Opinion ID: 2361414
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: hearsay: witness interview summaries.

Text: Between June 13 and June 21, 1994, Bizer's attorney interviewed nine employees of Bizer's Preston Highway store with respect to the incidents leading up to Berrier's termination. He made handwritten notes during the interviews and reduced the notes to separate typewritten witness interview summaries. He then furnished each witness with a copy of her witness interview summary for suggestions or corrections. Most of the summaries were returned with handwritten notes or corrections added. Prior to the November 1997 trial, each witness was again given a copy of her witness interview summary to refresh her recollection. So far, so good. However, at the conclusion of the direct examination of each witness at trial, Bizer's attorney produced that witness's witness interview summary, had the witness authenticate it, and, over the continuing objection of Berrier's attorneys, introduced it into evidence as a marked exhibit. The jury was permitted to take these exhibits to the jury room for consideration during deliberations. We will not burden this opinion with the content of each witness interview summary or the manner in which it was authenticated and introduced into evidence. Typical, however, was the summary of the interview of Michele Logsdon, which provided as follows: I met this date (June 13, 1994) with Ms. Michele Logsdon. Ms. Logsdon is employed at the Preston Highway street location of Dr. Bizer's Vision. She has worked for the Company for approximately five years; two and half years at Preston, one and a half years at Clarksville, and one and a half years at the Dixie Highway location. Wakefield [now Berrier] was at the Preston Highway location nearly the entire time that Ms. Logsdon was employed at that store. Ms. Logsdon recalls that Wakefield was a trouble maker in her dealings around the store. She often made comments to co-workers about Barry Gallas. She didn't seem to like changes in procedures that Gallas had instituted. She advised her co-workers that they would be wasting their time to go to Barry Gallas to discuss business-related problems. In general, Wakefield was a drag on the morale of her co-workers. Ms. Logsdon was not present during the blow up which occurred approximately two weeks prior to Wakefield's termination. However, she heard about the blow up from another frame stylist, Ms. Karchner. The blow up was a common topic of discussion among co-workers of Wakefield. The most common observation was the question of how Wakefield could get away with such behavior. Concerning the wage and hour investigation, Ms. Logsdon recalled that it occurred at some point during the Fall. It seemed to be common knowledge on the part of everyone around the store that Wakefield had called the Wage and Hour Board. In fact, Ms. Logsdon overheard a comment Wakefield made to Ms. Connie Bruner wherein Wakefield asked if Bruner was going to burn Barry's a. Ms. Logsdon recalled that generally very few people liked Wakefield. It was Ms. Logsdon's opinion that she should have been fired long ago and that she got away with too much insubordinate or other improper activity. For example, the blow up occurred in front of both co-workers and patients. For some reason, Ms. Logsdon observed that Barry Gallas seemed to bend over backwards to accommodate Sheri. Even though Wakefield had animosity for Gallas, no personal animosity to Wakefield was shown by Gallas. In particular, Ms. Logsdon did not notice any change of attitude by Barry Gallas or anyone else with respect to Wakefield after it was learned that she was pregnant. Ms. Logsdon recalled that Wakefield was granted lots of flexibility regarding prenatal needs. The Company also attempted to accommodate Wakefield's doctor's appointments. Wakefield's patient care was the subject of occasional patient complaints. One in particular was documented by Ms. Logsdon. In essence, it appeared to Ms. Logsdon that Wakefield used her pregnancy to avoid the responsibilities of her job at the store. At one point, Wakefield went so far as to say that after she was pregnant she would likely go on AFDC and not return to work. There are multiple reasons why the admission of this statement and its treatment as a trial exhibit requires reversal for a new trial. First, the statement contains numerous prejudicial assertions and opinions that were not repeated in Logsdon's sworn testimony at trial. Specifically, Logsdon did not testify that Berrier was a trouble maker, or a drag on the morale of her co-workers, or that Berrier should have been fired long ago and that she got away with too much insubordinate or other improper activity. Nor did she testify that Berrier told her that after she was pregnant she would likely go on AFDC and not return to work. Those statements were not the testimony of the witness, but statements attributed to the witness by Bizer's attorney. Logsdon was not asked if the contents of the summary were accurate, but only if she wished to change anything in the summary. The proscription in KRE 611(c) against asking leading questions on direct examination would have precluded Bizer's attorney from specifically asking Logsdon if Berrier was a trouble maker, a drag on morale, or insubordinate, or otherwise putting words in her mouth. By introducing the witness interview summary, he accomplished much more. Not only was he able to introduce Logsdon's derogatory opinions of Berrier's workplace conduct without eliciting them directly from the witness, he was able to frame the evidence in his own words, not the witness's. Even if the witness interview summary had been prepared by Logsdon, herself, it would have been hearsay, since it was an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. KRE 801(c); Fields v. Commonwealth, Ky., 12 S.W.3d 275, 279 (2000). A hearsay statement of a non-party witness is admissible only if the statement is: (1) Inconsistent with the declarant's testimony; (2) Consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive; or (3) One of identification of a person made after perceiving the person. KRE 801A(a). Logsdon did not testify inconsistently with the contents of the witness interview summary and her testimony did not pertain to identification. Nor was there any express or implied charge that her trial testimony was recently fabricated or the product of improper influence or motive. In fact, the summary was introduced during the direct examination of Logsdon, not in rebuttal. Bizer claims the summary was a recorded recollection, KRE 803(5), offered to refresh Logsdon's memory. KRE 612. This argument confuses the concepts of past recollection recorded and present memory refreshed. KRE 612 applies to the latter and permits the writing to be introduced only by the adverse party. A writing used to refresh memory does not, through that process, acquire any status as evidence. It may not be introduced as such by the party using it to refresh memory and, as stated in one opinion, it cannot be read under the pretext of refreshing the recollection of the witness. R. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 3.20, at 162 (3d ed. Michie 1993) (quoting Payne v. Zapp, Ky., 431 S.W.2d 890, 892 (1968)). The resulting evidence is the product of the refreshed memory, not the writing used to refresh it; thus, the writing is not introduced into evidence and there is no involvement of the hearsay rule. Lawson, supra, § 8.85, at 500. KRE 803(5) applies when the witness is unable to testify from present memory even after being exposed to the recorded recollection. In that instance, the recorded recollection is admissible, but only after verification of its accuracy. Lawson, supra, § 8.85, at 500. Even if admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party. KRE 803(5). Regardless, all of the witnesses testified from present memory, thus, there was no need for the admission of any recorded recollections. The error in this case was compounded when the jury was permitted to take the witness interview summaries to the jury room for consideration during deliberations. Generally, a jury is not permitted to take even a witness's sworn deposition to the jury room. Young v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Ky., 975 S.W.2d 98, 99 (1998); Louisville, H. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 110 Ky. 740, 62 S.W. 736, 737 (1901); Thompson v. Walker, Ky.App., 565 S.W.2d 172, 174 (1978). The primary reason for the rule is that jurors may give undue weight to testimony contained in such a deposition and not accord adequate consideration to controverting testimony received from live witnesses. 75B Am.Jur.2d, Trial § 1671, at 454 (1992). [B]ecause jurors may give undue weight to the testimony contained within a deposition which they take with them and may not accord adequate consideration to controverting testimony received from live witnesses, it is the universal rule that depositions may not be reviewed by a jury on an unsupervised basis. People v. Montoya, 773 P.2d 623, 625 (Colo.Ct.App.1989); see also Young v. State, 645 So.2d 965, 966-67 (Fla.1994); cf. Tibbs v. Tibbs, 257 Ga. 370, 359 S.E.2d 674, 675 (1987). It is even worse to permit the jury to take with them to the jury room an unsworn statement of a witness, e.g., State v. Poe, 119 N.C.App. 266, 458 S.E.2d 242, 248 (1995), much less a summary of such prepared by the adverse party's attorney, that not only bolsters the witness's trial testimony but also contains facts and opinions to which the witness did not testify. For a similar case involving audiotapes of witness interviews, see Mills v. Commonwealth, Ky., 44 S.W.3d 366, 371-72 (2001). Bizer's claim of harmless error is belied by the prejudicial content of Logsdon's witness interview summary and the fact that similar summaries were introduced during Bizer's direct examinations of eight other witnesses.