Opinion ID: 1514168
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the alimony awards

Text: One of the factors which the court considered in arriving at its lump sum award was the defendant's equitable 50 percent interest in the shares of the County Federal Savings and Loan Association. The original shares, purchased solely in the plaintiff's name in December of 1976, were financed by means of a promissory note to City Trust cosigned by the defendant and secured by a mortgage on the jointly owned family residence. The defendant testified that the stock was supposed to be in joint names and that she relied on her husband's representation in this respect. The court found that a confidential relationship existed between the parties and that the plaintiff, by purchasing the stock solely in his own name, abused that relationship. Relying on this abuse and principles of constructive trust, the court fixed the defendant's interest in the stock at 50 percent. The plaintiff contends that because no fraud was shown, there was no basis for the imposition of a constructive trust. The plaintiff does not challenge the existence of a confidential relationship between the parties. [1] Where such a relationship exists, proof of fraudulent intent is not a condition precedent for the imposition of a constructive trust. Hieble v. Hieble, 164 Conn. 56, 63, 316 A.2d 777 (1972). Indeed, in such cases the burden of proof rests on the party denying the trust to negate it by clear and convincing evidence. Id., 62. The trial court was justified, on the basis of the evidence, in treating the shares of stock in the County Federal Savings and Loan Association as being jointly owned by the parties. In reviewing the amount of the various orders rendered in this case to determine whether they are excessive, an overview of the parties' finances, both before and after the awards, will be helpful. We note at the outset, however, that there are no simple formulae for determining whether distribution of a certain percentage of family assets to one spouse is excessive in any given case. With that in mind, we turn to the data. The plaintiff calculates the total assets of the marriage at $1,797,187. Not included in this total is his interest in the Beatrice Koizim trust, which the plaintiff himself values at $400,000, his $6000 interest in a condominium, and a $10,000 Keogh Retirement Fund. Including these additional items the family asset total is $2,213,187. The defendant, using additional items and different valuations, arrives at a total of $2,519,854. The plaintiff calculates the value of the assets ordered distributed to the defendant, excluding the periodic alimony, to be about $1,410,000. This total includes the lump sum order valued at $600,000. Since this sum is payable in equal instalments over a period of ten years the $600,000 figure does not accurately represent the true value of this portion of the total award. If one were to discount the lump sum award at an interest rate of 8 percent, [2] the value of the lump sum award at the time of the order would approximate $400,000. Am. Jur. 2d, Desk Book, p. 445. If we deduct the difference of $200,000 and exclude the $55,000 allowance for counsel fees, which we consider separately in this opinion, the total value of the assets distributed to the plaintiff represents 52 percent of the total assets as calculated by the plaintiff and 46 percent of the total assets as calculated by the defendant. Calculated another way, the value of assets transferred and actual payments due during the first year, excluding counsel fees, would be about $858,000. This represents 39 percent of family wealth, according to the figures used by the plaintiff. The standards for appellate review in dissolution proceedings are the same whether the subject matter is the assignment of property or periodic alimony. Fucci v. Fucci, 179 Conn. 174, 182, 425 A.2d 592 (1979). Taking into account the criteria set forth in General Statutes § 46b-81, the trial court has broad discretion in making an equitable distribution of family assets. Chambliss v. Chambliss, 171 Conn. 278, 279, 370 A.2d 924 (1976). The test is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did. Aguire v. Aguire, 171 Conn. 312, 314, 370 A.2d 948 (1976). The plaintiff showed a cash flow annual income of $208,000. The defendant maintained that the correct figure was approximately $250,000 or $233,000 if noncash fringe benefits are eliminated. The defendant's annual income is about $1000, her expenses $85,000. There was evidence that during the marriage the annual expenses were $90,000. If we take into account the financial circumstances of the parties, including the plaintiff's capacity to generate substantial income, and apply the statutory criteria, the trial court's order of periodic alimony and lump sum assignment of property was fair and equitable. The plaintiff's characterization of the court's property and alimony orders as outrageously excessive and mind boggling is more pejorative than persuasive. There was evidence that the plaintiff had an annual income of $250,000 and that after distribution he would be left with capital assets worth, on the basis of his own evaluation of the Beatrice Koizim trust, at least $1,700,000. Thus, even if we ignore the plaintiff's major and minor transgressions and look solely at the other statutory criteria, especially the meager capacity of the defendant to enhance her financial situation and the contributions that each spouse made to the marriage, to the accumulation of assets and to the substantial capacity of the plaintiff to generate additional income, the court's orders are neither mind boggling, outrageously excessive nor unreasonable. Because we do not sit at nisi prius in domestic relations matters, of necessity in the overwhelming number of cases we must accord great weight to the trial court which has a distinct advantage in dealing with domestic relations, where all of the surrounding circumstances and the appearance and attitude of the parties are so significant. Fucci v. Fucci, supra, 180-81. Our refusal to upset the property and alimony awards in this case does not constitute an abdication of our responsibility for appellate review. To the contrary it evidences a recognition on our part that by constitutional charter we are limited to corrections of errors of law; Styles v. Tyler, 64 Conn. 432, 450, 30 A. 165 (1894); and that, therefore, in matters of this sort our role of necessity is not to work the vineyard but rather to prune the occasional excrescence.