Opinion ID: 853063
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Applying Article IV, Section 23 to Subsection (g)

Text: The decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in this case reflected both the reasonable classification approach and the view that population classifications are per se permissible under Article IV as general legislation. As both courts pointed out, any county could theoretically move into the 200,000-to-300,000 person population category defined by subsection (g), from above or below those points, and thus the statute, being susceptible of uniform application to any county in the State meeting the population criteria, was general, not special, legislation. Kimsey, 751 N.E.2d at 811-12. The Court of Appeals also stated: Notwithstanding Section 23, the legislature may make classifications of subjects of legislation, provided the classification is reasonable and the statute operates equally on all within the class. The statute is then considered to be general. Id. at 810 (citations omitted). As explained in Part III, these considerations are relevant if not controlling on the issue of whether a general law can be made applicable. But neither of these points addresses the threshold issue whether subsection (g) is general or special under Moseley, Hoovler, and Williams. As in Hoovler, the circumstances surrounding the enactment of subsection (g) leads to the conclusion that this statute is special legislation. State v. Hoovler, 668 N.E.2d 1229, 1234-35 (Ind.1996). Public Law No. 257 was introduced as amendatory legislation in 1993 by a Representative from St. Joseph County, and sponsored in the Senate by a Senator whose district included both St. Joseph and Elkhart Counties. The bill declared an emergency requiring immediate effect. 1993 Ind. Acts 257 § 4. Because Section 3 of the bill applied only to St. Joseph County at the time of its enactment and for the foreseeable future, and immediate effect was required, the legislature necessarily intended it to address some issue peculiar to St. Joseph County. Thus the evidence is clear that, at the time it was enacted, subsection (g)'s population classification served no purpose other than to identify St. Joseph County. This is no different than had the legislature simply named St. Joseph County in the statute, as was the case in Williams, where the statute specifically stated that it governed the courts of Lake County. Moreover, later amendments did not change the special status of St. Joseph County. In Moseley, it was apparent that the statute at issue was special legislation because it affected Lake County differently from other counties allowed to permit dockside gambling, and also rendered most Indiana counties unable to participate in dockside gambling. Ind. Gaming Comm'n v. Moseley, 643 N.E.2d 296, 301 (Ind.1994). Here, the singling out of St. Joseph County is just as severe. Section 36-4-3-13 now requires the opposition of sixty-five percent of landowners to defeat annexation in every other county in the State, but retains the majority requirement for St. Joseph County. Ind.Code § 36-4-3-13(e) (2002).
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the statute is presumed constitutional. The Court of Appeals noted the general principle that [a]ny reasonable interpretation of a statute is sufficient if it evokes a finding of constitutionality. 751 N.E.2d at 812. This doctrine calls for adopting one among multiple meanings of the statute if that interpretation renders the legislation valid. Here there is no issue as to what the subsection means. More relevant is the point that the challenging party must negate every conceivable basis which might have supported the classification. Id. (quoting Am. Legion Post # 113 v. State, 656 N.E.2d 1190, 1192 (1995)). This may be done by presenting evidence establishing the lack of distinct characteristics, or, as in Williams, the relevant facts may be subject to judicial notice. In this case, several different explanations were offered to justify the subsection's application only in counties of 200,000 to 300,000 population. But these reasons were all couched in terms of characteristics of St. Joseph County, not necessarily those possessed by a county of this population size. They ranged from the need to preserve rural land around urban areas (South Bend), which the trial court judicially noticed, to preventing competing cities (South Bend and Mishakwaka) within the same county from annexing each other's land, which the Attorney General advanced in the trial court. But none of these justifications are inherent in the population range and none turn on facts unique to St. Joseph County. Preserving rural land near urban areas or preventing competing annexation by different municipalities may indeed be legitimate concerns, but there is no basis to conclude they are unique to St. Joseph County. Although the trial court took judicial notice of the fact that St. Joseph County is largely urban but contains significant rural areas, the same is true of Lake and Allen Counties. Several counties have multiple municipalities capable of exercising annexation powers. In short, we are directed to nothing in the record and no relevant facts susceptible of judicial notice that are unique to St. Joseph County. Accordingly, this legislation is unconstitutional special legislation. In contrast to this record, in Hoovler, Tippecanoe County's unique Superfund site needs were well-documented. Thus, the proponents of that special legislation had a factual basis upon which to rest their assertion that a general statute could not apply. [8] In Moseley, the makeup of Lake County, where most of the land contiguous to Lake Michigan is occupied by cities of significant size, justified a voting procedure different from that employed in other counties eligible to adopt dockside gambling. [9] Similarly, in Williams, the specific judicial needs of Lake County supported specific legislation providing for the appointment of magistrates in that county alone. Thus, the statute in each case was constitutional special legislation by reason of facts of record or judicially noticeable. Justice Sullivan is mistaken in claiming that we apply an Article I, Section 23 equal privileges test to this case. We have noted the historical similarity of some but not all aspects of Article IV issues to Article I analysis, but our decision is based on Article IV alone. [10] We also disagree with Justice Sullivan's description of this Court's Article IV, Section 23 precedent as uniformly deferring to the legislature's judgment. Although the cases described by Justice Sullivan all upheld the legislative action, they did so on the merits. They also plainly found that the issues presented by an Article IV, Section 23 challenge were within the province of the judiciary to decide. Indeed that is what judicial review means. Justice Sullivan in substance argues for a doctrine of nonjusticiability of Article IV issues. But for over seventy years precedent has uniformly rejected that view. We think Article IV presents a powerful case for judicial enforcement of a constitutional provision. Forty years ago, judicial intervention was necessary in the area of legislative reapportionment to correct massive imbalances in representation occasioned by the legislature's inability or unwillingness to recognize the need to redistrict. [11] In simple terms, the legislators and their constituents who were overrepresented had no interest in remedying the situation. Special legislation presents a similar issue because it eliminates the normal pressures of constituent objection to unwise policy. This is less debilitating than the paralyzing effect of unremedied malapportionment. But the appropriateness of entertaining claims of unconstitutional special legislation is fortified by the express constitutional provision found in Article IV, Section 23. Moreover, both the 1816 and 1851 constitutions were adopted at a time when judicial review of legislation for conformity to constitutional text was well established. As we held in Dawson v. Shaver, 1 Blackf. 204, 206-07 (1822), citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803): The task is delicate and unpleasant, but the duty of the Court is imperative, and its authority is unquestionable, to declare any part of a statute null and void that expressly contravenes the provisions of the constitution, to which the legislature itself owes its existence. This case adds no new doctrine to the analysis of Moseley, Hoovler, and Williams, and the legislature has taken no steps to eliminate Article IV, Section 23 in the years since those cases were decided. Because special legislation doctrine derives solely from Article IV, Section 23, it can readily be repealed if two sessions of the General Assembly approve that decision and the voters ratify it. We neither advocate nor oppose the wisdom of Section 23. Rather, the Constitution makes that decision for us.