Opinion ID: 2441011
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Skillicorn's Challenges for Cause

Text: Skillicorn challenged for cause prospective jurors Paul Huddleston, Stephen DeMasters, John Homan, and John Akridge because they exhibited a bias in favor of the death penalty. His challenges were denied by the trial court. Skillicorn attacks those rulings. In a separate point, Skillicorn claims the trial court also erred by sustaining the state's objection to a question his attorney presented to venireperson Richard Heitmeyer. Skillicorn did not challenge Heitmeyer for cause. Skillicorn exercised a peremptory challenge against each of these venirepersons. Skillicorn alleges that the denial of the for cause challenges against Huddleston, DeMasters, Homan, and Akridge, and the curtailment of his questioning of Heitmeyer violated his rights to a fair trial, to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and to make cause and peremptory challenges intelligently. The trial court has wide discretion in determining the qualifications of jurors, and its decision thereon will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion and a real probability of injury to the complaining party. State v. Copeland, supra, at 852. As Skillicorn concedes, we have previously rejected his argument. In State v. Richardson we stated:  State v. Gray ... made clear that the right to a list of qualified jurors from which to make peremptory strikes is statutory. The relevant statute was amended in 1993. It currently provides that a potential juror's qualifications do not constitute grounds for a new trial or reversal if the juror was removed by a peremptory strike and did not serve. Section 494.480.4, RSMo Supp.1993. State v. Richardson, 923 S.W.2d 301, 310 (Mo. banc 1996). Venirepersons Huddleston, DeMasters, Homan, Akridge, and Heitmeyer did not serve as jurors; therefore, the trial court did not commit reversible error. Points Eleven and Twenty are denied.