Opinion ID: 3165442
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: hebert’s challenge to the sufficiency of the

Text: EVIDENCE SUPPORTING HIS SENTENCE Hebert first challenges his sentence on evidentiary grounds. In particular, Hebert argues that the government failed to prove that he murdered Bloch by a preponderance of the evidence and that the district court erred in finding second degree murder as a result. Hebert argues that there is no DNA or blood evidence indicating that Bloch was killed and points to witness testimony suggesting that Bloch may still be alive. Moreover, Hebert 11 Case: 14-31405 Document: 00513320169 Page: 12 Date Filed: 12/23/2015 No. 14-31405 argues that the record is devoid of evidence establishing his mental state or motivations for the murder. At the outset we note that neither party disputes that Hebert’s 92-year sentence cannot be sustained without a finding of second degree murder. The finding of murder was integral to the sentence because otherwise the district court could not have applied the cross-reference to U.S.S.G. § 2A1.2 and could not have applied an upward variance. 4 For the reasons below, however, we find that the court did not clearly err in making a finding of second degree murder. “Findings of fact for sentencing purposes need only be found by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Simpson, 741 F.3d 539, 556 (5th Cir. 2014). On appellate review of judicial factfinding at sentencing, we will not find “clear error if the district court’s finding is plausible in light of the record as a whole.” United States v. Odom, 694 F.3d 544, 547 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Cisneros–Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 764 (5th Cir. 2008)). And under clear error review, even “[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985). The district court’s finding of murder is plausible in light of the record as a whole. The court was careful to recite the elements of murder under federal law 5 and recounted substantial circumstantial evidence suggesting 4 The government concedes that the 92-year sentence would not be substantively reasonable without a finding of murder. 5 The statute provides, in relevant part: (a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing; or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, escape, murder, kidnapping, treason, espionage, sabotage, aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse, child abuse, burglary, or robbery; or perpetrated as part of a pattern or practice of assault or torture against a child or children; or perpetrated from a 12 Case: 14-31405 Document: 00513320169 Page: 13 Date Filed: 12/23/2015 No. 14-31405 that Hebert killed Bloch. The court noted that the last credible sighting of Bloch was on October 2, 2007, that Hebert was on shift in Metairie around that time, that Hebert later came into possession of Bloch’s debit card and car keys, and that Bloch’s vehicle was later found abandoned under suspicious circumstances. Moreover, the court reached its ultimate conclusion—that Hebert murdered Bloch—after a thorough and fact-specific four-day hearing. Although Hebert argues that that there were witnesses who reported seeing Bloch after October 2, the district court addressed that testimony and did not find it persuasive, particularly in light of Bloch’s failure to return home or obtain his medication after October 2. Moreover, we cannot fault the factfinder’s choice between “two permissible views of the evidence.” Id. Hebert’s other argument—that the lack of a body, crime scene, or DNA evidence does not support a murder finding—also fails. Courts have noted that murder may be found on the basis of circumstantial evidence in the absence of a body. See Gov’t of V.I. v. Harris, 938 F.2d 401, 408 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Courts have relied on circumstantial evidence in proving the corpus delicti for first degree murder in both federal and state court cases . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). The district court here identified substantial circumstantial evidence, which convinced the court that, under all scenarios, Hebert killed Bloch sometime around October 2. Finally, and contrary to Hebert’s assertions otherwise, the record contains evidence suggesting Hebert’s intent in committing the murder. premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being other than him who is killed, is murder in the first degree. Any other murder is murder in the second degree. 18 U.S.C. § 1111. The term “malice aforethought,” as used in the statute “encompasses three distinct mental states: (1) intent to kill; (2) intent to do serious bodily injury; and (3) extreme recklessness and wanton disregard for human life (‘depraved heart’).” Lara v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 990 F.2d 839, 841 (5th Cir. 1993). 13 Case: 14-31405 Document: 00513320169 Page: 14 Date Filed: 12/23/2015 No. 14-31405 The district court also found that “Mr. Hebert killed Mr. Bloch and disposed of his body for his personal financial gain.” On this evidence, we cannot say that the district court’s finding of second degree murder was “illogical or implausible.” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 577. IV. HEBERT’S GUIDELINES CHALLENGE TO HIS SENTENCE Hebert’s primary challenge to his sentence is that the district court erred in calculating his Base Offense Level under the Guidelines when the court cross-referenced the guideline in U.S.S.G. § 2A1.2, the second degree murder guideline. The cross-reference here had the effect of increasing Hebert’s Base Offense Level to 38 and authorizing a life term of imprisonment under the Guidelines. Hebert argues that the application of this cross-reference to his sentence was procedural error for two reasons. First, he argues that U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(c)(3)—the sentencing guideline on bank fraud, which allows for crossreferencing—only allows cross-references for the “count of conviction,” and murder was not in Hebert’s counts of conviction because he expressly refused to admit the additional allegation of murder in Paragraph J of his Indictment. Second, Hebert argues that U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(c)(3) only permits crossreferences if “the conduct set forth in the count of conviction establishes an offense specifically covered by another guideline in Chapter Two (Offense Conduct).” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(c)(3). Because the alleged offense committed by Hebert is a state law killing and is not specifically covered by another guideline, Hebert contends that the cross-reference is improper for this additional reason. 6 Hebert argues that this procedural error was not harmless 6 Hebert notes that while there is a federal murder statute, this statute applies to murder “[w]ithin the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 1111. He argues that the federal murder statute is the offense covered in U.S.S.G. § 2A1.2 and that state murder offenses are not covered by this guideline. 14 Case: 14-31405 Document: 00513320169 Page: 15 Date Filed: 12/23/2015 No. 14-31405 because his sentence, prior to the application of the cross-reference, would have been only six to seven years of imprisonment. As the district court noted, whether a federal bank fraud offense permits a cross-reference to the second degree murder guideline is an issue of first impression in the Fifth Circuit. However, we need not reach this issue of first impression because Hebert’s sentence may be affirmed on the district court’s alternate basis for the sentence—that the sentence is appropriate as an upward variance based on Bloch’s murder. See United States v. Bonilla, 524 F.3d 647, 656–59 (5th Cir. 2008) (affirming a non-guideline sentence as an upward variance despite the lower court’s error in calculating a guideline sentence when the court imposed the non-guideline sentence as an alternative); see also United States v. Urbina, 542 F. App’x 398, 399 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“We need not consider the propriety of [a] sentence as an upward departure . . . because the sentence may be affirmed on the court's alternate basis as an upward variance justified by the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors.”). Assuming, without holding, that the district court could have made a procedural error in applying the cross-reference, the error would be harmless given this alternate basis for the sentence, which was also premised on Bloch’s murder. See United States v. Groce, 784 F.3d 291, 296 (5th Cir. 2015) (“An erroneous guidelines range calculation is harmless if ‘(1) [ ] the district court would have imposed the same sentence had it not made the error, and (2) [ ] it would have done so for the same reasons it gave at the prior sentencing.’” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Ibarra– Luna, 628 F.3d 712, 714 (5th Cir. 2010))). We find that the upward variance in Hebert’s sentence is substantively reasonable. Absent the application of the cross-reference, Hebert’s 92-year sentence falls within the statutory maximum of 153 years he could have received but is higher than the six to seven year sentence his initial PSR 15 Case: 14-31405 Document: 00513320169 Page: 16 Date Filed: 12/23/2015 No. 14-31405 calculated based on the Guidelines. While we have noted that a withinGuideline sentence is afforded a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness, “a court may impose a non-Guideline sentence,” otherwise known as an upward variance, that is “higher . . . than the relevant Guideline Sentence.” United States v. Smith, 440 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2006). In imposing an upward variance, “the district court must more thoroughly articulate its reasons . . . than when it imposes a sentence under authority of the Sentencing Guidelines.” Id. “These reasons should be fact-specific and consistent with the sentencing factors enumerated in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a),” 7 and “[t]he farther a 7 The federal sentencing statute provides, in relevant part: (a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence.—The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider— (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed— (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for [the applicable category of offense issued by the Sentencing Commission]; ... (5) any pertinent policy statement [issued by the Sentencing Commission]; ... (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and 16 Case: 14-31405 Document: 00513320169 Page: 17 Date Filed: 12/23/2015 No. 14-31405 sentence varies from the applicable Guidelines sentence, ‘the more compelling the justification based on factors in section 3553(a)’ must be.” Id. (quoting United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005)). Nonetheless, “a checklist recitation of the section 3553(a) factors is neither necessary nor sufficient,” and “[t]he purpose of the district court’s statement of reasons is to enable the reviewing court to determine whether, as a matter of substance, the sentencing factors in section 3553(a) support the sentence.” Id. And “[u]ltimately, our ‘review for substantive reasonableness is “highly deferential,” because the sentencing court is in a better position to find facts and judge their import under the § 3553(a) factors with respect to a particular defendant.’” United States v. Diehl, 775 F.3d 714, 724 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Hernandez, 633 F.3d 370, 375 (5th Cir. 2011)); see also id. (“Even a significant variance from the Guidelines does not constitute an abuse of discretion if it is ‘commensurate with the individualized, case-specific reasons provided by the district court.’” (quoting United States v. McElwee, 646 F.3d 328, 338 (5th Cir. 2011))). The district court here conducted a fact-specific, four-day hearing where it heard evidence on Bloch’s murder and Hebert’s background. At sentencing, the district court stated that it was considering a number of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in imposing the upward variance, including the nature and circumstances of the offense, Hebert’s history and characteristics, the seriousness of the offense, just punishment, and the need to protect the public. While the 92-year sentence was a significant upward variance from the recommendation in the PSR, the court specifically noted that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors merited an upward variance because Hebert had abused his (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 17 Case: 14-31405 Document: 00513320169 Page: 18 Date Filed: 12/23/2015 No. 14-31405 position of trust and authority as a police officer to take Bloch’s life. And this court as well as other courts have approved of similarly significant upward variances where appropriate. See, e.g., United States v. Brantley, 537 F.3d 347, 348 (5th Cir. 2008) (affirming a sentence of incarceration 253% higher than the top of the Guidelines range); United States v. Smith, 417 F.3d 483, 492–93 (5th Cir. 2005) (affirming a sentence of incarceration nearly 300% higher than the top of the Guidelines range); see also United States v. Sebolt, 598 F. App’x 159, 161–62 (4th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished) (affirming an upward variance to life imprisonment following a conviction for advertising child pornography). In light of our deferential review and the thorough findings made by the district court, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence when it imposed the upward variance of 92 years based on Bloch’s murder. V. HEBERT’S FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO HIS SENTENCE Hebert’s primary constitutional challenge to his sentence is that it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and his jury trial right under the Sixth Amendment. Hebert argues that the district court engaged in improper factfinding that increased his sentence when the court, rather than a jury, found that Hebert murdered Bloch. While Hebert does not claim that all judicial factfinding at sentencing is improper, Hebert claims that the fact of murder found by the district court is a fact “that the law makes essential to his punishment.” United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 232 (2005). This is because Hebert’s 92-year sentence would have been substantively unreasonable under the post-Booker sentencing regime absent a judicial finding of murder. Hebert then cites to concurrences from Supreme Court opinions and dissents from denials of certiorari suggesting that judicial factfinding violates a defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial where the 18 Case: 14-31405 Document: 00513320169 Page: 19 Date Filed: 12/23/2015 No. 14-31405 factfinding renders reasonable an otherwise substantively unreasonable sentence. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 8 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Marlowe v. United States, 555 U.S. 963 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 374 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“There will inevitably be some constitutional violations under a system of substantive reasonableness review, because there will be some sentences that will be upheld as reasonable only because of the existence of judge-found facts.”). Hebert argues further that the district court’s judicial factfinding effectively increased his mandatory minimum sentence in violation of Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), 8 because the federal sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) requires a judge to impose a “sufficient” sentence and his 92-year sentence would not have been sufficient absent the judicial factfinding of murder. See id. at 2163 (“[F]acts that increase mandatory minimum sentences must be submitted to the jury.”). Hebert’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment challenges are foreclosed by our precedent, however, because we have held that courts can engage in judicial factfinding where the defendant’s sentence ultimately falls within the statutory maximum term. Following Booker, we noted that “[t]he sentencing judge is [still] entitled to find by a preponderance of the evidence all the facts relevant to the determination of a Guideline sentencing range and all facts relevant to the determination of a non-Guidelines sentence.” United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005). And in Hernandez our circuit “foreclosed as-applied Sixth Amendment challenges to sentences within the statutory maximum that are reasonable only if based on judge-found facts.” 8 In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held “that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum [sentence] is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury” and must be “found beyond a reasonable doubt.” Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155, 2163. 19 Case: 14-31405 Document: 00513320169 Page: 20 Date Filed: 12/23/2015 No. 14-31405 633 F.3d at 374. We added that a “within-guidelines and above-guidelines sentence [imposed within the statutory maximum can be] reasonable solely based on judge-found facts.” Id. 9 As a result, the judicial factfinding that made Hebert’s 92-year sentence substantively reasonable does not violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendments because his sentence was ultimately within the 153year statutory maximum he could have received for the seven counts to which he pleaded guilty. 10 Hebert’s Alleyne challenge also fails under our precedent. As we held in United States v. Tuma, 738 F.3d 681 (5th Cir. 2013), “[t]he Alleyne decision applies only to facts that increase a statutory mandatory minimum sentence,” so that judicial factfinding at sentencing does not pose an Alleyne problem where a defendant’s sentence “d[oes] not expose him to a mandatory minimum sentence.” Id. at 693. Hebert does not point to any of his underlying convictions in arguing that the court’s factfinding has increased his mandatory minimum sentence. Instead, Hebert’s argues that any sentence must be “sufficient” under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the federal sentencing statute, and that any judicial factfinding making the sentence “sufficient” effectively increases the mandatory minimum. But 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) only provides a number of sentencing factors for courts to consider and imposes no mandatory minimum. 11 Therefore, Hebert fails to demonstrate that the judicial 9 Our precedent, in this respect, comports with the Supreme Court’s holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), that “other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 490. 10 Hebert’s citations to non-binding concurrences and dissents from denial of certiorari have no bearing on our analysis. See, e.g., Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 202 F.3d 788, 802 n.10 (5th Cir. 2000) (“We note in passing that . . . a denial of petition for certiorari . . . is not binding authority.”). 11 Indeed, if Hebert were correct that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) provided a mandatory minimum, then essentially any judicial factfinding at sentencing would pose an Alleyne problem. This cannot be so given that the Alleyne Court was careful to note: “Our ruling . . . does not mean that any fact that influences judicial discretion must be found by a jury. We 20 Case: 14-31405 Document: 00513320169 Page: 21 Date Filed: 12/23/2015 No. 14-31405 factfinding of murder violates his due process right and constitutional right to a jury trial.