Opinion ID: 178401
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Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Development of Crack/Powder Disparity:

Text: At the time Mr. Lewis was sentenced, the sentencing ratio of crack cocaine to powder cocaine was 100:1. In other words, for purposes of drug quantities for sentencing under the guidelines, one gram of crack triggered the same mandatory penalties as one hundred grams of powder cocaine. The 100:1 ratio yields sentences for crack offenses three to six times longer than those for powder offenses involving equal amounts of drugs. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 94, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007). This ratio has resulted in a general tumult concerning its propriety. When the crack/powder disparity was first introduced in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, crack cocaine was a relatively new drug... but it was already a matter of great concern. Id. at 95, 128 S.Ct. 558. For a variety of reasons, Congress believed crack was significantly more dangerous than powder cocaine, an assumption that proved eventually to be wrong. [1] Thus, the Sentencing Commission subsequently determined that the crack/powder sentencing disparity is generally unwarranted. Id. at 97, 128 S.Ct. 558. While not believing that it should eliminate entirely the disparity between crack and powder sentences, the Commission has several times sought to achieve a reduction in the crack/powder ratio. Id. at 99, 128 S.Ct. 558. In 1995, the Commission proposed amendments to the guidelines replacing the 100:1 ratio with a 1:1 ratio, but Congress, exercising its authority under 28 U.S.C. § 994(p), rejected the amendments, while directing the Commission itself to propose revisions to the crack/powder drug quantity ratio. [2] The Commission then issued reports in 1997 and 2002, recommending that Congress change the 100:1 ratio prescribed in the 1986 Act. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 99, 128 S.Ct. 558. The 1997 Report proposed a 5-to-1 ratio, and the 2002 Report recommended lowering the ratio at least to 20 to 1. Congress did not act on either Report. In the Commission's 2007 Report, the Commission again encouraged Congress to amend the 1986 Act to adjust the 100-to-1 ratio. This time, however, the Commission did not simply await congressional action. Instead, the Commission adopted an ameliorating change in the Guidelines. The alteration, which became effective on November 1, 2007 [Amendment 706], reduces the base offense level associated with each quantity of crack by two levels. Id. at 99-100, 128 S.Ct. 558 (citation omitted); see also Dillon v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 2688, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010). By virtue of Amendment 706, sentences for crack offenders are between two and five times longer than sentences for equal amounts of powder. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 100, 128 S.Ct. 558. The Commission noted that [a]ny comprehensive solution requires appropriate legislative action by Congress. Id. (quoting 2007 Report 10). There have been increasingly urgent requests from other quarters to make changes to the crack/powder ratio. Indeed, the United States Attorney General Eric Holder recently stated: It is the view of this Administration that the 100-to-1 crack-powder sentencing ratio is simply wrong. It is plainly unjust to hand down wildly disparate prison sentences for materially similar crimes. It is unjust to have a sentencing disparity that disproportionately and illogically affects some racial groups. Attorney General Eric Holder at the D.C. Court of Appeals Judicial Conference (June 19, 2009) (available at http://www. justice.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech- 090619.html). Additionally, Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer has also recently remarked: [W]e cannot ignore the mounting evidence that the current cocaine sentencing disparity is difficult to justify based on the facts and science, including evidence that crack is not an inherently more addictive substance than powder cocaine. We know of no other controlled substance where the penalty structure differs so dramatically because of the drug's form. Moreover, the Sentencing Commission has documented that the quantity-based cocaine sentencing scheme often punishes low-level crack offenders far more harshly than similarly situated powder cocaine offenders.... The impact of these laws has fueled the belief across the country that federal cocaine laws are unjust. Restoring Fairness to Federal Sentencing: Addressing the Crack-Powder Disparity: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crimes and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (Statement of Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen. of the Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice) at 9. Assistant A.G. Breuer recognized, however, that prosecutors and courts must follow the current laws, subject to the courts' ability to vary from the crack guidelines, until Congress effects a change: Until a comprehensive solutionone that embodies new quantity thresholds and perhaps new sentencing enhancementscan be developed and enacted as legislation by Congress and as amended guidelines by the Sentencing Commission, federal prosecutors will adhere to existing law. We are gratified that the Sentencing Commission has already taken a small step to ameliorate the 100:1 ratio contained in existing statutes by amending the guidelines for crack cocaine offenses. We will continue to ask federal courts to calculate the guidelines in crack cocaine cases, as required by Supreme Court decisions. However, we recognize that federal courts have the authority to sentence outside the guidelines in crack cases or even to create their own quantity ratio. Our prosecutors will inform courts that they should act within their discretion to fashion a sentence that is consistent with the objectives of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and our prosecutors will bring relevant case-specific facts to the courts' attention. Id. at 11. Congress finally took action recently, when it enacted the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (Aug. 3, 2010). This Act reduces that crack/powder ratio to 18-1. It is not, however, retroactive and thus does not apply to this case. It does, on the other hand, relegate this case to a relatively short shelf-life, inasmuch as defendants being sentenced henceforth will be sentenced under a different applicable ratio. The explicit crack/powder ratio is, unfortunately, not the only source of some confusion concerning the application of the crack sentencing guidelines. The question arose, and divided the circuit courts of appeal, as to whether a sentence ... outside the guidelines range is per se unreasonable when it is based on a disagreement with the sentencing disparity for crack and powder cocaine offenses. United States v. Kimbrough, 174 Fed. Appx. 798, 799 (4th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (per curiam), rev'd, 552 U.S. 85, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007). The Supreme Court held that a district judge may determine ... that, in the particular case, a within-Guidelines sentence is `greater than necessary' to serve the objectives of sentencing. In making that determination, the judge may consider the disparity between the Guidelines' treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenses. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 91, 128 S.Ct. 558 (citation omitted). Thus, district courts are permitted to vary from the advisory guideline sentence calculated with the 100:1 ratio. Further confusion arose, however, as to whether Kimbrough contemplated variances from the 100:1 ratio only when the sentencing court, looking at the particular circumstances of the defendant and his offense under the rubric of § 3553(a), felt a variance was appropriate in the particular case before it, or whether sentencing courts could vary simply on the ground that the court believed, as a policy matter, that the 100:1 ratio creates unwarranted disparities among defendants. In Spears v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 840, 843, 172 L.Ed.2d 596 (2009), the Supreme Court clarified the point of Kimbrough.  Id. at 843. The Court explained that Kimbrough represented a recognition of district courts' authority to vary from the crack cocaine Guidelines based on policy disagreement with them, and not simply based on an individualized determination that they yield an excessive sentence in a particular case. Id. Thus, district courts are entitled to reject and vary categorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with those Guidelines. Spears, 129 S.Ct. at 843-44. District courts must, however, recognize that they have the authority to vary downward based on the crack/powder disparity: The district court must at least recognize that it has the authority to vary downward based on the disparity [between powder and crack]. United States v. Anderson, 618 F.3d 873, 883 (8th Cir.2010) (citing Moore v. United States, 555 U.S. 1, 129 S.Ct. 4, 5, 172 L.Ed.2d 1 (2008)) (per curiam) (reversing decision based on finding that the district court did not recognize authority to vary downward based on crack/powder disparity in the Guidelines). Accordingly, with that background in mind, we turn to the district court's decision to sentence Mr. Lewis.