Opinion ID: 844217
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Constitutionality of Peace Officer Special Circumstance

Text: (22) The special circumstance of killing a peace officer applies to a first degree murder if [t]he victim was a peace officer, as defined in [enumerated Penal Code sections] who, while engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties .... (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(7).) Defendant contends that this special circumstance is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad on a number of grounds. First, defendant argues, the special circumstance requires only that a defendant should have known the victim was a peace officer, rather than that he actually knew. We have previously rejected the claim that the reasonably should have known element renders the peace officer special circumstance unconstitutional. (See People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 874 [277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906]; People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1224 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159]; People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135]; People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 780-783 [230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].) Defendant provides no persuasive reason for us to reconsider these decisions. Second, he contends the special circumstance is vague because peace officer has been defined broadly to include many categories of individuals whose status as a peace officer would not be apparent to the ordinary person. (See, e.g., §§ 830.6 [persons summoned to the aid of peace officers], 830.35 [child support investigators], 830.37 [volunteer fire wardens].) Nevertheless, the reasonably should have known element would prevent a true finding on the special circumstance if the victim's status would not have been apparent to a reasonable person. Third, defendant argues that because the special circumstance includes individuals who are not traditionally involved in law enforcement, including, for example, an investigator for the Public Employees' Retirement System, lottery security personnel, or an investigator at a racetrack (§ 830.3), it fails to meaningfully distinguish between those killings in which the imposition of a death sentence is justified as compared to killings in which it is not, as required by Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S. 862 [77 L.Ed.2d 235, 103 S.Ct. 2733]. This contention does not provide a basis for challenging the special circumstance or death sentence in defendant's case, however, because the victims were traditional law enforcement officers whose status as such was apparentthey were in uniform and driving a marked police car at the time of the incident. Finally, defendant contends this court's decisions interpreting the special circumstance to apply so long as the officer's conduct was objectively lawful and regardless of the defendant's subjective belief that the officer's conduct is unlawful have rendered the special circumstance unconstitutionally overbroad. (See People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 1217-1218; People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1020-1021 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044] ( Jenkins ).) We explained in People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, that making eligible for the death penalty a defendant who should have known the victim was a police officer is constitutional because it reasonably serves the goals of retribution and deterrence. ( Id. at p. 781.) Applying the special circumstance to situations in which the officer was lawfully engaged in his or her duties, even if the defendant believed otherwise, is constitutional for the same reasons. As we have observed, limiting the special circumstance to situations in which the defendant subjectively believed that the officer was acting lawfully would be inconsistent with the purpose of the special circumstance to afford special protection to officers who risk their lives to protect the community, and obviously would undermine the deterrent effect of the special circumstance. ( Jenkins, supra, at p. 1021.)