Opinion ID: 1711125
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Pre-1963 Private Judicial Remedies

Text: To understand what occurred in 1963, it is important to remember what brought us to that point. Michigan was at the forefront in the development of civil rights long before the Civil Rights Act was enacted. Early on, the right to pursue private judicial remedies has been recognized as fundamental to the enforcement of civil rights. Ferguson v. Gies, 82 Mich. 358, 46 N.W. 718 (1890), was a watershed decision by which Michigan parted company from majority rule. The Ferguson Court rejected the separate but equal theory six years before the United States Supreme Court adopted it in the infamous Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896). More important for us in the instant case is that Ferguson held that a black man who had been aggrieved by unlawful discrimination had a right to pursue private judicial relief. At issue in Ferguson was whether a statutory provision, which penalized racial discrimination as a misdemeanor, precluded a separate private civil suit for damages. The Court held that it did not. The Court stated: The general rule, however, is that where a statute imposes upon any person a specific duty for the protection or benefit of others, if he neglects or refuses to perform such duty, he is liable for any injury or detriment caused by such neglect or refusal, if such injury or hurt is of the kind which the statute was intended to prevent; nor is it necessary in such a case as this to declare upon or refer to the statute. The common law as it existed in this State before the passage of this statute, and before the colored man became a citizen under our Constitution and laws, gave to the white man a remedy against any unjust discrimination to the citizen in all public places. It must be considered that, when this suit was planted, the colored man, under the common law of this State, was entitled to the same rights and privileges in public places as the white man, and he must be treated the same there; and that his right of action for any injury arising from an unjust discrimination against him is just as perfect and sacred in the courts as that of any other citizen. This statute is only declaratory of the common law, as I understand it now to exist in this State. [ Id. at 365, 46 N.W. 718 (emphasis added).] Ferguson began to establish that, in Michigan, whenever a particular equal protection right is recognized, whether by constitution, statute, or common law, then fused to that right is the right to pursue judicial relief. [24] In other words, adhering to the substantive right is a remedy against any unjust discrimination. Id. In Ferguson, the substantive right recognized was that black men were entitled to equal access to public accommodations. The right to pursue a private civil action has been reaffirmed many times. Even in the absence of a common-law remedy and in the absence of a statutory remedy, our Court long ago held that there was a private civil remedy for violations of a civil rights statute. Bolden v. Grand Rapids Operating Corp., 239 Mich. 318, 328, 214 N.W. 241 (1927). In 1944, this Court reaffirmed Bolden in St. John v. General Motors Corp., 308 Mich. 333, 336, 13 N.W.2d 840 (1944). St. John held that a penal statute [25] that prohibited gender wage discrimination included a private civil remedy. The statute establishes specified personal civil rights and if there has been discrimination between sexes in the instances at bar the remedy by action at law is available to claimants. Id. As the Legislature has expanded the scope of civil rights over the years, the right to pursue judicial remedies has been coupled with the expansion. [26] In 1955, the Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) was enacted, which created a civil right to equal opportunity in the pursuit of employment [27] in the private sector, as well as the public sector. [28] Pompey v. General Motors Corp., 385 Mich. 537, 551-552, 189 N.W.2d 243 (1971), explained that this was the first time that the right to be free from unlawful discrimination extended to private employment. Even though the statute did not create a private civil action, Pompey held that a statutorily created civil right included a private action for civil damages in addition to any statutory enforcement mechanism. Id. at 560, 189 N.W.2d 243. The Court explained: In 1955, the fair employment practices act created a civil right in the opportunity to obtain employment without discrimination because of race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry. Defendant contends, and we agree, that prior to the passing of this important legislation in 1955, there was in Michigan no recognized legal remedy for acts of discrimination based on race in private employment. While a right of action was recognized for racial discrimination in public accommodation ( Ferguson v. Gies [1890], 82 Mich. 358, 46 N.W. 718) and in the enjoyment of various other civil rights, the right to be free from discrimination on account of race in private employment was not rewarded as a civil right entitled to protection of the law. We recognize that the fact that there was no preexistent common-law remedy for racial discrimination in private employment is generally highly significant in determining the exclusiveness of the statutory remedy. The general rule, in which Michigan is aligned with a strong majority of jurisdictions, is that where a new right is created or a new duty is imposed by statute, the remedy provided for enforcement of that right by the statute for its violation and nonperformance is exclusive. Correlatively, a statutory remedy for enforcement of a common-law right is deemed only cumulative. But courts have forged exceptions to these general rules when the statutory rights infringed were civil rights. Although there is some authority to the contrary most decisions have held that a person aggrieved by the violation of a civil rights statute is entitled to pursue a remedy which will effectively reimburse him for or relieve him from violation of the statute, notwithstanding the statute did not expressly give him such right or remedy. [ Id. at 551-553, 189 N.W.2d 243 (citations omitted).] Turning to the argument of the General Motors Corporation that there was no private cause of action, Pompey rejected the argument and restated the rule: Our Court unqualifiedly rejected such an argument when dealing with civil rights statutes, concluding that the aggrieved person may maintain an action for damages for injuries suffered by the violation of the civil rights statute despite the fact that the statute made no express provision for such recovery. We cited as the controlling principle: `In cases where there has been illegal discrimination the person aggrieved has clearly a civil right of action for damages, and this is true although the provision for the enforcement of a civil rights statute under which the complainant claims redress provides for a criminal prosecution only. This right accrues by virtue of the general rule that where a statute imposes upon any person a specific duty for the protection or benefit of others, neglect or refusal to perform the duty creates a liability for any injury or detriment caused by such neglect or refusal, if the injury or hurt is of the kind which the statute was intended to prevent.' [ Id. at 555-556, 189 N.W.2d 243 (citations omitted).]