Opinion ID: 48740
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Videotape Evidence

Text: 24 We have long recognized that the use of tape recordings obviously is acceptable as long as a proper foundation has been laid and that recordings constitute real, as opposed to testimonial, evidence. 14 We have also recognized that it is within the discretion of the trial court to allow a transcript to be used by the jury `to assist the jury as it listens to the tape.' 15 This assistance will be necessary when portions of a tape may be relatively inaudible or without the aid of a transcript, it may be difficult to identify the speakers. 16 Neither party directs us to any case—and we have found none—in which facts and circumstances like those presented in this case were implicated, i.e., a transcript-assisted video recording shown to the jury without contemporaneously playing the underlying audio recording represented in the transcript. 25 A supplemental transcript is intended only to aid the jury in its assessment of real evidence (the actual audio recording), so the omission of the underlying audio recording may constitute error. The trial court apparently recognized this when it instructed the jury: 26 I have admitted the transcript for the limited and secondary purpose of aiding you in following the content of the conversation as you listen to the tape recording, and also to aid you in identifying the speakers. 27 You are specifically instructed that whether the transcript correctly or incorrectly reflects the content of the conversation or the identity of the speakers is entirely for you to determine based upon your own evaluation of the testimony you have heard concerning the preparation of the transcript, and from your own examination of the transcript in relation to your hearing of the tape recording itself as the primary evidence of its own contents; and if you should determine that the transcript is in any respect incorrect or unreliable, you should disregard it to that extent. 17 28 Despite the government's insistence otherwise at oral argument, we do not believe that the audio portion of this filming was played to the jury, but neither do we find anything in the record reflecting that Thompson objected to the playing of the videotape and transcript without the contemporaneous playing of the audio portion. He now must show, therefore, that the district court committed plain error by allowing the video tapes to be entered into evidence and played with only a transcript and not the audio portion as well. 18 29 To show plain error, Thompson must demonstrate that admitting the videotape and transcript without the underlying audio was error that was clear or obvious. The government emphasizes that, before trial, the parties had agreed to the use of a transcript that the defense had seen and that the transcript would appear on the video screen and scroll along as the tape was played. Thompson does not challenge the accuracy or authenticity of the transcript, but challenges the failure of the government to play both the transcript and the underlying audio to the jury while it was viewing the video portion. Without the audio portion, Thompson contends, the jury was unable to evaluate the accuracy of the transcript or, more importantly, to compare the voices on the other recordings (and the CI's voice, which the jury heard at trial) to the voices of the individuals who appear on the videotape. 30 Even if the omission of the audio portion of the recording were unintentional (as it appears to have been), the district court should have recognized and corrected the mistake as soon as the video started to play. As it did not do so, we are constrained to treat the district court's failure to do so as clear or obvious error. 31 For this clear error to rise to the level of plain error, however, Thompson must also show that it affected his substantial rights. Thompson contends that it did because omission of the audio from the videotape bolstered both the CI's and Deramus's testimony that Thompson was the drug dealer depicted on the videotape. Thompson's contention on this point, however, depends on the supposition that hearing the voice of the dealer on the videotape was somehow essential to the jury's determination of Thompson's identity and thus his guilt. This defies logic. 32 First, as Thompson never spoke at trial, the voice on the videotape could not have provided a basis for the jury's own identification of Thompson as the drug dealer. Second, the jury's inability to verify the accuracy of the transcript is immaterial, because Thompson neither challenges that nor disputes that the video shows a drug deal taking place. Third, the fact that the jury could not compare the voice on the videotape to the voice on the other audio recordings is inconsequential. The transcripts make clear that, in each audio recording (including the unplayed one underlying the transcript) the CI spoke with an individual named Rock. The jury heard the audio recordings of the telephone conversations in which the CI and Rock agreed to meet for the third transaction, the one that was videotaped. Consequently, Thompson's contention that hearing the audio of the dealer's voice during the videotaped third transaction somehow could have altered the jury's perception of the evidence rests on the completely implausible assumption that the CI might have conducted the third transaction with an individual called Rock entirely different from the one with whom the CI spoke by phone when arranging the meeting earlier that day. 33 Given the totality of these observations, we conclude that Thompson's substantial rights were not affected by the omission of the underlying audio recording when the video and the transcript of the third transaction was shown to the jury. Consequently, the district court did not commit plain error when it allowed the jury to view that videotape and transcript in the absence of the audio portion of the recording.