Opinion ID: 1173265
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Only Witness Statement

Text: The single issue for discussion here is whether the prosecutor's only witness observation, supra, constitutes a comment upon the defendant's right to remain silent and is thus in violation of the rights which are guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Art. 1, § 11 of the Constitution of Wyoming. In pursuit of this inquiry, we need not seek an answer to the question which asks whether or not the comment was harmless assuming we were to hold that the remark was in fact an impermissible comment upon the silence of the defendant, because we have recently held that any such comment is prejudicial error. In Westmark v. State, Wyo., 693 P.2d 220 (1984) we said: We herewith return to the rule of Clenin v. State, [Wyo., 573 P.2d 844 (1978),] and will hold that any comment upon the accused's exercise of his or her right to remain silent is prejudicial error which will entitle accused to a reversal of the conviction. 693 P.2d at 222. This case need not, however, be resolved upon the harmless-error position of the appellant because the overriding question here is whether the prosecutor's only witness statement was in fact a comment upon the decision of the accused not to testify in his own behalf. In Oldham v. State, Wyo., 534 P.2d 107 (1975), the prosecutor observed that certain of the State's evidence was not contradicted, and the prosecutor also said: `The sheer weight of the evidence is just too much for Mr. Oldham to explain.' 534 P.2d at 112. In response to the defendant's charge that these kinds of comments constitute comments upon the defendant's decision not to testify, we said: An examination of some of the authorities upon which defendant places reliance demonstrates that these questions must be decided on the factual background of each case and that general statements are a weak reed upon which to rely. Knowles v. United States, 10 Cir., 224 F.2d 168, 170, upon which appellant places great reliance, sets out the proper rule in our view, and we adopt the language therein as follows: `It is concededly improper and reversible error to comment on the failure of a defendant to testify in his own behalf, and the test is whether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify. [Citation.] It is not improper for the government to draw attention to the failure of lack of evidence on a point if it is not intended to call attention to the failure of the defendant to testify.   ' This language was approved in United States v. Altavilla, 9 Cir., 419 F.2d 815, 817, another of defendant's authorities. 534 P.2d at 112. We went on to observe in Oldham: These authorities upon which appellant relies clearly demonstrate that far more serious direct comment has not been held violative of the right, and we are unconvinced this argument was `manifestly intended' as, or that it was such statement that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be, comment on the defendant's failure to take the stand. It, in our view, merely served to call attention to a lack of evidence on the point, and we will not indulge a presumption that this was done deliberately or had the unmistakable effect of calling attention to defendant's failure to testify. 534 P.2d at 113. A similar contention had previously been made in Deeter v. State, Wyo., 500 P.2d 68, 71 (1972), where the defendant did not testify and the prosecutor argued: `There is not one single thing in this case that you have to weigh in your mind as to is he telling the truth, or isn't he telling the truth; or which one is right, and which one is wrong?' We held that these remarks did not constitute a comment upon the defendant's failure to testify. In the case at bar, the trial judge, as well as the district court judge, decided that the remark of the prosecutor did not attain the stature of a comment upon the defendant's silence  as a matter of fact. In Oldham, we held that this is a fact question. It is to be resolved by deciding whether or not the language used was `manifestly intended' to be a comment upon the failure of the accused to testify, or is of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be [a] comment on the defendant's failure to take the stand. 534 P.2d at 113. Given the prosecutor's only witness comment and the context in which it was made, this court cannot say as a matter of law that the interpretation placed upon the remark by the trial court and district court judges was without foundation in logic or reason. On the contrary, we agree with these courts' holdings that the prosecutor's statement was neither intended nor would the jury interpret it to be a comment upon the defendant's refusal to testify. Affirmed.