Opinion ID: 506169
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Cash Transaction Reports Instruction

Text: 75 Defendant Black also objects to the trial court's instructions regarding the filing of cash transactions reports (CTRs) under the Currency Transaction Reporting Act (CTRA), 31 U.S.C. Sec. 5313(a) (1982). This requires banks to report certain transactions as specified by the Treasury Department, which has set a threshold of $10,000. See 31 C.F.R. Sec. 103.22 (1987). Black's objections are that the court did not make it sufficiently clear, first, that only the financial institution has a duty to file CTRs, and second, that the depositors are completely free to structure their transactions so as to keep under the threshold. We find no error. The court instructed the jury as follows: 76 The law provides that a financial institution shall file a report of each transaction in currency of more than $10,000. The duty and the responsibility to obtain the required information, fill out and file the required currency transaction report is on the banking institution in the case of bank deposits exceeding $10,000. The depositor, that is the person making the deposit, does not file the report. 77 Tr. 6421. These instructions obviously make it clear that depositors do not have a duty to file CTRs, so we turn to the second objection. 78 Here Black specifically objects to the trial court's refusal to give his Requested Instruction No. 8, to the effect that the law does not prohibit a person from structuring his transactions in such a way as to avoid the filing of CTRs. We note at the outset that Black's view of the law is hotly disputed in the courts of appeal. Compare United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1311 (2d Cir.1987); United States v. Puerto, 730 F.2d 627, 631 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 847, 105 S.Ct. 162, 83 L.Ed.2d 98 (1984); United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092, 1098 (11th Cir.1983) with United States v. Larson, 796 F.2d 244, 246 (8th Cir.1986); United States v. Reinis, 794 F.2d 506, 508 (9th Cir.1986); United States v. Varbel, 780 F.2d 758, 762 (9th Cir.1986); United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 681 (1st Cir.1985). Even if we assume that the depositor has no legal duty not to structure his transactions so as to avoid the filing of CTRs, however, we still conclude that omission of the requested instructions was not error. The prosecution did not charge Black with substantive violations of the CTRA. 4 Though the prosecutor made references to Black's evident efforts to keep below the trigger amount, he did so exclusively to support the inference that Black wished to avoid the governmental scrutiny that would follow if the bank filed a CTR with the federal government each time he deposited proceeds of drug sales. Tr. 6082-83, 6085-90, 6354-55. Thus the government claim was that these otherwise apparently lawful acts were unlawful only because they were carried out in furtherance of a conspiracy. 5 79 Clearly many acts that are by themselves perfectly legal may constitute overt acts manifesting participation in an illegal conspiracy, C. TORCIA, 4 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW Sec. 728 at 538 (1981). The jury need not be informed that all such acts are in the normal course of things perfectly legal. For instance, where conspiracy to rob a bank is charged and one member is assigned to case the joint by driving around the bank, it would be absurd to argue that the trial court must explain that driving a car near a bank is legal. In the absence of either a charge against Black under the CTRA itself or insinuations by the prosecutors or the court that Black's actions were illegal apart from their connection to the conspiracy, we find no error in denial of the proposed instructions.