Opinion ID: 1449928
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Self-Defense The Lesser Included Offense of Involuntary Manslaughter

Text: Perez first contends that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter. Perez neither requested the instruction nor objected to the trial court's failure to so instruct. (The trial court instructed the jury on first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter.) Perez argues that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have concluded that he unintentionally killed his wife while defending himself, using excessive force. The State counters that an instruction on involuntary manslaughter was not required because the evidence did not support a theory of self-defense. Specifically, the State argues that Perez's statement indicates Delores raised the knife above her head and said, Don't make me use this. Delores made no other threat and did not swing the knife or otherwise attempt to harm Perez. The State asserts that once Perez removed the knife from Delores she was unarmed and that Perez was not justified in using the knife to defend himself. We agree. In a criminal case a trial court must instruct the jury on the law applicable to the theories of all parties where there is supporting evidence. K.S.A. 21-3107(3); State v. Wilburn, 249 Kan. 678, Syl. ¶ 1, 822 P.2d 609 (1991). An instruction on a lesser included offense is not proper if from the evidence the jury could not reasonably convict the defendant of the lesser offense. In reviewing the evidence to determine if a lesser included offense instruction should have been given, we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to Perez. State v. Perkins, 248 Kan. 760, 772-73, 811 P.2d 1142 (1991). The right of self-defense is defined by K.S.A. 21-3211, which provides: A person is justified in the use of force against an aggressor when and to the extent it appears to him and he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or another against such aggressor's imminent use of lawful force. We have explained that `[u]nder the common law, the excuse for killing in self-defense is founded upon necessity, be it real or apparent.' State v. Stewart, 243 Kan. 639, 644, 763 P.2d 572 (1988). `Our test for self-defense is a two-pronged one. We first use a subjective standard to determine whether the defendant sincerely and honestly believed it necessary to kill in order to defend. We then use an objective standard to determine whether defendant's belief was reasonable  specifically, whether a reasonable person in defendant's circumstances would have perceived self-defense as necessary.' 243 Kan. at 649. When we speak of `necessary,' we mean to prevent imminent serious bodily harm. State v. Jordan, 250 Kan. 180, 185, 825 P.2d 157 (1992). Perez relies on State v. Hill, 242 Kan. 68, 744 P.2d 1228 (1987), and State v. Gregory, 218 Kan. 180, 542 P.2d 1051 (1975). However, Gregory and Hill are distinguishable. Hill and Gregory each testified that they were in fear of assault by the victim. Hill, 242 Kan. at 73; Gregory, 218 Kan. at 181. In each case, the evidence supported the existence of a reasonably necessary belief under the circumstances. During oral argument, Perez' counsel referenced State v. Clark, 218 Kan. 18, 542 P.2d 291 (1975), which was not cited in his brief. In Clark, we reversed a conviction of voluntary manslaughter because the trial court failed to give an instruction on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of the charge of second-degree murder. Clark was convicted of the Christmas season killing of his wife during a domestic argument. Clark had testified he was startled when he turned and saw that his wife was pointing a gun at him. He panicked, dropped to the floor, reached under the bed for a gun, and heard an explosion. Clark had no recollection of pulling the trigger. He then looked over at his wife, who was lying on the floor. 218 Kan. at 20. We reasoned that a jury might possibly have inferred from Clark's testimony that he did not intend to kill his wife. 218 Kan. at 22. Perez presented no evidence that he had a belief the use of force was necessary. He did not indicate that he was frightened or believed that Delores would use the knife. The inflicting of the stab wounds on Delores by Perez using two knives marks a telling factual distinction between the case at bar and Clark, and shows that any notion that self-defense was necessary was unreasonable. Perez argues that he did not intend to kill Delores. He attempts to negate intent by asserting he: (1) snapped; (2) showed remorse over the killing; (3) claimed to have attempted suicide; (4) asked police to kill him; and (5) was in a psychotic frenzy and suffered paranoia. His attempts to negate intent are not successful. The evidence of at least 43 stab wounds precludes a finding of unintentional killing without malice. The jury could not reasonably conclude that Perez was guilty of involuntary manslaughter. An instruction on involuntary manslaughter was not required. Diminished Capacity Perez contends that if the jury had been instructed on diminished capacity, it could have found that he lacked the specific intent to kill Delores, a necessary element of first-degree murder. The State asserts that Perez neither requested a diminished capacity instruction nor raised the issue below; therefore, he may not claim error on appeal. The State's assertion is correct. Absent an instruction request, we may reverse only if the trial court's failure to instruct was clearly erroneous. The failure to instruct is clearly erroneous only if we reach a firm conviction that absent the alleged error there was a real possibility the jury would have returned a different verdict. Perkins, 248 Kan. 760, Syl. ¶ 8. See K.S.A. 22-3414(3). The State also contends that because we have held that the giving of a diminished capacity instruction is a matter of judicial discretion, Perez's argument is without merit. We agree. We have recently reviewed the issue of a trial court's refusal to give a requested instruction on diminished capacity. In State v. Wilburn, 249 Kan. 678, 686, 822 P.2d 609 (1991), we acknowledged that evidence of diminished capacity is admissible for the limited purpose of negating specific intent. We concluded that even if evidence of diminished capacity is presented, the instruction is not required. Instructing on diminished capacity is a matter of trial court discretion. We find no error in the trial court's refusal to instruct on diminished capacity. The Hard 40 Instructions, K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 21-4624(4) Perez challenges a portion of the hard 40 sentencing instructions. The challenged instruction stated: If the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances exist that are not outweighed by mitigating circumstances that are found to exist, then the jury may consider recommending the mandatory minimum term of 40 years. If the jury makes such a recommendation it must designate upon its verdict form with particularity the aggravating circumstances which it found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt. If the jury has a reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances found to exist outweigh mitigating circumstances found to exist, then it is your duty to return a verdict of life imprisonment with parole eligibility in 15 years. Perez asserts the instruction indicated he would be paroled after serving 15 years. He contends the instruction should have explained that parole eligibility does not mean definite release in 15 years. Perez argues the jury could have concluded he would be released automatically after 15 years if it did not impose a mandatory 40-year term. He requests that his sentence be vacated and remanded for modification. The State contends: (1) Perez failed to object to the hard 40 instruction; consequently, our review is limited to the clearly erroneous standard; and (2) the hard 40 instruction correctly stated Perez would be eligible for parole in 15 years; therefore, the instruction was not error. At the sentencing instruction conference, the trial court asked for objections. Defense counsel commented: The only thing else that I may be concerned about is, I know it's emphasized in the jury instructions that parole eligibility exists after a certain length of time. I think it's important if that language goes in there that  that the jury be advised that it is only parole eligibility and it's not an assurance that anybody would be, in fact, placed upon parole after 40 years or 15 years. The trial court responded: The Court will permit argument on that. In closing argument, defense counsel stated: There is no suggestion in the instructions that people are automatically paroled out in 15 years or even after 40 years. The length of the time that he will spend beyond those periods is up to people other than this Court. We find no error in the instruction and, consequently, need not address whether defense counsel's remarks during the instruction conference were sufficient to challenge the instruction. We approve the challenged portion of the hard 40 instructions. If the jury chose not to recommend the 40-year mandatory sentence under K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 24-4628, the only alternative was life imprisonment under K.S.A. 21-4501. K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 22-3717(b) provides that an inmate sentenced to life for a class A felony shall be eligible for parole after serving 15 years. The instruction was stated in terms of parole eligibility. Defense counsel argued to the jury that inmates are not automatically paroled after 15 years. Thus, the instruction fairly stated the law, and the jury could not have been misled. The Pattern Instructions in Kansas Committee has adopted an instruction for the mandatory 40-year imprisonment provision of K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 21-4624 and K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 21-4628. The instruction, PIK Crim.2d 56.01-F (1992 Supp.), is nearly identical to the instruction we have approved in the case at bar. Affirmed.