Opinion ID: 1301632
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Heading: Prohibition of Vehicular Traffic.

Text: Plaintiffs argued in the trial court that an easement for street purposes, which arose by prescription and implied dedication, is limited or restricted to that use to which the land has been put in the most recent years. Accordingly, plaintiffs asserted that the intended prohibition of vehicular traffic in the 100 block of Sycamore Street would operate as an abandonment and termination of the city's easement as the most recent use of the street has been for vehicular traffic. The city contends that the prohibition of vehicular traffic in the 100 block of Sycamore Street will not constitute an abandonment of its easement. The city also argues that even if Sycamore Street will be closed by prohibiting vehicular traffic, nevertheless, Ga. L. 1931, p. 736, granting to the city the power to close streets, does not authorize the city to pay damages for any property right taken by the closing prior to the closing of the street. The plaintiffs' argument on this point is that the statute must be construed to be in harmony with the Constitution, Code Ann. § 2-301. This issue of the 1931 statute need not be addressed, however, as we conclude that the prohibition of vehicular traffic alone in the 100 block of Sycamore Street will not constitute an abandonment of the city's easement. That portion of Sycamore Street lying between plaintiff Datry's store and the proposed MARTA station will be converted into a pedestrian thoroughfare. Even if the thoroughfare were to constitute a misuse of the easement, such a misuse or diversion would not work a reversion of the property, free of the easement, to the owner of the dominant fee but would only entitle plaintiffs to an injunction against the misuse of the easement. Donalson v. Georgia Power Co., 175 Ga. 462 (5) (165 SE 440) (1932). Limiting the street to the use of pedestrians and emergency vehicles, however, will not be a misuse of the street easement. In Atlanta & W. P. R. Co. v. Atlanta, B. & A. R. Co., 125 Ga. 529, 544 (54 SE 736) (1906), the court stated, in regard to an easement for street purposes which had arisen by implied dedication: [b]eing implied, it follows, as a matter of course, that there are no express limitations as to the character of the use which would restrict the public from any of the legal modes of enjoyment. It goes to the public, therefore, as a public way of passage in the broadest sense. The court then went on to define a street as a highway in a city or town used by the public for the purpose of travel, either by means of vehicles or on foot. Id. at 545. See also Holland v. Shackelford, 220 Ga. 104, 111 (137 SE2d 298) (1964); Jones v. City of Moultrie, 196 Ga. 526, 532 (27 SE2d 39) (1964); Hancock v. Rush, 181 Ga. 587, 600 (183 SE 554) (1936). An implied limitation on the use of this easement for street purposes, as contended by the plaintiffs, is inconsistent with the concept of the easement as belonging to the public as a public way of passage in the broadest sense. Thus, property dedicated to a public use may .. . be put to all customary uses within the definition of the use. Franklin v. Board of Lights &c. Works, 212 Ga. 757 (1) (95 SE2d 685) (1956); City of Albany v. Lippitt, 191 Ga. 756, 762 (13 SE2d 807) (1941); Brown v. City of East Point, 148 Ga. 85 (3) (95 SE 962) (1918). A thoroughfare for pedestrian traffic is, by definition, a street and thus, necessarily, a use within the ambit of an implied easement for public travel. Consequently, the creation of a pedestrian thoroughfare on Sycamore Street is not a misuse of the easement but rather is a permitted use. It was, therefore, error for the trial court to hold that the prohibition of vehicular traffic alone in the 100 block of Sycamore Street is sufficient to constitute an abandonment of the easement by the city. Plaintiffs also argue that even if the exclusion of vehicular traffic from the 100 block would not in itself cause a reversion, nevertheless it will damage their right of access to their property. As elements of this damage, plaintiffs seek to include the city's intended elimination of the parking spaces and loading zones presently located in the street within the 100 block. As an initial matter, it is necessary to distinguish between the plaintiffs' right of access to their property and their interest in the maintenance of parking spaces and loading zones in the adjoining street. The right of access, or easement of access, to a public road is a property right which arises from the ownership of land contiguous to a public road, and the landowner cannot be deprived of this right without just and adequate compensation being first paid. Dougherty County v. Hornsby, 213 Ga. 114, 116 (97 SE2d 300) (1957); Barham v. Grant, 185 Ga. 601, 604 (196 SE 43) (1938); Howell v. Bd. of Commrs., 169 Ga. 74 (4) (149 SE 779) (1929); State Hwy. Bd. v. Baxter, 167 Ga. 124 (2) (144 SE 796) (1928). The easement consists of the right of egress from and ingress to the abutting public road and from there to the system of public roads. Cf. Dougherty County v. Hornsby, supra. The use of the street itself, however, is subject to reasonable regulation and control by the state or municipality in the exercise of its police power. See Dennis v. State, 226 Ga. 341 (175 SE2d 17) (1970) (vehicle weight restrictions); City of Dalton v. Staten, 201 Ga. 754 (1) (41 SE2d 145) (1947) (prohibition of telephones on sidewalk); Gardner v. City of Brunswick, 197 Ga. 167 (28 SE2d 135) (1943) (regulation of parking by means of parking meters); Borough of Atlanta v. Kirk, 175 Ga. 395 (165 SE 69) (1932) (prohibition of parking on certain streets during the daytime); Howell v. Bd. of Commrs., supra, (regulation of use of sidewalks); Schlesinger v. City of Atlanta, 161 Ga. 148, 160 (129 SE 861) (1925) (prohibition of jitneys and busses on certain streets). Plaintiffs do not challenge the authority of the City of Decatur to eliminate parking and loading spaces in the 100 block of Sycamore Street but only assert that subsumed in their right of access is the right to use the adjoining street for purposes of parking and loading. In accordance with the rationale of the above cited cases, this contention is without merit. The use of a street for parking is not included in the right of access but rather is a privilege subject to reasonable regulation by the city or state. In short, a property right to park in a city street does not exist either as an incident of the right of access or independently of that right. See Gardner v. City of Brunswick, supra, and also 7 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations 740, § 24.640 (1970). See also Cheek v. Floyd County, 308 FSupp. 777 (N. D. Ga. 1970); Brown v. Jackson, 268 Ore. 111 (519 P2d 87) (1974). The exclusion of vehicular traffic from the 100 block of Sycamore Street, however, does raise a question regarding the impairment of the plaintiffs' right of ingress to and egress from their property. While a city may, consistent with its police powers, prescribe that vehicles shall not pass over certain streets ( Schlesinger v. City of Atlanta, 161 Ga. 148, supra (dictum); 7 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations 620, 709, §§ 24.566 and 24.616 (1960). See also Gama Realty, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 121 S2d 183 (Fla. 1960); Simpson v. City of Los Angeles, 4 Cal. 2d 60 (47 P2d 474) (1935)), nevertheless, the exercise of this authority may occasion a compensable taking, if access to adjoining property is prevented or impaired. See Dougherty County v. Hornsby, 213 Ga. 114, supra; Howell v. Bd. of Commrs., 169 Ga. 74, supra; and Dougherty County v. Snelling, 132 Ga. App. 540, 543 (208 SE2d 362) (1974). It is clear that the plaintiffs in this case will not be deprived of all access to their property because at least a portion of Sycamore Street, adjoining their property, will remain open as an improved pedestrian thoroughfare. Thus, the question is limited to plaintiffs' right to vehicular access to their property. The prohibition of vehicular traffic in the 100 block of Sycamore Street will clearly deprive plaintiffs of the possibility of vehicular access to their property from Sycamore Street. [I]nterfering with access to premises, by impeding or rendering difficult ingress or egress, is such a taking and damaging as entitle the party injured to compensation under a provision for compensation where property is damaged. Dougherty County v. Hornsby, supra, p. 117. The measure of damages is any diminution in the market value of the property by reason of such interference. Since it appears that the prohibition of vehicular traffic in the 100 block of Sycamore Street will cause some interference of plaintiffs' easement of access within the meaning of Art. I, Sec. III, Par. I of the Georgia Constitution (Code Ann. § 2-301), the trial court properly enjoined the city from excluding vehicular traffic in the 100 block of Sycamore Street until just and adequate compensation is first paid. Howell v. Bd. of Commrs., 169 Ga. 74, 75, supra.