Opinion ID: 1436568
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Judge Dixon's Order Limiting the Introduction of Certain Evidence

Text: Mr. McFarland also argued that the so-called reduction in force (RIF) at CEEP in April 1999 was a pretext for eliminating his position, because a real RIF did not occur in ADCE (the larger division of which CEEP was a department) until November 1999. Granting GW's motion in limine, Judge Dixon excluded evidence of facts surrounding any termination that occurred or did not occur concerning employees in any other department of the ADCE Division or any other Department or Division of the University. However, Judge Dixon also ruled that Mr. McFarland could offer evidence of facts surrounding any termination that occurred or did not occur concerning employees in the [CEEP] . . . during April 1999 and October 1999 . . . (emphasis in original). Mr. McFarland characterizes the first ruling as effectively dismissing his second theory of liability, in which he claimed that GW retaliated by terminating him in April 1999 rather than in November 1999 pursuant to the real RIF. This early RIF argument is not a distinct theory of liability at all-it is merely a recasting of Mr. McFarland's retaliation claim. Even assuming that GW did expedite his termination, all Mr. McFarland would have shown is that GW was eager to get rid of him; it would not establish a causal link between his termination via the April RIF and his protected activity in August 1997. See Green, 652 A.2d at 45. Moreover, there would be no causal link between the April 14, 1999, letter and the decision to terminate McFarland's position, whether in April or in November. Judge Dixon's order was simply a limitation on the admission of evidence at trial. Evidentiary rulings are within the trial court's sound discretion, and we will upset them only upon a showing of grave abuse. Brown v. United States, 763 A.2d 1137, 1139 (D.C.2000) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 661 A.2d 636, 643 (D.C. 1995)). Here, Mr. McFarland was able to offer evidence of the facts surrounding the RIF within CEEP, from April 1999 through October 1999. That latitude was sufficient to explore GW's intent in eliminating McFarland's position, and he has not explained how evidence about the operations of other parts of the university would have illuminated that issue. Judge Dixon's order merely precluded Mr. McFarland from offering evidence of dubious relevance to the central issue of retaliatory intent. His ruling, which strikes us as eminently sensible, was not a grave abuse of discretion. Brown, 763 A.2d at 1139.