Opinion ID: 1182357
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: doctrine of shared control

Text: Plaintiff's arguments for reversing summary judgment raise another issue that requires discussion. Plaintiff argues that defendants must assume the burden of explaining who caused the injury because it is impossible for her to prove which of the two defendants is liable. [3] Although summary judgment must be reversed, we address the argument because this issue has been raised here and will likely be asserted at trial. An unexplained and unexpected injury can be the basis for requiring multiple defendants collectively in control of the circumstances to explain how the injury occurred. The doctrine of shared control is, however, an exception to the general rule that the plaintiff does not make out a preponderant case against either of two defendants by showing merely that the plaintiff has been injured by the negligence of one or the other. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 39, at 251 (5th ed. 1984) (footnote omitted). The general rule applies in res ipsa loquitur cases. In Ballow v. Monroe, 699 P.2d 719, 723 (Utah 1985), we reiterated that res ipsa loquitur does not establish a presumption of negligence, either rebuttable or irrebuttable, and does not shift the burden of producing evidence. The burden of proof principle stated by Professor Keeton and the Ballow court, that the plaintiff generally has the burden of producing evidence against multiple defendants, was applied in Talbot v. Dr. W.H. Groves' Latter-Day Saints Hospital, Inc., 21 Utah 2d 73, 440 P.2d 872 (1968). There, the plaintiff suffered an injury to an arm because of a lack of blood supply to the nerves after back surgery. The Court refused to apply res ipsa loquitur against a number of defendants who had successive management, control, or partial control of the plaintiff during and after the surgery, because the injury could have been caused by an act or omission of any one of the defendants outside the observation of the others. We have, however, narrowed and carved out exceptions to this general rule. In Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, 791 P.2d 193, 200 (Utah 1990), the plaintiff suffered a burn on her leg during a caesarean operation. The evidence showed that the burn occurred while the plaintiff was unconscious in the operating room, but did not show who or what caused the burn. The evidence was clear that the operating staff was responsible for all probable causes of the injury. Application of res ipsa loquitur in that case was based on the inference, logically based on the common experience and knowledge of lay persons, that a patient does not suffer that kind of injury during a caesarean operation absent negligence on the part of the medical staff. We modified the rule in Talbot by holding that all defendants who are charged with the safety of a helpless patient may be held liable where the only possible instrumentalities that could cause injury were within the defined area of an operating room under the control of all defendants.... Id. at 200. Thus, Dalley stands for the proposition that when the second element of the res ipsa foundation rests on the defendants' exclusive management or control of all possible causation factors, the burden of producing evidence does change. The case now before this Court, however, is different from Dalley. Here, plaintiff has sued two defendants, a doctor and a medical device manufacturer. The liability of each, if any, is separate and independent from the other. Plaintiff has not established exclusive management or control by defendants of the possible causative factors that would justify shifting the burden of producing evidence in this case. Shifting the burden in Dalley was justified because the inference was strong that the injury had occurred while the plaintiff was within the observation and control of all the defendants. Here, Searle had no knowledge of the care with which Dr. Porter inserted the Cu-7 and certainly no control over the process. Dr. Porter had no knowledge of Searle's research and manufacturing process and no control over Searle. Plaintiff therefore is not entitled to rely on the shared control exception. Reversed and remanded. HALL, C.J., and HOWE, Associate C.J., and DURHAM, J., concur. ZIMMERMAN, J., concurs in the result.