Opinion ID: 4546078
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sentence-Six Remand

Text: Under sentence six of section 405(g), a district court may remand a case to the Commissioner for consideration of newly discovered evidence. To obtain a remand under sentence six, a claimant must demonstrate that “(1) there is new, noncumulative evidence; (2) the evidence is ‘material,’ that is, relevant and probative so that there is a reasonable possibility that it would change the administrative result, and (3) there is good cause for the failure to submit the evidence at the administrative level.” Hunter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 808 F.3d 818, 821 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Caulder v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 872, 877 (11th Cir. 1986)). The district court denied Reeves’s motion for a sentence-six remand based on new evidence. First, the district court explained -- correctly -- that the ALJ’s 2019 favorable benefits determination constituted no new evidence for purposes of section 405(g). We have said that a later favorable ALJ decision constitutes no new and material evidence warranting a sentence-six remand. Id. at 822 (explaining that “the mere existence of a later favorable decision by one ALJ does not undermine the validity of another ALJ’s earlier unfavorable decision or the factfindings upon which it was premised.”). 7 Case: 19-14575 Date Filed: 07/02/2020 Page: 8 of 8 The district court also determined that Dr. O’s 2018 medical opinion -- that Reeves was disabled in January 2018 and that her conditions had worsened -- was no material evidence warranting a sentence-six remand because nothing indicated that Reeves’s functional impairments (observed by Dr. O in 2018) existed before the ALJ’s 2017 decision. In reviewing an ALJ’s decision about whether a claimant is entitled to benefits, we consider only evidence of the claimant’s condition before the date of the ALJ’s decision. See Wilson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir. 1999) (explaining that a doctor’s opinion about the claimant’s condition one year after the ALJ’s decision was not probative of whether the claimant was disabled during the pertinent time). Nothing evidences (nor does Reeves argue) that the functional limitations observed by Dr. O in 2018 existed before February 2017. The district court thus determined correctly that Dr. O’s 2018 opinion was not pertinent to the ALJ’s 2017 determination about whether Reeves was disabled. We conclude that a remand under either sentence four or sentence six was not warranted in this case; we affirm. AFFIRMED. 8