Opinion ID: 845765
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: the rebuttable presumption in mcl 436.1801(8)

Text: The majority finds that clear and convincing proof should be required to rebut the presumption in MCL 436.1801(8). It concludes, in effect, that reading the statute as written would render the presumption meaningless or redundant. I disagree. The interpretation offered by the majority contradicts well-established rules of statutory construction because it adds words to the statute that the Legislature did not put there. The words that the Court adds are, The presumption may be overcome only by a showing of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In interpreting statutory language, courts must determine and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. In re MCI Telecom. Complaint, 460 Mich. 396, 411, 596 N.W.2d 164 (1999). When ascertaining legislative intent, we look first at the words of the statute itself. House Speaker v. State Administrative Bd., 441 Mich. 547, 495 N.W.2d 539 (1993). There is no standard in MCL 436.1801(8) for determining how the presumption may be rebutted. The Legislature is presumed to know the law. Wold Architects & Engineers v. Strat, 474 Mich. 223, 234, 713 N.W.2d 750 (2006), citing Bennett v. Weitz, 220 Mich. App. 295, 299, 559 N.W.2d 354 (1996). Michigan law holds that a rebuttable presumption normally can be rebutted by credible evidence. Krisher, supra . Hence, the majority creates a new clear and convincing evidence standard out of thin air in complete disregard of the text of MCL 436.1801 and of recognized rules of statutory interpretation. It offers no policy considerations to justify this action, as the Court did in Krisher. Interestingly, the Legislature has shown that it is quite capable of providing a heightened burden for rebutting a presumption when it chooses to do so. For example, it inserted into MCL 570.1203(2) a presumption that payment has been made to a contractor for improvements. It then added that the presumption may be overcome only by a showing of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. The lack of the same or a similar addition to MCL 436.1801 strongly indicates that the Legislature intended the courts to apply our general common-law standard to the presumption in that statute. We should not alter this policy choice by the Legislature. This year, the Court held that the absence of evidence of specific legislative intent to change the common law shows that the Legislature meant to leave the common law untouched. See Wold, supra . Nothing in the statutory text at issue indicates that the Legislature intended any standard other than our common-law standard to apply. I acknowledge that, in reviewing a statute's language, every word should be given meaning, and we should avoid a construction that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory. Wickens v. Oakwood Healthcare Sys., 465 Mich. 53, 60, 631 N.W.2d 686 (2001), citing Altman v. Meridian Twp., 439 Mich. 623, 487 N.W.2d 155 (1992). In these cases, I interpret the rebuttable presumption of MCL 436.1801(8) to give it full force and effect. My interpretation is that the presumption existed on defendant's behalf but disappeared when defendant's motion for summary disposition was heard. This is because plaintiffs produced credible evidence that defendant served beer to Breton while he was visibly drunk. Even if the standard were clear and convincing, the presumption would have disappeared in these cases. However, I am convinced that the correct standard is credible evidence, only. There is no valid legal justification to change the common-law standard or to manufacture a special enhanced standard for this statute. The Legislature chose not to do so, and no public policy reasons have been advanced to justify it. My interpretation renders the presumption neither surplusage nor nugatory. [3] And, unlike the interpretation of the majority, it adds no new and higher standard without justification and contrary to the intent of the Legislature.