Opinion ID: 2165781
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Parole Officer

Text: Cluck next urges that the circuit court erred when it allowed the State to introduce evidence that Officer Heather Douglas was Cluck's parole officer for prior convictions of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, as these facts had minimal independent relevance and the probative value did not substantially outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice. He explains that the court allowed the State to introduce this evidence in response to his counsel's general questions during cross-examination of Officer Dawson about how the items found in Cluck's possession were everyday household items and might be legally used. This was error, he contends. Cluck further maintains that the only probative value of the evidence of his prior convictions was to show that he previously had been convicted of similar crimes and not that he intended to manufacture methamphetamine. He asserts that the evidence of prior crimes was not independently relevant because it only showed that he had been convicted of two earlier crimes. For these reasons, he seeks (a) a determination that the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting this testimony and (b) reversal of his conviction. This court reviews evidentiary rulings using an abuse-of-discretion standard: This Court has held that trial courts are afforded wide discretion in evidentiary rulings. See Hawkins v. State, 348 Ark. 384, 72 S.W.3d 493 (2002). Specifically, in issues relating to the admission of evidence under Ark. R. Evid. 401, 403, and 404(b), we have held that a trial court's ruling is entitled to great weight and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Cook v. State, 345 Ark. 264, 45 S.W.3d 820 (2001). This Court will, likewise, not reverse absent a showing of prejudice. Gaines v. State, 340 Ark. 99, 8 S.W.3d 547 (2000). McCoy v. State, 354 Ark. 322, 325, 123 S.W.3d 901, 903 (2003). Prior to trial, Cluck filed a motion in limine to prevent Officer Heather Douglas from testifying that Cluck was on parole at the time of his arrest and that she was his parole officer. The court ruled that Officer Douglas could testify that she was employed as a parole officer but not that Cluck was on parole. Additionally, Cluck moved in limine to preclude the State from introducing evidence of his prior convictions for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. In his preliminary ruling, the trial judge stated that those two prior convictions would become relevant only if the defendant puts into question ignorance, lack of knowledge, et cetera[.] The trial judge further added that he was denying the use of the two previous convictions unless the defendant first brings up the issue as far as ignorance and lack of knowledge, et cetera. Following Cluck's cross-examination of Officer Dawson, the State maintained that Cluck had opened the door for the State to be able to inquire about Rule 404(b) evidence as Cluck had made his intent an issue. The State explained that when defense counsel elicited testimony from Officer Dawson that most of the items found in Cluck's home were common household items with legitimate uses, this placed knowledge and intent directly at issue. The trial judge ruled in favor of the State, noting that it was the defendant's contention that he just accidentally had these things and they were being used for lawful purposes. The trial judge further said that the intent or . . . the knowledge that he has becomes critical as far as the State is concerned[.] Hence, the judge allowed Officer Heather Douglas to testify that Cluck was on parole under her supervision for his conviction of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. Officer Heather Douglas was also permitted to testify about Cluck's prior conviction for possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. The judge then admonished the jury that they were to consider the evidence of Cluck's prior convictions only for the purpose of proof of motive, intent, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, and that they were not to consider that evidence for the purpose of proving bad character. Arkansas Rule of Evidence 404(b) prevents evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith, but it allows such evidence as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Ark. R. Evid. 404(b) (2005). This court has written the following regarding our analysis of a Rule 404(b) issue: If the evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is relevant to show that the offense of which the appellant is accused actually occurred and is not introduced merely to prove bad character, it will not be excluded. The test for establishing motive, intent, or plan as an Ark. R. Evid. 404(b) exception is whether the evidence of the other act has independent relevance. To be probative under Rule 403, the prior criminal act must be similar to the crime charged. McCoy, 354 Ark. at 326, 123 S.W.3d at 903-04 (citations omitted). We have held that in order to find prior crimes admissible under Rule 404(b), this court must find that the evidence is independently relevant, thus having a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Cook v. State, 345 Ark. 264, 270, 45 S.W.3d 820, 824 (2001). The State asserts that it offered evidence of Cluck's prior crimes to show his knowledge, which was highly probative of his intent to use the found items illegally. To that end, the State argues that Cluck's prior crimes are independently relevant as proof of knowledge and intent to commit an offense. We agree with the State and hold that the evidence of prior crimes falls within the Rule 404(b) exception. Next, we consider whether, under Rule 403, the probative value of the prior-crime evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Cluck maintains that the circuit court abused its discretion because it failed to weigh the probative value of the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice. We note, however, that this argument was not made to the circuit court and is made for the first time on appeal. Moreover, it is incumbent on defense counsel to get a ruling from the circuit court on issues he now argues on appeal. Because Cluck runs afoul of both of these bedrock principles for appellate review, we hold that the Rule 403 issue is not preserved for our consideration. See Riggs v. State, 339 Ark. 111, 3 S.W.3d 305 (1999) (holding that it is incumbent on defense counsel to request the trial court to conduct a probative-prejudicial weighing with respect to evidence if the defense considers such weighing to be important or legally required). Finally, the fact that Cluck was on parole and that Officer Heather Douglas testified to this status does not constitute reversible error. That is because the jury, which was permitted to learn of his prior crimes, would not be surprised to hear that he was on parole as a result of those crimes. This court has held that evidence that is cumulative is not considered to be prejudicial. See, e.g., Threadgill v. State, 347 Ark. 986, 69 S.W.3d 423 (2002). There was no abuse of discretion in this regard.