Opinion ID: 766255
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Drug Conspiracy Convictions

Text: 14 To establish a drug conspiracy, the government must prove (1) an agreement to violate drug laws; (2) knowledge and intent to join the conspiracy; and (3) participation in the conspiracy. See United States v. Welch, 97 F.3d 147, 148-49 (6th Cir. 1996). In a § 846 conspiracy, the government must show the willful formation of a conspiracy and the willful membership of the defendant in the conspiracy, but need not prove that defendant committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Spearman, 186 F.3d 743, 745-47 (6th Cir. Aug. 2, 1999) (citing United States v. Bourjaily, 781 F.2d 539, 544 (6th Cir. 1986)). While the government must show the defendant agreed to participate in what he knew to be a joint venture to achieve a common goal, the government need not prove an actual agreement. Id. Rather, a factfinder may infer the existence of a drug conspiracy from the interdependence of the enterprise, or may assume that participants understand that they are participating in a joint enterprise because success is dependent on the success of those from whom they buy and to whom they sell. Id. The government may meet its burden of proof through circumstantial evidence. See id. Defendant argues that the government failed to bring forth sufficient evidence of his participation in the drug conspiracies alleged in Counts 1, 4, and 6, and that thus the evidence presented shows merely that he is a drug user who regularly purchased cocaine. While we disagree as to Counts 1 and 4, we agree with Defendant that the government failed to produce sufficient evidence to support his conviction in Count 6. 15
16 Count 1, which relates to conduct concluded on May 21, 1996, charged a conspiratorial relationship between Defendant and Ables to distribute and possess with intent to distribute powder cocaine. Defendant suggests there is no evidence proving that Ables was more than merely present at Defendant's home at the time of Defendant's arrest. Indeed, a defendant's mere presence in a home containing drugs or his mere proximity to drugs does not by itself demonstrate a drug conspiracy. See United States v. Peters, 15 F.3d 540, 544 (6th Cir. 1994). 17 Here, however, the evidence clearly demonstrates that Ables and Defendant worked together to achieve the common goal of violating drug laws. Pearce and Winesburgh both testified that Ables served as a lookout for Defendant during Defendant's drug transactions. Winesburgh testified that on May 21, 1996 he observed as Defendant asked Ables to get a set of triple beam scales, and to get tape to seal up a cocaine package from which Defendant took a sample, and watched Ables comply with Defendant's commands. Moreover, on the day of the arrest, agents found Ables with Defendant, and found two kilograms of cocaine by Ables and one by Defendant. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a rational trier of fact could conclude from the circumstances surrounding Ables'involvement that Ables and Defendant were co-conspirators. See United States v. Christian, 786 F.2d 203, 211 (6th Cir. 1986). Therefore, we find that the government produced sufficient evidence of Defendant's involvement in a drug conspiracy to support his conviction on Count 1. 18
19 Count 4, which relates to conduct concluded on July 1, 1994, refers to the existence of a conspiracy between Defendant and informant Fuller to possess with intent to distribute powder cocaine. Defendant alleges that no more than a buyer-seller relationship existed between him and Fuller. We have recognized that a buyer-seller relationship is not alone sufficient to tie a buyer to a conspiracy. United States v. Grunsfeld, 558 F.2d 1231, 1235 (6th Cir. 1977). However, additional evidence beyond the mere purchase or sale of drugs, such as evidence of repeat purchases or some enduring arrangement that implies knowledge of the scope of the conspiracy may support a conspiracy conviction. See United States v. Anderson, 89 F.3d 1306, 1310 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Baker, 905 F.2d 1100, 1106 (7th Cir. 1990)). 20 The evidence at trial showed that Defendant regularly distributed cocaine to Fuller and that when Agent Copeland approached Fuller about a kilogram of cocaine, Fuller indicated that Defendant would want to buy the kilogram. Fuller visited Defendant and obtained from Defendant a set of triple beam scales for use in the drug transaction. The evidence also showed that Defendant demanded the return of his scales and complained to Fuller that he was losing business without them. The evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the government, reveals that Defendant was not simply a street buyer engaging in a discrete transaction, but that he knew he was involved in an ongoing conspiracy of some dimension. United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1064 (6th Cir. 1993). Therefore, we find that sufficient evidence of a conspiracy, beyond a mere buyer-seller relationship, existed to support a conviction on Count 4 against Defendant. 21
22 Although the government produced sufficient evidence of drug conspiracies in Counts 1 and 4, we agree with Defendant that the same cannot be said for Count 6, which targeted conduct from March 1996 through May 21, 1996 and charged Defendant with a conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine in violation of § 841(a)(1) and § 846. (J.A. at 35.) To prove a conspiracy under § 846, the government must show an agreement by two or more persons to violate federal drug laws and knowledge of, intention to join, and participation in the conspiracy on the part of each conspirator. See United States v. Maliszewski, 161 F.3d 992, 1006 (6th Cir. 1998). Here, the government failed to show that two or more persons agreed to manufacture, distribute, and possess crack with intent to distribute, and thus failed to prove a violation of §841(a)(1) and §846. 23 The sum total of the government's evidence regarding Defendant's involvement with crack cocaine came from the testimony of Rhonda Pearce. Pearce testified that she saw crack cocaine at Defendant's residence after Hicks arrived there, and that she thereafter began using crack cocaine regularly with Defendant, Ables and Hicks. Although Pearce stated that Ables would serve as Defendant's lookout during his powder cocaine sales, Pearce did not characterize Ables as a lookout during times they used crack together. Pearce also testified that Defendant did not charge her for the crack cocaine, although he charged her for powder cocaine. Pearce testified that she saw others using crack at Defendant's home; not that others purchased crack at Defendant's home. 24 At best, the government proved that Defendant himself distributed crack and possessed crack with intent to distribute--an offense for which the government charged and convicted Defendant in Count 7 under § 841(a)(1). See United States v. Washington, 41 F.3d 917, 920 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that a person who shares drugs with a friend possesses the drug with an intent to distribute in violation of § 841(a)(1)). The offense charged in Count 6 is conspiracy to distribute or to possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine, and is different from that in Count 7 only by virtue of the fact that a conspiracy conviction requires proof of an agreement to commit the substantive offense. See United States v. Fife, 573 F.2d 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1976). Thus, without proof of an agreement between Defendant and Pearce, Hicks, Ables or some other person to distribute crack or to possess crack with an intent to distribute it, the government failed to prove a separate offense of conspiracy. 5 Cf. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (describing separate offenses in double jeopardy context as ones where each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not). 25 Notably, the government may have proved that Defendant conspired with others to use crack cocaine--at most, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), which criminalizes simple possession. Pearce, Ables, and Hicks appear to have conspired only to possess crack for personal use, and not to possess crack with the intent to distribute it. See United States v. Swiderski, 548 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1977) (observing that where two individuals acquire possession without an intent to distribute the drug to a third person, neither serves as a link in the chain of distribution and they must therefore be treated as possessors for personal use than for further distribution). Moreover, the government did not introduce evidence of a large quantity of crack to support the inference of a conspiracy to distribute, as opposed to a conspiracy to possess crack. See United States v. Vincent, 20 F.3d 229, 233 (6th Cir. 1994). Again, what is lacking is proof of an agreement between Defendant and one other person to distribute or to possess with intent to distribute. Indeed, there is no evidence that Defendant and another person conspired to distribute crack, or that Defendant and another person had a tacit agreement to possess crack with the intention of distributing it. In the absence of such a showing, we find that the government did not present sufficient evidence of a crack conspiracy to sustain Defendant's conviction on Count 6 of the indictment.