Opinion ID: 2675341
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Untimely Disclosure of Gang Expert

Text: On September 5, 1996, at the hearing on defendant’s motion to exclude gang evidence from his trial, the trial court told the prosecutor he must use an expert witness to present gang evidence, and it directed him to provide the defense with information on his gang expert within the next four days. Defendant’s trial began on September 13, 1996, but the defense did not receive information about the proposed gang expert until the morning of November 4, 1996, well into the presentation of the prosecutor’s case-in-chief. That same day, the trial court held an Evidence Code section 402 hearing on the expert’s qualifications and the admissibility of his testimony. When defendant’s counsel was offered the 58 opportunity to cross-examine Sergeant Beard, she told the court she was not ready because she only learned about the proposed expert that morning. The trial court denied counsel’s request for a continuance, noting this was “a very limited area.” Defendant’s counsel then cross-examined Sergeant Beard. At the end of the hearing, the trial court found the sergeant was qualified to testify as a gang expert.
Defendant contends the trial court’s denial of counsel’s request for a continuance constituted an abuse of discretion and a denial of due process.26 He argues that had the defense been afforded sufficient time to prepare for the in limine hearing, it could have established that Sergeant Beard was not qualified to testify as an expert. Defendant’s claim of prejudice based on the denial of the continuance therefore rests on his argument that Sergeant Beard was not qualified to testify as a gang expert. (People v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 921.) We need not decide whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant defense counsel a continuance because, as discussed in the next section, the record reflects that Sergeant Beard was amply qualified to testify as a gang expert. Even if the trial court erred in denying the continuance, defendant was not prejudiced, and therefore the error was harmless.