Opinion ID: 504039
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: discussion of the commission's interpretation

Text: 29 The standard for our review of a statutory interpretation by a federal agency charged with administering a statute is controlled by 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706. In Crounse Corp. v. I.C.C., 781 F.2d 1176 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 290, 93 L.Ed.2d 264 (1986), Judge Kennedy wrote: 30 Although substantially intertwined, our review of the Commission's interpretation of the statute naturally differs somewhat from our review of the Commission's application of the statute. While an agency's interpretation of a statute is entitled to deference, federal courts bear the ultimate responsibility for interpreting federal statutes. Meade Township v. Andrus, 695 F.2d 1006 (6th Cir.1982). Our task, however, is not to determine whether we think the Commission's construction is the best construction, but only to determine whether the Commission's construction was sufficiently reasonable. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 75, 95 S.Ct. 1470, 1479, 43 L.Ed.2d 731 (1975). To satisfy this standard it is not necessary for a court to find that the agency's construction was the only reasonable one or even the reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding Federal Election Commission v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U.S. 27, 39, 102 S.Ct. 38, 46, 70 L.Ed.2d 23 (1981). 31 781 F.2d at 1183. 32 (A) The Commission's Interpretation is Reasonable 33 The Commission's construction of the Act's definition of single-line rate is a reasonable interpretation of the statutory language. The proposed charges, except for the fact that they have been adopted by several carriers rather than a single carrier, clearly fit within the definition. The rate proposed to be charged for each delivery covered by the tariff is a rate that each single member motor carrier proposes to charge each of its customers for transportation of that customer's property only over (from one point to another point on) that carrier's line. Obviously, the transportation can be provided by that carrier. 34 Whether or not such charges are proposed individually or collectively, only one carrier makes the charge and only one carrier provides the transportation. Construing the definition in pari materia with other relevant provisions of the Act, the term proposed refers to a filing with the Commission of a rate that is proposed to apply only to shippers who deliver property to that carrier for transportation over its line. The purpose of proposing the rate by such a filing is to permit shippers to exercise any legal rights they may have to protest the proposed rate and, if the rate is not in accordance with law, to require the Commission to reject it. 35 To construe proposed by a single carrier as the expression of a Congressional intent to exclude a rate proposed by two or more carriers would lead to an absurd result. Since the Act clearly prohibits an agreement that establishes a rate bureau from providing for the discussion of or voting upon single-line rates, the effect would be to attribute to Congress an intent that rate bureaus should be able to remove themselves from the operation of the law by the very act of violating it. 36 (B) The Commission's Interpretation Accords With the Statutory Policy 37 The Commission's construction of the definition accords with the national transportation policy of promoting competitive and efficient transportation services, as set forth in 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10101a. The Act specifically requires the Commission to assure that rate bureau agreements are not inconsistent with transportation policy, and authorizes the Commission to require rate bureaus to comply with reasonable conditions to assure that the agreements establishing them further transportation policy. 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10706(b)(2). The Commission's interpretation guarantees to shippers their right under the Act to have transportation charges fixed by competition and not by collective action. 38 Law established by the Reed-Bulwinkle Act, 62 Stat. 472 (1948), unchanged by the Act, prohibits rate bureaus from interfering with any carrier's right of independent action and from changing or cancelling any rate established by independent action after the enactment of that provision of the law. 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10706(b)(3)(B)(ii). Individual members of CSMFTA had the right, by independent action, not to adhere to the proposed tariffs and, in fact, some carriers initially did exercise that right by flagging out when the tariffs were submitted to them. However, the right of independent action affects competition only to the extent that it permits a carrier to price its transportation competitively. The Commission's interpretation of single-line rates correctly reflects a statutory policy of precluding carriers who do not wish to compete from combining to avoid competition. 39 (C) The Commission's Interpretation Accords With Legislative History 40 The Commission's interpretation is consistent with legislative history. 41 Members of both Houses of Congress had before them, prior to casting their votes, the report of the House Public Works and Transportation Committee (House Report), H.R.Rep. No. 1069, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2283. 42 The House Report explains the Act's application to collective ratemaking of the motor carrier industry: 43 The bill makes some important changes in the area of motor carrier pricing. The motor carrier industry now collectively sets rates it charges to the public. It does this under a grant of immunity from the antitrust laws. Section 14 of the bill limits the permissible scope of collective ratemaking. Beginning in 1984, carriers may not collectively vote on or discuss single-line rate proposals. However, carriers will be allowed to continue discussing and voting on general increases and decreases and some other matters, provided that any such discussion be limited to industry average carrier costs and not include discussions of individual markets or particular single-line rates. 44 Id. at 3-4, 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News pp. 2285, 2286. 45 With respect to single-line rates, the House Report states: 46 Under the current statutes, the Interstate Commerce Commission has substantial discretion in approving or disapproving rate bureau agreements. The Commission has recently embarked upon a series of reviews of rate bureau agreements to determine whether they should be continued and, if so, under what conditions. The Commission has already announced that it has voted to eliminate immunity for single-line rate discussion and voting. In this context, the term single-line rate refers to a rate offered by a motor carrier of property that is applicable over its lines and which does not involve the services of any other carrier. Under current practices, most tariff rates are identical for both single-line and joint-line movements. Thus, when rate bureaus discuss individual rates, they generally do not distinguish between single-line and joint-line rates. This has not always been the case, however, and need not be in the future. 47 The Committee voted to implement a number of procedural reforms in the rate bureau process and, effective in 1984, to eliminate antitrust immunity for discussion or voting upon single-line rates. The Committee is aware of the fact that this will result in a significant change in the way that motor carriers price their services. It will mean that consideration of single-line and joint-line rates must be done separately. It will put a greater burden upon individual carriers to determine their own cost structures and the most optimum rates from their individual company point of view to offer the shipping public. But on balance, the Committee believes that there will be public benefits that outweigh the burdens of changing to a new system--namely, more competitive pricing. 48 The Committee believes that it is good policy to eliminate single-line rate immunity after a period of time. The existing system has operated for over 30 years and both carriers and shippers must be given sufficient time to adjust to the new environment. The elimination of antitrust immunity for single-line rates is one of the most important aspects of the legislation. (Emphasis added.) 49 Id. at 27-28, 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News pp. 2309, 2310. 50 Of significance are the remarks of legislators who opposed the passage of the Act's provisions on single-line rates, since they interpreted the definition of single-line rate in the same way as did the majority. Senators Earnest F. Hollings and Daniel K. Inouye stated their view in the Minority Views of Messrs. Hollings and Inouye, S.Rep. No. 641, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 80 (1980): 51 We are greatly concerned, however, with the additional reform to take place on July 1, 1983; that is, the ban on discussion of or voting upon single-line rates. The majority does not understand the full impact of the ban. 52 .... 53 ... As noted above, some 60 to 70 percent of all shipments move via single-line service. But the industry is capable of transporting almost all shipments origin to destination in single-line service. So the bulk of today's joint-line service provided is at the demand of shippers. If carriers are prohibited from establishing, collecting [sic], rates that simultaneously apply via single and joint-line service, the fear of violating the antitrust laws would compel them to publish joint rates and offer joint-line service only when they cannot offer single-line service. 54 .... 55 The single-line restriction will cause considerable volumes of motor carrier traffic moving today in joint-line service, but at single factor rates, to move at a combination of local rates. This means individual rates for each segment of the movement on separate bills of lading. This is more costly to the shipper and ultimately the consumer. 56 Id. at 112-113. 57 The senators would have had no reason to be so concerned if Congress had intended the statutory prohibition on discussion of, and voting upon, single-line rates to apply only to independent actions of a single motor common carrier. 58 (D) The Commission's Interpretation Accords With the Report of the Study Commission Created By the Same Act of Congress 59 The Commission's interpretation is also supported by post-enactment statements of the Motor Carrier Ratemaking Study Commission (Study Commission) created by section 14(b) of the Act. The members of the Commission included Senators Robert W. Packwood, Howard W. Cannon, Barry M. Goldwater and Edward M. Kennedy, and Congressmen Robert A. Rowe, John F. Seiberling and E.G. Bud Shuster. These members of Congress had been instrumental in the passage of the Act. 60 The Act specifically made the effective date of the prohibition of discussion of, or voting upon, single-line rates dependent upon the date on which the Study Commission submitted its final report. 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10706(b)(3)(D). Section 14(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Act required the Study Commission to make a full and complete investigation and study of the collective ratemaking process for all rates of motor common carriers of property and to report upon the possible need for continued antitrust immunity. Accordingly, some weight may be given to the Study Commission's post-enactment statements. During its deliberations, proponents of collective ratemaking urged upon the Study Commission an interpretation similar to CSMTFA's interpretation of the statutory definition of single-line rates. In response, the final report of the committee states: 61 The proponents of collective ratemaking have raised a question regarding the definition of single-line rates. Newly enacted subsection 10706(b) defines a single-line rate as a rate, charge, or allowance proposed by a single motor common carrier of property that is applicable only over its line and for which the transportation can be provided by that carrier. The subsection goes on to forbid collective consideration of single-line rates commencing in 1984. 62 The purpose of subsection 10706(b), the industry asserts, is merely to underscore and reinforce the carriers' right of independent action. It is the industry's contention that under the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 definition, a single-line rate literally is the equivalent of a rate established by independent action. In other words, the industry would have the Study Commission accept the proposition that Congress prohibited something which the carriers have never been permitted to do--namely, to consider collectively the rates that they have always been required to establish independently. 63 Besides being intuitively difficult to accept, the industry's position is inconsistent with any of the accepted rules of statutory construction. When the definition of single-line rate is construed in context with subsection 10706(b)'s remaining paragraphs--as it must be--it is clear that Congress was simply speaking of a rate applied to a movement between two points on one carrier's line when it prohibited discussion and voting on single-line rates. Single-line rates can be established either collectively or independently. When Congress spoke of a rate ... proposed by a single motor common carrier ... applicable only over its line, it was not, by use of the word only, trying to equate a single-line rate with an independent action, but rather to distinguish between single-line rates which apply to movements between two points on one carrier's line, and joint-line rates which apply to movements over two or more carriers' lines. The reason for making the distinction, of course, is that the subsection goes on to prohibit the collective establishment of single-line rates (leaving carriers free to set joint-line rates collectively), while at the same time reinforcing the carriers' right to set single-line rates independently free from rate bureau interference. (Footnotes omitted.) 64 Motor Carrier Ratemaking Study Comm'n, Collective Ratemaking in the Trucking Industry at 497-99 (1983).