Opinion ID: 2646881
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: In Propria Persona Status and Standby Counsel

Text: Defendant next contends that his Sixth Amendment right of selfrepresentation was violated when the trial court revoked his Faretta status. He argues that “[t]he trial judge’s rationale for termination of [defendant’s] Faretta 63 rights — that [defendant] was using dilatory practices — is not supported by the record.” We disagree. A criminal defendant has a right to represent himself at trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806; People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 20.) “A trial court must grant a defendant’s request for self-representation if the defendant knowingly and intelligently makes an unequivocal and timely request after having been apprised of its dangers.” (People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 97–98.) Erroneous denial of a Faretta motion is reversible per se. (People v. Dent (2003) 30 Cal.4th 213, 218.) However, the right of self-representation is not absolute. “[The] government’s interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant’s interest in acting as his own lawyer.” (Martinez v. Court of Appeal (2000) 528 U.S. 152, 161.) “The right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it a license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 834–835, fn. 46; see also People v. Butler (2009) 47 Cal.4th 814 [“The court may deny a request for self-representation that . . . is intended to delay or disrupt the proceedings.”].) “Thus, a trial court must undertake the task of deciding whether a defendant is and will remain so disruptive, obstreperous, disobedient, disrespectful or obstructionist in his or her actions or words as to preclude the exercise of the right to self-representation. The trial court possesses much discretion when it comes to terminating a defendant’s right to selfrepresentation and the exercise of that discretion ‘will not be disturbed in the absence of a strong showing of clear abuse.’ ” (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 735.) 64 Because we have already recounted the relevant factual background and procedural history above, we highlight here only the most salient points. When the trial court granted defendant’s request to represent himself on August 16, 2000, defendant assured the trial court that he would be prepared for trial by February 5, 2001. By the time the trial court revoked defendant’s Faretta status on June 28, 2001, defendant had exceeded this deadline by almost five months. While proceeding in propria persona, defendant requested and received two continuances and did not object to a third continuance requested by standby counsel. During the 10-and-a-half-month period during which defendant represented himself, defendant repeatedly complained about David Gunn and made multiple motions to remove him as standby counsel despite the fact that the trial court had made clear that Gunn had no control over defendant and played no role in defendant’s preparation of his defense. Defendant also filed three separate motions to disqualify the trial judge pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1; moved to disqualify the prosecutor pursuant to Penal Code section 1424; and filed a motion for a change of venue. These motions were denied. During the same period, defendant did not subpoena any witnesses or turn over any discovery. The record demonstrates that defendant did not engage in efficient investigation and trial preparation. Although the prosecutor represented to the trial court that he had given his investigator’s phone number to defendant, defendant did not make contact with the investigator. Defendant claimed that the investigator never answered the phone, but the prosecutor countered that defendant never actually called. During a June 15, 2001, trial readiness conference, the trial court said that it had received a letter from defendant’s courtappointed investigator notifying the court that the investigator was “no longer” on the case and asking for his appointment to be terminated. In the letter, the 65 investigator stated: “I find it impossible to work with Mr. Williams.” The trial court granted the investigator’s request and relieved him from the case. On June 28, 2001, when the trial court asked defendant if he had retained a new investigator, defendant stated: “No. I do plan on, yes.” During a hearing on June 28, 2001, the prosecutor alleged that defendant was engaging in delay tactics and urged the trial court to relieve defendant of his Faretta status. According to the prosecutor, defendant had “done everything to delay the proceedings in his dealings with the investigator,” and defendant was “no closer to trial today than he was a year ago.” In response, defendant challenged the prosecutor’s factual representations but also acknowledged that he was “in over [his] head.” He then stated: “I — at this point, I’m kind of, like, fed up. Whatever y’all want to do. . . . This is your house. I’m burnt out. [¶] . . . So if you want to take my pro per status, fine. This is your courtroom. Do what you want to do. I don’t care. But don’t give it to [attorney David Gunn]. That’s the whole thing I’ve been fighting. That is why I filed the motion to remove him as standby counsel, because when he was counsel he ain’t doing nothing.” The trial court then issued the following ruling: “I make the following findings: That [defendant] has had — and I do not know the number of Marsden motions. I can’t even count the number of lawyers that he’s had. . . . [¶] I find that I agree with [defendant], he’s in over his head. And that all of these have been delay tactics. And I’m going to remove him from his pro per status.” “[T]he Faretta right is forfeited unless the defendant ‘ “articulately and unmistakably” ’ demands to proceed in propria persona.” (People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 99.) By conceding that he was in over his head and acquiescing to the revocation of his Faretta status, defendant did not unmistakably demand to continue in propria persona. Defendant has therefore forfeited this claim. (See People v. Rudd (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 620, 628–630 [holding that 66 defendant forfeited his objection to an order revoking his pro se status by raising it for the first time on appeal].) Forfeiture aside, defendant’s claim fails on the merits. By the time defendant’s Faretta status was revoked, defendant had been proceeding in propria persona for over 10 months and had missed the ready-for-trial deadline by five months. During this period, defendant did not conduct any meaningful investigation or engage in any discovery. Defendant conceded, and the trial court found, that he was “in over his head.” The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that defendant had engaged in “delay tactics” in the course of his selfrepresentation. Accordingly, we find no violation of defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to self-representation.
Defendant next asserts that the trial court’s refusal to remove attorney David Gunn as standby counsel while he was proceeding in propria persona “denied [defendant] the assistance of conflict-free counsel throughout the ten months of his representation, in violation of the Sixth Amendment.” Defendant is incorrect. It is well-established that “a defendant has no right, under either the federal or state Constitution, to ‘hybrid representation.’ Criminal defendants have the constitutional right to have an attorney represent them, and the right under the federal Constitution to represent themselves, but these rights are mutually exclusive.” (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1104, 1119–1120, fn. omitted.) “Of course, a State may — even over objection by the accused — appoint a ‘standby counsel’ . . . to be available to represent the accused in the event that termination of the defendant’s self-representation is necessary.” (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 834, fn. 46.) We have explained that “standby counsel . . . takes no active role in the defense, but attends the proceedings so as to be familiar with the 67 case in the event that the defendant gives up or loses his or her right to selfrepresentation . . . .” (People v. Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 1119, fn. 7, italics added.) Because defendant had no Sixth Amendment right to any counsel while he was proceeding in propria persona, he certainly had no Sixth Amendment right to assertedly “conflict-free” standby counsel. Accordingly, even assuming that Gunn did have a conflict of interest, defendant’s claim fails. C. Prosecution’s Obligations Under Brady v. Maryland Defendant contends that the prosecution failed to timely disclose certain discovery materials he maintains were favorable to the defense, thus violating his due process rights under Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83. “Under the federal Constitution’s due process clause, as interpreted by the high court in Brady . . . , the prosecution has a duty to disclose to a criminal defendant evidence that is ‘ “both favorable to the defendant and material on either guilt or punishment.” ’ [Citations]. The prosecution’s withholding of favorable and material evidence violates due process ‘irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.’ [Citation.]” (In re Bacigalupo (2012) 55 Cal.4th 312, 333.) “For Brady purposes, evidence is favorable if it helps the defense or hurts the prosecution, as by impeaching a prosecution witness.” (People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1132.) “[The] touchstone of materiality is a ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result . . . . The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. A ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result is accordingly shown when the government’s evidentiary suppression ‘undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.’ ” (Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419, 435.) In determining whether evidence is material under this standard, we consider “ ‘the 68 effect of the nondisclosure on defense investigations and trial strategies.’ ” (People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 279.) The prosecution is obligated to disclose favorable and material evidence “whether the defendant makes a specific request [citation], a general request, or none at all [citation].” (In re Brown (1998) 17 Cal.4th 873, 879.) “The scope of [the prosecution’s] disclosure obligation extends beyond the contents of the prosecutor’s case file and encompasses the duty to ascertain as well as divulge ‘any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) A determination that the prosecution improperly withheld material information requires reversal without further harmless error analysis. (Kyles v. Whitley, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 435; People v. Zambrano, supra, at p. 1133.) Defendant contends that the prosecution violated its Brady obligations by failing to timely disclose (1) information regarding Gary’s criminal activities and associates; (2) a four-page FBI report regarding prosecution witness Robert Scott; (3) information regarding a potential prosecution witness, Tami Wilkerson; and (4) the address of prosecution witness Conya L. We address each contention in turn. 1. Gary’s Criminal Activities and Associates Defense counsel represented to the trial court that during a meeting with the prosecutor on January 9, 2002, he came across a previously undisclosed one-page document entitled “Gary and 100 bandits” outlining the numerous bank robberies Gary was believed to have committed with the assistance of various associates. During in-court conferences held on January 23, 2002, and March 29, 2002, defense counsel requested and received continuances of the trial date to investigate these robberies and the individuals involved. During the March 29, 2002, conference, defense counsel represented that the FBI had recently granted him 69 access to files pertaining to these matters and maintained that he needed more time to review the materials. On May 1, 2002, defense counsel requested and received an additional continuance to investigate the potential for “third-party liability,” i.e., the possibility that one of Gary’s associates had committed the charged crimes. Jury selection began on July 1, 2002. Defendant now argues that “[t]he prosecution’s undue delay in revealing the existence of potentially exculpatory evidence related to Gary’s numerous robberies and associates with motives to kill him . . . resulted in a denial of the defense’s ability to fully investigate those materials or to render a complete defense at trial.” However, the fact that victim Gary Williams had been involved in bank robberies was no secret; his history as a bank robber had been disclosed at the very beginning of the case. As early as the preliminary hearing on January 4, 1996, for example, defense counsel cross-examined Conya L. regarding her knowledge of Gary’s criminal activities. Further, the prosecution stipulated at trial that Gary was a bank robber who had worked in conjunction with other bank robbers, and Scott testified that he and Gary had worked together to commit over 20 armed credit-union robberies during the early 1990s. Thus, the critical facts regarding Gary’s past had been fully disclosed, and the defense was free to investigate. The fact that defense counsel did not appear to investigate diligently for much of the pretrial period has no bearing on the Brady analysis: “the prosecutor had no constitutional duty to conduct defendant’s investigation for him.” (People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 715.) “Because Brady and its progeny serve ‘to restrict the prosecution’s ability to suppress evidence rather than to provide the accused a right to criminal discovery,’ the Brady rule does not displace the adversary system as the primary means by which truth is uncovered. [Citation.] Consequently, ‘when information is fully available to a defendant at the time of 70 trial and his only reason for not obtaining and presenting the evidence to the Court is [the defendant’s] lack of reasonable diligence, the defendant has no Brady claim.’ ” (Ibid.) Moreover, defendant’s last attorney, Cormicle, learned of the existence of the “Gary and 100 bandits” document more than six months before the trial began. Cormicle was granted three separate continuances to conduct additional investigation into the possibility of third-party culpability. He requested and received further information regarding the robberies from the FBI. Because it appears that no evidence was in fact “suppressed” and that defense counsel had adequate time to conduct additional investigation, defendant’s Brady claim is without merit. 2. Prosecution Witness Robert Scott On April 23, 2002, defense counsel indicated that he had only recently received “a four-page report from the FBI that was in the possession of the district attorney pertaining to Robert Scott.” During an ex parte hearing held two days later, defense counsel explained that the four-page document was a “proffered statement” from Robert Scott “where he’s presumably looking to cut a deal with the US Attorney.” Defendant apparently contends that the belated disclosure of this evidence violated his due process rights. Defendant’s argument is without merit. Defense counsel received the fourpage “proffered statement” — a letter signed by Robert Scott and addressed to the district attorney — over two months before the trial began. The letter was introduced into evidence during the trial, and Scott was cross-examined extensively regarding its meaning and his motivations for preparing the document. Among other things, defense counsel elicited that Scott was hoping “to get out before [he] had to complete the 11 years and six months that [he had been] given” 71 on a robbery conviction by offering “testimony in connection with [defendant’s] case.” Accordingly, there was no suppression of evidence and no Brady violation.
During a hearing on April 23, 2002, defense counsel “cited a need for information on a prior criminal incident committed by prosecution witness Tami Wilkerson that could be used to potentially impeach her testimony.” He contends that the prosecution had possessed this information for several years before it was turned over. However, defendant does not assert, and the record does not reflect, that the prosecution ever called Tami Wilkerson to testify. Because there was no testimony to impeach, defendant’s Brady claim is without merit.
Defendant contends that the prosecution violated its Brady obligations by failing to provide discovery regarding Conya L.’s whereabouts. But defendant cites no case that has held that the prosecution’s refusal to disclose a witness’s address, without more, constitutes a Brady violation, and he acknowledges that none of the cases he cites “explicitly discuss[es] the prosecution’s failure to provide access to potentially material information.” The absence of any authority supporting defendant’s position is not surprising. “There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one . . . .” (Weatherford v. Bursey (1977) 429 U.S. 545, 559; see also Wardius v. Oregon (1973) 412 U.S. 470, 474 [“[T]he Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded . . . .”].) Moreover, “Brady does not require the disclosure of information that is of mere speculative value” (People v. Gutierrez (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1472), and defendant himself concedes that “it remains speculative as to what might have been discovered.” He acknowledges that there is no way to know “if disclosure of [Conya L.’s] address would be helpful or harmful to [defendant’s] defense.” 72 Because defendant has not shown that the prosecution withheld evidence that was both “favorable and material” to the defense (In re Bacigalupo, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 333), his claim is without merit. (We address defendant’s claims that withholding of Conya L.’s address violated his statutory rights and the confrontation clause below, post, at pp. 73–85.)
“[W]hile the tendency and force of undisclosed evidence is evaluated item by item, its cumulative effect for purposes of materiality must be considered collectively.” (In re Brown, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 887.) Because we have found that the prosecution did not suppress any evidence that was favorable to the defense, we reject defendant’s cumulative error argument. D. Prosecution Witness Conya L. Defendant raises a number of arguments regarding the investigation and examination of the prosecution’s main witness, Conya L. Specifically, he argues that the state was required to disclose Conya L.’s current address pursuant to section 1054; that the state prevented defendant from meaningfully crossexamining Conya L. in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by failing to disclose her address; and that the trial court improperly limited certain lines of inquiry during cross-examination in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. After summarizing the factual background, we address each of these arguments in turn. 1. Factual Background On July 15, 1995, Conya L. was attacked and her throat was lacerated by two knives. After narrowly escaping with her life, she provided an account of the attacks to the police. Conya L. then fled the state shortly after her release from the hospital. 73 On December 14, 1995, defendant’s codefendant Ronald Walker requested a continuance of the preliminary examination. The prosecutor opposed the request, stating that Conya L. had received a “death threat” and that the threatening party had represented to Conya L. that he knew where she was and intended to carry out a “hit” on her in the immediate future. During the preliminary hearing on January 4, 1996, Conya L. testified at length and was subject to cross-examination by both defense counsel. At one point during the hearing, the prosecutor asked Conya L. if she had received any death threats, and Conya L. answered, “yes.” When the prosecutor attempted to inquire further, both defense counsel objected on the ground of relevance. Their objections were sustained. On February 28, 1997, the parties agreed that Conya L.’s address would be redacted from her medical records before those documents were turned over to the defense. On March 7, 1997, however, defense counsel requested unredacted copies of Conya L.’s medical records, which included her current address. The trial court instructed the parties to brief the issue. On May 16, 1997, the prosecution submitted the sealed declaration of Tony Pradia, an investigator employed by the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office. Investigator Pradia declared that defendant and his codefendant were admitted Crips gang members; that Conya L. had received two separate death threats on or about December 19, 1995, warning her that she would be killed if she attempted to testify at the preliminary hearing; that Detective Gary Thompson had received information from an informant that Conya L. and her six-year-old son would be murdered prior to the preliminary hearing; that Conya L. had been relocated both before and after the preliminary hearing in response to these threats; that Conya L.’s continued cooperation was critical to an ongoing investigation into the identity of the third perpetrator; and that Pradia would not be able to ensure 74 Conya L.’s continued safety if her address were disclosed to the defense. At a hearing held the same day, defense counsel argued that the alleged threats were hearsay. She also argued that any danger to Conya L. could be minimized if Conya L.’s address were disclosed only to defense counsel and not to defendant himself. On June 6, 1997, after taking the matter under submission, the trial court ruled that the prosecution was not required to disclose Conya L.’s address or telephone number to the defense. During a hearing on May 1, 2002, Conya L. spoke in support of the prosecutor’s request to proceed to trial without any further delay. She stated that she had relocated every time she had received a death threat. She further stated: “People tell me all the time that the defendant has asked about my whereabouts. He inquires about my whereabouts. And he sends messages through other people to give to me. I hear this all the time. And it’s very stressful.” During the trial, defense counsel called Conya L. as part of the defense case. Before calling her to the stand, defense counsel indicated to the trial court that he wished to introduce evidence that Conya L. “had a warrant out for her arrest at the time” that the crimes were committed. Defense counsel explained that Conya L. had been convicted of welfare fraud on November 27, 1991 and placed on probation for two years. As part of her conviction, she was ordered to pay a $350 fine by February 25, 1992. When Conya L. failed to pay the fine, a warrant was issued for her arrest. Conya L. did not pay the fine for over three years. The prosecutor objected that evidence of the warrant should be excluded under Evidence Code section 352 because it would invite the jury to speculate as to the reason the warrant had been issued. Citing People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, the trial court responded that “the fact that the warrant was issued on a Wheeler-type impeachment would not be admissible. The underlying facts are.” 75 Defense counsel then clarified that he wished to introduce evidence of the warrant not just for impeachment purposes, but also to explain Conya L.’s absence from the state. The trial court noted that such evidence would “open[] up some doors that you probably don’t want to open up,” at which point defense counsel responded: “Okay.” Defense counsel then called Conya L. to testify. During the examination, Conya L. admitted that she had been convicted of misdemeanor welfare fraud in 1991. She further admitted that she had lied in an employment application in 1992 by falsely declaring that she had never been convicted of a misdemeanor; she had signed the application under penalty of perjury. She repeated the same lie in a 1996 employment application, although this time not under penalty of perjury. Finally, Conya L. admitted that she had been convicted of two misdemeanors in 1994: false impersonation and fraudulent use of a Medi-Cal card. On cross-examination, the prosecutor attempted to rehabilitate Conya L. by eliciting that she had been young and poor at the time she had committed the subject crimes. Before redirect, defense counsel informed the trial court that he intended to ask Conya L. about her ability to pay the court-ordered fine and whether she had failed to report income on her applications for government assistance. The prosecutor objected that this evidence was cumulative, arguing that Conya L. had already admitted to failing to report income. The trial court limited this line of inquiry to the following question: “You previously admitted that you failed to report that income . . . and you signed under penalty of perjury that you would report all of your income; isn’t that correct?” 2. California Penal Code Defendant argues that “Conya [L.’s] testimony was the State’s case.” He notes that she was the sole percipient witness and that there was no forensic evidence linking anyone to the charged crimes. Indeed, as the prosecutor himself 76 remarked, the prosecution’s case “hing[ed] substantially, if not entirely, upon [Conya L.’s] identification” of the individuals responsible for the crime. In light of the crucial importance of her testimony, defendant argues that the prosecution was required to disclose Conya L.’s address pursuant to section 1054. He further contends that the prosecution’s failure to disclose this information precluded meaningful confrontation and cross-examination of this important witness in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Under the Penal Code, the prosecutor must disclose the names and addresses of the individuals whom he intends to call at trial. (§ 1054.1, subd. (a).) “The disclosure may be made to defense counsel, who is prohibited from revealing, to the defendant or others, information that identifies the address or telephone number of the prosecution’s potential witnesses, absent permission by the court after a hearing and a showing of good cause. (§ 1054.2.) . . . . Absent a formal court order directing earlier disclosure, discovery must be provided at least 30 days prior to trial, ‘unless good cause is shown why a disclosure should be denied, restricted, or deferred.’ (§ 1054.7.) ‘Good cause’ is defined for purposes of this provision as ‘threats or possible danger to the safety of a victim or witness, possible loss or destruction of evidence, or possible compromise of other investigation by law enforcement.’ (Ibid.) Section 1054.7 additionally provides that upon the request of any party, the court may permit a showing of good cause — for the denial or regulation of disclosures — to be made in camera.” (Alvarado v. Superior Court (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1121, 1132–1133 (Alvarado).) “Orders under this section are subject to review for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 458.) We have held that these provisions of the Penal Code are constitutional (Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal. 3d 356), and that “[a] defendant does not have a fundamental due process right to pretrial 77 interviews or depositions of prosecution witnesses” (Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at 458). Notwithstanding defendant’s assertions to the contrary, the trial court clearly had “good cause” to deny disclosure of Conya L.’s address. As noted, Conya L.’s testimony was crucial to the prosecution’s case. Conya L. testified that she had received death threats, and Investigator Pradia submitted a sworn declaration stating that Conya L.’s life had been threatened and that disclosure of her address would jeopardize her safety and compromise the integrity of an ongoing investigation. Because there were “threats or possible danger to the safety of a victim or witness, possible loss or destruction of evidence, [and] possible compromise of other investigations by law enforcement” (§ 1054.7), the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding good cause to deny defendant’s request. The analogous case of People v. Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th 395, is instructive. In that case, the prosecution requested that a witness’s “out-of-state address not be disclosed to defendant based on allegations that he had conspired with others to kill her and another witness.” (Id. at p. 457.) The trial court granted the prosecution’s request. (Id. at p. 458.) We concluded that “where there appears to have been a credible allegation of potential injury to the witness, we find no abuse of discretion.” (Ibid.) Defendant contends that the trial court could have mitigated the danger to Conya L. by ordering that her address be disclosed only to defense counsel and not to defendant. But defendant misapprehends the good cause exception to the disclosure requirement. Pursuant to section 1054.2, the default rule is that “the address or telephone number of a victim or witness whose name is disclosed to the attorney pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 1054.1” may not be disclosed to the “defendant, members of the defendant’s family, or anyone else.” (§ 1054.2, 78 subd. (a)(1).) The exception codified in section 1054.7 allows the trial court to deny even such limited disclosure when the prosecution can show good cause. Because we have found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding good cause in this case, defendant’s argument is without merit. Accordingly, we find no violation of the reciprocal discovery statutes of the California Penal Code. 3. Sixth Amendment Right to Confrontation Nor did the trial court’s order violate defendant’s rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution “ ‘to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’ ” (Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 678 (Van Arsdall).) “The right of confrontation, which is secured for defendants in state as well as federal criminal proceedings, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), ‘means more than being allowed to confront the witness physically.’ Davis v. Alaska [(1974)] 415 U.S. [308,] p. 315. Indeed, ‘ “[t]he main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination.” ’ (Id., at pp. 315–316 (quoting 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1395, p. 123 (3d ed. 1940) (emphasis in original).” (Van Arsdall, at p. 678.) The high court has said that “when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the very starting point in ‘exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth’ through crossexamination must necessarily be to ask the witness who he is and where he lives. The witness’[s] name and address open countless avenues of in-court examination and out-of-court investigation. To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry at the threshold is effectively to emasculate the right of cross-examination itself.” (Smith v. Illinois (1968) 390 U.S. 129, 131, fn. omitted; see also Alford v. United States (1931) 282 U.S. 687, 692 [“Prejudice ensues from a denial of the opportunity to place the witness in his proper setting and put the weight of his testimony and his credibility to a test, without which the jury cannot fairly appraise them.”].) 79 “The right of confrontation is not absolute, however [citations], ‘and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.’ ” (Alvarado, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 1138–1139.) The high court has not “establish[ed] an inflexible rule requiring disclosure of a witness’s identity and address in all circumstances.” (Id. at p. 1142.) To the contrary, as we explained in Alvarado, withholding “only . . . the residential address” of even a crucial witness may be permissible “when the risk posed to a witness’s safety is grave enough.” (Ibid.; see, e.g., People v. Watson (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 12, 20 [in permitting nondisclosure of the prosecution witness’s address, the court found that the defendant “was not deprived of a substantial right” because he already had presented “ample evidence . . . to place the witness . . . in his proper setting and accurately to evaluate his credibility”]; People v. Castro (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 191, 200–204 [defense sought the address of the prosecution’s witness for the purpose of impeachment, but because the witness already had been impeached as a drug addict, felon, and cheat, the court found that the defense had presented “sufficient environmental background” to allow the jury to judge the witness’s credibility].) “Numerous decisions handed down in the federal courts similarly have held that where the identifying information, such as a witness’s true name and address, was deemed to be inconsequential to material issues to be contested at trial, nondisclosure was permissible on the basis that the lack of such information did not prejudice the defense.” (Alvarado, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1143, fn. 10; see, e.g., United States v. Persico (2d Cir. 1970) 425 F.2d 1375, 1383–1384 [fear for the witnesses’ personal safety justified the trial court’s refusal to disclose their correct address and place of employment, where the witnesses were well known to the defense and the defense failed to demonstrate a “particularized need” for the information]; United States v. Contreras (5th Cir. 1979) 602 F.2d 1237, 1239–1240 [reasonable concern for a Drug Enforcement 80 Administration agent’s safety justified trial court’s refusal to require disclosure of his home address where the defendant “had ample opportunity to place the witness in his proper setting” and where nondisclosure of the address “could not have prejudiced defendant”]; United States v. Avalos (5th Cir.1976) 541 F.2d 1100, 1117 [observing “that the Supreme Court . . . had established no hard and fast rule regarding questions about [current] addresses,” and the defendants had failed to show prejudice from the nondisclosure of such information involving two government witnesses who had been placed in a witness protection program]; United States v. Crockett (5th Cir. 1975) 506 F.2d 759, 762–763 [government’s strong basis for believing that its witnesses’ lives were in danger justified the trial court’s order permitting nondisclosure of their residential addresses, and the defendants demonstrated no prejudice].) In this case, competent evidence indicated that Conya L.’s life was at risk. “[T]he state’s ability to afford protection to witnesses whose testimony is crucial to the conduct of criminal proceedings is an absolutely essential element of the criminal justice system” (Alvarado, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 1149–1150), and withholding certain information to protect Conya L.’s safety was therefore justified as long as the trial court’s protective orders did not in fact “significantly impair” defendant’s “ability to investigate or effectively cross-examine” Conya L. (Id. at p. 1147). We find no such significant impairment in this case. Unlike in Alvarado, in which the prosecution permanently concealed the identities of crucial prosecution witnesses and allowed those witnesses to testify anonymously at trial (id. at p. 1125), in this case only Conya L.’s then address was withheld from the defense. Her name and identity were known to the defense seven years before trial. (See People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 108 (Valdez) [finding no constitutional violation where, among other things, “the record [did] not support 81 defendant’s assertion that the witnesses’ identities were unknown to the defense until the moment the witnesses took the stand”].) Moreover, defendant does not argue that the prosecution withheld information concerning where Conya L. had been living at the time the instant offenses were committed. Information regarding where Conya L. had been living at time of the subject crimes would surely have been more useful for the purpose of gathering reputation evidence than information regarding the location of the out-of-state community where Conya L. had lived for only a short period of time. (See People v. Panah, supra, 35 Ca1.4th at p. 458 [“The trial court observed the information about [the witness’s] reputation in her new community, in which she had lived for only a brief time, was of minimal relevance, if any.”]; State v. Novosel (1980) 120 N.H. 176, 184 [“[O]n direct examination, the defendant and jury were told where the witness lived at the time of the offense. [Citation]. The witness had moved to another state at the time of trial, but the likelihood that a jury would be aided by the knowledge of what state, much less the precise city and street, is tenuous at best.”].) Notably, defendant did not call any witness to testify as to Conya L.’s reputation in the Southern California community where she had lived when the crimes were committed. Defendant’s decision not to call any such witnesses undermines his claim that reputation evidence was necessary to impeach Conya L.’s testimony even after her credibility had been called into question by other evidence. Further, as in Valdez, the record demonstrates that “the court’s protective orders did not in fact ‘significantly impair’ defendant’s ‘ability to investigate or effectively cross-examine’ ” Conya L. (Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 111.) As noted, the preliminary hearing gave defense counsel the opportunity to crossexamine Conya L. almost seven years before trial began. During pretrial discovery, the defense was given access to Conya L.’s medical records and 82 criminal history. During the trial, defense counsel impeached Conya L.’s testimony by eliciting that she had lied on employment applications, fraudulently used a Medi-Cal card, and willfully committed welfare fraud and perjury. Defense counsel also took advantage of cross-examination to highlight inconsistencies in Conya L.’s various accounts and to suggest that her identification of defendant was suspect. Finally, during closing argument, defense counsel made an array of arguments challenging Conya L.’s credibility. For the foregoing reasons, we reject defendant’s argument that the prosecution’s nondisclosure of Conya L.’s current residential address prevented him from meaningfully confronting and cross-examining Conya L. in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 4. Limitation on Cross–examination In a separate but related argument, defendant contends that the trial court improperly limited defense counsel’s cross-examination of Conya L. during the trial. Specifically, he maintains that the trial court prevented him from eliciting the fact that there was a warrant for Conya L.’s arrest at the time the crimes were committed and from inquiring as to whether Conya L. had the ability to pay a court-ordered fine. Defendant’s arguments are without merit. When defense counsel indicated that he wished to introduce evidence of the warrant to explain Conya L.’s absence from the state, the trial court cautioned that the introduction of such evidence would “open[] up some doors that you probably don’t want to open up” — i.e., further exploration of the death threats that Conya L. had received. Defense counsel acknowledged the trial court’s warning and declined to ask Conya L. about the warrant. Accordingly, defense counsel voluntarily elected not to introduce evidence of the warrant. Defendant does not assert deficient 83 performance by his counsel in this regard, and he presents no reason for us to second-guess his trial counsel’s litigation decision. Defendant next asserts, without citation to the record, that Conya L. lied about her ability to pay the court-ordered fine. The record indicates that defense counsel intended to prove that Conya L. had lied about her ability to pay because “she had $6,000 that she had gotten from the sale of [a] car . . . that she stuffed into [a] vacuum cleaner bag.” Even assuming that this isolated fact, which had already been presented to the jury in a different context, had marginal relevance to Conya L.’s general financial condition, Conya L. had already admitted to failing to report income under penalty of perjury. Evidence Code section 352 allows for the exclusion of evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence pursuant to Evidence Code section 352 “ ‘ “will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a manifest abuse of that discretion resulting in a miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 485, quoting People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 33.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that additional inquiry into Conya L.’s financial situation and her truthfulness regarding that situation would “necessitate undue consumption of time” on a point that was, at best, of marginal relevance. E. Introduction of Assertedly Prejudicial Evidence Defendant next argues that the prosecution introduced “inflammatory and damning evidence” that compromised defendant’s “ability to receive a fair trial in violation of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment.” Specifically, he contends that the trial court improperly admitted evidence that Conya L. had 84 received death threats and that defendant was a member of a gang. Neither of these assertions is persuasive. 1. Death Threats
Out of the presence of the jury, the prosecutor informed the trial court that he intended to introduce evidence that Conya L. had received death threats. He argued that such evidence would explain Conya L.’s inability to remember “minor details” and allow the jury to accurately assess her demeanor. Defense counsel objected to the introduction of this evidence, arguing (1) that the threats had been made many years ago and no longer affected Conya L.’s demeanor, (2) that it was unclear whether any threats had in fact been made, and (3) that such evidence would be unduly prejudicial because the jury would be left with the impression that the threats had originated from defendant. After hearing from both sides, the trial court ruled that it would allow a “narrow” line of inquiry regarding whether Conya L. had received death threats, so long as the threats were in no way attributed to defendant. The trial court found that the evidence was relevant to assessing Conya L.’s testimony, reasoning: “I do believe that a threat on somebody’s life, no matter who makes it, until there’s a resolution of all the cases, that threat does [a]ffect one’s ability to recall. It [a]ffects one’s ability to think about it. I think a death threat has a tremendous impact on a witness’s demeanor, ability, especially with the facts that we know.” The trial court further found that, pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, the “probative value [of the evidence] outweigh[ed] [its] prejudicial effect.” During the prosecutor’s direct examination of Conya L., the prosecutor elicited the following testimony: “Q: Now, is there another reason why you’re nervous about testifying in this case? 85 “A: There’s been death threats. “Q: Okay. Over the last seven years have you received threats on your life? “A: Yes, I have. “Q: And have these threats gotten to you through third persons or independent mediaries [sic]? “A: Yes, they have. “Q: And are you in fear for your life as you testify in this case? “A: Yes, I am. “Q: Does that fear also make it hard to remember exactly what happened and what happened next? “A: Yes.” On cross-examination, Conya L. testified that none of the alleged threats were received directly; rather, they were relayed to her by third parties: “Q: I believe you testified on direct that you had received death threats in this case; is that correct? “A: That’s correct. “Q: Was this a threat that you had received . . . as through a third party; correct? “A: Correct. “Q: You did not receive anything directly; correct? “A: That’s correct. “Q: And which individuals relayed this information to you? “A: One was relayed to me by Mr. Thompson, [Detective] Gary Thompson. “Q: Was there any other threat? “A: Yes “Q: And who was that relayed to or relayed by? 86 “A: My sister. “Q: And was that Tanya? “A: Yes. “Q: Was there any other threat? “A: Yes. “Q: And who was — who relayed that to you? “A: The person begged me not to reveal their name.” After this testimony was elicited, defense counsel asked the trial court to provide the jurors with the following instruction: “You have received evidence of threats to a witness. If you believe that evidence to be true you must limit that evidence solely to considering the effect on the demeanor of that witness. There is no evidence that the defendant Robert Williams was responsible for those threats.” The trial court expressed some concern that “the last sentence . . . sounds like I’m making a comment on the evidence.” He therefore suggested that the parties stipulate that no evidence had been introduced that the defendant had made any death threats. Both parties agreed to this procedure, and defense counsel expressly withdrew his prior request. Accordingly, the following stipulation was presented to the jury: “There is no evidence that Robert Williams made a threat to any witness in this case.”
“Evidence a witness is afraid to testify is relevant to the credibility of that witness and is therefore admissible.” (Evid. Code, § 780.) “Testimony a witness is fearful of retaliation similarly relates to that witness’s credibility and is also admissible. [Citation.] It is not necessary to show threats against the witness were made by the defendant personally, or the witness’s fear of retaliation is directly linked to the defendant for the evidence to be admissible.” (People v. Sanchez (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1435, 1449; see also People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 87 932, 946 [“ ‘An explanation of the basis for the witness’s fear is likewise relevant to her credibility and is well within the discretion of the trial court.’ ”].) The trial court therefore correctly found that this evidence was relevant and admissible, subject to a balancing of its probative value and prejudicial effect under Evidence Code section 352. As noted, Evidence Code section 352 provides that “[t]he court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” “ ‘The “prejudice” referred to in Evidence Code section 352 applies to evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against defendant as an individual and which has very little effect on the issues. In applying section 352, “prejudicial” is not synonymous with “damaging.” ’ ” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 320.) “[T]he trial court enjoys broad discretion in assessing whether the probative value of particular evidence is outweighed by concerns of undue prejudice, confusion or consumption of time. [Citation.] Where, as here, a discretionary power is statutorily vested in the trial court, its exercise of that discretion ‘must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. [Citations.]’ ” (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124.) Applying this standard, we find no abuse of discretion. The trial court appropriately found that the evidence was probative in that it would allow the jury to accurately assess the credibility of the prosecution’s central witness. The trial court limited any potentially prejudicial effect by allowing only a “narrow” line of inquiry regarding whether Conya L. had received threats and by admonishing the prosecutor to make clear that the threats were not attributable to the defendant. 88 The parties also stipulated that “[t]here [was] no evidence that [defendant] made a threat to any witness in this case.” Relatedly, defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to give defendant’s proposed limiting instruction to the jury. Evidence Code section 355 provides that “[w]hen evidence is admissible as to one party or for one purpose and is inadmissible as to another party or for another purpose, the court upon request shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.” (Italics added.) In this case, although defense counsel initially requested a limiting instruction, he expressly withdrew his request and agreed with the trial court’s suggestion that the parties instead stipulate that there was no evidence defendant had made any threats to any witness. Because defendant withdrew his request for a limiting instruction, he cannot now complain of the trial court’s failure to give a specific and particularized instruction that the evidence could be considered only for a limited purpose. Additionally, even if defendant had maintained such a request and the trial court had erred by refusing to give the instruction, any error would have been harmless because it is not reasonably probable that defendant would have obtained a more favorable result had the instruction been given. (People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 83.) By stipulation, the jury was informed that there was “no evidence” that defendant had threatened any witness in the case. The jury was instructed that it was required to accept this stipulation “as proven,” and we presume that the jurors followed the trial court’s instructions. (People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 292.) Accordingly, we presume that the jurors did not improperly consider Conya L.’s testimony as evidence that defendant made any threats to any witness in the case. 89 2. Gang Affiliation Defendant contends that evidence of defendant’s “gang affiliation” was introduced to the jury “for no other reason than to taint [defendant] as a violent and dangerous man in the minds of the jurors.” He argues that evidence of a defendant’s criminal disposition is inadmissible to prove he committed a specific criminal act. (Evid. Code § 1101; see also People v. Ruiz (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 234, 240 [“[E]vidence of gang membership should be excluded if the evidence is only relevant to prove a defendant’s criminal disposition.”].) The record belies defendant’s factual assertion that the prosecution introduced evidence of defendant’s gang affiliation. As noted, witness Robert Scott testified for the prosecution. Scott testified that two weeks before the murders of Gary and Roscoe, defendant pressed a gun into Gary’s neck and threatened that he would kill Scott, Gary, and Gary’s family unless Gary turned over a portion of the proceeds from his bank robberies to defendant. On crossexamination, defense counsel elicited that Gary and Scott robbed “federal credit unions with loaded guns.” On redirect, the prosecutor asked Scott why he was afraid of defendant when he himself was a bank robber with access to guns. At this point, the trial court called a recess. Outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor represented to the trial court that Scott was afraid of defendant because he believed defendant was a “gangster.” The prosecutor agreed that any suggestion that defendant was a “gangster” or a member of a “gang” would be more prejudicial than probative. He argued, however, that Scott’s fear of defendant was relevant to the jury’s assessment of Scott’s demeanor and credibility, especially with respect Scott’s claim that he and Gary had committed their most recent robbery in response to defendant’s threat. He therefore suggested that Scott could explain his fear of defendant by testifying that he understood defendant to be a person willing to “jack” people, or a “jacker.” 90 Defense counsel objected that this evidence would be hearsay and unduly prejudicial. Pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, the trial court ruled that the probative value of referring to defendant as a “jacker” outweighed its prejudicial effect, with “the admonition that it’s not being offered for the truth of the matter, but only as to the state of mind of this witness . . . .” After the jury reentered the courtroom, the following testimony was introduced: “Q: Mr. Scott, . . . [w]hy were you so scared of this guy? “A: Because he was a jacker. He — he was crazy, you know. “. . . . “Q: Okay. When you use the term “jacker,” do I understand correctly . . . , in your opinion — this is just limited to your opinion, not for the truth of the matter — that he was somebody who would just rip off anybody? “A: He would jack anybody — “Q: Okay. “A: — for anything. “Q: Okay. That was your opinion? “A: Yes, sir. “THE COURT: I’m going to admonish the jury that there statements and the opinions by Mr. Scott of Mr. Williams are only being offered to show Mr. Scott’s state of mind, and they are not to be considered for any truth of the matter that might be in the opinion. [¶] Is that satisfactory, gentlemen? “MR. CORMICLE: Yes, your Honor. “MR. RUIZ: Yes, Judge.” Defendant argues that it was clear from this testimony that “Scott was using the term ‘jacker’ as a substitute for gangster.” But there is no reason to believe 91 that the jury would have understood Scott’s fleeting mention of the word “jacker,” which was defined as someone who would “just rip off anybody,” to mean that defendant was a member of a gang. Accordingly, defendant’s argument that the trial court improperly admitted evidence that defendant was member of a gang is without merit. F. Prosecutorial Misconduct Defendant claims that “[i]n his zealousness to convict and garner a death verdict for [defendant], Prosecutor Ruiz lost sight of the ethical responsibilities every prosecutor owes to the accused.” He asserts six specific claims of misconduct. “First, . . . there were systematic obstructions in discovery. Second, Ruiz interfered with the appointment of defense counsel. Third, Ruiz delayed in relaying information regarding an informant that created a conflict and caused the Public Defender to withdraw, thus significantly delaying the onset of trial and forcing one of several changes in representation for [defendant]. Fourth, he offered a disingenuous argument which resulted in the termination of Robert's self representation. Fifth, he misrepresented that Robert’s clothing was missing and then misrepresented the testing of the clothing. Finally, Ruiz insisted that the trial go forth knowing that there was still third party culpability evidence that had not been disclosed.” Defendant contends that the “cumulative impact of these instances of misconduct so permeated the pretrial as to deny Robert Williams a fair trial and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.” “ ‘A prosecutor’s conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution when it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.’ [Citations.] Under California law, a prosecutor who uses deceptive or reprehensible methods of persuasion commits misconduct even if such actions do not render the trial fundamentally unfair. [Citation.] Generally, a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is not cognizable on 92 appeal unless the defendant made a timely objection and requested an admonition. [Citation.]” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 444.) “In order to be entitled to relief under federal law, defendant must show that the challenged conduct was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 828, fn. 35.) Defendant’s first claim of prosecutorial misconduct is premised on his contention that the prosecution violated its Brady obligations and that the prosecution’s withholding of Conya L.’s address violated defendant’s rights under the Penal Code and the United States Constitution. Because we have already rejected these claims (ante, at pp. 73–85), defendant’s first claim of prosecutorial misconduct also fails. Second, defendant claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct by “interfering with the appointment of defense counsel.” However, the incident to which defendant refers involved the prosecutor’s attempt to secure replacement counsel for codefendant Walker. After Walker’s first counsel withdrew from the case, the prosecutor attempted to find Walker a replacement attorney who could be ready for trial in less than a year. Because the prosecutor’s alleged “interference” had nothing to do with defendant or his counsel, it is not relevant to this appeal Third, defendant claims the prosecutor delayed in relaying information that revealed a conflict of interest between the public defender’s office and defendant. On April 3, 1998, the public defender’s office declared a conflict with defendant. A representative of the public defender’s office, Attorney Floyd Zagorsky, indicated that the conflict was “a result . . . of information that we received recently from the prosecution . . . we felt should have been provided much earlier in the case.” However, he did not explain this assertion, stating: “I’m not at liberty to divulge, obviously, what the nature of the conflict is.” He later repeated: “Again, I do not believe that I can discuss the nature of any information that 93 relates to this conflict.” In the absence of any other evidence in the record, the unexplained assertion by a representative of the public defender’s office is insufficient to show misconduct by the prosecution. Fourth, defendant maintains that the prosecutor acted improperly by arguing that defendant’s Faretta status should be revoked because he was engaged in delay tactics. But the trial court agreed with the prosecutor, and we have determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking defendant’s Faretta status on that basis. (Ante, at pp. 64–67.) Fifth, defendant contends that the prosecutor “misrepresented critical evidence to the court.” Specifically, he takes issue with the prosecutor’s representation that he had a tape recording of Walker stating that he had been with “Robert Williams” on the night of the murders, when in fact Walker had said only that he had been with “Rob” that night. Defendant fails to explain how the prosecutor’s inference that the “Rob” to whom Walker referred in the tape was “Robert Williams” constitutes prosecutorial misconduct. Moreover, contrary to defendant’s suggestion, the trial court was not misled by the prosecutor’s statement because it was independently familiar with the tape. The prosecutor was similarly imprecise in summarizing other portions of the tape (e.g., the prosecutor referred to “bloody clothing” when the tape referred only to “clothing”), but again the trial court was independently familiar with the tape and reasonably concluded that any errors in description were unintentional. Defendant also highlights the prosecutor’s inaccurate representation that no tests had been performed on the clothing that defendant had been wearing at the time of his arrest in Las Vegas. Twenty days later, however, the prosecutor corrected this representation and produced the results of the tests. These errors, which were later corrected, do not rise to the level of misconduct. 94 Sixth, defendant argues that the prosecutor “delayed disclosing third-party culpability evidence that many of Gary Williams’s former associates had a motive to harm [Gary] and then compounded the error” by opposing defendant’s many continuance requests. As previously noted, however, the prosecution disclosed the critical facts regarding Gary’s criminal history at the outset of the case, and defendant’s final defense counsel was granted three separate continuances to conduct additional investigation into his theory of third-party culpability. (Ante, at pp. 70–71.) In sum, none of the prosecutor’s actions, either singly or in combination, constitutes misconduct. G. Jury Issues 1. Excusal of Prospective Jurors for Cause Defendant contends that the trial court violated his right to an impartial jury under the federal Constitution by erroneously excusing Prospective Jurors D.W. and E.W. for cause because of their views on the death penalty. (Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 (Witt); People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 13.) “A prospective juror may be challenged for cause based upon his or her views regarding capital punishment only if those views would ‘ “prevent or substantially impair” ’ the performance of the juror’s duties as defined by the court’s instructions and the juror’s oath.” (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 975, quoting Witt, 469 U.S. at p. 424.) “When the prospective juror’s answers on voir dire are conflicting or equivocal, the trial court’s findings as to the prospective juror’s state of mind are binding on appellate courts if supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Duenas (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1, 10 (Duenas).) a. Prospective Juror D.W. On his juror questionnaire, Prospective Juror D.W. affirmed that he had “philosophical, religious or moral feelings that would make it difficult or 95 impossible for [him] to sit in judgment of another person.” When the trial court asked him to expand on this response, D.W. stated: “I want to explain that I am really against the state taking the life of another person.” The trial court then asked D.W. “if the evidence, everything and the aggravating factors are overwhelmingly pointing toward the death penalty, would you be able to vote for death?” D.W. replied: “You know, the only thing that I can say, like, I don’t know. And it’s, like, an emotional thing but also a philosophical thing. If it’s a heinous crime, probably. I don’t know. But I can’t just –– put it in cement and say yes or no.” During voir dire, the prosecutor asked all of the prospective jurors to “nod” if they could offer him the assurance that during the guilt phase of the trial they would be able to follow the law and put aside considerations of “punishment” or “sympathy.” The prosecutor stated that should any prospective juror fail to nod, he “would know you don’t want to go through that.” As to D.W., the prosecutor noted: “I didn’t see you nod your head. Okay.” The prosecutor then asked: “[D.W.], can you give us assurance that you would do that [sentence a man to death], if you feel it is warranted under the facts and the law?” D.W. replied: “I can’t give you an answer, but most likely I could if it’s a heinous crime.” The prosecutor challenged D.W. for cause, citing D.W.’s uncertainty about being able to follow the law if it conflicted with his morals. The prosecutor also noted that he was troubled that D.W. had written “not applicable” in response to questions asking him to describe his feelings regarding how “African Americans are treated by the criminal justice system” and to give his views concerning “the three most important problems with the criminal justice system.” In considering the prosecution’s challenge, the trial court stated: “He . . . said, in answer to your direct question, ‘Could you do it?’ and he hesitated very long. And he did not ever say yes. I want to say he said no. But I can’t be that 96 bold, but I think he said no. It certainly was not a yes . . . .” The trial court then solicited the views of defense counsel, who replied: “Submit it, your honor.” The trial court then ruled: “I’m going to grant [the prosecution’s challenge for cause] as to [D.W.]. I think the law is very clear, that based upon a properly phrased question, if the person cannot say that they would be able to vote for death, that that would be proper grounds for challenge for cause.” b. Prospective Juror E.W. On her juror questionnaire, Prospective Juror E.W. was asked to describe her “general feelings regarding the death penalty.” E.W. responded: “I don’t want to sentence anyone to death. If convicted of a serious crime, I think they should be sentenced for the rest of their life without parole.” In response to a separate question, E.W. indicated that her religious group “does not advocate death” and that she was not interested in “condemn[ing] anybody to death.” She explained: “I don’t want to be in conflict with my spiritual beliefs. I don’t want to have to agonize over whether I did something against God and his teaching.” E.W. further stated that her views were premised on her “religious conviction[s]” and that she would “always vote for life without possibility of parole” over death. When the trial court asked her to elaborate on her responses, E.W. stated: “I thought about it. I would be able to vote for the death penalty . . . . I don’t want to condemn anybody to death, but if the evidence is overwhelming, as you say, and that has to be the sentence, then so be it.” She agreed that imposing death would create a “conflict” with her God and spiritual beliefs, but indicated that she felt she could “go ahead and vote for [death]” if required. She would deal with the conflict by “ask[ing] God to forgive” her. During voir dire, the prosecutor asked E.W. to ask herself: “Do I trust this legal system enough to be able to say I can make a life or death sentence either way following the laws I’m given by this system, and mean it for both sides? I 97 want you to think about that. [E.W.]?” E.W. responded: “Yes.” Inquiring further into the conflict E.W. had described between her spiritual beliefs and her ability to impose a death sentence, the prosecutor asked: “[E.W.], I want you to think about this. Do you really want to find yourself asking those questions when that man’s life hangs in the balance? And you know that if you don’t vote for death, there will not be a death verdict in this case. Do you really want that kind of conflict and pressure in your life?” E.W. responded: “No, I do not.” The prosecutor then asked: “[E.W.], can you come in here and sentence this man to death, if you feel it’s warranted?” E.W. responded: “I believe I would have a difficult time.” The prosecutor challenged E.W. for cause, stating that she should be excused for her views on the death penalty because she “didn’t think that [she] could do it.” Asked for his views, defense counsel replied: “I’ll submit it, your Honor.” The trial court then dismissed E.W., stating: “[B]oth [E.W. and another prospective juror] gave, and in answer to the direct question, could you do it [sentence someone to death], answer to the direct question they both said no.”
When asked to respond to the prosecutor’s for-cause challenges, defense counsel submitted the question to the trial court. “ ‘Hence, as a practical matter, he “did not object to the court’s excusing the juror[s], but . . . also refused to stipulate to it.” [Citation.] Although “this failure to object does not forfeit the right to raise the issue on appeal, . . . it does suggest counsel concurred in the assessment that the juror[s] [were] excusable.” ’ ” (People v. Hawthorne (2009) 46 Cal.4th 67, 82; see Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at pp. 434–435 [in light of counsel’s failure to question the prospective juror or object to her excusal for cause, “it seems that . . . no one in the courtroom questioned the fact that her beliefs prevented her from sitting”]; People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 262 (Schmeck).) 98 Moreover, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that, based upon their demeanor and responses, the views of Prospective Jurors D.W. and E.W. would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties. (Schmeck, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 262.) Both jurors indicated at various times that, in light of their views concerning capital punishment, they would be unable to consider the death penalty as a reasonable possibility. (Ibid.) On his questionnaire, D.W. affirmed that he had “philosophical, religious or moral feelings that would make it difficult or impossible for [him] to sit in judgment of another person.” During voir dire, he was unable to say if he would be able to vote for death even “if the evidence . . . and the aggravating factors are overwhelmingly pointing toward the death penalty.” On her questionnaire, E.W. indicated that she would “always vote for life without possibility of parole” over death. During voir dire, E.W. could not affirm she was capable of imposing a death sentence even if she believed “it’s warranted.” Although defendant is correct that at times each prospective juror gave equivocal or conflicting responses, under such circumstances the trial court’s determination as to the juror’s actual state of mind is binding if supported by substantial evidence. (Duenas, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 10.) After giving appropriate deference to the trial court’s determination regarding the state of mind of these prospective jurors, we find the trial court’s ruling fairly supported by the record and conclude that the trial court did not err in excusing Prospective Jurors D.W. and E.W. for cause. 2. Wheeler/Batson Claim Defendant, who is African American, contends that the prosecutor improperly exercised peremptory challenges against three African American prospective jurors for racial reasons. 99 a. Procedural Background Voir dire began on July 22, 2002. Following dismissals for hardship, 103 prospective jurors remained. The parties then stipulated to the dismissal of a number of jurors for cause, leaving 70 prospective jurors in the pool. These jurors were then examined in groups of 24. With respect to the initial group of prospective jurors, defense counsel successfully challenged three for cause. The prosecutor then challenged four prospective jurors for cause: D.W., R.A., E.W., and J.M. The trial court excused all of these individuals with the exception of J.M., an African American. Following the for-cause dismissals, the trial court and the parties agreed to litigate any peremptory challenges to African American prospective jurors outside the presence of the jury. It was further agreed that defense counsel would not be required to make a prima facie showing of discrimination and that the prosecutor would simply state his reasons supporting each challenge. The prosecutor indicated he would be challenging Prospective Juror C.H. and explained his reasons for doing so. Defense counsel then made a Wheeler motion, which the trial court denied. The prosecutor also indicated that he anticipated asserting a peremptory challenge against J.M. Defense counsel made a Wheeler motion as to J.M. The trial court noted that the prosecutor had already voiced his concerns with respect to J.M. during his for-cause challenge, and stated: “[T]here are more race neutral reasons to challenge [J.M.] that we went over on the challenge for cause than there is on [C.H.]. [¶] So I would deny the motion for him also.” Because the prosecution had not yet asserted a peremptory challenge against J.M., however, the trial court clarified that if such a challenge were made, “the record is clear that Mr. Cormicle has made a Wheeler motion, and that it’s been heard, and the Court will deem that motion being timely, even though it was premature.” 100 After questioning the second group of 24 jurors, the prosecutor indicated that he anticipated utilizing a peremptory challenge against Prospective Juror S.F., an African American. The prosecutor explained his reasons for the challenge, and defense counsel made a Wheeler motion. The motion was denied. The trial court then mentioned J.M., at which point the parties and the trial court agreed that the challenge to J.M. had already been resolved. The prosecutor declined to exercise any peremptory challenges against two other African American prospective jurors. During subsequent rounds of challenges, the prosecutor passed and accepted the panel six separate times with those two jurors seated. The jury ultimately selected included two African American jurors and one African American alternate juror. b. Analysis The prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors based on group bias, such as race or ethnicity, violates a defendant’s right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and his right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative crosssection of the community under article I, section 16 of the California Constitution. (Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 97 (Batson); People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 276–277 (Wheeler).) “The three-step inquiry governing Wheeler/Batson claims is well established.” (People v. Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 569.) “First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case ‘by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.’ [Citations.] Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the ‘burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion’ by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes. [Citations.] Third, ‘[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike 101 has proved purposeful racial discrimination.’ ” (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168 (Johnson).) In order to prevail, the defendant must show that “it was more likely than not that the challenge was improperly motivated.” (Id. at p. 170.) In this case, the trial court did not require defendant to establish a prima facie case and instead simply requested the prosecutor’s reasons for the peremptory challenges and ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination. Thus, the question of whether defendant established a prima facie case is moot. (People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 613, fn. 8 (Lenix).) “Accordingly, we focus on the third Wheeler/Batson prong and examine whether the African American panelists were excused due to intentional discrimination.” (People v. Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 570.) “ ‘At the third stage of the Wheeler/Batson inquiry, “the issue comes down to whether the trial court finds the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations to be credible. Credibility can be measured by, among other factors, the prosecutor’s demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.” ’ ” (People v. Jones (2011) 51 Cal.4th 346, 360.) We have stated that “[r]eview of a trial court’s denial of a Wheeler/Batson motion is deferential, examining only whether substantial evidence supports its conclusions. [Citation.] ‘We review a trial court’s determination regarding the sufficiency of a prosecutor’s justifications for exercising peremptory challenges “ ‘with great restraint.’ ” [Citation.] We presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner and give great deference to the trial court’s ability to distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excuses. [Citation.] So long as the trial court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal. [Citation.]’ ” (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 613–614.) 102
Prospective Juror C.H. initially failed to fill out several pages of his questionnaire; the trial court therefore returned the form to allow C.H. to complete it. In response to question 27, which asked whether the prospective juror had any friends or relatives who had been arrested or charged with a crime, C.H. indicated that he had an uncle who had been convicted of drug charges and was sentenced to five years in prison. In response to question 66, which asked how African Americans are treated by the criminal justice system, C.H. wrote, “unfairly and unjust.” Similarly, in response to question 66B, when asked whether African Americans “are treated fairly in our courts,” C.H. answered, “Rarely.” In response to question 74, which asked whether any member of the prospective juror’s family had died from unnatural causes, C.H. indicated that his uncle had been murdered. In response to question 82B, which asked whether he would be able to follow the law requiring him to consider all aggravating and mitigating factors before determining the appropriate sentence, C.H. checked, “No.” C.H. also wrote “N/A” in response to several questions, including question 78A (“What are your GENERAL FEELINGS regarding the death penalty”), question 78B (“What are your GENERAL FEELINGS regarding life in prison without the possibility of parole?”), question 79A (“Do you feel that the death penalty is used . . .” “Too often,” “Too seldom,” or “About right”?), and question 86 (“What are your impressions of life in prison without the possibility of parole as a punishment for murder?”). When asked which adjective most accurately described his philosophy regarding the death penalty, C.H. marked, “[n]eutral.” During voir dire, C.H. indicated that he had been confused when he answered “no” to question 82B. When asked to explain why he felt African Americans were treated unjustly by the criminal system, C.H. responded: “Family history, that’s about it. . . . Uncles and, like, cousins were unjustly prosecuted. 103 That’s it.” Upon further questioning from the trial court, C.H. acknowledged that he did not know whether his relatives actually had been unjustly treated or whether they merely felt they had been mistreated. In explaining his reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge against C.H., the prosecutor stated that he used a “three strikes system.” “If an individual hits what I think are three negative answers, regardless of race, the three strikes and you’re out, basically are the wisdom of my approach.” According to the prosecutor, C.H. had accumulated the following “strikes”: (1) he had an uncle in prison for drug charges; (2) he believed African Americans were “rarely” treated “fairly” in the court system; (3) he believed his relatives had been unjustly prosecuted; (4) his uncle had been murdered (the prosecutor explained that this reason was not one of his strikes, but noted that “that is a question”); (5) he answered “not applicable” in response to various questions about the death penalty; and (6) he initially failed to answer question 82A, which asked whether he would be able to fairly consider all the evidence presented during the penalty phase. The prosecutor stated that C.H.’s failure to answer that question was particularly important, explaining that question 82A was “the acid test question for me. . . . He just refused to answer that.” The prosecutor noted that C.H. had “bagged [sic] off a little bit” on his views about the fairness of the justice system during voir dire, but explained that “[a]s a prosecutor on a death penalty case, I cannot take that kind of chance and have a loaded gun up there like that.” Defense counsel responded as follows: “I’m not sure how much importance we should give to the lack of answers on those series of questions the first time around. He did fill it out a second time around. [¶] And they seemed fairly neutral, but he did get around to filling those out. Secondly, his explanation as to why he would say unfairly and unjustly prosecuted once, he realized his error of his own analysis, which was just relying on the word of his relatives as opposed 104 to really thinking about was there something there live, any proof? [¶] . . . I think he did come to realization that his initial position was erroneous, that he should not have made such a blanket statement without actually having analyzed the circumstance of those statements that were made about his relatives. “With respect to the relative that is in prison, I think we have other people is this that [sic] shake out differently. I’m not sure Mr. Ruiz will challenge those people as well. I’m not sure that that that necessarily throws him in any special category. [¶] I think we have [another juror] with a brother-in-law on death row in North Carolina. . . . [¶] And with regard to having an uncle that I believe was murdered, again I believe that there’s several people on this jury panel that have been victims of crimes or have relatives that are victims of crimes. [¶] . . . I’m not sure that that would justify the challenge that the prosecutor is urging is race neutral.” The trial court then ruled as follows: “I’ve listened to Mr. Ruiz’s reasons. Let me start out with saying I agree with Mr. Cormicle that [C.H.] did, in fact, change his answers in light of my questioning of him, that especially about the uncles and the cousins. That is the part that really stuck in my mind, that he said, no, that it was word of mouth from them. [¶] . . . [¶] Now unfortunately, at this point, . . . let’s see if [other prospective jurors] meet the same three tests Mr. Ruiz uses, the same thought process on a caucasion, for instance. I don’t know that answer. [¶] But I think these reasons are good enough to defend against a Wheeler motion. And I would deny the Wheeler motion, with that caveat that I’m kind of operating in the blind here. But I would expect Mr. Ruiz to use the same standards on evaluating a caucasion speculative juror as he does [C.H.]. [¶] . . . I’m going to have to deny it based upon what I have at this point.” Further, the trial court said to the prosecutor: “[P]art of my decision was made on the idea that you said you’re using the three strikes. My reference to 105 using the same standard on a caucasion is if you get a caucasion that’s got the three — or fails the three strikes test, are you going to use the same judgment on that person? That is where I’m in the dark at this point because I don’t know. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . I’m going to assume that the lawyers are upfront with me — [¶] . . . [¶] — until they prove that they can’t be trusted. And so, therefore, you get the benefit of the doubt . . . .” In the trial court, defendant did not later renew his Batson/Wheeler challenge to the strike of C.H. based on the prosecutor’s subsequent decisions to strike or not strike prospective jurors based on his “three strikes system.” In this appeal, defendant argues that the prosecutor’s stated reasons were insufficient to justify striking Prospective Juror C.H. We disagree. On this record, we find that the trial court made “ ‘a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered’ ” and thus “ ‘its conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal.’ ” (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 614.) The trial court indicated that it listened to the prosecutor’s stated reasons and defense counsel’s response, and it did not indiscriminately accept the prosecutor’s reasons. Instead, the trial court said it agreed with defense counsel that during voir dire C.H. had changed his answer about the fairness of the justice system upon realizing he lacked substantiation for his earlier concern about unjust prosecution of his uncles and cousins. Presumably, then, the trial court viewed with some skepticism the prosecutor’s reliance on C.H.’s views about the fairness of the justice system. As for the prosecutor’s reliance on a “three strikes system,” the trial court ultimately told the prosecutor “you get the benefit of the doubt,” but not before putting the prosecutor on notice that it “would expect [the prosecutor] to use the same standards on evaluating a caucasion” and expressing caution that, at this early stage of the peremptory strikes, it did not know one way or the other whether the prosecutor would apply the system consistently. Further, the record 106 supports the prosecutor’s statements that C.H. had an uncle in prison for drug charges, that C.H. indicated on his juror questionnaire that he believed African Americans were “rarely” treated “fairly” in the court system, and that C.H. answered “not applicable” to various questions about the death penalty. Defense counsel, while mentioning other jurors with some individual attributes similar to C.H.’s, did not later contend that the prosecutor applied the “three strikes system” inconsistently. In sum, the record shows that the trial court, through a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the prosecutor’s stated reasons, determined that defendant had not shown it was more likely than not that the reasons were pretextual, and substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination.
On his questionnaire, Prospective Juror S.F. indicated that his cousin had been convicted of discharging a weapon in public. He noted that he and his relatives had been victims of serious crimes (three of his cousins had been murdered) and that the response of the judicial system and law enforcement was “not good enough” because “nothing was done.” When asked about his opinion of the judicial system, S.F. responded that “[i]t needs work.” In response to question 38, which asked “what are the three (3) most important problems in the current criminal justice system,” S.F. wrote, “Corrupt police, money buys everything, laws.” S.F. reported that he had been “jumped” by individuals of another race and that the experience had made him dislike that race, but he also indicated that he was “over that now.” He also reported that he had been harassed by three police officers. In response to question 66, which asked how African Americans are treated by the criminal justice system, S.F. wrote, “We are treated worse than any other race.” He wrote that “African Americans have never been treated on equal ground” and indicated that they are rarely treated fairly in the courts. When asked to describe his general feelings regarding the death penalty, S.F. wrote, “I am not 107 for the death penalty; because, whether guilty or innocent your life is in someone else’s hands.” He indicated that the death penalty is used “[t]oo often” and wrote that “[t]oo many people innocent to have the death penalty.” He described himself as “[s]trongly against” the death penalty, writing, “I believe God is the only one to decide what to do with life.” He added, however, that his opinions would not make it difficult for him to vote for the death penalty because “God says to live by the laws of the land,” and “I don’t feel an innocent or guilty man’s blood will be on my hands.” When asked if there were any aggravating or mitigating factors he would refuse to consider during the penalty phase of the trial, S.F. indicated that he would refuse to consider the age of the defendant at the time of the crime and whether the defendant was an accomplice to the offense. During voir dire, the trial court asked S.F. why he wrote on his questionnaire that he believed the death penalty was used “too often.” S.F. answered, “Well, I feel that in a lot of situations the death penalty isn’t necessary. And there have been mistakes made where people have been put on death row, and they found out that that person was not guilty. And I think that if there is an option of putting someone in prison without parole, that’s a better opinion.” Asked to elaborate, S.F. said that “my religious belief is that I should abide by the laws of the land. If the laws of the land are for me to choose the death penalty, and there’s not other options, then I have no other options, I have to choose the death penalty. [¶] But if I have an option, then I would rather choose life in prison.” When asked about his perception that African Americans are treated unfairly by the criminal justice system, S.F. clarified that he was referring to the “life that African Americans had to go through in the 60s and 50s and 70s,” and noted that “[i]t’s not as bad now.” In exercising a peremptory challenge against S.F., the prosecutor explained that S.F. was “strong antideath penalty.” He added: “And there are other reasons 108 that I think are valid as to [S.F.], the anti law enforcement, biased, the anti court system bias, when it comes to treatment of African Americans.” The trial court agreed, explaining, “As to [S.F.], I believe that he — the same standard that you have used on non black, specifically, white jurors, that he is — he comes in with a bias against law enforcement and against the court system, as it pertains to fair treatment for African Americans. And he has a strong antideath penalty [perspective], even though he said he could vote for the death penalty in a certain case. All of his other answers say that that was really truly stretching it for him.” Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s reasoned assessment. S.F.’s written and verbal responses indicated that he strongly opposed the death penalty. S.F. also believed African Americans were treated unfairly by the criminal justice system (at least historically), and he expressed a degree of mistrust of the judicial system and law enforcement; the prosecutor could legitimately excuse him for those reasons. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.
Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly struck prospective juror J.M. As an initial matter, the Attorney General contends, without citation to the record, that “[defendant’s] complaint on appeal regarding Prospective Juror [J.M.] is specious since, contrary to [defendant’s] assertion [citation], the record reflects that the prosecutor never even exercised a peremptory challenge against Prospective Juror [J.M.].” But this is simply incorrect. The record clearly shows that J.M. was dismissed on July 24, 2002, the day after the court preemptively ruled that it would deny defendant’s Batson/Wheeler motion if jury selection got as far as J.M. and if the prosecutor struck J.M. On the merits, defendant’s claim with respect to J.M. fails. In his questionnaire, J.M. indicated that he had served on a jury before and “didn’t like it” because the “defense lawyer did a poor job.” He reported that his mother and 109 sister had been victims of crime and that the response of law enforcement to both incidents had been “poor.” When asked about his opinion of the judicial system, he responded that “it doesn’t always lead to justice.” In response to question 38, which asked “what are the three (3) most important problems in the current criminal justice system,” he wrote, “Prosecutors who try to convict regardless of guilt; overcrowding of prisons; plea bargaining.” He had an unpleasant experience with a peace officer when he disputed a traffic ticket. When asked if he had any reason to be biased either for or against criminal prosecutors, he wrote, “Yes media cases indicating manipulation of evidence to convict whether guilty or not.” When asked if he had any reason to be biased either for or against criminal defense attorneys, he wrote, “Yes the last one I witnessed did a poor job.” He indicated that he had “experienced racial prejudice by white race” and that he had “[m]ild” “racial attitudes or prejudices” because of “past experiences of racial prejudice in routine everyday life.” He felt African Americans were treated unfairly by the criminal justice system and that whether they were treated fairly in the courts depended on the individuals involved in each case. When asked to describe his general feelings regarding the death penalty, he wrote, “It is being disputed in the courts but some cases seem to merit the death penalty.” He indicated he was moderately in favor of the death penalty. During voir dire, J.M. said he didn’t like “having to be called every year and come and sit in jury duty.” When asked if he could think of any specific instances of prosecutors trying to convict regardless of guilt, he said, “I’ve heard that there are prosecutors that . . . receive their reputation and their career status based on whether or not they win cases. And there have been media reports that in some cases it’s a tactic for prosecutors to withhold evidence that could even bring about nonconviction of a particular person that they’re prosecuting.” With respect to plea bargaining, he said that “sometimes people are given the opportunity to 110 plea bargain and they end up going to jail for crimes they didn’t actually commit because they were threatened with . . . they were not going to get off at all, and so in some cases it denies them their rights.” When asked why he thought the last defense attorney he witnessed did a poor job, J.M. explained that the defense attorney “did not present any defense at all.” With respect to his racial attitudes or prejudices, J.M. said, “Well, in America race prejudice exists, and as a black person or minority person growing up, you usually experience it, and I have experienced it. And it’s no secret. It’s a fact of American life.” The prosecutor challenged J.M. for cause on the ground that he was “so hostile to the judicial system and prosecutors and law enforcement that he cannot give the People a fair trial.” He noted that J.M. had expressed a “distrust of the legal system,” that he believed that “prosecutors want to convict regardless of the evidence,” and that he had “sat as a juror in a case and hated it.” Asked for his views, defense counsel responded, “I’ll submit it on him as well.” The trial court denied the prosecutor’s challenge for cause, reasoning that J.M.’s “answers were sufficient that I can’t, in good conscious [sic] under the law, grant a challenge for cause.” The trial court noted, however, that he personally “would be afraid to have him no matter which side of the table I was sitting on” and suggested that one side “challenge him preemptorily.” The trial court credited the prosecutor’s concerns regarding J.M. as “totally race neutral.” In light of J.M.’s written and oral responses, which revealed a degree of hostility to law enforcement and the judicial system not comparable to what had been expressed by any other juror, we find that the trial court’s assessment was supported by substantial evidence. 3. Juror Misconduct Defendant contends that the “[trial] court’s failure to investigate whether a juror slept through crucial portions of the trial proceedings denied [defendant] his 111 right to have his trial heard and decided by an impartial and competent jury in violation of the Sixth Amendment.” We disagree. a. Factual Background During defense counsel’s cross-examination of prosecution witness Robert Scott, the prosecutor approached the trial court and reported that a trial spectator had told him she believed that Juror No. 6 had been sleeping during the testimony. The trial court responded: “I’ve been watching, and I didn’t really pick up on it. But I hadn’t been staring.” At the suggestion of defense counsel, the trial court questioned the spectator directly and asked her what she had observed. The spectator responded: “Well, I observed that in its entirety he has nodded off. He’s been — a couple of times when he was nodding off, he was actually asleep. At first I wasn’t really sure because a lot of times people listen with their eyes closed. I thought that might be the case. But trust me, that is not the case. . . . [¶] I noticed it already today. I mean, it’s early. It’s not after lunch. You know, he was already nodding off, you know. And the testimony to me — every day the testimony to me was not dry, just drawn out, where you might nod off, you know. It’s every day. And I’m not the only one who has noticed. . . . [¶] I’m not the only one who has noticed. I’m not the only spectator who has noticed. . . . [¶] I just really don’t think that it is fair to the defense or the prosecutor’s case. I really don’t think that is fair.” Neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel accepted the trial court’s invitation to further question the spectator. The trial court then noted for the record that Juror No. 6 was African American and asked defense counsel what he would like to do. Defense counsel responded: “I think a general admonition, to make sure that everybody pays attention, is alert throughout the proceedings.” The trial court agreed to provide the admonition and also instructed its deputy to keep an eye on the jury. The 112 prosecutor agreed that an admonition would be sufficient. The trial court and defense counsel then engaged in the following exchange: “THE COURT: And, Mr. Cormicle, I don’t know if you’ve been watching the jurors. Probably not as much as the [spectator] has, but do you feel that your client’s rights have been sacrificed by keeping that juror? “MR. CORMICLE: No. But I can also say that I have not been watching the jury so I cannot say — I cannot weigh this one way or the other. “THE COURT: I haven’t been — obviously haven’t been watching them as close as [the spectator] has. [¶] Waive any defect? I know I’m asking you a tough question, but I have to, I think. “MR. CORMICLE: Yes. My suggestion is to keep quiet. “THE COURT: I think so. Any issue of whether he was asleep or not, you’re willing to waive that at this point? “MR. CORMICLE: Yes. “THE COURT: And Mr. Williams agrees with you? . . . [¶] Mr. Williams, waive — counsel waive any defect or prejudice, if, in fact, he was dosing [sic] off? Waive any defect or prejudice? “THE DEFENDANT: No comment. “MR. RUIZ: Well, I think we have to make a factual basis. “THE DEFENDANT: I agree. “THE COURT: I’m sorry, sir? “THE DEFENDANT: I agree. “THE COURT: You waive any defect or any claim of prejudice that, in fact, this juror was dosing [sic] off on occasion? “THE DEFENDANT: To this point, yeah.” When the jury returned to the courtroom, the trial court issued the following admonition: “Ladies and gentlemen, I’m going to ask you to keep your 113 eyes open. The reason I say that is because it’s important that all jurors stay awake. And I can’t tell if somebody is dosing [sic] off if they have their eyes closed, or when they’re really just listening with their eyes closed. I just caution you that sometimes trials get a little bit boring. Maybe you have noticed. And I’m being very generous now. [¶] I just ask you to please keep your eyes open and stay awake. Okay?” b. Analysis As indicated by the exchange between the trial court and defense counsel, defense counsel neither objected to Juror No. 6’s continued service nor requested a mistrial on the ground of juror misconduct. Not only did defense counsel fail to object, he expressly waived any defect, affirmatively requested the procedure followed by the trial court, and indicated that his client’s interests would be best served by a general admonition to the jurors to pay attention. Accordingly, defendant has forfeited his claim of juror misconduct. (See People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1308; People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 950.) In any event, the claim fails on the merits. “A trial court may discharge a juror who ‘becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his [or her] duty, . . .’ [Citation.] Once a trial court is put on notice that good cause to discharge a juror may exist, it is the court’s duty ‘to make whatever inquiry is reasonably necessary’ to determine whether the juror should be discharged. [Citation.] We have . . . explained, however, that the mere suggestion of juror ‘inattention’ does not require a formal hearing disrupting the trial of a case.” (People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 821.) “ ‘ “The decision whether to investigate the possibility of juror bias, incompetence, or misconduct — like the ultimate decision to retain or discharge a juror — rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. [Citation.] The court does not abuse its discretion simply because it fails to investigate any and all new 114 information obtained about a juror during trial.” ’ [Citation.] A hearing is required only where the court possesses information which, if proved to be true, would constitute ‘good cause’ to doubt a juror’s ability to perform his or her duties and would justify his or her removal from the case.” (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1348.) People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1229, is instructive. In Bradford, the trial court acknowledged on the record that a juror was asleep and had been asleep the previous day. We stated: “We have observed that ‘[a]lthough implicitly recognizing that juror inattentiveness may constitute misconduct, courts have exhibited an understandable reluctance to overturn jury verdicts on the ground of inattentiveness during trial. In fact, not a single case has been brought to our attention which granted a new trial on that ground. Many of the reported cases involve contradicted allegations that one or more jurors slept through part of a trial. Perhaps recognizing the soporific effect of many trials when viewed from a layman’s perspective, these cases uniformly decline to order a new trial in the absence of convincing proof that the jurors were actually asleep during material portions of the trial. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1349, quoting Hasson v. Ford Motor Co. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 388, 411.) We held that “[a]lthough the duty to inquire as to juror misconduct is activated by a lower threshold of proof, in the present case the absence of any reference in the record to the juror’s inattentiveness over a more substantial period indicates that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to conduct an inquiry.” (Ibid.; see People v. Espinoza, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 821 [concluding that defense counsel’s speculation that a juror might have been sleeping was insufficient to apprise the trial court that good cause might exist to discharge the juror and therefore did not obligate the court to conduct further inquiry].) 115 Under the circumstances in this case, the spectator’s assertion that Juror No. 6 had been “nodding off” was insufficient to apprise the trial court that good cause might exist to discharge him. The trial court had been observing the jurors’ behavior and had not noticed Juror No. 6 sleeping. After hearing the spectator’s observations, neither the defense nor the prosecution asked the trial court to investigate further. Additionally, after admonishing the jury to remain attentive, the trial court instructed its deputy to keep an eye on the jurors for the remainder of the trial, and no further incidents were reported. (See People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1233–1234 [concluding that the trial court’s “self-directed inquiry,” which involved observing several jurors closely to determine whether they were asleep and determining that none was dozing, was sufficient and that a formal hearing was not required under the circumstances].) Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to conduct a formal hearing into juror misconduct. H. Cumulative Error Defendant contends the cumulative effect of the asserted guilt phase errors was prejudicial. However, there was no error to accumulate. (See People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 994.)