Opinion ID: 754226
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plaintiffs' Status as Prevailing Parties

Text: 53 The question of whether a plaintiff is a prevailing party within the meaning of the fee-shifting statutes is a threshold question that is separate from the question of the degree to which the plaintiff prevailed. See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. at 1939. For a plaintiff to be considered a prevailing party, and thus eligible for an award of fees, he need not have succeeded on the central issue in the case, Texas State Teachers Association v. Garland Independent School District, 489 U.S. 782, 790-91, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 1492-93, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989), and need not have obtain[ed] the primary relief sought, Carroll v. Blinken, 42 F.3d 122, 130 (2d Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); see LaRouche v. Kezer, 20 F.3d at 71. It is sufficient that the plaintiff succeeded on any significant issue in [the] litigation, Texas State Teachers Association v. Garland Independent School District, 489 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. at 1493 (internal quotation marks omitted), regardless of the magnitude of the relief obtained, Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114, 113 S.Ct. 566, 574, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992), if he received actual relief on the merits of his claim [that] materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff, id. at 111-12, 113 S.Ct. at 573. 54 In Farrar v. Hobby, the Supreme Court held explicitly that a plaintiff who wins nominal damages is a prevailing party. 506 U.S. at 112, 113 S.Ct. at 573. The Court stated that [a] judgment for damages in any amount, whether compensatory or nominal, modifies the defendant's behavior for the plaintiff's benefit by forcing the defendant to pay an amount of money he otherwise would not pay. Id. at 113, 113 S.Ct. at 574 (emphasis added). 55 In the present case, following the reversal and remand in LeBlanc-Sternberg I, ruling that the jury verdict in plaintiffs' favor against the Village was fully supportable and entitled them as a matter of law to nominal damages, see 67 F.3d at 431, the district court duly awarded each plaintiff nominal damages against the Village. Thus, in his Fee Decision the district judge erred in ruling that [t]he institution and prosecution of [plaintiffs'] suit did not effect [sic ] the behavior of the defendant Village in any meaningful way, Fee Decision at 8, and that the judgment in the present case did not materially change the legal relationship between the[ ] private plaintiffs and the Village, id. Under Farrar v. Hobby, even if plaintiffs had been awarded no other relief, their entitlement to nominal damages made them prevailing part[ies].