Opinion ID: 836210
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: present injuries under the torts alleged

Text: Plaintiffs sued under negligence and nuisance theories. To prove negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate a present physical injury to person or property in addition to economic losses that result from that injury. Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 473 Mich. 63, 75-76, 701 N.W.2d 684 (2005) (Henry I) (emphasis in original). Henry I created a bright line rule by unambiguously requiring a plaintiff alleging negligence to prove present physical injury. Here, plaintiffs cannot show that each land parcel in the 100-year flood plain is presently contaminated with pollution alleged to have originated from Dow's activities. Indeed, studies by the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) expressly show that some of the land is not contaminated. Because the owners of uncontaminated property do not have present physical injuries, they cannot allege negligence under Michigan law. Accordingly, plaintiffs argue that even the uncontaminated properties suffer present injury in fact under a nuisance theory because they may become contaminated in the future. But Dow correctly argues that the purported injury in fact to many of these properties is too speculative to be recognized in Michigan. To prove private nuisance, a plaintiff must show substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of his land. Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 440 Mich. 293, 303-304, 487 N.W.2d 715 (1992). [2] Because a nuisance is a nontrespassory invasion, a plaintiff need not show physical intrusion upon his land to prove nuisance. Id. at 302, 487 N.W.2d 715. There are countless ways to interfere with the use and enjoyment of land including interference with the physical condition of the land itself, disturbance in the comfort or conveniences of the occupant including his peace of mind, and threat of future injury that is a present menace and interference with enjoyment. [ Id. at 303, 487 N.W.2d 715.] Significantly, although nuisance may involve `threatening or impending danger,' id., quoting Kilts v. Kent Co. Supervisors, 162 Mich. 646, 651, 127 N.W. 821 (1910), a plaintiff cannot prove nuisance where damage and injury are both predicated on unfounded fear of third parties that depreciates property values, id. at 312, 487 N.W.2d 715. [P]roperty depreciation alone is insufficient to constitute a nuisance. Id. at 311, 487 N.W.2d 715. Here, the facts presented by plaintiffs do not suggest that all or even most of the 2,000 proposed class members can allege cognizable nuisance claims. As noted, the DEQ reports that many parcels of land are not physically contaminated. Many more parcels have not even been tested, were never subject to flooding, and are very unlikely to experience flooding even during the next century. Crucially, the DEQ's restrictions apply only to contaminated or frequently flooded landnot to all land in the 100-year flood plain. [3] Because the class was defined on the sole basis of the geographic boundaries of the 100-year flood plain, much of the circumscribed land has only a one percent chance of flooding in a given year. See ante at 317 n. 1 (Young, J.). Moreover, the degree of risk of contamination from future flooding is questionable and somewhat speculative; Dow has already altered its activities and begun remediating past contamination of the river as was required, in part, by the DEQ. [4] Accordingly, although some landowners may be able to allege present harm from nuisance, many residents of the flood plain certainly cannot. Indeed, the land that is not presently contaminated, that has a low risk of flooding in the future, and that has a largely speculative risk of actual contamination as a result of future flooding, is comparable to the land in Adkins where the plaintiffs sought damages based on diminished property values they alleged were caused by contamination in the surrounding area. These plaintiffs' land was not actually contaminated; a groundwater divide prevented the migration of toxic chemicals from the surrounding land. Adkins, 440 Mich. at 299-300, 318, 487 N.W.2d 715. The Court held that fearbased diminution in property values was an insufficient basis for relief, stating: Under such a theory, a cause of action could be stated on behalf of any individual who could demonstrate an effect on property values even if the polluted ground water had neither strayed from defendants' own property, nor disturbed a plaintiffs enjoyment by the fear that it would do so. If any property owner in the vicinity of the numerous hazardous waste sites that have been identified can advance a claim seeking damages when unfounded public fears of exposure cause property depreciation, the ultimate effect might be a reordering of a polluter's resources for the benefit of persons who have suffered no cognizable harm at the expense of those claimants who have been subjected to a substantial and unreasonable interference in the use and enjoyment of property. [ Id. at 318-319, 487 N.W.2d 715.] The very problem identified in Adkins is present here. Plaintiffs argue that property values throughout the flood plain have been diminished in part as a result of DEQ warnings to residents concerning possible contamination and steps residents should take to avoid harmful exposure to dioxin-contaminated soil; residents were told, for example, that children and gardeners should avoid prolonged exposure to contaminated soil and that certain steps were required if residents wished to move or dispose of such soil. But the DEQ itself also reported that various areas of the flood plain were not harmfully contaminated, and the state-promulgated restrictions applied only to contaminated or, at most, frequently flooded land. Indeed, the depositions of some flood plain residents explicitly revealed that these residents were not directly affected by pollution and had not altered the use of their land in any way as a result of Dow's alleged polluting activities. Thus, many proposed class members would be able to argue at most that their property values decreased simply as a result of publicity concerning pollution of the Tittabawassee River in part due to this lawsuit. But this is precisely the sort of unfounded fear that the Adkins Court concluded could not underlie a nuisance claim. Finally, the 170 or so plaintiffs who moved for class certification risk the very problem identified in Adkins; by attempting to certify 2,000 class members, most of whom obviously had not yet chosen to participate in the suit and many of whom may not be able to allege damages from present injuries, the plaintiffs virtually guarantee both that Dow's resources will be stretched to defend uncognizable claims at the expense of those plaintiffs who suffer actual harm and that any fear-based diminution in property values throughout the flood plain will accelerate as a result of the overbroad class definition. [5] Indeed, not only does the proposed class definition incorrectly suggest that undamaged land is indeed damaged in some way, but the definition likely would suspend all flood plain residents' abilities to sell undamaged land throughout the pendency of this suit, which is already over six years old.