Opinion ID: 488009
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Neglect of Professional Responsibilities

Text: 20 The District Court apparently viewed the term neglect of professional responsibilities as if the words neglect of were interchangeable with the words failure to meet. It held that [i]t seems incontrovertible that the refusal to teach a class (flouting direct administration orders in the process) must constitute a failure to meet a professional responsibility. 621 F.Supp. at 331. It is difficult to doubt the assertion that teaching assigned classes was part of McConnell's professional responsibilities and that, by not teaching assigned classes, McConnell failed to meet a professional responsibility. Failure to meet professional responsibilities, however, is not the standard set forth in the Faculty Handbook for dismissal for cause; neglect of professional responsibilities is. Thus, the issue that must be resolved is whether Dr. McConnell's failure to teach assigned classes constituted neglect of his professional responsibilities. 21 Dr. McConnell contends that his failure to teach the classes did not constitute neglect of professional responsibilities. He maintains that the McNeil incident disrupted the class and that he needed to reestablish an appropriate teaching atmosphere before he could resume teaching. In essence, Dr. McConnell asserts that, had he persisted in attempting to teach the class without resolving the incident, he could not teach effectively, and would thus be neglecting his professional responsibilities by continuing to teach in such a situation. Dr. McConnell argues that the District Court erred in viewing his failure to teach as per se constituting cause for his dismissal. 22 We agree with the appellant. The term neglect necessarily implies an assessment as to whether Dr. McConnell's actions, given the entire factual context, were within the acceptable range of conduct within his profession. The Grievance Committee's findings suggest that Dr. McConnell's actions may well not have constituted a neglect of professional responsibilities. The Grievance Committee stated that, in its view, Dr. McConnell's decision not to teach the class was an attempt to restore what [he] believed to be standard teacher-student relationships, Report of the Liberal Arts Grievance Committee dated December 21, 1983 at 8, reprinted in Appellant App. 68, and that it is convincingly clear from the evidence presented that his departmental colleagues, including the Departmental Chairman, fail to view him as being professionally negligent. Id. 23 At trial, Dr. McConnell should be allowed to present evidence that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, he acted within the bounds of reasonable behavior for a professor. Among the relevant issues are: (1) whether Dr. McConnell's reaction to the McNeil incident was a reasonable one; (2) whether Dr. McConnell took reasonable steps to resolve the incident; and (3) whether, under the circumstances, including Howard University's alleged lack of action to rectify the McNeil incident, McConnell acted reasonably in deciding not to teach the class until Ms. McNeil either dropped the class or apologized. 24 In short, we believe that the term neglect of professional responsibilities, by its very words, includes a consideration of the reasonableness of Dr. McConnell's actions under the totality of the circumstances surrounding them. We also believe that the very concept of termination for cause necessarily includes the consideration of mitigating factors. 6 In any event, it is clear that the terms neglect of professional responsibilities and cause certainly do not explicitly exclude the consideration of reasonableness and mitigating circumstances. So, at worst, the terms are ambiguous and must be construed in keeping with general usage and custom at the University and within the academic community. 7 25 In the instant case, the termination procedures set forth in the Faculty Handbook make sense only if the determination as to whether cause for termination exists includes an assessment of professional standards in the context of the particular facts and circumstances. The termination procedures include a hearing before a Grievance Committee composed of tenured faculty members. The Grievance Committee, after conducting the hearing, then prepares a report containing findings and recommendations for presentation to the Board of Trustees. The Board then decides whether to adopt the Grievance Committee's recommendations, or to conduct its own review of the record. Such a structure, with fact-finding and recommendations made by a panel of fellow professors, would make little sense if the only relevant issue was whether an established responsibility had not been fulfilled. The contract clearly contemplates an evaluation of a professor's actions according to the standards of the profession and a determination as to whether, given the facts and circumstances, the actions of the professor constituted cause for termination. A wooden exercise in single-issue fact-finding is simply not contemplated under this structure. 26 In viewing Dr. McConnell's failure to teach as per se constituting cause for his dismissal, the District Court foreclosed consideration of the reasonableness of the appellant's actions and possible mitigating circumstances. This was error. 27