Opinion ID: 389566
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Recorded Conversation

Text: 17 Ms. Davis argues that the district court violated her fifth amendment right against self-incrimination by refusing to suppress the recorded conversation between herself and Ms. Preston. We disagree. 18 A necessary element of compulsory self-incrimination is some kind of compulsion. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 304, 87 S.Ct. 408, 414, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966). No evidence of compulsion exists in this case. Ms. Davis disclosed the incriminating information voluntarily. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 470-75, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 2743, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1975). 19 In the present case no valid claim has been made that Ms. Davis' incriminating statements were the product of any sort of coercion, legal or factual. Where a defendant's conversations with an informant are voluntary and the informant's presence was wholly voluntary, admissions made by the defendant do not violate the fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. 6 Hoffa v. United States, supra, 385 U.S. at 303-04, 87 S.Ct. at 414. 20 Ms. Davis' reliance on Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), in her brief is misplaced. No arrest took place prior to or during the telephone conversation. See United States v. Gocke, 507 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 979, 95 S.Ct. 1407, 43 L.Ed.2d 660 (1975). The telephone conversation contained no inherently compelling pressures which worked to undermine (Ms. Davis') will to resist and to compel (her) to speak where (she) would not otherwise do so freely  Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. at 1624. 21 Although probable cause for arrest may have existed, there is no constitutional right to be arrested at the moment probable cause to do so is established. Andresen v. Maryland, supra, 427 U.S. at 475, 96 S.Ct. at 2745; United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 455, 474 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820, 99 S.Ct. 82, 58 L.Ed.2d 110 (1978). In sum, the decision to admit the telephone conversation into evidence was not violative of appellant's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination.