Opinion ID: 2614680
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: parole condition

Text: Appellant was sentenced pursuant to the provisions of § 7-13-601, W.S. 1977, pertaining to persons convicted of certain sex crimes. [4] The trial court had the alternative of sentencing appellant to the penitentiary for a period of time as provided for the crime for which convicted (which was here done) or to sentence him to receive psychiatric treatment either as an outpatient while on probation or in a hospital or other institution. If appellant were sentenced to receive psychiatric treatment as an outpatient while on probation and if he violated the terms of such, the court could sentence him to the penitentiary or to receive the psychiatric treatment in a hospital or other institution. If the sentence was to a hospital or other institution for psychiatric treatment, the court could release appellant under parole supervision after review of the required reports from the superintendent of the hospital or other institution or it could sentence him to the penitentiary. The procedure does not empower the court to condition parole after a sentence to the penitentiary, and appellee-State so concedes. However, appellee asserts such to be an inherent power of the district courts. We do not agree. The courts can impose only those sentences as authorized by the legislature. The power to determine what acts shall constitute crimes, and what acts shall not, and to prescribe punishment for acts prohibited belongs to the legislative branch of government. This power is said to be inherent in the state legislature and it is also comprehended in the general grant of legislative power contained in the state constitution. The power is exclusive and is not shared by the courts. So long as constitutional prohibitions are not infringed, the will of the legislature in this respect is absolute. But the power to define crimes is of course subject to the limitations contained in state and federal constitutions. 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 14 (1965). See 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 13 (1961). Art. 3, § 1 of the Wyoming Constitution vests the legislative power of the state in the legislature of the State of Wyoming, and Art. 2, § 1 of that constitution prohibits the exercise of the powers of one department (legislative, executive and judicial) of the government by another department of it. It must be kept in mind that the court has no inherent right to grant probation. The authority over sentencing comes from the legislature.    Hicklin v. State, Wyo., 535 P.2d 743, 752 (1975). As previously indicated, the power to grant parole after incarceration was not granted to the court in the enactment pertaining to Persons Convicted of Certain Sex Crimes and general parole power has been given by the legislature to the Board of Parole. Such parole is defined by the legislature as permission to leave the confines of the institution in which he is confined    under sentence ordered by any district court of this state   . Section 7-13-402, W.S. 1977. The legislature further provided that:    In granting a parole the board shall fix such terms and conditions as it deems proper to govern the conduct of the parolee while the parole is in effect; such terms and conditions may be special in each case, or they may be prescribed by general rules and regulations of the board, or both.    Section 7-13-402(a), W.S. 1977. Such power as placed by the legislature in the Board of Parole is inconsistent with the exercise by the court of parole power over an individual confined in the institution. The legislature has prescribed specific punishment which may be imposed by the courts for violation of the respective crimes, usually in terms of a minimum and maximum period of incarceration. In §§ 7-13-201, et seq., W.S. 1977, it provided generally for the imposition of sentences and the granting of probation by the courts. Probation is authorized either with a suspension of the imposition of sentence or after sentence but with suspension of the execution of it. Sections 7-13-203 and 7-13-301, W.S. 1977. It may be possible to read into the language of § 7-13-301, W.S. 1977, a potential for a court to grant parole after incarceration. This section reads: After conviction or plea of guilty for any offense, except crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment, the court may suspend the imposition of sentence, or may suspend the execution of all or a part of a sentence and may also place the defendant on probation or may impose a fine applicable to the offense and also place the defendant on probation. With the consent of a defendant charged with a crime, except a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment, the court may suspend trial and place such defendant on probation. (Emphasis supplied.) The emphasized portion of the foregoing could be said to authorize suspension of only a part of the execution of the sentence, and after incarceration for the part of the sentence not suspended, to grant parole. However, such is not thereby authorized for two reasons: One, § 7-13-301 was enacted in 1969. The Board of Parole was established and given parole power in 1971. The 1971 act repeals by implication the portion of the 1969 act pertaining to the authority of the court to suspend execution of a part of a sentence and also place the defendant on probation. Although repeals by implication are not favored,    where there is a manifest legislative intent that a subsequent general statute shall have universal application, it repeals by implication earlier laws dealing with only a small part of the same subject. [Citations.] Longacre v. State, Wyo., 448 P.2d 832, 834 (1968). And see Hutchins v. State, Wyo., 483 P.2d 519 (1971). If the parole is mandated by the court at a specific time after incarceration, the time, conditions, etc. for parole are already determined, and there is no need for the Board of Parole to concern itself with a consideration of the inmate's attitude, progress, etc. since incarceration as well as the consideration of the several other factors involved. In other words, there is no consideration of whether or not reformation to any degree has been accomplished by the sentence. This is contrary to the overall objective and intent of the legislature as evidenced by parole enactments taken as a whole. As a matter of fact, the policy of the Board of Parole has been to refuse to consider board action for any inmate for whom the court has directed parole of a certain time or for whom it has directed other specific post-incarceration action. The inmate is thus possibly prevented from receiving benefits available to other inmates. In the same fashion as the board recognizes the authority of the court to limit the board's discretion as to parole by setting a very small interval between the minimum and maximum terms of sentence or to expand such discretion by setting a large interval, [5] so too it considers court direction for post-incarceration actions as completely replacing board discretion as to action for the particular inmate. This result is contrary to the manifest intent of the legislature that the general parole statute have universal application. Longacre v. State, supra, 448 P.2d at 834. Second, the use of the word probation in § 7-13-301, W.S. 1977 to designate the status of the convicted person after serving part of a sentence is conflicting and inconsistent by definition, thus reflecting an intention of the legislature to not authorize court ordered supervision and conditions on release after incarceration. Parole is defined in § 7-13-402, W.S. 1977, as permission to leave the confines of the institution. [6]    `[P]robation' ordinarily negatives the implication that a state prison sentence was imposed or served. Hayward v. Watsonville Register-Pajaronian and Sun, 265 Cal. App.2d 255, 71 Cal. Rptr. 295, 300 (1968).    `Probation is a release by the court before sentence has commenced.' [Citation.] State v. Gates, 230 Ore. 84, 368 P.2d 605, 608 (1962).    Probation relates to judicial action taken before the prison door is closed, whereas parole relates to executive action taken after the door has closed on a convict.    State v. Hewett, 270 N.C. 348, 154 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1967). When a word has a well-settled meaning in law at the time of its usage, its use by the legislature will be so understood unless a different meaning is unmistakably intended. Title Guaranty Company of Wyoming, Inc. v. Belt, Wyo., 539 P.2d 357 (1975); Johnson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., Wyo., 568 P.2d 908 (1977). Accordingly, the trial court did not have the power to impose parole or other post-incarceration conditions in the sentence. If part of a divisible sentence is illegal or improper, we may modify it by vacating or striking that part which is illegal and improper and affirming the balance. State v. Feilen, 70 Wash. 65, 126 P. 75 (1912); Wahl v. State, 39 Ariz. 62, 3 P.2d 1052 (1931). In this instance, however, we note that the trial court gave the parole board considerable discretion in the time in which parole could be granted and we note the exercise of the discretion was conditioned on a mandatory hospitalization at the time of parole. Accordingly, the sentence may not be divisible. The trial court might have imposed an entirely different sentence had it known that the mandatory hospitalization would not be required. Therefore, we affirm the conviction and remand the case for resentencing of appellant in accordance with the foregoing.