Opinion ID: 3057310
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Race and Sex Discrimination under Title VII

Text: Next, Jeudy argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on her claims of race and sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. In particular, she argues that the defendants discriminated against her based on her pregnancy when they failed to accommodate her and when they terminated her. Title VII requires that “[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment . . . in executive agencies . . . be made free from any discrimination based on [race, color, or sex] . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). “The Pregnancy Discrimination Act amended Title VII to provide that discrimination on the basis of sex includes discrimination ‘on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions.’” Holland v. Gee, C F.3d C, 2012 WL 1292342  (11th Cir. 2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)). Under Title VII, a plaintiff who is relying on circumstantial evidence, as Jeudy does here, must make a requisite showing of a prima facie case of 5 Case: 11-15838 Date Filed: 07/26/2012 Page: 6 of 8 discrimination. Id. To set out a prima facie case for disparate treatment, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified to do the job; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees, not of the plaintiff’s protected group, were treated differently. Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004). Once a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, “the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.” Id. At that point, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the reasons provided by the employer are pretext for unlawful discrimination. Holland, 2012 WL 1292342 at 3. Here, Jeudy argues that she suffered two adverse employment actions, namely (1) the denial of her request for accommodations for her pregnancy by allowing her to work a different shift and to remain seated on the job and (2) her termination. First, we find no error in the district court’s conclusion that the denial of Jeudy’s request for an accommodation could not be considered a materially adverse employment action, which required Jeudy to establish “a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” as viewed by a reasonable person in the circumstances. Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2001). The denial of Jeudy’s request for a shift change did 6 Case: 11-15838 Date Filed: 07/26/2012 Page: 7 of 8 not change any terms of her employment, and indeed, the defendant did not preclude Jeudy from changing her shift if she could find another employee who was willing to switch shifts with her, which she could not. Instead, no reasonable person would view the defendant’s unwillingness to change Jeudy’s shift as a serious and material change in her employment where here Jeudy has not shown that her pregnancy-related complications constitute a disability. See Swain v. Hillsborough County School Bd., 146 F.3d 855, 858 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Employers have no duty to accommodate an employee if the employee is not disabled under the ADA.”). The district court, however, found that Jeudy=s termination was materially adverse. Nonetheless, even if we assume that Jeudy established all other elements of her prima facie case of unlawful race and sex discrimination based on her termination, we cannot say that the district court erred in granting the defendant summary judgment. The defendant asserted that it terminated Jeudy because of two separate work infractions that she committed within a few days of each other during her probationary period. In the first incident, Jeudy brought her cell phone to a staff training at the detention center in violation of an employee policy. In the second incident, Jeudy failed to properly secure her housing unit during a count by leaving one cell door ajar and unlocked. Both asserted bases for Jeudy’s termination are legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons which Jeudy has failed to 7 Case: 11-15838 Date Filed: 07/26/2012 Page: 8 of 8 meet head on and rebut, but instead merely “quarrel[s] with the wisdom of th[ose] reasons.” Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000). Finally, Jeudy argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on her claim that she was retaliated against for making a complaint of sexual harassment. In order to establish a prima facie case for retaliation, a claimant must establish that: (1) he engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) he suffered a materially adverse action; and (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action. Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008). If a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the defendant to produce legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for the adverse action. Id. The plaintiff has the ultimate burden to prove retaliation by the preponderance of the evidence and that the employer=s reason was pretextual. Id. Even assuming that Jeudy established a prima facie case of retaliation, as discussed above, she failed to show that the legitimate reasons given for her termination were pretext for unlawful retaliation. AFFIRMED. 8