Opinion ID: 53386
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mora’s Motion to Remand

Text: Mora also argues that the BIA erred in denying her motion to remand her case to the BIA on the grounds that her counsel was ineffective for failing to properly examine her, investigate her claim, and present evidence to the IJ that she had been stabbed with a screwdriver on January 31, 2003 during her encounter with the two Bolivarian Circle members. Mora asserts that, had her counsel more fully investigated and developed her claim, there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of her hearing would have been different. Initially, we address the government’s assertion that Mora’s motion for remand should be treated as a motion to reopen. The government correctly notes that this Court, as well as the BIA, treats motions to remand as either part of the appeal or as motions to reopen. Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1301. “[I]f a motion to remand seeks to introduce evidence that has not previously been presented, it is generally treated as a motion to reopen under” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). Id. Mora’s 10 motion sought to introduce evidence of the stabbing that she did not previously present before the IJ, and, thus, we will treat her motion to remand as a motion to reopen. “We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion.” Abdi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 430 F.3d 1148, 1149 (11th Cir. 2005). “Our review is limited to determining whether there has been an exercise of administrative discretion and whether the matter of exercise has been arbitrary or capricious.” Id. (quotation omitted). Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), “[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” “A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing . . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). We have determined that, in removal proceedings, an alien may raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a motion to reopen. Dakane v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 399 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2005). “In order to establish the ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of a deportation hearing, an alien must establish that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient to the point that it 11 impinged upon the fundamental fairness of the hearing such that the alien was unable to reasonably present his or her case.” Id. at 1273-74 (quotation omitted). An alien must also establish that she suffered prejudice as a result of her counsel’s deficient performance. Id. at 1274. Here, Mora has failed to established that her counsel’s performance was deficient. Mora claimed before the BIA that her counsel should have elicited testimony during her direct examination regarding her allegation that she was stabbed by Bolivarian Circle members on January 31, 2003. In support of her claim, Mora submitted her affidavit, in which she did not claim that she informed her counsel of the stabbing incident; rather, she indicated that she mistakenly failed to correct the omission in her written statement because she “thought it preferable to continue with the story that had already been prepared.” Mora also submitted a letter from her counsel, in which her counsel indicated that Mora did not tell him about the stabbing incident. Given the record evidence, and Mora’s admission on appeal that her counsel “did not violate his ethical or legal responsibilities,” the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mora’s motion to reopen on the grounds that her counsel’s performance was not deficient.3 3 Even if we conclude that Mora’s counsel was ineffective in failing to interview Mora further to determine her entire claim, as she now alleges, the record indicates that counsel’s failure to do so did not prejudice Mora where she had multiple opportunities during her direct examination to further elaborate on the events of January 31, 2003. Specifically, during Mora’s testimony at the removal hearing, her counsel asked her several open-ended questions about 12 Furthermore, the BIA also did not abuse its discretion in denying Mora’s motion to reopen on the grounds that the evidence she sought to present upon reopening could not have previously been discovered or presented to the IJ. Mora explicitly indicates that the stabbing incident occurred on January 31, 2003. She filed her asylum application in January 2004 and her removal hearing was held on May 3, 2005. As such, Mora had more than ample time to obtain the letters and doctors’ evaluations that she submitted with her motion to reopen. Accordingly, Mora failed to comply with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1)’s requirement that the “evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing . . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).