Opinion ID: 4187625
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Procedural History Related to Current Appeal

Text: On February 7, 2007, after a bench trial in Cumberland County, appellant was convicted of two counts of indecent assault arising out of an incident where he touched the breasts of his girlfriend’s twelve-year old daughter.2 Sentencing was scheduled for May 8, 2007, at which time appellant would have been ordered to register as a sex offender with the Pennsylvania State Police for a period of ten years pursuant to theneffective Megan’s Law III. See 42 Pa.C.S. §9795.1 (expired). However, appellant failed to appear for his sentencing hearing and absconded until he was apprehended on unrelated charges in Rhode Island in September 2014. N.T., 10/14/14 at 2. During his (…continued) Article I, Section 17 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides: “No ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts, or making irrevocable any grant of special privileges or immunities, shall be passed.” PA. CONST., art. I, §17. 2 See 18 Pa.C.S. §§3126(a)(1) (person is guilty of indecent assault if he has indecent contact with the complainant for purpose of arousing sexual desire in himself or complainant, without complainant’s consent), 3126(a)(7) (complainant less than 13 years of age). [J-121B-2016] - 2 absence, the General Assembly had replaced Megan’s Law III with SORNA. Under SORNA, persons convicted of indecent assault of a person less than thirteen years of age, 18 Pa.C.S. §3126(a)(7), are categorized as Tier III offenders and are required to register as sex offenders for the remainder of their lives.3 Accordingly, appellant was sentenced to four to fourteen months’ imprisonment and ordered to comply with lifetime registration requirements under SORNA. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion seeking application of the ten-year registration period under Megan’s Law III, which was the law in place at the time of his offense and conviction, instead of lifetime registration under SORNA. The court denied appellant’s motion and he appealed to the Superior Court, claiming retroactive application of SORNA violates the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, and the reputation clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution.4 The Superior Court affirmed the ruling of the trial court in a three-page unpublished memorandum opinion. Commonwealth v. Muniz, No. 2169 MDA 2014, unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. filed August 7, 2015). The panel opined Commonwealth v. Perez, 97 A.3d 747 (Pa. Super. 2014), directed its holding “the new registration regime pursuant to SORNA is constitutional under the Federal and State Ex Post Facto Clauses.” Muniz, slip op. at 3, quoting Perez, 97 A.3d at 760 (SORNA is not 3 Appellant’s seven year absence from the Commonwealth is of no moment. SORNA applies retroactively to any individual serving a sentence for a sexual offense or any individual who had not completed their registration period under prior registration statutes as of SORNA’s effective date of December 20, 2012. 42 Pa.C.S. §9799.13. Had appellant been sentenced in 2007 and subject to registration under Megan’s Law III, he would not have completed his ten-year registration period when SORNA became effective and thus his ten-year registration period would have been converted to a term of lifetime registration. 4 PA. CONST. art. I §1 (“All men … have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of … protecting property and reputation. ...”). [J-121B-2016] - 3 punitive; retroactive application does not violate federal ex post facto clause).5 The panel further held appellant waived his reputation clause claim by failing to raise it in his post-sentence motion. Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal raising two questions regarding SORNA’s “sexual offenses and tier system” provisions set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. §9799.14: 1) Does applying [42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14] retroactively violate the Federal Constitution? 2) Does applying [42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14] retroactively violate the Pennsylvania Constitution? This Court granted review of both questions. Commonwealth v. Muniz, 135 A.3d 178 (Pa. 2016). II. Summary of Arguments and Applicable Standards of Review Briefly, appellant argues SORNA unconstitutionally increases the length of registration and notification requirements for sex offenders subject to its retroactive application. Appellant claims despite the General Assembly’s declaration SORNA is not to be construed as punitive, the statute’s text and structure make clear the legislative objective was to punish. Appellant asserts SORNA is so punitive in purpose and effect that the General Assembly’s intent to deem it civil is undermined. Thus, appellant claims, SORNA increases punishment for conduct which occurred before its enactment and such retroactive application violates both federal and state constitutional bans on ex post facto laws; in doing so, appellant argues the Pennsylvania Constitution provides 5 The panel did not explain that, in Perez, the Superior Court did not actually reach the merits of the state constitutional claim, holding instead it was waived for failure to present an analysis under Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991). See Perez, 97 A.3d at 760. [J-121B-2016] - 4 greater protection than the United States Constitution. Appellant argues SORNA is therefore unconstitutional as applied to someone like him whose conviction predated its enactment.6 In response, the Commonwealth argues the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003), and an analysis of the factors set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), both direct SORNA is not punishment, and thus there can be no ex post facto violation. The Commonwealth focuses on the General Assembly’s aim to address the “major public concern” of recidivism among adult sex offenders and indicates SORNA’s terms are not excessive given this legislative purpose.7 As we consider the parties’ arguments in more detail below, we recognize there is a general presumption that all lawfully enacted statutes are constitutional. 6 The Defender Association of Philadelphia and the Pennsylvania Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (hereinafter referred to jointly as PACDL) filed an amicus curiae brief supporting appellant. Amicus briefs in support of appellant were also filed by The Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers, Assessment and Treatment Alternatives and the Joseph J. Peters Institute, The Collateral Consequences Resource Center, and The Social Science Scholars; these policy based briefs focused on studies which opined recidivism by sex offenders is overstated and sex offender registration is ineffective and may also be counterproductive. The Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association (PDAA) filed an amicus brief in support of the Commonwealth. 7 The Commonwealth also claims appellant waived his argument that SORNA violates the reputation clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. We note the Superior Court correctly concluded the issue was waived because it was not raised in appellant’s postsentence motion, and appellant has not raised an independent reputation clause claim before this Court. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). However, appellant does include reputation-based concerns in his analysis of Pennsylvania’s ex post facto clause, and whether it provides greater protection than its federal counterpart; appellant presented almost identical reputation-based arguments in his Edmunds analysis before the Superior Court as well. To the extent reputation-based concerns support appellant’s claim that SORNA’s provisions are punishment and retroactive application is a violation of Pennsylvania’s ex post facto clause, we consider them only in that limited context. [J-121B-2016] - 5 Commonwealth v. Lee, 935 A.2d 865, 876 (Pa. 2007). In addition, as this case presents questions of law, our scope of review is plenary and we review the lower courts’ legal determinations de novo. Id.