Opinion ID: 2977284
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fidel’s Conviction

Text: Fidel’s sole challenge to his conviction is that the district court clearly erred in admitting Arnold’s wire-intercepted statements (“Call 250”) under the coconspirator hearsay exception. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). A court properly admits statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) where the offering party demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) a conspiracy existed; (2) the defendant and declarant were coconspirators; and (3) the statements were made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Conrad, 507 F.3d 424, 429 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); United States v. Payne, 437 F.3d 540, 544 (6th Cir. 2006). In making its findings of fact, a court may consider the statements themselves, Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181 (1987), but the offering party must provide other independent evidence, Payne, 437 F.3d at 544. At the close of evidence, the district court overruled Fidel’s objection to the statements, making each -3- Nos. 07-5543 and 07-5544 United States v. Estrada and Villasenor of the required findings. Although Fidel concedes that a conspiracy existed, he denies that he and Arnold were coconspirators, and that Arnold’s statements were made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. We conclude that the court did not clearly err in admitting Arnold’s statements. See Payne, 437 F.3d at 544 (applying a clear-error standard of review for factual determinations) (citation omitted).
Fidel argues that the Government failed to demonstrate either his own or Arnold’s involvement in the conspiracy. Specifically, Fidel construes Call 250 as Little merely complaining about Fidel and notes that Little’s colleagues did not mention either Fidel or Arnold in their testimonies. These arguments are meritless. First, the Government introduced several wire-intercepted calls between Little and Fidel that point to Fidel’s role as a coconspirator. DEA Agent Samantha McIsaac testified that after Fidel and Little met in January 2005 to negotiate a marijuana and methamphetamine purchase, the Government intercepted thirty-one calls between the two men during the next three months, five of which the Government introduced into evidence. Each call pertained to a delay in the transport of the drugs and involved drug-related euphemisms that Little decoded at trial. For example, on March 20, 2005, Fidel told Little: “I can’t send nobody, it’s got to be me that meets you down there . . . . [But] I can’t leave this place until I get all the, all of the parts, for that Camaro ready.” Little testified that Fidel used “Camaro” as a euphemism for marijuana. On March 26, 2005, Fidel reiterated that he could -4- Nos. 07-5543 and 07-5544 United States v. Estrada and Villasenor not find a courier: “My ride is on vacation right? And he don’t want to leave because of his family and his kids, and because it’s a holiday, well, what can I do?” The final call between the two, on March 29, 2005—three days before Little’s contested conversation with Arnold—reflected Little’s increasing agitation about the delayed transaction. These various phone calls provide ample support for Fidel’s involvement in the drug conspiracy. Second, the statements Arnold made during Call 250 suggest that Arnold, too, acted as a coconspirator. Although Little concedes that he called Arnold to complain about the delay, he also explained that he called “to get the truth” about why the transaction had stalled “for two or three weeks.” In the course of the call, Arnold spoke knowledgeably about the impending deal: LITTLE: Okay, you know, I’d like to get this to work, you know what I’m talking about . . . ARNOLD: Yeah. LITTLE: But I been setting [sic] here 2 weeks . . . You know what I’m saying . . . it’s not you, but I mean, you guys are still working together . . . ARNOLD: Yeah, but he [inaudible] John, I know we been trying to get it going, but the problem is the transportation John . . . . We got 113 of those things, and . . . LITTLE: And you got ‘em, you got ‘em? ARNOLD: And we ain’t got no money to give the driver man and he’s not taking off, so . . . it might go today or tomorrow, but at the latest, we’re working on sending you only, uh, what you [inaudible] 100 . . . it’s going to be a dollar and three. Arnold’s knowledge of the transaction is probative of his involvement with Fidel in the conspiracy. In fact, he used the term “we” six times while discussing the deal. Later, after Little rejected -5- Nos. 07-5543 and 07-5544 United States v. Estrada and Villasenor Arnold’s attempt to pass the phone to another individual participating in the transaction (“Frank”), Arnold again referenced his role as a coconspirator: “Well, he’s the one you’re getting it from, so you may was [sic] well . . . he’s the one I have to go through.” (emphasis added). Finally, after mentioning Perez (or “Fatso”), the brothers’ nephew, as an alternate source of narcotics, Little corroborated Arnold’s involvement in the conspiracy by saying, “I’d rather work with you [and] your brother instead of Fatso.” Third, the fact that Little later purchased methamphetamine from Perez independently supports Arnold’s role as a coconspirator. Arnold acknowledged that Perez supplied drugs, and the Supreme Court notes that where a declarant’s statements corroborate events that later transpire, those later events provide independent evidence that the declarant and defendant were coconspirators. See Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 180–81 (concluding that independent evidence corroborated that the defendant and declarant were coconspirators where “[t]he friend, who turned out to be [the defendant], showed up at the prearranged spot at the prearranged time . . . [,] picked up the cocaine, and a significant sum of money was found in his car.”); Payne, 437 F.3d at 545. Fourth, although Fidel contends that neither Fidel nor Arnold are coconspirators because David Frederick and Kevin Shrull—two coconspirators who testified at trial—did not mention the brothers, his argument carries no weight. This court maintains that one coconspirator need not know every other coconspirator or the scope of the enterprise in order to be a participant in the conspiracy. See United States v. Maliszewski, 161 F.3d 992, 1006 (6th Cir. 1998). And Little testified that -6- Nos. 07-5543 and 07-5544 United States v. Estrada and Villasenor Arnold recommended coconspirator Willie as a supplier for marijuana, which Fidel seems to concede in his brief. In sum, the Government presented sufficient evidence for this panel to conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that both Fidel and Arnold were coconspirators for purposes of Rule 801(d)(2)(E). 2. Statements Made During the Course of and in Furtherance of the Conspiracy Fidel next argues that the Government failed to demonstrate that Arnold’s statements were made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. This court considers a statement “in furtherance” of a conspiracy if it is “intended to promote the objectives of the conspiracy.” Conrad, 507 F.3d at 430 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Under that analysis, we reject Fidel’s argument. The timing and the context of the statements are key. See Conrad, 507 F.3d at 430 (holding that the district court erred by not determining when a statement occurred or in what context). Call 250 occurred on April 1, 2005, following five phone calls between Little and Fidel during March 2005, each of which revealed Little’s frustration with the delayed drug transaction. The timing and context thus suggest that Call 250 represents an attempt to finalize details relevant to the deal. We are likewise persuaded by the fact that Arnold’s statements “identif[ied] participants and their roles in the conspiracy.” See United States v. Monus, 128 F.3d 376, 393 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Clark, 18 F.3d 1337, 1342 (6th Cir. 1994)). Arnold identified Perez as an -7- Nos. 07-5543 and 07-5544 United States v. Estrada and Villasenor alternate source of drugs, named another individual (“Frank”) as the supplier, and knew that the transportation of the drugs presented a problem for completing the transaction. In fact, Arnold suggested a timeline for the deal, hypothesizing that “[the drugs] might go today or tomorrow.” Arnold also furthered the conspiracy by employing coded language to aid the drug ring’s objectives. See Payne, 437 F.3d at 546 (“Statements designed to conceal an ongoing conspiracy are made in furtherance of the conspiracy for purposes of Rule 801(d)(2)(E).”). He referred to “dollars” when discussing the transaction with Little: “[W]e’re working on sending you only, uh, what you [inaudible] 100 . . . it’s going to be a dollar and three.” And Little later testified that these dollar amounts corresponded to pounds of marijuana (i.e. “a dollar” equals 100 pounds). Under our deferential review of the district court’s factual findings, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in applying Rule 801(d)(2)(E) to admit Arnold’s statements at trial.