Opinion ID: 1175478
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: jury instructions' omission of intent to kill as requirement for assault with intent to murder

Text: (9a) Defendant contends that in instructing the jury on the two charges of assault with intent to commit murder (former ง 217), allegedly perpetrated against Jean Prendergast and Karen, the trial court prejudicially erred by omitting the requirement of an intent to kill. The repeal of section 217 as of January 1, 1981 (shortly after the present crimes occurred), abolished the crime of assault with intent to commit murder, leaving acts formerly prosecuted under the repealed section punishable as attempted murder under section 664. (10a) It is well settled that both the former crime of assault with intent to commit murder (of which defendant was convicted) and the crime of attempted murder require a specific intent to kill and cannot be based on mere implied malice even though implied malice would sustain a charge of murder itself. ( People v. Lee (1987) 43 Cal.3d 666, 670 [238 Cal. Rptr. 406, 738 P.2d 752]; People v. Ramos (1982) 30 Cal.3d 553, 583-584 [180 Cal. Rptr. 266, 639 P.2d 908]; People v. Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 762-765 [175 Cal. Rptr. 738, 631 P.2d 446].) In Lee the jury instructions were inconsistent. The trial court correctly instructed that the crime of attempted murder requires a specific intent to kill a human being (CALJIC No. 3.31) but also instructed that the crime is an unlawful attempted killing with malice aforethought. It further instructed that malice may be implied when the attempted killing results from an intentional act involving a high degree of probability that it will result in death, and that under that circumstance, it is not necessary to establish that the defendant intended to kill. (CALJIC Nos. 8.11, 8.31.) We held it was error to give the instructions basing the crime of attempted murder on implied malice. (43 Cal.3d at p. 671.) (9b) In the present jury instructions, the initial references to intent dealt with the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove specific intent in the crimes of murder, assault with intent to commit murder, robbery, and burglary. (CALJIC No. 2.02.) Somewhat later, the jury was instructed that as to each of those crimes, there must exist a union or joint operation of act or conduct and a certain specific intent in the mind of the perpetrator.... The specific intent required is included in the definitions of the crimes charged. (CALJIC No. 3.31.) Very soon thereafter, the court announced that the next series of instructions deal with the charge of murder ... generally, with murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree, and then a lesser included offense of murder, which is involuntary manslaughter. The ensuing murder instructions included the following statements pertaining to state of mind: The crime of murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.... (CALJIC No. 8.10.) Malice may be either express or implied. Malice is express when there is manifested an intent unlawfully to kill a human being. Malice is implied when the killing results from an act involving a high degree of probability that it will result in death, which act is done for a base, antisocial purpose and with a wanton disregard for human life ... or when the killing is a direct causal result of the perpetration or the attempt to perpetrate a felony inherently dangerous to human life. Burglary, robbery and rape are such a felony. (Former CALJIC No. 8.11, last sentence added by the court.) Although second degree murder may involve an intent to kill (CALJIC No. 8.30), it is also the unlawful killing of a human being as the direct causal result of an act involving a high degree of probability that it will result in death, which act is done for a base, antisocial purpose and with wanton disregard for human life.... When the killing is the direct result of such an act, it is not necessary to establish that the defendant intended that his act would result in the death of a human being. (CALJIC No. 8.31.) Having completed the instructions on murder, manslaughter, and special circumstances, the court announced that the next series of instructions would deal with (1) assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury and (2) assault with intent to commit murder. The court carefully explained that the former requires only a general intent, whereas the latter requires a specific intent, on which the jury was instructed as follows: Every person who assaults another with the specific intent to commit murder is guilty of the crime of assault to commit murder. [ถ] In order to prove the commission of the crime of assault to commit murder, each of the following elements must be proved: [ถ] 1. That a person was assaulted, and [ถ] 2. That the assault was made with the specific intent to commit murder. (CALJIC No. 9.01.) Defendant contends that because of the instructions (1) that the mental state requisite to the crime of assault with intent to commit murder was an intent to commit murder and (2) that murder could be committed either with express malice, which requires an intent to kill a human being, or with implied malice, which requires a mental state short of such intent, the instructions stated or implied to the jury that the crime of assault with intent to commit murder did not require an intent to kill. In our view, the instructions could not have been so understood. The jury was repeatedly told that the crime of assault with intent to commit murder requires a specific intent to commit murder. Murder by any commonsense definition is a form of killing; moreover, the jury had been instructed that murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought (CALJIC No. 8.10). Thus, it is impossible to intend to commit a murder without intending to kill. Indeed, the word kill no more implies intentionality than does the word murder. It is the combination of intent to with either murder or kill that conveys an intent to effect the death of another. The proper instruction that one can be guilty of murder on the basis of implied malice not involving an intent to kill, did not state or imply that one could be guilty of a crime which requires a specific intent to commit murder without intending to kill. Nothing in counsel's final arguments at the guilt phase misled the jury to the contrary. The prosecutor introduced the issue of intent on counts II and V (assault with intent to commit murder) this way: [T]here has to be the specific mental state, the specific intent to murder. We have already talked about murder, the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Was this in the defendant's mind when he assaulted Mrs. Prendergast? Was it in his mind to commit murder? Was it in his mind to commit murder on [Karen] when he assaulted her? That is your decision on those two charges. He went on to argue that such intent could be inferred from defendant's infliction on both victims of deep stab wounds in vital areas of their bodies and from the fact they both were potential witnesses to his shooting of Ms. Neidig. Defendant's counsel argued that the two charges of assault with intent to commit murder require a specific intent, that when you assault them you specifically intended to kill them. He urged the jury to conclude there was no such intent in light of defendant's testimony of the gun's going off accidentally, his horror at seeing Ms. Neidig's face, and his loss of memory of events from then until after he started to run away. Defendant relies on People v. Murtishaw, supra, 29 Cal.3d 733. There, as here, the defendant was charged with murder and with an assault with intent to commit murder (former ง 217) on a surviving victim. The jury was told that (1) murder could be based on any of three theories: express malice requiring an intention to kill; implied malice arising out of certain kinds of dangerous, wanton acts; or implied malice consisting of felony murder; and (2) section 217 would be violated by an assault with the specific intent to commit murder. The Murtishaw court concluded that these instructions defined [intent to murder] to include forms of murder not requiring an intent to kill (29 Cal.3d at p. 763) and were therefore erroneous, since [i]mplied malice, as defined in [the instructions given], cannot coexist with a specific intent to kill. To instruct on implied malice in that setting, therefore, may confuse the jury by suggesting that they can convict without finding a specific intent to kill ( id. at p. 765). We agree that implied malice is inconsistent with an intent to kill, but it does not follow that where a defendant is charged with both murder and assault with intent to commit murder, a reasonable jury will think that a specific intent to commit murder, specified as an element of the latter crime, does not require an intent to kill, simply because they have been instructed that murder itself can be committed with implied malice. Murtishaw, which like the present case involved assault with intent to commit murder (former ง 217), was cited in later cases involving attempted murder. Thus, in People v. Ramos, supra, 30 Cal.3d 553, the jury was instructed that an attempt consists of a specific intent to commit the crime and a direct but ineffectual act towards its commission. Since the defendant was also charged with murder, the court also gave instructions on express malice, implied malice, and felony murder. The Ramos court held that the instructions thus implied that the jury should find appellant guilty of attempted murder if it determined that appellant intentionally committed an act which, were the victim to die, would constitute murder on an implied malice or felony-murder theory. ( Id. at p. 583.) In People v. Croy (1985) 41 Cal.3d 1 [221 Cal. Rptr. 592, 710 P.2d 392], this Ramos holding was followed and quoted even though the jury had been told that attempted murder `consists of two elements, namely, a specific intent to commit the crime of Murder and a direct but ineffectual act done toward its commission' ( id. at p. 20, italics added). In People v. Montiel (1985) 39 Cal.3d 910 [218 Cal. Rptr. 572, 705 P.2d 1248], this court held that compliance with the former rule that a felony-murder special circumstance necessarily requires proof of the actual killer's intent to kill ( Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131 [197 Cal. Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862], overruled by People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1138-1147 [240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306]) was excused by the fact that the intent issue was necessarily resolved adversely to the defendant under other, properly given instructions ( People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 721 [112 Cal. Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913], quoted in People v. Garcia (1984) 36 Cal.3d 539, 555 [205 Cal. Rptr. 265, 684 P.2d 826]), in that the jury had found, as a special circumstance, that the murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain (ง 190.2, subd. (a)(1)). Citing Murtishaw, the defendant contended that the finding that `the murder was intentional' was insufficient; the jury still was not required to find an intent to kill.  (39 Cal.3d at p. 926.) The contention was rejected: Unlike the situation in Murtishaw, requiring the jury here to find that the murder was intentional directed it to determine whether the defendant intentionally sought the victim's death ; no other possible distinction can be drawn between intentional and unintentional murders in this context. ( Id. at p. 927.) A footnote added: The analogous situation in Murtishaw would have arisen had the jury been instructed to find an intent to commit intentional murder, rather than an intent to commit murder. ( Id. at p. 927, fn. 5.) By that analysis, the mischief denounced by Murtishaw arose because the jury might have understood the instructions to encompass an intent to commit an unintentional murder. We find it inconceivable on this record that even the possibility of such an absurd, self-contradictory interpretation would have occurred to any reasonable juror. A murder based on implied malice involves an unintentional killing resulting from an illegal act of a nature sufficient to establish the implied malice. It is not logically possible to specifically intend to commit an unintentional murder. (10b) We adhere to the rule that the crimes of assault with intent to commit murder (former ง 217) and of attempted murder require a specific intent to kill a human being โ an intent which can never be replaced by implied malice. ( People v. Lee, supra, 43 Cal.3d 666, 670-671.) Moreover, in view of the controversy surrounding instructions on an intent to murder in this context, the required intent should be described to the jury as an intent to kill another. (See, e.g., CALJIC No. 8.66 (1987).) (9c) Nonetheless, we do not believe the jury in the present case could have understood the instructional references to a specific intent to commit murder as meaning any state of mind less than an intent to kill, notwithstanding the instructions on implied malice given in connection with the murder charge.