Opinion ID: 587754
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Preponderance of the Evidence Standard Applies to Forfeiture Under Section 853(a)(1)

Text: 16 Since we have determined that Congress may apply a less strenuous standard of proof than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to criminal forfeiture, we must next determine which standard of proof Congress intended to apply to forfeiture under section 853. We start by again looking to the statutory language. Blum, 465 U.S. at 896, 104 S.Ct. at 1547-48. Section 853(d) 11 provides that the property of a person convicted of certain felonies is subject to forfeiture if the government establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the property was acquired during the period of the crime or within a reasonable time thereafter and that there was no likely source for such property other than the crime. Consequently, the property would be subject to forfeiture, unless the defendant rebuts the presumption by presenting sufficient evidence to the contrary. This presumption would have no significance if the government was still required to prove forfeiture beyond a reasonable doubt. Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d at 1577. 12 Accordingly, section 853(d) authorizes the use of the preponderance standard. 17 The language of the section 853(d) presumption clearly addresses the property outlined in section 853(a)(1). Section 853(a)(1) relates to proceeds of narcotics violations obtained directly or indirectly. Section 853(d) relates to property acquired during the period of the violation or within a reasonable time thereafter, and for which there is no likely source other than the narcotics violation. While section 853(d) does not specifically state that it is referring to proceeds, it logically follows that property acquired during or soon after a violation with no other likely source other than the violation is simply a more sophisticated way of saying proceeds resulting from the violation. This interpretation is strengthened by the legislative history for section 853(d), which states that the presumption will be useful in obtaining forfeiture of the huge profits produced by illicit drug trafficking. 1984 U.S.S.C.A.N. at 3182, 3395. Not only are profits and proceeds synonymous, but the legislative history further states that the purpose of the presumption is to aid in the forfeiture of proceeds. Id. Accordingly, the section 853(d) presumption and, therefore, the preponderance of the evidence standard applies to property subject to forfeiture under section 853(a)(1), the proceeds of narcotics violations. 18 This holding is further supported by section 853(o), which provides that [t]he provisions of this section shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes. 13 In enacting section 853, Congress intended to save valuable judicial and law enforcement resources, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3182, 3380, by eliminating the need for separate, duplicative proceedings. The legislative history consistently reflects the aim of expediting the forfeiture of drug-related proceeds. That goal would be frustrated if the beyond a reasonable doubt standard was required in forfeiture proceedings against drug proceeds because the government would likely choose to pursue a civil forfeiture action under section 881, which allows proof by preponderance of the evidence. Hence, section 853 would remain largely unused and, contrary to congressional intent, contribute little to more efficient forfeiture proceedings. Holding that the presumption, and thus the preponderance standard, applies to property forfeitable under section 853(a)(1) is consistent with the legislative history for section 853(d) which states that its purpose is to facilitate forfeiture of proceeds, not to facilitate all forfeitures. 1984 U.S.S.C.A.N. at 3182, 3395. 14 19 Elgersma argues that there are references to the standard of proof in the Senate Report indicating that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is required in criminal forfeiture. 15 He avers that the Report twice states that the standard of proof for civil forfeiture was lower than that for criminal forfeiture. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3182, 3379, 3393. These references, however, pertain to the law prior to the enactment of section 853. 16 One of Congress' reasons for passing the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 was to correct the problem[s] with what were the then current forfeiture statutes. Id. at 3375 (This bill is intended to eliminate the statutory limitations and ambiguities that have frustrated active pursuit of forfeiture by Federal law enforcement agencies.). Elgersma also notes that in discussing the burden of proof in subsequent ancillary proceedings where third parties challenge forfeiture, the Report states that [s]ince the United States will have already proven its forfeiture allegations in the criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt, the burden of proof at the hearing will be on the third party. Id. at 3392. However, this reference does not relate to criminal forfeiture under the CCE which is the subject of this case; rather, the reference relates to criminal forfeiture under RICO. While the forfeiture provisions of the CCE and RICO are similar, they are not identical. The most significant difference between the two provisions, as it relates to the present case, is that the forfeiture provisions under RICO do not include the rebuttable presumption that section 853(d) provides, which establishes the preponderance of the evidence standard. 20 The Supreme Court has examined section 853 in two related cases concerning the Sixth Amendment; however, neither addressed the question of the applicable burden of proof. See Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 109 S.Ct. 2646, 105 L.Ed.2d 528 (1989); United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 109 S.Ct. 2657, 105 L.Ed.2d 512 (1989). 17 Three other circuits have addressed this issue directly and unanimously concluded that Congress intended the standard of proof in criminal forfeiture under section 853 to be the preponderance of the evidence standard. United States v. Herrero, 893 F.2d 1512, 1541-42 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 927, 110 S.Ct. 2623, 110 L.Ed.2d 644 (1990); Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d at 1576-78; Sandini, 816 F.2d at 874-76. 18 While these cases discuss the preponderance of the evidence standard as it applies to property forfeitable under section 853 generally, and not just property forfeitable under section 853(a)(1), a closer examination of two of these cases reveals that their holdings are consistent with our holding in the present case. 21 In Herrero the court found the preponderance of the evidence standard applicable and the property forfeitable because the property was obtained (1) during the drug conspiracy, and (2) there was no other likely source for the property other than the conspiracy. Herrero, 893 F.2d at 1542. Therefore, Herrero held that the preponderance standard applies to property which meets the section 853(d) requirements, i.e., drug proceeds. 22 The similarity between the holding in Hernandez-Escarsega and our holding here is even more apparent. The Ninth Circuit explained that the requirements needed for the section 853(d) presumption to apply are identical to factual determinations prescribed in section 853(a)(1). Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d at 1576. (If the jury found the predicate facts of section 853(d), it also had to be convinced by a preponderance of the evidence of the ultimate factual determination prescribed in section 853(a)(1), that the property be obtained directly or indirectly from the continuing criminal enterprise.). Therefore, our holding that the presumption applies to property forfeitable under section 853(a)(1), is in accord with the Ninth Circuit's holding in Hernandez-Escarsega. 23 Elgersma's residence in Marathon, Florida, was found not to be forfeitable under section 853(a)(1); rather, this property was found forfeitable under sections 853(a)(2) and (3). Since it is debatable whether the section 853(d) presumption and the preponderance standard it employs applies to the forfeiture of the property in Marathon, Florida, there remains a question as to whether the district court committed plain error in finding it forfeitable. 19 We agree with the panel decision that the district court did not commit plain error and we adopt the panel's reasoning in that regard. See Elgersma, 929 F.2d at 1550-51. 20