Opinion ID: 1996085
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Voluntariness of Consent to Search: Deception

Text: [¶ 21] Bailey next contends that any consent he may have given is void because it was induced by Beaulieu's deceit and misrepresentation. He contends that the detective misrepresented the purpose of his investigation; although Beaulieu claimed he was investigating a problem in the neighborhood of people gaining access to others' computers, he was actually investigating the dissemination of child pornography. Bailey argues that had he known the true purpose of the search, he would not have consented. [¶ 22] The burden of proof for justifying the lawfulness of a search upon consent lies on the State which, to satisfy the same, must prove that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given. State v. Barlow, 320 A.2d 895, 901 (Me. 1974). Consent to search can be invalidated if the officer obtained the consent by use of misrepresentation or deceit. See id. at 900 ([A] consent search is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the consent was induced by deceit, trickery or misrepresentation of the officials making the search.). [¶ 23] We have recognized the practical necessity for the use of deception in criminal investigations, State v. Carey, 417 A.2d 979, 981 (Me.1980), but the effect of deception as to purpose is an issue of first impression. [8] Case law from federal and other state jurisdictions on the effect of deception is necessarily fact driven, but in cases where courts have found that deception alone vitiates consent, there has been an express and affirmative misrepresentation by the authorities as to the purpose of the search or investigation. [9] Most frequently, police deception as to purpose is viewed among all of the circumstances surrounding the individual's consent in a voluntariness analysis. See United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (noting that deception is one relevant inquiry within the totality of the circumstances); United States v. Romero, No. 05-10080-01-WEB, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 26000, at - (D.Kan. Oct. 19, 2005) (analyzing the voluntariness of a consensual search by considering deception along with other factors including custody, language barrier, force, and coercion); Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 443 Mass. 245, 820 N.E.2d 233, 242 (2005) (stating that deception as to purpose is one factor to consider in the totality of the circumstances). [¶ 24] As with other factors bearing on voluntariness, whether a misrepresentation of the purpose of a search by the police invalidates consent is a question of fact based on the totality of the circumstances. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 229, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); State v. Faulkner, 586 A.2d 1246, 1247 (Me.1991); Koucoules, 343 A.2d at 873. The record contains these facts bearing on the voluntariness of Bailey's consent: the officer clearly identified himself and indicated he was investigating some sort of computer issue; Bailey allowed the officer to enter his home; the officer asked for and received permission to search the computer; Bailey was neither in custody during the encounter, nor arrested at the end of the encounter; and Bailey was present for the entire duration of the computer search. In light of all these circumstances, as well as the suppression court's finding that Beaulieu's statements, though ambiguous, were not affirmatively misleading, the court did not clearly err in determining that Bailey voluntarily consented to the search of his computer. See Cress, 576 A.2d at 1367.