Opinion ID: 2584210
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Does LEOFF's right to sue provision violate the City's sovereign immunity?

Text: ¶ 9 The City in both Locke and Lindell argues that the City is immune from suit under sovereign immunity principles. RCW 41.26.281 grants law enforcement officers and fire fighters the right to sue their employers for damages over the amount received under workers' compensation. See Fray v. Spokane County, 134 Wash.2d 637, 655, 952 P.2d 601 (1998); accord Hauber v. Yakima County, 147 Wash.2d 655, 660, 56 P.3d 559 (2002). Whether the legislature has abrogated the City's sovereign immunity by statute is a question of statutory interpretation. As with all questions of law, we review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Berrocal v. Fernandez, 155 Wash.2d 585, 590, 121 P.3d 82 (2005) (citing Enter. Leasing, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, 139 Wash.2d 546, 552, 988 P.2d 961 (1999)). ¶ 10 A municipality derives its sovereign immunity from the State. Kelso v. City of Tacoma, 63 Wash.2d 913, 916-17, 390 P.2d 2 (1964) (discussing municipality sovereign immunity). The state legislature may waive such immunity as provided in article II, section 26 of the Washington Constitution: The legislature shall direct by law, in what manner, and in what courts, suits may be brought against the state. Accord Coulter v. State, 93 Wash.2d 205, 207, 608 P.2d 261 (1980) ([T]he abolition of sovereign immunity is a matter within the legislature's determination.). The City argues that the legislature has not waived the municipality's sovereign immunity from suits under LEOFF. ¶ 11 In Locke, 133 Wash.App. at 702-04, 137 P.3d 52, the Court of Appeals ruled that the legislature waived the City's sovereign immunity by enacting RCW 4.96.010(1), which provides in pertinent part as follows: All local governmental entities . . . shall be liable for damages arising out of their tortious conduct, or the tortious conduct of their past or present officers, employees, or volunteers while performing or in good faith purporting to perform their official duties, to the same extent as if they were a private person or corporation. (Emphasis added.) The City contends that RCW 4.96.010(1) does not waive its sovereign immunity because private employees may not sue their employers under LEOFF and must instead recover exclusively under the Industrial Insurance Act, Title 51 RCW. We have already held that RCW 4.96.010 waives sovereign immunity for LEOFF Plan I members under an identical right to sue provision. Taylor v. City of Redmond, 89 Wash.2d 315, 320, 571 P.2d 1388 (1977). Thus, we must determine whether the same is true for LEOFF Plan II members. ¶ 12 The Court of Appeals held that RCW 4.96.010 waives the City's sovereign immunity, holding that [t]he correct interpretation of RCW 4.96.010 is that if a government is found to have engaged in tortious conduct under applicable substantive law, which may or may not be different for government than for private parties, then the government will be liable for such tortious conduct `to the same extent as if [it] were a private person or corporation.' Locke, 133 Wash.App. at 703-04, 137 P.3d 52. ¶ 13 We hold that RCW 4.96.010 waives the City's sovereign immunity for suits under LEOFF. As we have previously articulated, the concern in RCW 4.96.010 is not to impose new, general public duties upon the municipality. E.g., J & B Dev. Co. v. King County, 100 Wash.2d 299, 304-05, 669 P.2d 468 (1983) (describing analysis under RCW 4.96.010), overruled on other grounds by Meaney v. Dodd, 111 Wash.2d 174, 759 P.2d 455 (1988); see also Beal v. City of Seattle, 134 Wash.2d 769, 784-86, 954 P.2d 237 (1998) (describing public duty doctrine). Allowing LEOFF members to sue their employers for negligent or intentional harm does not create a new municipal duty not otherwise existing for private parties. Further, the language of RCW 4.96.010 does not state that parties may sue governmental entities  only to the same extent as a private party may be liable. Rather, it merely notes that municipalities may not be liable for breaches of duties not generally existing for private entities or corporations. Thus, we hold that RCW 4.96.010 waives the City's sovereign immunity.