Opinion ID: 2183205
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sua sponte delivery of supplemental instruction.

Text: The jury retired to consider the case at 12:06 p.m. on February 23, 1972, and after being taken to lunch, returned to its deliberations. At 4:45 p.m. the trial judge recalled the jury and delivered the following standard supplemental instruction: . . . I see no reason why you jurors aren't just as competent and just as able or as likely to decide this case and decide it right as the next jury that would be called upon to determine the case. I don't want you to understand, by what I say, that you are going to be made to agree or that you are going to be kept out until you do agree. I do want you to understand that it is your duty to make an honest and sincere attempt to arrive at a verdict. Jurors should not be obstinate. They should be open-minded. They should listen to the arguments of others and talk matters over freely and fairly and make an honest effort as fair-minded men and women to come to a conclusion on all of the issues presented to them. Now I'm going to ask you to retire to the jury room again and resume your deliberations. . . . [1] The jury then returned to its deliberations, and at 6:55 p.m. returned with a guilty verdict. The defendant acknowledges that prior decisions of this court have held that this supplemental instruction is not coercive on its face. Kelley v. State (1971), 51 Wis. 2d 641, 187 N. W. 2d 810; Madison v. State (1973), 61 Wis. 2d 333, 212 N. W. 2d 150; Ziegler v. State (1974), 65 Wis. 2d 703, 223 N. W. 2d 442. However, the defendant argues that this case presents a different situation. This is so, suggests the defendant, because the trial judge gave the instruction on his own initiative without any indication from the jury that they were deadlocked. Thus, says the defendant, the jury was not given a reasonable time to deliberate and the sua sponte delivery of the supplemental instruction constituted an invasion of the province of the jury. These arguments are completely without merit. Suffice it to say at this point that the principal defense in this case was intoxication or a drug condition. The defendant refers to the supplemental instruction given in this case as the Allen charge, [2] and also as the so-called Allen instruction. We would emphasize that the supplemental instruction given in this case and approved by this court in Kelley v. State, supra , Madison v. State, supra , and Ziegler v. State, supra , is not the Allen charge or so-called Allen instruction. This court, however, expressed its disapproval of this coercive element of the Allen charge thirty years ago in Mead v. Richland Center (1941), 237 Wis. 537, 297 N. W. 419. The drafters of the Wisconsin instruction considered that decision, omitting all references to minority or majority views. The present Wisconsin instruction charges all members of the jury to make an honest effort to agree. In addition, the instruction expressly informs the jury members they will not `be made to agree, or . . . be kept out until [they] do agree.' Kelley v. State, supra, p. 647. The defendant also directs our attention to sec. 5.4 (a), (b) and (c) of the American Bar Association, Standards Relating to Trial by Jury. These suggested standards were considered in detail in Kelley v. State, supra . A further discussion of them at this time would serve no useful purpose. We would observe, however, that sec. 5.4 (b) of the ABA Standards provides in part: (b) If it appears to the court that the jury has been unable to agree, the court may require the jury to continue their deliberations and may give or repeat [a supplemental] instruction. . . . While we have not adopted these standards per se, we find no language in them which would require that the jury inform the trial court that it is deadlocked or having difficulty reaching a verdict before a supplemental instruction can be given. The commentary to the section recognizes that the trial judge can determine to give a supplemental instruction when the jury has deliberated for some time without reaching an agreement. [3] This is precisely what happened in this case. Under the facts of this case, we conclude that the trial judge properly exercised his judicial discretion in giving the supplemental instruction.