Opinion ID: 763468
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The County's Competing Interpretation of Definition 10(c)

Text: 35 The county urges this Court to accept an alternative reading of definition 10(c) as reasonable. According to the county, the phrase by or on behalf of defines the possessory interest of the person aggrieved in 10(c). Under this interpretation, in order for the insured to invoke coverage for an invasion, the claimant must have the right to occupy the premises, either as owner, landlord, or lessor, or with the permission of the owner, landlord, or lessor. 36 In support of its interpretation, the county cites United States v. Security Management Co., 96 F.3d 260 (7th Cir.1996). In that case, the Seventh Circuit examined language identical to definition 10(c). Although the District Court found the provision to be ambiguous, the Seventh Circuit read the language beginning that a person occupies ... as unambiguously refin[ing] the nature of the prerequisite 'right' of private occupancy. Id. at 265. In other words, in the view of the Security Management court, the language at issue limit[s] coverage to those instances where 'a person occupies by or on behalf of its owner, landlord or lessor'  and functions to exclude[ ] at least unapproved sub-lessees from coverage. Id. 37 The Seventh Circuit's commentary on the meaning of the clause again is dicta, however. Its holding is based on the fact that the litigants claiming an invasion in that case unquestionably lacked any ... enforceable claim of occupancy, Id. at 265; indeed, the litigants were testers, or civil rights activists who posed as apartment-hunters but who did not actually rent a unit. Id. at 265. As we noted earlier, we are not bound by this dicta, although we may consider it in our analysis if we deem it appropriate. See supra n. 7. 38 The county also cites Blackhawk--Central City Sanitation District v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 856 F.Supp. 584 (D.Colo.1994), for the proposition that definition 10(c) is ambiguous. In that case, the court was asked to construe language identical to definition 10(c), and the parties' arguments mirror those presented here. Appellee contended that language identical to definition 10(c) requires that the eviction, entry or invasion be by or on behalf of the owner, landlord or lessor of the premises. Id. at 590. The appellant, on the other hand, argued that the provision could be read to modify, not the party who evicts, enters or invades, but rather on whose authority the current occupant holds the property. Id. Faced with these competing interpretations, the court deemed the provision ambiguous and construed the language in favor of the insured. See id. The Blackhawk--Central court, however, did not elaborate on how it reached its conclusion and thus provides us with little guidance. 39 In sum, the county has presented this Court with authority to suggest that definition 10(c) is ambiguous. The case law it cites--Security Management and Blackhawk--Central--however, is either dicta or void of analysis and thus it does not, by itself, establish that definition 10(c) is ambiguous or that the county's interpretation is reasonable. Having reviewed the relevant case law supporting both sides of the issue, we consider the weight of the authority.