Opinion ID: 164794
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficient Evidence Exists to Support Valdez's Conviction

Text: 27 In applying the Jackson standard, we look to New Mexico law to determine the substantive elements of the relevant criminal offense. See Wingfield, 122 F.3d at 1332. The New Mexico second-degree murder statute provides that a person who kills another human being without lawful justification or excuse commits murder in the second degree if in performing the acts which cause the death he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-1(B) (1978). Additionally, [a] person may be charged with and convicted of the crime as an accessory if he procures, counsels, aids or abets in its commission, even though he did not directly commit the crime. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-1-13 (1994). The New Mexico Uniform Jury Instructions provide that a defendant may be found guilty as an accessory if the government proves: (1) the defendant intended that the crime be committed; (2) the crime was committed; and (3) the defendant helped, encouraged or caused the crime to be committed. UJI 14-2822 NMRA 2000. 2 28 The New Mexico Supreme Court has held that an accessory must share the criminal intent of the principal. See State v. Carrasco, 124 N.M. 64, 946 P.2d 1075, 1079 (citing S tate v. Ochoa, 41 N.M. 589, 72 P.2d 609 (1937)). This intent can be inferred from behavior which encourages the act or which informs the confederates that the person approves of the crime after the crime has been committed. Id. Furthermore, evidence of aiding and abetting 29 may be as broad and varied as are the means of communicating thought from one individual to another; by acts, conduct, words, signs, or by any means sufficient to incite, encourage or instigate commission of the offense or calculated to make known that commission of an offense already undertaken has the aider's support or approval. 30 State v. Salazar, 78 N.M. 329, 331, 431 P.2d 62, 64 (1967) (citation omitted). 31 However, mere presence at the scene of crime without some outward manifestation of approval is insufficient. Id. Moreover, a jury must find a community of purpose for each crime of the principal. This principle means that a jury must find that a defendant intended that the acts necessary for each crime be committed. Carrasco, 946 P.2d at 1079 (emphasis original). 3 Whether the alleged aider and abettor shared the principal's criminal intent is a question of fact for the jury and may be inferred from the circumstances. See State v. Riley, 82 N.M. 298, 480 P.2d 693, 694 (1971); Ochoa, 72 P.2d at 618. 32 After reviewing the record and proceedings below, we conclude that the evidence is constitutionally sufficient to support a finding of accessory liability in this case. The testimony viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution establishes the following facts: Valdez and his companions went to Rudolph's mobile home with the intention of fighting; Valdez willingly drove to the mobile home in his own vehicle; Valdez broke through the front door with the other four men and attacked Smith as he slept in a chair; Valdez fought Smith outside the back door of the house while his four companions attacked Rudolph; Valdez then reentered the mobile home and warned the others as the police arrived; Valdez's actions prevented Smith from assisting Rudolph. 33 Based on the foregoing, a jury could reasonably have inferred that Valdez intended the attack on Rudolph and that Valdez aided and encouraged Jerrold Campos in committing acts that created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to Rudolph. The record reveals that Valdez knew there would be a fight because Campos had told him there would be some chinagasos at the mobile home park. Valdez also knew Campos was angry because some men had jumped his cousin. In fact, Valdez later admitted to police that he went to the mobile home to back up Campos. Furthermore, by keeping Smith from coming to the aid of the greatly outnumbered Rudolph, a jury could reasonably have inferred that Valdez not only intended to aid the initial attack on Rudolph, but also the ongoing assault that resulted in his death. 34 Nonetheless, the district court overturned Valdez's state conviction based on a perceived lack of intent evidence. 4 As noted above, the district court found that [t]here was no evidence in the record of any agreement or understanding that a murder would take place. There was no evidence that Petitioner even knew his companions had a knife. Order at 3. From this the court concluded [t]here is simply no evidence in this case that Petitioner associated himself with or sought to bring about the murder of Kendrick Rudolph. Id. 5 35 In this regard, Valdez argues that even if sufficient evidence exists showing that he intended the assault on Rudolph, there is insufficient evidence in the record to establish that he intended Rudolph's death. However, in S tate v. Ochoa, the New Mexico Supreme Court set forth a plain rule: The intent to kill, or to aid and abet in the commission thereof, may be formed at the scene of the crime, even though the accused may have gone there without such intention. 72 P.2d at 617. The court thus held that where a participant in a group fight, though free from felonious intent at the beginning of combat, realizes that another member of his party is employing a deadly weapon, he may be guilty of sharing the other person's intent and hence become an aider and abettor if he continues to participate. See id. at 618. In these circumstances the participant exposes himself to an inference of sharing the latter's intent. Id. In interpreting Ochoa, the New Mexico Supreme Court later explained that intent can be inferred from behavior which encourages the act or which informs the confederates that the person approves of the crime after the crime has been committed. Carrasco, 946 P.2d at 1079 (emphasis added). 36 Here, Valdez reentered the trailer after fighting with Smith and warned Campos and the others that the police were arriving. While in the living room he witnessed Garcia hit Rudolph over the head with a VCR and also saw that Rudolph was covered with blood. [Tape 16, 28.1 to end]. Combined with the fact that the Valdez-Smith fight occurred only a short distance from where Rudolph was being stabbed outside, a jury could have reasonably inferred that Valdez realized another member of his party was employing a deadly weapon. A jury could also have reasonably inferred that Valdez approved of this fact because he continued to participate in the altercation despite this knowledge. 37 Valdez's actions after the stabbing provide support for this inference. Instead of attempting to render aid to the victim or dissociate himself from his companions, Valdez left with the other attackers, fled from the police in his vehicle, and later falsely reported that his vehicle had been stolen. [Tape 16, 28.1 to end]. Therefore, in our view, even if Valdez went to the trailer with the intention of only committing assault, a jury could have reasonably inferred that his subsequent conduct affirmed an intent to aid or abet second degree murder. Moreover, such a resolution of the evidence is surely within the bounds of reason. Messer, 74 F.3d at 1013.