Opinion ID: 2418557
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admissibility of Appellant's Custodial Statements

Text: For her final point on appeal, appellant urges reversal based on the trial court's denial of her pretrial motion to suppress her custodial statements. Appellant here challenges (1) whether the statements were voluntarily made and (2) whether the statements were made after a knowing and intelligent waiver. After appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress her custodial statements, the trial court held a hearing on April 1, 1996, during which the court stated: the main thing we are doing is the motion to suppress ... [appellant's] statement. The principal issue that the parties debated at the hearing was whether appellant's counsel, Denese Fletcher, phoned the jail after she was retained and requested that appellant not be questioned anymore. At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties were to brief the issue and provide phone records to substantiate whether Fletcher had made the alleged contact. From the record, it is unclear how, or if, the court specifically ruled on this after the briefing. However, just prior to the beginning of the trial, the trial court summarily denied all of appellant's pending motions, including the motion to suppress. Appellant's pretrial motion to suppress was sufficient to raise the issue of the voluntariness of her custodial statement and to require the court to hear evidence out of the jury's presence. Moore v. State, 303 Ark. 1, 791 S.W.2d 698 (1990). The trial court met its obligation to have a hearing by holding the April 1, 1998 hearing. The State presented a witness, Detective Keith Connell, who testified regarding appellant's custodial statements. Also, appellant presented her counsel, Fletcher, as a witness, and she testified that at some time after appellant retained her, she had requested that appellant not be questioned. Appellant relies on our decision in Rankin v. State, 329 Ark. 379, 948 S.W.2d 397 (1997), where we remanded a case to the trial court to conduct a hearing on whether the appellant's custodial statements should be suppressed. This situation is different because the court did hold a hearing on the suppression issue and later denied appellant's motion. Beyond that, the burden was on the appellant to obtain a ruling. See Wright v. State, 327 Ark. 558, 940 S.W.2d 432 (1997). A statement made while the accused is in custody is presumptively involuntary, and the burden is on the State to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a custodial statement was given voluntarily and was knowingly and intelligently made. Humphrey v. State, 327 Ark. 753, 940 S.W.2d 860 (1997). We make an independent review of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession to determine whether appellant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his constitutional rights. Davis v. State, 330 Ark. 76, 953 S.W.2d 559 (1997). We reverse only if we determine that the trial court's finding was clearly erroneous, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Id. We have pointed out that there are two components in the inquiry into the validity of a defendant's waiver. Humphrey, 327 Ark. at 760, 940 S.W.2d at 863. First, we examine whether the statement was voluntary. Id. The voluntary statement argument addresses whether the statements were the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Id. (citing Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987) and Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986)). We look at the following factors to aid us in making our determination: age, education, and intelligence of the accused, lack of advice as to his constitutional rights, length of detention, repeated and prolonged nature of questioning, or the use of physical punishment. Id. at 760, 940 S.W.2d at 864. Second, we examine whether the waiver was knowingly and intelligently made. Id. The waiver of rights argument focuses upon whether the waiver was made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it, as well as whether the accused made the choice, uncoerced by police, to waive his rights. Id. Appellant, in a pretrial motion, moved to suppress all five custodial statements that were subsequently admitted at trial. We review these statements to determine whether the trial court's rulings were clearly erroneous.
Appellant made her first statement when the police picked her up for questioning in the early morning hours of January 27, 1996. The police informed appellant of her rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, and she indicated that she understood and signed her waiver-of-rights form. At this time, she stated, I didn't kill Burt McKinley. I asked Kenny for ten dollars, but I did not talk about killing Burt. Based on the factors which aid us on review, we conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting this statement because it was voluntary and was the product of a knowing and intelligent waiver. Appellant was forty-two at the time of these statements. She was advised of her constitutional rights, and signed a waiver form indicating that she understood them. She was picked up for questioning and promptly released after indicating that she had no knowledge of the incident. No evidence was presented that Detective Connell used any coercive tactics or threats to compel the statement, or that the form of the questioning was repeated or prolonged. Detective Connell had been informed that appellant had been smoking crack on the evening in question, and he testified that he observed no signs of intoxication and that appellant did not appear to be incapable of giving a statement due to the influence of drugs or alcohol. However, even if she had been intoxicated, that issue would be a question of fact regarding whether she lacked capacity to waive her rights intelligently, and would be a question for the trial court to resolve. Standridge v. State, 329 Ark. 473, 951 S.W.2d 299 (1997). Also, evidence of intoxication reflects on the credibility of the statement, not its admissibility. Id. Based on these facts, we conclude that this statement was the product of appellant's free and deliberate choice and that her waiver was made with a full awareness of her rights and a choice to waive those rights. Therefore, the trial court did not err in admitting this statement into evidence.
Appellant was released and subsequently picked up around 1:50 p.m. on the same day, after the police officers found additional evidence linking her to the crime. Again, the officers read appellant her rights, and she signed and initialed the waiver form, acknowledging that she understood her rights. This time, when the officer showed her the blue coveralls, she stated, That's my clothes. I want a lawyer. The officers testified that the questioning ceased at that point. Police officers may interrogate a suspect until she unequivocally invokes her right to counsel, at which time the interrogation must cease. Davis, 330 Ark. at 87 n. 2, 953 S.W.2d at 562 n. 2. Appellant's statement identifying her jump suit is admissible because it occurred after she signed her waiver form and before she invoked her right to counsel. We conclude that the trial court's admission of this statement was not clearly erroneous.
The third statement was taken on January 29, around 4:53 p.m., after appellant initiated contact with Detective Connell. Detective Connell again read appellant her rights, and she signed another waiver form. In her statement, appellant said that she had been with Pam Isbell and Greg Martin in her apartment at the time of McKinley's death. She also identified her jump suit and repeatedly asserted that she did not know anything about the incident. During custodial questioning, an individual may terminate all questions by indicating that she wishes to remain silent. Davis, 330 Ark. at 87, 953 S.W.2d at 562. However, if an accused, who had previously expressed a desire to deal with the police only through counsel, initiates further communication or conversation, she waives the previous invocation of the right to counsel. Stephens v. State, 328 Ark. 81, 941 S.W.2d 411 (1997) (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)). Under the circumstances before us, we cannot say that the trial court's decision to admit this statement was clearly erroneous because, although she had previously invoked her right to counsel, the evidence shows that appellant initiated this communication herself.
On February 1, 1996, appellant gave her fourth statement while being interviewed by Investigator C.A. Beall and Sergeant John Howell of the Arkansas State Police. Appellant gave two statements at this time. She was yet again informed of her rights and signed a waiver form. The first statement was taken at 1:58 p.m., and the second at 3:13 p.m. In the first statement, appellant acknowledged that the coveralls and knife that the police possessed were hers, and she stated that she did not remember a lot of things from the day of the slaying because she was under the influence of alcohol and crack cocaine. In the second statement, appellant related her version of the events on the night of McKinley's death. She recalled that she, Isbell, and Martin were drinking and smoking crack that afternoon when they hatched a plot to rob McKinley. Martin questioned her about McKinley and asked her if he could borrow a knife to scare McKinley. She said that Martin left and came back, telling appellant and Isbell to get a motel room. They then bought some more crack. She stated that Martin later told her that he had cut McKinley. At the April 1 hearing on the pretrial motions, appellant argued that she retained counsel around February 1, 1996. However, appellant never reinvoked her right to counsel after she initiated contact with Detective Connell either on January 29 or February 4. Although Denese Fletcher testified that she contacted the police station sometime after February 1, the approximate date that appellant retained her as counsel, and instructed them to refrain from questioning appellant further, we have no other evidence supporting that assertion or indicating that appellant had any knowledge of the call. In Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 422, 106 S.Ct. 1135, the Supreme Court concluded that an accused's knowledge, or lack of knowledge, of outside events is irrelevant to her capacity to understand and voluntarily relinquish a known right. Further, appellant again signed and initialed a form indicating that she understood her rights and waived them prior to the state police officer's questioning. No evidence of coercion or changed circumstances gives us reason to find that this statement was the product of anything other than appellant's free will. Again, we cannot say that the trial court's decision to admit this statement was clearly erroneous.
Appellant gave her fifth statement to Detective Connell on February 4, 1997, at 5:37 p.m. Appellant sent a message through a matron that she wanted to speak to him and give a statement. Detective Connell read appellant her rights, and she again signed and initialed a statement indicating that she understood them. This statement was more detailed in its account than the February 1 statement. Appellant here said that she and Isbell accompanied Martin to McKinley's house. She said that she pointed out the house to Martin, and that she and Isbell went ahead and waited for Martin on the street. The account is consistent otherwise, but with more details of the evening. Detective Connell read the statement into evidence. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting this statement because she had invoked her right to counsel. In arguing that this contact was impermissible, appellant overlooks the fact that she reinitiated contact with Detective Connell on February 4. By reinitiating contact with Detective Connell, appellant waived her prior invocation of her right to counsel. See Stephens, 328 Ark. at 88, 941 S.W.2d at 415 (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. at 484-84, 101 S.Ct. 1880). Because appellant reinitiated this contact with Detective Connell and signed another waiver-of-rights form, we cannot find clear error in the trial court's admission of her fifth statement under these circumstances. Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 4-3(h) Compliance: In accordance with Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 4-3(h), the record has been reviewed, and it has been determined that there were no reversible errors with respect to rulings on objections or motions prejudicial to appellant. Affirmed.