Opinion ID: 2791462
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Missouri Administrative Procedure Act

Text: Draper next contends that the district court erred when it reviewed the City Council’s decision as a contested case under MAPA. He argues alternatively that even if this is a contested case, the City Council’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and was not supported by substantial evidence. Whether the City Council’s termination decision was contested or noncontested determines the scope of judicial review under MAPA. The classification of a case as contested or noncontested is a matter of law that we review de novo. See City of Valley Park, Mo. v. Armstrong, 273 S.W.3d 504, 506 (Mo. 2009) (per curiam) (holding that the classification is determined as a matter of law); Sherpell v. Humnoke Sch. Dist. No. 5, 874 F.2d 536, 539 (8th Cir. 1989) (standard of review). “The key to the classification of a case as contested or noncontested is the requirement of a hearing.” Armstrong, 273 S.W.3d at 507. “Contested cases provide -8- the parties with an opportunity for a formal hearing with the presentation of evidence, including sworn testimony of witnesses and cross-examination of witnesses, and require written findings of fact and conclusions of law.” Id. at 506 (quoting Furlong Cos. v. City of Kan. City, 189 S.W.3d 157, 165 (Mo. 2006)). Other procedural formalities used generally in contested cases include notice of the issues, the making of a record, and adherence to evidentiary rules. Id. at 507; see also Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 536.063-536.090. By contrast, “[n]on-contested cases do not require formal proceedings or hearings before the administrative body.” Armstrong, 273 S.W.3d at 506 (quoting Furlong, 189 S.W.3d at 165). Draper does not dispute that he received notice of the hearing, that a hearing was held, that witnesses testified under oath, that exhibits were admitted, that a record was made, and that a written decision was rendered. Thus, this was a contested case. Had Draper attended the hearing, he could have sought to establish “the triviality of the charges against him,” as they were characterized by his counsel on appeal, by cross-examining the witnesses and by presenting evidence on his behalf. Draper also argues that the City Council decision was not supported by the evidence and that it was arbitrary and capricious. Judicial review of a contested case is governed by Missouri Revised Statutes sections 536.100 to 536.140. Furlong, 189 S.W.3d at 165. We review the record created before the administrative body to determine whether the agency decision is supported by competent and substantial evidence based on the whole record and whether the agency decision is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. See id.; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 536.140(2). “Whether an action is arbitrary focuses on whether an agency had a rational basis for its decision,” and “[c]apriciousness concerns whether the agency’s action was whimsical, impulsive, or unpredictable.” Mo. Nat. Educ. Ass’n v. Mo. State Bd. of Educ., 34 S.W.3d 266, 281 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000). The competent-evidence standard is not “met in the rare case when the [agency’s decision] is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.” Lagud v. Kan. City Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 136 S.W.3d 786, 791 (Mo. 2004) -9- (alteration in original) (quoting Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220, 223 (Mo. 2003)). An agency’s decision may be supported by competent evidence “even though the evidence would also have supported a contrary determination.” Id. at 791 n.5. In light of evidence recounted above, we conclude that the evidence before the City Council supported its decision to terminate Draper and that its decision to do so was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.