Opinion ID: 2585254
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Vulnerable victim

Text: Next, the respondent argues that the panel incorrectly found Katha Helms, as the victim of a serious personal injury, was obviously incapable of handling restitution and compensation on her own behalf and was therefore vulnerable. The ABA Standards permit consideration of the vulnerability of [the] victim as an aggravating factor: Aggravation 9.21 Definition. Aggravation or aggravating circumstances are any considerations, or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. 9.22 Factors which may be considered in aggravation. Aggravating factors include: (h) vulnerability of victim .... The respondent argues that Helms was not permanently mentally or physically incapacitated by her injuries. However, he notes that she had a metal jaw, a ruined right hip, and ... will have trouble having children. The respondent does not question that Helms was seriously and permanently injured in her accident, but he contends that her injuries were not the type that would make her especially vulnerable to the misconduct of a lawyer. The Disciplinary Administrator acknowledges that ABA Standard § 9.22(h) does not define the word vulnerability. He argues that the application of the term is to be determined by the specific facts of a case. At the hearing, the Disciplinary Administrator argued that Helms was a vulnerable person: Vulnerability of the victim, I think that applies only to Katha Hebb/Helms. She was vulnerable. She clearly ... did not know the statute of limitations had been missed until June 19th of 1999 when she had the conversation with attorney Greg Lower and then she telephoned the respondent. But up until that time, she was trusting her attorney that her attorney was going to represent her and she was injured. In addition, the Disciplinary Administrator argued that he did not think Helms was very worldly and that, although he was unsure of her education level, he did not think she was well-educated. The respondent argued that vulnerability means an uneducated person, somebody who has a mental or emotional problem, someone who is very old, [or] someone who is very young. He observes that the Commentary to ABA Standard § 9.22, p. 49, cites People v. Lanza, 200 Colo. 241, 613 P.2d 337 (1980), as an example of vulnerability of victim. Although the term vulnerable was not used in the opinion, the Lanza court observed that one of the victims was a widow in her early seventies, who was indigent, somewhat feeble, and had a poor grasp of the English language. 200 Colo. at 242. The respondent also cites cases from other jurisdictions. See People v. Grist, 948 P.2d 1020, 1020-21 (Colo. 1997) (lawyer abandoned clients in criminal, juvenile, and civil cases, and some of those clients were vulnerable); In re Basile, 714 So.2d 687, 688 (La. 1998) (victim of lawyer's misconduct included lawyer's own father); Matter of Discipline of Tanner, 960 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 1998) (client was vulnerable due to his adversarial relationship with police, which may have led lawyer to believe client would avoid reporting lawyer's misconduct). The Disciplinary Administrator references our disciplinary opinions in which the panel has found clients to be vulnerable. See In re Coggs, 270 Kan. 381, 401, 14 P.3d 1123 (2000) (client was 90 years old and placed her trust in attorney who prepared her will and trust); In re Trickey, 268 Kan. 835, 838, 999 P.2d 964 (2000) (all bankruptcy clients are financially vulnerable); In re Cole, 268 Kan. 171, 175, 991 P.2d 422 (1999) (client did not have experience in the administration of a decedent's estate matters and relied completely on the advice and judgment of the attorney); In re Christians, 267 Kan. 240, 243, 978 P.2d 910 (1999) (client unsophisticated in bankruptcy matters and trusted attorney's professional expertise); In re Scimeca, 265 Kan. 742, 747, 962 P.2d 1080 (1998) (unsophisticated consumers of limited means); In re Anderson, 264 Kan. 758, 760, 956 P.2d 1330 (1998) (indigent clients); In re Berg, 264 Kan. 254, 278, 955 P.2d 1240 (1998) (emotionally distraught clients); In re Seck, 258 Kan. 530, 533, 905 P.2d 122 (1995) (client sustained permanent injuries and was not skilled or experienced in business matters or in handling litigation). However, none of the cited cases either involved a statute of limitations bar or an objection to the vulnerability finding. Helms relied upon her attorney, but was not informed that her claim was barred until months after the statute of limitations had run. The problem, as we see it, with applying vulnerability as an aggravating factor here is twofold. First, every personal injury plaintiff relies on counsel to protect his or her claim from being barred by the statute of limitations. Second, Helms did not appear before the panel. Thus, a traditional element of factfinding, listening, and observing as the witness testifies, is missing here. Helms' complaint was submitted by stipulation and agreement. We do not believe vulnerability is an appropriate aggravating factor here. Our conclusion is limited to the facts of this case. Our holding on vulnerability, however, does not affect our endorsement of the panel's recommendation on discipline.