Opinion ID: 891631
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: respondent's disciplinary proceeding was constitutional and afforded him due process

Text: {8} At the outset, we address a number of constitutional challenges that Respondent raises in an effort to question the underlying fairness of his disciplinary proceeding. Respondent's first challenge stems from his request that chief disciplinary counsel conduct an independent review of his case. In response to that request, chief disciplinary counsel sent Respondent a letter informing him that pursuant to Rule 17-307(E) NMRA she had reviewed the file prior to the filing of charges and concluded that there was reasonable cause to believe that Respondent had committed rule violations. She also informed Respondent that she no longer had any authority to intervene in the proceedings because the matter was now before the hearing committee, and noted that Rule 17-307(B) provides that all doubts shall be resolved in favor of conducting a formal hearing. {9} Respondent argues that chief disciplinary counsel's reliance on Rule 17-307(B) violated his right to due process. His argument is twofold. First, Respondent contends that by resolving all doubts in favor of conducting a formal hearing, Rule 17-307(B) is contrary to the fundamental notion of due process that a person is innocent until proven guilty and not civilly at fault until proven liable. Second, Respondent asserts that Rule 17-307(B) is not being consistently applied. Respondent believes that a consistent application of the rule would either result in formal proceedings on nearly every complaint filed with the Board or else the arbitrary pursuit of only some complaints. We do not find either of Respondent's arguments persuasive. {10} Respondent's contention that Rule 17-307(B) presumes his culpability is misguided. As is the case with both criminal and civil proceedings, Rule 17-307(B) provides that in deciding whether a complaint should be dismissed without a formal evidentiary hearing, the facts alleged in the complaint must be taken as true before deciding whether there is reasonable cause to believe that a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct has occurred. This is no different than the standard imposed in either a criminal or a civil context for motions to dismiss the initiating pleading. See N.M. Life Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Quinn & Co., 111 N.M. 750, 753, 809 P.2d 1278, 1281 (1991) (A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, we must accept as true all well-pleaded facts and question only whether the plaintiff might prevail under any state of facts provable under the claim.); State v. Wasson, 1998-NMCA-087, ¶ 5, 125 N.M. 656, 964 P.2d 820 (recognizing that when considering pretrial motions attacking the sufficiency of an indictment or information, the factual allegations in the State's pleadings are taken as true). {11} To the extent that Respondent contends that disciplinary counsel is applying Rule 17-307(B) arbitrarily, his argument is based on unsupported conjecture and a misunderstanding of the handling of disciplinary complaints. First, although Respondent asserts that disciplinary counsel dismisses many more complaints than should be allowable under Rule 17-307(B), his assertion has no support in the record. See State v. Reynolds, 111 N.M. 263, 267, 804 P.2d 1082, 1086 (Ct.App.1990) (Matters outside the record present no issue for review.). Moreover, even when Rule 17-307(B) precludes disciplinary counsel from summarily dismissing a complaint, the Rules Governing Discipline still provide for a formal investigation procedure and the possibility of an informal disposition that may avoid the need for the filing of formal charges. See Rule 17-307(C) (providing a formal investigation procedure before the filing of formal charges); Rule 17-308 NMRA (giving disciplinary counsel discretion to propose an informal admonition to resolve the matter without the need for a formal hearing). In short, even if most disciplinary complaints do not result in the filing of formal charges, Respondent wrongly assumes that arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement is the cause. {12} Respondent next argues that he was the victim of selective prosecution because of his involvement in a petition to convene a grand jury to investigate the operation of EcoVersity. See N.M. Const. art. II, § 14 (providing registered voters with the right to petition the district court to convene a grand jury). We assume without deciding that the affirmative defense of selective prosecution is available to a respondent-attorney in a disciplinary proceeding. Cf. State v. Estrada, 2001-NMCA-034, ¶ 12, 130 N.M. 358, 24 P.3d 793 (requiring a defendant in a criminal proceeding who asserts the affirmative defense of selective prosecution to show that (1) he was singled out for prosecution while others similarly situated have not been prosecuted, and (2) selection of him for prosecution was invidious or in bad faith and based on intentional, purposeful discrimination stemming from impermissible considerations, such as... the exercise of a constitutionally protected right). However, even if the defense were available, Respondent has failed to establish its prerequisites. {13} First, Respondent made no showing that other similarly situated attorneys have not been the subject of disciplinary proceedings, while he has. Second, Respondent's attempt to characterize this disciplinary proceeding as a means to punish him for exercising his right to petition for a grand jury proceeding is a gross distortion of the record. To justify his claim of selective prosecution, Respondent seizes on an isolated statement in a reviewing officer's report prepared before the filing of formal charges against him. See Rule 17-104(B) NMRA (A reviewing officer, upon request of disciplinary counsel or the chair of the board, shall have the authority and duty to review, approve, modify or disapprove dismissals of complaints docketed for formal investigation and offers of informal admonitions proposed by disciplinary counsel.). In that report, after twelve pages detailing why the reviewing officer believed that Respondent committed misrepresentations and the unauthorized practice of law, the report briefly notes the reviewing officer's concern about Respondent's ongoing efforts to petition for the convening of a grand jury to investigate criminal fraud. Respondent's actions in that regard most concerned the reviewing officer because the reviewing officer thought that Respondent was trying to carve out a legal role for himself when he does not represent anyone who has any standing to bring these claims. From this single statement, Respondent seeks to portray the entire disciplinary proceeding as flowing from an unlawful intent to deprive him of his constitutional rights. He is simply wrong. {14} The reviewing officer's report describes in detail the factual basis for his conclusion that Respondent engaged in misrepresentations and the unauthorized practice of law. No fair reading of the reviewing officer's report can lead to the conclusion that Respondent was being singled out for exercising his right to petition the district court to convene a grand jury. Rather, the reviewing officer only noted that Respondent's petitioning activity was merely his latest attempt to press claims that he had unsuccessfully solicited others to pursue through civil litigation. The reviewing officer believed that the claims Respondent was trying to raise through a grand jury proceeding were in violation of Rule 16-301 NMRA, which prohibits the bringing of frivolous claims. However, the reviewing officer specifically recommended against bringing a disciplinary proceeding on this basis, believing that a court of law was the appropriate forum for determining either the merit or the frivolousness of the claims Respondent was trying to pursue by means of a grand jury investigation. In short, there is no basis for Respondent's claim that he is the victim of selective prosecution. {15} Respondent also seeks to establish a claim of vindictive prosecution because disciplinary counsel initially recommended dismissing the complaint against him, but then pursued disbarment after the reviewing officer disapproved dismissing the complaint. Cf. State v. Brule, 1999-NMSC-026, ¶ 10, 127 N.M. 368, 981 P.2d 782 (discussing the defense of vindictive prosecution within the context of criminal prosecutions). As with Respondent's claim of selective prosecution, we assume without deciding that the defense of vindictive prosecution may be available to a respondent in an attorney discipline proceeding. Nevertheless, Respondent has failed to establish that vindictive prosecution was at work in this case. {16} Respondent's basis for presuming vindictive prosecution is that disciplinary counsel ultimately sought his disbarment after first proposing to dismiss the complaint. However, as touched on above, whenever disciplinary counsel wants to summarily dismiss a complaint, the review and concurrence of a reviewing officer must be obtained. See Rule 17-105(B)(3)(a) NMRA (providing that the dismissal of a complaint that has been docketed for formal investigation is effective only after review and concurrence by a reviewing officer); Rule 17-104(B) (giving a reviewing officer the authority and duty to review, approve, modify or disapprove dismissals of complaints docketed for formal investigation). Under our Rules Governing Discipline, if a reviewing officer determines that a complaint should not be dismissed, disciplinary counsel has no choice but to pursue the case. Thus, the fact that disciplinary counsel sought the most severe possible sanction does not demonstrate even a prima facie showing of vindictiveness, much less require disciplinary counsel to offer an explanation in rebuttal. Cf. Brule, 1999-NMSC-026, ¶ 11, 127 N.M. 368, 981 P.2d 782 (By itself, the District Attorney's decision to pursue felony charges in district court after filing a nolle prosequi on the initial misdemeanor charges does not suggest a likelihood of vindictiveness.).