Opinion ID: 70664
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the zoning ordinance was constitutionally valid.

Text: C. Whether any provision of the zoning ordinance pertaining to mobile homes was preempted by federal or state law. The foregoing statements as to the nature of the Boatmans' constitutional claim(s), considered in the light of what the Boatmans alleged in their complaint, are confusing at best and no doubt explain why the district court was still trying to get a handle on what the Boatmans were contending on the day the trial began. In their supplemental brief to us, they sought to justify the ambiguous presentation of their constitutional claim(s) by relying on the notice pleading permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: In pleading their arbitrary and capricious due process claim, the Boatmans were required by Rule 8(a)(2) ... to provide only a 'short and plain statement' that would give the defendant fair notice of what the claim was and the grounds upon which it rested.... There is no heightened pleading standard in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under § 1983.... [Their] complaint clearly met federal pleading requirements. Concluding this argument, they said that the allegations were clearly sufficient to place [the Town] on notice of what the Boatmans' claim was and the grounds upon which it rested. We have described the sort of pleading in which the Boatmans have engaged in this case as shotgun pleading. See Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1518 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S.Ct. 167, 116 L.Ed.2d 131 (1991). 7 The court concluded that the verdict also disposed of the Boatmans' pendant state claims; accordingly, it gave the Town judgment on those claims as well 8 In any action to enforce 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) 9 The record reveals that Mrs. Boatman was a member of the Zoning Board in 1991, at the time the present controversy began. She resigned in June 1992, a few months after the Boatmans brought this suit 10 In a supplemental brief to us on the question of the remedies that would have been available to the Boatmans in state court, the Boatmans argue that the Orange County circuit court could not have provided them the damages relief they sought in the district court. Their argument is disingenuous at best. We take judicial notice that the Orange County circuit court is a court of general jurisdiction and thus had the authority to compensate the Boatmans with money damages. See Fla. Const. art. V, §§ 5(b), 20(c)(3); Fla.Stat. § 26.012(2) (Supp.1994). Had the Boatmans repaired to the circuit court in a timely manner, however, it is likely that they would have suffered no loss--except for a brief delay in obtaining a certificate of occupancy, providing their structure passed inspection 11 The Department of Community Affairs is the state agency charged, among other things, with approving or disapproving the comprehensive growth plans of the state's local governments 12 Mrs. Boatman participated in the preparation of the Town's plan. She also participated in the Town's response to the Department's objections to the plan, including the Department's recommendation, set out in the text, infra, concerning the need to provide for mobile homes 13 The order could have been in the form of an injunction or a writ of mandamus. A writ would have issued if the circuit court concluded that the performance of a final inspection of a new building was a ministerial act--that is, whether the Boatmans' structure was barred by the Town's zoning ordinance was a matter for the Zoning Board, not the inspector, to decide. In any event, we have no doubt that, as we explain, supra, the circuit court would have decided the state law controversy before us