Opinion ID: 1684899
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: motion for postconviction dna testing

Text: Overton contends that the trial court erred in the partial denial of the motion which requested DNA testing of the hairs attached to the tape used to bind Susan. As a general rule, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853(c)(5) provides: (5) The court shall make the following findings when ruling on the motion: . . . . (B) Whether the results of DNA testing of that physical evidence likely would be admissible at trial. . . . (C) Whether there is a reasonable probability that the movant would have been acquitted or would have received a lesser sentence if the DNA evidence had been admitted at trial. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.853(c)(5)(B)-(C). In the order denying relief with regard to the second motion for DNA testing, the trial court found: b. In terms of admissibility at trial of the results of the DNA testing in question, there appears to exist reliable proof to establish authenticity and a chain of custody. However, in terms of relevance, unless the results showed the hairs to be those of the Defendant, the results would not be relevant and hence, not admissible. c. If the DNA evidence had been admitted at trial, there is no reasonable probability that the Defendant would have been acquitted or would have received a lesser sentence. The trial court also noted: [E]ven assuming that the source of the hairs in question is a person other than the Defendant or one of the victims, that information is of no consequence. First of all, there is no way to determine where the tape itself came from, that is, was it in the MacIvor's residence before the break-in or was it brought to the crime scene by the perpetrator? Secondly, the fact of the matter is that tape is a sticky substance which can easily pick-up a few strands of hairs in a variety of ways and from a variety of sources. For example, the pieces of hair in question could have been on the tape prior to commission of the crimes, or the pieces of hair could have been left in the MacIvor residence weeks, months, or even years before the crimes by a legitimate guest and then picked up by the tape at the time of the crimes. In view of the fact that it is impossible to establish when and how the pieces of hair became attached to the tape, DNA testing is of no use or significance. We agree with the trial court and deny relief as we more fully explain.
Overton contends that it was error to find that DNA test results of the hairs on the tape would only be admissible if the hairs belonged to Overton. He reasons that if DNA testing revealed that the hairs came from someone other than the victims and not from him, the results would prove the identity of the true perpetrator and disprove that he was at the crime scene. He asserts this would constitute relevant admissible evidence. As the trial court correctly noted, evidence that the hairs came from someone other than Overton or the victims would fail to prove or disprove any theory in this case because it is impossible to establish when or how the hairs may have become attached to the tape. In an effort to provide the requisite nexus to link the hairs to the crime, Overton contends that the hair became attached to the unwrapped tape only as it was being used to bind the victim's ankles and contends that the decision on direct appeal establishes that the tape came from inside the home. Although the decision of this Court on direct appeal states that the officers believed that the items used to bind and strangle Susan came from inside the home, Overton, 801 So.2d at 882, the observation refers to and directly follows the discussion of how the items used to bind Susan included a belt, necktie, and black sash, and that the officers noticed an open drawer in the bedroom which contained belts and ties. Nothing in this statement or elsewhere in the opinion states or even implies that this belief extended to the clothesline rope or masking tape that was also involved. Additionally, and contrary to the assertions of Overton, evidence that the tape came from inside the home would strengthen the argument that the hairs could have been left by a legitimate guest at sometime prior to the murders and had become attached to the tape as it was being used, handled, and stored inside the residence. Regardless of where the tape originated, Overton's assertion that the hair adhered to the tape only as fresh layers of tape were unwrapped from the roll does not establish the requisite nexus between the hair and the crime. Even if the hair adhered to a section of freshly unwrapped tape, that fact does not establish the source of the hair or the timing of placement within the home. The hair could have easily originated from a large number of sources, including the carpet, comforter, victim's nightshirt, or any of the items thought to have been emptied from her purse which were discovered under the comforter upon which her body was found. See id. Likewise, the hair could have attached on contact with the belt or clothesline rope that were also used to bind Susan. See id. Thus, the conclusory assertion that if the hair does not belong to Overton or the victims, it must belong to a person who committed or participated in the crime, is far too tenuous because there is no way to determine when, why, where, or how the hairs attached to the tape. This assertion is the type of speculation that this Court has found to be a basis for denying a rule 3.853 motion. See Lott, 931 So.2d at 821 (holding that the defendant embarked on a fishing expedition for genetic material whose . . . potential relevance is pure conjecture, and that the defendant could not obtain DNA testing based on the speculative allegations in his motion); Hitchcock v. State, 866 So.2d 23, 26 (Fla.2004) (speculative claims cannot form the basis of granting a motion for postconviction DNA testing). Based on the foregoing, the trial court correctly determined that the rule 3.853 motion failed to demonstrate that the DNA evidence sought by Overton would have been admissible during the trial.
The rationale with regard to the admissibility of the test results is also applicable with regard to the analysis of whether the DNA evidence would have given rise to the reasonable probability that Overton would have been exonerated or received a lesser sentence had the evidence been introduced during trial. Florida courts have repeatedly denied motions for the DNA testing of hair where the time and manner in which the hair was deposited at the crime scene or on a piece of evidence is unknown. See King v. State, 808 So.2d 1237 (Fla. 2002) (upholding the trial court's finding that the defendant could not meet the requisite showing that DNA testing of hair would give rise to a reasonable probability that he would be acquitted or receive a reduced sentence because it was impossible to determine when, where, or how hair transferred to the victim's nightgown); see also Hitchcock, 866 So.2d 23 (affirming the trial court's denial of the motion for DNA testing of hairs where the defendant, victim, and person that the defendant alleged was the perpetrator all lived in the same home; hairs from all three would have been deposited throughout the home; and proof that the hair was not the defendant's would not establish that the defendant was not at the crime scene or did not commit the murder); Tompkins v. State, 872 So.2d 230 (Fla.2003) (affirming the trial court's denial of the motion for DNA testing of hairs because the hairs were unreliably contaminated due to the location of the victim's remains in a shallow grave); Galloway v. State, 802 So.2d 1173 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (affirming the trial court's denial of the motion for DNA testing because a mere allegation that the DNA of the defendant would not match DNA evidence was insufficient to establish that the defendant was not present and a coparticipant in the crime). Overton's attempt to distinguish this precedent is unavailing. He contends that, unlike King, in which the hair was found on a victim who crawled from a burning bedroom and was later dragged out of her burning house, the hair on the tape bindings here was found on a person who was bound and immobilized inside her home and the hair adhered to the tape during the binding. Even assuming that the hair did attach to the tape during the binding, Overton, like King, cannot satisfy the statutory requirement that the testing of the hair would give rise to a reasonable probability that he would be acquitted or receive a lesser sentence because there is no way to determine when, why, where, or how the hair was deposited in the MacIvor residence. Overton argues that because, unlike Galloway, the State here did not assert or prove that there were multiple perpetrators, DNA testing of the hair would prove that there was an additional participant in the sexual battery and murder of Susan, which would give rise to the reasonable probability that Overton would have received a reduced sentence. However, contrary to this assertion, the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Galloway was based on the fact that even if testing of the evidence obtained from the crime scene demonstrated that the DNA did not match the defendant, it would not prove that the defendant was not present at the crime scene or a participant in the crime. See Galloway, 802 So.2d at 1175 (citing People v. Pugh, 288 A.D.2d 634, 732 N.Y.S.2d 673, 674 (N.Y.App.Div.2001) ([U]pholding denial of postconviction DNA testing in single assailant rape case on grounds that `the absence of defendant's semen on the tested material . . . would not have exonerated or tended to exonerate defendant.')). Likewise, even if the testing of the hair here reveals it did not come from Overton or the victims, the results will not exonerate Overton or mitigate his sentence because such results would not prove that Overton was neither the perpetrator nor present at the crime scene. Overton asserts that there was no evidence other than the allegedly unreliable DNA test results that linked him to the crime in the instant case and that the trial court impermissibly relied on this evidence in denying the instant motion. However, the trial court based its determination that testing of the hair would be inconsequential to proving or disproving any material fact upon the impossibility of determining how, when, where, or why the hair was deposited in the MacIvors' residence. [22] Moreover, and contrary to Overton's argument, this Court has already acknowledged the importance of the direct testimony in linking Overton to the crime, which is completely independent of DNA testing. See Overton, 801 So.2d at 899. Based on the foregoing, the trial court correctly found that the rule 3.853 motion failed to assert a reasonable probability that the requested testing would exonerate Overton or lessen his sentence.
Overton contends that the trial court was required to specify evidence in the record that conclusively demonstrates he is not entitled to relief, and he relies on Ortiz v. State, 884 So.2d 70 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), to support this position. In Ortiz, the Second District noted that a 3.853 motion cannot be summarily denied unless the record conclusively demonstrates that the appellant is entitled to no relief. See id. at 71. Contrary to the assertions of Overton, the trial court did identify evidence in the record that conclusively demonstrates that Overton is not entitled to relief. The trial court specifically noted that it is unknown where the tape here came from and when the hair may have become attached to the tape. With this crime occurring in a residence, the trial court also noted that, as a practical matter, hair can be left behind by any person who may enter a residence and it would be impossible to determine when the hair was deposited in the MacIvor residence. See Overton, 801 So.2d at 881. Thus, DNA testing would not establish that the person whose DNA matched the hair had any connection with this crime. Additionally, it was demonstrated during the trial that the hair did not visually match Overton or the victims; thus, the record demonstrates that the fact that the hair did not come from Overton had no bearing on Overton's death sentences. Unlike the appellant in Ortiz, the trial court here indicated which portions of the record conclusively demonstrate that Overton is not entitled to relief.
Finally, Overton contends that the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing to determine the type of trace evidence that could be picked up by tape, the type of evidence that could be recovered from the tape, the condition of the tape, and where it was found. Florida courts have required evidentiary hearings in 3.853 proceedings only when there is some disputed factual issue. See Jordan v. State, 950 So.2d 442 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (whether it is scientifically possible to develop a DNA profile of assailant whom the victim scratched); Hampton v. State, 924 So.2d 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (whether it is scientifically possible to generate DNA profiles of all three assailants from one sample); Carter v. State, 913 So.2d 701, 702 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (Where a defendant claims that DNA evidence exists, but the state denies the claim, a factual dispute results and an evidentiary hearing is required.); Thompson v. State, 922 So.2d 383, 383 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (A decision by the postconviction court that DNA evidence does or does not exist is a factual finding and requires an evidentiary hearing.). In the instant case, there was no factual dispute with regard to the existence of the hair on the tape or whether a DNA profile could be developed. Thus, the assertions made by Overton are without merit and do not warrant an evidentiary hearing because information with regard to the type of trace evidence that could be picked up by tape, the type of evidence that could be recovered from the tape, the condition of the tape, and where it was found would not demonstrate when, why, where, or how the hair attached to the tape. With this predicate, and as the trial court found, the requested testing of the hair samples would not have proved or disproved a material fact and would not have exonerated Overton or lessened his sentence.