Opinion ID: 1563391
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Tagoe's Claims of Error

Text: As previously mentioned, Tagoe's unexcused failure to give timely written notice of her injury does not bar her claim for medical and vocational rehabilitation benefits. Her entitlement to medical benefits is not in dispute. The ALJ denied Tagoe's claim for vocational rehabilitation because he found that she was not disabled, a finding the Director upheld. In brief, the ALJ found Tagoe's migraines did not prevent her from continuing to work full-time as a physician; her decision to pursue an alternative career was not necessitated by her stroke and its sequelae; and she suffered no wage loss as a result of her injury. [33] Tagoe does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support those determinations, but instead complains of certain rulings by the ALJ or the Director admitting or excluding evidence, and of the ALJ's determination not to address her vocational rehabilitation request. We see no reason to disturb the evidentiary rulings. Over Tagoe's objection, the ALJ admitted supplemental medical reports by Dr. Weir and an independent physician who examined Tagoe at the Hospital's request, even though the reports were prepared and submitted after the close of discovery. The reports opined that Tagoe's recurring migraines were not linked to her stroke. Nonetheless, Tagoe was not prejudiced by the discretionary ruling admitting the reports, because the ALJ found the necessary medical causal relationship in spite of them, and the Hospital has not sought review of that finding. Tagoe also contends the Director erred by refusing to allow her to introduce new evidence when she appealed the ALJ's initial compensation order. The new evidence consisted of (1) records of medical treatment Tagoe received at Alexandria Hospital for her headaches, which allegedly would have contradicted a subsidiary finding by the ALJ that Tagoe did not seek such post-injury treatment; and (2) documents pertaining to a complaint Tagoe submitted to the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME), which allegedly would have undermined the testimony of one of her program supervisors. [34] Under former D.C.Code § 32-1522(b)(2) (2001), the Director had discretion to allow Tagoe to augment the record with additional evidence upon a sufficient showing of its materiality and reasonable grounds for her failure to present the evidence in the initial hearing. [35] We are not persuaded that the Director abused his discretion by denying Tagoe's request. The evidence was not newly discovered, its materiality is doubtful, and Tagoe did not demonstrate good reasons for failing to offer it at the hearing before the ALJ. [36] Finally, the ALJ stated in her compensation order that, because Tagoe was not disabled, she would not address Tagoe's request for vocational rehabilitation payments. The Director affirmed the compensation order without specifically addressing the subject of vocational rehabilitation. We perceive no error in this regard. In pertinent part, the Workers' Compensation Act provides that [v]ocational rehabilitation shall be designed, within reason, to return the employee to employment at a wage as close as possible to the wage that the employee earned at the time of injury. The Mayor shall monitor the provision of vocational rehabilitation of disabled employees and determine the adequacy and sufficiency of such rehabilitation. [37] Since, per the ALJ's finding, Tagoe suffered no wage loss and was not disabled as a result of her injury, she could show no entitlement to vocational rehabilitation benefits under this statute.