Opinion ID: 1457749
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Presumption of Prosecutorial Independence and the Causation Problem

Text: A prosecutor's independent judgment may break the chain of causation between the unconstitutional actions of other officials and the harm suffered by a constitutional tort plaintiff. See Hartman, 547 U.S. 250, 262-63, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 164 L.Ed.2d 441 (2006) (discussing the issue in the First Amendment context); Smiddy I, 665 F.2d at 266-68 (discussing the issue in the Fourth Amendment context). Put in traditional tort terms, the prosecutor's independent decision can be a superseding or intervening cause of a constitutional tort plaintiff's injury, precluding suit against the officials who made an arrest or procured a prosecution. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 440 et seq. (discussing causation problems in tort cases). The method we have prescribed for addressing this causation question in Fourth Amendment-based suits differs somewhat from the method the Supreme Court recently set out in the context of First Amendment retaliatory prosecution suits. [8] We first discuss both methods in some detail before explaining how they apply to Beck's appeal. We first consider our Fourth Amendment causation law, in which we have used a rebuttable-presumption-based approach. In Smiddy I, a § 1983 false arrest case, we adopted an evidentiary presumption, see Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1126 (9th Cir.2002), that the prosecutor filing [a criminal] complaint exercised independent judgment in determining that probable cause for an accused's arrest exist[ed], thereby breaking the chain of causation between an arrest and prosecution and immunizing investigating officers ... from damages suffered after the complaint was filed. Smiddy I, 665 F.2d at 266-67; see also Smiddy v. Varney, 803 F.2d 1469, 1472 ( Smiddy II ) (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing the presumption). The Smiddy I presumption may be rebutted if the plaintiff shows that the independence of the prosecutor's judgment has been compromised. Smiddy I, 665 F.2d at 266-67. Smiddy I provided examples of circumstances in which the presumption of independent judgment will be considered rebutted, emphasizing that [t]hese examples are not intended to be exclusive. Id. at 267. The enunciated circumstances, elaborated upon in later cases, include situations in which the prosecutor was pressured by police or was given false information, id. at 266-67; the police act[ed] maliciously or with reckless disregard for the rights of an arrested person, id. at 267; the prosecutor relied on the police investigation and arrest when he filed the complaint instead of making an independent judgment on the existence of probable cause for the arrest, id. [9] ; or the officers otherwise engaged in wrongful or bad faith conduct that was actively instrumental in causing the initiation of legal proceedings, Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir.2004). Once the plaintiff has introduced evidence to rebut the presumption, the burden remains on the defendant to prove that an independent intervening cause cuts off his tort liability. Smiddy I, 665 F.2d at 267. Critically for this case, [i]f for reasons of privilege or otherwise the relevant evidence [to challenge the presumption] is not available, no presumption will arise, id. at 267-68, and the defendant has the burden to show that the prosecutor's judgment was independent. [10] Having described our approach in Fourth Amendment arrest cases where a prosecutor's actions have intervened, we turn to the Supreme Court's recent resolution of the similar causation issues arising from prosecutorial actions in First Amendment retaliatory prosecution cases. The Court set out its approach in Hartman, published, as we have noted, after the district court decision in this case. See 547 U.S. at 262-66, 126 S.Ct. 1695 (discussing the causation problem). [11] Hartman addressed an allegedly retaliatory prosecution in which the plaintiff contended that postal inspectors retaliated against his constitutionally protected speech by procuring his prosecution. Id. at 252-255, 126 S.Ct. 1695. The plaintiff sought to hold the inspectors liable for the prosecution. Id. The Court noted that the prosecutor's presence in the causal chain meant that the requisite causation between the defendant[] [official's] retaliatory animus and the plaintiff's injury is usually more complex than it is in other retaliation cases, id. at 261, 126 S.Ct. 1695, because [e]vidence of an [official's] animus does not necessarily show that the [official] induced the action of a prosecutor who would not have pressed charges otherwise. Id. at 263, 126 S.Ct. 1695. This difficulty, coupled with the longstanding presumption of regularity accorded to prosecutorial decisionmaking, id., and the fact that it would be unrealistic to expect a prosecutor to reveal his mind, id. at 264, 126 S.Ct. 1695, gave the Court considerable pause in determining the circumstances in which a plaintiff alleging a speech-retaliatory prosecution can bridge the gap [created by the independent judgment of the prosecutor] between the nonprosecuting government agent's motive and the prosecutor's action. Id. ; see also id. at 263, 126 S.Ct. 1695 (citing Smiddy I as an example of the causation problem). Considering the dilemma created in a First Amendment retaliatory prosecution case by the prosecutor's intervening decision to prosecute, the Court developed a bright-line, objective standard as a substitute for inquiries into the prosecutor's subjective state of mind. Noting that there will always be a distinct body of highly valuable circumstantial evidence available and apt to prove or disprove retaliatory causation, namely evidence showing whether there was or was not probable cause to bring the criminal charge, id. at 261, the Court held that a retaliatory motive on the part of an official urging prosecution combined with an absence of probable cause supporting the prosecutor's decision to go forward are reasonable grounds to suspend the presumption of regularity behind the charging decision, id. at 265. So, under Hartman, if a plaintiff can prove that the officials secured his arrest or prosecution without probable cause and were motivated by retaliation against the plaintiff's protected speech, the plaintiff's First Amendment suit can go forward. [12] We see no reason to limit Hartman 's probable cause requirement solely to First Amendment retaliatory arrest and prosecution cases. Rather, its logic extends to Fourth Amendment false arrest cases like Beck's, at least to the extent that the plaintiff must prove the absence of probable cause to rebut the presumption of independent prosecutorial judgment, when a prosecutor's actions are interposed between the actions of investigating officials and the arrest. Ordinarily, however, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the absence of probable cause anyway in a Fourth Amendment false arrest case. Proving lack of probable cause is usually essential to demonstrating that the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights were violated. As a practical matter, consequently, Hartman will rarely add to the plaintiff's ultimate burden in a § 1983 false arrest case.