Opinion ID: 187050
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Fifth Claim: Reduced Airtime

Text: The District Court granted appellee's motion to strike appellant's final claim, i.e., that she suffered retaliation when McMenamin reduced her airtime production from 17 minutes to 13 minutes. The District Court struck this claim on the grounds that appellant failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Appellant filed an informal complaint of discrimination, withdrew it on August 27, 2002, and never filed a formal complaint specifically listing her airtime claim. The District Court erred in striking appellant's claim, because the reduced airtime allegation could have reasonably been expected to grow out of [appellant's] earlier complaint. Weber v. Battista, 494 F.3d 179, 184 (D.C.Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Hattie Baldwin, the Director of the USIA's Office of Civil Rights, wrote to appellant confirming that her complaints of discrimination and retaliation had been received, acknowledged, and consolidated. Letter from Hattie P. Baldwin to Verla M. Wiley (5/14/98), J.A. 407-08. The complaints that were accepted for processing included the denial of training for supervisory/managerial roles within the Branch, the denial of Wiley's input on programming and policy with regard to office procedures and broadcasts, and the denial of career advancement and promotional opportunities. Id. at 408. The record thus makes it clear that the airtime claim was like or related to the claims of discrimination and retaliation raised in appellant's original complaint. Weber, 494 F.3d at 184. Therefore, we conclude [appellant] gave [BBG] an opportunity to resolve her claim administratively before she filed her complaint in district court. Id. The claim was properly before the District Court and should not have been struck. Although it cannot be said that appellant failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, we nonetheless grant judgment to appellee. The District Court effectively dismissed appellant's claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b) states that, if, on a motion to dismiss, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b). [1] In this case, the District Court considered matters outside the pleading in granting the agency's motion to strike, and both parties had a reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to the motion. The District Court, however, did not convert what was ostensibly a 12(b)(6) motion to one for summary judgment. Nonetheless, in these circumstances, this court is free to characterize the District Court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal as a grant of summary judgment under Rule 56 and affirm, so long as we are assured that both sides had a reasonable opportunity to present evidence and there are no genuine issues of material fact. See, e.g., Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 452 F.3d 798, 805 (D.C.Cir.2006). Finding no merit in appellant's claim, we will grant summary judgment to appellee. Appellant's claim lacks merit because she failed to establish that a reduction in airtime responsibilities constituted a materially adverse action for the purpose of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation. As noted above, an employee suffers an adverse employment action if he experiences materially adverse consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment or future employment opportunities such that a reasonable trier of fact could find objectively tangible harm. Forkkio, 306 F.3d at 1131. Appellant offered nothing to the District Court or to this court establishing that the reduction in her airtime production  from 17 minutes to 13 minutes  could affect her compensation, grade, or opportunity for future advancement. Appellant has also failed to establish that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. Burlington, 126 S.Ct. at 2415 (internal quotation marks omitted). Without such proof, there can be no finding of unlawful retaliation. Actionable retaliation claims are limited to those where an employer causes  material adversity, not trivial harms. Id. Appellant has failed to show that the disputed reduction in airtime production was anything other than a trivial harm, if that.