Opinion ID: 2544571
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The City of Liberty's Checkpoint to Promote Compliance with the City's Sticker Ordinance

Text: Mindful of the aforementioned principles, we now review the purpose the checkpoint in this matter was intended to serve. The Court of Appeals concluded, as did the trial court, that the checkpoint's purpose was to regulate compliance with a local ordinance requiring residents of Liberty and non-residents working in the city to purchase and display a city sticker. The Court of Appeals found the checkpoint to be constitutionally valid because it was sufficiently similar to the purpose approved by the United States Supreme Court in Delaware v. Prouse , i.e., checking motorists for driver's license and vehicle registration violations. The Court of Appeals then upheld Liberty's checkpoint because it was established and conducted according to the kind of systematic and non-discretionary plan outlined in Buchanon. However, the Court of Appeals misreads the relevant cases. Appellant vigorously contends that checking for city sticker ordinance violations is not an acceptable purpose for a traffic checkpoint that stops and detains motorists without any individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. He argues that the use of the checkpoint to root out city sticker law violators suffers from the same deficiency as the drug interdiction checkpoint found unconstitutional in Edmond. Appellant asserts that in both cases, the checkpoints were designed for the sole purpose of catching lawbreakers, or detecting] evidence of criminal wrongdoing, with no direct concern for highway safety or border security. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41, 121 S.Ct. 447.
The Commonwealth posits the view that Liberty's checkpoint did not run afoul of Edmond because a city ordinance violation is not a crime as defined in KRS 500.080(2), [6] and therefore, a roadblock detaining motorists to verify compliance with a city ordinance is not for the purpose of ordinary crime control. We need not parse the definition of crime, and in any case it is unlikely that the United States Supreme Court in Edmond took into account Kentucky's statutory definition of crime. The Commonwealth views Edmond too narrowly and overlooks the principle upon which Edmond is based. Edmond noted that each of the checkpoint programs that we have approved [referring to Sitz, Prouse, and Martinez-Fuerte ] was designed primarily to serve purposes closely related to the problems of policing the border or the necessity of ensuring roadway safety. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42, 121 S.Ct. 447. We decline to suspend the usual requirement of individualized suspicion where the police seek to employ a checkpoint primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes. We cannot sanction stops justified only by the generalized and everpresent possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime. Id. at 44, 121 S.Ct. 447. The rule established in Edmond does not depend upon the classification of the offense that a checkpoint was set up to discover. It turns upon the principle that a checkpoint set up to stop vehicles without individualized indicia of suspicion on the random chance of catching a law breaker is too great a breach in the wall of protection provided by the Fourth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court in Edmond condemned the highway checkpoint set up for general crime control (and specifically for drug law violations) because, if roadblocks so established were approved by the courts: there would be little check on the ability of the authorities to construct roadblocks for almost any conceivable law enforcement purpose. Without drawing the line at roadblocks designed primarily to serve the general interest in crime control, the Fourth Amendment would do little to prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine part of American life. Id. at 42, 121 S.Ct. 447. The concern voiced by the United States Supreme Court as the rational underpinning of Edmond is in no way lessened when the roadblock is used to detect violations of a city ordinance rather than a felony or misdemeanor. The threat to individual liberty is the same. Indeed, a city ordinance would appear to be of lesser stature than a crime as used in Edmond, and thus rather than distinguishing Edmond, the better assessment would appear to be that Edmond would apply with even more force against a roadblock set up solely to detect violations of a city ordinance. We also recall that the initial concern that sparked the need for the checkpoint was the report that some teachers had failed to pay the sticker fee. That concern could have been addressed by means far less intrusive than a traffic checkpoint. For example, police officers could have simply walked through the school parking lot and cited cars without a sticker. An appropriate factor to consider when assessing the validity of a traffic checkpoint is whether an alternate, less intrusive means is available to achieve the same objective.
The Commonwealth argues that Prouse should be read as approving traffic checkpoints designed to verify compliance with vehicle registration and operator licensing laws which have no impact upon highway safety. We must disagree. In Prouse, the checkpoint's purpose was found valid only because the licensing and registration requirements advanced the public interest in highway safety: We agree that the States have a vital interest in ensuring that only those qualified to do so are permitted to operate motor vehicles, that these vehicles are fit for safe operation, and hence that licensing, registration, and vehicle inspection requirements are being observed. Automobile licenses are issued periodically to evidence that the drivers holding them are sufficiently familiar with the rules of the road and are physically qualified to operate a motor vehicle. The registration requirement and, more pointedly, the related annual inspection requirement in Delaware are designed to keep dangerous automobiles off the road. Unquestionably, these provisions, properly administered, are essential elements in a highway safety program. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 658, 99 S.Ct. 1391 (footnotes omitted). This point was expressly confirmed in Edmond, Not only does the common thread of highway safety thus run through Sitz and Prouse, but Prouse itself reveals a difference in the Fourth Amendment significance of highway safety interests and the general interest in crime control. Edmond, at 40, 121 S.Ct. 447. As the trial court found, the City of Liberty's sticker ordinance does not have as its purpose anything remotely connected to border patrol or highway safety. We find nothing in the record to refute that finding. It is also apparent that the checkpoint had no information-seeking function of the sort approved in Lidster. The checkpoint's only purpose was to enforce a revenue-raising tax upon vehicles in the city. Thus, the checkpoint to enforce the sticker ordinance comports with none of the purposes which the United States Supreme Court has found to be important enough to override the individual liberty interests secured by the Fourth Amendment.