Opinion ID: 1122968
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE UNDER ORS 163.150(1)(b)

Text: Defendant first assigns error to the trial court's denial of his motion to limit the state's penalty-phase evidence only to evidence that directly was relevant to the first three statutory questions set forth in ORS 163.150(1)(b). He argues that some of the state's penalty-phase evidence was not relevant to the first three questions and, consequently, should not have been admitted. Defendant asserts that the admission of that evidence violated ORS 163.150(1) and his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We consider defendant's statutory argument before considering his constitutional argument. See State v. Guzek, 322 Or. 245, 250, 906 P.2d 272 (1995) ( Guzek II ) (so stating). At the time of defendant's crimes in June of 1992, and of his trial in 1993, ORS 163.150(1)(b) provided: Upon the conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall submit the following issues to the jury: (A) Whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that death of the deceased or another would result; (B) Whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; (C) If raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased; and (D) Whether the defendant should receive a death sentence. In defendant's view, the fourth question permits only the admission of mitigating evidence and, consequently, the trial court erred when it admitted certain aggravating evidence that was not relevant to the first three questions. The state contends that the fourth question permits the introduction of aggravating evidence and, alternatively, contends that, even if only mitigating evidence is admissible under the fourth question, the evidence at issue was admissible under the second question. Because we agree with the state that the evidence was relevant under the second question, we do not address defendant's contention concerning the fourth question. [13] As noted, ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B) requires that a jury in a death-penalty case determine [w]hether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. That question, commonly referred to as the future dangerousness question, makes relevant any evidence that is probative of whether a defendant is likely to engage in dangerous, criminal conduct in the future. See State v. Moen, 309 Or. 45, 76, 786 P.2d 111 (1990) (applying principle). Defendant challenges the admission of two types of evidence that the state now contends was relevant to the jury's determination of future dangerousness. Some of that evidence concerned defendant's attraction to teenage girls, and the remaining evidence concerned his belief in white supremacy. We address the relevance of each type of evidence in turn. The evidence concerning defendant's attraction to teenage girls had two parts. First, the state introduced evidence that, before his marriage to his then-current wife, defendant had been sexually involved with two teenage girls, one of whom became pregnant. The record discloses that defendant's relationships with both girls involved a significant amount of violent conduct on defendant's part. Such violent conduct is relevant to the jury's determination whether defendant would be dangerous in the future and, consequently, is admissible under the second question. See Williams I, 313 Or. at 43, 828 P.2d 1006 (stating that [e]vidence that goes to the question of [a] defendant's future probable violent behavior is relevant [to]    the issue of future dangerousness). Second, the state elicited testimony from defendant's former neighbor concerning defendant's desire to have sexual relations with teenage girls. Defendant's neighbor testified that, on two occasions, defendant had made comments to him of a graphically sexual nature in reference to two young teenage girls. Defendant argues that the neighbor's testimony was not relevant, because the incidents    were [not] accompanied by any act of violence, or by any action whatsoever. The comments were indicative of what was going on in defendant's brain at the time. The comments were ugly and distasteful, but they were not violent. We disagree with defendant's assessment of the relevance of the neighbor's testimony. In Williams I, this court concluded that a defendant's statements that he would like to rape a `girl,' that it was something that he had thought about, and that he thought that it would be thrilling to do it, were relevant to the second question. 313 Or. at 43, 828 P.2d 1006. The court reasoned that the defendant's statements indicated that [the defendant] may act violently toward women in the future. Ibid. We reach the same conclusion here. Defendant's comments demonstrated his desire to have forcible sexual intercourse with young teenage girls. That evidence, particularly when considered together with the evidence of defendant's actual, violent sexual relationships with two other teenage girls, was relevant to the jury's determination under the second question. Consequently, the trial court did not err in admitting that evidence. We next consider defendant's contention that the state's evidence generally concerning defendant's belief in white supremacy was irrelevant to the issue of future dangerousness. At the outset, we again emphasize that the second question asks the jury to determine the likelihood of whether a defendant will engage in dangerous, criminal conduct that will constitute a continuing threat to society. Moen, 309 Or. at 73, 786 P.2d 111. Although that determination often focuses upon whether a defendant will commit violent criminal acts, this court has stated a number of times that ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B) permits the admission of a broad range of evidence. See State v. Smith, 310 Or. 1, 29, 791 P.2d 836 (1990) (We consistently have held that ORS 163.150(1)    is to be interpreted broadly.). Such evidence may include a defendant's  entire previous criminal history, including nonviolent crimes, Moen, 309 Or. at 73, 74-76, 786 P.2d 111 (emphasis added), unadjudicated bad acts committed by a defendant, State v. Williams, 322 Or. 620, 632, 912 P.2d 364 (1996) ( Williams II ), and, generally, evidence of [a] defendant's previous bad character, State v. Wagner, 305 Or. 115, 178, 752 P.2d 1136 (1988), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 492 U.S. 914, 109 S.Ct. 3235, 106 L.Ed.2d 583 (1989) ( Wagner I ), on remand 309 Or. 5, 786 P.2d 93, cert. den. 498 U.S. 879, 111 S.Ct. 212, 112 L.Ed.2d 171 (1990). In sum, in making a determination under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B), the jury should have before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine. The relevant question during the sentencing hearing is whether the defendant will be dangerous in the future. ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B). Evidence of all of a defendant's prior conduct, bad and good, is precisely the type of evidence that the jury needs to make this determination. Moen, 309 Or. at 73, 786 P.2d 111. There is a limit, however, upon the broad range of evidence that is admissible under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B). Because the standard of relevance set forth in OEC 401 applies in penalty-phase proceedings, Guzek II, 322 Or. at 250, 906 P.2d 272, in order to be admissible, evidence offered under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B) must have [a] tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the [question] more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence, OEC 401. To be admissible under the second question, therefore, the proffered evidence must have a tendency to show that a probability either does or does not exist that the defendant will commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. During the penalty phase of defendant's trial, the state introduced extensive evidence that generally concerned defendant's belief in white supremacy. That evidence, the admissibility of which defendant challenges upon review, included: (1) testimony that neo-Nazi propaganda was found in defendant's home; (2) evidence that, on several different occasions, defendant had disseminated neo-Nazi and anti-Semitic literature and propaganda to members of his family and to the public; (3) the introduction of a photograph that showed defendant giving a [S]ieg heil, or Heil Hitler, salute; (4) testimony that defendant did not like people of African descent, Hispanics, or Jews; (5) testimony that defendant commonly referred to people of African descent as niggers and also had referred to an African-American corrections officer as a Kaffir, which is a disparaging term sometimes used toward black South African citizens; (6) testimony that defendant believed that [o]ur world should be all white and that people of African descent, Hispanics, and Jews were supposed to die; and (7) testimony about additional statements that demonstrated defendant's violent hatred toward minority groups, including testimony that defendant believed in killing black people. Defendant asserts that the evidence described in the preceding paragraph merely was indicative of his beliefs and was not probative of his future dangerousness. We agree with defendant that, standing alone, evidence that a defendant believes that one race is superior to all others, or that a defendant uses disparaging language to refer to people of other races, generally is irrelevant under the second question. A mere expression of one's beliefs, such as those made here, does not, in and of itself, indicate that the holder of those beliefs will be dangerous in the future. Words of such an abstract and general nature, in the absence of any related conduct, cannot serve as an indicator of a defendant's future behavior. [14] Indeed, a person may hold beliefs similar to defendant's and yet never act upon those beliefs in a manner that is demonstrative of that person's capacity for future dangerousness. In this case, however, the state also introduced evidence that defendant had engaged in conduct, related to his belief in white supremacy, that demonstrated that he may be dangerous in the future. First, during the guilt phase, defendant's wife testified that, when in high school in the 1950s, defendant often fought with minority students, specifically Japanese people and Hispanic[s] and blacks. Second, during the penalty phase, the state introduced evidence that, in 1982, defendant had spray-painted the word murder three times on the doors of a synagogue. The evidence concerning both of those types of incidents, which defendant does not challenge upon review, clearly tended to show that defendant might engage in dangerous, criminal conduct in the future. See Williams II, 322 Or. at 632, 912 P.2d 364 (evidence of unadjudicated bad acts is relevant and admissible under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B)). In our view, when considered in context with that evidence of defendant's violent, criminal conduct, the evidence concerning defendant's beliefs relating to the basis for that conduct becomes relevant under the second question, because it demonstrates that defendant has continued to hold the racist beliefs that drove him to engage in dangerous conduct in the past. The evidence at issue also demonstrates the depth with which defendant has continued to hold those beliefs. It follows, therefore, that the evidence of defendant's beliefs here relates to the extent of his propensity to act dangerously in the future. In sum, after considering all the evidence concerning defendant's belief in white supremacy, together with the evidence of his related conduct, we hold that the trial court did not err in admitting that evidence, because it was probative of defendant's future dangerousness under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B). Defendant also contends upon review that the admission of all the evidence described in this section violated his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. A review of the record, however, discloses that defendant did not object to any of the evidence at issue upon due process grounds. Consequently, his constitutional argument is not preserved and we do not address it.