Opinion ID: 2685521
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutional sufficiency

Text: ¶33 To be constitutionally sufficient, a warrant must be based on probable cause and be reasonable both in its issuance and in its execution. Henderson, 245 Wis. 2d 345, ¶¶18–20. The warrant we review was based on the affidavit of Detective Pajot, 18 Tate cites federal cases holding that this mosaic of authority is insufficient to allow law enforcement to track a cell phone using cell site information. But, the State points out, in those cases the government sought to obtain cell site information not upon a showing of probable cause, but upon a lower statutory showing. See In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of Prospective Cell Site Info., 412 F. Supp. 2d 947, 949 n.1 (E.D. Wis. 2006) (the issue of whether a search warrant issued in accordance with the provisions of Rule 41 would support issuance of the requested order (if the appropriate showing were made) is not before the court); In re Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 765 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (Denial of the government's request for prospective cell site data in this instance should have no dire consequences for law enforcement. This type of surveillance is unquestionably available upon a traditional probable cause showing under Rule 41.); In re Application of the United States for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & a Trap & Trace Device and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. and/or Cell Site Info., 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 300 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (disclosure of cell site information turns a mobile telephone into a 'tracking device' and therefore such disclosure may not be authorized without a showing of probable cause); In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register & a Caller Identification Sys. on Tele. Nos. [] & [] and the Prod. of Real Time Cell Cite Info., 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 605 (D. Md. 2005) (When the government seeks to acquire and use real time cell site information to identify the location and movement of a phone and its possessor in real time, the court will issue a warrant upon a sworn affidavit demonstrating probable cause to believe the information will yield evidence of a crime.). 19 No. 2012AP336-CR who described sufficient facts to support probable cause to believe that the cell phone site information law enforcement sought would aid in a particular apprehension or conviction for a particular offense. Id., ¶19 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶34 Judge Wagner was told that a surveillance video made at the time of a homicide captured a person wearing a distinctive shirt, who identified himself to a store clerk as Bobby when he purchased a cell phone. He also was told that, moments later, surveillance video captured a person matching that physical description shooting two people outside the store. Finding the cell phone the suspect purchased could be probative that the person in possession of the phone was the shooter. Tate has not established that the facts before the circuit court were clearly insufficient to support a determination of probable cause. See id.; Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d at 989. ¶35 In regard to Tate's complaint that Detective Pajot, Assistant District Attorney Huebner and Judge Wagner did not address why the cell phone constituted evidence of a crime, neither the Fourth Amendment nor our decisions require the person seeking a warrant to explain why a particular object or information constitutes evidence. Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d at 989. ¶36 Starting with Assistant District Attorney Huebner's application for the order and the order itself, the standard is whether the warrant-issuing magistrate is apprised of sufficient facts to excite an honest belief in a reasonable mind 20 No. 2012AP336-CR that the objects sought are linked with the commission of a crime, and that the objects sought will be found in the place to be searched. State v. Starke, 81 Wis. 2d 399, 408, 260 N.W.2d 739 (1978). In keeping with this standard, our decisions have focused on the sufficiency of the evidence, not the legal arguments of the applicant or the reasoning of the magistrate. E.g., State v. Kerr, 181 Wis. 2d 372, 380-81, 511 N.W.2d 586 (1994) (although the supporting affidavit contained minimal factual basis to support probable cause, we upheld a determination of probable cause based on the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying . . . information). ¶37 As to Detective Pajot's affidavit, we have described the responsibilities of an affiant seeking a warrant as follows: [A]ffidavits for search warrants[] . . . must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a commonsense and realistic fashion. They are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no proper place in this area. A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants will tend to discourage police officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial officer before acting. . . . Recital of some of the underlying circumstances in the affidavit is essential if the magistrate is to perform his detached function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police. However, where these circumstances are detailed, where reason for crediting the source of the information is given, and when a magistrate has found probable cause, the courts should not invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner. Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d at 991-92 (quoting Starke, 81 Wis. 2d at 410) (further citation omitted). 21 No. 2012AP336-CR ¶38 Although we do not require an affiant to provide legal theories, we do require a narration of sufficient facts and a statement upon what basis such a narration is made. However, if an affiant seeks a warrant based solely on his or her own legal conclusions, the magistrate cannot find probable cause. Id. at 992. Having concluded that Judge Wagner had a sufficient factual basis for finding probable cause, we turn to Tate's particularity argument.19 ¶39 Tate argues that the order fails the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement because it does not specify a particular location where evidence will be found. When it had failed to timely obtain a warrant for the monitoring of a beeper in a home, the government made a similar argument in Karo: it would be impossible to describe the 'place' to be searched, because the location of the place is precisely what is sought to be discovered. Karo, 468 U.S. at 718. The Supreme Court was not impressed with that logic and concluded that the government could describe the object into which the beeper would be placed and the circumstances that led the government to want to install the beeper. Id. ¶40 Tate's similar argument that the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment's warrant clause was not met fails for two reasons. First, both the United States Supreme Court and this court have upheld searches involving tracking 19 Tate does not dispute that Judge Wagner was a neutral magistrate, so we do not address that warrant requirement. 22 No. 2012AP336-CR devices despite the impossibility of describing the exact place to be searched by a traditional description, such as a street address. Id.; Brereton, 345 Wis. 2d 563, ¶¶52-54; Sveum, 328 Wis. 2d 369, ¶52. Second, we disagree with Tate's argument that since there was no physical installation of the tracking device on Tate's property in this case, as there was in Karo, Brereton, and Sveum, the order does not satisfy the particularity requirement. ¶41 In Sveum, we explained that [i]n order to satisfy the particularity requirement, the warrant must enable the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things which are authorized to be seized. Sveum, 328 Wis. 2d 369, ¶27 (quoting State v. Noll, 116 Wis. 2d 443, 450-51, 343 N.W.2d 391 (1984)). While a description of the object into which the tracking device was to be placed was a factor in satisfying the particularity requirement in Sveum, there is no reason why another way of identifying a cell phone, such as by its electronic serial number, cannot serve the same function as physically placing the tracking device on Tate's property. Accordingly, we conclude that the employment of the electronic serial number for Tate's phone satisfies the particularity requirement because that number permits a particularized collection of cell site information for only one cell phone. Therefore, applying great deference to Judge Wagner's probable cause determination, we conclude that the warrant passes constitutional muster.