Opinion ID: 1850004
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Testimony of Guardian Ad Litem

Text: Lori argues that the district court erred in permitting the guardian ad litem to give opinion testimony as a court-appointed expert. She also contends that the court erred in overruling certain hearsay objections to the guardian ad litem's testimony. Some additional background is pertinent to our consideration of these issues. In its November 26, 2001, order the district court determined on its own motion that a guardian ad litem should be appointed, instructed to assess the resources available for counseling for Abby and the parties, and report to the Court whatever counseling the guardian recommends. On the same day, the court entered a separate order appointing a guardian ad litem with all powers, privileges and responsibilities necessary or desirable for the full and effective performance of her duties and obligations to [Abby]. The guardian ad litem in this case is a practicing attorney who also holds a masters degree in maternal-child nursing. The order of appointment instructed the guardian ad litem to provide the court and attorneys for the parties with a final written report advising the Court of such matters as the Guardian Ad Litem deems necessary, but did not specifically designate the guardian ad litem as a court-appointed expert pursuant to § 27-706(1). The guardian ad litem served the parties with her report on July 18, 2002. The report was based upon correspondence from the parties' counselors, Abby's school records, interviews with Brian and his fiance, and interviews with Abby and Lori. Brian's counsel offered the report at the November 1 hearing, and the court sustained Lori's hearsay objection, stating: It is hearsay. It will be made part of the record of the Court, but the witness ought to testify to the contents so there will be firsthand information. The judge stated on the record that he had not read the report. Brian called the guardian ad litem to testify at the November 1, 2002, hearing as an expert witness. The guardian ad litem testified that she had been appointed a 706 expert at a meeting held in the judge's chambers shortly before the hearing. There is no verbatim record of this meeting, although counsel for the parties seems to agree that it transpired. During direct examination, the guardian ad litem was asked her opinion as to where the Court should place Abby Heistand for permanent care and custody. Lori's counsel objected on grounds that such an opinion was not the product of any recognized methodology and invaded the province of the court. The court overruled the objection, stating: [I]t seems to me that a person who is an attorney is much more likely to be familiar with the state of the law as it pertains to custody matters, what is to guide a court in determining what is or is not in the best interests of the children. This, after all, is why we appoint attorneys usually as 706 experts. Lori's counsel subsequently moved to strike opinion testimony of the guardian ad litem on essentially the same grounds. The court deferred a ruling on the motion. During her testimony, the guardian ad litem acknowledged that her opinions were based in part upon hearsay. In its order of modification, the court overruled the motion to strike, characterizing the guardian ad litem as one skilled and knowledgeable in the law who knew what constitutes a material change of circumstance and . . . how the law looks at such changes to determine the best interests of the child. While acknowledging that the guardian ad litem's opinions or concerns about certain facts affecting custody could have become speculative in some particulars and in others may have merely reflected the guardian's personal value judgments, the court concluded that it was perfectly capable of disregarding the chaff and did not look to the guardian ad litem for some sort of binding opinion, but, rather, insight and enlightenment from someone trained in law who has made herself familiar with the facts of this particular case. We conclude that the district court erred in receiving the opinion testimony of the guardian ad litem for two reasons. Initially, we note procedural deficiencies in the manner in which the guardian ad litem was apparently appointed as an expert witness. Section § 27-706(1) provides in relevant part that a judge may appoint witnesses of his own selection. An expert witness shall not be appointed by the judge unless he consents to act. A witness so appointed shall be informed of his duties by the judge in writing, a copy of which shall be filed with the clerk, or at a conference in which the parties shall have opportunity to participate. A witness so appointed shall advise the parties of his findings, if any; his deposition may be taken by any party; and he may be called to testify by the judge or any party. He shall be subject to cross-examination by each party, including a party calling him as a witness. The record in this case does not include a written appointment filed with the court. The appointment was apparently made verbally during a pretrial conference in chambers of which there is no verbatim record. Thus, we have no way to determine what duties the guardian ad litem was appointed to perform as a rule 706 expert. When asked during her testimony if she had any specialized training upon which to form an opinion, she replied: If your question is did I do a custody evaluation as a trained psychologist, no, I did not, but I wasn't asked to do a custody evaluation. [4] In addition to these procedural shortcomings, the record does not reflect that the guardian ad litem was ever properly qualified as an expert with respect to the subject matter of her opinion testimony. Neb. Evid. R. 702, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-702 (Reissue 1995), provides that [i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-705 (Reissue 1995), an expert's opinion is ordinarily admissible if the witness (1) qualifies as an expert, (2) has an opinion that will assist the trier of fact, (3) states his or her opinion, and (4) is prepared to disclose the basis of that opinion on cross-examination. Gittins v. Scholl , 258 Neb. 18, 23, 601 N.W.2d 765, 768 (1999). It appears that in this case, the district court considered the guardian ad litem as an expert on the law as it pertained to modification of child custody by virtue of the fact that she was (a) an experienced lawyer and (2) the duly appointed guardian ad litem with access to certain factual information. [5] The duties of a guardian ad litem in a case involving a child custody dispute are to investigate the facts and learn where the welfare of his or her ward lies and to report these facts to the appointing court. Betz v. Betz , 254 Neb. 341, 345, 575 N.W.2d 406, 409 (1998). Such reports to the court, whether in written form or testimony by the guardian ad litem, including hearsay, are subject to the Nebraska rules of evidence. Id. In Joyce S. v. Frank S ., 6 Neb. App. 23, 571 N.W.2d 801 (1997), disapproved in part on other grounds, Betz, supra , the Nebraska Court of Appeals held that a trial court erred in considering the opinion testimony of a guardian ad litem in a case involving termination of parental rights. The court noted that while a guardian ad litem may be a legal expert, . . . a person appointed a guardian ad litem is not necessarily an expert on child welfare. Id. at 32, 571 N.W.2d at 808. After noting the requirements of § 27-702, the court concluded: Bearing in mind that guardians ad litem and judges are invariably lawyers and that most, if not all, trial judges are at least as experienced in the area of child welfare as practicing lawyers, it is doubtful that an opinion of a guardian ad litem, as an expert, would truly assist the judge in understanding the evidence or in determining any issues of fact in litigation involving the welfare of children. Joyce S. , 6 Neb. App. at 32, 571 N.W.2d at 809. One commentary addressing the issue of whether a guardian ad litem can be qualified as an expert witness has expressed a similar view: Qualification cannot occur in guardian ad litem situations because no recognized area of general expertise with regard to custody or child placement exists. The legal standard for determining child placement is the best interests of the child. While there are many factors that may be considered in making that decision, no widespread scientific standard has evolved that can be applied in assessing all those factors. . . . . In custody cases, courts often ask those performing the role of guardian ad litem to render expert opinions even though they do not have the requisite training to do so. It is assumed that they can make such a recommendation merely because they have done an investigation at the request of the court. In effect they are imbued with expertise, merely by virtue of having been placed in that role, irrespective of their actual background. This fictional qualification as a child custody expert then becomes self-perpetuating. The more often a particular individual performs that role, the more likely that the trial court will rely on him as if he were an expert. The judiciary and the general public assume lawyers are competent to render such an opinion in the role of a guardian ad litem simply because of their experience representing dissolution clients. This logic is akin to assuming that an attorney who has handled a number of soft tissue injury suits would be qualifiable as an expert on soft tissue injuries. Raven C. Lidman & Betsy R. Hollingsworth, The Guardian Ad Litem in Child Custody Cases: The Contours of Our Judicial System Stretched Beyond Recognition , 6 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 255, 275-76 (1998). [6] On this record, we find no showing that the guardian ad litem possessed any scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge which would assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Moreover, to the extent that the district court invited or considered the opinions of the guardian ad litem on issues of law, we have held in another context that expert testimony concerning a question of law is generally not admissible. Baker v. Fabian, Thielen & Thielen , 254 Neb. 697, 578 N.W.2d 446 (1998). Thus, we conclude that the opinion testimony of the guardian ad litem, and the hearsay incorporated therein, was erroneously admitted. We disregard such evidence in our de novo review, and consider only that evidence which is relevant and admissible. See Stecker v. Stecker , 197 Neb. 164, 247 N.W.2d 622 (1976).