Opinion ID: 1229876
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Public Use Exception Applies in Hawai'i

Text: A negligence action lies only when the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff. Birmingham v. Fodor's Travel Publications, Inc., 73 Haw. 359, 365-66, 833 P.2d 70, 74 (1992). To hold Campbell Estate liable for negligence, the Haos must establish that Campbell Estate owed a legal duty to Sean. [7] The Haos claim that the primary basis for such a duty is Restatement (Second) of Torts § 359. That section (often called the public use exception) provides: A lessor who leases land for a purpose which involves the admission of the public is subject to liability for physical harm caused to persons who enter the land for that purpose by a condition of the land existing when the lessee takes possession, if the lessor (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care could discover that the condition involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such persons, and (b) has reason to expect that the lessee will admit them before the land is put in safe condition for their reception, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to discover or to remedy the condition, or otherwise to protect such persons against it. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 359 (1965). Cf. Restatement (Second) of Property, Landlord & Tenant § 17.2 (1977) (substantively identical to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 359). The threshold question we must decide is whether § 359 applies in Hawai'i. Our analysis of that question is guided by several basic principles. First, [t]he existence of a duty, that is, whether such a relation exists between the parties that the community will impose a legal obligation upon one for the benefit of the other  or, more simply, whether the interest of a plaintiff who has suffered invasion is entitled to legal protection at the expense of a defendant  is entirely a question of law. Birmingham, 73 Haw. at 366, 833 P.2d at 74-75. Second, whether a duty exists is a question of fairness that involves a weighing of the nature of the risk, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the risk, and the public interest in the proposed solution. Doe v. Grosvenor Properties (Hawaii) Ltd., 73 Haw. 158, 162, 829 P.2d 512, 515 (1992) (citing King v. Ilikai Properties, Inc., 2 Haw. App. 359, 363, 632 P.2d 657, 661 (1981)). Third, we will not impose a new duty upon members of our society without any logical, sound, and compelling reasons taking into consideration the social and human relationships of our society. Johnston v. KFC Nat'l Management Co., 71 Haw. 229, 232-33, 788 P.2d 159, 161 (1990). There are, in our view, logical, sound, and compelling reasons for imposing a duty on lessors under the circumstances outlined in § 359. We note initially that the public use exception, as described in § 359, has deep roots. At common law a non-possessory lessor generally had no duty to protect a lessee or others on the land against harm from dangerous conditions existing at the time of the lease. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 356 comment a (1965); W.P. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 63, at 434-35 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter Prosser & Keeton ). To avoid its often harsh consequences, modern courts developed a number of exceptions to the general rule, shaping a doctrine of premises liability that was more compatible with contemporary social and economic conditions. In general, those exceptions, including the public use exception, were due in large part to increasing recognition of the fact that tenants who lease defective premises are likely to be impecunious and unable to make the necessary repairs which their own safety and that of others may demand; that one who is in possession of the premises only for a limited term does not have the same incentive to maintain them in good condition as the lessor to whom they will revert at the end of the lease; and that the landlord who receives benefit from the transaction in the form of rent may properly be required to assume in return at least certain limited obligations with respect to the safety of others. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 356 comment a. [8] While the older cases relied on several rationales for the public use exception, including implied invitation and nuisance, [9] the real justification is the policy-based one that a lessor's responsibility to the public is so great that he will not be permitted to shift it to the tenant, and he may not escape responsibility for the use of his land to be used in a manner involving a public, rather than a private, danger. Prosser & Keeton § 63, at 438 (footnote omitted). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 359 comment a. Justice Cardozo stated it more simply when he said, the nature of the use itself creates the duty[.] Junkermann v. Tilyou Realty Co., 213 N.Y. 404, 108 N.E. 190, 191 (1915). We agree that the nature of land leased for a public use imposes a duty of care upon its lessor. First, people invariably enter public places with the reasonable expectation that they are kept in good repair, and the public therefore has an important interest in encouraging lessors to make sure that their premises are, in fact, safe. That interest is especially strong when the potential extent of the harm is great, as when the public gathers in one place. [10] Second, the duty under § 359 is triggered only in reasonably circumscribed circumstances. It applies only when the lessor knows, or should know, that an unreasonably dangerous condition exists and that the lessee will admit the public before rectifying the dangerous condition. Thus, as a general matter, only those in a position to protect unsuspecting persons from harm have a duty to do so. In that sense the duty under § 359 is not very different from the duty we have imposed on lessors in other circumstances. For instance, a lessor has a duty to warn a lessee of dangerous conditions known to the lessor but not known or obvious to the lessee, even when the dangerous condition exists in an area not controlled by the lessor. Kole v. AMFAC, Inc., 69 Haw. 530, 750 P.2d 929 (1988). Cf. Birmingham, 73 Haw. at 379-83, 833 P.2d at 81-82 (occupier who invites a person onto its land to use adjoining property not under its control has a duty to warn the invitee of extremely dangerous conditions on the adjoining property that are known to the occupier, but not readily apparent to an invitee of ordinary intelligence) (citing Littleton v. State, 66 Haw. 55, 656 P.2d 1336 (1982); Kaczmarczyk v. City & County of Honolulu, 65 Haw. 612, 656 P.2d 89 (1982); Kamakawiwoole v. State, 6 Haw.App. 235, 718 P.2d 1105 (1986)). Finally, we think that one receiving a benefit from the public use of his or her land should bear at least some of the attendant costs. While § 359 does not require that the premises be leased for valuable consideration, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 359 comment g, a lessor undoubtedly receives some sort of benefit, pecuniary or otherwise, when land is leased for public purposes. Given the nature of the risks involved and the reasonably limited circumstances in which the duty under § 359 applies, we think it is only fair that in return for those benefits the lessor shares some of the responsibility for the public's safety. In short, we think that there are good reasons to impose a duty of care on lessors under the circumstances described in § 359. We therefore hold that § 359 applies in this jurisdiction.