Opinion ID: 152649
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Plain Error Review of the District Court's Guideline Calculation

Text: Plain error occurs where there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) the plain error affects substantial rights. Castillo-Casiano, 198 F.3d at 790 (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). Where these three conditions are met, we have discretion to correct the error, but only in cases where the error `seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 469-70, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997)).
Error is [d]eviation from a legal rule . . . unless the rule has been waived. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733-735, 113 S.Ct. 1770. Wahid contends that the district court erred because it did not understand that it had discretion to reduce the sentences related to Counts One through Three because these counts, which charged him with wire fraud, are non-predicate felonies for purposes of Section 1028A. He points out that the district court grouped Counts One through Five. Wahid does not argue that the grouping was error in and of itself under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c) (requiring grouping of counts if they embody conduct that was treated as a specific offense characteristic in, or other adjustment to, the guideline applicable to another of the counts) or 3D1.2(d) (requiring grouping of counts if they involve substantially the same harm). Rather, he contends that the grouping is evidence that the court did not understand the distinction between predicate and non-predicate felonies.
Plain error, as we understand that term, is error that is so clear-cut, so obvious, a competent district judge should be able to avoid it without benefit of objection. United States v. Turman, 122 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir.1997); see also United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982) (noting that error is plain only if the trial judge is derelict in countenancing it). Our analysis for plain error differs depending on whether the state of the law was unclear at the time of the trial or was settled at the time of trial and clearly contrary to the law at the time of the appeal. Turman, 122 F.3d at 1170. When the state of the law is unclear at trial and only becomes clear as a result of later authority, plain error means error plain at the time the district court made the alleged mistake. Id. However, [w]here the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal[,] it is enough that the error be `plain' at the time of appellate consideration. Id. (citing Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544). Wahid does not attempt to show that the law at the time of his sentencing was settled and clearly contrary to our interpretation of Section 1028A. Accordingly, we examine the district court's sentencing decision as of the time the decision was made. Wahid claims that the district court's comments at the sentencing hearing show plainly that the district court believed that it did not have discretion to reduce his sentence for the non-predicate counts. He points to the district judge's comment that even if I were to take the minimum under the guidelines, it's 108 months, plus 24 months, which is 132 months. So how am I suppose to get around that? However, immediately following that statement, the district judge said, Even though I understand I have discretion to sentence outside the guidelines range, I have to have a basis for doing that. . . . If I were trying to justify it, I can't see how I can justify going below the term. The court continued, I have discretion, but obviously to exercise discretion I have to have a basis. Finally, the district court observed: I'm not in this particular situation going to be persuaded that he somehow should not be sentenced under the guidelines in this particular situation. The crimes that he has committed are so numerous to so many victims that even though he's only charged with the number that's contained in the indictment, it cannot be argued that there are not many more. In Vidal-Reyes, the district court stated explicitly that it wanted to reduce the sentence for the defendant's nonpredicate felonies but believed that it could not under the mandatory provision of Section 1028A. 562 F.3d at 47-48. Similarly, in United States v. Mendoza, 121 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 1997), cited in Castillo-Casiano as an example of plain error, the district court stated specifically (and incorrectly) that it believed it did not have discretion with respect to a particular issue. Mendoza, 121 F.3d at 512. Even with the benefit of hindsight, we cannot say that the district court plainly erred in considering its discretion to reduce the sentences for the non-predicate felonies. The district court made several statements indicating that it understood it had discretion to impose a sentence outside of the guidelines. Because the district court recognized that it had discretion but chose not to exercise it, there was no plain error. As the court noted in Vidal-Reyes, a new proceeding is needed where the district court wrongly thought it lacked legal power to depart from sentencing guidelines, but not where it simply chose not to exercise this authority. 562 F.3d at 56 (internal citations and marks omitted). [2]