Opinion ID: 1648144
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Penalty Phase of Land's Trial

Text: We begin with Land's claims that relate to his counsel's performance during the penalty (or sentencing) phase of his trial because most of his discovery requests arise from these claims. Land alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase of his trial because, he says, his counsel did not investigate the possibility of the existence of mitigating evidence and did not present any evidence of mitigating circumstances. Land says that evidence of mitigating circumstances existed at the time of his trial and that that evidence consists of the following: (1) evidence that he adjusts well to incarceration; this evidence, he says, is contained in records of his incarceration in the Jefferson County jail, the State Cattle Ranch Facility, the Mobile County jail, the Mt. Meigs Youth Services Facility, and records held by the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles and the Alabama Department of Corrections; (2) evidence of mental-health problems; this evidence, he says, is contained in records maintained by Bryce Hospital, Taylor Hardin Secure Medical Facility, the Alabama Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, the Alabama Department of Youth Services, Mt. Meigs Youth Services Facility, and the Department of Human Resources; (3) evidence of mental and emotional problems stemming from family problems and relationships he experienced as a juvenile; this evidence, he says, is held by the Alabama Department of Youth Services and the Mt. Meigs Youth Services Facility. Land maintains that all of this evidence was available at the time of his trial and that his trial counsel should have attempted to discover it and present it at the penalty phase of his trial. The State contends that Land is merely attempting to use the discovery process as a fishing expedition and to drum up a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because, the State says, none of his claims is meritorious on its face. The State also argues that Land has not shown that the documents he requests relate to his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or that the documents he seeks contain any mitigating evidence. The State also maintains that Land has waived his right to request discovery of his correctional and juvenile records because he did not make such a request before the trial court. Last, the State contends that Land is not entitled to the requested information because, it says, he has not presented evidence indicating that he has ever had any interaction with Bryce Hospital, Taylor Hardin Secure Medical Facility, or the Alabama Department of Human Resources. First, we disagree with the State's argument that Land's claims are not facially meritorious. In fact, Land's claims, if proved to be true, would entitle him to relief. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that trial counsel's failure to investigate the possibility of mitigating evidence is, per se, deficient performance. See Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449, 1462 (11th Cir. 1991) (our case law rejects the notion that a `strategic' decision can be reasonable when the attorney has failed to investigate his options and make a reasonable choice between them), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 952, 112 S.Ct. 1516, 117 L.Ed.2d 652 (1992); see, also, Jackson v. Herring, 42 F.3d 1350, 1366-68 (11th Cir.) (Although counsel need not `investigate every evidentiary lead,' he must gather enough knowledge of the potential mitigation evidence to arrive at an `informed judgment' in making [the decision not to present such evidence].... [A] legal decision to forgo a mitigation presentation cannot be reasonable if it is unsupported by sufficient investigation.) (emphasis added; citations omitted), cert. dismissed, 515 U.S. 1189, 116 S.Ct. 38, 132 L.Ed.2d 919 (1995). Furthermore, trial counsel may be found ineffective for failing to present evidence of adjustment to incarceration, evidence of mental-health problems, and evidence regarding the defendant's contact with a juvenile system. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (holding that a capital defendant must be permitted at the penalty phase of his trial to introduce evidence of adjustment and good behavior while incarcerated); Horton v. Zant, supra (counsel found ineffective for not presenting evidence of adjustment to incarceration); Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477 (11th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 943, 112 S.Ct. 2282, 119 L.Ed.2d 207 (1992) (counsel found ineffective for failing to introduce evidence that defendant had mental-health problems and a very low IQ and had suffered from various bouts of paranoia and depression); Porter v. Wainwright, supra (holding that juvenile records may be evidence of mitigating circumstances and that trial counsel's failure to present such records may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel); see, also, Williams v. Turpin, 87 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir.1996) (failure to investigate and present juvenile records may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, depending on the content of such records and a showing of prejudice). Second, the State's argument that Land has not shown that the requested documents contain evidence of mitigating circumstances and that he therefore is not entitled to the requested discovery is equally unavailing. Until the documents are actually produced, it is impossible to determine whether they contain evidence of mitigating circumstances. Cf. United States v. Streit, 962 F.2d 894, 900 (9th Cir.) (rejecting the Government's position that the defendant could not discover sealed documents because he could not show that the documents contained exculpatory evidence and stating that [i]f defendants were required to make a positive showing that sealed documents in fact contained exculpatory material, Brady violations would come to the attention of appellate courts only by the merest happenstance of confidential material falling into a defendant's hands), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 962, 113 S.Ct. 431, 121 L.Ed.2d 352 (1992). Thus, this argument is without merit. Third, we disagree with the State's contention that Land waived his right to request discovery of his correctional and juvenile records by not requesting those records in his motions made in the trial court. A close review of those motions shows that Land did request those records. In his Rule 32 petition, at p. 856, Land alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to investigate and offer mitigating evidence, which would have included his correctional and juvenile records. In his first motion for discovery, Land requested discovery of his juvenile and correctional records. See Motion for Discovery of Prosecution Files, Records, and Information Necessary to a Fair Rule 32 Evidentiary Hearing, p. 12. In his motion for reconsideration, Land argued that he was clearly constitutionally entitled to those records which predate his arrest for the current [offense], and that Such records are necessary to claims ... [that counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase of his trial], for they may establish that a) Mr. Land was a model prisoner.... Motion for Reconsideration of the Denial of Court-Ordered Discovery of Records Necessary to a Fair Rule 32 Evidentiary Hearing, p. 16. Thus, this argument is also without merit. Fourth, we reject the State's argument that Land should not be allowed to discover the requested materials because, the State argues, he has not shown any connection with Taylor Hardin Secure Medical Facility, Bryce Hospital, or the Alabama Department of Human Resources. Land has alleged that persons from both Taylor Hardin and Bryce evaluated him. He also claims that he and his family had interaction with the Alabama Department of Human Resources. Furthermore, if these facilities have no documents that relate to Land's claims, they can simply say so. Merely determining whether such documents exist would not unduly burden the State. Thus, Land presented the trial court with claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that are facially meritorious. In fact, these claims suggest several potential serious deficiencies in the performance of his trial counsel that, if proved, may entitle him to relief. Furthermore, we agree with Land that it would be practically impossible for him to show that he suffered prejudice from the deficient performance of his counsel unless he could show the trial court that mitigating evidence (which he has a reasonable basis to believe in fact exists) existed at the time of his trial and then argue, on the basis of that evidence, that a reasonable probability exists that a jury hearing the evidence would have recommended life imprisonment without parole. Cf. Jackson v. Herring, supra, 42 F.3d at 1364, 1369 (federal habeas evidentiary hearing unearthed a great wealth of [mitigating evidence] from which the defendant was able to show that a reasonable probability exists that a jury hearing this evidence would have recommended life). Therefore, we conclude that Land demonstrated to the trial court that he was entitled to the requested discovery (listed above), which is relevant to his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase of his trial.