Opinion ID: 8704898
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The FRSA proceedings

Text: On the day following the derailment, Koger notified NSR that he had been injured in the accident. Compl. ¶25. In February 2008, after receiving his notice of dismissal from NSR, and while arbitration was pending, Koger filed a whistleblower complaint under 49 U.S.C. § 20109, alleging that he had been terminated in violation of FRSA for reporting a work-related personal injury to NSR. Id. On June 3, 2008, following an investigation, the Regional Administrator for OSHA, Region III, exercising authority delegated by the Assistant Secretary, determined that there was no reasonable cause to believe that NSR had retaliated against Koger in violation of FRSA. Compl. ¶ 26. Koger appealed the Regional Administrator’s determination to a Department of Labor ALJ. Compl. ¶ 27. The ALJ held that 49 U.S.C. § 20109(f) barred Roger’s FRSA complaint, because Roger elected to challenge his dismissal by pursuing the grievance and arbitration procedures under RLA § 3, 45 U.S.C. § 153. Id; Roger v. Norfolk Southern Ry., Case No. 2008-FRSA-003 (May 29, 2009). According to the ALJ, Roger sought protection under “another provision of law,” i.e., the RLA, for the “same unlawful act,” ie., his discharge. Therefore, the ALJ reasoned, Roger’s complaint ran counter to the language of § 20109(f). Id; Compl. Exh. A (Final Decision and Order on Interlocutory Review by the ARB) (“ARB decision”) at 4. Roger petitioned the ARB for review of the ALJ’s decision. Compl. ¶ 28. The ARB consolidated Roger’s appeal with an appeal in another case, Mercier v. Union Pacific R.R., Case No. 2008-FRSA-0004 (June 3, 2009), where a different ALJ determined that § 20109(f) did not preclude an employee who had challenged his termination in RLA § 3 arbitration from filing a whistleblower claim under FRSA. Compl. ¶ 29. The ALJ in Mercier determined that “the contractual agreement or collective bargaining agreement under which Mercier had proceeded in his grievance/arbitration action is not a provision of law in itself although it is enforceable through provisions of law such as the RLA.” ARB decision at 3. The ALJ in Mercier observed that this conclusion was supported by § 20109(g), which provides that nothing in § 20109 preempts or diminishes any other safeguards against discrimination, and § 20109(h), which provides that employees retain rights and remedies “under any Federal or State law or under any collective bargaining agreement,” and that the rights and remedies provided under FRSA “may not be waived.” Id The ARB agreed with the decision of the ALJ in Mercier, and, on September 29, 2011, ruled that, as a matter of law, an employee’s pursuit of RLA arbitration does not constitute an election of remedies under 49 U.S.C. § 20109(f). Compl. ¶ 30. The ARB affirmed the ALJ’s order in Mercier, reversed the dismissal of Roger’s FRSA complaint, and remanded both cases for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. ARB decision at 9. The ARB decision was not a final order of the Secretary, and is not appealable to a court of appeals under 49 U.S.C. § 20109(d)(4). Compl. ¶ 32.