Opinion ID: 613834
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Religious Discrimination Claims

Text: 1. The FHA's Anti-Discrimination Provisions We begin by outlining the relevant statutory framework. Congress has articulated a policy of providing, within constitutional limits, for fair housing throughout the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 3601. Consistent with that broad policy, Congress included in the FHA two anti-discrimination provisions that are relevant here. Under the first, id. § 3604(a), it is unlawful (a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. Under the second, id. § 3604(b), it is similarly unlawful (b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. The FHA defines dwelling as any building, structure, or portion thereof which is occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by one or more families. Id. § 3602(b). The FHA does not define residence. Defendant acknowledges that the anti-discrimination provisions in the FHA apply to the residential drug treatment program attended by Cowles. But Defendant asserts that those provisions do not apply to its homeless shelters, for two independent reasons. First, relying on the references to the sale or rental of ... a dwelling in § 3604(a) and (b), Defendant argues that Congress intended for those provisions to apply only in the context of selling and renting dwellings. Because Defendant operates its shelters at no charge to its guests, Defendant urges us to hold that its homeless shelters do not fall within the ambit of § 3604(a) and (b). Second, Defendant argues that its homeless shelters do not fit Congress' definition of dwelling because its shelters are neither occupied as, nor designed or intended to be occupied as, residences. Relying on authority from the Third and Eleventh Circuits, Defendant understands the term residence in § 3602(b) to mean a temporary or permanent dwelling place, abode or habitation to which one intends to return as distinguished from the place of temporary sojourn or transient visit. Lakeside Resort Enters., LP v. Bd. of Supervisors, 455 F.3d 154, 157 (3d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1214 (11th Cir.2008) (adopting the same definition). Drawing on that definition, both of those circuits held that, at a minimum, a residence is a place designed for occupants to treat as their home for a significant period of time. Lakeside Resort, 455 F.3d at 158; Schwarz, 544 F.3d at 1215. Defendant urges us to define residence as the Third and Eleventh Circuits did. That definition, according to Defendant, leads to the conclusion that its homeless shelters are not residences, because Defendant does not permit its guests either to stay there for a significant period of time or to treat the shelters as their homes. Plaintiffs and HUD dispute Defendant's factual and legal conclusions, arguing that § 3604(a) and (b) do apply to Defendant's homeless shelters. [4] In the circumstances, we need not and do not decide either of the questions of statutory interpretation raised by Defendant. Even assuming that § 3604(a) and (b) apply to Defendant's homeless shelters, the FHA's religious exemption permits the practices challenged by Plaintiffs in this case. We therefore express no view on the merits of Defendant's arguments about the proper scope of § 3604(a) and (b) and the proper definition of residence in § 3602(b). 2. The Religious Exemption Although § 3604(a) and (b) of the FHA prohibit religious discrimination generally, in 42 U.S.C. § 3607(a) Congress provided an exemption for religious organizations that want to limit access to their charitable services to people who practice the same religion. Specifically, § 3607(a) provides in relevant part: (a) Nothing in [the FHA] shall prohibit a religious organization ... from limiting the sale, rental or occupancy of dwellings which it owns or operates for other than a commercial purpose to persons of the same religion, or from giving preference to such persons, unless membership in such religion is restricted on account of race, color, or national origin. We recognize that we must construe § 3607(a) narrowly. See City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731-32, 115 S.Ct. 1776, 131 L.Ed.2d 801 (1995) (construing the FHA's absolute exemption, contained in 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1), narrowly to effectuate the FHA's broad policy of providing fair housing throughout the United States). We nevertheless conclude that § 3607(a) exempts the practices challenged here. [5] No one disputes that Defendant is a bona fide Christian organization that does not restrict its membership on account of race, color, or national origin. And no one disputes that Defendant operates its homeless shelters and drug treatment program for other than a commercial purpose. Because Defendant satisfies those threshold requirements, this case presents us with the opportunity to apply § 3607(a) cleanly to the religious practices at issue. With respect to the drug treatment program, we see nothing in Cowles' allegations to suggest that Defendant does anything other than give preference to persons of its religion. To the contrary, those allegations are consistent with Defendant's avowal that it restricts membership in its religiously based drug treatment program to Christians and people who desire to become Christian. According to Cowles, Defendant required her to participate in religious activities as a condition of continued residence. Those activities included church services every Sunday, religiously-based substance abuse treatment, and other religious services ... throughout the day. Eventually, after Cowles made it clear to Defendant's staff that she was not, and did not want to become, Christian, Defendant terminated Cowles' participation in the program. Because § 3607(a) permits a religious organization to limit[ ] the ... occupancy of dwellings which it owns or operates for other than a commercial purpose to persons of the same religion, we hold that the practices alleged to have taken place in Defendant's drug treatment program do not violate the FHA. Cowles' religious discrimination claim therefore fails as a matter of law. [6] So too does Chinn's religious discrimination claim. According to Chinn, Defendant encourages guests of its homeless shelters to attend religious services. If they do, they go to the front of the line for food and housing. If they do not, they must wait outside the shelters or in the dining rooms until services conclude. Those who refuse to attend services also must wait at the end of the food line and sometimes get inferior food. Those practices amount to giving preference to people of Defendant's religion. Accordingly, § 3607(a) exempts them from violating the FHA. Plaintiffs urge us to reach the opposite conclusion. [7] With respect to Defendant's homeless shelters, they reason that, because homeless people who attend Defendant's religious services are not necessarily Christians, the exemption does not allow Defendant to give preference to Christians. We find that construction of § 3607(a) too restrictive. Defendant reasonably assumes that those who come to its shelters, who read and complete the admission form that apprises them of Defendant's religious purposes, and who thereafter attend its religious services are Christian. The exemption does not require Defendant to make intensive inquiries of those whom it serves or to prove that every person to whom it gives a preference believes sincerely in Christianity. With respect to the drug treatment program, Plaintiffs reason that, because Defendant admitted Cowles to its drug treatment program even though Cowles was not a Christian, Defendant cannot credibly claim that it restricts membership in its program to Christians. They further argue that, because § 3607(a) does not in their view allow Defendant to require its participants to become Christian before graduating, Defendant's drug treatment program violates the FHA. We disagree. First, the record shows that Defendant had every reason to think that Cowles was Christian when it admitted her. Cowles knew when she applied that Defendant required all participants to engage in a wide range of Christian activities. In her letter requesting admission, she expressed a deep desire to find God. To be sure that Cowles understood the nature of its program, Defendant's staff interviewed her. Staff members emphasized the Christian religious requirements of the program, and Cowles gave no indication that she had any concerns about those requirements. Even if there were a genuine issue of fact with respect to Cowles' religion at the time of her acceptance into Defendant's program, however, Cowles' religious discrimination claim still fails. Requiring participants to convert to Christianity before permitting them to graduate from the program constitutes giving preference to Christian participants. Accordingly, even under Cowles' version of the facts, Defendant's drug treatment program does not violate the FHA because the preference for Christians, and those who desire to become so, falls within the scope of § 3607(a).