Opinion ID: 2812341
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Redd’s Race Discrimination Claim Based on MPIP

Text: Here, as the district court did, we need discuss only the third element of Redd’s prima facie case as to his race discrimination claim based on his MPIP— whether he was subjected to an adverse employment action. See Maynard, 342 F.3d at 1289. We conclude that Redd failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his placement on the MPIP constituted an adverse employment action. Redd did not present any evidence that the MPIP resulted in a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of his employment. See 11 Case: 14-14945 Date Filed: 06/26/2015 Page: 12 of 22 Davis, 245 F.3d at 1239. Specifically, in his deposition, Redd testified that the corrective steps and goals in the MPIP all involved existing responsibilities of his position as a Business Manager and that the MPIP did not result in any change in pay or benefits. On appeal, Redd points to his declaration statements that the MPIP involved additional work and paperwork and “required [him] to work more hours in order to . . . satisfy the MPIP . . . [and] document [his] performance,” and former UPS employee Robert Kibler’s testimony that placement on a MPIP is “humiliating” and doubles a manager’s workload. However, these conclusory and vague references to additional paperwork and unspecified increased work and hours are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the MPIP resulted in a serious and material change to the terms and conditions of Redd’s employment. And Kibler’s subjective view of the humiliation of being placed on a MPIP is not controlling. See id. In sum, the district court properly granted summary judgment to UPS on Redd’s race discrimination claim based on the MPIP. B. Redd’s Race Discrimination Claim Based on Demotion In this case, the district court found, and neither party disputes, that Redd established a prima facie case of race discrimination based on his demotion. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, once a plaintiff-employee establishes a prima 12 Case: 14-14945 Date Filed: 06/26/2015 Page: 13 of 22 facie case of discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004). A defendant’s burden of production in articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is “exceedingly light.” Turnes v. AmSouth Bank, NA, 36 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 1994) (quotations omitted). The employer need not persuade the district court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reason. Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1087. If the employer satisfies its burden, then the burden of production shifts to the plaintiff to offer evidence that the employer’s proffered reason is a pretext for illegal discrimination. Id. The plaintiff can show pretext by demonstrating “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies or contradictions” in the proffered reason that a reasonable factfinder could find it unworthy of credence. Springer v. Convergys Customer Mgmt. Grp. Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1348 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). In attempting to rebut an employer’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment action, a plaintiff is not allowed to recast the employer’s reason or substitute his business judgment for the employer’s judgment. Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). As long as the proffered reason is one that might motivate a reasonable employer, “an employee must meet that reason head on and rebut it, 13 Case: 14-14945 Date Filed: 06/26/2015 Page: 14 of 22 and the employee cannot succeed by simply quarreling with the wisdom of that reason.” Id. Here, the district court determined that (1) UPS articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Redd’s demotion, and (2) Redd failed to establish that UPS’s reason for demoting him was a pretext for discrimination. We agree. First, UPS’s articulated reason for Redd’s demotion—his failure to properly manage the June 3, 2010 serious service failure within the context of concerns generally about his performance—was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason that would motivate a reasonable employer to demote Redd. See Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1087; Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030. To the extent that Redd argues that UPS did not meet its burden because the evidence underlying UPS’s reason for demoting him was inconsistent, this argument is relevant instead to pretext and does not show that UPS failed to meet its “exceedingly light” burden to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. See Turnes, 36 F.3d at 1061. Second, Redd failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether UPS’s reason for demoting him was a pretext for discrimination. Redd does not dispute that a serious service failure occurred in the operations for which he was responsible on June 3, 2010, or that he underreported the number of affected packages to management in its aftermath. He instead contends that he took all the 14 Case: 14-14945 Date Filed: 06/26/2015 Page: 15 of 22 necessary steps to address the service failure and that he should not have been held accountable for the failure in the first place. The relevant inquiry, however, centers on the beliefs of Division Manager Stan Garrett, the decision maker, and whether Garrett was dissatisfied with Redd for the proffered nondiscriminatory reasons, even if mistakenly or unfairly so. See Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010) (“The inquiry into pretext centers on the employer’s beliefs, not the employee’s beliefs and, to be blunt about it, not on reality as it exists outside of the decision maker’s head. . . . The question is whether [plaintiff’s] employers were dissatisfied with her for these or other non-discriminatory reasons, even if mistakenly or unfairly so, or instead merely used those complaints about [plaintiff] as cover for discriminating against her because of her Cuban origin.”). Moreover, to the extent that Redd argues his actions in addressing the June 2010 service failure were unworthy of demotion, Redd cannot substitute his business judgment for that of Garrett, who testified that Redd’s actions as well as his lack of accountability were factors in Garrett’s decision to demote him. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030. Nor has Redd shown that UPS’s reasons for demoting him were inconsistent and therefore unworthy of credence. See Springer, 509 F.3d at 1348. Redd argues that Division Manager Garrett’s deposition testimony suggested that Redd was 15 Case: 14-14945 Date Filed: 06/26/2015 Page: 16 of 22 demoted solely based on the June 2010 service failure, while Garrett’s subsequent declaration stated that Redd’s demotion was based on multiple serious service failures over a six-month period. We disagree with Redd’s characterization of Garrett’s testimony. In his deposition, when Garrett testified about Redd’s demotion, he explained generally that Redd “had some service issues that occurred under his management” and discussed specifically the June 2010 service failure. Then, in Garrett’s declaration, Garrett provided more detail as to Redd’s earlier “service issues” referenced in Garrett’s deposition, describing the two other service failures that occurred under Redd’s supervision in less than six months. On appeal, and in the district court, Redd also attempts to show pretext based on a January 2010 “Scorecard,” prepared by UPS, that ranks Alabama’s package centers for a one-month period. Redd contends that the “Scorecard” shows that he was actually performing well as Business Manager because it ranks the Birmingham package center as ninth out of Alabama’s thirty-three package centers. We agree with the district court that the January 2010 “Scorecard” does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. For starters, in his deposition, Redd conceded that the “Scorecard” ranked package centers as a whole, not individual managers. In addition, Diaz explained in a declaration that “many of the elements reflected on the scorecard do not correlate to things within an individual manager’s control and there are factors that 16 Case: 14-14945 Date Filed: 06/26/2015 Page: 17 of 22 might improve or reduce the ranking of areas of operation listed on the [scorecard] for which a Business Manager has no accountability or right to claim credit.” Finally, Redd attempts to identify other managers who were responsible for multiple service failures but who were not demoted. However, he does not present evidence that another manager under Garrett’s supervision was accountable for a serious service failure where that manager made additional mistakes—such as inaccurately reporting the number of affected packages—that compounded the problem. As Garrett explained in his declaration, Redd did not properly manage the June 2010 service failure and, afterward, did not take responsibility for the service failure. In sum, we cannot say that Redd has demonstrated “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies or contradictions” in UPS’s proffered reason for his demotion as to create a genuine dispute about whether it was worthy of credence. See Springer, 509 F.3d at 1348.