Opinion ID: 769004
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the centrality of the credibility issue

Text: 16 See United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1185 n.8 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc); see also United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1473 n.12 (9th Cir. 1988). Although the trial judge is not required to state his or her analysis of each of the five factors with special precision, the record should reveal, at a minimum, that the trial judge `was aware of the requirements of Rule 609(a)(1).'  Wallace, 848 F.2d at 1473 (quoting United States v. Givens, 767 F.2d 574, 579-80 (9th Cir. 1985)). 17 The correct procedure is for a district judge to ensure that the record reflects a consideration of the five Cook factors, as well as a weighing of the probative value of the conviction being offered against its prejudicial effect. Likewise, as proponents of the impeachment evidence, prosecutors should be vigilant about seeing to it that the record supports the judge's ruling. 18 We have had previous occasion to consider situations in which the record on the admissibility of the prior conviction was less than optimum. 2 In this case, although the record is less than perfect, it nonetheless compels an inference that the district judge was, at a minimum . . . aware of the requirements of Rule 609(a)(1) as required by Wallace. This is demonstrated by the fact that the judge recognized the possible prejudicial effect of the assault with a deadly weapon conviction, and attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to ameliorate that prejudice. The record shows that the judge recognized the centrality of the credibility issue and the defendant's testimony, but also attempted to protect Jimenez to the extent that his assault conviction would unfairly prejudice the jury. Under these particular circumstances, we believe the district judge demonstrated that he was, at a minimum . .. aware of the requirements of Rule 609(a)(1). 3 19 The real problem in this case is that in the district judge's well-meaning attempt to mitigate the prejudice to the defendant, he inadvertently made it worse. The district judge took Jimenez's assault with a deadly weapon conviction and ordered it referred to as a felony involving a firearm -this in a trial where the only issue in dispute was whether the defendant had, in fact, possessed a firearm. By altering the nature of Jimenez's previous assault conviction to include the reference to the firearm, the judge increased, rather than decreased, the risk that the jury would draw a conclusion that is impermissible in law: because he did it before he must have done it again. Bagley, 772 F.2d at 488. The limiting instruction the judge later offered could not fully eliminate this danger.