Opinion ID: 3015876
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Puricelli’s Appeal

Text: Puricelli’s core issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in granting the Rule 11 motion by default. Beyond the conclusory assertion of error, however, Puricelli gives little in the way of argument directly bearing on this issue. Instead, his brief devolves into a series of arguments that he could have raised in opposition to the Rule 11 motion had he responded to the motion for sanctions. As the District Court explained, the pertinent local court 9 rule provides that “any party opposing [a] motion shall serve a brief in opposition . . . within fourteen (14) days after service of the motion. . . . In the absence of a timely response, the motion may be granted as uncontested. . . .” Eastern District of Pennsylvania Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1(c). In light of the District Court’s finding that Puricelli received the Rule 11 motion but failed to respond, the application of this local rule seems on its face to doom Puricelli’s appeal. Moreover, citing Local Rule 7.1(c) or a rule similar to it, courts have held that a Rule 11 sanctions motion can be granted by default. See, e.g., Geller v. Randi, 40 F.3d 1300, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Aziz v. Pa. State Univ., 1998 WL 964483, at  (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 1998); Carbone v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 1996 WL 420427, at  (E.D. Pa. July 25, 1996). Nevertheless, there is authority from our Court that, while not cited by the parties, lends some support to Puricelli. See Landon v. Hunt, 938 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1991) (per curiam). In Landon the District Court sanctioned the plaintiffs after they failed to file a timely response to the defendants’ motion for sanctions under Rule 11 subsequent to two of the plaintiffs not appearing for trial. Although recognizing that the sanctions motion was unopposed, we nonetheless concluded that Rule 11 did not provide authority for imposing sanctions. See id. at 453. As we explained, imposing sanctions suffered from two obvious deficiencies. First, Rule 11 authorizes sanctions against the signer of any pleading, motion or other paper. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) and (c). The conduct at issue in Landon, however, was 10 entirely unrelated to the signing of any pleading, motion or other paper—the sanction related to the failure to appear for trial. See Landon, 938 F.2d at 453 (“We have consistently held that ‘Rule 11 sanctions are proper only in situations involving a signed pleading.’” (quoting Schering Corp. v. Vitarine Pharms., Inc., 889 F.2d 490, 496 (3d Cir. 1989))(emphasis added in Landon)). Second, defendants’ sanctions motion was filed more than six months after the entry of final judgment and, moreover, we explained that there was no possible justification for the inordinate delay. See id.; see also Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 100 (3d Cir. 1988) (adopting a “supervisory rule for the courts in the Third Circuit . . . requir[ing] that all motions requesting Rule 11 sanctions be filed in the district court before the entry of a final judgment”).2 In contrast to Landon, and Puricelli’s protestations notwithstanding, the sanctions motion here did not involve obvious facial deficiencies. The motion asserted that the amended complaint Puricelli had filed—and to which he was the sole signer—was without adequate legal or factual basis. Thus the motion did not fall outside Rule 11’s ambit (signed pleadings), thus distinguishing Landon.3 Further, although 2 In Landon we did not consider the effect of a local rule governing a party’s failure to file a timely response. 3 Puricelli also argues that the entry of the sanction after dismissal of the action violates the supervisory rule—announced 11 Puricelli argues that the sanctions motion suffered from procedural defects (the most significant being the failure to comply with Rule 11’s “safe harbor” provisions), the alleged procedural shortcomings do not rise to the level of those associated with a motion inexcusably filed six months too late. Under Local Rule 7.1(c), the District Court was authorized to consider Puricelli’s arguments waived, and we do so as well. Accordingly, the District Court did not err in granting the unopposed motion for Rule 11 sanctions.