Opinion ID: 2589798
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Funding for Jury Selection Expert

Text: Defendant contends voir dire was also improperly limited by the trial court's failure to authorize funding for a jury selection expert. (§ 987.9.) [4] He contends this failure, in combination with the other alleged errors noted above, deprived him of his right to an impartial jury and a reliable penalty determination, violated his rights under the California Constitution and his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel, and resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial. In particular, defendant contends that by arbitrarily denying defense counsel funding for a jury selection expert, the trial court allowed bias to continue unprobed by not providing counsel the resources to intelligently exercise peremptory and for cause challenges. We disagree. On August 23, 1990, Defense Counsel Elizabeth Barranco filed a declaration requesting investigative and expert funds, including a request for $9,240 to hire jury selection expert Dr. Wendy Saxon. (§ 987.9.) The declaration stated Saxon had experience in 33 capital cases, and, in particular, experience in selecting juries in cases involving the capital murder of children, which trial counsel did not. San Diego County Superior Court apparently uses a panel of trial judges (which of course does not include the assigned trial judge) to review funds requests. At the September 4, 1990, hearing on the request, trial counsel stated Saxon's expertise was particularly necessary because the district attorney's office had a full-time jury selection expert; the court noted this expert will be gone in two months. One judge expressed the panel's view that lawyers are trained as well as anyone else to select juries, and there are two lawyers on the case, and their expertise is as great or greater than this person's. Counsel stated Saxon had experience in several capital cases involving murdered children, which counsel did not, and I think murder of children, from what I read, is one of the most touchy areas with the jury. A judge apparently responded that it was fairly obvious people don't like people accused of killing children. [5] The judge added that [o]n the general subject of jury selection experts have been proliferating, not because anyone thought it was necessary, but because we recognize that in a number of cases the District Attorney has had someone there who may or may not have some competence. I think the general attitude for this group of judges is that that's nice but nonessential, and at least a majority and one hung on the issue of [whether] we should continue this. Counsel said, I know a lot of the cases pending have jury experts, and I feel like we are being shorted ... because we didn't ask for it earlier. A judge responded, You have to have a place to start change. On September 11, 1990, Barranco filed another declaration requesting the court to reconsider its denial of funding for a jury selection expert. The requested amount was reduced to $4,200 because jury selection was now expected to take half the time originally estimated. Counsel stated that contrary to the panel's assumption, defense counsel would not be permitted to ask prospective jurors any direct questions unless pursuant to a challenge for cause. In addition, she stated there would not be Hovey voir dire for every prospective juror. ( Hovey v. Superior Court, supra, 28 Cal.3d 1, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301.) Moreover, jury selection will be done without [the] benefit of a jury questionnaire. Defense counsel had no experience selecting a jury under these circumstances, and were thus all the more needy of a death penalty jury selection expert who, on the basis of her experience and studies, can identify with minimal information those prospective jurors who should be peremptorily challenged. At the September 18, 1990, hearing on the reconsideration request, the court stated, I have seriously considered the question of experts on jury selection. They are nice to have. We can't afford giving everybody in this case and every case an expert for jury selection. That's what lawyers are for. They are supposed to be experts. You're going to have a couple. That will do lots of things. If you will study the situation, I am sure in a case of this nature the judge will allow voir dire by [the] lawyer, as the judge has discretion to do. And I see no reason ... in this case, why it's different from any other case, and you are skilled lawyers. I know [codefense counsel] Mr. Adair is extremely adept and skilled at selecting juries. I have had Mr. Adair appear in front of me on serious cases, and I'm not going to reconsider it. Counsel said, [O]ur judge has told us he will not allow us to ask any questions. The court responded, That doesn't alter the situation. Section 987.9 commits to the sound discretion of the trial court the determination of the reasonableness of an application for funds for ancillary services such as a jury selection expert. ( People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 847, 268 Cal.Rptr. 802, 789 P.2d 983; see People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 234, 58 Cal. Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365.) Here, contrary to defendant's assertion, the record reveals the panel did not deny the funds request simply because it had decided to arbitrarily draw a line in the sand concerning expenses. Nor, by relying on the expertise of these particular attorneys instead of providing funding for a jury selection expert, did the trial panel virtually ensure[ ] that jurors with strong biases due to the nature of the case and of the victims remained in the jury pool. Rather, the trial court reasonably concluded a jury selection expert was not reasonably necessary for preparation or presentation of the defense. (See People v. Mattson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 847, 268 Cal.Rptr. 802, 789 P.2d 983.) While defense counsel expressed concern that they had no experience in selecting a jury post-Proposition 115, or in a case involving a child's murder, and noted the possibility that the district attorney would use a jury selection expert, none of these circumstances establish a basis for concluding funding was reasonably necessary. (§ 987.9.) As the trial court stated, lawyers are trained as well as anyone else to select juries, and there are two lawyers on the case, and their expertise is as great or greater than this person's. Here, counsel was permitted to suggest voir dire questions to the court, and sensitive matters were discussed in chambers, at which point counsel was permitted to inquire. Defendant does not explain how counsel lacked the ability during this process to identify juror bias simply because the case involved a child's murder. Indeed, in Mattson, which involved the brutal kidnapping, sexual assault, and murder of a nine-year-old girl, we also upheld the trial court's refusal to grant funding for a jury selection expert, concluding that none of the factors cited in support of the request established such funds were `reasonably necessary.' ( People v. Mattson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 839-840, 847-848, 268 Cal.Rptr. 802, 789 P.2d 983.) In so doing, we rejected the claim that reasonable necessity was established because counsel lacked experience performing Hovey voir dire, the inflammatory nature of the charges increased the difficulty of selecting impartial jurors, counsel had been economical in other phases of trial preparation, and the cost of an expert was modest. ( Id. at p. 847, 268 Cal.Rptr. 802, 789 P.2d 983.) We stated the defendant did not demonstrate how lack of experience in conducting voir dire under the Hovey procedure was relevant to his ability to identify prospective jurors who were qualified or were subject to excuse for cause. ( Ibid. ) Moreover, [n]othing about the charges in this case so distinguishes it from other capital cases or noncapital cases in which sexual assaults are charged as to compel a conclusion that selection of impartial jurors would be unusually difficult. ( Id. at p. 848, 268 Cal.Rptr. 802, 789 P.2d 983.) The same is true here. Thus, this case is unlike Ake v. Oklahoma (1985) 470 U.S. 68, 74, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53, on which defendant relies, and in which the high court held an indigent defendant is entitled to the services of a psychiatrist when he makes a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial. Unlike psychiatric expertise, the trial panel reasonably concluded a jury selection expert in this case would not offer any expertise not already available to counsel.