Opinion ID: 516909
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the verdict in the case of hector r. rodriguez estrella

Text: 77 The district court submitted special verdicts to the jury for each plaintiff. The special verdicts consisted of a short statement of the claim of each plaintiff and a series of questions. In order to understand this issue, a portion of the verdict form for plaintiff Hector R. Rodriguez Estrella and the pertinent jury answers to the interrogatories must be reproduced. 78 Hector R. Rodriguez Estrella was the official collector of the Municipality of Las Piedras. He claims to be a career employee. The defendants claim that he was a confidential or trust employee. 79 23. Was Hector R. Rodriguez Estrella a career employee? Answer Yes or No. Place an X next to your answer. YES. 80 X NO. 81 If you answered this question in the negative, then answer question No. 24. 82 24. Assuming for the purposes of this question that Mr. Rodriguez-Estrella was a trust employee, do the particular responsibilities of the position of official collector require that political party affiliation be an appropriate requisite for the effective performance of the public office involved? Answer Yes or No. Place an X next to your answer. X YES NO. 83 Despite the answers to these questions, which constituted a finding of no liability, the jury went on to answer a series of questions finding that Rodriguez had been dismissed because of political discrimination and assessing compensatory damages of $25,000 and punitive damages of $10,000 against the Mayor. 84 After the court received the verdict form from the jury, there was an off-the-record discussion with counsel. The court then stated to the jury: 85 THE COURT: Members of the Jury, I have examined the verdict form and everything that you found is consistent, one question with the others on all plaintiffs, except that in the case of Mr. Rodriguez Estrella, I find that there is an inconsistency. I have discussed it with counsel. And they are in agreement, there is an inconsistency. And even though the Court has the power to pass upon that inconsistency, as a matter of law, I believe that I should give you an opportunity of examining that inconsistency. 86 The court then gave additional instructions to the jury and went over the special verdict questions pointing out that the answers to questions 23 and 24 were inconsistent with the succeeding questions and answers finding that Rodriguez Estrella's rights were violated and assessing compensatory and punitive damages against Mayor Castro Davila. The court then told the jury: 87 Apparently the mistake was mine, in the sense that I should have indicated in an instruction, right after Question 24, I should have put in a note that says, Note: If you answer this question in the negative, do not answer questions 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33. 88 What I intend to do is this: I am going to add, in red ink, an instruction, after question 24, that will read as follows: Note: If you answer Question Number 24 in the affirmative, do not answer questions 25 to 33. However, if you decide otherwise, then you have to answer those questions, which you already did. And the remaining answers will be consistent. 89 What I will do is, I will ask you to go back and deliberate on this matter and I will read that instruction again to you. And if there is any correction to be made, you don't have to make any. You will do what you think is best. You are the judges of the facts. You will--so we don't change the verdict form--you will do it in red ink, with this red pen I'm going to give you, if there is any change to be made. 90 When the verdict form was returned to the court after further deliberations, the jury had changed its answers to questions 23 and 24. It now found in answer to number 23 that Rodriguez Estrella had been a career employee and consistent with that answer, the jury did not answer question 24. 91 It is appellant's contention that on the basis of the pleadings, the issues originally submitted to the jury, and the first set of jury instructions there was no inconsistency in the answers the jury gave to the special verdict questions. We start our analysis with a review of basic and longstanding principles. In Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 119, 83 S.Ct. 659, 666, 9 L.Ed.2d 618 (1963), the Court held that it is the duty of the courts to attempt to harmonize the answers [to special interrogatories] if it is possible under a fair reading of them. It quoted the holding of Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 364, 82 S.Ct. 780, 786, 7 L.Ed.2d 798 (1962): Where there is a view of the case that makes the jury's answers to special interrogatories consistent, they must be resolved that way. See McIsaac v. Didriksen Fishing Corp., 809 F.2d 129, 133 (1st Cir.1987); Goeken v. Kay, 751 F.2d 469, 485 (1st Cir.1985); Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 590 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866, 100 S.Ct. 138, 62 L.Ed.2d 90 (1979), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 866, 104 S.Ct. 205, 78 L.Ed.2d 178 (1983). This is the law that applies to Rule 49(a), the applicable rule here, which unlike Rule 49(b) has no provision for the procedure to follow when there are inconsistent answers. 11 The first thing we must determine, therefore, is whether the first answers can be made consistent under any view of the case. 92 Appellants' consistency argument is simple: in its first set of answers, the jury found defendants not liable by the answers to questions 23 and 24; therefore, the other answers should be disregarded. We do not think that consistency can be achieved by considering only part of the answers. The answer to question 25 found that Rodriguez Estrella had been discharged because of political discrimination, the answer to question 26 found that the procedural rights of the plaintiff were violated, and the answer to question 27 found that the Mayor violated the rights of the plaintiff. 12 There was, therefore, an irreconcilable inconsistency on the issue of liability, leaving aside the answers assessing compensatory and punitive damages. There is no view of the case that would force the answers on the liability questions into a consistent mold. Since we find the answers to the special verdict questions inconsistent under any view of the case, we must next decide whether the resubmission of the questions to the jury was permissible. 93 As already noted, in contrast to Rule 49(b), Rule 49(a) does not explicitly provide for a resubmission to the jury based on inconsistency. But neither does it prohibit such a procedure. In Atlantic Tubing & Rubber Co. v. International Engraving Co., 528 F.2d 1272, 1276 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 60, 50 L.Ed.2d 77 (1976), we stressed that a district court has considerable discretion in applying the principles of Gallick and A & G Stevedores and [t]his discretion encompasses the power to refuse to accept the jury's answers to special interrogatories. 94 The Fifth Circuit has approved resubmission under similar circumstances. In Landry v. Offshore Logistics, Inc., 544 F.2d 757, 760-61 (5th Cir.1977), the jury in its original verdict had stated in answer to a question that plaintiff was not contributorily negligent. In its answer to the next question, it found that plaintiff's negligence contributed to the accident in the amount of 75%. The questions were resubmitted to the jury and the 75% negligent finding was erased. The court rejected appellant's argument that there should have been a mistrial and resubmission to the jury coerced the verdict, stating: 95 This was simply a case in which, obviously by inadvertence, the jury fell into an inconsistency with reference to one aspect of its verdict. The verdict had not been accepted. The jury had not been discharged. Counsel was present, making no inquiry and raising no objection. The jury quickly eliminated the one inconsistent answer. We can perceive of no sound reason for allowing this episode to abort the trial, necessitating a third trial of this case. 96 Id. at 761. In Nance v. Gulf Oil Corp., 817 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir.1987), the court, in approving resubmission, justified its decision on the basis of both the seventh amendment and Rule 49(a): 97 Because the answers in the first verdict were irreconcilable, there was no seventh amendment violation by the resubmission of the verdict form The seventh amendment only requires a court to adopt a jury's verdict if the answers to the interrogatories in the verdict are consistent or if there is some view of the case which would make the jury's answers to the interrogatories consistent. 98 Gulf [defendant] maintains that even if the jury's answers to the interrogatories were irreconcilable, the district court should have ordered a new trial rather than resubmit the verdict form since a Rule 49(a) verdict form cannot be resubmitted to the jury to resolve inconsistencies. Contrary to Gulf's assertions, Rule 49(a) does not prohibit resubmission of a 49(a) verdict form. While Rule 49(a) unlike 49(b) does not provide for resubmission of a verdict form, Rule 49(a) certainly does not preclude resubmission. 99 Id. at 1178 (footnotes omitted). 100 We think the approach of the Fifth Circuit makes good sense. The district court should have discretion to resubmit inconsistent answers to special verdict questions submitted under Rule 49(a) in the following circumstances: where the answers are inconsistent under any view; where the attorneys are or should be present; and, of course, where the jury has not been discharged. We realize that the Fourth Circuit in McCollum v. Stahl, 579 F.2d 869, 871 (4th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 912, 99 S.Ct. 1225, 59 L.Ed.2d 460 (1979) has held as a matter of law that the resubmission of questions under Rule 49(a) is not permissible because no provision is made for such procedure in the rule. Such a strict interpretation of the rule can only result in new trials. Not only is justice delayed, but the parties are saddled with the cost of another round of litigation. So long as the court does not coerce a verdict, we see no harm, and much good, in allowing the jury to reconsider its inconsistent answers. 101 We have carefully reviewed the instructions given to the jury on resubmission and reject appellants' attack on the resubmission procedure and the court's instructions pursuant to that procedure. 102 Appellants' other objection to the answer given by the court to a question involving the effect to be given two documents is without merit and needs no discussion.IV. THE VERDICT FOR WANDA I. ROSA FLORES 103 The jury found in answer to questions 67 and 68 that Wanda I. Rosa Flores was transferred and eventually dismissed because of political discrimination and that her rights were violated. The next question and answer were: 104 69. Which of the defendants violated the rights of Wanda Rosa Flores? Plan an X next to your answer. X A. Mayor Modesto Castro Davila B. Rene Rodriguez Morales C. Judith Velazquez Delgado 105 The jury awarded Rosa Flores $10,000 in compensatory damages which were assessed against Mayor Castro Davila. 106 Castro Davila's main contention on appeal is that there was no causal connection between the actions taken against Rosa Flores and himself, that he was not the proximate cause of her transfers and eventual dismissal. We turn, therefore, to a review of the evidence. 107 Because the jury found for plaintiff, our review of the evidence must be made in the light most favorable to plaintiff, drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor and without evaluating the credibility of the witnesses or the weight of the evidence. Forrestal v. Magendantz, 848 F.2d 303, 305 (1st Cir.1988); CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842, 848-49 (1st Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016, 106 S.Ct. 1198, 89 L.Ed.2d 312 (1986); Computer Systems Engineering, Inc. v. Qantel Corp., 740 F.2d 59, 65 (1st Cir.1984). This does not mean, however, that we can ignore uncontradicted evidence offered by the opposing party. Layne v. Vinzant, 657 F.2d 468, 472 (1st Cir.1981); Allen Pen Co. v. Springfield Photo Mount Co., 653 F.2d 17, 19 (1st Cir.1981). Nor can we accept unreasonable inferences based on conjecture or speculation. Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32, 39 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 852, 105 S.Ct. 172, 83 L.Ed.2d 107 (1984); Carlson v. American Safety Equipment Corp., 528 F.2d 384, 386 (1st Cir.1976). The pertinent evidence, viewed against this background, is as follows. 108 Rosa Flores testified to the following effect. Both she and her family were active supporters of the NPP. On July 2, 1984, she was appointed a typist for the Municipal Assembly and, after a three-month probationary period, the Assembly unanimously voted to hire her as a permanent employee. At this time, Castro Davila was a member of the Municipal Assembly. The position of typist is classified as a career position. 109 In January of 1985, the newly elected President of the Municipal Assembly, Rene Rodriguez Morales, took office and his secretary, Mrs. Raquel Mendoza, became the immediate supervisor of Rosa Flores. Both Rodriguez Morales and Mrs. Raquel Mendoza were brusque in their treatment of Rosa Flores. She described them as being very dry towards her. Rosa Flores was not allowed to go to the bathroom alone, and when she took her morning breakfast break, she was always admonished by Mrs. Raquel Mendoza to come back right away. Rosa Flores was not given any work to do, was denied access to files and documents of the Municipal Assembly, and was not allowed to touch any documents belonging to the Assembly. 110 In June of 1985, Rosa Flores received a letter from Rodriguez Morales advising her that there were no longer any Assembly funds to pay her and that he was asking the Mayor to relocate her in another position in the Municipal government. She went to see the Mayor, who said that he had no place to put her, but that he would send her to the Civil Defense Office. She remained at the Office of Civil Defense until September 3 when the President of the Municipal Assembly Rodriguez, once again placed me back in the Municipal Assembly. 111 While she was at the Civil Defense Office, Flores was given no work to do and was not allowed to use the telephone either to make calls or answer them. She, along with her father, met with the Mayor on July 8, 1985, and she told him that she was unhappy at the way she was being treated. The Mayor told her that he would relocate her to an irregular position. Addressing her father, the Mayor then said, You have my word that your daughter is not going to lose her job. On July 12, she wrote the Mayor stating that she would not accept a transfer from her career position to that of an irregular employee and she understood that her rights would be violated if such a transfer were made. The Mayor replied by letter of August 16. The contents of the letter were not testified to and we have not been furnished a translation copy of it. 112 On September 3, Rosa Flores was informed that the President of the Municipal Assembly wanted to see her. She went to see him and he told her that under a layoff plan he was preparing she would be laid off in October. She was also told by Rodriguez that he was relocating her as a typist in the offices of the Municipal Assembly and that effective September 4, she had to render a daily report of all the work that she did for the Municipal Assembly. On September 4, she wrote a letter to Rodriguez in which she stated that she acknowledged his directive, that she considered it discriminatory, but that she would comply with it. The letter also requested that she be told in writing the daily duties and obligations that she had to carry out. Rodriguez gave her a written list of her duties on September 6. 113 On October 1, 1985, a memorandum was given to Rosa Flores. It was signed: Hon. Rene Rodriguez, Chairman Municipal Assembly, Municipality of Las Piedras. The memorandum informed Rosa Flores that due to lack of funds and/or work she would be laid off as of November 4, 1985. She was also informed of her right to attend an informal hearing prior to the layoff and to appeal the layoff to the Appeals Board of the Personnel Management System within thirty days of the receipt of the memorandum. 114 The Mayor testified that he had not participated in the decision to lay off Rosa Flores and that he did not have the authority to either appoint or discharge employees of the Municipal Assembly. On cross-examination, he was asked whether Rene Rodriguez was the one who fired Wanda Rosa Flores and he answered Yes. No other witnesses testified in Wanda Rosa Flores' case. 115 We have found nothing in the record from which it could be found that the Mayor had the authority to hire or discharge employees of the Municipal Assembly. The evidence shows clearly that Rosa Flores was hired by the Municipal Assembly of Las Piedras and laid off by the President of the Municipal Assembly, Rodriguez Morales. The discriminatory treatment she received was at the hands of Rodriguez and his secretary. It was Rodriguez who told her, in June of 1985, that there were no longer any funds to pay her and suggested she see the Mayor. The Mayor found a temporary job for her, but it was Rodriguez who transferred her back to the Municipal Assembly in September and told her what duties she had. And it was Rodriguez who laid her off. There is no evidence that the Mayor and Rodriguez ever discussed Rosa Flores. 116 We can find no causal link between the Mayor and the transfers and eventual dismissal of Rosa Flores. Appellee suggested that such a link can be forged from the facts that the Mayor and Rodriguez were friends and belonged to the same political party. We do not think that friendship and political affiliation without more can establish causation. Plaintiff Rosa Flores has not proved that the Mayor caused her transfers and dismissal. On the basis of the evidence, it could only be found that the person liable was Rodriguez Morales. The judgment for Rosa Flores against Mayor Castro Davila must be reversed. 117 AFFIRMED IN PART. REVERSED IN PART. REMANDED. 118 No costs on appeal.