Opinion ID: 722562
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Exposure to Prejudicial Information

Text: 71 Defendants argue that there was unauthorized exposure of prejudicial, extraneous information to the jury in regard to defendant Thomas Elder because an exhibit list presented to them contained a reference to a newspaper article about the apartment fire allegedly set by Elder on December 6, 1992, which killed four infants. However, the newspaper article itself was never sent to the jury room; only an exhibit list was sent. Among the hundreds of items listed on page 14 of the exhibit list was a reference which read: 10-21-93 ... newspaper article--deaths.... 72 On March 24, 1994, the district court held a hearing about the list of allegedly prejudicial exhibits and questioned each of the twelve jurors who deliberated in the case. Six of the twelve jurors indicated that they neither saw the exhibit list, nor did any other juror mention the exhibit list to them. Of the remaining six jurors who had seen the exhibit list, none had seen the identification only entry concerning the 10-21-93 newspaper article. The district court conducted this hearing pursuant to the provisions of Fed.R.Evid. 606(b), which provides for an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment. 73 We find that the district court properly followed the dictates of Rule 606(b) and inquired into whether extraneous prejudicial information in regard to defendant Thomas Elder was improperly brought to the jury's attention. We agree with the court's determination that there was no evidence to contradict the jurors' testimony that they were not exposed to this entry and were not influenced by it. The district court is affirmed on this issue. 74 Defendants also contend that the district court erred in denying a request to allow counsel to review the jurors' notebooks to make sure that the jury was not exposed to this extraneous information regarding defendant Elder and the deaths of four children. They contend that instead of questioning the jury pursuant to Rule 606, the court should have allowed defense lawyers to examine the jurors' notebooks for the purpose of determining whether or not any information regarding the deaths of four children by arson had been placed before them. The United States opposed the request to examine the notebooks because of the likelihood that portions of the deliberations, including the jurors' thought processes, comments, or calculations would be contained in these notebooks and that a review of these notebooks would be a violation of Rule 606(b). 75 Rule 606(b) specifically prohibits seeking a statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying. If the juror's thought processes, comments, or calculations are written in juror notebooks, then the notebooks cannot be made available for inspection. See United States v. Sanders, 962 F.2d 660, 673 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 892, 113 S.Ct. 262, 121 L.Ed.2d 192 (1992). In light of this restriction of Rule 606(b), the district court properly refused the motion to have access to the jurors' notebooks. The district court is affirmed on this issue. 76 Defendants also contend that the district court abused its discretion in failing to sequester the jury in a highly publicized trial. In United States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1195, 1209 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 906, 106 S.Ct. 3279, 91 L.Ed.2d 568 (1986), this court held where a jury has been clearly admonished not to read newspaper accounts of the trial in which they are serving as jurors, it is not to be presumed that they violated that admonition. In the present case, the district court daily cautioned the jury not to discuss the case with anyone, not to read or listen to any news stories or articles, not to listen to any radio or television reports about the case or about anyone who had anything to do with the case. Defendants have not shown that the jury failed to follow the court's instructions or were exposed to any extraneous prejudicial information, including pretrial or mid-trial publicity. For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to sequester the jury. 77 Defendants also argue that they were prejudiced because of excessive security personnel in the courtroom. They contend that they were tried in a courtroom constantly full of security personnel, which identified them as dangerous individuals, and that as a result, they were denied a fair trial because a person accused of a crime is generally entitled to the physical indicia of innocence. Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 104 (6th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959, 94 S.Ct. 1976, 40 L.Ed.2d 310 (1974). 78 We do not believe this argument has any merit. In Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-69, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 1345-46, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986), the Supreme Court concluded that the conspicuous deployment of security personnel in the courtroom during trial is not the sort of inherent prejudicial practice that, like shackling, should be permitted only where justified by an essential state interest specific to each trial. In order to establish prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate either that the alleged misconduct was inherently prejudicial or caused actual prejudice. Id. at 572, 106 S.Ct. at 1347-48. 79 In the present case, we do not believe that security personnel were inherently prejudicial to defendants. The Deputy United States Marshals were dressed in plain clothes and placed so as not to be conspicuous. Moreover, they were spread around the courtroom with some at the exits and others seated behind the defendants. There was no evidence that any of the security personnel displayed firearms or that any of the defendants were shackled or handcuffed in front of the jury. Also, there was no evidence that the jury was in any way aware of or influenced by the additional security personnel. Because defendants have not been able to show any inherent or actual prejudice, the district court is affirmed on this issue. 80 To conclude, defendants' arguments concerning exposure to prejudicial information or actions have no merit, and the district court is affirmed in regard to these issues.