Opinion ID: 1147525
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Instruction Defining Aggravate and Mitigate

Text: Shortly after deliberations commenced, the jury requested definitions of the terms aggravating and mitigating. The court suggested to counsel that the jury be instructed that the dictionary defines aggravate as to make worse, more serious, or more severe, and it defines mitigate as to make less severe or painful; to cause to become less harsh or hostile. Defendant's counsel answered, That's fine. A written instruction containing these definitions, and identifying the dictionary from which they were taken, was then sent into the jury room. (25a) Defendant contends that the giving of this instruction was prejudicial error because the definitions are too narrow and imply that the penalty determination turns on a balance between good and bad rather than between life and death (see People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d 512, 541-542, fn. 13). In particular, he maintains that the definition of mitigate could lead the jury to believe it could consider as mitigating only circumstances which made the capital offense itself less severe or painful and therefore to ignore mitigating character and background evidence (see Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 989-990, 98 S.Ct. 2954]; Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1, 4 [90 L.Ed.2d 1, 6, 106 S.Ct. 1669]). We rejected an argument similar to the one raised here in People v. Karis, supra, 46 Cal.3d 612. In that case one juror informed the others during deliberations that mitigate was defined in the dictionary as to make or become milder, less severe, less rigorous, or less painful; moderate. (P. 644.) We concluded that it was misconduct for jurors to consult a dictionary but that defendant was not prejudiced: While the dictionary definition of `mitigating' may not have been particularly helpful to the jury in understanding the use of the term in this context, defendant offers no persuasive argument to support a conclusion that the jury might have been misled. He suggests that if the jury had believed it could consider as mitigating evidence that did not pertain directly to the crime, notwithstanding the instruction, consideration of that definition would lead them to conclude that to be considered mitigating the factors had to make the crimes themselves `mild, soft, or tender,' or `less severe, less rigorous, less painful, moderate.' [¶] Nothing in the definition suggests the restricted meaning that defendant believes the jury may have attributed to the word mitigating. (P. 645.) Aggravating and mitigating are commonly understood terms which need not be defined for the jury. ( People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 55 [252 Cal. Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249].) We have stated that certain definitions, while not required, provide a helpful framework for the jury's consideration of particular aggravating and mitigating circumstances. ( People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 77-78 [246 Cal. Rptr. 209, 753 P.2d 1].) (26) Definitions found to be helpful include a definition of an aggravating circumstance as `any fact, condition or event attending the commission of a crime which increases its guilt or enormity, or adds to its injurious consequences which is above and beyond the elements of the offense itself' and a definition of a mitigating circumstance as `any fact, condition or event which, as such, does not constitute a justification or excuse for the offense in question, but which may be considered as an extenuating circumstance in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty.' ( Ibid.; see also, People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 269-270 [253 Cal. Rptr. 55, 763 P.2d 906].) (25b) Here the jury was expressly instructed that the circumstances to be considered in making the penalty determination included any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, and any other aspect of the defendant's character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death and that you may consider sympathy for the defendant in determining penalty. (See People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 878, fn. 10 [196 Cal.Rptr 309, 671 P.2d 813].) The arguments of counsel likewise explained the proper scope of mitigating circumstances in the determination of penalty. Viewing the arguments of counsel and the entire body of instructions, we are not persuaded that defendant suffered any prejudice from the giving of the challenged instruction.