Opinion ID: 6321891
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The “Lustful Disposition” Doctrine

Text: Generally, ER 404(b) permits admission of evidence of prior bad acts for purposes other than propensity, “such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” The parties dispute whether we should retain or abandon “lustful disposition” as a permissible “other purpose” to admit prior bad acts under ER 404(b). “We do not lightly set aside precedent.” State v. Kier, 164 Wn.2d 798, 804, 194 P.3d 212 (2008). In order for this court to overturn precedent, “we require ‘a clear showing that an established rule is incorrect and harmful.’” State v. Johnson, 188 Wn.2d 742, 756-57, 399 P.3d 507 (2017) (quoting In re Rights to Waters of Stranger Creek, 77 Wn.2d 649, 653, 466 P.2d 508 (1970)). “We may also abandon our precedent ‘when [its] legal underpinnings . . . have changed or disappeared altogether.’” Id. at 757 (alterations in original) (quoting W.G. Clark Constr. Co. v. Pac. Nw. Reg’l Council of Carpenters, 180 Wn.2d 54, 66, 322 P.3d 1207 (2014)). We hold that the term “lustful disposition” must be rejected and that it may no longer be cited as a distinct purpose for admitting evidence under ER 404(b). However, we do not disturb our precedent permitting evidence of collateral misconduct relating to a specific victim for appropriate purposes under ER 404(b), including “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” The evidence in this case was admitted for such permissible 7 State v. Crossguns No. 99396-3 purposes. 1. “Lustful disposition” is not a separate, permissible purpose for admitting evidence; to the extent our precedent suggests otherwise, it is disavowed In Washington, the “lustful disposition” doctrine has been used as a means to admit evidence of prior, uncharged acts by the defendant against the same victim. Washington first held that such evidence may be admissible over 100 years ago, early in our state’s jurisprudence, though we did not then use the term “lustful disposition.” See State v. Wood, 33 Wash. 290, 74 P. 380 (1903). We later adopted the label “lustful disposition.” State v. Crowder, 119 Wash. 450, 452, 205 P. 850 (1922). We have retained the doctrine since then without close examination. See, e.g., State v. Ferguson, 100 Wn.2d 131, 667 P.2d 68 (1983). Our precedent has occasionally mischaracterized the purpose of evidence admitted pursuant to the “lustful disposition” doctrine. For example, in State v. Thorne, evidence that the defendant had “acted in a lewd and lascivious manner” with the victim one year prior to the charged offense was admitted to demonstrate “the lustful inclination of the defendant toward the [victim], which in turn makes it more probable that the defendant committed the offense charged” because it “evidences a sexual desire for the particular [victim].” 43 Wn.2d 47, 60, 260 P.2d 331 (1953). Thorne has been cited in subsequent cases to describe the term “lustful disposition,” but it has not been carefully scrutinized. See State v. Ray, 116 Wn.2d 531, 547, 806 P.2d 1220 8 State v. Crossguns No. 99396-3 (1991); State v. Camarillo, 115 Wn.2d 60, 70, 794 P.2d 850 (1990); Ferguson, 100 Wn.2d at 134; State v. Golladay, 78 Wn.2d 121, 141-42, 470 P.2d 191 (1970), overruled on other grounds by State v. Arndt, 87 Wn.2d 374, 378, 553 P.2d 1328 (1976); State v. Fischer, 57 Wn.2d 262, 264-65, 356 P.2d 983 (1960). We must now reexamine it. The term “lustful disposition” perpetuates outdated rape myths that sexual assault, including child sex abuse, results from an uncontrollable sexual urge or a sexual need that is not met. This remains an area not well understood and where research is ongoing. Natalie Bennett & William O’Donohue, The Construct of Grooming in Child Sexual Abuse: Conceptual and Measurement Issues, 23 J. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 957 (2014). 4 Nevertheless, in recognition of how sexual violence is a crime of violence that uses unwanted sexual contact as the weapon, most jurisdictions have redefined the crime of rape as sexual assault. Despite this recognition, Washington courts continue to employ the term “lustful disposition,” which uses outdated language that paints a picture that the offender has an overpowering sexual desire for or attraction to their victim. This implies that these motivations are natural and fails to acknowledge the inherent violence in sex crimes and the life-changing impacts such crimes can cause. Although 4 Ninety-one percent of cases of child abuse are committed by someone the victim knows. ADMIN. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU MALTREATMENT SURVEY 2020, 27. 9 State v. Crossguns No. 99396-3 the Court of Appeals in this case called the doctrine into question, the majority’s concern for the level of specificity of the defendant’s sexual desire was misplaced. Crossguns, No. 37079-8-III, slip op. at 13. The problem with the doctrine is not whether it demonstrates “general sexual proclivities” because “many men have a lustful disposition to a large population of females or males,” but that it evokes sexual desire at all. Id. The term “lustful disposition” suggests that the offender is inherently inclined to be sexually attracted to their victim, that they have a “lustful inclination” or “sexual desire for the particular [victim].” Id. (emphasis added) (citing Ferguson, 100 Wn.2d at 134). In other jurisdictions, this doctrine has been called “‘depraved sexual instinct,’” 5 “unnatural lust,” 6 and “‘lewd disposition.’” 7 These terms all echo incorrect, anachronistic beliefs that sexual assault is a crime primarily of sexual attraction. They also incorrectly suggest that evidence admitted under the “lustful disposition” label may be used as propensity evidence. As discussed further below, it may not. In addition to being incorrect, the “lustful disposition” label is also harmful. To the extent that it appears to allow propensity evidence, it is clearly harmful because “ER 404(b) is a categorical bar to admission of evidence for the purpose of proving a 5 State v. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d 10, 16 (Mo. 1993) (quoting State v Lachterman, 812 S.W.2d 759 (Mo. App. 1991)), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Vorhees, 248 S.W.3d 585, 592 n.5 (Mo. 2008). 6 State v. Edwards, 224 N.C. 527, 528, 31 S.E.2d 516 (1944). 7 State v. Tobin, 602 A.2d 528, 531 (R.I. 1992) (quoting State v. Jalette, 119 R.I. 614, 624, 382 A.2d 526 (1978)). 10 State v. Crossguns No. 99396-3 person’s character and showing that the person acted in conformity with that character.” State v. Gresham, 173 Wn.2d 405, 420, 269 P.3d 207 (2012). Moreover, by erroneously focusing on sexual desire, “lustful disposition” perpetuates other rape myths. For example, the misconception that people commit sex crimes based on sexual desire emphasizes outdated, sexist assumptions and expectations about the “desirability” or “complicity” of the victim by analyzing the victim’s conduct, clothing, and sexual history. Karen M. Kramer, Rule by Myth: The Social and Legal Dynamics Governing Alcohol-Related Acquaintance Rapes, 47 STAN. L. REV. 115, 120, 121 (1994) (discussing “beliefs that alcohol increases sexual arousal[ and] loosens women’s sexual inhibitions,” making them “acceptable targets for sexual assault”). The misplaced focus on sexual desire in turn reinforces these myths that excuse sex offenders by blaming victims. Finally, despite the broad language this court has occasionally used to describe “lustful disposition” evidence, the underlying analysis in Thorne and other cases reveals that “lustful disposition” is more akin to a permissible showing of intent, motive, opportunity, common scheme or plan, preparation, and absence of accident or mistake. In Thorne, this court likened the use of “lustful disposition” to motive, explaining that “‘in showing the lustful desire or disposition of the defendant for the prosecuting witness you are showing a motive, i.e., a state of feeling impelling toward the act charged.’” 43 Wn.2d at 61 (quoting State v. Clough, 33 Del. 140, 145, 132 A. 11 State v. Crossguns No. 99396-3 219, 221 (1925)). Similarly, this court in State v. Leohner noted that “we have held that evidence of the accused’s collateral conduct is admissible to prove his lustful inclination, and to prove a common scheme or design. . . . [A]ppellant tacitly admits that his other acts are admissible to show an absence of accident or mistake.” 69 Wn.2d 131, 135, 417 P.2d 368 (1966) (holding testimony that the defendant previously took “unpermitted liberties” with each of the girls named in the information was properly admitted) (citations omitted) (citing Fischer, 57 Wn.2d 262; State v. Johnson, 60 Wn.2d 21, 371 P.2d 611 (1962)). This demonstrates that “lustful disposition,” properly understood, is not a distinct purpose for admitting evidence, but a label used to refer to permissible ER 404(b) purposes in the specific context of sex crimes.This anachronistic label is incorrect and harmful. It is often incorrectly used to admit evidence of behavior that is prominent in crimes of sexual abuse, such as grooming, victim identification, and planning, which has nothing to do with general sexual attraction. Moreover, the term “lustful disposition” reinforces the myth of the pathological, crazed rapist who is a stranger to the victim. By continuing to label this kind of evidence as proof of a “lustful disposition,” we perpetuate other rape myths that improperly focus on the victim. This reinforces incorrect and harmful misconceptions about sexual assault. We therefore conclude the term “lustful disposition” is both incorrect and harmful. We reject the “lustful disposition” label, and to the extent that our precedent indicates that “lustful disposition” is a distinct, 12 State v. Crossguns No. 99396-3 permissible purpose for admitting evidence, we clarify that it is not. The evidence, however, that has come in under this doctrine remains admissible, as we explain below. 2. We do not disturb our precedent permitting evidence of collateral misconduct relating to a specific victim under ER 404(b) As noted above, even where we have purported to rely on the “lustful disposition” doctrine, the evidence in question has generally been admissible for some other, proper purpose, such as intent, motive, opportunity, common scheme or plan, preparation, and absence of accident or mistake. In addition, due to the nature of the crimes of rape and of child sexual abuse, the evidence of other uncharged sexual misconduct may be admissible as part of the crime itself in appropriate cases. In this case, the trial court properly admitted evidence of Crossguns’s uncharged sexual assaults for permissible ER 404(b) purposes. Therefore, the court’s reference to “lustful disposition” in admitting the evidence was harmless. Sometimes, evidence that might have been erroneously admitted under the “lustful disposition” label is nevertheless admissible because it is necessary to demonstrate the dynamics between the offender and their victim or victims. “Two necessary components” for the commission of sex crimes “are access and control,” and developing trust is necessary to the “‘grooming process.’” Basyle J. Tchividjian, Predators and Propensity: The Proper Approach for Determining the Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts Evidence in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 39 AM. J. CRIM. L. 327, 364, 368 (2012) (footnotes omitted). “Manipulating relationships of trust with children 13 State v. Crossguns No. 99396-3 for purposes of gratifying the abuser” is a major component to the crime of child sexual assault. David R. Katner, Delayed Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, the Kavanaugh Confirmation Hearing, and Eliminating Statutes of Limitation for Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 47 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 3 (2020). Evidence of such manipulation shows the planning and intent involved in building a relationship with the child victim in order to obtain the access and opportunity to commit the acts of sexual assault, as we see in this case, which stands in contradiction with the idea that “lust” is an overwhelming motivator and almost impervious to planning. 8 Therefore, evidence of prior sexual misconduct may be relevant and admissible in cases such as this that involve sexual abuse in the context of a relationship with unequal power dynamics. And, of course, the fact that a case involves crimes of sexual violence does not preclude the admission of evidence for permissible ER 404(b) purposes. In this case, although Crossguns was charged with only two counts, the trial court admitted evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct from over a year of his abusing R.G.M. The trial court erred in admitting the evidence, in part, under the anachronistic term of “lustful disposition,” but any error in admitting the evidence was 8 See Georgia M. Winters & Elizabeth L. Jeglic, Stages of Sexual Grooming: Recognizing Potentially Predatory Behaviors of Child Molesters, 38 DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 724, 724 (2018) (“Successful grooming involves the skillful manipulation of a child and the community so that sexual abuse can be more easily committed without detection. . . . These behaviors include strategies such as selecting a vulnerable victim, gaining access to the child, developing trust, and desensitizing the victim to touch.”). 14 State v. Crossguns No. 99396-3 harmless because the evidence was properly admitted for other, permissible purposes, including “intent, plan, motive, opportunity, absence of mistake or accident, . . . and as res gestae in the case to show [R.G.M.]’s state of mind for her delayed disclosure.” CP at 119. See State v. Foxhoven, 161 Wn.2d 168, 178-79, 163 P.3d 786 (2007) (concluding that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of bad acts for one reason, but any error was harmless because the evidence was properly admitted for another reason). The evidence of prior bad acts was also admitted to prove the aggravating factors that Crossguns used a position of trust to commit the crimes and that the offenses were part of an ongoing pattern of sexual abuse of the same victim. Crossguns’s arguments are inconsistent on this point; in one part of his brief, he seems to drop the challenge to the admission of the evidence for these other purposes, but in other areas he reasserts that challenge. Even if he does challenge the admission of this evidence, we find it was admissible under ER 404 and conclude that any error was harmless. Id. In sum, we abandon the term “lustful disposition” but hold that the evidence of Crossguns’s prior sexual misconduct against R.G.M. was properly admitted for permissible purposes under ER 404(b). Therefore, we affirm the Court of Appeals on different grounds.