Opinion ID: 2519619
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy

Text: Plaintiff also attempts, based on defendant's refusal to accommodate his use of marijuana, to state a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. The legal principles that underlie such a claim are well established: Either party to a contract of employment without a specified term may terminate the contract at will (Lab.Code, § 2922), but this ordinary rule is subject to the exception that an employer may not discharge an employee for a reason that violates a fundamental public policy of the state. ( Stevenson v. Superior Court, supra, 16 Cal.4th 880, 887, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888, 941 P.2d 1157; Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 27 Cal.3d 167, 170, 176-178, 164 Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330.) To support such a cause of action, the policy in question must satisfy four requirements: First, the policy must be supported by either constitutional or statutory provisions. Second, the policy must be `public' in the sense that it `inures to the benefit of the public' rather than serving merely the interests of the individual. Third, the policy must have been articulated at the time of the discharge. Fourth, the policy must be `fundamental' and `substantial.' ( Stevenson v. Superior Court, supra, 16 Cal.4th 880, 889-890, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888, 941 P.2d 1157, fn. omitted.) Defendant contends his discharge violated fundamental public policies supported by the Compassionate Use Act (Health & Saf.Code, § 11362.5), the FEHA (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.), and the privacy clause of the California Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1). We disagree. The Compassionate Use Act (Health & Saf.Code, § 11362.5), as we have explained, simply does not speak to employment law. Nothing in the act's text or history indicates the voters intended to articulate any policy concerning marijuana in the employment context, let alone a fundamental public policy requiring employers to accommodate marijuana use by employees. Because the act articulates no such policy, to read the FEHA in light of the Compassionate Use Act leads to no different result. Plaintiff argues that the statutory provision on which a wrongful termination claim is based does not have to ... prohibit the employer's precise act.... ( Grinzi v. San Diego Hospice Corp. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 72, 80-81, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 893.) Even so, the provision in question still `must sufficiently describe the type of prohibited conduct to enable an employer to know the fundamental public policies that are expressed in that law' ( id. at p. 80, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 893, quoting Sequoia Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1472, 1480, 16 Cal. Rptr.2d 888; see Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1256, fn. 9, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 876 P.2d 1022) and to `have adequate notice of the conduct that will subject [the employer] to tort liability to the employees [it] discharge[s]' ( Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 79, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 16, 960 P.2d 1046, quoting Stevenson v. Superior Court, supra, 16 Cal.4th 880, 889, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888, 941 P.2d 1157). The Compassionate Use Act did not put defendant on notice that employers would thereafter be required under the FEHA to accommodate the use of marijuana. Plaintiff also argues that his discharge violated the public policy that underlies an adult patient's right to determine whether or not to submit to lawful medical treatment ( Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 242, 104 Cal.Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1)a right we have located both in the privacy clause of the state Constitution (art. I, § 1) and in the common law. ( Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 531-532, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 28 P.3d 151.) The body of law to which plaintiff refers protects the right of competent adult patients to refuse medical treatment ( id. at p. 531, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 28 P.3d 151) and imposes, inferentially, an obligation on health care providers to seek patients' informed consent before undertaking medical procedures ( ibid. ). Defendant's decision not to accommodate plaintiffs marijuana use does not implicate plaintiffs right to refuse medical treatment. In the course of this argument, plaintiff attempts to describe a right of medical self-determination broader than the right to refuse treatment we recognized in Conservatorship of Wendland supra, 26 Cal.4th 519, 531-532, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 28 P.3d 151, and in Cobbs v. Grant, supra, 8 Cal.3d 229, 242, 104 Cal.Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1. Plaintiff relies on Abigail Alliance v. von Eschenbach (D.C.Cir.2006) 445 F.3d 470, 486, in which a federal court held that a terminally ill patient with no other government-approved treatment options had a due process right under the United States Constitution to have access to an investigational new drug that the Food and Drug Administration had not approved for commercial sale but had determined to be sufficiently safe for testing on human beings. Analogizing to Abigail Alliance, plaintiff argues that [i]n California, medical marijuana use is legal, so under the state [Constitution RagingWire was not permitted to prohibit [plaintiff] from using it. Assuming for the sake of argument Abigail Alliance has any relevance to the case before us, the decision does not compel a different result because defendant has not prevented plaintiff from having access to marijuana. Defendant has only refused to employ plaintiff. To assert that defendant's refusal to employ plaintiff affects his access to marijuana is merely to restate the argument that the Compassionate Use Act (Health & Saf.Code, § 11362.5) gives plaintiff a right to use marijuana free of hindrance or inconvenience, enforceable against third parties. That argument we have already rejected. (See ante, 70 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 388-89, 174 P.3d at p. 205-06.) We thus conclude plaintiff cannot state a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.