Opinion ID: 3066667
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: j.r.

Text: J.R. is an intellectually disabled man with an IQ of 56. He functions as a seven-year-old. “Although J.R.’s [intellectual disability] will always exist, his potential for dangerousness . . . can change.” In 2000 J.R. was charged with sexual 5 Case: 12-14212 Date Filed: 10/15/2015 Page: 6 of 22 battery in Lee County, Florida. The Lee County Circuit Court found J.R. incompetent to stand trial and involuntarily admitted him to the Department of Children and Family Services (the precursor to the APD, J.R. II, 2015 WL 2236760, at  n.1). In 2004 J.R. was involuntarily admitted to non-secure residential services under § 393.11. The order involuntarily admitting J.R. contains no end date. J.R. has lived in several different settings since his admission. While J.R.’s commitment is characterized by the statutory scheme as “non-secure,” his liberty is substantially limited.6 As the District Court explained by way of example: “[i]f he were to ‘elope,’ the police would probably be called to return him” to his group home. Beyond that, J.R. “is subject to a daily curfew of 10 p.m.”; he cannot drink alcohol; he had to “earn” the right to leave his group home, and when he does leave “he must always inform the . . . staff exactly where he is going, the purpose of his trip, and when he will return.” If he does not comply with these requirements, “he may lose his right to freedom of movement.” While the precise 6 The APD insists that J.R. is merely “admitted,” not “committed.” It says that the “use of the term ‘commitment’ implies a more restrictive living setting than the community setting that J.R. has maintained.” Quoting Black’s Law Dictionary, the APD maintains that “commitment” necessarily implies confinement to a prison, mental hospital, or other institution. We are not so sure that involuntary “admission” to a residential group home does not fit within that definition. But even if it does not, this argument is semantic wrangling. The APD is trying to make a distinction between “commitment” and “admission,” but even if a distinction exists it would make no difference to this appeal. Whether we call it “commitment” or “assignment” or something else altogether (perhaps “free rent”), the substance of the action is the same: the State exercises its sovereignty to force J.R. to live in a place he does not want to live, and prevents him from leaving. That is a curtailment of his liberty by any name. 6 Case: 12-14212 Date Filed: 10/15/2015 Page: 7 of 22 restrictions on J.R.’s liberty have changed and may continue to change with the annual revision of his support plan, 7 the circuit court has not held a hearing about J.R.’s commitment since 2005. Neither has J.R. filed a habeas petition seeking release.