Opinion ID: 2387298
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proffered Instruction and Interrogatory on Liability of Insane Person

Text: For her second point for reversal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to give the following proffered jury instruction: An insane person is liable for his torts, unless the specific act complained of involves an intent which the person from whom recovery is sought is incapable of entertaining. Appellant asserts that the proffered instruction was required by this court's decision in Ragan v. Cox, 210 Ark. 152, 194 S.W.2d 681 (1946). In Ragan , this court held that generally an insane person is liable for his torts, unless the specific act complained of involves an intent that the person from whom recovery is sought is incapable of entertaining. Appellees point out that, although the trial court did not give the proffered instruction separately, it did incorporate the information into Instruction No. 14, which provided in part: Janice Edwards, as guardian for Joe Edwards, claims that at the time of his actions on March 17, 1995, Joe Edwards, because of mental disease or defect lacked the mental capacity to intentionally commit the torts of assault or battery or false imprisonment or to form the intent to willfully and wantonly engage in extreme and outrageous conduct. The general rule of law is that a person suffering from a mental disease or defect is liable for his torts, unless the specific act complained of involves an intent which the person from whom recovery is sought is incapable of entertaining. We will not reverse a trial court's refusal to give a proffered instruction unless there was an abuse of discretion. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Priddy, 328 Ark. 666, 945 S.W.2d 355 (1997). Furthermore, it is not error for the trial court to refuse a proffered jury instruction when the stated matter is correctly covered by other instructions. Ouachita Wilderness Inst. v. Mergen, 329 Ark. 405, 947 S.W.2d 780 (1997). Appellant has failed to demonstrate that she was prejudiced or that the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting the proffered instruction in favor of Instruction No. 14. In fact, the instruction given may have been beneficial to Appellant as it included the term mental disease or defect as opposed to insane, as set out in Ragan, 210 Ark. 152, 194 S.W.2d 681. Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in refusing to give her proffered interrogatory pertaining to Edwards's mental state, which provided: INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that on March 17, 1995, when the incident occurred, Joe Edwards was suffering from psychosis or delusions? Appellant contends that this was a proper statement of the law under Ragan, 210 Ark. 152, 194 S.W.2d 681, and section 5-2-312. We disagree. Ragan addressed the issue of liability where the person was unable to entertain the requisite intent to commit the wrongful act. Similarly, section 5-2-312 provides a defense to criminal liability if the person lacked the capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law or to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. Neither one of these authorities supports Appellant's proffered interrogatory. As discussed in the previous point, a person suffering from psychosis or delusions is not necessarily insane such that he cannot form the intent to commit a wrongful act, or appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, or conform his behavior to the requirements of the law.