Opinion ID: 1385359
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Maximum Term

Text: After defendant entered his plea to the burglary charge a probation report was prepared. After reviewing both crimes and defendant's history, and finding substantial circumstances in aggravation and no circumstances in mitigation, the probation officer recommended that probation be denied in the burglary conviction and revoked in the stolen property case. Despite the above findings, the probation officer recommended imposition of the middle term of two years in both cases. At the sentencing hearing the court announced its intention to send defendant to YA, stating: The court has read and considered the probation officer's report ..., which recommends a denial of probation and commitment to the Youth Authority, but, of course, when we sentence or commit him to Youth Authority, we have to impose  we have to state what the maximum term is, and there was no plea bargain for less than the regular commitment time. I am prepared to follow that recommendation. In amplification, thereafter, the court commented, I am denying probation because of the numerous crimes of this type that the defendant has committed. The defendant is committed to the Youth Authority. The maximum period he could be sentenced for under the law is three years. That doesn't mean he will be in that facility for that long. It just means that we have to state what the maximum could be. (1) Defendant contends that the trial court in imposing sentence failed to comply with the requirements of California Rules of Court, rules 439 and 453(a), and section 1170. We agree. Rule 453(a), requires that when a court orders YA commitment for a defendant convicted of a crime for which a sentence under section 1170 could be imposed, the order of commitment shall specify the term of imprisonment to which the defendant would have been sentenced. The term shall be determined as provided by sections 1170 and 1170.1 and these rules, as though a sentence of imprisonment were to be imposed. Where, as here, the applicable statute specifies three possible terms, section 1170 requires the sentencing court to select the appropriate term and to apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council. Subdivision (c) of section 1170 requires that The court shall state the reasons for its sentence choice on the record at the time of sentencing. Rule 439(b) mandates that the upper term is justified only if facts in aggravation outweigh those in mitigation and the lower term is justified if the reverse is true. In either case, The facts and reasons for selecting the upper or lower term shall be stated orally on the record, and shall include a concise statement of the ultimate facts which the court deemed to constitute circumstances in aggravation or mitigation justifying the term selected. (Rule 439(c).) Even if the mid-term is selected, the court must state its reasons for selecting imprisonment. (§ 1170, subd. (c); rule 439(d).) The People point to the trial court's references to defendant's commission of the second crime while on probation for the first, and his commission of numerous crimes of this type as sufficient indication that the court fully considered circumstances in mitigation and aggravation as required. They argue that the court should be deemed to have considered all relevant criteria under rule 409, and that the record clearly indicates the judge's intention to impose the maximum term of imprisonment. Closely scrutinized, however, the comments of the trial court during sentencing appear ambiguous. For example, the court indicated that it intended to follow the probation report recommendation (two-year commitment) but in fact it imposed a three-year commitment. The court also appears to have been under the impression that it was required to state the maximum possible term for which an adult might have been sentenced on the underlying offense, rather than to select among the possible terms to which an adult might be sentenced under sections 1170 and 1170.1. This confusion may have resulted from the differing requirements of Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 under which juveniles who have been committed to YA by juvenile court are committed for a period equivalent to the maximum possible confinement period for adults. (See In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522 [159 Cal.Rptr 317, 601 P.2d 549].) In order to assess whether judges are imposing like sentences in like situations (Pen. Code, § 1170.4), it is necessary for them to state on the record why a certain sentence has been selected (Pen. Code, §§ 1170, subd. (c), 1170.3; California Rules of Court, rules 443, 425, 433). ( People v. Walker (1978) 83 Cal. App.3d 619, 622 [148 Cal. Rptr. 66].) It is unclear from the record before us why the court imposed the sentence that it did, and it is also possible to conclude that the court erroneously believed that it was required to impose the maximum possible term of commitment. Under such circumstances, we cannot be reasonably assured that the trial court in fact exercised its discretion. It may have been under a misapprehension as to its power to sentence defendant to anything other than the maximum term. We do not suggest, however, that it could not, on the record before it, have imposed such maximum term in the fair exercise of its discretion. However, in view of the applicable sentencing statutes and rules and the ambiguity concerning whether the court understood that it could sentence defendant to less than the maximum aggravated term, the judgments must be reversed and the causes remanded for resentencing.