Opinion ID: 2363278
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Per Diem Argument

Text: The first issue which we must resolve is the validity of the plaintiff's arguments concerning per diem. One of the most difficult decisions facing the jury in a personal injury action is to decide the amount of monetary award, if any, that the plaintiff is entitled to be awarded as compensation for past, present and future pain and suffering. The measure of damages for pain and suffering in this state is and has been what is fair and reasonable. The jury is so instructed by MAI. There is no fixed measure, table or standard which the jury can use as an accurate index to establish an award of damages. No method is available to the jury by which it can objectively evaluate such damages, and no witness may express his subjective opinion concerning the matter. From time immemorial, the judicial measure of damages for pain and suffering has been fair and reasonable compensation . . . because there is and can be no established standard, fixed basis, or mathematical rule by which such damages may be calculated. Faught v. Washam, 329 S.W.2d 588, 602 (Mo.1959). In a very real sense, the jury is required to evaluate in terms of monetary compensation the injuries and pain and suffering sustained. In guiding the jury in this difficult task, the courts, including those in this state, permit counsel to suggest a lump sum, and the mere argumentative suggestion of a lump sum is not error. It is proper to inform the jury of the total amount of damages sought and this technique does not seem to be questioned. Faught, 329 S.W.2d at 602 and cases cited therein; annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 541, 541 (1967). The controversy which has raged over the past several decades has been the propriety of the so-called per diem argument made by plaintiff's counsel to the jury. The pure per diem argument discussed in the numerous judicial decisions reduces the physical and mental suffering down into units of years, days, hours or minutes, and then sets a value on each such unit. Each unit is multiplied by the total number of such units which gives a total value of compensation. There are, however, other aspects of such arguments on pain and suffering which are strictly not pure per diem computations. They range from the lump sum approach to a job offer. See e. g., Ricketts v. Kansas City Stock Yards of Maine, supra ; McCormick v. Smith, 459 S.W.2d 272, 278 (Mo.1970); Kometani v. Heath, 50 Hawaii 89, 431 P.2d 931, 938 (1967)lump sums for various injuries; Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal.2d 166, 53 Cal.Rptr. 129, 139, 417 P.2d 673, 683 (1966) (Traynor, C. J., concurring and dissenting) and Faught, supra. The pure per diem argumentwhether an attorney may argue to the jury that his client's damages for pain and suffering may be measured in terms of dollars for a specific unit of time has been debated and discussed for years. Few issues have evoked more controversy. There is no unanimity among the states. [15] Of the 36 states which have passed upon the issue, 25 allow the per diem argument and 11 have ruled that it may not be used. The weight of authority favors the use of such an argument. Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713, 60 A.L.R.2d 1331 (1958) is the leading decision prohibiting such an argument. In Botta , the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld the trial court's refusal to allow plaintiff's attorney to suggest that the client's damages for pain and suffering be measured by units. Such statements are not evidence and such statements substitute unproven, speculative and fanciful standards of evaluation for evidence. Such argument instills in the minds of the jurors impressions, figures and amounts not in evidence. Such valuations have no foundation in the evidence. In the final analysis,. . . [such] suggestions . . . constitute an unwarranted intrusion into the domain of the jury. . . . `Jurors know the nature of the pain, embarrassment and inconvenience, and they also know the nature of money. . . . ' Botta, 138 A.2d at 725, 60 A.L.R.2d at 1345-1346. The reasons for the principle prohibiting the use of such an argument have been summarized in Ratner v. Arrington, supra, 111 So.2d at 88: (1) there is no evidentiary basis for converting pain and suffering into monetary terms, (2) suggesting a formula amounts to the attorney giving testimony, (3) juries are misled into making excessive awards, (4) following such argument the defendant is placed in a difficult position. Authorities favoring the use of such arguments also give numerous reasons: (1) it is necessary that the jury be guided by some practical considerations, (2) the jury should not be required to make a blind guess as to damages, (3) the argument that the evidence fails to provide a foundation for per diem suggestion is unconvincing, because the jury must, by that or some other reasoning process, estimate an amount tailored to the evidence, (4) the claimed danger of such a suggestion is an exaggeration and such danger may be dispelled by the court's instructions. The leading case in Missouri is Faught v. Washam, supra . There a division of this court in a wide ranging opinion held that a job offer [16] per diem argument was improper. Recognizing a sharp cleavage among the decisions, it was held that the considerations advanced by the authorities disapproving the mathematical formula argument are more persuasive. Whatever may be the cold logic or academic theory of the matter, the ungilded reality is that such argument is calculated and designed to implant in the juror's minds definite figures and amounts not theretofore in the record. . . and to influence the jurors to adopt those figures and amounts in evaluating pain and suffering and in admeasuring damages therefor. Faught, 329 S.W.2d at 603. The court agreed with Botta . While much emotional reasoning can be advanced for the thesis proposed in behalf of injured plaintiffs. . . ., equal opportunity in the trial of cases for the contending parties to offer their proof and submit their arguments . . .. cannot justify a mathematical formula agreement. Through the years Faught has been followed in Missouri although our research discloses that no case has been reversed because of such an argument. [17] In Ricketts , plaintiff's counsel made an argument similar to the one at barsuggesting a certain amount for days of hospitalization, a certain amount for pain and suffering following hospitalization and a certain amount for future pain. The Kansas City District, in effect, held that such argument did not come within the proscription of Faught because (1) the plaintiff did not refer to any per day or per hour amount but simply suggested a lump sum for the specific periods, and (2) the argument did not affect the size of the verdict nor cause it to be excessive because the amount requested was not accepted by the jury. Plaintiff-Graeff places great reliance on Ricketts . We agree with Ricketts . The argument here is similar to Ricketts and McCormick which we approve. The posture in which the plaintiff's counsel in this case offered the figures is such that he did not refer to any per day or per hour amount but merely suggested a lump sum for the specific periods of hospitalization, the time in the cast, the pain and suffering for the period from injury to trial, and for future life expectancy. The argument was not broken down into minutes, hours or days. There was no job offer argument as in Faught . Furthermore, there is a specific finding by the trial court that the verdict was not excessive. Chambers, supra . We therefore conclude on this point that the argument of counsel for plaintiff was not within the limitations and objections of Faught . We are not persuaded that because the jury reached a verdict identical to the maximum amount suggested by plaintiff's counsel, that such an argument is to be condemned. Faught stated the proof of the pudding is in the eating, by referring to Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 80 So.2d 662 (Fla.1955), aff'd. 96 So.2d 127 (Fla. banc 1957) when the jury returned a verdict in the exact amount requested. But despite such isolated instances there can be little doubt that in the vast majority of cases the jury does not follow counsel's suggestions. Cf. Beagle, 53 Cal.2d at 136, 417 P.2d at 680. Such an argument places little faith in the jury. The jury is still bound by the court's instructions and is presumed to do its duty and award damages that are just and reasonable. We therefore rule this point against respondent Temple and conclude that the trial court erred in finding the argument of plaintiff's counsel prejudicial.