Opinion ID: 4117602
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The multiple sentences imposed shall so

Text: far as possible conform to subsection a. of this section[.] [N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b).] In Hudson, supra, this Court addressed the meaning of subsection b: Subsection b’s plain language applies subsection a’s bar against imposing a sentence comprised of more than one extended term for the conviction of an offense which was committed prior to the imposition of the defendant’s current extended-term sentence but for which defendant is being sentenced after the imposition of the first extended sentence. [209 N.J. at 517 (emphasis added).] 8 In addressing the “so far as possible” qualifier in subsection (b)(1), we rejected the view that this phrase meant subsection b’s incorporation of subsection a was discretionary. Id. at 517-18. Instead, we interpreted “so far as possible” to mean that the prohibition against multiple extended-term sentences is the default. Id. at 534. The “so far as possible” qualifier is triggered only when compliance cannot be achieved, as, for example, when the second extended-term sentence is mandatory. Id. at 535. Thus, Hudson stands for the proposition that, under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b), the imposition of a second extended term for offenses committed prior to the imposition of a first extended-term sentence is illegal unless unavoidable. See id.