Opinion ID: 2815220
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Unreasonable Invasions of Privacy

Text: Our ruling, however, does not conclude the analysis as the question becomes whether the officers' actions constituted a violation of Counts' state constitutional right against unreasonable invasions of privacy. 2006))); United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that no suspicion needed to be shown in order to justify the 'knock and talk' ); United States v. Cruz-Mendez, 467 F.3d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir. 2006) (As commonly understood, a 'knock and talk' is a consensual encounter and therefore does not contravene the Fourth Amendment, even absent reasonable suspicion.); United States v. Taylor, 458 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2006) (The Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by the government, is not implicated by entry upon private land to knock on a citizen's door for legitimate police purposes unconnected with a search of the premises.). a. South Carolina Invasion of Privacy Jurisprudence As previously stated, the South Carolina Constitution provides citizens an express right to privacy. S.C. Const. art. I, § 10. But, other than the use of the word unreasonable to modify this right, there are no parameters concerning the right or a definition of what constitutes unreasonable invasions of privacy. As a result, legal scholars interpreting the legislative history of this constitutional provision have concluded that the drafters were depending upon the state judiciary to construct a precise meaning of this phrase. Jaclyn L. McAndrew, Who Has More Privacy?: State v. Brown and Its Effect on South Carolina Criminal Defendants, 62 S.C. L. Rev. 671, 694 (2011). As will be discussed, our state jurisprudence is scant on the right to privacy. Thus, this case presents us with an opportunity to further define this state constitutional right. Although several appellate decisions in this state make a passing reference to the right to privacy,5 our most comprehensive discussion to date is contained in State v. Forrester, 343 S.C. 637, 541 S.E.2d 837 (2001) and State v. Weaver, 374 S.C. 313, 649 S.E.2d 479 (2007). In Forrester, the defendant was approached by law enforcement for questioning after officers observed the defendant exhibiting suspicious behavior at a local train station. Forrester, 343 S.C. at 640, 541 S.E.2d at 839. According to the investigating officer, he identified himself to the defendant who agreed to let him search her luggage. Id. Because the defendant was clutching her purse tightly, the officer asked to search the purse. Id. The defendant opened the purse to allow the officer to look inside. Id. at 641, 541 S.E.2d at 839. Without requesting permission to search the interior of the purse, the officer took the purse and tore open the lining at which time he found crack cocaine. Id. On appeal from her conviction, the defendant argued that she did not give consent to the officer to 5 See, e.g., State v. Herring, 387 S.C. 201, 209, 692 S.E.2d 490, 494 (2009) (Private residences are places in which an individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is one society recognizes as justifiable. Accordingly, searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable absent exigent circumstances.); State v. Houey, 375 S.C. 106, 651 S.E.2d 314 (2007) (finding that requiring defendant, who was charged with second-degree CSC with a minor, to submit to testing for sexually transmitted diseases was not overly intrusive or so unreasonable as to render statutory authority for this test violative of the South Carolina Constitution). search her purse and, thus, the crack cocaine was discovered in violation of the express right to privacy found in Article I, section 10 of the South Carolina Constitution. Id. at 645, 541 S.E.2d at 841. This Court disagreed, finding our state constitutional provision did not require informed consent prior to government searches. Id. at 647-48, 541 S.E.2d at 842-43. In so ruling, we compared this state's right to privacy with the ten other states that have express right to privacy provisions in their constitutions. Id. at 646, 541 S.E.2d at 841-42. We noted, South Carolina and five other states have their right to privacy provision included in the section prohibiting unreasonable search and seizures, which in turn creates a distinct privacy right that applies both within and outside the search and seizure context. Id. at 644, 541 S.E.2d at 841. Consequently, this Court concluded that [t]he South Carolina Constitution, with an express right to privacy provision included in the article prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, favors an interpretation offering a higher level of privacy protection than the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 645, 541 S.E.2d at 841. Notwithstanding the broader privacy protection afforded by our state constitutional provision, this Court ultimately rejected the defendant's argument that suspects must be informed of their right to refuse consent to search. Id. at 647-48, 541 S.E.2d at 842-43. Specifically, we stated, while our state constitution may provide a higher level of protection in the search and seizure context, it does not go so far as to require informed consent prior to government searches. Id. Although the Court found that our state constitution did not require the investigating officer to inform Forrester of her right to refuse giving consent to search her purse, the Court reversed Forrester's conviction. Id. at 648, 541 S.E.2d at 843. The Court found that the law enforcement officer exceeded the scope of Forrester's consent when he proceeded beyond the visual inspection of the purse granted by Forrester to an intense physical examination of the purse. Id. As a result, the Court held that the crack cocaine should have been excluded at trial. Id. Six years later, this Court again acknowledged the higher level of privacy protection afforded by our state constitution. In Weaver, the defendant was convicted of murder and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime following a shooting at a nightclub. Weaver, 374 S.C. at 317, 649 S.E.2d at 480. The investigation of the shooting led law enforcement to the home of the defendant's cousin where they discovered the vehicle that had been driven by the defendant parked in the backyard. Id. at 317, 649 S.E.2d at 481. According to the defendant's cousin, the defendant had recently been at the home and asked for a change of clothes, some bleach, and a garbage bag. Id. The defendant then left the home. Id. Upon finding the vehicle driven by the defendant, the investigating officer opened the door and discovered the inside of the vehicle was wet and smelled of bleach. Id. at 318, 649 S.E.2d at 481. The officer also found a bag of wash that smelled like bleach in a nearby area. Id. Based on this evidence, the officers impounded the vehicle and processed it. Id. The investigating officers found blood in the vehicle that matched that of the shooting victim. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued the evidence found in the vehicle should have been suppressed as it was the product of an impermissible warrantless search. Id. This Court rejected the defendant's contention, finding the warrantless search met the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 319-21, 649 S.E.2d at 482. However, the Court also analyzed whether the search and seizure violated the defendant's right to privacy pursuant to the South Carolina Constitution. Id. at 321, 649 S.E.2d at 483. Citing Forrester, the majority noted the South Carolina Constitution affords a higher level of privacy protection than the Fourth Amendment. Id. Despite this broad protection, the majority declined to find the privacy provision required a warrant before the search and seizure of a vehicle located in the backyard of a private residence. Id. at 322, 649 S.E.2d at 483. The majority explained that [t]he focus in the state constitution is on whether the invasion of privacy is reasonable, regardless of the person's expectation of privacy in the vehicle to be searched. Once the officers have probable cause to search a vehicle, the state constitution's requirement that the invasion of one's privacy be reasonable will be met. Id.