Opinion ID: 2994901
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ellsworth’s Sixth Amendment Claim

Text: The Supreme Court has held that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment/1 includes the right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of the trial. Allen, 397 U.S. at 338. This constitutional right to presence, though rooted in the Sixth Amendment, is protected by the Due Process Clause in some situations were the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him. United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985). But the constitutional right to presence is not implicated per se by a judge’s ex parte communication with the jury during deliberations. Verdin, 972 F.2d at 1481-82. [T]he mere occurrence of an ex parte conversation between a trial judge and a juror does not constitute a deprivation of a constitutional right. The defense has no constitutional right to be present at every interaction between a judge and a juror, nor is there a constitutional right to have a court reporter transcribe every such communication. Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526 (quoting Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 125-26 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring)). Accordingly, the due process right to be present at each and every communication between the judge and jury is implicated only when such presence ’has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of [a defendant’s] opportunity to defend against the charge . . . to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence.’ Verdin, 972 F.2d at 1482 (quoting Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526) (omission in original). The defendant’s right is violated only where his absence renders the trial fundamentally unfair in light of the entire proceedings. United States v. Widgery, 778 F.2d 325, 330 (7th Cir. 1985). Thus, the proper inquiry is whether the ex parte communication had a prejudicial effect on the defendant, Verdin, 972 F.2d at 1482, and so infect[ed] the trial process as to make the trial as a whole fundamentally unfair, id. at 1480 (quoting district court opinion). Initially Ellsworth argues that the Indiana Court of Appeals applied a rule that was contrary to the law as set forth by the United States Supreme Court because Supreme Court precedent required that the ex parte communication be deemed presumptively prejudicial. Ellsworth contends that the Supreme Court has held that any ex parte communication with the jury is presumptively prejudicial, Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954). Remmer, however, is distinguishable from this case. In Remmer an unnamed third party contacted a juror and suggested that he could profit by bringing in a verdict favorable to the petitioner. Id. at 228. Ellsworth cites no other Supreme Court precedent to establish the proposition that any ex parte contact between a judge and jury creates a presumption of prejudice, and Gagnon suggests that, at the least, ex parte communications between the judge and the jury are not per se unconstitutional. See Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526 ([t]he mere occurrence of an ex parte conversation between a trial judge and a juror does not constitute a deprivation of a constitutional right); see also Widgery, 778 F.2d at 330 ([o]nly a trial fundamentally unfair in light of the entire proceedings violates the open-ended aspect of the constitutional protection. Widgery’s trial was generally conducted according to the rules, and a single glitch in a lengthy trial does not create constitutional error.). In any event, we need not resolve this issue because Ellsworth’s characterization of the Indiana Appellate Court’s decision is obviously misconstrued to the benefit of the defendant. The Indiana Appellate Court noted several times that an inference of prejudice arises from an ex parte communication. The court wrote that [a]n inference of prejudice arises from an ex parte communication and this inference creates a rebuttable presumption that an error has been committed. Rebuttal of the inference deems the error harmless. Later the court reiterated this statement, noting that [a]lthough the judge’s response to the notes creates a rebuttable presumption that error was committed, the judge’s communication had no effect upon the jury’s ability to come to a fair determination of the case (emphasis added). Thus, the Indiana Appellate Court did (whether or not it was so required) give Ellsworth the presumption that the ex parte communication was prejudicial. Instead, the Indiana Appellate Court, after weighing the facts and applicable case law, determined that the error was harmless, noting that the jury’s requests do not indicate a disagreement as to the testimony relating to the exhibits . . . [and] the judge’s communication had no effect upon the jury’s ability to come to a fair determination of the case. This finding is not contrary to the law as articulated by the Supreme Court, as the Supreme Court has consistently held that the government may show that the ex parte contact was harmless. Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 120 (1983); Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229. There is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or more jurors do not have occasion to speak to the trial judge about something . . . . The lower federal courts’ conclusion that an unrecorded ex parte communication between trial judge and juror can never be harmless error ignores these day-to- day realities of courtroom life and undermines society’s interests in the administration of criminal justice. Rushen, 464 U.S. at 118-19. Accordingly, Ellsworth’s claim that the Indiana Appellate Court’s decision was contrary to the law as set forth by the United States Supreme Court is without merit. In the alternative, Ellsworth contends that the Indiana Appellate Court’s finding that the trial judge’s error was harmless involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. In support, Ellsworth cites to Fillipon v. Albion Vein Slate Co., 250 U.S. 76 (1919). But Ellsworth’s reliance upon Fillipon is misplaced. In Fillipon a judge, without informing counsel, responded to a jury question regarding the law of contributory negligence with an instruction that erroneously stated the law. Id. at 80-82. The facts of this case markedly differ. Here, the jury requested for review several police reports (which were not received in evidence) and certain exhibits (which were). The judge merely informed the jury, correctly we add, that the police reports were not received in evidence and that the exhibits were. As such, the judge did not provide the jury with any additional instructions, much less direction as to how to deliberate. Thus, the communication, in addition to being factually accurate, was merely routine. With regard to a criminal defendant’s right to be present, the Supreme Court has instead stated that a defendant suffers a Constitutional violation to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only. Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526. Still, Ellsworth presses the argument that if counsel had been made aware of the jury’s notes, he could have suggested responses other than what the judge provided; and if he had (assuming they were an accurate application of the case law), they would have benefitted his defendant client. Therefore, Ellsworth argues he was prejudiced by the trial judge’s failure to allow his counsel to suggest alternate responses to the jury’s questions. His argument is based on a foundation of quicksand, and is nothing more than mere speculation. Ellsworth does not suggest what this response might have been--or how the failure to give it prejudiced him. Further, he never suggests in what way the jury’s deliberations might have been altered--or even, as the Indiana Appellate Court noted, that there was some disagreement in the jury that would have been resolved differently--if his counsel had been allowed to give an alternate response to the jury’s inquiry regarding the police reports. The trial judge’s responses were accurate, and, moreover, were standard responses to simple questions. In Verdin and Widgery, this court was confronted with similar factual situations. In Verdin we concluded that a state judge’s answer to the jury’s question regarding verdict forms was a brief procedural remark that did not mislead the jury . . . and that fairness and justice were not thwarted by Mr. Verdin’s absence at the exchange. Verdin, 972 F.2d at 1482 (citing Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526). Thus, the ex parte communication did not have sufficient prejudicial effect to rise to the level of a due process violation. Id. Similarly, in Widgery we concluded that a judge’s ex parte responses to an accusation by a jury member of another juror’s intoxication and a question about hypothetical deadlock was a single glitch in a lengthy trial [that did] not create constitutional error. Widgery, 778 F.2d at 330 (citing Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522). Ellsworth fails to distinguish how the routine response given by the judge in this case is any different than those provided in Verdin and Widgery, which we deemed harmless. Accordingly, Ellsworth’s claim that the Indiana Appellate Court’s unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent to determine that the trial judge’s error was harmless is also without merit. The district court’s denial of Ellsworth’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is AFFIRMED. /1 The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment was made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in Painter v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).