Opinion ID: 2555874
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statements Made Extrinsic to a Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Proceeding.

Text: Some forty-nine years ago, we considered an out-of-court statement in Kennedy, where an attorneyfearing a possible lynch mob targeting his client reached out to the press to defend his client from the perceived wrath of the mob. See Kennedy, 229 Md. at 94, 182 A.2d at 55. We noted the distinction that absolute immunity extends . . . [to] defamatory statements uttered in the course of a trial or contained in pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other documents directly related to the case. Kennedy, 229 Md. at 97, 182 A.2d at 57 (emphasis added). Owing in part to the breadth of this language, we extended the privilege in Adams to defamatory statements made prior to (and, therefore, outside of) a proceeding, reasoning that a qualifying statement could be directly related to the pending litigation and [published] during the course of the judicial proceeding. Adams, 288 Md. at 8, 415 A.2d at 295 (emphasis added). Adams (published a year before Gersh ) has spawned sophisticated progeny on the subject of out-of-court defamation, which deserve further comment. These extrinsic statements occur commonly in three categories: (1) statements made with the direct purpose or effect of producing a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, e.g., a police brutality complaint, (2) statements prepared for possible use in connection with a pending judicial proceeding, Adams, 288 Md. at 4, 415 A.2d at 294 (emphasis added), but which remain unfiled at the time of the alleged injury, and (3) statements that are not designed necessarily to produce a proceeding or cause one to be filed, but which are connected contextually to a pending or ongoing proceeding. We extend the absolute privilege to these three categories of statements for the traditional reasonto encourage the free divulgence of information in pursuit of justice. More specifically, we apply the privilege because [t]he evaluation and investigation of facts and opinions for the purpose of determining what, if anything, is to be raised or used in pending litigation is as integral a part of the search for truth. . . as is the presentation of such facts and opinions during the course of the trial. . . . Adams, 288 Md. at 8, 415 A.2d at 295; see also Offen, 402 Md. at 202, 935 A.2d at 726 ([T]he basis for extending absolute immunity [is] to prevent unduly hindering important speech, and to ensure that otherwise actionable conduct thus is protected where the accused acts in furtherance of a recognized socially important interest.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
As to the first category, we consider whether the proceeding, which results from the statement, serves an important public interest and possess adequate procedural safeguards. As examples, in Miner v. Novotny, 304 Md. 164, 174-77, 498 A.2d 269, 273-75 (1985), and Imperial v. Drapeau, 351 Md. 38, 50-51, 716 A.2d 244, 250-51 (1998), we held that absolute privilege protected citizens who filed complaints with governmental entities against a deputy sheriff and an emergency medical technician, respectively. [15] The possible harm stemming from these defamatory complaints was outweighed by the public's interest in encouraging the filing and investigation of valid complaints. Miner, 304 Md. at 176, 498 A.2d at 275 (emphasis added); see also Imperial, 351 Md. at 50, 716 A.2d at 250-51 ([P]ublic policy encourages the communication of information to public authorities responsible for maintaining the quality of emergency medical services.).
The second category involves statements prepared for possible use in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, regardless of whether the [statement] has been filed. Adams, 288 Md. at 8, 415 A.2d at 295. For instance, in Adams, a husband and wife entered into a separation agreement, whereby the wife would receive physical and legal custody of the children and the father visitation rights. See Adams, 288 Md. at 2, 415 A.2d at 292. Later, the wife began to doubt the propriety of the father's visitation. See id. She sent her children to see a psychiatrist, who concluded ultimately that the father had abused one of the children, and that he was `an ill man and in definite need of psychiatric treatment.' Adams, 288 Md. at 2, 415 A.2d at 292-93. The wife sought modification of the visitation rights on that basis. See Adams, 288 Md. at 2, 415 A.2d at 293. The father alleged that the psychiatrist defamed him. See Adams, 288 Md. at 2-3, 415 A.2d at 293. Concluding that an absolute privilege protected the statements by the psychiatrist, the Adams Court reasoned that his statements were published in a document which [wa]s prepared for possible use in connection with a pending judicial proceeding. . . . Adams, 288 Md. at 4, 415 A.2d at 294. Any other holding would permit a potential plaintiff to say, `I do not bring the action against you for what you said in the witness-box, but I bring the action against you for what you told the solicitor you were about to say in the witness-box.' Adams, 288 Md. at 7, 415 A.2d at 295 (quoting Watson v. M'Ewan, (1905) A.C. 480(HL)). The `public policy which renders the protection of witnesses necessary. . . must as a necessary consequence involve that which is a step towards and is part of the administration of justice namely, the preliminary examination of witnesses to find out what they can prove.' Id. (quoting Watson ).
Many statements are not designed to be filed in a court action, but rather are simple communications by or between individuals connected to some pending or ongoing proceedinghence, a third category. A canvass of relevant caselaw reveals that, for the most part, Maryland courts attempt to preserve the distinction of what must be established for the privilege to applyregarding relevancebetween witness, et al., and attorneys of record.
In Odyniec v. Schneider, 322 Md. 520, 588 A.2d 786 (1991), a former patient filed a medical malpractice claim before an arbitration panel. Before the proceeding, she underwent a physical examination, during which the examining doctorwho was expected to later present his expert testimony before the arbitration paneltold the patient that her previous doctor[, in fact] had performed unnecessary medical procedures on her. Offen, 402 Md. at 203, 935 A.2d 719, 726 (citing Odyniec, 322 Md. at 523-24, 588 A.2d at 787-88). After observing the public purpose and the procedural safeguards embedded in the arbitration proceeding, we concluded that the examining doctor made his statement (1) while conducting a medical examination of [the patient-plaintiff] and (2)  to [the patient], a party in the then-pending arbitration proceeding. . . . Odyniec, 322 Md. at 534, 588 A.2d at 793 (emphasis added). Based on these facts, we held that the doctor, a potential witness, made his statement during the course of his participation in th[e] pending [arbitration] proceeding; consequently, his verbal statement [wa]s accorded the same absolute privilege as if it had been made by a witness during the arbitration hearing itself. Id.; see Adams, 288 Md. at 8, 415 A.2d at 295 (extending the absolute privilege to a statement because it was published during the course of the judicial proceeding). That the defamatory statement may have been gratuitous, unsolicited, and in part irrelevant to the purpose for which [the doctor] was employed did not defeat recognition of the privilege. Odyniec, 322 Md. at 534, 588 A.2d at 793. In Sodergren v. Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory., 138 Md. App. 686, 697, 773 A.2d 592, 603 (2001), the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the absolute privilege protected an employer who sent apology letters, pursuant to a settlement agreement in a pending suit, to a putative victim of sexual harassment and false plagiarism accusations. After a prodigious discussion of Maryland and foreign caselaw, the intermediate appellate court agreed that settlement is a part of a judicial proceeding. . . . Sodergren, 138 Md.App. at 701, 773 A.2d at 601. [T]here is a sufficient nexus between a judicial proceeding and the settlement of that proceeding . . . to extend the [absolute] privilege to the statements made by [the defendant] regarding [the plaintiff] and published to [parties involved in the original litigation]. Sodergren, 138 Md. App. at 705, 773 A.2d at 603 (emphasis added). In Sodergren, the Court of Special Appeals recognized also that the proceeding satisfied the Gersh test and that the employer wrote the letter as part of the settlement agreement, i.e., in the context of a judicial proceeding. Sodergren, 138 Md.App. at 701, 773 A.2d at 601 (emphasis added). The intermediate appellate court found instructive that the instrument containing the challenged statements was of a judicial nature, i.e., out-of-court settlement of a lawsuit, and the statements were published to parties involved in the original litigation. See Sodergren, 138 Md.App. at 704-05, 773 A.2d at 603-04 ([T]his case do[es] not require us to reach the issue of publication to a third person not directly involved in the case.). Therefore, the Court concluded that the letter . . . was published in the `course of a judicial proceeding'. . . . Sodergren, 138 Md.App. at 704, 773 A.2d at 603. The foregoing analyses teach us to apply an absolute privilege to out-of-court statements, made by witnesses, parties, or judges, when (1) the contemplated or ongoing proceeding fulfills Gersh, [16] and (2) the context of the statement demonstrates that it was made during the course of the proceeding ( i.e., while the putative tortfeasor was participating in the proceeding). We assess the context of the statement by asking, among other things: what was the overall or general reason for the instrument or letter (but not the motive of the challenged statement itself, see English rule) [17] ; what was the defendant doing when he or she made the statement; and to whom did he or she make the statement. If these factors are present, protection of the communication serves the ultimate purpose of the privilegeto loosen the otherwise secure floodgates of information required for the successful resolution of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. The proceeding, however, must be actually contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration. . . . The bare possibility that [a] proceeding might be instituted is not to be used as a cloak to provide immunity for defamation when the possibility is not seriously considered. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 588 cmt. e. (2006); see also Kennedy, 229 Md. at 98, 182 A.2d at 58 ([T]he extension of this absolute privilege to statements not made in the judicial proceeding itself is limited . . . by the comments on the rule of the Restatement itself. . . .).
With respect to attorneys of record in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, Maryland caselaw adds the requirement of relevance of the statement to the proceeding before an absolute privilege may apply. In Woodruff v. Trepel, 125 Md.App. 381, 725 A.2d 612 (1999), an attorney in a custody dispute sent a letter to opposing counsel, summarizing a recent conversation. In the letter, the attorney referred to incourt testimony, which alleged that the opposing party had abused his child physically and verbally. See Woodruff, 125 Md. App. at 388, 725 A.2d at 616. The Court of Special Appeals held that absolute privilege immunized the attorney from culpability for defamation for this statement because his letter was rationally related to and reference[d] the underlying [child custody] litigation, in addition to a possible future litigation. Woodruff, 125 Md.App. at 394, 725 A.2d at 619; see also Woodruff, 125 Md.App. at 393, 725 A.2d at 618 (quoting Maulsby v. Reifsnider, 69 Md. 143, 162, 14 A. 505, 510 (1888), for the principle that `if counsel in the trial of a cause maliciously slanders a party . . . in regard to a matter that has no reference or relation to, or connection with, the case before the Court, he is and ought to be answerable in an action by the party injured') (emphasis added); [18] Arundel Corp. v. Green, 75 Md.App. 77, 84-85, 540 A.2d 815, 819 (1988) (holding that an absolute privilege would extend to an attorney's letter sent to a stone supplier's customersas part of his investigation into his clients' potential asbestos claims, resulting from exposure to stone dustif it was made in connection with and ha[d] some relation to the anticipated proceeding). These cases indicate that Maryland courts extend an absolute privilege to an attorney of record, so long as (1) the contemplated or ongoing proceeding meets the Gersh test, (2) the context of the statement evinces that the statement was made during the course of the proceeding, and (3) the statement has some rational, articulable relevance or responsiveness to the proceeding. [19] If so, then extension of the privilege would serve the ultimate goal of information exchange and discovery of the truth. [20]