Opinion ID: 2338879
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: motions re psychiatric examination of witness

Text: The defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his two motions requesting a psychiatric examination of Christian D. Noury, a witness for the prosecution. Prior to the trial testimony of the witness Noury, defense counsel conducted a preliminary examination, outside the presence of the jury, in an attempt to determine whether the witness should be subjected to a mental examination before being permitted to testify. During the course of that preliminary examination by the defense, Noury stated that he had in the past used the hallucinogenic drug acid, and the amphetamine commonly known as speed. Noury said that he did not remember the last time he had used acid, but indicated that he had taken no form of drug in months. On the basis of the above preliminary testimony, the defendant claimed that the witness should not be permitted to testify before the jury without a psychiatric examination. The court, stating that it had no basis to conclude that Noury was not a competent witness at the time, denied the defendant's motion for examination. Following the direct examination of Noury in the presence of the jury, during which he testified, in part, to his observations of the defendant's activities [18] and to a statement claimed to have been made by the defendant on the night of the murders, the witness was questioned on cross-examination by the defense regarding his own activities on that date. Noury testified that, on October 19, 1974, he arrived at a house party some time between six and seven o'clock in the evening and smoked hashish and possibly drank some wine during the couple of hours prior to the defendant's arrival. [19] Thereafter, the witness underwent an extensive cross-examination regarding various aspects of his testimony. Sometime after Noury had completed his testimony, defense counsel again moved the court for a psychiatric examination indicating that Noury's activities on the night in question may have affected his judgment and his ability to observe the facts to which he testified. The court denied this second motion stating, inter alia, that since the amount of hashish and the amount of wine, if any, consumed by Noury were unknown, any medical or psychiatric opinion as to the effect that they might have had upon the witness would be highly speculative. The defendant argues, relying almost exclusively upon our decision in Taborsky v. State, 142 Conn. 619, 116 A.2d 433, that the denial of his motions resulted in the trial court's having an inadequate basis upon which to decide the issue of Noury's competence, and deprived the defendant of his right to present admissible psychiatric testimony to the jury to impeach the credibility of this witness. On the question of competency, the defendant points to our suggestion in Taborsky v. State, supra, in which we granted the defendant a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence regarding the serious mental abnormalities of a crucial state's witness, that a motion for a mental examination of a witness is properly made at the time he is called to testify. Id., 630. In Taborsky, we noted that the trial court at no time had the question of the witness, competency properly presented to it by a timely challenge and production of evidence allowing for a determination of the witness' mental condition at a most opportune moment. Id., 630, 632. At the trial in the present case, in contrast, the question of Noury's competence was timely and properly presented to the trial court for its preliminary determination. See Holcomb v. Holcomb, 28 Conn. 177, 179. It is well settled that `[t]he competency of a witness is a matter peculiarly within the discretion of the trial court and its ruling will be disturbed only in a clear case of abuse or of some error in law. State v. Orlando, 115 Conn. 672, 675, 163 A. 256. The considerations which should govern the determination of competency are the proposed witness' maturity to receive correct impressions by his senses, ability to recollect and narrate intelligently, and ability to appreciate the moral duty to tell the truth. State v. Segerberg, 131 Conn. 546, 547, 41 A.2d 101; Kuczon v. Tomkievicz, 100 Conn. 560, 570, 124 A. 226.' State v. Manning, 162 Conn. 112, 115, 291 A.2d 750; see McCormick, Evidence (2d Ed.) § 62. State v. Siberon, 166 Conn. 455, 457-58, 352 A.2d 285. The trial court in the present case properly considered whether there was sufficient doubt as to the competency of Noury to warrant his examination. State v. Manning, supra. On the basis of the facts elicited during the preliminary examination and the court's own observation of the witness' demeanor, it satisfied itself on the question of his competency according to the principle enunciated in State v. Segerberg, supra, and concluded that a psychiatric examination was not required. The trial court did not misapply any principle of law or, on the facts appearing of record, depart from a reasonable determination of the competency of [Noury]. [20] State v. Manning, supra. `The court is not bound to order an examination on the question [of competency] merely because counsel for the accused requests that it be done, where the court, after hearing the testimony of the witness, has no doubt of his mental soundness.' State v. Vars, 154 Conn. 255, 268, 224 A.2d 744. We similarly reject the defendant's claim that the trial court committed reversible error in denying his second motion for a mental examination. Again referring to Taborsky v. State, supra, the defendant argues that the denial of his motion deprived the defendant of his right to present admissible psychiatric testimony to the jury to impeach the credibility of [Noury]. We disagree. The trial court explicitly rejected any suggestion that the defendant would be prevented from fully cross-examining Noury on the question of his mental condition on the night of October 19, 1974; and, as noted above, such an inquiry was in fact conducted. See generally, annot., Use of Drugs as Affecting Competency or Credibility of Witness, 65 A.L.R.3d 705, § 5 [b]. Moreover, although defense counsel indicated his intention to bring in a psychiatrist to testify as to his judgment and to renew the motion for an examination at that later date, such testimony was apparently never produced. Since there was no evidence as to the strength or quality of the substance smoked by the defendant or the quantity of hashish or wine ingested on the night in question, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a psychiatric examination of Noury on the grounds that any expert opinion as to the effect of those activities upon him at the time would, under the circumstances, necessarily be speculative. See United States v. Pacelli, 521 F.2d 135 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 911, 96 S. Ct. 1106, 47 L. Ed. 2d 314; Ledbetter v. United States, 350 A.2d 379 (D.C. App.); State v. Looney, 294 N.C. 1, 240 S.E.2d 612; State v. Klueber, 81 S.D. 223, 132 N.W.2d 847; McCormick, op. cit., § 45; see also Juviler, Psychiatric Opinions as to Credibility of Witnesses: A Suggested Approach, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 648, 663 (1960). The trier, as the sole judge of the credibility of a witness; State v. Mitchell, 169 Conn. 161, 170, 362 A.2d 808; State v. Farrah, 161 Conn. 43, 49, 282 A.2d 879; was, in the present case, fully apprised of the facts claimed by the defendant to be relevant to that assessment with regard to the testimony of Noury.