Opinion ID: 1655581
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: DID THE CHANCELLOR ERRONEOUSLY BASE DISTRIBUTION OF THE OWENS' PROPERTY UPON ONE FACTOR RATHER THAN UPON ALL THE FACTORS OF FERGUSON v. FERGUSON?

Text: ¶ 11. Margaret alleges that the chancellor committed reversible error in basing the division of marital assets upon one factorfinancial contributions to the accumulation of marital propertyrather than upon all eight Ferguson factors. This Court finds that the chancellor's division of property did improperly focus only on Kenneth's economic contributions to the marriage, and accordingly we reverse the decision. ¶ 12. This Court has established equitable distribution of marital assets upon divorce as an automatic right and has delineated the following eight factors for consideration by the chancellor in equitably dividing such marital property: 1. Substantial contribution to the accumulation of the property. Factors to be considered in determining contribution are as follows: a. Direct or indirect economic contribution to the acquisition of the property; b. Contribution to the stability and harmony of the marital and family relationship as measured by quality, quantity of time spent on family duties and duration of the marriage; and c. Contribution to the education, training or other accomplishment bearing on the earning power of the spouse accumulating the assets; 2. The degree to which each spouse has expended, withdrawn or otherwise disposed of marital assets and any prior distribution of such assets by agreement, decree or otherwise; 3. The market value and the emotional value of the assets subject to distribution; 4. The value of the assets not ordinarily, absent equitable factors to the contrary, subject to such distribution, such as property brought to the marriage by the parties and property acquired by inheritance or inter vivos gift by or to an individual spouse; 5. Tax and other economic consequences, and contractual or legal consequences to third parties, of the proposed distribution; 6. The extent to which property division may, with equity to both parties, be utilized to eliminate periodic payments and other potential sources of future friction between the parties; 7. The needs of the parties for financial security with due regard to the combination of assets, income and earning capacity; and 8. Any other factor which in equity should be considered. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, 927-28 (Miss.1994). ¶ 13. Chancellors are to consider those factors on the record and are to support their decisions with findings of fact and conclusions of law for appellate review. Id. at 928. This Court has reversed decisions where, even though the chancellor may have actually applied the Ferguson factors, the chancellor failed to make specific findings on the record. Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 732 So.2d 876, 880-81 (Miss.1999). At the same time, not every case requires consideration of all eight of the factors. This Court has stated that the chancellor may consider only those factors he finds `applicable' to the property in question. Carrow v. Carrow, 741 So.2d 200, 202 (Miss.1999); see also Lindsey v. Lindsey, 749 So.2d 77, 80 (Miss.1999) (upholding chancellor's division of marital assets where chancellor only addressed factors relevant to case). However, in this case, there were certainly more Ferguson factors that were applicable other than just Kenneth's economic contributions. Accordingly, the chancellor should have addressed these factors on the record. ¶ 14. Although we reverse the trial court's decision due to the deficiency in applying the Ferguson factors, the equitable distribution argument will be addressed. While equitable distribution based upon those eight factors has long been established as a right in Mississippi, this Court has declined to interpret equitable distribution to mean equal distribution. Trovato v. Trovato, 649 So.2d 815, 818 (Miss.1995); Chamblee v. Chamblee, 637 So.2d 850, 863-64 (Miss.1994). In Chamblee, the Court emphasized that Mississippi is not a community property state.... This point cannot be stressed enough. Id. at 864. Divorcing parties also have no right to equal distribution even where the parties jointly accumulated the property. Pierce v. Pierce, 648 So.2d 523, 526 (Miss.1994). ¶ 15. Yet, even though spouses have no right to equal distribution, spouses are not prohibited from receiving a portion of marital assets acquired solely by the other spouse's financial contributions if that non-cash contributing spouse has made alternative contributions to the marriage. Draper v. Draper, 627 So.2d 302, 306 (Miss.1993). This Court in Draper stated that the chancellor is not limited to a consideration of the earning and cash contributions of each party to the accumulation of the property. It is sufficient contribution if one party renders services generally regarded as domestic in nature. Id. at 306. As this Court first noted in Hemsley, marital partners can be equal contributors whether or not they both are at work in the marketplace. Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So.2d 909, 915 (Miss.1994). In Hemsley this Court explained the basis for rewarding non-cash contributing spouses, stating that: in acquiring a marital estate, courts cannot tell who is the most important, the man or the woman. Presently the law often deals with a fiction that the parties are deemed to enter into marriage with two separate estates. Most parties enter into marriage with no estate and proceed to build an estate together. Therefore, in the event of a divorce, there is more often than not one estate. If the breadwinner happens to be the husband and [he] has all the property in his name, this serves to relegate the non-breadwinner wife to the equivalent of a maidand upon division of the marital estate entitled to a minimum wage credit for her homemaking service. We abandon such an approach. Id. at 915. In Ferguson this Court reiterated that point, commenting: Although contributions of domestic services are not made directly to a retirement fund, they are nonetheless valid material contributions which indirectly contribute to any number of marital assets, thereby making such assets jointly acquired. And, it must be remembered, the goal of the chancellor in a divorce case is to do equity.... When one spouse has contributed directly to the fund, by virtue of his/her labor, while the other has contributed indirectly, by virtue of domestic services and/or earned income which both parties have enjoyed rather than invested, the spouse without retirement funds in his/her own name could instead have been working outside the home and/or investing his/ her wages in preparation for his/her own retirement. When separate plans for each spouse are not in existence, it is only equitable to allow both parties to reap the benefits of the one existing retirement plan, to which both parties have materially contributed in some fashion. Ferguson, 639 So.2d at 934. This Court has consistently followed the approach set out in Hemsley and Ferguson, instructing chancellors to assume that one spouse's domestic contributions are equally as valuable as the contributions of the wage earning spouse. Johnson v. Johnson, 650 So.2d 1281, 1285-86 (Miss.1994); see also Hankins v. Hankins, 729 So.2d 1283, 1287-88 (Miss.1999) (stressing that spouse's domestic contributions are not to be valued at minimum wage).