Opinion ID: 1057905
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues raised by j. houston gordon

Text: J. Houston Gordon (Gordon) [3] raises two issues in his brief. First, he asserts that Richard H. Dinkins' withdrawal from consideration for appointment rendered the first panel invalid. As a result, Gordon contends that the Governor's purported return or rejection of the first panel had no legal effect. He argues that the Commission should have replaced Dinkins' name with the name of another nominee and then should have resubmitted the first panel to the Governor for his consideration. Second, Gordon argues in the alternative that, assuming arguendo that the Governor's rejection of the first list was valid, the Tennessee Plan does not preclude the Commission from including on a second panel the name of a person listed on a first panel of nominees rejected by the Governor. We will address each of these two issues in turn. Gordon's first issue is based upon his interpretation of section 17-4-109(e), which provides, in pertinent part: the commission, in public or private meeting, by a majority vote shall select three (3) persons whom the commission deems best qualified and available to fill the vacancy and certify the names of the three (3) persons to the governor as nominees for the judicial vacancy. Under Gordon's argument, one nominee's withdrawal from consideration for appointment contravenes this statute because the withdrawal results in less than three names certified to the Governor. Accordingly, he argues that the list certified to the Governor by the Commission becomes void upon the withdrawal of one nominee and the list should be returned to the Commission for the addition of a new third nominee. This issue is one of statutory construction. When interpreting statutes, this Court must ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent without restricting or expanding the statute's intended meaning or application. Killingsworth, 205 S.W.3d at 408. As we stated in Clark v. Lowe's Home Centers, 201 S.W.3d 647, 649 (Tenn.2006): Intent is determined from the natural and ordinary meaning of the statutory language within the context of the entire statute without any forced or subtle construction that would extend or limit the statute's meaning. State v. Flemming, 19 S.W.3d 195, 197 (Tenn.2000). If the statute's language is clear, we must apply its plain meaning without a forced interpretation. Mooney v. Sneed, 30 S.W.3d 304, 306 (Tenn.2000). Applying these rules of statutory construction, we must reject Gordon's argument. The Tennessee Plan is completely silent as to the effect of the withdrawal of one nominee certified to the Governor by the Commission. Section 17-4-109(e) requires the Judicial Selection Commission to select three (3) persons whom the commission deems best qualified and available to fill the vacancy and certify the names of the three (3) persons to the governor as nominees for the judicial vacancy. That is exactly what occurred in this case  on July 18, 2006, the Commission certified by letter to the Governor the names of three nominees for the expected vacancy on this Court: Richard H. Dinkins, J. Houston Gordon, and George T. Buck Lewis. Once the Commission certified those three names to the Governor, its role in the selection and appointment process set out in the statute was complete, unless and until the Governor exercised his statutory right to reject the first list of nominees. We conclude that Gordon's proposed construction of section 17-4-109(e) is a forced interpretation of the statute. See Clark, 201 S.W.3d at 649. We also conclude that Gordon's interpretation of section 17-4-109(e) is inconsistent with the overall purpose and intent behind the Tennessee Plan. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 17-4-101(a). If Gordon's interpretation of the statute were to prevail, a troubling element of gamesmanship could be introduced into the judicial appointment process. For example, one nominee who believes that another nominee is about to be appointed by the Governor could preempt that appointment merely by withdrawing his or her name. Thus, the unilateral action of a single individual could derail the statutory process for selecting and appointing a person to fill a judicial vacancy; that individual could both invalidate the list of nominees certified by the Commission and interfere with the Governor's statutory authority to appoint a remaining nominee or to request a second list of nominees. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 17-4-112(a). There is another practical flaw in Gordon's argument on this issue. In his brief, Gordon asserted that he and Lewis had the legal right to be considered for appointment to the Supreme Court and that Dinkins' withdrawal frustrated that right. It is difficult to see how the withdrawal of one of three nominees for appointment could frustrate the chances of the two remaining nominees  indeed, the withdrawal of one candidate obviously increases the likelihood that one of the two remaining nominees would be appointed. In other words, there was no legal impediment to the Governor appointing either Gordon or Lewis after Dinkins' withdrawal; he simply exercised his statutory authority to reject the first panel and to request that the Commission submit a second panel from which to make the appointment. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 17-4-112(a). In his second issue, Gordon argues in the alternative that the Tennessee Plan does not preclude the renomination, on a second panel, of a person who was listed on a first panel rejected by the Governor. In summary, he argues that a list or panel of nominees should be viewed as an entity and that a second panel therefore is lawful if it contains at least one different name from the three names on the first list. Thus, under his argument, a second panel of nominees containing the name of one previously rejected nominee plus two new nominees is a different panel from the first panel. We conclude that Gordon's argument is without merit. Section 17-4-112(a) provides that, upon the Commission's certification of a first list of three nominees, the governor shall fill the vacancy by appointing one (1) of the three persons nominated by the judicial selection commission, or the governor may require the commission to submit one (1) other panel of three (3) nominees. (Emphasis added.) The word other, as used in section 17-4-112(a), must be construed in light of section 17-4-101(a), which states that [i]t is the declared purpose and intent of the general assembly by the passage of this chapter to assist the governor in finding and appointing the best qualified persons available for service on the appellate courts of Tennessee. (Emphasis added.) The Governor's rejection of a first panel of nominees must be understood not only as a rejection of the panel but also as a rejection of each person nominated by the Judicial Selection Commission to be on the panel. Obviously, the Governor would not reject a first panel if he intended to appoint one of the nominees on that panel. Moreover, although the Tennessee Plan charges the Commission with certifying one (1) other panel of three (3) nominees for the Governor's consideration, nothing in the statutory scheme expressly allows the Commission to certify a second panel consisting of persons who were already rejected by the Governor. In the absence of specific statutory language, we are unwilling to reach such a conclusion. Accordingly, we conclude that a second (other) panel selected by the Commission must consist of three new nominees and that the Commission exceeded its authority in renominating Gordon on the second panel certified to the Governor. We hold that Dinkins' withdrawal did not invalidate the first panel, and we also hold that the Judicial Selection Commission erred in renominating Gordon on the second panel certified to the Governor. Having considered and rejected the arguments made by Gordon, we turn next to consider the issues raised by Lewis.