Opinion ID: 652876
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Strength of Evidence Supporting Detention.

Text: 31 As previously indicated, this factor requires consideration of the strength of the prosecution's evidence regarding the risk that Millan and Rivera will flee, and the danger their release would pose to any other person and the community. 32
33 In ordering Rivera released on bail, Judge Kram performed only a brief review of the evidence concerning risk of flight. She noted the defendant's proffered explanations for several bench warrants that had been issued against Rivera in criminal actions in New York courts, but stated that, the Court is not in a position to assess the validity of these explanations. Rivera, slip op. at 4. She also noted that Rivera ha[d] lived his entire life in New York City and ha[d] solid verifiable ties to the community, including his mother, wife and five children. Id. Essentially, however, Judge Kram concluded that whatever risk of flight Rivera might pose, due process required his release in view of the length of his detention and the government's responsibility for delaying the trial. See id. at 4-5. 34 As noted earlier, Judge Sotomayor took a less favorable view concerning the bench warrants and the significance of Rivera's current ties to the community. Judge Sotomayor also stressed the potential sentence faced by Rivera, his travels abroad and ties to communities outside New York City, and his financial ability, as a result of his dealings in heroin, to facilitate flight and reimburse bail sureties. Judge Kram did not address these matters. Whether or not Judge Kram should have accorded some deference to the prior determination by Judge Sotomayor under the doctrine of law of the case, cf. Melendez-Carrion, 820 F.2d at 60 n. 1; Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2d at 337, it is clear that the matters considered by Judge Sotomayor have a legitimate bearing upon, and must be considered in assessing, Rivera's risk of flight. In addition, knowledge regarding the government's case that Rivera obtained during the aborted initial trial, as well as from a brief period of cooperation during which the government made Rivera privy to substantial evidence of his guilt, provides a considerable additional incentive to flee. We deem that risk high, for the same reasons that Judge Sotomayor did. Indeed, we do not understand Judge Kram to be in essential disagreement with that view, but rather to have regarded the risk of Rivera's flight, however serious, to be outweighed by the other applicable factors. 35 This is even more clearly the case with respect to Millan. Judge Kram noted that as the head of the Blue Thunder organization, Millan had received a sizable portion of the $65 million in heroin revenues collected by the organization during the forty months for which the government seized financial records, some of which he had secreted overseas. Millan, 824 F.Supp. at 42. The court also acknowledged that Millan had travelled extensively in South America. Id. While it noted various factors mitigating the risk of flight, such as Millan's ties to the New York area, the court found, on balance, that 36 the serious nature of the crimes charged, the central role Millan allegedly played in heading the organization responsible for those crimes, his obvious incentive to flee in light of a potential life sentence, and the extent and weight of the evidence indicating his culpability all point towards a serious risk of flight in the case at hand. 37 Id. at 44. 38 Despite this assessment, Judge Kram concluded that at some point risk of flight must be accepted in order to avoid a deprivation of constitutional rights, and that [t]hat point has been reached. Id. In so ruling, she relied heavily upon our decisions in Ojeda Rios and Gonzales Claudio. As we have indicated, however, Ojeda Rios involved a significantly longer period of detention than this case. Gonzales Claudio presented at least a twenty-six month period of anticipated confinement, see 806 F.2d at 341, and significantly greater governmental responsibility for the overall delay than is presented here. See id. at 341-43; cf. Melendez-Carrion, 820 F.2d at 60-62 (reassessing government's responsibility for delay in same case in light of additional evidence, and authorizing continued confinement of codefendants for anticipated total period of thirty-two months). 39 We conclude that both Rivera and Millan present a high risk of flight, and proceed to consider the danger to any person or the community that would result from their release on bail. 40
41 The rulings of both Judge Sotomayor and Judge Kram regarding Rivera on this issue were entirely conclusory. Judge Sotomayor simply stated that Rivera continues to be a danger to this community, relying in this respect upon the prior rulings of three magistrate judges who had considered the issue of Rivera's release. Judge Kram ruled, without elaboration, that the Court finds that the bail conditions proposed by defense counsel will adequately ensure the safety of community members. Rivera, slip op. at 4. There is a statutory presumption that 42 no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of the community if the judicial officer finds that there is probable cause to believe that the person committed an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. Sec. 951 et seq.). 43 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(e) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). That presumption is obviously applicable to Rivera (and Millan) in this case. Cf. Rodriguez, 950 F.2d at 88 (presumption continues to be weighed even after presentation of rebuttal evidence); Jackson, 823 F.2d at 6-7 (same). In addition, in making a release assessment, a judicial officer must take into account: 44 (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence or involves a narcotic drug; 45 (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; 46 (3) the history and characteristics of the person, including-- 47 (A) the person's character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings; and 48 (B) whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the person was on probation, on parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an offense under Federal, State, or local law; and 49 (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person's release. 50 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(g)(1)-(4) (1988 & Supp. II 1990) (emphasis added). 51 In assessing these considerations, we note that Rivera was arrested in 1982 for possession of a controlled substance, was again arrested in 1983 for loitering and the unlawful use of a controlled substance, and pled guilty to these charges. Rivera was convicted of criminally negligent homicide in the 1983 shooting death of his wife. Moreover, much of the ongoing criminal activity charged in the indictment occurred during Rivera's five years of probation following his homicide conviction. 52 The district court's assessment of Millan's dangerousness was more extensive. At the outset of the memorandum in which his release was ordered, the court explicitly stated that the evidence presented supports Millan's continued detention on the ground[ ] of dangerousness, Millan, 824 F.Supp. at 39, but concluded that such detention was constitutionally impermissible. Id. Its subsequent discussion of the issue, however, expressed a more mixed view. 53 After summarizing testimony by former Blue Thunder confederates that Millan had ordered numerous shootings, beatings, and a contract murder, and had issued threats against the families of witnesses who testified adversely to him at trial, the court stated that Millan did not present[ ] a danger to any specific individual, id. at 44, noting that he had not individually threatened the testifying confederates or their families, and that the cooperating witnesses had difficulty attributing any specific acts of violence directly to Millan because (in the words of one of the witnesses) he gets others to do his dirty work for him very often. Id. 54 The court then inferred that the principal concern raised by the prosecution was the prospect that Millan would return to criminal activity to the detriment of the community. Id. at 45 (citing United States v. Leon, 766 F.2d 77, 81 (2d Cir.1985) (it is clear that the harm to society caused by narcotics trafficking is encompassed within Congress definition of 'danger' )). The court concluded that an adequate likelihood of recidivism had not been established to warrant continued confinement, noting that the offenses charged are Millan's first and that his alleged misconduct occurred over two years ago [i.e., before he was detained]. The court's ultimate conclusion was that continued detention, beyond twenty-three months, of a person presumed to be innocent is fundamentally unfair and violates due process. Id. 55 In our view, the district court employed an erroneous analysis in assessing the danger that Millan posed to the safety of any other person or the community within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(e)-(g) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). The court invoked a statement in S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3195, that: The reference to safety of any other person is intended to cover the situation in which the safety of a particular identifiable individual, perhaps a victim or witness, is of concern.... The report goes on to state that the language referring to the safety of the community refers to the danger that the defendant might engage in criminal activity to the detriment of the community. Id. The district court concluded, in effect, that because drug trafficking falls within the concept of danger to the community, the prosecution's contentions that Millan posed a danger to the community should be confined to the likelihood that he would resume such activity; and that the absence of a particularized threat to intimidate a specific witness precluded a finding that Millan posed a danger to the safety of any other person. 56 We reject this analysis. Our ruling in Leon that narcotics trafficking constitutes criminal activity to the detriment of the community of the sort envisioned by the Senate report should not be read to imply that obstruction of justice by intimidation of witnesses does not fit within the concept. Further, the notion that only threats to particular, specified witnesses provide a basis for detention is contravened by our ruling in United States v. Gotti, 794 F.2d 773 (2d Cir.1986). 57 In that case, a specific past instance of witness tampering was deemed to provide an adequate basis for confinement in the face of Gotti's claim that the due process clause prohibits pretrial detention based on a prediction that a defendant will intimidate witnesses because he has done so in a prior case. Id. at 779 (emphasis added). The district court opinion that we affirmed was similarly unspecific, concluding only that if continued on bail John Gotti would improperly influence or intimidate witnesses in this case. United States v. Gotti, 634 F.Supp. 877, 887 (E.D.N.Y.) (emphasis added), aff'd, 794 F.2d 773 (2d Cir.1986). 58 Neither the district court nor this court required the identification of a particular trial witness or witnesses that might be the object of influence or intimidation. We reject the notion that such an identification is required in the instant case, where credible testimony has been presented that Millan repeatedly threatened to harm any witnesses that might testify against him, and their families. Cf. Rodriguez, 950 F.2d at 88 (repudiating requirement imposed by district court that the violent conduct witnessed by the informant be connected to the activity charged in the indictment). 59 We conclude that the district court did not adequately examine the issue of dangerousness with respect to Rivera, and conducted a legally flawed examination with respect to Millan. See Shakur, 817 F.2d at 196 (The clearly erroneous standard does not apply to the district court's ultimate finding ... if the court has made an error of law.) (citing Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 994). It is our view that both Rivera and Millan would pose a very serious danger to the community in the event of their pretrial release on bail. We note in this respect that: 60 the constitutional limits on a detention period based on dangerousness to the community may be looser than the limits on a detention period based solely on risk of flight. In the former case, release risks injury to others, while in the latter case, release risks only the loss of a conviction. 61 Orena, 986 F.2d at 631. 62