Opinion ID: 2640748
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The AOAO's Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices Claims

Text: The AOAO contends that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Venture 15, Royal, Lee, and Liu on its unfair or deceptive acts or practices claims. Specifically, the AOAO maintains that the circuit court erred in concluding that the AOAO lacks standing to assert such claims, arguing that: The [AOAO's] HRS § 480-2 claim[, i.e., its unfair or deceptive acts or practices claim,] was brought on behalf of the[ ] [individual Newtown Meadows] apartment owners under the authority of HRS § 514A-93 [(1993) [17] ], which provides [in relevant part]: Without limiting the rights of any apartment owner, actions may be brought by the manager or board of directors, in either case in the discretion of the board of directors on behalf of two or more apartment owners, as their respective interests may appear, with respect to any cause of action relating to the common elements or more than one apartment. . . . . The standing created by HRS § 514A-93 distinguishes condominium associations from other organizations attempting to sue under HRS [§] 480-2. In light of HRS § 514A-93, it is difficult to comprehend what reason the legislature could have to want to bar an [a]ssociation from bringing an action on behalf of its owners for violation of HRS [§] 480-2. (Emphases omitted.) The AOAO further directs this court to the legislative history behind HRS § 480-2, claiming that the [e]xpressed legislative intent . . . undermines the circuit court's application of the amendment to HRS § 480-2[,] which limited [HRS chapter] 480 actions to `consumers[,]' [18] because [t]he legislature's purpose in limiting standing to `consumers' was to `preclude [the clause's] application to private disputes between businessmen.' In the dichotomy between business disputes and consumer actions, the present case clearly falls within the latter. (Footnote and citations omitted.) Venture 15, Royal, Lee, and Liu basically contend that, because HRS § 480-2(d) provides in pertinent part that no person other than a consumer, the attorney general or the director of the office of consumer protection may bring an action based upon unfair or deceptive acts or practices and the AOAO does not fall in any of the aforementioned three categories, the AOAO lacks standing to assert its unfair or deceptive acts or practices claims. Specifically, they point out that a consumer is defined as a natural person who, primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, purchases, attempts to purchase, or is solicited to purchase goods or services or who commits money, property, or services in a personal investment. (Quoting HRS § 480-1 (1993).) Venture 15, Lee, and Liu assert that, because the AOAO alleges that it is an unincorporated association, it is not a natural person and, therefore, the AOAO is not a consumer. Liu further argues that, [a]lthough [HRS] § 514A-93 may provide a procedural vehicle for [the AOAO] to file a cause of action on behalf of two or more apartment owners, it does not override the specific statutory requirements of HRS [c]hapter 480 [,] which dictate that a private claim may only be filed by a consumer or natural person. (Footnote omitted.) (Emphasis added.) Thus, Venture 15, Royal, Lee, and Liu maintain that the circuit court correctly concluded that the AOAO lacks standing to assert its unfair or deceptive acts or practices claims. HRS § 480-2 provides in relevant part: (a) Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are unlawful. . . . . (d) No person other than a consumer, the attorney general or the director of the office of consumer protection may bring an action based upon unfair or deceptive acts or practices declared unlawful by this section. (Emphasis added.) HRS § 480-1, in turn, defines a consumer as  a natural person who, primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, purchases, attempts to purchase, or is solicited to purchase goods or services or who commits money, property, or services in a personal investment. (Emphasis added.) Inasmuch as the AOAO is clearly not the attorney general or the director of the office of consumer protection, it may only bring an action based upon unfair or deceptive acts or practices declared unlawful by HRS § 480-2 if it is a consumer within the meaning of HRS § 480-1. The parties in this case do not dispute that the AOAO is an unincorporated association. Indeed, the AOAO so alleged in its amended complaint. An unincorporated association[, however,] is not a natural person[.] W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486, 493 (7th Cir.1984) (emphasis added). Consequently, an unincorporated association is not a consumer as defined by HRS § 480-1. The AOAO, therefore, lacks standing to bring an action based upon unfair or deceptive acts or practices declared unlawful by HRS § 480-2. Cf. Joy A. McElroy, M.D., Inc. v. Maryl Group, Inc., 107 Hawai`i 423, 435, 114 P.3d 929, 941 (App. 2005) (determining that a corporation lacked standing to bring an action based upon unfair or deceptive trade practices under HRS § 480-2 inasmuch as a corporation is not a natural person). Moreover, it is well-established that, where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, our sole duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning. Diamond v. State, Bd. of Land & Nat'l Res., 112 Hawai`i 161, 172, 145 P.3d 704, 715 (2006) (citation omitted) (format altered). As such, in light of the plain and unambiguous language of HRS § [] 480-2[,] Hunt v. First Ins. Co. of Hawaii, Ltd., 82 Hawai`i 363, 373, 922 P.2d 976, 986 (App.1996), we need not resort to the use of legislative history as the AOAO urges on appeal. In addition, as Liu points out, HRS § 514A-93 does not override HRS § 480-2's specific requirement that a complainant must be a consumer, the attorney general, or the director of the office of consumer protection in order to bring an action based upon unfair or deceptive acts or practices, and the AOAO does not present any argument or explanation to the contrary. Nonetheless, the AOAO further claims on appeal that the circuit court's dismissal of its unfair or deceptive acts or practices claims conflicts with cases holding that the amendment limiting HRS [chapter] 480 claims to consumers[ ] is not retroactive. GWC Restaurants v. Hawaiian Flour Mills, 691 F.Supp. 247 (D.Haw.1988); Dash v. Wayne, 700 F.Supp. 1056 (D.Haw. 1988). Under these cases, the amendment is inapplicable to claims arising prior to the amendment. In their summary judgment motions, Defendants[, presumably, Venture 15, Royal, Lee, and Liu,] did not show  and indeed could not have shown that [the AOAO's] cause of action arose after the effective date of the amendment. (Emphases omitted.) Liu, however, asserts that, assuming arguendo [] that [the AOAO's] [HRS c]hapter 480 claim arose before June 1987[, i.e., the date the amendment to HRS § 480-2 took place, see supra note 18,] this is tantamount to an admission by [the AOAO] that it knew or should have known about its claim at that time and was required to file its claim within the applicable four-year statute of limitations. Pursuant to [HRS] § 480-24(a) [(1993)], any action brought under [HRS c]hapter 480 shall be barred unless commenced within four years after the cause of action accrues. However, [the AOAO's] original [c]omplaint in this case was filed on February 18, 1997, over five years after the purported limitations period expired in June 1991. Based on [the AOAO's] own assertion of when its claim arose, [the AOAO's] unfair and deceptive trade practice claim should be time-barred as a matter of law. (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.) Indeed, as Liu correctly points out, HRS § 480-24(a) provides in relevant part that [a]ny action to enforce a cause of action arising under this chapter shall be barred unless commenced within four years after the cause of action accrues [.] (Emphasis added.) In order for the AOAO's retroactivity argument to succeed, its claim must have arisen prior to the effective date of the amendment to HRS § 480-2, which, as previously noted, see supra note 18, was June 24, 1987. Ironically, however, even assuming arguendo that the AOAO's retroactivity argument is meritorious such that the AOAO's claims accrued, at the latest, in June 1987, the AOAO's argument fails in light of the four-year statute of limitations found in HRS § 480-24(a), inasmuch as the AOAO's original complaint was filed on February 18, 1997, over five years after the four-year limitations period would have expired in June 1991. [19] Consequently, the AOAO's claims would be time-barred as a matter of law. We, therefore, conclude that the AOAO lacks standing to bring an action based upon unfair or deceptive acts or practices declared unlawful by HRS § 480-2. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Venture 15, Royal, Lee, and Liu on the AOAO's unfair or deceptive acts or practices claims.