Opinion ID: 2644367
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ferrier Warnings and Consent

Text: I agree that the deputies did not seek Ruem's consent in order to circumvent the requirements of the search warrant process. Lead opinion at 12 (collecting cases). The concurrence overstates the power of a surprise show of government force and authority to overbear an ordinary person's free will. Concurrence at 2. Ferrier is distinguishable on its facts because in that case the police were attempting to circumvent the warrant requirement specifically because they believed that they could not obtain a search warrant. State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103, 107, 960 P.2d 927 (1998). Here, Ruem was not the direct object of the deputies' action and motivation. 6 The lead opinion characterizes these facts as mere impressions of [the family members'] truthfulness. Lead opinion at 9 n.6. However, when one person says Chantha was there and another says he is not, at least one of those family members is not telling the truth. Lying to the police is supportive of probable cause. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 1904,20 L. Ed. 2d 917 (1968). -7- State v. Ruem (Dara), No. 86214-1 The deputies sought Chantha under a court's arrest warrant. Accordingly, I believe that the deputies obtained consent to search the trailer for Chantha notwithstanding the absence of Ferrier warnings. I concur with the Ferrier warning analysis in part B of Justice Stephens' opinion. I concur in the lead opinion's Ferrier holding, and the rule in this case remains that law enforcement officers' failure to inform one resident of a home about the right to refuse consent to execute an arrest warrant does not render that consent per se invalid. Instead, a reviewing court will continue to evaluate the totality of the circumstances. In Washington, [w]hen there is no majority opinion, the holding is the narrowest ground upon which a majority agreed. In re Pers. Restraint of Francis, 170 Wn.2d 517, 532 n.7, 242 P.3d 866 (2010). 7 Therefore, when 7 I recognize that the United States Supreme Court uses a different rule: When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.' Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193, 97 S. Ct. 990, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260 (1977) (emphasis added) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.l5, 96 S. Ct. 2909,49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976)). I see no reason for this court to follow that rule because of the significant differences between this court and our federal counterpart. We are elected directly by the people rather than appointed. We interpret two constitutions, not just one. Our oath requires us to faithfully and diligently perform the duties of our office. Just because my conscience will not allow me to sign an opinion that reverses Ruem' s conviction does not invalidate my opinion that Justice Stephens' Ferrier holding correctly states the law in Washington. -8- State v. Ruem (Dara), No. 86214-1 the rationale for a dissent more closely aligns with the lead opinion on a certain issue, that rationale forms the court's holding as to that issue. C. Ordinary Consent and the Totality of the Circumstances The deputies asked for permission to search the trailer and Ruem initially consented. The lead opinion correctly states the factors we should consider in analyzing the voluntariness of consent. Lead opinion at 13. These factors are ( 1) the education and intelligence of the consenting person; (2) whether Miranda[ 8] warnings, if applicable, were given prior to consent; and (3) whether the consenting person was advised of his right not to consent. Id. (citing State v. Shoemaker, 85 Wn.2d 207, 211-12, 533 P.2d 123 (1975)). However, I think these factors weigh in favor of finding voluntary consent here. Ruem was intelligent enough to know how to run a sophisticated grow operation in his home. He had enough education to give evasive answers to the deputies and later attempted to limit that consent shortly after it was given. The first factor weighs against Ruem. The second and third factors did not apply here. Miranda warnings were not applicable because Ruem was not under arrest when he gave consent. Ruem had no right to refuse 8 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). -9- State v. Ruem (Dara), No. 86214-1 consent because the deputies had authorization to search the trailer pursuant to the arrest warrant. See supra pp. 3-5. Thus, the consent was voluntary. There is no fourth factor regarding the length of time consent was granted before it was withdrawn. Mere moments existed between the time Ruem consented and the time Ruem withdrew consent. But those moments here require an important legal distinction. After consent, but before withdrawal, the deputies smelled marijuana in the trailer. Once in the trailer lawfully, the police now had probable cause to believe criminal activity was occurring in their presence. Law enforcement officers have neither duty nor legal requirement to ignore their sense of smell when it reveals that criminal activity is afoot. Hammond, 24 Wn. App. at 598. Hammond still stands for this proposition. Grande merely sought to prohibit law enforcement officers from arresting a car full of people just because they smell marijuana inside, which could originate from one person or even the car itself. Grande, 164 Wn.2d at 146. In this case, no one else was in the trailer so the only individual privacy concerns at stake here are those of Ruem. Id. The concerns raised by Grande are not present here. - 10- State v. Ruem (Dara), No. 86214-1 D. Independent Source Rule Until this year, marijuana consumption (manufacture or distribution) was clearly criminal activity in Washington and still is criminal activity under the federal laws of the United States. The activity at issue in this case was commercial manufacture of marijuana, which is still illegal without a license. Because the police detected the distinct odor of marijuana while entering the trailer at the defendant's invitation, this also was sufficient to meet the independent source rule. The smell of marijuana has no other explanation than the presence of mariJUana. Therefore, the smell of marijuana was sufficient to substantiate the probable cause that eventually gave rise to the search warrant. See supra pp. 2-3, 7. 9 The United States Supreme Court has declined to extend the plain smell doctrine to smells detected by dog. Florida v. Jardines, _U.S._, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 185 L. Ed. 2d 495 (2013). However, the justification for that rule is that a smell by a service dog is more akin to a search than smells detectable by humans that are in plain view because the dog is an instrument that extends the senses of the police. !d. at 1424. The odor of marijuana may provide probable cause to seek a warrant but does not, 9 The search following issuance of the warrant uncovered more marijuana plants and lighting consistent with a grow operation. - 11 - State v. Ruem (Dara), No. 86214-1 without exigent circumstances, justify a warrantless search. State v. Tibbles, 169 Wn.2d 364, 370, 236 P.3d 885 (2010). 10 In this case, because the deputies smelled the marijuana without assistance while entering the trailer at Ruem's invitation, the smell itself did not constitute an illegal search. They then obtained a search warrant that had several bases not violative of Ruem' s constitutional rights and so the evidence should not be suppressed.