Opinion ID: 2552144
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ruling on the Merits

Text: ¶ 28. The youth-court order, which transferred the case to chancery court, stated that the youth court's orders would remain in effect until the chancellor rendered a decision. The chancellor granted the motion to dismiss and regarded the dismissal as a termination of the youth-court orders. Concerned that the custody of Baby Dennis would have been left in limbo, the chancellor awarded custody to Finnegan as the natural parent. ¶ 29. Under the natural-parent presumption, it is presumed that it is in the best interest of a child to remain with the natural parent as opposed to a third party. In re Dissolution of Marriage of Leverock and Hamby, 23 So.3d 424, 429(19) (Miss.2009). But that presumption may be rebutted by evidence that the parent relinquished the right through abandonment, desertion, or other unfitness, and if it is otherwise overcome by an overriding concern for the best interest and welfare of a child. Id. We do not suggest that Finnegan is unfit to have custody of Baby Dennis. But with these allegations, Finnegan is not automatically entitled to custody without some on-the-record findings. ¶ 30. Based on this Court's review of the record, the chancellor failed to consider the history of this case before making his decision. The hearing transcript shows that the chancellor neither reviewed the youth-court record nor Finnegan's Written Request for Release of Custody before rendering judgement: COURT: Before you got here, Mr. Stewart, I asked Mr. Baker if heI should have asked y'all earlier, but Ido you have a copy of the youth court file? MR. STEWART: I do not, Your Honor. COURT: What's the word? Are we going to be able to get it? MR. ROBERTS: The word is it's on the way. ... COURT: Do you want to join in his Motion to Dismiss? MR. BAKER: Yes, Judge, we do. COURT: All right. Court grants it. Dismissed. I'm also going to award sanctions to the defendant in the sum of $750 to be payable MR. BAKER: Your Honor, will the Court duly note that a decision has been rendered in this matter? COURT: Yes. MR. BAKER: In accordance with the order of the corrected review hearing officer order. So I don't want there to be any argument that youth court orders are still in effect. COURT: No. I'm getting a copy of that youth court file delivered and it's going to be made a part of this record. Let me see the Order that you have. You represent to me as an officer of the court, sir, that this is a good, valid, and authentic copy of the Final Order that was entered by the youth court? MR. BAKER: Yes, Your Honor. COURT: Okay. All right. The matter is dismissed. MR. BAKER: Okay, Your Honor. COURT: And I'm going to award the defendant $750 in attorney's fees forthis matter is frivolous. The whole way it has been handled has been frivolous. I had to sit here and listen to a lawyer read to me a motionhe essentially read it to me verbatim for abouthow long was it? almost 30 minutes. This is the most frivolous conduct I've seen, that you would go to the youth court and ask for the matter to be transferred here and then file the guardianship here and then turn around and ask for it to be dismissed, but you're getting what you want, and that iscustody, by the way, needs to go to this lady. MR. BAKER: Thank you, Your Honor. And I want to make sure the Order indicates Ms. Wanda Bell has no further COURT: It's dismissed with prejudice. MR. BAKER: Okay. MR. STEWART: Your Honor, if I may, please, I would like COURT: Don't argue with the Court after the Court has ruled. MR. STEWART: I'm not arguing with the Court, Your Honor. I just want to make a record thatnever mind, strike it. MR. BAKER: Thank you, Your Honor. COURT: I do nowI have handed to me a copyan entire copy of the youth court [sic], and the Order previously presented to me by Mr. Baker is very clear that it is the same one. These will be placed under seal inasmuch as they are youth court records. ¶ 31. As reflected by the trial transcript, the chancellor did not receive a copy of the youth-court file, which included Finnegan's Written Request for Release of Custody, until after he had ruled on the matter. Because the chancellor had not seen the youth court file, it was impossible for him to give any consideration to its contents in making his decision. The chancellor abused his discretion by dismissing the case and then awarding custody to Finnegan without any on-the-record findings. ¶ 32. In youth court, the primary goals are to protect the child and also facilitate reuniting the family, if found to be in the child's best interest. See Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-103 (Rev.2009). In every child-custody matter, the polestar consideration is the best interest of the child. Albright v. Albright, 437 So.2d 1003, 1005 (Miss.1983). Thus, the best interest of Baby Dennis is more important than Finnegan's natural-parent status. Several years have elapsed since Finnegan has had custody of Baby Dennis, and it was inappropriate for the chancellor to grant Finnegan custody without evidence that she has rehabilitated herself and other relevant factors. The chancellor should not have awarded custody to Finnegan without determining whether she was suitable to regain care, custody, and control of Baby Dennis. See In the Interest of R.D., 658 So.2d 1378, 1387-1389 (Miss.1995). Additionally, the best interest of Baby Dennis far outweighs Bell's and Morse's desire to have their petition dismissed or the chancellor's desire to teach them a lesson. ¶ 33. Because the matter was properly before the chancellor, and Baby Dennis's future was in question, the chancellor should have proceeded with the custody hearing. The allegations in this case necessitate a thorough review of the youth-court record, a hearing on the matter, and possibly a guardian ad litem to represent the child's best interest.