Opinion ID: 2633743
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Brewer v. Turner

Text: The distinct time frames at which competency may be an issue-the time of the offense, the time of extradition, the time of trial, or the time of execution of a sentence must be considered when applying Brewer, 165 Kan. 330, 194 P.2d 507, the case upon which the Court of Appeals relied in rejecting Patton's contention that he is entitled to a competency inquiry in an extradition proceeding. Brewer was a fugitive from California when he was adjudged to be insane in Oklahoma and was committed to a state hospital. He left the state hospital, but it was not settled whether Brewer escaped or was discharged. Brewer was eventually arrested in Kansas on a warrant issued by the Kansas Governor on the request of California authorities. Brewer challenged extradition and argued, inter alia, that he had been declared legally insane in Oklahoma and must, therefore, be presumed to be presently insane because he had never been restored to sanity. According to Brewer, California was bound by that insanity determination and presumption. And, because California prohibits trying and punishing a person who is insane, he could not be extradited. This court rejected Brewer's contention and held: [W]here habeas corpus is invoked to defeat extradition, whether the prisoner was insane at the time of the commission of the offense with which he is charged in the demanding state, or is presently insane, is not a question to be decided in a habeas corpus proceeding brought in the asylum state [citation omitted] and . . . courts in the asylum state have no authority in habeas corpus proceedings to consider the present sanity or insanity of an alleged fugitive from justice [citation omitted]. 165 Kan. at 335, 194 P.2d 507. The holding in Brewer, however, was not a determination of whether a court in an extradition proceeding should allow an inquiry into an alleged fugitive's present competency to understand the nature of the proceeding. Instead, this court's statement regarding present sanity related to the argument that the state of California was bound by the determination of insanity in Oklahoma with regard to the question of whether the fugitive should be excused from serving the unexpired portion of his California sentence. See 165 Kan. at 333, 335, 194 P.2d 507. The Brewer holding fails to unequivocally answer the question presented in this case. In ordering summary disposition in reliance on Brewer, the Court of Appeals failed to distinguish the issue of competency during the extradition proceeding versus competency at other phases of the criminal proceeding. The distinction has been recognized in other states. Those states which have considered the specific issue now before us consistently conclude that competency to stand trial is not relevant in an extradition proceeding under the holding of Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 461-62, 33 S.Ct. 945, 57 L.Ed. 1274 (1913), and such competency must be raised in the demanding state. Yet, these courts recognize that competency during the extradition proceeding is a separate issue regarding which there is no controlling federal authority. See, e.g., Kostic v. Smedley, 522 P.2d 535, 537 (Alaska 1974); Oliver v. Barrett, 269 Ga. 512, 513-14, 500 S.E2d 908 (1998). Brewer does not address this later category and does not control the question before us. Moreover, besides not squarely addressing the issue raised by Patton, Brewer predates Kansas' adoption of the UCEA.