Opinion ID: 1058693
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Testimony of Annuity Specialist

Text: Vanderbilt argues that the trial court erred in precluding testimony related to the cost of an annuity. Vanderbilt contends that this evidence would have assisted the jury in determining an appropriate amount of damages for future medical expenses. Generally, questions regarding the admissibility, qualifications, relevancy, and competency of expert testimony are left to the trial court's discretion, and the trial court's ruling in this regard may be overturned only if the discretion is arbitrarily exercised or abused. McDaniel v. CSX Transp. Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 263-64 (Tenn. 1997). In the present case, the trial court excluded the testimony of Bruce Wolfe, a structural annuity specialist, offered by Vanderbilt on the issue of damages. Vanderbilt's offer of proof indicated that Mr. Wolfe would have testified about the cost of an annuity policy that could have been purchased to ensure a stream of cash payments to cover Qualls's future medical expenses. The trial court ruled that this evidence was too speculative. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding this testimony. Many changing variables affect the quote that an annuitist delivers to the jury. For instance, time limits and market factors both impact annuity rates. Moreover, an insurance company is in no way bound to the quoted rate or to its initial underwriting decision. These factors not only make the testimony as to the cost of an annuity speculative, but they also raise questions about its potential to mislead the jury. See Gold, Vann & White, P.A. v. DeBerry, 639 So. 2d 47, 55 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1994). Furthermore, such testimony invites the jury to depart from its legal duty to award present cash value. See Gusky v. Candler Gen. Hosp. Inc., 192 Ga.App. 521, 385 S.E.2d 698, 701 (1989); Herman v. Milwaukee Children's Hosp., 121 Wis.2d 531, 361 N.W.2d 297, 306 (1984); see also Waller v. Skeleton, 31 Tenn.App. 103, 212 S.W.2d 690, 698 (1948) (suggesting that an award of future medical expenses must be reduced to present value). Therefore, the trial court did not err in excluding this testimony.