Opinion ID: 1317119
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Power of the Court Acting in Equity

Text: The Court of Appeal correctly identified the nature of plaintiff's cause of action and the issue in this appeal when it wrote: This is an appeal from an equitable decree which declared that plaintiffs had acquired an easement by prescription over the property of defendant. (Italics added.) Neither the parties nor the majority disagree with that characterization. We come, therefore, to the power of the court in equity. Whether the trial court must order the plaintiffs to pay fair market value for the prescriptive easement, as the Court of Appeal concluded, depends on the breadth of discretion which the court in equity enjoys. Let us briefly explore the concept of equity. Equity's origins lie in the King's extraordinary judicial power, exercised through the Chancery, to administer justice whenever it was probable that a fair trial in the ordinary Courts would be impeded, and also whenever, ... the regular administration of justice was hindered. (5 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (1941) § 31 p. 37, hereinafter Pomeroy.) The Chancellor was obliged to look only to Honesty, Equity, and Conscience [ ] to decide conflicts. ( Id., § 35, p. 40.) Today, it is only a matter of degree that separates the early Chancellors who decided whether reason and conscience demanded special intervention.... (Walsh, § 53, p. 282) from the modern judges and their grants of equitable relief. ( Id. ) The modern judge remains the repositor of special relief; he stands in the states' stead modifying the rigor of hard and fast rules at law where reason and conscience demand it. ( Ibid. ) What would be fair under the circumstances of the case at bench? The problem began because plaintiff built a large commercial building without leaving sufficient room for delivery trucks to approach the loading docks. The building which defendant had built left a 150-foot wide strip of unimproved land. The 40-foot wide driveway plaintiffs had constructed was simply insufficient for its purposes. Therefore, the delivery trucks went on to defendant's land. In the original negotiations the creation of an easement was considered by the seller, plaintiffs and defendant, but none was negotiated. Later, plaintiffs offered to purchase an easement at least twice. Finally, when defendant raised a dirt pad of land on his land (apparently in preparation for the construction) which prevented the trucks from trespassing more than five feet, plaintiffs brought this action. Traditionally the courts have not imposed a condition that fair market value be paid before a prescriptive easement will be declared and protected. However, in my view, the courts do have such power. In the case at bench that power should be exercised. The role which the court in equity can play is seen in two disparate examples, one old and one new. First, we look to the traditional case wherein the building of one owner trespasses upon that of another. Where the law recognizes a legal wrong in such a trespass, and would normally order the removal of the encroaching building (as was done in the case at bench), the court in equity may instead order that money damages be paid by the encroaching party as a condition of protecting the encroachment, particularly where the encroachment was unintentional. (See Walsh, § 55, pp. 284-85.) Second, I cite a quite different example which does not deal with property. The courts, pursuant to their inherent equitable powers, have created several exceptions to the statutory rule (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021) which requires each party to pay his or her own attorney fees. (See Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 34-47 [141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 569 P.2d 1303].) These examples simply illustrate the not too startling notion that courts of equity, in search of fairness, may (1) impose conditions before a decree protecting rights will issue, (2) grant monetary damages, and (3) extend statutory rights. I cite these only to stress that no reason abides in the history, concept or modern practice of equity which would so restrict the power of the court that it could not impose a requirement that fair market value be paid by the trespasser who is granted a prescriptive easement. Finally, I turn to the fairness issue. By permitting the prescriptive easement in the case at bench the state, acting through the court, endorses a private action akin to eminent domain. Practically, [3] it is the taking of property rights from defendant and giving them to plaintiff. Can it be fair to reward a wrongdoer and punish an innocent property owner? The majority says yes. It is fair, according to the majority, for several reasons including (1) reducing litigation, (2) protecting possession, and (3) preference for use over disuse of land. None of these reasons is convincing. First, no litigation was reduced. Society should not be in the business of forcing an owner of land to bring suit when a trespass has occurred. Such a policy increases litigation. Second, the possession of the easement has in fact been protected; plaintiffs are only required to pay for the easement. Third, modern society evidences a preference for planned use, not the ad hoc use of a trespasser. It is questionable that in the urban setting of the case at bench, such use by the trespasser is preferred by society. I do not rely solely on my personal view of fairness. Rather, it is my role as a judge, as it was with the chancellor, to apply a conception of justice in accordance with the prevailing reason and conscience of the time. (Walsh, § 53, p. 281.) (See also 5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, § 67, p. 89; [Equity] is so constructed ..., that it possesses an inherent capacity of expansion, so as to keep abreast of each succeeding generation and age.) The final decree of the trial court, approved by the majority, contravenes today's basic notions of fairness and justice. A requirement that plaintiffs pay fair market value for the land use given them is the least our society expects.