Opinion ID: 48822
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cases 8208 and 608

Text: Carter argues that he filed suit within the statutory limitations period. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, a plaintiff must file a judicial complaint 4 within ninety days of receiving notice of a final agency action regarding plaintiff’s administrative complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407(a). The notice may be constructive, as well as actual. Irwin v. Dept. of Veteran’s Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 93 (1990); Espinoza v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 754 F.2d 1247, 1250 (5th Cir. 1985). In this case, Carter filed his suit more than ninety days after notification of the final agency decision arrived at his attorney’s building. Carter argues that because the letter was received in the building rather than at his office, and because Carter’s attorney did not claim the letter from the building’s central mailing facility until three days after the letter arrived, the statute of limitations should have run from that later date. “[T]he giving of notice to the claimant at the address designated by him suffices to start the ninety-day period unless the claimant, through no fault of his own, failed to receive the right-to-sue letter or unless, for some other equitable reason, the statute should be tolled until he actually receives notice.” Espinoza, 754 F.2d at 1250. Here, the notice was delivered to Carter’s attorney’s building on December 29, 2003. Although the attorney’s offices were closed at the time, there were no circumstances beyond the attorney’s control that prevented collection of the notice. The mere fact that no one checked the 5 central mailing facilities until several days after the letter’s receipt does not prevent the limitations period from beginning to run. A contrary rule would “encourage factual disputes about when actual notice was received, and thereby create uncertainty in an area of the law where certainty is much to be desired.” Irwin, 498 U.S. at 93. Carter also argues that the court should exercise its equitable powers to toll the statute because his attorney’s office was closed for the Christmas holidays when the notice arrived. The fact that counsel was on vacation, however, does not merit the tolling of the statute. See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96 (holding that a case where a lawyer was absent from the office when the notice arrived and did not file suit within the limitations period constituted “a garden variety case of excusable neglect,” and did not trigger equitable tolling). Furthermore, Carter argues that because he was undergoing treatment for prostate cancer during December 2003, he was unavailable to his attorney at that time. However, Carter’s treatment apparently ended in December, and there appears to be no reason why the suit could not have been filed within ninety days of receipt of the letter.