Opinion ID: 1707193
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the trial court erred in admitting flight evidence and in giving flight instruction.

Text: ¶ 9. On the day of her trial, Ilene did not appear. Ilene's bond was revoked and a warrant was issued for her arrest. She was located at approximately 7:00 p.m. in Attala County by Deputy Hudson of the Attala County Sheriff's Department. Deputy Hudson met Ilene head-on. He recognized her, turned his car around, and pursued her. Ilene sped away. Deputy Hudson chased her for approximately four miles before she lost control of her car and crashed into a ditch. Ilene was intoxicated and her car contained a gun with bullets, $2,247.63 in cash, numerous items of clothes and toiletries, photographs, a road atlas, jewelry, etc. ¶ 10. Ilene filed a motion in limine to keep this evidence from being presented to the jury. The trial judge denied the motion and based his reasoning on testimony presented at the hearing held on the motions for psychiatric examination and for release of personal property. Ilene testified that she left her house to go to the store to call her mother and that was the last thing she remembered before being stopped. She stated that the clothing and toilet items were in her car because she did not use the items anymore and did not have room for all of it in her home. ¶ 11. In denying the motion in limine, the trial judge relied on Pannell v. State, 455 So.2d 785 (Miss.1984), Fuselier v. State, 468 So.2d 45 (Miss.1985), and Mack v. State, 650 So.2d 1289 (Miss.1994). In Pannell, this Court held that a flight instruction was appropriate in cases where the flight was unexplained and in cases wherein flight has considerable probative value. Id. at 788. In Fuselier, this Court further held that an instruction that flight may be considered as a circumstance of guilt or guilty knowledge is appropriate only where that flight is unexplained and somehow probative of guilt or guilty knowledge. Id. at 56-57. In Mack, this Court found that Fuselier implicitly held that evidence of flight is inadmissible when independent reasons exist to explain the flight.... Id. at 1309. Finally, the probative value must substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect. Id. ¶ 12. The trial judge made the following findings: I think based on the law that's developed since Pannell and, of course, Pannell was a development of prior law that you have to ask four things in determining whether or not flight evidence would be admissible. First would be is the flight unexplained, and I think clearly in this case the flight is unexplained. It's totally denied in fact. So, there's a complete dispute in the testimony as to whether or not flight even occurred at all. The Defendant denies that flight occurred. The deputy on the other hand states that he engaged in a high speed chase that resulted in the Defendant, in fact, running in a ditch and wrecking her automobile. So, that is unexplained. Now, the Defendant attempted to explain what she did on that date by stating that she blacked out, but that does not explain why she apparently came to as soon as she saw a deputy, and then still denies that she ran from him. The Court also then will look at the next factor, does it have considerable probative value. And, the Court considered that, and it seems that all of the items in the automobile are consistent with someone that was attempting to flee, escape, or make a quick exit from the jurisdiction of the Court. Many of the items in the car were apparently scattered around, which certainly tends to show someone that was grabbing as many things as possible trying to make a quick and hasty exit and not taking much time to do that. Also, you look at the evidence that was actually inor the items that were actually in the automobile. It was clothes, shoes, suitcases with clothes in them, toiletry items, jewelry, family pictures, a Road Atlas, a large sum of case [sic]. That all is certainly probative of somebody that had guilty knowledge of the crime for which they were charged, and I think that the facts as exist as far as the items that were in the automobile, coupled with the fact that that was the day of her trial, would certainly show considerable probative value of the Defendant's consciousness of guilt of the crime for which she was going to be on trial. The Court also then had to look at the factor, is the evidence of flight probative of things other than the guilt or guilty knowledge of the murder of Jerry Tavares. In Fuselier v. State and Mack v. State , our Supreme Court stated that because the defendants were prison escapees that evidence of flight tended to show evidence of proof of guilty knowledge of escape, as well as proof of guilty knowledge of the crime for which they were on trial. So, there was a situation where there were two separate and distinct trials, I mean crimes; if they ran from one crime they might have been running from the escape charge rather than from the crime for which they were on trial. The Court seemed to be concerned that a defendant in those cases would have to put on proof of their prison escape in order to defend against the allegations that they were fleeing because of a sense of guilt for the crime for which they were on trial. Now, in this case the Defendant argues that proof of flight in this case is as much evidence of guilt of failure to show up for trial or for a bond violation as it would be of guilt of the crime of capital murder. But, in reviewing the testimony of the Defendant, and if the Defendant had stated under testimony that that's why she ran that would be one thing, but the Defendant's testimony again, which was re-read yesterday afternoon by me, stated that she did not flee from the police at all. She stated that Deputy Hudson did not get in behind her. Since the Defendant denies that she engaged in flight from Deputy Hudson, she's not in the same position as the defendants in Fuselier and Mack are in. In those cases the defendants were prejudiced because they would have to put on testimony of guilt of another crime in order to defend against the evidence that they were in flight because of a sense of guilt for the crime for which they were on trial. However, in this case the Defendant will not be prejudiced because if she has to put on proof of commission of another crime because her testimony is that she did not engage in flight to begin with. So, a total denial of flight is not the same type proof that the Supreme Court deemed prejudicial in Mack and Fuselier. The Defendant in this case simply would deny that she engaged in flight at all. Therefore, that would not bring up any evidence of any other crime that she had committed. Also, I think that the fact that the failure to appear for trial is so inter-related with the charge for which the Defendant is on trial, I do not think that that would be considered by the Jury to be a separate crime to begin with. Finally, the Court has to balance whether or not the probative value is substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect so as to render the evidence inadmissible under Rule 4.03. The Court is of the opinion that the probative value is not substantially outweighed, and, therefore, the Court will rule that the evidence will be admissible as to her attempt to flee the jurisdiction or attempt to flee from Officer Hudson on the date that her trial was set to begin. ¶ 13. The trial judge found that Ilene's flight was unexplained, that the case was distinguishable from Fuselier and Mack because Ilene denied that she fled, and that the probative value of the flight evidence was not outweighed by its prejudicial value. ¶ 14. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge's finding: Tavares contends that her situation is similar to that in Mack. She asserts that a totally independent basis existed for her flight from Deputy Hudson: the fact that she was in violation of her bond for failure to appear, and also that she was intoxicated at the time. However, Tavares herself testified that she was not fleeing from Deputy Hudson. She stated that she thought he was in pursuit of a speeding trucker. Therefore, any reliance on Mack is displaced as no independent basis existed for Tavares's flight. From the record, it is clear that Tavares's flight was unexplained. She did not show at her trial in Grenada County on the morning of June 26, 1992, and was apprehended in Attala County later that evening. She sped away from Deputy Hudson causing him to reach speeds of 90 miles per hour in pursuit. She was intoxicated at the time of her flight from Deputy Hudson and crashed her vehicle into a ditch. She had everything except the kitchen sink in her car when she was apprehended. Based upon these facts, evidence of flight was probative of guilt or guilty knowledge and thus the introduction of evidence and the instruction on flight were warranted. ¶ 15. Ilene filed a supplemental brief in which she cites this Court's more recent opinion in Fuselier v. State, 702 So.2d 388 (Miss.1997). Once again, this Court reversed and remanded Fuselier's case as a result of the State introducing evidence regarding Fuselier's flight. Unlike Ilene, however, Fuselier, in both of his cases, could rationally explain his flight as not being evidence of guilt. The trial judge did not commit reversible error in admitting evidence of Ilene's flight.