Opinion ID: 1169301
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the illegal sentence

Text: Before reaching Price's illegal sentence and due process arguments, we note that Price failed to move the sentencing court for correction of the illegal sentence under Rule 36, W.R.Cr.P., [2] which provides that the court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. A motion to correct an illegal sentence is normally for the trial court in the first instance. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 588 (1982). The United States Supreme Court has, however, stated that [i]t is more appropriate, whenever possible, to correct errors reachable by the appeal than remit the parties to a new collateral proceeding. Bartone v. United States, 375 U.S. 52, 84 S.Ct. 21, 23, 11 L.Ed.2d 11 (1963). This practice, of resolving the question of a possible illegal sentence on appeal rather than waiting for the appellant to file a Rule 35 motion (Rule 36, W.R.Cr.P.) in district court, has been followed by a number of courts of appeals. See, e.g., United States v. Rosenbarger, 536 F.2d 715 (6th Cir.1976); Berry v. United States, 435 F.2d 224 (7th Cir.1970); but see United States v. Horton, 646 F.2d 181 (5th Cir.1981); United States v. Weiner, 418 F.2d 849 (5th Cir.1969), for authority that appellate courts would not consider the claimed illegality until the appellant had moved for correction at the district court level. We have concluded that, in the interest of judicial economy, we will consider appellant's two substantive claims, i.e., that his sentence was illegal and that he was denied due process when transferred from the mental hospital to prison. Our adjudication should not be construed as a rejection of the general rule that a motion for correction under Rule 36 should be made to the sentencing court in the first instance. The denial of such motion is, of course, a final order from which an appeal may be taken. Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 704 P.2d 1323 (1985). The sentence imposed read in part: That you, TIMOTHY PRICE    be conveyed    to the Wyoming State Hospital    for treatment    and that upon conclusion of said treatment    be committed to the Wyoming State Penitentiary    for such period of time that your total commitment    shall not be less than fifteen (15) nor more than twenty (20) years. Price argues that the sentence was illegal because § 7-13-605, W.S. 1977, is not written to allow for sentencing to the Penitentiary and treatment at the hospital. To support his argument, Price relies on our decision in McGiff v. State, Wyo., 514 P.2d 199 (1973). He quotes the following from McGiff: So there can be no misunderstanding    we believe that    the trial court could, in its sole discretion, determine whether a convicted person coming under the sex offender's sentencing act (§§ 7-348 through 7-378, W.S. 1957) would be sentenced to the penitentiary or committed to the State Hospital, and that nothing in the statutes indicates that a preference should be given to either sentence or commitment. 514 P.2d at 200. From this, Price concludes that § 7-13-605 clearly provides for an `either/or' type of sentence, i.e., either sentencing to the penitentiary or commitment for treatment, but not both sentencing and treatment. McGiff does not stand for that proposition. The above quote was taken from our denial of a petition for rehearing and not from the actual McGiff decision. We simply clarified our holding that even if the reports of examining physicians revealed that the convicted person's conduct fell within the description of the statute, § 7-351, W.S. 1957 (now § 7-13-604) did not require that the trial court must commit the defendant to hospital treatment   . McGiff v. State, Wyo., 513 P.2d 407, 410 (1973). That is quite different from appellant's contention that the sex offender statutes prevent the trial court from imposing both commitment to the hospital and confinement to the penitentiary. Price next contends that the plain language of § 7-13-604 only gave the court two sentencing options. It could have sentenced him to the penitentiary or it could have ordered treatment without imposing sentence until treatment was completed. Section 7-13-604 provides that if the convicted person meets the stated statutory requirements, then the court may enter its order in accordance with [§ 7-13-605] or sentence such convicted person to the state penitentiary   . (Emphasis added.) Section 7-13-605 provides that the court may place such convicted person on probation, with    one (1) of the conditions of such probation, that he or she receive    psychiatric treatment    or such convicted person may be committed by the court for treatment in a hospital.    Upon release from such hospital,    the convicted person shall be subject to parole supervision or the court at its discretion may enter orders of commitment to the state penitentiary   . According to Price, a court which chooses to apply § 7-13-605 can impose a penitentiary sentence only after the defendant's treatment is complete. We disagree. Section 7-13-605 does not authorize the court to impose a sentence at the end of a convict's mental treatment. Instead the court may enter orders of commitment to the penitentiary upon the convict's release from the hospital. These orders of commitment simply carry out the sentence which the court should have imposed before the defendant entered the hospital. The phrase [u]pon release from such hospital, or other institution, the convicted person shall be subject to parole supervision, appearing in § 7-13-605, supports our conclusion that the sentence must be imposed before the convicted person is committed to the hospital. Parole is defined by the legislature as being permitted to leave the confines of the institution in which [the person] is confined    under sentence ordered by any district court of this state. (Emphasis added.) Section 7-13-402, W.S. 1977. Under this definition it is clear that if a person is subject to parole supervision upon release from the hospital, there must first be a sentence imposed by the district court. We conclude that the plain meaning of §§ 7-13-604 and 7-13-605, W.S. 1977, supra, when considered together, is that the court impose sentence and that the convicted person then begin serving his sentence in the penitentiary (§ 7-13-604), or that he be placed on probation, one of the conditions being that he receive psychiatric treatment (§ 7-13-605). Geraud v. Schrader, Wyo., 531 P.2d 872 (1975). The courts must determine legislative intent from statutory language and not conjecture. Where the language of a statute is plain, unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to rules of statutory construction, and the court has no right to look for and impose another meaning. Courts will not usurp the power of the legislature by deciding what should have been said. (Citations omitted.) Id. at 878. When the trial court first imposed sentence, then committed Price to the Wyoming State Hospital for treatment, and then to the penitentiary, it was a proper sentence within the provisions of the statutes. We disagree with Price's contention that in imposing such a sentence the court attempted to bypass all the procedural steps inherent in the statute   . Section 7-13-605 provides that the convicted person may be committed to the penitentiary upon release from the hospital after he has received treatment. In this case the record shows that the court did not enter its order of commitment until Price had completed the drug abuse program and individual counseling, had made considerable therapeutic gains, and it was clear that further treatment would not be therapeutic. After Price had been committed to the hospital, Dr. Burnett, on June 8, 1984, wrote the sentencing judge stating that there was nothing more the Wyoming State Hospital could do for Price and he should, therefore, be transferred to the penitentiary. Counsel for Price requested a hearing to determine what treatment had been provided, and requested an order requiring the Wyoming State Hospital to provide appropriate treatment or to transfer Price to a facility which could provide adequate treatment. In response, the sentencing judge discussed the situation with counsel and requested another report from the Wyoming State Hospital. On October 23, 1984, Dr. Burnett again reported that Price had exhausted all of the treatment available at the hospital. On December 4, 1984, however, the superintendent and medical director of the Wyoming State Hospital, Dr. Karn, requested that Price be allowed to remain at the hospital. Price remained at the State Hospital until February 20, 1985, at which time Dr. Karn stated that no further gains could be made at the hospital and suggested that Price should be transferred to the penitentiary. During this time Price's counsel's suggestions for treatment were also considered by the judge. Only after all of these communications did the trial judge order Price committed to the penitentiary to serve the remainder of his sentence. These actions of the trial judge do not reflect an attempt to bypass all of the procedural steps inherent in § 7-13-605. As we said in McGiff v. State, supra, the court is not required to commit the defendant for treatment initially; and it follows that there is no requirement that treatment be continued for any specific period of time. The entry of the order transferring Price to the penitentiary was within the court's discretion as provided in § 7-13-605, W.S. 1977.