Opinion ID: 2994162
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cross-Examination of Donald Marini

Text: Ward asserts that the district court improperly restricted his defense by limiting the scope of his cross-examination of government witness Donald Marini. On cross-examination by Ward’s counsel, Marini testified that, as a result of his cooperation, federal prosecutors helped to clear a warrant against Marini based on unrelated charges in California state court. Defense counsel then sought to question Marini as to the nature of the state charges, attempting to elicit the fact that the charges were based on allegations of spousal and child abuse. The prosecutor objected, and following a sidebar, the court sustained the objection. The court noted that the information regarding the nature of the charges was highly inflammatory and irrelevant to the point being developed on cross-examination that Marini received a benefit for his cooperation. We review a district court ruling limiting cross-examination for abuse of discretion. Akinrinade, 61 F.3d at 1285. As we have noted, the sufficiency of cross- examination turns on whether the jury had sufficient information to make a discriminating appraisal of the witness’ motive and bias. Akinrinade, 61 F.3d at 1285 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Ward argues that the district court’s ruling prevented him from inquiring as to the substantial benefit to Mr. Marini as bearing on bias, motive and credibility. However, the district court allowed Ward’s counsel to elicit the fact that Marini received a benefit in the form of dismissal of a state warrant in exchange for his cooperation in the federal prosecution. This was sufficient to allow the jury to make a discriminating appraisal of Marini’s motive and bias. Moreover, trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). The district court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting defense counsel from inquiring into the nature of the state charges.