Opinion ID: 616819
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Morgan's Brady Claim

Text: Next we turn to Morgan's Brady claim. Morgan argues that the prosecution violated his right to a fair trial under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), by providing false or incomplete disclosure of two 1982 drug cases filed against Gregson shortly after the murders occurred and alleged preferential treatment she received on those charges in exchange for her trial testimony against Morgan. Gregson was arrested on April 16, 1982after the murders but before Morgan's trialfor possessing a controlled substance and marijuana; she was arrested again on May 4, 1982 and charged with two counts of possessing a controlled substance and one count of possessing marijuana. The charges in both arrests were nol prossed. Morgan had to establish two things to prevail on his Brady claim. He first had to show that the government failed to give him evidence favorable to his defense, that would tend to show his innocence, or that could be used to impeach witnesses at trial. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. Second, Morgan had to show that the evidence suppressed was material; that there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Carvajal v. Dominguez, 542 F.3d 561, 566-67 (7th Cir.2008) (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999)). Addressing the first Brady element, we agree with the district court that the prosecution failed to supply the defense with information during Morgan's trial that was impeaching. The government's failure to disclose the criminal history of Gregson or a promise of leniencyif there was onedeprived Morgan of impeachment material. We now turn to whether the suppressed evidence was material. Morgan claims that the Illinois supreme Court made two errorsone under § 2254(d)(2) and another under § 2254(d)(1)in concluding that the suppressed evidence was not material. Morgan first submits that the Illinois Supreme Court engaged in an objectively unreasonable determination of facts. On habeas review, we are, again limited by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Essentially, Morgan must show that the Illinois Supreme Court's determination of facts was unreasonable, that is, lying well outside the bounds of permissible differences of opinion. Toliver v. McCaughtry, 539 F.3d 766, 774 (7th Cir.2008) (internal citation omitted). Under § 2254(d)(2), a decision involves an unreasonable determination of the facts if it rests upon fact-finding that ignores the clear and convincing weight of the evidence. Ward v. Sternes, 334 F.3d 696, 704 (7th Cir.2003). Applying this deferential standard of review, we conclude that the Illinois Supreme Court did not violate § 2254(d)(2) when it found that there was no reasonable probability that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have led to a different result. We begin by pointing out that there was no direct evidence that Gregson was induced to testify against Morgan in exchange for favorable treatment on her two arrests. In fact, the Illinois Supreme Court found, and the district court agreed, that Morgan's argument that Gregson testified against him in exchange for favorable treatment was nothing more than unsubstantiated speculation. But even if there were evidence that the State treated Gregson favorably in exchange for her testimony, we would still conclude that the court did not err under § 2254(d)(2). In analyzing whether the suppressed evidence was material under Brady, the court noted that Prater's trial testimony and other independent evidence corroborated Gregson's trial testimony implicating Morgan in the murders. For instance, the court noted that Prater testified that he heard Motley make a remark to Morgan, then heard a shot and saw Morgan step into the kitchen holding the shotgun. The court also noted that Prater testified that he saw Morgan point the gun at Merkson's head, looked away, and heard a shot; he then saw Morgan holding the gun as he stood near Merkson's body. This account, the court recognized, was corroborated by Gregson. Moreover, the court pointed out that when the police encountered Morgan the day after the murders, he did not stop but continued walking and pointed a revolver at the officers. And that, when police officers apprehended Morgan, they found a revolver matching bullets recovered in Prater's apartment and the black notebook that Prater and Gregson identified as the one recovered from Motley's body. Lastly, the court found that the testimony of Prater's downstairs neighbor, Frank Blume regarding the timing of the shots corroborated both Prater and Gregson's chronology of the murders. The Illinois Supreme Court also attached significance to the independent evidence that corroborated Gregson's trial testimony of Morgan's rape and kidnapping. For example, Gregson testified that Morgan committed two murders, kidnapped her, and struck and punched her, before raping her. This testimony, the court noted, was corroborated at trial by the testimony of the motel clerk that he saw Morgan point a gun at Gregson and throw her headfirst into a car. After considering the evidence cited aboveevidence other than Gregson's trial testimonythe court noted that the actual significance of ... [her] criminal charges is questionable, and concluded that no reasonable probability exists that, had the State fully disclosed Gregson's criminal history, the result of the proceeding would have been different. In fact, the court was clear to point out that [i]n the end, defendant's postconviction petition turned on a single factor: the credibility of Elijah Prater. We do not agree that the Illinois Supreme Court engaged in an objectively unreasonable determination of facts in concluding that the suppressed evidence was not material under Brady. Morgan asserts that the court failed to undertake the analysis demanded by Brady.  Again, our review under the unreasonable application clause of § 2254(d)(1) is limited to whether the court extended a rule to an inapplicable context or refused to extend a rule to an applicable context. Neither of these situations is present here. After making the threshold determination that Brady was violated by nondisclosure, the court went on to address Brady 's second prongwhether the suppressed evidence was material. Here, the court properly weighed the significance of Gregson's criminal history and found it questionableconcluding that Gregson's trial testimony was corroborated by other evidence and that there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different, had the state disclosed Gregson's criminal history. We will not disturb the Illinois Supreme Court's reasonable application of Brady.