Opinion ID: 2624541
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Weighing of factors indicating potential prejudice versus the benefits to the state of joinder

Text: As observed earlier, section 954.1 (quoted, ante, fn. 2), provides that when, as here, properly joined charges are of the same class, the circumstance that evidence underlying those charges would not be cross-admissible at hypothetical separate trials is, standing alone, insufficient to establish that a trial court abused its discretion in failing to sever those charges. Accordingly, the assumed absence of cross-admissibility on the issue of identity in the present case is simply one factor to be weighed against the benefits of joinder. ( Frank, supra, 48 Cal.3d 632, 641.) We turn to the other three factors that often are considered in evaluating such requests (see, ante, p. 775likelihood to unduly inflame; bolstering of a weak case with a strong one; and conversion of charges into a capital offense), and proceed to weigh all four factors against the benefits to the state of joinder. The homicides at issue in the Rigby and Olson cases are similar in nature and equally egregioushence neither, when compared to the other, was likely to unduly inflame a jury against defendant. (See, e.g., Mason, supra, 52 Cal.3d 909, 934.) Nor is this a situation in which either charge is a capital offense, or in which the prosecutor sought joinder in order to convert the matter into a capital case. (Cf. Williams v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 441, 454 [204 Cal.Rptr. 700, 683 P.2d 699] [a case in which it is the joinder itself which gives rise to the special circumstances allegation of multiple murder...].) Although neither of these two factors militates against the benefits of joinder in the present proceedings, defendant suggests that the remaining factor does: he asserts (and the Court of Appeal found) that the Olson charges were relatively weak compared with the Rigby charges, and that the spillover effect of a joint trial wouldand didunfairly alter the outcome of one or both of the charges. As an initial matter, based upon the information before the trial court at the time it ruled on the severance motion, it was not clear that the evidence supporting the Olson charge was significantly weaker than that underlying the Rigby charge. In each instance, defendant's fingerprints linked him to the victim's campsite. And in each, witness testimony was proffered, establishing that defendant was in the company of the victim at or near his camp, and was acting in an aggressive fashion shortly before the commission of the homicide. In the Rigby case, testimony was proffered establishing that defendant played cards with the victim at his camp shortly before his death, and at least one witness (Nash) was prepared to testify (and did so at trial) that defendant was upset with Rigby, pushed him, and argued with Rigby throughout the game. In the Olson case, a witness (Rogers) was prepared to testify (and did so at trial) that when Olson last was seen alive as he left the Coffee Bean, defendant said that he would accompany Olson to his camp to have a beer, and that when Olson and defendant departed for the camp, Olson shook his head no, indicating to Rogers that he was frightened. Defendant suggests that the evidence supporting the Rigby charge was stronger than that underlying the Olson charge, because DNA identified from blood samples found on a paper bag and cardboard at Rigby's camp matched DNA from samples taken from defendant, whereas, by comparison, DNA testing of samples from the Olson camp revealed no link to defendant. On the other hand, we note that different DNA evidence taken from the railroad tie found at the Rigby camp excluded both defendant and Rigby, and apparently belonged to a third, unidentified malea circumstance highlighted by defense counsel in her closing argument to the jury. [17] By comparison, no such forensic evidence concerning a third person was found at the Olson camp and so in this sense, the Rigby evidence may be seen as more susceptible to challenge than the Olson evidence. Even assuming that, when viewed as a whole, the Rigby evidence may have appeared, at the time of the severance motion, to be somewhat stronger than the Olson evidence, the salient point is that the proffered evidence was sufficiently strong in both cases. (9) In any event, as between any two charges, it always is possible to point to individual aspects of one case and argue that one is stronger than the other. A mere imbalance in the evidence, however, will not indicate a risk of prejudicial spillover effect, militating against the benefits of joinder and warranting severance of properly joined charges. ( People v. Ruiz, supra, 44 Cal.3d 589, 606, 607 ( Ruiz ) [severance not required of two properly joined murder charges even though evidence underlying one charge was relatively weak and was made much stronger by the evidence underlying the second charge].) Furthermore, the benefits of joinder are not outweighedand severance is not requiredmerely because properly joined charges might make it more difficult for a defendant to avoid conviction compared with his or her chances were the charges to be separately tried. (E.g., Zafiro v. United States (1993) 506 U.S. 534, 540 [122 L.Ed.2d 317, 113 S.Ct. 933] [[D]efendants are not entitled to severance merely because they may have a better chance of acquittal in separate trials.]; accord, Richards, supra, 906 P.2d 222, 227.) Against this showing of potential prejudice, the Court of Appeal considered the benefits of joinder and found them to be minimal. But, as explained below, the appellate court inappropriately minimized the benefits of joinder. As the appellate court conceded, a single trial of properly joined charges would promote case-specific efficiencies. The record before the trial court at the time of the severance motion revealed that in the event of separate trials, there would be overlap concerning matters such as the cause of death and the significance of blood sample evidence. Moreover, as the People observe, [t]he jury would also have to be educated in both cases regarding facts unique to the transient lifestyle, and [t]he prosecution ... intended to impeach [defendant] with the same evidence if he testified. In addition, the Court of Appeal failed to take into account the circumstance that, as a general matter, a single trial of properly joined charges promotes important systemic economies. Whenever properly joined charges are severed, the burden on the public court system of processing the charges is substantially increased. Even assuming that some level of economy might be preserved by (when possible) appointing or assigning the same counsel, investigators, and paralegals to prosecute and defend each charge separately, merely segmenting the proceedings typically will result in inefficiency. For example, each of the numerous procedural steps attendant to any criminal proceedingsuch as discovery, pretrial motions, as well as trial sessions themselveswould proceed on discrete tracks. Additionally, when two previously joined matters advance to separate trials, approximately twice as many prospective jurors would need to be summoned and subjected to the selection process. Further amplifying these and related trial-level inefficiencies resulting from separate trials is the appeal of right afforded to all convicted criminal defendants. Separate appellate records would be compiled by the clerk's offices of the respective trial courts. Even assuming the same appellate counsel could be appointed or assigned to represent the parties, once again merely segmenting the proceedings generally will cause inefficiency. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal, through its own clerk's office, would be required to manage and process discrete appeals, and provide an opportunity for separate oral arguments. Individual written decisions would be drafted, considered, and filed. Subsequently, separate petitions for rehearing could be filed in the Court of Appeal, followed by individual petitions for review in this court. This court, in turn, would need to process, analyze, and dispose of each. Thereafter, separate collateral reviews at the three levels of the federal court systemreprising versions of many of the procedures outlined above could ensue. (10) Although our courts work diligently to ensure due process in all proceedings, their resources are limited. California's trial courts in particular face ever-increasing civil and criminal dockets without any guarantee of corresponding, additional funds for court servicesjudges, judicial staff, and clerk's office personnelto meet the demand. Today, no less than in the past, the opportunity for joinder and its attendant efficiencies provided by section 954 is integral to the operation of our public court system. Manifestly, severance of properly joined charges denies the state the substantial benefits of efficiency and conservation of resources otherwise afforded by section 954. (11) The Court of Appeal erred, initially, by failing to take into account these general benefits in its consideration of whether the advantages of joinder were sufficiently substantial to outweigh any possible spillover prejudice to defendant, and further erred by concluding that the benefits of joinder were minimal. Quite to the contrary, the benefits of joinder were very substantial. ( Bean, supra, 46 Cal.3d 919, 939-940; see also Frank, supra, 48 Cal.3d 632, 639; Mason, supra, 52 Cal.3d 909, 935; accord, Richards, supra, 906 P.2d 222, 227; Bythrow, supra, 790 P.2d 154, 158-159.) On the record before us, after considering the factors set out above, we conclude that defendant has failed to carry his burden of making the clear showing of prejudice required to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to sever the [two] charges. ( Alcala, supra, 43 Cal.4th 1205, 1227.)