Opinion ID: 1974323
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The agent of the buyer instruction

Text: Minor argues next that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the principal theory of his defense. He sought a jury instruction that his defense was that he was acting as an agent of the buyer, i.e., the undercover officer, rather than the seller, and therefore that he lacked the requisite intent to distribute the heroin. [6] The trial court refused to give this instruction on the ground that, under District of Columbia law, distribution occurs regardless of whether one aids the seller or the buyer. See Griggs v. United States, 611 A.2d 526, 528-529 (D.C.1992). [7] The court offered instead to instruct the jury that the theory of the defense was that Minor lacked the intent to commit the crime of distribution. Defense counsel accepted the court's offer, and the jury was instructed accordingly. As we have said, it is settled law that a defendant is usually entitled to an instruction on any recognized defense for which there exists sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find in his favor. Mathews, supra, 485 U.S. at 63, 108 S.Ct. at 887 (citations omitted). This standard limits a defendant's entitlement to an instruction on the theory of the defense in two fundamental ways. First, the proffered defense must be recognized as a valid defense under the law; second, sufficient evidence supporting it must be presented before the jury. We need look no further than the first of these two limitations to conclude that the trial court properly denied Minor's request for an agent of the buyer instruction, because the law is clear that being an agent of the buyer is not recognized as a valid defense to a charge of distributing a controlled substance. Distribution is defined by statute to mean the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another ... of a controlled substance, whether or not there is an agency relationship. D.C.Code § 33-501(9) (emphasis added). The statute on its face does not define distribution in terms of a sale of narcotics. The language instead proscribes a broader range of conduct, i.e., any act effecting the transfer of narcotics from one person to another. See Long v. United States, 623 A.2d 1144, 1147-1148 (D.C.1993); Chambers v. United States, 564 A.2d 26, 31 n. 10 (D.C.1989) ([a] sharing, or even a gift, of a controlled substance is enough to constitute a distribution). Thus it makes no difference under the statute whether a middleman who distributes or transfers narcotics to another, or who (like Minor here) participates in the sale with the seller by bringing the seller to the buyer and by quoting the seller's price to the buyer, is an agent of the buyer or the seller. The guilt of such a middleman results from his participation in the transaction in any capacity and, as the statute makes explicit, is not defeated by the existence of an agency relationship between the middleman and any other party to the transfer. This interpretation of our statute is consistent with case law under the corresponding federal statute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1988). [8] The agent of the buyer or purchasing agent defense originated under the predecessor federal statute, which made it unlawful to `sell, barter, exchange, or give away narcotic drugs....' United States v. Bailey, 164 U.S.App.D.C. 310, 312 n. 1, 505 F.2d 417, 419 n. 1 (1974) (quoting former 26 U.S.C. § 4705(a)), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 961, 95 S.Ct. 1350, 43 L.Ed.2d 438 (1975). That provision was interpreted by some courts to allow a defendant to avoid culpability under the statute by proving that in a given sale in which he was an intermediary he was acting as an agent for the ultimate purchaser rather than as a seller himself. Id. (citations omitted). There is uniform agreement among the federal courts that the agent of the buyer defense was eliminated in 1970 when Congress repealed 26 U.S.C. § 4705(a) and put in its place the law that exists today. See United States v. Porter, 764 F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir.1985) (collecting cases). The 1970 enactment [9] effected this change by substituting the concept of `distribution' in place of the operative concept of a `sale,' a result consistent with Congress' intent to penalize severely individuals engaged in procuring drugs for others, while providing less serious penalties for those involved in personal drug abuse. United States v. Swiderski, 548 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir.1977); accord, Long v. United States, supra, at 1149 n. 10 (same); see id. at 1149-1151 & n. 14 (observing that an intent to penalize distributors more severely than users also underlies District law); Gorham v. United States, 339 A.2d 401, 406 (D.C.1975) (en banc). [10] Considering both the statutory language in the definition of distribute, D.C.Code § 33-501(9), and the reasons given by other courts for rejecting the agent of the buyer defense under analogous federal law, we hold that being an agent of the buyer is not a defense to a charge of distribution of a controlled substance under D.C.Code § 33-541(a)(1). It follows that the trial court committed no error when it refused to instruct the jury on that proffered defense when Minor's counsel requested such an instruction.