Opinion ID: 612823
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellants' Claim under the UDCPA

Text: As noted, Oregon enacted the UDCPA to prohibit debt collectors in the state from using certain abusive collection practices. See Or.Rev.Stat. § 646.639(2). Specifically, § 646.639(2)(k) prohibits a debt collector from [a]ttempt[ing] to or threaten[ing] to enforce a right or remedy with knowledge or reason to know that the right or remedy does not exist.... Appellants' complaint states that Chase violated Oregon Revised Statutes [§] 646.639(2)(k) by attempting to collect a debt when it knew or had reason to know that its right to do so did not exist. In support, the complaint alleges that Chase failed to comply with the requirement under 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a) that it provide a written explanation for a properly disputed debt. The complaint further alleges that Chase was prohibited under the FCBA from attempting to collect the disputed debt. It also alleges that Chase was prohibited under § 1666a from reporting the debt as delinquent to credit agencies. In short, Appellants' UDCPA claim is predicated on Chase's violation of the FCBA and the federal statute's restrictions on Chase's right to attempt to collect the debt or report it as delinquent. In Isom v. Portland General Electric Co., 67 Or.App. 97, 677 P.2d 59, 65 (1983), the Oregon Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs stated a valid claim to relief under § 646.639(2)(k) where a bill collector took actions related to their debts that were prohibited by separate federal and state statutes. See also Porter v. Hill, 314 Or. 86, 838 P.2d 45, 49 (1992) (citing Isom as a correct application of § 646.639(2)(k)). The plaintiffs in Isom alleged that Portland General Electric (PGE) violated § 646.639(2)(k) because it insisted on full payment [of utility bills] instead of explaining the option of partial payment [as required under Oregon Revised Statutes § 757.760(2)], ... asserted a right to plaintiffs' full cash payment which, under the Low Income Energy Assistance Act [42 U.S.C. §§ 8621 et seq.], they knew did not exist and terminated service despite full payment. 677 P.2d at 64. The court held a jury could find PGE attempted to or threatened to enforce the right to terminate service when it had reason to believe that the right to terminate was not available because plaintiffs qualified for legislatively mandated relief. Id. at 65 (emphasis added). Under the analysis adopted in Isom, Appellants have stated a valid claim for relief under § 646.639(2)(k). Pursuant to the requirements imposed under the FCBA, Chase did not have the right to attempt to collect the disputed charge or to report it to credit agencies as delinquent without first providing a written explanation. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666(a), 1666a(a); Koerner, 452 U.S. at 237, 101 S.Ct. 2281. By asserting rights through the actions of its collections agents when it had reason to know of the relevant restrictions imposed by the FCBA, Chase could be found to have violated Oregon Revised Statutes § 646.639(2)(k). Because this result is controlled by Isom, we conclude that certification of Appellants' proposed question to the Oregon Supreme Court is unwarranted, and deny the motion on this basis. [4] See Or.Rev.Stat. § 28.200 (stating that the Oregon Supreme Court may answer certified questions of law only when there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the Supreme Court and the intermediate appellate courts of this state); see also Estrella v. Brandt, 682 F.2d 814, 817 (9th Cir.1982) (An intermediate state appellate court decision is a `datum for ascertaining state law which is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise.') (quoting West v. A.T. & T. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237, 61 S.Ct. 179, 85 L.Ed. 139 (1940)). The district court erred by suggesting that Plaintiffs premise their Oregon UDCPA claim on the fact that there was no underlying debt, which allegations do not invoke the UDCPA's coverage. The district court is correct that § 646.639(2)(k) does not protect against efforts to collect a nonexistent debt. See Porter, 838 P.2d at 48-49 (The statute proceeds from the assumption that a debt does (or might) exist and prohibits the debt collector from using unfair practices to collect it. Nothing in the statute evidences a legislative concern with the existence or amount of the underlying debt, as distinct from the use of abusive methods to pressure debtors to pay their debts.). There is no allegation in the complaint, however, that suggests the disputed $645 amount was not owed at all. To the contrary, the complaint includes a letter Lyon sent to Chase in which he asks it to confirm what we now know to be correct: that the $645 charge was added to his bill in order to correct a mistaken $645 credit Chase had previously applied. In determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim to relief, a court must `accept the plaintiffs' allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to plaintiffs.' N.M. State Inv. Council v. Ernst & Young LLP, 641 F.3d 1089, 1094 (9th Cir.2011) (quoting Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 895 (9th Cir.2002)). Seen in the light most favorable to the Appellants, the allegations in the complaint suggest that the $645 was owed due to the mistaken credit, but that Chase failed to provide the required clarification of the charge and was therefore prohibited from attempting to collect it or report it as delinquent. Because this conduct by Chase violates the FCBA whether or not the debt was owed, Appellants' claim does not violate the decision in Porter. See 838 P.2d at 48-49. The Oregon Supreme Court held that § 646.639(2)(k) should be read to prohibit certain methods of collecting a debt, such as enforcing a right collateral to the debt in order to pressure the debtor to pay the debt. Id. at 49. Congress's clear intent in adopting the FCBA was to prevent a creditor from simply ignoring a billing dispute when attempting to collect a debt. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (stating that the purpose of the statute is to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices). The ultimate validity of a disputed charge does not relieve a creditor of the obligations and restrictions imposed under the FCBA. Accordingly, the statute's restrictions fit within Porter 's interpretation of § 646.639(2)(k) as prohibit[ing] certain methods of collecting a debt. 838 P.2d at 49. We therefore reverse the district court's dismissal of Appellants' UDCPA claim and remand this claim for further proceedings.