Opinion ID: 168346
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: T he A rrest

Text: -17- M r. Cruz-M endez contends that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him at the apartment. The district court concluded that the officers had probable cause. W e review this determination de novo. See United States v. Dozal, 173 F.3d 787, 792 (10th Cir. 1999). As this court has previously stated: Probable cause to arrest exists only when the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge, and of which they have reasonably trustw orthy information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed. Probable cause does not require facts sufficient for a finding of guilt; however, it does require more than mere suspicion. Probable cause is measured against an objective standard. The primary concern is whether a reasonable officer would have believed that probable cause existed to arrest the defendant based on the information possessed by the arresting officer. United States v. Soto, 375 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal citations, ellipsis, and quotation marks omitted). W e agree with the district court. The officers began with anonymous tips that a previously deported felon named M anuel Cruz-M endez was at a particular address. Such tips are in themselves entitled to little weight. But the followup investigation provided substantial corroboration. First, the officers’ identification of Olga Armenta corroborated one caller’s tip that M r. Cruz-M endez was staying with his girlfriend Olga at the apartment. Second, the officers’ discovery of a man’s jacket containing a cellular phone etched with the name “CRU Z” corroborated the presence of M r. Cruz-M endez at this address, particularly since the discovery indicated that M s. Armenta had lied when she had been asked -18- whether she knew a M r. Cruz-M endez. Third, M s. Armenta’s admission outside the apartment that she had been lying about M r. Cruz-M endez’s presence, that she feared him, and that he was hiding served to corroborate the anonymous tips regarding his location and history and to indicate that he was living in the apartment and was avoiding law-enforcement authorities. Fourth, the discovery of M r. Cruz-M endez hiding under clothing in a closet further corroborated the tw o anonymous calls, and demonstrated his consciousness of guilt. Cf. United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 879 n.4 (10th Cir. 1994) (“It is well recognized that a defendant’s intentional flight from police officers may be used as circumstantial evidence of guilt.”). And fifth, at the time of the arrest the officers knew that there was a warrant issued out of Salt Lake City for a man named M anuel Cruz. Cf. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802 (1971) (“W hen the police have probable cause to arrest one party, and when they reasonably mistake a second party for the first party, then the arrest of the second party is a valid arrest.” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). The totality of this information established probable cause to arrest M r. Cruz-M endez. Finally, M r. Cruz-M endez, citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), claims that “where as here, the police do not have an arrest warrant, they may not arrest a person in his home even with probable cause, absent exigent circumstances.” Aplt. Br. at 26. But Payton holds only that “the Fourth -19- Amendment . . . prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home in order to make a routine felony arrest.” 445 U.S. at 576 (emphasis added). Because we have held that the officers’ entry into the bedroom was consensual, Payton does not apply.