Opinion ID: 6350362
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unanimity of Jury Verdict

Text: Sexton next alleges he was denied his right to a unanimous jury verdict. Section 7 of the Kentucky Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to unanimous jury verdicts. Alleged unanimity errors are questions of law. Such errors are therefore reviewed de novo. Sargent v. Shaffer, 467 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Ky. 2015). The Commonwealth contends that Sexton waived his right to a unanimous jury verdict by admitting guilt in his closing argument and by failing to preserve the issue through either objection or a motion for directed 6 verdict. Although we are not persuaded by either argument for waiver,2 the Commonwealth points to an important factual distinction in this case. Sexton’s concession of guilt is not only relevant, but dispositive. Because Sexton failed to preserve his unanimity argument and because lack of preservation is not a waiver, we review for palpable error. See Elam, 500 S.W.3d at 826; RCr 10.26. “[A] palpable error affecting the substantial rights of a party, even if insufficiently raised or preserved, is reviewable, and, upon a determination that it has resulted in manifest injustice, reversible.” Deemer v. Finger, 817 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Ky. 1990) (citing CR 61.02). Manifest injustice is found only where, after consideration of the record, the defect alleged was “shocking or jurisprudentially intolerable” and where “the error seriously affected the ‘fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceeding.’” Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ky. 2006) (citations omitted). “[T]he required showing is probability of a different result or error so fundamental as to threaten a defendant’s entitlement to due process of law.” Id. at 3. When we engage in palpable error review, our “focus is on what happened and whether the defect is so manifest, fundamental and unambiguous that it threatens the 2 A waiver “is a voluntary and intentional surrender or relinquishment of a known right, or an election to forego an advantage which the party at his option might have demanded or insisted upon.” Vinson v. Sorrell, 136 S.W.3d 465, 469 (Ky. 2004) (quoting Greathouse v. Shreve, 891 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Ky. 1995)). The right in question stems from Section 7 of the Kentucky Constitution. Conceding that the Commonwealth has met its burden of proof is necessarily distinct from a defendant’s right to trial and a unanimous jury verdict. Sexton’s concession is not equivalent to a “voluntary and intentional surrender” of his right to a unanimous verdict. 7 integrity of the judicial process.” Baumia v. Commonwealth, 402 S.W.3d 530, 542 (Ky. 2013) (quoting Martin, 207 S.W.3d at 5). Manifest injustice was not present here. Sexton’s counsel was open about the fact that he was guilty of the alleged conduct. Counsel requested leniency and for the jury to consider mitigating factors in sentencing. Even absent potential error resulting from jury instructions that violated Sexton’s right to a unanimous verdict, this Court cannot hold that there is any possibility that the result of the case would have been different. Sexton, through counsel, acknowledged guilt; the jury agreed that he was guilty of two counts each of rape and incest. Such an error, to the extent that it occurred, cannot have resulted in manifest injustice. Accordingly, we distinguish this case from the cases preceding it in which the majority of this Court has held that any unanimity error is, by necessity, palpable. See, e.g., Martin v. Commonwealth, 456 S.W.3d 1, 9–10 (2015) (“[A]ll unanimous-verdict violations constitute palpable error resulting in manifest injustice.”); see also Justice v. Commonwealth, 636 S.W.3d 407, 415 (Ky. 2021) (“If the jury instructions created a unanimous-jury-verdict problem, reversal is required because defendants are guaranteed the right to a unanimous verdict by the Kentucky Constitution.”) (citing King v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2018)). In holding as such, this Court was not faced with an additional and summarily damning admission of the alleged conduct. This case illuminates the necessity for cabining our precedent: reversal is not the universal, essential result of a unanimous verdict 8 error. Where manifest injustice will not result, this Court can find no palpable error. This case provides a compelling example of the force of that standard. Given Sexton’s counsel’s unequivocal concession of guilt as well as the overwhelming evidence against Sexton, we cannot hold that any potential unanimity error would have resulted in a manifest injustice. There is no probability that the result of Sexton’s trial would have been different had the jury instructions included specific details about the allegations of rape and incest. Any error that may have occurred neither threatened Sexton’s entitlement to due process of law nor threatened the integrity of the judicial process. Accordingly, we decline to reverse Sexton’s conviction based on any error that may have occurred in the jury instructions.