Opinion ID: 2303773
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Strict Scrutiny Review

Text: [¶20] A regulation will survive strict scrutiny only if it is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and ... it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. 948. Whether the State has articulated a compelling interest sufficient to survive the first prong of the strict scrutiny analysis is a determination we review de novo. See Anderson v. Town of Durham, 2006 ME 39, ¶ 19, 895 A.2d 944, 951.

[¶21] The State asserts that its general interest in accuracy and truth in the political process constitutes a compelling state interest. Although the government's interest may be a laudable one, great care is in order whenever the government seeks to restrict campaign speech. The U.S. Supreme Court has cautioned that any claim by a state that it is `enhancing the ability of its citizenry to make wise decisions by restricting the flow of information to them must be viewed with some skepticism.' Eu, 489 U.S. at 228, 109 S.Ct. 1013 (quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 221, 107 S.Ct. 544, 93 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986)). A state cannot substitute its judgment as to how best to speak for that of speakers and listeners. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 791, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988). [4] [¶22] Applying this admonition, the Supreme Court of Washington struck down, as facially invalid, a law similar to 21-A M.R.S. § 1014-A. State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm'n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 135 Wash.2d 618, 957 P.2d 691 (1998). The Washington statute prohibited any person from sponsoring, with actual malice, a political advertisement containing a false statement of material fact. Id. at 693 (citing Wash. Rev.Code § 42.17.530(1)(a) (1988)); see also Rickert v. Pub. Disclosure Comm'n, 161 Wash.2d 843, 168 P.3d 826 (2007) (invalidating on similar grounds a subsequent amendment to the statute limiting prohibited statements to those made about a candidate for public office). In evaluating the constitutionality of the Washington statute, the court distinguished the statute from those reviewed in cases such as Burson, 504 U.S. 191, 112 S.Ct. 1846, where the Court upheld a statute that restricted potential voter intimidation by those campaigning physically too close to the voting booths. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d at 698. [¶23] Maine's section 1014-A is similar to the Washington statute struck down by that state's Supreme Court. The statute before us effectively puts the State in the position of requiring proof of accuracy in advance of a campaign statement. This requirement does not serve to protect voters from the confusion of a chaotic and oppressive physical voting environment. Rather, it attempts to protect voters from potentially misleading or inaccurate speech, the precise action that First Amendment jurisprudence guards against. [¶24] In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court's affirmation of a state's efforts to protect voters from confusion and undue influence by preventing intimidation in the doorway of the polling place is designed to protect the very act of voting. Burson, 504 U.S. at 199, 112 S.Ct. 1846. It cannot be read to provide the government with the authority to guard the public against any statement it determines might potentially be misleading. See Eu, 489 U.S. at 228-29, 109 S.Ct. 1013. The mere possibility of voter confusion is insufficient to establish a compelling state interest. See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. ___, ___, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 1193, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008). To the contrary, a compelling state interest is much more apparent where the activity prohibited by statute interferes with the act of voting itself and the activity does not merely relate to intangible `influence' such as the printed materials employed by Mowles here. Burson, 504 U.S. at 209 n. 11, 112 S.Ct. 1846. [¶25] When the government undertakes to tell politicians what they can and cannot say in the course of an election, we must all be cautious. The government may restrict the speech of political candidates only when it can clearly advance a compelling reason for the restriction. Avoiding substantive confusion among the voters regarding political issues simply does not present such a compelling interest. Indeed, it has been said that the appropriate cure for misleading political speech is more speech. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97, 97 S.Ct. 1614, 52 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977) (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377, 47 S.Ct. 641, 71 L.Ed. 1095 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). [¶26] In the absence of a compelling state interest, we need not opine on the further question of whether the provisions of section 1014-A are narrowly tailored to achieve the statute's general purpose of assuring accurate communications. See, e.g., McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348-49, 115 S.Ct. 1511.
[¶27] The State also contends that section 1014-A should be upheld as narrowly tailored to serve its interests in preventing fraud. The State's interest in preventing fraud and libel carries special weight during election campaigns when false statements... may have serious adverse consequences for the public at large. Id. at 349, 115 S.Ct. 1511. The Supreme Court has recognized that this interest might represent an overriding state interest sufficient to support a narrowly tailored restriction on speech. Id. at 347, 349-53, 115 S.Ct. 1511. [¶28] The restriction on speech embodied in section 1014-A is not, however, limited in application to fraudulent or libelous statements made in the context of an election. Instead, section 1014-A sweeps broadly enough to prohibit the use of an endorsement that was actually made. [¶29] The fact that the unauthorized use of an endorsement is not necessarily fraudulent is amply illustrated in this case. Mowles's use of the 2004 general election endorsements of Senators Snowe and Collins in his 2006 primary campaign was, as the Commission found, unauthorized. Mowles's flyer, however, did not misrepresent the truth because it included, albeit in smaller type, the fact that the endorsements dated back to October 2004. [¶30] Today's society is no stranger to advertising that relies on fine print and other less-than-prominent disclaimers to stay within the bounds of the truth. Although the fairness of these approaches can be questioned, they are generally not, without more, fraudulent. With respect to political endorsements, there are myriad circumstances in which a candidate might publish an endorsement without the express authorization of the endorser and not commit a fraud on the public. In any event, at no point in this proceeding has the State asserted that Mowles's use of the endorsements of Senators Snowe and Collins was fraudulent. [¶31] Free speech is accorded great value in our society. Although the State need not sit idly by and allow [its] citizens to be defrauded, Riley, 487 U.S. at 795, 108 S.Ct. 2667, it cannot seek to punish fraud indirectly by indiscriminately outlawing a category of speech, based on its content, with no necessary relationship to the danger sought to be prevented. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357, 115 S.Ct. 1511. Because section 1014-A captures far more speech within its grasp than it can legitimately hold as a fraud-preventing measure, it cannot be sustained by the State's special interest in preventing false statements in an election where time does not allow for such statements to be counterbalanced by the truth. Thus, even if the State's concern regarding fraud were supported by any fact in this record, the statute is not narrowly tailored to address that interest.