Opinion ID: 465035
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: search for a statute of limitations

Text: 13 Recognizing that we are dealing with a complex if not an esoteric set of issues involving several kinds of parties, statutes, causes of action, and periods of limitation, we propose to proceed as follows. We first describe the cast of characters, i.e., the parties and statutes dealt with in the precedents we shall examine. We then attempt to extract the relevant teachings of DelCostello. Applying these teachings to the case at bar, we look first to see if there is an analogous state statute of limitations, and then endeavor to see where the balance of opposing interests lies in this case, examining, first, the impact of solitary or free standing LMRDA suits on labor-management relationships and, second, the nature and importance of the rights secured by the LMRDA. Finally, we test the persuasiveness of what we have said against the contrary precedents. 14
15 1. Economic Rights. Of older lineage is the structure erected to protect a worker's economic rights. Those rights are secured through negotiations between a union and employer, resulting in a collective bargaining agreement. Such an agreement makes provision, through dealings between employer and union in grievance and arbitration procedures, for the private settlement of issues involving an employee's economic loss. Ordinarily the result of the dispute settlement procedures will be final, but the union member may pursue his economic rights in court if the union has failed to represent the employee fairly. 16 In such an instance, an employee may bring suit against both the employer and the union, notwithstanding the outcome or finality of the grievance or arbitration proceeding. [Citations omitted.] Such a suit, as a formal matter, comprises two causes of action. The suit against the employer rests on Sec. 301 [of the Labor-Management Relations Act], since the employee is alleging a breach of the collective-bargaining agreement. The suit against the union is one for breach of the union's duty of fair representation, which is implied under the scheme of the National Labor Relations Act. [Footnote omitted.] 'Yet the two claims are inextricably interdependent. To prevail against either the company or the Union, ... [employee-plaintiffs] must not only show that their discharge was contrary to the contract but must also carry the burden of demonstrating breach of duty by the Union. '  DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164-65, 103 S.Ct. at 2290 (citations omitted). 17 In DelCostello, the Supreme Court observed that this suit to vindicate an employee's economic rights, a hybrid Sec. 301/fair representation suit, amounts to  'a direct challenge to the private settlement of disputes under [the collective-bargaining agreement]. '  DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165, 103 S.Ct. at 2291. 18 2. Civil Rights. After twenty years of experience with the NLRA, Congress realized that vital non-economic interests of employees were not being adequately protected under existing legislation. The LMRDA was therefore enacted to regulate the internal affairs of labor unions and protect union members from autocratic abuses by union officials. Local No. 82, Furniture and Piano Moving, Furniture Store Drivers, Helpers, Warehousemen and Packers v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526, 104 S.Ct. 2557, 2559, 2563, 81 L.Ed.2d 457 (1984); H.Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1959), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1959, 2318. Title I of the act is designated a bill of rights, seeking to vindicate a union member's civil and political rights, its protections covering such matters as freedom of speech and assembly, and equal voting rights. 19 This appeal deals with a suit based solely on Title I of the LMRDA, a union member's civil rights complaint pure and simple. Appellant's claim is that defendants denied him full and equal rights of membership, apparently because of his protected speech activities, which would be violations of sections 411(a)(1) and (a)(2) of Title I. He brought suit in federal court pursuant to section 412, which authorizes a civil action for infringement of rights enumerated in section 411. 20 We recognize that there are cases where LMRDA claims have been appended to what was basically a classic hybrid suit to set aside an employer-union compromise on an economic issue where the union violated its duty of fair representation. Our own decision in Linder v. Berge, 739 F.2d 686 (1st Cir.1984), was one. There we simply applied the six month statute of limitations to the entire case. See also Adkins v. International Union of Electrical Workers, 769 F.2d 330 (6th Cir.1985); and Vallone v. Teamsters Local 705, 755 F.2d 520 (7th Cir.1984). 2 Whether and under what circumstances an LMRDA claim also involving union and employer action related to employment can be the subject of suit filed beyond the six month period we leave for another day. 3
21 The very fact that two other circuits have read DelCostello as commanding the importing of the NLRA six month statute of limitations into free standing LMRDA cases makes indispensable our closest possible analysis of this case. 22 We begin by noting that in one of the two cases embraced in DelCostello, the limitations period for claims against both union and employer fixed by the lower court was 30 days and that in the other claims had to be asserted against the employer within 90 days, and against the union within 3 years. The Court both began and ended its opinion with homage to the norm of borrowing limitations periods from state law. It began by noting, We have generally concluded that Congress intended that the courts apply the most closely analogous statute of limitations under state law. 462 U.S. at 158, 103 S.Ct. at 2287. See generally, id. at 158-61, 103 S.Ct. at 2287-89. 4 23 Then the Court noted that it had borrowed a six year period from state law to apply to a union suit against an employer for breach of a collective bargaining agreement in Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966). Even though labor-management relations were the subject--ordinarily an issue calling for uniform treatment, the Court observed: [N]ational uniformity is of less importance when the case does not involve 'those consensual processes that federal labor law is chiefly designed to promote--the formation of the collective agreement and the private settlement of disputes under it,' 383 U.S., at 702 [86 S.Ct., at 1111]. We also relied heavily on the obvious and close analogy between this variety of Sec. 301 suit and an ordinary breach-of-contract case. 462 U.S. at 162-63, 103 S.Ct. at 2289. 24 The Court then proceeded to articulate its concern in the case before it over periods as short as the 90 days that state laws required for suits to vacate arbitration awards, id. at 165-68, 103 S.Ct at 2291-92. But it also manifested its concern over a limitations period as long as three years. It quoted its language in United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 64, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 1564, 67 L.Ed.2d 732 (1981):  'This system [collective bargaining], with its heavy emphasis on grievance, arbitration, and the law of the shop, could easily become unworkable if a decision which has given meaning and content to the terms of an agreement, ... could suddenly be called into question as much as [three] years later.'  Id. at 169, 103 S.Ct. at 2293. 25 Significantly, the Court acknowledged that, even with these objections, resort to state law might have to be tolerated if there were no federal statute of limitations designed to accommodate a balance of interests very similar to that at stake here--a statute that is, in fact, an analogy to the present lawsuit more apt than any of the suggested state-law parallels. Id. at 169, 103 S.Ct. at 2293. It then noted the very substantial overlap and family resemblance between unfair labor practices, union breaches of fair representation, and employer breaches of collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 170, 103 S.Ct. at 2293. It also stressed as at least equally important to this similarity of rights the similarity of the underlying considerations-- 'stable bargaining relationships and finality of private settlements' . Id. at 171, 103 S.Ct. at 2294. It thus meticulously justified by both negative and positive reflections its choice of NLRA section 10(b)'s six month period. 26 Having undergone such an intricate analysis, the Court returned to its theme at the outset and cautioned that it was not departing from its preference of borrowing state limitations periods, even saying that there is not always an obvious state-law choice for application to a given federal cause of action; yet resort to state law remains the norm.... Id. at 171, 103 S.Ct. at 2289. Even under this elaborate reasoning, carving out a narrow exception from the general borrowing norm, Justices Stevens and O'Connor would have followed the usual rule. 27 We draw the clear conclusion that DelCostello is not the kind of precedent that lends itself as a springboard for easy application to other rights, statutes, and policies. Rather, it is a closely reasoned exception to a general rule which illumines a rather narrow path.
28 Our  ' primary guide ' --though not our exclusive one 5 --is to look for a state law statute of limitations that applies to analogous state law claims. Unlike the hybrid claim in DelCostello, the pure Title I claim does not defy comparison with state law. It is not an amalgam of contract and another sort of claim, such as the duty of fair representation; nor is a free standing Title I claim against a union or union officials inextricably linked with a claim against the employer, as is the DelCostello hybrid claim. The Title I cause of action is a straightforward claim against the union or its officers for deprivation of rights guaranteed by a federal bill of rights. It closely resembles a civil rights claim. Although we typically think of federal law in relation to civil rights violations, see 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, Massachusetts also has a civil rights statute, Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 12, Sec. 11 H-I, allowing suit against private persons. Thus, structurally, there is no reason to depart from the traditional practice of looking to state law for an appropriate limitations period.
29 Although the fit between a free standing Title I LMRDA claim and a Massachusetts private civil rights claim would seem under DelCostello to make further analysis unnecessary, we realize that our disposition is a minority one. We therefore proceed to analyze and try to balance the interests and policies at stake.
30 As we have noted at the outset, in Section A of this part, the hybrid claims in DelCostello involve economic matters related to the union member's employment, as do the unfair labor practice claims from which the Court in DelCostello borrowed the six month limitations period. In contrast, the free standing Title I claim alleges a violation of union democracy and is concerned about the internal operation of the union. Although both types of claims may involve allegations of discrimination, discrimination in a hybrid claim or unfair labor practice charge is likely to center on unequal employment status, allegedly caused by the union's discriminatory treatment, in contrast to internal discrimination, e.g., depriving some individuals of the right to vote on certain union matters, disciplining without due process or in retaliation for speech, or refusing access to books and records. On the one hand, the complaint is first, and foremost, that of an employee; on the other, it is that of an organization member. See generally R. Gorman, Labor Law 699-701 (1976) (union member's protection under NLRA includes freedom from unfair, irrelevant or invidious treatment at the hands of the statutory bargaining representative in matters affecting the employment relationship , id. at 699) (emphasis added). 31 We acknowledge that the National Labor Relations Board has occasionally gone beyond this rationale to find violations of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA for actions not directly implicating employment. See, e.g., East Texas Motor Freight, 1982-1983 NLRB Dec. p 15,002; Western Renaissance Corp., 1983-1984 NLRB Dec. p 15,931. The fact that there is an overlap between Section 8(b)(1)(A) and Secs. 411 and 412 of the LMRDA does not make the exception prove the rule. The labor-management relationship is still the core of the NLRA, as it is the core of the hybrid section 301/fair representation claim, and as distinguished from the LMRDA. Moreover, we see no significant problem if a union member, whose unfair labor practice charge has been barred by the statute of limitations, is allowed to file a timely LMRDA claim based on the same deprivation of a speech or voting right, if such has not affected his employment. At least in the case of a free standing claim which could fit either under section 8(b)(1)(A) or sections 411 and 412, we see no more reason to apply exclusively section 10(b)'s limitations period than to hold that a similar claim falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board. Cf. Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233, 238, 91 S.Ct. 609, 613, 28 L.Ed.2d 10 (1971). Indeed, the added opportunity for a remedy is consistent with Title I's focus on individual rights. 32 The difference in focus between the union democracy claims under Title I and the employment claims at issue in DelCostello leads to several concrete differences in the suits filed under these statutes. A Title I suit cannot be brought against the employer. It in no way challenges the stable relationship between the employer and the union. It does not affect any interpretation or effect any reinterpretation of the collective bargaining agreement and so, unlike the hybrid actions, a Title I claim does not attack a compromise between labor and management. Moreover, another factor in the DelCostello equation is lacking. There is no erosion of the finality of private settlements, for in free standing LMRDA cases the union member is not attempting to attack any such settlement. As in Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., this case does not involve either  'the formation of the collective agreement [or] the private settlement of disputes under it.'  462 U.S. at 163, 103 S.Ct. at 2289. 33 We conclude, therefore, that the interests served by a rather short statute of limitations in DelCostello, stable labor-management relationships and finality in privately grieved and arbitrated settlements, are virtually, if not entirely, absent in the case at bar.
34 By contrast, the interest of the employee or union member is qualitatively enhanced in a Title I case. It is an interest created by specific statute, recognizing a national policy. Under the hybrid claim there are no such specifically identified rights. In some ways the contrast resembles that between a plaintiff with a federal civil rights claim and a plaintiff with a contract claim. 35 The legislative history gives emphasis to this observation. The Congressional debate on the LMRDA includes repeated references to Title I as a bill of rights akin to that in our federal constitution, and the concern expressed was for individuals in relation to their government. Representative Griffin, who coauthored one version of the LMRDA, gave the following description of the bill of rights provision: 36 These basic guarantees are hardly new or novel--they are essential and fundamental rights which every American citizen is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights of the Federal Constitution. 37 As the senior Senator from Arkansas has said: 38 'There is no reason why a union man should be required to leave the rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution of the United States at the door when he goes into a union meeting.'  39 105 Cong.Rec. 14,193 (1959). 40 See also 105 Cong.Rec. 5,806 (1959); id. at 6,478; H.Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1959); cf. Local No. 82, Furniture and Piano Moving, Furniture Store Drivers, Helpers, Warehousemen and Packers v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526, 104 S.Ct. 2557, 2564, 81 L.Ed.2d 457 ( 'Congress adopted the freedom of speech and assembly provision ... in order to promote union democracy.' ). 6 41 We thus draw from this history the sense that claims under Title I's bill of rights provisions were viewed primarily as civil rights matters rather than as labor matters. It was not coincidence that Title I was labelled a bill of rights, and we believe it therefore is more logical to derive a statute of limitations for pure Title I claims from a civil rights statute than from an unfair labor practices statute. 42 The legislative history also suggests the inapplicability of section 10(b)'s limitations period for a different reason. Section 411(a)(4) of Title I protects the union members' rights to sue their union under the LMRDA or any other statute, but requires that they exhaust internal procedures for up to four months before filing suit. When Senator McClellan first introduced the bill of rights on the floor of the Senate, the internal exhaustion requirement was three months. 105 Cong.Rec. 5,810 (1959). It was changed to six months before the bill left the Senate. Id. at 9,108. In the House, legislators focused on how the six month provision would bar suits under the NLRA because of that statute's six month limitations period. See id.; id. at 13,880; id. at A8510. The problem was that union members who exhausted remedies for the required six months would find their NLRA claims time-barred at the end of that period. There is no indication that the members of Congress felt a similar concern about union members losing suits under the LMRDA. While this history is not equivalent to an express intent that the limitations period for the LMRDA be greater than six months, we do view it as some support for the argument that Congress expected that LMRDA plaintiffs would have more time to bring their suits. 7 43 Given the importance of the rights assured by the LMRDA, the concern voiced by the Court in DelCostello over the problems faced by an employee in bringing a hybrid suit becomes more serious. 462 U.S. at 166, 103 S.Ct. at 2291. The Court pointed to the difficulties of evaluating the adequacy of union representation, retaining counsel and investigating hybrid cases. And yet, it may well be that the general run of hybrid cases may be brought with less difficulty than LMRDA claims. They may be more a part of the law of the shop and familiar to the employee. Filing an unfair labor practice claim is, without doubt, more easily accomplished. A union member need only file a one-page charge form with the Board. 44 Whether or not LMRDA claims or unearthing the facts to support them are more complex or difficult than hybrid or unfair labor practice claims, there are other differences weighing in favor of a longer period for bringing labor-related civil rights claims. In most cases a Title I plaintiff will be a union member who, unlike many unfair labor practice claimants, has not lost his job but wishes to remain a member. To decide to sue one's co-workers and superiors who may have much to do with one's future fate even if one is successful gives pause. Such a decision is not lightly taken; the pressures on such a plaintiff to collect facts, retain an attorney and reflect suggest the inappropriateness of a six month period. Moreover, the objective sought in the typical hybrid case is a purely personal victory in the form of restoration of job, pay, or promotion. In contrast, the objective of LMRDA cases is to increase union democracy, which is a benefit to all union members and the public at large. We therefore conclude that the interests of the union member with a free standing LMRDA claim are such as to tilt against applying the six month section 10(b) limitation. 45