Opinion ID: 2352695
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Objection to opinion of expert witness as based on opinions of others.

Text: Dr. Kay, the psychiatrist, was called as a witness for the plaintiffs. Before plaintiffs' counsel began the direct examination, counsel for defendants examined him on voir dire. Counsel asked Dr. Kay whether the opinion he was about to render in the case was based upon his examination of Mrs. Slattery, data he received from other physicians, and certain observations of plaintiffs' attorney. Without referring to the opinion he was about to render, Dr. Kay replied that his conclusions were based primarily on his own observations and examinations, although he took advantage of any other information or objective data available. Counsel for defendant then asked for a ruling excluding Dr. Kay from testifying. Counsel for plaintiffs replied that he was calling Dr. Kay as a psychiatric expert and would put to him a hypothetical question. After considerable argument the trial judge told counsel that he would rule on the questions as they came up. Thereafter Dr. Kay testified to the patient's history as related to him by her, and then answered a hypothetical question whether in his opinion the accident of February, 1959, had a causal connection with Mrs. Slattery's present symptoms. Dr. Kay replied that there was no question but that there was such a causal relationship. We find no specific objection to this testimony. At all events it was clearly proper. The contention is that the court should have ruled out his testimony in advance, on the ground that it would be based on opinion of other doctors and statements of counsel. But, as it turned out, the witness was not asked to state the conclusions that he had referred to on voir dire, but was asked to express an opinion on the hypothetical question. Thus the testimony actually given affords no support to defendants' contention. Indeed the method pursued by counsel for defendants  the attempt on voir dire to attack testimony not yet given by the witness  seems to us to be an unusual method of proceeding. The trial judge correctly declined to make a definite ruling on any such basis, but he, of course, reserved to defendants' counsel the right to object to the questions later to be asked. It is said that it is impossible to be certain how much of Dr. Kay's testimony is based on improper sources. We find no suggestion in the record supporting this argument. There was no error in the admission of Dr. Kay's testimony.