Opinion ID: 184641
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Physician Union Case

Text: On September 4, 1996 the Physician Union petitioned theBoard for certification as the exclusive representative ofTDMC's Regular Full Time and Regular Part-time Physicians, including physicians elected Department Chairpersons. TDMC, then a wholly owned subsidiary of FoundationHealth Corporation (Foundation), opposed the certificationpetition on various grounds, including that the physicianswere statutory supervisors because, inter alia, they supervised support staff.2 An evidentiary hearing was conductedin late September 1996 to determine whether the proposedbargaining unit was appropriate. Toward the end of thehearing TDMC expressly withdrew its support staff supervision argument. At the time FPA had entered an agreementto purchase all of TDMC's stock from Foundation with thetransfer planned for the beginning of October 1996. Although acquisition was delayed due to a routine audit by theSecurities and Exchange Commission, FPA began managingTDMC on October 1, 1996 under a management agreementwith Foundation. Joint Appendix (JA) 2, 6. On November 8, 1996 the Board's Regional Director issueda decision and direction of election which rejected TDMC'sarguments that the doctors were supervisors (except thewithdrawn supervision argument which the decision did notaddress). On November 26, 1996 TDMC filed a request forreview of the Regional Director's decision on a number ofgrounds but did not seek to revive the support staff supervision argument. On December 19, 1996 FPA, which had __________ 2 TDMC also argued that the proposed unit's state-wide scopewas inappropriate and that the physicians were supervisors ormanagers because they supervised seven allied health professionalsand participated in standing committees and task forces. finally acquired TDMC's stock effective November 29, 1996,filed a notice of appearance in the NLRB proceeding. OnJanuary 7, 1997 the Board issued a brief order denyingTDMC's request for review. On January 8, 1997 FPA filed a motion for rehearing and toreopen the record [i]n order to provide FPA with an opportunity to present its position to the Board, and in order thatthe Board may consider evidence of changes in operationswhich have been implemented by FPA after its acquisition ofthose operations and which impact the issues raised in theBoard's decision. JA 433-34. On January 17, 1997 theBoard denied the motion because FPA fail[ed] to specifywhat additional evidence it would adduce and how, if adducedand credited, such evidence would require a different result. JA 436. On February 19, 1997 FPA filed another motion for rehearing or to reopen the record on the ground that it had had noopportunity to participate in the proceeding until after thehearing on September 26, 27 and 30, and after the RegionalDirector's Decision and Direction of Election had issued. JA 439. The motion was accompanied by an affidavit alleging, for the first time since the issue was withdrawn duringthe September 1996 hearing, that TDMC's physicians supervised the clinics' support staff employees.3 On March 18,1997 the Board issued an order denying the motion as it isuntimely and because it does not establish the existence ofnewly discovered evidence. JA 448. In the meantime, the Physician Union had prevailed in aunion election on December 5, 1996 and had been certified onFebruary 3, 1997 as the collective bargaining agent for theTDMC physicians. From February 15 through March 21,1997 the Physician Union made several demands that TDMCbargain with it. On March 24, 1997 TDMC's lawyer responded: Your demand for bargaining is rejected since the unit is __________ 3 Although FPA indicated in its January 8, 1997 motion that itintended to produce evidence of post-acquisition operationalchanges relevant to the physicians' supervisory status, the affidavitalleged none. improperly certified. JA 482. The Board's General Counselsubsequently filed a complaint charging FPA with an unfairlabor practice for refusing to bargain.4 TDMC and FPAadmitted refusing to bargain but asserted as a defense thatTDMC was not required to bargain with the [PhysicianUnion] because [the Physician Union] does not represent anappropriate unit under the National Labor Relations Act. JA 483-84. On July 24, 1997 the Board granted summaryjudgment against TDMC and FPA, ordering them to ceaseand desist unfair labor practices and to bargain with thePhysician Union. The Board summarily explained its decision as follows: All representation issues raised by the Respondents were or could have been litigated in the representation proceeding. The Respondents do not offer to adduce at a hearing any newly discovered and previously unavailable evidence, nor do they allege any special circumstances that would require the Board to reexamine the decision made in the representation proceeding. We therefore find that the Respondents have not raised any issue that is properly litigable in this unfair labor practice proceeding. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 162 (1941). Accordingly, we grant the General Counsel's Motion for Summary Judgment. 324 N.L.R.B. No. 15, slip op. at 1-2. FPA petitions for review of the NLRB's unfair laborpractice decision on the ground that the Board acted arbitrarily when it refused to reopen the evidentiary record. Wereject FPA's challenge because the Board's refusal was notan abuse of discretion. See Road Sprinkler Fitters LocalUnion No. 669 v. NLRB, 789 F.2d 9, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ([A]decision to reopen the record is within the Board's discretion.) (citing Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669 v. __________ 4 Refusing to bargain and thereby engendering an unfair laborpractice complaint is the standard route to challenge a certificationorder, which is not subject to direct review. B B & L, Inc. v.NLRB, 52 F.3d 366, 369 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). NLRB, 676 F.2d 826, 829 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1982)); NLRB v.Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, 662 F.2d1044, 1045 (4th Cir. 1981)). It is well established that, in the absence of newly discovered evidence or other special circumstances requiring reexamination of the decision in the representation proceeding, arespondent is not entitled to relitigate in a subsequentrefusal-to-bargain proceeding representation issues that wereor could have been litigated in the prior representationproceeding. Westwood One Broadcasting Servs., Inc., 323N.L.R.B. No. 175, 1997 WL 331,860, at  (June 16, 1997)(citing Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 162(1941)), enforced, No. 97-3495 (3d Cir. July 28, 1998); see also29 C.F.R. s 102.67(f) (Failure to request review [within 14days after regional director's unit decision] shall precludesuch parties from relitigating, in any related subsequentunfair labor practice proceeding, any issue which was, orcould have been, raised in the representation proceeding.); Soft Drink Workers Union Local 812 v. NLRB, 937 F.2d 684,688 (D.C. Cir. 1991); NLRB v. Mar Salle, Inc., 425 F.2d 566,571-72 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Amalgamated Clothing Workers ofAm. v. NLRB, 365 F.2d 898, 903-06 (D.C. Cir. 1966). FPA offered no newly discovered evidence to justifydeviating from the general no-relitigation rule but contends itdemonstrated special circumstances, namely, that in September 1996 TDMC's then-owner Foundation had different incentives from FPA, which motivated Foundation to withdrawthe supervision argument--a step FPA, had it then ownedTDMC, would not have taken. Even assuming conflictinginterests between the successive owners--and we do notclaim to comprehend entirely the conflict argument urged-- FPA has not explained why its inertia persisted as long as itdid.5 FPA declined to participate in the NLRB representa__________ 5 The Board has recognized that a stock transfer is 'the continuing existence of a legal entity, albeit under new ownership.'Hendricks-Miller Typographic Co., 240 NLRB 1082, 1083 fn. 4(1979), and has also held that the 'mere change of stock ownershipdoes not absolve a continuing corporation of responsibility under tion proceeding, not only during the September 1986 evidentiary hearing but even after FPA assumed management ofTDMC on October 1, 1996 and for weeks after it acquired thecompany outright on November 29, 1996. It was not untilDecember 19, 1996, almost six weeks after the RegionalDirector's decision that the physicians were not supervisors,that FPA even filed a notice of appearance. No furtheraction was taken until January 18, 1997 when FPA filed amotion for rehearing and to reopen the record. Yet eventhen FPA made no attempt to revive the waived supervisionargument. Given FPA's sustained torpor throughout thisperiod, we cannot say that the Board abused its discretion inrefusing to consider the argument when finally asserted insupport of FPA's February 19, 1997 motion.