Opinion ID: 4562699
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plain-Error Claims

Text: Ralston argues, “From the first sentence of its opening statement through its closing argument, the government appealed to the passions and prejudices of the jury.” Appellant’s Br. at 29. The district court, he claims, erred in failing to prevent the government’s misconduct despite “recogniz[ing] that the government was repeatedly crossing the line; that it was introducing irrelevant testimony; [and] that it was showboating.” Id. at 35. He opines that the court should have declared a mistrial sua sponte. Here, Ralston challenges five prosecutorial statements and examination questions permitted by the district court. We review for plain error because Ralston did not object to their admission. See United States v. Bentley, 561 F.3d 803, 809–10 -14- (8th Cir. 2009) (“[The defendant] objected at trial to only one of the remarks that he now cites as error. We review the remaining claims for plain error . . . .”). Under the plain error standard of review, we may only grant relief if [Ralston] demonstrates (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects [his] substantial rights. Even if these three prongs are satisfied, we should only exercise our discretion to correct plain error if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Brown, 702 F.3d 1060, 1065 (8th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). We first address Ralston’s assertion that the district court erred by not declaring a mistrial sua sponte based on the government’s reading of R.B.’s class poem during its opening statement. The poem expressed R.B.’s feelings, stemming from Ralston’s sexual abuse of her. He contends that the reading of the poem was inherently argumentative, improper, and prejudicial. We disagree. “The prosecutor’s opening statement should objectively outline the evidence reasonably expected to be introduced during the trial.” United States v. Kalagian, 957 F.2d 527, 528 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). And here, the government’s opening served that purpose. As it relates to Count 1, the government’s partial reading of R.B.’s poem conveyed the impact of Ralston’s acts to the jury and was consistent with the facts of the case. The district court later admitted the poem into evidence as a part of the government’s case-in-chief. During her testimony, R.B. read and explained the poem without any objections from Ralston. The government’s reading of R.B.’s poem in its opening was neither improper nor unfairly prejudicial. Even if reading the poem were improper, the district court did not plainly err, considering “the weight of the -15- evidence was heavy, and there is no reasonable probability that the verdict would have changed absent the [reading of the poem].” Bentley, 561 F.3d at 810–11 (cleaned up). Second, Ralston argues that the district court erred in failing to declare a mistrial sua sponte based on the government asking R.B.’s mother, on redirect examination, to discuss how R.B.’s experience affected their family. The district court acknowledged that the government’s question was not within the scope of the cross-examination, which had attacked R.B.’s mother’s credibility and her ability to recall the specific facts of Count 1. The district court on its own initiative rebuked the government for the breadth of its line of questioning. The court then “instructed the jury not to consider [R.B.’s mother’s] last answer” at Ralston’s request. Appellant’s Br. at 31. Although objectionable, we cannot say that the government’s question and the witness’s testimony were so prejudicial that the court should have declared a mistrial sua sponte. Ralston never moved for a mistrial, the court quickly cured the improper questioning and witness testimony, and Ralston’s guilty verdict is supported by sufficient evidence. On this record, we find no plain error. Third, Ralston contends that the district court erred in failing to declare a mistrial sua sponte based on the government asking M.W. the following leading question during direct examination: “The fact that [Ralston] . . . also had sexual contact with your sister still weighed very heavily on your heart at that time as well?” Trial Tr., Vol. 2, at 474. “Whether leading questions are permitted is a matter generally left to the discretion of the trial judge.” United States v. Wright, 540 F.3d 833, 844 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation omitted). Ralston is correct that the question was leading. But, Ralston did not object. In addition, Ralston had the opportunity to cross-examine -16- M.W. in the instant case. See id. at 845. We further note that Ralston’s state convictions relating to J.W., M.W.’s younger sister, were admitted into evidence. Even assuming that the leading question was improper, “we see no substantial and injurious influence on the verdict arising from the manner in which the examination was conducted.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). When this question was posed, Ralston’s illegal sexual contact with J.W. was an established fact. Fourth, Ralston claims that the district court erred in failing to declare a mistrial sua sponte based on the government’s question to Agent Thomas on re-redirect examination. The government asked Agent Thomas whether “[R.G.] acknowledge[d] that she had been raped at least three times by the defendant.” Trial Tr., Vol. 3, at 640. The district court, in front of the jury, asked the government whether that question could fit within the scope of Agent Thomas’s recross-examination. In his recross, Ralston’s trial counsel—based on extended lapses in time between the applicable conduct and FBI interviews—compared R.G.’s inability to remember the exact details of the sexual crime committed against her with Ralston’s inability to remember R.B. In a sidebar conversation, the district court informed the government’s counsel that he would not “be allowed to abuse the rules.” Id. It further stated, “Oh, that was blatant. You wanted to get the last dig in. And I’m going to strike it.” Id. at 641. The court struck the examination question and Agent Thomas’s answer to the extent they were cumulative to previous testimony. As the government points out, “Ralston did not object to the question, to [Agent] Thomas’s answer, or to the court’s decision to strike the answer.” Appellee’s Br. at 35. The district court’s instruction cured any harm that may have resulted from the government’s improper re-redirect question. Simply put, Ralston has not shown the requisite prejudice to warrant reversal. Lastly, Ralston posits that the district court erred in failing to declare a mistrial sua sponte based on the government’s closing argument. The closing, according to -17- Ralston, improperly attacked his character and urged the jury “to use its decision” “to serve some larger social objective” as opposed to merely punishing him for the proven crime. Appellant’s Br. at 33 (internal quotation omitted). As noted above, the prosecutor’s closing argument included these statements: “What kind of man sexually assaults a five-year-old girl that he goes to church with, is in a Sunday school class? What kind of man sexually assaults an 18-year-old girl who looked to him as a father figure?” and “[Ralston] told Ricky Ball, remember, Oh, she likes it rough. She says no but that means yes. And I pray to God that we have grown enough as a society to recognize . . . when a woman says no, she means, No . . . .” Trial Tr., Vol. 4, at 713, 725. “A prosecutor should not urge a jury to convict for reasons other than the evidence; arguments intended to inflame juror emotions or implying that the jury’s decision could help solve a social problem are inappropriate.” Alaboudi, 786 F.3d at 1144 (internal quotation omitted). We conclude that the district court’s decision not to declare a mistrial was not plain error. The government’s statements during its closing did not misrepresent the evidence that was admitted and considered by the jury to convict Ralston. We highlight that “[u]nless calculated to inflame, an appeal to the jury to act as the conscience of the community is not impermissible.” United States v. Sanchez-Garcia, 685 F.3d 745, 753 (8th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation omitted). In short, a mere reference to lamentable societal conditions is not synonymous with a “‘community conscience’ argument” seeking to inflame the jurors against the defendant. See Alaboudi, 786 F.3d at 1145. Because “a finding that each particular instance of misconduct was harmless does not end the inquiry,” we must also consider whether the cumulative effect of the government’s alleged misconduct violated Ralston’s right to a fair trial. United States -18- v. Wadlington, 233 F.3d 1067, 1080 (8th Cir. 2000). The asserted evidentiary errors “occurred at different times over the course of the [four] day trial, during which the [g]overnment presented ample evidence of [Ralston]’s guilt.” Id. Upon our review of the entire record, we hold that the cumulative effect of the alleged prosecutorial misdeeds did not violate Ralston’s right to a fair trial. To summarize, the government presented testimony from 16 witnesses, including R.B. and R.G.; a recorded FBI interview of Ralston’s admission to having sexual relations with R.G.; evidence of Ralston’s prior sexually related convictions; evidence of other similar allegations against Ralston; and digital forensic evidence consistent with Ralston engaging in other sexual-criminal behavior. Moreover, Ralston concedes that the district court provided curative instructions to the jury when necessary and struck portions of the improper examination questions and witness testimony. Ralston’s arguments simply do not establish the kind of cumulative and pervasive misconduct that has warranted reversal in other cases. See, e.g., United States v. Conrad, 320 F.3d 851, 855–57 (8th Cir. 2003). 2. J.W.’s Testimony from the State Preliminary Hearing Furthermore, Ralston argues that the district court erred in allowing the government to read to the jury J.W.’s testimony from a preliminary hearing conducted in Kansas state court. He contends that the government failed to offer proof that she was unavailable to testify at Ralston’s federal trial. The preliminary hearing involved Ralston’s state charges in which he pleaded no contest to two felony counts of aggravated indecent liberties with J.W. Ralston claims that “[t]he only statement on the record was that [J.W.] had . . . some preterm contractions and was on bed rest.” Appellant’s Br. at 45. Ralston further claims that this does not meet the standard set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) and that “although the defense is allowed to cross-examine at a preliminary hearing, the scope of such an examination is much more circumscribed and limited than it is at trial.” Id. at 47. The admission of J.W.’s -19- testimony, according to Ralston, also violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation because it was testimonial. The government responds that “Ralston waived any claim that J.W. was not medically unavailable when he told the court, ‘we’re not disputing that at all.’” Appellee’s Br. at 46 (quoting Trial Tr., Vol. 1, at 8–9). Also, the government points out that Ralston was present at the state preliminary hearing and “had sufficient opportunity and a similar motive to cross-examine J.W. during the preliminary hearing.” Id. The government thus argues that “[J.W.’s] testimony was admissible both under the Confrontation Clause and Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1).” Id. As with his prosecutorial misconduct allegations, Ralston failed to object to the reading of J.W.’s prior testimony on the basis of the Confrontation Clause. We thus review for plain error. See United States v. Rodriguez, 484 F.3d 1006, 1013 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Because [the defendant] did not raise a Confrontation Clause objection to this testimony at trial, we review his claim for plain error.”); United States v. Johnson, 688 F.3d 494, 504 (8th Cir. 2012) (“[S]uch an objection must adequately put the district court and the prosecution on notice of the grounds on which the defendant meant to object.”); Appellant’s Br. at 48 n.5 (“To the extent that defense counsel’s acquiescence results in a failure to preserve this objection to permitting the reading of the transcript, the trial court’s decision to admit this testimony amounted to plain error because it was inadmissible and in violation of the Confrontation Clause and harmed [Ralston].”). The Confrontation Clause bars “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004). Furthermore, Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(4) provides that a witness is unavailable if she has a “then-existing infirmity [or] physical illness.” Consistent with the Confrontation Clause, this unavailable -20- witness’s testimony from a preliminary hearing in a prior case will not violate the hearsay rule if the testimony is “offered against a party” in a subsequent case “who had . . . an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by . . . cross- . . . examination.” Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1)(B). At the start of Ralston’s trial, J.W., who was pregnant, began experiencing preterm contractions. The government represented to the district court that she was not willing to make the drive to Springfield, Missouri, for the trial. The government, however, did not provide any medical documentation to prove J.W.’s unavailability. But despite the district court’s request and the government’s failure to produce medical documentation, Ralston did not dispute J.W.’s unavailability when questioned by the court. See Trial Tr., Vol. 1, at 8–9. His trial counsel stated, “[W]e’re not disputing that” “she’s medically not able to be here.” Id. at 9. We agree with the government that Ralston waived his challenge as to J.W.’s unavailability. See United States v. Ford, 888 F.3d 922, 925–26 (8th Cir. 2018) (“Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right, whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right. The former precludes review altogether, while the latter requires a plain-error standard of review.” (cleaned up)). After conceding J.W.’s unavailability, Ralston cannot now claim that the government did not sufficiently prove it. Ralston also had an opportunity and similar motive to cross-examine J.W. on her account of the allegations at the state preliminary hearing. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (“We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’ Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing . . . .” (footnote omitted)). J.W. testified under oath about Ralston’s sexual assault. At that hearing, Ralston’s counsel cross-examined J.W. regarding the substance of her testimony including the basic facts, -21- inconsistencies in her testimony, and her delay in reporting the incident. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165–66 (1970). We recognize that a preliminary hearing is more circumscribed than an actual trial, but that and any other differences are not dispositive here. See, e.g., Morrow v. Wyrick, 646 F.2d 1229, 1233 (8th Cir. 1981) (“reject[ing] petitioner’s argument[s] that different counsel at the preliminary hearing and at trial undermines the reliability of the preliminary hearing proceeding” and “that the preliminary hearing testimony was ‘unduly prejudicial’ because it was ‘read’ to the jury by third parties and . . . was not subjected to ‘face-to-face confrontation’”). We thus conclude that the district court did not plainly err by admitting J.W.’s prior testimony. 3. Right to Call Johnson as a Witness Furthermore, Ralston contends that the district court abused its discretion by not compelling Johnson to testify. He claims that this error deprived him “of his right to compulsory process and confrontation.” Appellant’s Br. at 23. The government replies, “Ralston made no showing that Johnson’s testimony would be material and favorable,” which is necessary to defeat Johnson’s right against self-incrimination. Appellee’s Br. at 56. We normally review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s decision not to compel testimony after a witness has claimed a Fifth Amendment privilege. United States v. Washington, 318 F.3d 845, 856 (8th Cir. 2003). But, Ralston failed to object to the district court’s ruling on Johnson’s right against self-incrimination. We therefore review for plain error. See Trial Tr., Vol. 3, at 644–45 (failing to object); Appellant’s Br. at 51 n.6 (“To the extent that defense counsel’s acquiescence results in a failure to preserve this objection to the failure to permit compulsory process, the trial court’s decision to exclude this testimony amounted to plain error because it was admissible and critical to the defense and its exclusion harmed [Ralston].”). -22- Ralston’s “challenge represents a conflict between his right to call [Johnson] as a witness in his defense and [Johnson]’s right to avoid self-incrimination.” United States v. Blaylock, 421 F.3d 758, 770 (8th Cir. 2005). “It is well settled that an accused’s right to compulsory process must yield to a witness’s Fifth Amendment privilege not to give testimony that would tend to incriminate him or her.” Id. (quoting United States v. Habhab, 132 F.3d 410, 416 (8th Cir.1997)). “The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person ‘shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.’” Id. (quoting Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 688 (1993) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. V)). “Nothing in the Fifth Amendment, or in any other constitutional provision, provides a means for overcoming this privilege once a potential witness has invoked it.” Id. (quoting United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 466 (4th Cir. 2003)). Ralston’s “Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process does not include the right to compel [Johnson] or any other witness to waive his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” Id. Johnson “did not want to subject himself to the government’s cross-examination.” Id. Johnson’s counsel explained his reasoning for invoking his right to avoid self-incrimination. Under a thorough examination, Johnson also informed the district court that he was a defendant in pending federal and state prosecutions and that he did not want to disclose any potential inculpatory statements in Ralston’s federal prosecution that may affect his own cases. Although the court criticized Johnson’s reasoning to a certain degree, it concluded that Johnson’s “right to preserve his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination trumped [Ralston]’s right to compel him to testify.” Id. The district court did not plainly err by not requiring Johnson to testify. -23-