Opinion ID: 197726
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony of Customs Service Agent Alpers

Text: 21 The defendants next contend that the trial court erred in not requiring pretrial disclosure of Alpers' opinion testimony that the defendants were the same individuals whom he observed fleeing the vessel. 6 The defendants claim that Alpers' testimony was expert testimony, and thus the government's failure to comply with the expert disclosure requirements constituted a discovery violation. The government contends that Alpers' testimony was not expert testimony, but rather constituted a permissible lay opinion. 22 The central issue in the trial was whether the three men who were arrested were three of the same four men who fled the vessel when they grounded it. On direct examination, Alpers testified as to the events he witnessed with the aid of the FLIR system. On cross-examination, defense counsel sought to undermine Alpers' assertion that the defendants were the same people whom he had observed on the vessel with the FLIR system. On redirect examination, Alpers testified over the defendants' objection that in his opinion and based on his experience, he had no doubt that they were the same individuals. The defendants contend that because Alpers' opinion was based not upon direct observation but instead upon images on the FLIR this was expert rather than lay testimony. Because the government did not reveal in its expert report that Alpers would give his opinion regarding the identity of the defendants as the men who left the boat, the defendants claim that the government violated discovery rules by introducing the testimony. 7 23 We have rejected similar contentions in the past. In United States v. Rivera-Santiago, 107 F.3d 960, 968 (1st Cir.1997), the defendants also claimed that customs agents had improperly testified as experts. We stated: 24 In United States v. Paiva, 892 F.2d 148 (1st Cir.1989), we noted that the modern trend favors the admission of opinion testimony [from lay witnesses], provided it is well founded on personal knowledge and susceptible to cross-examination. Id. at 157 (permitting drug user to express opinion that substance she found was cocaine). We further explained that the individual experience and knowledge of a lay witness may establish his or her competence, without qualification as an expert, to express an opinion on a particular subject outside the realm of common knowledge. Id.; accord United States v. VonWillie, 59 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir.1995) (based on experience, police officer could testify as lay witness that it was common for drug traffickers to use weapons to protect drugs; opinion was helpful to determination of whether defendant was involved in drug trafficking). 25 Rivera-Santiago, 107 F.3d at 968. Here, Alpers unquestionably had experience and knowledge in interpreting FLIR images outside the realm of the jurors' common knowledge. Because he was able to form an opinion based on his direct observation and he was subject to cross-examination, it was permissible for him to offer his opinion as a lay witness. The defendants' attempt to distinguish Rivera-Santiago is unavailing. Alpers was not presented as an expert and he did not testify as an expert. Thus it was not error for the trial court to allow him to give his opinion as to the identity of the individuals whom he had observed on the FLIR system.