Opinion ID: 1060382
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Kersey Instruction

Text: The defendant next asserts that the trial court erred during the sentencing phase of his trial by instructing the jury in accordance with Kersey v. State, 525 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1975). Specifically, the defendant maintains that, when a jury is undecided concerning the imposition of a sentence of death, Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(h) precludes the giving of a Kersey charge and requires the trial court instead to instruct the jury to choose between the punishments of life imprisonment without possibility of parole and life imprisonment. Even assuming the statute does not generally prohibit the giving of a Kersey charge, the defendant asserts that the instruction was unduly coercive given the circumstances of this particular case. The State responds that Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(h) does not prohibit the giving of a Kersey instruction and only requires the trial court to remove the death penalty from the jury's consideration when the jury cannot ultimately agree on the imposition of the death penalty. The State asserts that the statutory provision affords trial courts the discretion to determine whether there is an ultimate disagreement on punishment. Additionally, the State disagrees with the defendant's assertion that the instruction was coercive in this case, arguing that [n]othing in the Kersey instruction is directed at the minority, nor does it force any person to abandon his or her convictions. We begin our analysis of this issue with Kersey in which this Court reconsidered the dynamite charge that previously had been approved in Tennessee. After, deliberating for sometime, the jury in Kersey reported that it had not reached a verdict and (i)t looks like we are not going to. 525 S.W.2d at 140. The trial court inquired and was advised by the foreperson that the jury was split on the question of guilt or innocence eleven to one. Id. At this point, the trial court provided the following instruction: While the verdict must be the verdict of each individual juror, and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of your fellows, yet you should examine the questions submitted with candor and with a proper regard and D[eference] to the opinions of each other. It is your duty to decide the case if you can conscientiously do so. You should listen with a disposition to be convinced to each other's arguments. If the larger number are for conviction or acquittal, dissenting juror should consider whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made no impression on the minds of so many other men, equally honest, and equally intelligent with himself. The jury should not go contrary to their convictions, but they should properly give heed to the opinions of their fellow jurors and by reasonable concessions reach a conclusion which although not originally entertained by any of them, nevertheless, may be one to which all can scrupulously adhere. In other words, the minority should listen to the views of the majority with the disposition of being convinced. Now, with that addition we will work a few minutes longer. Kersey, 525 S.W.2d at 140. This instruction was referred to as the Allen-Simmons instruction because it was originally derived from Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896), with variations approved by Simmons v. State, 198 Tenn. 587, 281 S.W.2d 487 (1955). In reviewing this instruction, this Court first observed that the trial court's inquiry as to the division of the jury was not a proper practice. Kersey, 525 S.W.2d at 141. To remedy this improper procedure, the Kersey Court, invoking its inherent and statutory supervisory power, directed trial judges to admonish jurors not to disclose their division or personal view when returning to open court to report an inability to reach a verdict. However, the Kersey Court emphasized that trial courts may ask jurors about their progress and whether they believe further deliberations will enable them to reach a verdict. Id. Explaining that supplemental instructions may be given, [i]f the trial judge feels that further deliberations might be productive, the Court rejected the Allen-Simmons charge, concluding that it operate[s] to embarrass, impair and violate the right of trial by jury guaranteed by the Tennessee Constitution. Kersey, 525 S.W.2d at 141 and 144. Discounting any suggestion that might necessarily makes right, the Court explained: [a]ny undue intrusion by the trial judge into this exclusive province of the jury, is an error of the first magnitude. We recognize that the trial judge has a legitimate concern in the administration of justice and that he labors under a duty to lend guidance to the jury through instructions as to the governing principles of the law. However, when the effort to secure a verdict reaches the point that a single juror may be coerced into surrendering views conscientiously entertained, the jury's province is invaded and the requirement of unanimity is diluted. Id. Having rejected the Allen-Simmons charges, the Court in Kersey again exercised its statutory and inherent supervisory power and directed trial courts to comply with Section 5.4 of the American Bar Association Standards relating to trial by jury. Id. at 144. Under these standards, trial courts may require the jury to continue their deliberations and may give or repeat an instruction or provide a supplemental instruction . . . . Id. Trial courts shall not require or threaten to require the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable intervals. Id. The jury may be discharged without having agreed upon a verdict if it appears that there is no reasonable probability of agreement. Id. The Court concluded that if a trial court determines upon inquiry that further deliberations may result in a verdict, trial courts may give the following instruction: The verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror. In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that each juror agree thereto. Your verdict must be unanimous. It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to re-examine your own views and change your opinion if convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. Kersey, 525 S.W.2d at 145. If given as a part of the main charge, it may be repeated should a deadlock develop. Judicial economy and uniformity demand these results. Strict adherence is expected and variations will not be permissible. Id. Nine years later, in State v. Caruthers, 676 S.W.2d 935 (Tenn. 1984), this Court considered the propriety of giving the Kersey charge in the context of a capital sentencing hearing. After deliberating on the sentence for approximately three hours, the jury in Caruthers sent the following note to the trial court: No unanimous decision has been reached in our determining punishment for Walter Lee Caruthers. As of now the jury stands at eleven to one, with no foreseeable change. Please advise. Caruthers, 676 S.W.2d at 942. Over the defendant's objection, the trial judge called the jury into open court and gave the Kersey charge. Just over two hours later, the jury returned with a unanimous verdict of death. The Kersey charge had been included in the jury instructions given at the conclusion of the guilt phase of the trial, but it had not been included in the instructions given at the conclusion of the sentencing phase. Id. As in this case, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in refusing to accept the jury's initial report that it was unable to agree on punishment. Caruthers, 676 S.W.2d at 942. This Court rejected the defendant's claim that the instruction was coercive in the circumstances of Caruthers's case and, in addition, addressed, generally, the propriety of giving a Kersey instruction in a capital sentencing hearing. At that time, Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-2-203(h) provided that if a jury in a capital case cannot ultimately agree as to punishment, the judge shall dismiss the jury and . . . shall impose a sentence of life imprisonment. Caruthers, 676 S.W.2d at 942 (quoting the statute). Explaining that [t]he use of the adverb `u[l]timately' indicates the Legislature anticipated a jury's tentative inability to agree on punishment, this Court concluded that a trial judge should exercise discretion in determining whether there is an ultimate disagreement as to punishment. . . . Id. Finding that the trial court in Caruthers had not abused its discretion by refusing to accept the jury's initial report and giving the Kersey charge, this Court affirmed the sentence of death. Id. Having summarized the governing law, we proceed to the circumstances of this case. Here, after the sentencing hearing concluded, the jury was charged and deliberations began at 4:06 p.m. on February 24, 1999. Shortly after 4:50 p.m. that same day deliberations ceased. Deliberations resumed at 9 a.m. the next morning. At 11:21 a.m. the jury sent the trial court a question about what the jury described as a contradiction in the instructions regarding the requirement for unanimity on aggravating circumstances when deciding on a life sentence. At 11:56 a.m. the trial court gave a supplemental instruction on this issue, and the jury retired at noon to continue deliberations. At 2:35 p.m. the jury sent the following message to the trial court: We are at a deadlock, 11 for death and 1 for life imprisonment. What do we do at this point? The one for life imprisonment has stated that he will not change his mind. Defense counsel immediately asked that the trial court instruct the jury to choose between sentences of life imprisonment without possibility of parole and life imprisonment. The State, in turn, requested a Kersey charge. Over the defendant's objections, at 2:47 p.m. the trial court called the jury into open court and gave the following instruction: It is your duty as jurors to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to your own individual judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but you should do so only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to re-examine your own views and change your opinion if convinced it is erroneous, but do not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. All right. Please continue your deliberations. At 3:57 p.m., approximately one hour later, the jury returned to open court and announced a verdict of death. The supplemental instruction given by the trial court omitted three prefatory sentences that are part of the charge adopted in Kersey : The verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror. In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that each juror agree thereto. Your verdict must be unanimous. 525 S.W.2d at 145. The complete Kersey instruction had been given prior to the jury's deliberations on the defendant's guilt or innocence, but the instruction was not repeated prior to the jury's deliberations on the appropriate sentence. The State argues that the decision in Caruthers controls the resolution of the issue in this appeal. With respect to the general propriety of the Kersey charge at a capital sentencing hearing, we agree with the State that Caruthers controls. The statute in effect at the time Caruthers was decided has since been repealed and replaced with Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(h) (1993), which provides: If the jury cannot ultimately agree on punishment, the trial judge shall inquire of the foreman of the jury whether the jury is divided over imposing a sentence of death. If the jury is divided over imposing a sentence of death, the judge shall instruct the jury that in further deliberations, the jury shall only consider the sentences of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole and imprisonment for life. If, after further deliberations, the jury still cannot agree as to sentence, the trial judge shall dismiss the jury and such judge shall impose a sentence of imprisonment for life. Id. As the State correctly points out, the adverb ultimately, which was a significant basis of our decision in Caruthers , has been retained in the amended statute. One rule of statutory construction provides that courts should presume that the General Assembly is aware and approves of prior judicial constructions when it re-enacts an earlier statute. See State v. Rhodes, 917 S.W.2d 708, 712 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1995). Thus, this Court should presume that, in enacting Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(h), the General Assembly was aware of our decision in Caruthers and approved the construction given the term ultimately in the context of that case. On the other hand, the rationale for giving the Kersey chargeavoidance of the societal costs of a retrialis not as compelling in a capital sentencing hearing because the jury's inability to agree on the sentence does not result in a retrial. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 238, 108 S.Ct. 546, 551, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988). The jury's inability to agree merely results in further deliberations on the punishments of life imprisonment or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, and if the jury is unable to unanimously agree on either of these options, the trial judge imposes a life sentence. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(h) (1993). Nonetheless, we agree with the United States Supreme Court that [t]he State has in a capital sentencing proceeding a strong interest in having the jury express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death. Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 238, 108 S.Ct. at 551 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Where a jury returns from deliberations after only a short period of time and informs a trial court that it has failed to achieve unanimity, the trial court has the authority to give the Kersey instruction, but trial courts should be mindful in such cases that the qualitative difference between death and other penalties calls for a greater degree of reliability when the death sentence is imposed. Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 238-39, 108 S.Ct. at 551. Therefore, we reject the defendant's assertion that trial courts may never give a Kersey instruction in a capital sentencing hearing. Trial courts are afforded discretion to determine whether a jury has been ultimately unable to agree on punishment. However, in exercising this discretion, trial courts must be mindful that the rationale for giving the instruction is not as compelling in a capital sentencing hearing and the need for reliability is greater because of the qualitative difference between death and other penalties. Having decided that trial courts generally are afforded discretion on this issue, we nonetheless conclude that the trial court erred by giving the Kersey instruction in this particular case. The jury had deliberated for approximately six hours on the sentencing issue before reporting: We are at a deadlock, 11 for death and 1 for life imprisonment. What do we do at this point? The one for life imprisonment has stated that he will not change his mind. Over defense objections, the trial court returned the jury to open court and gave the instruction, despite the fact that the note expressed an unequivocal deadlock. The note did not request further instructions, and the trial court did not ask the jurors whether further instructions and deliberations might assist them in returning a verdict. [22] Instead, the trial court simply gave the instruction and ordered the jury to continue deliberation. Just one hour later the jury returned with a unanimous verdict of death. While no inquiry was made, the note informed the trial court of the jury's division on the sentence of death, and the dissenting juror, who presumably had held out for six hours, likely concluded that the trial court was instructing him, one of only four men on the jury, to reconsider his position. [23] See Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 239-40, 108 S.Ct. at 552; Tucker v. Catoe, 221 F.3d 600, 611-12 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting factors that militate in favor of finding that the giving of a supplemental charge in a particular case is coercive). Contrary to the State's assertion, the circumstances of this case are distinguishable from Caruthers in several important respects. The jury in Caruthers had deliberated only three hours, less than half the time the jury in this case deliberated. The note given the trial court by the Caruthers jury did not report a deadlock: the note simply reported: [a]s of now the jury stands eleven to one, with no foreseeable change. Please advise. This language is equivocal and indicated that the vote possibly could change at a later time, as compared to the language in this jury's note he will not change his mind. Finally, although the note in Caruthers disclosed the jury's division, it did not disclose the nature of the split or identify in any manner the dissenting juror, as in this case, thus decreasing the coercive effect of the instruction. Considering this case in its context and under all the circumstances, [24] we conclude that, unlike Caruthers , the effort to secure a verdict here reached the point that a single juror may have been coerced into surrendering views conscientiously held, and under such circumstances, the jury's province is invaded and the requirement of unanimity is diluted. Kersey, 525 S.W.2d at 144. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in giving the Kersey charge rather than accepting the jury's initial report that it was deadlocked. As a result, we remand this case to the trial court for a sentencing hearing where the jury shall only consider the sentences of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole and imprisonment for life. If, after further deliberations, the jury still cannot agree as to sentence, the trial judge shall dismiss the jury and such judge shall impose a sentence of imprisonment for life. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(h) (1993).