Opinion ID: 2623203
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exemption for Providers of Medical Services Under AS 23.10.060(d)(12)

Text: We first consider whether Hutka was exempt under AS 23.10.060(d)(12) and therefore ineligible to bring an Alaska Wage and Hour Act claim. Hutka argues that the legislative history establishes that only a person who is directly providing medical services is exempt. The Alaska Legislature originally enacted an exemption under AS 23.10.060 in 1962 for hospital employees. [12] From 1962 until 1983, the exemption applied to any employee of a nonprofit hospital. [13] In 1983 the legislature amended the provision to include the current wording of the exemption which states that the overtime section does not apply to an employee of a hospital whose employment includes the provision of medical services. [14] The amendment was made at the request of Humana Hospital's executive director, Ronald Pavellas, Dennis Dewitt of the Alaska State Hospital Association, and other Humana administrators and employees. [15] A letter signed by Humana employees, which was reviewed by the House Labor and Commerce Committee, stated that [i]n order to meet the needs of our community, we naturally must be available 7 days a week, 24 hours a day, making a 40 hour workweek difficult to schedule. [16] Humana administrators and employees also stated that changes in the statute were necessary to allow more flexibility in scheduling. Upon hearing the testimony, Representative Cowdery moved and asked unanimous consent to adopt the [amendment] to the [bill]. There was no objection and it was so ordered. [17] Humana Hospital's testimony suggests that one factor that influenced the legislature's decision to extend the amendment was the interest in keeping medical facilities open and providing more flexible schedules for employees whose extended hours of labor were needed to maintain the hospital in operation at all times. This interpretation of the legislative intent may call into question whether the medical provider exemption should apply to an employee like Hutka who spent many of her overtime hours at home reviewing payroll records. An alternative, broader interpretation of the statutory intent is that it was designed not for the limited purpose of providing flexibility to medical staff but rather with the objective of enhancing access to health care generally. And the home health care that Hutka supervised is included within this objective. Providence correctly argues that the plain language of the statute favors the latter interpretation. The plain language of the statute simply states that it applies to any hospital worker whose job `includes the provision of medical services.' Nothing in the statute or legislative history suggests that the Legislature somehow intended to state `primarily consists of,' but mistakenly ended up with `includes.' There are no words in the plain language that imply any restrictions on the extent of the medical services [provided]. [18] But Hutka points to an opinion letter from the Department of Labor, submitted by Providence in support of its motion for summary judgment. The Department of Labor opinion letter stated that the exemption should be limited to those who directly provide medical services: [I]t was the department's position that the qualification which limits the exemption to employees whose employment included the provision of medical services should be added for the specific purpose of restricting the exemption to doctors, nurses, technicians, treating specialists and like employees. Employees such as maintenance, office clerical, janitorial, culinary, and others who do not directly provide medical services would remain eligible for overtime. The original wording of the provision when it was enacted in 1962 provided that any employee of a nonprofit hospital was exempt. The opinion letter suggests that the amended phrasing in 1983 to an employee of a hospital whose employment includes the provision of medical services, was intended to qualify and limit the exemption. The legislative intent, as shown through the 1983 amendment and the opinion letter from the Department of Labor, suggests that the exemption would not apply to a clerical worker whose job is exclusively administrative. And if the provision of medical care is not part of a worker's regular duties and is performed only on rare occasions, there remains a question whether such an employee would be exempt. But if an employee's duties include the provision of direct medical services, then the exemption does apply. Thus, the remaining inquiry is whether there exists a material question of fact regarding whether Hutka's position as a supervisor of home health care requires her to provide medical services sufficient to qualify her as a direct provider of medical care. Providence points out that Hutka testified that she provided direct medical care to patients. In an affidavit in support of her opposition to Providence's motion for summary judgment on the supervisory employee exception, Hutka testified that at least three times a week, for at least ... four hours a day, for a total of ... 12 hours, I would visit patients to review their care plans, institute care plans on their behalf ... [and carry out] the doctors' orders that they prescribed for a patient.... During the week, I would also have to call doctors to get orders or double check or review their orders to make sure they were accurate. Hutka concedes in her testimony that she visited patients and managed their care plans. From this evidence, we can conclude that Hutka provided direct medical care and that this provision of care was not an isolated occurrence but part of her regular duties. Because she directly provided medical services, Hutka is exempt as a provider of medical services under AS 23.10.060(d)(12).