Opinion ID: 786737
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: AutoZone's Failure to Present Evidence of Actual Dilution

Text: 67 We need not resolve whether the Nabisco factors may be useful in future cases because AutoZone here has presented no evidence of actual dilution. 3 However, we note that several of the Nabisco factors are particularly unhelpful in cases such as this one. Given that the FTDA authorizes dilution claims no matter whether there exists competition between the owners of the respective marks or whether there is a strong likelihood of confusion between the marks, the factors measuring proximity of the products, Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 218-19, shared consumers and geographic limitations, id. at 220, and actual confusion, id. at 221, seem irrelevant to the dilution analysis. 4 Even Radio Shack conceded at oral argument that actual confusion is not a pertinent consideration. 68 No matter the remaining vitality of the Nabisco test, the district court properly granted summary judgment because AutoZone has not presented enough evidence of actual dilution such that there exists a genuine dispute of material fact for a jury to resolve. Coupled with AutoZone's failure to provide any evidence that the PowerZone mark blurred the distinctiveness of the AutoZone mark, the dissimilarity between the two marks by itself demonstrates why AutoZone's claim cannot succeed. The similarity test for dilution claims is more stringent than in the infringement milieu: 69 The ... test of similarity used in the traditional likelihood of confusion test cannot be the guide [for dilution], for likelihood of confusion is not the test of dilution. For blurring... to occur, the marks must at least be similar enough that a significant segment of the target group of customers sees the two marks as essentially the same. Blurring is one mark seen by customers as now identifying two sources. But two different marks identifying two different sources is not blurring and will not cause dilution. 70 4 McCarthy § 24:90:2, at 24-160. In V Secret, we considered it important that the two marks in questions are highly similar.  V Secret, 259 F.3d at 476 (emphasis added); see also id. at 476-77 (finding that Victoria's Secret and Victor's Little Secret are semantically almost identical and graphically similar as well.). In Jet, we stated, The purpose of anti-dilution laws is to provide a narrow remedy when the similarity between two marks is great enough that even a noncompeting, nonconfusing use is harmful to the senior user.... The degree of similarity required for a dilution claim must be greater than that which is required to show likelihood of confusion. 165 F.3d at 425. We held that because JET and AEROB-A-JET were not similar enough even to satisfy the likelihood of confusion test, the plaintiff's dilution claim could not succeed. 5 Despite AutoZone's contention that the level of similarity required is not higher in the dilution context, every federal court to decide the issue has ruled that a high degree of similarity, ranging from nearly identical to very similar, is required for a dilution claim to succeed. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 806 (9th Cir.2002) (stating that marks must be identical or nearly identical); Eli Lilly, 233 F.3d at 469 (holding that HERBROZAC and PROZAC were highly similar); Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 458 (requiring a sufficient similarity between the junior and senior marks to evoke an instinctive mental association of the two (quotation omitted) and affirming lower court's factual finding that GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH and GREATEST SNOW ON EARTH were not similar enough to sustain dilution claim); Luigino's, 170 F.3d at 832 (LEAN CUISINE and LEAN `N TASTY are not similar enough because the sight and sound of the marks are different and the common use of the word lean does not make the marks similar); Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 218 (stating that [t]he marks must be of sufficient similarity so that, in the mind of the consumer, the junior mark will conjure an association with the senior, but not requiring that marks be completely identical); I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 50 (1st Cir.1998) (adopting the standard that customers must view the marks as essentially the same). Following our precedent and the guidance of other circuits, we require a plaintiff to demonstrate a higher degree of similarity than is necessary in infringement claims in order to prove that actual dilution has occurred. 71 AutoZone's dilution claim must fail because the absence of a high degree of similarity between AUTOZONE and POWERZONE underscores AutoZone's failure to provide any evidence of actual dilution. Given that there is not even enough similarity between the two marks to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion, the marks are certainly not highly similar or nearly identical such that AutoZone can prove that actual dilution has occurred. The two marks look different; they are written in different fonts and colors. They utilize different designs (slanted versus nonslanted tradename) and are meant to convey different messages. They also sound different because there is little acoustic similarity between AUTO and POWER. As a comparison, AUTOZONE and a hypothetical AUDIOZONE would have a higher level of acoustic similarity. Additionally, the common word between AUTOZONE and POWERZONE is pronounced second and is consequently deemphasized. 72 Because we hold that AUTOZONE and POWERZONE are not similar enough to pass the higher threshold required to prove actual dilution, and because AutoZone has produced no other evidence of actual dilution, AutoZone cannot demonstrate that Radio Shack's use of POWERZONE caused dilution of the distinctive quality of the senior mark. Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d at 628. 73