Opinion ID: 2253638
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Meaning of Penal Code, Section 1377, Subdivision (g)

Text: The statutory language of Penal Code section 1377, subdivision (g) contains an ambiguity as it applies to the instant case. A plain reading of Penal Code section 1377, subdivision(g) indicates that the statute prohibits a civil compromise where the offense is committed [u]pon a child, as described in Section 647.6 or 11165.6. (Italics added.) The subdivision's use of the term as described followed by specifically enumerated statutes creates the ambiguity, especially in light of the fact that another subdivision of the same statute uses the term in violation of also followed by specifically enumerated statutes. For instance, subdivision (f) of Penal Code section 1377 prohibits a civil compromise where the offense is committed [u]pon an elder, in violation of Section 368 of this code or Section 15656 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. (Italics added.)] Therefore, in contrast to the language in Penal Code section 1377, subdivision (g), subdivision (f) makes clear, by using the term in violation of, that a civil compromise is only prohibited for two specifically named offenses committed upon an elder. As a result, under subdivision (f)'s plain meaning, all offenses committed against elders are not categorically excluded from being civilly compromised. On the other hand, Penal Code section 1377, subdivision (g), by using the term as described, is unclear, by itself, without reference to the two specifically named statutes. As a result, we must now refer to Penal Code section 647.6 and 11165.6 to determine the meaning of section 1377, subdivision (g). Penal Code section 647.6 is a misdemeanor criminal offense prohibiting annoying or molesting a child. Penal Code section 11165.6 is not a criminal offense, in itself, but it defines the types of child abuse or neglect that triggers the reporting requirements under the 1987 Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (Pen. Code, § 11164 et seq.). Neither statute offers a specific definition of the term child. As a result, the only reasonable interpretation of subdivision (g) of Penal Code section 1377 is that the Legislature intended to prohibit a civil compromise where the offense was committed against a child in the circumstances as described in Penal Code sections 647.6 and 11165.6. Therefore, contrary to The People's initial arguments before the trial court, a civil compromise is not categorically prohibited in all cases where the victim is a child. Moreover, since Penal Code section 11165.6 is not a chargeable offense and only defines child abuse and child neglect, we find no requirement that a defendant be specifically charged with a crime of child sexual abuse, child abuse, or child neglect. A court will normally presume that when the Legislature uses different words in the same connection in different parts of a statute that a different meaning was intended. ( Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 210 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 548, 973 P.2d 527], citing Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1117 [81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 969 P.2d 564].) The fact that the Legislature used the term as described in in Penal Code section 1377, subdivision (g), when it used in violation of in subdivision (f) clearly indicates that the Legislature intended a different meaning. The use of the term as described in Section 647.6 or 11165.6 in section 1377, subdivision (g) must mean that the underlying facts of the crime need only comport with the offense being describable by either Penal Code section 647.6 or 11165.6. Consequently, the issue of whether the conduct is describable by either section 647.6 or 11165.6 requires a hearing to permit inquiry into the underlying facts of the crime for which the civil compromise is sought. A court may examine the underlying facts of the charged offense to determine whether a civil compromise is precluded by statute. ( People v. Moulton (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d Supp. 10 [182 Cal. Rptr. 761]) In Moulton, the Appellate Department of the Los Angeles County Superior Court [3] reversed the trial court's decision to permit a civil compromise and dismissal of the criminal action in which the defendant had been charged with the offense of grand theft. Though the offense was a wobbler offense punishable as either a felony or a misdemeanor, the prosecution elected to file the matter as a misdemeanor. The prosecution objected to the compromise, arguing that the offense could not qualify for a civil compromise because, as a wobbler, the offense necessarily carried an intent to commit a felony, a specific prohibition to civil compromise under Penal Code section 1377, subdivision (c). The trial court rejected this argument and any attempt by the prosecution to present facts to prove that the offense was committed with felonious intent and stated: `. . . where they [the People] have filed the case as a misdemeanor, they have by their action taken out of the case the question of whether it was done with felonious intent.' ( People v. Moulton, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d Supp. at p. 16, 182 Cal.Rptr. 761.) The appellate department reversed and concluded that the prosecutor's decision to file a charge as a misdemeanor has little if any relationship to the question of whether defendant in the commission of a crime intended `to commit a felony.' ( People v. Moulton, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d Supp. at p. 17, 182 Cal.Rptr. 761.) In reversing, the court further stated that the issue of whether defendant had such intention is a factual one to be resolved at a hearing in which both the People and the defendant have a right to present evidence. Thus, in the present case, the trial judge's refusal to permit inquiry into `the underlying facts' foreclosed such a hearing and was error. ( Id. at p. Supp. 17, 182 Cal.Rptr. 761.) If it is necessary to consider the underlying facts of the offense to determine whether the offense was committed with felonious intent, regardless of the actual charges, it is equally logical to permit an inquiry into the underlying facts of the offense to determine whether the offense involved child sexual molestation, child abuse, or neglect of a child, regardless of the offense actually charged in the complaint. Consequently, we hold that Penal Code section 1377, subdivision (g)'s prohibition of civil compromises where the crime was committed upon a child applies only to offenses that meet the description of any conduct listed in Penal Code sections 647.6 and 11165.6. The issue of whether the charged crime falls within the conduct described by sections 647.6 and 11165.6 is a factual one to be resolved at a hearing. In the instant case, the hearing that took place was insufficient to determine whether Respondent's offense fell within any of the conduct described by Penal Code sections 647.6 and 11165.6. In the absence of a hearing, or stipulation in substitute thereof, the record is inadequate to determine whether Respondent's charged crime fell within the conduct described by section 647.6 or section 11165.6. Therefore, we reverse the order granting the civil compromise and dismissing case and remand the matter for the trial court to conduct a hearing consistent with this opinion.