Opinion ID: 2550043
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Determination of Willfulness

Text: We next turn to the requirement that the trial court make a determination of willfulness and whether a failure to make such a determination can be considered harmless error, as the Third District has held, or constitutes fundamental error, as the First District has held. We generally apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a trial court's decision to revoke probation. See Lawson v. State, 969 So.2d 222, 229 (Fla.2007). Here, however, the issue presented is a question of law, and we apply a de novo standard of review. See id. In this case, we review the statutory scheme, construing related statutes in pari materia, and also consider the guiding constitutional principles espoused in Bearden and Stephens. The First District has held that although the burden of proving inability to pay shifts to the probationer after the State establishes nonpayment, the trial court must make an inquiry and determination with regard to the probationer's ability to pay. See Martin v. State, 937 So.2d 714, 715-16 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). In fact, the First District has held that the failure of the trial court to make a finding of willfulness is reversible error: Section 948.06(5) does not relieve the trial court of its duty to determine that the violation was willful by proving the probationer's ability to pay. Martin, 937 So.2d at 716; Blackwelder v. State, 902 So.2d 905, 907 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). Because ability to pay is an essential element for a finding that a probationer willfully violated probation for failure to pay supervisory costs, the revocation of Appellant's probation based on the alleged violation of Condition (2) constitutes fundamental error. Hobson [ v. State ], 908 So.2d [1162,] 1164 [(Fla. 1st DCA 2005) ]. In Friddle v. State, 989 So.2d 1254, 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), we held that revoking the defendant's probation based on his failure to pay restitution, without a specific finding that he had the ability to pay, compelled reversal. For the same reason, the finding that Appellant willfully violated Condition (2) must be stricken from the probation revocation order. Odom v. State, 15 So.3d 672, 678 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). Conversely, the Third District, while acknowledging the necessity of a determination of ability to pay, has concluded that the failure of a trial court to make this determination is harmless, thus eroding the underlying constitutional principle expressed in Bearden that a probationer may not be deprived of his conditional freedom simply because, through no fault of his own, he cannot pay a monetary obligation. In Guardado, 562 So.2d at 696-97, the Third District stated: With regard to the third ground, failure to make payments for the cost of supervision, it is true that there should have been a finding of ability to pay. See Brown v. State, 537 So.2d 180, 181 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). However, under subsection 948.06(4), Florida Statutes (1989),[ [7] ] inability to pay the cost of supervision is a defense which the probationer must prove by clear and convincing evidence. Guardado offered no evidence whatsoever on that issue. That being so, the failure to make a specific finding was harmless. The Third District's holding that the failure of a trial court to make a specific finding of ability to pay is harmless directly contradicts the clear rule established by this Court in Stephens and the rationale upon which the principle of law announced by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bearden is based. The specific question addressed in Bearden was whether a sentencing court can revoke a defendant's probation for failure to pay the imposed fine and restitution, absent evidence and findings that the defendant was somehow responsible for the failure or that alternative forms of punishment were inadequate. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 665, 103 S.Ct. 2064 (emphasis added). In answering that question in the negative, the Supreme Court clearly articulated its belief that a specific inquiry with regard to ability to pay is required to pass constitutional scrutiny: We hold, therefore, that in revocation proceedings for failure to pay a fine or restitution, a sentencing court must inquire into the reasons for the failure to pay.... To do otherwise would deprive the probationer of his conditional freedom simply because, through no fault of his own, he cannot pay the fine. Such a deprivation would be contrary to the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672-73, 103 S.Ct. 2064. Chief Justice Canady's dissent ascribes too narrow and limited a reading to Bearden and fails to recognize the important constitutional principles announced in that decision. Far from simply constitut[ing] a recognition that the reasons for failure to pay are relevant to whether revocation is proper and that it is impermissible to preclude consideration of those reasons, dissenting op. at 1017 (emphasis added), Bearden clearly mandates that a sentencing court must inquire into the reasons for the failure to pay in revocation proceedings for failure to pay a fine or restitution, Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672, 103 S.Ct. 2064 (emphasis added). Likewise, this Court in Stephens, 630 So.2d at 1091, recognized that in Bearden, the [United States Supreme] Court held that a court must investigate the reasons for failing to pay a fine or restitution in probation revocation proceedings. (Emphasis added.) This Court did not simply [r]ecogniz[e] the illegality of ... an unconditional plea agreement waiver by a probationer, dissenting op. at 1017, in Stephens, but instead unmistakably held that before a person on probation can be imprisoned for failing to make restitution, there must be a determination that that person has, or has had, the ability to pay but has willfully refused to do so. 630 So.2d at 1091. Regardless of whether the State or the probationer has the burden of proof with regard to ability, or inability, to pay, both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have made it abundantly clear that there must be both an inquiry into a probationer's ability to pay and a determination of willfulness. This flows from both state and federal constitutional requirements. The Third District's holding in Guardado ignores the inquiry required by Bearden, which, according to that opinion, is necessary [w]hether analyzed in terms of equal protection or due process. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666, 103 S.Ct. 2064. Further, Guardado is inconsistent with this Court's requirement expressed in Stephens regarding a specific finding of willfulness. A probationer cannot have his probation constitutionally revoked absent an inquiry into ability to pay and a specific finding of willfulness, and a trial court's failure to conduct such an inquiry or make such a finding cannot be deemed harmless. Although Guardado was decided prior to this Court's decision in Stephens, it has been improperly extended and relied on in decisions rendered after Stephens, including Gonzales, upon which the Third District relied in Del Valle. See, e.g., Del Valle, 994 So.2d at 425 (citing Gonzales, 909 So.2d at 960); Gonzales, 909 So.2d at 960 (citing Guardado, 562 So.2d at 696-97). The absence of a specific finding of willfulness in a probation revocation proceeding cannot be considered harmless error. An automatic revocation of probation without such a finding would be unconstitutional. To comply with the rules set forth in Bearden and Stephens, trial courts must inquire into a probationer's ability to pay and make an explicit finding of willfulness based on the greater weight of the evidence. The failure to comport with these requirements constitutes fundamental error. We emphasize that the probationer's ability to pay is an element of willfulness in the context of determining whether there is a willful violation for failure to pay a monetary obligation as a condition of probation. See Odom, 15 So.3d at 678-79 ([A]bility to pay is an essential element for a finding that a probationer willfully violated probation for failure to pay....). As stated by this Court in Stephens, 630 So.2d at 1091, there must be a determination that the probationer has, or has had, the ability to pay but has willfully refused to do so. Thus, the trial court must inquire into a probationer's ability to pay before determining willfulness.