Opinion ID: 1388566
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Marquez-Ramos's Fourth and Fifth Amendment Claims

Text: Marquez-Ramos argues that evidence seized in Mexico from the yellow and green house and The Castle should be suppressed, and that he was entitled to a mistrial since some of it had already been presented to the jury before he could have known it was illegally obtained. This evidence included, from The Castle, large quantities of marijuana, a drug ledger with Marquez-Ramos's name in it, and firearms. Recovered from the yellow and green house was evidence involving Liuzza's murder, including her driver's license, a blood-stained axe handle and carpet that tested positive for her DNA, and identification belonging to Marquez-Ramos. At one point Marquez-Ramos made both Fourth and Fifth Amendment arguments for suppression. At oral argument before this court, his counsel explicitly disclaimed reliance on the Fourth Amendment. Thus, we review only for a Fifth Amendment due process violation. In considering the denial of a suppression motion, we review factual findings for clear error and constitutional conclusions de novo. United States v. Troop, 514 F.3d 405, 409 (5th Cir.2008). The government argues that Marquez-Ramos waited too long before objecting to the introduction of the evidence, thus subjecting his claim to plain error review. We need not decide the question, as the outcome is clear under either standard. The factual basis for this claim is Sepulveda's trial testimony, which Marquez-Ramos claims shows American law enforcement agents sat idly by while Mexican agents encouraged Sepulveda to lie and exaggerate his story in order to obtain Mexican search warrants. Marquez-Ramos's due process argument relies primarily on a precedent from this court. We found that due process was violated when an IRS agent committed a deliberate deception by giving a literally true but misleading answer to a question designed to discover whether an investigation was being undertaken for criminal purposes. United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir.1977). Notably, Tweel relied on a case which stated that an `affirmative misrepresentation' by an agent must be shown, by a clear and convincing standard of proof, in order to demonstrate that the government acted impermissibly. Id. (quoting United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1033 (5th Cir. 1970)). Here, Marquez-Ramos does not allege that agents of this country made any representations whatsoever, much less a misrepresentation. At best, his evidence is that they sat by while Mexican authorities induced a witness to make false statements for use within the Mexican judicial system. Substantive due process may forbid obtaining a conviction based on law enforcement conduct that shocks the conscience, when the conduct is brutal and offensive to human dignity and is among the most egregious official conduct. Stokes v. Gann, 498 F.3d 483, 485 (5th Cir.2007) (citation omitted). Even taking as true Marquez-Ramos's allegation that American law enforcement agents were aware that their Mexican counterparts were inducing a witness to lie in order to obtain a Mexican search warrant, that conduct does not sink to the required depths. We find no error in the denial of the motion to suppress.