Opinion ID: 776487
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Adequacy of Drawings and Specifications

Text: 21 On appeal, FPC contends that the Board misapplied the Spearin doctrine. See United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 39 S.Ct. 59, 63 L.Ed. 166 (1918). Under the Spearin doctrine, when the government provides a contractor with defective specifications, the government is deemed to have breached the implied warranty that satisfactory contract performance will result from adherence to the specifications, and the contractor is entitled to recover costs proximately flowing from the breach. See, e.g., Spearin, 248 U.S. at 136, 39 S.Ct. 59; Essex Electro Eng'rs, Inc. v. Danzig, 224 F.3d 1283, 1289 (Fed.Cir.2000); USA Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 821 F.2d 622, 624 (Fed.Cir.1987); Ordnance Research, Inc. v. United States, 221 Ct.Cl. 641, 609 F.2d 462, 479-80 (Ct.Cl.1979). FPC argues that the Board impermissibly injected an impossibility element into the doctrine by stating that it was not impossible for FPC to complete the work with the information contained in the 1991 specifications and 1995 drawings. 22 We take the Board's analysis of the defective specification issue to mean that this is not a situation where the specification is defective, or, that to the extent the specification is arguably defective by omission, there are no additional costs flowing proximately from the defect. In either case, we agree with the Board's ultimate conclusion. Thus, the Board's comments that the project was not impossible do not create reversible error. 23 The issue is whether a specification can be defective by omission of information at the solicitation stage when the Government intended to provide the information, but where the contractor instead was provided a subset of the information from which the contractor developed and furnished a fixed-price bid. The answer will turn on the nature of the omitted information and the other facts and circumstances of the situation. Here, the contract was a firm, fixed-price contract that required FPC to furnish all labor, material, equipment, and transportation and perform all operations necessary to repair the stairs. Pavkov at 153,600. In essence, as contractors must when they bid fixed-price work, FPC took a certain amount of risk by submitting a bid and ultimately entering into the contract on the basis of the information before it: the 1991 specifications and 1995 drawings. Even though it did not have the 1995 specifications or the D & H drawings, FPC had other opportunities to gather information during the bid process, including visits to the job site by one of its representatives. Moreover, there were no Government responsibilities expressed in the 1991 specifications for it to prepare or supply the additional information contained in the 1995 specifications and D & H drawings. 24 The contract stated that the Government would provide specifications, which it did at the preconstruction conference. Even though those specifications were the 1991 specifications, FPC does not argue that it was somehow held to a higher standard of performance, or required to supply materially different deliverables on the basis of the 1995 specifications. The record does not show that the Government held FPC to performance standards articulated in the 1995 specifications but not expressed in the 1991 specifications, and that this increased FPC's costs. The record does not show that the Government demanded anything on the basis of the 1995 specifications that increased FPC's costs. Recovery for defective specifications requires proof that the defective specifications increased costs. FPC only argues that its costs would have been reduced if it had received the 1995 specifications because of the information contained therein. However, as the Board reasoned, the 1991 specifications required FPC to do more work, not less, and therefore it had in fact submitted its bid knowing the scope of work required for it to deliver the performance noted in the 1991 specifications. 25 Even if FPC's costs would have been lower if it had the benefit of the 1995 specifications and D & H drawings, this does not make the specifications defective because the purpose of the Spearin doctrine is to allow contractors to recover when the Government does not fulfill its responsibilities in preparing and supplying specifications. Even though the Government intended to distribute the 1995 specifications and D & H drawings, this intent does not mutate into an obligation to do so. Because FPC entered into a fixed-price contract on the basis of the 1991 specifications, and because the Board had substantial evidence to determine that the differences in the 1995 specifications did not increase FPC's costs and that the 1991 specifications in and of themselves were not defective, we agree with the Board's conclusion that any defect by omission in this situation is not a defect allowing for recovery. 2 26