Opinion ID: 3153495
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of McDonnell Douglas to WPA Claims

Text: [¶25] The County contends that, even if Brady succeeded in making out a prima facie case, it is entitled to summary judgment pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas framework because Brady has not produced sufficient evidence that the County’s proffered non-retaliatory reason for disciplining him was pretextual. Brady contends that the McDonnell Douglas framework lacks utility for deciding motions for summary judgment in WPA retaliation cases and that we should no 18 longer apply that approach in this context. We agree and conclude that in a summary judgment motion in a WPA retaliation case, it is unnecessary to shift the burden of production pursuant to McDonnell Douglas once the plaintiff—as she must do to present a prima facie case—has presented the requisite evidence that the adverse employment action was motivated at least in part by retaliatory intent. In analyzing this issue, we first consider the origins and purpose of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. We then evaluate the suitability of applying that analysis to WPA cases governed by Maine law.
[¶26] The McDonnell Douglas case addressed the parties’ burdens of production at trial, rather than on summary judgment, for racial discrimination claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 797. Under that analysis, in order to establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff need only show “(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications.” Id. at 802. [¶27] McDonnell Douglas was intended to create a procedure that was thought to be favorable to plaintiffs in Title VII cases who face difficulty in 19 presenting evidence of the employer’s discriminatory animus. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985); Wells v. Colorado Dept. of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1224 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J., concurring). That difficulty is both foreseeable and understandable because of the challenges inherent in proving an employer’s discriminatory intent. Trans World Airlines, 469 U.S. at 121 (“The shifting burdens of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas are designed to assure that the [employee] has his day in court despite the unavailability of direct evidence.” (quotation marks omitted)); Lapsley v. Columbia Univ.—Coll. of Physicians & Surgeons, 999 F. Supp. 506, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). The McDonnell Douglas framework constitutes “an information-forcing device by requiring employers to explain arguably suspicious activity.” Lapsley, 999 F. Supp. at 514. Therefore, in the first step of the McDonnell Douglas three-step process, the four elements of a Title VII prima facie case do not include a requirement that the plaintiff produce evidence of unlawful motivation. Rather, presentation of a prima facie case as defined in McDonnell Douglas merely “raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors.” Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (emphasis added). 20 [¶28] The standard for a prima facie case created in McDonnell Douglas is therefore limited in its effect: it creates a “legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption,” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 n.7, but it falls short of a body of evidence that would be sufficient to permit a finder of fact to conclude that the employer acted unlawfully. See id. In this way, a “prima facie case” within the meaning of the McDonnell Douglas analysis is different than a “prima facie case” that more generally describes a collection of evidence that is sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Budge, 2012 ME 122, ¶ 12, 55 A.3d 484 (referring to the plaintiff’s burden to produce evidence of a prima facie case for each element of a claim to defeat a motion for summary judgment). [¶29] Under McDonnell Douglas, if the employee succeeds in presenting evidence of a prima facie case, the burden of production then shifts to the employer to articulate the explanation for the adverse employment action—in other words, to produce evidence of an explanation that will cause the disappearance of the initial “inference of discrimination,” which arose only because of the absence of a legitimate explanation, and then “the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework as applied to a summary judgment motion, it is only at this point that the employee must point to evidence in the record on summary judgment that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the employer’s conduct was motivated at least in 21 part by unlawful considerations, thereby creating a triable issue about the employer’s proffered explanation. The employee is not called on to present evidence of causation unless and until the employer raises the issue by presenting some evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. [¶30] In most cases, the employer will counter the employee’s evidence of retaliatory intent by producing evidence that it acted for legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons.7 Brady v. Office of the Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d. 490, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Lapsley, 999 F. Supp. at 514 (“Of course, the employer in every case will articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for its action.”). This has the effect of negating the “inference of discrimination,” because the employer’s actions are no longer unexplained. Therefore, under McDonnell Douglas, the real battleground in summary judgment motions is in the application of the third step, where a court is called to examine whether the employee has presented evidence responsive to the employer’s articulation of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the action it took against the employee. Brady, 520 F.3d at 494; Lapsley, 999 F. Supp. at 514 (observing that as McDonnell Douglas is often applied, “[t]he first two steps, for all practical purposes, have fallen out of the equation”). Although McDonnell Douglas created a compartmentalized analysis with internal 7 If the employer does not present evidence of such a non-retaliatory motive, then the employee may become entitled to a summary judgment based on evidence in a prima facie case that is not placed in material dispute by the employer. 22 shifting burdens of production, courts applying that process have recognized that in the specific context of summary judgment motions, the ultimate question really is whether the record on summary judgment contains evidence that the adverse employment action taken against an employee was motivated at least in part by unlawful considerations.8 Brady, 520 F.3d at 494; Fields v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, No. 96-7523, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 19794, at  (2d Cir. May 23, 1997); Peterson v. City Coll., 32 F. Supp. 2d 675, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). This is the issue that is addressed in the third step of the McDonnell Douglass process. [¶31] With this understanding of the reasons underlying the development and application of the McDonnell Douglas process, we now examine its suitability to a motion for summary judgment filed in a WPA retaliation action under Maine law. 8 While federal courts remain bound to follow the McDonnell Douglas jurisprudence, some have not been reticent to express critical views about the doctrine and its ongoing usefulness. See, e.g., Brady v. Office of the Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting that the formulation of the prima facie case is “a largely unnecessary sideshow . . . spawning enormous confusion and wasting litigant and judicial resources”); Wells v. Colorado Dep’t. of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1221, 1224 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J., concurring) (stating that McDonnell Douglas has created “wasted judicial effort and greater opportunity for judicial error” and that it causes courts to “focus on the isolated components of the McDonnell Douglas framework, losing sight of the ultimate issue”); Peterson v. City Coll., 32 F. Supp. 2d 675, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (describing the McDonnell Douglas model as “confusing and unworkable”); Lapsley v. Columbia Univ.—Coll. of Physicians & Surgeons, 999 F. Supp. 506, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting a “legion” of criticisms of the “cumbersome” doctrine and quoting characterizations by courts and commentators as a “‘yo-yo rule,’ ‘befuddling,’ ‘replete with confusion,’ and ‘incomprehensible’”). 23
[¶32] Under Maine law, the cause of action for whistleblower retaliation consists of three elements: (1) that the employee engaged in a protected activity; (2) that the employer took adverse employment action against the employee; and (3) that there was a causal connection between the two. Walsh, 2011 ME 99, ¶ 24, 28 A.3d 610. Therefore, at trial an employee asserting a WPA retaliation claim must present evidence that would allow a fact-finder to reasonably find each of the three elements of the claim. Id. That standard is the same in assessing an employee’s case that is challenged through a motion for summary judgment. See Corey, 1999 ME 196, ¶ 7, 742 A.2d 933. In both situations, the employee must present evidence that would allow the fact-finder “to rule in the [plaintiff’s] favor.” Lougee Conservancy v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2012 ME 103, ¶ 12, 48 A.3d 774 (quotation marks omitted). [¶33] Because of the way a WPA claim is defined under Maine law, in a summary judgment motion—just as at trial—the employee must not only produce evidence that she engaged in protected activity and later suffered an adverse employment action, but in the first instance she must also produce some evidence of the employer’s unlawful motivation. Walsh, 2011 ME 99, ¶ 24, 28 A.3d 610. Without evidence of a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action, the employee has not presented a prima facie case for 24 WPA retaliation, and the employer is entitled to summary judgment. Alternatively, if the employee presents evidence of a causal connection between protected activity and adverse employment action, then the employee has created a record sufficient to defeat an employer’s motion for summary judgment. [¶34] This requirement serves to distinguish WPA retaliation cases from Title VII cases. Under McDonnell Douglas, the employee with a Title VII claim does not have an obligation to produce evidence of causation—that is, discriminatory animus—until after the employer satisfies the second step of the process by producing evidence of a lawful explanation for the adverse employment action. In a WPA case, on the other hand, even before the burden of production would shift to the employer under the McDonnell Douglas model, the employee would already have been required to present evidence of causation. When an employee has presented evidence of (1) protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal relationship between the two, she has already presented a case that would be sufficient to go to a jury, and therefore one that is sufficient to defeat the employer’s motion for summary judgment. [¶35] Once the employee has presented evidence covering the elements of a WPA retaliation claim, the employer’s evidence of a lawful reason for the adverse employment action, presented as the second step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, merely creates a dispute of material fact and precludes the court from 25 granting summary judgment to the employee, because it is evidence that the employer may use to contradict or otherwise call into question the employee’s evidence that the employer acted with a retaliatory motivation. In other words, it is evidence presented by the employer to dispute the truth of the employee’s evidence of wrongful conduct in the workplace. Similarly, any evidence presented by the employee at the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, that the legally benign explanation offered by the employer to explain its action was actually a pretext, does not affect the fact that with her initial showing, she had already presented sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the employer’s conduct was actionable. [¶36] Therefore, the second and third phases of the McDonnell Douglas model require an analysis that, on a summary judgment motion in a WPA retaliation case, is duplicative. In summary judgment proceedings in WPA retaliation cases, if the employee presents evidence encompassing the three elements of a WPA claim, there is no reason to shift the burdens according to McDonnell Douglas, because the evidence that must be produced by the employee in the first instance is by itself sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Farrell, 206 F.3d at 286; Henderson v. Jantzen, Inc., 719 P.2d 1322, 1324 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (“A plaintiff’s prima facie case does not 26 disappear merely because a defendant asserts a non-discriminatory reason which may or may not persuade the trier of fact.”). [¶37] Elimination of the burden-shifting process does not limit the scope of the evidence presented in summary judgment motion practice in WPA retaliation cases, when compared to the evidence that would be presented under the McDonnell Douglas model. With or without the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting process, the question of whether the record on summary judgment contains evidence of causation requires the court to recognize any evidence that the employer had a lawful reason for the adverse action taken against the employee, and any evidence that that proffered reason is merely a pretext. Accordingly, the evidence that would be presented in the second and third stages of the McDonnell Douglas framework will still fall within the analytical framework applicable to summary judgment motions in WPA retaliation cases because that evidence still bears on the allegation of causation. Causation is an essential element of a claim of WPA retaliation, and so the parties are entitled to present evidence of the reasons for the employer’s action, but without any need to follow the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting structure. Without McDonnell Douglas, the court will now consider that evidence in a unitary way and simply determine whether the record as a whole would allow a jury to reasonably 27 conclude that the adverse employment action was motivated at least in part by retaliatory intent. [¶38] Eliminating the burden-shifting analysis set out in McDonnell Douglas for WPA retaliation claims is analytically similar to the approach taken by some federal courts in Title VII cases, which are directly governed by that case. Those courts essentially presume that the employee has presented evidence sufficient to make out a prima facie case and that the employer has articulated a lawful reason for its actions. They then focus almost exclusively on the question of whether the record could reasonably sustain an argument of causation. E.g., Brady, 530 F.3d at 494; Lapsley, 999 F. Supp. at 514-15. Thus, that approach functionally diminishes the first two steps of McDonnell Douglas almost to the point of invisibility, thereby eliminating the burden-shifting exercise, and instead proceeds directly to the question of causation. The effect of that approach is the same as we prescribe here, which is to examine the record as a whole to determine simply whether the employee has presented evidence that could support a finding that the adverse employment action was motivated at least in part by protected activity. [¶39] For these reasons, we are now convinced that application of the McDonnell Douglas framework to the summary judgment stage of WPA retaliation cases, which would shift the burden of production back and forth after 28 the employee had made out a case for retaliation, is unnecessary and only serves to complicate a proper analysis of the employee’s claim.9 See Trott, 2013 ME 33, ¶ 28, 66 A.3d 7 (Silver, J. concurring) (stating that the “rigid and artificial trifurcation of the causation analysis confuses rather than clarifies the ultimate issue in employment discrimination cases: whether there is evidence of discrimination” (quotation marks omitted)). Instead, we hold that at the summary judgment stage in WPA retaliation cases, the parties are held to the same standard as in all other cases. The employer has the burden to “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact,” M.R. Civ. P. 56(c), and that “the evidence fails to establish a prima facie case for each element of the cause of action,” Budge, 2012 ME 122, ¶ 12, 55 A.3d 484 (quotation marks omitted). As part of that process, the employee must produce evidence generating a triable issue on each of those elements. Lougee Conservancy, 2012 ME 103, ¶ 12, 48 A.3d 774. If the evidence in the summary judgment record would allow a jury to find for the 9 Because this case reaches us on summary judgment, it does not present us with occasion to consider whether the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting structure should still be treated as a useful analytical device at trial. Compare Maine Human Rights Comm’n. v. Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253, 1261 (Me. 1979) (“The special rules developed by the federal courts provide a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination.” (quotation marks omitted)), and Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320 S.W.3d 777, 784 (Tenn. 2010) (approving “the McDonnell Douglas framework . . . to permit the trier of fact to better evaluate the evidence as to whether the employer was motivated by a discriminatory or retaliatory intent”), with Palmquist v. Shinseki, 689 F.3d 66, 71 (1st Cir. 2012) (indicating that at trial, “the McDonnell Douglas framework, with its intricate web of presumptions and burdens, becomes an anachronism”). 29 employee on each element of the employee’s case, then the employer is not entitled to summary judgment. [¶40] Here, Brady produced evidence sufficient to generate a genuine issue of material fact on each of the three elements of his claim for retaliation, including the element that his demotion was motivated at least in part by retaliation. Accordingly, the County is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Determinations of the weight to be given to that evidence, including whether Brady can prove that the County’s explanation for the adverse employment action was pretext for a retaliatory motive, are necessarily left for a fact-finder’s decision at trial. For these reasons, we vacate the summary judgment entered in favor of the County and remand for further proceedings. The entry is: Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On the briefs: Jonathan M. Goodman, Esq., and William K. McKinley, Esq., Troubh Heisler, PA, Portland, for appellant Gerard Brady Peter T. Marchesi, Esq., and Cassandra S. Shaffer, Esq., Wheeler & Arey, PA, Waterville, for appellee Cumberland County 30 At oral argument: Jonathan M. Goodman, Esq., for appellant Gerard Brady Peter T. Marchesi, Esq., for appellee Cumberland County Androscoggin County Superior Court docket number CV-2013-56 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY