Opinion ID: 2816600
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The FDCPA and Its General Prohibitions on

Text: Third-Party Contacts The FDCPA was enacted in 1977 in response to “the abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors.” Lesher v. Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, PC, 650 F.3d 993, 996 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). The purpose of the Act is both to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices” and to “‘insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged.’” Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)). As remedial legislation, the Act is construed broadly to effectuate those purposes. Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC, 709 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 2013). “[T]he invasion of privacy,” we recently explained, is “a core concern animating the FDCPA.” Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299, 303 (3d Cir. 2014); accord 15 U.S.C. 1692(a) (stating that unfair debt collection practices lead to, among other things, “invasions of individual privacy”). One way Congress addressed this concern was to “prohibit[] a debt collector from communicating with third parties about the consumer’s debt.” Edwards v. Niagara Credit Solutions, Inc., 584 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing § 1692c(b)). Legislative history indicates this prohibition was considered an “extremely important protection.” S. Rep. 95-382, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1699. 8 In recognition of a “debt collector’s legitimate need to seek the whereabouts of missing debtors,” id. at 4, however, the Act provides an exception to this general prohibition for communications made “for the purpose of acquiring location information about the consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692b.5 In other words, a debt collector may contact third parties to ascertain where it may locate the consumer. That exception is itself limited, however, as debt collectors may “not communicate with any such person more than once . . . unless the debt collector reasonably believes that the earlier response of such person is erroneous or incomplete and that such person now has correct or complete location information.” Id. at § 1692b(3). None of our sister Circuits has yet addressed the question whether the consumer has the burden of disproving this exception as part of its case-in-chief, or whether the debt collector carries the burden of proving the exception as an affirmative defense, and the district courts have taken divergent approaches.6 It is to this question we now turn. 5 Other exceptions to the general prohibition on thirdparty communications include prior consent by a consumer, the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, and communications reasonably necessary for a debt collector to effectuate a post-judgment judicial remedy. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b). 6 Compare, e.g., Williams v. Web Equity Holdings, LLC, No. 13-13723, 2014 WL 3845952, at  (E.D. Mich. Aug. 5, 2014) (“The language of § 1692b(3) creates an exception for debt collectors seeking to locate the debtor to contact persons they reasonably believe have such location 9