Opinion ID: 2979105
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Inconsistent Jury Verdict

Text: Ruiz argues that conspiracy was an element of the Travel Act count and therefore the jury’s determination that she was guilty of the Travel Act count but not the conspiracy count creates an impermissible inconsistent verdict. She characterizes the conspiracy charge and the Travel Act charge as “mutually exclusive crimes,” arguing that the conspiracy was a necessary element of the Travel Act charge. Ruiz takes the position that the not-guilty verdict on the conspiracy count demonstrates that the “jury did not (and apparently could not) find that a conspiracy existed,” and in the absence of a conspiracy, the Travel Act count must be dismissed. Ruiz recognizes that the Supreme Court has repeatedly found that jury verdicts like the one in this case should not be reviewed. In United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984), the Court considered a factual situation very much like the one before this court and found that there was no reason to review the jury’s verdict. Id. at 69. In Powell, the defendant was charged in a 15-count indictment with conspiring with her minor son and husband to possess with the intent to 5 distribute cocaine, possession with the intent to distribute cocaine, and several counts of using a telephone to commit and facilitate the drug felonies. The jury acquitted her on the conspiracy count and the possession count, but found her guilty of three of the telephone facilitation counts. Id. at 59-60. Powell argued that proof of the conspiracy or the possession counts was an element of each of the telephone facilitation counts, so the jury’s verdict was inconsistent. Id. at 60. The Court reiterated the rule it adopted in Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932): The most that can be said in such cases is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced of the defendant’s guilt. We interpret the acquittal as no more than their assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise, but to which they were disposed through lenity. Id. at 63 (quoting Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59, 60 (2d Cir. 1925)). The Court went on to point out that a defendant’s assumption that the error was in the conviction is no more than speculation; the opposite could have been true – that the error was in the acquittal, but the government has no right to challenge the acquittal on grounds of inconsistency. Id. at 65. “The fact that the inconsistency may be the result of lenity, coupled with the Government’s inability to invoke review, suggests that inconsistent verdicts should not be reviewable.” Id. at 66. Instead, a defendant’s protection against an inconsistent verdict lies in an independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence. Id. at 67. 6 Nevertheless, Ruiz has seized upon a footnote in the Powell opinion that excepts a situation where a guilty verdict on one count necessarily excludes a finding of guilt on another. Id. at 69, n. 8; see also United States v. McCall, 85 F.3d 1193, 1197-98 (6th Cir. 1996) (using the term “mutually exclusive” but finding that the verdicts were not reviewable). This court finds, however, that this is not a case where the exception would apply. In crafting the exception, the Court contemplated a situation in which a defendant receives two guilty verdicts that are logically inconsistent, for example if a jury convicted a defendant of both larceny and embezzlement based on the same underlying conduct. See United States v. Daigle, 149 F. Supp. 409, 414 (D.D.C. 1957), cited in Powell, 469 U.S. at 69 n.8. Even putting aside the obvious distinction that Ruiz has received one guilty and one not-guilty verdict, just as in Powell, we conclude that the two charged crimes are interdependent rather than mutually exclusive. Contrary to Ruiz’s contention, a notguilty verdict on the conspiracy count is not determinative of whether Ruiz intended to promote or facilitate an unlawful activity while traveling in interstate commerce. As the Court noted in Powell, the verdict could reflect jury lenity, or even a mistaken acquittal. Powell, 469 U.S. at 64-65. We find that this issue is controlled by the Supreme Court’s decision in Powell and decline to review the jury’s verdict. There is no reason to vacate a conviction “merely because the verdicts cannot rationally be reconciled.” Powell, 469 U.S. at 69. 7