Opinion ID: 2570739
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sengupta failed to meet his threshold burden.

Text: On June 23, 1997, the superior court dismissed all claims from Sengupta's original complaint except for the § 1981 claim based on mixed motives discrimination with respect to the termination. On September 12, 1997, the superior court permitted Sengupta to add a Title VII claim alleging discrimination based on race, national origin, or prior EEOC activity. [72] On December 11, 1997, the superior court granted summary judgment in favor of UAF with respect to Sengupta's mixed motives discrimination claims. On appeal, Sengupta claims that this summary judgment grant was in error. As an initial matter, § 1981 employment discrimination claims are generally analyzed in the same manner as Title VII claims. [73] To prove an employment discrimination claim, the plaintiff must assert either that the employer's challenged decision stemmed from a single, illegitimate motive (a pretext case) or that the decision was the product of both legitimate and illegitimate motives (a mixed motives case). [74] In order to survive summary judgment in a mixed motives case, the plaintiff must demonstrate that it is more likely than not that a protected characteristic played a motivating part in the employment decision. [75] The superior court held that, under Cram v. Lamson & Sessions Co., [76] Sengupta failed to meet his threshold evidentiary burden. Sengupta claims that the superior court incorrectly required direct evidence and that the evidence presented raises a genuine issue of fact sufficient to avoid summary judgment. We reject both claims. The Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins [77] has created some confusion among the federal courts as to whether direct evidence is required to meet the plaintiff's threshold burden. Several federal circuit courts have concluded that circumstantial or inferential evidence may be presented to sustain the plaintiff's burden. [78] Other courts have interpreted Price Waterhouse to mean that a plaintiff must produce non-circumstantial or non-inferential evidence. [79] The principal mixed motives cases relied upon by Sengupta ( Thomas ) [80] and UAF ( Cram [81] ) both approve of using circumstantial evidence. [82] We have permitted the use of circumstantial evidence in pretext cases, [83] and we now hold that a plaintiff may sustain his threshold burden for a mixed motives claim by presenting circumstantial evidence, as long as this evidence is directly linked to the alleged discriminatory attitude. [84] As we noted in Haroldsen, it is usually impossible for an employee to directly prove that the employer acted with a discriminatory intent. [85] Despite Sengupta's assertions to the contrary, the superior court did not require him to produce direct evidence. Rather, the superior court followed the Cram analysis and explicitly permitted the use of circumstantial evidence: [A] prima facie case under mixed motives theory requires evidence of conduct or statements by persons involved in the decision making process that directly reflects a discriminatory attitude.... The evidence may be direct or circumstantial. But particularly if circumstantial, it must be tied directly to the alleged discriminatory animus, and I find Cram . . . to be particularly persuasive in this regard. For example as discussed in Cram, a plaintiff who does not show evidence of discriminatory statements or ill treatment by decision makers cannot meet the threshold burden required in a mixed motives case. A plaintiff cannot meet the threshold burden for a prima faci[e] case through circumstantial evidence connected to decision makers only through a series of inferences based on other inferences. The superior court, after finding no direct evidence, went on to find that Sengupta has not provided any evidence of racial or national origin animus such as derogatory remarks about employees from India. This finding appears to address the permissible type of circumstantial evidence. Sengupta is incorrect in his assertions that the superior court disallowed the use of circumstantial evidence. Sengupta next argues that his evidence satisfies this threshold burden. But Sengupta's evidence consists largely of his own conclusory affidavit testimony, his allegedly lower salary level, and his treatment by Dean Trent. The cited portions of the record do not support Sengupta's assertions that he presented evidence of a discriminatory intent by Trent or Wadlow to terminate him. Nor do they support Sengupta's assertion that he was the only UAF employee terminated or disciplined for his grievance activity. Sengupta also claims that the concealment by UAF of the 1991 amendments was evidence of discriminatory disparate treatment. Overall, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Sengupta, this cited evidence does not meet his threshold burden to produce evidence of conduct or statements by persons involved in the decisionmaking process that is directly tied to the alleged discriminatory attitude. Because Sengupta has failed to meet his threshold burden, this court affirms the dismissal of Sengupta's mixed motives discrimination claims under Title VII and § 1981.