Opinion ID: 1043845
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of White

Text: In the seventeen months since our ruling in White, the Court of Criminal Appeals has grappled with a variety of kidnapping cases that were in the “appellate pipeline” at the time the opinion in White was filed. Initially, our decision did not “creat[e] a new standard for kidnapping,” and, in consequence, “d[id] not articulate a new rule of constitutional law or require retroactive application.” Id. at 578. There was a question as to whether this Court intended White to be applied to any cases that were pending direct appeal or to be limited to those trials held after the filing of the White opinion on March 9, 2012. As the Court of -10- Criminal Appeals properly observed in State v. Osby, our statement in White was not intended to preclude consideration of the newly required instruction in cases already in the various stages of the appellate process. No. W2012-00408-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 5381371, at  (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2012) (“We note . . . that the [supreme] court has remanded a number of cases for reconsideration in light of its ruling in White, suggesting that it intended . . . application of the ruling to those already-tried cases in the appellate pipeline, that is[,] pending direct appeal[] at the time it was filed[,] and that its use of the word ‘retroactive’ was intended to prevent use of the ruling for collateral attack.” (citation omitted)), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 5, 2013). Because this case was on direct appeal at the time White was decided, the issue has been preserved, and the Defendant is entitled to the benefit of our ruling. See Lease v. Tipton, 722 S.W.2d 379, 379 (Tenn. 1986) (per curiam) (adopting the “pipeline approach,” which applies a new legal principle “to the litigants at bar, to all actions pending on the date the decision announcing the change becomes final[,] and to all causes of action arising thereafter”). Relying upon the separate due process analysis articulated in Anthony, the Defendant argued to the Court of Criminal Appeals that the false imprisonment was “essentially incidental” to the assault, and, therefore, the evidence was insufficient to support both convictions. Cecil, 2012 WL 2674521, at  & n.2. The Court of Criminal Appeals found this argument to be without merit because Anthony had been overruled by White, and made the following further observation: For the Defendant’s argument to succeed under White, we would have to conclude that the conduct by the Defendant that “removed or confined” the victim unlawfully so as to “interfere substantially” with the victim’s “liberty” did not exceed that which was necessary to accomplish the assault. See [Tenn. Code Ann.] § 39-13-302 (2010). . . . The evidence is sufficient beyond any reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the offense of falsely imprisoning the victim. The evidence is also clearly sufficient to support the jury’s verdict that the Defendant assaulted the victim. Id. at . The Court of Criminal Appeals found no error at all, concluding that “[t]he jury was correctly instructed.” Id. at . Although some panels of the Court of Criminal Appeals have similarly administered a simple sufficiency of the evidence analysis in post-White cases, other panels of the court have properly found that the absence of the White instruction constitutes error. Compare State v. Savage, No. M2011-00666-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 4054814, at -16 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 22, 2013); Cecil, 2012 WL 2674521, at -7, perm. app. granted (Tenn. Nov. 29, 2012); and State v. Young, No. -11- E2012-00726-CCA-RM-CD, 2012 WL 2465156, at -13 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 21, 2012),8 with State v. Scott, No. E2011-00707CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 5503951, at  (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2012) (observing that this Court “acknowledged [in White] that the sufficiency of the evidence could not be evaluated in the absence of proper jury instructions on the affected issue”), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 5, 2013); and Osby, 2012 WL 5381371, at  & n.3 (same). While we did state in White that “[o]ur task . . . of assessing the sufficiency of the convicting evidence qualifies as the ultimate component of th[e due process] constitutional safeguard,” 362 S.W.3d at 578, we also declined to review the sufficiency of the evidence because the jury had not received an adequate instruction, id. at 579. We explained that the jury, whose primary obligation is to ensure that a criminal defendant has been afforded due process, must first be properly instructed under the law in order to determine whether the State has proven the defendant’s guilt as to each and every element of kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 577. In our view, therefore, providing the definition of the “substantial interference” element to the jury is essential to afford the protections of due process. Only when the jury is properly instructed can appellate review of the sufficiency of the convicting evidence satisfy the due process safeguard.9 Although the Court of Criminal Appeals found that the jury was correctly instructed in this case, we must disagree. The State has properly conceded this point. The same instructional error that existed in White is present in this case—the jury was not adequately charged on the question of whether the victim’s removal or confinement, as an element of false imprisonment, was essentially incidental to the assault.10 In White, we held that even 8 In Young and Savage, although we denied the defendants’ applications for permission to appeal, we also designated those opinions of the Court of Criminal Appeals “not for citation.” See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 4(E). As indicated, we granted review in this case to determine “[w]hether, in analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence in light of State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012), the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding that the jury was correctly instructed and that the [Defendant’s] due process rights were not violated.” 9 As the Court of Criminal Appeals has observed, [b]ecause the due process issue at stake is now deemed a factual issue to be determined by the trier of fact and not a legal issue to be determined by the trial court, an appellate court that embarks upon determining the ‘sufficiency of the evidence’ on this issue despite the absence of the necessary, enabling instruction usurps the role of the trier of fact. Osby, 2012 WL 5381371, at  n.3 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 10 The instruction on assault required the jury to find that the State had proven “beyond a reasonable doubt that the [D]efendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury to another.” The (continued...) -12- though the jury instructions tracked the language of the kidnapping statute, they were erroneous because “they did not define the key element—the substantial interference with the victim’s liberty—as requiring a finding by the jury that the victim’s removal or confinement was not essentially incidental to the accompanying felony offense.” 362 S.W.3d at 580 (emphasis added). Of importance, “[t]he failure to instruct the jury on a material element of an offense is a constitutional error subject to harmless error analysis.” State v. Faulkner, 154 S.W.3d 48, 60 (Tenn. 2005) (emphasis added) (citing State v. Ducker, 27 S.W.3d 889, 899 (Tenn. 2000)); see also State v. Garrison, 40 S.W.3d 426, 434 (Tenn. 2000) (holding that “harmless error analysis is appropriate when evaluating omissions of an essential element of an offense from the jury charge”). In consequence, the lack of the instruction set out in White, while entirely understandable because the trial predated our ruling, qualified as constitutional error. The Court of Criminal Appeals should have addressed whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.11 See State v. Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d 361, 371 (Tenn. 2008) (“The existence of a non-structural constitutional error requires reversal unless the State demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless.”). In order to determine whether an instructional error is harmless, the appellate court must ask “whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Id. (quoting State v. Allen, 69 S.W.3d 181, 190 (Tenn. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also White, 362 S.W.3d at 580 n.20 (“Because we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the instructional error, we cannot find the error harmless.”). As we observed in White, the touchstone of this inquiry is whether a rational trier of fact could interpret the proof at trial in different ways. 362 S.W.3d at 579. In a number of cases, the Court of Criminal Appeals, having addressed the omission 10 (...continued) instruction on false imprisonment required the jury to find that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt “(1) that the [D]efendant removed or confined another unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with the other’s liberty,” and (2) that “the [D]efendant acted knowingly.” The trial court further instructed the jury as follows: The crime charged in each count is a separate and distinct offense. You must decide each charge separately on the evidence and the law applicable to it. The [D]efendant may be found guilty or not guilty of any or all of the offenses charged. Your finding as to each charge must be stated in your verdict. 11 Of course, if the jury does receive the instruction required by White, or if the failure to provide a White instruction is determined to be harmless error, then appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence will be appropriate. See White, 362 S.W.3d at 578. -13- of the White instruction, conducted proper analyses and remanded for new trials. See, e.g., State v. Davis, No. M2011-02075-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 5947439, at  (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 16, 2012) (reversing conviction and remanding for new trial because the evidence was subject to differing interpretations and the jury was not instructed on the definition of “substantial interference”); State v. Raymer, No. M2011-00995-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 4841544, at  (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 10, 2012) (reversing conviction and remanding for new trial because the evidence was subject to differing interpretations and the proper jury instruction could have changed the outcome of the trial); State v. Powell, No. E2011-00155-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 1655279, at  (Tenn. Crim. App. May 10, 2012) (same).12 In contrast, the Court of Criminal Appeals has also issued several opinions that illustrate when the failure to provide the White instruction may be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In State v. Keller, while addressing the absence of the White instruction as to an especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, the court concluded that the instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because it was “clear that the movement and confinement of the victims was not done for purposes of accomplishing assaults upon them.” No. W2012-00825-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 3329032, at  (Tenn. Crim. App. June 27, 2013). The court found that “the record reflects that after the victims had been subjected to threats of deadly force, they were further removed and confined with the intention that they be used as hostages in support of the defendant’s efforts to rob [a third party].” Id. at . Likewise, in State v. Hulse, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the absence of the White instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the defendant, after raping the victim, chased her with a boxcutter, grabbed her ankles, pulled her down a sidewalk, and prevented her from summoning help. No. E2011-01292-CCA-R3CD, 2013 WL 1136528, at  (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 19, 2013). Finding that these actions were not inherent in the crimes of rape or aggravated rape, which had already been completed, the court held that “[t]he only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the evidence is that the [d]efendant’s actions were well beyond that necessary to consummate the rape.” Id. The circumstances here are not so certain. The proof in this case demonstrated that sometime after midnight on June 26, 2010, the victim drove to the Defendant’s residence and walked directly into his bedroom to confront him about his infidelity and to break off their relationship. At some point she left the residence, but chose to return. An argument ensued and the two exchanged multiple blows over the course of one to two hours. The victim acknowledged that she “blacked out” when she got angry, and she could not recall “who hit first.” She maintained that at some point the Defendant threw her onto the bed, but she also 12 While we recognize that the Court of Criminal Appeals did not explicitly state that it was applying a harmless error analysis, it is clear that the principles applied in these opinions were consistent with those we adopted in White and have applied in this instance. -14- admitted that she threw punches and bloodied the Defendant’s lip. When the Defendant left the bedroom to replace his shirt that was torn during the struggle, the victim was able to use her cell phone to dial 911 and, without making a complaint, alert the police dispatcher of her location. Eventually, the Defendant and the victim both “calmed down” and the physical altercation ceased. According to the victim, she lay in bed with the Defendant for some fifteen minutes and planned to leave after he fell asleep, but when the police arrived at the residence, the Defendant “wouldn’t let [her] get up and answer the door.” She acknowledged that they initially believed the knock at the door may have come from a neighbor, and that the Defendant answered the door after approximately ten minutes. The victim estimated that she attempted to leave three times during the course of the altercation. A harmless error analysis is necessarily imprecise, requiring that appellate courts assess the cold, written record rather than seeing and hearing the witnesses firsthand. Because of these limitations, we cannot say that the omission of the White instruction qualified as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The victim offered conflicting testimony as to who initiated the physical altercation, whether she inflicted wounds upon the Defendant, and when she may have been able to leave the Defendant’s residence. The trial judge expressed doubts about the propriety of a separate conviction for false imprisonment, making the following observations at the sentencing hearing: [O]n the false imprisonment case there’s evidence that the victim went out of the residence one time and then returned. But I guess the overall evidence suggests that that occurred before the injuries were inflicted, before the assault actually occurred. These two offenses are so intertwined that I think it would be inappropriate to order a consecutive sentence. Because very much like a burglary and robbery might involve a detention of a person against their will for some period of time, it might not justify a separate conviction or . . . consecutive sentences for the kidnapping or false imprisonment aspect of that. And there might not have been a holding or detaining against the victim’s will, but for the [D]efendant’s reluctance to let officers see her in the condition she was in at that time, emotionally and physically. (Emphasis added.) Similarly, when discussing his role as the thirteenth juror at the hearing on the motion for a new trial, the trial judge expressed doubt as to whether the confinement was substantial enough to support a separate conviction for false imprisonment: I do want to affirmatively express at this time, as the [thirteenth] juror, that the evidence was strong enough to have satisfied this Judge beyond a -15- reasonable doubt . . . of both the assault and the false imprisonment. And yet, the injuries were not horrible and the victim did take herself voluntarily to his residence, at a very late hour of the night, and left the mobile home . . . at least once during the evening, went to her car, and came back in voluntarily. .... [T]he point being, she went there voluntarily, she stayed there, she went out, she returned voluntarily, and that probably cut both ways. It showed that at least . . . earlier during the time frame she was there, she was not being falsely imprisoned. But it did appear from the record that she was being, maybe, held against her will at the time the officers were trying to get [their] attention, even though she’d used her phone to summon the officers by dialing 911 and leaving the line open . . . . (Emphasis added.) The record supports this assessment. On one hand, the evidence could support a finding that the Defendant intended only to assault the victim, and that any removal or confinement of the victim—such as dragging her into the bathroom—was in furtherance of that goal, making it essentially incidental to the assault. On the other hand, the evidence could support a finding that the removal or confinement of the victim was greater than that necessary to accomplish the assault, particularly in light of the victim’s implication that the Defendant may have prevented her from answering the door when the police arrived. From our review of the record, it is impossible to determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether there was a removal or confinement of the victim that was not essentially incidental to the assault. We cannot, therefore, conclusively say that a properly instructed jury would have found that the Defendant’s actions toward the victim constituted a substantial interference with her liberty. See White, 362 S.W.3d at 579 (“In our view, this proof could be interpreted in different ways and, therefore, the determination of whether the removal or confinement of [the victim] constituted a substantial interference with her liberty was a question of fact for the jury to resolve.”).