Opinion ID: 2275877
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the Indictment and Instructional Error

Text: Appellant makes two closely related claims of error, which we will address together: that the indictment was insufficient under the Due Process Clause, and that error in the jury instructions deprived him of his due process rights and violated principles of double jeopardy. [10] The sufficiency of an indictment is measured by two criteria under the Due Process Clause: first, it must sufficiently apprise a defendant of the criminal conduct for which he is called to answer; second, the indictment and instructions together must provide adequate specificity so as to allow the defendant to plead acquittal or conviction as a defense against future indictment and punishment for the same offense. Schrimsher v. Commonwealth, 190 S.W.3d 318, 325 (Ky.2006) (citing Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962); Valentine v. Konteh, 395 F.3d 626, 634-35 (6th Cir. 2005)). See also RCr 6.10(2) (stating that an indictment shall be sufficient if it contains, a plain, concise and definite statement of the essential facts constituting the specific offense with which the defendant is charged). Appellant argues that the indictment was insufficient because it failed to adequately inform him of the specific crimes for which he was charged. However, when there is evidence of a pattern of abuse, the Commonwealth is permitted to charge the defendant with a single, general count of each offense, as was done here. See Applegate v. Commonwealth, 299 S.W.3d 266, 270-71 (Ky.2009) (holding sufficient an indictment that charged the defendant with a single, general count of each of the offenses of first-degree rape and first-degree sodomy, where the testimony indicated multiple occasions of sexual abuse, and noting that a second prosecution for the same conduct would be barred by principles of double jeopardy). The indictment was therefore sufficient on its face. Appellant further argues that the sexual abuse instructions under Count 1 and Count 2 violated due process and double jeopardy, as they were identical and did not differentiate what physical conduct of Appellant constituted the two separate counts of sexual abuse. [11] Appellant was charged with first-degree sexual abuse as a lesser included offense of both first-degree rape and first-degree sodomy. As to Count 1, the jury acquitted Appellant of first-degree rape, but convicted him of the lesser included offense of first-degree sexual abuse. As to Count 2, the jury convicted Appellant of first-degree sodomy. While the jury instructions for the primary charges stated entirely separate offenses, the instructions for the two lesser included offenses were identical. [12] It is well settled that where there are multiple counts of the same offense, a trial court is obliged to include some sort of identifying characteristic in each instruction that will require the jury to determine whether it is satisfied from the evidence the existence of facts proving that each of the separately charged offenses occurred. Harp v. Commonwealth, 266 S.W.3d 813, 818 (Ky.2008). In the present case, however, the sexual abuse instructions did not violate Harp because the jury was clearly directed to two different types of conduct. Count 1 of the jury instructions gave the jury two choicesrape, [13] or sexual abuse as a lesser included offense of rape. Count 2 of the instructions again gave the jury two choicessodomy, [14] or sexual abuse as a lesser included offense of sodomy. Looking at the instructions in toto, not in isolation, there was no Harp issue, and hence, no error, because of the deliberate way the instructions were structured.