Opinion ID: 2975640
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutionality Of Search

Text: The Fourth Amendment states in relevant part, “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), provides the standard two-part test governing Fourth Amendment search violations. Specifically, (1)whether the individual has manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search; and (2) whether society is willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable. Widgren v. Maple Grove Township, 429 F.3d 575, 578 (6th Cir. 2005). The Sixth Circuit in Widgren further delineates the second prong of the Katz test. The second prong consists of two considerations. The first consideration is “what a person had an expectation of privacy in.” Id. The second consideration examines “what the person wanted to protect his privacy from.” Id. at 579. This requires an examination of the degree of government intrusion in (i) the methods used in the search, and (ii) the purpose for the search. Id. at 583. Based on the facts of this case, there was an unconstitutional search of Taylor’s home. Here, there is no disagreement as to whether Taylor manifested a subjective expectation of privacy. He most certainly did. It is with respect to the second prong of the Katz test, however, that I disagree with the panel. First, Taylor’s expectation of privacy in his home and the curtilage surrounding it satisfies the initial element of the second prong of the Katz test. Part one of the second prong of the Katz test looks at what Taylor had an expectation of privacy in. Widgren, 429 F.3d at 578. Principally, “[t]his inquiry centers on ‘whether the human relationships that normally exist at the place inspected are based on intimacy, confidentiality, trust or solitude and hence give rise to a “reasonable” expectation of privacy.’” Id. at 578-579 (citations omitted). Taylor’s expectation of privacy in his home and the curtilage surrounding his home satisfies this standard. Taylor’s home is a place where such intimate relationships exist and take place. Indeed, the Supreme Court accords special status to the sanctity of the home: The Fourth Amendment’s protection of the home has never been tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of information obtained. In Silverman, for example, we made clear that any physical invasion of the structure of the home, “by even a fraction of an inch,” was too much, 365 U.S. at 512, and there is certainly no exception to the warrant requirement for the officer who barely cracks open the front door and sees nothing but the non-intimate rug on the vestibule floor. In the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (emphasis in original). Therefore, Rose’s peering into the home, garage, and bedroom window, was peering into a place that the Court recognizes intimate No. 05-2732 Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Resources, et al. Page 8 relationships occur. Taylor’s expectation of privacy was accordingly valid, thus satisfying the first element of the second prong of the Katz test. Likewise, the second element of the second prong of the Katz test is also satisfied. In evaluating this element, our “inquiry focuses on the government intrusion at issue.” Widgren, 429 F.3d at 579. This requires assessing the degree of the government intrusion by “addressing both the methods used and the purpose for the intrusion.” Id. at 583. The methods used in this case were sufficiently intrusive to categorize the search as unconstitutional. This was more than a mere naked-eye inspection of the exterior of the house, as was the case in Widgren. Here, Rose did in fact touch and look into the house. See id. at 585 (noting that the property assessor “did not touch enter or look into the house.”). Furthermore, Rose obtained neither consent nor a warrant before breaching the curtilage of Taylor’s property. Id. (stating that “tax appraisers would be well advised to obtain consent or a warrant as a matter of course before breaching the curtilage because, in many instances, such an intrusion may be a Fourth Amendment search”); see also id. at 583 (stating “breaching the curtilage and other trespass, though not necessarily determinative, are also relevant to the degree of government intrusion.”). While it may be true that a passing policeman need not avert his eyes, here Rose walked up to various windows in Taylor’s garage and home, pressed his face and hands against these windows and peered inward; what this method lacks in subterfuge and advanced technology it makes up for in sheer flagrancy. “Like the methods used, the purpose for the interference bears upon the intrusiveness of government action.” Id. Neither party disputes the fact that Rose’s initial purpose was a lawful one. Rose was on the land investigating a complaint about the fencing on Taylor’s property. And while one might applaud Rose for his concern about a potential intruder on Taylor’s property, this purpose does not sanction Rose’s search. Noting that the property check was brief, involved a low degree of intrusion, and was conducted in the middle of the afternoon, the district court opines that Rose was not carrying out a criminal investigation, which would carry with it the imprimatur of “suspicion of crime.” Taylor v. Humphries, 402 F. Supp. 2d 840, 847 (W.D. Mich. 2005) (citations omitted). I disagree. Rose states that his concern was that an intruder might be on the premises, a concern that was heightened when he saw the curtains drawn, which led him to believe that a burglar might be present. The purpose of this search then became a criminal investigation. Rose was searching for evidence of a burglar; to wit, he checked all the doors to see if they were open, and he checked all the windows to see if anyone had broken in. The fact that Rose was searching for someone other than Taylor does not make it any less a search of Taylor’s home. Indeed, Rose might just as easily have come across a marijuana plant growing in Taylor’s bedroom (notably, at oral argument, counsel for DefendantAppellees was unable to offer an answer as to how such an encounter and subsequent arrest would not be an unconstitutional search).1 Given that, Rose’s argument amounts to “no harm done.” While the harm in terms of damages may in fact be small, it is no less an unconstitutional search. See, e.g., People v. Haddad, 122 Mich.App. 229, 230 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (affirming the trial court’s determination that an “officer had no right to peer through the [defendant’s ]bedroom window when [the officer ]only had a suspicion of an assault and battery and a mere suspicion as to the safety of a person who might have been present.”). 1 The exchange went as follows: I asked, “You agree, I think, that if the officer had happened to see, say, a marijuana plant growing inside the house when he looked in the window, that that evidence couldn’t be used to convict the homeowner of growing plants. So, if that’s the case, then why isn’t this a Fourth Amendment violations?” Counsel for Defendants-Appellees first noted the complexity of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and then answered, “I thought I might get asked a question like that from you, and I thought about it, and I thought about it, and I’m not sure what the answer is.” No. 05-2732 Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Resources, et al. Page 9
In addition to protecting Taylor’s home, the Fourth Amendment also extends its scope of protection to the immediately surrounding property, or curtilage. Specifically, “The protection afforded the curtilage is essentially a protection of families and personal privacy in an area intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically, where privacy expectations are most heightened.” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986). This protection, however, is not limitless. Id. (noting that police need not cover their eyes on public thoroughfares, nor to activities knowingly exposed to the public, nor when they observe from a public place). The property immediately surrounding Taylor’s home qualifies as curtilage under the Supreme Court’s four factor test, and is therefore entitled to Fourth Amendment protection. Defendants-Appellees claim that Rose did not intrude upon protected curtilage. The four factors used to determine whether an area is a home’s curtilage are: (1) the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, (2) whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, (3) the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and (4) the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by. Widgren, 429 F.3d at 582 (citations omitted). First, the property at issue immediately surrounds Taylor’s home. Indeed, the defendants-appellees do not contest the satisfaction of the first factor. Second, the property is also within an enclosure surrounding the home. While there might not be physical enclosures of this land, Taylor claims, that like the defendant in United States v. Depew, 8 F.3d 1424 (9th Cir. 1993), he chose the property because it was remote, in a secluded area, not visible from any highway due to a long driveway, and had thick trees blocking any public view of the residence. Additionally, Taylor’s property is entirely fenced-in on two sides with six foot chain link fencing, including the gate entrance with the “No Trespassing” signs. Collectively, this satisfies the notion of an enclosed property. Third, the nature of the use of the land was for Taylor’s enjoyment, as well as his entrance and exit from the land. This, too, satisfies the standards for curtilage. Lastly, we have already mentioned some of steps taken by Taylor to protect the area from observation, including his choice of a secluded locale away from the highway, the fencing placed on the property, as well as the no trespassing signs. All four factors are satisfied, thus qualifying that area as curtilage and requiring Fourth Amendment protection. (NB: The district court acknowledged that Rose “likely breached the curtilage of the home.” Taylor, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 847 n.7).
Given that Taylor had an expectation of privacy in his home and the surrounding curtilage, the next issue is whether a basis for the police action existed. First we consider the exigent circumstances exceptions to getting a warrant. The Sixth Circuit has held that: In general, exigent circumstances exist when real immediate and serious consequences would certainly occur if a police officer were to postpone action to get a warrant. The exigent circumstances exception relies on the premise that the existence of an emergency situation, demanding urgent police action, may excuse the failure to procure a search warrant. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has identified the emergency situations giving rise to the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement as (1) hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, (2) imminent destruction of evidence, (3) the need to prevent a suspect's escape, or (4) a risk of danger to the police or others. See United States v. McClain, 430 F.3d 299, 304 (6th Cir. 2005) Here, no exigent circumstances justify Rose’s warrantless search. No. 05-2732 Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Resources, et al. Page 10 In the first place, one can ask the ex ante question as to whether Rose had probable cause to get a warrant to search the house. Rose was within his rights to go to the house to attempt to contact the homeowner regarding his visit, but Rose’s stated purpose for going to the house was his suspicion about a burglar/trespasser. He saw tire tracks and footprints leading to the home. By themselves, these facts do not point in any particular direction. The tracks could just as well have belonged to the homeowner as to a trespasser. Similarly, with respect to the open curtains, they might just as well signal that the homeowner is at home, or might simply be an aesthetic choice. Still, Rose maintains that his years of experience taught him that burglars often leave curtains open in order to watch for oncoming homeowners. These circumstances do not rise to the level of exigent circumstances. There was no hot pursuit of a fleeing felon; there was no concern about imminent destruction of evidence; there was no need to prevent a suspect’s escape (indeed, there was no suspect!); and there was no risk of danger to police or others. While one could perhaps contend that fear of a burglar/trespasser might give rise to this last exception, the circumstances, and Rose’s behavior, both speak to the contrary. As discussed previously, tire tracks are ambiguous; they might merely have indicated that Taylor was on the property. They certainly are not clear harbingers of risk to the police or others. Similarly, Rose’s behavior on Taylor’s property did not indicate any danger, let alone risk of danger qualifying as exigent circumstances. Rose walked leisurely around the property, at times with both hands in his pockets. He never took out his weapon nor appeared concerned about any potential risk to his safety. Based on the facts then, Rose’s search was not justified by the exigent circumstances exception. Similarly, the “community caretaking” exception does not apply to the facts of this case. The district court categorized the purposes of Rose’s search as “community caretaking.” The Supreme Court, in Cady v. Dombrowksi, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973), describes community caretaking as those actions that are “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” While in Cady the Court held that a warrantless search of a vehicle’s trunk for a weapon following the arrest of a police officer for drunk driving was incidental to the police function to protect the “safety of the general public,” the Court’s conclusion that the search was constitutional was premised in part on the Court’s “prior recognition of the distinction between motor vehicles and dwelling places.” Id. at 447. Case law indicates that the community caretaking function articulated in Cady has been principally applied to the warrantless searches of automobiles. See United States v. Bute, 43 F.3d 531, 535 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement is applicable only in cases involving automobile searches); see also United States v. Erickson, 991 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the fact that a police officer is performing a community caretaking function, however, cannot itself justify a warrantless search of a private residence). The Sixth Circuit makes it clear that “the community care-taking function of the police applies only to actions that are totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497, 508 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). With that in mind, it is clear that Rose’s conduct does not fall within the sanctuary of community caretaking. First, Rose’s search of Taylor’s property was not an automobile search. Second, by Taylor’s own admission, he walked around and peered into Taylor’s home because he was worried about a potential burglar/trespasser. Therefore, the very nature of this search was centered upon, not divorced from, detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute. Therefore, it is inappropriate to apply the community caretaking exception to the facts of this case.