Opinion ID: 599
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Original Claims

Text: In addition to rejecting the majority's precedent-based arguments, I part ways with the majority's policy justifications for applying written description to original claims. The majority accepts Lilly's argument that, while an original claim is part of the specification, this fact does not mean that original claims must always be an adequate written description of the invention. Lilly's Br. 35. This debate is not new. See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed.Cir. 2004) (Lourie, J., concurring) (Thus, the fact that a statement of an invention is in an original claim does not necessarily end all inquiry as to the satisfaction of the written description requirement.). However, the policy reasons for applying such a requirement to original claims remain unconvincing. It is beyond dispute that original claims are part of a patent's disclosure. See id. (Lourie, J., concurring) (As for the proposition that an original claim is part of the written description, that is clear.). And our predecessor court repeatedly held that, as part of the disclosure, original claims constitute their own description. In re Koller, 613 F.2d 819, 823 (CCPA 1980); see also In re Smith, 481 F.2d 910, 914 (CCPA 1973) (Where the claim is an original claim, the underlying concept of insuring disclosure as of the filing date is satisfied, and the description requirement has likewise been held to be satisfied.); In re Gardner, 475 F.2d 1389, 1391 (CCPA 1973) (holding that an original claim sufficiently described itself, and that [n]othing more is necessary for compliance with the description requirement of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112), reh'g denied, 480 F.2d 879, 879-80 (CCPA 1973) (Under these circumstances, we consider the original claim in itself adequate `written description' of the claimed invention.). Thus, as I have said before, [f]or original claims, ... the claim itself evidenc[es] possession of the invention as of the filing date. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 988 (Fed.Cir.2002) (Linn, J., dissenting). It is inconsistent to say that on its filing date, a patent does not show that the inventor possessed subject matter that the claims actually encompass and the specification fully enables. Doing so perpetuates an unnecessary tension between the claims and the written description as the definition of a patented invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2 (requiring claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 339, 81 S.Ct. 599, 5 L.Ed.2d 592 (1961) (observing that the claims made in the patent are the sole measure of the grant). Indeed, the majority reinforces the confusing notion that the primary purpose of claims is to provide notice of the boundaries of the right to exclude ... not to describe the invention. Maj. Op. at 1347; cf. Br. of Amicus Oskar Liivak 15 (The claims are not the invention as a logical, conceptual and practical matter.). Again, since the 1836 Patent Act, claims have served the purpose of distinguishing the invention, while the specification as a whole must enable. The fear that even original claims might claim[] the invention by what it does rather than what it is, Lilly's Br. 35, is unfounded because all claims must satisfy enablement and other requirements for patentability. The majority agrees that many original claims will satisfy the written description requirement, but expresses concern that applicants may use functional language to define the boundaries of a claimed genus, without disclosing species sufficient to support a claim. Maj. Op. at 1349. I agree that such claims should be invalidbut enablement polices those claims effectively. Any claim that uses purely functional language, or covers a broad genus without sufficient supporting examples, will not be enabled. E.g., In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495-96 (Fed.Cir. 1991) (affirming enablement rejection of genus claims). Lilly and several amici caution that the written description doctrine protects the public by requiring patentees to provide specific notice of the scope of their inventions. See, e.g., Br. of Amicus Medtronic, Inc. 11-12. This concern is also misplaced. Generally, under 35 U.S.C. § 122(b), patent applications publish eighteen months from the earliest filing date for which a benefit is sought. Therefore, the public receives notice of original claims within a specified time. See Br. of Amicus Monsanto Co. 8 (Regardless of its breadth, the language of an original claim puts skilled artisans on notice that the inventor is claiming such subject matter as the inventor's own invention.). Even if the application does not publish before the patent issues, the original claims remain part of the public prosecution history and notify the public of the invention's scope. The government submitted an amicus brief in which it asserted that the written description doctrine is necessary to permit USPTO to perform its basic examination function and claimed that the Patent Office applies § 112, paragraph 1 to over 400,000 patent applications each year. Br. of Amicus United States 19-20. However, at oral argument the government could not cite the number of applications that the PTO annually rejects on written description grounds and cannot reject on another basis. See Oral Arg. at 22:42-24:50. The government also agreed that enablement is available to address a large number of these problems. Id. at 28:01-32. Indeed, a study released after argument that reviewed over 2800 appeals to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) during 2009 found that only 4.3% of those cases decided written description issues, and that none of those outcomes would change if the PTO could continue to issue new matter rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 132. Dennis D. Crouch, An Empirical Study of the Role of the Written Description Requirement in Patent Prosecution 2 (Univ. of Mo. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No.2010-06, 2010), available at http://ssrn. com/abstract=1554949. The study concludes that, in the context of patent applications appealed to the BPAI, the impact of the separate written description requirement is negligible apart from its role in policing the addition of new matter. Id. at 3. While this research only addressed a small sample of applications and did not consider written description rejections that applicants overcome or do not appeal, these results and the government's lack of empirical evidence undermine the government's hypothesis that our patent examination system would grind to a halt if written description no longer applies to originally filed claims. The Patent Office survived well enough before 1997, when it was understood that written description was a basis for rejecting broadening amendments to claims or specifications, not original claims. See Rasmussen, 650 F.2d at 1214.