Opinion ID: 2403694
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial Judge's Ruling

Text: G.E. filed a motion to suppress his statements based on violations of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment and Miranda rights. At the suppression hearing on December 20, 2004, the trial judge made several key factual findings, which formed the basis for his decision to suppress the statements made by G.E. to Detective Paci on the night of July 29, 2004. The judge declared, It's quite clear that once a respondent asserts the right to counsel, all questioning has to stop. The judge therefore found that Detective Paci's question Are you sure? after G.E. answered No to question number four on his PD 47 card violated G.E.'s Miranda rights. The judge further stated that, although Police are allowed to ask narrow questions to clarify the accused's statement when there is equivocal or ambiguous information, G.E.'s answer No to question four was an unambiguous statement and that therefore Detective Paci initiated the conversation that led to G.E.'s narrative, thereby violating the rule established in Edwards, supra : THE COURT: ... In this case, the answer was no. That's quite clear. It's quite unequivocal. And there were no events leading up to the answer no that would have created in the detective's mind any confusion regarding what no meant.... The initiative came from Detective Paci: Are you sure?.... Mr. E did not initiate. It was Detective Paci. Hence, the suppression of the statement. The judge concluded that although G.E.'s statements must be suppressed they were not obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, or involuntarily in the traditional sense. Hence, the judge stated that the suppressed statements may be used for purposes of impeachment at trial should G.E. elect to testify. The trial judge credited the testimony of Officer Burggraf and Detective Paci regarding the events that occurred when G.E. was arrested and questioned on the night of July 29, 2004. The trial judge further found that Officer Burggraf had probable cause to arrest G.E. based on the positive identification of him by Xavier Brown. [6] Citing D.C.Code § 23-581(a)(1)(a)(2001), the trial judge held that the arresting officer had the authority to arrest G.E. without a warrant because he had adequate probable cause to believe that G.E. committed a felony.