Opinion ID: 857325
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Indictment Was Legally Sufficient

Text: Scheuneman argues that Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment were legally insufficient. Scheuneman did not raise this objection with the district court, so the indictment “is immune from attack unless it is so obviously No. 11-1554 9 defective as not to charge the offense by any reasonable construction.” United States v. Franklin, 547 F.3d 726, 730 (7th Cir. 2008). As a general matter, “tardily challenged indictments should be construed in favor of validity.” United States v. Harvey, 484 F.3d 453, 456 (7th Cir. 2007). “The Fifth Amendment guarantee of the right to indictment by a grand jury, its protection against double jeopardy, and the Sixth Amendment guarantee that a defendant be informed of the nature of the charges against him establish the minimum requirements for an indictment.” United States v. Fassnacht, 332 F.3d 440, 444 (7th Cir. 2003). An indictment satisfies these minimum requirements “if it (1) contains the elements of the offense charged; (2) sufficiently apprises the accused of what he must be prepared to meet; and (3) enables the accused to plead a judgment under the indictment as a bar to any subsequent prosecution for the same offense.” United States v. McComb, 744 F.2d 555, 562 (7th Cir. 1984). Scheuneman maintains that Counts 1 and 2 were con- stitutionally deficient because they did not contain allegations necessary to state the elements of tax evasion. To establish Scheuneman’s liability for tax evasion, the government needed to prove: “(1) a tax deficiency existed, (2) the defendant acted willfully, and (3) the defendant took an affirmative step to elude or defeat the payment of taxes.” United States v. Collins, 685 F.3d 651, 656 (7th Cir. 2012). In presenting his argument, Scheuneman relies on two discrepancies in the allegations related to the time period in which he evaded his income tax obligations. Count 1 accurately stated that Scheuneman committed tax evasion “for the 2003 10 No. 11-1554 calendar year, on taxable income of approximately $48,572, none of which income was declared on an income tax return to the IRS for the 2003 tax year.” However, the introductory language of Count 1 incorrectly described the period of the offense as “[f]rom approximately early 2002 to on or about April 15, 2003” when it should have said early 2003 to on or about April 15, 2004. Similarly, Count 2 alleged that Scheuneman evaded his taxes “for the 2004 calendar year, on taxable income of approximately $49,797, none of which income was declared on an income tax return to the IRS for the 2004 tax year.” Once again, however, Count 2 erroneously identified the relevant time period for the offense as “[f]rom approximately early 2003 to on or about April 15, 2004.” Despite the potential confusion caused by the erroneous dates in the introduction, Counts 1 and 2 still state all of the elements of tax evasion. In Count 1, the government alleged: (1) Scheuneman owed and did not pay personal income tax on $48,572 of taxable income for calendar year 2003; (2) Scheuneman acted willfully; and (3) Scheuneman failed to declare any of his income on his tax return to the IRS for the 2003 tax year. Similarly, in Count 2, the government alleged: (1) Scheuneman owed and did not pay personal income tax on $49,797 of taxable income for calendar year 2004; (2) Scheuneman acted willfully; and (3) Scheuneman failed to declare any of his income on his 2004 tax return. Each charge alleged the necessary elements of tax evasion. Cf. United States v. Eley, 314 F.2d 127, 129 (7th Cir. 1963) (finding no error resulted from variance between indictNo. 11-1554 11 ment and bill of particulars regarding amount of tax deficiency). Although Scheuneman maintains only that Counts 1 and 2 failed to state the necessary elements of tax evasion, we note that they also satisfy the remaining criteria for a legally sufficient indictment. Counts 1 and 2 informed Scheuneman of what he had to be prepared to meet by expressly identifying the statute Scheuneman was accused of violating, the years associated with the tax obligations Scheuneman evaded, the amount of taxable income Scheuneman earned in each of those years, and the affirmative act of evasion he committed by failing to state his income on his tax return for the relevant tax year. These allegations were sufficient to apprise Scheuneman of the nature of the charges against him. See United States v. Sloan, 939 F.2d 499, 501-02 (7th Cir. 1991). Furthermore, these allegations presented enough detail to allow Scheuneman to plead double jeopardy to avoid future prosecution based on the same conduct alleged in Counts 1 and 2. See id. at 502 (finding that defendant could avoid subsequent prosecution for conduct listed in tax evasion counts when “the indictment sufficiently designated the tax, the tax year, and the specific . . . forms” that were the instrument of evasion). Despite the erroneous dates listed in the introductory language of the indictment, we find that the allegations of Counts 1 and 2 were legally sufficient. 12 No. 11-1554