Opinion ID: 2367442
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Construction Vacancy generally

Text: The function of the recess appointment power must be viewed in light of the purpose for which it was created. The Constitution of 1897 severely curtailed the Governor's right to appoint to public offices. As noted above, our earlier Constitutions  1776, 1792 and 1831  gave the Governor the absolute appointing power without any requirement of Senate confirmation. At the Constitutional Convention of 1897 this limitation of appointment power had near unanimous approval although there was substantial debate as to the proper majorities for Senate consent. [8] Thus, there is, as appears uncontested, a constitutional norm for appointment with approval from the Senate. [9] The Article III, § 9 recess clause is a specific exception to this norm and therefore must be strictly interpreted to harmonize not only with the norm but also with the other provisions of the Constitution. See 2A Southerland Statutory Construction § 46.05 (4th ed. 1973). The Governor's authority to exercise the recess appointment power granted in Article III, § 9 is premised upon the existence of a vacancy in a public office. A vacancy is prerequisite to any exercise of the Governor's power under Article III, § 9 .... Opinion of the Justices, Del.Supr., 352 A.2d 406, 408 (1976). The words of Article XV, § 5, the holdover provision, have bearing on the determination of whether such vacancy exists. All public officers shall hold their respective offices until their successors shall be duly qualified, except in cases herein otherwise provided. The plain purpose of both Article III, § 9 and Article XV, § 5 is to prevent public offices from becoming unoccupied and being without an incumbent to perform the public duties. State ex rel. Satterthwaite v. Stover, 159 A. at 244; Walker v. Hughes, Del.Supr., 36 A.2d 47, 50 (1944); State ex rel. Southerland v. Caulk, Del.Super., 138 A. 354, 357 (1927). If vacancy is defined as a condition created by the expiration of term, the Governor would have a recess power to appoint. However, such a definition calls into question the purpose of Article XV, § 5 since that section gives an incumbent the legal right to remain in office at expiration of term when no successor is qualified. The incumbent continues as a constitutionally sanctioned de jure officer. This situation is to be distinguished from what occurs if a properly appointed recess officer continues in office after the adjournment of the Senate. He loses de jure status because he has no legal right to continue in office and his position, though not absolutely, or physically, vacant, is constructively vacant because there is no lawful incumbent. [10] State ex rel. Satterthwaite v. Stover, 159 A. at 244. Thus, it appears to us that the Constitution provided for continued occupancy of office in two ways, the first automatically by Constitutional provision and second, in the greater emergency, when even the automatic extension of term did not fill the gap. The second was to be used only on the failure of the first.