Opinion ID: 2167246
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: analysis of misrepresentation claims

Text: In their second assignment of error, the Boneses contend the district court erred in failing to find a genuine issue of material fact with regard to their claim of fraudulent misrepresentation. The Boneses contend Johnson's statement that Lydic Brothers was not interested in purchasing the real estate was known to be false and that therefore Agri Affiliates engaged in fraudulent misrepresentation. To recover on a fraudulent misrepresentation claim, one must show: (1) that a representation was made; (2) that the representation was false; (3) that when made, the representation was known to be false or made recklessly without knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; (4) that it was made with the intention that [it] should [be relied] upon ...; (5) that the [party] reasonably did so rely; and (6) that he or she suffered damage as a result. (Emphasis supplied.) Gibb, 246 Neb. at 360, 518 N.W.2d at 916. To recover on a negligent misrepresentation claim, one must demonstrate, inter alia, that [o]ne who, in the course of his business, profession, or employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information. (Emphasis supplied.) Gibb v. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc., 246 Neb. 355, 370, 518 N.W.2d 910, 921 (1994). This court has concluded that the difference between fraudulent misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation is the duty required in each claim. In fraudulent misrepresentation, one becomes liable for breaching the general duty of good faith or honesty. However, in a claim of negligent misrepresentation, one may become liable even though acting honestly and in good faith if one fails to exercise the level of care required under the circumstances. Id. at 371, 518 N.W.2d at 921. There is, however, a similarity between the two in that a necessary element of both is a showing that the statement was false. As a result, the initial inquiry into whether the statement by Johnson was a misrepresentation is the same under either a negligent or a fraudulent misrepresentation framework, and we will consider them together. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Boneses, and giving to them the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence, we determine the record contains no evidence that the statement made by Johnson regarding Lydic Brothers' interest in the property was false. In his testimony, Johnson stated that he had two telephone conversations with Lydic in July. Specifically, Johnson testified: [The Boneses' counsel:] Do you remember the dates of the two phone conversations with Don Lydic? A. No, sir. I can't quote them to you. Q. But they were in late June oror July of 1997? A. I believe they were both in July. .... Q. The first phone conversation you had, what if anything do you remember about that conversation? A. Just that I told him [Lydic] I knew that he and his brothers were the tenants on there and that we had activity on it and if he wanted to do anything please let us know or let the Boneses know. We needed to know what his intentions were. Q. What do you recall his response being if any? A. His response was At that price we're not interested. Q. And what price was that? A. The $490,000. Q. So you called him later in July then. Do you remember when that conversation was? A. It was just prior to the Keller offer and I was telling him once again that I was in the process to go visit with a person I thought was going to make a very good offer and was he interested, and that's when he told me I believe that they had already made an offer on the property and they were not interested in making a higher offer at that time. They thought the price was too high. Q. [Lydic] told you they had already made an offer on the property? A. $190 an acre. Q. And who had they made that offer to? A. The Boneses. . . . . Q. Why didn't you call him after you had the $490,000 offer? A. Because immediately prior to that offer he had completely rejected it. They were not going to make an offer. I had no reason to call him back. There is no genuine issue of material fact in the record which refutes Johnson's assertion. With respect to the first telephone conversation in which it is claimed Lydic said that [a]t that price we're not interested, the record is devoid of evidence raising any inference that Lydic did not make such a statement to Johnson. With respect to the second conversation occurring just prior to the Keller offer, Lydic's version of that same telephone conversation was as follows: [Lydic:] He told me he was on his way to a guy who said he would sign a, or, he said I'm on my way to see a guy that says he will give the full price. Q. And you knew from receiving Exhibit 36 and Exhibit 12 that the full price meant at least $245 an acre, is that right? A. It would be the $245 an acre. The record discloses that Lydic's response to this second telephone conversation was simply, `Loren, that's a lot of money, you know.' While it is true that Lydic testified he thought he would have the opportunity to match any offer made on the property, the record shows such thought was the result of a letter received from Audrey. The record does not contain evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the Boneses, that anyone at Agri Affiliates made such representation to him. Furthermore, Lydic acknowledged that Lydic Brothers did not have a right of first refusal on the property. The district court did not err in finding there was no genuine issue of material fact to support the Boneses' allegation that Agri Affiliates made a false representation to them. As there is no evidence in the record to indicate that the statement made by Johnson to the Boneses was false, the district court's error in failing to consider the Boneses' claim of negligent misrepresentation resulted in no prejudice. There is no merit to the Boneses' second assignment of error.