Opinion ID: 2550667
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Issue 1: Did the district court admit evidence in violation of K.S.A. 60-3307(a)(2) because it allowed the J-2 vehicle (Vitara) as a reasonable alternative design to the J-1 vehicle (Sidekick)?

Text: Our analysis begins with the statute. K.S.A. 60-3307 provides: (a) In a product liability claim, the following evidence shall not be admissible for any purpose: (1) Evidence of any advancements or changes in technical or other knowledge or techniques, in design theory or philosophy, in manufacturing or testing knowledge, techniques or processes in labeling, warning of risk or hazards, instructions for the use of such product, if such advancements or changes have been made, learned or placed into common use subsequent to the time the product in issue was designed, formulated, tested, manufactured or sold by the manufacturer; and (2) evidence of any changes made in the designing, planning, formulating, testing, preparing, manufacturing, packaging, warnings, labeling or instructing for use of, or with regard to, the product in issue, or any similar product, which changes were made subsequent to the time the product in issue was designed, formulated, tested, manufactured or sold by the manufacturer. (b) This section does not require the exclusion of evidence of a subsequent measure if offered to impeach a witness for the manufacturer or seller of a product who has expressly denied the feasibility of such a measure. (Emphasis added.) To help prove Griffin's theory of liability of the J-1's (1994 Sidekick) dangerous and defective design, she intended to place in evidence the J-2 as her reasonable alternative design. Evidence of a reasonable alternative design in products liability litigation is allowed in Kansas. As this court stated in Delaney v. Deere and Co., 268 Kan. 769, 772-73, 999 P.2d 930 (2000): [W]hile the final test is one of consumer expectations, `in a products liability case involving a claimed design defect, the parties . . . may present evidence as to . . . the feasibility of a safer design. Likewise, evidence may be introduced as to the importance of the need or needs served by the product and its design, the technical and economic feasibility and practicability of serving those needs with a safer design, and the availability of other products, if any, to serve the same needs.' [Citation omitted.] Suzuki argues that the J-2 evidence is prohibited by K.S.A. 60-3307(a)(2) as italicized above. Consequently, on March 27, 2002, Suzuki filed a motion in limine to exclude all references to the new design of the Chevrolet Tracker and the Suzuki Vitara introduced in the 1999 model year, also referred to as the J-2 vehicle, which succeeded the J-1 Geo Tracker and Suzuki Sidekick, sold in various configurations between the 1989-1998 model years. In support of its motion, Suzuki made allegations in support of its apparent argument that the changes from the J-1 to the J-2 were design changes, e.g., subsequent remedial measures which were inadmissible. It stated in relevant part: 3. It is anticipated that plaintiffs will attempt to suggest that design changes made to the J-2 Chevrolet Tracker and the Suzuki Vitara are admissible in this action as a subsequent remedial measure. 4. It is also anticipated that plaintiffs will attempt to admit and discuss in front of the jury rollover testing of a J-2 Vitara conducted in 2001 by their expert John Marcosky as an attempted comparison of its performance to that of the 1994 four-door Sidekick. 5. As a general rule, evidence of subsequent remedial measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct. K.S.A. 60-3307(a)(2); K.S.A. 60-451; Floyd v. General Motors Corp., 25 Kan. App. 2d 71, 74-75, 960 P.2d 763 (1998); Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Manufacturing Co., 253 Kan. 741, 758-759, 861 P.2d 1299 (1993). Indeed in Kansas product liability litigation, evidence of subsequent remedial measures `shall not be admissible for any purpose,' with the only exception being to impeach the testimony of a witness for the manufacturer or seller who has expressly denied the feasibility of the proposed remedial measure. K.S.A. 60-3307(b); DiPietro v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 28 Kan. App. 2d 372, 376, 16 P.3d 986 (2000). 5. [ sic ] Defendants do not deny the feasibility of the design changes made in the J-2 vehicles, and none of their experts is expected to deny the feasibility of these changes. Suzuki also appeared to argue that the changes were not design changes because the J-2 represented a wholly new design. Accordingly, they were irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. 6. Also, the J-2 Suzuki Vitara and Chevrolet Tracker represent not a design change but a wholly new design. As such their new design is irrelevant to the design of the subject 1994 four-door Sidekick. (See Inoue Affidavit, Appendix Exhibit B to Defendant GM's Motion for Summary Judgment.) 7. Kansas courts have recognized that evidence involving other vehicles not similar to the vehicle at issue in a suit may properly be excluded as irrelevant.. . . Betts v. General Motors Corporation, 236 Kan. 108, 114, 689 P.2d 795 (1984). . . . Floyd v. General Motors Corp., 25 Kan. App. 2d 71, 72, 960 P.2d 763 (1998). 8. Numerous jurisdictions have likewise recognized that evidence in product liability cases should be limited to models which are the same or substantially similar to the subject model. [Citations omitted.] 9. In this case, the only similarity between the 1994 four-door Sidekick and the J-2 Suzuki Vitara is that they are both sport utility vehicles. Plaintiffs simply cannot present any evidence of substantial similarity between the two models. Apropos of plaintiffs' claim that a defect in the 1994 four-door Sidekick led to plaintiffs' accident, defendants note that the 1994 four-door Sidekick and J-2 Vitara have different track widths, suspensions, steering systems and other components, but that there is no evidence that any of these new design features was instituted to correct any deficiency in the handling/stability or rollover resistance of the J-1 Sidekick. As such, they are not `substantially similar' and any evidence relating to the J-2 Chevrolet Tracker or Suzuki Vitara is irrelevant. 10. Plaintiffs' attempts to refer to the new design of the J-2 Chevrolet Tracker or Suzuki Vitara are made only with one purpose in mind  to alienate the jurors from the defendants. Griffin responded on April 9 that K.S.A. 60-451 and 60-3307(a)(2) did not apply. She pointed out that the J-2 incorporated several of the design features that plaintiffs' experts would testify should have been part of the original rollover resistance design, parameters, and characteristics of the J-1. As a result, the J-2 was evidence of reasonable alternative design recommended by her experts. She therefore argued that plaintiffs should not be precluded from presenting evidence of their reasonable alternative design simply because that design was incorporated in a vehicle designed and manufactured by defendants. Griffin characterized the J-2 as the plaintiffs' `go to' vehicle with regard to rollover resistance design, parameters, characteristics and performance. She specifically argued K.S.A. 60-451, i.e., subsequent remedial conduct, did not apply because Suzuki's witnesses had testified that the change was not remedial, but a wholly new design. Moreover, according to Griffin, K.S.A. 60-3307(a)(2) did not render the J-2 evidence inadmissible since Suzuki admitted that the J-2 represents not a design change, but a wholly new design and that the J-1 and J-2 are not substantially similar. As a result, under the statute, the J-2 was not evidence of any changes made in designing . . . the product in issue, or any similar product . . . .  She argued that defendants could not have it both ways, i.e., could not assert in their pleadings that the J-2 is not the product in issue and is not a similar product, and still assert that Griffin's J-2 evidence is inadmissible pursuant to K.S.A. 60-3307. At the April 10 hearing on the motion, Suzuki clarified that it was arguing in the alternative. It claimed that Griffin either had to prove that the J-1 and J-2 vehicles were substantially similar, in which case 60-3307 barred the evidence of the J-2, or, if Griffin could not show that the vehicles were substantially similar, then the J-2 evidence was not relevant. Griffin responded that Suzuki had to be held to its pleadings where it stated that the J-2 was not the product in issue or a similar product; that the J-2 does not incorporate design changes, but is a wholly new design; and that there is no evidence of substantial similarity between the J-1 and the J-2. The district court ruled at the April 10 hearing: I put a lot of thought and a lot of research into this. And, quite frankly, folks, this Court feels that the main contingent in this matter is that the go-to vehicle is a vehicle, and that was produced by and manufactured by the defendants. So, I do consider that, or would this argument be going on if this was GM or Chrysler or Ford or someone in that regard? Statute is very clear. Is it the product in question? It's been specifically denied. And the defendant  and the plaintiff is not saying that it is, and the defendant has stated that it's a wholly different vehicle.  Is it similar? Again, it's a wholly different vehicle. And the Court feels that the plaintiff has the right and opportunity, as the case law would dictate, that they have the right to present a reasonable alternative design. This Court has not heard that information as to  and believes that to be a question of fact for the jury as to whether or not that is a reasonable alternative design. But for those reasons, and a literal reading of 60-3307(a)(2), this Court will deny the motion in limine in that regard. (Emphasis added.) On April 25, 2002, Suzuki then filed a motion to reconsider the denial of its motion in limine. It continued to argue that the J-1 and J-2 are similar products under 60-3307 and therefore the J-2 evidence should be excluded. As support it stated: The Sidekick design was 10 years old, so Suzuki replaced the Sidekick with a new, second generation design  the Vitara. It is not the same vehicle, but it is a new design for Suzuki's small SUV product, i.e., a similar product. Suzuki attached to its motion a deposition excerpt from a Suzuki representative, Masatoshi Nakamura, who testified that the J-1 is a first generation Tracker and Sidekick. He also testified that the J-2 is a second generation Tracker and the Vitara. As in Suzuki's initial motion in limine, it again referenced the affidavit from Suzuki engineer Yoshihisa Inoue. Griffin responded that defendant's arguments did not change the basic fact  the J-2 is evidence of a vehicle that incorporates plaintiffs' reasonable alternative design (go-to vehicle) and is not evidence of a design change in the J-1, but rather is a wholly new design. At the April 26 hearing on the motion to reconsider, Suzuki also argued that excluding its J-2 did not prohibit plaintiffs' experts from asserting an alternative design. Rather, the experts simply could not use Suzuki's J-2 as the alternative design to Suzuki's J-1 Sidekick. It also emphasized that Suzuki's substantial improvements and changes did not detract from the fact that the J-2 was simply the second generation of the J-1 and became Suzuki's successor small SUV. After hearing oral arguments on the motion to reconsider, the district court appeared to clarify its earlier ruling. It stated it was not relying upon similarity/dissimilarity. Rather, 60-3307 did not exclude evidence of the J-2 because the J-2 was not a change in the J-1, but was a wholly new design. Court again knows that this is a very sensitive issue in this case, and as such, has delved and given it quite a little bit of time. Folks, I've reviewed the material from the last hearing, the case law, and, or course, the motion of the defendant in this case, which was very informative. But the Court's opinion does not change.  The Court did not make this determination [ of J-2's admissibility ] on finding that the Tracker or the Vitara are not similar vehicles. The Court made this decision in applying 60-3307(a)(2) to the facts in this case. The facts in this case are that, defendants have alleged that, one, this was not a change in design; and, two, is not a similar vehicle, but, again, a wholly different design, not an upgrade, not an alteration, not a design change, or planning, or formulating, testing preparing, manufacturing, all of those things, it is not a change in any of that, it's a wholly new design. As such, based upon that, this Court has found, and will still find, that 60-3307(a)(2) has its place, but it's not in this case. The facts do not  that have been presented to this Court are different than the facts and the inadmissible evidence that is considered and should be kept out of 60-3307(a)(2). The reason being  again, I'll be very clear, this is not evidence of a design change, and it's a wholly new design. Court will find that 60-3307(a)(2), for those reasons, is not applicable. Evidence comes in. (Emphasis added.) On May 2, 2002,  5 days before trial began  Suzuki filed a brief in support of its evidentiary objections regarding the J-2. It argued that because the court had twice ruled the evidence of the J-2 was admissible because it was a wholly new design and therefore not similar to the J-1, then the evidence consequently had to be irrelevant to whether the J-1 had been defectively designed. In short, it renewed its alternative position from the original motion in limine. It again cited the Yoshihisa Inoue affidavit to argue the J-2 was dissimilar. The court denied the requested relief, essentially concluding that the designs of the two vehicles were wholly different; that they therefore did not constitute changes; and that as a result the J-2 evidence was not excluded by 60-3307. Accordingly, at trial the jury heard testimony from yet another Suzuki representative, engineer Eiji Mochizuki, during Griffin's case in chief. He testified through a translator that the J-2 vehicle is a completely new design. The J-1 had a truck-like ride with a four-passenger capacity, while the J-2 had a five-passenger capacity and was developed to be like a passenger car with a powerful engine, a good ride, and quiet operation. The Court of Appeals held the admission of the J-2 evidence was reversible error. In doing so, it focused on the similarities between the J-1 and the J-2, concluding that [a]mple evidence of product similarity was presented at trial. Griffin v. Suzuki Motor Corp., No. 89,466, unpublished opinion filed February 27, 2004. It then described in some detail the similarities between the vehicles. The court seemingly rejected Griffin's argument that the statements in Suzuki's motions were counsel's binding admissions and also that any error was invited by Suzuki. We disagree with this approach because the determination of a wholly different design was a preliminary finding of fact necessary to an evidentiary ruling made by the district court; searching the record for evidence to the contrary exceeds the scope of an appellate court's authority, as explained below. Before this court, Griffin continues to devote considerable effort to argue that Suzuki is conclusively bound by its statements appearing in its initial motion in limine on the issue. She argues Suzuki's counsel made a binding admission regarding wholly new design, specifically by paragraphs six and nine of its motion, and strongly suggests Suzuki is estopped from arguing otherwise. She cites, among other cases, In re Estate of Carrell, 183 Kan. 491, 496, 327 P.2d 883 (1958). Likewise, Suzuki continues to devote nearly the same considerable effort to argue the admission was merely an alternative pleading, suggesting it was not a fact but a legal argument. We need not address the parties' detailed positions regarding the effect of Suzuki's counsel's statements and arguments in Suzuki's motions because the district court's finding is supported by the pretrial affidavit of Suzuki's Yoshihisa Inoue. His affidavit dated February 22, 2002, was referenced in Suzuki's own motion in limine, as well as in its motion to reconsider, and had been provided to the district court as Exhibit F to Suzuki's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Add a Claim for Punitive Damages on March 5, 2002. It provided in relevant part: 1. . . . All of these vehicles [ e.g., J1 and J2 ] are differently designed vehicles with different design concepts and different design programs. . . . . 14. The J2 vehicles were designed as replacements for the J1 vehicles in part because the J1 vehicles reflected designs that were more than 10 years old. SMC designed the J2 vehicles from the ground up and incorporated new design features not found in the J1 vehicles. 15. From an engineering and design standpoint, the J1 and J2 vehicles are substantially different. The center of gravity height, curb weight, gross vehicle weight rating, overall length, interior occupant space, cargo space, fuel tank capacity, body structure, chassis frame, suspension setting and other numerous significant design details differ between the J1 and J2 vehicles. 16. The J1 and J2 vehicles were designed and developed at different times. There were different design concepts for the J1 and J2 vehicles, and, the J1 and J2 vehicles were developed in different design programs.  (Emphasis added.) Because the court's determination that the J-2 was a wholly new design is a finding of fact, it is subject to a substantial competent evidence standard. Substantial evidence is that which possesses both relevance and substance and which furnishes a substantial basis of fact from which the issues can reasonably be resolved. U.S.D. No. 233 v. Kansas Ass'n of American Educators, 275 Kan. 313, 318, 64 P.3d 372 (2003). On appeal, we do not weigh conflicting evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or redetermine questions of fact. We also accept as true all inferences to be drawn from the evidence which support or tend to support the findings of the district court. 275 Kan. at 320. After reviewing the Inoue affidavit, we conclude the district court's pretrial finding is supported by substantial competent evidence. Our affirmation of the district court's factual finding that the J-2 was a wholly different design, however, merely leads us to the second major step in our analysis: Determining whether evidence of a wholly different design is excluded by K.S.A. 60-3307(a)(2). We first observe that K.S.A. 60-3307(a)(2) makes inadmissible for any purpose, evidence of any changes made in the designing . . . of . . . the product in issue, or any similar product . . . . (Emphasis added.) The district court's interpretation essentially provides that a wholly different design cannot constitute any changes in the original design. As mentioned, the interpretation of a statute is a question of law, our review is unlimited, and this court is not bound by the district court's interpretation. State v. White, 279 Kan. 326, 332, 109 P.3d 1199 (2005). The fundamental rule to which all other rules are subordinate is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained, and when a statute is plain and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed rather than determine what the law should or should not be. Schmidtlien Electric, Inc., v. Greathouse, 278 Kan. 810, 822, 104 P.3d 378 (2005). Intent of the legislature is to be derived in the first place from the words used. McCraw v. City of Merriam, 271 Kan. 912, 915, 26 P.3d 689 (2001). When construing a statute, a court should give words in common usage their natural and ordinary meaning. Schmidtlien Electric, Inc., v. Greathouse, 278 Kan. at 822. The face of the statute makes it clear that any change in the design of a product made after the product is designed, formulated, tested, manufactured, or sold is inadmissible for any purpose, except to meet a defendant's denial of feasibility. As Suzuki correctly observes in its brief, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1980) defines change as including to make different in some particular, and to replace one with another, and to make a shift from one to another. Accordingly, we hold that a change in design in a manufacturer's small SUV would encompass a wholly different design manifested in the same manufacturer's later generation small SUV serving as a replacement to the original  particularly when, as here, the two generations of vehicles are similar enough to render the later vehicle relevant as evidence for comparative purposes under the doctrine expressed in Betts v. General Motors Corp., 236 Kan. 108, 114, 689 P.2d 795 (1984), and Floyd v. General Motors Corp., 25 Kan. App. 2d 71, 73-74, 960 P.2d 763 (1998). Although not necessary to our resolution of the issue, we observe that our holding is also consistent with the purposes of the KPLA. Similarly, without our determining that K.S.A. 60-3307(a)(1) was ambiguous, in Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 253 Kan. 741, 861 P.2d 1299 (1993), we discussed its purposes and some legislative history. Patton was a product liability case involving a field cultivator. According to the Patton court, the KPLA became effective July 1, 1981, and is based on the Model Uniform Product Liability Act. Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 253 Kan. at 756. The purpose of the Model Act was to consolidate all product liability actions, regardless of theory into one theory of legal liability. 253 Kan. at 756. K.S.A. 60-3307, however, was not passed until 1986. See Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a New Cloth for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects  A Survey of the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 493, 673 (Winter 1996) (In 1981, Kansas adopted a comprehensive Products Liability Act which severely limited consumers rights. The 1981 Act was amended several times to extend its anti-consumer aspects.). The Patton court highlighted the following from some of the 1986 amendment's legislative history: Legislative hearings on S.B. 668 (K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 60-3307) included a statement from the President of the Senate, Senator Robert V. Talkington, who supported the bill's passage: `I encourage the committee to support a bill which would prohibit the admission into evidence, during court proceedings, of information related to normal advancements or changes in knowledge or techniques of production, design theory, and packaging of products. ` Normal product changes are a result of the growth of knowledge and not a desire to cover-up design inadequacies. Passage of this measure would not mean victims of poorly designed products would be unable to seek and achieve compensation for injuries sustained from proper use of such products. What S.B. 668 would do is prevent the mere change of a product or product package being construed in court as an implicit acknowledgment that the original design was defective. `I urge the committee to support this bill to provide an additional element of fairness in our judicial process and encourage economic development and growth in Kansas.' Minutes of Senate Judiciary Committee, March 6, 1986, A-II. (Emphasis added.) 253 Kan. at 758-59. The Patton court immediately thereafter concluded: We believe that 60-3307 is an attempt to codify the wide variety of circumstances that may occur under the rule that excludes evidence of subsequent remedial procedures. See Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 862 F.2d 1404, 1410 n.2 (10th Cir.1988) (farm combine strict product liability case). K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 60-3307 encourages manufacturers to make their products as safe as possible, free from the fear that remedial measures will be used adversely in later litigation. See also K.S.A. 60-451 (relating to subsequent remedial conduct). We view 60-3307 as a `state-of-the-art' statute which prohibits the introduction of post-manufacture remedial measures, except as provided by 60-3307(b) (evidence allowed to impeach a witness after a manufacturer's or seller's express denial of the feasibility of the remedial measure). See Siruta v. Hesston Corp., 232 Kan. 654, 667, 659 P.2d 799 (1983), for our approval of the admissibility of `feasibility' evidence before the enactment of 60-3307. We consider the following to be the operative language in the context of the case at bar: `if such advancements or changes have been made, learned or placed into common use subsequent to the time the product in issue was . . . sold by the manufacturer.' K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 60-3307(a)(1). Patton, 253 Kan. at 758-59. The Patton court also identified the public policy contained in the KPLA, stating: The legislature, in the KPLA, has clearly declared the public policy of the State. The policy is to limit the rights of plaintiffs to recover in product liability suits generally and to judge a product for an alleged defect only when it is first sold. 253 Kan. at 752. The Patton court, which addressed allegations of a farm implement manufacturer's post-sale duty to warn, also examined the negative practical consequences of accepting an argument by its plaintiff, stating: Well-made farm implements last a long time. Durability would be perceived by manufacturers as a negative factor if manufacturers were subjected to post-sale duties. The rule of law Patton seeks to have us adopt will stifle technology and suppress product safety development. Under Patton's scenario, a manufacturer would be far safer to design a machine intended to wear out in a few years. Replacement would be required more often, and more machines, albeit inferior ones, would be sold. Pride of product design and improvement would become secondary to fear of liability. Farmers and implement manufacturers would both be losers.  253 Kan. at 752. (Emphasis added.) To accept Griffin's statutory interpretation is to send a similar stifling and suppressing message to manufacturers, i.e., that their design changes should be incremental, and not extensive. In other words, there should be no wholly different designs, no wholesale innovations, and no successor generations of improved product  even though the extensive changes could be safer, and perhaps cheaper, for the consumer if introduced now. As noted in Patton, pride of product design and improvement would become secondary to fear of liability. Consumers and vehicle manufacturers would both be losers. Accepting Griffin's statutory interpretation also is inconsistent with our statement in Patton that K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 60-3307 prohibits the admission: (1) of subsequent product improvements, and (2) `for any purpose,' not only product design improvements, but also later acquired knowledge as to warnings and hazards. (Emphasis added.) 253 Kan. at 751. Such an interpretation is also inconsistent with the legislative history quoted there: `a bill which would prohibit the admission into evidence, during court proceedings, of information related to normal advancements or changes in . . . design theory. ' (Emphasis added.) 253 Kan. at 758. As in Griffin's pretrial arguments, she reminds us that she is merely trying to use the J-2 as her reasonable alternative design to show the J-1 was in a defective condition, as is allowed by Kansas law. She argues the J-2 evidence was specifically used by her expert witness Allen to demonstrate the feasibility, adequacy, and effectiveness of his reasonable alternative design and should not be prohibited merely because it too is Suzuki's product. As in Suzuki's pretrial motions, it responds that a reasonable alternative design is not required and that Griffin may utilize one as long as it is not Suzuki's successor or replacement small SUV. We agree with Suzuki. Griffin's experts may still assert their alternative designs, including the same changes that may be found in the J-2. But the Kansas Legislature has precluded from evidence the fact that those designs may now be found in a subsequent Suzuki product. K.S.A. 60-3307 is clear: design changes cannot be used for any purpose except to meet a manufacturer's allegation that the changes are not feasible. And Suzuki has never claimed lack of feasibility. In short, allowing a manufacturer's later product to be introduced into evidence as a reasonable alternative design to the manufacturer's original product could lead a jury to wrongly conclude the later product is substantial proof that the earlier was defective and that the later product repaired this defect with its new design. This path is contrary to the basic theme contained in 60-3307. Cf. Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 253 Kan. at 759 (We believe that 60-3307 is an attempt to codify the wide variety of circumstances that may occur under the rule that excludes evidence of subsequent remedial procedures.).