Opinion ID: 1576586
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutional Appellate Court Majority

Text: Preliminarily, we address plaintiff's argument attacking the appellate court's judgment as constitutionally invalid. Plaintiff contends for the Court of Appeal sitting en banc to modify or reverse a district court judgment, there must be a majority of the full complement of the elected court, not just those sitting. The First Circuit Court of Appeal consists of twelve elected judges. In an order dated July 2, 2008, the court clarified the July 18, 2008 docket was the court's en banc consideration of the case. Judge Hughes had previously recused himself in this matter, thus eleven judges considered and decided this case. In a split six to five decision, the Court of Appeal reversed in part and vacated in part the trial court's judgment. Plaintiff maintains six judges do not compose the constitutionally required majority of the full complement of the First Circuit Court of Appeal necessary to reverse or modify the district court judgment. In support of the argument, plaintiff relies upon Dauzat v. Allstate Ins. Co., 257 La. 349, 242 So.2d 539 (1970), specifically its conclusion when the Court of Appeal sits En banc, a judgment must be rendered by a majority of the full complement or membership of the Courtnot a majority of those sitting En banc. Id. at 546. In opposition, Entergy contends plaintiff's reliance on Dauzat is misplaced. In Dauzat, decided under the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, the court addressed a practice in the Third Circuit Court of Appeal meant to break ties when the then six-member court deadlocked while sitting en banc the elimination of one of the six judges by lot or chance. Dauzat, 242 So.2d at 547 (Barham, J., concurring). Justice Barham explained La. Const. art. VII, Sections 23 and 26 (1921), when read in pari materia, forced the conclusion that the chance method of breaking tie votes in the Court of Appeal was unconstitutional. Id. at 548. The relevant constitutional articles provided, in pertinent part:    Courts of appeal having more than three judges shall sit in rotating panels composed of three judges selected in conformity with the rules adopted by the court, two of whom constitute a quorum. However, in exceptional cases or when deemed necessary or expedient by the judges thereof, a court of appeal may sit en banc.    La. Const, art. VII, § 23 (1921). No judgment shall be rendered by any of the courts of appeal unless a majority of the judges sitting in the case have read the record and have concurred in the judgment. If for any reason they cannot concur, or if one or more of the judges are absent, recused, or unable to serve, they, or the remaining judges, may appoint district judges, or lawyers having the qualifications of judges of courts of appeal, to sit in the case. La. Const, art. VII, § 26 (1921). Entergy contends the Dauzat case created a constitutional fiction that regardless of the number of absences, if a Court of Appeal sat in a grouping of more than three, it necessarily sat en banc, because the 1921 Constitution did not allow any composition other than three or en banc. Entergy argues Dauzat is inapplicable in light of the 1974 constitution. Article V, Section 8 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution, unlike its predecessor, does not refer to the Court of Appeal sitting en banc, but states the appellate courts shall sit in panels of at least three judges. In a case decided after the adoption of the 1974 Constitution, ten judges of the First Circuit Court of Appeal, which was composed of twelve judges, participated in the decision, with six judges concurring in the judgment. McLaughlin v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 582 So.2d 203 (La. Ct.App. 1 Cir.1991), writ denied, 586 So.2d 536 (La.1991). That court held because the law did not require it to sit en banc, six judges constituted a majority because Art. V, section 8(A) and (B) of the 1974 Constitution requires the decree be rendered by a majority of those sitting. We begin our analysis with the relevant constitutional article, La. Const, art. V, § 8 (1974), which provides, in pertinent part: (A) Circuits; Panels. The state shall be divided into at least four circuits, with one court of appeal in each. Each court shall sit in panels of at least three judges selected according to rules adopted by the court. (B) Judgments. A majority of the judges sitting in a case must concur to render judgment. However, in civil matters only, when a judgment of a district court is to be modified or reversed and one judge dissents, the case shall be reargued before a panel of at least five judges prior to rendition of judgment, and a majority must concur to render judgment. Under this constitutional article, in deciding whether a majority is determined by the number of appellate judges participating in the decision, or by the full complement of the elected court regardless of the number actually participating in an en banc decision, we keep certain principles in mind. The starting point in the interpretation of constitutional provisions is the language of the constitution itself. Board of Directors of the Indus. Dev. Bd. of the City of Gonzales v. All Taxpayers, Prop. Owners, Citizens of the City of Gonzales, 05-2298, pp. 14-15 (La.9/6/06), 938 So.2d 11, 20; Ocean Energy, Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish Gov't, 04-0066, pp. 6-7 (La.7/6/04), 880 So.2d 1, 7. When a constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, its language must be given effect. City of Gonzales, 05-2298 at p. 15, 938 So.2d at 20; Ocean Energy, 04-0066 at p. 7, 880 So.2d at 7. Unequivocal constitutional provisions are not subject to judicial construction and should be applied by giving words their generally understood meaning. Id. The constitutional language at issue requires [a] majority of the judges sitting in a case must concur to render judgment. The clear and unambiguous language requires only a majority of the judges sitting in a case to render a judgment. To ascertain the ordinary, usual, and commonly understood meaning of a word not otherwise defined in the constitution, we look first to a legal dictionary, given that sitting is a term of art in the judicial context. See, Caddo-Shreveport Sales and Use Tax Comm'n v. Office of Motor Vehicles through Dep't of Public Safety and Corrections, 97-2233, p. 7, (La.4/14/98), 710 So.2d 776, 780. With reference to a judge, sit[ting] is defined to hold court or perform official functions. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1513 (9th ed.2009). Thus, the logical and clear interpretation of the phrase in La. Const, art. V, § 8(B) (1974) is a majority of the judges holding court or performing official (judicial) functions must concur to render a judgment. A recused judge has no power or authority to act in a case. State v. Wilson, 362 So.2d 536, 538 (La.1978); State v. Price, 274 So.2d 194, 197 (La.1973). To include a recused judge, who is not sitting in the case and who has no power to act in the case in the mathematical determination of what constitutes a majority of the judges sitting in [the] case would do violence to the plain and unambiguous meaning of the constitutional language. Moreover, there is no mention of appellate courts sitting en banc in Article V, Section 8. The constitution mandates the appellate courts shall sit in panels of at least three judges and further mandates in civil cases, where one judge dissents in a three judge panel from the modification or reversal of the district court judgment, the case shall be reargued before a panel of at least five judges . . . and a majority must concur to render judgment. There is nothing in the language of La. Const, art. V, § 8 (1974) to reasonably support a finding when the court of appeal sits en banc with a member recused, the number of judges constituting a majority is determined by the full complement of the court, rather than the number of judges sitting in the case. Although Dauzat held when sitting en banc, the vote of a majority of the judges on the court rather than a majority of those sitting was necessary to render a decision, there is a significant distinction between Dauzat and the case sub judice. Under the 1921 Constitution, the Court of Appeal could sit in only two compositions: in panels of three or en banc. The present constitution no longer restricts the appellate courts to compositions of three judge panels or en banc. The appellate courts are mandated to sit in panels of at least three judges, thus permitting the appellate courts to sit in compositions of any number as long as at least three are sitting. Therefore, we find Dauzat is not binding; it interpreted constitutional provisions that have been significantly changed. The only other jurisprudence from our court addressing the constitutional language at issue here is Pattan v. Fields, 95-2338, 95-2341, 95-2342 (La.9/25/95), 661 So.2d 142 (per curiam) . That election case concerned a candidate qualification challenge in which only nine of the thirteen members of the First Circuit Court of Appeal participated, with three judges not participating and one judge unaccounted for. Because it was statutorily required under the Election Code for the appellate court to sit en banc, we find that decision is limited to that particular statute, especially as the per curiam contains no analysis or examination of the language in La. Const, art. V, § 8(B) (1974). We find the appellate court decision was constitutionally valid and now turn to plaintiff's argument as to whether the trial court correctly found the addendum was not a valid contract because it was not hand-signed by Entergy, the primary reason invoking our discretion to grant this writ.