Opinion ID: 2630876
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Did the trial court violate Levy's right to compel witnesses to testify by allowing Martin's attorney to make a blanket assertion of Martin's Fifth Amendment privilege on her behalf?

Text: ¶ 49 The standard of review for a claim of constitutional error is whether the court can conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Lougin, 50 Wash.App. 376, 382, 749 P.2d 173 (1988) (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824). ¶ 50 Levy argues that his constitutional right to compel witnesses to testify was violated when the court relied on a statement by Martin's attorney that Martin had asserted her Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate herself. He argues that Martin's attorney did not have the authority to assert the privilege for Martin, and she should have been required to take the stand to assert the privilege. The State did not present arguments contesting this issue. ¶ 51 Both the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and the Washington Constitution protect a defendant's right to compel the testimony of witnesses. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967); State v. Maupin, 128 Wash.2d 918, 924, 913 P.2d 808 (1996). However, a valid assertion of the witness' Fifth Amendment rights justifies a refusal to testify despite the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. United States v. Goodwin, 625 F.2d 693, 700 (5th Cir.1980). ¶ 52 The Fifth Amendment privilege is only applicable where the defendant has `reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer.' Id. (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951)). The court must determine whether the privilege is applicable and a witness cannot establish the privilege merely by making a blanket declaration... that he cannot testify for fear of self-incrimination. United States v. Gomez-Rojas, 507 F.2d 1213, 1220 (5th Cir.1975). The trial judge must inquire into the legitimacy of the assertion and the scope may not extend to all relevant questions. Id. If the judge has specialized knowledge of the likely testimony, and can determine whether the privilege is properly asserted for that witness, the judge may allow the witness to refuse to answer all questions. United States v. Moore, 682 F.2d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 1982). As with other issues of constitutional magnitude, the court will only affirm if it can say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 858. [N]ot every trial error, even one of constitutional dimension, requires reversal of a criminal conviction. Id. at 857. ¶ 53 Here, Martin made a blanket declaration that she could not testify without fear of incriminating herself in her own separate trial, but she did not make the assertion to the trial judge; her attorney made it for her. The Court of Appeals concluded that as Levy's codefendant, Martin was entitled to assert the privilege and that Goodwin does not require the defendant to personally assert it before the court. Levy, 2004 WL 1326813, at , 2004 Wash.App. LEXIS 1206, at . Nevertheless, this flies directly in the face of the rule that a blanket declaration is insufficient without further inquiry. It is questionable that the court could adequately inquire into Martin's reasons for asserting the privilege without actually speaking to her because the court's mandate is to determine whether the assertion is legitimate. It is also possible that Martin could have answered some questions without incriminating herself. For these reasons, the trial court erred in not requiring that Martin personally assert her Fifth Amendment privilege. ¶ 54 Nevertheless, we conclude the error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because there was such clear evidence presented as to Levy's participation in the crime. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals on other grounds.