Opinion ID: 400932
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Posse Comitatus

Text: 39 Appellant Garcia argues that the involvement of Air Force officials in the surveillance of appellants' aircraft violates the doctrine of posse comitatus 32 as embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 1385. That statute proscribes use of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws except as expressly provided by Congress. Section 1385 has been interpreted as broadly prohibiting use of such military personnel to assist civil law enforcement officials in carrying out their duties. See, e.g., United States v. Red Feather, 392 F.Supp. 916, 922 (D.S.D.1975); United States v. Jaramillo, 380 F.Supp. 1375, 1379-80 (D.Neb.1974), appeal dismissed, 510 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1975); Wrynn v. United States, 200 F.Supp. 457, 464-65 (E.D.N.Y.1961). But cf. United States v. McArthur, 419 F.Supp. 186, 192-95 (D.N.D.1976), affirmed sub. nom. United States v. Casper, 541 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970, 97 S.Ct. 1654, 52 L.Ed.2d 362 (1977) (only exercise by military of regulatory, proscriptive, or complusory authority is prohibited by section 1385). 33 We need not address whether the government's activities in this case in connection with appellants' apprehension violated section 1385, however, since appellants did not raise this issue at trial. 34