Opinion ID: 2976473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of Neil v. Biggers

Text: Styles was robbed on September 22, 2004. On November 3, 2004, she was asked to come to the police station to view a lineup. Styles was shown a photographic array of six men and “immediately” picked out Number 2, Pickett, as the robber. She stated that “Number 2 is the guy only with a wider nose. He robbed us,” which the officer recorded on the identification record that Styles then signed. Pickett makes no argument that Styles’s identification was influenced by suggestive procedures. Styles viewed a photographic array of six men with similar features and was able to pick Pickett out of the array. While Styles indicated that she believed the robber had a wider nose than the picture of Pickett used in the lineup, this information was presented to the jury and they were given opportunity to weigh the credibility of Styles’s identification. Accordingly, because Pickett has not shown that the identification process was unduly suggestive, Styles’s identification testimony was properly admitted. See United States v. Marks, 209 F.3d 577, 586 (6th Cir. 2000).
There is no evidence that Jones’s and Reece’s viewing of the wanted posters was unduly suggestive or prone to misidentification. Even if there were such evidence, however, both identifications are supported by sufficient indicia of reliability and are reliable under the totality of the circumstances. See Neil, 409 U.S. at 199. Jones testified that she saw the robber for between one and three minutes, that she was extremely close to the robber, and that she would be able to identify him. The crime occurred during -7- No. 06-2543 United States v. Pickett daylight and in a well-lit building, but the suspect had a beard and long hair at the time, thus obstructing her view of his face. Jones testified that she was frightened during the time and that, as a bank teller, she was given training prior to starting to her job to be generally observant while working as a teller. Further, she gave a detailed description of the suspect immediately following the robbery, suggesting that she was able to pay attention to the robber during the crime. Jones was also able to give a specific and detailed description of the suspect, suggesting that her identification was reliable. The amount of attention that Jones was able to give to the robber supports a finding of reliability, as “[t]his Court is more likely to find an identification reliable where a witness ‘was able to view the assailant with a heightened degree of attention, as compared with disinterested bystanders or casual observers.” Haliym, 492 F.3d at 705 (quoting Howard, 405 F.3d at 473). The viewing of the wanted poster, the time that passed between the robbery and the identification, and Jones’s inaccurate estimate of the robber’s height do not create the type of circumstance that indicates a “very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification,” Manson, 432 U.S. at 116; absent such a circumstance, the identification evidence was properly admitted and the reliability was properly “for the jury to weigh.” Id. As for Reece, the district court made findings regarding the reliability of her identification of Pickett, and its findings are supported by the record: She testified as to the - - where she was, what her opportunity was to view the criminal activity and the person that was conducting that criminal activity. She demonstrated for us while sitting at the stand, she said two feet and then showed us in proportion of where she was located. She testified that the attention that she was paying to it, the accuracy of her identification, the sureness of her identification, I think all of those elements were quite strong in relation to her testimony. -8- No. 06-2543 United States v. Pickett (Joint Appendix 137.) In addition, the record demonstrates that, like Jones, Reece viewed the robber at a close distance and for a matter of minutes. Although the robber’s full beard may have lessened Reece’s view of Pickett’s facial features, the crime occurred during daylight and in a well-lit area of the bank. Reece also testified that, as a bank teller, she was given training prior to starting her job to be generally observant. Further, she gave a detailed description of the suspect immediately following the robbery, suggesting that she was able to pay attention to him during the crime. Reece estimated Pickett’s height as between 5'9 and 6'0, not far from the 6'2 listed on his driver’s license. Reece also indicated that she would be able to identify the robber if she saw him again. Reece’s identification is thus supported by many indicia of reliability, and the attention she was able to give to the robber again support admission of her identification. See Haliym, 492 F.3d at 705. The circumstances surrounding the identification, including her repeated viewings of the wanted poster, do not indicate that the presence of the wanted poster “gave rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Id. at 704 (quoting Manson, 432 U.S. at 107). Because the tellers’ identifications of Pickett as the robber were not so unreliable as to lead to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, we decline to reverse the district court’s denial of Pickett’s motion to suppress. As stated by the Supreme Court, We are content to rely upon the good sense and judgment of American juries, for evidence with some element of untrustworthiness is customary grist for the jury mill. Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the weight of identification testimony that has some questionable feature. -9- No. 06-2543 United States v. Pickett Manson, 432 U.S. at 116. Here, because any untrustworthy elements of the witnesses’ identifications were available for the jury to consider, the district court did not err in denying Pickett’s motion to suppress the eyewitness testimony.