Opinion ID: 478987
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Misconduct by the Trial Court.

Text: 28 Appellants assert that the trial court exhibited prejudice against them, resulting in a violation of due process. Appellants complain of the trial court's evidentiary rulings, questioning of witnesses, statements of counsel, exclusion of evidence, jury instructions, and procedural decisions. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 144 requires recusal only when the trial court's bias is extrajudicial. The alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must also result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583, 86 S.Ct. 1698, 1710, 16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966). Disqualification is not required because the judge has definite views as to the law of a particular case. See Johnston v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., etc., 659 F.2d 865, 869 (8th Cir.1981). Antipathy to an attorney is insufficient grounds for disqualification of a judge because it is not indicative of extrajudicial bias against a party. Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 722 F.2d 1390, 1398 (8th Cir.1983). Because appellants have failed to show extrajudicial bias on the part of the trial court, we must deny their motion for a new trial on this basis. 29 Assuming that 28 U.S.C. Sec. 144 is not applicable to this case, we do not believe that any of the appellants' specific allegations of bias have merit. Appellants claim that the court harbored a bias against the law stated in Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir.1982). In its order denying the motion for new trial, the district court stated that its alleged excoriation of the Gibson opinion was a blatant misstatement and bordered on contempt, and that the court's dissatisfaction was with counsel's repeated citation of Gibson for propositions foreign to the holding, dicta, and rationale of the opinion. Order at 11-12. We find nothing in the record which would suggest that the district court did anything but follow the law as set out in Gibson. Appellants also claim that the court erred in giving an instruction which is contrary to the rule set out in Gibson. The instruction stated that 30 [y]ou will note that the Act does not require that advanced age, substantial length of service or seniority entitled employees to special favorable consideration, except as I have stated the statute to provide. 31 This instruction is taken almost verbatim from Manville v. ACTION, No. 79-1103 (D.D.C. August 13, 1980). We do not believe that the court committed error in including this instruction in order to dispel the notion that the broad experience of the appellants would give them bumping rights throughout the plant. 32 Appellants also maintain that the court erred in failing to include in its charge Plaintiffs' Proposed Instruction A-II, Third Set, an instruction on damages patterned after Gibson. We have considered the appellants' argument and conclude that the district court has committed no error. Even if the court erred, it was not prejudicial to the appellants because the jury did not reach the damages issue. 33 Finally, appellants assert error in the district court's rejection of their testimony as to their qualifications for other jobs as showing disapproval of the Gibson opinion. The district court found this evidence inadmissible as irrelevant in determining whether the appellants were terminated because of their age. Once again, we find no error in the trial court's finding inadmissible this opinion evidence, nor do we believe the court's ruling was inconsistent with Gibson. 34 As to the remaining claims of bias on the part of the trial court, we conclude after carefully examining the record before us that the trial court committed no error and that if any error was committed it was not prejudicial to the appellants. We affirm the district court's denial of a new trial on this ground. 35