Opinion ID: 804324
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Personal Circumstances

Text: Finally, the government argues that the personal circumstances of Prosperi and Stevenson do not distinguish them from other similarly situated defendants and do not justify the downward variance in this case. Under the guidelines, departures from the GSR based on family circumstances are ordinarily inappropriate save under stringent conditions. USSG § 5H1.6. However, post-Booker, a judge may vary from the GSR, disagreeing with details or even major premises, see Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007) ([A]s a general matter, courts may vary from Guidelines ranges based solely on policy considerations, -37- including disagreements with the Guidelines.), but the variance must be reasonable and, in almost all cases where a defendant has a family, some hardship and disadvantage to them will result wherever incarceration is part of the sentence. Here, whether or not squarely within the exception set forth in the guidelines, the circumstances of Prosperi's family are atypical and powerful, both in justifying a variance and in the home confinement actually chosen. At the time of sentencing, Prosperi's wife was battling terminal cancer. She submitted a letter to the district court stating that, I depend on my husband for almost everything. He is my caregiver, my love and he is irreplaceable. I need him by my side. Similarly, her sister submitted a letter stating that, I fear that without [Prosperi] as her caregiver, her optimism and hope will be diminished and will have a devastating impact in her ongoing battle. Most significantly, the doctor treating Prosperi's wife submitted a letter to the court stating that her survival was due, in no small part to the . . . remarkable care and dedication of her husband and that [s]he certainly would not be alive today without his attentiveness and his capacity to recognize when she is in trouble. The doctor added that Mr. Prosperi's support has been a critical factor in keeping [his wife] alive and I am quite concerned about [her] ability to function without her husband. -38- While Stevenson presented evidence that he too served as a caretaker for members of his family, his circumstances are not as compelling. Stevenson played an integral role in the on-going care for his adopted, badly disabled daughter, and said that he was the primary caregiver for his elderly parents. Also, there were numerous letters detailing Stevenson's charitable work and support for friends and neighbors. Seemingly, his disabled daughter is now adult and living in a group home, but there was evidence that the family hoped to be able to bring their daughter, who will need care indefinitely, to a facility near to the family home, allowing Stevenson to play a role in providing care. Furthermore, after concluding that Prosperi would not receive a sentence of incarceration, the court was entitled to take this fact into consideration in fashioning Stevenson's sentence. See United States v. Tejeda, 481 F.3d 44, 60 (1st Cir. 2007) ([A] district court may consider disparities among co-defendants in determining a sentence.). Stevenson was a subordinate of Prosperi and seemingly participated in the fraudulent actions under the superintendence of his superior -- not an excuse but a factor that a judge might reasonably think argues against a higher sentence, especially when for both men the family needs are poignant beyond the ordinary. We have been clear that, post-Booker, [a] district court . . . may take idiosyncratic family circumstances into account, at -39- least to some extent, in fashioning a variant sentence. Martin, 520 F.3d at 93. Although policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission are relevant in determining the type and degree of idiosyncracy necessary to support a given variance, they are not decisive. Id. Here, for the reasons stated, the particular circumstances of both Prosperi and Stevenson were a permissible factor for the court to consider in imposing its variant sentences.