Opinion ID: 4173563
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: District Court Sanctions Order

Text: [¶14] Nathaniel argues that the motion court abused its discretion when it sanctioned him for repeated disregard of his discovery obligations. He contends that the court imposed “the most severe sanction” and that it was “neither just nor specifically related to Mika’s claim of a marital interest in the property.” 8 [¶15] Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 37(b), the trial court has broad discretion to sanction a party for withholding evidence, delaying the production of evidence, or failing to comply with discovery orders, including an order made pursuant to Rule 26(g). See Camp Takajo, Inc. v. SimplexGrinnell, L.P., 2008 ME 153, ¶ 13, 957 A.2d 68. A court may issue a discovery sanctions order designating facts as established for the purposes of the action being litigated or prohibiting a party from introducing designated matters into evidence. M.R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)-(B). [¶16] When determining the appropriate sanction, “the court should take into account the purpose of the specific rule at issue, the party’s conduct throughout the proceedings, the party’s bona fides in its failure to comply, prejudice to other parties, and the need for the orderly administration of justice.” Baker’s Table, Inc. v. City of Portland, 2000 ME 7, ¶ 17, 743 A.2d 237. “Because the trial court must weigh these factors and is in a unique position to understand the effects of the failure to comply, both general and specific, we review the court’s decisions to impose sanctions for abuse of discretion.” Id.; see Harris v. Soley, 2000 ME 150, ¶ 11, 756 A.2d 499 (concluding that an abuse of discretion in a discovery sanctions order may be demonstrated only when the court makes a “serious mistake” in weighing the applicable factors). 9 [¶17] Early in the divorce proceedings, Nathaniel acknowledged that Timshel, LLC, contained a marital component in the increased value of the property. However, between September 2015, when Mika requested discovery about Timshel, LLC, and May 2016, when the sanctions hearing was held, Nathaniel repeatedly failed to adequately respond to Mika’s discovery requests. The court’s earlier discovery orders did not deter Nathaniel, who continued to disregard the court’s orders and offer excuses that the court was entitled to find were unavailing. [¶18] As the magistrate noted in a March 3 order, “the exchange of financial information is a vital part of most divorce proceedings.” See Harris, 2000 ME 150, ¶ 16 n.13, 756 A.2d 499 (“Liberal discovery is one of the principal devices available to effectuate the purpose of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.’”). Mika had no other means to procure the requested information, she was unable to determine the marital component of a considerable asset without the discovery, and she was denied a timely final divorce hearing due to the delays caused by Nathaniel. On this record, Nathaniel has failed to demonstrate that the court made a “serious mistake” in weighing these factors. We conclude that the motion court did not abuse its discretion in the 10 sanctions it imposed for Nathaniel’s repeated failures to provide necessary discovery. See Harshman v. Harshman, 2017 ME 60, ¶¶ 17-18, --- A.3d ---; Harris, 2000 ME 150, ¶ 11, 756 A.2d 499.