Opinion ID: 2961220
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: tier iii classification

Text: Under the sentencing guidelines the offense level for failing to register under SORNA depends on whether the predicate sex offense is classified as tier I, tier II, or tier III. See USSG § 2A3.5(a) (base offense level is 16 for tier III offenders; 14 for tier II offenders; and 12 for tier I offenders). Tier III is the classification for one whose “offense . . . is comparable to or more severe than [the federal crimes of] . . . aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse (as described in sections 2241 and 2242 of Title 18).” 42 U.S.C. § 16911(4)(A)(i). We review a challenge to an offense-level calculation 1 Defendant also argues that SORNA violates the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment. We rejected these arguments in United States v. White, 782 F.3d 1118, 1123‒28 (10th Cir. 2015), decided during the pendency of this appeal. As Defendant’s counsel conceded at oral argument, this panel is bound by those rulings. See, e.g., United States v. Meyers, 200 F.3d 715, 720 (10th Cir. 2000). 3 for abuse of discretion, reviewing legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. See White, 782 F.3d at 1128‒29. As a general rule, to make the comparison required by § 16911, we apply what is called the categorical approach, examining the statutory elements of the state and federal offenses to see whether the defendant’s prior offense is comparable to or more severe than § 2241 or § 2242. See id. at 1130‒36. The California statute under which Defendant was convicted states: Every person who induces any other person to engage in sexual intercourse, sexual penetration, oral copulation, or sodomy when his or her consent is procured by false or fraudulent representation or pretense that is made with the intent to create fear, and which does induce fear, and that would cause a reasonable person in like circumstances to act contrary to the person’s free will, and does cause the victim to so act, is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year or in the state prison for two, three, or four years. Cal. Penal Code § 266c (2014). The statute defines fear as “the fear of physical injury or death to the person or to any relative of the person or member of the person’s family.” Id. The relevant elements of the first comparator statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2241, are “knowingly caus[ing] another person to engage in a sexual act—. . . (2) by threatening or placing that other person in fear that any person will be subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping; or attempt[ing] to do so . . . .” § 2241(a)(2). And the relevant elements of § 2242 are “knowingly—(1) caus[ing] another person to engage in a sexual act by threatening or placing that other person in fear (other than by threatening or 4 placing that other person in fear that any person will be subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping); . . . or attempt[ing] to do so . . . .” § 2242(1). Defendant argues that he cannot be classified in tier III because the California statute “sweeps more broadly” than the federal offenses of aggravated sexual abuse (§ 2241) or sexual abuse (§ 2242). Aplt. Br. at 18. First, he appears to contend that to violate § 266c it is necessary only to “fraudulently induce[] another to consent to a sexual act,” but that such conduct would not violate the federal statutes. Id. at 17. Second, he asserts that § 266c “punishes a person who induces a consensual sexual act by fraudulent representation made with the intent to create fear,” which is a less severe offense than § 2241 and § 2242, which, he says, require that a sexual act follow “a direct threat or action that created fear.” Id. Third, he argues that § 266c is less severe because it “defines fear more broadly” than § 2241 and § 2242. Id. We reject each argument (the second, under plain-error review). Defendant’s first contention is based on a false premise. Section 266c is not violated by the mere act of fraudulently inducing consent to a sexual act. The statute requires more—a fraudulent representation “that is made with the intent to create fear, and which does induce fear, and that would cause a reasonable person in like circumstances to act contrary to the person’s free will, and does cause the victim to so act.” Cal. Penal Code § 266c. It is therefore irrelevant that the federal statutes cannot be violated by (just any) misrepresentation. 5 Defendant’s second argument is that § 2241 and § 2242, unlike § 266c, require “a direct threat or action that created fear.” Aplt. Br. at 17. In other words, even though both federal statutes are satisfied by “placing th[e] other person in fear,” 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a)(2), 2242(1), Defendant is saying that “placing” can be accomplished only by direct threat or action. But this argument is forfeited because he failed to argue below that the federal statutes do not encompass fear induced by fraud; our review is therefore only for plain error. See Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1128 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Teague, 443 F.3d 1310, 1314 (10th Cir. 2006). Because Defendant does not argue plain error, we could end our analysis there. See Richison, 634 F.3d at 1130‒31. In any event, we see no reason to limit the meaning of “placing . . . in fear” by excluding the making of false representations that induce fear, and we are aware of no precedent saying that. See Teague, 443 F.3d at 1318‒19 (for asserted error to be “plain,” it must be “clear under current law” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Finally, Defendant contends that § 266c defines fear more broadly than § 2241 and § 2242, because fear under the California statute means “the fear of physical injury or death to the person or to any relative of the person or member of the person’s family,” Cal. Penal Code § 266c, while the federal statutes require “fear that any person will be subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping.” Aplt. Br. at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant is right about § 2241 but he misreads § 2242. Section 2241 requires inducing fear of death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping. But § 2242 does not. Indeed, that is why § 2242 is entitled “Sexual abuse” while § 2241 is 6 entitled “Aggravated sexual abuse.” What § 2242(1) prohibits is “knowingly— (1) caus[ing] another person to engage in a sexual act by threatening or placing that other person in fear (other than by threatening or placing that other person in fear that any person will be subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping)” (emphasis added). Perhaps the fear required by § 2242(1) must be more than de minimis, but it surely does not require greater fear than what is defined in the California statute—“the fear of physical injury or death to the person or to any relative of the person or member of the person’s family” that “would cause a reasonable person in like circumstances to act contrary to the person’s free will.” Cal. Penal Code § 266c. Defendant has failed to show that § 266c can be violated in a manner that would not also violate § 2241 (if the fear is that a person will be subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping) or, at least, § 2242 (if the fear is otherwise). The California statute is therefore “comparable” to the federal statutes. Defendant is qualified to be a tier III sex offender. We can briefly dispose of the one case cited by Defendant as support for his tierclassification argument, United States v. Cabrera–Gutierrez, 756 F.3d 1125, 1133–34 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 124 (2014). The Ninth Circuit held that an Oregon sex-abuse statute was not comparable to the federal statutes because “[n]onconsensual intercourse with a mentally and physically capable individual not involving a threat or the use of fear might violate Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.425, but it would not violate 18 U.S.C. § 2242.” Id. at 1134. Cabrera–Gutierrez does not help Defendant 7 because such intercourse would not violate § 266c either. Cabrera–Gutierrez does not suggest that there could be a violation of § 266c that is not a violation of the federal statutes.