Opinion ID: 767873
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Corruption and its Appearance

Text: 31 We now inquire whether, under the guidelines of Shrink Missouri PAC, the evidentiary showing of corruption or its appearance is sufficient to establish Maine's interest. There, the Court found that the evidence in support of Missouri's statute was more than sufficient to sustain the state's evidentiary obligation. See Shrink Missouri PAC, 120 S. Ct. at 907-08 ([T]his case does not present a close call requiring further definition of whatever the State's evidentiary obligation may be. . . . There might, of course, be need for a more extensive evidentiary documentation if petitioners had made any showing of their own to cast doubt on the apparent implications of Buckley's evidence and the record here.); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 (because corruption can never be reliably ascertained, all that is required is that the threat not be illusory). Although the evidence did not show that the Missouri legislature relied on the findings accepted in Buckley, a state senator, the co-chair of the legislature's Interim Joint Committee on Campaign Finance Reform, stated that large contributions had the 'real potential to buy votes.' See Shrink Missouri PAC, 120 S. Ct. at 907. There were also several newspaper accounts recounting large contributions that supported inferences of impropriety. See id. Finally, the evidence established that '74 percent of [those who voted on a referendum to impose contribution limits in] Missouri determined that contribution limits are necessary to combat corruption and the appearance thereof.' Id. at 908 (citation omitted). 32 In this case, the State contends that Maine voters as well as legislators and those intimately involved in the political process have valid concerns about corruption and the appearance thereof caused by large contributions. Under the prior contribution limits of $1,000 per election for an individual and $5,000 for a PAC, a single political action committee could fund the average 1998 House campaign twice over and could provide over half of the average 1998 Senate campaign by making the maximum primary and general election donations. An individual, again making the maximum contributions, could provide nearly one-half of the average House race funding and over one-tenth of the average Senate campaign funding. 33 Further, the opportunity to make such large contributions translated into a perception among Maine voters that corruption was a reality in the State House. Statements similar to the one relied upon in Shrink Missouri PAC were offered here. One representative attested to the belief of many of his constituents that legislators are beholden to large contributors: Representative David Shiah, currently the House Assistant Majority Leader, attested that, Based upon extensive conversations with voters in my district, it is my opinion that voters believe that there is too much money in politics today and that most politicians are beholden, or give special access, to those who give large amounts to their campaigns. Senator Chellie Pingree related instances in which she and other legislators were pressured to change their position on an issue or risk the loss of contributors' support. On one occasion, for example, she was admonished by lobbyists for a certain interest that if she continued to sponsor a bill in opposition to that interest, Democratic legislators would lose significant campaign contributions; after Pingree and Democratic leaders forged ahead with the legislation, the special interests did not, in fact, donate to Democratic leadership PACs the following year, despite their history of doing so. 34 An abundant file of press clippings includes both news stories and editorial comment covering the years 1995-1999. The following sampling suggests that large contributions have occurred in Maine and that Maine citizens are concerned about their impact on lawmakers. Indeed, the evidence to this effect is far greater than that cited in Shrink Missouri PAC. 35 One story states that [r]anking lawmakers and their committees pulled in close to $400,000 in big gifts from special interests, almost all of which lobby the Legislature. Paul Carrier, Contributions Give Special Interests Political 'Box Seats,' Maine Sunday Telegram, Jan. 3, 1999, at 1A. One column declared, There is nothing illegal about tobacco companies bankrolling political campaigns - only suspicious. We can debate the influence of campaign contributions till the cows come home, but one fact remains: The money is given on the expectation that it will influence policy. Editorial, Taking the Money, Maine Times, May 15, 1997. This sentiment has been oft-repeated: A group with a certain point of view can buy influence during a political campaign with a campaign donation. Politicians routinely deny that influence is being bought; evidence is often to the contrary. Editorial, A Stain-Guard for State Government, Lewiston Sun-J., May 7, 1997. Not only are Maine's citizens concerned, but so are its political leaders; Governor Angus King, who self-imposed a contribution limit of $250 in his 1998 reelection campaign, stated on a national news program that the problem is we've got this situation where you either have to have your own money or you have to be beholden. Newshour with Jim Lehrer, (National Public Radio broadcast, Mar. 26, 1997). 36 The fundraising practices of Maine legislators have drawn much criticism. One article reported negatively on a fundraising breakfast that an organization hosted for legislators who served on a committee handling bills affecting the organization, emphasizing the absence of average citizens. See Bill Nemitz, Dough Rises for Political Pancakes, Portland Press Herald, Mar. 8, 1996, at 1B. Another questioned the propriety of an industry hosting a fundraiser for a legislator the day before a hearing on an important bill affecting the industry. See Editorial, Gravel Industry Didn't Expect Anything for Lord Fund-Raiser?, Portland Press Herald, Mar. 26, 1996, at 6A. An editorial criticizing such fundraisers commented, The whiff of too-close connections between influential lawmakers and interests with big money on the line added an acrid aroma to legislating in both the House and the Senate this session. Nancy Grape, Let's Change the Pockets Instead of Pocketing the Change, Portland Press Herald, Apr. 7, 1996, at 5C. 10 37 In addition, a survey of Maine residents showed that over 70% of respondents believed that large campaign contributions were a major source of political corruption, that large donors received special treatment from legislators, that the new contribution limits would renew currently lagging faith in the integrity of the process among the electorate, and that the new limits would help decrease the potential for undue influence. 11 38 Finally, we take note, as did the Court in Shrink Missouri PAC, of the fact that Maine voters approved the referendum imposing reduced contribution limits as indicative of their perception of corruption. The body of evidence here clearly surpasses the quantum of evidence offered and accepted as sufficient in Shrink Missouri PAC and would meet an even higher standard if one were applicable. 39 Moreover, the limits are sufficiently closely drawn by the standards set forth in Buckley, as applied in Shrink Missouri PAC. In Buckley, the Court concluded that the $1,000 limit on contributions to federal office seekers was closely drawn because it focused on the narrow aspect of political association where the actuality and potential for corruption have been identified - while leaving persons free to engage in independent political expression, to associate actively through volunteering their services, and to assist to a limited but nonetheless substantial extent in supporting candidates and committees with financial resources. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28. The statute here also leaves these avenues open and confronts only those making the largest donations, touching only 3.7% of donors to House campaigns and 7.1% of donors to Senate campaigns in 1998. 12 40 Appellants assert that the statute is overbroad, reminiscent of the challengers' contentions in Buckley. They allege that the State's only compelling interest is in preventing corruption arising from large contributions and that $250 and $500 contributions are not sizeable enough to allow the fruition or create the appearance of corruption. 41 The Court in Buckley concluded that the statute was not overbroad because it was important for the government to safeguard against even the appearance of potential corruption; the Court's role was not to determine whether a higher limit would have been as effective, and a contribution limit was not invalid merely because of a legislative failure to engage in . . . fine tuning. See id. at 30. The Court in Shrink Missouri PAC added that the public interest in countering [the perception of corruption] was, indeed, the entire answer to the overbreadth claim raised in the Buckley case. Shrink Missouri PAC, 120 S. Ct. at 906. Cases referenced by Shrink Missouri PAC display the reluctance of the Court to second-guess legislative determinations, especially when corruption is the harm to be prevented. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 500 (1985) (recognizing the proper deference to a congressional determination of the need for a prophylactic rule where the evil of potential corruption had long been recognized); Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210 (1982) (Nor will we second-guess a legislative determination as to the need for prophylactic measures where corruption is the evil feared.). 42 Further, we cannot determine whether the limits would better serve their purpose if set at some other monetary level; '[i]f it is satisfied that some limit on contributions is necessary, a court has no scalpel to probe, whether, say, a $2,000 ceiling might not serve as well as $1,000.' Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30 (quoting court of appeals opinion, Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 842 (D.C. Cir. 1975)). Such distinctions in degree become significant only when they can be said to amount to differences in kind. Id. In Shrink Missouri PAC, the Court rejected a claim that the limitations at issue were different in kind from those allowed in Buckley. See Shrink Missouri PAC, 120 S. Ct. at 909. 43 The Court in Shrink Missouri PAC validated the constitutionality of a $1,075 limit for state-wide offices and any office representing more than 250,000 constituents, see id. at 903-10; in Maine, there are 35 Senate districts comprised of approximately 34,000 constituents and 151 House districts comprised of roughly 8,000 constituents. Moreover, campaigns are inexpensive compared to most other states. 13 As the district court stated, If contribution limits are permissible, differences in their level from state to state should reflect democratic choices, not court decisions. Daggett, 81 F.Supp.2d at 139 (footnote omitted). 44 We cannot say that the limits here are different in kind from those upheld in Buckley and Shrink Missouri PAC. Thus, we conclude that Maine's contribution limits of $250 do not unconstitutionally infringe upon candidates' and donors' free association rights because they are supported by a sufficiently important governmental interest to which the ceilings are closely tailored. Now we turn to consider the final question regarding contribution limits, whether they disallow candidates from gathering enough financial support to efficiently advocate their views. 45