Opinion ID: 1725774
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: vining vs. vining, p.a.

Text: Paragraph 2 of the referee's findings of fact states, The Respondent is for the purpose of this proceeding the same as Edward C. Vining, P.A., hereinafter referred to as the Respondent. [2] Vining argues that this finding is unsupported by the evidence. Initially, we note that it is questionable whether this finding is a genuine finding of fact in the true sense of the word, since, more than anything else, it appears to be simply for ease of reference by the referee in the report. The referee appears to be asserting that there is no question that the same lawyer, Edward Vining, represented the Building and at the same time his P.A. leased office space in the Building. However, to the extent that it is a finding of fact, Vining's burden on review is to demonstrate that there is no evidence in the record to support [the referee's] findings or that the record evidence clearly contradicts the conclusions. Florida Bar v. Spann, 682 So.2d 1070, 1073 (Fla.1996); see also Florida Bar v. Jordan, 705 So.2d 1387, 1390 (Fla.1998) (quoting same). Where the referee's findings are supported by competent substantial evidence, this Court is precluded from reweighing the evidence and substituting its judgment for that of the referee. Florida Bar v. MacMillan, 600 So.2d 457, 459 (Fla.1992); see also Jordan, 705 So.2d at 1390 (quoting same). Here, the testimony clearly shows that Vining was the sole shareholder of Edward C. Vining, Jr., P.A. Additionally, although, as Vining points out, there is no testimony or other evidence in the record showing that he practiced as a professional association or that the purpose and function of the P.A. was anything other than to lease office space, the referee's finding is not to the contrary. The referee did not find that Vining practiced as a professional association; she simply found that for the purpose of the bar proceedings, Vining the lawyer was the same as the Vining in the P.A. Vining also argues that because the Building was unable to pierce the corporate veil and impose personal liability on him in the litigation against the P.A. for unpaid rent, the referee in these proceedings could not conclude that he and the P.A. were one and the same. [3] Clearly, the referee's finding in these proceedings is in a completely different context, and she did not determine that Vining and the P.A. were the same for purposes of whether the corporate veil could be pierced. In fact, the referee clearly and appropriately limited her statement to this proceeding. Accordingly, Vining has not met his burden of showing that there is no evidence to support the finding or that it is clearly contradicted by the evidence.