Opinion ID: 78335
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to disclose information in violation of Brady v. Maryland

Text: Parker contends that, despite his motions and requests for all favorable and exculpatory evidence, the prosecution failed to reveal that one of its witnesses, Teddy Lynn White, had more convictions than it initially disclosed. He maintains that the facts of White's additional convictions, his eligibility for release, the withdrawal of his initial release date, and his subsequent release were discoverable and highly prejudicial. He argues that the Alabama courts incorrectly interpreted Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) by finding that the prosecutor's lack of knowledge of White's convictions or early release excused the prosecution from complying with Brady. Parker moved for favorable and exculpatory discovery in May 1988 and in March and May 1989. In response to these requests, Alabama produced a statement of White dated 19 May 1989. In this statement, White explained that he was serving a sentence for burglary. White stated that, about one to two weeks before the murder, Parker had asked him to sell him a gun and had told White that he and Kenny planned to murder someone for money. Exh. Vol. 14 at 2672-76. At a pre-trial motions hearing, in response to Parker's Brady claims, the prosecutor explained that he had provided Parker's attorney with a complete copy of [his] file. Exh. Vol.1, R5 at 105. During the trial, the judge overruled Parker's objection to White's testimony. Parker argued that the statement that the prosecution had provided to him did not indicate any exculpatory evidence, including White's criminal record. White then testified, consistent with his prior statement, about his conversation with Parker before the murder. White answered Yes when asked whether he had been convicted of a felony on more than one occasion, and stated that all of his felonies were burglaries. Exh. Vol. 8 at 1483-84. He also responded that he had not been promised anything, including that there would be no objections to his release, in exchange for his testimony. During the motion for new trial hearing, however, Parker's counsel learned that, at the time of White's testimony on 6 June 1989, White had been convicted of theft, receiving stolen property, burglary, and unlawful breaking and entering. White also had an earlier burglary conviction in 1985. Parker's counsel also learned that, although White was originally scheduled to be released on 24 May 1989, his release was delayed on 19 May 1989 (the same day that he provided his statement). White had submitted a request for the Supervised Intensive Restitution Program (SIR) in March 1989. His application was approved and he was scheduled for SIR release on 24 May 1989. On 10 May 1989, however, the Lauderdale County District Attorney filed a protest to White's placement in SIR. Exh. Vol. 10 at 1845-46, 1850-51. On 26 May 1989, the prison's Director of Classification disapproved of the protest and advised that White was to be placed into SIR on 26 May 1989 regardless of the protest. Id. at 1851, 1863-64. On 12 June 1989 (one week after his testimony in Parker's trial in Colbert County), White's release into SIR was approved and, on 14 June 1999, he was released from confinement and put into the SIR program. On 18 May 1989, while White's SIR application was being reviewed, May was advised that White might have a connection with Parker's case. May attempted to have White interviewed immediately, but was unable to have the interview conducted until 19 May 1989. On appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals found that there was no evidence that the prosecution suppressed any evidence whatsoever. Parker I, 587 So.2d at 1086. It noted that (1) the contention that White's testimony was secured in exchange for his release was supported only by a coincidence of facts, (2) Parker was aware that White would testify before the trial, and (3) there was no evidence that the prosecution had obtained or had possession of White's arrest history or knowledge of his prior convictions. Id. at 1086-87. The district court held that the Alabama court did not unreasonably apply the Brady suppression element and that the decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. It also held that Parker failed to prove prejudice with regard to either claim. Once a defendant requests the discovery of any favorable evidence material to either guilt or sentence, the prosecution's suppression of such evidence, whether in good or bad faith, violates due process. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97. The prosecutor has a duty not only to disclose such favorable evidence but also to learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf .... Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432, 437, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1565, 1567, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). The duty exists whether or not the prosecutor knew of the existence of the evidence if the evidence was in the possession of the government arm or generally provided only to governmental entities. Martinez v. Wainwright, 621 F.2d 184, 186-87 (5th Cir. 1980). The prosecution does not, however, have an obligation to seek evidence of which it has no knowledge or which is not in its possession. United States v. Luis-Gonzalez, 719 F.2d 1539, 1548 (11th Cir. 1983). Further, there is no suppression if the defendant knew of the information or had equal access to obtaining it. Maharaj v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Corr., 432 F.3d 1292, 1315 n. 4 (11th Cir.2005). In Alabama, a defendant has access to convictions records which are matters of public record and available through counsel's own efforts. Ex parte Perkins, 920 So.2d 599, 606 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (per curiam). To demonstrate a Brady violation, a defendant must show that: (1) the cumulative effect of evidence was favorable because it was exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the prosecution; and (3) the evidence was material; and (4) that the failure to disclose the evidence was prejudicial. Bradley v. Nagle, 212 F.3d 559, 566 (11th Cir.2000) (citation omitted). The prosecution is not required to provide its entire file to the defense, but must disclose material evidence. Stephens v. Hall, 407 F.3d 1195, 1203 (11th Cir.2005) (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). Excluded evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A `reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reasonably applied Brady in finding that the prosecutor did not suppress evidence of White's convictions. The prosecutor provided Parker with all of the information that he had and there was no showing that the prosecutor had knowledge of White's other convictions. White's conviction record was available to Parker's attorneys and used by them in support of the motion for new trial. Further, Parker did not show prejudice. The jury heard White's testimony that he had multiple convictions for burglary; his convictions for theft and breaking and entering were not materially different enough to provide additional bases for discrediting his testimony. Further, even if White's testimony was discredited, same or similar testimony was presented that Parker was looking for a gun on the morning of the murder and that Parker admitted to participating in a murder for hire scheme. [25] Parker is, therefore, also unable to show materiality for White's arrest record. There was also no showing that the Colbert County prosecutor had any knowledge related to White's release or of the delay of his release due to the protest filed by the Lauderdale County prosecutor. White's application for the SIR program was filed months before May learned of his connection with Parker, and was approved before White's interview or testimony. White testified that no one had promised him anything in exchange for his testimony, and May testified that no one had promised White a SIR release in exchange for his testimony. White's SIR supervisor also stated that no one in the Board of Corrections' chain of command, except possibly the Prison Commissioner or the prison's Director of Classification, could move a prisoner to SIR in exchange for his testimony in a case and that he knew of no one who had been so moved. Parker has not shown that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals unreasonably determined the facts regarding his Brady claim as to White's release when it held that the claim was supported only by a coincidence of facts or unreasonably applied Brady in holding that he failed to prove that the prosecution suppressed knowledge of a release agreement. Parker I, 587 So.2d at 1086-87.