Opinion ID: 397401
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Request for Severance

Text: 106 Appellants Evans and Hood contend that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant their motion under Fed.R.Crim.P. 14 to sever Count Ten from the remaining counts. The test in this circuit for reviewing the denial of a severance is that the defendant must be unable to obtain a fair trial without severance and must demonstrate compelling prejudice against which the trial court will be unable to afford protection. United States v. Swanson, 572 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 849, 99 S.Ct. 152, 58 L.Ed.2d 152 (1978). See United States v. Grapp, 653 F.2d 189, 192-93 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Salomon, 609 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. 1980). The trial court denied the pre-trial severance motions of Evans and Hood, finding that the jury could reasonably be expected to separate the indictments or the defendants and to evaluate the evidence properly and individually against each. United States v. Thevis, 474 F.Supp. 117, 132 (N.D.Ga.1979) (quoting United States v. Harris, 458 F.2d 670, 673 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 888, 93 S.Ct. 195, 34 L.Ed.2d 145 (1972)). In its pre-trial severance order, the court noted its continuing duty at all stages of the trial to grant a severance if prejudice did appear, and stated this Court remains ready to enter such an order, if it becomes apparent that a jury is incapable of isolating the proof among the several defendants and charges. 474 F.Supp. at 133. 107 We find that such prejudice never materialized, and that the trial court acted within its discretion in refusing to grant Evans and Hood's motions for severance. This was not a case with an extraordinarily large number of defendants in which the jury might have difficulty keeping the evidence separated as to each defendant. Moreover, the trial court was extremely careful throughout the trial to instruct the jury that the racketeering evidence against Thevis and Global had no connection with Evans and Hood. At the beginning of the government's presentation of the RICO evidence, the trial court specifically instructed the jury that the trial was entering a new phase and that none of the racketeering evidence would pertain to Evans and Hood. We agree with the trial court that Evans and Hood did not show the compelling prejudice necessary to warrant a discretionary severance under Rule 14.