Opinion ID: 8077183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: analysis

Text: 1. Nondefamation Claims Barred by the Act Choice argues that the district court erred in finding that the Act barred its nondefamation claims. Choice does not dispute that none of its employees were licensees. Rather, Choice asserts that the Act does not apply, because it never performed acts or rendered services prohibited by the Act or it was not subject to the Act pursuant to § 81-885.04(1). [4] We have held that pursuant to the Act, any person collecting a fee or commission on the sale of real estate must be a licensed real estate broker or salesperson unless he or she meets one of the exceptions provided in the Act. 11 At this point, we recall specific provisions of the Act. First, the Act prohibits lawsuits for compensation by nonlicensees. “No action or suit shall be instituted, nor recovery be had, in any court of this state by any person for compensation for any act done or service rendered, the doing 8 Bogue v. Gillis, ante p. 445, 973 N.W.2d 445 (2022). 9 Id. 10 Nebraska Republican Party v. Shively, ante p. 160, 971 N.W.2d 128 (2022). 11 In re Estate of Ronan, 277 Neb. 516, 763 N.W.2d 704 (2009). - 849 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports CHOICE HOMES v. DONNER Cite as 311 Neb. 835 or rendering of which is prohibited under [the Act] to other than [licensees].” 12 Second, the Act broadly defines the term “broker”: Broker means any person who, for any form of compensation or consideration or with the intent or expectation of receiving the same from another, negotiates or attempts to negotiate the listing, sale, purchase, exchange, rent, lease, or option for any real estate or improvements thereon, or assists in procuring prospects or holds himself or herself out as a referral agent for the purpose of securing prospects for the listing, sale, purchase, exchange, renting, leasing, or optioning of any real estate or collects rents or attempts to collect rents, gives a broker’s price opinion or comparative market analysis, or holds himself or herself out as engaged in any of the foregoing. Broker also includes any person: (a) Employed, by or on behalf of the owner or owners of lots or other parcels of real estate, for any form of compensation or consideration to sell such real estate or any part thereof in lots or parcels or make other disposition thereof; (b) who auctions, offers, attempts, or agrees to auction real estate; or (c) who buys or offers to buy or sell or otherwise deals in options to buy real estate. 13 Third, the Act further defines a broker, associate broker, or salesperson as any person “who, directly or indirectly for another, with the intention or upon the promise of receiving any form of compensation or consideration, offers, attempts, or agrees to perform or performs any single act described in [§ 81-885.01(2)], whether as a part of a transaction, or as an entire transaction.” 14 This section also declares that “[c]ommitting a single act described in [§ 81-885.01(2)] by a person 12 § 81-885.06. 13 § 81-885.01(2). 14 § 81-885.03(1). - 850 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports CHOICE HOMES v. DONNER Cite as 311 Neb. 835 required to be licensed under [the Act] and not so licensed shall constitute a violation of [the Act].” 15 For convenience, we refer to the acts defined in §§ 81-885.01(2) and 81-885.03(1) as “prohibited acts” throughout the remainder of this opinion. In order to determine whether the Act barred Choice’s nondefamation claims, we must begin with two questions. Did Choice perform a prohibited act? And, if so, did Choice do so with the intent to or upon the promise of receiving any form of compensation or consideration? Then, we must determine whether the Act’s exception for acts “as owner . . . with reference to property owned” by Choice applies here. 16 [5-7] Answering these questions requires statutory interpretation, which is guided by well-settled principles. Statutory interpretation is a question of law. 17 It begins with the text, and the text is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. 18 An appellate court will not resort to interpretation of statutory language to ascertain the meaning of words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. 19 We digress momentarily to note that, unlike the district court, we will consider Gillman’s affidavit in our analysis. This affidavit was admitted into evidence. The court below applied Momsen to disregard it. 20 Although Choice does not specifically assign error to the court’s application of Momsen, we assume, without deciding, that Gillman was a nonparty witness. 21 At oral argument, Donner conceded that Gillman was not deposed pursuant to the rule permitting identification of an organization as the deponent. 22 This court has 15 Id. 16 See § 81-885.04(1). 17 In re Estate of Severson, 310 Neb. 982, 970 N.W.2d 94 (2022). 18 Nebraska Republican Party v. Shively, supra note 10. 19 Id. 20 See Momsen v. Nebraska Methodist Hospital, supra note 4. 21 See id. 22 See Neb. Ct. R. Disc. § 6-330(b)(6) (rev. 2022). - 851 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports CHOICE HOMES v. DONNER Cite as 311 Neb. 835 repeatedly declined to extend Momsen 23 to instances of changed testimony by nonparty witnesses, 24 and it is not necessary to do so here. [8,9] In reviewing the district court’s grant of summary judgment, an appellate court views the pleadings and admitted evidence de novo. 25 The grant of a motion for summary judgment may be affirmed on any ground available to the trial court, even if it is not the same reasoning the trial court relied upon. 26 (a) Acts or Services Rendered Choice asserts that it never performed any prohibited acts. Choice focuses upon the requirement in § 81-885.03(1) that a prohibited act must be performed “for another.” Choice argues that because it was a party to the transactions, it acted in its own behalf—not “for another.” For instance, Choice contends that it did not show the property to prospective buyers for another’s benefit. Choice claims it did so “in anticipation of purchasing the property and then reselling it to customers who wanted Choice to build a home on the property” instead. 27 We disagree. Choice performed a plethora of prohibited acts for the owners and buyers. It • procured prospective buyers for the owners, • solicited the sale of the property to the buyers, • found the buyers’ “dream property for them,” 23 Momsen v. Nebraska Methodist Hospital, supra note 4. 24 See, Breeden v. Anesthesia West, 265 Neb. 356, 656 N.W.2d 913 (2003); Ketteler v. Daniel, 251 Neb. 287, 556 N.W.2d 623 (1996). See, also, Momsen v. Nebraska Methodist Hospital, supra note 4. 25 See Bogue v. Gillis, supra note 8. See, also, Rodriguez v. Nielsen, 259 Neb. 264, 609 N.W.2d 368 (2000); MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline v. State Bd. of Equal., 242 Neb. 263, 494 N.W.2d 535 (1993). 26 Zawaideh v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 285 Neb. 48, 825 N.W.2d 204 (2013). 27 Brief for appellant at 24. - 852 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports CHOICE HOMES v. DONNER Cite as 311 Neb. 835 • “introduce[d] the [owners and buyers],” • “made [the buyers] aware that [it] would secure [the property] under a separate agreement with the [owners] for conveyance to [the buyers] under the terms of the purchase agreement between [them],” • negotiated the sale of the property, and • assisted the owners in “get[ting] out of [the property].” While Choice may have been motivated to act in its own behalf, the undisputed evidence shows that it performed these prohibited acts for the owners and buyers. Our statutes prohibit any unlicensed person (aside from those explicitly excepted in § 81-885.04) from negotiating, attempting to negotiate, or assisting in procuring prospects for the sale or lease of “‘any real estate or improvements thereon.’” 28 (b) Compensation or Consideration Choice asserts that it never expected to receive compensation from the owners or the buyers. Instead, Choice expected to “realize a profit when [it] resold the property to a third party.” 29 Choice argues that if it intended to be compensated by the owners or the buyers, the purchase agreements would have mandated that it be paid a commission fee. This argument lacks merit. Choice expected to receive compensation under its oral agreement with the owners. Choice agreed to purchase the property from the owners for a set price if it “found a buyer interested in [the property].” Choice would then “realize a profit” 30 by reselling the property to a buyer at a higher price. In essence, Choice solicited the sale of the property and procured a buyer for the owners in exchange for the right to simultaneously purchase and sell the property for a $620,000 profit. 28 Ford v. American Medical International, 228 Neb. 226, 230, 422 N.W.2d 67, 70 (1988) (quoting § 81-885.01(2)) (emphasis in original). 29 Brief for appellant at 24. 30 Id. - 853 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports CHOICE HOMES v. DONNER Cite as 311 Neb. 835 [10] The Act does not mandate that a person be compensated in a specific manner such as through a commission fee in a purchase agreement. 31 All the Act requires is that a person—who is not a licensee—perform a prohibited act with the expectation that he or she will receive compensation from another. 32 (c) § 81-885.04(1) The Act barred Choice’s nondefamation claims unless § 81-885.04(1) applied. This statute mandates that the Act shall not apply to: Any person, partnership, limited liability company, or corporation who as owner or lessor shall perform any of the acts described in subdivision (2) of section 81-885.01 with reference to property owned or leased by him, her, or it or to the regular employees thereof, with respect to the property so owned or leased, when such acts are performed in the regular course of or as an incident to the management, sale, or other disposition of such ­property . . . . 33 Choice asserts that it owned the property, because it obtained equitable title to the property under its purchase agreement with the owners. Because it “owned” 34 the property, it argues, the Act does not apply here. We disagree, because it claims too much. Choice does not claim that it obtained any ownership rights in the property other than equitable title. Choice also does not claim it obtained equitable title in the property before signing its purchase agreement with the owners. [11] If the owner of real estate enters into a contract of sale whereby the purchaser agrees to buy and the owner agrees 31 See, generally, § 81-885.01 et seq. 32 See id. 33 See § 81-885.04(1). 34 See id. - 854 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports CHOICE HOMES v. DONNER Cite as 311 Neb. 835 to sell it and the vendor retains the legal title until the purchase money or some part of it is paid, the ownership of the real estate as such passes to and vests in the purchaser, and that from the date of the contract the vendor holds the legal title as security for a debt as trustee for the purchaser. 35 While the current version of § 81-885.04(1) does not define “property owned,” 36 its plain and ordinary meaning includes equitable title. 37 However, Choice fails to recognize that § 81-885.04(1) only applied to the prohibited acts that it performed while it owned the property. The statute only allowed Choice “as owner” to “perform any [prohibited act] with reference to property owned . . . by . . . it.” 38 The exception does not apply to prohibited acts that Choice performed before or after it owned the property. Choice “owned” the property for less than 24 hours. Choice obtained equitable title in the property through its purchase agreement with the owners. However, later that day, Choice entered into its purchase agreement with the buyers, which transferred equitable title to them. 39 Choice had no other ownership interest in the property. Choice performed multiple prohibited acts before and after it owned the property. Choice solicited the sale of the property, sought to procure a buyer, showed the property to the buyers, attempted to facilitate the sale of the property, and negotiated with the owners and buyers to “try[] to keep the agreements between [it, the owners, and the buyers] alive.” 35 DeBoer v. Oakbrook Home Assn., 218 Neb. 813, 359 N.W.2d 768 (1984). 36 But see 2022 Neb. Laws, L.B. 892, § 2 (effective July 20, 2022). See, also, Neb. Const. art. III, § 27. 37 See Nebraska Republican Party v. Shively, supra note 10. See, also, DeBoer v. Oakbrook Home Assn., supra note 35. 38 See § 81-885.04(1). 39 See DeBoer v. Oakbrook Home Assn., supra note 35. - 855 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports CHOICE HOMES v. DONNER Cite as 311 Neb. 835 Therefore, the court did not err in finding the Act barred Choice’s nondefamation claims. 2. Nondefamation Claims— Alternative Findings [12] Choice assigns that the court erred in finding that it could not prove the elements of its nondefamation claims. Because the district court correctly concluded that the Act barred Choice’s nondefamation claims, we need not address this assignment. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an analysis that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy before it. 40 3. Defamation Claim Fails Choice assigns that the district court erred in finding it could not prove the elements of its defamation claim. Before summarizing its arguments, we quote the review, and then summarize the applicable law. (Prior to this section of our analysis, we have referred to Donner collectively in her individual and representative capacities. In this section, we are referring to Donner only in her individual capacity.) Donner’s review (which we quote exactly) stated: Please be careful of any contract you sign with Jason Gillman of Choice Homes. He was a great neighbor to us for many years. He sat in the man cave with my husband at our place and they shared beers. We arranged for him to park his motorhome at Nebraska football games. We the mistake of trusting him, signed a property contract with him, and when my husband suddenly passed away, Jason wants to sue me, the widow, telling me this just a few days after his passing, hoping to cash in. Please don’t trust this man. Everything I have said is true, you can contact me through my Facebook account if you 40 Preserve the Sandhills v. Cherry County, 310 Neb. 184, 964 N.W.2d 721 (2021). - 856 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports CHOICE HOMES v. DONNER Cite as 311 Neb. 835 need verification I can provide both our lawyers and any other proof you need. [13,14] A defamation claim has four elements: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the claimant, (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party, (3) fault amounting to at least negligence on the part of the publisher, and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication. 41 By statute, truth in and of itself is made a complete defense unless the plaintiff proves the statements were made with actual malice. 42 [15] The question of whether a particular publication is defamatory is, in the first instance, a question of law for the court. 43 As noted in the standard of review section, we review questions of law de novo. [16,17] The threshold question in a defamation suit is whether a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the published statements imply a provably false factual assertion. 44 Statements of fact can be defamatory whereas statements of opinion—the publication of which is protected by the First Amendment—cannot. 45 Put another way, “‘subjective impressions’” cannot be defamatory, as contrasted with objective “‘expressions of verifiable facts.’” 46 However, the U.S. Supreme Court has discouraged the practice of dividing a speaker’s statements into “opinion” or “fact” and only considering whether the latter statements 41 JB & Assocs. v. Nebraska Cancer Coalition, 303 Neb. 855, 932 N.W.2d 71 (2019). 42 Bartels v. Retail Credit Co., 185 Neb. 304, 175 N.W.2d 292 (1970). See, also, § 25-840. 43 Wheeler v. Nebraska State Bar Assn., 244 Neb. 786, 508 N.W.2d 917 (1993). 44 Steinhausen v. HomeServices of Neb., 289 Neb. 927, 857 N.W.2d 816 (2015). 45 Id. 46 Id. at 940, 857 N.W.2d at 828. - 857 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports CHOICE HOMES v. DONNER Cite as 311 Neb. 835 are actionable. 47 The Court explained that there is not a “­wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled ʽopinion.’” 48 Even if the speaker states the facts upon which the speaker bases his or her opinion, if those facts are either incorrect or incomplete, or if his or her assessment of them is erroneous, the statement may still imply a false assertion of fact. 49 [18] Thus, shortly after the high court’s explanation, this court recognized that language must be evaluated in its broader context to assess whether a reader would have understood the allegation to be a statement of fact. 50 As we then stated, in determining whether a statement implies a provably false factual assertion, both the language of the statement and the context in which the statement was made must be examined. 51 [19] To distinguish fact from opinion in a defamation claim, courts apply a totality of the circumstances test. Relevant factors include (1) whether the general tenor of the entire work negates the impression that the defendant asserted an objective fact, (2) whether the defendant used figurative or hyperbolic language, and (3) whether the statement is susceptible of being proved true or false. 52 [20,21] Context is important to whether an ordinary reader would view a statement as one of fact or opinion. 53 In addition to the content of the communication, a court looks to the knowledge, understanding, and reasonable expectations 47 See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 110 S. Ct. 2695, 111 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1990). 48 See id., 497 U.S. at 18. See, also, Wheeler v. Nebraska State Bar Assn., supra note 43. 49 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., supra note 47. 50 See Wheeler v. Nebraska State Bar Assn., supra note 43. 51 Id. 52 Steinhausen v. HomeServices of Neb., supra note 44. 53 Id. - 858 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports CHOICE HOMES v. DONNER Cite as 311 Neb. 835 of the audience to whom the communication was directed, taking cues from the broader setting in which the statement appears. 54 Words, particularly the pejorative ones, often have both a literal and figurative meaning. 55 As noted, whether the language is hyperbolic is relevant to distinguishing fact from opinion. 56 Rhetorical hyperbole—language that, in context, was obviously understood as an exaggeration, rather than a statement of literal fact—is not actionable. 57 With these principles in mind, we turn to Choice’s arguments, some of which appear only in the summary of argument portion of its brief. As best we can discern, its main argument seems to be that the district court failed to view Donner’s review in its totality. However, we apply de novo review to the question of whether a statement is defamatory. Thus, it matters not how the trial court analyzed the review if it reached the right result. 58 Choice argues Donner’s statements of fact that were undisputedly true should be considered defamatory, because it did not need to prove malice. Choice contends that a plaintiff only needs to prove malice if it is a public figure. But Donner’s motion for partial summary judgment also placed her affirmative defense before the court. And as we recognized above, by statute truthful statements are not actionable unless made maliciously. 59 Choice also argues that Donner’s review was defamatory, because she provided insufficient context for their inter­actions. In this regard, Choice argues that Donner failed to inform 54 Id. 55 Id. 56 Id. 57 Id. 58 See Zawaideh v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs., supra note 26. 59 See JB & Assocs. v. Nebraska Cancer Coalition, supra note 41. See, also, § 25-840. - 859 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports CHOICE HOMES v. DONNER Cite as 311 Neb. 835 the reader that she and Jackson “breached the agreement,” “[k]nowing that they cited a false reason for refusing to close [which] painted Choice and [Gillman] as violating a close trusting relationship and taking advantage of a widow in a moment of weakness.” 60 Choice then asserts that “[t]he average person reading [Donner’s review] would be left with an impression that signing a [purchase] agreement with [Choice] and [Gillman] could subject a person to being unfairly sued in order for [C]hoice to ‘cash in’ on the agreement.” 61 Along the same line, Choice contends Donner’s invitation to the reader to “contact” her for “additional information” “implies that she has more defamatory information which she is willing to share.” 62 This, Choice argues, “distinguishes her [review] from protected opinion.” 63 We address this implication argument along with the preceding contextual argument. To determine whether Choice could prove the elements of defamation, we must determine what statements, if any, by Donner were false and defamatory. Because there is no evidence in the record to prove that Donner published her review with malice, her statements of fact that were undisputedly true did not defame Choice. 64 Therefore, in analyzing Choice’s defamation claim, we only consider Donner’s statements that were not proved to be entirely undisputedly true. Such statements are as follows: • “Please be careful of any contract you sign with . . . Gillman of Choice.” • “We the mistake of trusting him, signed a property con- tract with him, and when [Jackson] suddenly passed away, 60 Brief for appellant at 36. 61 Id. 62 Id. at 21. 63 Id. 64 See Steinhausen v. HomeServices of Neb., supra note 44. See, also, § 25-840. - 860 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports CHOICE HOMES v. DONNER Cite as 311 Neb. 835 [Gillman] wants to sue me, the widow, telling me this just a few days after [Jackson’s] passing, hoping to cash in.” • “Please don’t trust this man.” • “Everything I have said is true, you can contact me through my Facebook account if you need verification I can provide both our lawyers and any other proof you need.” In reviewing these statements, we consider the context of their publication and look to the knowledge, understanding, and reasonable expectations of the audience to whom the communication was directed, taking cues from the broader setting in which the statement appears. In these statements, Donner used hyperbolic language to express her subjective skepticism of Gillman’s trustworthiness. Donner then concluded her review by reaffirming that her earlier statements of fact were undisputedly true and offering to discuss the matter with the reader privately. An ordinary reader would understand these statements to be Donner’s opinions. Donner’s opinions did not imply a false statement of fact. Donner expressed her disfavor in Gillman for “want[ing] to sue” her, but she never implied that she was being “unfairly sued.” 65 Donner never claimed that she had no fault in failing to close on the purchase agreement. Donner never alleged that the only reason Gillman “want[ed] to sue” her was because she was a widow. Nor did Donner imply that the reader would suffer the same fate as her. Therefore, an ordinary reader would not infer that he or she would be “unfairly sued” simply by “signing a [purchase] agreement” with Choice. 66 We find Donner did not state or imply any false statements of fact in the review. Therefore, the district court did not err in finding that Choice could not prove the elements of its defamation claim. 65 Brief for appellant at 21. 66 Id. - 861 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports CHOICE HOMES v. DONNER Cite as 311 Neb. 835