Opinion ID: 1844705
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: aiding and abetting instructions

Text: Miller was charged as a principal to murder. Miller's last argument centers around the trial court's instructions to the jury that he could be found guilty of murder as an aider and abettor, although no such allegation appeared in his indictment, which, combined with the State's failure to respond to his request for a bill of particulars, he alleges made him incapable of mounting an effective defense. He also asserts he was entitled to a unanimous verdict on a single theory of culpability which the alternative principal/aider and abettor theories prevent. He relies on State v. Reutter, 374 N.W.2d 617 (S.D. 1985), and State v. Alexander, 313 N.W.2d 33 (S.D.1981), for the proposition that failure to allege aiding and abetting in an indictment is reversible error. Both of those cases involved conspiracies. Aiding and abetting, however, is a separate and distinct crime from conspiracy. State v. Erickson, 315 N.W.2d 332 (S.D.1982); State v. Anderberg, 89 S.D. 75, 79-80, 228 N.W.2d 631, 634 (1975). As to substantive crimes other than conspiracy, involving aiders and abettors, the situation is different. The applicable statutes are: SDCL 22-3-3: Any person who, with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a crime, aids, abets or advises another person in planning or committing the crime, is legally accountable, as a principal to the crime. (Emphasis supplied.) SDCL 22-3-3.1: The distinction between an accessory before the fact and a principal, and between principals in the first and second degree, in cases of felony, is abrogated. Any person connected with the commission of a felony, whether he directly commits the act constituting the offense or aids and abets in its commission, though not present, must be prosecuted, tried, and punished as a principal. (Emphasis supplied.) SDCL 22-3-5.1: An accessory to the commission of a felony may be prosecuted, tried, and punished, even if the principal is not prosecuted or tried, and even if the principal was acquitted. (Emphasis supplied.) In State v. Zemina, 87 S.D. 291, 206 N.W.2d 819 (1973), we explained this statutory scheme (the statutes in effect then, SDCL §§ 23-10-3, -4, and -5, were essentially the same as those above), rejecting an argument, similar to Miller's: Defendant contends that because the state had charged him with murdering Fernen it was error to allow the state to submit the case to the jury on alternative theories that he had killed Fernen or had aided and abetted his brother Bruce in the killing. He argues that before one can be charged and convicted on a theory of aiding and abetting the commission of an offense the state must first prove that the principal was guilty of the crime in which the defendant aided and abetted. ... As was stated in State v. Bachelor, 67 S.D. 259, 291 N.W. 738 [1940]: The effect of these two sections of the Code [SDCL 23-10-3 and 23-10-5, supra] is to do away with the necessity, in the prosecution, of any reference to a defendant as an accessory. A party who aids and abets another in the commission of a criminal offense is himself a principal in the commission of such offense and is to be tried the same as though he were actually a principal and the record of the conviction of the principal, either by verdict or plea of guilty, is not evidence, prima facie, or otherwise of the guilt of an accessory. ... It is not necessary in an indictment under Federal law to allege that a person is guilty of aiding and abetting, and one may be convicted as an aider and abettor even though he is not charged in that capacity. United States v. Lugo-Baez, 412 F.2d 435 [(8th Cir.1969)]; United States v. Thomas, 469 F.2d 145 [(8th Cir.1972)]. Zemina, 87 S.D. at 300-01, 206 N.W.2d at 823-24 (emphasis added). Other jurisdictions follow the Zemina course. A defendant in Wisconsin, indicted for murder as a principal, rested his case without calling witnesses, and was informed at the instruction conference that the State was asking for a party-to-a-crime instruction: Whiting argues that he would have called several witnesses to dispute the party-to-a-crime charge had the state notified him in a timely fashion. We find no merit in this argument. State v. Whiting, 136 Wis.2d 400, 411, 402 N.W.2d 723, 728 (Wis.App.1987). Also, see People v. Hooper, 50 Mich.App. 186, 190-91, 212 N.W.2d 786, 788 (1973): [T]he trial court instructed the jury on aiding and abetting, despite the fact that he was not charged, in the information, as an aider and abettor. It is contended now that this procedure resulted in a denial of due process since he was not given notice of the nature of the charges against him. We do not agree. It is well settled that an aider and abettor may be indicted, tried, and on conviction punished as a principal and no denial of due process results from charging an aider and abettor as a principal. People v. Lamson, 44 Mich.App. 447, 205 N.W.2d 189 (1972); People v. Palmer, 42 Mich.App. 549, 202 N.W.2d 536 (1972); People v. Dockery, 20 Mich.App. 201, 173 N.W.2d 726 (1969); People v. Weatherspoon, 6 Mich.App. 233, 148 N.W.2d 891 (1967). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently rejected the argument that a defendant suffered any prejudice through conviction as either an aider or abettor or a principal in United States v. Eagle Elk, 820 F.2d 959 (8th Cir.1987): Under the sixth amendment, a criminal defendant in federal court has a non-waivable right to a unanimous jury verdict.... In the present case, the jury returned a unanimous verdict finding Eagle Elk guilty under 18 U.S.C. § 2(a), which was quoted in the trial court's instructions. The statute makes an aider or abettor in an offense against the United States punishable as a principal. Even if the jury was divided on whether Eagle Elk committed the principal crime or aided or abetted in its commission, there can be no question that the illegal act was murder. Eagle Elk, 820 F.2d at 961 (citations omitted). Here, where the defendant's theory of defense, from beginning to end of the trial, consisted of claiming he was operating in the scheme with mysterious strangers, or Bill, or Mike, and this evidence was known before trial started, it is ludicrous to cry surprise. It was Miller, himself, who factually raised aiding and abetting. Instructions below were in accordance with past precedent in this Court and our statutes. In State v. Johnson, 272 N.W.2d 304, 305 (S.D.1978), this Court held: It is settled law that a conviction may be supported by proof that the defendant was an aider and abettor even though the charging instrument charges him as a principal. Johnson was cited with approval by the Supreme Court of Vermont in State v. Jaramillo, 140 Vt. 206, 436 A.2d 757 (1981). Similarly, we reject Miller's claim that the State's failure to provide him with a bill of particulars was prejudicial. On the theory that a bill of particulars is supplied to inform defendant of facts of which he is unaware, the defendant is not entitled to information which is within his own knowledge, which may be gleaned from the accusation itself, or which may be procured through other means readily accessible to him. C. Torcia, 2 Wharton's Criminal Procedure, § 355, at 288-89 (12th ed. 1975) (footnote omitted). AFFIRMED.