Opinion ID: 2343208
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: issue 10the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction

Text: Noting that [] due process prohibits the conviction of any person `except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged,' Jones submits that the jury instruction in the instant case relieved the Commonwealth of the full measure of its burden. (Brief of Jones at 78 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970))). He specifically claims that the reasonable doubt charge deprived him of his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Pennsylvania's Standard Jury Instruction for reasonable doubt provides in pertinent part that: [a] reasonable doubt is a doubt that would cause a reasonably careful and sensible person to hesitate before acting upon a matter of importance in his own affairs. Pa. Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instruction 7.01(3) (1979). In the instant case, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: A reasonable doubt is such a doubt as would cause a reasonably prudent, careful, and sensible person to pause, hesitate, and restrain himself or herself before acting upon a matter of highest importance in his or her own affairs. (N.T., 5/17/83, at 5885). Jones argues that the addition of the words pause and restrain unconstitutionally reduced the prosecution's burden of proof as it improperly elevated the level of doubt required before a juror would find reasonable doubt. (Brief of Jones at 79). Jones' claim is entirely baseless. This Court has explicitly approved of instructions containing the word `restrain' for nearly five decades. Commonwealth v. Marshall, 570 Pa. 545, 810 A.2d 1211, 1225 (2002), cert. denied, Marshall v. Pennsylvania, 540 U.S. 833, 124 S.Ct. 81, 157 L.Ed.2d 61 (2003) (collecting cases); see also Commonwealth v. Fisher, 572 Pa. 105, 813 A.2d 761, 769-70 (2002) (upholding the trial court's instructions that defined reasonable doubt as both a doubt that would cause a reasonably careful and sensible person to pause and hesitate before acting upon a matter of importance in his or her own affairs as well as the kind of doubt that would restrain a reasonable man from acting in a matter of importance to himself); Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292, 301-02 (2001) (upholding the trial court's instructions where it defined reasonable doubt using the terms hesitate and restrain); Commonwealth v. Rodney Jones, 529 Pa. 149, 602 A.2d 820, 822 (1992) (approving of language in trial court's instructions that defined reasonable doubt as doubt of such substance that if it occurs [sic] in a matter of importance in your own affairs, it would restrain you from acting). Clearly, the trial court's instructions on reasonable doubt were entirely proper, and counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise such a baseless claim. See Hall, supra. ISSUE 11TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION ON FIRST-DEGREE MURDER AND AGGRAVATED ASSAULT In a brief, one-paragraph argument, Jones argues that, pursuant to In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), he was unconstitutionally convicted of first-degree murder and aggravated assault. Winship states that a defendant cannot be convicted of a crime unless every element of the offense is charged and the jury finds the defendant guilty of each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068. Jones asserts that the trial court failed to instruct the jury on transferred intent, see 18 Pa.C.S. § 303(b), and thus ran afoul of the requirement of Winship. This claim utterly fails. The trial court's instruction on the doctrine of transferred intent stated: The principle of transferred intent, really, simply stated, applies to a situation in which a mistake of fact may be made, under the facts and circumstances.    Where one kills the wrong person or inflicts serious bodily harm upon the wrong person by shots which were intended to seriously harm or kill another, third person, is guilty of criminal homicide and the same degree of criminal offense with respect to inflicting serious bodily injury as if the shots had killed or seriously harmed his intended victim. (See N.T., 5/18/83, at 6005-07). These instructions were proper. See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 559 Pa. 229, 739 A.2d 1023, 1029-30 (1999) (approving of the instructions, which advised that if the intent to commit a crime exists, this intent can be transferred for the purpose of finding the intent element of another crime.). Where the trial court gave proper instructions to the jury it cannot be in violation of Winship. As the underlying claim is meritless, Jones cannot succeed on his associated claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Hall, supra.