Opinion ID: 3003388
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Manager-Or-Supervisor Enhancement

Text: Mr. Anderson also challenges the district court’s application of a sentencing enhancement pursuant to No. 08-2925 21 U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b), which authorizes a three-level enhancement when a defendant acted as a manager or supervisor of a criminal activity. We review the district court’s finding that Mr. Anderson exercised a managerial or supervisory role in the offense for clear error. United States v. Sainz-Preciado, 566 F.3d 708, 714 (7th Cir. 2009). To qualify for an enhancement under section 3B1.1, a defendant “must have been the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of one or more other participants” in the charged criminal activity.1 4 U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.2. The Guidelines do not define the terms “manager” and “supervisor.” The commentary to section 3B1.1, however, does set forth several factors that this court may use to ascertain whether an individual had a supervisory role in an offense. United States v. Howell, 527 F.3d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 2008).15 Those factors include: (1) the exercise of decision-making authority; (2) the nature of participation in the commission of the offense; (3) the recruitment of accomplices; (4) the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime; 14 For the purposes of that section, a “ ’participant’ is a person who is criminally responsible for the commission of the offense,” although the person need not have been convicted. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.1. 15 Although the factors enumerated in the commentary were designed to assist courts in distinguishing leaders from managers, we also have “found that they are . . . relevant in ascertaining whether an individual had a supervisory role at all.” United States v. Howell, 527 F.3d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). 22 No. 08-2925 (5) the degree of participation in planning and organizing the offense; (6) the nature and scope of the illegal activity; (7) the degree of control and authority exercised over others. Id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4). “No one of these factors is considered a prerequisite to the enhancement, and, at the same time, the factors are not necessarily entitled to equal weight.” United States v. Wasz, 450 F.3d 720, 729 (7th Cir. 2006). Although not all of these factors must be present, the enhancement cannot be applied unless the defendant “ ‘exercised some control over others involved in the commission of the offense.’ ” United States v. Gracia, 272 F.3d 866, 877 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Pagan, 196 F.3d 884, 892 (7th Cir. 1999)). Mr. Anderson claims that the Government presented no evidence that he exercised any influence or control over Prudenza, Dalglish or any other participants in the conspiracy. We disagree. There are many facts—several of which fit into one or more of the categories enumerated in Note 4—that support the district court’s finding that Mr. Anderson managed or supervised one or more participants in the conspiracy. First, there is evidence that Mr. Anderson exercised decision-making authority over participants in the scheme: Lennox testified that Mr. Anderson approved his salary and signing bonus, R.196 at 93-95,16 and Prudenza stated that Mr. Anderson 16 This testimony supports the district court’s conclusion in two ways: First, it demonstrates that Mr. Anderson had the authority to decide how much compensation Lennox, a non- (continued...) No. 08-2925 23 16 (...continued) partner participant in the conspiracy, would receive for his role in the scheme. Second, it suggests that Mr. Anderson was Lennox’s boss, rather than his equal, thus supporting the court’s conclusion that Mr. Anderson supervised at least one participant. See United States v. Polichemi, 219 F.3d 698, 712 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Although the court did not find this fact explicitly, its discussion of Neal’s relationship to Edward Russey and Larry Oesterman indicates that it found the necessary supervision. Neal was president of Konex Marketing, and Russey and Oesterman were salesmen for the company. As such, Neal was their boss, not their equal.”). Although Lennox was initially listed in the criminal complaint, see R.1 at 1, it appears that he was granted immunity in exchange for his cooperation. See R.196 at 23; R.197 at 61-67; R.200 at 119. Nevertheless, the fact that Lennox was not ultimately prosecuted or convicted does not preclude the finding that he was a “participant” in the offense for the purposes of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. As the commentary to that provision notes, “[a] ‘participant’ is a person who is criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have been convicted.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.1 (emphasis added). Moreover, we have previously accepted the argument that an individual who testified under a grant of immunity may be considered a “participant” in an offense. See United States v. Jackson, 95 F.3d 500, 511 (7th Cir. 1996). In Jackson, we affirmed the district court’s denial of a reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 (mitigating role in the offense), which defines “participant” in accordance with the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.1. In that case, the Government argued that several telemarketers other than the indicted defendants should be considered criminally responsible “participants” in the (continued...) 24 No. 08-2925 oversaw the whole of First Capital’s operations while he and Dalglish were in Italy.1 7 Second, the nature of Mr. Anderson’s participation in the offense supports the district court’s conclusion; because Mr. Anderson controlled the purse strings of First Capital, he likely had either direct or indirect financial control over other participants in the enterprise. Third, Mr. Anderson claimed a one-third share of First Capital’s profits. The evidence of Mr. Anderson’s decision-making authority over Lennox, his control of the enterprise during Prudenza and Dalglish’s absence, his control of First Capital’s finances and his receipt of a large share of First Capital’s profits supports the district court’s conclusion that Mr. Anderson was a manager or supervisor of the crim- 16 (...continued) scheme. Jackson, 95 F.3d at 511. Specifically, the Government noted that “two of the . . . employees who testified were granted immunity,” and that “the apparent nature of the fraud from the script itself . . . strongly suggest[ed] that other telemarketers could have been indicted and prosecuted” had the Government sought to do so. Id. The defendant did not reply to that argument, which we found “convincing.” Id. 17 We have considered control over an enterprise, even on a temporary basis, to be a fact supporting the application of an enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. See United States v. Sheikh, 367 F.3d 683, 688 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that the defendant “exclusively ran the store and directed Yousef’s activities for a period of time during which the fraud continued”). No. 08-2925 25 inal enterprise.18 We therefore conclude that the district court did not clearly err in applying the manager-orsupervisor enhancement.