Opinion ID: 2447509
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Actual Fault

Text: We have long recognized in Maryland that an employer is not liable for harm caused by the work of an employee so long as the employee is `a contractor, pursuing an independent employment, and, by the terms of the contract, is free to exercise his own judgment and discretion as to the means and assistants that he may think proper to employ about the work, exclusive of the control and direction, in this respect, of the party for whom the work is being done.' Gallagher's Estate v. Battle, 209 Md. 592, 601, 122 A.2d 93, 97 (1956) (quoting Deford v. State ex rel. Keyser, 30 Md. 179, 203 (1869)). When an employer has retained control of the details of the work, however, liability is permitted under a theory of actual fault. See Gallagher's Estate, 209 Md. at 601, 122 A.2d at 97 (explaining that an employer's liability under respondeat superior is predicated on the rationale that the employer's control over the employee's work renders the employer constructively present during the work, so that the negligence of the servant is the negligence of the master); Restatement §§ 410-429 introductory n. (referring to actual fault as the basis for imposing liability on employers under the retention of control doctrine set forth in § 414). Under this theory an employer is subject to liability for his failure to exercise with reasonable care such control over the doing of the work as he retains to himself. Id. As this passage from the Restatement implies, and we have repeated throughout, the retention of control is an absolute prerequisite to an employer's liability for harm caused by the work of an independent contractor. See Gallagher's Estate, 209 Md. at 602, 122 A.2d at 98 ([A] principal employing an agent to accomplish a result, but not having the right to control the details of his movements, is not responsible for incidental negligence while such agent is conducting the authorized transaction.). General control over an independent contractor's work, however, is insufficient to establish liability. As the Court of Special Appeals correctly stated, Appiah, 183 Md.App. at 621-22, 962 A.2d at 1055, and Comment c to § 414 provides, the retention of control doctrine only applies if: [T]he employer [has] retained at least some degree of control over the manner in which the work is done. It is not enough that he has merely a general right to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which need not necessarily be followed, or to prescribe alterations and deviations. Such a general right is usually reserved to employers, but it does not mean that the contractor is controlled as to his methods of work, or as to operative detail. There must be such a retention of a right of supervision that the contractor is not entirely free to do the work in his own way. We have characterized these principles as requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that the employer not only has retained control over the operative detail and methods of the work but also that this control extends to  the very thing from which the injury arose.  See Gallagher's Estate, 209 Md. at 602, 122 A.2d at 98 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Wells v. General Electric Co., 807 F.Supp. 1202 (D.Md.1992) (describing Maryland law as requiring that the retention of control must exist in respect to the very thing from which the injury arose (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The Court of Special Appeals concluded, and we agree, that the very thing from which the injury arose, and thus the very thing over which Respondents must have retained control for liability to attach, is Marine Repair's work connecting shipping containers to trucks. See Appiah, 183 Md. App. at 628, 962 A.2d at 1058. The accident in which Mr. Appiah sustained his injuries occurred during the process of connecting a reefer to a truck and no other activity could reasonably be alleged to have caused his death. Petitioners' claims that P & O retained the right to ban dangerous truck drivers from the premises and to inspect for and remedy safety hazards at Seagirt in no way establish that P & O controlled the operative detail of Marine Repair's work or safety practices, especially as related to connecting shipping containers to trucks. [11] Assuming that P & O could prohibit the entry of truck drivers who had been cited for unsafe driving at Seagirt, that authority does not translate into the authority to dictate the operative detail of Marine Repair's work or safety practices. Likewise, any authority P & O may have to inspect Seagirt for hazards and unsafe acts and to correct those problems does not support an inference that P & O may direct the operative details of Marine Repair's work. At most that authority would permit P & O to inspect Marine Repair's operations and prescribe alterations and deviations. § 414 cmt. c. We repeat: Such a general right is usually reserved to employers, but it does not mean that the contractor is controlled as to his methods of work, or as to operative detail. Id. With regard to Petitioners' contentions related to the MPA, the lease agreement with Marine Repair establishes the MPA's right to be apprized of any injury or damage to persons or property and to adopt whatever measures may be necessary to prevent further losses. Although these provisions grant the MPA the right to notice of injuries and potentially the right to prescribe alterations and deviations, the Restatement explains that such rights do not necessarily constitute control over the operative detail of the work. Id. We are not persuaded that a contrary conclusion is warranted in this case. Given that Petitioners have failed to allege any facts demonstrating the requisite retention of control to impose liability on Respondents, we hold that Respondents are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.