Opinion ID: 352543
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: effect of statutory wind-up provision

Text: 30 Since we find jurisdiction in the District Court to review actions of the Micronesian Claims Commission allegedly in contravention of either the Constitution or plain statutory imperatives, we must remand this case to afford a further opportunity to exercise that jurisdiction. To ease the District Court's considerable task on remand, we now proceed to address several issues that are bound to arise therein. In this part of our opinion we will consider the effect of the three-year windup provision 142 on further prosecution of Ralpho's claim. In Part IV we will set forth the legal parameters within which Ralpho's due process contention must be assessed. 31 Section 2019b(e) of the Micronesian Claims Act provides that the Commission shall wind up its affairs as expeditiously as possible, and in any event not later than three years after the expiration of the time for filing claims under this Act. 143 That filing deadline was October 15, 1973, 144 and so the windup date has passed during the pendency of this litigation. The Commission now insists that this statutory specification is mandatory rather than directory, and that it has divested the Commission of any legal power even to redress its own malfeasance. 145 It perceives the statute as having, like Lachesis, measured out the duration of its obligations of procedural fairness and, inflexible as Atropos, cut it off at October 15, 1976. 32 This position unduly exalts the importance of the windup provision in derogation of the Act's overriding goals. Most congressional mentions of Section 2019b(e) itself stemmed from fear that the bureaucracy created by the Act might unduly prolong its life at public expense. 146 These apprehensions elicited assurances from supporters of the Act that Section 2019b(e) protected against such waste. 147 This solicitude for the federal fisc, however, does not eclipse the purpose of the Act swift justice for long-standing Micronesian claims. Nor should it obscure the fundamental motivations for the congressional action fulfillment of international commitments and elimination of disgruntlement in the Trust Territory. 148 Nowhere have we encountered the slightest indication that justice was to be sacrificed on the altar of speed. Had the Commission's activities been concluded without incident, no conflict between promptitude and justice would have arisen. But as things are, we seriously doubt that the will of Congress would be served by letting haste limit and even obliterate fairness. 33 In determining the effect of the windup provision, we must cleave as nearly as we can to the congressional design. 149 That design, as evidenced by the mischief to be remedied as well as contemporaneous discussion, 150 convinces us that justice to the Micronesians is not to be renounced simply to avoid even a brief additional lease on life for the Commission. Statutes that, for guidance of a governmental official's discharge of duties, propose to secure order, system, and dispatch in proceedings are usually construed as directory, whether or not worded in the imperative, 151 especially when the alternative is harshness or absurdity. 152 Though phrased in the language of command, 153 the windup provision would, if construed as mandatory, allow the Commission to walk away from what Ralpho asserts was unconstitutionally shoddy treatment. We prefer a construction that bestows the benefits of the Act on those for whom it was chiefly intended, 154 and hold that, in the event the District Court should find merit in Ralpho's allegations, it must direct the Commission to give such relief as is appropriate. 155