Opinion ID: 2031928
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Comments Relating to the Defendant's Failure to Testify

Text: Defendant next contends that the prosecutor improperly commented on his failure to testify at trial and thus deprived him of a fair trial and due process. See Griffin v. California (1965), 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (accused has constitutional right not to testify as a witness in his own behalf); People v. Wollenberg (1967), 37 Ill.2d 480, 229 N.E.2d 490 (comment by prosecutor whose underlying purpose and ultimate effect was to call attention to defendant's silence amounted to plain error). In closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that certain evidence presented at trial was uncontradicted and uncontroverted. First, the prosecutor stated as follows: He told [cellmate] Irwin that he taped Judy's eyes and wrists. That he stole her money and jewelry. And that he set her on fire. He confessed. Irwin Johnson didn't know anything about this case. He didn't know about tape or fire or jewelry. This man knew about that. Uncontradicted, uncontroverted. He confessed. Defense counsel objected to this remark and asked for a limiting instruction. The trial judge sustained the objection and told the jury that the defendant in this case is presumed innocent. The State must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant does not have to produce evidence to prove his innocence. The act of sustaining an objection and properly admonishing the jury is usually viewed as sufficient to cure any prejudice. People v. Gonzalez (1991), 142 Ill.2d 481, 491, 154 Ill.Dec. 643, 568 N.E.2d 864; People v. Baptist (1979), 76 Ill.2d 19, 30, 27 Ill.Dec. 792, 389 N.E.2d 1200. The prosecutor continued closing argument and made similar uncontradicted and uncontroverted comments as to the DNA evidence, the fingerprint evidence, the flight evidence, the ABO blood type evidence, and the burnt hair evidence. Defense counsel failed to object to these additional comments at trial, and has thus waived the issues. ( Enoch, 122 Ill.2d at 186, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124.) Defendant claims, however, that the comments amounted to plain error, and that we should review the errors under that rule. Defendant argues that the prosecutor's comments were direct references to his failure to testify. The State responds that the prosecutor's comments were proper because they were not intended to direct the jury's attention to defendant's silence. ( People v. Herrett (1990), 137 Ill.2d 195, 211, 148 Ill. Dec. 695, 561 N.E.2d 1 (prosecution may describe evidence as uncontradicted even if defendant is only one who could contradict it when remarks are not intended to direct jury's attention to defendant's silence); also see People v. Morgan (1986), 112 Ill.2d 111, 133-34, 97 Ill.Dec. 430, 492 N.E.2d 1303.) The Herrett court held that the question on review is whether the comments, considered in the context of the entire proceeding, were improper. Herrett, 137 Ill.2d at 211, 148 Ill.Dec. 695, 561 N.E.2d 1. In the instant case, we agree with the State that the prosecutor's remarks were not intended or calculated to direct the jury's attention to the defendant's failure to testify. We believe that the prosecution was simply emphasizing the character and the weight of the evidence against the defendant. Even if error occurred, however, the uncontradicted comments did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. After the first comment, the trial judge admonished the jury that [t]he defendant does not have to produce evidence to prove his innocence. The trial judge also later instructed the jury that the defendant's silence should not be considered by the jury in any way in arriving at a verdict. Given the context of the entire proceeding, we find that the comments were not improper or did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. We therefore do not invoke the plain error rule.