Opinion ID: 2051214
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 2A-21 Standardization of Location

Text: Standardization of position cannot always be attained in practice; however, the general rule is to locate signs on the righthand side of the roadway, where the driver is looking for them. On wide expressways, or where some degree of lane-use control is desirable, or where space is not available at the roadside, overhead signs are often necessary. Signs in any other locations ordinarily should be considered only as supplementary to signs in the normal locations. Under some circumstances signs may be placed on channelizing islands or (as on sharp curves to the right) on the left-hand shoulder of the road, directly in front of approaching vehicles. A supplementary sign located on the left of the roadway is often helpful on a multi-lane road where traffic in the right-hand lane may obstruct the view to the right. (Emphasis added.) (Illinois Manual § 2A-21.) A review of this section's plain language reveals that there is no shall provision directing that the sign in question be placed on the right-hand side of the road. Rather, locating signs on the right-hand shoulder is just ordinarily, the general rule and, [u]nder some circumstances[,] signs may be placed    on the left-hand shoulder of the road, directly in front of approaching vehicles. This section further explains why this general rule is not mandatory: Standardization of position cannot always be attained in practice. Consequently, I agree with the appellate court that section 2A-21 does not mandate precise sign placement. In fact, by setting forth indefinite guidelines, section 2A-21 acknowledges that traffic planners must analyze road conditions and make a judgment call each time a traffic sign is installed. Therefore, the sign placement at issue here was a discretionary function even in light of the applicable provisions of the Illinois Manual. See Francis v. Mills (1991), 214 Ill.App.3d 122, 125, 157 Ill.Dec. 905, 573 N.E.2d 323. (holding that the decision of township employees not to replace or upgrade an existing traffic control device was a discretionary function because the applicable manual did not mandate a certain course of conduct). The majority, in an attempt to bolster its conclusion that the sign placement was ministerial, further notes another so-called example of the defendant's noncompliance with the Illinois Manual. (167 Ill.2d at 471, 212 Ill.Dec. at 646, 657 N.E.2d at 991.) The majority then discusses section 2C-3 of the Illinois Manual. The majority neglects to point out that this section is not mandatory, a point which even plaintiffs' expert conceded at trial. Section 2C-3 lists suggested minimum sign placement distances (Illinois Manual § 2C-3) and is thus merely recommended usage. Therefore, this section does not support the majority's conclusion. Section 11-304 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-304 (West 1992)) is also irrelevant to the majority's conclusion because the majority declines to address whether it applied to the sign placement in question. See 167 Ill.2d at 472 n. 3, 212 Ill.Dec. at 647 n. 3, 657 N.E.2d at 992 n. 3. Lastly, the majority implies that to countenance the township's interpretation of the Illinois Manual would be absurd because a government official would be immunized for plac[ing] a traffic control device upside down, behind a tree, or anywhere else he chooses. (167 Ill.2d at 472, 212 Ill.Dec. at 647, 657 N.E.2d at 992.) This suggestion, with its exaggerated scenarios, flies in the face of the Immunity Act. The Immunity Act expressly grants immunity to public entities and officials for the performance of discretionary functions, even if negligent. (745 ILCS 10/2-109, 2-201 (West 1992).) Accordingly, the proper analysis here focuses simply on whether the Immunity Act's grant of discretionary immunity applies in this case. It is not for this court to rewrite the Immunity Act and replace its judgment for that of the General Assembly's. In conclusion, I would affirm the appellate court and hold that the commissioner's placement of the sign was a discretionary function. Under the Immunity Act, both he and the township are provided immunity from tort liability for his performance of this discretionary function, even if negligent.