Opinion ID: 2608625
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the validity of the first search

Text: As discussed above, after Officers Cargill and Lyons had pulled the Pontiac over, a third officer, Officer Daniels, arrived as the suspects were getting out of the car. Daniels finished pat-searching a suspect and walked to the side of the car where, with the aid of a flashlight, he could see a gray sweatshirt matching the description of that worn by the robber, and the butt of a gun. Daniels opened the car door and retrieved the gun. Uptegraft contends that these items were not in plain view because the car windows were frosted, and that the officer allegedly did not see the weapon until he opened the door. In our opinion, neither contention is supported by the evidence, and we conclude that the items were in plain view. Uptegraft's sole remaining argument is that, having seen what appeared to be a weapon, the police were then obligated to obtain a search warrant before they could open the car door to seize it. In State v. Spietz, 531 P.2d 521 (Alaska 1975), we held that police officers were not authorized to enter a house and remove some marijuana plants which they had observed through an open doorway. Plain view gave the officers probable cause to obtain a warrant to search the house, but did not by itself authorize an entry to seize the evidence. Spietz, however, relies heavily on the fact that the evidence seized was the product of a warrantless entry into a person's home. The home has traditionally been afforded special protection under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and under the Alaska Constitution. A door of the home represents a firm constitutional barrier whether or not it is open.... Plain view alone could not justify the warrantless entry through the doorway into the constitutionally protected area of the Spietz house. 531 P.2d at 525 (footnotes omitted). Spietz also relied on the United States Supreme Court case of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 20, 22, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, reh. denied, 404 U.S. 874, 92 S.Ct. 26, 30 L.Ed.2d 120 (1971), which also speaks in terms of premises in holding that plain view does not justify an intrusion and seizure. Incontrovertible testimony of the senses that an incriminating object is on premises belonging to a criminal suspect may establish the fullest possible measure of probable cause. But even where the object is contraband, this Court has repeatedly stated and enforced the basic rule that the police may not enter and make a warrantless seizure. 403 U.S. at 468, 91 S.Ct. at 2039, 29 L.Ed.2d at 584 (emphasis added). [6] We have not applied Spietz or a similar rationale to automobiles stopped on highways, nor are we aware of any cases from other jurisdictions which have applied such a rule. One reason such a rule has not been applied is that, as we noted in Gray v. State, 596 P.2d 1154, 1157 (Alaska 1979), quoting United States v. Robinson, 533 F.2d 578, 584 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 956, 96 S.Ct. 1432, 47 L.Ed.2d 362 (1976), In the case of a car on the street there is [a] lesser expectation of privacy than in a home. In Pope v. State, 478 P.2d 801, 805 (Alaska 1970), reh. denied, 480 P.2d 697 (Alaska 1971), a police officer saw a gun lying on the front seat of the defendant's car and seized it. We decided the question on the ground that the gun could be seized because it was in plain view. Although this case arose prior to our decision in Spietz, we see no reason to disturb its holding today. Moreover, even if we were convinced that Spietz was applicable to automobiles and that items in plain view within a car's interior cannot be seized without a warrant, we would not apply such a rule in this case. As discussed more fully below, the police were allowed to remove weapons from an area within the potential reach of the suspects. [7]