Opinion ID: 784536
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 20 Somewhat akin to their instructional argument is the Somsamouths' claim that their falsehoods about work cannot have been material because it has not been shown that their working was also substantial gainful activity. In so arguing, they ask us to take an overly crabbed view of materiality. 21 While we have not had occasion to explore the meaning of material fact in the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1383a(a)(2), it has been explored in many other contexts. In the income tax area, for example, the Supreme Court has explained the reach of a statute which made it a crime to file a tax return that the defendant did not `believe to be true and correct as to every material matter.' Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 1837, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (citation omitted). The Court pointed out that [i]n general, a false statement is material if it has `a natural tendency to influence, or [is] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed.' Id. (citation omitted). 22 We have addressed the meaning of the general statute covering false statements of material fact to government agencies — 18 U.S.C. § 1001 — and have defined the concept as follows: A statement is considered material if it has the propensity to influence agency action; actual influence on agency action is not an element of the crime. United States v. Vaughn, 797 F.2d 1485, 1490 (9th Cir.1986); see also United States v. Facchini, 874 F.2d 638, 643 (9th Cir.1989) (en banc). Similarly, in commenting on the meaning of material misrepresentation, which is one of the elements of mail fraud, 3 we have stated: A false promise, statement or representation is material if `it is made to induce action or reliance by another' or has `a natural tendency to influence or is ... capable of influencing another's decisions[.]' United States v. LeVeque, 283 F.3d 1098, 1103-04 (9th Cir.2002) (citation omitted). We see no reason to deviate from that uniform approach at this time, and, therefore, determine, as the district court essentially did, that the meaning of material fact for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1383a(a)(2) is the same as the meaning we have used in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. See Vaughn, 797 F.2d at 1490. 23 The above being so, it is apparent that the Somsamouths' attack on the sufficiency of the evidence must fail. The issue was not whether they were performing substantial gainful activity; it is whether their false statements had a propensity to influence agency action. Plainly, the answer is yes. Even if the extensive work activities in which the Somsamouths were engaged were not actually generating income for them, it is pellucid that truthful answers to the SSA's questions about their activities would have led to further investigation at least. The Somsamouths' lies were designed to influence the agency into not investigating them or giving further consideration to whether they were, in fact, engaging in substantial gainful activities. Our earlier quotation from 20 C.F.R. § 416.971 nicely underscores this point, by pointing out that even if work actually done was not substantial gainful activity, it can show that the person is able to do more. 24 Indeed, Mr. Somsamouth well understood the point; he admitted that he had lied about his ability to drive for that very reason. That and the Somsamouths' other misrepresentations bring home the fact that their statements about their work activities were both calculated to influence and capable of influencing the SSA in the performance of its duties and in the making of its decisions. 4 Certainly, a rational juror could find that the government met its burden of persuasion in this case. See Gonzalez-Torres, 309 F.3d at 598.