Opinion ID: 797987
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Harmless Error Review

Text: 30 A constitutional error is harmless and may be disregarded if it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. 7 Neder, 527 U.S. at 15, 119 S.Ct. 1827 (quotation omitted). An instructional error may be harmless where the element on which the jury was not properly instructed was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error. Id. at 17, 119 S.Ct. 1827. Because this court's harmless error review must focus exclusively on the erroneously instructed fear element, the error is harmless in this case only if it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found Holly placed the victims in fear of death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping, had it not been erroneously instructed that fear of some bodily harm was sufficient. 31 It is well-established that the burden of proving harmless error is on the government. United States v. Serawop, 410 F.3d 656, 669 (10th Cir.2005). In this case, however, the government has failed to raise harmless error as an alternative ground to affirm Holly's convictions. Nevertheless, where the government has failed to assert harmless error, this court may in its discretion initiate harmless error review in an appropriate case. United States v. Samaniego, 187 F.3d 1222, 1224 (10th Cir.1999) (quotation omitted). In deciding whether to exercise its discretion to address harmlessness, this court considers (1) the length and complexity of the record; (2) whether the harmlessness of the errors is certain or debatable; and (3) whether a reversal would result in protracted, costly, and futile proceedings in the district court. 8 Id. at 1225. 32 The record in this case consists primarily of the 700-page trial transcript of a five-day jury trial involving thirty-two witnesses. Each of the fifteen counts involved conduct occurring on separate occasions and each required separate proof. See id. at 1225 (declining to sua sponte raise harmless error where each conviction involved discrete and specific transactions and each required separate proof). Although not all fifteen counts are at issue in this appeal, the absence of argument by the parties, caused by the government's failure to argue harmless error, leaves this court with the difficult task of determining which portions of the transcript may be relevant to the five counts in question. This court should therefore be hesitant to engage in an unsolicited, unassisted, and undirected harmless error review to determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Further, it should be with a great deal of trepidation that an appellate court undertake a full, independent harmless error review of a lengthy record when the convicted defendant has been deprived of the adversary process on the issue of harmlessness. 9 33 Despite this court's general reluctance to sua sponte apply harmless error review, it may be appropriate to do so where the certainty of the harmlessness is readily apparent. Evaluation of the certainty of the harmlessness necessarily requires this court to review the record to some extent, though not to the same degree as would be required pursuant to a full harmless error review. As noted above, such review must be constrained to the fear element and must not extend to evidence of the force element for which the instruction was proper. 34 Even a preliminary review of the trial transcript leads this court to conclude that the harmlessness of the instructional error is certain as to Count V, for the reasons more fully discussed below. Thus, this court concludes it is appropriate to sua sponte engage in a full-scale harmless error review as to this count. 10 It would not generally be appropriate to engage in a full-scale harmless error review as to Counts II, IV, VI, and VII because the harmlessness of the instructional error is far from certain as to those counts. This is a unique case, however, in that the harmlessness of one of the five counts is both certain and readily apparent. Because this court must conduct a thorough examination of the entire record in conducting harmless error review as to Count V, it therefore will fully consider the evidence and the issue of harmlessness as to the other counts as well. Based on this independent review of the trial transcript, this court concludes the instructional error is harmless as to Count V. As to Counts II, IV, VI, and VII, however, the error is not harmless. 35
36 This court's review of Helmert's testimony at trial renders it certain that the requisite element of fear of death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error. Neder, 527 U.S. at 17, 119 S.Ct. 1827. A thorough examination of the entire trial transcript further confirms this conclusion. At trial, Helmert testified as follows: 37 Q. [Prosecutor] What happened at that point? 38 A. [Helmert] At that point, I go—my back is towards the door and I go—and he grabs me and he said—and I said, Get away from me. 39 And he says that if he can't get to me, he'll get to my family, and my little sister is cute too. He goes, Your little sister is awfully cute too. And my little sister is nine years old. 40 Q. Did that upset you? 41 A. Yes, very much. 42 And I go to turn around and he's looking at—his gun is sitting on the table and he's looking at his gun the whole time, you know, or he would look down at it. And he pushed me up beside the door and pushed me down on the ground and he had his hand over my mouth and he's kissing my neck and he starts to kiss my neck and I keep on moving it and I'm trying to push him off and he puts his hands—his hand down there and touched me, and then I started kicking. I got off and he said, Get up, he said, You are too loud, and then he said a cuss word and he said, You are too loud, get out of my office. 43 This testimony provides overwhelming evidence that Holly placed Helmert in fear that either she or her nine-year-old sister would be subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping. See 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a)(2) (stating aggravated sexual abuse is committed where the victim is threatened or placed in fear that any person will be subjected to death, serious bodily injury or kidnapping (emphasis added)). In addition to the explicit threat to Helmert's sister, the testimony that Holly repeatedly looked at the gun prior to engaging in the sexual assaults constitutes direct and specific testimony of an implicit threat of death or serious bodily injury. Given this express testimony on the requisite degree of fear, there is no way a rational jury could have concluded Helmert was placed in fear of some bodily harm, as this jury necessarily did, without also concluding she was placed in fear of death or serious bodily injury. 44 Further, Helmert's testimony regarding both the explicit and implicit threat was entirely uncontested by Holly. On cross-examination of Helmert, Holly did not challenge whether these threats were actually made and did not inquire into the degree of fear Helmert felt at the time the sexual abuse occurred. In contrast to the cross-examination of other victims, Holly failed to question Helmert as to whether he made threats to kill or seriously injure her if she did not submit to his advances. Rather, the only cross-examination of Helmert regarding the incident was brief and focused exclusively on whether anyone else was present and could have heard her screams. Even if the jury convicted Holly on the basis of the legally erroneous fear instruction, it clearly rejected Holly's defense, implied in the cross-examination of Helmert and established clearly by his own testimony, that the incident did not occur. Thus, Holly's conviction on Count V is like the defendant's conviction in Neder where the element that was not properly submitted to the jury was supported by overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence. Neder, 527 U.S. at 17, 119 S.Ct. 1827. In such a situation, the error could not have contributed to the verdict obtained and the error is harmless. 45
46 The evidence that Holly placed Partain, Hyslop, and Foreman in fear of death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping at the time the sexual abuse occurred is neither uncontested nor overwhelming. A review of the trial transcript reveals some evidence that could support a finding of the requisite degree of fear as to these counts. All three victims testified that they were scared and that Holly's gun was present and within reach at the time the sexual abuse occurred. Hyslop further elaborated that she was scared [Holly] would shoot her because he told her he killed a lot of people in his time and he has a reputation for killing people in Wilburton. While such testimony may provide evidence of the requisite degree of fear, however, it does not stand alone. 47 Unlike the testimony of Helmert, the testimony of these three witnesses also contained significant admissions that would tend to undermine a finding of the requisite fear element. Partain and Foreman each testified they were motivated in part by a desire to obtain privileges from Holly. Likewise, Hyslop admitted she previously told an FBI agent she had sex with Holly in exchange for favors and special treatment. On cross-examination, each of these three victims testified that Holly made no threats to kill them or seriously injure them if they refused to have sex with him. Thus, unlike the omitted element in Neder, the requisite fear element as to these three victims was specifically contested by defense counsel at trial. Although there was evidence Partain, Hyslop, and Foreman were placed in significant fear, the existence of evidence suggesting they were motivated by something other than fear renders it far from clear what the jury would have found if it had been properly instructed on the requisite degree of fear. Given all of this evidence, this court cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the instructional error was harmless as to Counts II, VI, and VII. 48
49 The testimony of Fowler also does not constitute such overwhelming evidence of fear of death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping as to render the erroneous jury instruction harmless. In response to an open-ended question asking Fowler to describe the sexual abuse, she did not initially mention that a gun was present. It was only after the prosecutor suggested the significance of the gun, several questions later and following an intervening change in subject, that Fowler testified Holly's gun was within his reach during the sexual abuse and that this made her [v]ery uncomfortable, scared. This isolated and general statement regarding fear, however, does not alone establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found Fowler was in fear of death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping. Significantly, Fowler's response was not further developed by questions qualitatively probing the degree of fear she felt. While Fowler's testimony certainly provides evidence from which the jury could have inferred the requisite degree of fear, it does not so overwhelmingly support the fear element as to make the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to Count V.