Opinion ID: 3000767
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Indiana Statutory Antitrust Claims

Text: The plaintiffs next assert that the no-hire provision was an unlawful restraint of trade on the part of RBC and Bank One, in violation of Indiana’s antitrust act, I.C. § 24-1-2-1, et seq. The act provides for a private right of action by individuals injured as a result of violations of the act. Id. § 24-1-2-7. The elements of a private action for violation of the Indiana act are: “1) a violation of the statute, 2) injury to a person’s business or property proximately caused by the violation, and 3) actual damages.” City of Auburn v. Mavis, 468 N.E.2d 584, 585 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). The second element of a private action also requires a showing of “antitrust injury”: “the type of injury which the antitrust laws intend to prevent and the type of injury which naturally flows from what makes the defendant’s acts unlawful.” Id. at 586; see also Berghausen v. Microsoft Corp., 765 N.E.2d 592, 597 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). The plaintiffs concede that they cannot demonstrate an antitrust injury, but contend that, because they are private individuals as opposed to corporations, they should be permitted to recover without demonstrating antitrust injury. Because this claim arises under Indiana law, we must decide the issue “as we believe the Supreme Court of Indiana would if faced with the same issue.” Clark, 473 F.3d at 712. In doing so, we may look to the decisions of the Indiana courts that construe the Indiana antitrust statute. Id. We have found nothing in the decisions of the Indiana courts of appeals to indicate that the Supreme Court of Indiana would create the exception urged by the plaintiffs. Further, such an exception would be inconsistent with the statute authorizing a private right of action for violations of the Indiana act. This statute provides a private right of action for “[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by any person or corporation by reason of the doing by any person or persons of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful” by the Indiana act. I.C. § 24-1-2-7 (emphasis added). The text of the statute makes clear that the private action provides recovery for injuries only when the violation of the act is the reason for the injury. What the act forbids or declares unlawful are schemes, contracts or combinations that restrain trade, as that concept is understood in federal antitrust law. See I.C. § 24-1-2-1; see also Rumple v. Bloomington Hosp., 422 N.E.2d 1309, 1315 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (noting that the Indiana act was modeled after section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and has been interpreted consistent with the Sherman Act). It follows that the anti-competitive conduct must be the reason for the plaintiffs’ injuries for their claims to fall within
1 (...continued) involuntary servitude by preventing the plaintiffs from seeking employment with Bank One. We deem this contention frivolous and shall not address it further. No. 06-3802 Page 6 Thus, there is nothing in the statute or the decisions of the courts of Indiana to support the view that the Supreme Court of Indiana would waive the element of proof of an antitrust injury for individuals in the plaintiffs’ position. Because the plaintiffs cannot demonstrate antitrust injury, RBC and Bank One are entitled to summary judgment in their favor on the plaintiffs’ Indiana statutory antitrust claims.