Opinion ID: 2570849
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: franco's claims

Text: ¶ 20 Franco's complaint pleads claims against the LDS Church Defendants for gross negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and breach of fiduciary duty (negligence-based claims). Franco argues that these claims are different from a clergy malpractice claim in substance and effect and therefore the First Amendment is inapplicable. The LDS Church Defendants argue, however, that despite Franco's creative pleading, her claims are merely a roundabout way of alleging clergy malpractice and therefore the claims are barred by the First Amendment. ¶ 21 As an initial matter, we must emphasize that regardless of whether a claim against a cleric is one for malpractice, the claim will not survive constitutional scrutiny if an adjudication of the claim would foster an excessive governmental entanglement with religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. However, that said, we agree with the LDS Church Defendants that Franco's negligence-based claims are merely an elliptical way of alleging clergy malpractice. ¶ 22 An examination of Franco's complaint reveals that each of her negligence-based claims alleges that while counseling with Franco in the context of an ecclesiastical counseling relationship, the LDS Church Defendants breached a duty owed to Franco by advising her to forgive, forget, and seek Atonement or by advising her to seek outside help from Browning, an unlicensed therapist. Accordingly, like her clergy malpractice claim, which she abandoned on appeal, the essence of each of Franco's negligence-based claims is that the LDS Church Defendants generally mishandled the pastoral counseling relationship by giving bad adviceclaims necessarily directed at the LDS Church Defendants' performance of their ecclesiastical counseling duties. Therefore, despite Franco's characterization of her negligence-based claims as gross negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and breach of fiduciary duty, we must deal with the real issue hereclergy malpractice. See Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1438 (7th Cir.1994) (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Coffey, J., concurring) (stating that district court correctly determined that plaintiff's claim for breach of fiduciary duty was simply an elliptical way of alleging clergy malpractice); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F.Supp. 321, 327 (S.D.N.Y.1991) ([A]s with her negligence claim, [plaintiffs] fiduciary duty claim is merely another way of alleging that the [clergyman] grossly abused his pastoral role, that is, that he engaged in malpractice.); Amato v. Greenguist, 287 Ill.App.3d 921, 223 Ill.Dec. 261, 679 N.E.2d 446, 451 (1997) (stating that we will not determine the justiciability of [plaintiffs] counts based upon the nomenclature used by the plaintiff in entitling the counts in determining whether a negligence claim against a cleric is essentially a malpractice claim). ¶ 23 Because Franco's negligence-based claims allege that the LDS Church Defendants generally mishandled their ecclesiastical counseling duties, a determination of the claims, like the clergy malpractice claims asserted in Nally and White, could not be made without first ascertaining whether the LDS Church Defendants performed within the level of expertise expected of a similar professional, i.e., a reasonably prudent bishop, priest, rabbi, minister, or other cleric in this state. Indeed, malpractice is a theory of tort that would involve the courts in a determination of whether the cleric in a particular casehere an LDS Church bishopbreached the duty to act with that degree of skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A (1965). Defining such a duty would necessarily require a court to express the standard of care to be followed by other reasonable clerics in the performance of their ecclesiastical counseling duties, which, by its very nature, would embroil the courts in establishing the training, skill, and standards applicable for members of the clergy in this state in a diversity of religions professing widely varying beliefs. This is as impossible as it is unconstitutional; to do so would foster an excessive government entanglement with religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Dausch Rykse, 52 F.3d at 1432 (Ripple, Circuit J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that an evaluation of a clergy malpractice claim would require courts to evaluate and investigate religious tenets and doctrines); Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 553 (Mo.Ct.App.1987) (stating that clergy malpractice would force courts to judge competence, training, methods and content of the pastoral function); F.G. v. MacDonell, 150 N.J. 550, 696 A.2d 697, 706 (1997) (O'Hern, J., dissenting) (stating that creating a tort of clergy malpractice would establish an official religion of the state); Bladen v. First Presbyterian Church of Saltisaw, 857 P.2d 789, 797 (Okla.1993) (Once a court enters the realm of trying to define the nature of advice a minister should give a parishioner serious First Amendment issues are implicated.). ¶ 24 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that Franco's claims against the LDS Church Defendants for gross negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and breach of fiduciary duty are barred by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
¶ 25 In addition to her negligence-based claims, Franco also asserted a claim against the LDS Church Defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961), this court stated: Due to the highly subjective and volatile nature of emotional distress and the variability of its causations, the courts have historically been wary of dangers in opening the door to recovery therefor. This is partly because such claims may easily be fabricated: or as sometimes stated, are easy to assert and hard to defend against. Samms, 11 Utah 2d at 291, 358 P.2d at 345. Accordingly, to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant intentionally engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiff, (a) with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or, (b) where any reasonable person would have known that such would result; and his actions are of such a nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality. Jackson v. Brown, 904 P.2d 685, 687-88 (Utah 1995) (emphasis added) (quoting Samms, 11 Utah 2d at 293, 358 P.2d at 347). ¶ 26 The sufficiency of Franco's pleadings must be determined by the facts pleaded rather than the conclusions stated. Ellefsen v. Roberts, 526 P.2d 912, 915 (Utah 1974). In light of this standard, Franco's claim under this cause of action pleads the following operative facts: that during ecclesiastical counseling, Franco asked the LDS Church Defendants to refer her to a licensed mental health professional; that in accordance with her request, the LDS Church Defendants referred Franco to Browning at the Bountiful Mental Health Center, allegedly stating that he was well qualified to help; and that despite this representation, Browning was not qualified to render the appropriate treatment. Franco alleges that the LDS Church Defendants referred her to Browning for the purpose of protecting Strong and the LDS Church and that these actions were made in a reckless and intentional manner that was extreme and outrageous and caused her severe emotional distress. ¶ 27 However, despite the above, Franco's complaint is devoid of allegations that the LDS Church Defendants referred her to Browning for the purpose of inflicting emotional distress. Rather, Franco merely alleges that the LDS Church Defendants referred her to Browning, not for the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, but to protect Strong and the LDS Church and that as a result of this conduct, she suffered severe emotional distress. This bare allegation, however, even assuming its truth, is insufficient to state a claim under the purpose test established by Samms. See Samms, 11 Utah 2d at 293, 358 P.2d at 347; see also 86 C.J.S. Torts § 72, at 728 (1997) (stating that [i]t is not enough to establish a claim that defendant intentionally acted in a way that causes distress (emphasis added)). ¶ 28 Moreover, Franco's complaint alleges no action by the LDS Church Defendants that can be considered outrageous and intolerable in that [it] offend[s] against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality. Samms, 11 Utah 2d at 293, 358 P.2d at 347. To be considered outrageous, [t]he conduct must evoke outrage or revulsion; it must be more than unreasonable, unkind, or unfair. 86 C.J.S., supra ¶ 27, § 70, at 722. Furthermore, [a]n act is not necessarily outrageous merely because it is tortious, injurious, or malicious, or because it would give rise to punitive damages, or because it is illegal. Id. at 722-23; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d (1965). ¶ 29 In this case, at worst, the LDS Church Defendants' actions consisted of referring Franco to an unlicensed counselor. However, the complaint contains no allegations that the LDS Church Defendants knew Browning was unlicensed when they made the referral or that the LDS Church Defendants had any other indication their conduct in referring Franco to Browning might cause emotional distress. Absent such evidence or allegations, the LDS Church Defendants' actions cannot be considered outrageous and intolerable as a matter of law. To hold otherwise would leave every bishop, priest, rabbi, or minister of every church who seeks to help a parishioner having apparent psychiatric problems to receive outside secular counseling open to liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress. ¶ 30 Based on the above, we hold that the trial court did not err in dismissing Franco's claim against the LDS Church Defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Because we have determined that this claim fails as a matter of law, we do not reach the constitutional issue. See Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 1980) (stating that it is a fundamental rule that constitutional questions should not be reached if the merits of the case can be determined on other than constitutional grounds).
¶ 31 Finally, we address Franco's claim against the LDS Church Defendants for fraud. As an initial matter, as noted in footnote 5 supra, matters outside the pleadings have been presented with regard to Franco's fraud claim that were not excluded by the trial court, and therefore, we treat the LDS Church Defendants' motion to dismiss this claim as one for summary judgment as provided for in rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b); Lind v. Lynch, 665 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1983). ¶ 32 A grant of summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). On appeal from a summary judgment, we accept the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the losing party. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). Because we resolve only legal issues in reviewing a summary judgment, we give no deference to the trial court's view of the law; we review it for correctness. Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). ¶ 33 To establish fraud under Utah law, a party must prove by clear and convincing evidence each of the following elements: (1) That a representation was made; (2) concerning a presently existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act: (9) to his injury and damage. Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty, 641 P.2d 124, 126 (Utah 1982) (emphasis added) (quoting Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 144-45, 247 P.2d 273, 274-75 (1952)). ¶ 34 In this case, in support of her fraud claim, Franco argues that the LDS Church Defendants falsely represented to her that Browning had a Ph.D. in counseling or psychology or was a licensed psychiatrist. (Emphasis added.) However, in a letter from the Bountiful Mental Health Center to Franco, which Franco presented to the trial court as an exhibit, Craig Berthold, the director of the Bountiful Mental Health Center, stated: Dr. Browning does have a doctorate degree in Counseling (Ph.D.), from the educational psychology department at the University of California at Los Angeles. Accordingly, Franco's own exhibit establishes that the LDS Church Defendants did not make a representation concerning a presently existing material fact which was false, Pace, 122 Utah at 145, 247 P.2d at 275, and therefore, the LDS Church Defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on this count. ¶ 35 Moreover, even if we were to ignore the evidence that Browning had a Ph.D. in counseling or psychology, focusing solely on Franco's argument in this appeal that the LDS Church Defendants' false representation was that Browning was licensed, as Franco argues we should, her claim still fails as a matter of law because the complaint does not plead fraud with sufficient particularity to withstand summary judgment. ¶ 36 To state a claim for fraud, a plaintiff must plead not only that the defendant made a material representation that was false, but also that the defendant either knew the representation to be false or made the representation recklessly, knowing that he or she had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a representation. See Mikkelson, 641 P.2d at 126; see also 37 Am.,Jur.2d Fraud and Deceit § 41, at 66 (1968) (stating that one of the necessary elements upon which to base an action in fraud is that a false representation was made and known to be false by the party making it). Moreover, because this is a claim for fraud, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake [must] be stated with particularity. Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b). We have stressed, arid continue to hold, that mere conclusory allegations in a pleading, unsupported by a recitation of relevant surrounding facts, are insufficient to preclude ... summary judgment. Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Utah 1989) (citing Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983); Ellefsen v. Roberts, 526 P.2d 912, 915 (Utah 1974)). ¶ 37 In this case, as we stated with regard to Franco's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the complaint is devoid of allegations that the LDS Church Defendants represented to Franco that Browning was licensed, knowing that he was unlicensed, or knowing that they had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a representation. Moreover, as part of her general allegations, Franco stated that the Bountiful Mental Health Center held ... Browning out to [be] licensed or qualified to render the appropriate treatment and that Browning held himself out on his business card as practicing Individual, Marital, and Family Counseling, under the heading of General Psychiatry. Therefore, even though we must consider all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the facts alleged in this case, is that the LDS Church Defendants believed that Browning was licensed to provide the appropriate treatment when they made the referral. ¶ 38 Accordingly, because Franco has failed to establish the necessary elements of fraud, the LDS Church Defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on this count, and consequently, we do not address the constitutional issue.