Opinion ID: 3040378
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Whether it appears excessive in relation to the

Text: alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and may often point in differing directions. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). The district court found that the DNA Act is not “so punitive” in effect as to outweigh Congress’s non-punitive intent. See Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1162. After analyzing the facts of this case in light of the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors, we reach the same conclusion. [12] With respect to the first Mendoza-Martinez factor, the DNA Act does confer an affirmative disability. However, as discussed earlier, that disability is minimal. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 86; Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989). Second, neither blood nor DNA collection have been historically viewed as punishment. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 86 (“[T]he regulatory scheme, in its necessary operation, has not been regarded in the Nation’s history and traditions as a punishment.”). Next, the penalty provisions of the DNA Act do not require a specific showing of scienter, as required by the third Mendoza-Martinez factor. See Pub. L. No. 106-546 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14135a) (assigning a misdemeanor to anyone who “fails to cooperate in the collection” of a DNA sample). [13] The fourth factor requires analysis whether the DNA Act promotes the goals of punishment. Legislative history suggests that Congress acknowledged that the DNA Act might help curb recidivism rates. See 146 Cong. Rec. S1164502, S11646 (“Statistics show that many of these violent felons will repeat their crimes once they are back in society. Since the Federal Government does not collect DNA from these felons, however, the ability of law enforcement to rapidly identify likely suspects is slowed.”) (statement of Sen. Dewine); see also Kincade, 379 F.3d at 839. However, not every law with a deterrent effect is punitive. See United States v. Jack408 UNITED STATES v. REYNARD son, 189 F.3d 820, 824 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that “deterrence may also serve non-punitive goals” (internal citations omitted)). Further, the DNA does not have a retribution component because it does not “label[ ] the offender as more culpable than before,” Russell, 124 F.3d at 1091, and “is not geared toward making [Reynard] understand and regret the severity of his crimes,” Jackson, 189 F.3d at 824. [14] Addressing the fifth factor, while the DNA Act does criminalize an individual’s failure to submit to a blood draw, such non-compliance is punished as a separate offense, which diminishes potential Ex Post Facto problems. See Russell, 124 F.3d at 1088-89 (emphasizing fact that Ex Post Facto Clause is concerned with increased punishment for prior, not separate, offenses); supra Part II(C)(3). Because Reynard concedes that the DNA Act serves a non-punitive function, he necessarily concedes that there is a rational alternative purpose for the Act, as required by the sixth factor. The district court did not address the seventh factor in its analysis. Considering this factor in Smith, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]he question here is not whether the legislature has made the best choice possible to address the problem it seeks to remedy, but whether the regulatory means chosen are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 89. Because the DNA Act is a reasonable means by which Congress can achieve and regulate a non-punitive goal, the Act meets this standard. [15] After weighing the many factors, we find that the district court was correct in concluding that the DNA Act does not have a “punitive” effect sufficient to outweigh Congress’s non-punitive intent. See Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1162. In light of the Mendoza-Martinez factors, the DNA Act is not “so punitive” in effect as to outweigh Congress’s non-punitive intent. Accordingly, the DNA Act does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. UNITED STATES v. REYNARD 409 D. The Compelled Extraction of Blood Under the DNA Act Does Not Violate Reynard’s Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination [16] Reynard contends that the extraction of DNA information violates his Fifth Amendment right not to be subject to the compelled production of any incriminating evidence. To support this contention, Reynard cites to a concurring opinion in United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000), in which Justice Thomas states that “the Fifth Amendment privilege protects against the compelled production not just of incriminating testimony, but of any incriminating evidence.” Id. at 49 (Thomas, J., concurring). However, Justice Thomas’s concurring comments are not binding on us, and as the government is quick to point out, blood samples and DNA profiles are physical, rather than testimonial. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966) (holding that analysis of blood sample, taken without defendant’s consent, did not violate defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights); United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (recognizing that blood characteristics are “physical evidence” that do “not engender Fifth Amendment protection”). [17] Therefore, the extraction of Reynard’s DNA does not violate his Fifth Amendment rights. CLIFTON, Circuit Judge, with whom TASHIMA, Circuit