Opinion ID: 3200854
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retaliation for Taking FMLA Leave

Text: Menekse also argues that she was retaliated against for attempting to assert her FMLA rights and for making a complaint about an FMLA violation. To make a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2), the plaintiff must establish that: (1) she was protected under the FMLA; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the adverse action was causally related to the exercise of her FMLA rights. See Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 500, 508 (3d Cir. 2009). If the plaintiff succeeds in her prima facie case, the defendant must articulate a 4 Harrah’s filed a “Slot Incident Report” in September of 2010, describing an incident in which Menekse addressed casino patrons in a “poorly matter,” J.A. 717, however it is unclear whether formal discipline was taken against Menekse in relation to this incident. 5 Menekse attempts to explain her pre-2010 disciplinary record by pointing to the alleged discriminatory animus of supervisor John Truitt. Menekse essentially argues that, absent Truitt’s discrimination, she would have a clean record, and therefore the discipline she received in 2011 is more suspect. However, Menekse puts forth no competent evidence to show or suggest that Truitt had knowledge of her religion or her national origin. Thus, these alleged facts do not assist in demonstrating causation. 6 legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. See Ross v. Gilhuly, 755 F.3d 185, 193 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997). “The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the articulated reason was [] pretext for discrimination.” Id. We agree with the District Court that, even if she can establish a prime facie case, Menekse failed to demonstrate pretext on her FMLA claim. Menekse was terminated one week after her most recent request for FMLA leave on June 30, 2011. The District Court was correct to conclude that “the one-week gap . . . is sufficiently small that it creates a triable issue as to whether her request for FMLA leave was the cause of her termination.” J.A. 13. Menekse could not, however, establish pretext as she did not show that Harrah’s proffered reasons for her termination were so weak so as to be disbelieved. See Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 800 (3d Cir. 2003). On this point, the District Court noted that Menekse presented no evidence. On appeal, Menekse argues that the following evidence can establish pretext: first, the fact that her statement was not actually a threat; second, the temporal proximity between her request and her termination; and third, Harrah’s previous denials of her FMLA requests. None of this evidence can establish pretext. The record evidence indicates that Harrah’s reasonably believed Menekse’s statement was a threat. While Menekse might have a different view as to how her statement was interpreted, this disagreement does not establish pretext. Id. (stating that an employee’s “personal view of 7 his employer’s explanation . . . falls far short of establishing pretext”). Menekse fares no better on her arguments regarding temporal proximity and Harrah’s denials of her FMLA requests. Without more, such evidence cannot raise an inference of pretext, given Menekse’s history of disciplinary infractions, which are documented in the record, and which began long before the leave requests at issue.