Opinion ID: 2395704
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Count TwoWrongful Termination

Text: The next cause of action alleged by the Appellants was wrongful termination. [5] In support of this count, the Appellants averred that Mrs. Roth was subjected to improper and sexually explicit conduct by her superiors including the president and CEO Defendant DeFelice ... thereby creating a hostile and abusive environment for employment all in violation of the West Virginia Human Rights Act. The Appellants further alleged that the Appellees terminated her based on observing defendant DeFelice's sexually explicit and improper behavior. The Appellants alleged that as result of the sexual discrimination and/or harassment of Plaintiff Roth, which was known by Defendant DeFeliceCare to be unlawful, in violation of the public policies of the State of West Virginia, and in violation of the Defendant DeFeliceCares's own policies and procedures, Mrs. Roth was terminated. The Court held in the syllabus of Harless v. First National Bank in Fairmont, 162 W.Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978), that [t]he rule that an employer has an absolute right to discharge an at will employee must be tempered by the principle that where the employer's motivation for the discharge is to contravene some substantial public policy principle, then the employer may be liable to the employee for damages occasioned by this discharge. Accord Syl. Pt. 2, Stanley v. Sewell Coal Co., 169 W.Va. 72, 285 S.E.2d 679 (1981); Syl. Pt. 1, Shanholtz v. Monongahela Power Co., 165 W.Va. 305, 270 S.E.2d 178 (1980); see Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., 174 W.Va. 321, 325, 325 S.E.2d 111, 115 (1984). The burden is on the plaintiff to establish the existence of a substantial public policy. Syl. Pt. 8, Page v. Columbia Natural Res., 198 W.Va. 378, 480 S.E.2d 817 (1996). A determination of the existence of public policy in West Virginia is a question of law, rather than a question of fact for a jury. Cordle, 174 W.Va. at 322, 325 S.E.2d at 112, Syl. Pt. 1. To identify a substantial public policy, the Court looks to established precepts in [the State's] constitution, legislative enactments, legislatively approved regulations, and judicial opinions. Birthisel v. Tri-Cities Health Servs. Corp., 188 W.Va. 371, 377, 424 S.E.2d 606, 612 (1992). Based upon its review of the Complaint, the circuit court found that the Appellants failed to carry their burden of establishing a substantial public policy. Specifically, the lower court focused solely on the criminal statutes relied upon by the Appellants [6] and concluded that a public policy disfavoring public nudity is not at issue in this case and upholding Plaintiff's discharge would not compromise this policy. The circuit court, however, failed to address the Appellants' argument that a substantial public policy was present because of her allegations of sex discrimination and sexual harassment in employment and that such discrimination or harassment contravenes the public policy articulated in the West Virginia Human Rights Act. Further, the circuit court did not address the Appellants argument that Mrs. Roth was terminated due to what she witnessed, because her observations of sexual relations between Mr. DeFelice and the other female employee, Mrs. Kelly, made Mrs. Roth a potential discoverable witness in a case involving similar conduct against Mr. DeFelice. The Appellants assert that the allegations in the other lawsuit styled Champion v. DeFelice Care Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 05-C-519, involved the Appellee Leslie DeFelice's legendary propensities for womanizing and inappropriate sexual acts and behaviors in the workplace. Significantly, before the circuit court, the Appellants argued that Mrs. Roth's observations in June of 2006 would have not only supported the allegations of the plaintiff [in the Champion case] ... but would have undermined the future under oath testimony of Mr. DeFelice and Mrs. Kelly. There apparently was testimony in the Champion case that indicated that Mr. DeFelice and Mrs. Kelly were not involved in a relationship. Regarding the burden that the Appellants bear in establishing the existence of a substantial public policy, prefaced against the well-established case law that the determination of whether a substantial public policy exists is a question of law, the Court finds that the circuit court's dismissal of this cause of action without considering all the bases relied upon by the Appellants regarding the existence of a substantial public policy was erroneous. While the Court does not disagree with the circuit court's determination that a substantial public policy did not arise in this case from the provisions of West Virginia Code § 61-8-9, [7] the circuit court simply failed to consider all the bases for the substantial public policy set forth by the Appellants in their opposition to the Motion to Dismiss prior to dismissing this count. For instance, the Appellants pleaded that the Appellees' conduct in terminating her violated the public policies of this State. Further, as previously mentioned, in their opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, the Appellants argued that a substantial public policy was violated when she was terminated because of her allegations of sex discrimination and sexual harassment in employment, because such discrimination or harassment contravenes the public policy articulated in the West Virginia Human Rights Act. Further, the Appellants argued in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss that a substantial public policy was violated because Mrs. Roth was a potential witness based in other litigation due to her observations of Mr. DeFelice and Mrs. Kelly. Just as the circuit court considered the reliance by the Appellants on the criminal statute regarding indecent exposure in determining that a substantial public policy did not exist, the circuit court should have considered the other viable grounds the Appellants relied upon to show a violation of a substantial public policy. Unlike the Appellants' reliance upon the criminal statute, there is support for the Appellants' assertions that a substantial public policy was violated if the Appellants ultimately prove that Mrs. Roth was terminated either because of allegations of sexual harassment or that she was going to be a witness in the other litigation. Regarding the former basis, this Court has held in syllabus point eight of Williamson v. Greene, 200 W.Va. 421, 490 S.E.2d 23 (1997), that [e]ven though a discharged at-will employee has no statutory claim for retaliatory discharge under W. Va.Code, 5-11-9(7)(C) [1992] of the West Virginia Human Rights Act because his or her former employer was not employing twelve or more persons within the state at the time the acts giving rise to the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice were committed, as required by W. Va.Code, 5-11-3(d) [1994], the discharged employee may nevertheless maintain a common law claim for retaliatory discharge against the employer based on alleged sex discrimination or sexual harassment because sex discrimination and sexual harassment in employment contravene the public policy of this State articulated in the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W. Va.Code, 5-11-1, et seq. 200 W.Va. at 423, 490 S.E.2d at 25, Syl. Pt. 8 (emphasis added); accord Syl. Pt. 1, Kalany v. Campbell, 220 W.Va. 50, 640 S.E.2d 113 (2006). Moreover, regarding the allegation that Mrs. Roth was terminated because she was going to be a potential witness in other litigation, this Court has held that [i]t is against substantial public policy of West Virginia to discharge an at-will employee because such employee has given or may be called to give truthful testimony in a legal action. Page, 198 W.Va. at 382, 480 S.E.2d at 821, Syl. Pt. 4. Consequently, the circuit court erred in its determination that the Appellants failed to sufficiently plead a violation of a substantial public policy.