Opinion ID: 2569354
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Instruction on Affirmative Defense of Intoxication

Text: Harlan argues that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury to consider whether, due to his voluntary intoxication, he had the capacity to form the specific intent required for first degree murder. The defendant alleges that this instruction violated his due process right to require the prosecution to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all the elements of the charged offense, by impermissibly lowering the prosecution's burden of proof concerning his affirmative defense of intoxication. We hold that the instruction given, based on model instruction COLJI-Crim. 7:13 (1983), is an incorrect statement of law, but that it constituted harmless error in this case.
We begin by explaining why voluntary intoxication, evidence of which is introduced to negate the specific intent element of the charged offense, does not constitute an affirmative defense under section 18-1-804, 6 C.R.S (1999). At trial Harlan asserted a right to have his voluntary intoxication defense presented to the jury as an affirmative defense. The prosecution did not object, and Trial Phase Instruction No. 28  following the model instruction  instructed the jury that the defendant's claim of voluntary intoxication was an affirmative defense. On appeal, neither party challenges the characterization. We address this issue sua sponte to avoid perpetuating the confusion presented in this case. According to section 18-1-804(1): Intoxication of the accused is not a defense to a criminal charge, except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, but in any prosecution for an offense, evidence of intoxication of the defendant may be offered by the defendant when it is relevant to negative the existence of a specific intent if such intent is an element of the crime charged. [12] Subsection (1) indicates that intoxication is not a defense, but that evidence of intoxication is relevant to whether the defendant had the specific intent required by the charged offense. [13] That is, the statute sets forth a rule concerning the admissibility of evidence of intoxication by the defendant to counter the prosecution's evidence that the defendant had the requisite specific intent of the charged offense. Such evidence does not excuse or justify the criminal conduct, absolving the defendant of criminal liability, as do affirmative defenses. See, e.g., §§ 18-1-701 to -710, 6 C.R.S. (1999). Section 18-1-804(1) absolves a defendant of liability only for a specific intent offense when the evidence of intoxication negates the existence of the specific intent. A defendant, after introducing such evidence, nonetheless remains liable for a lesser included general intent offense (in this case, second degree murder). Therefore, subsections (1) and (3) are distinct in language, function, and effect. Subsection (1) is explicitly described as not comprising a defense, whereas subsection (3) is denominated as a defense. See § 18-1-804(1). The function of subsection (1) is to identify evidence of voluntary intoxication as relevant to the issue of whether a defendant had the mental state required for a specific intent offense. Subsection (3) asks whether the defendant had the capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law in light of intoxication that was not self-induced. Subsection (1) weighs in on the issue of specific intent, whereas subsection (3) excuses a defendant of all criminal liability. We previously have recognized these differences between subsections (1) and (3). See People v. Low, 732 P.2d 622, 627-28 (Colo.1987). We therefore understand the plain meaning of subsection (1) to be that it is an evidentiary rule permitting the introduction of evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate the requisite specific intent of the charged offense.
Harlan was not entitled under section 18-1-804 to an instruction setting forth an affirmative defense of intoxication. He would have been entitled to such an instruction only if he introduced evidence suggesting he was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law due to intoxication that was not self-induced. See § 18-1-804(3)-(4). The defendant did not satisfy these conditions. Harlan presented no evidence that his intoxication was involuntary. He did not argue that he was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. His claim instead was that he was voluntarily intoxicated and that he did not intend to kill his victim or deliberate prior to the killing. Therefore, the defendant's claim falls squarely under section 18-1-804(1). Nevertheless, we must determine whether Trial Phase Instruction No. 28 violated the defendant's due process right to require the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to every element of first degree murder. Harlan asserts that Trial Phase Instruction No. 28 impermissibly lowered the prosecution's burden of proof because it required the jury to consider only whether, in light of the evidence of intoxication presented by the defendant, the prosecution proved that the defendant had the capacity to form the requisite specific intent element of first degree murder, not whether he in fact formed the specific intent. We hold that the trial court committed harmless error by so instructing the jury.
It is an essential feature of a fair trial that the trial court correctly instruct the jury on all matters of law. See People v. Mattas, 645 P.2d 254, 257 (Colo.1982). A defendant's right to due process requires correct jury instructions when such instructions bear on the prosecution's burden to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385, 390 (Colo.1982); Mattas, 645 P.2d at 257. Trial Phase Instruction No. 28 stated that: It as an affirmative defense to the crimes of First Degree Murder after deliberation, First Degree Assault and Attempted First Degree Murder after deliberation that the defendant, because of intoxication, did not have the capacity to form that specific intent required by the offense. (Emphasis added.) We hold that the trial court erred in giving Trial Phase Instruction No. 28 because the instruction mistakenly conflates subsections (1) and (3) of section 18-1-804. The instruction fuses the specific intent element of subsection (1) with a single term from the capacity to conform his conduct element of subsection (3). The defendant's claim of intoxication falls under section 18-1-804(1), which, as we have seen, states that evidence of intoxication is admissible when it bears on the question of whether the defendant in fact had the specific intent of the charged offense. Trial Phase Instruction No. 28, however, called for the jury to consider whether intoxication eliminated Harlan's capacity to form the specific intent. Proving that Harlan had the capacity to form the requisite specific intent does not also prove that he in fact formed it. Therefore, the instruction misstates how the jury was to consider the evidence of intoxication. Although Trial Phase Instruction No. 28 is an erroneous statement of law, it does not require reversal of the defendant's conviction or sentence.
Harlan asserts that Trial Phase Instruction No. 28 is in direct conflict with the trial court's instructions concerning the elements of first degree murder, which correctly stated that the defendant is guilty of first degree murder only if he had the requisite specific intent, and not merely the capacity to form that intent. The result of this conflict, he further claims, is that the prosecution's burden of proof concerning the first degree murder charge was impermissibly lowered. Because Harlan preserved the issue for appeal, we consider his claim under a harmless error standard. Under this standard, trial errors require reversal unless the appellate court can declare a belief that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Dunlap, 975 P.2d at 737 (internal quotation marks omitted). Our inquiry is whether Trial Phase Instruction No. 28, in light of the other instructions given and presented in the guilt phase, contributed to the verdicts ultimately rendered or undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial. See id.; Bogdanov v. People, 941 P.2d 247, 253 (Colo.1997). We conclude that the use of Trial Phase Instruction No. 28 was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury instructions taken as a whole kept the prosecution to its proper burden of proof concerning all the elements of first degree murder. See People v. Riley, 708 P.2d 1359, 1365 (Colo.1985) (stating that in determining the propriety of a particular jury instruction the instructions should be viewed as a whole); People v. Travis, 192 Colo. 169, 171, 558 P.2d 579, 581 (1976) (It is axiomatic ... that instructions are to be read as a whole and that if taken as a whole they adequately inform the jury of the law, there is no reversible error.). Trial Phase Instruction No. 28, read alone, tends to create the erroneous impression that, to rebut what is mistakenly called the defendant's affirmative defense, the prosecution need only prove that Harlan had the capacity to form the specific intent required for first degree murder. However, the trial court also correctly instructed the jury that, to carry its burden of proof concerning the first degree murder charges, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offense, including the specific intent element. See Trial Phase Instruction No. 6. The jury therefore always had before it an instruction that correctly stated both the culpable mental state element of first degree murder and the prosecution's burden of proof concerning the offense, as well as the affirmative defense instruction which required the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Harlan's capacity to form the mental state. In effect, then, the instructions functioned consistently: proving that the defendant in fact formed the specific intent for first degree murder implies proof that he had the capacity to form the intent. The affirmative defense instruction highlighted one aspect of the prosecution's burden of proof, but did not thereby lower that burden. The instructions given in this case, viewed as a whole, held the prosecution to its proper burden. Therefore, Harlan was not deprived of his right to a trial by jury. See Travis, 192 Colo. at 171, 558 P.2d at 581. The jury, in order to conclude that Harlan was guilty of first degree murder, was required to find that the prosecution proved that the defendant had the capacity to form, and in fact did form, the requisite specific intent. See Hendershott, 653 P.2d at 390; Mattas, 645 P.2d at 259. This case is thereby distinguishable from those in which reviewing courts have found reversible error due to jury instructions that improperly lowered the prosecution's burden of proof concerning the offense See, e.g., Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281-82, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (erroneous definition of reasonable doubt); People v. Vance, 933 P.2d 576, 580-81 (Colo.1997) (failure to submit an element of the offense to jury). Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that a jury follows the trial court's instructions. See Dunlap, 975 P.2d at 743. The defendant presents no evidence to suggest that the jury failed to follow the guilt phase instructions that identified the true elements of first degree murder or that the jury was wrongly guided by Trial Phase Instruction No. 28 in determining whether the prosecution proved the elements of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, Trial Phase Instruction No. 28 is harmless error because the trial court directed the jury to consider whether the prosecution had met its burden to prove each element of first degree murder in light of the evidence of intoxication presented by the defendant. Under section 18-1-804(1), such evidence is admissible when it is relevant to whether a defendant had the requisite mental state for the charged offense. The trial court never instructed the jury to consider the intoxication evidence only regarding what had been mistakenly described as the defendant's affirmative defense. The jury, we must presume, considered the evidence of intoxication when determining whether the prosecution proved the elements of first degree murder. During the defendant's guilt phase closing argument, the trial court explicitly indicated that the jury could apply evidence of intoxication to the issue of whether the mental state element of first degree murder was proved: [DEFENSE:] Now  but he [defendant] did say he was on crack and ... that allows you to consider intoxication both as an affirmative defense and as it relates to generally deliberation and intention, just as a general factor. [PROSECUTION:] Objection, Your Honor. I believe the Court has ruled with respect to deliberation it does not apply. [DEFENSE:] I recognize that the Court said it did not apply as an affirmative defense but it does apply as part of [the] total circumstances whether a person can deliberate or not. [COURT:] I'll overrule the objection. (Emphasis added.) Here the trial court allowed defense counsel to invite the jury to consider intoxication as relevant not only to the affirmative defense, but also to whether Harlan deliberated before killing his victim. The court's ruling during the defendant's guilt phase closing argument mirrors Trial Phase Instruction No. 30. The trial court explicitly told the jury in this instruction to consider evidence of intoxication in determining whether the prosecution has prove[d] beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Harlan had the required culpable mental state for first degree murder (after deliberation). (Emphasis added.) [14] We conclude that when the jury found that the prosecution had proved all the elements of first degree murder, it could only do so after considering whether intoxication prevented Harlan from having the culpable mental state for first degree murder, including after deliberation, in accordance with the requirements of section 18-1-804(1). Therefore, the evidence of intoxication served its proper purpose in the guilt phase of Harlan's trial.
Therefore, we hold that voluntary intoxication does not constitute an affirmative defense. To the extent that prior decisions indicate otherwise, they are disapproved. See, e.g., People v. DelGuidice, 199 Colo. 41, 44, 606 P.2d 840, 842 (1979); People v. Quintana, 996 P.2d 146 (Colo.App.1998). Despite Trial Phase Instruction No. 28's erroneous statement of the law, nothing in the record suggests that the error contributed to the verdicts rendered against the defendant or undermined the fundamental fairness of his trial. See Dunlap, 975 P.2d at 737; Bogdanov, 941 P.2d at 253; Vance, 933 P.2d at 580. For this reason, we hold that Trial Phase Instruction No. 28 is harmless error.