Opinion ID: 170798
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consent to enter despite the locked doors

Text: The scope of the consent to search is generally defined by its expressed object, looking to what the typical reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801. We conclude a reasonable person would have understood Pikyavit's words to the police as giving consent to enter his home to search for exculpatory evidence even if the doors were locked if entry could be made without property damage. A reasonable person would have reached this understanding for a variety of reasons, including: (1) Pikyavit did not expressly condition or otherwise limit the scope of the search on finding the front door unlocked; (2) Pikyavit initiated the encounter with police; and (3) Pikyavit wanted the search to commence quickly so evidence he hoped police would find, including blood, hair, and other signs of a fight, could be used to exonerate him. First, Pikyavit did not expressly condition the search of his home on the police finding the doors unlocked. [A] defendant's failure to limit the scope of a general authorization to search is a factor indicating the search was within the scope of consent. United States v. Gordon, 173 F.3d 761, 766 (10th Cir.1999). Pikyavit gave the officers general consent to search his home for evidence of the fight. Without words of limitation or condition, the reasonable inference from Pikyavit's conversations with Jacobson and Carter was he had impliedly consented to the search of his home even if the doors were locked. See People v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. App.3d 636, 116 Cal.Rptr. 24, 26 (1974) (finding defendant impliedly consented to search of dresser drawer because [w]ords may imply consent as well as express it); see also Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.1(c) at 19 (4th ed.2004) (noting the importance of taking into account any express or implied limitations or qualifications on the scope of consent). This factor is especially important given the urgency with which Pikyavit hoped the search would be conducted and the result he hoped to obtainexoneration. That the police used a card to open the front door does not vitiate the generalized consent Pikyavit gave to search the home. Once a generalized consent to search is given, the police can use reasonable means to enter the location to be searched. See United States v. Maynes-Ortega, 857 F.2d 686, 688-89 (10th Cir.1988) (upholding search of car's trunk despite the defendant claiming he did not have a trunk key and police using a key they found between car's front seats); see also United States v. Flowal, 234 F.3d 932, 934-35 (6th Cir.2000) (upholding search of defendant's luggage despite police officers' lack of a key and need to open the luggage by other means), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Leachman, 309 F.3d 377, 382 (6th Cir.2002); United States v. Milian-Rodriguez, 759 F.2d 1558, 1563-64 (11th Cir.1985) (upholding search of closet even though police picked the closet's lock); State v. Lash, 21 N.C.App. 365, 204 S.E.2d 563, 565 (1974) (upholding search of vehicle's trunk even though police entered through back seat because trunk key was missing). The police had no obligation in the circumstances here to ask Pikyavit what they should do if they found the door locked, as it was up to Pikyavit to limit or condition the search if that was his intent. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252, 111 S.Ct. 1801 (A suspect may of course delimit as he chooses the scope of the search to which he consents. But if his consent would reasonably be understood to extend to a particular container, the Fourth Amendment provides no grounds for requiring a more explicit authorization.); United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1177 (10th Cir.2000) (The scope of the consent to search is limited by the breadth of the consent given.); United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 957 (3d Cir.1994) (Of course [defendant] could have limited his consent to certain items, but he had the burden to express that limitation....). It was reasonable for the police to conclude that Pikyavit would have wanted them to enter the home if it could be done quickly and without damaging the premises. And, in fact, the police were able to slip the lock without damaging either the lock or the door itself. [2] Pikyavit's subjective motivations are irrelevant. See Maynes-Ortega, 857 F.2d at 689. An objectively reasonable interpretation of Pikyavit's consent is that he gave the officers general consent to enter his home even if they found it locked. The fact that either Pikyavit did not know whether the home was locked, or whether his brother had locked the home to prevent unauthorized entry, does not invalidate the officers' reasonable understanding of what Pikyavit had asked them to do. Second, it was reasonable for the officers to enter the home because Pikyavit initiated the encounter and specifically requested they search inside the home for exculpatory evidence. Detective Jacobson and Deputy Carter both testified, and the district court found, Pikyavit asked them to search inside the home for the evidence he wanted preserved. His goal was for police to see evidence that would let him off the hook, a goal that was plainly furthered by the police using reasonable means to open the locked door. The record indicates Pikyavit was the sole occupant of the home, and entry did not compromise any other privacy interests. Cf. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006) (focusing consent inquiry on societal understandings and norms regarding privacy interests). The fact that Pikyavit lived alone but was in jail at the time and unavailable to assist the officers bolsters their belief that reasonable entry  even slipping the lock  was of the essence of Pikyavit's consent. If Pikyavit had been present with the officers, there is little doubt he would have opened the door for them. See United States v. Prazak, 500 F.2d 1216, 1217 (9th Cir.1974) (concluding that when defendant is absent, test for scope of consent is whether what the officer did can be said to have been what [defendant] himself reasonably would have done had he been able to act for himself). The assurances Pikyavit gave the officers that the home would be open further solidified their reasonable interpretation Pikyavit wanted them to enter. Deputy Carter testified, [Pikyavit] stated the house would be opened. He said that his brother just went in there and his brother would have left it open because his brother told him that they needed to have us come out there, that he knew we would be coming. He told me that the house would be unlocked and it was hardly ever locked. R., Vol. V at 21. Thus, the police had several reasons to believe the door would be unlocked: Pikyavit's brother had recently been in the house, and it was common for Pikyavit's house to be unlocked. They had no reason, however, to believe the house would be locked orfurther, that if the house were locked, they should not enter it. Finally, the urgency with which Pikyavit asked Jacobson and Carter to search his home would have led a reasonable person to believe they had permission to enter even if it were locked. Over one week had passed since the night of the fight, during which time Pikyavit had been in jail. Pikyavit described his house as a crime scene that he wanted properly and completely documented. R., Vol V at 42-43. Because of the physical nature of the evidence, the possibility it would be disturbed, destroyed, or otherwise compromised was obvious to all parties involved. Pikyavit thus conveyed a strong sense of urgency to the officers. Pikyavit initiated the encounter with Detective Jacobson by filling out an inmate request form. On the form, Pikyavit included the acronym ASAP. R., Vol. V at 15. He wanted to talk to the officers and to initiate the search for evidence as quickly as possible. Moreover, both Jacobson and Carter testified Pikyavit was insistent they search his home for evidence of the fight. Id. at 39, 19. For example, at the suppression hearing Carter testified, [Pikyavit] was quite insistent that we go out there [to the home]. Id. at 19. He also described Pikyavit as excited during their conversation, and very, very insistent that the investigation commence. Id. at 20. In fact, Carter complied with Pikyavit's request and immediately proceeded to the home. This is not to say a reasonable police officer, on encountering facts materially different than those described by Pikyavit, would not reasonably conclude a defendant's consent to search was limited. We can imagine circumstances where the property to be searched varied so widely from the defendant's description, for example, that a reasonable police officer would have to conclude a search would exceed the scope of the consent. Here, the circumstance of the locked door did not vary materially from what the police had been told by Pikyavit. The police therefore had no obligation to obtain further consent. In sum, based on the totality of the circumstances, the district court's determination that the police stayed within the scope of Pikyavit's consent when they entered his locked home was not clearly erroneous.