Opinion ID: 496787
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Review by the Secretary of Education

Text: 42 The district court also ruled that plaintiffs failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies under EDGAR by not requesting the Secretary of Education to review the final complaint resolution procedure decision of the State. We hold that review by the Secretary is not a necessary step prior to commencing this Sec. 1983 action. 43 The State Board argues that once the CRP apparatus is invoked it must be exhausted prior to commencing a Sec. 1983 civil rights action. Defendants concede that the Secretary's review would not involve the complaining party to the same degree as do Sec. 1415(a)-(d) due process hearings. Defendants also recognize that the relief that such review can provide is limited. These two characteristics of the Secretary's review form the core of Legal Services' argument against requiring exhaustion of this remedy prior to commencing this action. 44 Specifically, Legal Services claims that review by the Secretary is inadequate because there is no opportunity to introduce evidence or cross-examine witnesses, and the only relief afforded by such review is the withholding of federal funds. Additionally, Legal Services argues that the applicable complaint resolution procedure did not state that review by the Secretary was available. Notification of the availability of review by the Secretary, according to plaintiffs, is required under 34 C.F.R. Sec. 76.781(c). 45 EDGAR regulations mandate that a state must include in its CRP the right to request the Secretary to review a state's final decision. 1 Briefly, the CRP apparatus is as follows. The state educational authorities have authority to provide the full relief requested here by instituting a new CRP plan, thereby addressing the individual and system-wide concerns of petitioners. The Secretary's authority, in contrast, extends only to withholding federal funding from a state found to be in noncompliance with Sec. 1412 or Sec. 1413. 20 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1416 (West 1978 & Supp. 1987). Further, the Secretary's decision may be challenged only by a state. Id. Sec. 1416(b)(1). 46 Although the Secretary's statutory authority encompasses only the remedy of withholding funds, we recognize that review by the Secretary might be helpful in resolving the issue of the State Board's compliance with the complaint resolution scheme. Clearly, a state would prefer to convince the Secretary of its compliance with EDGAR and Sec. 1415 or modify the state plan to ensure compliance rather than be subject to withholding of substantial federal funds. Even recognizing this possible effect of review by the Secretary, the fact remains that it would be contrary to plaintiffs' interests to petition for the withholding of federal funds from the State of Connecticut. Plaintiffs want Connecticut's handicapped education program implemented, not dismantled. 47 In evaluating whether exhaustion of CRP remedies is required, we commence analysis with the Act itself. Significantly, Sec. 1415(f) does not specify, directly or by incorporating its legislative history, exhaustion of possible CRP remedies. In fact, research has unearthed no statute or regulation that requires exhaustion of CRP remedies prior to commencing a Sec. 1983 action based on alleged EHA violations. Plainly, state administrative remedies must be exhausted when a federal statute so provides. Turning to the EHA caselaw, we note that the Supreme Court has never suggested that the CRP need to be invoked or exhausted prior to seeking federal court involvement in construing the EHA pursuant to Sec. 1415. See Smith, 468 U.S. at 994-1021, 104 S.Ct. at 3459-73; Rowley, 458 U.S. at 177-210, 102 S.Ct. at 3035-53. 48 In light of the complete absence of a statutory directive or decisional law requiring CRP exhaustion prior to commencing an action under Sec. 1415(e) or Sec. 1983, we must rely on general principles concerning exhaustion of state administrative remedies in Sec. 1983 actions. The Supreme Court has held that exhaustion of state judicial or administrative remedies is not required when federal claims are premised on Sec. 1983. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472-73, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 1222, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974). This is especially true when the state administrative remedy is inadequate. McNeese v. Board of Educ. for Community Unit School Dist. 187, 373 U.S. 668, 674-75, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 1437, 10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1963). Resisting serious challenges to this view, the Supreme Court confronted the issue in 1982, and stated categorically that exhaustion is not a prerequisite to an action under Sec. 1983. Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 500-01, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 2560, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982). 49 Without evaluating the merits of the inadequacy claim here, we hold based on Steffel and Patsy that plaintiffs' Sec. 1983 claims may not be barred at this stage of the litigation for failure to request review by the Secretary. Thus, the judgment appealed from may not be affirmed on defendants' alternative ground of non-exhaustion of EDGAR remedies.