Opinion ID: 1313347
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Qualified Immunity for Individual Appellees

Text: The district court ultimately decided that Shearer had failed to establish a violation of due process because she failed to sufficiently prove that she had been damaged by the appellees' conduct. Before we reach that issue, however, we must first consider whether Allen and Leuenberger in their individual capacities are immune from liability under § 1983. Under § 1983, public officials sued in their individual capacity `are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). Whether an official may prevail in his or her qualified immunity defense depends upon the `objective reasonableness of [his or her] conduct as measured by reference to clearly established law.' Id. In order to determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, we engage in a two-part analysis.... First, we must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the violation of a constitutional right.... Second, we must determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. (Citations omitted.) Manzano v. South Dakota Dept. of Social Services, 60 F.3d 505, 509 (8th Cir.1995). As noted above, Shearer's petition, when liberally construed, alleges the violation of a constitutional right. Hence, our analysis turns to whether or not that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. For a constitutional right to be clearly established, [t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he [or she] is doing violates that right. ... This is not to say an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent. (Citation omitted.) Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in the context of a child abuse investigation, has noted that an imperfect investigation without more does not deprive the investigators of qualified immunity.... (The question is whether the state of the law was such that a reasonable person would have known [his or her] actions were unconstitutional. Furthermore, a reasonable person is not expected to act as a legal scholar and predict the future direction of the law. Closely analogous cases, decided before the defendant acted ... are often required to find that a constitutional or statutory right is clearly established .) Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1460 (8th Cir.1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58, abrogated on other grounds, Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991). In a series of cases, the Eighth Circuit has held that parental liberty interests are not clearly established in the context of reasonable suspicion of child abuse, even where that suspicion results in the wrongful placement of the children into foster care. See, e.g., Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Services, Inc., 85 F.3d 1365 (8th Cir.1996); Manzano v. South Dakota Dept. of Social Services, supra ; Lux by Lux v. Hansen, 886 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir.1989); Doe v. Hennepin County, 858 F.2d 1325 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied 490 U.S. 1108, 109 S.Ct. 3161, 104 L.Ed.2d 1023 (1989); Myers v. Morris, supra . We also note that several other jurisdictions have confronted due process challenges to child abuse registry schemes similar to that established in Nebraska. Appellate courts that have confronted similar facts to those in the instant case have generally found that those circumstances comport with due process. See, e.g., Watso v. Dept. of Social Services, 841 P.2d 299 (Colo.1992); Roth v. Reagen, 422 N.W.2d 464 (Iowa 1988); Mary L. v. State Dept. of Social Services, 244 A.D.2d 133, 676 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1998); Physical Abuse at Blackacre Acad., 304 N.J.Super. 168, 698 A.2d 1275 (1997); J.P. v. Carter, 24 Va.App. 707, 485 S.E.2d 162 (1997); Johnston v. Michael Shea and Associates, 425 N.W.2d 263 (Minn.App.1988). Those appellate courts that have found child abuse registry systems to violate due process have done so on facts that are distinguishable from those found in the Nebraska scheme and in the present case. See, e.g., Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992 (2d Cir.1994); Lee TT. v. Dowling, 87 N.Y.2d 699, 664 N.E.2d 1243, 642 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1996) (finding due process violated because burden of proof in substantiating allegations was not placed on investigating agency); Richardson v. Chevrefils, 131 N.H. 227, 552 A.2d 89 (1988); Wilson v. State Dept. of Human Services, 969 P.2d 770 (Colo.App.1998) (finding due process violated because no notice was given to suspected abuser); Matter of East Park High School, 314 N.J.Super. 149, 714 A.2d 339 (1998) (finding due process violated by denial of fair administrative hearing); Cavarretta v. DCFS, 277 Ill.App.3d 16, 660 N.E.2d 250, 214 Ill.Dec. 59 (1996) (finding due process implicated by 598-day delay in completing appeals process). Furthermore, those cases determined that due process interests were strongly implicated because the information contained in the registry was more widely disseminated than under Nebraska's law. See id. In the instant case, DSS gave notice to Shearer before her name was placed in the Registry, was required to find that the claim was supported by the preponderance of the evidence, and proceeded without unreasonable delay. Had Shearer chosen to pursue her administrative remedies, she would have been entitled to a fair hearing in which the burden would have been on DSS to sustain its action. There is no evidence that information regarding Shearer was disseminated, even to the limited degree permitted by the Nebraska statutes. The concerns iterated by the above-cited cases are not implicated in this appeal. We, therefore, conclude that the procedures in this case did not violate any `clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984). Consequently, Shearer has not pled facts that breach Allen's and Leuenberger's qualified immunity under § 1983.