Opinion ID: 166561
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: EEOC Concerns

Text: 43 The EEOC states in its amicus brief that it does not agree that a charging party's failure to cooperate during the administrative process precludes him from later proceeding against his employer in court. Rather, the EEOC argues that if the charging party has satisfied the express prerequisites to suit [laid out in the text of the ADEA], he has the right to sue his employer, based on the charge, and have a court determine the merits of his discrimination claim. 44 The EEOC is the principal arm of the federal government charged with eradicating employment discrimination, see Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1979), and the ADEA vests the EEOC with full power to issue legislative rules. See 29 U.S.C. § 628. This suggests that the EEOC's interpretations of the ADEA may bind courts' interpretation of the statute. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). 45 However, amicus briefs, opinion letters, and policy guidances do not reflect the deliberate exercise of interpretive authority that regulations and guidelines demonstrate. Rebecca Hanner White, The EEOC, the Courts, and Employment Discrimination Policy: Recognizing the Agency's Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation, 1995 Utah L.Rev. 51, 105. Thus, the Supreme Court has not afforded Chevron deference to EEOC interpretations promulgated only in such materials. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991) (refusing to defer to EEOC conclusion articulated only in the course of litigation, rather than in a deliberative exercise of interpretive authority) 6 ; Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 138-40, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944) (giving limited deference to FLSA administrator's interpretations issued in interpretive bulletin, opinion letters, and amicus brief). 46 In this case, the EEOC simply asserts its position in an amicus brief. 7 Thus we are not bound by the agency's interpretation of the prerequisites to suit under the ADEA. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988) (We have never applied [ Chevron deference] to agency litigating positions that are wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice.). 47 Moreover, the agency's position is not particularly persuasive. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140, 65 S.Ct. 161 (The weight [accorded to an administrative] judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.). The EEOC's brief provides no indication of whether the agency has been thorough in its consideration of the issue, and it appears that the agency's position has not been subjected to any sort of public scrutiny. The agency's interpretation is not one adopted contemporaneously with the passage of the ADEA. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142, 97 S.Ct. 401, 50 L.Ed.2d 343 (1976). Moreover, the agency's position is directly contrary to the numerous well-supported opinions from the Supreme Court and various courts of appeals highlighting the importance of voluntary cooperation to the enforcement of the federal antidiscrimination statutes generally, and the ADEA in particular. 48 Thus, we need not and do not afford significant deference to the EEOC's litigation position. 49
50 The EEOC also argues that requiring a charging party to cooperate with the EEOC is in tension with a long line of cases holding that the EEOC's conduct during the administrative process does not affect the charging party's right to a de novo judicial determination of the merits of his complaint. (EEOC Br. at 18.) See, e.g., Scheerer v. Rose State College, 950 F.2d 661, 663 (10th Cir.1991); Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. EEOC, 720 F.2d 804, 809 & 812 (4th Cir.1983); Ward v. EEOC, 719 F.2d 311, 313-14 (9th Cir.1983). The EEOC's principal concern is that if it dismisses cases based upon an EEOC determination of a claimant's failure to cooperate, courts will not be able to make a true de novo interpretation of whether cooperation really occurred. The EEOC argues that a district court will not be able to make a de novo determination of whether a plaintiff's non-cooperation constitutes a failure to exhaust without giving some effect to the EEOC's handling of the charge. As a result, the EEOC believes its investigators may feel constrained to retain charges . . . even though that means devoting less time to charges that, in the investigator's judgment, would otherwise warrant more extensive treatment. 51 The EEOC's argument ignores the reality that the district court's review is of the conduct that gave rise to the agency's decision to dismiss, not the agency's decision itself. See McBride, 281 F.3d at 1105-06 (It is for the district court to determine whether the plaintiff has complied with the regulatory requirements when the defendant raises the issue of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.). We have evaluated Shikles' cooperation with the EEOC without relying on the EEOC's decision to dismiss his charge. 8