Opinion ID: 1444172
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Resolving the Tension

Text: Our varying approaches to similar Fourth Amendment scenarios give rise to the question presented here: Should the rationale of Tyrell J., i.e., the status of a juvenile probationer subject to close supervision, coupled with the special needs exception to the warrant requirement, be extended to validate suspicionless searches of adult parolees? Or, should the reasonableness of a parole search still depend on a showing of reasonable suspicion as required under Burgener? In the wake of Tyrell J., the Attorney General argues the standard should be the same. Because there are no significant differences, for Fourth Amendment purposes, between search conditions imposed involuntarily on adult parolees and those imposed involuntarily on juvenile probationers, the Attorney General suggests society should not be required to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy beyond the basic guarantee against unreasonable searches. Defendant disagrees. He would limit the holding in Tyrell J. to juvenile probationers; however, if there is no constitutionally significant distinction, he argues all parole and probation searches should be governed not by the Bravo `arbitrary and capricious' standard, but by the Burgener (and Griffin ) `reasonable suspicion' standard. The Court of Appeal adopted defendant's view, distinguishing Tyrell J. and holding that reasonable suspicion remains a requirement for conducting a search of a parolee's home. We think the Attorney General offers the better argument. The logic of Tyrell J. applies equally, if not more so, to parolees. Because of society's interest both in assuring the parolee corrects his behavior and in protecting its citizens against dangerous criminals, a search pursuant to a parole condition, without reasonable suspicion, does not intrude on a reasonable expectation of privacy, that is, an expectation that society is willing to recognize as legitimate. ( Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 89, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519.) We agree. The United States Supreme Court has conceded that although `some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure[,] ... the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion.' ( T.L.O., supra, 469 U.S. at p. 342, fn. 8, 105 S.Ct. 733, quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte (1976) 428 U.S. 543, 560-561, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116; see Treasury Employees v. Von Raab (1989) 489 U.S. 656, 665, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 [rejecting claim that any measure of individualized suspicion ... is an indispensable component of reasonableness in every circumstance]; Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn. (1989) 489 U.S. 602, 624, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639[[A] showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional floor, below which a search must be presumed unreasonable.].) In determining whether a suspicionless intrusion is justified, the court has looked at several factors: (1) the individual's interest, (2) the government's interest, (3) the necessity for the intrusion, and (4) the procedure used in conducting the search. To assess the first factor, the court looks to a hierarchy of privacy interests. Reasonable expectations of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as legitimate receive the greatest level of protection; diminished expectations of privacy are more easily invaded; and subjective expectations of privacy that society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate have no protection. ( T.L.O., supra, 469 U.S. at pp. 337-338, 105 S.Ct. 733; see Hudson v. Palmer (1984) 468 U.S. 517, 526, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393; Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 148-149, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387.) When parole or probation searches are involved, the balance struck between individual interest and government necessity is implicit in the determination that a warrantless search condition is a reasonable term in a parole or probation agreement. ( Burgener, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 532, 224 Cal.Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251; see Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 87, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519 [To better effectuate the rehabilitation of the juvenile, the condition of probation permitting police (and others) to conduct warrantless searches is imposed by the juvenile court to serve the important goal of deterring future misconduct.].) The rationale of Tyrell J. can be stated succinctly. When involuntary search conditions are properly imposed, reasonable suspicion is no longer a prerequisite to conducting a search of the subject's person or property. Such a search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment as long as it is not arbitrary, capricious or harassing. Tyrell J. 's reasoning applies with equal force to adults. In both cases the expectation of privacy is already reduced by the absence of the warrant requirement. As a convicted felon still subject to the Department of Corrections, a parolee has conditional freedomgranted for the specific purpose of monitoring his transition from inmate to free citizen. The state has a duty not only to assess the efficacy of its rehabilitative efforts but to protect the public, and the importance of the latter interest justifies the imposition of a warrantless search condition. The threat of a suspicionless search is fully consistent with the deterrent purposes of the search condition. `The purpose of an unexpected, unprovoked search of defendant is to ascertain whether [the parolee] is complying with the terms of [parole]; to determine not only whether he disobeys the law, but also whether he obeys the law. Information obtained under such circumstances would afford a valuable measure of the effectiveness of the supervision given the defendant....' ( People v. Mason, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 763, 97 Cal.Rptr. 302, 488 P.2d 630, quoting People v. Kern (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 962, 965, 71 Cal.Rptr. 105.) More importantly, the government's action is triggered by defendant's own conduct. The existence of this triggering eventthe crime which results in conviction or juvenile adjudicationcreates the compelling need for government intervention and diminishes any reasonable expectation of privacy. Other courts reached similar conclusions both before and after the Griffin decision. In Owens v. Kelley (11th Cir.1982) 681 F.2d 1362, 1368, the court declined to impose a reasonable suspicion standard on warrantless probationary searches because such a requirement could completely undermine the purpose of the search condition. (Fn. omitted.) In State v. Zeta Chi Fraternity (N.H.1997) 696 A.2d 530, 540-541, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held warrantless random searches of probationers not based on particularized suspicion are constitutionally permissible if the search is authorized as a condition of probation, related to the rehabilitation and supervision of the probationer, and conducted in a manner that is reasonable in time, scope, and frequency. Unannounced searches, even when the probation officer does not suspect that the probationer is violating his probation conditions, may be essential to adequately monitor the probationer's rehabilitation and protect the public. ( Id. at p. 539.) In Burgener, we analyzed parole searches along with other administrative searches and concluded `The determination of the standard of reasonableness governing any specific class of searches requires balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails.' ( Burgener, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 534, 224 Cal.Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251, quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, 387 U.S. at pp. 536, 537, 87 S.Ct. 1727.) While acknowledging that the balance fell heavily on the side of the government interest in public safety, we nevertheless concluded reasonable suspicion was the appropriate standard to justify a parole search. ( Burgener, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 535, 224 Cal.Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251.) In more recent administrative search cases, however, the United States Supreme Court has upheld suspicionless searches where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion. ( Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., supra, 489 U.S. at pp. 624, 631, 109 S.Ct. 1402; Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 674, 109 S.Ct. 1384.) A similar balance applies to parolees who are subject to limitations not applicable to ordinary citizens. The level of intrusion is de minimis and the expectation of privacy greatly reduced when the subject of the search is on notice that his activities are being routinely and closely monitored. Moreover, the purpose of the search condition is to deter the commission of crimes and to protect the public, and the effectiveness of the deterrent is enhanced by the potential for random searches. We thus conclude a parole search may be reasonable despite the absence of particularized suspicion. However, our holding that particularized suspicion is not required in order to conduct a search based on a properly imposed search condition does not mean parolees have no protection. As explained in People v. Clower (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1737, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 38, a parole search could become constitutionally `unreasonable' if made too often, or at an unreasonable hour, or if unreasonably prolonged or for other reasons establishing arbitrary or oppressive conduct by the searching officer. ( Id. at p. 1741, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 38; United States v. Follette (S.D.N.Y.1968) 282 F.Supp. 10, 13; see In re Anthony S. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1004, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 214 [a search is arbitrary and capricious when the motivation for the search is unrelated to rehabilitative, reformative or legitimate law enforcement purposes, or when the search is motivated by personal animosity toward the parolee]; People v. Bremmer (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 1058, 1062, 106 Cal.Rptr. 797 [unrestricted search of a probationer or parolee by law enforcement officers at their whim or caprice is a form of harassment].) Where the search is for a proper purpose, we hold that, even in the absence of particularized suspicion, a search conducted under the auspices of a properly imposed parole search condition does not intrude on any expectation of privacy society is `prepared to recognize as legitimate.' ( T.L.O., supra, 469 U.S. at p. 338, 105 S.Ct. 733; Hudson v. Palmer, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 526, 104 S.Ct. 3194.)