Opinion ID: 1658330
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: is the zoning ordinance constitutional on its face and as applied to plaintiff?

Text: Plaintiff contends that the township zoning ordinance is unconstitutional on its face because it operates to exclude all single-wide mobile homes from areas other than mobile-home parks. We disagree. In Robinson Twp v Knoll, supra, 310, this Court held that [t]he per se exclusion of mobile homes from all areas not designated as mobile-home parks has no reasonable basis under the police power, and is therefore unconstitutional. We also held: [A] municipality need not permit all mobile homes, regardless of size, appearance, quality of manufacture or manner of on-site installation, to be placed in all residential neighborhoods. A mobile home may be excluded if it fails to satisfy reasonable standards designed to assure favorable comparison of mobile homes with site-built housing which would be permitted on the site, and not merely because it is a mobile home. [ Id. ] The requirements for a dwelling within the definition of the zoning ordinance are set forth in the facts stated above. We initially note that these regulations do not treat mobile homes materially different than site-built homes. We further find that the requirements, as stated, are either reasonable standards designed to assure favorable comparison of mobile homes with site-built housing, or constitute a reasonable exercise of police power for the protection of the safety, health, morals, prosperity, comfort, convenience, and welfare of the public or a substantial part of the public. Robinson Twp, supra, 312. Nor are we persuaded that the zoning ordinance is unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff. We believe the trial court properly summarized the plaintiff's argument in this regard: The thrust of plaintiff's argument is that because there are already existing on the land in question as nonconforming uses 11 mobile homes, any ordinance that prevents the placing of similar mobile homes on the remaining lots is unreasonable. The reasons for this conclusion are that (1) because mobile homes are situated on the plat in question that are nonconforming, aesthetics cannot be a proper concern of the township, at least in regard to the requirement that dwellings have an interior ceiling height of 7 1/2 feet, and an external width of 24 feet, and (2) that because there is no indication that any of the existing mobile homes will be vacating, it is not reasonable for the township to continue to classify these homes as nonconforming uses, which must be replaced with conforming uses when their useful life is over, and to require conforming uses on the as yet unsold lots.... Plaintiff [further] argues that (1) the ordinance restricts a reasonable use of the land (that being used as a site for placing mobile homes thereon) and (2) plaintiff cannot sell the remaining plots at the price he is asking for any use other than mobile home sites because no one will want to purchase land to build next to mobile homes. The following principles of law are applicable to plaintiff's claim: The plaintiff must show: [F]irst, that there is no reasonable governmental interest being advanced by the present zoning classification itself ... or [S]econdly, that an ordinance may be unreasonable because of the purely arbitrary, capricious and unfounded exclusion of other types of legitimate land use from the area in question. [ Kirk v Tyrone Twp, 398 Mich 429, 434; 247 NW2d 848 (1976).] There are four rules for applying these principles: 1. `[T]he ordinance comes to us clothed with every presumption of validity.' 2. `[I]t is the burden of the party attacking to prove affirmatively that the ordinance is an arbitrary and unreasonable restriction upon the owner's use of his property.... It must appear that the clause attacked is an arbitrary fiat, a whimsical ipse dixit, and that there is no room for a legitimate difference of opinion concerning its reasonableness.' 3. Michigan has adopted the view that to sustain an attack on a zoning ordinance, an aggrieved property owner must show that if the ordinance is enforced the consequent restrictions on his property preclude its use for any purposes to which it is reasonably adapted. 4. `This Court, however, is inclined to give considerable weight to the findings of the trial judge in equity cases.' [ Kirk, supra, 439-440. Citations omitted.] We disagree with plaintiff that the existence of eleven single-wide homes in the plat renders the ordinance unreasonable to plaintiff. Notwithstanding the eleven mobile homes, the zoning ordinance will improve the aesthetics of the area, thereby advancing a reasonable government interest. Moreover, the state may properly provide for the limitation and eventual elimination of a nonconforming use in order to advance the goals of the zoning plan. Austin v Older, 283 Mich 667, 676; 278 NW 727 (1938). We also conclude that plaintiff has not carried its burden of establishing that if the ordinance is enforced, any purpose to which the land is reasonably adapted is precluded. As the trial court found, the ordinance did not deprive plaintiff of other uses of his land, since the evidence indicated that the vacant lots would sell for conventional or modular home occupancy if the asking price was realistic and if screening was provided for the existing mobile homes. We further agree with the Court of Appeals that plaintiff cannot establish a confiscation by simply showing a disparity in value between uses. Brae Burn, Inc v Bloomfield Hills, 350 Mich 425; 86 NW2d 166 (1957); Kirk v Tyrone Twp, 398 Mich 429; 247 NW2d 848 (1976). Justice SMITH pointed out in Brae Burn, Inc v Bloomfield Hills, supra, 433-434: Disparity in values between residential and commercial uses will always exist.... If such a showing serves to invalidate an ordinance the efforts of our people to determine their living conditions will be hopeless. To avoid confiscation in this sense (the obtaining of the highest dollar for one particular lot) will result in confiscation of far greater scope in property values in the municipality as a whole due to its inability to control its growth and development. We stress that this is not a situation where the property is unsuitable for the uses allowed by the zoning ordinance and has little or no value if so restricted. Compare Fenner v Muskegon, 331 Mich 732; 50 NW2d 210 (1951). Therefore, the issue of confiscation is not properly before us. See Brae Burn, supra . In summary, we find that plaintiff has not established that the zoning is unconstitutional either on its face or as applied to plaintiff.