Opinion ID: 1934454
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Polygraph Tests.

Text: The ruling of the trial court with respect to the statement by the prosecutrix that she had taken a lie detector test was not error. In examining the prosecuting witness, the State's Attorney asked her if she had been given any tests. She replied, Yes sir, a lie detector. An objection to this response was sustained, and the trial judge then and there instructed the jury to disregard the answer of the witness. Of course, the result of a lie detector test is almost universally excluded as evidence. But in this case, there is no question as to the admissibility of the result. Nor is there a question as to the admissibility of the fact of taking a test. The objection to the statement made by the prosecutrix was aimed not at its admissibility, [1] but at its prejudicial character. The only case we have been able to find on this point holds that the fact of taking was not prejudicial. In State v. Sheppard, 100 Ohio App. 345, 128 N.E.2d 471 (1955), it was said: The results of the test were not inquired about, and the simple fact that a test was made by agreement of the witness under the circumstances could not prejudice the defendant's case. This decision was affirmed in State v. Sheppard, 165 Ohio St. 293, 135 N.E.2d 340, cert. denied 352 U.S. 910 (1956). We are unable to find that the trial court was wrong when it ruled that the statement made by the prosecutrix was not prejudicial, and refused to declare a mistrial. The granting of a motion for a mistrial is within the discretion of the trial judge, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that he abused his discretion. In State v. Waterbury, 133 Iowa 135, 110 N.W. 328 (1907), it was held that the question of prejudice is a matter which the trial court is in the best position to judge, and its decision should not be reversed unless it is clear that there was prejudice. Under the circumstances in this case, we think the prompt action of Judge Gray, in instructing the jury to disregard the answer of the prosecutrix, fully satisfied the right of the defendant to a fair trial. See Cohen v. State, 173 Md. 216, 195 A. 532, 196 A. 819 (1937). There remains the inquiry whether the conduct of the State's Attorney was so prejudicial as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Obviously, the prosecuting attorney was determined not to accept the propriety of the court's ruling as to the polygraphic tests. On several occasions during the course of the conferences of counsel with the judge at the bench, the State's Attorney referred to the polygraph tests which had been given the defendant as well as the prosecutrix. And, during his examination of Sergeant E.F.G. Gray, of the Prince George's County Police Department, he asked the detective sergeant, What, if any, tests were given the defendant? The court again promptly sustained the objection to the question, and it was not pressed further. The defendant contends that the several colloquies between counsel and the judge at the bench could be heard by the jury, but there is nothing in the record to substantiate this contention. He further argued that the action of the State's Attorney in continually referring to the tests which had been made were prejudicial and constituted grounds for a mistrial, but, again, there is nothing in the record to support this argument. We are unable to hold that the efforts of the State's Attorney to introduce evidence as to lie-detector tests (subsequent to the statement by the prosecuting witness which we have already discussed) went beyond the limits permitted by the court's ruling made in a conference at the bench while the detective sergeant was on the stand. We find no objection by the defendant to this ruling made at that time, nor was the motion for a mistrial renewed when a question relating to tests was asked and the defendant's objection was sustained. There was no answer to the improper question propounded to the detective sergeant on the witness stand. And all other reference to polygraphic tests were made at the bench, ostensibly out of the hearing of the jury. Generally speaking, the courts require the party prejudiced by the asking of an improper question to preserve his rights by a seasonable objection or motion for a mistrial. See Annotation, 109 A.L.R. 1089. See also Stoskoff v. Wicklund, 49 N.D. 708, 193 N.W. 312 (1923), and State v. Waterbury, supra . In 53 Am. Jur., Trial, Sec. 971, it is said: It is impossible to define all the circumstances that may constitute an urgent necessity justifying [the declaration of a mistrial and] the discharge of a jury in a criminal case. Except as found in the decided cases, the matter is left to the sound discretion of the presiding judge, acting under his oath of office, having due regard to the rights of the accused and the state. The power ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes. There is nothing in the record to show any plain and obvious reason why a mistrial should have been declared.