Opinion ID: 848916
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: nabozny

Text: Similarly, in Nabozny, the plaintiff was injured in a fight with the insured. The policy at issue was identical to the one in Masters and this case, and provided coverage for an occurrence, which, in turn, was defined as an accident. 461 Mich. at 474, 606 N.W.2d 639. As in the present case, the insured claimed that the injury he caused was a covered occurrence because he did not intend to break the plaintiff's ankle. We unanimously rejected that argument, holding: In this case, Mr. Burkhardt apparently did not intend to break Mr. Nabozny's ankle. However, it is plain that in tripping someone to the ground in the course of a fight, Mr. Burkhardt reasonably should have expected the consequences of his acts because of the direct risk of harm created. This precludes a finding of liability coverage under the terms of this policy. In other words, the injury did not result from an accident. Moreover, Mr. Burkhardt's testimony that he did not intend to break any bones does not assist him. In our quote from Marzonie, Justice GRIFFIN cited [ Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v.] Piccard [, 440 Mich. 539, 489 N.W.2d 422] which explained: [W]here a direct risk of harm is intentionally created, and property damage or personal injury results, there is no liability coverage even if the specific result was unintended. It is irrelevant that the character of the harm that actually results is different from the character of the harm intended by the insured. It is clear from the facts, as stated by the insured, that injury reasonably should have been expected. Therefore, it is irrelevant that the broken ankle was not the specific harm intended by the insured. [ Id. at 480-481, 606 N.W.2d 639 (citations omitted).] It is worth reemphasizing that in both Masters and Nabozny the policy language we construed was identical to the policy language contained in the present case. Here, like Masters and Nabozny, the insured engaged in a deliberate act but claimed that the resulting unintended consequences rendered the event an accident. In both Masters and Nabozny, this Court rejected this argument and held that there was no covered occurrence because the insured reasonably should have expected the consequences of his intentional actions-even when the insured himself did not anticipate such consequences. Thus, in Masters and Nabozny we declined to view the expectation of the injury from the subjective perspective of the insureds in making the determination whether an accident occurred.