Opinion ID: 2585470
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: overbreadth and vagueness claims

Text: ¶ 28 Although standing is dispositive, we will analyze Dr. John's constitutional arguments insofar as they have been raised and insofar as Chief Justice Durham addresses them in her dissent.

¶ 29 Dr. John's argues that the sexual novelties at issue here amount to expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. The trial court assumed arguendo that marginal protection applied to proceed with the substantive analysis. It is far from clear, however, that the sale of sexual devices deserves any First Amendment protection. Whatever the intellectual attraction may be in treating sexual devices as marginally protected symbolic speech, it is clear from Haltom's testimony that Dr. John's interest in selling the products was purely commercial. A product's mere shock value does not trigger protected speech considerations, especially where the challenger would use the First Amendment as a prophylactic shield against valid government licensing regulations. The district court's use of mid-level scrutiny was thus overly generous to Dr. John's. ¶ 30 As the district court held, absent some perceptible communicative or expressive function, the sexually oriented novelties should be examined using the lowest level of scrutiny afforded commercial speech. This would place the analysis squarely within the well-established Hoffman framework and defeat any claims of vagueness or overbreadth because the ordinance implicates no constitutionally protected conduct. See generally Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 497, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). Dr. John's has failed to demonstrate any speech interest in the products it sells, and in fact affirmatively denied such an interest. [3] Accordingly, we decline to infer a communicative purpose in these products. Whatever level of speech or communicative quality may lie hidden in the sexual novelties Dr. John's sells, the government may require that Dr. John's apply for and receive a valid business license.
¶ 31 The United States Supreme Court has noted that certain sexually expressive items and conduct are entitled to some quantum of protection under the First Amendment. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 285, 120 S.Ct. 1382, 1388-89, 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000). The items sold at Dr. John's, however, are at best symbolic speech, falling within the outer ambit of the protection and subject to evaluation under the O'Brien framework. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). [T]he sordid business of pandering is constitutionally unprotected... the sale of material solely to produce sexual arousal... does not escape regulation because the [material] has been dressed up as speech, or in other contexts might be recognized as speech. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225-26, 110 S.Ct. 596, 604-05, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (omission and second alteration in original). Thus, the district court was overly generous in applying mid-level scrutiny to the ordinance. ¶ 32 Under the four-part O'Brien content-neutral test used for analyzing symbolic speech, government regulation is sufficiently justified if (1) it is within the constitutional power of the government; (2) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, 88 S.Ct. at 1679. ¶ 33 The Midvale ordinance clearly passes constitutional muster because it is unrelated to expression and Dr. John's has failed to demonstrate any communication that it might actually suppress. Dr. John's residual claim that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to denote exactly what constitutes items of a sexual nature also fails. It is clear that the sexual novelties sold by Dr. John's represent items of a sexual nature. See IDK, Inc. v. County of Clark, 599 F.Supp. 1402, 1410-11 (D.Nev.1984) (holding any ambiguity in language classifying SOB and subsequent licensing requirements was not unconstitutionally vague where plaintiff's business was clearly an SOB). ¶ 34 That a city official may exercise discretion when classifying a business as an SOB is of no constitutional significance. Absent some type of different treatment, negative effect, or more onerous review process, city officials may classify a particular business any way they see fit. See FW/PBS, Inc., 493 U.S. at 217, 110 S.Ct. at 604-05.

¶ 35 The district court was correct in ruling that the determinative issue was licensing rather than censorship, and that the doctrine of prior restraint was simply inapplicable. A ministerial action as to licensing is not presumptively invalid, and unlike most prior restraints, the city is not required to justify its decision in court on every occasion. See FW/PBS, Inc., 493 U.S. at 229, 110 S.Ct. at 606-07. This distinction is important because the constitutionality of the statute turns on whether the licensing scheme functions as a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction or a censoring wolf in sheep's clothing that would trigger Freedman's rigid analysis. ¶ 36 Prior restraint is only at issue where the government exercises some form of censorship or indirectly represses the communication of ideas before their dissemination. Generally, ordinances that have failed under prior restraint have either delegated unbridled discretion to state officials or lacked sufficient time restraints for the licensing process. See FW/PBS, Inc., 493 U.S. at 225-26, 110 S.Ct. at 604-05. ¶ 37 Prior restraint, notwithstanding Dr. John's nearly talismanic reliance on the mere assertion of the phrase, is not implicated by the ministerial requirement of a completed application. The mere invocation of the words prior restraint should not transmogrify a personal battle for laxer sexual mores into a constitutional issue, lest this court be led toward ruling on an issue of fundamental importance when Dr. John's harm is illusory and the restraint self-imposed. The record indicates that had Mr. Haltom truthfully filled out the proper form he would have been granted a license. As a practical matter, it is only Mr. Haltom's refusal to permit classification as an SOB that has allowed him to manufacture a fight with the government. Classification is clearly permissible without implicating any constitutional concerns. The mere fact that ... material protected by the First Amendment is subject to ... licensing requirements is not a sufficient reason for invalidating [an] ordinanc[e]. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 2448, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976). ¶ 38 The narrow question presented in this case is whether a municipality may require an SOB to complete a different application than a nonsexually oriented business. This question presents no intellectual challenge. The First Amendment has nothing to do with a wholly ministerial requirement that a business apply for and obtain a valid business license, even if that license is somehow different from other commercial establishments. There is no fundamental right to be free from government classification of a business as a certain type, nor a ministerial licensing provision, so long as the process does not restrict or otherwise negatively impact business owners. See Young, 427 U.S. at 70-71, 96 S.Ct. at 2452 ([W]e hold that the State may legitimately use the content of [sexually explicit] materials as the basis for placing them in a different classification. . . .); Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 812, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 2686, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that the statute differentiates between professional fundraisers and volunteer[s] ... [but] this fact alone does not impose an impermissible burden on protected speech, nor does it require that the licensing provisions be subjected to strict scrutiny). ¶ 39 Because municipalities may generally impose licensing requirements for purposes of regulation and zoning, and because the constitutionality of applying a more stringent application process for SOBs has been thoroughly examined by other courts, we forego a rigorous constitutional analysis and uphold the district court's decision. See Schultz v. City of Cumberland, 26 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1149 (W.D.Wis.1998) (holding licensing requirement mandating disclosure of prior criminal convictions not unconstitutional prior restraint); IDK, Inc. v. County of Clark, 599 F.Supp. 1402, 1410-11 (D.Nev.1984) (holding any ambiguity in language classifying SOB and subsequent licensing requirements not unconstitutionally vague where as applied to plaintiff it was clear that business was SOB); St. Louis County v. B.A.P., Inc., 18 S.W.3d 397, 408-17 (Mo.Ct.App.2000) (holding licensing ordinances governing SOBs sufficiently narrowly tailored to satisfy constitutional concerns). See generally Lee R. Russ, Annotation, Validity of Statutes or Ordinances Requiring Sex-Oriented Businesses to Obtain Operating Licenses, 8 A.L.R.4th 130 (1981) (listing recent cases where ordinances have been found to be both constitutional and unconstitutional as prior restraints).
¶ 40 The district court correctly determined that the Midvale licensing scheme does not constitute a prior restraint on speech. A court may not properly engage in a prior restraint analysis prior to determining the level of protection afforded the subject matter and the manner in which the ordinance restricts expression. To do so places the cart before the horse. The propriety of the analysis does not change because the regulation is facially attacked as unconstitutional. It is still necessary for the petitioner to demonstrate how the regulation affects expression, even if the restraint is hypothetical. In this case, even if the material were found to warrant protection under prior restraint analysis, the ordinance is constitutionally sound. ¶ 41 Prior restraint exists when speech or an analogue is conditioned upon the prior approval of public officials. Prior restraints are presumptively invalid because they typically involve two evils that will not be tolerated: (1) the risk of censorship associated with the vesting of unbridled discretion in government officials; and (2) the risk of indefinitely suppressing permissible speech when a licensing law fails to provide for the prompt issuance of a license. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 227, 110 S.Ct. 596, 605, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990). As the district court correctly held, the Midvale ordinance contains sufficient safeguards to redeem it from a facial assault. ¶ 42 In FW/PBS, Inc., the Supreme Court applied Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59, 85 S.Ct. 734, 738-39, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965), to a film censorship regulation. See FW/PBS, Inc., 493 U.S. at 225-27, 110 S.Ct. at 604-05. Freedman provides a paradigmatic tripartite framework for analysis that is used in all prior restraint claims where the effect of the licensing provision is to restrict communication. See, e.g., Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 802, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 2680-81, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558-64, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 1246-49, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 367-75, 91 S.Ct. 1400, 1403, 28 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971). ¶ 43 Although the fractured opinion in FW/PBS, Inc. has been the subject of some controversy, the framework it provides for analyzing licensing regulations is controlling where the regulation has at least some potential to restrict expression. However, as the Supreme Court has made clear through decisions following FW/PBS, Inc., mere business licensing does not trigger Freedman or FW/PBS, Inc. analysis absent some discernible restriction on expression. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 795-96, 108 S.Ct. at 2676-77; Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62-63, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 2448-49, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54, 106 S.Ct. 925, 932, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986). Nevertheless, the instant case provides an appropriate forum in which to comment on the analysis and may provide municipalities with some guidance in this complex area of constitutional law. ¶ 44 FW/PBS, Inc. involves the following tripartite framework. First, the licensing decision must be made within a brief and determinate period; second, the process must assure a prompt judicial decision in case of denial; and third, the scheme must place the burden of litigating a denial on the government. See FW/PBS, Inc., 493 U.S. at 227, 110 S.Ct. at 606. Importantly, the plurality concluded that the third Freedman requirement, proving the unprotected nature of the speech, is inapplicable when a system of prior restraint does not require a public official to pass judgment on the content of any speech. See 493 U.S. at 229-30, 110 S.Ct. at 606-07. ¶ 45 The current problem does not involve the third requirement because it is only applicable where a form of censorship obtains and not where the content of the speech is merely incidental to the categorization of a business. That is, the third requirement applies where an official is making a yes or no licensing decision based on the content of the speech. See id. Here, the decision to categorize only results in the need for a different license and review process, rather than the ultimate decision regarding approval. Though there has been some disagreement in using an abbreviated Freedman test for content-neutral ordinances, it has never been suggested that a mere licensing regulation should be subject to the level of scrutiny Dr. John's suggests. ¶ 46 Thus, even if a prior restraint analysis were appropriate here, the Midvale ordinance is clearly constitutional. First, the ordinance is devoid of any unbridled official discretion that might render the ordinance constitutionally infirm. Second, there are no temporal ambiguities that might result in unreasonably delaying licensing. Lastly, though the ordinance does not guarantee a prompt judicial determination as required by FW/PBS, Inc., until the United States Supreme Court clarifies this problematic concept, a combination of provisional licensing and prompt judicial access will have to suffice. See City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of Waukesha, 531 U.S. 278, 281, 121 S.Ct. 743, 746, 148 L.Ed.2d 757 (2001) (noting that [c]ourts have divided over the meaning of FW/PBS's `prompt judicial review' requirement, granting certiorari to resolve the conflict, and subsequently finding issue not genuinely presented resulting in dismissal). Absent an action by the city to restrict business operation while the issue is litigated, the decision language is not dispositive because the city granted a de facto provisional license.
¶ 47 Dr. John's suggests that unbridled official discretion exists in the Midvale ordinance. A prior restraint involving official discretion exists when speech is conditioned upon the prior approval of public officials. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 1245-46, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975) (finding prior restraint where approval of musical was conditioned on municipal board's decision). Although officials may exercise discretion in deciding that products are sexually oriented, this is not the type of discretion prohibited by FW/PBS, Inc. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 61, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 2448, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976) (finding vagueness relating to decision regarding threshold sexually explicit activity acceptable where ordinance described threshold as characterized by an emphasis on such matter). ¶ 48 Dr. John's fails to allege any harm deriving from the classification itself. Moreover, the explicit and mandatory language of the ordinance and lack of individual discretion in the licensing process effectively negate any concern that an official may delay or short-circuit the procedure. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755-56, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 2143, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988) (holding ordinance vesting discretion in official unconstitutional). Accordingly, the Midvale ordinance does not exhibit unbridled discretion.
¶ 49 The Midvale licensing scheme prescribes fixed and reasonable time periods for application review and does not contain language that might cause undue delay. The licensor must make the decision whether to issue the license within a specified time period and the appeals process subsequent to a denial is clear and unambiguous. The time periods for initial decision and appeal are mandatory and, at forty-five to sixty days, are well within limits that have been deemed acceptable by other courts. See City of Colorado Springs v. Baby Dolls, 896 P.2d 272, 282 (Colo.1995) (upholding forty-day limit); Nightclubs, Inc. v. City of Paducah, 202 F.3d 884, 892 (6th Cir.2000) (noting that under Supreme Court case law, processes including judicial review with `potential delays of over five months are impermissible' (citations omitted)). ¶ 50 Moreover, the ordinance requires timely review, specified appeals processes, and mandatory approvals in cases where the city fails to act. See, e.g., Midvale City, Utah, Midvale City Code § 5.56.130(E) (1998) (if agency fails to approve within 15-day extension, premises shall be deemed approved). These provisions are of the type and kind specifically found to be reasonable under FW/PBS, Inc. and Freedman. See generally Lee R. Russ, Annotation, Validity of Statutes or Ordinances Requiring Sex-Oriented Businesses to Obtain Operating Licenses, 8 A.L.R.4th 130 (1981) (listing cases where ordinances have been found to be both constitutional and unconstitutional as prior restraints). ¶ 51 Chief Justice Durham argues that the relatively innocuous phrase good cause injects the possibility of indeterminacy into the licensing process. This is a mistake. First, the record contains no suggestion that the phrase has ever been invoked. Second, the phrase is omnipresent in the legal field, and is very likely surplusage as used here. Third, we can find no authority to support the concept that this phrase has ever been found to supply a level of indeterminacy necessary to void legislation. Finally, as we discuss below, even if we were to find this phrase problematic, the proper course of action would be to sever the offending words from the ordinance and leave intact the municipality's intent. ¶ 52 Even if we were to determine that the likely unintentional inclusion of the phrase good cause in the ordinance renders it constitutionally suspect, we must determine if that phrase is severable. The fact that the phrase has failed to attract judicial consideration in any similar context notwithstanding, the words are surplusage and clearly severable without affecting the legitimate purpose of the statute. ¶ 53 When reviewing the construction of statutes, the general rule is `that statutes, where possible, are to be construed so as to sustain their constitutionality. Accordingly, if a portion of the statute might be saved by severing the part that is unconstitutional, such should be done.' State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, ¶ 18, 980 P.2d 191 (quoting Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 657 P.2d 1293, 1299 (Utah 1982)). ¶ 54 In determining whether an unconstitutional portion is severable, we look to legislative intent. Lopes, 1999 UT 24 at ¶ 19, 980 P.2d 191. When the legislature's intent is not expressly stated, we turn to the statute itself, and examine the remaining constitutional portion of the statute in relation to the stricken portion. If the remainder of the statute is operable and still furthers the intended legislative purpose, the statute will be allowed to stand. Id.; see also Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 686 (Utah 1985) (`Severability, where part of an act is unconstitutional, is primarily a matter of legislative intent[,]' which generally is determined by whether the remaining portions of the act can stand alone and serve a legitimate purpose. (Citations omitted)). The test fundamentally is whether the legislature would have passed the statute without the objectionable [i.e., the unconstitutional] part.... Union Trust Co. v. Simmons, 116 Utah 422, 429, 211 P.2d 190, 193 (1949); see also Berry, 717 P.2d at 686. ¶ 55 Although the ordinance does not include any indication of legislative intent regarding severability, it is indisputable that the ordinance is not only operable without the phrase, but completely unchanged. The phrase good cause is present in countless statutes, court rules, and contracts for no greater reason than word smiths believe it sounds lawyerly. In the present ordinance, the phrase serves no express or clear purpose, and is severable without any effect on the legitimate purpose of the ordinance. Thus, we must not smite the entire ordinance, leaving it neither root nor branch. Rather, pruning the vine would offer a more circumspect solution.
¶ 56 Most problematic is FW/PBS, Inc.'s requirement that the licensing process provide for not just prompt judicial access, but rather prompt judicial determination. The obvious dilemma created by the United States Supreme Court has been the subject of vociferous debates among the federal circuits and resulted in a split of authority as to what the Court actually meant. See J. David Guerrera. The Meaning Of Prompt Judicial Review Under The Prior Restraint Doctrine After FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 62 Brook. L.Rev. 1217 (1996) (explaining split among circuits). ¶ 57 Since municipalities clearly lack any control over the judiciary and the timeliness of a decision, the prompt judicial review requirement is a veritable Pandora's box because it contains the most dangerous potential for indefinite and thus unconstitutional delays. At least one circuit has noted that a provisional license or equivalent measure exorcises the demons of delay, and we agree. See Nightclubs, Inc. v. City of Paducah, 202 F.3d 884, 894 (6th Cir.2000). But see Déjà Vu of Nashville v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 274 F.3d 377, 403 n. 8 (6th Cir.2001) (reaching the opposite conclusion under a different panel of the Sixth Circuit). ¶ 58 Although it is indisputable that FW/PBS, Inc. mandates prompt judicial determination and not mere access, the remarkable split of authority among circuits, combined with the Supreme Court's refusal to rectify the acknowledged confusion in City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of Waukesha, 531 U.S. 278, 285-86, 121 S.Ct. 743, 748, 148 L.Ed.2d 757 (2001), persuades us to advance an interim solution such as that suggested by the Sixth Circuit in Nightclubs, Inc., 202 F.3d at 894. Thus, any city procedure, however informal, that maintains existence of the status quo pending judicial review, will suffice until the United States Supreme Court devises some way out of this imbroglio.