Opinion ID: 2973824
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: White’s motion to dismiss the Indictment

Text: This Court generally reviews for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of 4 a motion to dismiss an indictment. See United States v. Middleton, 246 F.3d 825, 841 (6th Cir. 2001). It does not appear that any cases from this Circuit have specifically addressed the standard of review on a motion to dismiss based on the IADA’s speedy clock provision. The Second Circuit has held that a district court’s legal conclusions under the IADA are subject to de novo review. See United States v. Paredes-Batista, 140 F.3d 367, 374 (2d Cir. 1998). The First Circuit has determined that the same standard of review applies to a district court’s decision to dismiss an indictment under the IADA as is employed in analogous cases under the Speedy Trial Act: the district court’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, its factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and its ultimate ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Kelley, 402 F.3d 39, 41 (1st Cir. 2005). Article III(a) of the IADA provides in pertinent part: Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party State, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party State any untried indictment, information, or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred and eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information, or complaint. . . . The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time 5 remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decision of the State parole agency relating to the prisoner. 18 U.S.C. App. § 2, Art. III(a). If these conditions are complied with and the defendant is not brought to trial within 180 days as provided in the IADA, Article V(c) requires that the indictment against that defendant be dismissed. See 18 U.S.C. App. § 2, Art. V(c). White contends that he triggered IADA’s protection on or before February 22, 2004, when his speedy trial demand was sent to the officials at CCI. Because the Government did not bring him to trial within 180 days of that date (by August 22, 2004), therefore, the indictment must be dismissed. White claims that the IADA apparently does not specifically govern a situation in which a defendant makes a proper request in the custodial State, but the request is not made known to the receiving State. He asserts that the apparent fault of the custodial State to follow proper IADA procedures should not prejudice a defendant who does everything in his control to initiate proper proceedings. White notes that this Court has held, “When the prisoner has done everything possible to comply with the IAD, and it is the custodial state that is responsible for the prisoner’s default, then strict compliance with the IAD may not be required.” See Norton v. Parke, 892 F.2d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 1989). 6 White claims the district court recognized that he contacted that court through his request for information to file a speedy trial request, and that the custodial State, CCI, failed to comply with its obligations pursuant to the IADA. He notes, however, that the district court cited Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 51 (1993), and ParedesBatista, 140 F.3d 367, for the proposition that the 180-day clock does not begin to run until both the district court and the prosecutor have received the prisoner’s request for a speedy trial. White asserts this Court and other courts have determined that substantial compliance may be sufficient in some circumstances. See Norton, 892 F.2d at 481; see also United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 186-87 (3d. Cir. 1998) (observing that although strict compliance with Article III’s requirements has typically been required, it has recognized that such compliance may not be required if the prisoner has complied to the extent possible, and the state is responsible for the default.). White further notes that in Gibson v. Klevenhagen, 777 F.2d 1056, 1058 (5th Cir. 1985), the Fifth Circuit concluded that by writing a letter to the prosecutor in which he asked for a final disposition of his case and seeking relief pursuant to the IADA from the department of corrections, the defendant had substantially complied with the IADA. White contends that by signing a request for a speedy trial at CCI and by writing the clerk’s office to inquire about initiating proper speedy trial procedures, he 7 substantially complied with the IADA. Accordingly, White requests that this Court reverse the district court and that the indictment be dismissed on remand. The Government notes that the United States Supreme Court has made clear that the IADA’s 180-day speedy trial clock does not begin to run until both the prosecuting attorney’s office and the court in the charging jurisdiction actually receive the speedy trial request from the institution where the individual is being held. See Fex, 507 U.S. at 52. This is consistent with the text of the statute. See id. The Government states that it is undisputed that neither its office nor the district court received White’s CCI speedy trial request made on February 22, 2004 until July 14, 2004, when the request was attached to a pleading. The Government claims that the state institution’s failure to forward White’s request does not alter the IADA’s requirements or the application of Fex’s holding. It further notes that the Second Circuit has held that even if the fault rested with the Marshal’s Service, the 180-day clock does not begin to run until both the district court and the United States Attorney’s Office receive the prisoner’s speedy trial request. See Paredes-Batista, 140 F.3d at 374 (“Even if we were to accept arguendo that delivery of the request to the U.S. Marshals’ office . . . was sufficient under a theory of agency to constitute delivery to the ‘prosecuting officer’ . . . as Batista urges, that request did not become effective and start the 180-day clock until it was also delivered to the district court.”). 8 The Government notes that White makes policy arguments pursuant to United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 350 (1978), based on the Supreme Court’s language that efforts should be made “to accomplish the disposition of detainers as promptly as possible,” and “principles of interstate comity in the settlement of detainers” should be observed. The Government contends, however, that the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Fex, 507 U.S. at 52, is the controlling authority that the 180day IADA clock starts when the speedy trial request is delivered to the prosecutor and the district court. Moreover, the Government alleges that this result is supported by the plain language of the IADA. See 18 U.S.C. App. § 2, Art. III(a). The Government asserts that the dismissal of an indictment when the prosecutor had no notice of a speedy trial request and therefore could not comply would be inconsistent with IADA’s spirit of cooperation between prosecuting authorities. The Government further claims that the district court properly concluded that after CCI failed to deliver White’s February 22, 2004 speedy trial request, none of White’s subsequent actions can fairly be characterized as notice of a speedy trial request. His letter mailed to the Clerk of the District Court requesting information about the pending federal detainer was not received by the Government, nor placed in the court’s docket. That letter did not include his CCI speedy trial request nor did it make a request for a speedy trial. 9 The Government alleges that White’s reliance on Gibson, 777 F.2d at 1058, is misplaced because that Fifth Circuit decision has been trumped by Fex. Additionally, Gibson is factually distinguishable because White did not make a speedy trial request of the prosecutor in this case. The Government contends that because July 14, 2004 is the date on which White delivered his speedy trial request to the district court and the Government, the district court correctly held that the IADA’s 180-day clock began to run on that date. Consequently, the time to bring White to trial on the indictment had not expired at the time he moved to dismiss the indictment on November 10, 2004. White entered his guilty plea on December 17, 2004, almost one month before the Government claims that the 180-day clock would have expired on January 14, 2005. The Government contends, therefore, that the district court did not err in denying White’s motion to dismiss. This case is controlled by the Supreme Court’s decision in Fex. We conclude there was no violation of the 180-day time period in the IADA. White’s speedy trial request at CCI did not constitute notice “to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court.” 18 U.S.C. App. § 2, Art. III(a). Pursuant to the plain language of the IADA, therefore, the Government did not violate the 180-day speedy trial clock of the IADA. White’s speedy trial request was not made to the prosecutor and the 10 appropriate court, as is required by the IADA. Id. Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that the applicable language of IADA is to be literally read. See Fex, 507 U.S. at 52 (“We hold that the 180-day time period in Article III(a) of the IAD does not commence until the prisoner’s request for final disposition of the charges against him has actually been delivered to the court and prosecuting officer of the jurisdiction that lodged the detainer against him.”). Even assuming that substantial compliance with the IADA may sometimes be permissible, we conclude that this is not such a case. It would be unfair to penalize the Government in this case when neither the U.S. Attorney’s Office nor the district court received notice of White’s speedy trial request of CCI officials. Because the request was actually delivered to the prosecutor and the court on July 14, 2004 and White pled guilty less than 180 days later, we find that there was no violation pursuant to the IADA. Accordingly, the district court committed no error in denying White’s motion to dismiss the indictment.