Opinion ID: 787192
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Cianci's Taped Statement

Text: 141 In 1995, a government agent posing as an air conditioning businessman taped his conversation with Cianci when he requested a city contract. Cianci assured the agent that he would refer him to Alan Sepe, who Cianci believed knew more about air conditioning matters than he did. Cianci then told the agent, [Sepe] is honest as the day is long. He deals in governments and ..... No one will ask you for a thing. If anybody does, you pick up the phone and call me. I'll cut his .... off and have him arrested, okay? The agent had said or done nothing to prompt discussion of corruption. Then, Cianci, in introducing the agent to an unidentified man, remarked, He's probably an FBI agent. 142 The district court refused to admit this tape on relevancy grounds, holding that the conversation in it does not relate to any predicate act or to any specific matter with respect to which the Government has presented any evidence. In response to Cianci's argument that the statements were admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, see Fed.R.Evid. 803(3), the court concluded, This statement or the import of the statement is to show what Mr. Cianci did or didn't do on other occasions with respect to unrelated matters, so therefore it does not fall under the exception to the hearsay rule created by Rule 803(3) for state of mind existing at the time of the event in question. Cianci argues that the district court's refusal to admit this taped statement in evidence was an abuse of discretion and violated his right to due process. Colasanto v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 100 F.3d 203, 213 (1st Cir.1996). 143 The district court deemed Cianci's taped statement irrelevant because it did not relate to any predicate act or to any specific matter with respect to which the Government has presented any evidence. Cianci argues that the court failed to recognize the statement's relevance to the RICO charges in general. He asserts that the statement tends to make the existence of the enterprise less likely than without the statement, Fed.R.Evid. 401, and that the court conflat[ed] the provisions of Rule 803(3) ... with the relevancy requirements of Rule 401. 144 Cianci recapitulates that if the statement in the tape is hearsay, it falls within the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. Fed.R.Evid. 803(3). To be admissible under this exception, a declaration, among other things, must `mirror a state of mind, which, in light of all the circumstances, including proximity in time, is reasonably likely to have been the same condition existing at the material time.' Colasanto, 100 F.3d at 212 (quoting 2 John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 274 (4th ed.1992)). Cianci contends that the statement evinces a contemporaneous intent not to endorse bribery in his administration, rather than a statement denying past instances of corrupt acts. In addition to adopting the district court's conclusion that the statement evinced a state of mind as to events or behavior on other occasions, the government argues that Cianci's statements were self-serving, and hence outside the ambit of Rule 803(3), because he knew that he was talking to a federal agent. 145 As an initial matter, the taped statement is hearsay. Cianci offered it to prove the truth of the assertion that Cianci did not tolerate corruption. Another thing is certain: the statement was not admissible in order to show what Cianci might have done or not done on other occasions not proximate to the time the statement was uttered. The only purpose for which the statement could have been admitted would have been to establish Cianci's state of mind at the time the statement was made. Because disputes over whether particular statements come within the state-of-mind exception are fact-sensitive, the trial court is in the best position to resolve them. Colasanto, 100 F.3d at 212. That the statement was made at one point during the time of charged conspiracy cannot be sufficient to mandate its admission, especially where the latter part of the statement — He's probably an FBI agent — places doubt on what Cianci claims is the probative value and relevance of the statement as a whole. Whether Cianci's statement is forward-looking or refers to past acts and events is unclear from the statement itself. This issue is further complicated by the fact that Cianci's mention of pay-offs was gratuitous and not provoked by anything the agent said or did. Hence, it was within the district court's discretion to conclude that the statement, at least in part, applied to past acts of the Cianci administration and were to a large extent self-serving attempts to cover tracks already made. Such observations are well-established grounds for non-admission. See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 264 F.3d 535, 549 (5th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1016, 122 S.Ct. 1605, 152 L.Ed.2d 620 (2002); United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1265-66 (9th Cir.1989); United States v. Jackson, 780 F.2d 1305, 1313-15 (7th Cir.1986). Thus, as the district court determined that Cianci sought to admit the statement to show that he did not and does not take bribes or engage in corrupt activity, we are loath to disturb the court's exercise of discretion to deny admission of the statement.
146 Cianci claims that by denying admission of his taped statement, the district court violated his Fifth Amendment due process right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 687, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986). We review this claim for plain error because it was not raised at trial. Under plain error review, the defendant must show (1) that an error occurred (2) which was obvious in the sense that governing law was clearly settled to the contrary, (3) affected the defendant's substantial rights, and (4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Gomez, 255 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir.2001). 147 Application of evidentiary rules do not abridge an accused's right to present a defense so long as they are not `arbitrary' or `disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.' ... [W]e have found the exclusion of evidence to be unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate only where it has infringed upon a weighty interest of the accused. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998) (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987)). We have described the Supreme Court's rule as overturning convictions only in egregious cases. Fortini v. Murphy, 257 F.3d 39, 47 (1st Cir.2001). Cianci outlines his weighty interest as his effort to disprove the government's theory of criminal intent. Even if we were to give some exculpatory value to the statement, given the amount of evidence of Cianci's criminal knowledge and intent presented at trial, its absence from the evidence does not rise to an egregious violation of Cianci's interest in defeating this part of the government's case. Arguably, the statement itself indicates that Cianci knew he was talking to an FBI agent. Regardless, the court acted well within its discretion in determining that Cianci's taped statement did not pass muster under Rule 401 and that its value, if any, fell outside of Rule 803(3)'s exception to the hearsay rule. Accordingly, we conclude that the court's refusal to admit his taped statement did not constitute error, let alone plain error, and thus, Cianci's due process claim fails.