Opinion ID: 2589798
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged Unconstitutionality of Death Sentencing Statute and Process

Text: Defendant contends the California death statute is unconstitutional in numerous respects. We have previously rejected all of these arguments, and defendant cites no compelling reason to reconsider our decisions. Thus, the California death statute is not unconstitutional in failing to require the jury to make explicit findings of the factors it finds in aggravation and mitigation ( People v. Davenport, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1232, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 800, 906 P.2d 1068), require intercase or intracase proportionality review ( People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1053, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044; People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 209, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 762, 878 P.2d 521), delete inapplicable factors ( People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 207-208, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 762, 878 P.2d 521), identify which factors are aggravating and which are mitigating ( People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 153, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887), require that aggravating factors be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, require that the aggravating factors must outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, require that death must be found to be the appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt ( ibid.), or require that there be any burden of proof ( People v. Hawthorne, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 79, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118). Nor are the factors a jury may consider in determining penalty, such as the circumstances of the crime, the defendant's age, or the use of the adjectives extreme and substantial, unconstitutionally vague. ( Tuilaepa v. California, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 976-977, 114 S.Ct. 2630; People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 208, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 762, 878 P.2d 521.) Nor does the prosecutorial discretion to charge special circumstances or seek the death penalty under the statute violate the federal Constitution. ( People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 278, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 152, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) Nor does the death statute in general, or the multiple-murder special circumstance in particular, fail to narrow in a constitutionally acceptable manner the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. (See generally People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 1017, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 154-156, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) Contrary to defendant's assertion, use of unadjudicated criminal activity during the penalty phase is permissible; however, no such evidence was introduced in this case. ( People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1054, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044; People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 209, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 762, 878 P.2d 521.) While there was evidence at the guilt phase regarding defendant's drug use and dealing, the jury was instructed at the penalty phase that, aside from the crimes defendant was convicted of in the guilt phase, it could only consider criminal activity ... which involve[d] the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence, and that it could not consider any evidence of any other criminal activity as an aggravating circumstance. The crucial assumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury is that jurors generally understand and faithfully follow instructions. ( People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 689, fn. 17, 286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84.)