Opinion ID: 194546
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Appellants assert that as there was insufficient evidence of criminal intent, the district court erroneously denied their Rule 29(a) motions for judgment of acquittal. In reviewing a properly preserved Rule 29 motion, we examine the evidence and all legitimate inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the government to determine whether a rational jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Torres, 980 F.2d 788, 790 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Clotida, 892 F.2d 1098, 1103 (1st Cir. 1989). The government argues that appellants waived their Rule 29 motions by presenting evidence after the government concluded its case-in-chief and by failing to renew the motions at the close of the -2- evidence. Were this so, our review would be for plain error only.1 E.g., United States v. Alfredo Alvarado, Nos. 91-2075, 2076, slip op. at 6 (1st Cir. Dec. 31, 1992); United States v. Arango-Echeberry, 927 F.2d 35, 37 (1st Cir. 1991); Clotida, 892 F.2d at 1103. However, we need not decide whether appellants waived their Rule 29 motions. Even assuming they did not, the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find that appellants were guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellants urge that mere presence at the scene is not enough to convict a defendant of aiding and abetting in the commission of a crime. E.g., Clotida, 892 F.2d at 1104. They assert the evidence merely showed that they were present on a vessel in an area of the open sea where an air drop of bales of cocaine took place. They analogize their conviction to that of innocent crew members on board a sailboat taking part in the Grand Regatta Columbus2 solely because crew members in another sailboat in the regatta committed a crime. Appellants' analogy does not wash. 1. We upheld the convictions of co-defendants Luis Alfredo Alvarado and Juan Eugenio Lorenzi Padilla against a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the plain error standard. See United States v. Alfredo Alvarado, Nos. 91-2075, 2076, slip op. at 5-7 (1st Cir. Dec. 31, 1992). The opinion in that case contains a more exhaustive account than we provide here of the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the convictions of appellants and their codefendants. 2. The Grand Regatta Columbus was a celebration of the 500th anniversary of Columbus' discovery of America in which hundreds of vessels from dozens of nations took part in a five-month race from Europe to America and back in the spring and summer of 1992. M.E. Malone, CADIZ to Boston; Grand regatta pays homage to Columbus' voyage, Boston Globe, July 5, 1992. -3- Rather than being aboard only one of hundreds of vessels taking part in a regatta, appellants were in one of two vessels over which a suspect aircraft was seen to hover. Flying at night without lights and with no flight plan, the aircraft made tight circles about 300 to 500 feet above the two vessels. A Customs Service pilot following the suspect aircraft testified to having seen moving lights from the vessels. From this a reasonable jury could infer that the vessels wished to be visible to the aircraft. Bales of cocaine were dropped in proximity to the vessels from the aircraft, after which the vessels began heading north towards the shore with their navigation lights turned off. At first the two boats traveled together at a distance of about 100 yards. After the second vessel veered off in a westerly direction, a police helicopter was directed over the first vessel, occupied by the appellants. The helicopter was lit and identified as a police helicopter by the letters FURA, which were twelve to sixteen inches long. A police sergeant aboard the helicopter gestured for appellants to stop. Appellants looked up, reduced speed, and then accelerated. When a police marine vessel subsequently approached, appellants' vessel veered off in order, it might be inferred, to get away. While other explanations were offered, a jury could reasonably conclude from this conduct that appellants were conscious of having engaged in criminal activity and were more than mere inadvertent bystanders at the drug drop. United States v. Lopez, 944 F.2d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Hernandez-Bermudez, 857 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. -4- Flores Perez, 849 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Alvarez, 626 F.2d 208, 210 (1st Cir. 1980). The fishing gear found aboard both vessels was wrapped up and not prepared for fishing. No bait or fish were found on either vessel. No fishing nets were found in the area. As fishing was apparently not their purpose, the jury could infer that appellants had another purpose for their nighttime sojourn on the sea. Although no cocaine was found aboard appellants' vessel, four bales of cocaine were discovered on the companion vessel. A connection between the two vessels was suggested not only by their proximity when first seen but by evidence that appellant Wilfredo Alvarado Ortiz was related to codefendant Luis Alfredo Alvarado. While innocent association with those involved in illegal activities can never form the sole basis for a conviction, . . . the existence of a close relationship between a defendant and others involved in criminal activity can, as part of a larger package of proof, assist in supporting an inference of involvement in illicit activity. United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 713 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949)), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3479 (1993). Criminal intent may, of course, be inferred from circumstantial evidence. E.g., United States v. Gomez-Villamizar, No. 92-1228, slip op. at 9 (1st Cir. Dec. 23, 1992); Ortiz, 966 F.2d at 711; United States v. Rodriguez- Alvarado, 952 F.2d 586, 590 (1st Cir. 1991). Here, numerous factors, including the unlighted, clandestine airplane maneuvering over the two boats, the lights on the vessels, -5- their proximity to the cocaine when dropped, the fact that appellants' vessel was running without navigational lights, the finding of cocaine bales on the companion vessel, and the lack of support for their being engaged in fishing or some other innocent occupation, constituted substantial evidence from which a jury could infer that appellants possessed the requisite criminal intent. See Alfredo Alvarado, Nos. 2075, 2076, slip op. at 6-7 (1st Cir. Dec. 31, 1992).