Opinion ID: 2074112
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Initial Detention Legal

Text: Title 11, section 1902 codifies the standards for stops and temporary detentions under Delaware law. [3] That section reads, in pertinent part: § 1902. Questioning and detaining suspects. (a) A peace officer may stop any person abroad, or in a public place, who the officer has reasonable ground to suspect is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime, and may demand the person's name, address, business abroad and destination. The term reasonable ground has the same meaning as reasonable and articulable suspicion. [4] In order to satisfy the reasonable and articulable standard, the officer must point to specific facts which, viewed in their entirety and accompanied by rational inferences, support the suspicion that the person sought to be detained was violating the law. [5] The totality of circumstances, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, trained officer in the same or similar circumstances, must be examined to determine if reasonable suspicion has been properly formulated. [6] Miller argues that there were no facts, such as some suspicious behavior on his part, that justified his detention under the loitering statute, specifically, section 1321(6). The Delaware loitering statute contains six subsections, each making various actions a potential violation. The most general provision is subsection (6) which reads, in pertinent part: A person is guilty of loitering when: (6) The person loiters . . . at a time or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals under circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity, especially in light of the crime rate in the relevant area. Unless flight by the accused or other circumstances make it impracticable, a peace officer shall, prior to any arrest for an offense under this subdivision, afford the accused an opportunity to dispel any alarm which would otherwise be warranted, by requesting identification and an explanation of the person's presence and conduct. [7] The record reflects that the police were aware of community concerns about weapons activity, drug dealing, and property damage caused by individuals who loitered but did not reside in the area. According to Corporal Taylor, the police stopped Miller simply to advise or warn him of the loitering laws. [8] When asked by defense counsel if the reason for the stop was to warn Miller, he responded, absolutely. Corporal Taylor also testified that he believed an actual warning was given to Miller and that the stop was also intended to find out if Miller belong[ed] in the block. Although the Delaware statute does not generally define loitering, a common definition of the word loiter is to remain in an area for no obvious reason. [9] A reasonable, trained police officer, viewing a person sitting on the steps of a vacant building at night for an extended period of time doing nothing, would have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person was loitering. [10] Accordingly, in accordance with Delaware's loitering statute, such activity would warrant a brief detention to investigate or warn the person to move on. [11] The record reflects that the police sweep team may have shown more initial force than is generally customary to enforce the loitering statute. Nevertheless, the police and probation officers had reasonable and articulable [12] suspicion that Miller was loitering because: the surveillance team watched him sit on the step of the vacant business for twenty to thirty minutes; the vacant building was formerly used in an illegal bookmaking operation; it was 9 p.m., and the general area was known for drug problems and other criminal activity. Therefore, we hold the Superior Court correctly concluded that the officers' initial detention of Miller to enforce the loitering statute was lawful.