Opinion ID: 2542656
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the property interest created by the decree of divorce was a fee simple determinable

Text: ¶ 13 Both Mr. Hall's right to recover for the value of the improvements he made to the Allen/Satterfield home and the right of creditors whose interests are secured by the home depend on the nature of the property interest described in paragraph 10 of the divorce decree. For reasons that we will explain, the interest conveyed first to Ms. Satterfield then to Mr. Hall on to Homecomings and finally to the Moores was a fee simple determinable. ¶ 14 If a fee estate can be determined or defeated by an event which is not certain to occur, it is a defeasible fee simple. . . . A defeasible fee gives the complete set of rights of ownership to the grantee until the defeating event arises. James H. Backman, Thomas and Backman on Utah Real Property Law § 2.02(c), at 43 (1999) (Supp.2004). Defeasible fee interests, in turn, fall into two categories: fee simple determinable and fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. The two classes of defeasible interests may be distinguished by the consequences that befall the holder of the defeasible interest if the event that makes the fee defeasible occurs. ¶ 15 In the case of the fee simple determinable, the defeasible fee will terminate automatically upon the occurrence of the condition. Nelson v. Provo City, 872 P.2d 35, 38 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 615-16 (6th ed.1990)). By contrast, a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent is an estate that will be terminated only after the grantor re-enters the land or makes a claim to it following the occurrence of the condition. With the fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, the grantee holds the fee subject to the possibility of reverter and not the inevitability of reverter that marks the fee simple determinable. ¶ 16 Paragraph 10 of the divorce decree states that, in the event Ms. Satterfield moves more than fifty miles from Salt Lake City before the youngest child of the parties turns eighteen years of age, ownership of the marital residence shall revert to [Mr. Allen]. This is unambiguous language creating a fee simple determinable. This language was repeated in the quit-claim deed through which Mr. Allen conveyed the property to Ms. Satterfield. The deed states that if the grantee [Satterfield] fails to maintain current house payments or if the grantee shall move more than 50 miles from Salt Lake City, Utah, before the grantor and grantee's last child reaches 18 year [sic] of age, title and ownership of the above described property shall revert to the grantor [Allen]. Accordingly, we conclude that Mr. Allen conveyed a fee simple determinable to Ms. Satterfield.