Opinion ID: 2633163
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appeal to the LIRAB

Text: On May 18, 2001, Capua appealed the director's supplemental decision to the LIRAB. After a hearing, held on May 23, 2003, the hearing officer entered a proposed decision and order, pursuant to HRS § 91-11 (1993), [6] affirming the director's supplemental decision. The hearing officer entered the following proposed conclusions of law: Pursuant to [HAR] § 12-14-36 . . ., an employee who has been issued a PPD award by the [d]irector is determined to have waived the right to rehabilitation. In this case, [Capua] was awarded PPD by the [d]irector in a December 4, 1996 decision. Under [HAR] § 12-14-36, [Capua] is not entitled to VR services. Accordingly, we conclude that the [d]irector did not err in denying [Capua] VR services. [Weyerhaeuser's] offer of VR after PPD was awarded was gratuitous and not required by law. However, having made the offer of VR, and having agreed to an October 18, 2000 deadline for [Capua] to accept VR, [Weyerhaeuser] could have acted more honorably in this case. Both Capua and Weyerhaeuser filed exceptions to the proposed decision and order in accordance with HRS § 91-11, quoted supra note 6. On December 29, 2003, a hearing was held, wherein Capua argued, inter alia, that HAR § 12-14-36 could not serve as a ground to deny her VR services because HAR § 12-14-36 was inconsistent with HRS § 386-25. At the time of Capua's disability, HRS § 386-25 (1993) provided in relevant part: (b) The director shall refer employees who may have or have suffered permanent disability as a result of work injuries and who in the director's opinion can be physically or vocationally rehabilitated to the department of human services or to private providers of rehabilitation services for such physical and vocational rehabilitation services as are feasible. . . . . . . . (g) The eligibility of any injured employee to receive other benefits under this chapter shall in no way be affected by the employee's entrance upon a course of physical or vocational rehabilitation as herein provided. (Emphases added.) In essence, Capua argued that HAR § 12-14-36 conflicted with HRS § 386-25. Conversely, Weyerhaeuser contended that, inasmuch as HAR § 12-14-36 was clear and unambiguous, there was no room for exceptions. On December 30, 2003, the hearing officer issued an order, adopting the proposed decision and order in toto. Thereafter, Capua filed her notice of appeal with the ICA, pursuant to HRS § 386-88 (Supp.2007). [7]