Opinion ID: 185300
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scope of this court's exclusive jurisdiction under the OPA

Text: 21 Where a statute commits final agency action to review by this court, we also retain exclusive jurisdiction to hear suits seeking relief that might affect [our] future statutory power of review. TRAC, 750 F.2d at 72. This includes mandamus actions challenging an agency's unreasonable delay. Id. We must therefore determine whether the OPA vests this court with jurisdiction in the first instance to hear challenges to regulations, like those at issue here, promulgated pursuant to Title IV of the Act. 22 Section 1017(a) of the OPA states: Review of any regulation promulgated under this Act may be had upon application by any interested person only in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States for the District of Columbia. § 1017(a), 104 Stat. at 504 (emphasis added). On its face, the term this Act would seem to suggest broad application of the review provision to all titles of the OPA. Petitioners, however, point to a possible complication. The Supreme Court earlier this year held that § 1018's pre-emption savings clause-the provision immediately following § 1017 in Title I of the OPAapplied only to the pre-emptive effect of provisions like those contained in Title I, and not those contained in the remainder of the Act. See Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1146. Petitioners argue that, in so holding, the Supreme Court interpreted this Act, as used in § 1018, to refer only to Title I of the OPA. Why, they ask, should it be interpreted more broadly in the context of § 1017(a)? Petitioners fundamentally misunderstand both the holding and reasoning of Locke. 23 Locke involved a claim that various federal oil cargo statutes, including the OPA, pre-empted the State of Washington's rules governing tanker vessel manning, operation, and design. The Court of Appeals had held that § 1018 of the OPA effectively saved all state tanker provisions from its, and the other statutes', pre-emptive reach. Section 1018 reads in pertinent part: 24 (a) Preservation of State Authorities ... Nothing in this Act or the Act of March 3, 1851 shall 25 (1) affect, or be construed or interpreted as preempting, the authority of any State or political subdivision thereof from imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect to 26 (A) the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within such State; or 27 (B) any removal activities in connection with such a discharge; ... 28 (C)Additional Requirements and Liabilities; Penalties. Nothing in this Act ... shall in any way affect, or be construed to affect, the authority of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof 29 (1) to impose additional liability or additional requirements; or 30 (2) to impose, or to determine the amount of, any fine or penalty (whether criminal or civil in nature) for any violation of law; 31 relating to the discharge, or substantial threat of a discharge, of oil. 32 § 1018, 104 Stat. at 505-06 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2718) (emphasis added). Relying in large part on Congress' placement of the provision in Title I, the Supreme Court held that Congress intended these savings clauses only to preserve state laws of a scope similar to the matters contained in Title I of OPA. Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1146. The Court's conclusion was fortified by § 1018(c)'s use of the phrase relating to the discharge, or substantial threat of discharge, of oil, for Congress had used these same key words in declaring the scope of Title I. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a), which codified § 1002(a), 104 Stat. at 489). In other words, Congress intended to save from pre-emption only those State laws having to do with liability and compensation regarding an oil spill. Because the State provisions at issue dealt with tanker manning, operation, and design, rather than liability and compensation, the Court concluded that they were subject to pre-emption. Id. at 1148-50. 33 At no point in its analysis did the Court profess to interpret the phrase this Act or suggest that it was limited to Title I of the OPA. At no point did the Court hold that § 1018 disarmed the pre-emptive effect of Title I provisions alone. Rather, the Court merely held that § 1018 insulates only those state regulations of the type contained in Title I, whether it be from provisions contained in other titles of the OPA or any provision contained in one of the other named statutes. Because Locke gives us no reason to part from the natural interpretation of § 1017(a)'s this Act, we turn now to the jurisdictional claims specific to this case. 34