Opinion ID: 1057938
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Mass Murder Aggravating Circumstance

Text: The defendant contends that the trial court erred during the penalty phase of the trial by permitting the State to introduce evidence of the murders at the Captain D's restaurant as a means of establishing the mass murder aggravating circumstance. He argues that because the trial court excluded the evidence during the guilt phase of the trial, the jury should not have been permitted to consider the prior convictions in their deliberation on capital punishment. At the time of the offenses, the mass murder aggravating circumstance was defined as follows: The defendant committed `mass murder,' which is defined as the murder of three (3) or more persons within the state of Tennessee within a period of forty-eight (48) months, and perpetrated in a similar fashion in a common scheme or plan. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(12) (Supp.1996). In State v. Bobo, 727 S.W.2d 945 (Tenn.1987), this Court examined this particular aggravating circumstance in detail, concluding that it may be constitutionally applied if the triggering offenses are shown only by convictions that have been entered prior to the sentencing hearing at which they are to be utilized. Bobo, 727 S.W.2d at 955. Later, this Court recognized that the `mass murder' aggravating circumstance [is] appropriate for a series of separate but related homicides committed as part of a common scheme or plan. State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561, 582 (Tenn.1993). The defendant argues that the mass murder circumstance was not applicable because the trial court had previously determined that the murders at the Captain D's and McDonald's were not part of a common scheme or plan. The record establishes that the State initially sought to introduce proof of the prior murder convictions during the guilt phase of the trial under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) in an effort to establish the defendant's identity as the perpetrator. While determining that the murders at the two restaurants were part of a common scheme or plan, the trial court nevertheless excluded the evidence because the probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b). [I]t comes down to . . . a weighing process, the trial court observed, [W]hat I would be asking the jury to do would be to hear proof about other homicides and then disregard it, and I'm not so sure that is even humanly possible to do. The trial court excluded the evidence during the guilt phase by the application of Rule 404(b). The standard for admission of prior convictions during the guilt phase, however, is different than the standard in the penalty phase. While the Rules of Evidence govern the former, the latter standard is statutory. Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(c) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: In the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the punishment and may include, but not be limited to, the nature and circumstances of the crime; the defendant's character, background history, and physical condition; any evidence tending to establish or rebut the aggravating circumstances enumerated in subsection (i); and any evidence tending to establish or rebut any mitigating factors. Any such evidence which the court deems to have probative value on the issue of punishment may be received regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence; provided, that the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements so admitted. . . . Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(c) (2003) (emphasis added). The rules of evidence, therefore, do not limit the admissibility of evidence in a capital sentencing proceeding. State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 702 (Tenn.2001) (citing Van Tran v. State, 6 S.W.3d 257, 271 (Tenn.1999)). Our statute empowers `trial judges [with] wider discretion than would normally be allowed under the Tennessee Rules of Evidence' in the admission of evidence during the penalty phase of a capital case. Id. at 703 (quoting State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 14 (Tenn.2001)). The Rules of Evidence should not be applied to preclude introduction of otherwise reliable evidence that is relevant to the issue of punishment, as it relates to mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the nature and circumstances of the particular crime, or the character and background of the individual defendant. Sims, 45 S.W.3d at 14. Because the rules of evidence are too restrictive and unwieldy in the arena of capital sentencing, the terms of the statute apply. Id. The question here is not whether the Captain D's murder convictions were admissible under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b), but instead whether that evidence was reliable and relevant to one of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Detective Postiglione testified during the penalty phase that the murders of the McDonald's employees were similar to those the defendant had committed at the Captain D's. The State submitted that the murders qualified, under the statutory definition, as a common scheme or plan, a necessary component of the mass murder aggravating circumstance. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(12) (Supp.1996). Indeed, each of the murders took place at a franchised, fast food restaurant. There were other similarities. The crimes were committed when the restaurants were closed but while the employees remained inside. There were robberies at each location. The victims in each instance were moved to an isolated area, ordered to the floor, and shot twice in the head. The offenses occurred within thirty-five days of each other. While perhaps falling short of the criteria for admission under Rule 404, these comparable elements satisfy the terms of the statute. The prior convictions were also admitted to prove that the defendant had previously committed felonies involving violence. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2) (Supp. 1996). The convictions for the prior murders were reliable and relevant to the issue of punishment in this case. Thus, the trial court did not err by allowing proof of the convictions in order to establish the mass murder aggravating circumstance. In State v. Branam, 855 S.W.2d 563, 570 (Tenn.1993), we held that the trial court should not have instructed the jury on the aggravating circumstance under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(i)(6) where there was not a shred of evidence in the record to support the claim. Here, however, the State presented reliable evidence that the defendant had committed two murders at the Captain D's and established that there were significant commonalities with the crimes in this case. Thus, the trial court did not err by submitting the mass murder aggravating circumstance to the jury.