Opinion ID: 2979949
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Breach-of-plea-agreement issue

Text: If the government materially breaches a plea agreement, then any appellate waiver contained in the agreement is unenforceable. United States v. Swanberg, 370 F.3d 622, 626-29 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that the defendant could appeal his sentence even though he had validly waived his right to appeal because the government materially breached the plea agreement). Oscar argues that the government breached the present plea agreement “by failing to make the same factual statement about his cooperation that was made to the benefit of Frank Canez Munoz, thereby rendering the provision in the plea agreement waiving his right to appeal his sentence unenforceable.” Specifically, Oscar contends that the government provided more detailed information about the brothers’ cooperation in a sealed sidebar conference during Frank’s sentencing hearing than it did during Oscar’s sentencing -4- hearing. Oscar did not learn about this difference until well after his own sentencing, when his attorney obtained a transcript of the sealed sidebar conference involving his brother Frank. Appellate courts ordinarily review de novo the issue of whether a plea agreement was breached. Swanberg, 370 F.3d at 627. The government, however, asserts that this issue should instead be reviewed under the plain-error standard because Oscar did not argue that the government breached the plea agreement at his sentencing hearing. We acknowledge that the government’s position is not without support: “This court’s decisions . . . have consistently applied plain-error review where a defendant fails to claim during sentencing that the government has breached the plea agreement.” Id. But because Oscar had no knowledge of the alleged breach until after his sentencing, he was not able to raise this objection at sentencing, which weighs in favor of applying de novo review. We need not decide which standard of review to use in this case, however, because Oscar cannot show a breach of the plea agreement even under the more lenient de novo standard. Turning now to the merits of Oscar’s argument, “we use traditional contract law principles in interpreting and enforcing” plea agreements because they are contractual in nature. United States v. Bowman, 634 F.3d 357, 360 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “But because plea agreements’ constitutional and supervisory implications raise concerns over and above those present in the traditional contract context, in interpreting such agreements we hold the government to a greater degree of responsibility than the defendant for imprecisions or ambiguities in the plea agreements.” Id. (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). We therefore construe such ambiguities against the government, especially because the government has the ability to draft plea agreements more precisely to avoid imprecision. Id. at 360-61. -5- We find Oscar’s argument that the government breached the plea agreement unpersuasive because its premise—that the government promised as part of the plea agreement to make the same factual statement during Oscar’s sentencing hearing about his cooperation as it had made during his brother’s hearing about the latter’s cooperation (the “similar-statements promise”)—has no support in the record. The plea agreement in this case does not require the government to make any specific factual statement about Oscar’s cooperation, let alone the same factual statement that it made about Frank’s cooperation. In exchange for Oscar’s plea and cooperation, the government made three promises: (1) to dismiss Count 2 of the Indictment after Oscar was sentenced on Count 1; (2) to not charge Oscar with additional nonviolent crimes based solely on Oscar’s conduct underlying the current charges; and (3) if the government determined in its sole discretion that Oscar continued to provide substantial assistance, then it would file a motion seeking to reduce Oscar’s sentence based on his assistance. None of the above promises match the similar-statements promise that Oscar alleges was breached. Moreover, the integration clause in the plea agreement (which Oscar fails to address) reinforces the conclusion that the alleged similar-statements promise is not part of the plea agreement. This clause provides that “[t]his written Agreement embodies all of the agreements and understandings between the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Ohio and the defendant. No conversations, discussions, understandings, or other documents extraneous to the Agreement shall be considered part of the Agreement.” And Oscar confirmed during the change-ofplea hearing that no one from the government had promised him any form of leniency beyond the plea agreement itself. Because the plain language of the plea agreement shows that the alleged similar- -6- statements promise is not a part of the agreement, the government could not possibly have breached a nonexistent promise. The appellate-waiver provision in the plea agreement is therefore enforceable.