Opinion ID: 771335
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: standards for admissibility of expert testimony.

Text: Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states: 26 If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 27 The Supreme Court amplified the operation and scope of Rule 702 in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra. There, the Court held that scientific knowledge requires 28 an inference or assertion... derived by the scientific method. Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate validation -- i.e., good grounds, based on what is known. In short, the requirement that an expert's testimony pertain to scientific knowledge establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability. 29 Id. at 590. Rule 702 thus clearly contemplates some degree of regulation of the subjects about which an expert may testify. Id. at 589. Consequently, the Court established a gatekeeping role for the [trial] judge. Id. at 597. 30 [T]he trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), 11 whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue. 31 Id. at 592-93. The proponent must satisfy this burden by a preponderance of proof. Id. at 593 n.10. 32 Although [m]any factors will bear on the inquiry, the Court has set out some general observations, Id. at 593, that serve as guideposts in determining if proffered expert testimony is sufficiently relevant and reliable to be admissible. 12 First, a key question to be answered in determining whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has been) tested. Id. Second, the court should consider whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication. Id. Publication, which is an element of peer review, is not a sine qua non of admissibility: it does not equate with reliability. Id. It may, however, suggest good science. Id. The fact of publication (or lack thereof) in a peer reviewed journal will be a relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in assessing the scientific validity of a particular technique or methodology upon which an opinion is premised. Id. at 594. Third, in the case of a particular scientific technique, the court ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error, and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation. Id. Fourth, and finally, general acceptance can have bearing on the inquiry. Id. Widespread acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible, and a known technique which has been able to attract only minimal support with the community may properly be viewed with skepticism. Id. However,general acceptance is not a necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence. Id. at 597. The Court also emphasized that the inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is... a flexible one, and noted that the focus... must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they generate. Id. at 595. 33 Shortly after the Supreme Court decided Daubert, we applied its teachings in In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994)(Paoli II). There, we concluded that Rule 702 has two major requirements; qualifications and reliability, and noted that an expert's qualifications are interpreted liberally. In discussing Reliability we listed the factors enunciated in Daubert but noted the continued vitality of our prior analysis in United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985). We held that a district court should take into account all of the factors listed by either Daubert or Downing as well as any others that are relevant, Paoli II, at 742, in conducting an inquiry into the reliability of proposed expert testimony. The factors that are relevant under Daubert and Downing include: (1) whether a method consists of a testable hypothesis; (2) whether the method has been subjected to peer review; (3) the known or potential rate of error; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation; (5) whether the method is generally accepted; (6) the relationship of the technique to methods which have been established to be reliable; (7) the qualifications of the expert witness testifying based on the methodology; and (8) the non-judicial uses to which the method has been put. Paoli II, at 742 n. 8. 34 In Paoli II, we also stated that the expert's testimony must fit, in that it must assist the trier of fact. Id. at 743. Admissibility thus depends in part upon the proffered connection between the scientific research or test result to be presented and particular disputed factual issues in the case. Id. This standard is not intended to be a high one, nor is it to be applied in a manner that requires the plaintiffs to prove their case twice -- they do not have to demonstrate to the judge by a preponderance of the evidence that the assessments of their experts are correct, they only have to demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that their opinions are reliable. Id. at 744. This is a very important distinction. The test of admissibility is not whether a particular scientific opinion has the best foundation or whether it is demonstrably correct. Rather, the test is whether the particular opinion is based on valid reasoning and reliable methodology. Kannankeril v. Terminix International Inc., 128 F.3d 802, 806 (3d Cir. 1997). The analysis of the conclusions themselves is for the trier of fact when the expert is subjected to cross-examination. Id. 35 Nonetheless, conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U. S. 136, 146 (1997). A court must examine the expert's conclusions in order to determine whether they could reliably flow from the facts known to the expert and the methodology used. Heller v. Shaw Industries, Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 153 (3d Cir. 1999). A court may conclude that there is simply too great a gap between the data and the opinion proffered. Joiner, at 146; see also In re TMI Litigation, 193 F.3d 613, 682-683 (3d Cir. 1999), opinion amended by 199 F.3d 158 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. General Public Utilities Corp. v. Abrams, 120 S. Ct. 2238 (2000) and Dolan v. General Public Utilities Corp., 120 S. Ct. 2238 (2000). 36 Although Daubert was decided in the context of scientific knowledge (whether evidence established a connection between the defendant's drug and birth defects), Daubert has since been extended to the kind of technical or other specialized knowledge, at issue here. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U. S. 137, 141 (1999) (We conclude that Daubert's general holding--setting forth the trial judge's general `gatekeeping' obligation--applies not only to testimony based on `scientific' knowledge, but also to testimony based on `technical' and `other specialized' knowledge.). The expert in Kumho Tire was an engineer and the Court there framed the issue before it as how Daubert applies to the testimony of engineers and other experts who are not scientists. Id. at 141. 37 We examine the specific testimony that was excluded here against this background. We afford a district court's application and interpretation of Rule 702 plenary review, Paoli II at 749, but we review the court's decision to admit or reject testimony under an abuse of discretion standard. Joiner, at 143. An abuse of discretion arises when the district court's decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact. Hanover Potato Products, Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1993). An abuse of discretion can also occur when no reasonable person would adopt the district court's view. Id. We will not interfere with the district court's exercise of discretion unless there is a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors. Id. 38