Opinion ID: 2582263
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Drug Tax Stamps/Opportunity to Affix

Text: Next, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of possession of methamphetamine without the appropriate drug tax stamp because there was no evidence that defendant had been in possession of the methamphetamine long enough to have had a reasonable opportunity to affix the stamps. In support, he cites State v. Edwards, 27 Kan. App. 2d 754, 762, 9 P.3d 568 (2000), which held that a defendant may not be found guilty of a crime for failing to affix tax stamps to a controlled substance unless the evidence shows that the defendant had sufficient possession so that he or she had an opportunity to affix those stamps. The Court of Appeals panel in this case rejected the defendant's argument, finding the reasoning of State v. Alvarez, 29 Kan. App. 2d 368, 372, 28 P.3d 404, rev. denied 272 Kan. 1419 (2001), and State v. Curry, 29 Kan. App. 2d 392, 28 P.3d 1019, rev. denied 272 Kan. 1420 (2001), to be more persuasive. Alvarez relied on K.S.A. 79-5204(c), which requires that a dealer affix a drug tax stamp immediately after receiving the substance, in holding that there is no grace period to purchase and affix a drug tax stamp. 29 Kan. App. 2d at 372. Curry similarly held: Evidence that a defendant had actual possession of a controlled substance or possession with sufficient control to permit the immediate affixing of drug tax stamps is sufficient to support a conviction under K.S.A. 79-5208. 29 Kan. App. 2d 392, Syl. ś 4. This court has not previously addressed the conflict between the Edwards opinion and the Alvarez and Curry opinions. Edwards relied upon another Court of Appeals opinion, In re Burrell, 22 Kan. App. 2d 109, 912 P.2d 187, rev. denied 260 Kan. 993 (1996). Burrell was a civil taxation action where the Kansas Department of Revenue had assessed taxes and penalties on the defendant's possession of marijuana. The defendant had been arrested by an undercover officer immediately after the officer put marijuana purchased by the defendant into the defendant's car. The defendant never had actual, physical custody of the marijuana, only constructive possession. The Burrell panel agreed with the Board of Tax Appeals that the defendant's possession was insufficient to incur tax liability, reasoning that imposing criminal liability for failure to pay the drug tax would be unconstitutional if it were based on conduct that gave the violator no opportunity to comply with the law. 22 Kan. App. 2d at 116-17. Edwards then applied Burrell in the criminal context, but expanded it to require that a defendant be in possession of a controlled substance  for a period of time sufficient for the defendant to have affixed the stamps to the substance. (Emphasis added.) Edwards, 27 Kan. App. 2d 754, Syl. ś 5. The Alvarez panel rejected the Edwards analysis because it failed to mention K.S.A. 79-5204(c), which requires that a dealer affix a drug tax stamp `immediately after receiving the substance.' Alvarez, 29 Kan. App. 2d at 372. The Curry panel went one step further and stated that Edwards has misapplied Burrell by suggesting that the sufficiency of possession was a function of time: Under the facts in Burrell, the constructive possession, if it was such, did not allow any opportunity for the dealer to affix drug tax stamps. If a dealer's control over drugs is so tenuous as to preclude any opportunity to affix drug tax stamps, such constructive possession will not constitutionally support a conviction for possessing drugs without affixing drug tax stamps. Edwards would suggest the determination of what constitutes `sufficient possession' to avoid constitutional challenge is a function of time; the dealer must be allowed some amount of time to affix the stamps. However, the legislature has established the time that drug stamps are to be affixed, i.e., immediately. . . . K.S.A. 79-5208 does not permit any grace period. The tax is due and payable, and tax stamps must be affixed immediately upon receipt, acquisition, or possession of the cocaine. We feel Edwards' suggestion that sufficiency of possession under K.S.A. 79-5208 is a function of time does not comport with the legislative intent of K.S.A. 79-5204(c). What made the possession in Burrell constitutionally suspect was Burrell's lack of control over the drugs. Curry, 29 Kan. App. 2d at 398. The Curry panel concluded that the relevant analysis was not whether the defendant had possession of the drugs for a sufficient period of time to affix drug tax stamps, but whether he had actual possession or possession with sufficient control over the drugs to permit the immediate affixing of drug tax stamps. 29 Kan. App. 2d at 399. The rationales of Alvarez and Curry are persuasive. Under K.S.A. 79-5204(c) and (d), the drug tax is due and payable, and drug tax stamps must be affixed immediately upon receipt, acquisition, or possession of the controlled substance. In this case, there was no issue of constructive possession. The defendant had actual possession and sufficient control over the methamphetamine found in the cooler to permit his immediately affixing drug tax stamps as required by K.S.A. 79-5204(c) and (d). The defendant was the only person in the vehicle and, as noted by the Court of Appeals, he was found with a Bud Ice beer bottle sitting between his legs, a brand of beer identical to that found in the same cooler with the methamphetamine. Schoonover, slip op. at 23. Under these circumstances, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for possession of methamphetamine without the appropriate tax stamp. The defendant also contends that the methamphetamine was not yet in usable form and there was no evidence as to whether the weight of the methamphetamine in its final form would have been enough to require tax stamps to be affixed. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, noting that the Kansas Bureau of Investigation (KBI) chemist testified that the net weight of the methamphetamine found in the cooler was 26.46 grams. Schoonover, slip op. at 23. The State contends that a drug need not be in usable form to be considered an illegal substance under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, citing State v. Brown, 245 Kan. 604, 783 P.2d 1278 (1989). However, Brown held that proof of the possession of any amount of a controlled substance, whether or not that amount is measurable or usable, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for possession. 245 Kan. at 613-14. Brown did not hold that a drug need not be in usable form, only that it need not be in a usable amount. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals panel in this case ruled correctly on this issue. K.S.A. 79-5202 imposes a drug tax on each gram of a controlled substance. Controlled substance means any drug or substance defined by K.S.A. 65-4101(e). K.S.A. 79-5201(b). Controlled substance is not defined based on whether a drug is in usable form or not. In fact, for purposes of this case, controlled substance is defined as [a]ny material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of [methamphetamine]. K.S.A. 65-4107(d)(3); 65-4101(e). The KBI chemist testified the substance in the jar was methamphetamine, which is a controlled substance. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction of possession of methamphetamine without affixing a drug tax stamp.