Opinion ID: 882661
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: covenant running with the land

Text: The plaintiffs contend that the Covenant to Dedicate runs with the land, thus benefitting their property and binding the defendants to make the agreed-upon road improvements. We agree. It is undisputed that, in 1975, when the subdivision plat and Covenant to Dedicate at issue here were accepted by the Board of County Commissioners and were respectively filed and recorded in Flathead County, the subdivision and plat were subject to the requirements of the Montana Subdivision and Platting Act (the Act), §§ 11-3859, et seq., RCM, 1947, as amended, (now §§ 76-3-101, et seq., MCA). The purposes of the Act were set forth at § 11-3860, RCM, 1947, as amended, (now § 76-3-102, MCA), as follows: It is the purpose of this act to promote the public health, safety, and general welfare by regulating the subdivision of land; to prevent overcrowding of land; to lessen congestion in the streets and highways; to provide for adequate light, air, water supply, sewage disposal, parks and recreation areas, ingress and egress, and other public requirements; to require development in harmony with the natural environment; to require that whenever necessary, the appropriate approval of subdivisions be contingent upon a written finding of public interest by the governing body; and to require uniform monumentation of land subdivisions and transferring interests in real property by reference to plat or certificate of survey. (emphasis added) With minor amendments not at issue here, those purposes have remained in the Act to the present. Under the statutory definition in place in 1975, a subdivision was a division of land which created one or more parcels containing less than twenty acres. Section 11-3861(12), RCM, 1947, as amended. That remained true at all times pertinent to this litigation. See § 76-3-103(15), MCA. In this case, the warranty deed from the Granruds to Shirley Scherpenseel described the real property as follows: [1] Lot 9 of Stillwater Terrace  Unit 2, as shown on the plat or map thereof on file and of record in the office of the Clerk and Recorder of Flathead County, Montana. The plat referred to in this real property description is the one accepted by the Board of County Commissioners on May 19, 1975 and subsequently filed. The plat was accepted after the Covenant to Dedicate was executed by the defendants and in consideration of the Board of County Commissioners of Flathead County, Montana, approving the covenantors map or plat of Stillwater Terrace, Unit 2. Section 11-3870(3), RCM, 1947, as amended, (now § 76-3-304, MCA) provided in 1975, and still provides that: The recording of any plat made in compliance with the provisions of this act [now referred to as chapter] shall serve to establish the identity of all lands shown on and being a part of such plat. Where lands are conveyed by reference to a plat, the plat itself or any copy of the plat properly certified by the county clerk and recorder as being a true copy thereof, shall be regarded as incorporated into the instrument of conveyance and shall be received in evidence in all courts of this state. Section 11-3869, RCM, 1947, as amended, (now § 76-3-306, MCA), provided in 1975, and still provides, that: All covenants shall be considered to run with the land, whether marked or noted on the subdivision plat or contained in a separate instrument recorded with the plat. In this case, the Covenant to Dedicate was a separate instrument which was recorded with the Clerk and Recorder. Although not in the record, the plaintiffs also contend that the Covenant to Dedicate is noted on the recorded plat, and the defendants have not denied this contention. This contention is supported by the Board of County Commissioners' minutes, dated May 19, 1975, which state that the plat of Unit 2 was accepted with restrictive covenants to dedicate. Accordingly, we hold that, under the above-cited provisions of the Act, the Covenant to Dedicate at issue here clearly was and is one running with the land for the benefit of the plaintiffs and binding upon the defendants and, further, that the covenant was incorporated in plaintiffs' deed of conveyance by operation of law. Ruling to the contrary, the District Court relied solely on the case of Majers v. Shining Mountains (1986), 219 Mont. 366, 711 P.2d 1375, in granting summary judgment to the defendants. However, Majers is not on point. In that case, the defendant subdivided a 7,000 acre ranch. In order to sell the lots, the defendant prepared and filed subdivision plat maps. These plats were filed prior to the effective date of the Montana Subdivision and Platting Act and were not subject to its provisions. The plaintiffs purchased lots within the subdivision and allegedly were told by the defendant's personnel that roads would be constructed and maintained by the defendant and that a dam would be constructed across a creek to form a lake suitable for fishing and other recreational pursuits. When the plaintiffs requested that the defendant construct the roads, the defendant refused. The plaintiffs then filed an action alleging an implied covenant based on the verbal representations allegedly made by the defendant's personnel. Majers, 711 P.2d at 1376. We held that the plats themselves did not give rise to a promise to construct roads, and we remanded for a determination of what verbal representations were made when the defendant sold the lots to the plaintiffs. Majers, 711 P.2d at 1378. We also held that the appropriate statute of limitations on an implied covenant arising from the use of written documents was eight years, the limitation for actions based on a written contract. Majers, 711 P.2d at 1378-79. We disagree with the District Court's conclusion that Majers is very similar to the case at hand. First, the subdivision and plat at issue in Majers were not subject to the Montana Subdivision and Platting Act, as are the subdivision, plat and covenant at issue in the present case. Second, Majers dealt with oral representations giving rise to an implied covenant. In the case at hand, an express, written covenant was executed and recorded. Therefore, we conclude that Majers is not sufficiently similar to the instant case so as to warrant reliance thereon. In passing, we note that the Board of County Commissioners' minutes refer to the covenant at issue as a restrictive covenant. A restrictive covenant is defined as a [p]rovision in a deed limiting the use of the property and prohibiting certain uses. Black's Law Dictionary 1182 (5th ed. 1979). On the other hand, an affirmative covenant is defined as a covenant in which the party binds himself to the existence of a present state of facts as represented or to the future performance of some act. Black's Law Dictionary 327 (5th ed. 1979). We conclude that, in actuality, the covenant at issue here is an affirmative covenant, instead of a restrictive covenant, notwithstanding the reference in the Board of County Commissioners' minutes.