Opinion ID: 836195
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: application of stare decisis to lansing mayor

Text: As stated above, I begin my stare decisis analysis with a presumption in favor of upholding precedent. Only if a compelling justification exists should the Court overrule the prior decision. Although Lansing Mayor was wrongly decided with respect to the definition of ambiguity, this fact does not constitute the requisite compelling justification to overrule it. Instead, we must examine additional factors to determine whether there exists a compelling justification to overrule it. First, I consider whether the method for discerning ambiguity in Lansing Mayor has proven intolerable because it defies practical workability. I believe that it does. Intrinsically, an analytical approach to interpreting statutes on the basis of their plain meaning, where reasonable minds disagree on what that meaning is, is unworkable. This standard gives judges unfettered discretion to pick and choose among available plain meanings or dictionary definitions, and thus sheds little light on what the Legislature intended statutory language to mean. [54] It also potentially leads to arbitrary outcomes and injects instability into the law. Moreover, the mere fact that different justices of this Court, judges of the Court of Appeals, and trial judges disagree on the meaning of statutory language suggests that ambiguity exists. Allowing a judge to pick one meaning among several equally plausible meanings without using the rules of statutory construction is quite simply an exercise in speculation. As Justice Stevens of the United States Supreme Court stated: [T]he minimalist judge who holds that the purpose of [a] statute may be learned only from its language retains greater discretion than the judge who will seek guidance from every reliable source. A method of statutory interpretation that is deliberately uninformed, and hence unconstrained, increases the risk that the judge's own policy preferences will affect the decisional process. [55] I share Justice Stevens's concerns and believe that Lansing Mayor's definition of ambiguity is inherently unworkable. I also note that application of Lansing Mayor's definition of ambiguity has never once led the Court to find statutory language ambiguous. [56] If a rule of statutory interpretation inevitably leads to the same result in each case in which it is applied, such a rule is innately unworkable. Accordingly, this factor weighs strongly in favor of abrogating the Lansing Mayor definition. Second, I examine whether reliance on the rule is such that overruling it would cause a special hardship and inequity. I believe that litigants have reasonably relied on Lansing Mayor's definition of ambiguity. [57] Its application potentially leads to a different statutory interpretation than one based on alternative definitions. Hence, I conclude that rejecting the definition may prejudice current litigants who have relied on it. However, I also recognize that litigants have continued to rely on previous standards for discerning ambiguity. This reliance is also reasonable given the inconsistent application of Lansing Mayor's definition, [58] as well as the disagreement over the proper definition of ambiguity among the justices of this Court. [59] Such reliance is not surprising given that Lansing Mayor's definition is so vastly different from the definitions of ambiguity that preceded it for more than 150 years. [60] In fact, despite its explicit holding, Lansing Mayor did not overrule or cite any previous cases that addressed the proper method for discerning ambiguity. Nevertheless, because Lansing Mayor stands as the most recent declaration of how to discern statutory ambiguity, litigants reasonably relied on it for this point. I therefore conclude that this factor weighs moderately in favor of upholding the definition. Third, I consider whether related principles of law have so far developed since the Lansing Mayor definition of ambiguity was pronounced that only a remnant of the definition has survived. This factor is inapplicable to the stare decisis analysis in this case. The definition of ambiguity is a tool of judicial construction. Its only relevance is to discern ambiguity or the lack of it in a given statute. Thus, the definition of ambiguity stands alone and is not inherently related to other principles of law. Accordingly, this factor neither weighs in favor of nor against replacing the Lansing Mayor definition. Fourth, I examine whether facts and circumstances have so changed, or have come to be seen so differently, as to rob the old definition of significant justification. This factor focuses on real-world practicalities. [61] However, the definition of ambiguity is not beholden to the underlying facts and circumstances of a given case. Accordingly, because the definition of ambiguity does not implicate practical concerns, I do not believe that this factor weighs in favor of or against replacing the Lansing Mayor definition. Fifth, I consider whether other jurisdictions have decided similar issues in a different manner. My review indicates that Lansing Mayor's definition of ambiguity is unsupported by any other jurisdiction. In fact, not a single jurisdiction, state or federal, requires an irreconcilable conflict between provisions or that language be equally susceptible to more than one meaning before finding statutory ambiguity. [62] Accordingly, this factor weighs strongly in favor of rejecting the Lansing Mayor definition. I note that the sixth factor, whether upholding the Lansing Mayor definition is likely to result in serious detriment prejudicial to public interests, has no bearing on this case. As previously stated, the definition of ambiguity is merely a tool of statutory interpretation. As such, its application has no relevance to public interests because the definition of ambiguity, standing alone, does not dictate any course of action in a particular case. Finally, I consider whether the prior decision was an abrupt and largely unexplained departure from precedent. As noted earlier, Lansing Mayor's definition of ambiguity is nothing more than a legal fiction, wholly unsupported by any law. Furthermore, it represented a decisive and abrupt shift from precedent without recognition of the prior standards for discerning statutory ambiguity. Accordingly, this factor weighs heavily in favor of abrogating Lansing Mayor's definition of ambiguity. Under my analysis of the aforementioned factors, Lansing Mayor's definition of ambiguity has proven unworkable, is unsupported by other jurisdictions, and represents an abrupt and unexplained departure from precedent. Although it has been relied on in Michigan, reliance has been uneven and short-lived. Accordingly, I conclude that a compelling justification exists for replacing it. [63]