Opinion ID: 2433485
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Judge-Conducted Death Qualification

Text: Nicklasson claims constitutional error from the trial court's limitation of his general voir dire and the solely-by-judge-conducted death qualification of the jury. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a ... public trial by an impartial jury. U.S. CONST. AMEND VI (1791). In [all] criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to ... a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county. MO. CONST. ART. I, SEC. 18(A). The United States Constitution requires only that the jury finally seated be impartial. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 2278, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988). Likewise, the state constitution requires only that the jury actually impaneled be impartial. Before addressing his claims, we note that Nicklasson does not assert in his brief before this Court that the jury which served to convict him of first degree murder was in any way impartial or unable to follow the law. 1. Voir Dire Introductory Comments Nicklasson claims that the trial court misled and confused the members of the venire in its introductory comments to each panel of the venire prior to death qualification. [1] Nicklasson alleges that the remarks were improper because: the instructions did not provide a definition of murder in the first degree; did not offer a meaningful definition of mitigating circumstances; [2] omitted descriptions of important steps of the process of jury consideration of punishment in the penalty phase of the trial; indicated that Nicklasson had to present mitigating evidence in order for the jury to consider a sentence less than death; and indicated that the defendant could present evidence comparing his crime to other capital cases and himself to other capital defendants. Nicklasson's claims are without merit. First, the quoted portions of the trial court's comments refute most of his assertions of error based on omission. Second, Nicklasson's brief fails to favor the Court with legal argument or authority tying his generalized assertions of error to specific prejudice. Absent such argument, there is nothing for the Court to review. State v. Isa, 850 S.W.2d 876, 900 (Mo. banc 1993). Finally, assuming arguendo, that the trial court misspoke in some way during its introductory presentation to the venire, the jury received proper instructions during the guilt and penalty phases of the trial correcting the trial court's earlier error before deliberations began. State v. Gray, 887 S.W.2d 369, 379 (Mo. banc 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1042, 115 S.Ct. 1414, 131 L.Ed.2d 299 (1995). The points are denied. 2. General Voir Dire Nicklasson claims the trial court erred in failing to allow the defense adequately to question the venire panels regarding the law and evidence the jury might hear on the issue of diminished capacity and in refusing to allow questioning of the potential jurors about the evidence of unadjudicated other crimes that the court had ruled were admissible in the penalty phase only. a. A few broad comments regarding voir dire are in order first. The purpose of voir dire is to determine which persons harbor bias or prejudice against either party which would make them unfit to serve as jurors. State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 60 (Mo. banc 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017, 108 S.Ct. 1755, 100 L.Ed.2d 217 (1988). [T]he examination of jurors as to their qualifications is conducted under the supervision of the trial court and the nature and extent of the questions counsel may ask are discretionary with that court. State v. Smith, 649 S.W.2d 417, 428 (Mo. banc), cert. denied., 464 U.S. 908, 104 S.Ct. 262, 78 L.Ed.2d 246 (1983). A defendant has a right, through the process of voir dire, to discover bias or prejudice on the part of prospective jurors. This is a right to participate in voir dire, not to dictate how voir dire is conducted. The trial court is vested with wide discretion in the conduct of voir dire. State v. Ramsey, 864 S.W.2d 320, 335 (Mo. banc 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1078, 114 S.Ct. 1664, 128 L.Ed.2d 380 (1994). Id. The nature and extent of questioning on voir dire is within the discretion of the trial judge. We review the trial court's actions for abuse of discretion. Where appellant claims the trial court abused its discretion, appellant has the burden of showing a real probability that he was thereby prejudiced. State v. Gray, 887 S.W.2d at 382. b. In support of his argument that he had a right to probe the venire more fully on diminished capacity and unadjudicated crimes, Nicklasson seizes language from State v. Young, 844 S.W.2d 541, 547 (Mo.App. 1992), and State v. Finch, 746 S.W.2d 607, 613 (Mo.App.1988). In Young , the court rebuffed a claim that the trial court had permitted too-broad voir dire by the state. The court said that [c]ounsel is afforded much latitude in probing the venire panel to determine preconceived prejudices which would prevent them from following the court's instructions. Young, 844 S.W.2d at 547. In Finch , the court found reversible error in the trial court's decision to limit inquiry into whether a potential juror would automatically believe a person who claimed to have been raped. The court said that [i]t is the rule in this state that a liberal latitude is allowed in the examination of the jurors on voir dire. The court also wrote, Litigants have the right, through the process of voir dire, to discover bias or prejudice on the part of prospective jurors and they should be allowed wide latitude in the search for open minded jurors. Finch, 746 S.W.2d at 613. Young and Finch cannot be read to permit the unfettered voir dire for which Nicklasson argues. Reading further in Young , we discover reference to State v. White, 699 S.W.2d 19 (Mo.App.1985). White says: No fixed and inflexible rule may be laid down which may in all cases determine the extent to which counsel may go in the examination of jurors upon voir dire. Such examination is conducted under the supervision of the trial court, and in such matters the court necessarily has considerable discretion. White, 699 S.W.2d at 21, citing State v. Crockett, 419 S.W.2d 22 (Mo.1967). We are back where we began, even giving Finch and Young their full due. The test of the adequacy of voir dire is whether the process permits the parties to discover bias, prejudice or some other form of impartiality on the part of potential jurors. The trial court abuses its discretion and reversal is required only if the voir dire permitted does not allow the discovery of bias, prejudice or impartiality in potential jurors. c.