Opinion ID: 2582572
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: clear and substantial public policy

Text: ¶ 15 The public policy exception to the employment at-will presumption is much narrower than traditional notions of public policy. See Ryan, 972 P.2d at 405. Only clear and substantial public policies will support a claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Ryan, 972 P.2d at 404; see also Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1282. The nature and scope of what constitutes a clear and substantial public policy, however, is not always easily discernible. See, e.g., Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306, 50 S.Ct. 253, 74 L.Ed. 854 (1930) (The truth is that the theory of public policy embodies a doctrine of vague and variable quality . . . .). In Utah, we have frequently invoked the concept of public policy without articulating precisely its origin or definition. Berube, 771 P.2d at 1042; see also Fox, 931 P.2d at 860 (stating that a more precise definition of the term must await the time when this Court has had sufficient experience with a number of cases); Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1282 (The identification of clear and substantial public policies will require case-by-case development.). ¶ 16 Our prior cases in this area provide us with some general governing principles. We have stated that a public policy is clear if it is plainly defined by one of three sources: (1) legislative enactments; (2) constitutional standards; or (3) judicial decisions. See Dixon v. Pro Image Inc., 1999 UT 89, ¶ 31, 987 P.2d 48 (citing Ryan, 972 P.2d at 405); Hodges, 811 P.2d at 165-66; see also Burton, 2000 UT 18 at ¶ 6, 994 P.2d 1261 (stating that declarations of public policy can be found in constitutions and statutes). For example, we have held that the enforcement of a state's criminal code that reflects Utah policy constitutes a clear and substantial public policy. See Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1283 (holding that employer who fired employee for refusing to feloniously provide false information on tax forms could be held liable for wrongful termination); Hodges, 811 P.2d at 166-68 (holding that discharged employee had action for wrongful termination where employee was fired for refusing to accede to extortionate demands by employer). ¶ 17 We have also held that a public policy is substantial if it is of overreaching importance to the public, as opposed to the parties only. Ryan, 972 P.2d at 405. [W]e must ... inquire whether the discharge is against public policy and affects a duty which inures to the benefit of the public at large rather than to a particular employer or employee. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 254 Cal.Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373, 379 (1988); see, e.g., Fox, 931 P.2d at 861-862 (holding that retaliatory termination for reporting possible criminal conduct of co-workers to employer does not give rise to a violation of substantial public policy). Statutes that simply regulate conduct between private individuals or impose requirements whose fulfillment does not implicate fundamental public policy concerns are not sufficient to require an exception to the at-will presumption. See id. As we stated in Ryan: First, one must ask whether the policy in question is one of overarching importance to the public, as opposed to the parties only. Second, one must inquire whether the public interest is so strong and the policy so clear and weighty that we should place the policy beyond the reach of contract, thereby constituting a bar to discharge that parties cannot modify, even when freely willing and of equal bargaining power. 972 P.2d at 405. ¶ 18 It is important to note, however, that not every employment termination that has the effect of violating some public policy is actionable. Fox, 931 P.2d at 860. [E]ven those principles which are widely held values may not be sufficient to justify wrongful termination recovery. Berube, 771 P.2d at 1043. This court `recognizes the importance of keeping the scope of the public policy exception narrow to avoid unreasonably eliminating employer discretion in discharging employees.' Dixon, 1999 UT 89 at ¶ 31, 987 P.2d 48 (quoting Ryan, 972 P.2d at 405); see also Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1285-86 (Howe, A.C.J., concurring) (`The public policy exception is narrow enough in its scope and application to be no threat to employers who operate within the mandates of the law . . . . Such employers will never be troubled.'). We have held, and continue to ensure, that public policies [are construed] narrowly and will [protect] only those principles which are so substantial and fundamental that there can be virtually no question as to their importance for promotion of the public good. Berube, 771 P.2d at 1043. ¶ 19 Legitimate reliance on a public policy exception to the at-will rule requires an attempt to identify the proper sources of public policy and the principles which underlie it. Id. at 1042-43. The court of appeals found that the following constitutional and statutory provisions did not provide grounds for a finding of clear public policy: (1) article I, sections 1 and 27 of the Utah Constitution; (2) federal and state ombudsman provisions provided in 42 U.S.C. § 3058g(a)(3) and (5) and sections 62A-3-201 to -202 of the Utah Code; and (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(6), R432-150-4 of the Utah Administrative Code, and 42 C.F.R. § 483.10. [4] We address each in turn.
¶ 20 Plaintiff first asserts that two provisions in the Utah Constitution form the basis of a clear public policy. Article I, section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides in pertinent part that [a]ll men have the inherent and inalienable right to . . . acquire, possess and protect property . . . . Article I, section 27 provides that [f]requent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free government. While these two provisions do protect the right to acquire, possess, and protect property, they do not enunciate the narrow type of policy envisioned by our case law creating the public policy exception. The right of a care facility resident to manage her own funds is not plainly defined by . . . [these] constitutional standards. Ryan, 972 P.2d at 405.
¶ 21 Next, plaintiff contends that 42 U.S.C. § 3058g(a)(3) and (5), and sections 62A-3-201 to -208 of the Utah Code also plainly define such a public policy. [5] Plaintiff specifically points to subsections (a)(3) [6] and (a)(5) [7] in support of her position. However, subsections (a)(3) and (a)(5) are devoid of any language relating to a resident's right to manage her funds. While these provisions broadly discuss the duty of the ombudsman to monitor and protect the rights of care facility residents, they in no way state a narrow and clear public policy necessary for an exception to the at-will rule. This statute governs the duties and functions of the office of the ombudsman and its representatives and entities, and in no way enunciates rights of care facility residents. ¶ 22 Similarly, we find sections 62A-3-201 and -202 of the Utah Code unavailing. The stated purpose of these provisions is to establish within the division [of Aging and Adult Services] the [Utah] long-term care ombudsman program for the aging . . . and identify duties and responsibilities of that program . . . in order to address problems relating to long-term care. Utah Code Ann. § 62A-3-201 (2000). In pertinent part, the ombudsman is to address the difficulties of the aging citizens of the state by assisting in asserting their civil and human rights as residents of care facilities through legal means. See id. We similarly find this language too broad to constitute a clear and substantial specific public policy.
¶ 23 Next, plaintiff contends that 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(6), R432-150-4 of the Utah Administrative Code and 42 C.F.R. § 483.10 provide a clear basis for her public policy claim. First, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r, which governs the requirements care facilities must meet to obtain grants for medical assistance programs, provides that [t]he nursing facility. . . may not require residents to deposit their personal funds with the facility. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(6)(A)(i). Subsection (c)(6) includes guidelines for how care facilities are to manage resident funds when management of such funds has been authorized by the resident. Although not clearly stated, this section could imply that care facility residents have the right to manage their own financial affairs. In the past we have held that we may look beyond the provision in question to determine whether the motivating policy behind it constitutes a clear and substantial public policy. See, e.g., Heslop, 839 P.2d at 837 (finding that the general purposes of the Utah Financial Institutions Act constitute a clear and substantial public policy). However, we conclude that a mere hint to such an underlying policy, as is the case here, is insufficient to constitute the type of clear and substantial policy necessary to establish an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. Thus, we hold that 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(6) does not rise to the level of a clear public policy. ¶ 24 Rule 432-150-4.400 of the Utah Administrative Code provides that [t]he resident has the right to maintain his financial affairs and the facility may not require a resident to deposit his personal funds with the facility. Utah Admin. Code R32-150-4.400 (1994). Both of these sections plainly state that care facility residents have the right to manage their own finances. ¶ 25 Additionally, 42 C.F.R. § 483.10, governing resident rights that must be recognized by long-term care facilities, provides the most detailed and applicable provision. It states: The resident has a right to a dignified existence, self-determination, and communication with and access to persons and services inside and outside the facility. A facility must protect and promote the rights of each resident, including . . . the right to manage his or her financial affairs, and the facility may not require residents to deposit their personal funds with the facility. 42 C.F.R. § 483.10(c). This regulation explicitly states that care facility residents have the right to manage their own funds. ¶ 26 However, we have earlier pointed out that a clear public policy must be found in our statutes or constitutions, see Burton, 2000 UT 18 at ¶ 6, 994 P.2d 1261; Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1282; Hodges, 811 P.2d at 165-66; Berube, 771 P.2d at 1043, or judicial decisions, see Hodges, 811 P.2d at 165; Berube, 771 P.2d at 1043. The provision in 42 C.F.R. § 483.10 is an executive agency regulation that governs practice and procedure before federal administrative agencies. Similarly, R432-150-4.400 is a provision in the Utah Administrative Code. ¶ 27 Administrative regulations by their very nature are not substantial under our case law. The character of the public policy exception is that it furthers policies that protect the public or promote public interest. Berube, 771 P.2d at 1043. Agency regulations are created by the agencies themselves and are tailored to govern specific agency needs. The public policy exception must be `narrow enough in its scope and application to be no threat to employers who operate within the mandates of the law and clearly established public policy as set out in the duly adopted laws.' Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1285 (Howe, A.C.J., concurring) (citation omitted). Thus, we hold that while 42 C.F.R. § 483.10 and R432-150-4.400 of the Utah Administrative Code expressly state that care facility residents have the right to manage their own funds, our case law does not allow for administrative regulations alone to constitute expressions of clear public policy. [8] ¶ 28 In so holding, we recognize that care facility residents are often at the mercy of the facilities in which they reside. Residents face many challenges as their mobility decreases and their ability to take care of themselves physically, mentally, and emotionally deteriorates. However, while we agree with plaintiff that [t]he rights of nursing home residents, especially with the increasing longevity of Utah residents and the growth of Utah's population, are a matter of most significant public concern, we also recognize the reality that many residents, while remaining in control of their funds, voluntarily seek the assistance of family members or friends with their banking and spending decisions. That appears to have been the situation in the instant case. Such efforts by honest and helpful advisors should be encouraged and not discouraged by rigid, government-imposed requirements.