Opinion ID: 1356666
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The basis for review in this case.

Text: In summary, we have concluded that ORS 679.140 does not contravene any provision of the state or federal constitution. We have also concluded that when the section was amended to provide that unprofessional conduct was no longer limited to the expressly proscribed acts, the legislature did not mean that it had its own conception of what constitutes unprofessional conduct which the board was to divine in the form of interpretation, nor did it mean that existing standards of professional conduct were to be determined empirically by taking notice or evidence of prevailing views. Rather it authorized the board to expand the list of conduct deemed unprofessional for disciplinary purposes by rules, without the need to return for legislative amendments. A rule covering fraudulent business practices in the conduct of the professional practice would be within the reach of the statutory delegation, but the board made no such rule before proceeding against petitioner. The question is whether petitioner is now entitled to judicial relief. The proceeding that resulted in the revocation of petitioner's license was a contested case under the administrative procedure act, then ORS 183.310(2)(c), see supra note 10, and review is governed by ORS 183.482. The statute was in process of revision when the Court of Appeals decided this case. At that time, the relevant parts of ORS 183.482(8) directed the reviewing court to reverse or remand the order only if it found the order to be unlawful in substance or procedure, or if it found the statute, rule or order to be unconstitutional. Petitioner did not argue in the Court of Appeals whether the board's failure to adopt rules defining unprofessional conduct rendered its revocation of his license unlawful in substance or in procedure or both, so the court declined to decide that question. [23] The court limited itself to petitioner's constitutional claim, which it rejected. As amended, ORS 183.482 now provides with respect to the scope of judicial review: (7) Review of a contested case shall be confined to the record, the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to any issue of fact or agency discretion . . . The court shall remand the order for further agency action if it finds that either the fairness of the proceedings or the correctness of the action may have been impaired by a material error in procedure or a failure to follow prescribed procedure. (8)(a) The court may affirm, reverse or remand the order. If the court finds that the agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law and that a correct interpretation compels a particular action, it shall: (A) Set aside or modify the order; or (B) Remand the case to the agency for further action under a correct interpretation of the provision of law. (b) The court shall remand the order to the agency if it finds the agency's exercise of discretion to be: (A) Outside the range of discretion delegated to the agency by law: (B) Inconsistent with an agency rule, an officially stated agency position, or a prior agency practice, if the inconsistency is not explained by the agency; or (C) Otherwise in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision. (c) The court shall set aside or remand the order if it finds that the order is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Oregon Laws 1979, ch. 593, § 24. The new version separates a challenge based on material procedural error from a challenge based on misinterpretation or misapplication of the governing law. Under subsection (7), failure to follow prescribed procedure or to do so correctly requires a remand to the agency if the correctness of the action, or irrespective of this, if the fairness of the proceedings may have been impaired by the error. But this refers to procedure in the contested case, for the remand ordered by subsection (7) cannot cure a prior error in adopting a substantive rule if the order depends on such a previously adopted rule. [24] Petitioner does not complain of the procedure in the license revocation proceeding. Subsection (8) directs the parties and the court to distinguish between three kinds of claims. One is that a governing provision of law (not limited to statutes) requires the agency to take or to refrain from a particular action. The second is that the law assigns the agency a range of discretion, but that the challenged order transgresses limits imposed on this discretion by the range of the authorizing law, by other statutory or constitutional provisions, or by the agency's own rules or established prior policies. [25] The third is that the order is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. If error is found, the statute provides for reversal, modification, or remand as appropriate to the character of the error and the agency's further role in the matter; subsection (7) forbids the court to substitute its own judgment for that of the agency on issues of fact or agency discretion. The latter restraint on over enthusiastic judicial review is reinforced in a new section, ORS 183.486, enjoining the reviewing court to affirm the agency action unless one of the specified grounds of error can be identified. But the court is not confined within the formal limits of the petition. The court is to provide whatever relief is appropriate irrespective of the original form of the petition; it may decide the rights, privileges, obligations, requirements or procedures at issue between the parties, and it may order ancillary relief when necessary. [26] We conclude that petitioner is entitled to relief. His license has been revoked under a statutory standard of unprofessional conduct, that was broadened beyond its original list of specifications, which the statute means the board to particularize by rules. Although his original attack was couched in constitutional terms, its target was the same lack of comprehensible and channeling criteria that the rules are meant to provide. No such rule having been made to proscribe the kind of conduct charged against petitioner, there was no legal ground on which to revoke his license. The board erroneously interpreted a provision of law, namely ORS 679.140(1)(c) and (2), in believing that the standard could be applied ad hoc to facts not covered by a specification in subsection (2) or a rule adopted pursuant to ORS 679.250(7). The error could not be cured on a remand. Thus ORS 183.482(8)(a)(A) requires that the board's order be reversed. Reversed.