Opinion ID: 2648174
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Beneficiaries

Text: In order to demonstrate Article III standing, a plaintiff must show: (1) a concrete injury; (2) fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US. 555, 560–61 (1992). “In a class action, standing is satisfied if at least one named plaintiff meets the requirements.” Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). “[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim” and “for each form of relief sought.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 US. 332, 352 (2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The standing formulation for a plaintiff seeking prospective injunctive relief” generally requires that the plaintiff’s concrete injury be “coupled with ‘a sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a similar way.’” Bates, 511 F.3d at 985 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 US. 95, 111 (1983)). 16 HARO V. SEBELIUS “[A] plaintiff is presumed to have constitutional standing to seek injunctive relief when [the plaintiff] is the direct object of [government] action challenged as unlawful.” Los Angeles Haven Hospice, Inc. v. Sebelius, 638 F.3d 644, 655 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Lujan, 504 US. at 561–62). Here, Haro was the direct object of the Secretary’s allegedly overreaching collection practice. She received a letter requesting reimbursement before her administrative appeal had run its course. We therefore start with the presumption that Haro has Article III standing, on behalf of the class, to challenge the Secretary’s practice. See Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2010) (“When the lawsuit at issue challenges the legality of government action, and the plaintiff has been the object of the action, then it is presumed that a judgment preventing the action will redress his injury.”). We consider whether the elements of Article III standing, as articulated in Lujan, were satisfied at the time the complaint was filed. Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 US. 44, 51 (1991). When the complaint was filed, Medicare owed Haro $103.87—the difference between the $800 she sent to Medicare in response to the first demand letter and Medicare’s $696.13 final reimbursement determination. Haro had been deprived of $103.87 for approximately one month3 and had therefore suffered a modest but concrete fiscal injury that was directly traceable 3 Haro claims in an affidavit that she sent the $800 payment with her request for redetermination on January 21, 2009. She repeats this contention in her brief. However, the check itself was dated March 4, 2009. Moreover, a March 4 letter from Balentine to Medicare states that an $800 check is enclosed. The complaint was filed on March 10, 2009 and Medicare’s reimbursement check to Haro was dated April 13, 2009. HARO V. SEBELIUS 17 to the challenged action of the Secretary. The first two prongs of the Lujan formulation were therefore satisfied as to the beneficiaries’ claim. The third element of Article III standing is redressability. The Secretary argues that Haro is not likely to suffer the same injury again and that she therefore cannot show that injunctive relief would redress her injury. Lyons suggests that Haro must demonstrate that she was likely to suffer the same injury in the future, absent injunctive relief. 461 US. at 105–06 (choke-hold victim lacked standing to pursue injunctive relief against police where he was unable to demonstrate likelihood of future choke-holds). But unlike the plaintiff in Lyons, Haro’s alleged injury was ongoing at the time the complaint was filed—she was deprived of $103.87. An injunction prohibiting the Secretary from withholding reimbursement payments until after completion of the appeals process would have redressed Haro’s injury. See McLaughlin, 500 US. at 51 (distinguishing Lyons). Because we conclude that a properly framed injunction would have redressed Haro’s injury, Haro has demonstrated the necessary criteria for Article III standing on behalf of the class.