Opinion ID: 4024287
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendantsʹ Additional Arguments

Text: The defendants raise a number of additional arguments on appeal, which we consider and reject. First, Kristofor argues that the district court violated the rule of completeness by admitting redacted portions of his grand jury testimony while excluding other portions. The omitted portions, however, were not necessary to place the admitted portions in context. See United States v. Johnson, 507 F.3d 793, 796‐97 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding rule of completeness requires admission if necessary to explain or put admitted portion in context or avoid misleading jury). The omitted statements were generally post‐hoc explanations for prior conduct, which did not alter the meaning of the admitted redacted portion. Next, Kristofor argues that the district court abused its discretion with respect to a number of evidentiary rulings. This argument is without merit. We reverse a district courtʹs evidentiary rulings ʺonly if we find manifest error,ʺ that is not ʺharmless,ʺ United States v. Miller, 626 F.3d 682, 688 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted), and upon review of the record before us, we conclude that there was no such manifest error here. Finally, Russell argues that his indictment was obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self‐incrimination. Russell, however, ‐45‐ knowingly waived his Fifth Amendment right at the time of his testimony. Moreover, even if Russellʹs grand jury evidence had been obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self‐incrimination, the suppression of such testimony at trial, not the dismissal of the indictment, would have been the appropriate remedy. United States v. Rivieccio, 919 F.2d 812, 816 (2d Cir. 1990). Russellʹs grand jury testimony was not introduced at trial. Accordingly, there was no need to suppress the testimony or dismiss the indictment.