Opinion ID: 1479756
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Policies Underlying Double Jeopardy Clause Protection Against a Second Prosecution

Text: There are several reasons why this valued right merits constitutional protection. First, a defendant has an interest in being able, once and for all, to conclude his confrontation with society through the verdict of a tribunal he might believe to be favorably disposed to his fate. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486, 91 S.Ct. 547, 558, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (plurality opinion); see Crist, 437 U.S. at 35-36, 98 S.Ct. at 2160-61. This interest in retaining a potentially favorable jury initially arises with the selection and swearing in of a panel of jurors. For any number of reasons, a defendant may perceive the jury to be sympathetic to his case at the outset. Indeed, the extensive time and effort frequently spent screening veniremen attest to the importance attached to empaneling a receptive jury. See 2 A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 340 (1971). This interest in retaining a chosen jury may intensify as the trial proceeds, if the defendant senses the trial is going well and the factfinder is leaning toward acquittal. In the present case, for example, appellant apparently had every reason to believe the trial was progressing favorably; counsel had announced a frameup theory to the jury and had substantially undermined the first government witness' ability to identify appellant as his assailant. Second, when a defendant is forced to abandon a trial in progress and undergo a retrial, the prospects for an acquittal may be lessened and the risk that an innocent defendant may be convicted may be enhanced. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 504, 98 S.Ct. 824, 829, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978). The opportunity to present the government's case a second time may permit the prosecutor to compensate for weaknesses exposed during the first trial, correct mistakes, and generally strengthen the government's presentation. This second crack at a jury is especially significant when there is an assailant-identification issue, as in this case. Courts have observed that government witnesses frequently become more definite in their testimony and more favorable to the prosecution with successive trips to the stand. See Carsey v. United States, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 205, 208-09, 392 F.2d 810, 813-14 (1967). The prosecutor also may benefit from having observed defense strategies at the first trial. [5] Finally, the defendant's right to receive a judgment at the first trial is supported by the realization that inherently  without regard to the merits of the prosecution  a second [trial] may be grossly unfair. It increases the financial and emotional burden on the accused, [and] prolongs the period in which he is stigmatized by an unresolved accusation of wrongdoing. Arizona, 434 U.S. at 503-04, 98 S.Ct. at 829. [6] Because these burdens of delay, expense, and personal anxiety will inevitably be associated with a reprosecution, regardless of whether the defendant is ultimately found guilty or innocent, a defendant need not demonstrate any other prejudice when seeking to bar a retrial on double jeopardy grounds. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 471, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 1073, 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (1973).