Opinion ID: 2801043
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trust’s Petition

Text: Before determining the merits of the cause, we must first satisfy ourselves that we have jurisdiction. One element of jurisdiction is standing. There is no question that the Districts have standing to bring their current petition. They are entities regulated by the order under review, and the relief prayed would alleviate the harm asserted. They allege, and it is evident, that the acts of the Commission have caused the injury of which they complain, that is, that they must submit to licensure. It is equally evident that the relief sought in the current litigation, the vacating of the Commission’s order, would alleviate that harm. The same is not true of the Trust. The Trust seeks to have the Project made subject to the licensure requirements of the FPA. The Commission entered an order declaring that the Project is subject to the licensing requirements of the FPA. The Trust does not seek to have the court change the decision, but only asks the court to tell the Commission that it should do so for four reasons instead of three. Unlike Becket, the Trust does not speak of “do[ing] the right deed for the wrong reason.” T.S. Eliot, Murder in the Cathedral, Act 1. Rather, it accuses the Commission of doing the right thing for too few reasons. This does not establish standing. Because standing “is an essential and unchanging part 6 of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III,” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992), the Trust must establish it has standing before we may exercise jurisdiction over its claims, County of Delaware, Pa. v. Department of Transp., 554 F.3d 143, 147 (D.C. Cir. 2009). It is well established “that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. “To establish constitutional standing, a petitioner must show an actual or imminent injury in fact, fairly traceable to the challenged agency action, that will likely be redressed by a favorable decision.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. FERC, 571 F.3d 1208, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2009). An injury in fact is “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (quotations and citations omitted). The Trust did not suffer an injury in fact because the Trust received exactly what it sought. FERC accepted some of the jurisdictional theories advanced by the Trust, and found that the La Grange Project was required to be licensed. The Trust argues that it is aggrieved because FERC’s refusal to license La Grange and the Don Pedro Project in a single proceeding doubles the cost the Trust must bear in order to actively participate in both licensing proceedings, and frustrates the creation of a coordinated fish passage through the two dams, thus resulting in a decline to the fish population. This decline in fish population, they argue, reduces the number of tourists who come to observe the spawning salmon, thus reducing the money the Trust will make from guided tours. Neither of the Trust’s asserted injuries satisfies the constitutional requirement of injury in fact. We have previously recognized that the expenditure of resources on advocacy is not a cognizable Article III injury. See Center for Law and Educ. v. Department of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1162 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 7 (“[T]o hold that a lobbyist/advocacy group had standing to challenge government policy with no injury other than injury to its advocacy would eviscerate standing doctrine’s actual injury requirement.” (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739–40 (1972))). This is true whether the advocacy takes place through litigation or administrative proceedings. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. EPA, 667 F.3d 6, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (concluding that time and money spent “submitting comments to the EPA” and “testifying before the United States Senate” does not suffice to establish an injury in fact). “The mere fact that an organization redirects some of its resources to litigation and legal counseling in response to actions or inactions of another party is insufficient to impart standing upon the organization.” Nat’l Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. U.S., 68 F.3d 1428, 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quotations and citation omitted). The Trust’s decision to expend more of its resources by participating in both Don Pedro’s and La Grange’s licensing proceedings is the type of alleged harm that we have repeatedly held does not qualify as an injury in fact. The Trust, relying on this Court’s decision in Equal Rights Center v. Post Properties, Inc., argues that if a “defendant’s allegedly wrongful action prompts an organization to ‘increase[] the resources [it] must devote to programs independent of its suit,’ . . . the organization has shown an injury in fact.” 633 F.3d 1136, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). But Equal Rights Center is inapposite. As we noted in that case, an organization must allege that the defendant’s conduct “perceptibly impaired” the organization’s ability to provide services in order to establish injury in fact. 633 F.3d at 1138–39 (citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378–79 (1982)). The Trust does not allege impairment of its ability to provide services, only impairment of its advocacy. As we noted above, this will not suffice. 8 The Trust’s second asserted injury, a decline in tourism revenue, is also insufficient to satisfy the injury in fact requirement. It is purely conjectural. The Trust theorizes that if La Grange and Don Pedro are not licensed in a single proceeding, then the two projects will not have a coordinated fish passage, which will lead to a decline in the fish population, potentially reducing the number of tourists to the river and, consequently, the amount of money the Trust will make off of tourism. “This theory stacks speculation upon hypothetical upon speculation, which does not establish an ‘actual or imminent’ injury.” New York Regional Interconnect, 634 F.3d at 587. We may reject as overly speculative the Trust’s assumption regarding the future behavior of third parties. See Crete Carrier Corp. v. EPA, 363 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Moreover, the Trust’s prediction that separate licensing proceedings will result in the lack of a coordinated fish passage hypothesizes as to the outcome of future legal proceedings, and is thus “too speculative to invoke the jurisdiction of an Art[icle] III Court.” Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maintenance Trust v. FERC, 962 F.2d 27, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 157 (1990)). The record before us does not establish that FERC cannot coordinate fish passage between La Grange and Don Pedro despite separate licensing. See Nov. 14, 2014 FERC 28(j) Letter and attachment at 2, 7–8. Indeed, FERC suggested at oral argument that it intended to do so. Oral Arg. Rec. at 30:50–32:05, 33:25–34:00. The FPA empowers FERC to formulate comprehensive plans for, among other things, “enhancement of fish and wildlife.” 16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(1). On this record, it is wholly speculative to suggest that separate licensing will lead to an uncoordinated fish passage. The Trust also seeks to proceed under associational standing, arguing that a decline in fish population will diminish its members’ ongoing use and enjoyment of the river for fly fishing. To establish standing as an association, the Trust must 9 demonstrate that at least one of its members meets the three element test set forth in Lujan. See NO Gas Pipeline v. FERC, 756 F.3d 764, 767 (D.C. Cir. 2014). However, the notion that a lack of a coordinated fish passage will lead to a decline in the fish population which in turn will lead to a decrease in tourism is doubly speculative, and thus cannot be the basis for an injury in fact for either the Trust or its members. As noted above, we need not accept the Trust’s assertion that fish passage will not be coordinated. Moreover, we have repeatedly held that litigants cannot establish an Article III injury based on the “independent action[s] of some third party not before th[is] court.” Florida Audubon Soc. v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42 (1976)). This is because “predictions of future events (especially future actions taken by third parties)” are too speculative to support a claim of standing. United Transp. Union v. ICC, 891 F.2d 908, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The Trust’s theory of standing rests upon unsupported presumptions regarding fish population, and guesswork about what future tourists might do. This is insufficient to support a claim of standing. Because the Trust has failed to establish standing either for itself or on behalf of its members, we dismiss its petition for lack of jurisdiction.