Opinion ID: 628033
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the district court's civil contempt order

Text: 42 Next, the appellants appeal from the district court's May 21, 1993 civil contempt order. The district court found the appellants in contempt of this Court's Orders of January 6 and 11, 1993, and the Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia dated January 15, 1993 in two respects: (1) for failing to promulgate new, appropriate, and proper recordkeeping regulations for electronic federal records to replace those regulations struck down by this Court on January 6, 1993 and (2) because the transfer of 5,839 tapes from the Defendant agencies to the Archivist has adversely affected the condition of the tapes and the information stored therein which was contrary to this Court's Orders to preserve the tapes and federal records contained on [303 U.S.App.D.C. 122] them. Order, Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 821 F.Supp. 761 (D.D.C.1993). The court further ordered that, unless the appellants should purge themselves of this finding of contempt by tak[ing] appropriate action by 4:00 p.m. on June 21, 1993, they would be subject to a fine of $50,000 for each day of noncompliance during the first week, to be doubled to $100,000 per day the second week and $200,000 per day the third week, with increases in such sanctions reserved thereafter for any further noncompliance with Court Orders. Id. at 2-3. The appellants assert that the contempt finding must be reversed because, inter alia, the district court's first ground, the failure to promulgate new regulations, was not a violation of the cited orders and therefore cannot support civil contempt. The standard of review on an appeal from a finding of contempt is whether the District Court abused its discretion. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 849 F.2d 1481, 1486 (D.C.Cir.1988). We agree with the appellants that the contempt finding, as articulated, was an abuse of discretion because it rests in part on an impermissible ground. 43 As a preliminary matter, we reject the appellees' jurisdictional argument that the May 21, 1993 order is not an appealable one because it imposes only a conditional sanction for failure to comply with a preexisting order. See Appellees' Contempt Brief at 13. As both the Eleventh Circuit and the Second Circuit have concluded,  'Being placed under the threat of future sanction is a present sanction'  and an order so threatening  'imposes a present remedy and hence is appealable.'  United States v. O'Rourke, 943 F.2d 180, 186 (2d Cir.1991) (quoting Sizzler Family Steak Houses v. Western Sizzlin Steak House, Inc., 793 F.2d 1529, 1533 n. 2 (11th Cir.1986)) (emphasis in original). We agree and therefore proceed to the merits of the contempt appeal. 44 There can be no question that courts have inherent power to enforce compliance with their lawful orders through civil contempt. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370, 86 S.Ct. 1531, 1535, 16 L.Ed.2d 622 (1966). Nevertheless, civil contempt will lie only if the putative contemnor has violated an order that is clear and unambiguous, Project B.A.S.I.C. v. Kemp, 947 F.2d 11, 16 (1st Cir.1991), and the violation must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild, Local 35 v. Washington Post Co., 626 F.2d 1029, 1031 (D.C.Cir.1980). The district court's first ground for its contempt finding, however, did not involve violation of any court order. The district court's January 11, 1993 order did not expressly direct the appellants to promulgate new regulations, but merely issued a Declaratory Judgment that the guidelines issued by and at the direction of the Defendant Agencies are inadequate and not reasonable and are arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law in that they permit the destruction of records contrary to the Federal Records Act. Amended Order, Armstrong v. Bush, 810 F.Supp. 335 (D.D.C.1993). As the Supreme Court has observed: [E]ven though a declaratory judgment has 'the force and effect of a final judgment,' 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2201, it is a much milder form of relief than an injunction. Though it may be persuasive, it is not ultimately coercive; noncompliance with it may be inappropriate, but is not contempt. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 471, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 1221, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974) (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 125-26, 91 S.Ct. 674, 697, 27 L.Ed.2d 701 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring)). Thus, because the appellants were never directly ordered to promulgate new regulations, we must reverse the district court's contempt finding which was based in part on their failure to do so. Cf. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 276-77, 110 S.Ct. 625, 632-33, 107 L.Ed.2d 644 (1990) (reversing contempt finding against individual city councilmembers for city's violation of consent decree where the individual city councilmembers ... were not parties to the action and although the injunctive portion of that decree was directed not only to the city but to 'its officers, agents, employees, successors and all persons in active concert with any of them,' ... the remaining parts of the decree ordering affirmative steps were directed only to the city); International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1291 v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64, 76, 88 S.Ct. 201, [303 U.S.App.D.C. 123] 208, 19 L.Ed.2d 236 (1967) (reversing opinion upholding contempt finding for violating order that did not state in 'specific ... terms' the acts that it required or prohibited) (quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 65(d)). Accordingly, we vacate the contempt order and remand to the district court to consider whether its second ground, the failure to preserve the tapes, by itself, justifies a finding of contempt, taking into account all efforts that have or will then have been made to assure the tapes' integrity. 13 45