Opinion ID: 2507152
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The district court incorrectly determined Heinze understood the terms of the PDS.

Text: In its first memorandum decision, the district court found that Heinze understood the terms of the settlement, stating Heinze acknowledged that he understood the terms of the settlement, and Heinze stated in open court, under oath, that he understood the terms of the settlement offer and that he agreed. . . . This finding was apparently based upon the following dialogue between Heinze and the magistrate: THE COURT: That having been said, and without a great repetition of everything that we have talked about, because we have talked for a long time  and I have probably done more than my share  Mr. Heinze, you brought this matter. Are you in agreement today? MR. HEINZE: I am. THE COURT: And do you agree to abide by the terms and conditions? MR. HEINZE: I do. This testimony demonstrates that Heinze represented that he was entering into an agreement and that he agreed to be bound by the terms of that agreement. Significantly, however, this testimony did not address Heinze's understanding of the terms of that agreement. Heinze did not file his own affidavit in connection with the summary judgment proceedings. Accordingly, there is no direct testimony in the record that he was unaware of errors in the PDS at the time of the settlement. Instead, Heinze relies on his email to Bauer that expressed misgivings with the settlement he reached in a time pressured environment. Summary judgment proceedings are generally decided on the basis of admissible evidence. [1] I.R.C.P. 56(e). Normally, a party would not be entitled to rely on an unsworn document that he or she authored in order to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. However, Bauer has raised no objection, either before the trial court or on appeal, to consideration of the email. For this reason alone, we consider the email as evidence Heinze did not understand the terms of the PDS. Accordingly, we conclude the district court erred in its statement that Heinze represented that he understood the terms of the settlement. However, in its memorandum decision on the motion for reconsideration, the district court concluded that, under McKay, judicial estoppel may be imposed based on what the estopped party knew or should have known. This suggests that the district court's decision on reconsideration was based on what Heinze should have known, and not what he actually knew. Therefore, we consider whether the district court properly concluded that Heinze was chargeable with knowledge of the terms of the PDS.