Opinion ID: 2966230
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Intentional Interference with Contractual Rights

Text: Appellants further allege that defendants are liable for intentional interference with appellants' contractual rights. The district court, concluding that LaForce, rather than defendants, caused the disintegration of the contractual relationship, granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. To state a claim for intentional interference with a contract, the plaintiff must prove that: (1) he had a contract with a third party; (2) the defendant knowingly induced the third party to break that contract; (3) the defendant's conduct was for an improper purpose or by improper means; and (4) the plaintiff was harmed by the defendant's actions. See United Truck Leasing Corp. v. Geltman , 551 N.E.2d 20, 21, 23 (Mass. 1990); Jenkins v. DeTucci , 668 N.E.2d 1345, 1350 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996). As the district court properly found, even if we make all inferences in favor of the non-moving party for summary judgment, the appellants have not alleged facts to support the requisite element that defendants knowingly induced the third party to breach the contract. Rather, appellants have claimed the contrary: that LaForce intended to reclaim the Pub, in violation of their agreement, and that he requested the police to assist him in this endeavor. Thus, the defendants did not induce LaForce to breach the contract, but LaForce induced the defendants to breach his own contract. A party to a contract cannot be held liable for intentional interference with that contract. See Harrison v. NetCentric Corp. , 744 N.E.2d 622, 632 (Mass. 2001). Therefore, since appellants failed to present evidence that would support a claim for intentional interference with contractual rights, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of all of the defendants. (12)