Opinion ID: 520345
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dalton, Kimmelman, and Collins

Text: 27 Able first contends that Judge Rovner failed to find Dalton and its employees in contempt because she erroneously believed that she was in no position to order Dalton to do anything when she dismissed the suit on June 26. Able then contends that Dalton violated the judgment because it clearly had knowledge of the court's order--Able's messenger delivered a copy of the minute order to Mr. Collins on Friday afternoon. Furthermore, Dalton abetted Stotler in delaying the release of the funds until a subsequent writ of attachment could be obtained. Able concludes that under these circumstances Judge Rovner would have found Dalton and its employees in contempt if she realized that she in fact possessed the authority to do so. 28 We agree with Able that under certain circumstances Rules 70 and 71 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a district court to find a nonparty in contempt. Rule 70 permits a court to find a party in contempt if he fails to honor a court's order. Rule 71 provides that when obedience to an order may be lawfully enforced against a person who is not a party, that person is liable to the same process for enforcing obedience to the order as if a party. However, Rule 71 does not define the circumstances under which an order may be lawfully enforced, instead leaving that issue to the enforcing court. 12 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 3031 (1973). 29 We also agree with Able that ordinarily a court may find a nonparty in contempt if that person has actual knowledge of the court order and either abets the [party named in the court order] or is legally identified with him. See, e.g., Quinter v. Volkswagen of Am., 676 F.2d 969, 972 (3d Cir.1982) (court finding that an expert witness was legally identified with both the plaintiff and the plaintiff's attorney, justifying a finding of contempt); see also NLRB v. Sequoia Dist. Council of Carpenters, 568 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir.1977); 12 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 3033 (1973). Accord Waffenschmidt v. MacKay, 763 F.2d 711, 717 (5th Cir.1985) (discussing contempt power in a Rule 65(d) injunction context), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056, 106 S.Ct. 794, 88 L.Ed.2d 771 (1986). However, we disagree with Able that Judge Rovner was in a position to hold Dalton and its employees in contempt. 30 For Judge Rovner to find Dalton and its employees in contempt pursuant to Rule 71, Able had to prove that the order was enforceable against Dalton as if it were a party. 5 However, Judge Rovner found, and we agree, that her June 26 order did not direct Dalton to perform any specified action. The judgment of dismissal did not mention Dalton and did not specify any course of action to be undertaken by any person. Instead, Judge Rovner merely dismissed the suit. Thus, Able could not prove that the judgment in this case  'set[ ] forth in specific detail an unequivocal command.'  Ferrell, 785 F.2d at 1378 (citation omitted). 31 Even if we held that Judge Rovner erroneously refused to find a clear and specific command to Dalton, we cannot conclude that Dalton and its employees failed to exercise reasonable diligence and energy to accomplish what the judgment contemplated. We believe that Judge Rovner reviewed all of the facts and circumstances, in light of Dalton's position as a nonparty, and properly refused to find Dalton and its employees in contempt. 32 Prior to receiving a copy of the judgment, the attorneys for Able and Stotler telephoned Dalton's offices after the hearing and spoke with Dalton's operations manager, Mr. Collins. Mr. Collins was unfamiliar with the legal action between Able and Stotler--his superior, Mr. Kimmelman, had handled the earlier writ of attachment and its subsequent dissolution by Judge Getzendanner. 6 Mr. Collins did not know whether the attorneys on the phone were who they were purported to be and he reasonably delayed action on the matter until Mr. Kimmelman could be consulted. Furthermore, Mr. Collins reasonably refused to release the funds until he received written confirmation from the parties as Mr. Kimmelman had received when Judge Getzendanner dismissed the earlier suit. 7 Therefore, we conclude that Mr. Collins acted with reasonable diligence in his attempts to comply with an ambiguous court directive which was not directed at Dalton specifically. 33 We also believe that Mr. Kimmelman acted reasonably when he reviewed the matter on Monday, June 29, 1987. When Mr. Kimmelman arrived at Dalton's offices, he immediately reviewed the judgment and referred the matter to Dalton's attorney. Mr. Kimmelman legitimately was confused because the existing writ of attachment had been issued by a state court on June 25, 1987, and yet had been ordered vacated by a federal district court on Friday, June 26, 1987. His actions to review the matter and refer it to Dalton's counsel indicate the sort of reasonable diligence which precludes a finding of contempt. 34 Dalton's attorney likewise was confused by the nature of these proceedings, in part because he was not aware of the June 26 motions and hearings. Before Dalton's attorney had even received and reviewed the documents verifying the validity of the June 26, 1987 order and its effect, Stotler had filed a third action in Illinois state court and had received yet another writ of attachment freezing Able's funds in Dalton's possession. Under the circumstances of this case, we believe that Dalton and its employees acted with reasonable diligence at all times and could not properly be held in contempt. 8