Opinion ID: 2284361
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: References to the Laker Fee

Text: Appellants filed a motion in limine for an order prohibiting any references to the Laker litigation fee, arguing that it was irrelevant to the issues at trial and that any probative value it had would be outweighed by its potential for prejudice. After Judge Kessler denied the motion, appellants renewed the issue before Judge Weisberg, who stated: I think it is really essential to the plaintiff's case that the jury be told that there was an amount that was speculated about in June of '84 and an amount that was received in October '85[;] to the extent that any of that forms the jury assessment of what the parties intended in June of '84 or July of '84 they are entitled to know that. And also the motives of the parties in acting the way they did. [Emphasis added.] Farmer defends the latter basis for admission, arguing that a central question before the jury was whether Beckman and Kirstein had breached their fiduciary duties to him, and that evidence of the feeparticularly its sizetended to show their motive to breach those duties. We agree. By the time Farmer's cause of action went to the jury, directed verdicts had reduced it to the claim that Beckman and Kirstein wrongfully denied him his share of the Laker fee, thus breaching their fiduciary duties, and that Beckman's conduct was aggravated so as to warrant punitive damages. Farmer's evidence of the fiduciary breach spanned a time period both before and after the Separation of Practice Agreement was executed. Testimony and documents concerning receipt of the fee and its amount offered an explanation why appellants resisted his demand that they wind up and account. Beckman argues that even if the evidence was relevant on this ground, Farmer used it to argue improperly to the jury that he could not have intended to surrender his share of so large a fee in the July 6 agreement in exchange for so little. We need not decide whether the jury could have properly considered it for that purpose, because Judge Weisberg specifically instructed the jury that it was not to let the fact that a large fee was ultimately received affect its decision whether Farmer had waived a share of the fee. [34] He also instructed the jury that arguments of counsel were not evidence, and were not to be used as a basis for its findings. We presume that these instructions were followed unless the contrary appears, or the circumstances are very unusual. Weeda v. District of Columbia, 521 A.2d 1156, 1163 (D.C.1987) (citation omitted). There was no error in the admission of this evidence.