Opinion ID: 392853
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Estelle v. Smith

Text: 11 Application of Smith to the facts of this case requires that we set aside petitioner's death sentence. At the time of Dr. Patterson's testing of petitioner he was confined at the Tarrant County Jail and so was in custody for the purpose of determining the applicability of Miranda. 14 Dr. Patterson's testing constituted an interrogation of petitioner as that term has been defined under Miranda. 15 Dr. Patterson had been appointed by the state trial court to conduct the examination and therefore the custodial interrogation was conducted by an agent of the state. 16 Finally, Dr. Patterson did not advise petitioner of his fifth amendment privilege, and the defense neither requested an examination on future dangerousness nor introduced psychiatric or psychological testimony on that issue. Unless there is some significant difference between this case and Smith petitioner's death sentence must be vacated. 17 12 The State contends that this case is not controlled by Smith for several reasons, none of which we find persuasive. The State argues that petitioner's responses to Dr. Patterson's tests constituted real rather than testimonial evidence. However, here as in Smith the mental health expert who testified for the State based his analysis of petitioner's future dangerousness on the content of the responses given by the petitioner to the expert's tests. 18 Petitioner was not simply required to use his voice as an identifying physical characteristic but instead was required to speak his guilt by responding to Dr. Patterson's test questions. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1930, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967). Accord United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 6-7, 93 S.Ct. 764, 768, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 1953, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967). Therefore, petitioner's responses constituted testimonial evidence. Estelle v. Smith, supra, --- U.S. at ----, 101 S.Ct. at 1873-74. 13 The State also contends that petitioner waived his fifth amendment privilege by requesting a psychiatric examination to determine his competency to stand trial and his sanity at the time of the commission of the crime. This argument however confuses the use of psychiatric examinations by the defense or the State to determine a defendant's competency to stand trial with the use of a psychiatric examination by the defense or the State to ascertain the defendant's insanity at the time of the crime. Each use of psychiatric testimony raises questions different from those raised by the other and different doctrines have developed to account for these different problems. 14 The use of a psychiatric or psychological examination to determine a defendant's competency to stand trial 19 is a separate matter as far as the fifth amendment privilege is concerned and is distinct from the use of a psychiatric or psychological examination to determine the defendant's culpability or responsibility for the crimes charged against him. The State's use of the results of a competency examination does not infringe upon a defendant's fifth amendment privilege because it does not assist the State in proving any of the elements necessary to support the imposition of a criminal punishment under state law. See Estelle v. Smith, supra, --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 101 S.Ct. at 1874-75. 20 Had Dr. Patterson's examination been used only to determine petitioner's competency to stand trial no Fifth Amendment issue would have arisen. Id. at ----, 101 S.Ct. at 1874; id. at ----, 101 S.Ct. at 1876. 15 However, when the same type of examination is used to determine a defendant's culpability or responsibility for the crimes charged against him the fifth amendment privilege is involved because the use of a psychiatric or psychological examination in this context may assist the State in establishing the basis for imposition of a criminal punishment. 21 This use of psychiatric or psychological testimony can arise in a variety of situations. One such situation was present in Smith. There the State used the results from a court-appointed psychiatric examination of a defendant who neither requested the examination nor introduced psychiatric testimony himself in order to prove an essential element under state law for imposing a criminal punishment. In that situation, the Supreme Court held that the defendant is entitled to the protection of the fifth amendment and also that a court-appointed psychiatrist must inform that defendant of his fifth amendment rights in accordance with Miranda prior to any custodial interrogation in order for the State to introduce at trial the results obtained from that interrogation. A different situation was present in United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855, 97 S.Ct. 149, 50 L.Ed.2d 130 (1976). In Cohen, the federal government used the results of a court-appointed psychiatric examination only after the defense had introduced psychiatric testimony in order to raise a mental defense. In this situation, this Court held that the introduction by the defense of psychiatric testimony constituted a waiver of the defendant's fifth amendment privilege in the same manner as would the defendant's election to testify at trial. 22 Cohen, like virtually every other federal and state court addressing this issue, concluded that any burden imposed on the defense by this result is justified by the State's overwhelming difficulty in responding to the defense psychiatric testimony without its own psychiatric examination of the accused and by the need to prevent fraudulent mental defenses. 23 16 The State contends however that a defendant's mere submission to a psychiatric or psychological examination constitutes a waiver of the fifth amendment privilege. But the waiver doctrine is inapplicable, as here, when the defendant does not introduce the testimony of a mental health expert on the issue of a mental state relevant to the offense or a defense raised by the evidence in the case. Accordingly, a defendant can invoke the protection of the privilege when he does not introduce mental health expert testimony. Submitting to a psychiatric or psychological examination does not itself constitute a waiver of the fifth amendment's protection. Therefore, this ground offered by the State to distinguish the Smith case is untenable. 17 Finally, the State argues that Smith is distinguishable because the defense requested the psychiatric examination rather than the State and therefore the concerns prompting the Supreme Court to adopt Miranda are unnecessary to protect a person when he initiates the interrogation himself. While this factor is relevant once a defendant has been admonished in accordance with Miranda and Smith, see Edwards v. Arizona, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ---- & n. 9, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-85 & n. 9, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); id. at ---- - ----, 101 S.Ct. at 1887-89 (Powell, J., concurring), the fact that the defense requested the examination does not obviate the necessity for giving the Miranda warnings where the defense did not request such an examination on the question of future dangerousness. Miranda was designed to protect a putative defendant's fifth amendment privilege and thus he must be given the prescribed warnings prior to official custodial interrogation. The fact that defense counsel initially requested an examination to determine the petitioner's competency and sanity does not render Miranda inapplicable. 24