Opinion ID: 203320
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dead Letter

Text: Undaunted by pre- Lawrence case law, the plaintiffs, who all admit they are homosexual within the meaning of Section 654(f)(1), [16] argue that the statement presumption burdens speech more than is essential because, as applied, it is functionally impossible to rebut the presumption short of recanting one's status. As such, plaintiffs allege that the statement presumption punishes service members who speak about their constitutionally protected homosexual status by requiring their discharge. The government disagrees with plaintiffs' dead letter theory that the statement presumption is impossible to rebut in practice. The government points out that, although the Act broadly defines homosexual conduct to include a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct, 10 U.S.C. § 654(f)(1), the implementing DoD Directives narrowly interpret propensity to engage in homosexual conduct to mean more than an abstract preference or desire to engage in homosexual acts; it indicates a likelihood that a person engages in or will engage in homosexual acts. DoD Directive No. 1332.14 ¶ E2.1.10 (defining propensity) (emphasis added); see also id. at ¶ E3.A1.1.8.1.2.2 (same). Accordingly, in the government's view, because a service member's personal definition of homosexuality may not coincide with the Act's definition, a service member may be able to successfully rebut the statement presumption if he can show that his statement I am gay is not indicative of a likelihood that the he will engage in proscribed homosexual conduct. As several courts have pointed out, the line between propensity and orientation is razor-thin at best. See, e.g., Able, 880 F.Supp. at 975 (characterizing the distinction between orientation and propensity as Orwellian); Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 941-42 n. 8 (Luttig, J., concurring) (I do not know what homosexual orientation is, if it is not the propensity to commit homosexual acts; indeed, I do not understand how one even knows that he has a homosexual orientation except by realizing that he has a propensity toward the commission of homosexual acts.). Emphasizing that propensity sweeps in everyone who is gay, plaintiffs allege that, in practice, gay and lesbian service members are routinely discharged despite evidence that there is no likelihood that they will engage in proscribed homosexual conduct while they are in military service. Accordingly, plaintiffs contend that any honest admission of a gay or lesbian service member's sexual orientation results in discharge. In my view, if the Act were applied to punish statements about one's status as a homosexual, it would constitute a content-based speech restriction subject to strict scrutiny. See Meinhold v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 34 F.3d 1469, 1476-80 (9th Cir.1994) (in an equal protection challenge to the military's pre-Don't Ask, Don't Tell homosexuality policy, construing the policy as only applying to conduct in order to avoid constitutional concerns that would arise if the policy punished service members for mere propensity or status alone) (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 543-44, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968) (Black, J., concurring)). Indeed, as Lawrence articulates, Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 47 S.Ct. 641, 71 L.Ed. 1095 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (stating that the founders believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth). It is telling that the government does not contend it has a substantial interest, let alone a compelling one, in separating a service member because of his or her status as a homosexual. Rather, the government protests that it is not punishing homosexual status, and insists that it has an interest only in identifying and proscribing homosexual conduct to further its substantial interest in morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion. As proof that the statement presumption is in fact rebuttable, the government highlights opinions, in particular Able and Holmes, that have found that the statement presumption has been successfully rebutted in the past. See Able, 88 F.3d at 1298 ([A]s the government represented at oral argument without contradiction, in seven cases (out of forty-three attempts), service members have been able to rebut the presumption created by their admission and have been retained.); Holmes, 124 F.3d at 1136 (pointing to several cases, including one where a female Naval officer admitted to her homosexuality but submitted a statement, in which she stated, inter alia, that she understands the rules against homosexual conduct and intended to obey those rules.). However, in Able, the fact that some service members were successful was held to be sufficient to defeat a facial assault on the statute under the Salerno standard. See Able, 88 F.3d at 1297-98 (Because plaintiffs have mounted a facial challenge to the Act, they must show that, no matter how the Act is read, it punishes status and not conduct.) (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095). Here, in contrast to Able, plaintiffs mount an as-applied challenge by alleging the presumption is now functionally impossible to rebut short of recanting. Although the government points to cases of the statement presumption being successfully rebutted, the cherry-picked examples are all well over twelve years old: In fact, some 11,000 service members have been discharged under the Act since 1993. On a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true all the factual allegations in the complaint, Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993); accord Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ____, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (a court must assume that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)), and a court must make all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs' favor. Clark v. Boscher, 514 F.3d 107, 112 (1st Cir.2008). Finally, the government argues that even if the statement presumption is a dead letter in practice, any misapplication of the presumption can be cured by the availability of administrative review. It may be true that an individual service member may prevail in rebutting the presumption on administrative review short of recanting his status, by stating, for example, that he will refrain from engaging in prohibited homosexual conduct. However, the availability of an administrative remedy does not defeat a First Amendment claim that the government is systematically applying the Act in such a way that it unconstitutionally burdens protected speech. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977) (Constitutional questions obviously are unsuited to resolution in administrative hearing procedures.); see also Able, 88 F.3d at 1289 ([B]ecause none of the administrative boards before which the plaintiffs would appear has the power to declare the Act unconstitutional, there is no realistic possibility that such proceedings would result in anything other than the plaintiffs' discharge.). Accordingly, when all reasonable inferences are drawn in their favor, the plaintiffs have alleged a viable cause of action that the burden placed by the government on gay and lesbian service members' speech is greater than is essential to the government's interest in preventing the occurrence of homosexual acts in the military.