Opinion ID: 182006
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Limitations on Self-Care

Text: Self-care has long been recognized as a major life activity under the ADA. The federal regulations adopted in the year following the passage of the Act listed caring for oneself as a major life activity. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). Courts followed suit. See Holt v. Grand Lake Mental Health Center, Inc., 443 F.3d 762, 767 (10th Cir.2006) (recognizing self-care as a major life activity under the ADA); Regional Economic Community Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 47 (2d Cir.2002) (providing examples of limitations on self-care); Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheimer's Research Center, 155 F.3d 775, 780-81 (6th Cir.1998) (identifying caring for oneself as a recognized major life activity under the Act); Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 726 (5th Cir.1995) (caring for oneself encompasses a broad range of normal activities related to daily living, including feeding oneself, driving, grooming, and cleaning home). We ruled in Nawrot v. CPC International, 277 F.3d 896, 904-05 (7th Cir.2002), that an employee's inability to administer his own diabetes medication also amounted to a limitation on the major life activity of self-care. Likewise in Brunker v. Schwan's Home Service, 583 F.3d 1004, 1008-09 (7th Cir.2009), we found that not being able to dress oneself appropriately constituted evidence of a limitation on the major life activity of self-care. Our application is consistent with the purpose of the ADA to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate to combat disability discrimination. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-336, § 2, 104 Stat. 327, 329; see also ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 1(b), 122 Stat. at 3554 (elaborating on a broad scope of protection intended by Congress to be available under the original Act); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 495, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the ADA was meant to serve a remedial purpose). The specific inclusion of caring for oneself in the 2008 Amendments' list of major life activities further supports this interpretation. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555, amending 42 U.S.C. § 12102. Shepherd testified at his deposition that he needed assistance with dressing himself, brushing his hair, and bathing four or five days each week while he was working at AutoZone prior to September 13, 2003. He also recalled experiencing other difficulties since 2003, including an inability to tie his shoes and the development of oral hygiene problems that resulted from his inability to care for his teeth properly. Shepherd's wife, Susan Shepherd, also testified that she had to assist him with personal care while he was working at AutoZone. According to her deposition testimony, she had to help Shepherd with showering, putting on his pants and shoes, and brushing his hair and teeth before he stopped working for AutoZone. There is some ambiguity in Susan's testimony regarding exactly when Shepherd began having difficulty with certain personal tasks. Though Susan said she assisted him with his personal tasks before he stopped working for AutoZone, at other times in her May 2008 deposition, she testified that Shepherd's difficulties with these tasks began three or four years ago. For purposes of summary judgment, however, AutoZone removed much of the ambiguity in its own statement of undisputed facts filed to support its summary judgment motion. There, AutoZone stated: Shepherd has needed assistance with dressing himself, brushing his hair and bathing on a daily basis from approximately the year 2003 or 2004 to the present time; [s]ince 2003, Shepherd's wife has assisted him with washing his back; [s]ince 2003, Shepherd has had difficulty brushing his teeth; during [his flare-ups]... he would not be able to put on his own pants, his own shoes, brush his hair, or brush his teeth; and, Shepherd would not be able to wash his own hair, back or feet when having these flare-ups. These statements by AutoZone as well as the Shepherds' testimony could be understood to mean that Shepherd's limitations on his ability to care for himself began at any point during or immediately after 2003. At the summary judgment stage, any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. It was the responsibility of the questioning attorney at the deposition to clarify the facts if the attorney intended to move for summary judgment on the basis of these answers. Particularly here, where one of the key issues was the time period during which Shepherd was affected by his condition March through September 12, 2003AutoZone could have asked follow-up questions to try to get more specific answers from the Shepherds. For the purposes of summary judgment, the testimony by Susan Shepherd was consistent with her husband's testimony to the effect that Shepherd was limited in caring for himself between March and September 2003.