Opinion ID: 198181
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Effect of Reprosecution on Administration of Justice and

Text: Enforcement of the Act 78 The effect that reprosecution would have on the administration of justice and enforcement of the Speedy Trial Act likewise does not call for barring reprosecution. To be sure, the orderly administration of justice necessarily is hindered to some degree whenever the Act is violated. Nevertheless, a retrial should not take more than one week (the first trial lasted four days), and there is no reason to believe that reprosecution would otherwise have a deleterious effect on the fair and efficient administration of justice. 79 Similarly, enforcement of the Speedy Trial Act would not be unduly hampered by allowing Barnes to be retried. There is little doubt that the harsh remedy of dismissal with prejudice has greater deterrence value than its counterpart. But considerations of general deterrence are not dispositive or else dismissal with prejudice would impermissibly become the preferred tool. See United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 334, 108 S.Ct. 2413, 101 L.Ed.2d 297 (1988) (Congress did not intend any particular type of dismissal to serve as the presumptive remedy for a Speedy Trial Act violation.). Moreover, the fact that a retrial might be necessary at all is often deterrence enough. We find that to be true here. As the Supreme Court has observed, 80 Dismissal without prejudice is not a toothless sanction: it forces the Government to obtain a new indictment if it decides to reprosecute, and it exposes the prosecution to dismissal on statute of limitations grounds. Given the burdens borne by the prosecution and the effects of delay on the Government's ability to meet those burdens, substantial delay well may make reprosecution, even if permitted, unlikely. 81 Id. at 342, 108 S.Ct. 2413. Conversely, little would be gained in the case at bar by foreclosing the possibility of another trial. 82