Opinion ID: 2226490
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Equal protection, ex post facto and double jeopardy

Text: Technically speaking, we do not disagree with the majority's equal protection analysis. Unlike substantive due process, which necessarily examines the statute's effect on a person's fundamental right of liberty, equal protection focuses on the distinction between those who fit within the statute's reach and those who do not. Unless such a distinction involves a suspect classification, this court will ask only if there is any rational basis for such a selection. Pearson, 309 U.S. at 274, 60 S.Ct. at 525-26. When such a statute threatens a liberty interest, however, this court will apply heightened scrutiny and ask whether the statute delineates genuine and substantial distinctions. Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 917. The SDP Act distinguishes between those sexually dangerous persons who have a mental disorder and those who do not. Minn.Stat. ง 253B.02, subd. 18b(a) (1994). The majority holds that the legislature's decision to civilly commit the first group but not the second is valid because mental disorders help to isolate sexually dangerous persons most likely to harm others in the future, and because the state's interest in treating sexual predators is served by confining the scope of the SDP Act to those with mental disorders. Ante, at 187. In short, this court is upholding the legislature's determination that sexually dangerous persons with a mental disorder are both more dangerous and more amenable to treatment than are those without a mental disorder. Although we do not disagree with this conclusion, we point out that the first justification for the distinction (dangerousness), while sufficient to uphold the act under the equal protection clause, is not sufficient to uphold the act under due process analysis. Likewise, the second justification for the distinction (treatment), while mere surplusage under equal protection requirements, is a necessity for this court's conclusion that the SDP Act does not violate ex post facto or double jeopardy. Unlike substantive due process, which focuses on the government's interests, ex post facto and double jeopardy focus on the statute's purpose and whether it is for treatment purposes and    not for purposes of preventive detention. Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312, 320 (Minn.1995) (emphasis added). Although it is apparent that the legislature's motivation in passing the SDP Act was to lock up dangerous persons such as Linehan, the majority noted that [t]he purpose and effect of the SDP Act is    predominantly remedial, not punitive. Ante, at 188 (emphasis added). As stated earlier, we elect not to quibble with this holding at this time. But see Young v. Weston, 898 F.Supp. 744, 751-54 (W.D.Wash.1995) (holding that Washington's sexually violent predator statute violates ex post facto and double jeopardy). Despite the legislature's motivation, the statute does include enough treatment provisions to conclude that its stated purpose is remedial. But we note that the Supreme Court has upheld as remedial only those civil commitment statutes that provide for both mandatory treatment at a psychiatric care facility and full discharge once the patient demonstrates that he or she no longer is in need of treatment. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369-75, 106 S.Ct. 2988, 2992-95, 92 L.Ed.2d 296 (1986). The majority correctly states that Linehan has not offered evidence that the treatment regime at MSH or MPPTC is a sham, or even that such treatment is ineffective. Ante, at 189. But given the legislature's real motivation behind the SDP Act, we are concerned that such evidence will become readily available in the near future. When that occurs, we will not hesitate to find that the SDP Act, in addition to violating substantive due process, also violates ex post facto and double jeopardy.