Opinion ID: 891641
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Proving Actual Physical Control

Text: {33} In reviewing approaches taken by other jurisdictions with respect to establishing actual physical control of a vehicle, we find portions of the recently recommended Arizona jury instruction particularly helpful and persuasive. Arizona's recommended instruction directs jurors to consider the totality of the circumstances shown by the evidence and suggests a list of non-exhaustive factors that can be employed to determine whether a defendant had actual physical control and posed a real danger to himself or others. State v. Zaragoza, 221 Ariz. 49, 209 P.3d 629, 634 (2009) (en banc). We believe these non-exhaustive factors would be useful for a New Mexico fact finder to determine whether an individual is in actual physical control of a vehicle and has the general intent to drive so as to pose a real danger to himself, herself, or the public. The factors are: 1. Whether the vehicle was running; 2. Whether the ignition was on; 3. Where the ignition key was located; 4. Where and in what position the driver was found in the vehicle; 5. Whether the person was awake or asleep; 6. Whether the vehicle's headlights were on; 7. Where the vehicle was stopped; 8. Whether the driver had voluntarily pulled off the road; 9. Time of day; 10. Weather conditions; 11. Whether the heater or air conditioner was on; 12. Whether the windows were up or down; 13. Any explanation of the circumstances shown by the evidence. Id.; see also Revised Arizona Jury Instruction (RAJI) (Standard Criminal) 28.1381(A)(1)(DUI) (3d ed. 2008). Arizona also instructs jurors that [i]t is up to [them] to examine all the available evidence in its totality and weigh its credibility in determining whether the defendant was simply using the vehicle as a stationery [sic] shelter[.] Zaragoza, 209 P.3d at 633 (citing RAJI (Standard Criminal) 28.1381(A)(1)(DUI) (3d ed. 2008)). We agree with this additional factor when the prosecution relies on actual physical control to prove DWI. {34} The clarification of our actual physical control jurisprudence that we introduce today is supported by the rationale and public policy underlying New Mexico's DWI law and legislative intent, which is to prevent people from driving while intoxicated and endangering themselves or the public. The prosecution must establish, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the accused was actually, not just potentially, exercising control over the vehicle with the general intent to drive so as to pose a real danger to himself, herself, or the public. If the Legislature intends otherwise, it is free to amend the statute to make clear its purpose. {35} To understand how these factors might be applied to determine whether a driver is in actual physical control of a vehicle and has the general intent to drive so as to endanger the public, we review some precedent cases. The facts from Harrison implicate numerous factors in the analysisthe key was in the ignition, the ignition was on, and the driver was sitting behind the wheel of the vehicle in a traffic lane while he applied the brakes, thus demonstrating actual control of the vehicle. 115 N.M. at 75, 846 P.2d at 1084. The jury also would have to determine whether these same facts evidenced the defendant's intent to drive so as to endanger the public. That the vehicle was on a roadway arguably increases the danger posed to both the defendant and the public and supports an inference of the general intent to drive. The facts in Boone are similar in this regard. The defendant's vehicle was in the middle of a traffic lane and the motor was running, but the lights were turned off. Boone, 105 N.M. at 226-27, 731 P.2d at 369-70. Most importantly, there are no facts in either case that indicate that the defendants were passive occupants or had been using their vehicles as stationary shelters. {36} In State v. Rivera, 1997-NMCA-102, ¶ 2, 124 N.M. 211, 947 P.2d 168, the defendant was found either unconscious or asleep at the wheel of his car in the front yard of his house; the car's engine racing. While the Court of Appeals determined that Rivera was similar to Harrison and so upheld the conviction, id. ¶ 3, the recitation of the facts does not make clear what time of day the defendant was apprehended; whether the transmission was in drive; whether he intended to drive or was in his vehicle for the sole purpose of listening to the radio, as his wife contended; or why or how the vehicle came to rest in his front yard. It is possible that, given our clarification of the meaning of actual physical control in this case, the answers to these questions may have mandated a different outcome on appeal if the fact finder could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was anything other than a passive occupant who did not intend to drive. We note that unlike Boone, the defendant in Rivera was not stopped in the middle of a roadway, where it is unlikely an individual would choose to use a vehicle as a place of shelter while intoxicated. The public endangerment factor is also not as clearly implicated when a vehicle is lawfully parked in a front yard. {37} The facts of the consolidated cases we reviewed in Johnson also pose some challenges under the more demanding totality test we introduce today. The defendant in Wenger was found in the driver's seat of his vehicle, with the keys in the ignition but the engine off, parked off the roadway on private property. 1999-NMCA-092, ¶ 2, 127 N.M. 625, 985 P.2d 1205, reversed by Johnson, 2001-NMSC-001, ¶¶ 4, 24, 130 N.M. 6, 15 P.3d 1233. While there was evidence that the defendant actually had been driving, the Court of Appeals determined that the State did not preserve the argument that there was evidentiary support for an inference that Defendant was driving while intoxicated[,] and so affirmed the conviction based only on evidence of actual physical control. Wenger, 1999-NMCA-092, ¶¶ 4, 18, 127 N.M. 625, 985 P.2d 1205. It is unlikely that evidence of an intoxicated individual sitting in his or her lawfully parked vehicle with the keys in the ignition, but the ignition off, and nothing more, would be sufficient to establish actual physical control under the more narrow test we introduce today. What facts would have been sufficient to find actual physical control, however, were not at issue in Wenger. The sole question in Wenger and Johnson, its companion case, was whether the crime of actual physical control applied on private as well as public property because the defendants did not challenge the finding of actual physical control. Johnson, 2001-NMSC-001, ¶ 1, 130 N.M. 6, 15 P.3d 1233. The facts in Johnson, to the extent they were developed at all, also appear to be insufficient under the new totality test to indicate that control was actual, and not potential or hypothetical. The defendant in Johnson was parked in a motel parking lot with the vehicle's engine running, the key in the ignition, and a large pool of condensation under the exhaust pipe, indicating that the car had possibly been at the location for three hours. Id. ¶ 3. On these facts alone, it is not clear whether the defendant was using his vehicle for anything other than a shelter, or how either defendant was endangering himself or the public. {38} It is evident from a brief review of these cases that the totality of the circumstances test we adopt today increases the evidentiary burden on the State relative to the dicta in Johnson. See id. ¶ 19 (stating that the purpose of actual physical control is to deter persons from placing themselves in a situation in which they can directly commence operating a vehicle while they are intoxicated). More care will be required of investigating officers and prosecutors to establish facts tending to prove that defendants actually used their vehicles with the general intent to drive and posed a real danger to themselves or the public. Facts that suggest what the defendants might do or the ease with which the defendants could commence driving are now insufficient to establish actual physical control. A totality of the circumstances test must prove what defendants have done and what they intend to do, not merely what they might do. A finding that there [is] nothing to prevent [the d]efendant from ... driving is now inadequate. Sims, 2008-NMCA-017, ¶ 9, 143 N.M. 400, 176 P.3d 1132.