Opinion ID: 1111013
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Replacement Cost of Other Improvements

Text: Improvements located on the property near the main residence included a swimming pool, guest house, barn, equipment shed, and car shed. The lower courts found that plaintiff is entitled to recover the replacement cost of these structures, minus the amount paid for them by DOTD when it acquired the property. Because these structures functioned as part of the Polks' homestead, we agree that they should be included in the replacement housing cost calculation. Neither Girlinghouse nor Tompkins provided DOTD with an estimate for replacing the various improvements (other than the main residence) which were located on the acquired property. Mansour, on the other hand, provided estimates at trial for replacing the guest house, pool, barn, car shed and equipment shed. DOTD had the opportunity to present evidence as to the replacement cost of those structures, but did not do so. As the only evidence on replacement cost for these structures came from Mansour, we accept his figures on these items. Those figures establish that while the state paid Mrs. Polk $9,500 for the pool, a similar pool would cost $18,500 to build (an estimate provided to Mansour by the contractor who constructed the Polks' pool), a difference of $9,500. Mansour's uncontradicted figures also establish that while the state paid $26,000 for the guest house, a similar guest house would cost $37,415 to build, a difference of $11,415. With respect to the remaining structures on the acquired property, Mansour's figures establish that the Polks are entitled to replacement housing benefits of $14,590 for the barn ($19,090 replacement cost minus $4,500 acquisition cost), $1,416 for the car shed ($2,208 replacement cost minus $792 acquisition cost) and $10,039 for the equipment shed ($14,729 replacement cost minus $4,690 acquisition cost.) [7] All told, Mansour's uncontradicted testimony established that the Polks are entitled to recover replacement housing benefits of $46,960 with respect to improvements other than the main residence. DOTD failed to show a reasonable basis for its decision not to award replacement housing benefits for these improvements. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the courts below to award benefits for these improvements based upon Mansour's estimate of their replacement cost ($46,960). DOTD argues that because the plaintiff has not actually built a new pool, guesthouse, barn, car shed and equipment shed, and because there is no evidence that she intends to do so, she is not entitled to replacement costs for these structures. The record indicates that plaintiff clearly intended to build a comparable home with similar improvements but did not do so because of the uncertainty caused by this litigationand perhaps because of the fact that she intended to use the money received from DOTD for replacement housing benefits, to help accomplish this construction. Under these circumstances, we believe it is proper and fair to award replacement housing benefits for these items. We note that DOTD made a determination regarding replacement housing benefits for the main residence without first requiring plaintiff to build a new home, and see no reason why there should be any such prerequisite for determining replacement benefits due for the other improvements on the property. [8] (4) Moving Expenses As a displaced person, plaintiff clearly qualified for moving expenses under La.R.S. 38:3104. We find unreasonable DOTD's decision to deny plaintiff reimbursement for those costs on the ground that she did not technically follow the application procedures for moving expenses as set out in department guidelines. Clearly DOTD was aware of her plans to move, and at least three of its employees advised her that she would receive reimbursement for moving expenses. We approve the $8,000 award allowed by the lower courts for moving expenses. [9] (5) DOTD's Reconventional Demand After plaintiff filed suit for relocation benefits, she also obtained a preliminary injunction from the trial court, prohibiting DOTD from taking possession of the property while the suit was pending. DOTD reconvened for rent due from plaintiff during the period that the injunction was in effect, in the amount of ½ of 1% of the purchase price per month. The preliminary injunction was dissolved only after the trial on the merits, and DOTD claims that it is entitled to recover rent from plaintiff totaling $18,628.50. The lower courts rejected the recoventional demand, as do we. La.Civ.Code art. 2486 provides that if the seller fails to timely deliver the property sold to the buyer, the seller is liable to damages, if there result any detriment to the buyer, occasioned by the non-delivery at the time agreed on. Apparently DOTD relies on this article in support of its reconventional demand for damages. However, DOTD presented no evidence at trial to show that it suffered any detriment from the fact that it was unable, by virtue of the preliminary injunction, to take possession of the property at an earlier date. DOTD accordingly is not entitled to any recovery on its recoventional demand.