Opinion ID: 2460345
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Link Between the Standards

Text: The text of K.S.A. 60-261 explains the source of the substantial rights language. Yet, the statute does not specify a test for determining whether a party's substantial rights are affected. Despite the lack of statutory language, we have frequently stated that the test is whether the error affected the outcome of the trial. This test is widely accepted and has been used by the United States Supreme Court for more than a half-century and by this court for a century. E.g., Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946); Bly, 215 Kan. at 178, 523 P.2d 397; Smith v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 214 Kan. 128, 132, 519 P.2d 1101 (1974); Saunders v. Railway Co., 86 Kan. 56, 62, 119 P. 552 (1911); see generally 2 Childress & Davis, Federal Standards of Review § 7.03 (4th ed. 2010). At the federal level, the phrase affect the substantial rights was codified in 1919 at 28 U.S.C. § 391, which provided that appellate courts should decide cases based on the entire record of the case without regard to technical errors, defects, or exceptions that do not affect the substantial rights of the parties. See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 757, 66 S.Ct. 1239. In Kotteakos, the United States Supreme Court noted that the phrase affect the substantial rights also had been incorporated in the harmless error rule, Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which the Court characterized as a restatement of existing law. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 757 n. 9, 66 S.Ct. 1239. The Court then concluded that an error affected the defendant's substantial rights if it had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239. Since Kotteakos, the United States Supreme Court has consistently reiterated that an error affected substantial rights when it had a prejudicial effect on the outcome of the proceeding. See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) (the phrase `error that affects substantial rights' means error with a prejudicial affect on the outcome of a judicial proceeding); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (The plain error rule of Fed. R.Crim. Proc. 52[b] requires showing that the error affected substantial rights; [t]his is the same language employed in Rule 52[a], and . . . means that the error must have been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the . . . proceedings.); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239 and concluding that error involving misjoinder affected substantial rights requiring reversal only if the misjoinder results in actual prejudice because it `had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict'). A similar history can be traced in Kansas cases. In 1911, this court discussed the version of K.S.A. 60-261 that was then in effect. The statute required the court to ignore technical errors and defined a reversible error as one that prejudicially affected the substantial rights of the party complaining. G.S.1909, 95-6176 (Civ. Code § 581). The court explained that a court must disregard immaterial errors and rulings that do not appear to have influenced the verdict or impaired substantial rights. The ruling must be prejudicial as well as erroneous, and prejudice must affirmatively appear, or the error will be disregarded. Prejudice may be said to appear when the proceedings show that the court or jury was misled by the error, and that the verdict or judgment was probably affected to the injury of the complaining party. Saunders, 86 Kan. at 62, 119 P. 552. When the various statutory amendments that result in the current version of the harmless error statute, K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 60-261, are traced through this court's case law, similar statements can be found in many cases. This history and the use of the would affect the outcome of the trial standard when examining if substantial rights were affected leads us to the conclusion that the Court of Appeals in this case was applying 60-261. This conclusion is reaffirmed if we follow the judicial lineage of the cases cited by the Court of Appeals; the line eventually ends with 60-261. In addition to citing to K.S.A. 60-261, many of this court's cases also cite the appellate harmless error statute, K.S.A. 60-2105, as the standard for an appellate court's review of the trial court's application of K.S.A. 60-261. See, e.g., State v. Rider, Edens & Lemons, 229 Kan. 394, 407, 625 P.2d 425 (1981); cf. Thompson v. General Finance Co., Inc., 205 Kan. 76, 101, 468 P.2d 269 (1970) (noting that there had been no motion for mistrial or showing of a basis for mistrial under K.S.A. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-2105). The appellate harmless error statute, K.S.A. 60-2105, also uses the substantial rights standard, providing: The appellate court shall disregard all mere technical errors and irregularities which do not affirmatively appear to have prejudicially affected the substantial rights of the party complaining, where it appears upon the whole record that substantial justice has been done by the judgment or order of the trial court; and in any case pending before it, the court shall render such final judgment as it deems that justice requires, or direct such judgment to be rendered by the court from which the appeal was taken, without regard to technical errors and irregularities in the proceedings of the trial court. (Emphasis added.) Even if we did not have numerous cases relying on K.S.A. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-2105 when assessing if a mistrial should be granted, the text of those provisions would lead us to conclude the statutes should be applied because the language clearly fits the task of evaluating a mistrial motion. For example, applying the statutory substantial rights standard to determine what justice requires under 60-261 is congruent with a trial court's assessment of whether there was an injustice, as that term is used in K.S.A. 22-3423(1)(c), the criminal mistrial statute. Furthermore, applying 60-261 at the stage of the trial when a motion for mistrial is made is compatible with the plain language of 602-61 indicating the standard should be applied at every stage of the proceeding. K.S.A. 60-2105 can then be applied by an appellate court reviewing a trial court ruling.