Opinion ID: 865812
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: I don’t remember.

Text: ¶33. Hailey’s statements to the principal were inconsistent with her trial testimony about her living conditions. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 613 provides: (a) Examining Witness Concerning Prior Statement. In examining a witness concerning a prior statement made by him, whether written or not, the statement need not be shown nor its contents disclosed to him at that time, but on request the same shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel. (b) Extrinsic Evidence of Prior Inconsistent Statement of Witness. Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require. This provision does not apply to admissions of a party-opponent as defined in Rule 801(d)(2). 17 The proper predicate for a prior inconsistent statement “requires the witness be asked ‘whether or not on a specific date, at a specific place, and in the presence of specific persons, the witness made a particular statement.’” Bush v. State, 667 So. 2d 26, 28 (Miss. 1996). If the witness denies or cannot recollect having made the prior statement, or otherwise fails to acknowledge the prior statement, then extrinsic evidence of the statement is admissible. Harrison v. State, 534 So. 2d 175, 180 (Miss. 1988). ¶34. After laying a predicate, Clark questioned Hailey about her prior inconsistent statements to the principal. Hailey testified that she did not recall having made the statements. At that point, extrinsic evidence of her prior inconsistent statements was admissible under Rule 613(b). Id. However, the trial court did not admit the school referral form into evidence. It is clear that this error did not prejudice Clark. Hailey previously had testified on cross-examination that, until the time that her grandmother had discovered her injuries in March 2005, she always had lied about the true nature of her living conditions. She also testified extensively about having written a false letter to the school counselor in which she had denied any abuse and had praised Clark’s parenting skills. Hailey explained that she had lied to protect her family. Substantial testimony was before the jury concerning prior inconsistent statements by Hailey. Therefore, Exhibit D-5 was cumulative of other evidence. As Clark suffered no prejudice from the failure to admit the extrinsic evidence, the Court finds that no reversible error occurred. IV. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING DEFENSE INSTRUCTION D-7. 18 ¶35. Clark argues that the trial court erred by refusing Jury Instruction D-7. The instruction stated: The Court instructs the jury that you must be convinced by the evidence presented beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged abuse of [Hailey] was inflicted and caused by Wanda Clark on the dates as charged in the indictment, and if you can determine from the evidence that the alleged abuse of [Hailey] could have been or was caused by something else other than the intentional acts of Wanda Clark then you shall find Wanda Clark not guilty of the charges against her. Clark contends that she was entitled to this instruction, because it was the only jury instruction that articulated her theory of the case. ¶36. This Court reads jury instructions as a whole to determine whether the jury was fully and fairly instructed according to the applicable law. Davis v. State, 18 So. 3d 842, 847 (Miss. 2009). “In other words, if all instructions taken as a whole fairly, but not necessarily perfectly, announce the applicable rules of law, no error results.” Id. An accused has a fundamental right to have her theory of the case presented to the jury, but the right is not absolute. Id. “A defendant is entitled to have jury instructions given which present his theory of the case; however, this entitlement is limited in that the court may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence.” Spires v. State, 10 So. 3d 477, 483 (Miss. 2009) (quoting Heidel v. State, 587 So. 2d 835, 842 (Miss. 1991)). ¶37. Clark argues that the jury instructions were deficient without instruction D-7. We find that any need for instruction D-7 was obviated by the elements instruction, which stated, in part: 19 The Defendant, WANDA CLARK, has been charged by a multi-count indictment with two counts of Felonious Abuse/Battery of a Child. In Count II, if you find from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) on or about January 9, 2005 in Coahoma County, Mississippi the Defendant, WANDA CLARK, did individually or while aiding and abetting another, (2) unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously whip, strike, or otherwise abuse or mutilate a child, [Hailey], (3) who was fifteen (15) years of age, (4) causing bodily injury by beating [Hailey] with an extension cord about the arms, legs, back and torso, and (5) said abuse was not in self-defense or to prevent bodily harm to a third party, then you shall find the Defendant, WANDA CLARK, guilty in Count II of Felonious Abuse/Battery of a Child. If the State failed to prove any one or more of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you shall find the defendant not guilty in Count II. The instruction recited identical elements pertaining to Count III. The elements instruction required the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Clark had caused the injuries. Therefore, the instruction fully informed the jury that, if it believed someone else had caused the injuries, or if it did not believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Clark had caused the injuries, then it was to acquit. The Court finds that the trial court did not err by refusing instruction D-7.