Opinion ID: 2226365
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims Asserted Against Detroit Edison

Text: The scope of the duty owed by electrical companies to move, insulate or de-energize overhead power lines is a question of foreseeability. Schultz v. Consumers Power Co., 443 Mich. 445, 452, 506 N.W.2d 175 (1993). Utility companies, particularly electric companies, are charged with a duty to protect against foreseeable harm. Id. In Dees v. L.F. Largess, 1 Mich.App. 421, 136 N.W.2d 715 (1965), the plaintiff was electrocuted when a crane came into contact with overhead power lines owned by Detroit Edison. The plaintiff, a construction worker, was holding a hook hanging from a crane when the crane's cable contacted a power line. The Court of Appeals upheld a directed verdict for Detroit Edison. The Court found that Detroit Edison was not negligent in failing to anticipate that a skilled workman, with full knowledge of the wires, would come into contact with these wires through the cable of a crane. Id. at 427, 136 N.W.2d 715. In Koehler v. Detroit Edison, Co., 383 Mich. 224, 174 N.W.2d 827 (1970), the plaintiff was killed while riding on the arm of a crane as part of his employment at a construction site, when the crane's arm came into contact with overhead electrical cables. This Court upheld the trial court's determination that the electrical company owed no duty to the plaintiff, despite its knowledge of the construction. Id. at 231, 174 N.W.2d 827. In reaching this conclusion, this Court stated: The mere fact that Detroit Edison knew a building was under Construction near its power line and that, from time to time, mobile cranes were being brought upon the premises to be used in construction work, would not, standing alone, create a duty upon Detroit Edison to remove the charge, insulate the line, or notify the parties of a dangerous condition. [ Id. ] Thus, because Detroit Edison could not anticipate that cranes on construction sites would contact its power lines, it owed no duty to that plaintiff. The Court of Appeals revisited the issue in Ransford v. Detroit Edison Co., 124 Mich. App. 537, 335 N.W.2d 211 (1983). In that case two men were electrocuted, and the plaintiff's decedent killed, when the wire-guided model planes they were flying crashed into electrical wires. Id. at 541-542, 335 N.W.2d 211. The Court found that there was no duty on the part of the power company because the occurrence was completely unforeseeable. Id. at 546, 335 N.W.2d 211. Rather, it stated that liability could not be based on such purely fortuitous circumstances. Id. Further, the Court explained that the issue of foreseeability should be determined at the time the lines were installed. Id. This Court last spoke on this issue in Schultz v. Consumers Power Co., supra . That case involved the death of a homeowner when a ladder that he was holding came into contact, either directly or through an electric arch, with a power line. The electric line had been placed 15-1/2 feet away from the preexisting house. At the time of the accident, the line was frayed and pitted. In finding a duty, this Court noted that electrical companies occupy a special role as providers of an essential, yet extremely dangerous commodity. Id. at 450-451, 506 N.W.2d 175. This special relationship with the public was found to impose a duty upon electrical companies to reasonably inspect and repair wires and other instrumentalities in order to discover and remedy hazards and defects. Id. at 451, 506 N.W.2d 175. The Court also formulated a test to determine when this duty existed in a particular case: The test to determine whether a duty was owed is not whether the company should have anticipated the particular act from which the injury resulted, but whether it should have foreseen the probability that injury might result from any reasonable activity done on the premises for business, work, or pleasure. [ Id. at 452, 506 N.W.2d 175.] The Court determined that an accident involving a homeowner was foreseeable, given the location and disrepair of the power line. The plaintiffs in Parcher and Bohnert also allege that Edison owed a duty to warn of the presence of dangerous power lines. [5] However, there is no duty to warn someone of a risk of which that person is aware. Bullock v. Gulf & Western Mfg., 128 Mich.App. 316, 340 N.W.2d 294 (1983). Specifically, there is no duty to warn of known overhead power lines. Wilhelm v. Detroit Edison Co., 56 Mich.App. 116, 224 N.W.2d 289 (1974) (finding no duty to warn severally, but finding a question of fact because the plaintiff believed the lines to be insulated). Further, the duty to warn only arises when there is a foreseeable, victim. Thus, this duty, like the duty to inspect and repair, does not arise where it is not foreseeable to Edison that the plaintiff would come into harmful contact with the wires.

The Court of Appeals correctly found that no duty arose on the part of Edison to protect Mr. Parcher. This case is closely analogous to Dees and Koehler. Edison, like the defendant in Dees, could not have reasonably foreseen that a skilled workman, with full knowledge of the power lines, would bring a crane into contact with those power lines. As in Koehler, Edison knew that there was ongoing construction, but had no reason to know that any high profile machinery would be used near its power lines. Therefore, under Dees and Koehler, Edison did not owe a duty to Mr. Parcher. Similarly, the circumstances of Mr. Parcher's accident are fortuitous. The forklift Mr. Parcher was driving only came into contact with the wire because Mr. Parcher was transporting an uncollapsed scaffold while reversing around a pile of debris. Edison could not have reasonably foreseen that a worker would reverse around a pile of debris and bring a twenty-nine-foot high uncollapsed scaffold into contact with its electric wire. Thus, summary disposition was appropriate because these events were not foreseeable, and, therefore, no duty arose. Ransford. Further, this was not a poorly maintained wire that had been placed close to a home as in Schultz. Rather, this wire was on a commercial construction site and was sixty-seven feet from the building at a height of thirty-five feet. Not only is there no evidence showing that this wire was not adequately maintained, but the distance from the building is sufficient to make this accident unforeseeable. Thus, Schultz is easily distinguishable from this case. Finally, Edison did not owe Mr. Parcher a duty to warn. Mr. Parcher's contact with the wire was clearly unforeseeable, and, thus, no duty to warn arose. Further, Mr. Parcher had been warned about the wires by supervisors on the job site. Thus, Mr. Parcher was fully aware of the presence of the wires. Edison owed no duty to warn about a known danger. Wilhelm, Bullock, supra .
Mr. Groncki alleges that Edison owed him a duty to: inspect, repair, and insulate the power lines; place the lines in a safe location; and erect safety barriers around them. Similar to the allegations of Mr. Parcher, Mr. Groncki's claim rests on the question of foreseeability. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, finding that Edision owed a duty to Mr. Groncki. We disagree and restore the award of summary disposition for Edison. Mr. Groncki bases his claim on Schultz's language that a power company owes a duty on the basis of the probability that injury might result from any reasonable activity done on the premises for business, work or pleasure. Schultz at 452, 506 N.W.2d 175. Mr. Groncki claims that he was engaged in reasonable activity while repairing the roof of the condominium and, therefore, was owed a duty by Edison. However, there are several facts that distinguish this case from Schultz. In Schultz, the probability of injury was based upon a frayed line that had been placed next to a preexisting structure. Further, the plaintiff in Schultz was a homeowner making repairs to his own home. In this case, there is no evidence suggesting that the line was in poor condition or was not properly maintained. Further, Mr. Groncki was not a homeowner unfamilar with the dangers of electric lines. Rather, he was an experienced workman who was fully aware of the presence of the wires. Indeed, he warned a coworker to take exceptional care around the power lines. Thus, it was not foreseeable that he would ignore his own warnings and attempt to move the fully extended metal ladder himself, [6] and Edison owes no duty to Mr. Groncki.
The Court of Appeals erred in overturning the grant of summary disposition on Mrs. Bohnert's claim against Edison. Mr. Bohnert's injury was not foreseeable to Edison. Therefore, Edison owed no duty to warn Mr. Bohnert or to move, insulate, or de-energize the power lines. As in Dees, Mr. Bohnert was a skilled and experienced workman with years of experience. Indeed, Mr. Bohnert had been delivering masonry supplies for forty years. Further, Mr. Bohnert had knowledge of the dangers of operating the boom on his truck near power lines. Indeed, there was a warning against such operation only a few inches above the boom's controls. Simply put, it was not foreseeable to Edison that an experienced, skilled workman would disregard clear instructions and operate his delivery vehicle directly beneath power lines. Thus, no duty arose on the part of Edison to plaintiff. Further, Edison had not been notified that any type of machinery would be operating at that location on that day. It clearly had no knowledge that a large delivery truck equipped with a boom would be operated directly beneath its lines. While Edison did know that a house was being built at that location and could reasonably expect that machinery would be used, this degree of knowledge was found insufficient to create a duty in Koehler. Plaintiff's argument that the driveway was the only place where such material could be delivered does not change this conclusion. Edison cannot be expected to know all probable delivery locations on any given construction site. Rather, it can reasonably expect that trained workmen will not operate delivery vehicles directly under power lines or, if such operation is required, will properly inform Edison. The mere location of the power line does not impose a duty on Edison. While this line was closer than that in Schultz, there are significant factors that distinguish this case. First, there is no evidence that the power line in this case was in disrepair. In Schultz, the wire was pitted and frayed and susceptible to arching. Secondly, the power line had been placed in its location by Edison before the commencement of construction. In Schultz, the power company had placed the line dangerously close to a preexisting house. Indeed, Edison had informed the homeowners in this case of the danger of building too close to power lines, and had convinced them to move the structure several feet to achieve additional clearance. These factors weign in favor of not imposing a duty on Edison.
Public policy also mitigates against the imposition of a duty in these cases. Sound public policy is a factor in deciding duty. Sizemore v. Smock, 430 Mich. 283, 293, 422 N.W.2d 666 (1988); Antcliff v. State Employees Credit Union, 414 Mich. 624, 630-631, 327 N.W.2d 814 (1982), see also Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 53, p 358. As this Court has recognized, Social policy must intervene at some point to limit the extent of one's liability. Sizemore at 293, 422 N.W.2d 666. Further, these plaintiffs contend that the duty to inspect and repair imposed by Schultz includes the duties to relocate, insulate, deenergize, warn, and erect safety barriers around power lines. Schultz at 455, 506 N.W.2d 175. Inasmuch as such a holding would expand Schultz, it is proper that this Court consider the public policy ramifications of such a decision. The social policy at issue is the public's need for electric power at a reasonable cost. To impose a duty to relocate, insulate, or de-energize power lines whenever third parties construct buildings near power lines would interfere with this policy. The costs of insulating or moving these lines would be significant. Edison alone has over 35,000 miles of power lines in this state. To impose the duty the plaintiffs request would certainly amount to a huge cost that would be passed on to the consuming public. Further, it may often be impossible for Edison and other power companies to move power lines away from new construction without moving them closer to preexisting structures. In any event, the costs of injuries such as those suffered by these plaintiffs will have to be met in another societal forum.