Opinion ID: 2600675
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The prosecution's peremptory challenges of death penalty skeptics

Text: Defendant contends that despite his objections, the prosecution utilized its peremptory challenges systematically to excuse prospective jurors who, although not unalterably opposed to the death penalty, nonetheless expressed skepticism concerning that punishment. Defendant identifies Prospective Jurors B.H., A.N., D.C., and J.F., asserting that the removal of these jurors violated his federal and state rights to due process of law, equal protection of the laws, an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, and a reliable determination of his guilt and appropriate penalty. (U.S. Const., Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 1, 7, 15, 16 & 17.) As defendant recognizes, we have rejected this claim on numerous prior occasions. Skepticism about the death penalty is a permissible basis for a prosecutor's exercise of a peremptory challenge. ( People v. Jurado, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 106; see, e.g., Ward, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 201-202; Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 441; McDermott, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 970-971; People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1200 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254].) Defendant does not offer any compelling reason to depart from our precedent, and we reject this claim, as we have in past cases.