Opinion ID: 610567
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: 2 In July of 1988, an OSHA compliance officer inspected a worksite where respondent Contractors Welding of Western New York, Inc. (Contractors) was repairing the Ferry Street Bridge, a metal drawbridge, in Buffalo, New York. The compliance officer observed two welders standing on the edge of an abutment, working above water on an understructure of the drawbridge. Since the water was fifteen to twenty feet deep and the welders were wearing heavy clothes and boots, the compliance officer considered that the workmen were at risk of drowning for lack of appropriate safety gear. Because the welders were not wearing life vests and the compliance officer reported that other floatation devices such as ring buoys were not readily available at the worksite, the Secretary issued a citation alleging violations of OSHA safety standards. Item One of the citation charged Contractors with violating 29 C.F.R. § 1926.106(a) (1992), which requires that [e]mployees working over or near water, where the danger of drowning exists, shall be provided with U.S. Coast Guard-approved life jacket or buoyant work vests. Item Two charged Contractors with violating 29 C.F.R. § 1926.106(c), which requires that [r]ing buoys with at least 90 feet of line shall be provided and readily available for emergency rescue operations. Item Three charged Contractors with violating 29 C.F.R. § 1926.106(d), which requires that [a]t least one life-saving skiff shall be immediately available at locations where employees are working over or adjacent to water. The Secretary proposed a penalty of $480 for each violation. 3 Contractors challenged the citation and the proposed penalties, and a hearing was held before an ALJ appointed by the Commission. Contractors argued, inter alia, that sections 1926.106(a) and (c) did not apply because the employees observed by the compliance officer were wearing life belts with lanyards attached to the bridge structure. In a decision dated February 2, 1990, the ALJ found violations of 29 C.F.R. §§ 1926.106(a), (c) and (d) and imposed a penalty of $480 for each violation. 4 The Commission directed a review of so much of the ALJ's decision as found violations of sections 1926.106(a) and (c). The review was directed pursuant to section 12(j) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (the Act), 29 U.S.C. § 661(j) (1988), which provides that the report of the ALJ becomes the final order of the Commission within thirty days after such report ... unless within such period any Commission member has directed that such report shall be reviewed by the Commission. 5 In a decision dated September 6, 1991, the Commission vacated the portion of the ALJ's decision that found a violation of section 1926.106(a) (the life vest requirement) and affirmed the portion of the ALJ's decision that found a violation of § 1926.106(c) (the ring buoy requirement). See Secretary of Labor v. Contractors Welding of W.N.Y., Inc., 15 OSHC (BNA) 1249 (Sept. 6, 1991). In vacating the finding of the section 1926.106(a) violation, the Commission examined and rejected the Secretary's interpretation of the regulation. Section 1926.106(a) provides: Employees working over or near water, where the danger of drowning exists, shall be provided with U.S. Coast Guard-approved life jacket[s] or buoyant work vests. (emphasis supplied). The Secretary did not dispute that Contractors had the life vests available at the worksite; however, the Secretary interpreted the safety standard as requiring that the vests be used rather than just made available. The Commission found that the Secretary's interpretation of the regulation was unreasonable and that the regulation's requirement that life vests be provided did not mean that they must be worn at all times. The Commission found that the term provide was not ambiguous and that its plain meaning should be applied--shall be provided should be read as requiring only that life vests be furnished or made available. See 15 OSHC (BNA) at 1250-51. 6 On October 31, 1991, the Secretary and Contractors petitioned this Court, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 660, for review of the Commission's order. While the petition was pending before us, the parties agreed to a settlement of citation Items One and Two (the life vest and ring buoy violations), conditioned upon vacatur of the Commission's September 1991 order. 1 As part of the settlement agreement, the Secretary stipulated that the two employees observed working on the bridge structure from the edge of the abutment were wearing safety belts with lanyards attached to the bridge structure. The parties agreed that the use of safety belts and lanyards by the employees rendered the regulations provided for in 29 C.F.R. §§ 1926.106(a) and (c) inapplicable on the record of this case. Because the life vest and ring buoy regulations were inapplicable based upon the stipulated facts, the settlement agreement provided that the Secretary would withdraw the citation with respect to the violations of those safety standards upon execution of the agreement. 7 The parties discussed their settlement agreement, including vacatur of the Commission's decision, in a pre-argument conference with staff counsel for the Second Circuit. Staff counsel advised the parties to follow the approach outlined in Nestle Co. v. Chester's Market, Inc., 756 F.2d 280 (2d Cir.1985). In accordance with Nestle, the parties agreed to present their settlement agreement initially to the Commission for approval. The parties filed a joint stipulation withdrawing the appeal, subject to reinstatement within fifteen days after the Commission refused to vacate, or by March 17, 1992, whichever date was earlier. 8 On March 3, 1992, the parties filed with the Commission a joint motion to approve their settlement and to vacate the Commission's September 1991 order. The parties included a citation to the Nestle decision to support their decision to bring the motion initially before the Commission rather than before this Court. In an order dated March 10, 1992, the Commission construed the motion solely as one for reconsideration of a final order and concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion because the joint stipulation withdrawing the appeal did not contain any language directing the Commission to reconsider its decision or remanding the case to the Commission for that purpose. Secretary of Labor v. Contractors Welding of W.N.Y., Inc., OSHRC Docket No. 88-1847, at 1-2 (Mar. 10, 1992). In the absence of such a directive, the Commission found Nestle to be inapplicable: The Nestle decision ... is distinguishable because the court in that case had issued an order remanding the matter to the district court expressly to allow the district court to consider the parties' motion to set aside its decision. Id. at 2. In addition, the Commission noted that while Nestle applied F[ed].R.Civ.P. 60(b) as grounds for vacating the lower court's decision, the Secretary in two cases pending before us has taken the position that Rule 60(b) does not confer jurisdiction on the Commission to reconsider a final order. Id. The Commission deferred its ruling until the jurisdictional issue was properly briefed and fully examined. Id. 9 On March 17, 1992, the Secretary reinstated the appeal pursuant to the terms of the stipulation of withdrawal. The Secretary and Contractors then filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss Appeal and to Remand Case to Commission with Instructions to Vacate. In an order filed on May 19, 1992, we granted the parties' joint motion and ordered that the case be remanded for further proceedings before the Commission in accordance with the parties' settlement agreement. Our mandate was issued on May 21, 1992. 10 In a decision dated August 6, 1992, the Commission vacated the part of its prior decision that had affirmed the finding of a violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.106(c). In the same decision, the Commission amended the part of its prior decision that had vacated the finding of a violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.106(a). In the amendment, the Commission noted that the citation was withdrawn as to this violation and that the part of the decision vacating the finding therefore was moot. The Commission stated: While the decision on the 1926.106(a) item is now moot, we believe that the analysis of the issue presented is correct.... [W]e conclude that our decision still constitutes valid precedent and may be relied on in future arguments to the Commission. Secretary of Labor v. Contractors Welding of W.N.Y., Inc., 15 OSHC (BNA) 1874, 1876 (Aug. 6, 1992). 11 The Secretary has petitioned for enforcement of our May 19, 1992 mandate remanding for further proceedings in accordance with the parties' settlement agreement. He asks that we order the Commission to vacate its September 1991 decision for all purposes, thereby eliminating any precedential effect of the decision. We have jurisdiction to review and correct a decision of the Commission under section 11(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(b), which permits the Secretary to obtain review in this Court of any final order of the Commission concerning alleged violations of the Act and regulations committed in this Circuit.