Opinion ID: 545214
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of the Departure

Text: 9 The government also challenges both the grounds for and the extent of the departure. The district court gave three reasons for the downward departure: (1) the lack of a criminal record; (2) appellee's employment history; and (3) the remarkable way in which the bribery offense was committed. The government contends that none of these is a valid basis for departing from the Guidelines range. 10 We review de novo a district court's determination that a particular factor was of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(b). United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 602-03 (2d Cir.1990). By contrast, we review under a clearly erroneous standard a district court's factual determination that the factor in question was present. Id.; see United States v. Stroud, 893 F.2d 504, 506-07 (2d Cir.1990). 11 The district court's reliance on appellee's lack of a criminal record was erroneous. The Guidelines acknowledge that [t]here may be cases where the court concludes that a defendant's criminal history category significantly over-represents the seriousness of a defendant's criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit further crimes. Guidelines Sec. 4A1.3. In such cases, a downward departure may be appropriate. However, the Sentencing Commission has explicitly indicated that such a departure is not warranted where, as here, the defendant has been placed in criminal history Category I. The lower limit of the range for a Category I criminal history is set for a first offender with the lowest risk of recidivism. Therefore, a departure below the lower limit of the guideline range for a Category I criminal history on the basis of the adequacy of criminal history cannot be appropriate. Id.; see United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 962, 965-66 (1st Cir.1989); United States v. Paulino, 873 F.2d 23, 24-25 (2d Cir.1989) (per curiam). 12 The downward departure can nonetheless be upheld on the basis of the other factors cited by the district court--appellee's previous employment record and the unusual nature of the bribery transaction. The Guidelines provide that previous employment record is not ordinarily relevant to the determination of whether a departure is warranted. Guidelines Sec. 5H1.5. Thus, a defendant's previous employment record should be a ground for departure only in exceptional or extraordinary cases, see United States v. Brewer, 899 F.2d 503, 510 (6th Cir.1990); United States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326, 1331-32 (8th Cir.1990), and will warrant a departure in only a relatively few instances. 13 The district court viewed this case as one of those few instances. It pointed to the fact that appellee had been gainfully employed for the nine years since he had entered this country. Taken alone, this fact is not especially remarkable. However, once it is coupled with the third factor--the unusual circumstances of the offense--the district court was justified in considering appellee's case to be sufficiently exceptional to justify departure. The district court gave special emphasis to the fact that appellee used a personal check in the bribery transaction. This, in the district court's view, reflected an utter lack on appellee's part of the sophistication usually shown by persons bribing an official. Thus, the picture painted of appellee is one of a person with an entirely stable background, indicated by his employment history, and whose unusually unsurreptitious conduct in undertaking the bribery constituted a mitigating factor of a kind, or to a degree not adequately considered by the Guidelines. The district court therefore stated valid grounds for a downward departure. Having set forth proper grounds for a departure, the district court's decision to depart was not unreasonable. See Lara, 905 F.2d at 603; Palta, 880 F.2d at 639. Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that probation, rather than some period of incarceration below that set forth by the Guidelines, was an appropriate sentence in light of the circumstances presented. 14 As we have previously noted, it was not Congress' aim to straitjacket a sentencing court, compelling it to impose sentences like a robot inside a Guidelines' glass bubble, and preventing it from exercising discretion, flexibility or independent judgment. Lara, 905 F.2d at 604; see also United States v. Correa-Vargas, 860 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir.1988). In short, we do not view this appeal as presenting an instance in which we should reject the assessment of an experienced district judge that the case presents exceptional circumstances not adequately considered by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines.