Opinion ID: 2981234
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Watson’s Arrest

Text: The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and mandates that “no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has -5- No. 11-1331 United States v. Watson interpreted this as requiring officers to obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before they may lawfully enter a home. United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 315-16 (1972). While “searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable,” the Court instructs that without a warrant, “officers need . . . probable cause plus exigent circumstances in order to make a lawful entry into a home.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586; 590 (1980); see also Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002) (emphasis added). “To be arrested in the home involves not only the invasion attendant to all arrests but also an invasion of the sanctity of the home. This is simply too substantial an invasion to allow without a warrant, at least in the absence of exigent circumstances, even when it is accomplished under statutory authority and when probable cause is clearly present.” Payton, 445 U.S. at 588-89 (citing United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 423 (1978)). Based on the controlled buy occurring at the home a short time before the entry, officers did in fact have probable cause to search Lewis’s home. Officers also claimed that exigent circumstances existed to overcome the lack of a warrant. The Sixth Circuit defines exigent circumstances as “situations where ‘real immediate and serious consequences’ will ‘certainly occur’ if the police officer postpones action to obtain a warrant.” Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 253 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 501 (6th Cir. 2002)). The “need to prevent evidence from being lost or destroyed” constitutes exigent circumstances permitting an officer’s warrantless entry into a home. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (holding that police may enter a home without a warrant to “prevent imminent destruction of -6- No. 11-1331 United States v. Watson evidence”); United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1511 (6th Cir. 1988). Whether exigent circumstances exist in a given situation is not judged by the subjective belief of the officers. Brigham, 547 U.S. at 404. “An action is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind, ‘as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.” Id. (emphasis in original). Officer Shepard testified that they entered the home based on exigent circumstances because they believed that someone in the neighborhood would alert Watson to Lewis’s traffic stop and that Watson would then attempt to flee the home with evidence or destroy evidence before officers could obtain a search warrant. The district court did not credit this argument and aptly stated: The Prosecution’s argument that “someone” from the neighborhood would send a “heads up” to “someone” at the 808 Second residence is too broad and sweeping of a statement especially since in this instance the man was not from the neighborhood. It may be, as testified to by the deputies at the hearing, that the neighborhood is known as a “high crime” area. It may be that the neighbors are well known to each other. However, the Court is unable to jump to the conclusion that just because “everyone” in the neighborhood knows “everyone else” in the neighborhood, that “everyone” or “anyone” or “someone” who saw the traffic stop a few blocks from 808 Second, would call “someone,” who is not from the neighborhood, at 808 Second, to report the traffic stop. This would mean that “everyone” in the neighborhood was in some way aiding “everyone else” or “anyone else” in the neighborhood, in hiding a crime, in this case, distribution of drugs. There was no testimony that anyone witnessed the traffic stop a few blocks away from 808 Second. There is also no testimony that if witnessed, those persons who witnessed the stop knew those who were stopped or knew where they came from or where they lived. The Court finds unreasonable that persons who may have witnessed the traffic stop a few blocks away, would necessarily know what the traffic stop was about and to whom it should be reported. The traffic stop could have very well been a “normal” traffic stop, such as speeding, as opposed to a traffic stop in order to prevent the destruction of evidence from a controlled buy which occurred a few blocks away from 808 Second. How would a person who witnessed a traffic stop a few blocks -7- No. 11-1331 United States v. Watson away know that it was a result of a controlled buy which occurred a few minutes earlier at that address? (emphasis in original). The district court correctly found that the officers’ belief that exigent circumstances existed to enter the home without a warrant was unreasonable in light of the facts of this case. Since the officers lacked exigent circumstances to enter the home, Watson’s arrest was the product of an illegal entry and was therefore unconstitutional. Payton, 445 U.S. at 590. Because the entry into the home violated the Fourth Amendment, Watson’s subsequent arrest was unlawful, and his post-arrest statements that flowed from the unlawful arrest are fruit of the poisonous tree and subject to the exclusionary rule. Id.