Opinion ID: 2508223
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim

Text: The McGrews contend that Karen L. does not require dismissal of their claim that DFYS engaged in intentional misconduct. They argue that their allegations of intentional wrongdoing and deceit distinguish Karen L. [26] The state simply responds that Karen L. bars the McGrews' claims for negligence and emotional distress. To plead a claim for IIED, a plaintiff must allege these necessary elements: (1) the conduct is extreme and outrageous, (2) the conduct is intentional or reckless, (3) the conduct causes emotional distress, and (4) the distress is severe. [27] The McGrews' complaint alleged that DFYS's conduct was extreme, outrageous and atrocious; that its conduct was intentional and/or reckless; that its conduct caused emotional distress to the McGrews; and that their distress was severe and that they suffered personal injury, personal humiliation, mental anguish, pain and suffering. Their complaint therefore adequately pleaded all necessary elements of an IIED claim. IIED claims require the trial court to make a threshold determination whether the severity of the emotional distress and the conduct of the offending party warrant a claim. [28] We review this threshold determination for abuse of discretion, [29] but there was no threshold determination in this case about whether the state's alleged conduct was sufficiently outrageous or whether the McGrews' alleged emotional distress was sufficiently severe for an IIED claim. Instead, the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the IIED claim seems to have been based on a conclusion that Karen L.'s discussion of duty also controls IIED claims against DFYS. We review that conclusion de novo because it presents an issue of law. [30] In Karen L. we considered the narrow question whether the state defendants owed Karen a duty of care to protect her from emotional distress with respect to the CINA proceeding. [31] We have usually discussed the element of duty of care in context of negligence claims, not intentional tort claims. For example, in Chizmar v. Mackie , we stated that a plaintiff's right to recover emotional damages caused by mere negligence should be limited to those cases where the defendant owes the plaintiff a preexisting duty. [32] We noted in Hawks v. State, Department of Public Safety that the first step in determining whether a negligence action can be maintained is determining whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care. [33] Our discussion in Karen L. of a duty of care and the D.S.W. factors pertained only to Karen L.'s negligence claims against the state and its agencies and employees. [34] That discussion does not control the McGrews' IIED claims here. We discussed separately in Karen L. the mother's IIED claims against the state defendants. The superior court had dismissed the mother's IIED claims on summary judgment. [35] We affirmed, holding that Karen did not make the necessary threshold showing on the conduct element for an IIED claim, and the record requires the conclusion that the conduct of the social worker defendants was neither outrageous nor extreme. [36] But the McGrews' IIED claim was dismissed on the pleadings, not summary judgment, and as we noted above, the McGrews' complaint sufficiently pleaded an IIED claim. The superior court here consequently never had to decide whether their case met the thresholds for an IIED claim. Moreover, we discussed duty in Karen L. and D.S.W. in context of claims in which the existence of an actionable duty of care was legally and factually problematic. The legal determination whether there is an actionable duty of care has little if any conceptual relevance to an IIED claim. The concept of a duty of care is usually identified with negligence claims, [37] and has no obvious bearing on a claim of intentional and outrageous conduct; the intentionality of the outrageous conduct needed for an IIED claim presupposes at least some intended relationship between the actor and the person harmed. The D.S.W. factors are typically applied to determine whether there is an actionable duty of care when there is no existing or intended relationship between the actor and the person harmed. [38] We conclude that the D.S.W. multi-factor duty analysis we applied in Karen L. does not apply to intentional tort claims. Karen L.'s duty discussion therefore does not preclude the McGrews' IIED claim. Because that claim was dismissed on the pleadings under Rule 12(b)(6), there was no opportunity to consider whether plaintiffs' evidence could surmount the thresholds for the severity of any emotional distress and the outrageousness of the actor's conduct. [39] We therefore cannot affirm the dismissal of this claim on a possible alternative theory that the McGrews did not or cannot overcome the threshold for an IIED claim. We consequently reverse the dismissal of their IIED claim.