Opinion ID: 835146
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Panel Opinion Signed by Only Two Panel Members

Text: When the trial panel filed its opinion with the Disciplinary Board, the panel chair did so with a cover letter and an initial footnote in the opinion itself acknowledging that the opinion had been signed by only two of the three members of the trial panel. The letter explained that the member who did not sign the opinion (Dr. Kosokoff, the public member of the panel) had fully participated in the trial of the case, the deliberations and ultimate decision of the trial panel, and also provided comment and input on the initial draft of the opinion. Because of Kosokoff's travel plans, which required him to be out of the country, the date for filing the opinion had been extended to permit him to review and comment on the opinion in its final form after his return. While traveling, however, Kosokoff suffered a stroke and was hospitalized out of state. He could not communicate verbally and was unavailable to review the final written opinion and to sign it. The chair ended the letter stating, Because Dr. Kosokoff actively participated in the trial and decision process, and to avoid further delay in the case, I have elected to proceed with filing the opinion without Dr. Kosokoff's signature. BR 2.4(a) requires a trial panel in a disciplinary proceeding to consist of 2 attorneys and 1 public member. BR 2.4(i)(2)(a) provides, in part, that the trial panel shall render a written opinion signed by the concurring members of the trial panel. That rule also provides that a dissenting member shall note his or her dissent, and may file a dissenting opinion and attach it to the majority opinion of the trial panel. Relying on that requirement, the accused argues that the lack of Kosokoff's signature on the opinion requires a mistrial. The accused urges that [n]o one knows if [Kosokoff] was ill during the proceedings and now suggests, based on the accused's observations, that Kosokoff may not have been well at that time. The accused maintains that the trial panel's understanding of how Kosokoff voted was a product of inadmissible hearsay. [20] In the accused's view, the procedural irregularity of having only two signatures on the opinion per se requires a mistrial. Although the lack of Kosokoff's signature on the opinion may be a procedural irregularity, it is not one that requires a mistrial. Nothing in the Bar's rules expressly requires that all three panel members actually sign the panel opinion. Rather, only those concurring must do so. Here, the chair and one other member of the trial panel concurring in the decision both signed the opinion. That is enough to make the opinion the official opinion of the panel. If one panel member were to insist on abstaining from casting a vote, nothing in the rule prevents two concurring members from still rendering an opinion and giving it effect by signing it. At best for the accused, that was the consequence of Kosokoff's inability to sign the panel opinion herehe did not join in the opinion, and neither did he dissent. He effectively is in the position of an abstaining panel member. We might reach a different conclusion if the irregularity were shown to have prejudiced the accused. But here, there is no prejudice. The accused's belated assertion that Kosokoff may not have been well at the time of the hearing is unsupported. Our de novo review of the record confirms his active participation in the hearing ( e.g., through the questions he asked both of witnesses and the accused). And, significantly, the accused raised no claim during the proceedings that Kosokoff seemed ill or was otherwise not participating. Neither did the accused do anything to raise such an assertion when the trial panel chair, upon filing the opinion, noted Kosokoff's participation in the hearing and the deliberations on the draft opinion, while explaining the circumstances that prevented Kosokoff from participating in review of the final opinion and signing it. Under the circumstances, there is no reason to believe that Kosokoff's post-hearing illness limited the development of the record or the deliberations of the trial panel, or that it in any other way deprived the accused of a fundamentally fair proceeding. See In re Hendrick, 346 Or. 98, 107-08, 208 P.3d 488 (2009) ( de novo review cannot cure a procedural error that might affect the development of the record). The accused is not entitled to a new disciplinary hearing on this ground.