Opinion ID: 848647
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for distributing child sexually abusive material

Text: The next question is whether the prosecution proved that defendant had the criminal intent to distribute or promote child sexually abusive material. Due process requires proof of intent beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Petrella, 424 Mich. 221, 268, 380 N.W.2d 11 (1985). When determining if sufficient evidence was presented to sustain a conviction, a court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. It must determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven as required. People v. Wolfe, 440 Mich. 508, 515, 489 N.W.2d 748 (1992).
Although defendant intended to distribute the laptop containing child sexually abusive material to his former employer, no evidence suggests that he distributed the material with a criminal intent. There was no evidence that defendant made anyone at Comcast aware, or attempted to make anyone aware, of the presence of the material. To the contrary, there is evidence that defendant neither intended nor expected anyone at Comcast to discover or view the material. Comcast witnesses acknowledged that the computer hard drive could be erased and reformatted without any of its files being reviewed. Mr. Williams admitted that this was the practice at Comcast and that defendant himself may have previously performed such erasures on returned computers. Williams admitted that he looked through defendant's files because I just wanted to see what was on there, not because it was necessary. Williams further testified that he did not tell defendant when he arranged to pick up the computer that he intended to look at any of his files. Another witness testified that the practice at Comcast was simply to wipe the hard drives of all information and reformat them. From the testimony, one could reasonably conclude that defendant anticipated that no one at Comcast would review his files. His statement to FIA investigators was that he thought the entire hard drive would be merely erased and reformatted. Viewed most favorably to the prosecution, the record contains nothing from which to reasonably infer that defendant intentionally left the material on the laptop for Comcast's employees to discover. The dissent questions the relevancy of the fact that defendant did not intend anybody to discover or view the material. As explained above, defendant could be convicted of distributing child sexually abusive material only if he distributed the material with a criminal intent. Obviously, if defendant distributed the material not intending anybody to discover or view it, he did not distribute it with a criminal intent. Defendant returned the computer, as he was required to do, to individuals who possibly knew how to find the information. This does not change the fact that defendant concealed the images. Nor does it change the fact that, on the basis of past company practice, defendant legitimately believed that those individuals would not search the computer for picture files. That someone had the ability and desire to search for the material defendant purposefully concealed does not affect the analysis of defendant's state of mind. The actions of a third party could not create a criminal intent in the mind of defendant. In addition to defendant's statement to the FIA, substantiation for the inference that there was no mens rea is found in the testimony of prosecution witness Radcliffe. He said that the photos were buried deep in a user profile, not in a readily available location. Likewise, Sergeant Duke testified that, in his opinion, the location, seven directory levels down, indicated that defendant intended to keep the material secret. Hence, insufficient evidence existed from which the jury could draw an inference beyond a reasonable doubt that, when returning the laptop, defendant distributed child sexually abusive material with criminal intent. We avoid the dissent's error of conflating the criminal intent to distribute child sexually abusive material with the simple intent to return the laptop.
The prosecutor made the alternative argument that defendant distributed child sexually abusive material over the Internet. However, the jury acquitted him of that crime. It specifically found that defendant did not use a computer or the Internet to communicate with another person to distribute or promote child sexually abusive material. MCL 750.145d. It found him guilty only of using a computer or the Internet to communicate with another person in order to possess child sexually abusive material. Id. We apply the same reasoning regarding this argument as did the Court of Appeals: Given the prosecutor's theory that defendant distributed child sexually abusive material by returning to Comcast the computer containing such material and the jury's verdict of acquittal on the charge of using a computer to distribute or promote such material, we conclude that defendant's conviction solely rests upon the theory primarily advanced by the prosecution at trial: that defendant distributed child sexually abusive material by returning to Comcast a computer that contained such material. Accordingly, our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited to the theory that resulted in defendant's conviction. [260 Mich.App. at 208, 679 N.W.2d 77.] [Emphasis added.] In his concurrence, Chief Justice Taylor concludes that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict defendant of distributing child sexually abusive material. The basis for the conviction could have been that he shared such material with others on the Internet. The concurrence acknowledges that the jury specifically acquitted defendant of using a computer to distribute such material, but it observes that jury verdicts need not be consistent. We reason that, although inconsistent jury verdicts may be legally permissible, it does not follow that we should find verdicts inconsistent when it is possible to find them consistent. See Lagalo v. Allied Corp., 457 Mich. 278, 282, 577 N.W.2d 462 (1998) (`[i]f there is an interpretation of the evidence that provides a logical explanation for the findings of the jury, the verdict is not inconsistent.') (Citation omitted.) There is no disagreement that, here, the jury specifically acquitted defendant of using a computer to distribute child sexually abusive material, and it convicted him of distributing such material. It could have found him guilty of distributing the material in one of two ways: (a) finding that he shared the material with others on the Internet, or (b) finding that he distributed it by returning the computer to Comcast. The former would be inconsistent with the jury's verdict concerning the use of a computer to distribute child sexually abusive material charge; the latter would not be. Because we presume that the verdicts are consistent, we conclude that the jury convicted defendant of distributing the material by returning the computer to Comcast. [10]