Opinion ID: 1786407
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the trial court erred in allowing the dower claim of the administratrix.

Text: The error in confirming the allotment of dower is obvious, unless we accept appellee's contention that appellants were barred by passage of 90 days after the order approving the commissioner's report without appellants' objections having been heard. The objections were well taken. There is not even a pretense that the commissioners followed the statutes. See Ark. Stat.Ann. § 62-711 (Repl.1971). Their testimony shows that Mrs. Price approached each of them separately with a plot plan with the homestead she claimed and the dower to be allowed already laid out, and that little if any regard was given to property values, the only consideration being that 1.21 acres was one-third of the area of the whole tract. Two of the commissioners signed the report only upon the representation of Mrs. Price that the heirs had agreed to this allotment. Only one of them even viewed the property. The layout was drawn by one of Mrs. Price's sons. Appellee's reliance upon Ark.Stat.Ann. § 22-406.3 as a bar to appellants' objections is misplaced. This section was a part of Act 358 of 1969, by which the term of court concept was abolished for chancery and probate courts. The section invoked only made final orders and decrees of a probate court have the same force and effect upon the expiration of 90 days after their filing with the clerk as they would previously have had upon expiration of the term of court at which rendered. This is not such an order. In the first place the order alloting dower recited that it was entered over the objections of appellants. Within six days thereafter the exceptions of appellants were filed. There was considerable discussion about the reasons these exceptions were not earlier heard but the probate judge finally ruled that the order had not become final, but sustained the report of the commissioners on the merits. We need not concern outselves with the correctness of the court's holding in this regard, because the expiration of the term has not had the same significance in probate courts as in others since the adoption of the Probate Code. The drafters obviously knew that there was need for greater flexibility in that court in regard to finality of orders in the process of administration of an estate. For good cause, the probate court may vacate or modify any order, or grant a rehearing thereon (except for any order as to which an appeal has been taken, or motion to set aside an order of probate of a will after the time allowed for contest) at any time within the time allowed for appeal after the final termination of the administration of the estate of a decedent. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 62-2015 (Repl.1971). When an appeal is taken from the order of final distribution, all prior appealable judgments and orders to which appellant has filed objections within 60 days after the order or judgment was rendered, with certain exceptions not here applicable, may be reviewed on appeal. Brooks v. Baker, 242 Ark. 128, 412 S.W.2d 271. Thus, the fact that appellants did not appeal from the order approving the commissioner's report prior to the probate court's final order, even though they might have done so, does not constitute a bar to the present appeal. Authorities and statutes which might indicate to the contrary but antedate the Probate Code are not controlling. It is true that after cross-examining each of the three commissioners extensively appellee moved to strike their testimony on the ground that no appeal had been taken from the order assigning dower. The court's ruling seems ambiguous. The court did not grant the motion as to any witness. As to the first, the probate judge simply said, Let it go in for the record. As to the second the probate judge indicated that he understood the motion and remarked, We will let it go in for the record. As to the third and last, the court simply said that the motion would be noted. Even if this ambiguous language can be taken as excluding this testimony, it would have been improperly excluded, for the reasons just stated. Appellate review in probate cases is de novo, just as it is in equity. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 62-2016, subd. g (Repl. 1971). On trial de movo on appeal in chancery cases, improperly excluded evidence will be considered. Greer v. Davis, 177 Ark. 55, 5 S.W.2d 742; Adams v. Adams, 177 Ark. 374, 6 S.W.2d 290.