Opinion ID: 516973
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dangerousness of the Defendant

Text: 33 The district court expressed concern in hearings on Shawar's competency that, because the defendant neither was charged with the commission of a violent crime, nor posed a danger to the person or property of others, yet was incompetent to stand trial, that the Federal Courts are [not] very well equipped to deal with these kinds of situations. (R. 39, Tr. at 16). The fact that Shawar was a non-dangerous incompetent thus seems to have been part of the district judge's rationale for dismissing the case. 8 It is true that the language of the statute does not explicitly cover the nondangerous incompetent. The district judge stated, however, his belief that the dangerousness (or lack thereof) of the defendant at the time of the commitment hearing is just another one of the things that [courts] look to. Id. 34 The clear language of Sec. 4241(d) does not provide for consideration by courts of whether the defendant is dangerous in deciding whether to commit him for the four month evaluation period. It provides only that the court find that the defendant is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense. Since the district judge found that Shawar was incompetent, finding that he is not dangerous does not make him any less so. 35 In cases interpreting the predecessor statute, courts have read that statute not only to authorize, but indeed to require, that dangerousness be considered at the initial commitment hearing, in cases where it seemed unlikely that the defendant would recover. See Jackson, 406 U.S. at 732, 92 S.Ct. at 1855 (quoting Greenwood, 350 U.S. at 374, 76 S.Ct. at 414-15); United States v. Curry, 410 F.2d 1372, 1374 (4th Cir.1969). The current statutory scheme, however, seems to contemplate that the court will not consider the dangerousness of the defendant, with respect to the decision whether to commit him, until after the evaluation period, 9 and even then only if the procedures under Sec. 4246 are followed. 36 In other words, it no longer is proper to consider dangerousness at the initial commitment hearing. The dangerousness issue only arises under the statute when the defendant already has been committed under Sec. 4241 and the director of the facility where the defendant is hospitalized makes his certification to that effect under Sec. 4246(a), or if a defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity, and a hearing must be conducted under Sec. 4243. Cf. 18 U.S.C. Secs. 4243(c), (e), Sec. 4246(a); 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4247(c)(4)(C) (only if a psychiatric examination is ordered under Sec. 4243 or Sec. 4246 must the psychiatrist's report include his opinion as to whether the defendant's condition is such that, if he were released, he would pose a danger of bodily injury to or serious damage to the property of another). 10 37 This reading of the current statute is entirely consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the predecessor statute. In Jackson, it noted that without a finding of dangerousness, a defendant still can be committed for a reasonable time to determine whether there is a substantial chance he will attain the capacity to stand trial in the near future. 406 U.S. at 733, 92 S.Ct. at 1855; see also Curry, 410 F.2d at 1373. In other words, if a court could, under the predecessor statute, commit the defendant for such an evaluation period without finding that he was dangerous, it would not be impermissible (if he otherwise was incompetent) to commit him for the evaluation period without considering dangerousness at all. This is the scenario we believe the plain language of the statute envisions. 38 Moreover, for the reasons we have discussed above, not only does the statute contemplate that consideration of dangerousness shall be deferred until the evaluation period, when an in-depth assessment can be made, but an in-depth assessment of Shawar's mental condition would be helpful in this particular case. Admittedly, it is not entirely clear what should happen after the initial commitment period to the non-dangerous individual who will never regain competency. 11 We need not, however, address that issue at this point. The only issue presented in this case with regard to commitment is what is to happen to the defendant in the initial commitment proceeding under Sec. 4241. We hold that a judge who finds a defendant incompetent to stand trial under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4241 must commit him to the custody of the Attorney General.