Opinion ID: 1155727
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Renton Analysis

Text: In applying the Renton analysis to the ordinance here, we determine as a preliminary matter whether the ordinance is a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation. If so, we then determine whether the ordinance, and in particular the shopping center exception, is designed to serve a substantial governmental interest, and allows for reasonable alternative avenues of communication. [6]
(1) Since the city's ordinance, like the one in Renton, does not ban adult businesses altogether, but merely provides that such businesses may only be located in certain areas, the ordinance is properly analyzed as a form of time, place, and manner regulation. ( Renton, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 46 [89 L.Ed.2d at pp. 36-37].) Moreover, we conclude that the ordinance is content-neutral, since the ordinance is, as in Renton, supra, 475 U.S. at page 47 [89 L.Ed.2d at pages 37-38], aimed not at the content of materials sold, but rather at the secondary effects of adult businesses on the surrounding community. [7] While the superior court did not expressly address this issue, in its discussion of the evidence in support of its finding that the ordinance was designed to serve a substantial government interest, the court noted that there was testimony that the ordinance was enacted as part of a comprehensive scheme of urban redevelopment in an effort to combat blight in National City, and that the presence of Chuck's Bookstore ... has led to `secondary effects' on the community... Moreover, the court's ruling upholding the constitutionality of the ordinance under Renton constitutes an implied finding that the ordinance is content-neutral. The record amply supports this implied finding. (2) Respondents devote much of their argument to the proposition that the city's ordinance is content-based, and that the predominant censorial purpose behind it was to prohibit the establishment of any adult business. In support of this contention, respondents rely on evidence they claim establishes that the city knew or should have known owners of shopping centers would be either reluctant, or would outright refuse, to rent to an adult business. The factual predicate for this argument is unsupported by the record, since Mr. Post categorically denied that city planners were aware of any reluctance to rent. [8] More importantly, Mr. Post denied any motivation on the part of the city to eliminate adult businesses. Rather, Mr. Post testified that the purpose of the ordinance was to alleviate the secondary effects of adult businesses, while allowing reasonable alternative locations for those businesses. The trial court apparently credited this testimony, and we see no reason to question its ruling. (See Renton, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 48 [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 38], quoting United States v. O'Brien (1968) 391 U.S. 367, 383 [20 L.Ed.2d 672, 683-684, 88 P.2d 1673] [`It is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.']; Ward, supra, 491 U.S. at p. 791 [105 L.Ed.2d at p. 675], quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence (1984) 468 U.S. 288, 293 [82 L.Ed.2d 221, 226-227, 104 S.Ct. 3065] [Government regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is `justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.'].) Respondents also rely on evidence that they claim demonstrates that the city knew or should have known that it would not be economically feasible for an adult business to build its own shopping center. However, as we discuss more fully in our evaluation of whether the ordinance allows for reasonable alternative avenues of communication, the ordinance does not limit respondents' alternatives to such construction. Finally, respondents argue that since the effect of the ordinance is to eliminate all adult businesses, that must be its underlying intent. Since we conclude, post, that the ordinance does not have this effect, we likewise reject respondents' suggestion of illicit intent. In sum, we conclude that the ordinance is content-neutral, and proceed to evaluate the constitutionality of the ordinance under Renton's two-part test.
(3) We find, as did the two lower courts, that the first prong of substantial governmental interest is easily satisfied. The city presented substantial evidence at trial that adult businesses are a source of urban decay, and that the location of the adult business at issue in this case has in fact led to the secondary effects the ordinance seeks to curtail. Moreover, the city demonstrated that both the distance regulation and the shopping center exception are designed to serve substantial government interests in decreasing blight and crime, shifting part of the regulatory burden to the private sector, by either dispersing adult businesses, or by placing them in locations such as enclosed shopping malls designed to minimize the occurrence of negative secondary effects, and protecting the city's tax base. (See Renton, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 48 [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 38] [upholding ordinance designed to prevent crime, protect the city's retail trade, maintain property values, and generally `protec[t] and preserv[e] the quality of [the city's] neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of urban life'].) We also find that the city's shopping mall exception is narrowly tailored, since the `regulation promotes ... substantial government interest[s] that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.' ( Ward, supra, 491 U.S. at p. 799 [105 L.Ed.2d at pp. 680-681], quoting United States v. Albertini, supra, 472 U.S. at p. 689 [86 L.Ed.2d at pp. 548-549].) First, under the ordinance, the malls in which adult businesses are permitted to be established are either inward looking configurations, or those isolated from direct view from public streets, parks, schools, churches or residentially zoned property. Access is by a pedestrian walkway, not a public street. This configuration reduces the secondary effects associated with adult businesses by segregating such businesses away from residential areas and schools, and placing them in a location where they do not affect the moral climate of the community as a whole. Specifically, it decreases the problems of harassment of neighborhood adults and children, littering of sexually explicit reading material and paraphernalia, loitering, and visual blight from bright colors and explicit signage associated with adult businesses. Second, placing adult businesses in shopping centers promotes the city's interests by shifting part of the regulatory burden to the private sector. A shopping center has its own signage, paint, and landscaping restrictions. A mall arrangement also addresses such factors as hours of operation, parking, and security. Thus, a shopping center generally exercises a high degree of control over its tenants. This benefits the city, as Mr. Post testified, by removing it from the enforcement business. We don't have to expend the amount of resources that we typically would if the shopping center itself is doing some of the policing in terms of these various factors. [9] Finally, there was testimony that the result of reducing the secondary effects of adult businesses, and freeing up public protection resources, is a healthier economic base. As noted above, National City is particularly reliant on its commercial tax base, and hence has a substantial interest in its preservation. Therefore, placing adult businesses in malls furthers the city's substantial interests in reducing the secondary effects of adult businesses, relieving the city from some of the regulatory burden by shifting it to the private sector, and protecting the commercial tax base.
(4) We also conclude that the ordinance provides reasonable alternative avenues of communication. The ordinance makes available the entire commercially zoned area of the city, or 572 acres of land, on which to locate an adult business. This area is highly accessible by major freeways and arterials. In addition, the ordinance limits neither the total number of adult businesses that may locate in the city, nor the hours they may operate. Finally, the ordinance does `not affect the operation of existing establishments but only the location of new ones.' ( Young, supra, 427 U.S. at p. 71, fn. 35 [49 L.Ed.2d at pp. 326-327], citation omitted.) Respondents contend, however, that the availability of sites under the ordinance is illusory because of the lack of sites currently for rent, the unwillingness of owners of available sites to rent to them, and the considerable cost of building their own shopping center in compliance with the ordinance. We find none of these arguments establish constitutional infirmity. The high court in Renton made clear that `The inquiry for First Amendment purposes is not concerned with economic impact.' ( Renton, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 54 [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 42], quoting Young, supra, 427 U.S. at p. 78 [49 L.Ed.2d at pp. 330-331]. See City of Vallejo v. Adult Books (1985) 167 Cal. App.3d 1169, 1180 [213 Cal. Rptr. 143] [[E]vidence of the considerable economic difficulty of locating `adult' uses at many legally permissible sites within the City of Vallejo.... falls far short of establishing that appellant is foreclosed or unreasonably restricted by the ordinance from effectively operating within the city limits.], cert. den. (1986) 475 U.S. 1064 [89 L.Ed.2d 601, 106 S.Ct. 1374].) As noted earlier, Renton refused to sustain an economic viability argument on a record demonstrating that a substantial part of the 520 acres zoned for adult businesses was occupied by a sewage disposal site, race track, and other uses restricting, as a practical matter, available sites. Similarly, we decline to find on this record that National City's ordinance fails to provide reasonable alternative avenues of communication. [10] Moreover, Renton explicitly rejected the argument that because `practically none' of the undeveloped land [was] currently for sale or lease the ordinance `would result in a substantial restriction' on speech. ( Renton, supra, 475 U.S. at pp. 53-54 [89 L.Ed.2d at pp. 41-42], citations omitted.) The record here in fact reveals that vacancies existed at all three shopping centers, and that the evidence of landowners' unwillingness to rent consisted essentially of generalized responses by leasing agents to respondents' expert's telephone inquiry, and testimony that it is generally known among realtors that shopping centers do not usually rent to adult businesses. Nor, in this case, is any reluctance or outright refusal of private land owners to rent to adult businesses dispositive of the issue of whether the ordinance provides a reasonable opportunity for such businesses to locate within National City. While a city may not suppress protected speech, neither is it compelled to act as a broker or leasing agent for those engaged in the sale of it. We decline to hold local governments responsible for the business decisions of private individuals who act for their own economic concerns without any reference to the First Amendment. The Constitution does not saddle municipalities with the task of ensuring either the popularity or economic success of adult businesses. Respondents' reliance on the fact that only one other adult business currently operates within the city is also misplaced. The number of adult businesses is, without more, of no particular significance in evaluating the validity of the ordinance. We find no authority that mandates a constitutional ratio of adult businesses to a particular population figure. [11] We note that at the time the Renton ordinance was enacted no adult theaters were located in Renton.... ( Playtime Theaters, Inc. v. City of Renton, supra, 748 F.2d at p. 530.) Moreover, nothing in this record indicates whether similar enterprises have attempted to locate in the city and have been thwarted by virtue of unreasonable restrictions, or simply found it economically less advantageous than other localities. It is also inaccurate to characterize the ordinance as forcing respondents to build their own shopping mall at prohibitive cost. Rather, this is merely one option under the ordinance. The city has demonstrated that there are three shopping centers, and a partially developed 4.5-acre area, where an adult business may seek to rent an existing location. Moreover, certain malls may be modified in conformance with the ordinance to accommodate adult businesses. It is respondents, not the city, who define construction of a new shopping center as their only alternative under the ordinance. Hence, we conclude that the ordinance provides reasonable alternative avenues of communication.