Opinion ID: 1267954
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: admissibility of appellant's confession on december 20, 1987

Text: At trial, appellant made a motion to have the December 20, 1987 confession suppressed. The basis of this motion was that the confession was involuntary and the result of coercion. Appellant argues that the confession was improperly induced by a promise of leniency, specifically the polygraph examiner's statement that it would be in appellant's best interest to tell the truth. We find that appellant's confession was freely and voluntarily made and hence, admissible. If a defendant, as here, was advised of his Miranda rights, but nevertheless chose to make a statement, the burden is on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his rights were voluntarily waived. State v. Neeley , 271 S.C. 33, 40, 244 S.E. (2d) 522, 526 (1978). Once a voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights is made, that waiver continues until the individual being questioned indicates that he wants to revoke the waiver and remain silent or circumstances exist which establish that his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired. State v. Moultrie , 273 S.C. 60, 62, 254 S.E. (2d) 294, 295 (1979). Further, the confession may not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, [or] obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, [or] by the exertion of improper influence. Hutto v. Ross , 429 U.S. 28, 30, 97 S.Ct. 202, 203, 50 L.Ed. (2d) 194, 197 (1976) (brackets in original). A statement induced by a promise of leniency is involuntary only if so connected with the inducement as to be a consequence of the promise. State v. Peake , 291 S.C. 138, 352 S.E. (2d) 487 (1987). The trial judge's determination of whether a statement was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made, requires an examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the waiver. State v. Doby , 273 S.C. 704, 258 S.E. (2d) 896 (1979). On appeal, the conclusion of the trial judge on issues of fact as to the voluntariness of a confession will not be disturbed unless so manifestly erroneous as to show an abuse of discretion. State v. Livingston , 223 S.C. 1, 73 S.E. (2d) 850 (1952). In response to appellant's assertion that his confession was induced by the polygraphs examiner's alleged promise of leniency, we find that this case is clearly distinguishable from Peake , In Peake , the defendant made an inculpatory statement after unequivocally being told by the interrogating officers that the State would not seek the death penalty if he gave a statement. In Peake , we reversed the defendant's conviction and sentence on the ground that his inculpatory statement was the product of the officer's promise of leniency and should have been excluded. Here, the investigating officers did not at any time promise appellant anything if he gave a statement. The polygraph examiner's statement was not on its face an inducement or hope of lighter punishment. Standing alone, the polygraph examiner's comment did not constitute the kind of hope or reward or benefit condemned by this Court in Peake. See also Tyler v. State , 247 Ga. 119, 274 S.E. (2d) 549 (1981) (officer's advisement to accused that it is always best to tell the truth will not, without more, render a subsequent confession inadmissible). Considering the totality of the circumstances, appellant's confession was properly admitted into evidence. In addition to our finding that appellant's confession was not induced by a promise of leniency, there is sufficient evidence that shows appellant was not worn down by improper interrogation tactics such as lengthy questioning, trickery, or deceit. Appellant's confession was not induced by force, psychological or physical, or by direct or implied threats. The trial judge properly admitted appellant's confession made on December 20, 1987.