Opinion ID: 739683
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Borden's Affidavit

Text: 32 Appellants first contend that the district court erred in refusing to admit an affidavit of Randolph Borden, Esq., Shay's former attorney, which Borden submitted to the United States Attorney's Office and the FBI in an effort to avoid indictment. After Borden was arrested and charged with mail and wire fraud, he undertook to convince the Office and the FBI that his conduct in the Matamoras matter had been consistent with his professional obligations, and that he had at no time harbored criminal intent. To this end, he submitted a sworn statement which outlined his response to the Complaint and sought to explain his innocence. Soon after being indicted, Shay demanded production of documents which Borden had provided to the Government in an effort to avoid prosecution. The Government disclosed these documents upon court order, but withheld the Borden affidavit until mid-trial. In the affidavit, Borden recounted giving Shay his opinion that the regulations were legally suspect, and recalled advising Shay at a September 1989 meeting that dumping could be lawfully resumed provided the Shay group followed his advice, i.e., dump only processed C & D, remove the so-called leaded materials, erect a clay liner, and test the new fill prior to dumping. Further, Borden swore he advised Shay that completion of the reclamation project with new processed C & D could be defended in court. 33 Prior to cross-examining Dotey, Shay sought to introduce this affidavit under Fed.R.Evid. 806 to impeach statements attributed to Borden by Dotey and others. Defendants argued that the affidavit impeached the statements because it showed, inter alia, that Borden advised Shay to take steps to ensure that the new dumping could be defensible in court, and therefore contradicted Dotey's testimony as to what Borden had said at the critical September 1989 meetings. 34 The district court denied Appellants' request, ruling that the statements were not a basis of cross examination for [Dotey]. They're admissible, if you want, and you will be entitled to receive them. And when you do, I think you're entitled to offer them. 35 Later, however, when the defense sought to introduce the Borden affidavit to impeach the veracity of statements attributed to Borden by Dotey, the district court refused. In response to an application that defendants be permitted to impeach a non-testifying declarant with the affidavit as provided by Rule 806, the court responded that the Borden statements were offered for the fact that they were said in the presence of the defendants, but were not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted. Therefore, the statements were not hearsay admitted under either one of the Rule 803 exceptions to the hearsay rule or as statements of a co-conspirator. 36 We first address whether the court correctly admitted the statements as non-hearsay rather than as co-conspirator statements. Borden's statements could not have been elicited for the truth of the matters he discussed unless the Government had been attempting to show that Borden's legal advice was accurate, which was clearly not the case. Furthermore, even Herzog conceded at argument to the district court that Borden's statements only served to demonstrate the defendants' scienter, not to prove any other facts underlying the charges. 37 We are somewhat concerned by the court's failure to grant a limiting instruction as to the purpose for which the Dotey testimony about Borden's statements was admitted. Rule 105 makes such an instruction mandatory, if it is requested. However, a review of the record reveals that none of the defendants objected to the admission of the Dotey testimony at the time the Borden statements came into evidence, nor did any defendant request a limiting instruction at that time. Furthermore, during Dotey's cross-examination, when the court ruled that the Borden affidavit could not be used for impeachment purposes because the Borden statements were not admitted for the truth, no defendant requested a limiting instruction. After the evidence was closed, Shay sought again to have the proffer admitted under Rule 806. Even at that time, neither Shay nor Herzog requested a limiting instruction--rather, Herzog requested that the Government be prohibited from arguing that Borden was a co-conspirator (which the Government in fact never did argue). At that time, Christiansen's counsel requested an inappropriate limiting instruction to the effect that the Borden statements are only admissible as to what he said and what his intent was. That request was incorrect because it was not Borden's intent but the defendants' intent that was at issue. 38 Without deciding whether Shay and Herzog can now rely upon Christiansen's dilatory and inexact request for a limiting instruction, we hold that if the failure to give an instruction was error, it was harmless error. First, as indicated above, the Government never contended to the jury, 10 at any point in the trial, that Borden should be viewed as a co-conspirator. Furthermore, defendants were free to manage the jury's potential confusion by attacking Dotey's credibility, his recollection of what was said during the September meetings, and his motive to fabricate. And, they in fact did so, as discussed fully in the next section of this opinion. Defendants also could have presented conflicting testimony as to what was discussed at those meetings to refute Dotey's recollection. We conclude that Dotey's testimony was properly admitted, not for the truth of the matter asserted, but simply to show defendants' scienter. 39 Having held that the court properly considered Dotey's statements to be non-hearsay, it follows that Rule 806 does not apply to the proffered Borden affidavit. Rule 806 provides in pertinent part: When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2), (C), (D), or (E), has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a witness. Fed.R.Evid. 806. 11 Because Rule 806 is not applicable to non-hearsay statements, and because Dotey's statements are not of the sort defined in Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E), the Rule by its very terms is irrelevant to Dotey's statements, and the affidavit did not fall within Rule 806. We thus uphold the court's ruling.