Opinion ID: 783767
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Extreme Cruelty

Text: 47 There is no dispute that the egregious abuse that Hernandez suffered in Mexico would qualify as battery or extreme cruelty. However, it is also clear that none of the acts of battery that occurred took place in the United States. Although Congress has since removed the requirement that an alien must have suffered from domestic abuse within the United States, 9 Hernandez's case is subject to an older version of VAWA, which did include this requirement. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(3) (1996). Thus, the question presented is whether the actions taken by Refugio in seeking to convince Hernandez to leave her safe haven in the United States in which she had taken refuge can be deemed to constitute extreme cruelty. 10 48 1) Refugio's Behavior in the Context of Domestic Violence 49 Hernandez and amici 11 argue that the interaction between Hernandez and Refugio in Los Angeles made up an integral stage in the cycle of domestic violence, and thus the actions taken by Refugio in order to lure Hernandez back to the violent relationship constitute extreme cruelty. Although according to common understanding, Refugio's actions might not be perceived as cruel, in enacting VAWA, Congress recognized that lay understandings of domestic violence are frequently comprised of myths, misconceptions, and victim blaming attitudes, and that background information regarding domestic violence may be crucial in order to understand its essential characteristics and manifestations. H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 24. Thus, in order to evaluate Hernandez's argument, we must first consider the nature and effects of violence in intimate relationships. 50 The field of domestic violence and our own case law reflect the fact that Refugio's actions represent a specific phase that commonly recurs in abusive relationships. Abuse within intimate relationships often follows a pattern known as the cycle of violence, which consists of a tension building phase, followed by acute battering of the victim, and finally by a contrite phase where the batterer's use of promises and gifts increases the battered woman's hope that violence has occurred for the last time. Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1208 (1993); Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Women Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 985-86 (1995); see also Dillard v. Roe, 244 F.3d 758, 763-64 (9th Cir.2001) (describing domestic violence expert's testimony that [a]fter the violent episode,... the man is scared that the woman will tell the police or decide to leave him. He tells the woman he loves her and minimizes the seriousness of his violent outburst....). Indeed, Hernandez's relationship with Refugio reflected just such a cycle: as described in Hernandez's testimony, following each violent episode, Refugio would for a time again become the man she had loved. 51 The literature also emphasizes that, although a relationship may appear to be predominantly tranquil and punctuated only infrequently by episodes of violence, abusive behavior does not occur as a series of discrete events, but rather pervades the entire relationship. Dutton, supra, at 1208. The effects of psychological abuse, coercive behavior, and the ensuing dynamics of power and control mean that the pattern of violence and abuse can be viewed as a single and continuing entity. Id. ; see also Stark, supra, at 985-86. Thus, the battered woman's fear, vigilance, or perception that she has few options may persist, ... even when the abusive partner appears to be peaceful and calm. Dutton, supra, at 1208-09. The psychological role of kindness is also significant in understanding the impact of Refugio's actions on Hernandez, since in combination with the batterer's physical dominance, such kindness often creates an intense emotional dependence by the battered woman on the batterer. Id. at 1206, 1225. Significantly, research also shows that women are often at the highest risk of severe abuse or death when they attempt to leave their abusers. Id. at 1212; see also H.R. REP. 103-395, at 24. 52 Although the INS implies otherwise, the record before the IJ and BIA contained substantial evidence regarding the cycle of violence and clinical and psychological understandings of domestic violence, evidence that was entirely unrebutted. For example, Leslye Orloff's Manual on Intrafamily Cases for the D.C. Superior Court Judges (1993) explained: 53 Either immediately following the battering incident or shortly thereafter, the batterer will become contrite, apologetic and will beg the battered woman for forgiveness. He tells her that the violence will never happen again and promises to reform. During this phase, batterers will court their spouse and become again the man that she fell in love with. Many batterers honestly believe that they will reform their behavior. Battered women want to believe them.... [Batterers] will be apologetic or very convincing that the violence will cease. However, without outside intervention in most cases the cycle will gradually repeat itself[,] moving from this hearts and flowers phase back into the tension building phase. 54 Id. at 15. Information in the record also explained that [d]omestic violence is not an isolated, individual event, but rather a pattern of perpetrator behaviors used against the victim. Anne L. Ganley, Understanding Domestic Violence, in IMPROVING THE HEALTH CARE RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 18 (Carole Warshaw & Anne L. Ganley eds., 1996). Explaining the connection between violence and other tactics of control, this work stated: 55 Sometimes physical abuse, threats of harm, and isolation tactics are interwoven with seemingly loving gestures (e.g., expensive gifts, intense displays of devotion, sending flowers after an assault, making romantic promises, tearfully promising it will never happen again). Amnesty International (1973) describes such occasional indulgences as a method of coercion used in torture. With such tactics, the perpetrator provides positive motivation for victim compliance.... The message is always there that if the victim does not respond to this loving gesture or verbal abuse, then the perpetrator will escalate and use whichever tactic, including force, is necessary to get what he wants. 56 Id. at 22; see also id. at 33 (Perpetrators do not just let victims leave relationships. They will use violence and all other tactics of control to maintain the relationship.). This excerpt also discussed how a battered woman's responses to the batterer may reflect her experience of violent retribution: Victims use many different strategies to cope with and resist the abuse. Such strategies include ... accepting the perpetrator's promises that it will never happen again, saying that she still loves him, being unwilling to leave the perpetrator or terminate the relationship, and doing what he asks. These strategies may appear to be the result of passiveness or submission on the part of the victim, when in reality she has learned that these are sometimes successful approaches for temporarily avoiding or stopping the violence. 57 Id. at 34. The INS presented no evidence contradicting or undermining any of Hernandez's evidence. 58 Understood in light of the familiar dynamics of violent relationships, Refugio's seemingly reasonable actions take on a sinister cast. Following Refugio's brutal and potentially deadly beating, Hernandez fled her job, home, country, and family. Hernandez believed that if she had not fled, Refugio would have killed her. Unwilling to lose control over Hernandez, Refugio stalked her, convincing the very neighbor who helped Hernandez to escape to give him her phone number and calling her sister repeatedly until Hernandez finally agreed to speak with him. Once Refugio was able to speak with Hernandez, he emanated remorse, crying and telling Hernandez that he needed her. Refugio promised not to hurt Hernandez again, and told her that if she would go back to him he would seek counseling. Wounded both emotionally and physically by someone she trusted and loved, Hernandez was vulnerable to such promises. Moreover, Hernandez was well aware of Refugio's potential for violence. Behind Refugio's show of remorse, there also existed the lurking possibility that if Hernandez adamantly refused, Refugio might resort to the extreme violence or murder that commonly results when a woman attempts to flee her batterer. Refugio successfully manipulated Hernandez into leaving the safety that she had found and returning to a deadly relationship in which her physical and mental well-being were in danger. 59 2) Statutory Analysis of Extreme Cruelty 60 No court has yet interpreted the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(3)'s reference to extreme cruelty. We interpret a federal statute by ascertaining the intent of Congress and by giving effect to its legislative will. Bedroc, 314 F.3d at 1083 (quoting Ariz. Appetito's Stores, Inc. v. Paradise Vill., 893 F.2d 216, 219 (9th Cir. 1990)). The text of the statute reveals that Congress distinguished between battery and extreme cruelty, reserving the term extreme cruelty for something other than physical assault, presumably actions in some way involving mental or psychological cruelty. A contrary interpretation would render section 244's reference to extreme cruelty redundant, violating elementary principles of statutory construction. See, e.g., id. at 1088 ([I]t is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant. (internal quotation marks omitted)). 61 However, because the text of the statute provides no further elucidation regarding Congress's intent, we must look to the congressional intent revealed in the history and purposes of the statutory scheme. Id. (quoting United States v. Buckland, 289 F.3d 558, 565 (9th Cir.2002) (en banc)). The legislative history reflects Congress's conviction that [c]urrent [immigration] law fosters domestic violence, H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 26, and its intent that VAWA be so interpreted as to remedy the widespread gender bias and ignorance that have resulted in governmental harm, rather than help, for survivors of domestic violence, see H.R. REP. No. 103-395. However, the legislative history does not contain any explicit consideration of the phrase in question, and thus is of limited aid in interpreting Congress's intent with regard to the breadth of extreme cruelty. 62 When traditional tools of statutory interpretation are unable to unearth Congress's intent with regard to the precise question at issue, the courts must respect the interpretation of the agency to which Congress has delegated the responsibility for administering the statutory program. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 448, 107 S.Ct. 1207 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778); see also INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 19, 103 S.Ct. 281, 74 L.Ed.2d 12 (1982). The INS has promulgated a regulation defining battery and extreme cruelty in the context of VAWA self petitions, a regulation that lends support to Hernandez's contention that she was subjected to extreme cruelty by Refugio's contrite actions. Because the statutory text at issue is subject to a number of possible interpretations, 12 the regulation promulgated by the INS interpreting this language is accorded Chevron deference. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (If ... the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue ... the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.). 13 The regulation states in relevant part: 63 For the purpose of this chapter, the phrase was battered by or was the subject of extreme cruelty includes, but is not limited to, being the victim of any act or threatened act of violence, including any forceful detention, which results or threatens to result in physical or mental injury. Psychological or sexual abuse ... shall be considered acts of violence. Other abusive actions may also be acts of violence under certain circumstances, including acts that, in and of themselves, may not initially appear violent but that are a part of an overall pattern of violence. 64 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(vi) (emphasis added). As we have mentioned, Congress clearly intended extreme cruelty to indicate nonphysical aspects of domestic violence. Defining extreme cruelty in the context of domestic violence to include acts that may not initially appear violent but that are part of an overall pattern of violence is a reasonable construction of the statutory text at hand. This interpretation is congruent with Congress's goal of protecting battered immigrant women and recognition of past governmental insensitivity regarding domestic violence, see H.R. REP. No. 103-395, and consistent with the clinical understanding of domestic violence, see, e.g., Dutton, supra, at 1204. 65 Moreover, the INS conceded at oral argument that section 244(a)(3) was a generous enactment, intended to ameliorate the impact of harsh provisions of immigration law on abused women. Thus, this interpretation also adheres to the general rule of construction that when the legislature enacts an ameliorative rule designed to forestall harsh results, the rule will be interpreted and applied in an ameliorative fashion.... This is particularly so in the immigration context where doubts are to be resolved in favor of the alien. United States v. Sanchez-Guzman, 744 F.Supp. 997, 1002 (E.D.Wash.1990); see also Matter of Vizcaino, 19 I. & N. Dec. 644, 648 (BIA 1988) (noting that expansion of relief clearly was intended as a generous provision, and it should therefore be generously interpreted); cf. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449, 107 S.Ct. 1207 (emphasizing the importance of maintaining flexibility in immigration law when the alien makes a claim that he or she will be subject to death or persecution if forced to return to his or her home country). 66 Congress's intent in allowing a showing of either battery or extreme cruelty was to protect survivors of domestic violence. H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 37-38. Under the INS's regulation, any act of physical abuse is deemed to constitute domestic violence without further inquiry, while extreme cruelty describes all other manifestations of domestic violence. Non-physical actions rise to the level of domestic violence when tactics of control are intertwined with the threat of harm in order to maintain the perpetrator's dominance through fear. Ganley, supra, at 20. By defining extreme cruelty to encompass abusive actions that may not initially appear violent but that are part of an overall pattern of violence, 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(vi), section 244(a)(3) protects women against manipulative tactics aimed at ensuring the batterer's dominance and control. Because every insult or unhealthy interaction in a relationship does not rise to the level of domestic violence, see, e.g., Ganley, supra, at 20 (Emotional abuse in domestic violence cases is not merely a matter of someone getting angry and calling his partner a few names or cursing. Not all verbal insults between partners are acts of violence.), Congress required a showing of extreme cruelty in order to ensure that section 244(a)(3) protected against the extreme concept of domestic violence, rather than mere unkindness. 67 Here, there is no question that the relationship between Hernandez and Refugio was a violent one. Hernandez's interaction with Refugio in the United States clearly occurred within this context, an observation reaffirmed by the fact that domestic violence is not a phenomenon that appears only at brief isolated times, but instead pervades an entire relationship. See Dutton, supra, at 1208. Refugio's success in this contrite or hearts and flowers phase occurred because of Hernandez's emotional vulnerability, the strong emotional bond to Refugio necessitated by his violence, and the underlying threat that the failure to accede to his demands would bring renewed violence. Against this violent backdrop, Refugio's actions in tracking Hernandez down and luring her from the safety of the United States through false promises and short-lived contrition are precisely the type of acts of extreme cruelty that may not initially appear violent but that are part of an overall pattern of violence. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(vi). As a result, we hold that Hernandez has established that she was subjected to extreme cruelty in the United States. 68 The INS argues that Hernandez was appropriately denied relief because she is not the type of battered immigrant woman with whom Congress was concerned in enacting VAWA. The INS contends that because Hernandez and Refugio never lived together in the United States, and because Hernandez had already left Refugio, the agency was entitled to find her ineligible for suspension of deportation. We are unpersuaded. 69 Congress required that battered immigrant women show two sources of connection to the United States in order to be eligible for relief under section 244(a)(3): three years of residency and a spouse who was a legal permanent resident or citizen of the United States. We reject the notion that the INS is at liberty to also add a third requirement. Vincent v. Apfel, 191 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir.1999) (There is no justification for adding limiting language to a clear and unambiguous statute and regulation.). This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that Congress chose to add the very factor proposed by the INS elsewhere, 14 but not here. See Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d at 480; Gorbach v. Reno, 219 F.3d 1087, 1093-94 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc). 70 Moreover, Congress's goal in enacting VAWA was to eliminate barriers to women leaving abusive relationships. H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 25 (stating that the goal of the bill is to permit[] battered immigrant women to leave their batterers without fearing deportation); see also Orloff & Kaguyutan, supra, at 108-15. The notion that Congress would require women to remain with their batterers in order to be eligible for the forms of relief established in VAWA is flatly contrary to Congress's articulated purpose in enacting section 244(a)(3). 71 Thus, we reverse the BIA's determination that Hernandez did not suffer extreme cruelty in the United States, and remand to the BIA to determine whether Hernandez can establish the extreme hardship prong and for the exercise of discretion regarding suspension of deportation. IV. ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS 72 Hernandez also appeals the BIA's denial of her petition for adjustment of status under section 245 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1255. The BIA deemed Hernandez statutorily ineligible for relief, and alternatively denied her relief as a discretionary manner. As an initial matter, we note that the INS's treatment of Hernandez's application for adjustment of status provides belated support for Congress's assessment that the INS's hostility to battered women results in unnecessary barriers to relief to which they appear entitled. Both grounds relied upon by the BIA to justify its denial of Hernandez's application — her inability to provide a copy of the approved visa petition and the deterioration of her marriage — relate directly to her status as a battered woman. 73 A. Statutory Eligibility For Adjustment of Status 74 Section 245(i) requires that in order for an applicant to be eligible for an adjustment of status, the applicant must show that: (A) the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence; and (B) an immigrant visa is immediately available to the alien at the time the application is filed. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i). During the time that Hernandez lived with her husband, who was a legal permanent resident of the United States, he filed an I-130 petition for her to become a legal permanent resident pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(B). As the spouse of a legal permanent resident, Hernandez was eligible for an immigrant visa under the second family preference category upon approval of the petition. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2)(A). 75 However, the IJ, affirmed by the BIA, found that Hernandez was statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status because she could not show that she had an approved visa petition and because she had not been allocated an immigrant visa number. We address these issues in turn. 1) Approved Visa Petition 76 The INS claims that Hernandez must show that a visa petition has been approved on her behalf. Neither the BIA nor the INS clearly traced the provenance of the requirement that Hernandez show an approved visa petition. As noted above, section 245 requires eligibility for a visa and immediate availability of the visa at the time of filing. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(2). It is silent as to possession of an approved visa petition. Of course, an immigrant visa cannot be immediately available to a petitioner unless a petition on her behalf has been approved. 15 See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(1)(B)(i); Jacobe v. INS, 578 F.2d 42, 44-45 (3d Cir.1978). 77 Even assuming the existence of some authority to require an applicant for adjustment of status to show an approved visa petition, Hernandez has made this showing. First, Hernandez provided a letter that she had received from the Transitional Immigrant Visa Processing Center, dated August 11, 1992. This letter explained that at the time it was issued, there was no visa number available to Hernandez, but her application had been archived. The letter stated that Hernandez's priority date was April 3, 1992, and her preference category was LB. 78 Once Hernandez obtained representation, her attorneys submitted a request that the INS provide a copy of the I-130 approval notice and the I-130 petition itself. In response, the INS refused to provide any information, stating, The information requested by you is unavailable because regulations do not permit providing information directly to the beneficiary of the petition. Please direct your inquiry to your petitioner. 16 Hernandez and her attorneys also sought to obtain information from the consulate in Juarez. The cover letter received in response stated that Hernandez's preference category was F2A-Mex and her priority date was April 3, 1992. It listed the traveling applicants as Hernandez and her two children. The letter closed with an enclosure line indicating that it was accompanied by Packet 3. The INS also apparently made inquiries of the consulate, to no avail. 79 The only interpretation to which this evidence was susceptible is that Hernandez was the beneficiary of an approved petition. Two independent letters indicate that Hernandez had been assigned a priority date. Procedures established by the Department of State and the INS provide that a priority date is not assigned until a visa petition is approved. See 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(g)(2); 22 C.F.R. § 42.53(a); 9 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 42.53 N5.1(a); see also GORDON, supra, at § 55.03(2). Additionally, Hernandez had received communications regarding her application from the Transitional Immigrant Visa Processing Center. 17 A petition is not forwarded to a Visa Center unless it has been approved. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b); GORDON, supra, at §§ 55.06(1), (2); IRA J. KURZBAN, IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 583 (8th ed.2002). Finally, Hernandez received a letter from the consulate indicating that a Packet 3 was enclosed. Consulates sent Packet 3 only when the priority date of an approved petition was current or almost current. 18 80 In short, Hernandez's petition could not have reached the stage it did unless it had been approved. The INS has not suggested that the documents produced by Hernandez are fraudulent, and has provided no alternative explanation regarding their subject matter. 19 At oral argument, the INS suggested that we disallow any effort to prove an approved visa petition except by production of a copy of the approved petition or notice of approval. The INS proposed that because errors are frequent in the agency, we should assume the documents produced by Hernandez were sent erroneously. We reject this rather remarkable proposition. The BIA's determination that Hernandez failed to show that she possessed an approved visa is not supported by substantial evidence. 81 2) Availability of Immigrant Visa Versus Allocation of Immigrant Visa 82 As noted above, in order for an applicant to be eligible for adjustment of status, an immigrant visa must be immediately available at the time of filing. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255(a), 1255(i). Hernandez's April 3, 1992 priority date was current for the second family preference category, Mexico, as of the time that Hernandez filed the application for adjustment of status. Visa Bulletin for March 1997, 74 Inter. Rel. 312 (Feb. 24, 1997). The text of the statute requires nothing else. 83 However, the INS argues that Hernandez must show that she actually has been allocated a visa number, pointing to a regulation that states: An application for adjustment of status as a preference alien shall not be approved until an immigrant visa number has been allocated by the Department of State. 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(5)(ii). In response, Hernandez cites 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(g)(1), which states in relevant part: 84 An alien is ineligible for the benefits of section 245 of the Act unless an immigrant visa is immediately available to him or her at the time the application is filed. If the applicant is a preference alien, the current Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs Visa Bulletin will be consulted to determine whether an immigrant visa is immediately available. 85 Id. (emphasis added). 86 We do not read the regulation cited by the INS as requiring that a visa number be allocated to the individual seeking to adjust status. The regulation itself does not indicate that an individual must possess an allocated number, and no treatise or regulation promulgated by the Department of State 20 or INS suggests otherwise. See GORDON, supra, at § 51.02(2)(b)(iii); NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, supra, at §§ 4:149, 8:10; KURZBAN, supra, at 587, 590. In fact, the regulation cited by the INS itself refers back to the regulation cited by Hernandez for a description of what is meant by immediately available. 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(2)(i)(A) (An immigrant visa must be immediately available in order for an alien to properly file an adjustment application under section 245 of the Act. See § 245.1(g)(1) to determine whether an immigrant visa is immediately available.). Additionally, the allocation of a visa number for an adjustment of status appears to be triggered by INS officials. 22 C.F.R. § 42.51(b) ([T]he Department shall allocate immigrant visa numbers for use in connection with the issuance of immigrant visas and adjustments based on ... the priority dates of... applicants for adjustment of status as reported by officers of the INS.  (emphasis added)). Thus, there is no indication that possession of an allocated visa number is an eligibility requirement for adjusting status. 21 87 In light of this conclusion, it appears that the evidence produced by Hernandez is more than sufficient to establish that her priority date was April 3, 1992, that this priority date was current at the time she filed the application for adjustment of status, and that an immigration visa was immediately available to her. The INS points to the mysterious preference category LB on the letter Hernandez received from the Transitional Immigrant Visa Processing Center, and also notes that Hernandez is unable to explain why her children would be listed as traveling applicants on the letter she received from the consulate. Although these clerical errors are puzzling, the INS does not suggest that these documents are fraudulent or that these inconsistencies demonstrate that they relate to some other matter. We do not believe that the INS intends to advocate for a rule whereby an applicant may rely upon government documents only if he or she is able to explain every notation upon them. In sum, Hernandez has met her burden of showing her eligibility for adjustment of status. 88 B. Discretionary Denial Due to Nonviability of Marriage 89 The BIA provided an alternative basis for denying Hernandez's application, affirming the IJ's determination that, because Hernandez's marriage to Refugio had completely deteriorated, the application for adjustment of status was appropriately denied as a matter of discretion. Hernandez contests this determination pointing to case law establishing that the nonviability of a marriage at the time of adjustment is an impermissible basis for denying an application for adjustment of status. 1) Jurisdiction 90 The INS challenges our jurisdiction over this question. It argues that because the BIA's determination was discretionary, we have no authority to review it. The first step in adjudicating a petition for adjustment of status is the nondiscretionary determination of statutory eligibility, followed by a discretionary determination regarding whether an eligible applicant is actually permitted to adjust status. Dillingham, 267 F.3d at 1003; Vasquez v. INS, 767 F.2d 598, 601 (9th Cir.1985). Although the eligibility determination is clearly reviewable, IIRIRA stripped us of jurisdiction to review the discretionary aspect of a decision to deny an application for adjustment of status. IIRIRA § 309(c)(4)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1101, Note (providing that there shall be no appeal of any discretionary decision under section ... 245 ... of the Immigration and Nationality Act); see also Dillingham, 267 F.3d at 1003. The INS urges us to end our analysis here. 91 However, in interpreting IIRIRA's jurisdictional limitations, the Supreme Court has cautioned that restrictions on jurisdiction should be construed narrowly. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482, 119 S.Ct. 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999) (criticizing widely-adopted broad reading of seemingly sweeping provision and requiring much narrower interpretation); see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001). We have distilled two fundamental principles from the Court's admonitions, which we apply in evaluating jurisdiction in the immigration context: 92 First, there is a strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298, 121 S.Ct. 2271. Second, there is a longstanding principal construing any [lingering] ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien. Id. at 320, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (quoting Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449, 107 S.Ct. 1207). 93 Montero-Martinez, 277 F.3d at 1141 (citations reformed); see also Mart v. Beebe, 94 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1123 (D.Or.2000) (Restrictions on jurisdiction are construed narrowly, and the court will not assume that its jurisdiction has been repealed unless the statute says so explicitly.). 94 In this case, the BIA and IJ affixed the adjective discretionary to the determination that the nonviability of Hernandez's marriage was a proper basis for denying her adjustment of status. The INS asserts that the use of this adjective places the BIA's decision beyond review. However, it has long been established that the nonviability of a marriage at the time of adjustment is not a permissible basis for denying a petition. See Matter of Boromand, 17 I. & N. Dec. 450, 454 (BIA 1980) ([T]he denial of an adjustment of status application or the subsequent rescission of such a grant cannot be based solely on the nonviability of the marriage at the time of the adjustment application.); United States v. Qaisi, 779 F.2d 346, 348 (6th Cir.1985) (Decisions from the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the district courts have universally held that the viability of a marriage is not a material factor in deciding to confer or deny an immigration benefit.); 3A AM. JUR.2d Aliens & Citizens § 475, Viability of Marriage (2003) (If a marriage is not a sham or fraudulent from its inception, it is valid for immigration purposes....). Thus, the jurisdictional question at issue can be stated as follows: May the BIA insulate a decision that is contrary to law from review by labeling such a decision discretionary? 95 The BIA has no discretion to make a decision that is contrary to law. See Mejia v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir.2002) (The BIA does not have the discretion to misapply the law....); see also Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 895 (9th Cir.2003) (same). Regulations defining the power of the BIA provide that it shall resolve the questions before it in a manner ... consistent with the Act and regulations, and shall be governed by the provisions and limitations prescribed by applicable law, regulations, and procedures, and by decisions of the Attorney General. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1) (2003); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (Except as Board decisions may be modified or overruled by the Board or the Attorney General, decisions of the Board ... shall be binding on all ... immigration judges in the administration of the immigration laws of the United States.). The regulations provide that  [s]ubject to these governing standards, Board members shall exercise their independent judgment and discretion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) (emphasis added). Thus, the regulations themselves limit the BIA's discretion to operating within the law. A nonprecedential decision by the BIA in defiance of its own precedential case law simply cannot be classified as discretionary. 22 Cf. Spencer Enters., Inc. v. United States, 345 F.3d 683, 2003 WL 22137016 (9th Cir.2003) (Even if a statute gives the Attorney General discretion ... the courts retain jurisdiction to review whether a particular decision is ultra vires the statute in question.); Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 121-22, 66 S.Ct. 423, 90 L.Ed. 567 (1946) (contrasting erroneous decisions of selective service boards with decisions not in conformity with the regulations, and deeming the latter to exceed the granted authority of the boards); Frazar v. Gilbert, 300 F.3d 530, 551 n. 109 (5th Cir.2002) (noting in the context of Ex Parte Young injunctive relief that government officials have no `discretion' to violate federal law). As we have explained before, [t]he BIA must exercise its discretion `within the constraints of law.' Andriasian v. INS, 180 F.3d 1033, 1040 (9th Cir.1999) (quoting Singh v. INS, 94 F.3d 1353, 1358 (9th Cir.1996)). 96 The INS implicitly posits a world in which there is a small box labeled reviewable decisions. This box contains only the elements of statutory eligibility. Under this view, a decision is not reviewable as long as the BIA bases its decision upon a factor not in the box, even if it must remove the factor from the box to do so. If the BIA were truly at liberty to disregard the law merely by labeling its conclusions discretionary, serious constitutional problems would arise. 23 See, e.g., Ramirez-Alejandre v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 365, 380 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc). However, such is not the case. When the BIA acts where it has no legal authority to do so, it does not make a discretionary decision, see Mejia, 298 F.3d at 878; Andriasian, 180 F.3d at 1040, and such a determination is not protected from judicial review, see, e.g., Bernal-Vallejo v. INS, 195 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir.1999) (§ 309(c)(4)(E) precludes the exercise of jurisdiction only where ... the agency decision rests on a ground that is committed to agency discretion.). Because the decision made by the BIA was contrary to law, it was not discretionary and jurisdiction exists to review the determination. 2) Merits 97 Because the basis of our jurisdiction is the fact that the BIA acted beyond the bounds of its discretion by relying upon the nonviability of the marriage in contradiction to its own case law, the merits of the question require little additional scrutiny. 98 As noted above, the INS had no authority to consider the present nonviability of Hernandez's marriage in considering her petition for adjustment of status. In a series of decisions in the early eighties, the BIA overturned its previous holdings that the nonviability of a marriage formed a valid basis for rejecting a petition. See Matter of Mowrer, 17 I. & N. Dec. 613, 615 (BIA 1981) (In recent decisions, this Board has ruled that the viability of an alien's marriage can no longer be determinative of his entitlement to immigration benefits.); Matter of Pierce, 17 I. & N. Dec. 456, 456 (BIA 1980) ([T]he Board has altered its position in regard to the question of viable marriages.). 24 99 The prior line of cases had held that an individual could be barred from obtaining immigration benefits where, although valid at its inception, the marriage was no longer viable. See, e.g., Matter of Sosa, 15 I. & N. Dec. 572, 574 (BIA 1976). The logic behind this position, the same logic applied by the IJ in the case before us, was that conferring immigration benefits on the basis of a nonviable marriage would defeat the purpose behind adjustment of status: to prevent the separation of families and to preserve the family unit. Id.; see also Menezes v. INS, 601 F.2d 1028, 1034-35 (9th Cir.1979). However, rulings by the federal courts rejected this position, noting that the inquiry into viability represents an intrusion into the most sensitive and private areas of life and has extremely dangerous implications. Chan v. Bell, 464 F.Supp. 125, 130 (D.D.C.1978) (citations omitted); see also Dabaghian v. Civiletti, 607 F.2d 868, 869-70 (9th Cir.1979); Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200, 1201-02 (9th Cir.1975) (Aliens cannot be required to have more conventional or more successful marriages than citizens. Conduct of the parties after marriage is relevant only to the extent that it bears upon their subjective state of mind at the time they were married.); Whetstone v. INS, 561 F.2d 1303, 1309 (9th Cir.1977) (Sneed, J., concurring) (The desire of the Service to engraft on 8 U.S.C. § 1184 a requirement of `satisfactoriness,' or `continuing viability,' of the marriage is understandable but without statutory authority.). 100 In response to these rulings, the BIA expressly overrode the viability test, Matter of Lenning, 17 I. & N. Dec. 476, 477 (BIA 1980), concluding that the denial of an adjustment of status application ... cannot be based solely on the nonviability of the marriage at the time of the adjustment application, Matter of Boromand, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 454. Moreover, in the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-639, 120 Stat. 3537 (1986), Congress denied the INS's request that it insert a viability requirement, see H.R. REP. No. 99-906, at 10 (1986), thus legislatively endorsing the judicial prohibition on the use of viability. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580, 98 S.Ct. 866, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978) (Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.); see also Vonnell C. Tingle, Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986: Locking In by Locking Out?, 27 J. FAM. L. 733 (1989). 101 The INS accuses Hernandez of mistaking factors that may be considered in the context of eligibility with factors that may be considered in the context of discretion. Although this argument is not implausible, the sweeping statements made by the BIA do not recognize such a distinction. See, e.g., Matter of McKee, 17 I. & N. Dec. 332, 334 (BIA 1980) ([A] separation in and of itself is no longer a valid basis for denial of a visa petition....). 25 Moreover, in Matter of Adalatkhah, the BIA discussed our decision in Menezes, which had distinguished between discretionary and eligibility determinations, but reiterated the new policy that separation of the parties to a marriage ... [is] no longer a valid basis for denial of a visa petition. 17 I. & N. Dec. at 405-06. Additionally, the policy reasons for forbidding the inquiry into marriage viability do not permit a distinction between eligibility determinations and discretionary determinations. See, e.g., Chan, 464 F.Supp. at 130 (INS has no expertise in the field of predicting the stability and growth potential of marriages... and it surely has no business operating in that field.); see also 3A AM. JUR.2d Aliens & Citizens § 475, Viability of Marriage (2003) (The INS has no authority to establish the elusive concept of marriage viability and enforce that concept by intruding on the privacy of the marital relationship.). 26 Thus, in reaching back to rely upon the Menezes dictum, which deferred to the BIA's now disavowed position, the BIA improperly resurrected the doctrine of nonviability in contradiction to both circuit court and BIA precedent. 102 In conclusion, the BIA erred both in finding Hernandez ineligible for adjustment of status and in relying upon an impermissible factor while purporting to exercise its discretion regarding her application. We reverse the denial of adjustment of status. V.