Opinion ID: 1658441
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: law i. did the game inspection violate the fourth amendment?

Text: The initial stop of Robert Drane's vehicle occurred under the authority of a regulation governing the supervision of wildlife management areas. This regulation was promulgated by the Commission on Wildlife Conservation pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated, Section 49-1-29 (Supp. 1985), which authorizes the commission to make such rules and regulations ... as it may deem necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this chapter. The regulation itself states: Any vehicle may be searched for illegal game or firearms while within, entering or leaving a management area. Drane contends that the stop and search of his vehicle, and by implication any statute or regulation authorizing it, were unconstitutional in that they violated the Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures. Fourth Amendment considerations do, indeed, apply in these situations, since the stop of a vehicle is a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2578, 45 L.Ed.2d 607, 614 (1975). Whether the seizure of a vehicle in an inspection stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment is determined by balancing its intrusion on the individual's interest in privacy against its promotion of legitimate government interests. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667 (1979). In assessing the weight of the intrusion the court may consider such factors as the physical inconvenience and anxiety caused in the motorist. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657, 99 S.Ct. at 1398, 59 L.Ed.2d at 670. One practical result of this analysis is that stops at fixed, identifiable road blocks have been held less intrusive for Fourth Amendment purposes than stops by roving police units. Thus, a border patrol road block at a fixed point was deemed permissible in part because any motorist passing it would normally expect to be stopped. U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3083, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116, 1128-29 (1976). On the other hand a roving border patrol unit could stop a particular car, only if facts could be articulated to support suspicion of a violation. U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882-83, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2580-81, 45 L.Ed.2d 607, 617 (1975). In Prouse, the court held that random stops of motorists to check drivers' licenses, whether by roving units or a fixed location, were constitutionally impermissible. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401, 59 L.Ed.2d at 673. The current federal doctrine, then, seems to be that stops without probable cause are permissible, so long as they are not made at random and are not subject to the uncontrolled discretion of the officers. Drane argues that the spot check in the present case does not pass constitutional muster. First, he contends that the stop involved what Prouse called an unsettling show of authority. 440 U.S. at 667, 99 S.Ct. at 1398, 59 L.Ed.2d at 670. Second, he contends that in the absence of any departmental guidelines for the roadblocks, they partake of standardless and unconstrained discretion which the Supreme Court has regarded as a major evil in searches and seizures by police. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661, 99 S.Ct. at 1400, 59 L.Ed.2d at 672. The implications of the Fourth Amendment for game checks have figured in two recent state cases. In State v. Halverson, 277 N.W.2d 723 (S.D. 1979), the South Dakota Court rejected the Fourth Amendment challenge without any real discussion. But in State v. Tourtillott, 289 Or. 845, 618 P.2d 423 (1980), cert. denied 451 U.S. 972, 101 S.Ct. 2051, 68 L.Ed.2d 352 (1981), these issues were treated at length. Tourtillott involved a roadblock similar to that in the present case; all passing motorists were stopped to check for hunting licenses. When the defendant was stopped, it was discovered that she had a suspended drivers' license. She raised constitutional questions substantially the same as Drane's in the present case. The Oregon court rejected the constitutional challenge. After noting the obvious fact that the state had a legitimate interest in the conservation of game, the court performed the balancing test prescribed by the border patrol cases and Prouse. It concluded that since all the vehicles were stopped or slowed at the checkpoint, the degree of psychological intrusion occasioned by the stop here is clearly more analogous to that found permissible in Martinez-Fuerte than to those in Brignoni-Ponce and Prouse. Tourtillott, 289 Or. at 858, 618 P.2d at 430. Further, the stop was not invalidated by the element of discretion involved. The court reasoned that: [t]here was no exercise of discretion in the sense that the policeman would pull over any vehicle upon a hunch. The fact that the roadblock was set during hunting season, in an area frequented by hunters, and subjected all vehicles to being stopped or slowed circumscribes the possibility of an abuse of discretion on the officers' part. (289 Or. at 859, 618 P.2d at 430.) The approach of Tourillott seems sounder than that urged by the appellant. The latter, if adopted, would effectively disable the state from conducting spot checks on game preserves. In Halverson, supra, the South Dakota court observed that the only effective means of implementing [the state's game policy] is by use of roadblocks or check point stops in game areas. Stops on probable cause would not satisfy the purpose of the law, since the number of hunters is large and game officers few. 277 N.W.2d at 724. Without such checks, there is no reason to suppose that Mississippi would have any more success in enforcing its game laws than South Dakota would. We hold that such stops are permissible under the Fourth Amendment.