's actions. Evans, 672 N.W.2d at 331 (citing State v. Chang, 587 N.W.2d 459, 462 (Iowa 1998); State v. Farnum, 554 N.W.2d 716, 720 (Iowa Ct.App.1996)). Given the prior history between the two parties, we believe the evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find the defendant acted with the intent to alarm or intimidate Arnold in the two incidents for which he was convicted of harassment. By August 31, when Evans showed up at Arnold's home uninvited and asked Arnold if she would be willing to play a dominant female role in a new pictorial he was producing about Dred Scott, Arnold had repeatedly rebuffed Evans' offers. By September 25, Evans had made several more unsuccessful attempts to persuade Arnold to pose for him, including the incident at the car wash where Arnold hurriedly ran away from Evans without washing her car or picking up her change. It should not have been unexpected on Evans' part that his conduct would alarm Arnold. In the context of the history between these two parties, we think a reasonable jury could find, at the very least, Evans intended to alarm Arnold when he showed up at her front door asking to take her picture on August 31. This behavior would easily cause Arnold to feel frightened, disturbed, or in danger; such is the natural consequence of Evans' acts, from which the requisite intent for harassment may be inferred. See Evans, 672 N.W.2d at 331 (citing Chang, 587 N.W.2d at 462; Farnum, 554 N.W.2d at 720). This inference becomes even stronger by the September 25 incident, in light of the additional unsuccessful attempts which occurred in the interim and the fact Evans appeared wearing red, strappy high heels with matching toenails. There is ample evidence here of a ratcheting up of bizarre and alarming behavior. For both incidents, a rational jury could conclude Evans intended to alarm Arnold.