Opinion ID: 2445590
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The History of CJP Section 12-202

Text: Importantly, the original form of Section 12-202 used very narrow language in limiting this Court's jurisdiction. The law, as enacted in 1966, read: [I]f it shall be made to appear to the Court of Appeals upon petition of any party, whether a defendant or the State, that a review is desirable and in the public interest, the Court of Appeals shall require, by certiorari or otherwise, any such case to be certified to the Court of Appeals for its review and determination, except no such petition shall be entertained by the Court of Appeals from the denying or granting by the Court of Special Appeals of an application for leave to prosecute an appeal in post conviction and defective delinquent proceedings and from the denying or granting by the Court of Special Appeals of a petition for review filed under § 21 of this article. Maryland Code (1957, 1966 Cum.Supp.), Art. 5, § 21A (emphasis added). When Section 21A was recodified as CJP Section 12-202 in 1973, the Governor's Commission to Revise the Annotated Code stated that the recodification was merely a rearrangement of present law for which no changes [were] made. The Governor's Commission to Revise the Annotated Code, Report No. 3B to the General Assembly of Maryland at 3 (21 Sept. 1972) (hereafter Report No. 3B). Despite this reassurance to the legislators, the revision to the language of Section 12-202, enacted by Chapter 2 of the Acts of the First Special Session of 1973, included the following, revised language: No review by way of certiorari may be granted by the Court of Appeals in a case or proceeding in which the Court of Special Appeals has denied or granted leave to appeal. This change introduced an ambiguity because it used language suggesting a substantive change, and a more expansive scope for Section 12-202. The Revisor only worsened this ambiguity when it commented: [T]he Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction at all to review cases in these categories. The present language refers in terms only to actions denying or granting leave to appeal or a writ of certiorari; it does not expressly prohibit review of a decision rendered after certiorari, for example, has been granted. General Revisor's Note, Laws of Maryland, First Special Session of 1973, at 354 (emphasis added). This misinterpretation appears to be based on some unnamed conversation with a person associated with the Court of Appeals, perhaps the Clerk of Court, as it added the following rather unusual notation: The revisor is informed that this view of the statute was adopted by the Court of Appeals when it withdrew its order granting certiorari in Cherry v. State, 9 Md.App. 416 [264 A.2d 887] (1970). Id. It appears that the author of the Revisor's Note thought that the 1973 clarifying changes in language were offered by the Recodification Commission in an attempt to follow what the Revisor perceived to be the understanding of the Court of Appeals, rather than some legislative will to change the Court's jurisdiction from that set forth in the previous version of the statute. I submit that the change made to Section 12-202 during recodification was an unorthodox attempt by the Revisor to incorporate into the plainly-worded statute an interpretation of that section expressed by someone associated with the Court of Appeals, but never stated in any opinion issued by this Court. The Revisor's unusual note cites as authority for this change, an order of the Court unaccompanied by an opinion, which denied certiorari after originally granting it. The Revisor, in doing so, departs from the Governor's Commission's explicit statement that the amendment to the statute was a mer[e] rearrangement of the language without substantive change. See Report No. 3B. In a recent case we observed that, in the context of a recodification, the legislature, believing the Revisor's note to be accurate, may well follow it, even when it is erroneous. See Parker v. State, 402 Md. 372, 393-394, 936 A.2d 862, 875 (2007). [4] This was the stance we took when addressing the 1973 recodification to Section 12-202 in the decade after its enactment. This Court was first called upon to reconcile the 1973 changes to the language of the statute, with its limited purpose and this Court's otherwise expansive certiorari jurisdiction in Jourdan v. State, 275 Md. 495, 341 A.2d 388 (1975). In Jourdan, we addressed the effect of Section 12-202 on our jurisdiction, but only in a footnote. There, the trial court set aside a criminal conviction, and the State applied to the CSA for leave to appeal. Id. at 505, 341 A.2d at 394. In that case, like here, the CSA granted leave to appeal and transferred the case to its regular appeals docket. Id. The CSA thereafter reversed the trial court decision, and we granted certiorari to review the decision on the merits. Id. at 506, 341 A.2d at 394. On the subject of jurisdiction, we simply said in a footnote: Under Maryland Code (1974), § 12-202(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, this Court has no jurisdiction to review a decision of the Court of Special Appeals granting or denying leave to appeal in a post conviction proceeding. However, once the Court of Special Appeals grants leave to appeal in such a case and transfers the case to its appeal docket, the matter takes the posture of a regular appeal, and we do have jurisdiction under § 12-201[ [5] ] of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article to review the Court of Special Appeals' decision on the appeal itself. Id. at 506 n. 4, 341 A.2d at 394-395 n. 4. The issue came up again two years later in Moss v. Director, 279 Md. 561, 569, 369 A.2d 1011, 1016 (1977) (Orth, J., dissenting) when it was raised sua sponte by Judge Orth in his dissent: To me, there is no ambiguity whatsoever in the dictates of § 12-202. The plain and certain language leaves nothing to be construed or interpreted. The sure legislative intent is clearly expressed in the command that [n]o review by way of certiorari may be granted by the Court of Appeals in a case or proceeding in which the Court of Special Appeals has denied or granted ... leave to appeal in any of the three specified proceedings, one of which is the proceeding herea defective delinquent proceeding. The Court of Appeals has acknowledged that it has no jurisdiction to review a decision of the Court of Special Appeals granting or denying leave to appeal under § 12-202 in a post conviction proceeding. Jourdan v. State, 275 Md. 495, 506, n. 4, 341 A.2d 388 (1975), Smith, J. dissenting on other grounds. But the Court justified review, despite the provisions of the statute[.] Id. at 570-571, 369 A.2d at 1016-1017. The Moss majority opinion did not respond to the dissent's jurisdictional argument, and simply made its ruling on the merits. Shortly after Moss, the leading case on this jurisdictional issue, Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 438 A.2d 1301 (1981), was written by Judge Eldridge. The Court in Williams declined to interpret Section 12-202 according to the recodified language, and instead confirmed Jourdan's narrow interpretation. Id. at 208-11, 438 A.2d 1301, 1304-05. The appeal arose after a criminal defendant challenged his conviction under the Post Conviction Procedure Act, and the post-conviction trial court granted the defendant a new trial. Id. at 204, 438 A.2d at 1302. The CSA granted the State's request for leave to appeal and remanded to the trial court for reconsideration. Id. Williams then sought writ of certiorari from this Court to appeal the remand, which we granted. Id. at 205, 438 A.2d at 1302. In rejecting the State's argument in Williams that Section 12-202 deprived this Court of jurisdiction to hear post-conviction cases at all [6] our language was unmistakably clear in articulating the very limited scope of the jurisdictional restriction set forth in Section 12-202 [W]e reaffirm the holdings in Jourdan and Moss that the limitation upon this Court's jurisdiction set forth in § 12-202 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article relates only to the action of the Court of Special Appeals in granting or denying an application for leave to appeal. Except for the nonreviewability of that specific action, we have jurisdiction over the type of cases listed in § 12-202 to the extent that such jurisdiction is conferred by § 12-201 or other statutory provisions. Therefore, in the present case, although we may not review the Court of Special Appeals' exercise of discretion in granting the State's application for leave to appeal, we are authorized to review that court's decision on the merits remanding the case to the trial court. Id. at 210-11, 438 A.2d at 1305 (emphasis added). To support this departure from the language of the statute, Judge Eldridge relied on precedent and legislative acquiescence to judicial decisions: The Legislature has re-enacted with amendments § 12-202 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article on two occasions since the Jourdan case was decided in July 1975. See Ch. 678, § 4, of the Acts of 1977 and Ch. 311, § 3, of the Acts of 1977. It has also amended the Post Conviction Procedure Act twice since 1975. See Ch. 678, § 1, of the Acts of 1977 and Ch. 472, § 6, of the Acts of 1976. On none of these occasions did the Legislature change the interpretation of those statutes set forth by this Court in Jourdan. The General Assembly is presumed to be aware of this Court's interpretation of its enactments and, if such interpretation is not legislatively overturned, to have acquiesced in that interpretation. This presumption is particularly strong whenever, after statutory language has been interpreted by this Court, the Legislature re-enacts the statute without changing in substance the language at issue. Under these circumstances, it is particularly inappropriate to depart from the principle of stare decisis and overrule our prior interpretation of the statute. Id. at 209-10, 438 A.2d at 1305 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In subsequent cases involving Section 12-202, we applied the holdings of Jourdan and Williams to different factual circumstances, although never in a case involving Section 12-203 bypass jurisdiction. See, e.g., Sherman v. State, 323 Md. 310, 311, 593 A.2d 670, 670 (1991) (holding that § 12-202 bars jurisdiction when the CSA has simply denied an application for leave to appeal in a post-conviction proceeding); Cianos v. State, 338 Md. 406, 407, 659 A.2d 291, 292 (1995) (holding that Section 12-202 does not apply where the Court of Special Appeals addresses the merits in a denial); Grayson v. State, 354 Md. 1, 12, 728 A.2d 1280, 1285 (1999) (holding that 12-202 does not bar jurisdiction where the Court of Special Appeals decisions were not simply discretionary determinations that there should be no appeals.)