Opinion ID: 2585503
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Jury Instructions Regarding P.M.

Text: Defendant contends the trial court violated his state and federal constitutional rights to a fair trial, to a reliable penalty determination, and to due process of law by failing to grant his request to instruct the jury that P.M. was an accomplice as a matter of law. (See CALJIC No. 3.16.) Instead, the trial court decided the jury should determine the issue and instructed it thusly: You must determine whether the witness [P.M.] was an [accomplice as I have defined that term. [H] The defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that [P.M.] was an accomplice in the crimes charged against the defendant. (See CALJIC No. 3.19.) Defendant contends the trial court erred because there was ample evidence showing P.M. was subject to prosecution for the same crimes as defendant. We disagree. Whether a person is an accomplice within the meaning of section 1111 presents a factual question for the jury `unless the evidence permits only a single inference.' [Citation.] Thus, a court can decide as a matter of law whether a witness is or is not an accomplice only when the facts regarding the witness's criminal culpability are `clear and undisputed.' ( People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 679, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752.) The evidence in this case did not permit the clear and undisputed inference that P.M. was an accomplice. P.M. testified that when he got in the car with defendant and Mark Bender, he did not know they intended to steal someone's wheel rims. He testified he found out about the plan once he was in the backseat of the car, but did not agree to it. The jury was certainly free to disbelieve this testimony, but it was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's decision that the witness was not an accomplice as a matter of law. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not err in refusing to give CALJIC No. 3.16. Even were we to assume the trial court erred, we would find no prejudice. As we explained, ante, at part II.A.8, failure to instruct on accomplice liability under section 1111 is harmless if there was adequate corroboration of the witness. Here, the testimony from other eyewitnesses, as well as that from witnesses who testified to defendant's own statements that he smoked that bitch and took her truck, provides sufficient corroborative evidence to render any instructional error harmless.
In a related claim, defendant also contends the trial court violated his state and federal constitutional rights to a fair trial, to a reliable penalty determination, and to due process of law by modifying the language of CALJIC No. 3.10. Thus, the court instructed the jury: An accomplice is a person who is subject to prosecution for the identical offense charged in Counts I [the robbery of Christina Ramirez] and II [the murder of Ramirez] of the Information against the defendant on trial by reason of aiding and abetting. (Italics added.) As noted, ante, at part II.A.9.a, the court also instructed the jury that it was to determine whether P.M. was an accomplice, and that defendant bore the burden of proof on that question by a preponderance of the evidence. Defendant contends that, by wording the instruction in the conjunctive (and) rather than the disjunctive (or), the trial court unfairly increased his burden of establishing the witness was an accomplice subject to the corroboration rule because it required him to prove P.M. was an accomplice for both the robbery and the murder. [14] We disagree. Defendant's argument hinges on the possibility that the jury may have found P.M. was subject to prosecution for only one of the two charged crimes, i.e., that P.M. was subject to prosecution for the robbery but not the murder, or for the murder but not the robbery. As there was absolutely no evidence suggesting he was guilty of the murder only, we may discard that possibility. But because he was in the car with Mark Bender, Broderick Fields and defendant when both crimes were committed, it is possible he was subject to prosecution for robbery if he acted with (1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; ... (2) the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, [and] (3) by act or advice aid[ed], promote[d], encourage[d] or instigate[d] the commission of the crime. ( People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 561, 199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318.) It is not possible, however, for P.M. to have been subject to prosecution for only the robbery and not the murder, for the victim's death, even if unintentional or accidental, would constitute first degree felony murder under these circumstances. ( People v. Pulido (1997) 15 Cal.4th 713, 63 Cal. Rptr.2d 625, 936 P.2d 1235; see § 189.) Hence, if P.M. was subject to prosecution for robbery, he necessarily was also subject to prosecution for murder. Thus, the court did not err by phrasing the instruction in the conjunctive. Even were we to assume the trial court erred, defendant suffered no prejudice. The alleged harm in phrasing CALJIC No. 3.10 in the conjunctive was that the jury may erroneously have believed P.M. was not an accomplice to the murder, and that his testimony therefore need not be corroborated. As explained, ante, at part II.A.4, ample evidence corroborated P.M.'s testimony, including defendant's admission to more than one person that he smoked that bitch, defendant's possession of the victim's truck, and Rena Stanfill's eyewitness account of the crime. Any error was thus harmless.
In a related claim, defendant also contends the trial court violated his state and federal constitutional rights to a fair trial, to a reliable penalty determination, and to due process of law by denying his request to instruct the jury with CALJIC No. 8.27. Defendant further claims the alleged error in giving CALJIC No. 3.10 in the conjunctive was exacerbated by the court's failure to instruct sua sponte on aiding and abetting, specifically with CALJIC Nos. 3.02 and 3.00. We disagree. CALJIC No. 8.27, as defendant proposed, provides: If a human being is killed by any one of several persons engaged in the commission or attempted commission of the crime of [robbery], all persons, who either directly and actively commit the act constituting that crime, or who with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator of the crime and with the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, aid, promote, encourage, or instigate by act or advice its commission, are guilty of murder of the first degree, whether the killing is intentional, unintentional, or accidental. It does not appear defendant specifically asked the trial court to give CALJIC Nos. 3.00 or 3.02. They are, of course, the standard aider and abettor instructions. [15] A court must instruct sua sponte on genera] principles of law that are closely and openly connected with the facts presented at trial. [Citations.] ( People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 90, 91 Cal. Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506.) Of course, there was no suggestion that defendant was a mere aider and abettor; it was the prosecution's theoryand the evidence showedthat defendant was the one who personally fired the gun, killing the victim. Moreover, P.M. had been granted immunity and was not on trial. It would thus appear aiding and abetting instructions were unnecessary. Despite these facts, defendant contends these three instructions were necessary to allow the jury properly to consider P.M.'s testimony. In particular, defendant argues there was substantial evidence from which the jury could find P.M. was an aider and abettor and thus an accomplice whose testimony required corroboration before it could be considered. This argument, then, is merely a variant of the claim that P.M. was an accomplice as a matter of law. Inasmuch as the trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 3.19, which allowed the jury to find P.M. an accomplice subject to the corroboration requirement, the court did not err in refusing to give CALJIC No. 8.27 or failing to give CALJIC Nos. 3.00 or 3.02 sua sponte. [T]he general rule is that a trial court may refuse a proffered instruction if it ... is duplicative. ( People v. Gurule, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 659, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224.) As explained, ante, at part II.A.4, even were we to assume that the failure to instruct interfered with defendant's ability to have the jury conclude P.M. was an accomplice, any error was harmless because P.M.'s testimony was amply corroborated.