Opinion ID: 2625101
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jacobs's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

Text: ¶ 20 The next issue presented is whether Jacobs's counsel was ineffective in failing to request a competency hearing and allowing him to enter a plea in its absence, thus violating his right to assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim presents a mixed question of law and fact. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 518 (Utah 1994). Accordingly, we review the post-conviction court's legal conclusions for correctness while we review its factual findings for clear error. See id. ¶ 21 The United States Supreme Court, in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), established the two-prong test that determines whether a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel has been violated. See id. at 687-88. As formulated by this court, that test is as follows: To prevail, a defendant must show, first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. Parsons, 871 P.2d at 521 (quoting Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988)). ¶ 22 Jacobs contends that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment because his counsel allowed him to plead guilty without pursuing a competency hearing. In support of this contention, Jacobs notes several factors that should have led his counsel to request such a hearing: (1) his bizarre behavior after arrest, (2) contradictions in the alienists' reports, i.e., findings that he was actively psychotic and otherwise mentally ill and yet competent to stand trial, and (3) the trial court's expressed willingness to conduct a competency hearing before proceeding to trial. ¶ 23 These factors fail to demonstrate that Jacobs's counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment. First, Jacobs's behavior after arrest was, in fact, considered by each of the experts in reaching their opinions. Indeed, this behavior prompted the examinations. We find that it was a reasonable exercise of professional judgment for Jacobs's counsel to rely on the experts' unanimous conclusion that such behavior did not make him incompetent to stand trial. Second, the concept of competency to stand trial is a narrower one than that of mental illness. As shown above, the alienists' reports were not contradictory, as Jacobs contends, merely because they concluded that although he was mentally ill, he was still competent to stand trial. Finally, all of the alienists determined that Jacobs was competent to stand trial, and the trial court found him competent to do so, as well. In light of these uniform findings, we find that it was reasonable for defense counsel to forego the competency hearing and allow Jacobs to plead guilty to one count of rape of a child in exchange for dismissal of six other charges  one count of aggravated sexual assault, one count of aggravated burglary, another count of rape of a child, two counts of sexual abuse of a child, and one count of sodomy upon a child. [4]