Opinion ID: 2602301
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a Child

Text: ¶ 17 At issue in this interlocutory appeal is whether the district court correctly denied Lusk's motion to dismiss by ruling that the statute of limitations did not bar prosecution of Lusk for aggravated sexual abuse of a child.
¶ 18 To determine whether the district court correctly concluded that the statute of limitations has not run to bar prosecution of Lusk for aggravated sexual abuse of a child, we must first determine which statute of limitations applied to aggravated sexual abuse of a child when Lusk allegedly committed the crimes, Featherstone v. Schaerrer, 2001 UT 86, n. 2, 34 P.3d 194 (we apply the law as it existed at the time of the violation charged), and then determine if that limitations period expired before the State charged Lusk. [3] ¶ 19 The determination of which statute of limitations applied to aggravated sexual abuse of a child at the time that Lusk allegedly sexually abused the girls is a question of statutory interpretation. [O]ur primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. We need look beyond the plain language only if we find some ambiguity. State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, ¶ 25, 4 P.3d 795 (citations omitted); see also Dairy Prod. Servs., Inc. v. City of Wellsville, 2000 UT 81, ¶ 20, 13 P.3d 581. In other words, only if there is ambiguity [in a statute] do we look beyond the plain language to legislative history or policy considerations. Vigos v. Mountainland Builders, Inc., 2000 UT 2, ¶ 13, 993 P.2d 207 (citing Olsen v. McIntyre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah 1998)). ¶ 20 In the instant case, no ambiguity inheres in the statute. Indeed, the statute in question, section 76-1-303(c), as enacted in 1983, explicitly named the crimes to which the eight-year statute of limitations set forth therein applied. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-303(c) (1983). [4] ¶ 21 In 1983 and 1984 when Lusk allegedly sexually abused N.H. and H.H., the eight-year statute of limitations set forth in section 76-1-303(c) applied to sexual abuse of a child, but did not explicitly apply to aggravated sexual abuse of a child. We held in State v. Lavoto that the eight-year statute of limitations applie[d] only to the crimes . . . specified in section 76-1-303(c). 776 P.2d 912, 913 (Utah 1989). We noted that our conclusion was supported by the language of [the statute] itself because the legislature specified the exact names of the crimes in [section] 76-1-303(c) to which the legislature intended the eight-year statute of limitations to apply. Id. at 913-14. We decline to depart from our conclusion in Lavoto that the eight-year statute of limitations applied only to the crimes specifically named in the statute. ¶ 22 In 1983, when Lusk allegedly began sexually abusing the girls, aggravated sexual abuse of a child had not yet been statutorily created as a crime in Utah. Then, in 1984, when the Utah Legislature created the crime of aggravated sexual abuse of a child, it did not simultaneously amend section 76-1-303(c) to specifically make the eight-year statute of limitations, which was already explicitly applicable to sexual abuse of a child, applicable to aggravated sexual abuse of a child. [5] According to the plain language of the statute as it read in 1983 and 1984, aggravated sexual abuse of a child was not expressly named in section 76-1-303(c), and therefore, the eight-year statute of limitations did not apply to the crime. [6] ¶ 23 Furthermore, when the legislature enacted the statute defining the crime of aggravated sexual abuse of a child in 1984, the legislature did not specify that any other limitations period applied to the crime. By not specifying that a particular statute of limitations applied to aggravated sexual abuse of a child, the legislature tacitly mandated that the four-year catchall statute of limitations applied to the crime. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-302(1)(a) (1978). Section 76-1-302(1)(a), as it existed in 1983, provided in pertinent part: (1) Except as otherwise provided in this part, prosecutions for other offenses are subject to the following periods of limitation: (a) A prosecution for a felony must be commenced within four years after it is committed. . . . Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-302(1)(a) (1978) (emphasis added). The plain language of section 76-1-302(1)(a) as it read in 1983 was clear that unless an exception to this four-year catchall statute of limitations was otherwise provided, a felony would be subject to the four-year catchall statute of limitations. Id. In fact, we recognized in Lavoto that the crime-specific limitations periods of section 76-1-303(c) acted only as an exception to the four-year catchall statute of limitations and crimes not specifically enumerated therein were covered by the four-year catchall statute of limitations. 776 P.2d at 914; see also Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-302(1)(a) (1978), 303(c) (1983). ¶ 24 Because section 76-1-303(c) (1983) did not explicitly include aggravated sexual abuse of a child in the list of crimes to which the eight-year statute of limitations applied  and no other limitations period explicitly applied to aggravated sexual abuse of a child  we conclude that according to section 76-1-302(1)(a) (1978), the four-year catchall statute of limitations was the proper limitations period for the crime. Accordingly, inasmuch as the State alleged that Lusk committed the aggravated sexual abuse of a child between August 1983 and April 1984, the four-year catchall statute of limitations would have expired in April 1988 at the latest, precluding the State from subsequently charging Lusk with aggravated sexual abuse of a child. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-302(1)(a) (1978). Because the State did not charge Lusk with aggravated sexual abuse of a child until December 20, 1999, more than eleven years after the four-year catchall statute of limitations expired, the statute of limitations bars the charges unless we determine that an extension of the applicable limitations period should be applied retroactively.
¶ 25 The State contends that the legislature's 1996 amendment of section 76-1-303.5, which added aggravated sexual abuse of a child to the list of crimes specifically covered by the four years after report statute of limitations, applies retroactively so that the State can now charge Lusk with aggravated sexual abuse of a child for his alleged sexual abuse occurring between August 1983 and April 1984. We conclude, however, that the State could not charge Lusk in December 1999 with aggravated sexual abuse of a child for acts that occurred in 1983 and 1984 because the applicable four-year catchall statute of limitations expired before the 1996 amendment became effective. ¶ 26 We hold that a statutory amendment enlarging a statute of limitations will extend the limitations period applicable to a crime already committed only if the amendment becomes effective before the previously applicable statute of limitations has run, thereby barring prosecution of the crime. In other words, no subsequent amendment of a statute that enlarges a limitations period can resurrect the State's ability to prosecute a crime already barred because of the running of the statute of limitations. ¶ 27 It is a long-standing rule of statutory construction that a legislative enactment which alters the substantive law or affects vested rights will not be read to operate retrospectively unless the legislature has clearly expressed that intention. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 253 (Utah 1988); accord Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 953 P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 1997); Roark v. Crabtree, 893 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah 1995). Nevertheless, where such specific legislative intent is absent, a statute may be applied retroactively if it is procedural in nature and does not enlarge or eliminate vested rights. Evans & Sutherland, 953 P.2d at 437-38; see also Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Indus. Comm'n, 947 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah 1997); State ex rel. Kirby v. Jacoby, 1999 UT App 52, ¶ 10, 975 P.2d 939. ¶ 28 Amendments to statutes that extend limitations periods may be applied retroactively under appropriate circumstances. We have previously stated, Statutes of limitations are essentially procedural in nature and . . . do not abolish a substantive right to sue. . . . Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 575 (Utah 1993). Because statutes of limitations are procedural in nature, a legislative amendment enlarging a limitation period may be applied retroactively to crimes committed before the amendment where the limitations defense has not accrued to the defendant before the amendment becomes effective. See Roark, 893 P.2d at 1061; see also State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 586 (Utah 1983) (dictum), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 424-28 (Utah 1986); Jacoby, 1999 UT App 52 at ¶ 13, 975 P.2d 939. ¶ 29 Conversely, a legislative enactment extending a statute of limitations will not be retroactively applied to a crime committed if prosecution of that crime would already be precluded by the running of the previously applicable statute of limitations. See Roark, 893 P.2d at 1062 ([A]n act increasing the period of limitation could not operate to affect or renew a cause of action already barred.). In sum, we reiterate what we said in Del Monte Corp. v. Moore: The general and well-established principle of law is that statutes prescribing limitations relate to remedies; and that the legislature has power to increase the time in which an action may be brought. In that connection it should be observed that if the statute has run on a cause of action, so that it is dead, it cannot be revived by any such statutory extension. But if the cause of action is still alive, the new enactment can extend the time in which it may be brought. 580 P.2d 224, 225 (Utah 1978) (footnotes omitted). We believe that this language from Del Monte regarding civil actions similarly applies to criminal prosecutions. ¶ 30 Moreover, although statutes of limitation may be procedural in nature, a statutory amendment extending a statute of limitations will not be applied retroactively when it eliminates a vested right. Jacoby, 1999 UT App 52 at ¶ 10. We have consistently held that once the statute of limitations has run in a particular case, a defendant has a vested right to rely on the limitations defense, which right cannot be rescinded by subsequent legislation extending a limitations period. [7] DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 851 (Utah 1996); Roark, 893 P.2d at 1063; see also 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 44 (1970) ([A]fter a cause of action has become barred by the statute of limitations the defendant has a vested right to rely on that statute as a defense.). If we permitted a legislative enactment to be applied retroactively to extend the statute of limitations after the limitations period previously applicable to a committed crime had already run, then the defendant's vested right to rely on a limitations defense would be eliminated. Otherwise, the statute of limitations would only imperfectly bar prosecution of a crime to which the limitations period had expired because a subsequent legislative extension of the statute of limitations would resurrect that dead crime, solely upon the whim and vagary of the legislature. Such a result would be untenable. Hence, we hold that once the statute of limitations has run on a crime committed, precluding prosecution of the crime, it is forever barred and a defendant's vested right to rely on that limitations defense cannot be eliminated by subsequent legislative action. ¶ 31 In the instant case, the statute amending section 76-1-303.5 to include aggravated sexual abuse of a child was enacted approximately eight years after the four-year catchall statute of limitations had run with respect to charging Lusk with aggravated sexual abuse of a child for his actions in 1983 and 1984. As discussed above, the four-year catchall statute of limitations ran on that crime in April 1988. The amendment of section 76-1-303.5, which specifically provided that the four years after report statute of limitations was applicable to aggravated sexual abuse of a child, was not effective until 1996. Simply put, the 1996 amendment went into effect too late to resurrect the charges that could have only been brought against Lusk by April 1988. Therefore, we conclude that no statutory amendment became effective before the four-year catchall statute of limitations ran in April 1988, thereby precluding the State from charging Lusk with aggravated sexual abuse of a child after that date. Because the State charged Lusk with the crime in December 1999, the State filed the charges after the statute of limitations expired, and the charges should have been dismissed.