Opinion ID: 830914
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: home builders

Text: Under Home Builders, the circuit court indisputably erred by creating and considering an evidentiary record outside of what was created during the rulemaking process. However, despite the fact that the circuit court impermissibly expanded the record in contravention of Home Builders, I do not believe that the error is outcome determinative. Under the proper standard of review, neither the circuit court record nor the administrative record supports the trial court's conclusion that the OFIS rules are invalid. After declining to review the administrative record and instead constructing its own record, the circuit court concluded that the OFIS rules were invalid. It did so on the basis of its independent factual conclusion that insurance scores accurately reflect differences in risk. I believe that, by reaching its own factual conclusions and failing to consider the administrative record at all, the circuit court erred. We long ago held that courts accord due deference to administrative expertise and [may] not invade the province of exclusive administrative fact-finding by displacing an agency's choice between two reasonably differing views. [14] Although this holding arose in the context of judicial review of quasi-judicial administrative decisions, I see no basis for limiting it to such cases. Judicial review of agency actions implicates significant questions about the separation of powers. [15] The Court of Appeals in Home Builders cited ample authority in summarizing this point: The federal courts generally limit judicial review to the administrative record already in existence, rather than permitting either review de novo or trial de novo. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743-744, 105 S.Ct. 1598, 84 L.Ed.2d 643 (1985); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142, 93 S.Ct. 1241, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973) ([T]he focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court.); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Horner, 272 U.S. App DC 81, 89, 854 F.2d 490 (1988) (Stated most simply, our task is to determine... whether [the agency] considered the relevant factors and explained the facts and policy concerns on which it relied, and whether those facts have some basis in the record.); Norwich Eaton Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Bowen, 808 F.2d 486, 489 (C.A.6, 1987). For example, in Florida Power, supra at 744, 105 S.Ct. 1598, the United States Supreme Court stated: If the record before the agency does not support the agency action, if the agency has not considered all relevant factors, or if the reviewing court simply cannot evaluate the challenged agency action on the basis of the record before it, the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation. The reviewing court is not generally empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed and to reach its own conclusions based on such an inquiry.  [16] Moreover, agency actions taken in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, as contrasted with those taken in a quasi-legislative capacity, are subject to a heightened standard of review. [17] Thus, quasi-legislative agency actions are afforded greater deference. Accordingly, the factual findings on which an administrative agency's rule is based certainly must be considered in reviewing the validity of that rule. To allow a court to make factual findings based solely on a record made in the court would allow the judiciary to substitute its own judgment for that of the agency. Moreover, it would allow the courts to usurp the authority that the Legislature granted to administrative agencies.