Opinion ID: 807902
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preemption principles generally

Text: We turn now to the preemption question. In light of the federal Constitution’s Supremacy Clause,8 “it has long been recognized that federal law preempts contrary state enactments.” Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 765 (10th 8 The Supremacy Clause provides that “the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land[,] . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 16 Cir. 2010); see also Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012). Such preemption can occur in one of three ways: 1) when a federal statute expressly preempts state law (“express preemption”); 2) where Congress intends to occupy a field (“field preemption”); and 3) to the extent that a state law conflicts with a federal law (“conflict preemption”). See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2500-01; In re Universal Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practice Litig., 619 F.3d 1188, 1195 (10th Cir. 2010). Here, the United States invokes only conflict preemption. See Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 618 F.3d 1127, 1143 n.16 (10th Cir. 2010) (declining to address field preemption because defendants failed to develop that argument in their appellate briefs or at oral argument), cert. denied, 79 U.S.L.W. 3662 (U.S. June 25, 2012) (Nos. 10-1377, 10A845). The United States bears “the burden of showing that federal and state law conflict.” Id. at 1143. “Whatever its form, preemption analysis ‘starts with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States are not to be superseded by . . . [a] Federal Act unless that is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. Accordingly, the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone of pre-emption analysis.’” Emerson v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 503 F.3d 1126, 1129 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)); see also Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501. B. Applying Colorado’s regulation prohibiting storage of any hazardous waste restricted from land disposal, 6 Colo. Code Regs. § 268.50, to the Depot’s chemical weapons conflicts with Congress’s mandate in 50 U.S.C. §§ 1521 and 1512a “Conflict preemption occurs where it is impossible for a [regulated] party to comply with both state and federal requirements, or where state law stands as an obstacle 17 to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” In re Universal Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practice Litig., 619 F.3d at 1196 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501. Colorado sought from the district court partial summary judgment declaring that the State’s authority to enforce its hazardous waste regulation prohibiting the storage of any hazardous waste restricted from land disposal, 6 Colo. Code Regs. § 268.50§ 268.50, against the United States with regard to its storage of chemical weapons at the Depot. But the United States cannot comply with that State regulation, prohibiting the storage of any such hazardous waste, and also comply with Congress’s mandate that it must biotreat and neutralize the Depot’s chemical weapons at a plant built at the Depot solely for that purpose. It appears that the Depot has not yet completed constructing the plant. And Congress gave the Depot until December 2017 to destroy the chemical weapons in the plant.9 Colorado acknowledges that, in practical terms, the United States cannot immediately eliminate the chemical weapons currently stored at the Depot. The State 9 Colorado argues, for the first time in its reply brief on appeal, that federal law cannot preempt 6 Colo. Code Regs. § 268.50 because Congress, in enacting 50 U.S.C. § 1521, did not expressly require that the United States store chemical weapons at the Depot. Though we need not address such a belatedly raised argument, see United States v. Bass, 661 F.3d 1299, 1301 n.1 (10th Cir. 2011), Colorado’s argument fails in any event. For preemption purposes, Congress’s intent need not be explicit; it can “be . . . implicitly contained in [the] structure and purpose” of the relevant statute. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, because Congress prohibited the DOD from moving the Depot’s chemical weapons out of Colorado, and because Congress has set the 2017 deadline for the completion of their destruction, Congress has thus implicitly mandated that the DOD continue to store these weapons at the Depot for the time being. 18 nonetheless seeks to exercise its authority to prohibit the storage of any such hazardous waste by requiring the United States to follow a schedule that will ensure the destruction of the chemical weapons by a date certain. And, in an effort to avoid conflict preemption, Colorado selected as its date certain the same date as that currently provided by Congress, December 31, 2017.10 In addition to seeking to enforce the same deadline chosen by Congress, however, Colorado further seeks to provide interim project milestones that the State can enforce against the United States to insure its compliance with the 2017 deadline. To avoid conflict preemption, “‘it is not enough to say that the ultimate goal of both federal and state law is the same. A state law also is pre-empted if it interferes with the methods by which the federal statute was designed to reach this goal.’” Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 769 (quoting Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987) (alterations, citation omitted)); see also Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505. And that is true here, as well. Our conclusion, that Colorado cannot enforce its prohibition against the storage of any hazardous waste restricted from land disposal against the United States’ storage of chemical weapons at the Depot is founded on the detail Congress has provided regarding 10 Colorado further asserts that, in the exercise of its authority to prohibit the storage of any hazardous waste restricted from land disposal, the State could require the United States to destroy the Depot’s chemical weapons earlier than Congress’s 2017 deadline, and such a requirement would not be inconsistent with the congressional mandate that the Army destroy these weapons “no later than” December 2017. Further, it appears likely that, if Colorado has authority to regulate the Depot’s chemical weapons, it will exercise that regulatory authority to continue to enforce the 2017 deadline even if Congress acts to extend the deadline for the destruction of these weapons. 19 how and when the DOD must destroy these weapons. While Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to destroy these weapons, Congress also acted to insure that the manner of their destruction “provide[s] for . . . maximum protection for the environment, the general public, and the personnel who are involved in the destruction,” and that the destruction occur in “adequate and safe facilities designed solely for the destruction.” 50 U.S.C. § 1521(d)(1)(A), (B) (2011). To that end, Congress required testing of incineration as a method of destruction, and later directed the Secretary to explore alternative destruction methods, eventually settling on neutralization of the Depot’s weapons. Thus, Congress has required a measured pace in undertaking the destruction of these chemical weapons and, on at least six occasions, has extended the destruction deadline to accommodate that pace. This unmistakably indicates that Congress intended to reserve for itself the power and flexibility to establish and extend the destruction deadline, as well as to alter the process and timing by which these chemical weapons are destroyed. Moreover, Congress’s comprehensive treatment of the destruction of these weapons indicates that the timing of the weapons’ destruction is but one of several congressional goals addressed in Title 50. Permitting Colorado to be a second enforcer of the 2017 destruction deadline, and to add other enforceable interim deadlines of its own, interferes with the measured, flexible and frequently revised approach Congress has taken to destroy these weapons. Our conclusion, that Colorado cannot enforce its prohibition against the storage of any hazardous waste restricted from land disposal against the United States’ storage of chemical weapons at the Depot, is bolstered by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 20 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2505., (noting that, although Arizona’s law at issue in that case “attempts to achieve one of the same goals as federal law . . . , it involves a conflict in the method of enforcement. The Court has recognized that a conflict in technique can be fully as disruptive to the system Congress enacted as conflict in overt policy”) (quotation marks, alterations omitted). Understandably, Colorado has grown impatient with the delay in destroying the chemical weapons stored at the Depot. But compelling the United States, in its handling of these munitions, to comply with Colorado’s regulation prohibiting the storage of any hazardous waste restricted from land disposal will impede or interfere with the accomplishment of the objectives and purposes of 50 U.S.C. §§ 1512a and 1521. Therefore, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1512a and 1521 preempt Colorado’s enforcement of its regulation, 6 Colo. Code Regs. 268.50, against the United States under the circumstances presented here. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505, 2507 (holding state law that interfered with, or presented an obstacle to, the accomplishment of Congress’s objectives was preempted under a theory of conflict preemption). Our earlier case of United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993), on which the State relies, does not require a different conclusion. In that case, we held that Colorado could enforce its hazardous waste regulations, authorized by RCRA, “at a hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal facility owned and operated by the federal government which the EPA ha[d] placed on the national [Superfund] priority list, and where a CERCLA [Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980] response action [wa]s underway.” Colorado at 1568-69, 1584. 21 But Colorado was able to do so there because of two savings clauses that Congress included in CERCLA: CERCLA’s “savings provision” provides that “[n]othing in [CERCLA] shall affect or modify in any way the obligations or liabilities of any person under other Federal or State law, including common law, with respect to releases of hazardous substances or other pollutants or contaminants,’” 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d) (West 1983). Similarly, CERCLA’s provision entitled “relationship to other laws” provides that “[n]othing in [CERCLA] shall be construed or interpreted as preempting any State from imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect to the release of hazardous substances within such State.” 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (West 1983). Id. at 1575-76 (footnote omitted; brackets in original). RCRA, too, similarly provides that “[n]othing in this chapter [referring to RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k] shall be construed to prohibit any State or political subdivision thereof from imposing any requirements, including those for site selection, which are more stringent that those imposed by [federal] regulations.” 42 U.S.C. § 6929. But it is not RCRA that preempts Colorado’s enforcement of its storage prohibition on the United States’ storage of chemical weapons at the Depot. Instead, it is 50 U.S.C. §§ 1512a and 1521 that preempt Colorado’s enforcement of its storage prohibition under the circumstances presented here. And those federal statutes do not include any savings language. On appeal, Colorado seeks to avoid preemption by asserting it only wants to exercise its regulatory authority under its regulation prohibiting the storage of any hazardous waste restricted from land disposal in order to enforce Congress’s own 2017 deadline for the destruction of these chemical weapons. But Colorado can only enforce that, or any other, deadline against the Depot if Colorado has authority to regulate the 22 Depot’s stored chemical weapons in the first place. That is why Colorado sought partial summary judgment specifically to that effect. But we conclude, for the reasons stated above, that 50 U.S.C. §§ 1521 and 1512(a) preempt Colorado’s authority to regulate the Depot’s chemical weapons under the circumstances presented here. So it does not matter that Colorado only seeks to exercise its regulatory authority in a limited manner. Cf. Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 133 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 365 (2011) (“For the purposes of preemption analysis, it is the cause of action, and not the specific relief requested, that matters.”).