Opinion ID: 2229929
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Proof of Home Invasion

Text: An individual other than a peace officer acting in the line of duty commits home invasion when without authority he or she knowingly enters the dwelling place of another when he or she knows or has reason to know that one or more persons is present. 720 ILCS 5/12-11 (West 1992). Defendant asserts that there is no proof that when he entered the Stephens' home, he had reason to know that anyone was in the home. Thus, according to defendant, his conviction for home invasion must be reversed for lack of evidence. Relying on People v. Simms, 143 Ill.2d 154, 168-73, 157 Ill.Dec. 483, 572 N.E.2d 947 (1991), defendant then maintains that because home invasion was one of the bases submitted for a finding of death eligibility under section 9-1(b)(6) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1994)), and because the jury returned a general verdict of eligibility, his death sentence must be reversed and the cause remanded for resentencing. It is well established that [i]n a prosecution for home invasion, knowledge may be proven by circumstantial evidence so long as the State presents sufficient evidence from which an inference of knowledge can be made. People v. Ramey, 240 Ill.App.3d 456, 462, 181 Ill.Dec. 439, 608 N.E.2d 512 (1992) (and cases cited therein). In the case at bar, the evidence showed that the offenses occurred before dawn on a weekday-a time when most persons are asleep or are just getting up to go to work. See People v. Frisby, 160 Ill.App.3d 19, 30-31, 111 Ill.Dec. 700, 512 N.E.2d 1337 (1987) (the fact that the defendant's entry into the dwelling occurred at 4 a.m. was significant in establishing that the defendant had reason to know someone was at home); People v. Tackett, 150 Ill. App.3d 406, 420, 103 Ill.Dec. 574, 501 N.E.2d 891 (1986) (element of knowledge established, in part, by the fact that defendant entered the home at 1 a.m.). In addition, two cars were parked in the Stephens' driveway at the time of the offenses, and the defendant entered the house carrying a gun. Both of these facts help establish that defendant had reason to know that someone was in the Stephens' home. See People v. Redisi, 172 Ill.App.3d 1003, 1011, 123 Ill.Dec. 221, 527 N.E.2d 684 (1988) (element of knowledge established, in part, by the fact that the victim's car was parked in the driveway); Tackett, 150 Ill.App.3d at 420, 103 Ill.Dec. 574, 501 N.E.2d 891; (element of knowledge established, in part, by the fact that the defendant was carrying string to tie up anyone found in the house, and by the fact that the defendant may have seen the victim's car in the garage). Also, defendant had lived in the small town of Ritchie for several years and had routinely checked other people's trash for salvageable items. This fact made it probable that defendant knew that Jeff did not live alone in the house. Considered together, the factors outlined above provide sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that defendant had reason to know that someone was in the Stephens' house when he entered it. See, e.g., Frisby, 160 Ill.App.3d at 30-31, 111 Ill.Dec. 700, 512 N.E.2d 1337; Tackett, 150 Ill.App.3d at 420, 103 Ill.Dec. 574, 501 N.E.2d 891; Redisi, 172 Ill.App.3d at 1010-11, 123 Ill.Dec. 221, 527 N.E.2d 684. Therefore, we decline to reverse defendant's conviction for home invasion.