Opinion ID: 75704
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excessive Force During the Arrest

Text: 18 We very occasionally encounter the exceptional case in which a defendant officer’s acts are so egregious that preexisting, fact-specific precedent was not necessary to give clear warning to every reasonable (by which we, in the qualified immunity context, always mean every objectively reasonable) officer that what the defendant officer was doing must be “unreasonable” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919 (11th Cir. 2000). See generally Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1031 n.9 (discussing means by which officers can be fairly and clearly warned). But the case now before us is not one like that. 19 We conclude that the force used by Sgt. Farrell during his arrest of Rodriguez did not violate the Constitution. The use of excessive force in carrying out an arrest constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). But, “the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Id. at 396. In the Eleventh Circuit, we recognize that the typical arrest involves some force and injury. See Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1257-58 (11th Cir. 2000). The evidence, in the light most favorable to plaintiff, shows that Sgt. Farrell grabbed plaintiff’s arm, twisted it around plaintiff’s back, jerking it up high to the shoulder and then handcuffed plaintiff as plaintiff fell to his knees screaming that Farrell was hurting him. Plaintiff was placed in the rear of Sgt. Farrell’s patrol car, kept handcuffed behind his back and transported to the police station. The handcuffs were removed minutes after arrival at the police department. The handcuffing technique used by Sgt. Farrell is a relatively common and ordinarily accepted non-excessive way to detain an arrestee. Plaintiff’s orthopedic surgeon testified that the handcuffing was a “very serious, painful event,” that resulted in the loosening of the internal surgical hardware, and caused the displacement of a key bone fragment. The resulting 20 complications included more than twenty-five subsequent surgeries and ultimately amputation of the arm below the elbow.19 Painful handcuffing, without more, is not excessive force in cases where the resulting injuries are minimal. See Nolin, 207 F.3d at 1257-58 (concluding, as a matter of law, that force used during arrest, including handcuffing, was not excessive when force and resulting injury were minimal); Brissett v. Paul, 141 F.3d 1157 (4th Cir. 1998) (table) (concluding, as matter of law, that painful handcuffing with minimal injury not constitutional violation); Foster v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 914 F.2d 1076, 1082 (8th Cir. 1990) (same); see also Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 869-70 (4th Cir. 1988) (concluding that force used, as a matter of law, was not excessive); Silverman v. Ballantine, 694 F.2d 1091, 1096-97 (7th Cir. 1982) (same). This case is different from Nolin because Rodriguez’ earlier surgery made what otherwise would be a common non-excessive handcuffing technique (that ordinarily would be painful but cause minimal injury) a maneuver that caused severe injury and tragic results. This distinction, however, is not important legally and does not preclude a conclusion that Rodriguez has shown no constitutional 19 Given the loss of an arm, we are presented with the proverbial “hard case,” that is, one in which one’s natural sympathies are aroused by the plaintiff’s plight. We recall Justice Jackson’s warning to judges: “We agree that this is a hard case, but we cannot agree that it should be allowed to make bad law.” FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 229, 67 S.Ct. 213, 216 (1946). 21 violation: no evidence has been presented that Sgt. Farrell knew of plaintiff’s recent elbow surgery or, more important, knew that handcuffing plaintiff would seriously aggravate plaintiff’s preexisting condition.20 20 Rodriguez admits that he did not tell Sgt. Farrell that he had an injured arm before his arrest, and nothing outwardly indicated that Rodriguez’ arm was injured after Rodriguez was outside the car. But, Rodriguez asks us to infer from the evidence he presented that Sgt. Farrell knew or should have known that Rodriguez’ arm was already injured and required special treatment during the arrest. Rodriguez specifically argues that the evidence shows that, before Sgt. Farrell arrested him: (1) Rodriguez told Sgt. Farrell that he had just gotten out of the hospital because he (Rodriguez) had been in a motorcycle accident; (2) Sgt. Farrell briefly looked through Rodriguez’ hospital records; and, (3) Sgt. Farrell was standing behind Ms. Foulkes’ car when Rodriguez was in the car and still had his arm in a sling. From these three circumstances, Rodriguez says that one can reasonably infer that Sgt. Farrell knew about Rodriguez’ injured arm and that the arm demanded special treatment. We disagree. Sgt. Farrell testified flatly that he did not see Rodriguez’ arm in a sling. And, the circumstances to which Rodriguez points are not inconsistent with Sgt. Farrell’s sworn testimony. Rodriguez admits that the interior of Ms. Foulkes’ car -- the area into which Sgt. Farrell, from his position behind the car, would have needed to have seen Rodriguez in his sling -- was “dark.” Never does Rodriguez tell us how far behind the pertinent car Sgt. Farrell was standing. Never does Rodriguez say that he saw Farrell focus on him while Rodriguez was in the car wearing a sling. Given the evidence in this record, Rodriguez relies on conjecture that the sling could have, and would have, been observed by a reasonable officer. See Daniels v. Twin Oaks Nursing Home, 692 F.2d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 1982) (“[A]n inference is not reasonable if it is ‘only a guess or a possibility,’ for such an inference is not based on the evidence but is pure conjecture and speculation.”). Rodriguez cannot overcome contradictory direct evidence -- Sgt. Farrell’s sworn testimony that he did not see the sling -- and raise a genuine issue of fact. We decline to accept Rodriguez’ contended-for double inference (that the sling was observable and that Sgt. Farrell made, or a reasonable officer would have made, that observation in the context of what was occurring generally in the nighttime traffic stop and arrest of Ms. Foulkes) to prove that Sgt. Farrell saw, or should have seen, Rodriguez’ arm in the sling. See generally Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1355 (11th Cir. 1999) (concluding that inference that one person told a second person about a specific fact regarding a topic, based upon evidence that the first and second persons met and talked and evidence that the second person knew about the topic generally, was unreasonable speculation in the light of an affirmative denial of knowledge of the specific fact by the second person); Burrell v. Board of Trs. of Georgia Military Coll., 970 F.2d 785, 791 n.15 (11th Cir.1992) (“Considering that Burrell cannot offer evidence of the contents of Baugh's and Baggarly's meeting, that Baugh and Baggarly provide a reasonable and consistent explanation for their meeting, that Baugh and Baggarly flatly deny having discussed 22 We do not use hindsight to judge the acts of police officers; we look at what they knew (or reasonably should have known) at the time of the act. What would ordinarily be considered reasonable force does not become excessive force when the force aggravates (however severely) a pre-existing condition the extent of which was unknown to the officer at the time. See Silverman, 694 F.2d at 1096-97 (concluding that force used was not, as a matter of law, excessive even though Burrell, only one fact can be inferred from their meeting: that the meeting took place. Any conclusion about the content of their discussion in contradiction to their testimony would qualify as speculation, not inference.”); Daniels, 692 F.2d at 1326 (concluding jury could not reasonably draw inference that nursing home’s negligent act of allowing patient to wander away from home was proximate cause of patient’s death because inference was only supported by mere scintilla of evidence and conflicted with uncontradicted facts). See also Pennsylvania R.R. v. Chamberlin, 288 U.S. 333, 340-41, 53 S. Ct. 391 (1933) (“And the desired inference is precluded for the further reason that respondent's right of recovery depends upon the existence of a particular fact which must be inferred from proven facts, and this is not permissible in the face of the positive and otherwise uncontradicted testimony of unimpeached witnesses consistent with the facts actually proved, from which testimony it affirmatively appears that the fact sought to be inferred did not exist.”). Thus, the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that Sgt. Farrell knew, or should have known, about Rodriguez’ injured arm (and that the arm demanded special treatment) because Rodriguez had the arm in a sling at a time before his arrest. Nor does Rodriguez’ testimony that Sgt. Farrell briefly “looked” at Rodriguez’ hospital records raise an inference that Sgt. Farrell knew, or should have known, about Rodriguez’ injured arm and that the arm demanded special treatment. Rodriguez specifically testified that Sgt. Farrell “looked” at the records; he admits that Farrell did not “read” them. Rodriguez also provides no evidence tending to show specifically what the content of these hospital records would have been. Under the circumstances, this evidence, even combined with evidence that Rodriguez told Sgt. Farrell that he had just gotten out of the hospital after a motorcycle accident, is not enough to support an inference that Sgt. Farrell knew, or should have known, specifically that Rodriguez’ arm was injured and that the arm demanded special care. Cf. Clover, 176 F.3d at 1355. 23 arrestee died of heart attack during arrest). Under the circumstances of this case, Sgt. Farrell’s acts cannot rise to the level of a constitutional violation.21 REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 21 In the alternative, we conclude that Sgt. Farrell is entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim. 24