Opinion ID: 835001
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Voir Dire and Guilt Phase

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court erred in excusing sua sponte two prospective jurors who lacked proficiency in the English language and who needed an interpreter. During voir dire, the trial court invited prospective jurors to indicate any reasons for which they should be excused. One prospective juror, Lamloc, stated that his English was not good enough and that he had memory problems. Lamloc indicated that it would be difficult for him to concentrate through a lengthy trial and to understand and process the evidence adduced at trial. Defense counsel inquired whether an interpreter could be provided, to which the trial court responded that it was not allowed to provide one for jurors. Over defendant's objections, the trial court released Lamloc, explaining that it was doing so both because of the language issue and because of Lamloc's admittedly limited cognitive abilities. The trial court also clarified its position with respect to translators by noting that the Judicial Department would not provide funds for the use of translators for jurors. Several days later, defense counsel raised concerns that another prospective juror, Montesinos, lacked sufficient proficiency in English to serve as a juror. In response, the trial court indicated that it would obtain an interpreter to assist with voir dire. During voir dire, defense counsel tried questioning Montesinos without using an interpreter. Listening to the responses, the trial court was concerned that Montesinos did not understand the questions. Montesinos then indicated that he would need an interpreter to understand the testimony at trial. The trial court explained that the Judicial Department would provide an interpreter for voir dire, but not for trial. As a result, the trial court excused Montesinos over defense objections. Defendant challenges the trial court's ruling on the grounds that it violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Oregon statutory law. In accordance with our ordinary practice of considering state law issues before federal law issues, see State v. Langley, 314 Or. 247, 252, 839 P.2d 692 (1992), adh'd to on recons, 318 Or. 28, 861 P.2d 1012 (1993) (describing practice), we turn first to defendant's argument that the trial court violated Oregon statutes by refusing to provide interpreters that would enable prospective jurors who were not proficient in English to serve on the jury.
The parties agree that the trial court excused at least one prospective juror, Montesinos, because his proficiency in English was insufficient for him serve as a juror without an interpreter, and the court had declined to appoint an interpreter for him. [6] Defendant argues that Oregon lawspecifically, ORS 45.275 and ORS 45.273requires the state to provide interpreters for prospective jurors who could serve but for their lack of proficiency in English. For the reasons that follow, we disagree with defendant's interpretation of those provisions. ORS 45.275 provides, in part: The court shall appoint a qualified interpreter in a civil or criminal proceeding, and a hearing officer or the designee of a hearing officer shall appoint a qualified interpreter in an adjudicatory proceeding, whenever it is necessary: (a) To interpret the proceedings to a non-English-speaking party; (b) To interpret the testimony of a non-English-speaking party or witness; or (c) To assist the court, agency or hearing officer in performing the duties and responsibilities of the court, agency or hearing officer. Defendant also relies on ORS 45.273, which sets out the legislature's policy for creating procedures for the qualification and use of court interpreters. ORS 45.273(1) provides: It is declared to be the policy of this state to secure the constitutional rights and other rights of persons who are unable to readily understand or communicate in the English language because of a non-English-speaking cultural background or a disability, and who as a result cannot be fully protected in administrative and court proceedings unless qualified interpreters are available to provide assistance. Nothing in the text of ORS 45.273 either authorizes or requires the provision of interpreters for non-English speakers. Rather, that statute is a general statement of a policy to protect the constitutional and other rights of persons who are not proficient in English in administrative and court proceedings. That general statement is implemented by the specific provisions in ORS 45.275 and ORS 45.285 for the appointment of an interpreter for a non-English-speaking party in a civil or criminal case, a non-English-speaking witness, or a witness who cannot communicate because of a physical hearing or speaking impairment. See ORS 45.275(1)(a), (b); ORS 45.285(1)(c), (2) (so providing). Apparently recognizing the absence of any specific statute regarding non-English-speaking jurors or prospective jurors, defendant argues that ORS 45.275(1)(c) requires the appointment of an interpreter for such a person. Paragraph (c), however, provides for the appointment of an interpreter to assist the court, agency or hearing officer in performing their official duties. It does not mention the appointment of an interpreter to assist prospective jurors. Even assuming, without deciding, that ORS 45.275(1)(c) would authorize a trial court to appoint an interpreter for a non-English-speaking juror because that appointment would assist the court, the statute nevertheless does not require the trial court to make such an appointment. Nothing in the statutes cited by defendant suggests that the trial court may not respond to the potential difficulties of seating a non-English-speaking juror by excusing that juror. Indeed, ORS 10.050(2) specifically provides that the trial court may excuse a juror whose presence on the jury would substantially impair the progress of the action on trial   . We conclude that the trial court's decision not to provide an interpreter for a non-English-speaking prospective juror, and its subsequent decision to exclude the prospective juror because he was unable to participate at trial without an interpreter, did not violate Oregon statutes.
Defendant next argues that the exclusion of a non-English-speaking person from the jury pool violated his Sixth Amendment right to have his jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. [7] Under the Sixth Amendment, a person who has been charged with a serious offense has a fundamental right to a trial by jury, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), which includes the right to trial by a jury that is drawn from a fair cross section of the community. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). This court identified the elements of a fair cross-section claim in State v. Rogers, 334 Or. 633, 642, 55 P.3d 488 (2002): [T]he elements of a prima facie case, with regard to the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement, require a criminal defendant to show: (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a `distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of that group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that the underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. Id. at 642, 55 P.3d 488 (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted)). [8] Defendant advances a similar argument under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [9] See Rogers, 334 Or. at 642 n. 8, 55 P.3d 488 (summarizing requirements) (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977)). There are four requirements for proving that the selection of the jury panel violates the Equal Protection Clause. Rogers, 334 Or. at 642 n. 8, 55 P.3d 488. First, the defendant must establish that the group is one that is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment under the law, as written or as applied. Second, the defendant must show the degree of under representation by comparing the proportion of the group in the total population to the proportion called to serve as grand jurors, over a significant period of time. Third, the defendant must demonstrate that the state's selection procedure is susceptible of abuse or is not racially neutral in order to support the presumption of discrimination raised by the statistical showing. Finally, to make out an equal-protection challenge, the defendant must show that the exclusion of a cognizable group is purposeful, which requires the party to establish a clear pattern that emerges from the effect of the state's action, inexplicable on grounds other than race, even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face. Id. Defendant argues that prospective jurors who lack fluency in English are a distinctive group, as that term is used in the fair cross-section cases and a recognizable, distinct class, as that term is used in the equal protection cases. For example, he points out that the legislature has declared that individuals whose communication skills in the English language are deficientbecause of a non-English-speaking cultural backgroundare such a distinctive and sufficiently cognizable class that they need to be protected in administrative and court proceedings. [10] That declaration, defendant asserts, shows that the legislature has recognized non-English-speaking persons as a distinctive and recognizable group. Defendant argues that it is the very lack of this group's English-language proficiency that `defines' and `limits' it, consistent with the concerns expressed in the legislative policy statement. Defendant continues: [E]xcluding those lacking English-language proficiency from jury pools in indigent criminal cases would not serve those purposes [of the fair-cross-section requirement outlined in Lockhart ], but instead would erode the confidence of such citizens in the criminal justice system, as well as their belief that they have a civic responsibility to share in the administration of justice. In addition to characterizing the issue as one of civic participation and legislative concern, defendant suggests, more significantly, that language is a measure of race and ethnicity. In analyzing some ethnic groups or communities for purposes of an equal protection claim, proficiency in a particular language may be treated as a surrogate for race or ethnicity. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality opinion) (so stating). In Hernandez, the plurality observed that eliminating persons who speak a particular language from a jury pool, without regard to the particular circumstances of the trial or the individual responses of the jurors, may be found by the trial judge to be a pretext for racial discrimination. Id. at 371-72, 111 S.Ct. 1859. Accordingly, defendant argues that the state's failure to provide funding for jurors who lack proficiency in English effectively excludes potential jurors from the jury pool on the grounds of language, which, in effect, excludes them on the impermissible basis of race or ethnicity. Defendant faces a difficult hurdle in claiming that the exclusion of non-English-speaking jurors violates the United States Constitution. A federal statute provides that the ability to speak and understand English is a requirement for service on a federal jury, 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(2), (3), and every court that has considered the issue has upheld that requirement against constitutional challenge. E.g., United States v. Angulo-Hernandez, 565 F.3d 2, 12 (1st Cir.2009), cert den, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 776, 175 L.Ed.2d 540 (2009) (28 U.S.C. § 1865 does not violate fair cross-section requirement of Sixth Amendment); United States v. Aponte-Suarez, 905 F.2d 483, 492 (1st Cir.1990) (English proficiency requirement for jury service is constitutional and serves overwhelming national interest.). Moreover, every state court that has considered whether a requirement that jurors be proficient in English violates the Sixth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, or the Equal Protection Clause has concluded that it does not. See, e.g., State v. Gibbs, 254 Conn. 578, 597-98, 758 A.2d 327, 340-41 (2000) (citing cases). Defendant does not assert that those cases were wrongly decided, nor does he explain why, if statutes that exclude those without English proficiency from juries are constitutional, then a state's administrative decision not to provide interpreters for jurors without English proficiency would be unconstitutional. Simply put, no case supports defendant's position. Turning to the first element that is required to make out a violation of the Sixth Amendment's fair-cross section requirementthe existence of a distinctive group defendant again encounters the problem that, although numerous courts have considered the issue, no court has concluded that non-English-speaking persons constitute a distinctive group for Sixth Amendment purposes. See Commonwealth v. Acen, 396 Mass. 472, 479, 487 N.E.2d 189, 194 (1986), appeal dismissed, 476 U.S. 1155, 106 S.Ct. 2269, 90 L.Ed.2d 714 (1986) (so stating). Although defendant cites Hernandez for the proposition that a trial judge could find that excluding jurors because they spoke a particular language was a pretext for racial discrimination, that case involved proficiency in Spanish, rather than lack of proficiency in English, and here, of course, the trial court made no finding of racial discrimination, pretextual or otherwise. Even assuming, without deciding, that non-English-speaking prospective jurors constitute a distinctive groupand also assuming that the group is under-represented in jury pools due to systematic exclusionthe United States Supreme Court has consistently held that states may exclude individuals who are members of such groups from juries if the exclusion is required to advance significant state interests and is no broader than necessary to serve those interests. E.g., Duren, 439 U.S. at 367-68, 99 S.Ct. 664 (so holding for purposes of Sixth Amendment right to jury trial). The state argues that its interests in excluding prospective jurors who are not proficient in Englishincluding ensuring that jurors understand the proceedings at trial and are able to participate in deliberations, avoiding the disruption of having interpreters in the jury room, and not incurring the costs of providing interpretersare compelling. We agree that the interests articulated by the state are sufficient to justify excluding non-English-speaking persons from the jury pool. It is critical for jurors to be able to follow the proceedings in the courtroom and to be able to participate meaningfully in deliberations. The state may also reasonably conclude that the cost of providing interpreters for one or more non-English-speaking jurors is an expense that the state should not incur. Those justifications are similar to the reasons that have led every state and federal court that has considered the issue to conclude that a state permissibly may decline to provide interpreters for non-English-speaking jurors. See Gibbs, 254 Conn at 598-99, 758 A.2d at 341; Acen, 396 Mass. at 480, 487 N.E.2d at 194; Aponte-Suarez, 905 F.2d at 492 (all so holding). For similar reasons, defendant's equal protection argument also is unavailing. Even assuming, without deciding, that persons lacking proficiency in English constitute a distinct, recognizable class for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, the state's strong interest in the integrity and efficiency of jury trials justifies its decision not to provide interpreters for those persons. Again, every court that has considered the issue has concluded that the exclusion of such prospective jurors does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, just as it does not violate the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g., Gibbs, 254 Conn. at 598-99, 758 A.2d at 341 (assuming non-English speakers are cognizable group for equal protection purposes, no constitutional violation because state's interests in having jurors understand proceedings and avoiding jury disruption and costs associated with interpreters are compelling); State v. Garza, 241 Neb. 934, 958, 492 N.W.2d 32, 49 (2007) (rejecting Sixth Amendment and equal protection challenges because excluding non-English speakers from juries promotes the interests of the state's judicial process by assuring that jurors can understand the proceedings); State v. Paz, 118 Idaho 542, 552, 798 P.2d 1, 11 (1990), cert den, 501 U.S. 1259, 111 S.Ct. 2911, 115 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1991) (rejecting Sixth Amendment and equal protection challenges because state has a significant interest in the integrity of the jury system    [which] is manifestly and primarily advanced by limiting jurors to those who are capable of understanding the proceedings). Defendant, recognizing the absence of case law supporting his position, argues that Oregon statutes should lead to a different resolution of the federal constitutional issues. He notes that, in contrast to the federal statute and statutes in some other states requiring English proficiency to serve on a jury, Oregon does not explicitly bar non-English-speaking jurors from serving. On the contrary, defendant points to ORS 45.273(1), quoted above, as establishing a state policy to secure the constitutional rights and other rights of those who cannot understand English and whose rights cannot be protected unless qualified interpreters are available to provide assistance. Defendant argues that, even if it is permissible to exclude non-English-speaking jurors by statute, Oregon has declined to enact such a law and instead has adopted a policy in favor of interpreters that is intended to secure the rights of its non-English-speaking citizens. Therefore, the state violates a defendant's fair trial and equal protection rights by failing to provide interpreters for potential jurors who lack proficiency in English. We disagree. As discussed above, see 349 Or. at 181-83, 243 P.3d at 36-38, no Oregon statute articulates a policy in favor of, much less requires, interpreters for non-English-speaking jurors, as opposed to parties to a legal proceeding or witnesses in such a proceeding. Moreover, we fail to see how an administrative or judicial decision not to fund interpretersas long as it is applied in a nondiscriminatory mannerwould violate a defendant's constitutional rights, when a statute excluding non-English-speaking jurors does not. We conclude that the state's decision not to provide funding for interpreters for jurors who are not proficient in English does not violate the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of bias on the part of Robert Cameron, one of the state's primary witnesses, after Cameron made a comment to defendant while Cameron was leaving the courtroom. Cameron testified during the state's case-in-chief and was extensively cross-examined with respect to the substance of his testimony and his credibility, as we discuss in greater detail below. During the defendants' case-in-chief, they presented a witness, Brown, who asserted that Cameron had told him that he had lied to prison officials about defendants' involvement in Polin's death. [11] In the state's rebuttal, it again called Cameron, and he testified briefly that he had never talked to Brown about the case. As Cameron left the stand, he allegedly made a remark to defendants, which defense counsel described to the court, outside the jury's presence: `As Mr. Cameron was leaving the courtroom, he looked at our clients and maybe defense counsel as well and said: How do you like me now? And it was audible, certainly to our clients and people at counsel table. We believe the jury may or may not have heard it. We would like to make sure that the jury is informed that he made that statement. After a colloquy, the trial court stated: Mr. Cameron, when he got up, I saw him look towards both Mr. Haugen and Mr. Brumwell and I don't doubt he said something. I find that to be inappropriate on Mr. Cameron's behalf. I do not find it to be any evidence of anything that the jury should hear about. So, you've made a record of what Mr. Cameron said. It was inappropriate. If he was here, I would tell him that, but I'm not going to allow the jury to hear it. Defendant's attorney then said, [T]he jury doesn't have to hear it, but it may indicate his bias. (Emphasis added.) Two days later, before instructions and closing argument, defendant made a pro se objection, arguing that certain evidence should have been admitted, including Robert Cameron leaving the stand stating: How do you like me now?
The state first contends that defendant failed to preserve his argument that the trial court erred in excluding Cameron's remark from evidence. Requiring preservation of issues at trial is important to judicial efficiency because it allows the trial court to consider legal argument and correct the error. State ex rel. Juv. Dept. v. S.P., 346 Or. 592, 604, 215 P.3d 847 (2009). In addition, the preservation requirement promotes fairness to the adversary parties. Id. There are various levels of specificity by which an issue may be preserved for review, consistent with those purposes. See State v. Stevens, 328 Or. 116, 122, 970 P.2d 215 (1998) (In analyzing preservation of error, an appellate court must view the facts in light of the purposes of fairness and efficiency that underlie the requirement.). A party ordinarily may preserve an issue for review merely by raising an issue at trial; alternatively (and preferably), a party may preserve an issue by raising the issue, identifying a source for the party's position, and advancing a particular argument. See State v. Hitz, 307 Or. 183, 188, 766 P.2d 373 (1988) (discussing alternative methods of preserving issues for review). Making an offer of proof is ordinarily part of preserving an argument that the trial court erred in excluding evidence. See State v. Bowen, 340 Or. 487, 500, 135 P.3d 272 (2006), cert. den., 549 U.S. 1214, 127 S.Ct. 1258, 167 L.Ed.2d 89 (2007) (so stating). The purpose of this rule [requiring an offer of proof] is to assure that appellate courts are able to determine whether it was error to exclude the evidence and whether any error was likely to have affected the result of the case. State v. Affeld, 307 Or. 125, 128, 764 P.2d 220 (1988). The state argues that an offer of proof requires a party to identify the evidence that the party believes should have been admitted. See State v. Busby, 315 Or. 292, 298, 844 P.2d 897 (1993) (An offer of proof must identify what the evidence would have shown.). The state asserts that defendant did not make clear to the trial court what evidence defendant wanted to put on regarding Cameron's bias; defendant did not suggest that Cameron be recalled to the stand to be examined about his statement or that either of the defendants or one of the four defense counsel take the stand to testify as to the statement. Instead, defendant asked only that the jury be informed that he made that statement. The state argues that, because defendant failed to offer any evidentiary vehicle for presenting evidence of Cameron's possible bias to the jury, his argument was not preserved. We conclude that the issue was sufficiently preserved for us to consider it. After Cameron left the stand, and before the jury was excused, the trial court asked whether defendants had any further evidence. Defense counsel replied that he might have one more witness and wanted a few minutes to discuss it. The jury was then excused, and defense counsel described the remark that Cameron had made when he stepped down, as quoted above. Defendant now responds to the state's argument that he did not indicate how Cameron's remark might be introduced as evidence by asserting that the reference to one more witness was a reference to recalling Cameron to testify about the remark if the court would permit it. Although defense counsel could have been clearer in stating to the trial court, after the jury had been excused, that he wished to recall Cameron as a witness to testify about the remark, we believe the purposes of preservation were served by what defense counsel did say. Having previously informed the court that he might have one more witness, defense counsel later stated that Cameron had made a comment while passing the defense table and repeated the substance of that comment. [12] He told the court that he wanted the jury to be informed of the remark. With knowledge that a comment had been made and what the comment was, the trial court then ruled that it was not going to allow the jury to hear it. The state also argues that defense counsel's statement, after the court had ruled, that the jury doesn't have to hear it, but it may indicate his bias, indicates that defendant did not disagree with the court and accepted its ruling. However, defendant's equally plausible reading of that remark was that defense counsel was acknowledging (by repeating) the court's unfavorable ruling (the jury doesn't have to hear it), but continuing to object that the witness's statement reflected bias and that the jury should know about it. In addition, defendant himself later stated to the trial court that the jury should have been told of Cameron's remark. Moreover, the trial court, immediately after ruling against defendant's request that the jury be informed of Cameron's remark, told defense counsel, So, you've made a record of what Mr. Cameron said. As noted, it would have been preferable for defense counsel to have requested that Cameron immediately be recalled to the stand or to have made an offer of proof by identifying the witness he would have called and what that witness's testimony would have been, but we think, in these circumstances, that defendant sufficiently apprised the trial court of his objection and the reasons for it. See State v. Milbradt, 305 Or. 621, 630, 756 P.2d 620 (1988) (citing State v. Foster, 296 Or. 174, 183, 674 P.2d 587 (1983)) ([A] defense attorney does not have to walk over any more legal coals to protect the record after first stating the grounds for the objection.).
Having concluded that defendant preserved his objection, we turn to the question whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence of Cameron's comment to defendants as he left the witness stand. Evidence of a witness's bias is generally admissible. OEC 609-1 (The credibility of a witness may be attacked by evidence that the witness engaged in conduct or made statements showing bias or interest.); State v. Hubbard, 297 Or. 789, 796, 688 P.2d 1311 (1984) (A principle of evidence law in Oregon is that: It is always permissible to show the interest or bias of an adverse witness. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). However, our cases also make clear that, while evidence of bias is relevant and may be admitted, it is not necessarily error to exclude such evidence: Evidence relevant to the bias or interest of a witness need not always be admitted.     Where bias or interest is shown, but further questioning is objected to, the decision is within the discretion of the trial judge. Hubbard, 297 Or. at 799-800, 688 P.2d 1311. As the 1981 Conference Committee Commentary on OEC 609-1 states, although the rule permits the credibility of a witness to be attacked by evidence of conduct or statements showing bias or interest, [t]he trial judge retains discretion to control the extent to which proof of bias or interest may go. As with other evidence, where the evidence of conduct or statements showing bias is merely cumulative of other evidence of bias, the trial court has discretion to exclude it. See State v. Cox, 337 Or. 477, 487, 98 P.3d 1103 (2004), cert. den., 546 U.S. 830, 126 S.Ct. 50, 163 L.Ed.2d 81 (2005) (trial court did not err in excluding evidence of victim's violent acts towards others to show defendant's reasons for fearing victim, because evidence, although relevant, would not have added greatly to the evidence already before the jury). Defendant now argues in great detail that Cameron's statement was evidence of his animosity towards defendants and was therefore probative of his bias against them. Accordingly, defendant asserts, the statement should have been admitted as evidence of bias under OEC 609-1. Although the state responds that Cameron's statement did not necessarily demonstrate any particular hostility towards defendants, it also concedes that the comment might be susceptible of such a reading. If so, the statement was at least marginally relevant to the issues at trial because it tended to show Cameron's bias. Thus, it would have been permissible for the trial court to admit evidence that Cameron had made the statement. That does not mean, however, that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the comment. As noted, our cases hold that a trial court has discretion to limit evidence of bias or interest under OEC 609-1 if it is simply cumulative of other, similar evidence of bias. The state argues that Cameron's remark itself was no more probative of [his general hostility towards defendants] than other evidence received at trial. Further, according to the state, because there was ample and specific evidence of Cameron's hostility, the admission of his comment would not have substantially assisted the jury in making a decision about his credibility. [13] We agree. Defendant cross-examined Cameron extensively during the state's case-in-chief and sought to develop evidence that he was hostile towards defendants and biased against them. [14] The record reflects that, while testifying before the jury, Cameron was mocking, hostile, and uncooperative toward defense counsel, calling one of defendant's attorneys a jerk off and asserting that the attorney was trying to peg [him] in a corner. Cameron testified that, after he had decided to testify against defendants, he received a death contract in the mail, threatening him and his brother. Cameron was upset with defendants for making him (as well as themselves) look guilty by committing the murder near the band room during the time when the band in which he and they were members was scheduled to practice. Moreover, they involved him in the attempted cover-up by trying to get him to hide their bloody clothes. He thought that murdering Polin because he was a rat made little sense, when there were baby killers, child molesters, all kinds of rats in this prison bigger than him. Why not them? And Cameron was hostile to defendants because they had killed a friend: I liked [Polin].    And had I known that somebody was going to kill him, I would have g[iven] him a head's up, you know. I wouldn't let somebody just, you know, sneak attack. I mean, there'sI mean, for what? For nothing. In short, Cameron's direct testimony and his answers on cross-examination provided evidence of bias against defendants. Cameron also testified that his life in prison had changed for the worse, not for the better, after coming forward to testify against defendantstestimony from which the jury could have inferred that he now bore some level of hostility towards defendants. He said that telling the authorities about defendants had turned my life upside down and that he now was being treated like shit. Cameron stated that the defendants were doing better time than I'm doing and that he was clearly upset about being placed in a segregation unit after coming forward as a witness. He concluded that, Since I came forward on this, I have got nothing but dicked. So, you [defense counsel] are sitting over there making all of these innuendos like I am getting something or I did this [coming forward to testify] for something. I was doing fine on my own. I didn't ask them to come to me with this shit. Given the detailed cross-examination of Cameron and the other evidence that defendant adduced at trial to show Cameron's dislike of defendants and the multiple reasons that the jury should view Cameron's testimony with suspicion, we conclude that the trial court's decision to exclude what defendant now asserts is additional evidence of biasCameron's remark to defendants as he left the witness standwas within the trial court's discretion. It was not error.