Opinion ID: 844212
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Biasing the jury toward the death penalty

Text: Defendant complains the court expressed a pro-prosecution bias during voir dire by suggesting it favored the death penalty and believed persons willing to impose the death penalty have more character or inner strength than persons who would choose against death. (6) [T]rial courts should be evenhanded in their questions to prospective jurors during the `death-qualification' portion of the voir dire, and should inquire into the jurors' attitudes both for and against the death penalty to determine whether these views will impair their ability to serve as jurors. ( People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 908-909 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93].) But the portion of the voir dire to which defendant refers here was not a part of the court's attempt to explore prospective jurors' attitudes toward the death penalty. Rather, the court was impressing on the prospective jurors that should they find defendant guilty, they would have no option but to impose a very serious penalty. It explained that if jurors found defendant was guilty of a murder committed during the course of a robbery, they would be required to impose a penalty of either life without the possibility of parole or death. The court then asked if prospective jurors would have difficulty imposing either penalty and whether in determining the penalty they would consider and weigh mitigating and aggravating factors. The court's remarks were designed to impress on the prospective jurors the gravity of their task; they entailed no suggestion that the court favored one penalty over the other, or favored the prosecution over the defense. In a related claim, defendant asserts the court during voir dire twice improperly insinuated a sentence of life without the possibility of parole might not mean defendant would be imprisoned for the rest of his life. Defendant somewhat mischaracterizes the court's comments. The court again was acknowledging that both death and life without the possibility of parole are significant penalties and explaining that if the trial reached the penalty phase, the jury would be required to choose one or the other. It explained that although it was impossible to guarantee the jury's verdict would be enforced, that uncertainty should not distract jurors from the gravity of their decision. The court thus explained that, generally speaking, a sentence of life without the possibility of parole means the defendant will spend his life in prison and will die there. It later stated: Previously I told you that for purposes of your decision, you have to assume that the government will keep the man locked up for his entire life and he'll die in prison. That's the assumption you have to make. We're not telling you and guaranteeing to you that that's true. We're simply trying to impose upon you the gravity of your responsibility as jurors. [¶] And with regards to that very strong gravity of your responsibility, you must assume that if you impose life without parole, that means what it says; if you impose the death penalty, that means that ultimately the death penalty will be carried out. The remarks were not made in a context that would convey to the prospective jurors that defendant might be released if the jury did not impose a verdict of death; the court was impressing on them that they would have no option but to impose one of two harsh penalties were they to return a verdict finding defendant guilty of first degree murder. Defendant complains the court rushed the jury toward a verdict of death by observing at the end of the guilt phase that juries generally have no reason to listen to all the testimony a second time. He cites the court's remark that the process of having the reporter read back testimony is time consuming and the court's request that the jury determine whether a rereading was necessary before asking for one. The court's words, spoken at the end of the guilt phase, did not suggest the court was biased toward death. Nor do we see anything in them rushing the jury toward a verdict or suggesting the jury could not ask for a rereading of the testimony if it wished. The court was simply explaining there was good reason to refrain from requesting a rereading if it would not be helpful. Any possible misunderstanding would in any event have been cured by the court's further explanation that it was not intending to dissuade the jury from receiving the testimony, and its admonishment that [y]ou may take as long or as brief a time as you need to reach a verdict. You are under absolutely no time requirements or constraints in reaching such a verdict. We conclude defendant is not entitled to reversal for judicial misconduct.