Opinion ID: 608849
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Substantial Justification of the Commission's Position

Text: 13 Where as here, there is no claim of special circumstances which would make an award unjust, attorney's fees under the EAJA must be awarded to the prevailing non-government party unless the court finds that the position of the United States in the pertinent litigation to have been substantially justified. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). To justify such a finding, the government must show that its position, both administratively and before the courts, had a reasonable basis in both law and fact. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566 & n. 2, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2550 & n. 2, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988). The test is essentially one of reasonableness, H.R.Rep. No. 1418 at 10, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. The government has the burden of demonstrating substantial justification. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 1081, 1085 (2d Cir.1983). In our statement of facts, supra, we note that the panel which had previously considered this case on the merits found the government's position to have been unreasonable. Thus we must determine the extent to which we are bound by that panel's finding that the Commission had failed to provide a 'reasonable interpretation' of either its own regulation or of § 438(a)(4), 943 F.2d at 196. 14 Appellant maintains that the reasoning behind the earlier panel's decision conclusively establishes that the government's position was not substantially justified. It relies on a Ninth Circuit case which was decided while this appeal was pending, Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Madigan, 980 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir.1992). It was there held that a panel considering an EAJA fee application was bound by a previous panel's holding that the government's position had been unreasonable, at least when in so determining the first panel had carefully considered the language and legislative history of the statute in question. 15 The Commission, on the other hand, points to a series of cases for the proposition that this inquiry is a purely historical one, properly confined to an analysis of how the situation looked to the government before it lost its case. It reminds us that the EAJA is not an automatic fee-shifting statute, Spencer v. N.L.R.B., 712 F.2d 539, 550 (D.C.Cir.1983), and urges a standard for determining this question which is separate and distinct from whatever legal standards governed the merits phase of the case, FEC v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1087 (D.C.Cir.1986); see also United States v. Paisley, 957 F.2d 1161, 1167 (4th Cir.1992), cert. denied sub nom. Crandon v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 73, 121 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992); Welter v. Sullivan, 941 F.2d 674, 676 (8th Cir.1991); Griffon v. United States Dep't. of Health and Human Services, 832 F.2d 51, 52 (5th Cir.1987); Cinciarelli v. Reagan, 729 F.2d 801, 806 (D.C.Cir.1984). 16 Having considered these positions, we conclude, as did the Ninth Circuit, that the earlier panel's careful analysis of the government's position allows no further consideration of this issue. This is so because the legal standards which governed the merits phase of this litigation are precisely those to be applied to the EAJA question. The government's position is deemed reasonable only if it has a reasonable basis both in law and in fact, Pierce, 487 U.S. 552, 565, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2550. In granting summary judgment to appellant, the previous panel found the Commission's position unreasonable in light of the plain language and legislative history of the statute. It also found that the lists, compiled without addresses or phone numbers and bearing a warning against commercial use, posed no danger to the privacy interests which § 438(a)(4) was designed to protect. Neither the terms of the statute, its legislative history, nor the evidence concerning the nature of the lists involved were unknown to the Commission when it decided to undertake this litigation. We therefore find that the previous panel has conclusively established that the Commission's position was not substantially justified so as to bar an award of attorney's fees. Like the Ninth Circuit, [w]e come to this conclusion not because the government lost its claim, but because a previous panel of this court determined that the statutory language and legislative history were clear. 980 F.2d at 1332. 17 In brief, contrary to the suggestion in the dissenting opinion, we have no occasion to assess the merits of the district court's exercise of discretion. We hold that in this unusual situation where a previous panel has specifically passed on every question before us, and has found the Commission's position to have been unreasonable in that it frustrated the intent of Congress and might jeopardize first amendment rights, the district court was--as are we--bound by the panel's conclusions. It would be hard to imagine how it could be held that one had been substantially justified in defying the will of Congress and jeopardizing First Amendment rights.