Opinion ID: 2576334
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legally Relevant Factors

Text: ¶ 23 Montiel first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider all legally relevant factors before rejecting the proposed plea agreement. In support of this claim, Montiel cites this court's statement, made in the context of sentencing review, that a trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to consider all legally relevant factors. State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990). He then cites certain cases from other jurisdictions that have sought to identify what factors are legally relevant in the context of plea bargaining. [12] As we noted above, however, most jurisdictions decline to specify all those factors that are legally relevant in rejecting plea agreements, and for good reason. First, it would be quite difficultif not impossibleto anticipate the myriad potential legitimate bases for rejecting plea agreements. Second, to adopt stringent guidelines would undermine our stated goal of vesting trial courts with broad discretion in this area. ¶ 24 Because we have elected not to set forth any mandatory list of factors that must be considered when rejecting a plea agreement, we cannot import the definition of abuse of discretion in the context of sentencing (where mandatory factors are indeed defined [13] ) for use in the context of plea bargaining. More appropriate language defining the abuse of discretion standard for this context is found in our decision in State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, 63 P.3d 731, in which we held that a trial court has abused its discretion only if the trial court's decision [is] beyond the limits of reasonability, or, in other words, that an abuse of discretion has occurred if the trial court's actions are inherently unfair or if ... no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. Id. at ¶ 101, 63 P.3d 731 (internal quotation omitted). So long as the trial court carefully considers a proffered plea agreement and states its reasons for rejecting the plea in the record, it will not be overturned on appeal unless it can be said that the trial court's decision was beyond the limits of reasonability. Id. Other jurisdictions have adopted a similar standard. See, e.g., United States v. Greener, 979 F.2d 517, 519 (7th Cir.1992) ([W]e will not reverse the district court's decision [to reject a plea agreement] if any reasonable person could agree with the district court.); Darlington, 105 P.3d at 232 (Where the trial court clearly exercises independent judgment in rejecting the plea agreement and sets forth on the record its reasons for doing so, its ruling will not be set aside on appeal.). ¶ 25 Because we decline to adopt the unnecessarily burdensome standard Montiel proposes, Montiel's first argument fails.