Opinion ID: 1940368
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: analysis of validity of waiver

Text: An abuse of discretion standard applies when reviewing a trial court's determination regarding a capital defendant's competency to waive postconviction counsel and proceedings. Slawson v. State, 796 So.2d 491, 502 (Fla.2001); Castro v. State, 744 So.2d 986, 989 (Fla.1999). Thus, the issue to be addressed here is whether the circuit court abused its discretion in finding that Alston knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights to postconviction counsel and proceedings. In Durocher v. Singletary, 623 So.2d 482 (Fla.1993), a case in which a capital defendant wished to drop all postconviction proceedings and waive representation by CCRC, this Court stated that [c]ompetent defendants have the constitutional right to refuse professional counsel and to represent themselves, or not, if they so choose. Id. at 483 (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)). Further, this Court wrote: Regardless of our feelings about what we might do in a similar situation, we cannot deny Durocher his right to control his destiny to whatever extent remains.... Having said this, however, we also recognize that the state has an obligation to assure that the waiver of collateral counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Accordingly, we direct the trial judge forthwith to conduct a Faretta -type evaluation of Durocher to determine if he understands the consequences of waiving collateral counsel and proceedings. ... If the Faretta -type hearing raises questions in the judge's mind about Durocher's competency, he may order a mental health evaluation and make a competency determination thereafter. Id. at 484-85 (emphasis added). Later, in Slawson, 796 So.2d at 502, this Court stated that Durocher established that the relevant test for competency in the context of waiving collateral counsel and collateral proceedings in Florida is whether the person seeking waiver has the capacity to `understand[] the consequences of waiving collateral counsel and proceedings.' Additionally, in Johnston v. State, 497 So.2d 863, 868 (Fla.1986), this Court stated that in determining whether a defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel, a trial court should inquire into, among other things, the defendant's age, mental status, and lack of knowledge and experience in criminal proceedings. In its order discharging Alston's CCRC-M counsel and dismissing Alston's postconviction proceedings, the circuit court stated: Pressley Alston was before the court on June 6, 2003, on his request to discharge Capital Collateral Regional Counsel (CCR) and his request to waive post-conviction relief. Two CCR lawyers were present representing the defendant and two lawyers were present on behalf of the State of Florida. The court placed the defendant under oath and thereafter the court inquired as to his wishes. Mr. Alston made it clear that he wanted to discharge counsel and waive post-conviction or collateral relief. After the court's interrogation the lawyers for the parties inquired of the defendant to be sure that his decision was free, voluntary and knowing. Although the defendant has a tendency to ramble somewhat at times, his responses to the court's and counsel's questions were coherent and logical. His decision was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. State v. Alston, No. 95-0053260-CF-A, order at 1 (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct. order filed June 12, 2003). The transcript of the Durocher hearing reflects that the circuit court conducted a Faretta -type evaluation of Alston, eliciting information that Alston was thirty-two years old at the time of the hearing, had completed high school, reads and writes in the English language, was not under any medication, and understood the purpose of the hearing. Additionally, the transcript reflects that Alston repeatedly exhibited an understanding of the consequences of waiving his rights to postconviction counsel and proceedings. On the basis of this record, we conclude that the circuit court, having held a hearing at which the judge explored Alston's age, education, and capacity to understand the consequences of waiver, has complied with the standards applicable to waiver of one's rights to collateral counsel and proceedings, and therefore did not abuse its discretion. In court-ordered briefs to this Court, CCRC-M counsel primarily argue that Alston's tendency to ramble at the Durocher hearing calls into question his competency to waive his rights and that Alston's additional pro se filings following the Durocher hearing contradict the conclusion that Alston's decision was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. However, as this Court's case law indicates, this argument is insufficient to establish that the circuit court abused its discretion. In Sanchez-Velasco v. State, 702 So.2d 224 (Fla.1997), the circuit court held a Durocher hearing at which Sanchez-Velasco indicated that he understood the nature of postconviction motions, that by withdrawing his motion he would lose forever his right to any further appeals, and that after he elected to represent himself, the court would not appoint another attorney for him. On appeal to this Court, his prior counsel asserted that Sanchez-Velasco's competency was placed in legitimate doubt by his simultaneous and contradictory demands that his counsel be dismissed due to ineffectiveness in pressing his postconviction claims and that he be allowed to withdraw his postconviction motions. Noting that the circuit court followed the procedure outlined in Durocher, repeatedly stressed the implications of dismissing his collateral appeal, and had support in the record for finding Sanchez-Velasco to be competent, this Court affirmed the order discharging postconviction counsel and dismissing postconviction proceedings. 702 So.2d at 228. We specifically found that, to the extent such a contradiction may exist, it does not in and of itself lead us to doubt Sanchez-Velasco's competence in the face of at least ten evaluations determining him to be competent. Id. Additionally, in Slawson, 796 So.2d at 491, the circuit court followed the procedures outlined in Durocher, considered the reports, testimony, and conclusions of three doctors regarding Slawson's competency, and found Slawson competent to make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his rights to collateral counsel and proceedings. This Court then affirmed, writing: The circuit court has extensively questioned Slawson regarding his knowledge of his pending proceedings, the rights he would be waiving, and the consequences of making such a waiver. Slawson's responses to the questions posed by the circuit court demonstrate that he comprehends his legal options and the consequences of a waiver. Although it is clear that Slawson is disenchanted with the perceived inadequacy of the representation being provided to him by CCRC-M, that fact alone does not negate his ability to waive both collateral counsel and collateral proceedings. Id. at 502-03. Finally, in Castro, 744 So.2d at 986, Castro's discharged counsel relied on the existence of conflicting testimony regarding Castro's competency to attack the circuit court's determination that Castro was aware of the rights he was waiving and the order discharging CCRC and dismissing Castro's postconviction motion. This Court first considered all of the testimony regarding competency and concluded that there was no showing of an abuse of discretion with regard to the circuit court's competency determination. Id. at 989. This Court then concluded that the circuit court had likewise complied with the requirements of Durocher and affirmed the circuit court's order. Id. at 990.