Opinion ID: 2632630
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The district court properly admitted the 1999 judgment

Text: UNLV contends the district court erred by allowing the jury to interpret the meaning of the Sutton I judgment. The stipulation, entered into by the parties in open court (Sutton I), required UNLV to continue [Sutton] in his employment unless and until such time as his tenure is revoked by hearing held pursuant to the university code. UNLV argues that the stipulation authorized UNLV to conduct the hearing and prevented Sutton from arguing at trial that UNLV could not conduct the hearing. We disagree. Normally, the `legal operation and effect of a judgment must be ascertained by a construction and interpretation of it,' which presents a question of law for the court. [29] However, in the instant matter, the parties' stipulation, which became a part of the judgment, was admitted by the district court at trial. Sutton sought and was denied a partial summary judgment before trial. Sutton suggested in his summary judgment motion that the UCCSN code, which was incorporated into his 1999 contract, did not permit UNLV to terminate his employment because the hearing was held more than six months after the filing of the initial administrative complaint. UNLV opposed that motion, arguing that the stipulation contained in the 1999 judgment did allow the parties to proceed with a hearing in 1999. We conclude the district court did not err by admitting the 1999 judgment into evidence. The judgment was relevant to the issue of whether the parties intended the 1999 contract as an integration of their prior stipulation. Further, the judgment was relevant to President Harter's motive in pursuing the hearing, despite the six-month rule. The jury was entitled to review the 1999 judgment in light of all the other evidence presented.