Opinion ID: 1928017
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: exclusion of identification evidence proffered by bloodsworth

Text: The State called Detective Robert Capel as a witness. On direct examination he testified as to the composite sketch and photographic identification made by Christian Shipley. He also testified as to line-up identifications of Bloodsworth by five witnesses. On cross-examination the defense sought to question Capel regarding a line-up conducted at the same time as the other line-ups in which someone other than Bloodsworth was identified. He was asked whether he talked to Debra McNamara in the case. He replied in the affirmative. An objection was sustained to a question as to whether she attended the line-up. He was asked whether she gave a description. A bench conference followed the objection of the State at which time the defense said: I don't want to call her as a witness. I can't vouch for her. I think she's way off, she is the one that, to refresh your recollection, is the one that said that Kirk Bloodsworth was nude in the woods. Defense counsel indicated that his purpose [was] to bring out the fact that there were statements made by witnesses who identified Mr. Bloodsworth that the police obviously did not believe, even though they went to a line-up and they identified him. He said he thought the jury has a right to know that people who they brought in were not able to identify Kirk Bloodsworth. That's exculpatory evidence, and I think Miss McNamara's testimony is exculpatory. The trial judge said: It's available for you, if you want to call the witnesses, but it is hearsay otherwise. The defense also sought to question Capel regarding a second composite sketch. At the bench as a reason for the State's objection it was stated that defense counsel was about to get into the making of a composite with a witness who has not testified and is not going to be called by the State and is certainly available to the Defendant. The defense agreed that Fay McCullough was the witness in question. The trial court found such evidence to be hearsay and excluded it. The defense called Detective Hessie as a witness. He was asked to tell the jury what description he had of the suspect. The trial judge said: I'm not going to let you ask him what the description is, when it is clear from this report, that description up here is very probably not a description given down here or given by Chris or Jackie Poling. This up here is a description that was put together by others from various sources, and I think it would be highly improper to let that come in in this fashion. If you want to ask him what the source of his information is and then go to the source, it's up to you, but I'm not going to let you ask him what the description is in this fashion. The defense called Officer Pacquin as a witness. He testified as to investigation in the neighborhood two days after the murder. He said: We knocked on the door, and we asked them if they had seen anything in the area and if they had seen anything on the date of that offense, if they have seen any suspicious people or anything, vehicles in the area. He was then asked whether he gave the people a description of the suspect for whom they were looking. He replied that he told them basically what [the police] were looking for and asked them if they had seen it. The next question was as to what description he gave these people. In response to the objection the trial judge said: The danger of that, Mr. Scheinin, as you well know is to confuse the jury. It has no probative value in this case based on the evidence that has been submitted. Bloodsworth sees himself as having been denied due process rights, citing Foster v. State, 297 Md. 191, 464 A.2d 986 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073, 104 S.Ct. 985, 79 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984); Austin v. State, 253 Md. 313, 252 A.2d 797 (1969), and DeLilly v. State, 11 Md. App. 676, 276 A.2d 417 (1971). We deem those cases inapposite. He also says the exclusion violated Maryland rules of evidence, citing Johnson v. State, 237 Md. 283, 206 A.2d 138 (1965), and Judy v. State, 218 Md. 168, 146 A.2d 29 (1958). We had occasion to refer to Johnson in Bedford v. State, 293 Md. 172, 176-77, 443 A.2d 78, 80 (1982), where we discussed circumstances pertaining to an extrajudicial identification. The circumstances here do not fit our prior Maryland cases. The trial judge was correct in his ruling.