Opinion ID: 1656301
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Excessiveness of Damages Award

Text: Cochran lastly contends that he is entitled to a new trial because, he says, the award of punitive damages was excessive. Cochran suggests that because economic damages totaled $75,000, the verdict of $350,000 must have, by necessity, contained an element of punitive damages. The trial court in this case instructed the jury on the species of fraud for which punitive damages are recoverable, as well as the species of fraud for which punitive damages are not recoverable. The verdict form used by the jury did not specify whether the damages were compensatory damages. The language on the face of the verdict form, however, is consistent with the trial court's instruction on the species of fraud for which punitive damages are not recoverable. The verdict form specifically instructed the jury that it should find in favor of the Wards and against Cochran and A-1 if you find fraud, either innocentfraud by misrepresentation or innocent misrepresentation . . . . (Emphasis added.) As previously noted, Cochran consented to the use of this verdict form by failing to make any specific objection to it. Because the verdict form applicable only to legal fraud was used by the jury and because it is inconsistent with an award of punitive damages, we must conclude that the total award of $350,000 represented compensatory damages. We presume that the jury follows the trial court's instructions unless there is evidence to the contrary. Bradley v. State, 925 So.2d 232 (Ala.2005); Wootten v. Ivey, 877 So.2d 585, 590 (Ala.2003). A jury's verdict is presumed correct, and that presumption is strengthened by the trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Goodman, 789 So.2d 166 (Ala.2000). We do not find any evidence to contradict the presumption that the jury followed the trial court's instruction, notwithstanding Cochran's bare contention that the verdict of necessity included punitive damages. At trial, the Wards presented evidence of actual damage, as well as evidence of mental anguish. As previously noted, during the installation process, the roof leaked throughout the house, causing damage to the house. Mr. Ward testified that the difference in the value of the house before and after the roof was installed was $75,000. Mrs. Ward testified that she suffered inconvenience, disappointment, and loss of sleep as a result of the improperly installed roof. She testified that she had consulted with a physician, who prescribed an antianxiety medication for her. Based on the undisputed evidence regarding economic damage of $75,000 and the evidence of mental anguish, and in light of the language on the verdict form, we reject Cochran's contention that the $350,000 award of necessity included punitive damages. We further note that it is not unusual for juries to award compensatory damages for mental anguish at or above the level awarded here. See Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Jeter, 832 So.2d 25 (Ala.2001); Oliver v. Towns, 770 So.2d 1059 (Ala.2000); Delchamps v. Bryant, 738 So.2d 824 (Ala. 1999); Sperau v. Ford Motor Co., 674 So.2d 24 (Ala.1995), vacated on other grounds, 517 U.S. 1217, 116 S.Ct. 1843, 134 L.Ed.2d 945 (1996), on remand, 708 So.2d 111 (Ala.1997); Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 657 So.2d 821 (Ala.1994); and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Harris, 630 So.2d 1018 (Ala.1993). Because Cochran makes no argument that the damages for mental anguish are excessive, we pretermit any discussion of that issue. Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not err in denying Cochran's postjudgment motion for a JML or for a new trial.