Opinion ID: 1562242
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Estelle Woods's Prior Conviction

Text: Finally, defendant contends that the trial justice abused her discretion in precluding defendant from impeaching Estelle Woods with her 1989 conviction for loitering for indecent purposes. The defendant cites a number of cases in which this Court has upheld a trial justice's ruling permitting impeachment of defense witnesses with evidence of prior convictions that were similarly remote in time to Ms. Woods's conviction. See, e.g., State v. Silvia, 898 A.2d 707, 717-18 (R.I.2006); State v. Camirand, 572 A.2d 290, 295 (R.I. 1990); State v. Pope, 414 A.2d 781, 784, 785 (R.I.1980), overruled on other grounds, State v. Acquisto, 463 A.2d 122, 124-25 (R.I.1983). He also cites several cases in which we upheldas not being exceedingly prejudicialimpeachments of defendants using prior convictions for offenses that were similar to the offenses for which those defendants were standing trial. See, e.g., State v. Rodriquez, 731 A.2d 726, 731-32 (R.I.1999); Mattatall, 603 A.2d at 1116-18; State v. Pailin, 576 A.2d 1384, 1387, 1388 (R.I.1990). In light of these cases, defendant concludes that the trial justice in the case at hand could not reasonably have determined that Ms. Woods's prior conviction was either too remote or too prejudicial to be admitted. [I]t is well settled in this jurisdiction that the trial justice has broad discretion in deciding whether or not to admit evidence of prior convictions    for impeachment purposes. State v. Drew, 919 A.2d 397, 406 (R.I.2007) (quoting Silvia, 898 A.2d at 718). We will not disturb a trial justice's ruling in this regard absent an abuse of discretion. Silvia, 898 A.2d at 718 (citing State v. Morel, 676 A.2d 1347, 1357 (R.I.1996)). The standard of abuse of discretion is one that gives extreme deference to the trial justice's determination. State v. Remy, 910 A.2d 793, 797 (R.I.2006) (quoting State v. Werner, 831 A.2d 183, 204 (R.I.2003)). Accordingly, we may uphold a trial justice's ruling even if we would have ruled differently had we been in the trial justice's position. See Werner, 831 A.2d at 204. According to Rule 609 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, evidence of any prior conviction, regardless of the conviction's age, potentially is admissible to impeach a witness. State v. Coleman, 909 A.2d 929, 940-41 (R.I.2006). See also Rule 609. Furthermore, the prior conviction need not involve dishonesty, false statement, or a felony to be admissible. State v. Medina, 747 A.2d 448, 450 (R.I. 2000). However, evidence of a prior conviction is not admissible if the court determines that its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs the probative value of the conviction. Rule 609(b). In making this determination, the trial justice must consider `the remoteness of the conviction, the nature of the crime, and the defendant's disdain for the law as represented by the extent of his prior criminal record   .' Remy, 910 A.2d at 798 n. 2 (quoting Mattatall, 603 A.2d at 1117). In the case at bar, the trial justice appropriately considered these factors before concluding that the potential prejudice of Ms. Woods's 1989 conviction outweighed any probative value for determining her credibility. The trial justice found that the conviction's probative value was limited by its age of approximately sixteen years. [9] The defendant correctly points out that we have upheld impeachments using similarly remote convictions. See, e.g., Silvia, 898 A.2d at 717-18; Camirand, 572 A.2d at 295; Pope, 414 A.2d at 784-85. However, we also have affirmed trial court rulings excluding evidence of prior convictions that also were similarly remote to the one in the case at hand and to the several in the cases defendant cited. See Werner, 831 A.2d at 187, 203-05 (no abuse of discretion where the trial justice excluded as stale several convictions ranging from six to fifteen years in age); State v. Wilson, 568 A.2d 764, 767-68 (R.I.1990) (upholding a trial justice's exclusion of thirteen-year-old convictions for robbery, larceny, and forgery where the witness had only one minor conviction for a traffic offense in the intervening years). Taken together, these cases illustrate both the extreme deference that we consistently have afforded trial justices concerning Rule 609 rulings and the fact that remoteness in time alone is not dispositive of the probative-prejudicial determination. Rather, the nature of the crime and the extent of the witness's criminal record also inform the trial justice's Rule 609 determination. See Remy, 910 A.2d at 798 n. 2. In the case at hand, the trial justice addressed the crime of loitering for indecent purposes and properly concluded that it was not indicative of Ms. Woods's credibility. Further diminishing the conviction's probative value was the fact that it was the only conviction in Ms. Woods's criminal record available to the jury. [10] Thus, the trial justice could make the discretionary decision that Ms. Woods had not demonstrated a disdain for the law that would inform the jury's assessment of her credibility. Ultimately, the trial justice justifiably concluded that the prior conviction's potential prejudice outweighed its relatively low probative value. Loitering for indecent purposesor prostitution, as it is more colloquially calledis a particularly ignominious crime. The trial justice's concern that the conviction would influence the jury improperly was reasonable. The defendant argues that, because we have permitted impeachments of defendants using arguably more prejudicial convictions than the one in the case at hand, the trial justice could not have excluded this conviction without abusing her discretion. Again, however, the decision whether to admit evidence of prior convictions involves the balancing of several factors that turns on the particular facts of each case. Where, as here, the trial justice has engaged in that analysis in a reasoned manner, we will not disturb her ruling.