Opinion ID: 198980
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Subject Matter Jurisdiction over the ICCTA Claim

Text: 26 Grimmel argues that nothing in the ICCTA abrogates federal district court jurisdiction over ICCTA claims, and so jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) and 1337(a) (jurisdiction over civil actions arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce). As a preliminary matter, Grimmel claims that once federal subject matter jurisdiction has been established under §§ 1331 and 1337, Congress can limit or remove it only by expressly stating its intention to create exclusive jurisdiction in another court or agency, citing Avery v. Secretary of HHS, 762 F.2d 158, 163 (1st Cir. 1985) ([A]bsent a clear statement to the contrary, legislation should not ordinarily be interpreted to oust a federal court's equitable power, or its jurisdiction over a pending case.). 27 Guilford replies that Grimmel bears the burden of demonstrating subject matter jurisdiction, and cannot use a presumption against the removal of such jurisdiction to avoid its burden. Guilford claims that Avery is inapplicable here because it involved a legislative attempt to intervene in a group of specific, pending actions. Guilford is correct that Avery is distinguishable. The ICCTA is in no sense an attempt to oust a federal court's... jurisdiction over a pending case. Id. Grimmel cannot rely on any presumption of federal court jurisdiction; it must carry its burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction exists. See Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 189 F.3d at 7.
28 Section § 10501(b), which describes the STB's general jurisdiction, states without qualification that the STB's jurisdiction over, inter alia, transportation by rail carriers and the operation, abandonment, or discontinuance of spur... tracks is exclusive. 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b). In interpreting this provision, however, we will not look merely to a particular clause in which general words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute... and the objects and policy of the law. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 189 F.3d at 9 (quoting Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 535 (1980)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the district court correctly noted, later sections of the ICCTA strongly suggest that certain actions may be filed in federal district court -- and that in some areas the STB's jurisdiction is concurrent, not exclusive. See Pejepscot, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 113 (citing §§ 11705(a), (b), and 11706(d)). The question, therefore, is whether § 11704(c)(1) grants the district court concurrent jurisdiction over Grimmel's ICCTA claim.
29 Pointing to § 11704(c)(1), Grimmel argues that the ICCTA on its face contemplates enforcement through civil actions in federal district court. Subsection (c)(1) states: 30 A person may file a complaint with the Board under section 11701(b) of this title or bring a civil action under subsection (b) of this section to enforce liability against a rail carrier providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the Board under this part. 31 49 U.S.C. § 11704(c)(1) (Grimmel's emphasis). 4 Grimmel claims that this subsection demonstrates Congress's intent to authorize concurrent STB and federal district court jurisdiction over ICCTA claims. 32 In response, Guilford argues that the district court properly viewed § 11704(c)(1) as only permitting a party to bring a civil action to enforce [a] liability that has been previously determined by the STB. Grimmel's proposed construction, says Guilford, is inconsistent both with the role Congress has assigned the STB and with the structure of the ICCTA. To buttress its position, Guilford cites the argument from the district court opinion in DeBruce Grain: if anyone seeking damages from a rail carrier can proceed in district court, there will be nothing left of the Board's exclusive jurisdiction. DeBruce Grain, 983 F.Supp. at 1283. Guilford argues that while § 11704 provides remedies for violations of the ICCTA, providing a remedy is not the same as granting subject matter jurisdiction to the federal district courts. In Guilford's view, § 10501(b) requires that the remedies provided by § 11704 be pursued in the first instance before the STB. 33 Reading § 11704(c)(1) as Guilford urges -- as merely permitting a party to bring a civil action to enforce a liability previously determined by the STB -- presents a number of problems. First, there is the plain language itself: [t]he words of the statute are the first guide to any interpretation of the meaning of the statute. Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 192 (1st Cir. 1999). Subsection (c)(1) states that [a] person may file a complaint with the Board... or bring a civil action under subsection (b) of this section to enforce liability against a rail carrier. 49 U.S.C. § 11704(c)(1). The most natural reading of this language is that it authorizes a person who has suffered damages as a result of a rail carrier's violation of the ICCTA either to file a complaint with the STB or to bring a civil action. See Pejepscot, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 113. Guilford's suggestion that to enforce liability should be understood as to enforce [a] liability [previously determined by an STB order] requires a significant leap from the subsection as written. 34 Furthermore, as Grimmel argues, this interpretation of subsection (c)(1) would render § 11704(c)(2) superfluous. Subsection (c)(2) authorizes a party who has obtained an award of damages from the STB to bring a civil action to enforce that [award]... if the rail carrier does not pay the amount awarded. 49 U.S.C. § 11704(c)(2). If (c)(1) is interpreted only to permit a party to bring a civil action to enforce [a] liability previously determined by the STB, then (c)(2) is surplusage. A reading that renders a statutory provision surplusage is disfavored. See Massachusetts Ass'n of Health Maintenance Orgs. v. Ruthardt, 194 F.3d 176, 181 (1st Cir. 1999) ([A]ll words and provisions of statutes are intended to have meaning and are to be given effect, and no construction should be adopted which would render statutory words or phrases meaningless, redundant or superfluous.) (quoting United States v. Ven-Fuel, 758 F.2d 741, 751-52 (1st Cir. 1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 35 Although the language of § 11704(c)(1) reads as though it is intended to establish concurrent jurisdiction, this seems to create a conflict with § 10501(b), which describes the jurisdiction of the STB as exclusive. 36 Grimmel contends that the thrust of § 10501(b) is to preempt state law, and that there is no conflict between the exclusive language of § 10501(b) and the concurrent jurisdiction language of § 11704(c)(1). The district court found this interpretation of § 10501(b) unconvincing. See Pejepscot, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 112-13. The last sentence of § 10501(b) plainly preempts state law. See 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)(2) (Except as otherwise provided in this part, the remedies provided under this part with respect to the regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and preempt the remedies provided under Federal or State law.); see also, e.g., Burlington N. Santa Fe Corp. v. Anderson, 959 F. Supp. 1288, 1293 (D. Mont. 1997) (holding that § 10501(b)(2) expressly preempts state economic regulation of railroad operations). But the first sentence of § 10501(b) is far less susceptible to this interpretation; indeed, it makes no mention of state law. 5 While it would be an unusual construction, exclusive could be understood to mean excluding state law. Words can be ambiguous, often materially so. Massachusetts v. Blackstone Valley Elec. Co., 67 F.3d 981, 986 (1st Cir. 1995). 37 Left with some doubt about the plain meaning of the language, we must reach beyond the language of §§ 10501(b) and 11704(c)(1) and examine their history. If the meaning is not plain from the words of the statute, then resort to legislative history is required. Greebel, 194 F.3d at 192.
38 The legislative history, in our view, resolves this matter in favor of jurisdiction in the district court. This strikes us as the most logical resolution of the quandary Congress created by using inconsistent language in §§ 10501(b) and 11704(c)(1). 39
40 Grimmel argues that the legislative history of the ICCTA demonstrates that Congress intended no change to the scheme of jurisdiction that existed under the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA). Under the ICA, Grimmel says, courts allowed parties to bring civil actions in federal court, and we must presume that Congress was aware of that practice. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-98 (1979) (stating that it is appropriate to assume that the drafters of Title IX were aware of the courts' prior interpretations of Title VI). 41 In the section-by-section analysis of the Act in the Conference Report on the ICCTA, § 11704 is described as follows: Section [11704] reenacts the applicable rail portions of former section 11705. These include authority for injured persons to seek judicial enforcement of agency orders and to seek damages for a violation of the statute. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-422, at 195 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 850, 880 (emphasis added). As might be expected given Congress's intent to re-enact the old ICA provision, the language of current § 11704(c)(1) closely mirrors that of former § 11705. Under the ICA, § 11705 provided: A person may file a complaint with the [ICC] under section 11701(b) of this title or bring a civil action under subsection (b)(1) or (2) of this section to enforce liability against a common carrier providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the [ICC].... 49 U.S.C. § 11705(c)(1) (1994). 6 Grimmel also notes that the ICC's jurisdiction was described as exclusive in the section of the ICA to which § 10501(b) of the ICCTA corresponds. See 49 U.S.C. § 10501(d) (1994). Grimmel claims that, despite the exclusive language, no court construed § 10501(d) of the ICA to bar federal district court jurisdiction over civil actions under the ICA. 42 Grimmel contends that such civil actions against rail carriers under the ICA were routinely brought in federal district court. Grimmel offers as an example Overbrook Farmers Union Cooperative Ass'n v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 21 F.3d 360 (10th Cir. 1994). In Overbrook, a shipper sought damages in federal district court from a carrier for refusal to provide rail service on reasonable request in violation of 49 U.S.C. § 11101(a), the same provision underlying Grimmel's Count III. See id. at 362. The district court referred the question of the reasonableness of the rail carrier's refusal to provide service to the ICC, which determined that the refusal was unreasonable and left the issue of damages to the district court. Id. 43 Guilford denies that a system of concurrent jurisdiction existed under the ICA. Guilford claims the decision most nearly on point under the ICA is Kraus v. Santa Fe Southern Pacific Corp., 878 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1989), in which the Ninth Circuit held that the ICC's exclusive jurisdiction to assess mergers prevents a private suit in federal court under the Interstate Commerce Act for damages caused by the merger. See id. at 1197-98. As Grimmel points out, Kraus is easily distinguishable. The specific Interstate Commerce Act provision at issue in Kraus required prior express approval of the ICC for all railroad mergers and did not provide for a private civil remedy. See id. at 1198; see also 49 U.S.C. § 11341(a) (1994) (The authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission under this subchapter [i.e., the ICA subchapter governing mergers] is exclusive.). 44 The legislative history of § 11704 of the ICCTA indicates that Congress intended to maintain the status quo that had existed under the ICA. Overbrook demonstrates that under the ICA, a district court could exercise jurisdiction over a refusal of service claim; Kraus is not to the contrary. See also Aluminum Ass'n, Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 746 F. Supp. 207, 210 (D.D.C. 1990) (stating that the ICA specifically empowers both the ICC and District Courts to entertain complaints for reparations or damages as a result of illegal acts or omissions of a carrier's actions pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 11705(b)(2)). 45
46 The legislative history of § 10501 of the ICCTA also offers support for Grimmel's argument that in establishing the STB's jurisdiction under the ICCTA, Congress intended only to preempt state law and remedies, not to give the STB exclusive jurisdiction over ICCTA claims. 47 First, under the heading Remedies are exclusive, the section-by-section analysis found in the House Report on the ICCTA states: The bill is intended to standardize all economic regulation (and deregulation) of rail transportation under Federal law, without the [previous regime of] optional delegation of administrative authority to State agencies to enforce Federal standards.... H.R. Rep. No. 104-311, at 95, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 793, 807. 7 Second, under the heading General jurisdiction, the Report states that changes were made to the jurisdictional provision 48 to reflect the direct and complete pre-emption of State economic regulation of railroads. The changes include extending exclusive Federal jurisdiction to matters relating to spur, industrial, team, switching or side tracks formerly reserved for State jurisdiction.... The former disclaimer regarding residual State police powers is eliminated as unnecessary, in view of the Federal policy of occupying the entire field of economic regulation of the interstate rail transportation system. 49 Id. at 95-96, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 807-08 (emphasis added). The thrust of the statute is to federalize these disputes, not to deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction. 8 50 Guilford argues that the references to preemption of state law and regulation in the legislative history of § 10501(b) are simply beside the point. Guilford says that the references do not address the question of whether that section, in addition to preempting state law, establishes exclusive jurisdiction in the STB. We do not find the history of § 10501(b) as unhelpful as Guilford suggests. While not determinative by itself, the focus on preemption of state law in the legislative history does give Grimmel's suggested interpretation of § 10501(b) some additional plausibility. 51 Arguments both for and against concurrent jurisdiction can be drawn from the language and structure of the ICCTA, its legislative history, and case law. Viewing the language of the ICCTA in light of its legislative history and the evidence of practice under its predecessor, the ICA, we conclude that Grimmel has successfully carried its burden of establishing the existence of federal district court jurisdiction over its ICCTA claim.