Opinion ID: 1127540
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Heading: The law of release

Text: At common law, the release of one tortfeasor automatically released all other potential tortfeasors. Dougherty v. California Kettlemen Oil Royalties, 13 Cal.2d 174, 88 P.2d 690, 693 (Cal. 1939). This result was harsh and without any rational basis. See Neves v. Potter, 769 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Colo. 1989). Critics urged that [t]he only desirable rule would seem to be that a plaintiff should never be deprived of a cause of action against any wrongdoer when the plaintiff has neither intentionally surrendered the cause of action nor received substantially full compensation. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 49, at 335 (5th ed. 1984). To avoid the harshness of the common law rule, the Nevada Legislature adopted the Uniform Joint Obligations Act (UJOA) as chapter 101 of Nevada Revised Statutes. tlesea v. Farmer, 86 Nev. 347, 349, 469 P.2d 57, 58 (1970). In pertinent part, the UJOA states: If an obligee releasing or discharging an obligor without express reservation of rights against a coobligor, then knows or has reason to know that the obligor released or discharged did not pay so much of the claim as he was bound by his contract or relation with that coobligor to pay, the obligee's claim against that coobligor shall be satisfied to the amount which the obligee knew or had reason to know that the released or discharged obligor was bound to such coobligor to pay. NRS 101.060(1) (emphasis added). This rule was drafted to protect the intentions of the parties and to avoid a trap for the unwary. Van Cleave v. Gamboni Construction, 101 Nev. 524, 530, 706 P.2d 845, 849 (1985) ( citing Whittlesea, 86 Nev. at 354, 469 P.2d at 61). Based on the UJOA, courts refuse to allow tortfeasors to escape liability through a release executed by an injured party in favor of a joint tortfeasor unless the injured party's intention to release all tortfeasors is manifest. Whittlesea, 86 Nev. at 353, 469 P.2d at 60-61 (Zenoff, J., concurring). The Nevada Legislature adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA) in 1973. The UCATA was drafted to specifically address the inequities that resulted from adherence to the traditional common law rule. Neves, 769 P.2d at 1050. In pertinent part, the UCATA states: When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury ...: 1. It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury ... unless its terms so provide. ... NRS 17.245 (emphasis added). The key question in this case is whether the any and all persons, firms or corporations language in the release signed by Laura discharged General Motors and Fairway. Jurisdictions that apply the UCATA are divided over how to interpret such language. Some jurisdictions hold that all possible tortfeasors are released by a general, boilerplate release. Douglas v. United States Tobacco Co., 670 F.2d 791, 794-95 (8th Cir.1982); Newsome v. Finch, 375 So.2d 1144, 1145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Ralkey v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 63 Md.App. 515, 492 A.2d 1358, 1363-66 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985). Other jurisdictions narrowly construe the unless its terms so provide requirement only to discharge a tortfeaser who is named in the release or identifiable from the face of the release. Moore v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 299 Ark. 232, 773 S.W.2d 78, 81 (Ark. 1989); Alsup v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 101 Ill.2d 196, 77 Ill.Dec. 738, 741, 461 N.E.2d 361, 364 (Ill. 1984); Robertson v. McCarte, 13 Mass.App.Ct. 441, 433 N.E.2d 1262, 1264 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982); Beck v. Cianchetti, 1 Ohio St.3d 231, 439 N.E.2d 417, 420 (1982). A third view probes the intentions of the parties by holding that a boilerplate release can only discharge an unnamed tortfeasor if the parties to the release intended such a result. McInnis v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 943, 958 (D.R.I.1986); Neves, 769 P.2d at 1055; Allen v. Ouachita Marine and Indus. Corp., 606 P.2d 607, 609 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980). The United States Supreme Court has endorsed this latter approach in its review of anti-trust and intellectual property cases. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Co., 377 U.S. 476, 501, 84 S.Ct. 1526, 1540, 12 L.Ed.2d 457 (1964); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 401 U.S. 321, 347, 91 S.Ct. 795, 810, 28 L.Ed.2d 77 (1971). Our cases that address the issue at bar adhere to the latter view because it is the more reasoned approach. Compare Neves, 769 P.2d at 1055. The absolute bar view continues to act as a trap for the unwary, thereby frustrating the intent of the UCATA to abrogate the common law. See Alsup, 77 Ill.Dec. at 741, 461 N.E.2d at 364. A plaintiff such as Laura would be unfairly barred from pursuing lawsuits against unknown defendants on claims that are legally distinguishable from the claims considered during the negotiation of the release. The view that a release only discharges tortfeasors who are named in a release, or identifiable from the face of a release, is unpersuasive. Such a view renders NRS 17.245 meaningless because before NRS 17.245 was adopted, an express reservation was already required by the UJOA. Further, requiring an express reservation would erroneously render the any other persons, firms, or corporations language in a release completely meaningless. See Phillips v. Mercer, 94 Nev. 279, 282, 579 P.2d 174, 176 (1978). Chwialkowski v. Sachs, 108 Nev. 404, 834 P.2d 405 (1992), is the most recent Nevada case dealing with a release of the type presented here. In Chwialkowski, the plaintiff was involved in a car accident and sued the other driver, Sachs, after signing a release with the insurance carrier for Sachs' car. The release expressly stated that it was a release and forever discharge [of] ... Paul Cachs [sic] ... and all other persons, firms or corporations. ... Id. at 406, 834 P.2d at 405 (emphasis added). Because Sachs was expressly named in the release, interpretation of the all other persons, firms, or corporations language was not necessary for resolution of Chwialkowski's claim. In two other release cases, Von Zehner v. Truck Ins. Exch., 99 Nev. 152, 659 P.2d 879 (1983), and Igert v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 91 Nev. 240, 533 P.2d 1365 (1975), we affirmed dismissal orders because each defendant's liability was discharged by a release. In both Von Zehner and Igert, the defendants were expressly named in their respective release. Von Zehner, 99 Nev. at 153-54, 659 P.2d at 881; Igert, 91 Nev. at 240, 533 P.2d at 1366. In Van Cleave v. Gamboni Constr., 99 Nev. 544, 665 P.2d 250 (1983) ( Van Cleave I ), we concluded that absent a statute to the contrary the valid release of one joint tortfeasor releases all joint wrongdoers.... Id. at 546, 665 P.2d at 252. However, in Van Cleave I we did not interpret the UCATA because an issue remained as to whether the contract under review was actually a release. Id. at 548, 665 P.2d at 253. We considered the same dispute again in Van Cleave v. Gamboni Construction, 101 Nev. 524, 706 P.2d 845 (1985) (Van Cleave II). In Van Cleave II, we concluded that the UCATA applies in vicarious liability cases because the harsh common law rule of release was abrogated by the UCATA. Id. at 525, 706 P.2d at 846. We did not consider the specific issue at bar in either Van Cleave I or Van Cleave II. The release under review in those cases discharged an employee of Gamboni and expressly reserved all claims against anyone else. Id. at 526, 706 P.2d at 846. Still, our analysis probed the intention of the releasor. We commented that the record did not indicate that Van Cleave believed that she was settling her entire loss and the reservation clause itself indicated she did not intend to settle her whole claim. Id. at 530, 706 P.2d at 849. In Hansen v. Collett, 79 Nev. 159, 380 P.2d 301 (1963), we explained that the harsh common law rule of release must yield to more enlightened cases that promote the administration of justice. Id. at 163, 380 P.2d at 303. We also ratified the views of respectable authorities, both in cases and in the work of eminent text writers, that a release does not, in and of itself, release a party unless it was the intention of the injured person to release that party. Further, we stated that determining an injured party's intentions depends upon proof and is not susceptible to resolution as a matter of law. Such a determination is appropriately a jury question. Id.