Opinion ID: 1258959
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of the HWPA

Text: HRS § 378-62 provides in relevant part: An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment because: 1) The employee ... reports or is about to report to a public body, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a law or rule adopted pursuant to law of this State, a political subdivision of this State, or the United States, unless the employee knows that the report is false.... (Emphasis added). Crosby complains that the trial court construed the HWPA too narrowly in COL 2 and that his removal affected a condition of employment. The State counters that the mere reassignment of a project within DBF could not have affected any condition of Crosby's employment; rather, DBF took appropriate management action. The terms compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment are not defined in HRS chapter 378. The ordinary definition of condition includes [a]ttendant circumstances; existing state of affairs ... ( Webster's New International Dictionary 556 (2d ed. 1960)) and situation with respect to circumstances; existing state or case.... The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 280 (Rev. ed. 1979). Clearly, one of the circumstances of Crosby's employment was that he was assigned to the project. A broad reading of the term condition in the HWPA is in accord with the legislative intent. See discussion supra section II (citing Richardson (Klein, J., dissenting), 76 Hawai`i at 68-69, 868 P.2d at 1215-16). Legislative history confirms that the HWPA provides protection to employees who report suspected violations of law from  any form of retaliation by their employers. Sen.Stand.Comm.Rep. No. 1127, in 1987 Senate Journal, at 1392 (emphasis added). Specifically, the legislature intended that the HWPA bar discharge, discrimination and other forms of adverse action.... Sen. Stand.Comm.Rep. No. 833, in 1987 Senate Journal, at 1249 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the HWPA is a remedial statute. See Flores v. United Airlines, Inc., 70 Haw. 1, 12 n. 8, 757 P.2d 641, 647 n. 8 (1988) (citations omitted). As such, the HWPA should be construed liberally to accomplish the purpose for which it was enacted. Id. (citation omitted); see also Richardson (Klein, J., dissenting), 76 Hawai`i at 68-69, 868 P.2d at 1215-16. In order for an employee to prevail under the HWPA, however, the employer's challenged action must have been taken because the employee engaged in protected conduct in order to be considered discriminat[ory] under the HWPA. In other words, a causal connection between the alleged retaliation and the whistleblowing is required. The HWPA's legislative history indicates that the legislature intended that the required burden of proof be similar to that utilized in traditional labor management relations discharge cases. Under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1988), an employee has the burden of showing that his or her protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to terminate the employee. See also Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 380, 652 P.2d 625, 631 (1982) (noting that the plaintiff alleging a retaliatory discharge bears the burden of proving that the discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy). In reviewing an initial draft of the HWPA, the House Standing Committee reported: the bill imposes the burden of proof on the employee and also establishes a higher standard of proof than normally applied in civil cases. Under existing custom and practice in labor management relations discharge cases, the burden of proof is placed on the employer. Accordingly, your Committee amended the bill to remove subsection (d) of section -3, thereby maintaining the existing custom and practice of placing the burden of proof on the employer in discharge cases. Hse.Stand.Comm.Rep. No. 25, in 1987 House Journal, at 1090. [13] We note, however, that an aggrieved employee always retains the ultimate burden of proof in a retaliatory discharge case. Sonicraft, Inc. v. NLRB, 905 F.2d 146, 150 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1024, 111 S.Ct. 671, 112 L.Ed.2d 664 (1991). The legislature must have been referring to the corresponding rule that the burden of negating causation is on the employer. Id. Once the employee shows that the employer's disapproval of his first amendment protected expression played a role in the employer's action against him or her, [t]he employer can defend affirmatively by showing that the termination would have occurred regardless of the protected activity. NLRB v. Howard Elec. Co., 873 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir.1989) (citing NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 401-03, 103 S.Ct. 2469, 2474, 76 L.Ed.2d 667 (1983)). In other words, the employer has an affirmative defense (no causation), as to which of course he bears the burden of persuasion, but so far as the main case is concerned the burden of persuasion never shifts. Sonicraft, 905 F.2d at 150. Although the trial court did not refer to any standard of proof in its resolution of the instant case, a presumption arises that it applied the correct standard. State v. Aplaca, 74 Haw. 54, 66, 837 P.2d 1298, 1305 (1992) (applying this rule in a criminal case where the trial court merely commented on the nature of the evidence in support of the finding of guilt; specifically, the trial court noted that the witness' testimony was more credible than the defendant's). Crosby's argument is grounded on the testimony of Goda and Takushi to the effect that Crosby was removed from the project, in part, because of his expressed opinions. During oral argument Crosby's counsel protested that Crosby was removed from the project because he refused to lie by adding sole source or non-competitive language to the contract. The question of the State's motivation in removing Crosby is certainly susceptible to differing views. Nonetheless, there is substantial evidence in the record, see infra section III.B. (listing six relevant facts), to support the trial court's COL 2 and 3, as they pertain to COL 5. [14] The trial court did not err when it found that there was no causal nexus between Crosby's protected expression and his removal from the project, nor when it concluded that the State did not discriminate against Crosby regarding a condition of his employment. In any event, we agree with the trial court's conclusions even on de novo constitutional review, as expressed in the following section.