Opinion ID: 853725
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fair Cross-Section of Jury Venire

Text: As a final point Ewing contends the jury selection process systematically excluded persons under the age of fifty. Because none of the forty-seven prospective jurors who comprised the panel from which his jury was selected were under the age of fifty, [1] Ewing moved to strike the entire jury panel. In overruling Ewing's motion the trial court observed that [t]he panel is selected from registered voters. There have been situations where we have had just the opposite, where we have a lot of young persons and no older people, so I don't know, it's a random selection. In order to make a prima facie showing of a violation of the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-section requirement, a defendant must establish: (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979). As a threshold matter we must address whether persons aged eighteen to fifty are a distinctive group in the community. Ewing cites no authority for the proposition that people within a certain age range are a distinctive group for purposes of the fair cross-section requirement. This Court has explicitly rejected the contention that persons between eighteen and twenty four years old are a distinctive group under Duren. See Thomas v. State, 443 N.E.2d 1197, 1199 (Ind.1983); Tawney v. State, 439 N.E.2d 582, 585 (Ind.1982); Grassmyer v. State, 429 N.E.2d 248, 251 (Ind. 1981). We observed in Grassmyer that there was no showing that this age group is a group distinct from the rest of society in a significant way, having interests which cannot be adequately represented by other members of the trial panel. Regarding the claim that the group is distinctive in the economic sense, there is likewise no showing. 429 N.E.2d at 251; see also Moore v. State, 427 N.E.2d 1135, 1139 (Ind.Ct.App.1982) (finding no showing whatever that the alleged group of 18 to 24 year olds possesses the common thread necessary so that their relative exclusion prevented the jury from the opportunity to represent a reasonable cross section of the community). Courts in other jurisdictions agree. As the Seventh Circuit recently observed, every federal circuit that has considered the issue has concluded that young persons do not constitute a distinctive group under Duren. See Johnson v. McCaughtry, 92 F.3d 585, 593 (7th Cir.1996) (collecting cases). Not only has Ewing failed to establish that eighteen to fifty year olds are a distinctive group, he has also made no showing of systematic exclusion. Although defense counsel suggested that there is a problem of how the jury commissioners are gathering the prospective jurors and how they are making the quarterly panels, the trial court observed that the jurors were selected from registered voters lists and we have had panels where the people between the ages of eighteen and forty-five were more prevalent than the older people, so I can't really say that what they are doing is improper. Ewing has not demonstrated a violation of the fair cross-section requirement.