Opinion ID: 569810
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 52 Both defendants appeal on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they knew the securities were stolen, converted or taken by fraud as required under 18 U.S.C. § 2314. When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, the inquiry is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Gallo, 763 F.2d 1504, 1518 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1917 (1986) (emphasis in original) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). This standard applies whether the evidence presented is direct or circumstantial because circumstantial evidence is entitled to the same weight as direct evidence in determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954); United States v. Thurston, 771 F.2d 449, 452 (10th Cir.1985). 53 Defendants argue that there was insufficient evidence to show that they had knowledge that the securities (GPC's checks) were stolen, converted, or taken by fraud. However, [k]nowledge may be inferred from defendant's conduct and surrounding circumstances. United States v. Stack, 853 F.2d 436, 439 (6th Cir.1988). In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we note that the government presented strong evidence from which the jury could find that defendants had knowledge that the GPC checks they received were obtained by fraud, i.e., the concealment of the payment of kickbacks to Malone to cause her to pay the defendants' invoices. Malone had informed the defendants that she was in charge of bookkeeping, handled all invoices, and wrote the checks. The defendants knew Malone was in a position to pay their invoices and was in fact paid to protect the invoices, and the government argues that defendants did not particularly care how she accomplished that task. We agree. 54 Defendant Tripp admitted that he knew his customer was GPC, yet his payments of the so-called premiums, which included considerable cash, were made to Edith Malone personally. None of the invoices reflected the payment of gifts or money to Malone. The government argues that a rational jury could reasonably conclude that the defendants had knowledge that the management of GPC was unaware that Edith Malone was being paid money to obtain payment of defendants' invoices. Therefore, the evidence was clearly sufficient for a rational juror to reasonably conclude that defendants knew of the fraud being perpetrated on GPC by Malone, participating in their scheme in transporting checks to defendants in interstate commerce which she had stolen, converted or taken by fraud. 55 Both defendants make another argument which is distinct from the sufficiency of the evidence issue. The defendants argue that because the district court charged the jury that they must find that the defendant knew the checks were 'stolen, converted or taken by fraud,' there was a distinct possibility that the jury's verdict was not unanimous on counts 61 to 79. Following the court's instruction on the elements of 18 U.S.C. § 2314, defendants did not make a special request for a different jury instruction and made no objection to the quoted instruction. However, the defendants argue that the district court's charge could possibly have resulted in a non-unanimous verdict. This argument is frivolous and involves pure conjecture. The district court did not err in its charge to the jury. See United States v. McPherson, 782 F.2d 66 (6th Cir.1986); United States v. Gullett, 713 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069 (1984).