Opinion ID: 661460
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Karibian's Quid Pro Quo Claim

Text: 17 Under the Guidelines established by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), quid pro quo harassment occurs when submission to or rejection of [unwelcome sexual] conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual. 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1604.11(a)(2) (1993). See also Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 577 (2d Cir.1989). Accordingly, to establish a prima facie case of quid pro quo harassment, a plaintiff must present evidence that she was subject to unwelcome sexual conduct, and that her reaction to that conduct was then used as the basis for decisions affecting the compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of her employment. See Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir.1988); Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 805 F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir.1986); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11th Cir.1982). 18 Because the quid pro quo harasser, by definition, wields the employer's authority to alter the terms and conditions of employment--either actually or apparently--the law imposes strict liability on the employer for quid pro quo harassment. See Kotcher, 957 F.2d at 62 (The supervisor is deemed to act on behalf of the employer when making decisions that affect the economic status of the employee.); Carrero, 890 F.2d at 579 ([T]he harassing employee acts as and for the company, holding out the employer's benefits as an inducement to the employee for sexual favors.). 19 Karibian argues that the district court erred when it required her to present evidence of actual, rather than threatened, economic loss in order to state a valid claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment. We agree. There is nothing in the language of Title VII or the EEOC Guidelines to support such a requirement. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64, 106 S.Ct. at 2404 ([T]he language of Title VII is not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination.). 20 True, in the typical quid pro quo case, the employee who refuses to submit to her supervisor's advances can expect to suffer some job-related reprisal. See, e.g., Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 142 (2d Cir.1993). Accordingly, in such refusal cases, evidence of some job-related penalty will often be available to prove quid pro quo harassment. But that is not to say that such evidence is always essential to the claim. In the nature of things, evidence of economic harm will not be available to support the claim of the employee who submits to the supervisor's demands. Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 913; see, e.g., Showalter v. Allison Reed Group, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 1205, 1212 (D.R.I.1991). The supervisor's conduct is equally unlawful under Title VII whether the employee submits or not. Under the district court's rationale, only the employee who successfully resisted the threat of sexual blackmail could state a quid pro quo claim. We do not read Title VII to punish the victims of sexual harassment who surrender to unwelcome sexual encounters. Such a rule would only encourage harassers to increase their persistence. 21 The relevant inquiry in a quid pro quo case is whether the supervisor has linked tangible job benefits to the acceptance or rejection of sexual advances. It is enough to show that the supervisor used the employee's acceptance or rejection of his advances as the basis for a decision affecting the compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of the employee's job. See, e.g., Showalter, 767 F.Supp. at 1212 (The obvious tangible job benefit the plaintiffs received for succumbing to the harassment was the retention of their employment.). In this case, Karibian stated that her work assignments, raises and promotions depended on her continued responsiveness to Urban's sexual demands. In addition, Karibian claimed that Urban implicitly threatened to fire her and to damage her career if she did not comply. If true, Urban's conduct would constitute quid pro quo harassment because he made and threatened to make decisions affecting the terms and conditions of Karibian's employment based upon her submission to his sexual advances. 22 In support of an actual economic loss requirement, Columbia relies on isolated language from the Kotcher and Carrero cases, supra, decided by this Court. In Kotcher, we broadly stated that under a quid pro quo theory the plaintiff-employee must establish that she was denied an economic benefit either because of gender or because a sexual advance was made by a supervisor and rejected by her. 957 F.2d at 62 (emphasis added). Kotcher, however, was a hostile work environment case, not a quid pro quo case; hence, the quoted language is, at best, dictum. 23 Carrero was a quid pro quo case, and there we did say: The gravamen of a quid pro quo claim is that a tangible job benefit or privilege is conditioned on an employee's submission to sexual blackmail and that adverse consequences follow from the employee's refusal. 890 F.2d at 579 (emphasis added). Carrero, however, was a refusal case, not a submission case; accordingly, as one might expect, the job-related consequences of Carrero's refusal were both obvious and adverse. Consistent with the prima facie case outlined above, Carrero satisfied Title VII because her supervisor made decisions affecting her employment based on her response to his sexual advances. We read Carrero 's reference to adverse consequences, therefore, as descriptive of the facts before the Court, not as establishing a sine qua non that employment decisions be adverse in order to state a valid claim. Accordingly, there is no inconsistency between Carrero and our conclusion that once an employer conditions any terms of employment upon the employee's submitting to unwelcome sexual advances, a quid pro quo claim is made out, regardless of whether the employee (a) rejects the advances and suffers the consequences, or (b) submits to the advances in order to avoid those consequences. 24 Finally, we believe imposing an actual economic loss requirement in a quid pro quo case where the employee submits to the unwelcome sexual overtures of her supervisor places undue emphasis on the victim's response to the sexual harassment. The focus should be on the prohibited conduct, not the victim's reaction. While the employee's submission to the supervisor's advances is certainly relevant, it bears only on the issue whether the sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether unwelcome sexual advances were unlawful. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68, 106 S.Ct. at 2406 (The correct inquiry is whether respondent by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome....). Ultimately, the question whether Karibian submitted to Urban's advances out of a reasonable fear of some job-related reprisal is properly one for the finder of fact. Because the district court erroneously removed this central question from the factfinder by the grant of summary judgment, we reverse. 25