Opinion ID: 1644479
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: As Modified, the Restrictiveness-Level-Needs-of-the-Child Analysis is an Appropriate Standard Through Which to Measure the Juvenile Court's Fulfillment of its Dispositional Duty

Text: Prior to the dissent in J.L.O. v. State, 721 So.2d 440, 442-43 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), Florida appellate decisions had not provided a cohesive, statutorily based legal standard to determine whether a juvenile court's stated departure reasons were legally sufficient and whether the departure disposition was the product of appropriate discretion. Without such a standard, the appellate courts lacked a viable basis for meaningful review to determine whether and how a departure disposition provided a juvenile with the most appropriate dispositional services in the least restrictive available setting. § 985.03(21), Fla. Stat. (2007). However, the dissent in that case provided a nascent, viable standard that would eventually become the majority approach in this state: Though the lower court has satisfied the statutory requirement of stating the reason for departing from the DJJ recommendation, common sense dictates that not just any reason will do. The reason must have reference to the characteristics of the restrictiveness level vis-à-vis the needs of the child. See § 985.03(45)(1997). J.L.O., 721 So.2d at 443 (Griffin, C.J., dissenting) (some emphasis supplied) (citation omitted). It became recognized that simply stating any reason that may be factually supported in the DJJ's comprehensive assessment and PDR is insufficient, standing alone, to justify departure under the statutory scheme constructed by the Legislature. Rather, the stated departure reasons must have reference to how the characteristics of the restrictiveness level relate to, and further, the needs of the child, while providing adequate protection to the public, because that is the animating purpose and requirement of the disposition hearing. To support this proposition, courts have relied, inter alia, on section 985.03(45), Florida Statutes (1997), [35] which separately delineated each level  from low-risk residential to maximum-risk residential  based on the needs and risks associated with the type of youth who should be committed at the specified level. See § 985.03(45)(a)-(e), Fla. Stat. (1997). Through subsequent refinement, this standard evolved into the following legal framework for reviewing the sufficiency of a juvenile court's decision to depart from the DJJ's disposition recommendation: A trial judge may not deviate from DJJ's recommendation at a juvenile delinquency disposition hearing simply because the judge disagrees with the recommendation. See K.M. v. State, 891 So.2d 619, 620 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). In order to deviate, a trial court must identify adequate reasons, grounded in the evidence, for disregarding the recommendation. See A.C.N.[ v. State ], 727 So.2d [368, 370 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)]. A judge may reweigh the same factors [that] the [DJJ] considered and come to a different conclusion. But, when the court does so, the court must set forth its reasons in the context of the needs of the child. E.S.B. v. State, 822 So.2d 579, 581 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). The judge's findings must have reference to the characteristics of the restrictiveness level vis-à-vis the needs of the child. Id. The judge must explain why the judge came to a different conclusion than the [DJJ], and explain why the new restrictiveness level is indicated. N.B. v. State, 911 So.2d 833, 835-36 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). The Second and Fifth Districts have also adopted this statutorily based approach. See, e.g., M.S. v. State, 927 So.2d 1044, 1046 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); P.R. v. State, 782 So.2d 911, 913 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). As we have explained, a complete reading of chapter 985's provisions supports a modified version of this standard. For a period of time, even the Fourth District followed this standard and held that the reasons set forth by the court for disregarding the recommendation level must reference the characteristics of the restrictiveness level vis-à-vis the needs of the child. See S.L.K. v. State, 776 So.2d 1062, 1064 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (citing A.C.N. v. State, 727 So.2d 368, 369 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)). Nevertheless, that district eventually receded from this position based on a claim that its prior articulation of the rule was dicta. See K.S. v. State, 835 So.2d 350, 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); see also E.A.R., 975 So.2d at 610-11; A.T., 983 So.2d at 679. Since that step back, the Fourth District has maintained that the text of section 985.433(7)(b), and its predecessors, does not require the juvenile court to reference the characteristics of the restrictiveness level vis-à-vis the needs of the child. See, e.g., E.A.R., 975 So.2d at 611-13. However, based on our research, the Fourth District has not construed the provisions of chapter 985 in pari materia or analyzed any of the underlying legislative intent and historical development that led to the enactment of these provisions. The Fourth District also has not articulated an alternative, statutorily based substantive standard to separate sufficient from insufficient departure reasons, which would thereby fulfill the Legislature's stated intent that the appellate courts of this state provide meaningful review of departure dispositions. See § 985.433(7)(b), Fla. Stat. (2007). Instead, the Fourth District has (1) expressed tepid support for a vague general concept of relatedness and (2) held that so long as the juvenile court's on-the-record departure reasons are supported by a preponderance of the evidence, the court has not abused its discretion in departing from the DJJ's recommended disposition. See, e.g., E.A.R., 975 So.2d at 611-13. The Third District does not appear to have taken an explicit stance on this issue, but has issued a decision holding that a juvenile court's departure reasons were not supported by a preponderance of evidence where the court departed from the DJJ's recommended disposition of a moderate-risk commitment and, instead, imposed a high-risk commitment: Although [the child] ran away from her foster home, she was not placed in a moderate-risk placement prior to the institution of the current proceedings and, therefore, never ran away from such placement. Thus, there is no evidence that a moderate-risk placement would be insufficient to keep [the child] under control. ... [S]ection 985.03(45)(c), provides [p]lacement in programs at [the high-risk residential] level is prompted by a concern for public safety that outweighs placement in programs at lower commitment levels. It is clear that the statute is referring to juveniles who have committed offenses of violence towards others such that they pose a genuine threat to the physical safety to members of the public. Although [the child's] activities were illegal, they did not pose a threat of physical harm and thereby require that [the child] be placed in a facility where she would have no access to the community. K.M. v. State, 891 So.2d 619, 620-21 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (citations omitted). Therefore, in K.M., the Third District partially analyzed the characteristics of the alternative restrictiveness levels, in light of the needs and risks of the child, to determine that the reasons supplied by the juvenile court (flight risk and threat to public safety) were not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. Such an analysis reinforces the conclusion that the only rational or logical means to exercise appropriate discretion and provide reasons explaining why one restrictiveness level is more appropriate than another  with regard to providing the most appropriate dispositional services in the least restrictive available setting  is to clarify the characteristics of the opposing restrictiveness levels and then explain why  in light of those differing characteristics  one level is better suited to serving the rehabilitative needs of the child and protecting the public from further acts of delinquency. Even when the juvenile court's departure reasons are stated on the record, and are supported by a preponderance of the evidence, they may nonetheless be insufficient to explain and justify how the court's departure decision provides the most appropriate dispositional services [for the child] in the least restrictive available setting. § 985.03(21), Fla. Stat. (2007). Tellingly, the Legislature has defined the various restrictiveness levels for the very purpose of promoting comparison and identifying the level that best suits the needs and risks of the child. See § 985.03(44)(a)-(e), Fla. Stat. (2007). The Fourth District's noncommittal approach does not provide a principled basis for separating permissible from impermissible departure reasons, fails to require a basis for meaningful appellate review, and, likewise, fails to further the Legislature's statutory objectives, which include the underlying requirements for a sound determination at a disposition hearing. See §§ 985.01-.02, 985.03(21), 985.433(7)(b), Fla. Stat. (2007). In contrast, as modified, the restrictiveness-level-needs-of-the-child standard fulfills the intent of the Legislature and harmonizes the relevant provisions of chapter 985. Therefore, based on a comprehensive reading of chapter 985, we reiterate and adopt the following modified analysis, quash the decision of the Fourth District in E.A.R. v. State, 975 So.2d 610 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), and disapprove its decision in A.T. v. State, 983 So.2d 679 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). The only rational or logical means through which the juvenile court may provide reasons that explain, support, and justify why one restrictiveness level is more appropriate than another  and thereby rationalize a departure disposition  is for the court to: (1) Articulate an understanding of the respective characteristics of the opposing restrictiveness levels including (but not limited to) the type of child that each restrictiveness level is designed to serve, the potential lengths of stay associated with each level, and the divergent treatment programs and services available to the juvenile at these levels; and (2) Then logically and persuasively explain why, in light of these differing characteristics, one level is better suited to serving both the rehabilitative needs of the juvenile  in the least restrictive setting  and maintaining the ability of the State to protect the public from further acts of delinquency. Simply listing reasons that are totally unconnected to this analysis does not explain why one restrictiveness level is better suited for providing the juvenile offender the most appropriate dispositional services in the least restrictive available setting. § 985.03(21), Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis supplied); see also §§ 985.03(44)(a)-(e), 985.433(7)(a)-(b) Fla. Stat. (2007). The failure to connect departure reasons to the juvenile court's ultimate statutory duty during a disposition hearing completely undermines the Legislature's carefully crafted statutory scheme. These reasons must establish by a preponderance of the evidence why the court is disregarding the assessment of the child and the restrictiveness level recommended by the [DJJ]. § 985.433(7)(b), Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis supplied). Simply regurgitating information provided by, and contained within, the DJJ's comprehensive assessment and PDR does not establish acceptable statutory reasons as to why the court is disregarding these documents and the DJJ's recommended disposition. Rather, such parroting merely communicates that the court concurs with the DJJ's assessment and PDR but then, for some unexplained, unarticulated reason, has imposed a judicially recrafted disposition. We conclude that simply parroting is insufficient to justify departure and that, instead, the juvenile court's stated reasons, must provide a legally sufficient foundation for disregarding the DJJ's professional assessment and PDR by identifying significant information that the DJJ has overlooked, failed to sufficiently consider, or misconstrued with regard to the child's programmatic, rehabilitative needs along with the risks that the unrehabilitated child poses to the public. These are suitable means of insuring fulfillment of the Legislature's comprehensive scheme and its stated intent that the juvenile courts of this state exercise appropriate discretion with the ultimate aim of providing the juvenile offender the most appropriate dispositional services in the least restrictive available setting. Accordingly, read in pari materia, the Legislature's statutory scheme discloses the following substantive measure of compliance with section 985.433(7)(b): (1) whether the juvenile court has employed the proper legal standard (as outlined above) in providing its on-the-record departure reasons; and, if so, (2) whether its stated reasons are supported by a preponderance of the competent, substantial evidence contained within the record. Cf., e.g., A.S. v. State, 934 So.2d 583, 584 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (expressing a competent, substantial evidence standard of review). Whether the circuit court has exercised appropriate discretion [36] in imposing a departure disposition is measured by this statutorily based imperative. This standard should not be applied mechanically or tautologically; instead, the appellate courts of this state should remain cognizant of the legislative intent that they provide meaningful review of juvenile departure dispositions. Cf. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966) (Meaningful review requires that the reviewing court should review. It should not be remitted to assumptions.). There is no room for boilerplate formalism on either the trial or appellate levels.