Opinion ID: 762253
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Psychiatric Expert

Text: 14 Johnson repeatedly requested funds to retain a psychiatric expert. The trial court denied these requests, and petitioner presented no psychiatric evidence at either the guilt or sentencing phase of trial. The district court denied habeas relief, finding that Petitioner had failed to make the requisite preliminary showing that his sanity would be a significant factor at trial.
15 Due process requires that when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83, 105 S.Ct. 1087. The defendant must, however, show more than general allegations and undeveloped assertions. See Liles v. Saffle, 945 F.2d 333, 336 (10th Cir.1991). The question in a case such as this, where Ake was decided after trial but while direct appeal was pending, is whether, upon review of the entire record, the habeas petitioner could have made a threshold showing under Ake that his sanity at the time of the offense was to be a significant factor at trial. Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086, 1109 (10th Cir.1998). 16 We agree with the district court that petitioner does not make the threshold showing with respect to the guilt phase. He simply fails to present, upon consideration of the entire record, evidence that his sanity at the time of the offense was likely to be a significant factor at trial. Cf. Castro, 71 F.3d at 1513-14. Although petitioner offers an expert neuropsychological evaluation as evidence of the type of psychiatric testimony he would have presented, this report presents no evidence tending to demonstrate that he was incompetent at the time of the crime. See Moore, 153 F.3d at 1109.
17 Johnson further contends that the denial of funds for psychiatric assistance was unconstitutional in light of the State's use of the continuing threat aggravating circumstance. At the sentencing phase, the State did not present psychiatric evidence on the continuing threat aggravator. It presented evidence of Johnson's prior convictions on rape, robbery, and burglary charges as well as evidence of four unadjudicated offenses including rape, attempted rape, burglary, and robbery. We have held, however, that [a]n expert must be appointed if the State presents evidence, psychiatric or otherwise, of the defendant's future dangerousness or continuing threat to society during the sentencing phase, and the indigent defendant establishes the likelihood his mental condition is a significant mitigating factor. Castro, 71 F.3d at 1513 (emphasis added). 18 We conclude that Johnson has met the threshold showing of a likelihood that mental condition could have been a mitigating factor at the sentencing stage. See Moore, 153 F.3d at 1110. He presents us with a neuropsychological evaluation stating he could be treated ... in the prison setting in a way that would control his behavior and especially remove the risk of further dangerous behavior. Appellant's Br., App. 1, at 1-2. This statement, although general and conclusory, nevertheless rises to the level of evidence that arguably suggests if [Johnson] were to receive proper psychiatric treatment for his mental disorders, he would be less likely to commit future crimes and, in short, would be less dangerous to society. Moore, 153 F.3d at 1110. Thus, we conclude that Johnson has established his constitutional entitlement to mental health expert assistance at the sentencing phase of trial. See Castro, 71 F.3d at 1515. 19 The denial of this entitlement leads us to harmless error analysis, and, in this particular context, to the following inquiry: Do [we] harbor a significant doubt that this evidence would have caused at least one juror to choose life rather than death? Moore, 153 F.3d at 1110 (quoting Brecheen, 41 F.3d at 1373). In this case, we can see no such doubt. Unlike in Castro, the jury's only question during deliberations shows no confusion in determining whether Johnson's crime merited the death penalty. Compare Castro, 71 F.3d at 1516, with Moore, 153 F.3d at 1110-11. Nor are we presented with a situation, where reversal of the especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel aggravating circumstance left the jury with only the continuing threat circumstance. Cf. Castro, 71 F.3d at 1516. The jury in Johnson's case rejected the heinous, atrocious, and cruel circumstance, but found the aggravating circumstances of both continuing threat and previous violent felony convictions. As in Moore, most, if not all, of the evidence presented at the sentencing phase could ... have been properly considered by the jury, 153 F.3d at 1111, including Johnson's previous rapes and other violent crimes, as well as the manner of Thompson's death. Against the weight of that evidence, the mental health evidence Johnson presents to us now--none of which explains his murder of Thompson--fails to raise a significant doubt that it would have persuaded even one juror to choose the alternative sentence. See id.