Opinion ID: 2631882
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: ¶ 10 In a preliminary hearing, a magistrate must dismiss an information and discharge a defendant if the State's evidence fails to establish probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed the charged crime. Utah R.Crim. P. 7(h)(3). However, [t]he dismissal and discharge do not preclude the State from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. Id. Rule 7, then, permits refiling as a general proposition. ¶ 11 We determined in State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), that State refiling of a dismissed charge is limited by due process protections of the Utah Constitution. See Utah Const. art. I, § 7. We held that after a magistrate has dismissed a charge for insufficient evidence, state due process forbids refiling the same charge unless the State can show that new or previously unavailable evidence has surfaced, or that other good cause justifies refiling. Brickey at 647. In Brickey, we focused on a balancing of two important interests: (1) a prosecutor's right to freely prosecute, and (2) due process protections of the accused. Id. We indicated that Oklahoma's procedural approach best achieved the proper balance among these competing interests. Id. ¶ 12 We noted that courts have had occasion to scrutinize the exercise of the broad discretion accorded prosecutors, and that scrutiny has revealed that the prosecutor's good faith is a fragile protection for the accused. Id. To curb the potential for abuse of this discretion, we required prosecutors, whenever possible, [to] refile charges before the same magistrate who does not consider the matter de novo, but looks at the facts to determine whether new evidence or changed circumstances are sufficient to require a reexamination. Id. Therefore, we adopted the Oklahoma approach that prohibits a prosecutor from refiling criminal charges earlier dismissed for insufficient evidence unless the prosecutor can show that new or previously unavailable evidence has surfaced or that other good cause justifies refiling. Id. (citing Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169, 171 (Okla. Ct.App.1971)). ¶ 13 The policies and protections underlying the Brickey rule provide guidance in understanding the rule and properly defining its intended ambit. First, we noted that granting the State unbridled discretion in determining whether to refile charges raises the intolerable specter of the State's continually harassing a defendant who previously had charges dismissed for insufficient evidence. Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646-47. Thus, one important purpose underlying the Brickey rule is to protect defendants from intentional prosecutorial harassment arising from repeated filings of groundless claims before different magistrates in the hope that some magistrate will eventually bind the defendants over for trial. Id. at 647; accord State v. Fisk, 966 P.2d 860, 864 (Utah Ct.App.1998) ( Brickey rule ensures that the defendant is not harassed by repeated charges on tenuous grounds). ¶ 14 A second significant purpose inheres in the dicta of the case interpreting other good cause to include an innocent miscalculation of the evidence necessary to establish probable cause for a bindover. Id. at 647 n. 5. Although Brickey did not reach the issue of what might constitute other good cause, we noted in a footnote that other jurisdictions have found that good cause may exist when a prosecutor innocently miscalculates the quantum of evidence required to obtain a bindover. Id. at 647 n. 5 (citing Harper v. District Court, 484 P.2d 891, 897 (Okla. 1971)). This language implies an additional underlying purpose of preventing the State from intentionally holding back crucial evidence to impair a defendant's pretrial discovery rights and to ambush her at trial with the withheld evidence. Such action would prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial and would thus be in contravention of important due process rights. ¶ 15 In sum, we hold that fundamental fairness, the touchstone of due process, precludes, without limitation, a prosecutor from seeking an unfair advantage over a defendant through forum shopping by harassing a defendant through repeated filings of groundless and improvident charges, or from withholding evidence. Overreaching by the State, in any of its forms, is the chief evil we sought to prevent in Brickey. To the extent that these overzealous practices may infringe on a defendant's right to due process, Brickey limits the State's ability to refile charges that have been dismissed for insufficient evidence. Brickey does not, however, indicate any intent to forbid refiling generally or preclude refiling where a defendant's due process rights are not implicated. The lodestar of Brickey, then, is fundamental fairness. ¶ 16 As a result, when potential abusive practices are involved, the presumption is that due process will bar refiling. When potential abusive practices are not involved, we hold that there is no presumptive bar to refiling. See, e.g., State v. Elling, 19 Ariz.App. 317, 506 P.2d 1102, 1103 (1973) (where no forum shopping involved reprosecution was permissible); People v. Sabell, 708 P.2d 463, 466 (Colo.1985) (where court found no oppressive tactics, refiling was deemed permissible); State v. Bacon, 117 Idaho 679, 791 P.2d 429, 433-34 (1990) (no evidence of bad faith or purposeful harassment; reprosecution permissible); Stockwell v. State, 98 Idaho 797, 573 P.2d 116, 126 (1977) (stating refiling is not prohibited unless done without good cause or in bad faith); State v. Vargo, 139 Mich.App. 573, 362 N.W.2d 840, 842-43 (1985) (holding simple neglect rather than deliberate attempt to harass defendant justified refiling); State v. Dail, 228 Neb. 653, 424 N.W.2d 99, 102 (1988) (where no forum shopping was involved, reprosecution was permissible); Chase v. State, 517 P.2d 1142, 1143 (Okla.Ct.App.1973) (mistaken testimony in first preliminary hearing justified refiling). We now turn to the court of appeals' decision in Morgan and apply our reasoning as stated above. ¶ 17 The court of appeals properly acknowledged Brickey's holding that discovery of new or previously unavailable evidence or other good cause would justify refiling. Morgan, 997 P.2d 910, 2000 UT App. 48 at ¶ 15. However, Morgan then effectively rejects the notion that an innocent miscalculation of the quantum of evidence necessary for a bindover may, in and of itself, suffice as another subcategory of other good cause for refiling charges, stating: [U]ntil and unless our supreme court directs otherwise, the innocent miscalculation of the quantum of evidence required to obtain a bindover is not grounds for refiling the dismissed charge unless new or previously unavailable evidence results from a nondilatory investigation prompted by realization of the miscalculation. Id. at ¶ 16. ¶ 18 The court of appeals imposes a narrow requirement that to establish an innocent miscalculation the State must in every case produce new or previously unavailable evidence that it could not have reasonably discovered earlier. Its linkage of an innocent miscalculation with new or previously unavailable evidence in effect envelops the former category in the latter, since the opinion precludes establishing an innocent miscalculation without a showing of new or previously unavailable evidence. ¶ 19 However, Brickey's analysis indicates that other good cause represents a broad category with new or previously unavailable evidence as but two examples of subcategories that come within its definition. Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646-48. Other good cause, then, on its face, simply means additional subcategories, other than new evidence or previously unavailable evidence, that justify refiling. While we noted but did not specifically adopt innocent miscalculation as a subsection of other good cause in Brickey, we do so today. Id. at 648. In so doing, we emphasize that the miscalculation must be innocent, and further investigation must be nondilatory and not otherwise infringe on due process rights of a defendant. ¶ 20 In the case at bar, defendant faced a felony drug charge of possession with intent to distribute. Despite the presence of two police officers in court, sworn and ready to testify, the State called only the arresting officer. Morgan, 997 P.2d 910, 2000 UT App. 48, ¶ 2. The magistrate determined that the evidence was insufficient to support an intent to distribute, reduced the charge to simple possession, and bound defendant over on the reduced charge. Id. at ¶ 3. The State indicated that it had assumed the arresting officer's testimony was sufficient and the testimony of the second officer was therefore unnecessary. ¶ 21 Although the evidence was not new or unavailable at the first hearing, we hold that the failure of the prosecutor to call the second officer as a witness in this instance was an innocent miscalculation, which, under our rule enunciated today, is other good cause sufficient to allow the prosecutor to refile the case. Nothing in the record indicates that fundamental fairness, the underlying threshold of the Brickey rule, should prohibit the prosecutor from refiling. The prosecutor simply miscalculated the quantum of evidence necessary to obtain a bindover. ¶ 22 It is true that correction of the prosecutor's mistake here may inconvenience defendant. However, due process is not concerned with ordinary levels of inconvenience because the nature of the criminal justice system necessarily inconveniences those individuals who have been accused of crimes. People v. Noline, 917 P.2d 1256, 1264 (Colo. 1996). In fact, from the accused point of view, the criminal justice system always entails some level of harassment and oppression. Id. Instead, due process in cases such as the one before us today is concerned with potential bad faith or misconduct of prosecutors. ¶ 23 In this case, the magistrate had overruled a defense counsel objection to the sufficiency of the arresting officer's experience and training to identify the methamphetamine, marijuana, and narcotics packaging. When the prosecutor then asked for the officer's opinion on defendant's intent to distribute these items, defendant did not further object to the question or answer. Only at the conclusion of the hearing, after both parties had rested, did the magistrate voice his concern as to the sufficiency of the foundation for the arresting officer's opinion on intent. The prosecutor immediately moved to reopen so that the other officer, who was present and more qualified, could testify and satisfy the magistrate's concern on proof of intent to distribute. The request was denied. ¶ 24 In the second preliminary hearing, the second officer, provided testimony that quantitatively added to the evidence the arresting officer had provided in the first hearing because of the former's superior training and experience. Where the arresting officer had minimal drug training, the second officer had been an officer for nineteen years, including two to three as a narcotics officer and ten years as a street investigator, and had received training with the D.E.A. and the Utah Drug Academy. Additionally, where the arresting officer gave testimony on the general nature of the narcotics packaging, the second officer explained the differences in for-profit and personal usage of methamphetamine in conjunction with the confiscated drugs. The magistrate viewed the difference in the quantum of evidence provided in the testimonies as significant and reversed his earlier ruling. ¶ 25 We conclude that unlike the prosecutor in Brickey who admitted he would refile until obtaining a bindover, the prosecutor here did not engage in forum shopping, as the second preliminary hearing was held before the same magistrate. Nor did the prosecutor refile to harass defendant, as the prosecutor attempted to reopen the preliminary hearing immediately upon recognizing the magistrate was not satisfied with the level of evidence required to bind over defendant. The prosecutor did not withhold evidence to disadvantage defendant, as the second officer was present and sworn in at the first hearing. Accordingly, this is a clear instance of a prosecutor miscalculating the quantum of evidence requisite for a bindover. As such, the prosecutor did not abuse the due process rights of defendant.