Opinion ID: 1223875
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prior accidents involving straddle carriers

Text: The plaintiffs sought to introduce numerous exhibits into evidence relating to accidents that had occurred prior to Tabieros's accident and that had involved the use of straddle carriers in Terminals's operations. Most of the proffered exhibits were disallowed by the circuit court, which ruled that the plaintiffs had failed to lay a sufficient foundation regarding substantial similarity to Tabieros's accident. The circuit court, however, allowed the introduction, over Clark's objection, of Plaintiffs' Exhibits 27C and 179, which were accident reports prepared by Terminals's personnel; the reports related to two prior accidents involving Terminals's straddle carriers that had taken place in Terminals's shipping yards. On appeal, Clark contends that the circuit court erroneously admitted the exhibits as substantially similar accidents, not for the purpose of [proving] notice [of a dangerous condition], but as evidence of defectiveness and/or negligent design. On the other hand, the plaintiffs insist that the two prior accidents reflected in the exhibits were offered and properly allowed to show both notice [of a dangerous condition] and the [existence of a design] defect. The record clearly establishes  as Clark suggests  that the accident reports were, and could only have been, introduced for the sole purpose of showing a design defect in the Series 510 straddle carrier. [28] Inasmuch as the accidents reflected in them occurred in August 1987 (Exhibit 27C) and February 1988 (Exhibit 179), they could not possibly have placed either Clark or Navigation on notice of a design defect in any material way. By 1987, Clark was no longer designing, manufacturing, or selling straddle carriers; it is undisputed that Clark had ceased the manufacture of the Series 510 straddle carrier in or about 1968 and had sold its entire straddle manufacturing business in the mid-1970s. Navigation, for its part, had transferred its ownership of and maintenance responsibilities for the straddle carriers to Terminals in 1973. Thus, as of 1987 or 1988, notice of a dangerous condition could have had no relevance to the plaintiffs' claims of strict product liability or negligent design. This court adheres to the propositions that [e]vidence of other accidents may be highly probative on material issues of a negligence [or strict product liability] action. Simon v. Town of Kennebunkport, 417 A.2d 982, 985 (Maine 1980). [E]vidence of other similar accidents or occurrences may be relevant circumstantially to show a defective or dangerous condition, notice thereof or causation on the occasion in question. Id. at 984-85. But the introduction of other-accident evidence may carry with it the problems associated with inquiry into collateral matters.... Id. at 985. To minimize these problems we have cautioned our trial courts that: [b]efore evidence of previous ... [accidents] may be admitted on the issue of whether or not the condition as it existed was in fact a dangerous one, it must first be shown [by the proponent of the evidence] that the conditions under which the alleged previous accidents occurred were the same or substantially similar to the one in question. Warshaw v. Rockresorts, Inc., 57 Haw. [645,] 652, 562 P.2d [428,] 434 [(1977)] (quoting Laird v. T.W. Mather, Inc., 51 Cal.2d 210, 220, 331 P.2d 617, 623 (1958) (modifications in original)). Kaeo v. Davis, 68 Haw. 447, 455-56, 719 P.2d 387, 393 (1986) (some brackets in original and some added) (ellipsis points in original). See also American Broadcasting Companies v. Kenai Air of Hawaii, Inc., 67 Haw. 219, 225, 228, 686 P.2d 1, 5, 7 (1984); Page v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 80 Hawai`i 204, 206, 908 P.2d 552, 554 (App.1995). Thus, evidence of previous accidents, which is introduced to establish a defective condition in the product allegedly causing the accident on the present occasion, but which lacks sufficient similarity of circumstances, is irrelevant and, therefore, inadmissible under HRE 401 and 402. Such determinations of admissibility are reviewed under the right/wrong standard. See Arceo, 84 Hawai`i at 11, 928 P.2d at 853; Kupihea, 80 Hawai`i at 314, 909 P.2d at 1129. Yet even when sufficient similarity is shown, the admission of evidence of prior similar accidents is still within the discretion of a trial court. The evidence, of course, may be excluded if the danger of unfair surprise, prejudice, confusion of the issues or the consideration of undue consumption of time is disproportionate to its value. Kaeo, 68 Haw. at 456, 719 P.2d at 393 (citations, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). Such determinations of admissibility are governed by HRE 403 and are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id.; see also Arceo, 84 Hawai`i at 11, 928 P.2d at 853; Walsh, 80 Hawai`i at 215, 908 P.2d at 1201; Sato, 79 Hawai`i at 19, 897 P.2d at 946. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 27C is a Report of Incident prepared by an employee of Terminals in August 1987. The Details of Incident section contains the following typed description: The straddle 50020 ran into old C.Y. [ i.e., container yard] pick-up truck # 426. The [pick up] truck[,] moving slowly towards Waikiki ... on the apron side[,] noticed through his rear view mirror that the strad was coming towards him (cab first) [,] so he pulled into [a container lane] which was open and stopped[,] hoping to give the strad the right of way, but the strad turned into him and crushed the left door and rear bumper. Apparently the strad did not see the pick-up[,] being on the away side of the strad's cab. (Emphases added.) Clark contends that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of showing substantial similarity. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 27C was inadmissible, Clark contends, because the incident report did not quantify the distance between the two vehicles at any particular time, did not indicate whether the straddle carrier was turning left or right, and shed no light on the role, if any, that a blind spot  the alleged defect in the present case, which is caused by the relative positions of the straddle carrier's engine and cab  played in causing the accident. [29] Accordingly, Clark argues that the circuit court erred in admitting the exhibit. As the ICA has said previously, the precise mechanism of causation between the prior incidents and [the plaintiff's] accident need not be identical. The critical issue is whether the failure [of the defective product in the prior incidents] and the one [in question on the present occasion] posed [the same] risk of injury[.] Page, 80 Hawai`i at 208, 908 P.2d at 556. Thus, the critical issue in the present case is whether the blind spot, inherent in the design of the straddle carriers, posed the same risk of injury in causing the accidents described in Plaintiffs' Exhibits 27C and 179 as it allegedly did in causing Tabieros's accident. The prior incident described in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 27C documents an accident in which a straddle carrier  similar to the Series 510 model and also manufactured by Clark  collided with an occupied vehicle while executing a turn in Terminals's container yard because the operator of the straddle carrier was apparently unable to observe the vehicle from his position in the carrier's cab. We can neither say that the circuit court was wrong in concluding that such a prior incident was substantially similar to Tabieros's accident or that it abused its discretion in not excluding the exhibit under HRE 403. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not err in admitting Plaintiffs' Exhibit 27C into evidence. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 179, however, is more problematic. The details of incident section of the report, dated February 2, 1988, but apparently prepared by a Terminals's employee on February 4, 1988, sets forth the following description: [The] operator of straddler # 26[ ] was attempting to drive away ... (after putting a container at one of the door[s] ) when he struck the tire of a 24[-foot] chassis which was parked along the roadway. The impact caused the ladder located under the cab side of the straddler to bend into the tire. [The operator] stated that he did not see the chassis in time to avoid hitting it. Unlike Plaintiffs' Exhibit 27C, this report of incident, as Clark observes, did not indicate whether the straddle carrier was moving in a cab-forward or cab-aft direction  a critical factor in assessing the causal relation, if any, between the collision and the straddle carrier's blind spot, see Page, 80 Hawai`i at 208, 908 P.2d at 556  or whether it was executing a turning maneuver, as in Tabieros's accident. In addition, the statement that the straddle carrier operator did not see the chassis in time is ambiguous; it could easily imply that the operator's view of the chassis was not impeded, but that, for whatever reason, he did not notice it in a timely fashion. Thus, the proffered exhibit did not, on its face, describe an incident that was substantially similar to Tabieros's accident because it failed to reflect that the straddle carrier's blind zone was even implicated. Moreover, the handwritten notation, No facts, appears prominently in the details of incident section. The plaintiffs evidently did not depose any of the persons involved in the incident and offered no additional evidence of facts that would tend to establish the similarity of the prior accident. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting Plaintiffs' Exhibit 179 into evidence.