Opinion ID: 199695
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Nalco Cross-Appeal

Text: 22
23 The cross-appeal is predicated on the contention that Nalco was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, on the MHRA age-discrimination claim brought by Walton, because Maine law allows neither damages nor attorney fees unless the plaintiff alleges and establishes that the MHRC has taken final action on the administrative charge or issued a right-to-sue letter. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4622 (1)(C); see also Gordan v. Cummings, 756 A.2d 942, 944-45 (Me. 2000). 9 The district court ruled that Nalco waived its contention by (i) failing to raise it, either in its answer or as an affirmative defense, and (ii) engaging in trial by ambush by withholding its objection until the close of Walton's evidence. 24 The Maine Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) has yet to determine the proper allocation of burdens of proof under section 4622. Consequently, we must make an informed prophecy of what the [SJC] would do in the same situation, seeking guidance in analogous state court decisions, persuasive adjudications by courts of sister states, learned treatises, and public policy considerations identified in state decisional law. Blinzler v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 81 F.3d 1148, 1151 (1st Cir. 1996). We review statutory interpretations de novo. See Laaman v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, 238 F.3d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 2001). 25 Section 4622, by its plain language, precludes any characterization of the MHRC exhaustion issue as a mere affirmative defense, 10 since it explicitly states that the plaintiff, rather than the defendant, must plead[] the requisite MHRC filing. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. 11 On the other hand, the section 4622 requirement, strictly speaking, is not an element of the statutory age-discrimination claim, since it does not preclude a jury finding of discrimination, but merely limits the types of recovery available to prevailing plaintiffs. 12 26 Since section 4622 more closely resembles a condition precedent, cf. Jensen v. Frank, 912 F.2d 517, 520 (1st Cir 1990) (noting that Title VII exhaustion requirement is condition precedent to suit); MHRC v. Local 1361, UPIU AFL-CIO, 383 A.2d 369, 375 (Me. 1978) (observing that Title VII case law may provide guidance in interpreting MHRA), it is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(c), see 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1302, (2d ed. 1987) ([Rule 9(c)] is applicable in all actions in the federal courts, even when the pleading practice in the state in which the court is sitting is different.). 27 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(c) provides as follows: 28 In pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions precedent, it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred. A denial of performance or occurrence shall be made specifically and with particularity, but when so made the party pleading the performance or occurrence has the burden of proving it. 13 29 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(c). Rule 9(c) has the effect of forcing defendant to raise the issue [of noncompliance with a condition precedent] whenever he believes there actually is a question about performance. 5 Wright & Miller § 1304; id. § 1302 (Rule 9(c) is designed to eliminate the detailed and largely unnecessary averments that resulted under common law procedure, and to prevent nonmeritorious dismissals for failure to plead the fulfillment of conditions precedent that are not at issue in the suit.). 30 As we have noted, supra, section 4622 explicitly requires that the plaintiff plead the requisite MHRC filing. Consequently, provided the complaint includes a general averment that all conditions precedent to suit or recovery have been met, and the defendant does not deny the satisfaction of the preconditions specifically and with particularity, then the plaintiff's allegations are assumed admitted, and the defendant cannot later assert that a condition precedent has not been met. Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 678 F.2d 992, 1010 (11th Cir. 1982). 14 31 Accordingly, the appropriate inquiry in the present case is whether either the original or amended complaint included an adequate general averment that Walton had met all conditions precedent to the recovery of damages under the MHRA, even though neither complaint explicitly alleged that Walton had filed an MHRC charge. The original complaint alleged that Walton had satisfied all conditions precedent to jurisdiction under the ADEA, including the timely filing of a discrimination charge with the EEOC. Moreover, Count 1 -- the ADEA claim -- alleged damages, including, but not limited to loss of income, loss of benefits, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, costs, prejudgment interest, and declaratory and injunctive relief. Further, the prayer for relief in Count 1 demanded all available remedies under the Maine Human Rights Act including reinstatement, back pay and penal damages . . . [and] such other relief and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 32 Finally, the amended complaint made crystal clear that Count 1 of the original complaint had been brought under both the ADEA and the MHRA and that Walton was demanding damages, including, but not limited to, loss of income, loss of benefits, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, costs, prejudgment interest, and declaratory and injunctive relief. (Emphasis added.) Yet Nalco neither opposed the motion to amend the complaint, nor submitted an amended answer. 15 33 Under the liberal notice pleading standards, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1) & (f), these original and amended complaints met the general averment requirements prescribed by Rule 9(c). Although the complaints neither explicitly alleged compliance with all preconditions to recovery under the MHRA, nor with the requirement that an MHRC charge be filed, such compliance was plainly implicit. Cf., e.g., Kiernan v. Zurich Cos., 150 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding it sufficient to satisfy the loose guidelines of Rule 9(c) that plaintiff allege that insurance policy was in full force and effect, thus by implication that all conditions precedent to valid policy were met). 34 First, Walton alleged that he had filed an EEOC charge. Second, it is common practice to file simultaneous EEOC and MHRC charges. Furthermore, by explicitly demanding MHRA damages, both in the original and amended complaints, Walton plainly placed Nalco on reasonable notice that he was claiming compliance with section 4622. Indeed, at trial Nalco's counsel acknowledged: I'll be candid to say I did not have in mind this [affirmative defense] when I drafted the answer. 16 Consequently, the parties proceeded to trial with no hint whatsoever that section 4622 compliance was in dispute. Accordingly, the district court correctly rejected the motion for judgment as a matter of law on the MHRA claim. 1. The Age-Discrimination Claim Evidence 35 Nalco contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury verdicts on the ADEA and MHRA claims. We review these Rule 50 motions de novo, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the prevailing party. See Negron v. Caleb Brett U.S.A., Inc., 212 F.3d 666, 668 (1st Cir. 2000). We must affirm unless the evidence was so strongly and overwhelmingly inconsistent with the verdicts that no reasonable jury could have returned them. See id. (citation omitted). This demanding standard was not met. 36 Nalco contends that Walton was discharged due to his refusal to sign the employment agreement tendered to him, and that his age was immaterial. The record evidence nonetheless reasonably permitted a contrary inference. Walton adduced competent evidence that Vice-President Yankowski, who attempted to intimidate Walton into accepting early retirement, had related several anecdotes regarding former employees of Walton's vintage who had been forced into early retirement by Nalco. More particularly, Yankowski stated to another Nalco employee: We can't have a man in his sixties [viz., Walton] sitting on his accounts coasting. We need to get a young rep in there selling business. Walton thus presented competent evidence of an age-based animus by a Nalco decision maker. See Kirk v. Hitchcock Clinic, 261 F.3d 75, 79 (1st Cir. 2001) (noting that direct evidence of discriminatory animus may consist of 'statements by a decision maker that directly reflect the alleged animus and bear squarely on the contested employment decision') (citation omitted). 37 Moreover, Walton adduced evidence that Nalco maneuvered to establish a pretextual basis for discharging him. See Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 56 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that pretext may be established with evidence that nondiscriminatory reasons were after-the-fact justifications, provided subsequent to the beginning of legal action). After Nalco received a letter, from Walton's attorney, claiming age discrimination, Joseph Carney, Walton's direct supervisor, administered the so-called Personnel Regeneration Form to Walton at Yankowski's direction, which purported to show that Walton was not a competent salesman. At trial, however, Walton adduced compelling evidence of his competence as a salesman, evidence Nalco conveniently excluded from consideration in its final evaluation. For example, Nalco never received a client complaint regarding Walton's work performance. Moreover, Walton had long been the highest grossing salesman in his territory, and consistently enjoyed exceptional customer loyalty as evidenced by the fact that he had never lost a client in more than twenty years. Furthermore, his supervisor testified that Walton was outstanding at building relationships with his customers. Additionally, rather than demonstrating laxity in developing new business, the sales volume generated by Walton increased by 92% even as Nalco was transferring 20% of Walton's client accounts to Malbon, his designated replacement. Moreover, even though the performance evaluation prepared by Nalco assigned Walton a deficient rating in regard to producing a business plan, it omitted mention that Walton already had been excluded from Nalco meetings at which new sales prospects were divided amongst his fellow sales associates. In addition, though Walton was rated deficient in record keeping, Nalco adduced no sales reports supporting its assessment. 38 Finally, given the record evidence before it, the jury reasonably could have found that Nalco orchestrated the Personnel Regeneration Form as pretextual support for its age-based decision to discharge Walton. See Santiago-Ramos, 217 F.3d at 56 (noting that memo setting forth legitimate grounds for discharging employee, prepared after it became apparent that former employee was initiating litigation, could be considered pretextual post hoc justifications because [grounds] were only provided in anticipation of litigation). 39
40 Nalco contends that the Yankowski statement -- [w]e can't have a man in his sixties sitting on his accounts coasting. . . . [w]e need to get a young rep in there selling new business -- was irrelevant to the issue of age animus, because Walton did not prove that Yankowski played any decision making role in the discharge. 17 41 Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Invest Almaz v. Temple-Inland Forest Prods. Corp., 243 F.3d 57, 69 (1st Cir. 2001). Evidence that discriminatory remarks were made by persons in a position to influence the challenged employment action may suffice to establish pretext. See, e.g., Straughn v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 250 F.3d 23, 35 (1st Cir. 2001). The jury was entitled to disbelieve the trial testimony that Richard Murphy unilaterally discharged Walton without consultation or input from Yankowski, who was one of Walton's superiors and the vice president for Nalco's eastern sales division. See Febres v. Challenger Caribbean Corp., 214 F.3d 57, 60-61 (1st Cir. 2000). Yankowski initiated not only the conversations regarding Walton's retirement plans, but also the telltale age-related anecdotes. Moreover, when Walton's attorney advised Yankowski of the age-discrimination claims, it was Yankowski who directed Carney to administer the so-called Personnel Regeneration Form to Walton, see supra, whose grossly inaccurate results strongly suggested a pretextual basis for the Walton discharge. Three months after the Personnel Regeneration Form was administered to Walton, his employment was terminated. 42 The jury reasonably could have inferred, without difficulty, that Yankowski played a pivotal role in the termination decision implemented by Vice-President Murphy, and that the statement Yankowski made to Ray Field, see supra note 3, was both directly related and temporally proximate to the challenged employment action. See Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 583 (1st Cir. 1999) (observing that comment by decision maker -- I don't have to hire you locals or Cape Verdean people -- was not mere stray remark where employer refused to rehire people of Cape Verdean descent). 18 The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the Yankowski testimony.
43 Finally, Nalco contends that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to exclude the evidence it proffered in support of its counterclaim for damages, viz., the profits allegedly lost due to Walton's post-discharge solicitation of former Nalco clients in violation of the noncompetition agreement. Specifically, Joseph Carney, the Nalco district sales manager for Maine, sought to tender a lay opinion as to the net profits lost by Nalco. The opinion was predicated exclusively upon Carney's lay review of corporate reports reflecting the gross profits generated by Nalco in its Maine sales district. Carney concededly possessed no personal or independent knowledge as to how the Nalco corporate data were compiled. Moreover, these corporate reports contained data pertaining exclusively to 1997, but none relating to the crucial 1998-99 period. 44 A trial court ruling excluding lay-opinion testimony is reviewed for a clear abuse of discretion. United States v. Vega-Figueroa, 234 F.3d 744, 755 (1st Cir. 2000); see Fed. R. Evid. 701. As we have explained, Rule 701 permits the rendering of lay opinion testimony when [it] is (a) 'rationally based upon the perception of the witness,' and (b) 'helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.' Lynch v. City of Boston, 180 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). [T]he modern trend favors the admission of opinion testimony provided it is well founded on personal knowledge and susceptible to cross-examination. Vega-Figueroa, 234 F.3d at 755. The district court acted well within its broad discretion in excluding the Carney opinion testimony, which was based neither on personal knowledge nor apposite data. 45 Affirmed.