Opinion ID: 2831116
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reversible Trial Errors

Text: Because we find that the evidence presented to the jury was sufficient to support the Defendants' convictions, we now turn to the Defendants' allegations regarding supposed errors that - 30 - might warrant a new trial. Specifically, Cruz-Ramos argues that the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress the August 2010 search of his home that led to his arrest, the seizure of numerous guns and large amounts of drugs, and the arrest of Bernard and several other people in the house. The Defendants also collectively argue that the district court erred during jury selection and in making certain evidentiary rulings at trial.
To start us off, Cruz-Ramos claims that the district court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the fruits of the 2010 police search of his home (and the car garaged there), as the police had no probable cause to enter his home without a warrant, let alone to search. He also argues that the statements he made to police after the search (and his subsequent arrest) should also be suppressed as fruits of the poisonous search. Because we agree with Cruz-Ramos that probable cause was lacking and therefore the search of the home and car violated the Fourth Amendment, we find that the evidence seized during the search should have been suppressed. We also conclude that including the erroneously admitted evidence at trial was not harmless, given the lack of other compelling evidence linking CruzRamos to drug crimes, and thus, a new trial for Cruz-Ramos is warranted. - 31 - District Court Decision Based on the testimony from three law enforcement agents (the only witnesses to testify at the suppression hearing), the district court made the following factual findings. See United States v. Beras, 183 F.3d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 1999) (In reviewing the court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress, we recite the facts as found by the district court to the extent they are not clearly erroneous.).18 On August 28, 2010, Puerto Rico Police Department Officer Carlos A. Jimenez-Rolon showed up at Las Dalias housing project around 2:30 a.m. to conduct a preventative round (Las Dalias had one of the highest crime rates of the island's housing projects). During the round, Officer Jimenez-Rolon saw a man walking. The Officer got out of his (marked) car and told the man to stop. Instead of complying, the man took off running. Officer Jimenez-Rolon gave chase. The man reached into his pocket and threw an unidentified object toward the second story of the nearby building. 18 While Cruz-Ramos additionally argues that some of the district court's factual findings were clearly erroneous, see United States v. Brown, 621 F.3d 48, 55 (1st Cir. 2010), we need not address that argument, as we conclude that even adopting the court's findings as-is, there was no probable cause to search. - 32 - Office Jimenez-Rolon realized he wouldn't be able to catch the fleer, so instead went to investigate what the man had purged from his pocket. Officer Jimenez-Rolon went up to the second floor of the nearby building and discovered a different man lying down (presumably in the hallway), with a firearm at his side. Officer Jimenez-Rolon arrested this man and took him to the police station.19 At the police station, Officer Jimenez-Rolon began to interview the arrested man. The arrestee told Officer JimenezRolon that if the police could provide security to his family, he would tell them where to find Bernard, one of Puerto Rico's mostwanted fugitives for allegedly shooting down the municipal helicopter. Officer Jimenez-Rolon brought his supervisor, Lieutenant Luis David Flores-Ortiz, into the loop, and Lieutenant Flores-Ortiz agreed to the deal and continued with the interview. Lieutenant Flores-Ortiz had not met or spoken to the man prior to this encounter, and as far as the Lieutenant knew, the man had never previously served as an informant to the Puerto Rico police. The arrestee (who we'll call from now on the Informant) told Lieutenant Flores-Ortiz that Bernard was hiding at a house in 19Among the other details that are difficult to gather from the police officers' story, it is unclear why the police arrested this man. The record does not reflect that he was charged with any crime (i.e., unlawful possession of a firearm), or that his tip, which we discuss shortly, was provided in exchange for prosecutorial leniency. - 33 - the Berwind Estates housing subdivision in Rio Piedras with at least four other people -- Cruz-Ramos, two females, and perhaps other unidentified males. Bernard would have on him many weapons, firearms, and controlled substances, the Informant warned. Four rifles would also be hidden in a flower box on the terrace, and sidearms (like Berettas and Glocks) and drugs would be in a hidden compartment in a red Ford Expedition. The Informant did not provide any further details concerning what police would find at the home, nor a description of the house. The Informant said Bernard wouldn't stick around for long and would depart at sun-up through the back of the house. The Informant further warned that Bernard would open fire at the police as soon as he saw them. Upon leaving the Berwind Estates home, Bernard would head for the Las Dalias housing project, the Informant claimed, at which point the PRPD would lose their opportunity to arrest him that night. The brief interview ended sometime between 3:30 and 4:00 a.m. Despite the fact that neither the Puerto Rico police nor Lieutenant Flores-Ortiz had any prior relationship with the Informant, the Lieutenant deemed him reliable based on the fact that both the Informant and Bernard came from the Las Dalias housing project, and thus the Informant could likely be part of Bernard's 'close-knit' group and know Bernard's whereabouts. - 34 - With that, shortly after the interview ended, Officer Jimenez-Rolon drove the Informant to the house where Bernard was supposedly located. After they reached Berwind Estates and passed a manned security hut, the Informant pointed out a good-sized residence with lots of vegetation behind and to the side of it. The vegetation was relatively thick, but someone hiding in the bushes could still be seen from certain angles. A terrace with a flower box was also visible. Apparently satisfied with what he had observed, Officer Jimenez-Rolon took the Informant back to the police station, and around 5:00 a.m., the police returned to the house to arrest Bernard. They did not attempt to obtain either a federal or local search warrant to enter or search the home. After the police secured the home's perimeter (and extended the perimeter out to the guardhouse), an entry team comprising six officers entered through the property through the vegetation on the side of the house, crossed over the terra-cotta floored portion of the carport driveway, and proceeded to the door located on the side terrace. To enter the carport, the officers had to jump a cement wall, and to enter the terrace, they opened a closed gate. From the terrace, the officers saw through a window an unidentified female sitting in the kitchen. They told her they were police, instructed her to stay silent, and asked her to open - 35 - the door. She complied. They asked the woman where Bernard was, and she said he was in the bedroom. While the police made their way to the bedroom, other men (including Cruz-Ramos) appeared out of adjacent rooms. The officers detained them. The police continued into the bedroom, where they found Bernard in a bed either asleep or just halfawake. Close by Bernard was a pistol. They arrested him. All of the detained people were also arrested for harboring a fugitive. With everyone under arrest and the house secure, Officer Jimenez-Rolon searched the flower box on the terrace, where he found hidden under the dirt four rifles. Then he went in the house, walked through the foyer and through a glass door that opened into the carport, where a red Ford Expedition was parked. In the car, Officer Jimenez-Rolon found a hidden compartment with weapons, ammo, and drugs. Officer Jimenez-Rolon seized all of the drugs and guns he found. Cruz-Ramos, along with the other arrestees, was taken to the police department following his arrest. Sometime between 10:30 a.m. and noon, Cruz-Ramos was placed in a small room with three federal agents for an interview, which was not recorded. CruzRamos was verbally apprised of his constitutional rights (particularly, his right to remain silent and his right to an attorney), and while he acknowledged that he understood them, he refused to sign any paperwork waiving his rights. - 36 - The police proceeded to interview Cruz-Ramos anyway, and he told the agents that he lived in the house where he and Bernard were arrested, but that he was originally from the Las Gladiolas housing project. He admitted to being affiliated with a group of housing projects that were partners and supported each other. Cruz-Ramos also admitted to carrying a gun for personal defense and to having numerous rifles hidden or buried somewhere. He told the agents that he knew Bernard because they hung out together in different bars, and Bernard was acquainted with his stepdaughter. Cruz-Ramos said he knew Bernard was wanted by the police and had tried to arrange for Bernard to find a lawyer and surrender himself. Based on all these facts, the district court concluded that the police had probable cause to search Cruz-Ramos's home without a warrant. Specifically, the court found that [a]lthough the Informant had never provided information before, and only offered the information upon his arrest and interrogation, all of the other facts and circumstances support the [police's] conclusion that the Informant was indeed truthful and reliable. Those facts were: the Informant was arrested in Las Dalias, a housing project that Bernard was associated with; the Informant provided very detailed information; the Informant agreed to travel with Officer Jimenez-Rolon to point[] out the precise residence, which matched the description he had already provided; and the - 37 - Informant put himself in danger by providing the tip. The court also found that exigent circumstances were present, namely, Bernard's risk of escape and the threat he posed to public safety. Additionally, the court concluded that the warrantless search of the Ford Expedition was legal, as the Informant had provided a basis for probable cause that guns and drugs were hidden in it. While the court found no exigency, it nonetheless denied suppression of the car-search based on the auto exception to the warrant requirement. See United States v. Polanco, 634 F.3d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting that under the auto exception, if there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity, agents can search without a warrant any area of the vehicle in which the evidence may be found (internal quotation marks omitted)). Even if the automobile exception didn't apply though, the police made a good faith error because based on their legal presence on [the] property, the probable cause known to them at the time, and the automobile exception, it was entirely reasonable for them to believe that the warrantless search of the Expedition was justified, the district court concluded. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 348-49 (1987) (recognizing that evidence resulting from a Fourth Amendment violation should only be suppressed if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment (internal - 38 - quotation marks omitted)). The court did, however, exclude the search of the flower box, on the grounds that even though the police had probable cause, there were no exigent circumstances to justify searching there because Bernard had been arrested and the house was secure, rendering safety a non-issue. The court likewise excluded the fruits of the flower-box search (four rifles found under the dirt) because they dropped from a poisonous tree (the illegal search of the flower box), and no good faith exception applied.20 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963) ([E]vidence seized during an unlawful search [can]not constitute proof against the victim of the search.). As for Cruz-Ramos's statement to the police, the court found that it could not be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous search because the search of the house was not poisonous (i.e., illegal). The court likewise rejected Cruz-Ramos's argument that his statement was not given voluntarily, which he said violated the Fifth Amendment. No Probable Cause As we hinted at above, the focus of our analysis here is on whether the police had probable cause to search Cruz-Ramos's home. Cruz-Ramos argues that since the sole basis of probable 20 The government does not dispute the suppression of the flower-box evidence. - 39 - cause was the uncorroborated tip from an unknown informant, the police needed more than just his word to search without a warrant. [W]e review de novo the district court's conclusions of law, including its application of the law to the facts, its probable cause . . . determination[], and the district court's ultimate legal decision to grant or deny the motion to suppress. United States v. Camacho, 661 F.3d 718, 724 (1st Cir. 2011). In assessing whether there was probable cause for a search, our task, like that of the . . . district court, is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. United States v. McLellan, No. 14-1561, 2015 WL 4071914, at  (1st Cir. July 6, 2015) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). We first provide a little background on the relevant law before diving into our analysis. The Fourth Amendment instructs that no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Based on this constitutional tenet, the law clearly establishes that even when police have a warrant to arrest someone, a search warrant is still ordinarily required to enter the home of a third person to arrest an individual who is believed to be - 40 - inside the home. Fletcher v. Town of Clinton, 196 F.3d 41, 49 (1st Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, a warrantless entry into a person's dwelling may be permitted to effect an arrest, United States v. Samboy, 433 F.3d 154, 158 (1st Cir. 2005), so long as two conditions are met: one, the police had probable cause to enter the home, and two, exigent circumstances existed, like a fugitive's threat to public safety. Hegarty v. Somerset Cty., 53 F.3d 1367, 1373-74 (1st Cir. 1995). And probable cause only exists when the totality of the circumstances suggests that there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. United States v. Gifford, 727 F.3d 92, 98 (1st Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). As was the case here, police often rely on tips from confidential informants to underlie probable cause. But the principle is long-standing that [e]ven where a search warrant is obtained, the police must show a basis for the search beyond the mere fact of an assertion by an informer. Recznik v. City of Lorain, 393 U.S. 166, 169 (1968). It follows then that [a]t least as much is required to support a search without a warrant. Id. at 169-70. Therefore, when, as here, the primary basis for a probable cause determination is information provided by a confidential informant, law enforcement must provide some information from which a [court] can credit the informant's - 41 - credibility. Gifford, 727 F.3d at 99. In other words, a probable cause finding may be based on an informant's tip so long as the probability of a lying or inaccurate informer has been sufficiently reduced. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). To help assess an informant's reliability, we look to a nonexhaustive list of factors:
knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information; (2) whether an informant's statements reflect first-hand knowledge; (3) whether some or all of the informant's factual statements were corroborated wherever reasonable and practicable (e.g., through police surveillance); and (4) whether a law enforcement [officer] assessed, from his professional standpoint, experience, and expertise, the probable significance of the informant's provided information. United States v. Tiem Trinh, 665 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2011) (citations, internal quotations marks, and alterations omitted). Applying these factors to the instant case, we find that there is simply no indication on this record that the police explored the Informant's basis of knowledge for the information he relayed, or that the police bothered to corroborate any of the information that actually suggested that criminal activity was afoot at Cruz-Ramos's home. Even if we were to agree with the district court that the information the Informant provided was detailed, we find that because the police did not sufficiently - 42 - test the reliability of the detailed information, the denial of the motion to suppress cannot stand. Specifically, nothing in the district court's factual findings indicates the informant's basis of knowledge, such as whether the informant had firsthand knowledge of Bernard's whereabouts (i.e., he had seen Bernard at the house), or just heard about it as hearsay or through rumor. See Gifford, 727 F.3d at 100; cf. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234 (1983) ([An informant's] explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed firsthand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case.). Notably, the only basis Lieutenant Flores-Ortiz articulated for trusting the Informant was that because he came from the same housing project as Bernard, [h]e could form a part of [Bernard's] close-knit group. That inference could implicate every resident in the complex, yet Lieutenant Flores-Ortiz apparently never bothered to ask the Informant whether he actually was part of Bernard's crew. The Informant could have been relaying a rumor he overheard on the street, or even fabricating the information. It is also undisputed that the police here had no past history with the informant to establish that informant's credibility. See Gifford, 727 at 100; cf. United States v. Dixon, 787 F.3d 55, 59 (1st Cir. 2015) (that informant had given police fruitful tips in the past and police had met with the informant - 43 - before in person on several occasions supported the informant's reliability). Furthermore, while the district court credited the police for corroborating the Informant's tips, our review shows that the only information the police actually corroborated before they entered the premises was the Informant's (very general) outside description of the house. Indeed, all the police did here before entering the premises was drive by the home and confirm the readily apparent details the Informant described -- that the home was in the gated community the Informant identified and had a flower box. But this kind of information, indeed, the kind that is immediately visible to anyone who passes the house, is not -- without more -- useful information when it comes to making a probable cause determination. True, corroboration of even innocent activity reported in [a] tip may support a finding of probable cause, at least when [c]orroboration of apparently innocent activity can establish the reliability of the informant because the activity might come to appear suspicious in light of the initial tip. Tiem Trinh, 665 F.3d at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the information must be at least marginally useful in establishing that criminal activity is afoot. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990) (noting that it is also important that . . . 'the anonymous tip contained a range of - 44 - details relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted.' (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 245)). Here, the police did not corroborate any of the information that might actually have suggested suspicious activity. For instance, one could find it curious to see multiple adults (at least one the Informant even identified by name) coming in and out of a single-family home. Or perhaps if the police had staked out the house, they might have seen someone protectively guarding or manipulating the flower box in an unusual way. Cf. id. at 11 (police conducted surveillance to corroborate much of the informant's information, including the fact that the informant had, multiple times, been in and out of the house where the purported drug operation was going down). In sum, we find that the police did not do enough to confirm the unknown Informant's story such that probable cause could issue.21 21 The fourth Tiem Trinh factor, whether the police officer assessed from his professional standpoint the probable significance of the tip, 665 F.3d at 10, is arguably met here because Lieutenant Flores-Ortiz did surmise that the Informant was reliable. However, we give his assessment little weight because the police knew nothing about the Informant other than his affiliation with Las Dalias and still did not inquire into the Informant's source of knowledge. Thus, the officer had no real basis for making his assessment. The district court, relying on an out-of-circuit case, also emphasized that the Informant put himself in danger by providing the tip. See United States v. One 56-Foot Yacht Named Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276, 1287 (9th Cir. 1983) (considering as a factor in the reliability analysis that [t]he information was given to the - 45 - Our outcome should be no surprise, given our precedent. In addition to the test we laid out in Tiem Trinh, we have emphasized on multiple occasions that an informant's reliability must be vetted. For instance, in United States v. Jordan, we carefully weighed the police's efforts to corroborate a hearsay tip, and specifically noted some of the various means by which an informant could be corroborated, such as direct surveillance or circumstantial evidence, vouchsaf[ing] by a highly experienced law enforcement officer, independent corroboration (i.e., conducting controlled drug buys), and most particularly, the informant's history of providing reliable information and investigative assistance to the police in the past. 999 F.2d 11, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1993). We found that on balance, all of these efforts on the part of the police sufficed to corroborate the informant's tip. In Dixon, the police officer took similar measure, meeting with the informant face-to-face on several occasions, independently corroborat[ing] facts, including not government in circumstances subjecting the informants to possible personal or penal risk (alterations omitted)). But even if we took into account the risk of retaliation the Informant faced, the record does not reflect that La ONU knew or would have been able to figure out that the (confidential) Informant was the one talking to police. If the Informant had heard the information through a rumor or eavesdropping, there would be no reason -- at least not one we can discern from this record -- to think the gang would suspect him. And we reiterate that the officers here did not probe the Informant's basis of knowledge (e.g., whether the Informant knew the information because he was in the gang and thus would be in danger because he cooperated). - 46 - only innocent facts like the defendant's phone number and cartype, but also by conducting controlled drug buys that were carefully monitored and regulated to minimize the chance that the [informant] could have falsely implicated the defendant. 787 F.3d at 59. Further, the informant in that case also had given fruitful tips in the past. Id. In contrast, anyone driving by Cruz-Ramos's home could parlay the generic description the Informant gave, and confirming only those innocuous details is not, on its own, sufficient to corroborate a tip from an unknown confidential informant. The Informant did not even say that the house was the only one in the area with a flower box, meaning that the flower box's existence did not make for a distinguishing characteristic. Given the lack of other indicia of the Informant's reliability, the police had an obligation to corroborate something of the tip before entering Cruz-Ramos's home without a warrant. See Recznik, 393 U.S. at 169 (finding that police did not have probable cause to enter a home when no effort was made to show that either the petitioner or the apartment was at that time connected with criminal activity, and the police did not even attempt to establish that the informers were reliable). In sum, there was no probable cause to search Cruz-Ramos's home. Cruz-Ramos further asserts that the search of his car was also illegal for lack of probable cause. As we discussed - 47 - above, the Informant's tip was not sufficiently reliable on its own, and we agree with Cruz-Ramos that the same reasoning extends to the search of the Expedition. See United States v. Dickerson, 514 F.3d 60, 66 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that police may only conduct a warrantless search of a car if there is probable cause to believe the car has contraband or evidence of a crime (emphasis added)). Contrary to the district court's decision, we conclude that the initial entry into the home was illegal, and so the police could not form probable cause from what illicit activity they observed once they entered the home. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.). Thus, there was no basis for probable cause to search the Expedition. For the same reason, the so-called automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment does nothing to save the search of Cruz-Ramos's car (assuming the exception even applies to a car parked within the curtilage of a defendant's home, as was the case here). See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 460-62 (1971). Sure, the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home, such that warrantless examinations of automobiles have been upheld in - 48 - circumstances in which a search of a home . . . would not.22 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976). However, police still need probable cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband before conducting a warrantless search. United States v. Silva, 742 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2014). As with a home-search, in this context [p]robable cause exists when the facts and circumstances as to which police have reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that evidence of a crime will be found. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis added). As we discussed, the police did not probe the Informant's basis for his claims that weapons and drugs were in the car and therefore had no reasonable basis for believing the Informant's tip, such that probable cause could issue on the tip alone. One final point on probable cause -- that the police actually did end up finding guns, drugs, and, of course, Bernard in Cruz-Ramos's home cannot enter our calculus, as [a] search unlawful at its inception may [not] be validated by what it turns up. United States v. Mercedes-De La Cruz, 787 F.3d 61, 69 (1st The logic behind this automobile exception is that [o]ne 22 has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976) (internal quotation mark omitted). - 49 - Cir. 2015) (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Based on these facts,23 we conclude that there was no probable cause to enter Cruz-Ramos's home or car. Thus, while we certainly understand (though we do not address whether) exigency may have been a legitimate concern here because of Bernard's status as a dangerous fugitive, the Constitution does not permit the police to forego a search warrant in situations like this based on exigency alone. Rather, as we have discussed, they also need probable cause. See Hegarty, 53 F.3d at 1373-74. The Seized Physical Evidence We must next consider whether the evidence seized as a result of the illegal search should also have been suppressed at trial. It is well established under the exclusionary rule that generally, evidence seized during an unlawful search [can]not constitute proof against the victim of the search. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484. That is, the government may make no use of evidence illegally seized. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961). It's clear, then, that per the plain language of the exclusionary rule, 23To the extent additional facts came out during the two-day evidentiary hearing that the district court did not address in its decision, the government did not point them out to us. Indeed, the government's curiously scant brief did not provide any developed argument as to the motion to suppress (as well as several other issues the Defendants raised), instead choosing to simply regurgitate large chunks of the district court's factual findings. - 50 - the physical evidence seized during the illegal search of CruzRamos's home (including the car and flower box), should have been suppressed. The district court said as much when it determined that if the initial entry into Cruz-Ramos's home was illegal, then everything subsequently discovered by the [police] would be subject to suppression as fruit of the poisonous tree.24 Like most rules, however, the exclusionary rule has exceptions. We examine their applicability next. Good-Faith Exception Police practices trigger the harsh sanction of exclusion only when they are deliberate enough to yield meaningful deterrence, and culpable enough to be worth the price paid by the justice system. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). This good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule dictates, then, that even when the seizure of evidence results from a Fourth Amendment violation, that evidence should only be suppressed if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Krull, 480 U.S. at 348-49 (internal quotation marks omitted). 24 The government does not dispute this conclusion in its briefing. - 51 - We conclude that the good-faith exception does nothing for the government here. For one, the government did not ask us to invoke the exception. Cf. United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2013) (finding that a good-faith argument can be waived, at least when the government fails to raise it below); United States v. Archibald, 589 F.3d 289, 301 n.12 (6th Cir. 2009) (declining to address the good-faith exception where it had not been raised, preserved, or argued by the government). In fact, the government makes no argument concerning the good-faith exception at all, even though it bears the heavy burden of proving that the good-faith exception applies. Wurie, 728 F.3d at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted). Regardless, the good-faith exception would not help the government in this case. Lieutenant Flores-Ortiz admitted at the evidentiary hearing that the reason the police did not try to get a warrant was because to get a warrant, PRPD must 'conduct several surveillances over a period of days, a lot of photographs, videos; and the process gets complicated. It's a process that takes a great deal of time.' Cruz-Ramos urges us to interpret this testimony as an admission that the police specifically knew that corroboration was generally necessary for probable cause, did not want to put in the work required to get it, and decided to barge into Cruz-Ramos's home anyway. And the government makes no argument that we should interpret the testimony differently. Based - 52 - on Cruz-Ramos's interpretation of the testimony (which is not contradicted by the district court's findings, and, again, importantly, was not disputed by the government), the officers' disregard of the lack of probable cause was certainly deliberate, such that excluding the evidence would have [r]eal deterrent value, Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427-28, in discouraging future intentional and unlawful police practices. See Krull, 480 U.S. at 348-49; Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) (noting that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is deterring Fourth Amendment violations in the future).25 The Supreme Court has also said, however, that [f]or exclusion to be appropriate, the deterrence benefits of suppression must outweigh its heavy costs. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 25We note that the record in this case, as it was presented to us, reflects that the good-faith exception does not apply because the police acted in deliberate disregard of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, we need not address today the full extent of the exception's applicability to warrantless searches in general. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2439 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing scenarios where the good-faith exception has been applied and noting that the good-faith exception has not generally been applied to warrantless searches). Nor need we address whether the exception applies to negligent police mistakes. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 146 (2009) (stating that negligent police mistakes could also be sufficiently culpable to bar application of the good-faith exception, at least [i]n a case where systemic errors were demonstrated, such that it might be reckless for officers to rely on an unreliable . . . system); see also Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2439 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that if courts apply the exclusionary rule only where a Fourth Amendment violation was deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent, then the good faith exception will swallow the exclusionary rule (internal quotation marks omitted)). - 53 - 2427. We recognize (indeed, regret) the substantial social costs that might come to bear as a result of the vacation of Cruz-Ramos's conviction and his resulting re-trial. See id. As we noted above, the police found several guns in the car, along with an extraordinary amount of drugs (specifically, more than 1,000 decks of heroin, 80 baggies of cocaine, 21 containers of marijuana, 740 vials of crack, and almost 1,000 vials of crack), and it's a hard pill to swallow that none of that evidence can be introduced at Cruz-Ramos's trial. But the law instructs us that [w]hen the police exhibit deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh the resulting costs. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). So is the case here, as we cannot overlook the egregious Fourth Amendment violation that occurred. At the end of the day, law enforcement simply cannot cut corners at the cost of a person's constitutional privileges. We conclude that the exclusionary rule bars the admission of evidence obtained from the illegal search of CruzRamos's house and car. Harmless Error Even if the evidence was illegally obtained (and even if the police had no good-faith reason to seize it), we will only remand for a new trial if letting in the evidence was not harmless. - 54 - United States v. Burgos-Montes, 786 F.3d 92, 114 (1st Cir. 2015). While the government does not address this issue in its brief,26 we conclude that the introduction of the seized evidence in this case was not harmless. Since the error here rises to the level of constitutional, we must assess whether we can consider the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Trenkler, 61 F.3d 45, 60 n.22 (1st Cir. 1995). We must find, then, that beyond a reasonable doubt, it is highly probable that the result would have been the same if the error had not occurred. United States v. Leon-Delfis, 203 F.3d 103, 112 (1st Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). We are not concerned here with whether there was sufficient evidence on which the petitioner could have been convicted without the evidence complained of. United States v. Argentine, 814 F.2d 783, 789 (1st Cir. 1987). Instead, [t]he question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction. Id. We have the discretion to address harmless error sua sponte 26 in certain situations, but we remind the government that it bears the burden of persuasion with respect to showing that the error was harmless. United States v. Rose, 104 F.3d 1408, 1414 (1st Cir. 1997). We will not fret over whether it is appropriate to exercise our discretion to address harmlessness here despite the government's failure to raise it because the argument would have failed anyway. - 55 - Cruz-Ramos points out (and the government does not dispute) that the evidence seized from Cruz-Ramos's car -- seven guns, and more drugs than we care to recount -- was the only physical evidence at trial that directly connected Cruz-Ramos to La ONU activities (or to any drug trafficking). As far as we can tell, without this physical evidence the only other evidence connecting Cruz-Ramos to anything illegal was the testimony of the cooperators, which they provided in exchange for leniency in their own cases. Further, as Cruz-Ramos points out, even if we take the witnesses at their word, their testimony did not make for a slamdunk for the government by any means -- for instance, while Gutierrez-Santana initially said that Cruz-Ramos was at the planning meeting for Pequeque's murder, he later (unequivocally) testified on cross that Cruz-Ramos was not there. See United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1123 (1st Cir. 1978) (considering that the government's case consisted primarily of the testimony of admitted accomplices, whose credibility was attacked in finding that a constitutional error was not harmless); United States v. Ofray-Campos, 534 F.3d 1, 27-28 (1st Cir. 2008) (in harmless beyond a reasonable doubt analysis, considering that no physical evidence tied defendant to drug activity); Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1571 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that there was no conclusive evidence that tie[d] petitioner tightly to the crime, and that it did not suffice that it [was] probable that - 56 - petitioner committed the crime). Thus, we simply cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt it is highly probable that the jury would have reached the same verdict without the wrongly admitted physical evidence. See Leon-Delfis, 203 F.3d at 112; cf. United States v. Jiménez, 419 F.3d 34, 42 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding harmless error when erroneously admitted evidence pale[d] in light of the other evidence introduced at trial); United States v. Crooker, 688 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012) (finding harmless error where drug residue was illegally obtained, but the government presented a wealth of other evidence, including bags of drugs, drug paraphernalia, and the defendant's confession that he used and possessed drugs). All in all, neither the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule nor the harmless-error doctrine apply here. Therefore, Cruz-Ramos is entitled to a new trial, and the evidence that was illegally seized from his home cannot be introduced. Cruz-Ramos's Statement We are left with one unresolved issue concerning the motion to suppress. While, as we discussed above, it's clear that the physical evidence seized during the illegal search of CruzRamos's home should have been suppressed, whether Cruz-Ramos's statements to the police should have been too is a tad trickier since the statement was provided after the search of the house. - 57 - In examining this more complicated question, we generally look at whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court did not undertake this inquiry, given its finding that the search was legal. Further, the government does not address this issue (along with numerous others) at all in its brief (meaning it is likely waived). However, because this question depends primarily upon weighing the facts in the particular case, . . . and is thus a matter especially suitable for resolution by the district court in the first instance, United States v. AcostaColon, 157 F.3d 9, 21 (1st Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted), we think it appropriate that the district court address this issue on remand. See id.; United States v. Cordero-Rosario, 786 F.3d 64, 78 (1st Cir. 2015). For the reasons discussed, we must reverse in-part the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, vacate CruzRamos's conviction, and remand his case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Because we find that Cruz-Ramos is entitled to a new trial based on suppression error, we need not address his other allegations of reversible trial or sentencing errors. - 58 - We move on to the grievances pressed by his cohorts.
Having resolved Cruz-Ramos's appeal, we turn now to the issues raised by Laureano-Salgado and Ramírez-Rivera. We start with their qualms with jury selection. Anonymous Empanelment First up, the Defendants claim that the district court erred in empaneling an anonymous jury, arguing that it violated their Sixth Amendment right to a public trial before an impartial jury. We review this claim for abuse of discretion. United States v. DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 1998). Our review takes into account not only the evidence available at the time the anonymous empanelment occurred, but all relevant evidence introduced at trial. Id. Let's review the legal backdrop for the Defendants' claim. It is constitutional bedrock that '[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.' Sampson v. United States, 724 F.3d 150, 163 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting U.S. Const. amend VI). To protect this important right, certain safeguards are generally put in place during jury selection. For instance, jurors' names and some other identifying personal information are made available - 59 - to the parties (and sometimes to the public). See 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7). However, a district court may empanel an anonymous jury in any case in which 'the interests of justice so require.' United States v. Marrero-Ortiz, 160 F.3d 768, 776 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7)). Because empanelment of an anonymous jury should be recognized as an extraordinary protective device, especially if it tends to suggest that the jurors may have something to fear from the accused, thereby conceivably encroaching upon the presumption of innocence, DeLuca, 137 F.3d at 31, we have held that empaneling an anonymous jury is a permissible precaution only when two requirements are satisfied: (1) there are strong grounds for concluding that it is necessary to enable the jury to perform its factfinding function, or to ensure juror protection; and (2) reasonable safeguards are adopted by the trial court to minimize any risk of infringement upon the fundamental rights of the accused. Id. Considering both of these factors, we find that the district court acted well within its discretion to empanel an anonymous jury in this case. On the strong grounds prong, we have considered a variety of factors in looking at whether this standard has been satisfied. For instance, we have chewed over the defendants' link to organized crime, a factor which strongly indicate[s] that clandestine outside assistance might be brought - 60 - to bear in any effort to intimidate or punish jurors; the defendants' involvement in violent crime; their attempts to witness tamper; and the potential for mandatory lifetime sentences upon conviction, which surely provide[s] a strong inducement to resort to extreme measures in any effort to influence the outcome of their trial. Id. at 32 (alterations omitted). Ultimately, though, we assess whether the record as a whole affords sufficient foundation for empaneling an anonymous jury both as a prudent safety precaution and a means of ensuring unfettered performance of the factfinding function. Id. Here, the indictment alleged -- and the evidence proved -- that the Defendants were part of an organized drug-trafficking ring that freely used violence (read: murder) to get its way.27 See Marrero-Ortiz, 160 F.3d at 776 (noting that [t]he indictment charged the appellant and his coconspirators with membership in a sprawling drug ring that often resorted to violence in its pursuit 27We note that the Defendants do not take issue with the district court's factual findings in this regard, but only with the manner in which the court weighed the facts and the source of the facts (i.e., the indictment). To that end, while the Defendants argue that the district court improperly relied on allegations the government made in the indictment to empanel the jury anonymously, as we noted above, in reviewing this claim we look to all the evidence introduced at trial -- not just the facts that were available at the time of empanelment. The Defendants simply ignore that legal principle. Further, the judge may consider a variety of other sources of information, including the indictment and evidence proffered by the government. See United States v. Marrero-Ortiz, 160 F.3d 768, 776 (1st Cir. 1998). - 61 - of profits). Not even police were excepted, and La ONU certainly did not look kindly on people who cooperated with the government (remember, one of the organization's rules was to kill anyone who cooperated with the police). Further, the government proffered to the court that incarcerated La ONU members were able to call people on the outside using phones they had illegally obtained in prison, meaning, as the district court found, that the reach of La ONU extend[ed] outside the federal correctional facilities and present[ed] a real risk to jurors. In addition, the Defendants faced mandatory life sentences if convicted. These facts provided ample fodder for the district court's reasoning that strong grounds called for anonymous empanelment. The district court also adopted reasonable safeguards to minimize infringement on the Defendants' constitutional rights. Rather than bring up any concern for the jurors' safety, the judge told the jurors that they would remain anonymous to avoid media interference. He instructed the jurors that the Defendants were to be presumed innocent no fewer than four times during the course of jury selection. He also informed the jurors that while he would read portions of the indictment to give them a flavor of the case, the indictment was not evidence of guilt or of anything else. See id. (finding that Judge Fusté, the same judge who empaneled the jury in this case, took satisfactory precautions to protect the defendants' rights when he did not mention any threat to - 62 - juror safety, but, rather, informed the jurors that they would remain anonymous during the trial because of publicity concerns. He then instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence, and periodically repeated that instruction as the trial progressed.). Finding no error in the district court's decision to empanel an anonymous jury, we move on to the next issue. Voir Dire The Defendants' next claim is that the district court mishandled voir dire, insofar as the court did not appropriately probe into the jurors' possible biases. Specifically, the Defendants refer to three supposed problems: (1) Juror No. 56, who, according to the Defendants, raised her hand when the court asked about the jury's familiarity with the helicopter shooting, was not asked any follow-up questions; (2) after the jury was seated, the court disclosed that one juror lived in Trujillo Alto municipality, which was nearby the 2010 La ONU-La Rompe shootout that led to the death of a police officer and civilian bystander; and (3) the court did not sufficiently vet whether all the jurors could speak and understand the English language. Essentially, then, the Defendants raise two separate issues -- one, should the court have asked additional questions during voir dire? And two, should certain jurors have been excused for bias? We assess each of these questions in turn. - 63 - Additional Questioning We review the first issue -- the district court's handling of voir dire -- for abuse of discretion.28 See United States v. Orlando-Figueroa, 229 F.3d 33, 44 (1st Cir. 2000) (Because voir dire determinations rely largely on immediate perceptions, federal judges have been accorded ample discretion in determining how best to conduct the voir dire. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)). Upon assessing the record, we find that no abuse of discretion occurred here simply because the court declined to ask the jurors more voir dire questions to appease the Defendants. While [a] probing voir dire examination is [t]he best way to ensure that jurors do not harbor biases for or against the parties, Sampson, 724 F.3d at 163-64 (internal quotation marks omitted), a district court need not . . . pose every voir dire question requested by a litigant. Orlando-Figueroa, 229 F.3d at 44 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is more than enough if the court covers the substance of the appropriate areas of concern by framing its own questions in its own words. Id. 28 The parties do not address whether the Defendants sufficiently contemporaneously objected to the grievances with jury selection they now press on appeal. While generally we review unpreserved objections for plain error, because the government did not ask us for plain error review (and because the Defendants' claims fail under either standard anyway), we will review the Defendants' claims for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Tapia-Escalera, 356 F.3d 181, 183 (1st Cir. 2004). - 64 - Here, the district court asked the potential jurors whether any of them had knowledge of the helicopter shooting. The court followed up with each person who raised his or her hand in response. While the judge indicated that he was taking notes as to which jurors raised their hands, when defense counsel stated that he thought the court had missed the fact that Juror 54 had raised her hand,29 in an abundance of caution, the judge asked the jurors again whether any of them had heard of La ONU, La Rompe, the helicopter shooting, or the Trujillo Alto bridge shooting. No hands were raised. Asking the question again was sufficient remedy for ensuring that the judge did not miss any hands (particularly because this was precisely the remedy the defense asked for during voir dire).30 29While neither side addresses this in their briefs, we assume that it was later clarified that the juror who raised her hand was actually Juror 56, not Juror 54. 30Contrary to Cruz-Ramos's counsel's representation at oral argument, our review of the record shows that the district court did not improperly pose the helicopter-shooting question. After expressing reservation about asking a question about the incident, the judge consulted with counsel to get their take on the issue. Upon deciding to ask the question, the judge clarified with the jurors that the Defendants were not charged with the helicopter shooting, but because La ONU was associated . . . with that incident, anyone who had read or seen anything touching about the group of people known as La ONU or . . . La Rompe ONU should raise their hands. Indeed, one juror indicated that she had read or heard about the case in the news and that the name La ONU rings a bell. - 65 - As to the juror who lived in Trujillo Alto, the Defendants contend that the court should have asked prior to seating the jury where each juror resided, because people who lived near the area of the Trujillo Alto shooting would have been greatly affected and scared by the . . . incident. As we noted above, the court asked the jurors whether they had heard of the Trujillo Alto shooting -- a much more appropriate question to ask if the concern is that people who were aware of the shooting would be afraid of the Defendants. Concerning the jurors' language abilities, the court did not abuse its discretion by declining to further inquire into the jurors' English-language skills. When defense counsel expressed concern that one particular juror had trouble understanding English, the court probed further with the juror, who answered all of his questions in English. In particular, when the judge asked what kind of jury service that juror had done in the past, the juror explained, [o]ne criminal case. When the Defendants later raised the juror's language skills again with the court (a generous assumption, given that all the attorney actually said was, I was having a hard time understanding her), the judge indicated that he understood her perfectly. Given the special deference we afford to the trial court's conclusions that are drawn from its face-to-face interactions with jurors during selection, we find that the court did not abuse its discretion in so determining. - 66 - See United States v. Sherman, 551 F.3d 45, 51 (1st Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Lemmerer, 277 F.3d 579, 592 (1st Cir. 2002) (Our cases make clear that the judgment of the trial judge, who can appraise the jurors face to face, deserves great weight. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)). The Defendants also have not directed us to any other jurors for which they had language-comprehension concerns. See Orlando-Figueroa, 229 F.3d at 45 (finding no abuse of discretion where defendants do not point to any evidence that any juror's ability to understand English was deficient). Bias To the extent the Defendants argue (however sparsely) that Juror 56 and the juror from Trujillo Alto should have been dismissed because of their bias against the Defendants, we reject that claim as well.31 As we discussed above, a defendant is guaranteed by the Constitution an impartial jury. And to be sure, a defendant's right to be tried by an impartial jury is an integral component of a fair trial that must be jealously 31Neither side bothers to try to clarify this confusion for us, but our review of the jury selection transcript shows that Juror 56 was initially excused. Then, while the court was in the process of selecting the jurors who would be seated, one of the attorneys asked why Juror 56 was excused. For reasons the transcript doesn't reflect, the juror was brought back and seated as an alternate. According to the Defendants, however, Juror 56 ended up deliberating. - 67 - safeguarded. Sampson, 724 F.3d at 160 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). But [o]ur usual standard of review once the trial judge has made an appropriate inquiry is an abuse of discretion standard, which recognizes that the district court has wide discretion in deciding how to handle and how to respond to allegations of juror bias and misconduct that arise during a trial.32 United States v. Martí-Lón, 524 F.3d 295, 300 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). As to Juror 56, as we discussed above, the district court sufficiently probed with the jurors whether they were familiar with the helicopter shooting, despite the fact that the defense was not even sure that the juror had raised her hand (and the judge's notes did not reflect that she had). Still, the court provided a cautionary remedy -- the very remedy the defense asked for -- when this issue came up during voir dire, that is, to ask the jurors the question again. No one raised a hand. [W]e give great weight to the judgment of the trial judge, who can appraise the jurors face to face, as to whether the juror can be impartial, id. (internal quotation marks omitted), and the Defendants have given 32Bias means that a reasonable judge, considering all the facts and circumstances, would determine that the juror lacked the capacity and the will to decide the case based on the evidence (and that, therefore, a valid basis for excusal for cause existed). Sampson v. United States, 724 F.3d 150, 165-66 (1st Cir. 2013). - 68 - us no reason to stray from that principle here. Likewise, as we noted above, the Defendants have provided no explanation for why we should assume the juror from Trujillo Alto would be biased against them simply because she lived in Trujillo Alto (even though she had not heard of the bridge shooting). The district court did not abuse its discretion during voir dire. Right-to-be-Present and Juror Misconduct Next, the Defendants argue that the district court committed per se reversible error in its handling of Juror 30, who asked to be excused prior to the start of trial because of her fear of the Defendants. They argue that the court should not have prohibited them from being present during the juror's in camera interview. They also say that the district court should have polled the other jurors to ensure Juror 30 did not taint them with her bias. We review the right-to-be-present claim de novo. United States v. Brown, 669 F.3d 10, 32 (1st Cir. 2012). Further, the exclusion of a defendant from a trial proceeding should be considered in light of the whole record. United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1985). We review the denial of the jury polling for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 82 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Connolly, 341 F.3d 16, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2003) ([T]he district court's response - 69 - to an allegation of juror misconduct is generally reviewed only for abuse of discretion.)). We first address whether the district court erred by excluding the Defendants from the in camera interview. A defendant's constitutional right to be present during his trial proceedings largely derives from the Sixth Amendment, which, as we noted above, guarantees the defendant a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury, as well as the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. See Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526. However, the Supreme Court has recognized that [the] right [to be present during trial proceedings] is protected by the Due Process Clause in some situations where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him, id., such as jury empanelment. This due process protection exists only when a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by [the defendant's] absence, and to that extent only. Id. Thus, the high Court has articulated that a defendant only has a due process right to be present at a proceeding when his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, [a] criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be present at all stages of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the - 70 - proceedings. United States v. Fernández-Hernández, 652 F.3d 56, 65 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Of course, jury empanelment falls into this category. See id. (noting that defendant must be present at 'every trial stage, including jury impanelment,' except at stages where . . . '[t]he proceeding involves only a conference or hearing on a question of law' (quoting Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 43(a)(2), (b)(3) (citation omitted))). But contrary to the Defendants' position that an exclusion from a court's in camera interview is a per se constitutional violation, both the Supreme Court and this court have held that a defendant's temporary exclusion during an in camera questioning of a juror, where defense counsel is present, does not automatically offend a defendant's constitutional rights. Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526 (noting that the defense has no constitutional right to be present at every interaction between a judge and a juror (internal quotation marks omitted)); Fernández- Hernández, 652 F.3d at 65-67 (finding that a defendant's absence from a bench conference during voir dire did not deprive him of any constitutional right). Here, the fairness of the proceedings were not frustrated by the court's decision to exclude the Defendants from the in camera conference with Juror 30. While the Defendants argue that they could have consulted with their attorneys on possible questions to present to the Court so it could ask Juror #30 on the possible contamination of other jurors, - 71 - as the district court noted in its decision on this issue, the jury had not yet convened such that the juror could contaminate the other jurors. In addition, the court asked the juror whether she knew any of the other jurors, or had even interacted with any of them, and she indicated in clear and decisive terms that she did not communicate her fears or anxieties to any other member of the jury. The Defendants have presented us nothing that might refute that finding. They also have provided no indication that their interests were not sufficiently protected by their counsel's presence during the interview.33 See id. Thus, the court did not err in excluding the Defendants from the in camera conference.34 33While the court invited all of defense counsel to be present at the interview, one attorney (Cruz-Ramos's) did not show because of a scheduling conflict. This fact does not change our holding. The attorney's position on this issue (as submitted in writing) did not differ from his co-counsel's, and the attorney did not submit any additional questions for the court to ask the juror during the interview. Further, the Defendants have not argued that the attorney's inability to be at the interview warrants reversal -- only that their own does. The Defendants also fail to address what they could have done . . . had they been at the conference, or how they would have gained anything by attending. United States v. FernándezHernández, 652 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). As we discuss below, the Defendants were not entitled to an individualized questioning of each juror. And given that the district court ended up dismissing Juror 30, the Defendants do not tell us what other relief they would have wanted. 34The Defendants also argue that allowing the juror's husband to be present during the interview was also reversible error because it is possible that he might have a chilling effect on the juror's responses. We are troubled by a practice of allowing a relative of the juror to attend an in camera conference when other members of the public, and the Defendants themselves, were - 72 - We also reject the Defendants' claim that the court should have individually questioned each juror to determine whether Juror 30's bias against the Defendants contaminated the other jurors. When a non-frivolous suggestion is made that a jury may be biased or tainted by some incident, the district court must undertake an adequate inquiry to determine whether the alleged incident occurred and if so, whether it was prejudicial. United States v. Ortiz–Arrigoitia, 996 F.2d 436, 442 (1st Cir. 1993). But the trial judge is vested with the discretion to fashion an appropriate and responsible procedure to determine whether misconduct actually occurred and whether it was prejudicial. Id. at 443. Substantial deference is due the trial court's exercise of its discretion, United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1185 (1st Cir. 1990), and the deference due the court's ultimate finding on the issue of continued juror impartiality is enhanced because this determination is a question of fact, United States v. Barone, 114 F.3d 1284, 1307 (1st Cir. 1997). Even assuming (without deciding) that the Defendants' suggestion that Juror 30 biased the rest of the jury is nonfrivolous (a point we seriously doubt, given the fact that the jurors had not yet sat together at trial), we find that the excluded. But still, the Defendants have provided no law (or otherwise developed argument) that the district court violated their constitutional rights. See Zannino, 895 F.2d at 17. - 73 - district court probed enough to assure itself that Juror 30 did not taint the other jurors. As we noted above, the Defendants have provided no suggestion even that Juror 30 communicated or interacted with the other jurors, let alone that she had communicated to them her anxiety about sitting on the jury. See United States v. Maceo, 873 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that the the defendant has the burden of proving prejudice or jury bias). Furthermore, the Defendants have not shown (or suggested) that even if Juror 30 communicated her anxiety to the other jurors, the other jurors actually became biased as a result, such that they would have to be excused from the jury. See Sampson, 724 F.3d at 165 (Jurors normally are subject to excusal for cause if they are biased or if they fail to satisfy statutory qualifications.). Seeing no merit in the Defendants' claims regarding jury selection, we turn to their next set of arguments.
Next on the list, the Defendants dispute a number of the district court's evidentiary rulings made during the trial, arguing that they amounted to reversible error. We review a trial court's objected-to evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. RodríguezBerrios, 573 F.3d 55, 60 (1st Cir. 2009). Likewise, a trial court's determination of whether evidence is more probative than - 74 - prejudicial is also reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Walker, 665 F.3d 212, 229 (1st Cir. 2011). We stay mindful that the trial judge has savored the full taste of the fray, and his considerable discretion must be respected so long as he does not stray entirely beyond the pale. United States v. Rodríguez, 215 F.3d 110, 121 (1st Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Figueroa-Viera Impeachment Say Defendants, the district court should have allowed them to impeach the government's star witness (Figueroa-Viera) with evidence that he was untruthful during his plea negotiations. Specifically, the Defendants refer to Figueroa-Viera's testimony that after he was arrested for his drug-trafficking activities with La ONU, he pleaded guilty to the charges brought against him. He signed a plea and cooperation agreement with the government in exchange for a reduced-sentence recommendation. The cooperation agreement required that Figueroa-Viera disclose all information known to [him] regarding any criminal activity. It also required that he agree[] to provide truthful, complete and accurate testimony, information on a continuing basis and as required by [the] United States. On cross, defense counsel attempted to question Figueroa-Viera about his plea agreement. The attorney asked: - 75 - Q: And the fact is that during that interview [with the government], you didn't tell [law enforcement] all of the murders that you have committed in Puerto Rico? The government objected, which the court sustained, letting defense counsel know that he could try again if he could lay a foundation for the question. The defense showed the witness a copy of his plea agreement and continued: Q: And, in fact, in that document, you agreed to cooperate with the government and to provide all information known to the defendant regarding any criminal activity, including but not limited to the offense described in the pending indictment; is that right? A: Yes. . . . Q: So I ask you now whether it isn't true that you were not completely truthful in providing the agent all of the information regarding your past criminal activities, including murder, or anything about murder in Puerto Rico? A: Yes. Before continuing with his questions, and to head-off another round of objections, the attorney asked for a sidebar to proffer the foundation for his next line of questions. The attorney explained that defense investigators had uncovered that Figueroa-Viera had killed someone during a 2011 bakery hold-up, - 76 - which he did not disclose to the government in violation of his plea agreement. The government objected, arguing that this line of questioning was forbidden by Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), as evidence that the witness committed a murder was a specific instance of conduct not probative of the witness's truthfulness (more on Rule 608(b) in a little bit). The court, however, acknowledged that if the witness had not adhered to the plea agreement's requirement that he provide accurate information to the government, his failure to disclose his criminal activity could go to his credibility. Thus, the court ruled that the defense could ask the witness whether he has complied with this agreement and answered all the questions truthfully and provided accurate answers to the government investigators. Per Rule 608, however, the defense could not ask questions about the bakery murder because it constituted a specific instance of conduct that the defense was attempting to use to impeach the witness. Also acknowledging that the witness's answer to the last-asked question was unclear (the court interpreted the witness's yes to mean that he was not completely truthful to the government, while the government interpreted the witness to mean the opposite), the court also allowed the defense attorney to go back and clarify that particular question.35 35Despite this confusion, the defense attorney apparently did not think it was necessary to ask the question again, asserting - 77 - Now Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) says that [e]xcept for a criminal conviction under Rule 609, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness's conduct in order to attack or support the witness's character for truthfulness. However, the rule says that the court may, on cross-examination, allow [the specific instances of conduct] to be inquired into if they are probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of . . . the witness. The Defendants argue that the court should have allowed further crossexamination because [a] witness' response to a question whether he told the truth on a previous occasion could well be probative of his character for truthfulness. But the Defendants do not tell us what more they wanted to ask Figueroa-Viera to probe his truthfulness. Whether FigueroaViera committed the bakery murder does not tell anything of his tendency to be truthful, unless he was required to tell the government about the murder and did not. Indeed, the district court allowed the defense to ask about whether Figueroa-Viera disclosed to the government all the murders he committed in Puerto Rico, and this question goes right to the heart of whether the that the government should clarify that in the redirect, not me, since it's the government that's alleging there's some confusion in the record. The government did not accept the invitation. - 78 - witness was truthful in his dealings with the government.36 Thus, while Rule 608 leaves the court the discretion to allow the specific instances of conduct to be probed, the Defendants do not tell us how the specific details of the murder -- as opposed to the details of the witness's communications with the government -- would be probative of the witness's character for truthfulness. See Tigges v. Cataldo, 611 F.2d 936, 938 (1st Cir. 1979) ([S]ince the past conduct was not, in and of itself, 'probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness,' plaintiff could not have crossexamined [the witness] directly on the subject of the [past] incident. (citation omitted)). Furthermore, while acknowledging that Rule 608 makes discretionary the district court's choice to allow cross-examination on specific instances of conduct, the Defendants made no developed argument as to why the court was required to do so here. See id. at 939 (The court . . . has considerable discretion to exclude avenues of cross-examination To be sure, whether the witness intended to disclose that 36 he was not totally forthcoming with the government remains a mystery, given the way the defense attorney asked the question. But we suspect the witness meant to testify that he was truthful -- during a carefully worded re-direct, the government asked the witness whether the plea agreement required him to tell the complete truth (to which the witness responded yes) and what would have happened if he did not say the complete truth. The witness responded: Everything I said would be used against me, and I couldn't cooperate anymore. - 79 - which promise to lead far afield from the main controversy.).37 The district court did not abuse its discretion in restricting this particular line of questioning. Uncharged Pep Boys Murder Next, the Defendants claim that the district court should not have let in testimony about a murder that the Defendants were not charged with. The Defendants claim that this evidence was introduced only to rile up the jury. Specifically, Defendants refer to testimony regarding a murder that occurred in January 2010 behind a Pep Boys auto parts store, when two La ONU leaders ordered the killing of a La Rompe boss. As far as we can tell, none of the Defendants were personally involved in that murder. Federal Rule of Evidence 401 provides that evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact 37 The Defendants also claim that the prosecutor improperly vouched for Figueroa-Viera's testimony when he asked about the terms of Figueroa-Viera's plea agreement by suggesting that the information the witness provided to the government had been verified. But Defendants concede that this objection was not preserved below, and is therefore subject to plain-error review. See United States v. Pulgarin, 955 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1992). Still, the Defendants do not attempt to show how they have satisfied the plain-error standard, particularly given that Defendants have provided no caselaw from our circuit on the point. See United States v. Correa-Osorio, 784 F.3d 11, 22 (1st Cir. 2015) (describing a plain error as an indisputable slip up on the judge's part, given controlling precedent (internal quotation marks omitted)). - 80 - that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. And we have previously held that when the scope of a RICO conspiracy includes murder as a tool to further the enterprise, a murder [is] still relevant to the RICO counts as it tended to prove the existence and nature of the RICO enterprise and conspiracy, even when all the indicted defendants are not charged for the particular killing. United States v. DeCologero, 530 F.3d 36, 54 (1st Cir. 2008). Here, cooperating witness Figueroa-Cancel testified that the reason he participated in the Pep Boys murder was because La ONU leaders instructed him to, and if the leader ordered us to kill anybody, we had to do it. This testimony was relevant to framing the structure of the La ONU enterprise (i.e., that La ONU did, in fact, have leaders and that subordinate members were to obey their orders), and corroborated the other testimony regarding the rules and mission of the enterprise (i.e., that La Rompe members were to be killed on-sight). Thus, we do not agree with the Defendants that the Pep Boys evidence was not relevant to the RICO count. Even relevant evidence may be excluded sometimes, though, if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 403. - 81 - The Defendants launch a Rule 403 attack on the Pep Boys evidence based on unfair prejudice, but we reject that argument too. Usually, courts use the term 'unfair prejudice' for evidence that invites the jury to render a verdict on an improper emotional basis. United States v. Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113, 122 (1st Cir. 2000). The Defendants have made no effort to explain to us why the Pep Boys evidence was unfairly prejudicial. See id. (We stress 'unfair' because by design, all evidence is meant to be prejudicial. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)). Given the nature of this violence-infested case, we see no reason why testimony about an additional murder would cause the jury an improper emotional reaction, and the Defendants have not provided any reason. We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in letting in this evidence.38 38Defendants additionally argue that the testimony of the Pep Boys murder should not have been allowed under Rule 404(b). But that rule bars introduction of [e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act introduced to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Given that the Defendants were not personally involved in the Pep Boys murder, such that the Pep Boys murder would constitute one of their prior bad acts, it is not readily apparent to us (and the Defendants do not explain) how Rule 404(b) would apply here. We also note that while the Defendants describe witness testimony of other uncharged murders and violent crimes in their factual recitation, they only argue that the Pep Boys murder was impermissibly introduced, and so it is the only uncharged act we address. - 82 - In sum, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in making the contested evidentiary rulings.