Opinion ID: 161536
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable.

Text: First, the Board argues that Mr. Woodard’s claims should be dismissed pursuant to an extension of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which precludes federal review of state-court judgments. This argument was rejected by the district court, see Woodard , 108 F. Supp. 2d at 1187-1189, and the Board did not cross-appeal from the court’s adverse ruling. See Hutchinson v. Pfeil , 208 F.3d 1180, 1186 (10th Cir. 2000) (“A party may not circumvent the obligation to cross-appeal an adverse decision simply by rearguing the matter in connection with another, favorable ruling.”); Trigalet v. Young , 54 F.3d 645, 647 n.3 (10th Cir. 1995). Even if the ruling had been properly appealed from, however, we would find the Board’s argument to be without merit. First, the Board’s request that we extend Rooker-Feldman to bar federal jurisdiction over Mr. Woodard’s retaliation claim fails for lack of a “judgment” rendered by a statutorily authorized administrative tribunal. There is simply no “judgment” here. Further, as the district court correctly noted, the -24- Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only to judicial proceedings. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983). 2. Genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment. Next, the Board asserts that summary judgment should be upheld because there is an absence of evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the Board terminated Mr. Woodard’s employment in retaliation for whistle-blowing activities. This issue was raised before, but not ruled on, by the district court. Generally we do not consider issues on appeal that have not been decided in the district court. See R. Eric Peterson Constr. Co. v. Quintek, Inc. (In re R. Eric Peterson Constr. Co.) , 951 F.2d 1175, 1182 (10th Cir. 1991). However, because our review is de novo and the stipulated facts and record summarized in part I of our order and judgment provide ample evidence establishing that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to why the Board decided to terminate Mr. Woodard, we conclude that summary judgment is not appropriate. We deny the Board’s request to affirm the district court on alternative grounds. -25- The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas is REVERSED and REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this order and judgment. Entered for the Court David M. Ebel