Opinion ID: 1297188
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Defense Counsel's Alleged Concession of Guilt

Text: (18a) In his opening statement to the jury, counsel for defendant suggested that the identity of the robbers as well as intent to kill on the part of the gunman would be issues at trial. [5] During the evidence portion of the guilt phase, counsel cross-examined witnesses and presented one defense witness on identity. After all the evidence had been presented, however, and it came time to argue the case, counsel Strellis discussed solely the question of intent to kill. He did not expressly concede defendant's identity as the gunman, and in discussing the gunman he referred, not to defendant, but to the accused robber. But he never argued that defendant was not the gunman, and he phrased the issue as whether defendant intended to kill. Counsel for the codefendant argued extensively the question of identity, attacking the eyewitness identifications and the credibility of witness Horton. Defendant contends that his attorney's concession of guilt was tantamount to a guilty plea requiring a knowing and voluntary waiver of constitutional rights, and that counsel failed to provide effective representation in this regard. We disagree on both counts. Citing Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [23 L.Ed.2d 274, 89 S.Ct. 1709] and In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [81 Cal. Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449], defendant argues that he had to be admonished of and personally waive his rights against self-incrimination, to a jury trial, and to confront adverse witnesses before counsel could concede his guilt of everything but the special circumstance. Counsel did not, however, concede guilt; he merely did not argue the question of identity. The jury still had to find defendant was the gunman beyond a reasonable doubt. But even if counsel had expressly conceded identity, admonitions and waivers would not have been necessary. In People v. Hendricks (1987) 43 Cal.3d 584 [238 Cal. Rptr. 66, 737 P.2d 1350], defense counsel presented no closing argument at all. Pointing out that defendant did receive a jury trial, exercise his right against self-incrimination, and confront witnesses, we held that the admonitions and waivers were not necessary. ( Id. at pp. 592-594; see also People v. Griffin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1011, 1029 [251 Cal. Rptr. 643, 761 P.2d 103] [no waiver needed even though defense counsel expressly conceded defendant's responsibility for the killing]; People v. Murphy (1972) 8 Cal.3d 349, 365-366 [105 Cal. Rptr. 138, 503 P.2d 594].) Defendant correctly argues that in People v. Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d at page 592, the record expressly reflected that the defendant agreed with counsel's actions. Here, the record reflects neither agreement nor disagreement. That makes no difference. The plurality opinion in People v. Frierson (1985) 39 Cal.3d 803 [218 Cal. Rptr. 73, 705 P.2d 396] made it clear that although counsel does not have authority to override his client's express objection to conceding guilt, there is no requirement of a Boykin/Tahl waiver. ( Id. at p. 818, fn. 8.) Here, unlike in Frierson, the record shows absolutely no indication that defendant disagreed with his attorney's tactical approach. ( People v. Griffin, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 1029.) Defendant cites Brookhart v. Janis (1966) 384 U.S. 1 [16 L.Ed.2d 314, 86 S.Ct. 1245]. There, the defense agreed that the state need only prove a prima facie case, and that the case would not be contested and the defendant would not cross-examine witnesses. ( Id. at p. 3 [16 L.Ed.2d at pp. 316-317].) The high court held this procedure required a waiver of constitutional rights. There was, however, no comparable agreement here, thus making that decision inapposite. ( People v. Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 593.) In People v. Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d at page 594, footnote 1, we noted, The decision on the part of counsel not to present a defense does not involve a question of waiver but rather the issue of effective assistance of counsel. Defendant claims his attorneys were ineffective. To prevail, defendant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel's actions were sound trial strategy under the circumstances prevailing at trial. ( Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 689 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 694-695, 104 S.Ct. 2052]; People v. Bunyard (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1215 [249 Cal. Rptr. 71, 756 P.2d 795].) He cannot overcome that presumption on this record. The decision of how to argue to the jury after the presentation of evidence is inherently tactical; counsel's approach comes within the permissible range of competent representation. Recognizing the importance of maintaining credibility before the jury, we have repeatedly rejected claims that counsel was ineffective in conceding various degrees of guilt. ( People v. Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 177 [19 Cal. Rptr.2d 836, 852 P.2d 331]; People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1186-1187 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146] [counsel conceded defendant's presence at the crime scene, thus repudiating defendant's alibi testimony, but under the circumstances, we cannot say counsel was constitutionally ineffective in his attempt to make the best of a bad situation]; People v. Mitcham, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 1060-1061 [good trial tactics often demand complete candor with the jury, and ... in light of the weight of the evidence incriminating a defendant, an attorney may be more realistic and effective by avoiding sweeping declarations of his or her client's innocence]; People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 306-307 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585]; People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 292-293 [168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149].) The same applies here. It is true, as defendant argues, that counsel indicated in the opening statement that identity was one of the issues. But much happened between the opening statement and the closing argument, namely the presentation of evidence. During the evidence portion of trial, counsel for both defendants cross-examined witnesses and presented evidence on the question of identity. [6] When the time came to argue the case to the jury, however, counsel had to base the tactical decisions on how the trial actually went, not how it might have gone. At the beginning of trial, it was uncertain whether Horton would testify. She had refused to testify at the preliminary hearing, and the district attorney expressed doubt that she would testify at trial. In fact, she did testify, and presented evidence that was devastating to both defendants on the question of identity. However, counsel for defendant elicited from her on cross-examination that defendant told her shortly after the robbery he did not intend to shoot the victim, and that the shooting was an accident. Thus, at the time of argument, the evidence of identity was stronger than counsel might have anticipated at the outset. There were three positive and one tentative eyewitness identifications, plus the testimony of Horton, which was essentially unimpeached. There was no apparent reason why Horton would perjure herself to incriminate the defendants. On the other hand, Horton's testimony helped defendant on the question of intent to kill. Because of this, counsel had difficult decisions to make regarding the argument. It is inherently difficult to argue to a jury that the defendant did not do it and if he did he did not intend to. In addition, attacking Horton's credibility, which would be necessary to challenge identity, would also effectively attack the helpful portion of her testimony. Counsel could reasonably be reluctant to launch a full attack on her credibility and then try to rely on her testimony regarding intent. (17b), (18b) Another factor existed in this case: the codefendant. Counsel for Gutierrez did not have the dilemma facing defendant. Because there was no evidence that Gutierrez intended to kill Koger, no special circumstance was charged as to him. He was charged with murder under the felony-murder rule. The sole issue as to him, therefore, was identity; there was no question of intent. No part of Horton's testimony was useful to Gutierrez. Therefore, counsel for Gutierrez could, and did, fully attack the identity evidence without worrying about losing his credibility. The evidence of identity was largely the same as to both defendants. Except for Norwood Square's tentative identification of defendant, but not Gutierrez, those who identified one defendant identified both. Horton incriminated both. As indicated by the fact Gutierrez called a witness who provided an alibi for defendant but not Gutierrez, challenging identity for one effectively challenged identity for both. Moreover, the testimony of Dr. Loftus regarding factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness identifications, although presented by Gutierrez, applied equally to both defendants. [7] Counsel could reasonably have believed it unlikely that the jury would find a reasonable doubt regarding identity as to Gutierrez, but not also as to defendant. Thus, argument on behalf of Gutierrez was also, in effect, argument on behalf of defendant. Counsel could reasonably have chosen to let Gutierrez argue the question of identity, and to concentrate on the issue that concerned defendant alone  intent. That way, defendant could benefit from Gutierrez's argument while allowing counsel for defendant to maintain his credibility with the jury by not making either weak arguments (all eyewitness identifications were wrong and Horton was lying) or inconsistent arguments (Horton was lying but she also was right about intent). Counsel effectively used Horton's testimony without also having to argue to the jury that she should not be believed. Defendant claims that the witness identifications could have been attacked in various ways. That is no doubt true. The defendants in fact cross-examined the witnesses and presented evidence on identity. As always, there were some inconsistencies in the testimony and the descriptions of the robbers, and other areas of possible attack. But that does not eliminate the hard, practical decisions confronting counsel. Counsel had to decide what approach was best for their client, and base this decision on the precise situation before them. Making this decision, and the record shows convincingly that counsel did make it, is not incompetence. ( People v. Kelly, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 522-523.) Defendant has also not shown prejudice. In light of the strong evidence of identity, and the fact the codefendant was convicted in the face of largely the same evidence despite his attorney's argument regarding identity, it is not reasonably probable the outcome would have been different had counsel adopted a different strategy. ( People v. McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1187.) In a related vein, defendant claims the court erred in its response to a jury question during deliberations, and his attorneys were ineffective in not objecting. During the read-back of testimony at jury request, one juror asked: It may be out of line, but what is the procedure  I mean, this lineup identification, identification lineups, these suspects were in this lineup because of a flyer  if it's known to the court  because of the flyers that were sent out to the other police departments or maybe a telephone call . Without objection, the court responded: The reason for the lineup is to determine and see if a witness can make an identification. That's all you have to know.... [¶] And the composition of the lineup is not for you to concern yourself. Because there was no objection to the court's answer, the issue has been waived. ( People v. Mitcham, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1053.) Counsel were also not ineffective. They were present, and could best judge the impact the court's comment might have had on the jury, and the possible usefulness of an objection. (See People v. Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 158.) In the context of the case as a whole, counsel might reasonably have felt the comments were understood as merely telling the juror not to be concerned with who the other members of the lineup were. We see neither incompetence nor prejudice.