Opinion ID: 1656572
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prohibition on the practice of law

Text: ¶ 32. As the majority correctly notes, this Court reviews disciplinary matters de novo. Miss. Comm'n On Judicial Performance v. Teel, 863 So.2d 973, 975 (Miss.2004). However, the Court is not bound by the factual findings and recommendations of the Commission. Id. That is, we may impose additional sanctions. Id. ¶ 33. Miss.Code Ann. § 9-9-9 (Rev.2002) states as follows: The county judge shall not practice law in any of the courts of the county wherein he holds court, but this prohibition shall not prohibit the judges of the county courts from practicing in any of the courts so far as to enable them to bring to a conclusion cases actually pending when they were appointed or elected, in which such county judges were then employed as provided in section 9-1-25, Mississippi Code of 1972, for judges of the circuit court and chancellors. (emphasis added). A county court judge is allowed six months to bring his practice to a conclusion. See id. § 9-1-25. ¶ 34. I agree with the majority that Judge Osborne has engaged in the practice of law after appointment as county judge. In my opinion, he is in violation of Miss.Code Ann. §§ 9-1-25 and 9-9-9, as well as Canons 1, 2A, 2B, 3A and 4G of the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct. His conduct constituted willful misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Miss. Const. art 6, § 177A. However, I disagree with the majority as to the appropriate sanction for Judge Osborne. ¶ 35. As the Commission and majority point out, this Court has never interpreted Section 9-9-9. The first determination in construing a statute is whether it is ambiguous. Allred v. Yarborough, 843 So.2d 727, 729 (Miss.2003) (quoting City of Natchez v. Sullivan, 612 So.2d 1087, 1089 (Miss.1992)). This Court, [w]hen called upon to apply statutes to specific factual situations, ... appl[ies] the statutes literally according to their plain meaning, and there is no occasion to resort to rules of statutory interpretation where the language used by the legislature is plain, unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning. Davis v. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 750 So.2d 1225, 1233 (Miss.1999). The Court will not impute an unjust or unwise purpose to the legislature when any other reasonable construction can save it from such imputation. Allred, 843 So.2d at 728-29. [T]he ultimate goal of this Court in interpreting a statute is to discern and give effect to the legislative intent, regardless of whether the statute is ambiguous or not. Id. at 729. ¶ 36. Section 9-9-9 is not ambiguous. Under the plain language of the statute, county judges are prohibited from practicing law. The Legislature supplied but one exception to this prohibition  the winding down period of six months. Under the ordinary meaning of this statute, the winding down period has two components. First, it applies only to cases actually pending when a county judge was appointed or elected. To benefit from this exception, the judge must have first been employed in the case at the time he was elected or appointed and second, the case should have been filed with a court. ¶ 37. I can envision no rational, good faith interpretation of the term, bring to a conclusion cases actually pending, which would allow the filing of a new complaint. To the contrary, the filing of a complaint begins a case. Rule 3 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that [a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court. The comment to Rule 3 provides, The first step in a civil action is the filing of the complaint with the clerk or judge. Thus, Judge Osborne's assertion that he filed complaints to bring to a conclusion some of his cases, works to only compound his wrongful conduct. ¶ 38. The plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase cases actually pending denotes a controversy or dispute in which a complaint or petition has been filed with a court. This is a reasonable interpretation, and construing this provision in any other way would be to impute an unwise purpose to the Legislature. Until an action is initiated in court by the filing of a complaint or petition, there is no case actually pending. Thus, the cases at issue here were not actually pending until Judge Osborne filed the petitions or complaints after he took judicial office. ¶ 39. Moreover, Judge Osborne does not benefit from the winding down provision. It escapes me how filing complaints or petitions after he was appointed could be deemed winding down Judge Osborne's law practice. To the contrary, after being appointed as a judge, filing a complaint or petition with a court creates a case actually pending. Thus, logically, it is difficult for me to see how filing petitions and complaints could simultaneously be the beginning of cases and the winding down of Judge Osborne's practice. Judge Osborne should have been initially sending these clients to other counsel rather than filing new litigation. It is little wonder that this issue is one of first impression. The statute and canons are so obvious, apparently, no prior judge has attempted what Judge Osborne has done in filing cases after being appointed to the position of a judge. Again, I must emphasize the clear language of the already cited Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 9-9-9 (Rev.2002) unequivocally states that county judges, during the wind down period, are not prohibited from practicing in any of the courts so far as to enable them to bring to a conclusion cases actually pending when they were appointed or elected.... (emphasis added). Some might argue that a case actually pending is one that a lawyer has in his or her office awaiting resolution. But how could any reasonable person interpret this statute in any way other than cases actually pending means  court cases actually pending?