Opinion ID: 4153794
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Genuinely Responsive to Safety?

Text: We next ask whether the permitting regulations are “genuinely responsive” to safety. See VRC, 460 F.3d at 612. UMA argues the district court erred in analyzing this question because it did not conduct a provision-byprovision analysis. UMA contends that such a review reveals that certain permitting regulations were not responsive to safety concerns. A provision-by-provision analysis of regulations generally should be undertaken to determine whether each provision is genuinely responsive to safety. See, e.g., California Tow Truck Ass’n, 807 F.3d at 1014. Here, although 10 Case: 16-50115 Document: 00513916817 Page: 11 Date Filed: 03/17/2017 No. 16-50115 the district court did not go through the permitting regulations one by one in its order, we find no error in its analysis. One reason is that, as UMA acknowledges, the district court heard testimony on the various provisions and requested provision-by-provision briefing. In addition, UMA does not provide substantive analysis as to specific provisions that allegedly do not relate to safety, nor did it challenge the provisions in a provision-by-provision manner in district court. In conducting its analysis as it did, the district court was simply addressing the arguments before it. The question, then, is whether these regulations are responsive to Section 14501(a)(2)’s focus on safety. The district court applied the Ninth Circuit’s two-part test, asking (1) whether there was a safety motivation for the scheme and (2) whether there was a nexus between the provision and the safety concern. See id. at 1019–20. 6 Again, we agree that the caselaw interpreting and applying Section 14501(c)(2)(A) provides the appropriate analysis for analyzing preemption under Section 14501(a)(2). Our cases have applied a test that is similar to the Ninth Circuit’s. See Houston Prof’l Towing, 812 F.3d at 449–51. We now apply that test. First, we look “to statements of intent on the face of the ordinance” to determine whether “it was designed to promote safety[.]” See id. at 449. Our caselaw is illustrative of our approach. In Cole, we considered the preamble to an ordinance but did not discuss whether the city had entered any studies or expert testimony about the dangers being addressed. Cole, 314 F.3d at 734– 35. The ordinance stated “that the proposed safety-related regulations for nonconsensual tows would promote the public safety” by, among other things, “contributing to a decrease in the potential for confrontation and violence . . . .” 6 The district court cited to an earlier opinion in California Tow Truck Association, which was later modified by the Ninth Circuit. For simplicity’s sake, we cite only the modified opinion. Which opinion is used does not affect our analysis. 11 Case: 16-50115 Document: 00513916817 Page: 12 Date Filed: 03/17/2017 No. 16-50115 Id. at 735. In light of the ordinance’s expressed purpose and effect, we concluded the safety purpose was “manifest.” Id. In VRC, we likewise found that there was a safety purpose when the city “considered the possibility of violent confrontation” as “a safety issue and found that” the ordinance would remedy it; when a city administrator testified “that there was a real problem with confrontation between citizens and tow truck drivers and that the signs had been helpful”; and when, “[l]ogically, the [ordinance’s requirements] could . . . help to defuse the anger of some who actually were towed . . . .” VRC, 460 F.3d at 615. We analyzed the safety exception in another case decided after the district court’s order here. See Houston Prof’l Towing Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 449. There, we discussed the safety exception to determine whether a tow-truck association’s challenge to a city ordinance was barred by res judicata. Id. at 448–49. The association had previously challenged the ordinance, but a district court held it to be within the safety exception. Id. at 446. Our analysis was thus limited to whether intervening amendments to the ordinance had changed the factual and legal basis for the association’s claim of preemption. Id. at 449. After analyzing the applicability of the safety exception, we held they had not. Id. at 450–51. In doing so, we looked to the ordinance’s preamble, which “contain[ed] a number of clauses discussing the safety motivations for the [ordinance].” Id. at 449–50. The preamble revealed the ordinance’s purpose was “to promote safety by expeditiously clearing stalled and wrecked vehicles”; hence we concluded that “[t]here [was] no doubt that safety [was] the justification . . . .” Id. at 450. Here, the ordinance contains numerous safety-purpose statements. See AUSTIN CITY CODE § 13-2-251. The ordinance states that various events make the City a destination for “masses of visitors,” which “impact[s] public safety and impede[s] the flow of pedestrian and vehicular traffic.” Id. For these 12 Case: 16-50115 Document: 00513916817 Page: 13 Date Filed: 03/17/2017 No. 16-50115 reasons, the City found its “regulations [would] help to protect and ensure that charter bus services use mechanically safe vehicles, operate their service in a safe manner, and . . . meet minimum insurance coverage requirements.” Id. Also, after recounting a history of charter-bus accidents in Texas, the ordinance notes its effectiveness in preventing such “deadly accidents.” Id. It makes clear that “the purpose of the . . . regulations is not to generate revenue but as enumerated above, to protect the public health, safety, and welfare.” Id. These statements are similar to those that we have previously held to evidence a safety motivation. See, e.g., Houston Prof’l Towing Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 450; Cole, 314 F.3d at 735. Here, like in those cases, we have no reason to “doubt that safety is the justification for [the regulations].” See Houston Prof’l Towing Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 450. We next look to “evidence that there was a ‘nexus between the ordinance and public safety.’” Id. at 449 (alteration omitted) (quoting VRC, 460 F.3d at 614–15). The district court held there was. It held that the ordinance gave “the City the ability to hold charter bus operators who do not comply with the substantive safety provisions . . . accountable.” Examples the district court mentioned included loading and unloading passengers in the street, alternative transportation for passengers when a bus broke down, and prohibitions on the sale of alcohol, controlled substances, and other criminal conduct. It also noted that the permitting requirements “imply the threat of permit revocation,” making them “tools for policing misconduct.” When the relation between the regulation and safety is obvious and logical, the second prong of our analysis is satisfied. See VRC, 460 F.3d at 615; see also California Tow Truck Ass’n, 807 F.3d at 1020. This is true even if “municipalities are accomplishing some economic regulation, or more precisely consumer protection, while making findings about safety in the preambles of their ordinances.” See VRC, 460 F.3d at 615. 13 Case: 16-50115 Document: 00513916817 Page: 14 Date Filed: 03/17/2017 No. 16-50115 UMA may have a point that the City is accomplishing economic goals, such as consumer protection, via some of the permitting regulations. We have recognized, though, that “safety and consumer protection are not mutually exclusive categories.” See id. We agree with the district court that for most of the regulations, the relation is obvious and logical. For all of them, “the City’s safety concerns are real enough that the court is convinced that they are both reasonably related and genuinely responsive to safety concerns.” See id. The district court did not err by finding a nexus between the permitting regulations and safety.