Opinion ID: 717492
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The February Transaction

Text: 24 Crockett raises an entirely different, and more substantial, objection to the inclusion of the February transaction in the quantity determination. The February transaction resulted from the arrest of Gullo and New in January. After being arrested, New agreed to cooperate with the government by setting up a controlled buy from Crockett. New called Crockett and set up a meeting among Crockett, New and an undercover government agent. According to the agent, Crockett gave New 6.1 grams of cocaine as a sample prior to the meeting. At the meeting, the agent negotiated with Crockett to purchase two kilograms of cocaine for $48,000. The agent reported that Crockett agreed to the transaction but wanted the money up front. The transaction was never brought to completion. 25 At sentencing, two kilograms plus 6.1 grams were attributed to Crockett because of this February transaction. Crockett argues that this transaction may not be treated as relevant conduct for his conviction of a conspiracy which ended in January 1992. He argues that the postconspiracy transaction cannot qualify as conduct relevant to the conspiracy--which had terminated with the arrest of Gullo and New--and, in addition, that the district court failed to articulate the necessary findings that the transaction was relevant conduct. Indeed, Crockett contends that the district court relied upon an erroneous definition of relevant conduct in making its ruling. 26 The district court's discussion of this point was as follows:So you have a series of actions, jointly taken, let's say over a two-year span of time, with Mr. Crockett dealing with New and then with somebody else, and somebody else. Then, but carved right out of the center of it is a particular conspiracy timeframe as charged with New and Crockett and ... Gullo. 27 Now, as far as counts of the indictment, as far as the charge of conspiracy, the timeframe of those six months is right out of the center. But the sentencing guidelines, in my estimation, contemplates you go beyond that, before and after the conspiracy. 28 And even though not charged, maybe a new organized conspiracy, maybe changes of players, whatever it is, it is still related conduct dealing in the field of controlled substances and drugs, for the purpose of sentencing. 29 Sentencing Tr. at 135-36. 30 The determination whether a particular drug transaction is relevant conduct to the offense of conviction is guided by USSG § 1B1.3. This guideline provides that, for offenses for which the offense level is determined largely on the basis of ... the quantity of a substance involved, USSG § 3D1.2(d), relevant conduct includes all acts and omissions committed ... by the defendant, USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A), that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction. USSG § 1B1.3(a)(2). The commentary to § 1B1.3 further defines common scheme or plan and same course of conduct as: 31 (A) Common scheme or plan. For two or more offenses to constitute part of a common scheme or plan, they must be substantially connected to each other by at least one common factor, such as common victims, common accomplices, common purpose, or similar modus operandi. 32 ... 33 (B) Same course of conduct. Offenses that do not qualify as part of a common scheme or plan may nonetheless qualify as part of the same course of conduct if they are sufficiently connected or related to each other as to warrant the conclusion that they are part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses. Factors that are appropriate to the determination of whether offenses are sufficiently connected or related to each other to be considered as part of the same course of conduct include the degree of similarity of the offenses, the regularity (repetitions) of the offenses, and the time interval between the offenses.... USSG § 1B1.3 Application Note 9. 3 34 As we have noted on prior occasions, the government's burden at sentencing is considerably lightened through the application of the preponderance of the evidence standard and the relaxed evidentiary rules which govern. However, because the relevant conduct rule is not without limits and because its application so favors the government, we insist that courts be scrupulous to ensure that the government has adhered to those limits. One of the ways in which we ensure that these limits are maintained is by requiring sentencing courts to explicitly state and support, either at the sentencing hearing or (preferably) in a written statement of reasons, the finding that the unconvicted activities bore the necessary relation to the convicted offense. United States v. Beler, 20 F.3d 1428, 1431-32 (7th Cir.1994), citing United States v. Duarte, 950 F.2d 1255, 1263 (7th Cir.1991). 35 One important distinction to be made in the relevant conduct determination is that section 1B1.3(a)(2) should not be applied to offenses that are of the same kind, but not encompassed in the same course of conduct or plan as the convicted offenses. Beler, 20 F.3d at 1432, quoting United States v. White, 888 F.2d 490, 500 (7th Cir.1989). The mere fact that the defendant has engaged in other drug transactions is not sufficient to justify treating those transactions as relevant conduct for sentencing purposes. To ensure that this distinction is maintained, we require that district courts make specific findings that offenses to be included as relevant conduct for sentencing purposes are part either of the same course of conduct as the charged offense or of a common scheme or plan including the charged offense. 36 The sentencing judge in this instance was less than precise in his statement supporting the finding that the February transaction constituted relevant conduct in that it was part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan. The court's statement that the February transaction was related conduct dealing in the field of controlled substances and drugs could be construed as relying on the same sort of reasoning that was rejected in White. It is not, of course, enough that the conduct in question merely involved drugs. Here, however, other parts of the statement seem to refer (albeit indirectly) to closeness of time and similarity of participants as grounds for including the February conduct. These comments would be germane to the critical question whether the February transaction was part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the charged conspiracy. And certainly the objective circumstances here are such that a district court would have no difficulty in invoking closeness of time and similarity of participants. 37 The determination that an uncharged drug transaction is to provide a basis for an increased sentence of imprisonment is, of course, a very significant matter. The rules delineating the circumstances under which such transactions may be included in the drug quantity computation must be carefully observed. To ensure that only relevant conduct is included in calculating the sentence, the government must carefully present the justification for the inclusion of any uncharged acts and the court must, in turn, set out its reasoning as clearly as possible. The conclusory statement that whatever it is, it is still related conduct dealing in the field of controlled substances and drugs is not adequate. 38 The deficiencies in the district court's statements, however, are harmless for three separate reasons: First, the available evidence can easily support a finding that the February transaction was part of a common scheme or plan with the Gullo-Crockett-New conspiracy. The February transaction involved a common accomplice--New; a common purpose--cocaine sale; and a common modus operandi--meeting in a restaurant and then proceeding to another location to transfer the drugs. 4 The transaction took place in close temporal proximity to the sales included in the charged conspiracy. Second, Crockett's base offense level would not, in any event, be affected by the exclusion of the 2 kilograms and 6.1 grams of cocaine associated with this transaction. The final quantity determination at sentencing was 16.87 kilograms. As already discussed, this result was infected with an arithmetic mistake. When that mistake is corrected, the quantity of drugs attributed to Crockett by the district court for the charged conspiracy alone is approximately 15.1 kilograms. This quantity is sufficient to yield the same base offense level of 34 upon which Crockett's sentence was based. Thus, the sentencing court's questionable statement of reasons for including the February transaction as relevant conduct had no effect on Crockett's sentence, since, with or without that transaction, the cocaine attributed to Crockett would have exceeded 15 kilograms.