Opinion ID: 6221797
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Relocation and Primary Residence

Text: [¶16] Riemann contends that the evidence does not support the award of primary residence to Toland in Ohio and that the referee failed to conduct the requisite balancing of constitutional rights, which Riemann argues should be based on whether a parent has compelling reasons for relocation and other “objective” factors. Riemann also contends that the referee’s best interest analysis focused only on whether the child should live with Riemann in Maine or with Toland in Ohio and was thus based on the “false premise” that Toland 8 would move to Ohio without the child, which Toland had said she would not do.4 [¶17] We review the referee’s recommendation as to parental rights for an abuse of discretion. Wechsler, 2016 ME 21, ¶ 12, 131 A.3d 909. A determination of parental rights and responsibilities must be based on the best interest of the child as that standard is set forth in 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3). See, e.g., Vibert v. Dimoulas, 2017 ME 62, ¶ 15, 159 A.3d 325. Applying the best interest standard when parental relocation is at issue, the referee must strike a balance between “a custodial parent’s right to engage in interstate travel and to decide where the parent and child will reside[] and a non-custodial parent’s right to have continuing and meaningful parent/child contact with the child.” Light v. D’Amato, 2014 ME 134, ¶ 20, 105 A.3d 447 (quotation marks omitted). The referee must therefore “balance the rights and interests of the parents 4Riemann also argues that the referee erroneously considered Toland to be the primary caregiver and failed, in denying his request for “shared primary residential care,” to explain why it is not in the best interest of the child. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(2)(D)(1) (2021). These arguments are unpersuasive. A fact finder’s consideration of a parent’s historical contributions to the child’s care is not error when it relates to the best interest of the child. See Wechsler v. Simpson, 2016 ME 21, ¶¶ 7, 20, 131 A.3d 909 (affirming the fact finder’s best interest determination when one parent’s historical role as the primary caregiver was considered in that analysis); Low v. Low, 2021 ME 30, ¶¶ 5, 10, 251 A.3d 735 (same); see also 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3)(B). And where, as here, a fact finder expressly concludes that the best interest of the child is served by granting primary residence to one parent, that conclusion sufficiently explains the reasons why shared primary residential care is not in the child’s best interest. See Wechsler, 2016 ME 21, ¶¶ 20-21, 131 A.3d 909. We have also noted that section 1653 “does not define ‘shared primary residential care’ or explain how it might differ from an award of primary residence to one parent with rights of contact to the other.” Id. ¶ 19. 9 while taking into full consideration the child’s best interest.” Low v. Low, 2021 ME 30, ¶ 9, 251 A.3d 735. [¶18] Here, the referee did exactly that. The referee articulated the specific best interest factors that were important to this case, see 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3)(A)-(B), (E)-(F), (H), (N), and made findings as to each that are supported by substantial record evidence, including expert testimony assessed and weighed carefully by the referee, see Sloan v. Christianson, 2012 ME 72, ¶ 33, 43 A.3d 978 (“[D]eterminations of the weight and credibility to assign to the evidence are squarely in the province of the fact-finder.”). [¶19] The referee considered the age of the child, finding that she was five years old; the stability of any proposed living arrangements, finding that Toland’s mother would provide any necessary childcare and that the child was familiar with her grandmother’s Ohio home; and the relationship of the child to her parents and to other persons who may affect her welfare, crediting the GAL’s belief that it would be more detrimental to the child to be apart from Toland and finding that the child had not formed significant ties in Maine but was particularly close to Toland’s mother in Ohio. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3)(A)-(B), (E). 10 [¶20] While assessing the best interest factors fully, the referee carefully balanced the right of each parent to have contact with the child against Toland’s right to travel and decide where she and the child will live. The referee considered the parties’ motivations, see 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3)(F), finding that Toland believed that the move was the best decision for her and the child, that her employment prospects as an accomplished scholar in her field would be greater in Ohio, and that she and the child both had family support there.5 The referee furthermore considered the capacity of each parent to facilitate contact with the other parent, see 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3)(H), placing great emphasis on the GAL’s belief that Toland would do “whatever possible” to mitigate any disruption to the child’s relationship with Riemann. [¶21] The referee’s best interest analysis is distinguishable from that in Light, where the court awarded primary residence of the parties’ minor child to the mother, who wished to relocate from Maine to Italy, but concluded nonetheless that it was in the child’s best interest to remain in Maine if the 5 Contrary to Riemann’s argument, the requisite balancing analysis does not require the relocating parent’s reason for relocation to “outweigh” the child’s best interest, nor do we conclude, as Riemann urges us to, that the parent’s reasons must be “compelling” or of a certain kind. Rather, the parent’s motivations must be considered among the other relevant factors in assessing the child’s best interest. See In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 142 (Colo. 2005) (“[T]he issue in relocation cases is the extent to which the parents’ needs and desires are intertwined with the child’s best interests.”); Light v. D’Amato, 2014 ME 134, ¶ 21, 105 A.3d 447 (citing Ciesluk to explain that a court’s balancing in relocation cases must ultimately focus on the child’s best interest). 11 mother did indeed relocate to Italy. Light, 2014 ME 134, ¶¶ 9-10, 105 A.3d 447. Unlike the referee’s findings here, the child in Light was almost eight years old and had only visited Italy on vacation; the child’s mother was unlikely to encourage contact with the father if the child relocated to Italy with her; and the child’s stability in her home community of Falmouth was paramount to the child’s best interest given the child’s relationships there with her therapist, other family members, and a substantial network of friends. Id. ¶¶ 3, 8, 10. [¶22] Furthermore, and contrary to Riemann’s argument, the scope of the referee’s best interest analysis under section 1653(3) was not erroneously limited to whether the child should live with Riemann in Maine or with Toland in Ohio. The best interest factors, 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3), which the referee assessed fully, do not permit such a narrow inquiry when considering the best interest of a child. The referee could have, as in Light, conditioned the award of primary residence on Toland staying in Maine. Instead, the referee determined that it was in the child’s best interest to live with Toland, whether in Maine or Ohio. [¶23] In making that determination, the referee’s assumption that Toland might move to Ohio was not error, nor did it create a “false premise” upon which the referee relied in her best interest analysis. The balancing 12 analysis assumes the parent’s constitutional right to travel, and the central inquiry remains the best interest of the child. See Light, 2014 ME 134, ¶¶ 19-22 & n.1, 105 A.3d 447. Toland’s admission that she would stay in Maine if the court refused her primary residence of the child in Ohio acknowledges only that the court’s ruling would affect her own decision making. Cf. id. ¶ 19 (explaining that the court’s decision not to award the mother primary residence of the child if she moved to Italy did not constrain her freedom to travel to Italy because, while it might affect her decision making, it did not impair her right to travel and settle in whatever location she chooses). [¶24] The referee’s findings are not clearly erroneous, and we do not disturb the referee’s determination, based on those findings, that the child’s best interest would be served by living with Toland in Ohio while maintaining contact with Riemann. See, e.g., Akers, 2012 ME 75, ¶¶ 6-7, 44 A.3d 311.