Opinion ID: 63384
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Official-Capacity Claims Against Stalder

Text: Fairley asserts claims against Stalder in his official capacity for both damages and injunctive relief.
We begin an analysis of Fairley’s claim against Stalder in his official capacity for damages under § 1983 by quoting long and clearly established Supreme Court precedent on the matter: “[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”11 As § 1983 only provides a remedy against a “person,” the dismissal of Fairley’s § 1983 claims was indisputably proper. The claims asserted against Stalder in federal court on state law grounds12 for money damages, although not barred by Will v. Michigan Department of State Police,13 must still overcome Louisiana’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.14 Fairley asserts five theories for his conclusion that this immunity is overcome: (1) Louisiana has waived its sovereign immunity by 10 Humana Health Plan of Tex., 336 F.3d at 379. 11 Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (barring suits for money damages under § 1983 against states and state officials in their official capacity). 12 Fairley claims that the alleged federal constitutional torts were also “practiced intentionally, with malice, and/or with reckless disregard for and/or with deliberate indifference to plaintiffs’ federally protected rights, as well as plaintiffs’ rights under State law.” 13 491 U.S. at 71. The state law claims are not barred by Will because they are not brought under § 1983. 14 See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1974) (barring suits against states and state officials in their official capacity for damages without mention of the state or federal nature of the claims); Hughes v. Savell, 902 F.2d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 1990). 6 No. 07-30589 litigating other Hurricane Katrina-related suits in federal court as a plaintiff; (2) Louisiana has constructively waived its sovereign immunity by participating in various federal programs; (3) Louisiana has waived its sovereign immunity by statute and constitutional provision; (4) Congress abrogated Louisiana’s sovereign immunity as to the issues in the case, namely, flood control, hurricane protection, prison reform, and disaster preparation and response; and (5) the federal judiciary has “badly misconstrued” the Eleventh Amendment or it “does not apply under the facts and circumstances of this case.” As to the final “theory,” whatever its merit, we are unable to act on it as “only the Supreme Court may overrule a Supreme Court decision.”15 And, as we show below, Supreme Court precedents clearly speak to each of Fairley’s contentions. The first theory fails when analyzed as a litigation-conduct waiver.16 There is an interesting argument to be made that invocations of federal jurisdiction in related suits waive sovereign immunity as to other suits. This 15 Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 280 (5th Cir. 2004). 16 See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 619 (2002) (“[A] State’s voluntary appearance in federal court . . . [is] a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity.” (emphasis added)); see also id. (“[A] State waives any immunity respecting the adjudication of a ‘claim’ that it voluntarily files in federal court.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gunter v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906) (“[W]here a state voluntarily becomes a party to a cause, and submits its rights for judicial determination, it . . . cannot escape the result of its own voluntary act by invoking the prohibitions of the Eleventh Amendment.” (emphasis added)); cf. College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675 (“[O]ur test for determining whether a State has waived its immunity from federal-court jurisdiction is a stringent one.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Clearly, if invocations of a federal court’s jurisdiction in one instance waived a state’s sovereign immunity for all other suits, the exception would swallow the rule and the test for waiver would hardly be “stringent.” Fairley’s citation to Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883), is inapposite, as Louisiana has not intervened in the instant suit. If, for example, Louisiana should intervene in a case and assert a claim against the plaintiffs, but simultaneously assert a defense of sovereign immunity against claims brought against it, a very different case, under Clark and Lapides, would be present. Further, if this case were consolidated with a case in which Louisiana were a plaintiff, perhaps a different case would be present before us. Whether Lapides goes much further than Clark is a question on which we do not pass today. 7 No. 07-30589 argument emerges from language in Lapides v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in which the Supreme Court distinguished litigation-conduct waivers from other kinds of (repudiated) constructive waivers.17 There the Court said: [A]n interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment that finds waiver in the litigation context rests upon the Amendment’s presumed recognition of the judicial need to avoid inconsistency, anomaly, and unfairness, and not upon a State’s actual preference or desire, which might, after all, favor selective use of ‘immunity’ to achieve litigation advantages.18 Fairley, however, has made no effort to link other pending Katrina litigation to this case in a way that would highlight potential “inconsistency, anomaly, and unfairness.” He asserts that this litigation and the Louisiana v. United States19 cases arise out of the “same transactions and occurrences” and are “logically related” to this case because they all relate to the failures of levees and retaining walls after Hurricane Katrina. Additionally, he contends that the evidence in these cases will be the same as in the instant litigation. These observations, without more particularized development to demonstrate the potential for “inconsistency, anomaly, and unfairness” (particularly anomaly, which we do not, without more, see here), or without an elaboration of why the cases arise out of the “same transactions and occurrences,” are woefully insufficient to trump Louisiana’s sovereign immunity. The second theory, constructive waiver, is similarly meritless. Even if constructive waiver arguments remain viable,20 a waiver of this type may be 17 535 U.S. at 620. 18 Id. 19 E.g., Louisiana v. United States, No. 2:07-cv-05040 (E.D. La. filed Aug. 29, 2007). 20 See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (“Constructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the surrender of constitutional rights and we see no place for it here.”). 8 No. 07-30589 found only when a congressional desire to make states liable is found in the “unmistakable language in the statute itself.”21 That not being the case here (or, counsel not having invited our attention to any such statutory language), discovery is unnecessary and dismissal is appropriate.22 The third waiver argument advanced by Fairley turns on the contention that Louisiana has waived sovereign immunity expressly by constitutional provision and statute. Under the Supreme Court’s rubric, however, an express waiver may be found only when a provision expresses “the State’s intention to subject itself to suit in federal court.”23 There is no express consent to suit in federal court in section 10, article XII of the Louisiana Constitution or Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:2798.1, the provisions cited by Fairley. Further, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 13:5106(A) provides: “No suit against the state or a state agency or political subdivision shall be 21 Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985). In fact, it is now more difficult for Congress to comply with this requirement from Atascadero after Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996), which ended the Court’s experimentation with abrogation through pre-Eleventh Amendment congressional powers. 22 Fairley does not make clear in his briefs whether he is arguing that a constructive waiver has arisen because of participation in the programs or because of an actual agreement between Louisiana and the United States. In a late filing with this court, devoid of argument or specific citations, Fairley’s counsel provided a copy of an article by Gil Seinfeld, Waiver-inLitigation: Eleventh Amendment Immunity and the Voluntariness Question, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 871 (2002). Perhaps the only basis of support in it for Fairley’s request for discovery is the case Innes v. Kansas State University (In re Innes), 184 F.3d 1275 (10th Cir. 1999). There, the Tenth Circuit found a waiver of sovereign immunity in a contract between Kansas State University and the United States. We question the reasoning of the court in that case, particularly as Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004), addressed the same situation with different, and broader, reasoning. See Susan E. Hauser, Necessary Fictions: Bankruptcy Jurisdiction After Hood and Katz, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1181, 1202-09 (2008). Nevertheless, it is important to note that even Innes appears to recognize the necessity of a specific statutory or constitutional authorization for state officials to waive sovereign immunity by contract. See Innes, 184 F.3d at 1280 (“[T]hese cases . . . firmly establish that a state agent acting with proper authorization can effectuate a waiver . . . .” (emphasis added)). Fairley has not brought to our attention any authorization to enter into an agreement that waives immunity. 23 Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241 (emphasis in original). 9 No. 07-30589 instituted in any court other than a Louisiana state court.” These are the reasons that we have unequivocally stated, on numerous occasions, that Louisiana has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity in this manner.24 Finally, the contention that Congress has abrogated Louisiana’s immunity in the areas of flood control, hurricane protection, prison reform, and disaster preparation and response is feckless. Undoubtedly, Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity,25 but only pursuant to a post-Eleventh Amendment grant of congressional power and then only through an unequivocal expression of intent to exercise of that power.26 There are no allegations that flood control, hurricane protection, and disaster preparation and response statutes were enacted by Congress pursuant to a post-Eleventh Amendment power or that Congress attempted to abrogate, unequivocally or otherwise, state sovereign immunity from suit in these areas. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs request discovery on these matters. As a statute “must contain an unequivocal statement of congressional intent to abrogate,”27 however, discovery is unwarranted here and dismissal is appropriate.
24 E.g., Delahoussaye v. City of New Iberia, 937 F.2d 144, 147 (5th Cir. 1991). 25 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996). 26 See id. at 55, 65, 72. 27 Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 272, 277 (5th Cir. 2005). 10 No. 07-30589 Injunctive relief against Stalder is also unwarranted.28 Ex Parte Young does permit suits against state officials to force compliance with the Constitution and federal law,29 but Stalder is not the proper party from whom to obtain relief from harms Fairley may have suffered (or may fear suffering) in OPCSO facilities. We find instructive district courts opinions that describe in some detail the Louisiana framework governing parish penal facilities. In Galo v. Blanco, for example, the court dismissed claims against Stalder, Governor Blanco, and Mayor Nagin because “there is no legal basis for holding [the defendants] liable for the conditions of plaintiff’s confinement within the Orleans Parish Prison system.”30 We have examined Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 15:702, 15:704, 33:1435, and 33:4715, and we agree that day-to-day operation of the parish prison is the responsibility of the local sheriff, and that financing and maintenance are the responsibility of the local governing authority. Our analysis of sections 15:826 and 15:827, which establish the services and duties of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, and section 15:823, which establishes the duties of the Director of Corrections, further supports this view. Accordingly, Stalder is not in a position to provide the requested relief.31 28 The claims of former inmates for injunctive relief are moot. See Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 2001); Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock County, Tex., 929 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir. 1991); Beck v. Lynaugh, 842 F.2d 759, 762 (5th Cir. 1988). As some of the named plaintiffs may still be incarcerated, although whether or not that is so is hard to tell from Fairley’s briefing, we nevertheless explain why the claims would fail even if they were not moot. 29 209 U.S. 123, 155-56, 166-67 (1908). 30 No. Civ.A. 06-4290, 2006 WL 2860851, at  (E.D. La. Oct. 4, 2006); Broussard v. Foti, No. Civ.A. 00-2318, 2001 WL 258055, at -2 (E.D. La. Mar. 14, 2001). 31 See Broussard, 2001 WL 258055, at -2; see also O’Quinn v. Manuel, 773 F.2d 605, 609 (5th Cir. 1985) (“The administration of the jails is the province of the sheriff.”); Howard v. Fortenberry, 723 F.2d 1206, 1212-13 (5th Cir. 1984), vacated in part, 728 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1984) (noting the absence of a duty for the Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections to supervise local prison officials). It is questionable whether anyone can be ordered to implement some of Fairley’s requests. For example, it is doubtful that a 11 No. 07-30589