Opinion ID: 810029
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Manufacture of False Evidence

Text: “If officers use false evidence, including false testimony, to secure a conviction, the defendant’s due process is violated.” Wilson, 260 F.3d at 954; see also Napue v. People of State of Ill., 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (“[I]t is established that a conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment.”). We have recognized that a plaintiff can make out a violation of substantive due process by “offer[ing] evidence of a purposeful police conspiracy to manufacture, and the manufacture of, false evidence.” Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 647 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc). We agree with the district court that the facts give rise to a reasonable inference that Defendants purposefully manufactured false evidence to convict White. The evidence suggests that Defendants systematically and intentionally coached witnesses into providing false testimony that fit Defendants’ particular narrative of how the crime was committed. The interview transcripts involving JoAnn Taylor are replete with examples of this behavior. For instance, in Taylor’s -20- initial statement, she only mentioned “Lobo” and an unknown “boy” and gave a narrative that was completely incompatible with the facts. Through leading questions and hints about basic facts, Searcey was able to reconstruct Taylor’s statement to match the established evidence. Perhaps most concerning is how Taylor’s narrative began to match Searcey’s theory of the case after a break in the recording of her interview. Taylor’s story and her ability to recall specific details drastically changed after the break. Indeed, over the course of the entire investigation, Taylor’s narrative of the case changed multiple times, corroborating Defendants’ latest theories and incorporating new suspects when they were suggested to her. Some of the most alarming evidence that Defendants developed false testimony to use against White arises from the circumstances surrounding the arrests of Dean and Gonzalez. According to Searcey, Cliff Shelden informed him that Dean was possibly involved in the crime, but there is no mention of Dean in any of Cliff’s recorded statements. Searcey and Lamkin then interrogated Deb Shelden on successive days. On the first day, Deb named Taylor, Winslow, and White as being involved and indicated that it was her blood that had been found at the scene of the crime. After it was determined that Deb did not have type-B blood, Searcey and Lamkin reinterrogated Deb. On this occasion, Searcey suggested that Dean was involved, and Deb suddenly “remembered” Dean’s presence at the scene. These facts give rise to a reasonable inference that Searcey manipulated Deb into implicating Dean. Deb’s statement led to Dean’s arrest on April 15, 1989. Dean repeatedly denied any involvement in Wilson’s murder and indicated that he had absolutely no knowledge of the crime. No recorded interrogation of Dean took place until May 8, 1989. In the intervening period, Dean was kept in the county jail and there is evidence that Defendants subjected Dean to repeated interrogation without the presence of his counsel, repeatedly threatened Dean with the death penalty, fed Dean -21- information that fit Defendants’ theory of the case, took Dean to Wilson’s apartment, and showed Dean photographs and a video of the crime scene to help him “remember.” Another troubling piece of evidence is that Price offered to serve as Dean’s therapist without initially informing Dean of his role as a law enforcement officer. Price then told Dean that his polygraph results indicated he was repressing memories of the crime. After weeks of being “counseled” by Price and pressured to independently recall information that was fed to him by Defendants, Dean professed to dreaming about the murder and to believing that he was present. When Dean volunteered this information to Defendants, they encouraged him to continue in his efforts to “remember” more information and held repeated interviews so that Dean could rehearse his story. In sum, these facts give rise to a reasonable inference that Defendants managed to overcome Dean’s judgment and convince him that he was present at the murder so that he could implicate White and the other suspects. Indeed, Dean provided damning testimony at White’s trial by reciting a narrative that matched Defendants’ theory of the case. Defendants’ actions in their search for a suspect who could serve as a link to the forensic evidence also give rise to a reasonable inference that Defendants purposefully manufactured evidence against White. Searcey and Price returned to Deb Shelden, who is revealed in the transcripts to be one of Defendants’ more suggestible witnesses. Although Gonzalez’s name had never before been mentioned as a suspect, Searcey showed Deb a single photograph of Gonzalez after Deb apparently recalled seeing another person at the scene of the crime. Deb then “remembered” that this additional person at the scene of the crime was Gonzalez. On the same day, Dean inexplicably reached the exact same epiphany about Gonzalez being present at the murder after Searcey showed him Gonzalez’s photograph. Searcey’s arrest affidavit for Gonzalez stated that it was based on Deb’s positive -22- identification of Gonzalez, but it did not mention that this identification only occurred after Deb had been in the county jail for six weeks and after Searcey showed Deb a picture of Gonzalez. Defendants then arrested Gonzalez, who turned out to have type-B blood. These facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to White, give rise to the reasonable inference that Defendants intentionally fabricated evidence about Deb Shelden, James Dean, and Kathy Gonzalez in order to build a case against White and his alleged accomplices. Indeed, the circumstances surrounding the arrests of Deb, Dean, and Gonzalez allow a factfinder to identify a pattern whereby: Defendants first convinced a suspect that he or she was at the scene of the crime through lies, threats, leading questions, manipulative “therapy” sessions, and the alleged accusations of several other “accomplices”; and then if the suspect’s blood was not a match for the blood found at the crime scene, Defendants manipulated the suspect into implicating yet another individual, thus beginning the process again. Defendants subjected both Deb Shelden and Dean to this, and it only ended after Gonzalez was determined to have type-B blood. The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to White, also suggest that Defendants repeatedly ignored any evidence that did not fit within their narrative. From the beginning of Searcey’s investigation, Searcey credited statements from questionable sources, such as Bishop and Podendorf, who tended to implicate White and his alleged accomplices, even when their statements contradicted readily verifiable facts. Searcey then drafted untimely and inaccurate reports about his investigation; there are no records of his independent investigation in 1985 other than the reports he drafted over three years later. Even after Searcey was officially authorized to investigate the case, his reports omitted details or contained discrepancies. For example, Searcey’s report of his February 13, 1989 interview with Winslow omitted Winslow’s claim that he loaned his car to Cliff Shelden on the night -23- of the murder, a claim Searcey knew to be implausible because Searcey was aware that Cliff was hospitalized at the time. And several weeks after the March 24 interview of Deb Shelden, Searcey wrote a report that conflicted with the timely report of BPD Officer Stevens. While Stevens reported that Deb never read a particular letter from Taylor to Cliff and that Deb could not recall if White was implicated in the crime, Searcey unequivocally stated that Deb had personally read Taylor’s letter and that it implicated both Taylor and White. Later, when Dean was “remembering” suspects and details in his dreams, Defendants were all too eager to credit his testimony. But when Dean “remembered” that Cliff Shelden was present for the murder, both DeWitt and Searcey disregarded his testimony. Finally, the record indicates that none of the suspects possessed any independent knowledge of facts that were consistent with the evidence found at the crime scene. With the exception of Taylor, who confessed to being present at Wilson’s murder in a bizarre and implausible account, each suspect initially denied involvement and had no knowledge of the facts. Only White maintained his innocence, and the other suspects all confessed for various reasons. Winslow sought immunity, Gonzalez wanted a plea agreement to avoid the death penalty, and it appears that Deb Shelden and Dean both came to believe that they were present through suggestion, systematic pressure, and a reliance on “memories” recovered in their dreams. Even Taylor’s initial statement came after North Carolina law enforcement officials told her she was present at the murder. But in these confessions, each of White’s alleged accomplices refused to admit to an active role in the rape and murder of Wilson. Instead, White’s alleged accomplices universally maintained that they were mere bystanders during the rape and murder. Based on the evidence in the interview transcripts, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that White’s alleged accomplices were all coached by Defendants into reciting some semblance of a coherent story. -24- Defendants argue that there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate that they acted reasonably in believing that White and the other suspects were involved in the homicide. Based on the record, we acknowledge that a factfinder could conclude that Defendants were merely negligent in conducting their investigation, did not purposefully manufacture testimony, and had probable cause to believe that White was guilty. However, we must examine the facts in the light most favorable to White, see Krout, 583 F.3d at 564, and when viewed through that lens, we believe a factfinder could determine that White’s conviction was the result of a purposeful conspiracy by Defendants to fabricate evidence against White. Defendants also insist that they cannot be held liable simply because White’s alleged accomplices kept changing their stories or because Defendants believed certain witnesses, followed certain leads, and discounted evidence they found incredible. We agree with Defendants’ propositions as a general matter. However, the facts in this case support a finding that Defendants were not merely mistaken or thrown off by the changing stories of White’s alleged accomplices. The facts allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Defendants purposefully fabricated evidence to obtain White’s conviction. The record shows that Defendants coached and manipulated White’s alleged accomplices into adopting Defendants’ theory of the case up until White’s trial. Some of the investigative techniques used by Defendants, such as the single-photograph identification process that led to the arrest of Gonzalez, further support the inference that Defendants acted purposefully. The interview transcripts also contain a number of inexplicable moments where White’s alleged accomplices completely changed their stories or suddenly remembered important details about the crime after breaks in the tape recording. Both Dean and Taylor testified against White at White’s trial, reciting a narrative that matched Defendants’ theory of the case. These facts, combined with the numerous examples of Defendants’ unwillingness to acknowledge blatant discrepancies or implausibilities in their theory of the case, allow a reasonable juror to draw the inference that -25- Defendants purposefully fabricated testimony in order to convict White. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to White, demonstrate a violation of White’s substantive due process liberty interest in obtaining fair criminal proceedings. Finally, Defendants argue that White failed to demonstrate the elements of a conspiracy between Defendants to manufacture a case against White. “To be liable as a conspirator [one] must be a voluntary participant in a common venture . . . . It is enough if [Defendants] understand the general objectives of the scheme, accept them, and agree, either explicitly or implicitly, to do [their] part to further them.” Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1988) (affirming a jury’s finding of civil liability for police officers who conspired to fabricate evidence and used it to prosecute an innocent defendant). In the instant case, the facts viewed in the light most favorable to White give rise to the reasonable inference that Defendants acted in concert with the goal of securing White’s conviction for the rape and murder of Helen Wilson. Thus, the district court did not err in denying Defendants’ request for summary judgment on the conspiracy claim.