Opinion ID: 2501590
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Violation of the Lawyer's Oath

Text: Respondent contends that the civility clause contained within the lawyer's oath is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We disagree. Respondent took the lawyer's oath which includes the following clause, To opposing parties and their counsel, I pledge fairness, integrity, and civility, not only in court, but also in all written and oral communications. . . . Rule 402(k), SCACR. The United States Supreme Court has noted that lawyers are not entitled to the same First Amendment protections as laypeople. See In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 644-45, 105 S.Ct. 2874, 2881, 86 L.Ed.2d 504 (1985). Moreover, attorneys' [o]bedience to ethical precepts may require abstention from what in other circumstances might be constitutionally protected speech. In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 646-47, 79 S.Ct. 1376, 1388, 3 L.Ed.2d 1473 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring). Even outside the courtroom, . . . lawyers in pending cases [are] subject to ethical restrictions on speech to which an ordinary citizen would not be. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1071, 111 S.Ct. 2720, 2743, 115 L.Ed.2d 888 (1991).
The concept of vagueness or indefiniteness rests on the constitutional principle that procedural due process requires fair notice and proper standards for adjudication. State v. Albert, 257 S.C. 131, 134, 184 S.E.2d 605, 606 (1971). A law is unconstitutionally vague if it forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that a person of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application. Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 572, 549 S.E.2d 591, 598 (2001) (citation omitted). In Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 476 Mich. 231, 719 N.W.2d 123 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1205, 127 S.Ct. 1257, 167 L.Ed.2d 75 (2007), an attorney challenged the constitutionality of Michigan's civility and courtesy rules for lawyers. That court held, Such a challenge cannot be successfully advanced here because there is no question that even the most casual reading of these rules would put a person clearly on notice that the kind of language used by Mr. Fieger would violate MRPC 3.5(c) and MRPC 6.5(a). Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 139. In this case, there is no question that even a casual reading of the attorney's oath would put a person on notice that the type of language used in Respondent's Drug Dealer e-mail violates the civility clause. Casting aspersions on an opposing counsel's offspring and questioning the manner in which an opposing attorney was rearing his or her own children does not even near the margins of the civility clause. While no one argued it in this case, it could be argued that the language used by Respondent in the Drug Dealer e-mail constituted fighting words. Moreover, a person of common intelligence does not have to guess at the meaning of the civility oath. We hold, as the court held in Fieger, that the civility oath is not unconstitutionally vague.
The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine is an exception to the usual rules regarding the standards for facial challenges. In re Amir X.S., 371 S.C. 380, 384, 639 S.E.2d 144, 146 (2006). Under the overbreadth doctrine, the party challenging a statute simply must demonstrate that the statute could cause someone elseanyone elseto refrain from constitutionally protected expression. Id. (citation omitted). The overbreadth doctrine has been implemented out of concern that the threat of enforcement of an overly broad law may deter or `chill' constitutionally protected speechespecially when the overly broad law imposes criminal sanctions. Id. at 384-85, 639 S.E.2d at 146 (citation omitted). The overbreadth doctrine: . . . permits a court to wholly invalidate a statute only when the terms are so broad that they punish a substantial amount of protected free speech in relation to the statute's otherwise plainly legitimate sweepuntil and unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation narrows it so as to remove the threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected expression. Id. at 385, 639 S.E.2d at 146-47 (citation omitted). A court analyzing whether a disciplinary rule violates the First Amendment must balance the State's interest in the regulation of a specialized profession against a lawyer's First Amendment interest in the kind of speech that was at issue. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1073, 111 S.Ct. 2720, 2744, 115 L.Ed.2d 888 (1991). In those instances where a lawyer's unbridled speech amounts to misconduct which threatens a significant state interest, a state may restrict the lawyer's exercise of personal rights guaranteed by the Constitutions. In re Johnson, 240 Kan. 334, 729 P.2d 1175, 1178 (1986) ( citing N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438, 83 S.Ct. 328, 340-41, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963)). A layman may, perhaps, pursue his theories of free speech . . . until he runs afoul of the penalties of libel or slander, or into some infraction of our statutory law. A member of the bar can, and will, be stopped at the point where he infringes our Canon of Ethics. In re Woodward, 300 S.W.2d 385, 393-94 (Mo.1957). The interests protected by the civility oath are the administration of justice and integrity of the lawyer-client relationship. The State has an interest in ensuring a system of regulation that prohibits lawyers from attacking each other personally in the manner in which Respondent attacked Attorney Doe. Such conduct not only compromises the integrity of the judicial process, it also undermines a lawyer's ability to objectively represent his or her client. There is no substantial amount of protected free speech penalized by the civility oath in light of the oath's plainly legitimate sweep of supporting the administration of justice and the lawyer-client relationship. Thus, we find the civility oath is not unconstitutionally overbroad.