Opinion ID: 173048
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Trial and Sentencing Proceedings Generally

Text: We have reviewed the record for other potential non-frivolous issues, and see nothing to suggest possible reversible error in the conduct of defendant’s trial. There is no doubt concerning the admissibility of the compelling evidence of guilt provided by the victim, which was corroborated by damning communications from the defendant himself. And the district court’s handling of evidence of criminal sexual conduct by the defendant directed toward other child victims under similar circumstances, pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 413/414, is not subject to any colorable challenge. The evidence clearly fell within the compass of these rules, and the court did not abuse its discretion in balancing relevance against unfair prejudice under Rule 403. See generally United States v. Benally, 500 F.3d 1085, 1089-91 (10th Cir. 2007). -8- Finally, in his Anders brief, counsel expressly disavows any challenge to sentencing, noting that the district court imposed a sentence below the guideline range of life imprisonment on the sexual abuse counts. We agree that there are no non-frivolous objections to be made in this regard. The district court correctly calculated the guideline range, 4 properly considered the statutory sentencing factors to reduce the guideline sentence to a limited degree, and, given the nature and duration of the conduct involved, reasonably declined defendant’s request for a drastic sentence reduction. Any challenge to the sentence imposed would be frivolous. 4 The court followed circuit precedent applying the “one book” principle in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(b)(2) and (3) to reject defendant’s argument for sentencing under the guideline manual in force at the time of his earliest sex offense. See United States v. Sullivan, 255 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (10th Cir. 2001). Defendant’s perfunctory effort to circumvent our precedent by invoking a later Supreme Court case applying the “rule of lenity” to accept a defendant’s construction of an ambiguous criminal statute, United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2025 (2008) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion), was patently meritless. Santos concerned an entirely different question of statutory interpretation; and the rule of lenity itself was clearly a part of the legal landscape when Sullivan was decided, see Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2050 (citing line of authority dating back to 1917), so that it cannot be invoked as a newly-minted legal principle permitting reconsideration of our precedent. In any event, the rule applies “only when, after consulting traditional canons of statutory construction, we are left with an ambiguous criminal statute,” United States v. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. 1079, 1089 (2009) (quotation omitted), and, as Sullivan reflects, the guideline provisions involved here are easily construed without any unresolved ambiguity. -9- Accordingly, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED and the appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. Entered for the Court Jerome A. Holmes