Opinion ID: 3049370
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pleading Standard Under Twombly and Iqbal

Text: In Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957), the United States Supreme Court instructed that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 8 In this appeal, the CDC states that “Plaintiff did not challenge any of the material facts or supporting exhibits filed by the government. The district court accordingly relied on the government’s statement of undisputed facts in its opinion.” Appellee’s Br. at 6 n.5. We recognize, however, that Speaker, in the district court, did contest the authenticity of the CDC’s press conference transcripts, alleging irregularities and omissions. The CDC then supplemented the record with videos of those same press conferences. In this appeal, Speaker has not contested the district court’s reliance upon these extrinsic documents. 9 The CDC faults Speaker for relying upon facts, contained in newspaper articles, that were not alleged in his Amended Complaint. See Appellee’s Br. at 28. Yet, the CDC itself placed these newspaper articles before the district court by appending them to its motion to dismiss as statements of undisputed material facts and exhibits. The CDC has utilized them in its own brief on appeal, and on appeal the CDC has not objected to the district court’s usage of these facts. The CDC cannot employ its exhibits as both a sword and a shield. 14 facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Id. at 45-46, 78 S. Ct. at 102. In 2007, the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), retired Conley’s “no set of facts” test in favor of a new formulation of Rule 12(b)(6)’s pleading standard. Id. at 562-63, 127 S. Ct. at 1969. In Twombly, the Supreme Court distinguished “plausible” claims from allegations that were merely “conceivable,” and stated that the Court “[did] not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570, 127 S. Ct. at 1974. The Supreme Court explained that a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” but the allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555; 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65. Furthermore, “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Id. at 556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965 (quotation marks omitted). Subsequently, in Iqbal the Supreme Court clarified that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; see also Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 15 1295-1296 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The Court has instructed us that the rule ‘does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,’ but instead ‘simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ the necessary element.”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965). Given the Twombly and Iqbal plausibility standard, we turn to whether Speaker’s Amended Complaint states a claim under the Privacy Act.