Opinion ID: 1044011
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Partial Expungement

Text: A person who satisfies the criteria in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-32-101 (2006 & Supp.2010) is entitled to removal and destruction of public records. K.F. and L.W. argue that they are entitled to expungement of the records for the charges dismissed from their multi-count indictments. The State counters that subsection 40-32-101(a)(1)(E) prohibits expungement of any records related to charges in a multi-count indictment when a defendant has been convicted of at least one count. This issue presents a matter of statutory interpretation to which we apply a de novo standard of review. State v. Marshall, 319 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Tenn. 2010). Our role in statutory interpretation is to carry out legislative intent without broadening or restricting the statute beyond its intended scope. Id. We find legislative intent in the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language when it is unambiguous. Id. When the statute's meaning is in question, however, we may rely on rules of statutory construction. Id. The expungement statute is designed to prevent citizens from being unfairly stigmatized by criminal charges. Adler, 92 S.W.3d at 403. Cognizant of this purpose, we have construed the word charge in the expungement statute to mean `the specific crime the defendant is accused of committing.' Adler, 92 S.W.3d at 402 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.1990)). At the time of the decision in Adler, the expungement statute provided in pertinent part: All public records of a person who has been charged with a misdemeanor or a felony, and which charge has been dismissed ... or a verdict of not guilty returned by the jury ... shall ... be removed and destroyed without cost to such person.... Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-32-101(a)(1) (Supp.2002). We therefore held that a defendant who is convicted of a lesser included offense of the offense sought in the indictment or presentment is entitled to have the record expunged of any greater charge(s) for which the jury finds the defendant not guilty. Adler, 92 S.W.3d at 403. Fewer than five months after our decision in Adler, the General Assembly amended the expungement statute. See Act of May 8, 2003, ch. 175, 2003 Pub. Acts. 292 (codified as amended at Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-32-101 (Supp.2010)). The amended statute now provides: (A) All public records of a person who has been charged with a misdemeanor or a felony shall, upon petition by that person to the court having jurisdiction in the previous action, be removed and destroyed without cost to the person, if: (i) The charge has been dismissed; .... (E) A person shall not be entitled to the expunction of such person's records in a particular case if the person is convicted of any offense or charge, including a lesser included offense or charge. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-32-101(a)(1). The amendment precludes expungement of a conviction for any offense or charge, including a lesser included offense or charge. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-32-101(a)(1)(E). The language is unambiguous. A person who is convicted of a lesser included offense is not entitled to have the records of any greater charges expunged, thus effectively abrogating that part of our decision in Adler. The language is equally clear that the preclusion against expungement is not limited to lesser included offenses. The statute prohibits expungement when a person is convicted of any offense or charge, including a lesser charge. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-32-101(a)(1)(E). This language any offense or charge recognizes that the law permits a conviction for an uncharged offense under certain circumstances. For tactical reasons, a person may choose to plead guilty to an offense that is not charged in the indictment and is not a lesser included offense of the indicted offense. See Studdard v. State, 182 S.W.3d 283, 286-88 (Tenn.2005) (holding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to accept the defendant's guilty plea to incest even though it was not a lesser included offense of the indicted offense of rape of a child). Therefore, a person who is convicted of any offense or charge arising from an individual count in an indictment or presentment is not entitled to expungement of records relating to that count. The amendment precludes expungement for a conviction for a charged or uncharged offense, including a lesser included offense or a lesser charge, arising from an individual count. The State argues that the General Assembly intended section 40-32-101(a)(1)(E) to prohibit expungement of all counts in a multi-count indictment or presentment if any of the counts in the indictment results in a conviction. The State bases its argument on the use of the word case qualifying those records not subject to expungement: A person shall not be entitled to the expunction of such person's records in a particular case if the person is convicted of any offense or charge, including a lesser included offense or charge. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-32-101(a)(1)(E) (emphasis added). The State contends that the word case refers to the entire criminal proceeding that is brought by filing an indictment or presentment, not the individual counts within it. The word case is used in a similar context in another subsection of the expungement statute providing for expungement when a nolle prosequi is entered: Upon petition by a defendant in the court which entered a nolle prosequi in the defendant's case, the court shall order all public records expunged. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-32-101(a)(3) (Supp.1996) (emphases added). The Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the right to expungement in State v. Liddle, 929 S.W.2d 415, 415 (Tenn.Crim.App.1996). [3] In Liddle, the defendant was charged with six separate counts of aggravated battery in a single indictment. In exchange for his plea of guilty to one count, the prosecutor entered a nolle prosequi on the remaining five counts. Because the defendant had pleaded guilty to one count of a multi-count indictment, the trial court denied the petition to expunge the other five counts. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, finding no indication that the right to expungement applies only to an entire indictment as opposed to individual charges within an indictment. Id. at 415. We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals' construction of the word case in Liddle. We presume that the General Assembly intends the same meaning throughout a statute for the same language used in the same context. Madison Suburban Util. Dist. v. Carson, 191 Tenn. 300, 232 S.W.2d 277, 280 (1950). Moreover, we presume that the General Assembly has knowledge of its prior enactments and is fully aware of any judicial constructions of those enactments. Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 751, 762 (Tenn.2010). The General Assembly was aware of the construction of the word case in Liddle when it used the same word in a similar context in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-32-101(a)(1). We therefore hold that a conviction for one count in a multi-count indictment or presentment does not preclude expungement of the records relating to a separate count when the criteria of section 40-32-101 have been satisfied. [4] K.F. is entitled to the expunction of all public records of her charges of harassment and aggravated criminal trespass, which were dismissed. No conviction for any offense or charge, including a lesser included offense or charge, arose from these counts in the indictment. Her conviction for domestic assault arose from a separate count in the indictment. L.W. is entitled to the expunction of all public records of her charge of felony possession of cocaine. No conviction for any offense or charge, including a lesser included offense or charge, arose from this count in the indictment. Her conviction for misdemeanor possession of marijuana arose from a separate count in the indictment. Although the trial court concluded that L.W. was not entitled to partial expungement due to the intertwined nature of the charges, the State has not argued on appeal to this Court that the intertwined nature of the charges prohibits expungement.