Opinion ID: 2972707
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Departing from Precedent

Text: Cooper first argues that the Board erred in its 2003 Order by departing from its own precedent without explanation. Citing Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc. v. NLRB, 884 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1989), Cooper maintains that the law is clear that an agency cannot significantly depart from its own precedent without explicitly recognizing it is doing so and explaining why. In Shaw’s Supermarkets, shortly before a union election, the employer told all employees that “if they were to turn their affairs over to” the union, they would be guaranteed “minimum wages and workmen’s comp and that’s where [the] collective bargaining process would begin.” Id. at 34-35. Based on this statement, the Board refused to certify the results of the election and directed a second election. The Board moved for enforcement of its order. Citing several Board decisions finding that almost identical statements made under almost identical circumstances did not warrant a second election, the First Circuit reversed, holding that when the Board deviates “from well-established precedent as significantly as it has done here, it must, at least, explain the reasons for its deviation.” Id. at 35. Here, Cooper argues that the Board sustained the Union’s objection and directed a second election based solely on its finding that an employee reasonably would have interpreted Question 22 as a threat to take away the 2002 ROAM bonus if the Union won the election. According to Cooper, as in Shaw’s Supermarkets, under Board precedent, such a single, implied threat to eliminate an existing benefit was not sufficient to warrant a new election. We disagree. 8 Unlike Shaw’s Supermarkets, there is no such clear line of contrary precedent governing this case.6 In fact, contrary to Cooper’s claims, there is authority supporting the Board’s finding that a single, implied threat of retaliation is sufficient to taint an election. In Siemens Mfg. Co., 322 NLRB 994 (1997), for example, the Board found that an employer’s speech to employees reiterating the average wage increases and bonuses paid the previous five years, followed by a comment that if the employees voted to unionize, everything “is frozen until we reach an agreement at the negotiating table” was sufficiently coercive to taint the union election. Id. This Court also has held that a veiled threat of retaliation is sufficient evidence that an employer interfered with the employees’ exercise of their rights in the context of a Union election. See UFORMA/Shelby Bus. Forms, Inc. v. NLRB, 111 F.3d 1284, 1295 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that the fact that the employer did not enforce its threat or otherwise engage in objectionable conduct does not shield it from liability, because “the threat itself is the actionable wrong”); V & S ProGalv, Inc. v. NLRB, 168 F.3d 270, 279 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that objectionable threats include insinuations by an employer that it will withhold or curtail a bonus or benefits in retaliation for unionization); see also NLRB v. Island Film Processing Co., 784 F.2d 1446, 1451 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Implied threats of retaliation suffice to taint an election.”). Thus, the real issue in this case is not that the Board significantly departed from prior precedent but whether there was substantial evidence to support the Board’s finding that Cooper’s conduct violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 6 The Shaw’s Supermarkets court recognized the uniqueness of the case before it, however, indicating that it was limiting its decision to cases in which the Board departs from “past cases” which “trace a relatively clear line.” Id. at 39. It was not imposing on the Board “the time consuming obligation of microscopically examining prior cases; nor [] encourag[ing] counsel to examine past precedent with an eye towards raising hosts of legalistic arguments and distinctions.” Id. 9