Opinion ID: 626146
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: This Court's Decision in White II

Text: On remand from White I, after a divided panel of this court affirmed with regard to Wersal's remaining challenges to the partisan-activities and solicitation clauses, Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 361 F.3d 1035 (8th Cir.2004), we granted en banc review and vacated the panel opinion. Ultimately, we sustained Wersal's remaining challenges and concluded the partisan-activities and solicitation clauses violated the First Amendment. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) ( White II ). In White II, we first considered Wersal's challenge to the partisan-activities clause, which stated a judge or a candidate for election to judicial office shall not. . . identify themselves as members of a political organization, except as necessary to vote in an election; . . . attend political gatherings; or seek, accept or use endorsements from a political organization. Id. at 745 (quoting 52 Minn. Stat. Ann., Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5, subd. A(1)(a), (d)). At the outset, we recognized Minnesota's compelling interest in protecting litigants from biased judges. Id. at 754. However, closely tracking the reasoning of White I, we held the clause was not narrowly tailored to serve the State's interest under this particular meaning of judicial impartiality. Id. We reasoned that association is itself an important form of speech and, to the extent association is a proxy for the expression of ideas and the alignment with particular views, the clause is likewise `barely tailored' to affect any interest in impartiality toward parties. Id. Further, in the case of parties coming before a judge who associated with that party, we noted, any credible claim of bias would have to flow from something more than the bare fact that the judge had associated with that political party, because the associational restrictions are part-and-parcel of a candidate's speech for or against particular issues embraced by the political party. Id. at 755 (emphasis in original). Finally, if cases arose where the partisan activities raised more than an inference of bias, we concluded the problem could be solved through the less-restrictive means of recusal. Id. We also addressed the meaning of impartiality articulated by White I as open-mindedness in the context of the partisan-activities clause. Id. at 756. Like the announce clause considered by the Supreme Court, we concluded the partisan-activities clause was woefully underinclusive because the clause was not adopted for the purpose of protecting judicial open-mindedness and the clause's underinclusiveness betrayed the claim that it was compelling. Id. On the latter point, we discussed how it made little sense for Minnesota to restrict associational activities to only political parties, while not restricting a judicial candidate's association with varying political interest groups. Id. at 759-60. In sum, we concluded the partisan activities clause was not narrowly tailored to any compelling state interest, and therefore violated the First Amendment. Id. at 760. We proceeded to consider the constitutionality of certain provisions of the solicitation clause, which barred candidates from personally soliciting individuals or even large gatherings for campaign contributions. Id. at 763. The Code permitted a candidate to solicit donations through his campaign committee, and prohibited the candidate from learning the identity of any person to whom a solicitation was made. Id. at 745. Wersal challenged two components of this system: first, he asserted a right to solicit contributions from large groups; second, he challenged a provision of the Code barring campaign committees from using the candidate's signature on written solicitations. Id. at 765. We first recognized the prohibition on direct personal solicitation certainly addresses a compelling state interest in impartiality as to parties to a particular case. Id. However, in striking down the challenged provisions, we determined the solicitation clause did not serve an interest in impartiality in the sense of preventing a lack of bias for or against a party to a case, because the Code specifically provided the contributions would be made to the candidate's committee, and the candidate could not learn the identity of the donors. Id. In this sense, we reasoned the candidate would not be able to deduce who contributed to his or her campaign, and thus the blanket ban did not advance an interest in impartiality. Id. at 765-66. Accordingly, we concluded the challenged portions of the solicitation clause were barely tailored to the State's interest in maintaining an impartial judiciary. Id. at 765. We likewise concluded the solicitation clause seems barely tailored to in any way affect the open-mindedness of a judge. Id. at 766. Therefore, we held the solicitation clause violated the First Amendment. Id.