Opinion ID: 2517385
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Security Life Is Entitled to Attorney Fees Under Section 38-1-122(1.5)

Text: Under section 38-1-122(1.5), a landowner is entitled to attorney fees if the condemnation award equals or exceeds 130 percent of the last written offer given to the landowner prior to the filing of the condemnation proceeding: [I]n addition to any compensation awarded to the owner in an eminent domain proceeding, the condemning authority shall reimburse the owner whose property is being acquired or condemned for all of the owner's reasonable attorney fees incurred by the owner where the award by the court in the proceedings equals or exceeds one hundred thirty percent of the last written offer given to the property owner prior to the filing of the condemnation action. (Emphasis added). The School District contends that the plain language of section 38-1-122(1.5) requires a court to disregard any written offer other than the one made prior to the filing of the petition in condemnation. Thus, the School District maintains that the final written offer in this case is its final offer to purchase Parcel A for $3,250,000, which was made four days before the School District filed its petition in condemnation. The School District further argues that the offer to purchase Parcel A should be modified to reflect its amendment to the petition in condemnation by prorating the offer, either by the square foot or by the square acre, to a proportional value of either $7,477,761.81 or $7,474,999 depending on which unit value is used in the calculation. In either case, the amount of compensation owed by the School District to Security Life for the condemnation of all 138 acres  $9,274,520, as confirmed by the trial court  would not equal or exceed 130 percent of the prorated last written offer, and Security Life would not be entitled to any attorney fees. In support of its position, the School District cites two court of appeals cases: E-470 Public Highway Authority v. Wagner, 77 P.3d 902, 903-05 (Colo.App.2003), and E-470 Public Highway Authority v. Kortum Investment Co., 121 P.3d 331, 332-34 (Colo. App.2005). There are no Colorado cases that interpret section 38-1-122(1.5) in situations such as the one in this case, where a condemning authority makes a final written offer before filing its petition in condemnation and then decides to amend the petition in condemnation in a way that changes the amount of property condemned. However, Wagner and Kortum Investment required the court of appeals to interpret identical language from section 43-4-506(1)(h)(II)(B), [5] which pertains to highway condemnation proceedings, and to apply that interpretation to situations in which the condemning authority amended its petition in condemnation. In Wagner, the E-470 Highway Authority made a written offer to purchase thirty-nine acres, which the landowner rejected, before filing a petition in condemnation to acquire the property. 77 P.3d at 903. The highway authority later amended its petition in condemnation to acquire only twenty-seven acres and an easement. Id. Because the highway authority did not make a new last written offer before it amended its petition, the trial court determined the value per acre represented by the written offer to purchase the thirty-nine acres and then reduced that offer by deducting the value of the acreage that the highway authority decided not to condemn. Id. at 904. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed, finding that the trial court properly prorated the last written offer because the highway authority did not make a new last written offer based upon the changes in the amount of land. Id. at 905. In Kortum Investment, the E-470 Highway Authority made a written offer to purchase fourteen acres in fee, as well as an easement to use five and a half acres, which the landowners rejected. 121 P.3d at 332. The highway authority then filed a petition in condemnation to acquire the fourteen acres in fee as well as an easement to use the five and a half acres. Id. Subsequently, the highway authority amended its petition in condemnation to acquire the entire nineteen and a half acres in fee, and made a written offer to purchase the nineteen and a half acres in fee three days after filing the amendment, which the landowners rejected. Id. Based on the second written offer, the trial court awarded the landowner attorney fees. Id. The court of appeals held that the second written offer could not be considered a final written offer because the highway authority offered it three days after filing its amended petition, in contradiction to the plain language of the statute which requires final written offers to be made prior to the filing of the condemnation action. Id. Citing Wagner, the court of appeals held that the trial court should have prorated the highway authority's first written offer to a proportional value for the purchase of the entire property in fee. Id. at 334. In dicta, the court of appeals commented that it is unclear whether section 43-4-506(1)(h)(II)(B) either requires or permits a new last written offer when the condemning authority amends its petition in such a substantial manner as to warrant a conclusion that a taking of an essentially new or different character is at issue. Id. However, Wagner and Kortum Investment are distinguishable from this case because, unlike the condemnation proceedings in either Wagner or Kortum Investment, this case involves two distinct and separable condemnations that were tried in a single proceeding, and the School District made a final written offer both before filing its petition in condemnation to acquire Parcel A and before amending its petition in condemnation to acquire both Parcel A and Parcel B. Four days before it filed its petition in condemnation to acquire Parcel A, the School District made a final offer to purchase Parcel A for $3,250,000. Almost one month before it amended its petition in condemnation to acquire both Parcel A and Parcel B, the School District made a final offer to purchase both Parcel A and Parcel B for $6,564,492. Unlike the second written offer in Kortum Investment, which was made three days after the highway authority amended its petition in condemnation, the second written offer in this case was made almost one month before the School District amended its petition in condemnation. Section 38-1-122(1.5) defines the last written offer as the offer given to the property owner prior to the filing of the condemnation action. Given that this case involves two distinct and separable condemnations that were tried in a single proceeding, we conclude that section 38-1-122(1.5) contemplates the trial court's application of each written offer to the corresponding condemnation scenario. In the first scenario, the condemnation action occurred when the original petition was filed on January 16, 2004, four days after the School District's last written offer of $3,250,000 on January 12, 2004. The value of Parcel A and the value of the damages to Parcel B as determined by the jury, $7,619,240, exceeds 130 percent of the School District's last written offer of $3,250,000. In the second scenario, the condemnation action occurred when the petition was amended to include both parcels on June 15, 2004, following the last written offer of $6,564,492 for both parcels on May 18, 2004. The amount of compensation owed by the School District to Security Life for the condemnation of all 138 acres, as confirmed by the trial court to be $9,274,520, exceeds 130 percent of the School District's last written offer of $6,564,492. Hence, we hold that Security Life is entitled to attorney fees under section 38-1-122(1.5). Security Life requests attorney fees incurred on appeal and states section 38-1-122(1.5) as its legal basis for such fees. We direct the trial court to determine whether Security Life is entitled to attorney fees incurred on appeal and, if so, to determine the reasonable amount of those fees.