Opinion ID: 2517913
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Application of standard to instant case

Text: Having established that the district court possessed the power to impose reasonable filing restrictions, we turn to that court's order in this case. We have not previously articulated a standard of review for this particular issue. The Court of Appeals in Lynn applied an abuse of discretion standard. 26 Kan.App.2d at 82, 975 P.2d 813. However, it was reviewing a district court decision permanently enjoining the filing of future lawsuits. See Steffes v. City of Lawrence, 284 Kan. 380, 393, 160 P.3d 843 (2007) (granting of injunctive relief reviewed for abuse of discretion). We recently noted, however, that a district court has substantial discretion in controlling the proceedings before it. Harsch v. Miller, 288 Kan. 280, 288, 200 P.3d 467 (2009). We therefore readily conclude that, like the federal courts, we should review district court decisions on docket management for abuse of discretion. See e.g., Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-633, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962); Chambers, 501 U.S. at 55, 111 S.Ct. 2123 (reviewing a court's imposition of sanctions under its inherent power for abuse of discretion); Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC, 513 F.3d 181, 187 (5th Cir.2008); United States v. Nicholson, 983 F.2d 983, 988 (10th Cir.1993); Tripati, 878 F.2d at 354; Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1096 (11th Cir.2008). The district court in the instant case issued an outright ban on further K.S.A. 60-1507 or similar motions surrounding this case. This ban, unlike those imposed by the courts in Lynn, Tripati, Winslow, and other opinions, does not contain any conditions that would allow Holt to file future motions in his case. As noted, an outright ban is an impermissible restriction on a litigant's access to the courts. While Holt's past and current motions admittedly continue to advance the same arguments, the district court's order cuts off possible meritorious claims in the future. Further, the order does not define similar motions. Nor does it allow Holt any opportunity to seek permission from the district court before filing future motions. In effect, the order also prevents Holt from filing a motion for DNA testing or a motion to correct an illegal sentence in his criminal case, contrary to statutory direction permitting their filing at any time. See, e.g., K.S.A. 21-2512 (motion for DNA testing after conviction of certain crimes); Bruner v. State, 277 Kan. 603, 605, 88 P.3d 214 (2004) (60-1507 motions can include requests for DNA testing); State v. Mitchell, 284 Kan. 374, 378-79, 162 P.3d 18 (2007) (noting the similarity of a motion to correct an illegal sentence and a 60-1507 motion); K.S.A. 22-3504 (motion to correct illegal sentence). We recognize the district court's desire to curb Holt's successive filings. It exceeded its authority, however, by banning outright his future 60-1507 motions and similar avenues of relief. Its order denies Holt meaningful access to the courts. In short, the court abused its discretion. See State v. Skolaut, 286 Kan. 219, Syl. ¶ 3, 182 P.3d 1231 (2008) (abuse of discretion standard includes a review to determine that the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions). This problem can be corrected on remand both by enumerating reasonable conditions that inmate Holt must meet to allow his future filings and by giving him notice and an opportunity to be heard before the restrictive conditions are to become effective. See, e.g., Lynn, 26 Kan.App.2d at 81, 975 P.2d 813; Tripati, 878 F.2d at 354. The district court's order is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.