Opinion ID: 2653126
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: SMC Relating to Knee Disability

Text: CUE is a collateral attack on a final Board decision, and “is a very specific and rare kind of error.” 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403. For CUE to exist, either (1) “the correct facts, as they were known at the time, were not before the adjudicator or [(2)] the statutory or regulatory provisions extant at the time were incorrectly applied.” Russell v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 310, 313 (1992) (en banc). The error must be undebatable, and manifestly change the outcome of the prior decision based on the record or law at the time of the decision. Id. at 313–14. El Malik argues that the Board erred in not finding CUE in the denial of additional SMC because it mistakenly based that finding on an interpretation of 38 U.S.C. § 1114(r), rather than on 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a DC 5055 Note 2. EL MALIK v. SHINSEKI 7 38 U.S.C. § 1114(r) states: [I]f any veteran, otherwise entitled to compensation authorized under subsection (o) of this sec- tion, at the maximum rate authorized under subsection (p) of this section, or at the intermediate rate authorized between the rates authorized under subsections (n) and (o) of this section and at the rate authorized under subsection (k) of this section, is in need of regular aid and attendance, then, in addition to such compensation-- (1) the veteran shall be paid a monthly aid and attendance allowance at the rate of $2,002; or (2) if the veteran, in addition to such need for regular aid and attendance, is in need of a higher level of care, such veteran shall be paid a monthly aid and attendance al- lowance at the rate of $2,983 in lieu of the allowance authorized in clause (1) of this subsection, if the Secretary finds that the veteran, in the absence of the provision of such care, would require hospitalization, nursing home care, or other residential in- stitutional care. 38 U.S.C. § 1114(r). The Veterans Court, like the Board before it, interpreted the plain language of section 1114(r) to require an SMC award under either section (o), section (p), or both section “n and a half” and section (k), prior to providing an award for aid and attendance. A4. Specifically, it noted that eligibility under section 1114(r) requires an additional award under section 1114(k) if the veteran has an SMC award under the “n and a half” rate. A4. We agree with this interpretation; the plain language of section 1114(r) is clear. 38 U.S.C. § 1114(r) authorizes aid 8 EL MALIK v. SHINSEKI and attendance for veterans who have an SMC rating under either section (o), section (p), or section “n and a half,” with an additional rating under section (k). 38 C.F.R. § 3.350(h) further supports this reading, explaining that, for SMC under section 1114(r), the veteran must be entitled to “the maximum rate under 38 U.S.C. 1114 (o) or (p)” or “the intermediate rate between 38 U.S.C. 1114(n) and (o) plus special monthly compensation under 38 U.S.C. 1114(k).” (emphasis added). While El Malik has an SMC rating at the “n and a half” rate, he does not have an additional SMC rating under section 1114(k). Consequently, he could not qualify for additional SMC under section 1114(r). El Malik does not dispute this reading of 1114(r). He asserts, however, that discussion of section 1114(r) is irrelevant to his claim. He argues that DC 5055 Note 2 and 38 U.S.C. § 1156(d) entitle him to receive “aid and attendance” SMC, separate and apart from the SMC authorized in section 1114(r), because his surgery resulted in the permanent use of crutches. Inf. Br. Appellant 4. 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a DC 5055 relates to knee replacements (prosthesis). It provides for a 100 percent rating for one year following implantation of prosthesis for prosthetic replacement of a knee joint. 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a DC 5055 Note 2 states that “[SMC] is assignable during the 100 pct rating period the earliest date permanent use of crutches is established.” (emphasis added). 38 U.S.C. § 1156(d) states that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to preclude the Secretary from providing a temporary disability rating under an authority other than this section.” Nowhere does Note 2 or section 1156(d) mandate or require the award of SMC. Note 2 only clarifies that SMC is assignable during this temporary period of convalescence. Note 2 provides no information about the level of SMC for which a veteran might qualify during the temporary 100 percent rating period. Instead, the criteria for SMC is set forth in 38 U.S.C. § 1114 and 38 C.F.R. EL MALIK v. SHINSEKI 9 § 3.350. 3 As the Board found, El Malik was already at a 100 percent disability rating and had already been awarded SMC based on his multiple service-connected disabilities when he had his knee surgeries. As such, the question as of the date of his knee surgeries was whether El Malik was entitled to additional SMC. That question is governed by section 1114(r). El Malik disagrees and argues that the Veterans Court’s application of 38 U.S.C. § 1114(r) in his circumstances conflicts with 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a DC 5055 Note 2. Inf. Br. Appellant 5. He contends that, since the 100 percent rating period is limited to one year, it authorizes a temporary assignment of benefits, regardless of his prior disability level. He alleges that a veteran is always entitled to additional SMC, regardless of his prior disability, as long as he requires the permanent use of crutches after knee replacement. As explained above, however, Note 2 does not automatically entitle a veteran to SMC; a veteran must still meet the qualifications for SMC under the relevant SMC provisions. We find no conflict between the statute and the implementing regulation; SMC is assignable during a temporary 100 percent rating period of convalescence as long as the veteran meets the criteria for SMC set forth in 38 U.S.C. § 1114. Accordingly, we find no legal error in the Veterans Court’s analysis and affirm the Veterans Court’s decision that the Board did not commit CUE in denying additional SMC to El Malik. 3 El Malik’s attempts to classify SMC into tempo- rary and permanent categories have no basis in statute or regulation. The criteria for eligibility for SMC remains centered in 38 U.S.C. § 1114 and 38 C.F.R. § 3.350. 10 EL MALIK v. SHINSEKI