Opinion ID: 1817650
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the default judgment was the result of the defendant's own conduct.

Text: In addition to the general proposition noted in Kirtland that [o]n review, a trial court's decisions should be looked upon with great deference, 524 So.2d at 608, we explained in Jones v. Hydro-Wave of Alabama, Inc., 524 So.2d 610, 616 (Ala. 1988), and reaffirmed in Phillips, 828 So.2d at 279, that due to the trial judge's superior vantage point, the trial court is the more suitable arbiter for determining with accuracy the culpability of the defaulting party's conduct, and, for this reason, we will show great deference toward the trial court's decision with respect to such culpability. In Kirtland we stated: Conduct committed willfully or in bad faith constitutes culpable conduct for purposes of determining whether a default judgment should be set aside. Negligence by itself is insufficient.... Willful and bad faith conduct is characterized by incessant and flagrant disrespect for court rules, deliberate and knowing disregard for judicial authority, or intentional nonresponsiveness. 524 So.2d at 607-08. A defaulting party's reasonable explanation for inaction and noncompliance may preclude a finding of culpability. 524 So.2d at 608. Lifestar acknowledges that the summons and complaint were routed to its home office but simply says that from there it is unclear where they went. In DaLee v. Crosby Lumber Co., 561 So.2d 1086, 1091 (Ala.1990), we stated: In McDavid v. United Mercantile Agencies, Inc., 248 Ala. 297, 301, 27 So.2d 499, 503 (1946), the Court set out the duty of a party when legal process is duly served upon him: `It is the duty of every party desiring to resist an action or to participate in a judicial proceeding to take timely and adequate steps to retain counsel or to act in his own person to avoid an undesirable judgment. Unless in arranging for his defense he shows that he has exercised such reasonable diligence as a man of ordinary prudence usually bestows upon important business, his motion to set aside a judgment for default should be denied. Little v. Peevy, [238 Ala. 106, 189 So. 720 (Ala.1939)]. `Courts cannot act as guardian for parties who are grossly careless of their own affairs. All must be governed by the laws in force, universally applied, according to the showing made. `If judgment be entered against a party in his absence, before he can be relieved of the judgment he must show that it was the result of a mistake or inadvertence which reasonable care could not have avoided, a surprise which reasonable precaution could not have prevented, or a negligence which reasonable prudence could not have anticipated.' See also Phillips, 828 So.2d at 279. Certainly it would have been apparent to Vanessa Hill, as well as to subsequent recipients of the complaint at Lifestar's home office, that the incident described in the complaint necessarily served to identify Lifestar as the entity intended to be sued. As noted, only a few months before Ms. Lemuel filed her action, the summons and complaint for another wrongful-death action against Care Ambulance Service of Alabama, Inc. had been served on Vanessa Hill, and Lifestar had answered the complaint, identifying itself as doing business as Care Ambulance Service and explaining that it had been incorrectly designated in the complaint as Care Ambulance Service of Alabama, Inc. Lifestar obviously received and processed Judge Price's May 16 order setting a hearing on damages for May 28. That was established by the explanation in Care's motion to set aside the default judgment and the attached copy of that order bearing imprinted fax routing information showing that it had been faxed to Care from the Montgomery office of Lifestar on May 29, 2003. Even if it is assumed that the May 16 order was not forwarded to Lifestar's Montgomery office until after it was filed with the circuit clerk on May 22, Lifestar has made no attempt to account for why it delayed forwarding notice of the hearing to Care until the day after the scheduled hearing. Lifestar took no action other than to have one of its representatives telephone Halstrom on June 3, 2003, to advise him that the default judgment had been taken against the wrong party. When Lifestar finally filed a motion to set aside the judgment, it made no attempt to invoke the Kirtland factors except to argue that Care had a meritorious defense. At the July 22, 2003, hearing, Lifestar offered no evidence in support of the Kirtland factors other than to argue that Lifestar had provided no medical services to Mr. Lemuel. Concerning its supposed lack of culpability, Lifestar argued only that it had never been put on notice that it might be the entity involved in the Lemuel incident. Given the great deference we are obliged to accord Judge Price's decision concerning culpability, we cannot say that he exceeded his discretion in finding as he did. Having analyzed the application of all three of the Kirtland factors in the context of the development of those factors before Judge Price, we cannot say that Judge Price exceeded his discretion in concluding that Lifestar was not entitled to have the default judgment set aside. We turn last to Lifestar's contention that the amount of the default judgment was excessive. Lifestar acknowledges that it did not assert excessiveness at the trial court, but it seeks to benefit from the fact that that issue was briefed and argued by Care at the hearing. (Lifestar's brief, p. 46.) The argument Care briefed and presented in its motion to set aside the judgment, however, was that, because the purpose of punitive damages is to deter wrongful conduct and to punish those responsible for wrongful conduct, it was deserving of no such punishment because it was not the entity that provided the medical treatment to Mr. Lemuel. Further, it asserted: Care of Alabama is informed by the actual transporter, Lifestar[,] that the condition from which Mr. Lemuel ultimately died was such that no reasonably prudent emergency transport team and/or member would have been expected to thwart. In other words, it is believed that the unfortunate consequence of Mr. Lemuel's condition was going to be death no matter the care offered by the ambulance team. Stated another way, certainly the actions of this defendant are not causally related to Mr. Lemuel's death since it had no connection therewith, but in addition it would appear that Lifestar's actions were also not culpable. Facts relating to these issues have not been able to be developed through discovery and presented to the Court and would give grounds to another `meritorious defense' under Kirtland [v. Fort Morgan Authority Sewer Service, Inc., 524 So.2d 600 (Ala.1988)]. Lifestar argues to this Court that there was no medical evidence presented to Judge Price at the damages hearing to substantiate the cause of death as being a breach of the standard of care by the medics providing service at the scene and in route to the hospital. (Lifestar's brief, p. 47.) Given the testimony of Dallas Johnson at the damages hearing, we cannot agree with that contention. This Court and the Legislature have established a constitutionally appropriate system for reviewing a contention that a punitive-damages award is excessive. See Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala.1986), and Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218 (Ala.1989); and § 6-11-23(b), Ala.Code 1975. Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has established various guideposts and considerations for assessing whether punitive damages are excessive, in a series of cases including, most notably, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996). Lifestar would have been entitled to a Hammond-Green Oil hearing if it had properly requested one, but a trial judge does not err in not conducting a hearing on punitive damages if no such hearing is requested. Phillips, 828 So.2d at 279. Lifestar says in its brief that [a]dmittedly, no Hammond-Green Oil hearing was held, but goes on to argue that [w]ithout getting into the Hammond-Green Oil, BMW, and § 6-11-23(b), Code of Alabama, requirements, this Court should, on its own initiative, conduct an independent review of the punitive damages awarded in this case. A Hammond-Green Oil hearing was available to Care and Lifestar; they simply made no effort to present any evidence or argument relating to the factors and criteria developed by caselaw for reviewing punitive damages, other than as incidentally presented in connection with the Rule 55(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., and Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., arguments noted above. Likewise, no separate argument was presented with respect to any of the BMW guideposts. In now asserting that [t]his Court is charged with the duty of conducting its own review of punitive damages, Lifestar cites only Life Insurance Co. of Georgia v. Johnson, 701 So.2d 524, 532 (Ala.1997). That case stands for the proposition that we will conduct our own review of a punitive-damages award if the issue of excessiveness has been properly presented to the trial court; we do not, however, review a punitive-damages award for excessiveness where the issue has not been properly raised before the trial court. Because of the procedural and evidentiary deficiencies infecting Lifestar's claim that the punitive-damages award was excessive, we are in no position independently to assess the constitutional propriety of that award.