Opinion ID: 2310654
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Brady Claims

Text: Both appellants contend that the government, in numerous respects, violated its obligations under Brady v. Maryland, supra note 1, to disclose material exculpatory evidence in time for the defense to make effective use of it at trial. Appellants argue, in particular, that they were unfairly prejudiced by the failure of the government to disclose (1) that Mr. Mayfield, not Mr. Stone, was the actual owner of the murder weapon; (2) that Mr. Nicholes and Mr. Wheeler also had possession of the murder weapon around the time of the murder; (3) that in 1995, as part of a plea agreement in an unrelated case, Ronald Nicholes had pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to the murder of Carlos Kemper; and (4) that the 911 tape from the night of the murder indicated that the suspected shooters had fled from the scene in a brown car. Under Brady and its progeny, a defendant's right to due process is violated if the government withholds evidence that is material either to guilt or to punishment. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194; see, e.g., James v. United States, 580 A.2d 636, 644 (D.C.1990) (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)). The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); accord, James, 580 A.2d at 644 (citing Bagley ). It is also well settled that the prosecution must disclose exculpatory material `at such a time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case. . . .' Edelen v. United States, 627 A.2d 968, 970 (D.C.1993) (citation omitted); accord, Sterling, 691 A.2d at 134. Nevertheless, even if Brady evidence has not been timely disclosed (or has not been disclosed at all), reversal is warranted only where there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Edelen, 627 A.2d at 971 (citations omitted). In this case defense counsel apparently learned for the first time during Rufus Mayfield's direct testimony that the weapon used to kill Carlos Kemper had previously been in the possession of Mayfield and Wheeler. Stone's counsel argued that if she had known this fact earlier, she would have spent or my investigator would have spent a considerable amount of time putting that gun in his hand for a lot longer period than he is now willing to admit.... [T]hat's why it's Brady.  The only relief that counsel requested, however, was that the court order the government to disclose what additional evidence it has in its possession regarding ownership of that weapon by Mr. Mayfield. After hearing from the government, the trial court apparently concluded that even if the evidence should have been disclosed under Brady, it would not have materially affected the verdict. [8] Although defense counsel's pretrial preparation might have been different if they had known of the weapon's true owner and the subsequent exchanges, we agree with the trial court that the result of the proceeding would have been the same. On cross-examination Mayfield testified that the gun that killed Carlos Kemper was in his possession after the murder and was the same gun that he gave to Nicholes. In addition, both defense attorneys impeached Mr. Mayfield with his grand jury testimony, and Mayfield admitted that he had not told the grand jury that the gun Stone used to kill Kemper was his own. In fact, Boone's counsel read an excerpt from the grand jury proceedings into the record in which Mayfield had testified that the gun that Stone had in his possession on the night of the murder was Stone's own gun. Confronted with this testimony, Mayfield acknowledged that he had deliberately misled the grand jury. Likewise, both Nicholes and Wheeler testified that they had each come into possession of the weapon after the murder. [9] While it might have been prudent for the trial judge to grant a brief respite in the trial (had either counsel asked for one) in order to permit counsel to absorb the new information and to make strategic readjustments, the record reveals no prejudice resulting from the court's failure to do so. See Edelen, 627 A.2d at 972 (trial court has wide latitude in deciding whether to grant or deny a continuance); Martin v. United States, 606 A.2d 120, 132 (D.C. 1991) (same); O'Connor v. United States, 399 A.2d 21, 28 (D.C.1979) (same). Both defense attorneys effectively used the new information to impeach the government's witnesses and to weaken the government's case. As a result of excellent work by each attorney, the jury learned the critical facts, namely, that the gun used to kill Carlos Kemper was actually Mayfield's gun, and that after the murder the gun was traded to Nicholes. As Stone correctly notes in his brief, the government's case consisted almost entirely of testimony from self-proclaimed felons, drug dealers, and government snitches; nevertheless, the jury chose to believe those very witnesses. Accordingly, we are satisfied that the result of the trial would not have been different even if Mayfield's connection with the gun had been disclosed before he testified. For many of the same reasons, appellants' other assertions of Brady violations are without merit. On the fourth day of trial, defense counsel made a preliminary Brady request for the radio run on the night of the shooting. It appears that two or three people reported the shooting to the police, and one of them made reference to a brown getaway car. When this fact came out, Boone's counsel complained, This was the first time that we heard this. As a matter of fact, the car that supposedly the shooters got away in was a blue car, and we think Brady requires us to have the names of the people who called that in. . . . After reviewing the 911 tape, the prosecutor agreed that there was a reference to a brown car, but it had no relationship to the shooting, and the individual who called it in didn't leave a name, didn't leave an address, and didn't leave any information. In response to the court's questioning, the prosecutor stated that she was satisfied that the tape did not contain any Brady material. The court then said: No doubt, if you had the information, you would have tried to use it, but that isn't the standard of Brady. Brady says that you have to have  for it to be discoverable, producible, information that suggests even exculpation, and the reference on the radio run is not that the car contained the people who committed the offense. At most, the car is the same car seen leaving the scene of the area where the shooting took place, but nobody says in it were the perpetrators and, therefore, since it's brown and these guys left in a blue car, they didn't commit this offense. It's not that strong.... To the extent that there has not been any Brady demand for further information resulting from a review of the audio tape, your request is denied. I just don't have a sufficient factual predicate to request further investigation by the government. It is clear that the radio broadcast did not contain exculpatory information material to either appellant's guilt or punishment. On the contrary, the statements on the tape were vague and unlikely to have a significant effect on the result of the trial. At most, the tape indicates that after the shooting a number of people called to report the incident and that those who were in the area fled after hearing gunshots. We find it doubtful that the tape would have had much utility, if any, if the defense had had access to it before trial. Even on appeal, appellants offer no specific argument to show how the fact that a brown car was seen leaving the area of the murder was itself exculpatory. They merely rely on the notion that the failure of the prosecutor to disclose this information was wrong [and] that the error was detrimental to the defense. That is not enough to persuade us that a different result was reasonably probable. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 441, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995); Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Farley v. United States, 694 A.2d 887, 889 (D.C. 1997) (citing Kyles and Bagley ). Appellants also contend that the government failed to disclose in a timely manner that, as part of a 1995 plea agreement involving numerous narcotic charges, Mr. Nicholes pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to the second-degree murder of Carlos Kemper. Boone maintains, in addition, that the government failed to make timely disclosure of the actual transcript of Nicholes' plea hearing. As to the plea agreement itself, the government recognized that it had an obligation to disclose this information to defense counsel and did so several days before Nicholes was subject to cross-examination. Appellants admit that they were aware that Nicholes had pleaded guilty to Kemper's murder, but not until we had the Jencks material during the trial. Their Brady argument is simply that the Nicholes plea agreement could have been used more effectively ... if disclosed pretrial. This court has rejected any notion that disclosure in accordance with the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1994), satisfies the prosecutor's duty of seasonable disclosure under Brady, or even that if such disclosure is made, the burden may then be shifted to the defendant, under pain of waiver, to request a continuance or similar remedy. See Edelen, 627 A.2d at 970; James, 580 A.2d at 643-644. In the present case, however, even if we assume for the sake of argument that the government mischaracterized Nicholes' plea agreement as Jencks material and was in fact obliged under Brady to provide it in advance of trial, reversal based on its failure to do so would be warranted only if there were a reasonable probability that, had the disclosure been made earlier, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Catlett v. United States, 545 A.2d 1202, 1217 (D.C.1988) (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017, 109 S.Ct. 813, 102 L.Ed.2d 803 (1989). Both defense attorneys cross-examined Mr. Nicholes and impeached him with the plea agreement. It is difficult to imagine what additional use they could have made of it if it had been provided to them earlier. Moreover, this case does not appear to have been a close one. The prosecution's case at trial was presented through the testimony of six civilian witnesses and four police officers, as well as physical evidence and exhibits. The defense put on three witnesses who gave contrary accounts of the shooting. The physical and testimonial evidence was strong, and it does not appear to us that the jury's verdict depended to any significant extent on the credibility of Mr. Nicholes. We hold, accordingly, that appellants have failed to show how disclosure of this information before trial would have made a different result probable. See Edelen, 627 A.2d at 971 (no Brady violation when defendant could not demonstrate how earlier disclosure would have affected the outcome of the trial); Frezzell v. United States, 380 A.2d 1382, 1385 (D.C.1977) (in light of overwhelming testimonial evidence, court was unable to conclude that any exculpatory description of a witness who gave a name and address that could not be traced would have created reasonable doubt as to guilt). As for the transcript of Mr. Nicholes' plea hearing, the standard for determining materiality, as Bagley makes clear, is the same whether or not the evidence at issue was specifically requested. See 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375. In this case, since neither appellant apparently was aware of the transcript and thus did not request it, the ultimate question, again, is whether the transcript was material to the outcome of the trial. Id. The portion of the transcript read into the record in no way exculpates either appellant, nor does the transcript contain any additional information that was not elicited during either the direct or the cross-examination of Mr. Nicholes. Thus appellants have again failed to show how disclosure of this information before trial would have made a different result reasonably probable. [10] For the foregoing reasons, we find no basis for reversal in any asserted violation of the principles of Brady v. Maryland .