Opinion ID: 269372
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sullivan v. New York Times Co. necessitates reversal of the judgment in toto.

Text: 71 The Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan held that the Constitution limits state power, in a civil action brought by a public official for criticism of his official conduct, to an award of damages for a false statement made with actual malice, that is with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. 2 The district court did not think the New York Times Co. case governed the present action for the reason that the present plaintiff was not a public official as contemplated by the New York Times rule, and for the reason that ample evidence existed from which a jury could have concluded that there was reckless disregard by the defendant of whether the article was false or not. [R., p. 1467-68.] The district court stated that [t]o hold plaintiff, an employee of the University Athletic Association, a public official would, in this Court's opinion, be extending the `public official' designation beyond that contemplated by the ruling in the case of New York Times Company v. Sullivan   . [R., p. 1467.] The plaintiff held to be a public official in New York Times Co. was Commissioner of Public Affairs, one of three elected Commissioners of the City of Montgomery, Alabama. His duties involved the supervision of the Police Department, Fire Department, Department of Cemetery and Department of Scales. 3 The Supreme Court noted: 72 We have no occasion here to determine how far down into the lower ranks of government employees the `public official' designation would extend for purposes of this rule, or otherwise to specify categories of persons who would or would not be included. Cf. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 573-575, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 1340-1341, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434. Nor need we here determine the boundaries of the `official conduct' concept. It is enough for the present case that respondent's position as an elected city commissioner clearly made him a public official, and that the allegations in the advertisement concerned what was allegedly his official conduct as Commissioner in charge of the Police Department. 4 73 It is clear that public officials as contemplated by New York Times Co. are not limited to elected officials. In Garrison v. Louisiana, 5 decided subsequent to New York Times Co., the District Attorney for Orleans Parish, Louisiana, was convicted of criminal libel for issuing a statement disparaging the judicial conduct of the eight judges of the Criminal District Court. The Supreme Court's decision, which brought the District Attorney's statement within the purview of criticism of the official conduct of public officials and entitled to the benefit of the New York Times Co. rule, did not hinge on whether the eight judges were elected officials. No mention was made of how the judges obtained their positions. Moreover, it is clear from the Court's statement in New York Times Co., quoted above, that the rule applies to government employees.  The question reserved by the Court was  how far down into the lower ranks of government employees the `public official' designation would extend   . 6 A precise formula for designation of public officials for the purpose of the New York Times rule was not attempted. Indeed, it is clear from the background and reasons for the rule that to fashion and apply a precise formula for designation of public officials for the purpose of the New York Times rule would be a formidable, if not impossible, task. 7 74 The first amendment secures freedom of expression upon public questions. The constitutional safeguard, the Supreme Court has said, was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people. 8 Similarly, [I]t is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions. 9 Mr. Justice Brandeis has stated that [t]hose who won our independence believed    that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government. 10 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964, 376 U.S. 254, 269-270, 84 S.Ct. 710. As was said in Garrison v. Louisiana, 11 the First and Fourteenth Amendments embody our `profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan   . It was against this background that the Supreme Court in New York Times Co. stated that the newspaper advertisement, which contained an inaccurate description of events occurring in Montgomery in connection with the civil rights movement, was an expression of grievance and protest on one of the major public issues of our time and would seem clearly to qualify for the constitutional protection. 12 75 It is therefore necessary to examine the facts and weigh the circumstances to determine whether the allegedly defamed plaintiff is involved in the conduct of the public business 13 to an extent which attains constitutional significance. 76 The plaintiff held his position of Athletic Director of The University of Georgia by reason of a contract with the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, which hired him as an employee. [Brief for Appellee, p. 67.] The plaintiff supervised the scheduling and location of games, planned the budget, attended to the addition of new athletic facilities, supervised ticket sales and prepared plans for band trips and performances. Moreover, he generally supervised the entire athletic program of the school. [R., pp. 654-55; Brief for Appellee, pp. 69-70.] The education of youth in the State of Georgia is unquestionably a matter of public concern. By his position the plaintiff is intricately involved with a significant public issue, that is, the education of the youth who attend The University of Georgia — a public institution. According to the Duke of Wellington, The battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton. The ever-increasing difficulties to be faced by this nation require the utmost integrity in the training of its youth. I think the plaintiff is a public official as contemplated by the New York Times Co. decision. 77 The article, which the defendant published under the subtitle, How Wally Butts and Bear Bryant Rigged a Game Last Fall, concerned alleged information on Georgia plays given by Wallace Butts to Coach Paul Bryant relating to the University of Alabama and the University of Georgia football game played in Birmingham in September 1962. The article charged Wallace Butts with being corrupt and with betraying his players. It charged that the players were forced into the game like rats in a maze and took a frightful physical beating. In an italicized preface to the article, The Editors stated that Wallace Butts and Coach Bryant were participants in the greatest and most shocking sports scandal since that of the Chicago White Sox in the 1919 World Series. In the same preface, Wallace Butts was relegated to a status worse than that of disreputable gamblers and a corrupt person who, employed to educate and guide young men, betrays or sells out his pupils. [See R., pp. 88-89 (order granting motion for new trial.)] 78 I think it clear that the defendant's statements are within the purview of criticism of the official conduct of public officials. As stated by the Supreme Court, [t]he public official rule protects the paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning public officials, their servants. To this end, anything which might touch on an official's fitness for office is relevant. Few personal attributes are more germane to fitness for office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motivation, even though these characteristics may also affect the official's private character. 14 79 The district court charged the jury that general damages were recoverable absent proof of actual malice. The plaintiff argues that even if the New York Times rule is applicable, the district court's failure to charge that malice is a prerequisite for actual damages is harmless error since the district court charged that actual malice was required for an award of punitive damages and the jury awarded punitive damages. I do not agree that the district court's charge complies with the New York Times rule. 80 In dealing with the question of punitive damages, the district court charged the jury: 81 Where it is established that the defendant was inspired by actual malice in the publication of the defamatory matter, the jury, in its discretion, may, but is not required, to award punitive damages. As previously stated to you, actual malice encompasses the notion of ill will, spite, hatred and an intent to injure one. Malice also denotes a wanton or reckless indifference or culpable negligence with regard to the rights of others. [R., pp. 1356] (Emphasis supplied.) 82 I think it clear that the district court's charge does not embrace the New York Times Co. definition of actual malice, which is with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The New York Times rule emphasizes the knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, 15 and not merely intent to injure the individual or negligent disregard of the rights of others. The necessary requisite to a showing of actual malice under the New York Times standard is proof that the lie    [is] knowingly and deliberately published about a public official or published with reckless disregard of the truth. 16 83 Since the jury might well have understood the district court's charge to allow recovery on a showing of intent to inflict harm or even the culpably negligent infliction of harm, rather than intent to inflict harm through falsehood, the charge does not comply with the New York Times standard. 17 84 The majority of this Court have held that the defendant has clearly waived any right it may have had to challenge the verdict and judgment on any of the constitutional grounds asserted in Times. While I respect the judgment of the majority, I do not share that judgment. 18 In short, I do not think the defendant may be said to have waived by silence a constitutional right not enunciated at the time; it was not even enunciated by the counsel who petitioned for certiorari in the New York Times Co. decision. 85 In the New York Times Co. case, the trial judge charged that the portions of the advertisement in issue were libelous per se,  that general damages need not be alleged or proved but are presumed, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover both such presumed and punitive damages if the jury decided that the words related to and concerned him and that the damages awarded were not excessive. The jury awarded damages of $500,000. The questions presented to the Supreme Court in the petition for a writ of certiorari dealt with the award of $500,000, the sufficiency of the evidence and the lack of proof of special damages in light of the first amendment as embodied in the fourteenth. 19 Conspicuously absent is any suggestion that the first amendment, as embodied in the fourteenth amendment, requires that a public official must prove actual malice against critics of his official conduct. 20 Apparently this is due to the fact that the defendant's objections in the trial court were directed to the absence of a requirement of proof of special damages. 21 Only by looking at the New York Times Co. case in retrospect can it be said that the defendant has waived the great constitutional rights contemplated by the New York Times rule. But applying the same retrospective look to the present case, 22 it is also clear that had the defendant contended the same as did the defendant in the New York Times case, i. e., that the first and fourteenth amendments were infringed by holding the publication libelous and actionable without proof of special damage, 23 it would not have affected the trial of the present action; for the district court ruled, in dealing with the motion for new trial, that the New York Times rule was not applicable to the present plaintiff. [R., p. 1467.] 86 The fact that the present defendant offered no defense under Georgia law, which provides that communications concerning the acts of public men in their public capacity are deemed privileged under certain conditions, cannot be said to constitute a waiver of a defense that the plaintiff is a public official under the New York Times standard. As recognized by the plaintiff, members of the athletic department are, like members of the faculty, employees under Georgia law and are not considered in public office or officers. 24 Thus, although the Georgia statute which grants a privilege to [c]omments upon the acts of public men in their public capacity and with reference thereto 25 appears as broad, if not broader, than the public official as contemplated by New York Times Co., the plaintiff recognizes that the Georgia case law results in a narrow application of the privilege and the present plaintiff is not covered. 87 Moreover, I think that Henry v. Collins, 26 reflects that the Supreme Court does not intend to allow the great constitutional rights inherent in the New York Times rule to be ignored in a case such as the present one. 88 In Henry v. Collins, the most recent Supreme Court decision interpreting the New York Times rule, the Court reversed per curiam the judgments obtained by a county attorney and a chief of police in their libel actions against the petitioner. The petitioner had charged that his arrest for disturbing the peace was the result of a diabolical plot. The trial judge had charged that malice does not necessarily mean hatred or ill will, but that malice may consist merely of culpable recklessness or a wilful and wanton disregard of the rights and interests of the person defamed. The Supreme Court reversed since the trial judge's instructions concerning malice did not comply with the New York Times rule. The trial of the plaintiff's suit and the decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court affirming the judgments occurred shortly before the Supreme Court handed down New York Times Co. Like the present defendant, the defendant in Henry raised his first amendment question by a motion for a new trial. However, the defendant in Henry filed a motion for a directed verdict at the same time which also raised the first amendment question. Both motions were overruled. Significant is the fact that the constitutional questions raised by the motions were raised for the first time after the close of the plaintiffs' case. 27 89 Since the majority of this Court are not of the opinion that the judgment must be reversed, considerations of effective judicial administration do not require me to review the evidence in the present record to determine whether it could constitutionally support a judgment for the plaintiff should the plaintiff seek a new trial. 28 90 In summary, I think the present diversity action was brought by a public official for criticism of his official conduct; therefore, he was limited to an award of damages for a false statement made with actual malice — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The present action was tried on a definitely stated theory which was fundamentally and constitutionally deficient. The present action should be tried on the theory set forth by the Supreme Court's decision supervening the district court's judgment, that is, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. In such a situation, it has been held, as far back as 1937, that the duty of the district court is to grant the motion for a new trial. 29 91 II. That part of the Judgment awarding $400,000 punitive damages violates the defendant's rights under the first, fifth and seventh amendments. 92 On the question so far discussed, that is, whether New York Times v. Sullivan necessitates reversal of the judgment in toto, I would concede that there is a debatable issue of waiver on which I differ from the majority. The questions hereafter discussed had their genesis in the jury's verdict and are unquestionably preserved for review by the defendant's first motion for new trial (R., pp. 46-48). As to the questions now to be considered, there can be no issue of waiver. 93 The punitive damages, either as found by the jury or as fixed by the court, are many times greater in amount than the general damages. Under the court's instructions to the jury, the general damages included compensation for the mental anguish, pain, mortification, and humiliation he has experienced as a result of the publication. (R. 1354) The punitive damages included no element to which the plaintiff was entitled by way of compensation, but, according to the court's instruction to the jury, the purpose of punitive damages is to deter the defendant from a repetition of the offense and is a warning to others not to commit a like offense. It is intended to protect the community and has an expression of ethical indignation, although the plaintiff receives the award. (R. 1356) The statute which allows the jury to impose punitive damages is Georgia Code Annotated § 105-2002, which reads: 94 In every tort there may be aggravating circumstances, either in the act or the intention, and in that event the jury may give additional damages, either to deter the wrongdoer from repeating the trespass or as compensation for the wounded feelings of the plaintiff. 95 In the present case compensation for the wounded feelings of the plaintiff had been included in the general damages. [See R., p. 1354, quoted supra.] The trial court expanded considerably on the alternative purpose to deter the wrongdoer from repeating the trespass; it included also a warning to others not to commit a like offense, the protection of the community, and an expression of ethical indignation. [See R., p. 1356, quoted supra.] The jury was bound to observe the instructions of the court. For the purpose of considering whether the jury's award of punitive damages exceeded constitutional bounds, it is of no moment that it may also have exceeded the limits set by the statute. 30 The court further instructed the jury that,    if you decide to award punitive damages, the sum you award need have no relationship to any amount that you may award for general damages. It may be greater or it may be less. That is a matter which rests in your sole discretion. [R., p. 1356.] The jury could reasonably infer that no limit was placed on the exercise of its discretion. 96 If the defendant corporation had been tried under the Georgia criminal libel statute, 31 it might have been punished by a fine not to exceed $1,000. 32 As it is, the defendant stands subjected to a judgment of $400,000 for punitive damages, four hundred times the maximum fine for criminal libel. Evidently, the $400,000 sufficed to express the trial judge's sense of ethical indignation while that of the jurors swelled to $3,000,000 — 3,000 times the maximum fine which could have been imposed in a criminal prosecution. 97 Further, in a criminal proceeding, the defendant was subject to no fine unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, while here the judge charged the jury that    the defendant, Curtis Publishing Company, has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the statements contained in this article are true   . (R., p. 1347.) 98 I would not imply that the return of punitive damages in the ordinary case is constitutionally suspect, for more than a century ago the Supreme Court commented: 99 It is a well-established principle of the common law, that in actions of trespass and all actions on the case for torts, a jury may inflict what are called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages upon a defendant, having in view the enormity of his offence rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff. We are aware that the propriety of this doctrine has been questioned by some writers; but if repeated judicial decisions for more than a century are to be received as the best exposition of what the law is, the question will not admit of argument. By the common as well as by statute law, men are often punished for aggravated misconduct or lawless acts, by means of a civil action, and the damages, inflicted by way of penalty or punishment, given to the party injured. 100 Day v. Woodworth, 1851, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 370-371, 14 L.Ed. 181. 101 The theory of punitive damages involves a blending of the interests of society in general with those of the aggrieved individual in particular. 33 There can be no serious question but that the Georgia statute permitting additional damages 34 is constitutional upon its face. 102 However, as that statute was applied by (1) the court's instructions to the jury, (2) the jury's verdict, and (3) the reduced judgment ultimately entered by the court on motion for new trial, the award of punitive damages in the present case is tantamount to a criminal fine or penalty. As said in the very recent case of United States v. Brown, U.S. Oct. Term, 1964, 85 S.Ct. 1707, decided June 7, 1965: 103 It would be archaic to limit the definition of `punishment' to `retribution.' Punishment serves several purposes: retributive, rehabilitative, deterrent — and preventive. One of the reasons society imprisons those convicted of crimes is to keep them from inflicting future harm, but that does not make imprisonment any the less punishment. 104 Similarly, in Trop v. Dulles, 1958, 356 U.S. 86, 96, 78 S.Ct. 590, 595, 2 L.Ed.2d 630, it was said: 105 In deciding whether or not a law is penal, this Court has generally based its determination upon the purpose of the statute. 18 If the statute imposes a disability for the purposes of punishment — that is, to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter others, etc., it has been considered penal. 19 But a statute has been considered nonpenal if it imposes a disability, not to punish, but to accomplish some other legitimate governmental purpose. 20 106 18. Of course, the severity of the disability imposed as well as all the circumstances surrounding the legislative enactment is relevant to this decision. See, generally, Wormuth, Legislative Disqualifications as Bills of Attainder, 4 Vand. L.Rev. 603, 608-610; 64 Yale L.J. 714, 722-724. 107 19. E. g., United States v. Lovett, supra [328 U.S. 303, 66 S.Ct. 1073, 90 L.Ed. 1252]; Pierce v. Carskadon, 16 Wall. 234, 21 L.Ed. 276; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L.Ed. 366; Cummings v. State of Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 18 L.Ed. 356. 108 20. E.g., Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 44 S.Ct. 283, 68 L.Ed. 549; Hawker v. People of State of New York, 170 U.S. 189, 18 S.Ct. 573, 42 L.Ed. 1002; Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L. Ed. 637; Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 5 S.Ct. 747, 29 L.Ed. 47. 109 Footnote 18 to the text just quoted makes clear that the enormity of the verdict and even of the final judgment are relevant factors to be considered in determining whether the punitive damages amount to a criminal fine. I submit that there is no difference in substance between the punitive damages imposed in the present case and criminal punishment — an ex post facto punishment 400 times as great as the defendant could have anticipated from the criminal libel statute, 35 and imposed without any of the procedural safeguards which are required in criminal proceedings by due process. 36 110 If there should be any doubt that the award of $400,000 in damages strictly punitive violates the due process clause for lack of the safeguards required in criminal proceedings, there can be none, I submit, that it amounts to a prior restraint upon freedom of the press. The rule as announced in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964, 376 U.S. 254, 277-278, 84 S.Ct. 710, has clear application to the facts of this case: 111 What a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel. The fear of damage awards under a rule such as that invoked by the Alabama courts here may be markedly more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute. See City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 307 Ill. 595, 607, 139 N.E. 86, 90, 28 A.L.R. 1368 (1923). Alabama, for example, has a criminal libel law which subjects to prosecution `any person who speaks, writes, or prints of and concerning another any accusation falsely and maliciously importing the commission by such person of a felony, or any other indictable offense involving moral turpitude,' and which allows as punishment upon conviction a fine not exceeding $500 and a prison sentence of six months. Alabama Code, Tit. 14, § 350. Presumably a person charged with violation of this statute enjoys ordinary criminal-law safeguards such as the requirements of an indictment and of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. These safeguards are not available to the defendant in a civil action. The judgment awarded in this case — without the need for any proof of actual pecuniary loss — was one thousand times greater than the maximum fine provided by the Alabama criminal statute, and one hundred times greater than that provided by the Sedition Act. And since there is no double-jeopardy limitation applicable to civil lawsuits, this is not the only judgment that may be awarded against petitioners for the same publication. Whether or not a newspaper can survive a succession of such judgments, the pall of fear and timidity imposed upon those who would give voice to public criticism is an atmosphere in which the First Amendment freedoms cannot survive. Plainly the Alabama law of civil libel is `a form of regulation that creates hazards to protected freedoms markedly greater than those that attend reliance upon the criminal law.' Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70, 83 S.Ct. 631, 639, 9 L.Ed.2d 584. 37 112 For yet another reason the award of $3,000,000 by the jury, or of $400,000 by the court, as punitive damages is unconstitutional and void. There was no sembalance of definite standard or controlling guide to govern the award. 38 Can any standard be more vague or arbitrary than an expression of ethical indignation first on the part of the jury and then on the part of the trial judge? It must be remembered that stricter standards of permissible vagueness are applicable to a rule having a potentially inhibiting effect on freedom of the press than are applicable to rules relating to less important subjects. 39 113 Still further, I submit that the remittitur violates the defendant's rights under the seventh amendment. The trial judge concluded that the award for punitive damages in this case was grossly excessive. It is the court's considered opinion that the maximum sum for punitive damages that should have been awarded against Curtis Publishing Company should be $400,000.00. [R., p. 95] In another part of his opinion on motion for new trial, the district judge commented: The award for punitive damages in the case under consideration is more than seventeen times larger than the highest award for punitive damages ever sustained. [R., p. 93.] The district judge's opinion is silent as to the underlying reason for such a grossly excessive verdict. The majority opinion says that    the judge necessarily rejected the idea that this verdict had been infected by such destructive elements [as passion or prejudice]. [Majority opinion, p. 717.] With deference, I submit that that conclusion is not based on the record or on anything said by the trial judge. To the contrary, in colloquy with counsel, the judge may well have disclosed his view as to why the judgment was excessive: Suppose the court should determine that probably a certain portion of the argument was improper, and therefore the verdict was excessive, and grant you a new trial on that ground, and then it was tried again   . [R., p. 1373.] 114 The majority of this Court labors under a different impression. It several times refers to the defendant's new policy of sophisticated muckraking without benefit of what the defendant claimed that it meant by that expression [R., pp. 37-38, 1019.]: 115 Defendant admits that beginning in the latter part of 1962, The Saturday Evening Post adopted an editorial policy of `sophisticated muckraking' in the sense of printing the truth about the grave dangers facing the country, including the threat from outside the country and the deterioration of moral values within the country. [R., pp. 37-38.] 116 It was, of course, for the jury to say whether the defendant's explanation was true. In any event, I agree with the majority that the expression was by itself more than enough to inflame the jury. [Opinion, p. 714.] If, as is impliedly conceded, the jury was inflamed, then was not passion and prejudice the most probable cause for its grossly excessive verdict? The majority continues, Counsel for Butts could only gild the lily. [Opinion, p. 715.] I am tempted to facetiously comment on their plentiful supply of gilt, but, in a more serious vein, I must express my shock and surprise that this Court will leave standing what amounts to severe criminal punishment of the defendant in the face of the highly improper and prejudicial argument of plaintiff's counsel. 117 The majority says that some of the argument was invited   , but is not more specific as to the particular argument of defendant's counsel which amounted to an invitation. However, the appellee's brief (p. 93) refers to the following: 118 Mr. Cody's exact words were: (R. 1267) `The point I want to make is that a man [plaintiff] that will go to one of your public officials [Comptroller General], bet enough to start into this business and a lot of other businesses while he is charged with the duty of Athletic Director, but it is worse, in order to obtain the license to do that, to misrepresent your financial condition.' (Emphasis added). 119 In response, there is attached to appellant's reply brief as Exhibits A and B, the affidavit of Mr. Cody supported by the affidavit of Rufus L. Hixon, the official court reporter. The court reporter's affidavit is to the effect that after deponent had examined his stenotype notes, he telephoned Mr. Bondurant to state that the word `bad' had been used by Mr. Cody in his closing argument but that the word `bet' had been erroneously transcribed. [Exhibit B, p. 8a, Appellant's Reply Brief.] 120 In addition I would note that in beginning his argument, counsel for the defendant referred to his attachment to the University of Georgia and to the fact that the trial judge, opposing counsel, and he had received their training in that institution. The arguments of counsel are set forth in the record (pp. 1257-1341). They do not, in my opinion, disclose any invitation or provocation to justify or excuse the improper and inflammatory argument of plaintiff's counsel. The following excerpts are only samples of the objectionable parts of that argument, but, I submit, that they speak so loudly as not to require comment: 121 Since he talked to you about the University of Georgia and when he was there, I think I likewise have a right to mention to you briefly that I probably have known Wally Butts longer than any man in this case. I was at Mercer University with Wally Butts when he played end on the football team there. He was in some respects a small man in stature, but he had more determination and more power to win than any man that I have ever seen in my life. I would not stand before you in this case today arguing in his behalf if I thought that Wally Butts would not tell you the truth when he raises his hand on this stand and swears to Almighty God that what he is going to tell you is the truth. [R., p. 1289] 122