Opinion ID: 6496285
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Intervene as a Matter of Right

Text: We first consider whether Neverson was entitled to intervene in Callahan’s case as a matter of right pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2). Rule 24(a)(2) requires a court to permit intervention of right by a movant who “claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical 14 CALLAHAN V. BROOKDALE SENIOR LIVING CMTIES. matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.” We apply the following four-part test when analyzing a motion to intervene of right under Rule 24(a)(2): (1) the motion must be timely; (2) the applicant must claim a “significantly protectable” interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) the applicant must be so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede its ability to protect that interest; and (4) the applicant’s interest must be inadequately represented by the parties to the action. Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Sierra Club v. EPA, 995 F.2d 1478, 1481 (9th Cir. 1993)). “In evaluating whether these requirements are met, courts ‘are guided primarily by practical and equitable considerations.’” United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 397 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 409 (9th Cir. 1998)). Courts construe Rule 24(a) “broadly in favor of proposed intervenors.” Id. (quoting United States ex. rel. McGough v. Covington Techs. Co., 967 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1992)). We assume without deciding that Neverson’s motion to intervene was timely, and that Neverson has an interest in recovering penalties pursuant to PAGA that is sufficient to satisfy prongs two and three of the test articulated above. Even with these assumptions, Neverson’s motion for intervention as a matter of right fails at the fourth and final prong of the Wilderness Society test. CALLAHAN V. BROOKDALE SENIOR LIVING CMTIES. 15 We consider three factors in deciding whether a present party adequately represents the interests of a prospective intervenor: (1) whether the interest of a present party is such that it will undoubtedly make all of a proposed intervenor’s arguments; (2) whether the present party is capable and willing to make such arguments; and (3) whether a proposed intervenor would offer any necessary elements to the proceeding that other parties would neglect. Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing California v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 792 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1986)). “When an applicant for intervention and an existing party have the same ultimate objective, a presumption of adequacy of representation arises.” Id. (citing League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 131 F.3d at 1305). And, if the proposed intervenor’s interest is “identical to that of one of the present parties, a compelling showing should be required to demonstrate inadequate representation.” Id. (citation omitted). Here, Neverson and Callahan have the same ultimate objective: to obtain civil penalties on behalf of the LWDA under PAGA. Therefore, given this identity of interest, Neverson must make a compelling showing to demonstrate inadequate representation. We conclude she has failed to make the required showing. Neverson’s primary contention is that her interests are not adequately represented because the PAGA settlement amount is too small. She claims that Callahan miscalculated the maximum PAGA penalties and unreasonably discounted them in agreeing to the settlement. But she provides no basis 16 CALLAHAN V. BROOKDALE SENIOR LIVING CMTIES. for her own calculation of the total penalties under PAGA and no basis for her contention that Callahan’s valuation of the penalties was incorrect. Neverson’s argument that Callahan should not have settled the PAGA action for the agreed-upon amount ultimately amounts to a disagreement over litigation strategy. And “[w]hen a proposed intervenor has not alleged any substantive disagreement between it and the existing parties to the suit, and instead has rested its claim for intervention entirely upon a disagreement over litigation strategy or legal tactics, courts have been hesitant to accord the applicant full-party status.” League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 131 F.3d at 1306 (citations omitted). Therefore, Neverson’s assertion that she would not have agreed to the settlement is insufficient to show that Callahan did not adequately represent her interests. Neverson also argues that her interests were not adequately represented because her case was formally litigated and Callahan’s was not. However, Callahan still obtained significant informal discovery prior to mediation, including copies of all of Brookdale’s relevant policies and procedures, three years’ worth of time and payroll data for a group of over 17,000 employees, and copies of related PAGA actions currently pending against Brookdale in California. Callahan also had access to the discovery produced in Neverson’s case and two other related cases. Under these circumstances, we are not persuaded by Neverson’s assertion that the absence of formal litigation in Callahan’s case left Callahan unable to adequately represent Neverson’s interests. Neverson further argues that Callahan was not properly deputized to pursue certain claims that were a part of the settlement due to the statute of limitations having run on CALLAHAN V. BROOKDALE SENIOR LIVING CMTIES. 17 those claims. However, even if Neverson is right, she does not establish that she is the proper party to pursue the claims for which Callahan was not properly deputized. In light of this failure, whether Callahan was properly deputized to pursue certain claims she settled on behalf of the state is not relevant to whether Callahan adequately represented Neverson’s interests based on the three relevant factors. While the argument that Neverson was not properly deputized to pursue certain claims may be relevant to whether the district court abused its discretion in approving the settlement, we do not reach this issue on appeal. For these reasons, we conclude that Neverson has failed to make the required showing that Callahan did not adequately represent her interests. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of her motion to intervene as of right.