Opinion ID: 1991039
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Arson Jury Instruction

Text: Appellant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to use the word maliciously in instructing the jury on arson to denote the requisite mens rea, as defined in the statute. See D.C.Code § 22-401 (1996), supra note 2. In its final instructions to the jury on the elements of arson, the trial court instructed the jury: The essential elements of the offense of arson, each of which the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt[,] are one, that the defendant burned or attempted to burn a building. Two, that the building was the property in whole or in part of someone other than the defendant; and three, that the defendant set fire to the building voluntarily and on purpose, not by mistake or accident; and fourth, that the defendant acted with the intent to kill or injure another person with the intent to threaten the security of anyone who lived in or occupied that building or other property or in conscious disregard of a known and substantial risk that his action would endanger life or threaten the security of anyone who lived in, who occupied that building or other property. This instruction mirrors that found in the Redbook instruction 4.33. See Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 4.33 (4th ed.1993). Even assuming that appellant has not waived his objection by failing to object at the time the instruction was given, [22] we perceive no error in the instruction given. In Comber, the case upon which the trial court relied, the en banc court suggested that the term malice together with concepts associated with malice such as acting with a `bad or evil purpose' or with a `wicked heart,' not be used in jury instructions because of its potential to confuse jurors. Comber, 584 A.2d at 42 n. 18; Thomas v. United States, 557 A.2d 1296, 1305 n. 17 (D.C.1989); Charles v. United States, 371 A.2d 404, 411 (D.C.1977). The trial court's instruction to the jury, moreover, comported with the definition of malice suggested in Carter v. United States, 531 A.2d 956, 962 (D.C.1987) (quoting Charles v. United States, 371 A.2d 404, 411 (D.C.1977)): All that is required is a conscious disregard of a known and substantial risk of the harm which the statute is intended to prevent. Therefore, there was no error in the trial court's omission of the word maliciously from the arson instruction.