Opinion ID: 76557
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Constitutionality of the Permitting Provision

Text: 7 Burk argues that the permitting provision constitutes a facial violation of the First Amendment by impermissibly discriminating on the basis of content of speech in public fora 2 and by granting the County Sheriff excessive discretion over permitting decisions. Because we agree with her on content discrimination, we decline to reach her discretion argument as it relates to the permitting requirement generally. 8 Because it requires groups of five or more people to obtain permission from the County Sheriff in order to carry out a protest or demonstration, the Augusta-Richmond Ordinance is a prior restraint on speech. See United States v. Frandsen, 212 F.3d 1231, 1236-37 (11th Cir.2000) (A prior restraint of expression exists when the government can deny access to a forum before the expression occurs.). Prior restraints are presumptively unconstitutional and face strict scrutiny. Id. at 1237; Church of Scientology Flag Serv. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1547-48 (11th Cir.1993). Nonetheless, a prior restraint may be approved if it qualifies as a regulation of the time, place, and manner of expression rather than a regulation of content. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2754, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989); Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1316 (11th Cir.2000). A content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation must leave open alternative channels of communication and survive intermediate scrutiny, the requirement that it not restrict substantially more speech than necessary to further a legitimate government interest. Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. at 2758. 3 By contrast, content-based speech regulations face strict scrutiny, the requirement that the government use the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling government interest. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 1886, 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000). 9 Accordingly, we first inquire whether the Ordinance is content-neutral. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. at 2754. It is not. The Ordinance applies only to public demonstration or protest, § 3-4-11, defined as support for, or protest of, any person, issue, political or other cause or action, § 3-4-1(e). Neither in its brief nor at oral argument has the County disputed Burk's assertion that this language targets political expression, however defined. 4 Nor has the County disputed the fact that the Ordinance leaves other speech untouched. The Ordinance therefore classifies and regulates expression on the basis of content. Accord Hall v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 681 F.2d 965, 970-71 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (The Board has sought to regulate that speech based upon its content: whether it is `political or sectarian,' or `special interest material.' This is not regulation of `time, place, or manner' of expression); 5 see also Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 533, 100 S.Ct. 2326, 2330-31, 65 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (holding content-based a regulation that barred utility company bill inserts expressing opinions or viewpoints on controversial issues of public policy but did not bar topics that are not `controversial issues of public policy'). 10 The County argues that we must find the Ordinance content-neutral under Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000), and Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988). We disagree; we do not believe either decision erodes our holding in Hall that targeting only political speech renders a regulation content-based. We address each case in turn. 6 11 In Hill v. Colorado, the Supreme Court found content-neutral a Colorado statute that prohibited any person within the regulated areas ... to knowingly approach within eight feet of another person, without that person's consent, for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such other person. Id. at 707, 120 S.Ct. at 2484. The County argues that if a statute regulating only those engaged in protest, education, or counseling is content-neutral, then surely an ordinance regulating only political protests and demonstrations is content-neutral as well. 12 A close reading of Hill reveals that the analogy fails. Hill relied heavily on the notions that [t]he principal inquiry in determining content neutrality ... is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys, id. at 719, 120 S.Ct. at 2491 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. at 2754), and government regulation of expressive activity is `content neutral' if it is justified without reference to the content of regulated speech, id. at 720, 120 S.Ct. at 2491 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. at 2754). The statute at issue in Hill was justified without reference to the content of regulated speech because it did not distinguish among speech instances that are similarly likely to raise the legitimate concerns to which it responds. Id. at 724, 120 S.Ct. at 2493. The distinctions it drew were justified by a legislative concern independent of content — protecting persons walking into health care facilities. Id. ([T]he statute's restriction seeks to protect those who enter a health care facility from the harassment, the nuisance, the persistent importuning, the dogging, and the implied threat of physical touching that can accompany an unwelcome approach within eight feet of a patient by a person wishing to argue vociferously face-to-face and perhaps thrust an undesired handbill upon her.). In fact, the statute at issue in Hill places no restrictions on — and clearly does not prohibit — either a particular viewpoint or any subject matter. Id. at 723, 120 S.Ct. at 2493. 13 The Augusta-Richmond County Ordinance differs from the statute at issue in Hill because it places restrictions on certain subject matter, political expression, and is not justified without reference to the content of regulated speech. Id. at 720, 120 S.Ct. at 2491. In this case, the latter characteristic is apparent from the poor fit between the Ordinance's means and purported ends. Hill instructs that [a] statute that restricts certain categories of speech only lends itself to invidious use [the vice of content-based regulation] if there is a significant number of communications, raising the same problem that the statute was enacted to solve, that fall outside the statute's scope, while others fall inside. Id. at 723, 120 S.Ct. at 2493 (citing Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972)). The statute in Hill did not distinguish among speech instances that are similarly likely to raise the legitimate concerns to which it responds. Id. at 724, 120 S.Ct. at 2493. By contrast, the Ordinance at issue in this case does distinguish among speech instances that raise the same concerns. The Ordinance's purported goals are maintaining public safety, avoiding traffic congestion, keeping the peace, and providing advance notice to law enforcement officials of public events. See § 3-4-11(b)(3). But the Ordinance regulates countless expressive activities that do not threaten public safety, traffic, or the peace, and it fails to regulate countless other expressive activities that do threaten the harms. For example, the Ordinance does not apply to numerous activities involving more than five people — e.g., a street party, a tailgating party, a sidewalk performance by a five-person musical group, or even a high school band — that will likely threaten the County's feared harms. And the Ordinance restricts a five-person political discussion or silent sit-in on the sidewalk's edge even though such events are unlikely to threaten the County's feared harms. 7 In other words, there are easily a significant number of communications, raising the same problem that the statute was enacted to solve, that fall outside the statute's scope, while others fall inside. Hill, 530 U.S. at 723, 120 S.Ct. at 2493. Therefore, the Ordinance is not justified by its purported content-independent goals, and the County has regulated based on content. Id. at 723-24, 120 S.Ct. at 2493. 8 14 The County also misses the mark with Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420. In Frisby, the Supreme Court approved a prohibition on picketing in front of individual residences. The Court accepted the ordinance as content-neutral when construed not to exempt labor picketing. 487 U.S. at 481-82, 108 S.Ct. at 2501. 15 The County argues that Frisby made no mention of the possibility that the ordinance may have been content-based because it restricted picketing, which is a method of political protest, but did not restrict other expressive conduct. It argues that if regulations of picketing are content-neutral, then regulations of protest or demonstration should be content-neutral. 16 The County errs by failing to appreciate the difference between picketing — which is a method of delivery of speech involving conduct without regard to any particular message or subject matter — and the County's definition of Protest/Demonstration, which expressly targets all expression on a certain subject matter, political speech. See § 3-4-1(e). Of course, people engaging in picketing nearly always intend to send a message of some kind along with their acts. However, the acts themselves — standing, marching, or holding a sign, for example — do not involve any particular expressive content, and the conduct may therefore be regulated without burdening any particular viewpoint or subject matter. 9 A content-neutral conduct regulation like those at issue in Frisby and Hill places no restrictions on — and clearly does not prohibit — either a particular viewpoint or any subject matter that may be discussed, Hill, 530 U.S. at 723, 120 S.Ct. at 2493, and it may be said about such regulations that they have nothing to do with the content of speech but rather are imposed because of the nature of the regulated conduct, see id. at 737, 120 S.Ct. at 2500-01 (Souter, J., concurring, joined by O'Connor, J., Ginsburg, J., and Breyer, J.) (The correct rule ... is captured in the formulation that a restriction is content-based only if it is imposed because of the content of the speech and not because of offensive behavior identified with its delivery.... The facts overwhelmingly demonstrate the validity of [the statute at issue in Hill ] as a content-neutral regulation imposed solely to regulate the manner in which speakers may conduct themselves within 100 feet of the entrance of a health care facility.) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 10 Thus, a content-neutral conduct regulation applies equally to all, and not just to those with a particular message or subject matter in mind. Id. at 723, 120 S.Ct. at 2493 (Instead of drawing distinctions based on the subject matter that the ... speaker may wish to address, the statute applies equally to used car salesmen, animal rights activists, fundraisers, environmentalists, and missionaries.). The same cannot be said of the Augusta-Richmond County Ordinance because it applies to a particular subject matter of expression, politics, rather than to particular conduct, such as picketing. 11 17 Finally, it is useful to contrast the Augusta-Richmond County Ordinance and an ordinance the Supreme Court addressed in Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316, 122 S.Ct. 775, 151 L.Ed.2d 783 (2002). In that case, the Supreme Court found an ordinance content-neutral and rejected a challenge under Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 85 S.Ct. 734, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965) (requiring procedural safeguards in content-based regulatory contexts). However, the ordinance at issue in Thomas required a permit for all public assemblies of more than 50 people, regardless of purpose. The Court readily found that the ordinance was content-neutral, explaining that the ordinance ... is not even directed to communicative activity as such, but rather to all activity conducted in a public park. The picnicker and soccer-player, no less than the political activist or parade marshal, must apply for a permit if the 50-person limit is to be exceeded. 534 U.S. at 322, 122 S.Ct. at 779 (emphasis added). By contrast, the Augusta-Richmond County Ordinance is directed only to communicative activity, rather than to all activity, and its applicability turns solely on the subject matter of what a speaker might say. The Ordinance regulates only political speakers, leaving soccer-players, sidewalk performers, and tailgating groups untouched. 18 Because the Ordinance is a content-based prior restraint on speech, we must strictly scrutinize it to ascertain whether it employs the least restrictive means to meet a compelling government interest. See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813, 120 S.Ct. at 1886. 12 Few laws survive such scrutiny, and this Ordinance is no exception. The County could promote its goals through numerous less restrictive means. It could, for example, target only offensive behavior or the manner of delivery of speech without regard to viewpoint or subject matter. Or it could tailor its regulation more closely to fit expressive instances or conduct likely to threaten the harms it fears. Or it could enact an ordinance like that at issue in Thomas, which applies generally, without reference to expressive content, and only to larger groups. 13 Finally, it is clear that regulating as few as five peaceful protestors ( e.g. silently sitting in on the edge of the sidewalk) is not the least restrictive means of accomplishing the County's legitimate traffic flow and peace-keeping concerns. 14 19 For these reasons, we readily conclude that the County has failed to carry its burden of proving, see Playboy, 529 U.S. at 816, 120 S.Ct. at 1888, that this content-based Ordinance is sufficiently tailored to survive strict scrutiny. We hold that it is unconstitutional. 20