Opinion ID: 1770653
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues on appeal of the sentence of death

Text: After the sentencing hearing the jury recommended life imprisonment. The trial judge refused to abide by the recommendation and imposed a death sentence. The trial court's written findings of fact in support of the sentence of death set forth the following aggravating circumstances: that the murder was committed during the course of a felony, section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (1983); that the murder was committed to avoid arrest, section 921.141(5)(e); and that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel, section 921.141(5)(h). The judge found no mitigating circumstances. DuBoise claims that death is a disproportionate punishment for felony murder and, therefore, that his death sentence violates Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982). We disagree. We have upheld the death penalty in numerous cases where, as here, the appellant did not actually commit the subject homicide. E.g., Copeland v. Wainwright, 505 So.2d 425 (Fla. 1987); Jackson v. State, 502 So.2d 409 (Fla. 1986); Cave v. State, 476 So.2d 180 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1178, 106 S.Ct. 2907, 90 L.Ed.2d 993 (1986); State v. White, 470 So.2d 1377 (Fla. 1985); Bush v. State, 461 So.2d 936 (Fla. 1984), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031, 106 S.Ct. 1237, 89 L.Ed.2d 345 (1986); James v. State, 453 So.2d 786 (Fla.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1098, 83 L.Ed.2d 717, 105 S.Ct. 608 (1984); Ruffin v. State, 420 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1982). Moreover, the United States Supreme Court recently clarified Enmund in Tison v. Arizona, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987). In Tison the Court stated that Enmund covered two types of cases that occur at opposite ends of the felony-murder spectrum, i.e., the minor actor in an armed robbery, not on the scene, who neither intended to kill nor was found to have had any culpable mental state and the felony murderer who actually killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill. 107 S.Ct. at 1684. The Tison brothers, however, presented the intermediate case of the defendant whose participation is major and whose mental state is one of reckless indifference to the value of human life. Id. 107 S.Ct. at 1685. The Court recognized that the majority of American jurisdictions which provide for capital punishment specifically authorize the death penalty in a felony-murder case where, though the defendant's mental state fell short of intent to kill, the defendant was a major actor in a felony in which he knew death was highly likely to occur, Id. 107 S.Ct. at 1686, and that substantial participation in a violent felony under circumstances likely to result in the loss of innocent human life may justify the death penalty even absent an `intent to kill.' Id. Commenting that focusing narrowly on the question of intent to kill is an unsatisfactory method of determining culpability, the Court held that major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement. Id. 107 S.Ct. at 1688 (footnote omitted). Tison is applicable to this case because it does not present either of the extremes covered by Enmund; DuBoise was more than a minor actor in the felonies involved here, but he did not actually kill the victim. Therefore, we must determine if DuBoise was a major participant in felonies committed with a reckless indifference to human life which culminated with the victim's death. We find that DuBoise meets these criteria. In aggravation the trial court found that the homicide occurred during a sexual battery and a robbery. The evidence supports finding that DuBoise participated in both these crimes. DuBoise and his two companions decided to grab a woman's purse in order to get some money. As they passed the victim on the street, DuBoise left their car and attempted to snatch her purse. When she resisted, the other man came to assist DuBoise. The victim recognized one of DuBoise's companions, and the three men put the victim in the car and drove to another area of town. There, while DuBoise raped her, the man whom the victim had recognized struck her with a piece of lumber. DuBoise's companions then raped the woman and both struck her with pieces of lumber. DuBoise was a major participant in the robbery and sexual battery. He made no effort to interfere with his companions' killing the victim. By his conduct during the entire episode, we find that he exhibited the reckless indifference to human life required by Tison. We hold, therefore, that there were no constitutional impediments to sentencing DuBoise to death. Although we hold that Enmund did not preclude the trial court from sentencing DuBoise to death, we hold that he should not have done so because DuBoise is correct in his assertion that the court improperly overrode the jury's unanimous recommendation of life imprisonment. In Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975), this Court stated: In order to sustain a sentence of death following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ. We hold that the facts of this case are not so clear and convincing and that reasonable persons could differ regarding the propriety of sentencing DuBoise to death. Although the court found that no mitigating factors had been established, the jury had been instructed on the statutory mitigating circumstances and had been told that the statutory list was not all inclusive. The jury could have been influenced by one of DuBoise's companions being his older brother, a person who might well have had an influence on this eighteen-year-old defendant's behavior and conduct. Moreover, the two people who actually killed the victim had not been apprehended, leaving DuBoise alone to account for these crimes. The jury also knew that DuBoise has an IQ only of 79 and heard his father's testimony as to DuBoise's deprived family background. We conclude that the trial court should have followed the jury's recommendation. In summary, we affirm the convictions of first-degree murder and three counts of probation violation. We reverse the trial judge's order granting the motion for arrest of judgment on count two of the indictment charging DuBoise with sexual battery and order that judgment be entered pursuant to the verdict of guilt of attempted sexual battery. We vacate the sentence of death and remand with directions that DuBoise be sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for twenty-five years. It is so ordered. McDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur. EHRLICH, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which SHAW and GRIMES, JJ., concur.