Opinion ID: 2295666
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case

Text: At trial, plaintiffs sought to make a prima facie case of discrimination by three alternative theories: (1) disparate treatment, as in McDonnell Douglas, supra ; (2) a past pattern or practice of discrimination (a type of disparate treatment), as in Teamsters v. United States, supra ; and (3) disparate impact, as in Albemarle, supra . The prima facie case on each theory of discrimination involves a somewhat different type of evidence that will support an inference of unlawful discrimination.
To make out a prima facie case of disparate treatment, the plaintiff must prove that she belongs to a protected class, that she applied and was qualified for the job sought, and that she was rejected. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. In this case, plaintiffs Hall and Bernard were members of the protected female class and they were rejected for the job sought. The contested issue concerned their qualifications. The Superior Court erred in initially requiring plaintiffs to shoulder the burden of proving that they were at least as qualified as the male applicants who were certified by the CSC. In order for a prima facie case of discrimination to be made out, it need not include evidence of plaintiffs' relative qualifications. See Davis v. Weidner, 596 F.2d 726, 730 (7th Cir. 1979). All that is required to create an inference of discrimination is proof that plaintiffs were not rejected because of absence of a job opening or lack of the minimum objective qualifications prescribed for the job as a police officer. See Davis v. Califano, U.S.L.W. 2339 (D.C.Cir. Nov. 8, 1979). The First Circuit recently explained the reasons for this rule of proof: As such, it addresses two problems that exist in most employment discrimination cases: (1) direct evidence of discrimination is likely to be unavailable, and (2) the employer has the best access to the reasons that prompted him to fire, reject, discipline or refuse to promote the complainant.. . . Proof of the McDonnell Douglas -type prima facie case assures the plaintiff his day in court despite the unavailability of direct evidence, and entitles him to an explanation from the defendant-employer for whatever action was taken. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., supra at 1014.
Another form of disparate treatment exists where the employer has regularly and purposefully treated women less favorably than men. Evidence proving that unlawful discrimination has been a regular procedure or policy followed by an employer or group of employers, Teamsters v. United States, supra 431 U.S. at 360, 97 S.Ct. at 1867, will constitute a prima facie case as to unlawful discrimination against the particular plaintiff. Statistical evidence as well as evidence of overt and intentional discrimination can be evidence tending to prove such a pattern or practice. Id. at 337-40, 97 S.Ct. 1843. In Teamsters, as here, there were specific instances when applicants from the protected group were told that the defendant was not yet ready to hire them. [14] In this case there was also evidence of the CSC chairman's expressed opinion that female police officers would be a luxury and of his remark to plaintiff Hall that she was just a pretty face. The Superior Court thus erred in finding no evidence that officials of the city of Auburn had discouraged women in their pursuit of jobs as police officers. [15] In Teamsters, the Supreme Court warned against an employer's subtle discrimination of discouraging applicants by his consistent discriminatory treatment of actual applicants, by the manner in which he publicizes vacancies, his recruitment techniques, his responses to casual or tentative inquiries, and even by the racial or ethnic composition of that part of his work force from which he has discriminatorily excluded members of minority groups. Teamsters v. United States, supra at 365, 97 S.Ct. at 1870. It is also noteworthy that height and weight requirements such as those imposed by the city of Auburn up until 1975 have been held to deter potential applicants. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977) (striking down height and weight requirements for prison guards). Indeed, the CSC's certification of Jean Greeley was restricted because she failed to meet the physical requirements, and eight other female applicants out of a total of thirteen were rejected for similar reasons. The height and weight requirements are significant in relation to the statistical evidence. Defendants argued, and the Superior Court agreed, that the number of females who applied for police jobs and the number screened by the CSC were too small to be of statistical significance and that the use of statistics regarding the percentage of women in service jobs in the Lewiston-Auburn area was impermissible. However, general population statistics have probative value where potential female applicants may have been deterred by the past practices of defendants. [16] Small statistical samples may become significant where the small number of female applicants may be due to unequal recruitment and past discriminatory practices. Boston Chapter NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1020-21 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910, 95 S.Ct. 1561, 43 L.Ed.2d 775 (1975). Also, even if the statistical sample is small, the results can be probative if corroborated by evidence of intentional and overt discrimination. Commonwealth v. Rizzo, 466 F.Supp. 1219, 1232 (E.D.Pa.1979). See also E. E. O. C. v. N. Y. Times Broadcasting Service, Inc., 542 F.2d 356, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1976). Still further, where there exists the inexorable zero  zero female police officers, zero female applicants fully certified by the CSC  the prima facie inference of discrimination becomes strong. Teamsters v. United States, supra 431 U.S. at 342 n. 23, 97 S.Ct. 1843; Lee v. City of Richmond, 456 F.Supp. 756, 767 (E.D.Va. 1978).
A prima facie case of disparate impact is established where an employer's practice (such as a written or oral test, or a particular job requirement) is facially neutral but in fact affects more harshly one group than another. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, supra 422 U.S. at 426, 95 S.Ct. 2362; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). Proof of disparate impact upon one group supports an inference of unlawful discrimination against a particular plaintiff who is a member of that group. The primary method of establishing a skewed selection process is by statistical evidence. In this case the Superior Court rejected plaintiffs' disparate impact attack on the Auburn police hiring method, in part, because of an erroneous finding of fact. The court stated that in the previous five years, 20% of the female [17] and 18% of the male applicants had been certified by the CSC. However, the record clearly establishes that in the previous five years, 1974-78, only one out of thirteen female applicants (7.7%) had been certified, as opposed to 20% of the male applicants. It was in the previous four years, 1975-78, that 18% of the male applicants  and an inexorable zero percent of the female applicants  had been certified. The 20%-7.7% disparity is made even greater by the facts that Jean Greeley (who, alone, made up the 7.7% figure) was not given an unqualified certification and that by the then prevailing practice of the CSC her written score had been weighted more heavily than were the written scores of plaintiffs Hall and Bernard.