Opinion ID: 1611770
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Guilt Phase Ineffective Assistance Claims Denied After Evidentiary Hearing

Text: In his sixth claim, Cole raises numerous arguments that trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Cole's rule 3.850 motion as to each of these subclaims.
Cole first argues that trial counsel should have questioned each prospective juror individually, and counsel's failure to do so constitutes deficient performance. Cole maintains that he was prejudiced because two of the five non-individually questioned venire members ultimately became members of the jury that convicted Cole. The trial court found that every prospective juror was questioned individually by the trial court, by the State, or by trial counsel, and that trial counsel was an active participant throughout voir dire, even though trial counsel did not question each juror individually. There is competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings. We find no error with the trial court's determination that, on the basis of this record, Cole has failed to demonstrate his trial counsel's ineffectiveness under Strickland for trial counsel's not questioning each prospective juror himself. Therefore, this subclaim is without merit. See Johnston v. Dugger, 583 So.2d 657, 662 (Fla.1991) (rejecting argument that counsel failed to voir dire jurors adequately); see also Occhicone v. State, 768 So.2d 1037, 1048 (Fla.2000) (noting strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel).
Cole next argues that trial counsel should have exercised a peremptory challenge to remove juror Cutts, an employee of the Department of Corrections. The record reflects that trial counsel unsuccessfully attempted to remove Cutts for cause. During voir dire, trial counsel concluded and advised Cole that a peremptory challenge should be exercised to remove Cutts; however, Cole stated to counsel that he wanted to retain Cutts. Trial counsel's conclusion as to juror Cutts was not sufficiently strong that counsel interfered with what Cole wanted to be done. We find no error in the trial court's determination that, under these circumstances, trial counsel's decision not to peremptorily challenge juror Cutts did not constitute deficient performance within the boundaries of Strickland. See Occhicone, 768 So.2d at 1048; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (The reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions.).
Cole alleges that trial counsel should have presented codefendant Paul's testimony because the evidence of Cole's guilt was mainly circumstantial. The trial court found after the evidentiary hearing that: 1. William Paul testified at depositionwherein he was actively questioned by Defendant's trial counselthat Defendant was the individual who killed John Edwards and raped Pam Edwards. William Paul's deposition testimony was consistent with his statement to law enforcement immediately after his arrest. 2. Pam Edwards testified at trial that the Defendantnot William Paul killed John Edwards and raped her. Pam Edwards' trial testimony was consistent with William Paul's deposition testimony and his statement to law enforcement. 3. William Paul wrote a letter to both Defendant's trial counsel and counsel for the State and informed them that he would not willingly testify for either party. 4. Defendant's trial counsel had no reason to believe that William Paul's testimony would be helpful to his client. Therefore, he made a tactical decision not to call William Paul as a witness. Defendant, who had been supplied with a copy of Paul's deposition by his trial counsel, concurred with counsel's decision. State v. Cole, No. 94-498-CF, order at 3 (Fla. 5th Cir. Ct. order filed May 24, 2000). We find that there is competent, substantial evidence supporting the trial court's finding that trial counsel's decision was tactical. Trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he had taken Paul's deposition, that he was aware of the substance of Paul's statement to Marion County deputies, and that he was familiar with the physical evidence in the case. Prior to trial, trial counsel and Cole extensively discussed whether Paul should testify. Trial counsel testified that Cole reviewed Paul's statement and letter. Trial counsel concluded that having Paul testify would not help Cole, and counsel discussed with Cole the advantages and disadvantages of having Paul testify. At that time, Cole agreed with counsel not to have Paul testify. Thus, we find no error in the trial court's conclusion that Cole failed to demonstrate that trial counsel performed deficiently. See, e.g., Occhicone, 768 So.2d at 1048.
Cole's fourth subclaim asserts trial counsel's failure to contemporaneously object to the prosecutor's opening statement during the guilt phase. [5] Trial counsel did not immediately object. Instead, at the conclusion of the prosecutor's opening statement, counsel moved for a mistrial, citing the prosecutor's mankind at its worst statement made during the opening statement. The trial court denied the motion but offered a curative instruction, which trial counsel declined. Cole argues that counsel's failure to immediately object to the mankind at its worst comment and counsel's failure to accept the curative instruction constituted ineffective assistance. Cole's claim must rely on counsel's decision not to contemporaneously object and not on a failure to object because counsel moved for a mistrial at the conclusion of the prosecutor's statement. Thus, Cole must demonstrate that his counsel performed deficiently and that he was prejudiced by counsel's decision to wait until the conclusion of the prosecutor's opening statement before moving for a mistrial on the basis of the prosecutor's argument. Likewise, Cole must demonstrate that counsel performed deficiently and that he was prejudiced by counsel's decision to decline the curative instruction. Trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he decided to wait until after the opening statement so that the comment would not be emphasized and also testified that the curative instruction in this case would have had the effect of repeating the offensive comment. We find that competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court's conclusions that trial counsel's decision to wait until the conclusion of the prosecutor's opening statement before moving for mistrial was tactical as well as counsel's decision to decline the curative instruction. We find no error in the trial court's ruling that Cole was not entitled to Strickland relief because Cole failed to demonstrate that his counsel performed deficiently. We also conclude that Cole has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced.
Next, Cole asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for calling John Thompson as Cole's only witness during Cole's case-in-chief, thereby losing the right to the rebuttal argument. While the specific claim relates to witness John Thompson, an examination of this claim also involves witness Mary Gamble. Both Thompson and Gamble, who did not previously know each other, met each other and Cole months prior to the murder and rape while they and others jointly lived at the Salvation Army in Marion County. Gamble and Cole formed a friendship and engaged in sexual relations, and after Cole's arrest, Gamble visited Cole at the jail. Gamble testified during the State's case-in-chief that while she visited Cole in jail, he confessed to her that he raped Pam Edwards and slit John Edwards' throat. Thompson had driven Gamble to the jail to visit Cole. Counsel called Thompson during Cole's case-in-chief to have Thompson testify that Gamble never told him that Cole confessed to the murder, even though he drove Gamble to the jail. The record establishes that Thompson was the State's fifteenth trial witness, and Gamble was the State's eighteenth witness. Thompson testified, when called by the State, that he drove Gamble to the jail to see Cole while Cole was awaiting trial. When Thompson testified for the State, the State did not elicit any testimony concerning any conversation Gamble had with Cole at the jail. When Gamble later testified, she testified that Cole confessed to committing these crimes. Thus, trial counsel called Thompson as a witness for the defense so that Thompson could testify that Gamble never told him that Cole confessed. Cole contends that trial counsel should have elicited the testimony impeaching Gamble during Thompson's cross-examination, when Thompson was a State's witness and prior to Gamble's testimony. We do not agree because the record shows that at the time Thompson testified there was no predicate in the record upon which Gamble could be impeached. At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that he knew by calling Thompson trial counsel was losing the right to a rebuttal closing but thought that the benefit of having Thompson refute Gamble, the only person who testified that Cole confessed, outweighed the benefits of giving the rebuttal argument. We find there to be competent, substantial evidence supporting the trial court's finding that counsel's decision to call Thompson was tactical. We find no error in the trial court's conclusion that Cole failed to demonstrate how his trial counsel performed deficiently under Strickland and therefore is not entitled to relief on this claim.
Cole's last subclaim to this issue is that cumulative error occurred during the guilt phase. Because all of Cole's guilt phase issues are either meritless or procedurally barred, there is no cumulative error to consider. See Melendez v. State, 718 So.2d 746, 749 (Fla.1998). Our resolution of the cumulative error subclaim is upon a review of all guilt phase issues and not limited to the subclaims raised in claim six.