Opinion ID: 1774411
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Constitutional Issues in the Trial Court

Text: Shelton Ross's motion to quash, aside from alleging the nonconstitutional issues discussed in the opinion of the Court, also alleged that the ordinance was unconstitutional for being overly broad, and vague under the Federal and State Constitutions. In the hearings on the motion the defense argued that the language of the ordinance, in particular the phrase remains in a public place, is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to give adequate notice of exactly what conduct is prohibited. In addition, the defense also contended that the ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad since it unjustifiably criminalizes a number of constitutionally protected activities. In response to the defense's constitutional arguments, the city prosecutor rejoined that the ordinance clearly and distinctly criminalizes only solicitation for illegal activities, and does not address constitutionally protected activities. The city prosecutor also argued that the phrase remains in a public place is susceptible to a common understanding, and therefore not unconstitutionally vague. Based on the foregoing arguments, the city prosecutor maintained that the ordinance was constitutional. Citing LSA-R.S. 14:11, [6] the trial court interpreted the word intentional in the ordinance to require a showing of only general criminal intent to prove a violation of the ordinance. After examining the effect of this intent requirement in light of the range of activities purportedly reached by the ordinance, the trial court concluded that the ordinance was unconstitutionally overbroad. In addition, the trial court, focusing upon the phrase remains in a public place, ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague. I now review the trial court's determination that the ordinance is unconstitutional. In so doing I begin with the trial court's finding that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague, in violation of the defendant's right to due process under Article I, § 2 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. After the vagueness claim has been addressed, I will move on to the contention that the ordinance impermissibly infringes upon rights of free speech and assembly guaranteed by Article I, §§ 7 and 9 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.