Opinion ID: 1420265
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The sexual discrimination claim

Text: Kotowski alleged that Norcon had subjected her to sexual discrimination in violation of AS 18.80.220 through her transfer, her discharge, and the harassment directed at her. [4] The superior court agreed with Norcon's contention that, while Kotowski's sexual harassment claims were independent of the CBA, any claim that she was terminated because of her sex, that similarly situated males were not terminated is a termination for other than just cause and could have been grieved under the collective bargaining agreement. Thus the jury received separate questions concerning sexual discrimination and harassment and answered the latter, but not the former, once it determined that the six-month LMRA limitations period had run. [5] The superior court erred in preventing the jury from deciding Kotowski's discriminatory transfer and termination claim. The question of whether Kotowski's transfer and termination violated AS 18.80.220 was a question of state law, entirely independent of any understanding embodied in the collective-bargaining agreement. Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 125, 114 S.Ct. 2068, 129 L.Ed.2d 93 (1994). The right to a non-discriminatory workplace conferred upon Kotowski by AS 18.80.220 could not be waived by any contrary contractual provision. Because it is a non-waivable state law right, no need exists to consult the CBA to determine its meaning. We were presented with a similar situation in Public Safety Employees Association v. State, 658 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1983) ( PSEA ). In PSEA, we explored the relationship between a statutory right to sue under the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA), AS 34.03, and language in a CBA requiring arbitration for disputes involving the meaning or application of the express terms of the [CBA]. 658 P.2d at 772. We held that because the right to sue under the act cannot be prospectively bargained away, it followed that the contract remedy here cannot displace that which is provided by the act. Id. at 774-75. Thus the existence of the arbitration remedy did not preclude the exercise of the statutory remedy. See id. at 774. Even if Norcon had just cause under the terms of the CBA to terminate Kotowski once she drank on duty, this fact would not make interpretation of the CBA necessary to resolve her sexual discrimination claim. The question whether Norcon sexually discriminated against Kotowski is a factual question as to motive: did Norcon transfer and terminate Kotowski because of her gender, or did it transfer and terminate her for drinking an alcoholic beverage in violation of the zero tolerance, alcohol-free workplace policy? [6] See AS 18.80.220(a)(1). Answering this question of motive does not require interpretation of the CBA. Our conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning in Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 129 L.Ed.2d 203 (1994). Norris involved a pre-emption question under the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., under which the Supreme Court applies the same pre-emption analysis as under the LMRA. See 512 U.S. at 260, 114 S.Ct. 2239. Norris was a mechanic who was terminated after he refused to sign an aircraft maintenance record certifying that repairs had been satisfactorily performed. See id. at 249-50, 114 S.Ct. 2239. Norris brought a state law wrongful discharge suit over this termination, which Hawaiian Airlines defended by arguing that resort to the CBA was necessary and Norris's suit therefore was pre-empted by the mandatory grievance procedures of the RLA. See id. at 250-51, 114 S.Ct. 2239. In Norris the Court observed that purely factual questions about an employer's conduct and motives do not require interpretation of the CBA to answer. See id. at 261, 114 S.Ct. 2239. Because Norris's state law wrongful discharge claim involved this sort of factual determination, it was not pre-empted. See id. at 266, 114 S.Ct. 2239. Furthermore, the Supreme Court was not persuaded by petitioners' contention that the state tort claims require a determination whether the discharge ... was justified by respondent's failure to sign the maintenance record, as the CBA required him to do. Id. While such a determination would have been necessary in a wrongful discharge claim alleging violation of the CBA, it was not necessary in the state law claim requiring only the purely factual determination of the employer's motive. See id. Similarly, the jury could have addressed Kotowski's sexual discrimination claim by determining whether Norcon's transfer and termination of her were motivated by gender bias. The fact that Kotowski's alcohol consumption may have been just cause under the CBA for terminating her is no more relevant than the fact that Norris's refusal to sign maintenance records may have been just cause under the CBA to terminate him in Norris. The LMRA did not pre-empt Kotowski's sexual discrimination claim.