Opinion ID: 1739926
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Affirmative representations

Text: ¶ 40 As affirmative factual representations, the Doe plaintiffs allege that the Archdiocese represented that it did not know that Widera had a history of molesting children and it did not know he was a danger to children. The Doe plaintiffs allege the Archdiocese did so by its responses to parishioners' letters wherein it affirmed the parishioners' positive comments about Widera's frequent interactions with children. For example, on February 12, 1974, the Vice President of the St. Andrew School Board wrote: The children in our school literally follow him (Widera) around, he is so kind and shows so much interest in them. On February 19, 1974, the Reverend John J. Theisen, Executive Secretary for the Archdiocese, responded: We are most happy to hear that you are so pleased with Father Sig Widera. We are happy to hear that he is doing well in the school and shows so much interest in the children. The Doe plaintiffs' complaints attach and incorporate these letters and other documents showing that Widera was convicted of a violation of Wis. Stat. § 944.17 (1973-74) (sexual perversion) on August 13, 1973. It is alleged that the Archdiocese knew of this conviction when it responded in a reaffirming manner to the parishioners' letters. ¶ 41 The Doe and Linneman complaints also allege that the Archdiocese's act of placing the priests in parishes with unsupervised access to children constituted affirmative representations that the Archdiocese did not know that the priests had a history of sexually molesting children and that the Archdiocese did not know the priests were a danger to children. For example, the Doe plaintiffs' complaints allege: 34. By placing Siegfried Widera at St. Andrews in Delavan, the Archdiocese affirmatively represented to minor children and their families at the parish, including [the] Plaintiffs [] and their families, that Siegfried Widera did not have a history of molesting children, that Defendant Archdiocese did not know that Siegfried Widera had a history of molesting children and that Defendant Archdiocese did not know that Siegfried Widera was a danger to children. . . . . 36. Particularly, Defendant Archdiocese knew that Siegfried Widera had sexually molested numerous children and that Siegfried Widera was a danger to children before Widera molested [] Plaintiff[s]. . . . . 50. Defendant Archdiocese knew that Siegfried Widera had a history of sexually molesting children before Plaintiff[s]. ( See John Doe 1 Compl.) Similar allegations are made in Linneman's complaint relative to the Archdiocese's representations about Becker. ¶ 42 We have held that acts can be the equivalent of a representation. Scandrett v. Greenhouse, 244 Wis. 108, 113, 11 N.W.2d 510 (1943). In Scandrett, the attorney who had represented Greenhouse in a prior suit received an offer to settle the entire suit, including a subrogated claim, for $250. Id. at 110, 11 N.W.2d 510. He responded to the offer by saying he would have to check with the insurance carrier in regard to its position on settling the subrogated claim. Id. The attorney later accepted the check without further comment. Id. However, when he accepted the check, he had not contacted the insurance carrier, and he did not pay its claim. Id. at 110-11, 11 N.W.2d 510. Later, when the insurance carrier sued to collect its $41.20 subrogated claim, there was a question about whether the attorney's act of accepting the check could be construed as an affirmative representation sufficient to support a claim for fraud. Id. at 111, 11 N.W.2d 510. We concluded that it did and explained: It is not necessary for a person to make oral misrepresentation of fact in order to be guilty of fraudulent conduct,such representations may be made by the acts or conduct of the party. The rule is stated in 1 Bigelow, Fraud, p. 467: Any conduct capable of being turned into a statement of fact is a representation. There is no distinction between misrepresentations effected by words and misrepresentations effected by other acts. Id. at 113, 11 N.W.2d 510 (citations omitted). ¶ 43 Courts of other jurisdictions also have recognized that affirmative representations may, under certain circumstances, be made by non-verbal conduct. See, e.g., Haberstick v. Gordon A. Gundaker Real Estate Co., 921 S.W.2d 104, 109 (Mo.Ct.App.1996) (concluding that conduct undertaken to mislead may satisfy an affirmative representation); Bedell v. Daugherty, 362 Mo. 598, 242 S.W.2d 572, 575 (1951) (concluding [a] misrepresentation may be made by conduct calculated to mislead and to fraudulently obtain an undue advantage); Guaranty Bond State Bank of Mt. Pleasant v. Kelley, 13 S.W.2d 69, 71 (Tex. Comm'n App.1929) (concluding that even if the husband consummated the deal with the bank, the wife's conduct amounted to an affirmative representation that she and her husband had, in good faith, conveyed the homestead and reserved the lien thus assigned to the bank). ¶ 44 Here, all the plaintiffs allege that the Archdiocese's act of placing the priests in parishes where they had unsupervised access to children affirmatively represented to the minor children and their families that the Archdiocese did not know the priests had a history of molesting children and that the Archdiocese did not know the priests were a danger to children. Because acts can constitute representations of fact, based solely on the allegations in the complaints before us, we cannot conclude that such acts as are described in the complaints are not sufficient to constitute an affirmative representation. ¶ 45 The other four elements of intentional misrepresentation were also pled by the plaintiffs. First, the plaintiffs allege that the affirmative representations that the Archdiocese did not know of the priests' history of molestation and that the Archdiocese did not know the priests were a danger to children were untrue. Second, the plaintiffs allege that the Archdiocese knew the representations were untrue when made. [13] ¶ 46 Third, the complaints allege the Archdiocese intended to deceive the plaintiffs and induce them to act on the representations by not telling the parishioners of Widera's criminal conviction of sexually molesting a minor boy and of Becker's history of sexually molesting children. ¶ 47 Fourth, the plaintiffs allege that they relied on such representations because the defendants were in positions of superiority and influence, which caused them to be sexually molested and suffer damages. Therefore, we conclude that the plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to state claims for fraud.