Opinion ID: 791648
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: True threats for purposes of the First Amendment

Text: 41 A core purpose of the First Amendment is to allow `free trade in ideas' — even ideas that the overwhelming majority of people might find distasteful or discomforting. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d 535 (2003). Yet the First Amendment does not provide absolute protection to all types of expression; notable for our purposes here, the First Amendment does not protect so-called true threats. Id. at 359, 123 S.Ct. 1536. 42 In defining a true threat, our precedent has generally called for application of an objective test. That is, a statement is a true threat if a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1074 (9th Cir.2002) (en banc) (quoting Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d at 1265). We have utilized some form of that objective test for over thirty years. See Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874 (9th Cir.1969) (holding that for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 871, which proscribes threats made against the President, a threat is a true threat if a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take the life of the President. . . .). 43 Yet in United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622 (9th Cir.2005), our holding suggested the objective true threat definition was no longer tenable in light of Black. We observed that, in Black, the U.S. Supreme Court defined true threats as those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. Id. at 631 (quoting Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60, 123 S.Ct. 1536). We construed Black's definition of a true threat to embrace[ ] not only the requirement that the communication itself be intentional, but also the requirement that the speaker intend for his language to threaten the victim. Id. (emphasis in original). We observed Black's definition was in tension with our earlier holdings applying the objective true threat definition, but concluded Black was irreconcilable with those earlier cases and thus Black's definition must control. Id. at 633. Accordingly we held that speech may be deemed unprotected by the First Amendment as a `true threat' only upon proof that the speaker subjectively intended the speech as a threat. Id. 44 Cassel stated, however, that it did not address the question of what effect our holding has on other specific statutes that we have previously held do not require the government to prove subjective intent. Id. at 633 n. 8. 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) is such a statute. As noted, in Orozco-Santillan, we held the objective true threat definition applies in evaluating threats under section 115(a)(1)(B). Yet we decided Orozco-Santillan in 1990, before the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Black in 2003, which raises the question whether Black's subjective true threat definition sub silentio overruled the objective true threat definition used by Orozco-Santillan for purposes of section 115(a)(1)(B). See Cassel, 408 F.3d at 633. 45 Moreover, by its express language, section 115(a)(1)(B) contains a specific intent element: it punishes only threats made regarding enumerated officials with the intent to impede, intimidate, interfere with, or retaliate against such officials on account of the officials' performance of official duties. Thus, a conviction under that statute could only be had upon proof that the speaker intended the speech to impede, intimidate, interfere with, or retaliate against the protected official. Such proof would seem to subsume the subjective true threat definition announced in Black and recognized by Cassel; one cannot have the intent required under section 115(a)(1)(B) without also intending to make the threat. See id. at 632 (stating that Black's holding thus affirms our own dictum — not always adhered to in our cases — that `the element of intent is the determinative factor separating protected expression from unprotected criminal behavior.' (quoting United States v. Gilbert, 813 F.2d 1523, 1529 (9th Cir.1987)) (internal alteration omitted)). 7 46 Resolution of the issue whether to apply the objective or subjective true threat definition for purposes of section 115(a)(1)(B) is further complicated by our recent decision in United States v. Romo, 413 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir.2005). There, in affirming the defendant's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 871(a), we applied an objective definition to determine whether the defendant's statement that he wanted to put a bullet in the President's head was a true threat. Id. at 1051. In a footnote, we stated: 47 The recent decision in United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622 (9th Cir.2005), does not change our view. Cassel leaves untouched the reasonable person analysis for presidential threats because it did not address whether statutes like 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) require intent. Because Romo has not raised First Amendment issues and Cassel does not alter the analysis of presidential threats, we employ the decades-old approach to analyzing threats under 18 U.S.C. § 871(a). 48 Romo, 413 F.3d 1044, 1051 n. 6 (internal citations omitted). 49 We are not fully convinced that Romo properly distinguished Cassel, or that Romo's continued use of the objective true threat definition is consistent with Black's subjective true threat definition. Nonetheless, we need not decide whether the objective or subjective true threat definition should apply here. 8 That is because the evidence establishes that Stewart's statement was a true threat under either definition and thus is not protected by the First Amendment. 50 Under the objective definition, Stewart's statement that he wanted to target a judge and string the motherfucker up and cut her throat, his throat, and make it like a copycat so that people would do the same thing, combined with an offer to provide weapons and money reward, can reasonably be interpreted as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault the target; here, a federal judge. See Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d at 1265-66 (affirming the defendant's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) for threatening a federal agent where, after the agent arrested the defendant, the defendant stated he would kick the agent's fucking ass, urged the agent to box with him, cursed at the agent, and pushed him); cf. United States v. Schiefen, 139 F.3d 638, 639 (8th Cir.1998) (affirming the defendant's section 115(a)(1)(B) conviction for mailing to a U.S. district judge a letter stating a judgment of foreclosure was treasonous, and that TREASON by law, is punishable by the DEATH PENALTY; the court held the statements were true threats because a reasonable person would perceive the statements as threats). Although Judge Silver was not initially named as a target of the threat, Stewart later identified her as the target. Thus, Stewart's statement was a true threat under the objective definition. 51 Under the subjective definition — which asks whether the speaker subjectively intended the speech as a threat, Cassel, 408 F.3d at 633 — section 115(a)(1)(B) requires that Stewart have made the statement with the specific intent to impede, intimidate, interfere with, or retaliate against Judge Silver on account of the performance of her official duties. 9 We determined supra there was sufficient evidence presented to the jury to establish the existence of such specific intent, and that in turn is sufficient to show Stewart subjectively intended the speech as a threat. See id.; id. at 637 n. 14 (The defendant might, of course, threaten to bring about the injury indirectly — for example, by having a third party harm the victim.). 52 Accordingly, under either the objective or subjective true threat definition, Stewart's statements were true threats and are not protected by the First Amendment. We thus affirm Stewart's conviction on Count 1. 53 B. Count 2 — Making material false statements to FBI agents 54 Stewart also argues there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction on Count 2 for making material false statements to Special Agent Gallante. We reject this argument. 55 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) punishes any person who, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully . . . makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation. . . . Special Agent Gallante asked Stewart whether he said anything that could even be misinterpreted as a threat to a judge. Stewart falsely denied making any such statements, even though Stewart had earlier threatened Judge Silver and plotted with Weiss to order a hit on her life. His false statements were material because they had the capability of influencing a government agency's operations — as Special Agent Gallante testified, the FBI had every man on alert in an attempt to thwart any attempt to harm Judge Silver. See Salas-Camacho, 859 F.2d at 791 (explaining that a statement is materially false if it is capable of influencing the government agency's operations, and that the statement need not actually influence the agency). Those facts are sufficient for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Stewart violated section 1001(a)(2), and thus we affirm Stewart's conviction on Count 2. 10 56 C. Count 4 — Soliciting another person to murder a federal judge 57 Stewart also contends there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction on Count 4. Specifically, Stewart argues there was insufficient corroboration of his intent under 18 U.S.C. § 373(a) because Weiss's testimony was inherently unreliable in that Weiss is a convicted felon. 18 U.S.C. § 373(a) provides in part: 58 Whoever, with intent that another person engage in conduct constituting a felony that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against property or against the person of another in violation of the laws of the United States, and under circumstances strongly corroborative of that intent, solicits, commands, induces, or otherwise endeavors to persuade such other person to engage in such conduct, shall be imprisoned. . . . 59 We have not before examined the meaning of the term circumstances strongly corroborative of that intent. We review the construction and interpretation of a statute de novo. United States v. Ventre, 338 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir.2003). We turn first to the plain meaning of the statute because, if we can interpret clearly its meaning from the statutory text, resort to legislative history is unnecessary. Id. 60 Section 373(a) punishes a person who solicits another person to engage in felonious conduct that includes the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against property or against the person of another in violation of federal law, with the intent the other person engage in the conduct. The statute, through the use of the word and, also requires that the solicitation occur under circumstances strongly corroborative of that intent. 61 We are well-acquainted with the terms corroborative and corroborate. See Black's Law Dictionary 596 (8th ed.2004) (defining corroborating evidence as [e]vidence that differs from but strengthens or confirms what other evidence shows (esp. that which needs support)). The term corroborative means serving or tending to corroborate, Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 512 (1965), and corroborate means [t]o strengthen or confirm; to make more certain, Black's Law Dictionary, supra, at 370. See Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary, supra, at 512 (defining corroborate as to provide evidence of the truth of: make more certain: confirm). In addition, circumstance means [a]n accompanying or accessory fact, event, or condition, such as a piece of evidence that indicates the probability of an event. Black's Law Dictionary, supra, at 259; see Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary, supra, at 410 (defining circumstance as a condition, fact, or event accompanying, conditioning, or determining another). 62 The plain meaning of the phrase circumstances strongly corroborative of that intent thus shows that section 373(a) requires the government to present evidence of facts accompanying the solicitation strongly confirming that the defendant actually intended the solicited person to engage in the solicited violent crime. See United States v. Korab, 893 F.2d 212, 215 (9th Cir.1989) (noting section 373(a) is focused upon punishing persons who make[ ] a serious effort to induce another person to commit a crime of violence, regardless of whether or not the crime of violence is actually committed); United States v. Gabriel, 810 F.2d 627, 635 (7th Cir.1987) (noting a violation of section 373(a) requires the surrounding circumstances in general must indicate that the solicitor is serious that the person solicited actually carry out the crime.). Such corroborating evidence could consist of discussions or planning between the defendant and the person solicited regarding the crime to be committed, offers of payment, or the providing of information regarding the description or location of the proposed victim. 63 We need not outline the precise limits of section 373(a) because Stewart's conduct squarely falls within the range of conduct prohibited by the statute. The Government presented evidence that: (1) Stewart specifically discussed with Weiss arranging the murder of Judge Silver; 11 (2) those discussions happened over the course of several meetings; (3) Stewart offered weapons and money for the murder; (4) Stewart provided Weiss with Judge Silver's description and location so Weiss's fictional brother-in-law could find her; and (5) Stewart suggested he wanted the murder committed by having Judge Silver's throat cut. 12 The evidence not only showed that Stewart solicited Weiss to have Weiss's fictional brother-in-law murder Judge Silver, but the circumstances accompanying the solicitation ( e.g., the multiple discussions between Stewart and Weiss, the offer of payment, the information on the whereabouts of the target, and the method of execution) strongly corroborated Stewart's intent to have the murder committed by Weiss's fictional brother-in-law. Such evidence is sufficient to support Stewart's conviction for a violation of section 373(a), and thus we affirm the conviction on Count 4. 13