Opinion ID: 1230603
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Distinguish Between Departure and Variance

Text: Second, Herrera-Zuniga asserts that the court committed procedural error by failing to adequately explain its methodology for calculating his sentence. In particular, he claims that the district court was required to specify whether its decision to impose an above-Guidelines sentence was a departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 or a variance based on the court's consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). To the extent that the district court imposed an above-Guidelines sentence based on a departure under § 4A1.3(a), Herrera-Zuniga also challenges the district court's failure to specify a final offense level. This Court has recognized the distinction between sentencing departures under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 and variances under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United States v. Jordan, 544 F.3d 656, 671 n. 12 (6th Cir.2008) (A sentence outside the Guidelines based on Chapter 5 of the Guidelines is a `departure' or `Guideline departure,' whereas a sentence outside the Guidelines based on the § 3553(a) factors is a `variance' or `non-Guideline departure.'). Unlike some of our sister circuits, [10] however, we have not required that district courts carefully distinguish between whether the decision to deviate from the advisory Guidelines range is based on a departure or variance. See id. (construing the district court's deviation as a variance rather than a departure because it based its sentence on the § 3553(a) factors, but finding no error in the court's failure to specify the basis for its rejection of the advisory Guidelines range). Although the sentencing court is required to provide an adequate explanation of the basis for its decision, the court may exercise discretion in determining how much of an explanation of the sentence is required because `the amount of reasoning required varies according to context.' United States v. Jeross, 521 F.3d 562, 582-83 (6th Cir.2008) (quoting Liou, 491 F.3d at 338). Moreover, because the sentencing court has authority to deviate from the advisory Guidelines range under either § 3553(a) or § 4A1.3, the failure to specify to what extent each factored into the court's determination of an appropriate sentence does not affect our ability to review the reasonableness of the deviation. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 356, 127 S.Ct. 2456 (requiring only that the sentencing judge set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties' arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority); United States v. Kirby, 418 F.3d 621, 626 (6th Cir.2005) (requiring only that the district court must articulate its reasoning in deciding to impose a sentence in such a manner that is sufficient to allow for reasonable appellate review); United States v. Jackson, 408 F.3d 301, 304 (6th Cir.2005) (finding no per se error in the district's fail[ure] to discuss the extent of the departure at all, because [t]he question before us on appeal is what quality of analysis and explanation, if any, is necessary where the district court exercises its discretion to vary a defendant's sentence from the applicable range provided by the now-advisory Guidelines); see also Tankersley, 537 F.3d at 1114 (The old departure scheme is relevant today only insofar as factors that might have supported (or not supported) a departure may tend to show that a non-guidelines sentence is (or is not) reasonable.); United States v. Mohamed, 459 F.3d 979, 986 (9th Cir.2006) (concluding that the scheme of downward and upward `departures' [was] essentially replaced by the requirement that judges impose a `reasonable' sentence). Accordingly, Herrera-Zuniga's first argument is unavailing. Although more compelling, Herrera-Zuniga's second argument also must fail. In cases such as this, where the district court determines that an upward departure is warranted but the defendant's criminal history score already places him or her in category VI, the Guidelines recommend that the court should structure the departure by moving incrementally down the sentencing table to the next higher offense level in Criminal History Category VI until it finds a guideline range appropriate to the case. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(4)(B). Over the years, this Court has considered various methods adopted by district courts in applying this provision. For instance, in United States v. Carr, 5 F.3d 986 (6th Cir.1993), we held that § 4A1.3 requires a district court to consider each successive sentencing range that would result from an incremental increase of the offense level, concluding that the district court was precluded from increasing the defendant's offense level unless the court demonstrate[s] why it found the sentence imposed by each intervening level to be too lenient. Id. at 994 (citing United States v. Lassiter, 929 F.2d 267, 270 (6th Cir. 1991)). In United States v. Gray, 16 F.3d 681 (6th Cir.1994), we read § 4A1.3 to preclude a district court from creat[ing] a hypothetical criminal history category greater than VI. Id. at 683. Following Booker, however, our decisions have made abundantly clear that a rigid understanding of the methodology recommended under the Guidelines is not binding on the district court, and should not be substituted for the district court's judgment. United States v. Griffin, 530 F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir.2008) (citing United States v. Brown, 371 F.3d 854, 860 (6th Cir.2004)). In fact, even before Booker, we had rejected such a mechanical application of § 4A1.3, concluding that sentencing judges were not required to explain formalistically, gridblock by gridblock, why each intervening range is inappropriate. Thomas, 24 F.3d at 835 (Such a rigid, formalistic and essentially meaningless exercise to determine a sentence is not required by the guidelines, nor is it necessary to the fair and impartial administration of criminal justice.). As we explained in United States v. Brown, 371 F.3d 854 (6th Cir.2004), although an expedient formula may be useful as a reference point, the use of such a construct... cannot replace the exercise of the court's independent judgment. Id. at 860. Thus, regardless of the method employed, the whole point of the exercise is to `find[ ] a guideline range appropriate to the case.' Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting Thomas, 24 F.3d at 835). Simply put, this Court has rejected a mechanistic approach to departures. Thomas, 24 F.3d at 833. The logic underlying our decisions in Thomas and Brown is clear: because the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory only, the particular methodology set forth in § 4A1.3 cannot be binding. Given this rejection of a formulaic approach to departures, we cannot say that it always is per se procedurally unreasonable for a district court to fail to specify whether its deviation was based on a departure or variance, or to specify an adjusted offense level. [11] The only statutory requirement is that the district court impose a sentence that accords with, but is not greater than necessary to achieve, the settings goals identified by Congress. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Regardless of the method employed, at the end of the day the court must decide, in light of all the facts and circumstances of the particular case before it, whether the range in question is appropriate to the case. Brown, 371 F.3d at 860 (internal quotations marks omitted). Generally speaking, this requires that the sentencing judge consider the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct, the likeliness of recidivism, prior similar adult conduct not resulting in criminal convictions, previous lenient sentences for offenses, whether the sentence will have a deterrence on future criminal conduct, the necessity of isolating the defendant from the community and the length of time necessary to achieve rehabilitation, if rehabilitation is possible. Thomas, 24 F.3d at 833 (citing United States v. Joan, 883 F.2d 491, 496 (6th Cir.1989)). Although the district court is required to properly calculate the Guidelines range, that is only a starting point and initial benchmark of the sentencing analysis. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 596. There is no requirement that, after concluding that a departure is warranted, the court must specify a new, adjusted sentencing range. And because we apply a presumption of reasonableness only to sentences falling within the initial sentencing range recommended under the Guidelines, see Smith, 474 F.3d at 892, there also would be no intrinsic need to specify an adjusted sentencing range to aid our appellate review. In this case, the record reflects that the district court properly calculated the initial Guidelines range and thoroughly considered the relevant § 4A1.3 and § 3553(a) factors, finding that Herrera-Zuniga's criminal history category underrepresented his criminal history and that he was likely to commit other crimes. The district court did not commit procedural error by failing to explain whether its deviation was based on a departure or variance. Nor did it err by failing to specify a final, adjusted sentencing range.