Opinion ID: 1367717
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Admission of Inez Blanco's Prior Inconsistent Statements

Text: In her testimony at the preliminary hearing, Inez Blanco denied that when she saw defendant the day preceding the murder, he was desperate for money, but she admitted he may have driven her automobile on that occasion. After Blanco's preliminary hearing testimony was read to the jury, the prosecution called as a witness Lompoc Police Sergeant Vernon Stevens, who testified without objection that prior to the preliminary hearing, Blanco had told him that the day preceding the murder defendant had asked to drive her automobile but she had refused. Blanco further had stated that defendant had made repeated requests for money, which she also had refused. (26a) Defendant contends the admission of this evidence violated his right to confront the witnesses against him, because he had no opportunity to cross-examine Inez Blanco regarding her inconsistent statement. ( People v. Beyea (1974) 38 Cal. App.3d 176 [113 Cal. Rptr. 254].) We asked the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing the question whether defendant timely objected to the admission of this evidence. Defendant concedes he did not raise a separate objection to the admission of Sergeant Stevens's testimony regarding Inez Blanco's inconsistent statements, but contends such an objection was incorporated within the objection to the introduction of Inez Blanco's preliminary hearing testimony. We disagree. (27) Evidence Code section 353, subdivision (a), provides that a judgment shall not be reversed because of the erroneous admission of evidence unless there was a timely objection so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the objection.... The reason for the requirement is manifest: a specifically grounded objection to a defined body of evidence serves to prevent error. It allows the trial judge to consider excluding the evidence or limiting its admission to avoid possible prejudice. It also allows the proponent of the evidence to lay additional foundation, modify the offer of proof, or take other steps designed to minimize the prospect of reversal. [Citation.] ( People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 187-188 [279 Cal. Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949].) (26b) As previously noted, defendant objected to the admission of Inez Blanco's preliminary hearing testimony, and the trial court properly overruled that objection. Defendant did not, however, object to the admission of Sergeant Stevens's testimony and did not apprise the trial court of the contention he now makes on appeal, namely, that even if Inez Blanco's preliminary hearing testimony was admissible, Sergeant Stevens's testimony relating Blanco's prior inconsistent statements was inadmissible. Defendant further asserts he did not object to the admission of Sergeant Stevens's testimony because the trial court had stated, in ruling upon defendant's objection to the admission of Inez Blanco's preliminary hearing testimony: I've made my ruling. That's all the argument I want on the subject. The quoted statement indicates only that the court would entertain no further argument concerning defendant's objection to the admission of Inez Blanco's preliminary hearing testimony; the court did not preclude defendant from raising additional objections to other evidence. Finally, defendant cites the plurality opinion in People v. Frank (1985) 38 Cal.3d 711, 729, footnote 3 [214 Cal. Rptr. 801, 700 P.2d 415], for the proposition that On an appeal from a judgment imposing the penalty of death, a technical insufficiency in the form of an objection will be disregarded.... As we noted in rejecting a similar contention, Here, however, there was not a `technical insufficiency in the form of an objection'; there was no objection at all. ( People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 331 [246 Cal. Rptr. 886, 753 P.2d 1082]; see also People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 357 [279 Cal. Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009].) Accordingly, this issue may not be raised for the first time on appeal. ( People v. Welch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 106, 114-115 [104 Cal. Rptr. 217, 501 P.2d 225].) Even if the issue had been preserved for review and the trial court had erred in admitting Blanco's statements, reversal of the judgment would not be required, because any such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065]; People v. Beyea, supra, 38 Cal. App.3d 176, 194.) Inez Blanco's statement that defendant may have driven her automobile the day preceding the murder is significant only to the extent it provided an innocent explanation for the presence of defendant's fingerprints inside the vehicle. The prosecution's fingerprint expert testified, however, that the location of defendant's fingerprint on the gearshift lever indicated defendant was the last person to drive the vehicle. Additionally, Blanco's vehicle was found parked near the bus station from which defendant had left town, and Pastor Valdez testified he had seen defendant driving a similar vehicle, which defendant had said belonged to his sister. Therefore, the admission of Blanco's out-of-court statement that defendant had not driven her automobile the day preceding the murder could not have affected the outcome of the trial. Similarly, the admission of Blanco's out-of-court statement that defendant had asked her for money could not have affected the verdict, in light of Blanco's testimony at the preliminary hearing that defendant had searched her vehicle for coins and had telephoned her at 3 a.m., requesting an advance of funds from their mother's estate. We conclude any error in the admission of this evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant contends that in the event he is precluded from challenging on appeal the admission of Sergeant Stevens's testimony because the defense failed to object in the trial court, he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and the judgment must be reversed on that basis. (28a) Reviewing courts will reverse convictions on the ground of inadequate counsel only if the record on appeal affirmatively discloses that counsel had no rational tactical purpose for his act or omission. ( People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 581 [189 Cal. Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144].) (26c) In the present case, defense counsel reasonably might have chosen for tactical reasons not to object to Sergeant Stevens's testimony because, although this evidence was favorable to the People in some respects, it also benefited defendant insofar as it served to impeach Inez Blanco's preliminary hearing testimony. Also, as noted above, Sergeant Stevens's testimony was not very damaging to defendant's case, in light of the other evidence establishing that defendant asked Inez Blanco for money prior to the murder and drove her automobile after the murder. Defense counsel reasonably may have concluded, therefore, that defendant's interests were better served by the admission of this evidence, because it impeached Inez Blanco's preliminary hearing testimony. Defendant's claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel also fails for another reason. (28b) A judgment will not be reversed based on denial of effective representation unless there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's failings, the result would have been more favorable to the defendant. ( People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1058 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 230, 824 P.2d 1277]; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-218 [233 Cal. Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839]; see Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-696 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693-699, 104 S.Ct. 2052].) (26d) As noted above, even if the challenged evidence had been excluded, it is not reasonably probable a determination more favorable to defendant would have resulted.