Opinion ID: 422085
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Was Knight Denied Due Process by Failure to Disclose

Text: 23 Pending Juvenile Proceedings Against the Davis Twins? 24 Knights contends that the failure of the prosecution to disclose that juvenile charges were pending against the Davis brothers at the time of the trial or to correct Jake's testimony that there were no pending charges constitutes a violation of due process under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). 2 He argues that the pendency of juvenile charges was information favorable to the defendants in that it tended to show the interest and bias of the Davis brothers. He argues further that the level of State intervention in Jake and Jerry Davis' lives was for the purpose of inducing them to lie at trial, and that The reward for presenting testimony that the prosecution wanted was freedom from further State surveillance. 3 He notes that pending juvenile charges were dismissed immediately after the brothers had testified at Knights' trial. 25 These contentions were considered at length and rejected by the state appellate court in People v. Veal, and also by the district court in a well considered opinion denying the habeas corpus petition. 26 As the court noted in People v. Veal, 16 Ill.Dec. at 206, 374 N.E.2d at 981, Knights and his co-defendant requested that the State disclose 'the criminal record and pending criminal cases, if any, of those persons the State may call as witnesses.' Nothing in the record indicates that the defendants requested information concerning the Davis brothers juvenile records. The court recognized, however, that information may be so significant that the State's duty to disclose is not dependent upon the defendant's request, citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2400, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). After a careful analysis of the record and the cases upon which Knights relied, the court concluded that the information concerning the juvenile proceedings against the Davis brothers is not sufficient to create a reasonable doubt of defendants' guilt and that while Jake's testimony may have been confusing, it was clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 16 Ill.Dec. at 206-207, 374 N.E.2d at 981-982; 16 Ill.Dec. at 208, 374 N.E.2d at 983. 27 Judge Crowley, in his memorandum opinion and order, entered February 25, 1981, first noted the different standards for specific and general requests for information: 28 In a situation where a specific request for impeachment material is made, reversal is warranted if the suppressed evidence would have affected the outcome of the trial. Scurr v. Niccum, 620 F.2d 186 (8th Cir.1980). A different standard is applied where only a very general request for impeachment information is made. Then the standard of review is whether the failure to disclose such evidence creates reasonable doubt, United States v. Ramirez, 608 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.1979) or would have resulted in probable acquittal United States v. Jackson, 579 F.2d 553, 560 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 [99 S.Ct. 569, 58 L.Ed.2d 652 (1978). Regardless of whether Knights' request is construed as specific or general, none of the information allegedly suppressed was material. Therefore, there has been no due process violation. 29 In support of this conclusion, the district court's opinion concisely reviews the major cases upon which appellant relies and the relevant facts: 30 None of the cases relied on by Knights supports his due process claim. In Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 [94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347] (1974) the prosecution's key witness had been adjudicated a delinquent for burglarizing two cabins and was on probation at the time he testified. The prosecutor's key witness in Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 [92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104] (1972) had been promised that he would not be prosecuted if he testified before the grand jury and at trial. In Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 [79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217] (1959) the state's principal witness at the murder trial, who was already serving a 199 year sentence for the same murder, falsely testified that he had not received a promise of consideration in exchange for his testimony. In each instance the Court held that the suppressed evidence was material and, thus, the failure to disclose the information constituted a due process violation. 31 These cases have no application here, for the Davis brothers were never charged or convicted of a serious crime. There were no leniency agreements made between the prosecutor and the witnesses. Further, Jake Davis' testimony that no charges were pending against him or his brother was true. Jake was merely on probation for going to the Cabrini Green area after being ordered by the juvenile court to stay out of the area. 4 The order was precipitated by a shooting incident in which Jake was hurt. His brother had a Minor in Need of Supervision (MINS) petition pending against him. Jake testified that charges had been placed against him and that he was on probation for being shot. He also stated that his mother had told him that the charges had been dismissed when, in fact, at the time of Jake's testimony, proceedings had been continued on the MINS petition. Neither probation nor the MINS petition are juvenile charges. People v. Veal, 58 Ill.App.3d 938 [16 Ill.Dec. 188], 374 N.E.2d 963 (1978). Although Jake's answers about the pending proceedings were somewhat confusing, there is no evidence that Jake was lying. Moreover, the defense had ample opportunity to correct any misinformation on cross-examination. There is no evidence to substantiate the charge that the juvenile proceedings were initiated in order to keep the Davis twins prisoners of the state in order to use the threat of pending charges to procure favorable testimony. 32 We agree with the state appellate court and the district court that neither nondisclosure of the juvenile court proceedings involving the Davis brothers nor Jake's testimony at trial denied Knights due process. We find no evidence to support Knights' contention that the juvenile proceedings were for the purpose of inducing the Davis brothers to lie at trial, or that the dismissal of the proceedings after trial was a reward for their testimony. 33