Opinion ID: 166669
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Victim in Courtroom

Text: 52 Mr. Visinaiz argues that the district court erred in allowing Ms. Jenkins' son, Johnny Jenkins, to remain in the courtroom for the remainder of the trial after his testimony was complete. Aplt. Br. at 80-82. He argues that the district court should not have considered Mr. Jenkins a victim, or at least should have issued a cautionary instruction that Mr. Jenkins was not to discuss his testimony with other witnesses. Id. at 80-81. Finally, Mr. Visinaiz argues that these requirements are implicit in Federal Rule of Evidence 615. Id. at 81. 53 The district court allowed Mr. Jenkins to remain in the courtroom, following his testimony, as a victim under 18 U.S.C. § 3510. For purposes of that statute, [n]otwithstanding any statute, rule, or other provision of law, a United States district court shall not order any victim of an offense excluded from the trial.... 18 U.S.C. § 3510(a). A victim for purposes of this statute includes a person that has suffered direct physical, emotional, or pecuniary harm as a result of the commission of a crime.... 42 U.S.C. § 10607(e)(2) (emphasis supplied); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3510(c) (noting that the definition of victim under § 3510 includes all persons defined under § 503(e)(2) of the Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990, which is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 10607(e)(2)). Thus, Mr. Jenkins was a person authorized by statute to be present. Fed.R.Evid. 615(4). Finally, there was no request for a cautionary instruction and there was absolutely no suggestion that Mr. Jenkins discussed his testimony with others. Consequently, there was no error and Mr. Visinaiz' arguments are without merit. 54