Opinion ID: 1197916
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: State's Failure to Disclose Felony Conviction of Witness

Text: At the presentencing hearing on March 5, 1993, defendant's counsel informed the court of his recent discovery that the state had failed to disclose that one of the state's guilt phase witnesses, Michael Smith, had prior convictions for felony embezzlement and felony misapplication by a bank employee and had served a two-year sentence in California. On March 25, defendant filed a supplemental motion for new trial alleging that Smith's undisclosed felony conviction was yet another reason for granting defendant a new trial. At a hearing on the motion, defendant said that he had also learned that Smith had another embezzlement arrest. The trial court ordered the state to provide the disclosure required by rule 15.1(a)(7), but later denied defendant's motion for new trial stating that the prosecutor's failure to disclose was inadvertent, and the felony conviction would have had no effect on the verdict. Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying him a new trial because he could have used this information to show that Smith may have murdered Jeanette. Motions for new trial are disfavored and should be granted with great caution. State v. Rankovich, 159 Ariz. 116, 121, 765 P.2d 518, 523 (1988). This court will not disturb a trial court's denial of a motion for new trial absent an abuse of discretion. Rankovich, 159 Ariz. at 121, 765 P.2d at 523. Defendant's motion for new trial based on the state's failure to disclose was made more than three months after the jury returned its guilty verdict and was therefore untimely pursuant to rule 24.1, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Even if defendant's motion is construed as a timely motion to vacate judgment based on newly discovered evidence or a constitutional violation, defendant was still not entitled to a new trial. See rule 24.2(a)(2)-(3), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. The prosecution is required to disclose any material exculpatory evidence to the defense including all prior felony convictions of witnesses whom the prosecutor expects to call at trial. Rule 15.1(a)(7), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. At the aggravation/mitigation hearing, the deputy county attorney, John Ditsworth, conceded that he had not run records checks on any witnesses before trial because he believed that rule 15.1 only required such checks on the defendant. See rule 15.1(a)(5). The state's violation of rule 15.1(a)(7) did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation such as would require a new trial because the undisclosed conviction was not material. See State v. Borbon, 146 Ariz. 392, 396, 706 P.2d 718, 722 (1985). Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that disclosure of the evidence to the defense would have changed the outcome of the proceeding. Borbon, 146 Ariz. at 396, 706 P.2d at 722. Smith was the personnel director at Jeanette's place of employment, and he testified that: (1) Jeanette was not at work on January 6, 1992; (2) he later learned that she had called to request a leave of absence for a family problem; (3) Jeanette's mother had called her place of work around mid-January looking for her daughter; and (4) Smith had called the police after a co-worker had seen a news bulletin about an unidentified body and had recognized some of Jeanette's personal belongings. Smith's prior felony convictions could only have been used for impeachment purposes under rule 609(a), Arizona Rules of Evidence, and it is likely that other employees could have verified Smith's factual testimony. Defendant could not have used the convictions or subsequent arrest to show that Smith committed the murder because none of that evidence had an inherent tendency to connect Smith to Jeanette's death. See State v. Fulminante, 161 Ariz. 237, 252, 778 P.2d 602, 617 (1988), aff'd, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (Before a defendant may introduce evidence that another person may have committed the crime, the defendant must show that the evidence has an inherent tendency to connect such other person with the actual commission of the crime.). Under these circumstances, we agree with the trial court that a new trial was not warranted because disclosure of Smith's prior conviction would not have changed the jury verdict.