Opinion ID: 606114
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Martin's Confession

Text: 5 Petitioner's theory of defense was that the murder was actually committed by Anthony Ray Martin. Mr. Martin had been charged with aiding and abetting the murder, but was acquitted. See State v. Martin, 237 Kan. 285, 699 P.2d 486 (1985). Several witnesses, including Mr. Martin, identified Petitioner as the gunman, and other witnesses testified that Petitioner admitted committing the murder. Mr. Martin testified in person at the second trial, and his testimony was read into the record at the third trial after he exercised his Fifth Amendment privilege. Mr. Martin testified that, just prior to the shooting, he saw a man throw down a pool cue case, which Martin picked up, hoping to find drugs. After the shooting, he found the case again and decided that he should wipe off his fingerprints, which he did, and then tossed it away. He identified Mr. Haislip as the gunman, and denied knowing him or giving him the gun. 6 Several of Petitioner's witnesses testified to observing Anthony Martin at the scene. Krystal Butler, a witness who had been talking to the officers from the passenger side of the car when the shooting occurred, testified that she saw Mr. Martin on the other side of the car, with a shotgun. She also testified that she had been smoking marijuana that night, and admitted that in a prior sworn statement she had denied knowing the identity of the gunman. Defense counsel attempted to question Ms. Butler about a confession by Mr. Martin, which, upon objection, the court disallowed as hearsay. Defense counsel did not challenge the court's ruling. 7 Petitioner contends that the statement was admissible as a statement against penal interest under Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-460(j) and would have changed the outcome of the case, and that his counsel's failure to argue for admission and cite the statute was objectively unreasonable. The Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the evidence may have been admissible had the trial court considered it. Haislip, 701 P.2d at 921. The possible application of the Kansas statute was waived, however, because the trial court was not given an opportunity to consider it. 8 Petitioner must overcome a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.... Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. Petitioner argues that counsel's failure to offer exculpatory evidence is obviously unreasonable, relying on Washington v. Murray, 952 F.2d 1472 (4th Cir.1991); Moffett v. Kolb, 930 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir.1991) and Nixon v. Newsome, 888 F.2d 112 (11th Cir.1989). Each of these cases, however, concerns the utter failure of defense counsel to offer evidence which was highly exculpatory and which was not introduced through other means. Here, Petitioner's counsel introduced several witnesses who testified that Mr. Martin was the killer. Ms. Butler testified as an eyewitness to the shooting. Defense counsel may have erred in not arguing for admission of the confession, but we cannot say that Petitioner's representation was objectively unreasonable. 9 Furthermore, considering the totality of the evidence, we do not find a reasonable probability that introduction of the confession would have resulted in a different verdict. The prosecution presented a strong case against Petitioner, which included eyewitness accounts and evidence of Petitioner's own confession. The jury heard evidence supporting Petitioner's theory and chose to convict him anyway.