Opinion ID: 2718562
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jones – Sufficiency of the Evidence

Text: Because we agree with the district court that the evidence recovered from 2713 Eagledale Drive should not have been suppressed, we move now from Jones’s pre-trial error claims to his trial error claims. As it turned out, the evidence recovered from the Eagledale residence was critical to the prosecution. The jury found Jones guilty of two crimes based upon items discovered in the Eagledale search—namely, possession of crack cocaine with the intent to distribute and being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. The jury also found Jones guilty on the drug conspiracy charge, but the district court granted an oral Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal on that charge after the verdict. Jones contends that his Rule 29 motion should have been granted on the other two charges as well. According to Jones, the government failed to introduce sufficient evidence to prove that he possessed either the crack (Count Eleven) or the firearms (Count Twelve) recovered from the house at 24 Nos. 11-2267, 11-2288, 11-2535 & 11-2687 2713 Eagledale Drive. He also challenges whether the government proved that he possessed the crack with intent to distribute. “A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury’s verdict bears a ‘heavy burden.’” United States v. Griffin, 684 F.3d 691, 694 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Olson, 978 F.2d 1472, 1478 (7th Cir. 1992)). He “must show that no rational trier of fact could have found that the government proved the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. We view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences “from the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.” Id. The essential elements of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) are that “the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed a controlled substance with the intent to distribute it, while knowing that it was a controlled substance.” United States v. Carraway, 612 F.3d 642, 645 (7th Cir. 2010). The essential elements of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) are that “(1) the defendant has a previous felony conviction, (2) the defendant possessed the firearm …, and (3) the firearm … had traveled in or affected interstate or foreign commerce.” Griffin, 684 F.3d at 695. With respect to both the drugs and the firearms, the possession proved could be actual or constructive, and sole or joint. Proof of the mere presence of Jones at the Eagledale residence would not be enough; proof of his possessory interest in the contraband would be necessary. Since both the drugs and the firearms attributed to Jones were recovered from the Eagledale residence, the success of Jones’s Rule 29 motion claim hinges on the evidence presented by the govNos. 11-2267, 11-2288, 11-2535 & 11-2687 25 ernment at trial regarding the fruits of the search there, so we have scoured the record carefully for details concerning that search. When law enforcement arrived to execute the search warrant, there were two people inside the house: Jones and an unidentified female. 2713 Eagledale Drive is a ranch-style house containing three bedrooms, a living room, a dining room, and a kitchen. The house was, by all accounts and as well demonstrated by photos admitted into evidence, “a little messy,” to say the least. No. 11-2267 App. Dkt. 78-6, 77. There was a mattress in the middle of the living room floor, not to mention an entire bedroom with “clothing and items of personal belongings scattered … about it.” Id. And of course, there were three guns, three digital scales, a total of 100.1 grams of crack cocaine and Jones’s cell phone, strewn, along with a hodge-podge of clothing and household items, throughout the kitchen, the living room, and the two bedrooms. IMPD narcotics detective Mark Kunst testified at trial about where various items were found during the execution of the search warrant. Unfortunately, he was unable to provide information about where Jones and the female were in the residence at the moment of the police entry. But he did explain where the drugs and guns were found. The drugs were in plain sight in two rooms of the house. But the guns were not. The first gun was located in the living room behind the entertainment center, and Detective Kunst admitted on the stand that this gun was “not in view” and “you’d have to bend over to get it.” No. 11-2267 App. Dkt. 78-6, 75. The other two guns were located in the master bedroom, apparently lying among the piles of clothing. The master bed26 Nos. 11-2267, 11-2288, 11-2535 & 11-2687 room, according to Kunst’s testimony, was quite messy, and one of the guns there was at least partially obscured by clothing and other personal belongings. The government argues that it presented at least enough evidence to sustain a conviction on a theory of constructive possession. “Constructive possession is a legal fiction whereby a person is deemed to possess contraband even when he does not actually have immediate, physical control of the object.” Griffin, 684 F.3d at 695 (citing United States v. Morris, 576 F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir. 2009)). We apply the same test to determine constructive possession of the drugs and the gun. Morris, 576 F.3d at 666. “Constructive possession may be established by demonstrating that the defendant knowingly had both the power and the intention to exercise dominion and control over the object, either directly or through others. This required ‘nexus’ must connect the defendant to the contraband, separating true possessors from mere bystanders.” Griffin, 684 F.3d at 695 (citation omitted). Where, as here, a defendant does not have “exclusive control” over the property where the contraband was found, “evidence that a defendant had a ‘substantial connection’ to the location where contraband was seized is sufficient to establish the nexus between that person and the [contraband].” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Morris, 576 F.3d at 667). “[M]ere proximity to contraband is not enough to establish a sufficient nexus to prove constructive possession.” Id. at 696. Rather, “[p]roximity must be coupled with other evidence, including connection with an impermissible item, proof of motive, a gesture implying control, evasive conduct, or a statement indicating involvement in an enterprise in order to sustain a guilty verdict.” United States v. Reed, 744 F.3d Nos. 11-2267, 11-2288, 11-2535 & 11-2687 27 519, 526 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Griffin, 684 F.3d at 696), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. June 9, 2014) (No. 13-10530). In cases where a defendant jointly occupies a residence, a defendant’s “substantial connection” to the residence is insufficient to establish constructive possession of contraband in that residence. Griffin, 684 F.3d at 696–97. In such cases “proof of constructive possession of contraband in the residence requires the government to demonstrate a ‘substantial connection’ between the defendant and the contraband itself, not just the residence.” Id. at 697 (emphasis added). We conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Jones had a substantial connection to both the Eagledale Drive address and the crack cocaine located there. The government introduced evidence that on two separate occasions, in the early morning hours of January 11 and 15— four days apart—Jones’s cell phone was located at the Eagledale Drive address and his car was parked nearby. Thus Jones’s cell phone and car were placed at the residence within five days of the January 20 search of the residence. And, as we know, when law enforcement searched the Eagledale Drive residence in the early morning on January 20, they found both Jones and his cell phone. Furthermore, although we do not know where inside the house the officers found Jones, we do know that more than half of the crack cocaine found there was out in the open in common areas—the kitchen and living room; it was not concealed away in a bedroom or closed container. One of the digital scales was found out in clear view on the kitchen countertop too. Thus, Jones had easy access to the crack cocaine and had the power to exercise dominion and control over it. 28 Nos. 11-2267, 11-2288, 11-2535 & 11-2687 In addition, the government introduced evidence of the telephone arrangement of six transactions from late November 2009 through January 4, 2010, in which Jones sought distribution quantities of crack cocaine from Mockabee. The last of these transactions occurred about two weeks before the search and seizure at the Eagledale Drive residence. These recorded conversations provide evidence that close to the time leading up to the search, Jones repeatedly had been seeking to acquire the very type of contraband found at the residence—distribution quantities of crack cocaine. This evidence provides that “other factor” our case law demands: Jones’s connection with and desire to possess crack cocaine. We think the evidence at trial established Jones’s substantial connection not only to the Eagledale Drive address but also to the quantities of crack cocaine found there— sufficient for the jury to conclude he was guilty of drug possession. That the woman who also was in the house when the officers arrived to search may also have had access to the crack is immaterial. As previously noted, possession may be joint. United States v. Kitchen, 57 F.3d 516, 521 (7th Cir. 1995). Thus, the evidence was sufficient to prove that Jones possessed the crack cocaine. The government also presented sufficient evidence of Jones’s intent to distribute the cocaine. Evidence of a drug quantity inconsistent with personal use and evidence of drug paraphernalia associated with distribution, such as baggies or scales, raise a reasonable inference that the defendant possessed the drug with intent to distribute it. See, e.g., United States v. Irby, 558 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2009). Digital scales with cocaine residue were found in the residence. Detective Clark testified that 0.2 grams of crack coNos. 11-2267, 11-2288, 11-2535 & 11-2687 29 caine was a common dosage unit for crack cocaine, and more than 450 dosage units of crack cocaine were seized from the residence. And the crack and scale in the kitchen were found in sight of a substantial stack of currency, a typical feature of the lucrative, cash-based business of illegal drug trafficking. Thus, the evidence raises a reasonable inference that Jones possessed the cocaine with intent to distribute it. Turning to the firearms found at the residence, we reach the same conclusion. The government argues that it has established a substantial connection between Jones and the .22 caliber Ruger pistol based on the proximity of the pistol to the crack cocaine found by the entertainment center in the living room. Detective Kunst testified that a Pyrex bowl containing the crack was “in the living room by the entertainment center” and the Ruger was found by reaching behind that center. Although not right next to each other, the drugs and that gun were in close proximity to each other. Regarding all the firearms found in the house, the government argues that it established a substantial connection between Jones and these firearms with proof of motive. The government relies on the strong relationship between drug trafficking and the possession of firearms. We have remarked that “it is widely known that guns and drugs go hand in hand.” United States v. Gulley, 722 F.3d 901, 908 (7th Cir. 2013). Similarly, we and countless experts have recognized that “guns are tools of the drug trade.” United States v. Vaughn, 585 F.3d 1024, 1029 (7th Cir. 2009). And although we have also recognized that “the average juror is not well versed in the mechanics of the drug trade,” United States v. Ramirez-Fuentes, 703 F.3d 1038, 1043 (7th Cir. 2013), the government helped the jury draw that connection through the 30 Nos. 11-2267, 11-2288, 11-2535 & 11-2687 testimony of one of its law enforcement witnesses. IMPD Detective Stephen Swarm testified without objection that, based on his training and experience, drug traffickers use firearms to protect themselves from robbery or from being arrested by the police. Trial Tr. vol. 5, 748–49. Such testimony comports with what courts have allowed “concerning the tools of the [drug] trade.” Ramirez-Fuentes, 703 F.3d at 1043 (quoting United States v. Allen, 269 F.3d 842, 846 (7th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). The evidence of Jones’s participation in drug trafficking provides the motive for his possession of all three firearms found in the residence and therefore establishes the substantial connection between Jones and the firearms. Viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find that Jones possessed crack cocaine with the intent to distribute it and that he possessed the firearms to protect that distribution objective. Therefore, Jones’s sufficiency challenge to his convictions is unsuccessful.