Opinion ID: 776953
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Andrade to Bray's and Brown' Sentences

Text: 37 Bray's and Brown's cases are very similar to Andrade's in most respects. As in Andrade, Bray and Brown were convicted of shoplifting merchandise worth a small amount of money, an offense ordinarily punishable by a maximum of six months in jail, and sentenced to indeterminate life sentences. While the circumstances of these cases vary in several respects from those in Andrade, we conclude that none of these distinctions justifies a different result.
38 The State argues that Bray's and Brown's sentences are only half as long as Andrade's, so that Andrade 's gross disproportionality analysis has no application here. Andrade, however, was sentenced to 50 years to life for two petty theft convictions; his sentence was nothing more than a 25-year-to-life sentence for a petty theft conviction followed by a consecutive, identical sentence for a second petty theft conviction, imposed for a distinct, albeit similar, offense that occurred at a different time and place. Although Andrade was tried and sentenced at one time for his two offenses, the joint conviction was fortuitous; there could as easily have been separately imposed consecutive sentences. Moreover, Bray's and Brown's sentences are not half as long as Andrade's. Although their minimum term is half as long as Andrade's minimum term, Bray and Brown were sentenced to indeterminate life sentences and could serve as long for their single petty theft convictions as Andrade will for two. 39 It bears noting, in this connection, that the standard we are applying is one of proportionality — the relationship of the conviction to the crime. If Andrade's 50-year-to-life sentence for two petty theft convictions was grossly disproportionate, it follows that a 25-year-to-life sentence is grossly disproportionate to one petty theft conviction. A combined sentence for two entirely separate offenses cannot be grossly disproportionate if each individual sentence is not grossly disproportionate. 8 40 Andrade was sentenced to life imprisonment, with no possibility of parole for 50 years, at which time he would be 87 years old. Bray and Brown will both be eligible for parole in 25 years, when they will be about 59 and 67 years old, respectively. As to these possible differences in age on release, that factor cannot be determinative. An Eighth Amendment analysis necessarily considers the punishment for the offense, Solem, 463 U.S. at 292, 103 S.Ct. 3001, taking into account only those personal circumstances that may mitigate one's culpability in committing the crime. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). So, while Andrade mentioned the petitioner's age at possible release, the court could not have meant that the same sentence would have been acceptable for a 19-year old, or that a person with a limited life expectancy is constitutionally entitled to a short sentence for the same crime as a co-defendant not so impaired. Rather, the fact that Andrade could well die before serving out his sentence simply underscored the length of the mandatory sentence. Here, Bray and Brown entered prison as relatively young men and will emerge, if at all, as senior citizens (Brown) or close thereto (Bray), again demonstrating the length of their punishment. See Sistrunk v. Armenakis, 271 F.3d 1174, 1183 (9th Cir.2001) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (stating that the defendant's life was at stake, because to an adult man, a thirty-year sentence pretty much is life).
41 Nor does the length of Bray's and Brown's sentences change the result of the intrajurisdictional comparison performed in Andrade. Bray and Brown could each have been sentenced for up to three years in prison under Section 666 for their single petty theft convictions, in light of their prior records, while Andrade could have been sentenced for up to six years for his two petty thefts. A 25-year minimum sentence bears the same relationship to the usual three-year sentence for Bray's and Brown's crimes as a 50-year minimum does to the usual six-year sentence. See Andrade, 270 F.3d at 761. 42 Further, the violent crimes to which Andrade compared the 50-year sentence — second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, and sexual assault on a minor — all carry sentences considerably less than 25 years to life. See id. at 761-62. Moreover, defendants who commit the same crimes as Brown and Bray and whose records include serious or violent crimes but no theft convictions can be punished under California law by no more than six months in jail. See § 666. So Bray and Brown were sentenced to higher terms than criminals who commit serious violent crimes, and than criminals who commit the same crime and have a comparable past record of violent or serious crime. 43 Additionally, Andrade must necessarily have based its intrastate comparison on one 25-year-to life sentence rather than two; otherwise, the comparison should have been to two convictions for violent crimes, which it was not. See 270 F.3d at 761-62. Because Bray and Brown received indeterminate life sentences for one petty theft conviction although they could not have been so sentenced for many violent crimes, their sentence, if anything, is more disproportionate on an intrajurisdictional basis than was Andrade's. 44 Bray's and Brown's sentences, we recognize, do not have the distinguishing feature of Andrade's sentence, which was twice as long as that of most petty theft offenders sentenced under Three Strikes. But again, Andrade was sentenced for two, entirely distinct offenses. Anyone sentenced under Three Strikes for two petty thefts with priors would have received the same sentence. Any lack of similar sentences, then, must have been because no one else was sentenced for two such petty thefts under Three Strikes, not because others who were sentenced for similar crimes received lesser sentences. 45 The State nonetheless maintains that because a few hundred other defendants have been sentenced to 25 years to life under Three Strikes with the triggering offense of petty theft, the sentence is not disproportionate. As Andrade held, this approach is less than convincing, because it attempts to justify the constitutionally-suspect application of a statute by pointing to other applications of the same statute. Id. at 762. In other words, that a sentence is imposed frequently, while relevant to proportionality analysis, cannot be the determining factor, as the protections of the Eighth Amendment are not reserved only for aberrant situations. If, for example, the state decided to chop off the hands of everyone convicted of speeding, the likely conclusion that such a sentence is cruel and unusual would not change because the state inflicted it on many people. Thus, while a comparison between a particular defendant's sentence and that imposed on other recidivists may sometimes be informative, as it was in Andrade, such comparison is neither necessary nor, if one discovers only that others have been similarly sentenced under the same statute, entitled to much weight.
46 Andrade noted that in only four states can petty theft with a prior qualify for recidivist sentencing. Looking at those four states, we conclude that at the time his offense was committed and at the time he was sentenced, Bray could not have received a life sentence without possibility of parole in any of them. Brown could have received a life sentence without possibility of parole in Louisiana, because he was arrested and sentenced while a version of the Louisiana law so permitting was in effect. But, Louisiana has since amended its habitual offender law so that such a sentence is not currently available in Louisiana in either Bray's or Brown's case. Thus, if one can divine a contemporary judgment on the matter among the states, it is that the sentences Brown and Bray received are disproportionate to their petty theft offenses.
47 Like Andrade, Bray and Brown were convicted of stealing merchandise worth less than $100, an offense that cannot count as a felony in Rhode Island, even with prior theft convictions. R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-41-20(d); see also 270 F.3d at 763. Thus, the additional 25-year penalty for three-time felons, R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-21, would not have applied to either Bray or Brown, and the maximum term that Rhode Island could have imposed on them would be one year, id. § 11-41-20(d).
48 If two prior theft convictions were counted for each of them, Bray and Brown could have received up to 20 years in prison for a petty theft conviction under Texas' habitual offender law, Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 31.03(e)(4)(D), 12.42(a)(2) & (3), 12.33, but they would have been eligible for parole in five years, or even less with good time credits, Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 508.145(f) — a distinctly less onerous sentence than the mandatory 25-year sentence they will have to serve in California.
49 West Virginia allows for a life sentence upon a third felony conviction. W. Va. Code § 61-11-18(c). West Virginia, however, provides by statute that offenders sentenced to life under the recidivist statute are eligible for parole in 15 years. Id. § 62-12-13. Even if West Virginia would have allowed a life sentence for Bray or Brown, they would have been eligible for parole ten years earlier there than in California. Further, while Andrade concluded that West Virginia does not allow life sentences for non-violent recidivists, 270 F.3d at 765, West Virginia also precludes life sentences for some recidivists with violent prior felonies. 9 50 Under West Virginia constitutional proportionality law, the principal offense, not preceding felony convictions, is the central, albeit not exclusive, focus, since it provides the ultimate nexus to the sentence. Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher, 166 W.Va. 523, 276 S.E.2d 205, 212 (1981) (holding that a life sentence for check forgery violated the state constitution, even though one of the prior felonies was for arson); see also State v. Miller, 184 W.Va. 462, 400 S.E.2d 897, 898 (1990) (finding life sentence disproportionate for an assault conviction that involved a firearm, with prior felonies of breaking and entering, forgery, and false pretenses); State v. Lewis, 191 W.Va. 635, 447 S.E.2d 570, 575 (1994) (holding that a provision of the criminal code requiring a sentence of one year in prison for a third shoplifting offense violated the state constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment). Using this approach, the West Virginia Supreme Court has, on at least one occasion, held a life sentence in violation of state proportionality standards when the offender had a violent prior offense, stressing the remoteness in time of the violent offense. State v. Deal, 178 W.Va. 142, 358 S.E.2d 226, 231 (1987) (finding a life sentence disproportionate for possession of a controlled substance where the record revealed a violent prior felony conviction 16 years earlier). 51 Three of Bray's violent felony convictions occurred 15 years earlier, while the other was eight years before. It is therefore possible that, focusing on the non-violent nature of his petty theft offense and acknowledging that his prior violent felony convictions were dated, Bray's sentence would have been considered excessive in West Virginia. Brown's prior violent felony convictions occurred 13, 19, and 24 years prior to his petty theft offense. His sentence might well have been considered excessive in West Virginia, based on the age of the violent offenses.
52 Finally, under Louisiana's habitual offender statute, at the time the last offenses in these cases were committed, Bray could not have received a comparable sentence, although Brown could have received a higher one.
53 Before August 15, 1995, 10 the Louisiana habitual offender statute required that both the third or fourth strike triggering life imprisonment and two of the prior felonies be a crime of violence ..., a sex offense, or ... a violation of the Uniformed Controlled Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for ten years or more or any other crime[] punishable by imprisonment for twelve years or more. See 1995 La. Sess. Law. Serv. 1245 § 1 (West) (amending La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) & (c)(ii)). Because his current offense, albeit treatable as a felony if two prior thefts were considered, see La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 14:67(B)(3), is not within any of these special categories of felonies, Bray could not have received such a sentence had he committed his offense in Louisiana at the time he committed his petty theft in California. 54 Rather, the applicable Louisiana law when Bray committed his offense and received his sentence would have allowed him to be sentenced to a maximum of four years for his current offense: That offense could only have been charged as a third felony in Louisiana, because Louisiana considers only offenses tried separately. Bray was convicted of three of his four robberies in one trial, so he had — and has — at most three strikes under Louisiana law. See Andrade, 270 F.3d at 764 n. 22, 765 (citing State v. Butler, 601 So.2d 649, 650 (La.1992); State v. Corry, 610 So.2d 142, 147 (La.Ct.App.1992)). The petty theft offense, with two prior theft offenses, could be treated as a second or third subsequent felony, in which case the maximum sentence for Bray would have been twice the two-year maximum for a first-time offender. La.Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 14:67(B)(3), 15:529(A)(1)(b)(i); see also Andrade, 270 F.3d at 764 n. 22. 55 Louisiana has recently amended its habitual offender law so that it currently reads as it did before August of 1995. 2001 La. Sess. Law Serv. 403 (West). For a period of about six years, however, including the time at which his court of appeal decision was issued, Louisiana could have imposed a sentence of life without possibility of parole on Bray. See La. Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 14:67(B)(3), 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) & (c)(i)-(ii) (West 2000), amended by 2001 La. Sess. Law Serv. 403 (West); see also Andrade, 270 F.3d at 765 & n. 22. 11 As the statute so providing was not in effect when Bray committed his last offense and is not in effect now, however, it is of no relevance to the interjurisdictional comparison.
56 Brown committed his offense and received his sentence while the harsher, interim version of Louisiana's habitual offender law was in effect. 12 He therefore could have received a sentence of life without parole had he committed his petty theft offense in Louisiana on the same date that he committed it in California. Brown's two prior strikes — assault with a deadly weapon and robbery — would have been considered crimes of violence in Louisiana, so Brown would have been subject to a sentence of life without possibility of parole under the Louisiana statutes in effect during this interim period. See La. Rev.Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) & (c)(ii) (West 2000), amended by 2001 La. Sess. Law Serv. 403. It appears, however, that, even while this version of the statute was in effect, a life sentence without possibility of parole for petty theft might well have been vulnerable to successful challenge under the Louisiana Constitution, despite Brown's violent priors, given other recent Louisiana proportionality decisions. See Andrade, 270 F.3d at 765 (citing State v. Hayes, 739 So.2d 301, 303-04 (La.App. 1999) (holding that a life sentence was impermissibly excessive for a defendant convicted of theft of over $1000 who had a prior robbery conviction, considered violent in Louisiana); State v. Burns, 723 So.2d 1013 (La.Ct.App.1998)); see also State v. Neal, 762 So.2d 281, 286 (La.Ct.App.2000) (finding a mandatory life sentence without possibility of parole under the habitual offender statute to be unconstitutionally excessive where the defendant's current offense was theft of $160 worth of goods and his priors included two violent offenses — attempted manslaughter and aggravated battery). 57 Under the recent amendments to Louisiana's habitual offender statute, Brown could not be subject to a mandatory life sentence without possibility of parole, but he could receive a minimum sentence of 20 years for his last offense — a fourth or subsequent felony — had his entire record been proven to the trier of fact. See La.Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i). 13 This sentence would be less onerous than his Three Strikes sentence in California: The sentence would be five years shorter, and it is possible that Brown would be eligible for parole before he served 20 years. 14 58 To summarize: Under both the law in effect at the time of his offense and current Louisiana law, Bray would have received a much lower sentence in Louisiana than in California. While Brown could have received a higher sentence in Louisiana originally, he would now receive a lower sentence in Louisiana than in California, and might be eligible for parole. So, there was at most one jurisdiction that conceivably would have imposed a higher sentence on one of these defendants, and that jurisdiction has since concluded — in an era when legislatures are hardly prone to impose light sentences on repeat criminals — that such a sentence is too high, and would now impose a lower sentence than in California. 59 Recent rejection of a higher sentence by the only state that perhaps would have allowed it in narrow circumstances signals a considered national legislative judgment based on actual experience that California's sentence is indeed disproportionate to the crime. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) ([W]e have held repugnant to the Eighth Amendment punishments which are incompatible with `the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society'.) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958) (plurality opinion)). [T]he circumstance that a State has the most severe punishment for a particular crime does not by itself render the punishment grossly disproportionate, Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1000, 111 S.Ct. 2680, and the interjurisdictional comparison cannot in any event be the determining factor in an Eighth Amendment analysis. 15 Nonetheless, the fact that California is comparatively isolated in its judgment concerning the appropriate punishment for petty theft by a recidivist, even for a recidivist with some violent criminal history, `validate[s][the] initial judgment that [the] sentence is grossly disproportionate to [the] crime'. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 765 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005, 111 S.Ct. 2680).
60 The final possible point of distinction between these cases and Andrade is that both Bray's and Brown's past criminal record includes crimes classified by California as violent crimes, while Andrade's did not. See § 667.5. For several reasons, this distinction cannot serve to justify a different result than in Andrade. 61 First, this asserted difference is somewhat ephemeral. Andrade's prior convictions could be considered objectively violent, while it does not appear that any of Bray's or most of Brown's priors were considered violent under California law at the time of conviction. 62 Andrade classified Andrade's residential burglary prior convictions as non-violent, as they are not in the list of violent offenses, § 667.5, referenced by Three Strikes. Nevertheless, residential burglary carries a strong potential for violence and is treated as a violent crime for other purposes, including under federal law. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 581, 588, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) (noting that the legislative history of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 indicates that burglary was included because it is one of the most violent street crimes, and because of its inherent potential for harm to persons and that Congress apparently thought that all burglaries serious enough to be punishable by imprisonment for more than a year constituted a category of crimes that shared this potential for violence ...). 16 63 Conversely, California law did not categorize ordinary robbery as violent when Bray and Brown were convicted. Although Three Strikes references a section listing violent offenses that currently includes any robbery, § 667.5(c)(9), this section was only recently amended to include all robberies, Prop. 21 § 15 (approved March 7, 2000). When Bray and Brown were sentenced, section 667.5 included only robberies perpetrated in a dwelling house or inhabited building or trailer where either (1) it is charged and proved that the defendant personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon, § 667.5(c)(9) (West 1999), amended by Prop. 21 § 15 (approved March 7, 2000); or (2) the defendant voluntarily acted in concert with two or more other persons, § 667.5(c)(18) (West 1999), amended by Prop. 21 § 15 (approved March 7, 2000); see also § 213(a)(1)(A). Crimes of violence, as defined by section 667.5, also included any felony in which the defendant inflicts great bodily injury on any person or in which the defendant uses a firearm. § 667.5(c)(8). 64 It is unlikely that any of Bray's four robbery convictions would have been classified as violent under section 667.5. The first two convictions took place in a car and the third outside on railroad tracks. Nor did Bray himself use a firearm or inflict great bodily injury on any person. The record does not reveal facts indicating that the fourth robbery conviction would have fallen within section 667.5 at the time of Bray's appeal. 65 One of Brown's prior strikes — the assault with a deadly weapon, which involved a firearm — would have been classified as violent under this statute. The record does not reveal any facts of Brown's robbery conviction, other than that it was originally a conviction for burglary, so we cannot assume that it would have met the requirements of a violent felony robbery. 66 Second, the presence of violent prior offenses might well be of great significance were the crime of conviction a violent crime, but cannot be where the crime of conviction is non-violent. Where the crime of conviction is a violent one, a more severe recidivist sentencing scheme for defendants with past convictions for violent crimes would simply reflect a judgment that such individuals cannot curb their violence and should therefore be imprisoned for at least a lengthy time and for as long as life. But where, as here, the present conviction does not demonstrate continued proclivity toward involvement in violent crime, distinguishing between criminals convicted for non-violent offenses on the basis of their past violence would run up against compelling Double Jeopardy Clause considerations. 67 Recidivist sentencing schemes, imposing higher sentences on repeat offenders, have long been held constitutional in the face of Double Jeopardy challenges. As an early case put it, summarizing and quoting from still-earlier decisions, legislators may constitutionally conclude that `one who proves, by a second or third conviction, that the former punishment has been inefficacious in doing the work of reform for which it was designed' `has evidenced a depravity, which merits a greater punishment, and needs to be restrained by severer penalties than if it were his first offence.' Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 677, 16 S.Ct. 179, 40 L.Ed. 301 (1895), quoting Plumbly v. Commonwealth, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 413, 1841 WL 3384 (1841), and People v. Stanley, 47 Cal. 113, 1873 WL 1267 (1873); see also, e.g., Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 128 L.Ed.2d 745 (1994); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-60, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967); Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732, 68 S.Ct. 1256, 92 L.Ed. 1683 (1947) (The sentence as a fourth offender or habitual criminal is not to be viewed as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crimes. It is a stiffened penalty for the crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one.) 68 At the same time, [t]he Constitution was designed as much to prevent the criminal from being twice punished for the same offense as from being twice tried for it. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173, 21 L.Ed. 872 (1874); see also Witte, 515 U.S. at 395-96, 115 S.Ct. 2199. It is for this reason that the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed, in upholding recidivist sentencing schemes, that the priors can be relevant only as they aggravate the defendant's culpability for the crime of conviction. If that connection between the prior convictions and the present one is lost, then the Double Jeopardy concerns reemerge. See Riggs, 525 U.S. at 1114, 119 S.Ct. 890 (Stevens, J., memorandum opinion respecting the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari). 69 In this connection, one can perceive two possible theories upon which a recidivist statute can maintain the relationship between the current crime and past convictions so as to avoid Double Jeopardy concerns about imposing a new punishment for past offenses: A harsher sentence for a new crime can be warranted either (1) because the defendant's repeated violations of the criminal law reveal his incapability of conforming to society's norms in general, see Rummel, 445 U.S. at 276, 100 S.Ct. 1133 (The interest in recidivist statutes is in dealing in a harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal acts have shown that they are simply incapable of conforming to the norms of society as established by its criminal law); or (2) because the defendant's current offense involves repetition of a particular offense characteristic, indicating that the defendant remains prone to that specific kind of antisocial activity — as for example, when a defendant commits a second theft offense, demonstrating proclivity toward stealing. If neither of these theories serves to justify the sentencing enhancement for the principal offense, then it is hard to escape the conclusion that the enhancement is simply an additional punishment for the previous offenses, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 70 Andrade 's holding forecloses application of the first theory — that a general lawbreaking tendency can justify Three Strikes' mandatory indeterminate life sentence for petty theft. See 270 F.3d at 747. After Andrade, for all the reasons already surveyed, an indeterminate life sentence for a defendant convicted of felony petty theft with a prior who has at least two prior serious felony convictions, see § 1192.7, violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 17 71 If we attempt to distinguish Andrade solely on the basis that Bray and Brown have prior felonies that may have been violent, as opposed to serious, then we would be punishing Bray and Brown as non-violent lawbreakers who were violent in the past. This practice could not be justified under the second, particular criminal proclivity approach. Rather, the sentence would necessarily be an additional penalty for their earlier [violent] crimes, for which Bray and Brown have already been punished. See Gryger, 334 U.S. at 732, 68 S.Ct. 1256; Solem, 463 U.S. at 297 n. 21, 103 S.Ct. 3001; Riggs, 525 U.S. at 1114, 119 S.Ct. 890 (Stevens, J, memorandum opinion respecting the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari). Because such additional penalties for past crimes violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, the prior violence in Bray's and Brown's criminal record cannot be a basis for distinction between these cases and Andrade's. 72 We note, further, that Three Strikes itself does not distinguish between serious and violent prior offenses. Rather, Three Strikes references other sections of the California Penal Code, which exist for other purposes, to define what felonies count as prior strikes. § 667.5(d)(1) (referring to §§ 667.5(c) and 1192.7(c)). Although certain of these offenses can be found in Section 667.5(c) and are labeled as violent, while other strikes appear only in Section 1192.7(c) and are labeled as serious, the category into which prior convictions fit has absolutely no bearing on the application or length of a Three Strikes sentence. In addition, under the petty theft with a prior statute, violent prior felonies are irrelevant to the enhancement of the petty theft into a felony unless they are also theft crimes. These aspects of the California scheme indicate that California is not enhancing sentences because the prior convictions were for violent crimes. Again, ( see n. 18, supra ), it makes little sense to defer to a penal judgment that the legislature did not make in determining whether or not a particular sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate to the crime of conviction. 73 In sum, these cases are materially indistinguishable from Andrade. We therefore conclude that Bray's and Brown's sentences did violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 74