Opinion ID: 171480
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unreasonable Seizures and Arrests

Text: Capt. Gonzales's first challenge is to the district court's conclusion that he was not entitled to summary judgment relating to the seizures and arrests of the Arrested Plaintiffs. As we explain below, Capt. Gonzales is entitled to qualified immunity (and, thus summary judgment) unless the Arrested Plaintiffs can establish (1) Capt. Gonzales violated a constitutional right, and (2) the right he violated was clearly established at the time. Mecham, 500 F.3d at 1204. Prior to analyzing Capt. Gonzales's challenge, however, we briefly summarize the arrest of each Arrested Plaintiff, construing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs.

While in front of the Baskin Robbins on Central Avenue, Ms. Silva-Banuelos saw a group of protestors sit down. Officers surrounded the protestors and she saw one officer jab a protestor with a baton. Later, at the intersection of Central Avenue and Yale Boulevard, she stood on the street near the curb in front of a parked car. She joined in chanting police strike and she told officers that the crowd was being treated poorly, to which the horse-mounted officers laughed and charged forward. She stepped back and made peace signs in front of the Papa John's restaurant. The horse-mounted officers encircled her and told her not to move. An officer twisted her arms back and forced her to walk to the police car where she was handcuffed. Ms. Silva-Banuelos did not directly interact with Capt. Gonzales, although he is seen in a videotape apparently directing her arrest. (Capt. Gonzales denies authorizing her arrest, but concedes, for purposes of summary judgment, that he must assume this fact to be true. Reply Br. at 8, n. 1.) The police charged her with resisting, evading, or obstructing on officer, and public nuisance. All charges were dismissed upon the prosecutor's subsequent motion.
Mr. Doyon joined his friends playing samba music on percussion instruments with his ringing of a cowbell. He witnessed officers shoving some protestors with batons, and between the intersection of Harvard Drive and Cornell Drive, [h]e saw one officer with a rifle that appeared to shoot beanbag rounds. Aplts' App. vol. VIII, at 1969. As he watched, [t]he officer aimed the rifle at a young man who was walking east on the sidewalk, and he heard the officer say that if the man did not move faster, he would shoot him. Id. He believed [t]he drumming appeared to ease some of the tension in the crowd[,] and many people began to smile, sing, and dance. Id. at 1969-70. He did not hear any orders to leave the intersection or warnings about the use of chemical agents, nor did anyone tell him to stop drumming. Id. at 1970. Capt. Gonzales then ordered the officers to remove the drums and to arrest the drummers. Mr. Doyon watched as officers in riot gear immediately entered the crowd, passing several people in order to apprehend four of the drummers. Id. vol. VIII, at 1970. Two officers grabbed him by the shoulders, causing him to trip. Id. The officers dragged him from the crowd and pushed him face down onto the pavement, where [o]ne of the officers placed his knee on the small of [his] back, pinning him to the ground. Id. Though he did not resist, the officers pushed Mr. Doyon forward onto the hood of a police car and handcuffed him with plastic flexicuffs. Id. As he was being taken to a police van, he saw an officer walking toward the crowd at Central Ave. and Cornell Dr. with a tear gas canister launcher. Id. Upon entering the van, [he] heard a loud pop followed by the sounds of people in the crowd screaming and yelling. Id. Shortly thereafter, tear gas began wafting into the van, burning [his] eyes, throat, and nasal passages and causing him to have difficulty breathing. Id. Police officers closed the door to the van, sealing in the tear gas, and [o]ther protestors in the van began to panic because they were trapped in a van permeated with tear gas with no way to get fresh air. Id. The charges were dismissed against him after he successfully completed an alternative sentencing program, which was a one-day informational citizenship program. Id. at 1971.
Mr. Kisner attended the demonstration along with his sister, Alicia Kisner, and his mother, Lisa Kisner. He witnessed officers use pepper spray and batons to keep the crowd moving, he was subjected to pepper ball rounds, saw the launching of tear gas, and saw officers throw drummers to the ground. After witnessing a female protester collapse after an officer fired beanbag rounds at her from close range, he and other protestors went to assist her. An officer shot him with beanbag rounds in the shoulder and chest. He proceeded to the corner of Central Avenue and Cornell Avenue and joined a group of protestors chanting shame to the police. Id. at 1978. A horse-mounted officer ordered everyone to leave. Mr. Kisner and others questioned why they could not be on the sidewalk. Mr. Kisner also explained that his car was north of the demonstration, and that he needed to proceed in that direction in order to depart. The officer refused to let Mr. Kisner continue going north and, after feeling the burning of pepper spray, Mr. Kisner turned around on Cornell Avenue. Then, two horse-mounted officers approached him on each side, grabbed his backpack and thrust him to the ground. Another officer led him to a police van. Mr. Kisner was charged with Resisting, Evading, or Obstructing an Officer in violation of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-22-1 and Public Nuisance in violation of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-8-1. After the completion of a one-day citizenship information program, the charges against Mr. Kisner were dismissed.
Having summarized the three arrests, we consider Capt. Gonzales's argument that he is entitled to qualified immunity. While we are mindful that Arrested Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that Capt. Gonzales violated their clearly established constitutional rights, Mecham, 500 F.3d at 1204, we note that he offers four separate arguments in support of his purported entitlement to qualified immunity. First, he argues that he cannot be liable because he was not personally involved in the seizures or arrests of the Arrested Plaintiffs. Second, he contends that the seizures were not unreasonable because there was a reasonable basis to believe that probable cause existed to arrest each plaintiff. Third, he urges that, even if the officers did not have probable cause to arrest, he is protected by qualified immunity's second prong, because the right of the Arrested Plaintiffs was not clearly established. Finally, he argues that he should not be held liable for the arrests as a supervisor. For reasons explained below, we find that the Arrested Plaintiffs have met their burden and that each of Capt. Gonzales's arguments is unpersuasive.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Arrested Plaintiffs, as we must, we consider whether they have established that Capt. Gonzales may have violated their constitutional rights. Mecham, 500 F.3d at 1204; see also Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151; Reynolds v. Powell, 370 F.3d 1028, 1030 (10th Cir. 2004). The first two of Capt. Gonzales's aforementioned contentions  that (a) he did not violate the Arrested Plaintiffs' constitutional rights because he was not personally involved in their arrests or seizures, and (b) the arrests were supported by probable cause  must be considered under the first prong of our qualified immunity analysis. We will examine each of Capt. Gonzales's arguments in turn.
For liability under section 1983, direct participation is not necessary. Any official who `causes' a citizen to be deprived of her constitutional rights can also be held liable. The requisite causal connection is satisfied if the defendant set in motion a series of events that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to deprive the plaintiff of her constitutional rights. Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 700 (10th Cir.1990). In this case, the district court found that the Arrested Plaintiffs established the requisite causal connection between alleged deprivation of their constitutional rights and Capt. Gonzales's actions. We agree with the district court's conclusion. To begin, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Silva-Banuelos, the video footage of her arrest places Capt. Gonzales nearby, strongly suggesting that Capt. Gonzales was aware of, if not the director of, her arrest. Thus, he was at least on the scene directing, if not even more personally involved in her arrest. See Fischer v. Forestwood Co., 525 F.3d 972, 978 (10th Cir.2008). The district court also determined that Capt. Gonzales was intimately and personally involved in the preparation and planning of the APD response to the demonstration, including measuring the amount of force the officers used and the arrests they made: It is undisputed that Defendant Gonzales played a role in developing the APD's plan for the protest and acted as the incident commander in charge of the police response to the March 20, 2003 demonstration. Consequently, he was the point of contact for, and the immediate supervisor of, all police officers assigned to duty at the demonstration. By his own admission, Defendant Gonzales did not expect his officers to take independent action unless they received specific directives, and this was particularly true concerning the use of force. As the incident commander, Defendant Gonzales directly supervised his officers' conduct and issued specific directives as he followed the progress of the march and the protest. When the march neared the conclusion after the demonstrators returned to Central Avenue, Defendant Gonzales ordered the arrest and removal of five to seven individuals who were acting as provocateurs. After the crowd returned to the intersection of Central Avenue and Cornell Drive, Defendant Gonzales ordered his officers to seize the percussion instruments that certain protestors were playing and directed his officers to make arrests if necessary. Toward the end of the protest, Defendant Gonzales deviated from the APD's general policy of citing and releasing demonstrators and ordered his officers to book the arrested persons downtown. Aplts' App. vol. VIII, at 2009 (emphasis added). We note that Capt. Gonzales also ordered his officer to take the unusual step of booking the arrestees downtown, rather than citing them and releasing them. The district court also found that Capt. Gonzales's authorization of the provocateurs' arrests and of other necessary arrests encompassed the arrests of Mr. Doyon and Mr. Kisner. Further, the district court found that there was sufficient evidence of Capt. Gonzales's direct participation in Mr. Doyon's seizure and arrest. We agree with the district court that, viewing the facts favorably to the Plaintiffs, Capt. Gonzales's personal involvement was the catalyst of the chain of events leading to Ms. Silva-Banuelos's and the two other Arrested Plaintiffs' arrests. Id. at 2008 (citing Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988, 995 (10th Cir.1996) (A plaintiff may satisfy this standard by showing the defendant-supervisor personally directed the violation or had actual knowledge of the violation and acquiesced in its continuance.)).
Having found that Arrested Plaintiffs have adequately established a causal connection between Capt. Gonzales's actions and their arrests, we turn to Capt. Gonzales's second argument: that there was a reasonable basis to believe that probable cause existed to arrest the Arrested Plaintiffs. The Fourth Amendment protects the right of individuals to be free from improper arrest and detention. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (The right of people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable seizures ... shall not be violated.). [A] warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed, Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004), and the validity of the arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually committed a crime. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979); see also Wilder v. Turner, 490 F.3d 810, 813 (10th Cir.2007) (Probable cause only requires a probability of criminal activity, not a prima facie showing of such activity.). Accordingly, when a warrantless arrest is the subject of a § 1983 action, in order to succeed, a plaintiff must prove that the officer(s) lacked probable cause. Id., 490 F.3d at 813-14. [W]hen an officer has probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor crime in his presence, the balancing of private and public interests is not in doubt. The arrest is constitutionally reasonable. Virginia v. Moore, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008). Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been committed. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). The inquiry depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest, Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 152, 125 S.Ct. 588, where supported by reasonably trustworthy information. Beck, 379 U.S. at 91, 85 S.Ct. 223. We determine probable cause from the totality of the circumstances taking into account both inculpatory as well as exculpatory evidence. Wilder, 490 F.3d at 814. In general, it is a jury question in a civil rights suit whether an officer had probable cause to arrest. DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 623 (10th Cir.1990). In addition, the legality of an arrest may be established by proving that there was probable cause to believe that the plaintiff had committed a crime other than the one with which [s]he was eventually charged, provided that the crime under which the arrest is made and [the] crime for which probable cause exists are in some fashion related. Gassner v. City of Garland, Tex., 864 F.2d 394, 398 (5th Cir.1989) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 149, 125 S.Ct. 588 ([T]he subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause.); Apodaca v. City of Albuquerque, 443 F.3d 1286, 1289 (10th Cir.2006) (All that matters is whether [the officer] possessed knowledge of evidence that would provide probable cause to arrest her on some ground. (emphasis in original)). Capt. Gonzales argues that his conduct, to the extent it impacted the arrests, stemmed from his and his officers' collective knowledge of the existence of probable cause to arrest for each of the charged violations, and of probable cause to arrest each of the three Arrested Plaintiffs for various uncharged violations: the Parade Ordinance, § 7-3-1 et seq., Revised Ordinances of Albuquerque (ROA); prohibiting pedestrians on roadways, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-7-339; walking along a roadway, § 8-2-7-7; and disorderly conduct, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-20-1(a); § 12-2-5(D) ROA. Central to this analysis is determining which crime, or crimes, [the] defendant[] could objectively and reasonably have believed that [the Arrested Plaintiffs] committed. Fogarty, 523 F.3d at 1156. We disregard evidence of an officer's subjective belief in this inquiry. See id. Instead, we concern ourselves only with whether [the Arrested Plaintiffs'] conduct, as viewed objectively and in the light most favorable to [them], could establish probable cause to believe that [they] had [committed these crimes]. Id. It is well-established that the police may pool their information to establish probable cause, United States v. Corral, 970 F.2d 719, 725 n. 4 (10th Cir.1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, Capt. Gonzales must point to an officer who has relay[ed] information to, or receiv[ed] information from, fellow officers based on personal observation of [the Arrested Plainitffs' behavior] before we may apply this rule. Fogarty, 523 F.3d at 1158 n. 10. We consider whether probable cause existed with respect to each Arrested Plaintiff.
Ms. Silva-Banuelos was arrested for resisting, evading, or obstructing an officer and for public nuisance. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-22-1. The prosecutor later reduced this charge to a violation of ROA 1994 § 12-2-19 of the Albuquerque City Code, which provides language nearly identical to the state statute. [2] Under New Mexico law, resisting, evading, or obstructing an officer consists of: A. knowingly obstructing, resisting or opposing any officer of this state or any other duly authorized person serving or attempting to serve or execute any process or any rule or order of any of the courts of this state or any other judicial writ or process; B. intentionally fleeing, attempting to evade or evading an officer of this state when the person committing the act of fleeing, attempting to evade or evasion has knowledge that the officer is attempting to apprehend or arrest him; C. willfully refusing to bring a vehicle to a stop when given a visual or audible signal to stop, whether by hand, voice, emergency light, flashing light, siren or other signal, by a uniformed officer in an appropriately marked police vehicle; or D. resisting or abusing any judge, magistrate or peace officer in the lawful discharge of his duties. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-22-1. Under New Mexico law, public nuisance consists of: knowingly creating, performing or maintaining anything affecting any number of citizens without lawful authority which is either: A. injurious to public health, safety, morals or welfare; or B. interferes with the exercise and enjoyment of public rights, including the right to use public property. Whoever commits a public nuisance for which the act or penalty is not otherwise prescribed by law is guilty of a petty misdemeanor. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-8-1. Ms. Silva-Banuelos stood in the sidewalk chanting police strike before her arrest. Aplts' App. vol. VIII, at 1993. As horse-mounted officers approached, she moved to the sidewalk, and raised her hands making peace signs. She was arrested by an officer who was on foot. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Silva-Banuelos, we agree that Capt. Gonzales brings no argument before this court that such actions constituted either resisting or abusing an officer in the course of his duties. Nor does he offer an argument that her actions could amount to a public nuisance before us on appeal. Capt. Gonzales focuses his arguments on appeal on those violations for which Ms. Silva-Banuelos was not charged. He contends that there is more than probable cause establishing she violated the City's parade ordinance, as there is no dispute that the demonstrators did not obtain a parade permit, and that they marched on the public streets. See ROA 1994 § 7-3-5. Similarly, there is no dispute that state and city law requires persons to walk on the sidewalk if one is available. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-7-339, and ROA 1994 8-2-7-7. Finally, Capt. Gonzales maintains that there was probable cause for an officer to believe Ms. Silva-Banuelos was engaging in disorderly conduct. As to the parade permit ordinance, because Ms. Silva-Banuelos was marching in a procession without a permit, Capt. Gonzales argues that any APD officer could easily have concluded that she was in violation of the ordinance. Similarly, he argues that one video clearly depicts Ms. Silva-Banuelos chanting in the street, in violation of the regulations regarding walking in the street. However, the Arrested Plaintiffs maintain that several streets were closed before the demonstrators moved to the streets. The protestors assumed that police, by directing the procession, were actually permitting, if not sanctioning, the march and its flow into the streets. Capt. Gonzales argues that [b]ecause the protestors refused to clear the streets, [he] ultimately ordered the closure of part of Central Avenue to traffic. Aplt's Br. at 27. However, as the district court noted, the historical facts seen in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs would not amount to probable cause because the officers' conduct essentially amounted to the grant of a de facto parade permit, as the officers would have been aware: Seen in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the evidence suggests that Defendants may have implicitly sanctioned the march not only by closing off streets to traffic, but also by directing the progress and direction of the procession. In addition, because the authority to grant parade permit applications lay with the APD Chief of Police (Chief Gilbert Gallegos was present at the demonstration), any action by APD officers acquiescing to an unplanned march could reasonably have been interpreted as a waiver of the parade permit requirement. Under the circumstances viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff Silva-Banuelos, none of the APD officers could have had probable cause to arrest [her] for violating the Parade Ordinance. Aplts' App. vol. VIII, at 1996. [3] We agree with the district court's conclusion that, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Silva-Banuelos, the APD's street closures and direction of the procession sanctioned the protestors walking along the road and waived the permit requirement. Finally, we turn to Capt. Gonzales's argument that a reasonable officer might have objectively believed Ms. Silva-Banuelos was engaged in disorderly conduct. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-20-1(A) (defining disorderly conduct as engaging in violent, abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous, unreasonably loud or otherwise disorderly conduct which tends to disturb the peace). We have explained: Under New Mexico law, disorderly conduct must meet two requirements. The first requirement is that the conduct itself fall into one of the categories enumerated in the statute by being violent, abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous, unreasonably loud, or otherwise disorderly. Id. The second prong measures the potential effect of the conduct on others, requiring that it tend to disturb the peace. State v. Oden, 82 N.M. 563, 484 P.2d 1273, 1274 (Ct.App.1971) (holding that tend to disturb the peace is an independent element of disorderly conduct). Disturbing the peace requires an act of violence, or ... an act likely to produce violence, or which, by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community. State v. Florstedt, 77 N.M. 47, 419 P.2d 248, 249 (1966) (quotation omitted). Fogarty, 523 F.3d at 1156-57. Capt. Gonzales contends there was an ample basis for probable cause to believe Ms. Silva-Banuelos engaged in disorderly conduct, as she was marching through the streets during rush hour traffic and refusing to obey the officers' lawful commands to clear the streets. Aplt's Br. at 28. But, as the district court noted, one video depicts her chanting for about a minute, followed by her standing quietly in the street. There is testimony that one officer identified Ms. Silva-Banuelos as the long-haired girl and observed some of her actions. We agree with the district court that one minute of chanting a non-abusive, non-profane slogan (police strike) does not amount to disturbing the peace or inciting an act of violence. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09, 94 S.Ct. 326, 38 L.Ed.2d 303 (1973) (overturning disorderly conduct conviction of antiwar protestor who yelled We'll take the f___ing street later (or again)). We thus reject Capt. Gonzales's suggestion that there was probable cause for her arrest.
Mr. Doyon was also charged with resisting, evading, or obstructing an officer and public nuisance. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-22-1(D); 30-8-1. Capt. Gonzales maintains that the cowbell and other percussion instruments were interfering with his officers' ability to communicate with the protestors. Mr. Doyon claimed that the music actually assuaged tension in the crowd. He further stated he did not hear any orders to move from the intersection, nor did anyone tell him to cease playing music. As above with respect to Ms. Silva-Banuelos, Capt. Gonzales provides no substantive argument before this court in support of the elements of the charged offenses. Mr. Doyon did not resist arrest, nor did he engage in conduct directed at the officers, and Capt. Gonzales does not argue that Mr. Doyon interfered with public property. With regard to the uncharged offenses, we apply the same reasoning as above regarding the Parade Ordinance and the ordinance and statute regarding walking in the street, in that the officers' closure of the street may have been interpreted as a sanctioning of the demonstration. Finally, we turn to Capt. Gonzales's argument that there was probable cause supporting Mr. Doyon's arrest for the uncharged offenses of disorderly conduct, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-20-1(A) (defining disorderly conduct as engaging in violent, abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous, unreasonably loud or otherwise disorderly conduct which tends to disturb the peace), and ROA 1994 § 12-2-5(D) (defining disorderly conduct as engaging in any public place in violent, abusive or indecent conduct and [i]nciting, causing, aiding, abetting or assisting in creating any riot, affray, or disturbance at ... any ... public place in the city). In New Mexico, disorderly conduct is conduct with the tendency [] to disturb the peace. State v. Salas, 127 N.M. 686, 986 P.2d 482, 486 (1999). A breach of the peace is an act likely to cause violence or which disturbs the peace and quiet of the community by causing consternation and alarm. State v. Doe, 92 N.M. 100, 583 P.2d 464, 466 (1978). As noted above, [u]nder New Mexico law, disorderly conduct must [be] ... violent, abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous, unreasonably loud, or otherwise disorderly, and it must tend to disturb the peace. Fogarty, 523 F.3d at 1156-57 (internal quotation marks omitted). As to unreasonably loud and disorderly behavior, Capt. Gonzales argues that the crowd was loud and unruly, and the percussion playing was riling up the members of the protest and otherwise tending to disturb the peace. Aplt's Br. at 29, 30. Mr. Doyon responds that he was surrounded by protestors who were chanting, speaking into megaphones, and playing percussion instruments. Aples' Br. at 45 (quoting Aplts' App. vol. VIII, at 2000). He stated that his bell-ringing actually helped to de-escalate the rising tension in the crowd. Id. at 46. As was the case with a fellow percussion player, the district court found sufficient support in the record that Mr. Doyon was playing at a reasonable volume. See Fogarty, 523 F.3d at 1158. Capt. Gonzales argues that he ordered Mr. Doyon's arrest because the percussion instruments interfered with his efforts to communicate with the crowd, as well as incited hostility towards the police. Reply Br. at 12. He concedes, however, that there is conflicting testimony on this point, and we agree that crediting the facts found by the district court and those that it likely assumed, we are precluded from holding that [Mr. Doyon's] conduct threatened to incite violence or create `consternation and alarm' as required by New Mexico law. Fogarty, 523 F.3d at 1158.
Mr. Kisner faced the same charges as Mr. Doyon: resisting, evading, or obstructing an officer and public nuisance. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-22-1(D); 30-8-1. Mr. Kisner, like Mr. Doyon, engaged in behavior that did not provide probable cause to arrest for either resisting or obstructing an officer or public nuisance. His interaction with the police was limited to chanting shame toward a number of officers and asking an officer why he could not remain on the sidewalk. There is no indication that his conduct approached abuse of an officer in the course of his duties. And, as the district court noted, Mr. Kisner's posing questions to an officer did not constitute resisting an officer. Aplts' App. vol. VIII, at 2002 (citing Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1128 (Although plaintiff briefly asked Defendants what was going on before complying with their commands to exit the residence, this does not amount to resistance.)). And, similar to Ms. Silva-Banuelos's, Mr. Kisner's activities did not interfere with the right to use public property in a manner sufficient to support an arrest for public nuisance. We thus consider whether there was probable cause to arrest for the uncharged misdemeanors. The demonstrators may have reasonably viewed the officers' involvement in closing the streets and directing the protest to be a sanctioning of the demonstration. Capt. Gonzales offers little support for Mr. Kisner's uncharged disorderly conduct misdemeanor, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-20-1(A). Probable cause existed to arrest each of the Arrested Plaintiffs for violation of this statute, he argues, because the protestors were marching through the streets during rush hour traffic and refusing to obey officers' lawful commands to clear the streets. However, under our standard of review, we agree with the district court that non-abusive chanting as part of a large-scale demonstration could hardly qualify as disturbing the peace. Aplts' App. vol. VIII, at 2004. Further, we agree that a reasonable officer would not have believed, based on the facts most favorable to Michael Kisner, that probable cause existed to arrest him for the crimes with which he was not charged. Id.
Having concluded the district court correctly determined that the facts alleged demonstrate that Capt. Gonzales's conduct violated a constitutional right, see Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, we next consider his third argument as to whether the right was clearly established. Id. This question must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful under the circumstances presented. Fogarty, 523 F.3d at 1155 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151). Capt. Gonzales argues that the Arrested Plaintiffs' arrests were objectively reasonable because there is no evidence that he violated a clearly established constitutional right. We disagree. In the context of an unlawful arrest our analysis is simple, for the law was and is unambiguous: a government official must have probable cause to arrest an individual. Fogarty, 523 F.3d at 1158-59 (internal quotation marks omitted). As the above analysis demonstrates, the record does not suggest behavior that allowed Capt. Gonzales to infer that probable cause existed to arrest the [Arrested Plaintiffs]. Aplts' App. vol. VIII, at 2010. Viewing the facts most favorably to the Arrested Plaintiffs, Capt. Gonzales's issuance of arrest orders, when on notice that probable cause was lacking, was a violation of a clearly established right.
We turn to Capt. Gonzales's final argument related to the arrests and seizures, which challenges the district court's conclusions regarding supervisory liability. As noted above, we cannot review the district court's sufficiency of the evidence determinations. Fogarty, 523 F.3d at 1154. The district court made the following findings: It is undisputed that Defendant Gonzales acted as the incident commander in charge of the police response to the March 20, 2003 demonstration. It has also already been established that Defendant Gonzales did not expect his officers to take independent action unless they received specific directives, and this was particularly true concerning the use of force. As the incident commander, Defendant Gonzales directly supervised his officers' conduct and issued directives as he followed the progress of the protest. In addition, Defendant Gonzales authorized the use of chemical munitions and pepper ball rounds, and personally deployed a tear gas canister. Also as discussed above, Defendant Gonzales directed his officers to arrest certain protestors who were playing percussion instruments, including Plaintiff Doyon, and ordered the use of force to sweep people from the sidewalk in front of the Frontier restaurant, where Plaintiff Michael Kisner was standing. Aplts' App. vol. VIII, at 2035 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Accepting the district court's factual determinations, we agree that Capt. Gonzales's personal participation and exercise of control or direction made him the apparent commander in charge at the scene. We further agree that these determinations support the conclusion that Capt. Gonzales is liable as a supervisor for the unconstitutional arrests of the Arrested Plaintiffs. Thus, Capt. Gonzales may be personally liable for the seizures of the Arrested Plaintiffs under a supervisory liability theory. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976) (finding that supervisory personnel could be held liable where the plaintiff demonstrates an affirmative link between the constitutional violation and the defendant's actions, typically through the adoption of any plan or policy ... showing authorization or approval); Fogarty, 523 F.3d at 1162 ([I]n situations where an affirmative link exists between the constitutional deprivation and either the supervisor's personal participation, his exercise of control or direction, or his failure to supervise, the supervisor may be personally liable. (internal quotation marks omitted)).