Opinion ID: 2518603
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pagenkopf's claim for prejudgment interest from Dilbeck

Text: Determining the starting date for prejudgment interest presents a question of law that we resolve by applying our independent judgment. [40] We review interpretations of statutes de novo, adopting the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy. [41] Pagenkopf argues that the superior court erred in ruling that prejudgment interest should accrue from April 2, 2002, the date that the third-party complaint was served on Dilbeck. Pagenkopf claims that the court should have ordered prejudgment interest to begin much sooner  within several days of the accident, when Dilbeck and his insurer first became aware that a claim was likely to be filed. Dilbeck responds that Pagenkopf is not entitled to interest from the earlier date, since he failed to give proper written notice of a claim against Dilbeck as required by AS 09.30.070(b). The relevant portion of AS 09.30.070(b) provides: Except when the court finds that the parties have agreed otherwise and except as provided by AS 45.05.111(d), prejudgment interest accrues from the day process is served on the defendant or the day the defendant received written notification that an injury has occurred and that a claim may be brought against the defendant for that injury, whichever is earlier. The written notification must be of a nature that would lead a prudent person to believe that a claim will be made against the person receiving the notification, for personal injury, death, or damage to property. Under this provision, a potential defendant does not need to receive notice of an actual claim, but rather only needs to receive notice that a claim may be brought. [42] In Lloyd's v. Fulton we stated that AS 09.30.070(b) establishes an objective test providing that interest begins to accrue upon written notice `that would lead a prudent person to believe that a claim will be made against the person receiving the notification.' [43] Direct notice from the potential claimant is not required. [44] In McConkey v. Hart we further held that, despite AS 09.30.070(b)'s express reference to written notice, the statutory requirement of written notice may be satisfied by proof of actual notice. [45] While Dilbeck argues that there is no evidence that Pagenkopf ever intended to make a direct claim against him, AS 09.30.070(b) does not require the defendant to know the claimant's identity; it only requires knowledge that a claim may be brought against the defendant for th[e] injury. Dilbeck's actions in the immediate aftermath of the accident appear to show that he actually believed a claim might be brought against him. [46] He was present during the accident, realized that Pagenkopf was injured, and promptly sent his insurer a written Notice of Incident form describing the accident in a manner that ascribed negligence to Chatham. Dilbeck's insurance agent notified the insurance carrier that there was no claim as of yet and added that Dilbeck believes there may not be one. At a minimum, Dilbeck's optimistic belief reveals his actual knowledge that a claim might be filed; and his hopeful subjective view that there may not be one would hardly preclude a finding that, objectively viewed, the information Dilbeck actually knew would lead a prudent person to believe that a claim [would] be made against him. [47] The record thus contains reliable proof capable of supporting a finding that Dilbeck had actual notice of the potential claim soon after Pagenkopf was injured. [48] Moreover Dilbeck's ensuing communications with Chatham's insurance carrier and his later participation in mediation with Chatham and Pagenkopf would seem to establish the existence of actual notice by the time the mediation occurred  still well before he was served with Chatham's third-party complaint. Under these circumstances we hold that AS 09.30.070(b)'s written-notice requirement does not control in this case and that prejudgment interest began to accrue no later than the date of the mediation. Because an even earlier starting point is arguable, the exact date must be determined in the first instance by the superior court on remand.