Opinion ID: 1651524
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Resubmission Clause

Text: [4] A constitution represents the supreme written will of the people regarding the framework for their government. Duggan, supra . The people have the power to amend the Nebraska Constitution by the initiative process pursuant to article III, § 2, which provides in part: The first power reserved by the people is the initiative whereby laws may be enacted and constitutional amendments adopted by the people independently of the Legislature. [5] In adopting the Nebraska Constitution, however, the people have imposed upon themselves limitations on their ability to amend this fundamental law. Duggan v. Beermann, 245 Neb. 907, 515 N.W.2d 788 (1994). The dispositive issue in this action is the application of the limitation on the initiative power found in article III, § 2, which provides that [t]he same measure, either in form or in essential substance, shall not be submitted to the people by initiative petition, either affirmatively or negatively, more often than once in three years. By its terms, the resubmission clause does not prevent resubmission or reconsideration by the voters, but merely postpones for 3 years reconsideration of the same measure. Although this provision has been a part of our state Constitution since 1912, this court has not previously construed or applied it to a specific initiative measure. In construing the provision, we are guided by familiar general principles. [6-8] In ascertaining the intent of a constitutional provision from its language, the court may not supply any supposed omission, or add words to or take words from the provision as framed. Pony Lake Sch. Dist. v. State Committee for Reorg., 271 Neb. 173, 710 N.W.2d 609 (2006); DeCamp v. State, 256 Neb. 892, 594 N.W.2d 571 (1999). The words in a constitutional provision must be interpreted and understood in their most natural and obvious meaning unless the subject indicates or the text suggests that they are used in a technical sense. See Hall v. Progress Pig, Inc., 259 Neb. 407, 610 N.W.2d 420 (2000). It is permissible to consider the historical facts in determining the meaning of the language of the Nebraska Constitution. Pig Pro Nonstock Co-op v. Moore, 253 Neb. 72, 568 N.W.2d 217 (1997). It is also appropriate and helpful to consider, with the historical background, the evil and mischief attempted to be remedied, the objects sought to be accomplished, and the scope of the remedy its terms imply. Id. It is a fundamental principle of constitutional interpretation that each and every clause within a constitution has been inserted for a useful purpose. Day v. Nelson, 240 Neb. 997, 485 N.W.2d 583 (1992). [9-11] The Legislature and the electorate are concurrently equal in rank as sources of legislation, and provisions authorizing the initiative should be construed in such a manner that the legislative power reserved in the people is effectual. Loontjer v. Robinson, 266 Neb. 902, 670 N.W.2d 301 (2003). The power of initiative must be liberally construed to promote the democratic process. Id. The right of initiative is precious to the people and is one which the courts are zealous to preserve to the fullest tenable measure of spirit as well as letter. State ex rel. Stenberg v. Moore, 258 Neb. 199, 602 N.W.2d 465 (1999); State ex rel. Brant v. Beermann, 217 Neb. 632, 350 N.W.2d 18 (1984). [12,13] The resubmission clause is found in the same section of the state Constitution in which the people reserved to themselves the power of the initiative. Neb. Const. art. III, § 2. It serves to define the scope of the initiative power. We ascertain the purpose of the resubmission clause from its language. The people in their constitution reserved the power to reconsider a previously submitted initiative measure, but not more frequently than once in 3 years. The people's reserved power of the initiative and their self-imposed limitation on the power through the resubmission clause are of equal constitutional significance. Just as we must respect and . . . give effect to the power the people have reserved to themselves to amend the constitution or enact legislation through initiative measures, we are obliged to give meaningful effect to their self-imposed limitations on that power, such as that represented by the resubmission clause. See Duggan v. Beermann, 249 Neb. 411, 421-22, 544 N.W.2d 68, 75 (1996). Accord Duggan v. Beermann, 245 Neb. 907, 515 N.W.2d 788 (1994). The parties agree and we conclude that the 2006 initiative measures are not the same in form as the 2004 measures. This case thus requires us to determine whether the two initiative measures submitted for inclusion on the 2006 general election ballot are the same . . . in essential substance as initiative measures which appeared on the ballot in 2004. All of the measures in question pertain to gaming. However, the parties have differing views on the appropriate test to determine whether a proposed 2006 measure is the same in essential substance as a measure submitted in 2004. Lemon takes a narrow view, arguing that the language of the resubmission clause is designed to prevent the same initiative measure from being resubmitted using synonyms or mere rewording of language. Brief for appellee at 11. Gale has employed a broader comparison, arguing that the resubmission clause precludes the submission of measures which share the same fundamental nature or essence more than once every three years. Brief for appellant at 24. The district court concluded that the resubmission clause prevents the submission of a measure that is substantially the same as a measure submitted in the previous three years. This requires one to consider the important and significant aspects of the measure, including its purpose, object and effect. If we were to apply the substantially the same standard utilized by the district court, Nebraska's resubmission clause would become similar to that of the New Jersey Constitution, which provides that if a proposed constitutional amendment is not approved by voters, neither such proposed amendment nor one to effect the same or substantially the same change in the Constitution shall be submitted to the people before the third general election. N.J. Const., art. IX, ¶ 7. Applying New Jersey's constitutional language, a New Jersey court held that a proposed constitutional amendment pertaining to casino gambling was not substantially the same as a proposed amendment which had been defeated by voters 2 years earlier. Young v. Byrne, 144 N.J. Super. 10, 364 A.2d 47 (1976). The court noted that the first proposed amendment provided for state ownership and operation of casinos, while the second permitted private ownership; the first amendment would have permitted casinos throughout the state, while the second limited casino locations to Atlantic City, New Jersey; and the two measures differed with respect to the treatment of gambling revenues. Id. Applying the principle that each and every clause within a constitution has been inserted for a useful purpose, we do not interpret the phrase same . . . in essential substance in the Nebraska Constitution to mean substantially the same. The latter phrase invites the type of discrete comparison employed by both the New Jersey court in Young and the district court in this case to determine if specific provisions in one measure differ from those of the other. Instead, we interpret the phrase essential substance in the Nebraska Constitution to require a broader, conceptual analysis and comparison of the fundamental theme and purpose of each initiative measure to determine if they are the same for purposes of the resubmission clause.