Opinion ID: 25278
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: competence to plead guilty or waive the right

Text: There is no dispute that Arnold attempted to counsel must be measured by a standard to waive any ineffective assistance of counsel that is higher t han (or even different from)” claim. Not only did he request the court’s as- competence to stand trial.2 Accord Dunn v. sistance in enforcing his instructions to counsel, he remarked after the trial that 1 Accord Autry v. McKaskle, 727 F.2d 358, 561 I wish to say that I’m quite satisfied with (5th Cir. 1984) (concluding that, if defendant the decision made by the jury. I’m also knowingly chose to seek the death penalty and not satisfied with theSSthe conduct of the to present mitigating evidence, his counsel was Court. I feel that all my rights have “ethically bound” to obey that choice). been fully protected and recognized. 2 And I have been very adequately To be competent to stand trial, a defendant representedSSand vigorously soSSby must have “‘sufficient present ability to consult mySSby my two court appointed with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of unattorneys. derstanding’ and [have] ‘a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’” Godinez, 509 U.S. at 396 (quoting Dusky Moreover, all alleged errors resulted from Ar- v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curi- nold’s express instructions to counsel. “The am)); accord Mata v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 324, 329 circumstances are extremely rare when counsel n.2 (5th Cir. 2000). Arnold’s high degree of inis not required to follow his client’s volvement indicates he was capable of understandinstructions on a decision of this nature.” ing the proceedings and consulting with his Lowenfield v. Phelps, 817 F.2d 285, 292 (5th attorneys and therefore was competent to make strategic decisions during voir dire and sentencing. (continued...) 2 Johnson, 162 F.3d 302, 307-08 (5th Cir. 1998). Because Arnold was competent to stand trial and therefore to waive his right to counsel, he was, a fortiori, competent to over- ride the advice of counsel. See Coleman, 244 F.3d at 545. Indeed, Arnold threatened to dis- charge counsel and proceed pro seSSa course of action he undisputedly was competent to take under GodinezSSif not allowed to be an active participant in the trial. Under those cir- cumstances, we cannot say that the trial court deprived Arnold of effective assistance of counsel merely by allowing him to make stra- tegic decisions. The district court analyzed this issue in a comprehensive seventy-seven-page opinion. Essentially for the reasons given by the district court, the judgment is AFFIRMED. 2 (...continued) See Coleman v. Mitchell, 244 F.3d 533, 545 (6th Cir. 2001) (relying on defendant’s high degree of activity at trial in finding him competent under Godinez to instruct counsel not to present mitigating evidence during sentencing phase). In Godinez, 509 U.S. at 400, the Court recognized that, in addition to determining competence, the trial court also must ensure that the waiver of the right to counsel is knowing and voluntary. Arnold does not argue that his decision to ignore the advice of counsel was not knowing or voluntary, and his statements before and during trial confirm that it was. 3