Opinion ID: 1884741
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: liquidation of claim

Text: [¶ 23] In paragraph four of its order, the Probate Court required Terry to pay to Benton from the Trust/Ricci Corporation assets, if necessary, a lump sum payment in the amount of $496,962.16 less the arrearages amount actually paid. Terry objects to this order on several grounds including the lack of authority of the court over the trust and the lack of evidence to support Benton's request for a lump sum amount. [¶ 24] The Probate Code provides that when a claim is contingent, a claimant who consents can be paid the present value of the claim. 18-A M.R.S.A. § 3-810(b)(1) (1998). The determination of present value must take any uncertainty of the claim into account. Id. Benton's claim for future spousal support is contingent because it is for a monthly amount payable until her death or remarriage; upon either of those events, the payment obligation ends. Benton consented to payment of the present value, and the Probate Court determined the present value of the claim. [¶ 25] The parties have not argued in this Court or in the Probate Court whether title 19-A statutes would allow or defeat the request for a modification of the periodic spousal support into a lump sum amount. Although lump sum spousal support is allowed in 19-A M.R.S.A. § 951-A(3) (Supp.2002), the parties did not argue as to whether a change in circumstances would be required to modify any periodic payments into a lump sum. Because the court and the parties proceeded as though only 18-A M.R.S.A. § 3-810(b)(1) was relevant to the lump sum request, we conclude that Terry has failed to preserve any defense to Benton's request that she might have on the ground that Benton has not shown a change in circumstances sufficient to warrant a lump sum amount. [¶ 26] Terry argues to us that that the court's factual determination of the present value did not take into account the contingency of Benton's remarriage. However, this was not an objection raised before the trial court. The parties had agreed, in lieu of expert testimony on present value, to allow a calculation based upon the estate tax regulations of the Internal Revenue Code. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 7520 (2002); 26 C.F.R. § 20.2031-7(d)(2)(iv) (2002). Benton prepared the calculation, which was admitted in evidence without objection. That calculation showed the present value as $496,962.16. Terry has not preserved any objection to the present value on the ground of failure to take the uncertainty of remarriage into account. [¶ 27] Terry's objection at trial was that the estate could not afford to pay a lump sum of $496,962.16. When a court determines whether to accelerate a contingent claim, it should consider the ability of the estate to pay the present value as well as the desirability of bringing the claim to a conclusion. The court had expressly found that the assets of the trust, which included the Ricci Corporations, were available to pay the estate's claims. Although the Probate Court has discretion in determining whether to reduce a contingent claim to present value, the court exercised that discretion from its view that the trust and its assets were before the court for distribution. In contrast to the portions of its order regarding payment of the arrearage, interest, and attorney fees by Terry to Benton, the court expressly ordered the $496,962.16 to be paid by Terry to Benton from the Ricci Trust and Ricci Corporation assets, if such was necessary. As we stated above, the court could not exercise jurisdiction over the distribution of the trust's assets once the trustee timely noticed the removal of any claim against the Ricci Trust to the Superior Court. Because the court misapprehended its power over the trust and because its decision to order the lump sum relies upon payment of it by the trust and corporations, we conclude that it abused its discretion in ordering the lump sum payment.