Opinion ID: 2270446
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prior Videotaped Testimony

Text: Brooks argues that the trial judge erred to his substantial prejudice and denied him the right to confront witnesses against him when he declared that an incarcerated witness who had recently attempted suicide was unavailable and permitted the prior videotaped testimony of that witness to be shown to the jury in lieu of her live testimony. We disagree. At a pretrial hearing the day before the scheduled trial, the prosecutor advised the trial judge that Mary Wood, an incarcerated witness, had attempted suicide and would not be available to testify at trial. The Commonwealth filed a motion in limine to be allowed to play the videotape of Wood's testimony from an earlier trial of Brooks in lieu of her being present at the third trial in person. The Commonwealth was allowed to play the videotape of the testimony from the September 20, 2000 trial which had ended in a mistrial. At the earlier trial, Wood was called by the prosecution and recalled by the defense. The earlier trial involved the same defendant and the same offense on the same charges. The Commonwealth relied on RCr 7.20 and RCr 7.22 which permit the use of previous trial testimony where a witness is unavailable. Defense counsel objected claiming that the evidence did not comport with the hearsay exception under KRE 804(b)(1) and that the defense did not believe Mary Wood was legally unavailable. He claimed that the unavailability was due to the inaction of the Commonwealth in not preventing the suicide attempt. The trial judge rejected the defense arguments and found that the witness was unavailable and that such unavailability was not caused by the Commonwealth. Brooks also objected to the finding as to unavailability asserting that the Commonwealth had presented no physical evidence with regard to her illness. The Commonwealth then presented a sworn affidavit from the prosecutor about the information he had obtained noting that the affidavit also contained the telephone numbers of persons he had spoken to at the Kentucky Correctional Institute for Women. The defense countered that it did not believe the affidavit was sufficient and the trial judge asked if defense counsel would like, on the record, to telephone either or both of the prison officials listed in the affidavit to determine if the facts asserted were correct. Defense counsel declined to do so. After further discussion, the trial judge himself telephoned the prison during the in-chambers hearing in order to corroborate the affidavit and to ascertain the apparent condition of the witness. Neither party objected to the trial judge speaking to the representatives at the prison. The trial judge spoke to an officer at the prison who verified the circumstances that the prosecutor had reported. The officer also stated that although they could transport Wood and would follow any order of the court in that regard, it would be against medical advice and that the prison did not want the potential liability in the event that anything happened to Wood. Following this conversation, the trial judge found that based on the affidavit of the prosecutor and his personal contact with the correctional facility personnel that the witness was unavailable for trial. Defense counsel told the court that he might, after consulting with Brooks, seek a continuance. The following morning, the trial judge conducted another in-chambers meeting, this time with Brooks present, and ruled that he would allow the playing of the prior testimony. The trial judge also inquired directly of Brooks if he wanted a continuance in the light of his ruling. Brooks stated that he did not. There was no formal motion made for a speedy trial. Consequently, this issue was waived. The trial judge properly exercised his sound discretion in determining that Mary Wood was unavailable to attend or testify because of sickness or infirmity pursuant to RCr 7.20(1). Such a decision is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. See Lovett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 103 S.W.3d 72 (2003); see also Ruppee v. Commonwealth, Ky., 821 S.W.2d 484 (1992), citing Carter v. Commonwealth, Ky., 782 S.W.2d 597 (1990). Such a determination will not be reviewed unless the decision of the trial judge is clearly unreasonable. Ruppee, supra . A careful review of the record here shows that the decision of the trial judge was not clearly unreasonable. The trial judge correctly concluded that there had been a sufficient showing as to the unavailability of Wood because of health concerns. See Bruce v. Commonwealth, Ky., 441 S.W.2d 435 (1969). Any concerns for the confrontation clause lack merit. There is an exception to a defendant's constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him where a witness is unavailable and has given testimony at previous judicial proceedings against the same defendant which was subject to cross-examination by that defendant. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968). Barber, supra , is otherwise factually distinguishable. That case involved a witness who was located in a federal prison in another state. The court held that the mere absence of a witness is not sufficient grounds for dispensing with the constitutional right of confrontation, particularly in view of the increased cooperation between states and between states and the federal government with respect to processes for obtaining the presence of witnesses from outside the jurisdiction. Here, the witness' presence was compromised by her medical health. Commonwealth v. Howard, Ky.App., 665 S.W.2d 320 (1984), stated that if the prior testimony is found by the trial court to be reliable and trustworthy, and the witness was subject to cross-examination, it makes no difference whether the prior testimony comes by way of deposition, previous trial, preliminary hearing, or as in the Howard case, a bond reduction hearing, provided the same offense and same charge are dealt with. See also Wells v. Commonwealth, Ky., 562 S.W.2d 622 (1978) cert. denied 439 U.S. 861, 99 S.Ct.181, 58 L.Ed.2d 170; Cf. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). The case of Stoner v. Sowders, 997 F.2d 209 (6th Cir.1993), is factually different because in that case the Commonwealth failed to show why two witnesses were unavailable to give the same testimony in court when the depositions had been taken the day before trial. No such factual pattern occurred in this case. The trial judge was correct.