Opinion ID: 1119842
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Internal Investigation

Text: The conduct of Donald Phillips, a forensic scientist who had been employed as a supervisor of criminalistics at the crime lab during and after the murder investigation, is the subject of several errors alleged by Lord. The trial court ruled on a number of motions related to Phillips' testimony. We begin with a summary of these motions and the related facts. Prior to trial, Lord moved to exclude any testimony by Phillips because he had not yet received a report from Phillips related to the investigation of the crime scene or been able to arrange an interview with Phillips. In response to Lord's motion, the court ordered that Phillips be deposed with both parties present. During the deposition, Lord learned that Phillips had used leuco-malachite green to test for the presence of blood at Kirk Lord's workshop. On some items, he used a 2-step process where a colorless dye is applied, and then an oxidizing agent is applied in a separate step. On other items, Phillips used a 1-step method, where the dye and oxidizing agent are premixed and then applied by spraying the item being tested. The hammer, which the State submitted was the murder weapon, was tested using the latter method. Defense again moved to exclude Phillips' testimony contending that the 1-step method used by Phillips was not generally accepted within the scientific community. As a result of Phillips' deposition, Lord became aware of an internal investigation by the crime lab of Phillips' conduct in connection with the murder investigation. Lord made an oral motion for production of the records related to the investigation, which the trial court granted. Upon receipt of a summary of the investigation materials, Lord moved for dismissal, a mistrial, or an order excluding the testimony of Phillips and detectives Hudson and Wright in connection with testing for blood at the workshop. Lord also requested an evidentiary hearing. The court released notes and tapes of the interviews with crime lab personnel in connection with the internal investigation to both counsel and conducted an extensive evidentiary hearing regarding Phillips' activities and the internal investigation. The court then ordered the crime lab to provide both counsel copies of all the records and summaries of statements given concerning the investigation of Phillips, the notes of Brown and Sweeney, and the official written report, attached diagram, and notes submitted by Phillips. The records released by the crime lab indicated that a complaint regarding Phillips' conduct during the homicide investigation was received on November 26, 1986. The complaint alleged that Phillips had used the 1-step method to test for blood at the workshop after Sweeney had instructed him to use a 2-step or drop method. The complaint further alleged that Phillips had lied by telling Sweeney he had used the drop method and had falsified his report to say that he had swabbed the hammer. The complaint went on to state that Phillips had asked detectives Wright and Hudson to indicate in their report that they  not Phillips  had found the hammer at the workshop. Finally, the complaint noted an odd occurrence where Phillips told a fellow employee that a vision or dream had revealed that the hammer was the murder weapon. When Phillips learned he was being investigated, he went on 30-day sick leave and began taking medication, including antidepressants. Phillips resigned from the lab on December 26, 1986, before the investigation was completed. The court denied Lord's motions, after specifically finding that there had been no misconduct on the part of either the prosecutor or the sheriff's office. The court went on to say that if any misconduct had occurred, it was within the lab and, thus, went only to credibility. In denying the motion, the court noted that defense counsel had never been misled by the false report because counsel knew from both the interviews with detectives Hudson and Wright, and from Phillips' deposition, that Phillips had used the 1-step method to test for blood at the workshop. Furthermore, Lord acquired abundant impeachment evidence through the hearing and crime lab investigation documents. The court concluded that there was insufficient prejudice to grant a mistrial or dismissal, or to suppress evidence; any prejudice had been cured by the discovery. Turning to Lord's allegations, he first argues that the trial court erred in allowing Phillips to testify regarding the use of leuco-malachite green as a presumptive test for blood. [8] He argues that Phillips' testimony regarding the testing at the workshop should have been excluded because the 1-step spray method Phillips used does not comport with the generally accepted standard in the scientific community. Before ruling on the admissibility of testimony on leuco-malachite green, the trial court heard testimony from John Thornton, Ph.D. Thornton, Lord's own expert witness, testified that leuco-malachite green is a generally accepted presumptive test for blood and testified that both methods are used. He testified that while the 2-step method gives slightly more specificity than the 1-step method (because some false positives can be ruled out), both tests are presumptive, not conclusive, for the presence of blood. Thornton had reservations about the spraying method, which he believed was an improvident method of proceeding. However, he testified that the 1-step spray method is used when searching for blood where the area has been cleaned and there is no blood visible to the naked eye. Spraying is also appropriate when searching for a pattern of blood. He noted that the decision on how to proceed is a judgment call to be made by the investigator. The jury heard considerable testimony on this subject from both Phillips and Thornton. The defense had adequate opportunity to cross-examine Phillips regarding his actions at the workshop. Thornton's rebuttal testimony spanned 32 pages. The trial court correctly concluded that Lord's argument went to the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence. Lord next argues that his due process right to a fundamentally fair trial was violated by the admission of the hammer because Phillips sprayed it with leuco-malachite green, thereby precluding more specific testing. In effect, he claims that the State intentionally destroyed exculpatory evidence. [14] Under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, [9] it must be demonstrated that the State's prosecution of Lord comported with prevailing notions of fundamental fairness such that Lord was afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. To ensure that Lord was given this opportunity, the prosecutor had a constitutional duty to give Lord any exculpatory evidence that would raise a reasonable doubt about his guilt. California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 81 L.Ed.2d 413, 104 S.Ct. 2528 (1984). Specifically, Lord contends that, had Phillips used the 2-step swab method to test the hammer, additional tests could have been done to determine conclusively if there was blood on the hammer and, if so, whether it was Tracy's. If such tests had shown that the blood was not Tracy's, he further argues, a conviction would then have been highly unlikely. Because the opportunity to perform specific tests on the hammer was lost once it had been sprayed, Lord claims that Phillips' actions are tantamount to a failure by the State to preserve material exculpatory evidence. He concludes that he was thus denied a fair trial. The argument Lord makes was rejected in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57-58, 102 L.Ed.2d 281, 109 S.Ct. 333 (1988). In Youngblood, the defendant was convicted of child molestation and sexual assault. A sample collected from the victim was used to show that a sexual attack had occurred. Police procedure did not routinely require tests for blood grouping and none were performed. When the sample was again tested at a later date, the test failed to detect any blood group substances. The victim's clothes were also tested for semen more than 2 months after the attack. The clothes had not been refrigerated in the interim. They tested positive for semen, but testing for blood group typing was unsuccessful. The defendant claimed that his due process rights had been violated because, had the samples been tested shortly after they were gathered, or the clothes properly refrigerated, there might have been evidence eliminating him as the assailant. Youngblood, at 52-54. [15] In Youngblood, the Court found that no due process violation had occurred. The Court noted that if a due process claim is based on the State's failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence, good or bad faith on the part of the State is irrelevant. Youngblood, at 57 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963)). However, the Court distinguished cases where the State fails to preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant. Youngblood, at 57. Youngblood held that, absent bad faith, failure to preserve merely potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law. Youngblood, at 57-58. Lord's contention should be analyzed using the rule set forth in Youngblood. Lord's claim that the hammer could have yielded more information is no different from the claim in Youngblood. The State failed to preserve potentially useful evidence that could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated him. Youngblood, at 57. Thus, absent bad faith on the part of Phillips, there is no due process violation. Although Lord characterizes the spraying of the hammer by Phillips as the destruction of evidence, there is no evidence that Phillips acted intentionally. The hammer was lying underneath the coiled extension cords and was sprayed inadvertently. Phillips did not see the hammer until after he sprayed the cords. When he realized what he had done, Phillips unsuccessfully tried to save a sample for further testing by using a swab to take material from the claw of the hammer. Phillips' actions did not constitute bad faith. [10] Additionally, as in Youngblood, nothing about the State's handling of the hammer was concealed at trial, and the defense had access to the hammer for testing. Youngblood, at 58. In addition, there was independent testimony connecting the hammer to the crime. Two detectives and Phillips all testified to seeing a positive reaction consistent with blood on the hammer. The medical examiner testified that Tracy's wounds could have been inflicted by a hammer. Lord was a carpenter who used tools at his brother's workshop. The hammer was properly admitted and no due process violation occurred. Lord next claims that his due process right to a fair trial was violated when Phillips falsified the report he submitted to his supervisors. We disagree. As the trial court noted, Lord never relied on the false information in the report. He was aware from interviews with the detectives that the hammer had been sprayed. When he was deposed, Phillips truthfully stated that he had sprayed the hammer. Thus, the defense was not deliberately misled. Rather, Phillips' actions implicate his credibility as a witness. Because the evidentiary hearing provided Lord with a wealth of impeachment evidence against Phillips, in a sense, rather than denying Lord a fair trial, the false report actually assisted defense counsel's attempts to impeach his testimony. Finally, Lord contends that the trial court improperly limited the scope of his cross examination of Phillips regarding any possible mental defects Phillips may have had and the statements Phillips made about a vision that the hammer was the murder weapon. [16, 17] Generally, cross examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. However, the court may permit inquiry into additional matters. ER 611(b). The scope of cross examination lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. ER 611(b); State v. Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d 51, 96, 804 P.2d 577 (1991). The trial court's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless no reasonable person would take the position adopted by the trial court. State v. Rice, 110 Wn.2d 577, 600, 757 P.2d 889 (1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910 (1989). In denying Lord's motion in limine, the trial court ruled that Lord could not inquire if Phillips was under psychiatric care at the time of the homicide investigation. However, Lord could ask if Phillips was on medication during the relevant time. Lord agreed that inquiry was only relevant in relation to the use of medications. The court's ruling was correct. The trial court also ruled that Lord could not inquire about the reference to a vision about the hammer. The court ruled that this statement was more unfairly prejudicial than probative given that Phillips had already admitted his mistake and falsification, and that Nolan had testified about the repeated testings at Phillips' request. We agree. In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of cross examination of Phillips.