Opinion ID: 1681614
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Venue in the Bessemer Division

Text: McClain filed this complaint in the Bessemer Division of the Jefferson Circuit Court. [6] However, Homewood, Mountain Brook, Trussville, and Vestavia Hills are located entirely within the geographical boundaries of the Birmingham Division of the Jefferson Circuit Court. Homewood, Mountain Brook, Trussville, and Vestavia Hills filed a motion to dismiss the complaint or, alternatively, to sever and transfer the action as to them to the Birmingham Division of the Jefferson Circuit Court based on improper venue. They argued that the claims asserted against them could be brought only in the Birmingham Division. The trial court denied the motion. Homewood, Mountain Brook, Trussville, and Vestavia Hills appeal that ruling. We begin by reviewing the history of the Bessemer Division. In 1893, Local Act No. 281 created the Bessemer Division; however, that division was subsequently abolished. In 1919, the Bessemer Division was recreated by Local Act No. 213 (the Bessemer Act). Section 2 of the Bessemer Act provides: The said Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, holding at Bessemer, as in this Act provided, shall have, exercise and possess all of the jurisdiction and the powers which are now or which may hereafter be conferred by law on the several Circuit Courts of this State, which said jurisdiction and powers shall be exclusive in, limited to, and extend over that portion of the territory of the County of Jefferson, which is included in the following precincts, to wit: [a physical description of what is commonly referred to as the Bessemer Cut-Off]. . . .  In Glenn v. Wilson, 455 So.2d 2 (Ala. 1984), this Court addressed whether the Bessemer Act is jurisdictional or addresses solely venue: We acknowledge that some of the cases are less than clear and seem to confuse venue and jurisdiction by use of the term `territorial jurisdiction.' However, we are convinced thatexcept for those cases which by their nature can be adjudicated only in a particular county, such as suits for partition of land or suits to enforce a lien on land, both of which must be brought in the county where the land liessuits `arising in' the geographical boundaries of the Bessemer Cutoff but filed in Birmingham (or, vice versa, suits `arising in' the Birmingham Division but filed in Bessemer) are subject to transfer to the proper division pursuant to the provisions of § 12-11-11, Code 1975. . . . `. . . . ' The Bessemer Cutoff legislation does not diminish the general jurisdiction of other circuit courts, either in Jefferson or other counties. Therefore, in those Jefferson County cases subject to transfer to the other division pursuant to § 12-11-11, a claim for transfer based on the improper filing may be waived, just as in a suit filed in some other county the parties may waive claims of improper venue. 455 So.2d at 4-5 (citations omitted). Subsequent decisions also have concluded that the Bessemer Act controls venue between the two divisions. In Ex parte Walter Industries, Inc., 879 So.2d 547, 552 (Ala.2003), this Court stated: While at times this limitation [that the Jefferson Circuit Court, sitting in the Bessemer Division, could hear only cases `arising in' that division] has been described as jurisdictional, this Court has recognized since Glenn v. Wilson, [455 So.2d 2 (Ala.1984)], that the limitation in the [Bessemer] Act is one of venue. In sum, the voluminous caselaw on this issue clearly holds that venue for an action filed in Jefferson County is proper in the Bessemer Division only if the cause of action `arose' in that division. See also Ex parte World Omni Fin. Corp., 491 So.2d 236, 237 (Ala.1986) (Venue in this case is controlled by the local act creating the Bessemer Division.); Ex parte Jackson, 516 So.2d 768, 769 (Ala. 1986) (agreeing that the Bessemer Act should be read as venue legislation rather than jurisdiction legislation); and Ex parte Johnson, 692 So.2d 843, 845 (Ala.Civ. App.1997) (It is well established that the Bessemer Division is, in fact, a separate and distinct circuit with the same power exercised by the Tenth Judicial Circuit . . . and that the legislation creating the two divisions in Jefferson County is `venue' legislation rather than `jurisdiction' legislation.). When the rationale of those cases is applied to the facts of this case, it is evident that the claims asserted against Homewood, Mountain Brook, Trussville, and Vestavia Hills were improperly filed in the Bessemer Division because those claims did not arise in the Bessemer Division. Those municipalities enacted their ordinances in the Birmingham Division; those ordinances applied only in the Birmingham Division; and those municipalities enforced their ordinances in the Birmingham Division and collected the allegedly invalid tax there. Because none of these events occurred within the geographical boundaries of the Bessemer Division, venue in the Bessemer Division was improper as to the claims asserted against Homewood, Mountain Brook, Trussville, and Vestavia Hills. Accordingly, the trial court improperly denied the motion filed by Homewood, Mountain Brook, Trussville, and Vestavia Hills to dismiss the action against them or to transfer it to the Birmingham Division. Venue as to those municipalities was improper in the Bessemer Division, and the trial court should have granted their motion to dismiss or to transfer the claims against them to the Birmingham Division. McClain also argues that it would be wasteful and futile to require two different courts to hear the same claims, the same evidence, and the same defenses. However, we must construe the Bessemer Act consistent with the unambiguous language in that Act. The trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss or, alternatively, to sever and transfer the claims against Homewood, Mountain Brook, Trussville, and Vestavia Hills to the Birmingham Division. Because venue as to Homewood, Mountain Brook, Trussville, and Vestavia Hills was improper in the Bessemer Division, we vacate the trial court's judgment as to those municipalities. We remand the case to the trial court with directions to dismiss the claims asserted against Homewood, Mountain Brook, Trussville, and Vestavia Hills, or to transfer the claims against those municipalities to the Birmingham Division. Should the trial court dismiss the claims, then the escrow of all funds collected under their respective tobacco-tax ordinances by Homewood, Mountain Brook, Trussville, and Vestavia Hills shall be terminated, and the funds returned to the respective municipalities by the clerk of the Jefferson Circuit Court. Should the trial court transfer the claims against Homewood, Mountain Brook, Trussville, and Vestavia Hills to the Birmingham Division, the funds collected under the previously ordered escrow by those municipalities shall remain with the circuit clerk subject to the further order of the Birmingham Division.