Opinion ID: 2328388
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Identification of the Premises

Text: [¶ 19] Gabay argues that HSBC relies upon documents in the summary judgment record to provide an adequate description of the mortgaged premises, but that the documents relied upon, primarily the mortgage agreement, fail to state a comprehensive, complete description of the premises to be foreclosed because the sixth page of the addendum to the mortgage agreement appears to be missing. Gabay argues generally that HSBC has not met the requirement that it provide an adequate description of the mortgaged premises, including the street address, if any. HSBC Mortg. Servs., 2011 ME 59, ¶ 9 n. 6, 19 A.3d 815; Chase Home Fin., 2009 ME 136, ¶ 11, 985 A.2d 508. [¶ 20] Contrary to Gabay's assertion, the supporting documentation in the form of the mortgage agreement and addendum adequately states the existence of the mortgage, including the book and page number of the mortgage, and an adequate description of the mortgaged premises, including the street address. Despite the availability of the requisite information in documents in the record, however, there is a deficiency in HSBC's statement of material facts. [¶ 21] The first statement of material fact states that Gabay is the owner of real property located in Cumberland County at 19 Common Way Road, Naples. However, the fact that an individual owns real property at a particular location does not establish that the identified property is the mortgaged property, particularly when, as here, the defendant may own more than one parcel of real estate. The third statement of material fact states that Gabay executed and delivered a mortgage of certain real property located in Naples, Cumberland County, Maine, which Mortgage was recorded in the Cumberland County Registry of Deeds at a certain book and page number. The statement of material facts does not, however, specifically link the two facts, i.e., to state outright that the property owned by Gabay and identified as located at 19 Common Way Road in Naples is, in fact, the mortgaged premises, which mortgage is recorded at a particular book and page number. [¶ 22] The rule is straightforward. Facts not set forth in the statement of material facts are . . . not in the summary judgment record, even if the fact in question can be gleaned from affidavits or other documents attached to, and even referred to in portions of, a statement of material fact. Chase Home Fin., 2009 ME 136, ¶ 12 & n. 4, 985 A.2d 508. Viewing HSBC's statement of material facts in a light most favorable to Gabay, as we must, HSBC's statement of material facts does not contain an adequate description of the mortgaged premises including a street address. See HSBC Mortg. Servs., 2011 ME 59, ¶ 9 n. 6, 19 A.3d 815; Chase Home Fin., 2009 ME 136, ¶ 11, 985 A.2d 508.