Opinion ID: 1256193
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's Silence

Text: {25} Defendant's next contention is that the prosecutor violated his right to due process by eliciting testimony that Defendant had invoked his right to remain silent after being advised of this right in accordance with Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Detectives Christensen and Schofield of the San Juan County Sheriff's Department arrested Defendant and advised him of his Miranda rights on December 29, 1994. They then drove Defendant from Albuquerque to a sheriff's office in Aztec, New Mexico. During the drive from Albuquerque to Aztec, Defendant made several statements. He told the detectives that he would have shot it out with them if they had attempted to arrest him the day before, but that he had changed his mind after talking with his employer. Referring to information contained in the affidavit for the search warrant that the detectives had served on him prior to his arrest, Defendant said a witness was incorrect in stating that the victim's name appeared in Defendant's daily planner. When they arrived at the sheriff's office in Aztec, Defendant told the detectives that he did not kill the victim and that he believed they did not have any evidence against him. He named another individual as the murderer. At some point during the interview, Defendant stated that he had some knowledge of the victim but that anything he said would implicate him. {26} At trial, the prosecutor questioned Detective Christensen about this statement as follows: Q: [W]hat, if anything, did the Defendant say to you in the interview room at the sheriff's office? A: He said that he, basically, had some knowledge of the [victim], but anything that he said would implicate him, and, uh, stopped there. Q: Okay. And when he said that he had some knowledge of [the victim], did he say with respect to what about [the victim]? I mean A: No, he did not go into detail. Q: Did he say that he knew how [the victim] lived or not lived or A: Well, anything that he said would implicate him in thein the death of [the victim]. Q: And did youafterdid he elaborate on, at all, what he knew that would implicate him on the death of [the victim]? A: No, he did not. Defendant did not object to this testimony until after Detective Christensen was excused as a witness and the jury was excused from the courtroom. {27} Notwithstanding the lack of a timely objection at trial, an appellate court will apply the doctrine of fundamental error and grant review of certain categories of prosecutorial misconduct that compromise a defendant's right to a fair trial. See State v. Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 55, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829. Remarks by a prosecutor that directly comment on a defendant's invocation of the right to remain silent after receiving warnings under Miranda ... fall into this category of error. Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 55, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829. The same rule applies to certain prosecutorial questions pertaining to the defendant's postarrest silence and certain testimony elicited by those questions. State v. Hennessy, 114 N.M. 283, 285, 837 P.2d 1366, 1368 (Ct.App.1992), overruled in part on other grounds by Lucero, 116 N.M. at 453-54, 863 P.2d at 1074-75. We apply this rule inasmuch as it is fundamentally unfair and a violation of due process to allow people's invocation of their right to remain silent to be used against them after they have been arrested and informed of this right. Cf. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976) (discussing a prosecutor's use of postarrest silence to impeach a defendant's testimony at trial). In such circumstances, a prosecutor's comment on the defendant's exercise of his [or her] fifth amendment right to remain silent may constitute error requiring reversal. State v. Johnson, 102 N.M. 110, 114, 692 P.2d 35, 39 (Ct.App.1984). To the extent that a trial court permits the prosecution to introduce evidence of a defendant's silence, we also apply the plain error rule. See Rule 11-103(D) NMRA 1999; Lucero, 116 N.M. at 453-54, 863 P.2d at 1074-75. {28} These same rules do not necessarily apply when a defendant ha[s] not remained silent during questioning, and the prosecutor's inquiry at trial concerned his [or her]... statements, not his [or her] refusal or failure to make a statement. State v. Loera, 1996-NMSC-074, ¶ 8, 122 N.M. 641, 930 P.2d 176; accord Johnson, 102 N.M. at 114, 692 P.2d at 39. While a defendant may exercise the right to remain silent even if that right is not initially asserted, Hennessy, 114 N.M. at 288, 837 P.2d at 1371, [t]he fact that a defendant omits details in his [or her] statement is certainly not the kind of silence which is constitutionally protected as the defendant does not remain silent with respect to the subject matter of his [or her] statement, Johnson, 102 N.M. at 114, 692 P.2d at 39. As one commentator notes: To elicit such facts properly, the recounting witness may conclude the account in a natural fashion by indicating that there is nothing more to say because the defendant chose to stop. Otherwise, the jury might erroneously infer that the police cut the interview short before the defendant had a full opportunity to give his account. Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Misconduct § 9.3(d), at 9-22 (1998). {29} During the bench conference that followed Detective Christensen's testimony regarding Defendant's statement to police in this case, the trial court concluded that Defendant's statement was a sharing of information rather than an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights. Nevertheless, the trial court proceeded to warn the prosecutor that the State would not be allowed to argue any consciousness of guilt from the statement in question. The trial court also instructed the next witness, Detective Schofield, not to testify about it. Finally, the trial court offered to give an instruction to remind the jury of the State's burden of proof, and Defendant's trial counsel stated: That will be sufficient, Your Honor. {30} Under these circumstances, we agree with the trial court that the focus of the prosecutor's inquiry and the detective's testimony was a statement that Defendant made rather than his refusal or failure to make a statement. We note that unlike the prosecutor in Hennessy, 114 N.M. at 285, 837 P.2d at 1368, the prosecutor in this case did not argue to the jury that they should infer Defendant's guilt from the fact that he stopped talking after making the statement in question, or that Defendant had an obligation to elaborate on his prior statement. For these reasons, we conclude that Detective Christensen's account of his conversation with Defendant did not involve the kind of reference to a defendant's silence that would require reversal under the doctrine of plain or fundamental error.