Opinion ID: 668541
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rivera's Challenge to the Testimony of Rodriguez

Text: 10 Rivera contends that he is entitled to a new trial on the ground that the district court improperly permitted Rodriguez to give expert testimony as to the meanings of the organization's records. He relies on cases such as United States v. Simmons, 923 F.2d 934, 947 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 919, 111 S.Ct. 2018, 114 L.Ed.2d 104 (1991); United States v. Boissoneault, 926 F.2d 230, 233 (2d Cir.1991); United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1308 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 957, 958, 108 S.Ct. 355, 357, 98 L.Ed.2d 380, 382 (1987); and United States v. Brown, 776 F.2d 397, 401 (2d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141, 106 S.Ct. 1793, 90 L.Ed.2d 339 (1986), for the proposition that Rodriguez should not have been allowed to interpret records she did not prepare. Since Rodriguez did not testify as an expert, however, Rivera's reliance is misplaced. Under the applicable principles, we see no error in the admission of her testimony. 11 The cases relied on by Rivera dealt with the permissible scope of testimony by law enforcement agents who testified as experts as to how certain jargon is commonly used in the drug trade. We concluded that agents who have no first-hand knowledge of the actual usage by the defendants in the case in question should not be allowed draw conclusions as to the actual meanings ascribed to those terms by those defendants. Such conclusions, we reasoned, would be based only on assessments of the probabilities that those defendants used the terms in the way they were commonly used and could encroach on the province of the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 923 F.2d at 947 (inappropriate to allow the expert [to] interpret[ ] and draw[ ] conclusions from the evidence instead of simply testifying as to the jargon of the drug trade); United States v. Boissoneault, 926 F.2d at 233 (expressing our discomfort with expert testimony in narcotics cases that not only describes the significance of certain ... evidence in general, but also draws conclusions as to the significance of that ... evidence in the particular case). 12 Here, in contrast, the challenged testimony is not that of law enforcement agents testifying as experts but rather the testimony of Rodriguez who had been a member of the conspiracy. Rodriguez was never qualified at trial to testify as an expert, and to the extent that she testified to her opinions, she did so as a lay witness. 13 The admission of lay opinion testimony is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 701. Under Rule 701, such testimony is admissible if the court concludes (1) that it is  'rationally based on' the witness's own perceptions, United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1215 (2d Cir.1992) (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 701(a)); see United States v. Urlacher, 979 F.2d 935, 939 (2d Cir.1992), and (2) that it will be helpful to the jury in determining a fact in issue, see Fed.R.Evid. 701(b); United States v. Urlacher, 979 F.2d at 939; United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d at 1215. The rational-basis requirement 'is the familiar requirement of first-hand knowledge or observation.'  Id. (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 701 Advisory Committee Note). The trial court's decision to admit lay testimony will be overturned only if it constitutes an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Tyson v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 756, 760 (7th Cir.1992); United States v. Burnette, 698 F.2d 1038, 1051 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 936, 103 S.Ct. 2106, 77 L.Ed.2d 312 (1983). 14 Rivera contends that because Rodriguez did not create all of the records, she lacked first-hand knowledge of the meaning of those she did not create. We disagree. Prior to January 1991, Rodriguez had observed Rivera, at his mill, create productivity records for the organization. From January 1991 through June 1991, Rodriguez was in charge of running the mill for Rivera, under his general supervision, and she was called upon to continue the record-keeping function. Thus, though Rodriguez did not create all of the records that were introduced, her testimony showed that she had first-hand knowledge of the organization's record-keeping methods and of the terminology it used in making those records. This knowledge was sufficient to satisfy the first requirement of Rule 701. 15 The second requirement of Rule 701 was also satisfied. There can be no doubt that Rodriguez's testimony concerning interpretations of the various record entries was helpful to the jury's understanding of the operations of the organization. 16 We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing her testimony in evidence under Rule 701. 17