Opinion ID: 168369
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Mr. Jimenez argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm.4 We review the record de novo to determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Yehling, 456 F.3d 1236, 1240 (10th Cir. 2006). In so doing, “[w]e consider both direct and circumstantial evidence, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, but do not weigh conflicting evidence or consider the credibility of witnesses.” Id. To convict Mr. Jimenez, the Government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Mr. Jimenez was previously convicted of a felony; (2) he thereafter knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition; and (3) the possession was in or affecting interstate commerce. United States v. Colonna, 360 F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th Cir. 2004); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Mr. Jimenez challenges only the second element on appeal, arguing that the Government failed to prove he possessed the firearms. 3 We address Mr. Jimenez’s sufficiency of the evidence argument prior to reviewing his contention that the District Court erred in instructing the jury on the elements of the crime because our discussion of the former is relevant to the latter. 4 Although Mr. Jimenez suggests in a heading that he is also challenging the sufficiency of the evidence related to his conviction for possession of ammunition, he never makes any argument or relates any facts on that issue. Accordingly, we will not address that issue here. - 12 - Possession under § 922(g)(1) can be either actual or constructive. United States v. Mills, 29 F.3d 545, 549 (10th Cir. 1994). A defendant has constructive possession of an object when he “knowingly holds the power to exercise control or dominion over it.” United States v. Lopez, 372 F.3d 1207, 1211 (10th Cir. 2004) (alteration and citation omitted). When a defendant has exclusive possession of the place where the object is found, then knowledge, dominion, and control over the object may be inferred. United States v. Michel, 446 F. 3d 1122, 1128 (10th Cir. 2006). When two or more people occupy a given space, however, the government must present additional evidence “to show some connection or nexus between the defendant and the firearm or contraband.” Mills, 29 F.3d at 549. We will uphold a conviction based on constructive possession in a joint occupancy situation when there is “some evidence supporting at least a plausible inference that the defendant had knowledge of and access to the weapon or contraband.” Id. at 550 (citation omitted). Finally, the government need not show intention to exercise that dominion or control, “nor is it necessary to show that the defendant actually owned the weapons—mere possession is enough.” Colonna, 360 F.3d at 1179. First, the jury could properly conclude that Mr. Jimenez was a joint occupant at the E. Bonney address on February 10, 2003. When officers executed the search warrant, they found men’s clothing and shoes in the master bedroom closet. Among the clothing was a sweatshirt with Mr. Jimenez’s nickname, “Chills,” on it. They also found a box with the initial “M.” and the words “Jimenez” and “Chills” appearing on the outside of the box. After being arrested, an officer asked Mr. Jimenez for his address; he said it was - 13 - 334 E. Bonney. Both Michelle and Gilbert Flores testified that Mr. Jimenez was residing with them at 334 E. Bonney on February 10. Furthermore, beginning in 2001, Mr. Jimenez consistently reported his residence as 334 E. Bonney to his probation officer, and she made weekly visits to that address over the course of the following year. Moreover, there is sufficient evidence in the record on appeal to support the conclusion that Mr. Jimenez had knowledge of and access to firearms. The evidence shows that Mr. Jimenez had knowledge of the firearms in the gun safe and in the closet. During Mr. Jimenez’s interview at the police station, an officer told Mr. Jimenez, “You’ve got a lot of guns in your house.” Mr. Jimenez responded that “[t]hose are my kid’s guns . . . .” His statement that the firearms belonged to someone else evidences his knowledge of their presence. See Colonna, 360 F.3d at 1179 (finding knowledge where defendant told officers the guns in his bedroom belonged to his wife). The jury could also reasonably conclude that Mr. Jimenez had specific knowledge that guns were stored in a closet and not in the gun safe. During the same interview Mr. Jimenez said he “found [some guns] up in the closet” and told Gilbert that the guns had to be in the gun safe. The closet Mr. Jimenez described was the closet where officers found the Winchester M200 shotgun. Mr. Jimenez also had access to at least the Winchester M200 and .410 gauge shotguns.5 With respect to the Winchester M200, Mr. Jimenez acknowledged that the 5 Count one of the indictment charged Mr. Jimenez with possession of ten different firearms. To convict, the jury did not need to find that Mr. Jimenez possessed all of the - 14 - closet in which it was found was “my closet . . . where my heater’s at.” When asked whether police would find his fingerprints on any of the guns, Mr. Jimenez responded, “I hope not. I have—I do put some away; you know what I mean?” With respect to the .410 gauge shotgun, although Gilbert testified that he was a hunter, that he owned all of the guns and the gun safe, and that he only removed the .410 gauge shotgun from the gun safe temporarily, the jury was entitled to disbelieve his testimony. See United States v. Waldroop, 431 F.3d 736, 742 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting issues of witness credibility are delegated exclusively to the jury). Moreover, as noted above, that another person owned the guns does not establish that a defendant did not possess the guns. See Colonna, 360 F.3d at 1179 (government need not show the defendant owned the prohibited item; possession is enough). Thus, the jury could reasonably infer that Mr. Jimenez had knowledge of and access to, at a minimum, the Winchester M200 shotgun and .410 gauge shotgun. Mr. Jimenez’s reliance on Mills, 29 F.3d 545, to direct a finding of insufficient evidence is misplaced. In Mills, although the government presented evidence that the defendant had dominion and control over the dining room where firearms were found, it failed to establish the defendant knew the firearms were hidden within a compartment of the dining room table. Id. at 550. Here, the guns were not hidden, and there is no firearms, so long as the Government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed one of them. The District Court instructed the jury that to convict, the jurors must agree unanimously on which firearm he possessed. The jury was not required to specify in its verdict which firearms it specifically found Mr. Jimenez to have possessed. - 15 - question that Mr. Jimenez was aware of their presence. All that is required to uphold the jury’s verdict is “some evidence to support at least a plausible inference” that Mr. Jimenez had knowledge of and access to the weapons and ammunition. Id. at 549. There is more than sufficient evidence in the record on this point, and accordingly, we will not disturb the jury’s verdict.