Opinion ID: 1350669
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: preexisting law

Text: In State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986), we recognized preexisting state law as one of the noninclusive factors that may be of benefit in determining the coverage of the Washington Constitution: Previously established bodies of state law, including statutory law, may also bear on the granting of distinctive state constitutional rights. State law may be responsive to concerns of its citizens long before they are addressed by analogous constitutional claims. Preexisting law can thus help to define the scope of a constitutional right later established. Gunwall, at 61-62. The majority relies on the fact that there were statutes penalizing the distribution of obscene material before and after the ratification of the Washington Constitution (Laws of 1885, p. 122-23; Laws of 1891, ch. 69, § 24) to conclude that obscenity is not protected. This analysis is misguided. The true focus of this Gunwall factor should be on whether the constitution responds to a concern already addressed by legislation. An example of how this analysis should apply is found in Gunwall itself. This court found the fact that this state has a long history of extending strong protections to telephonic communications lends strong support to extending broader protections under the state constitution than the United States Constitution for such communications. Gunwall, at 66. The majority's approach is to limit the scope of a constitutional provision through statutes that violate its explicit terms. This is surely unintended. If anything is clear it is that the constitution overrides statutes. Const. art. 27, § 2 (only laws that are not repugnant to the constitution remain in force). The fundamental strength of the constitution is that it forces us, having declared basic principles, to apply those principles uniformly, even if such a result may not be popular in some instances and even where we must nullify a statute. See Const. art. 1, § 32 (fundamental principles). The majority's analysis would seem to diminish the dignity and courage of our constitution, which was designed to protect speech even where it is repugnant to the majority of citizens. Moreover, the majority has not considered how its analysis would require us to find constitutional restrictions of free speech simply because such restrictions were part of the statutory scheme around the time of the ratification of the constitution. In fact, the logical extension of the majority's analysis, which in essence relies exclusively on the existence of statutes at the time of the ratification of the constitution as defining the scope of a constitutional protection, is that statutes enacted in the late 19th century have special immunity from constitutional challenges and can in fact control now in situations far from the intent of drafters of those statutes. As discussed above, a finding that RCW 9.68.140 is unconstitutional does not prevent regulation of the pornography industry and reasonable time, place and manner restrictions. A successful struggle against pornography can be waged without the passage of laws that effectively totally ban offensive expression.