Opinion ID: 76694
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dunlap II

Text: 23 In Dunlap II, Dunlap alleged, essentially, that the Dunlap II defendants misappropriated, converted, and stole his Bank Concept—the idea for an Internet bank catering to the gay and lesbian community. R7-273 at 12-21. The district court exercised federal question jurisdiction because Dunlap again alleged claims related to the G&L Bank trademark. For the reasons stated in our discussion of Dunlap I, subject matter jurisdiction was improper as to these claims. 24 In addition, the district court found that Dunlap's claim for conversion of his idea for the Bank was completely preempted by § 301 of the Copyright Act. We now turn to this alternative jurisdictional ground, which raises a question of first impression in this circuit: whether a state-law claim for conversion of an idea, the expression of which merges with the idea, is completely preempted by the Copyright Act, thereby vesting the trial court with federal removal jurisdiction. 25 Section 301(a) of the Copyright Act dictates that the following state-law claims are preempted: 26 [A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103. 27 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (emphasis added). We have held that this language sets up a two-part test for determining when a state-law claim is preempted: first, [w]e must decide whether the rights at issue fall within the `subject matter of copyright' set forth in sections 102 and 103; and second, we must determine whether the rights at issue are `equivalent to' the exclusive rights of section 106. Crow v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1224, 1225-26 (11th Cir.1983). The central question presented in this appeal therefore involves the interplay between §§ 102(a) and 301: does an idea, which is not entitled to copyright protection, nevertheless fall within the subject matter of copyright, such that a claim for conversion of that idea would (if the second prong were satisfied) be preempted by the Copyright Act? The district court—with a cite to one Florida case 13 —answered in the affirmative. R16-584 at 39. We must disagree, based on a plain reading of the Copyright Act, its legislative history, and consideration of relevant circuit court cases. 14 See Blab T.V., 182 F.3d at 857 (noting that congressional intent is the touchstone of complete preemption analysis).
28 Section 102(a) defines the Subject matter of copyright to include, for example, literary works, musical works, and sound recordings. 15 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Section 102(b), in contrast, contains a negative definition of the subject matter of copyright by listing elements that do not fall within its penumbra, including ideas: In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea ... regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. 16 Id. § 102(b); see also Celine Michaud & Gregory Tulquois, Idea Men Should be Able to Enforce Their Contractual Rights, 6 Vand. J. Ent. L. & Prac. 75, 81 (2003); Paul Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 1107, 1119 (1977). Therefore, the Copyright Act does not extend protection to ideas as distinguished from their expression. Nimmer on Copyright, § 1.01[B][2][c] at 1-58 (2004). 29 The language and structure of the Copyright Act contains an important distinction that is critical to our analysis of whether an idea can be said to fall within the subject matter of copyright. Substantively, § 102(a) lists examples of tangible works that, if certain constitutional requirements are satisfied, would qualify for protection under the Act. Warren Publ'g, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 115 F.3d 1509, 1515 (11th Cir.1997) (en banc). Relevant requirements include, for example, sufficient originality. Id. Section 102(b), on the other hand, lists examples of elements that are substantively excluded from the Act's protection—including ideas—regardless of whether all constitutional requirements are satisfied. An idea, therefore, does not substantively qualify for protection under the Copyright Act, no matter how original it may be. 30 More significantly in this case, [u]nder the merger doctrine, `expression is not protected in those instances where there is only one or so few ways of expressing an idea that protection of the expression would effectively accord protection to the idea itself.' BellSouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ'g, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436, 1442 (11th Cir.1993) (en banc) (quoting Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir.1991)). Recall that the idea in this case is simply that a bank should cater to gay and lesbian customers. Manifestly, given its simplicity, there are but a very few ways to express that one idea and they all merge with the idea. The conversion alleged was not how to implement the idea, but solely the idea itself. This idea is akin to the classic merger doctrine application to an algorithm. 31 The problem here is that the district court conflated the concept of a work with that of an idea. Where a work of original authorship embraces more than simply the idea, preemption would be appropriate. But where, as here, there is no work that is claimed to have been pirated— only an idea which lends itself to very few expressions—there is merger and no preemption. 32 Accordingly, based on the critical distinction between elements substantively excluded from copyright protection and those substantively capable of receiving protection, and given that we have previously characterized the statutory substantive exclusions of § 102(b) as limiting principle[s], we conclude that the subject matter of copyright, in terms of preemption, includes only those elements that are substantively qualified for copyright protection. Warren Publ'g, 115 F.3d at 1514. Therefore, because ideas are substantively excluded from the protection of the Copyright Act, they do not fall within the subject matter of copyright 17 : [t]he assertion that an element which is not protected by copyright is included in the subject matter of copyright is completely illogical. Michaud & Tulquois, Idea Men, 6 Vand. J. Ent. L. & Prac. at 81. 18
33 The legislative history of the Copyright Act further bolsters our conclusion. The House Report regarding the broad preemption of state law states that 34 [t]he intention of section 301 is to preempt and abolish any rights under the common law or statutes of a State that are equivalent to copyright and that extend to works coming within the scope of the Federal copyright law.... 35 As long as a work fits within one of the general subject matter categories of sections 102 and 103, the bill prevents the States from protecting it even if it fails to achieve Federal statutory copyright because it is too minimal or lacking in originality to qualify, or because it has fallen into the public domain. 36 H.R.Rep. No. 94-1476, at 130-31 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5746-47 (emphasis added). The emphasized language makes clear that the preemptive effect of the Copyright Act extends only to those elements substantively capable of receiving federal copyright protection, regardless of whether all constitutional requirements, such as originality, are satisfied. Thus, in order for a state-law claim to be preempted, it is necessary that the claim involve a work that is substantively eligible for copyright protection. 19 An idea is substantively excluded from the protection of copyright—[c]opyright may be claimed only in the `expression' of a work of authorship, and not in its `idea.' Nimmer on Copyright, § 2.03[D] at 2-36.2. Accordingly, ideas are substantively and categorically excluded from the subject matter of copyright.
37 GLHG points us to the Sixth Circuit's decision in Murray Hill Publ'ns, Inc. v. ABC Communications, Inc., 264 F.3d 622, 635-36 (6th Cir.2001), as support for its assertion that Dunlap's claim for conversion of his idea is preempted by the Copyright Act. Murray Hill, however, does not support GLHG's assertion and, in fact, supports the distinction we have articulated here. 20 38 In Murray Hill, the plaintiffs (companies owned by composer and producer Bobby Laurel) alleged conversion of their ideas and concepts—a theme song, a tag line (This is J.P. on JR in the A.M.), and certain artwork. 264 F.3d at 627, 629. Laurel composed a theme song and a tag line for a radio-DJ friend of his, which was used by the radio station-defendant for nearly five years until the DJ's unexpected death. After the DJ's death, the radio station aired a tribute show that included the familiar theme song. Id. at 628. The tribute show was so popular that the radio station converted it into a 90-minute commercial-free recording for public distribution. Laurel did not give his permission for the theme song to be included in the tribute recording and was not credited with authorship of the song on the recording's packaging. Id. 39 Before the DJ's death, the radio station also allegedly engaged in an ad campaign using the tag line without Laurel's permission. In addition, Laurel alleged that the radio station used artwork on promotional billboards that was copied from a souvenir program distributed at the premier of a movie he produced. Id. at 629. 40 Laurel sued the radio station and its corporate owner in federal district court, alleging violations of the Copyright Act and certain state-law claims, including conversion. The Sixth Circuit noted that any case of federal preemption of state law is highly dependent upon the facts presented and the claims actually pled by the parties. Id. at 636. With this caution in mind, the court reasoned that the theme song was a work that fell within the subject matter of copyright as a musical work under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). In addition, the Sixth Circuit held that the tag line and the artwork, though not amenable to copyright protection for lack of originality, nevertheless fell within the subject matter of copyright because the scope of the Copyright Act's subject matter extends beyond the tangible expressions that can be protected under the Act to elements of expression which themselves cannot be protected. Id. (citation omitted). The Sixth Circuit held that Laurel's conversion claims were preempted by the Copyright Act because, although the [tag line] and the [a]rtwork lack the level of creativity necessary to come within the protection of the Act, each of them is the expression of an idea, which is the essence of the subject matter of the Act. Id. 41 The reasoning of the Murray Hill court supports the distinction we make above with regard to substantive threshold eligibility. Laurel's tag line, theme song, and artwork were all substantively eligible for copyright protection—even though the tag line and artwork ultimately failed to receive protection. Thus, the tag line, the theme song, and the artwork were all within the subject matter of copyright, and the Sixth Circuit correctly held that Laurel's claims for conversion of these works were preempted by the Copyright Act. Id. at 637. 42 In this case, however, we are dealing with a substantive ineligibility, rather than failure of the constitutional requirements of eligibility. See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 1287, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991) (The sine qua non of copyright is originality.). Ideas are substantively ineligible for copyright protection and, therefore, are categorically excluded from the subject matter of copyright. Thus, we conclude that a plaintiff's claim for conversion of his ideas—even original ideas expressed in a tangible medium—is not preempted by the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (ideas are manifestly ineligible for copyright protection regardless of the form in which [the idea] is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied).