Opinion ID: 1090506
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Victim Impact Limiting Instruction

Text: In his third claim, Hoskins argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to give a limiting instruction when admitting victim impact evidence. Such evidence, designed to demonstrate the victim's uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community's members by the victim's death, is admissible once the prosecution has provided evidence of one or more aggravating circumstances. § 921.141(7), Fla. Stat. (2004). Just before resting its case, the State called the victim's niece to read a short statement (less than two pages in the transcript). The defense requested that the jury be given a limiting instruction both before and after it heard the victim impact evidence. The trial court asked, Is there some authority . . . for giving [the instruction] now? Defense counsel responded in the negative, and the trial court denied the request. At the conclusion of all evidence, the trial court instructed the jury that the victim impact evidence may be considered by you to determine the victim's uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community's members by the victim's death, but that the law does not allow you to weigh this evidence as an aggravating circumstance. We have consistently approved similar instructions. See, e.g., Rimmer, 825 So.2d at 330-31 (approving an instruction that victim impact evidence should not be considered by you as evidence of an aggravating circumstance or rebuttal of mitigating circumstances, but may be considered to demonstrate the victim[']s uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community's members by the victim[']s death); Alston v. State, 723 So.2d 148, 160 (Fla.1998) (approving an instruction that you shall not consider the victim impact evidence as an aggravating circumstance, but the victim impact evidence may be considered by you in making your decision in this matter). Hoskins does not quarrel with the wording of the instruction or the content of the statement. Instead, he argues that under section 90.107, Florida Statutes (2004), the court should have given a limiting instruction before the statement was given. That rule of evidence provides that [w]hen evidence that is admissible as to one party or for one purpose, but inadmissible as to another party or for another purpose, is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict such evidence to its proper scope and so inform the jury at the time it is admitted. § 90.107, Fla. Stat. (2004). Hoskins failed to preserve this argument. Upon inquiry, defense counsel told the trial court he did not have authority for giving the victim impact limiting instruction at the time of introduction. For an issue to be preserved for appeal, . . . it `must be presented to the lower court and the specific legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal must be part of that presentation if it is to be considered preserved.' Perez v. State, 919 So.2d 347, 359 (Fla.2005) (quoting Archer v. State, 613 So.2d 446, 448 (Fla. 1993)) (emphasis added), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2359, 165 L.Ed.2d 285 (2006); see also Rimmer, 825 So.2d at 330. In Rimmer, the defendant argued on appeal that the victim impact instruction did not provide the jury with clear instructions on how to consider the evidence. 825 So.2d at 330. While defense counsel objected to introduction of several statements and presented alternative instructions, he did not raise the argument made on appeal with the trial court. Id. We held that because appellant raises on appeal an argument that is different than the one argued to the trial court, appellant's claim is not preserved for appellate review. Id. at 330. Similarly, here, defense counsel did not raise section 90.107 in the trial court. Therefore, the claim is not preserved. In any event, given that the trial court ultimately instructed the jury properly, the minimal amount of victim impact evidence presented, and the strong case for aggravation and relatively weak case for mitigation, any error would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Alston, 723 So.2d at 160 (finding harmless any error in admitting victim impact testimony from victim's mother given the strong case in aggravation and the relatively weak case for mitigation); Varnadore v. State, 626 So.2d 1386, 1386 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (holding error in failing to give a limiting instruction at the time of admission of evidence of a prior conviction harmless where standard instructions were given at the close of the evidence and defense counsel told the jury during closing that the prior felonies could only be considered in relation to the weight of the defendant's testimony).