Opinion ID: 1368892
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Did the trial court err in instructing the jury on both the tort of outrage and assault?

Text: The defendants claim error in the instruction of the jury on both assault and the tort of outrage regarding the same conduct, allowing for the possibility of double recovery. The tort of outrage, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, has long been recognized in Washington. Browning v. Slenderella Sys., 54 Wn.2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959). In Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wn.2d 52, 530 P.2d 291, 77 A.L.R.3d 436 (1975), we adopted the definition of the tort of outrage from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965). The basic elements of the tort are (1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress; and (3) actual result to the plaintiff of severe emotional distress. Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra; Grimsby v. Samson, supra ; Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wn.2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173 (1977). [5] The defendant correctly notes damages for mental or emotional distress are recognized as recoverable under either the theory of assault or outrage. Titus v. Tacoma Smeltermen's, Local 25, 62 Wn.2d 461, 470-71, 383 P.2d 504 (1963) (mental distress, suffering, or anxiety caused by assault are recoverable damages). Apparently only two decisions, however, have addressed the relationship between claims for outrage and for assault. In Bankhead v. Tacoma, 23 Wn. App. 631, 638, 597 P.2d 920 (1979), the court held the trial court properly dismissed the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress where the plaintiff also had a claim for assault. The court stated: In our view, plaintiff may present his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress as a part of his assault claim. Indeed, an assault claim has long been held to encompass claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of the assault. Damages for emotional distress may be awarded as part of the assault damages. In Criss v. Criss, 356 S.E.2d 620 (W. Va. 1987), the court specifically held instruction on both assault and outrage provides double recovery, since assault includes recovery for emotional distress resulting from the tortious conduct. The language of the Restatement supports a conclusion that outrage should allow recovery only in the absence of other tort remedies. Comment b to section 46 states: [T]he rule stated in this Section has been fully recognized as a separate and distinct basis of tort liability, without the presence of the elements necessary to any other tort, such as assault, battery... or the like. (Italics ours.) Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, comment b, at 72 (1965). This result is also supported by a review of the Washington cases allowing recovery for outrage; none of the cases presented facts to support an assault claim. Corrigal v. Ball & Dodd Funeral Home, Inc., 89 Wn.2d 959, 577 P.2d 580 (1978) (improper handling of human remains); Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., supra (racial slurs); Grimsby v. Samson, supra (improper medical care); Browning v. Slenderella Sys., supra (racial discrimination); Phillips v. Hardwick, 29 Wn. App. 382, 628 P.2d 506 (1981) (misconduct in the sale of homes); Jackson v. Peoples Fed. Credit Union, 25 Wn. App. 81, 604 P.2d 1025 (1979) (debt collection tactics). The instruction given by the trial court was erroneous.