Opinion ID: 205434
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Law Applicable to Jurisdiction and Waiver

Text: This court has jurisdiction over an appeal from a denial of summary judgment only under limited circumstances because a denial of summary judgment is not ordinarily a final decision for purposes of appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Supreme Court has explained, however, that an appeal from a denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds may be entertained where the denial turns on an issue of law. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806; see also Levan v. George, 604 F.3d 366, 369 (7th Cir.2010). Indeed, so long as the issue is a legal one, we can consider the propriety of a denial of qualified immunity even on grounds other than those relied on in the district court. See Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1157 (6th Cir. 1996) (regardless of the district court's reasons for denying qualified immunity, we may exercise jurisdiction over the ... appeal to the extent it raises questions of law.). An appellate court does not have jurisdiction, however, where qualified immunity involves factual issues. See Levan, 604 F.3d at 369. Accordingly, a finding of waiver is a legal determination which enables appellate review of the denial of qualified immunity. See e360 Insight v. Spamhaus Project, 500 F.3d 594, 599 (7th Cir.2007) (explaining that the legal question of whether [a party's] conduct amounts to waiver [is reviewed] de novo.); see also Pasco v. Knoblauch, 566 F.3d 572, 575 (5th Cir.2009) (reviewing de novo the issue of waiver of qualified immunity because it formed the basis for the denial of summary judgment); Eddy v. V.I. Water & Power Auth., 256 F.3d 204, 209 (3d Cir. 2001) (reviewing de novo a denial of qualified immunity based on waiver). Turning to the merits of the waiver issue, the Supreme Court has described waiver as the  `intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.'  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). It is well established in our precedents that skeletal arguments may be properly treated as waived, see, e.g., United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir.1991), as may arguments made for the first time in reply briefs, see, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 533 F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir.2008). The underlying concern is to ensure that the opposing party is not prejudiced by being denied sufficient notice to respond to an argument. See generally Egert v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 900 F.2d 1032, 1035 (7th Cir.1990).