Opinion ID: 6260257
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of the Tax Act of 1963

Text: Section 201(a) of the Tax Act of 1963 for Education, 72 P.S. §3403-201 (a), imposes a tax upon “each separate sale at retail as defined herein”, and Section 2(j) (4) of the Act, 72 P.S. §3403-2(j) (4) defines “sale at retail” as follows: “(4) The rendition for a consideration of the service of repairing, altering, mending, pressing, fitting, dyeing, laundering, drycleaning or cleaning tangible personal property or applying or installing tangible personal property as a repair or replacement part of other personal property for a consideration, whether or not the services are performed directly or by means of coin-operated equipment or by any other means, and whether or not any tangible personal property is transferred in conjunction therewith, except such services as are rendered in the construction, reconstruction, remodeling, repair or maintenance of real estate. . . .” (Emphasis added.) The Commonwealth contends and we agree that appellant’s business falls squarely within this statutory definition. By making washing machines available to the public appellant performs for a consideration the services of “laundering . . . tangible personal property.” Appellant seeks to distinguish Section 2(j)(4) by asserting that the term “service” in common and ordinary usage denotes work or labor done for another. Since neither he nor any agent of his personally performs any work for the laundromat customers, it is argued that he performs no taxable “service” for those customers. However, given the prevalence of today’s machine technology, it is doubtful that the present ordinary meaning of the term “service” is restricted to manual service, and in light of the comprehensive scheme of taxation provided by the Tax Act of 1963 for Education we will not infer that the Legislature intended such a restrictive meaning. Appellant does indeed work for his customers—through his machines, and Section 2(j)(4) expressly contemplates as much by providing broadly that laundry services are taxable “whether or not . . . performed directly or by means of coin-operated equipment or by any other means . . .” Appellant additionally claims that an examination of the legislative history and of the historical necessity that led to the enactment of the present version of Section 2(j) (4) demonstrates that the Legislature intended to tax only attended coin-operated laundries. However, “[w]hen the words of a law are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Statutory Construction Act, Act of May 28, 1937, P. L. 1019, art. IV, §51, 46 P.S. §551; see also Commonwealth v. Rieck Investment Corp., 419 Pa. 52, 213 A. 2d 277 (1965). The Legislature has here clearly provided that services of the sort offered by appellant are taxable.