Opinion ID: 2818132
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: a district court judge may act as both a

Text: MAGISTRATE AND A JUDGE WITHIN THE SAME CASE ¶14 Within the Utah state court system, a magistrate is a justice, judge, or commissioner who performs one of several functions described by statute. UTAH CODE §§ 77-1-3(4), 78A-2-220. One of the enumerated functions of a judicial official acting as a magistrate is to “conduct a preliminary examination to determine probable cause.” Id. § 78A-2-220(1)(f). ¶15 Mr. Black contends that by presiding over proceedings leading up to his preliminary hearing, the district court judge stepped into the role of a magistrate. Mr. Black further argues that in doing so, the judge irretrievably surrendered the authority inherent to his position as a district court judge and that he could no longer perform duties reserved for the district court, such as adjudicating a competency petition. See id. § 77-15-5(1)(b) (“The district court . . . shall review the allegations of incompetency . . . .”). ¶16 Both the State and Mr. Black agree that this issue was not mooted by Judge Kouris’s transfer because the question remains whether a replacement district court judge may act as both magistrate and judge in this case when it is remanded. We therefore review the presiding judge’s ruling that a district court judge may resolve a competency petition after acting as a magistrate in a case. We review this ruling de novo, ceding no deference to the lower court’s legal conclusions regarding the authority of a district court judge. Cf. State v. Norris, 2007 UT 6, ¶ 10, 152 P.3d 293 (“Whether the district court has jurisdiction is a question of law that we review for correctness, giving no deference to the lower court.”). 1 Because it is unnecessary to the resolution of this issue, we draw no conclusions about the first or second elements. 4 Cite as: 2015 UT 54 Opinion of the Court ¶17 Mr. Black bases his argument that the district court judge was locked in his role as a magistrate on language taken from Van Dam v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1977) and State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991). In Van Dam, we held that “[w]hen a judge acts in the capacity of a magistrate, he does not do so as a judge, but rather as one who derives his powers” from the statutes defining the authority of a magistrate. 571 P.2d at 1327. We later affirmed this holding in Humphrey when we stated that our statutory provisions make an unmistakable distinction between the functions and powers of a judicial officer acting as magistrate and one acting as judge of a court. . . . [Judicial officials] when sitting as magistrates hav[e] the jurisdiction and powers conferred by law upon magistrates and not those that pertain to their respective judicial offices. 823 P.2d at 467 (third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶18 Van Dam and Humphrey, however, do nothing to advance Mr. Black’s argument. In those cases we held that a judge sitting as a magistrate performs a unique statutory function that is separate from his or her judicial office. We did not say that a judge who sits as a magistrate may no longer act as a judge in subsequent proceedings in the case. ¶19 In fact, we have recognized that a judge may switch between a magistrate role and a judicial role in the same case. In State v. Jaeger we observed that the judge in that case “took off his judicial hat and put on his magistrate’s hat to conduct the preliminary hearing,” and then “removed that hat and put his judicial hat back on just prior to entering his judgment of dismissal and discharge.” 886 P.2d 53, 54 n.2 (Utah 1994). We later affirmed this language from Jaeger and held that the fact that a district court judge may switch between the roles of a magistrate and a judge “does not mean that the district court loses jurisdiction when it moves between these different capacities.” State v. Smith, 2014 UT 33, ¶ 24, 344 P.3d 573. ¶20 Accordingly, we uphold the presiding judge’s conclusion that a district court judge may act as both a magistrate and a judge in the same criminal case. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 5