Opinion ID: 885841
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the District Court erroneously instruct the jury on the definition of purposely?

Text: ¶ 37 We review a claim of instructional error in a criminal case to determine whether the instructions, as a whole, fully and fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case. State v. Johnson, 1998 MT 289, ¶ 28, 291 Mont. 501, ¶ 28, 969 P.2d 925, ¶ 28 (citations omitted). Furthermore, a trial court has broad discretion when it instructs a jury. Johnson, ¶ 28. ¶ 38 In the present case, the District Court instructed the jury that a person commits the offense of DELIBERATE HOMICIDE if he purposely or knowingly causes the death of another human being. The District Court then instructed the jury on the definition of purposely as follows: A person acts purposely with respect to deliberate homicide if it is his conscious object to cause death or a similar type of harm to another human being. Incident to giving these instructions, the District Court refused Clausell's proposed jury instruction on the elements of deliberate homicide, including intent. ¶ 39 Clausell argues the jury was not properly instructed on the definition of purposely, because the word similar does not appear in the statutory definitions of purposely or deliberate homicide. He contends the jury instruction given lowered the State's burden of proving every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree. ¶ 40 Clausell was charged with violation of § 45-5-102, MCA, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 45-5-102. Deliberate Homicide. (1) A person commits the offense of deliberate homicide if: (a) the person purposely or knowingly causes the death of another human being.... Montana Code defines purposely as follows: 45-2-101. General definitions. (64) Purposelya person acts purposely with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense if it is the person's conscious object to engage in that conduct or to cause that result. When a particular purpose is an element of an offense, the element is established although the purpose is conditional, unless the condition negatives the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense. Equivalent terms, such as purpose and with the purpose, have the same meaning. Both parties cited State v. Rothacher (1995), 272 Mont. 303, 901 P.2d 82, as authority for their respective proposed instructions regarding deliberate homicide and intent. ¶ 41 In Rothacher, we noted that the statutory definitions of deliberate homicide and purposely and knowingly must be read with § 45-2-201, MCA, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (2) If purposely or knowingly causing a result is an element of an offense and the result is not within the contemplation or purpose of the offender, either element can nevertheless be established if: .... (b) the result involves the same kind of harm or injury as contemplated but the precise harm or injury was different or occurred in a different way, unless the actual result is too remote or accidental to have a bearing on the offender's liability or on the gravity of the offense. We clarified our previous line of decisions applying these statutes and held that the mental state for deliberate homicide can be established if the result involves the same or similar kind of harm or injury as contemplated by the defendant, although the actual degree of injury is greater than intended. Rothacher, 272 Mont. at 306-07, 901 P.2d at 84-85; see also State v. Lantis, 1998 MT 172, ¶ 35, 289 Mont. 480, ¶ 35, 962 P.2d 1169, ¶ 35. ¶ 42 Thus, pursuant to Rothacher, the District Court did not lower the State's burden when it instructed the jury that a person acts purposely with respect to deliberate homicide if it is his conscious object to cause death or a similar type of harm. We conclude, therefore, that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury on the definition of purposely.