Opinion ID: 2639210
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction To Terminate Blake's Parental Rights to Timothy.

Text: Blake claims the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to terminate her parental rights to Timothy. Blake concedes that the superior court had temporary emergency jurisdiction over Timothy, but argues that the court wrongfully retained jurisdiction for longer than necessary to ensure his safety. The superior court did not address the question of California's jurisdiction, holding only that [t]he court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the proceeding as the child resided in Alaska for more than six months preceding the initiation of [the] proceedings. [13] This case requires us to consider the interrelationships of two provisions of the UCCJEA. We must first determine whether the superior court's termination order modified a child custody determination made by the California court, which would require Alaska to have jurisdiction to modify California's determination under AS 25.30.320. If the superior court's termination order did not modify a California child custody determination, we must then determine whether Alaska had jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination under AS 25.30.300.
Alaska's jurisdiction to modify the child custody determinations of other states is severely limited by AS 25.30.320. [14] Because that statute applies only to the modification of child custody determinations, we must decide whether the California order constituted a child custody determination. Alaska Statute 25.30.909(3) defines that term as: a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child, including a permanent, temporary, initial, and modification order, except that the term does not include an order relating to child support or other monetary obligation of an individual.... If the death of Timothy's guardian terminated California's guardianship order, California's original guardianship determination is not an existing, ongoing child custody determination capable of modification, and Alaska's jurisdiction is not limited by AS 25.30.320. We look to California law to determine whether the California order survived the death of Timothy's guardian. Section 2630 of the California Probate Code provides that the relationship of guardian and ward is terminated by the death of either, but that the California court retains jurisdiction following such death for the purpose of settling the accounts of the guardian or conservator or for any other purpose incident to the enforcement of the judgments and orders of the court upon such accounts or upon the termination of the relationship. [15] But any order incident to the wrapping up of the accounts of the guardian under Section 2630 of the California Probate Code would not be an order providing for the legal or physical custody of the child or visitation, and thus could not constitute a child custody determination under AS 25.30.320. Accordingly, we conclude that with the death of the guardian there was no existing child custody determination. Alternatively, California might have resuscitated its earlier child custody order by using its power to appoint a new guardian. Construing the predecessor statute to section 2630, a California court in In re Estate of Mims [16] held that while the death of a guardian automatically revokes that guardian's appointment, the court may appoint a new guardian without specifically terminating the first guardianship. [17] But In re Estate of Mims limited this holding by stating that the guardianship continues, but a new guardian must be appointed. [18] As previously described, the Superior Court of California appointed Laura Iverson as Timothy's guardian in 1992, and she died in April 1998. The order contains no provision covering this situation, and California did not act to appoint a new guardian. Because California did not appoint a new guardian, its child custody determination ended with the death of Timothy's guardian. Finally, it might be argued that the California court's no-contact order constituted a child custody determination. We reject that argument, because AS 25.30.909(3), in defining the phrase, specifies only affirmative custodial orders, rather than orders merely precluding contact. California law also supports the conclusion that California did not possess modification jurisdiction under its Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), which is applicable because it was in effect as of October 1999, [19] when this suit was filed. [20] California's UCCJA [21] provided that California had neither initial nor modification jurisdiction if it was no longer the home state of the child and no longer had a significant connection to the child. [22] In determining its home state jurisdiction, California looks to where the children live, where the most evidence of their daily living conditions will be found, where the continuity and stability of their parental relationship and their daily routines will be least disrupted by the legal procedure....[¶] The children's home is the presumptively correct forum. [23] Under this test, it is clear that California did not maintain home state jurisdiction because Timothy had been living in Alaska for almost three years, all evidence of his daily living conditions was in Alaska, and his daily routine and stability could only be maintained in Alaska. Likewise, California no longer possessed significant connection jurisdiction under California's best interest of the child test, which does not allow jurisdiction `unless it is demonstrated [that] the child and at least one parent have a significant connection with [California] and that there is available in California substantial evidence concerning the child's care and relationships with others.' [24] Because Timothy has had virtually no connection with California, that state did not possess significant connection jurisdiction to modify its initial child custody determination. As a result, California no longer had modification jurisdiction under its UCCJA, and there was no ongoing child custody determination that would restrict Alaska's exercise of jurisdiction by limiting it to the narrow modification jurisdiction of AS 25.30.320.
We turn next to the question whether Alaska properly exercised initial child custody jurisdiction. Alaska Statute 25.30.300(a) [25] sets out the circumstances under which a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination. The superior court asserted jurisdiction under subsection (1): if ... this state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceedings. That decision was correct if Alaska was Timothy's home state when this proceeding was commenced in October 1999. Accordingly, we must determine whether Alaska meets the definition of a home state under AS 25.30.909(7). [26] For purposes of this discussion, the statute contains two requirements: that the child have been present in this state for at least six consecutive months before the commencement of the action, and that the child have been here with a parent or [a] person acting as a parent. Timothy was here for almost three years before the action was filed, so the only question is whether Lynne Bailey was a person acting as a parent. To answer that question, we must look to the definition of that phrase under AS 25.30.909(13). [27] That statute too contains two requirements that are relevant to this case: that the person have had physical custody of the child for at least six consecutive months before the commencement of the action and that the person claim a right to legal custody under the laws of this state. Physical custody is defined in AS 25.30.909(14) as the physical care and supervision of a child. We believe that physical custody as used in AS 25.30.909(13), therefore, refers to de facto, as distinct from legally awarded or de jure, authority for the physical care and supervision of a child. By contrast, legal custody in the statute refers to legally awarded, or de jure, authority for some aspect of the child's care. Using these terms as so understood, Bailey has had physical custody over Timothy since November 1996, almost three consecutive years before the commencement of this proceeding. Thus the only remaining question is whether she claims a right to legal custody under the laws of this state. Literally, Bailey has made such a claim since she seeks to adopt Timothy. But we think that the statute also requires that a claim of a right to legal custody be at least legally plausible. That is the case here, for Alaska recognizes the rights of nonparents to exercise legal custody of children over the competing claims of parents when the welfare of the child so requires, upon a showing that it clearly would be detrimental to the child to permit the parent to have custody. [28] That standard is at least plausibly satisfied under the facts of this case given Blake's personal circumstances, the fact that Timothy has not lived with her since infancy, and the fact that Bailey had been exercising physical custody of Timothy for almost three years before the present action was filed. In consideration of the foregoing, we conclude that Lynne Bailey has physical custody of Timothy and claims a right to his legal custody in the sense meant by the statute. She thus qualifies as a person acting as a parent under AS 25.30.909(13). It follows that the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the state's petition to terminate Blake's parental rights under AS 25.30.300(a)(1). Finally, since California no longer had jurisdiction and Alaska did have jurisdiction, the exercise of jurisdiction by the superior court was proper under the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act. [29]
Blake also argues that the superior court lacked jurisdiction over her personally because she had no contacts with Alaska, much less minimum contacts. DFYS argues that under Alaska Civil Rule 12(h) Blake waived any objection regarding the lack of personal jurisdiction by failing to raise this issue as required by Civil Rule 12(b). [30] But Blake stated at a December 1999 status conference that I don't even think Alaska has jurisdiction because [indiscernible] California does. She also stated at the April 2000 CINA disposition hearing that Timothy should not be in the custody of the state of Alaska because [h]e has no family ties up there and that she was his parent and she was in California. We conclude that these assertions were sufficient to raise the issue. As a general rule, a forum may not exercise jurisdiction over a non-consenting party consistent with the requirements of due process unless that party has certain minimum contacts with the forum state. [31] This usually means that the party must purposefully avail[] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. [32] There is no question that Blake has not purposefully availed herself of the benefits of Alaska's laws. But because this case falls under an exception to the general rule, Alaska's power to terminate her parental rights does not depend upon her contacts with Alaska at all, but on Alaska's contacts with her child, Timothy. In Shaffer v. Heitner, [33] the United States Supreme Court expanded the minimum contacts rule to cover almost all cases, whether labeled in rem, quasi in rem, or in personam. [34] But the Court recognized that this single standard could not accommodate some necessary litigation, [35] and recognized that certain jurisdictional rules, such as the particularized rules governing adjudication of status, are not inconsistent with the standard of fairness. [36] The majority of courts that have addressed the issue have held that child custody proceedings conducted under the jurisdictional rules of the UCCJA fit within Shaffer's status exception, meaning that personal jurisdiction over non-consenting parties is not required. [37] Likewise, numerous courts that have considered whether termination proceedings fit within the status exception have held that they do. [38] The reasoning of both sets of cases is persuasive, and both apply here. [39] Accordingly, we hold that Blake's due process rights were not violated by the superior court's assertion of jurisdiction over her in spite of her lack of contacts with Alaska.