Opinion ID: 3063773
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Venireperson’s comments

Text: We review the district court’s denial of a motion to strike the jury panel for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Tegzes, 715 F.2d 505, 507 (11th Cir. 1983). Deference to the district court’s discretion is based on that court’s unique position to evaluate demeanor evidence and other factors relevant to the 4 qualifications of a juror. United States v. Hurley, 746 F.2d 725, 727 (11th Cir. 1984). “Accordingly, it is generally proper for a reviewing court, which must rely on a cold record, to defer to the conclusions reached by the trial judge on this issue.” United States v. Simmons, 961 F.2d 183, 184 (11th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted); see United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073, 1102 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting a trial judge’s denial of a for-cause challenge to a potential juror was one of the aspects of a jury trial where we were least likely to disturb the trial judge’s exercise of discretion). To succeed on a claim regarding impartiality, the party proffering a challenge to a juror “must demonstrate that the juror in question exhibited actual bias by showing either an express admission of bias or facts demonstrating such a close connection to the present case that bias must be presumed.” United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073, 1102 (11th Cir. 1993). When reviewing juror impartiality, we have “focused on whether (1) the juror may be affected by matters not in evidence, and (2) the juror may presume guilt rather than innocence.” United States v. Dickerson, 248 F.3d 1036, 1045 (11th Cir. 2001). We have upheld a district court’s denial of a motion to strike the jury panel where one juror’s comments that her son had overdosed on drugs: did not constitute an opinion concerning the guilt or innocence of the defendants, nor did it relate to knowledge about the facts, parties, or 5 witness involved . . . . Appellants’ suggestion that mere awareness of the adverse consequences of crime induces bias toward the defendant is highly speculative and falls far short of the potential actual prejudice which would mandate additional voir dire. Tegzes, 615 F.2d at 508. Under this standard, the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to strike the jury panel based on one veniremember’s comments because Brye did not show that the other jurors had an actual bias.