Opinion ID: 398947
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Refusal to Certify the Plaintiff Class

Text: 14 The district court refused to certify the plaintiff class on the grounds that the plaintiffs were inadequate representatives and that there were no common questions of law or fact. While we reject the district court's reasoning on the first ground, we affirm its order on the second.
15 The district court first ruled that the 12 state prisoners were not adequate representatives under Rule 23(a)(4) because eight of them had already been transferred from county jails to the state penitentiary and four others were subject to such transfer in the future. 87 F.R.D. at 769-70. It then concluded that none of the plaintiffs were adequate representatives because there (was) no assurance that they would be as interested in seeking injunctive relief as in pressing their personal claims for large damages. 11 The court reasoned that (t)his potential antagonism could be alleviated only by creating a subclass of persons formerly incarcerated and seeking money damages, id. at 770; this subclass, according to the district court, could be certified only under Rule 23(b)(3), whose requirements were clearly not met. 16 The court erred in concluding that the prospect of future transfer or release makes a prisoner an inadequate class representative. If its conclusion were correct, then no prisoner in the county jails-where sentences are invariably a year or lesscould ever be an adequate class representative. While the mooting of an individual's claim for relief is a valid consideration in determining whether he should be allowed to continue as class representative, see Harris v. Peabody, 611 F.2d 543, 544-45 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 958, 101 S.Ct. 368, 66 L.Ed.2d 224 (1980), the prospect of future release from confinement is not a valid ground for denying class certification. 12 To the contrary, this very prospect supports class certification: while any individual prisoner's claim for injunctive relief is in danger of becoming moot before the court can grant relief, 13 class certification ensures the presence of a continuing class of plaintiffs with a live dispute against prison authorities. See United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 1209, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980). If the district court believes that a prisoner's post-certification release renders him an inadequate representative, the solution is to permit his substitution by a new representative, not to dismiss the class claims. 17 The district court also erred in holding that an individual claim for damages 14 in itself disqualifies a plaintiff from representing the class in its claim for injunctive relief. An individual claim for large damages does not necessarily make a putative representative's interests antagonistic to those of the class; to the contrary, the courts have often viewed the assertion of such a claim as an indication that the representative will prosecute the action vigorously. 7 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1767, at 637-38 (1972). Of course, if the court has reason to conclude that a plaintiff has neglected or will neglect the claims for injunctive relief in his pursuit of his damage claims, it may find him an inadequate representative. But in this case, there is nothing in the record to indicate that plaintiffs' claims for damages are in any way antagonistic to the class claims for injunctive relief. The complaint, in fact, primarily recites allegations that are applicable to the entire class; it appears that plaintiffs' claims for damages are based on what they claim is the experience suffered by every inmate in the county jails. Moreover, the district court's conclusion that a subclass of inmates demanding damages could not be certified under subdivision (b)(3) 15 was irrelevant to the question whether plaintiffs could press their individual damage claims and still represent the (b)(2) class. Thus, the court was erroneous in relying on these grounds to conclude that plaintiffs were inadequate representatives.
18 Despite the errors in the district court's opinion, we conclude that it did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification on the ground that the physical and environmental conditions at county jails in the state are so divergent that it is virtually impossible to state with certainty what may be common issues. 87 F.R.D. at 769. 19 Under Rule 23(a)(2), plaintiffs may bring a class action only if ... there are questions of law or fact common to the class. This provision does not require complete identity of legal claims among the class members. Johnson v. American Credit Co., 581 F.2d 526, 532 (5th Cir. 1978). But we think that it does require that there be at least one issue 16 whose resolution will affect all or a significant number of the putative class members. As among the inmates in different county jails, we do not think that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that there were no common questions in this case. 20 The legal test for an Eighth Amendment challenge to the conditions of one's confinement, although imprecise, is well settled: the court must consider the totality of the conditions to determine whether they violate contemporary standards of decency. 17 This test requires the court to make a detailed inquiry into all of the conditions of a prison, as well as the circumstances that have created the conditions. Plaintiffs concede that the application of this test in this case would require the district court to hold a hearing on the conditions and circumstances of each county jail in Mississippi to determine whether that jail's conditions violate the Eighth Amendment's command. 18 They point out no way in which the resolution of this ultimate issue concerning one jail would have any effect on the resolution of the issue concerning any other jail. They have identified no practice or condition common to all the jails which would allow the district court to maintain the class action with respect to particular issues under Rule 23(c)(4)(A). 19 21 Plaintiffs contend that these problems can be dealt with by subclassing under Rule 23(c)(4)(B). In this case, however, we do not have subclasses of a class identifiable by questions of law or fact common to the class as those terms are used in Rule 23(a)(2); we have in reality 82 different classes that would not benefit in any perceivable way by having all of their claims resolved in a single lawsuit. A common question can be said to exist here only in the most abstract form: all of the putative class members are prisoners, and all may raise the question whether the conditions of their confinement violate a general legal standard. If we were to hold that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to conclude that the presentation of this abstract issue did not raise a common question within the meaning of Rule 23(a)(2), any allegation of a breach of legal duty by any class of defendants-no matter how vast or diverse-could be impressed into a single case. 22 Plaintiffs argue that the presence of all responsible state and county officials will allow the district court to impose on all of the jails uniform requirements concerning physical facilities, medical care, visiting hours, access to legal materials, disciplinary rules, staff training, and rehabilitation programs. The Eighth Amendment, however, does not require the conditions of confinement in different institutions to be uniform, nor does it license the federal judiciary to impose what we as individuals might like to see accomplished in the way of ideal prison conditions. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 287 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part on other grounds and cert. denied, 438 U.S. 781, 915, 98 S.Ct. 3057, 3144, 57 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1978). What the Eighth Amendment does is forbid cruel and unusual punishment; plaintiffs must allege some common violation of this prohibition to justify a class action involving different jails, not point out that a single court could establish uniform standards if violations were found. 20 23 The purposes of Rule 23 fully support the district court's conclusion. It is undisputed that the purpose of Rule 23 is to prevent piecemeal litigation-to avoid (i) a multiplicity of suits on common claims resulting in inconsistent adjudications and (ii) the difficulties in determining the res judicata effects of a judgment. Donovan v. University of Texas, 643 F.2d 1201, 1206-07 (5th Cir. 1981). Preventing piecemeal litigation also has a third beneficial purpose-saving time and expense to the litigants and the courts. See 7 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, § 1751, at 504. 24 Maintenance of a single action involving the conditions in all of the jails in Mississippi would serve none of these purposes. The district court would have to make a separate inquiry into the totality of conditions in each jail. There is no danger of inconsistent adjudications. The conclusion concerning the conditions in any jail would not be res judicata concerning the conditions in another jail. A single action involving every jail will not require less judicial time or energy than a separate suit for each jail; instead, it will simply require one court to make the separate inquiries that several courts could make just as efficiently and perhaps more thoroughly. Moreover, plaintiffs concede that county-by-county class actions had been brought against at least 20 counties prior to the institution of this action; several of the jails involved are already operating under court order. See 87 F.R.D. at 764 n.2. We see no reason to force the litigants or the courts in these separate suits to stand aside while plaintiffs prosecute this omnibus action, which will inevitably take years to be ready for trial, much less reach final judgment on all the jails and go through the appeals process. 21 25 Plaintiffs argue that a single class action will confer significant benefit on jail inmates because the available pro bono legal representation in Mississippi is inadequate to maintain separate suits, while a single suit will provide all inmates with representation by the legal services organization that filed this suit. We realize that the unavailability of counsel may be a serious impediment to the vindication of the rights of every person incarcerated in a county jail. We do not see, however, how proving the case against each of 82 counties will require significantly less time or effort on the part of counsel if the separate hearings are held by separate courts or by one court; if plaintiffs' counsel does not have the resources to prove 82 separate cases, they may not have the resources to adequately represent the inmates in every one of the 82 counties in a single action. While a single action will certainly save time and expense in the pleading stages of the case, we think that the unfocused pleadings and certification inquiry that resulted in this case confer an uncertain benefit on the inmates in the various jails. While the unavailability of adequate legal resources is unfortunate, it is not a reason for ignoring the requirements or purposes of Rule 23. 26 Plaintiffs argue that, even if the district court properly refused to certify the statewide class, the court should have certified a class of inmates in the eight counties named as defendants in this case. Plaintiffs, however, did no better in establishing common questions among the eight counties named than it did among all of the county jails. Thus, the court's refusal to certify an eight-county class was not an abuse of discretion. 27 The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.