Opinion ID: 2242294
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: The defendant raises several challenges to the propriety of his remand for a new sentencing hearing. However, our review of this matter has been affected by the governor's actions. Although we issued a written decision in this case on October 18, 2002, in which we vacated defendant's death sentence, as noted, the State moved on November 8, 2002, for a stay of our mandate pending the filing of certiorari proceedings in the United States Supreme Court. We allowed the motion on November 19, 2002. [1] In addition, defendant's filing of his petition for rehearing in November 2002 prevented our decision from being considered final. See PSL Realty Co. v. Granite Investment Co., 86 Ill.2d 291, 56 Ill.Dec. 368, 427 N.E.2d 563(1981); Glasser v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 346 Ill.App. 72, 104 N.E.2d 510 (1952); Berg v. Allied Securities, 193 Ill.2d 186, 191-92, 249 Ill.Dec. 770, 737 N.E.2d 160 (2000) (Freeman, J., specially concurring) (noting that when a petition for rehearing is filed, the judgment of the reviewing court does not become final until the petition is denied). Thus, once defendant filed a petition for rehearing in this case, the original October 18, 2002, decision was not a final one and was subject to modification. In light of the foregoing, on January 10, 2003, the date of the Governor's commutation action, defendant remained under an existing sentence of death. An appellate issue is moot when it is abstract or presents no controversy. People v. Blaylock, 202 Ill.2d 319, 325, 269 Ill.Dec. 490, 781 N.E.2d 287 (2002). An issue can become moot if circumstances change during the pendency of an appeal that prevent the reviewing court from being able to render effectual relief. People v. Jackson, 199 Ill.2d 286, 294, 263 Ill.Dec. 819, 769 N.E.2d 21 (2002). In the case at bar, defendant raises issues dealing solely with his death sentence. As we have explained, subsequently to the filing of his petition for rehearing and the State's commencement of certiorari proceedings, the governor commuted defendant's death sentence to natural life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Commutation removes the judicially imposed sentence and replaces it with a lesser executively imposed sentence. People ex rel. Johnson v. Murphy, 257 Ill. 564, 566, 100 N.E. 980 (1913); Black's Law Dictionary 274 (7th ed.1999). Thus, the commutation rendered the sentencing issues raised by defendant in this appeal moot. See, e.g., Lewis v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 31, 38, 235 S.E.2d 320, 325 (1977); State v. Mitchell, 239 Or. 87, 88, 396 P.2d 572, 573 (1964). We therefore must dismiss the appeal as moot.