Opinion ID: 2562751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: My view of the analogous ABA Standard and the appropriate sanction

Text: The supreme court has directed us to the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter ABA Standards ) for an analogous theoretical framework when fashioning sanctions upon judges. In re Johnstone, 2 P.3d 1226, 1237 (Alaska 2000); Inquiry Concerning A Judge, 788 P.2d 716, 723 (Alaska 1990). I am mindful that judges are held to higher standards than lawyers. Inquiry Concerning A Judge, 822 P.2d 1333, 1343 (Alaska 1991). I am aware that I must consider the ethical duty violated by the judge, the extent of actual or potential injury caused by the judge, the judge's mental state, and the presence of aggravating or mitigating factors. [9] In re Johnstone, 2 P.3d 1226, 1237 (Alaska 2000). The ABA Standards state that disbarment is appropriate where a lawyer makes an improper ex parte attempt to influence a trial participant and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or causes significant interference with the outcome of a legal proceeding. ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, (1992) § 6.31(b), at p. 23. Disbarment and removal are directly analogous professional sanctions. I conclude that this is the proper analogy for Judge Cummings' actions. I regard Judge Cummings' misconduct as analogous to jury tampering. See AS 11.56.590 (procedurally improper direct or indirect communication with a juror with the intent to affect the outcome of an official proceeding). To me, the parallel is clear: Judge Cummings intentionally sought to quietly tip off the prosecution to a legal issue which he deemed significant, and which he apparently believed the testifying troopers and the prosecutor had missed. In my view, Judge Cummings sought to surreptitiously aid the prosecutor, either by encouraging him to pose a certain line of questions to the trooper, or by subtly encouraging the prosecutor to raise the issue as a proposed jury instruction or at closing summation. In my view, Judge Cummings was also tacitly tipping his hand as to how he would rule on this legal issue. This is to say that I believe that Judge Cummings acted intentionally to blunt a defense argument, and increase the chances of a criminal conviction, where a defendant may otherwise have secured acquittal. At the conclusion of the March 10 trial day, I do not believe that Judge Cummings actually intended to convey the identical tip to the defense lawyer. He let pass too many opportunities to do so had that been his genuine intent. I also conclude that Judge Cummings' explanations during the investigation of this case regarding the second note are inconsistent. To me, Judge Cummings' initial second note explanation seems to have been invented on the bench at the outset of the March 11 hearingonly minutes after he had read the prosecutor's email, and realized that the prosecutor had disclosed the first note to the defense lawyer. His subsequent, contradicting explanationsin his answer to the commission's complaint, in his July 2008 deposition, and in his Judicial Council interview which occurred the very next day after his deposition I find to be irreconcilable. I conclude that Judge Cummings' misconduct caused actual, serious harm to the litigants. His error triggered a mistrial. The defendant returned to jail to await another trial day, with Rule 45 reset, in derogation of his constitutional due process and speedy trial rights. The crime victim's constitutional right to timely disposition of the case was also compromised. The prosecutor eventually settled the case, but he doubtless discounted its sentencing value due to the procedural confusion that Judge Cummings had created. I have also given weight to the testimony of Amber Terrell, who described a similar episode of Judge Cummings' surreptitious, pro-prosecution witness-coaching. Ms. Terrell's testimony went essentially un-rebutted. I am mindful of Judge Cummings' self-report to the Judicial Conduct Commission's Executive Director. I give this little weight, however. I conclude that Judge Cummings only self-reported after he knew he was caught, and after the defense lawyer forcefully (and appropriately) told Judge Cummings that he intended to pursue the issue further. In other words, Judge Cummings only self-reported in the sense that he contacted Ms. Greenstein before the defense lawyer did. I am mindful of Judge Cummings' absence of a prior judicial disciplinary record. I have also noted Judge Cummings' contrite demeanor at our hearing. I also note his willingness to accept future guidance and training as he expressed at the conclusion of his testimony. However, I do not regard censure as an appropriate sanction here. [10] When a judge actively and secretly assists one party in litigation, the litigants and the public should be extremely skeptical that the same judge will administer a fair trial to both sides in the future. One questions whether the public should assume that risk.