Opinion ID: 585447
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Attorney's Fees Under the Social Security Act

Text: 9 We review a district court's decision regarding attorney's fees under the Social Security Act for an abuse of discretion. Starr v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 872, 873 (9th Cir.1987). 10 In Starr v. Bowen, we set forth the method for establishing the proper attorney's fee under the Social Security Act as follows: 11 The district court's analysis should initially begin with the Supreme Court's directive that [t]he most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); see also Greater Los Angeles Coun[cil] on Deafness v. Community Television, 813 F.2d 217, 221 (9th Cir.1987). After calculating this lodestar amount, the district court may adjust the fee by considering the factors identified in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951, 96 S.Ct. 1762, 48 L.Ed.2d 195 (1976): 12 (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the undesirability of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases. 13 Id. at 70; see also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. at 1940 n. 9 (noting that the district court may also consider the twelve factors in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.1974), which were expressly adopted by this court in Kerr). 14 Id. at 874 (footnote omitted). 15 In Starr, the record did not show that the district court had evaluated the fee award by considering the appropriate factors. We therefore vacated the district court's fee award and remanded the case for a detailed inquiry into the reasonableness of the fee award in light of the Hensley and Kerr factors. Id. at 874; see also Straw v. Bowen, 866 F.2d 1167, 1170-71 (9th Cir.1989) (remanding to district court for consideration of factors outlined in Kerr ). 16 The district court in this case did not provide any reasons for its decision to award attorney's fees in the amount of $3,760, reflecting an award of thirty-five hours of time spent at the approximate rate of $107 per hour. For example, we do not know if the court considered the fact that this was a contingent fee case. It appears that the court simply adopted the fee urged by the Government in its opposition to attorney's fees under the EAJA. We therefore vacate the Social Security fee award, and remand to the district court for a decision and findings consistent with Starr. 17 AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.