Opinion ID: 1773735
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Interpreting the Divorce Decree

Text: Notwithstanding the state of the law at the time the divorce decree was entered, this case does not involve a direct appeal, and we must interpret the decree to determine not what the trial court should have done but, if possible, what the court actually did. When interpreting a divorce decree, courts apply the general rules regarding construction of judgments. Wilde v. Murchie, 949 S.W.2d 331, 332 (Tex.1997) (per curiam) (citing Constance v. Constance, 544 S.W.2d 659, 660 (Tex. 1976)). Judgments should be construed as a whole to harmonize and give effect to the entire decree. Constance, 544 S.W.2d at 660. [I]f the decree, when read as a whole, is unambiguous as to the property's disposition, the court must effectuate the order in light of the literal language used. Wilde, 949 S.W.2d at 332; see also Baxter v. Ruddle, 794 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Tex.1990). If the decree is ambiguous, the court should review the record along with the decree to aid in interpreting the judgment. Wilde, 949 S.W.2d at 332. In addition, if a judgment is ambiguousthat is, subject to more than one reasonable interpretation courts should adopt the construction that correctly applies the law. MacGregor v. Rich, 941 S.W.2d 74, 75 (Tex.1997) (per curiam). As with other written instruments, whether a divorce decree is ambiguous is a question of law. Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex.1983). The decree in question identifies George's pension plan as arising out of past employment, but then states that Kenda is entitled to a `pro rata interest'... of any and all sums received or paid to [George] from such pension plan.... The decree also defines pro rata interest as 25% of the total sum or sums paid or to be paid to [George] from such pension or retirement plan. The decree does not set out a specific Taggart -like formula to be used in calculating Kenda's interest. The court of appeals concluded, and we agree, that the decree is unambiguous, and Kenda should receive twenty-five percent of George's total retirement benefits. The phrase arising out of past employment as an employee of American Airlines (emphasis added) does not render the decree ambiguous, as George argues; rather, it merely serves to identify more specifically the property that is being divided (i.e., George's retirement plan). [4] As noted by the court of appeals, the trial court awarded Kenda an interest of all sums received under such plan, not an interest of presently accrued benefits under such plan. 110 S.W.3d at 6. And the plan that was in existence at the time of the divorce and referred to in the decree is the same plan in effect now that George has retired. The fact that the plan's value may have increased since the divorce does not affect the decree's plain language, which simply cannot reasonably be construed to award Kenda an interest only in the plan benefits that had accrued on the date of divorce. Whether intentional or not, the court that entered the decree failed to limit the community interest pursuant to the Taggart apportionment fraction and instead clearly gave Kenda a twenty-five percent interest in the total amount (whatever that might be) to be paid to George under the plan. Viewing the division of the plan benefits in light of the decree as a whole, the fact that the court awarded Kenda only a twenty-five percent interest in the plan also supports our interpretation. Trial judges must carefully review all community assets in making a just and right division of those assets, and the retirement benefits were one of the assets considered in this case. See Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551, 555 (Tex.1970). Given the complexities involved in dividing this type of asset, perhaps the trial court intended to achieve an overall just and right division by awarding Kenda a lesser interest in the total value of the plan at retirement rather than a greater interest in a smaller portion of the benefits. We simply cannot know with certainty because the decree was never appealed. In any event, our responsibility is to construe the decree as written. It is true, as George points out, that Texas law prohibits courts from divesting spouses of their separate property. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 139-40 (Tex.1977). But George therefore urges us to interpret the decree to award Kenda an interest in only the community portion of the plan to avoid attributing to the trial court an intent to divide separate property, which it lacked authority to do. That argument is flawed in two respects. First, it overlooks the fact that applying Taggart, which was the controlling law at the time the decree was entered and required benefits to be valued at the time of their disbursement, would probably divest George of a portion of his separate property anyway. In fact, the reason the Court altered the requisite formula in Berry was to avoid invading a spouse's separate property. See supra note 3; Berry, 647 S.W.2d at 947. [5] This tension demonstrates the difficulty inherent in dividing pension plans that involve both separate and community property and indicates that interpreting such a division is not as simple as presuming a lack of intent to divide separate property. [6] Such an analysis is also problematic because the fact that the district court erroneously applied the law when it entered the divorce decree does not alter the decree's plain language. In Baxter, which was decided after Berry, the divorce decree in question awarded the non-employee spouse 37 1/2% of [the employee spouse's] gross benefits, if, as and when he received them. The decree also provided that [the non-employee spouse] was to receive 37 1/2% of the total benefits that [the employee spouse] received each month. 794 S.W.2d at 763 (emphasis removed). We held that [t]his language unambiguously provided that [the non-employee spouse] was to receive 37 1/2% of the total retirement benefits received by [the employee spouse] each month, including any post-divorce increases. Id. [7] We therefore enforced the decree as written even though it conflicted with Berry. Id. Similarly, we must enforce the decree as written in this case even though it conflicts with Taggart. Kenda argues that the district court cannot change the substantive division of property made in the original decree. We agree. While the court may enter a clarifying order to enforce compliance with an insufficiently specific decree, Tex. Fam. Code § 9.008(b), a court may not amend, modify, alter, or change the division of property made or approved in the decree of divorce. Id. § 9.007(a). The original decree in this case is unambiguous, and the trial court had no authority to enter an order altering or modifying the original disposition of property. Id.; Pierce v. Pierce, 850 S.W.2d 675, 679 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1993, writ denied); see also McGehee v. Epley, 661 S.W.2d 924, 925-26 (Tex. 1983) (stating that clarification orders cannot be used to effect a substantive change in a divorce decree after the trial court's judgment becomes final). George's remedy for a substantive error of law by the trial court was by direct appeal, and he cannot now collaterally attack the judgment. Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex.1990); Baxter, 794 S.W.2d at 762; Stinson v. Stinson, 668 S.W.2d 840, 841 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The district court was therefore without authority to enter a QDRO altering the terms of the decree by limiting Kenda to a twenty-five percent interest in the benefits that had accrued under the plan at the time of the divorce.