Opinion ID: 867277
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prior act evidence

Text: ¶ 9 Hargrave argues on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting three categories of evidence at trial: (1) evidence related to his membership in the Imperial Royal Guard (IRG), (2) evidence of his statement to officers during his arrest that things would have been different had he been awake, and (3) evidence regarding the guns and ammunition recovered from the campsite. He claims that the evidence was not relevant and its admission violated Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(b) because its limited probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice. He also contends that the prosecutor used the evidence for an improper purpose. ¶ 10 Evidence of a defendant's prior or subsequent acts is not admissible to show that the defendant is a bad person or has a propensity for committing crimes. State v. McCall, 139 Ariz. 147, 152, 677 P.2d 920, 925 (1983) (prior acts); see also State v. Moreno, 153 Ariz. 67, 68, 734 P.2d 609, 610 (App.1986) (subsequent acts). Other act evidence may be admitted, however, for other purposes, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b). The proponent must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant committed the act, State v. Terrazas, 189 Ariz. 580, 582, 944 P.2d 1194, 1196 (1997), and the court must then (1) find that the act is offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b); (2) find that the prior act is relevant to prove that purpose; (3) find that any probative value is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice; and (4) give upon request an appropriate limiting instruction, State v. Anthony, 218 Ariz. 439, 444 ¶ 33, 189 P.3d 366, 371 (2008).
¶ 11 Hargrave and Boggs had formed the Imperial Royal Guard (IRG), a paramilitary organization that asserted the supremacy of the white race and espoused negative views of racial minorities. Boggs served as Chief of Staff and Hargrave as Assistant Chief of Staff. At Hargrave's campsite, police discovered Hargrave's IRG membership application, his oath of allegiance to the IRG, a binder containing a declaration describing the IRG's tenets, and a camouflage jacket bearing his IRG Assistant Chief of Staff name tag. ¶ 12 The State offered the IRG evidence to establish racial bias as a potential motive for the crimes. It presented evidence that all three victims were members of minority groups and that Boggs had shouted racial epithets during the shootings. Hargrave argues that the trial court erred in admitting the IRG evidence because it was not relevant to the crimes charged and no evidence established that the murders were motivated by racial bias. ¶ 13 Because Hargrave did not object to the IRG evidence at trial, [3] we review its admission for fundamental error, which is error going to the foundation of the case, error that takes from the defendant a right essential to his defense, [or] error of such magnitude that the defendant could not possibly have received a fair trial. State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567 ¶ 19, 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005) (quoting State v. Hunter, 142 Ariz. 88, 90, 688 P.2d 980, 982 (1984)). To prevail under this standard, Hargrave must first establish that an error occurred, then prove that the error was fundamental in nature and caused prejudice. Id. at 567 ¶¶ 20, 23, 115 P.3d at 607. ¶ 14 Hargrave has not established that any error occurred. Contrary to Hargrave's argument, motive is relevant in a murder prosecution. State v. Hunter, 136 Ariz. 45, 50, 664 P.2d 195, 200 (1983). He counters that the State presented evidence of other motives, such as robbery or retaliation for having been fired from his job. But the fact that the State may have evidence of other motives does not preclude the State from presenting the IRG motive evidence. See Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b); see also State v. Andriano, 215 Ariz. 497, 503 ¶ 26, 161 P.3d 540, 549 (2007) (finding evidence of defendant's extra-marital affair admissible under Rule 404(b) to prove motive, even though less prejudicial evidence of motive existed). ¶ 15 Citing Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992), Hargrave claims that his affiliation with the IRG was protected by the First Amendment. In Dawson, the prosecution attempted to introduce evidence of the defendant's Aryan Brotherhood and swastika tattoos during the penalty phase of his murder trial. 503 U.S. at 161, 112 S.Ct. 1093. The Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the introduction of this evidence because it was not relevant to the capital sentencing proceedings. Id. at 160, 112 S.Ct. 1093. ¶ 16 Here, in contrast, evidence of Hargrave's affiliation with the IRG was relevant to establish a motive for the crimes and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the prejudice it might have caused. Hargrave has not satisfied his initial burden of establishing that the trial court committed any error in admitting this evidence. [4]
¶ 17 Hargrave argues that the trial court erred in admitting his post-arrest comments that things would have been different if he had been awake when the officers arrived and that the police were lucky that he was asleep when they took him into custody. He contends that the statements served no proper purpose, were not connected to the murders, and allowed jurors to speculate that he was a violent person. The prosecutor offered the statements to show a consciousness of guilt. ¶ 18 Because Hargrave did not object to these statements at trial, we review for fundamental error. Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567 ¶ 19, 115 P.3d at 607. ¶ 19 There was no fundamental error. Hargrave's statements did not go to the foundation of his case, cause him prejudice, or otherwise deprive him of a fair trial or any right essential to his defense. See id. at 568 ¶ 24, 115 P.3d at 608. The State produced substantial evidence of Hargrave's participation in the murders, including eyewitness testimony, Hargrave's DNA on the murder weapon, a photograph of Hargrave attempting to use victim F.J.'s ATM card after the murders, and Hargrave's own admission of his culpability in planning and implementing the armed robbery.
¶ 20 Hargrave objected to the admission of guns, boxes of ammunition, and shell casings found at his campsite, arguing that the evidence was not relevant because the guns and ammunition were not used during the murders. The court overruled Hargrave's objection, finding the evidence of Hargrave's arrest with Boggs's guns relevant to rebut Hargrave's claim that he did not know that Boggs would have a gun during the restaurant robbery. [5] ¶ 21 We review the trial court's evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion. State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, 49 ¶ 29, 97 P.3d 865, 874 (2004). ¶ 22 In State v. Ellison, we found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that a defendant possessed a gun before and after the charged crime because it made the defendant's story less plausible. 213 Ariz. 116, 133 ¶ 58, 140 P.3d 899, 915 (2006). The evidence here was similarly relevant to rebut Hargrave's main defensethat he did not know Boggs would have a gun. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting evidence of the campsite guns and ammunition. [6]
¶ 23 Hargrave asserts that the trial court erred in its final limiting instruction regarding 404(b) evidence. [7] The State concedes that the trial court erred in instructing the jurors that they could consider this evidence as demonstrating that Hargrave had a character trait that predisposed him to commit the crimes. Such a limiting instruction is properly given when the jury hears evidence regarding sexual propensity, Ariz. R. Evid. 404(c), not evidence of prior acts, Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b). Hargrave did not object to this erroneous instruction at trial, however, and so we review for fundamental error. Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567 ¶ 19, 115 P.3d at 607. ¶ 24 The erroneous instruction did not deny Hargrave a fair trial or a right essential to his defense. Despite the error, the jury instruction, taken as a whole, properly advised jurors of the State's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and instructed them not to use the prior act evidence as a basis for convicting Hargrave of the charges. Hargrave has not met his burden of establishing that this error constituted fundamental error. ¶ 25 There was also either an error in the trial court's reading of the limiting instruction or in the court reporter's transcription of the instruction. The transcript reads: You must [sic] consider this act to determine that the defendant acted in conformity with the defendant's character or character trait and therefore committed the charged offense. The [sic] notation, which appears in the original transcript, could be interpreted in one of two ways: Either the judge misspoke and the court reporter noted the error, or the court reporter did not hear what was said and included the notation to fill the blank in the transcript. ¶ 26 Hargrave has not met his burden of persuading us that the trial judge gave an improper instruction. It is highly unlikely that such an improper instruction, if given, would have escaped the notice of the trial judge, the prosecutor, and defense counsel. Moreover, the jurors had with them when they deliberated an instruction that correctly stated the law on this issue. Viewing the jury instructions as a whole, we cannot conclude that the error in reading the limiting instruction, if one occurred, rises to the level of fundamental error.