Opinion ID: 199445
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Abuse-of-Trust Adjustment

Text: 13 The district court increased O'Connell's offense level by two levels pursuant to § 3B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines: If the defendant abused a position of public or private trust . . . in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense, increase by 2 levels. U.S.S.G. Manual § 3B1.3. O'Connell argues that the district court committed legal error in concluding that he occupied a position of trust. Our review of the legal question, that is, what qualifies as a position of trust under the Guidelines, is de novo. United States v. Reccko, 151 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir. 1998). 14 The Guideline Commentary defines a position of public or private trust as characterized by professional or managerial discretion. U.S.S.G. Manual § 3B1.3, cmt. n.1. Under this definition, a bank executive would qualify, but a bank teller would not. Id. In light of this special meaning, we have held that a receptionist/switchboard operator at police headquarters, although entrusted with sensitive information, did not hold a position of trust, because the job afforded no discernible discretion. Reccko, 151 F.3d at 31-33. 15 There is some support for O'Connell's argument that his position as a bookkeeper at Pyramid did not place him within the Guideline definition of a position of trust. He was not a legal signatory on the Pyramid checking account, and clearly exceeded the bounds of his authority when he forged John Leavitt's name to the checks that he made out to himself. Further, an outside accountant was responsible for overseeing much of O'Connell's work at Pyramid. Both of these factors suggest that it was not professional discretion that facilitated the commission of O'Connell's crimes, but merely his access to the Pyramid checkbook and accounting software. The Commentary and our case law emphasize that this would not qualify for a § 3B1.3 increase. 16 The district court, however, pointed to two other aspects of O'Connell's employment that enabled his thefts: O'Connell's authority to transfer funds from the line of credit to the checking account and his close, personal relationship with the Leavitts. There is no question that O'Connell's unfettered access to an $850,000 line of credit facilitated his taking as much money undetected as he did. And the authority to draw off the account suggests significant managerial discretion. 1 The district court also believed that O'Connell's personal relationship led John Leavitt to put more trust in O'Connell than he would have in a stranger, resulting in less supervision of and more autonomy for O'Connell. This is consistent with the uncontested finding of the presentence report that John Leavitt increasingly relied on O'Connell to manage Pyramid's financial affairs. The district court surmised that O'Connell's treatment by the Leavitts as basically that of a son enabled his criminal efforts. We review the district court's factual determinations for clear error, United States v. Tardiff, 969 F.2d 1283, 1289 (1st Cir. 1992), and discern none with reference to these findings. 17 Because O'Connell had the authority to access the line-of-credit account and because we uphold the district court's conclusion that O'Connell's relationship with the Leavitts rendered him uniquely trusted as an employee, we hold O'Connell did occupy a position of trust for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines. As to the second step of the inquiry, whether O'Connell used his position of trust to facilitate commission of the criminal acts, see United States v. Gill, 99 F.3d 484, 489 (1st Cir. 1996), we agree with the district court that O'Connell's access to the line of credit and professional/personal relationship with the Leavitts did in fact improve his chance of success and contributed to the long period of time during which he was able to conceal the thefts. The two-level increase under § 3B1.3 to O'Connell's offense level is affirmed.