Opinion ID: 1189909
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: August 2002 to March 3, 2003

Text: The district court concluded that the Puckets lacked standing to assert a claim based on the period from August 2002, when the School District discontinued busing, until March 3, 2003, when § 13-29-1.2, which specifically gave school districts discretion to bus private-school children, became effective. The district court concluded that prior to the enactment of § 13-29-1.2, public school districts were not authorized to bus private-school children under South Dakota law. Thus, the court concluded that the Puckets lacked standing to sue as they suffered no injury-in-fact based on the School District's decision to discontinue busing Bethesda students, because the School District did not have statutory authority to do so. On appeal the Puckets argue that the district court erred by misinterpreting the South Dakota statutes at issue and by failing to consider the legislative history of § 13-29-1.2. [S]chool boards are creatures of statute with limited powers. Therefore, a school board cannot exercise power unless it is expressly granted or necessarily implied by statute. In re Writ of Certiorari as to Wrongful Payments of Attorney Fees Made by Brookings Sch. Dist. Sch. Bd., 668 N.W.2d 538, 542 (S.D.2003). [A]ny power sought to be exercised must be found within the four corners of the statute under which they proceed. Sunnywood Common Sch. Dist. No. 46 of Minnehaha County v. County Bd. of Educ. of Minnehaha County, 81 S.D. 110, 131 N.W.2d 105, 110 (1964). When powers are necessarily implied from a statute, the implication should be clear and undoubted, and the party claiming through [it] should be able to point [it] out with certainty and precision.... Implications spring from the necessities of some power actually conferred, and not from notions of what would be convenient or expedient under particular circumstances. State ex rel. Bell v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Beadle County, 68 S.D. 237, 300 N.W. 832, 834 (1941) (quotation omitted). When determining the scope of a school board's authority, we must examine the statutes that govern school boards. We begin with the plain language of each statute and try to ascertain the intent of the legislature by looking at the language of the statute itself and giving it its plain, ordinary and commonly understood meaning. In re M & S Grading, Inc., 457 F.3d 898, 901 (8th Cir.2006) (quotation omitted). It is well established that courts do not interpret statutes in isolation, but in the context of the corpus juris of which they are a part. Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 281, 123 S.Ct. 1429, 155 L.Ed.2d 407 (2003). The correct rule of interpretation is, that if divers statutes relate to the same thing, they ought all to be taken into consideration in construing any one of them. United States v. Freeman, 44 U.S. 556, 564, 3 How. 556, 11 L.Ed. 724 (1845). As the district court correctly explained, § 13-29-1 does not provide authority for the School District to bus Bethesda students. Under § 13-29-1, school districts may bus students to and from its schools or for athletic, musical, speech, and other interscholastic contests. (Emphasis added). Bethesda is not one of the School District's schools, and Bethesda students are not being bused to athletic, musical, speech or other interscholastic contests. Thus, we conclude that the plain language of § 13-29-1 does not authorize the School District to bus Bethesda students. The Puckets also argue that the district court erred in its interpretation of §§ 13-24-20 and 13-29-1.1. Section 13-24-20 states, in relevant part, that [t]he school board may grant the use of school facilities, computers, motor vehicles, or land belonging to the school district for any purposes which it considers advisable as a community service for such compensation as it determines.... The use may not interfere with school activities. Section 13-29-1.1 provides that [a] school board may allow nonprofit civic organizations or other government entities to use vehicles owned by the school district to transport persons to various activities deemed by the school board to be in the public interest. Both statutes authorize school boards to grant or allow others, including nonprofit organizations, to use a school district's vehicles. Use is defined as to put or bring into action or service. Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language 1564 (2d College ed.1984). Riding as a passenger in a vehicle does not constitute putting the vehicle into action or service. Accordingly, applying the ordinary meaning of use, we conclude that §§ 13-24-20 and 13-29-1.1 merely authorize the School District to allow a nonprofit organization actually to operate the School District's motor vehicles. The Puckets argue that use by a nonprofit, nonpublic school includes students enrolled at that school riding on buses operated by drivers employed by the School District. However, this broad interpretation of use is not consistent with the command that any power sought to be exercised by a school district must be either expressly granted or necessarily implied by the statute. See In re Writ of Certiorari as to Wrongful Payments of Attorney Fees Made by Brookings Sch. Dist. Sch. Bd., 668 N.W.2d at 542. Such a reading also is inconsistent with the language of other South Dakota statutes regulating busing. Section 13-29-1 authorizes school districts to provide transportation of students to and from its schools and interscholastic contests, and § 13-29-1.2 now authorizes school districts to provide transportation to nonpublic school students to and from their schools. Neither of those statutes employ the word use. When intending to enable a school district to provide busing services to its students, [4] the South Dakota legislature notably chose the phrase provide transportation. If the legislature intended § 13-24-20 or § 13-29-1.1 to authorize school districts to provide busing services to private-school children, it would have expressed that intent by using the word transportation. The fact that the legislature instead chose the word use indicates that the legislature did not intend for either of these statutes to permit school districts to provide busing services for private-school children. Rather, the plain language of §§ 13-24-20 and 13-29-1.1 authorizes a school district to allow other nonprofit groups to use its buses, employing their own drivers. [5] Finally, the Puckets argue that we should consider the legislative history of § 13-29-1.2, which they claim supports their argument. The Puckets rely on statements of two legislators regarding the passage of § 13-29-1.2 to support their claim that the legislature passed § 13-29-1.2 only to clarify and confirm that school districts already had the authority to bus private-school children. However, when statutes are straightforward and clear, legislative history and policy arguments are at best interesting, at worst distracting and misleading, and in neither case authoritative. N. States Power Co. v. United States, 73 F.3d 764, 766 (8th Cir.1996). As the district court noted, if school districts had the authority to transport private-school children to and from school, the legislature would not have needed to enact § 13-29-1.2. See Nat'l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 534 N.W.2d 63, 65 (S.D.1995) (The legislature does not intend to insert surplusage in its enactments.). Accordingly, South Dakota law did not authorize the School District to bus Bethesda students until § 13-29-1.2 became effective on March 3, 2003. The Puckets cannot show that the School District's alleged discrimination caused their injury because the School District did not have the statutory authority to bus the Puckets or any other Bethesda students before March 3, 2003. See, e.g., Donaghy v. City of Omaha, 933 F.2d 1448, 1455 (8th Cir.1991) (holding that police officer lacked standing to challenge city's race-conscious employment decisions because, even if the city had only promoted based on rank order, he would not have been promoted based on his rank); Grahek v. City of St. Paul, 84 F.3d 296, 299 (8th Cir.1996) (citing Donaghy in finding that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue because he would not have been referred for openings for which he applied even if the police chief had not applied an affirmative-action plan); Wilson v. Glenwood Intermountain Props., 98 F.3d 590, 593 (10th Cir.1996) ([A] person who fails to satisfy lawful, nondiscriminatory requirements or qualifications for the benefit lacks standing to raise claims of discrimination in the denial of the benefit.); see also 13 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3531.5, at 452 (2d ed. 1984) (Causation is most easily rejected when a plaintiff challenges the denial of a benefit on one ground, and it is shown that the plaintiff is in any event ineligible for the benefit on some other ground.). Therefore, we agree with the district court that the Puckets lack standing to challenge the School District's decision to discontinue busing Bethesda students prior to March 3, 2003. [6]