Opinion ID: 781269
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Motions for Continuance Relating to Counts 1 and 2

Text: 25 Next, Bogosian maintains that the district court erred in denying her motions to postpone the bench trial due to her life-threatening illness. We review trial-management rulings for clear abuse of discretion and [o]nly an `unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay will abuse [such discretion].' N.E. Drilling, Inc. v. Inner Space Servs., Inc., 243 F.3d 25, 36 (1st Cir.2001) (citation omitted). Our review examines, inter alia, the delay entailed, the reasons for the request, whether the moving party is at fault, any inconvenience to the court and litigants, and whether the denial of a continuance unfairly would prejudice the moving party. See FDIC v. Houde, 90 F.3d 600, 608 (1st Cir.1996). 26 Although we recognize that Bogosian experiences serious health problems, the record on appeal plainly reflects that these district court rulings were neither irrational nor arbitrary. First and foremost, by July 2000 when Bogosian submitted the initial motion to continue the trial, this litigation had been languishing for twelve years. Her motions were also predicated upon her recent retention of new counsel, the ninth such substitution of counsel since she initiated her lawsuit. Even assuming some adequate justification for Bogosian's numerous replacements of trial counsel, the attendant further delays plainly afforded additional legitimate grounds for the district court to continue to seek, wherever practicable, a fair and expeditious disposition of the case. See Amarin Plastics, Inc. v. Md. Cup Corp., 946 F.2d 147, 151 (1st Cir.1991) (noting that trial court may consider reasons for previous delays). 27 Second, medical doctors determined that Bogosian, then age 77, suffered from several debilitating illnesses, including severe arthritis and a serious anxiety disorder. See Morrissey v. Nat'l Mar. Union, 397 F.Supp. 659, 668 (S.D.N.Y.1975) (noting unavailable witness's advanced age as ground for denying continuance), aff'd, 544 F.2d 19, 32 (2d Cir.1976). As regards her metastatic lung cancer, Bogosian's doctors performed major surgery ( viz., a lobectomy), followed by an arduous course of concurrent radiation and chemotherapy, which was expected to provide Bogosian with but a 30% to 50% prospect of long-term survival. Although in more normal circumstances a continuance may well have been warranted, there existed the very real prospect that any immediate postponement almost surely would deteriorate into an indefinite one given that Bogosian's physical condition was such as reasonably to suggest that it was improbable that she would ever become more available to assist counsel or testify at trial. See Amarin Plastics, Inc., 946 F.2d at 152-53 (noting absence of any reasonable indication that party would ever improve enough to appear at trial); Scholl v. Felmont Oil Corp., 327 F.2d 697, 700 (6th Cir.1964) (affirming denial of continuance absent any medical assurances that witness would ever be available to testify at trial). 28 Third, trial counsel for Bogosian advised the district court at the September 2000 hearing that he intended to substitute a limited liability family corporation as the lone plaintiff, in order to minimize Bogosian's continued involvement and participation in the proceedings. Plainly, such a representation by counsel strongly implied that other members of Bogosian's family were available and competent to assist counsel with further pretrial preparations. 29 Fourth, Bogosian's protestations on appeal notwithstanding, the district court granted her July 2000 motion to continue, thereby authorizing the requested 190-day extension, whereupon the anticipated trial date was postponed to late March 2001. Moreover, the district court subsequently allowed yet another motion for continuance, further postponing the trial to May 8, 2001. 30 Fifth, Bogosian submitted no updated medical documentation that she remained unfit to testify at trial in May 2001, even though her oncologist had represented in a November 3, 2000, letter that her treatment would finish in late January [2001], and that he anticipated a month or so of post-treatment recovery. 5 Moreover, in a January 2001 follow-up letter, the oncologist reiterated that his estimate of the anticipated recovery time for Ms. Bogosian from all her treatment would not be until the end of February of this year 2001. The January 2001 letter was the final pretrial communication from her medical professionals regarding when she would be able to testify at trial. 6 As the district court observed at trial, Bogosian still has not shown she is incapable of testifying in open court. All I have is [counsel's] word that she is not able to come to court. I see no doctor's certificate. 31 Moreover, the district court later allowed Bogosian's deposition testimony to be admitted at trial. Finally, Bogosian has made no contention on appeal (let alone any showing) that her deposition testimony was inherently inferior, in any respect, to her anticipated live testimony. See Wells v. Rushing, 755 F.2d 376, 380 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that need for continuance becomes less compelling where testimony comes in by deposition). 32 Accordingly, given the totality of the circumstances, the district court rulings regarding Bogosian's requests for a sick-leave-based continuance did not remotely constitute an `unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay.' N.E. Drilling, Inc., 243 F.3d at 36 (citation omitted). 7 33