Opinion ID: 1169250
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: evidence of oral statements

Text: The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff's allegations that the defendant made oral defamatory statements to Bank officials. This conclusion is correct even without the strict summary judgment standard of Mark v. Seattle Times, supra . For the following reasons we agree with the courts below that the plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of fact. [2] First, the plaintiff has offered inadmissible hearsay to establish that Wayne made oral defamatory statements. A court cannot consider inadmissible evidence when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Charbonneau v. Wilbur Ellis Co., 9 Wn. App. 474, 512 P.2d 1126 (1973). The Washington Rules of Evidence define hearsay as an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. ER 801(c). Plaintiff's only evidence of the alleged statements consists of his and his wife's descriptions of their conversation with the Bank president. Both allege that the president told them that Wayne had complained of Dunlap's insisting on a kickback. The plaintiff is therefore trying to use out-of-court statements of the Bank president to prove that the defendant made an oral defamatory statement. Even if Wayne's alleged out-of-court oral defamatory statement is itself admissible, the plaintiff cannot introduce it by repeating the Bank president's out-of-court statement. 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1770(2), at 265 n. 6 (rev. ed. 1976); Sanderson v. Moline, 7 Wn. App. 439, 443, 499 P.2d 1281 (1972). Second, the plaintiff contends that a court can and should draw an inference from the evidence presented that the defendant made oral defamatory statements charging the plaintiff with soliciting a kickback. As the plaintiff argues, undisputed facts reveal that (1) in the letter, the defendant's attorney threatened to notify the Bank of the plaintiff's solicitation of kick-backs, (2) defendant Wayne did in fact contact the Bank, and (3) the Bank fired plaintiff Dunlap for his participation in the defendant's business. [3] This suggested inference does not qualify as evidence. A party must provide affirmative factual evidence to oppose a motion for summary judgment. CR 56(e); Mackey v. Graham, 99 Wn.2d 572, 663 P.2d 490, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983). Moreover, the plaintiff asks this court to disregard the testimony of Bank officials to draw the suggested inference. The Bank president denied that he or Wayne used the words kickback or shakedown. The Bank official who met with defendant Wayne also denied that Wayne used the words kickback or shakedown to characterize Dunlap's conduct. To raise an issue of credibility at a hearing on a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must present contradictory evidence or otherwise impeach the evidence of the moving party. See Balise v. Underwood, 62 Wn.2d 195, 200, 381 P.2d 966 (1963); Cowiche Basin Partnership v. Mayer, 40 Wn. App. 223, 228, 698 P.2d 567 (1985). The plaintiff has not placed the credibility of these Bank officials into issue with admissible contradictory or impeaching evidence.