Opinion ID: 751631
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecutorial misrepresentation

Text: 37 Petitioner argues that the state misrepresented the nature of the understanding it had with his co-defendant and the state's key witness, Brian Ellis, to the jury, based on the following exchange between Ellis and the prosecutor: 38 Q. Do you have an understanding as to whether or not the State will make any recommendation with respect to your sentence? 39 A. I hope so. 40 Q. And what is your understanding, Sir? 41 A. That if I testify, I can get a lower sentence. 42 Q. And what is the recommended sentence? What will the State recommend for you? 43 A. Hopefully something lower than the sentence that I'm getting. 44 Q. Which sentence are you going to get, Sir? 45 A. Seven to 14 years. 46 Q. The sentence of not less than seven or more than 14 years? A. Yes 47 ... 48 Q. And can you tell us why you're testifying here today? 49 A. So that I hope that I do get a lesser sentence. 50 Q. Now do you understand that the State is going to recommend a sentence of seven to 14 years? 51 A. Yes. 52 Q. And your attorney has the right to argue for a lesser sentence, is that right? 53 A. Yes. 54 Q. And do you understand that the State's recommendation is seven to 14 years, regardless of whether you testify today? You understand that, Sir? 55 A. Yes, Your Honor; I mean, yes. 56 Petitioner points to the fact that on the prosecutor's later recommendation, the sentencing court actually sentenced Ellis to a sentence of four and one-half to nine years. Pointing to the above exchange, petitioner claims that the prosecutor improperly led the jury to believe that regardless of Mr. Ellis' testimony the prosecutor would not recommend a further reduced sentence--in effect that the deal was already done--when in fact at the time of Mr. Ellis' sentencing the prosecutor did exactly that. According to petitioner, the prosecutor's alleged misrepresentations in this regard denied him his Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial, because the jury was instructed to infer that nothing was motivating Ellis' testimony except his heartfelt desire to tell the truth. 57 We disagree. It is well established that under Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959), prosecutors are obligated to correct any misconceptions arising from a situation where a government witness falsely denies having struck a bargain with the state, or substantially misrepresents the nature of the bargain. A new trial, however, is only required if 'the false testimony could ... in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury....'  Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. at 766 (quoting Napue, 360 U.S. at 271, 79 S.Ct. at 1178). 58 Applying these principles, it is true that the prosecutor's presentation of the inducement offered to Mr. Ellis--as it was ultimately delivered--may not have been as clear as it could have been. That is not dispositive, however. The question here is one of materiality. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. at 766. As the various exchanges recited above, together with the record as a whole, demonstrate, the jury was well informed that Mr. Ellis' testimony flowed from his desire to fulfill his end of the bargain struck with the prosecution. Any further impeachment of Mr. Ellis' credibility which might have resulted from attempts to make difficult, if not impossible, prospective disclosure of what ultimately proved to be the prosecutor's persuasive efforts on his behalf would simply not have been material. We agree with the district court that there was no reasonable likelihood that the inartful disclosure of the precise nature of the inducement ultimately offered to Mr. Ellis would have affected the judgment of the jury.