Opinion ID: 2201396
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence to Support Punitive Damage Award.

Text: The bank argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the award of punitive damages returned by the jury. We have recognized that punitive damages are justified where a defendant acts maliciously. Beeck v. Aquaslide `n' Dive Corp., 350 N.W.2d 149, 167 (Iowa 1984). The malice may be actual (express), such as personal spite, hatred, or ill will, or it may be legal (implied), as where the defendant acts illegally or improperly with willful or reckless disregard for another's rights. Freeman v. Bonnes Trucking, Inc., 337 N.W.2d 871, 879-80 (Iowa 1983); Holcomb v. Hoffschneider, 297 N.W.2d 210, 214-15 (Iowa 1980). In the present case, the jury could have found that the bank, having learned that the Kloosters were considering filing a federal bankruptcy petition which would stay the bank's action on the notes, acted deliberately to circumvent the statutory protections afforded debtors by the statutes authorizing prejudgment attachment. The evidence suggests the bank was aware of the method employed would not produce the best available price. The order drafted by the bank's attorney provided for immediate payment to the bank of the attachment proceeds rather than holding the money in custodia legis. The jury might have found that the bank acted in reckless disregard of the Kloosters' rights in order to avoid the consequences of the impending bankruptcy. We cannot say the district court abused its discretion in upholding the punitive damage award. Because these allegedly malicious acts were intertwined in a single pattern of conduct, we agree with the district court that the Kloosters should recover only the highest of the individual punitive damage awards rather than totaling the separate verdicts.