Opinion ID: 1543938
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mohler's Case

Text: The § 16-206(a)(1)(ii) issue in Mohler's case is clear cut: Can a single conviction of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor serve, without more, as the factual predicate for a finding that a driver is unsafe within the meaning of the subsection? [5] We hold that Judge Woods construed and applied the statute correctly when he answered that question in the negative. As we have noted, § 16-206(a)(1)(ii) reads: (a)(1) The Administration may suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue or renew the license of any resident... on a showing by its records or other sufficient evidence that the applicant or licensee: ... (ii) Is an unfit, unsafe, or habitually reckless or negligent driver of a motor vehicle. When construing a statute, the duty of the reviewing court is to determine the goal of the legislature and to effectuate that objective. Rucker v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 315 Md. 559, 564, 555 A.2d 1060, 1063 (1989). The court must divine the legislative goal or purpose by examining the language of the statute in the context within which it was adopted. Rucker, 315 Md. at 565, 555 A.2d at 1063. See State v. Runge, 317 Md. 613, 566 A.2d 88, 92-93 (1989). The statute before us went through several metamorphoses before reaching its current form. Under the 1918 Code of Maryland, the commissioner of Motor Vehicles could, at his discretion, suspend or revoke the license of a person holding a Maryland driver's license who was convicted of any violation of any of the provisions of this sub-title. Md.Code (1918), Art. LVI, § 145. The statute also gave the commissioner the discretion to revoke or suspend an operator's license for any cause which he may deem sufficient. Id. The unfit and unsafe language appeared in 1947. The Department of Motor Vehicles retained the authority to revoke or suspend a license for any violation of the code and, in addition, could do so for any other cause or reason which, in the opinion of the Department renders the holder of any such license ... an unfit or unsafe person. Md. Code (1947 Cum.Supp.), Art. 66 1/2, § 95. This version of the statute deleted the broad language which gave the commissioner the power to revoke or suspend a license for any cause which he may deem sufficient. In 1970, the legislature again revised the provision. The grounds for suspension or revocation became: a showing by [the department's] records or other sufficient evidence that the licensee: (1) Is either an unfit or unsafe driver. (2) Has been convicted with such frequency of violations of the traffic regulations ... as to indicate an intent to disregard the traffic laws and the safety of other persons ... (3) Is an habitually reckless or negligent driver of a motor vehicle; (4) Is incompetent to drive a motor vehicle; (5) Has permitted an unlawful or fraudulent use of the license; (6) Has committed an offense in another state.... Md.Code (1970 Repl.Vol.), Art. 66 1/2, § 6-206. This revision divested the department of its authority to revoke or suspend an operator's license for any violation of the code. In the 1977 code revision process, the revisors consolidated the language in former § 6-206. Paragraphs (1) and (3) were combined, and paragraph (4) was deleted. Md.Code (1977), § 16-206 of the Transp. Art. Those changes put the provision in its current form. The evolution of § 16-206 reveals the legislature's goal of limiting the department's (now the MVA's) discretion to revoke or suspend licenses. The legislature first took away the commissioner's (department's) power to revoke or suspend a license for any reason that that official (it) found sufficient, and later took away the department's power to revoke or suspend a license for any motor vehicle violation under the statute. The objective of these changes was to establish a tighter, more specific standard for revocation or suspension. Moreover, the statutory development shows that the legislature meant to attach distinct meanings to unsafe, unfit, and the two habitual categories. The 1977 revisor's note to § 16-206 advises that the reference to an `incompetent' driver [in former Art. 16 1/2, § 6-206 was] deleted as superfluous in light of the references to an `unfit,' or `unsafe' driver. Ch. 14, Acts of 1977. We may conclude that the legislature believed that unsafe and unfit together encompass the meaning of incompetent and unsafe and unfit are not intended to be synonyms; otherwise, the legislature would have deleted one of those words as well. Lack of fitness has to do with incompetence: physical or mental unsoundness for a particular purpose. See Random House Dictionary of the English Language at 2068 (2d ed. 1987); Oxford English Dictionary Vol. XIX at 19 (2d ed. 1989). Unsafe means, among other things, exposing to danger. Webster's Third New International Dictionary at 2509 (1976); Oxford English Dictionary Vol. XIX at 180 (2d ed. 1989). An unfit driver may be an unsafe one, but an unsafe one is not necessarily an individual who is subject to a physical or mental condition that impairs his or her ability to drive. As we have said, we deal here with a driver found by the MVA to be unsafe. But the single conviction upon which the hearing examiner relied could not be the basis for that finding. We do not rule out the possibility that a single incident might, in some circumstances, provide a sufficient foundation for a finding of unsafe. But a conviction of driving under the influence is not even complete evidence of a single incident. The surrounding circumstances are unknown. We do not know how Mohler was driving, to what extent he was under the influence, his proclivity, if any, to drink or any other information that might bear upon his unsafeness as a driver. The hearing examiner must determine that the licensee is unsafe at the time of the hearing. The statute is a measure designed to keep unsafe drivers off the road, at least for a time. Hence, it must be determined that the licensee is unsafe at the time of revocation or suspension. The statute's history supports this reading of it. What is now § 16-206 traces back to § 6-206 of the Uniform Vehicle Code. See Uniform Vehicle Code (Revised 1962). While the Maryland statutory provisions are not identical to those of the Uniform Code, and never have been, the purpose of both is the same. With respect to the physical or mental disability ground for sanction, it has been said that [i]f any broad generalization is possible, it is that in order to support the administrative denial or withdrawal of driving privileges ... there must be competent, substantial evidence of the existence of some tangible disease or defect which bears, or could in the future bear, adversely upon the particular motorist's capacity to drive safely. 7A Am.Jur.2d. Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 116 at 284 (1980). In other words, where unfitness is the criterion, the unfitness must be a present one ... one that bears, or could in the future bear, upon the licensee's capacity to drive safely. The same is true when unsafe is the criterion. Thus, the unsafe standard requires the hearing examiner to determine whether the licensee possesses some characteristic that is likely to make him an unsafe driver. The focus is on the driver, not on the offense of which the driver was convicted. For this reason, MVA's reliance on out-of-state cases that allow suspension or revocation when a driver has been convicted of a serious offense is not helpful. See, e.g., Crow v. Shaeffer, 199 N.W.2d 45 (Iowa 1972) (I.C.A. § 321.210(7) authorizing suspension of licensee who has committed a serious violation of the motor vehicle laws of this state allows suspension based on single conviction of reckless driving, when details of reckless driving established); Ralston v. State, 60 Wash.2d 535, 374 P.2d 571 (1962) (R.C.W. 46.20.290(4) authorizing suspension of license of one who has committed a serious violation of the motor vehicle laws of this state permits suspension based on single drunk driving conviction). Those statutes make the nature of the violation the test for suspension or revocation. Maryland, at least where § 16-206(a)(1)(ii) is concerned, looks to the characteristics of the driver, not just the gravity of the motor vehicle violation. To be sure, the nature of a violation may have some bearing on whether a driver may be considered unsafe, as may facts that disclose the details of the violation. See Bungardeanu v. England, 219 A.2d 104 (D.C. 1966) (facts that drunk driver struck two parked cars and left scene of accident sufficient to support a finding of flagrant disregard for the safety of persons or property under D.C. Traffic and Motor Vehicle Regs. § 5(a)). But under our carefully limited statute, Mohler's single conviction of driving under the influence is insufficient in and of itself, to sustain the hearing examiner's finding that Mohler was an unsafe driver. Judge Woods did not err when he reversed the hearing examiner on this point. [6]