Opinion ID: 2607272
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the obligation to preserve and protect cultural and historic resources

Text: Having established the jurisdiction of the courts in this case, we now turn to the substantive arguments advanced by Nansay and the HPC. [16] Nansay argues that the HPC has no obligation under the CZMA or any other law to consider, much less require, protection of traditional and customary Hawaiian rights. The HPC concurs, adding that the ICA's opinion in PASH I places an undue burden on the CZMA process. In any event, the HPC contends that it did not disregard protection of gathering rights because the SMA permit contains a condition requiring establishment of a program for preserving and maintaining the anchialline ponds on the development site. Nansay and the HPC also contend that PASH failed to establish a prima facie claim of native Hawaiian gathering rightsspecifically, Nansay claims that the evidence only shows shrimp gathering at the ponds as far back as the late 1920's.
Within the scope of their authority, all agencies in Hawai`i must ensure that their rules comply with the objectives and policies of the CZMA. HRS §§ 205A-4(b) and -5. Moreover, the neighbor island county planning commissions and the Honolulu City Council are specifically required to give full consideration ... to ... cultural ... [and] historic ... values as well as to needs for economic development when implementing the objectives, policies, and SMA guidelines set forth in the CZMA. HRS § 205A-4(a) (emphasis added). In accordance with statutory mandates, HPC Rule 9-11(C) provides that the relevant governmental authority may grant a SMA use permit only upon finding that the proposed development: (1) will not have any significant adverse environmental or ecological effect; [17] (2) is consistent with [CZMA] objectives and policies ... and the [SMA] guidelines; [18] and (3) is consistent with the General Plan, Zoning Code and other applicable ordinances. A significant adverse effect, for the purposes of deliberations upon a SMA permit application, [19] includes the expected primary or secondary consequences of a proposed development, as well as the shortand long-term effects or cumulative consequences of the proposal. Accordingly, the HPC may not issue a SMA use permit unless it finds that the proposed project will not have any significant adverse effects. Cf. Hui Alaloa v. Planning Comm'n, 68 Haw. 135, 705 P.2d 1042 (1985). In Hui Alaloa, the Maui Planning Commission (MPC) failed to make the requisite finding that a proposed development on the island of Moloka`i was consistent with CZMA historic protection and preservation objectives. Notwithstanding the inclusion of permit conditions requiring the developer to retain a qualified archaeologist and to substantially comply with the CZMA and HAPA, we vacated the MPC's orders granting SMA permits. The following factors, inter alia, may constitute significant adverse effects: (a) an irrevocable commitment to loss or destruction of any natural or cultural resource, including but not limited to, historic sites and view planes; (b) effects upon the economic or social welfare and activities of the community, County or State; and (c) actions contrary to the objectives and policies of [the CZMA] and the [SMA] Guidelines[.] HPC Rule 9-10(H)(1), (4) & (10) (emphases added). See also HPC Rule 9-6(A)(2); HRS § 205A-2(b)(2) (one of the CZMA's objectives and policies is to protect and preserve those natural and manmade historic and prehistoric resources in the coastal zone management area that are significant in Hawaiian ... history and culture ) (emphasis added). The interests asserted by PASH fall within these broad categories; therefore, they are entitled to protection under the CZMA. [20] See HRS § 205A-21 (finding that special controls on development are necessary to avoid permanent losses of valuable resources and the foreclosure of management options, and to ensure ... adequate access); HPC Rule 9-11(C) (authorizing the the HPC to attach reasonable terms and conditions to SMA permits); cf. Hammond v. North Slope Borough, 645 P.2d 750, 761-62 (Alaska 1982) (holding that Alaska's version of the CZMA requires its agencies to assure opportunities for subsistence usage of coastal areas and resources and to issue development permits only where consistent with Alaska's environmental and cultural interests). In order for any conditions placed on a SMA permit issued by the HPC on remand to be deemed reasonable, they must bear an essential nexus to legitimate State interests and must be roughly proportional to the impact of the proposed development. See infra section V.B. (discussing the respective requirements from Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 3148, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994)). Here, the relevant State interests are reflected in article XII, section 7 of the Hawai`i Constitution (1978) and HRS § 1-1. See infra section IV.B. In other words, the HPC may require dedications appropriately tailored to the special and quantifiable burdens associated with granting discretionary benefits to Nansay, through a SMA permit, which facilitate development of the company's land. Conditions that ensure continued access to the subject property for the legitimate and reasonable practice of customary and traditional rights would presumably comply with constitutional prohibitions against the uncompensated taking of private property. See infra section V.B.
In addition to the requirements of the CZMA, the HPC is obligated to protect customary and traditional rights to the extent feasible under the Hawai`i Constitution and relevant statutes. Article XII, section 7 of the Hawai`i Constitution (1978) provides: The State reaffirms and shall protect all rights, customarily and traditionally exercised for subsistence, cultural and religious purposes and possessed by ahupua`a tenants who are descendants of native Hawaiians who inhabited the Hawaiian Islands prior to 1778, subject to the right of the State to regulate such rights. (Emphases added.) HRS § 1-1 (Supp.1992) provides: The common law of England, as ascertained by English and American decisions, is declared to be the common law of the State of [Hawai`i] in all cases, except as otherwise expressly provided by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or by the laws of the State, or fixed by Hawaiian judicial precedent, or established by Hawaiian usage; provided that no person shall be subject to criminal proceedings except as provided by the written laws of the United States or of the State. (Emphasis added.) [21] The aforementioned provisions were discussed by this court, in the context of an individual's asserted gathering rights, in Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 66 Haw. 1, 656 P.2d 745 (1982). Ten years later, in Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, supra, we recognized that ancient Hawaiian gathering rights may have extended beyond the boundaries of individual ahupua`a in certain cases. 73 Haw. at 620, 837 P.2d at 1272. Nevertheless, neither Kalipi nor Pele precluded further inquiry concerning the extent that traditional practices have endured under the laws of this State. In Kalipi, we foresaw that `[t]he precise nature and scope of the rights retained by § 1-1 would, of course, depend upon the particular circumstances of each case.' Pele, 73 Haw. at 619, 837 P.2d at 1271 (quoting Kalipi, 66 Haw. at 12, 656 P.2d at 752). In order to determine whether the HPC must protect traditional and customary rights of the nature asserted in this case, we shall first review our analysis of gathering rights in Kalipi and Pele. Then we shall clarify the status of customary rights in general, as a result of relevant judicial and legislative developments in Hawaiian history. Finally, we will provide the HPC with some specific, although not necessarily exhaustive, guidelines to aid its future deliberations in the event that Nansay elects to pursue its challenges to the legitimacy of PASH's claims.
Kalipi involved an individual's attempt to gain access to private property on the island of Moloka`i in order to exercise purportedly traditional Hawaiian gathering rights. The court prefaced its consideration of Kalipi's claims with a discussion of the State's obligation to preserve and enforce traditional Hawaiian gathering rights under article XII, section 7 of the Hawai`i Constitution: We recognize that permitting access to private property for the purpose of gathering natural products may indeed conflict with the exclusivity traditionally associated with fee simple ownership of land. But any argument for the extinguishing of traditional rights based simply upon the possible inconsistency of purported native rights with our modern system of land tenure must fail. 66 Haw. at 4, 656 P.2d at 748 (emphasis added). The court then began its analysis of Kalipi's asserted gathering rights by interpreting HRS § 7-1 (1985) [22] so as to essentially  conform these traditional rights born of a culture which knew little of the rigid exclusivity associated with the private ownership of land, with a modern system of land tenure in which the right to exclude is perceived to be an integral part of fee simple title. Id. at 7, 656 P.2d at 749 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the court fashioned a rule permitting lawful occupants of an [ahupua`a] ... [to] enter undeveloped lands within the [ahupua`a] to gather those items enumerated in the statute [HRS § 7-1]. Id. at 7-8, 656 P.2d at 749. The requirement that these rights be exercised on undeveloped land is not, of course, found within the statute. However, if this limitation were not imposed, there would be nothing to prevent residents from going anywhere within the [ahupua`a], including fully developed property, to gather the enumerated items. [23] In the context of our current culture this result would so conflict with understandings of property, and potentially lead to such disruption, that we could not consider it anything short of absurd and therefore other than that which was intended by the statute's framers. Moreover, it would conflict with our understanding of the traditional Hawaiian way of life in which cooperation and non-interference with the well-being of other residents were integral parts of the culture. Similarly the requirement that the rights be utilized to practice native customs represents, we believe, a reasonable interpretation of the Act as applied to our current context. The gathering rights of § 7-1 were necessary to insure the survival of those who, in 1851, sought to live in accordance with the ancient ways. They thus remain, to the extent provided in the statute, available to those who wish to continue those ways. Id. at 8-9, 656 P.2d at 749-50 (citation omitted) (footnote and emphasis added). Because Kalipi did not actually reside within the subject ahupua`a, the court held that he was not entitled to exercise HRS § 7-1 gathering rights there. Id. at 9, 656 P.2d at 750. Nevertheless, the court specifically refused to decide the ultimate scope of traditional gathering rights under HRS § 1-1 because there was an insufficient basis to find that such rights would, or should, accrue to persons who did not actually reside within the [ahupua`a] in which such rights are claimed. Id. at 12, 656 P.2d at 752 (emphasis added). In other words, Kalipi did not foreclose the possibility of establishing, in future cases, traditional Hawaiian gathering and access rights in one ahupua`a that have been customarily held by residents of another ahupua`a.
Pele involved, inter alia, the assertion of customarily and traditionally exercised subsistence, cultural, and religious practices in the Wao Kele `O Puna Natural Area Reserve on the Big Island. For the purposes of summary judgment, we held that there was a sufficient basis to find that gathering rights can be claimed by persons who do not reside in the particular ahupua`a where they seek to exercise those rights. Pele, 73 Haw. at 621, 837 P.2d at 1272 (reversing summary judgment and remanding for trial on this issue). We specifically held that native Hawaiian rights protected by article XII, § 7 may extend beyond the ahupua`a in which a native Hawaiian resides. Pele, 73 Haw. at 620, 837 P.2d at 1272. In so holding, we explicated the discussion of gathering rights in Kalipi by recognizing that a claim based on practiced customs raises different issues than assertions premised on mere land ownership. Unlike Kalipi, [Pele Defense Fund] members assert native Hawaiian rights based on the traditional access and gathering patterns of native Hawaiians in the Puna region. Because Kalipi based his claims entirely on land ownership, rather than on the practiced customs of Hawaiians on [Moloka`i], the issue facing us is somewhat different from the issue in Kalipi. Pele, 73 Haw. at 618-19, 837 P.2d at 1271. Although we later mentioned other requirements of Kalipi  with approvalimplicitly referring to the undeveloped lands and no actual harm requirements of Kalipi, see 73 Haw. at 621, 837 P.2d at 1272our holding in Pele was not intended to foreclose argument regarding those requirements in future, unrelated cases involving assertions of customary and traditional rights under HRS § 1-1. In Kalipi, we foresaw that `[t]he precise nature and scope of the rights retained by § 1-1 would, of course, depend upon the particular circumstances of each case.' Pele, 73 Haw. at 619, 837 P.2d at 1271 (quoting Kalipi, 66 Haw. at 12, 656 P.2d at 752).
In addition to creating the undeveloped land requirement, see Kalipi, 66 Haw. at 7-8, 656 P.2d at 749, the court in Kalipi made the following observations concerning claims of traditional gathering rights under HRS § 1-1: [24] We perceive the Hawaiian usage exception to the adoption of the common law to represent an attempt on the part of the framers of the statute to avoid results inappropriate to the isles' inhabitants by permitting the continuance of native understandings and practices which did not unreasonably interfere with the spirit of the common law. The statutory exception is thus akin to the English doctrine of custom whereby practices and privileges unique to particular districts continued to apply to the residents of those districts even though in contravention of the common law. This is not to say that we find that all the requisite elements of the doctrine of custom were necessarily incorporated in § 1-1. Rather we believe that the retention of a Hawaiian tradition should in each case be determined by balancing the respective interests and harm once it is established that the application of the custom has continued in a particular area. In this case, Plaintiff's witnesses testified at trial that there have continued in certain [ahupua`a] a range of practices associated with the ancient way of life which required the utilization of the undeveloped property of others and which were not found in § 7-1. [25] Where these practices have, without harm to anyone, been continued, we are of the opinion that the reference to Hawaiian usage in § 1-1 insures their continuance for so long as no actual harm is done thereby. Oni v. Meek, [2 Haw. 87, (1858)], does not preclude this conclusion, for in that case the application of the doctrine of custom was argued and the doctrine itself was not rejected.... Moreover, the language in Oni respecting the conclusiveness of § 7-1 does not necessarily preclude application of the doctrine. Id. at 10-11, 656 P.2d at 751 (citations omitted) (footnote renumbered and internal citation added) (emphases added). [26] In reaching its conclusion regarding the continued existence of customary rights, the Kalipi court necessarily rejected the appellee's contentions that 1) any customary rights which might otherwise have been retained by § 1-1 have been abrogated by judicial precedent[,] and 2) no customary rights other than those found in ... [HRS § 7-1] survived the [ M&amacr;hele ]. [27] Id. at 9-10, 656 P.2d at 750. Oni does not stand for the proposition that customary rights, which had not yet been formally established through judicial proceedings, were extinguished sub silentio by the M&amacr;hele or its associated legal developments. Oni merely rejected one particular claim based upon an apparently non-traditional practice that had not achieved customary status in the area where the right was asserted. The Kalipi court implicitly acknowledged the possibility of recognizing certain customary rights, under HRS § 1-1, to gather items that are not specifically delineated in HRS § 7-1. See supra note 25 & accompanying text (quoting Kalipi, 66 Haw. at 10 & n. 4, 656 P.2d at 751 & n. 4). However, the court did not fully embrace the opportunity to clarify Oni with respect to the potential application of the doctrine of custom. [28] We believe that the Kalipi court's preoccupation with residency requirements under HRS § 7-1 obfuscated its cursory examination of Kalipi's alternative claim based on customarily and traditionally exercised Hawaiian rights. [29] Accordingly, we read the discussion of customary rights in Oni and Kalipi as merely informing us that the balance of interests and harms clearly favors a right of exclusion for private property owners as against persons pursuing non-traditional practices or exercising otherwise valid customary rights in an unreasonable manner. On the other hand, the reasonable exercise of ancient Hawaiian usage is entitled to protection under article XII, section 7. See Pele, 73 Haw. at 618-21, 837 P.2d at 1269-72 (holding that rights primarily associated with residence in a particular ahupua`a under HRS § 7-1 might have extended beyond those bounds through ancient Hawaiian custom preserved in HRS § 1-1); id. at 620, 837 P.2d at 1272 (holding that article XII, section 7 reaffirmed  all such rights). Traditional and customary rights are properly examined against the law of property as it has developed in this state. Thus, the regulatory power provided in article XII, section 7 does not justify summary extinguishment of such rights by the State merely because they are deemed inconsistent with generally understood elements of the western doctrine of property.
Some of the generally understood western concepts of property rights were discussed in Reppun v. Board of Water Supply, 65 Haw. 531, 656 P.2d 57 (1982). The western doctrine of property has traditionally implied certain rights. Among these are the right to the use of the property, the right to exclude others[,] and the right to transfer the property with the consent of the owner. In conformance with creation of private interests in land, each of these rights were embodied in the delineation of post-[M&amacr;hele] judicial water rights. Ostensibly, this judge-made system of rights was an outgrowth of Hawaiian custom in dealing with water. However, the creation of private and exclusive interests in water, within a context of western concepts of property, compelled the drawing of fixed lines of authority and interests which were not consonant with Hawaiian custom. Id. at 547, 656 P.2d at 68. Although the court in Reppun focused on interests in water, its discussion of the development of Hawaiian property rights is enlightening. In 1840 the first constitution of the Kingdom of [Hawai`i] proclaimed that although all property belonged to the crown it was not his private property. It belonged to the Chiefs and the people in common, of whom [the King] was the head, and had the management of the landed property. [Hawai`i] Const. of 1840 in Fundamental Laws of Hawaii 3 (1904). Thus, prior to the [M&amacr;hele], all land remained in the public domain. However, other laws passed during the same period lay the foundation for the eventual imposition of private property rights in land by limiting the King's and landlords' heretofore unregulated authority to disseize one to whom land had been granted and insuring certain rights of the common people and lesser lords. Id. at 542, 656 P.2d at 65. The 1839 Declaration of Rights, which was incorporated into the 1840 Constitution, provided that nothing whatever shall be taken from any individual except by express provision of the laws. Thurston, Fundamental Law of Hawaii 1 (emphasis added) [hereafter Fundamental Law ]. See also Kekiekie v. Dennis, 1 Haw. 42, 43 (1851) (recognizing that the rights of each hoa`&amacr;ina, or ahupua`a tenant, were secured by the 1840 constitution). Several laws enacted in 1839 and 1840, and later compiled in the Laws of 1842, permitted the extinguishment of tenant rights in limited circumstances. See, e.g., Act of Nov. 9, 1840, ch. III, § 7, reprinted in Fundamental Law at 20 (excepting from restoration to previous holders those residuum lands that were separated from their affiliated lands for reasons of public interest); Fundamental Law at 43 (providing compensation for incursions related to road-building); id. at 133-35 (permitting dispossession of tenants because of idleness, where such idleness is proven at trial). The 1840 constitution reflected an attempt to deal with chiefs and foreigners who sought to vest land rights without the required consent of the King. See Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom 1778-1854 (1938) [hereafter Kuykendall]. [30] Gun-boats frequently came to Hawai`i to enforce the claims of foreigners. Levy, Native Hawaiian Land Rights, 63 Cal.L.Rev. 848, 852 (1975) [hereafter Levy]; Kuykendall at 153. For example, British Consul Richard Charlton claimed a valuable piece of land based upon a 299-year lease supposedly obtained from a Hawaiian named Kalanim&omacr;k&umacr; in 1826. Kuykendall at 208. Kalanim&omacr;k&umacr; was a husband of the dowager Queen Ka`ahumanu and also served as a guardian of the young King Kamehameha III. The lease purportedly covered land occupied by Charlton as well as an adjoining piece, which had been occupied since 1826 by the retainers of Queen Ka`ahumanu. Id. at 208-09. Kamehameha III rejected this claim in 1840 for various reasons, including absence of legitimate authority to make the grant. Id. at 209. Conflicts exacerbated by further adverse decisions of the King and the Hawaiian courts, see id. at 208-12, eventually led to the provisional cession of Hawai`i on February 25, 1843, under threat of violence, to Lord George Paulet, commander of the British warship Carysfort. [31] Id. at 216; Levy at 852. Although Hawaiian independence was reaffirmed on July 31, 1843, these events would have a profound impact on future socio-political developments in the islands. The minutes of a Privy Council meeting on October 9, 1845 reveal the continuing belief that nothing but difficulties, even though we should be without fault, would result from the system of Reports of Foreign Consuls, being supported, and their complaints redressed without inquiry, by the Naval Forces of their nations. 1 Privy Council Records at 89, 91. Later, during the kingdom's ongoing efforts to resolve Charlton's land claim, additional claims surfaced. The minutes of another Privy Council meeting indicate: The King remarked, ... give up this new claim, and then the General will claim the whole harbour. They all agreed that in some way or other, not disrespectful to the British Government, an end must be put to these pretensions coming upon them unexpectedly, contrary to all the law and usage among them. Id. at 147 (emphasis added). Consequently, the development of private property rights was deemed indispensable to the political existence of the kingdom. L. 1845-46, at 5. Furthermore, the increase of foreign commerce and the enhanced value of property ... required something more of the Hawaiian courts than mere investigation of facts. Id. (The events of the late Provisional Cession to Great Britain conclusively prove that some more minute and extensive judicature was long since requisite.). See also 2 Privy Council Records 231 (1846-47) (discussing a compromise for the sake of peace in another dispute with foreigners). At the time, native Hawaiian subjects frequently petitioned Kamehameha III regarding the dramatic changes taking place in the kingdom. See, e.g., petition signed by 301 residents of L&amacr;na`i, dated April 1845, Hawai`i State Archives (HSA), Interior Dept., Miscellaneous File (asking the King not to appoint foreign Ministers, and not to sell any more land to foreigners, because [w]e are afraid that the wise will step on the ignorant); The Friend, vol. III, no. XV, August 1, 1845, at 118-19 (reprinting a similar petition, signed by over 1600 people). [32] The next major step in the evolution of private property rights was the formation in 1845 of the Board of Land Commissioners to quiet land titles. See Law Creating the Board to Quiet Land Titles, in Fundamental Laws of Hawaii 137 (1904). It was the Land Commission's responsibility to ascertain or reject claims of interests in land brought before it. Decisions of the Board were to be made in accordance with the civil law and native customs of the Kingdom. [33] The Board itself was not empowered to grant fee simple title to land. Rather, its duty was to define each applicant's identifiable interests in land and issue an award describing those interests. Actual title to land could be gained only by a payment of commutation to the Kingdom and issuance of a royal patent. See, Chinen, The Great Mahele: Hawaii's Land Division of 1848 (1958). To carry out its duties, the Land Commission adopted principles that were to be followed in quieting title to land. The principles were subsequently also adopted by the legislative council of the Kingdom and were made binding rules by which all claims to land would be tested. Laws of 1847, at 81, RLH 1925, Vol. II at 2124. In its statement of principles the Land Commission related the necessity of its establishment to the unenforceability of the laws passed at the time of the Constitution of 1840 noting that: Neither the laws of 1839 nor of 1840 were found adequate to protect the inferior lords and tenants, for although the violators of law, of every rank, were liable to its penalty, yet it was so contrary to ancient usage, to execute the law on the powerful for the protection of the weak, that the latter often suffered, and it was found necessary to adopt a new system for ascertaining rights, and new measures for protecting those rights when ascertained, and to accomplish this object the Land Commission was formed. The Land Commission therefore viewed its responsibilities as including the actualization of the laws of 1839 and 1840, among them, of course, the law[s] governing ... [residuum lands and dispossession of tenants, see selected provisions from the compiled Laws of 1842, supra this section]. Thus, when in the next paragraph the Board reserves from allocation to private persons the sovereign prerogatives of the King, including the power: To encourage and even to enforce the usufruct of lands for the common good[,] it is clear that in accordance with preexisting civil law and native usage, the Commission intended to reserve to the sovereign the right to regulate ... [undeveloped land] in accord with the needs of the people of the Kingdom. Reppun, 65 Haw. at 543-44, 656 P.2d at 66 (footnote added) (bracketed material inserted in place of references to interests in water). See also McBryde, 54 Haw. at 184-86, 504 P.2d at 1337-38 (indicating that the M&amacr;hele proclaimed Kamehameha's intention to share the lands with his people, and that confirmation of title was subject to inalienable sovereign prerogatives). Thus, the Land Commission's principles included appropriate provisions intended to preclude the konohiki from dispos[ing] of the grass land as to leave ... his hoaainas [sic] destitute and to preclude the government from selling unoccupied or vacant land so as to leave the [hoa`&amacr;ina] destitute. L.1847, at 70-72 (citing §§ 2 and 6 of Act of November 7, 1846). [34] After the M&amacr;hele, the Privy Council considered the rights of tenants under the new system of private land ownership and proposed a resolution providing that: the rights of the makaainanas [sic] to firewood, timber for house, grass for thatching, ki leaf, water for household purposes in said land, and the privilege of making salt and taking certain fish from the seas adjoining said lands shall be and is hereby sacredly reserved and confirmed to them for their private use [should they need them] but not for sale ... provided, that before going for firewood, timber for houses and grass for thatching, said makaainanas [sic] shall give notice to the Lord or his luna resident therein. 3B Privy Council Records 681, 687 (1850). [35] The King responded, however, by expressing his concern that a little bit of land even with allodial title, if they were cut off from all other privileges, would be of very little value[.] Id. at 713. Accordingly, the final resolution was passed with the comment that the proposition of the King, which he inserted as the seventh clause of the law, a rule for the claims of the common people to go to the mountains, and the seas attached to their own particular land exclusively, is agreed to[.] Id. at 763; see L. 1850, § 7, at 203-04. Provisions of the law requiring the landlord's consent were repealed the following year because many difficulties and complaints have arisen from the bad feeling existing on account of the Konohiki's [sic] forbidding the tenants on the lands enjoying the benefits that have been by law given them. L. 1851, at 98. Given the preservation of Hawaiian usage in conjunction with the transition to a new system of land tenure, see, e.g., supra note 21 (outlining the continued reliance on custom and usage throughout the kingdom's legal history, which was adopted as the law of the territory upon annexation of these islands to the United States); supra note 33 (quoting L. 1845-46, at 109), [36] it is doubtful that accept[ance] of traditional and customary rights was required or that recognition of such rights would have fundamentally violat[ed] the new system. Kalipi, 66 Haw. at 11 n. 5, 656 P.2d at 751 n. 5. [37] See supra section IV.B.3 (indicating that Kalipi implicitly rejected the argument that customary rights were extinguished by the specification of tenant rights in the 1846, 1850, and 1851 legislative enactments). Our examination of the relevant legal developments in Hawaiian history leads us to the conclusion that the western concept of exclusivity is not universally applicable in Hawai`i. Cf. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 317 Or. 131, 143, 854 P.2d 449, 456 (1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1332, 127 L.Ed.2d 679 (1994) (holding that [w]hen plaintiffs took title to their land, they were on [constructive] notice that exclusive use ... was not part of the `bundle of rights' that they acquired). In other words, the issuance of a Hawaiian land patent confirmed a limited property interest as compared with typical land patents governed by western concepts of property. Cf. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 384, 25 S.Ct. 662, 665, 49 L.Ed. 1089 (1905) (observing that the United States Congress was competent to secure to the Indians such a remnant of the great rights they possessed). Although this premise clearly conflicts with common understandings of property and could theoretically lead to disruption, see Kalipi, 66 Haw. at 8-9, 656 P.2d at 750, the non-confrontational aspects of traditional Hawaiian culture should minimize potential disturbances. See, e.g., supra note 23 and infra note 43. In any event, we reiterate that the State retains the ability to reconcile competing interests under article XII, section 7. We stress that unreasonable or non-traditional uses are not permitted under today's ruling. See, e.g., Winans, 198 U.S. at 379, 25 S.Ct. at 663, 49 L.Ed. 1089 (noting that the trial court found that it would `not be justified in issuing process to compel the defendants to permit the Indians to make a camping ground of their property while engaged in fishing ') (emphasis added). [38] There should be little difficulty accommodating the customary and traditional Hawaiian rights asserted in the instant case with Nansay's avowed purposes. A community development proposing to integrate cultural education and recreation with tourism and community living represents a promising opportunity to demonstrate the continued viability of Hawaiian land tenure ideals in the modern world.
The Kalipi court properly recognized that all the requisite elements of the doctrine of custom were [not] necessarily incorporated in § 1-1. 66 Haw. at 10, 656 P.2d at 751.83101883 Accordingly, HRS § 1-1 represents the codification of the doctrine of custom as it applies in our State. One of the most dramatic differences in the application of custom in Hawai`i is that passage of HRS § 1-1's predecessor fixed November 25, 1892 as the date Hawaiian usage must have been established in practice. Compare State v. Zimring [ Zimring II ], 58 Haw. 106, 115 n. 11, 566 P.2d 725, 732 n. 11 (1977) (citing State v. Zimring [ Zimring I ], 52 Haw. 472, 479 P.2d 202 (1970)), with Oni, 2 Haw. at 90 (implying that the time immemorial standard is entitled to great weight but declining to express a conclusive opinion). [39] Other differences in the doctrine's applicability are readily discernible. For example, under English common law, a custom for every inhabitant of an ancient messuage [meaning [d]welling-house with the adjacent buildings and curtilage[,] see Black's Legal Dictionary 990 (6th ed.1990)] within a parish to take a profit a prendre in the land of an individual is bad. Blackstone's Commentaries, at 78 n. 18. Strict application of the English common law, therefore, would apparently have precluded the exercise of traditional Hawaiian gathering rights. As such, this element of the doctrine of custom could not apply in Hawai`i. See supra note 21 (discussing the prominent status of custom throughout Hawaiian legal history). In light of the confusion surrounding the nature and scope of customary Hawaiian rights under HRS § 1-1, the following subsections of this opinion discuss applicable requirements for establishing such rights in the instant case.
Nansay argues that the recognition of rights exercised by persons who do not actually reside in the subject ahupua`a represents such a departure from existing law ... [that Pele ] should be overruled or strictly limited to its specific facts. Nansay's Third Supp. Brief, at 2-3 n. 1. Nansay contends further that Pele is inconsistent with the fundamental nature of Hawaiian land tenure, which allegedly recognizes only three classes: government, landlord, and tenant. Id. at 3-4; see Principles adopted by Land Commission (1847), reprinted in 2 Revised Laws of Hawai`i (RLH), at 2124-37 (1925). We decline Nansay's invitation to overrule Pele; on the contrary, we reaffirm it and expressly deem the rules of law posited therein to be applicable here. In Pele, we held that article XII, section 7, which, inter alia, obligates the State to protect customary and traditional rights normally associated with tenancy in an ahupua`a, may also apply to the exercise of rights beyond the physical boundaries of that particular ahupua`a. Pele, 73 Haw. at 620, 837 P.2d at 1272; see also Palama v. Sheehan, 50 Haw. 298, 300-01, 440 P.2d 95, 97 (1968) (noting that Hawaiians did not necessarily reside in the same place that they exercised traditional rights). Although it is not clear that customary rights should be limited by the term tenant, see supra note 27, we are nonetheless aware that the tenant class includes at least one sub-class. See 2 RLH (1925), at 2124, 2126 (mentioning a lowest class of tenants, lower orders and sub-tenants, apparently from the Hawaiian terms l&omacr;p&amacr; ma lalo, hoa`&amacr;ina ma lalo, and l&omacr;p&amacr;). Therefore, we hold that common law rights ordinarily associated with tenancy do not limit customary rights existing under the laws of this state.
In the context of an argument challenging the Pele Defense Fund's (PDF) standing to bring its claim, as raised on appeal in Pele, we made passing reference to the circuit court's finding that PDF's membership included persons of fifty percent or more Hawaiian blood[.] 73 Haw. at 615 n. 28, 837 P.2d at 1269 n. 28; see also 73 Haw. at 620 n. 34, 837 P.2d at 1272 n. 34 (citing affidavits of persons with at least one-half native Hawaiian blood). Because the lower court's relevant factual determination was not challenged on appeal, we did not disturb this finding in Pele. Nevertheless, these references in Pele were not intended to imply our endorsement of a fifty percent blood quantum requirement for claims based upon traditional or customary Hawaiian rights. The definition of the term native Hawaiian in the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act (HHCA) [40] is not expressly applicable to other Hawaiian rights or entitlements. Furthermore, the word native does not appear in HRS § 1-1. Because a specific proposal to define the terms Hawaiian and native Hawaiian in the 1978 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified, the relevant section was deleted from the 1985 version of the HRS. See Kahalekai v. Doi, 60 Haw. 324, 342, 590 P.2d 543, 555 (1979). Consequently, those persons who are  descendants of native Hawaiians who inhabited the islands prior to 1778, and who assert otherwise valid customary and traditional Hawaiian rights under HRS § 1-1, are entitled to protection regardless of their blood quantum. Haw. Const., art XII, § 7 (emphasis added). [41] Customary and traditional rights in these islands flow from native Hawaiians' pre-existing sovereignty. The rights of their descendants do not derive from their race per se, and were not abolished by their inclusion within the territorial bounds of the United States. See Organic Act, § 83; Act of April 30, 1900, c. 339, 31 Stat. 141, 157, reprinted in 1 HRS 36, 74 (1985) (as amended).
The court in Kalipi suggested that the Hawaiian usage exception in § 1-1 may be used as a vehicle for the continued existence of those customary rights which continued to be practiced[.] 66 Haw. at 11-12, 656 P.2d at 751-52. See also id. at 10, 656 P.2d at 751 (indicating the court's belief that retention of a Hawaiian tradition should in each case be determined by balancing the respective interests and harm once it is established that the application of the custom has continued in a particular area ) (emphasis added); Pele, 73 Haw. at 619, 837 P.2d at 1271 (reading Kalipi as upholding the right to practice continuously exercised rights ... so long as no actual harm [is] done by the practice) (emphasis added). The court in Zimring II noted further that although usage must be based on actual practice and not on assumptions or conjecture, the establishment of traditional usage would be of little weight because the practice would not have carried over into a private property regime within the framework of a private enterprise economic system. 58 Haw. at 116-18, 566 P.2d at 732-33. On the other hand, the Kalipi court also indicated that the traditional practices enumerated under HRS § 7-1 remain available to those who wish to continue those ways. Id. at 9, 656 P.2d at 750 (emphasis added). Contrary to the dictum in Zimring II, supra, the ancient usage of lands practiced by Hawaiians did, in fact, carry over into the new system of property rights established through the Land Commission. Compare Zimring II, 58 Haw. at 116-18, 566 P.2d at 732-33, with Kukiiahu v. Gill, 1 Haw. 54 (1851), and Kekiekie, 1 Haw. at 43 (recognizing that ahupua`a tenant's rights were secured by the constitution and could not have been conveyed away even if the King had not made [the kuleana] reservation[s,] see supra note 24). See also supra notes 21, 33, and 36 (citing statutory authority and case law that supports this conclusion). Furthermore, the reservation of sovereign prerogatives, see supra section IV.B.4 (citing Reppun, 65 Haw. at 543-44, 656 P.2d at 66; McBryde, 54 Haw. at 184-86, 504 P.2d at 1337-38), in conjunction with limitations on the Land Commission's authority, see supra section IV.B.4 (citing L. 1847, at 70-72), [42] confirms that fee simple title in Hawai`i is specifically limited by the sovereign authority to regulate its use. In other words, the right of each ahupua`a tenant to exercise traditional and customary practices remains intact, notwithstanding arguable abandonment of a particular site, although this right is potentially subject to regulation in the public interest. See supra note 26 (citing Blackstone's Commentaries for the proposition that continuous exercise is not absolutely required to maintain the validity of a custom).
We have stated previously that rights of access and collection will not necessarily prevent landowners from developing their lands. Pele, 73 Haw. at 621 n. 36, 837 P.2d at 1272 n. 36 (reiterating the early holding that article XII, [section] 7 does not require the preservation of ... [undeveloped] lands in their natural state and that  Kalipi rights only guarantee access to undeveloped lands); see also Kalipi, 66 Haw. at 8 n. 2, 656 P.2d at 749 n. 2. Our analysis in the instant case is consistent with these cases. [43] The Kalipi court justified the imposition of a non-statutory undeveloped land requirement by suggesting that the exercise of traditional gathering rights on fully developed property would conflict with our understanding of the traditional Hawaiian way of life in which cooperation and non-interference with the well-being of other residents were integral parts of the culture.  66 Haw. at 9, 656 P.2d at 750 (emphasis added). The court also stated that, without the undeveloped land limitation, there would be nothing to prevent residents from going anywhere within the ahupua`a, including fully developed property, to gather the enumerated items. Id. at 8, 656 P.2d at 750 (emphasis added); but see supra note 23. However, the court did not expressly hold that the exercise of customary gathering practices would be absurd or unjust when performed on land that is less than fully developed. For the purposes of this opinion, we choose not to scrutinize the various gradations in property use that fall between the terms undeveloped and fully developed. Nevertheless, we refuse the temptation to place undue emphasis on non-Hawaiian principles of land ownership in the context of evaluating deliberations on development permit applications. Such an approach would reflect an unjustifiable lack of respect for gathering activities as an acceptable cultural usage in pre-modern Hawai`i, see HRS § 5-7.5 (Supp. 1992), [44] which can also be successfully incorporated in the context of our current culture. Contrary to the suggestion in Kalipi that there would be nothing to prevent the unreasonable exercise of these rights, article XII, section 7 accords an ample legal basis for regulatory efforts by the State. See also supra note 23 (citing evidence suggesting that ancient Hawaiian usage was self-regulating). In other words, the State is authorized to impose appropriate regulations to govern the exercise of native Hawaiian rights in conjunction with permits issued for the development of land previously undeveloped or not yet fully developed. Depending on the circumstances of each case, once land has reached the point of full development it may be inconsistent to allow or enforce the practice of traditional Hawaiian gathering rights on such property. However, legitimate customary and traditional practices must be protected to the extent feasible in accordance with article XII, section 7. See supra note 43. Although access is only guaranteed in connection with undeveloped lands, and article XII, section 7 does not require the preservation of such lands, the State does not have the unfettered discretion to regulate the rights of ahupua`a tenants out of existence. Thus, to the extent feasible, we hold that the HPC must protect the reasonable exercise of customary or traditional rights that are established by PASH on remand.