Opinion ID: 6335350
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims Related to the Removal of Facebook Posts

Text: Brock alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by removing his posts from the Facebook platform. But to bring these constitutional claims, Brock “must first establish that the challenged conduct constitutes state action.” Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 206 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). This holds true for claims under the First Amendment. See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (2019) (“[T]he Free Speech Clause prohibits only governmental abridgment of speech.”). Brock’s amended complaint made two principal arguments as to why the removal of his Facebook posts constituted state action: (1) Facebook was a publicly held company; and (2) Facebook was the equivalent of a “public square” or “public forum.” See App’x at 79, 93 (emphasis omitted). Although Brock alleged some 4 facts, construed liberally, as to his first argument, it clearly fails as a matter of law. “The management of a corporation is not a public function; and a state’s permission for a corporation to organize itself in a particular manner is not the delegation of governmental authority.” Cranley v. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. of Vt., 318 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2003). As to Brock’s assertion that Facebook is a public square, he failed to make any non-conclusory factual allegations to support that claim. Instead, the amended complaint merely repeats the legal conclusion that Facebook is a public forum and public square. While we construe pro se complaints liberally, legal conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations,” Ruston v. Town Bd. for Town of Skaneateles, 610 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). None of Brock’s conclusory allegations “nudged” his claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In his opposition to the motion to dismiss, Brock conclusorily asserted for the first time that Facebook is a state actor because it performs the traditional public function of delivering mail. Brock did not raise this argument on appeal or challenge the district court’s conclusion that he cannot “avoid the state action question” by analogizing “Facebook’s provision of an online messaging service to 5 the government’s traditional provision of mail services through the United States Postal Service,” App’x at 188–89. It is well settled in the Second Circuit “that issues not discussed in an appellate brief will normally be deemed abandoned.” Beatty v. United States, 293 F.3d 627, 632 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d 593, 596 n.3 (2d Cir. 2000) (“When a litigant – including a pro se litigant – raises an issue before the district court but does not raise it on appeal, the issue is abandoned.”). And although “[a]n abandoned claim may nevertheless be considered if manifest injustice would otherwise result,” Ocean Ships, Inc. v. Stiles, 315 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2002), such circumstances are not present here; Brock’s complaint and opposition below is devoid of any facts that would support a conclusion that Facebook has assumed a heretofore exclusively public function. The district court therefore did not err in dismissing Brock’s constitutional claims against Defendants.
Brock also alleged violations of unspecified “federal and state laws” based on Facebook’s removal of his posts. App’x at 79. Although Brock failed to provide any detail about these additional claims beyond this brief mention, the district court determined that any such claims would be barred by section 230(c)(1) of the 6 Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). We think it unnecessary, however, to reach these unspecified claims. While we construe pro se complaints liberally, a pro se complaint must nonetheless “state a plausible claim for relief.” Darby v. Greenman, 14 F.4th 124, 127–28 (2d Cir. 2021). Here, the causes of action listed in Brock’s complaint regarding Facebook’s removal of his posts are based on constitutional violations (primarily, a violation of his right to free speech), which we have already addressed. Moreover, at oral argument, Brock conceded that he was not alleging additional causes of action beyond his constitutional and RICO claims. We therefore decline to address any additional claims theoretically raised by his fleeting mention of “federal and state laws.”