Opinion ID: 2169451
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Extension of Child Support Obligation.

Text: Kenneth assigns as error the Court of Appeals' affirmance of the district court's order extending his child support obligation. Although we disagree with the Court of Appeals' reasoning, we conclude that the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the district court's order extending Kenneth's child support to age 19 and accordingly, affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. Corcoran v. Lovercheck, 256 Neb. 936, 943-44, 594 N.W.2d 615, 621 (1999) (noting that upon further review from a judgment of the Court of Appeals, this court will not reverse a judgment which we deem to be correct merely because we may disagree with the reasoning employed by the Court of Appeals). The district court's order was a modification of a child support order, and as discussed above, a party seeking to modify a child support order must show a material change in circumstances. Rhoades v. Rhoades, supra . Thus, Ava was required to show a material change in circumstances which justified modifying the child support order. With respect to the requested increase in the amount of child support, Ava alleged in her petition to modify that the material changes in circumstances warranting modification of the decree were (1) that Kenneth was making significantly more income and Ava was making more income than at the time of the decree of May 5, 1986, and (2) that subsequent to the decree, the Nebraska Supreme Court had adopted the Nebraska Child Support Guidelines and that application of such guidelines would result in a variation by 10 percent or more due to financial circumstances which have lasted 3 months and could reasonably be expected to last for an additional 6 months. Ava requested that the decree be amended to increase child support, that Kenneth's support obligation be continued until Eric reached age 19, and that Kenneth be ordered to pay attorney fees and costs. Kenneth admitted Ava's asserted material changes in circumstances with respect to the parties' incomes and asked that the child support guidelines be applied to calculate the amount of child support. However, he opposed the remainder of Ava's petition and asked that it be dismissed. In the district court's Journal Entry on Modification, the court ordered that the decree be modified to increase Kenneth's child support obligation to $683 per month. Citing to the public policy of this state that a parent has a duty to support his or her minor or unemancipated child, the district court further ordered that the decree be modified to reflect that [Kenneth's] child support obligation shall continue until the minor child of the parties becomes 19 years of age. The district court awarded attorney fees to Ava. The record is clear, and the parties do not dispute, that there was a material change of circumstances justifying modification of the amount of Kenneth's child support obligation. Such modification was justified by the changes in the parties' incomes and by the adoption of the child support guidelines subsequent to the entry of the decree in 1986. See Schmitt v. Schmitt, 239 Neb. 632, 477 N.W.2d 563 (1991) (holding that adoption of child support guidelines effective October 1, 1987, constituted material change of circumstances sufficient to justify consideration of proposed modification of child support orders entered before that date). Once these material changes of circumstances were demonstrated with respect to the amount of child support, the trial court, which may always review or modify a child support order, see Shomaker v. Shomaker, 183 Neb. 609, 163 N.W.2d 102 (1968), was also justified in reassessing the propriety of the duration of Kenneth's child support obligation. The district court was not required to find a separate material change of circumstances specifically relating to duration in order to modify both the amount and duration of Kenneth's child support obligation. In extending Kenneth's child support obligation to age 19, the district court followed the public policy of this state which provides that parents have a duty to support their minor children until they reach majority or are emancipated, Waldbaum v. Waldbaum, 171 Neb. 625, 107 N.W.2d 407 (1961), and a parent is not relieved of this duty by virtue of divorce. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in extending Kenneth's child support obligation to age 19. Upon appeal, although neither asserted by Ava in her petition nor cited by the district court, the Court of Appeals determined that the 1997 enactment of § 42-371.01 was a change in circumstances justifying modification of the age 18 provision. Specifically, the Court of Appeals concluded the enactment of § 42-371.01 in 1997 was a material change in circumstances and reasoned that while the age of majority was 19 when the court first entered the decree, the statutory law has now changed to make child support to age 19 mandatory unless the child is emancipated. Reinsch v. Reinsch, 8 Neb.App. 852, 856, 602 N.W.2d 261, 265-66 (1999). Contrary to the determination by the Court of Appeals, we hold that the enactment of § 42-371.01 in 1997 delineating the circumstances for terminating child support obligations is not tantamount to a material change in circumstances justifying modification of a child support award. Section 42-371.01 merely reflects the principle that a parent has a legal duty to support an unemancipated minor child, see Waldbaum v. Waldbaum, supra , and sets forth the circumstances and method for the termination of a child support obligation. Although we disagree with the reasoning employed by the Court of Appeals, we nevertheless conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found a material change of circumstances that justified a modification of both the amount and the duration of Kenneth's child support obligation. We therefore conclude that the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the district court's order extending Kenneth's child support obligation to Eric's 19th birthday.