Opinion ID: 1975531
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Independent State Grounds Argument

Text: I am dismayed also at the form of analysis of the Pennsylvania Constitution employed by the majority. It has been my impression for the past year that we had set forth a dramatically new way of assessing state constitutional issues, especially Article I, section 8 cases predicated on independent state grounds. Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 586 A.2d 887 (1991). I take the central message of Edmunds to be that mere assertions of independent state constitutional grounds are not acceptable: no longer can the state constitution be viewed as an all-purpose surrogate for informed analysis, to be taken from the shelf and opened like a can of beans to feed those who periodically hunger for answers in that document. Instead, Edmunds mandated a structured analytical form to be used in applicable cases. I remind my brethren of the clear language of that case: The recent focus on the New Federalism has emphasized the importance of state constitutions with respect to individual rights and criminal procedure. As such, we find it important to set forth certain factors to be briefed and analyzed by litigants in each case hereafter implicating a provision of the Pennsylvania constitution. The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), now requires us to make a plain statement of the adequate and independent state grounds upon which we rely, in order to avoid any doubt that we have rested our decision squarely upon Pennsylvania jurisprudence. Accordingly, as a general rule it is important that litigants brief and analyze at least the following four factors: 1) text of the Pennsylvania constitutional provision; 2) history of the provision, including Pennsylvania case-law; 3) related case-law from other states; 4) policy considerations, including unique issues of state and local concern, and applicability within modern Pennsylvania jurisprudence. Depending upon the particular issue presented, an examination of related federal precedent may be useful as part of the state constitutional analysis, not as binding authority, but as one form of guidance. However, it is essential that courts in Pennsylvania undertake an independent analysis under the Pennsylvania Constitution. 526 Pa. at 390-391, 586 A.2d 887 (footnotes omitted). While it may be pardonable to omit specific reference to Edmunds, there is insufficient reason to ignore its substance. The majority opinion does cite a few of our cases on general constitutional issues involving statutory interpretation, but I find little beyond conclusory text on the specific issue posed by this case. Certainly, no plain reading of the majority's argument relating to independent state grounds brings it within the orbit of Edmunds. Additionally, I perceive such a close interplay between federal law and state law in the opinion that I cannot believe Michigan v. Long itself could be satisfied to accomplish the very purpose of the majority opinion. Contrary to the teaching of Edmunds, it appears that the federal law is much more than one form of guidance. I believe I am quite correct in stating that we decided Edmunds in order to guard against precisely this kind of opinion. Even assuming arguendo that the majority could make its case on independent state grounds (which I do not believe), there is no evidence they have done so here. I take very little comfort in the fact that although we adopted a significant and path-breaking analysis one year ago, neither the courts below nor the majority opinion herein have shown any recognition of its existence as precedent. And still we wonder why our courts often are criticized for being like little puppies who chase their own tails rather than run forward.