Opinion ID: 592141
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdiction, Exhaustion of Remedies, and Standing

Text: 7 The INS contends that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the plaintiffs' challenges to INS policy and regulations. The contention is without merit. 8 This issue has been resolved by the Supreme Court's decision in McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 499, 111 S.Ct. 888, 112 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991), and by our recent decisions in Zambrano v. INS, 972 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir.1992), and in Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 956 F.2d 914 (9th Cir.1992). Both the Supreme Court in McNary and our court in Zambrano and in Catholic Social Services concluded that the district court had jurisdiction to review INS regulations promulgated under IRCA. See McNary, 498 U.S. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 897 (district court had jurisdiction to review INS procedures for evaluating applicants for amnesty under IRCA's Special Agricultural Worker program); Zambrano, 972 F.2d at 1124 (district court had jurisdiction to review INS regulation interpreting IRCA standard for admissible aliens); Catholic Social Services, 956 F.2d at 919-21 (district court had jurisdiction to review INS regulations interpreting IRCA requirement for continuous physical presence in the United States). In all of these cases, the statutory provisions for judicial review in IRCA were found to allow federal district courts to hear broad-based constitutional and statutory challenges to INS regulations. 4 9 In the present case, the statutory provision for judicial review is identical to that construed in Zambrano and Catholic Social Services. Our own case law therefore dictates the conclusion that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs' challenges to INS regulations. 5
10 The INS argues on appeal that the district court should not have granted relief because the remedies available to legalization applicants under IRCA have not been exhausted. The district court rejected the agency's arguments about exhaustion on the ground that the organizational plaintiffs have no remedies to exhaust under IRCA. On appeal, the INS contends that individual applicants should have to exhaust their statutory remedies and that the district court's analysis of the exhaustion issue does not address this contention. 11 We review the district court's decision de novo, Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1303 (9th Cir.1992), and conclude that requiring individual applicants to exhaust their statutory remedies would serve no useful purpose here. 12 The purpose of exhaustion is to allow administrative agencies to complete their own decisionmaking procedures and to discourage premature judicial intervention. The INS argues that judicial review is premature because the agency has not completed its process of adjudicating individual applications for legalization. 13 The agency's argument is beside the point. The organizational plaintiffs have presented broad-based statutory and constitutional challenges to INS regulations. The organizational plaintiffs are not requesting that the court review individual applications. As to the issues presented by the organizational plaintiffs in this case, the INS has already completed its decisionmaking process. 14 Requiring individual applicants to exhaust administrative remedies before the organizational plaintiffs may bring broad-based statutory and constitutional challenges makes little sense. The statutory remedies available to individual applicants provide no real opportunity to present the complex constitutional and statutory issues involved here. It is unreasonable to expect individual applicants who are often not represented by counsel to press such arguments. Moreover, individuals who do raise broader challenges to agency regulations do not have remedies in the administrative appeals process that are equivalent to those available in federal court. INS adjudicators are not empowered to invalidate agency regulations. 6 Agency adjudicators reviewing statutory or constitutional challenges that might arise in an individual case must review those challenges on the basis of a limited administrative record. 7 The only other opportunity for an alien to challenge INS regulations is to surrender for deportation and then appeal the deportation order in federal court. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1105a, 1255a(f)(4) (1988). Furthermore, IRCA provides no remedies either to the organizations who are plaintiffs to this action or to those aliens discouraged from applying for legalization because of putatively invalid regulations. Finally, where the INS's interpretation of the statute is clear, we need not wait for the agency to adjudicate individual applications to be able to review broad-based challenges to INS policy and regulations such as those presented here by the organizational plaintiffs. 15 We agree with the district court that judicial review of plaintiffs' challenges to INS policy and regulations is not premature. We also agree with the district court that waiting for the agency to adjudicate individual cases before reviewing INS regulations could cause considerable hardship to applicants.
16 The INS maintains on appeal that the seven organizational plaintiffs do not meet the requirements for organizational standing. The agency contends that INS regulations caused no injury to the plaintiff organizations and that IRCA was not intended to protect these organizations in any event. 17 The district court rejected these arguments and denied the government's motion to dismiss. We review the district court's decision de novo and agree that the requirements for organizational standing were met in this case. See United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers, and Allied Trades No. 40 v. Ins. Corp. of America, 919 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.1990) (standing is a question of law reviewed de novo). 18 To establish standing, the organizational plaintiffs must plausibly allege that an agency's illegal action is the cause of some threatened or actual injury to the organization and that this injury can be remedied by the court. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). The organizational plaintiffs must also show that their injury is within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the statute. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475, 102 S.Ct. at 760; McMichael v. County of Napa, 709 F.2d 1268, 1270 (9th Cir.1983). 19 The record demonstrates that INS regulations for eligibility criteria caused harm to the organizations by draining organizational resources and impairing their ability to assist and counsel nonimmigrants. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 1124, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982) (standing found for organizations on the basis of concrete and demonstrable injury caused by regulations that drained organizational resources); Action Alliance of Senior Citizens v. Heckler, 789 F.2d 931, 937-39 (D.C.Cir.1986) (same). 20 The plaintiff organizations fall squarely within the zone of interests protected by IRCA. The organizational plaintiffs provide services to an identifiable group of individuals that Congress specifically intended organizations such as these to represent. 8 Moreover, the zone of interests requirement for standing is not particularly stringent, and is meant only to preclude standing for those whose interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit. Clarke v. Securities Industry Association, 479 U.S. 388, 399, 107 S.Ct. 750, 757, 93 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987).