Opinion ID: 71666
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Before turning to the dispositive issue in this case, it is worthwhile to point out that political patronage is not at issue here, although at first blush it might seem to be raised by the facts. The First Amendment prohibits a public employer from conditioning employment on a basis that violates an employee's freedom of expression. In general, there are two methods by which a public employee can enforce that prohibition by litigation in the federal courts. These two methods make a distinction between cases involving employee political patronage and cases involving employee speech. Stough v. Gallagher, 967 F.2d 1523, 1527 (11th Cir.1992) (citation omitted). Political patronage cases are governed by two major Supreme Court cases: Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976), and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980). As we have explained: The [Elrod/Branti ] method does not require open-ended inquiries into specific work-place relationships that may underlie overt expressive conduct because the public employee's interests and the public employer's interests are essentially fixed and unvarying in the raw political patronage context. Stough, 967 F.2d at 1527 (citations omitted). Under Elrod/Branti, the relevant inquiry is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Our circuit has not limited political patronage cases strictly to those cases involving party affiliation, but has recognized that the Elrod/Branti analysis applies whenever public employment is conditioned upon political allegiance and not upon the content of expressions of political beliefs. Terry v. Cook, 866 F.2d 373, 377 (11th Cir.1989). Nevertheless, we have emphasized that it is important to retain the distinction between actions that assert employees' right of expression and actions that challenge discharge decisions based on political patronage. Id. It is important to retain the distinction between political patronage cases and free expression cases, because the analysis applicable to the two types of cases is markedly different. See id. at 376-77. As we have explained, cases involving the overt expression of ideas or political speech, unlike political patronage cases, require the open-ended inquiry or method of analysis the Supreme Court established in Pickering [v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) ]. Stough, 967 F.2d at 1527 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Although Morris' complaint might be read to state a claim under both theories, the case has proceeded as a pure political speech case. The jury was not instructed on a political patronage theory, and the parties' First Amendment arguments on appeal are based solely on the application of the Pickering analysis to this case. Because Morris did not press an Elrod/Branti political patronage claim in the district court, we have no occasion to discuss the relative merits of such a claim under the facts of this case. We do not mean to imply that Morris' case might have been meritorious had she pursued a political patronage theory. To the contrary, we have doubts about that, but those doubts require no discussion in view of Morris' decision not to pursue an Elrod/Branti theory. Therefore, we will focus the remainder of our analysis on the theory that Morris did pursue—freedom of expression. B. WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW ON THE MERITS OF MORRIS' FREE EXPRESSION CLAIM This Court has established a four-part test for determining whether a public employer has unconstitutionally demoted or discharged a public employee in retaliation for the exercise of free speech rights: First, a court must determine whether the employee's speech may be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern. If so, the district court must weigh the employee's first amendment interests against the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Should the employee prevail on the balancing test, the fact-finder determines whether the employee's speech played a substantial part in the government's decision to demote or discharge the employee. Finally, if the employee shows that the speech was a substantial motivating factor in the employment decision, the state must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision ... even in the absence of the protected conduct. Morgan v. Ford, 6 F.3d 750, 754 (11th Cir.1993) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1221, 114 S.Ct. 2708, 129 L.Ed.2d 836 (1994). The first two steps present questions of law; the second two present questions for the fact finder. We begin with the legal questions, and finding them dispositive, we forego discussion of the factual questions. 1. Whether Morris' Speech Addressed a Matter of Public Concern To fall within the realm of public concern, an employee's speech must relate to a matter of political, social, or other concern to the community. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1690, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). Absent extraordinary circumstances ... First Amendment protection remains unavailable when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee on matters only of personal interest.'  Morgan, 6 F.3d at 754 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147, 103 S.Ct. at 1690). The court must discern whether the employee spoke on behalf of the public as a citizen, or whether the employee spoke for herself as an employee. Id. (citations omitted). To accomplish this, a court considers the content, form and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The public concern issue is a close one in this case. The speech for which Morris seeks protection—waving a campaign sign at a polling place—is core First Amendment activity. Were we able to segregate Morris' sign-waving from its context, it would be patently obvious that her speech addressed a matter of public concern. However, when the content, form and context of Morris' sign-waving demonstration are fully considered, the result is not so obvious. The form and context of Morris' speech is that she was engaging in a vituperative outburst expressing her anger that Crow had fired her husband. There is no evidence that Morris' speech at the polling place included any commentary on the relative qualifications of the candidates; she simply showed her husband how she thought he should be holding the sign, while her verbal commentary centered on Sheriff Crow's decision to terminate her husband. Moreover, an employee's motive for speech, while not dispositive, is a factor that must be considered in determining whether speech is a matter of public concern. Goffer v. Marbury, 956 F.2d 1045, 1049 (11th Cir.1992). Here, there is no dispute that Morris' dissatisfaction with Crow's decision to fire her husband played a substantial role in her sign-waving at the polling place. Nor is there any dispute that the firing of her husband was unrelated to any political expression or participation. Despite the taint of private concerns that emanates from the form and context of Morris' sign-waving demonstration, we are not entirely sure that Morris' speech may not be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern. Morgan, 6 F.3d at 754 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Because we need not decide that matter in order to decide this case, we will assume for present purposes that Morris' speech constituted speech on a matter of public concern. We turn now to the Pickering analysis. 2. Pickering Balancing The Pickering balancing test requires us to consider whether Sheriff Crow's interest in promoting the efficiency of his administration outweighs Morris' interest in engaging in her First Amendment activity in the manner that she chose for doing so. Our task, as defined by the Supreme Court, is to seek a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 1734-35, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). In performing the Pickering test, we cannot consider Morris' speech in a vacuum. Instead, the manner, time, and place of the employee's expression are relevant, as is the context in which the dispute arose. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 2899, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151-54, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1692-93, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (applying same analysis). As the Supreme Court said in Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 439 U.S. 410, 415 n. 4, 99 S.Ct. 693, 696 n. 4, 58 L.Ed.2d 619 (1979), When a government employee personally confronts his immediate superior, the employing agency's institutional efficiency may be threatened not only by the content of the employee's message but also by the manner, time, and place in which it is delivered. One relevant consideration is whether the speech at issue impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes performance of the speaker's duties or interferes with the regular operation of the [public employer's] enterprise. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388, 107 S.Ct. at 2899. Although Morris' sign-waving, in and of itself, cannot fairly be viewed as impairing discipline or harmony among coworkers, it was inextricably intertwined with her profane chewing out of one of her superiors—in full view of her co-workers.3 To say the very least, the manner in which Morris' message was expressed was disrespectful, demeaning, rude, and insulting, and it was perceived as such by Morris' co-workers. It is not difficult to see how Morris' behavior at the polling place could cause serious disciplinary problems, undermine employee morale, and impair harmony among co-workers. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how it could do anything else. The First Amendment does not require a public employer to tolerate an embarrassing, vulgar, vituperative, ad hominem attack, simply because the employee recently has waved a political sign, or was waving the sign while conducting the attack. Morris' conduct at the polling place is clearly of the kind that impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among coworkers, [or] has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388, 107 S.Ct. at 2899. Accordingly, her employer's interest in preventing those results outweighs her interest in expressing her views—at least in the manner in which she chose to express them.4 The Sheriff was, at the very least, entitled to transfer Morris to 3 In so characterizing Morris' conduct at the polling place, we are mindful of our duty to review the evidence in the light most favorable to Morris, e.g., Daniel v. City of Tampa, 38 F.3d 546, 549 (11th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2557, 132 L.Ed.2d 811 (1995), and of Morris' testimony that when she used profanity in her conversation with Captain Hall, she did not direct it right to him and did not intend to show him any disrespect. [R8:187-88] However, even taking as true Morris' testimony about her subjective intentions, the undisputed evidence in the record reveals that any benign intentions she may have had were completely lost on her audience. For purposes of determining whether speech impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes performance of the speaker's duties, or interferes with the regular operation of the [public employer's] enterprise, Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388, 107 S.Ct. at 2899, the perceived character of the speech is more relevant than the subjective intentions that accompany its delivery. 4 Morris points to Waters v. Chaffin, 684 F.2d 833 (11th Cir.1982), as authority for the proposition that even her use of profanity at the polling place was protected speech. In Waters, we held that a police officer could not be disciplined for calling the police chief a bastard and a son of a bitch, when the officer was out of the department's jurisdiction at the time he made those comments and was speaking privately to a person he considered to be a friend. Id. at 838. Waters is distinguishable on those facts. Unlike Waters, this case is not about idle barroom chatter. Id. Here, Morris was in the jurisdiction, in full view and earshot of her co-workers, on duty, and publicly and loudly castigating a superior officer. Waters erects no per se rule that employee speech passes the Pickering test merely because profanity is included, and our holding a job more insulated from the public view in order to minimize the negative effects of her conduct on the efficient administration of an important public office. She was fortunate not to be fired.