Opinion ID: 1493954
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Burden of Proof for Fraudulent Misrepresentation

Text: [¶ 14] Gorman contends that the court employed a preponderance of the evidence burden of proof, but that the proper burden of proof was clear and convincing evidence. MECA responds that the court applied the proper burden of proof because it alleged ordinary common law fraud, not any of the types of fraud that must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. [¶ 15] Although Gorman provided the trial court with the proper burden of proof in her trial brief and her post-trial brief, she did not present the argument to the court through a post-judgment motion. See, e.g., M.R. Civ. P. 52, 59, 60. If the parties disputed a finding of fact without making a motion for findings of fact pursuant to Rule 52, we would assume that the court found all facts necessary to support its decision. See Bell v. Bell, 1997 ME 154, ¶ 4, 697 A.2d 835, 836. In the present case, however, the asserted error is an error of law that Gorman argued in her briefs to the trial court; accordingly, we review the court's application of the burden of proof de novo. See Steelstone Indus., Inc. v. McCrum, 2001 ME 171, ¶ 6, 785 A.2d 1256, 1258; Emerson v. County Concrete & Constr. Co., 614 A.2d 549, 550 (Me.1992). [¶ 16] The elements of fraudulent misrepresentation must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. St. Francis De Sales Fed. Credit Union v. Sun Ins. Co. of N.Y., 2002 ME 127, ¶ 26, 818 A.2d 995, 1003; Mariello v. Giguere, 667 A.2d 588, 590 (Me.1995). Although we held in Petit v. Key Bank of Maine, 688 A.2d 427, 431 (Me.1996), that we would not require clear and convincing evidence to prove the element of fraud in a claim of tortious interference with an advantageous economic relationship, we also acknowledged that fraudulent misrepresentation claims do require proof by clear and convincing evidence. Id. (stating that certain civil actions alleging fraud require proof by clear and convincing evidence and citing Arbour v. Hazelton, 534 A.2d 1303, 1305 (Me.1987), a fraudulent misrepresentation case). [¶ 17] The court here made its factual findings for purposes of its judgment as a whole by a preponderance of the evidence and did not signal in any way that it was employing a higher burden of proof for the fraudulent misrepresentation claim. The court's acknowledgment that the case presented contradictory evidence on the material facts counsels us against inferring that the court would have made the same findings of fact if it had applied the clear and convincing evidence standard. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the error in applying the burden of proof was harmless. See Emerson, 614 A.2d at 550 (holding that the application of the improper standard of proof required that an order of attachment be vacated); In re Application of Hughes, 594 A.2d 1098, 1101-02 (Me. 1991) (vacating and remanding decision on bar application because the single justice applied the wrong standard of proof). [¶ 18] Ordinarily, we remand in such circumstances for further consideration and for application of the more stringent burden of proof. We would vacate the judgment on the fraudulent misrepresentation count without remand, however, if we were to conclude, as Gorman argues, that no reading of the evidence could support a finding that Gorman was liable for fraudulent misrepresentation, regardless of the burden of proof.