Opinion ID: 2193035
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Governmental Status of the Water District

Text: [¶ 19] Apparently recognizing the solid foundation of this common law principle, the Town does not press for the abrogation of the nullum tempus doctrine broadly. [4] Rather, it urges us to narrowly hold that a prescriptive easement may be asserted against a quasi-municipal special-purpose district, as distinct from a municipality itself. The next question presented, then, is whether the Water District is a governmental entity protected from the assertion of a prescriptive easement. To determine whether the Water District is the government for these purposes, we must examine the nature of the Water District itself. The Legislature created the Portland Water District in 1907. P. & S.L.1907, ch. 433, repealed and replaced by P. & S.L.1975, ch. 84. Currently, the Water District is authorized to supply water to inhabitants of eleven cities or towns, including Standish. P. & S.L.2001, ch. 25, § 2. The Water District is authorized by Public and Special Law to supply water, manage wastewater and sewage, contract with companies that manage wastewater and sewage, erect and install structures to supply water or manage wastewater and sewage, hold and acquire property, excavate roads to perform repairs, exercise eminent domain in certain municipalities, borrow money to issue bonds and notes, grant or loan money, inspect connections to the sewer system, and adopt reasonable rules and regulations. P. & S.L.1975, ch. 84, §§ 2-6, 8-10, 16. The Water District's property is exempt from taxation. P. & S.L.1975, ch. 84, § 17. [¶ 20] Also, although not controlling in determining whether the Water District is a governmental entity, we consider the related legislative pronouncement regarding what types of entities are entitled to tort immunity. The Maine Tort Claims Act defines a political subdivision as any city, town, plantation, county, . . . quasi-municipal corporation and special purpose district, including, but not limited to, any water district, sanitary district, hospital district, school district of any type, any volunteer fire association as defined in Title 30-A, section 3151, a transit district as defined in Title 30-A, section 3501, subsection 1, a regional transportation corporation as defined in Title 30-A, section 3501, subsection 2, and any emergency medical service. 14 M.R.S. § 8102(3) (2005) (emphasis added). [5] [¶ 21] We have also considered whether statutorily created entities were governmental entities in other contexts. In construing the Freedom of Access Act, currently codified at 1 M.R.S. §§ 401-410 (2005), we have held that a hospital administrative district created by a private and special law as a body politic and corporate, P. & S.L.1999, ch. 84, § A-1, is a political subdivision for purposes of the Act. Town of Burlington v. Hosp. Admin. Dist. No. 1, 2001 ME 59, ¶¶ 3-6, 769 A.2d 857, 859-60. In reaching this conclusion, we took into account the hospital administrative district's authority to issue bonds and its ability to obtain money through taxation. Id. ¶ 5, 769 A.2d at 860. [¶ 22] We also held that a municipal housing authority was a political subdivision for purposes of a statute that preempted the regulation of firearms by political subdivisions. Doe v. Portland Hous. Auth., 656 A.2d 1200, 1202-04(Me.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 861, 116 S.Ct. 171, 133 L.Ed.2d 112 (1995). In addition, for purposes of taxation, we held that a public water district, or a municipality providing water service, is a public entity, not a private corporation, due to its public purposes, powers, and duties. Inhabitants of Boothbay v. Inhabitants of Boothbay Harbor, 148 Me. 31, 37-39, 88 A.2d 820, 823-24 (1952); City of Augusta v. Augusta Water Dist., 101 Me. 148, 63 A. 663 (1906). By contrast, we held that a building owned by a county agricultural society, a private corporation, did not provide a public use that rendered the property immune from condemnation because the use by the public was permissive, not a right. Oxford County Agric. Soc. v. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 17, 161 Me. 334, 335-37, 211 A.2d 893, 894-95 (1965). [¶ 23] Taking into account our earlier pronouncements regarding the qualities that make an entity a governmental entity or political subdivision of the State, we conclude that the Water District is a governmental entity against which a prescriptive easement may not be asserted. The State created the Water District; exempted it from taxation; and granted it the authority to exercise extensive, uniquely governmental functions, including providing water and sewage disposal, maintaining and repairing the infrastructure necessary to achieve those ends, exercising eminent domain, and adopting rules and regulations. In addition, the current legislative concept of a political subdivision, 14 M.R.S. § 8102(3), supports the notion that the Water District is a governmental entity. [6] [¶ 24] Finally, the public policy behind the rule that protects a governmental entity from the prescriptive claims of others does not apply any less forcefully because the asserted easement is a public easement. [7] Indeed, it may be more difficult to monitor the activities of the public generally than to monitor the activities of individuals or single entities. Accordingly, to vindicate the purpose of protecting government property from being ceded through inaction or oversight, see Sandmaier, 2005 ME 126, ¶ 8, 887 A.2d at 519, we hold that the assertion of a prescriptive easement is not permitted against a governmental entity. [¶ 25] Because we conclude that the Town cannot, as a matter of law, assert a public prescriptive easement against the Water District, we need not determine whether the Town has raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding the elements of a prescriptive easement. The entry is: Judgment affirmed.