Opinion ID: 172965
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Product of Coercion

Text: Even if she was not illegally detained, Lambert contends her consent to search was not voluntary because it “was obtained only after the conduct of the police had made it manifest that they could issue orders to her without explanation or justification and search portions of her room and belongings without asking for permission . . . .” (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 27.) She states she “belie[ved] . . . she had no alternative to consent.” (Id.) Lambert did raise this argument before the district court and so we consider it. “Overnight guests . . . of motel rooms possess reasonable expectations of privacy - 10 - in the property on which they are staying.” United States v. Kimoana, 383 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2004). While the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits searches conducted without a warrant, “[o]ne of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.” Id. (quotations omitted). “When the government relies on a defendant’s consent for the validity of a search, the government bears the burden of proving that defendant’s consent was freely and voluntarily given, a determination we make by evaluating the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Sanchez, 89 F.3d 715, 718 (10th Cir. 1996). “We have developed a two-step test for determining the voluntariness of a consent to search: the government must (1) proffer clear and positive testimony that consent was unequivocal and specific and freely and intelligently given and (2) prove that this consent was given without implied or express duress or coercion.” Id. at 719 (quotations omitted). “Whether [Lambert] freely and voluntarily consented to the search of [her possessions] is a question of fact based on the totality of the circumstances, which we review for clear error.” United States v. Rosborough, 366 F.3d 1145, 1149 (10th Cir. 2004). “A finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. The clearly-erroneous standard is significantly deferential.” United States v. Cruz-Mendez, 467 F.3d 1260, 1265 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotations and citation omitted). In determining whether consent was coerced, we consider factors such as: - 11 - the threatening presence of several officers; the brandishing of a weapon by an officer; some physical touching by an officer; use of aggressive language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with an officer’s request is compulsory; prolonged retention of a person’s personal effects . . . ; a request to accompany the officer to the station; interaction in a nonpublic place or a small, enclosed place; and absence of other members of the public. United States v. Guerrero, 472 F.3d 784, 790 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted). Three of these factors suggest Lambert’s consent might have been coerced, but we are not “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” CruzMendez, 467 F.3d at 1265. Lambert was questioned by two officers outside her motel room and there were two officers present in Lambert’s motel room when she consented to the search of her possessions. We have recognized “the presence of two police officers in a home might be intimidating to the point of negating the voluntariness of consent in some situations.” United States v. Davis, 40 F.3d 1069, 1078 (10th Cir. 1994). This is not one of those situations as there is nothing in the record to suggest the presence of multiple police officers was threatening. The officers did not brandish their weapons, did not touch Lambert, did not use aggressive language or an aggressive tone of voice, and did not retain any of Lambert’s personal effects. Moreover, Lambert’s demeanor was pleasant and she did not appear intimidated at any point prior to the discovery of her true identity. See McRae, 81 F.3d at 1537 (concluding defendant’s consent was voluntary, noting he “seemed relaxed throughout the entire encounter”). Also potentially suggestive of coercion is the fact the officers interacted with Lambert in a nonpublic place—her motel room—in the absence of any other members of - 12 - the public. However, the officers did not ask to enter Lambert’s motel room. Instead, they began their questioning of Lambert in public, outside of her motel room. It was Lambert who invited the officers to enter her room. It was also Lambert who told Sergeant Bushman he could “check” to see whether she had something to do with selling the gun and the laptop. (R. Supp. Vol. I at 69.) Bushman did not expressly request Lambert’s consent, which suggests Lambert’s consent was not coerced. See Rosborough, 366 F.3d at 1149 (concluding defendant’s consent to the search of his vehicle was voluntary where, inter alia, the officer did not ask defendant for consent to search; “to the contrary, [the defendant] himself volunteered permission to [the officer] to search his car”). Lambert argues: “The police . . . indicated, both implicitly and explicitly, that they would not leave until [she] provided them with sufficient information to persuade them she was being truthful, making it clear that [she] was not free to terminate the encounter with them.” (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 9.) The government does not contend the officers informed Lambert she had a right not to allow Bushman to search her belongings, but that is immaterial. “The fact that officers do not specifically inform an individual that he or she has the right to refuse to consent to a search does not render that search coercive.” Davis, 40 F.3d at 1078. It would be odd for an officer to inform an individual she does not have to consent to a search when he never asks for her consent in the first place. In any case, it appears Lambert was aware she did not have to allow the officers to search her belongings. After the officers located the firearm, Lambert told the officers they could not look in her ID case and they “left it at that point.” (R. Supp. Vol. I - 13 - at 87-88.) Lambert’s instruction suggests she did not feel unable to revoke or limit her consent. See Rosborough, 366 F.3d at 1149 (the fact defendant “affirmatively asked to terminate the encounter” after a canine alert “undermin[ed] his claim that he felt unable to revoke his consent”). Lambert claims her consent was coerced because the officers’ commanding presence in her motel room stripped her of control and plainly suggested she had no choice but to submit to the officers’ continued questioning and consent to a search of her possessions. Her argument is not without merit. The officers (probably) turned on the lights in her motel room; they denied her request for permission to smoke (in her room); they briefly looked into her open purse without her consent; they thought she was lying and told her so; they searched the bathroom for weapons; they then ordered her to get dressed in the bathroom with the door closed. While we understand how these actions could create a coercive environment, for the most part, the officers appear to have been motivated by legitimate concerns and did not act unreasonably. We understand why two male officers might have been uncomfortable in the presence of a minimally-clothed woman in a darkened motel room, motivating them to turn on the lights and ask Lambert to get dressed. Given the size and layout of the motel room, the bathroom was not an unreasonable place for Lambert to get dressed. Though Lambert might have wanted to keep an eye on the officers while she changed clothes, the officers were reasonably and understandably concerned when she began to undress without closing the door. Officer Stutz thought Lambert might have been creating “some kind of situation.” (R. Supp. Vol. I at 25.) - 14 - We are likewise relatively untroubled by the officers’ search of Lambert’s open purse (by briefly shining a light into it). The officers were responding to a report of a woman attempting to sell a firearm and a laptop. They were thus legitimately concerned Lambert had a weapon and they believed (not unreasonably, as it turns out) she was not answering their questions truthfully. The search of Lambert’s purse was permissible. See Cruz-Mendez, 467 F.3d at 1266 (“[A]n officer’s mere observation of an item left in plain view . . . generally involves no Fourth Amendment search. For a mere observation to be valid, the only requirement is that the officer be lawfully in a position from which he can view the object.”) (quotations and citation omitted). The fact the officers used a flashlight to illuminate the purse does not render the search unlawful. See id. (“[T]he use of [artificial means] to illuminate a darkened area . . . does not constitute a search, and thus triggers no Fourth Amendment protection.”) (quotations omitted). The officers’ search of the bathroom cannot be so easily justified. While it appears to have been motivated by a legitimate concern for officer safety, it was not a protective sweep because it was not conducted incident to Lambert’s arrest. See United States v. Walker, 474 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[A] ‘protective sweep’ of a residence to ensure officer safety may take place only incident to an arrest.”). The officers searched the bathroom before the firearm was discovered and before asking Lambert to enter the bathroom unsupervised. The search of the bathroom appears to have been unlawful, but that is not the question we are called upon to determine. No evidence was discovered in the bathroom search and our review is limited to determining whether Lambert’s consent was coerced. Though the officers may have exceeded the scope of - 15 - their authority in searching the bathroom, we perceive no clear error in the district court’s conclusion that Lambert’s subsequent consent to search her belongings was not coerced. Similarly, the government does not claim the officers had a legitimate basis for denying Lambert’s request to smoke. This is cause for concern as it suggests Lambert felt the need to ask permission for an action she should have been able to take in her own room and felt the need to obey the officers’ directive not to smoke. It is particularly troubling when considered in conjunction with the other assertions of authority made by the officers. But Lambert does not directly challenge the officers’ denial of her right to smoke and, in evaluating whether her consent was coerced, we are to consider the totality of the circumstances. Here, those circumstances include Lambert’s express invitation to Officers Stutz and Carson to enter her motel room and her express invitation to Sergeant Bushman to search her belongings. Those circumstances also include Lambert’s instruction not to search her ID case, an instruction which the officers respected. Our review is highly deferential and, viewing the circumstances as a whole, we perceive no clear error in the district court’s conclusion that Lambert’s consent to search her possessions was voluntary and not coerced. AFFIRMED. Entered by the Court: Terrence L. O’Brien