Opinion ID: 768203
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Futility and Procedural Default

Text: 62 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254(b)(1), exhaustion is excused if a return to state court would be futile because of an absence of available State corrective process[,] or ... circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant. Futility exists where: a state's highest court has ruled unfavorably on a claim involving facts and issues materially identical to those undergirding a federal habeas petition and there is no plausible reason to believe that a replay will persuade the court to reverse its field, Allen v. Attorney General of Maine, 80 F.3d 569, 573 (1st Cir. 1996); where the state provides no means of seeking the relief sought, Wallace v. Cody, 951 F.2d 1170, 1172 (10th Cir. 1991), Dawan v. Lockhart, 980 F.2d 470, 475 (8th Cir. 1992); or where the state courts have failed to alleviate obstacles to state review presented by circumstances such as the petitioner's pro se status, poor handwriting and illiteracy, Hollis v. Davis, 941 F.2d 1471, 1473-1475, 1479 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 S.Ct. 938 (1992). 63 If an appropriate remedy does not exist or its utilization is frustrated by the state system. . .[t]he deference accorded the state judicial process must give way to the primary role of the federal courts to redress constitutional deprivations. . . . If it appears that the prisoner's rights have become an empty shell or that the state process is a procedural morass offering no hope of relief, then the federal courts may excuse the prisoner from exhausting state remedies and may directly consider the prisoner's constitutional claims. 64 Hankins v. Fulcomer, 941 F.2d 246, 249-250 (3d Cir. 1991). Accordingly, we have held that exhaustion is not required if there is inordinate delay in state procedures, id. at 250, or if state officials have obstructed the petitioner's attempts to obtain state remedies, Mayberry v. Petsock , 821 F.2d 179 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 946 (1987). 65 As we noted in Doctor, futility is also established where exhaustion is not possible because the state court would refuse on procedural grounds to hear the merits of the claims. Doctor, 96 F.3d at 681; Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 518-519 (3d Cir. 1997). Lines' assertion of futility here is based upon the unavailability of further state process. We do not excuse exhaustion in this context unless state law clearly forecloses state court review of claims which have not previously been presented to a state court. Toulson v. Beyer, 987 F.2d 984, 988-989 (3d Cir. 1993). 66 If the federal court is uncertain how a state court would resolve a procedural default issue, it should dismiss the petition for failure to exhaust state remedies even if it is unlikely that the state court would consider the merits to ensure that, in the interests of comity and federalism, state courts are given every opportunity to address claims arising from state proceedings. 67 Doctor, 96 F.3d at 681 (emphasis added), see also Lambert, 134 F.3d at 516. The fact that it is merely unlikely that further state process is available is therefore insufficient to establish futility: 68 [I]f we permitted such a prediction to constitute the type of futility which would allow a federal court to excuse exhaustion, we would undermine the exhaustion doctrine. Although exhaustion is often cumbersome, and may appear to require duplicative expenditure of judicial resources on claims that frequently have no merit, the doctrine is premised on firmly entrenched principles of comity. We are not free to disregard those principles for the sake of expediency or occasional efficiency. 69 Gibson v. Scheidemantel, 805 F.2d 135, 141 (3d Cir. 1986). See also Banks v. Horn, 126 F.3d 206, 213 (3d Cir. 1997) (enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act which overall is intended to reduce federal intrusion into state criminal proceedings, reenforces that federal courts ought to be reluctant to conclude that resort to state courts would be futile.). Thus, [i]n questionable cases it is better that the state courts make the determination of whether a claim is procedurally barred. Id . Accordingly, we must determine if we can conclude with certainty that the courts of Pennsylvania would no longer entertain Lines' substantive claims for relief. 70 Lines filed his Petition for Allowance of Appeal more than seven years ago. We think it is obvious that he could not successfully amend a petition that has now been denied for seven years and include within it claims that he could have included when he first filed the petitio. 15 Thus, under Pennsylvania law, the only avenue that may be available to Lines is a second petition under the PCRA. Thus, we turn to the provisions of the PCRA to see if Lines can file a second collateral attack in the state courts. 16 71 42 Pa. C.S.A. S 9545(b)(1) limits the availability of PCRA relief. It states: 72 Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that: 73 (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim . . . . 74 (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or 75 (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively. 76 Under section 9545(b)(3), a prior petition becomes final for PCRA purposes at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review. Commonwealth v. Banks, 556 Pa. 1, 726 A.2d 374, 375 (1999). Under Banks, it is now clear that the one year limitation applies to all PCRA petitions including a second petition, no matter when the first was filed. 17 77 Clearly, more than a year has passed since Lines' judgment of conviction became final 18 and none of the aforementioned exceptions to the limitations period applies to Lines' claims. He does not allege that improper governmental interference or previously unknown facts prevented him from asserting them in state court in a timely manner, nor does he base his claims upon the assertion of a new constitutional right. 78 Moreover, 42 Pa. C.S.A. S 9543(a)(3) provides that claims raised in a PCRA petition must not have been previously litigated or waived. Section 9544 defines those terms as follows: 79 (a) Previous litigation. -For purposes of this subchapter, an issue has been previously litigated if: . . . 80 (2) the highest appellate court in which the petitioner could have had review as a matter of right has ruled on the merits of the issue; or 81 (3) it has been raised and decided in a proceeding collaterally attacking the conviction or sentence. 82 (b) Issues waived. -For purposes of th is subchapter, an issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state postconviction proceeding. 83 When Lines filed his first PCRA petition he was represented by counsel other than trial counsel. Therefore, he could have raised the issue of trial counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to move for a severance in his first PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Griffin, 537 Pa. 447, 454 (1994) (a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel under the PCRA must be raised at the earliest stage in the proceedings after petitioner is no longer represented by allegedly ineffective counsel). Under Pennsylvania law Lines could attempt to challenge the stewardship of PCRA counsel even though he is not guaranteed the right to counsel to collaterally attack his conviction under the United States Constitution. See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31, 43 (1999) (we have never found our power of review, and if necessary, remedy deficiencies of counsel at the post-conviction stage circumscribed by the parameters of the Sixth Amendment.). However, the only vehicle for now doing so is a second P.C.R.A. petition. As we noted above, the period for filing such a petition has long since run, and the courts of Pennsylvania therefore no longer have jurisdiction to entertain a successive P.C.R.A. petition. Banks, 726 A.2d at 376 (the issue . . . is one of jurisdiction. . .). Accordingly, we conclude that it would be futile for Lines to return to state court in an effort to attempt to bring a second PCRA proceeding raising the unexhausted claims he has included in his federal habeas petition. 84 Thus, although federal courts should be most cautious before reaching a conclusion dependent upon an intricate analysis of state law that a claim is procedurally barred, Banks v. Horn, 126 F.3d at 213, the aforementioned considerations combine to convince us that Lines is now clearly foreclosed from further state court review of his claims. As a result, exhaustion would be futile and is excused. Put another way, based upon the futility of requiring Lines to cure his procedural default, we will consider his claims exhausted because there are no state remedies available to him. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. 85 As noted above, it does not necessarily follow, however, that Lines is entitled to an adjudication of the merits of his unexhausted federal habeas claims merely because it is now futile to attempt to raise them in state court. A finding of futility merely eliminates the procedural pretense of requiring a federal habeas petitioner to return to an unavailable state forum for nonexistent relief. Futility, without more, 19 does not mean that the federal courts may proceed to the merits of the petitioner's claims. As the court said in Whittlesey v. Circuit Court for Baltimore County, 897 F.2d 143, 146 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 922 (1990) (another escape case): 86 That it may now be futile for Whittlesey to await completion of his Florida sentence to challenge his Maryland conviction begs the question of how that futility has come about. The equitable principles governing habeas relief will not permit Whittlesey to create a situation in which seeking state post conviction relief is futile, and then invoke that same futility to avoid the exhaustion requirement. 87 When exhaustion is futile because state relief is procedurally barred, federal courts may only reach the merits if the petitioner makes the standard showing of cause and prejudice or establishes a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Caswell, 953 F.2d at 861 (3d Cir. 1992). Unlike the petitioners in Doctor, Toulson, and Lambert, Lines is not asserting his actual innocence or facts that would suggest a miscarriage of justice in the context of federal habeas jurisprudence. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). Accordingly, we must focus on whether Lines can establish cause and prejudice for his default in state court. McCandless, 172 F.3d at 263. See also Caswell, 953 F.2d at 861 (citing Coleman, 111 S.Ct. at 2557 n.1).