Opinion ID: 411741
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: EXXON'S CLAIM UNDER Sec. 1125

Text: 24 Exxon argues here that even if the HUMBLE mark were abandoned, Exxon has the right to prevent a competitor from gaining an unfair advantage by using a false designation of origin or a false representation in interstate commerce in violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1125(a). 8 The district court found that appellant Humble Exploration's use of the trade name Humble constituted a misrepresentation of goods and services in commerce in violation of Sec. 1125(a). That conclusion flows from its finding that Exxon had not abandoned the HUMBLE mark. This court having found that Exxon has discontinued use of the mark, abandonment of the mark is yet to be decided by the inquiry into intent to resume use. Whether the mark has been abandoned is in turn precedent to Exxon's claim under Sec. 1125. That is, to the extent that Exxon travels on a trademark infringement claim, Sec. 1125(a) is to be read in a parallel fashion with Secs. 1114 and 1115. 9 While Sec. 1125 has a broader reach than Sec. 1114, and claims under it can be maintained by plaintiffs who are not owners of a trademark, see Norman M. Morris Corp. v. Weinstein, 466 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.1972), when a claim is based on alleged ownership of a mark, the two sections must be applied in a parallel manner. Otherwise stated, the Sec. 1125 claim rises or falls on the issue of abandonment for the reason that the only basis for the trial court's holding that Sec. 1125 was violated was the use by appellant of the mark, a use not faulted if the mark has been abandoned. 10 It would be incongruous to hold that Exxon had abandoned the mark, discontinued the mark with no intent to resume use, and thus that appellant had a right to use that mark because of Exxon's abandonment, see P. Daussa Corp. v. Sutton Cosmetics Inc., 462 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.1972), and then to hold that appellant had engaged in false designation or representation of origin. Section 1125(a) must still be read in the context of the statute in which it appears.... General Pool Corp. v. Hallmark Pool Corp., 259 F.Supp. 383, 386 (N.D.Ill.1966). 25 The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In doing so, we emphasize that we do not decide here whether the present record would support a finding that Exxon had sufficient intent to resume use of the Humble mark so as to avoid its loss, nor do we here address Exxon's rights under the common law to block any present use of the mark in a confusing manner. Finally, we leave to the trial court the decision whether additional evidence on the issue of intent to resume use ought to be heard. 26 AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.