Opinion ID: 1722787
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the Jury's Special Verdict on Assumption of Risk Precludes Plaintiff's Recovery on a Negligence Theory.

Text: All defendants urge on appeal that the jury's finding with respect to the defense of assumption of risk precludes recovery by plaintiff on his negligence claims as well as his strict liability claims. The basis for this argument is a contention that the form of the instruction on assumption of risk which was used by the trial court presented that doctrine in its primary meaning. Defendants now argue that because the doctrine embodied in the primary meaning of assumption of risk was not eliminated as a bar to recovery in negligence cases by Rosenau v. City of Estherville, 199 N.W.2d 125, 131 (Iowa 1972) we should apply that doctrine as a bar to plaintiff's recovery in the present case. We reject defendants' contentions for several reasons. First, it is clear from the record that, prior to the verdict of the jury, defendants made no effort to have assumption of risk presented in the instructions as a defense to the negligence claims. We believe it is equally clear that the trial court's instructions did not present assumption of risk to the jury as a defense to the negligence claims. Although Instruction No. 22 contains language which, in isolation, provides that if defendants establish their assumption of risk defense then your verdict should be for the defendants, a contextual analysis of this instruction with respect to the other instructions suggests that this language was meant to apply to only the strict liability claims. Several factors support this conclusion. As the instructions are arranged, Instruction No. 22 is located among those instructions dealing with the strict liability claims. In describing the type of claims for which the defense precludes recovery, the instruction alludes to injuries sustained because of defects or dangerous condition, which are the primary elements of a strict liability claim. In addition, the special verdict form on assumption of risk refers only to Westfield and Van Zetten, the defendants against whom the strict liability claims were made and not to Guiter against whom no such claim was lodged. Instruction No. 11 and Instruction No. 12 which are the marshalling instructions on the negligence claims advise the jury that if it is established that any of the defendants were negligent and that such negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries then plaintiff is entitled to recover in some amount. The instructions tell the jury not to consider the strict liability claims if it should return an affirmative finding on the matter of assumption of risk but to proceed, in that event, to consider the negligence claims. Finally, the record shows the following discussion transpired in a colloquy between Guiter's counsel and the court at the conclusion of the parties' objections to instructions: [Counsel for Guiter] Your honor, I think I have a duty to point out to the court in connection with the instructions as it might inure to my benefit, in view of Mr. Heslinga's objection made to Instruction No. 22. I don't think the defendant, Guiter, is entitled to the benefit of that particular affirmative defense in relationship to the negligence claims pleaded against unless I don't understand the instructions. Unless you really are not talking about the defendant, Guiter, in connection with that instruction. The Court: Assumption of risk. That instruction is referred to in the verdict form as relating only the issue of strict liability as goes to Westfield and Van Zetten . (Emphasis added.) Defendants' present claims on the doctrine of assumption of risk must be perceived as an afterthought presented for the first time in their motions for new trial. We have said that theories which were never submitted to the jury may not be utilized by the court in post-trial motions to resurrect a verdict based on [other] grounds. Carter v. MacMillan Oil Co ., 355 N.W.2d 52, 55 (Iowa 1984). In rejecting defendants' contentions on this ground we are not suggesting that the trial court's instruction on assumption of risk did present that doctrine in its primary meaning as understood and applied in Rosenau , 199 N.W.2d at 131. Primary assumption of risk is not an affirmative defense. It is an alternative expression for the proposition that defendant was not negligent, i.e ., either owed no duty or did not breach the duty owed. Id . at 131. It is based on the concept that a plaintiff may not complain of risks that inhere in a situation despite proper discharge of duty by the defendant. See Parsons v. National Dairy Cattle Congress, 277 N.W.2d 620, 622 (Iowa 1979). Primary assumption of risk is merely a label for denying that a duty existed or that a duty was breached. Id. Whether the court's instruction was correct is not an issue. The instruction, whether correct or not, was obviously an instruction on assumption of risk in its secondary meaning because it asks the jury to find whether plaintiff acted unreasonably in assuming a particular risk. See Rosenau, 199 N.W.2d at 131. Thus, pursuant to holding in Rosenau, the defense was unavailable to defendants on plaintiff's negligence claims. Id. at 133. This is true despite our adoption of comparative negligence. See Campbell v. Van Roekel, 347 N.W.2d 406, 410 (Iowa 1984). We thus find that plaintiff was not barred from recovery on his negligence claims by the jury's finding of assumption of risk on the strict liability claims.