Opinion ID: 2752896
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Inconsistent Mental Health Theories

Text: With respect to Mr. Tanzi’s first argument—“that trial counsel was ineffective for presenting the testimony of mental health experts who did not collaborate and, therefore, diagnosed Tanzi with varying mental disorders,” Tanzi II, 94 So. 3d at 490, the Florida Supreme Court held that Mr. Tanzi failed to prove deficiency and prejudice. Id. at 490–91. In support of its no-deficiency ruling, the court explained: 13 Case: 13-12421 Date Filed: 11/19/2014 Page: 14 of 34 At the [state] evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that his strategy was to “compartmentalize” his mental health experts to avoid any charge of collusion and any lessening of the experts’ credibility. And “strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel’s decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.” Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000). Tanzi II, 491 So. 3d at 490–91. Nothing about this conclusion is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent or otherwise objectively unreasonable. It is supported by the record and Strickland itself. Here, trial counsel testified at the postconviction hearing that he had been to a number of death penalty training seminars. Further, trial counsel stated “it was prevailing wisdom from some of the seminars [he] had been to to compartmentalize your experts so that there wouldn’t be any charges of collusion or anything like that.” What is more, trial counsel testified that he knew his experts’ testimony “wasn’t going to be absolutely consistent,” but he was “trying to minimize” the inconsistencies. The Florida Supreme Court’s conclusion that trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision to compartmentalize Mr. Tanzi’s experts is well within the bounds of reasonableness under AEDPA. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066 (“[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable . . . .”). Further, this is not a case where trial counsel presented completely contradictory testimony from two different mental health professionals. Mr. 14 Case: 13-12421 Date Filed: 11/19/2014 Page: 15 of 34 Tanzi’s assertion that the findings of Dr. Vicary and Dr. Rapheal were “diametrically opposed to one another” is simply not borne out by the record. Dr. Vicary diagnosed Mr. Tanzi with bipolar disorder, substance abuse, sexual disorder, and antisocial personality disorder. Dr. Raphael diagnosed Mr. Tanzi with several different disorders, including substance abuse disorder, sexual disorders and antisocial personality disorder. It is true Dr. Raphael did not diagnose bipolar disorder, but he testified at the penalty phase that he suspected Mr. Tanzi suffered from some form of psychotic disorder and was unable to rule out bipolar disorder. Indeed, during the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Dr. Raphael confirmed that psychological testing supported his suspicion that Mr. Tanzi might have some bipolar elements in his background, even if he was not able to make a formal diagnosis of bipolar disorder. While Dr. Vicary and Dr. Raphael were not in full agreement about Mr. Tanzi’s precise diagnosis, Mr. Tanzi concedes they both agreed that Mr. Tanzi “met the requirements of both statutory mental health mitigators, and that there was substantial non-statutory mitigation.” These facts bolster our conclusion that Mr. Tanzi has neither overcome the “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance” under Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, nor the deference owed the Florida Supreme Court’s decision under § 2254(d)(1). 15 Case: 13-12421 Date Filed: 11/19/2014 Page: 16 of 34 The Florida Supreme Court also found that Mr. Tanzi did not show prejudice as to this sub issue. See Tanzi II, 94 So. 3d at 491 (concluding “the non-identical diagnoses of Dr. Vicary and Dr. Raphael are not sufficient to undermine our confidence in the outcome”). The court was not required to make a finding on prejudice here. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069 (“[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to . . . address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.”). For the same reason, in light of the reasonableness of the Florida Supreme Court’s no-deficiency determination, it is not necessary for us to express any opinion about prejudice. In contrast, the Florida Supreme Court only addressed prejudice for the next issue, so we must as well.