Opinion ID: 2208977
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Application of the Rape Shield Law

Text: Appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to permit him to cross-examine the victim on the issue of other sexual experience in an effort to suggest an alternate source of gonorrhea. We find no merit in the contention. At common law, evidence of a female rape complainant's general reputation for morality and chastity was deemed admissible on the issue of consent. The result of this common law rule was notorious abuse of victim witnesses by aggressive defense counsel who essentially put the victim on trial. In response to such unjustifiable abuses, the federal government and the states enacted statutes known as Rape Shield laws. Rape Shield laws were intended to end the abuses fostered by the common law rule by limiting the harassing and embarrassing inquires of defense counsel into irrelevant prior sexual conduct of sexual assault complainants. See Williams, Rape Reform Legislation and Evidentiary Concerns: The Law in Pennsylvania, 44 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 955, 955-75 (1985); see generally White, Evidentiary Privileges and the Defendant's Constitutional Right to Introduce Evidence, 80 J.Crim.L. & Crim. 377, 377-426 (1989); Kello, Rape Shield Paradox: Complain and Protection Amidst Oscillating Tends Of State Judicial Interpretation, 78 J.Crim.L. & Crim. 644, 644-98 (1987); Gavin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 Minn.L.Rev. 763, 763-916 (1986); Haxton, Rape Shield Statutes: Constitutional Despite Unconstitutional Exclusions of Evidence, 1985 Wisc.L.Rev. 1219, 1219-72 (1985); Tall, Evidence  Rape Shield Statutes, 19 Gonzanga L.Rev. 437, 437-51 (1984); Ordover, Admissibility of Patterns of Similar Sexual Conduct: The Unlamented Death of Character for Chastity, 63 Cornell L.Rev. 90, 90-120 (1977). Though laudable and long-overdue, Rape Shield laws, if rigidly construed, could impermissibly encroach upon a defendant's right to confront and cross-examine witnesses which is secured by the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. The manner in which those counterveiling interests are to be balanced has been the subject of considerable litigation in this Commonwealth and other jurisdictions. See generally Annotation, Constitutionality of Rape Shield Statute Restricting Use of Evidence of Victim's Sexual Experiences, 1 ALR 4th 283, 283-305 (1980 & 1989 Supp.); Annotation, Admissibility in Incest Prosecution of Evidence of Alleged Victim's Prior Sexual Acts With Persons Other Than Accused, 97 ALR 3d 967, 967-80 (1980 & 1989 Supp.); Annotation, Modern Status of Admissibility, In Forcible Rape Prosecution, Of Complainant's General Reputation for Unchastity, 95 ALR 3d 1181, 1181-97 (1979 & 1989 Supp.); Annotation, Modern Status of Admissibility, In Forcible Rape Prosecution, Of Complainant's Prior Sexual Acts, 94 ALR 3d 257, 257-86 (1979 & 1989 Supp.). In Commonwealth v. Majorana, 503 Pa. 602, 470 A.2d 80 (1983), our Supreme Court construed the Pennsylvania Rape Shield law to intend to exclude only irrelevant and abusive inquiries, and not to exclude inquiries regarding relevant evidence which would tend to disprove the allegation. 470 A.2d at 84. In Majorana, the defendant had made a specific offer to prove through the testimony of an identified third person that the semen and sperm detected in the victim's body, which had been offered as evidence to corroborate the victim's testimony, had actually come from a separate source. 470 A.2d at 81, 84. In Commonwealth v. Lyons, 364 Pa.Super. 620, 528 A.2d 975 (1987), this Court held that a defendant had improperly been denied an opportunity to provide an alternate explanation for blood stains on panties offered to corroborate charges of child sexual abuse. A claim that the proffered evidence was too remote was rejected because of the indefiniteness as to when the panties were worn or stained. 528 A.2d at 978. The adequacy of the proffer made in that case was not otherwise discussed. In Commonwealth v. Black, 337 Pa.Super. 548, 487 A.2d 396 (1985), this Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing as to whether the trial court improperly denied the defendant an opportunity to demonstrate a specific motive for the complainant to bring false charges against the defendant, because the defendant had allegedly thwarted the complainant's alleged incestuous relationship with her brother by throwing him out of the family home shortly before the challenged charges were brought. While the proffered evidence was deemed potentially relevant, this court, nonetheless, remanded for a hearing to determine whether the specific proffer was relevant, whether the proffered evidence was more probative than prejudicial, and whether alternative (unprivileged) grounds for impeachment existed. 487 A.2d at 401. Taken together, Majorana, Lyons, and Black demonstrate that the Rape Shield law will bow to a defendant's right to confront and cross-examine when a specific proffer demonstrates that the proposed inquiry is intended to elicit relevant evidence, which is more probative than prejudicial, and which is not cumulative of other evidence available without encroaching upon Rape Shield law protections. Majorana, Lyons, and Black, thus, involve limited exceptions to the broad exclusion of the Rape Shield law. The significance of the required offer of proof is demonstrated in our prior decision in Commonwealth v. Troy, 381 Pa.Super. 326, 553 A.2d 992 (1989). In Troy, this Court held that the defense counsel's proffer as to the relevance of evidence otherwise inadmissible under the Rape Shield law was too vague and conjectural to warrant even a remand for further inquiry under Black, 553 A.2d at 996-97. The absence of an adequate specific proffer is, thus, fatal to challenges to Rape Shield protections. It is true that in Commonwealth v. Jorgenson, 512 Pa. 601, 517 A.2d 1287 (1986) (per Zappala, Nix, C.J., and Flaherty, McDermott, JJ., join; Papadakos, J., dissents; Larsen and Hutchinson, JJ., join the dissent), a bare majority of our Supreme Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing despite a vague proffer of an alternate explanation for physical evidence offered in support of sexual abuse charges. By its terms, however, the majority opinion in Jorgenson was of extremely limited prospective precedential value. The failure to provide a specific proffer was deemed excusable because Majorana had not yet been decided, and because the trial court's express reliance upon Commonwealth v. Duncan, 279 Pa.Super. 395, 421 A.2d 257 (1980), had rendered any question of specificity of the proffer moot. 517 A.2d at 1290. In Duncan, this Court had construed the Rape Shield law broadly, as an essentially absolute bar without exceptions. The dissenting members of our Supreme Court in Jorgenson disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the absence of a specific proffer was excusable, and emphasized the patent inadequacy of the proffer. 517 A.2d at 1292. We find that the allowance of remand for an evidentiary hearing in Jorgenson was limited to cases decided in the trial court prior to Majorana, and where the trial court expressly relied upon Duncan. As neither limitation is met here, we find Troy rather than Jorgenson controlling. The absence of an adequate proffer here, was therefore fatal to appellant's claim. While the procedural defect is sufficient to dispose of the claim, we find it appropriate to note the substantive deficiency of the claim as well. Substantively, a proffer seeking to avoid the Rape Shield law bar must meet the three prong test suggested in Majorana, and expressly set forth in Black: the evidence must be relevant; must be more probative than prejudicial; and may not be merely cumulative of other unprivileged impeachment or rebuttal evidence. Majorana, supra, 470 A.2d at 84-85; Black, supra, 487 A.2d at 401. Several cases have demonstrated the significance of these limitations. In Commonwealth v. Erb, 524 Pa. 103, 569 A.2d 352 (1990), our Supreme Court reversed an unpublished order of this Court which had granted a new trial based upon the exclusion of excerpt from the complainant's diary describing her sexual interest in a boyfriend, which had been offered to establish a motive to make false charges of sexual assault against her father, who had allegedly thwarted the relationship between his daughter and the boyfriend by recently moving the family. See Commonwealth v. Erb, 380 Pa.Super. 645, 547 A.2d 436 (1988). The apparent basis for the per curiam reversal and reinstatement of the verdict and sentence was that the Majorana standard of relevance, probative value, and necessity had not been met. 569 A.2d at 352, citing Commonwealth v. Majorana . In Commonwealth v. Johnson, 389 Pa.Super. 184, 566 A.2d 1197 (1989), this Court held that a proffer regarding a hearsay statement attributed to the complainant suggesting that another had sexually assaulted the complainant on a prior occasion was not sufficient to demonstrate an alternate explanation for the evidence or to demonstrate a motive to raise false charges. This Court agreed with the trial court that the evidence, even if arguably relevant, was nonetheless more prejudicial than probative and so was therefore properly excluded. 566 A.2d at 1202. In Commonwealth v. Appenzeller, 388 Pa.Super. 172, 565 A.2d 170 (1989), this Court held that evidence of prior sexual abuse suffered by a three year old victim offered to provide an alternate source for the young child's rudimentary knowledge of sexual functions and terms, was not relevant because poor parental supervision of the child victim had made it highly likely that she had learned sexual functions and terms through sources other than the alleged sexual assault by appellant. Because the circumstance of that case were deemed not to render the child victim's rudimentary knowledge of sexual functions and terms incriminating as to Appenzeller, the proffered evidence of an additional alternate source the child victim's knowledge (through a sexual assault committed by another) was deemed to be more prejudicial than probative. 565 A.2d at 171. In Commonwealth v. Poindexter, 372 Pa.Super. 566, 539 A.2d 1341 (1988), this Court held that, where the trial court had admitted evidence that the complainant was angry at the accused for filing criminal charges against her boyfriend, the trial court did not err in refusing to permit the accused to inquire as to the level of intimacy involved in complainant's relationship with her boyfriend. The inquiry was deemed to be focused on evidence which would have been of minimal probative value, but of high potential prejudicial impact. 539 A.2d at 1344. Finally, in Commonwealth v. Simmons, 355 Pa.Super. 326, 513 A.2d 453 (1986), this Court held that proffered evidence that the complainant had made her allegations against the accused only when she was first confronted by her mother with a rumor that complainant was pregnant did not fall with the bias/motive precedent of Commonwealth v. Black, supra . This Court found that the proffer failed to demonstrate a sufficient motive to falsely accuse the defendant so as to render the evidence more probative than prejudicial, especially when the victim's delay in reporting the assault had otherwise been fully presented and argued to the jury. 513 A.2d at 454-55. Taken together, Erb, Johnson, Appenzeller, Poindexter, and Simmons demonstrate the substantive limitations on the exceptions to Rape Shield law protections applied in Majorana, Lyons, and Black. These limitations are significant and cannot be ignored. In summary, while the Rape Shield law must bow to the need to permit an accused an opportunity to present genuinely exculpatory evidence, the Rape Shield law nonetheless remains an effective limitation on abusive inquires addressed to irrelevant personal matters which were formerly conducted to harass and defame the complainant while distracting the jury from the legitimate issues involved in sexual assault cases. There is a delicate balance to be maintained. That balance is to be maintained by requiring a specific proffer and by evaluating the proffer for relevance, probativeness, and necessity. See Commonwealth v. Majorana, supra ; Commonwealth v. Black, supra ; Commonwealth v. Troy, supra . Applying the foregoing to the instant case we have no hesitation in finding appellant's claim to be meritless. First, appellant made no proffer whatsoever. Rather, appellant concedes that he has no idea of whether any relevant evidence would be secured by his proposed inquiry. Indeed, for the inquiry to disclose relevant evidence, it would have to establish not only a separate sexual assault on the 12 year old victim, but a separate assault by a gonorrhea infected assailant within a time period which would account for the state of gonorrhea infection detected in the child victim. In neither the trial court, nor here on appeal, has appellant provided any basis to suggest that such evidence exists. We find no authority for the kind of fishing expedition style intrusions on Rape Shield law protections proposed by appellant in the Pennsylvania or United States Constitutions or in our prior case law. Moreover, even if the inquiry were permitted and such evidence was discovered, such evidence would merely suggest a possible alternate source for the infection; it would not preclude appellant as the actual source of the infection. Given the minimal probative value and high potential prejudice of such evidence, we would find no error in its exclusion. Cf. Commonwealth v. Durst, 522 Pa. 2, 559 A.2d 504 (1989); Commonwealth v. Appenzeller, supra, 565 A.2d at 172. [1] Hence, we find no error in declining to permit inquiry designed to seek such evidence. Finally, even if the inquiry was improperly restricted, we would find that other overwhelming evidence rendered any error in the exclusion of this minimally relevant questioning harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, for each of the above reasons we find no merit in appellant's contention.