Opinion ID: 4494189
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: c. 35-48-4-10.

Text: The question is whether Garcia’s prior conviction under this statute is a “felony drug oﬀense” for purposes of the enhancement for his federal crime. Federal law defined “felony drug oﬀense” as: 4 Nos. 18-1890 & 18-2261 an oﬀense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State or foreign country that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, anabolic steroids, or depressant or stimulant substances. 21 U.S.C. § 802(44). Federal law also defined these particular substances. “Narcotic drug” generally includes opium, opiates, poppy straw, coca leaves, cocaine, ecgonine, and any compound containing any of these substances. Id. § 802(17). “Marihuana” generally means all parts of Cannabis sativa L. and every compound of this plant. Id. § 802(16). “Anabolic steroid” generally means any drug or hormonal substance related to testosterone. Id. § 802(41)(A). “Depressant or stimulant substance” generally means a drug containing barbituric acid or amphetamine, or lysergic acid diethylamide, or any drug containing a substance the Attorney General designated as having a potential for abuse because of its depressant, stimulant, or hallucinogenic eﬀect. Id. § 802(9). (Foreshadowing: “felony drug oﬀense” includes marijuana but not salvia.) Courts use the categorical approach to determine whether a conviction under a state statute meets § 802(44)’s definition of “felony drug oﬀense.” United States v. Elder, 900 F.3d 491, 497–501 (7th Cir. 2018). “The categorical approach focuses solely on whether the elements of the crime of conviction sufficiently match the elements of the crime referenced in the federal statute, while ignoring the particular facts of the case.” Id. at 498 (internal quotation marks and brackets removed) (quoting Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016)). Under the categorical approach, Garcia’s appeal is easy. The problem for the government is salvia. The Indiana statute plainly Nos. 18-1890 & 18-2261 5 prohibits it, but the federal definition of “felony drug oﬀense” plainly does not include it. So the Indiana statute is broader than the federal definition. Indiana may convict a person for violating I.C. 35-48-4-10 even though he never dealt with a drug listed in the federal definition. Thus, under the categorical approach, a conviction under I.C. 35-48-4-10 is not a “felony drug oﬀense” and cannot raise the mandatory minimum sentence for Garcia’s instant federal crime. The government concedes Indiana’s statute includes salvia and concedes the federal definition of “felony drug offense” does not. The government essentially concedes I.C. 3548-4-10 is overbroad under the categorical approach. But the government argues I.C. 35-48-4-10 is divisible, so the modified categorical approach applies. When a statute sets out alternative elements rather than merely alternative means, it is divisible, and courts use the modified categorical approach to determine which division formed the basis of the conviction. Here, if the statute’s list of drugs is a list of alternative elements rather than alternative means, then we would apply the modified categorical approach to determine which of the listed drugs supported Garcia’s prior conviction. If that drug were marijuana, then the prior conviction is a “felony drug oﬀense” enhancing the present sentence. If that drug were salvia, then the prior conviction is not a “felony drug oﬀense” and does not enhance the present sentence. So the ultimate question is whether Indiana’s statute is divisible. Federal courts defer to state courts on the issue of whether a state statute is divisible. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256 (“This threshold inquiry—elements or means?—is easy in this case, as it will be in many others. Here, a state court decision definitively answers the question … .”). A state supreme court 6 Nos. 18-1890 & 18-2261 decision on point generally controls. But reliance on a state intermediate court decision is appropriate in the absence of a decision from the State’s highest court or a compelling reason to think the highest court would disagree with the intermediate decision. Mathis itself does not require a federal court to look only to the decisions of the State’s highest court. Indeed, we recently looked to an Indiana Court of Appeals decision for the “most authoritative guidance” regarding the scope of particular Indiana drug crimes for purposes of determining whether that scope fell within the Armed Career Criminal Act’s definition of a “serious drug oﬀense.” United States v. Williams, 931 F.3d 570, 576 (7th Cir. 2019) (discussing Hyche v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1176, 1179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)). Here, decisions by Indiana’s Supreme Court and Court of Appeals show the statute is not divisible. See Duncan v. State, 412 N.E.2d 770, 775–76 (Ind. 1980); Everroad v. State, 570 N.E.2d 38, 54 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), rev’d in part but summarily aﬀ’d in relevant part, 590 N.E.2d 567, 571 (Ind. 1992); Martin v. State, 374 N.E.2d 543, 545 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978). The Indiana Court of Appeals decision in Everroad is particularly instructive. The court applied Indiana Supreme Court precedent to an older version of I.C. 35-48-4-10. Indiana charged defendants with two counts under I.C. 35-48-4-10 based on a single occurrence: one for marijuana, one for hashish. On appeal, defendants argued they could only be convicted of one count under this statute even though two drugs itemized in the statute were involved. The intermediate court applied Duncan and concluded possessing marijuana and hashish is only one violation of I.C. 35-48-4-10. Defendants could not be convicted of separate counts for marijuana and hashish based on the same occurrence. Nos. 18-1890 & 18-2261 7 The intermediate decision in Everroad is currently the authoritative resolution of this issue by an Indiana court. Indiana’s Supreme Court has not directly addressed this issue, although its decision in Duncan supported the intermediate decision in Everroad,2 which is clear and unambiguous. Possessing marijuana and hashish is only one violation of I.C. 3548-4-10. Salvia stands on equal statutory footing. Thus, the list of drugs in Indiana’s statute lists alternative means of committing a single oﬀense. So the modified categorical approach does not apply. “Marijuana, hash oil, hashish, or salvia” are not alternative elements for alternative crimes. Rather, they are alternative means of committing a single crime. Therefore, under the categorical approach, if any of these drugs in Indiana’s statute are not included in the list of drugs in the federal definition of “felony drug oﬀense,” then the Indiana statute is broader than the federal definition. And if the Indiana statute is broader, then a conviction under it is not a “felony drug oﬀense” for enhancement purposes, regardless of which drug the defendant actually dealt. As already noted, inclusion of salvia in the Indiana statute excludes it from the federal definition of “felony drug oﬀense.” Thus, Garcia’s prior conviction under I.C. 35-48-4-10 is not a “felony drug oﬀense” and does not support the sentencing enhancement here. Application of this enhancement was plain error. But this does not mean Garcia is unaccountable. He was held accountable by the state court for his prior 2 The Indiana Supreme Court summarily affirmed the relevant part of the intermediate court’s decision in Everroad. We need not evaluate whether this is more than perfect silence from the Indiana Supreme Court because reliance on an intermediate decision is legitimate absent persuasive indicia Indiana’s highest court would reach a different conclusion. 8 Nos. 18-1890 & 18-2261 conviction. We remand to the district court for resentencing without this prior conviction as an enhancer under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) but we do not remove the prior conviction from the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) analysis. See Portee v. United States, 941 F.3d 263, 273 (7th Cir. 2019).