Opinion ID: 2569893
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Events After Our Remand to District Court

Text: {11} After we remanded the case, Defendant's new defense counsel received and reviewed the police statements of Tucker and Goen that had been in Montoya's possession during his impeachment of Defendant at trial. Defense counsel determined that the statements did not contain any references to Defendant bragging about the shooting and did not include a statement from Defendant's sister that Defendant admitted he shot the victim and presented a motion to the district court to bar further prosecution. In the motion, defense counsel explained to the trial court that the police statements from these witnesses did not contain the statements that Montoya claimed they did when he attempted to impeach Defendant at trial. Defendant's counsel concluded in his memorandum in support of the motion to bar further prosecution that Montoya certainly knew, or must be presumed to have known ... that his false characterization of the statements [given to the police by Sarah Tucker and Sherri Goen] was `improper and prejudicial'; and he `act[ed] in willful disregard of the resulting... reversal' such that retrial should be barred pursuant to Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, ¶ 32, 122 N.M. 655, 930 P.2d 792. {12} Prosecutor Troy Davis, Montoya's co-counsel at the first trial, represented the State after remand for a new trial and filed a response describing Montoya's impeachment of Defendant as an isolated instance in an otherwise fair trial. In the response, Davis claimed that a prosecutor acting out of error or negligence, or mistake does not subject the State to the sanction of a bar to retrial because his behavior does not rise to the level of willful disregard as required by Breit to bar reprosecution. Id. ¶ 48. {13} The district court set the matter for an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the State did not call any witnesses. Conceding that Montoya's questioning of Defendant about the statements made by Tucker and Goen had been improper, the State argued that it was an isolated instance in an otherwise fair trial and that Montoya's questions were not in evidence, only Defendant's responses were evidence. Orally, the district court told the parties: Certainly, if this Court had known about what was transpiring during the trial, the Court would have put a stop to it immediately and declared a mistrial in that case. But unfortunately the Court didn't know what was transpiring at the time and this Court was under the presumption that the District Attorney was asking those questions in good faith. Granting Defendant's motion to bar further prosecution and dismissing the matter with prejudice pursuant to New Mexico Constitution, Article II, Section 15, NMSA 1978, Section 30-1-10 (1963), and Breit, the district court entered a written order with the following findings: 1. In the course of cross-examining defendant Charles I. McClaugherty at trial in this matter, Assistant District Attorney Kenny Montoya questioned Mr. McClaugherty about statements given by his sister Sarah Tucker and his roommate Sherri Goen to the police on June 19, 1999. In his questions to Mr. McClaugherty and in a colloquy at the bench, Mr. Montoya grossly misrepresented the content of those statements. 2. If the Court had known of Mr. Montoya's misconduct at the time, it would have granted a mistrial. 3. Mr. Montoya's misconduct was so unfairly prejudicial to Mr. McClaugherty that it could not have been cured by means short of a mistrial or a motion for new trial. 4. Mr. Montoya either knew, or must be presumed to have known, that his conduct was improper and prejudicial to Mr. McClaugherty. 5. Mr. Montoya acted in willful disregard of the potential consequences of his misconduct. He either was actually aware, or must be presumed to have been aware, that his misconduct had the potential to result in a mistrial or a reversal. Mr. Montoya made a conscious and purposeful decision to dismiss any concern that his conduct might lead to a mistrial or reversal. The State timely appealed this dismissal to the Court of Appeals.