Opinion ID: 2559058
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Consent Allegations Inadequate

Text: Wireless argues that if Crown's consent was required, the Amended Complaint adequately alleges that Crown consented to increases in the Loan Commitment. The Amended Complaint contains the following allegations regarding Crown's alleged consent to increases in the Loan Commitment: Section 2.2 of the Loan Agreement contemplates that Wireless, with Crown's consent, may add additional towers or licenses to existing towers that would, by virtue of increased revenues, also increase the Loan Commitment under the formula contained in the Loan Agreement. Crown consented to increases in the Loan Commitment based on the addition of certain licenses to existing towers owned by Wireless. Wireless asserts that the Loan Agreement's consent requirement would be met by Crown consenting to Wireless adding licenses to existing towers that would, by virtue of increased revenues, also increase the Loan Commitment under the formula contained in the Loan Agreement. The Superior Court noted that these allegations of consent that Wireless added to its Amended Complaint are in [a] passive voice. Who increased it? How did it get increased? I mean, you are being very vague there. And that's troublesome because this goes to the heart of the argument that we had in December. The Superior Court reasoned, saying that Crown consented is simply a conclusion. It doesn't say how Crown consented. To the extent that it says how they did that in the allegation, it would be based upon the addition of certain licenseswhich is what you did, not themto existing towers owned by Wireless.... [2] Alternatively, Wireless argues that the Agreement's written consent requirement was satisfied by alleging that Crown furnished spreadsheets showing that the then-current Loan Commitment amount as of December 31, 2008 was $8,514,480.17. Wireless alleges that such spreadsheets constitute written expressions of Crown's consent. Crown responds that its calculation of the maximum permissible borrowing capacity under the Agreement's Tower Cash Flow formula is in no way the equivalent of an expression of intentin writingto obligate itself to advance funds up to that amount. The words Loan Commitment do not appear on the spreadsheets. The spreadsheet calculates the Loan Used to Date, the Max[imum] Loan Available and the Remaining Loan Capacity. Those terms are consistent with the Agreement, which imposed a formula to cap the maximum Loan Commitment and granted Crown the discretion to loan up that amount ( i.e., the remaining loan capacity.). The Superior Court held that Crown's calculations on a spreadsheet cannot, as a matter of law, constitute the written consent required by the Agreement. We agree. Finally, Wireless alleges that the requirements of a formal writing may be waived. Wireless claims that Crown advanced funds in the past and accordingly, increased the Loan Commitment amount without providing evidence of its written consent. Crown asserts that the loan itself is evidence of Crown's consent. The Superior Court agreed with Crown's position: It's one thing for a lender to obligate itself to a loan by advancing the money without including a written statement that the loan amount has been increased. They forked over the money. At that point they couldn't say, wait a minute, give us the money back, or something along those lines, because the money has been advanced and that's that; even if there's no written document to that effect. So that's one thing. It's another thing to say, however, that because in one instance or more the lender has turned over the increased loan amount without a written statement that because it's done that in a few instances in the past ... that henceforward they are obligated to turn over money and not put it in writing. The Agreement recites that neither [it] nor any portion or provisions hereof may be changed, modified, amended, waived, supplemented, discharged, cancelled, or terminated orally or by any course of dealing, or in any manner other than by an agreement in writing, signed by the party to be charged. The Superior Court properly ruled that there is no basis to conclude that Crown's past advances amount to a waiver of its discretionary ability to refuse to consent in the future.