Opinion ID: 789967
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Horne Factors

Text: 29 The majority rests its decision on the avoidance of constitutional dicta. Under Ehrlich, this is not, in itself, a sufficient ground for disregarding Saucier. Even if it were, however, it provides no justification for avoiding the constitutional question in this case. 30 In cases in which we ultimately resolve the issue in favor of defendants on qualified immunity grounds, any finding of a constitutional violation is dicta. As we noted in Ehrlich, however, the Supreme Court, by the very logic of Saucier, makes clear that such dicta is enough to put defendant state actors on notice that, if they repeat their acts, they will not have the benefit of qualified immunity. Ehrlich, 348 F.3d at 56 n. 11. I believe this principle carries added weight in a case where, as here, state courts have placed the imprimatur of legitimacy on an arguable violation of the federal Constitution, and thus if a federal court does not step in and inform state actors that the law violates the federal Constitution, state law enforcement officers will continue to be placed in the same impossible position as the defendants in this case: they will have a duty to enforce a law that violates core federal constitutional rights because state courts have told them that the law is valid. 31 Although the Horne majority expressed concern about constitutional holdings in dicta, Horne, 191 F.3d at 247-48, none of those concerns should overcome the necessity of reaching the constitutional issue in this case. The Horne majority fretted that judges risk being insufficiently thoughtful and cautious in uttering pronouncements in dicta, and that parties may do an inadequate job briefing and presenting an issue that predictably will have no effect on the outcome of the case. Id. at 247. Such concerns, to the extent they are relevant at all, are hardly relevant here. I doubt that any member of this panel fails to understand the importance of the issues in this case or has been insufficiently thoughtful and cautious in deciding this appeal. 32 Further, the majority cannot reasonably declare that the parties did not adequately address this issue. Defendants were represented on appeal by the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York. That office, although it preferred to place more emphasis on the qualified immunity issue that we ultimately resolved in its favor, devoted considerable portions of its opening and reply briefs to defending the constitutionality of § 240.30(1), both under state and federal law. Plaintiffs devote nearly half of their brief to the unconstitutionality of § 240.30(1) under federal law. The New York Attorney General, despite the panel's repeated requests for a brief defending the constitutionality of the statute, refused to defend the law and filed a one-page letter brief conclusorily stating that Vives' actions did not satisfy the elements of § 240.30(1), a position that none of the panel members found persuasive. Thus, it is hard to see how the parties could have better addressed the constitutional issue, and the fact that the State of New York refused to defend its own law cannot serve as grounds for us to decline to decide whether that law is or is not constitutional. 33 The Horne majority raised another objection to constitutional dicta that is more substantial. When we find a constitutional violation, but then find that the defendants are protected by qualified immunity, the defendants have no opportunity to appeal the constitutional issue because they won on qualified immunity. Horne, 191 F.3d at 247. 34 This scenario is, of course, an inescapable result of the sequential order of the Saucier inquiry, and since we cannot both follow Saucier and avoid this problem, we must assume the Supreme Court anticipated this result and was not troubled by it. In any event, if the plaintiff appeals this Court's qualified immunity ruling, there is no reason to believe that the Supreme Court would not review the constitutional issue, since doing so is the first step in analyzing any qualified immunity claim. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) (reiterating that, on review of a lower court decision granting defendants qualified immunity, [t]he threshold inquiry ... is whether plaintiff's allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation). As the Supreme Court will have ample opportunity to review our constitutional decision if plaintiff appeals our decision, the expressed concern over constitutional dicta is to my mind unavailing in the present case, especially since the majority failed to articulate any reason why Saucier should not apply. 35 Finally, the constitutional issue before us is not particularly difficult, and the violation is particularly egregious. For the reasons stated below, I have no difficulty finding a serious constitutional violation in the case now before us. II A. Section 240.30(1) is Unconstitutional on its Face 36 A criminal prohibition on communicating in an annoying or alarming way is facially unconstitutional. If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989). In fact, a principal `function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.' Id. at 408-09, 109 S.Ct. 2533 ( quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4, 69 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949)). 37 In this case, New York City police, acting pursuant to § 240.30(1) and with the blessing of New York courts, arrested Vives for mailing a political and religious statement to a candidate for public office. The officers' ground for arresting Vives was that the recipient found his communication with her annoying and/or alarming, which is a violation of § 240.30(1). Speech of this sort may only be proscribed in three very limited circumstances: (1) the speech constitutes fighting words that by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942); (2) the speech constitutes advocacy [that] is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969); and (3) the speech constitutes a `true threat' by which the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d 535 (2003) ( quoting Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969)). Section 240.30(1) is not limited to these three categories. By criminalizing speech that merely annoys or alarms, the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad. B. Section 240.30(1) is Unconstitutional As Applied 38 Moreover, § 240.30(1) is unconstitutional as applied. Vives sent, on a single occasion, to a candidate for public office, a non-threatening letter concerning political and religious issues of importance to him. One would be hard-pressed to think of an action that is closer to the core of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760, 115 S.Ct. 2440, 132 L.Ed.2d 650 (1995) ([P]rivate religious speech, far from being a First Amendment orphan, is as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular private expression.); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) (The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by our decisions. The constitutional safeguard, we have said, `was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.') ( quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957)). 39 Political or religious speech of the type Vives engaged in, as noted, may only be suppressed if it creates an unjustifiable risk of immediate breach of the peace, imminent lawless action, or a specific threat of violence directed to an individual or group. See Black, 538 U.S. at 359, 123 S.Ct. 1536. Chaplinsky, Brandenburg, and, most recently, Black, make clear that while these narrow limitations are consistent with the First Amendment, broader restrictions are not. See Black, 538 U.S. at 358-59, 123 S.Ct. 1536; Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447, 89 S.Ct. 1827; Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573-74, 62 S.Ct. 766. As a consequence, insofar as Vives was arrested under § 240.30(1) for engaging in annoying and/or alarming political and religious speech, his arrest is plainly unconstitutional.