Opinion ID: 2383603
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Past Support

Text: White brought this action pursuant to 19 M.R.S.A. § 443-A (Supp.1994), [1] the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, and 19 M.R.S.A. § 271 (Supp.1994), [2] the Uniform Act on Paternity. The former act contains section 446 Amount of Support, [3] that lists factors for the court to consider when making an award of support. White contends that with regard to past support the court should have applied sections 443-A and 446 of the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act to project the amount of child support it might have awarded had the matter been presented earlier. White argues that Mushero v. Ives, 949 F.2d 513 (1st Cir.1991) provides persuasive authority for the retroactive application of these sections. White is correct in her contention that Mushero supports a retroactive application of section 443-A, and we agree that she is entitled to back support pursuant to that section. Mushero did not apply section 446 retroactively, however, nor did it determine whether an award of past support may exceed the amount necessary for reimbursement. We hold that section 446 is not to be applied retroactively and that the measure of recovery for past support is reimbursement for actual and reasonable expenditures. In Mushero the defendant father argued that under Maine law, when paternity is not at issue, a custodial parent has no right pursuant to 19 M.R.S.A. § 443-A to be reimbursed for child support for periods prior to the formal establishment of a support obligation. Mushero's argument would have imposed a conditional duty of support, so that parents would be required to support their children only if their children's representatives obtained a formal order of support. The First Circuit rejected this argument and concluded that a parent's support obligation is retrospective as well as prospective and the obligee of that support has the right to secure reimbursement as well as continuing support. Mushero, 949 F.2d at 518 (citing 19 M.R.S.A. § 448). Section 446 of The Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act does not apply to an award of past support and it does not expand recovery beyond reimbursement. The cost of raising a child in the past is a matter of fact. Although future support inevitably involves estimation and projection, in the absence of proof that the nurture and rearing of a child was inadequate, past support remains a matter of what was rather than what might have been. Although Allen did not disclose his wealth, he did not prevent White from exercising her legal rights. She could have pursued a court order at any time to fix his support obligation, but she chose not to do so. White also argues that past support pursuant to the Uniform Act on Paternity is not limited to past education and necessary support, 19 M.R.S.A. § 273, but rather requires that the child support guidelines [4] be complied with in determining past support. We disagree. The child support guidelines do not apply to an award of past support. The guidelines are applicable only when a court determines a current order of support or modifies an existing order. An award of past support is neither a determination nor a modification of child support within the meaning of section 272. [5] White next contends that even if reimbursement for necessary education and support is the appropriate standard, the court erred in its calculation of the amounts necessary to reimburse her. White listed approximately $1,137 per month in living expenses for her and her son. The court found that those expenses had been fairly constant during the last six years. White contends that the proper measure of recovery would have been $1,137 per month for the past six years minus the amount of support paid. We do not set aside a trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Pongonis v. Pongonis, 606 A.2d 1055, 1057-58 (Me.1992). Competent evidence exists in the record to support the court's determination that Allen's monthly payments in the past were adequate to support his son and that the amount necessary for reimbursement was equal to the shortfall in his payments during the time that White experienced difficulty in maintaining her household. We find no error in the award.