Opinion ID: 1924787
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Merger of the Substantive Robbery and Carjacking Counts

Text: The defendant next argues that he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal because the substantive robbery and carjacking offenses merge. He contends that the same evidence was used to prove both of the charges and that they were, in fact, only a single offense. We agree. We are troubled by the fact that defendant did not raise his merger contention in a pretrial motion filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. We have previously indicated that a merger argument is essentially a double jeopardy argument. State v. Grayhurst, 852 A.2d 491, 500 (R.I. 2004). As such, Rule 12(b)(2) is applicable; [22] that rule provides in pertinent part: The defense of double jeopardy    may be raised only by motion before trial.  (Emphasis added.) Consequently, a defendant's failure to raise such a motion before trial precludes that defendant from thereafter raising a double jeopardy challenge. See State v. Feliciano, 901 A.2d 631, 647 (R.I.2006); Grayhurst, 852 A.2d at 500; State v. Haney, 842 A.2d 1083, 1084 (R.I.2004); State v. McGuy, 841 A.2d 1109, 1115 (R.I.2003). Since a ruling that a defendant's double jeopardy argument is meritorious would render a trial on the merits with respect to one of those charges unnecessary, [23] only upon a showing of good cause may a defendant be relieved from the strict mandate of the rule. Feliciano, 901 A.2d at 647; see also Grayhurst, 852 A.2d at 500; Haney, 842 A.2d at 1084; McGuy, 841 A.2d at 1115. In the instant case, however, because our case law has arguably not until today focused with maximal explicitness on the necessity of bringing a merger argument to the attention of the trial court through a pretrial Rule 12(b)(2) motion and because the trial justice did address the merger argument when he ruled on defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal, we have decided not to hold that defendant has forfeited his right to raise this argument before us. Accordingly, we shall next address the merits of defendant's contentions. As we indicated in section I B of this opinion, supra, when it is necessary to determine whether or not two offenses constitute two separate offenses, this Court has adopted the same evidence test enunciated in Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. 180. Consequently, where a single act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct provisions of the criminal law, we must consider whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. See State v. Rodriguez, 822 A.2d 894, 905 (R.I.2003) (quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. 180); see also Grayhurst, 852 A.2d at 501. In this case, defendant was indicted on two counts of first-degree robbery (counts 4 and 5) and on two counts of carjacking resulting in death (counts 6 and 7). In Rhode Island, the elements of the offense of robbery are the same as at common law. [24] Accordingly, in this jurisdiction, robbery consists of the felonious and forcible taking from the person of another of goods or money [of] any value by violence or [by] putting [the victim] in fear. State v. Briggs, 787 A.2d 479, 487 (R.I.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Grant, 840 A.2d 541, 548 (R.I.2004). Additionally, first-degree robbery requires that, in addition to proof of the foregoing elements, there also must be proof of the use of a dangerous weapon by the accused. State v. Arroyo, 844 A.2d 163, 171 (R.I.2004). The elements of carjacking resulting in death are set forth in § 11-39-2 (entitled Robbery of the owner, lessor, or occupant of a motor vehicle); that statute provides in pertinent part: (a) Every person who shall unlawfully seize a motor vehicle from its lawful owner, lessor, or occupant by use or threat of use of a dangerous weapon against the owner, lessor, or occupant resulting in serious bodily injury    shall be guilty of first degree robbery   .    (c) Every person who shall commit robbery of a motor vehicle by seizing it from its lawful owner, lessor, or occupant under the circumstances set forth in subsection (a) or (b) of this section, resulting in the death of the owner, lessor or occupant, shall be guilty of first degree murder   . (Emphasis added.) When we compare the elements of the common law felony of robbery and the statutory crime of carjacking resulting in death with which defendant was charged in this case, we are not sufficiently satisfied that each offense requires proof of a fact which the other does not. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. 180. Significantly, the above-quoted statute governing carjacking in this jurisdiction specifically and in so many words equates carjacking and robbery. It is our opinion that the trial justice erred in denying defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal regarding counts 4 and 5 (robbery). Consequently, while defendant's conviction on counts 6 and 7 (carjacking resulting in death) stands, we have no choice but to direct a motion for a judgment of acquittal with respect to counts 4 and 5 (robbery).