Opinion ID: 2460770
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion For Remittitur Or New Trial On Damages

Text: In breach of contract actions a plaintiff must present to the jury evidence sufficient to calculate the amount of the loss caused by the breach. [50] The evidence does not need to prove with exact detail the amount of damages; the evidence needs only to be sufficient to provide a reasonable basis for the jury's determination. [51] In other words the law does not require absolute precision, it requires only a reasonable basis for the award. [52] Although a purely speculative award of damages is impermissible: [53] Once actual damages are shown and there is a reasonable basis for computing an award, a defendant's opportunity for pre-trial discovery of the evidentiary basis for the amount claimed, the right to cross-examine witnesses and to present evidence, as well as the judge's duty to instruct the jury on the issue of certainty provide adequate protection against speculative verdicts.[ [54] ] A trial court may grant remittitur when a jury returns an otherwise proper verdict awarding an amount of damages that the evidence cannot reasonably support. [55] Remittitur is appropriate when a jury `without acting under the type of passion or prejudice that would warrant a new trial, nonetheless awards an amount that is unreasonable given the evidence.' [56] We review a trial court's denial of remittitur for abuse of discretion, reversing only when left with a firm conviction on the whole record that the trial judge made a mistake in refusing to order a remittitur . . . and where intervention on our part is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice. [57] A trial court may grant a new trial on all or part of the issues tried to a jury if required in the interest of justice. [58] When considering a motion for new trial based on a claim that the jury's verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the court must use its discretion and independently weigh the evidence and may set aside the verdict even when `there is substantial evidence to support it.' [59] But on review: Because [t]he question . . . whether to grant or refuse a new trial rests in the sound discretion of the trial court . . . we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. We will affirm a trial court's decision to deny a new trial if there is an evidentiary basis for the jury's decision, and will only reverse a decision to deny a new trial if the evidence supporting the verdict was so completely lacking or slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust.[ [60] ]
Alaska Airlines argues the evidence does not support the jury's damages award because Chang-Craft's travel benefits, which represented the majority of Chang-Craft's future damages, were improperly calculated. Alaska Airlines asserts that Briskey, Chang-Craft's damages expert, produced a fundamentally flawed damages estimate that cannot constitute an evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict because it failed to separate Chang-Craft's personal travel benefits from her family's travel benefits. Alaska Airlines further labels Briskey's estimate as speculative, claiming she relied solely on Chang-Craft's statements about future travel and not on actual facts. Prior to trial but after Briskey's initial report of lost travel benefits calculations for Chang-Craft and her family members, Alaska Airlines moved for partial summary judgment to preclude Chang-Craft from recovering lost travel benefits for non-dependent family members. Alaska Airlines acknowledged that it provided travel benefits for employees and their spouses, as well as employees' parents and dependent children. But Alaska Airlines argued that assuming damages for travel benefits were recoverable in this case, Chang-Craft had no standing to recover damages for her non-dependent family members' lost travel benefits. The court granted Alaska Airlines's motion as to Chang-Craft's children and parents, but noted that Chang-Craft could still seek damages related to transferable travel benefits that she herself would have received. At trial Briskey estimated Chang-Craft would have worked approximately 5 years before retiring and estimated her retirement would last approximately 27 years. Based on Chang-Craft's stated future travel plans and a summary of the number of flights Chang-Craft and her family members had previously taken, Briskey estimated that future travel would include approximately 25 round-trip flights per year. Briskey testified she calculated the travel benefits using $625 as the round-trip flight value because that represented the cost to buy enough frequent flier miles for a round-trip ticket. But she also testified that by the time of trial the cost of buying miles for a round-trip ticket had risen to $687.50. As noted earlier, Alaska Airlines asserted during its cross-examination of Briskey that her damages calculation for lost future travel benefits still included Chang-Craft's children's and parents' travel benefits, and moved to strike Briskey's testimony. Chang-Craft argued that Briskey's testimony about family travel related to transferable buddy passes that would have been given directly to Chang-Craft. The court concluded the dispute was a question of fact for the jury and that it would give an appropriate jury instruction. Alaska Airlines's own expert economist, Michael Reaume, later testified about the court's pretrial order limiting travel benefits damages and his understanding that Chang-Craft's claim for travel benefits was limited to benefits for Chang-Craft, her husband, and her allowable guests, but not for Chang-Craft's children or parents. Because of the vagaries of air fares and restrictions on employee travel, Reaume was not willing to estimate the value of Chang-Craft's travel benefits. But he testified that Alaska Airlines's own estimate of the annual travel benefits was pretty much the same as Briskey's original estimate [61] and that the fundamental difference between the defense and the plaintiff was how those annual travel benefits were distributed among Chang-Craft, her spouse, her parents, her children and guests. When Reaume actually quantified that difference based on his allocation of the travel benefits among Chang-Craft's family members, it was around $7,000. There is no question that Chang-Craft suffered actual damages in the form of lost travel benefits. Alaska Airlines had the opportunity for pretrial discovery into those damages and to make motions to limit those damages. Alaska Airlines had the opportunity to cross-examine Chang-Craft about her stated retirement travel plans and about the extent of the travel benefits available to retired employees. Alaska Airlines had the opportunity to cross-examine Briskey about her damages calculations. Alaska Airlines had the opportunity to present its own evidence on the extent of travel benefits available to retired employees and how to value airline flights for calculating lost travel benefits. As it turned out, Reaume did not disagree with Briskey's methodology for calculating annual travel benefits, nor did he contest Briskey's updated cost estimates for travel. Reaume's sole argument for a reduction from Briskey's initial estimate was that Briskey improperly included some travel benefits for Chang-Craft's parents and children. We agree with the trial court that Jury Instruction 27 on travel benefits made it clear that Chang-Craft could not recover for her non-dependent family members' travel benefits. We also agree with the trial court that the jury had sufficient evidence to rationally determine how many annual trips Chang-Craft and her husband would take during her retirement, how many transferable buddy passes Chang-Craft would receive during her retirement to use with her trips, and how to value those trips. As Alaska Airlines acknowledged: (1) approximately 70% of Chang-Craft's total damages and 95% of Chang-Craft's future damages were for lost travel benefits, and (2) the jury did not award the full damages Briskey estimated; this reflects that Alaska Airlines's cross-examinations of Chang-Craft and Briskey, along with its own expert testimony and arguments, were persuasive and that the jury followed Jury Instruction 27. On this record, we are not firmly convinced that the trial court erred in refusing to order a remittitur . . . [such that] intervention on our part is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice. [62] Nor can we conclude that the evidence at trial, taken in the light most favorable to Chang-Craft, was so completely lacking or slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust; [63] therefore we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a new trial on damages. [64]