Opinion ID: 619888
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Hines’s Atkins Claim

Text: Having determined that reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s application of AEDPA deference to the state court’s factual determinations, we now turn to a “threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of [Hines’s Atkins] claim[]” to determine whether he is entitled to a COA. MillerEl, 537 U.S. at 327. We look to see if “jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of [Hines’s] constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Id. Whether Hines is mentally retarded is a question of fact, reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Clark v. Quarterman, 457 F.3d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 2006); see also Maldonado v. Thaler, 625 F.3d 229, 236 (5th Cir. 2010). Under 12 Case: 11-70010 Document: 00511707653 Page: 13 Date Filed: 12/27/2011 No. 11-70010 § 2254(d)(2), a federal district court may grant habeas relief “only if the state court’s adjudication of his claim on the merits . . . ‘resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’” Rabe, 649 F.3d at 308 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).5 In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), the Supreme Court held that the execution of the mentally retarded violates the Eighth Amendment as a cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 320–21. However, in its opinion, the Supreme Court did not offer a specific definition for “mental retardation,” instead opting to refer to two medical definitions of mental retardation, one from the American Association on Mental Retardation (“AAMR”)6 and another from the American 5 We also note that under AEDPA “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct,” such that “[t]he applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The relationship between this provision and § 2254(d)(2) is ambiguous. As this court has previously explained, “[w]e do not make any pronouncements as to whether the more deferential standard prescribed in § 2254(e)(1) applies in every case presenting a challenge under § 2254(d)(2),” a question that the Supreme Court has left open. See Turner v. Epps, 412 F. App’x 696, 700 n.2 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Wood v. Allen, 130 S. Ct. 841, 848–49 (2010) (observing, but not resolving, the circuit split among courts regarding the relationship between § 2254(d)(2) and § 2254(e)(1))). Below, we hold that reasonable jurists could not debate the correctness of the district court’s determination that the state court’s adjudication was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Therefore, we see no need to resolve which standard—the more rigorous “clear and convincing” or the more lenient “unreasonable determination”—should govern this case and do not consider this issue further. 6 The AAMR defines mental retardation as the following: Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present functioning. It is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work. Mental retardation manifests before age 18. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (9th ed. 1992). In 2002, the AAMR modified its definition accordingly: Mental retardation is a disability characterized by significant limitations both 13 Case: 11-70010 Document: 00511707653 Page: 14 Date Filed: 12/27/2011 No. 11-70010 Psychiatric Association (“APA”).7 The Court highlighted three relevant elements from these clinical definitions: “[M]ental retardation require[s] not only [1] subaverage intellectual functioning, but also [2] significant limitations in adaptive skills such as communication, self-care, and self-direction that [3] became manifest before age 18.” Id. at 318. The Court left ““to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.’” Id. at 317 (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. 399 at 405, 416–17) (alteration in original). Thus, in determining whether Hines merits a COA, we look to Texas’s law regarding mental retardation. In Texas, the state legislature has failed to provide a statutory definition for what qualifies as mental retardation in the wake of Atkins, resulting in the CCA’s crafting of these standards. See Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 271–72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see also Briseño, 135 S.W.3d at 5–13 (establishing a definition of mental retardation under Atkins). The CCA defined mental retardation in Briseno as “a disability characterized by: (1) ‘significantly subaverage’ general intellectual functioning; (2) accompanied by ‘related’ limitations in adaptive functioning; (3) the onset of in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills. This disability originates before age 18. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 1 (10th ed. 2002). 7 The APA defines mental retardation somewhat similarly: The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety (Criterion B). The onset must occur before age 18 years (Criterion C). AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 41 (4th ed.2000). This definition is often referred to as the DSM-IV-TR definition. 14 Case: 11-70010 Document: 00511707653 Page: 15 Date Filed: 12/27/2011 No. 11-70010 which occurs prior to the age of 18.” Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7 (footnotes omitted).8 Importantly, this definition draws on the standard provided for in the Texas Persons with Mental Retardation Act, which requires that mental retardation originate during a person’s “developmental period,” prior to their eighteenth birthday. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 591.003(13) (“‘Mental retardation’ means significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning that is concurrent with deficits in adaptive behavior and originates during the developmental period.”). “Significantly subaverage intellectual functioning is defined as an IQ of about 70 or below (approximately 2 standard deviations below the mean).” Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7 n.24 (citation omitted).9 “Impairments in adaptive behavior are defined as significant limitations in an individual’s effectiveness in meeting the standards of maturation, learning, personal independence, and/or social responsibility that are expected for his or her age level and cultural group, as determined by clinical assessment and, usually, standardized scales.” Id. at 7 n.25 (citation omitted).10 A defendant who seeks to invoke the affirmative defense of mental retardation bears the burden 8 More specifically, the CCA adopted the AAMR definition of mental retardation, as well as the definition laid out in Texas Health and Safety Code § 591.003(13). See Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7. 9 This is not an inflexible numerical standard, however: “Psychologists and other mental health professionals are flexible in their assessment of mental retardation; thus, sometimes a person whose IQ has tested above 70 may be diagnosed as mentally retarded while a person whose IQ tests below 70 may not be mentally retarded.” Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7 n.24. The Texas Health and Safety Code has further explained, “‘[s]ubaverage general intellectual functioning’ refers to measured intelligence on standardized psychometric instruments of two or more standard deviations below the age-group mean for the tests used.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 591.003(20). 10 Given that “[t]he adaptive behavior criteria are exceedingly subjective, and undoubtedly experts will be found to offer opinions on both sides,” the CCA paired this definition with a list of “evidentiary factors” relevant in identifying a limitation in adaptive functioning. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8–9. We discuss these in greater depth below. 15 Case: 11-70010 Document: 00511707653 Page: 16 Date Filed: 12/27/2011 No. 11-70010 of showing that he is mentally retarded by a preponderance of the evidence. Neal, 256 S.W.3d at 273. Hines makes several arguments generally asserting that a preponderance of the evidence presented to the state court showed that he meets the Texas criteria for mental retardation.11 First, Hines argues that there was a preponderance of the evidence showing that he had subaverage intellectual function before the age of eighteen, including the testimony of his second grade teacher, evidence that I.Q. tests administered to him prior to the age of eighteen were invalid and unreliable measures of intelligence, and expert testimony that on later exams after the age of eighteen Hines was not malingering and gave full effort. Second, Hines also contends that there was a preponderance of the evidence that he had adaptive deficits before the age of eighteen, including testimony from family members about Hines’s behavioral and learning deficits, as well as evidence that Hines was mostly in special education as a child. We parse the district court’s review of the evidence presented to the state court in order to ascertain if reasonable jurists could debate the district court’s conclusion: Namely, that the state court’s rejection of Hines’s Atkins claim was not an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence before it. i. Significantly Subaverage General Intellectual Functioning Hines initially presented several pieces of evidence in making his Atkins claim before the state court: “(1) a handful of records from the Texas Youth Commission (TYC), Child Protective Services (CPS), and Paris Independent School District (PISD), affidavits from three family members, a former school counselor, and a former teacher, (3) and the report of Dr. Wesley E. Profit, Ph.D., 11 Hines also argues that the district court, despite its statements to the contrary, failed to engage in the de novo review it claims to have carried out when reviewing his Rule 59(e) motion and instead deferred to the state court’s findings. Since we conclude that AEDPA deference was due to the state court’s findings, we reject his contention. 16 Case: 11-70010 Document: 00511707653 Page: 17 Date Filed: 12/27/2011 No. 11-70010 J.D.” Ex parte Bobby Lee Hines, No. W91-21511-I(B), at 4, ¶ 9 (June 23, 2005). These were later supplemented with the affidavit of a co-worker and a report from another expert, Gilda Kessner, Psy.D., who Hines hired to personally evaluate him Id. at 4, ¶ 9–10.12 The district court also considered six documented I.Q. scores:13