Opinion ID: 25782
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Juror problems

Text: 1. Ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to strike a potential juror. Burns argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to exercise a peremptory challenge against juror Tennyson. This argument is based on Tennyson’s statement during voir dire that his religious beliefs lead him to the conclusion that “if a person take a life then his life should be took [sic].” Burns argues that his 7 lawyer should have stricken Tennyson from the jury because he held an intractable belief that death is the only punishment he would consider. This argument fails. Burns failed to object to the magistrate judge’s findings (adopted by the district court) rejecting this ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The district court therefore reviewed Burns’ claim only for plain error and held that the magistrate judge’s finding (that trial counsel’s failure to excuse Tennyson was not ineffective assistance of counsel) was not debatable among jurists of reason. This conclusion is sound because the record shows that although Tennyson did state that he believed in a “life for a life,” he expressed that belief only upon questioning by the prosecutor regarding his prior written statement that he could never, under any circumstances, return a verdict which assessed the death penalty. Tennyson also indicated that he would render a decision according to the law and the evidence and would answer “no” to the special assessment questions (if he thought that was the proper answer) even if that would result in a sentence contrary to his religious teachings. Additionally, Tennyson made several statements favorable to the defendant, including that he would require the State to produce at least two witnesses against the accused and that he interpreted “beyond a reasonable doubt” to mean “where you don’t have any doubt whatsoever.” Tennyson’s trial counsel testified at the state habeas proceeding that, in addition to the above statements, he did 8 not strike Tennyson because he was involved in a missionary program. One of Burns’ punishment witnesses in the sentencing phase was involved in similar work, and Burns’ trial counsel felt that Tennyson might be able to identify with that witness. When we look at all of Tennyson’s voir dire testimony-- particularly in light of counsel’s testimony at the habeas hearing- -it is clear that Burns’ trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to strike Tennyson. Reasonable jurists would not argue otherwise. 2. Juror bias as a matter of law Burns next argues that the acceptance of juror Tennyson resulted in an unfair trial, since he describes Tennyson as holding an intractable belief that the death penalty is the only punishment he would consider. This claim fails for two reasons. First, trial counsel made no objection to Tennyson as a juror. As the magistrate judge correctly observed, “absent a contemporaneous objection, federal habeas corpus review of claims about the composition of jury panels is barred.” See Huffman v. Wainwright, 651 F.2d 347, 349 (5th Cir. 1981). Second, the evidence indicates that Tennyson was not, in fact, biased, as discussed above. Rather, Tennyson was a person who believed that the death penalty is appropriate in murder cases, but would follow the law and evidence, and consider mitigating evidence in deciding whether to assess that punishment. 9 3. Improper (for cause) dismissal of a member of the venire Relying on Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521-22, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 1776-77 (1968), Burns next argues that prospective juror McKay was improperly excluded from service because of her views opposing the death penalty. Although Ms. McKay did state that she was “closer to being totally against the death penalty,” the record shows that she was stricken for general unsuitability rather than for anti-death penalty sentiments. The prosecutor asked McKay whether she would be able to answer the three special assessment questions truthfully and she responded that she had not read the questions. After several confused responses, the trial court gave petitioner’s counsel an opportunity to rehabilitate McKay by asking, “Would you refuse to find a person guilty even if the evidence overwhelmingly showed him to be guilty?” McKay responded, “I don’t know ahead of time.” When asked about the three special punishment issues again, McKay responded again that she had not read them. The trial court then gave McKay an opportunity to read the questions. After an extended period of time, the trial judge made the following comments: Sir, have the record reflect this venire man is over distraught just from having to answer the question or read the questions. She is obviously not capable of making a decision. The court excuses her upon challenge from the State. ... Mr. Court Reporter, you will have in your notes the amount of -- inordinate time this venire man took just sitting [here] attempting to decide how she was going to answer the question. The record shall reflect when the 10 court asked her to read the three questions she became distraught and began to cry and shake her head. Obviously not a fit person for jury service, obviously not. A federal habeas court gives substantial deference to the trial judge’s decisions on juror bias and suitability.13 The petitioner has presented no facts or persuasive legal authority calling into question the trial judge’s decision to exclude juror McKay.