Opinion ID: 584610
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Agent Mazur's Opinion Testimony

Text: 57 The appellants contend that the district court erred by allowing Agent Mazur to interpret certain tape-recorded conversations in violation of Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 18 They note that the issue at trial was not whether they engaged in financial transactions on behalf of Robert Musella, but whether they did so knowing that they were laundering drug proceeds. They contend that the only evidence relative to their state of mind were transcripts of undercover conversations and Agent Mazur's lay opinion testimony explaining those conversations. The appellants assert that Agent Mazur frequently interpreted dialogue that was not in code or otherwise complex to establish criminal intent, in the face of no other independent evidence to that effect. We review the district court's admission of opinion evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Davis, 787 F.2d 1501, 1505 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852, 107 S.Ct. 184, 93 L.Ed.2d 118 (1986). 58 The appellants cite numerous examples of Agent Mazur's interpretative testimony that allegedly imputed knowledge and willfulness of criminal conduct to the defendants by recasting innocuous comments made by the defendants into admissions of money laundering. Brief for Appellant Bilgrami at 13-27. We note the following two examples put forth by the appellants: Example 1: 59 [Bilgrami]: [I]t's very clear, I mean the law in the States is that if you're taking cash from a[n] ... individual, any of your offices ... then you have to advise the authorities immediately ... even if its five thousand dollars, if you have any inkling that the money is somewhat, uh, not clear ... that's with regard to cash. All the banks have an onus today ... to advise the authorities of that ... [b]ecause the environment has somewhat changed in the last two weeks ... generally there is a lot of, uh, laws coming out regarding this, so the environment is changing. 60 (GE 172B at 35-36). 61 Agent Mazur then testified that he understood Bilgrami to be conveying: 62 [The Witness]: That the law was being further defined in the United States and outside the United States as it related to handling the type of money that was coming from me and from my clients--that being drug money. 63 R88:77 (emphasis added). See Brief for Appellant Bilgrami at 16. Example 2: 64 [Bilgrami]: [T]he bank has a policy.... A credit policy ... And that credit policy is defined by the management and the Board.... [W]e have certain seniority but we can be overruled ... and therefore ... support does not exist ... for any particular transaction. All transactions are taken on a case-by-case basis.... So ... I would say support never exists in any institution.... And, in fact, I would say that ... if you were to give too many details to ... superiors, they might ask us not to do it.... So, I would say that ... they are not aware of anything with you on these transactions. If they were, they might say no.... [T]he bank as a policy tends to shy away from these transactions, these type of transactions ... where ... the transactions are not very clear. 65 (GE 172B at 24-26). 66 When asked during direct examination what Bilgrami meant by transactions that were not very clear, Agent Mazur responded: 67 [The Witness]: I took that to be his very cautious way of saying that they were illegal ... [b]ecause of the source of the funds. 68 R88:57 (emphasis added). See Brief for Appellant Bilgrami at 25. 69 The appellants assert that the above examples are representative of hundreds of instances during the two months of Agent Mazur's direct examination that he was permitted, over objection, 19 to offer subjective views about what straightforward comments in the tape-recorded conversations meant and why he and the defendants had uttered them. These explanations were especially prejudicial, they claim, in light of no other evidence establishing criminal intent. Thus, they conclude, the district court's admission of Agent Mazur's testimony constitutes reversible error under Rule 701 because it did not assist the jurors in reaching their own decisions about the meaning and import of those statements. We conclude otherwise. 70 Rule 701 allows lay opinion testimony if the opinion is 'rationally based on the perception of the witness and [is] helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.'  Davis, 787 F.2d at 1505 (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 701). Where a witness' testimony is based upon his perceptions of the conversations ... the accuracy of those perceptions [is] a question for the jury. Id. A witness may clarify conversations that are  'abbreviated, composed with unfinished sentences and punctuated with ambiguous references to events that [were] clear only to the [defendant] and [the witness].'  United States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587, 592 (3d Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. De Peri, 778 F.2d 963, 977 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1110, 106 S.Ct. 1518, 89 L.Ed.2d 916 and cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159, 106 S.Ct. 2277, 90 L.Ed.2d 720 (1986)). 71 Here, the district court reasonably recognized that the lay jury in this case would likely be unfamiliar with the complexities of high finance and the intricate world of money laundering. For this reason, the district court allowed Agent Mazur to explain terms such as haven countries, R82:25-27, and shell corporations. R86:24-30. The district court also reasonably recognized the helpfulness to the jury of allowing Agent Mazur, who was actually present and participating in the conversation and observing what was happening at the time in terms of gestures and the like of those who are speaking, R88:48, to explain phrases regarding international transactions involving correspondent banks, numbered accounts, time deposits using collateralized loans, and how drug traffickers shield themselves from law enforcement. See, e.g., R85:20-34; R87:68-72. All of these matters were central to the facts at issue and well within the ambit of Rule 701. 72 Turning to the examples cited by the appellants above, we cannot say that it was reversible error for the district court to admit Agent Mazur's comments. In Davis, 787 F.2d at 1505, the district court admitted lay opinion testimony from two government witnesses as to the meaning of comments made by defendants who had been charged with drug trafficking. When the first government witness was asked what the phrase you don't have to worry about [the name of a certain defendant] meant, he responded that he thought that the named defendant must have known about the dope business. Id. When the second government witness was asked what the phrase wanted to make a trip meant, he responded that he thought the defendant who uttered the phrase was referring to an illegal act. Id. Although strongly cautioning that the better practice might have been for the trial court to disallow [such] opinion testimony, we held that the district court did not abuse its discretion. Id. 73 Moreover, this case is distinguished from United States v. Dicker, 853 F.2d 1103 (3d Cir.1988), the case principally relied upon by the appellants. In Dicker, the Third Circuit held that an undercover customs agent should not have been allowed to interpret a defendant's potentially legitimate reference to munitions export certificates as phony documents when the reference was clear and straightforward. Id. at 1108-10. The Third Circuit also noted that the trial court did not  'vigorously police[ ] the government's examination....'  Id. at 1109 (quoting De Peri, 778 F.2d at 968). In the instant case, however, most of the appellants' comments about wire transfers and banking regulations were not perfectly clear without Agent Mazur's explanations, see id. at 1110, nor did the district court fail to vigorously police the introduction of unwarranted interpretations. The district court repeatedly sustained objections to government questions where it determined that Agent Mazur's explanations entered into areas that were clear from the tape or clear from previous explanations about how financial transactions occurred. See, e.g., R89:70; R92:17; R93:87; R95:25; R96:16; R97:11-12, 18; R102:47-50; R107:25, 123-24. Thus, we do not find reversible error.