Opinion ID: 2180125
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: State v. Chase

Text: In view of our decision to depart from Chase, a detailed analysis of that case is warranted. On March 14, 1989, while on probation for a previous conviction, the defendant, Ronald Chase, was arrested after allegedly selling cocaine to an undercover police officer. Due to his earlier conviction and sentence, the state presented the defendant as a violator before the Superior Court pursuant to a Rule 32(f) notice. After considering testimony given during a subsequent probation-revocation hearing, the hearing justice denied the state's motion. Reviewing the evidence, the hearing justice accepted the defendant's contention that he knew that at least one of the individuals involved in the drug transaction was a police officer acting in an undercover capacity at the time of the alleged narcotics sale. Thus, the hearing justice found it incredible that the defendant had breached the terms of his probation in the manner alleged by the state. After this favorable decision, the defendant moved to dismiss the pending criminal charges on the grounds of collateral estoppel, double jeopardy, and due process, arguing that the hearing justice's determination that he had not violated his probation precluded the state from relitigating the same issues at trial. The Superior Court denied the motion, and we reversed. First, we rejected the defendant's double jeopardy argument, opining that [t]he sole purpose of the [probation-revocation] hearing is to determine whether a defendant has breached a condition of the existing probation, not to convict a defendant for a new criminal offense. Chase, 588 A.2d at 122. Thus, we held, a defendant is not twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense when the facts litigated at the [probation-revocation] hearing are later used to support a criminal prosecution. Id. With regard to Chase's collateral estoppel claim, however, we held that the hearing justice's conclusion that the defendant had not committed the crime alleged by the state barred any further litigation of that material issue of fact. Noting a split of authority on the issue, we determined that a finding of non-violation, since it provided a full[ ] litigat[ion] of the issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence, constituted a valid and final judgment for collateral estoppel purposes. Chase, 588 A.2d at 122, 123. On this point, we recognized that the probation-revocation hearing provided each party with a full and fair opportunity to present evidence and call witnesses. Id. at 123. Moreover, we noted that any additional witnesses the state may have called at trial would have contributed only repetitive or cumulative evidence without `bring[ing] to light some new and independent truth of a different character.' Id. (quoting State v. Tavares, 461 A.2d 390, 392 (R.I.1983)). We rejected the state's argument that the issues decided in the probation-revocation proceeding were not identical to those adjudicated during a criminal trial. Acknowledging the differences between the two proceedings, we nevertheless concluded that the factual allegations in each were the same, and thus, the ultimate question of fact at issue during both proceedings was identical. Accordingly, we held it is our considered opinion that only a specific finding on a material matter of fact fully litigated at the probation-revocation hearing will collaterally estop the state from attempting to prove the same fact at trial. A general finding will not suffice, nor will a specific finding that was not fully litigated unless the state had notice that the issue was to be litigated fully at the hearing and had a fair opportunity to do so. Chase, 588 A.2d at 123.