Opinion ID: 2321645
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Testimony of Uncharged Sexual Misconduct

Text: The defendant avers that the trial justice erred by allowing testimony about uncharged incidents of sexual assault in violation of Rules 403 and 404(b). This Court consistently has declared that the admissibility of evidence is a decision within the sound discretion of the trial justice, and will not be disturbed unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion and the evidence was both prejudicial and irrelevant. State v. Merida, 960 A.2d 228, 237 (R.I.2008); see also State v. Mohapatra, 880 A.2d 802, 805 (R.I.2005). Rule 404(b) [9] generally prohibits the use of evidence of prior bad acts, wrongs, or crimes to show the defendant's propensity to commit the crime with which he is currently charged. State v. John, 881 A.2d 920, 926 (R.I.2005). However, [e]vidence of other conduct, even of a criminal nature, may be received if it is interwoven with the current charge in a way that tends to establish `guilty knowledge, intent, motive, design, plan, scheme, system, or the like.' Id. (quoting State v. Woodson, 551 A.2d 1187, 1193 (R.I.1988)). This Court recognizes that [t]he line between Rule 404(b) evidence presented for the impermissible purpose of demonstrating propensity and Rule 404(b) evidence presented for one of the specific non-propensity exceptions is `both a fine one to draw and an even more difficult one for judges and juries to follow.' State v. Rodriguez, 996 A.2d 145, 150 (R.I.2010) (quoting State v. Brown, 900 A.2d 1155, 1160 (R.I.2006)). However difficult the task, the trial justice must exercise his or her sound discretion in fixing that line and deciding whether this type of evidence should be admitted, excluded, or limited. See State v. Hopkins, 698 A.2d 183, 186 (R.I.1997) (noting that admission of Rule 404(b) evidence is within the trial justice's discretion). The trial justice also must balance the relevance of the evidence against its remoteness and the potential for improper prejudicial impact. Id. In passing on these issues, we look to the trial justice's reasons that underlie the ruling. In this case, the trial justice clearly articulated the test for admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b) and carefully considered the testimony proffered by the state regarding uncharged conduct involving Natalie and Lauren. The trial justice noted: And the test, obviously, with [Rule] 404(b) is, especially in these areas, is how close in time it is, the nature of the act, the relationship with the party involved; for example, if it's the same person or a sibling, those are critical factors; place is also a factor, and then, of course, you have to do a full [Rule] 403 analysis to decide whether or not it's still so highly prejudicial that it can't come in. After listening to the anticipated testimony, the trial justice allowed only two of the three uncharged incidents into evidence. The trial justice allowed Natalie to testify that when she was ten or eleven years old and lying on defendant's bed with defendant and Julie, defendant asked [i]f I show you mine, will you show me yours? He also permitted testimony about the pool incident, during which defendant swam beneath Natalie's legs, blew bubbles between her legs, and pushed his nose against her vagina. The trial justice noted that at the time the incidents occurred, Natalie was of a similar age as the other complainants, had a familial relationship with defendant (her uncle) and the other complainants, the incidents occurred at either defendant's house or a family home, and the incidents were all similarly playful in nature. Based on these similarities, the trial justice found that there was a sufficient nexus to allow the testimony to come into evidence in accordance with Rule 404(b) to show this defendant's intent and his disposition toward these youngsters. After making this determination under Rule 404(b), the trial justice then proceeded to conduct a Rule 403 analysis of Natalie's expected testimony. The trial justice concluded that the testimony was relevant as corroborative of the anticipated testimony from two of the complainants, Emily and Lauren, and that the probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. Significantly, the trial justice refused to allow testimony about the third incident that occurred when Natalie was fourteen years old, when defendant allegedly came up behind her, gave her a back rub, and touched her breasts. Under a Rule 404(b) analysis, the trial justice found that this incident was not sufficiently similar to the charged offenses because it was remote in time, lacked the playful or game-like nature of the crimes on trial, and that no other complaining witnesses were present. In accordance with Rule 403, the trial justice found that the relevance of this evidence, if any, would be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. As a result, he excluded it. The trial justice also acknowledged his responsibility to provide the jury with a cautionary instruction as to    the purpose of [this testimony]. When admitting other sexual acts into evidence the trial justice must offer a limiting instruction to guide the jury's consideration of the evidence, State v. Lamphere, 658 A.2d 900, 904 (R.I.1995), and caution that it not be used to prove defendant is a bad person or that he acted in conformity with the evidence. See Mohapatra, 880 A.2d at 806. Before Natalie testified about the uncharged incidents, the trial justice gave the jury clear instructions regarding the limited purpose of her testimony. The trial justice explained that the evidence was admitted for the limited purpose of indicating the defendant's intent or lewd disposition, and he declared that the jury may not consider the evidence for the purpose of proving that defendant is a bad person and, therefore, probably committed the crime   . We are of the opinion that this testimony was not admissible for purposes of demonstrating defendant's lewd disposition in this case because such evidence is limited to prior acts of sexual misconduct involving the complaining victim and not others. See Mohapatra, 880 A.2d at 806 n. 4 (stating that the lewd disposition exception may only apply to prior sexual misconduct committed against the `particular person,' referring to the victim (quoting State v. Jalette, 119 R.I. 614, 627, 382 A.2d 526, 533 (1978))); State v. Bernier, 491 A.2d 1000, 1004 (R.I.1985). At this point in the trial, Natalie was no longer a complaining witness. However, although we are satisfied that the trial justice erred in listing lewd disposition as one of the grounds for which the jury could consider Natalie's testimony, he did not err in instructing the jury that the testimony was admissible for the limited purpose of demonstrating defendant's sexual intent. Second-degree child molestation sexual assault is a specific intent crime, and requires that the defendant's contact with the victim was done for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or assault. [10] State v. Coningford, 901 A.2d 623, 629 (R.I.2006) (quoting G.L.1956 §§ 11-37-1(7) and 11-37-8.3); Mohapatra, 880 A.2d at 808; State v. Tobin, 602 A.2d 528, 534, 535 (R.I.1992). The state bears the burden of proving the defendant's specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt. See Tobin, 602 A.2d at 535. Natalie's testimony about the swimming pool incident and the [i]f I show you mine, will you show me yours? game is conduct that is suggestive of the defendant's intent to commit acts for purposes of sexual arousal or gratification. Based on this record, and mindful that the question of admissibility of the evidence at trial is an exercise of discretion on the part of the trial justice, we cannot say that the trial justice abused his discretion in admitting this testimony. Additionally, we are satisfied that the trial justice's limiting instruction to the jury that the evidence was admissible on the question of the defendant's intent was correct.