Opinion ID: 150603
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Vouching Argument

Text: A prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of a witness based on the prosecutor's personal knowledge, experience, or opinions. See Young, 470 U.S. at 18-19, 105 S.Ct. 1038. Vouching occurs when two criteria are met: (1) the prosecutor must assure the jury that testimony of a Government witness is credible; and (2) this assurance is based on either the prosecutor's personal knowledge, or other information not contained in the record. United States v. Walker, 155 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir.1998). While Lee says that the prosecutor vouched for the bloodhound evidence, the government argues that there was no vouching because the prosecutor merely told an anecdote about his own experience with Beagles and bird dogs. (Appellee's Ans. Br. at 64.) The government then argues that it is common knowledge that dogs have an ability much greater than humans to detect scent. ( Id. at 65 (quotation omitted).) Whether something is common knowledge to a group of people largely depends, of course, on the composition of the group. The amazing abilities of hunting dogs are not the common ken of all humanity. Perhaps the heightened ability of dogs to detect scent is well-known, but the prosecutor did not confine himself to that. Rather, he spoke from his own personal experience with dogs, dating back to his childhood, and reflected on the remarkable things he had witnessed. As a result, the jury may have been influenced by the prosecutor's experiences, thinking that the prosecutor's views bolstered the credibility of Kraus's and Harkins's testimony about Digger. [29] This is what the rule against vouching prohibits. However, even though the prosecutor did cross the line into improper vouching, a new trial is not warranted because it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to Lee's conviction, for several reasons. [30] Helbling, 209 F.3d at 241. First and most significantly, the prosecutor did not continue the vouching once an objection was raised and the District Court directed the prosecutor to move on. [31] See United States v. Galloway, 316 F.3d 624, 633 (6th Cir.2003) (holding that, while prosecutor's statement concerning his personal opinion were improper, the statement did not warrant a reversal because the defendant objected at trial and the court sustained the objection and directed the prosecutor to move on). Second, the acuteness of Digger's sense of smell was of record through Harkins's testimony. Third, the testimony about Digger's behavior required no vouching. The dog went within inches of the rifle on its way to the Apartments. That concrete and specific evidence, not general praise for the nose on man's best friend, is what in all likelihood left an impression on the jury, if anything about Digger did. Fourth, the Court specifically instructed the jury that what the lawyers said is not evidence and it's not binding on you. (App. at 589.) Thus, despite the wholly unnecessary vouching for the testimony about Digger and the gratuitous comments about a dog's ability to track a scent, a new trial is not warranted because it is highly probable that the misconduct did not contribute to the judgment. Lee challenges his sentence, arguing that the District Court erred in classifying his misdemeanor conviction for reckless endangerment as a crime of violence, thereby increasing his offense level under the career offender enhancement found in § 2K2.1(a)(2) and (a)(4) of the Sentencing Guidelines. [32] The government had argued to the District Court that Lee's conviction was a crime of violence under the Guidelines but, on appeal, concedes that reckless conduct, standing alone, is not the type of purposeful conduct that can constitute a crime of violence ... [and thus, Lee's] sentence should be vacated and the case remanded for the purposes of re-sentencing. (Appellee's Ans. Br. at 68 (citation omitted).) Lee and the government are correct in their agreement about the law. Following Lee's sentencing hearing, the Supreme Court decided Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008), in which it effectively held that, to qualify as a crime of violence, the crime at issue must present a serious potential risk of physical injury and be one that typically involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct. [33] Id. at 144-45, 128 S.Ct. 1581. The Court expressly distinguished crimes involving negligence or recklessness from those involving violence or aggression. Id. at 146, 128 S.Ct. 1581; see also United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir.2009). Thus, following Begay, a conviction for mere recklessness cannot constitute a crime of violence. [34] Lee's earlier-noted conviction for concededly reckless conduct, standing alone, does not qualify as a crime of violence. Accordingly, as the parties agree, Lee's sentence must be vacated and the case remanded for re-sentencing.