Opinion ID: 389939
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: proceedings leading to the present appeal

Text: 24
25 On remand, the parties expressed varying views as to the proper scope of the new proceedings. BFME, apparently envisioning a completely new trial of all the issues in the case, served on plaintiffs requests for more than 180 admissions of fact, ranging from the basic concept of civil service hiring, to the validation of the 1975 test, 5 to the state of employment discrimination law in this Circuit. Plaintiffs and the City set considerably narrower sights. The City stated that it wished to submit further evidence on three issues that it described as follows: 26 1. The effect on disparate impact if the passing score is reduced from 12 to 6 and differential adjustments are made. 27 2. Adopt a plan which accepts the score reduction and treats this list as a qualifying list without ranking, subject to passing physical and medical examinations, which would afford substantial minority representation on the Fire Department. 28 3. Whether the City has a long history of notorious discriminatory practices in its hiring policies? 29 Plaintiffs, expressly reserving their position that the City could not avoid liability by manipulation of the passing score after having been found to have discriminated, stated that they had no objection to presentation of further evidence on the City's first and third issues, nor on the second to the extent that it simply reflected the City's position with respect to remedy. Plaintiffs proposed, in addition, to submit evidence with respect to the current manpower needs and vacancies within the fire department, and with respect to Title VI. As to the latter, plaintiffs stated as follows: 30 After the trial in this case the Supreme Court addressed issues relating to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, et seq., issues which are raised in the pleadings in this case. The record is not clear with respect to the relevance of Title VI to this case, in that there is no evidence relating to receipt of federal funds by the City other than Revenue Sharing funds. The record should be developed on this issue, by having the record reflect the City's receipt of funds, in order to avoid the necessity for a remand at some future time. 31 In a prehearing order, the district court reviewed the directions given by this Court on the first appeal and determined that a broad-ranging evidentiary hearing was uncalled for. Directing that any additional evidence be limited to that suggested by this Court's opinion and that necessitated by the passage of time since the district court's original remedy order, Judge Daly ruled that the issues as to which supplementary evidence would be permitted were the effect of the interim hiring orders, the effect of lowering the passing score on the 1975 exam, and the present personnel needs of the fire department. Discovery on other issues was denied. The court stated that further findings with respect to the appropriateness of quota relief would be based on the prior record. 32
33 An evidentiary hearing was held, limited to the three issues specified by the district court. The defendants offered expert testimony as to various candidate selection methods by which the disparity in pass rates on the 1975 test could be eliminated, assuming the passing level were lowered from twelve to six. 6 Plaintiffs offered expert testimony to show that lowering the passing score from twelve to six would not eliminate the disparate impact of the exam because it would merely decrease the disparity in pass rates from 20.5 percentage points to 14.2 percentage points, still a highly significant statistical difference. 7 The defendants' expert conceded that merely lowering the test score, without also adopting one of the methods he espoused, would not eliminate the disparate impact of the exam. 34 Testimony on issues other than those specified in the court's prehearing order was rejected. Thus, when the defendants proffered the testimony of a statistician and a chart to show that the percentage of minorities in the Bridgeport labor market of persons over the age of 18 with a high school diploma would not exceed 18%, the court sustained plaintiffs' objections on the ground that this issue had been fully litigated at trial and the evidence was beyond the scope of the hearing. Similarly, when plaintiffs called the City's Comptroller to testify on the subject of the City's use of federal funds in the fire department, to support their Title VI claim, the court sustained the City's objection that such testimony would be outside the scope of the hearing. The court stated, after ascertaining that the City's budget was published, that judicial notice would be taken of the budget. 35 It does not appear that the entire published budget was ever presented to the court. Subsequent to the hearing, plaintiffs filed the affidavit of a paralegal employed by plaintiffs' counsel, annexing photocopies of four pages described as part of the City's Public Employment Employee Roster. The affidavit stated that these pages showed that in 1971 and 1972, some federal money, provided under the Emergency Employment Act, was used by the City to hire personnel for the Fire Department.
36 Following the submission of such supplementary evidence as was allowed, the district court made detailed findings of fact and set forth its conclusions of law. 37 The court found that, even had there been no additional evidence of discrimination, the statistical evidence alone would have established a prima facie case of discriminatory impact. In 1975, when black and hispanic persons comprised approximately 41% of the labor force, the City's fire department had 427 whites, one hispanic, and no blacks. In its entire history prior to 1975, the City had employed only two minority firefighters, one of them hired in 1938. Following the institution of the present suit, the City had, pursuant to the two orders permitting interim hiring, hired 84 firefighters; 81 of them were white. The court noted that the City's hiring of minorities approached the  'inexorable zero.'  479 F.Supp. at 109 n.9, quoting International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342 n.23, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1858 n.23, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). 38 Not surprisingly, the court found, the City had a strong reputation for discrimination in employment. Indeed, its reputation for employment discrimination against black and hispanic persons was 'by far the worst' of all cities in Connecticut. 479 F.Supp. at 106. The court found that the City's reputation, as well as certain of its actions, described below, deterred minority persons from even applying for City employment: This reputation created the attitude in the black community that '(i)f you're black, just don't apply because you won't get the job.'  Id. 39 As to the merits of the 1975 test, the court found again that it was not job related and that it had a disparate impact on minority candidates. The court expressly incorporated its original findings with respect to the invalidity of the test, see Part I. C. supra. In addition the court found that certain parts of the exam were significantly discriminatory against blacks, and that certain of the test score data were improperly used. If adjustments were made for the improperly used data, using the 1975 test as a predictor of job performance would be  'about as good as tossing a coin.'  Id. at 110 n.10, quoting testimony of Dr. John Peck. 40 In answer to one of the questions posed by this Court on the first appeal, Judge Daly found that merely reducing the passing level on the 1975 exam from twelve to six would not spare the City liability for unlawful discrimination. First, the court concluded, on the basis of testimony from experts on both sides, that such a reduction would decrease, but not eliminate, the disparity between the pass rates of whites and minorities; and the resulting disparity would still prove discriminatory impact. The court also concluded that it would be inappropriate for the court to order hiring on the basis of, and to undertake administration of, an employment test that had been proven to have no relation to job skills. Finally, the court found that even if the disparate effects of the 1975 test could be eliminated by lowering the passing level, the City could not avoid liability for employment discrimination, because it had engaged in a policy and practice of discrimination extending well beyond the 1975 exam. Id. at 109-10 n.10. 41 The court found that the City had made little or no effort to recruit minority persons for the fire department. Noting that, despite its awareness of its discriminatory policies and reputation, the City had not adopted any affirmative action program until it was forced to do so in order not to lose some $7 million in federal funds, the court found that (n)o voluntary efforts have been made by the City to comply with its own affirmative action goals for the Fire Department. Id. at 113 n.12. The court found that (a)bsolutely no attempts were made to recruit minority applicants for fire department examinations prior to 1972, id. at 106, and that no significant recruiting efforts were made by the City thereafter. Id. at 107. The court found that the City's pre-1972 failure to recruit minority persons for the fire department was deliberate. 42 Indeed, the court found that the City had engaged in a continuing pattern and practice of actively deterring minority persons who have sought to become firefighters. Id. at 104-05. For example, it found that, while a coalition of community minority groups, coordinated by a local official of the United States Labor Department, was attempting to recruit minority candidates for the fire department, the City probably impeded these efforts. The City Civil Service Commission's personnel director furnished the coalition with a notice of the 1975 examination, and stated that familiarity with fire department tools, knowledge of first aid and knowledge of the geography of Bridgeport would be covered on the test. The coalition then, in sessions open to anyone, regardless of race, gave applicants training in these subjects. But the subjects covered by the 1975 test bore no resemblance to these areas; there were no questions involving geography, or first aid, or the use of firefighting equipment. Id. at 107-08. The understandable reaction of the minority applicants who had studied these rather pertinent subjects, only to be confronted with a test that did not mention them, was,  '(t)he City has fooled us again.'  Id. at 108. 43 The court found that the City had also engaged in several acts of discrimination against individual minority candidates. Plaintiff Ismael Pomales, for example, took the 1975 exam and passed it. However, he did not receive any notification that he had passed until he was informed that his name was being removed from the eligible list because he had not appeared for the physical agility test that those who passed the written exam were required to take. Other candidates were prevented from even taking the written test. One such candidate, class member Elias Castro, an hispanic with four years' experience as a firefighter in the United States Air Force, attempted to file his application with the Civil Service Commission in the middle of the afternoon on the last day for filing applications. He was told that it was too late. He was not allowed to speak to the superior of the person who told him it was too late, and he was not informed of any means by which he could appeal or lodge an official complaint. He did not get to take the 1975 exam. Another candidate, plaintiff Harmin Linares, filed his application before the deadline and was told that a notice would be mailed to him stating the date and time of the exam. He never received such a notice, and he did not get to take the exam. 44 Finally, the court found that the City's discrimination against minorities was of long duration. It reviewed the written firefighter exams that the City had given in 1965, 1968, and 1971. It found that none of these tests was job related and that all had had a disparate impact on minority applicants. For all these pre-1975 tests combined, those identified as nonminority candidates 8 had passed at the rate of better than one out of every three; of eighteen identified minority applicants, only one had passed. Id. at 108 n.9. 45 Thus, the court concluded that the City had engag(ed) in a policy and practice of discrimination against black and hispanic persons relative to entry-level hiring in the Bridgeport Fire Department, id. at 111; see id. at 111-12; and that its pattern of discrimination was  'clear-cut (,) long-continued and egregious.'  Id. at 112. 46 On the basis of these findings the court concluded that the City had violated Title VII, which prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race. Noting that the Title VII had not become applicable to municipalities until March 24, 1972, the court found that the combination of the statistical evidence, the City's use after that date of the results of the discriminatory examination held in 1971, and the City's policy and history of discrimination, including its deliberate failure to recruit minority applicants, compelled the conclusion that the City's violation of Title VII dated back to March 24, 1972. 47 Relying on many of the above findings, the court concluded also that the City's discriminatory policies and practices violated Title VI, dating back to January 1, 1971. Stating that Title VI prohibits such discrimination in  'any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,'  id. at 111, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), the court held that the City's receipt of such funds had been adequately proven. 48 Finally, the district court found that the City had received revenue sharing funds in every year since 1973, and that it had expended these funds, in part, for the operation of its Fire Department. The court concluded that the City's discriminatory practices had therefore violated the Revenue Sharing Act since January 1, 1973.
49 In light of its expanded findings and conclusions, the district court fashioned a new remedial order, which we set forth in pertinent part in the margin. 9 The order banned any further use of the 1971 and 1975 exams, set immediate minority hiring goals for the City, required the active recruitment of minority firefighters and the hiring of firefighters on a nondiscriminatory basis after the immediate goals were met, and awarded backpay and seniority relief to victims of the City's discrimination. 50 After reviewing certain of this Court's decisions in employment discrimination cases, the court concluded that the City's long history of egregious race discrimination warranted the issuance of a race-conscious hiring order, and that the court would be shirking its duty were it not to order affirmative relief to remedy past effects of discrimination. The court stated that its own aims were to grant redress to the victims of discrimination, to prevent future discrimination, and to persuade potential minority candidates that future applications for employment in the Bridgeport fire department would not automatically be rejected. The court expressly declined, however, to impose a hiring quota, which it defined as an order requiring the relatively permanent use of a specified hiring ratio. Rather, the court determined to set hiring goals for the City, which would lapse when the specified number of minority offers had been made, concluding that the imposition of such goals was the only effective means of remedying past discrimination. Id. at 114. The court elaborated as follows: 51 (T)his Court is of the opinion that merely ordering nondiscriminatory hiring in the future, even coupled with the requirement that the City actively recruit minority candidates, would be inadequate either to remedy past discrimination or to assure prospective minority candidates that applying is no longer futile. Association Against Discrimination in Employment v. City of Bridgeport, supra, 594 F.2d at 311 n.13. The effects of past violation(s) of the minority's rights cannot be eliminated merely by prohibiting future discrimination, since this would be illusory and inadequate as a remedy. Affirmative action is essential. Rios v. Enterprise Association Steamfitters Local 638, (501 F.2d 622, 631 (2d Cir. 1974)). 14 52 Id. at 113-14. 53 In setting the hiring goals for the City, the court looked to the period during which violations had been found and to the ratio between Bridgeport's minorities and nonminorities. On the basis of its ruling that the City's violations of Title VI dated back to January 1, 1971, the court selected the period starting on that date as its time frame. Within that period, the court observed that the City had hired 152 white firefighters, one hispanic firefighter, and three black firefighters. Having noted at the outset of its opinion that black and hispanic persons in 1975 comprised approximately 41% of Bridgeport's labor force, the court observed that (t)he hiring of an additional 102 minority persons would create a situation in which the percentage of minority firefighters hired since January 1, 1971 roughly would equal the percentage of minority persons in the population of the City. Id. at 115 (footnote omitted). 10 54 The court therefore ordered the City to compile a list of 102 persons to whom firefighter positions are to be offered. 11 The list is to be comprised, first, of those minority individuals still seeking to be firefighters who filed applications for either the 1971 or the 1975 exam and who can pass the City's agility test and medical examination; if there are fewer than 102 such persons, the list is to include minority persons who can prove to a special master that they were deterred by the City's discriminatory practices from applying to take either the 1971 or the 1975 exam, and who can pass the agility test and medical exam; and finally, if the total number of applicants and deterred would-be applicants is less than 102, additional minority persons, identified by a method to be devised by the City with the approval of the court, are to be added until the total reaches 102. 12 55 The order requires the City, as quickly as possible within the limits of its ability to train new firefighters, to offer the 102 persons on the list active employment in the fire department and prohibits it from hiring any other individuals as firefighters until all of the persons on the list have been offered such employment. 56 In addition, the court ordered the City to compile a list of up to 102 persons to be awarded backpay, comprised, first, of persons who were applicants or deterred would-be applicants for the 1971 or 1975 exam whose names are placed on the list of persons to whom employment must be offered; if there are fewer than 102 such persons, the list is to include minority persons who applied to take the 1971 or 1975 test, but whose names are not on the list of persons to be offered positions, providing they prove to the special master by a preponderance of the evidence that they met the City's age, residency, driver's license, education, agility and medical requirements on the date of the exam for which they applied; and finally, if there are fewer than 102 persons in those two groups, the list is to include minority persons not on the list of those to be offered positions, who prove to the special master by a preponderance of the evidence that but for the City's discriminatory practices they would have applied to take either the 1971 or 1975 exam, and that on the date of such exam they met the city's age, residency, driver's license, education, agility and medical requirements. To the extent that all of these groups combined yield fewer than 102 persons, the remainder of the backpay list is to remain vacant. For those who took or were deterred from taking the 1971 exam, backpay was awarded for the period beginning in October 1973, i. e., two years prior to the filing of the first complaint with EEOC; for individuals who took or were deterred from taking the 1975 exam, backpay was awarded for the period beginning in October 1976, the date the first firefighter was hired from the 1975 list. 57 In recognition of the seniority loss suffered by the victims of the City's discrimination, the court prohibited the City from giving any promotional examinations to firefighters hired pursuant to the 1971 or 1975 exams until all new minority firefighters who took or were deterred from taking the 1971 or 1975 exams have become qualified to take the promotional examinations. The City was not prohibited from reducing its time-in-grade requirements for promotional exams so as to advance the time at which the new hirees would become eligible, or from filling any promotional vacancies on an acting or provisional basis, so long as any such acting or provisional supervisors were not given any preference in the selection of permanent supervisors. 13
58 On appeal, defendants do not contest the district court's conclusion that the City is liable for race discrimination under the Revenue Sharing Act dating back to January 1, 1973, 14 nor do they contest the conclusion that the 1975 exam was unlawful under Title VII. They contend, however, with respect to both Title VI and Title VII, that the district court erred in holding the City liable for discrimination prior to 1975. In addition, defendants challenge various aspects of the remedy, arguing that the remedy constitutes an impermissible hiring quota, that the numerical hiring order is overbroad and requires the City to hire unqualified individuals, that the promotional freeze places an undue burden on a small, readily identifiable group of nonminority employees, and that the backpay relief is overinclusive and insufficiently tailored to the alleged violations. 59 The plaintiffs have cross-appealed from two aspects of the relief ordered. They contend that the court erred in placing on the minority candidates the burden of proving that they met the City's nondiscriminatory employment requirements in order to receive backpay, and they contend that the district court should have awarded constructive seniority for job placement, benefits, and other purposes, to persons hired pursuant to the order. 60 As to liability, we affirm the holding that the City has violated Title VII since 1972, but vacate the district court's ruling that the City violated Title VI. As to remedy, we affirm the district court's general remedial plan, but remand for modification as to the number of minority persons to whom employment must be offered and as to various aspects of the backpay and seniority awards.