Opinion ID: 186209
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Legal Framework to the Facts of this Case

Text: 39 Teneyck expressly conceded below that she had not established a prima facie case of national-origin discrimination, so that claim is not before this court on appeal. What is at issue here is whether Teneyck met her initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of race discrimination under Title VII. Because Omni moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of Teneyck's case-in-chief — before Omni presented any evidence of its own — we are not confronted with the ultimate question of whether Omni intentionally discriminated against Teneyck. The precise question before us, in reviewing the District Court's grant of judgment as a matter of law, is whether Teneyck provided a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find that she had established the elements of a prima facie case. See FED.R.CIV.P. 50(a). We find that she did not. 40 It is undisputed that Teneyck offered testimony on the basis of which a reasonable jury could find the first three elements of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case. She is a member of a protected class: While she did not testify as to her race, the District Court noted, and Omni concedes, that the jury could see that she is Black. Tr. II at 13; Appellee's Br. at 9 & n. 3. As Omni likewise concedes, Teneyck testified that she applied for a housekeeping position for which she was qualified and that she was turned away before being given any work. Tr. I at 109-13; Appellee's Br. at 13. 41 Teneyck failed, however, to provide any evidence establishing the fourth McDonnell Douglas element: that the position remained open after Teneyck was turned away and that Omni continued to seek applicants of her qualifications. Teneyck testified that, after the Executive Housekeeper refused to speak to her when Teneyck called to be assigned work, Teneyck never made any further attempt to contact Omni about the position. Tr. I at 126-27. Teneyck offered no testimony as to whether the position remained open or whether Omni continued to seek applicants of her qualifications. She stated only that she never found out who Omni hired for the position. Id. at 120. By not offering any evidence in support of the fourth McDonnell Douglas element, Teneyck failed to eliminate one of the most common legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for a failure to hire: the absence of a vacancy. See Stella, 284 F.3d at 145. 42 In arguing the Rule 50(a) motion before the District Court, counsel for Omni clearly identified this specific deficiency as one of the grounds upon which judgment as a matter of law for Omni was warranted. Tr. II at 16-17. Teneyck's counsel made no attempt to move to reopen Teneyck's case-in-chief so as to provide evidence on this or any other issue. Accordingly, Omni was entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on the evidence put forward in Teneyck's case-in-chief. 43 Having reached this conclusion, we note that the District Court did not appear to base its judgment on the absence of evidence establishing the fourth McDonnell Douglas element. Indeed, the District Court's treatment of this issue is somewhat perplexing, so some clarification of the law is in order. Without reference to the specific McDonnell Douglas elements, the District Court noted in dicta that at most, Teneyck's testimony eliminated `the two most common legitimate reasons on which an employer might rely to reject a job applicant: an absolute or relative lack of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy in the job sought.' Teneyck, 254 F.Supp.2d at 21 (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358 n. 44, 97 S.Ct. at 1866 n. 44). The District Court nevertheless concluded that Teneyck had offered no evidence from which it could be inferred that she was discriminated against because of her race. Id. at 22. 44 These statements, taken in conjunction, reveal a misconception of the requisite elements of a prima facie case and of Teneyck's burden at this stage of the proceedings. If Teneyck had shown that Omni kept the position open and continued to seek applicants of her qualifications, then it would be proper to conclude that there was a continuing vacancy. This, along with the undisputed evidence as to the first three McDonnell Douglas elements, would have sufficed to establish a prima facie case, triggering a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption of discrimination. 45 Establishment of the elements of a prima facie case raises an inference of discrimination ... because we presume [the employer's] acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. at 1094 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp., 438 U.S. at 577, 98 S.Ct. at 2949) (emphasis added). The issue of whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, therefore, is quite distinct from the ultimate inquiry as to discrimination vel non  required after the defendant has met its burden of production. Here, Omni moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of Teneyck's case-in-chief, prior to offering any evidence of its own. At this stage, the factfinder is not called upon to determine whether, despite the plaintiff's successful establishment of the McDonnell Douglas elements of a prima facie case, discrimination can be inferred. Rather, establishment of the requisite elements — in the absence of any rebuttal evidence from the employer — creates an inference of discrimination as a matter of law. 46 The District Court's opinion goes on to suggest ways in which Teneyck might have successfully established a prima facie case: 47 Teneyck might have presented evidence, for example, to show that defendant hired a person who is not black ... to fill the housekeeper position. She might have presented evidence to show the racial composition ... of defendant's employees. She could have called defendant's employees as witnesses in her case-in-chief and set up the conflict [as to the defendant's professed legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions]. She could have sought other evidence of discriminatory statements or improper attitudes of defendant's employees or officials. 48 Teneyck, 254 F.Supp.2d at 22. This statement is not based on an accurate assessment of the law. The evidence cited by the District Court might in some cases be relevant to the establishment of a prima facie case, and it certainly could bear on the ultimate inquiry as to discrimination vel non. But we reject any implication that such evidence is required to establish a prima facie case. Establishment of the four McDonnell Douglas elements without more is sufficient. In particular, the suggestion that, in order to make out her prima facie case, Teneyck ought to have provided evidence that Omni hired someone of a different race for the position for which she applied is wrong as a matter of law. Stella clearly held that a Title VII plaintiff is not required to show that she was rejected in favor of someone outside her protected class. 284 F.3d at 145. 49 As noted above, although the foregoing aspects of the District Court's treatment of Teneyck's race discrimination claim are problematic, our de novo review of the record makes clear that Teneyck offered no evidence indicating that the position for which she applied remained open or that Omni continued to seek applicants of her qualifications. Therefore, we conclude that Omni is correct in its view that a motion for judgment as a matter of law was proper in light of Teneyck's failure to make out a prima facie case. 50