Opinion ID: 1196216
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Adoptive Admissions, Generally

Text: HRE Rule 803(a)(1)(B) recognizes that a party may make an admission by adopting the statement of another person. HRE Rule 803 states in relevant part: The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: (a) Admissions. (1) Admission by a party-opponent. A statement that is offered against a party and is (A) the party's own statement, in either the party's individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested the party's adoption or belief in its truth. In other words, statements made by others that would otherwise be hearsay are admissible as adoptive admissions of the defendant, if the defendant has manifested an adoption of the statement or a belief in its truth. HRE Rule 803(a)(1)(B). The Oregon Supreme Court explained adoptive admissions as follows: If a party manifests an adoption of a statement of another, the party is in the same position as if the party had personally made the statement. The party becomes the declarant, and the statement of the other person becomes the party's. Thus, the receipt of evidence of an adoptive admission involves (1) another person's hearsay statement and (2) a party's own manifested adoption of the statement. State v. Carlson, 311 Or. 201, 808 P.2d 1002, 1005-06 (1991) (analyzing whether the defendant's nonverbal reactionlowering his head and shaking it back and forthto his girlfriend's accusatory statement was an adoptive admission). The statement of another in this case is the alleged offer made by Aunt or Cousin, and the issue is whether Defendant manifested an adoption of that statement. Manifestation of an adoption of or belief in the truth of a hearsay statement of another may be express or implied by words or nonverbal conduct. See Commentary to HRE Rule 803; see also McCormick on Evidence § 160. The Commentary to HRE Rule 803 states: Regarding adoptive admissions ..., the issue for determination by the court ... is whether the party manifested his adoption [of] or belief in the truth of a statement made in his presence. Express assent or agreement presents no problem. When, however, will silence constitute adoption of the statement? ... [T]he theory is that the person would, under the circumstances, protest the statement made in his presence, if untrue. The decision in each case calls for an evaluation in terms of probable human behavior. In other words, statements made in the presence of a person who is now a party are not invariably adopted by that person; the issue is whether, in context, the statement was of such a nature that the person would reasonably have been expected to deny the statement if it were untrue. (Citation and quotations marks omitted.) Thus, when a party is alleged to have assented by ambiguous nonverbal conductfor example, by remaining silentthe determination whether a party has manifested his [or her] adoption [of] or belief in the truth of a statement requires a closer examination. See Commentary to HRE Rule 803; see also Carlson, 808 P.2d at 1006 (stating that, [w]hen it is claimed ... that a party-litigant has manifested an adoption or a belief by nonverbal conduct and the conduct is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the analysis is more complex). This court previously dealt with the ambiguous nonverbal conduct of silence in State v. Hoffman, 73 Haw. 41, 828 P.2d 805 (1992): A trial court should be most reluctant to credit mere silenceinherently ambiguousas conduct sufficient for adoption of an inculpatory statement. Before admitting a proffered admission by silence[,] the trial court must preliminarily determine that the defendant actually heard and comprehended the effect of the words spoken and that[,] under the circumstances[,] an innocent Defendant would normally be induced to respond. In its preliminary determination, the court should consider whether any other explanation [is] equally consistent with silence.... Failure to deny the statements of others is admissible only when no other explanation is equally consistent with silence and there is always another possible explanationnamely, ignorance or dissentunless the circumstances are such that a dissent would in ordinary experience have been expressed if the communication had not been correct. Id. at 49, 828 P.2d at 810 (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotations marks omitted). Although the nonverbal conduct analyzed in Hoffman was silence alone, we believe that in any circumstance in which a defendant's head or other body movement, including silence, is ambiguous, a closer examination is in order. Thus, in accordance with Hoffman, whether a defendant manifested an adoption of or belief in the truth of a statement of another by ambiguous nonverbal conduct requires proof that: (1) the defendant actually heard and comprehended the effect of the words spoken; (2) under the circumstances, an innocent defendant would normally be induced to respond; and (3) no other explanation is equally consistent with the defendant's words or conduct.