Opinion ID: 415379
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: waiver of limitations

Text: 18 Emmons's first contention concerns the propriety of Southern Pacific's assertion of limitations to bar his cause of action. Emmons argues that the trial court erred in allowing Southern Pacific to raise the issue because it was not pleaded as an affirmative defense or listed as an issue by Southern Pacific in the pretrial order. We disagree. 19 The limitations issue was suggested on the face of Emmons's complaint. In paragraph VII, Emmons alleged that [o]n or about February 9, 1973, plaintiff commenced his duties as a brakeman. In paragraph VIII, the complaint alleged that approximately two years after commencing his duties as a brakeman, plaintiff began to experience difficulty and pain in his legs and ankles. Approximately two years after starting work as a brakeman would have been in the spring of 1975, and without the limitations period. 20 Southern Pacific, in its answer, admitted the allegations of paragraph VII, but denied the allegations of paragraph VIII insofar as they concerned when Emmons's injury began to manifest itself. The answer also alleged that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 21 In the pretrial order, the ultimate facts claimed by Emmons included the fact that [a]pproximately two years after commencing his duties as a brakeman, plaintiff began to experience pain .... 22 Compliance with 45 U.S.C. Sec. 56 is a condition precedent to an injured employee's recovery in a FELA action. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railroad Company v. McClelland, 355 F.2d 196, 197 (5th Cir.1966). Failure to timely bring suit not only bars the claimant's remedy, but it also destroys the employer's liability. Dixon v. Martin, 260 F.2d 809, 811 (5th Cir.1958). 23 For if a statute of limitations is thus made a limitation upon the continued existence of the right, rather than a mere bar to suit upon it, it goes to the substance of the plaintiff's claim so that he must show himself to be within the statute in order to recover and the defendant, therefore, need not specially plead the defense under Civil Procedure Rule 8(c), ... Goodwin v. Townsend, 197 F.2d 970, 971 (3d Cir.1952). 24 The burden is therefore on the claimant to allege and to prove that his cause of action was commenced within the three-year period. Carpenter v. Erie R. Co., 132 F.2d 362, 363 (3d Cir.1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 788, 63 S.Ct. 983, 87 L.Ed. 1155 (1943). In a FELA action, limitations is nothing more than a negative defense, ... one which tends to disprove one or all of the elements of a complaint. An affirmative defense is properly concerned with the pleading of a matter not within the plaintiff's prima facie case, that is, pleading matter to avoid plaintiff's cause of action. [Citations omitted.] While the affirmative defenses are governed by Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Title 28, United States Code, the negative defenses are governed by Rule 8(b) of the same federal rules. [Footnotes omitted.] Gilbert v. Eli Lilly & Co. Inc., 56 F.R.D. 116, 123-24 (D. Puerto Rico 1972); see also Sanden v. Mayo Clinic, 495 F.2d 221, 224 (8th Cir.1974). 25 These authorities reflect that Southern Pacific was not required to affirmatively plead limitations under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c). 26 The limitations issue was not listed by Southern Pacific in the pretrial order. Nothing in Fed.R.Civ.P. 16, however, suggests that a party waives or admits an issue as to which his opponent has the burden of proof by failing to include the issue in his pre-trial stipulated list of remaining issues. Pacific Indemnity Company v. Broward County, 465 F.2d 99, 103 (5th Cir.1972). Emmons had the burden to prove that his cause of action was commenced within three years after he realized that his ankle problem was work related. 27 There is also another reason why the limitations issue was properly considered by the trial court. A trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to admit evidence on an issue not included in the pretrial order. Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir.1980). A trial court does not abuse its discretion in allowing evidence to be received on an issue not included in the pretrial order where the opposing party fails to object or to claim surprise to the introduction of evidence which plainly raises a nonlisted issue or where new disclosures are made during the trial which plainly raise a new issue. Bucky v. Sebo, 208 F.2d 304, 305 (2d Cir.1953); Manbeck v. Ostrowski, 384 F.2d 970, 975-76 (D.C.Cir.1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 966, 88 S.Ct. 1077, 19 L.Ed.2d 1170 (1968). 28 However, the introduction of evidence relevant to an issue already in the case may not be used to show consent to trial of a new issue absent a clear indication that the party who introduced the evidence was attempting to raise a new issue. International Harvester Credit Corp. v. East Coast Truck, 547 F.2d 888, 890 (5th Cir.1977). 29 Here, Emmons changed his testimony respecting the year when he realized that his ankle problem was work related. After Emmons rested, Southern Pacific recalled him to the stand to question him about when he realized that his injury was work related. The obvious and sole purpose of this examination was to prove that his cause of action was barred by limitations. The limitations issue was therefore plainly raised by Southern Pacific without objection on the part of Emmons's attorney during or after trial. 6 30 [I]f the parties actually litigate without objection issues not raised in the order, there is little reason to enforce pretrial elimination of the issues. The trial court can treat the pretrial order as amended by the consent of the parties See Mains v. United States, 508 F.2d 1251, 1259 (6th Cir.1975); Bucky v. Sebo, 208 F.2d 304, 305 (2d Cir.1953). In such a case, the court properly can enter a judgment that decides issues outside the scope of the original pretrial order. Perfection-Cobey Company v. City Tank Corp., 597 F.2d 419, 420-21 (4th Cir.1979). 31 The record shows that Emmons's attorney agreed to waive a jury trial on the limitations issue and to submit it for adjudication to the trial court. In view of these circumstances, we hold that the limitations issue, though neither expressly pleaded nor included in the pretrial order by either party, was tried with the express consent of the parties. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(b); Wallin v. Fuller, 476 F.2d 1204, 1209-10 (5th Cir.1973). 32 Emmons's next contention concerns the manner in which the trial court disposed of the limitations issue. Because Southern Pacific moved for a directed verdict, Emmons argues that the trial court, in ruling on the motion, should have applied the Boeing standard. Boeing v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374-75 (5th Cir.1969). This argument, however, overlooks the parties' agreement to submit the limitations issue to the trial court for adjudication. Although the court disposed of the issue through the vehicle of a motion for directed verdict, the issue was actually tried to the court as fact finder, and it made, in effect, findings of fact and conclusions of law thereon. 7 The Boeing standard was therefore inapplicable.