Opinion ID: 1197060
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The STOP Program and Protective Custody

Text: {20} Plaintiffs argue that, under the STOP program, the children were arrested, questioned, and punished through mandatory re-education, without warnings of their constitutional right against self-incrimination, and without legal representation, a hearing, or a chance to present evidence. The City stresses that the children were not arrested during the STOP program, but simply taken into protective custody. The City declares that the STOP program falls under a different section of the Children's Code, noting that Section 32A-3B-3(A)(4) authorizes a law enforcement officer to take a child into protective custody without a court order when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the child is endangered by the child's surroundings and removal is necessary to ensure the child's safety. Even assuming that children apprehended during the STOP program were taken into protective custody rather than arrested, we hold, for the following reasons, that the STOP program was inconsistent with express provisions of the Children's Code. {21} The Delinquency Act includes the serious conduct of children which is criminal in nature for all citizens, while other sections of the Children's Code, such as the Families in Need of Court-Ordered Services article, NMSA 1978, §§ 32A-3B-1 to 22 (1993, as amended through 1995), address behavior which, while not criminal, is not in the best interests of the child, such as truancy and running away from home. See State v. Julia S., 104 N.M. 222, 227, 719 P.2d 449, 450 (Ct.App.1986) (distinguishing treatment of delinquent children from that of children in need of supervision under a former version of the Children's code); Winship, 397 U.S. at 374 n. 6, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (Harlan, J., concurring) (The [persons in need of supervision] category was established in order to avoid the stigma of finding someone to be a `juvenile delinquent' unless he [or she] committed a criminal act.); State ex rel. M.S., 73 N.J. 238, 374 A.2d 445, 447 (1977) (Under the statute a delinquent is one who is guilty of serious antisocial conduct which, depending on circumstances, may require detention. On the other hand a [juvenile in need of services] is one who has not really committed an offense against society but only against his or her own best interests.). Section 32A-3B-2 addresses situations in which a child, subject to compulsory school attendance, is absent from school without an authorized excuse more than ten days during a school semester, a child is absent from the child's place of residence for a time period of twenty-four hours or more without consent of the child's parent, guardian or custodian, or a child refuses to return home. In other words, this section deals with certain behavior of children, such as truancy and running away from home, which does not amount to delinquent activity or activity which would be criminal if committed by an adult, and authorizes government involvement when such behavior places children in danger because of their surroundings. Certainly, had the City not created a criminal offense with the Curfew, restriction of night-time activities of children would seem more like truancy and running away than delinquent behavior. {22} In order to take children into protective custody, the Family in Need of Services article requires, among other circumstances, that the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the child is endangered by his [of her] surroundings and removal from those surroundings is necessary to ensure the child's safety. Section 32A-3B-3(A)(4). As Plaintiffs observe, the police officers who took the children into custody under the STOP program did not note any particularized finding that these children were in danger. The City argues that the lateness of the hour is inherently dangerous to children. We disagree. {23} We conclude that the City cannot take children into protective custody without a fact-specific showing that one or more of the specific statutory conditions within Section 32A-3B-3 are met. We reject the City's attempt to create a bright-line rule which automatically defines a child in violation of the Curfew as a child endangered by his or her surroundings. Such a rule is clearly over-inclusive, penalizes innocent conduct, and presents too great a danger that the police or municipalities will use protective custody as a subterfuge to avoid constitutional protections that would otherwise apply to warrantless arrests. See Samuel M. Davis, Rights of Juveniles: The Juvenile Justice System § 3.2, at 3-9 (2d ed.1999) (noting that the potential for abuse in this area is at least as great as it traditionally was in the handling of adults under vagrancy laws); cf. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 1856, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999) (holding that Chicago's gang-loitering ordinance is unconstitutionally vague in failing to provide fair notice of prohibited conduct or to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement officers); B.A.A. v. State, 356 So.2d 304, 306 (Fla.1978) (The [loitering and prowling] statute is not to be used as a `catch-all' provision [w]hereby citizens may be detained by police and charged by prosecutors when there is an insufficient basis to sustain a conviction on some other charge.); J.F.F., 473 N.W.2d at 549 (concluding that a search incident to a child's arrest was invalid because police lacked statutory authority to arrest the child for violating a municipal curfew ordinance). Just as Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution requires a particularized showing of exigent circumstances for a warrantless arrest, see Campos, 117 N.M. at 159, 870 P.2d at 121, we believe that the Legislature disapproves any local ordinance or enforcement scheme which would authorize police to take a child into protective custody without either a court order or a fact-specific showing that the conditions of Section 32A-3B-3(A)(4) are met. See Davis, supra, § 3.3, at 3-12 (The criminal justice system, by preferring the procurement of a warrant whenever practicable, deemphasizes the competence of the police to weigh evidence and make the on-the-street decision to arrest. The juvenile process should operate on no less a standard.). {24} Further, although the City argues that it acted under the authority of Section 32A-3B-3, the STOP program violated other provisions within the same article. For example, under Section 32A-3B-8(F) (1993), a child taken into protective custody shall not be fingerprinted or photographed for identification purposes, unless pursuant to a court order. During the STOP program, the children were photographed without a court order, in violation of this provision. Once law enforcement officers take a child into protective custody, the officers must contact the Children, Youth, and Families Department, see Section 32A-3B-4(A), deliver the child to his or her parents with all reasonable speed, see Section 32A-4-7(A), or place the child in approved community-based shelter-care facilities, see Section 32A-3B-6. The STOP program, as an enforcement scheme of the Curfew, is inconsistent with these requirements. We reject the City's attempt to validate the STOP program under particular sections of the Children's Code while ignoring other relevant sections within the same articles. {25} We conclude that the Children's Code preempts the Curfew ordinance because the Curfew creates criminal sanctions against children for violating the Curfew when such behavior is not unlawful if committed by an adult. We further conclude that the STOP program is invalid under the Children's Code because the City failed to follow the procedures of the Code. Because we affirm the district court's ruling upon these grounds, we do not reach Plaintiffs' other claims.