Opinion ID: 1377460
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Analogous Precedent

Text: Despite multitudinous research efforts, only one factually similar decision was unearthed that involved a judicial officer who sought to enhance his term length while still fulfilling a term to which he had been elected. In Hurowitz v. Board of Elections, 53 N.Y.2d 531, 443 N.Y.S.2d 54, 426 N.E.2d 746 (1981), a sitting civil court judge, who had served less than half of the ten-year term to which he had been elected, filed as a candidate for another ten-year seat on the same judicial body. Like Justice McGraw, Judge Hurowitz asserted his right to seek a separate judicial seat on the same court based on the language of New York's corollary to article VIII, section 7 of our state constitution. Citing the language of article VI, section 20 of the New York Constitution, which provided that a Judge may not `be eligible to be a candidate for any public office other than judicial office ... unless he resigns his judicial office,' Judge Hurowitz argued that the quoted constitutional language not only permits members of the judiciary to retain their positions while they pursue vacancies on other courts, but also sanctions sitting Judges whose terms have not yet expired to be candidates for identical positions on the same court. 443 N.Y.S.2d 54, 426 N.E.2d at 747. In rejecting Judge Hurowitz's postulate, the New York court examined the entirety of the language of article VI in which the subject constitutional language was located to determine the underlying general intent of the article. When the whole sixth (or judiciary) article of the Constitution is considered, certain purposes are clearly indicated. It was proposed to provide for the State a general and complete and continuous judicial system, and to create, or recognize and continue, all the judicial officers needed therefor.... It was designed that the general and    the exclusive mode of filling these offices    should be by election by the people, and not by appointment. 443 N.Y.S.2d 54, 426 N.E.2d at 747 (quoting People ex rel. Jackson v. Potter, 47 N.Y. 375, 379-80 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1872)). In light of the historical underpinnings of the judiciary article, the court in Hurowitz concluded that article VI was designed to assure a structured judiciary elected on a regular basis without fragmentation of terms. To accept this candidate's interpretation of section 20 would defeat the over-all purposes of article VI. Such activities could fragment terms and create interim vacancies on a regular basis, thereby infringing upon the people's right to a complete and continuous judicial system. 443 N.Y.S.2d 54, 426 N.E.2d at 748 (quoting Potter, 47 N.Y. at 379). Besides its concerns over fragmentation and the consequent disruption to the judicial process, the court in Hurowitz considered the logical consequences of the judge's candidacy on the selection of judges: [T]he nature of the Judge's candidacy could have the effect of aborting the election process. By seeking another position on the same court where he currently sits, he not only allows himself multiple chances to be re-elected, but also assures that when he is elected to the other position on the same court, a vacancy will occur. Such a vacancy creates an additional occasion for political involvement. Moreover, should this type of conduct become the norm, it would be possible that all positions would be appointive upon the resignations and shiftings of the other Judges; only at the next general election would the people be given a chance to vote, the effect of which may well be to merely approve the appointment. Although we do not find that this is currently the practice, the likelihood of such a result portends abuse of the elective system. Even viewed in its most favorable light, this conduct has the potential for mischief which this court cannot condone. 443 N.Y.S.2d 54, 426 N.E.2d at 748. Long before the Hurowitz decision, the New York Supreme Court was forced to consider, in its Potter decision of 1872, the effects necessarily wreaked upon the electoral process when judicial appointments are required due to politically-motivated vacancies. [16] If a vacancy in a term ... may defeat the electors of their privilege to choose an incumbent ..., so a resignation ... during the running of the term will have the same effect. More than that too, the appointee of the Governor, ... may ... resign his office, and then a vacancy again occurs, to be again filled by appointment for a like fractional term.... And this succession of appointment and resignation, and resignation and appointment, may be kept up as long as the judicial and executive servants of the people may be willing to act in it. Thus would the electors be permanently defeated in the exercise of their constitutional privilege of choice. It needs not to name all the evils which would thus result. It is sufficient to say, that it would work an entire perversion of the spirit and general intent of the judiciary article[.] Potter, 47 N.Y. 375, 1872 WL 9733 at p.3 (emphasis supplied). The potential for public backlash to this type of candidacy was fully appreciated by the court in Hurowitz: Not without significance in this connection is the risk of the appearance of impropriety that may be perceived by the public in a Judge's injection of himself into the political process for the sole purpose of extending his tenure. 443 N.Y.S.2d 54, 426 N.E.2d at 748 (emphasis supplied). Such injection into the political process, according to the court in Hurowitz, was contrary to the intent of the constitutional framers to minimize the involvement of the judiciary in the political process and the possible influences such exposure might bring with it. Id. With this sentiment, we heartily agree.