Opinion ID: 208807
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Supplementation of the Record

Text: Evidentiary determinations by the Court of Federal Claims, including motions to supplement the administrative record, are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Murakami v. United States, 398 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed.Cir.2005). A trial court's determination of an evidentiary matter constitutes an abuse of discretion if, for example, it is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful or is based on an erroneous construction of the law. Air Land Forwarders, Inc. v. United States, 172 F.3d 1338, 1341 (Fed.Cir.1999). [2] Appellants argue that the Court of Federal Claims erred by permitting Axiom to supplement the record with materials that were not before the agency, including legal pleadings filed before the GAO, declarations of Axiom's employees, and declarations from consultants retained for litigation. During a telephone conference with the trial court, the government objected to Axiom's request to add these documents to the record. The government acknowledged during the conference that the law of the Court of Federal Claims allows supplementation in at least some circumstances identified in Esch v. Yeutter, 876 F.2d 976, 991 (D.C.Cir.1989). The government asserted, however, that Axiom had not provided any explanation as to why it would be proper to add documents to the record in this case. The court responded: Well, let me cut to the chase here. My practice ... since I've been on the Court is to allow everybody to put ... whatever they want to put into the record in trial and even in an administrative record to supplement. My own view is that I don't know what's important or not until I finally get around to looking at the record, which would be some time from now. You know, I think that I have enough experience. Just because it's in the record doesn't mean I'm going to rely on it for any reason. I may never even bother to do anything with it, but I do think it's better to get it in there. If it goes up on appeal, that way the Appellate Court has a full record to work with, and the parties have put in everything that they feel they need to have to put forward their best argument. I do it on both sides. I'm not going to change that practice in this case. I don't see any prejudice to the government because you don't know what I'm going to do one way or the other with any of the stuff. The same thing for the Plaintiff. If they want to put it in, I'll put it in. J.A. 2034. When the government then requested to add its own supplementary evidence to the record, the court urged government counsel not to hold back, saying: I let everybody put in what they want to ... put in. The world will not come to an end. Western civilization will not crumble based upon this value judgment. J.A. 2035. While we recognize the need for an adequate record during judicial review, the parties' ability to supplement the administrative record is limited. In Camp v. Pitts, the Supreme Court stated that the focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court. 411 U.S. 138, 142, 93 S.Ct. 1241, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973). The task of the reviewing court is to apply the appropriate APA standard of review, 5 U.S.C. § 706, to the agency decision based on the record the agency presents to the reviewing court.  Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743-44, 105 S.Ct. 1598, 84 L.Ed.2d 643 (1985) (emphasis added). The purpose of limiting review to the record actually before the agency is to guard against courts using new evidence to convert the `arbitrary and capricious' standard into effectively de novo review. Murakami v. United States, 46 Fed.Cl. 731, 735 (2000), aff'd, 398 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir.2005). Thus, supplementation of the record should be limited to cases in which the omission of extra-record evidence precludes effective judicial review. Id. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in this case by adding Axiom's documents to the record without evaluating whether the record before the agency was sufficient to permit meaningful judicial review. The court made clear that it would freely allow the parties to supplement the record with whatever they want, and, by so doing, failed to make the required threshold determination of whether additional evidence was necessary. In its written decision finding that the government violated FAR § 9.5, the court offered an additional explanation for its determination that supplementation was warranted in this case: Although the Federal Circuit has not ruled on whether, or the circumstances under which, the Administrative Record may be supplemented, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has allowed the Administrative Record to be supplemented in circumstances similar to those presented in this bid protest. See Esch v. Yeutter, 876 F.2d 976, 991 (D.C.Cir.1989) ([T]he procedural validity of the Department's action... remains in serious question. Particularly in this context, it may sometimes be appropriate to resort to extra-record information to enable judicial review to become effective.). Axiom I, 78 Fed.Cl. at 586 n. 10. Relying on Esch in this fashion is problematic in at least two respects. First, the eight exceptions to the rule against extra-record evidence described in Esch originated in an article, predating Florida Power & Light, which described itself as a guide for lawyers challenging informal administrative action when they are attempting to submit evidence not in the formal record as assembled by the agency. Steven Stark & Sarah Wald, Setting No Records: The Failed Attempts to Limit the Record in Review of Administrative Action, 36 Admin. L.Rev. 333, 336 (1984). Second, and more critically, Esch 's vitality even within the D.C. Circuit is questionable in light of more recent opinions by that court which demonstrate a more restrictive approach to extra-record evidence. See, e.g., IMS, P.C. v. Alvarez, 129 F.3d 618, 624 (D.C.Cir.1997) (affirming the district court's decision to strike affidavits not in the agency record based on the appellant's failure to show that the agency failed to examine all relevant factors or to adequately explain its grounds for decision, or that the agency acted in bad faith or engaged in improper behavior); Saratoga Dev. Corp. v. United States, 21 F.3d 445, 457-58 (D.C.Cir.1994) (explaining that additional administrative discovery is permissible only if necessary for effective judicial review or if the existing record cannot be trusted). [3] Thus, Esch not only is heavily in tension with existing precedent, ARINC Eng'g Servs. LLC v. United States, 77 Fed.Cl. 196, 201 n. 5 (2007), but some of its exceptions are so broadly-worded as to risk being incompatible with the limited nature of arbitrary and capricious review, particularly if construed to allow the introduction of new evidence or theories not presented to the deciding agency, Murakami, 46 Fed.Cl. at 735 n. 4. For these reasons, insofar as Esch departs from fundamental principles of administrative law as articulated by the Supreme Court in Pitts and Florida Power & Light, it is not the law of this circuit. The focus of judicial review of agency action remains the administrative record, which should be supplemented only if the existing record is insufficient to permit meaningful review consistent with the APA. Faced with the request to supplement the administrative record in this case, the Court of Federal Claims should have determined whether supplementation of the record was necessary in order not to frustrate effective judicial review. Pitts, 411 U.S. at 142-43, 93 S.Ct. 1241. By admitting Axiom's extra-record evidence without making such determination, the court abused its discretion.