Opinion ID: 6500908
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Terry Stop or De Facto Arrest?

Text: The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Stopping someone is generally considered a seizure for which probable cause is required. Id.; see also United States v. Reedy, 989 F.3d 548, 552 (7th Cir. 2021). In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court recognized a limited exception to the Fourth Amendment’s probable-cause requirement for brief investigatory stops. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The salient difference between a Terry stop and a de facto arrest is the degree of justification required for the seizure. The former requires only reasonable suspicion of criminal activity while the latter demands probable cause. Rabin v. Flynn, 725 F.3d 628, 632–33 (7th Cir. 2013). The distinction between a Terry stop and a de facto arrest is subtle. United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1016 (7th Cir. 2011); Rabin, 725 F.3d at 832–33. Terry stops often place law enforcement at great risk of physical danger. United States v. Askew, 403 F.3d 496, 507 (7th Cir. 2005). Consequently, law enforcement’s use of force does not necessarily transform a Terry stop into an arrest where the circumstances give rise to a justifiable fear for personal safety. Id. If, however, law 3 As discussed in detail below, we find no Fourth Amendment violation. Therefore, we need not address the application of the good-faith exception. See United States v. Gibson, 996 F.3d 451, 462 (7th Cir. 2021). 10 No. 21-2128 enforcement’s use of force during a Terry stop is “disproportionate to the purpose of such a stop in light of the surrounding circumstances … the encounter becomes a formal arrest.” Rabin, 725 F.3d at 632–33. When considering whether use of force amounts to a de facto arrest, we examine “whether the surrounding circumstances would support an officer’s legitimate fear for personal safety.” Matz v. Klotka, 769 F.3d 517, 526 (7th Cir. 2014). No two encounters are identical, so there is “no litmus-paper test for determining when a seizure exceeds the bounds of an investigative stop and becomes an arrest.” Bullock, 632 F.3d at 1016 (internal quotations omitted). The officers approached Olson with their guns drawn, ordered him to place his hands on the hood of the car, physically secured his arms, disarmed him, and handcuffed him. In Olson’s view, this amounts to a de facto arrest. The officers’ decision to draw their weapons and handcuff Olson is atypical of a permissible Terry stop. We have consistently recognized, however, that the use of such force does not automatically convert a Terry stop into an arrest under certain circumstances, such as when officer safety is in question or a weapon may be present. United States v. Shoals, 478 F.3d 850, 853 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The cases are clear … that police officers do not convert a Terry stop into a full custodial arrest just by drawing their weapons or handcuffing the subject.”); see also United States v. Eatman, 942 F.3d 344, 347 (7th Cir. 2019); Howell v. Smith, 853 F.3d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 2017); Matz, 769 F.3d at 525. Both are true here. Given the unique and extreme circumstances of the night in question, the officers’ use of force when approaching Olson was eminently justifiable. What little the officers knew about Olson when they decided to confront him demanded they do so with extreme No. 21-2128 11 caution. Having watched Olson conceal a gun in the waistband of his pants, the officers knew Olson was armed. Hamilton saw Olson drinking from a “tallboy” style can possibly containing alcohol, suggesting Olson could be intoxicated. Olson carefully scrutinized his surroundings, which Gatdula and Hamilton interpreted to be “countersurveillance” measures to avoid detection. The officers had little time to confront Olson before he had the opportunity to leave the area, and Marzullo was particularly concerned Olson might pursue the group of officers that recently left the chapel. Each of the officers testified, and the district court found, that one purpose of the stop was to ensure law enforcement and civilian safety. Beyond Olson’s individual actions, the singular circumstances of the night in question reinforce the appropriateness of the officers’ response. During the weekend of May 30–31, 2020, widespread “chaotic, volatile, and dangerous” civil unrest characterized by rampant violence and arson gripped Madison. Law enforcement and civilians alike faced a serious risk of grave bodily harm. MPD officers were a particular target of an unpredictable mob comprised of several hundred people, some portion of whom came equipped with weapons and body armor. That weekend, protestors physically assaulted MPD officers and threatened them with further violence and death. Indeed, shortly before the officers approached Olson, a group of MPD officers left the chapel to assist an injured comrade. In this explosive atmosphere, it would have been foolish for the officers to treat Olson with anything but the utmost caution. 12 No. 21-2128 Olson’s initial seizure was a Terry stop, not a de facto arrest. We must determine, therefore, only whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Olson.