Opinion ID: 2180409
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Cruel, Unusual, and Disproportionate Punishment

Text: Defendant next contends that the Registration Act and the Notification Law violate the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment (U.S. Const., amend. VIII). In Adams, we rejected an eighth amendment challenge to the Registration Act, and held that registration of sex offenders was not punishment. Adams, 144 Ill.2d at 386-90, 163 Ill.Dec. 483, 581 N.E.2d 637. We determined above that the Notification Law does not constitute punishment. Accordingly, defendant's argument must fail. Defendant also argues that the Registration Act violates the provision of the Illinois Constitution that provides that, All penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). Defendant points out that failing to register as a sex offender is a Class 4 felony (730 ILCS 150/10 (West 1998)), and that this penalty can potentially be applied to those sex offenders whose underlying conviction was for only a Class A misdemeanor (730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.7) (West 1998)). Defendant has no standing to make this argument. A party may not raise a constitutional challenge to a provision of the statute that does not affect him or her. People v. Rogers, 133 Ill.2d 1, 15, 139 Ill.Dec. 714, 549 N.E.2d 226 (1989). Defendant's underlying conviction was for a Class 2 felony, and he thus lacks standing to make this claim.