Opinion ID: 2639369
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the district court err in granting a directed verdict dismissing Gillingham's claim seeking payment for extra work?

Text: When reviewing on appeal a trial court's grant of a directed verdict, we conduct an independent review of the evidence and do not defer to the findings of the trial court. Sheridan v. St. Luke's Reg'l Med. Cntr., 135 Idaho 775, 25 P.3d 88 (2001). We must determine whether, admitting the truth of the adverse evidence and drawing every legitimate inference most favorably to the opposing party, there exists substantial evidence to justify submitting the case to the jury. Id. The substantial evidence test does not require that the evidence be uncontradicted, or even that we find it persuasive. We do not weigh the evidence or consider the credibility of the witnesses. Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 17 P.3d 247 (2000). It requires only that the evidence be of sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could conclude that a verdict in favor of the party against whom the motion is made is proper. Sheridan v. St. Luke's Reg'l Med. Cntr., 135 Idaho 775, 25 P.3d 88 (2001). A directed verdict is proper only where the evidence is so clear that all reasonable minds would reach only one conclusionthat the moving party should prevail. Id. In its claim seeking payment for extra work, Gillingham relies upon this Court's decision in Beco Corporation v. Roberts & Sons Construction Company, Inc., 114 Idaho 704, 760 P.2d 1120 (1988), wherein we stated: Case law has established a rule that under appropriate circumstances, the contractor who encounters substantially different conditions in performing a construction contract from those contemplated and set forth in the plans and specifications contained therein may be entitled to increased compensation for the additional work. See generally 76 A.L.R. 268; 85 A.L.R.2d 212. The test of whether or not such contractor is entitled to additional compensation is whether or not he justifiably relied upon the plans and specifications for the construction in making his bid and entering into the contract. (citations omitted). The reason for this rule is that if unanticipated conditions not reasonably foreseeable are actually encountered in the work and vary substantially from anticipated conditions reasonably foreseeable by the parties at the time they entered into the contract, the contractor is performing an entirely different contract than the one agreed upon and in such case is entitled to the reasonable value of his additional services. Hash v. R.T. Sundling & Son, Inc., 150 Mont. 388, 436 P.2d 83, 86 (1967). 114 Idaho at 710, 760 P.2d at 1126. At issue here is that portion of the above quotation that states, The test of whether or not such contractor is entitled to additional compensation is whether or not he justifiably relied upon the plans and specifications for the construction in making his bid and entering into the contract. The district court granted a directed verdict upon the ground that the evidence did not show that Gillingham relied upon the plans and specifications in making its bid and entering into the contract. Gillingham did not offer into evidence the plans and specifications upon which it relied in making its bid. They were marked as exhibits, however, and Gillingham had its witnesses testify generally about their contents, use them for reference during their testimony, and show them to the jury to help explain their testimony. The plans and specifications included two maps. One map, which was entitled Site Clearing Plan, listed, among other things, the elevation above sea level of various points (spot elevations) throughout the construction site. The other map listed the finish elevation, stated in feet above sea level, of various points throughout the construction site. The quantity of dirt that Gillingham would be required to move by cutting and filling could be calculated by comparing the difference between the spot elevations as shown on the Site Clearing Plan map and the finish elevations as shown on the other map. Gillingham offered evidence showing that the spot elevations were wrong and that because the actual elevations were approximately 1¼ feet higher than as shown by the spot elevations, it was required to move more dirt than the plans and specifications indicated it would be required to move. Thus, it contends that moving that additional dirt constituted extra work [2] for which it was entitled to be paid. Gillingham was awarded the subcontract based upon its lump-sum bid. The evidence showed that an estimator employed by Gillingham prepared that bid. Before doing so, the estimator obtained the plans and specifications and viewed the construction site. The estimator did not testify during the trial, and there was no direct evidence showing that he relied upon the spot elevations in calculating the bid. Gillingham's president admitted that he did not know whether the estimator relied upon the spot elevations when preparing the bid, nor did he know how the estimator came up with the numbers reflected in the bid. The district court concluded that there was a lack of evidence showing that Gillingham actually relied upon the plans and specifications when preparing its bid. Thus, the issue is whether the evidence, including reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it, was of sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could conclude that Gillingham relied upon the plans and specifications when preparing its bid. Gillingham's president testified that when preparing a bid, using the spot elevations to calculate the quantity of dirt to be moved is generally the way Gillingham's estimator always calculates bids. Evidence of the routine practice of an organization is relevant to prove that the conduct of the organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with that routine practice. IDAHO R. Evid. 406. He also testified that the only way to estimate the volume of dirt that must be moved is by calculating it based upon the existing elevations and the finish elevations as shown by the plans and specifications. The construction site was relatively flat. The jury could reasonably infer that the estimator could not have calculated the dirt to be moved simply by viewing the site. For example, if the plans required that at a particular spot the finish elevation be 2795 feet above sea level, the estimator could not, simply by viewing the site, determine how much dirt needed to be moved, either by filling or cutting, to arrive at that elevation. Finally, Gillingham's president testified that he reviewed the estimator's bid before submitting it. When doing so, he determined from the plans and specifications that Gillingham would be required to remove approximately two feet of dirt from the entire site and that the site was approximately 424,000 square feet. By multiplying these two numbers, he estimated the quantity of dirt that would have to be moved. Based upon that estimate, he concluded that the bid prepared by the estimator was reasonable. There was sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably have concluded that Gillingham relied upon the plans and specifications in calculating its bid. The district court also ruled that as a matter of law Gillingham could not obtain a judgment against Newby-Wiggins because of Gillingham's settlement with the State. The district court held that because Gillingham's claim was based upon errors in the plans and specifications provided by the State, Newby-Wiggins could obtain indemnity from the State for any additional sums that it was obligated to pay Gillingham. As part of its settlement with the State, however, Gillingham agreed to indemnify the State for any sums it was required to pay on Newby-Wiggins' indemnity claim. Therefore, absent evidence showing that Gillingham was entitled to recover sums from Newby-Wiggins that it could not in turn recover from the State, Gillingham would be unable to obtain a final judgment in its favor. Gillingham argues that it was denied the opportunity to present such additional evidence. According to Gillingham, the district court established an order for presenting proof at the trial. Gillingham was to present its evidence against Newby-Wiggins, then Newby-Wiggins would present evidence supporting its indemnity claim against the State, and then Gillingham would present evidence supporting the State's defense to Newby-Wiggins' indemnity claim. Gillingham contends that because of this order of proof, it had not yet had the opportunity to present evidence showing that Newby-Wiggins could not obtain indemnity against the State. Gillingham cannot point to any place in the record, however, showing that the district court established such order of proof. The defense of Newby-Wiggins' indemnity claim against the State was based upon a clause in the prime contract which Gillingham contended required Newby-Wiggins to verify the elevations at the site before beginning construction. Gillingham argues that had Newby-Wiggins done so, the error in the elevations would have been discovered and corrected before Gillingham incurred any of its additional costs. Although the prime contract was not admitted into evidence, Gillingham's president testified regarding that contract as follows: [By Mr. Boardman, counsel for Newby-Wiggins] Q. Okay. And is it not true that one of those [claims against Newby-Wiggins] is that my clients somehow warranted the accuracy of the plans? In layman's terms, somehow guaranteed that they were accurate? A. Yes. Q. Okay. How did Mr. Newby do that or anyone from Newby-Wiggins? A. His contract with the State provides that he verifies the elevations of that site before the work starts. ... [By Mr. McCollum, counsel for Gillingham] Q. And how do you describe it in your concept? Why do you think you ought to recover this? A. Because it's work that I had to do, it was additional to the contract documents that I bid on, and I did it because the survey was not verified and the error was not corrected by the general contractor. [By Mr. Boardman] Q. Let me get this straight, Mr. Gillingham, you expected Newby-Wiggins the general contractor to correct the error? A. I believe his contract with the owner requires him to verify the elevations before the work begins. Q. You expected him to correct the error in the plans provided by the State? A. No. But he should have verified them so it could be corrected and the error would have been corrected before my work started. Gillingham contended that in its subcontract it did not assume this alleged obligation of Newby-Wiggins to verify the elevations before the work started. It argues that verifying the field elevations would require surveying, and the subcontract, which was admitted into evidence, expressly states that Gillingham is not required to perform any surveying. On cross-examination, Gillingham's president testified that Gillingham did not assume Newby-Wiggins' obligation to verify the elevations. The issue of whether Newby-Wiggins breached its prime contract with the State by not verifying the elevations of the site before construction began was raised by the State in its motion for summary judgment, which was argued approximately one month prior to trial. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court denied the motion on the ground that this provision of the prime contract was ambiguous as to what it required Newby-Wiggins to do and that the meaning of the contractual provision was a question of fact to be resolved by the jury. The only evidence on this issue at trial was that of Gillingham's president, who testified that the prime contract obligated Newby-Wiggins to verify the elevations before work started. His testimony constituted substantial evidence supporting Gillingham's claim that Newby-Wiggins could not obtain indemnity from the State for all sums that Gillingham may recover, and therefore it was error for the district court to grant the directed verdict.