Opinion ID: 2570814
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Undue Emphasis

Text: Second, we address Appleby's contention that the alteration to a PIK instruction may not single out and give undue emphasis to particular evidence, even if it correctly states the law. To support his argument, Appleby advances State v. Cathey, 241 Kan. 715, 741 P.2d 738 (1987), disapproved on other grounds State v. Schoonover, 281 Kan. 453, 133 P.3d 48 (2006). In Cathey, the jury was instructed that evidence that a defendant had fled soon after the commission of the alleged offense could be considered as evidence of guilt if the jury found the defendant fled to avoid arrest and trial. The Cathey court observed that the instruction was a correct statement of the law; evidence to establish the defendant's consciousness of guilt such as flight, concealment, fabrication of evidence, or the giving of false information is admissible as evidence in a criminal case. Cathey, 241 Kan. at 730, 741 P.2d 738. But the Cathey court held it was clearly erroneous for the trial court to instruct the jury on the defendant's consciousness of guilt by flight because in State v. McCorgary, 218 Kan. 358, 365, 543 P.2d 952 (1975), cert. denied 429 U.S. 867, 97 S.Ct. 177, 50 L.Ed.2d 147 (1976), the court directed that in subsequent trials the entire instruction on consciousness of guilt should be omitted from the instructions to the jury; the Cathey court noted that the reason the instruction had been disapproved is that it emphasized and singled out certain evidence admitted at a criminal trial. Cathey, 241 Kan. at 730-31, 741 P.2d 738. In responding to Appleby's reliance on Cathey, the State makes two arguments. First, the State points out that Cathey was distinguished in State v. Williams, 277 Kan. 338, 85 P.3d 697 (2004). Second, the State argues Cathey can also be distinguished because the instruction in this case merely provides a correct legal definition of the term premeditation rather than instructs the jury how to apply the evidence as did the Cathey instruction. Regarding the first point, the State is correct  Williams does distinguish Cathey. See Williams, 277 Kan. at 352-53, 85 P.3d 697. However, the distinction made in Williams bolsters Appleby's argument that there is a difference between emphasizing a theory when answering a question from a jury and when giving the initial instructions. In Williams, as in Gunby, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in responding to the jury's question about premeditation. During its deliberations, the Williams jury asked: How long beforehand does the thought have to occur to make it premeditation?; the word beforehand was circled. Williams, 277 Kan. at 351, 85 P.3d 697. While the court responded that no particular amount of time was required, the jury later sought a more detailed definition of premeditation. It asked whether premeditation included a preconceived plan and asked for an explanation of the relationship between intent and premeditation. The trial court responded with a correct statement of law, which was taken from State v. Jamison, 269 Kan. 564, 571-72, 7 P.3d 1204 (2000). Williams, citing Cathey, 241 Kan. at 730-31, 741 P.2d 738, argued that the trial court's second response, without mention of his mental defect, emphasized the weight of the State's evidence of premeditation and, by the same token, deemphasized the weight of his evidence of mental defect. The Williams court found this reliance on Cathey to be faulty in that a response to an inquiry, unlike an instruction, is formulated in response to the particular question asked by the jury. A trial court's task in responding to an inquiry is to provide guidance with regard to the subject of the inquiry. If the subject of the inquiry involves primarily the evidence of one party, said the Williams court, the trial court may be hard pressed, in drafting a helpful response, to avoid singling out and emphasizing the weight of any party's evidence. Williams, 277 Kan. at 353, 85 P.3d 697. The Williams court concluded that the trial court appropriately gave a response that was formulated to help the jury understand premeditation, which had been the specific question asked by the jury. Furthermore, the Williams court stated that if the defendant had wanted the trial court to remind the jury of the mental defect or disease defense, he could have made a request to include the mental defect instruction among those the trial court asked the jury to reread. The Williams court held that there was no abuse of discretion. Williams, 277 Kan. at 353, 85 P.3d 697. As Appleby notes, however, the issue arises in this case because of the trial court's initial instructions, not because of an answer to a jury question. The State recognizes this difference but argues the trial court was stating the law without emphasizing one side of the case or the other. To support this suggestion, the State cites State v. Green, 245 Kan. 398, 781 P.2d 678 (1989), which in turn is based on State v. Beebe, 244 Kan. 48, 766 P.2d 158 (1988). The State argues these cases suggest that the rationale of Cathey does not apply in this case because in Cathey, the instruction told the jury how to apply certain evidence in assessing the defendant's guilt or innocence and in this case  as in Green and Beebe  the instruction merely provided the legal definition of an element of the crime or factors to be considered. We agree this is a valid distinction and, in this regard, find Beebe to be the most analogous and helpful case for purposes of our analysis. In Beebe, the defendant, who was appealing his jury trial convictions of first-degree murder and aggravated kidnapping, argued the trial court erred in instructing the jury it could infer malice, premeditation, and deliberation from the use of a deadly weapon in the killing. The Beebe court concluded it was error to instruct that premeditation and deliberation could be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon because that fact, standing alone, does not support such an inference. Rather, a gun could be used to kill in first-degree murder, second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, or involuntary manslaughter. Beebe, 244 Kan. at 58, 766 P.2d 158. On the other hand, the portion of the instruction relative to the inference of malice was upheld. Unlike the premeditation portion, the malice portion was an accurate statement of the law, and the Beebe court pointed out that the instruction did not require or direct that malice be found from the use of a deadly weapon. The court stated: The use of a deadly weapon is one of the evidentiary facts from which the jury could infer malice, but we conclude it is the better practice not to give a separate instruction thereon. Beebe, 244 Kan. at 60, 766 P.2d 158. As in Beebe, the jury instruction defining premeditation in this case contained valid statements of Kansas law. While those statements of the law were added because of the facts of the case, they did not direct the jury to a result. In other words, in contrast to the instruction at issue in Cathey  where the instruction stated that evidence of flight could be considered as evidence of guilt  there was no statement in the instruction at issue in this case that evidence of a prolonged struggle or of strangulation could be considered as evidence of premeditation. Rather, the added language explained the law recognizing that premeditation must be present before the homicidal conduct but does not have to be present before a struggle begins. Further, Appleby fails to show that the jury instruction in this case misled the jury or prejudiced him. Certainly, the instruction included an explanation of premeditation that Appleby would like to ignore; he would have liked the jury to have believed he had to have premeditated the murder before he entered the pool pump room because there was no evidence to support such a finding, while there was direct and overwhelming evidence of premeditation formed before A.K.'s death. A.K. suffered a severe beating in which she sustained numerous cuts, bruises, and lacerations. And the back of A.K.'s head was bashed open in two places. Blood from A.K. and Appleby was found mixed together. There was evidence of both manual strangulation and ligature strangulation. According to expert testimony, it would have taken approximately 10 minutes  and perhaps as many as 16 minutes  for Appleby to strangle A.K. There were some periods when the force of strangulation was stopped, causing petechial hemorrhaging. The law supports a conclusion that under those facts there could have been premeditation, and the instruction merely informed the jury of that law. It did not direct them how to apply the evidence or unduly emphasize the State's case. While we again emphasize that trial courts should follow the pattern instructions whenever possible, we find no error in the premeditation instruction given in this case.