Opinion ID: 2621232
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Managing-speaking agent test

Text: The managing-speaking agent test appears to have evolved before the tests discussed above, in response to a United States Supreme Court case discussing the scope of the attorney-client privilege as applied to an organizational client. In Upjohn Co. v. United States, [32] the Court held that the privilege was not restricted to an organization's control group. Rather, the Court held that mid- and even low-level employees could have information necessary to defend against a potential claim, and thus communications between such employees and counsel were protected by the privilege. While acknowledging that the Upjohn opinion did not expressly apply to the no-contact rule, the courts adopting the managing-speaking agent test in Upjohn 's wake reasoned that the protection afforded an organization under the no-contact rule should be commensurate with that afforded by the attorney-client privilege. [33] At the same time, relying on dicta in Upjohn stating that confidential communications, not facts, were entitled to protection, these courts determined that the rule should not be expanded so broadly that informal investigation through ex parte interviews was restricted too severely. Some courts adopting this test have done so without reference to Model Rule 4.2's former comment, which includes three categories of employees: those with managerial responsibility, those whose acts or omissions could be imputed to the organization to establish liability, or those whose statements could constitute an admission by the organization. [34] Other courts applied the former comment in determining that the test best interpreted one or more categories of employees listed in the former comment. [35] No court appears to have adopted precisely the same statement of the test. [36] In all of its formulations, the managing-speaking agent test restricts contact with those employees who have speaking authority for the organization, that is, those with legal authority to bind the organization. [37] Which employees have speaking authority is determined on a case-by-case basis according to the particular employee's position and duties and the jurisdiction's agency and evidence law. This is the essence of the test as set forth in the most-cited case adopting it, the Washington Supreme Court's opinion in Wright by Wright v. Group Health Hospital. [38] Beyond this common factor, the test has sometimes included other employees. For example, in jurisdictions with an evidence rule similar to FRE 801(d)(2)(D), courts have applied the evidence rule in determining which employees speak for the organization, thus yielding a result similar to the party-opponent admission test. [39] Also, some courts have used this test to interpret one or another of the categories in Model Rule 4.2's former comment, but have also referred to the other categories, including those employees whose conduct could be imputed to the organization. [40] Courts adopting this test have concluded that it best balances the competing policies of protecting the organizational client from overreaching by opposing counsel through direct contact with its employees and agents, and the adverse attorney's need for information in the organization's exclusive possession that may be too expensive or impractical to obtain through formal discovery. [41] They also note, relying on Upjohn 's dicta, that the rule's purpose is not to protect an organization from the revelation of prejudicial facts, thus disapproving of the party-opponent admission test. [42] The test's primary drawback is its lack of predictability. [43] As noted above, several of the courts purporting to adopt the test have stated and applied it very differently. In addition, because the test relies on a particular jurisdiction's agency and evidence law, its application may yield divergent results.