Opinion ID: 868764
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Conditions of Confinement

Text: Walker plausibly alleged that his conditions of confinement at FCI Ray Brook deprived him of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities and subjected him to unreasonable health and safety risks. He alleged that for approximately twenty-eight months, he was confined in a cell with five other men, with inadequate space and ventilation, stifling heat in the summer and freezing cold -17- in the winter, unsanitary conditions, including urine and feces splattered on the floor, insufficient cleaning supplies, a mattress too narrow for him to lie on flat, and noisy, crowded conditions that made sleep difficult and placed him at constant risk of violence and serious harm from cellmates. Based on these allegations, we conclude that Walker has plausibly alleged cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. First, it is well settled that exposing prisoners to extreme temperatures without adequate ventilation may violate the Eighth Amendment. See Gaston, 249 F.3d at 164 (We have held that an Eighth Amendment claim may be established by proof that the inmate was subjected for a prolonged period to bitter cold.); see also, e.g., Corselli v. Coughlin, 842 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1988) (claims that inmate was exposed to subfreezing temperatures for three months with ice forming in toilet bowl were sufficient to raise issues of fact for jury, even where prison officials gave inmate extra blanket). Second, sleep is critical to human existence, and conditions that prevent sleep have been held to violate the -18- Eighth Amendment. See Tafari v. McCarthy, 714 F. Supp. 2d 317, 367 (N.D.N.Y. 2010) (Courts have previously recognized that sleep constitutes a basic human need and conditions that prevent sleep violate an inmate's constitutional rights.) (citing Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 720 (5th Cir. 1999)); see also, e.g., Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 521-22, 526 (2d Cir. 1967) (inmate stated Eighth Amendment claim by alleging he was forced to sleep completely nude on the cold rough concrete floor and that the cell was so cold and uncomfortable that it was impossible for him to sleep for more than an hour or two without having to stand and move about in order to keep warm); Robinson v. Danberg, 729 F. Supp. 2d 666, 683 (D. Del. 2010) (denying motion to dismiss Eighth Amendment claims based on allegations that defendants took spec ific acts designed to deprive [plaintiff] of sleep). 7 Further, at least one court recently found that the condition of a prisoner's mattress may be so inadequate as to constitute 7 Cf. Spivey v. Doria, No. 91 C 4169, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3527, at  (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 1994) (holding that pretrial detainee failed to allege constitutional violation where he alleged only that the lights and noise interfere[d] with his sleep not that he [wa]s unable to sleep or that the sleep deprivation ha[d] caused him any harm). -19- an unconstitutional deprivation. See Bell v. Luna, 856 F. Supp. 2d 388, 397-98 (D. Conn. 2012) (denying motion to dismiss where inmate lived for seven months with mattress that was torn, unstuffed, and smelled like mildew) . Third, we have long recognized that unsanitary conditions in a prison cell can, in egregious circumstances, rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment. See Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 106 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting that prisoners are entitled to, inter alia, sanitation); LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1972) (Causing a man to live, eat and perhaps sleep in close confines with his own human waste is too debasing and degrading to be permitted.) ; Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 365 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that the denial of basic sanitation . . . is cruel and unusual because, in the worst case, it can result in physical torture, and, even in less serious cases, it can result in pain without any penological purpose. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 8 Indeed, unsanitary 8 But see Jones v. Goord, 435 F. Supp. 2d 221, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (evidence that several inmates urinated on, rather than in, the toilet reflected isolated incidents of -20- conditions lasting for mere days may constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. See, e.g., Gaston, 249 F.3d at 165-66 (inmate stated an Eighth Amendment claim where the area in front of his cell was filled with human feces, urine, and sewage water for several consecutive days); Wright, 387 F.2d at 522, 526 (placement of prisoner for thirty-three days in cell that was fetid and reeking from the stench of the bodily wastes of previous occupants which . . . covered the floor, the sink, and the toilet, combined with other conditions, would violate the Eighth Amendment). Further, the failure to provide prisoners with toiletries and other hygienic materials may rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Trammell v. Keane, 338 F.3d 155, 165 (2d Cir. 2003) ([T]his court and other circuits have recognized that deprivation of toiletries, and especially toilet paper, can rise to the level of unconstitutional conditions of confinement . . . .); see also, e.g., Atkins v. Cnty. of Orange, 372 F. Supp. 2d 377, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ( The failure to misbehavior, or simple inaccuracy, [that] do not signify a structural lack of proper hygiene as a result of doublecelling). -21- regularly provide prisoners with . . . toilet articles including soap, razors, combs, toothpaste, toilet paper, access to a mirror and sanitary napkins for female prisoners constitutes a denial of personal hygiene and sanitary living conditions. (internal quotations marks and citations omitted)). Availability of hygienic materials is particularly important in the context of otherwise unsanitary living conditions. See, e.g., MacDougall, 473 F.2d at 978. Fourth, conditions that place a prisoner at a substantial risk of serious harm from other inmates may constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Jones v. Goord, 435 F. Supp. 2d 221, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833 ([P]rison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners. (citation, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted)); Ayers v. Coughlin, 780 F.2d 205, 209 (2d Cir. 1985) (The failure of custodial officers to employ reasonable measures to protect an inmate from violence by other prison residents has been considered cruel and unusual punishment.); see also, e.g., Villante v. Dep't of -22- Corr., 786 F.2d 516, 522-23 (2d Cir. 1986) (inmate could prevail on constitutional claim based on conditions of confinement if he could prove that there was a pervasive risk of harm to him from other prisoners and that prison officials displayed deliberate indifference to the danger). In dismissing Walker's complaint, the district court improperly assay[ed] the weight of the evidence, DiFolco, 622 F.3d at 113, and failed to draw all reasonable inferences in Walker's favor. For example, the district court found that Walker's failure to indicate the exact extent or duration of [his] exposure to unsanitary conditions was fatal to his Eighth Amendment claim. Similarly, the court held that Walker's allegations of inadequate ventilation were insufficient because he did not provide any details about the temperature s in his cell. Such detailed allegations, however, are not required for a pro se complaint to survive a motion to dismiss. Moreover, Walker alleged that he was placed in the six-man cell on November 18, 2008 and was still there when he filed his complaint on March 16, 2011. He also alleged that it was -23- so hot during the summer that he had difficulty breathing, and it was so cold during the winter that ice formed inside the cell windows. Drawing all reasonable inferences in Walker's favor, these allegations plausibly alleged that the conditions persisted for twenty-eight months and that the temperatures were extreme enough to state an Eighth Amendment claim. Further, the district court erred by dismissing Walker's claims of overcrowding on the ground that [t]he twenty-nine square feet that Plaintiff complains about having in his six-person cell is fundamentally the same complaint confronted by the Supreme Court in Rhodes [v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981),] and by the Northern District [of New York] in Chapdelaine [v. Keller, No. 95-CV-1126, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23017 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1998)]. Rhodes and Chapdelaine are plainly distinguishable for three reasons. First, while the Supreme Court in Rhodes found that the thirty-one square feet afforded each inmate in that case did not violate the Eighth Amendment, see Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, it did not hold that that amount of living space was sufficient as a matter of law. Rather, -24- housing multiple inmates together in one cell can amount to an Eighth Amendment violation if combined with other adverse conditions. Bolton v. Goord, 992 F. Supp. 604, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (quoting Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 67 (3d Cir. 1996)). Here, Walker plausibly alleged that the overcrowding and lack of living space in his cell were exacerbated by the ventilation, noise, sanitation, and safety issues, leading to deprivations of specific life necessities. Second, in contrast to the six-man cell to which Walker was assigned, the inmates in Rhodes and Chapdelaine were housed in two-man and four-man cells, respectively. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 343 (plaintiffs were assigned to two-man cells of approximately 63 square feet in size); Chapdelaine, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23017, at ,  (plaintiff was assigned to four-man cell at FCI Ray Brook of less than 120 square feet in size). While we do not hold that a six-man cell can never be constitutional, it is at least plausible that housing six men in one cell poses additional, greater risks to the inmates' health and safety. -25- Third, Rhodes and Chapdelaine were decided after development of the factual record. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 340-41, 342-43 (noting that district court had made extensive findings of fact about [the prison] on the basis of evidence presented at trial and the court's own observations during an inspection that it conducted without advance notice, which showed that the prison was unquestionably a top-flight, first-class facility (internal quotation marks omitted)); Chapdelaine, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23017, at -4, -15 (treating defendants' motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment [s]ince the parties . . . submitted affidavits and exhibits). Here, in contrast, Walker has not had any opportunity to take discovery or develop the record. 9 Whether or not the 9 Further, the principal cases cited by defendants on appeal were decided after development of the facts on motions for summary judgment or after trial. See, e.g., Trammel v. Keane, 338 F.3d 155, 165 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding no factual dispute regarding whether the temperature in [plaintiff's] cell posed a threat to his 'health or safety' and affirming district court's award of summary judgment); Gaston v. Coughlin, 249 F.3d 156, 164-66 (2d Cir. 2001) (reversing district court's award of summary judgment); LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 976 (2d Cir. 1972) (district court made findings of fact and conclusions of law after trial); Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir. 2008) (affirming district court's award of summary judgment dismissing Eighth Amendment claim based on the totality of the -26- factual record, when developed more fully, will ultimately show that the Eighth Amendment was violated, the facts asserted in Walker's complaint plausibly alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Accordingly, the district court erred by concluding as a matter of law that Walker failed to allege objectively serious conditions that denied him the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.