Opinion ID: 1994101
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: [¶ 6] Before addressing the merits of the firm's appeal, we must first decide whether we have the authority to entertain it. Ordinarily, the Maine Bar Rules require that a motion to quash a subpoena issued by Bar Counsel be resolved by the Board: The Board, the Grievance Commission or the Chair of any panel thereof, upon motion made promptly and in any event at or before the time specified in the subpoena for compliance therewith, may quash or modify any subpoena issued for appearance before Bar Counsel, the Board, the Grievance Commission or panels thereof, if the subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive. M. Bar R. 7.3(m)(1). The Rule does not contemplate this Court ruling on a motion to quash, at least before the Board has done so, regardless of the parties' wishes or agreement to use an alternate procedure. [¶ 7] Furthermore, we have said that we do not permit appeal from the denial of a motion to quash. Instead, the witness must appear . . . and testify or risk a finding of contempt. Only upon a judgment of contempt . . . is the issue ripe for appeal. In re Willoughby, 487 A.2d 636, 638 (Me.1985); see State v. Grover, 387 A.2d 21, 22 (Me.1978). In this case, however, notwithstanding the required procedure that a party seeking to challenge a subpoena issued by Bar Counsel must ordinarily follow, we find, as both Bar Counsel and the firm urge, that we have the inherent authority to decide this appeal. We further conclude that in these unusual circumstances we should do so. [¶ 8] Absent exceptional circumstances, we will honor our procedural rules. In re Application of Feingold, 296 A.2d 492, 496 (Me.1972). Nevertheless, this Court has the inherent and ultimate authority, independent of any rule, to regulate the practice of law and the conduct of attorneys in this State. See id. ; Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Lee, 422 A.2d 998, 1002 (Me.1980) (the ultimate power to regulate the conduct of attorneys is inherently in the judicial department). The Rules themselves recognize this fundamental principle: Any attorney admitted to, or engaging in, the practice of law in this State shall be subject to the Court's supervision and disciplinary jurisdiction. . . . M. Bar R. 1(a). Ordinarily, the Court's authority with respect to the Bar Rules may be exercised by a single justice, subject to appropriate review by the Law Court. M. Bar R. 1(d). The more uncertain issue before us is not whether we have the authority to decide the firm's appeal, but whether we should choose to exercise that power under these circumstances. [¶ 9] For several reasons, we conclude that given the unusual procedural posture of this case, and the importance of the privilege at issue, we should reach the merits. See Fiber Materials, Inc. v. Subilia, 2009 ME 71, ¶ 31, 974 A.2d 918, 928 (discussing importance of attorney-client privilege). In most cases, the person or entity interested in quashing a subpoena is the one compelled to act, either by testifying or by producing documents or other evidence. Here the person subpoenaed by Bar Counsel, Attorney Libby, is willing to comply. The firm, which is the entity with the claim of attorney-client privilege at stake, cannot disobey the subpoena because it did not receive a subpoena. The only procedural mechanism for effectively protecting the firm's privilege claim is the one it chosemoving to quash Libby's subpoena before he could comply with it. [2] [¶ 10] Bar Counsel, having agreed to bring the motion to quash before the single justice, argues that even though this Court has the power to hear the firm's appeal from the single justice's decision, we should nonetheless dismiss it as interlocutory. It is well-established that [o]rdinarily, the final judgment rule prevents a party from appealing a . . . court's decision on a motion before a final judgment has been rendered. Id. ¶ 12, 974 A.2d at 924. However, one of the recognized exceptions to the rule, the death knell exception, allows an interlocutory appeal to be heard if substantial rights of a party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment. Id. ¶ 14, 974 A.2d at 924 (quotation marks omitted). A right is irreparably lost if the appellant would not have an effective remedy if the interlocutory determination were to be vacated after a final disposition of the entire litigation. Id. (quotation marks omitted). Stated differently, if an interlocutory order has the practical effect of permanently foreclosing relief on a claim, that order is appealable. Id. (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 11] Here, the firm seeks to protect information it claims is privileged, and that is not yet known to anyone outside of the firm other than its former general counsel. If we do not address the denial of the firm's motion to quash now, the information will become known to Bar Counsel. That is a result that cannot be undone on direct appeal following a final judgment. This situation is not analogous to the one we analyzed in Lewellyn v. Bell, where, in the face of a claim that documents sought pursuant to a motion to compel were protected by attorney-client privilege, we held that no exception to the final judgment rule applied, in part because it is uncertain what information, if any, will be required to be disclosed . . . [therefore] the asserted harms are merely speculative. 635 A.2d 945, 947 (Me.1993). In this case, the single justice reviewed all of the documents sought by Bar Counsel's subpoena in camera and found, not as a matter of speculation but as a matter of fact, that they are potentially damaging. Because the firm stands to irreparably lose a substantial right if we do not hear its appeal, the death knell exception to the final judgment rule applies. [¶ 12] Finally, we elect to reach the merits of the firm's appeal now in the interest of judicial economy because the motion has already been decided by the single justice, and the issues have been fully briefed. As a practical matter, it makes little sense to remand the motion back to the Board, given the substantial likelihood that we would then be called upon to decide the same issues in the near future. See, e.g., Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Estate of Pecci, 2008 ME 93, ¶ 4 n. 1, 953 A.2d 369, 371 (stating that, notwithstanding parties' failure to comply with customary procedure, [a]s a matter of judicial economy . . . we address the issues on appeal); Lewis v. Town of Rockport, 2005 ME 44, ¶ 11 n. 4, 870 A.2d 107, 110 (We proceed to the merits in the interest of judicial economy and because the parties have thoroughly briefed all issues.).