Opinion ID: 751622
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Government's Obligation To Disclose Material Evidence

Text: 23 To the extent that the prosecutor knows of material evidence favorable to the defendant in a criminal prosecution, the government has a due process obligation to disclose that evidence to the defendant. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 431, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1564, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97 (Brady) (suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution). Information coming within the scope of this principle (Brady matter) includes not only evidence that is exculpatory, i.e., going to the heart of the defendant's guilt or innocence, but also evidence that is useful for impeachment, i.e., having the potential to alter the jury's assessment of the credibility of a significant prosecution witness. See, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 1177, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959) (jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence). 24 The government's obligation to make such disclosures is pertinent not only to an accused's preparation for trial but also to his determination of whether or not to plead guilty. The defendant is entitled to make that decision with full awareness of favorable material evidence known to the government. See, e.g., Tate v. Wood, 963 F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir.1992). Although a guilty plea is generally considered valid so long as the plea was intelligent and voluntary, see, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1468-69, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711-12, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), the validity of the plea must be reassessed if it resulted from impermissible conduct by state agents, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 757, 90 S.Ct. at 1473. Impermissible conduct includes Brady violations. See, e.g., Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1320-23 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 890, 109 S.Ct. 224, 102 L.Ed.2d 214 (1988). Thus, we have noted that where prosecutors have withheld favorable material evidence, even a guilty plea that was 'knowing' and 'intelligent' may be vulnerable to challenge. Id. at 1320 (holding that Brady violation invalidated agreement to plead not guilty by reason of insanity); see Tate v. Wood, 963 F.2d at 24-25 (remanding for evidentiary hearing with respect to effect of nondisclosure on agreement to plead guilty). 25 The Brady obligation extends only to material evidence (see Part II.B. below) that is known to the prosecutor. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. at 437, 115 S.Ct. at 1567. An individual prosecutor is presumed, however, to have knowledge of all information gathered in connection with his office's investigation of the case and indeed has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police. Id.; see United States v. Payne, 63 F.3d 1200, 1208 (2d Cir.1995). Nonetheless, knowledge on the part of persons employed by a different office of the government does not in all instances warrant the imputation of knowledge to the prosecutor, for the imposition of an unlimited duty on a prosecutor to inquire of other offices not working with the prosecutor's office on the case in question would inappropriately require us to adopt a monolithic view of government that would condemn the prosecution of criminal cases to a state of paralysis. United States v. Gambino, 835 F.Supp. 74, 95 (E.D.N.Y.1993), aff'd, 59 F.3d 353 (2d Cir.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1187, 116 S.Ct. 1671, 134 L.Ed.2d 776 (1996). Thus, in United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924 (2d Cir.1993) (Locascio), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1070, 114 S.Ct. 1645, 128 L.Ed.2d 365 (1994), we refused to impute to the AUSAs prosecuting that action knowledge of reports prepared by FBI agents who were uninvolved in the investigation or trial of the defendants-appellants. Id. at 949 (We will not infer the prosecutors' knowledge simply because some other government agents knew about the evidence.). In United States v. Quinn, 445 F.2d 940 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 850, 92 S.Ct. 87, 30 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971), we refused to impute the knowledge of a Florida prosecutor to an AUSA in New York, rejecting as completely untenable [the] position that 'knowledge of any part of the government is equivalent to knowledge on the part of this prosecutor.'  Id. at 944. 26 In the present case, Avellino argues that the government should be charged with constructive knowledge of the evidence gathered in the State investigation prior to the government's plea agreement with Avellino, in part because that evidence was present in the office of an AUSA in the very district in which Avellino's case was contemporaneously being prosecuted. Further, Avellino points out that although AUSA Orenstein may have been unaware that the State materials targeting Cuomo also focused on D'Arco, AUSA Mark E. Feldman, Orenstein's supervisor who in 1996 was Chief of the Eastern District's Organized Crime and Racketeering Section and who signed the plea agreement with Avellino, had been, in 1990, one of the New York County Assistant District Attorneys who supervised the State investigation. Thus, Avellino argues that the pertinent Eastern District prosecutors had reason to know that the unopened boxes of State materials contained information with respect to the 1989-1991 narcotics investigation of which D'Arco was a target. 27 Avellino's arguments raise a number of troublesome questions. The district court, because of its conclusions that the undisclosed information was not material and that withdrawal of the plea would likely cause the government significant prejudice, did not reach the question of the AUSAs' knowledge, actual or constructive. Were this Court in disagreement with the district court's assessment of materiality, we would likely remand for further proceedings to explore those questions. However, since we conclude, for the reasons stated in the sections that follow, that the undisclosed information does not meet the test for Brady materiality, we see no need to reach the questions of actual or constructive knowledge, and, accordingly, no need for a remand.