Opinion ID: 3001340
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Taped Conversations

Text: Schalk first challenges the district court’s admission of the taped conversations between Meneghetti and Sowers No. 06-2142 9 and between Sowers and Schalk. Schalk contends that in both sets of audio recordings, one of the participants in the conversation was no longer a co-conspirator (having become a government informant), and therefore the conversations were not had “in the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Schalk also claims that the statements made by the co-conspirator during those recorded conversations amounted to nothing more than “idle chatter,” which did not seek to further the conspiracy, as required for admission. Schalk also contends that any useful information elicited from these recordings was stated by the informant and is inadmissible. In order for a statement made by a member of a conspiracy to be admissible against other members of the conspiracy under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) a conspiracy existed; (2) the defendant and the declarant were members of the conspiracy; and (3) the statement was made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Powers, 75 F.3d 335, 339 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Stephenson, 53 F.3d 836, 842 (7th Cir. 1995)). A government informant’s statements are not admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) because he cannot be a conspirator; however, they are admissible if they provide context or were adopted by the conspirator during the course of the conversation. United States v. Woods, 301 F.3d 556, 561 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Gajo, 290 F.3d 922, 930-31 (7th Cir. 2002).
Sowers As noted above, Schalk argues that the statements recorded during Meneghetti and Sowers’s conversations were not in furtherance of the conspiracy. We disagree. During those conversations, Meneghetti and Sowers 10 No. 06-2142 discussed Sowers’s plans to meet with an unnamed man, the possibility of having to meet that man halfway, and Sowers’s intentions to get the cocaine to Meneghetti as quickly as possible so that Meneghetti could pay off his debt to Sowers. During the January 24, 2005 conversations, Sowers asked if Meneghetti had anyone that wanted to buy the cocaine right now with money up front, and how much money Meneghetti could get to Sowers that week. They also talked about Schalk leaving town and Sowers’s plans to meet him to stock up while he was gone. These statements are not “idle chatter,” but are discussions about supply, demand, transportation, and finances directly related to and in furtherance of the drug conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Powers, 75 F.3d 335, 339 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussions about directions to pick up drugs or money to pay for drugs were necessary for the actual conspiracy to distribute drugs, and thus were “in furtherance of the conspiracy”); United States v. Stephenson, 53 F.3d 836, 845 (7th Cir. 1995) (statements made to keep others informed of or confident in the alleged conspiracy “further the conspiracy”). Schalk also argues that he and Meneghetti never had an agreement to distribute cocaine. This argument is irrelevant because Meneghetti’s statements were not admitted as those of a co-conspirator under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Meneghetti’s statements, as a government informant during these conversations, were not admissible for their truth, but were admissible for the context they provided for Sowers’s statements. Meneghetti’s statements were thus properly admitted. Next, Schalk appears to argue that Sowers’s statements to Meneghetti are inadmissible hearsay because “Sowers became an informant shortly after Meneghetti recorded him.” This argument is not only frivolous, but in fact acknowledges that Sowers was still a party to the drug distribution conspiracy at the time of his conversaNo. 06-2142 11 tions with Meneghetti, as further evidenced by Schalk’s distribution of eleven ounces of cocaine to Sowers two days after the last conversation taped by Meneghetti. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the recorded conversations between Meneghetti and Sowers.
Schalk presents the same arguments as above in his contention that the taped conversations between Sowers and Schalk were improperly admitted. During those conversations, Schalk sought to further the conspiracy in several ways: (1) Sowers paid Schalk for drugs he had already received; (2) they discussed debts owed by Sowers for drugs fronted by Schalk; (3) they discussed traveling “up” because Schalk had “some put away,” to which Sowers declined to make the trip for such a small quantity of drugs; and (4) they explicitly discussed the three-page contents of the drug ledger kept by Schalk and the need for accuracy of those numbers. These were all discussions to keep the drug trafficking operation afloat. The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the recorded conversations between Sowers and Schalk into evidence.