Opinion ID: 2612448
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant's Right to Discharge Retained Counsel

Text: (2a) Defendant contends, and the People agree, that a defendant  whether indigent or not  who seeks in a timely manner to discharge retained counsel, ordinarily should be permitted to do so. The Court of Appeal held the trial court erred in requiring defendant to prove the Hernandezes were incompetent before it would allow him to discharge them. We granted review to resolve a conflict between that holding  which is consistent with People v. Stevens (1984) 156 Cal. App.3d 1119 [203 Cal. Rptr. 505]  and two contrary decisions, People v. Barnes (1983) 146 Cal. App.3d 663 [194 Cal. Rptr. 317], and South v. Superior Court (1986) 188 Cal. App.3d 1055 [233 Cal. Rptr. 765].
In People v. Barnes, supra, 146 Cal. App.3d 663, 665-667 (hereafter Barnes ), the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, held that a criminal defendant's motion to relieve his privately retained counsel and appoint the public defender in his stead is governed by the same standard as a motion for substitution of one appointed counsel for another, i.e., the court must allow the defendant to explain his reasons and then should exercise judicial discretion. The court reasoned that when a defendant seeks appointment of the public defender, his motion is tantamount to a substitution of appointed counsel.... ( Id. at p. 666.) One year later, the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, in People v. Stevens, supra, 156 Cal. App.3d 1119 (hereafter Stevens ), impliedly rejected Barnes ( id. at p. 1127, fn. 6) and held that an indigent criminal defendant was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel when the trial court unjustifiably denied his request to relieve his volunteer attorney in favor of the public defender ( id. at pp. 1121, 1123). The court concluded, a defendant's constitutionally protected interest in obtaining counsel of his choice encompasses the right to discharge retained counsel regardless of financial ability to hire another attorney. Absent a proper finding of unwarranted disruption of the orderly processes of justice, a court may not force a defendant who timely requests substitution to go to trial represented by retained counsel he no longer trusts. ( Id. at p. 1128.) Subsequently, a panel of the Sixth Appellate District of the Court of Appeal in South v. Superior Court, supra, 188 Cal. App.3d 1055, 1060, rejected Stevens and adopted the Barnes approach, stating, We do not believe that a defendant's motion to discharge retained counsel ... should be decided in a vacuum.... [A] court must concern itself with who will be representing the defendant if present counsel is discharged. The court held that the defendant, who requested appointment of the public defender, bore the burden of showing that his relieved counsel's representation would substantially impair his right to counsel. ( Ibid. ) Finally, in the case at bar a different panel of the Sixth Appellate District held to the contrary, stating that where, as here, a criminal defendant brings a timely motion to discharge his retained attorney it is error to deny the motion on the grounds he has not demonstrated his attorney's incompetence. For the reasons given below, we adopt the approach taken by the Court of Appeal in this case and in Stevens, supra, 156 Cal. App.3d 1119. [2]
(3) The right of a criminal defendant to counsel and to present a defense are among the most sacred and sensitive of our constitutional rights. ( Magee v. Superior Court (1973) 8 Cal.3d 949, 954 [106 Cal. Rptr. 647, 506 P.2d 1023].) While we have recognized competing values of substantial importance to trial courts, including the speedy determination of criminal charges, the state should keep to a necessary minimum its interference with the individual's desire to defend himself in whatever manner he deems best, using any legitimate means within his resources ( People v. Crovedi (1966) 65 Cal.2d 199, 208 [53 Cal. Rptr. 284, 417 P.2d 868] (hereafter Crovedi )). A criminal defendant's right to decide how to defend himself should be respected unless it will result in significant prejudice to the defendant or in a disruption of the orderly processes of justice unreasonable under the circumstances of the particular case. ( Ibid. ) In other words, we demand of trial courts a resourceful diligence directed toward the protection of [the right to counsel] to the fullest extent consistent with effective judicial administration. ( Id. at p. 209.)
The right of a nonindigent criminal defendant to discharge his retained attorney, with or without cause, has long been recognized in this state ( Gage v. Atwater (1902) 136 Cal. 170, 172 [68 P. 581]; Echlin v. Superior Court (1939) 13 Cal.2d 368, 372 [90 P.2d 63, 124 A.L.R. 719]; 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Attorneys, § 82, p. 101), and is governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 284, subdivision 2 ( Mandell v. Superior Court (1977) 67 Cal. App.3d 1, 4 [136 Cal. Rptr. 354]; People v. Bouchard (1957) 49 Cal.2d 438, 440-442 [317 P.2d 971]). [3] (4) The right to discharge retained counsel is based on `necessity in view both of the delicate and confidential nature of the relation between [attorney and client], and of the evil engendered by friction or distrust.' ( Todd v. Superior Court of San Francisco (1919) 181 Cal. 406, 413 [184 P. 684, 7 A.L.R. 938].) In order to ensure effective assistance of counsel, a nonindigent defendant is accorded the right to discharge his retained attorney: the attorney-client relationship ... involves not just the casual assistance of a member of the bar, but an intimate process of consultation and planning which culminates in a state of trust and confidence between the client and his attorney. This is particularly essential, of course, when the attorney is defending the client's life or liberty. ( Smith v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 547, 561 [68 Cal. Rptr. 1, 440 P.2d 65].) Thus, we conclude that the right to counsel of choice reflects not only a defendant's choice of a particular attorney, but also his decision to discharge an attorney whom he hired but no longer wishes to retain. A nonindigent defendant's right to discharge his retained counsel, however, is not absolute. The trial court, in its discretion, may deny such a motion if discharge will result in significant prejudice to the defendant ( People v. Gzikowski (1982) 32 Cal.3d 580, 587 [186 Cal. Rptr. 339, 651 P.2d 1145]), or if it is not timely, i.e., if it will result in disruption of the orderly processes of justice ( ibid. ; People v. Lau (1986) 177 Cal. App.3d 473, 478-479 [223 Cal. Rptr. 48]; Crovedi, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 208). As the court stated in Sampley v. Attorney General of North Carolina (4th Cir.1986) 786 F.2d 610, 613, the fair opportunity to secure counsel of choice provided by the Sixth Amendment is necessarily [limited by] the countervailing state interest against which the sixth amendment right provides explicit protection: the interest in proceeding with prosecutions on an orderly and expeditious basis, taking into account the practical difficulties of `assembling the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same place at the same time.' The trial court, however, must exercise its discretion reasonably: a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality. ( Crovedi, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 207 [defendant was entitled to two-month continuance so that he could be represented by retained counsel who was hospitalized at time of trial].) While we do require an indigent criminal defendant who is seeking to substitute one appointed attorney for another to demonstrate either that the first appointed attorney is providing inadequate representation ( In re Banks, supra, 4 Cal.3d 337, 342; People v. Crandell, supra, 46 Cal.3d 833, 854), or that he and the attorney are embroiled in irreconcilable conflict ( People v. Stankewitz, supra, 32 Cal.3d 80, 93-94), we have never required a nonindigent criminal defendant to make such a showing in order to discharge his retained counsel. (2b) With these rules in mind, we reach the issue whether a trial court may require an indigent criminal defendant to demonstrate inadequate representation by his retained attorney, or to identify an irreconcilable conflict between them, before it will approve the defendant's timely motion to discharge his retained attorney and obtain appointed counsel. We conclude that the reasons supporting the right of a nonindigent criminal defendant to discharge his retained counsel favor extension of that right to all criminal defendants, regardless of their economic status. The relationship between an indigent criminal defendant and his retained attorney is no less delicate and confidential than that between a nonindigent defendant and his retained attorney, nor is the evil engendered by friction or distrust between an indigent criminal defendant and his attorney any less fatal to an effective attorney-client relationship. Moreover, we must be just as concerned about the effectiveness of counsel when the client whose life or liberty is at stake is indigent as when he is not: an indigent criminal defendant who is required to undergo a trial with an attorney from whom he believes he is receiving inadequate representation, or with whom he is locked in an irreconcilable conflict, is just as certainly deprived of the effective assistance of counsel as his nonindigent counterpart. In fact, as shown below, it may be even more important for an indigent defendant to be able to discharge retained counsel: if his motion is denied, he must choose between proceeding with no legal assistance or continuing with a retained attorney reluctantly serving on a pro bono basis. We are justifiably concerned about the right to counsel of choice, and thus the right to effective assistance of counsel (see Maxwell v. Superior Court (1982) 30 Cal.3d 606, 613 [180 Cal. Rptr. 177, 639 P.2d 248, 18 A.L.R.4th 333] [right to counsel of choice closely linked with the doctrine of effective assistance]), when a defendant is forced to choose between proceeding to trial without an attorney or continuing to trial with an attorney originally hired to represent him but whom he no longer is able to pay. The risk in compelling a defendant to go to trial with unpaid counsel against his wishes and those of his attorney, is that the defendant will get what he paid for. For example, defendant and his family were unable to pay the Hernandezes in full for the first trial, or for the experts retained to testify at that trial. Nevertheless, at the time of the mistrial the Hernandezes stated the jury was divided six to six on the issue of the identity of the murderer. The court thereafter returned the matter to the master calendar. During the period preceding the second trial, at which time they were convinced defendant could no longer afford to pay them, the Hernandezes (1) sought a number of continuances to prepare their case  in part because of delay caused by their concurrent representation of Richard Ramirez, (2) were sanctioned for repeatedly failing to appear in court, and (3) allegedly failed to return defendant's calls or to adequately investigate potentially exculpatory evidence. Only after the court had repeatedly denied efforts by the Hernandezes to withdraw, and motions by defendant to discharge them, did defendant submit a Bunnell plea. This scenario suggests what is likely to happen if courts compel attorneys to represent criminal defendants without compensation against the wishes of both the lawyer and the defendant. Without evaluating the wisdom of defendant's Bunnell plea, we nevertheless recognize that one possible result of requiring an unwilling attorney to represent a defendant without compensation is that Some attorneys may find shortcuts particularly seductive. In a close case, an attorney may encourage an indigent defendant to stipulate to judgment. This would effectively avoid the cost and time involved in a full trial. (Gilbert & Gorenfeld, The Constitution Should Protect Everyone  Even Lawyers (1984) 12 Pepperdine L.Rev. 75, 88; see also State ex rel. Scott v. Roper (Mo. 1985) 688 S.W.2d 757, 768 [52 A.L.R.4th 1031] [quality of the uncompensated service can be expected to decrease in almost direct proportion to the loss of choice of the professional rendering the service]; Uelmen, Simmering on the Backburner: The Challenge of Yarbrough (1985) 19 Loyola L.A.L.Rev. 285, 308-310, 322-323 [History should teach us that a double standard of justice is inevitable if we consign the indigent to seeking handouts from uncompensated volunteers.... Economics should teach us that legal services respond to the same laws of supply and demand as do other products and services in our free economy.]; Cunningham v. Superior Court (1986) 177 Cal. App.3d 336, 354-355 [222 Cal. Rptr. 854] [the county and state public defender were created in response to this concern over the shoddy quality of legal services donated to indigent criminal defendants].) In this case, the threat of coerced, uncompensated representation could be alleviated very simply by allowing defendant to discharge the Hernandezes and to seek appointment of counsel by the court. In addition, the policy concerns underlying the rule that a defendant generally is not entitled to more than one appointed attorney (see, e.g., People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 123) are irrelevant when an indigent criminal defendant, like defendant here, makes a timely motion to discharge his retained attorney and obtain a public defender or other appointed counsel in the court's discretion. First, it is ordinarily appropriate to require the defendant who is seeking to substitute one appointed counsel for another to show cause, because he is requesting duplicative representation and repetitive investigation at taxpayer expense. That is not the case here: defendant is requesting appointed counsel for the first time in connection with his retrial. Accordingly, he should be treated no differently from a defendant who qualifies for representation by, and seeks appointment of, the public defender at the outset of the proceedings against him. No additional public expense or drain on the state's limited resources is at issue, [4] nor, as long as the motion is timely, is there a risk of any undesirable opportunity to delay trials and otherwise embarrass effective prosecution of crime ( People v. Williams (1970) 2 Cal.3d 894, 906 [88 Cal. Rptr. 208, 471 P.2d 1008]). Second, unlike a Marsden defendant who will continue to be represented by an attorney at public expense if his motion is denied, the defendant in this case, on denial of his motion, will be represented by coerced, unpaid counsel, and exposed to all the attendant risks we discuss above. Equally irrelevant in this context are the concerns that underlie the rule denying indigent defendants the right to choose which attorney will be appointed to represent them. (See People v. Manchetti (1946) 29 Cal.2d 452, 458 [175 P.2d 533] [delay of trial; convenience of court and prosecution]; United States v. Thompson (S.D.N.Y. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 683, 688-689 [expense; administrative concerns; imposition of too many demands on a single attorney].) While defendant will require appointment of an attorney if he is permitted to discharge the Hernandezes, the issue raised by the trial court is merely whether he should be permitted to discharge them without proving their incompetence or an irreconcilable conflict; there is no suggestion that defendant is asking the court to appoint any particular attorney to replace the Hernandezes. We agree, therefore, with the Court of Appeal that a court must not consider whether a defendant is indigent and will require appointment of counsel in ruling on his timely motion to discharge retained counsel. To conclude otherwise would be to ignore the value we place on allowing defendants to defend themselves as they deem best, absent prejudice to themselves or unreasonable delay in the processes of justice. Although nothing we do here affects the rule that indigent defendants do not have the right to choose a particular attorney to be appointed at public expense, there is no interest compelling us to treat an indigent defendant any differently from a nonindigent defendant when he moves to discharge his retained counsel. In light of the importance of the right to counsel of choice and the sensitive nature of the relationship between a criminal defendant and his lawyer, we must not allow a defendant's indigence to prevent him from discharging in a timely manner the retained counsel he no longer wishes to represent him. (See Griffin v. Illinois (1956) 351 U.S. 12, 19 [100 L.Ed. 891, 899, 76 S.Ct. 585, 55 A.L.R.2d 1055] [stating that [t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.].) Applying the law to the facts of this case, we agree with the Court of Appeal that the trial court erred by requiring defendant to demonstrate the incompetence of the Hernandezes before allowing him to discharge them. Defendant's motion, made after the mistrial and well before any second trial, was sufficiently timely; the timing reflects defendant's genuine concern about the adequacy of his defense rather than any intent to delay the retrial. On this showing, discharge of the Hernandezes would not have interfered with the orderly processes of justice. The People contend the error was not prejudicial. In fact, because appointment of counsel is left to the court's discretion ( Harris v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 786, 795 [140 Cal. Rptr. 318, 567 P.2d 750]; Drumgo v. Superior Court (1973) 8 Cal.3d 930, 934-935 [106 Cal. Rptr. 631, 506 P.2d 1007, 66 A.L.R.3d 984]), they claim that we need only remand the case for the trial court to exercise its discretion to determine whether it would have appointed the Hernandezes. If the trial court rules it would have appointed the Hernandezes, they conclude, the judgment should stand, because the Hernandezes continued to represent defendant. (5) Reversal is automatic, however, when a defendant has been deprived of his right to defend with counsel of his choice. ( People v. Gzikowski, supra, 32 Cal.3d 580, 589.) The right to counsel of choice, including the right to discharge retained counsel, furthers the dual goals of due process: (1) ensuring the reliability of the guilt-determining process by reducing to a minimum the possibility that an innocent person will be punished; and (2) protecting the ideal of human individuality by affirming the state's duty to refrain from unreasonable interference with a defendant's desire to defend himself in whatever manner he deems best. ( Crovedi, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 206; Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication  A Survey and Criticism (1957) 66 Yale L.J. 319, 346-347.) The right to counsel of choice is one of the constitutional rights most basic to a fair trial. Accordingly, it is clear that a criminal defendant need not demonstrate prejudice resulting from a violation of that right in order to have his conviction reversed. As stated in the controlling case of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 23 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065]: there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error.... The right here is such a right. (6) Just as when a court improperly denies a defendant's motion to represent himself ( Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525]) or to replace counsel because of a conflict of interest ( Holloway v. Arkansas (1978) 435 U.S. 475 [55 L.Ed.2d 426, 98 S.Ct. 1173]), or when an indigent criminal defendant is denied counsel altogether ( Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335 [9 L.Ed.2d 799, 83 S.Ct. 792, 93 A.L.R.2d 733]), we must presume prejudice when an indigent criminal defendant is forced to proceed with a retained attorney whom he has consistently, and in a timely manner, sought to discharge in favor of the public defender or other court-appointed counsel. We must not speculate as to the prejudicial effect of `injecting an undesired attorney into the proceedings' ( People v. Courts (1985) 37 Cal.3d 784, 796 [210 Cal. Rptr. 193, 693 P.2d 778]), especially when, as here, the defendant has repeatedly alleged inadequate assistance. In fact, any standard short of per se reversal would inevitably erode the right itself ( People v. Courts, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 796, fn. 11), by relegating appellate review of a constitutional right to mere speculation. As we suggested in Courts ( id. at p. 796), to assess `why or how an accused's trial was disadvantaged by injecting an undesired attorney into the proceedings would require an impossibly speculative comparison' of the performance of the counsel whom the court refused to discharge with the unrealized performance of an appointed attorney. Furthermore, in this case we are concerned not only with what the Hernandezes did in the course of representing defendant, as reflected by the record, but also with what the Hernandezes did not do following the trial court's error, as suggested by the Bunnell plea and defendant's allegations that the Hernandezes failed to adequately investigate potentially exculpatory evidence or to return his calls. We therefore conclude that the judgment of the Court of Appeal reversing the judgment of conviction should be affirmed and the matter remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.