Opinion ID: 2041803
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Teachers Remained Employees Under Tenure Act While on Strike

Text: The Crestwood School Board further contends that the discharged teachers, by striking discontinued their services within the meaning of Art V, § 1 of the teachers' tenure act, MCLA 38.111; MSA 15.2011, [15] thereby forfeiting the procedural safeguards of that act. This is an issue which this Court specifically reserved for decision in Shiffer v Board of Education of Gibraltar School Dist, 393 Mich 190, 201-203; 224 NW2d 255 (1974). We agree with Justice LEVIN'S analysis on this point, in Section IV of his opinion, concluding that by striking, the teachers did not cease to be employees. In addition, we note that in this case there was a contractual employment relationship between the board and the teachers during the fall of 1974, though the specific terms of that contractual relationship were court-ordered, and that the teachers had actually been working on the job. [16] School Dist for the City of Holland v Holland Education Association, 380 Mich 314; 157 NW2d 206 (1968) (Opinions of O'HARA, SOURIS and KELLY, JJ.). Cf. OAG 1969-1970, No 4704, p 150 (June 24, 1970). VII  Probationary v Tenured Teachers The Crestwood School Board further contends that the circuit court and the Court of Appeals erred in their opinions in failing to distinguish between probationary and tenured teachers with respect to the applicability of the procedural provisions of TTA. Article II, § 4 of the TTA, MCLA 38.84; MSA 15.1984 reads in its entirety as follows: Articles 4, 5, and 6 shall not apply to any teacher deemed to be in a period of probation. Articles 4 and 6 contain the hearing, review, and other procedural protections and rights guaranteed by law to tenure teachers. The fact that probationary teachers are not included in those specific sections does not mean, however, that probationary teachers have no procedural rights at all. As this Court has previously noted: [T]he intent of the entire [teachers' tenure] act was to eliminate capricious and arbitrary employment policies of local school boards. This includes the probationary as well as the tenure period of employment. [Latter emphasis added.] Munro v Elk Rapids Schools, 383 Mich 661, 688, 691; 178 NW2d 450 (1970) (Dissenting opinion of T.G. KAVANAGH, J.), later aff'd in full in Munro v Elk Rapids Schools, 385 Mich 618; 189 NW2d 224 (1971) (On Rehearing). In guarding against such arbitrary and capricious employment policies and, in light of the lack of legislative directive on the issue of the proper procedure to be followed in disciplining or discharging probationary teachers, the courts are forced to act to protect teachers from unreasonable and, potentially, unconstitutional dismissal. [17] Cf. Hortonville Education Association v Hortonville Joint School Dist. 66 Wis 2d 469, 225 NW2d 658 (1975). The Court of Appeals has previously acted in this regard to guarantee the right of review of dismissal to probationary teachers though TTA does not specifically make provision for such review. Caddell v Ecorse Board of Education, 17 Mich App 632, 635; 170 NW2d 277 (1969). Such review does not involve the same level of employment termination protection afforded tenure teachers by statute. [18] Tenure teachers may only be discharged for reasonable and just cause. MCLA 38.101; MSA 15.2001. The discharge of a probationary teacher, however, in the absence of specific legislation or contractual provision on point, is permissible only where it is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary nor beyond the scope of the board's authority. Caddell, supra, 636. Similarly, we hold today, in the absence of specific legislation on point, that probationary teachers have a right to notice and a hearing prior to discharge. Again, probationary teachers are not thereby converted into tenure teachers by virtue of this right  the hearing, if requested promptly, would only be concerned with the issues of whether the employment termination was arbitrary and unreasonable, or whether it was action outside the scope of the board's authority, rather than the broader issues of reasonable and just cause for discharge in the case of tenure teachers who have been given broader statutory protection. Accordingly, we hold that the Crestwood Board of Education erred, inter alia, in discharging both its probationary and tenured teachers without prior notice and hearings. VIII  Circuit Court Injunction Properly Issued The board also contends that, in any case, the teachers were not entitled to equitable relief in the form of an injunction due to their lack of clean hands in violating a previous circuit court injunctive order of October 22, 1974. The teachers respond, inter alia, that appellant school board likewise violated injunctive orders in the course of these protracted proceedings and, accordingly, has no cause to complain. The Court of Appeals agreed with the teachers, noting that [a]ll three judges in the trial court agreed that both parties were in `open, flagrant defiance and in violation of [Judge Rashid's] orders'. 57 Mich App 636, 647. Dissenting Judge Rashid, on the circuit court, ruling directly on the clean hands question, explicitly opined: I feel that both sides have been in error on this score.    The fact is that both sides actually violated the terms of the [October 8 and 22, 1974] order. We will not second-guess the courts below, especially the trial court which has had direct contact with this litigation throughout its course, on this issue. As we have previously ruled in Thompson v Enz, 385 Mich 103, 110; 188 NW2d 579 (1971): [A]s a general rule, equity will administer such relief as the nature, rights, facts, and exigencies of the case demand at the close of the trial or at the time of the making of the decree. Quoting from 27 Am Jur 2d, Equity, § 248, p 818. The circuit court acted within its discretion in issuing its injunction and order of January 10, 1975. IX  Court of Appeals Compulsory Arbitration Order Improper We do not believe that the sua sponte order of the Court of Appeals requiring compulsory arbitration was a proper exercise of judicial discretion in this case. X  Conclusion We hold, as did the circuit court majority and the Court of Appeals, that appellee teachers were discharged in a procedurally improper manner. Accordingly, we affirm the Circuit Court order of January 10, 1975. We further affirm the conclusion, except as to compulsory arbitration, but not the analysis of the Court of Appeals. This matter is remanded to Wayne Circuit Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. No costs, a public question being involved.