Opinion ID: 74026
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 29 Diaz contends the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for either conspiracy or money laundering. 30 Regarding the conspiracy, Diaz argues that there was no evidence that he entered into an agreement with Easterling or the other co-conspirators, and that at most the evidence shows a series of purchases between himself and the other parties, which in and of themselves do not amount to a conspiracy. 31 An agreement may be proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence and a common scheme or plan may be inferred from the conduct of the participants or from other circumstances. The government is not required to prove that a defendant knew every detail or that he participated in every stage of the conspiracy. See United States v. Jones, 913 F.2d 1552,1557 (11th Cir. 1990). The evidence taken in the light most favorable to the government indicates that Diaz and the other co-conspirators understood themselvesto be involved together in a single venture. The evidence shows that the defendant and Stafford Easterling met each other through William Hill, whom Diaz supplied with cocaine in 1985 or 1986. Stafford Easterling introduced his brother Woodrow to Diaz in approximately 1988, for the purpose of buying cocaine from defendant. From 1990 through 1994, defendant supplied Stafford Easterling with forty to sixty kilograms of cocaine on a regular basis. The jury, on the basis of these facts, could have found that Diaz was involved with the other witnesses in a single criminal venture. 32 As to the money laundering charge, the record also contains sufficient evidence to support the conviction. 33 Section 1957 prohibits anyone from knowingly engaging in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property that is of a value greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity. 18 U.S.C. 1957(a). 34 Defendant argues the government failed to present any evidence that he knew the source of the $12,000 wired to him to purchase a truck in 1992 was illegal. The trial evidence established that Diaz gave Easterling United States currency to buy a truck. Easterling then directed his wife to wire transfer $12,000 from a bank in Gainesville using her mother's business account to Diaz in Kearney, Missouri, where he purchased the truck. Easterling testified that virtually all of his business with Diaz was drug business. This evidence combined with evidence of Diaz's income during the relevant period sufficiently supports the conviction. 35 Diaz also argues that the prosecutor's question in closing argument, Where else would $12,000 come from? impermissibly shifted the burden to the defendant to explain where the money came from. The prosecutor's comment could not be characterized as an indirect reference to defendant's failure to testify because Diaz did testify as to his sources of income. Instead, the prosecutor's remark was a permissible comment based on logical inferences from all the evidence produced at trial. As such, it was neither improper nor prejudicial. 36