Opinion ID: 1559083
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Curtileniea Tate's Testimony.

Text: ¶ 27. Tate also complains about the district attorney's cross-examination of Curtileniea Tate in Tate's case-in-chief. ¶ 28. Contrary to the testimony of Deputy Vallely and Rosie Holloway that, at the initial meeting with Deputy Vallely, Curtileniea had done most of the talking, Curtileniea testified that her mother had done all the talking, because she (Curtileniea) did not believe what Brittany was saying about Tate. During the State's cross-examination of Curtileniea, the district attorney questioned her about Exhibit 3, the statement that Brittany had written out and that Brittany and Curtileniea had signed. Curtileniea was questioned about the portion of the statement where Brittany wrote I told my mom and she talked to [Tate] and he said he won't do it again, and Curtileniea testified the statement was not true. Curtileniea was questioned about her testimony that, although she had concluded by August or September of 2007 that Brittany's accusations against Tate were not true, Curtileniea and her mother had taken the little green wiggle thing (vibrator) to Deputy Vallely around September 10, 2007. The district attorney likewise questioned Curtileniea about the affidavit (Exhibit 5) she had signed under oath charging Tate with child molestation of Brittany, while at the same time stating that she did not believe the charges to be true. ¶ 29. The district attorney then questioned Curtileniea concerning the written statement she eventually took to Deputy Vallely. This statement, written and signed by Curtileniea, was marked as Exhibit A for identification, but was never received into evidence. This statement read: To Whom it May Concern, This is a statement about the conversation that I had with Erick (sic) Tate. My son had the phone and I grabbed it from him, I said hello twice and Erick (sic) said hey its (sic) me and how was I and the boys. I said how the F___ you think we doing. He said he was sorry. I said what did you do to [Brittany] and he said all the things she said I did I did not do. I told him just doing anything was wrong. I told him charges has (sic) been filled (sic) and he said he wasn't going back to prison, tell his boys he loved them, told me to continue to take care of his boys and don't bring them to his funeral and then he hung up the phone. /s/ Curtileniea Tate Since this statement generated an objection by defense counsel, the trial judge sent the jury out and then heard lengthy arguments from counsel, outside the presence of the jury. Defense counsel's main objections focused on the comments about not going back to prison and not bringing the boys to his funeral. As to the latter comment, defense counsel opined that this was another reference to possible suicide, and defense counsel reminded the trial judge that he already had sustained defense counsel's objection to Deputy Vallely's reference to possible suicide by Tate. In the end, after finding that the comments in this statement were relevant, and after performing the required balancing test, [8] the trial judge stated that the district attorney could cross-examine Curtileniea about the contents of the statement, with the exception of Curtileniea's comment that he said he wasn't going back to prison. ¶ 30. The trial court clearly did not err in allowing the district attorney to cross-examine Curtileniea as to the first part of the statement directly attributable to her. This was classic impeachment of a witness based on inconsistencies in the witness's in-court testimony and out-of-court statements, especially out-of-court statements which she voluntarily put in written form and submitted to Deputy Vallely. The statements attributable to Curtileniea as found in Exhibit A are inconsistent with Curtileniea's in-court testimony that she had questioned the veracity of Brittany's allegations from the very beginning. Curtileniea was provided limitless opportunities either to admit or deny her various in-court and out-court statements. Johnson v. State, 905 So.2d 1209, 1212-13 (Miss. 2005). See also Miss. R. Evid. 613. Likewise, at the request of defense counsel, the trial court granted Jury Instruction No. D-7A (Instruction No. 6) (relating to how the jury could consider any witness's testimony deemed by the jury to be false, in whole or in part); and Jury Instruction No. D-12 (Instruction No. 8), which stated in part that [t]he testimony of a witness may be discredited by showing that the witness testified falsely concerning a material matter, or by evidence that at some other time the witness said or did something... which is inconsistent with the testimony the witness gave at this trial. Tate no doubt wanted this jury instruction in order to be able to attack Brittany's credibility during closing arguments; however, the jury also could apply this jury instruction in considering and comparing Curtileniea's in-court testimony and her out-of-court statements. ¶ 31. Concerning the district attorney's use of the portions of Exhibit A attributable to Tate in his cross-examination of Curtileniea, we likewise find no error by the trial court in overruling defense counsel's objection. In addition to Curtileniea writing that Tate had said he was sorry and that he did not do what he was accused of doing, according to Curtileniea's statement, Tate also said, inter alia, that he was not going back to prison and that Curtileniea should not bring [their boys] to his funeral. Since the trial judge refused to allow the district attorney to question Curtileniea about Tate's reference to not going back to prison, we focus on the remaining statement which Tate finds objectionable. Tate asserts that the comments in Curtileniea's written statement about not bringing the boys to his funeral is tantamount to an improper reference to suicide. ¶ 32. Both the State and Tate concede that this Court has never addressed the issue of whether a defendant's attempted suicide or threat of suicide is admissible in an effort to show consciousness of guilt. [9] The State asserts that, while twenty-four states have held that evidence of a defendant's attempted suicide is admissible to show consciousness of guilt, only four states (Illinois, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, and Georgia) have addressed the issue of a defendant's threat to commit suicide and found that suicide threats were admissible to show consciousness of guilt. [10] Nothing in the record indicates that Tate ever attempted suicide, so our initial inquiry must be whether Tate's statement to Curtileniea that she must not bring their sons to his funeral was a threat of suicide. ¶ 33. We briefly turn to the four cases cited by the State for the purpose of determining in each case what act by the defendant was deemed to be a threat of suicide. In People v. O'Neil, 18 Ill.2d 461, 165 N.E.2d 319 (1960), the defendant, while being interrogated by law enforcement on an arson charge, threatened to commit suicide. O'Neil, 18 Ill.2d at 463, 165 N.E.2d 319. In State v. Seffens, 1992 WL 75831 (Tenn.Crim.App. March 16, 1992), the defendant, who was charged with multiple counts of aggravated rape and assault of his children and step-children, threatened to kill his wife and himself because he could get forty years for these offenses. Seffens, 1992 WL 75831, . In Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 416 Pa.Super. 160, 610 A.2d 1020 (1992), the defendant, who was charged with murder, rape, robbery, and burglary, had an ideation of suicide, in that he revealed to the prison psychiatric unit personnel that he was thinking of killing himself. Sanchez, 610 A.2d at 1026, 1028. Finally, in Duncan v. State, 269 Ga.App. 4, 602 S.E.2d 908 (2004), the defendant, who was charged with multiple counts of child molestation, on the date that his case was originally set for trial, left his mother and sister a note that I just think it would be better that I'm not around any more, and then attempted suicide by shooting himself in the head. Duncan, 602 S.E.2d at 910. ¶ 34. We find the facts of today's case to be distinguishable from the cases just discussed. [11] It is critical that we look at the totality of Tate's statements and the manner in which they were used by the State. Tate said to Curtileniea to tell his boys he loved them, told me to continue to take care of his boys and don't bring them to his funeral. At the time the district attorney broached this subject during his cross-examination of Curtileniea, the trial judge sent the jury to the jury room and discussed this issue with counsel outside the jury's presence. The district attorney argued: They want to put her up here and let her say she didn't ever believe it, but they don't want to deal with the problems that came with when she did believe it, and Your Honor, it's our position that short of that information about the prison situation, that statement is totally and fully admissible and relevant to this case. Although the trial judge ultimately ruled that the written statement by Curtileniea chronicling what Tate had told her could not be offered into evidence, the trial judge ruled that, with one exception, the district attorney could question Curtileniea about this statement, reasoning: She has taken the stand and testified for the defendant that although she signed the affidavit that she does not believe that he did it. The Court has read this statement which apparently was signed by her and given to law enforcement authorities. Again, the portion where it says about where he said he wasn't going back to prison, I find clearly that prejudice of that far outweighs any relevance. The remaining portions of the statement do have some relevance as to her conversations with the defendant which she has gotten up here and testified totally on his behalf, and the Court finds that any prejudice from this is outweighed by the relevancy, and I will allow the State to question her about the remaining part of the statement. (Emphasis added). [12] ¶ 35. After this ruling by the trial judge, the jury was returned to the courtroom and the district attorney continued his cross-examination of Curtileniea about the statement, omitting the he-said-he-wasn't-going-back-to-prison comment. Once Curtileniea was questioned in detail about the contents of the statement and additionally had admitted that she had the conversation with Tate, had written out the statement, and had taken the statement to Deputy Vallely, the district attorney tendered Curtileniea for re-direct examination by defense counsel. ¶ 36. Of significant import is the method in which the State used this evidence concerning Curtileniea's testimony about her memorializing in the written statement what Tate had told her. During the first phase of the State's closing argument to the jury, the assistant district attorney stated: You heard from his wife, Mrs. Curtileniea Tate tell you, He wouldn't even talk to me about it. He told me I needed to call my mama to find out what was going on. Is that not the most ridiculous thing you have ever heard in your life. He didn't deny it. Then she comes to law enforcement, and she gives them a statement, and she says in the statement that she wrote for Deputy Vallely that she brought to him. He said he was sorry. He said tell my boys I love them. Don't bring them to my funeral. That's the kind of thing that guilty people write, ladies and gentlemen. At this point, defense counsel objected, not on the basis of any perceived reference to suicide or guilty knowledge, but instead, on the basis that [the assistant district attorney] read the statement, but she did not read the complete statement where he said he did not do this. ¶ 37. The only other reference to the objectionable statement is during the final portion of the State's closing arguments when the district attorney again read the statement (with the exception of the he-said-he-wasn't-going-back-to-prison comment) to the jury when discussing the fact that Curtileniea had been questioned about this statement on cross-examination. The district attorney then argued: Now, [defense counsel] wants you to say, well he says he didn't do it in here because it says Eric said hey  I said what did you do to [Brittany] and he said all the things she said I did I did not do. I submit to you, the way that reads is he said all the things she said I did I did not do. And I  the reason I believe is, well, because then she says I told him just doing anything was wrong. So he's admitting it here, folks. BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor. BY THE COURT: Again, let's move on, Mr. Harper. BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It's incredible. BY [THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: What do you mean it's incredible. It's exactly what he says. BY THE COURT: Just a second. Mr. Harper, you have about one minute. You've got about one minute. Let's wrap it up. Time is running out. You've got about one minute left. BY [THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: I said what did you do to [Brittany], and he said all the things she said I did I did not do. I told him just doing anything was wrong. Y'all can interpret that any way you want to. Ladies and gentlemen, I think the case is clear. It's clear. [Defense counsel] calls his man the victim. I tell you, the victim is sitting right out there, and he told y'all yesterday morning, I remember this because he talked about Mrs. Holloway, the child's grandmother. Said she had a controlling spirit. Well, when his wife was testifying today, she said something about that she needed to get control of [Brittany], and then after he made these accusations and his wife had left him and was doing everything she could to help prove that he did these things, then she goes back to him. Y'all tell me who's got the controlling spirit in this picture. This concluded the State's closing argument. ¶ 38. From the record before us, it is obvious that the State was not attempting to single out any perceived threat of suicide by Tate as being evidence of consciousness of guilt. The only time anyone made any reference to consciousness of guilt was when the assistant district attorney stated to the jury That's the kind of thing that guilty people write. However, the assistant district attorney, in referring to [t]hat's the kind of thing ... was referring not to one, but three statements by Tate: `He said he was sorry. He said tell my boys I love them. Don't bring them to my funeral.' That's the kind of thing that guilty people write, ladies and gentlemen. ¶ 39. We find from the totality of the evidence that there was no effort to prove via alleged suicide threats that Tate possessed a consciousness of guilt. Additionally, no jury instruction was submitted to, or considered by, the trial judge informing the jury that it could consider whether Tate's purported suicide threats showed consciousness of guilt. We thus decline to address on a case of first impression whether evidence of threats of suicide by the defendant in a criminal case is admissible in an effort by the State to prove the defendant's consciousness of guilt. ¶ 40. Finally, while we concede that the learned trial judge in this case did not utter verbatim the words found in Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403, the trial judge properly conducted the required Rule 403 analysis with regard to Exhibit A prior to ruling on this evidence. This Court previously has stated: [The defendant] argues that such evidence should be subjected to a balancing test pursuant to the provisions of Miss. R. Evid. 403 and our case law. Indeed, the record does not reveal that the trial court performed a Rule 403 balancing test. Even though a trial judge's determination on the issue of admissibility of evidence must ultimately be filtered through Rule 403, a trial judge's failure to place Rule 403's magic words into the record does not necessarily create the presumption that the trial judge failed to consider Rule 403's requirements, nor does it automatically render the trial judge's decision on admissibility to be error, much less reversible error. Havard v. State, 928 So.2d 771, 797 (Miss. 2006) (footnote omitted). In Havard, a death penalty case, we ultimately determined that the trial judge's admission of certain photographic evidence was not an abuse of discretion and concluded that the probative value of this relevant evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. at 797-98. ¶ 41. In today's case, the record clearly reveals that the trial judge performed an on-the-record Rule 403 analysis, albeit in less-than-perfect language, by stating [t]he remaining portions of the statement do have some relevance as to her conversations with the defendant which she has gotten up here and testified totally on his behalf, and the Court finds that any prejudice from this is outweighed by the relevancy, and I will allow the State to question her about the remaining part of the statement. (Emphasis added). We find that, although the magic words referenced in Havard were not uttered by the trial judge in today's case, the Rule 403 analysis was performed on this evidence, and the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing the district attorney to cross-examine Curtileniea Tate on the statement she wrote out and presented to Deputy Valley. See Turner, 3 So.3d at 744. ¶ 42. Alternatively, even if we were to find error in the trial court's allowing the district attorney to cross-examine Curtileniea about the handwritten statement she gave to Deputy Vallely, such error, if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. McKee v. State, 791 So.2d 804, 810 (Miss.2001) (error is harmless when apparent from record that fair-minded jury could arrive at no verdict other than guilty) (citations omitted). Where the prejudice from erroneous admission of evidence dims in comparison to other overwhelming evidence, this Court has refused to reverse. Carter v. State, 722 So.2d 1258, 1262 (Miss.1998) (citing Holland v. State, 587 So.2d 848, 864 (Miss.1991)). As will be discussed in more detail under a separate assignment of error, the evidence of Tate's guilt was overwhelming, absent any reference to Tate's statement about not bringing his boys to his funeral. Such conclusion is based on the testimony of Brittany, Dr. Leigh Gray, Deputy Sheriff Bill Vallely and Rosie Holloway. ¶ 43. For all the reasons stated, we find this assignment of error to have no merit.