Opinion ID: 2181670
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Were the Remaining Criteria of Section 317 Met?

Text: Section 317 requires, as a condition of imposing an affirmative duty to control, that the servant subject to control be upon premises in possession of the master or upon which the servant is privileged to enter only as [the master's] servant. There is no dispute that this condition was met in the case at bar. The baseball field on which the Bridgeview-Lemont game was played and on which the attack took place was not open to the general public. George Loy, Sr., and George Loy, Jr., were allowed in the dugouts and on the field only because they were Bridgeview's assistant coaches. Section 317 also requires, as a condition of imposing an affirmative duty to control, that the master know or have reason to know of the necessity and opportunity to control the servant. The parties dispute what type of notice Ted Loy must have had regarding the need to control the assistant coaches before the duty to control could arise. Citing to cases discussing a parent's affirmative duty to control a child, Bridgeview argues that specific instances of prior misconduct by George Loy, Sr., and George Loy, Jr., were required before any duty to control could be imposed. See, e.g., Bishop v. Morich, 250 Ill.App.3d 366, 370, 190 Ill.Dec. 174, 621 N.E.2d 43 (1993) (to establish that parents negligently failed to control a child to prevent an intentional tort, plaintiff must establish, inter alia, that parents were aware of specific instances of prior conduct sufficient to put them on notice that the act complained of was likely to occur); see also F. James, Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 Nw. U. L. Rev. 778, 812 (1953) (and cases cited therein) (discussing the master's affirmative duty to control his servants and noting that before the duty will be imposed [i]t must be shown    that the likelihood of [acts done entirely on the servant's own account] had been brought home to the master, e.g., by a showing that the acts had occurred so persistently that the master knew or should have known of them). Because there was no evidence of prior assaults or physical attacks by any of the Loys, Bridgeview argues that it had no notice of the need to control and that no affirmative duty to control could be imposed. Plaintiffs, in contrast, argue that prior incidents of misconduct are not required before the duty to control may be imposed. According to plaintiffs, the proper focus in determining whether the master has sufficient notice of the need to control is on the time immediately preceding the attack, not days, weeks, or months before. Plaintiffs further argue that George Sr.'s swearing and gesturing was sufficient to put Ted Loy on notice that an attack was forthcoming and, therefore, that there was a need to control the assistant coaches. Under either standard of notice proposed by the parties in this case, it is clear that, prior to the commencement of the attack on John Hills, Ted Loy did not have notice that George Loy, Sr., or George Loy, Jr., would intentionally harm John Hills. There was no evidence offered at trial that George Loy, Sr., or George Loy, Jr., had any violent propensities, that they had ever committed a previous assault on any person, or that Ted Loy knew of any violent tendencies on their part. Moreover, the witnesses at trial who viewed the attack uniformly testified that they were surprised, shocked and stunned when the attack on John Hills began. No witness stated that he or she foresaw the attack approaching. Most important, both John Hills and Patricia Hills testified unequivocally that, despite the swearing and gestures, they did not believe that George Loy, Sr., was going to physically assault John Hills. Under ordinary negligence standards, `[f]oreseeability means that which is objectively reasonable to expect, not merely what might conceivably occur.' (Emphasis omitted.) American National Bank & Trust Co. v. National Advertising Co., 149 Ill.2d 14, 29, 171 Ill.Dec. 461, 594 N.E.2d 313 (1992), quoting Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 62 Ill.2d 456, 466, 343 N.E.2d 465 (1976), quoting Winnett v. Winnett, 57 Ill.2d 7, 12-13, 310 N.E.2d 1 (1974). In addition, [s]erious crimes are generally unforeseeable because they are different in nature from what employees in a lawful occupation are expected to do. Wright v. City of Danville, 174 Ill.2d 391, 405, 221 Ill.Dec. 203, 675 N.E.2d 110 (1996). Given the record before us, there is no basis for holding that Ted Loy knew or should have known, before the attack began, that the assistant coaches were going to intentionally harm John Hills. Citing to Shortall v. Hawkeye's Bar & Grill, 283 Ill.App.3d 439, 219 Ill. Dec. 90, 670 N.E.2d 768 (1996), plaintiffs argue in the alternative that, even if Ted Loy did not know of the need to control George Loy, Sr., and George Loy, Jr., before the attack began, he must have known of the need to control them after the assault had started. See Shortall, 283 Ill.App.3d at 443, 219 Ill.Dec. 90, 670 N.E.2d 768 (A criminal attack by a third person is reasonably foreseeable    when a serious physical altercation has already begun). The appellate court below agreed with this reasoning, concluding that Ted Loy knew of the need to control once the beatings began and two one-minute lulls followed and that an affirmative duty to control the assistant coaches arose after the attack began. [4] We disagree. Section 317 requires more than that the master be aware of the need to control before the duty to control will arise. The master must also know or have reason to know that he has the ability to control his servant. The ability to control requirement of section 317 does not mean that Ted Loy had to be able to physically restrain the assistant coaches before a duty to control could be imposed. There is no duty to control another's conduct at the risk of the actor (F. Harper & P. Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 Yale L.J. 886, 888 (1934)) and plaintiffs do not argue that Ted Loy was required to physically intervene in the assault. Nevertheless, the term control is used in section 317 in a very real sense. 43 Yale L.J. at 891. Under section 317, the essential basis of liability [is] the practical opportunity for effective control arising from the general master-servant relationship and from the connection between the dangerous conduct and the employment. (Emphasis added.) F. James, Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 Nw. U. L. Rev. 778, 812 n. 183 (1953). Section 317 is addressed primarily to the most common form of master-servant relationship, that of employer and employee. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317, Comments b, c, at 125-26 (1965) (giving examples of a factory owner and a railroad company's duty to control their employees). In a situation such as that presented here, where it is alleged that a master has a duty to intervene in an ongoing criminal attack committed by its servants, there is a theoretical justification for imposing a duty to control upon the master, when the master is an employer and the servant is a paid employee. Because an employer controls an employee's salary, an employer has economic leverage and, hence, a measure of actual control over an employee. During an ongoing assault, an employer may use that economic leverage, and exercise his authority as master, by verbally threatening to discipline, demote or discharge an employee if he or she does not stop the assault. Arguably, even in the heat of an attack, an employee may pause when threatened with the loss of his livelihood or a portion thereof. Imposing a duty to control on the employer in such a situation is thus, generally speaking, warranted. See, e.g., Sunseri v. Puccia, 97 Ill.App.3d 488, 494, 52 Ill.Dec. 716, 422 N.E.2d 925 (1981) (owner of a restaurant and lounge potentially liable for failing to act in any manner to terminate altercation in which employee bartender participated). In the case at bar, however, George Loy, Sr., and George Loy, Jr., were not paid employees of Bridgeview. They were volunteers. Unlike an employer, a master of a volunteer has no inherent economic leverage or control over that volunteer. Further, volunteers typically provide their services for reasons other than their own personal benefit. In the instant case, for example, George Loy, Sr., and George Loy, Jr., may have agreed to act as assistant coaches solely as a favor to Ted Loy. If such were the case, a verbal threat by Ted Loy to discipline or fire the assistant coaches would have been worthless as an effective means of control. Plaintiffs point out that, under the Restatement, one who volunteers services without an agreement for an expectation of reward may be a servant of the one accepting such services. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 225 (1958). Plaintiffs contend that the volunteer status of the assistant coaches should not affect the resolution of this case. However, plaintiffs have not explained, under the facts of this case, what effective means of control Ted Loy could have utilized, in his capacity as master, to constrain the volunteer assistant coaches once the attack began. In the absence of any evidence of an effective means of control available to Ted Loy and, therefore, to Bridgeview, it would be tantamount to imposing strict liability ( Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Center, 77 Ohio St.3d 284, 298, 673 N.E.2d 1311, 1323 (1997)) to require Bridgeview to control the conduct of the volunteer assistant coaches. We decline to impose that standard of liability upon Bridgeview. The appellate court below erred when it concluded, without analysis or qualification, that the volunteer assistant coaches were subject to sufficient control after the assault began to establish Bridgeview's liability pursuant to section 317. There is no authority to support such a holding and it is at odds with the requirement of actual control set forth in section 317. On this record, we hold that the volunteer relationship between Bridgeview and George Loy, Sr., and George Loy, Jr., lacked sufficient elements of control to bring that relationship within the purview of section 317. Accordingly, we conclude that Bridgeview had no affirmative duty to control the assistant coaches to curtail the criminal attack. Because Bridgeview, acting through Ted Loy, had no affirmative duty to control George Loy, Sr., or George Loy, Jr., the trial judge erred in denying Bridgeview's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.