Opinion ID: 2570544
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excusal of Jurors M.F. and C.T. for Cause

Text: Defendant next contends the trial court violated his constitutional right to an impartial jury as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, by sustaining the prosecutor's challenges for cause to Prospective Jurors M.F. and C.T. Unlike the challenge to the excusal of Prospective Juror M.M., the trial court excused M.F. and C.T. based solely on their written responses in their juror questionnaires, with no oral, inperson examination. Although defendant contends excusing these jurors without personally examining them was improper, as we explain, the trial court did not err. [2]
As noted above, all prospective jurors were asked to complete a written questionnaire in which several questions addressed the death penalty. Preceding these questions was a long prefatory statement setting forth the basic procedure applicable to capital cases. [3] The questions then began; 40. Briefly describe your general feelings about the death penalty. ________ a. On a scale of 1-10, with 10 being strongly in favor of the death penalty, 5 having no opinion, and 1 being strongly against the death penalty, how would you rate yourself? strongly against no opinion strongly in favor  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 b. Is there a particular reason why you feel as you do about the death penalty? ___ Yes ___ No If yes, please explain: ______ c. If you are against the death penalty, would your opinion make it difficult for you to vote for the death penalty in this case, regardless of what the evidence was? ___ Yes ___ No Please explain: _____ d. If you are in favor of the death penalty, would your opinion make it difficult for you to vote for life without the possibility of parole regardless of what the evidence was? ___ Yes ___ No Please explain: _____ e. In what ways, if any, have your views about the death penalty changed over time? _____ 41. Do you have any religious affiliations that take a stance on the death penalty? ___ Yes ___ No If yes, please explain: _____ (Original underscoring.) Question 42 is critical to our holding in this case because the trial court used it as the basis for excusing both Prospective Jurors M.F. and C.T. That question provided: It is important that you have the ability to approach this case with an open mind and a willingness to fairly consider whatever evidence is presented as opposed to having such strongly held opinions that you would be unable to fairly consider all the evidence presented during the possible penalty phase. [¶] There are no circumstances under which a jury is instructed by the court that they must return a verdict of death. No matter what the evidence shows, the jury is always given the option in a penalty phase of choosing life without the possibility of parole. Assuming a defendant was convicted of a special circumstances murder, would you: ___ a. No matter what the evidence was, ALWAYS vote for the death penalty. ___ b. No matter what the evidence was, ALWAYS vote for life without possibility of parole. ___ c. I would consider all the evidence and the jury instructions as provided by the court and impose the penalty I personally feel is appropriate. (Italics added, original underscoring and capitalization.) The trial court explained its methodology, which was focused on question 42. After culling the jury pool for hardship excusals, the remaining jurors would be asked to complete the questionnaire. If a juror reported that he or she would automatically vote for death or automatically vote for life at that point, the parties would be asked to stipulate to the juror's excusal. According to the trial court: My view, if they checked question 42-a or 42-b, they're gone ... [¶] [w]ithout any need for follow-up. There's not much distinction between [42]-a and [42]-b, and that's why we're excusing people at both ends of the spectrum. Following receipt of the completed questionnaires, the trial court discussed them with the attorneys for defendant and codefendant Phillips as well as with the prosecution. The attorneys for all sides stipulated to the excusal for cause of certain prospective jurors based solely on their written answers to these questions, with no oral voir dire. For example, Prospective Jurors A.C. and D.S., who both rated themselves a 10 in question 40-a (i.e., strongly in favor of the death penalty) and stated they would always vote for the death penalty in question 42-a, were excused with the consent of both sides. Similarly, Prospective Jurors D.K. and F.M., who both rated themselves a one (i.e., strongly against the death penalty) and stated they would always vote for life imprisonment, were excused by stipulation. Prospective Juror M.F. answered question 40 by saying: I am a religious person and do not feel that two wrongs make a right. However, I am unsure about the death penalty in itself. I really don't know. She rated herself a four on the scale of one to 10, meaning she was slightly against the death penalty. In explanatory comments, she wrote: I could not see myself punishing or participating in the punishment dealing w/the death penalty, and It [the death penalty] is not the answer to our problems. In answering question 42, however, she checked b, that is, that [n]o matter what the evidence was, [she would] ALWAYS vote for life without possibility of parole. Discussing this juror, the trial court noted: She rated herself a four, but she says no matter what the evidence was she'd always vote for life without possibility of parole. She couldn't see herself punishing or participating in the punishment dealing with the death penalty. The media have made her very unsure, however, once she puts herself in the shoes of the victim's family. She has a religious stance. It's not the answer to our problem, the death penalty is not. She's a religious person. She doesn't feel two wrongs make a right. She's unsure about the death penalty. She really doesn't know. I think she's substantially impaired [within the meaning of Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412]. Defense counsel requested that the trial court conduct a followup oral examination of M.F., explaining that he was not willing to stipulate [to her excusal]. The court declined to examine the juror, explaining that I'm going to make a finding if you're not willing to stipulate right now. Prospective Juror C.T. answered question 40 by saying: I believe that if the defendant gets to the penalty phase I would probably look at the life without possibility of parole [option], more than the death penalty. That is because of my religious background. She rated herself a four on the scale of one to 10, meaning she was slightly against the death penalty. Like Prospective Juror M.F., C.T. answered question 42 by checking option b, proclaiming she would always vote for life. The trial court noted that I think her views meet the substantial impairment test. She said she'd never impose the death penalty, because she's a Christian, although she's a four on the scale. I think she meets the substantial impairment test. Defense counsel requested that the court conduct a followup examination of the juror, whereupon the prosecutor reminded the court that at that point, every prospective juror who had checked option 42-b and indicated they would always choose life imprisonment had been excluded. The court agreed and excused C.T. based solely on her written answers in the questionnaire.
(3) We addressed the propriety of excusing prospective jurors during a capital case voir dire, based solely on their written responses in a juror questionnaire, in People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271] ( Stewart ). In that case, the trial court excused for cause five prospective jurors, finding their views as expressed in the questionnaire were clearly and unambiguously against the death penalty. ( Id. at pp. 444-445.) Setting forth the applicable procedures, we explained that [b]efore granting a challenge for cause concerning a prospective juror, over the objection of another party, a trial court must have sufficient information regarding the prospective juror's state of mind to permit a reliable determination as to whether the juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair' the performance of his or her duties (as defined by the court's instructions and the juror's oath).... ( Id. at p. 445.) The prosecution, as the moving party, [bears] the burden of demonstrating to the trial court that this standard was satisfied as to each of the challenged jurors. ( Ibid. ; see Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 423.) (4) We explained in Stewart that the mere fact a prospective juror, in a written questionnaire, checked a box or otherwise expressed a personal opposition to the death penalty does not permit the court to automatically disqualify him or her from the jury. Decisions of the United States Supreme Court and of this court make it clear that a prospective juror's personal conscientious objection to the death penalty is not a sufficient basis for excluding that person from jury service in a capital case under [ Wainwright v.] Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412. In Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 176 [90 L.Ed.2d 137, 106 S.Ct. 1758] ..., the high court observed that `not all those who oppose the death penalty are subject to removal for cause in capital cases; those who firmly believe that the death penalty is unjust may nevertheless serve as jurors in capital cases so long as they clearly state that they are willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law.' Similarly, in People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 699 [276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278] ..., we observed: `Neither Witherspoon [v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770]] nor [ Wainwright v.] Witt , ... nor any of our cases, requires that jurors be automatically excused if they merely express personal opposition to the death penalty. The real question is whether the juror's attitude will `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' ( Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424, fn. omitted.) A prospective juror personally opposed to the death penalty may nonetheless be capable of following his oath and the law. A juror whose personal opposition toward the death penalty may predispose him to assign greater than average weight to the mitigating factors presented at the penalty phase may not be excluded, unless that predilection would actually preclude him from engaging in the weighing process and returning a capital verdict. ' (Italics added.) ( Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 446.) (5) The critical flaw in Stewart was the trial court's reliance on that part of the questionnaire that asked jurors whether they held views that would `prevent or make it very difficult' for the prospective juror `[t]o ever vote to impose the death penalty.' ( Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 442-443.) We explained: In light of the gravity of [the death penalty], for many members of society their personal and conscientious views concerning the death penalty would make it `very difficult' ever to vote to impose the death penalty. As explained below, however, a prospective juror who simply would find it `very difficult' ever to impose the death penalty, is entitled indeed, duty boundto sit on a capital jury, unless his or her personal views actually would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his or her duties as a juror. ( Id. at p. 446.) Although we concluded in Stewart that the trial court erred by excusing five prospective jurors for cause based solely on the combination of their checked answers and written comments in the questionnaire, we stopped short of recognizing a bright-line rule, though we hinted that one might be justifiable. [W]e need not and do not hold that a trial court never may properly grant a motion for excusal for cause over defense objection based solely upon a prospective juror's checked answers and written responses contained in a juror questionnaire. We are, however, unaware of any authority upholding such a practice. ( Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 449-450, fn. omitted.) More recently, however, we modulated any such suggestion. Addressing the issue in People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076] ( Avila ), we opined: The question left undecided in Stewart is squarely presented here, and we now hold that a prospective juror in a capital case may be discharged for cause based solely on his or her answers to the written questionnaire if it is clear from the answers that he or she is unwilling to temporarily set aside his or her own beliefs and follow the law.  ( Id. at p. 531, italics added.) In Avila, the trial court excused four jurors without orally questioning them, based solely on their written answers to the jury questionnaire. We found no error and distinguished Stewart on the ground that the jury questionnaire in Stewart included a material flaw not present in the questionnaire used in Avila. ( Avila, at p. 530.) Thus, we explained that whereas the questionnaire in Stewart asked whether a juror's conscientious opinion or belief about the death penalty ... `would prevent or make it very difficult ' ( Avila, at p. 530) for a juror to vote to convict of first degree murder, sustain a special circumstance or impose the death penalty, the questionnaire in Avila instead asked whether a juror would automatically so vote ( id. at p. 528, fn. 23, underscoring omitted). [B]ecause mere difficulty in imposing the death penalty does not, per se, prevent or substantially impair the performance of a juror's duties ( id. at p. 530), the decision in Stewart  that the trial court erred by excusing prospective jurors based solely on their written questionnaire answerswas correct. But nothing in Stewart indicates that an excusal without oral voir dire is improper where the prospective juror's answers to a jury questionnaire leave no doubt that his or her views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his or her duties in accordance with the court's instructions and the juror's oath. ( Avila, at p. 531, italics added.) From this discussion, the rule emerges that reliance on written responses alone to excuse prospective jurors for cause is permissible if, from those responses, it is clear (and leave[s] no doubt) that a prospective juror's views about the death penalty would satisfy the Witt standard ( Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412) and that the juror is not willing or able to set aside his or her personal views and follow the law. Applying this rule here, we conclude the trial court did not err when it excused Prospective Jurors M.F. and C.T for cause. Although the questionnaire used in this case did not, as in Avila, ask whether a prospective juror would automatically vote for either life or death irrespective of the evidence ( Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 528, fn. 23), questions 42-a and 42-b in this case asked jurors whether, [n]o matter what the evidence was, would they ALWAYS vote for the death penalty or for life without possibility of parole. This phraseology is the equivalent of that which we approved in Avila ; the capitalization and underscoring of the word always must have made clear to all prospective jurors that the question sought to determine if the juror would automatically vote one way or the other irrespective of the evidence. This reading of questions 42-a and 42-b is consistent with the import of the questionnaire as a whole. The prefatory statement at the beginning of the section of the questionnaire concerning the death penalty (see ante, pp. 781-782, fn. 3) gave prospective jurors the basic outline of the penalty phase procedures involved, including the need for a fair assessment and weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. This written outline reinforced the trial court's oral statement, delivered before the jurors were given the questionnaires, which provided similar background information. For example, the court informed the prospective jurors that [f]actors in mitigation include good things about the defendant for the purpose of showing that the appropriate sentence in the case is life without possibility of parole. And within those guidelines, after a consideration and weighing of all the factors, you have the discretion as to what penalty to impose.  (Italics added.) Then, at the beginning of question 42, the prospective jurors were informed that [t]here are no circumstances under which a jury is instructed by the court that they must return a verdict of death. No matter what the evidence shows, the jury is always given the option in a penalty phase of choosing life without the possibility of parole. This passage further reinforced the admonition that a juror at the penalty phase need not automatically vote one way or the other. Absent some evidence Prospective Jurors M.F. or C.T. did not read these statements or misunderstood them, they must have been aware when they checked 42-b (i.e., that [n]o matter what the evidence was, [they would] ALWAYS vote for life without possibility of parole) they would have the option to vote for either life or death in their discretion. This is especially true becauseby checking 42-bM.F. and C.T necessarily chose not to check 42-c: I would consider all the evidence and the jury instructions as provided by the court and impose the penalty I personally feel is appropriate. In short, a fair reading of the questionnaire demonstrates that M.F. and C.T. must have known the scope and nature of the discretion they would wield in the penalty phase, but nonetheless checked 42-b, indicating that they would always vote for life over death irrespective of the facts and circumstances. [4] Although the jury questionnaire used in this case, as in Stewart, admittedly asked jurors whether their opinion about the death penalty would ... make it difficult for you to vote for the death penalty in this case (italics added), the similarity with Stewart ends there, for the trial court did not excuse Prospective Jurors M.F. and C.T. on that basis. Instead, the court was clear that if any prospective juror checked 42-a or 42-b, the court would ask the parties to stipulate to the juror's excusal because, in the trial court's opinion, such a response indicated the juror would automatically vote for death or automatically vote for life at that point. As the trial court explained: My view, if they checked question 42-a or 42-b, they're gone ... [¶] [w]ithout any need for follow-up. There's not much distinction between [42]-a and [42]-b, and that's why we're excusing people at both ends of the spectrum. Thus, unlike in Stewart, use of the make it difficult language here does not require reversal. [5] Of course, a face-to-face assessment of the sincerity and understanding of a prospective juror may, under particular circumstances, be preferable, and trial courts retain discretion to examine jurors in person. ( People v. Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 965 [If the trial court remained uncertain as to whether [a prospective juror's] views concerning the death penalty would impair his ability to follow the law or to otherwise perform his duties as a juror, the court was free ... to follow up with additional questions.].) Even a person with a strongly held view in favor of, or against, the death penalty could possibly set aside those views and decide a case according to the law. ( Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 531; Lockhart v. McCree, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 176.) Moreover, a trial court may have reason to suspect a prospective juror is a poor reader or may simply have misunderstood the questionnaire. Although reading the questionnaire in this case as a whole convinces us the trial court did not err in concluding that prospective jurors who checked option 42-b would not set aside their personal feelings about the death penalty regardless of the evidence that might be presented at the penalty phase, this important point could be clarified in future cases simply by including a question asking this point directly in the context of questions concerning attitudes towards the death penalty. For example, question 91 in the questionnaire used in Avila asked: `Do you honestly think that you could set aside your personal feelings and follow the law as the Court explains it to you, even if you had strong feelings to the contrary?' ( Avila, at p. 528, fn. 23.) We appreciate that trial courts may desire to streamline the death qualification voir dire process in capital cases, for such jury selection procedures can be a long and tedious business. Prudent use of written jury questionnaires can be a valuable addition to the process, serving as a screening tool during death qualifications of jurors. We need not emphasize, however, that those accused of capital crimes have an important interest at stake, and because their right to a fair and impartial jury is a vital constitutional concern, trial courts should err on the side of caution when questionable or marginal cases arise. But because the jury questionnaire used here, and especially questions 42-a, 42-b and 42-c, made it sufficiently clear that Prospective Jurors M.F. and C.T., by checking 42-b, met the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, we conclude the trial court did not err by excluding them for cause without personally examining them.