Opinion ID: 1242682
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: We examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict and giv[e] the verdict the benefit of all reasonable inferences. We will reverse the jury verdict only if no reasonable jury could have found [the defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Montano, 506 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). To prove conspiracy, the Government must show that there was an agreement to achieve an illegal purpose, Torres knew of the agreement, and Torres knowingly participated in the agreement. United States v. Castro-Gaxiola, 479 F.3d 579, 581 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 430, 169 L.Ed.2d 301 (2007). Mere presence at the location of the crime alone, even when coupled with knowledge of that crime, is not sufficient to establish guilt on a conspiracy charge. United States v. Sloan, 293 F.3d 1066, 1067 (8th Cir.2002) (internal quotation omitted). Additionally, [e]vidence of association or acquaintance . . . alone is insufficient to establish a conspiracy. United States v. Whirlwind Soldier, 499 F.3d 862, 869 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1286, 170 L.Ed.2d 112 (2008) (internal quotation omitted). Instead, the defendant must have knowingly contributed . . . efforts to the conspiracy's objectives. Sloan, 293 F.3d at 1067. Torres contests the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the Government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a member of a conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana. Torres does not contest the existence of a conspiracy. He argues instead that no reasonable jury could find that he was a member of that conspiracy because he was merely present during the sale of controlled substances, and his association with Sosa and Marquez is insufficient for criminal liability. He further challenges the Government's reliance on cooperating witnesses who hoped for sentence reductions in exchange for their testimony. The evidence supports the jury's finding that Torres was more than a mere bystander and that he knowingly contributed to, and was thus a member of, the conspiracy in numerous ways. As outlined above, the witness testimony establishes the following: Torres made numerous deliveries of controlled substances, he accompanied his co-conspirators during other deliveries, he collected the proceeds from his and his co-conspirators' sales of controlled substances, and he sold cocaine. Torres's own statements following his arrest also evidence his participation in the conspiracy. At trial, a law-enforcement officer testified that the extent of Torres's knowledge about Sosa's and Marquez's dealings was inconsistent with someone who was a simple bystander and not a participant in the drug trade. Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Torres knowingly participated in the conspiracy. With regard to Torres's claim that the government's witnesses were not credible because they expected to receive reduced sentences in exchange for their testimony, it is not our charge on appeal to assess the credibility of witnesses. United States v. Bower, 484 F.3d 1021, 1025-26 (8th Cir.2007). [W]e have repeatedly upheld jury verdicts based solely on the testimony of co-conspirators and cooperating witnesses, noting that it is within the province of the jury to make credibility assessments and resolve conflicting testimony. Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted). This court has also frequently placed importance on the defendant's opportunity to expose to the jury the inconsistency between a witness's trial testimony and earlier inconsistent statements. United States v. Crenshaw, 359 F.3d 977, 990-91 (8th Cir.2004). In this case, Torres's counsel repeatedly and properly called into question the witnesses' credibility. Ultimately, however, [i]t was the jury's job to determine whether these witnesses could be trusted. United States v. Baker, 367 F.3d 790, 798 (8th Cir.2004). Some of the cooperating witnesses gave statements to the police that were inconsistent with their later trial testimony, particularly with regard to Torres's involvement in the conspiracy and the quantity of drugs involved. This fact, however, is also an insufficient basis on which to overturn the jury's verdict. The government rehabilitated many of these witnesses on redirect, and the types of inconsistencies and omissions that Torres highlights do not warrant taking the fact-finding function away from the jury. See Baker, 367 F.3d at 798 (indicating that factual determinations as a matter of law may be appropriate in circumstances that include when the testimony describes a physical impossibility under the laws of nature or when it was physically impossible for the witness to have observed what he or she claims); see also Crenshaw, 359 F.3d at 990 (providing examples of when inconsistencies in witness testimony were insufficient to undermine a jury's conviction). In conclusion, the verdict indicates that the jury found the Government's cooperating witnesses to be credible and that it accepted their testimony. The testimony established a factual basis to believe that Torres was a member of the conspiracy. As a result, there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict.