Opinion ID: 2431316
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Construing the Amended Statute

Text: There are three reasons why I believe this Court is free to construe the current statute in a different manner than the previous version of the statute was construed in Blitz and the subsequent line of decisions. First, Blitz makes clear that the phrase criminal offense, as defined in section 556.010, was absolutely fundamental to those decisions. Either of the two legislative changes, i.e., the repeal of section 556.010, effective January 1, 1979, or the removal of the term criminal offense from section 491.050 in 1981, was sufficient to release this Court from its prior construction of the statute. Because this is the first time this Court has considered this issue since the amendments to the statutes, I believe it is appropriate to consider the impact of those amendments on our determination of this issue. I will not speculate as to what my decision would have been in Blitz had I been around in 1903. Nevertheless, in construing the successor statute in 1992, I believe I am entitled to benefit from the 90 years of doubt in the wisdom of this radical alteration in the rules of evidence and the equally long-expected change by the legislature that never came to pass despite our strict enforcement. If the statute had not been amended and the precedent construing it was recent, I would be reluctant to deviate from that precedent. However, refusing to follow the much-criticized rationale, which this Court used in 1903 in Blitz , is significantly different from refusing to follow recent precedent in construing a statute that had not been amended. I believe this Court should seize the opportunity to adopt a more workable, logical rule of impeachment. Second, it may be contended that the term crime, as used in the phrase convicted of a crime in the first line of section 449.050, incorporates from section 556.010 the definition of crime similar to the definition of criminal offense, which the prior statute incorporated from repealed section 556.010. In my view, conviction of a crime  is used generically and not specifically. The purpose of the amendment in 1981 was to change the result of the holding in State v. Frey, 459 S.W.2d 359 (Mo. 1970). In Frey , this Court held that a suspended imposition of sentence (SIS) is not a conviction and, therefore, could not be used to impeach. Prior to 1981, the statute required a conviction for impeachment. To enlarge what could be shown to impeach to include a SIS, the 1981 amendment added prior pleas of guilty, pleas of nolo contendere, and findings of guilt. Since these three additional dispositions have been added to the description of occurrences that can be used for impeachment, a conviction of a crime  is no longer the exclusive impeaching event covered by the statute. The addition of pleas of guilty, pleas of nolo contendere, and findings of guilt, which do not incorporate the term crime and thus could not incorporate the definition from section 556.010, leads me to believe that the term crime was used generically and not specifically. This portion of the statute does not speak to the issue of whether non-credibility convictions of crimes, pleas of guilty, pleas of nolo contendere, or findings of guilt can be used to impeach. This is the second reason I believe this Court is free to decide this issue without regard to the Blitz precedent and the Court's construction of the prior statute. Third, and perhaps most important, is the last sentence of the statute, which has not been considered by any court, on the issue of whether non-credibility misdemeanors may be used to impeach. This sentence states: Such proof may be either by the record or by his own cross-examination, upon which he must answer any question relevant to that inquiry, .... § 491.050, RSMo (emphasis added). The phrase, [s]uch proof, means proof of a criminal conviction to affect credibility in a civil or criminal case or proof of prior pleas of guilty, pleas of nolo contendere, or findings of guilt to affect credibility in a criminal case. The phrase, that inquiry, refers to the inquiry of whether the conviction, plea or finding of guilt affects the witness's credibility. The statute specifically provides the witness must answer any question about those convictions, pleas or findings of guilt relevant to credibility. It follows that the contrary is also mandated; i.e., the witness need not answer any question relating to a conviction, plea or finding of fact that is not relevant to credibility. Thus, the statute specifically includes, and always has included, the answer to the issue under discussionthat the witness need only answer regarding convictions, pleas and findings of guilt that are relevant to credibility. Thus, I would hold that the statute mandates exactly what it says; i.e., it only provides for the admission of convictions, pleas and findings of guilt that are relevant to credibility.