Opinion ID: 1945980
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Giglio, Brady, and Jencks Act Violations

Text: Appellants next contend that the prosecutor committed various Brady, [14] Giglio, [15] and Jencks Act [16] violations by failing to adequately disclose evidence. Brady and Giglio require the government to disclose evidence which is both exculpatory to a defendant and material to guilt or innocence, including [e]vidence that an accused can use to impeach a government witness, Brown v. United States, 726 A.2d 149, 156 n. 3 (D.C.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1130, 120 S.Ct. 967 (2000), and prohibit prosecutors from knowingly putting forth false testimony, Bruce v. United States, 617 A.2d 986, 992 (D.C.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1042, 113 S.Ct. 1878, 123 L.Ed.2d 496 (1993). Even assuming nondisclosure, however, the evidence is not material and reversal is not warranted absent a further showing that `disclosure of the suppressed evidence to competent counsel would have made a different result reasonably probable,' Farley v. United States, 694 A.2d 887, 889 (D.C.1997) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 441, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995)) (exculpatory evidence under Brady ), aff'd after remand, 767 A.2d 225 (2001); United States v. Huddleston, 194 F.3d 214, 222 (1st Cir.1999) (impeachment evidence under Giglio ), or unless `the false testimony could . . . in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury,' McNeil v. United States, 465 A.2d 807, 810 (D.C.1983) (quoting Giglio, supra, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. 763). In this context, `[a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' Farley, supra, 694 A.2d at 889 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). We evaluate the materiality of the evidence at issue on a cumulative basis. Kyles, supra, 514 U.S. at 436, 115 S.Ct. 1555. However, delayed disclosure of exculpatory or impeachment evidence (as opposed to an outright failure to disclose) will require reversal only if an appellant establishes prejudice from the delay itself. See Bellanger v. United States, 548 A.2d 501, 503 & n. 6 (D.C.1988) (citing United States v. Ingraldi, 793 F.2d 408, 411-12 (1st Cir.1986) (due process requirements met where Brady material disclosed after beginning of trial, if accused not prejudiced in preparing and presenting his case)); see also Norris v. Schotten, 146 F.3d 314, 334 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 935, 119 S.Ct. 348, 142 L.Ed.2d 287 (1998) ( Brady does not generally apply to a tardy disclosure but rather to a complete failure to disclose). On the other hand, the Jencks Act relates to statements made by government witnesses, regardless of their exculpatory nature or value as impeachment material. The Jencks Act imposes an affirmative duty upon the government to preserve statements of its witnesses and, on motion of the defendant, to disclose and produce those statements. The Act defines statement as either a written statement made by [a] witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by [the witness] or a recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by [a] witness and recorded contemporaneously with the making of [the] oral statement. McGriff v. United States, 705 A.2d 282, 287 (D.C.1997) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)(1) & (2)), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1086, 118 S.Ct. 1542, 140 L.Ed.2d 690 (1998). A violation of this act will not result in automatic sanctions; rather, the administration of the Jencks Act must be entrusted to the `good sense and experience' of the trial judges subject to `appropriately limited review of appellate courts.' Id. (quoting United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 355, 89 S.Ct. 528, 21 L.Ed.2d 537 (1969)) (other internal quotations and citations omitted). Even though the Jencks Act provides for sanctions when the statement of a witness is not produced, the choice of a sanction is entirely within the trial court's discretion, as is the decision whether to impose any sanction at all. We will not reverse a trial court ruling under the Jencks Act unless that discretion has been abused. Id.
Over the term of the lengthy trial, appellants raised numerous claims under these doctrines. The trial court carefully examined each claimed violation, and, where necessary, took steps to either sanction the prosecution or rectify the alleged inequity. On more than several occasions, the trial court held hearings to determine the extent of any violations, and whether or not sanctions would follow. On two occasions, the trial court sanctioned the prosecutor for discovery violations and informed the jury of the sanctions and the reasons behind them  namely, that the prosecutor had failed to disclose evidence as required by law. [17] In the relatively rare instances where the trial court ruled that alleged Brady or Giglio material need not be disclosed, appellants were nevertheless not prejudiced because the jury was in fact apprised of claimed exculpations and the witnesses' motives to lie. Although much of the material requested by the appellants was not disclosed initially, the majority of the requested material was turned over to appellants during trial. More importantly, appellants were able to employ those truantly disclosed materials in their cross-examinations of the relevant witnesses. [18] Taken together, these factors rebut the necessary demonstration that appellants were prejudiced, or that the court abused its discretion. Looking at the claims of abuse in this light, we find no reversible error. Of the numerous claimed violations, the majority represented late disclosure of Brady and Giglio material. Appellants' counsel were able to exploit this material as part of their defense, and they are unable to show reversible prejudice arising from the tardy disclosure  they point to no difference earlier disclosures would have made in their respective cases, with the exception of their opening arguments. Where, as here, the defense was able to eventually use Brady evidence to cross-examine government witnesses, the requisite prejudice is lacking, and we will not disturb the trial court's ruling. [19] See Edelen v. United States, 627 A.2d 968, 972 (D.C.1993) ([T]he trial judge was on the scene. He was in a far better position than we are to assess the atmospherics of the case and to determine whether, given all that had occurred, [the] defense was appreciably prejudiced by any delay in the [ Brady ] disclosure . . . .); see also, e.g., United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1376 (10th Cir.1997) (As long as ultimate disclosure is made before it is too late for the defendant[] to make use of any benefits of the evidence, Due Process is satisfied.) (internal quotations omitted). Appellants nevertheless argue that the cumulative effect of such last minute disclosures undermined the credibility of the prosecutor. This, they argue, indirectly impinged upon the prosecutor's assurances that certain witnesses were not parties to extensive agreements with the government, who in turn gave false testimony against appellants. Appellants, however, misstate their argument by relying on the cumulative effect the alleged Brady violations had on the prosecutor's credibility. As Kyles makes clear, the relevant inquiry is whether the cumulative effect of suppressed Brady evidence raises a reasonable probability that disclosure would have produced a different result, not whether a prosecutor's repeatedly late disclosures under Brady might otherwise affect the prosecutor's credibility on other matters. 514 U.S. at 421-22, 115 S.Ct. 1555. The prosecutor's credibility is not Brady evidence. Without a demonstration of how the late disclosure of the evidence prejudiced their case, the prosecutor's consistently late disclosures cannot form the basis for reversal.
Appellants also point to other situations where alleged Brady, Giglio, and Jencks material was not disclosed at all during trial. We need not delve too deeply into a discussion of whether or not the various materials should have been disclosed under either Brady or Giglio because appellants have failed to demonstrate the reasonable probability of a different outcome flowing from that evidence. First, appellants claim that the government was required to produce material relating to the government's favorable treatment of witness Kalvin Bears in exchange for his testimony. [20] After a bench conference on the issue, the trial court denied the Giglio motion of appellants' counsel, as well as the request to hold a hearing as to whether Bears' conviction for utterance was dismissed as a direct result of the prosecutor's intervention. Notwithstanding the trial court's denial, the jury heard substantial evidence of the favorable treatment the government gave Bears, and thus the potential motive to fabricate, as well as his extensive criminal record and prior history of drug abuse. On direct examination, Bears admitted that he was arrested nine times, and convicted five times, including convictions for armed robbery, and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. [21] He also testified to both using and distributing illegal substances, and that he was a crack addict at the time of the relevant events. [22] Bears informed the jury that he had recently been arrested on one charge of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute (PWID), one charge of attempted PWID, and one charge of carrying a pistol without a license, that he had pleaded guilty to the charges, and that he faced a mandatory minimum five year sentence up to a maximum of life in prison. He further admitted that the sentencing had been put off, and that he had entered into a limited use immunity agreement with the government in exchange for testifying. [23] That agreement was entered into evidence. On cross-examination, Bears denied that the government agreed not to charge him in the murder plot. However, he admitted that he had been informed by the government that he could have been charged, but after he agreed to testify in this case, charges were never brought against him. Likewise, Bears denied that he was placed in a halfway house, rather than prisons, as a result of his testifying, but nevertheless admitted that he was incarcerated prior to his involvement with the government and was in fact placed in a halfway house where he received weekend passes, on the basis of an unopposed release motion after he testified before the grand jury. Bears also admitted that he escaped from the halfway house but was never charged with a crime for that action. [24] Bears was cross-examined with the aid of a transcript demonstrating that the prosecutor in this case appeared at Bears' sentencing on his then-pending charges, and that another prosecutor, at another sentencing hearing, indicated that Bears may have been forced into a plea. He was cross-examined on the basis of another transcript wherein, at a sentencing hearing for the PWID and pistol charges, Bears' attorney represented in open court that because of his cooperation in this case, he might make a motion to withdraw his plea. Furthermore, Bears admitted that, after testifying before the grand jury, he was arrested for uttering (stealing a check), that following the arrest he had called the prosecutor in this case, and that the charge was subsequently dropped (no papered). He was cross-examined extensively regarding his possible bias arising from this treatment. While disclosure of the allegedly explicit deals, if they indeed existed, was required by Brady and Giglio, the presentation of the witness to the jury demonstrated something far less than an unblemished facade. The jury was markedly exposed to the witness's potential for bias and lack of credibility. See Johnson v. United States, 537 A.2d 555, 559-60 (D.C.1988) (In light of . . . both the jury's and defense counsel's independent awareness of the circumstances implying the witness' bias and questionable credibility, we find no reasonable probability that disclosure of the [alleged Brady material] would have affected the outcome of appellant's trial.); Hawthorne v. United States, 504 A.2d 580, 592 (D.C.) (in evaluating an alleged Giglio violation, [w]e . . . may consider the fact that [the witness's] credibility was successfully undermined in other ways), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 992, 107 S.Ct. 593, 93 L.Ed.2d 594 (1986). Second, appellants claim that relevant Giglio and Brady material was not produced with respect to government witness Ida Stanford. Specifically, they contend that the government intervened on behalf of Stanford to reduce a mandatory twenty year sentence on an unrelated charge to probation, among other claims. [25] However, in light of the trial testimony, appellants fail to adequately demonstrate a reasonable probability that such disclosures undermine the verdict. Like Bears, the jury was informed of Stanford's extensive criminal past, including her involvement in drugs and arms and her role as a very large drug dealer in this town. She also admitted that she had lied under oath in a previous trial. She testified further that she had entered an agreement with the government, whereby her cooperation would be reported to the sentencing judge in her pending case. She stated that, based on the subsequent report from the government regarding her cooperation, the [sentencing] Judge [could] disregard my guidelines and not sentence me to the mandatory 20 years. She explained that the government was not required to file a guidelines departure letter on her behalf, and that if one was filed, the sentencing judge need not follow it. However, she admitted that if she broke the terms of her agreement the departure letter provision would be annulled. After she testified, Stanford did receive a departure letter and was sentenced to only five years of probation. Appellants argue that the failure to disclose the post-testimony departure violated Giglio in light of the evidence that the government had pre-committed itself to assist the witness. However, Stanford was cross-examined extensively on the issue of the government's involvement in her pending sentencing, including the fact that her sentencing was continued until after her testimony in this case. The trial court found that the post-testimony departure letter given by the government represented nothing more than a strategic decision to forego action until after her testimony. In any event, we fail to find the necessary prejudice in any difference between an admitted perjurer and drug dealer who faces the possibility of a departure letter being sent on her behalf in light of her testimony, and an admitted perjurer and drug dealer who is guaranteed a departure letter prior to testifying. [26] See Johnson, supra, 537 A.2d at 559-60; Hawthorne, supra, 504 A.2d at 592. [27] Moreover, the mere fact that a departure letter was, in fact, sent after her testimony does not indicate that Stanford was lying, but rather supports her version of the agreement. Likewise, appellants have failed to articulate any reversible prejudice from the other claims of failure to disclose required discovery material. Appellants used a dismissed motion for sanctions against the prosecutor to cross-examine Lewis Yancey regarding an alleged meeting with the prosecutor outside the presence of his attorney. Even though an audio tape of Yancey indicating that the gun used by Card may have belonged to someone else was not disclosed, appellants fail to address how the ownership of the murder weapon was material to any issue in the case. With regard to witness James Craille, although his prior inconsistent statements were not revealed, Craille nevertheless testified that he had previously made the false statements. Even without disclosure of alleged contact visits, appellants' counsel acknowledged that Craille was substantially impeached in cross-examination.
Finally, Edwards' claim that the trial court gave an inadequate sanction for a Jencks Act violation in relation to the government's failure to disclose the grand jury testimony of Detective Bradley fails. Sanctions for such actions are left to the discretion of the trial judge. See McGriff, supra, 705 A.2d at 287. We do not think the court's adverse-inference instruction to the jury informing them of the government's failure was an abuse or an otherwise inadequate sanction, especially where appellant was afforded the opportunity to effectively and extensively cross-examine the detective with the previously undisclosed testimony. See Woodall v. United States, 684 A.2d 1258, 1265 (D.C.1996) (absent gross negligence or significant prejudice in failing to preserve Jencks material, court's decision not to strike testimony was not an abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1130, 117 S.Ct. 1278, 137 L.Ed.2d 354 (1997); Williams v. United States, 385 A.2d 760, 763 (D.C.1978) (affirming trial court's refusal to strike testimony despite evidence that police officer deliberately destroyed Jencks material).