Opinion ID: 1119431
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: collateral-felony requirement

Text: 8. Campos first argues that the felony-murder doctrine should not have been applied in his case. He contends that the underlying felony of first-degree CSP was not independent of or collateral to the killing and therefore cannot serve as a predicate felony for felony murder. Campos relies on State v. Harrison in which this Court first discussed the collateral-felony doctrine for felony murder. [1] State v. Harrison, 90 N.M. 439, 442, 564 P.2d 1321, 1324 (1977) (reviewing felony-murder conviction based on false imprisonment followed by a homicide). We noted in Harrison that various jurisdictions have placed limitations on the felony-murder doctrine, including the following: (1) there must be a causal relationship between the felony and the homicide, (2) the felony must be independent of or collateral to the homicide, and (3) the felony must be inherently or foreseeably dangerous to human life. Id. (emphasis added); see also, State v. Pierce, 109 N.M. 596, 601, 788 P.2d 352, 357 (1990) (reaffirming applicability of these limitations in New Mexico). However, Harrison did not address the application of the collateral-felony doctrine. Harrison, 90 N.M. at 441-42, 564 P.2d at 1323-24 (discussing causation and dangerous felony requirements). But see Pierce, 109 N.M. at 601, 788 P.2d at 357 (noting kidnapping preceded and was independent of the subsequent killing). 9. The collateral-felony requirement originated in response to concern over the broadening application of the felony-murder doctrine. When the felony-murder doctrine first developed in England, all felonies were punishable by death. See Harrison, 90 N.M. at 441, 564 P.2d at 1323 (discussing history of the doctrine). Therefore, it made little difference if the perpetrator were executed for felony murder or for the predicate felony. Id. However, as legislatures shifted to a graduated system of punishment for differing felonies, the felony-murder doctrine took on a greater significance. The felony-murder doctrine served to relieve prosecutors of the burden of having to prove malice aforethought when the defendant killed someone while committing a felony. The commonly stated purpose of the felony-murder rule was not to deter the underlying felony, but instead to deter negligent or accidental killings that may occur in the course of committing a felony. People v. Smith, 35 Cal.3d 798, 201 Cal.Rptr. 311, 678 P.2d 886, 891 (1984) (in bank); State v. Lucas, 243 Kan. 462, 759 P.2d 90, 93 (1988), aff'd on reh'g, 244 Kan. 193, 767 P.2d 1308 (1989). 10. However, the vast majority of homicides are predicated on an initial felonious assault or battery of some kind. For example, a homicide involving a shooting could be classified as either second-degree murder or felony murder based on an assault with a deadly weapon. Thus, courts realized that in such cases, application of the felony-murder doctrine would allow for conviction of the defendant for murder without the prosecution having to prove the existence of malice. This, in turn, would eliminate the mens-rea requirement for murder in most homicide cases and circumvent the legislative gradation system for classes of homicides. 1 Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses § 103(b) (1984). As the California Supreme Court explained: [T]he utilization of the felony-murder rule in [such circumstances] extends the operation of that rule beyond any rational function that it is designed to serve. To allow such use of the felony-murder rule would effectively preclude the jury from considering the issue of malice aforethought in all cases wherein homicide has been committed as a result of a felonious assaulta category which includes the great majority of all homicides. This kind of bootstrapping finds support neither in logic nor in law. People v. Ireland, 70 Cal.2d 522, 75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 580, 590 (1969) (in bank) (citation omitted) (quoting People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130, 134 (1965)). Consequently, courts established the limitation that the predicate felony had to be collateral to or independent of the homicide. Harrison, 90 N.M. at 441, 564 P.2d at 1323.
11. The various jurisdictions have developed differing standards for determining whether the predicate felony is collateral or independent. See generally 1 Robinson, supra, § 103(b) (noting different approaches). Some jurisdictions, such as Kansas, have focused solely on whether the act that caused the homicide was the same as the underlying felonious conduct. See, e.g., State v. Prouse, 244 Kan. 292, 767 P.2d 1308, 1313 (1989). The Kansas Supreme Court explained: Time, distance, and the causal relationship between the underlying felony and the killing are factors to be considered in determining whether the killing is a part of the felony and, therefore, subject to the felony-murder rule. The collateral felony must, therefore, be felonious conduct other than the lethal act itself. Thus, a homicide occurring during the commission of an independent felony, such as aggravated robbery, rape, or kidnapping, comes under the felony-murder statute. However, the lethal act itself cannot serve as the independent collateral felony necessary to support a felony-murder conviction. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Lucas, 759 P.2d at 90 (syllabus language)); see also Garrett v. State, 573 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Tex. Crim.App.1978) (noting that, for felony-murder doctrine to apply, there must be felonious conduct other than the act causing death). 12. Other jurisdictions focus on the defendant's underlying purpose in committing the predicate felony. See, e.g., People v. Mattison, 4 Cal.3d 177, 93 Cal.Rptr. 185, 481 P.2d 193, 198 (1971) (in bank); People v. Moran, 246 N.Y. 100, 158 N.E. 35, 36 (1927). In Mattison, the California Supreme Court held that the same act could serve as the basis for both the homicide and the predicate felony so long as the predicate felony was committed with a collateral or independent felonious design. Mattison, 93 Cal.Rptr. 185, 481 P.2d at 198 (quoting People v. Taylor, 11 Cal.App.3d 57, 89 Cal.Rptr. 697, 699, hearing denied, (Oct. 28, 1970)). Under this approach, if a defendant committed burglary with the intent of assaulting the occupant of the home and actually killed the occupant, the felony of burglary could not serve as a predicate felony for felony murder because it was not committed with a felonious design that was collateral to the homicide. However, the opposite conclusion would be true if the burglary were committed with the intent of robbing the occupant but resulted in a homicide. Cf. Taylor, 89 Cal.Rptr. at 701-02 (discussing felony murder and burglary). 13. However, in People v. Hansen , the California Supreme Court recently departed from this collateral felonious-design test, focusing instead on whether allowing the particular felony to serve as a predicate felony for applying the felony-murder doctrine would subvert legislative intent regarding the mens-rea requirements of the murder statutes. People v. Hansen, 9 Cal.4th 300, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 609, 885 P.2d 1022, 1030-31 (1994) (in bank) (concluding that felony of willful discharge of a firearm at inhabited house could serve as predicate felony for felony murder when the shooting killed an occupant). 14. Arizona has followed yet another approach. Arizona's felony-murder statute specifically enumerates certain felonies for which a resulting homicide will be deemed first-degree murder. See State v. Miniefield, 110 Ariz. 599, 522 P.2d 25, 28 (1974) (en banc). Accordingly, in applying the felony-murder doctrine, the Arizona courts only look to see if the predicate felony is enumerated in the statute, regardless of whether the underlying act was unitary or if there was only a single purpose. Id. (holding that arson resulting in death constituted felony murder even though the same act was the basis for both the predicate felony and the homicide, and even though the defendant's design was to use the act of arson to commit a homicide). The New Mexico felony-murder statute, however, does not enumerate possible predicate felonies. NMSA 1978, § 30-2-1(A)(2) (Repl.Pamp.1994).
15. Campos urges us to follow the Kansas approach and hold that the collateral-felony requirement mandates that the underlying felonious act must be temporally or spatially distinct from the lethal act. Campos points out that, in this case, the act of criminal sexual penetration with a mop was the very same act that caused Gutierrez's death. He therefore argues that the CSP cannot serve as the predicate felony for applying the felony-murder doctrine. However, we decline to follow the Kansas approach or the other two approaches discussed above. 16. New Mexico has a distinct version of the felony-murder doctrine, which calls for a different formulation of the collateral-felony requirement. The primary distinction between New Mexico's felony-murder doctrine and those of other jurisdictions is that, in State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554, 563, 817 P.2d 1196, 1205 (1991), this Court imposed a mens rea requirement for felony murder. Compare Ortega, 112 N.M. at 563, 817 P.2d at 1205 (requiring showing of mens rea for second-degree murder to elevate the murder to first-degree felony murder) with Miniefield, 522 P.2d at 28 (The legislature has deemed... murder committed in the perpetration of certain other felonies so heinous and committed with such a wanton disregard for human life that there is no need to prove the elements usually necessary for a conviction for first degree murder.) and Mattison, 481 P.2d at 198 (noting with respect to second-degree felony murder, The purpose of the felony-murder rule is to deter felons from killing negligently or accidentally by holding them strictly responsible for killings they commit. (quotations omitted)) and State v. Branch, 244 Or. 97, 415 P.2d 766, 767 (Or. 1966) (en banc) (The purpose of the felony-murder rule is to relieve the State of the burden of proving premeditation or malice whenever the victim's death is caused by the killer while the killer is committing another felony.). 17. We explained in Ortega that the felony-murder doctrine in New Mexico does not abandon the mens rea requirement for murder, nor does it create a presumption that a defendant had intended to kill whenever a homicide occurs during the course of a felony. Ortega, 112 N.M. at 563, 817 P.2d at 1205. Our felony-murder rule only serves to raise second-degree murder to first-degree murder when the murder is committed in the course of a dangerous felony. Id. 18. Accordingly, unlike other jurisdictions, New Mexico's modernized felony-murder doctrine does not run the risk of circumventing the legislatively determined mens rea for murder. Furthermore, the purpose of the felony-murder rule as explained in Kansas and Californiato deter negligent or accidental killings that may occur in the course of committing a felonyis inapposite in New Mexico, because a negligent or accidental killing would not constitute second-degree murder and would therefore not implicate the felony-murder doctrine. Rather, this Court explained that the purpose of the felony-murder rule in New Mexico is to elevate second-degree murder to first-degree murder when it occurs in circumstances that the legislature has determined are so serious as to merit increased punishment. Id. We noted in Harrison that these serious circumstances include the commission of a first-degree felony or a lesser-degree felony that is itself inherently dangerous or is committed under circumstances that are inherently dangerous. Harrison, 90 N.M. at 442, 564 P.2d at 1324. 19. Therefore, because the killing must already constitute second-degree murder for the felony-murder doctrine to apply, the main concern in applying the felony-murder doctrine in New Mexico is that the prosecution may be able to elevate improperly the vast majority of second-degree murders to first-degree murders by charging the underlying assaultive act as a predicate felony for the felony-murder doctrine. Consequently, the appropriate limitation imposed by the collateral-felony doctrine in New Mexico is simply that the predicate felony cannot be a lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. See 1 Robinson, supra, § 103(b), at 498 (An approach [to the collateral-felony doctrine] more consistent with modern offense definitions might be to merge all felonies that are lesser included offenses of the [second-degree] murder statute.); cf. State v. Essman, 98 Ariz. 228, 403 P.2d 540, 545 (1965) (en banc) (The felony-murder doctrine does not apply where the felony is an offense included in the charge of homicide.).
20. Having determined that the predicate felony cannot be a lesser-included offense of second-degree murder, we are still left with the question of what constitutes a lesser-included offense for purposes of applying the collateral-felony rule. See, e.g., State v. Meadors, 121 N.M. 38, 41-42, 908 P.2d 731, 734-35 (1995) (noting different approaches to question of what constitutes lesser-included offense); Swafford v. State, 112 N.M. 3, 10-13, 810 P.2d 1223, 1230-1233 (1991) (same). In Meadors we explained that New Mexico follows two distinct approaches for analyzing whether one crime constitutes a lesser-included offense of another. Meadors, 121 N.M. at 41-44, 908 P.2d at 734-37. The first approach is the strict-elements test, which generally applies in the double jeopardy context. We noted: Under [the strict-elements test], a court would find an offense to be a lesser-included offense of another only if the statutory elements of the lesser offense are a sub-set of the statutory elements of the greater offense such that it would be impossible ever to commit the greater offense without also committing the lesser offense. State v. Meadors, 121 N.M. at 42, 908 P.2d at 735; see also Swafford, 112 N.M. at 8-9, 810 P.2d at 1228-29 (setting out strict-elements test in double-jeopardy analysis (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932))); State v. Garcia, 114 N.M. 269, 273, 837 P.2d 862, 866 (1992) (A lesser included offense is one that includes some, but not all, of the elements of a greater offense and that does not have any element not included in the greater offense, so that it is impossible to commit the greater offense without necessarily committing the lesser offense.). The Swafford Court explained that this test provides a tool for inferring whether the legislature intended to authorize separate application of each [criminal] statute. Swafford, 112 N.M. at 9, 810 P.2d at 1229. 21. The second lesser-included offense test is the DeMary test, which is applicable when a prosecutor requests that the court instruct the jury on a crime not explicitly set out in the charging instrument. Meadors, 121 N.M. at 42-43, 908 P.2d at 735-36 (applying State v. DeMary, 99 N.M. 177, 179, 655 P.2d 1021, 1023 (1982)). The DeMary test is designed to safeguard the defendant's constitutional right to notice of the crimes against which he or she must defend. The DeMary test requires that only those crimes for which the elements are sufficiently described in the charging document, and for which supporting evidence is adduced at trial, are presented to the jury as lesser-included offenses. Id. at 44, 908 P.2d at 737. [2] 22. The strict-elements test, rather than the DeMary test, is applicable to the collateral-felony rule. As we explained above, the purpose of the collateral-felony limitation to the felony-murder doctrine is to further the legislative intent of holding certain second-degree murders to be more culpable when effected during the commission of a felonythereby elevating them to first-degree murderswhile maintaining the important distinction between the classes of second- and first-degree murders. Accordingly, because the strict-elements test provides a tool for inferring the legislative intent regarding the application of the criminal statutes, we conclude it is the appropriate method for evaluating whether the underlying felony constitutes a lesser-included offense of second-degree murder for purposes of the collateral-felony doctrine. [3] 23. Furthermore, in those situations in which there is more than one statutory definition of the requisite dangerous felony, a question may arise regarding which of the alternative statutory definitions is applicable for purposes of collateral-felony analysis. This question arose in a different context in Meadors, 121 N.M. at 49-52, 908 P.2d at 742-45, and also in State v. Rodriguez, 113 N.M. 767, 833 P.2d 244 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 113 N.M. 636, 830 P.2d 553 (1992). In such a situation, the correct inquiry is whether it is possible to commit second degree murder without committing some form of the dangerous felony. For example, it is impossible to commit second degree murder without committing some form of both aggravated assault and aggravated battery. Thus, both of those offenses would always be deemed to be non-collateral even though, under some statutory definitions, aggravated battery and aggravated assault include one or more statutory elements that are not elements of second degree murder. We note that this approach is distinct from the approach taken with respect to the double-jeopardy analysis used in Meadors and Rodriguez, in which the courts held that it was necessary to refer to the facts of the particular case in order to ascertain the statutory elements of the offense for purposes of double jeopardy analysis. 24. Turning to the case before us, the predicate felony that elevated Campos's charge to felony murder was first-degree CSP. The CSP statute, NMSA 1978, § 30-9-11 (Repl.Pamp.1994), provides in relevant part: A. Criminal sexual penetration is the unlawful and intentional causing of a person to engage in sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio or anal intercourse or the causing of penetration, to any extent and with any object, of the genital or anal openings of another, whether or not there is any emission. B. Criminal sexual penetration does not include medically indicated procedures. C. Criminal sexual penetration in the first degree consists of all sexual penetration perpetrated: (1) on a child under thirteen years of age; or (2) by the use of force or coercion that results in great bodily harm or great mental anguish to the victim. Our second-degree murder statute, NMSA 1978, § 30-2-1(B) (Repl.Pamp.1994), provides in relevant part: B. Unless he is acting upon sufficient provocation, upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion, a person who kills another human being without lawful justification or excuse commits murder in the second degree if in performing the acts which cause the death he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another. 25. Applying the strict-elements test to these two statutes, we conclude that first-degree CSP is not a lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. The statutory elements of first-degree CSP are not a sub-set of the statutory elements of second-degree murder but instead contain distinct requirements, and it is certainly possible to commit murder without necessarily committing first-degree CSP. See Meadors, 121 N.M. at 42, 908 P.2d at 735 (applying strict-elements test; Garcia, 114 N.M. at 273, 837 P.2d at 866 (same)). CSP requires engaging in one of the specified acts or some form of penetration of the genital or anal openings of another, § 30-9-11(A), which are not elements of second-degree murder, § 30-2-1(B). Similarly, the second-degree murder statute requires that the defendant know that his or her acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm, § 30-2-1(B), whereas the CSP statute does not contain a similar mens rea with respect to the result of great bodily harm or great mental anguish to the victim, § 30-9-11(C)(2). Cf. State v. Pierce, 110 N.M. 76, 80-81, 792 P.2d 408, 412-13 (1990) (noting CSP is distinguishable offense from battery and homicide). Accordingly, we conclude that first-degree CSP properly served as a predicate felony for applying the felony-murder doctrine.