Opinion ID: 364209
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Modification of The Protective Order

Text: 13 The order of October 9, 1978, modifying the protective order on the motion of, and for the primary benefit of a nonparty is based on two determinations. First, the district court concluded that allowing the government's motion would not interfere with the control that either it or the District of Columbia court had over their respective cases. Second, the district court expressly declined to rule that ATT would be prejudiced unduly by the modification of the protective order. 14 Appellant submits, inter alia, that the retroactive modification of a protective order in order to disclose discovered documents to a nonparty is a violation of the spirit and the logic of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, appellant urges that modification of the protective order after appellant relied on its authority and scope for more than four years unduly prejudices appellant. 15 As a general proposition, pretrial discovery must take place in the public unless compelling reasons exist for denying the public access to the proceedings. F.R.Civ.P. 26(c). In the first instance, it is a matter for the district court to issue protective orders permitting a party to keep secret discovered material when good cause is shown. It is also within the discretion of the district court to modify existing protective orders to permit disclosure of discovered materials. 16 The question of whether it is permissible to modify a protective order on the motion of a nonparty in order to permit that nonparty retroactive access to discovered documents is apparently a case of appellate first impression. 17 On the one hand, several district courts have refused to enter protective orders which prevent disclosure to others litigating similar issues on the grounds that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not foreclose collaboration in discovery, and further, that there was no showing that the moving party was exploiting one case solely to assist in the litigation of another. Johnson Foils, Inc. v. Huyck Corp., 61 F.R.D. 405 (N.D.N.Y.1973); Williams v. Johnson & Johnson, 50 F.R.D. 31 (S.D.N.Y.1970). 18 On the other hand, several other courts have declined to modify protective orders in order to permit a party to turn over discovered documents to a nonparty. In GAF Corporation v. Eastman Kodak Company, 415 F.Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y.1976), the court denied plaintiff's motion for an order allowing it to give to the government 52 documents selected from the hundreds of thousands requested and received in discovery. Plaintiff had concluded that the documents evidenced an antitrust violation. The court reasoned that there had been an explicit understanding between the parties that discovery was being demanded solely for the preparation of the case 2 and in the face of that understanding and the potential augmentation of the government's awesome powers as investigator, 3 an attempt to persuade the government to initiate a suit in this manner would not be countenanced. 19 After a thorough review of the applicable case law, this Court notes that where a protective order is agreed to by the parties before its presentation to the court, there is a higher burden on the movant to justify the modification of the order. While it is not the case that the  sophisticated litigant cannot take the scope delineated by a protective order literally even when it is in terms subjected to change by further order of the court, nonetheless this Court cannot conclude that the district court erred in permitting modification of the protective order. The exceptional considerations warranting the alteration of an agreed protective order exist in the present case. The government filed its antitrust complaint eight months after the filing of the MCI complaint. Since the government filed its complaint against ATT nearly four years ago, there is no showing that the government seeks to exploit MCI v. ATT in the prosecution of USA v. ATT. In addition, there is no showing that any claim of privilege was waived or that anything discovered by MCI would be protected from a long and costly discovery process in the District of Columbia case. ATT has already transferred the microfilms of documents to the government, pursuant to Judge Greene's order, and thus, the relaxation of the protective order in this case has only the effect of permitting MCI counsel to make the depositions and their analyses of data available to government counsel. We are impressed with the wastefulness of requiring government counsel to duplicate the analyses and discovery already made. 20 For these reasons, the district court order is affirmed. However, the stay order by this Court pending the disposition of the appeal shall remain in effect until the mandate issues.