Opinion ID: 2548767
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the post-conviction court correctly granted summary judgment to the state on kell's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

Text: ¶ 26 Kell's Amended Petition raised numerous claims alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel at the guilt phase, ineffective assistance of trial counsel at the penalty phase, and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We conclude that the post-conviction court correctly granted summary judgment to the State on these claims because Kell failed to provide evidence of counsel's deficient performance and failed to show prejudice. ¶ 27 The Supreme Court of the United States recognizes that a Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists and is necessary to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052. To warrant reversal of a conviction, a defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must establish both that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Lafferty v. State, 2007 UT 73, ¶ 11, 175 P.3d 530. ¶ 28 To prove that counsel's performance was deficient, the petitioner must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The objective standard of reasonableness is to be determined by prevailing professional norms. Id. Standards such as those laid out by the American Bar Association are guides to determining what is reasonable, but the Supreme Court has declined to adopt any detailed criteria defining ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Instead, counsel's performance must be evaluated considering all the circumstances, with a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 688, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. ¶ 29 To prove that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. When a defendant challenges a death sentence... the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencerincluding an appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidencewould have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. Id. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
¶ 30 Kell's Amended Petition raised numerous claims that trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase of the trial. Kell attempts to demonstrate ineffective assistance by going through each of his claims and stating that the failure of counsel to act in each situation was per se deficient and per se caused prejudice under the Strickland standard. ¶ 31 For sixteen of Kell's claims, [9] Kell apparently relies solely on a theory of per se deficiency and per se prejudice to illustrate counsel's ineffective performance. But Kell fails to cite to any authority to show that this court should presume counsel's failure to act was per se deficient or per se prejudicial. Additionally, Kell fails to point to any objective standard of reasonableness to show that counsel's performance was deficient and fails to show prejudice by illustrating how the outcome of the trial would have been different if not for counsel's alleged unprofessional errors. ¶ 32 The Supreme Court of the United States does recognize certain circumstances where ineffective assistance of counsel and prejudice are presumed. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). Such circumstances include (1) when there is a complete denial of counsel, (2) when counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, and (3) when it is unlikely that any attorney could provide effective assistance [10] under the circumstances. Id. at 659-60, 104 S.Ct. 2039. The first and third circumstances are not raised here. With respect to the second circumstance, the Court in Bell v. Cone noted that failing to challenge the prosecution at specific points of its case is not considered an entire failure to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing and is insufficient to warrant a finding of presumed prejudice. 535 U.S. 685, 697, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002). ¶ 33 In this case, Kell's counsel did not entirely fail to challenge the prosecution's case; rather, counsel challenged the prosecution's case throughout the proceedings by filing numerous pretrial motions, examining witnesses at the preliminary hearing, questioning prospective jurors, and presenting extensive evidence during the guilt phase. Such actions by counsel do not constitute an entire failure to challenge the prosecution's case. ¶ 34 Because Kell failed to show that the circumstances surrounding his case justified a presumption of ineffective assistance of counsel, Kell cannot rely entirely on claims of per se deficiency and per se prejudice. Instead, Kell must meet both prongs of the Strickland test by illustrating how his trial counsel's performance at the guilt phase fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and how his trial counsel's alleged ineffective assistance at the guilt phase adversely influenced the outcome of his case. Kell failed to offer any evidence suggesting that his counsel's alleged failures meet these requirements. Thus, Kell failed to overcome the strong presumption that counsel's assistance was reasonable, and we reject Kell's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase. ¶ 35 For the remainder of Kell's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase, [11] Kell cites to several objective standards of reasonableness, including American Bar Association guidelines and case law, but fails to offer evidence to illustrate how counsel violated these standards. Additionally, Kell fails to show how he was prejudiced at trial by counsel's alleged deficient performance, apparently relying on an assertion of per se prejudice. Indeed, while Kell states that both prongs of the Strickland test are met, he offers no analysis to support this statement and fails to mention the element of prejudice at all. ¶ 36 Because the Strickland test requires that a defendant establish both deficiency of counsel and prejudice, Kell's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase fail because Kell establishes neither. We accordingly affirm the post-conviction court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the State on these claims.
¶ 37 Kell's Amended Petition raised five claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel at the penalty phase. Again, Kell relies on assertions of per se deficiency and per se prejudice to satisfy the Strickland requirements. Like Kell's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of trial, Kell's claims of ineffective assistance at the penalty phase are not the type of claims where we presume ineffective assistance and prejudice as a matter of law. ¶ 38 For three of these claims, [12] Kell does not point to any specific instances in the record to show that his counsel was ineffective. Instead, Kell makes only broad, bare allegations that counsel was ineffective. We reject these claims of ineffective assistance because Kell has not demonstrated how counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under Strickland. Additionally, even if we were to presume deficient performance, Kell fails to meet the second Strickland requirement of showing how the outcome of the penalty phase would have been different if not for counsel's allegedly deficient performance. ¶ 39 For Kell's remaining two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase, [13] Kell provides specific instances of counsel's allegedly deficient performance but still fails to show how such actions fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. And again, Kell fails to establish prejudice by showing how the outcome of the penalty phase would have been different if not for counsel's allegedly deficient performance. ¶ 40 Accordingly, Kell's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of trial must fail, and we affirm the post-conviction court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the State on these claims.
¶ 41 Kell raises four claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. [14] Again, Kell relies on claims of per se deficiency and per se prejudice to satisfy the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel. ¶ 42 The standard for evaluating whether appellate counsel is ineffective is the same Strickland standard used to determine whether trial counsel is ineffective. Bruner v. Carver, 920 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Utah 1996). Thus, a criminal defendant must prove that appellate counsel's representation `fell below an objective standard of reasonable conduct and that the deficient performance prejudiced [him].' Lafferty v. State, 2007 UT 73, ¶ 39, 175 P.3d 530 (alteration in original) (quoting Bruner, 920 P.2d at 1157). To show that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise a claim, the petitioner must show that the `issue [was] obvious from the trial record and ... probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal.' Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, ¶ 16, 156 P.3d 739). ¶ 43 Like Kell's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Kell fails to show how appellate counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Kell also fails to show prejudice. In only one of Kell's claims for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel does Kell even argue that his sentence would likely have been reversed on appeal if not for counsel's alleged unprofessional errors, but this conclusory statement is not supported with any analysis or authority. For the remainder of Kell's claims, Kell does not even argue that there probably would have been a reversal on appeal if not for counsel's alleged errors. Because Kell fails to show a probability of reversal on appeal, even assuming deficient performance of counsel, Kell's claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must fail. ¶ 44 We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court in granting summary judgment to the State on Kell's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims because Kell failed to show that his counsel was ineffective or that he was prejudiced by any allegedly deficient performance.