Opinion ID: 150469
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Guidance to Airports

Text: The ATA next argues the Amendments do not comply with 49 U.S.C. § 47129(b)(2). That provision requires the Department to establish standards or guidelines for the Secretary of Transportation to use in determining ... whether an airport fee is reasonable, but airports understandably use that guidance to anticipate how the Secretary will evaluate the reasonableness of the fees they charge. The ATA maintains the only guidance the Amendments provide is the tautology that a fee is not unreasonable as long as it is reasonable. The DOT responds that, because the Amendments specif[y] the methodologies [airports] may use to set landing fees at congested times, the Amendments provide more and sufficient guidance, and we agree. We have not hesitated in the past to fault the DOT when it failed to provide adequate guidance to airport operators. The 1996 Policy capped airfield fees at historical cost but allowed airports to set non-airfield fees using essentially any reasonable methodology, 61 Fed.Reg. at 32,020/3; upon the ATA's petition for review, we noted the `guideline' seems to be missing a `line' because the concept of  any reasonable methodology .... does not seem to add muchif anythingto the statutory requirement that airport fees be reasonable. ATA I, 119 F.3d at 41. We vacated portions of the 1996 Policy because the Department failed adequately to explain the distinction it drew between airfield and non-airfield fees. See id. at 43; 129 F.3d at 625. As we have pointed out, however, when the Congress has `not specified the level of specificity expected of the agency, ... the agency [is] entitled to broad deference in picking the suitable level.' Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. EPA, 493 F.3d 207, 217 (2007) (quoting Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 306 F.3d 1144, 1149 (D.C.Cir.2002)). Here, because the call for standards or guidelines in the Federal Aviation Authorization Act, 49 U.S.C. § 47129(b)(2), does not mandate any particular level of specificity, Cement Kiln, 493 F.3d at 218, we will defer to any reasonable interpretation by the DOT. See Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694; Cement Kiln, 493 F.3d at 217 (citing Chevron ). Because the Amendments leave only two variables to the discretion of the airport proprietor, and thus set out a nearly complete pricing algorithm, we conclude the DOT has provided sufficient guidance. The two-part fee the Amendments permit reflects two major components of airfield costs: the cost per landing and the cost imposed in proportion to the weight of an aircraft. See 73 Fed.Reg. at 40,443-44. Limiting the fees to those components provides specific guidance and is specific enough to constrain an airport proprietor's pricing discretion. In addition, the Amendments and the 1996 Policy limit the total fees an airport may collect. See id. at 40,445/1-2; 61 Fed.Reg. at 32,019/2-3. The Amendments set reasonably specific standards because the airport proprietor is free only to calculate the fixed charge per operation and to determine how the variable weight component is to be scaled to aircraft weight. The Amendments therefore discharge the Department's statutory obligation to set standards or guidelines that shall be used by the Secretary in determining ... whether an airport fee is reasonable, 49 U.S.C. § 47129(b)(2). Nonetheless the ATA faults the DOT for us[ing] the word `reasonable' [in the Order promulgating the Amendments] as though it [were] self-defining. Many of the specific instances of which the ATA complains appear in the background section of the Orderthe concise general statement of ... basis and purpose required of every regulation subject to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c)not in the Amendments themselves. Surely the DOT may discuss reasonableness in general terms when introducing and explaining the purpose of a rule. As for the use of reasonable in the Amendments themselves, we fail to see why adding the requirement of reasonableness to a rule that independently provides adequate guidance takes the rule out of compliance with the statutory mandate. If, for example, a highway has a posted speed limit and at the same time a statute prohibits driv[ing] a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable, Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 28-701, it simply would not follow that a motorist is given inadequate guidance about how fast he may drive. See Arizona v. Rich, 115 Ariz. 119, 563 P.2d 918, 919-20 (Ct.App.1977) (rejecting vagueness challenge).