Opinion ID: 783051
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gilding Exception to the Speedy Trial Act

Text: 40 The second point on which the District Court distinguished Oliver — the so-called gilding exception to the Speedy Trial Act — is the dominant disagreement between the parties on appeal. The District Court's cited source of the phrase, the Second Circuit's 1985 decision in Napolitano, does not provide much content to the term beyond recognizing that some cases hold only that a subsequent prosecution may be barred if it is based on an indictment which merely `gilds' an earlier charge or if the subsequent charge is a mere difference in accusational dates. 761 F.2d at 138. In Napolitano, the initial charge against the defendant for making a false application for a bank account was entirely different from and based on different proof than the later indictment for larceny of bank funds. Id. 41 Other courts similarly have recognized the existence of the gilding exception, but also failed to provide any significant explanation of the doctrine's contours. For example, in United States v. Giwa, 831 F.2d 538 (5th Cir.1987), the Fifth Circuit accepted that there does exist a notable exception to the general rule that an arrest on one charge does not trigger the right to a speedy trial on another charge filed after arrest. Id. at 542. If a subsequent charge merely `gilds' the initial charge filed against an individual and the different accusatorial dates between the two charges are not reasonably explicable, the date of the initial arrest may trigger the applicable time periods of the Act as to prosecution for both offenses. Id. (citing Napolitano, 761 F.2d at 138); United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 309 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981) (quoting United States v. DeTienne, 468 F.2d 151, 155 (7th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 911, 93 SCt. 974, 977, 35 L.Ed.2d 274 (1973)). The defendant in Giwa had been arrested and charged with credit card fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3). After a Speedy Trial Act violation, he was indicted for mail fraud and use of a false Social Security number in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and 42 U.S.C. § 408(g)(2). Id. Because [t]he offenses for which Giwa was arrested and indicted, while arising from the same criminal transaction, are separate and distinct offenses each requiring proof of different elements, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the `gilding' exception does not apply and section 3162(a)(1) bars prosecution of only the initial offense charged, the charge of credit card fraud. Id. at 543. 42 A more recent discussion of the gilding exception is found also in a Fifth Circuit decision, United States v. Bailey, 111 F.3d 1229 (5th Cir.1997). The Court again acknowledged the existence of the exception, and noted, as had at least one other court, that dictionaries variously define gilding as embellishing and unnecessary ornamentation. Id. at 1236 (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Webster's Collegiate Dictionary; citing United States v. Oliver, 683 F.Supp. 35, 38 (E.D.N.Y.1988)). Thus, a gilded charge is one that merely annotates in more detail the same charge alleged in the initial accusatory instrument.... Id. The Court also concluded that its interpretation of the gilding exception aligned with the Supreme Court's approach to analyzing multiple prosecutions for double jeopardy purposes. Id. Under the so-called same-elements test — based on the Supreme Court's decision in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) — a court inquires whether each offense contains an element not contained in the other; if not, they are the `same offense' and double jeopardy bars additional punishment and successive prosecution. Bailey, 111 F.3d at 1236 (quoting United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993)). In other words, different charges will be construed as the same if they contain the same elements. Applied to the circumstances in Bailey, the Fifth Circuit concluded the gilding exception did not apply where felony and misdemeanor charges for receipt of the same stolen handgun contained different elements as to the valuation of the weapon. Id. at 1236-37. 43 We have not heretofore addressed the gilding exception, and other courts question whether it even exists. United States v. Archer, 984 F.Supp. 321, 325 n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1997) (noting both points). For example, in Derose — a case we already have cited for analyzing whether unstated charges may be found in a complaint — the Eleventh Circuit declined to decide whether the gilding exception was a viable doctrine, but concluded that, even assuming it was, the exception would not apply to the facts of that case. 74 F.3d at 1183. The defendants argued that the charged offenses — conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana and possession with intent to distribute marijuana — arose from the same events, were both contained in the complaint, and therefore the application of the gilding exception is appropriate here because the two counts are not separate and distinct. Id. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed on two grounds. 44 First, Congress considered and declined to follow the suggestion that the Speedy Trial Act's dismissal sanctions should be applied to a subsequent charge if it arose from the same criminal transaction or event as those detailed in the initial complaint or were known or reasonably should have been known at the time of filing the initial complaint. United States v. Napolitano, 761 F.2d 135, 137-38 (2d Cir.1985) (citing A. Partridge, Legislative History of Title I of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, pp. 194-195, Federal Judicial Center, 1980). Second, it is well established that conspiracies and substantive offenses are separate and distinct offenses requiring proof of different elements. E.g., Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593, 81 S.Ct. 321, 5 L.Ed.2d 312 (1961). Thus, it is questionable whether a substantive offense can ever gild a conspiracy charge, since they are separate and distinct offenses. 45 Id. at 1184. Accordingly, while not decid[ing] the fate of the gilding exception in this ruling, the Derose Court held the substantive offense contained in the indictment did not gild the conspiracy charge found in the complaint. Id. 46 We find Derose instructive in this context as well. Even assuming (without deciding) that the gilding exception to the Speedy Trial Act is viable, it does not apply in this case. We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that because conspiracies and substantive offenses contain different elements, it is questionable whether a substantive offense can ever gild a conspiracy charge. Id. This view is further supported by the statements of the Fifth Circuit — which explicitly has recognized the gilding exception — in Bailey analogizing the exception's operation to the Blockburger test for determining if multiple prosecutions are barred by principles of double jeopardy. See 111 F.3d at 1236. Under this formulation, the dismissal of the charge against Defendants for conspiracy to import cocaine does not preclude prosecution for the substantive offense of importation of cocaine because a substantive crime and a conspiracy to commit that crime are not the `same offence' for double jeopardy purposes. United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 389, 112 S.Ct. 1377, 118 L.Ed.2d 25 (1992). 47 Anticipating this hurdle, Defendants argue that the gilding exception should not be limited to a narrow comparison of the elements of the offenses; instead, a court should focus on whether the proofs underlying the two charges are the same. But a same-proofs test is untenable. Whether the proofs underlying the two charges are identical is no different than whether the charges in the indictment are based on the same underlying conduct as the initial complaint, i.e., the transaction test we specifically rejected in Oliver, 238 F.3d at 473. Defendants disagree, arguing that  Oliver did not have occasion to address the gilding exception because ... the two charges at issue there — making false statements and embezzlement — plainly required different proofs even though they both arose from the same criminal transaction. Appellees' Br. at 31. This distinction does not rehabilitate the same-proofs test. Conspiracy and substantive offenses require separate evidence. A conspiracy charge does not require proof of success in committing the offense (as does a substantive offense), only an agreement to commit it. And a conspiracy charge (unlike a substantive offense) also requires proof that multiple persons agreed to commit the crime in concert. See, e.g., United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 51 (3d Cir.1976) (the crime of conspiracy is separate and distinct from the related substantive offense. It requires proof of the additional element of an agreement between the alleged co-conspirators. Hence, it is neither illogical nor impossible for a jury to find an alleged conspiracy nonexistent while, at the same time, convicting the defendants of the substantive offenses charged.) (citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946); United States v. Pappas, 445 F.2d 1194 (3d Cir.1971)). 48 Even were we inclined to recognize the validity of a gilding exception to the Speedy Trial Act (a question left for another day), it would not prevent the prosecution of Defendants on the substantive importation charge following the dismissal of the related conspiracy charge. 49