Opinion ID: 4550523
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Intrafamily Offenses Act

Text: The Intrafamily Offenses Act (“the Act”), D.C. Code §§ 16-1001–1006, was passed by Congress in 1970 in order to create a civil mechanism for addressing violence within families – an “imaginative and progressive” system that was designed to promote “prevention and treatment” over punishment. United States v. Harrison, 461 F.2d 1209, 1210-11 & n.2 (D.C. Cir 1972) (citations omitted). In giving the courts of the District of Columbia “a wider range of dispositional powers than criminal courts,” including the power to issue CPOs that enjoin future actions and provide for counseling and mental health treatment, id., the Act was 6 This confusion is also apparent in the dissent’s assertion, however wellmeaning, that our cases allow for a nebulous inquiry in which the injunctive nature of a CPO is irrelevant and no legal framework is necessary. Post 69-72. 19 designed both to “protect victims of family abuse from acts and threats of violence,” Cruz-Foster, 597 A.2d at 929, and to “effect rehabilitation rather than retribution” or “punish[ment]” of civil offenders. Harrison, 461 F.2d at 1210-11. The Act should therefore be liberally construed in furtherance of its remedial purposes. Id. at 1210; Cruz-Foster, 597 A.2d at 929. 7 The Act seeks to prevent and remediate particular criminal offenses: intrafamily, interpersonal, and intimate partner violence, as well as stalking, sexual assault, and sexual abuse. D.C. Code §§ 16-1001(6)-(9), (12), 16-1005(c). 8 To 7 In focusing only on the remedial purpose of protecting and rehabilitating petitioners, while ignoring or minimizing the other stated remedial purpose of rehabilitating (rather than punishing) respondents, the dissent – not this opinion – “read[s] into the Act limitations or restrictions which [the Act] does not contain.” See post at 53-62, 71. 8 As originally passed, D.C. Code § 16-1001 defined an “intrafamily offense” as a criminal offense committed between family members or those who share(d) a mutual residence. District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473, 546-47 (1970). In 1994, the Council of the District of Columbia (“Council”) broadened the definition of “intrafamily offense” to also include criminal offenses committed between those who have or had a romantic relationship. Domestic Violence in Romantic Relationships Act of 1994, D.C. Law 10-237, § 2, 42 D.C. Reg. 36-37 (Dec. 27, 1994). In 2009, the Council again amended the Act, making extensive revisions to several sections. These changes included redefining “intrafamily offense” in § 161001 to mean “interpersonal, intimate partner, or intrafamily violence,” and adding definitions of each of these terms (“interpersonal violence,” “intimate partner (…continued) 20 this end, it provides that a trial court “may issue” a CPO that is effective for “up to one year,” if it “finds that there is good cause to believe the respondent committed or threatened to commit a criminal offense against the petitioner.” § 16-1005(c), (d). The CPO may include a range of remedial provisions, including protective and rehabilitative measures, both mandatory and prohibitory, applicable to the petitioner and the respondent, as appropriate. § 16-1005(c)(1)-(12). Consistent with the standards generally applicable to civil cases, a finding of good cause to issue a CPO must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and it is the (…continued) violence,” and “intrafamily violence”) to § 16-1001; adding “petitioner” and “respondent” to the definitions included in § 16-1001; defining a petitioner as any person who alleges that he or she was the victim of “interpersonal, intimate partner, or intrafamily violence, stalking, sexual assault, or sexual abuse”; and modifying the language of § 16-1005(c) to allow a trial court to issue a CPO upon a finding of good cause that a respondent has committed or threatened to commit “a criminal offense” against a “petitioner.” Intrafamily Offenses Act of 2008, D.C. Law 17-368, § 3, 56 D.C. Reg. 1338-45 (Jan. 22, 2009). These revisions stemmed from the Council’s recognition that the need for a CPO may “result[] from a relationship that is not, strictly speaking, intrafamily,” such as a dating relationship. Council, Comm. on Public Safety & the Judiciary, “Report on Bill 17-55, the ‘IntraFamily Offenses Act of 2008,’” at 2-3 (Nov. 25, 2008); see also Richardson v. Easterling, 878 A.2d 1212, 1217 n.6 (D.C. 2005) (noting that the legislative history of the Act indicates that the proponents recognized that domestic violence may include physical, sexual, or emotional violence, such as stalking). Thus, under the Act as it now reads, a petitioner may obtain a CPO if a respondent has committed or threatened to commit a criminal offense against him or her – specifically interpersonal, intimate partner, or intrafamily violence, stalking, sexual assault, or sexual abuse. D.C. Code §§ 16-1001(12), -1003(a), 161005(c) (2012 Repl.) (2020 Supp.). 21 petitioner’s burden to put forth this evidence. See Salvattera II, 111 A.3d at 1037 (citing J.O. v. O.E., 100 A.3d 478, 481 (D.C. 2014)); Cruz-Foster, 597 A.2d at 930-31. The issuance of a CPO is within the broad discretion of the trial court, and this court will reverse the trial court’s decision only where the trial court has abused its discretion. Maldonado v. Maldonado, 631 A.2d 40, 42 (D.C. 1993); see also Robinson v. Robinson, 886 A.2d 78, 86-87 (D.C. 2005); Cruz-Foster, 597 A.2d at 931-32. The Act also provides that, upon motion of any party, the trial court “may . . . extend, rescind, or modify the [CPO] for good cause shown.” D.C. Code § 16-1005(d). 9 We have held that the same procedural features apply to extensions of CPOs that apply to the initial issuance of CPOs – meaning that the petitioner bears the burden of proof, the trial court must make a finding of good cause based on a preponderance of the evidence, and this court reviews the grant or denial of a CPO extension for abuse of discretion. Robinson, 886 A.2d at 87; Maldonado, 631 A.2d at 42; Cruz-Foster, 597 A.2d at 930 & n.3; cf. Salvattera II, 111 A.3d at 1037; see also J.O., 100 A.3d at 481. The legal standard applicable to motions to 9 The language of this subsection has not changed since the Act was first passed in 1970, except to substitute the term “judicial officer” for the term “Family Division.” Compare District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, 84 Stat. at 547, with D.C. Code § 16-1005(d). 22 extend CPOs, however, has been the subject of continued inquiry. This is, in part, because, while § 16-1005(c) defines “good cause” to issue a CPO in the first instance, § 16-1005(d) does not define “good cause” to extend a CPO. We have therefore sought, in our case law, to define the good cause determination necessary for extending a CPO and to articulate additional relevant considerations.