Opinion ID: 1225871
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether the district court properly denied the suppression motion.

Text: Franklin next argues that Officer Hall's traffic stop was pretextual and that the district court thus improperly denied Franklin's suppression motion. This issue is entirely a protective appeal, as Franklin's counsel plans to seek a writ of certiorari asking the Supreme Court to reconsider its decision in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). Franklin argues that the decision in Whren now requires reversal because of empirical evidence that the police use racial profiling techniques when determining whether or not to conduct a search pursuant to a traffic stop, and thus that minority drivers are much more likely than non-minorities to be subjected to a full search pursuant to a traffic stop. The government argues that the district court properly found that the search was supported by probable cause. First, the government argues that the probable cause determination in this case largely came down to a credibility determination between the witnesses for the defense and the arresting officer, and that the district court credited Officer Hall's testimony. On matters like this, the district court's choice of whom to believe is almost never vulnerable to a finding of clear error. United States v. Alvarado, 326 F.3d 857, 862 (7th Cir.2003); see also United States v. Thornton, 197 F.3d 241, 247 (7th Cir.1999). Second, the government argues that Officer Hall made a proper traffic stop; Franklin admits he does not remember how fast he was going and Officer Hall testified that he witnessed Franklin commit two traffic violations. Hall also had probable cause to search Franklin's vehicle for drugs because he could smell marijuana smoke through an open window as he approached the car. This probable cause determination was bolstered by his use of a drug-sniffing dog, who alerted near the front of the car. A police officer who smells marijuana coming from a car has probable cause to search that car. See United States v. Wimbush, 337 F.3d 947, 951 (7th Cir.2003). And a police officer's use of a drug-sniffing dog around the exterior of a car is not an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005). Franklin's argument that the stop was pretextual and thus unconstitutional is not really addressed to this court; it is addressed to the Supreme Court. Whren has been reaffirmed by Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001), in which the Court reiterated that it would not entertain arguments based on the real motivations behind otherwise lawful traffic stops. Id. at 771-72, 121 S.Ct. 1876. The Court's recent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence offers observers little reason to believe that the justices wish to revisit this decision. See, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008), Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001). Regardless, we need only apply Supreme Court precedent to determine that Officer Hall made a lawful traffic stop of Franklin's car and had probable cause to search the car for narcotics. We thus affirm the district court's decision on the motion to suppress.