Opinion ID: 1496361
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: suspension is appropriate

Text: Having found that Mr. Madison violated each of the enumerated disciplinary rules, this Court turns to the question of the appropriate discipline. The ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1992 ed.) provide useful guidance in this regard. See, e.g., Belz, 258 S.W.3d at 39; Crews, 159 S.W.3d at 360-61. ABA Standard 3.0 states that a court will look at four primary factors in determining which sanction is appropriate: (1) the duty violated; (2) the lawyer's mental state; (3) the potential or actual injury the conduct caused; and (4) aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The definitions section of the ABA Standards provides that the term injury includes harm to the legal system or the profession, that acting with intent means having a conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result, and that acting with knowledge means a conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish that result. Id. Mr. Madison impugned the integrity of both judges in his letters and in his verbal address to the judge hearing the landlord tenant matter, violating Rule 4-8.2(a). He admitted at his hearing, and in this Court, that he intentionally sent these letters and continues to believe that they were appropriate and deserved. He has expressed no remorse. The letters were utterly without factual support. Mr. Madison made no attempt to correct what he perceived as legal errors or improprieties by the means provided for in lawappeal or the filing of a complaint with the disciplinary authorities. Mr. Madison did not limit his allegations about the judge who continued his case to her alone; he repeated many of his allegations to both lawyers and non-lawyers, including a television reporter, causing the judge and the court embarrassment and requiring them to explain what was a simple need to continue a case due to an inability of the judge to attend for personal, family reasons. Mr. Madison's accusations were made either intentionally or in reckless disregard for their truth. Under ABA Standards 6.13 and 6.23, a reprimand is appropriate only when the lawyer disrupts a tribunal negligently. That is the sanction imposed by this Court in Coe, 903 S.W.2d at 918, for conduct by an attorney disruptive to and disrespectful of the court in the course of a trial where the attorney had no dishonest motive, offered a profuse public apology and agreed to avoid similar misconduct. Similarly, in Westfall , although the attorney made disrespectful and unsupported comments to the press about a court with whose ruling he disagreed, the case involved an issue of first impression, and the attorney privately apologized. By contrast, ABA Standard 6.22 states that suspension is usually the appropriate sanction when a lawyer knowingly causes interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding. ABA Standards 6.1 and 6.12 state that suspension is appropriate when the case involves conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice or that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation to a court. Mr. Madison's conduct merits suspension, in the absence of consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors. Mr. Madison says mitigating factors are that he had reason for his conduct because the judges' conduct was wrong in both instances, that he was just trying to protect the interests of his clients, and that he has practiced without additional incident since these violations occurred in 2005. The DHP found, however, that Mr. Madison had selfish motives in making his comments. They arose from his desire to correct what he saw as purported transgressions by the judges, without regard to whether it would disrupt the tribunal or cause harm, and that this was part of a pattern of misconduct. His actions did not further any interest of his clientshe settled one case and failed to appeal the other. He simply satisfied his own need to vent his feelings, which were unsubstantiated by any facts known to him at the time he wrote his letters. His arguments in mitigation are without merit, other than the lack of additional misconduct since 2005. Aggravating circumstances clearly are present. Mr. Madison has a prior disciplinary history, including a reprimand arising out of a felony aggravated assault conviction. Even in this Court, he refused to acknowledge the wrongfulness of his conduct. He acted with a dishonest or selfish motive and displayed a pattern of misconduct. He has had substantial experience in the practice of law and knows what type of conduct is expected of a lawyer. These factors favor an increase in the appropriate sanction under ABA Standard 9.2 and under this Court's precedent. [9] A further aggravating circumstance occurred while this case was pending before the DHP, resulting in a disruption of the disciplinary proceedings. Mr. Madison decided that in order to present his side in the disciplinary action, he needed to take fairly in-depth video depositions of both judges. He stated that he planned to ask the judge who continued the case personal questions about why she was unable to attend court that day and to depose her husband so he could get to the truth of why she was not at court that day. Counsel for the judges tried to reach an agreement with Mr. Madison concerning the scope of the discovery, but Mr. Madison refused to sign an agreement to limit discovery. Mr. Madison also refused to sign an affidavit in which he would agree to refrain from using the videotaped deposition testimony for any purpose other than the disciplinary hearing. Because of this impasse, counsel for the judges sought a protective order, which was granted by the DHP's presiding officer, who ruled that the issue in the disciplinary action was Mr. Madison's conduct, not that of the judges. The protective order also provided that the depositions would be limited to relevant matters and that a deposition of the judge's husband would not be permitted. The parties stipulated that the depositions would be taken at the offices of the DHP's presiding officer and would be scheduled so that the presiding officer could be available to rule on any objections during the deposition that needed to be addressed immediately. The judges' depositions then were scheduled by agreement of the parties and their counsel. Ironically, when considered in light of the fact that the focus of three of Mr. Madison's letters was a judge's allegedly arbitrary failure to appear for a scheduled trial, Mr. Madison failed to appear at the scheduled deposition. At the time the deposition was to begin and with other participants present and waiting, he called the presiding officer and advised that he would not be attending. He said he did not have to give advance notice to any of the participants that he was not going to conduct the deposition because he never had provided a formal written deposition notice but rather simply had set a date and time informally for the deposition. In a subsequent telephone call, the presiding officer advised Mr. Madison that, as a result of the delay and inconvenience caused by his failure to appear, any future discovery would have to be arranged through the presiding officer. At this point, Mr. Madison began shouting and would not allow the presiding officer or anyone else to interject. Ultimately, the telephone conference had to be terminated because Mr. Madison continued to yell and refused to allow anyone else to speak. Unhappy with the ruling that future depositions would have to be scheduled with leave from the presiding officer, Mr. Madison then filed a motion to disqualify the presiding officer. In his motion, Mr. Madison went so far as to suggest that the presiding officer was also a part of the evil conspiracy in which he asserted one of the judges was involved. The panel overruled the motion. This Court agrees with the panel that Mr. Madison's inappropriate and uncooperative conduct toward the panel, his lack of respect for the tribunal shown through his shouting at the presiding officer and his failure to attend a deposition he had scheduled are properly considered as additional matters in aggravation. They are a continuation of the pattern Mr. Madison had established in his letters to the two judges discussed above of blaming any setback on a conspiracy against him and refusing to acknowledge the wrongfulness of his own conduct. Considering Mr. Madison's conduct in light of the aggravating and mitigating factors shown, and with knowledge of the sanctions imposed for similar conduct by other courts, this Court finds that a reprimand is insufficient. This Court directs that Mr. Madison be suspended from the practice of law without leave to reapply for six months and with the conditions on readmission set out below.