Opinion ID: 2576427
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Johnson Remedy

Text: ¶ 12 In Johnson, we held that a criminal defendant who reasonably relied on his attorney's assurance that an appeal would be timely filed was unconstitutionally denied his right to appeal his conviction. State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981). We then established a procedural mechanism to restore this right in Johnson's case and in future situations in which a defendant was prevented from bringing a timely appeal through no fault of his own. We directed defendants to file a motion for resentencing in the trial court so that the thirty-day time period for bringing an appeal set forth in rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure would begin to run anew. Id. at 38. ¶ 13 Manning urges us to retain the Johnson remedy because it allows filing for relief in the underlying criminal case, thus preserving the right to state-paid counsel in seeking an appeal. She argues that the changes to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure have no impact on the remedy's availability because the remedy is based on the common law writ of error coram nobis [2] and may continue to function as such. In adopting the remedy in Johnson, however, we described [t]he postconviction hearing procedure [under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as] a successor to the common-law writ of error coram nobis, and directed defendants to seek relief under rule 65B(i). Id. The State accordingly argues that since the Johnson remedy originally proceeded under rule 65B(i), it must now be sought under rule 65C, which it considers the successor to former rule 65B(i), and the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA), Utah Code sections 78-35a-101 to -110 (2002). ¶ 14 Based on our analysis of Johnson and the Rules of Civil Procedure, we conclude that neither party is entirely accurate in its assessment of Johnson's analytic sources. Rather, as discussed below, the Johnson remedy was a hybrid of both coram nobis and postconviction procedure principles, judicially fashioned to preserve the constitutional right to appeal in criminal cases. As we also discuss below, the evolution of statutory law and procedural rules since Johnson has foreclosed the usefulness of this remedy.
¶ 15 We first examine the relationship between the common law writ of error coram nobis and the Johnson remedy. In Johnson, we examined other jurisdictions that had, by narrowly expanding the common law writ of error coram nobis, permitted `resentenc[ing] nunc pro tunc upon the previous finding of guilt' as a mechanism for restoring the time frame for filing an appeal where the right to appeal had been denied. 635 P.2d at 38 (quoting People v. Callaway, 24 N.Y.2d 127, 299 N.Y.S.2d 154, 247 N.E.2d 128, 130 (N.Y.1969)). Under Utah common law, coram nobis had been available to vacate a judgment of conviction on the basis of facts which, without defendant's fault, did not appear on the face of the record and as to which defendant was without other remedy. Id. We followed other courts in relying on coram nobis as a basis for considering extra-record facts to establish the denial of the right to appeal and vacate a judgment, after which the defendant would be resentenced to establish a new appeal time frame. Id. ¶ 16 Coram nobis principles were thus essential to the Johnson remedy. Consistent with the United States Supreme Court's coram nobis rulings in right to appeal criminal cases, which direct that petitions be filed in the underlying criminal case, James v. United States, 459 U.S. 1044, 1046, 103 S.Ct. 465, 74 L.Ed.2d 615 (1982); United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 506 n. 4, 74 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954), motions for Johnson resentencing are filed in the underlying criminal case rather than as separate civil proceedings, as would be required if the remedy were based solely on rule 65B or its successor postconviction procedures. This is an important element of the Johnson remedy, partly for judicial economy in reviewing the record, but mostly because an attorney's assistance is not guaranteed to indigent defendants in postconviction civil proceedings. By contrast, a Johnson motion filed in the underlying criminal case guarantees defendants the right to state-paid counsel in seeking a first appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-301(5)(2002). This is important because the right to representation is an integral part of the right to appeal Johnson sought to protect. ¶ 17 The State argues that former rules 65B(i) and 65B(b) permitted the court to provide a pro bono attorney to an indigent petitioner in civil postconviction proceedings, as does the current PCRA section 78-35a-109(1). While the State is correct on this point, the Johnson remedy was fashioned not just to permit, but to guarantee, assistance of counsel in seeking a first appeal of right in the underlying criminal case, in accordance with coram nobis relief. See Beal v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 418, 454 P.2d 624, 627 (1969). ¶ 18 The Johnson remedy also incorporates coram nobis principles by placing the burden of proof establishing denial of the right to appeal on the defendant. State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah Ct.App. 1991). Manning incorrectly argues that coram nobis and the Johnson remedy shift this burden to the State; she asks us to require the State to prove a defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to appeal before a court may deny petitions seeking to restore an appeal time frame. However, coram nobis proceedings, whether styled as criminal or civil, place on the defendant the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence facts which will entitle him to relief. Sullivan v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 85, 448 P.2d 907, 910 (1968); see also United States v. Butler, 295 F.Supp.2d 816, 818 (S.D.Ohio 2003). Likewise, the Johnson remedy requires petitioners, not the State, to produce findings in the record or conduct a hearing establishing the unconstitutional denial of the right to appeal. Montoya, 825 P.2d at 679. [3] This is necessary to prevent abuse by those seeking to circumvent the timeliness requirements for appeals. Id. ¶ 19 Therefore, notwithstanding our direction in Johnson that defendants claiming denial of their right to appeal apply for relief under rule 65B(i) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Johnson remedy itself relied on coram nobis principles unavailable solely through rule 65B(i). [4]
¶ 20 As previously discussed, in adopting coram nobis-type relief in Johnson, we found [t]he postconviction hearing procedure to be a successor to pleading the writ of coram nobis and directed defendants to seek relief under rule 65B(i). 635 P.2d at 38. This was so because the 1977 version of rule 65B abolished pleading special forms of writs in favor of actions under these Rules. Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a) (1977) (amended by 65B(b)( l )(1992)). ¶ 21 Additionally, rule 65B was well-suited as a procedural avenue for seeking Johnson relief because it authorized the court to take action when there had been a substantial denial of . . . rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Utah, [5] Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(i)(1)(1977) (amended by 65B(b)( l ) (1992)), including the constitutional right to appeal. Upon finding such a denial, rule 65B(i) authorized a court to enter as a remedy an appropriate order, such as an order for Johnson resentencing. [6] Id. 65B(i)(8). ¶ 22 Therefore, both the mechanism for filing a claim in the criminal case and the remedy via a resentencing order were available under the 1977 version of rule 65B(i), and even the extensive 1991 amendments to rule 65B did not interfere with this. [7] However, in 1996, the Legislature enacted the PCRA and this court subsequently substantially revised rule 65B, wherein former rule 65B(i) (or, after 1991, rule 65B(b)) became, in revised and expanded form, rule 65C. As we explain below, these changes affected the relief available under Johnson and the former rules. ¶ 23 For one thing, a defendant may no longer file a petition pursuant to rule 65B(b) in instances governed by Rule 65C. Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(1). In addition, the specific grounds for which extraordinary relief may be sought under rule 65B are now enumerated in subsection (a) of that rule, and the broad language permitting proceedings resulting from the substantial denial of rights, constitutional or otherwise, no longer exists. Id. 65B(b)(11). ¶ 24 Such language also does not appear in rule 65C, which now govern[s] proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief filed under [the PCRA]. Id. 65C(a). The PCRA proclaims itself as a remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal except as provided in Subsection (2). Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-102(1) (2002). Subsection (2) does not expressly address the situation where a defendant has failed, for whatever reason, to timely file a direct criminal appeal. [8] Id. § 78-35a-102(2). Currently, rule 65C and the PCRA do not permit motions for Johnson relief for defendants who have not filed a direct appeal because their right to appeal has been unconstitutionally denied. While a defendant who simply fails to file an appeal within the time limits required by rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure would reasonably be considered to have exhausted any remedies he might have obtained thereby for purposes of the PCRA, the same is not true for a defendant who is unconstitutionally denied his right to appeal. See State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1166 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (Wilkins, J., concurring) (the denial of the right to appeal consists of a defendant having been prevented in some meaningful way from proceeding with [his or her] appeal[]). Such a defendant must have a means of regaining that right. It follows that there must be a mechanism for distinguishing those defendants who have truly exhausted their remedy of direct appeal from those whose right to appeal has been unconstitutionally denied. ¶ 25 Therefore, the unintended result of the transformation of rule 65B(i) since this court issued its decision in Johnson is that a defendant who has been unconstitutionally denied a direct criminal appeal may no longer seek Johnson relief under either rule 65B or rule 65C and the PCRA. Because of this, and because the Johnson remedy also independently relied on coram nobis principles, we deem it inappropriate to continue to rely on the Johnson remedy, and conclude that the restoration of a denied direct appeal through resentencing to establish a new appeal time frame is no longer feasible. Instead, we direct defendants who claim denial of their right to appeal to follow the procedure set forth below.