Opinion ID: 3035332
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Seizure of Tyree’s Sneakers

Text: Tyree argues that the District Court erred in holding that he voluntarily consented to the seizure of his sneakers or that the seizure was justified based on exigent circumstances. Voluntariness “is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). The District Court’s determination that Tyree’s consent was voluntary is reviewed for clear error. United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 459 (3d Cir. 2003). Although there was a coercive element in Golazeski’s statement that Tyree would have to remain at the police station while he applied for a warrant, we deem the coercion minimal, given that exigent circumstances, i.e., “the possibility that evidence may be removed or destroyed . . . .” United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 366 (3d Cir. 2006), justified a warrantless seizure of Tyree’s shoes. Exigent circumstances “do not meet Fourth Amendment standards if the government deliberately creates them.” 1 Id. However, Tyree acknowledges Golazeski may have had probable cause for a magistrate to issue a search warrant for the shoes. Golazeski sought Tyree’s consent to obtain a dust impression, which consent he received, and also sought his consent to turn over the shoes. 1 The District Court stated that the exigent circumstances doctrine “would likely” justify the warrantless seizure of the shoes. App. at 9. Although it is unclear whether this constitutes a finding by the Court regarding the presence of an exigency, “we may affirm on any ground supported by the record . . . .” In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 385 (3d Cir. 2007). 9 After finding the impressions matched the footprint evidence, Golazeski had probable cause and he could reasonably believe that the highly-mobile sneaker evidence may be destroyed while awaiting the warrant. See United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir. 1973). Thus, the exigency arose “naturally or from reasonable police investigative tactics . . . .” Coles, 437 F.3d at 371. We reject Tyree’s challenge to the District Court’s denial of the motion to suppress.