Opinion ID: 1876719
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Constitutionality of the Charitable-Immunity Doctrine

Text: Sowders next argues that the circuit court erred in finding that the charitable-immunity doctrine was constitutional. In support of this argument, Sowders cites article 2, § 13 of the Arkansas Constitution, which provides: Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs he may receive in his person, property, or character; he ought to obtain justice freely, and without purchase; completely, and without denial; promptly and without denial; conformably to the laws. Sowders claims that, because she cannot bring suit against either St. Joseph's or Sisters of Mercy, then she is deprived of a remedy for the injuries she suffered. The appellees argue that Sowders's recovery is merely limited in this case, not barred; therefore, her constitutional argument must fail. The appellees contend that, while Sowders cannot file a direct-action claim with Sisters of Mercy due to the absence of liability insurance, and while she cannot file suit against St. Joseph's due to its charitable immunity, she could have filed claims against the individual employees of the charity who allegedly engaged in the negligent conduct. Indeed, individuals alleged to have caused the injuries by their negligence are not immune to a suit for damages. See Low, supra (citing Helton v. Sisters of Mercy, 234 Ark. 76, 351 S.W.2d 129 (1961)). Here, Sowders failed to bring claims against the individual employees. The record reveals that the Program at issue would have indemnified the individual employees alleged to have caused her injuries. Sowders states that it makes no sense to accept the traditional public policy behind charitable immunity as protecting and preserving the assets of the charity when an injured party may collect from a fund that indemnifies both hospital employees and the hospital, but only if the employees are sued. In other words, Sowders argues that [t]he money all comes from the same fund, so it should not matter whether the hospital is sued or its employees are sued. While we are sympathetic to Sowders's frustration, the fact remains that the basis of her constitutional argument is that she has been denied a remedy for her injuries in violation of article 2, § 13 of the Arkansas Constitution. Because Sowders was free to bring suit against the employees, we cannot say that she has been denied a remedy. Finally, Sowders argues at length in her brief on appeal that we should abandon precedent and abolish the doctrine of charitable immunity because it is against public policy. The record reveals that the circuit court never ruled on Sowders's argument regarding public policy. We will not review an issue where the circuit court has not first decided it. See Farm Bureau Policy Holders and Members v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of Ark., Inc., 335 Ark. 285, 984 S.W.2d 6 (1998). We add that, while we are unable to reach the issue in this case, we again call on the General Assembly to consider whether the charitable immunity doctrine should be abolished. See Scamardo, 356 Ark. at 248, 149 S.W.3d at 318, overruled on other grounds by Low, supra . In sum, we hold that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of St. Joseph's and Sisters of Mercy. Affirmed. BROWN, J., dissents.