Opinion ID: 426204
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Harry Merriweather Discharge

Text: 31 The Administrative Law Judge found, and the Board affirmed, that ITT violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by terminating employee Harry Merriweather for an unlawful motive. Section 8(a)(3) provides that [i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment ... to discourage membership in any labor organization.... 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(a)(3). The ALJ determined that the company discriminated against Merriweather by terminating his employment approximately three weeks after the union election in retaliation for Merriweather's support of the union. 32 Merriweather worked as an order puller in the warehouse of the Mississippi plant from 1972 until March 6, 1979. During the union organizing campaign, Merriweather wore a union button at work, signed a union authorization card and attended at least one union meeting. The ALJ found that one day before the union election, Merriweather's supervisor, Lee Shepherd, questioned Merriweather concerning his preference in the upcoming election and stated that Merriweather and the other employees would later regret their support for the union. Three weeks after the election, Merriweather left work at 11:30 A.M. and did not return that day although his shift ended at 4:00 P.M. Personnel Manager Richard Covington explained to Merriweather the following morning that he had been discharged for leaving work early. 33 The Board contends that the reason put forward by the company for firing Merriweather was pretextual. In testimony before the ALJ, Merriweather stated that he had been given permission to leave work early if he finished pulling his orders for the day. This testimony was corroborated by a secretary, Sadie Loveless, who was present during the conversation in which Merriweather asked for permission to leave early. ITT, on the other hand, contests Merriweather's version of the story, claiming that Shepherd specifically denied Merriweather the permission he sought. The company asserts that the ALJ erroneously credited the testimony of the discriminatee, Merriweather, and discredited the testimony of Shepherd and another witness, Sammie Williams, who had testified at a prior hearing that he had overheard Shepherd refuse Merriweather's request. 34 The Board's determination to affirm the findings of the ALJ must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 160(f). Furthermore, this Court will not disturb reasonable findings of the Board or the ALJ as to the credibility of the various witnesses' testimony since it is they who have observed the demeanor of the witnesses. See, e.g., NLRB v. Rawac Plating Co., 422 F.2d 1259, 1260 (6th Cir.1970). 35 In this case, the Board has established by a preponderance of the evidence that there was anti-union animus on the part of the company. The Board properly considered evidence of the threat made by Shepherd to Merriweather the day prior to the election. In addition, there was convincing proof showing that the company had never fired an employee for leaving early and had never issued a warning to Merriweather even though he had left before the end of his shift several times prior to the union organizing drive. The ALJ chose to credit the testimony of Merriweather and Sadie Loveless that Merriweather was given permission to leave early; this was not clearly erroneous. 36 The company has failed to overcome this proof with a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the managers would have fired Merriweather despite their anti-union motivation. The only evidence submitted by the company was the testimony of Shepherd and the witness, Sammie Williams, that Merriweather was denied authorization to leave at 11:30 A.M. This testimony was discredited by the ALJ who had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. We find that the ALJ and the Board relied upon substantial evidence in their holdings that the company violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by wrongfully terminating Harry Merriweather.