Opinion ID: 1495306
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Issue of Joinder

Text: We address first appellant's contention that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for severance of the rape counts. D.C.Code 1973, § 23-311(a), permits the joinder of two or more offenses when each is charged in a separate count of the indictment, if such offenses . . . are of the same or similar character. . . . [2] Appellant urges, however, that because the two rapes were unrelated and occurred at different times, by charging them in one indictment the jury was permitted to cumulate the evidence in support of each offense with prejudicial effect within the purview of Super.Ct.Cr.R. 14. [3] Whenever similar but unrelated offenses are charged in an indictment to a single defendant, there is a possibility of some prejudice but, without more, such a joinder is permitted. Cupo v. United States, 123, U.S.App.D.C. 324, 359 F.2d 990 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1013, 87 S.Ct. 723, 17 L.Ed.2d 549 (1967). The court pointed out in Drew v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 11, 17, 331 F.2d 85, 91 (1964): [C]ourts, including our own, have . . found no prejudicial effect from joinder when the evidence of each crime is simple and distinct, even though such evidence might not have been admissible in separate trials . . . . See also and compare United States v. Miller, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 312, 319, 449 F.2d 974, 980 (1970); Hill v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 233, 418 F.2d 449 (1968). Moreover, while the two rapes here involved occurred at different times, the methods employed by the rapist in each case were strikingly similar. For example, in each case the rapist, driving a light blue Volkswagen, invited the victim into the automobile as an act of friendly concern and for an apparently innocent purpose. In each case the friendly attitude of the rapist changed suddenly, and without provocation, to one of anger accompanied by threats of bodily harm and death, because of some injury allegedly perpetrated on him or some one of his relatives by the victim or some one of her relatives. In each case the rape was accomplished by first putting the victim in fear of her life and then apparently abandoning that purpose and demanding and obtaining submission to sexual intercourse. Finally, after each rape the victim was treated kindly and returned to her destination. United States v. Miller, supra ; Drew v. United States, supra . We may reverse an order denying severance under Super.Ct.Cr.R. 14 only upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Hurt v. United States, D.C.App., 314 A.2d 489, 491-92 (1974); Coleman v. United States, D.C.App., 298 A.2d 40, 42 (1972). Because in the case at bar the evidence as to each rape was carefully separated and submitted to the jury after proper instructions, we are satisfied that there was no abuse of discretion in denying severance. Bell v. United States, D.C. App., 332 A.2d 351, 353-54 (1975). See also Hill v. United States, supra .