Opinion ID: 513191
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Charge to Jury and Summation Concerning Uncalled Witness

Text: 38 During a preliminary discussion concerning the jury charge, the Assistant United States Attorney requested that Judge Walker give a standard instruction concerning equally available uncalled witnesses. One of the defense counsel requested a missing witness charge as to Robert, who was entirely in the Government's control. The prosecutor responded that Robert was equally available since the Government had promised to make him available to testify, although Robert was unwilling to be interviewed by defense counsel before testifying. 39 At the charge conference, defense counsel renewed their objection to the use of an uncalled witness instead of a missing witness charge with respect to Robert. Defense counsel apparently never submitted the precise language of their proposed instruction. Judge Walker refused to give a missing witness charge as to Robert, and instead gave the standard instruction requested by the Government. The charge stated that both sides have the power to subpoena witnesses, and that if a witness could have been called by either side but was called by neither, then you may infer that the testimony of the absent witness may have been unfavorable to the government or to the defendant as the case may be, or to both of them. Judge Walker added that neither side had any obligation to call a witness whose testimony would be merely cumulative. After the charge was given, defense counsel renewed their earlier objection. 40 In their summations to the jury, counsel for three of the defendants pointed out that the Government had not called Robert as a witness. In his rebuttal, the Assistant United States Attorney said: 41 But the defendants do have the subpoena power. The defendants could have called the confidential informant and they didn't. [Objection overruled.] Listen to Judge Walker when he ... gives you what is known as an uncalled witness charge. And he will tell you that you can draw an inference either way; you can draw an inference against the defendants for not calling the confidential informant. [Objections overruled.] Do you think that the confidential informant's testimony would have helped them, ladies and gentlemen? 42 In addition to their objections during the rebuttal summation, defendants moved for a mistrial at the end of the summation on the ground that the prosecutor's comments were improper. The motion was denied. 43 United States v. Torres, 845 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir.1988), which comprehensively reviewed the law on this subject, is dispositive of defendants' objection to the district court's failure to give a missing witness instruction. In Torres, the district judge denied a defense request to give a missing witness instruction with respect to a confidential informant. As in this case, the Government in Torres offered to make the informant available to testify if the defense wished to call him, but in an in camera hearing the informant confirmed that he was unwilling to speak with defense counsel before testifying. Torres pointed out that in the context of the evidentiary inference to be drawn from a party's failure to call an available witness, the 'availability' of a witness ... depend[s] ... on all the facts and circumstances bearing upon the witness's relation to the parties, rather than merely on physical presence or accessibility. 845 F.2d at 1170, quoting United States v. Rollins, 487 F.2d 409, 412 (2d Cir.1973). Therefore, Torres held, the district court erred in not considering the informant's relationship to the Government and his refusal to be interviewed when it determined that the informant was available to the defense. 845 F.2d at 1170. Nevertheless, the Court held that even if the informant was as a practical matter unavailable to the defense, the district court's failure to give a missing witness instruction against the Government was not reversible error. Whether to give such an instruction lies in the trial court's discretion, id. at 1170-71, and the reviewing court is reluctant to reverse where a judge refrains from commenting on the inference to be drawn on the facts before the jury and allows counsel instead to argue the inference, id. at 1171. In addition, the defendants in Torres had not submitted to the district court proposed language for their requested charge, and therefore they were unable to show on appeal that their request accurately reflected the law, as is required to successfully challenge the trial court's denial of a requested instruction. Id. 44 The facts of this case are remarkably similar to those in Torres. Judge Walker's charge, like that of the district judge in Torres, permitted the jury to draw an inference adverse to the Government from its failure to call Robert as a witness, and Judge Walker permitted defense counsel to argue such an inference in summation. Furthermore, the defendants here, like those in Torres, apparently did not submit any proposed language for their requested charge. Therefore, for the reasons stated in Torres, Judge Walker's failure to give a missing witness charge does not constitute reversible error. 45 Nevertheless, as in Torres, we must also consider whether the district judge erred in permitting the prosecutor to argue in summation that the jury should draw an inference against the defendants for failing to call Robert. Torres did not address whether the trial judge in that case erred in permitting such an argument; it merely held that any error in this respect was harmless. Id. 46 In this case the defendants were not given Robert's name or address. The Government informed the defense that Robert was unwilling to be interviewed. The defendants were not able to contact Robert to ask him personally whether he would be willing to submit to a pre-trial interview. Nor were they able to investigate or inquire through other means as to what he might say if they decided to call him. Thus, if they had called Robert to testify, they would have done so without knowing what he would say. Since Robert was an informant with a special relationship with the Government, from the defense perspective this would have been an enormous and probably an intolerable risk. This, then, was a witness who was clearly favorably disposed toward the Government, and one who was not meaningfully available as a witness for the defense. See United States v. Ariza-Ibarra, 651 F.2d 2, 16 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895, 102 S.Ct. 392, 70 L.Ed.2d 209 (1981). Under these circumstances, it was not appropriate for the trial court to permit the Government to argue that the jury should draw an inference adverse to the defendants from their failure to call Robert as a witness.