Opinion ID: 1984181
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: errors during the trial.

Text: [31-37] The claims of error during the trial raised by defendant on this appeal include the following: (1) The defendant complains that the jury list for the trial did not contain the names of jurors numbered in the panel list from 87 to 141. This, the defendant claims, denied him a jury chosen by lot. [43] On the record the trial judge explained that, with the knowledge of the other circuit judges, he divided the panel list into two working units so that one unit could work for one portion of the term, and the second for another. The defendant does not allege any deliberate discrimination in the removal of fifty-five consecutive names. Even if this procedure departed from the statutory mandate, the defendant must be actually prejudiced thereby [44] and he has failed to allege or prove prejudice. (2) During the defendant's closing argument counsel referred to the lack of corroborative evidence regarding two pieces of paper on which, Pellitteri testified, one of the defendant's agents Abeles had written some quotations for bids. The prosecutor objected to this argument stating that, You know very well why we couldn't get evidence on that. The record shows that at the time of trial Abeles was outside the jurisdiction of the court and was challenging extradition from Illinois, but that the jury was not told of this fact. The defendant moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the prosecutor erred in testifying about matters not in the record. The trial court struck the prosecutor's remark, but refused to grant a mistrial. We hold that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding that the defendant was not denied a fair trial by reason of this remark. [45] (3) The defendant makes many challenges to the jury instructions. The court gave an instruction involving the weight to be given the testimony of an accomplice. The defendant did not request a similar instruction involving the weight to be given the testimony of an informer. During closing arguments the trial judge told the jury that the witness Pellitteri was no longer an accomplice after January 15, 1972, the date he became an informer. The defendant contends that this statement may have led the jury to believe it could give greater weight to Pellitteri's testimony after January 15 than before. Since both parties agreed at the time of trial that Pellitteri was no longer a coconspirator after January 15, 1972, we hold that the defendant has waived any claim of error concerning the effects of the court's instructions by not requesting an informer instruction. The trial court instructed the jury that after Pellitteri withdrew from the alleged conspiracy, any declarations of Abeles and Pellitteri could not be used as evidence against the defendant Standridge unless it first found that Standridge was a member of the conspiracy. The defendant Waste Management claims it was entitled to a similar instruction. But Waste Management's acts are the acts of its agents, Standridge or Abeles, and any statements of Abeles or Standridge bind Waste Management as the principal and not as a coconspirator. Thus the trial court did not err in refusing the defendant's request. The defendant's objection to the instruction that a person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his deliberate acts is without merit in Wisconsin. [46] The instruction that after Pellitteri withdrew from the conspiracy his actions could not be used against either of the two defendants was an adequate instruction on proof of conspiracy, [47] and the court was not required to give the additional instruction requested by the defendant. Because we have held in this opinion that in proving price fixing, bid rigging and market allocation the state was not required to prove an actual injury to competition, we uphold the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that evidence of competition between coconspirators creates an inference that no conspiracy existed. As to the other challenges to the instructions, as well as to the other challenges to the judgment of conviction, we find no basis for reversal. By the Court. Judgment and order affirmed.