Opinion ID: 20794
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: refusal to instruct on parole eligibility

Text: Dillingham argues that his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated by the trial court’s refusal to inform the jury in the punishment charge that he would not be eligible for parole for 35 calendar years. More specifically, relying on Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187 (1994), he contends that “the jury never had the opportunity to consider what effect, if any, parole would have had on their particularized assessment of the petitioner’s future dangerousness.” (emphasis deleted). In Simmons, the Supreme Court held that if the defendant’s future dangerousness is at issue and state law prohibits the defendant’s release on parole, due process demands that the sentencing jury be informed the defendant is ineligible for parole. 512 U.S. at 156, 114 S.Ct. at 2190. Although Dillingham acknowledges that Texas law does not require defendants convicted of capital murder to serve life without parole, he asserts that it is a distinction without a difference. We have explained that Simmons requires a jury be informed about a defendant's parole ineligibility only when (1) the state argues that a defendant represents a future danger to society, and (2) the defendant is legally ineligible for parole. Allridge v. Scott, 41 F.3d 213, 222 (5th Cir. 1994).4 Because Dillingham would 4 While recognizing our holding in Allridge, Dillingham nevertheless asserts that it rested, at least in part, on faulty reasoning. He points to our statement that Texas had chosen to 5 have been eligible for parole if sentenced to life imprisonment, our precedent precludes this claim. Finally, although Dillingham’s direct appeal became final after Simmons, we have explained that “an extension of Simmons to encompass situations in which a defendant was eligible for parole would be barred under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (1989).” See Montoya v. Scott, 65 F.3d 405, 416 (5th Cir. 1995).5 keep evidence or instruction of parole eligibility from juries. Id. (citing Rose v. State, 752 S.W.2d 529, 534-35 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987)). He asserts that this analysis ignored the opinion in Oakley v. State, 830 S.W.2d 107 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992), in which the Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the reenactment of a statute that required juries to be instructed regarding parole eligibility in certain noncapital cases because it had been authorized by an amendment to the Texas Constitution. In a footnote, Dillingham also states that the Texas legislature has now amended the capital sentencing statute to allow juries to be informed of parole eligibility with respect to a life sentence. We find this criticism to be ill-founded for three reasons. First, the Court of Criminal Appeals made clear that their decision in Oakley was not based on a federal constitutional claim, but instead involved only the Texas Constitution. 830 S.W.2d at 108 n.1. Simmons is, of course, based upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and federal habeas proceedings are limited to claims involving the United States Constitution. Second, although the Texas legislature has decided to allow capital juries to be informed regarding parole eligibility, that provision became effective September 1, 1999, several years after Dillingham’s conviction became final. In other words, Texas has not afforded this right to Dillingham. Third and most important, one panel of this Court may not overrule another absent an intervening decision to the contrary by the Supreme Court or this Court en banc. See Hogue v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 466, 491 (5th Cir. 1997). Thus, Allridge controls and precludes relief for Dillingham. 5 We note that Dillingham cites to an opinion written by Justice Stevens (and joined by three other Justices) respecting the denial of the petition for a writ of certiorari in Brown v. Texas, 118 S.Ct. 354 (1997). Justice Stevens stated that “[t]here is obvious tension between this rule and our basic holding in [Simmons].” Of course, that opinion did not constitute a decision 6 AFFIRMED. on the merits. Indeed, even if the Supreme Court now granted certiorari in such a case, we would be bound by our precedent. Martin v. Cain, 2000 WL 257182, at  (5th Cir. March 8, 2000). 7