Opinion ID: 3134433
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Circuit Court Erroneously Responded to a Question From the Jury During Deliberations

Text: At trial, the circuit court instructed the jury in part that: “To sustain the charge of armed robbery, the State must prove the following propositions: That the defendant, or one for whose conduct he is legally responsible, knowingly took property from the person or presence of William Chaney; and That the defendant, or one for whose conduct he is legally responsible, did so by the use of force or by threatening imminent use of force; and That the defendant, or one for whose conduct he is legally responsible, carried on or about his person a dangerous weapon or was otherwise armed with a dangerous weapon at the time of the taking.” The court further instructed the jury that: “To sustain the charge of first degree murder, the State must prove the following propositions: That the defendant, or one for whose conduct he is legally responsible, performed the acts which caused the death of Timothy Simenson; and That when the defendant or one for whose conduct he is legally responsible, did so, he intended to kill or do great bodily harm to Timothy Simenson; or he knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to Timothy Simenson; or he was committing the offense of Armed Robbery.” The court also tendered an instruction explaining the theory of accountability: “A person is legally responsible for the conduct of another person when, either before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of an offense, he knowingly solicits, aids, abets, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid the other person in the planning or commission of an offense.” Following the commencement of jury deliberations, the court received the following note from the jury foreman: “Judge please answer. Please define the law as to when an armed robbery ends.” Relying on People v. Hickman , 59 Ill. 2d 89 (1974), and over the objection of defense counsel, the court returned the following written response to the jury: “The period of time an activity [ sic ] is involved in escaping to a place of safety are [ sic ] part of the commission of a crime. Please utilize this information and your collective memory of the evidence as well as your other instructions and continue deliberating.” Defendant insists that the circuit court's response to the jury's question amounted to reversible error. The judge's answer mischaracterized the elements of armed robbery, defendant maintains. By informing the jury that the act of “escaping  [is] part of the commission of the crime,” the circuit court added an element to the armed robbery instruction and dictated a verdict against defendant on the armed robbery and felony murder charges. Under certain circumstances, whether a trial court responds to a jury inquiry concerning instructions lies within the discretion of the court. People v. Reid , 136 Ill. 2d 27, 39 (1990). Where “[the jury] has posed an explicit question or requested clarification on a point of law arising from facts about which there is doubt or confusion,” the court must answer the question. People v. Childs , 159 Ill. 2d 217, 229 (1994); Reid , 136 Ill. 2d at 39. “When a jury makes explicit its difficulties, the court should resolve them with specificity and accuracy.” Childs , 159 Ill. 2d at 229. At bar, the circuit court met its duty to respond to the question, but failed in its obligation to do so accurately. In People v. Dennis , 181 Ill. 2d 87, 105-06 (1998), this court recently explained that the “felony-murder escape” rule, stated in Hickman , and repeated by the circuit court in this case to the jury, cannot be applied to defendants charged with crimes pursuant to a theory of accountability. In Dennis , the State charged the defendant with armed robbery pursuant to an accountability theory. During deliberations, the jury sent two notes to the trial judge. The first question asked, “ `When is the commission of the offense complete?' ” Dennis , 181 Ill. 2d at 92. As the court and counsel discussed possible responses to the question, a second written question was sent from the jury room, “ `When is the commission of the crime over?' ” Dennis , 181 Ill. 2d at 92. The trial judge in Dennis , like the judge in this case, relied on Hickman in formulating his response, “ `[Y]ou may consider the period of time and the activities involved in escaping to a place of safety.' ” Dennis , 181 Ill. 2d at 92. The jury returned a guilty verdict. This court reversed Dennis' armed robbery conviction, in part because the trial judge's answer to the jury's questions constituted reversible error. The Dennis court held that, by the plain terms of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/5–2(c) (West 1996)), accountability for another's crimes attaches only before or during the commission of the crime. Dennis , 181 Ill. 2d at 101. Once the elements of the crime are fulfilled, no guilt by accountability may occur. Dennis , 181 Ill. 2d at 101. Applying this rule to the facts before it, the Dennis court held that a defendant may be held accountable for the commission of an armed robbery if, “either before or during the commission of the offense , he aided or abetted [the perpetrator of the armed robbery] in `conduct which is an element of [the] offense.' ” (Emphasis added.) Dennis , 181 Ill. 2d at 101. Continuing, the Dennis court reiterated the elements of armed robbery in Illinois: “the taking of property `from the person or presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force' while `armed with a dangerous weapon.' ” Dennis , 181 Ill. 2d at 101, quoting 720 ILCS 5/18–1, 18–2(a) (West 1994). The offense of robbery is complete when force or threat of force causes the victim to part with possession or custody of property against his will. Dennis , 181 Ill. 2d at 102. The armed robbery extends into an escape from the crime only if force is used to effectuate the escape. Dennis , 181 Ill. 2d at 103. When force and taking, the essential elements animating the offense, have ended, so has the crime of armed robbery. Dennis , 181 Ill. 2d at 103. Dennis acknowledged those authorities holding that, when a murder occurs during the course of an escape from a robbery, the escape is within the operation of the felony-murder rule. Dennis , 181 Ill. 2d at 104. Nonetheless, in light of the different purposes underpinning the theories of felony murder and accountability, the Dennis court declined to extend the felony murder escape rule to prosecutions grounded in an accountability theory of liability. Dennis , 181 Ill. 2d at 105. Felony murder depends solely on a cause and effect relationship between the crime committed and the resulting murder to impose liability. Dennis , 181 Ill. 2d at 105. The object of the felony murder statute is to limit the violence that attends the commission of felonies, so that anyone engaging in that violence will be automatically subject to a murder prosecution, should a murder occur during the commission of a felony. Dennis , 181 Ill. 2d at 105. Whether the perpetrator intended to murder the victim during the course of a felony is irrelevant. Dennis , 181 Ill. 2d at 105. In contrast, accountability depends entirely on the intent of the perpetrator for its viability. Dennis , 181 Ill. 2d at 105. Unless the accomplice intends to aid the commission of a crime, no guilt will attach. Dennis , 181 Ill. 2d at 105. In summation, this court held: “The felony-murder escape rule contemplates neither knowledge nor intent. Thus, the rule is irreconcilable with our accountability statute and we decline to apply it in that context.” Dennis , 181 Ill. 2d at 105-06. Under this analysis, the Dennis court ruled, the trial court's response to the jury's queries regarding the completion of armed robbery was “erroneous.” Dennis , 181 Ill. 2d at 107. The felony- murder escape rule is “not applicable for accountability purposes,” and escape is not an element of armed robbery for which the defendant could be held accountable. Dennis , 181 Ill. 2d at 107. Moreover, this court found in Dennis that the circuit court's “instruction” injecting the felony-murder escape rule into the jury deliberations could not be dismissed as merely harmless error. Dennis , 181 Ill. 2d at 107. Error arising from the tendering of jury instructions is deemed harmless only if the submission of proper instructions to the jury would not have yielded a different result. Dennis , 181 Ill. 2d at 107; see also People v. Johnson , 146 Ill. 2d 109, 137 (1991); People v. Fierer , 124 Ill. 2d 176, 187 (1988). The State cited evidence in Dennis which it believed demonstrated the defendant's accountability before and during the commission of the robbery. However, this court concluded that the jury's question to the judge asking when a robbery ends showed that the jury found such evidence unconvincing. Dennis , 181 Ill. 2d at 108. Further, the court found “equally unavailing” evidence that the defendant was at the crime scene, that he failed to report the crime, and that his exculpatory testimony regarding the crime might have been incredible. Dennis , 181 Ill. 2d at 108. Presence at the commission of the crime, even when joined with flight from the crime or knowledge of its commission, is not sufficient to establish accountability. Dennis , 181 Ill. 2d at 108. The court observed as well that the defendant's testimony that he knew nothing of the robbery until after the crime ended was uncontradicted, so that both the State's and the defendant's versions of the crime could appear equally plausible to the jury. Dennis , 181 Ill. 2d at 109. Finally, and most importantly, the trial court's direction to “ `consider the period of time and activities involved in escaping to a place of safety' ” clearly told the jury to consider escape as an element of the crime, so that, “[b]ut for the erroneous instruction,  the result at trial might have been different.” Dennis , 181 Ill. 2d at 109. Even in the absence of exculpatory testimony from defendant in the instant appeal, we conclude that Dennis compels a reversal of defendant's conviction for armed robbery. First, the State introduced no proof of any intent by defendant to further the robbery of Chaney. The State's case that defendant aided and abetted Williams before or during the armed robbery rested on circumstantial evidence that showed, at best, only defendant's presence at and flight from the Arbor Club apartment complex. While this court also acknowledges the short time frame in which the robbery and murder occurred, we conclude, again, that the sequence of events establishes no more than defendant's presence with Williams at the Arbor Club complex and at the intersection of Theodore and Burry. As stated in Dennis , presence at the crime scene, even when coupled with flight, cannot alone establish accountability. Second, the circuit court in this case directed the jury to consider escape from the crime scene as an element of armed robbery in even more explicit terms than the lower court in Dennis. Whereas the trial court in Dennis told the jury to “ `consider  activities involved in escaping to a place of safety' ” ( Dennis , 181 Ill. 2d at 92), the court in the case sub judice ordered the jury to consider escape as “part of the commission of the crime.” Like the jury in Dennis , the fact of the jury's question to the judge here demonstrated that the jury was unconvinced that defendant abetted Williams before the elements of armed robbery had been fulfilled by Williams. The possibility that the jury hinged its guilty verdict on defendant's participation in the escape from the crime is, in our view, equally as likely as a verdict based on defendant's assumed acts before Williams left Arbor Club. In sum, we cannot say that the verdict would have been the same even if the additional instruction had not been supplied by the court. See Dennis , 181 Ill. 2d at 109 (“On this record, we do not find evidence in support of defendant's armed robbery conviction so clear and convincing as to render the erroneous instruction harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); Childs , 159 Ill. 2d at 234. Accordingly, we reverse defendant’s conviction for armed robbery. By definition, a felony murder is a murder that occurs during the commission of certain felonies, including armed robbery. 720 ILCS 5/9–1(a)(3) (West 1996). Accountability for felony murder, in turn, exists only if defendant may be deemed legally responsible for the felony that accompanies the murder. See People v. Hicks , 181 Ill. 2d 541, 547 (1998) (accountability in and of itself is not a crime, but is a mechanism through which a criminal conviction may be obtained; a charge based on accountability necessarily flows from the principal crime at issue); People v. Stanciel , 153 Ill. 2d 218, 234 (1992) (“Accountability, tied as it is to the crime charged, must comport with the requirements of that crime”). Because defendant is not accountable for the armed robbery of Chaney, he may not be held accountable for any murder occurring during the robbery. We therefore also reverse defendant’s felony- murder conviction.