Opinion ID: 1226021
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Where Congress has intended to criminalize the making of material false statements, it has expressly done so.

Text: Congress has expressly used the word material in other provisions that criminalize the making of false statements, such as 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a). [7] Congress's omission of material from § 1015(a), combined with its inclusion of material in a similar statutory provision (§ 1001(a)), is evidence of Congress's expressed intent not to impose a materiality requirement in § 1015(a). See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983) ([W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.). Although § 1015(a) and § 1001(a) were not enacted as part of the same Act within the meaning of Russello, they are both located within Chapter 47 of Title 18 of the United States Code, which deals with Fraud and False Statements. Section 1001(a) explicitly requires a false statement to be material. Congress could have written a materiality requirement into § 1015(a) as it did in § 1001(a), but chose not to do so. Under the Russello rationale, § 1015(a) should be interpreted as Congress enacted it, without a materiality requirement. Therefore, we do not interpret § 1015 to include a materiality requirement.