Opinion ID: 2382190
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Heading: The New York Statute

Text: The New York statutory provision at issue states in pertinent part: § 1192. Operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 1. Driving while ability impaired. No person shall operate a motor vehicle while the person's ability to operate such motor vehicle is impaired by the consumption of alcohol. 2. Driving while intoxicated; per se. No person shall operate a motor vehicle while such person has .10 of one per centum or more by weight of alcohol in the person's blood as shown by chemical analysis of such person's blood, breath, urine or saliva, made pursuant to the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-four of this article. 3. Driving while intoxicated. No person shall operate a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law §§ 1192(1)-(3). In the Petrovick and Frantz appeals, the Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court's reversal of the suspension based upon its reasoning in Olmstead v. Dept. of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 677 A.2d 1285 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1996), aff'd per curiam, 550 Pa. 578, 707 A.2d 1144 (1998). The appellant in Olmstead argued that Pennsylvania had no offense that was essentially similar to New York's DWAI law, N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1192(1); to the contrary, Pennsylvania's DUI statute, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731, was substantially akin to a different provision, New York's Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) Law. In order to interpret the provisions of the New York statute, the Commonwealth Court looked to the reasoning in People v. Cruz, 48 N.Y.2d 419, 423 N.Y.S.2d 625, 399 N.E.2d 513 (1979), appeal dismissed, 446 U.S. 901, 100 S.Ct. 1825, 64 L.Ed.2d 254 (1980), in which the Court of Appeals of New York enunciated the distinctions between impairment under § 1192(1) and intoxication under § 1192(3). As to impairment under § 1192(1), the Court of Appeals explained that the pertinent inquiry is whether, by voluntarily consuming alcohol, this particular defendant actually impaired, to any extent, the physical and mental abilities which he is expected to possess in order to operate a vehicle as a reasonable and prudent driver. Cruz, 423 N.Y.S.2d 625, 399 N.E.2d at 516. Intoxication, for purposes of § 1192(3), is a greater degree of impairment which is reached when the driver has voluntarily consumed alcohol to the extent that he is incapable of employing the physical and mental abilities which he is expected to possess in order to operate a vehicle as a reasonable and prudent driver. 423 N.Y.S.2d 625, 399 N.E.2d at 517. The Commonwealth Court in Olmstead concluded that New York failed to report that Olmstead had driven while under the influence of alcohol to a degree that he was incapable of driving safely, and thus, DOT could not suspend his license under Article IV(a)(2). [6] Id. at 1288. The Commonwealth Court in Olmstead did not follow the analysis we have set forth today. Nevertheless, we find the distinctions in Cruz to be compelling. In rejecting the Olmstead court's reasoning, PennDOT's arguments center on why Pennsylvania's statute and New York's statute are substantially similar. First, PennDOT contends that both statutes only require that a licensee's ability to safely operate a motor vehicle be impaired, not intoxicated. In light of the distinctions drawn by the Cruz court, we find no merit in this contention. Second, PennDOT claims that the Commonwealth Court in Olmstead unduly relied on the BAC levels of the New York statute. To the contrary, we find that the Olmstead court properly based its decision upon the distinctions set forth by the Cruz court. Third, PennDOT claims that other party states to the Compact have found that New York's DWAI statute is substantially similar to that party state's statute. See, e.g., Montanye v. State, 262 Mont. 258, 864 P.2d 1234 (1993); State v. Regan, 209 N.J.Super. 596, 508 A.2d 1149 (1986); Przybyla v. South Carolina Dept. of Highways & Public Transp., 313 S.C. 116, 437 S.E.2d 70 (1993). We are not persuaded by the reasoning of any of these cases. PennDOT argues that the recent addition of section 1586 to the Compact indicates the General Assembly's rejection of the Commonwealth Court's reasoning in Olmstead and its progeny. Section 1586, entitled Duties of Department, provides: The department shall, for purposes of imposing a suspension or revocation under Article IV of the compact, treat reports of convictions received from party states that relate to driving, operating or being in actual physical control of a vehicle while impaired by or under the influence of alcohol, intoxicating liquor, drugs, narcotics, controlled substances or other impairing or intoxicating substance as being substantially similar to section 3731 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance). The fact that the offense reported to the department by a party state may require a different degree of impairment of a person's ability to operate, drive or control a vehicle than that required to support a conviction for a violation of section 3731 shall not be a basis for determining that the party state's offense is not substantially similar to section 3731 for purposes of Article IV of the compact. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1586, 1998, Dec. 21, P.L. 1126, No. 151, § 21, imd. effective. PennDOT argues that this section should be persuasive, even if, as PennDOT concedes, it is not directly applicable to cases heard prior to December 21, 1998, the date upon which the amendment became effective. However, our rules of statutory construction provide that the new provision shall be construed as effective only from the date upon which the amendment became effective. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1953. The legislature cannot create retroactive authority by passing clarifying legislation. Commonwealth v. Shaffer, J-181A-1998 ( citing St. Joseph Lead Co. & Koppers Co., Inc. v. Potter Township, 398 Pa. 361, 157 A.2d 638, 642 (1959)). Rather, an amendment to a statutory provisions can be applied retroactively only if the General Assembly specifically provides for such application in the provisions of the statute, Commonwealth v. Scoleri, 399 Pa. 110, 160 A.2d 215, 227(Pa.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 849, 81 S.Ct. 93, 5 L.Ed.2d 72 (1960), or if the legislation is a procedural law, rather than a substantive law which affects a party's rights. See Morabito's Auto Sales v. Dept. of Transportation, 552 Pa. 291, 715 A.2d 384, 386 (1998) (citation omitted). Because the General Assembly did not provide for retroactive application of section 1586, and because retroactive application of this amendment likely would affect the substantive rights of Appellees, we cannot base our decision on this provision. We may affirm the decision of a lower court if the result is correct on any ground without regards to the grounds which the trial court itself relied upon. E.J. McAleer & Co. v. Iceland Products, Inc., 475 Pa. 610, 381 A.2d 441, 443 n. 4 (1977). Although the lower courts in the Frantz and Petrovick appeals erred in their analyses, we conclude that they correctly determined that New York's DWAI law does not provide a basis for reciprocal suspension for purposes of Article IV of the Driver License Compact. [7]