Opinion ID: 709226
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Scope of Sec. 1503

Text: 34 Maloney argues that the alleged obstruction of justice in this case, witness tampering, is not actionable under Sec. 1503. In 1982, Congress enacted the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA) and removed from Sec. 1503 all references to witnesses. Coupled with the enactment of Sec. 1512, which deals with witness intimidation and harassment, the Second Circuit held that Congress intended to remove witnesses entirely from the scope of Sec. 1503, including from the omnibus clause. See United States v. Hernandez, 730 F.2d 895, 898 (2d Cir.1984). This court, however, rejected such an implied repeal argument in United States v. Rovetuso, 768 F.2d 809, 824 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1076, 106 S.Ct. 838, 88 L.Ed.2d 809 (1986), holding that witness tampering may still be charged under Sec. 1503 despite the enactment of the VWPA and Sec. 1512. 35 Maloney responds that the 1988 amendments to the VWPA, which extended protection to witness persuasion as well as intimidation, undercut the rationale of United States v. Lester, 749 F.2d 1288, 1295 (9th Cir.1984), cited with approval by Rovetuso, 768 F.2d at 824, for the coexistence of witness tampering under both Secs. 1503 and 1512. The Second Circuit, following its position in Hernandez, disparaged these cases on similar grounds in United States v. Masterpol, 940 F.2d 760, 763 (2d Cir.1991). This position, however, is still a minority one. Other circuits have continued to fall in line with Rovetuso 's holding after the 1988 amendments. See, e.g., United States v. Moody, 977 F.2d 1420, 1424 (11th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 1348, 122 L.Ed.2d 730 (1993); United States v. Kenny, 973 F.2d 339, 342-43 (4th Cir.1992). In Kenny, the court pointed out the correctness of this approach: 36 The omnibus clause of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503 ... clearly encompasses acts that obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice. The fact that Sec. 1512 more specifically addresses improper conduct involving a witness does not preclude application of Sec. 1503. The existence of a more narrowly tailored statute does not necessarily prevent prosecution under a broader statute, so long as the defendant is not punished under both for the same conduct. 37 Id. at 342. We see no reason to depart from this analysis and our precedent on the question.