Opinion ID: 676060
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rufo 's First Prong: Prerequisites for Modification

Text: 81 Rufo normally permits modification of a consent decree only to accommodate new factual or legal circumstances. The sorts of factual changes that may qualify include unanticipated developments that render continuation of the decree inequitable, Jacksonville Branch, NAACP v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 978 F.2d 1574, 1582 (11th Cir.1992), or that, for reasons unrelated to past discrimination or to the fault of the parties, make it extremely difficult or impossible to satisfy obligations that, while imposed by the decree, are not part of its fundamental purpose, United States v. City of Miami, 2 F.3d 1497, 1509 (11th Cir.1993). However, a district court should not modify long-standing goals in consent decrees merely because the goals have not been achieved. Id. at 1509. 82 Rufo similarly provides for flexibility in the face of changing legal standards, but does not mandate modifications in response to every legal development. For example, a court need not necessarily rewrite a consent decree so that it conforms to the constitutional floor just because that floor drops after entry of the decree. Rufo, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 764. On the other hand, a rising constitutional floor--or, as in this case, a falling constitutional ceiling--may make modifications necessary. Above all, [a] consent decree must ... be modified if ... one or more of the obligations placed upon the parties has become impermissible under federal law, id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 762, and that is the aspect of Rufo with which we grapple in the present case. 83