Opinion ID: 3046880
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: G eneral standing principles

Text: Standing implicates both constitutional requirements and prudential concerns. See Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 128 (2004). In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues. The standing requirement is born partly of an idea, which is more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (quotations, citations omitted). A federal court “[a]lways . . . must balance the heavy obligation to exercise jurisdiction against the deeply rooted commitment not to pass on questions of constitutionality unless adjudication of the constitutional issue is necessary.” Id. (quotations, citations omitted). Thus, Article III’s standing requirement “is every bit as important in its circum scription of the judicial power of the United States as in its granting of that power.” Valley Forge Christian 17 Coll. v. Ams. United for S eparation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 476 (1982). Invoking the power of the federal judiciary requires m ore than important issues and able litigants. See id. at 489-90.
“Article III, § 2, of the Constitution restricts the federal ‘judicial Pow er’ to the resolution of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’ That case-or controversy requirement is satisfied only where a plaintiff has standing.” Sprint Commc’ns C o. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2531, 2535 (2008); see also Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 471. [I]n order to have Article III standing, a plaintiff must adequately establish: (1) an injury in fact (i.e., a “concrete and particulariz ed” in vasion of a “legally protected interest”); (2) causation (i.e., a “fairly traceable” connection between the alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the defendant); and (3) redressability (i.e., it is “likely” and not “merely speculative” that the plaintiff’s injury will be remedied by the relief plaintiff seeks in bringing suit). Sprint Commc’ns Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2535 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61) (further quotation, alterations omitted); see also Cortes, 508 F.3d at 161. “In this manner does Art. III limit the federal judicial power ‘to those disputes w hich confine federal courts to a role consistent w ith a system of separated powers and which are 18 traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.’” Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 472 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968)). “Determining that a m atter before the federal courts is a proper case or controversy under A rticle III therefore assumes particular importance in ensuring that the Federal Judiciary respects the proper— and properly limited— role of the courts in a democratic society.” DaimlerChrysler Corp., 547 U.S. at 341 (quotation omitted). “[N]o principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.” Id. (quotations omitted). “If a dispute is not a proper case or controversy, the courts have no business deciding it . . . .” Id. Of particular relevance to this case, a plaintiff must allege an actual, concrete injury. See Sprint Comm c’ns Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2535; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. It is not enough to assert a generalized, abstract grievance shared by a large number of similarly situated people. See Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 482-83 (citing cases). W e go on to discuss prudential standing.
In contrast to constitutional standing, prudential standing “embodies judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.” Elk G rove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. at 11 (quotation omitted). Although the Supreme Court has not exhaustively defined the prudential 19 dimensions of the standing doctrine, [the Court has] explained that prudential standing encompasses the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked. Id. at 12 (quotation omitted); see also Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 474-75; Twp. of Piscataway v. Duke Energy, 488 F.3d 203, 209 (3d Cir. 2007). W ithout such limitations–closely related to Art. III concerns but essentially matters of judicial self-governance–the courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public significance even though other governmental institutions may be more competent to address the questions and even t h o u g h j u d ic ia l in te rv e n tio n m a y b e unnecessary to protect individual rights. Elk Grove U nified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. at 12 (quotation omitted). Of import in this case, then, “even when the plaintiff has alleged redressable injury sufficient to meet the requirements of Art. III, the [Supreme] Court has refrained from adjudicating ‘abstract questions of wide public significance’ w hich amount to ‘generalized grievances,’ 20 pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the representative branches.” V alley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U .S. at 474-75 (quoting W arth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975)).
“W hether styled as a constitutional or prudential limit on standing, the [Supreme] Court has sometimes determined that where large numbers of Americans suffer alike, the political process, rather than the judicial process, may provide the more appropriate remedy for a widely shared grievance.” Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23 (1998) (citing cases). Based upon this reasoning, the Supreme “Court repeatedly has rejected claims of standing predicated on the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the Government be administered according to law.” Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 482-83 (quotation, alteration omitted; citing cases); see also M assachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 516-17 (2007) (“W e will not . . . entertain citizen suits to vindicate the public’s nonconcrete interest in the proper administration of the laws.”); Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 442 (2007) (per curiam) (noting that the “[t]he only injury plaintiffs allege is that the law . . . has not been followed. This injury is precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance about the conduct of government that we have refused to countenance in the past.”); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74 (“W e have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government–claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the 21 Constitution and law s, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large–does not state an Article III case or controversy.”); id. at 573-77 (citing cases); Goode, 539 F.3d at 322 (holding taxpayers lacked standing to assert claims based upon generalized injury that all persons in Philadelphia suffered); C ortes, 508 F.3d at 164 (holding voters and taxpayers lacked standing to assert a “g en eralize d griev an ce[] of concerned citizens”); Taliaferro, 458 F.3d at 185, 190 (holding homeowners lacked standing to assert generalized challenge to local zoning ordinance); Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. M agnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 120-21 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding plaintiffs lacked standing to assert generalized claim that they were injured by knowing that creek was being polluted). Such claims amount to little more than attempts “to employ a federal court as a forum in which to air . . . generalized grievances about the conduct of government.” Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U .S. at 479 (quotation, alteration omitted). Therefore, “assertion of a right to a particular kind of Government conduct, which the Government has violated by acting differently, cannot alone satisfy the requirements of Art. III without draining those requirements of meaning.” Id. at 483. This reasoning “invariably appears in cases w here the harm at issue is not only widely shared, but is also of an abstract and indefinite nature— for example, harm to the common concern for obedience to law.” Akins, 524 U.S. at 23 (quotation om itted). “The abstract nature of the 22 harm— for example, injury to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed–deprives the case of the concrete specificity . . . which . . . prevents a plaintiff from obtaining what would, in effect, amount to an advisory opinion.” Id. at 24. “Often the fact that an interest is abstract and the fact that it is w idely shared go hand in hand. But their association is not invariable, and where a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the [Supreme] C ourt has found ‘injury in fact.’” Id.; see also M assachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. at 517; Goode, 539 F.3d at 322 (noting in that case that “[a]ppellants lack standing, . . . not because the alleged injuries they suffer are widely felt, but because their injuries are no different in nature from the general interest in enforcing compliance with the law which the public shares”). In this appeal, Plaintiffs argue they are not asserting generalized grievances, but are instead alleging the deprivation of “personal rights” under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Even so, Plaintiffs must allege that they directly suffered an actual injury to those rights. See Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 482-87; see also Goode, 539 F.3d at 315, 320-22 & 322 n.7 (applying same standing analysis to a citizen taxpayer’s claims alleging the deprivation of rights under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to access the courts and to petition the legislature, and thus requiring plaintiff to establish an actual and direct injury to her rights in order to have standing).
23 The named plaintiffs include four individuals— Tim Potts, Carl H. Silverman, W illiam R. Koch and H. W illiam M cIntyre— who are Pennsylvania residents, citizens and taxpayers. Plaintiff Greg Vitali is a citizen and taxpayer in Pennsylvania. H e is also a member of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives who voted against Act 44. 4 Two of the plaintiffs— Common Cause of Pennsylvania and the League of W omen Voters— are associations. C ommon Cause “is a national non-partisan citizen advocacy organization concerned with advancing integrity in government. Common Cause’s primary goal is governmental accountability and responsiveness, which it promotes through lobbying, oversight, education, outreach 4 In their second amended complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that each of the named plaintiffs, both individuals and associations alike, are taxpayers as well as citizens and residents of Pennsylvania. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs expressly do not rely on their status as taxpayers to establish their standing to assert the claims they pursue in this litigation. Accordingly, we do not reach the issue, although we note that under the present thinking of a majority of the Supreme Court, Plaintiffs would appear not to have standing as taxpayers under the circumstances alleged here. See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007) (plurality); see also 13B C harles A lan Wright, Arthur R. M iller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3531.10.1 (3d ed. 2008). 24 and litigation programs.” App. at 33. “Common Cause of Pennsylvania has over 10,000 members in Pennsylvania.” Id. Plaintiff League of W om en Voters of Pennsylvania “is a m em bership based, non-partisan, non-profit corporation organized under the laws of Pennsylvania. The League’s purpose is to promote the informed and active participation of citizens in their government.” Id. at 34. Its “membership consists of [Pennsylvania] citizens, taxpayers, and voters.” Id. An association’s or organization’s standing presents special considerations. [A]n organization or association may have standing to bring suit under tw o circumstances. First, an organization may be granted standing in its own right to seek judicial relief from injury to itself and to vindicate whatever rights and immunities the organization or association itself may enjoy. Alternatively, an association may assert claims on behalf of its m embers, but only w here the record show s that the organization’s individual members themselves have standing to bring those claims. Cortes, 508 F.3d at 162-63 (citations, alterations omitted); see also Pa. Psychiatric Soc’y v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 283 (3d Cir. 2002). Thus, “an organization may sue to redress its members’ injuries, even 25 without a showing of injury to the association itself.” United Food & Comm’l W orkers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 552 (1996). “‘[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members w hen: (a) its members w ould otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.’” Id. at 553 (quoting Hunt v. W ash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)); see also Pa. Psychiatric Soc’y, 280 F.3d at 283. The first requirement, “that at least one of the organization’s members w ould have standing to sue on his own, is grounded on Article III as an element of the constitutional requirement of a case or controversy.” United Food & Comm’l W orkers Union Local 751, 517 U.S. at 554-55 (quotation omitted). The second prong is, at the least, complementary to the first, for its demand that an association plaintiff be organized for a purpose germane to the subject of its member’s claim raises an assurance that the association’s litigators w ill themselves have a stake in the resolution of the dispute, and thus be in a position to serve as the defendant’s natural adversary. Id. at 555-56. The third prong, on the other hand, is prudential in nature, rather than a constitutional requirement. See id. at 556-57. 26 In this case, the two Plaintiff associations base their standing solely on injuries suffered by their members. Therefore, because Plaintiffs Common Cause and the League of W omen Voters have “alleged no injury to [themselves] as an organization, distinct from injury to [their] taxpayer members,” their claim to standing can be no different from those of the members [they] seek[] to represent. The question [presented, then,] is whether [their] members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit. Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 476 n.14 (quotation omitted). Because the standing of the two Plaintiff associations thus rests on the standing of their members, and because Plaintiffs allege that the associations’ members suffered the same injury as the individual plaintiffs, save perhaps Representative Vitali, we will address the associations’ standing together with that of the individual plaintiffs.