Opinion ID: 885518
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Contempt Policy

Text: ¶ 33 Nevertheless, the clear policy enunciated in Milanovich should not be buried beneath the weight of the foregoing stare decisis. Indeed, where parties are reluctant to abide by orders pertaining to custody, child support, maintenance, and property division, the best remedy to insure respect for the law and the orderly progress of relations between family members split by dissolution is to give effect to the contempt powers of the District Court. Milanovich, 201 Mont. at 336, 655 P.2d at 965. See also State ex rel. Rankin v. District Court (1920), 58 Mont. 276, 288, 191 P. 772, 774 (stating contempt power must be exercised to its fullest extent to enable the court to discharge its high duty of administering justice between parties whose rights are put in issue before it, or to enforce these rights after they have been determined). ¶ 34 We conclude that the foregoing statements of policy apply to all matters flowing from marital dissolution and child custody disputes, which obviously encompasses the case sub judice. Thus, this Court concludes that it would be poor public policy to create circumstances whereby a district court's contempt power, in enforcing the rights of the parties before it, is in any manner diminished by one party's ability to file a direct appeal that, in turn, frivolously and needlessly delays his or her compliance with the lower court's judgment and orders. To this end, our discretion to grant or deny a petition for certiorari or supervisory control for that matter undoubtedly is far more efficient and effective in upholding the family law policy set forth in Milanovich. It is therefore imperative that the family law direct appeal exception be well-defined and properly narrowed once and for all in light of the foregoing policy.