Opinion ID: 1211333
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preemption of Claims Against Defendants Glock and RSR

Text: The PLCAA requires that federal courts immediately dismiss[ ] a qualified civil liability action. 15 U.S.C. § 7902(b). The term qualified civil liability action means a civil action or proceeding or an administrative proceeding brought by any person against a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product, or a trade association, for damages, punitive damages, injunctive or declaratory relief, abatement, restitution, fines, or penalties, or other relief, resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a qualified product by the person or a third party, but shall not include [specified enumerated exceptions.] Id. § 7903(5)(A). We agree with the parties that this case meets all the elements of that general definition as applied to Defendants Glock and RSR. This case is a civil action brought by a person for damages and other relief to redress harm resulting from the criminal ... misuse of a qualified product by ... a third party. Id. Additionally, Glock and RSR are manufacturer[s] or seller[s] of a qualified product, id., because they are, respectively, a federally licensed manufacturer and a federally licensed distributor of the firearms allegedly used in the shootings, see id. § 7903(2) (defining manufacturer); id. § 7903(6) (defining seller). The PLCAA therefore requires dismissal if none of the specified exceptions applies. Plaintiffs argue that the third exception, § 7903(5)(A)(iii), applies. Under that exception, the PLCAA does not preempt an action in which a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product knowingly violated a State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the product, and the violation was a proximate cause of the harm for which relief is sought, including (I) any case in which the manufacturer or seller knowingly made any false entry in, or failed to make appropriate entry in, any record required to be kept under Federal or State law with respect to the qualified product, or aided, abetted, or conspired with any person in making any false or fictitious oral or written statement with respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale or other disposition of a qualified product; or (II) any case in which the manufacturer or seller aided, abetted, or conspired with any other person to sell or otherwise dispose of a qualified product, knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that the actual buyer of the qualified product was prohibited from possessing or receiving a firearm or ammunition under subsection (g) or (n) of section 922 of Title 18[.] Id. § 7903(5)(A)(iii) (emphasis added). This exception has come to be known as the predicate exception, because a plaintiff not only must present a cognizable claim, he or she also must allege a knowing violation of a predicate statute. City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384, 390 (2d Cir.2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1579, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2009); District of Columbia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 940 A.2d 163, 168 (D.C.2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1579, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2009); Smith & Wesson Corp. v. City of Gary, 875 N.E.2d 422, 429-30 (Ind.Ct.App.2007). That is, a plaintiff must allege a knowing violation of a State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the product. 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii). In City of New York, for instance, the plaintiffs brought a common-law public nuisance claim (the cause of action) and also alleged that the defendants knowingly violated a state criminal statute (the predicate statute). 524 F.3d at 390. Here, we previously ruled that Plaintiffs' negligence and public nuisance allegations state cognizable claims under California law. [2] Ileto I, 349 F.3d at 1209, 1215. To meet the requirements of the predicate exception, Plaintiffs do not point to an allegation of a knowing violation of any separate statute. Instead, Plaintiffs point out that, unlike many jurisdictions, California's general tort law is codified in its civil code. See Cal. Civ.Code § 1714(a) (negligence); id. § 3479 (nuisance); id. § 3480 (public nuisance). Plaintiffs argue that their allegations of knowing violations of those statutes satisfy the requirements of the predicate exception. In short, Plaintiffs argue that California Civil Code sections 1714, 3479, and 3480 (California tort laws), provide both the cause of action and the requisite predicate statute under the PLCAA. Defendants counter that only a separate statute, regulating firearms exclusively (or at least explicitly), can be a predicate statute. The parties' disagreement, then, is whether the California tort laws are predicate statutes under the PLCAA. More specifically, the parties dispute whether the California tort statutes are applicable to the sale or marketing of[firearms [3] ]. 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii). When interpreting a statute, we look first to its text. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) (Our first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 57, 111 S.Ct. 403, 112 L.Ed.2d 356 (1990) (We begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose. (internal quotation marks omitted)). If the statute's terms are ambiguous, we may use canons of construction, legislative history, and the statute's overall purpose to illuminate Congress's intent. Jonah R. v. Carmona, 446 F.3d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir.2006).
The plainness or ambiguity of statutory [text] is determined by reference to the [text] itself, the specific context in which that [text] is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341, 117 S.Ct. 843. Here, the statutory text states that a predicate statute is a State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of [firearms]. 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii). There is no dispute that the California tort laws, which are codified in the California Civil Code, are state statutes. The issue is whether those statutes are applicable to the sale or marketing of firearms within the meaning of the PLCAA. As discussed below, Plaintiffs and Defendants present competing definitions of the term applicable. Like most terms, applicable does not have only one meaning when viewed in isolation. Not surprisingly then, courts have struggled to determine the meaning of applicable as used in a variety of statutes. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996) (statute governing medical devices); McGee v. Peake, 511 F.3d 1352 (Fed.Cir.2008) (statute governing the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims); Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc. v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 471 F.3d 1350 (D.C.Cir.2006) (statute governing the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration). One everyday meaning, and a dictionary definition, of the term applicable is capable of being applied. Black's Law Dictionary 98 (6th ed.1990). Plaintiffs urge us to conclude that this expansive definition is the only possible meaning of the term applicable in the PLCAA's predicate exception. Under that definition, Plaintiffs would prevail: Because we held in Ileto I that Plaintiffs' claims concerning the sale and marketing of firearms are cognizable, the California tort laws are [capable of being applied to] the sale or marketing of [firearms]. By contrast, Defendants argue that Congress intended a very narrow use of the term applicable, which can mean relevant or applicable specifically. Defendants argue that, under that narrow meaning of the term, the requirements of the predicate exception would be met only if a plaintiff alleged a knowing violation of a statute that pertained exclusively to the sale or marketing of firearms. The dictionary captures this narrower definition, see Black's Law Dictionary at 98 (defining applicable as relevant), and so does everyday usage. [4] We are convinced at the outset, then, that the term applicable has a spectrum of meanings, including the two poles identified by the parties. To determine Congress' intended meaning in the PLCAA, we must examine the specific context in which [the term `applicable'] is used[ ] and the broader context of the statute as a whole. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341, 117 S.Ct. 843. Congress listed examples of predicate statutes in the PLCAA: (I) any case in which the manufacturer or seller knowingly made any false entry in, or failed to make appropriate entry in, any record required to be kept under Federal or State law with respect to the qualified product, or aided, abetted, or conspired with any person in making any false or fictitious oral or written statement with respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale or other disposition of a qualified product; or (II) any case in which the manufacturer or seller aided, abetted, or conspired with any other person to sell or otherwise dispose of a qualified product, knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that the actual buyer of the qualified product was prohibited from possessing or receiving a firearm or ammunition under subsection (g) or (n) of section 922 of Title 18[.] 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii). We conclude from those illustrations that Plaintiffs' asserted meaning of applicable appears too broad, but that Defendants' proposed restrictive meaning appears too narrow. See Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307, 81 S.Ct. 1579, 6 L.Ed.2d 859 (1961) (noting that a word is known by the company it keeps); Cal. State Legislative Bd. v. Dep't of Transp., 400 F.3d 760, 763 (9th Cir.2005) ([T]he general term should be defined in light of the specific examples provided.). The illustrative predicate statutes pertain specifically to sales and manufacturing activities, and most also target the firearms industry specifically. Those examples suggest that Plaintiffs' proposed all-encompassing meaning of the term applicable is incorrect, because each of the examples hasat the very leasta direct connection with sales or manufacturing. Indeed, if any statute that could be applied to the sales and manufacturing of firearms qualified as a predicate statute, there would be no need to list examples at all. Similarly, the examples suggest that Defendants' asserted narrow meaning is incorrect, because some of the examples do not pertain exclusively to the firearms industry. In conclusion, we hold that, viewed in isolation, the term applicable has a range of meanings. The context in which the term appears in the PLCAA suggests that neither Plaintiffs' nor Defendants' asserted meaning is wholly correct. In any event, we conclude, as did the Second Circuit, City of New York, 524 F.3d at 401, that the text of the statute alone is inconclusive as to Congress' intent. [5] We thus are left to examine the additional indicators of congressional intent. Jonah R., 446 F.3d at 1005.
Congress enacted the PLCAA in response to [l]awsuits ... commenced against manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and importers of firearms that operate as designed and intended, which seek money damages and other relief for the harm caused by the misuse of firearms by third parties, including criminals. 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(3). Congress found that manufacturers and sellers of firearms are not, and should not, be liable for the harm caused by those who criminally or unlawfully misuse firearm products or ammunition products that function as designed and intended. Id. § 7901(a)(5). Congress found egregious [t]he possibility of imposing liability on an entire industry for harm that is solely caused by others. Id. § 7901(a)(6). Congress reasoned that [t]he liability actions ... are based on theories without foundation in hundreds of years of the common law and jurisprudence of the United States and do not represent a bona fide expansion of the common law. Id. § 7901(a)(7). The PLCAA's stated primary purpose is: To prohibit causes of action against manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and importers of firearms or ammunition products, and their trade associations, for the harm solely caused by the criminal or unlawful misuse of firearm products or ammunition products by others when the product functioned as designed and intended. Id. § 7901(b)(1). In view of those congressional findings and that statement of purpose, Congress clearly intended to preempt common-law claims, such as general tort theories of liability. [6] Plaintiffs' claimsclassic negligence and nuisance, Ileto I, 349 F.3d at 1202are general tort theories of liability that traditionally have been embodied in the common law. With this background in mind, which strongly suggests that Congress intended to preempt Plaintiffs' claims, we turn to the predicate exception at issue here. The predicate exception covers causes of action that allege knowing violations of a state or federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of firearms. Plaintiffs argue that this exception covers all state statutes that could be applied to the sale or marketing of firearms. Because California long ago codified its common law into the California Civil Code, Plaintiffs argue that its general tort claims fall within this exception. We disagree for three reasons. First, although the California legislature codified its common law, it was not the intention of the Legislature in enacting section 1714 of the Civil Code, as well as other sections of that code declarative of the common law, to insulate the matters therein expressed from further judicial development; rather it was the intention of the Legislature to announce and formulate existing common law principles and definitions for purposes of orderly and concise presentation and with a distinct view toward continuing judicial evolution. Li. v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 13 Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226, 1233 (1975). In other words, although California has codified its common law, the evolution of those statutes is nevertheless subject to the same judicial evolution as ordinary common-law claims in jurisdictions that have not codified common law. That judicial evolution was precisely the target of the PLCAA: The liability actions ... are based on theories without foundation in hundreds of years of the common law and jurisprudence of the United States and do not represent a bona fide expansion of the common law. The possible sustaining of these actions by a maverick judicial officer or petit jury would expand civil liability in a manner never contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, by Congress, or by the legislatures of the several States. 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(7). Second, congressional findings speak to the scope of the predicate exception. Against the backdrop of Congress' findings on the unjustified expansion of the common law, id., Congress also found that [t]he manufacture, importation, possession, sale, and use of firearms and ammunition in the United States are heavily regulated by Federal, State, and local laws, id. § 7901(a)(4). We find it more likely that Congress had in mind only these types of statutesstatutes that regulate manufacturing, importing, selling, marketing, and using firearms or that regulate the firearms industryrather than general tort theories that happened to have been codified by a given jurisdiction. Third, Plaintiffs' argument leads to a result that is difficult to square with Congress' intention to create national uniformity. If Plaintiffs' view is correct, then general tort theories of liability are not preempted by the PLCAA in those states, like California, that have codified its common law. But, at the same time, those same theories of liability are preempted by the PLCAA in the states that have not codified their common law. In conclusion, an examination of the text and purpose of the PLCAA shows that Congress intended to preempt general tort theories of liability even in jurisdictions, like California, that have codified such causes of action.
We make two general observations from our review of the extensive legislative history of the PLCAA. [7] First, all of the congressional speakers' statements concerning the scope of the PLCAA reflected the understanding that manufacturers and sellers of firearms would be liable only for statutory violations concerning firearm regulations or sales and marketing regulations. See, e.g., 151 Cong. Rec. S9087-01 (statement of Sen. Craig) (This bill does not shield [those who] ... have violated existing law ... and I am referring to the Federal firearms laws.); id. S9217-02 (statement of Sen. Hutchison) ([Lawsuits] would also be allowed where there is a knowing violation of a firearms law.); id. (statement of Sen. Craig reading a Wall Street Journal article) (The gun makers... would continue to face civil suits for defective products or for violating sales regulations.); id. (statement of Sen. Reed in opposition to the PLCAA) (We will let [plaintiffs] proceed with their suit if there is a criminal violation or a statutory violation, a violation of regulations, but for the vast number of other responsibilities we owe to each other, that are defined for the civil law, one will not have the opportunity to go to court.); id. S8927-01 (statement of Sen. Reed) (stating that the PLCAA would not apply to violations of statutes related to the sale or manufacturing of a gun); id. S9246-02 (statement of Sen. Santorum) (This bill provides carefully tailored protections that continue to allow legitimate suits based on knowing violations of Federal or State law related to gun sales.). Second, congressional speakers referred to this very case as the type of case they meant the PLCAA to preempt. See 151 Cong. Rec. E2162-03 (statement of Rep. Stearns) (I want the Congressional Record to clearly reflect some specific examples of the type of predatory lawsuits this bill will immediately stop[:] ... [An] example is the case of Ileto v. Glock, in Federal court in Los Angeles, CA.); id. (statement of Sen. Craig) (I want to give some examples of exactly the type of predatory lawsuits this bill will eliminate.... [An] example of a lawsuit captured by this bill is the case of Ileto v. Glock, pending in Federal court in Los Angeles, CA.); see also Adames v. Sheahan, 378 Ill.App.3d 502, 316 Ill.Dec. 823, 880 N.E.2d 559, 586 (2007) (noting that Congress was primarily concerned with novel nuisance cases like Ileto ), rev'd on other grounds, ___ Ill.2d ___, ___ Ill.Dec. ___, ___ N.E.2d ___, No. 105789, 2009 WL 711297 (Ill. Mar.19, 2009). We are mindful of the limited persuasive value of the remarks of an individual legislator. See, e.g., Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980) ([O]rdinarily even the contemporaneous remarks of a single legislator who sponsors a bill are not controlling in analyzing legislative history.); Brock v. Writers Guild of Am., W., Inc., 762 F.2d 1349, 1356 (9th Cir.1985) (The remarks of legislators opposed to legislation are entitled to little weight in the construction of statutes.). Nevertheless, the unanimously expressed understanding of the scope of the PLCAA assists our analysis, particularly when that expressed understanding is in complete harmony with the congressional purpose and the statutory text.
Our inquiry into the scope of a statute's pre-emptive effect is guided by the rule that `[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.' Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 538, 543, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2008) (quoting Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. at 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240) (some internal quotation marks omitted). The purpose of the PLCAA leads us to conclude that Congress intended to preempt general tort law claims such as Plaintiffs', even though California has codified those claims in its civil code. [8] Our examination of the legislative history of the Act further confirms that conclusion. Accordingly, we hold that the district court correctly held that Plaintiffs' California tort claims against Defendants Glock and RSR are preempted by the PLCAA. [9]