Opinion ID: 750078
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Arbitrability of ADA Claims

Text: 33 That the Bercovitches' claims are based on a civil rights statute does not take them outside the reach of the FAA. That was made clear by the Supreme Court case of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991), which rejected arguments, based on earlier cases, to that effect. 34 In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974), the Court held that an employee was not precluded from bringing his Title VII claim in federal court, despite the existence of an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement, and the employee's prior submission of his claim to arbitration. In subsequent cases, the Court held a variety of non-civil rights statutory claims subject to mandatory arbitration. See, e.g., Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987) (holding enforceable an arbitration agreement for claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act); Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. 614, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (holding enforceable an arbitration agreement for claims arising under federal antitrust laws); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 94 S.Ct. 2449, 41 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974) (holding enforceable an arbitration agreement for claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act). 35 In Mitsubishi, the Court stated that once it was clear that the parties' agreement to arbitrate reached the statutory issues, a court must then consider whether legal constraints external to the parties' agreement foreclosed the arbitration of those claims. 473 U.S. at 628, 105 S.Ct. at 3355. The Court decided that nothing in the text, history, or policy of the antitrust laws precluded a waiver of a judicial forum, and that despite the complexity of issues an arbitral forum was adequate to address antitrust claims. See id. at 633-34, 105 S.Ct. at 3357-58. Until Gilmer, however, it was unclear whether the Court's analysis of the arbitrability of non-civil rights statutes, outside the context of a collective bargaining agreement, would apply equally to civil rights claims. Gilmer answered this question in the affirmative. 36 In Gilmer, the Court reiterated the  'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,'  500 U.S. at 25, 111 S.Ct. at 1651 (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24, 103 S.Ct. at 941), and rejected Gardner-Denver 's position that the arbitral forum, as a general matter, was not adequate to address the policies and intricacies of civil rights statutes--specifically the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. The petitioner in Gilmer had, as a term of his employment as a financial services manager, registered as a securities representative with the New York Stock Exchange under an agreement requiring arbitration of disputes. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23, 111 S.Ct. at 1650-51. The Court found that this agreement--strikingly similar to the agreement here--covered Gilmer's ADEA claim and was enforceable. See id. at 26-27, 111 S.Ct. at 1652-53. 37 The Court did indicate that there might be some cases in which the arbitral setting is an inappropriate forum for the resolution of statutory claims, but placed the burden squarely on the plaintiff to prove that this is so. See id. at 26, 111 S.Ct. at 1652 (stating that a party should be held to its own bargain to arbitrate unless it can show Congress intended to preclude a waiver of a judicial forum for the statutory claims at issue). If Congress intended to preclude a waiver, that intention would be discoverable in the text or legislative history of the statute, or in an inherent conflict between arbitration and the underlying goals of the statute. See id. 9 38 Gilmer controls this case. The burden is on plaintiffs to prove that Congress, in enacting the ADA, intended to preclude a prospective waiver of a judicial forum for ADA claims. In order to carry this burden, plaintiffs must point to something in the text or legislative history of the ADA that precludes enforcement of arbitration agreements as to ADA claims, or show an inherent conflict between the policies and purposes of the ADA and mandatory arbitration. 39 Gilmer does not appear to have changed the traditional rule that courts look first to the text of a statute, and then to the legislative history if the meaning of the text is ambiguous. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 194, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917); United States v. Bohai Trading Co., 45 F.3d 577, 581 (1st Cir.1995). The plain language of the text of the ADA contemplates arbitration, there is no inherent conflict, and while the legislative history evidences a concern that agreements to arbitrate should be voluntary, the Bercovitches do not claim the agreement was not voluntary. 40 Unlike the ADEA, the ADA expressly encourages arbitration of disputes. Section 12212 of the ADA states that, 41 [w]here appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including ... arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under this chapter. 42 42 U.S.C. § 12212. The meaning of this language, far from evidencing an intention to preclude arbitration, can only be interpreted as favoring it. 10 If this language were not interpreted to permit prospective waiver of a judicial forum, it would be superfluous. Litigants are always permitted to resolve their disputes extrajudicially, with or without statutory language authorizing such action. This language adds nothing if it does not mean that litigants can anticipatorily waive a judicial forum for ADA claims. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. 687, 698, 115 S.Ct. 2407, 2413, 132 L.Ed.2d 597 (1995) (statutory language is not to be treated as surplusage). 43 Despite this clear language, plaintiffs assert that certain sections of the legislative history of the ADA, although not the text, prove that Congress intended to preclude mandatory arbitration of ADA claims. The House Judiciary Committee Report, incorporated by reference into the House Conference Report, discusses the ADA alternative dispute resolution section as follows: 44 This section encourages the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law. These methods include ... arbitration. 45 ... The Committee wishes to emphasize, however, that the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is intended to supplement, not supplant, the remedies provided by this Act. Thus, for example, the Committee believes that any agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitration, whether in the context of a collective bargaining agreement or in an employment contract, does not preclude the affected person from seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of this Act. This view is consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, whose remedial provisions are incorporated by reference in title I. The Committee believes that the approach articulated by the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. applies equally to the ADA and does not intend that the inclusion of Section 513 [the ADA arbitration section] be used to preclude rights and remedies that would otherwise be available to persons with disabilities. 46 H.R.Rep. No. 101-485(III) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 499 (footnote omitted). See also H.R.Rep. No. 101-596 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 598. 47 In light of the language in the ADA text itself, this legislative history is not sufficient to rebut the presumption in favor of arbitration. This language, which was drafted prior to the Gilmer decision, appears simply to endorse and track Supreme Court precedent on the question of the arbitrability of civil rights claims. The committees appear to have been concerned with the issues dealt with in Gardner-Denver: the unfairness of enforcing arbitration agreements in collective bargaining agreements or employment contracts that the individual plaintiff may have had no knowledge of or influence over. It expresses a concern for involuntary agreements to arbitrate. We reiterate that the Bercovitches have made no claim that their agreement to arbitrate was somehow involuntary, nor is there any evidence of such unfairness. 48 Finally, we do not find any inherent conflict between mandatory arbitration of ADA claims and the policies behind the ADA. The ADA condemns discrimination based on disability, just as the ADEA condemns discrimination based on age. Gilmer found that arbitrators are competent to interpret age discrimination statutes and the policies behind them, as well as to award all the relief authorized by the statutes. There is no reason to think that the ADA presents a stronger policy case against arbitration than ADEA, and many reasons to think it does not. 49 If anything, the ADEA evinces a stronger policy against a prospective waiver of a judicial forum than does the ADA. In contrast to the ADA, the plain language of the ADEA, as amended by the Older Workers Benefits Protection Act in 1990 (before Gilmer was argued or decided), expressly requires that any waiver of rights under the ADEA be knowing and voluntary. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (1994). It also specifically defines the conditions under which a waiver may be knowing and voluntary. The ADA does not have any express protections against waiver of rights under the ADA. 50 In the end, this case is not distinct enough from Gilmer to persuade us that the ADA precludes a waiver of a judicial forum through a voluntary prospective agreement to arbitrate. Although the issue of arbitrability of an ADA claim is one of first impression in this circuit, at least one of our sister circuits agrees with us. See Miller v. Public Storage Management, Inc., 121 F.3d 215, 218 (5th Cir.1997) (holding ADA claim subject to arbitration and stating that the explicit language of the ADA persuasively demonstrates Congress did not intend to exclude the ADA from the scope of the FAA). Plaintiffs have waived a judicial forum, by their own bargain, and must now submit their ADA and Rehabilitation Act 11 claims to arbitration.