Opinion ID: 461570
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Policy of the Act

Text: 29 The head of the agency provision was fashioned to provide the agency with a final opportunity to review the terms of an agreement that the agency has signed with a union. 12 The provision first appeared in the Senate version 13 of the Civil Service Reform Act, and in a modified form was incorporated into the conference version of the bill. The Senate Committee explained that 30 [t]he purpose of the provision is to ensure that agreements conform to applicable laws (including this subchapter), existing published agency policies and regulations. A substantially identical provision is contained in Executive Order 11491. Experience under that Executive Order in numerous negotiability disputes established that the provision was warranted to accomplish the purpose described, and that the time limit imposed was a reasonable one to expedite the review process without sacrificing the quality of such review. 31 S.Rep. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 109 (1978), reprinted in Legislative History at 769, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, 2723, 2831. 32 The head of the agency provision was obviously designed to ensure high-level review of executed agreements. Of course, Congress might have limited the head of the agency's opportunity for review to the negotiation phase, but it apparently was unwilling to impose a continuous burden on the head of the agency to review each and every proposal as it arose in the course of day-to-day bargaining. Many of the Union's and the dissent's arguments about the unfairness of the extra 30-day period, apply equally to negotiated agreements and Panel-imposed settlements. We must be cautious not to allow disenchantment with the 30-day review in general, to impact on the independent question of whether Congress intended to except Panel-imposed settlements. 33 The Union argues that the policy that gave rise to head of the agency review is not applicable when the Impasses Panel has imposed a term, and that the Authority's interpretation is, therefore, unreasonable. The Union has failed to demonstrate, however, why the Impasses Panel's involvement changes anything. Indeed, an argument can be made that Congress's explicit policy to allow the head of an agency to invalidate an agreement may have even stronger justifications for terms imposed by the Impasses Panel, than for those negotiated by the parties. In the latter case, the agency's own authorized representative has agreed to the terms. In the former case, however, no representative of the agency may have agreed to them at all, if the Impasses Panel imposed a settlement which was not suggested by either party. Indeed, in such a case, no earlier opportunity for raising the negotiability issue may have been presented. In any event, even if the term was originally proposed by one of the parties, there is no reason why the statutory policy of not entrusting the critical question of compliance with the law exclusively to lower-level officials differs when the Impasses Panel is involved. 34 AFGE argues nonetheless that in most cases the agency will be familiar with the disputed term before the Impasses Panel imposes it, and so the agency should not be allowed to await the Impasses Panel's decision before it objects. As we have already pointed out, however, the issue here is not opportunity to raise the negotiability issue--that is always available as a defense in an unfair labor practice proceeding. The sole question is whether Congress envisioned an intermediate phase of review by the head of the agency within 30 days. The policy behind such a provision would be to permit the head of the agency who usually has the broadest knowledge of agency-wide laws, procedures, rules, and concerns to decide if the term is in fact in accordance with the provisions of this chapter and any other applicable law, rule, or regulation (unless the agency has granted an exception to the provision). Sec. 7114(c)(2). 35 AFGE also argues that the participation of the Impasses Panel is, in and of itself, a sufficient safeguard against illegally imposed terms. This argument misses the mark, however, because the Impasses Panel is not expert in the laws, regulations, practices, and procedures of each governmental agency, and so is not necessarily equipped to decide issues of scope of negotiability. 14 When a negotiability issue is raised in the course of its proceedings, the Impasses Panel automatically loses jurisdiction. See Interpretation and Guidance, 11 F.L.R.A. 626 (1983). Thus, the argument that the participation of the FSIP insures against terms that are nonnegotiable fails to persuade. 36 Our conclusion is bolstered by the Act's general policy of facilitating review of negotiability issues as quickly as possible. Expedited review of the head of the agency's action furthers that policy. 15 If the head of the agency is not allowed to veto a provision within 30 days, then he will be forced to challenge it eventually through non-compliance, by defending against unfair labor practice charges. Ultimately, his is not a choice between compliance and non-compliance with a term he believes illegal. It is a choice between triggering review of the issue within 30 days of the time the contract is signed and triggering review of the issue later, after the agency has refused to go along with the provision in question. 37 Essentially the head of the agency provision affects no more than the timing and the forum of review of negotiability issues. 16 As for timing, there is simply nothing in the statute or its policies that supports delayed determination of the issue. As for the forum of review, it is true that a head of the agency determination is not subject to arbitration under the parties' negotiated grievance procedure. 17 See infra Part II.C. But it is also true that Congress clearly preferred that these issues be taken up directly with the Authority through the expedited review of nonnegotiability assertions. Given the statute's structure and purpose, we conclude that the Authority's interpretation of the relationship between the head of the agency provision and the Impasses Panel provision was reasonable. 38 In reviewing the FLRA interpretation before us, we again emphasize the constraints of our judicial role. We are not members of Congress, with the power to rewrite the terms of a law which may have revealed infirmities in its implementation. Nor are we members of the FLRA, to whom Congress has delegated the primary authority to fill in interpretative voids in the Labor-Management Act. While we recognize that some of the policy arguments raised by the Union and by our dissenting colleague concerning the dynamics of head of the agency review may indeed present substantial concerns for the participants in the collective bargaining process, we stress that the alternative interpretation they advance creates an equally troublesome host of practical problems, apart from its inconclusiveness as an exercise in statutory interpretation. See supra pp. 856-861. Perhaps this fact alone illustrates the wisdom of judicial abstention from redesign of a statutory scheme. Notwithstanding disclaimer, the dissent's main theme is that the Authority's interpretation should be reversed because it is not the best, or the most reasonable one. We view our task, in contrast, as simply deciding, whether, given the existence of competing considerations that might justify either interpretation, the Authority's interpretation is clearly contrary to statute or is an unreasonable one. See Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-83, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); supra pp. 857-858. We think not.