Opinion ID: 3192721
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: cafa jurisdiction was proper

Text: Because Plaintiffs have only challenged the district court’s conclusion that Defendants established jurisdiction under CAFA on appeal, we only address whether the district court erred by not remanding this case to state court. Relevant to the instant case, CAFA grants subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts over a case where “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, . . . any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a 2 As part of their motion to dismiss, Defendants noted that TMS had voluntarily agreed to extend the warranties of the affected vehicles to offer repairs for heat-damaged components, thereby mooting Plaintiffs’ claims. 4 Case: 15-20561 Document: 00513457559 Page: 5 Date Filed: 04/08/2016 No. 15-20561 State different from any defendant,” and “the number of members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is [not] less than 100.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (5)(B). Plaintiffs challenge only the district court’s conclusion that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million, arguing that Defendants’ amount-in-controversy estimates, on which the district court relied, were grossly inflated. 3 We disagree and find no error in the district court’s conclusion that jurisdiction under CAFA was appropriate in this case. Remand to state court was, therefore, not required. In Dart, the Supreme Court outlined the procedures and standards for asserting, challenging, and evaluating allegations concerning the amount in controversy for putative class actions removed under CAFA. First, “a defendant’s notice of removal need include only a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold,” Dart, 135 S. Ct. at 554, and this “allegation should be accepted when not contested by the plaintiff or questioned by the court,” id. at 553; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). Next, “[i]f the plaintiff contests the defendant’s allegation,” then “both sides submit proof and the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied.” Dart, 135 S. Ct. at 553–54; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(B) (“[R]emoval . . . is proper on the basis of an amount in controversy asserted [by the defendant] if the district 3 We note that the district court committed no error in concluding that CAFA’s other jurisdictional requirements were satisfied in this case. Plaintiffs are citizens of Texas while TMS is a citizen of California, so minimal diversity exists here. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A). The proposed plaintiff class exceeds 100, as Plaintiffs propose a class of over 1,000 individuals. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(B). We further note that the “local controversy” exception to jurisdiction under CAFA does not defeat jurisdiction here. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A). Because a “class action has been filed asserting the same or similar factual allegations against any of the defendants,” the district court was not required to decline CAFA jurisdiction in this case. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(ii); see Perez v. G.F.B. Enters., L.L.C., No. 15-cv-21172-KING (S.D. Fla. filed Mar. 25, 2015) (involving a class action in which the plaintiffs assert similar allegations against some of the defendants in the instant case). 5 Case: 15-20561 Document: 00513457559 Page: 6 Date Filed: 04/08/2016 No. 15-20561 court finds, by the preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds [the jurisdictional threshold].”). Here, Plaintiffs contested Defendants’ allegations as to the amount in controversy. But in doing so, Plaintiffs introduced no evidence of the amount in controversy themselves, and on appeal they only criticize Defendants’ evidence and the way in which the district court interpreted that evidence. Defendants’ primary evidence was the declaration of Mark Rhymer. Rhymer stated, based on personal knowledge, that the average costs to repair a heatdamaged dashboard and door panel were approximately “$1,215.45” and “$1,663.42,” respectively. Based on there being 1,001 class members and assuming each member required both repairs, Defendants calculated a total of at least $2,881,737 in economic damages and, based on Texas law limiting exemplary damages to twice the amount of economic damages, a total of at least $5,763,474 in exemplary damages. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 41.008(b) (allowing up to “two times the amount of economic damages” in exemplary damages). We see no error in the district court’s conclusion that Defendants established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amountin-controversy requirement was satisfied. Plaintiffs first criticize Defendants’ amount-in-controversy calculations as based solely on the unsupported, general, and conclusory declaration of Rhymer. However, Rhymer stated that he had personal knowledge of matters related to the repair of heat-damaged vehicle interiors, and Plaintiffs have introduced no evidence of any kind to suggest that Rhymer’s estimates were inaccurate. Accordingly, the district court committed no error in relying on these estimates. Plaintiffs further criticize Defendants’ estimates as based on the assumption that each class member would require both dashboard and other interior component repairs when Plaintiffs never alleged that all class members would require both types of repairs. However, in their state court 6 Case: 15-20561 Document: 00513457559 Page: 7 Date Filed: 04/08/2016 No. 15-20561 complaint, Plaintiffs clearly alleged that class members “suffered damage to the dashboard and various interior components” and that members “required repairs to the dashboard and interior” components. Given these allegations, we find no error in the district court’s reliance on Defendants’ calculations based on all class members requiring both types of repairs. See Robertson v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 15-30920, 2015 WL 9592499, at  (5th Cir. Dec. 31, 2015) (noting that the required demonstration of the amount in controversy concerns “everything [the plaintiff] seeks,” not only what “the plaintiff is likely to win” (quoting Berniard v. Dow Chem. Co., 481 F. App’x 859, 862 (5th Cir.