Opinion ID: 2272642
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the trial court properly instructed the jury on the applicable duties

Text: Having reaffirmed the place of the sudden emergency doctrine in Kentucky jurisprudence, we now turn to Henson's more specific question: whether the doctrine was properly applied, given the evidence before the trial court. Henson argues that the sudden emergency instruction should not have been given in this matter because the circumstances present here amounted to no more than a sudden occurrence, rather than a sudden emergency, and because Klein's negligence precipitated the emergency. Finally, Henson asserts that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that as the lead vehicle she had the right-of-way. We conclude that the trial court properly instructed the jury. Relying primarily on Robinson v. Lansford, 222 S.W.3d 242 (Ky.App.2006) and adopting the terminology used therein, Henson contends that Klein was not confronted with a sudden emergency but instead faced only a sudden occurrence. She defines sudden occurrence as a reasonably anticipated action, whereas a sudden emergency is an unforeseeable and unexpected event. She argues that in the exercise of ordinary care, Klein should have anticipated that Henson would turn her Sea-Doo and yell to him, and thus the sudden emergency instruction was improper. We do not find that categorizing an event as either an occurrence or an emergency is a particularly helpful tool in determining when the sudden emergency doctrine applies. Those categories are not the basis upon which Robinson was decided. Robinson arose from a chain reaction, rear-end automobile collision. Robinson, in the lead vehicle, struck a vehicle in the road ahead of her and thus came to an abrupt stop. Lansford, following immediately behind Robinson, failed to stop and crashed into her. Lansford claimed Robinson's sudden stop confronted him with a sudden emergency. The Court of Appeals, citing Harris, correctly concluded that the sudden emergency instruction should not have been given, stating [t]he doctrine should be applied [only] if it changes or modifies a duty that would have been incumbent upon a plaintiff or defendant in the absence of the emergency. Robinson, 222 S.W.3d at 245. Lansford could not claim his response to Robinson's abrupt stop must be viewed in light of how the emergency may have altered his specific duties because there was no evidence that he responded or took any action at all as a result of the emergency. He simply continued ahead until he crashed. His lack of any action in response to the perceived emergency precludes him from a sudden emergency instruction because no duty, incumbent upon a plaintiff or defendant in the absence of the emergency could have been affected. Id. For that reason, Robinson referred to the matter as a sudden occurrence rather than a sudden emergency. [8] Here, the evidence sufficiently supported Klein's claim that when Henson suddenly changed course and turned in front of him, he responded by trying to retain control of his vessel while veering to the left away from her. He had other options. He could have released the throttle and tried to stop. He could have veered to the right. The sudden emergency instruction was properly given to inform the jury how Klein's duty to operate his Sea-Doo in accordance with the Rules of the Road may have been affected by the facts as the jury found them. Henson argues that the trial court and the Court of Appeals misconstrued the nature of the specific duties applicable to each of the parties. She asserts that by giving the sudden emergency instruction, the trial court adopted the theory that boats in the water should travel in lanes analogous to automobiles on a highway. This argument highlights the essential difference in the way the two parties view the accident. Henson sees the case as analogous to Robinson and Maresz; a rear-end collision that happened because two vehicles were travelling in the same lane, and the first one suddenly stopped, allowing the second vehicle to crash into it. Klein views the case, not as a rear-end collision case, but as a case in which Henson changed her path of travel in such a way that she entered Klein's intended path. Each party to an action is entitled to an instruction upon his theory of the case if there is evidence to sustain it. Reece v. Dixie Warehouse and Cartage Co., 188 S.W.3d 440, 449 (Ky.App.2006) (quoting Farrington Motors v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 303 S.W.2d 319, 321 (Ky.1957)). The problem with Henson's argument is that no evidence supports it. The evidence shows without contradiction that her Sea-Doo was not struck from behind because of a sudden stop. It was struck on the left side when she suddenly and sharply turned away from her line of travel. In more nautical terms, she changed her course, and entered Klein's anticipated line of travel. Whether the two Sea-Doos, travelling together in a wingman formation, are considered to be travelling within a single lane or traveling in separate parallel lanes is immaterial to our resolution of the matter. Henson did not ask for an instruction that reflected either view. Her complaint is the sudden emergency instruction tacitly established a lane theory with attendant duties not recognized by the law. We neither endorse nor condemn what Henson refers to as a lane theory. The evidence simply did not support her theory that this was a rear-end collision. Henson further contends that the trial court improperly declined to instruct the jury on a second theory of the case that Klein failed to yield the right-of-way to Henson. 301 KAR 6:030; § 6(b)(2) provides, among other things, that the operator of a vessel (including personal watercraft) overtaking another vessel shall yield the right of way to the vessel being overtaken. We agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the evidence does not support such an instruction. There was no evidence that Klein was overtaking Henson or that the collision occurred because he failed to yield the right-of-way. Therefore an instruction reflecting that theory of the case was not proper. We conclude that the trial court correctly instructed the jury on the duties applicable to each party, and properly qualified Klein's specific duty with the sudden emergency instruction.