Opinion ID: 490093
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: GAO's Performance-Based Adverse Action.

Text: 54 Although Title VII law does not ordinarily require a defendant-employer to prove the substance of his articulated nondiscriminatory explanation for the adverse action, in this case, the PAB assumed, and we have no occasion to question, that the GAO would have had to justify its decision to deny Chen's salary increase and eventually discharge him under other statutory provisions. 10 On an appeal of an adverse action under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7701, the agency bears the burden of proof set out in that section. See Jackson v. Veterans Administration, 768 F.2d at 1329. 55 The majority and dissenting opinions of the PAB disagreed as to the standard of proof under which the GAO had to justify its decision to deny Chen's within-grade salary increase. 11 Despite acknowledging that this circuit has overturned it, the PAB followed its own precedent, Kienzle v. GAO, 1 PAB 28 (1981), holding that such a personnel action must be supported by substantial evidence. 12 The dissent correctly noted that the law of this circuit requires a preponderance of the evidence to support a within-grade denial, see White v. Department of the Army, 720 F.2d 209 (D.C.1983), and opposed the board's assertion of nonacquiescence, PAB Dissent at 2-3, J.A. 25-26. Since we have retained jurisdiction over this case, on remand, the PAB must apply the clearly established law of this circuit, i.e., the preponderance of evidence standard. 13