Opinion ID: 1996887
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Final Judgment Certification

Text: Under Rule 2-602(b), a trial judge may certify as a final judgment an order that adjudicates only some of the rights at issue, even though other claims between the parties remain unadjudicated. [8] Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Smith, 333 Md. 3, 6-7, 633 A.2d 855, 857 (1993). The order certified, however, must be one that is itself final in the traditional sense. Planning Bd. of Howard County v. Mortimer, 310 Md. 639, 651, 530 A.2d 1237, 1243 (1987) ([A] prerequisite for the invocation of the certification procedure embodied in Rule 2-602(b) is an order which, absent the circumstance of multiple parties or multiple claims, would be final in the traditional sense.); see also Med. Mut. Liab. Ins. Soc'y of Maryland v. B. Dixon Evander & Assoc., 331 Md. 301, 308, 628 A.2d 170, 173 (1993) ([A] finding [of no just reason for delay] only makes a final order appealable. It cannot make a nonfinal order into a final order.). In other words, Rule 2-602 does not operate to modify one of the statutory conditions for appellate jurisdictionthe existence of a final judgment. Mortimer, 310 Md. at 649, 530 A.2d at 1242. To be deemed final in the traditional sense, an order must be completely dispositive of an entire claim or party. B. Dixon Evander, 331 Md. at 309, 628 A.2d at 174 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Addison, 411 Md. at 273 n. 14, 983 A.2d at 151 n. 14 (acknowledging that only orders adjudicating entire claims may be certified under Rule 2-602). Under Rule 2-602, a claim, regardless of whether it is the original claim, a counterclaim, or a third-party claim, is defined as a substantive cause of action, Suitland Dev. Corp v. Merchs. Mtg. Co., 254 Md. 43, 54, 254 A.2d 359, 365 (1969), that encompasses all rights arising from common operative facts, East v. Gilchrist, 293 Md. 453, 459, 445 A.2d 343, 346 (1982). [9] Orders that dispose of less than an entire claim, such as only one among multiple legal theories or counts presented, cannot be certified. Keene v. Levin, 330 Md. 287, 292, 623 A.2d 662, 664 (1993); East, 293 Md. at 459, 445 A.2d at 346. When a trial court has not exercised its discretion to certify an order as a final judgment, an appellate court, pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-602(e) may certify the order as a final judgment on its own initiative. [10] Silbersack v. AC & S, 402 Md. 673, 681, 938 A.2d 855, 859 (2008) ([An] appellate court's authority under Rule 8-602(e)(1)(C) to enter judgment on its own initiative may be exercised only when the circuit court has never exercised its own discretion in the matter and not when the trial court was asked to enter judgment under Rule 2-602(b) and expressly declined to do so.); see also Addison, 411 Md. at 269, 272-73, 983 A.2d at 146, 150-51 (holding that an appellate court cannot certify an order denying a motion to compel arbitration when the trial court had denied a motion to certify the same order earlier in the litigation). Rule 8-602(e), however, limits the certification authority of this Court and the Court of Special Appeals to only those orders for which the lower court had discretion to direct the entry of a final judgment pursuant to Rule 2-602(b). Rule 8-602(e)(1); Osborn v. Bunge, 338 Md. 396, 402, 658 A.2d 1102, 1105 (1995) (This Court's power is limited to cases in which certification may be granted under Rule 2-602[.]). The most frequently cited limitation on a trial court's discretion to direct the entry of a final judgment is that the court must expressly determine in a written order that there is no just reason for delay of the appeal. Mortimer, 310 Md. at 648, 530 A.2d at 1241-42 (In the exceptional case, the trial judge may decide that early appellate decision of a particular point is of sufficient importance, or that delay will produce sufficient hardship or unfairness, to outweigh the general policy against piecemeal appeals.). The Circuit Court in this case was not petitioned to certify its order denying Respondents' motion to compel arbitration; therefore, we need not address this condition to determine whether certification is appropriate. Instead, we must examine whether the Circuit Court's order denying Respondents' motion to compel arbitration is, as the law requires, final in the traditional sense. Mortimer, 310 Md. at 651, 530 A.2d at 1243. The Circuit Court's order conclusively denied Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings and thus finally settled Respondents' sole claim. To be final in the traditional sense, however, an order must not only settle an entire claim but also be intended by the court as an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy[.] Rohrbeck, 318 Md. at 41, 566 A.2d at 773. It is well settled that to constitute an unqualified final disposition an order must be so final as to determine and conclude the rights involved, or deny the appellant the means of further prosecuting or defending his rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Schwartz, 280 Md. 518, 521, 374 A.2d 896, 899 (1977), overruled on other grounds by Litton Bionetics, Inc. v. Glen Constr. Co., 292 Md. 34, 437 A.2d 208 (1981); see also Dep't of Pub. Safety v. LeVan, 288 Md. 533, 542, 419 A.2d 1052, 1057 (1980) (citing Schwartz, 280 Md. 518, 374 A.2d 896). From this principle, we have reasoned that a trial court's order, terminating the action in that court and remanding the parties to another tribunal for resolution of their dispute, is final and appealable even though the order does not resolve the underlying controversy. Horsey v. Horsey, 329 Md. 392, 404, 620 A.2d 305, 311 (1993). More specifically, in the context of arbitration, we have held that an order compelling arbitration of a controversy is immediately appealable as a final judgment even though `it does not finally dispose of all claims in the action in which it was filed because the order has the effect of putting the parties out of court. Town of Chesapeake Beach v. Pessoa Constr. Co., 330 Md. 744, 750-53, 625 A.2d 1014, 1017-18 (1993) (quoting Horsey, 329 Md. at 401, 620 A.2d at 310) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); accord Addison, 411 Md. at 272-73, 983 A.2d at 151. Conversely, [w]e have held that a trial court's order denying a challenge to its jurisdiction is a nonappealable interlocutory order because the order does not settle or conclude the rights of any party or deny him the means of proceeding further. Gruber, 369 Md. at 547, 801 A.2d at 1017 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Highfield Water Co. v. Washington County Sanitary Dist., 295 Md. 410, 416-17, 456 A.2d 371, 374-75 (1983) (holding that a trial court's determination that it had subject matter jurisdiction over a dispute was a nonappealable interlocutory order). As we noted in Addison, an order denying a motion to compel arbitration does not put the parties out of court but, instead, effectively keeps the parties in court to litigate the claims remaining between them. 411 Md. at 273, 983 A.2d at 151. Moreover, like an order denying a jurisdictional challenge, an order denying a motion to compel arbitration asserts a court's jurisdiction over the controversy and leaves the parties free to resolve the underlying dispute in a judicial forum. See Gruber, 369 Md. at 547-48, 801 A.2d at 1017 (Whenever a court makes a disposition or order, it does so on the basis that it has jurisdiction, and if its express announcement of that fact constituted an appealable order, it would be impossible for a court to proceed with the trial of any case in which its jurisdiction was challenged.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). For these reasons, an order denying a motion to compel arbitration is not final in the traditional sense. See Addison, 411 Md. at 273, 983 A.2d at 151. Consequently, we cannot certify as a final judgment, under Rule 8-602(e), the Circuit Court's order denying Respondents' motion to compel arbitration.