Opinion ID: 815111
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Colorado Addresses

Text: First, the government questioned whether petitioners engaged in forum shopping by, allegedly, fabricating residence in Colorado to obtain a change of venue 1 Section 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) applies in this case because petitioners filed their asylum application after May 11, 2005, the effective date of the REAL ID Act, which added the language permitting consideration of matters outside the heart of the asylum claim. See Ismaiel v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 1198, 1205 n.5 (10th Cir. 2008). In relevant part, the statute provides: Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and whether or not under oath, and considering the circumstances under which the statements were made), the internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record (including the reports of the Department of State on country conditions), and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). -7- from New York. The hearing had been adjourned several times to permit the parties to exchange documentary evidence on the issue. At the final hearing, Ms. Zheng testified that she and her husband resided in Colorado Springs but worked at a restaurant in Fort Collins, some 130 miles away, where they lived with other workers in an employer-provided dorm for up to three weeks at a time. She further testified that they spent only one or two days a month at their Colorado Springs residence. She could recite the street address of her Colorado Springs residence but was uncertain about the street address she gave for the dorm in Fort Collins. The IJ found it “implausible” that Ms. Zheng could remember the Colorado Springs address but not the Fort Collins address, and considered it “[u]nfortunate[]” that “there were no questions on re-direct to explain [her] inability to remember an address where she allegedly spends most of her time.” R. at 109. However, the IJ declined to determine whether petitioners “did, in fact, engage in ‘forum shopping,’” despite finding “the evidence with regards to [their] residence, especially the testimonial evidence, dubious at best.” Id. Ms. Zheng disputes the IJ’s reliance on her uncertainty about the Fort Collins address on two grounds. First, she testified on cross-examination that she thought the address of the Fort Collins dorm was “2489 Anneles,” adding that she was “not quite sure” because her “boss just take us around,” and she doesn’t “really pay attention.” Id. at 174. She claims this explanation was plausible and points out that she was able to give the correct address of the restaurant. Second, Ms. Zheng acknowledges that -8- credibility findings need not be based on matters that go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim,” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), but she also points out that the agency must consider “the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors.” Id. She thus contends that her uncertainty about the Fort Collins address is not relevant to her credibility. The IJ’s reliance on Ms. Zheng’s inability to be certain of the Fort Collins address while at the same time being able to provide her Colorado Springs address was not a “cogent” reason for disbelieving Ms. Zheng, Chaib, 397 F.3d at 1278, nor was it “substantially reasonable,” Woldemeskel, 257 F.3d at 1192. She gave an address for the Fort Collins dorm and a plausible, reasonable explanation why she was unsure about it. The IJ mentioned that explanation but never stated why he found it unpersuasive. And it is unsurprising that Ms. Zheng would know her Colorado Springs address because that is the address on utility bills submitted in support of venue in Colorado. Additionally, the relevance of her ability to recall the addresses appears limited to whether petitioners were forum shopping. It has little or no connection to the credibility of their fear—objective or subjective—of future persecution. We recognize that § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) grants the trier of fact latitude to consider a matter having virtually no connection to fear of future persecution. But in Ismaiel v. Mukasey, we said that “the significance of an omission [from an asylum application] must be determined by the context, and rigid rules cannot substitute for common -9- sense.” 516 F.3d 1198, 1205 (10th Cir. 2008). Ms. Zheng’s uncertainty about the Fort Collins address is benign as to her credibility, and Ismaiel’s requirement that context determines significance applies here. Section 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) calls for “[c]onsider[ation of] the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors” when making credibility determinations.2 See also Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 164 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that, after the REAL ID Act, “an IJ may rely on omissions and inconsistencies that do not directly relate to the applicant’s claim of persecution as long as the totality of the circumstances establish that the applicant is not credible”). The context here shows that Ms. Zheng’s inability to recall with certainty the Fort Collins address was understandable and insignificant. She gave a plausible, reasonable explanation; the IJ did not specifically explain why that explanation was insufficient; and there is a good reason why she could recall the Colorado Springs address. Ms. Zheng’s testimony regarding the addresses was therefore a substantially unreasonable basis for finding her not credible regarding her fear of future persecution. We require cogent and substantially reasonable bases for adverse 2 Ismaiel concerned an asylum application filed prior to the effective date of the REAL ID Act. However, its context rule governs cases involving applications filed after that date because, as Ismaiel recognized, even prior to the REAL ID Act, this court did not require that omissions from asylum applications go to the heart of the asylum claim to provide a basis for an adverse credibility finding. See Ismaiel, 516 F.3d at 1205-06 & n.5. - 10 - credibility findings, see Ismaiel, 516 F.3d at 1205; Chaib, 397 F.3d at 1278; Woldemeskel, 257 F.3d at 1192, and that standard was not met here.