Opinion ID: 1751157
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Speedy Trial.

Text: ¶ 36. In Mississippi, the right to a speedy trial is guaranteed under the authority of both the federal and state constitutions. The United States Constitution mandates that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. . . . U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Mississippi Constitution similarly requires that [i]n all prosecutions by indictment or information, a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the county where the offense was committed be granted a criminal defendant. Miss. Const. of 1890, Art. 3, § 26. The Constitutional Right to a Speedy Trial under the Sixth Amendment. ¶ 37. In Klopfer v. North Carolina, the United States Supreme Court pronounced the right to a speedy trial fundamental, and that it applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. 386 U.S. 213, 222, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967). The Court traced the origin of a speedy trial to the Assize of Clarendon, an act crafted during the rule of King Henry II in 1166, and to Magna Carta, that English document of freedoms adopted in 1215. Id. at 223-24, 87 S.Ct. 988. ¶ 38. Yet what exactly constituted a speedy trial under the federal constitution was not concretely defined until a few years later, in the case of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). Because the U.S. Constitution does not define the term, the Court found the right difficult to quantify: the right to speedy trial is a more vague concept than other procedural rights because [i]t is, for example, impossible to determine with precision when the right has been denied. Id. at 521, 92 S.Ct. 2182. ¶ 39. Ultimately the Court chose a balancing test where it identif[ied] four . . . factors: Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182. This landmark test, with some elaboration, is still utilized today in analyzing constitutional speedy trial violations. See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992) (the four separate enquiries are whether delay before trial was uncommonly long, whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay, whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and whether he suffered prejudice as the delay's result). ¶ 40. While understanding that such a ruling would have the virtue of clarifying when the right is infringed and of simplifying courts' application of it, the Barker Court explicitly declined to adopt a fixed point at which a speedy trial would be violated. 407 U.S. at 523, 92 S.Ct. 2182. The Court did note that some legislatures have enacted laws, and some courts have adopted procedural rules which more narrowly define the right. Id. In holding it could not craft such a fixed point, the Court stated that: [Adopting a fixed point] would require this Court to engage in legislative or rulemaking activity, rather than in the adjudicative process to which we should confine our efforts. We do not establish procedural rules for the States, except when mandated by the Constitution. We find no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specified number of days or months. The States, of course, are free to prescribe a reasonable period consistent with constitutional standards, but our approach must be less precise. Id. at 523, 92 S.Ct. 2182. ¶ 41. This invitation was heeded by many states as well as the United States Congress, which adopted the Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974. The Speedy Trial Act contains a lengthy list of deadlines and details in order to create a precise scheme not inherent in the vagueness of the Sixth Amendment. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 3162. Congress explained that the Act was [t]o assist in reducing crime and the danger of recidivism by requiring speedy trials and by strengthening the supervision over persons released pending trial, and for other purposes. 93 P.L. 619. The State Right from 1817 to 1975. ¶ 42. From its birth, Mississippi guaranteed speedy trials for its citizens; the language in our constitution today has barely changed since July 17, 1817, when we became a state. See Miss. Const. of 1817, Art. I, § 10 (in all prosecutions by indictment or information, a speedy public trial, by an impartial jury of the county); Miss. Const. of 1832, Art. I, § 10 (in all prosecutions, by indictment or information, a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the county where the offence was committed); Miss. Const. of 1868, Art. I, § 7 (in all prosecutions by indictment or information, a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the county where the offense was committed). ¶ 43. In 1857 our Legislature first codified a statutory definition of speedy trial: All indictments shall be triable at the first term, unless good cause be shown for a continuance. Miss.Code of 1857, Section LIX, Art. 285. That language was modified in 1892 to read shall be tried, and this remained the law until 1976. Miss. Code of 1892, § 1421. This was a strict standard because terms of court were governed by statute, and so each judicial district had its own time period in which to provide a speedy trial. This provided a flexible standard according to population. ¶ 44. For example, in 1942 there were six terms of court in the first district of Hinds County, each lasting 36 days, starting on the first Mondays of January, March, May, July, September, and November. 1942 Miss. Laws, § 1401. So if a defendant was arrested in June, the first term following is the July term of 36 days. Assuming the person was arrested on June 1, the State was responsible for trying that person within 66 days. Provided, of course, that there was no continuance, that date was roughly the maximum in that part of the state. ¶ 45. Terms of court per judicial district varied. While the first judicial district of Hinds, a large district in general and also the seat of state government, had six terms of court for 36 days, Grenada County only had two: On the fourth Monday of January and July, twelve days [each]. 1942 Miss. Laws, § 1399. Those terms were then roughly the end of the month of January and July. Accordingly, in that county, a speedy trial for a criminal defendant might be required within roughly 170 days. ¶ 46. One of the concerns of criminal defendants in the Mississippi of times past was not the deprivation of a speedy trial, but in receiving too speedy of a trial. As the Supreme Court noted in Barker, deprivation of the right [to a speedy trial] may work to the accused's advantage. 407 U.S. at 521, 92 S.Ct. 2182. The reason given that [d]elay is not an uncommon defense tactic because [a]s the time between the commission of the crime and trial lengthens, witnesses may become unavailable or their memories may fade, and [i]f the witnesses support the prosecution, its case will be weakened, sometimes seriously so. Id. Of course, delay can be a two-edged sword, as those witnesses testifying for the defense are also subject to unavailability or a gradual fading of memory. See generally Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (though time can tilt the case against either side . . . one cannot generally be sure which of them it has prejudiced more severely) (internal citations omitted). ¶ 47. In the case of Robinson v. State we examined a case that demonstrated the concern over a very speedy trial. The defendant was accused of a rape that occurred on Saturday, July 10, 1954. 223 Miss. 70, 77, 77 So.2d 265, 267 (1955). He was arrested on Sunday, July 11; indicted on Monday; July 12; and filed a motion on Tuesday, July 13, for a continuance of the trial. Id. at 77, 77 So.2d at 267. The motion was overruled, and the defendant tried that Friday, July 16, where he was sentenced to death. Id. Only six days elapsed from the attack to the sentencing. ¶ 48. On appeal, his counsel argued that the continuance should have been granted in order to allow more time for the preparation of the defense; we concluded that the trial was properly held in accordance with our speedy trial laws, i.e. within the term of court, and that the continuance had been improperly requested. Id. at 79, 77 So.2d at 268. Accordingly, we affirmed the penalty of death. Id. at 82, 77 So.2d at 269. ¶ 49. Earlier that year we had addressed concerns over a trial that was held 14 days after indictment and dismissed them, citing multiple other jurisdictions that had held trials of even shorter time periods  including trials that were held three, two, and even one day after arrest. Gallego v. State, 222 Miss. 719, 737-38, 77 So.2d 321, 329-30 (1955) (examining, among other cases Commonwealth v. Donnelly, 86 Pa.Super. 427, 428 (1925), where a defendant was tried and convicted of a crime committed the day before). The ultra-speedy trials in Robinson and Gallego were simply a part of the culture at that time. [4] The State Right in Modern Times. ¶ 50. In 1976 the Legislature altered the statutory right to a speedy trial considerably. Gone were fluctuating dates based upon terms of court, replaced instead by a uniform standard: Unless good cause be shown, and a continuance duly granted by the court, all offenses for which indictments are presented to the court shall be tried no later than two hundred seventy (270) days after the accused has been arraigned. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-17-1 (Rev.2000). Made effective on July 1, 1976, the statute set out a crystal-clear rule: defendants were required to be tried with 270 days after arraignment unless a continuance based upon good cause was granted by the trial court. [5] ¶ 51. We first examined the statute roughly two years later, in Payne v. State, 363 So.2d 278 (Miss.1978). In examining the law, we pronounced that [t]his statute is plain and unambiguous. Id. at 279. The indictment in that case was entered on August 16, 1976, and the defendant was not tried until August 31, 1977  well over a year later. Id. at 278. ¶ 52. Because [i]t [was] readily seen that the accused was tried and convicted more than 270 days after his arraignment and plea of not guilty, we held that [t]he only question remains is whether or not the delay comes within the framework of the exceptions in the statute. Id. at 279. While a continuance had been sought and granted on behalf of the defendant, there was no other evidence in the record of a continuance; therefore, a unanimous Court reversed the conviction and ordered the defendant released. Id. ¶ 53. The next year we again addressed the statute, this time in a case where we found that [a]lthough defendant was tried 584 days after his arraignment, he was tried within the time fixed by section 99-17-1 because good reason was shown for the delay. Durham v. State, 377 So.2d 909, 910 (Miss.1979). We looked closely at the terms of court in Leake County, finding that one was devoted to civil cases, in another counsel for the defendant was not present, in yet another the defendant requested a continuance for trial preparation, and last, a material witness was absent in another term. Id. at 910. Examining these reasons we unanimously found good cause was shown for the delay in the trial of the defendant and his constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated. Id. ¶ 54. Our unanimity in interpretation did not last. The case of Turner v. State garnered two spirited dissents that refused to join the majority in releasing a defendant tried long after the 270 days. 383 So.2d 489 (Miss.1980). In dissent, Justice Roy Noble Lee, joined by Justices Walker and Bowling, argued that he would only require that an accused be discharged in denying him a speedy trial which results in prejudice and in the denial of a fair trial to him. Id. at 492 (Lee, J., dissenting). While the Legislature demanded that a trial shall be within 270 days, it did not specify the remedy for the State's failure to comply. Justice Lee reasoned that if the legislature had intended a discharge for failure to comply with the statute, that intent would have been expressed in the present statute. Id. (Lee, J., dissenting). ¶ 55. A mere seven days after we delivered the opinion in Turner, we addressed the statute again in State v. Davis, 382 So.2d 1095 (Miss.1980). At this point our analysis of the statutory right under Mississippi law became hopelessly tangled with the federal constitutional right. Despite the fact that the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Barker rested squarely on interpreting the Constitution, which had no fixed point for speedy trial analysis, we imported its balancing test and applied it to the statute we formerly held was plain and unambiguous. Id. at 1097-98. ¶ 56. After that point various interpretations of the statute would arise, at times provoking increasingly complex and spirited debates between the majority opinion and dissenting justices, such as in the notable case of Winder v. State, 640 So.2d 893 (Miss.1994), which generated lengthy dissents by Justices Sullivan and Banks. The Modern Interpretation. ¶ 57. The critical turning point in our modern interpretation of the statute is Walton v. State, 678 So.2d 645 (Miss.1996). In that case a defendant was tried long after the 270 days had elapsed; there had only been a one-day continuance in the trial. Id. at 646-67. Although the State had not requested any other continuance, the State asks us to `(a)ssume . . . that each of the orders setting trial were continuances for good cause' and to `treat each order [setting trial] as a continuance.' Id. at 648. Despite the plain language of the statute, we did make that assumption. Further, we found that: The reasoning of Justice Lee's dissent in Turner v. State . . . is most persuasive regarding whether a case is dismissible when tried past the allotted 270 days. As stated by Justice Lee in Turner, I think that the provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions and of Section 99-17-1 only require that an accused be discharged in denying him a speedy trial which results in prejudice and in denial of a fair trial to him. . . . Accordingly, in the absence of a showing of prejudice to Walton's right to a fair trial by a delay beyond the 270 days, Walton's case should not be dismissed with prejudice. Id. at 650. ¶ 58. Thus we deviated materially from the plain and unambiguous language of the statute in two ways. First, we allowed a case to be tried long after the 270 deadline had elapsed without virtue of a continuance based on good cause. Second, we judicially grafted the federal constitutional concept of prejudice into the plain and unambiguous language of our state statutory right. A Strict Interpretation of the Statute is Required by Law and Precedent. ¶ 59. It is imperative that we return to strict compliance with the 270-day statute and overrule the line of cases that stray from the plain and unambiguous language crafted by the Legislature. The statute requires that all offenses . . . shall be tried no later than two hundred seventy (270) days after the accused has been arraigned. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-17-1 (emphasis added). There is no exception for a showing of prejudice, nor does that word appear anywhere in the statute; this part of the law has been crafted wholly by the justices of this Court. There is only one way around the 270-day rule, and this path has two components: first, good cause [must] be shown, and a continuance duly granted by the court. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-17-1. The 270 days can thus be extended, but only if a continuance is requested of and granted by the trial court, predicated upon a finding of good cause for the delay. ¶ 60. It is not simply judicial restraint and a respect for the enactments of the Legislature that drives this reasoning. The well-settled rule is that criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the accused. See United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411, 93 S.Ct. 1007, 35 L.Ed.2d 379 (1973) (a criminal statute . . . must be strictly construed, and any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of lenity); State v. Burnham, 546 So.2d 690, 692 (Miss.1989) (statutes imposing criminal penalties must be construed strictly in favor of the accused, a proposition which may not be doubted). This is the plain and unambiguous rule as set by the Legislature, and we are bound to follow it because of our constitutional mandate to faithfully apply the provisions of constitutionally enacted legislation. Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v. Easterling, 928 So.2d 815, 820 (Miss.2006). ¶ 61. It is not the purpose of this Court to craft legislation. We have ruled repeatedly in recent civil cases that we will faithfully apply the language of the statutes in question so long as they are constitutional. See Pitalo v. GPCH-GP, Inc., 933 So.2d 927 (Miss.2006) (requiring strict compliance with Section 15-1-36(15), which requires a 60-day notice be provided to medical providers prior to suit); Easterling, 928 So.2d at 819-20 (requiring strict compliance with Section 11-46-11(1), which requires 90 days notice prior to suit against a governmental entity). ¶ 62. We should also abandon caselaw which has unnecessarily intertwined federal law and our interpretation of a state statute. Simply put, Barker has absolutely no application to the interpretation of our state 270 day speedy trial statute, nor does it have application to Art. 1 § 26 of our state constitution. The Legislature has seen fit to define exactly what speedy trial means via the statute. The Barker analysis is to be reserved only in determining if there was a speedy trial violation under the Sixth Amendment. ¶ 63. The proper inquiry first determines if there was compliance with the 270-day legislatively-mandated time frame, for that statute is far more restrictive on the State than the federal constitutional right to a speedy trial. Thus, any inquiry into a violation of the right to a speedy trial must necessarily begin with an analysis of our state statutory right, as the State has the right to craft laws so long as they are not in violation of the minimum standards set by the federal constitution. ¶ 64. For example, a defendant's speedy trial rights under the statute may be violated in cases where his constitutional right to a speedy trial is not. Under the proper interpretation of state law, the rights of this hypothetical defendant are violated if he is tried 300 days after indictment, provided there are no continuances. At the same time, this might possibly not constitute a violation of his federal constitutional speedy trial right as analyzed under Barker. ¶ 65. If and when that analysis determines that a defendant has not suffered a speedy trial violation, the Barker review of the Sixth Amendment right is proper. Ultimately, [t]he state bears the burden of bringing to trial one charged with crime within the time prescribed by statute or showing good reason for failure to comply with the statute. Turner, 383 So.2d at 491. ¶ 66. This approach allows a clear distinction between the analysis of the state statutory right to a speedy trial from an analysis of the federal constitutional right. An analysis of the statutory right requires that this Court adhere to our constitutional duty to faithfully apply the law as promulgated by the Legislature, regardless of our view of the wisdom of that law. On the other hand, an analysis of the federal constitutional right under the Barker case allows this Court to exercise its discretion to determine if constitutional rights have been violated without the benefit of the guidance provided by clearly worded statutes. That is to say, an appellate court must necessarily come to its own conclusion of what is meant by the term speedy trial as it applies to the federal constitutional right. No such interpretation is necessary for an appellate court to apply the number 270, because it applies without interpretation, and subject only to the sole exception chosen by the Legislature and included in the statute. The Need to Improve Our Criminal Justice System. ¶ 67. In adhering to a faithful interpretation of the statute, we not only fulfill our proper role under the state constitution  we also safeguard our society from the plague of crime and injustice. The right to a speedy trial belongs not only to the accused  it also benefits society. As one commentator has expressed, the quick adjudication of criminal cases both protects the defendant and preserves society's right to remove convicted criminals from the street. If this decision forces the government to work faster and with more diligence to accomplish these ends, society is the ultimate winner. Daniel A. Conforti, Note: Doggett v. United States: Breathing New Life Into the Right to a Speedy Trial, 21 W. St. U.L.Rev. 619, 635 (1994). ¶ 68. Our Court has recently struggled to assist in improving the criminal justice system of Hinds County, where Mr. Guice was indicted and tried far in excess of the statutory requirement. In a letter sent in February of this year to the governor, Hinds County's four circuit judges, district attorney, public defender, supervisors, and Jackson city officials, Chief Justice Smith declared that `[t]he overall condition of the Hinds County criminal justice system is deplorable, unacceptable and in need of a major overhaul.' Jimmie E. Gates, Smith Wants Judges to Delay Civil Cases, Work Through Inmate Backlog, Clarion-Ledger, Feb. 21, 2006, at 1A. Speaking to the editorial board of the Clarion-Ledger, the Chief Justice related his belief that there's no excuse for people charged with serious crimes to be walking free awaiting trial, or arrested criminal suspects to be turned away from the jail due to lack of space, or for inmates in jail to wait months, even years, without trial, some without even being formally charged with a crime. Editorial, Hinds Justice: High Court Should Step in to Fix It, Clarion-Ledger, Feb. 22, 2006 at 6A. ¶ 69. Recently the sheriff of Hinds County announced that the county was in a crisis and deemed the need for reform in Hinds County an emergency. Leah Rupp, Ideas Few for Officials Weighing Jail `Crisis, ' Clarion-Ledger, December 20, 2006, at 1B. And another commentator lamented the failures of our Court to enforce the clearly written words of the statute: The legislature's speedy trial law . . . was passed to protect the general public and make sure our criminal justice officials are held accountable. Wyatt Emmerich, Editorial, Northside Sun, Sept. 7, 2006, at 4A. ¶ 70. Yet today, instead of working to improve this system of justice, we damage it even further. In doing so, the majority shrinks from our constitutional role in applying statutes as written, and more gravely, from our duty to safeguard the constitution and laws of the state of Mississippi. Whatever the condition of the criminal justice system in Hinds County, with today's decision we callously ignore the concerns of society and our constitutional mandate.