Opinion ID: 766158
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The RICO Charges

Text: 12 The defendants assert that the government failed to allege legally and prove factually a RICO enterprise and a RICO pattern of racketeering. First, they contend that the indictment fails to meet the statutory requirements because the government did not describe the structure of the organization, the manner in which it was formed, the duration of the enterprise, the hierarchy or organization of the enterprise, or the decision-making process within the organization. They also charge that the indictment fails to meet the statutory requirements, because the government did not state the duration of the activities sufficiently to establish a pattern of racketeering. Second, even if the indictment were sufficient, the defendants claim the government did not offer proof of the enterprise separate from the pattern of racketeering. They also contend that the activities occurred during a two-week period, which is not factually sufficient to establish a pattern of racketeering under RICO. We disagree and conclude that the indictment was sufficient to charge both a RICO enterprise and a pattern of racketeering and that the facts support finding that the defendants engaged in both.
13 We review contests to the sufficiency of an indictment de novo. See United States v. Agostino, 132 F.3d 1183, 1189 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1526 (1998). To be sufficient, an indictment must state the elements of the crime charged, inform the defendant of the nature of the charges to enable her to prepare a defense and allow the defendant to plead acquittal or conviction so as to bar the possibility of future prosecutions for the same offense. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1); Agostino, 132 F.3d at 1189. Generally, an indictment is sufficient when it sets forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as those words expressly set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished. United States v. Hinkle, 637 F.2d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir. 1981). We review indictments as a whole, rather than in a hypertechnical manner. United States v. McNeese, 901 F.2d 585, 602 (7th Cir. 1990). 14 The indictment of the defendants fulfills these requirements. The government charged the defendants under 18 U.S.C. sec. 1962, which states: 15 It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. 16 18 U.S.C. sec. 1962(c). Thus, the indictment must charge that the defendants engaged in (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern of racketeering activity. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985). 17 The defendants first contend that the government did not establish the existence of a RICO enterprise. The superseding indictment, however, clearly alleges the existence of an enterprise. In relevant part, it states: 18 [The defendants] were an enterprise as that term is defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 1961(4), namely a group of individuals who were associated in fact, which enterprise engaged in and the activities of which affected interstate and foreign commerce. . . . It was the purpose of the enterprise to obtain money and property, and to enforce the repayment of debts, through a course of kidnaping and intimidating individuals whom the defendants believed to owe, or whom they believed to be related to persons who owed, debts arising from the illegal trafficking of cocaine. 19 The statute defines enterprise as including any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity. 18 U.S.C. sec. 1961(4). It includes both legitimate and illegitimate, as well as formal and informal organizations. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981); Bachman v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 178 F.3d 930, 931 (7th Cir. 1999). It must be an organization with a structure and goals separate from the predicate acts themselves. United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1367 (7th Cir. 1991). A RICO enterprise is 'an ongoing 'structure' of persons associated through time, joined in purpose, and organized in a manner amenable to hierarchical or consensual decision-making.' Richmond v. Nationwide Cassel L.P., 52 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434, 1440 (7th Cir. 1990)). The continuity of an informal enterprise and the differentiation among roles can provide the requisite 'structure' to prove the elements of 'enterprise.' United States v. Rogers, 89 F.3d 1326, 1337 (7th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). 20 The enterprise alleged in the indictment is comprised of Varela, Torres, Ruiz, Sanchez, Carreno and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury. The enterprise existed as the enforcement arm of a cocaine trafficking operation. It sought to intimidate the debtors and their families by kidnapping. The indictment clearly spells out the means the defendants used to facilitate the enterprise, including the use of aliases and the possession of various items, such as firearms, ammunition, cell phones and pagers, to assist them in kidnapping and intimidating their victims. In addition, the indictment succinctly states the method employed by the defendants as part of the enterprise: 21 After identifying a target, the defendants abducted the targeted victim and transported the victim in the Chevrolet conversion van to a residence used by the defendants for their criminal activities. The victim was then restrained and held captive in the selected residence. Relatives of the victim were then contacted to demand ransom in exchange for the victim's release. 22 The indictment also details how the defendants' enterprise continued through the separate kidnapping of four individuals who owed or were the relative of another who owed drug debts. 23 Upon examination, we believe the indictment sufficiently alleges the existence of a RICO enterprise. It follows the words of the statute itself and alleges an enterprise made up of the defendants. It provides structure to the enterprise by explaining who participated in it, what they did and its purpose, means, and methods. It is clearly an association-in-fact, which is a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583. The defendants were associated to collect drug debts through a course of conduct including kidnapping, intimidation, and extortion. The allegations in the indictment go beyond simply a mere allegation of a group of people who get together to commit a pattern of racketeering. Therefore, the indictment sufficiently alleged a RICO enterprise. 24 The indictment also withstands scrutiny as to the pattern of racketeering element. The statute requires an allegation of at least two acts of racketeering activity within ten years. 18 U.S.C. sec. 1961(5). In addition, the indictment must allege that these predicate acts are related and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity. H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989). The indictment clearly alleges four predicate acts--the kidnapping of each victim, which occurred well within a ten year period. All four kidnappings happened during June 1996. 25 The defendants rest their challenge on a belief that the indictment does not sufficiently allege continuity. Specifically, the indictment, in relevant part, charges: 26 [The defendants] and other persons known and unknown to the Grand Jury, being persons employed by and associated with the enterprise, which enterprise engaged in, and the activities of which affected, interstate and foreign commerce, unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly combined, conspired, confederated, and agreed together and with each other to violate Title 18, United States Code, Section 1962(c), that is, to conduct and participate, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity . . . consisting of . . . multiple acts of kidnaping . . . multiple acts of extortion . . . an act of felony murder. . . . 27 Contrary to the defendants' assertions, an indictment does not have to allege continuity, which is not an element of the offense, with particularity. See United States v. Palumbo Bros., Inc., 145 F.3d 850, 877 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 375 (1998). 28 Even so, the facts substantiate the existence of continuity. As the Supreme Court noted, [C]riminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events. H.J., 492 U.S. at 240 (quoting 18 U.S.C. sec. 3575(e) and finding that Congress envisioned the same meaning with regard to its use of the term pattern in the RICO statute). In this case, the defendants in four separate instances engaged in similar conduct (kidnapping) for the same purpose (collecting drug debts) using the same methods. These acts were clearly not isolated events. They were part of a much larger plan that came to an end only upon the arrest of these participants. Thus, the indictment with regard to alleging a pattern of racketeering also withstands our review.
29 Coupled with the defendants' challenges to the sufficiency of the indictment are their claims that the government did not factually prove the elements of a RICO enterprise and a pattern of racketeering. We review these claims regarding the factual sufficiency of the evidence with regard to both establishing the existence of an enterprise and a pattern of racketeering asking whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Agostino, 132 F.3d at 1192 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). We will overturn a verdict only if the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 30 Sufficient evidence exists in the record to support the jury's finding of the existence of a RICO enterprise. To establish an enterprise, the government must show evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and . . . evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583. In this case, the government established that the defendants functioned as an informal organizational unit of a larger organization to enforce the collection of drug debts upon orders given to them by others in the organization in El Paso. Each surviving kidnap victim testified that the reason for his abduction was to obtain from the victim's family money to settle a drug debt he or one of his relatives owed. Sanchez testified that the defendants acted upon orders given by other associates in El Paso. The firearms, cell phones, pagers, ammunition, and other physical evidence located in the van and at the two hideouts support the allegations that the defendants were a well-equipped, sophisticated group engaged in criminal activities. This evidence clearly provides support for the jury's finding of the existence of an enterprise. 31 Sufficient evidence also supports a finding of a pattern of racketeering. The defendants' challenge focuses on the duration of the four predicate acts. They allege that the activities factually occurred during a two-week period of time, making it impossible to form a pattern. We disagree. 32 The government can show continuity by either referring to a closed period of repetitive conduct during a substantial period of time or to past conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition. H.J., 492 U.S. at 241-42. In this case, the government appears to be relying upon the open concept. While the government would have to show duration to allege a closed-ended continuity, the government to establish an open-ended continuity may satisfy the continuity prong of the pattern requirement regardless of its brevity. Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merchant Servs., Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 782 (7th Cir. 1994). One way to establish this prong is by showing the existence of a specific threat of repetition. H.J., 492 U.S. at 242. The government provided sufficient facts to meet this burden. 33 As other courts of appeals have noted, in cases where the acts of the defendant or the enterprise were inherently unlawful, such as murder or obstruction of Justice, and were in pursuit of inherently unlawful goals, such as narcotics trafficking or embezzlement, the courts generally have concluded that the requisite threat of continuity was adequately established by the nature of the activity, even though the period spanned by the racketeering activity was short. United States v. Aulicino, 44 F.3d 1102, 1111 (2d Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Busacca, 936 F.2d 232, 238 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding the government had established a pattern of racketeering from facts that demonstrated the defendant embezzled funds for only a two-and-one-half-month period because [t]he manner in which the embezzlements occurred was capable of repetition indefinitely into the future, so long as there were either legal fees or other expenses [the defendant] wanted paid.); United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1385 (2d Cir. 1989) (concluding that nearly simultaneous murders of three persons as part of the conduct of the affairs of an organized crime enterprise constituted a 'pattern of racketeering activity' within the meaning of [RICO]). We reached a similar Conclusion in United States v. O'Connor, 910 F.2d 1466, 1468 (7th Cir. 1990), holding that evidence of several acts of extortion during a two-month period that ended because of the defendant's arrest sufficiently formed a pattern of racketeering because the defendant had committed himself to an enduring series of criminal acts, sufficient to establish a 'pattern' . . . .  34 We believe the acts of the defendants are similar to those presented in these cases. The manner in which they engaged in the kidnappings was capable of indefinite repetition so long as the others in El Paso ordered them to enforce the collection of outstanding drug debts. The equipment, firearms and other evidence found at the apartment and house, as well as the manner in which they performed the acts of kidnapping demonstrate that the defendants had also committed themselves to a series of criminal activities. The only reason their scheme ended was because they were caught. We will not reward them by precluding the government from establishing a RICO pattern because of the quick success of law enforcement officials. Our review clearly shows that the government presented sufficient facts to support the jury's findings of the existence of a pattern of racketeering. 35 Therefore, the indictment was sufficient to sustain the conviction, and sufficient facts exist in the record to support the jury's ultimate conviction.