Opinion ID: 1823350
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the circuit court was in error in granting hinds county's motion to dismiss on the basis of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

Text: Tucker argues in his brief that Hinds County's actions were violative of the United States and Mississippi Constitutions in two ways: (1) Hinds County ordered his electric power shut off without affording him due process; and (2) Hinds County, acting in conjunction with MP & L, caused him to lose his deposit with MP & L. Tucker cites two cases which have nothing to do with due process, only with taking private property without compensation. The trial court found that Hinds County's sovereign immunity defense was valid as a matter of law, and dismissed Tucker's suit based on the 12(b)(6) defense raised in Hinds County's answer. A motion to dismiss made under Rule 12(b)(6) is not favored, and should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Martin v. Phillips, 514 So.2d 338, 340 (Miss. 1987). When considering a 12(b)(6) motion, the court's inquiry essentially is limited to the content of the complaint. Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 307, 309 (5th Cir.1986). The court must assume the factual allegations in the complaint are true, construe them in a manner most favorable to the non-movant, and decide if the facts alleged could give rise to an actionable claim. Rathborne v. Rathborne, 683 F.2d 914, 918 (5th Cir.1982). The court does not have to accept legal conclusions or allegations as to the legal effect of events which may be included in a complaint. Davidson v. State of Georgia, 622 F.2d 895, 897 (5th Cir.1980). Both parties agree that sovereign immunity will not protect the political subdivision when there has been a violation by the subdivision of an individual's constitutional rights. Tucker relies on Williams v. Walley, 295 So.2d 286, 288 (Miss. 1974), where this Court stated that when private property is taken without payment therefor, the courts are open to provide a remedy against the sovereign or any of its subdivisions. Otherwise section 17 of the Mississippi Constitution would be meaningless. Though Williams does not explicitly deal with a due process violation, it follows that to allow the sovereign immunity defense to block suits based on other provisions of the Mississippi Constitution would render them just as meaningless. The question then appears to be, does Tucker allege a constitutional violation sufficient to withstand Hinds County's 12(b)(6) defense? In his complaint Tucker only alleges a due process violation and does not mention, at least with reference to Hinds County, that his property was taken without due compensation. C.E. Tucker relies on both the due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article III, § 14 of the Mississippi Constitution. Though the two are worded differently, they have been found to contain the same guarantee. See NCAA v. Gillard, 352 So.2d 1072 (Miss. 1977); Mississippi Power Co. v. Goudy, 459 So.2d 257 (Miss. 1984). The first question to be considered is whether C.E. Tucker had a property interest, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, in the continuance of his utility service. To claim a property interest in a service, a person must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it, surpassing a mere abstract need or unilateral expectation of it. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 574, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2707-08, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). If Tucker possessed such an interest, and alleged that it was terminated by Hinds County without due process, then he has stated a claim sufficient to pierce the sovereign immunity defense of Hinds County. The seminal case involving property interests in one's utilities is Memphis Light Gas and Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 1554, 56 L.Ed.2d 30 (1978). The Crafts had their utility service terminated several times because of a billing dispute. Looking to state law, the Supreme Court found that the Crafts had a property interest in the continuance of their utility service, citing Tennessee case law which found a distinction between the power company's right to cut off a customer's service for non-payment of a just service bill, and the non-existent right to do so when there was a bona fide dispute concerning the correctness of the bill, such as with the Crafts. Craft, 436 U.S. at 6, 98 S.Ct. at 1559. The Court also mentioned that MLG & W attempted to rely instead on the general rule that a utility may terminate service for nonpayment of undisputed charges or noncompliance with reasonable rules and regulations. Craft, 436 U.S. at 6 n. 10, 98 S.Ct. at 1561 n. 10. Tennessee law further stated that a utility could not coerce a customer to pay a disputed claim, and could not terminate service without good and sufficient cause. Craft, 436 U.S. at 6-7, 98 S.Ct. at 1559. This Court has not considered or determined whether or not a subscriber has a property interest in continued service under Mississippi law. This Court has found in Mississippi Power Co. v. Goudy, 459 So.2d 257, 263 (Miss. 1984), that Mrs. Goudy as a consumer had no specific vested property right in a fair and reasonable utility rate. Mississippi case law dealing with discontinuance of a consumer's utilities is in accord with that from Tennessee mentioned in Craft. When a consumer has failed or refused to pay an undisputed bill, the power company may discontinue service. See Central Louisiana Power Co. v. Thomas, 145 Miss. 352, 111 So. 142 (1927); Mississippi Power Co. v. Byrd, 160 Miss. 71, 133 So. 193 (1931). However, when there is a bona fide dispute as to what is owed, the power company may not discontinue power. See Mississippi Power Co. v. Cochran, 167 Miss. 705, 147 So. 473 (1933); Doherty v. Mississippi Power Co., 178 Miss. 204, 173 So. 287 (1937). State law creating a property interest could also be statutory law; however, we find no Mississippi statute dealing with this matter. After a survey of other states, it is clear that the overwhelming majority of courts which have considered this question have found that continuance of electrical power is a property interest worthy of protection under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Denver Welfare Rights Organization v. Public Utilities Commission, 190 Colo. 329, 547 P.2d 239 (1976); I. Erlichman Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 92 Ill. App.3d 1091, 48 Ill.Dec. 448, 416 N.E.2d 721 (1981); Perez v. City of San Bruno, 27 Cal.3d 875, 168 Cal. Rptr. 114, 616 P.2d 1287 (1980); Dedeke v. Rural Water Dist. No. 5, 229 Kan. 242, 623 P.2d 1324 (1981); see also Freeman v. Hayek, 635 F. Supp. 178 (D.Minn. 1986) (applying Minnesota law). Almost all courts considering this question also take into account the fact that utility service has become almost a necessity for safety and comfort in modern-day life. It is time that Mississippi law recognizes such a property interest. The trial court dismissed Tucker's suit based on Hinds County's sovereign immunity. Both parties agree that sovereign immunity is no defense where a violation of one's constitutional rights are concerned. Finding that C.E. Tucker has a property interest in the continuance of his utility service, then he appears to have alleged a constitutionally viable claim, at least sufficient to survive a 12(b)(6) defense. There may be facts capable of proof under which Tucker could recover. Therefore, the dismissal as to Hinds County is reversed and remanded for further hearing on the claim of Tucker.