Opinion ID: 2402160
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Petition for Open Adoption

Text: With respect to the hearing justice's denial of the petition for adoption, respondents contend that Dawn and Irving retained the right to consent to Kayla's adoption prior to a final termination of their parental rights and that, by going forward with DCYF's petition for termination, the Family Court short-circuited their fundamental right to consent to the adoption. In addition, they contend that the Family Court should have deferred to their preference as to who would be a suitable adoptive parent for Kayla and that the denial of the adoption petition was contrary to Kayla's best interests. Finally, respondents contend that Sandra is a fit and proper relative to adopt Kayla and that the amount of time that Kayla has spent with her foster family should not control the outcome of this case. Contrary to respondents' contentions on appeal, it is our view that the hearing justice properly rejected the joint petition for an open adoption in the instant case. Open adoptions are creatures of statute, and the relevant statute, § 15-7-14.1(b)(4), expressly requires that, before the Family Court may in its discretion approve a proposed open adoption, DCYF or another licensed child placement agency and the child's guardian ad litem or court-appointed special advocate must first recommend to the court that the open adoption agreement be approved. [11] In the instant case, it is clear that DCYF did not recommend that the Family Court approve the petition for adoption and the accompanying decree of open adoption filed by Sandra and consented to by Dawn and Irving. Absent such a recommendation by DCYF, the Family Court was statutorily barred from considering the petition for open adoption. This would have been true even if the Family Court had not already terminated Dawn and Irving's parental rights prior to making its determination on the adoption petition. [12] Moreover, the hearing justice determined that it would not be in Kayla's best interests to have her move from the home of her foster parents, where she has lived for her entire life with her half-sister, to the home of her aunt, Sandra. He found that Kayla and her half-sister are closely bonded and that to move her would rupture the close relations between the two. In concluding that the open adoption was not in Kayla's best interests, the hearing justice also noted that Kayla had bonded closely with her foster parents. Section 15-7-14.1(b)(1) requires a court to first determine that the best interests of the child would be served before it may grant post-adoption privileges. In the instant case, the hearing justice found the converse to be true  i.e., that Kayla's best interests would best be served by her remaining with the foster parents. We cannot say that he clearly erred in so finding. Consequently, we affirm the hearing justice's denial of the adoption petition.