Opinion ID: 771970
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Limited Inferences Possible From Evidentiary Presumptions

Text: 31 Having failed to provide sufficient proof of Elaiho's specific knowledge and intent regarding the crimes charged through circumstantial evidence, the government seeks to rely on evidentiary presumptions to supply what is lacking. The government argues that either Elaiho's constructive possession of recently stolen goods or his conscious avoidance of the fact that the goods were stolen provides an inference that Elaiho knew that the contents of the boxes were indeed stolen. We reject the argument that Elaiho was in constructive possession of the boxes and find that although conscious avoidance may be a substitute for knowledge, it cannot substitute for the intent necessary to prove the crimes charged. 32
33 The unexplained possession of recently stolen property may permit an inference that the possessor knew that the property was stolen. See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 845-46 (1973). Such possession may be either actual or constructive. Constructive possession exists when a person has the power and intention to exercise dominion and control over an object. United States v. Payton, 159 F.3d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1998). However, mere presence at the location of contraband does not establish possession. United States v. Rios, 856 F.2d 493, 496 (2d Cir.1988). 34 In this case, Elaiho never exercised the dominion and control necessary to find that he was in constructive possession of the goods. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, showed that during the November 13, 1998 pickup, Samaria placed a box in Elaiho's car, following which Elaiho rode in the same car as a passenger. 7 During the November 18, 1998 pickup, the boxes were not placed in Elaiho's car at all, but rather in the yellow cab in which Samaria rode. Elaiho stayed in his car while Samaria removed the boxes from the yellow cab and set them down on the curb for Glover to stand near. There is no evidence that Elaiho handled any of the boxes or directed where they were to be taken or what was to be done with them. At all times, Elaiho appeared to follow the directions of Samaria and Glover. Elaiho did not, therefore, exhibit the dominion and control over the boxes necessary to find that he constructively possessed them. See United States v. Infanti, 474 F.2d 522, 526 (2d Cir. 1973) (finding no constructive possession of stolen stock certificates when [t]here was no evidence that [the defendant] could set the price for the securities, that he had the final say as to their means of transfer or that he was able to assure their delivery.); see also United States v. Ramirez, 176 F.3d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that a passenger's mere knowledge of the presence of contraband, without evidence suggesting a passenger's dominion or control of the contraband, is insufficient to prove possession); United States v. Windom, 19 F.3d 1190, 1200 (7th Cir. 1994) (concluding that mere proximity, mere presence, or mere association is insufficient to support a finding of possession). 8
35 The conscious avoidance doctrine provides that a defendant's knowledge of a fact required to prove the defendant's guilt may be found when the jury is persuaded that the defendant consciously avoided learning that fact while aware of a high probability of its existence. United States v. Finkelstein, 229 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2000). In such circumstances, a conscious avoidance instruction to the jury permits a finding of knowledge even where there is no evidence that the defendant possessed actual knowledge. United States v. Ferrarini, 219 F.3d 145, 154 (2d Cir. 2000). 36 Even assuming that the conscious avoidance instruction given to the jury in this case was proper, any such inference could do no more than establish Elaiho's knowledge of the criminal endeavor, not his specific intent to participate in the crimes charged. As this Court has explained: 37 [A]pplication of the conscious avoidance theory is appropriate where the essential mental element of the crime is guilty knowledge. It is equally clear that the requisite mental state for conspiracy is intent, not mere knowledge. Thus, the error in the government's logic becomes obvious. If someone can consciously avoid learning of the activities and objects of a conspiracy, how can that person ever intend those events to take place? 38 United States v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538, 547 n.1 (2d Cir. 1984) (internal citations omitted); see also United States v. Ferrarini, 219 F.3d 145, 156 (2d Cir. 2000) ([E]ven if the instructions could be construed to permit the jury to find knowing participation in the conspiracy based on conscious avoidance . . . the instructions still do not permit the jury to find intent to participate in the conspiracy based on conscious avoidance.). Because the substantive offenses underlying the conspiracy charges require the specific intent to receive or possess stolen goods or commit credit card fraud, and not simply knowledge that these crimes were afoot, conscious avoidance would not provide the requisite proof needed for conviction. For the same reason, a finding of conscious avoidance will not satisfy the intent requirement for the other counts charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2 (aiding or abetting) or 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2) (credit card fraud). Because we find that the government has not presented evidence sufficient to prove the requisite specific intent, we need not reach the further issue of whether conscious avoidance could have been inferred from this evidence, and, if so, whether the jury was properly instructed.