Opinion ID: 1453202
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Government's Disclosure of Brady Information

Text: Whether the Government was obligated to make notes of a potential witness's statements and whether it was required to disclose the witness's lies are very different questions. From the fact that the Government is not required to make notes of a witness's statements, it does not follow that the Government has no obligation to inform the accused of information that materially impeaches its witness. Brady and its progeny require the Government to disclose material information that is favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999); see also Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (due process obligation to disclose to the defendant evidence favorable to an accused); Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir.2001) (material evidence favorable to the defendant) (quoting United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir.1998)). This obligation is designed to serve the objectives of both fairness and accuracy in criminal prosecutions. To begin with, it recognizes the possibility that the evidence on which the prosecution relies to prove the defendant's guilt is not necessarily truthful, accurate, or complete, especially when the prosecution's investigations have made it aware of evidence or information that might be favorable to the defense in controverting the Government's proofs. The Supreme Court explained in Strickler that the Government's duty to disclose derives from the special role played by the American prosecutor in the search for truth in criminal trials. Within the federal system, for example, we have said that the United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281, 119 S.Ct. 1936. Brady information must be disclosed, furthermore, in a manner that gives the defendant a reasonable opportunity either to use the evidence in the trial or to use the information to obtain evidence for use in the trial. Thus, the Government must make disclosures in sufficient time that the defendant will have a reasonable opportunity to act upon the information efficaciously. See Leka, 257 F.3d at 100(noting that Brady disclosures must be timed so that the defense has a sufficient opportunity to use them); id. at 101 (When . . . a disclosure is first made on the eve of trial, or when trial is under way, the opportunity to use it may be impaired.); see also DiSimone v. Phillips, 461 F.3d 181, 197 (2d Cir.2006) (The more a piece of evidence is valuable and rich with potential leads, the less likely it will be that late disclosure provides the defense an `opportunity for use.' (quoting Leka, 257 F.3d at 103)). Similarly, disclosures must be sufficiently specific and complete to be useful. See Leka, 257 F.3d at 103(finding Brady not satisfied where Government did not disclose details of potential witness's knowledge, because defendant was left to gamble on what witness would say). If the district court's reason for declining to compel the Government to make disclosure was that the lies were not set forth in any document or recording (I have never seen anything that says the government has to turn over oral information.), we disagree. As noted above, we agree with the district court that the absence of such memorialization is determinative with respect to any obligation to disclose a witness's statements under the Jencks Act. The considerations under Brady and Giglio, however, are quite different. Brady and Giglio obligations, which apply only to material exculpatory and impeaching information, arise because it would be unfair to the defendant  and might cast doubt on the reliability of the verdict  for the trial to be conducted without informing the defendant of such information. The obligation to disclose information covered by the Brady and Giglio rules exists without regard to whether that information has been recorded in tangible form. [4] Even if the district court relied on an inappropriate reason for declining to compel disclosure, that would not necessarily mean that a Brady violation occurred, which would require overturning Rodriguez's conviction. [5] A Brady violation occurs only where there is a reasonable probability that a different verdict would have resulted from disclosure of the information that the defendant claims was suppressed. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281, 119 S.Ct. 1936; see also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108, 96 S.Ct. 2392; In re United States, 267 F.3d at 142. The Government declined to disclose the substance of Lopez's lies because it contended at trial that it had satisfied all of its obligations under Brady, and the district court, which ruled on a different basis, never considered whether the failure to disclose Lopez's lies would violate Brady. Because we do not know what Lopez's lies were, we cannot determine whether disclosure was mandated under Brady/Giglio or whether the Government's refusal to make disclosure more extensive than Lopez's testimony that she lied about everything caused the defendant prejudice. The district court is far better positioned to make this appraisal. Accordingly, we remand, in accordance with the procedures set forth in United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 22 (2d Cir.1994), so that the district court can evaluate these questions in the first instance. In the event the court determines that disclosure was mandated, the court will need to consider the Government's argument that any disclosure obligation was fully discharged when the AUSA elicited on the direct examination of Lopez that she had lied about everything. The Government takes the position that this disclosure gave the defendant the full protection of the Brady rule because it armed defense counsel with sufficient information to learn the specifics of Lopez's lies by cross-examining her. We express no definitive views on the Government's argument because the conclusion may vary depending on the nature of the undisclosed material. But at least in some circumstances, telling the defendant that a witness lied, but leaving it for defense counsel to find out what the lies were by questioning the witness before the jury, might as a practical matter foreclose effective use of the impeaching or exculpatory information. Defense counsel would be in the difficult position of having to question the witness blindly in the jury's presence, not knowing whether the answers elicited might seriously incriminate or prejudice the defendant. See Leka, 257 F.3d at 103 (The opportunity for use under Brady is the opportunity for a responsible lawyer to use the information with some degree of calculation and forethought. A responsible lawyer could not put [the potential witness] on the stand without essential groundwork.). It is not surprising that, despite having pressed for disclosure of the specific lies, none of the defense lawyers ran the risk of asking Lopez what lies she had told. At least in some circumstances, a prosecutor's use of this approach to the discharge of a Brady disclosure obligation might well result in the defendant's never learning the nature of the exculpatory or impeaching material which gave rise to the disclosure obligation. While we can easily imagine circumstances in which this approach to Brady disclosure would effectively defeat its purpose, it may be appropriate in other circumstances. The Government acknowledged to the court by letter that it might have been `the better practice' to have provided the defense with more information about the substance of Ms. Lopez's prior inconsistent oral statements. It contends nonetheless that its disclosure complied with Brady and Giglio. We will express no view of the issue on the present facts because the facts are unknown to us. We note further, however, that while the Government and Lopez characterized her initial statements as lies, that characterization presumes the truth of the version of events she gave on the witness stand  the very issue at the heart of Rodriguez's trial. Lopez eventually came to characterize her initial statements as lies and her subsequent statements incriminating the defendants as the truth. But she began by characterizing the initial statements as the truth, apparently denying, at least by implication, what she later testified to. It is at least possible that the initial statements were the truthful ones, and that Lopez's later testimony was a falsification designed to serve her interests as a cooperator. We do not know whether the initial statements, if true, tended to exonerate Rodriguez, together with Lopez, or contained leads to exculpatory evidence. Depending on the nature of the undisclosed information, the district court may find it pertinent to explore the sufficiency of the Government's limited disclosure. [6] After hearing the parties, the district court will determine whether there was a Brady violation, including whether Lopez's undisclosed statements were sufficiently material that the Government was obligated under Brady/Giglio to make disclosure; if so, whether the Government discharged that obligation by its partial disclosure; and whether the defendant knew or should have known the information in question. We direct the parties to advise us promptly of the district court's ruling. If either party wishes to contest that ruling, that party must file a letter brief within thirty days thereof, and the opposing party will have two weeks to respond. The appeal from the district court's ruling will be referred to this panel. If a party desires expedited review, that should be clearly requested in the letter. If within thirty days neither party contests the district court's ruling, upon receipt of advice of the ruling and of the lapse of thirty days, we will close the appeal. We have reviewed all of Rodriguez's other claims and find them to be without merit.