Opinion ID: 1230456
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence to Support Commissioner's Awards.

Text: A. Permanent total disability. The fighting issue on appeal is whether the record before the agency furnished substantial evidence to support the commissioner's award of permanent total disability benefits. Wal-Mart argued in district court, and urges in response to Caselman's appeal, that [t]he overwhelming medical evidence in this case was that Claimant was able to continue his career as a truck driver. Indeed, this is the precise language used by the district court to justify its reversal of the commissioner's ruling. We are convinced, however, that the record when viewed more objectivelyreveals facts that are far less conclusive and that would, in fact, support the inferences drawn by the commissioner. Crucial to the deputy commissioner's decision were credibility findings bearing on Caselman's subjective assessment of his inability to meet the standards required by Wal-Martor any other trucking companyin terms of strength and stamina. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(3) (adequacy of evidence must be judged in light of determinations of veracity by the presiding officer who personally observed the demeanor of the witnesses). The deputy began his factual findings this way: From my observation of [Caselman's] demeanor at hearing including body movements, vocal characteristics, eye contact and facial mannerisms while testifying in addition to consideration of the other evidence, I find Richard credible, including his self-described physical limitations. What doubt I may have had about the self-assessment of his limitations was extinguished by the testimony at hearing by Richard's superior at Wal-Mart, the transportation manager, Lisa Martins. Martins stated that Richard was an honest employee and she had no reason to disbelieve Richard's statements concerning his limitations or the numbness in his leg which prevents a return to truck driving. (Emphasis added.) Caselman's testimony, corroborated by the testimony of others experienced in the trucking field, described at great length the physical tasks in semi-truck driving, even of the drop and load variety. Caselman's most recent assignment at Wal-Mart involved picking up returned merchandise from a variety of stores. This routinely involved loading items weighing from five to 160 pounds, often without the availability of dollies or store-staff help. More fundamental demands of semi-truck driving, however, range from the basic necessity of pulling one's weight up into the cab to the more demanding tasks of engaging the fifth-wheel pin, cranking the trailer dolly, adjusting the rear wheels, transferring hoses, opening cargo doors and moving docking plates into place. As correctly noted by the deputy, all these routine tasks require more force than allowed by any doctor in this case. For this reason, we believe it reasonable for the deputy to characterize Wal-Mart's vocational counselor's contrary conclusion as not mak[ing] much sense. The deputy credited, instead, the report of McLaughlin who entertained grave reservations about Caselman's ability to perform the job of truck driver safely, notwithstanding his strong motivation to do so. Wal-Mart also argued on judicial review that the testimony of Caselman's independent examining physician, Dr. Riggins, must be given little weight because he was selected by Caselman's counsel and, hence, not independent. Echoing Wal-Mart's brief, the district court's ruling asserts that the deputy disregarded the evidence of [six other] doctors and relied on the `suspicions' expressed by Claimant's doctor, Dr. Keith Riggins. The deputy's credibility assessment on this point, however, defeats the court's expressed concern. In the deputy's words, the work restrictions imposed by the physicians, including those of Dr. Riggins, are causally related to the work injury. Dr. Riggins' views must be given considerable weight as they are the most recent, they are from a board certified orthopedic surgeon and they are the most consistent with Richard's credible testimony. (Emphasis added.) Substantial evidence in the record supports the deputy's credibility finding. By contrast to the other physicians and orthopedic surgeons who testified, Dr. Riggins is the only one who is board certified not only in orthopedic surgery but in the evaluation of disabilities and occupational medicine. A reasonable fact finder could assume that his tendency to accord greater weight to Caselman's subjective complaints of pain merely reflects his enhanced credentials in making such assessments, rather than some attempt to satisfy a paying customer. The court's contrary implication is not warranted under this record. The district court also criticized the deputy for ignoring the fact that Caselman has twice applied for, and been denied, social security disability benefits. Even more is made of the fact that the deputy did not mention the conclusions drawn by the doctors who reviewed Caselman's medical history in that connection. The record reveals, however, that those doctors never examined Caselman. And given the markedly different standards applicable to receipt of awards in these different realms, we do not believe the deputy's failure to address Wal-Mart's argument on this score detracts materially from its other findings. It would unduly lengthen this opinion and add little to our jurisprudence to recount in further detail all of the facts that support and detract from the deputy commissioner's findings and conclusions. Our task is to broadly and liberally apply [the deputy's] findings to uphold rather than to defeat the agency's decision. Al-Gharib, 604 N.W.2d at 632. While those with desk jobs might question how a person with no more than a common back injury could be suddenly rendered totally and permanently disabled, the record before us contains substantial evidence to support that conclusion. The fact that different inferences could be drawn from the same record does not diminish the soundness of the deputy commissioner's findings and conclusions [w]hen that record is viewed as a whole. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(3). Quoting the commissioner in Al-Gharib, this court observed that [t]otal disability does not mean a state of absolute helplessness. Al-Gharib, 604 N.W.2d at 633. The question is whether Caselman's work-related injury has wholly disable[d][him] from performing work that [his] experience, training, intelligence, and physical capacities would otherwise permit [him] to perform. Id. Credible evidence in the record made before the agency supports the deputy's conclusion that Caselman is no longer able to engage in employment for which he is fitted. See id. And although, in the deputy's words, the parties' vocational experts held radically divergent views on this point, that fact did not thereby free the court to substitute its judgment for the presiding officer who observed the testimony first-hand. We therefore reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for entry of an order affirming the agency's award. B. Penalty award. Caselman also challenges the district court's reversal of the agency's $8000 award of penalty benefits. He claims substantial evidence supports the award based on the commissioner's finding that Wal-Mart delayed unreasonably in rectifying its original error of paying under lower, Kansas rates and thereafter making several payments late. Wal-Mart counters that reversal and remand were justified under the record. It does not deny, however, that some amount of penalty benefits are warranted in this case. At the outset Wal-Mart challenges the commissioner's consideration of other recent cases in which penalty benefits had been assessed against the company. However in laying out the factors the commissioner may consider when imposing penalty benefits, this court has specifically included the prior penalties imposed against the employer. Robbennolt v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 555 N.W.2d 229, 238 (Iowa 1996); accord Meyers v. Holiday Express Corp., 557 N.W.2d 502, 505 (Iowa 1996). Such evidence was properly considered by the deputy in fashioning the award and furnished no grounds for reversal of the award by the district court on judicial review. Penalty benefits are authorized under Iowa Code section 86.13. The relevant portion of that statute states: If a delay in commencement or termination of benefits occurs without reasonable or probable cause or excuse, the workers' compensation commissioner shall award benefits in addition to those benefits payable under this chapter ... up to fifty percent of the amount of benefits that were unreasonably delayed or denied. Iowa Code § 86.13. The key to determining whether penalty benefits should be awarded is whether the employer's actions were reasonable. Gilbert v. USF Holland, Inc., 637 N.W.2d 194, 198 (Iowa 2001); Christensen v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 554 N.W.2d 254, 260 (Iowa 1996); Meyers, 557 N.W.2d at 504-05; Robbennolt, 555 N.W.2d at 236-37. Delay may be justified if (1) the delay was necessary for the insurer to investigate the claim or (2) the employer had a reasonable basis to contest the employee's entitlement to benefits. Meyers, 557 N.W.2d at 504. In other words, a reasonable basis for delay is synonymous with a fairly debatable claim. Meyers, 557 N.W.2d at 504. Two delays in payment are at issue here. First, when Wal-Mart commenced paying Caselman's workers' compensation benefits, it applied the lower Kansas rate rather than the rate required by Iowa law. Wal-Mart argues that it was at least fairly debatable that Caselman was entitled to Kansas, rather than Iowa, workers' compensation benefits. Its argument is not persuasive. Kansas law grants it jurisdiction of worker's injury claims outside the state if Kansas is the principal place of employment. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-506 (1999). Caselman was dispatched out of Kansas but worked in several states, made his employment contract in Iowa, and was injured in Iowa. The deputy observed that Wal-Mart would have challenged Iowa's jurisdiction if there had been a fairly debatable basis for Wal-Mart's claim that Kansas law applied. Moreover, the company admitted in August 1998 that paying benefits under Kansas law was in error but it failed to pay the differential until October 1998. Although Wal-Mart eventually paid interest as a result of the error, we agree that substantial evidence supports the deputy's finding that Wal-Mart's position on the point was not fairly debatable. A penalty award was thus justified. The deputy also assessed the penalty because weekly disability checks were not delivered to Caselman on time. Workers' compensation checks must be mailed or personally delivered on the date the payment is due. Meyers, 557 N.W.2d at 505. Imposition of a penalty is unjustified only if the employer has a reasonable excuse for the delay and conveys that reason to the employee contemporaneously with the beginning of the delay. Id. at 504. Wal-Mart admits that at least two or three checks were late. Based on Caselman's testimony, however, the deputy could have found that between ten and twenty checks were mailed late. So also could the deputy infer from the record a lack of contemporaneous explanation for the delay. For example, not until sending a letter dated April 7 to Caselman's counsel did the company explain the reason for delay of payments due March 16 and March 30. The district court rejected these findings, seemingly satisfied that the delay merely resulted from a recurring problem with Wal-Mart's auto pay computer program for workers' compensation benefits. Like the deputy, we do not believe this explanation comports with the spirit of section 86.13. While isolated delays occasioned by computer glitches may be unavoidable and, hence, reasonable, recurring and unexplained technical problems affecting the timely receipt of benefits are not. In short, the record amply supports the penalty award imposed by the agency. We therefore reverse and remand for entry of an order affirming that award. REVERSED AND REMANDED.