Opinion ID: 1100343
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Were Gnemi's pleadings sufficient to maintain his action with the special tribunal?

Text: ¶ 41. Waters also challenges the ruling of the special tribunal by asserting that Gnemi's petition for judicial review exceeded the scope of the matters alleged in his original petition to the HCDEC. In Darnell, this Court recognized the scope of the issues authorized by statute for a special judicial tribunal to review: [T]he special judicial tribunal will have no authority to review or examine into matters not presented by the original contest or protest before the executive committee, save as to matters germane which happened during or since the hearing before the executive committee, and save as to matters merely explanatory or incidental as mentioned in Harris v. Stewart, 187 Miss. 489, 507, 193 So. 339. And we have consistently held that the protest before the executive committee must show specifically, and not by generalities, what wrong or wrongs or illegalities the contestant complains of, and that thereby a wrong was done him in declaring his opponent the party nominee. See for instance, Hickman v. Switzer, 186 Miss. 720, 191 So. 486. 202 Miss. at 773, 32 So.2d at 685. ¶ 42. This Court has expressly defined the guidelines for a contestant when appealing an executive committee determination to a special judicial tribunal and in Harris, we opined that while a petition may not assign additional causes of action, it may be both amendatory, as to the original causes of action and grounds for relief, and supplementary, as to all those material facts which happened during and since the hearing before the executive committee. 193 So. at 343. In Harris, we cited directly from precedent and stated that [w]hen the main facts are set out in the original pleading, and an amendment is made which merely elaborates upon those facts and sets forth additional incidental facts not changing the original picture presented, although those incidental facts may be necessary, in point of strict law, to the statement of a good cause of action, the amendment introduces no new cause. Id. at 344 (citing Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Wales, 177 Miss. 875, 889, 171 So. 536, 539 (1937)). ¶ 43. In this case, Gnemi originally alleged in his written petition to the HCDEC that there were fundamental problems with the conduct of the primary election. Moreover, his original petition of August 25 not only placed the issue of ballot box security in violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-911(1) squarely before the HCDEC, it also contested the election officials' failure to count approximately five absentee ballots which Gnemi claimed were valid. Furthermore, Gnemi complained of Roy Anderson's third party candidacy in the Holmes County, District 3 primary, asserting that he did not maintain residency there, and he likewise alleged that the HCDEC's cancellation of the second primary election, where Gnemi apparently prevailed, was invalid. ¶ 44. Tracking these initial complaints, Gnemi's circuit court petition for judicial review asserts the same fundamental causes of action. Moreover, Gnemi includes claims for ballot box irregularity, failure to count valid absentee ballots, improper cancellation of the second primary election held on August 26, 2003, and Roy Anderson's alleged non-residency in District 3. The only additional claims arise out of the same fact issues asserted in his petition to the HCDEC. Furthermore, the only additional facts included by Gnemi in his petition for judicial review were those regarding alleged election-day irregularities at the polls-an issue discarded by the special tribunal. ¶ 45. The dispositive issue in this case concerning control of the ballot boxes and their contents was asserted in both the HCDEC petition and the circuit court petition for judicial review, and, as such, was well within the scope of Judge Smith's review of the actions of the HCDEC. This issue is thus without merit. ¶ 46. In sum, we find that Gnemi's petition filed with the HCDEC did not have to be sworn and was otherwise in proper form; that Gnemi's petition for judicial review filed with the circuit court was properly sworn; that there were attached to Gnemi's petition for judicial review the certificates of two disinterested attorneys, in proper form; that Gnemi's petition for judicial review was accompanied with a proper cost bond; and, that Gnemi's pleadings via the petition for judicial review were more than sufficient to maintain his action before the special tribunal. Thus, for these reasons, we find that the special tribunal had jurisdiction to consider Gnemi's properly filed circuit court petition for judicial review; therefore, Issue I is without merit.