Opinion ID: 2114563
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Vulgar and Abusive Names

Text: [¶ 20.] Finally, defendant asserts error in allowing testimony detailing the abusive and vulgar names he called his mother. Defendant's primary concern is that the evidence of name calling by itself, unattached to any alleged aggressive acts, simply portrayed him as a bad person. Proving the commission of a charged crime by showing an accused committed other wrongs is impermissible character evidence. Admission of other acts evidence is permissible, however, when appropriate to prove some fact other than character. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. SDCL 19-12-5 (Rule 404(b)). [¶ 21.] Domestic abuse often has a history highly relevant to the truth-finding process. See generally Burtzlaff, 493 N.W.2d at 1. When an accused had a close relationship with the victim, prior aggression, threats or abusive treatment of the same victim by the same perpetrator are admissible when offered on relevant issues under Rule 404(b). State v. Davi, 504 N.W.2d 844, 850-51 (S.D.1993) (motive); State v. Kerkhove, 423 N.W.2d 160, 162-63 (S.D.1988) (identity, modus operandi, and motive); see also People v. Zack, 184 Cal.App.3d 409, 413-15, 229 Cal.Rptr. 317, 319-20 (Cal.Ct.App.1986) (admitted under California's equivalent to § 404(b)). The rationale for admissibility is that an accused's past conduct in a familial context tends to explain later interactions between the same persons. Defendant's persistent verbal abuse, though not always accompanied by violence or threats, was an expression of his attitude, inseparable from his intermittent aggression. His previous attacks and threats, along with the vulgar names he called his mother were therefore admissible to show the nature of their relationship, his motive, and his state of mind. In our view, there was ample justification in the record to support the judge's finding that this evidence was relevant. [¶ 22.] Other courts have also held admissible prior abusive behavior against the same victim by the same defendant in a domestic relationship. See People v. Linkenauger, 32 Cal.App.4th 1603, 1612-13, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 868, 873-74 (Cal.Ct.App.1995) (under California's equivalent to Rule 404(b), evidence of prior domestic quarrels, jealousy, and threats admissible to show defendant's motive, intent and state of mind); Lindsey v. State, 135 Ga.App. 122, 218 S.E.2d 30, 31 (1975) (prior attempts to commit same crime against same victim generally admissible); State v. Gibbons, 256 Kan. 951, 889 P.2d 772, 780 (1995) (evidence of earlier spousal abuse admissible to show motive or intent, the parties' relationship, the continuing course of conduct, and corroboration); State v. Elvin, 481 N.W.2d 571, 575 (Minn.Ct.App.1992) (evidence of prior domestic violence admissible to show relationship between victim and defendant), review denied (1992); State v. Johnson, 73 Ohio Misc.2d 1, 657 N.E.2d 383, 384 (Ohio 1994) (defendant's earlier convictions for crimes of violence against same victim admissible in domestic violence threat case to prove element of crime charged and intent, motive, or absence of mistake or accident). [¶ 23.] Next, we review the trial court's ruling that this evidence was not substantially more prejudicial than probative. SDCL 19-12-3 (Rule 403) provides: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. The court excluded some of the past remarks, allowing only those statements relevant to defendant's motive, state of mind, or the nature of the relationship. Defendant was certainly not entitled to have the jury decide his case on a pretense that his behavior and feelings toward his mother were nothing but routinely warm and affectionate. See Zack, 184 Cal.App.3d at 415, 229 Cal.Rptr. at 320. The court also properly instructed the jury on the limited purposes for which the evidence could be considered. See SDCL 19-9-12 (Rule 105). Given the relevance and revealing nature of these statements, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh probative value. [¶ 24.] Affirmed. [¶ 25.] MILLER, Chief Justice, and SABERS, AMUNDSON, and GILBERTSON, Justices, concur.