Opinion ID: 1085663
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Client Confidentiality

Text: ¶31 The District Court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the conduct of Dr. Dale and Paxinos did not entitle Ugalde to dismissal of the information or a new trial. “Because it is a drastic step, dismissing an indictment is a disfavored remedy.” U.S. v. Rogers, 751 F.2d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1985). ¶32 A defendant’s “access to expert assistance is a crucial element in assuring a defendant’s right to effective legal assistance, and ultimately, a fair trial.” Hutchinson v. People, 742 P.2d 875, 881 (Colo. 1987). The confidentiality of experts “is a crucial element in the effective legal representation of a defendant.” Hutchinson, 742 P.2d at 882. The District Court correctly recognized, however, that when this duty of confidentiality is breached, the proper remedy is to disqualify the expert. In re Mitchell, 981 P.2d 172, 175 (Colo. 1999) (citing Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 762 8 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Va. 1991), rev’d in part on other grounds); see Rogers, 751 F.2d at 1079 (“If, in fact, Miller revealed a confidential communication in violation of his ethical obligations as an attorney, suppression of that evidence at trial is the appropriate remedy.”). ¶33 In Hutchinson, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed a conviction on the ground that the prosecution should not have been permitted to call a defense-retained handwriting expert in its case-in-chief. Hutchinson, 742 P.2d at 876. Unlike in Hutchinson, the expert at issue here, Dr. Dale, was never called to the stand and offered no testimony. ¶34 In Ugalde’s brief in support of her motion to dismiss, she argued that if the test for a breach of confidentiality by a non-attorney expert is met, “disqualification of the expert is compelled.” Her brief further noted that “[t]he policy of excluding an expert who has received this type of information is due to the fact that it is difficult to determine conclusively what impact such information may have on the expert’s analysis or subsequent testimony.” ¶35 Ugalde argues on appeal that the alleged breach of confidentiality here warrants a new trial or dismissal of the action. Her brief points out that, “[b]ecause Dr. Dale is not a retained expert for the prosecution in this matter, exclusion is not a remedy for his actions.” But, as the District Court recognized, this does not mean that dismissal is appropriate. See U.S. v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364-65, 101 S. Ct. 665, 668 (1981) (“[A]bsent demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof, dismissal of the indictment is plainly inappropriate, even though the violation may have been 9 deliberate.”).1 To the contrary, the fact that Dr. Dale was not called as a witness means that the type of harm against which exclusion is meant to protect never occurred here in the first place. ¶36 “The trial court has discretion to grant a criminal defendant a new trial but may do so only if required in the interests of justice.” State v. Billedeaux, 2001 MT 9, ¶ 23, 304 Mont. 89, 18 P.3d 990; § 46-16-702(1), MCA. The court’s decision to deny a new trial must be justified by the law and the weight of the evidence. Billedeaux, ¶ 23; § 46-16702(3), MCA. Ugalde relied on an unspoken—and ultimately misguided—assumption that her communications with Dr. Dale were confidential. The record shows that the prosecution already knew of the problems surrounding Dr. Bennett. Dr. Dale sent a letter on December 9, 2005—a considerable time before this case was filed—informing the Montana County Coroners and County Attorneys of Dr. Bennett’s problematic history. Ugalde was not affected by Dr. Dale’s disclosure of his ultimate opinion that Ugalde intentionally harmed I.N. because this opinion never reached the jury. Thus, we agree with the District Court that the evidence presented here does not warrant dismissal of the information or a new trial.