Opinion ID: 1357742
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Forest Guardians' Failure to Exhaust

Text: In 1982, the USFS revised its planning regulations (the 1982 Rules), 36 C.F.R. pt. 219 (1999), which govern USFS management at both the program and project levels. In November 2000, the USFS significantly amended these regulations and replaced them with the 2000 planning rules, codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219 (2001). National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, 65 Fed.Reg. 67,514, 67,568-81 (Nov. 9, 2000); see UEC III, 443 F.3d at 737. Rather than being immediately promulgated, these new regulations provided that from November 9, 2000, until the promulgation of a new, final rule, the USFS must consider the best available science [or `BAS'] in implementing... [a forest] plan. 36 C.F.R. § 219.35(a) (2001) [hereinafter 2000 BAS standard]. These transition provisions ultimately remained effective until new rules were implemented in January 2005; similarly, these new rules prescribe that the USFS must take into account the best available science. See 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.11 (2008); 70 Fed.Reg. 1023, 1027 (Jan. 5, 2005). As thoroughly explained by the district court, Forest Guardians had argued to the agency that the 1982 Rules were applicable to the USFS's evaluation and approval of the A/C Project. J.App. at 79, 83. Forest Guardians adopted the same position in its initial filings with the district court. See Aplt. Opening Br. Attach. at 31. Now, on appeal, Forest Guardians does not dispute the district court's contrary, accurate conclusion that the 2000 BAS standard, rather than the 1982 Rules, applies to the A/C Project; any projects proposed during the transition period must conform with the best available science standard set forth in the 2000 transition provisions. See UEC III, 443 F.3d at 746-47 (concluding, based on the USFS's interpretive rule adopted in 2004, that during the transition period between November 2000 and promulgation of a final rule, the Forest Service should use the `best available science' under § 219.35(a) for project decisions (internal quotation marks omitted)). [4] Rather, Forest Guardians' primary argument is directed toward the USFS's alleged failure to consider and apply the BAS standard in evaluating the project and the inequity of expecting Forest Guardians to present arguments regarding the BAS standard during the administrative appeal process. We previously have explained why the applicability of the 1982 Rules versus the 2000 BAS standard can be an important distinction in the evaluation of forest plans: Deciding whether the 1982 regulations apply to the Project ... is important because the 1982 regulations and the 2000 transition provisions contain key differences governing species monitoring. The 1982 rules, for example, require the Forest Service to monitor the population trends of the management indicator species and determine relationships to habitat changes. 36 C.F.R. § 219.19(a)(6). And we have held that these obligations apply to project level as well as plan level management actions. Conversely, the 2000 transition provisions contain no such explicit language governing monitoring but merely require the responsible official to consider the best available science in implementing a forest plan. 36 C.F.R. § 219.35(a), (d) (2001); 65 Fed.Reg. 67,514, 67,579 (Nov. 9, 2000). UEC III, 443 F.3d at 744-45 (alterations and citation omitted); see also UEC II, 439 F.3d at 1190 (quoting Forest Watch v. U.S. Forest Serv., 410 F.3d 115, 117 (2d Cir.2005), for the proposition that the standards of the 1982 Rules and the 2000 Transitional Rule areat leastdistinct); Sierra Club v. Wagner, 555 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir.2009) (One might think from the name that `best available science' is an unexceptionable standard, but according to [the plaintiff], the 1982 rules provided a set of precise tests for evaluating a project's impact on species that are more rigorous and were intentionally weakened by the 2000 rules.). This court and others have run into confusion in applying the 2000 transition provisions. UEC III, 443 F.3d at 745 (citing cases). Forest Guardians asserts that the USFS failed to properly apply the 2000 BAS standard in planning and approving the A/C Project. Forest Guardians further argues that the A/C Project's approval would be affected by the key differences between that standard and the 1982 Rules. Cf. Wagner, 555 F.3d at 25-26 (finding that the plaintiff had forfeited its argument regarding the applicability of the 1982 Rules when it had neither raised the argument to the district court nor explained whether or how the allegedly more rigorous standards of the 1982 rules would likely have altered the Forest Service's ultimate evaluation of the two projects). The district court, however, determined that because Forest Guardians failed to raise the BAS argument during the administrative appeal processinstead arguing that the 1982 Rules appliedForest Guardians failed to exhaust this claim, as is necessary for judicial review. The district court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the BAS argument. We review de novo the district court's jurisdictional conclusion. Urban ex rel. Urban v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-l, 89 F.3d 720, 724 (10th Cir.1996). Plaintiffs must exhaust available administrative remedies before the USFS prior to bringing their grievances to federal court. 7 U.S.C. § 6912(e); [5] 36 C.F.R. § 215.21. To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, plaintiffs generally must `structure their participation so that it alerts the agency to the parties' position and contentions, in order to allow the agency to give the issue meaningful consideration.' Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 495 F.3d 1162, 1170 (10th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 764, 124 S.Ct. 2204, 159 L.Ed.2d 60 (2004)). Claims not properly raised before an agency are waived, unless the problems underlying the claim are `obvious' or otherwise brought to the agency's attention. Id. (citation omitted). The claim must be presented in sufficient detail to allow the agency to rectify the alleged violation. Id.; see also Kleissler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 183 F.3d 196, 202 (3d Cir.1999) ([T]he claims raised at the administrative appeal and in the federal complaint must be so similar that the district court can ascertain that the agency was on notice of, and had an opportunity to consider and decide, the same claims now raised in federal court.); Idaho Sporting Cong., Inc. v. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 957, 965 (9th Cir.2002) (Claims must be raised with sufficient clarity to allow the decision maker to understand and rule on the issue raised, but there is no bright-line standard as to when this requirement has been met....). The exhaustion requirement thus helps prevent premature claims and ensure[s] that the agency possessed of the most expertise in an area be given first shot at resolving a claimant's difficulties. Id. The district court concluded that § 6912(e)'s exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional. Administrative exhaustion is often an affirmative defense, rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007) ([T]he usual practice under the Federal Rules is to regard exhaustion as an affirmative defense.). Judicially created exhaustion doctrines, in particular, are prudential in nature. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992), superseded by statute on other grounds, Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). But a statutory exhaustion requirement may be jurisdictional if it provides more than simply a codification of the judicially developed doctrine of exhaustion. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765-66, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975). We must evaluate each statute separately, showing regard for the particular administrative scheme at issue. Id.; see also McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 144, 112 S.Ct. 1081 (Of paramount importance to any exhaustion inquiry is congressional intent. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Among other criteria, we look for sweeping and direct statutory language that goes beyond a requirement that only exhausted actions be brought. Steele v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 355 F.3d 1204, 1208 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled in part on other grounds by Bock, 549 U.S. at 214-15, 127 S.Ct. 910; see also Salfi, 422 U.S. at 757, 95 S.Ct. 2457 (noting that the section's language was sweeping and direct and [ ] states that no action shall be brought under § 1331, not merely that only those actions shall be brought in which administrative remedies have been exhausted). The courts of appeals are split as to whether 7 U.S.C. § 6912(e) is jurisdictional. See Dawson Farms, LLC v. Farm Serv. Agency, 504 F.3d 592, 603-06 (5th Cir.2007) (discussing the views of the various circuits). We need not resolve the issue. Regardless of whether it is jurisdictional, the explicit exhaustion requirement in § 6912(e) is, nonetheless, mandatory. Forest Guardians, 495 F.3d at 1170; McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 144, 112 S.Ct. 1081 (Where Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is required.); see also Bastek v. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp., 145 F.3d 90, 94-95 (2d Cir.1998) (noting that § 6912(e) unambiguously required plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing suit, and their failure to do so deprived them of the opportunity to obtain relief in the district court). Forest Guardians concedes that it did not exhaust its BAS argument during the administrative process. It suggests that we should excuse the exhaustion requirement, but its arguments are unavailing. Section 6912(e) does not contain any explicit exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. However, judicially created exhaustion doctrines are subject to numerous exceptions, McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969), and several circuits have extended these exceptions to § 6912(e). See Dawson Farms, 504 F.3d at 606 (discussing § 6912(e) and the extraordinary circumstances and limited bases warranting an excuse of administrative exhaustion); Ace Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp., 440 F.3d 992, 1000 (8th Cir.2006) (noting that exhaustion under § 6912(e) may be excused if the complaint involves a legitimate constitutional claim, if exhaustion would cause irreparable harm, if further administrative procedures would be futile, or if the issues to be decided are primarily legal rather than factual (citation omitted)); McBride Cotton & Cattle Corp. v. Veneman, 290 F.3d 973, 980-82 (9th Cir. 2002) (excusing a failure to exhaust under § 6912(e) where the suit alleged a constitutional claim that was colorable, collateral to the substantive claim, and its resolution would not serve the purposes of exhaustion because exhaustion would be futile); see also Marcia R. Gelpe, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Lessons from Environmental Cases, 53 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. 1, 26, 64-65 (1984) (discussing judicially created exceptions to exhaustion in the environmental litigation context, observing that exceptions to the exhaustion requirement are not clearly delineated, and arguing that courts should be more insistent on requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies in environmental cases and, more specifically, that if there is significant doubt whether the facts fall into an exception [to the exhaustion doctrine], courts should require exhaustion). [6] We have never decided which, if any, of these exceptions are applicable, nor need we do so now. Even assuming that we could bypass § 6912(e)'s express direction, no exception is warranted on the facts of this case. Forest Guardians argues that it would have been futile to present its BAS challenge to the agency, because the USFS already had adopted the position that the A/C Project complied with the 2000 BAS standard when Forest Guardians filed its administrative challenge, i.e., the USFS had predetermined the issue before it. See Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 621 F.2d 369, 370-71 (10th Cir.1980) (excusing a statutory exhaustion requirement because that statute's reasonable grounds exception was met and the question was one of pure statutory interpretation). But despite the USFS's perceived stance on that issue, exhaustion of the BAS argument would not have been futile in the sense in which courts have applied this exhaustion exception. Specifically, there is no argument that: the USFS lacked the authority or the ability to resolve the challenge to the project approval, see McBride Cotton & Cattle Corp., 290 F.3d at 982; Ace Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 440 F.3d at 1000-01; this is purely a question of statutory interpretation, see Frontier Airlines, 621 F.2d at 371; or the court would not benefit from allowing the USFS to develop a full administrative record on the issue for our review, see Ace Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 440 F.3d at 1000-02; see also Salfi, 422 U.S. at 765, 95 S.Ct. 2457 (Exhaustion is generally required as a matter of preventing premature interference with agency processes, so that the agency may function efficiently and so that it may have an opportunity to correct its own errors, to afford the parties and the courts the benefit of its experience and expertise, and to compile a record which is adequate for judicial review.). Thus, assuming arguendo we could excuse § 6912(e)'s exhaustion requirement, Forest Guardians has not proffered reasons that demonstrate that an exception is warranted. Forest Guardians further argues that administrative exhaustion of the BAS argument should not be required because it would be unfair to require exhaustion of a claim that it did not know that it had at the time it filed its administrative appeal. Forest Guardians reasons that when it filed its appeal with the USFS in July 2004, Tenth Circuit case law indicated that the 1982 Rules would be applicable to the A/C Project. Forest Guardians points to Utah Environmental Congress v. Bosworth ( UEC I ), 372 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2004), which was issued on June 23, 2004. Related decisions in this circuit dealing with the application of the 1982 Rules and the 2000 BAS standard were not released until after the administrative appeal was decided in August 2004. It is true that in UEC I, we applied the 1982 Rules under the stated rationale that they were the regulations in effect in December 2000, the time of the USFS decision at issue. UEC I, 372 F.3d at 1222 n. 1. We also noted, however, that the regulations had changed in 2000. Id. In addition, Judge Baldock's concurrence observed that the Forest Service's adoption of new planning regulations effectively moots the issue [of interpreting the 1982 Rules] in future cases. Id. at 1232 n. 1 (Baldock, J., concurring). Accordingly, even though the 1982 Rules were applied in UEC I, that same case provided Forest Guardianspre-administrative appealwith notice that the 1982 Rules would not necessarily apply to the A/C Project. It is not inequitable to require Forest Guardians to have made an argument about the 2000 BAS standard in July 2004, even if there was some confusion as to the proper standard. Forest Guardians' reliance on Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 482-87, 106 S.Ct. 2022, 90 L.Ed.2d 462 (1986), for the proposition that exhaustion would be unfair, is misplaced. In Bowen, the Supreme Court waived the administrative exhaustion requirement because plaintiffs had been subjected to an unrevealed policy that was inconsistent in critically important ways with established regulations. Id. at 485, 106 S.Ct. 2022. Here, by contrast, the published federal regulation in effect on the date Forest Guardians filed its administrative appeal indicated that during the transition period beginning November 9, 2000, the responsible official must consider the best available science in implementing and, if appropriate, amending the current plan. 36 C.F.R. § 219.35(a) (2004); see also Forest Watch, 410 F.3d at 118 ([T]he plain language of the 2000 Transitional Rule dictates that the `best available science' standard applies when the agency is `implementing' a forest plan during the relevant time period.). Thus, rather than being victimized by an unpublished policy, Forest Guardians was provided notice by the plain language of the regulation that the applicability of the 2000 BAS standard was, at the very least, a pertinent issue. In addition, the ensuing uncertainty regarding the application of the 1982 Rules and the 2000 BAS standard was commented upon publicly by courts as well as the USFS prior to the filing of Forest Guardians' administrative appeal. See, e.g., Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 967-69 (9th Cir.2003) (noting concerns that arose regarding the 2000 transition provisions); National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Extension of Compliance Deadline, 66 Fed.Reg. 27,552 (May 17, 2001). If anything, we would expect such public commentary to convey to a litigant the potential applicability of the BAS standard to a project in July 2004 and, consequently, the reasonableness of advancing an argument relating to that standard, even if only as an alternative to a 1982 Rules argument. Therefore, because Forest Guardians did not argue during the administrative process that USFS failed to consider and apply the 2000 BAS standard when it implemented the A/C Project, we conclude that Forest Guardians failed to adequately present the BAS argument in its administrative appeal and thus has forfeited it. See Forest Guardians, 495 F.3d at 1171; cf. Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Troyer (UEC IV), 479 F.3d 1269, 1288, 1292 (10th Cir.2007) (McConnell, J., dissenting in part) (At no point has plaintiff UEC argued that the projects violated the `best available science' standard.... If UEC had argued that the decisions in question were deficient under the `best available science' standard, the Forest Service would have been able to respond, and the district court would have been able to make appropriate findings.). Therefore, we do not reach the merits of Forest Guardians' BAS claim. [7]