Opinion ID: 1796738
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the fire chief can appoint all positions in the fire department above the rank of district fire chief when the statute requires all appointments to be made on merit by open, competitive examinations

Text: The primary issue on Chandler's appeal is the construction of the following language, found in Miss. Code Ann. § 21-31-13 (1972): All appointments to and promotions in said departments shall be made solely on merit, efficiency, and fitness, which may be ascertained by open competitive examination and impartial investigation. (emphasis added). Chandler contends that § 21-31-13 should be construed to mean that determinations of merit, efficiency, and fitness can only be made by open competitive examination and impartial investigation. For this case, it would mean that the Fire Chief would not be able to appoint certain personnel to serve at his pleasure and be a part of his managerial team. When called upon to apply statutes to specific factual situations, we apply the statutes literally according to their plain meaning. Jones v. Mississippi Employment Sec. Comm'n, 648 So.2d 1138, 1142 (Miss. 1995); Brown v. Hartford Ins. Co., 606 So.2d 122, 124 (Miss. 1992). This Court attempts to give a statute that reading which best fits the legislative language and is most consistent with the best statement of policies and principles justifying that language. Jones, 648 So.2d at 1142. Popular words in statutes must be accepted in their popular sense and we must attempt to glean from the statutes the legislative intent. Mississippi Power Co. v. Jones, 369 So.2d 1381, 1388 (Miss. 1979); Dennis v. Travelers Ins. Co., 234 So.2d 624, 626 (Miss. 1970); Mississippi State Tax Comm'n v. Hinton, 218 So.2d 740, 742 (Miss. 1969). Where the language used by the legislature in a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion to resort to rules of statutory interpretation. Marx v. Broom, 632 So.2d 1315, 1318 (Miss. 1994); City of Natchez v. Sullivan, 612 So.2d 1087, 1089 (Miss. 1992); Forman v. Carter, 269 So.2d 865, 868 (Miss. 1972). When construing a statute, all possible repercussions and consequences of the construction should be considered. Allred v. Webb, 641 So.2d 1218, 1222 (Miss. 1994). It should be noted that although the word may usually has permissive or discretionary implications, Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1221 (Miss. 1994), this Court has on occasion varied from this rule. See, e.g., Barnette v. State, 481 So.2d 788 (Miss. 1985); Leflore Bank and Trust Co. v. Leflore County, 202 Miss. 552, 32 So.2d 744 (1948); State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. School Board of Quitman County, 181 Miss. 818, 181 So. 313 (1938); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Cole, 169 Miss. 634, 152 So. 872 (1934); Town of Carrollton v. Town of North Carrollton, 109 Miss. 494, 69 So. 179 (1915) (all construing the word may to have mandatory application). The only reason in this case to give the word may a mandatory connotation rather than a permissive one would be to effect the evident intention of the legislature or the rights of the public or of private persons under the statute. Jackson v. State, 337 So.2d 1242, 1251 (Miss. 1976). In Fireman's Fund, which is relied on by the appellants, this Court determined that may had a mandatory meaning because the legislature designated the counties in which the suits may be brought. Fireman's Fund, 169 Miss. at 641, 152 So. at 873. This, we stated, meant that the statute thereby excluded other counties therefrom. Id. Contrastingly, in Corpus Juris Secundum, the text writer notes that, As a general rule the word `may,' when used in a statute, is permissive only, and operates to confer discretion, especially where the word `shall' appears in close juxtaposition in other parts of the same statute. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 380 (1953)(emphasis added). See Scanlon v. City of Menasha, 16 Wis.2d 437, 114 N.W.2d 791, 795 (1962). In the case sub judice, a review of the purpose of the legislature in enacting Miss. Code Ann. § 21-31-13 is helpful. When the Civil Service Act was originally passed in 1944, the Mississippi Legislature employed a headnote to explain the purpose of the act: An act to create a board of civil service commissions in all municipalities of the state, operating under a commission form of government, having a population of not less than fourteen thousand (14,000), according to the federal census of 1940, and having a full time fire and police department having paid members; to provide a civil service system based upon examination and investigation as to merit, efficiency and fitness for appointment, employment and promotion of all officers and men appointed in said fire and police department and respective cities, and other purposes. Mississippi General Laws, 1944, ch. 208, Senate Bill No. 127, headnote. (emphasis added). This language indicates that the Mississippi Legislature envisioned a system based upon examination and investigation. Appellees suggest that the use of the word may instead of shall was designed to give the employer discretion as to whether or not they choose to use an open, competitive examination and impartial investigation. The Civil Service statutes were enacted to afford state and municipal employees with reasonable job security by protecting them from political considerations and partisanship. See 15A Am.Jur.2d Civil Service § 1 (1976). Therefore, if the employer has discretion as to how to choose candidates for appointment, it would still have to be based on examination and investigation. Appellees argue that because the Fire Chief will use the assessment center process to make appointments and promotions, the statutory requirements of merit, efficiency, and fitness would be met; in addition, the process would be an open competitive examination, thus satisfying the appellants. The record shows that Fire Chief Donovan would use the assessment center type process plus their record of accomplishment to choose appointees. The language of the adopted proposal states that the Commission and the Mayor of Jackson would have to approve any appointment made by the Fire Chief. Further, the Civil Service Rules for the City of Jackson comport with an ordinary meaning of the word may under § 21-31-13: In case of a vacancy in a position requiring peculiar and exceptional qualifications of a scientific, professional, or expert nature, and upon satisfactory evidence that the position can best be filled by the selection of some designated person of recognized attainments, the Civil Service Commission upon recommendation of the Department Head and the Commission's staff may ratify a non-competitive appointment as though made through the competitive class or may direct that an eligible list be formulated and the appointment made therefrom. Candidates recommended for appointment shall file an application for promotion or entrance with the Commission in regular forma and meet all requirements. Rule VII, Section 3, 1.3, Civil Service Rules for the City of Jackson, Mississippi. Combining the language of this rule with the provision adopted by the Commission, the Commission not only would have to approve any appointee named by the Fire Chief, but also the Commission would have the option of opening a non-competitive appointment up to include others eligible for appointment. Therefore, this process, as stated by Commissioner Henry Clay, provides criteria for qualifications which gives protection. In addition, if the legislature had intended to make open competitive examination and impartial investigation the only means of ascertaining merit, it could have easily inserted the word shall into § 21-31-13, just as it did only ten words before. Therefore, we find that the provision adopted by the City of Jackson Civil Service Commission does manifest the intent of the legislature. The Fire Chief's appointment of personnel above the District Fire Chief level is not unilateral, because his appointees must still be approved by the Civil Service Commission and the Mayor, thus keeping in spirit with § 21-31-13. Additionally, the protections mentioned above do guard the rights of the public and private persons in having competitive and impartial selection processes. Accordingly, we construe the word may in § 21-31-13 literally, giving a civil service commission the option to choose means to determine merit, efficiency, and fitness of appointees, so long as those methods require examination and investigation.