Opinion ID: 167897
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecutorial Misstatements

Text: 33 We turn now to Mr. Bland's argument that the prosecutors misstated the jury instruction regarding the lesser included offense, and thus violated due process. To prevail on a claim based on improper remarks by the prosecutor, a petitioner generally must demonstrate that the remarks so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974); see also Le v. Mullin, 311 F.3d 1002, 1013, 1018 (10th Cir.2002) (requiring a showing that the trial was fundamentally unfair where the prosecutor's comments appeared to contradict the jury instructions). Because the OCCA considered this claim, AEDPA standards of review apply, and we may reverse only if the OCCA's decision was legally or factually unreasonable. Gipson v. Jordan, 376 F.3d 1193, 1197 (10th Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 34 During closing argument, the prosecution argued that the jury need not consider the lesser included offense of first-degree manslaughter if the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of first-degree murder. Tr. Jury Trial, Day Six, at 8, 10. The defense did not object to the argument at trial, but Mr. Bland now contends that the argument violated Oklahoma law and misstated the jury instructions by inviting the jury first to consider the murder charges and then only look at the manslaughter if the jury was unable to find murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 106. 35 Reviewing for plain error, the OCCA found none. Both defense counsel and the prosecution reminded the jury to refer to the written instructions during deliberations. See id. at 9 (State's closing argument) (Read the Instructions, study them.); id. at 59 (Defendant's closing argument) (I want you back in the jury room[,] as I know you will[,] to read all of the instructions.). Mr. Bland has conceded that the written instructions provided to the jury were in accord with McCormick, the controlling OCCA precedent. See Bland, 4 P.3d at 726; Br. of Appellant, OCCA Case No. F-98-152, at 34. One instruction provided that [i]f you have a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt of the charges of MURDER FIRST DEGREE (PREMEDITATED) AND MURDER FIRST DEGREE (FELONY MURDER), you must then consider the charge of MANSLAUGHTER FIRST DEGREE BY DANGEROUS WEAPON (HEAT OF PASSION). O.R. Vol. II, at 374. Another instruction explained: 36 If you have a reasonable doubt as to which offense the defendant may be guilty of, Murder First Degree (Premeditated), and/or Murder First Degree (Felony Murder), or Manslaughter First Degree by Dangerous Weapon (Heat of Passion), you may find him guilty only of the lesser offense, Manslaughter First Degree by Dangerous Weapon (Heat of Passion). 37