Opinion ID: 2075944
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of evidence of prior allegations of sexual assault

Text: Appellant sought to impeach W.D.'s credibility through cross-examination about specific instances of prior conductspecifically, her prior allegations of sexual assault by other men. [10] He argues that the trial court's failure to permit such cross-examination constituted reversible error. In assessing appellant's contention, we first consider whether the trial court was constitutionally required by the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to permit inquiry into W.D.'s prior allegations. Finding no such constitutional mandate, we next examine whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion in precluding cross-examination about those allegations.
Appellant argues that the trial court's failure to permit him to cross-examine W.D. about her prior allegations violated his rights under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. [11] Appellant's argument appears to be that where a witness who testifies that he or she is the victim of a crime has in the past claimed to be a victim of similar crimes, those prior claims are so probative of the credibility of the witness that the confrontation clause therefore requires the trial court to allow cross-examination about them. The sixth amendment guarantees to a defendant in a criminal prosecution the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. Lawrence v. United States, 482 A.2d 374, 376 (D.C.1984) (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974)), and the opportunity to cross-examine government witnesses is central to that right. Id. Nevertheless, a criminal defendant's constitutional right to cross-examine adverse witnesses is not without limits. Reed v. United States, 452 A.2d 1173, 1176 (D.C.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 839, 104 S.Ct. 132, 78 L.Ed.2d 127 (1983). For instance, the proposed line of cross-examination must be relevant to the issues involved in the case. Gibson v. United States, 536 A.2d 78, 82 (D.C.1987) ([t]here is no constitutional right to present irrelevant evidence). [12] In this case, as the trial court correctly noted, W.D.'s past allegations would be probative of her credibility only if they were fabricated. [13] See Sherer v. United States, 470 A.2d 732, 738 (D.C.1983) (alleged perjury in another trial probative only if the perjury actually took place), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 931, 105 S.Ct. 325, 83 L.Ed.2d 262 (1984); Hughes v. Raines, 641 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir.1981) (any probative conclusions drawn from rape victim's previous accusation of rape depend on whether the other charge was false). [14] In contrast, if the prior accusations were true, they would not serve as a relevant basis for impeachment. Because the constitution does not require confrontation of witnesses with irrelevant evidence, the very applicability of the confrontation clause in this case depends on W.D.'s prior allegations being false. Under these circumstances, `the confrontation clause does not prevent the trial court from weighing the [defendant's] offer of proof to determine its probative value to the trier of fact.' Sherer, supra, 470 A.2d at 738 (citation omitted). Where an accused seeks to impeach the credibility of a witness by offering evidence that the witness has made a false claim under similar circumstances, the confrontation clause mandates that the trial court give defendant leave to cross-examine about the prior claim only where it is shown convincingly that the prior claim is false. Id. at 739 (citation omitted). In Sherer, the trial court refused to permit the defendant to cross-examine a witness concerning an alleged incident of perjury. Sherer, supra, 470 A.2d at 739. In sustaining this ruling, the Sherer court specifically agreed with the confrontation clause analysis employed in Hughes v. Raines, supra . In Hughes, a rape case, the defendant wanted to demonstrate that the victim had previously made a false accusation of rape. The court found that the trial court's denial of the defendant's request did not offend the confrontation clause because the offer of proof failed to show convincingly whether the prior accusation was false: [A]ny conclusions drawn from [the fact of a prior accusation] that would bear on this case would depend upon whether it could be shown convincingly that the other charge was false. Hughes v. Raines, supra, 641 F.2d at 792. This court's opinion in Lawrence v. United States, supra, 482 A.2d 374, does not compel a different conclusion. In Lawrence, the court, relying on the confrontation clause, found reversible error in a trial court's refusal to permit the defendant to cross-examine a witness to a sexual assault on a minor about prior false accusations of sexual activity made by [the witness] against other family members. Id. at 376. Admittedly, the court in Lawrence did not discuss the question of the showing a defendant must make as to the falsity of prior allegations. [15] However, it does not appear that the Lawrence court saw itself as deciding a case in which the veracity of the prior allegations was substantially disputed. As the court explained, the issue was whether the trial court violated the defendant's confrontation clause rights by, as argued by the defendant, preventing exploration into prior false accusations made by a witness, or whether, as the government responded, that the denial was an appropriate exercise of discretion. Id. (emphasis added). In other words, we read Lawrence as a case premised on the assumption that the allegations at issue were indeed false. [16] Our conclusion that Lawrence did not modify the shown convincingly standard articulated in Sherer is buttressed by the fact that the Lawrence court was aware of, and even cited, the Sherer opinion. Lawrence, supra, 482 A.2d at 377. To read Lawrence otherwise would suggest that the division of the court which decided Lawrence had revisited the question decided in Sherer about the showing required before a defendant is constitutionally entitled to cross-examine a witness about prior accusations of others. Under M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971), however, the court in Lawrence was bound by the decision in Sherer and could not reconsider that question. We think the best interpretation of Sherer and Lawrence, read together, is that where a witness has previously made allegations similar to those he or she testifies to at trial, cross-examination about those prior allegations is constitutionally mandated only where they are shown convincingly to be false. In this case, after reviewing the Minnesota records and observing W.D.'s testimony first hand, the trial court concluded that appellant had not convincingly shown that W.D.'s prior allegations of sexual assault were false. [17] We agree that appellant's proffer fell far short of the standard required to sustain a contention that cross-examination about those allegations was constitutionally mandated. [18]
Having determined that the refusal to permit appellant to cross-examine W.D. about her prior allegations did not violate the confrontation clause, we next consider whether the trial court's ruling was otherwise erroneous. Here, because evidence of W.D.'s prior allegations would have been probative only if the allegations were false, appellant's request to cross-examine about those allegations must be doctrinally analyzed in the context of the evidentiary rules governing impeachment of witness credibility with specific instances of bad conduct. For purposes of this analysis, W.D.'s allegedly false prior accusations would constitute the bad conduct. Our evidentiary rules on the impeachment of witness credibility provide that a witness may be cross-examined about a prior bad act that has not resulted in a criminal conviction only where, at a minimum: (1) the examiner has a factual predicate for such question, and (2) the bad act bears directly upon the veracity of the witness in respect to the issues involved [in] the trial. Sherer, supra, 470 A.2d at 738 (citations omitted). [19] The two-part Sherer standard constitutes a minimum threshold for the admissibility of proposed cross-examination into alleged prior bad acts, and evidence which fails to satisfy the Sherer test may not be admitted. In applying the rules pertaining to the impeachment of witnesses with specific instances of bad conduct, the trial court is vested with broad discretion. First, notwithstanding the fact that a party proposing cross-examination claims to have a factual predicate for inquiry into prior bad acts, the trial court may assess the questioner's offer of proof to determine whether such a factual predicate exists. See Sherer, supra, 470 A.2d at 739 (trial court did not abuse discretion in precluding cross-examination into prior testimony where defendant's offer of proof that the statements were false was scanty); cf. Hollingsworth v. United States, 531 A.2d 973, 981 (D.C.1987) (trial court has broad discretion when ruling on the relevance of evidence). Second, even where proposed cross-examination satisfies the two-part Sherer test, in the absence of confrontation clause concerns, the trial court retains its broad discretion generally to control the scope and extent of cross-examination. In re C.B.N., 499 A.2d 1215, 1218 (D.C.1985); see also Reed, supra, 452 A.2d at 1176; Smith v. United States, 392 A.2d 990, 993 (D.C.1978). In the exercise of this discretion, the court has wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra note 12, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. at 1435. With regard to prejudice, the court may preclude a proposed line of cross-examination if it appears that the danger of unfair prejudice will outweigh its probative value. Lee, supra, note 10, 454 A.2d at 775. See also Goldman v. United States, 473 A.2d 852, 856 (D.C.1984); Brown v. United States, 409 A.2d 1093, 1099-1100 (D.C.1979). And as is true even in confrontation clause situations, the trial court may also weigh the probable effect on fair and efficient conduct of the trial. Sherer, supra, 470 A.2d at 738 (citation omitted). This court will not reverse such decisions unless the trial court abuses its discretion. Brown, supra, 409 A.2d at 1100. In exercising discretion whether to permit cross-examination into prior allegations of sexual assault, the precise probative value of such evidence, even where it clears the factual predicate component of the Sherer threshold, will depend upon the degree of certainty with which the trial court can conclude that the prior allegations were false. [20] The stronger the evidence that the allegations are false, the greater the probative value. As a countervailing concern, cross-examination into prior allegations of sexual assault is likely to generate considerable prejudicial consequences. First, some prejudice results whenever cross-examination probes into the private life of a complainant in a sexual assault case. See Meaders v. United States, 519 A.2d 1248, 1254 (D.C.1986). See also State v. Anderson, supra, 211 Mont. at 286, 686 P.2d at 201 (evidence of prior allegations place[s] a prejudicial stamp on [the complainant's] general character and reputation). Second, evidence of a complainant's prior allegations of sexual assault diverts the jury's attention to collateral matters. McLean, supra note 10, 377 A.2d at 77. [21] See also State v. Johnson, supra, 102 N.M. at 118, 692 P.2d at 43 (the focus would be on whether the prior charges were `unsubstantiated,' in effect putting the complainant on trial as to the truthfulness of any complaint to the police which did not result in arrest or conviction). Here, the trial judge acted within her discretion in precluding cross-examination about W.D.'s prior allegations of sexual assault. [22] As indicated, the trial court determined, following voir dire, that there was no substantial basis for concluding that W.D. had fabricated her prior claims of sexual assault. As a result, the proposed line of impeachment was of limited probative value at best. [23] The prejudicial effect of the proposed inquiry, in comparison, was considerable. The cross-examination sought by appellant would have probed into extremely private and potentially humiliating aspects of W.D.'s life. Moreover, in this case the risk of distracting the jury with collateral matters was particularly acute. Appellant's proposed line of cross-examination would have diverted the jurors' attention away from the incident in the D.C. Jail and would have invited them instead to focus their energies on assessing the veracity of each of W.D.'s prior claims of sexual assault. [24] Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in precluding appellant from inquiring on cross-examination about W.D.'s prior allegations of sexual assault. [25] We do not think that this position necessarily conflicts with the opinion in Mintz v. Premier Cab Ass'n, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 389, 127 F.2d 744 (1942). In Mintz, the trial court permitted the defendant in a personal injury action to ask the plaintiff on cross-examination whether she had made claim for injuries in two previous unrelated accidents. 75 U.S.App.D.C. at 389, 127 F.2d at 744. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to admit evidence of prior claims under the claim-minded plaintiff principle. We read Mintz as permitting, not requiring, the trial court to allow cross-examination under this principle where it determines that the proffered evidence may create prejudice but is believed to be worth more than it costs. Id. at 390, 127 F.2d at 745. [26] Furthermore, the dictum in Mintz suggesting the principle's application to sexual assault cases is of dubious validity today. [27] In the era when the Mintz court suggested application of its cost-benefit calculus to sexual assault cases, the legal system operated under the assumption that it was also worth more than it costs in effect to put the victim on trial in rape cases; the rules of evidence at the time permitted a defendant, under the guise of cross-examination on the issue of consent, to grill his victim about virtually her entire sexual history and reputation. See Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM.L.REV. 1, 12-15 (1977); see also, e.g., Packineau v. United States, 202 F.2d 681, 684-87 (8th Cir.1953) (holding that trial court erred in excluding evidence of complaining witness' concupiscenceof her having sexual lust and unlawfully indulging in it with another man). As this court's opinion in McLean v. United States makes clear, courts today accord much more weight to the prejudicial aspect of inquiry into a rape victim's sexual history than did courts a half-century ago; in this jurisdiction, such prejudicial inquiry is no longer deemed to be worth more than it costs. McLean, supra note 10, 377 A.2d at 77-78. For similar reasons, we think that, absent confrontation clause concerns, the prejudice inherent in cross-examination about a complainant's prior allegations of sexual assault [28] precludes us from requiring the trial court under the Mintz principle to allow cross-examination of the victim in a sexual assault case about her prior allegations of sexual assault regardless of their truth or falsity. [29] In sum, under all the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the trial judge committed no reversible error in precluding appellant from cross-examining W.D. about her prior allegations of sexual assault.