Opinion ID: 2980343
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proper 404(b) Purpose

Text: Second, we must determine whether the chat transcripts were offered for a proper 404(b) purpose. The transcripts consisted of instant message conversations with three undercover police officers: Detective Linda Findlay, Detective Richard Weise, and Special Agent Jenny Emmons. The government argues that the evidence demonstrated Delaney’s identity, knowledge, intent, and absence of mistake or accident. Considering identity first, Rule 404(b) allows the introduction of other acts evidence to show identity, “provided they are ‘of sufficient distinctive similarity’ with the charges in the indictment to ‘create a pattern or modus operandi.’” United States v. Allen, 619 F.3d 518, 524 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Perry, 438 F.3d 642, 648 (6th Cir. 2006)). While the district court did not rely on these grounds to admit the evidence, we may affirm the admission of evidence on an alternative theory if that theory would justify the admission. See City Mgmt. Corp. v. United States Chem. Co., 43 F.3d 244, 251 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding that this Court may 15 No. 09-1820 United States v. Delaney affirm on any grounds supported by the record, even though they may be different than those relied upon by the district court). At trial, the government alleged that Delaney met Amanda, the victim in this case, on the Internet and communicated regularly with her using instant messaging from the screen name “Z Camaro Guy.” Delaney’s interactions with the three undercover police officers were the same: He met them on the Internet, communicated with them on instant messaging using the screen name “Z Camaro Guy,” and sent them pictures of himself. These interactions indicate a pattern of behavior that is consistent with the charged offense. Accordingly, the evidence was admissible for purposes of identity. See Perry, 438 F.3d at 648 (affirming admission of other acts evidence that established a distinctive “signature”). Next, the government argues that the evidence was demonstrative of Delaney’s knowledge and intent. This step is governed by United States v. Johnson, 27 F.3d 1186, 1192 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995), in which this Court held that “where there is thrust upon the government, either by virtue of the defense raised by the defendant or by virtue of the elements of the crime charged, the affirmative duty to prove that the underlying prohibited act was done with a specific criminal intent, other acts evidence may be introduced under Rule 404(b).” In this case, the government was required to show that Delaney intended to knowingly produce, possess, and distribute images of child pornography. 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), 2252A(a)(2), and 2252A(a)(5)(b). In the chat transcripts, Delaney discussed his sexual interest in young girls, prior possession of child pornography, using his camera to take child pornographic photos, and his knowledge of a file sharing program through which images of child pornography were available for download. In addition, he transmitted images of young girls in bathing suits. All of these statements and acts are 16 No. 09-1820 United States v. Delaney indicative of Delaney’s intent and knowledge to possess and distribute child pornography. They explain both his interest in the subject, and his past activities to procure it. Accordingly, this evidence was admissible for purposes of intent and knowledge because the acts involved a pattern of particular behaviors that were specifically related to the charged offense. See United States v. Bell, 516 F.3d 432, 443 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that Rule 404(b) evidence is probative of intent only “when the prior [acts] were part of the same scheme or involved a similar modus operandi as the present offense”); United States v. Hall, 202 F.3d 270 (table), 2000 WL 32010, at  (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that evidence of prior conviction, nude images of children, and sexually explicit emails were admissible to show defendant’s intent and knowledge to receive child pornography). Finally, the government argues that the evidence is probative of absence of accident or mistake. In order for evidence of other acts evidence to be admissible for this purpose, the defendant must assert a defense based on some form of mistake or accident. See United States v. Newsom, 452 F.3d 593, 606 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding absence of mistake not to be a permissible purpose in a felon in possession case, when the defendant’s only defense was that the gun was not his and that he did not know that it was under his seat); United States v. Ward, 190 F.3d 483, 489 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding absence of mistake not to be a permissible purpose for the admission of evidence when the defendant’s “defense was not that she mistakenly thought she was selling powdered sugar instead of cocaine”). Here, Delaney testified that he believed Amanda was 18, not 14. This Court has found that mistake of age is not a defense to alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), United States v. Humphrey, 608 F.3d 955, 962 (6th Cir. 2010), but that it is a defense to alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2251A, United States v. Stout, 509 F.3d 796, 799 (6th Cir. 2007). 17 No. 09-1820 United States v. Delaney Accordingly, this evidence was admissible for purposes of absence of accident or mistake. As this evidence was admissible for several permissible purposes, we find that the district court did not err in admitting that the chat transcripts for a proper 404(b) purpose.