Opinion ID: 308599
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Absence of Controlling Precedent on Source of Pro Se Right

Text: 26 The Supreme Court has never directly determined whether the Constitution guarantees the pro se right. Appellants rely on Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 242, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942) where the Court observed: 27 [t]he right to assistance of counsel and the correlative right to dispense with a lawyer's help are not legal formalisms. They rest on considerations that go to the substance of an accused's position before the law. . . [T]he Constitution does not force a lawyer upon a defendant. He may waive his Constitutional right to assistance of counsel if he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open. 28 However, Adams's correlative right language was not an essential ingredient of its holding, which was simply that a defendant who has intelligently waived his right to counsel may also waive his right to a jury trial. Moreover, in Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 85 S.Ct. 783, 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965), holding a defendant's waiver of right to a jury trial subject to the assent of the prosecution and the trial judge, the Court said that the ability to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist on the opposite of that right. 380 U.S. at 34-35, 85 S.Ct. at 789. It pointed out that 29 [t]he Constitution recognizes an adversary system as the proper method of determining guilt, and the Government, as a litigant, has a legitimate interest in seeing that cases in which it believes a conviction is warranted are tried before the tribunal which the Constitution regards as most likely to produce a fair result. Id. at 36, 85 S.Ct. at 790. 7 30 There are conflicting indications from the circuits. The Second Circuit in United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964), recognized constitutional status for the pro se right. In accord with Plattner, see Lowe v. United States, 418 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 1048, 90 S.Ct. 1378, 25 L.Ed.2d 660 (1970); United States v. Warner, 428 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400 U.S. 930, 91 S.Ct. 194, 27 L.Ed.2d 191 (1971); United States v. Pike, 439 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1971); Hodge v. United States, 414 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1969). But compare Juelich v. United States, 342 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1965); Van Nattan v. United States, 357 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1966). 31 In our court, Brown v. United States, 105 U.S.App.D.C. 77, 264 F.2d 363 (en banc 1959), left the issue unresolved. Reversal was sought because the trial judge failed to instruct a defendant of his right to represent himself when his court-appointed attorney informed the court that defendant was dissatisfied with the attorney's pessimism about the outcome of the case. There was no opinion for a majority of the court. Judge Miller, joined by Judges Prettyman, Danaher and Bastian, stated that the pro se right is statutory only, and therefore (a) defendant must assert the right in order to be entitled to it and (b) in any event no reversal was required since no prejudice could be discerned. 32 The opinions of the other five judges are consistent with a view that the Constitution is the basis for the right, although only one expressly discussed its source. Judge Burger, concurring in part, differed with the others voting to affirm because he treated defendant's expression of dissatisfaction as the equivalent of a request for removal of counsel, but held it within the court's discretion to deny the request so long as it was sufficiently apprised of the cause of the dissatisfaction. 33 The four dissenters joined in an opinion stating that the reasons for the dissatisfaction were not made sufficiently clear to the court to permit the exercise of its informed discretion on the matter, and hence the judge should have inquired further into the basis for defendant's attitude and should have specifically informed defendant of his right to proceed alone. The pro se alternative, they felt, is one of fundamental importance, and a defendant can make an informed decision on how best to conduct his defense only if he is made aware that he is free to dispense with counsel. The principal dissent, however, made no mention of the Constitution. Only Judge Bazelon, in a separate dissent, said the pro se right was grounded in the Constitution. 34 B. Need for Recognition of Statutory Right-If Timely Asserted, Not Waived, And Accompanied by Waiver of Right to Counsel 35 The Government says the pro se right is statutory and subject to extensive qualifications, discerning in the decisions seven factors on the basis of which the pro se right may be partially or entirely denied. 8 36 This case does not require final resolution of the constitutional question. That would be unavoidable had Congress attempted to narrow or qualify the pro se right along the lines advocated by the Government on this appeal. But that is not the case. The right of pro se representation was enacted by our very first Congress. The language declaring the pro se right is not qualified, see 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1654. The statute was passed in a context of colonial tribunals largely manned by laymen, and of pioneer modes of thought emphasizing the virtues of common sense and self-reliance. 9 Its constitutional aura is under-scored by the proposal the very next day of the Sixth Amendment. 10 37 In sum, whether or not the right of pro se representation has a constitutional foundation it is patently a statutory right, see Sec. 1654; this right was not only conferred by Congress in 1789 but has wide reverberation in organic state law 11 and was recognized by Congress as a fundamental right. We conclude that this right must be recognized if it is timely asserted, and accompanied by a valid waiver of counsel, and if it is not itself waived, either expressly, or constructively, as by disruptive behavior during trial. 12 38 The precedents relied on by the Government as subjecting the pro se right to extensive qualifications do no more than establish these basic elements: timely assertion; need for intelligent waiver of counsel; and possibility of waiver of the pro se right. A number of cases involved the special circumstance of defendants whose mental capacity was impaired. 13 The bulk of the cases cited to us involved requests made after commencement of trial, 14 and do no more than apply the recognized principle that the fundamental right to conduct the case pro se is one that must be claimed timely, before the trial begins. Just as a defendant who has unrestricted right to retain counsel of his own choosing must seek permission of the court once his choice has been made, to select a different retained counsel, and is subject to the sound discretion of the court when he seeks to make a change after his trial has commenced, so a defendant must obtain the court's permission when he seeks to make a change in order to select himself as counsel. 39 When the pro se right is claimed after trial has begun, the court exercises its discretion. It may weigh the inconvenience threatened by defendant's belated request against the possible prejudice from denial of defendant's request. In exercising discretion the judge may take into account the circumstances at the time, whether there has been prior disruptive behavior by defendant, whether the trial is in an advanced stage, etc. E. g., Seale v. Hoffman, supra, note 14; United States v. Foster, 9 F.R.D. 367 (S.D.N.Y.1949). The right to self-representation, though asserted before trial, can be lost by disruptive behavior during trial, constituting constructive waiver. But that is a far different situation from that presented by the instant case, where appellants unequivocally claimed the right to represent themselves, see Brown v. United States, supra, 105U.S.App.D.C. at 81, 264 F.2d at 367 (Burger, J.), United States ex rel. Higgins v. Fay, 364 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1966), well in advance of the beginning of trial and selection of the jury, see United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1965); cf. United States v. Thomas, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 308, 450 F.2d 1355 (1971). 40 C. Possible Disruption as a Basis for Denying Pro Se Defense 41 The Government seeks to sustain the denial of appellants' pro se motions on a theory of possible disruption. A list of five factors is offered 15 which, it is said, taken together support the judge's finding of risk of disruption. 42 Given the general likelihood that pro se defendants have only rudimentary acquaintanceship with the rules of evidence and courtroom protocol, a measure of unorthodoxy, confusion and delay is likely, perhaps inevitable, in pro se cases. 16 The energy and time toll on the trial judge, as fairness calls him to articulate ground rules and reasons that need not be explained to an experienced trial counsel, can be relieved, at least in part, by appointment of an amicus curiae to assist the defendant. 17 If defendant refrains from intentionally obstructive tactics, amicus would be available to provide advice on procedure and strategy. The utility of an amicus appointment is dependent on explanation to and cooperation by defendant, and on understanding, too, that he may claim with some merit that his pro se rights include his right to appear before the jury in the status of one defending himself, and that this is defeated if a too conspicuous role is played by an attorney, unless it clearly appears to the jury that he does not have the status of defense counsel. 18 43 On the other hand, a potentially unruly defendant may and should be clearly forewarned that deliberate dilatory or obstructive behavior may operate in effect as a waiver of his pro se rights and, in that event, amicus will be ready to assume exclusive control of the defense. 19 The Supreme Court has recently emphasized that even constitutional litigation prerogatives of a defendant are available to give choice in the conduct of a trial, and do not extend so far as to permit subversion of the core concept of a trial. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970). The same principle means that obstreperous behavior may constitute waiver of the pro se right. 20 44 Appointment of amicus counsel would not have resolved all the problems presented by pro se defenses in the multidefendant context involved in this case. Thus, the prospect of repetitious interrogation of witnesses would persist. But the joint trial that the prosecution seeks in the interest of efficiency cannot set aside the fundamental right of pro se representation. The trial judge must proceed by skill and suasion, by obtaining defendants' cooperation, not by denying their pro se rights. 45 We need not here consider whether or in what circumstances withholding of reasonable cooperation may be held equivalent to unruly action as a waiver of the right of self-representation. In the case before us, defendants and counsel assured the court, on several occasions, of their lack of disruptive intent, e. g., Tr. 23, 24. The judge in his oral opinion noted that his fears of disruption did not stem from concern over defendants' motivations. Furthermore, the record shows how reasonable cooperation was obtained from defendants, by a reasonable accommodation of interests. When defendants expressed concern over their exclusion from bench conferences, Judge Pratt made, and defendants accepted (Tr. 333-335), a suggestion permitting a representative defendant to participate in bench conferences as an observer. A similar approach might have obviated any serious problems of repetitious interrogation. 21 In the last analysis, however, if the assertion of a pro se right makes a multidefendant trial unmanageable, or unfair to the other defendants, the remedy lies in severance. Rule 14, F.R.Crim.P. 46 In effect the unqualified right of self representation rests on an implied presumption that the court will be able to achieve reasonable cooperation. The possibility that reasonable cooperation may be withheld, and the right later waived, is not a reason for denying the right of self representation at the start. 47 D. Lack of Foundation for Government Claims of Prior Disruptive Behavior 48 The Government argues that in this case there was disruptive behavior on the part of defendants which sustains the judge's denial of pro se representation. We assume, without deciding, that where there has been experience with the particular defendants that is plainly identifiable as disruptive in character, such as to overturn the premise of reasonable cooperation, and permit a finding of anticipatory breach and waiver, that would be a predicate for denying the pro se right. We do not think any such predicate appears in this case. 49 We begin by rejecting the Government's approach of using disruptive incidents following the denial of the pro se motions as reasons to support that denial. 22 This is like using the fruit of an unreasonable search to provide a cause making the search reasonable. Nearly all of the incidents cited by the Government concerned assertions of the right to self-representation. It would be anomalous to hold that the denial of one's rights can be justified by reference to the nature of subsequent complaints protesting that denial. 50 As to defendants' actions prior to the denial of their pro se requests, these were not the kind of disruptive actions that warranted denial on that basis alone. We are aware of the occasions prior to the pro se ruling when defendants interrupted the pre-trial hearing without obtaining the court's prior leave. However, most of the interruptions stemmed from defendants' confusion over the exclusion of the public from the pre-trial hearing, a matter that had been arranged at the pre-trial conference in which defendants had not participated, and which was subject to reasonably prompt clarification without repetition. 51 Thus, during Sister Malone's testimony, in which she inquired of the court the reasons for the exclusion of the public, appellant Dougherty interrupted to observe that he thought the courtroom was large enough to accommodate the people who could be expected to attend. This followed by moments an interruption by Mr. O'Rourke to make a request, joined in by Sister Malone, that two of their relatives be permitted to observe the progress of the hearing- a request that the court granted. 52 None of the incidents can be characterized as disruptive in the sense of evincing defendants' intent to upset or unreasonably delay the hearing. Indeed to some extent the defendants, not trained in courtroom decorum, had reason to suppose their behavior was within proper bounds. At the hearing and during the early trial, Judge Pratt not only took considerable care to explain his ruling on the pro se motions, but also permitted the defendants to participate personally in jury selection. The record also shows that Judge Pratt engaged defendants in colloquies on various matters directly rather than through counsel. We do not disapprove, we rather commend, Judge Pratt's willingness to handle this case with some flexibility. The Supreme Court has emphasized that one of the most important functions of criminal trials is, within reason, to make plain to defendants and society at large that justice is done in our courts, 23 and Judge Pratt's approach likely had that effect in this case. But the latitude previously granted to appellants must be taken into account in appraising whether their later requests manifest disruptive conduct. 24 We cannot agree their pre-ruling behavior can be considered as so disruptive as to constitute a constructive, anticipatory waiver of a fundamental right. 53