Opinion ID: 2234605
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Grant of New Trial

Text: Our limited remand asked the district court to rule on the pending Rule 179(b) motion. Rule 179(b) provides that a judge's findings may be enlarged or amended by making such a motion. The rule states: On motion joined with or filed within the time allowed for a motion for new trial, the findings and conclusions may be enlarged or amended and the judgment or decree modified accordingly or a different judgment or decree substituted. But a party, on appeal, may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain any finding without having objected to it by such motion or otherwise. Resistances to such motions and replies may be filed and supporting briefs may be served as provided in R.C.P. 100(d) and (e). Iowa R. Civ. P. 179(b). Nowhere does it state that only the judge who made the ruling can amend or enlarge the findings. As such, recusal of the presiding judge should not automatically lead to a new trial. In fact, another rule lends assistance here: In the event of the death or disability of a judge in the course of a proceeding at which the judge is presiding, or while a motion for new trial or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or for other relief, is pending, any other judge of the district may hear or act upon the same, and, if in the judge's opinion the judge can proceed with the matter or determine the motion the judge shall do so; otherwise, the judge may order a continuance, declare a mistrial, order a new trial of all or any of the issues, or make such disposition of that matter as the situation warrants. Iowa R. Civ. P. 367(a) (emphasis added). Although this rule allows a new trial to be granted where a new judge must hear the case, Rule 367(a) requires the new judge to make this decision after he has first determined he cannot proceed. The district court erred by making this determination upon its recusal. The above conclusion assumes that disability can embrace a situation where a judge recuses himself. Disability is defined as: The inability to perform some function. Black's Law Dictionary 474 (7th ed.1999). Disable further means: To legally disqualify (someone). Id. (emphasis added). When a judge recuses himself, he no longer has the ability to perform and, thus, is disqualified. Disability then can encompass a recusal. In fact, the synonym of recusal in Black's Law Dictionary is disqualification. Id. at 1281. Moreover, Iowa Code section 602.1606, which deals with the issue of recusal, refers to recusal as disqualification. Iowa Code § 602.1606 (1999). Further, the recusal section 602.1606 lists Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 367 regarding disability as a cross-reference. Therefore, we can easily equate disability with recusal under Rule 367. See In re Marriage of Seyler, 559 N.W.2d 7, 11 n. 4 (Iowa 1997) (recognizing that disability likely means legal disability rather than physical disability). As such, it was error for the recusing judge to grant the motion for new trial, rather than leaving that decision to the new judge under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 367(a). As a matter of public policy, we note that we would not be well served if defendants could make accusations of impropriety, which when accepted, would result in an automatic new trial. In future cases, when a Rule 179(b) motion is pending, but the presiding judge sees fit to recuse himself, it is the new judge who has the authority to decide if a new trial is required. Otherwise, this new judge should rule on the pending motion. Nothing in Rule 179 requires a different result. Therefore, we affirm the court's decision to recuse itself but reverse the grant of a new postconviction hearing. We reinstate the limited remand and return this case to the status it held at the time of our first remand, albeit before a different judge. As such, we will proceed as though Taylor's appeal is still pending before our court and retain jurisdiction. We recognize this is a unique disposition, but determine that our appellate authority justifies such an action. On limited remand, the district court is instructed to rule on the question posed by the original Rule 179(b) motion as directed and restricted by our initial order for limited remand. The district court, other than in regard to collateral issues, has no authority to review questions outside those that existed at the time of the limited remand. In re Marriage of Davis, 608 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Iowa 2000) (When . . . an appellate court remands for a special purpose, the district court upon such remand is limited to do the special thing authorized by the appellate court ... and nothing else.). AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS. All justices concur except STREIT, J., who takes no part.