Opinion ID: 546380
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Identifying the Real Party in Interest

Text: 21 Subsequent to the date that the district court issued its opinion, motions have been filed by various federal entities seeking to substitute themselves for New Twin City Bank. Accordingly, we deem it advisable as a preliminary matter to determine exactly who, at this point, is the real plaintiff party in interest and appellee in this litigation. 22 New Twin City Bank commenced this litigation against the appellants and was the plaintiff party on November 9, 1988, when the district court issued its ruling on the outstanding motions for summary judgment. The appellants, rather than immediately appealing the district court's ruling, timely filed a motion for reconsideration with the district court. This motion was denied on March 3, 1989. 23 On November 9, 1988, the same date that the district court issued its ruling in favor of New Twin City Bank, the FHLBB determined that New Twin City, following in the footsteps of its predecessor, Old Twin City, was insolvent. The FSLIC again was appointed receiver. On December 9, 1988, with the appellants' motion for reconsideration still pending in the district court, the FSLIC filed a motion to substitute itself as party plaintiff in lieu of New Twin City. This motion was granted on December 14, 1988, two and one-half months prior to the denial of appellants' motion for reconsideration. 24 Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the FSLIC had not yet entered the litigation at the time the district court issued its ruling on New Twin City's motion for summary judgment, the FSLIC as receiver for New Twin City was the actual plaintiff party at the time the district court issued its final order in this case denying the outstanding motion for reconsideration. See Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 103 S.Ct. 400, 403, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982) (district court's order is not a final, appealable order when timely filed motion to reconsider pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) remains pending); cf. In re Savers Federal Savings & Loan Association, 872 F.2d 963, 964 (11th Cir.1989) (upon being appointed conservator of failed bank, the FSLIC automatically becomes party to lawsuit involving that bank). 25 Indeed, a parallel can be drawn between the proceedings in this case, and those found in FSLIC v. Two Rivers Associates, 880 F.2d 1267 (11th Cir.1989). In Two Rivers Associates, the defaulted notes and mortgages in question had been issued by the Sunrise and Loan Association of Florida (Old Sunrise). The FHLBB declared Old Sunrise insolvent and appointed the FSLIC as receiver. The FSLIC reorganized Old Sunrise into the Sunrise Savings and Loan Association (New Sunrise) and transferred all of Old Sunrise's assets and liabilities to New Sunrise. 26 New Sunrise brought suit in state court to enforce the promissory notes and foreclose the mortgages. The state court issued a partial summary judgment finding the notes and mortgages valid and in default, and directed a public sale of the properties if the debt was not satisfied within three days. Simultaneously, the state court granted a motion allowing the debtors to file amended answers. 27 The debtors filed amended answers, and also moved for reconsideration of the grant of summary judgment. While the motion for reconsideration was pending, the FHLBB determined that New Sunrise was insolvent and appointed the FSLIC as receiver for the purpose of liquidating New Sunrise's assets and making payments of its liabilities. 28 Before the state court ruled on the motion to reconsider, the FSLIC was substituted for New Sunrise in the case and the case was removed to federal court. When reanalyzing the issues on summary judgment, both the district court and a panel of this court reviewed the case from the perspective of the FSLIC, and not New Sunrise, being the proper party in interest. 29 Hence, we need not on this appeal determine whether the district court was correct in following those courts that have held that successors to the FSLIC or the FDIC are entitled to the same common law defenses as may be asserted by the FSLIC or the FDIC. See, e.g., Porras v. Petroplex Savings Ass'n, 903 F.2d 379, 381 (5th Cir.1990) (holding that [c]laims and defenses barred as to the FSLIC by the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine are similarly barred as to private parties who purchase the assets of the failed institution from the FSLIC); FDIC v. Newhart, 892 F.2d 47 (8th Cir.1989) (according the FDIC's federal holder in due course status to a private party purchasing notes from the FDIC). Rather, our focus is merely limited to those defenses that could be asserted by the FSLIC, as real party in interest. Moreover, because there had not yet been a final judgment in this case at the time the FSLIC became a party, the FSLIC is entitled on this appeal to raise any federal common law defenses it may possess. 4 Compare Olney Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Trinity Banc Savings Ass'n, 885 F.2d 266, 275 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that the FSLIC does not possess a right, title, or interest in a challenged instrument and thus cannot assert federal common law defenses when, at the time the FSLIC enters the litigation, there already is a final judgment holding the challenged instrument to be void); Grubb v. FDIC, 868 F.2d 1151, 1159 (10th Cir.1989) (same holding with respect to the FDIC). 30