Opinion ID: 779997
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Length of Supervised Release Terms

Text: 11 The first issue is whether the five-year maximum provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3583 is applicable as a limitation upon the supervised release term of Cortes-Claudio who was sentenced for drug offenses pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). 12 We begin with a close look at the language of the two statutes. See Brady v. Credit Recovery Inc., 160 F.3d 64, 66 (1st Cir.1998). Defendants convicted of conspiracy to commit drug offenses pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 846, are subject to the penalties described in § 841(b). 2 Pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(A), the district court was required to sentence Cortes-Claudio to a term of imprisonment which could not be less than 10 years or more than life and a term of supervised release of at least 5 years. We have recently held that this language in § 841(b) establishes a mandatory minimum term of supervised release, not a maximum. United States v. Lopez, 299 F.3d 84, 90 (1st Cir.2002). Our holding in Lopez made clear that any apparent language to the contrary in previous cases is limited to the specific facts of those cases, and does not constitute precedent for the proposition that language in drug statutes, such as 21 U.S.C. § 841, referring to at least 5 years (or some other term) sets out the maximum rather than a minimum only. United States v. Barnes, 251 F.3d 251, 261 (1st Cir.2001); United States v. Barnes, 244 F.3d 172, 178 (1st Cir.2001); Suveges v. United States, 7 F.3d 6, 8 (1st Cir.1993). Given the plain meaning of at least and our Lopez holding, we do not regard Barnes and its companion cases as stare decisis in regard to the present issue concerning the upper limit of a term of supervised release in a drug case. 13 We start, therefore, with the premise that the district court was plainly required by § 841(b) to sentence Cortes-Claudio to a minimum supervised release term of at least five years. In arguing that five years is also a maximum in respect to the permissible term of supervised relief, Cortes-Claudio would have us borrow from a different statute, § 3583(b), applying to federal crimes generally. Section 3583(b) specifies, Except as otherwise provided, the authorized terms of supervised release are — 14 (1) for a Class A or Class B felony, not more than five years; 15 (2) for a Class C or Class D felony, not more than three years; and 16 (3) for a Class E felony, or for misdemeanor (other than a petty offense) not more than one year. 17 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(emphasis supplied). Because Cortes-Claudio was convicted of a Class A felony, he argues that he is subject to a term of supervised release of not more than five years. 18 The issue presented is whether § 841(b), which contains sentences applicable to specific drug offenses and conspiracy to commit such offenses, under which Cortes-Claudio was sentenced, takes precedence over the more general § 3583(b) in regard not only to the minimum five-year term expressly set forth in § 841(b) but also to the unspecified lengthier terms implied if not specifically set forth in the at least phraseology. We think it does. In so holding, we join the majority of circuits that have considered this issue and that have held that § 3583(b) does not limit the length of supervised release terms in cases under § 841. E.g., United States v. Sanchez-Gonzalez, 294 F.3d 563, 565 (3d Cir.2002); United States v. Kurkowski, 281 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 210, 154 L.Ed.2d 87 (2002); United States v. Sanchez, 269 F.3d 1250, 1286-88 (11th Cir.2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 942, 122 S.Ct. 1327, 152 L.Ed.2d 234 (2002); United States v. Page, 131 F.3d 1173, 1178 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 828, 119 S.Ct. 77, 142 L.Ed.2d 61 (1998); United States v. Eng, 14 F.3d 165, 172 (2d Cir.1994). 3 19 The language of § 3583(b), as well as of § 841, supports the conclusion that penalties for drug offenses within the latter should be imposed with direct reference to § 841(b), not § 3583(b). Section 3583(b) itself begins with the phrase [e]xcept as otherwise provided. This proviso indicates that § 3583(b) yields to other more specific statutes, such as § 841, that make different provisions for terms of supervised release for particular offenses. See, e.g., Sanchez-Gonzalez, 294 F.3d at 566; Eng, 14 F.3d at 172. Because § 841 does otherwise provide supervised release terms, its provisions rather than those of § 3583(b) apply to drug offenders like Cortes-Claudio. 20 It is true that § 841(b) does not set out a specific maximum term of supervised release. It does, however, require a minimum term of supervised release of at least five years, and this phraseology plainly implies the option of a term longer than five years. To allow § 3583(b) to limit to five years the supervised release term set forth in § 841(b) would, in Cortes-Claudio's case, rob the phrase at least contained in the latter statute of any meaning whatever. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 65 F.3d 301, 309 (2d Cir.1995). It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); Herman v. Hector I. Nieves Transp., Inc., 244 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir.2001) (A primary canon of statutory construction is that a statute should be construed so as not to render any of its phrases superfluous.). A further reason for not imputing § 3583(b)'s five-year maximum term to § 841 offenders is that, in some other instances, this would actually make it impossible to carry out the specific mandates set forth in § 841. See Eng, 14 F.3d at 172 (dividing cases under § 841 into different categories, including those like the present where § 841(b)'s mandatory minimums would be § 3583(b)'s maximum, and others where an actual conflict would exist between the minimum period of supervised release mandated under § 841 and the maximum permitted by § 3583). 21 Our interpretation of the two statutes is consistent with the legislative history. See Page, 131 F.3d at 1179. When Congress enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, it amended § 3583(b) to add the phrase [e]xcept as otherwise provided at the same time it included the supervised release terms set forth in § 841(b) and maintained the words at least before the specified minimum term. Act of Oct. 27, 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-570, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) 3207-6. 4 22 Defendants convicted of drug offenses have traditionally been subject to sentences different from those imposed upon defendants convicted under other federal laws. See Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 392, 100 S.Ct. 2247, 65 L.Ed.2d 205 (1980). Prior to the creation of the supervised release term to which defendants now must be sentenced, defendants generally were subject to a period of parole. As defendants were often released prior to serving their entire sentence, the length of a non-drug offender's parole was normally dictated by how much time remained on his or her original sentence. 23 Defendants convicted of drug offenses, however, were required to be sentenced by statute to a special parole term that was distinct from their original sentence. See id. (noting the intent of the special parole term was to give the judges another tool for sentencing and another means of protecting society when dealing with the drug violator.). When Congress eliminated parole and instituted in its stead supervised release terms, it continued to treat drug offenders separately from other criminals in respect to supervised release, substituting supervised release term for special parole term in § 841(b) and providing specific directions relative to those sentenced under that statute. See Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 402, 111 S.Ct. 840, 112 L.Ed.2d 919 (1991). 24 We, therefore, find no error in the district court's conclusion that the statutory supervised release terms for defendants convicted of drug offenses under § 841(a) are as described in § 841(b), and that those run from the mandatory minimum up to the life of the defendant. Section 841(b)(1)(A), the provision under which Cortes-Claudio was sentenced, provides for a mandatory minimum term of at least five years of supervised release up to a maximum supervised release term of life. 25