Opinion ID: 656636
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Victim Photographs

Text: 47 The defendant asserts that the trial court's admission of identification photographs of the two victims violated his rights to due process and a fair trial. We review the admission of photographs only for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Sides, 944 F.2d 1554, 1562 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 604, 116 L.Ed.2d 627 (1991).  'The trial judge's exercise of discretion in balancing the prejudicial effect and probative value of photographic evidence of this type is rarely disturbed,'  United States v. Soundingsides, 820 F.2d 1232, 1243 (10th Cir.1987) (quoting United States v. Goseyun, 789 F.2d 1386, 1387 (9th Cir.1986)), and we will not disturb it in this case. 48 The government alleged that the defendant murdered Ms. Joe and Ms. Washburn and therefore had the burden of proving the identity of these two victims. To prove the identity of the victims, the government introduced photographs of Ms. Joe and Ms. Washburn that had been taken prior to their deaths. Defense counsel objected to the admission of these photographs, arguing that the identity of the victims was not at issue and that the photographs were prejudicial. We reject these arguments. 49 The defendant never stipulated to the identity of the victims. Thus, the government was not relieved of its burden to prove identity and the photographs are probative of the victims' identity. See United States v. De Parias, 805 F.2d 1447, 1453 (11th Cir.1986) (making the unsurprising point that [p]hotographs of homicide victims are relevant in showing the identity of the victim), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916, 107 S.Ct. 3189, 96 L.Ed.2d 678 (1987). More importantly, we are convinced that the photographs were not unfairly prejudicial.  'Relevant evidence is inherently prejudicial; but it is only unfair prejudice, substantially outweighing probative value, which permits exclusion of relevant matter....'  Sides, 944 F.2d at 1563 (citations omitted). We held in Sides that close-up photographs revealing the victim's wounds and bloodstained shirt were probative and not unfairly prejudicial to the defendant. Id. Similarly, in United States v. Naranjo, 710 F.2d 1465, 1468-69 (10th Cir.1983), we held that the probative value of a photograph depicting a great deal of blood on a pillow, bedsheets, and the victim's face was not outweighed by its potential for prejudice. Unlike the graphic photographs in Sides and Naranjo, the photographs in this case merely showed the victims' faces prior to injury. 10 The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the identification photographs.V. Jury Instructions 50 The defendant next asserts that the district court's instructions to the jury were improper. When examining a challenge to jury instructions, we examine [the instructions] as a whole and apply a de novo standard of review to determine the propriety of tendering an individual jury instruction. United States v. Sasser, 974 F.2d 1544, 1551 (10th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1063, 122 L.Ed.2d 368 (1993). Thus, we consider all that the jury heard and, from [the] standpoint of the jury, decide 'not whether the charge was faultless in every particular but whether the jury was misled in any way and whether it had understanding of the issues and its duty to determine these issues.'  United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 673 (10th Cir.1989) (quoting Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 895 (10th Cir.1984)). 51 The district court instructed the jury that, To kill with malice aforethought means either to kill another person deliberately and intentionally, or to act with callous and wanton disregard for human life. Joe contends that the district court erred in submitting this instruction because it authorized the jury to infer malice based on a callous and wanton disregard for human life. According to Joe, the callous and wanton disregard for human life instruction relieved the prosecution of its burden to prove specific intent because the jury was permitted to find malice aforethought based solely on Joe's actions. 52 We have previously noted that [m]alice aforethought may be established by evidence of conduct which is reckless and wanton, and a gross deviation from a reasonable standard of care, of such a nature that a jury is warranted in inferring that the defendant was aware of a serious risk of death or serious bodily harm. Soundingsides, 820 F.2d at 1237; see also Montoya v. United States Parole Comm'n, 908 F.2d 635, 641 (10th Cir.1990) (Tacha, J., dissenting) (stating that malice aforethought may be based on one's callous and wanton disregard for human life); United States v. Chagra, 807 F.2d 398, 402 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 832, 108 S.Ct. 106, 98 L.Ed.2d 66 (1987). Based on Soundingsides, we conclude that Joe's malice aforethought may be established by his callous and wanton disregard for the lives of Ms. Joe and Ms. Washburn. The trial court's instruction on this point was proper. 53 Joe also argues that, taken as a whole, the jury instructions were hopelessly undecipherable and that they prevented the jury from properly distinguishing between the elements of first and second degree murder and manslaughter. In the instructions, the court first gave the jury a list of the distinct elements required to convict the defendant of first degree murder, the crime charged in the indictment, and then outlined the specific elements of second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. Further, the court instructed the jurors that they must acquit the defendant if they were not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt of first degree murder, second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter. The court also gave carefully worded pattern instructions defining the key terms unlawfully, willfully, malice aforethought, premeditation, and specific intent. The court emphasized that proof of specific intent was required to convict the defendant of first degree murder but not second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter. After carefully reviewing the record and examining the jury instructions as a whole, we believe that the instructions accurately stated the governing law so that the jury understood its duties and was not misled in any way. Accordingly, we conclude that the instructions submitted to the jury were not improper.