Opinion ID: 2642623
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Turtle Creek

Text: ¶11. As previously mentioned, the Court of Appeals’ majority opinion failed to discuss the issue of vicarious liability. Patterson argues that Turtle Creek paid T. L. Wallace by the hour, making T. L. Wallace an agent of Turtle Creek. Thus, Patterson states that Turtle Creek is responsible for the acts and omissions of T. L. Wallace. Both T. L. Wallace and Turtle Creek maintain that no agency relationship existed between them. Because T. L. Wallace is an independent contractor, its acts and omissions cannot be used to impute liability onto Turtle Creek. ¶12. Who constitutes an independent contractor is well defined: An independent contractor is a person who contracts with another to do 6 something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the other’s right to control with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the undertaking. Chisolm v. Miss. Dep’t of Transp., 942 So. 2d 136, 141 (¶7) (Miss. 2006) (quoting Richardson v. APAC-Mississippi, Inc., 631 So. 2d 143, 148 (Miss.1994)). Generally, the principal cannot be held vicariously liable for torts committed by the independent contractor. Id. ¶13. Turtle Creek proved no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding T. L. Wallace’s status as an independent contractor. Patterson claims T. L. Wallace was Turtle Creek’s agent, not an independent contractor, because Turtle Creek paid it by the hour. However, Patterson fails to cite any authority in support of his position. Also, the record belies Patterson’s claim. Deposition testimony of T. L. Wallace employees shows that Turtle Creek paid T. L. Wallace a fixed price to remove dirt from its land. The prep work, which was performed prior to Patterson’s accident, was included in that price. Based on the record, no evidence suggests that Turtle Creek controlled T. L. Wallace or its performance of the work. Thus, Turtle Creek cannot be held liable for the acts or omissions of T. L. Wallace. Turtle Creek was entitled to summary judgment on this issue, thus the circuit court did not commit error.
¶14. To show negligence, Patterson had to present evidence of duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages. Huynh v. Phillips, 95 So. 3d 1259, 1262 (¶9) (Miss. 2012). 7 Patterson claimed Turtle Creek failed to follow land-permit requirements8 and conduct safety inspections.9 Turtle Creek argues that Patterson failed to state authority in support of its position, and Patterson failed to show a genuine issue of material fact. It is Patterson’s duty to provide support for his argument. He failed to do so. Thus, we decline to consider the argument. See Grenada Living Ctr., LLC v. Coleman, 961 So. 2d 33, 37 (¶14) (Miss. 2007). ¶15. We agree with the circuit court’s findings regarding Turtle Creek’s alleged negligence. The record is void of any evidence that Turtle Creek deposited any debris onto the Parkway itself. Furthermore, although Turtle Creek owned property adjacent to the Parkway, it cannot be held liable for maintaining the public road. The Court has stated that: A possessor of land over which there is a public highway or private right of way is not subject to liability for physical harm caused to travelers upon the highway or persons lawfully using the way by his failure to exercise reasonable care (a) to maintain the highway or way in safe condition for their use, or (b) to warn them of dangerous conditions in the way which, although not created by him, are known to him and which they neither know nor are likely to discover. Martin v. Flanagan, 818 So. 2d 1124, 1128 (¶17) (Miss. 2002).10 Thus, the existence of 8 Patterson claims the requirements are contained in the Mississippi Air and Water Pollution Control Law. See Miss. Code Ann. § 49-17-29 (Rev. 2012). The statute aims to protect state air and water resources from pollution. We have reviewed the statute, and we do not see how this imputes legal liability upon Turtle Creek for Patterson’s injuries. 9 Patterson argued that Turtle Creek was required to minimize offsite vehicle tracking of sediment, install erosion controls, and inspect the erosion controls once a week. Patterson claimed that Turtle Creek did not install erosion controls as required. 10 Patterson argues his case is distinguishable from Martin because that case involved land in its natural state and, in his case, Turtle Creek had “graded, scraped, and improved” its land. The record suggests this activity took place in 2004, two years before Patterson’s accident, and was performed by another contractor. The activity also was performed prior to the Parkway opening for public use in 2005. 8 debris on the Parkway near Turtle Creek’s property is not sufficient to impose a duty on Turtle Creek to clean the debris or warn others of the condition. No evidence suggests that Turtle Creek performed some “unreasonable affirmative act” which would make it liable for any condition on the Parkway. See id. at 1128 (¶18). The retention-pond project, which stopped hundreds of feet away from the Parkway, is not an unreasonable act. Patterson failed to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Turtle Creek owed him a duty or breached any duty. Thus, Patterson’s claims against Turtle Creek cannot survive summary judgment. We find the circuit court properly granted Turtle Creek’s motion for summary judgment.