Opinion ID: 298598
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Trial Court's Charge

Text: 37 Appellants raise a number of objections to the charge, but only two merit comment. With respect to the net worth issue, specific reference is made to several portions of the charge which might have been stated with greater clarity. The only exception taken to this aspect of the instruction, however, concerned the question of the accuracy of the opening net worth figures and the jury's duty to disregard the net worth proof if these were not established to a reasonable certainty — a point the court was careful to clarify to the apparent satisfaction of defense counsel. Bearing in mind the Supreme Court's admonition that 38 [c]harges [in net worth cases] should be especially clear, including, in addition to the formal instructions, a summary of the nature of the net worth method, the assumptions on which it rests, and the inferences available both for and against the accused, 39 Holland v. United States, supra, 348 U.S. at 129, 75 S.Ct. at 132, Judge Port's charge satisfied these criteria. He explained the nature and the essential elements of the net worth-expenditure method of proof in terms that were comprehensible to a jury. In any event, with the limited exception noted above, appellants' vigilant trial counsel, who was at no loss to bring numerous objections to other aspects of the charge to the attention of the court, took no issue with this part of the instruction, F.R.Cr.P. 30, and we are certainly not prepared, especially in light of the proof by specific items, to characterize whatever shortcomings there might have been in the charge as plain error, F.R.Cr.P. 52(b). 40 In their requests to charge, the appellants sought an instruction to the effect that evidence of good reputation may alone create a reasonable doubt of guilt. The court charged that evidence of good reputation may be considered with the other evidence in the case, and may in connection with the other evidence, be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in your mind . . . . An exception was taken by defense counsel. In United States v. Minieri, 303 F.2d 550, 555 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 847, 83 S.Ct. 79, 9 L.Ed.2d 81 (1962), we noted that under certain circumstances [character] testimony alone may raise a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, and in the federal courts the defendant is entitled to such an instruction, citing Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476, 69 S.Ct. 213, 93 L. Ed. 168 (1948) and Edgington v. United States, 164 U.S. 361, 366, 17 S.Ct. 72, 41 L.Ed. 467 (1896). Although the appellants were therefore entitled to such an instruction, the error here, as in Minieri, was inconsequential since the charge was sufficiently explanatory of the effect reputation testimony has on the prosecution's burden of proof, 303 F.2d at 555, and in light of the Government's impressive case against appellants, the shortcoming in the charge was harmless error.