Opinion ID: 2977284
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Willie’s Motion for Mistrial

Text: Willie also argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial because: (1) Little mentioned Willie’s prior convictions; (2) the court admitted irrelevant photographs of both Mike and Desi Sr. Estrada; (3) the court implicitly allowed Little to speak to Agent McIsaac during a trial break; and (4) the court admitted wire-intercepted statements of Desi Jr. Estrada under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). See United States v. Childs, 539 F.3d 552, 562 (6th Cir. 2008) (applying an abuse-of-discretion standard). We reject each of these arguments, treating them in turn. -8- Nos. 07-5543 and 07-5544 United States v. Estrada and Villasenor
During his testimony, Little mentioned that Willie “had previous convictions.” When Willie objected and moved for new trial, the district court instructed the jury to disregard the statement but denied Willie’s motion. This is not, as Willie claims, a futile attempt to “unring a bell.” United States v. Murray, 784 F.2d 188, 189 (6th Cir. 1986). First, Little’s comment about Willie’s prior convictions did not elaborate on “the name [or] the nature” of the convictions, and the court immediately gave a curative instruction. United States v. Stotts, 176 F.3d 880, 887 (6th Cir. 1999); see United States v. Harris, 165 F.3d 1062, 1066 (6th Cir. 1999) (affirming the denial of a motion for mistrial where “the district court gave an immediate and clear limiting instruction” after a reference to a prior arrest); United States v. Terry, 729 F.2d 1063, 1070 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding that statements made by a police officer and FBI agent about other criminal investigations were “not so prejudicial as to deny [the defendant’s] right to a fair trial” where neither witness directly referenced the criminal activity). Second, the evidence against Willie dwarfs the statement’s import. See United States v. Moore, 376 F.3d 570, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) (“The single comment, which the court immediately admonished the jury to ‘completely disregard,’ did not taint the case so as to deny [the defendant] a fair trial.”); Harris, 165 F.3d at 1066 (noting that “the officer’s stray remark constituted only a minuscule part of the evidence against [the defendant]”). By the time he made the statement, Little had already testified that Willie knew Fidel’s nephew, Perez, and that Willie, together with his nephew Mike, -9- Nos. 07-5543 and 07-5544 United States v. Estrada and Villasenor brought him a load of marijuana in September 2004. He also testified about several later drug deals with Willie. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial despite Little’s reference to Willie’s previous convictions.
This court reviews the district court’s decision to admit photographs of Mike and Desi Sr. for abuse of discretion, and even if the court abused its discretion, does not require a new trial unless the mistake affected the “substantial rights” of a party. United States v. Cope, 312 F.3d 757, 775 (6th Cir. 2002). In order to be relevant for purposes of Rule 401, evidence must tend “to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401; Cope, 312 F.3d at 775. Willie argues that neither Mike nor Desi Sr. were members of the conspiracy and the admission of their pictures only “provoke[d] the notion that this was a criminal family enterprise” by “throw[ing] in another picture of another Hispanic with the same last name.” For its part, the Government explains that because testimony at trial involved “four different co-conspirators with the last name Estrada,” it admitted the photographs “so the jury could place a face with a name.” But the Government cites no authority for its conclusory association of the photos’ “illustrative purposes” with Rule 401 relevancy. Moreover, the photographs to which the Government points are only head shots that have little bearing on demonstrating involvement in a conspiracy. - 10 - Nos. 07-5543 and 07-5544 United States v. Estrada and Villasenor Although the relevancy of the photos seems weak, their use did not affect the substantial rights of any party, so the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting them.
Willie also argues that the district court improperly denied his mistrial motion because Little and Agent McIsaac communicated during a trial break. When Willie objected to that issue during trial, however, the court specifically made findings as to the prejudicial effect of the discussion. When probed by the court, Little stated that he told McIsaac that Desi Jr. had wanted to trade marijuana for cars, and that he received Desi Jr.’s phone number from Mike. The court gleaned that McIsaac only acknowledged Little’s statements without suggesting either content or method for testifying, and then overruled the motion. Raising the same issue on appeal, Willie fails to enunciate any reason why this communication prejudiced him, so we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial.
Willie next contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying his mistrial motion because the court improperly admitted intercepted statements between Desi Jr. and Little (“Call 171”) under the coconspirator hearsay exception. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E); see supra Part II.A. According to Little’s testimony, Call 171 took place on March 6, 2005, after police arrested Desi Sr. and Mike Estrada, and transpired in relevant part as follows: - 11 - Nos. 07-5543 and 07-5544 United States v. Estrada and Villasenor DESI JR: Yeah. [Mike and Desi Sr.], uh . .. they’ve been picked up since you last spoke with them. Cause I know. I spoke with him on Thursday and he told me that you were going to send me, uh, some stuff for the vehicle that I purchased. Right? LITTLE: Yeah, you got that package all right? DESI JR: Yeah. LITTLE: And he said . . . all he told me was he was going to have to, uh, maybe run out of town for two weeks. But, see . . . we had an agreement that when he has a package . . . DESI JR: . . . he calls you. LITTLE: Yeah. DESI JR: Yeah. And that’s the thing. I didn’t know how to get a hold of you. So, I thought . . . LITTLE: I haven’t talked to anybody. [Inaudible] DESI JR: Yeah. Uh, if anybody approaches . . . If anybody approaches you, don’t, don’t . . . you don’t know us . . . nothing. You don’t talk to anybody until we get a hold of you guys again. ... DESI JR: I know that I want to talk to you about some more cars that I, uh . . . That I want to buy from you cause I’d like to resell them. So, uh . . . LITTLE: I would think they’d DESI JR: Uh, just because they said that he . . . He used that as part of the deal. I told them that, that’s false. I told them that I sent my brother up there to pick up vehicles for me. And they said that they caught him, I guess, driving down south and they gave him two warnings; like tickets, I guess. So, in the process, they said that he used that to go up north. The Government contends that these statements fall within the coconspirator hearsay exception because Desi Jr. is a coconspirator and the statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Conrad, 507 F.3d at 429. To that end, the Government points out that Little testified that Desi - 12 - Nos. 07-5543 and 07-5544 United States v. Estrada and Villasenor Jr. wanted to continue in the business of trading cars for marijuana, and that Desi Jr. made statements in furtherance of the conspiracy when he warned Little against talking to anyone or attempting any further drug transactions while the situation with DEA agents was “hot.” The court accepted that the cars discussed were intended as part of an exchange for marijuana and that Desi Jr.’s warnings were given as a coconspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy, and admitted the statements. The district court’s finding that the statements were made during and in furtherance of a conspiracy likely survives clear-error review, but a closer question exists as to whether the court clearly erred in finding that Desi Jr. was a coconspirator. In order to demonstrate that a preponderance of the evidence supports such a finding, the Government must provide evidence independent from the statement in dispute. Payne, 437 F.3d at 544. Here, the Government points to a single instance where Desi Jr.’s relationship to the conspiracy was mentioned outside the contested Call 171. In its entirety, the discussion on direct examination proceeded as follows: GOV’T: And with reference to Desi, the vehicles, was it your understanding that he wanted to continue in the business? LITTLE: That’s what he said. The independent support offered by the Government is not wholly convincing, but is sufficient under our deferential standard of review. Given Little’s testimony describing Desi Jr. as a coconspirator, the district court did not clearly err in admitting the statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), and thus denying the motion for mistrial fell within its sound discretion. - 13 - Nos. 07-5543 and 07-5544 United States v. Estrada and Villasenor