Opinion ID: 2453630
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: BIDS Fee

Text: Hernandez claims that although the trial court considered his ability to pay, the trial court's assessment of Board of Indigents' Defense Services (BIDS) attorney fees defies logic and is unconstitutional because the court acknowledged that the fees may never be paid in full. The trial court made the following findings: The Court will direct that the restitution and the reimbursement to BIDS be paid in that order. Restitution first and then other matters followingother financial matters following over the period of sentence. I recognize that Mr. Hernandez is not going to be in a position to gain outside employment. On whatever limited basis that he is able to engage in the remunerative employment during his incarceration that that should go toward these items. The Court will direct that reimbursement to BIDS be made for fees. Again, I understand that that may never get paid in full, but there is a long period of time that is involved and to the extent that money can be paid toward it that it can and should be done because it enables others to be represented as well. I don't want to diminish in any respect the effortssubstantial efforts made by counsel for the defendant on his behalf by implying through the Court's order that he has not received anything other than the best benefit of counsel throughout this case. The assessment of attorney fees involves the interpretation of a statute, which is a question of law over which an appellate court exercises unlimited review. State v. Robinson, 281 Kan. 538, 539, 132 P.3d 934 (2006). This court has interpreted the statute at issue here to `clearly require[] a sentencing judge, in determining the amount and method of payment of BIDS reimbursement, i.e., at the time the reimbursement is ordered, to take account of the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of such sum will impose. The language is mandatory; the legislature stated unequivocally that this shall occur.' State v. Drayton, 285 Kan. 689, 715-16, 175 P.3d 861 (2008) (quoting Robinson, 281 Kan. at 543, 132 P.3d 934). This court uses an abuse of discretion standard to review the amount of the fee imposed. Drayton, 285 Kan. at 716, 175 P.3d 861. In Drayton, this court reversed the assessment of attorney fees for reimbursement of BIDS fees because the district court found Drayton was essentially unable to afford to reimburse any of the $7,110 fee imposed because he would be imprisoned for the next 25 years. Drayton, 285 Kan. at 716, 175 P.3d 861. In this case, the trial court made a finding that Hernandez would have some ability to pay the BIDS fees due to the possibility of remunerative employment during his lengthy incarceration period. The fee imposed here was not an abuse of discretion. Affirmed.