Opinion ID: 2975481
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Nature of the Victim

Text: The district court did not inappropriately enhance Brown Sr.’s sentence because the victim was his own son. Neither party cites any cases that hold the identity of the victim, in any sort of case, was an appropriate or inappropriate factor to consider. Brown Sr. points only to several newspaper articles indicating that identity theft is often perpetrated by members of one’s own family to prove that this is not an exceptional case. His argument, however, is erroneous. First, the Guidelines direct the district court to consider the “nature and circumstances” of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). This direction gives the district court latitude to consider a 1 Brown Sr. indicates a third error in his brief. He argues that the court took the letters into account not only to increase the his sentence based on past bad conduct, but also because of the present crime’s impact on his non-victim family members. This memo considers these two factors together because it concludes that the district court did not inappropriately consider the letters for any purpose. 4 wide range of factors directly related to the offense itself. The relationship of the victim to the defendant – whether a close friend, a family member, or a complete stranger – is a salient circumstance of the offense and the district court acts within its discretion when it increases or decreases a sentence based on that relationship (so long, of course, as the court does not place “an unreasonable amount of weight” on that relationship, Webb, 403 F.3d at 385). Second, committing a crime against a close family relation is, in many cases, a more heinous crime than if against a complete stranger. In United States v. Ferguson the district court applied a § 3B1.3 adjustment for abuse of a position of trust, which increased the offense level by two, and calculated the Guidelines recommended range accordingly. 456 F.3d 660, 664, 667 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3). Nonetheless, the district court determined that that increase was insufficient, and it departed upwards from the recommended range to (in part) deter others from abusing similar positions of trust. This court affirmed. Analogously, family members, in the ordinary case, are in a position of trust vis-à-vis one another and are in better position to obtain personal information. They are also in a position to directly and closely observe the effect their crime has on the victim. An identity thief who steals personal information from an internet database will not, most likely, be in the same position to observe the deleterious effects of his crime as the thief who steals from his neighbor. This closeness is exacerbated in this case, where Brown Sr. continued the theft for almost three years; indeed, the district court explicitly took into account the length of time that Brown Sr. was aware of the harm his crime caused his son. Finally, “[i]t has always been the case . . . that the appropriate penalty on a defendant can take into account the nature of the victims.” United States v. Cavera, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 1628799 (2nd Cir. June 6, 2007) (Calabresi, J., concurring dubitante). For example, the Guidelines recommend 5 an upward adjustment if the victim is a particularly vulnerable victim. U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b) & cmt. (“‘[V]ulnerable victim’ means a person . . . who is unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or who is otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct.” (emphasis added)). While the district court did not apply a § 3A1.1(b) adjustment to Brown Sr.’s sentence, it is clear that the Guidelines contemplate the district court taking the nature of the victim into account. Therefore, it was not error for the district court to consider that the victim of Brown Sr.’s crime was his own son.