Opinion ID: 1450048
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: There is no dispute about the standard of review. AEDPA applies. It follows that although the Court reviews the district court's legal conclusions de novo and its fact findings for clear error, the Court may not grant habeas relief unless the state court's decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or ... was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. Irick v. Bell, 565 F.3d 315, 319-20 (6th Cir.2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2)). In applying clearly established Supreme Court precedent, the court looks to the holdings, as opposed to dicta, of the Supreme Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003). The governing substantive standards are also summarized in Irick : In Brady [v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)], the Supreme Court held that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Id. at 87, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215. `There are three components of a true Brady violation: the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.' Owens [ v. Guida ], 549 F.3d [399] at 415 [(6th Cir.2008)] (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999)). A defendant is prejudiced when there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). Irick, 565 F.3d at 321. The extent to which the rule of Brady requires disclosure not just of evidence of formal cooperation agreements, but also evidence of informal communications between the prosecution and a witness, has received significant attention in recent Sixth Circuit case law. In Bell v. Bell, the court noted that [i]t is well established that an express agreement between the prosecution and a witness is possible impeachment material that must be turned over under Brady.  512 F.3d at 233. However, [t]he existence of a less formal, unwritten or tacit agreement is also subject to Brady 's disclosure mandate. Id. (citing Wisehart v. Davis, 408 F.3d 321, 323-24 (7th Cir.2005)).  Brady is not limited to formal plea bargains, immunity deals or other notarized commitments. It applies to `less formal, unwritten, or tacit agreement[s],' so long as the prosecution offers the witness a benefit in exchange for his cooperation, ... so long in other words as the evidence is `favorable to the accused.' Harris v. Lafler, 553 F.3d 1028, 1034 (6th Cir.2009) (quoting Bell, 512 F.3d at 233, and Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 105 S.Ct. 3375). Yet, the mere fact that a witness desires or expects favorable treatment in return for his testimony is insufficient; there must be some assurance or promise from the prosecution that gives rise to a mutual understanding or tacit agreement. Bell, 512 F.3d at 233. Further, the mere fact of favorable treatment received by a witness following cooperation is also insufficient to substantiate the existence of an agreement. [I]t is not the case that, if the government chooses to provide assistance to a witness following trial, a court must necessarily infer a preexisting deal subject to disclosure under Brady.  Id. at 234. The government is free to reward witnesses for their cooperation with favorable treatment in pending criminal cases without disclosing to the defendant its intention to do so, provided that it does not promise anything to the witness prior to the testimony. Id. (quoting Shabazz v. Artuz, 336 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir.2003) (emphasis in original)).