Opinion ID: 202297
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statements to the Police

Text: 36 Obershaw moved to suppress his statements to the police, partly on the ground he raises here: that he requested a lawyer, and that instead of honoring that request, the police elicited statements from him without a valid waiver of his rights. Obershaw, 762 N.E.2d at 280. This claim was presented to the state courts in federal constitutional terms, and adjudicated in such terms. See id. at 281, 283-84. The deferential AEDPA standard of review applies. We first describe the federal law. 37 Once a suspect invokes his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, the fact that he responds to later interrogation by the police does not, in itself, establish that he validly waived that right. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). In fact, once a suspect expresse[s] his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, [he] is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Id. 38 In Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), the Supreme Court held that after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney. Id. at 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350. [T]he suspect must unambiguously request counsel, and if [he] makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that [he] might be invoking the right to counsel, police questioning need not cease. Id. at 459, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The test is an objective one: whether the suspect has articulate[d] his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. Id. 39 Obershaw does not take issue with his initial statements to the police. He was advised of his Miranda rights at the outset, and he willingly conversed and cooperated with the police, even signing a written Miranda waiver. Eventually, though, the police discovered blood, and Obershaw made a brief, tearful confession. It was shortly after that statement, when the police asked Obershaw whether he would show them where Brian's body was, that Obershaw asked, Can I talk to a lawyer first? Obershaw's argument is that this was a clear, unambiguous request for counsel, and that the statements he gave to the police after that request were improperly obtained and should have been suppressed. 40 The state trial court determined that Obershaw never adequately and affirmatively invoked his right to counsel. Obershaw, 762 N.E.2d at 283 (internal quotation marks omitted). The SJC, citing Davis, inter alia, agreed. Id. at 283-84. The SJC stressed that the police responded to Obershaw's question by telling him he could use the telephone to call a lawyer, that he declined, that it was Obershaw who later initiated a conversation with the police, that he was again invited to use the telephone to call a lawyer, and that he again declined, after which he spent half an hour with his dogs and then started speaking to the police again. Id. at 284. The SJC reasoned that in this context, Obershaw had not clearly and affirmatively requested an attorney. Id. 41 Under AEDPA, this court is limited to determining whether the SJC reached a decision contrary to, or involving an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or one based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence. 5 The SJC's decision falls into neither category. 42 Obershaw inquired whether he could talk to a lawyer, rather than expressly asserting that he in fact wanted to do so. He has not directed us to any precedent, Supreme Court or otherwise, holding that language like his meets the Davis standard of unambiguously requesting counsel by expressing, with sufficient clarity, a desire to have counsel present. Moreover, even if Obershaw did initially invoke his right to counsel by asking whether he had such a right, he subsequently became subject to further police questioning when, despite twice being invited to call a lawyer, he chose to initiate further conversation with the police. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880.