Opinion ID: 166426
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: valid time, place, and manner restrictions

Text: 31 We apply the time, place, and manner doctrine to evaluate whether restrictions placed on expression in public fora violate the First Amendment. 9 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 731, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000); see also Wells v. City and County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1147 (10th Cir.2001). This doctrine allows the government to place restrictions on expression so long as it does not regulate what is said, but merely regulates such matters as when, where, and how loud.  Ward, 398 F.3d at 1254 (alterations omitted) (quoting Rodney A. Smolla, 1 Smolla & Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 8.36 (2004)). 32 There is no dispute in this case that Denver's policy is content-neutral. Thus, the test is whether Denver's policy is a reasonable restriction on the time, place, or manner of protected speech that is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. 10 Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). 33 Applying this analysis, we conclude that Denver may constitutionally restrict the displaying of signs or banners on highway overpasses. The state has a significant interest in traffic safety and in the avoidance of interference with official traffic control devices on highway overpasses. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 376, 117 S.Ct. 855, 137 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507-508, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 69 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981); cf. Wells v. City and County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1148 (10th Cir.2001). 11 Restricting signs or banners on highway overpasses directed at the motorists below is narrowly tailored to achieve this interest. See Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 798-800, 109 S.Ct. 2746. And as for ample alternative avenues for communication, the policy affects only highway overpasses; Denver rightly notes that there are hundreds of miles of sidewalks and thousands of acres of parks and other public fora to present . . . views and ideas to the public. 34 Therefore, Denver may constitutionally restrict signs or banners on highway overpasses, and such speech is legitimately subject to regulation. Thus, this restriction on expression falls within the plainly legitimate sweep of the policy. As such, if the policy, as Denver argues, only ever restricts signs and banners, it is not unconstitutional. Even if one were to hypothesize that the Denver policy might reach some expression on the overpass that could not impede traffic flow on the highway, there is nothing in this record to suggest that any such speech would be substantial in comparison to the legitimately prohibited expressions. See Hicks, 539 U.S. at 122, 123 S.Ct. 2191; Ward, 398 F.3d at 1248. 35