Opinion ID: 2615193
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Right to Confrontation and Witness Unavailability.

Text: (6a) Defendant also contends that by declaring Sarah unavailable as a witness and thus allowing her preliminary hearing testimony to be read to the jury the court deprived him of his federal and state constitutional right to confront witnesses against him and violated similar statutory guarantees. We conclude he is correct on this point as well. (7) The United States Supreme Court has established that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is a fundamental right, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. ( Pointer v. Texas (1965) 380 U.S. 400 [13 L.Ed.2d 923, 85 S.Ct. 1065].) The California Constitution now provides a specific guarantee of the right to confrontation: The defendant in a criminal cause has the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against the defendant. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) A similar guarantee is codified in section 686, subdivision 3, of the Penal Code, which provides that in a criminal action the defendant is entitled to produce witnesses on his behalf and to be confronted with the witnesses against him, in the presence of the court.... In California v. Green (1970) 399 U.S. 149 [26 L.Ed.2d 489, 90 S.Ct. 1930], the United States Supreme Court defined the three-fold purpose of the confrontation requirement: (1) to insure reliability by means of the oath, (2) to expose the witness to the probe of cross-examination, and (3) to permit the trier of fact to weigh the demeanor of the witness. ( Id. at p. 158 [26 L.Ed.2d at p. 497]; see also People v. Green (1971) 3 Cal.3d 981, 989 [92 Cal. Rptr. 494, 479 P.2d 998].) It is well settled, of course, that the right of confrontation is not absolute. In Barber v. Page (1968) 390 U.S. 719 [20 L.Ed.2d 255, 88 S.Ct. 1318], the high court recognized that there has traditionally been an exception to the confrontation requirement where a witness is unavailable and has given testimony at previous judicial proceedings against the same defendant which was subject to cross-examination by that defendant. ( Id. at p. 722 [20 L.Ed.2d at p. 258]; accord, People v. Enriquez (1977) 19 Cal.3d 221, 235 [137 Cal. Rptr. 171, 561 P.2d 261, 3 A.L.R.4th 73].) The California Evidence Code is consistent with this formulation. Section 1291 provides in relevant part: (a) Evidence of former testimony is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and: ... [¶] (2) the party against whom the former testimony is offered was a party to the action or proceeding in which the testimony was given and had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that which he has at the hearing. Here defendant did have the opportunity to cross-examine Sarah at the preliminary hearing, although his counsel elected not to question the girl at that time. (8) This tactical decision may not be construed as a waiver of the right to confront the witness. In Barber v. Page, supra, 390 U.S. 719, the Supreme Court addressed a situation in which defense counsel had declined to cross-examine a preliminary hearing witness who, by the time of trial, had been imprisoned in a foreign jurisdiction. The court held that defendant had not waived the confrontation challenge by counsel's failure to cross-examine the witness at the earlier opportunity, and offered the following observations regarding the preliminary hearing procedure: we would reach the same result on the facts of this case had petitioner's counsel actually cross-examined [the witness] at the preliminary hearing. [Citation.] The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the witness. A preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much less searching exploration into the merits of a case than a trial, simply because its function is the more limited one of determining whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial. While there may be some justification for holding that the opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at a preliminary hearing satisfies the demands of the confrontation clause where the witness is shown to be actually unavailable, this is not, as we have pointed out, such a case. (Id. at pp. 725-726 [20 L.Ed.2d at p. 260].) Although defense counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine Sarah at the preliminary hearing, the Evidence Code section 1291 exception to the rule against hearsay requires that the preliminary hearing witness be unavailable at the time of trial. Evidence Code section 240 in turn defines unavailable as a witness to include the witness who is unable to attend or to testify at the hearing because of then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity. (Evid. Code, § 240, subd. (a)(3).) The burden of proof on the issue of witness unavailability rests with the proponent of the evidence, and the showing must be made by competent evidence. ( People v. Williams (1979) 93 Cal. App.3d 40, 51 [155 Cal. Rptr. 414]; People v. Enriquez, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 235.) (6b) Here the only witness at the unavailability hearing was Sarah's mother, defendant's wife. She testified that Sarah had been suffering for some time from emotional difficulties, that she had experienced audio and visual hallucinations, that she had intentionally cut herself several times  most recently two days prior to the hearing  and that she had just been hospitalized following this latest incident. Although the court invited the prosecuting attorney to come forward at a later time with medical testimony in support of the mother's declarations, no physician, psychiatrist, or psychologist ever testified on the unavailability issue. We conclude that Sarah's mother's testimony on the issue of her daughter's mental health is legally insufficient to support a finding of witness unavailability. Reviewing courts have typically and properly required either expert testimony on the witness's present condition, or the witness's own express refusal to testify at trial. For example, in People v. Gomez (1972) 26 Cal. App.3d 225 [103 Cal. Rptr. 80], the Court of Appeal based its decision sustaining a finding of unavailability on the testimony of two physicians, both staff psychiatrists at the hospital where the witness, the victim of the alleged sex crime, was then under treatment. ( Id. at p. 228.) The court distinguished cases relied on by the defendant in which police officers had testified regarding the mental condition of the absent witness, but in which no medical testimony had been presented. ( Id. at p. 230, citing Sanchez v. Bagues & Sons Mortuaries (1969) 271 Cal. App.2d 188, 193-194 [76 Cal. Rptr. 372].) While refusing to specify the actual nature or severity of the disability required for a finding of unavailability, the court did offer the following general standard: We agree with appellant that the illness or infirmity must be of comparative severity; it must exist to such a degree as to render the witness's attendance, or his testifying, relatively impossible and not merely inconvenient.  (Italics added.) (26 Cal. App.3d at p. 230.) In People v. Williams (1979) 93 Cal. App.3d 40 [155 Cal. Rptr. 414], the Court of Appeal rejected a finding that a rape victim who had testified at the defendants' first trial was unavailable to testify at the second trial of a defendant. At the unavailability hearing several persons were called, including the judge from the first trial. He testified that the witness had been under severe emotional strain during the proceedings and on one occasion had collapsed. Although he also stated that the physician who had examined the witness had testified that she was then suffering from colitis, no such evidence was offered at the unavailability hearing to show that this condition had persisted or recurred. The police officer who had testified at the first trial reiterated his description of the witness's physicial condition immediately after the sexual attacks. The witness's girl friend, who had accompanied the witness to court during the first trial, testified that the witness had undergone extreme emotional and physical distress and, on learning of the new trial, had told her Barbara, I can't go through with that again. I can't. I want to put my life together and go on. I am being torn apart. ( Id. at p. 50.) Finally, the witness's former boyfriend testified that she had become hysterical on learning that she would have to testify again. ( Ibid. ) However, no medical evidence was presented in Williams regarding the witness's alleged mental infirmity at the time of the hearing. The court concluded that In the absence of medical testimony such as was introduced in Gomez, there was no credible evidence ... to support a finding that, if required to testify [the witness] would suffer any substantial impairment to her mental or physical health  either permanently or for any significant period of time. ( Id. at p. 54.) Adopting the test articulated in Gomez, the court held that the evidence established only that the absent witness's mental, emotional and physical condition rendered her ability to testify merely inconvenient and not `relatively impossible.' ( Ibid. ) As respondent here points out, neither the Gomez nor the Williams decision explicitly calls for medical testimony as a specific requirement for a finding of unavailability under the mental illness or infirmity provision of Evidence Code section 240. Indeed there is competent evidence in this case, from Sarah's mother, that Sarah was hospitalized and undergoing psychotherapy at the time of the hearing. However, although the mother may be capable of testifying to the existence of her daughter's mental illness or infirmity, section 240, subdivision (a)(3), requires that the witness be  unable to attend or to testify at the hearing because of then existing ... mental illness or infirmity. (Italics added.) In other words, the evidence must establish not only that there is an illness or infirmity, but also that the condition renders it relatively impossible  to use the language of Williams  for the witness to appear. This determination generally calls for expert opinion, with supporting reasons, as to the likely effect of the court appearance on the physical or mental health of the witness. The mother's understandably protective testimony was therefore insufficient as a matter of law for this critical purpose. As an alternative ground for sustaining the finding that Sarah was unavailable as a witness, respondent calls our attention to People v. Rojas (1975) 15 Cal.3d 540 [125 Cal. Rptr. 357, 542 P.2d 229, 92 A.L.R.3d 1127]. In Rojas the witness himself testified at the hearing on his unavailability and stated that he had received threats by telephone and by letter, that various acts of violence had been directed toward him and his family, and that he was therefore in desperate fear of his and his family's safety. ( Id. at pp. 547-550.) He did not invoke the privilege against self-incrimination, and was physically and mentally capable of testifying, yet he absolutely refused to testify. He was found in contempt of court and was detained in juvenile hall for the remainder of the trial. Although no medical testimony was presented at the unavailability hearing, we held that the term mental infirmity includes a mental state induced by fear that impels a witness to refuse to testify. ( Id. at p. 551; accord, People v. Quaintance (1978) 86 Cal. App.3d 594, 600 [150 Cal. Rptr. 281].) The record here indicates that Sarah spent one night in juvenile hall for refusing to cooperate at the preliminary hearing and for repeatedly answering I don't know or I don't remember when questioned by the prosecuting attorney. Respondent therefore contends that the situation is analogous to Rojas, and argues that Sarah has constructively refused to testify for fear of returning to juvenile hall. This contention is without merit, and Rojas is clearly distinguishable. In Rojas the witness who had testified at the preliminary hearing and at the first trial himself appeared at the beginning of the second trial and stated that he would refuse to testify out of fear. The court was therefore able to observe his demeanor to determine whether his fear amounted to a mental infirmity that would render it relatively impossible for him to testify. Sarah, however, did not testify at the hearing on her unavailability. The prosecution offered only her mother's testimony that Sarah was afraid that if she took the stand she might again be sent to juvenile hall for failing to answer questions properly. [3] While in Rojas there was no challenge made to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's determination that the fear was justified ( People v. Rojas, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 550), here it is the very sufficiency of the mother's testimony, supported neither by expert evidence nor by Sarah's own words, that is at issue. In Rojas we were asked to determine whether fear might constitute a mental infirmity for purposes of witness unavailability; here Sarah's subjective fear has not been established by the evidence. Furthermore, although in Rojas we held that fear may constitute a mental infirmity rendering a witness unavailable, we also compared the witness who refuses to testify with the witness who invokes the privilege against self-incrimination or who is physically absent from the hearing: No [] [sufficient] reason appears to us why the former testimony of a witness who is present in court but refuses to testify because he is in fear ... should not be used when that of a witness, who claims privilege or who is absent from the hearing and his attendance cannot be compelled or procured, can be used. ( Id. at p. 551.) No such analogy to the privilege exemption or to physical absence is possible in this case, because Sarah herself did not personally refuse to testify. We conclude that Sarah should not have been declared unavailable as a witness under Evidence Code section 240, subdivision (a)(3). Her preliminary hearing testimony was therefore erroneously admitted into evidence, as was Deputy Hoberg's testimony purporting to impeach Sarah's declarations. Defendant was thus denied the constitutional right to confront the principal witness against him, the alleged victim of the offenses charged, while respondent was permitted to impeach that witness's former testimony. (9) Because this error is of federal as well as state constitutional dimension, violating as it does the defendant's right to confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we must apply the reversible error test set out in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065]. ( People v. Arcega (1982) 32 Cal.3d 504, 525 [186 Cal. Rptr. 94, 651 P.2d 338].) This test provides that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (386 U.S. at p. 24 [17 L.Ed.2d at pp. 710-711].) The burden is on the beneficiary of the error either to prove that there was no injury or to suffer a reversal of his erroneously obtained judgment. ( Ibid. ; see also People v. Spencer (1967) 66 Cal.2d 158, 168 [57 Cal. Rptr. 163, 424 P.2d 715].) The Chapman court reiterated the approach it adopted in Fahy v. Connecticut (1963) 375 U.S. 85 [11 L.Ed.2d 171, 84 S.Ct. 229]: The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction. ( Id. at pp. 86-87 [11 L.Ed.2d at p. 173]; see also People v. Powell (1967) 67 Cal.2d 32, 56-57 [59 Cal. Rptr. 817, 429 P.2d 137].) Where a fundamental constitutional right is at issue, erroneous evidentiary rulings are seldom harmless under this standard: An error in admitting plainly relevant evidence which possibly influenced the jury adversely to a litigant cannot... be conceived of as harmless. ( Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at pp. 23-24 [17 L.Ed.2d at p. 710].) Further, we must weigh the impact of the error not only on the decision of the jury, but also on the course of the trial. ( People v. Spencer, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 163.) (10) It is surely reasonably possible in this case that Sarah's preliminary hearing testimony influenced the jury in its decision to convict defendant of the one felony and several misdemeanor charges. Viewing the record without Sarah's former testimony we are left with very little evidence. We exclude Deputy Hoberg's testimony in this analysis because it was introduced solely for impeachment. Because we have determined that Dr. Walker's testimony was erroneously admitted in violation of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, we view the record absent this testimony as well. We are left, then, with only the testimony of Sarah's mother, defendant's wife, who contributed negligibly to the prosecution's case. She testified at some length as to Sarah's personality and described her mental and emotional problems. When asked if she had discussed with her husband his sexual relations with Sarah she responded, reluctantly: All right. It was something of the nature that Sarah had told me that some things had occurred between she and my husband, also between she and a shepherd and between she and a neighbor boy and that I had taken Sarah to see Dr. Walker and that I felt that we had a problem which had to be faced. Whether or not what Sarah said was the truth was a problem in our household. Attempts to elicit more specific testimony as to the nature of defendant's sexual relations were unsuccessful. It is therefore probable that the jury would not have convicted defendant of any crime based on her testimony alone. Looking at Sarah's preliminary hearing testimony itself to evaluate its possible injurious effect on defendant's case, we are persuaded that her statements, however contradictory, reluctant or confused, did contribute to the conviction. While she was often evasive and uncertain in her responses, she conceded that a number of mutual fondling episodes had taken place and, if not in explicit language, suggested that an alleged oral copulation incident had occurred, described an incident of masturbation and ejaculation, and stated that one or two incidents involved the use of a vibrator. Although Sarah's credibility may have been questioned by the jury, her preliminary hearing testimony undoubtedly contributed to defendant's detriment. Considering the effect of the error on the course of defendant's trial, we note again that but for the admission into evidence of Sarah's former testimony, Deputy Hoberg would not have been permitted to testify to impeach this testimony. That witness would have been limited to testimony regarding her own observations of Sarah during their interview, and to disclosing whatever of Sarah's statements might have been admissible under some other exception to the rule against hearsay, if any. Thus we are unable to conclude that the erroneous admission into evidence of Sarah's preliminary hearing testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The judgment is reversed.