Opinion ID: 1436710
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Deportation Cases.

Text: The District also relies on Gonzalez v. United States I.N.S., 867 F.2d 1108 (8th Cir. 1989), as support for the proposition that Cort v. Ash applies. In Gonzalez, an incarcerated alien, who was serving a sentence for possession of heroin with intent to distribute it, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Attorney General to bring a prompt deportation proceeding against him while he was in the custody of prison authorities. Id. at 1108-09. The alien sought, in effect, to be deported during his term of incarceration, rather than after its completion. The court, invoking Cort v. Ash , held that a statute then providing that deportation proceedings shall be brought as expeditiously as possible did not create an implied right of action in favor of imprisoned aliens. Id. at 1109-10. Gonzalez and the decisions which have adopted its reasoning, [7] however, differ materially from the present case. The determination whether and when to institute enforcement proceedings against a specific individual is a core executive responsibility which may reasonably be viewed as having been committed to agency discretion so as to preclude substantive judicial review. See note 3, supra. The Sierra Club, on the other hand, is not asking the court to compel the District to institute enforcement proceedings against anyone. Rather, it seeks injunctive relief requiring DPW to collect recyclables as contemplated in the DCRL. In any event, in Gonzalez and its progeny, as in Parents United, the courts did not address the question, which at most lurk[ed] in the record, whether Cort v. Ash analysis applied at all. In Soler v. Scott, 942 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.1991), vacated as moot sub nom. Sivley v. Soler, 506 U.S. 969, 113 S.Ct. 454, 121 L.Ed.2d 364 (1992), the court did directly deal with that issue and held, on facts similar to those in Gonzalez, that the Cort model did not apply: The district court's conclusion that Soler's claim depends upon the existence of an implied private right of action under Section 701 was mistaken. When a petitioner seeks to compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), it is not necessary to determine whether the underlying statute creates a private right of action. The `right of action' in such cases is expressly created by the Administrative Procedure Act.... A separate indication of congressional intent to make agency action reviewable under the APA is not necessary; instead, the rule is that the cause of action for review of such action is available absent some clear and convincing evidence of legislative intention to preclude review. Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 231 n. 4, 106 S.Ct. at 2866 n. 4. See also Sierra Club v. Peterson, 705 F.2d 1475, 1478-79 (9th Cir.1983). Id. at 604 (alteration in original); see also Hernandez-Avalos v. I.N.S., 50 F.3d 842, 846-47 (10th Cir.1995). [8] The federal APA does not apply to this case but, as we have previously noted at page 358, supra, the right to judicial review existed at common law prior to the APA's enactment, and the Superior Court's civil action jurisdiction authorizes such review. See page 358-359, supra. Accordingly, we agree with the court's reasoning in Soler and the other authorities cited, and now turn to the merits of the Sierra Club's claim. [9]