Opinion ID: 2631759
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Search of Crawford's Center Console Was Constitutional.

Text: A warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless it falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. [20] One of the four exceptions recognized in Alaska is search incident to lawful arrest. [21] Search incident to lawful arrest allows the warrantless search of the area `within [the arrestee's] immediate control' at the time of the arrest to ensure officer safety and to preserve evidence related to the crime. [22] But special rules govern when closed containers can be searched incident to a lawful arrest and without a warrant. [23] Unless exigent circumstances exist, an officer must first seize items that are not immediately associated with the person and then obtain a search warrant to inspect their contents. [24] In Metcalfe v. State , we quoted with approval the following passage from United States v. Chadwick : Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest.[ [25] ] But when an item is immediately associated with the person, no exigency is required to search the item incident to arrest. [26] The court of appeals ultimately upheld the search of Crawford's center console because there was substantial evidence to support the superior court's finding on remand that Officer Oruoja had a reasonable and articulable basis for his belief that the console might contain weapons. [27] The court of appeals reasoned that this finding was necessary to justify the search because the court of appeals had previously determined that the console was not an item immediately associated with the person. [28] We affirm the court of appeals's decision affirming the superior court's judgment [29] but for the reason that the search of Crawford's center console was permissible because the console was an item immediately associated with Crawford's person. The court of appeals concluded that the center console in a vehicle is more akin to a briefcase, an item which is not immediately associated with the person, [30] than a purse or jacket, items which are immediately associated with the person. [31] Because the court of appeals determined that the console was not immediately associated with the person, it concluded that when the police arrest the driver of a vehicle, they are not authorized to search the center console of that vehicle as a matter of course. [32] Crawford contends that this conclusion of the court of appeals is correct because [t]he console of a vehicle is a permanent part of the vehicle. It cannot possibly be carried about or worn by a person. The state argues that a vehicle's console functions similarly to a purse and that [g]iven the typical use of vehicle consoles and the fact that they are always in the immediate proximity of a driver, they should be classified as immediately associated with a person. We have previously interpreted the phrase items immediately associated with the person to mean that: [C]ontainers found in clothing pockets may be searched. In our view ... containers such as purses which are often worn on the person and generally serve the same function as clothing pockets are also excepted from the strict exigency requirement. It would be possible, of course, to treat containers found in clothes pockets, such as billfolds, differently from items such as purses which are not carried in pockets but serve the same purpose. However, we can think of no reasons to justify such a distinction.[ [33] ] In Hinkel, we referred to United States v. Berry for guidance in classifying which items are immediately associated with the person. [34] In Berry, the Seventh Circuit held that an attache case was not immediately associated with the person. [35] The Seventh Circuit considered the attache case's common usage and held that a briefcase is not an item carried on an individual's person in the sense that his clothing or items found in his pocket are. [36] The court reasoned that, unlike a purse, an attache case may not always be carried with the person but is more like luggage in that it is often out of a person's reachin Berry, the suspect had retrieved the attache case from the trunk of a car. [37] The court also recognized that a suspect's expectation of privacy diminishes after a lawful arrest, such that a search of the suspect's person and pockets is reasonable. [38] But the court held that the search of the interior of the attache case constituted a `far greater intrusion into Fourth Amendment values.' [39] Following the reasoning of Hinkel and Berry, we conclude here that a vehicle's center console can be an item immediately associated with the driver's person. When a driver is seated in the vehicle, the center console can generally serve the same function as clothing pockets. [40] Like a pocket, the center console is commonly used to hold money, a cellular telephone, and personal hygiene items. Unlike a briefcase, which can be placed in the trunk or otherwise made inaccessible to the driver, the center console is permanently located directly next to the driver. Unless the console is locked, we can see no reason why a driver would have a greater expectation of privacy in the center console than in his or her purse or wallet. [41] Crawford argues that his center console is easily distinguished from the purse in Hinkel because the purse was being returned to [Hinkel] in accordance with police policy at the time it was searched. Crawford claims that the Hinkel rule does not allow the search of a center console when the arrestee no longer has access to it. But Hinkel does not depend on an arrestee's access to the item at the time of the search. If an item is classified as immediately associated with the person and the arrestee had access to the item at the time of the arrest, as we saw above, an officer is justified in searching the item even after the arrestee is detained so long as the search is reasonably contemporaneous with the arrest. [42] Crawford contends that classifying a center console as immediately associated with the person would greatly expand the rule and allow the search of a vehicle in the driveway of a person arrested in his yard. But that argument ignores the first requirement for a warrantless search if it is to be a legal search incident to arrest. The initial inquiry is whether the arrestee had access to the item at the time of arrest. [43] The immediately associated with the person distinction is irrelevant unless the item was accessible to the suspect at the time of arrest. [44] An officer cannot search an item, even one that is immediately associated with the person, without a warrant if that item was not in the arrestee's immediate control at the time of the arrest. [45] Crawford argues that, aside from the distinction for items immediately associated with the person, the general justifications underlying the search incident to arrest exception do not support the search of his console. The Supreme Court in Chimel v. California held that, in conducting a search incident to arrest, police officers could search the area within [the arrestee's] immediate control because of a concern for officer safety and a need to prevent evidence concealment or destruction. [46] It is undisputed that because Crawford was arrested for reckless driving, there was no concern about evidence destruction. [47] Crawford contends that, because he was handcuffed in the backseat of a police car at the time of the search, there was also no threat to officer safety. But we have held that the twin rationales for search incident to arrest outlined in Chimel apply only to define the search area; they do not regulate the scope or intensity of the search. [48] Once the area within the arrestee's immediate control is defined, the search need not be justified by officer safety or evidence preservation. Warrantless searches of items immediately associated with the person are justified even after the arrestee is in police custody because, by their nature, they do not involve any greater reduction in the arrestee's expectations of privacy than that caused by the arrest itself. [49] The search can occur at any time reasonably contemporaneous with the arrest [50] because [w]hile the legal arrest of a person should not destroy the privacy of his premises, it doesfor at least a reasonable time and to a reasonable extenttake his own privacy out of the realm of protection. [51] We have upheld searches of items immediately associated with the person when the search occurred thirty to forty-five minutes after the suspect was detained. [52] Officer Oruoja testified that he returned to Crawford's vehicle and searched the console after he and Officer Ritala placed Crawford in the backseat of Officer Oruoja's car. The search of Crawford's console therefore occurred within a reasonable time of his arrest. We hold that an unlocked center console of a motor vehicle is an item immediately associated with the person of the driver. Crawford's center console was immediately accessible to him when he was removed from his vehicle and arrested and the search of the console occurred reasonably contemporaneously with his arrest. The search in this case was therefore a valid warrantless search incident to arrest. [53]