Opinion ID: 2820085
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gross Negligence Exception

Text: Whether gross negligence serves as an exception to common law public official immunity is a matter of first impression. On this issue, this Court’s most relevant statement is that common law public official immunity applies to “public officials (as opposed to mere employees) who perform negligent acts during the course of their discretionary (as - 38 - opposed to ministerial) duties.” Houghton, 412 Md. at 585, 989 A.2d at 227 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The Court of Special Appeals has stated, however, that gross negligence is an exception to common law public official immunity. For example, in Hines v. French, 157 Md. App. 536, 560-62, 852 A.2d 1047, 1061-62 (2004), in discussing whether certain defendants were entitled to “public official immunity[,]” the Court of Special Appeals stated: Under common law immunity, public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from negligence claims. . . . [W]hether under common law qualified immunity or the statutory qualified immunity provided by the MTCA, [the defendants] may [] avoid liability for a claim of negligence [only] if their conduct was within the scope of the duties of State personnel[,] and each acted without malice or gross negligence. (Citations and paragraph breaks omitted). Similarly, in Callahan v. Bowers, 131 Md. App. 163, 175-76, 748 A.2d 499, 506, vacated on other grounds, 359 Md. 395, 754 A.2d 388 (2000) (per curiam), in determining that a law enforcement officer was entitled to public official immunity, the Court of Special Appeals explained: [F]or qualified immunity to attach, the conduct must be discretionary, not ministerial. Additionally, the action must be within the scope of the actor’s official duties. [The officer] meets these further standards. The decision to detain [the plaintiff] was clearly a discretionary act[,] and it was within [the] scope of [his] authority as a [law enforcement] officer to detain a suspected shoplifter within his jurisdiction. We hold, therefore, that [the officer], acting within the scope of [his] authority [as] a [law enforcement] officer enforcing the criminal law, is entitled to qualified public immunity, and is consequently shielded from civil liability in the absence of malice or gross negligence. (Citations omitted). And, in Artis v. Cyphers, 100 Md. App. 633, 653, 642 A.2d 298, 308, aff’d, 336 Md. 561, 649 A.2d 838 (1994) (per curiam), in commenting on a medic’s contention that he was entitled to common law public official immunity, the Court of - 39 - Special Appeals, stated: A similar situation exists with respect to the common law qualified immunity asserted by [the medic]; that, too, depends on a number of factspecific elements—those relating to whether he is a public official, whether he was engaged in discretionary as opposed to ministerial acts, and whether his conduct, if negligent, constituted gross negligence. In each of these cases, the Court of Special Appeals acknowledged or implied that gross negligence is an exception to common law public official immunity. Although the Court of Special Appeals did not state as much, such an acknowledgement may be due, in part, to Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and the need to provide a remedy for a public official’s gross negligence. Article 19 guarantees a remedy for an injury to a person or property by stating: “[E]very man, for any injury done to him in his person or property, ought to have remedy by the course of the Law of the Land, and ought to have justice and right, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay, according to the Law of the Land.” In Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 264, 863 A.2d 297, 308 (2004), this Court discussed Article 19 in the context of the MTCA and common law public official immunity, stating: [T]he principle that individual state officials should not be immune from suit for state constitutional violations is bound up with the basic tenet, expressed in Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, that a plaintiff injured by unconstitutional state action should have a remedy to redress the wrong. While Article 19 generally prohibits a grant of immunity to both the governmental official and the governmental entity which tortuously violates a plaintiff’s state constitutional rights, the effect of Article 19 upon nonconstitutional torts is somewhat more fluid. The test is one of reasonableness. - 40 - (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This Court determined that the MTCA did not run afoul of Article 19, explaining: [W]ith regard to torts encompassed by the [MTCA], the statute generally waives sovereign or governmental immunity and substitutes the liability of the State for the liability of the state employee committing the tort. Accordingly, where the immunity of the [MTCA] is applicable, the injured party will ordinarily be able to recover against the State as long as he or she complies with the procedural requirements of the [MTCA]. Id. at 262, 863 A.2d at 307. This Court observed that, in contrast to the MTCA, there are “strict limitations upon public official immunity[,]” and stated: Under circumstances where sovereign or governmental immunity is applicable, and where public official immunity is also applicable, the person injured by governmental tortious conduct will have no remedy. For this reason, any significant expansion of public official immunity might well present serious constitutional problems under Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Id. at 261-62, 863 A.2d at 307 (footnote omitted). After careful review of the relevant principles and authorities, in accordance with the dictates of Article 19, we hold that gross negligence is an exception to common law public official immunity; in other words, if a public official’s actions are grossly negligent, the public official is not entitled to common law public official immunity. To hold otherwise would effectively leave a void in liability, leaving plaintiffs, such as Respondents, without a remedy for a public official’s gross negligence. We would be remiss to leave Maryland common law in this position. To illustrate the void in liability, we created the below table: - 41 - Negligence Malice Gross Negligence MTCA State liable State immune State immune Official immune Official liable Official liable Common Law Public Official Official immune Official liable Official immune Immunity Result State liable Official liable No one liable In cases of gross negligence, under both the MTCA and common law public official immunity, State personnel who are also public officials, although otherwise liable under the MTCA, would nonetheless have common law public official immunity, and the State would also be immune. Succinctly put, where immunity exists under both the MTCA and common law public official immunity, the State would be liable for negligence, a public official would be liable for malice, but neither the State nor the public official would be liable for gross negligence—stated otherwise, there would be no remedy for the public official’s gross negligence. This is a nonsensical result with potentially disconcerting consequences. As Respondents’ counsel pointed out during oral argument, if gross negligence were not an exception to common law public official immunity, a public official and the State would have an incentive to avoid liability by arguing that the public official acted with gross negligence, and the plaintiff would be required to argue in response that the public official was “merely negligent” or malicious. We are unpersuaded by Cooper’s contention that Article 19 does not inform the application of gross negligence as an exception to common law public official immunity, and that there is no void in liability because the State has already paid Respondents for the - 42 - other correctional officers’ negligence. That the State has compensated Respondents for the negligence of Scott, Surgeon, and Gaither is of no consequence. The State’s payment for liability for negligence of another does not account for Cooper’s liability for gross negligence; liability for negligence and liability for gross negligence are not interchangeable.16 Our holding that gross negligence is an exception to common law public official immunity is consistent with the reasoning underlying the MTCA. To be sure, common law public official immunity and immunity under the MTCA are distinct principles. As this Court explained in Lee, 384 Md. at 260-61, 863 A.2d at 306-07: The purpose of the Maryland public official immunity principle is to [e]nsure that a public official (and not just any government employee), in the performance of an important public duty, has the freedom and authority to make decisions and choices. The principle is aimed at permitting a public official to act according to one’s judgment in the absence of a hard and fast rule. Thus, the situation where public official immunity is applicable involves a tort claim based upon alleged mis-judgment or a negligent exercise of judgment by a public official. The doctrine is intended to be a defense against claims that a “better choice” could have been made by an official. This defense is inherently related to actions based on negligence. Most alleged intentional torts, on the other hand, do not involve legitimate public policy choices or actions in the absence of a hard and fast rule. The immunity under the [MTCA], however, is not inherently related to negligence actions[,] in contrast to intentional tort actions. The purpose of the [MTCA]’s immunity is not simply to protect judgmental decisions by officials. Instead, the purpose of the [MTCA]’s immunity is to insulate state employees generally from tort liability if their actions are within the scope of employment and without malice or gross negligence. This broader purpose fully applies to non-malicious intentional torts and constitutional torts. 16 In addition, we recognize that, in a future case, there may be a finding of gross negligence only (and not negligence), and, as such, absent our holding today, the plaintiff in that case would not recover anything from either the State or the public official. - 43 - (Citations and some internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). Despite the distinction between immunity under the MTCA and common law public official immunity, it is entirely consistent with the MTCA to conclude that gross negligence is an exception to common law public official immunity. In Rios v. Montgomery Cnty., 386 Md. 104, 131 n.13, 872 A.2d 1, 16 n.13 (2005), this Court noted that “[t]he [MTCA] was enacted by the General Assembly in 1984 for the purpose of creating a remedy for individuals injured by tortious conduct attributable to the State. [T]he [MTCA] . . . [was] designed to expand the individual’s right to obtain remuneration for injury from the government[.]” (Citation omitted). Under the MTCA, the State waives its sovereign immunity in certain circumstances; “the State does not waive its sovereign immunity[, however,] for any tortious acts outside the scope of employment or when a ‘state personnel’ acts with malice or gross negligence.” Barbre, 402 Md. at 175, 935 A.2d at 710 (citations omitted). Thus, where the MTCA applies, either the State or State personnel is liable for the State personnel’s tortious conduct, depending on the nature of the tortious conduct. One of the core principles of the MTCA is that it provides the State immunity for the gross negligence of State personnel, while allowing State personnel to be liable for gross negligence. The MTCA broadly defines “State personnel,” in relevant part, as “a State employee or official who is paid in whole or in part by the Central Payroll Bureau in the Office of the Comptroller of the Treasury[.]” SG § 12-101(a)(1). The MTCA also lists specific examples of those who qualify as “State personnel” for purposes of the MTCA. See SG § 12-101(a)(2)–(14). By contrast, whether an individual qualifies as a “public official” for purposes of common law public official immunity has been defined narrowly - 44 - through case law. In D’Aoust v. Diamond, 424 Md. 549, 587-88, 36 A.3d 941, 963 (2012), we noted the following “factors that are useful in determining whether an individual is a public official”: (i) The position was created by law and involves continuing and not occasional duties. (ii) The holder performs an important public duty. (iii) The position calls for the exercise of some portion of the sovereign power of the State. (iv) The position has a definite term for which a commission is issued and a bond and an oath are required. . . . [T]hese factors are not conclusive to our determination[,] and[,] even if an individual does not meet these criteria, he [or she] may nonetheless be considered a public official if he [or she] exercises a large portion of the sovereign power of government or can be called on to exercise police powers as a conservator of the peace. . . . [S]overeign power, in its simplest terms, means the power to make and enforce laws. The exercise of sovereign power, thus, generally contemplates someone serving in a legislative or policymaking capacity. (Brackets, citations, footnote, internal quotation marks, and some paragraph breaks omitted). Thus, for example, law enforcement “officers are public officials” for purposes of common law public official immunity. Smith v. Danielczyk, 400 Md. 98, 128, 928 A.2d 795, 813 (2007) (citations omitted). Correctional officers are also public officials. See Livesay, 384 Md. at 12-13, 862 A.2d at 39. Court-appointed trustees, however, are not public officials. See D’Aoust, 424 Md. at 592, 36 A.3d at 965-66. Here, it is undisputed that Cooper, as a correctional officer employed by the Division of Correction of the Maryland DPSCS, is a State employee for purposes of the MTCA and also a public official for purposes of common law public official immunity. Our holding that gross negligence is an exception to common law public official immunity is consistent with the General Assembly’s intent in enacting the MTCA—that State personnel should be liable for gross - 45 - negligence. It would be an illogical result to not accord Cooper immunity under the MTCA, but provide immunity as a public official. Stated otherwise, it would be unreasonable to distinguish between State personnel and public officials for purposes of liability for gross negligence. Individuals who are State personnel but not public officials are liable for gross negligence under the MTCA. But, were we to hold otherwise, individuals who are both State personnel and public officials would not be liable for gross negligence. We discern no logical basis for shielding public officials from liability for gross negligence, but requiring State personnel to face liability for gross negligence. The MTCA’s legislative history supports our conclusion. In 1984, the MTCA was enacted as part of the then-new State Government Article. See 1984 Md. Laws 979, 141725 (Ch. 284, S.B. 50). At that time, SG § 12-104(c), concerning exclusions and limitations on the State’s waiver of immunity, contained no mention of not waiving immunity for a State employee’s gross negligence. See id. at 1420. SG § 12-107(d) provided, though, that “State personnel who act[ed] within the scope of the State personnel’s public duties and without malice and gross negligence [was] not liable as an individual for any damages that result[ed] from tortious conduct for which immunity [was] waived under” the MTCA Id. at 1424 (capitalization omitted). The following year, the General Assembly amended the MTCA. See 1985 Md. Laws 2682, 2688 (Ch. 537, S.B. 380). One of Senate Bill 380’s purposes was to “provid[e] that sovereign immunity is not waived for certain items” and to “provid[e] that State personnel are immune from certain tort suits[.]” Id. at 2682. To that end, one amendment to SG § 12-104 included adding a provision stating that - 46 - “[i]mmunity is not waived under this section for . . . any tortious act or omission of State personnel that . . . is made with malice or gross negligence[.]” Id. at 2684 (capitalization and paragraph breaks omitted). And, the provision concerning State personnel was moved from SG § 12-107(d) to SG § 12-105. See id. at 2685. Senate Bill 380’s bill file included an “Explanatory Statement” prepared by the Treasurer, which stated, in relevant part: The [MTCA] attempts to protect both the public and State employees by waiving sovereign immunity of the State and granting sovereign immunity to State employees. However, in seeking this double objective, the categories of waiver and protection have created a sea of legal uncertainty. . . . To remedy the defects of the [MTCA], [Senate Bill] 380 proposes the following: . . . 3) State employees would be protected from tort liability for tortious acts or omissions in the course of their employment – absent malice or gross negligence. (Paragraph breaks omitted). Senate Bill 380’s bill file also contained a “Bill Analysis” by the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, which noted that Senate Bill 380 “establishes the State’s immunity to liability for torts of State employees acting outside the scope of their duties or with malice or gross negligence.” The Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee noted, though, that Senate Bill 380 “retains the provision shielding State employees from tort liability when the State can be sued and when the employees acted within the scope of their duty and without malice or gross negligence.” What can be gleaned from this legislative history is that it is—and has always been—one of the purposes of the MTCA to allow State personnel to be liable for gross negligence. The rationale underlying the MTCA immunity provision applies equally to common law public official immunity. It would be contrary to both the purpose of Article 19 and the logic of the MTCA to conclude that common law public official immunity shields - 47 - public officials from liability for their gross negligence, leaving plaintiffs effectively without a remedy for a public official’s gross negligence. Already under common law public official immunity, public officials are not shielded from liability for their intentional torts or malicious acts. We decline to construe common law public official immunity in such a way that it is inconsistent with Article 19 and leaves those injured by the gross negligence of a public official without a remedy.17 Our holding is consistent with the manner in which other jurisdictions have addressed gross negligence through various tort claims acts, namely, someone—either the governmental entity or the government official—is liable for gross negligence under the circumstances set forth in the jurisdictions’ respective tort claims acts. In other words, other jurisdictions have expressed a desire for liability to exist for gross negligence. See, e.g., J.L. v. Barnes, 33 A.3d 902, 914 (Del. Super. Ct. 2011) (“When State actors or employees are sued in their individual capacities, they are exempt from liability . . . pursuant to the [State Tort Claims Act] when: (1) the alleged act or failure to act arises out of and in connection with the performance of official duties involving the exercise of discretion; (2) the act or failure to act was done (or not done) in good faith; and (3) the act 17 Respondents’ counsel pointed out during oral argument that to conclude that gross negligence is not an exception to common law public official immunity would be to write the MTCA “out of the law.” Respondents’ counsel stated: “It would be meaningless to say in the [MTCA] that the officer’s liable for gross negligence, as the [General Assembly] has, . . . but, under the common law,” the officer is not liable. This point is well-taken. Indeed, not only does the current state of common law public official immunity leave a vacuum in liability, but it also permits State personnel who are public officials to be immune for gross negligence, even though they would otherwise be liable under the MTCA. - 48 - or failure to act was done without gross negligence. A plaintiff need only prove the absence of one of these elements to defeat qualified immunity.” (Footnotes omitted)); Reilly v. Vadlamudi, 680 F.3d 617, 627 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Michigan law offers government employees immunity from tort liability under certain circumstances. Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1407(2). Defendants are immune from liability if . . . their ‘conduct did not amount to gross negligence that was the proximate cause of the injury or damage.’ Id.” (Brackets omitted)); Jackson v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 390 S.E.2d 467, 468 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam) (“[T]he Tort Claims Act states: [‘]The governmental entity is not liable for a loss resulting from responsibility or duty including but not limited to supervision, protection, control, confinement, or custody of any . . . , inmate, . . . , except when the responsibility or duty is exercised in a grossly negligent manner.[’] Therefore if the Department [of Corrections] was grossly negligent . . . , its immunity from liability under the Act is waived.” (Some ellipses in original) (paragraph breaks omitted)); Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225 (Tex. 2004) (“The Tort Claims Act expressly waives sovereign immunity in three areas . . . . [T]he Tort Claims Act further modifies a governmental unit’s waiver of immunity from suit by imposing the limitations of liability articulated in the recreational use statute. . . . [A] governmental unit waives sovereign immunity under the recreational use statute and the Tort Claims Act only if it is grossly negligent.” (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). See also Colby v. Boyden, 400 S.E.2d 184, 186 (Va. 1991) (“In Virginia, a government agent entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity is not immunized from suit. Rather, the degree of negligence which must be shown to impose liability is elevated from simple to gross negligence.” (Citations - 49 - omitted)); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-201(b)(2) (West 2015) (“All members of boards, commissions, agencies, authorities, and other governing bodies of any governmental entity, created by public or private act, whether compensated or not, shall be immune from suit arising from the conduct of the affairs of such board, commission, agency, authority, or other governing body. Such immunity from suit shall be removed when such conduct amounts to willful, wanton, or gross negligence.”). Because public official immunity is a common law doctrine, it is entirely appropriate for this Court to define its contours. In Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 261, 863 A.2d 297, 307 (2004), we stated: “The principle of public official immunity is not, and has never been, tied to a waiver of sovereign or governmental immunity.” In other words, although under the MTCA (and in other instances), the General Assembly has expressly waived sovereign or governmental immunity—and it was appropriate for the General Assembly to have acted in this regard—immunity pursuant to common law public official immunity is not a matter that requires action by the General Assembly. Instead, “this Court has authority under the Maryland Constitution to change the common law.” Bowden v. Caldor, Inc., 350 Md. 4, 27, 710 A.2d 267, 278 (1998) (citations omitted). See also Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 347 Md. 561, 593 n.29, 702 A.2d 230, 246 n.29 (1997); OwensIllinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 469, 601 A.2d 633, 657 (1992) (“By changing this standard of proof . . ., we have not overruled any particular Maryland cases on the ground that they were wrongly decided at the time. Instead, we have exercised our constitutional authority to change the common law.” (Citations omitted)). This Court has noted that “the common law is not static. Its life and heart is its - 50 - dynamism—its ability to keep pace with the world while constantly searching for just and fair solutions to pressing societal problems . . . . The common law is, therefore, subject to modification by judicial decision[.]” Warr v. JMGM Grp., LLC, 433 Md. 170, 250, 70 A.3d 347, 395 (2013) (citation omitted). Although the General Assembly is the appropriate entity to waive sovereign immunity under the MTCA, common law public official immunity is a principle developed through case law by the Courts of this State. Thus, the General Assembly would not be charged with determining whether gross negligence is an exception to common law public official immunity absent codification of public official immunity.18 Because the courts are the keepers of the common law, and because the Maryland Constitution instills within this Court the ability to determine the common law, 18 Of course, we are aware that common law public official immunity has been codified by the General Assembly for certain public officials. Specifically, CJP § 5- 507(a)(1) provides that “[a]n official of a municipal corporation, while acting in a discretionary capacity, without malice, and within the scope of the official’s employment or authority shall be immune as an official or individual from any civil liability for the performance of the action.” And CJP § 5-509(c)(1) provides that “an official of a special taxing district, [i.e., a member of the governing body of a special taxing district,] while acting in a discretionary capacity, without malice, and within the scope of the official’s authority, is immune in an official or individual capacity from civil liability for any act or omission.” In Lovelace, 366 Md. at 704, 785 A.2d at 734, we observed that the purpose of CJP §§ 5-507(b)(1) and 5-511(b) (now CJP § 5-509) “was to codify existing public official immunity, and not to extend the scope of qualified immunity beyond its Maryland common law boundaries.” (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, despite codification of these particular aspects of common law public official immunity, common law public official immunity remains a separate, viable ground for immunity for public officials. See generally Houghton, 412 Md. at 585-91, 989 A.2d at 227-31 (This Court discussed the various grounds on which Maryland public officials may claim immunity, analyzing common law public official immunity separately from immunity under CJP § 5- 507(b), CJP § 5-511(b) (now CJP § 5-509), and the MTCA.). Cooper has not contended that he is entitled to immunity under either CJP § 5-507 or CJP § 5-509; and, neither statute applies. - 51 - we are satisfied that our holding—that gross negligence is an exception to common law public official immunity—neither runs afoul of the Maryland Constitution nor invades the province of the General Assembly.