Opinion ID: 2612692
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: scope of the right of compulsory process

Text: The Oregon compulsory process clause is found in Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution and provides in part: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right    to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor   . In State ex rel. Gladden v. Lonergan, 201 Or. 163, 269 P.2d 491 (1954), we noted the literal meaning of the compulsory process clause and held that the provision secures to the defendant the right to process to obtain the attendance of witnesses, saying: Under Art. 1, § 11, Oregon Const., the accused not only is guaranteed the right `to meet the witnesses face to face', but also the right of having `compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor'. At common law an accused charged with a felony could not demand as a matter of right compulsory process for his witnesses, but it was the duty of the prosecution to call and examine all persons who had knowledge of material facts connected with the crime, whether favorable or unfavorable to the defendant. But under the federal constitution and the constitutions of most states, the right of compulsory process for witnesses on behalf of defendant is secured. The right is not subject to the discretion of the court; it is usually absolute, at least as to process for necessary and material witnesses, even though the persons needed as witnesses live outside the county of the venue.    201 Or. at 188, 269 P.2d 491. See Clinton, The Right To Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 Ind.L.Rev. 711 (1976), and Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 Mich.L.Rev. 71 (1973), for a detailed summary of the history of the compulsory process clause. Compare the concurring opinion of Lent, J., in State v. Douglas, 292 Or. 516, 520-538, 641 P.2d 561 (1982). The right to subpoena a witness into the courtroom is an empty right absent the related right to obtain the testimony of the witness. We have no hesitation in concluding that the clause protects both the right to the attendance of the witness and the testimony of the witness. In this respect, we construe the state compulsory process clause in the same way as the Supreme Court construed the virtually identical federal counterpart in Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). [2] In that case, after first holding that the federal compulsory process clause is so fundamental and essential to a fair trial that it is incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 388 U.S. at 17-18, 87 S.Ct. at 1922, the court stated the issue as follows:    We are thus called upon to decide whether the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right under any circumstances to put his witnesses on the stand, as well as the right to compel their attendance in court.    388 U.S. at 19, 87 S.Ct. at 1923. Observing that the compulsory process clause was enacted to overcome the early common law rule prohibiting a defendant from calling witnesses on his behalf, the court held that the clause guaranteed the right to obtain the testimony of witnesses as well as the right to secure their attendance.    The Framers of the Constitution did not intend to commit the futile act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testimony he had no right to use. 388 U.S. at 23, 87 S.Ct. at 1925. The specific question involved in this case is whether the preclusion sanction of ORS 135.865 is an unconstitutional limitation upon the right to obtain the testimony of a witness. We now turn to that question. [3]