Opinion ID: 4105365
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: eldridge factors balanced and

Text: WEIGHED AGAINST PRESUMPTION ¶ 35 Finally, we balance the three Eldridge factors against each other and then weigh them against the presumption against the right to counsel. As already indicated, L.E.S.’s interest is “a commanding one,” and the State shares L.E.S.’s interest in reaching a correct decision. When balancing these interests in favor of appointing counsel against the State’s relatively weak, albeit legitimate, pecuniary interest in not appointing counsel, the equation clearly comes out in favor of appointing counsel. And when we add the significant risks of error to this balance, it becomes abundantly clear that the Eldridge factors favor a right to counsel in this case. Upon weighing these significant interests against the presumption against the appointment of counsel, we hold that they outweigh that presumption and that L.E.S. therefore had a right to appointed counsel under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the initial appointment of counsel was reversed and L.E.S. had to proceed pro se, his federal due process right to counsel was violated. 10 10 In Lassiter, the Court’s analysis includes the mother’s lack of interest shown in the child and disinclination to participate in the judicial process. The Court observed that “the weight of the evidence that [Ms. Lassiter] had few sparks of . . . interest [in her son] was sufficiently great that the presence of counsel for Ms. Lassiter could not have made a determinative difference.” Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 32–33 (1981). In the case at hand, however, L.E.S. indicates that he tried for years “to contact or have contact with [K.A.S.] but her mother refused or avoided the subject.” He provided copies of a number of Facebook messages to back up that assertion. In those messages, he expressed that he missed K.A.S. and wanted to see her again, including a request “to arrange visitations” and to stop (cont.) 15 Cite as: 2016 UT 55 Opinion of the Court ¶ 36 The dissent contends that our analysis “turns th[e] presumption [against the right to appointed counsel in civil cases] on its head” by “virtually guarantee[ing] appointment of counsel in most every case in which a parent’s rights are in jeopardy.” Infra ¶ 48. We disagree. We note, at the outset, that our task is simply to apply Lassiter to the case before us. That is, our task—our only task—is to consider whether the presumption against L.E.S.’s having a right to counsel is overcome because (1) L.E.S.’s interest in appointed counsel is strong, (2) the State’s interest in denying appointed counsel is weak, and (3) the “stalling.” Granted, L.E.S. did not take K.A.S.’s mother to court for refusing to facilitate visits, because “he was afraid because he was on drugs.” Supra ¶ 26. But unlike the mother in Lassiter, L.E.S. has clearly shown interest in his child. L.E.S. has also shown that interest through his efforts to participate in these proceedings, again unlike the mother in Lassiter. In Lassiter, the mother “had expressly declined to appear at the 1975 child custody hearing” and “had not even bothered to speak to her retained lawyer after being notified of the termination hearing.” Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 33. Her “failure to make an effort to contest the termination proceeding was [found to be] without cause.” Id. Here, however, L.E.S. gave notice pro se that he contested the adoption, and he attended a number of court conferences, both in person and telephonically, and attempted to retain counsel. Supra ¶¶ 2, 5–7. He also filed, again pro se, a motion for continuance, and upon the denial of that motion and termination of his rights, he filed a pro se notice of appeal and has continued to pursue the matter in court. Supra ¶¶ 13, 16–17. Thus, unlike in Lassiter, we cannot conclude that “the presence of counsel . . . could not have made a determinative difference” based on the parent’s indifference to the child. See 452 U.S. at 32–33. Furthermore, L.E.S. has actively participated in the case, unlike the mother in Lassiter, whose “plain demonstration that she is not interested in attending a hearing” was among the circumstances considered by the Court in holding that “the trial court did not err in failing to appoint counsel.” Id. at 33. Another difference between the two cases, which is not, however, included in the analysis section in Lassiter, is the length of incarceration of the parent. In Lassiter, the mother had been sentenced to “25 to 40 years of imprisonment.” Id. at 20. L.E.S., in contrast, expected to be released from prison within nine months of his August 4, 2014 motion for continuance. See supra ¶ 13. 16 Cite as: 2016 UT 55 Opinion of the Court risks of error are high. Our application of Lassiter in this case leads us to the conclusion that L.E.S. is entitled to counsel. While it would not surprise us if the presumption against the right to appointed counsel in civil cases were overcome with greater frequency in parental-rights termination proceedings than in other contexts where the stakes are lower and the core issue in the proceedings is less complicated than whether to sever the parent-child relationship, these potential empirical results do not drive our analysis. Our task is to faithfully apply Lassiter to the facts of each case before us; whatever pattern of outcomes emerges from this exercise is the pattern of outcomes required by the law. Cf. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 30 & n.6 (1981) (noting—without apparent concern—that the presumption against the right to counsel in civil cases has “generally” been overcome in the parental-rights termination context). ¶ 37 The dissent understands the effect of Lassiter’s presumption to be that the right to counsel in civil cases—including parental-rights termination cases—must be found only rarely. See infra ¶ 63 n.9. This is a misreading of Lassiter. To be sure, Lassiter acknowledges that there is a presumption against the right to counsel in civil cases. But Lassiter nowhere implies that the effect of this presumption is that if courts regularly find a right to appointed counsel in parental-rights termination proceedings they are doing it wrong. To the contrary, Lassiter emphasizes that the ultimate issues with which a termination hearing deals are not always simple, however commonplace they may be. Expert medical and psychiatric testimony, which few parents are equipped to understand and fewer still to confute, is sometimes presented. The parents are likely to be people with little education, who have had uncommon difficulty in dealing with life, and who are, at the hearing, thrust into a distressing and disorienting situation. That these factors may combine to overwhelm an uncounseled parent is evident . . . . Lassiter 452 U.S. at 30. For this reason, Lassiter notes, “courts have generally held that the State must appoint counsel for indigent parents at termination proceedings.” Id. Nor does Lassiter lament, or seek to change, this state of affairs. To be sure, at one point the Lassiter court conceded that it could not “say that the Constitution requires the appointment of counsel in every parental termination proceeding.” Id. at 31. And it is certainly true that the Lassiter court concluded, under the specific facts before it, that counsel did not need to be appointed. 17 Cite as: 2016 UT 55 Opinion of the Court But Lassiter’s agnosticism about the frequency with which the Constitution would end up requiring the appointment of counsel in parental-rights termination proceedings is a far cry from a hard-nosed insistence that lower courts should work to make sure that the right to counsel in parental-rights termination cases is only grudgingly found. ¶ 38 We also disagree with the dissent that our application of Lassiter “demands appointment in the run of the mill case.” Infra ¶ 73 n.17. Instead, our application of Lassiter requires the appointment of counsel whenever the parent’s interest in appointed counsel is strong, the state’s interest is weak, and the risks of error are high. Our opinion is consistent with the proposition that in a case with circumstances like Lassiter—where, for example, the parent has not taken an interest in the proceedings and “the weight of the evidence” of the parent’s lack of interest in the child is “great”—or in a case where the parent faced fewer procedural or institutional barriers to availing himself of the court, the presumption against the right to counsel will not be overcome. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32; cf. supra ¶ 35 n.10 (noting evidence of L.E.S.’s interest in parenting K.A.S.). But, again, like the Supreme Court in Lassiter, our analysis is not driven by any empirical speculation about the frequency with which the presumption against the right to counsel will be overcome in parental-rights termination proceedings. We focus only on application of the legal test.11 And, for the reasons we have 11 In any event, we note that even if application of the Lassiter test will result in the right to appointed counsel in many cases in which a parent’s rights are in jeopardy, this result stems, in large part, from the existence of a statutory right to counsel under Utah Code section 78A-6- 1111(1)(c). Under that section, indigent parents have the right to counsel in parental-rights termination proceedings initiated by the State or a political subdivision of the State in juvenile court. Id. In such stateinitiated termination cases, the risk of error is likely to be lower because of the State’s goal to preserve families if possible and because of additional protections such as the provision of in-home services and the requirement of “sufficient evidence to satisfy a parent’s constitutional entitlement to heightened protection against government interference with the parent’s fundamental rights and liberty interests.” UTAH CODE §§ 62A-4a-201(1)(a), 78A-6-503(3); see also id. §§ 62A-4a-203(1)(a), 62A-4a-202(1)(a). Because of the lower risk of error, the presumption against the right to counsel would be less likely to be overcome. However, because of the statutory right to counsel under Utah Code (cont.) 18 Cite as: 2016 UT 55 Opinion of the Court explained, our application of that test leads us to the conclusion that the presumption against the right to counsel is overcome in this case.