Opinion ID: 1043964
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Application of the Test for Relief

Text: Having determined that the same test for relief applies under Rule 54.02 and Rule 60.02, it follows that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard. See Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 39. We next determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by reaching an illogical conclusion, basing its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employing reasoning that caused an injustice to Discover. See Id. In making this determination, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, Henry, 104 S.W.3d at 479, and will uphold the trial court's ruling `so long as reasonable minds can disagree as to [the] propriety of the decision made.' Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d at 85 (quoting Scott, 33 S.W.3d at 752). We begin our analysis by considering the actions of Discover's attorney in this case. Discover contends that its original counsel acted negligently, not willfully, in failing to oppose default judgment. At the April 29, 2008 hearing, original counsel admitted that his office received proper service of the motion for default judgment, but that his staff had failed to forward it to him or calendar the hearing date. He also denied actual personal knowledge of the letter from Morgan's counsel, dated April 13, 2007, warning that Morgan would move for a default judgment unless Discover filed an answer within two weeks. This neglect, Discover argues, together with its original counsel's prompt motion to set aside the default judgment, warrants relief due to excusable neglect. [28] However, original counsel also admitted at the April 29, 2008 hearing that he had actual notice of the counter-complaint; indeed, he claimed to have discussed the matter with general counsel for Discover and sought a settlement with counsel for Morgan. Moreover, he requested, and received, a time extension in which to file an answer. The answer was not filed within the extension period and was more than a month overdue when Morgan moved for default judgment. Even then counsel failed to lodge a proposed answer with the Court. We are at a loss to understand how the alleged mishaps at original counsel's office, pertaining to the hearing on the motion for default judgment, can justify original counsel's failure to answer the counter-complaint until nine months after the entry of default judgment. At no time did original counsel explain why he waited so long to answer the countercomplaint not in his motion to set aside the default judgment, not in his amended motion to set aside the default judgment, and not even at the April 29, 2008 hearing. Except for vague references to the transcript of that hearing, Discover has still not explained why it took more than a year to answer the counter-complaint in an action it initiated. Finding no explanation in the record for this flagrant violation of procedural rules, we deem this conduct willful and therefore ineligible for relief on grounds of excusable neglect.