Opinion ID: 842329
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: michigan's mixed determinate-indeterminate sentencing scheme

Text: It seems that the preceding argument is a component of the majority's contention that Michigan has a true indeterminate sentencing scheme. I would agree that Michigan generally has an indeterminate scheme in cases in which a defendant's PRV level places him or her somewhere other than in an intermediate sanction cell. [22] But I disagree with respect to cases in which the sentencing scheme sets two possible maximums, [23] which is exactly what occurs in cases involving intermediate sanction cells. In such cases, the sentencing scheme resembles the determinate sentencing schemes discussed in the Blakely line of cases. Blakely itself contains a discussion of the difference between indeterminate and determinate schemes: Justice O'Connor argues that, because determinate sentencing schemes involving judicial factfinding entail less judicial discretion than indeterminate schemes, the constitutionality of the latter implies the constitutionality of the former. This argument is flawed on a number of levels. First, the Sixth Amendment by its terms is not a limitation on judicial power, but a reservation of jury power. It limits judicial power only to the extent that the claimed judicial power infringes on the province of the jury. Indeterminate sentencing does not do so. It increases judicial discretion, to be sure, but not at the expense of the jury's traditional function of finding the facts essential to lawful imposition of the penalty. Of course indeterminate schemes involve judicial factfinding, in that a judge (like a parole board) may implicitly rule on those facts he deems important to the exercise of his sentencing discretion. But the facts do not pertain to whether the defendant has a legal right to a lesser sentence  and that makes all the difference insofar as judicial impingement upon the traditional role of the jury is concerned. In a system that says the judge may punish burglary with 10 to 40 years, every burglar knows he is risking 40 years in jail. In a system that punishes burglary with a 10-year sentence, with another 30 added for use of a gun, the burglar who enters a home unarmed is entitled to no more than a 10-year sentence  and by reason of the Sixth Amendment the facts bearing upon that entitlement must be found by a jury. [ Blakely, 542 U.S. at 308-309, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (emphasis in original; citation omitted).] Once this reasoning is applied to the case at hand, it becomes apparent that Michigan's sentencing scheme is not a traditional indeterminate sentencing scheme. It would be one thing if every second-offense habitual offender convicted of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder faced the same 15-year maximum. Then, no problem would arise if judicial fact-finding resulted in a sentence within the range of zero to 15 years. But that is not the case. Some second-offense habitual offenders convicted of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder face a maximum sentence of 11 months in jail. They are offenders whose criminal records and admissions, together with the jury's verdict, do not support an OV score. [24] These offenders are entitled to a sentence that is an intermediate sanction. Id. Given that there are two possible maximum sentences for the offense in question, a defendant is entitled to whichever is supported by the defendant's conviction, admissions, and criminal record alone. [A]nd by reason of the Sixth Amendment the [additional] facts bearing upon that entitlement must be found by a jury. Id. at 309, 124 S.Ct. 2531. Therefore, if certain other facts are necessary to move the defendant to the higher maximum sentence, they must be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority ignores this unusual nature of Michigan's intermediate sanction cells as compared with a traditional indeterminate sentencing scheme. Because intermediate sanction cells set maximum sentences, Michigan's sentencing scheme is distinct from the traditional indeterminate scheme. For Sixth Amendment purposes, it is properly viewed as a mixture of determinate and indeterminate sentencing schemes. This is because, as discussed in Blakely, a traditional indeterminate scheme can have only one maximum sentence. Id. at 308-309, 124 S.Ct. 2531. The fact that Michigan's indeterminate scheme is different in this way mandates that it be treated differently. The majority fails to honor this distinction. The majority's argument seems at least partially grounded in the argument raised by the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan and the Attorney General in their amici curiae brief. They assert that Michigan's sentencing system involves too much judicial discretion to violate the Sixth Amendment. They argue that the amount of discretion involved in sentencing in Michigan makes our system equivalent to traditional indeterminate systems. Cunningham specifically rejected this argument: The [California Supreme Court's] conclusion that the upper term, and not the middle term, qualifies as the relevant statutory maximum, rested on several considerations. First, the court reasoned that, given the ample discretion afforded trial judges to identify aggravating facts warranting an upper term sentence, the DSL does not represent a legislative effort to shift the proof of particular facts from elements of a crime (to be proved to a jury) to sentencing factors (to be decided by a judge). . . . Instead, it afforded the sentencing judge the discretion to decide, with the guidance of rules and statutes, whether the facts of the case and the history of the defendant justify the higher sentence. Such a system does not diminish the traditional power of the jury. [ People v. Black, 35 Cal.4th 1238, 1256, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 740, 113 P.3d 534 (2005)] (footnote omitted). We cautioned in Blakely, however, that broad discretion to decide what facts may support an enhanced sentence, or to determine whether an enhanced sentence is warranted in any particular case, does not shield a sentencing system from the force of our decisions. If the jury's verdict alone does not authorize the sentence, if, instead, the judge must find an additional fact to impose the longer term, the Sixth Amendment requirement is not satisfied. Blakely, 542 U.S., at 305, and n. 8, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403. [ Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. at 868-869.] The amount of discretion involved does not matter. What matters is what sentence a defendant would have received solely on the basis of the jury's verdict, his or her prior record, and any admissions he or she made. Whatever sentence a defendant would face as a maximum considering only these factors is the statutory maximum. Any fact-finding that changes this maximum violates the Sixth Amendment, regardless of how much discretion the trial court has in finding those facts. Id. Both Blakely and Booker make clear that it is irrelevant that the possibility exists for the judge to depart from the statutory maximum sentence in some circumstances. Under Blakely, the statutory maximum in this case remains the 11-month intermediate sanction sentence, even though the judge was empowered to increase it after additional fact-finding. Blakely succinctly explained the Supreme Court's reasoning on this point: The judge in this case could not have imposed the exceptional 90-month sentence solely on the basis of the facts admitted in the guilty plea. Those facts alone were insufficient because, as the Washington Supreme Court has explained, [a] reason offered to justify an exceptional sentence can be considered only if it takes into account factors other than those which are used in computing the standard range sentence for the offense. [ State v. ] Gore, [143 Wash.2d 288, 315-316, 21 P.3d 262 (2001)], which in this case included the elements of second-degree kidnapping and the use of a firearm, see [Wash. Rev. Code] 9.94A.320, 9.94A.310(3)(b). Had the judge imposed the 90-month sentence solely on the basis of the plea, he would have been reversed. See [Wash. Rev. Code] 9.94A.210(4). The maximum sentence is no more 10 years here than it was 20 years in Apprendi (because that is what the judge could have imposed upon finding a hate crime) or death in Ring (because that is what the judge could have imposed upon finding an aggravator). [ Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304, 124 S.Ct. 2531.] In this case, the statutory maximum was 11 months in jail. Only the judicial fact-finding necessary to score the OV factors allowed the judge to impose the higher maximum sentence. Had the judge sentenced defendant to a maximum of 15 years without scoring the OVs or making additional fact-finding, he would have committed an error requiring reversal. The same rule of law applies as in Ring, Blakely, Booker, and Cunningham. Therefore, there is a Sixth Amendment violation in this case, regardless of the fact that the trial judge exercised the discretion that the sentencing guidelines allowed.