Opinion ID: 1392567
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Plain View Seizure

Text: As previously noted, Meyer argues that, regardless of whether the open view or plain view doctrine applies, a showing of exigent circumstances is necessary to justify a warrantless seizure of evidence under either doctrine. In support of his position regarding plain view seizures, Meyer points to the following language from Coolidge that [p]lain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 468, 91 S.Ct. at 2039 (emphasis in original). Meyer's misapprehends the Coolidge analysis. Under the plain view doctrine, the requirement of exigent circumstances may be an issue where, because of the warrantless intrusion, the police were placed in plain view of the evidence. However, once the intrusion is justified, there is no requirement of exigency to seize evidence in plain view. The Supreme Court in Coolidge stated that, [w]here the initial intrusion that brings the police within plain view of ... an article is supported ... by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, the seizure is also legitimate. Id. at 465, 91 S.Ct. at 2037 (emphasis added). Thus, the portion of Coolidge cited to by Meyer, when read in context, stands only for the proposition that without prior justification for their presence, police officers may not enter constitutionally protected premises in order to seize evidence in plain view. This interpretation has been upheld in other cases by the Supreme Court as well as by other courts: The context in which the [Coolidge] plurality used the phrase, [plain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence,] however, indicates that it was merely a rephrasing of its conclusion ... that in order for the plain-view doctrine to apply, a police officer must be engaged in a lawful intrusion or must otherwise legitimately occupy the position affording him a plain view. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 n. 3, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1540 n. 3, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (emphasis in original). The Court in Brown explained that `plain view' provides grounds for seizure of an item when an officer's access to an object has some prior justification under the Fourth Amendment. Brown, 460 U.S. at 738, 103 S.Ct. at 1541. In Horton, the Court, in stating that objects properly in plain view may be subject to seizure despite the lack of a warrant, noted that the seizure of an object in plain view does not involve an intrusion on privacy. Horton, 496 U.S. at 141-42, 110 S.Ct. at 2310. In Minnesota v. Dickerson, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993), the Court stated that, if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant. Id. at ___-___, 113 S.Ct. at 2136-37; see also Soldal v. Cook County, ___ U.S. ___, ___-___, 113 S.Ct. 538, 545-46, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 1096, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1380, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413-14, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). In G & G Jewelry, Inc. v. City of Oakland, 989 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir.1993), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on Brown, stated that  there is no additional requirement of exigency for the seizure of property that is in plain view, provided that the police officer's presence on the property is lawful and the incriminating character of the evidence is immediately apparent. G & G Jewelry, 989 F.2d at 1100-01 (emphasis added). Although this court has yet to articulate specifically that warrantless plain view seizures can be justified without the presence of exigent circumstances, our cases have clearly implied that such seizures are legitimate. For example, in Powell, as previously described, after determining that the officer's initial stop of Powell was justifiable, this court held that the officer's actions were constitutionally permissible, and the warrantless seizure of the spoon and its subsequent admission at trial would be justified under the plain view doctrine. Powell, 61 Haw. at 325, 603 P.2d at 150 (internal quotation marks omitted). In State v. Ogata, 58 Haw. 514, 572 P.2d 1222 (1977), the police received a complaint that the Church of Scientology had received a threatening phone call. While responding to the complaint, the police noticed a suspicious vehicle, with two men inside it, in the vicinity of the Church. After learning that the vehicle was registered to Ogata, who had been named by the complainant as the suspected caller, police officer Tadly pulled the automobile over. After speaking to the two men, Officer Tadly ordered them both out of the vehicle in order to verify their identification and administer a sobriety test to the driver. While Officer Tadly was so engaged, another police officer, Officer Foley, looked into the vehicle from the outside and saw the sheathed sword-cane. Upon opening the door to secure the instrument, he saw the [wooden] knuckles on the vehicle floor. Ogata, 58 Haw. at 516, 572 P.2d at 1224. Holding that the seizure of both weapons was proper, this court stated that [t]he stop having been proper, the seizure of the swordcane, which was in plain view, and the recovery of the knuckles were also proper. Id. at 517, 572 P.2d at 1224; see also State v. Barnett, 68 Haw. 32, 34, 703 P.2d 680, 682 (1985) ([A] plain view rationale would support a warrantless seizure where police who are lawfully on constitutionally protected premises inadvertently come across evidence of a crime.); State v. Madamba, 62 Haw. 453, 456, 617 P.2d 76, 78 (1980) ([A] firearm which is in plain view from the outside of an automobile may properly be seized.); Hook, 60 Haw. at 202, 587 P.2d at 1228 (Where contraband comes into the view of an officer during the course of a permissible entry into constitutionally protected premises, the `plain view' doctrine may permit its seizure.); State v. Stachler, 58 Haw. 412, 417, 570 P.2d 1323, 1327 (1977) ([I]f the original intrusion is justified, ... objects sighted in plain view will be admissible so long as the view was inadvertent.); Kaaheena, 59 Haw. at 28, 575 P.2d at 466 (The officer has already intruded, and, if his intrusion is justified, the objects in plain view ... will be admissible.). In valid plain view observations, the intrusion has already lawfully occurred, and the seizure of the evidence in question is an extension of the exception to the warrant requirement. Therefore, as stated by the Supreme Court, `[p]lain view' is perhaps better understood, ... not as an independent `exception' to the Warrant Clause, but simply as an extension of whatever the prior justification for an officer's `access to an object' may be. Brown, 460 U.S. at 738-39, 103 S.Ct. at 1541; see also G & G Jewelry, 989 F.2d at 1100. Based on the foregoing, we hold that, where a governmental agent is engaged in a lawful intrusion and inadvertently observes evidence of a crime, the seizure of such evidence does not require any further constitutional protection.