Opinion ID: 196927
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Gulf

Text: 8 Fernandez contends that the district court erred in allowing evidence and argument regarding Gulf. We review a lower court's admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Disanto, 1996 WL 312368,  11 (1st Cir.1996); United States v. Rivera-Gomez, 67 F.3d 993, 997 (1st Cir.1995). 9 Testimony regarding Gulf was elicited by the government, over Fernandez' objection, during its cross-examination of defense witness Rosa Sanjurjo, an employee in Carrier's collection department. She stated that she began working for Carrier in January of 1992, prior to which she worked for Gulf until 1990. She acknowledged that Fernandez had also worked for Gulf, that it did the same type of business as Carrier, and that it closed before Carrier was created. She also stated that Gulf did not become Carrier. On redirect, Fernandez' counsel elicited her testimony that Gulf was a corporation controlled by Fernandez and two other individuals, including Sanjurjo's stepson. She stated on recross that Carrier and Gulf had different offices and used different warehouses. George Wyle, a salesman for Carrier for part of 1992, testified on cross that he knew Fernandez through the shipping business prior to 1992, that Fernandez was involved with Gulf, that Gulf did essentially the same kind of business that Carrier did, and that Gulf's full name was Gulf Carrier. 10 After the first few questions to Sanjurjo about Gulf, defense counsel objected to the cross-examination on Gulf as being outside the scope of examination; the court allowed the prosecution to continue, but asking questions on direct, instead of on cross. After a few more questions, defense counsel asked for a sidebar, and objected that the questioning was outside the scope of the testimony and the entire case. The prosecutor argued that the evidence was being used for impeachment, pointing out that since Fernandez was arguing that it was impossible that Carrier could have been used, the evidence on Gulf would show that even before Carrier started Fernandez was in the same line of business, at a company which operated in essentially the same fashion, offering Fernandez access to shipping services, albeit under a different name. The court denied Fernandez' objection. 11 Before closing arguments, Fernandez' counsel raised the issue of whether the government should be allowed to make reference to Gulf in its closing argument. Defense counsel protested that the government was trying to make an inference not based on the evidence, since there was no evidence regarding whether Gulf and Carrier had a similar identity, or when Fernandez was involved with Gulf. Indeed, counsel noted, the testimony indicated no continuity of ownership between the companies, and that they used different facilities. The court, however, rejected the defense's argument and allowed the government to discuss Gulf in its closing argument. 12 Fernandez now argues that the district court erred in allowing evidence and argument regarding Gulf. He does not specify his reasons, however. Rather, he simply refers us to the reasons stated in his additional arguments, leaving us to speculate as to which reasons would apply in this context, and running the risk of waiver. As we address those contentions where they are made, we add only a few comments here. 13 Briefly stated, while it could have decided the issue several different ways, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in choosing to allow the government to elicit and use the evidence regarding Gulf. While not detailed, the evidence was certainly relevant, for the very reasons the government outlined. See Fed.R.Evid. 401; United States v. Griffin, 818 F.2d 97, 101-02 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 844 (1987) (noting the broad discretion district courts enjoy in determining relevance). Allowing the line of questioning and argument was neither unfairly prejudicial, see Fed.R.Evid. 403, nor constituted an unfair surprise: Fernandez' defense was that it was impossible for him to have used Carrier to ship cocaine because Carrier was not in operation--a line of reasoning fairly inviting the question of what other companies Fernandez had access to during the relevant time period, and whether he could have used them in a similar manner.