Opinion ID: 2765922
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Inexcusable Neglect

Text: As discussed above, we also have an inexcusable neglect prong to CR 15(c) that we adopted following federal case law, in which a plaintiff adding a new party can do so only if the plaintiff's delay was not due to inexcusable neglect. See N St. Ass 'n, 96 Wn.2d at 367-69. Inexcusable neglect exists when the identity of the defendant is readily available and the plaintiff provides no reason for failing to name the defendant. S. Hollywood Hills Citizens Ass 'nfor Pres. ofNeigh. Safety & Env 'tv. King County, 101 Wn.2d 68, 78, 677 P.2d 114 (1984) (finding inexcusable neglect where the information necessary to properly implead the parties was readily available but the plaintiff's attorney simply did not inquire). [D]elay due to 'a conscious decision, strategy or tactic' constitutes inexcusable neglect. Segaline, 169 Wn.2d at 477 (quoting Stansfield v. Douglas County, 146 Wn.2d 116, 121, 43 P.3d 10 Martin v. Dematic No. 89924-0 498 (2002)). We have held that when a plaintiff could have discovered the identity of the defendant from any one of a variety of public sources and fails to do so, the plaintiffs failure is inexcusable neglect. Haberman v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 109 Wn.2d 107, 174,744 P.2d 1032,750 P.2d 254 (1987) (holding that because the identity of corporate defendants could have been easily ascertained by plaintiffs from a variety of public sources including documents on file with the secretary of state, the plaintiffs' failure to avail themselves of the information constituted inexcusable neglect). However, Haberman, like our other cases interpreting inexcusable neglect, first required that the record indicate that the defendant's identity was easily ascertainable during the limitations period before requiring the plaintiff to give a reason for failing to name the defendant. !d.; N. St. Ass'n, 96 Wn.2d at 368-69; S. HollywoodHills, 101 Wn.2d at 78. In line with those cases, we clarify that the defendant bears the initial burden of showing neglect by producing evidence that the defendant's identity was easily ascertainable by the plaintiff. Once the defendant has produced that evidence, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to give a reason for failing to ascertain the identity of the defendant. If the plaintiff fails to give a reasonable excuse or show that he or she exercised due diligence, it is inexcusable neglect. This clarification of the defendant's and plaintiffs burden is consistent with the primary textual focus ofCR 15(c), which is the defendant's notice ofthe lawsuit 11 Martin v. Dematic No. 89924-0 rather than the plaintiffs diligence. In fact, the phrase inexcusable neglect does not appear in the text of CR 15(c). We originally adopted the inexcusable neglect requirement from the federal courts and their analogous federal civil procedure rule. We note that the United States Supreme Court has now eliminated inexcusable neglect from its analogous rule. See Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 541, 130 S. Ct. 2485, 177 L. Ed. 2d 48 (2010). However, the parties have neither addressed Krupski nor asked us to consider similarly eliminating our inexcusable neglect requirement. Thus, we leave that issue for another day. Applying our inexcusable neglect standard, FCCNA failed to show that its identity was easily ascertainable during the limitations period, and thus FCCNA failed to demonstrate neglect. Although some ofthe publicly available documents could have pointed Martin to a Fletcher entity, it would have been difficult for Martin to realize FCCNA specifically was the proper defendant under the available information during the limitations period. Unlike Haberman, where the defendants' identity was readily available from any one of a number of sources, here the only information in the record that would have pointed to a Fletcher entity was a combination of ( 1) a 1993 Seattle Times article that stated WSH was going to become a Fletcher subsidiary named Fletcher Construction Co. Northwest and that GCC would become part of Fletcher General and (2) documents on file with the secretary of state showing the link between WSI, Fletcher General, and FCCNA. CP at 729,731,733-34. However, no 12 Martin v. Dematic No. 89924-0 single document could have directly connected WSH and FCCNA, and even a combination would not have cleanly connected the dots between the two. The Court of Appeals was incorrect when it stated that the record showed that the articles of amendment changing the name ofWSH to Fletcher General Inc. was publicly available and that GCC's publicly available web site should have put Martin on notice. Martin, 178 Wn. App. at 667. There is nothing in the record from the secretary of state's office connecting WSH to Fletcher General; rather, the record shows WSI merging into Fletcher General, and there are no public documents connecting WSI and WSH. Additionally, the printout from GCC' s web site is dated 20 10 and is thus irrelevant to what Martin knew or should have known in 2007 when she filed suit. CP at 73 7. Thus, nothing in the record shows that the identity of FCCNA and its connection to WSH was easily ascertainable during the limitations period. Because FCCNA failed to demonstrate that its identity and relationship to WSH was easily ascertainable during the limitations period, Martin did not need to give a reason for failing to identify FCCNA. The trial court thus erred by requiring Martin to demonstrate due diligence before FCCNA had made a showing that its identity was easily ascertainable.