Opinion ID: 1174739
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Credibility of Testimony and Sufficiency of the Evidence

Text: Defendants argue that the testimony of Virginia Lairby and Carri Long was so inherently improbable as to be incredible as a matter of law. [22] Defendants rely on the proposition that [a] reviewing court will overturn the jury on the question of credibility of the witnesses only when the evidence presented is so improbable, unbelievable, or unsatisfactory as to raise a serious question of the guilt of the defendant. People v. Dunn, 49 Ill. App.3d 1002, 1009, 7 Ill.Dec. 879, 885, 365 N.E.2d 164, 170 (1977). See also State v. Middelstadt, Utah, 579 P.2d 908, 909 (1978). We have examined the record and conclude that the foregoing rule does not apply to the testimony of either of the complaining child witnesses. Defendants focus on the childlike language used by Virginia Lairby, who was six at the time of trial, and on conflicts within the individual testimony and between the respective testimony of Virginia Lairby and Carri Long, the alleged victims. The State argues and we agree that a child may perceive and relate facts differently than would an adult, but that does not prevent a child from testifying truthfully, accurately, and in a manner which can be understood by the jury. [23] See State v. Wilkerson, Utah, 612 P.2d 362, 364-65 (1980). Although we will not affirm a judgment reached on evidence which is inherently improbable, testimony that merely reflects the age, immaturity, and juvenile vocabulary of a child does not fall within that category. Additionally, this Court has said, [I]t is not our province to measure conflicting evidence... . That responsibility belongs strictly to the trier of fact. State v. Wulffenstein, Utah, 657 P.2d 289, 292 (1982) (citing State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811, 813 (1977)), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1044, 103 S.Ct. 1443, 75 L.Ed.2d 799 (1983). Inconsistencies in the testimony, therefore, were for the jury to resolve. Our task is to assure that the evidence before the jury was substantial, thus permitting the conclusion that the jury could have properly arrived at a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That point is dealt with below. Lastly, defendants' argument that there was insufficient evidence to find them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt must also be rejected. The test for reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim is well settled. [W]e review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted. State v. Kerekes, Utah, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (1980); State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980); State v. Gorlick, Utah, 605 P.2d 761, 762 (1979); State v. Daniels, Utah, 584 P.2d 880, 882-83 (1978); State v. Romero, Utah, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (1976). State v. Petree, Utah, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (1983). In the instant case, the testimony of Virginia Lairby and Carri Long related specific acts that common sense dictates could only be within the knowledge and experience of young children who had been exposed to entirely inappropriate sexual behavior. Their testimony was essentially consistent. They related the same incidents on several different occasions to doctors, police, family members, and the court. At trial, defense counsel conducted a thorough cross-examination of each girl. After they were led by his questioning on to various tangents, they returned to the incidents of sexual abuse with regularity and conviction. Defendants have alleged throughout their briefs that the children related fabricated stories of sexual abuse resulting from a conspiracy by defendants' ex-spouses. [24] However, no evidence or reasonable inferences support such an allegation. Earlier in our discussion, we pointed out that there was no evidence of any communication at any time between Wanda Lairby and Richard Long. The two children, living in households in Utah and Arizona, would have had to be coached extensively and maintain their stories over a period of more than a year. Neither child retracted the essential allegations of abuse throughout long and difficult interrogation. There was no evidence that defendants and their ex-spouses anticipated custody battles or were unhappy with custody arrangements prior to the incidents charged here. There was no evidence that Wanda Lairby would not be considered a suitable custodial parent or that Richard Long ever expressed the desire to obtain custody of his children. Defendants testified that their ex-spouses did not allow them the contact and visitation defendants desired after their arrests. Such behavior on the part of the ex-spouses, however, is not evidence of a motive to fabricate, occurring as it did after the events of sexual abuse charged against the defendants. Dr. Palmer corroborated Virginia's testimony by testifying that, as a physician experienced in dealing with sexually abused children, he was of the opinion that her verbal and behavorial symptoms indicated she was in all probability a victim of sexual abuse. [25] Wanda Lairby's testimony did not reveal that she was vindictive toward her ex-husband or that she harbored any fear that she would be unable to gain permanent custody of her children. We conclude there was substantial credible evidence supporting defendants' convictions. The verdicts below are affirmed. HALL, C.J., concurs. STEWART and HOWE, JJ., concur in the result. ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate herein.