Opinion ID: 1302283
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Freedom to Associate[2]

Text: First Amendment rights protected by the federal constitution are applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There exists no expressly articulated right of freedom of association. Rather, as stated by Chief Justice Brickley, [t]he right of freedom of association is a right derived from the freedom of speech. Op. at 169. [3] This right of association was set forth by the United States Supreme Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-461, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1171, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958). [4] The Court stated: Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly.... It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the liberty assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.... Of course, it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters, and state action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny. [Emphasis added.] In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 3249-3250, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984), the United States Supreme Court stated that the nature and degree of constitutional protection afforded freedom of association may vary depending on the extent to which one or the other aspect of the constitutionally protected liberty is at stake in a given case. There are no limits or set parameters on potential associational freedoms. Further, there exists no bright-line test for determining the appropriate measure of constitutional protection against state interference with associational rights. Accordingly, the nature and extent to which the state may interfere with the freedom of association is dependent upon the type of associational rights implicated in each particular case. Chief Justice Brickley states that [t]he essential right protected under the freedom of association doctrine is the right to join together in a group of like-minded individuals and exercise free speech rights. Op. at 169. However accurate this statement may be, I prefer to rely on a broader statement describing the freedom of association. The United States Supreme Court has stated: [T]he right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment implies a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends. [ Bd. of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548, 107 S.Ct. 1940, 1947, 95 L.Ed.2d 474 (1987) (emphasis added).] Thus, I believe that associational rights afforded by the First Amendment are broader than recognized by Chief Justice Brickley. Additionally, Chief Justice Brickley narrows the possibilities for state infringement on the freedom of association. In determining whether association rights are implicated, he focuses primarily on whether an individual's attempt to join an organization is impeded by state interference. See Op. at 169. Chief Justice Brickley's attempt to join test is overly restrictive of the implication of associational rights. I believe that implication of First Amendment freedom of association rights may occur through many possible means and would not focus solely on whether an individual is impeded from joining an organization before feeling justified to invoke constitutional protections. Specifically, once an individual decides to join a group or organization, the associational freedoms that existed when the individual made the decision and joined the group remain intact and even become strengthened. Therefore, any governmental intrusion on the internal structure and organization of a group may pose questions of constitutional significance. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623, 104 S.Ct. at 3252 (government infringement on the freedom of association may result from interfer[ing] with the internal organization or affairs of the group). [5] It is well understood that employee unions enjoy freedom of association rights. Generally, in the context of labor unions, the freedom of association works to advance the collective economic interests of the labor union. See 4 Rotunda & Nowak, Constitutional Law, Substance and Procedure (2d ed), § 20.41, p. 249. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Brown v. Alexander, 718 F.2d 1417, 1422 (C.A.6, 1983), stated that first amendment protections extend to labor union activities and the right of employees to associate together as a labor organization. Further, it is undisputed that public employee unions also enjoy freedom of association rights. [6] However, the First Amendment does not guarantee public employee unions collective bargaining rights or even recognition. Id. at 1421. [7] Thus, I am fully aware that public employee collective bargaining rights are statutorily created and are not part of the First Amendment package of fundamental rights. However, I believe that §17 goes well beyond aiming at statutorily created collective bargaining rights and targets First Amendment associational freedoms. I believe that § 17 of 1994 P.A. 112 directly deprives the public school employees of the ability to run their organizations as they desire. [8] The ability to control the internal structure of one's organization is an essential component of the freedom of association. As in the case of most unions, the AFL-CIO and the MEA are hierarchical structures. When the individual bargaining unit members choose to associate with the statewide or the larger association, these people willingly relinquish the right to assert, in isolation and absent a statewide context, what is best for the individual bargaining unit. The individual bargaining unit members realize that they will benefit from the association's overall pattern of collective action. The United States Supreme Court expressly articulated the importance of the affiliation relationship to the effectiveness of the labor union. The essence of the affiliation relationship is the notion that the parent will bring to bear its often considerable economic, political, and informational resources when the local is in need of them.