Opinion ID: 1961129
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Alleged Conspiracy

Text: In his opening statement, defense counsel asserted the defense position to be that petitioner is a patsy in this case and suggested that he was framed by his aunt, Ms. Haddaway, because of animosity between her and her brother, petitioner's father. He did not attempt to explain the nature or derivation of that animosity, noting only her brother whom she despises. Counsel pointed out later that Ms. Haddaway had collected the $10,000 reward offered for information leading to petitioner's arrest and asserted that she was looking as well to claim the additional $15,000 offered for information leading to his conviction. He also brought out that Ms. Haddaway had visited Andrews in jail. The aspect of the patsy defense that produced the first complaint in this appeal arose during the cross-examination of Andrews. Petitioner's attorney indicated that he wanted to establish a conspiracy between Ms. Haddaway, Andrews, and Grayson Eckel, the lawyer who was representing Andrews. The thrust of the alleged conspiracy was that petitioner's father had owned a tract of land which, if the father died intestate, petitioner would inherit and that, immediately before trial, counsel learned that Mr. Eckel, who also represented Ms. Haddaway's daughter, Laci Janda, produced a holographic will leaving the land to Ms. Janda. Although he mentioned a proffer, counsel never made a formal offer of proof or indicated what questions he wanted to ask or what witnesses, if any, he intended to call. He said only that he wanted to attempt to lay a foundation for questioning Beverly Haddaway later, to establish that there's motivation and bias on the part of [Andrews], and to establish that [Andrews] is part of a conspiracy or a deal with Beverly Haddaway that involves her collecting reward money and that it involved her ... in a will contest or dispute in which ... her daughter, Laci Janda, has acquired real estate. The positing of this theory produced considerable discussion. The prosecutor noted that the father died after charges had already been filed against petitioner and said that she failed to see the relevance of his disposition of his land. The court inquired several times about the relevance, asking first what the will had to do with the criminal case. The response was that Mr. Eckel is apparently representing two conflicting, opposing interests in this matterAndrews in this case and Ms. Haddaway's daughter in the will case. The court had trouble seeing how that was a conflict, and the best counsel could respond was that Andrews's lawyer was helping Ms. Haddaway's daughter obtain the land by having Andrews help convict petitioner. The court characterized the theory as confusing, to which counsel responded: I agree it's confusing. But I don't see why the jury should be painted a pristine picture that shows there is no problems. And it's not confusing when in fact it is confusing, has been confusing to all of us from the very beginning. With that bit of supposed clarification, the court held that the point sought to be made was irrelevant. Counsel then completed his cross-examination of Andrews without further reference to the matter, and, when he later recalled Ms. Haddaway as a defense witness, he asked no questions regarding the will or any other aspect of the alleged conspiracy. Counsel returned to his conspiracy theory in closing argument, but cast it entirely in terms of Ms. Haddaway's seeking to collect the reward money. He explained that petitioner was a patsy because Haddaway wanted to collect the reward and, in order to do so, she needed to supply information, and so she has an opportunity to set up with Mr. Andrews a situation in which Mr. Andrews is going to take a small fall [and] someone else can take a big one, her nephew. In this appeal, petitioner urges that the court erred in excluding evidence tending to show that the State's main witness had an interest in the outcome of the proceeding and had a motive to testify falsely. Citing Gray v. State, 368 Md. 529, 547, 796 A.2d 697, 707 (2002), he posits that a defendant, within evidentiary and procedural restraints, is always entitled to present his full defense to the trier of fact, which in this case included the accusation that there was a conspiracy between [Haddaway and Andrews] (and perhaps Eckel), the object of which was to secure the wrongful conviction of Petitioner, collect the reward money, and secure the inheritance of Haddaway's daughter of the real property of Petitioner's father. Though acknowledging, from Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431,1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674, 683 (1986), that judges retain wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination, to avoid harassment, prejudice, confusion of issues ... or interrogation that is ... only marginally relevant, petitioner nonetheless asserts that he established a sufficient threshold to be entitled to proceed further with his theory, and that the court both erred as a matter of Constitutional law and abused its discretion in not allowing him to do so. He contends that the court was wrong in relying on the fact that his father died after the charges were filed against him, which he regards as irrelevant, and on the fact that Ms. Janda, rather than Ms. Haddaway, was the devisee of the land, and he stresses his right to attempt to establish bias and pecuniary interest on the part of State's witnesses. Citing Clark v. State, 364 Md. 611, 660, 774 A.2d 1136, 1165 (2001), he notes that a proffer to permit an initial question regarding credibility needs but minimal supportlittle more than an articulable suspicion ... to believe that the facts elicited will be relevant to credibility. We have no disagreement with the general propositions posited by petitioner that he had a right to present his defense to the jury, that evidence of bias and interest on the part of adverse witnesses is always relevant, and that such bias or interest is always the proper subject for cross-examination, which may not be unreasonably denied or limited. See Marshall v. State, 346 Md. 186, 695 A.2d 184 (1997). Those propositions are subject, however, to two paramount rules of evidence, embodied both in case law and in Maryland Rules 5-402 and 5-403. The first is that evidence that is not relevant to a material issue is inadmissible. [1] The second is that, even if relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. See Ware v. State, 348 Md. 19, 67-68, 702 A.2d 699, 723 (1997); Merzbacher v. State, 346 Md. 391, 413-14, 697 A.2d 432, 443 (1997). The exploration of bias or interest on the part of an adverse witnessMs. Haddaway and Mr. Andrews in this case is always material, and, indeed, petitioner was permitted to expose that bias or interest. He got before the jury that Ms. Haddaway had waited nearly 12 years to go to the police and did so only after learning of the reward, that she had already received $10,000 of the reward and was looking to claim the additional $15,000 offered for conviction. He got before the jury that Andrews was testifying pursuant to an Alford plea agreement to a much reduced charge with a recommended sentence not to exceed five years in prison. That kind of evidence was certainly relevant to establishing the material fact of bias or interest. The conspiracy theory arising from the father's will, however, was so unclear, so amorphous, and so tenuous as to strain any connection with bias or interest on the part of Haddaway or Andrews. It necessarily rested on the tacit premise that Ms. Haddaway, in concert with Mr. Andrews and/or Mr. Eckel, somehow importuned the father to devise the land by will to Ms. Janda rather than allow it to devolve by intestacy to petitioner. Even if we were to excuse the lack of a formal proffer of evidence to support such a conclusion, there was no indication of what counsel wished to explorewhat questions he wanted to ask. In the face of an objection on the ground of relevance, there was no assertion that he intended to inquire as to any of the facts or circumstances that might serve to establish a connection between the will and the testimony of Haddaway or Andrews(1) what the overall relationship was between petitioner and his father, (2) what the relationship was between the father and the niece, Ms. Janda, (3) when the holographic will was writtenwhether before or after the father may have become aware of petitioner's alleged involvement in Ms. Wilford's murder, (4) what the father's health and mental state were when the will was executed, (5) whether the will provided any other bequest to petitioner in lieu of the land, (6) whether there were ever any discussions between the father and Ms. Haddaway, or Mr. Andrews, or Mr. Eckel regarding the land, and, if so, when they occurred, or even (7) whether petitioner was expecting to inherit the land. We do not suggest that petitioner was required to establish these things in advance, before being allowed to proceed. Had he offered even a rudimentary basis for a connection between the will and the testimony of Haddaway or Andrews, he would have been entitled to some leeway to develop it. Here, however, there was nothing. The isolated fact that, at some unknown point, petitioner's father drew a will that devised land of unknown value to his niece makes neither more probable nor less probable that Ms. Haddaway or Mr. Andrews had a motive to testify falsely against petitioner. If there was any relevance inferrable from this void, it was certainly marginal at best, which invokes the discretion accorded both under the cases cited and under Maryland Rule 5-403 to exclude even relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. Holding aside the obvious prejudice to Mr. Eckel accusing a lawyer, who would likely be unable to testify in response, of criminal conspiracy to suborn perjurydefense counsel admitted that the issue was confusing, as indeed it was. Had counsel made a clear proffer or even identified the questions or types of questions he desired to ask, the trial court may have had some better idea of how to draw a balance under Rule 5-403. On this record, however, we cannot say that the judge abused his discretion in precluding counsel from wandering off onto smoke-filled tangents.