Opinion ID: 853860
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dissolution Attorney Fees

Text: The 1996 decree ordered Cowart to pay White's dissolution attorney fees in the amount of $14,521. The obligation to pay attorney fees may be nondischargeable in bankruptcy if it is in the nature of maintenance or support. See In re Balvich, 135 B.R. 327, 338 (Bankr.N.D.Ind.1991), aff'd 135 B.R. 323 (N.D.Ind.1991); In re Knabe, 8 B.R. 53, 56-57 (Bankr.S.D.Ind.1980). In exercising its discretion to award attorney fees under Indiana Code § 31-15-10-1, a trial court is required to consider the resources of the parties, their relative economic circumstances, and their ability to engage in gainful employment and earn adequate income. Barnes v. Barnes, 549 N.E.2d 61, 66 (Ind.Ct. App.1990); Euler v. Euler, 537 N.E.2d 554, 557 (Ind.Ct.App.1989). Accordingly, federal courts have held that an award of attorney fees based on the financial resources of the parties, ... ordinarily indicates that the award is in the nature of maintenance or support. In re Balvich, 135 B.R. at 337 (quoting In re Kijewski, 91 B.R. 48, 50 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1988)). In contrast, if attorney fees are not based on financial need they will be found to be property settlement debts dischargeable under section 523(a)(5). SOMMER & McGARITY, supra, at ¶ 6.05[1]. In this case, the trial court's 1996 decree awarded a larger share of the property sale proceeds to White observing that White worked only part-time during the marriage and that the Court of Appeals had approved a similar distribution where the husband had superior or future earning ability. The trial court did not make a similar observation as to the relative earning power of the parties when it awarded attorney fees. A court may order a former spouse to pay rehabilitative maintenance for a period of up to three years after considering: the education level of each spouse, whether an interruption in training or employment was a result of homemaking or child care responsibilities, the earning capacity of each spouse and the time and expense necessary for the spouse to acquire sufficient education and training to find appropriate employment. See IND.CODE § 31-15-7-2(3) (1998). Although the trial court clearly had discretion to award the attorney fees as maintenance, we are unable to conclude whether the fees were awarded as maintenance or support. Because, as explained below, a remand is necessary for other reasons, we leave it to the trial court to resolve whether the award of attorney fees was designed to provide White with resources to assist her in maintaining her lifestyle after dissolution or, in other words, maintenance. If so, Cowart's obligation to pay those fees survived his bankruptcy and Trial Rule 69 is available to enforce this obligation under the 1996 decree against Cowart.