Opinion ID: 527868
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reinstruction of the Jury

Text: 20 Cheek next argues that the district court erred in reinstructing the jury, particularly where this reinstruction was not solicited by it. He raises numerous challenges to this reinstruction, and we address these challenges in turn. 21 In Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612-13, 66 S.Ct. 402, 405, 90 L.Ed. 350 (1946), the Supreme Court said, When a jury makes explicit its difficulties, a trial judge should clear them away with concrete accuracy. Cheek contends that the district court's reinstruction of the jury violated this principle. This is because, Cheek claims, the jury's notes to the judge when it was having difficulty in reaching a verdict were not explicit about what its difficulties with the instructions at issue were. Cheek contends that in reinstructing the jury, the district court (and the government as well) merely guessed at the jury's difficulties. 22 We disagree. Once it is clear that a jury has difficulties concerning the original instructions, reinstruction is appropriate. Cf. United States v. Zabic, 745 F.2d 464, 475 (7th Cir.1984) (once questions arose among the jurors concerning the original instructions,  '[t]he trial court [had to] exercise its sound discretion in determining what type of supplementary instructions should be given to a deliberating jury that seeks clarification of the law.' ) (citation omitted). Of course, whether or not to give reinstruction at all is within the discretion of the trial court. United States v. Castenada, 555 F.2d 605, 611 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847, 98 S.Ct. 152, 54 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977); United States v. Braverman, 522 F.2d 218, 224 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985, 96 S.Ct. 392, 46 L.Ed.2d 302 (1975). The character and extent of supplementary instructions, moreover, rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. United States v. Keck, 773 F.2d 759, 768 (7th Cir.1985); accord Zabic, 745 F.2d at 475 (quoting Davis v. Greer, 675 F.2d 141, 145 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 975, 103 S.Ct. 310, 74 L.Ed.2d 289 (1982)); Castenada, 555 F.2d at 611; Braverman, 522 F.2d at 224. In United States v. Franco, 874 F.2d 1136 (7th Cir.1989), we set forth the factors upon which we focus in reviewing supplemental jury instructions. These are: whether the instructions as a whole fairly and adequately treat the issues, whether the instructions are a correct statement of the law, and whether the district court answered the jury's questions specifically. Id. at 1143 (citations omitted). 23 In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to reinstruct the jury on two occasions. It is apparent, contrary to Cheek's assertions, what the difficulties of the jury were. The jury clearly was focusing on the conflict between Jury Instruction No. 32 (an objectively reasonable good faith misunderstanding of the law negates willfulness) and Jury Instruction No. 53 (Cheek's theory of defense instruction, containing his beliefs). Jury Instruction No. 32 was incomplete without mentioning that beliefs that the tax laws are unconstitutional and that wages are not income, and disagreement with the government's tax collection systems and policies, do not constitute good faith misunderstandings of the law. Under Bollenbach, Judge Plunkett's reinstructions responded directly to the difficulties of the jury as set out by them, by providing more explicit instructions as to what constituted an objectively reasonable good faith misunderstanding of the law. None of these supplemental instructions, moreover, misstated the law in this circuit. As discussed above, a good faith misunderstanding of the law must be objectively reasonable. Moreover, the beliefs that wages are not income and that the tax laws are unconstitutional are not objectively reasonable as a matter of law. Buckner, 830 F.2d at 103-04; United States v. Latham, 754 F.2d 747, 750-51 (7th Cir.1985); Moore, 627 F.2d at 833. 2 24 The original instructions in this case were incomplete and misleading, but the addition of the supplemental instructions gave the jury a correct statement of the law in this circuit. As in Zabic, once the jurors raised questions, the trial judge properly exercised his discretion by providing the jurors with an accurate, specific, statement of the controlling law. 745 F.2d at 475. As we discuss below, no defendant is entitled to an instruction that incorrectly states the law. 3 25 The fact that the district court's second reinstruction of the jury was not specifically solicited by it, moreover, does not constitute reversible error in this case. As discussed above, the reinstruction of the jury had the desired effect of resolving the jury's difficulties with the original, unclear instructions. Cf. United States v. Cheramie, 520 F.2d 325, 332-33 (5th Cir.1975). 26 Cheek also argues that the district court's reinstruction of the jury violated Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. This rule provided at that time, 4 in part: 27 At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the requests. At the same time copies of such requests shall be furnished to all parties. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon the requests prior to their arguments to the jury. 28 Technical violations of Rule 30, assuming that one occurred here, require reversal only where the defendant can show actual prejudice. United States v. Baker, 722 F.2d 343, 346 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1037, 104 S.Ct. 1312, 79 L.Ed.2d 709 (1984). Cheek presents three reasons why he was prejudiced by the district court's reinstruction of the jury under Rule 30. We reject all of these reasons. 29 First, Cheek argues that the reinstruction had the effect of changing the law of the case to a direction that his beliefs did not constitute a defense. We find this argument to be without merit. First, as noted above, the district court's reinstruction of the jury corrected its earlier, confusing and unclear instructions. A defendant is not entitled to have the jury instructed incorrectly on the law. Cf. Baker, 722 F.2d at 347 (defendant was not unfairly prejudiced under Rule 30 by the trial judge's decision to correct an incorrect instruction; defendant was never entitled to an instruction referring only to embezzlement). Moreover, we note with approval the words of the Fifth Circuit in Cheramie:Admittedly, these [instructions] helped guide the jury to a verdict. Yet, that assistance is the purpose of jury instructions. Moreover, these additional instructions, whose use remains within the sound discretion of the court, ... correctly, and without prejudice to the defendant, reflected the state of the law. 30 520 F.2d at 332 (citations omitted). 31 Second, Cheek argues that the district court's reinstruction of the jury in violation of Rule 30 prejudiced him because he was unable to readdress the jury to explain his defense in light of the new instruction. As the government points out, however, Cheek's closing argument did not rely on any statements of law in the original jury instructions which might have been qualified by the supplemental instructions. Thus, Cheek was not prejudiced in this manner. Baker, 722 F.2d at 346. 32 Finally, Cheek argues that the reinstruction misstated his theory of defense and then directed the jury that this theory was not acceptable. We disagree with Cheek, as a preliminary matter, that the district court's reinstruction of the jury misstated his defense. The district court's original instruction to the jury on Cheek's theory of defense, Jury Instruction No. 53, was drafted by the court for Cheek and not rejected by him. This theory of defense instruction indicated, among other things, that Cheek's theory was that he acted at all times in good faith--that is, that he honestly and reasonably believed that he was not required to file tax returns, that Cheek had been attempting to test the constitutionality of the income tax laws, and that Cheek [contended] that his wages from ... American Airlines ... do not constitute income under the Internal Revenue Service laws. Moreover, as discussed above, the reinstruction properly corrected the earlier, misleading, instruction. Thus, we do not think that Cheek was prejudiced in this regard by the reinstruction.