Opinion ID: 848996
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: brickley dissent

Text: In a separate opinion, Justice Brickley took issue with the interpretation that the majority accorded the not unfounded perceptions thereof language. [6] Gardner, supra at 53, 517 N.W.2d 1. He observed that the majority had interpreted the not unfounded perceptions thereof language as merely reiterating the requirement that actual events of employment had to have occurred. Id. at 53-54, 517 N.W.2d 1. In his view, such an interpretation rendered the unfounded perceptions language superfluous, nugatory, and without independent effect, violating the well-established rule of statutory construction that every word of a statute be given meaning. Id. at 54, 517 N.W.2d 1. According to Justice Brickley, the unfounded perceptions language referred not to the existence of an event, but to a claimant's interpretation or perception of an actual event. This interpretation does not reiterate the `actual events' requirement, but instead demands, as an independent matter and without unnecessary surplusage, that a claimant's perception of actual events not have been unfounded. Id. He also explained that this conclusion is consistent with the Legislature's decision to abrogate the holding in Deziel. The Deziel subjective causal nexus test permitted recovery if a claimant honestly perceived that mental injury resulted from an employment event. While the majority explains that  Deziel's honest perception test permit[ted] a mental disability claim to be based on imagined, hallucinatory, or delusional events,  ... in fact Deziel did not address events but, rather, dealt exclusively with  causation determinations. Accordingly, while the Legislature's 1982 amendment of M.C.L. § 418.301(2) ... may have added an actual events requirement, its motivation was to reverse the causation standard created by Deziel. [ Gardner, supra at 55, 517 N.W.2d 1 (emphasis in original).] Further, Justice Brickley stressed that analysis of the second sentence of § 301(2) involved an objective inquiry. In this regard, he stated: Objective analysis is reflected in the requirements that actual events of employment have occurred and that a claimant's perception or interpretation of those events have been well-founded. This analysis demands both procedural and substantive objectivity. The existence of actual events and well-founded perceptions must be discerned by an objective trier of fact, not by the claimant. The standard of review is also objective did the event actually occur, and was claimant's perception of it well founded? [ Id. at 57, 517 N.W.2d 1.] However, Justice Brickley emphasized that his interpretation of M.C.L. § 418.301(2) was not a purely objective approach. Id. He observed that § 301(2) also encompassed a subjective element of inquiry. He stated that a subjective analysis is proper in examining a claimant's reaction to actual employment events, perceived in a well-founded manner. A claimant with a psychiatric disability cannot be expected to react to certain events, properly perceived, in a manner entirely consistent with that of a normal, healthy individual. Id. at 57-58, 517 N.W.2d 1. In other words, [w]hile a claimant's perception of the event must be objectively well-founded, that same claimant's reaction to the event can be very atypical. Id. at 58, 517 N.W.2d 1. In Justice Brickley's view, the subjective component of § 301(2) insures continued recognition of employers' general obligation to `take employees as they find them.' We believe that Justice Brickley's analysis of the statutory language is correct.