Opinion ID: 687605
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applicability of Sec. 933(g)

Text: 44 Section 933(g)(1) applies to settlements with third persons where the settlement is for an amount less than the compensation to which the claimant would be entitled under the LHWCA. It requires that the employee receive the written approval of the employer and the employer's carrier whenever the employee enters into a settlement for an amount less than the compensation that he or she is entitled to under the LHWCA. 45 The Board rejected Brenneman's defense under Sec. 933(g)(1), concluding that this subsection only applies where the amount recovered from a settlement is less than the amount of compensation due. It reasoned that Barbara and Gregory Bundens received a net recovery of $646,078 from the federal court tort settlement, and would only be entitled to $335,754 under the LHWCA, an amount less than the net recovery from the one million dollar settlement. 46 The Director argues that the Board made two errors in applying Sec. 933(g). First, the Board looked to the net settlement amount instead of the gross settlement amount when deciding whether Bundens had to obtain written approval of the settlement. Second, the Board treated the tort recovery of Barbara and Gregory as one settlement. Instead, it should have considered Barbara and Gregory separately since both are persons entitled to compensation under the LHWCA. 47 Comparing the language of Sec. 933(f) to Sec. 933(g), we observe that whereas Sec. 933(f) specifically refers to the net amount recovered against such third person (and even defines it), Sec. 933(g) refers simply to a settlement ... for an amount less than the compensation to which the person ... would be entitled. Thus, although Congress demonstrated its ability to specify net amount when it wanted to, it failed to do so in subsection (g). [W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1213, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987) (citations omitted). Moreover, as the Supreme Court has stated, where the plain meaning of th[e] statute appears to settle the question, a court should look to other sources to determine only whether there is 'clearly expressed legislative intention' contrary to the language, which would require [the court] to question the strong presumption that Congress expresses its intent through the language it chooses. Id. at 432 n. 12, 107 S.Ct. at 1213, n. 12. 48 Additionally, the inclusion of net and its definition in Sec. 933(f) was part of a comprehensive 1984 overhaul of Sec. 933. During this revision, Congress rewrote four subsections, including Sec. 933(g). Although Sec. 933(g) was elaborately recast, Congress did not elect to include the net language that it carefully placed in Sec. 933(f). 49 Given the opportunity to redraft the statute, we might well have included the net language in Sec. 933(g). 28 However, because our task is to interpret, and not to create law, we are compelled to conclude that in applying Sec. 933(g) the Board should consider the gross, and not the net, settlement funds. 29 50 Applying Sec. 933(g)(2) separately to Barbara and Gregory, we reach the following. Because the $700,000 30 gross settlement that Barbara received in the settlement exceeds the $100,628 that she would be entitled to under the LHWCA, she was not required under Sec. 933(g)(1) to obtain the written approval of either the employer or the employer's carrier prior to the settlement. And since the $300,000 that Gregory received was more than the $235,126 that he would be entitled to under the LHWCA, he too was not required to obtain the written approval of the employer or the employer's compensation carrier. 51 Although written approval was not required under Sec. 933(g)(1), the Board ruled that the Sec. 933(g)(2) notice provision applied. The Board found that this requirement was fulfilled here since Brenneman had been a party to the settlement agreement. We agree. Section 933(g)(2) requires that the employer receive notification of the third party settlement. Because Brenneman itself was a party to the third party settlement, the Sec. 933(g)(2) notification requirement was clearly satisfied in this case. 31 See also Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Mobley, 920 F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir.1990) (So long as the employer has notice of the settlement before it has made any payments and before the Agency orders it to make any payments, the purposes of [Sec. 933(g)(2) ] are satisfied.). 52 Although the Board erred in interpreting Sec. 933(g)(1), it reached the correct result in deciding that Sec. 933(g)(1) did not apply. Additionally, the Board did not err in holding that the notice provision of Sec. 933(g)(2) was satisfied. Thus, we will affirm the order of the Board on this issue.