Opinion ID: 1184454
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: appraisers' and attorney's fees

Text: The property owners also assign as error the refusal of the court below to tax their attorney's and appraisers' fees against the State. Civil Rule 72(k) governs the award of costs and attorney's fees in eminent domain proceedings. The rule provides in pertinent part: Costs and attorney's fees incurred by the defendant shall not be assessed against the plaintiff, unless . . . . . . (2) the award of the court was at least ten (10) percent larger than the amount deposited by the condemning authority or the allowance of the master from which an appeal was taken, or . . . . . . (4) allowance of costs and attorney's fees appears necessary to achieve a just and adequate compensation of the owner. The property owners contend that these cases should be governed by Civil Rule 72(k)(2) despite its apparent facial inapplicability. Although that provision provides for the award of costs and attorney's fees only after a court judgment is obtained which is at least ten percent higher than the deposit into the court or the appraisal of the master appointed by the court, the appellant property owners argue that it is the manifest policy of the rule to induce the condemning authority to make a reasonable offer early in the condemnation process. Since awarding costs and attorney's fees when the stipulated settlement is at least ten per cent greater than the initial offer would also serve as an incentive to the State to make a reasonable offer at the outset, the appellants conclude that Civil Rule 72(k)(2) should be controlling. We must reject this reasoning despite the invocation of an intelligent policy. Just as they have refused to assess interest against the state, [25] courts have also traditionally declined to tax litigation expenses and attorney's fees against the sovereign in the absence of express statutory authority. [26] Civil Rule 72(k)(2) specifies the conditions under which costs and attorney's fees are to be awarded; where these conditions remain unfulfilled, the common law rule continues to govern. We also agree with the appellee that the appellants' reliance on Civil Rule 82(a) [27] is misplaced. Civil Rule 72(a) makes the provisions of Civil Rule 72 the exclusive procedure in eminent domain, except where otherwise expressly provided: The procedure for the condemnation of property under the power of eminent domain shall be governed by these rules, except as otherwise provided in this rule. However, we hold that under the circumstances presented by the cases at bar, the property owners are entitled to recover attorney's and appraisers' fees under Civil Rule 72(k)(4) which provides for such recovery when necessary to assure just and adequate compensation. We are in agreement with the Court in New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Bayonne Barrel & Drum Co., [28] which, in assuming the discretionary authority to tax attorney's and appraisers' fees against the state, wrote: Under present-day conditions the traditional approach of requiring a condemnee, in all cases, to bear the expense of legal fees and expert witnesses is inequitable and an unfair burden placed upon the landowner... . If the average defendant is in court, it is usually because he has committed an act of commission or omission. A condemnee becomes a litigant merely because he owns land that the sovereign wishes to acquire. The sovereign must pay just compensation for such land. Does a condemnee receive just compensation or is he made whole if he must expend large sums of money to insure that he gets a fair price for his land? We think not. [29] We believe that Rule 72(k)(4) when construed in the framework of the just compensation clauses of the United States and Alaska constitutions [30] does entitle the property owner to be made whole for expenses necessarily incurred in connection with the condemnation of his property. [31] Without such a rule, the State forces a property owner to pay a greater portion of the costs of a public project than any other taxpayer must pay by afflicting him with the unavoidable expenses of condemnation. Placing such a burden on the property owner is no more than just than assessing a levy against him but no others. We think it is apparent that the appraisers' and attorney's fees were necessarily incurred in these cases. Each appellant's property consisted of a large tract of unimproved land. Parcels of land the size of those involved here do not have a readily ascertainable market value, as do, for example, subdivision lots where numerous transactions in lots of comparable size and quality establish the appropriate market value with some accuracy. Therefore, it is evident that the services of professional appraisers were essential before the property owners could determine whether to accept the State's offer. And the grossly inadequate amount of the State's initial tender could reasonably have led the property owners to believe that it would be necessary to retain an attorney in order to obtain just compensation for the taking of their property. We do not agree with the State's assertion that to allow attorney's and appraisers' fees in the case at bar would be tantamount to granting costs and attorney's fees in every condemnation action. Where the property to be taken has a readily ascertainable market value, or is worth too little to warrant a professional appraisal, an appraiser's fee could not be said to be necessary, and the property owner would not be entitled to compensation for such an expense. Similarly, where the property has a readily ascertainable market value and the State has offered at least that amount, any attorney's fees subsequently incurred would not be necessary in order to obtain just compensation, and would accordingly be disallowed. We are confident that in the administration of Civil Rule 72(k) (4), our trial judges will be vigilant to prevent abuses, and to insure that the State is not taxed with needlessly-incurred expenses. The denial of an award of appraisers' and attorney's fees is reversed, and these cases are remanded to the superior court in order to establish the reasonable value of services rendered by appellants' appraisers and attorney. Reversed and remanded. FITZGERALD, J., not participating.