Opinion ID: 159193
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Pending Challenge

Text: 26 No bright line separates permissible election-related regulation from unconstitutional infringements on First Amendment freedoms. 41 In the pending case, we are persuaded that the balancing test is appropriate. As we read the decisions described above, the balancing test is a general approach our court and the Supreme Court have employed in deciding the constitutionality of content-neutral regulation of the voting process. A balancing test takes account of the Supreme Court's recognition that, as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes. 42 27 Strict or exacting scrutiny has been employed in circumstances not presented in the pending case. The cases discussed above which applied strict scrutiny do not lend themselves to a simple synthesis. As we read them, however, strict scrutiny is applied where the government restricts the overall quantum of speech available to the election or voting process. More particularly, strict scrutiny is employed where the quantum of speech is limited due to restrictions on campaign expenditures, as in Valeo, the available pool of circulators or other supporters of a candidate or initiative, as in ACLF and Meyer, or the anonymity of such supporters, as in ACLF, Valeo, and McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n. 43 For example, the Court explained in Meyer that the prohibition against the use of paid circulators has the inevitable effect of reducing the total quantum of speech on a public issue. 44 In Valeo, the Court applied exacting scrutiny to contribution and expenditure limits, 45 reasoning that contribution and expenditure limitations impose direct quantity restrictions on political communication and association by persons, groups, candidates, and political parties, and that a primary effect of . . . expenditure limitations is to restrict the quantity of campaign speech by individuals, groups, and candidates. 46 In our view, the title setting process appellants challenge cannot be characterized as a direct limitation on the quantity of speech available to them. If anything, requiring proponents to pursue separate initiatives on separate subjects might encourage more speech on each such subject. 28 Having selected the balancing test, we have little trouble agreeing with the district court that the single subject and other title setting requirements are constitutional. Colorado has advanced in this litigation and by statute (quoted above) valid justifications for these requirements. The summary, single subject and title requirements serve to prevent voter confusion and promote informed decisions by narrowing the initiative to a single matter and providing information on that single matter to the voter. Further, they prevent a provision that would not otherwise pass from becoming law by piggybacking it on a more popular proposal or concealing it in a long and complex initiative. As with minor and third parties at issue in Timmons, the state has a valid interest in making sure that initiatives granted access to the ballot are bona fide and actually supported, on their own merits, by those who have provided the statutorily required petition or ballot support. 47 These justifications are sufficient to pass constitutional muster. [T]he State's asserted regulatory interest need only be sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation imposed on the [plaintiff's] rights. Nor do we require elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State's asserted justifications. 48 [T]he state's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions. 49 Colorado's title setting requirements are facially neutral and the state has offered reasonable justification for them. 29 We also note that in ACLF the Supreme Court stated that in aid of efficiency, veracity, or clarity, Colorado has provided for an array of process measures not contested here by [plaintiff]. These measures prescribe, inter alia, a single subject per initiative limitation . . . . 50 While not ruling on the constitutionality of the single subject provision, the Court did note its apparent virtue, and explained that [o]ur judgment is informed by other means Colorado employs to accomplish its regulatory purposes. 51 The Court also cited, with apparent approval, Biddulph v. Mortham, 52 as a case upholding single subject and unambiguous title requirements for initiative proposals to amend Florida's Constitution. 53 30 While appellants offered evidence below of difficulties they have encountered in complying with the single subject requirement, 54 they did not prove that the state applied the single subject requirement in a manner that discriminated against proponents on the basis of the content of their initiatives. 55 While compliance with the single subject requirement may be difficult for some who wish to offer ballot initiatives, and may to some extent limit their goal of unfettered participation in the electoral and legislative process, we are satisfied that the state's reasons for its procedures are sufficiently weighty to justify the procedures.