Opinion ID: 1119473
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Heading: The General Relevance of BWS

Text: Evidence Code section 1107 makes admissible relevant expert testimony regarding BWS, including the physical, emotional, or mental effects upon the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of victims of domestic violence. The statute further allows that this evidence shall not be considered a new scientific technique whose reliability is unproven (Evid. Code, § 1107, subd. (b)), thus legislatively obviating the need to qualify the expert's testimony under the standards of People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 30 [130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240]. (See People v. Leahy (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587, 593-604 [34 Cal. Rptr.2d 663, 882 P.2d 321]; but see Ibn-Tamas v. United States (D.C. 1979) 407 A.2d 626, 655 (dis. opn. of Nebeker, J.); Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent (1986) 72 Va. L.Rev. 619, 630-643.) However, since section 1107 does not specifically abrogate Evidence Code section 801, we may assume that section's definition of the foundational prerequisites for expert testimony remains integral to the assessment of relevance. Thus, not only must the proponent establish the expert's qualifications (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (b); id., § 1107, subd. (b)), the testimony must [r]elate[] to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.... ( Id., § 801, subd. (a); People v. Cole (1956) 47 Cal.2d 99, 103-104 [301 P.2d 854, 56 A.L.R.2d 1435].) With respect to psychological states analogous to BWS, such as rape trauma syndrome and child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome, courts, including this one, have generally held expert opinion admissible for the same general reason defendants proffer testimony on BWS: to disabus[e] the jury of some widely held misconceptions about [the] victims, so that it may evaluate the evidence free of the constraints of popular myths. [Citations.] ( People v. Bledsoe (1984) 36 Cal.3d 236, 247-248 [203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 681 P.2d 291] [rape]; People v. Sanchez (1989) 208 Cal. App.3d 721, 735 [256 Cal. Rptr. 446] [child sexual abuse]; cf. People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1300-1302 [283 Cal. Rptr. 382, 812 P.2d 563] [expert testimony admissible to dispel misconceptions about reporting of child molestation].) Nevertheless, consistent with the fundamental requisite of relevancy, admissibility is not unqualified. For example, in child molestation cases the prosecution is obligated to `identify the myth or misconception the evidence is designed to rebut' and the testimony must be limited to exposing the misconception by explaining why the child's behavior is not inconsistent with his or her having been abused. [Citation.] ( People v. Bothuel (1988) 205 Cal. App.3d 581, 587 [252 Cal. Rptr. 596], overruled on other grounds in People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 348 [36 Cal. Rptr.2d 627, 885 P.2d 1040]; People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal. App.3d 385, 394 [249 Cal. Rptr. 886].) The jury should also be given a limiting instruction. ( People v. Bergschneider (1989) 211 Cal. App.3d 144, 159 [259 Cal. Rptr. 219].)