Opinion ID: 55822
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Panels Agree With the Original Opinion's Logic

Text: The previous section demonstrates that the reasoning in the original opinion was not sophism, but straightforward syllogistic logic and required by previous case-law. The mere feeling by even a number of federal judges that a statutory offense of possession with intent to offer to sell should either be included in the guidelines definition or deleted from the Texas statute is, of course, not grounds for us to alter the plain words of the statute and the guidelines. See United States v. Herrera-Roldan, 414 F.3d 1238, 1244 (10th Cir. 2005) (We cannot rewrite the Sentencing Guidelines simply because they might, in future cases, produce an anomalous result.). [11] As concluded above, our original panel decision in Ford is the logical consequence of Gonzales and Taylor. By concluding otherwise, the majority ignores the clear logical implications of precedent. Subsequent unpublished decisions by other panels have reached the same result as our original panel opinion. For example, one panel applied the same reasoning to the same Texas statute of conviction, i.e., possession with intent to deliver, even though our original opinion did not bind their decision as our opinion was pending panel rehearing. See United States v. Barrera-Castro, 232 Fed.Appx. 429 (5th Cir.2007) (Smith, Wiener, Owen, JJ.) (citing United States v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 712, 715-17 (5th Cir.2007) (King, Wiener, Owen, JJ.)); United States v. Lozoya, 232 Fed.Appx. 431 (5th Cir.2007) (Smith, Wiener, Owen, JJ.). A different panel adopted and applied the reasoning of our original panel decision to a Colorado conviction for possession of drugs with intent to either sell or distribute in which sell was statutorily defined to include an offer to sell. See United States v. Flores-Meras, 234 Fed.Appx. 307 (5th Cir.2007) (Jolly, Clement, Owen, JJ.). In other words, the panel concluded that possession with intent to offer to sell under Colorado law is not possession with intent to distribute for federal sentence enhancement purposes. Id. The panels in Garza-Lopez (King, Garza, Benavides, JJ.) and Gonzales (King, Wiener, Owen, JJ.) considered and agreed with defendants who successfully raised arguments very similar to the arguments in this case. In sum, by pejoratively calling the reasoning of our original panel opinion sophistry, the new majority here is hurling the epithet of sophist at no less than a majority of this court, including all members of this panel. [12]