Opinion ID: 1436706
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Walton's Complaint and the Trial Court's Proceedings

Text: Walton filed suit in Superior Court on July 14, 1992 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and D.C.Code §§ 11-921(a)(2) and (a)(3)(C), see, supra, note 1, naming as Defendants the District of Columbia, the Department, and Walter Ridley, Director of the Department, Douglas Stempson and Ernestine Tillman in their official capacities. His complaint labeled his claims in two categories: (1) legal claims and constitutional violations and (2) statutory violations. With respect to the first category, he invoked the Fourteenth Amendment [13] to the United States Constitution and asserted two basic constitutional challenges to the Board's disciplinary action: (1) [T]he Adjustment Board gave no written statement to satisfy the minimum requirements of constitutional due process; and (2) [T]here was an insufficient written statement as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for disciplinary action in Administrator Stempson's February 4, 1992, letter denying his appeal. Hence, his constitutional challenge rested, as his complaint indicated, on that aspect of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2978, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), which requires a written statement by the fact finders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action. With regard to the second category of his claims, Walton's complaint asserted a violation of five sections of the LRAA pertaining to: (1) the person who should sign the disciplinary report (28 DCMR § 506.3 specifying that: the accusing official who has investigated an alleged offense shall fill out and sign a disciplinary report. . . .); (2) the requirement of a written report (28 DCMR § 512.7 requiring that the decision state: its findings as to the resident's involvement, the factual information upon which the finding is based, and ... the penalty to be imposed.. . .); (3) the standard of review for an appeal (28 DCMR § 513.2 requiring a review based upon a reasonable assessment of the evidence presented); (4) the insufficiency of evidence to meet the definition of major contraband, as set forth in 28 DCMR § 502.11(b); and (5) the insufficiency of evidence to meet the definition of possession of contraband as defined in 28 DCMR § 503.10. Walton sought a declaratory judgment that defendants violated his constitutional and statutory rights. He also asked that the disciplinary decision against him be vacated and that any record of the matter be expunged. In an order docketed on April 21, 1993, the trial court remanded the matter to the Department's Adjustment Board for issuance of written findings pursuant to § 112.6 of the LRAA, 28 DCMR § 512.7. As reasons for the remand, the trial court included the following clause: [I]t appearing to the Court that the Adjustment Board has not issued a written statement of findings setting forth the reasons for its disciplinary action as required by § 112.6 [28 DCMR § 512.7] of the Lorton Regulations Approval Act of 1982 . . . . The Board issued a revised statement, which the District of Columbia filed on July 2, 1993. Subsequently, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the District of Columbia. The trial court's August 13, 1993, order concluded in part that: [a]ccepting all of plaintiff's factual allegations as true, the complaint fails to state a claim of constitutional deprivation of due process rights and it further [appears] to the court that defendants have now complied with the pertinent provisions of the . . . [LRAA]. Walton noted an appeal.