Opinion ID: 729693
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Content-Neutrality and Content-Based Impact

Text: 35 As this circuit has noted, [t]he concept of what constitutes a content-based as opposed to a content-neutral regulation has proven protean in practice. Id. at 737. The Court's cases teach that the 'principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.'  Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2754, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989)). A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. at 2754. 36 Under this test, the Street Furniture Guideline seems to be the very model of a content-neutral regulation. It does not make or otherwise demand reference to the content of the affected speech, either in its plain language or in its application. Indeed, as applied to newsracks, it operates as a complete ban without any reference to the content of a given publication whatsoever: uniquely concerned with the physical structure housing the speech, it restricts only the mode of distribution and would plainly apply even if they were empty. As such, it seems to be an example of the very kind of total ban on newsracks which Justice Stevens was willing to assume arguendo might be constitutional in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 427-28, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 1515-16, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993) (holding ban on newsracks to be content-based because determining whether a newsrack fell within ban required reference to a publication's content). 8 Furthermore, like the ban on posted signs which the Court upheld in Members of City Council of City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804-05, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2128-29, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984), the Street Furniture Guideline is directed at aesthetic concerns and is unrelated to the suppression of ideas: indeed, nothing in the record suggests that the challenged regulation arose out of an effort to suppress any particular message communicated through the newsracks, nor do the Newspapers even contend as much. 9 That the Street Furniture Guideline results in a total ban on newsracks is nothing more than an incidental effect of its stated aesthetic goal of enhancing the historic architecture of the District by reducing visual clutter: there is nothing in the record to contradict this. 37 The Newspapers contend, however, that this directive has a content-based impact, because it singles out publishers, and most significantly daily newspapers, serving Boston for special, negative treatment. In advancing its targeting, differential treatment, and censorial effects arguments, the Newspapers urge us to test the Street Furniture Guideline against Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Comm'r of Rev., 460 U.S. 575, 103 S.Ct. 1365, 75 L.Ed.2d 295 (1983), and Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 111 S.Ct. 1438, 113 L.Ed.2d 494 (1991). The district court, in their view, correctly concluded that because the regulation exempts store-front merchandise and public safety/welfare structures, it singles the press for special treatment and, thus, raises similar concerns ... of 'censorial effects'  as found by the Court in Minneapolis Star. Globe Newspaper, 847 F.Supp. at 199. 38 We disagree. As an initial matter, we are of the view that reliance upon Minneapolis Star by both the Newspapers and the district court is misplaced in the instant case. First, Minneapolis Star, one of a line of cases establishing rules for the economic regulation of the press, did not involve a time, place and manner restriction. The tax on newsprint there was held unconstitutional, because it applied only to the press and discriminated in favor of one class of publishers over another; i.e., it was not generally applicable. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 581, 103 S.Ct. at 1369-70. More importantly, unlike the Street Furniture Guideline which adversely affects only one method of distribution, the regulation there rendered all forms of circulation more burdensome. Second, unlike the case of a discriminatory tax, the Commission asserts, and the Street Furniture Guideline present regulation advances, colorable non-content-discriminatory purposes: aesthetics. Last, we believe it is not coincidental that neither of the two newsrack cases decided by the Court, Discovery Network and Plain Dealer, engaged in a Minneapolis Star analysis. Indeed, none of the cases that have dealt with restrictions on newsracks have found the restrictions to be content-based, have a content-based impact, or otherwise trigger strict scrutiny because they singled-out the press for regulation; in fact, Minneapolis Star is not even mentioned in the two newsrack cases decided by the Court. See generally Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 113 S.Ct. 1505; Plain Dealer, 486 U.S. 750, 108 S.Ct. 2138. 10 That aside, even inspect[ing] this case through the precedential prism of Minneapolis Star and Leathers, National Amusements, 43 F.3d at 740, leaves us unpersuaded that there is a cognizable basis for invoking strict scrutiny. 39 In National Amusements, a panel of this court extensively discussed Minneapolis Star and Leathers. After noting the Court's statement in Minneapolis Star that differential treatment, unless justified by some special characteristic of the press, suggests that the goal of the regulation is not unrelated to suppression of expression, and [that] such a goal is presumptively unconstitutional, Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585, 103 S.Ct. at 1372, the panel went on to discuss that in Leathers the Court refined the analysis it had crafted in Minneapolis Star [.] National Amusements, 43 F.3d at 739. Leathers explains that targeting engenders strict scrutiny only when regulations (1) single out the press, (2) take aim at a small group of speakers, or (3) discriminate on the basis of the content of protected speech. Id. at 739-40. Essentially, then, because the Street Furniture Guideline does not discriminate on the basis of content, the Newspapers' arguments for strict scrutiny based on targeting and differential treatment hinge on one or both of the first two criteria identified in Leathers. 40 We note first that, to the extent the Newspapers' targeting and differential treatment arguments essentially rest upon the notion that strict scrutiny is always justified when the practical effect of a regulation is to regulate the First Amendment rights of a select group, this notion is misguided. National Amusements, 43 F.3d at 739. Simply put, this notion 41 flies in the teeth of the secondary effects doctrine. Under [this] formulation, any regulation that has an effect on fewer than all First Amendment speakers or messages could be deemed to be a form of targeting and thus subjected to strict scrutiny. Yet the Supreme Court has recognized that a municipality lawfully may enact a regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression ... even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others. 42 Id. at 740 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. at 2754). More importantly, 43 [i]n Minneapolis Star, the Court did not condemn all regulations that single out First Amendment speakers for differential treatment; rather, the Court acknowledged that certain forms of differential treatment may be justified by some special characteristic  of the regulated speaker. 44 National Amusements, 43 F.3d at 740 (quoting Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585, 103 S.Ct. at 1372 (emphasis added)). Most relevant to the instant case, noting that [s]econdary effects can comprise a special characteristic of a particular speaker or group of speakers, this court concluded that the language ... quoted from Minneapolis Star comfortably accommodates an exception to the prohibition on differential treatment for regulations aimed at secondary effects, so long as the disparity is reasonably related to a legitimate government interest. National Amusements, 43 F.3d at 740. 45 The Street Furniture Guideline falls within that exception. As an initial matter, we note that there is no indication that the Commission's alleged targeting or differential treatment was done in a purposeful attempt to interfere with the Newspapers' First Amendment activities: while it clearly takes away one method of distribution, other methods are left untouched. See ante at 179 n. 1 and at 180 n. 3; see also Gold Coast, 42 F.3d at 1345 (rejecting disparate treatment argument where there was no evidence regulation was enacted because of a dislike with the message conveyed). Cf. Leathers, (finding tax measure avoided pitfalls because, for example, there was no indication that Arkansas targeted cable television in a purposeful attempt to interfere with ... First Amendment activities). 46 More importantly, street furniture can obviously create or add to visual clutter in different ways such that solutions calling for differential treatment might be warranted. Cf. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 49, 106 S.Ct. 925, 929-30, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986) (noting that city treats certain movie theaters differently based on the markedly different effects upon their surroundings). See Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 430, 113 S.Ct. at 1517 (noting that unlike speech in Renton there [were] no secondary effects attributable to the commercial-publication newsracks that distinguished them from the non-commercial publications newsracks). While the Newspapers complain that the Street Furniture Guideline affects no other similarly situated object in the District, the truth of the matter is that there simply is no other such object. Not only is there no record evidence that any other entity--public or private--uses newsracks or other objects that are similarly anchored to lampposts, signposts, or fixtures on the sidewalks to distribute its product to the public, but there is also no record evidence that such an entity would not be subject to the challenged regulation. In our view, that there is no such evidence, let alone a suggestion to that effect, only underscores the uniqueness of the newsracks and the way in which they impact upon the District. 47 In reaching our conclusion, we are not swayed by the district court's findings that [g]overnmentally-placed street furniture is exempted, and merchandise-store fronts are subjected to no more stringent review than they ever were and/or that the only apparent effect of the [Street Furniture Guideline] will be the removal of [the Newspapers'] publication boxes. Globe Newspaper, 847 F.Supp. at 199. Contrary to the Newspapers' contentions, that exempt street furniture, store-front signs, or other tangible signs of modern life may also constitute or add to visual clutter does not necessarily render the differential treatment unjustified: this argument ignores legitimate, if not obvious, differences among those on-street or other visible objects that are essential to the public safety and welfare--street and traffic lights, mail boxes, fire hydrants, street trees, traffic and parking signs, trash receptacles, parking meters and hitchposts--and the preferred distribution means of private entities. See Plain Dealer, 486 U.S. at 797-98, 108 S.Ct. at 2165 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (finding difference between public services of a quasi-governmental nature and newsracks to be significant). Although the record is devoid of any facts regarding store-front stands, 11 the Newspapers' argument also seems to ignore practical and historical differences between merchants' on-site signs and bulky newsracks anchored along the sidewalks. It is safe to assume, at least in the absence of record evidence to the contrary, that the newsracks' overall bulky structure is reasonably predictable as compared to store-front signs, which lend themselves more readily to case-by-case review: designing the newsracks' appearance may reduce their complained-of unsightliness but it does not eliminate their complained-of congestion and inconvenience. 48 Perhaps most importantly, we disagree with the district court's conclusion that, as in Minneapolis Star, [s]imilar concerns ... in the sense of 'censorial effects' are raised by the ... Street Furniture Guideline[ ], Globe Newspaper, 847 F.Supp. at 199. Not only is there no record evidence to support the conclusion that, because of the regulation, publishers might be chilled by the threat of restrictions on other methods of distribution, we fail to countenance any reasonable basis upon which to ground such a fear: none of the other methods of distribution depend upon structures which are subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. Furthermore, because it is a complete ban upon newsracks, it does not provide for, or otherwise grant, the Commission any--let alone unbridled--discretion in determining what newsracks will be allowed. See Plain Dealer, 486 U.S. at 769-72, 108 S.Ct. at 2150-52. As to the Newspapers' claim that the censorial effects of the Street Furniture Guideline extend beyond the District, we find nothing in the record, other that this bald assertion, to merit such a conclusion. The allegation that this regulation sends affected publishers the message that if they criticize, annoy or otherwise offend any official with power over any forum, they may face another expensive and futile court battle implies that the Commission has acted in a retaliatory manner by enacting this legislation, an argument which is totally unsupported by any evidence. 49 Finally, we are unpersuaded by the Newspapers claim that, because the regulation deprives publishers of an already significant and still growing percentage of their readers, its impact is hardly incidental. While, as alleged by the Newspapers, newsracks may indeed be the indisputable workhorse of the daily press (a contention belied by the evidence regarding the District, ante at 179 n. 1), nothing in the record suggests, let alone demonstrates, how the removal of the District's newsracks is so burdensome that it is not incidental. As we see it, the Newspapers' complaint boils down to the potential reader passing through the District or the non-subscribing resident and, as we discuss later, ample alternative channels exist for the Newspapers to reach even these accidental transients passing through the District as well as those readers with more frequent ties to the District. 50 In sum, we find no cognizable basis for invoking strict scrutiny and, thus, apply an intermediate level of scrutiny. 51