Opinion ID: 2344370
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: prosecutorial misconduct/prosecutorial error.

Text: Defendant next alleges that there was prosecutorial misconduct throughout the penalty phase trialduring opening statements, at trial and during summation sufficient to require that his death sentence be vacated. Specifically, defendant alleges twelve separate categories of prosecutorial misconduct: (1) improper vouching; (2) engaging in argument during opening statement; (3) disparagement of defense counsel; (4) unwarranted comments and accusations; (5) obstruction of the defense's examination of defendant's cousin; (6) mention of a report prepared by a non-testifying defense expert; (7) equating the death penalty with justice; (8) explanation that the jury should not feel guilty about imposing a death sentence; (9) mischaracterization of the penalty phase as concerning what defendant deserved; (10) comments concerning defendant's age; (11) name-calling; and (12) improperly focusing on defendant's character. The State claims that there was no prosecutorial misconduct here and, in any event, that much of what defendant complains of on appeal was addressed by the trial court by way of a curative instruction. For purposes of analysis, we have divided defendant's contentions into three general categoriesobjections to the State's opening statement; objections arising during the evidentiary stage; and objections to the State's summationand we address each separately.
Our jurisprudence requires that prosecutors act in accordance with certain fundamental principles of fairness. It was long ago recognized that The [prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. It is fair to say that the average jury, in a greater or less[er] degree, has confidence that these obligations, which so plainly rest upon the prosecuting attorney, will be faithfully observed. Consequently, improper suggestions, insinuations, and, especially, assertions of personal knowledge are apt to carry much weight against the accused when they should properly carry none. [ Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314, 1321 (1935).] Echoing those precepts, we too have explained that [a] prosecutor may be zealous in enforcing the law but he must nevertheless refrain from any conduct lacking in the essentials of fair play, and where his conduct has crossed the line and resulted in foul play, the reversal of the judgment below will be ordered. State v. Siciliano, 21 N.J. 249, 262, 121 A. 2d 490 (1956). Thus, we have defined the role of a prosecutor similarly: It is but a truism that prosecutors, as lawyers, are engaged in an oratorical profession. As such, and in consonance with our adversarial method of ascertaining the truth, we properly afford counsel on both sides latitude for forceful and graphic advocacy. Our countenance of a certain measure of verbal flair is, however, tempered by the command that prosecutors are charged not simply with the task of securing victory for the State but, more fundamentally, with seeing that justice is served. Absolute adherence to this duty is stringently compelled in capital cases where the penalty is death. Accordingly, prosecutors should not make inaccurate legal or factual assertions during a trial and . . . must confine their comments to evidence revealed during the trial and reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence. [ State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553, 640-41, 859 A. 2d 1173 (2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).] In sum, we acknowledge that [p]rosecutors may fight hard, but they must also fight fair. State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 577, 575 A. 2d 816 (1990). For those reasons, we gauge the consequences of prosecutorial misconduct or error differently. We evaluat[e] the severity of the misconduct and its prejudicial effect on the defendant's right to a fair trial and conclude that prosecutorial misconduct is not grounds for reversal of a criminal conviction unless the conduct was so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. State v. Papasavvas (I), 163 N.J. 565, 625, 751 A. 2d 40 (2000) (quoting State v. Timmendequas (I), 161 N.J. 515, 575-76, 737 A. 2d 55 (1999), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed. 2d 89 (2001) (citations omitted)). Thus, [t]o justify reversal, the prosecutor's conduct must have been `clearly and unmistakably improper,' and must have substantially prejudiced defendant's fundamental right to have a jury fairly evaluate the merits of his defense. Ibid. Also, the Court should consider whether defense counsel made a timely and proper objection, whether the remark was withdrawn promptly, and whether the court ordered the remarks stricken from the record and instructed the jury to disregard them. Ibid. Next, [the] court must also decide whether the prosecutor's misconduct constitutes grounds for a new trial . . . because, in order to justify reversal, the misconduct must have been so egregious that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. State v. Smith, 167 N.J. 158, 181, 770 A.2d 255 (2001) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In sum, to warrant a new trial the prosecutor's conduct must have been clearly and unmistakably improper, and must have substantially prejudiced defendant's fundamental right to have a jury fairly evaluate the merits of his defense. Id. at 181-82, 770 A. 2d 255 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). It is in that context that we consider defendant's prosecutorial misconduct or error claims.

In the course of his opening statement to the death penalty jury, the prosecutor stated that [t]he State does not seek the death penalty on a routine basis. It is not something that we do lightly. The State seeks the death penalty when the State believes the facts call for it. Defendant claims that [t]his is a textbook example of prohibited vouching, in that it amounts to the prosecutor invoking the authority and presumably superior knowledge and experience of the State to provide the jury with reasons, above and beyond the evidence, to arrive at the verdict desired by the State: death. The State remarks that the contextual basis for defendant's objection is important because the statements were made on the heels of an extensive jury voir dire during which the death penalty phase jurors were subjected to a number of disturbing questions concerning the death penalty. Thus, the reason for that comment, the State asserts, was to explain the link between the lengthy and rigorous jury selection process to which each of those jurors had been subjected and the decision making task the selected jurors were being asked to perform. The State further notes that [t]he prosecutor did not lead the jury to believe that he had a personal or official belief that defendant deserved a sentence of death based on something beyond the evidence[,] and that he focused the jury's attention on the proofs to be adduced in the trial, saying that the jury was to determine the matter based upon what you hear in this courtroom. Finally, the State observes that the trial court denied defendant's motion for a mistrial based on the prosecution's opening statement, explaining that: With respect to a motion for mistrial, I would deny it at this point in time. I do feel that in light of what was said, either for purposes of clarity as to what is or is not an issue, for purposes of a curative instruction[ ], some curative instructions are necessary as a result of the opening. I would start with RPC 3.4 [7] and it [is] the Court's estimation that both counsel ran afoul of 3.4 in their openings stating their beliefs. I will probably give an instruction with respect to that . . . . I will before we proceed further deal with the 3.4 issue. The trial court then immediately instructed the jury as follows: If during the course of either opening any counsel referred to their personal opinion or personal belief, that is not a proper aspect of presentation and counsel's belief or counsel's opinion is not evidence and is indeed not proper argument either. So to the extent there was any such argument or presentation made, it should be disregarded by you and you should allow that to play no role in any determination which you make. Applying the test set forth above, we agree with the trial court's appraisal and handling of defendant's objection to the State's opening statement. Because they had the potential of injecting an element that was factually outside the jury's ken, the prosecutor's comments trod close to the prohibited expression of a personal opinion, raising matters irrelevant to the death penalty phase jury's task. However, although the State's comments may have stretched the bounds of relevance, the trial court promptly and effectively dealt with those comments via a curative instruction. Thus, when we consider the tenor of the trial and the responsiveness of counsel and the court to the improprieties when they occurred[,] State v. Papasavvas (I), supra, 163 N.J. at 625, 751 A. 2d 40 (quoting State v. Timmendequas (I), supra, 161 N.J. at 575, 737 A. 2d 55 (citation omitted)), we conclude that, even if the prosecutor's comments could be termed questionable, they were not sufficiently severe, and the potential prejudicial effect on defendant's right to a fair trial was so slight, the relief requested by defendant is unwarranted. We find no basis for reversal in respect of defendant's claim that the prosecutor impermissibly vouched for the State's request for the imposition of the death penalty in the course of its opening statement. That said, we again emphasize our long-standing rule that it is improper for the prosecutor to declare his individual or official opinion or belief of a defendant's guilt in such manner that the jury may understand the opinion or belief to be based upon something which he knows outside the evidence. State v. Thornton, 38 N.J. 380, 398, 185 A. 2d 9 (1962) (citation omitted). The rationale supporting that rule is straightforward: in the minds of jurors such statements may add the weight of the prosecutor's official and personal influence and knowledge to the probative force of the evidence adduced, and such added weight may creat[e] the possibility that the jurors consciously or unconsciously might adopt the prosecutor's view without applying their own independent judgment to the evidence. Ibid.
Defendant points to ten separate instances during the prosecution's opening statement that defendant claims constituted improper argument. Highlighting the specific language defendant claims is particularly improper, those are:  This aggravating factor recognizes the evil of killing a witness to a crime. A person, a criminal makes a decision that his freedom, his liberty is more important than the life of his victim or of a witness he is subject or eligible for the death penalty.  The Hazards aren't here to tell us how they were victimized, so the crime scene tells us how that occurred.  You're going to hear his trying to bring in Clemmons in [what] was the first of many, many lies he told through the course of this investigation. [8]  Stolen property was only found on [defendant]. The Hazards[']s blood, their DNA was found on his clothes. No other evidence suggests anybody else was involved in these crimes. This was an attempt by defendant to minimize his role, his responsibility for these crimes.  From [the fast-food restaurant] he goes to a store . . . and I'm not making this up, the reason he goes there is because he can't drive, doesn't like to drive without listening to music so he goes to the [store] to try to get some music.  In his first statement the only thing the defendant says he does is act as a lookout, pours some alcohol to help accelerate the fire. He never claims that he inflicted any injuries upon Mr. or Mrs. Hazard. This is his first self-serving statement.    [The police] are concerned about his self-serving statements because he tells the police how scared he was, but the next thing he is doing is going on a shopping spree, so the police want to talk to him some more.  The defendant has trouble keeping his lies straight about the involvement of Gary Clemmons.  The police then move on to speaking about what had occurred in relation to the crime, and the defendant, again, volunteers to write, and he draws some diagrams for the police. He draws diagrams of what happened in the house. He draws things about outside the house where he actually checks where he was standing three or four houses down, not really being the look out and being unfamiliar with the area he doesn't realize that there's no he is not being honest, but, again, they don't confront him in the interview, they just let him tell his story.  Now the policeconsidering this is a double murder and they want to find out everybody who is responsiblelook for Gary Clemmons. It's not like they just decided that they're not going to do anything, and within 20 seconds Gary Clemmons voluntarily walks into the Major Crimes Unit in Northfield and indicates that he was picking up his children in Atlantic City at 4:20 on the day of the crime. The police go down to Atlantic City and talk to two of the daycare workers, speak to them and they remember Mr. Clemmons, they remember him interacting well with his children, so they did investigate when he told them about Clemmons. According to defendant, those statements exceeded the proper scope of opening statements and, hence, require that defendant's death sentence be vacated. The trial court twice instructed the jury that the parties' opening statements were not evidence. The State explains that the majority of the comments objected to by defendant constituted representations of what the State intended to, and in fact did, prove at the penalty phase trial and that, in any event, none of the comments made by the prosecutor in his opening statement require reversal. The scope of the State's opening statement is limited to the facts he intends in good faith to prove by competent evidence. State v. Hipplewith, 33 N.J. 300, 309, 164 A. 2d 481 (1960) (citing State v. Haines, 103 N.J.L. 534, 138 A. 203 (Sup.Ct.1927)); State v. Ernst, 32 N.J. 567, 577, 161 A. 2d 511 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 943, 81 S.Ct. 464, 5 L.Ed. 2d 374 (1961) (holding that, in opening statements, [a] prosecutor should, as the trial court ruled, limit himself to a statement of what he will prove and not anticipate his final argument.); see also State v. Walden, 370 N.J.Super. 549, 558, 851 A. 2d 758 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 148, 862 A.2d 56 (2004) (`A prosecutor's opening statement should provide an outline or roadmap of the State's case. It should be limited to a general recital of what the State expects, in good faith, to prove by competent evidence.' (quoting State v. Torres, 328 N.J.Super. 77, 95, 744 A. 2d 699 (App.Div. 2000)). Therefore, we gauge prosecutorial misconduct or error thusly: [T]he test for determining whether prosecutorial misconduct constitutes reversible error is whether the misconduct was so egregious that it deprived defendant of a fair trial. The goal that rule seeks to foster is that juries [will] . . . reach a verdict and impose a penalty without inordinate exposure to unduly prejudicial, inflammatory commentary. Although we impose a greater burden on prosecuting attorneys than defense attorneys on that issue, [i]t is well-established that prosecuting attorneys, within reasonable limitations, are afforded considerable leeway in making opening statements and summations. [ State v. DiFrisco (II), 137 N.J. 434, 474, 645 A. 2d 734 (1994) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).] So informed, we address defendant's contentions of improper argument constituting prosecutorial misconduct or error in respect of the prosecution's opening statement. The highlighted comments fairly can be characterized as a recital, albeit with some limited yet permissible rhetorical leeway, of the aggravating factors the State intended to prove. Those comments also responded to the implausibility of the excuses defendant tendered in his various statements to the police, statements the prosecution intended to introduce in its case-in-chief. Thus, those comments do not, whether singly or in the aggregate, suffice to satisfy defendant's burden of demonstrating that the conduct [by the prosecutor] was so egregious that it deprived defendant of a fair trial[,] State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 322, 524 A. 2d 188 (1987), particularly in light of the curative instruction provided by the trial court at the close of opening statements. We therefore reject defendant's challenge that the prosecution's opening statement contained impermissible argument.

Defendant alleges that, at several points during the evidentiary stage of the penalty phase trial, the State accused the defense of discovery violations. According to defendant, those accusations constituted disparagement of defense counsel of the type condemned in State v. Nelson, 173 N.J. 417, 461, 803 A. 2d 1 (2002). Defendant complains of four separate instances when defendant claims his counsel was disparaged by the State, each of which deals exclusively with cross-examination questions regarding the timing of required discovery disclosures from defendant to the State. The State responds that none of the questions accused defendant or his counsel of discovery violations and that the prosecution never accused defendant or defense counsel of collusion in the presentation of defendant's witnesses. In respect of the first instance claimed as error by defendantwhen the State cross-examined defendant's traumatic brain injury expert concerning a computer printout that the State received last weekthe State notes that defendant's focus on the timing of the disclosure is belied by the trial court's conclusion that I don't see the time of receipt of significance in the question posed to the witness. In respect of the second instance of error claimed by defendantwhen the prosecutor noted in his cross-examination of defendant's brother that the basis of his cross-examination was that he received today another detailed statementthe State explains that defendant specifically requested that the trial court instruct the jury that the comments of the Prosecutor with respect to suggesting that [the defense] had done something improper with this material is inappropriate and should be disregarded. Abiding by that request, the trial court instructed the jury that when we broke for recess the Court was dealing with a legal issue, which essentially centers around discovery obligations. Essentially, under our practice within limits each side is obliged to turn all their information over to the other side, and I made a determination that there was no delay or no impropriety in [the defense] turning over the information with respect to the supplemental report. Accordingly, you should disregard [the prosecutor's] comments with regard to it. Defendant neither objected to, nor requested any addition or modification to, this curative instruction. The third instance involved the State's cross-examination of defendant's expert in clinical neuropsychology. Highlighting a discrepancy between the raw data supporting that expert's report and the language in the report itself, the State sought to determine that the discrepancy only became clear when the State subpoenaed the expert's raw data. Defendant objected, but the trial court deemed the prosecution's questioning proper, ruling that: What this witness may have chosen to withhold may be relevant on the issue of credibility and meet the credibility relevance, so I will allow cross-examination as to whether he was initially willing to turn it over if that's where the Prosecutor wants to go and whether it took a subpoena to get it. And then counsel are free to make the arguments that counsel chooses to make from there. With regard to the mistrial, in light of what I have said, I would deny the application for a mistrial. I will invite an instruction with respect to the purpose of this, what it is for and what it is not, on the issue of credibility. I'll tell the jury something to that effect when they get back in, but if there's anything further, counsel, that will be addressed. Upon the jury's return to the courtroom, the trial court issued the following curative instruction: An issue has arisen, and I'll give you some instructions with respect to it. The comments with regard to discovery being provided or information being provided[,] I'll instruct you that there has been no discovery violation on behalf of defense counsel or the defendant[,] that there has been no violation of any duty they owed to either the Court or to opposing counsel. Having said that, you will perhaps and you have heard some information and may hear further cross-examination as to when and the circumstances under which the so-called raw data were supplied. That would be before you for a limited purpose and a limited purpose only, and that would be for your purpose in assessing any credibility issues or any credibility determinations that you would make concerning the testimony of this witness. Again, defendant did not object to or request any addition to or modification of this curative instruction. Defendant's final instance of counsel disparagement arises in the context of the direct examination of defendant's capital mitigation specialist. During that examination, defendant's capital mitigation specialist described conversations she had had with defendant's mother. The State objected, noting that it had not been provided any information in respect of those conversations. The trial court explained to defendant that he had a continuing obligation to provide witness statements and, in the absence of statements, witness summaries. As a result, the trial court issued an additional curative instruction: Yesterday, at the close of business, issues arose with respect to a continuing discovery obligation. And out of your presence the Court dealt with some further matters with respect to it; after that I am satisfied that no attorney in this case endeavored to mislead or consciously fail[ed] to follow what they thought was the appropriate obligation of counsel. Rather, we have as you know a hotly contested matter where each side is advocating from their position. Accordingly, whatever happened should not prejudice any side on that. I have taken the responsibility, as is my responsibility, to make sure that the discovery obligations are clear. I think they are clearly understood at this point in time and we're ready to proceed. That instruction, which also was accepted by defendant without objection, marks the end of defendant's objections to the State's questions concerning when and under what circumstances these defense witnesses defendant's traumatic brain injury expert, brother, clinical neuropsychology expert, and capital mitigation specialistdisclosed to the prosecution matters properly subject to discovery obligations. An overarching principle guides any inquiry into whether a prosecutor may disparage defense counsel: [P]rosecutors are prohibited from casting unjustified aspersions on the defense or defense counsel. State v. Nelson, 173 N.J. 417, 461, 803 A. 2d 1 (2002) (citing State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 86, 727 A. 2d 1 (1999)). As with each of defendant's earlier claims of prosecutorial misconduct or error, however, the issue for resolution is two-fold: whether the prosecutor committed misconduct, and, if so, whether the prosecutor's conduct constitutes grounds for a new trial. State v. Smith, 167 N.J. 158, 181, 770 A. 2d 255 (2001). We have explained that, in order to meet the second part of that test, the misconduct must have been `so egregious that it deprived defendant of a fair trial.' Ibid. (citations omitted). Stated differently, [t]o warrant a new trial the prosecutor's conduct must have been clearly and unmistakably improper, and must have substantially prejudiced defendant's fundamental right to have a jury fairly evaluate the merits of his defense. Id. at 181-82, 770 A. 2d 255 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We do not read those three cross-examination questions or one objection posed by the State as an assault on defense counsel. On the contrary, in each instance, the prosecution properly sought to question a witness in respect of materials either recently disclosed or not disclosed at all to the State. Therefore, to the extent that line of questioning or objection raises credibility issues concerning recent fabrication or bias, interest or prejudice, see generally N.J.R.E. 607 ([A]ny party including the party calling the witness may examine the witness and introduce extrinsic evidence relevant to the issue of credibility . . . .), the questions and objection are proper. See, e.g., State v. Silva, 131 N.J. 438, 442, 621 A. 2d 17 (1993) (holding that if a witness appears to know of the charges and would naturally be expected to have come forward with the alibi testimony, the witness may be cross-examined about those circumstances of non-disclosure); State v. Josephs, 174 N.J. 44, 127, 803 A. 2d 1074 (2002) (In assessing the worth of the defense's case, the jury is entitled to `consider whether it was receiving a full picture, as interest and bias are always relevant.' (quoting State v. Timmendequas (I), 161 N.J. 515, 594, 737 A. 2d 55 (1999), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed. 2d 89 (2001))). Furthermore, even if we were to credit defendant's allegations and condemn the State for implying that the defense was derelict in its discovery obligations, we nevertheless conclude that the State's conduct in posing the complained-of questions and objection does not rise to the level where it can be considered so egregious that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 83, 727 A. 2d 1 (1999); see also State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 566, 575 A. 2d 816 (1990) ([T]he test by which we shall evaluate the prosecutor's misconduct is whether it was so egregious as to deny defendant a fair trial.); State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 322, 524 A. 2d 188 (1987) (same). Therefore, we reject defendant's claim that the State disparaged defense counsel or that, even if so construed, that the State's actions warrant a new death penalty phase trial.
In respect of five separate instances during the penalty phase trial, defendant next claims that the State engaged in what defendant characterizes as unwarranted comments and accusationsin plain terms, cheap shotsthat distorted the record and greatly prejudiced the defendant. First, defendant contends that, in respect of defendant's expert in the area of traumatic brain injury, the State improperly focused on the expert's fees and failure to treat defendant by inquiring why that physician did not treat defendant. Second, defendant alleges that, in the cross-examination of defendant's clinical neuropsychiatrist, the State also focused on the limitations of the physician's engagement: as solely an expert witness for hire and not as a treating physician. Third, defendant complains that the State improperly examined on re-cross the director of the Atlantic County Youth Advocate Program [9] who, years before, had been assigned to work with defendant. In defendant's view, the State's inquiries as to what programs were in fact available to defendant after the witness was no longer responsible for defendant's care were not properly in response to the witness's admission on re-direct examination that she should have pushed harder on defendant's behalf when he was under the witness's care. This, defendant claims, represents an especially low form of attack: casting aspersions on the witness'[s] sincerity and dedication by forcing her to acknowledge that she `did not follow up with [defendant]' after leaving the job which was the basis for her contact with him. Fourth, defendant asserts that the prosecutor's rejoinder to the social worker who was retained on defendant's behalf to conduct a social history investigation of defendant was improper. Specifically, in response to the witness's statement to the prosecutor that she did not feel comfortable relying on what [the prosecutor was] saying[,] the prosecutor quipped that the feeling is mutual, ma'am. Finally, defendant argues that, in the cross-examination of defendant's developmental psychologist, who had a particular expertise in youth violence, the State improperly questioned the psychologist on the basis that his orientation is not to focus on the injustices that the murderer committed, but the injustices that he experienced. Defendant also claims that the cross-examination of the developmental psychologist based on his prior writings in respect of the attacks on September 11, 2001 were gratuitous, inappropriate and inflammatory. The challenged question and answer were: Q: Even in the context of the September 11th terrorist attacks, you wanted to uncover the injustices that the terrorists may have suffered, correct? A: I want to understand everyone who commits a violent act. And terrorists have a developmental history. It is worth trying to understand it, particularly if you want to prevent it in the future. Defendant contends that this exchange was aggravated by the fact that it had been reported in the newspaper that defendant was a Muslim. The State asserts that the prosecutor properly cross-examined [defendant's traumatic brain injury expert and clinical neuropsychiatrist] concerning their fees and their relationships with defendant because these matters were relevant to their partiality, bias, and motive, and hence, their credibility. In respect of the cross-examination of defendant's youth advocacy worker, the State argues that its questions focusing on the services made available to defendant after he was no longer in that worker's care were designed to challenge factually that witness's opinion, elicited by defense counsel, that defendant was failed by DYFS. The State does concede that its rejoinder to the social worker who was retained to conduct a social history investigation of defendant that the feeling is mutual[,] that is, that the prosecutor similarly did not feel comfortable relying on what [the witness was] saying[,] was unnecessary. The State asserts, however, that the comment was brief, was intended to respond to those instances where the witness claimed that, without verification, she was unwilling to accept the factual premise of any questions posed by the prosecutor, and was the subject of the following colloquy and curative instruction: [Defense Counsel]: Judge, I object. [The Prosecutor]: Judge, she said that two or three times. She made that reference to me. [Defense Counsel]: He has indicated two times in front of the jury and this witness of things that are on the records that were not in the records, so she said I don't feel comfortable relying on it, I want to look at my report. The fact the feeling is mutual is an inappropriate commentary. She wanted to look through her own records. I don't think she said anything disparaging to the Prosecutor. [The Prosecutor]: I took it differently. [Defense Counsel]: I don't think it matters how he takes it. It is inappropriate, and I object to that. The Court: Subject to that interpretation it is inappropriate comment of counsel and should be disregarded by the jury, and if counsel feels that [there are] inappropriate comments being made by the witness[,] that matter can be addressed to the Court for resolution. The State notes that defendant neither requested further relief nor objected to the curative instruction given. Finally, the State asserts that its cross-examination of defendant's developmental psychologist was proper because [t]he prosecutor was entitled to cross-examine this witness about his extreme philosophical positions and professional opinions because they were relevant to his bias, interest, and partiality. The State also remarks that, the fact that defense counsel indicated that he was going to move for a mistrial on this ground, but then never did and instead pursued an entirely different objection demonstrates that in the context of this trial, defense counsel did not believe that the prosecutor's question was improper or that it prejudiced defendant's right to a fair trial. Our review of the examination of these witnesses leads to the conclusion that the cross-examination of each of defendant's traumatic brain injury expert, clinical neuropsychiatrist, and developmental psychologist was proper inasmuch as it was geared towards developing whether each of these witnesses was biased or partial in favor of defendant, or whether any of these witnesses bore an interest in the litigation. We have made clear that [a] prosecutor may suggest to the jury that the defense's presentation of the evidence was unbalanced and incomplete. A prosecutor's statements on the deficiency of a defendant's defense and the inferences to be drawn therefrom are permissible as long as they are grounded in the record. In assessing the worth of the defense's case, the jury is entitled to consider whether it was receiving a full picture, as interest and bias are always relevant. [ State v. Josephs, 174 N.J. 44, 127, 803 A. 2d 1074 (2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).] Applying that standard, we hold that the cross-examination of defendant's traumatic brain injury expert, clinical neuropsychiatrist, and developmental psychologist properly addressed these witnesses' biases, interest and partiality and, hence, was proper. Defendant's objection to the cross-examination of the youth advocacy worker also is unpersuasive. That witness testified that, in her opinion, defendant was failed by DYFS, a matter made relevant by defendant's claim in mitigation that the State agencies responsible for protecting children from parental abuse and/or neglect did not succeed in protecting defendant. [10] In that context, cross-examination designed to elicit the knowledge this witness had of the services that in fact were offered to defendant after he was no longer directly in her care was crucial to the issue defendant himself placed in issue: the degree to which the State had failed defendant in his upbringing, a mitigating factor submitted by defendant under the catch-all mitigating factor provided in N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h) (Any other factor which is relevant to the defendant's character, or record or the circumstances of the offense.). Furthermore, as opinion testimony, that witness was particularly susceptible to cross-examination. We have made clear [t]hat the credibility of a witness may be impeached on cross-examination is well settled [and that t]he scope of cross-examination is a matter resting in the broad discretion of the trial court. State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 255, 619 A. 2d 1208 (1993) (citations omitted). Further, in respect of the cross-examination of an expert, we have held that an expert witness is always subject to searching cross-examination as to the basis of his opinion . . . . Id. at 259, 619 A. 2d 1208 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In that context, we have held: That the scope of cross-examination is a matter for the control of the trial court and an appellate court will not interfere with such control unless clear error and prejudice are shown is well settled. State v. Murray, 240 N.J.Super. 378, 394 [573 A. 2d 488] (App.Div.), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 334, 585 [ A. 2d 350] (1990). In addition, an expert witness is always subject to searching cross-examination as to the basis of his opinion. Glenpointe Assocs. v. Twp. of Teaneck, 241 N.J.Super. 37, 54 [574 A. 2d 459] (App.Div.), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 391[, 585 A. 2d 392] (1990). To determine the credibility, weight and probative value of an expert's opinion, one must question the facts and reasoning on which it is based. Johnson v. Salem Corp., 97 N.J. 78, 91 [477 A. 2d 1246] (1984). [ Id. at 263-64, 619 A. 2d 1208.] We address the State's concession that the prosecutor's rejoinder to the social worker who was retained to conduct a social history investigation of defendant that the feeling is mutual[,] that is, that the prosecutor similarly did not feel comfortable relying on what [the witness was] saying[,] albeit unnecessary, did not deprive defendant of a fair trial for the following reasons: the comment was brief; the comment was intended to respond to those instances where the witness claimed that, without verification, she was unwilling to accept the factual premise of any questions posed by the prosecutor; and the comment was the subject of an immediate curative instruction. To be sure, in this specific respect and in this context, we find the prosecutor's conduct to be, at the very least, unnecessary. However, we also acknowledge that defendant's penalty phase trial was feverishly contested, and emotions ran high throughout the proceedings. In that framework, we recognize that we must not be so idealistic as to close our eyes to the realities of human nature as they are continually portrayed during our trial process. Each criminal trial is a swiftly moving dramatic contest which often evokes strong emotions in the participants. The charged atmosphere created frequently makes it arduous for the prosecuting attorney to stay within the orbit of strict propriety. [ State v. Bucanis, 26 N.J. 45, 56, 138 A. 2d 739 (1958).] However unfortunate the exchange between the prosecutor and defendant's social worker may have been, we cannot ascribe to this limited and immediately corrected instance the far-reaching implications defendant seeks. We instead hold that, although the prosecutor's gratuitous comment is worthy of disapproval, and is to be avoided, the exchange was not so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial because that comment could not have substantially prejudiced defendant's fundamental right to have a jury fairly evaluate the merits of his defense. State v. Papasavvas (I), 163 N.J. 565, 625, 751 A. 2d 40 (2000) (quoting State v. Timmendequas (I), 161 N.J. 515, 575, 737 A. 2d 55 (1999), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed. 2d 89 (2001) (citations omitted)).
Defendant next objects to what he perceives as the prosecution's intentional obstruction of his cousin's direct examination. Defendant called his cousin [11] to the stand to plead for his life. At its core, defendant's complaint is that, although he ultimately was able to secure from his cousin all of the testimony he sought in an uninterrupted manner, defendant views the prosecution's earlier objections during her testimony as unvarnished obstruction, in an evident attempt to circumvent the trial court's allowance of the testimony by impeding its delivery. In response, the State claims that the prosecutor made appropriate, good faith objections to the testimony of defendant's cousin . . . when her plea for mercy exceeded the permissible scope of relevant mitigating evidence [because defendant's cousin], in connection with requesting the jury to spare defendant's life, . . . began discussing the difficulties of her own childhood. The exchange on which defendant bases this objection bears setting forth in full: [Defense Counsel # 1]: If you had the opportunity, as I think you have at this point, to ask [the] jury to do something in terms of their decision, what would you like to say to the jury? [The Witness]: To allow [defendant] to live because he hasn't really lived. He hasn't had a life growing up. None of us did. [The Prosecutor]: You Honor, I'm going to object I think it has gone [Defense Counsel # 2]: I would object to him interrupting this witness after the Court already made a ruling indicating that she would be allowed to do it. [The Prosecutor]: She's talking about her life, that is not relevant. [Defense Counsel # 2]: Judge, Judge [The Prosecutor]: This Counsel is [Defense # 1's] witness. [12] [Defense Counsel # 2]: Judge, I would like to finish my objection. The Court: She may finish her answer. [Defense Counsel # 1]: Judge, quite frankly I think it was inappropriate, and I will address thisfor [the prosecutor] to interrupt this after the side-bar, I think was done deliberately to take her off The Court: I would ask counsel not to get into personalities. There was a ruling as to the subject matter that did not preclude whether the scope of the ruling was exceeded sobut I have ruled she may finish her answer. [The Witness]: None of us did really. Uhm . . . at least he is able to eat three meals a day; finish school [The Prosecutor]: Your Honor, this goesJudge, I need to approach. This is [Defense Counsel # 1]: Judge, you made a ruling. And I think that we're supposed to be bound by the rulings that this Court made. And I would ask that the prosecutor be bound by the rulings as we are and let this witness finish her answer. He keeps interrupting the plea[ ] for life which is done, I submit, deliberately so that it doesn't have the import it would have. [The Prosecutor]: The witness can't say whatever she wants. She is limited to what she can say. The Court: I would agree, and you have the right to object on that subject matter. And my ruling on it is that the scope of the Court's ruling hasn't been exceeded yet, in any event. Immediately following that exchange, the witness provided her very brief testimony on this point without interruption. We agree with the trial court that the State properly sought to enforce the limitation placed on the scope of this witness's testimony, that is, that her testimony was to be limited to the claimed mitigating factor that defendant was raised in a home without structure, boundaries or positive role models which he could emulate, a mitigating factor also presented under the catch-all provision of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h). When there is a reasonable and good faith expectation that a witness's answer to a question will exceed what is deemed proper under the circumstances, no party is required to sit idly by and allow impermissible testimony to be spread on the record. On the contrary, to the extent possible, the obligation of an advocate is to avoid trying to undo what may be impermissibly done as [t]he failure to object promptly to questionable comments, although not fatal, may oft-times result in not having the benefit of the trial court's exercise of its remedial powers on the propriety of the statements in issue[,] State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 452 n. 14, 550 A. 2d 1172 (1988), and [t]he courts have always had the obligation of preventing a jury, at least on objection, from hearing inadmissible evidence[,] State v. Phelps, 96 N.J. 500, 515 n. 3, 476 A. 2d 1199 (1984).
In its cross-examination of defendant's clinical neuropsychiatrist, the State referenced the report prepared by that expert. The following exchange then took place: [The Prosecutor]: Did you know other people would be relying on your report? [The Witness]: Of course. [The Prosecutor]: Did you know that Dr. Gary Glass relied on your report, the defense psychiatrist? [Defense Counsel # 2]: Can we be heard, please? The Court: Counsel may approach. Defendant objected to any reference to Dr. Glass, claiming that defendant may never call Dr. Glass, and it is improper for him to be throwing names in front of this jury. The trial court then ruled as follows: The issue, as I see it, is a narrow one. You have asked on cross-examination whether he anticipated that others would be relying on his report, and he got an affirmative answer to that. You're now refining it with respect to Dr. Glass. The defense says Dr. Glass may or may not testify. He probably will, he might not, I guess is the fairest statement. I can't pin them down, but I have to act in a contextthat's the context in which I act. You have got this witness'[s] anticipation of reliance, and if Glass comes on you can ask him whether he relied upon it. The State made no further reference to Dr. Glass, [13] and defendant sought no curative instruction requesting that the jury disregard any mention of Dr. Glass. Although satisfied with that resolution then, defendant now claims that [b]y this maneuver, the State conveyed to the jury that the defense had consulted an expert but would not present him, with the clear implication that the defense was hiding an unfavorable opinion from the jury. Although it made no contemporaneous request for a jury instruction of any sort, defendant now claims that the trial court did nothing to negate or correct the implication of the question[ ] that was asked. Our review of this single, fleeting question and answer, in the context in which these events occurred, requires that we reject the result advanced by defendant. We fail to see how asking defendant's neuropsychiatrist whether he knew that another doctor had relied on the neuropsychiatrist's report results in the clear implication that the defense was hiding an unfavorable opinion from the jury as alleged by defendant. We are most persuaded by the fact that, at the time defendant objected to the question and the trial court sustained that objection, defendant did not seek a curative instruction. In the absence of a request for a contemporaneous curative instruction at trial, defendant's present complaint in respect of the absence of a curative instruction will not be heard. See, e.g., State v. Bucanis, 26 N.J. 45, 57, 138 A. 2d 739 (1958) (In most instances, under our system of jurisprudence, the onus is upon the lawyer to safeguard his client . . . through means available in the trial court. Defense counsel is not ordinarily free to scrutinize the record at his later leisure and to secure reversals upon the basis of what he thus discerns as error, unless it definitely comes within the scope of our plain error rule as we have interpreted it.).
We recently held that, while a prosecutor's summation is not without bounds, `[s]o long as he stays within the evidence and the legitimate inferences therefrom the Prosecutor is entitled to wide latitude in his summation.' State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 330, 873 A. 2d 511 (2005) (quoting State v. Mayberry, 52 N.J. 413, 437, 245 A. 2d 481 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1043, 89 S.Ct. 673, 21 L.Ed. 2d 593 (1969)). We underscored that `[a] prosecutor may comment on the facts shown by or reasonably to be inferred from the evidence. There is no error so long as he confines himself in that fashion. Ultimately it was for the jury to decide whether to draw the inferences the prosecutor urged.' Ibid. (quoting State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 125, 449 A. 2d 1280 (1982) (citations omitted)). Isolating small portions of the prosecutor's summation, defendant claims he was denied a fair trial. We disagree. When read in its entirety, the fair import of the State's closing argument is that the prosecutor exhorted the jury to arrive at its decision, beyond a reasonable doubt, by balancing the aggravating and mitigating factors. We therefore reject all of defendant's challenges to the State's summation. [14] a. Equating the death penalty with justice. Defendant alleges that, in its summation, the State equated the imposition of the death penalty with the exaction of justice. Specifically, defendant complains of the following passages at the beginning of the State's summation: I thank you for your attention and your service in this case. At this moment I'm humbled with the responsibility to ask for justice on behalf of Richard and Shirley Hazard. We've seen their photographs to see how they once were, but they are not here. So I'm privileged to ask for justice. . . . . I'm sure you have an idea of the things I'm going to say. You probably have an idea of the things I'm going to ask you to do and based upon what we heard in this courtroom, I submit you know what your answers should be. You know what your answers must be. Based upon these Aggravating Factors this [d]efendant has gone too far. He has gone too far over the line. Society is entitled to make laws to protect citizens, to punish people who break those laws. Laws that talk about what a person can do and what a person can't do. I suggest the [d]efendant, based on these Aggravating Factors, has crossed that line beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant also complains of the following passage at the conclusion of the State's summation: From what we heard had occurred in that house [we] couldn't imagine worse nightmares. Who could have the stomach to watch what [defendant] did on video tape if there's a video tape available. He did it, he carried it out and he did it purposely and consciously. We suggest that the Aggravating Factors call out for death. [Defendant] says choose life. [Defendant] chose death twice over. You are not responsible for the choices that [defendant] made. Your commitment is to follow the law and render the truth. Only the twelve of you can do justice. Only the twelve of you can recognize the Aggravating Factors. Only the twelve of you can have the courage to make the right decision in this case. [The] State suggests the right decision is death. We ask you, as you promised that you would, to follow your oath. Follow the instructions of the Court wherever, wherever they may lead. You gave that commitment and we know how you've been following this case and we expect that you will do so. Despite [defendant's] total disregard of life, liberty, justice, he' s received a fair trial. Members of the community will judge him on his behavior. Unlike Richard and Shirley Hazard, he receives justice. I ask you to impose the death penalty because it is the only sanction that will serve truth and justice. I urge you to impose it. Defendant argues that the equation of death with `justice' violates the noted prohibitions against encouraging a death verdict on the basis of a duty to society, as does the insinuation that jurors who did not vote to impose death would not be following their oaths. The State responds that [t]he overriding and unmistakable message was that the jury should sentence defendant to death based on evidence actually produced concerning aggravating and mitigating factors[,] and that the prosecutor argued to the jury that the jurors [should] `not feel guilty' for following their oaths, and to have the courage to follow the court's legal instructions, `wherever they may lead.' According to the State, [t]he prosecutor did not tell the jurors that they would violate their oaths if they failed to return a death verdict, but instead emphasized that the jurors must faithfully apply the law as instructed by the court, whatever the result. Ruling on defendant's motion to set aside the death sentence, the trial court considered and rejected this argument. The trial court distinguished between what the prosecutor argued in summation in this case from those at issue in State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 575-76, 575 A. 2d 816 (1990), and held that [t]he references by the prosecutor were unrelated to the substantive issues in the case. They were not extensive, they were not inflammatory  it was the second sentence of his closing argument  and would not reflect any intention[ ] `to divert the jury from the material facts as to the worthiness of the victim[.]' State v. Marshall[(I), 123 N.J. 1, 162, 586 A. 2d 85 (1991) (quoting State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 571, 575 A. 2d 816 (1990))]. The State is allowed under State v. [Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23, 678 A. 2d 164 (1996)], to make appropriate comment with respect to the uniqueness of the victims in balancing those issues against the non[-]statutory aggravating factors as the jury was instructed. So I don't find any overreaching by the prosecutor with regard to that. And I don't conclude that the prosecutor in anyway turned the victim impact evidence into non[-]statutory aggravating factors. Rather, the Court concludes that the prosecutor's conduct was not clearly and unmistakably improper so as to result in any substantial prejudice to the defendant or fundamental right to have a jury fairly assess the persuasiveness of the case; that simply doesn't exist here. . . . . There was no suggestion, the Court holds, that the jurors would violate the oaths. At issue here [are] the statements made by the prosecutor that, [t]he juror[s] should not feel guilty for what they are about to do if they were following their oaths. . . . The prosecutor's comments did not cross the bounds of propriety by telling the jurors that they needed a sense of courage to impose the death penalty. Instead here the prosecutor's statement emphasized to the jury that they should deliberate with courage and dignity, such encouragement is not inconsistent, I would hold, with our capital jurisprudence. The prosecutor's comments reinforced to the jurors that they have a grave task and did not in any way impermissibly minimize or otherwise prejudice the jury's decision making process. . . . . With regard to the argument [in respect of] defendant's lack of remorse, the prosecutor did comment on what was argued to be a lack of remorse and, accordingly, the absence of that as any appropriate mitigating factor. . . . The prosecutor responded[,] and I would hold[,] the appropriate way as to whether or not there was any true remorse. Upon the defendant placing remorse at issue, the State did not deprecate what the defense was doing, but [the State] deprecated the quality, the significance of the remorse in the closing argument[,] and that's appropriate. . . . . The prosecutor here in no way of course, in the Court's estimation, in anyway sought to diminish the jury's responsibility. The prosecutor I think said these words: You are not responsible for the choices that he made. Your commitment is to follow the law and render the truth. Only the 12 of you can do justice. Only the 12 of you can recognize aggravating factors. In this particular case I would hold that there were no inferences from the statements which [the prosecutor] made that the prosecutor was in any way diminishing any of the jurors' responsibilities. I would say, rather, in the context of what he said, he did the opposite: he focused on the serious nature of their responsibilities. We agree with the trial court's careful and thoughtful analysis. As we noted in respect of a similar challenge where the prosecutor uttered almost the exact words used by the State in this case, [15] the prosecutor's comments did not jeopardize defendant's right to a fair trial and to individualized sentencing. Unlike the prosecutor whose statement we objected to in State v. Purnell, 126 N.J. 518, 545 [601 A. 2d 175] (1992), the prosecutor did not tell the jury that the only way to demonstrate courage would be to vote for death. To the contrary, he urged the jurors to have the courage to render a verdict in accordance with the evidence, however the verdict turned out. Specifically, he told them at one point during summation, whatever your verdict is, we will all leave this courtroom with our heads held high. Moreover, the statements did not urge the jury to send a message to society, nor did they scare the jury into believing that a death sentence was needed to protect society from a man like defendant. See [ State v.] Rose , 112 N.J. [454,] 521 [548 A.2d 1058] [(1988)] (criticizing prosecutor's statement to send a message to society); [ State v.] Ramseur , 106 N.J. [123,] 321 [524 A.2d 188] [(1987)] (condemning prosecutor's statement that suggested that jury should impose death penalty to protect society from crime). We are satisfied that that statement by itself, or in conjunction with other statements, see State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 218 [478 A. 2d 364] (1984) (stating that sum of statements may amount to reversible error, even where one would not by itself), was not so egregious as to warrant reversal. [ State v. DiFrisco (II), 137 N.J. 434, 476, 645 A. 2d 734 (1994).] b. Explanation that the jury should not feel guilty about imposing a death sentence. Defendant also takes issue with the following portion of the State's summation: You're not going to hear any discussion from me or from the Court about whether or not we should have a death penalty or not. Whether it's appropriate in our society. That's not what we're here for. We're here to apply the law of the State of New Jersey. The death penalty is the law of the State of New Jersey. So whether you agree or disagree with the death penalty, that's not the issue here. Do not feel guilty for what you are about to do in this courtroom. What you're doing is following your oath, doing your job. In defendant's view, the prosecutor's exhortation that the jury not `feel guilty for what [it was] about to do' is merely the flip side of the illegitimate `courage' argument. In response, the State argues that the prosecutor properly reminded the jurors to abide by their oaths to follow the law. He told the jurors to `not feel guilty' for following their oaths, and to have courage to follow the court's legal instructions `wherever they may lead.' By way of contrast, the State notes that [t]he prosecutor did not tell the jurors that they would violate their oaths if they failed to return a death verdict, but instead emphasized that the jurors must faithfully apply the law as instructed by the court, whatever the result. We reject the notion that the State's summation was improper. In light of the mitigating factors claimed by defendant  the overwhelming majority of which sought mitigation of defendant's confessed crimes based on elements of defendant's life, supra, 190 N.J. at 424-25, 921 A. 2d at 969-70 (2007)  it was fitting and proper for the State to remind the jurors that they need not feel guilty if they returned a death sentence. c. Mischaracterization of death penalty phase as concerning what defendant deserved. Defendant challenges a portion of the prosecutor's summation claiming that the prosecutor thereby encouraged the jury to believe that imposing a death sentence was a matter of deciding what the defendant `deserved.' The closing argument language challenged by defendant follows on the heels of the State's argument that the jury need not feel guilty if it returned a death sentence and, placed in context, is as follows: Just so there's no misunderstanding, the death penalty is a greater punishment than life without parole. Some people may think maybe life without parole is the worse sentence. The law says it is not. The death penalty is the maximum sentence [defendant] can receive. So when it's all said and done, if you think [defendant] deserves the maximum sentence, he should get the death penalty. If you think he deserves the minimum sentence, he should receive some form of life imprisonment. [You] can't say he deserves the maximum sentence and give him life without parole. That can't be done based upon what the Judge tells you what the maximum sentence is here. Some of you may be thinking even though he deserves the maximum sentence, life imprisonment would be a greater punishment, a greater hell because every day he would think about what he did. You have heard about [defendant] and that would be a mistake because while he looks like an ordinary person, he thinks differently. He has no guilt. He has no guilt. So thinking that he will be thinking about what he did every day for the rest of his life is a mistake. In response, the State argues that the prosecutor used the word `deserves' as a means of discussing the `appropriate' sentences for defendant based on the aggravating and mitigating factors. In the State's view, [t]he prosecutor's use of the word `deserves' in this context could not possibly have encouraged the jury to impose death on the basis of `revulsion,' or any other impermissible ground, particularly because the prosecutor did not use that word in conjunction with any discussion of defendant's `unsympathetic' qualities. We cannot give this portion of the State's closing argument the construction advanced by defendant. In our view, the prosecutor in summation properly asked the jury to weigh the proofs before it in their relevant context: the aggravating and mitigating factors identified by the State and defendant. State v. Papasavvas (I), 163 N.J. 565, 628, 751 A. 2d 40 (2000) (In capital sentencing each juror must individually determine whether each mitigating factor exists, and then individually decide whether the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. The death penalty is imposed only if the jurors unanimously agree that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors.) (citations omitted). Read in its proper context, the prosecutor's argument in summation in respect of whether defendant deserved the death penalty was innocuous and, therefore, no error is present. d. Comments concerning defendant's age. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(c) provides that, among the mitigating factors which may be found by the jury or the court [is] . . . [t]he age of the defendant at the time of the murder[.] Defendant was twenty-three years old when he committed the crimes to which he pled guilty and for which he was sentenced to death. As a result, defendant listed his age among the mitigating factors to be considered by the death penalty phase jury and, in his summation to the jury, defendant argued that his age should be a mitigating factor because defendant was only twenty-three at the time of the murders, because defendant's maturity had been adversely affected by his upbringing, and because his adolescent development had been interrupted by several incarcerations. Defendant contends that the State's summation distorted the nature of that factor when the State argued that [The defense] suggests you should give [defendant's age at the time of the murders of Richard and Shirley Hazard] some weight. We ask you, in deciding whether that has any weight, that you compare [defendant with] people in his peer group, people that are twenty-three years old. I would suggest that out of the people who are serving their country in Iraq, putting their lives on the line, a number of them are under twenty-three years old. I would suggest that people outside of that scenario that are twenty-three years old, that they're law-abiding. They work. They take care of their family. I suggest age is not a Mitigating Factor that should hold much, if any, weight. What about the psychological age[,] maybe that means something because of his upbringing. He knew right from wrong and his experiences, the Judge is going to tell you, should play into it, experiences. Well, we know he started to get in trouble at a young age. He knew the consequences of getting in trouble. He knew getting in trouble[,] from experience[,] will land you in jail. He knew it. He didn't care. Consider that when you consider age. Defendant asserts that [t]o contrast the defendant with generalizations concerning other people of the defendant's age is, in fact, to argue that age, per se, is not relevant, because others of the same age are doing good or great things. He also argues that by implying that only chronological age matters, the argument served to preclude consideration of relative maturity. Defendant concludes by claiming that the introduction of Iraq in this context, to explicitly contrast the defendant with the most admirable people of his chronological age, is highly inflammatory. According to defendant, the prejudice he suffered as a result of the State's distortion of this mitigating factor is readily evident in the jury's unanimous rejection of that mitigating factor. The State responds that the prosecutor's comments were a direct and measured response to defense counsel's closing arguments regarding defendant's relative youth. As interpreted by the State, [t]he prosecutor never suggested that defendant's age, per se, was not relevant. By way of contrast, the State argues that the prosecutor's comments suggested the exact opposite  that defendant's age was indeed a relevant consideration, but that in this particular case it did not carry much, if any weight, given the magnitude of his crimes and his ability to distinguish right from wrong. The State notes that `the prosecutor was free to depreciate the significance of defendant's mitigating evidence' by comparing him to his peers[.] State v. Bey (III), 129 N.J. 557, 621, 610 A. 2d 814 (1992), supplemented by 137 N.J. 334, 645 A. 2d 685 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164, 115 S.Ct. 1131, 130 L.Ed. 2d 1093 (1995) (quoting State v. Marshall (I), 123 N.J. 1, 164, 586 A. 2d 85 (1991), supplemented by, 130 N.J. 109, 613 A. 2d 1059 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929, 113 S.Ct. 1306, 122 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1993)). The State concludes that the prosecutor appropriately focused the jury's attention on defendant's chronological age, as well as on his experiences and maturity, in urging the jury to reject defendant's age as a mitigating factor, or at least give it little weight. Following the State's summation and defendant's motion for a new trial, the trial court rejected defendant's accusation that the State distorted the age mitigating factor. Denying defendant's motion for a mistrial immediately before the jury charge, the trial court held that my understanding of the prosecutor's arguments is that his comments that were objected to were made in [the] context [of discussing the mitigating factors], so I would hold that it is within the bounds of fair comment. More specifically, denying defendant's motion for a new trial, the trial court held as follows: With regard to the arguments concerning defendant's age, this case and what occurred here [are] quite distinct from State v. Bey. For example, in State v. Bey, the prosecutor said, contrary to what the law is, Quote: So age, per se, is just not relevant. End quote. The Court does hold that age per se is relevant, and the statute makes it clear that age per se has some relevance. Here what the prosecutor did was endeavor to compare the defendant to his peers and was not telling the jury to reject age per se but was making an argument as to what weight and effect that should have on the jury's balancing process. We have interpreted mitigating factor c(5)(c) as requiring juries to consider both chronological age and maturity in determining the applicability of the age mitigating factor to relatively young defendants. State v. Bey (III), supra, 129 N.J. at 613, 610 A. 2d 814. We have cautioned, however, that the statutory language makes clear that juries should give greater weight to a defendant's chronological age. Ibid. As the State correctly notes, the comparison of defendant with those in his age cohort serving in the armed forces stationed in war zones abroad also was proper. Id. at 621, 610 A. 2d 814 (endorsing comparison between eighteen-year-old defendant and the fifty thousand people who are stationed in Saudi Arabia in our military, many of them are eighteen). We fail to see how the prosecution's comments concerning defendant's age at the time of the murders in any way distorted the jury's application of the mitigating factor claimed by defendant under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(c). On the contrary, we embrace the trial court's reasoning when it held that what the prosecutor did was endeavor to compare the defendant to his peers[,] that the prosecutor was not telling the jury to reject age per se [,] but that, instead, the prosecutor was making an argument as to what weight and effect that should have on the jury's balancing process. In that context, defendant's claim of distortion of the age mitigating factor must be rejected. e. Name-calling. Defendant asserts further prosecutorial misconduct or error in the State's summation claiming that the prosecution engaged in impermissible name-calling when he argued that [f]rom what we know about [defendant] and Shirley and Richard Hazard, this is the case of the wolf taking the lives of the two helpless sheep and the facts cry out for death. Distinguishing the conduct we roundly condemned in State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 576-77, 575 A. 2d 816 (1990), the State replies that the prosecutor, on one single, isolated occasion, alluded to the `wolf and sheep' metaphor to collectively refer to defendant and the victims and that, in doing so, [t]he prosecutor did not unfairly single-out and demean defendant with a degrading epithet, nor did this remark substantially prejudice defendant's fundamental right to have the jury fairly evaluate the merits of his defense. We have explained that [b]y no stretch of the imagination can it be said that describing defendant as a coward, liar, or jackal is not derogatory. . . . It is not fair to employ degrading epithets such as [a] cancer, and parasite upon society, animal, butcher boy, young punk, hood, punk, and bum[.] . . . Epithets are especially egregious when, as here, the prosecutor pursues a persistent pattern of misconduct throughout the trial. [ State v. Pennington, supra, 119 N.J. at 577, 575 A. 2d 816 (citations omitted).] We have also condemned references to a defendant as the guest of honor, an equal opportunity shooter, and, in respect of an African-American capital defendant, a brother. State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 484, 575 A. 2d 435 (1990). We have, therefore, caution[ed] prosecuting attorneys that derogatory name-calling will not be condoned[,] and we have admonish[ed] prosecutors to be circumspect in their zealous efforts to win convictions. State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 456, 550 A. 2d 1172 (1988). That said, the proper yardstick in this context remains whether the prosecutor's statement was improper and, if so, whether the misconduct `was so egregious that it deprived defendant of a fair trial[ ]' [including the] penalty phases of a capital trial[.] State v. Pennington, supra, 119 N.J. at 565, 575 A. 2d 816 (citations omitted). When measured against that standard, the prosecution's single metaphor comparing the relationship between defendant and his murdered victims to that of the wolf taking the lives of the two helpless sheep did not violate the proscription against name-calling and simply does not rise to the level where defendant's right to a fair trial is implicated. Therefore, we reject defendant's claim that the State engaged in impermissible name-calling. f. Improper focus on defendant's character. Again isolating discrete statements in the State's summation, defendant argues that, in three instances, [t]he prosecutor further diverted the jurors from their proper function, and greased the skids towards aggravating factors and away from mitigating factors, by focusing the juror's attention toward the non-issue of the defendant's character. Placed in their respective context, defendant complains of the following highlighted statements: Now we heard from the testimony of the Hazard children, what that house represented to Richard and Shirley. It was home. It was about family. It's about safety. It's about children. What did that home represent to [defendant]? We suggest that home represented only an opportunity, an opportunity to take, an opportunity to steal, an opportunity to destroy. He didn't look at that home as other people looked at it. This home was a way for [defendant] to get the things that he wanted. Whether taking a car, getting something to eat, buying new clothes, buying new jewelry, renting a hotel room for his friends. That's what this home represented to [defendant]. Because in [defendant's] world everything is about him. This isn't the case  something else we ask you to consider. This isn't a case where [defendant] chose to burglarize a home, an empty home. He wants surpri[s]e by the occupants. We suggest that [when defendant] chose, that he chose to burglarize an occupied home and why he did that was because it made this crime easier for him. . . . . How does it relate to Mrs. Hazard? Again, Mr. Hazard and Mrs. Hazard are separate Aggravating Factors. We talked about her coming home for the last time. [We s]uggest that [defendant] had some advanced notice. She wasn't able to get her groceries down that she had bought. She was assaulted from behind. What does [defendant] do to try and obtain the property of Shirley Hazard, to obtain the valuables? First of all, he picks her up, looks her in the eye and carries her over to the basement and throws her down the basement steps. Doesn't he realize this is a human being? He doesn't care. It's all about the property. He gets downstairs he follows her down there and she's in a ball. She's curled up. Must be in pain and for some reason he stretches her out, pulls her over to where her husband is, who has the [plastic] garbage bag [over his head]. Imagine she looks over and sees her husband with a garbage bag over his head. Defendant decides he's going to inflict some more violence upon her, but before he can do that, the dog, the loyal family dog sees what is happening and has a response that a dog would have. Goes over and starts barking or growling and [defendant] has a dilemma here. What do I do? I don't want to get bitten. Thinking, how do I solve this dilemma? He runs upstairs, gets that wooden spoon and starts to beat the dog with it. He knows what's going on here. He's thinking. It's not a seizure. . . . . What happens at that time [when defendant writes a letter to his friends after he has been arrested]? [Defendant] suggests that he is upset. Starts banging his head again. He's banging his head. I'm going to Ancora [a State psychiatric facility]. I'll put on the act of despondent, talking about suicide. This letter is written before Sergeant Bennett gets down there. He's going to Ancora. Two and a half days after the murder. I suggest that all human beings have some kind of light in them, some kind of compassion, some kind of remorse. [Defendant] never had the light. It is out. He's incapable of remorse. He's not going to be remorseful today, one year from now or sixty years from now, he's not going to have any remorse. [(emphasis supplied).] In defendant's view, [s]uch trial by invective is improper, particularly in light of the State's declining to claim the depravity aggravating factor under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(c). The State responds by pointing out that defendant's contention that his character was a `non-issue' is starkly contradicted by his urging that mitigating factor (5)(h)  which permits the jury to consider `any other factor which is relevant to the defendant's character or record or to the circumstances of the offense'  was applicable. The State emphasizes that [h]ere, where defendant alleged 14 separate (5)(h) mitigating factors, certain aspects of his character certainly were at issue, and the prosecutor was entitled to comment on them in his summation. Taken in context, each of the challenged comments was fair comment in response to defendant's presentation. In respect of the first challenged comment, that in defendant's world everything is about him[,] the State's reference was to the burglary of the Hazard home to which defendant pled guilty and which formed an explicit part of the aggravating factors urged by the State. In respect of the second challenged comment of whether, while he was brutalizing Mrs. Hazard, defendant realize[d] that this is a human being and that he did not care, as well as the third comment that defendant does not have the light of compassion or remorse in him, we hold that, because defendant placed his character at issue by virtue of several of the mitigating factors he placed before the jury, it is entirely relevant, and proper, for the prosecution to respond as it did. In sum, we hold that none of the challenged comments improperly placed defendant's character in issue and, hence, defendant's objections thereto are unavailing.