Opinion ID: 2797758
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the sale of the coupons by

Text: Restaurant.com to plaintiffs constituted a “written consumer contract,” or whether the coupons “gave or displayed any written consumer warranty, notice, or sign,” under N.J.S.A. 56:12-15. Shelton III, 70 A.3d at 549 (alteration in original). The New Jersey Supreme Court then determined in a thorough and carefully crafted opinion – Shelton III – that the term “property” as used in the TCCWNA encompasses intangible property such as the gift certificates issued by Restaurant.com, id. at 554, 558-59, that the gift certificates were primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, id. at 555, 558-59, that the sale of the gift certificates constituted a written consumer contract, id. at 556, 559, and that the terms listed on the gift certificates constituted notice, id. at 558-59. In sum, the court concluded, “The statute as drafted … covers the certificates in question.” Id. at 559. 7 Next, we vacated the District Court’s dismissal of the TCCWNA count and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the New Jersey Supreme Court’s explication of the law in Shelton III. Shelton IV, 543 F. App’x at 171. Upon remand, Restaurant.com again filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Shelton III should apply only prospectively. The District Court agreed. It acknowledged that decisions are ordinarily applied retroactively under New Jersey law. But it concluded that retroactive application was inappropriate here because Shelton III established a new rule of law by resolving an issue of first impression, and retroactive application would yield substantial inequitable results. The District Court acknowledged the fact-sensitive nature of its analysis of the equities, but it rejected the Plaintiffs’ argument that an evidentiary record was needed to reach a decision. It instead decided that, because the Plaintiffs “have not suffered any actual, non-theoretical damages” (App. at 12) – in fact, there was “no allegation that Plaintiffs were unable to enjoy the bargained-for discounts at the third-party restaurants that they selected” – they should not be entitled to “windfall statutory damages and attorneys’ fees.” (Id. at 13.) In the District Court’s view, “common sense” dictated that the many “unsuspecting companies” that would be subject to the new law should be given a chance to change their conduct before being exposed to “extraordinary statutory penalties.” (Id. at 11.) In such a situation, the District Court concluded, even limited retroactive application to the plaintiffs in this case would be inequitable. The Plaintiffs timely appealed the District Court’s order. 8