Opinion ID: 6328976
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: In this appeal from the convictions of two separate defendants, we will ﬁrst address Hidalgo-Sanchez’s arguments then proceed to Gomez’s arguments.
Hidalgo-Sanchez raises three issues on appeal. First, he argues that the evidence presented at trial was insuﬃcient as a matter of law to support his conviction for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances in the Eastern District of Wisconsin. Second, he asserts that venue is improper in that district. Third, he contends that the district court reversibly erred when it failed to give a certain limiting instruction to the jury.
Because Hidalgo-Sanchez preserved his suﬃciency-ofthe-evidence argument by moving for judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 at the close of evidence, we review his claim de novo. United States v. Claybrooks, 729 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 2013). That does not mean, however, that he has an easy road ahead. In fact, he faces a “nearly insurmountable” burden. United States v. Anderson, 988 F.3d 420, 424 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Faulkner, 885 F.3d 488, 492 (7th Cir. 2018)). 16 Nos. 20-2673 & 21-1158 In suﬃciency challenges to jury verdicts, “we review the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the government and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Id. (citing United States v. Grayson Enters., Inc., 950 F.3d 386, 405 (7th Cir. 2020)). “We do not make credibility determinations or reweigh the evidence … .” United States v. Brown, 865 F.3d 566, 570 (7th Cir. 2017). Ultimately, we “will overturn a conviction only if, after reviewing the record in this light, we determine that no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the oﬀense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Anderson, 988 F.3d at 424 (citing Grayson Enters., Inc., 950 F.3d at 405). In other words, “[i]f there is a reasonable basis in the record for the verdict, it must stand.” United States v. Moshiri, 858 F.3d 1077, 1082 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Galati, 230 F.3d 254, 258 (7th Cir. 2000)). To secure a conviction in a conspiracy prosecution, “the government must prove that (1) two or more people agreed to commit an unlawful act, and (2) the defendant knowingly and intentionally joined in the agreement.” United States v. Hopper, 934 F.3d 740, 754 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 749, 754 (7th Cir. 2010)). With respect to drug-distribution conspiracies, “[t]he government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly agreed, perhaps implicitly, with someone else to distribute drugs.” United States v. Vizcarra-Millan, 15 F.4th 473, 506 (7th Cir. 2021). Evidence showing only that two people are in a buyerseller relationship is insuﬃcient to prove a drug-distribution conspiracy. Hopper, 934 F.3d at 754. The same is true if the evidence is “in equipoise”—that is, it suggests that either possibility is equally likely. Johnson, 592 F.3d at 755. Nos. 20-2673 & 21-1158 17 There are two principles that are helpful to this analysis. First, “[t]o be liable for conspiracy, a defendant must have ‘a stake in the venture’ and therefore exhibit[] ‘informed and interested cooperation.’” Vizcarra-Millan, 15 F.4th at 507 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Brown, 726 F.3d 993, 998 (7th Cir. 2013)). Second, we require “[e]vidence of an agreement to advance further distribution—beyond the initial transaction.” Hopper, 934 F.3d at 754 (alteration in original) (citing United States v. Pulgar, 789 F.3d 807, 812 (7th Cir. 2015)). We have also acknowledged and employed a “nonexhaustive list of characteristics that strongly distinguish a conspiracy from a buyer-seller relationship.” Id. at 755 (quoting United States v. Pereira, 783 F.3d 700, 704 (7th Cir. 2015)). Those characteristics include: sales on credit or consignment, an agreement to look for other customers, a payment of commission on sales, an indication that one party advised the other on the conduct of the other’s business, or an agreement to warn of future threats to each other’s business stemming from competitors or law enforce- ment authorities. Id. (quoting Pereira, 783 F.3d at 704). Moreover, “if a person buys drugs in large quantities (too great for personal consumption), on a frequent basis, on credit, then an inference of conspiracy legitimately follows.” Brown, 726 F.3d at 1002. Despite the utility of these “rules of thumb,” Vizcarra-Millan, 15 F.4th at 507, our ultimate charge is to “take into account all the evidence surrounding the alleged conspiracy and make a holistic assessment of whether the jury reached a reasonable verdict,” Brown, 726 F.3d at 1002. Otherwise stated, we must 18 Nos. 20-2673 & 21-1158 “consider the totality of the circumstances” to determine whether a conspiracy existed. Id. Hidalgo-Sanchez ﬁrst suggests that he was in a mere buyer-seller relationship with Gomez, not a conspiracy. To begin, we address the government’s contention that HidalgoSanchez waived or forfeited this argument because his trial counsel conﬁrmed to the district court during the jury instruction conference that the evidence did not require a buyerseller instruction. The government’s contention is beside the point. The thrust of Hidalgo-Sanchez’s appeal is that the evidence was insuﬃcient to show that he was involved in the alleged conspiracy. One way for him to do that is to concede that the evidence is suﬃcient to prove something short of conspiracy—a buyer-seller relationship—but nothing more. Put a diﬀerent way, he could have advanced this suﬃciency argument without mentioning “buyer-seller” at all. He could simply have explained what was not proven and refrained from also conceding what was proven. He preserved his sufﬁciency challenge by moving for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29. Claybrooks, 729 F.3d at 704. His earlier failure to insist on a buyer-seller jury instruction did not make that preservation impossible. Now we turn to the evidence. As will be shown below, the evidence makes it clear that Gomez was in charge of a fairly large conspiracy to distribute heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine in Milwaukee. He worked with coconspirators to transport these controlled substances to Milwaukee by hiding them in void spaces in cars that were then shipped via commercial car carriers. They would then hide money or drugs in the cars and send them elsewhere. Testimonial evidence, recorded calls, pole-camera footage, and in-person surveillance Nos. 20-2673 & 21-1158 19 conﬁrm Gomez’s role in at least three of these shipments. Intercepted phone calls also demonstrate that Gomez was in contact with two people in Mexico that the government asserts were sources of supply. Finally, in many phone calls, Gomez negotiated further drug sales to local distributors. One such distributor was Bryan Banks, who testiﬁed as to the coded language used in the recorded conversations and made clear that he was exchanging large sums of money for kilogram quantities of controlled substances. The key question, though, is whether the evidence ties Hidalgo-Sanchez to this conspiracy. We conclude that it does— or, at least, there is a reasonable basis in the record for the jury’s verdict that it does. To be clear, the evidence does not need to show that Hidalgo-Sanchez was involved in every act of the conspiracy. United States v. Brasher, 962 F.3d 254, 261– 62 (7th Cir. 2020). It is also not necessary that HidalgoSanchez knew every member of the conspiracy. Id. at 261. Instead, the evidence must only show that he was “aware of the aim of the conspiracy and made a knowing decision to join it.” Id. at 262 (citing United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 964 (7th Cir. 2002)). Here, there is evidence that Hidalgo-Sanchez would buy drugs from Gomez on credit and consignment. A few calls illustrate this point. First, in a June 22, 2017 call, Gomez asked Hidalgo-Sanchez if he “want[s] some for thirty-one (31), lent to [him] for about three (3) days.” Later in the call, Gomez explains that he “can tell them a week,” but “then if they start asking and I don’t have all the money, they’re going to start pressuring me.” By the end of the call, it’s not clear whether a deal was made, but an inference can be reasonably drawn about the way Gomez and Hidalgo-Sanchez worked together. 20 Nos. 20-2673 & 21-1158 In a February 15, 2017 call, Esquivel-Sotelo tells HidalgoSanchez that there was a fake ﬁfty-dollar bill that was part of a $600 payment that made its way from Hidalgo-Sanchez to Gomez’s sister, Tita. A jury could easily infer from the call that Esquivel-Sotelo was asking Hidalgo-Sanchez to replace it with real money and that Hidalgo-Sanchez was intent on complying. These two calls, together with Banks’s testimony about the coded language the conspirators used when making deals, could lead a jury to conclude that there was a course of conduct between Gomez and Hidalgo-Sanchez that involved the extension of drugs on credit. With respect to consignment, the key call occurred on March 8, 2017. In that call, Hidalgo-Sanchez complained that the “one” he got from Gomez was “falling apart” and “like dirt.” He explained that one of his customers, a guy who “bought the quarter from [him],” did not want it. They agreed that Hidalgo-Sanchez could return the “powdery” kilogram for a “harder” one, in hopes that the customer would not reject it. The ability to return unsold drugs is the hallmark of a consignment. See Pulgar, 789 F.3d at 811 (“[W]hen a ‘seller permits the buyer to return unsold drugs,’ he stands on the precipice of a consignment sale. And consignment sales are ‘quintessential evidence’ of a drug-distribution conspiracy.” (citation omitted) (quoting Brown, 726 F.3d at 999)). This call illustrates that the two had a shared stake in the further sale of the heroin and were working out a solution together. Other than these two examples, from which it would be reasonable for a jury to infer that the two were dealing with kilogram quantities, below are examples from other calls that Nos. 20-2673 & 21-1158 21 suggest that Hidalgo-Sanchez acquired “large quantities” from Gomez: • January 5, 2017: Hidalgo-Sanchez asked for a “half,” but Gomez did not have any and didn’t expect any for three more days. • March 6, 2017: Hidalgo-Sanchez complained about product that was “all damp.” They discussed “the other one,” which fell apart “terribly.” • March 8, 2017: Hidalgo-Sanchez asked if Gomez wanted to see the “ones from Califas.” He said he had “two,” “one and one.” • March 21, 2017: Hidalgo-Sanchez called Gomez from a private party at a restaurant and requested a “quarter,” explaining that there was a buyer waiting with “cash on hand.” Gomez explained that he only had the “lo[o]se kind.” Hidalgo-Sanchez changed course and asked Gomez if he could help him get “twenty ﬁve.” They discussed the diﬃculty of obtaining that much at one time. Gomez said that he would “see how many arrive … and let [him] know how many [he] can han- dle.” He also ventured that they could “leave ﬁve (5) down there, dude.” It would be reasonable for a jury to infer from these interactions that Hidalgo-Sanchez and Gomez dealt frequently with one another and exchanged large quantities of drugs and money. Moreover, they shared the objective of acquiring more drugs and ensuring that Hidalgo-Sanchez’s customers were satisﬁed. They had a joint stake in the operation. The jury could also have reasonably inferred from the evidence that Hidalgo-Sanchez arranged the transport of the 22 Nos. 20-2673 & 21-1158 Mercedes SUV containing ﬁve kilograms of methamphetamine that was intercepted in Michigan. The extreme similarity between this transport and the three other intercepted transports could reasonably lead a jury to infer that they were part of the same criminal objective. This is especially so considering that it happened in the middle of their course of dealing and followed the other three transports. Admittedly, this evidence does not necessarily entitle the government to the “legitimate[]” inference of conspiracy that follows from frequent transactions of large quantities of drugs on credit. See Brown, 726 F.3d at 1000. Although the evidence indicates that each of those features is present in one or more of Gomez’s and Hidalgo-Sanchez’s interactions, it is not clear that there was a consistent pattern of transactions that included all three. We are still convinced that the jury’s verdict should not be disturbed, though, for two reasons. First, it is possible that a jury could still reach the opposite conclusion, and our review is very deferential to that possibility. And second, the evidence otherwise establishes that Gomez and Hidalgo-Sanchez are guilty of the charged oﬀense. In any event, the totality of the circumstances suggests a relationship between the two that was much deeper and more entwined than a mere buyer-seller relationship. First and foremost, there is evidence that shows Gomez sold HidalgoSanchez drugs on credit and consignment. Second, there is evidence that Gomez had an interest in the sales that HidalgoSanchez made. He allowed Hidalgo-Sanchez to replace inferior product to ensure that his customers would be satisﬁed. Their relationship also showed a level of trust indicative of conspiracies. Vizcarra-Millan, 15 F.4th at 507 (“We have sometimes described [the conspiracy] factors as supporting Nos. 20-2673 & 21-1158 23 an inference of heightened trust, but evidence of mutual trust alone is insuﬃcient.” (citing Pulgar, 789 F.3d at 815–16)). They openly discussed the contents and expected arrival dates of shipments of controlled substances and very likely shared tactics for traﬃcking them. And the jury could infer from the similarity of the four vehicle seizures that the two were carrying out the same operation, or that one “advised the other on the conduct of the other’s business.” Johnson, 592 F.3d at 755– 56. This is more than enough evidence to support the jury’s verdict.
Hidalgo-Sanchez also argues that the evidence was insufﬁcient to show that venue was proper in the Eastern District of Wisconsin. We disagree. “[I]t is not at all unusual for conspiracies to cross state and judicial district lines; hence, the law recognizes that such crimes may be prosecuted in any district where one’s co-conspirators have acted in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Brasher, 962 F.3d at 263 (citations omitted). This proposition is backed by 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a), which states that “any oﬀense … begun in one district and completed in another, or committed in more than one district, may be … prosecuted in any district in which such oﬀense was begun, continued, or completed.” Here, the evidence shows that Hidalgo-Sanchez himself committed overt acts in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, not to mention his coconspirators, including Gomez. Three examples make the point. First, on December 5, 2016, Hidalgo-Sanchez and Avina were intercepted speaking on the phone about drugs. Hidalgo-Sanchez asked, “Isn’t there a little bit from that one? 24 Nos. 20-2673 & 21-1158 Because this guy wants some of that one.” Avina replied, “Well, … there’s hardly any left … . I don’t know how much you can get from that one, all that’s left is dust.” HidalgoSanchez said, “Let me see; are you there?” Avina answered, “Yes. I’m here at my house.” Detective Cooper testiﬁed that, after the call, he saw Avina and Hidalgo-Sanchez at Avina’s apartment in Milwaukee. Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, this exchange shows that the two conspired to advance further drug sales in the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The second example is the call that Hidalgo-Sanchez made from the Milwaukee restaurant to Gomez on March 21, 2017. He called Gomez to try to secure drugs for a customer who had “cash on hand.” Moreover, they discussed how to obtain a huge amount of additional drugs from a supplier. Third, on April 18, 2017, Gomez, with whom the evidence shows Hidalgo-Sanchez was conspiring, and several others prepared and loaded the silver Jetta onto a car carrier in the parking lot of a Milwaukee Wal-Mart. The Jetta was stopped in Illinois and oﬃcers found $145,380, a GPS tracker, and an audio recorder. Later, an intercepted call featured Gomez discussing the seizure of the Jetta with his sources of supply in Mexico. These were clear overt acts, occurring in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, that were central to the drug-distribution conspiracy that Hidalgo-Sanchez was a part of. Because Hidalgo-Sanchez and his coconspirators committed acts furthering their drug-distribution conspiracy in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, venue was proper there. Nos. 20-2673 & 21-1158 25
Hidalgo-Sanchez next argues that the district court erred when it twice refused to give an instruction to the jury to limit its consideration of the Michigan bill of lading to the purpose proﬀered by the government: that there were inconsistencies on it that prompted Oﬃcer Myers to investigate further the Mercedes SUV. When he did investigate, he found about ﬁve kilograms of methamphetamine. We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to give or refuse to give a jury instruction. United States v. Campos, 541 F.3d 735, 744 (7th Cir. 2008). We conclude that there was an abuse of discretion in this case when the district court refused to give a limiting instruction along the lines of what Hidalgo-Sanchez requested. That is because Federal Rule of Evidence 105 provides that “[i]f the court admits evidence that is admissible … for a purpose—but not … for another purpose—the court, on timely request, must restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.” Fed. R. Evid. 105; United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 860 (7th Cir. 2014) (“A limiting instruction must be given upon request.”). Here, the district court overruled Hidalgo-Sanchez’s immediate hearsay objection after the government explained that it was only oﬀering the bill of lading to show why it “raise[d] this oﬃcer’s suspicions.” Then, at the jury instruction conference near the close of evidence, Hidalgo-Sanchez proposed a limiting instruction. In response, the government requested that the bill of lading be admitted without limitation. The district court explained that it did not see “any need to give the jury an instruction” because the bill of lading was “not being admitted to show that this is where this shipment 26 Nos. 20-2673 & 21-1158 was going and this is who ordered the shipment to go there and the jury knows that.” Then, it moved on, leaving undisturbed its decisions to admit the bill of lading for a limited purpose and to not give an instruction. While we are somewhat persuaded by the reasoning of the district court that an instruction was not really necessary as a conceptual matter, that does not negate the fact that HidalgoSanchez was entitled to one upon timely request. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 105. Therefore, we believe an abuse of discretion occurred. Having concluded that refusing to give a limiting instruction to the jury was error, we must now decide whether it was harmless. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). The error was harmless if it did not aﬀect Hidalgo-Sanchez’s substantial rights. See United States v. Robinson, 724 F.3d 878, 888 (7th Cir. 2013). “Generally speaking, a ﬁnding of harmlessness is appropriate only if an appellate court can say ‘with fair assurance’ that the judgment was not ‘substantially swayed by the error.’” Id. (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)). It is the government’s burden to demonstrate this. Id. (citations omitted). Hidalgo-Sanchez contends that the bill of lading was a critical piece of evidence because it listed a number associated with him as the recipient’s phone number. The recipient’s name is listed only as “Jackson.” The jury should have been instructed not to consider the truth of the matter asserted, Hidalgo-Sanchez insists. But the truth of the matter asserted is seemingly that a person named Jackson in Sturgis, Michigan, with this phone number really is the recipient of the Mercedes SUV. Just as the district court concluded, this does not advance the government’s case against Hidalgo-Sanchez at all. Nos. 20-2673 & 21-1158 27 It is possible that the jury knew this number was associated with Hidalgo-Sanchez, and therefore that he was involved in this shipment, but the government already associated him with the shipment. It oﬀered two intercepted calls purportedly from “Roberto Martinez” to the car carrier company, Mueve Tu Carro. The calls were made from HidalgoSanchez’s number and Detective Lazo identiﬁed his voice on the calls. Hidalgo-Sanchez tries to deal with this fact by suggesting that even if he were the caller, the bill of lading shows that he was the recipient, too, and that fact is somehow a linchpin in the case. But in reality, that additional inference would not materially change anything, if the jury inferred it at all. Although the bill of lading was supposedly critical to the government’s case, after it was admitted, the government never mentioned it again at trial or in closing. Additionally, while Hidalgo-Sanchez was entitled to the instruction and wanted it, the instruction would have drawn the jury’s attention back to the bill of lading, when it had been all but abandoned. The linchpin argument is also undermined by the mountain of other evidence connecting Hidalgo-Sanchez to Gomez and the drug-distribution conspiracy. As the government points out, there are cases where instruction-related errors are so prejudicial that they warrant a new trial, see Robinson, 724 F.3d at 891, but this case is not one of them. Here, we “can say ‘with fair assurance’ that the judgment was not ‘substantially swayed by the error.’” Id. at 888 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765). Therefore, we conclude that the district court’s failure to give a limiting instruction was harmless. 28 Nos. 20-2673 & 21-1158
Gomez raises only one issue in his appellate brief. He argues that the government’s impermissible use of bolstering testimony so tainted his trial that a new one is warranted. The relevant testimony was elicited from Detective Cooper, and appears below: Q. Okay. And so you make the determination that you’re going to get—you’d like to get a wiretap. How does that process begin? A. So the wiretap’s kind of a last resort because it’s a lot of work, so the process begins through the controlled buys that we’ve talked about through surveillance, through a lot of analysis of phone records and viewing who people are calling and—and trying to identify who they’re talking to. Eventually we take all of that information and compile an aﬃ- davit which lays out our investigation to that point and the—the reasons we believe that a wiretap’s necessary. Q. Okay. And is that a small aﬃdavit, big aﬃda- vit? About roughly what’s the average size? A. I believe the goal is approximately 50 pages, but generally they’re a little longer than that. Q. Okay. And so you began to, I take it, you be- gan drafting an aﬃdavit? A. Yes. Q. And you did that in consultation with the prosecutor’s oﬃce? A. Yes. Nos. 20-2673 & 21-1158 29 Q. Okay. And is that the D.A.’s Oﬃce or the U.S. Attorney’s Oﬃce? A. The U.S. Attorney’s Oﬃce. …. Q. Okay. And so you indicated that a lot of the information goes into the aﬃdavit including an analysis of phone records and other documents. Do you know what a pen register is? A. Yes. …. Q. Okay. Once you draft your aﬃdavit for a wiretap, do you submit it to the U.S. Attorney’s Ofﬁce? A. Yes. Q. And then the U.S. Attorney’s Oﬃce has an in- ternal approval process? A. Right. Q. And then that aﬃdavit gets sent oﬀ to an- other—to be reviewed again? A. Yes, it does. Q. And ultimately that aﬃdavit has to be ap- proved from an oﬃcial in main justice? A. Yes. Q. After that is done, the aﬃdavit that you drafted, does that get submitted to a judge? A. It does, yes. Q. Okay. And that’s a federal judge? A. Yes. 30 Nos. 20-2673 & 21-1158 Q. And that aﬃdavit is submitted for review along with an order to allow you to wiretap? A. Correct. …. Q. And that was submitted to a federal judge? A. It was. Q. And a federal judge signed oﬀ for court ap- proval for a wiretap in that case? A. Yes. …. Q. And as part of your commitment to getting the wiretap—Let me back you up. When you get a wiretap authorized, that gets signed by a federal judge? A. Yes, it does. Q. And in authorizing the wiretap the federal judge makes some requirements of the agents, cor- rect? A. Yes. Q. And one of the requirements is an ongoing re- quirement to—to, for the sake of a better word, up- date the court? A. Yes. Q. So approximately how many—During the course of a wiretap, you’re required to give updates to the court? A. Yes, every 10 days. Nos. 20-2673 & 21-1158 31 Q. Okay. So every 10 days do you generate a re- port? A. Yes. Q. And that report documents whether—Well, what’s in that report generally? A. It documents kind of the status of the investi- gation, that says what—when did the wiretap go up on that phone, if it’s still up. It documents the number of calls that have come in and then the number of—those that are pertinent or non-pertinent, the number that have been minimized or were privi- leged. It discusses whether there were errors of the monitoring system which might’ve caused us to not hear—or for calls not to come into our system. Q. So part of the review process is you got to ba- sically every 10 days let the Court know that the machines are working right, right? A. Right. Because Gomez did not object to this testimony, our review is for plain error only. See United States v. McMahan, 495 F.3d 410, 418 (7th Cir. 2007), vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Smith, 552 U.S. 1091 (2008). To prevail under this standard, Gomez “must show (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) that ‘aﬀects substantial rights,’ and (4) that ‘seriously aﬀect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Gray, 410 F.3d 338, 345 (7th Cir. 2005)). Here, the government concedes that there was error and that it was plain. Still, we pause for a moment to discuss why that is. We explained in United States v. Cunningham that testimony regarding the many layers of approval by oﬃcials at 32 Nos. 20-2673 & 21-1158 various levels of government required to obtain a wiretap is “wholly unrelated to the defendants’ guilt or innocence—and not necessary to be established to prove the case against the defendants.” 462 F.3d 708, 712 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 401 (deﬁnition of relevance); and then Fed. R. Evid. 402 (irrelevant evidence inadmissible)). We summarized our decision in Cunningham in the following way: Over the defendants’ objection at trial, the government recounted a litany of procedures [that] the local U.S. Attorney’s oﬃce, the Oﬃce of the Attorney General, and the Drug Enforcement Administration … utilized in seeking court authorization for two telephone wiretaps. In doing so, the government wit- ness’s testimony suggested to the jury that a panel of senior government lawyers in the Oﬃce of the At- torney General in Washington, D.C. and others in law enforcement were of the opinion that there was probable cause to believe the defendants were in- deed engaging in criminal activity. The admission of this irrelevant evidence had the eﬀect of improperly bolstering the credibility of the government’s case in the eyes of the jury, and the error was not harmless. Id. at 709–10. The following year, we passed on the same issue again but reached a diﬀerent, but consistent result. In United States v. McMahan, the government impermissibly used bolstering testimony at trial, but defense counsel did not object. Therefore, we reviewed for plain error. 495 F.3d at 418. We found that there was error and it was plain, but that it had not aﬀected McMahan’s substantial rights or seriously aﬀected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings because “evidence of the defendants’ criminal activity was Nos. 20-2673 & 21-1158 33 substantial”; “none of the evidence came from the aﬃdavits ﬁled in support of the wiretap applications”; and “[t]here was no further reference to [the bolstering] testimony.” Id. Regarding Gomez’s substantial rights, we reach the same conclusion—they were not aﬀected by the error, primarily because the evidence against Gomez was truly overwhelming. That is, we “can say ‘with fair assurance’ that the judgment was not ‘substantially swayed by the error.’” Robinson, 724 F.3d at 888 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765); see also Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2096 (2021) (“[T]here must be ‘a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been diﬀerent.’” (quoting RosalesMireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1904–05 (2018))). The evidence at trial convincingly demonstrated that Gomez was central to the drug-distribution conspiracy. He was recorded on numerous phone calls discussing when shipments would arrive and what drugs they would contain. He was recorded answering questions and giving instructions to coconspirators. He was captured on pole-camera footage and by in-person surveillance preparing cars for transport and overseeing the loading of the cars onto carriers. He was recorded speaking with two people in Mexico about the seizures of vehicles across the country containing cash and drugs. And he was often responsible for ensuring that customers were satisﬁed by the drugs that he provided to middlemen, like Hidalgo-Sanchez. When they were not, he would work with the middlemen to replace them with higher quality drugs. Finally, Banks testiﬁed about speciﬁc interactions with Gomez, deal terms, and the coded language that they would use. In fact, the evidence is so substantial in this case that we do not even account for all of it in this opinion. 34 Nos. 20-2673 & 21-1158 Though Gomez failed to meet his burden on the third prong of the plain error test, dooming his appeal, we also note that he fails on the fourth prong. Despite his assertion that using the bolstering evidence “was an intentional eﬀort to ‘back door’ the jury and infect ‘the fairness and integrity,’ not only of [his] trial, but of justice itself,” there is no evidence of nefarious intent here. (Appellant’s Br. at 19.) Considering the strength of the case and the absence of evidence on intent, we cannot say that a “miscarriage of justice” occurred. United States v. Maez, 960 F.3d 949, 962 (7th Cir. 2020) (explaining that a “miscarriage of justice” is akin to “a substantial risk of convicting an innocent person” (quoting United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 481 (7th Cir. 2005))). Although we ﬁnd here, as in McMahan, that there was no plain error, we are disturbed that the government continues to use bolstering evidence in criminal trials. Fifteen years have now passed since Cunningham and McMahan, yet it still happens. Although Gomez had no proof that the government deliberately skirted our rule in this case, we certainly see the potential for prosecutors to evaluate the risk and reward of bolstering their weak cases with this type of impermissible testimony. If defense counsel objects, then the government might have to try the case again if the trial or appeals court determines the error was not harmless. But if the defense does not object, then perhaps the government could secure a conviction by prejudicing the jury, and then evade any consequence because of the deferential plain error standard on appeal. During oral argument, our concern led us to order the government to submit a supplemental response addressing cases from other circuits regarding the continued introduction of Nos. 20-2673 & 21-1158 35 bolstering testimony like the kind at issue here. We asked the government to include any case in which the appellate court declined to apply the plain-error standard as a remedial tactic. The government was able to ﬁnd only a few cases, and none declining to apply the plain-error standard. And in the end, we determined that we were bound to continue to employ that standard here. In closing, we want to be very clear: the use of bolstering testimony of the nature used in this case is impermissible and it has the potential to damage our criminal courts whenever it is used. The responsibility for avoiding this falls squarely on the government. At the very least, the government should ensure that its training materials reﬂect the seriousness of avoiding this type of conduct. It must also do whatever else is necessary to ensure this does not happen again. Finally, we impart upon the defense bar the importance of objecting immediately to the use of this type of testimony. While it was not the only diﬀerence between Cunningham and McMahan, it was a critical diﬀerence. As all criminal law attorneys are surely aware, plain error review is, by design, a much harder path to reversal than review for harmless error.