Opinion ID: 3018995
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Sentencing Under United States v. Booker

Text: Counsel notes that Webb raised three challenges to his sentence pursuant to United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005). He challenged the proposed enhancements for: (1) the obliterated serial numbers; (2) possession of eight or more guns; and (3) for being an organizer. In addition, at sentencing, Webb objected to an enhancement for obstruction of justice. Webb’s pro se Rebuttal Brief raises what can best be described as an “Apprendi issue.” See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Since the District Court did not apply an enhancement for an obliterated serial number, we need not address that issue. We review the sentence that was imposed based on the other enhancements for reasonableness. United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 2006). Here, the jury’s verdict establishes the facts relied upon for the enhancements beyond a reasonable doubt and there is no Apprendi issue. The obstruction of justice enhancement likewise provides no appealable issue. 9 That enhancement was only applied after the court found that the base offense category recommended in the Presentence Investigation Report (“PIR”)” was based upon the firearms counts—the highest charged offense—and did not reflect the conduct underlying Webb’s witness tampering or obstruction of justice. Accordingly, the court enhanced the sentence based upon that conduct. The resulting sentence was reasonable, and Webb does not argue to the contrary, other than challenging these enhancements. Accordingly, because “none of the legal points” stemming from Webb’s Booker challenges are “arguable on their merits,” appeal of these issues would be frivolous. See United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 301 (3d Cir. 2001). B. Legal Issues Only Raised by Trial Counsel Counsel has identified three possible legal issues, and concluded they are without merit. We agree. 1. Webb’s Base Offense Category in Light of Shepard v. United States The Probation Office recommended a base offense level of 22 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3), in part because Webb committed the present offenses subsequent to “sustaining one felony conviction for a crime of violence.” In 1989, Webb pled nolo contendere to two counts of aggravated assault. The Application Notes to Section 2K2.1 of the Guidelines specifically include “aggravated assault” in the definition of a “crime of violence.” United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1 app. 1 (2005). Even in the absence of this Note, however, it is clear that Pennsylvania defines aggravated assault 10 in relevant part as an “attempt[] to cause serious bodily injury to another, or [to] cause[] such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.” 18 PA.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1) (2004). Accordingly, it was not necessary for the sentencing court to consider anything beyond Webb’s plea to conclude he had a prior conviction for a “crime of violence,” and the resulting enhancement does not support any nonfrivolous challenge to the sentence. 2. Proper Calculation of Webb’s Base Offense Category Pursuant to the Expired Definitional Provision of 18 U.S.C. §921(a)(30) When Webb was arrested, 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(30) defined the firearms that qualify as “semiautomatic assault weapons.” Counsel submits that an argument can be advanced that a “semiautomatic assault weapon” cannot now be defined by reference to that provision because it is no longer the law. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has rejected this argument in United States v. Whitehead, 425 F.3d 870 (10th Cir. 2005). Here, the guns Webb was convicted of possessing included an UZI semiautomatic that was specifically included in the definition of “firearm” contained in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(30). That definition was in effect when Webb was convicted. The Probation Office used the November 1, 2004 edition of the Guidelines in calculating Webb’s PIR, and it adopted the definition in § 921(a)(30). Indeed, the current version of the Guidelines continues to reference 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(30). Accordingly, the District Court appropriately increased Webb’s base offense category for possessing that firearm. 3. Webb’s Criminal History Category 11 The Supreme Court specifically excluded prior convictions from the rule it announced in Apprendi. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. Accordingly, the District Court did not err in concluding that the PIR correctly included Webb’s prior convictions in calculating his criminal history as IV. The court also correctly determined that he was serving a federal sentence of supervised release for the 1997 conviction when he committed the instant offenses, and she thus properly added two additional points. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d) (2005). Accordingly, the court did not err in calculating Webb’s criminal history category, and any argument to the contrary would be frivolous.