Opinion ID: 3062214
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Meaning of “Shall”

Text: The statute provides that notice of the summons “shall” be given within 23 days before the date of the examination. Thus, we begin with the meaning of “shall.” This term indicates a mandatory intent. See United States v. Myers, 106 F.3d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 1997) (“It is a basic canon of statutory construction that use of the word ‘shall’ indicates a mandatory intent.”); Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 1999) (“The Supreme Court and this circuit have made clear that when a statute uses the word ‘shall,’ Congress has imposed a mandatory duty upon the subject of the command.”). 5 The government tells us that “shall” does not always signify a mandatory intent, relying on Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149 (2003), and Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605 (2010). We disagree with the government’s reading of Barnhart and Dolan. In both cases, statutes provided that the government “shall” act within a set time period. Barnhart, 537 U.S. at 752; Dolan, 560 U.S. at 607-08. In both opinions, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “shall” signifies a mandatory intent. Barnhart, 537 U.S. at 157-60; Dolan, 560 U.S. at 612. In Barnhart, the Commissioner of Social Security had a statutory obligation to assign a company that would fund benefits for individuals who had retired from the coal industry and were eligible for benefits. See Barnhart, 537 U.S. at 152. In Dolan, the district court had a statutory duty to determine how much the defendant owed in restitution. See Dolan, 560 U.S. at 607-08. To carry out these duties, the government had statutory deadlines. But in both cases, the government missed the deadlines. See Barnhart, 537 U.S. at 155; Dolan, 560 U.S. at 609. Thus, in both cases, the Supreme Court had to determine which mandatory obligation (the underlying obligation or the deadline) took precedence. In Barnhart, did the failure to timely comply mean that the Social Security Commissioner no longer had to designate a company to fund benefits for retirees entitled to benefits? And, in Dolan, did the district court’s failure to timely comply mean that the victim would no longer get the restitution that Congress said he was owed? In both cases, the Court held that missing a 6 deadline does not relieve the government of its statutory obligations. Barnhart, 537 U.S. at 158-72; Dolan, 560 U.S. at 611. Thus, the Social Security Commissioner’s failure to timely designate a company would not prevent retirees from obtaining benefits, and a court’s delay would not relieve criminals of a duty to compensate their victims. Our case is different. The IRS could issue the summonses, but it was not required to do so. In Barnhart, that choice was not available to the Social Security Commissioner; and in Dolan, that choice was not available to the sentencing court. In short, Barnhart and Dolan did not disturb the age-old precept that “shall” means “shall.”