Opinion ID: 2777003
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: pleading and proof in an

Text: ELECTION CONTEST ¶ 51 First, I disagree with the court’s conclusion that an election contest can be sustained “even if the contested votes cannot ultimately be counted, as when ballots are lost or destroyed.” Supra ¶ 33. Under the governing statutory provisions 24 Cite as: 2015 UT JUSTICE LEE, opinion of the Court in Part II as I understand them, it is the election contest petitioner’s burden to plead and prove that any “illegal votes” that were cast would have made a difference in the election. See UTAH CODE § 20A-4- 403(2)(c); id. § 20A-4-404(3), (4). And in light of that burden, I would conclude that any uncertainty in contested ballots that “cannot ultimately be counted” should be resolved against the election contest petitioner. ¶ 52 That premise seems embedded in the operative terms of the code. The code lists two categories of election contest claims: (a) those in which the election contest petitioner must establish that there were errors (in fraud, corruption, illegal votes counted, legal votes not counted, etc.) “sufficient to change the result” of the election 62 and (b) those that do not implicate the result of the election, as where the person declared elected was ineligible for office.63 The implication is clear. For the former category of 62 UTAH CODE § 20A-4-402(1)(a) (“for malconduct, fraud, or corruption on the part of the judges of election . . . sufficient to change the result”); id. § 20A-4-402(1)(d) (“when illegal votes have been received or legal votes have been rejected at the polls sufficient to change the result”); id. § 20A-4-402(1)(e) (“for any error of any board of canvassers or judges of election in counting the votes or declaring the result of the election, if the error would change the result”); id. § 20A-4-402(1)(f) (“when the election result would change because a sufficient number of ballots containing uncorrected errors or omissions have been received at the polls”); id. § 20A-4-402(1)(h) (“when an election judge or clerk was a party to malconduct, fraud, or corruption sufficient to change the result of the election”); id. § 20A-4-402(1)(i) (“for any other cause that shows that another person was legally elected”). 63 Id. § 20A-4-402(1)(b) (“when the person declared elected was not eligible for the office at the time of the election”); id. § 20A-4- 402(1)(c) (“when the person declared elected has: (i) given or offered to any registered voter, judge, or canvasser of the election any bribe or reward in money, property, or anything of value for the purpose of influencing the election; or (ii) committed any other offense against the elective franchise”); id. § 20A-4-402(1)(g) (“when the candidate declared elected is ineligible to serve in the office to which the candidate was elected”). 25 COX v. LAYCOCK JUSTICE LEE, opinion of the Court in Part II election contest claims (including claims asserting that “illegal votes have been received or legal votes have been rejected at the polls”), the statute contemplates a showing of an impact “sufficient to change the result” of the election. Id. § 20A-4- 402(1)(d). ¶ 53 The pleading provisions of the code reinforce this conclusion. To assert a “cause of contest” in a case in which “the reception of illegal votes” is the basis for challenging a primary election, a petitioner must “state generally that . . . illegal votes were given to a person whose election is contested, which, if taken from him, would reduce the number of his legal votes below the number of legal votes given to some other person for the same office.” Id. § 20A-4-403(2)(c)(i). Alternatively, where the contest involves “legal votes” that were “rejected,” a petitioner must allege that “legal votes for another person were rejected, which, if counted, would raise the number of legal votes for that person above the number of legal votes cast for the person whose election is contested.” Id. § 20A-4-403(2)(c)(ii). Thus, even at the pleading stage, the petitioner’s burden is more than just to identify a number of votes that would be sufficient to alter the outcome of the election if all of the ballots in question were assumed to have been cast for the “other person.” Instead, as to illegal votes, the election contest petitioner must allege that “illegal votes were given to a person whose election is contested” in a number that is sufficient to “reduce the number of his legal votes below the number of legal votes given to some other person for the same office.” Id. § 20A-4-403(2)(c)(i). And, as to rejected legal votes, the election contest petition must allege that such votes “for another person were rejected,” and that such votes “if counted, would raise the number of legal votes for that person above the number of legal votes cast for the person whose election is contested.” UTAH CODE § 20A-4-403(2)(c)(ii). ¶ 54 The election contest petitioner must accordingly do more than “challenge[] enough votes to meet or exceed the margin of victory.” Supra ¶ 27. He must instead make allegations that go to the actual impact of alleged illegal votes on the outcome of the election—as to illegal votes “given to a person whose election is contested” that would “reduce the number of his legal votes below the number of legal votes given” to the petitioning candidate, or as to rejected legal votes “for” the petitioning candidate that “would raise the number of legal votes for that 26 Cite as: 2015 UT JUSTICE LEE, opinion of the Court in Part II person” above those cast for the person whose election is contested. Id. § 20A-4-403(2)(c). ¶ 55 To me, this makes sense as a legal and logical matter. I see no basis in law or logic to assume that all illegal ballots in question (or rejected legal ballots) would have been cast in favor of the candidate filing the election petition. And the contrary presumption (in favor of the candidate whose election is contested) is premised rather straightforwardly in the burden of proof that the law has long assigned to a plaintiff or petitioner. Indeed, resolution of matters unresolved by the evidence is a core function of the burden of proof. One reason we assign a burden of persuasion is as a tie-breaker—to give the benefit of the doubt to the status quo, and to require the plaintiff or petitioner to rebut the status quo with evidence. 64 The pleading provisions of the election code appear to me to affirm this burden, by requiring an election contest petitioner to do more than just identify “enough votes to meet or exceed the margin of victory.” Supra ¶ 27. ¶ 56 The evidentiary standards in the code seem to me to further undermine the majority’s approach. Under subsection 403(2)(d), The court may not take or receive evidence of any the votes described in Subsection (2)(c), unless the party contesting the election delivers to the opposite party, at least three days before the trial, a written 64 See, e.g., 21B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5122, at 394 (2d ed. 2005) (explaining the policy underlying the burden of proof by noting that “[u]nder the American system,” judges do not “roam about the countryside like the Lone Ranger seeking wrongs to right,” rather a party brings a dispute to the judge and if that party were to “demand satisfaction from another, yet refuse to provide any information about the dispute,” the judge will not require the information of the opposing party because “the opponent is not asking any favors of the court,” the judge will “refuse[] to give the claimant the relief demanded where he has failed to bring evidence to support his claim”). 27 COX v. LAYCOCK JUSTICE LEE, opinion of the Court in Part II list of the number of contested votes and by whom the contested votes were given or offered, which he intends to prove at trial. UTAH CODE § 20A-4-403(2)(d)(i). In addition, the same provision clarifies that “[t]he court may not take or receive any evidence of contested votes except those that are specified in that list.” Id. § 20A-4-403(2)(d)(ii). The focus here and elsewhere is on “evidence of contested votes,” and on “prov[ing]” those votes “at trial.” This runs counter to the idea of presuming that contested votes would have been cast in favor of the petitioner (and against the person whose election is contested). Clearly, the code contemplates proof of the illegal votes, and by evidence presented at trial. ¶ 57 Final confirmation of this conclusion appears in section 404. That section prescribes the procedures governing the court in an actual election contest proceeding under the election code. It indicates that the “court shall meet at the time and place designated to determine the contest,” and, when “necessary for the court to inspect the ballots of any voting precinct in order to determine any election contest,” it directs the court to “open and inspect the ballots in open court in the presence of the parties or their attorneys.” Id. § 20A-4-404(2)–(3) (emphases added). Two points stand out in these provisions. One is that the court is to “determine the contest.” The other is that that determination is to be made by “open[ing] and inspect[ing] the ballots in open court.” This strikes me as incompatible with the majority’s notion of a presumption in favor of the petitioner. Far from assuming that “eight illegal votes in a five-vote-margin election [are] enough to warrant setting aside the election results,” supra ¶ 35, the code directs the court to consider the evidence before it to decide whether the illegal votes are sufficient to change the results of the election. And the code indicates the manner in which that evidence is to be considered—by inspection of the ballots in question, again to determine the proper resolution of the contest in question. ¶ 58 It is no answer, in my view, to assert that in this case “the contested votes cannot ultimately be counted.” Supra ¶ 33. That proposition was adopted by the district court and endorsed by the parties in the case before us on this petition for extraordinary writ. See Mem. Decision 11–12 (concluding that the court’s “choices are limited” because the court could not 28 Cite as: 2015 UT JUSTICE LEE, opinion of the Court in Part II “determine who received the highest number of legal votes”); Mem. Resp. & Opp. to Pet. 3 (noting that “because of how the contested ballots had been handled—co-mingled with all the other absentee ballots . . . — it would not be possible to identify and find those ballots to determine how they had been cast”). The premise, as far as I can tell, is that the contested ballots were comingled with other ballots, in a manner rendering it impossible for the district court to “open and inspect the ballots in open court” in the course of “determin[ing] the contest.” See Mem. Resp. & Opp. to Pet. 3. I have no basis for questioning that conclusion. 65 But it is in my view beside the point under the statute. Apparently, the legislature contemplated a proceeding in which a petitioner in an election contest would present contested ballots to the district court for inspection and an ultimate resolution of the contest. If for some reason that evidence was 65 In the course of briefing and oral argument, the suggestion was made that the proof problem in this case was not the product of comingling of ballots but instead a systemic issue embedded in our electronic voting system. The point, specifically, was that it is technically impossible to “inspect” a contested (allegedly illegal) ballot in court to determine which way the ballot was cast on the office in question. See Oral Arg. 9:00–17:00; but see Mem. Decision 9–10 (noting that by statute for either a paper or electronic ballot “[t]he poll worker should have written [Russell C. Jones’s] ballot number and the name of the Republican party opposite Mr. Jones’s name in the official register,” that for a paper ballot the poll worker should have “endorsed Mr. Jones’s initials on the [ballot] stub”). I have no way of knowing whether that is in fact the case. But if it is, this is a problem that the legislature, the lieutenant governor, and other election officials ought to be aware of. If there is a disconnect between the governing election contest provisions of our code and the voting system we are currently employing, one or the other of them ought to be altered. If our current voting system in fact makes it impossible to inspect a challenged ballot, our system should be altered to facilitate the required determination by the court. Or, alternatively, our election contest provisions should be amended to bring them in line with our current voting system. 29 COX v. LAYCOCK JUSTICE LEE, opinion of the Court in Part II unavailable in this case, there is an established mechanism for resolving a case in which evidence is missing—the burden of proof. And because the election contest petitioner (Dyer) bore the burden, I do not see how we can affirm a decision annulling and setting aside the election on his election contest petition absent the evidence and proof contemplated by the statute. 66 ¶ 59 By statute, the district court has authority to “annul[] and set[] aside the election.” UTAH CODE § 20A-4-404(4)(c)(i). But that authority is to be exercised in connection with the court’s determination of the election contest, and upon inspection of the contested ballots “in open court.” Id. § 20A-4-404(3)(b)(i). Indeed, as if to emphasize this point, the code specifies that the district court’s authority to enter a judgment “annulling and setting aside the election” is to be exercised only “[a]fter all the evidence in the contest is submitted.” Id. § 20A-4-404(4)(c)(i). 67 Because the district court did not determine the election contest in this case on the basis of the evidence specified by the code, and the election contest petitioner (Dyer) did not carry his burden of persuasion under the statute, I would not affirm the district court’s decision on the merits. And I would not conclude that an election contest 66 In so concluding, I would render neither judgment nor “suspicion” as to the “types of circumstantial evidence” that “could properly be relied upon to determine the outcome of an election.” Supra ¶ 27 n. 32 (“express[ing] great suspicion” that voter testimony could be considered in an election contest). 67 Presumably, the usual circumstance in which an election contest would be annulled and set aside without declaring another person the rightful winner would be the circumstances spelled out in the statute in which there is no showing required as to the impact on the “result” of the election. See supra ¶ 52 n.66; UTAH CODE § 20A-4-402(1)(b), (c), (g). This case is another—more unusual—example. As explained below, the lack of an appeal from the judge’s order annulling and setting aside the election in this case “void[ed]” the certificate of election by statute. UTAH CODE § 20A-4-406(2). Ordinarily, however, an election contest premised on an allegation of illegal votes being counted and/or legal votes not being counted would require proof that the votes in question were “sufficient to change the result.” Id. § 20A-4- 402(1)(d). 30 Cite as: 2015 UT JUSTICE LEE, opinion of the Court in Part II petitioner may succeed in overturning an election without carrying his burden of proof.