Opinion ID: 769987
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ohio Product Liability Act

Text: 25 Under OPLA, a product liability claim is defined as: 26 a claim that is asserted in a civil action and that seeks to recover compensatory damages from a manufacturer or supplier for death, physical injury to person, emotional distress, or physical damage to property other than the product involved, that allegedly arose from any of the following: 27 (1) The design, formulation, production, construction, creation, assembly, rebuilding, testing, or marketing of that product; 28 (2) Any warning or instruction, or lack of warning or instruction, associated with that product; 29 (3) Any failure of that product to conform to any relevant representation or warranty. 30 Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.71(M). OPLA claims brought under a theory of design defect are governed by § 2307.75(E) of the statute, which provides: 31 A product is not defective in design or formulation if the harm for which the claimant seeks to recover compensatory damages was caused by an inherent characteristic of the product which is a generic aspect of the product that cannot be eliminated without substantially compromising the product's usefulness or desirability and which is recognized by the ordinary person with the ordinary knowledge common to the community. 32 Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.75(E) (emphasis added). OPLA claims brought under a failure-to-warn theory are governed by § 2307.75(B), which states: 33 A product is not defective due to lack of warning or instruction or inadequate warning or instruction as a result of the failure of its manufacturer to warn or instruct about an open and obvious risk or a risk that is a matter of common knowledge. 34 Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.76(B) (emphasis added). Defendants argue that based upon these provisions, liability under OPLA is barred because the inherent risks of smoking are a matter of common knowledge.
35 This bar to recovery has come to be known as the common knowledge doctrine. See Tompkin v. American Brands, 219 F.3d 566, 571-72 (6th Cir. 2000) (OPLA expressly exempts from liability products whose dangers are regarded as 'common knowledge.'); Amendola v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 198 F.3d 244, 1999 WL 1111515, at  (6th Cir. Nov. 24, 1999) (unpublished) (holding that plaintiff's OPLA claim was barred by the common knowledge doctrine); Consumers of Ohio v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 52 F.3d 325, 1995 WL 234620, at  (6th Cir. April 19, 1995) (unpublished) (affirming 12(b)(6) dismissal of OPLA claims, stating, The extensive information that is now available regarding smoking tobacco precludes a jury question as to whether the risks involved are known by the average consumer.); Paugh v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 834 F. Supp. 228, 231 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (dismissing fraud, failure-to-warn, negligence, and defective design claims under 12(b)(6) based on finding that users of tobacco products have made a consumer choice in the face of health risks that are common to ordinary knowledge); Gawloski v. Miller Brewing Co., 96 Ohio App. 3d 160, 163, 644 N.E.2d 731 (1994) (holding that there is no duty under Ohio law to protect against dangers [that] are generally known and recognized by the ordinary consumer). 36 In Tompkin, we recently reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant tobacco companies, holding that whether the dangers of smoking were common knowledge between 1950 and 1965 presented a question for the jury. See Tompkin, 219 F.3d at 572-73. In Tompkin, the plaintiff brought OPLA claims of design defect, failure-to-warn, strict liability, and misrepresentation both individually and on behalf of the decedent smoker, who had smoked the defendants' tobacco products from 1950 to 1965. The plaintiff's decedent was diagnosed with lung cancer in 1992 and died in 1996. The district court denied the defendants' 12(b)(6) motion and, instead, conducted an extensive factual inquiry into the commonly known health risks of smoking. See Tompkin, 10 F. Supp. 2d 895 (N.D. Ohio 1998). After examining the expert testimony offered by both parties, the district court ultimately determined that plaintiff's OPLA claims were barred by the common knowledge doctrine, holding that a reasonable fact finder could not fail to conclude that the health risks from smoking, particularly the risk of lung cancer, was 'common knowledge' in 1950. See id. at 905. We reversed the district court in part, holding that because the plaintiff's decedent both began and quit smoking before the enactment of any Labeling Act, a rational factfinder could reasonably conclude that the public did not have 'common knowledge' of the strong connection between cigarette smoking and lung cancer between 1950 and 1965. Tompkin, 219 F.3d at 575. 37 In our earlier decision in Roysdon v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 236 (6th Cir. 1988), we affirmed the dismissal of a claim brought by a smoker and his wife under a Tennessee products liability statute, which, like OPLA, codified the common knowledge doctrine 3 . Citing the district court's judicial notice that tobacco has been used for over 400 years and thatits characteristics have also been fully explored, the Roysdon Court addressed the extent of the public's knowledge of the dangers of smoking between 1974 and 1984, the ten-year period immediately preceding the commencement of the suit. See id. at 232, 236. We held that plaintiffs' claims were barred because [k]nowledge that cigarette smoking is harmful to health is widespread and can be considered part of the common knowledge of the community. See id. at 236 (citing Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189, 1192 (E.D. Tenn. 1985)). 38 Glassner attempts to distinguish Roysdon based on the 1994 Waxman Hearings, where the tobacco industry's knowledge that tobacco is addictive and its manipulation of nicotine levels in cigarettes came to light during a congressional hearing chaired by Congressman Waxman of the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the House Energy and Commerce Committee. In Hollar v. Philip Morris, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 794 (N.D. Ohio 1998), the plaintiff similarly attempted to distinguish Roysdon on the ground that it was decided before the Waxman Hearings, arguing that the hearings illuminated the conspiracy to defraud the American public engaged in by the Defendants. Id. at 807. The Hollar Court properly declined to accept the plaintiff's reasoning, stating: 39 While more information may be available about Defendants' allegedly intentional manipulation of nicotine levels and their campaign to resurrect a smoking controversy that information does not negate the public's long held knowledge that cigarettes are (and were) dangerous to health. 40 Id. The court recognized that the plaintiff and her decedent began smoking in 1968 and 1971, respectively, well after the Labeling Act became effective on January 1, 1966, stating, the case law is well settled that the health hazards of smoking were within the ordinary citizen's 'common knowledge' by the time the plaintiffs began smoking. Id. 41 In Tompkin, we emphasized that because the plaintiffs alleged that defendants' products proximately caused Mr. Tompkin's lung cancer, the common knowledge inquiry must be narrowed to the question of whether the link between cigarette smoking and lung cancer was common knowledge, not simply whether the link between cigarette smoking and general health maladies was common knowledge. See Tompkin, 219 F.3d at 572-73. Here, Glassner does not allege any specific illness or injury caused by Defendants' products; he alleges simply that smoking cigarettes is hazardous to one's health and that his decedent was harmed as a result of smoking. Thus, we limit our common knowledge inquiry to the question of whether the link between cigarette smoking and general health risks was common knowledge during the relevant time period. Based upon Roysdon and Tompkin, it is clear that the point at which the common knowledge doctrine serves to bar recovery under OPLA falls somewhere between the periods of 1950 to 1965 (Tompkin) and 1974 to 1984 (Roysdon). See Tompkin, 219 F.3d at 572-75 (whether common knowledge existed prior to 1965, the date the plaintiff's decedent quit smoking, created a question for the jury in light of the fact that Congress had yet to enact the Labeling Act); Roysdon, 849 F.2d at 232, 236 (common knowledge between 1974 and 1984 was sufficient to bar plaintiff's claims, despite the fact that plaintiff began smoking in 1946, twenty years before the Labeling Act went into effect). Here, Glassner's decedent began smoking in 1969 and continued to smoke up until her death in 1997. Accordingly, we hold that the common knowledge doctrine bars Glassner's OPLA claims as a matter of law. 42 We recently affirmed a similar case dismissed on a 12(b)(6) motion where the complaint alleged, among other things, negligent misrepresentation and intentional infliction of emotional distress under OPLA. See Amendola v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 198 F.3d 244, 1999 WL1111515 (6th Cir. Nov. 24, 1999) (unpublished). In Amendola, the plaintiff began smoking in 1958, well before Congress mandated any warning labels on cigarette packages, and continued to smoke until 1998, well after cigarette warning labels made the health risks associated with smoking common knowledge. Focusing not on the point at which the plaintiff began smoking, but rather, the point at which she quit smoking, we held that the plaintiff's OPLA claims were barred as a matter of law by the common knowledge doctrine. See id. at -. 43 Not only did the Amendola Court rely on Roysdon, it also found support in Jones v. American Tobacco Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 706, 718 (N.D. Ohio 1998), a consolidated action based on OPLA claims of strict liability, negligence, fraud not based on common law, and breach of warranty. In Jones, one plaintiff began smoking in 1954 and quit in 1990, and the other plaintiff began smoking in 1968 and continued to smoke through the disposition of the case. The district court held that because both plaintiffs continued to smoke after 1966, when warning labels first were placed on cigarette packages, their claims were barred as a matter of law pursuant to the common knowledge doctrine. See id. at 718. 44 We find the reasoning on this point to be sound. Not only did Glassner's decedent begin smoking well after the 1965 Act mandated warning labels on cigarette packages, she continued to smoke even after the 1969 Act strengthened those warnings. Thus, we find that from the time Ella Glassner began smoking up until the time of her death, there existed a widespread public awareness of the health risks associated with smoking such that we must impute this common knowledge to her and presume that she was aware of and assumed those risks. Because Glassner's OPLA claims not preempted by the Labeling Act nevertheless are barred by the common knowledge doctrine, the district court properly dismissed those claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).