Opinion ID: 6345772
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Analysis of COA Application

Text: Mr. Padillow is not entitled to a COA because reasonable jurists would not debate whether the district court correctly decided the issues he seeks to appeal.
The district court denied relief on claims 2 through 5 on procedural grounds. “On habeas review, this court does not address issues that have been defaulted in state court on an independent and adequate state procedural ground, unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Harmon v. 7 Appellate Case: 21-5064 Document: 010110691410 Date Filed: 06/01/2022 Page: 8 Sharp, 936 F.3d 1044, 1060 (10th Cir. 2019) (quotations omitted). Here, Mr. Padillow did not appeal claims 2, 3, 4, or 5. Accordingly, they were waived under Oklahoma law.3 See Logan v. State, 293 P.3d 969, 973 (Okla. Crim. App. 2013) (“issues that were not raised previously on direct appeal, but which could have been raised, are waived for further review”). The district court noted that Mr. Padillow could overcome this procedural bar by showing cause and actual prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice but found Mr. Padillow had not done so. Mr. Padillow has not presented any meritorious challenge to the district court’s procedural ruling. He asserts that claims 2, 3, and 5, which allege ineffective assistance of his trial attorneys, “give validity” to his claims of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. Opening Br. & Appl. for COA at 3. But he fails to show how that assertion concerns the district court’s procedural ruling. He also asserts that claim 5—that his trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to object to the admission of “crucial evidence”—constituted plain error affecting his substantial rights. See id. at 26-28. But he fails to support that assertion with any substantive argument. He does not even address claim 4. Although we must construe Mr. Padillow’s brief liberally, we “cannot take on the responsibility of 3 The district court acknowledged it was required to undertake a more thorough “adequacy” analysis of Mr. Padillow’s waiver of his ineffective assistance claims. R. Vol. I at 263 (quotations omitted). It held that waiver was an adequate state procedural ground because (1) his trial attorneys and appellate counsel were different, and (2) the claims could have been resolved on the trial record alone. See id at 263-64 (citing English v. Cody, 146 F.3d 1257, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998)). Mr. Padillow has not challenged this conclusion, and reasonable jurists would not debate it. 8 Appellate Case: 21-5064 Document: 010110691410 Date Filed: 06/01/2022 Page: 9 serving as the litigant’s attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record.” See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). Reasonable jurists would not debate the correctness of the district court’s procedural ruling. We therefore deny Mr. Padillow’s request for a COA on claims 2 through 5.
The district court denied claims 1, 6, 7, and 8 on the merits. Mr. Padillow seeks a COA to appeal those rulings. a. Claim 1 – Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel We review Mr. Padillow’s ineffective assistance claims under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which first requires a defendant to show that (1) counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” id. at 688, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, id. at 692. The deficient performance prong requires a defendant to show “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. The prejudice prong requires a showing that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. The court reviews ineffective assistance claims with “a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. at 689 (quotations 9 Appellate Case: 21-5064 Document: 010110691410 Date Filed: 06/01/2022 Page: 10 omitted). As Strickland noted, “[t]here are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case,” and “[e]ven the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.” Id. The court may address the two Strickland components of an ineffective assistance claim in any order, and need not address both if it concludes the defendant has failed to satisfy one. See id. at 697. A showing that a defendant’s particular legal contention lacks merit necessarily establishes that counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise the issue. Davis v. Sharp, 943 F.3d 1290, 1299 (10th Cir. 2019). Finally, we must review the OCCA’s resolution of Mr. Padillow’s ineffective assistance claims “through AEDPA’s deferential lens.” Frost v. Pryor, 749 F.3d 1212, 1225 (10th Cir. 2014); see also Lockett v. Trammell, 711 F.3d 1218, 1248 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e review [the OCCA’s] analysis [of ineffective assistance of counsel claims] under the considerable deference required by Strickland itself—in addition to AEDPA deference.”). Mr. Padillow alleged in his habeas petition that he sent his appellate counsel a list of eight issues he wanted to include in his direct appeal: 1. There was insufficient evidence to support the charges; 2. The trial court erred in not determining witnesses requested by Mr. Padillow were unavailable; 3. The trial court wrongfully denied the testimony of Regina Johnson; 4. His trial attorneys never searched for video of the medical examination of one of the victims; 5. His trial attorneys did not attempt to find witness Regina Johnson; 10 Appellate Case: 21-5064 Document: 010110691410 Date Filed: 06/01/2022 Page: 11 6. During witness examinations, Mr. Padillow’s trial attorneys did not ask questions that he claims he had given them; 7. His trial attorneys insisted on a defense theory that Mr. Padillow deemed “a total lie,” Opening Br. & Appl. for COA at 17; and 8. His trial attorneys should have withdrawn after Mr. Padillow assaulted them, and the trial court should have appointed him new counsel or allowed him to represent himself. Mr. Padillow contends his appellate counsel was ineffective because he raised none of these issues on direct appeal. In his Opening Brief and Application for COA, Mr. Padillow has abandoned issues 2 and 3. We address the remaining issues as follows.
Mr. Padillow contends his appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to assert insufficiency of the evidence. He is entitled to relief on this ground only if “upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979). This standard “respects the jury’s responsibility to weigh the evidence and to draw reasonable inferences from the testimony presented at trial.” Dockins, 374 F.3d at 939. In addition, the nature of a constitutional sufficiency review by a habeas court is “sharply limited.” Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296 (1992). Thus, all of the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and the prosecution need not rule out every hypothesis except guilt. Id. We have thoroughly reviewed the trial court record. It contains sufficient victim testimony and corroborating evidence to support a guilty verdict against Mr. Padillow on 11 Appellate Case: 21-5064 Document: 010110691410 Date Filed: 06/01/2022 Page: 12 all counts. Both victims identified Mr. Padillow as their assailant. They provided sufficient detail to satisfy the elements of the crimes charged. In addition, the victims’ mothers offered corroborating testimony. A reasonable jury could have found sufficient proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellate counsel was thus not constitutionally ineffective in choosing not to raise this issue. See Davis, 943 F.3d at 1299. ii. Issue 4 - Trial attorneys’ alleged failure to search for video of the medical examination Mr. Padillow argues that appellate counsel should have argued his trial attorneys were ineffective in failing to present to the jury video of the sexual assault nurse examination of the victim. But as the district court noted, one of Mr. Padillow’s trial attorneys cross-examined the nurse responsible for the examination and elicited inconsistencies between the nurse’s written report and the physical evidence contained in the sealed rape kit. Having done so, his attorneys decided not to introduce the video, which would have been cumulative of the nurse’s cross-examination. This decision fell well within the bounds of sound trial strategy under Strickland. iii. Issue 5 - Trial attorneys’ attempts to find Regina Johnson Mr. Padillow contends appellate counsel should have asserted ineffective assistance based on his trial attorneys’ failure to find a witness named Regina Johnson. He alleges Ms. Johnson would have testified that he was alone with one of the victims for a limited amount of time. Even assuming this assertion is true, he has failed to show a reasonable probability that the trial result would have been different if Ms. Johnson had testified. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Indeed, if Ms. Johnson had testified in the way 12 Appellate Case: 21-5064 Document: 010110691410 Date Filed: 06/01/2022 Page: 13 Mr. Padillow claims, she would have helped to establish that he was alone with the victim, which would seem to bolster the prosecution’s case. Appellate counsel reasonably chose not to raise this issue. iv. Issues 6 and 7 - Defense strategy Mr. Padillow argues his appellate counsel should have argued that his trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to ask any of 200 questions he says he gave them for witness examinations (issue 6), and that his trial attorneys presented a defense theory that Mr. Padillow deemed “a total lie” (issue 7). Opening Br. & Appl. for COA at 17. Neither claim holds water. First, Mr. Padillow’s asserts that his attorneys declined to use any of his 200 questions, but he has not identified a single proposed question that they failed to ask. How to conduct witness examinations lies at the heart of trial strategy, see Boyd v. Ward, 179 F.3d 904, 915 (10th Cir. 1999). Mr. Padillow has not overcome the presumption that the witness examinations conducted by his attorneys were part of a sound trial strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Second, the trial attorneys’ defense theory was premised on the testimony of a DNA expert who admitted that there were alternative explanations for the physical evidence presented by the prosecution. Mr. Padillow characterizes this theory as “a lie,” but he fails to explain how the defense theory was objectively unreasonable. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 481 (2000) (“The relevant question is not whether counsel’s choices were strategic, but whether they were reasonable.”). 13 Appellate Case: 21-5064 Document: 010110691410 Date Filed: 06/01/2022 Page: 14 In short, Mr. Padillow has not overcome the “strong presumption” that his trial attorneys’ decisions were sound strategy that fell within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Appellate counsel again reasonably chose not to raise these issues. v. Issue 8 - Trial attorneys’ failure to withdraw after Mr. Padillow’s attack and the trial court’s denial of new counsel Mr. Padillow asserts that his appellate counsel should have argued on appeal that his trial attorneys were constitutionally ineffective for failing to withdraw from representation after Mr. Padillow’s attack on Mr. Cagle. He cites no supporting authority. Also, the trial transcript completely undermines this argument. It reflects that shortly after the attack, Mr. Lee, his other attorney, performed professionally and competently, including presenting a forceful closing argument on Mr. Padillow’s behalf. We reject Mr. Padillow’s implicit suggestion that his attorneys “[were] not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The trial transcript demonstrates the opposite. For substantially the same reasons, we reject Mr. Padillow’s related assertion that the trial court erred by not appointing new attorneys after Mr. Padillow attacked Mr. Cagle. A trial court’s determination regarding substitution of counsel is subject to the abuse of discretion standard, see United States v. Mullen, 32 F.3d 891, 895 (4th Cir. 1994), and Mr. Padillow has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion here. 14 Appellate Case: 21-5064 Document: 010110691410 Date Filed: 06/01/2022 Page: 15 Mr. Padillow has failed to make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). His appellate counsel reasonably chose not to raise this issue.