Opinion ID: 618612
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Hearing Testimony of Gombiner

Text: Gombiner, a trial attorney with some two decades of experience by the late 1990s, testified that he was one of the Legal Aid attorneys representing Bennett in his criminal case from September or October 1998 through late June 1999. (Hearing Transcript (Tr.), at 13-14, 17.) Gombiner testified that, while he did not have a specific recollection of advising Bennett of his right to decide whether or not to testify at the second trial, it was Gombiner's general practice, in any criminal case that might go to trial, always [to] discuss with the client the fact that he has the right to testify, the absolute right to testify. (Tr. 16.) Gombiner stated that he would often advise against the defendant's deciding to testify and would explain his reasons; but I always tell them that they have the right to testify. ( Id. ) I always tell them that, look, this is one of the really few decisions that is up to you rather than up to me, the decision whether to plead guilty or to go to trial, that's your decision. And, the decision whether to testify or not, that's your decision. Most of the other decisions,... that's going to be my call. ( Id. at 17 (emphases added).) Gombiner testified that he might not have such a conversation in a case in which it was clear that there was going to be a plea rather than a trial; [b]ut, if we are preparing for a trial, we have it well before the trial starts because you need to determine before the trial begins, you at least have to have a sense as to whether or not you are going to put your client on the stand because that's going to dictate much of your other strategy. ( Id. at 16.) Gombiner testified that before Bennett's second trial ( see id. at 33), I know we discussed the fact ... that it was up to him ( id. at 32). Gombiner doubted that he had had that discussion with Bennett with regard to the first trial because, when Gombiner joined Bennett's defense team, preparation for the first trial was underway and it had already been determined that Bennett would testify at that trial. ( See Tr. 22-23, 49-50.) After the first trial, at which Bennett was convicted of the perjury and obstruction offenses described above, Levitt, who had led Bennett's defense at that trial, left the Legal Aid office and had no further involvement in Bennett's case. Gombiner became lead counsel and was joined by Yankwitt. There ensued discussions as to whether Bennett should enter into negotiations toward a plea bargain rather than going through a second trial. Gombiner testified that he and Yankwitt, knowing that convictions in securities fraud cases were common, thought that Bennett should take advantage of the negotiating leverage he had as a result of the jury's inability to achieve unanimity on the fraud counts at the first trial. Bennett, however, wanted to go to trial again, and the difference of opinion resulted in some rather heated discussion. ( Id. at 26.) It was decided that Bennett would go to trial again because Bennett wanted to, and that was obviously his right. ( Id. ) Once Bennett had decided to go to trial again, Gombiner advised him not to testify. Gombiner had interviewed the jurors after Bennett's first trial and learned that they were 10 to 2 for conviction and learned that none of the jurors, including the two jurors who were holdouts for acquittal, none of them said that Mr. Bennett's testimony was a factor that operated in his favor; rather, some just said, you know, the guy wasn't telling the truth. (Tr. 24-25.) My advice to Mr. Bennett was very strongly that he should not testify. I know I was basing that, one, on the results. You know, we had an experiment [ sic ] now. Generally you don't get to do that when you make this decision but we knew how at least [the] first jury had reacted to it. ( Id. at 29.) However, Gombiner also knew that of necessity [Bennett] pretty much had to testify the same way he had as the first trial. I mean, we couldn't come in there like with some other totally different explanations or, you know, as to what was going on. That would ... obviously put you in a very poor position on cross-examination.... I was very concerned [about] the cross-examination .... ( Id. at 29-30.) Stating that he thought the government's cross-examination at the first trial had been quite ... poor ( id. at 30), Gombiner testified that he assumed the government would do a better job at the second trial because they had all of Mr. Bennett's testimony ( id. at 60); he thought the cross-examination at the second trial was likely to be more difficult to withstand ( id. at 30). Gombiner also believed it would be disadvantageous to have to ask Bennett about his perjury at the first trial and for Bennett to offer the same peculiar, non-innocent, explanation for having given the SEC false statements and documentswhich was that he committed and suborned perjury because he had done nothing wrong before but thought the SEC would not believe him: I also felt that we were in an almost impossible position ... for Mr. Bennett [to] testify now that he had actually been convicted of perjury and obstruction of justice[.] I mean, I had two concerns about that. One is just the fact thatI would have had to elicit that on direct examination and although it was going to come into the trial anyway, I mean, it was putting Mr. Bennett himself on the stand and saying: Mr. Bennett, have you ever been convicted of a crime? And he would have to say: Perjury. In what case? This case. I think that's a very poor start to any witness' [ sic ] testimony. I was also concerned that, and I felt this at the first trial, too, that I thought his explanation for why he committed perjury and obstruction of justice, I'm not making any judgments about the veracity of it but the explanation essentially was: I went before the SEC and I committed perjury and I helpedI falsified documents and I got other people to commit perjury and falsify documents and the reason that I did that was I had done absolutely nothing wrong but I didn't think the SEC was going to believe me if I told the truth because I didn't think they would believe that people did multi-million dollar transactions with so little paperwork or backup. I didn't think that was a good explanation. I didn't really want to get into that anymore than we had. I thought that would be a problem. (Tr. 30-31 (italics in original); see also id. at 63 (Bennett did not give an innocent explanation; rather, he admitted he did commit perjury and obstruction of justice).) In response to the government's question as to whether Gombiner had made it clear to Bennett that, despite Gombiner's advice not to testify, it was ultimately Bennett's decision to make, Gombiner testified that he did not have any specific recollection of any conversation where I sat down and said, Mr. Bennett, under the due process clause and under the compulsory process clause, etc., that you have a right to testify. I don't recall any discussion like that. I doubt if I gave any speech about it like that but I know we discussed the fact that he would have had that it was up to him. I mean, I think that was actually implicit. He testified already so I wasn't really thatI don't think that was probably foremost in my mind but to the extent it would have been my practice to tell him that. I'm sure he knew that already. Okay, I'm not sure he knew it because I'm not Mr. Bennett, but .... .... That's best I can recollect about it. Q: Mr. Gombiner, what was the determination with regard to whether or not Mr. Bennett would testify at the second trial? A: Well, after he talked about it with me I know he talked about it with Mr. Yankwitt, we determined that he wasn't going to testify. Q: And who made that decision? A: Well, ultimately Mr. Bennett made that decision but it washe certainly made it [with] my advice and Mr. Yankwitt's advice. ( Id. at 32-33 (emphases added).) Gombiner testified that he had hundreds of discussions with Bennett (Tr. 34) and that, although discussions were heated as to whether Bennett should negotiate for a plea of guilty ( id. at 26, 29, 34, 38, 48-49, 54), Gombiner did not recall, once Bennett decided to go to trial, that there were any arguments with Mr. Bennett about whether or not he was going to testify ( id. at 38). Gombiner did not recall Bennett's ever disagreeing with counsel's recommendation not to testify or indicating any adamant desire to testify at the second trial. ( See id. at 34.) Gombiner also testified that although he had some discussion with Bennett as to how much of Bennett's first-trial testimony would be read into evidence by the government, Gombiner never said that Bennett's entire testimony would be read into evidence at the second trial; nor, being familiar with the rules of evidence, would Gombiner ever have given such an opinion. ( See id. at 39-40.) Gombiner also did not recall Bennett's ever either expressing a view that Judge Martin was biased or stating that his decision not to testify was influenced by such a view. ( See id. at 38-39.) Gombiner did not prepare Bennett to testify because Bennett had decided not to testify. ( See id. at 74.) With respect to Bennett's contention that he received ineffective assistance of counsel by reason of failures to object to any aspect of the jury charge, Gombiner testified that if he did not object it was not for any tactical reason but was because he thought the instructions were not legally incorrect. ( See id. at 89-90.)