Opinion ID: 173907
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Breach of Purchase Agreement

Text: The Purchase Agreement required that Branin be given a position at Bessemer generally comparable to his former position at Brundage. Purchase Agreement, § 7.01(vii). The parties agreed upon what that position would be, the title of Managing Director, the base salary and bonus range, the terms of vacation time, and the form and scope of other benefits. Branin does not dispute that he received all that was agreed upon in this respect. Branin nonetheless continued to argue to the district court, and continues to argue here, that he suffered diminished responsibilities, exclusion from meetings, and effective demotion throughout his time at Bessemer. Bessemer II, 498 F.Supp.2d at 635. Because of these alleged diminished responsibilities, Branin maintains that questions of fact exist as to whether there was a material diminution in Mr. Branin's duties and responsibilities subsequent to the closing. Appellant's Br. at 63. The district court rejected this argument, concluding that even had Branin suffered the demotion and other grievances he alleges, Bessemer would not have breached any term of the Purchase Agreement or offer letter by doing so. Bessemer II, 498 F.Supp.2d at 635-36. We agree. Branin characterizes the Purchase Agreement's requirement that he be provided with a role that was generally comparable to the role he had at Brundage as a commitment that so long as Mr. Branin remained in Bessemer's employ, he would function in a comparable position with commensurate authority. Appellant's Br. at 64. But that is not what the contract says. Rather, the contract provides as a condition precedent to closing that the Brundage principals, Branin among them, accept in writing the terms of employment offered by Bessemer for a generally comparable position prior to the closing date. There is no allegation that this condition was not fulfilled. And Branin seems to concede as much in his admission that his employment at Bessemer was not subject to a definite duration. Id. Branin was thus essentially an at-will employee whose duties were subject to change or termination based on the needs and desires of his employer. Cf., e.g., Finley v. Giacobbe, 79 F.3d 1285, 1294-95 (2d Cir.1996) (noting that, with limited exceptions not relevant here, under New York law, an employee serving purely at will, by definition, has no contractual right to avoid dismissal). If he could be dismissed at will by Bessemer, it seems to us, the lesser action of changing his role at the firm, subject of course to his choosing to depart at his option instead, was permissible too.