Opinion ID: 2621239
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Evidence of prior sexual bad acts

Text: The general rule under Nevada's rules of criminal evidence is that [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. [38] However, such evidence may be admissible for a purpose not related to the character of the defendant, such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. [39] Notably, we have held that it is heavily disfavored to use prior bad act evidence to convict a defendant because bad acts are often irrelevant and prejudicial and force the accused to defend against vague and unsubstantiated charges. [40] Our concern has been that this evidence will unduly influence the jury to convict the defendant because, based on that evidence, the jury believes the defendant is a bad person. [41] We conclude that, under a Braunstein analysis, the district court erroneously admitted A.R.'s testimony. First, the motive exception is inapplicable under these facts. The motive exception generally applies to establish the identity of the criminal, or to prove malice or specific intent. [42] The motive exception may also be applicable where the charged crime was motivated by a desire to hide the prior bad act. [43] Richmond had already begun molesting A.B. before he met A.R., and molesting A.B. could not possibly disguise his crimes against A.R. Regarding the motive exception, the dissent states that motive for a sex crime is an attraction to or obsession with the victim. In essence, the dissent contends that it is proper to admit prior bad act evidence to show a sexual propensity, which we held in Braunstein is inadmissible character evidence. Notably, McCormick on Evidence explains how the motive exception in cases involving sex crimesto show a propensity for sexual aberrationis not applicable, as compared to its use in other crimes: Unlike the other purposes for other-crimes evidence, the sex-crime exception flaunts the general prohibition of evidence whose only purpose is to invite the inference that a defendant who committed a previous crime is disposed toward committing crimes, and therefore is more likely to have committed the one at bar. Although one can argue for such an exception in sex offenses in which there is some question as to whether the alleged victim consented (or whether the accused might have thought there was consent), a more sweeping exception is particularly difficult to justify. It rests either on an unsubstantiated empirical claim that one rather broad category of criminals are more likely to be repeat offenders than all others or on a policy of giving the prosecution some extra ammunition in its battle against alleged sex criminals. [44] As the dissent acknowledges, the State has other methods at its disposal to demonstrate why someone would sexually assault a child, i.e., expert witnesses. Next, the common plan exception is inapplicable here, as this exception requires that each crime should be an integral part of an overarching plan explicitly conceived and executed by the defendant. [45] Indeed, this court has stated, `The test is not whether the other offense has certain elements in common with the crime charged, but whether it tends to establish a preconceived plan which resulted in the commission of that crime.' [46] We have held that a sexual assault at the same location and perpetrated in the same manner a month before the sexual assault at issue was inadmissible because it did not establish a common plan. [47] Here, Richmond appeared simply to drift from one location to another, taking advantage of whichever potential victims came his way. His crimes were not part of a single overarching plan, but independent crimes, which Richmond did not plan until each victim was within reach. Finally, the evidence regarding A.R. was not relevant under any of the other exceptions to NRS 48.045. Therefore, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in admitting A.R.'s testimony. Failure to exclude evidence in a Petrocelli hearing is harmless error where overwhelming evidence supports the conviction. [48] Here, the only evidence that Richmond had molested A.B. was A.B.'s testimony. In fact, it appears from the record that this was more a trial of A.R.'s allegations than A.B.'s allegations. Thus, we conclude that the evidence concerning A.B. was not overwhelming, and that the extensive and highly prejudicial evidence concerning A.R. was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.