Opinion ID: 627446
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application to Saxton's Case

Text: 12 At the heart of this dispute are the parties' differing characterizations of the process of adding family members to a lease. Saxton characterizes THA's decision not to readmit her husband as one affecting her rights as a tenant under the terms of her lease. In contrast, THA characterizes the dispute as involving Ben's application for admission to the housing complex, which was denied pursuant to THA's regular procedures. THA contends that the regulations do not apply because its behavior in the present case did not adversely affect Saxton's rights, duties, welfare or status and did not constitute action or failure to act regarding her lease. Throughout this litigation, THA has steadfastly argued that the decision not to add Ben to the lease did not and could not affect any of Saxton's rights. 13 We reject THA's attempt to cast this dispute as affecting the rights, duties, welfare or status of Ben alone. Ben is not a party to this litigation, and we are not asked to consider whether THA's practices violated any of his rights. Ben did not formally apply for readmission; the sole action which initiated this dispute was Saxton's request that he be added to her lease. The Housing Act and grievance regulations address the welfare and status of public housing tenants, not applicants. It is precisely these tenant interests that Saxton asserts have been affected here. 5 14 Under a plain reading of the regulations, Saxton was entitled to a hearing because THA's decision affected her rights, duties, welfare or status. As a member of the class of individuals whom the Housing Act is designed to benefit, Saxton has a constitutionally protected property interest in her THA housing. See Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir.1982) (eligible applicants for Section 8 housing have sufficient property interests to entitle them to due process safeguards). As an existing tenant, Saxton has a stronger property interest than would a mere applicant for housing. Id. at 1217 (applicant has less weighty interest than someone who is currently receiving benefits and is threatened with reduction or termination of those benefits). 15 Moreover, freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40, 94 S.Ct. 791, 796, 39 L.Ed.2d 52 (1974). Decisions concerning family living arrangements fall within this protected sphere. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) (striking down a housing ordinance which limited occupancy of dwelling units to members of a restrictively defined single family). Saxton's request went to the heart of her family's living arrangements. Admittedly, the precise level of constitutional protection due such arrangements remains unclear. 6 Whether or not her interest rises to the level necessary to invalidate THA's practices on constitutional grounds, however, it is clearly the type of tenant interest to which the grievance procedures apply. 16 Saxton was also entitled to a hearing because the dispute concerned THA's action or failure to act in accordance with her lease. See 24 C.F.R. Sec. 966.52(a) (1992). We are not persuaded by THA's argument that it took no action or inaction regarding the lease. While THA may not have initiated the requested lease change, it is undisputed that THA denied the request. Denying a request to add a family member to the lease is clearly an action regarding that lease. 7 THA cites no regulation which limits the grievance procedures to actions initiated by the PHA alone. Such a distinction would be illogical, and we decline to read it into the regulations today. 17 We therefore hold that a public housing tenant whose request to add a returning family member to the lease is denied is entitled to a grievance hearing under the procedures specified in 24 C.F.R. Sec. 966.50 et seq. (1992). We conclude, however, that such a hearing could not have altered the result in the present case. Unbeknownst to THA, Ben had been convicted of rape in 1978; several years later, he pleaded guilty to four new counts of rape, including one which involved a knife. A history of criminal activity, particularly involving crimes of violence, is a legitimate consideration in decisions regarding public housing tenancy. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. Sec. 960.205(b)(3) (1992) (history of criminal activity is relevant information which may be considered in selection process). 8 18 Saxton has offered us no description of the type of evidence that she would have presented on Ben's behalf at the hearing. The record fails to reflect that any evidence would be sufficiently mitigating to warrant admitting for residence in his wife's public housing unit a five-time convicted rapist, just released from prison. THA, on the other hand, has established that such admission would contradict its duty to safeguard the health, safety, and welfare of its tenants. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. Sec. 960.205(b) (1992) (tenant selection criteria). We therefore conclude that a hearing would have served no useful purpose and could not have affected the outcome. 19 AFFIRMED.