Opinion ID: 625857
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ADA Amendments

Text: Before analyzing whether the district court erred in its assessment, we must first address Steffen’s argument that the 2009 Amendments to the ADA apply to his case, as they directly implicate the standard for determining whether an employee is “regarded as” disabled by his employer. Prior to the Amendments, an employee was not “regarded as” disabled by his employer unless his employer believed he satisfied the definition of “disabled” under the ADA. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(2007). Thus, an employee believed to have an impairment was not “regarded as” disabled unless his employer believed that impairment substantially limited the employee in a major life activity. Id. The Amendments changed this standard, decreeing that “[a]n individual meets the requirement of ‘being regarded as having such an impairment’ if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102. Steffen concedes that our case law prevents him from arguing that the Amendments apply to his case. See Fredricksen v. United Parcel Serv., Co., 581 F.3d 516, 521 n.1 No. 11-2664 11 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Congress did not express its intent for [the Amendments] to apply retroactively, and so we look to the law in place prior to the amendments.”). He nonetheless cites a district court case from the District of Columbia for the proposition that the Amendments revealed Congress’ true intent when it originally passed the ADA. He urges us to follow that court and treat the Amendments as persuasive authority in interpreting the old version of the ADA. As the district court in this case rightly pointed out, however, Steffen simply repackages a retroactivity argument repeatedly rejected by this Court, see, e.g., Gratzl v. Office of Chief Judges of 12th, 18th, 19th, and 22nd Judicial Circuits, 601 F.3d 674, 679 n.3 (7th Cir. 2010), and we cannot accede to his request without shirking our obligation to “cite, quote, and apply the ADA as it stood before the amendments.” EEOC v. Autozone, Inc., 630 F.3d 635, 639 n.2 (7th Cir. 2010). Steffen secondly argues that even if the Amendments are not applied to his entire case, they should apply to his requests for future relief. Specifically, he requests that we follow the Amendments when considering injunctive relief in the form of his reinstatement. He directs us to Jenkins v. National Board of Medical Examiners, an unpublished opinion in which the Sixth Circuit held that the Amendments are appropriately applied when prospective relief is sought. No. 08-5371, 2009 WL 331638, at  (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2009). In Jenkins, a third-year medical student sought more time on his medical boards as an accommodation for his reading disorder. Id. at . The Sixth Circuit explained that “[w]hen the intervening statute authorizes or affects the propriety of prospective 12 No. 11-2664 relief, application of the new provision is not retroactive.” Id. (quoting Landsgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 273 (1994)). Thus, the Sixth Circuit evaluated the plaintiff’s claim under the new ADA. Steffen argues that the same principle should apply to his requests for prospective relief. Assuming arguendo we follow the Sixth Circuit’s application of the Amendments, Jenkins is inapt in this case. In Jenkins, the plaintiff filed his case before the Amendments were passed, but the alleged violation of the ADA did not occur until after Congress amended the statute. Id. at . The plaintiff knew that he had an impending exam and wanted to secure an accommoda- tion before the test occurred. Id. The law in effect at the time of the relevant conduct—the denial of an accommodation during the examination—was the amended version of the ADA. Id. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit recognized this timing as distinguishing the case from cases in which “actions giving rise to the litigation occurred before the effective date of the amendments.” Id. at . Unlike in Jenkins, the allegedly violative actions in this case transpired before the effective date of the Amendments. The fact that Steffen asked to be reinstated for the USPS’ past transgressions does alter the fact that he is complaining of allegedly illegal behavior that took place in 2006: he does not ask this court for injunctive relief. Accord Geiger v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-636, 2009 WL 973545, at  (S.D. Ohio Apr. 10, 2009). The old version of the ADA controls this case. No. 11-2664 13