Opinion ID: 197760
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: the denial of the defendant's motion for a new

Text: TRIAL BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE TRIAL BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE The defendant filed a motion for a new trial two weeks before his sentencing. The court went forward with the -22- sentencing on June 25, 1996, and then heard the motion on July 24, 1996 and overruled the motion on March 13, 1997. The defendant then appealed the denial. This court then combined the two appeals for a single appellate argument. Recognizing that the standard of review is a manifest abuse of discretion as set forth in United States v. Montilla- Rivera, 115 F.3d 1060, 1064 (1st Cir. 1982), citing United States v. Andrade, 94 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1996), the defendant argues that the denial of the motion based on newly discovered evidence was such an abuse of discretion. The motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence was accompanied by a number of exhibits and affidavits in support of the motion. The main thrust of the materials was anchored in the proposition that had the evidence been presented to the jury, the jury would more likely have believed the defense that Henry did not believe the soils constituted hazardous waste and that he did intend to remediate the soils. The judge conducted a lengthy hearing in which he invited discussion on each of the exhibits and affidavits from counsel and then denied the motion in a carefully crafted 26 page order. A motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, to be successful, faces a difficult test. The defendant must demonstrate that the evidence was unknown or unavailable at the time of trial despite due diligence and that the evidence was material and likely to result in an acquittal upon retrial. United States v. Tibolt, 72 F.3d 965, 971 (1st Cir. 1995). -23- The district court found that much of the evidence could have been discovered with due diligence. In that context, we note that the initial indictment was returned on March 2, 1995 and the superceding indictment was filed on January 5, 1996. The trial began on February 6, 1996. Henry and his counsel, whose defense of Henry appears to have been thorough and intense, had nearly a year to prepare for the trial.9 We see no basis to disturb the district court's denial of the motion as it related to the evidence that could have been discovered prior to trial in light of our teachings that an order denying a motion for a new trial will not be reversed except where we find a manifest abuse of discretion. United States v. Montilla-Rivera, 115 F.3d 1060, 1064 (1st Cir. 1997). Henry did offer a March 28, 1996 report that was clearly new evidence in that the report was not available prior to that time. Sanborn, Head & Associates, a consultant for the State of New Hampshire, released a report assessing various remedial alternatives for the contaminated soil remaining at the Beede site. That report, in an appendix, contained copies of test results conducted by Beede's laboratory that used the 3040 test method. Henry contends that the SHA report was important new evidence as it demonstrated reliance by the State's environment consultant on the same 3040 test method that Henry claimed he had relied on in concluding that the soil removed from 9 Henry was represented by Bjorn R. Lange, an Assistant Federal Defender, who was appointed on March 9, 1995 and remained as Henry's counsel throughout the trial and on appeal. -24- the Stoneham Laundry site was nonhazardous. The judge acknowledged that the report was new evidence, but concluded it was impeaching and cumulative and not sufficiently probative to warrant a new trial. In reaching that conclusion, the district court opined: Henry has submitted no direct evidence to support his claim that either NHDES [New Hampshire Department of Environmental Safety] or SHA [Sanborn, Head & Associates] relied on the 3040 test results included in the SHA report. Thus, I am asked to infer this reliance from the bare inclusion of the