Opinion ID: 2191641
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Draper matter

Text: The petition for disciplinary action alleged that Marlene S. Draper was awarded a divorce a vinculo matrimonii from David W. Draper on or about January 7, 1975, in which she was awarded custody of their child; that in April 1976 Draper sought Kerpelman's representation of him in an effort to have the decree modified by having custody awarded to him; that Kerpelman advised Draper that the fee would be $960 plus court costs and that the fee should be paid prior to the date of any hearing on modification; that Draper paid Kerpelman $500 on or about April 15, 1976; that on or about May 7, 1976, Kerpelman submitted a bill to Draper in the amount of $10 for `Filing fee for Petition for Modification of Decree as to Child Custody'; that on or about May 14, 1976, Kerpelman filed a petition on behalf of Draper in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County for modification of the custody decree; that [d]uring the period April, 1976, to August 21, 1976, [Kerpelman] advised and counseled Draper to take his child from Marlene S. Draper, then living in Syracuse, New York, and further planned with Draper the methods by which he was to obtain the child, notwithstanding the award of custody [in the divorce decree]; that [a]cting at the direction of [Kerpelman], on or about August 21, 1976, Draper entered the apartment in which Marlene S. Draper was then living, in Syracuse, New York, and `... Took the child without the permission or consent of Marlene S. Draper ...,' returning with the child to Maryland; that on or about September 7, 1976, Draper forwarded $460 to Kerpelman, being the remainder of the fee to which reference was previously made; that on or about September 30, 1976, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County ordered Draper to return the child to Marlene S. Draper and to show cause why he should not be found in contempt of that court for his actions [in retrieving the child]; that on or about March 23, 1977, a hearing was held on Draper's petition for modification of the custody decree, which hearing resulted in an award of custody to Draper; that although Draper on numerous occasions [requested] an interview in [Kerpelman's] office prior to the hearing of March 23, 1977, [Kerpelman] refused to meet with Draper; that on or about March 24, 1977, Kerpelman submitted a bill to Draper for an `Additional final fee based on fully successful conclusion of case,' in the amount of $850, which amount Draper refused to pay; that as a result of Draper's refusal to pay this sum of $850 [Kerpelman] refused, upon Draper's request, to provide Draper with a copy of the Decree of Modification resulting from the hearing of March 23, 1977; and that Kerpelman withdrew from representation of Draper on or about June 21, 1977, without providing Draper with a copy of the decree of modification. (Emphasis in original.) Bar Counsel claimed that as a result of his actions Kerpelman had violated DR 1-102(A)(1), (4), (5), and (6); DR 2-106 (A); DR 2-110(A)(2); DR 6-101(A)(2) and (3); DR 7-102(A)(7); and DR 7-106(A). [3] The charges relative to excessive fees and neglect ultimately were dropped. At the conclusion of the hearings, the trial judge framed the following as the issues to be determined by him: 1. Did Respondent agree that his representation of Draper would cost about $1,000.00 at a time when Respondent intended to charge more based on certain factors including a successful result? 2. Did Respondent violate any Disciplinary Rules by advising Draper to retrieve (meaning illegally child snatch) the child from Syracuse, New York in flat violation of an unmodified court decree awarding custody of the child to Draper's former wife (mother of the child)? 3. Did Respondent violate DR 1-102(A)(5) by his alleged conduct in 1 above? 4. Did Respondent violate said latter Disciplinary Rule by his alleged conduct in 2 above. 5. Did Respondent violate DR 1-102(A)(6) by his alleged conduct in 1 above? 6. Did Respondent violate said latter Disciplinary Rule by his alleged conduct in 2 above? 7. Did Respondent violate DR 2-110(A)(2) by allegedly refusing to deliver to Draper, the decree of modification (or copy) of March 23, 1977 (awarding custody to Draper  the result sought by Draper and objective in his hiring Respondent) after the modification hearing and after Draper discharged Respondent? Did he further violate said Disciplinary Rule by not avoiding foreseeable prejudice to Draper before he withdrew his representation of Draper and by doing nothing for Draper in the face of danger of additional litigation? 8. Did Respondent not violate DR 6-101(A)(2) by lack of adequate preparation, in that he never conducted discovery, never interviewed any witnesses nor had in person interviews with Draper? 9. Did Respondent not violate DR 7-102(A)(7) and 7-106(A) by his alleged conduct in 2 above? The most serious charge against Kerpelman is that he advised a client to take steps to recover his child from the child's mother in New York State when, as Kerpelman knew, the mother had custody pursuant to a decree of one of the courts of this State. Here, as will fully appear by reference to the appendix to this opinion setting forth the findings verbatim, the trial judge found as a fact that Kerpelman did suggest to his client, in flat violation of the Decree, that he (Draper) physically take the child from the Syracuse residence where she was living with her mother; that it was [Kerpelman's], and not Draper's suggestion; [and] that [Kerpelman] told Draper to not make it look like a breaking and entering but just to get the child.... He found under this issue by clear and convincing evidence that [Kerpelman's] conduct was in violation of Disciplinary Rules 1-102(A)(1), 1-102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(5) and 1-102(A)(6) relative to conduct involving dishonesty, etc., conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, engaging in other conduct adversely reflecting on his fitness to practice law, and violation of disciplinary rules. On the issues concerning misrepresentation as to fee, the trial judge said, Despite all of the highly suspicious circumstances, I cannot find by clear and convincing evidence that [Kerpelman] intended to improperly charge a fee to Draper in violation of their fee `agreement.' (Emphasis his.) Likewise, on the issue relative to inadequate preparation the trial judge said he could not find by clear and convincing evidence that [Kerpelman's] representation was so inadequate as to conclude that he violated DR 6-101(A)(2). (Emphasis his.) His concluding comment on this issue was, In sum, while [Kerpelman's] representation was spotty and somewhat deficient, this court cannot find by clear and convincing evidence that [Kerpelman] handled the Draper case without preparation adequate in the circumstances. (Emphasis his.)