Opinion ID: 1947634
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Final Policy Decision

Text: Appellants contend that the ANC was entitled to notice because the agency's action falls within D.C.Code 1981, § 1-261(c)(1). In order to trigger the notice requirement of this subsection, the agency action must be a final policy decision, and it must relate to one of the items in the subsequent list (licenses, permits, etc.). See note 3 supra. In addition, the decision must be of significance to neighborhood planning and development. Id. § 1-251(d); Kopff, supra at 1381. The first of the two criteria may be further subdivided into the questions of whether the action is a policy decision and whether it is final. For the reasons discussed hereafter, I conclude that each of these elements has been satisfied and that the ANC was therefore entitled to notice before the agency awarded the exclusive rights.
Appellees argue that the exclusive right agreements are not licenses or permits because they do not allow the developers to engage in conduct that would otherwise be unlawful, as is true, for example, of liquor licenses. I disagree. A permit or license empowers the grantee to perform some act that would not be allowed in the absence of such authority. The DCAPA itself defines the term license to include any permit, . . . approval,. . . or other form of permission granted by . . . any agency. D.C.Code 1981, § 1-1502(12). There is nothing in the statute restricting such approval or permission to conduct that would otherwise be unlawful. Appellees point out that, theoretically, a developer would not be prevented from preparing a plan at its own expense, even without an exclusive right. But because these rights are exclusive, the agency is precluded by its own agreement from accepting or considering any other proposal. The valuable privilege at issue here, the right granted by the agency, is not the right to prepare a proposal, but rather the right to submit that proposal to the agency without competition from other developers. Accordingly, the exclusive rights bestowed by the agency here are properly characterized as licenses or permits within the meaning of § 1-261(c)(1).
Although this was not a contested case, the RLA's action was nonetheless adjudicative, as opposed to legislative ( see Part I supra ) since it was based on particular information (adjudicative facts), and was directed at the rights of specific parties. See Schneider, supra at 326. This court held in Kopff, supra, that the term policy decision or guideline encompasses more than merely legislative-type actions; it may include adjudicative situations as well. [4] Kopff, supra at 1380-81. Thus the award of an exclusive right to submit a development proposal may constitute a policy decision, even though it was adjudicative in nature. Keeping in mind this interpretation of the statute, I conclude that the agency's award of exclusive rights was a policy decision relating to a license or permit, within the meaning of § 1-261(c)(1). Most of the specific agency activities listed in § 1-261(c)(1) involve discrete, local issues; they are seldom the subjects of general policy-making. Kopff, supra at 1381. See note 3 supra. If the term policy decision were limited to matters of broad, general policy, it would be difficult to imagine an adjudicatory action relating to a license or permit that would ever involve a policy decision. [5] Subsection (c) would be rendered meaningless by such an interpretation because the two categories policy decision and license or permit would be mutually exclusive. Moreover, this court held in Kopff, supra at 1380-81, that issuance of a liquor license was a policy decision within the meaning of the Act. It cannot be persuasively argued that awarding an exclusive right to submit a development proposal for a parcel of downtown property is less a policy decision than the award of a liquor license.
The agency argues that its action was not final because it had made no commitment to lease or sell the property to the developers it had selected; it had only completed the first step in the land disposition process. This argument misperceives the nature of the agency action at issue here, by failing to recognize the distinction between the ultimate disposition of the parcels, on the one hand, and the agency's decision as to who will be awarded the exclusive development rights, on the other hand. It is only the latter decision, the award of the license or permit, that is being contested here. And that decision is clearly final for all practical purposes. Like most licenses or permits, these rights may be temporary or subject to revocation. But that does not alter the finality of their issuance. Were the court to conclude that these rights are not final, as does Judge Nebeker, licenses and permits as a class would rarely, if ever, qualify as final. The practical effect of such a construction would be to render superfluous the terms licenses and permits in the statute. See 2A C.D. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (4th ed. 1973). [6] Thus the agency's award of exclusive development rights was final within the meaning of § 1-261(c)(1).
The significance threshold is prescribed by § 738(d) of the Home Rule Act, D.C. Code 1981, § 1-251(d), which provides: (d) In the manner provided by act of the Council, in addition to any other notice required by law, timely notice shall be given to each advisory neighborhood commission of requested or proposed zoning changes, variances, public improvements, licenses, or permits of significance to neighborhood planning and development within its neighborhood commission area for its review, comment, and recommendation. [Emphasis added.] This court first construed the statutory term significance in the Kopff case, in which we held that, at a minimum, all government actions for which a prior hearing is required by law are sufficiently significant to require written notice to the affected ANC. Kopff, supra at 1381. In other words, every contested case will automatically be significant enough to trigger the notice requirement, as long as the terms of § 1-261(c)(1) are satisfied. See D.C. Code 1981, § 1-1502(8). But Kopff also recognized that the term of significance encompasses more than just contested cases: We do not imply that all administrative agency matters for which hearings are not required are automatically excluded from the realm of significance. While it is difficult to conceive of many matters, not requiring a hearing, which would be sufficiently significant to neighborhood planning and development to warrant special notice to an ANC, we do not wish categorically to exclude all such cases. [ Id. at 1381.] See also Shiflett v. District of Columbia Board of Appeals and Review, D.C.App., 431 A.2d 9, 10 (1981). As discussed above, this case is not contested. I believe, however, that it falls within that narrow category left open in Kopff. Even though no prior hearing is required, the award of an exclusive right to submit a development proposal is a matter of significance to neighborhood planning and development, because it may have a tremendous impact on the type of development that occurs in these areas of downtown Washington. The award of an exclusive right creates a strong impetus toward the ultimate approval of that developer's plan. Rejection of a plan would lead to time-consuming delays, which the agency may have an economic interest in avoiding. Thus, without an opportunity to submit its views at the exclusive rights stage, the ANC may be deprived of any meaningful participation later. This risk emphasizes the significance of the initial selection of the developer. Because the significance threshold of the Home Rule Act is satisfied, in addition to the terms of the ANC Act (Part III (B)(1)-(3) supra ), I conclude that the ANC was entitled to notice pursuant to D.C.Code 1981, § 1-261(b). [7]