Opinion ID: 2707
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Judgment as a Matter of Law on the Basis of Qualified Immunity

Text: Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); see, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); Coons v. Casabella, 284 F.3d 437, 440-41 (2d Cir.2002) ( Coons ); Cerrone v. Brown, 246 F.3d 194, 199 (2d Cir.2001) ( Cerrone ). Where the right at issue in the circumstances confronting police officers  here, the right not to be subjected to a warrantless arrest without probable cause  was clearly established but was violated, the officers will nonetheless be entitled to qualified immunity if . . . it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their acts did not violate those rights. Oliveira v. Mayer, 23 F.3d 642, 648 (2d Cir.1994) ( Oliveira ), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1076, 115 S.Ct. 721, 130 L.Ed.2d 627 (1995); see, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). The qualified immunity test is an objective one. [I]f officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to whether probable cause existed, immunity should be recognized. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). But if, on an objective basis, it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that probable cause existed, [d]efendants will not be immune. . . . Id. Whether a defendant officer's conduct was objectively reasonable is a mixed question of law and fact. See, e.g., Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir.2004) ( Kerman ); Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 420-21 (2d Cir.1995) ( Lennon ); Oliveira, 23 F.3d at 649-50; Warren v. Dwyer, 906 F.2d 70, 76 (2d Cir.) ( Warren ), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967, 111 S.Ct. 431, 112 L.Ed.2d 414 (1990). The ultimate question of whether it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that his conduct did not violate a clearly established right, i.e., whether officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to the lawfulness of such conduct, is to be decided by the court. However, [a] contention thatnotwithstanding a clear delineation of the rights and duties of the respective parties at the time of the acts complained of  it was objectively reasonable for the official to believe that his acts did not violate those rights `has its principal focus on the particular facts of the case.' Kerman, 374 F.3d at 109 (quoting Hurlman v. Rice, 927 F.2d 74, 78-79 (2d Cir.1991)); see, e.g., Oliveira, 23 F.3d at 649-50. If there is no dispute as to the material historical facts, the matter of whether the officer's conduct was objectively reasonable is an issue of law to be determined by the court. See, e.g., Lennon, 66 F.3d at 421; Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir.1987). [I]f there is such a dispute, however, the factual questions must be resolved by the factfinder. Kerman, 374 F.3d at 109; see, e.g., Oliveira, 23 F.3d at 649; Calamia v. City of New York, 879 F.2d 1025, 1036 (2d Cir.1989). Once the jury has resolved any disputed facts that are material to the qualified immunity issue, the ultimate determination of whether the officer's conduct was objectively reasonable is to be made by the court. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Doe, 332 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir.2003) (after the district court receives  the jury['s] . . . deci[sion as to] what the facts were that the officer faced or perceived,  the court then may make the ultimate legal determination of whether qualified immunity attaches on those facts (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added)); Lennon, 66 F.3d at 421 (the ultimate question of entitlement to qualified immunity is one of law for the court to decide [o]nce disputed factual issues are resolved (internal quotation marks omitted)); Warren, 906 F.2d at 76 (If there are unresolved factual issues which prevent an early disposition of the defense, the jury should decide these issues. . . . The ultimate legal determination whether . . . a reasonable police officer should have known he acted unlawfully should be made by the court on the facts found by the jury.); accord id. at 76, 77 (Winter, J., dissenting) (Although the ultimate decision regarding the qualified immunity defense is for the court, the court [that is] ruling on the qualified immunity issue must know what the facts were that the officer faced or perceived, and the finding of those facts appears to be a matter for the jury.). Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980). [B]ecause qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, it is incumbent upon the defendant to plead, and adequately develop, a qualified immunity defense during pretrial proceedings so that the trial court can determine . . . which facts material to the qualified immunity defense must be presented to the jury to determine its applicability once the case has gone to trial. Blissett v. Coughlin, 66 F.3d 531, 538 (2d Cir.1995) (emphasis added). To the extent that a particular finding of fact is essential to a determination by the court that the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, it is the responsibility of the defendant to request that the jury be asked the pertinent question. See, e.g., id. If the defendant does not make such a request, he is not entitled to have the court, in lieu of the jury, make the needed factual finding. See, e.g., Kerman, 374 F.3d at 120; see also Warren, 906 F.2d at 76 (the jury should decide these issues on special interrogatories).
Probable cause to arrest exists when the officers have knowledge of, or reasonably trustworthy information as to, facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 n. 9, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161-62, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925); Lee v. Sandberg, 136 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir.1997). Probable cause is to be assessed on an objective basis. Whether probable cause exists depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004). [A]n arresting officer's state of mind ( except for the facts that he knows ) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (reviewing cases); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) ( per curiam ). Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153, 125 S.Ct. 588 (emphasis added). Thus, an officer's subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause, id. ; an arrest is not unlawful so long as the officer has knowledge of, or reasonably trustworthy information as to, facts and circumstances sufficient to provide probable cause to believe that the person arrested has committed any crime, see, e.g., id. at 155, 125 S.Ct. 588; Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir.2006) ([A] plaintiff is not entitled to damages under § 1983 for false arrest so long as the arrest itself was supported by probable cause, regardless of whether probable cause supported any individual charge identified by the arresting officer at the time of arrest.). The existence of probable cause need not be assessed on the basis of the knowledge of a single officer. [A]n arrest . . . is permissible where the actual arresting or searching officer lacks the specific information to form the basis for probable cause or reasonable suspicion but sufficient information to justify the arrest or search was known by other law enforcement officials initiating or involved with the investigation. United States v. Colon, 250 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir.2001); see, e.g., United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 230-33, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985). This principle, known as the collective or imputed knowledge doctrine, recognizes that, in light of the complexity of modern police work, the arresting officer cannot always be aware of every aspect of an investigation; sometimes his authority to arrest a suspect is based on facts known only to his superiors or associates. United States v. Valez, 796 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1067, 107 S.Ct. 957, 93 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1987); see, e.g., United States v. Colon, 250 F.3d at 135. Where it has been conceded or established that the officers arrested the plaintiff without a warrant and without probable cause, the question raised by the qualified immunity defense is whether it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe they did have probable cause. Referring to this standard as arguable probable cause, we have stated that [a]rguable probable cause exists when a reasonable police officer in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the officer in question could have reasonably believed that probable cause existed in the light of well established law. Lee v. Sandberg, 136 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Cerrone, 246 F.3d at 202-03 (emphasis in original); see also Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir.2004) (Arguable probable cause exists `if either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.' (quoting Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir. 1991))). Although the tests for probable cause and arguable probable cause are thus not congruent, see, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640-41, 107 S.Ct. 3034, the concept of probable cause is the same in both inquiries. Probable cause existed if `at the moment the arrest was made . . . the facts and circumstances within the [officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing' that [the suspect] had violated the law, Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964)) (emphasis ours); and an officer sued under the Fourth Amendment for false arrest is entitled to immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed,  Hunter, 502 U.S. at 228, 112 S.Ct. 534 (emphasis added). Accordingly, like the probable cause analysis, the analysis of a qualified immunity defense to claims that official actions were taken without probable cause entails an inquiry into the facts known to the officer at the time of the arrest, Coons, 284 F.3d at 441. A court must evaluate the objective reasonableness of the appellants' conduct `in light of . . . the information the . . . officers possessed.' Cerrone, 246 F.3d at 202 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034). `Arguable' probable cause must not be misunderstood to mean `almost' probable cause. Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 87 (2d Cir.2007). The essential inquiry in determining whether qualified immunity is available to an officer accused of false arrest is whether it was objectively reasonable for the officer to conclude that probable cause existed. See Anderson [v. Creighton ], 483 U.S. [635] at 644 [107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)]. . . . There should be no doubt that probable cause remains the relevant standard. If officers of reasonable competence would have to agree that the information possessed by the officer at the time of arrest did not add up to probable cause, the fact that it came close does not immunize the officer. Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d at 87 (emphasis added); see also Cerrone, 246 F.3d at 202-03 (arguable probable cause focuses on the objectively reasonable belief of a reasonable police officer in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the officer in question (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In considering a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the district court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence . . . . Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge. . . . Thus, although the court should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, 530 U.S. 133, 150-51, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)) (emphases ours). Thus, a court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law only if it can conclude that, with credibility assessments made against the moving party and all inferences drawn against the moving party, a reasonable juror would have been compelled to accept the view of the moving party. Piesco v. Koch, 12 F.3d 332, 343 (2d Cir.1993) (emphasis added). In ruling on such a motion, the court must bear in mind that the jury is free to believe part and disbelieve part of any witness's testimony. See, e.g., Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319, 325 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 922, 107 S.Ct. 1384, 94 L.Ed.2d 698 (1987); see also Haywood v. Koehler, 78 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir.1996) (jurors are free to accept bits of testimony from several witnesses and to make reasonable inferences from whatever testimony they credit[]). Incontrovertible evidence relied on by the moving party, such as a relevant videotape whose accuracy is unchallenged, should be credited by the court on such a motion if it so utterly discredits the opposing party's version that no reasonable juror could fail to believe the version advanced by the moving party. See Scott v. Harris, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1775-76, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (so holding with respect to proceedings on summary judgment); see generally Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (the standard for granting summary judgment `mirrors' the standard for judgment as a matter of law, such that `the inquiry under each is the same' (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 250-51, 106 S.Ct. 2505)). The court is not permitted to find as a fact a proposition that is contrary to a finding made by the jury. See, e.g., Smith v. Lightning Bolt Productions, Inc., 861 F.2d 363, 367 (2d Cir.1988) (court cannot . . . substitute its judgment for that of the jury (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 430 (2d Cir.1995) (In ruling on the motion by [one codefendant] for judgment as a matter of law, . . . the court was required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the [individual] plaintiffs; whatever its own view of the facts may have been, the court was not entitled to substitute its view for adequately supported findings that were implicit in the jury's verdict against another defendant.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1017, 116 S.Ct. 2546, 135 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1996). Nor is the court permitted to make findings on factual questions not submitted to the jury where those findings take the evidence in the light most favorable to the moving party, rather than the opposing party. See, e.g., Kerman, 374 F.3d at 120. We review de novo the district court's decision on a motion for judgment as a matter of law. In so doing, we apply the same standard that is required of the district court. We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was made and . . . give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that the jury might have drawn in his favor from the evidence. Black v. Finantra Capital, Inc., 418 F.3d 203, 209 (2d Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). We disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097.
In the present case, defendants seek to defend the district court's decision granting them qualified immunity as a matter of law by asserting that they had actual or arguable probable cause to arrest Zellner (a) for disorderly conduct in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 240.20(5), as charged, and (b) for other violations not charged, to wit, disorderly conduct in violation of subsections (6) and (7) of § 240.20 and obstructing the troopers' functioning in violation of Penal Law § 195.05. We conclude, applying the above principles, that the record does not support qualified immunity on any of these bases.
In support of probable cause or arguable probable cause for Zellner's arrest on the actual charge of violating § 240.20(5), which involves obstruction of traffic, defendants state principally that after the truck arrived, Zellner walked into the crowd that was in the direct path of the truck (Defendants' brief on appeal at 33); that Zellner deliberately started to sit down . . . and shouted for everybody else to do so ( id. at 7); and that during his conversation with Major Weber, Zellner crouched, squatted, or made some other movement toward the ground ( see id. at 35, 40) that reasonably could have been interpreted as an attempt to sit down in the path of the truck ( id. at 35). These contentions impermissibly disregard the evidence and the jury's verdict. First, defendants' assertion that Zellner walked into the crowd that was in the direct path of the truck (Defendants' brief on appeal at 33) is unaccompanied by any supporting citation. Moreover, if we draw all inferences in Zellner's favor, as we must, the record does not support the contention that Zellner was actually and immediately blocking the truck. Reverend Davis testified that Zellner was not with the group that was standing in front of the truck but rather was away from the road. ( See Tr. 78.) And although the videotape shows that Zellner walked into a group of people standing in and around the driveway, it is impossible to tell whether he was in the truck's direct path at any time. Second, although Major Weber and the troopers who testified at trial stated that Zellner had sat down on the ground, and some of the troopers testified that Zellner had yelled for everyone else to sit as well, the jury's rejection of that testimony is implicit in its finding that defendants failed to show that they had probable cause for Zellner's arrest for disorderly conduct. The evidence taken in the light most favorable to Zellneras we are required to view it, and the jury was at liberty to view itwas that Zellner introduced himself to Major Weber, and the two shook hands; that, in a quiet and respectful manner, Zellner said that he understood that a restraining order requiring cessation of the construction work was on the way; that he requested of Major Weber that the troopers not take any further action until the restraining order arrived; and that Zellner said he hoped that there would be evenhanded treatment of everyone. Some 20-30 seconds into this conversation, while literally still speaking to Major Weber, Zellner was grabbed from behind, pulled backwards away from Weber, and pulled and pushed to the ground. Zellner and his witnesses testified that Zellner did not sit down and that he did not attempt to sit down. Zellner did not yell everybody down to the crowd even once, much less two or three times as Major Weber testified. Zellner did not yell anything. The protestors who testified at trial, some of whom were close enough to touch Zellner before he was grabbed by the troopers, did not hear him yell anything. Even Trooper Parker, standing right behind Zellner and slightly to his right, did not hear him yell anything. Plainly the jury was not required to accept the defense version that Zellner sat down on the ground or that he yelled for anyone else to sit down. Nor is there merit in defendants' assertion, invoking the district court's findings, that [d]uring []his conversation with Major Weber (Defendants' brief on appeal at 35), Zellner made a `crouching or squatting motion towards the ground' or otherwise made ` some sort of movement that could have been interpreted as an attempt to sit down in the path of the truck ' ( id. at 40 (quoting district court opinion, 399 F.Supp.2d at 159) (emphasis ours)). The contention that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this basis is flawed for a number of reasons. First, no trooper could make the interpret[ation] hypothesized above, unless Zellner actually made a crouching, squatting, or other downward movement. Absent such a movement, there was nothing for the troopers to interpret. Whether or not Zellner made any such movement, however, was a question of fact. The court . . . found that some motion was made (Defendants' brief on appeal at 41), which obviously was a factual finding. But making findings of fact and drawing factual inferences `are jury functions, not those of a judge.' Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505). Second, as to any act that defendants contended Zellner performed, and which they wished to argue provided either probable cause or arguable probable cause for his arrest, it was incumbent on defendants to have the jury decide whether Zellner in fact performed that act. Defendants did not request that the court include in the special verdict sheet any fact-specific question as to the conduct in which Zellner engaged, including whether he sat down on the ground, or made a crouching or squatting motion, or made any movement toward the ground. No such question having been put to the jury (and answered favorably to defendants), no movement by Zellner such as crouching or squatting was established as a fact. The court was not entitled to provide the missing factual finding unless the inference the court drew was one that the jury would have been compelled to draw. No inference that Zellner made such a movement was compelled in this case. Defendants argue that the court's finding that Zellner made a `crouching or squatting motion' or some other such movement `towards the ground' was appropriate because the jury rejected Zellner's assertion that he was thrown to the ground. (Defendants' brief on appeal at 40 (quoting district court opinion, 399 F.Supp.2d at 159).) This contention disregards the record, the verdict, and the principles discussed in Part II.A.3. above. Although the jury found that Zellner did not establish that he was  throw[n] . . . to the ground (Special Verdict Answer 1 (emphasis added)), Zellner had testified that he was face-to-face with Major Weber when he was grabbed from behind, pulled backwards and down (Tr. 380) and that he was grabbed from behind and pushed down ( id. at 345). Reverend Davis testified to her observation that Zellner was taken to the ground by 4 troopers touching him. ( Id. at 58.) The photograph introduced as PX 19D, in which Zellner's body is at a 45-degree angle to the ground, shows four troopers touching Zellner: Summerlin and Parker having hold of his arms, with most of their body mass behind Zellner; Drew with his hand on Zellner's back ( see Tr. 678); and Major Weber with his left arm fully extended, leaning toward Zellner with his hand on Zellner's right shoulder. Zellner and Reverend Davis testified that PX 19D shows the precise point at which Zellner had been grabbed and was being taken to the ground, and the positions and postures of all the persons shown in that picture are entirely consistent with the testimony that Zellner was grabbed from behind and was pulled and pushed to the ground. The jury found [t]hat the events surrounding plaintiff's arrest, particularly grabbing him, . . . occurred substantially as plaintiff contends  (Special Verdict Answer 1 (emphasis added)). Zellner's being grabbed from behind and pushed and pulled down is not inconsistent with the finding that he had not been subjected to the more violent action of being throw[n] down. Further, the evidence contradicts the proposition that Zellner crouched, squatted, or otherwise moved downward in a way that could reasonably have been interpreted as an attempt to sit down. All of the troopers who testified at trial testified that Zellner dropped to the ground and actually sat. Major Weber, who was standing 6-8 inches from Zellner, testified that Zellner dropped to the ground (Tr. 134) in a split second ( id. at 135). No trooper testified that Zellner, instead of actually sitting, had made a crouching, squatting, or other motion that could have been interpreted as an attempt to sit. Having discredited the troopers' actual testimony that Zellner in fact sat, the jury was not required to infer that Zellner had instead made some lesser movement that no trooper described. Moreover, consistent with the absence of any testimony by the troopers that Zellner had crouched, squatted, or made any other such movement, Zellner's witnesses testified that Zellner was simply standing there when he was grabbed by the troopers. Wright testified that Zellner was standing, doing [n]othing. (Tr. 318.) Reverend Davis testified to her observation that, other than drinking coffee, he wasn't doing anything. ( Id. at 58.) And Gumbs, when asked what Zellner was doing with his body before he was grabbed, testified that Zellner was standing there, not sitting or anything else.  ( Id. at 307 (emphasis added).) The factual proposition that Zellner had made some movement that could reasonably have been interpreted as an attempt to sit in the path of the truck is thus inconsistent with the evidence and is a proposition that the jury, even if asked, would not have been required to accept  especially in light of its conclusions that the version of the facts presented by the troopers was not credible and that defendants' treatment of Zellner warranted the imposition of punitive damages. In sum, as the jury was entitled to credit Zellner's testimony and that of his witnesses that he had done nothing but stand and talk to Major Weber when he was grabbed and pushed and pulled down by the troopers, the jury was not compelled  and hence the court was not permitted  to find that Zellner had made some downward movement on his own. Without the fact of such a movement, there was nothing for defendants to interpret in a way that gave them even arguable probable cause. We note that it is not entirely clear that the district court found that the crouching or squatting motion it attributed to Zellner occurred during his conversation with Major Weber, for the court stated that that movement was made at some point, 399 F.Supp.2d at 159. And defendants seem to suggest that two such motions are shown in a seven-second segment of the videotape before Zellner and Major Weber met. ( See, e.g., Defendants' brief on appeal at 6 (Zellner bent down twice . . . and then walked forward to talk to Major Weber).) There are two principal problems with such an interpretation. First, that segment of the videotape shows Zellner bending forward (to put his coffee mug down briefly while he closed his coat, Zellner testified), not making a squatting or a crouching motion. Second, even if bending forward could reasonably be considered a squatting or a crouching motion, there is no evidence in the record that any trooper, at the time of Zellner's arrest, was aware of that motion. The trooper who had been instructed by Major Weber to activate the video camera did not testify at trial; there is thus no evidence that the camera was manned and that the events it captured on tape were seen by that trooper contemporaneously. Nor did any of the troopers who testified at trial claim to have seen Zellner's bending movement. Although Major Weber testified at trial that he interpreted Zellner's bending forward as practicing sitting down and instructing the crowd on how to sit down ( see Tr. 118-20), Major Weber plainly did not see that movement when it occurred. Zellner's bending motion occurred at 13:19:20 to 13:19:26 on the videotape, which was several minutes before Zellner and Major Weber met. Major Weber testified that he first saw Zellner when the two were just five feet apart, and their conversation ensued immediately. ( See id. at 172.) Major Weber's first inkling that Zellner had ever bent down came upon his viewing the videotape at trial. ( See Tr. 120 (I believe after seeing this video that was a practice run. . . .) (emphasis added).) As discussed in Part II.A.2. above, however, the existence of both probable cause and arguable probable cause must be assessed on the basis of the facts known to the officer[s] at the time of the arrest, Coons, 284 F.3d at 441; see, e.g., Hunter, 502 U.S. at 228, 112 S.Ct. 534; Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034; Cerrone, 246 F.3d at 202. Zellner's action in bending to put his coffee mug down and then to pick it up, which no trooper claimed to have seen, provided no basis for a finding of either probable cause or arguable probable cause.
Defendants' contention that they had probable cause or arguable probable cause to arrest Zellner for violating two uncharged subsections of New York's disorderly conduct statute fares no better. Those subsections provide that [a] person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, 6. He congregates with other persons in a public place and refuses to comply with a lawful order of the police to disperse; or 7. He creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which serves no legitimate purpose. N.Y. Penal Law §§ 240.20(6), (7) (emphases added). As to subsection (6), defendants do not cite to any evidence in the record to show that Zellner was given any order within the scope of § 240.20(6). Zellner testified that he was not ordered to do anything. Reverend Davis, who was standing no more than 10 feet away from Zellner and Major Weber while they were conversing, testified that she did not hear any of the troopers given Zellner an order. Major Weber did not testify that he or any other trooper gave Zellner an order, and the other troopers did not testify that they gave Zellner any order. The record does not support the contention that there was probable cause  or that any reasonably competent trooper could have concluded that there was probable cause  to arrest Zellner for violating subsection (6). As to subsection (7)  creat[ing] a hazardous . . . condition by any act which serves no legitimate purpose  defendants' probable cause and arguable probable cause contentions are doubly flawed. First, defendants point to no evidence to support a reasonable belief that Zellner himself created any hazardous condition. They assert in their brief on appeal that after the pickup truck arrived at the demonstration site and began to make a left turn into the driveway, Zellner walked into the crowd that was in the direct path of the truck (Defendants' brief on appeal at 33). However, as discussed in the preceding section, that characterization of Zellner's actions is contradicted by the testimony of Reverend Davis and by the videotape showing Zellner moving away from the road. Second, we cannot say, based on the record before us, that a reasonable officer could have believed that Zellner's conversation with Major Weber serve[d] no legitimate purpose. We must accept as true Zellner's testimony that he was quietly and respectfully conveying information to the officer in charge as to the imminent arrival of a court injunction to halt the continuation of construction and was asking for patient and evenhanded treatment in the interim. The initiation of such a 20-or 30-second conversation by the co-chair of the Town's Anti-Bias Task Force plainly has a legitimate purpose, and no reasonably competent officer could have concluded otherwise.
Section 195.05 of the Penal law, invoked by defendants in their posttrial motion and on this appeal, provides in part that [a] person is guilty of obstructing governmental administration when he intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function or prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from performing an official function, by means of . . . interference. . . . N.Y. Penal Law § 195.05. Defendants suggest that they would have had probable cause or arguable probable cause to arrest Zellner under this section for intentionally obstruct[ing], impair[ing] or perverting the State Troopers' ability to manage the situation. (Defendants' brief on appeal at 36-37 (internal quotation marks omitted).) They argue that even if Zellner did not make a movement that reasonably could have been interpreted as an attempt to sit down, it would not have been unreasonable for an officer to believe that he had probable cause to arrest Zellner based on: (1) the increasingly dangerous situation with a crowd of people causing a truck to stop on a two-lane public road and children standing, walking, and running near the truck and the road; (2) Zellner's apparent influence on the crowd; and (3) Zellner's interference with Major Weber's ability to control the situation by engaging Major Weber at the moment he was trying to diffuse [ sic ] the situation, standing in a way that forced Major Weber to turn his back on the road, and urging Major Weber not to take any action. (Defendants' brief on appeal at 37.) The record does not include sufficient evidence to support these assertions. First, as noted above, the record does not establish that Zellner himself was in the truck's direct path. No matter how tense that situation, defendants were not entitled to arrest Zellner unless there was probable cause to believe that Zellner had broken the law. Second, there was no evidence at trial as to Zellner's influence  or apparent influence  on the crowd. Major Weber testified that he did not recognize Zellner as one of the protestors ( see Tr. 172); and there was no evidence in the record that any of the troopers had knowledge or information sufficient to give them a reasonable belief that Zellner had influence over the protestors. Third, there was no evidence that Zellner's conversation with Major Weber  lasting 20-30 seconds by Major Weber's own account  interfered with the police function in any way. Major Weber indicated that he had some 20 troopers on the scene ( see Tr. 96); Weber himself was giving orders to a captain who was marshaling the troopers to deal with the truck, and the captain proceeded to try to get the truck[] in. ( Id. at 134.) Reverend Davis testified that when the crowd around the truck was ordered to disperse, it did so. ( See Tr. 80.) In the meantime, Major Weber embarked on a thorough explanation to Zellner as to the builders' desire to leave the scene to go to other projects for the next thirty days, and their need[ for] some of their equipment, for construction projects, and that the purpose of the incoming truck was to refuel equipment so they could leave ( id. at 133-34), an explanation whose expansiveness suggests that the troopers did not have a reasonable belief that Zellner was interfering with the performance of their duties. On the existing record, it would not be objectively reasonable for any reasonably competent officer to believe that the initiation by the co-chair of the Town's Anti-Bias Task Force of a 20- or 30-second conversation with the major in charge of a highly structured team of some 20 troopers, respectfully informing the major of the imminent arrival of an injunction and asking for patience and evenhanded treatment until its arrival, constitutes an obstruction of governmental administration.