Opinion ID: 2706
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Frivolousness Determinations

Text: Having concluded that the IJs' credibility rulings were supported by substantial evidence, we turn to their frivolousness determinations. Section 208(d) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d), as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), provides, in relevant part: (d) Asylum procedure . . . (4) Notice of privilege of counsel and consequences of frivolous application At the time of filing an application for asylum, the Attorney General shall . . . advise the alien of the privilege of being represented by counsel and of the consequences, under paragraph (6), of knowingly filing a frivolous application for asylum . . . (6) Frivolous applications If the Attorney General determines that an alien has knowingly made a frivolous application for asylum and the alien has received the notice under paragraph (4)(A), the alien shall be permanently ineligible for any benefits under this chapter, effective as of the date of a final determination on such application. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(d)(4), (6). Thus, a final decision that an asylum application is frivolous permanently forecloses the petitioner from all benefits under the immigration laws of this country. [2] Because of the severe consequences of a finding of frivolousness under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6), see Y-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 155, the corresponding federal regulations prescribe the parameters within which an IJ and the BIA must operate in making these determinations: For applications filed on or after April 1, 1997, an applicant is subject to the provisions of section 208(d)(6) of the Act only if a final order by an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals specifically finds that the alien knowingly filed a frivolous asylum application. For purposes of this section, an asylum application is frivolous if any of its material elements is deliberately fabricated. Such finding shall only be made if the immigration judge or the Board is satisfied that the applicant, during the course of the proceedings, has had sufficient opportunity to account for any discrepancies or implausible aspects of the claim. 8 C.F.R. § 208.20. In Yuanliang Liu v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 455 F.3d 106 (2d Cir.2006), we considered a petition for review of the BIA's affirmance of a frivolousness finding. After surveying all of the relevant caselaw, we remanded the case to the BIA so that it could, in the first instance, set down clear and explicit standards by which frivolousness decisions may be judged. In doing so, we encourage[d] the BIA to consider not only the relevant statutes and regulations, but also the principles articulated by our sister circuits. . . . Id. at 116. On remand, the BIA, in vacating the IJ's frivolousness finding, set forth the following procedural safeguards which must be followed by immigration judges in rendering frivolousness determinations: (1) notice to the alien of the consequences of filing a frivolous application; (2) a specific finding by the Immigration Judge or the Board that the alien knowingly filed a frivolous application; (3) sufficient evidence in the record to support the finding that a material element of the asylum application was deliberately fabricated; and (4) an indication that the alien has been afforded sufficient opportunity to account for any discrepancies or implausible aspects of the claim. Y-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 155. The first provision require[s] that the Attorney General advise the alien at the time of filing an asylum application of the consequences of filing a frivolous application, i.e., permanent ineligibility for any benefits under the Immigration and Nationality Act except for withholding of removal. Id. (citing § 208(d)(6); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.20). [3] The second provision requires that the Immigration Judge separately address and include specific findings that the respondent deliberately fabricated material elements of his asylum claim. Id. at 157. An element of a claim is `fabricated' when it misrepresents the truth. . . . A `deliberate' fabrication involves a knowing and intentional misrepresentation of the truth. Id. at 156 (internal citations omitted). Therefore, an Immigration Judge's specific finding that a respondent deliberately fabricated a material element of his asylum claim constitutes a finding that he knowingly filed a frivolous asylum application. Id. In laying out standards for the third provision, the BIA rejected our suggestion in Liu that concrete and conclusive evidence of fabrication be required to support a frivolousness finding. Id. at 158. Instead, the BIA articulated the following requirement: After taking into account the respondent's explanations for discrepancies or implausible aspects of the claim, . . . the Immigration Judge must provide cogent and convincing reasons for finding by a preponderance of the evidence that an asylum applicant knowingly and deliberately fabricated material elements of the claim. Id. Finally, with respect to the fourth requirement, an opportunity to account for discrepancies, the BIA, in one section of its opinion, suggests that immigration judges should, as a matter of good practice, inform applicants that they are considering a frivolousness determination. Id. at 159-60 (In order to afford a sufficient opportunity to account for discrepancies, it would be a good practice for an Immigration Judge who believes that an applicant may have submitted a frivolous asylum application to bring this concern to the attention of the applicant prior to the conclusion of proceedings.). Later in its opinion, however, the BIA appears to require such an action in cases where it would not be obvious to an applicant that such a finding was being considered. See id. at 160 (In the case before us, the Immigration Judge did not mention during the course of the hearing that she was contemplating a frivolousness finding. We do not find that the particular concerns underlying the frivolousness finding were such that the respondent should necessarily have anticipated such a finding and provided explanations relevant to the question whether he deliberately fabricated the account of the forced abortion and illegal adoption in the second application.). [4] Ultimately, the BIA found that the IJ had failed to take into account the applicant's explanations for the inconsistencies and thus failed to meet the fourth requirement for making frivolousness determinations.
Although the IJ in Yang's case rendered his decision long before the BIA handed down its decision in Y-L-, the IJ unquestionably complied with at least some of the procedural safeguards articulated in Y-L-. First, the IJ, on at least two occasions, once at a Master Calendar hearing and then again at the Individual Hearing, provided Yang with notice of the consequences of filing a frivolous application. Moreover, the IJ, during the course of the hearing, informed Yang that he was considering a frivolousness finding. [5] More problematic in Yang's case, however, is the requirement that the IJ separately address and include specific findings that the respondent deliberately fabricated material elements of his asylum claim. Id. at 157. While the IJ exhaustively laid out his reasons for making an adverse credibility determination, with regards to the frivolousness finding, the IJ stated only: Notwithstanding the representations of the [applicant] regarding his understanding of the nature and gravity of the warnings concerning frivolous asylum applications, it is clear to the Court that [Yang] has submitted a clearly fabricated application for asylum. The Court comes to this conclusion based not only on the multiple inconsistencies uttered by the [applicant] regarding the narrative leading up to and from his alleged confrontation with family planning officials on May 20th, 2002, but also from the rank inconsistency between [Yang]'s application for relief and the statements made by him to officers of the immigration service at the Chicago International airport. The Court finds that the asylum application has been fabricated and will apply the lifetime bar to future immigration benefits pursuant to INA Section 208(d)(6). Because the IJ in Y-L- separately addressed the question of frivolousness and made separate factual findings with respect to that determination, id. at 156, the BIA held that her findings met the regulatory requirements without explicitly defining what it means to separately address and include specific findings regarding fabrication. See id. at 157. In Yang's case, although the IJ did separately address the frivolousness determination, he did not make specific factual findings supporting that determination, except to arguably incorporate by reference findings he already made in the context of the adverse credibility determination. In addition, while the IJ considered Yang's explanations for the inconsistencies and discrepancies when making his adverse credibility determination, he did not separately consider them when making his frivolousness determination. It is unclear whether the IJ's actions were sufficient under Y-L-. Moreover, the IJ never explicitly stated that the fabrications were deliberate, or that the fabrications were material to Yang's asylum claim. Id. at 157. The IJ, while laying out the factual findings to support an adverse credibility determination, certainly made comments which could lead to the inference that the fabrications were deliberate and material ( e.g., [it] would appear that [Yang] is simply making up testimony when confronted by inconsistencies, I am not convinced that [Yang] has provided any credible testimony which would allow the Court to determine what subjective fear, if any, [Yang] actually has of returning to China); however, the IJ never specifically made such findings. Y-L-, by contrast, appears to specifically require an IJ to find that an asylum applicant deliberately fabricated material elements of his asylum claim. Id. [6]
In determining that Lin had filed a frivolous asylum application, the IJ reasoned: I do not believe [Lin] has been truthful. He has filed documents that he made representations that were genuine or that he believed to be genuine. He has not come up with any plausible reasons why he would have believe[d] them to be genuine when they turned out not to be. He has not bothered to get evidence from third parties that they procured these documents for him and he was an innocent bystander, if you will. And I believe that his lies alone should sustain a finding that this is a frivolous application. Despite the fact that the Board has still failed to issue any precedent decision as to exactly what they think that means. Congress said that frivolous applications will be punished with a lifetime bar. An untruthful application is by definition, frivolous. Therefore, I believe the lifetime bar should apply in this case. The IJ's frivolousness determination as to Lin arguably more clearly violates the standards set forth in Y-L-. Although the IJ gave Lin notice of the consequences of filing a frivolous application and made separate, albeit sparse, factual findings to support that determination, the IJ did not find that the inconsistencies or discrepancies were deliberate or material, and the IJ did not inform the petitioner that she was considering a frivolousness finding during the course of the proceedings. Moreover, the IJ's statements  e.g., [a]n untruthful application is by definition, frivolous  reveal an erroneous understanding of the legal principles underlying frivolousness determinations. See Y-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 156 ([A] finding of frivolousness does not flow automatically from an adverse credibility determination.) (internal quotations marks omitted). It is therefore not evident that the IJ's frivolousness finding in Lin's case comports with the requirements set forth in Y-L-.
In light of the ambiguities in the statute and regulations, and in light of the fact that some of these ambiguities remain even after Y-L-, we believe that the most prudent course of action is to remand these cases for the BIA to interpret and apply the standards it set forth in Y-L- in the first instance. [8] In remanding the Liu case to the BIA, we noted, [b]ecause we conclude, as a matter of discretion, that it is prudent and useful for us to remand the issue of frivolousness, we need not address the more complicated question of when remands to the BIA are required by elementary principles of administrative law. 455 F.3d at 116 (citing Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 126 S.Ct. 1613, 164 L.Ed.2d 358 (2006) (per curiam)). We went on to set forth six reasons for why the case should be remanded as a matter of discretion: (1) neither the IJ, who made her frivolousness determination in the course of a few short paragraphs, nor the BIA, which summarily affirmed the IJ's decision, considered seriously the difficult issues and questions of first impression that this appeal presents; (2) the case presented a real opportunity for the BIA to take the lead in the establishment of uniform national standards for deciding when a finding of frivolousness is appropriate; (3) [t]here is language in the relevant statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d), and in the corresponding regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 208.20, that arguably require[d] interpretation and clarification; (4) [o]ur circuit ha[d] literally no case law on this subject; (5) virtually every asylum case that contains an adverse credibility ruling has the potential of giving rise to a finding of frivolousness; and (6) [a] finding of frivolousness is a potential `death sentence' for an alien's immigration prospects. Id. at 116-17. For these same reasons, we believe remand to the BIA  so that it can further interpret and apply the standards it set forth in Y-L-  to be the most prudent course of action in the present cases. On remand, the BIA should consider, inter alia, the following issues: (1) to what extent the IJ is required to set out his or her factual findings to support a frivolousness determination separately from the adverse credibility determination and to what extent he or she is permitted to incorporate by reference the findings made to support an adverse credibility determination; (2) to what extent the IJ is required to consider the applicant's explanations for any discrepancies separately from the adverse credibility determination; (3) to what extent the IJ is required to explicitly find that the fabrications at issue were deliberate or material; and (4) to what extent the IJ is required, if at all, to inform the applicant during the course of the proceedings that he or she is considering a frivolousness determination before he or she renders such a determination. [9]