Opinion ID: 877465
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: count ii: the aggravated kidnapping charge, jury instructions and verdict

Text: The same situation occurs with count II, the charge of aggravated kidnapping, but here policy reasons also require reversing the conviction for the added reason that because of this conviction, Coleman was sentenced to death. Due to the zeal of the trial court in laying the foundation to enable it to impose the death penalty, the jury was required in its verdict to make a special finding that the woman met her death as a result of being kidnapped. Even assuming this to be a unanimous finding, it still cannot be upheld because of the defect in the underlying aggravated kidnapping conviction. The prosecutor charged Coleman with count II, aggravated kidnapping, in the following language: That the defendant knowingly or purposely and without lawful authority restrained another person, to-wit: Peggy Lee Harstad, by holding her in a place of isolation and by using physical force to facilitate the commission of a felony, to-wit: Sexual Intercourse Without Consent, and for the purpose of inflicting bodily injury on and terrorizing the said victim, Peggy Lee Harstad, resulting in the death of Peggy Lee Harstad. (Emphasis added.) Just as the deliberate homicide charge was phrased in the conjunctive, so was the aggravated kidnapping charge phrased in the conjunctive. This being so, the State was required to prove each essential fact charged. However, the jury was not instructed on this charge in the conjunctive, but was instructed in the disjunctive. Instructions 37, 38 and 39 make it abundantly clear that the jury was given several statutory theories of criminal responsibility under which it could find Coleman guilty of aggravated kidnapping. Each of these instructions sets out a different list of essential facts to be proved in order to sustain a conviction. Such an inconsistency should not be permitted in any criminal case, let alone in a death penalty case. Here, this inconsistency is reason enough to reverse the conviction of aggravated kidnapping. How does anyone know which of the inconsistent instructions the jury followed in reaching its guilty verdict, or whether, because of the inconsistencies, the jury followed any of them at all? In instruction 37, the trial court defined the crime of aggravated kidnapping as follows: A person commits the crime of aggravated kidnapping if he knowingly or purposely and without lawful authority restrains another person by secreting or holding her in a place of isolation with any of the purposes: (1) to facilitate commission of any felony; (2) or to inflict bodily injury or to terrorize the victim. (Emphasis added.) In this instruction the jury was told that it could convict if Coleman, in restraining the woman, had the purpose to commit any felony, or if he had the purpose to inflict bodily injury, or if he had the purpose to terrorize the woman. Then, instruction no. 38 attempted to set out other facts which the State was required to prove, according to the actual charge filed against the defendant: The offense of Aggravated Kidnapping requires that the voluntary act (the secreting or holding of the victim without lawful authority in a place of isolation, or the holding of said person by physical force or threats thereof), be done either knowingly or purposely, and in addition thereto, that it be done for one of the following purposes: (a) to facilitate the commission of any felony (in this case sexual intercourse without consent of the victim, or an aggravated assault upon the victim), or (b) to inflict bodily injury on the victim. (Emphasis added.) In this instruction, the jury was told that the State had to prove these facts: First, that Coleman held or secreted the woman, and that he did so either without lawful authority or by using physical force or threatening to use physical force. Second, that Coleman had one or more of the following purposes when he held or secreted the woman: (a) the purpose to facilitate the commission of any felony (here, limited to sexual intercourse without consent or aggravated assault) or (b) the purpose to inflict bodily injury upon the woman. Assuming there is substantial evidence to support each of these alternative theories, there is still no way to tell whether the jury was unanimous in applying any one theory. Instruction no. 38 considerably expands the range of alternatives set out in instruction no. 37. But then instruction no. 39 further muddies the waters by again setting out and expanding the theories of criminal responsibility under which Coleman was charged: To sustain the charge of aggravated kidnapping, the state must prove the following propositions: First: That the defendant knowingly or purposely restrained Peggy Harstad by secreting her in a place of isolation; and Second: That the defendant had the purpose in so acting to facilitate the commission of any felony, or to inflict bodily injury, or to terrorize Peggy Harstad. Third, that in so doing the defendant acted without lawful authority. If you find from your consideration of all of the evidence that each of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty. If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty. (Emphasis added.) Instruction no. 39 differs considerably from instruction no. 37. The jury was told that it could find Coleman guilty by finding that he had any one of three purposes in restraining or secreting the woman. First, the jury could find Coleman guilty by finding he had the purpose to commit any felony. Although instruction no. 37 also states any felony, instruction no. 39 considerably expands upon instruction 38, which limited the purpose to the commission of sexual intercourse without consent or aggravated assault. Second, the jury could find Coleman guilty by finding his purpose was to inflict bodily injury upon her. This prosecution theory is also stated in instructions no. 37 and 38, and therefore is not inconsistent. Third, the jury could find Coleman guilty by finding his purpose in holding or secreting the woman was to terrorize her. This language is consistent with instruction no. 37 but is not consistent with instruction no. 38. Because these instructions are inconsistent, there is no way to determine which of the instructions the jury has followed, or whether the jury has disregarded them altogether. Where there has been inconsistent instruction on the essential elements of the crime charged, as there was here, it should not be tolerated on appeal. Here especially, where inconsistent instruction on the elements of the crime may have led to a conviction resulting in the death penalty, this court should not have to think twice before reversing the conviction and granting a new trial  reversal should be automatic. The dangers inherent in inconsistent instruction on the essential elements of aggravated kidnapping are further magnified by the general verdict returned by the jury which fails to disclose the theory or theories the jury applied in reaching its verdict. The verdict stated: A. We, the jury, in the above-entitled cause, find the defendant Guilty of the offense of Aggravated Kidnapping as Charged. B. We further find that Peggy Harstad [did] [did not] die as a result of said Aggravated Kidnapping. (Strike out bracketed word or words that do not apply). To find Coleman guilty of aggravated kidnapping, the jury had to find that Coleman, in restraining or secreting the woman, had, as his purpose at least one of those purposes listed in instructions no. 37, 38 and 39. How can we tell which purpose or purposes the jury used in reaching its decision? And, because the instructions are inconsistent on an essential element of the crime, how can we tell which instruction the jury used? And, because the instructions are inconsistent, can we be sure that the jury used any of the three instructions? The aggravated kidnapping charge must be reversed. First, in a criminal case inconsistent instructions as to an essential element of a crime, requires a reversal and a new trial. See Price, 622 P.2d 160, and cases cited in my dissent (622 P.2d 168, 37 St.Rep. 1935A). Second, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that its verdict must be unanimous on any theory or theories of criminal responsibility charged by the State. People v. Olsson, supra, People v. Embree, supra; State v. Golliday, supra; State v. Bleazard, supra; People v. Thompson, supra; United States v. Gipson, supra. Third, the trial court submitted ambiguous verdict forms to the jury, and the verdict returned fails to disclose the statutory theory or theories on which the jury based its guilt determination. Fourth, consider that substantial evidence does not support each of the statutory theories submitted to the jury. State v. Green (1980), 94 Wash.2d 216, 616 P.2d 628. And finally, consider that the aggravated kidnapping conviction laid the foundation for imposition of the death penalty. Reversal is absolutely required if the judicial system is to maintain its integrity.