Opinion ID: 1169839
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Option Four

Text: In light of the foregoing analysis, and reading the statutory language of HRS §§ 286-261(b) and -261(c) in the context of the entire statute in which the sections are embedded, the only construction that most consistently advances HARDLA's purposes is Option Four i.e., that Act 1 preserved the discretion accorded the Director by Act 188, but in a new and altered form. Pursuant to HRS § 286-261(b), see supra note 4, the Director is accorded the discretionary authority to increase the minimum periods of administrative revocation for non-refusing arrestees, as enumerated in subsections (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3); correlatively, the Director has always lacked discretion to increase the lifetime administrative revocation imposed by subsection (b)(4) because it is logically impossible to do so, there being no greater available revocation period than for life. By contrast, the Director has no discretion to vary the periods of administrative revocation for refusing arrestees enumerated in HRS § 286-261(c). See supra note 4. However, because the legislature has manifested a clear intent that refusing arrestees receive enhanced periods of administrative revocation, as compared to their non-refusing counterparts, see generally section III.B.2. of this opinion, supra, it follows that the Director's discretionary authority to increase the periods of administrative revocation pursuant to HRS § 286-261(b) is capped by the mandatory and nondiscretionary periods enumerated in HRS § 286-261(c). [29] Were this not so, the Director could effect an anomaly, namely, that a non-refusing arrestee could be subject to a period of administrative revocation greater than his or her refusing counterpart, a result clearly inconsistent with HARDLA's purposes. [30]