Opinion ID: 1203209
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sovereign Immunity from Liability

Text: Many jurisdictions have struggled to distinguish the nullum tempus doctrine from sovereign immunity from liability, in order to retain the former in light of abrogation of the latter. [11] The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for example, noted that both doctrines have their roots in the prerogative of the Crown. Commonwealth Dep't of Transp. v. J.W. Bishop & Co., 497 Pa. 58, 439 A.2d 101, 103 (1981). The court distinguished the two doctrines, however, on the grounds that when the Commonwealth invokes the doctrine of nullum tempus, it seeks as a plaintiff to protect public rights and public property. Id. 439 A.2d at 104. When the Commonwealth invokes immunity from liability, it seeks to deny those whom it has allegedly wronged the opportunity to obtain relief. Id. Immunity from liability, the court noted, has been defended on the theory that without it the courts would be overburdened and the Commonwealth financially imperiled. It has never been justified on the basis of the need to protect public rights. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court has observed that American courts in this century have viewed both doctrines as embodying a policy of protecting the public purse rather than perpetuating philosophical notions of sovereign power. City of Shelbyville, 451 N.E.2d at 876, 71 Ill.Dec. at 722. The court discarded immunity from liability, however, and retained immunity from statutes of limitations on the grounds that modern law supported immunity from limitations as it protects the public from state officers' negligence in asserting public causes of action. Id. We have not previously evaluated the underpinnings of sovereign immunity with an eye to immunity from statutes of limitations. In Evans v. Board of County Commissioners, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968 (1971), we abrogated the State of Colorado's immunity from suit, and acknowledged the General Assembly's authority to restore immunity as it saw fit. Id. at 105, 482 P.2d at 972. While noting that there was ample authority supporting sovereign immunity from liability, we chose to abrogate it because the common law philosophies justifying immunity from liability were shed when the Revolutionary War was won. Id. at 100, 482 P.2d at 969. We also noted that it would be incongruous to permit suits against municipalities when engaged in proprietary functions, but not when engaged in governmental functions. Id. We concluded that sovereign immunity from liability was inequitable and untenable. Id. at 105, 482 P.2d at 972. We find persuasive, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court's reasoning that the doctrine of nullum tempus is but an aspect of sovereign immunity. New Jersey Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Gruzen Partnership, 125 N.J. 66, 592 A.2d 559, 561 (1991). [12] The New Jersey Supreme Court abolished immunity from statutes of limitations based on its prior holding that immunity from liability did not accord with notions of fundamental justice endemic to a representative form of government. Id. In Evans, we similarly concluded that sovereign immunity from liability was inequitable. Since we do not recognize a distinction in local government functions, we cannot premise immunity on an elusive conception of protecting public versus private rights. We note that explosions in metropolitan populations have forced local governments to perform myriad, nontraditional services. See, e.g., Municipal Corporations § 1.52. Coupled with abrogation of sovereign immunity from liability, it would indeed be incongruous to give political subdivisions sovereign status by insulating them from statutes of limitations. Evaluation of the rationales underlying statutes of limitations also supports our conclusion. We have held that statutes of limitations promote justice by discouraging delay and prohibiting the prosecution of stale claims. Colorado Bd. of State Medical Examiners v. Jorgensen, 198 Colo. 275, 279, 599 P.2d 869, 872 (1979). We agree with the observation of the Illinois Supreme Court that [l]ong delays by the government in instituting suit, of course, cause harm to the defendant and are in the interest of no one. City of Shelbyville, 451 N.E.2d at 877, 71 Ill.Dec. at 723. We perceive no substantial benefit in tolerating official tardiness and allowing the City to prosecute its claim. Rather, we believe that the public will benefit from acquiring an ability to identify the time period in which local government claims can be brought.