Opinion ID: 617962
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting the Drug Conviction (Count 1)

Text: Mr. Irving argues that insufficient evidence was adduced at trial to support his conviction for possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). To obtain a conviction for possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute . . ., the government must establish the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) defendant possessed a controlled substance; (2) defendant knew he possessed a controlled substance; and (3) defendant intended to distribute the controlled substance. United States v. Harris, 369 F.3d 1157, 1163 (10th Cir.2004); accord United States v. Castorena-Jaime, 285 F.3d 916, 933 (10th Cir.2002). Mr. Irving argues that [n]o video showed any exchange of drugs for money and no law enforcement officer [on surveillance at the buy] observed any drugs, and insists, therefore, that [t]he possibility that Mr. Banks already had the cocaine base [wa]s not disproven beyond a reasonable doubt. Aplt. Opening Br. at 19-20. As Mr. Irving sees it, he provided an explanation for why he took the money from Mr. Banks (repayment of a loan) and for why Mr. Banks might falsely implicate him (receiving benefits from law enforcement), and, consequently, [t]here simply is insufficient evidence for a[] reasonable jury to have found [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 20. Mr. Irving's claim is without merit. The record more than adequately supports the jury's finding that Mr. Irving possessed crack cocaine with the intent to distribute. Of particular significance is the fact that Mr. Irving was arrested following a controlled buy that strictly adhered to an established protocol: the confidential informant and his vehicle were searched prior to and after the sale; the controlled buy was conducted under police surveillance, and nobody approached the vehicle during the operation except for Mr. Irving; and following the transaction, the confidential informant drove directly to the police and turned over the drugs. These facts were attested to at trial by members of the police, including Officer Hix, the orchestrating law enforcement official, and by the confidential informant himself. This alone is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Irving possessed crack cocaine with the intent to distribute. See, e.g., Wilson, 107 F.3d at 779 (The intent to distribute . . . cocaine could be inferred from [the orchestrating officer's] description of the events surrounding the `controlled buy.' While [the officer] did not actually observe Mr. Wilson sell the cocaine to the confidential informant, he did observe Mr. Wilson greet the informant in the yard and lead him into the house where the purchase occurred.). This point is underscored by this court's decision in United States v. [Patrick] Washington, 11 F.3d 1510 (10th Cir.1993). In that case, the defendant was convicted of three counts of distribution of crack cocaine following his involvement in three controlled buys with a FBI confidential informant. Id. at 1512-13. Although protocol dictates both that controlled buys be preceded by a search of the confidential informant and that the buy be subject to uninterrupted surveillance, the government admitted that neither of those things happened in two of the three buys. Id. at 1513. The confidential informant was, however, equipped with a recording device for all of the buys, which evidence showed had not been tampered with. Id. At trial, the government relied primarily on the testimony of the confidential informant and the orchestrating officer, along with the audiotapes from the controlled buys, to prove the defendant possessed crack cocaine with intent to distribute. Id. at 1515. The defendant, for his part, denied selling the confidential informant drugs on those dates, claiming that he had taken the money from the confidential informant to cover debts that were owed from earlier drug transactions, and that he had sold the confidential informant Vitablend in an effort to recover on those debts. Id. The defendant further argue[d] that after each buy [the confidential informant] procured the recovered cocaine base from another source, or . . . it was otherwise available to him. Id. The confidential informant actually acknowledged outstanding debts to [the] defendant. Id. Nonetheless, we concluded that, [d]espite some discrepancies in the testimony of the FBI agents and [the confidential informant], and opportunities during each buy for [the confidential informant] to misappropriate the contraband, a reasonable jury could believe that defendant engaged in drug trafficking on the three dates listed in the indictment. Id. Given that the deficiencies in the controlled buys present in [Patrick] Washington were not present here, we conclude with even greater force that a reasonable jury could find that Mr. Irving sold crack cocaine to Mr. Banks during the August 25, 2008, controlled buy. Moreover, the government points to Officer Hix's testimony concerning the cryptic nature of the recorded calls between Mr. Irving and Mr. Banks. Officer Hix testified that Mr. Irving's cryptic communications were consistent with the behavior of drug dealers, who always think that the police are listening to their phone calls, so they don't want to talk about exactly what they are doing on the phone. R., Vol. II, at 118. This testimony lends further support to our conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to establish Mr. Irving's guilt. To be sure, Mr. Irving offered an elaborate explanation for everythingfrom why he was so evasive on the phone, to how he wound up with the money. However, we do not weigh conflicting evidence or second-guess the fact-finding decisions of the jury when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence. Sells, 477 F.3d at 1235. The jury found Mr. Irving guilty of possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, and it is clear that the record is more than adequate to support that conclusion. Accordingly, Mr. Irving is not entitled to relief on this claim.