Opinion ID: 2498924
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Gendler's Request for Public Records

Text: ¶ 35 The trial court correctly ordered the WSP to provide copies of the accident reports upon Gendler's request without the State's limitation. WSP has a long standing duty to file, tabulate, and analyze all accident reports. RCW 46.52.060. The accident reports sought by Gendler were existing, identifiable public records, subject to disclosure under the PRA. The issue is whether federal law stands in the way. ¶ 36 To determine whether § 409 applies, the relevant inquiry is whether the information was compiled or collected, and held, by an agency for purposes unrelated to § 152. Guillen II, 537 U.S. at 146, 123 S.Ct. 720. While the PRA is construed broadly to promote open government, this limited federal privilege is narrowly construed because it impedes the search for truth. Accordingly, we hold § 409 is inapplicable to the WSP in this context because it collected and compiled the reports pursuant to RCW 46.52.060 and not for a § 152 purpose. ¶ 37 The Court of Appeals correctly noted the State fails to explain how the county sheriff in Guillen is any different from the WSP in this case, or how the public works department is any different from the DOT. See Gendler, 158 Wash.App. at 674, 242 P.3d 947. The records, when held by the WSP, are not privileged as they would be if held by the DOT because each agency collects and uses the records for different purposes. ¶ 38 The MOU cannot alter the WSP's obligations under RCW 46.52.060. See RCW 39.34.030(5). Furthermore, the language of the MOU itself supports Gendler's position. It confirms that the reports remain the property of the WSP, regardless of form, and that the WSP is not limited in its access to or use of the reports. CP at 205-07. The fact that DOT is granted joint access to and use of the reports for its own purpose does not change the character of the reports or divest WSP of its authority or ability to produce them. Indeed, the WSP continues to own even the scanned image of the accident report. CP at 205-06. These facts are sufficient to conclude that the WSP continues to hold the records, even though they reside in a joint database. ¶ 39 Nor does the type of form utilized by the WSP transform collection of the information into a joint WSP-DOT § 152 purpose. While the form was designed to include many categories of information needed by the DOT, which the WSP does not ultimately use, it is nevertheless filled out by law enforcement officers for WSP's own statutory purpose. ¶ 40 A remarkably similar scenario was addressed in Goza v. Parish of W. Baton Rouge, 2008-0086 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/5/09), 21 So.3d 320, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 3277, 176 L.Ed.2d 1184 (2010). In that case, an injured motorist sued the state's department of transportation and development (DOTD), alleging a design defect of a highway curve. Id. at 325. The DOTD relied on § 409 and sought to exclude from the matter accident reports related to the location. Goza, 21 So.3d at 326. The DOTD created the accident report form and trained local law enforcement officers to properly complete the form to fulfill its obligations under § 152. Goza, 21 So.3d at 328. However, as in this case, the law enforcement officers also compiled and collected information contained on the form pursuant to its own statutory duty to investigate and report accidents. Id. Applying Guillen II, the Goza court held § 409 did not apply because the records were compiled or collected for a purpose unrelated to § 152. As the court reasoned: To the extent that law enforcement accommodates the DOTD by adopting the uniform accident report forms designed by the DOTD for use in accident investigation, such action alone is insufficient to transform the normal accident investigation duties of local law enforcement agencies into an act of information compilation and collection for § 152 purposes. As such, we find no merit in the DOTD's argument that the mere completion of the form designed by the DOTD, and completed in accordance with training provided by the DOTD, makes the completion of an accident report by local law enforcement officials an act of compiling or collecting information for § 152 purposes. Goza, 21 So.3d at 328. This is the appropriate analysis, and we adopt it here. As in Goza, the WSP and DOT are acting together in some respects, but their purposes are separate. ¶ 41 It is also significant that long before the creation of the database, WSP was searching its reports and finding and disclosing information like that requested by Gendler. WSP now claims it cannot search reports by a specific location without the analysis performed by DOT. However, the fact that WSP has chosen to relocate its records into a database that is subsequently analyzed in greater detail by the DOT, does not relieve it of its obligation to produce the records upon request. The trial court correctly ruled in its memorandum decision that [i]f anything, these documents currently should be more available to the public, just as they are more available to the agencies who manage the database. CP at 322. ¶ 42 This reasoning is consistent with our Washington State Access to Justice Technology Principles (hereinafter AJT), http:// www.courts.wa/gov/court_rules/. These principles apply to all courts of law and serve as a guide for all other actors in our state justice system. AJT, scope. The AJT preamble declares, The use of technologies in the Washington State justice system must protect and advance the fundamental right of equal access to justice. There is a particular need to avoid creating or increasing barriers to access. ATJ, pmbl. `Technology' includes all mechanisms and means used for the production, storage, retrieval, aggregation, transmission, communication, dissemination, interpretation, presentation, or application of information. AJT, scope (emphasis added). [A]ccess to justice means the meaningful opportunity to acquire information necessary to assert a claim or defense. AJT, pmbl. WSP cannot shield otherwise disclosable accident reports under the guise of § 409 by depositing them in a forbidden DOT electronic database. Permitting this would fly in the face of our well grounded principle that technology should enhance access to information that is necessary for justice, not create barriers. ¶ 43 WSP's interpretation of the MOU and § 409 is also contradictory to Guillen II. That decision made clear that § 409 was not intended to make tort victims any worse off than they would have been before the § 152 hazard elimination program. The WSP's duty to generate these accident reports predates the federal program by 36 years. Until 2003, citizens have been able to request and receive copies of accident reports specific to a location. The State now asks us to place Washington citizens in a worse position than they would have been before § 152. The State's argument is rejected. It is inconsistent with Guillen II and the intent of § 409. ¶ 44 Section 409 does not extend to police accident reports generated and received by WSP pursuant to its own statutory duty. [8] The WSP's shared database with DOT does not alter this duty or its obligations under the PRA. The Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's order to produce the reports without limitation upon Gendler's request. We hereby affirm the Court of Appeals and the trial court.