Opinion ID: 186577
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Bribery Charge

Text: 40 At the conclusion of the trial, the District Court judge instructed the jury that [i]t is not a defense to the crime of bribery that had there been no bribe, the public official might have lawfully and properly performed the same act. Tr. at 16 (4/8/04). Orenuga argues that this is an erroneous construction of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(A), for, in his view, the public official must perform a quid pro quo in order to fall within the ambit of the statute. In the absence of evidence suggesting that he ultimately altered the businesses' liability, Orenuga contends that his crimes were not bribery, but more precisely defraud[ing] the two businesses by falsely convincing them that they were receiving some concession for their money. Br. of Appellant at 19. 41 Whether the District Court properly instructed the jury on the standard for bribery presents a question of law that we review de novo. See United States v. DeFries, 129 F.3d 1293, 1303 (D.C.Cir.1997) (per curiam). Our job is to `determine whether, taken as a whole, [the instructions] accurately state the governing law.' Id. at 1304 (quoting United States v. Washington, 106 F.3d 983, 1002 (D.C.Cir.1997) (per curiam)) (alteration in DeFries ). We find here that they do. 42 Under 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(A), a public official commits bribery if he or she directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally or for any other person or entity, in return for . . . being influenced in the performance of any official act. The Supreme Court has made it clear that the acceptance of the bribe is the violation of the statute, not performance of the illegal promise. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 526, 92 S.Ct. 2531, 33 L.Ed.2d 507 (1972). In other words, [t]he illegal conduct is taking or agreeing to take money for a promise to act in a certain way. Id. 43 Orenuga attempts to avoid Brewster by pointing to United States v. Gatling, 96 F.3d 1511 (D.C.Cir.1996), where this court stated that an essential feature of bribery is that it implies a quid pro quo.  Id. at 1522. Contrary to Orenuga's suggestion, however, Gatling did not hold that the quid pro quo must be fully executed for the act to be considered a bribe. Rather, in distinguishing between a bribe and an illegal gratuity, the court noted merely that a bribe is consummated when the defendant accepts money with the specific intent of performing an official act in return. Id. (emphasis added). Gatling is consistent with Brewster, as is the court's earlier decision in United States v. White, 887 F.2d 267, 272 (D.C.Cir.1989). 44 In sum, we find no support whatsoever for Orenuga's reading of the statute. The law unequivocally supports the District Court's instruction to the jury, which was therefore not erroneous.