Opinion ID: 2784487
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Were the Statements Improper?

Text: Prosecutors enjoy wide latitude in crafting closing arguments. State v. Scott, 271 Kan. 103, 114, 21 P.3d 516 (2001). A misstatement of the law during a prosecutor's closing argument can deny a defendant a fair trial when 'the facts are such that the jury could have been confused or misled by the statement.' State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 509, 544, 324 P.3d 1078 (2014) (quoting State v. Phillips, 295 Kan. 929, Syl. ¶ 5, 287 P.3d 245 (2012). With regard to lesser included offenses, K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 22-3414(3) states: In cases where there is some evidence which would reasonably justify a conviction of some lesser included crime . . . the judge shall instruct the jury as to the crime charged and any such lesser included crime. K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-5108(b) states: When there is a reasonable doubt as to which of two or more degrees of a crime the defendant is guilty, the defendant shall be convicted of the lowest degree only. In State v. Trujillo, 225 Kan. 320, 324, 590 P.2d 1027 (1979), the defendant complained that the district court, though instructing the jury on several lesser offenses of the charged offense, erred by not sequencing them in descending order of severity or providing guidance to the jury on which lesser offense was the more serious. The Trujillo court stated that in the interests of promoting an orderly method of considering the possible verdicts, a trial court should instruct on lesser included offenses in the order of severity beginning with the offense with the most severe penalty. 225 Kan. at 324. 7 The pattern instructions reflect Trujillo's command. In addition to organizing lesser included offenses by descending severity level, the pattern instructions recommend placing a transitional statement at the beginning of the elements instruction for each lesser offense. For example, when the facts warrant giving an instruction on seconddegree murder as a lesser included offense of first-degree murder, the pattern instructions recommend placing the following statement at the beginning of the elements instruction on second-degree murder: If you do not agree that the defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree, you should then consider the lesser included offense of murder in the second degree. PIK Crim. 4th 54.140. Consistent with the pattern instructions, the district court placed this language at the beginning of the elements instruction for seconddegree murder. Similarly, the district court prefaced the elements instruction for involuntary manslaughter by instructing the jury that if it did not agree that the defendant is guilty of second-degree murder, you should then consider the charge of involuntary manslaughter. In State v. Korbel, 231 Kan. 657, 661, 647 P.2d 1301 (1982), the defendant claimed that the instructional language if you cannot agree that the defendant is guilty coerced the jury into returning a verdict of guilty on the more severe charge. The court rejected this argument, stating: The words 'if you cannot agree' when used to preface an instruction on a lesser charge are not coercive and do not require the members of a jury to unanimously find the accused innocent of the greater charge before proceeding to consider a lesser charge. The words 'if you cannot agree' presuppose less than a unanimous decision and no inference arises that an acquittal of the greater charge is required before considering the lesser. 231 Kan. at 661. See also State v. Roberson, 272 Kan. 1143, 1153-55, 38 P.3d 715, cert. denied 537 U.S. 829 (2002), overruled on other grounds State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, 144 P.3d 647 8 (2006) (relying on Korbel to reject challenge to if you do not agree language prefacing lesser offense element instructions; language did not require jury to reach unanimous decision acquitting defendant of greater charge before considering lesser charges). Notably, in State v. Carter, 284 Kan. 312, 331-32, 160 P.3d 457 (2007), this court, relying on Roberson, Korbel, and other cases, found that instructions directing jurors to move on to consideration of lesser included offenses only if they do not agree or if they do not find defendant guilty were not coercive and correctly stated the law. Based on Korbel and the statutory mandate requiring that a defendant be convicted of a lesser crime [w]hen there is a reasonable doubt as to which of two or more degrees of a crime the defendant is guilty, see K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-5108(b), this court in State v. Hurt, 278 Kan. 676, 682, 101 P.3d 1249 (2004), held that a prosecutor would be misstating the law if he or she argued to jurors that all 12 of them had to agree that there was reasonable doubt concerning the crime charged before they could even consider the defendant's guilt for a lesser included offense. See also State v. Jones, 298 Kan. 324, 339, 311 P.3d 1125 (2013) (prosecutor misstated the law when she told jurors: '[B]efore you get all the way to this lesser excuse kind of homicide, voluntary manslaughter, . . . you have to all agree that there's no premeditation'; statement conveyed to jurors that each had to reject premeditation before a lesser included offense could be considered). The above statutes and caselaw show that it is improper to instruct or tell a jury that it must unanimously acquit the defendant of the charged offense before it can consider lesser included offenses. But, as this court's decision in Carter shows, directing jurors to move on to consideration of lesser included offenses only if they do not agree or if they do not find the defendant guilty of the charged offense is not coercive and correctly states the law. See Carter, 284 Kan. 312, Syl. ¶ 14. The reason for this, as explained in Korbel, is because the phrases do not require the jurors to unanimously 9 acquit the defendant of the greater charge before considering a lesser charge. Korbel, 231 Kan. at 661. Based on the above analysis, the prosecutor's comments directing the jurors to consider Parker's guilt for the lesser included offenses only if they first found him not guilty of felony murder were incorrect statements of the law because a guilty or not guilty verdict requires unanimous agreement amongst the jurors. See K.S.A. 22-3421; State v. Cheek, 262 Kan. 91, 108, 936 P.2d 749 (1997) (The authority for [instructing jurors that their agreement upon a verdict must be unanimous] is based on the fundamental right of any accused to a trial by jury, §§ 5 and 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, and K.S.A. 22-3403, together with our statute requiring a unanimous verdict under K.S.A. 223421.). Such a statement is distinguishable from telling a jury to move on to consideration of lesser included offenses only if they do not agree or if they do not find the defendant guilty of the charged offense because these statements presuppose a less than unanimous conclusion amongst the jurors. Accordingly, the prosecutor's statements were outside the wide latitude given to prosecutors in crafting closing arguments and, thus, constitute misconduct. B. Did the Prosecutor Commit Reversible Misconduct? Because we have concluded that the prosecutor's statements were erroneous, we now determine whether the comments constitute reversible misconduct. This involves a three-factor inquiry: (1) whether the misconduct was gross and flagrant; (2) whether it was motivated by prosecutorial ill will; and (3) whether the evidence was of such a direct and overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely have had little weight in the minds of jurors. No one factor is controlling. State v. Crawford, 300 Kan. 740, Syl. ¶ 3, 334 P.3d 311 (2014); Bridges, 297 Kan. at 1012; State v. Tosh, 278 Kan. 83, 93, 91 P.3d 1204 (2004). Before the third factor can ever override the first two factors, an appellate 10 court must be able to say that the State can meet both the statutory harmlessness standard stated in K.S.A. 60-261 and the constitutional standard stated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 (1967). Crawford, 300 Kan. at 740, Syl. ¶ 4; Bridges, 297 Kan. at 1012-13 (citing Tosh, 278 Kan. at 97). This court has noted that, as a practical matter, the result of the harmless error evaluation depends on the outcome of the Chapman constitutional standard. [B]oth the constitutional and nonconstitutional error clearly arise from the very same acts and omissions, and the constitutional standard is more rigorous. Bridges, 297 Kan. at 1015. Thus, the State necessarily meets the lower statutory standard under K.S.A. 60-261 if it meets the higher constitutional standard. With regard to the first factor—whether the misconduct was gross and flagrant— this court considers whether the misconduct was repeated, was emphasized, violated a long-standing rule, violated a clear and unequivocal rule, or violated a rule designed to protect a constitutional right. State v. Marshall, 294 Kan. 850, Syl. ¶ 6, 281 P.3d 1112 (2012). In analyzing whether a prosecutor's misconduct was motivated by ill will, the court considers whether the misconduct was deliberate, repeated, or in apparent indifference to a court's ruling. 294 Kan. 850, Syl. ¶ 7. Though the prosecutor made two incorrect statements of law regarding how the jury was to consider Parker's guilt for the lesser included crimes, the prosecutor also correctly told the jurors if they did not agree Parker was guilty of felony murder, then they should consider whether Parker was guilty of the lesser included offenses. See Korbel, 231 Kan. at 661 (The words 'if you cannot agree' when used to preface an instruction on a lesser charge are not coercive and do not require the members of a jury to unanimously find the accused innocent of the greater charge before proceeding to consider a lesser charge.). Where a prosecutor makes both a misstatement of the law 11 and a correct recitation of the applicable law in a closing argument, we have been loath[] to characterize the misstatement as being gross and flagrant misconduct. [Citations omitted.] Neither does such a situation support a finding of ill will. State v. Naputi, 293 Kan. 55, 62, 260 P.3d 86 (2011). Similarly, we do not characterize the prosecutor's comments here as either gross and flagrant or the product of ill will. See Jones, 298 Kan. at 339-40 (court refused to find that prosecutor's incorrect statement regarding jury's consideration of lesser included offenses was gross and flagrant or motivated by ill will because, prior to making improper comment, prosecutor correctly told jury: [I]f you cannot agree [on the existence of premeditation], only then do you go to second and determine whether or not the State has proven second-degree murder). Finally, the third factor: Was the evidence of such a direct and overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely have had little weight in the minds of jurors? In answering this question, the State, as the party benefit[ting] from the prosecutorial misconduct, bears the burden to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the defendant's substantial rights, i.e., there is no reasonable possibility the error affected the verdict. State v. Inkelaar, 293 Kan. 414, 431, 264 P.3d 81 (2011); see, e.g., State v. Raskie, 293 Kan. 906, 918, 269 P.3d 1268 (2012) (finding prosecutor's misstatement did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record). The evidence presented at trial showed that Parker committed a criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied building by recklessly and without authority firing his AR15 rifle multiple times at the MC's clubhouse while numerous people were inside. See K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6308(a)(1)(A). Because Beverly was killed during the commission of this inherently dangerous felony, the evidence clearly established that Parker was guilty of felony murder. See K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-5402(a)(2) and (c)(1)(O). Accordingly, we conclude that there is no reasonable possibility that the prosecutor's comments affected the verdict. 12 In passing, we note another reason for finding harmless the comments at issue here: Prior to Parker's trial in August 2013, the legislature amended the first-degree murder statute to state that there are no lesser included offenses of felony murder and that this change applies retroactively to all pending cases. See K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-5402(d) and (e). In State v. Todd, 299 Kan. 263, Syl. ¶ 4, 323 P.3d 829 (2014), this court held that the 2013 amendment did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause and, thus, could be properly applied to all cases not yet final. Since Todd, this court on numerous occasions has summarily rejected a defendant's contention that the district court erred by not giving instructions on lesser included offenses of felony murder. See e.g., State v. Clay, 300 Kan. 401, 409, 329 P.3d 484 (2014) (Based on Todd, we conclude Clay was not legally entitled to either an unintentional second-degree murder instruction or an involuntary manslaughter instruction as a lesser included offense of felony murder.). Based on K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-5402(d) and (e), the district court in this case should not have instructed on second-degree unintentional murder or involuntary manslaughter as lesser included offenses of felony murder because felony murder no longer has lesser included offenses. Thus, the instructions were not legally appropriate. Because Parker was not legally entitled to any instructions on lesser included offenses of felony murder, he could not have been prejudiced by the prosecutor's comments regarding how the jury was to consider his guilt for the lesser included crimes. Though we conclude that the prosecutor committed misconduct, the misconduct did not prejudice the jury against Parker and deny him a fair trial. Thus, we affirm Parker's convictions and sentence. 13