Opinion ID: 2575291
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Felony-murder and felony-murder special-circumstance instructions based upon burglary allegations

Text: The prosecution proceeded on two theories of first degree murder: (1) all of the homicides were willful, deliberate, and premeditated, and (2) the homicides perpetrated within the M-5 building were committed in the course of a burglary. (§ 189.) [17] The trial court instructed the jury on two theories of burglary: Every person who enters any building with a specific intent to commit assault with a firearm upon the person of Laura Black in violation of Penal Code Section 245(a)(2) or with the specific intent to commit malicious damage of property of a value in excess of five thousand dollars in violation of [former] Penal Code Section 594(b)(1), each a felony, is guilty of the crime of burglary in violation of Penal Code section 459. (Italics added; see also § 459 [any person who enters a defined structure with the intent to commit any felony is guilty of burglary].) The court also gave an instruction based upon the felony-murder rule: The unlawful killing of a human being ... which occurs during the commission or attempted commission ... of the crime of burglary is murder of the first degree when the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit such crime. The court further explained that [a] homicide is committed in the perpetration of a burglary if the killing and the burglary are parts of one continuous transaction, but [t]here is no requirement that the homicide occur while committing or while engaged in the burglary or that the killing be a part of the burglary other than that the two acts be part of one continuous transaction. Finally, the court instructed the jurors that they could find true the special circumstance allegation that defendant committed a murder while engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a burglary if defendant committed a murder while committing or attempting to commit a burglary, and did so to carry out or advance the commission of the burglary or to facilitate his escape or avoid detection. The court's instructions made clear that the special circumstance allegation was not established if the burglary or attempted burglary was merely incidental to the commission of the murder. [18] Defendant claims that neither burglary theory supports a finding that the homicides committed within building M-5 constituted felony murder. First, defendant asserts, the charge of burglary with the intent to commit property damage in excess of $5,000 could be either a felony or a misdemeanor under former section 594, subdivision (b)(1), depending upon the sentence imposed by the court. Therefore, defendant contends, he could not have entered ESL's facility with the intent to commit a felony, and thus could not be found guilty of burglary. Second, defendant asserts, the burglary premised upon entry with intent to assault Black would have merged with the death of Black, had she been killed, and would not have constituted a felonyindependent of the killing itselfupon which to base a theory of felony murder. ( People v. Wilson (1969) 1 Cal.3d 431 [82 Cal.Rptr. 494, 462 P.2d 22] ( Wilson ).) Therefore, he contends, his entry with the intent to assault Black cannot serve as the basis for the felony murder of six other victims who were killed inside the ESL facility, nor can it support a special circumstance finding that the murders occurred while defendant was engaged in committing a burglary. Defendant claims the giving of the foregoing instructions violated his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (14) Defendant's first challenge to the felony-murder instruction is that a violation of former section 594, subdivision (b)(1) is not a felony but a wobbler, whose ultimate classification will depend on the judge's sentence. [19] Consequently, he contends, a burglary count based upon an entry with intent to violate former section 594, subdivision (b)(1) is not a felony burglary. A felony, however, is defined as a crime which is punishable with death or by imprisonment in the state prison. (§ 17, subd. (a), italics added.) Former section 594, subdivision (b)(1) provided that [i]f the amount of defacement, damage or destruction is five thousand dollars ($5,000) or more, vandalism is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison .... That a judge ultimately may impose a sentence other than state prison, making the crime a misdemeanor, does not remove former section 594, subdivision (b)(1) from the class of crimes that may form the basis for a burglary conviction. (See § 17, subd. (b)(1); see also People v. Rathert (2000) 24 Cal.4th 200, 202, 208 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 779, 6 P.3d 700] [the defendant was convicted of burglary predicated upon felony false personation, which crime is a wobbler].) The instructions required the jury, in order to find defendant guilty of burglary, to find that he entered with the intent to cause property damage in excess of $5,000. Such conduct is punishable by imprisonment in state prison. That is sufficient to establish the commission of a felony supporting the giving of the burglary instruction. [20] (15) Defendant's second challenge to the felony-murder instruction is that the entry with the intent to assault Black merged with the six homicides committed inside ESL's facility. His theory finds its roots in People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, 539 [75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 580] ( Ireland ), in which the defendant was found guilty of the second degree murder of his wife, whom he fatally assaulted with a firearm. We concluded that the jury instructions may have been understood to direct the jury to find defendant guilty of second degree murder if it found only that the homicide was committed in the perpetration of the crime of assault with a deadly weapon ( ibid. ), and we held that it was error to instruct the jury concerning felony murder in these circumstances. Our opinion in Ireland explained that use of the felony-murder rule in cases in which the defendant is charged with assaulting and killing the victim would effectively preclude the jury from considering the issue of malice aforethought in all cases wherein homicide has been committed as a result of a felonious assaulta category which includes the great majority of all homicides. This kind of bootstrapping finds support neither in logic nor in law. ( Ibid. ) In Wilson, supra, 1 Cal.3d 431, we extended Ireland 's merger doctrine to first degree felony murder based upon a burglary committed with the intent to assault the murder victim. The first degree felony-murder rule is set forth in section 189: All murder which is ... committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, [certain enumerated felonies, including] burglary, ... is murder of the first degree. In Wilson, the instructions authorized the jury to find the defendant guilty of first degree murder if he entered [his wife's] bathroom with an intent to commit an assault with a deadly weapon and thereby committed a burglary, in the course of which he killed his wife. (1 Cal.3d at p. 439.) We observed that the only basis for finding a felonious entry is the intent to commit an assault with a deadly weapon, and concluded that, [w]hen, as here, the entry would be nonfelonious but for the intent to commit the assault, and the assault is an integral part of the homicide and is included in fact in the offense charged, utilization of the felony-murder rule extends that doctrine `beyond any rational function that it is designed to serve.' ( Id. at p. 440.) Therefore, we held that an instruction on first degree felony murder is improper when the underlying felony is burglary based upon an intention to assault the victim of the homicide with a deadly weapon. ( Id. at p. 442, italics added.) Defendant proposes that the merger rule established in Wilson be extended further to prohibit application of the felony-murder rule when the burglary charge is based upon an intention to assault someone other than the victim of the homicide. Defendant relies upon People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180 [84 Cal.Rptr. 711, 465 P.2d 847] ( Sears ), in which the defendant entered his estranged wife's home and assaulted her and her daughter, killing the daughter. The jury instructions, together with the trial court's answer to a question from the jury, could reasonably be understood to mean that if defendant entered with intent to assault his wife and stepdaughter he was guilty of burglary and that the first degree felony-murder rule was applicable. ( Id. at p. 188 (lead opn. of Peters, J.), italics added.) Therefore, under the principles enunciated in Ireland, supra, 70 Cal.2d 522, and Wilson, supra, 1 Cal.3d 431, Justice Peters's lead opinion, in which Chief Justice Traynor and Justice Tobriner concurred, held that the merger doctrine precluded reliance upon the felony-murder rule to find the defendant guilty of first degree murder. In his concurring opinion, in which Justices Burke and Sims (assigned) concurred, Justice Sullivan stated that he agree[d] generally ... that the court's instructions on the first degree felony-murder rule in this case were erroneous .... However, I do not agree with, and do not join in, the additional views of the [lead opinion], relating to the felony-murder rule. ( Sears, at p. 191 (conc. opn. of Sullivan, J.).) [21] Defendant relies upon the additional views of the lead opinion, to which Justice Sullivan's concurring opinion referred. ( Sears, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 191 (conc. opn. of Sullivan, J.).) Those additional views related to the Attorney General's theory that the evidence also supported the conclusion that the defendant entered with the intent to assault his wife but not his stepdaughter, and that the felony-murder rule is applicable on the theory that the burglary based on the intent to assault the wife was independent of and collateral to the killing of the stepdaughter. ( Id. at p. 188 (lead opn. of Peters, J.).) The lead opinion responded that the instructions given to the jury did not posit the applicability of the felony-murder rule upon any such theory. ( Id. at p. 189.) Nonetheless, the lead opinion expressed the view that [i]t would be anomalous to place the person who intends to attack one person and in the course of the assault kills another inadvertently or in the heat of battle in a worse position than the person who from the outset intended to attack both persons and killed one or both. ( Ibid. ) As our summary reflects, a majority of the justices in Sears agreed only that the actual instruction and the court's answer to a jury inquirywhich reasonably could be understood to signify that if defendant entered with intent to assault his wife and stepdaughter he was guilty of burglary and ... the first degree felony-murder rule was applicable ( Sears, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 188 (lead opn. of Peters, J.), italics added)were inconsistent with the merger doctrine ( ibid. ). Furthermore, the additional views expressed in response to the Attorney General's theory are dicta in the lead opinion itself. Thus, the lead opinion and the concurring opinion in Sears establish only that if the jury in the present case had been instructed that defendant entered ESL's facility with the intent to assault all of his homicide victims, the merger doctrine would have precluded reliance upon the felony-murder rule to find defendant guilty of first degree murder. (16) Following our opinion in Sears, supra, 2 Cal.3d 180, we have assumed that the felony-murder rule applies to a burglary in which there was an intent to assault an individual other than the homicide victim. (See People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572] ( Gutierrez. )) In Gutierrez, the defendant forced his way into his estranged wife's home, and while his accomplice held a gun to the wife in the living room, the defendant forced his way into the bathroom and killed his wife's boyfriend. The jury was instructed on first degree felony murder based upon burglary committed by the defendant with the intent to commit five target felonies, including assault with a deadly weapon upon his wife. We upheld the defendant's first degree murder conviction, observing: Notably, [the killing of the boyfriend] was not alleged as a target offense of the burglary.... Had the independent target offenses not been alleged in connection with the burglary charge, the merger doctrine might have applied. (See People v. Wilson [, supra, ] 1 Cal.3d [at pp.] 439-442.) ( Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1140, fn. 7.) Similarly, in the present case, the assaults upon victims other than Black were not alleged as target offenses of the burglary. Rather, only the target offenses of intent to assault Black and to vandalize were alleged in connection with the burglary charge. Therefore, the target offenses alleged by the prosecutor did not merge with the killings of the six individuals inside the M-5 building, and there was no error in the instruction on felony murder. [22] Although our jurisprudence, including the decision in Wilson, supra, 1 Cal.3d 431, supports the conclusion that defendant's entry with intent to assault Black did not merge with the six homicides committed within the ESL facility, we acknowledge that our past decisions applying the merger doctrine to first degree felony murder premised upon burglary have resulted in questionable distinctions. As illustrated by Sears, supra, 2 Cal.3d 180, whether a defendant may be convicted of felony murder may depend upon whether the prosecutor chooses to allege and prove that the defendant entered with the intent to assault only one victim, or also intended to assault another person, the homicide victim. As illustrated by Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th 1083, a defendant who enters with the intent only to assault the homicide victim may not be convicted of felony murder, but a defendant who also harbors an intent to commit a less serious felony may be found guilty of felony murder in connection with the intended assault. In addition to these analytical anomalies, we note that our recent opinion in Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th 1172, which analyzed the basis of the second degree felony-murder rule, has highlighted the difference between the sources of the second degree felony-murder rulethe context in which the merger doctrine developedand the first degree felony-murder rule. In Chun, we recognized that the second degree felony-murder rule reflects a judicial interpretation of section 188's definition of implied malice. Consequently, the merger doctrine developed as a judicial interpretation of section 188. This clarification raises the question of whether Wilson 's application of the merger doctrine in the context of first degree felony murder is an appropriate interpretation of section 189's definition of first degree felony murder. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that Wilson, supra, 1 Cal.3d 431, erred in extending the merger doctrine to first degree felony murder. [23] (17) The [felony-murder] rule has two applications: first degree felony murder and second degree felony murder.... First degree felony murder is a killing during the course of a felony specified in section 189, such as rape, burglary, or robbery. Second degree felony murder is `an unlawful killing in the course of the commission of a felony that is inherently dangerous to human life but is not included among the felonies enumerated in section 189 . . . .' [Citation.] ( Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1182.) The source of the second degree felony-murder rule has been questioned over the years, with some members of this court expressing concern that the rule lacked a statutory basis. ( Id. at pp. 1182-1183.) We resolved the issue in Chun, in which we explained that the second degree felony-murder rule is simply another interpretation of section 188's `abandoned and malignant heart' language ( id. at p. 1184) and, therefore, is based upon statute [24] ( Chun, at p. 1188). (18) Chun 's identification of the statutory basis of the second degree felony-murder rule focuses our inquiry upon the statutory basis of the first degree felony-murder rule. Section 189 provides in relevant part that [a]ll murder ... which is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, train wrecking, or any act punishable under Section 206, 286, 288, 288a, or 289, ... is murder of the first degree. As we recently reiterated, `It is the duty of this court in construing a statute to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.' ( Richardson v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040, 1048 [77 Cal.Rptr.3d 226, 183 P.3d 1199].) We begin with the language of the statute, affording the words their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in their statutory context. ( Alcala v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1205, 1216 [78 Cal.Rptr.3d 272, 185 P.3d 708].) (19) We find no ambiguity in the language of section 189. It provides that a killing committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate the enumerated felonies, including burglary, is first degree murder. Burglary has been a delineated felony supporting first degree felony murder since section 189 was enacted in 1872, [25] and indeed since the crime of murder was divided into first and second degree in 1856. (Stats. 1856, ch. 139, § 21, p. 219; see Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1185.) In enacting section 189, the Legislature did not limit the definition of burglary, or exclude burglaries based upon an intent to assault. Rather, section 189 applies the felony-murder rule to all burglaries. Under section 459, also enacted in 1872, burglary is committed when the defendant enters any [defined structure] with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony, including assault. (§ 459, [26] italics added; see People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 646 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 28 P.3d 175] [intent to unlawfully kill or to commit felonious assault will sustain a burglary conviction].) Thus, nothing in the language of section 189 supports the application of the merger doctrine to its terms. (20) We repeatedly have observed that `the power to define crimes and fix penalties is vested exclusively in the legislative branch. ( Keeler v. Superior Court [ (1970)] 2 Cal.3d 619, 631 [87 Cal.Rptr. 481, 470 P.2d 617]...; [citations].)' ( Chun, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1183.) The courts may not expand the Legislature's definition of a crime ( Keeler v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 632), nor may they narrow a clear and specific definition. (21) In the context of second degree felony murder, courts must interpret section 188's reference to an `abandoned and malignant heart.' ( Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1181.) In the context of first degree felony murder, however, there is no need for interpretation of the Legislature's clear language. Thus, the differences between the statutory bases for first and second degree felony murder support the conclusion that although this court properly may limit the breadth of second degree felony murder in a manner consistent with its interpretation of the Legislature's intent, there is no room for interpretation when the Legislature has defined first degree felony murder to include any killing committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, ... burglary. (§ 189.) Because the power to define crimes lies exclusively with the Legislature, our decision in Wilson, supra, 1 Cal.3d 431, erred in narrowing the Legislature's clear and specific definition of first degree murder. In Wilson, we expressed the view that [w]here a person enters a building with an intent to assault his victim with a deadly weapon, he is not deterred by the felony-murder rule. ( Id. at p. 440.) Although we recognized that crimes committed inside structures entail greater risks to the occupants, we concluded that this rationale does not justify application of the felony-murder rule to the case at bar. Where the intended felony of the burglar is an assault with a deadly weapon, the likelihood of homicide from the lethal weapon is not significantly increased by the site of the assault. ( Id. at pp. 440-441.) Finally, we concluded that the burglary statute includes within its definition numerous structures other than dwellings as to which there can be no conceivable basis for distinguishing between an assault with a deadly weapon outdoors and a burglary in which the felonious intent is solely to assault with a deadly weapon. [27] ( Wilson, at p. 441, fn. omitted.) We disagree with Wilson 's view that applying the felony-murder rule to a killing committed in the course of a burglary, with an intent to assault, serves no purpose. First, a person who enters a building with the intent to assault, rather than to kill (in which case the felony-murder rule would be unnecessary), may be deterred by the circumstance that if the victim of the assault dies, the burglar will be deemed guilty of first degree murder. ( People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375, 388 [99 Cal.Rptr. 1, 491 P.2d 793].) Second, the circumstance that the degree to which the peril is heightened may vary, depending upon the particular structure in which the assault occurs, does not negate the purpose of deterring assaults and the heightened risks entailed by assaults that are committed within structures. Individuals within any type of structure are in greater peril from those entering the structure with the intent to commit an assault, than are individuals in a public location who are the target of an assault. ( Miller, supra, 297 N.E.2d at p. 87.) Victims attacked in seclusion have fewer means to escape, and there is a diminished likelihood that the crimes committed against them will be observed or discovered. These risks are present regardless of whether the burglary and assault occur in a home, a tent, or a trailer coach. (See ante, fn. 27.) For these reasons, we reject Wilson 's conclusion that no purpose is served by applying the felony-murder doctrine to a burglary premised upon an intent to assault. (22) Defendant contends, however, that the Legislature's failure to amend section 189 in response to Wilson, despite having amended the statute in other respects, demonstrates that this body is not troubled by this Court's merger jurisprudence. [W]e frequently have expressed reluctance to draw conclusions concerning legislative intent from legislative silence or inaction. ( People v. Cruz (1996) 13 Cal.4th 764, 784 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 117, 919 P.2d 731].) Here, although the Legislature has not affirmatively disapproved this court's analysis in Wilson, neither has defendant established that the Legislature has either expressly or impliedly endorsed it. ( People v. Escobar (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 751 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 837 P.2d 1100].) (23) As we observed in People v. King (1993) 5 Cal.4th 59, 77 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 233, 851 P.2d 27], when this court has created a rule, we can reexamine it. The circumstance that we have misconstrued the statutory scheme in the aftermath of our 1969 decision in Wilson does not justify continuing to ignore the Legislature's apparent intent in enacting section 189. Defendant also contends that by applying the merger doctrine to second degree, but not first degree, murder, this court is sanctioning more severe punishment[] for less culpable conduct. As a preliminary matter, we reject defendant's premise that the insidiousness of an entry committed with the intent to commit an assault does not merit more severe punishment than a simple assault. In any event, as explained above, it is for the Legislature, not this court, to determine penalty. This court has reiterated numerous times that `The purpose of the felony-murder rule is to deter felons from killing negligently or accidentally by holding them strictly responsible for killings they commit.' ( People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 781 [44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130].) The Legislature has said in effect that this deterrent purpose outweighs the normal legislative policy of examining the individual state of mind of each person causing an unlawful killing to determine whether the killing was with or without malice, deliberate or accidental, and calibrating our treatment of the person accordingly. Once a person perpetrates or attempts to perpetrate one of the enumerated felonies, then in the judgment of the Legislature, he is no longer entitled to such fine judicial calibration, but will be deemed guilty of first degree murder for any homicide committed in the course thereof. ( People v. Burton, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 388.) Policy concerns regarding the inclusion of burglary in the first degree felony-murder statute remain within the Legislature's domain, and do not authorize this court to limit the plain language of the statute. Therefore, we overrule our decision in People v. Wilson, supra, 1 Cal.3d 431. (24) Because, due to ex post facto concerns, an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute may not be applied retroactively, our overruling of Wilson does not apply retroactively to defendant's case. ( People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 91-92 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675] [conclusion, contrary to Court of Appeal opinions, that a killing in imperfect self-defense is voluntary, not involuntary, manslaughter, is prospective only, due to ex post facto concerns]; People v. Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 430-432 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 975 P.2d 1071] [similar conclusion regarding an expansive reinterpretation of Pen. Code, § 182]; People v. Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 238-241 [overruling of People v. Caudillo (1978) 21 Cal.3d 562 [146 Cal.Rptr. 859, 580 P.2d 274] (regarding the asportation element of kidnapping) is prospective only, for similar reasons]; People v. Davis (1994) 7 Cal.4th 797, 811-812 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 50, 872 P.2d 591] [holding, contrary to Court of Appeal opinions, that viability of a fetus is not an element of fetal murder, is prospective only, for similar reasons]; People v. King, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 79-80 [overruling of In re Culbreth (1976) 17 Cal.3d 330 [130 Cal.Rptr. 719, 551 P.2d 23] regarding firearm use enhancement is prospective only, for similar reasons]; see also Rogers v. Tennessee (2001) 532 U.S. 451, 462 [149 L.Ed.2d 697, 121 S.Ct. 1693]; Bouie v. City of Columbia (1964) 378 U.S. 347, 353 [12 L.Ed.2d 894, 84 S.Ct. 1697].) Wilson, supra, 1 Cal.3d 431, was decided in 1969. Defendant committed his crimes in 1988, at which time it was unforeseeable that we would overrule Wilson. Accordingly, today's overruling is prospective only. Of course, in light of the conclusion we reach under our jurisprudence governing at the time of the crimesthat the burglary committed with the intent to assault Black did not merge with the homicidesthere was no error in instructing the jury concerning felony murder premised upon that burglary.