Opinion ID: 2087693
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Single Act of Medical Negligence

Text: The first time this Court examined the new medical malpractice statute of limitations was in the context of a claim for a single act of medical negligence. In Dunn v. St. Francis Hospital, [15] this Court held that there is no doubt that the phrase `injury occurred' refers to the date when the wrongful act or omission occurred. [16] In Dunn, this Court discussed the plaintiff's attempt to avoid the clear thrust of the statute by skillful resort to the general theory of a negligence action in relation to the statutory phrase `date upon which such injury occurred.' [17] In Dunn, the plaintiff argued that to establish a cause of action for negligence three elements must be shown: negligence, proximate cause, and damage. [18] The plaintiff in Dunn relied upon Prosser's Law of Torts for the proposition that the statute of limitation does not run in a negligence action until some damage has occurred. [19] The plaintiff then argued there was no damage until pain was experienced and therefore that was the date injury occurred. [20] In Dunn, this Court rejected the plaintiff's reliance upon the elements needed to proceed under a general theory of negligence in a Delaware action for single act of medical negligence. In doing so, we stated: [t]he answer, however, must be that the [Delaware Medical Malpractice] statute was a response to a particular issue in a particular context [medical negligence] and that to construe it broadly without bounds, as plaintiff desires, would emasculate its very purpose. [21] This Court then examined and rejected the plaintiffs argument that 18 Del.C. § 6856 is unconstitutional if the phrase injury occurred refers to the date on which the wrongful act or omission occurred. In this case, Meekins' argument is similar to the plaintiff's argument in Dunn. Paragraph 46 of the amended complaint alleges that in December 1994, the radiologists were medically negligent by failing to diagnose Meekins' cancer. Meekins' argues that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until she was damaged or injured when the radiologists failed to call her back for another mammogram six months later in June of 1995. Meekins had a cause of action for medical negligence, however, as early as December 21 or December 22, 1994. That is when Dr. Barnes examined the mammogram and reported to Dr. Dworkin, allegedly negligently and inaccurately, that there were no signs of cancer, no change from prior mammograms and recommended continued annual examination. In theory, Meekins could have brought an action at that time had Meekins known of the allegedly negligent diagnosis, although her damages would be difficult to quantify. The fact that Meekins did not know of the potential claim for misdiagnosis until her next annual examination in December, 1995 did not toll the beginning of the two-year statute of limitations. Lack of knowledge under the applicable statute extends the period to three years solely if that lack of knowledge extended for the entire two year period ( i.e., until December 21, 1996). The language of 18 Del.C. § 6856 is clear  No action ... against a health care provider ... arising out of malpractice shall be brought after the expiration of two years from the date [of injury] ... provided, however, that: (1) Solely in the event [the] ... injury ... during such period of 2 years was unknown ... such action may be brought ... [within] 3 years from the date [of] injury. (emphasis added). In Dunn, this Court held that the phrase injury occurred in the Delaware Medical Malpractice statute refers to the date of the medically negligent act. [22] An act of omission can be a valid basis for a plaintiff's medical malpractice claim, if that act of omission occurs within the context of an affirmative happening or event. [23] The only affirmative happening or event of the radiologists occurred at the time of the misdiagnosis in December 1994. It is artificial to predicate the commencement of the statute of limitations period, as Meekins' argues, on the theoretical six-month period ( i.e., June 1995) from the December 1994. Meekins selected that date on the basis of an affidavit by another physician that in December 1994, Dr. Barnes should have ordered another examination in six months. There was no cause of action that actually arose in June 1995 because no affirmative happening or event of medical negligence occurred at that time. It may seem harsh that a statute of limitations begins to run on a misdiagnosis from the date of that misdiagnosis when the patient is unaware of the allegedly negligent error causing the injury. But by providing for an additional year to bring suit, the General Assembly designed the Delaware Medical Malpractice statute to ameliorate that harshness, if the patient did not have knowledge of the claim until after the expiration of the two-year period. That is not this case. Both sides to this controversy agree that the two-year statute of limitations is applicable. Meekins still had one full year to bring suit for a single act of medical negligence against the radiologists, after learning of her injury in December of 1995. Unfortunately, she failed to do so.