Opinion ID: 2773045
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: How much of the work performed was

Text: reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter? 55 2009 UT App 148, ¶ 11, 213 P.3d 13 (concluding that a contingency fee agreement ―is not determinative when calculating the appropriate amount of an attorney fee award‖). 56 Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988) (citation omitted). 57 Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 318 (Utah 1998). 31 BURDICK v. HORNOR TOWNSEND Opinion of the Court 3. Is the attorney‘s billing rate consistent with the rates customarily charged in the locality for similar services? 4. Are there circumstances which require consideration of additional factors, including those listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility? 58 ¶ 60 The district court made no findings as to the four questions above. The district court determined only that it was impossible to separate the time spent on the separate Campbell and HTK claims, and therefore impossible to determine reasonable attorney fees. Thus, the district court denied the attorney fee request in its entirety. After reviewing the affidavit submitted by counsel, we hold that the district court abused its discretion when it denied attorney fees entirely and failed to make any findings relevant to the four questions above. There was no dispute as to the hourly rate presented by plaintiffs‘ counsel, and the affidavit clearly identifies 282 hours attributable only to the prosecution of the Campbell claim, amounting to $84,600. Despite the broad authority granted the district court in the determination of attorney fees, this broad authority is not an invitation to forego a reasoned analysis or attempt to parse out an appropriate award of attorney fees. ¶ 61 We therefore reverse the rejection of plaintiff counsel‘s affidavit and resulting denial of attorney fees and remand for a determination of appropriate attorney fees. Plaintiffs are entitled to a reasonable attorney fee for the time spent pursuing the claim against Mr. Campbell for which they were successful at trial and which was adequately identified by their affidavit in sections 6(oo)–6(tt). With regards to the remaining time, the district court must conduct a reasonableness analysis and attempt to discern what fees may be divided between the Campbell claims and the HTK claims. 58 Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 990 (footnotes omitted); see also Softsolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young Univ., 2000 UT 46, ¶¶ 48–50, 1 P.3d 1095. 32 Cite as: 2015 UT 8 Opinion of the Court