Opinion ID: 1347323
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: In the light of our previous comments and inquiries, we must determine the meaning of the following portion of the heretofore quoted statute:

Text: No group of axles of any vehicle, or any combination of vehicles, shall carry a load in pounds in excess of the value given in the    table   . In considering this question it is well to keep in mind the apparent purpose of the statute, which is to prevent the overloading of trucks and the resulting deterioration of the paving, as well as the avoiding of danger to all persons traveling on the highways. In fact, the court will take judicial notice of this fact. People v. Linde, 341 Ill. 269, 173 N.E. 361, 72 A.L.R. 997, 1003, and cited cases. The trailer truck is a separate portion of the combined unit. It is, however, a vehicle. Section 321.1(1), 1950 Code, I.C.A., defines vehicle as follows: `Vehicle' means every device in, upon or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, excepting devices moved by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks. Our statute states that: `Trailer' means every vehicle without motive power designed for carrying persons or property and for being drawn by a motor vehicle and so constructed that no part of its weight rests upon the towing vehicle. Section 321.1(9), 1950 Code, I.C.A. The trailer truck here involved is, in fact, a semitrailer and under our statutory definitions is a vehicle. `Semitrailer' means every vehicle without motive power designed for carrying persons or property and for being drawn by a motor vehicle and so constructed that some part of its weight and that of its load rests upon or is carried by another vehicle.    A `semitrailer' shall be considered in this chapter separately from its power unit. Section 321.1(10), 1950 Code, I.C.A. Without the second axle or wheel portion of the tractor, the truck trailer could not be propelled along the highway. This second axle or wheel portion of the tractor consequently becomes an integral and necessary part of the vehicle which carries the load proper. The weight of the trailer truck would necessarily rest between axles two, three and four. These axles constitute, in our opinion, a group of axles. It should be kept in mind that the statute prohibits an excess loading of a vehicle dependent upon the extreme axles of a group serving the vehicle and also between the extreme axles of a combination of vehicles such as in the case of a tractor and the accompanying trailer truck. A group of axles of a vehicle must necessarily mean some combination of axles in the vehicle other than both extreme axles of a combination vehicle or the tandem axles. Webster's New International Dictionary (2nd Ed.1944) defines the word group, in part, as follows: An assemblage of persons or things regarded as a unit because of their comparative segregation from others; an assemblage of objects in a certain order or relation, or having some resemblance or common characteristic. A group of axles in the present case must mean something other than all, and we hold it means those thingsaxles which are contiguous and segregated by reason of their use. In the instant case the extreme axles of a group would be the second axle or wheel and the rear axle or wheel of the tandem axles or wheels. These are the extreme axles of the group separated from the entire unit. When reference is also made in the alternative to any combination of vehicles it does not necessarily mean that consideration shall not be given to a single vehicle and its axles and the weight they carry. Then, too, we must keep in mind that the statute states that, `semitrailer' shall be considered in this chapter separately from its power unit. Consequently it is our holding that axles two, three, and four constitute a group of axles and that consideration can and must be given to the distance between the extreme axles of this particular group and the weight that was on them. II. It is the claim of the appellant that a motor freight carrier would be entitled to the maximum weight load set out in the table noted in the statute plus the percentage of tolerance as a matter of right. It is contended by him that the charge filed by the state alleges a weight of 32,950 pounds for the axles three and four. The distance between these two axles is four feet and the weight for this distance as set out in the statutory table is 32,000 pounds. With the allowance of the tolerance of three per centas these axles are tandem axlesthe total permissible weight allowed for these two axles would be 32,960 pounds. It is conceded by the state that, considering the tolerance allowance, there was no overweight on the tandem rear axles. It is the claim of the appellant that he was found guilty of an excess load on axles two and four and also of an excess load and weight on axles three and four. It is the contention of the appellant that inasmuch as the state concedes that there was no overloading of the rear tandem axles, he could not be found guilty as charged. III. It is the appellant's particular claim that where there is a reference to a group of axles of any vehicle, or any combination of vehicles and a later reference to the extreme axles of the group, there is an ambiguity. We do not think this is true. The reference is first to the group of axles of any vehicle. The truck trailer, as previously set forth, is a vehicle. The extreme axles of this group are axles two and four. In the alternative, reference is made to a combination of vehicles. We must keep in mind the purpose of this legislation to which reference has previously been made. The load on the trailer truck is the important thing to consider. Although this is a penal statute and is subject to strict construction, yet it must not be given a narrow meaning if to do so would be contrary to the plain intention of the legislature. Commonwealth v. Burall, 146 Pa.Super. 525, 22 A.2d 619, 622 and cited cases. We find no ambiguity. Even if there were ambiguity, which is not conceded, it should be the purpose of a court in seeking construction of a statute to    look not only to the language, but to the subject matter of the act, the object to be accomplished, or the purpose to be subserved, and the law should be construed to give effect to the legislative purpose.    Case v. Olson, 234 Iowa 869, 872-873, 14 N.W.2d 717, 719 and cases cited. IV. Despite the fact the state has conceded that considering the tolerance allowance set out in the statute, there was no overloading on the tandem rear axles, yet we see no necessity for reversal. There were two alleged violations set out in the summons. There is no question of the appellant's guilt on the charge of overloading of the extreme axles two and four. The violation of the applicable statute is termed a misdemeanor. Section 321.482. The fine imposed was $100. It is within the discretion of a trial court to impose a sentence or fine not in excess of the maximum penalty authorized by law. State v. Small, 233 Iowa 1280, 1284, 11 N.W.2d 377, 379. We find no reason for reversal. Affirmed.