Opinion ID: 773406
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Substantive Title VII Principles

Text: 50 Most of the substantive principles pertinent to this appeal are well established. Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discharge or discriminate against any individual with respect to conditions of employment, inter alia, on the basis of gender. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). This provision evinces a congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, that she was subjected to adverse employment action, under circumstances giving rise to an inference of prohibited discrimination. See, e.g., Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir. 1997); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 51
52 A plaintiff seeking relief for sexual harassment may proceed on a theory of, inter alia, quid pro quo harassment. See, e.g., Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 630 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 997 (1997). [T]o establish a prima facie case of quid pro quo harassment, a plaintiff must present evidence that she was subject to unwelcome sexual conduct, and that her reaction to that conduct was then used as the basis for decisions affecting the compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of her employment. Karibian v. Columbia University, 14 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1213 (1994). It is enough to show that the supervisor used the employee's acceptance or rejection of his advances as the basis for [such] a decision.... Id. at 778; see also Carrero v. New York City Housing Authority, 890 F.2d 569, 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1989) (quid pro quo claim established where the plaintiff's refusal to submit to supervisor's sexual demands and her complaints against him resulted in deficient training and demotion). 53 Disparate treatment prohibited by Title VII also encompasses sexual harassment that results in a hostile or abusive work environment. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2000) (EEOC Guidelines); id. § 1604.11(a) (sexual harassment includes conduct [that] has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment). In order to prevail on a claim of hostile-work-environment sexual harassment, a plaintiff must establish two elements. 54 First, she must prove that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive working environment. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67; Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d 143, 149 (2d Cir. 1997); Cosgrove v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 9 F.3d 1033, 1041 (2d Cir. 1993). Title VII does not authorize a hostile work environment claim for conduct that was merely offensive, rather than sufficiently severe or pervasive that a reasonable person would find the environment hostile or abusive. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. at 21; Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67 ([N]ot all workplace conduct that may be described as 'harassment' affects a 'term, condition, or privilege' of employment within the meaning of Title VII.). 55 [W]hether an environment is hostile or abusive can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances. These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. The effect on the employee's psychological well-being is, of course, relevant to determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive. But while psychological harm, like any other relevant factor, may be taken into account, no single factor is required. 56 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. at 23. 57 Second, the plaintiff must show a specific basis for imputing the hostile work environment to the employer. See, e.g., Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d at 149; Karibian v. Columbia University, 14 F.3d at 779; Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Center, 957 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1992). Although limited defenses may be available, an employer is presumed responsible where the perpetrator of the harassment was the victim's supervisor. See, e.g., Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Richardson v. New York State Department of Correctional Service, 180 F.3d 426, 441 (2d Cir. 1999); Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d at 152-53. If the supervisor's harassment did not culminate in a tangible employment action, Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; see Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad, 191 F.3d 283, 294 (2d Cir. 1999) (constructive discharge, see Part II.A.2. below, is not considered a tangible employment action for these purposes), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1959 (2000), an employer may avoid liability if (a) it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b)... the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; see Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. at 807-08; Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 767 (2d Cir. 1998). Those circumstances constitute an affirmative defense on which the employer has the burden of proof. See, e.g., Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
58 Adverse employment actions include discharge from employment. Such a discharge may be either an actual termination of the plaintiff's employment by the employer or a constructive discharge. See, e.g., Chertkova v. Connecticut Life Insurance Co., 92 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 1996). 59 Constructive discharge of an employee occurs when an employer, rather than directly discharging an individual, intentionally creates an intolerable work atmosphere that forces an employee to quit involuntarily. 60 Id.; see, e.g., Kader v. Paper Software, Inc., 111 F.3d 337, 341 (2d Cir. 1997). 61 To find that an employee's resignation amounted to a constructive discharge, the trier of fact must be satisfied that the... working conditions would have been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would have felt compelled to resign. 62 Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 73 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, 831 F.2d 1184, 1188 (2d Cir. 1987) (other internal quotation marks omitted)). 63 Even absent a discharge, invidious harassment that did not make the plaintiff's job unendurable or intolerable may support a claim of hostile work environment if the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted). While a mild, isolated incident does not make a work environment hostile, the test is whether 'the harassment is of such quality or quantity that a reasonable employee would find the conditions of her employment altered for the worse.' Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d at 70 (quoting Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d at 632 (emphasis in Whidbee)). The effect on the employee's psychological well-being is... relevant to determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive, though no one factor is determinative under the objective standard. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. at 23. The victim's psychological well-being need not be damaged in order to find a hostile work environment; [t]he fact that the law requires harassment to be severe or pervasive before it can be actionable does not mean that employers are free from liability in all but the most egregious of cases. Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d at 631.
64 Title VII also provides that [i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees... because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII]. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The 'objective of this section is obviously to forbid an employer from retaliating against an employee because of the latter's opposition to an unlawful employment practice.' Galdieri-Ambrosini v. National Realty & Development Corp., 136 F.3d 276, 291-292 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Manoharan v. Columbia University College of Physicians & Surgeons, 842 F.2d 590, 593 (2d Cir. 1988)). To prevail on a claim of retaliation in violation of Title VII, the plaintiff must show that she engaged in protected participation or opposition under Title VII, that the employer was aware of this activity, that the employer took adverse action against the plaintiff, and that a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action, i.e., that a retaliatory motive played a part in the adverse employment action. Sumner v. United States Postal Service, 899 F.2d 203, 208-09 (2d Cir. 1990); see, e.g., Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d at 768; Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 349 (2d Cir. 1998); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1307 (2d Cir. 1995). 65