Opinion ID: 790399
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Allegation of an offense

Text: 15 Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a), 16 whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully— (1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact; 17 (2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or 18 (3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry [shall be fined, imprisoned, or both.] 19 The district court held in this case that Count 28 did not charge an offense under § 1001 because the defendants' duty to disclose material facts does not apply to the disclosure of willful violations of the Act. Instead, it applies only to the disclosure of hazardous conditions. See 30 C.F.R. § 75.363(b) (A record shall be made of any hazardous condition found. This record shall be kept in a book maintained for this purpose on the surface at the mine.... This record shall not be required for shifts when no hazardous conditions are found....). Because the indictment charged that the defendants had concealed the existence of violations of the Act rather than of hazardous conditions, the district court granted the defendants' motion to arrest judgment. 20 We find no merit in the government's argument that the indictment was read too narrowly by the district court. An essential element of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 is that the defendants had a duty to disclose the particular information allegedly concealed from the government. United States v. Zalman, 870 F.2d 1047, 1055 (6th Cir.1989) (holding that the duty to disclose under § 1001 is a matter of law for the judge, rather than the jury, to decide). As the district court instructed the jury in the present case, [t]he law does not require the reporting of violations, nor does it require the reporting of violations which might become hazardous conditions. The law requires only the reporting of current hazardous conditions. See Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 116 F.3d 520, 539 (D.C.Cir.1997) (noting that [t]he Secretary properly emphasizes that[,] because the purpose of the examination is to identify current hazardous conditions, requiring reporting of all instances of noncompliance with safety and health standards could distract examiners from the primary focus of their task, and lessen the efficiency of examinations). Because the indictment does not distinguish between hazardous conditions and willful violations—and in fact does not even mention the disclosure of hazardous conditions—it does not charge an offense under § 1001. The district court therefore did not err in arresting judgment on Count 28. 21 B. The district court did not err in granting the defendants' motion for a judgment of acquittal on Count 28 and part of Count 1 22 In addition to their motions to arrest judgment, the defendants also moved for a judgment of acquittal on Count 28, as well as on the portion of Count 1 that alleges a conspiracy to conceal a material fact. These motions were granted by the district court. 1. Standard of review 23 The standard for determining whether a motion for a judgment of acquittal should be granted is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Landham, 251 F.3d 1072, 1083 (6th Cir.2001) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)) (emphasis in original). 2. Motions for acquittal 24 Because we agree that Count 28 failed to charge an offense, we need not reach the merits of the defendants' motions for a judgment of acquittal on that count. But even if the district court erred in arresting judgment, it properly granted the motions for a judgment of acquittal on Count 28 and part of Count 1. Conviction on a 18 U.S.C. § 1001 concealment charge requires a showing that the defendant had a legal duty to disclose the facts at the time he was alleged to have concealed them. United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 566 (3d Cir.1994). Pursuant to the mining regulations, the defendants here had a duty to disclose hazardous conditions on written reports at certain times during a shift, not to orally communicate the existence of hazardous conditions to MSHA inspectors upon their arrival at the mine. See 30 C.F.R. § 75.360(f) (establishing a duty to record the results of each pre-shift examination, including the existence of hazardous conditions and their locations); 30 C.F.R. § 75.363 (establishing a duty to post notices and keep records of hazardous conditions). 25 The government's proof that the defendants had committed a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 consisted of evidence that the defendants had notified the miners working below ground of the MSHA inspectors' arrival at the mine, thereby allowing the miners time to rectify any potentially hazardous conditions prior to inspection. But the regulations are limited to requiring those individual miners who are certified to conduct investigations to report hazardous conditions in periodic written reports. The purpose of the pre-shift and on-shift reports is to facilitate communication among employees who are beginning and ending their shifts regarding hazardous conditions in the mine. See Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 116 F.3d 520, 539-40 (D.C.Cir.1997). They are not intended to be a mechanism to report violations of mandatory standards. Id. at 539. The government failed to establish that the defendants found but did not disclose hazardous conditions during their pre-shift and on-shift examinations. Rather, it essentially alleged that, by preventing the safety inspectors from observing the actual working conditions in the mine, the defendants failed to disclose willful violations of the MSHA (or, more precisely, the defendants failed to allow the safety inspectors to discover the violations on their own). Such disclosure, however, is not required by the regulations. 26 The government argues that the district court's reliance on Curran is misplaced. In Curran, the Third Circuit reversed the defendant's conviction for failing to disclose facts pertaining to political donations because the defendant, a coal company executive who had solicited employees to make illegal campaign contributions, had no duty to disclose to federal authorities the names of the contributors. 20 F.3d at 567. The government's contention is unpersuasive. Although Curran is distinguishable on its specific facts, it stands for the legal proposition that 18 U.S.C. § 1001 is not violated unless there is a duty to disclose the concealed facts. Id. 27 As a final point on the issue of the defendants' duty under the Act, we note that the defendants were convicted on Count 27 of the indictment. Count 27 charged them with giving advance notice of inspections to be conducted by MSHA at Paradise # 9 mine in violation of 30 U.S.C. § 820(e). According to the indictment, Gibson, Mallicoat, and Tucker alerted mine personnel on the working face of Paradise # 9 mine that MSHA inspectors had entered mine property and would be inspecting the underground working face, so that corrections in working conditions could be effected. The alleged violations by the defendants of their duty to report hazardous conditions in pre-shift and on-shift written reports, charged in Counts 1 and 28, are entirely independent of the violations charged in Count 27. By stretching the duty to report hazardous conditions to include a duty to refrain from providing advance notice of impending inspections, the government is attempting to punish the defendants again for conduct for which they have already been convicted. 28 C. The district court properly concluded that the reference to hazardous conditions was not unconstitutionally vague 29 KenAmerican also argues that the term hazardous conditions found in 30 C.F.R. § 75.360(a) is unconstitutionally vague because it does not incorporate[] a high level of definiteness. Belle Maer Harbor v. Charter Township of Harrison, 170 F.3d 553, 557 (6th Cir.1999). Because the regulation does not define hazardous conditions, KenAmerican challenges its conviction under the portion of Count 1 that charged it with making false statements in a matter within the jurisdiction of the MSHA. 30 KenAmerican correctly notes that, to be facially valid, a criminal standard must define the proscribed behavior with sufficient particularity to provide a person of ordinary intelligence with reasonable notice of prohibited conduct and to encourage non-arbitrary enforcement of the provision. Id. at 556; see also M. Kraus & Bros. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614, 626, 66 S.Ct. 705, 90 L.Ed. 894 (1946) ([A] criminal conviction ought not to rest upon an interpretation reached by the use of policy judgments rather than by the inexorable command of relevant language.). 31 But KenAmerican was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a), not 30 C.F.R. § 75.360. The criminal statute provides that whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully ... makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation... shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years or ... both. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a). Such language is not so indefinite as to be void for vagueness. 32 Moreover, the appropriate standard for determining whether 30 C.F.R. § 75.360 is unconstitutionally vague is whether it is understandable to an experienced company mine examiner for whom the regulations were written. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 112, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (holding that a city's antinoise ordinance that proscribed the making of any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order of such school session or class thereof was not unconstitutionally vague because, given its particular context, the ordinance gave fair notice to those to whom (it) [was] directed) (quoting Am. Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412, 70 S.Ct. 674, 94 L.Ed. 925 (1950)). Whether the regulation in question here is understandable to the average person is not the issue. As the district court pointed out, although the regulations do not define hazardous conditions, they do give certified mine examiners sufficient guidance to prevent the reference to hazardous conditions from being unconstitutionally vague. 33 D. The district court did not err in concluding that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions on Counts 1-4, 7, and 10 of the indictment 34 The defendants also challenge their convictions on the remaining counts at issue in this appeal, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict. They therefore claim that the district court should have granted their motions for a judgment of acquittal and/or for dismissal on these claims. 1. Standard of review 35 In evaluating a claim that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support a conviction, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Stonefish, 402 F.3d 691, 695 (6th Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222, 230 (6th Cir.1992)). We will affirm the jury's verdict unless no rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [the defendants] committed the offenses charged. Id. 2. Count 1 36 Count 1 alleges a conspiracy to commit three separate crimes. First, as discussed in Part II.B.2. above, it alleges a conspiracy to conceal a material fact by trick, scheme, or device. The second crime alleged is a conspiracy to knowingly authorize, order, or carry out the willful violation of mandatory health and safety standards. Finally, Count 1 alleges a conspiracy to make false statements in a matter within the jurisdiction of the government. 37 Mallicoat argues that there was insufficient proof to establish that he committed an overt act for the purpose of advancing this alleged conspiracy. The jury, however, found that Mallicoat committed alleged overt act # 6 in furtherance of the conspiracy; namely, that he and the other defendants 38 were present on the working face of Paradise # 9 mine and observed that the ventilation curtains were not present within ten feet of the bumper of the continuous mining machine while coal was being extracted and were not being used to provide ventilation to the working face, and failed to cease production and correct or direct the correction of these violations. 39 At trial, witnesses testified to the fact that curtains were down throughout the mine and therefore were not within ten feet of the bumper of the CMM. They also testified as to the fact that there was insufficient ventilation in the mine. As a result, the jury's finding that Mallicoat committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was supported by sufficient evidence. 40 KenAmerican and Gibson also argue that there was insufficient evidence for a jury to convict them of making false statements as alleged in Count 1. The jury, however, heard testimony that Gibson told employees not to mention in their pre-shift and on-shift reports that the ventilation curtains were down. Other witnesses testified that, even though hazardous conditions were frequently observed at the mine, these conditions were rarely included in the reports. This evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that KenAmerican and Gibson were guilty of a conspiracy to make false statements as charged in Count 1. 41 KenAmerican further argues that a judgment of acquittal on Count 1 is appropriate because the jury's conviction might have been based on an act undertaken outside of the statute of limitations, which is five years. See United States v. Craft, 105 F.3d 1123, 1127 (6th Cir.1997) (The statute of limitations period for section 371 is five years, which period runs from the date of the commission of the last overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.). To convict KenAmerican, the jury was required to find that the corporation committed an overt act on or after May 8, 1997, five years before the government issued its indictment. Although the jury did not specify the acts upon which it convicted KenAmerican, there was ample evidence that the defendants violated the MSHA well beyond May 8, 1997. The failure to instruct the jury that it must find that an overt act was committed within the statute of limitations period therefore had no substantial and injurious effect or influence on the verdict. Hardaway v. Withrow, 305 F.3d 558, 565 (6th Cir.2002). Any error on the part of the district court was thus harmless.