Opinion ID: 626123
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: BIA's Review of Fact-Finding Concerning a Future Event

Text: We first consider the Board's treatment of the IJ's finding that if Huang is returned to China, the local authorities would coercively sterilize her. The Board did not rule whether this finding was clearly erroneous. Instead, it ruled that an IJ's prediction that local authorities will impose a particular form of harm upon a returned asylum applicant is not a finding of fact to be reviewed for clear error. As we have noted, the Board stated that it is impossible to declare as `fact' things that have not yet occurred. 25 I. & N. Dec. at 212 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If all the Board means by this statement is that a prediction that an event will occur in the future usually cannot be determined with the same degree of certainty that accompanies a finding that a past event has occurred, we would readily agree. But the Board is saying something much strongerthat a finding that an event will occur in the future is not a finding of fact at all. This meaning is evident from the Board's citation of its precedential decision in A-S-B-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 493 (B.I.A.2008). That case involved the claim of an asylum applicant who had previously been threatened by guerillas and feared future persecution because of the prior incident. The IJ had concluded that the applicant would likely be singled out for persecution. A-S-B-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 494. The BIA, exercising de novo review, stated: [T]he Immigration Judge rested his conclusion on speculative findings about what may or may not occur to the respondent in the future. This is not fact-finding, because, among other reasons, it is impossible to declare as fact things that have not yet occurred. Cf. [ Jian Xing] Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir.2005). Id. at 498 (emphasis added). [5] The Board additionally made its view clear in another precedential decision, Matter of V-K-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 500 (B.I.A.2008), vacated and remanded sub nom. Kaplun v. Attorney General, 602 F.3d 260 (3d Cir.2010), rendered the same day as A-S-B-. In V-K-, the Board, stated, Although predictions of future events may in part be derived from `facts,' they are not the sort of `[f]acts determined by the Immigration Judge' that can only be reviewed for clear error. 24 I. & N. Dec. at 501. We think the BIA has erred in declining to consider an IJ's finding that a future event will occur to be fact-finding subject to review for clear error. A determination of what will occur in the future and the degree of likelihood of the occurrence has been regularly regarded as fact-finding subject to only clear error review. See, e.g., In re Jackson, 593 F.3d 171, 178 (2d Cir.2010) (future earnings); National Market Share, Inc. v. Sterling National Bank, 392 F.3d 520, 529 (2d Cir.2004) (future viability of a business); Fuchstadt v. United States, 442 F.2d 400, 402-03 (2d Cir.1971) (future earnings). Such a finding may be rejected under clearly erroneous review as speculative only in those instances where the IJ lacks an adequate basis in the record for the determination that a future event will, or is likely to, occur, but the finding may not be rejected as speculative simply because it concerns a future event. As the Third Circuit has persuasively pointed out in Kaplun, A present probability of a future event ... while an assessment of a future event, is what a decision-maker in an adjudicatory system decides now as part of a factual framework for determining legal effect. 602 F.3d at 269. Furthermore, the Attorney General's 2002 Guidance to the BIA stated, The [Justice] Department's adoption of the `clearly erroneous' standard encompasses the standards now commonly used by the federal courts with respect to appellate court review of findings of fact made by a trial court. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms To Improve Case Management, 67 Fed.Reg. 54878-01, 54890 (Aug. 26, 2002). The BIA's non-fact view of a finding regarding a future event and its refusal to apply clear error review to such a finding is an error of law. [6] See En Hui Huang v. Attorney General, 620 F.3d 372, 382-83 (3d Cir.2010). [7] The BIA, however, is on sound ground in its view that de novo review applies to the ultimate question of whether the applicant has sustained her burden to establish that her subjective fear of persecution is objectively reasonable. What the law's legal construct of a reasonable person would believe or do under the particular circumstances of a case is normally a question of law, the decision of which is reviewed de novo. Examples are a reasonable police officer's belief, for purposes of the validity of an arrest, that probable cause exists, see United States v. Patrick, 899 F.2d 169, 171 (2d Cir.1990) (The ultimate determination of whether probable cause to arrest existed ... is essentially a legal question subject to de novo review.); a reasonable person's belief, for purposes of determining whether a seizure occurred, that the person was free to leave, see United States v. Peterson, 100 F.3d 7, 11 (2d Cir.1996) (Whether, in light of the facts, a seizure occurred is a question of law to be reviewed de novo. ); and a reasonable public official's belief, for purposes of qualified immunity, that the official's actions were lawful, see Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 161 (2d Cir.2012). [8] The Third Circuit suggested in En Hui Huang that the ultimate question of whether an asylum applicant has established an objectively reasonable fear of persecution often comprehends three subsidiary questions as to which different standards of review apply. The first is what may or will happen to the asylum applicant if she returns home. En Hui Huang, 620 F.3d at 383. Decision of this question, as we in this case and the Third Circuit have ruled, is a finding of fact as to which clear error review applies. See id. The second question is whether what may or will happen to the asylum applicant is serious enough to meet the legal test of persecution. See id. The Third Circuit ruled that a determination on this point is an issue of law as to which de novo review applies. See id. Although we have characterized this second issue as a mixed question of law and fact, see, e.g., Mirzoyan v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 217, 220 (2d Cir.2006) (The IJ determined ... that the facts did not meet the legal definition of persecution in the INA. This is a mixed question of law and fact, which we review de novo. ), we have likewise concluded that it is subject to de novo review. See Edimo-Doualla v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 276, 283 (2d Cir.2006) (The IJ also found that the [alleged harm] did not rise to the level of persecution.... We review de novo whether the IJ applied the correct legal standard for persecution claims[.]) (citing Secaida-Rosales v. I.N.S., 331 F.3d 297, 307 (2d Cir.2003)); Kambolli v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 454, 457 (2d Cir.2006) (reviewing the IJ's legal conclusions de novo, including his finding that the mistreatment Kambolli allegedly suffered did not constitute persecution). The Third Circuit characterized the third question as whether the possibility of those events occurring gives rise to a well-founded fear of persecution under the circumstances of the alien's case. En Hui Huang, 620 F.3d at 383 (emphasis added). This question, said the Third Circuit, is a mixed question of fact and law, id. at 384, as to which de novo review applies, id. at 387. One aspect of the Third Circuit's formulation of the third question is potentially ambiguous. It is not clear whether the Third Circuit is focusing on events that constitute the persecution, such as forcible sterilization, or events that would be the consequence of not submitting to family planning policy requirements, such as jail or a fine for not submitting to sterilization. We need not pursue this distinction because of the IJ's finding that forced sterilization will occur. [9] In the pending case, both sides urge us not to require the BIA to consider separately the three questions identified by the Third Circuit, an approach they contend would be unwieldy in practice, see Br. for Petitioner at 12 ([I]t becomes all but impossible to rationally differentiate the probability inquiry from the reasonableness inquiry.); Br. for Respondent at 38 (Applying the Third Circuit's deconstructionist theories ... is a dizzying prospect.). We see no need to prescribe a precise method of analysis that the BIA must apply when it reviews the decision of the IJ. An appropriate approach will depend on what the IJ has decided and what issues are challenged on administrative review to the BIA. The IJ might or might not have made a finding that some harm was inflicted on the applicant in the past, or that some harm will be inflicted in the future. There might be a finding only as to some probability of future harm, or only as to the consequences of not obeying a family planning policy requirement. The IJ might determine whether the harm, past or future, is serious enough to constitute persecution or whether the harm, past or future, has been shown to have been inflicted because of some protected ground. Based on such determinations, the IJ will normally determine whether the asylum applicant has suffered persecution and/or has a subjective fear of suffering future persecution, and whether she has an objectively reasonable fear of suffering future persecution. In making determinations on these various issues, IJs need to be careful to break out the purely factual components of their determinations. For example, if an IJ determines that an applicant has suffered persecution, the IJ normally needs first to find as a fact what has happened to the applicant and then determine the legal issue of whether the harm inflicted constitutes persecution. In some cases, however, there may be no dispute that the harm inflicted, for example, forcible sterilization, constitutes persecution. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2011) (definition of political refugee includes person who has a well-founded fear that they will be forced to undergo sterilization). In every case, the IJ should take pains to make clear what part of his or her determination is fact-finding and what part represents conclusions of law. For example, where an IJ finds a probability of future persecution, the IJ should make clear what it is that the IJ finds is likely to happen to the applicant and how likely it is, those being factual questions. The IJ should then explain the legal conclusion that such treatment of the applicant meets the legal standard for persecution. When the BIA reviews such determinations by an IJ, it will be clear which parts are fact-finding, reviewable for clear error, and which parts are questions of law, reviewable on a de novo standard. In the pending case, the BIA's determination that the IJ's finding of a future event is not fact-finding and is not reviewed for clear error requires that we remand. On remand, the BIA must either accept the finding that upon Huang's return, she will be coercively sterilized or reject that finding if it can properly determine that the finding is clearly erroneous. Only after reviewing this finding can the BIA consider the issue whether Huang has satisfied her burden to establish an objectively reasonable fear of persecution. If the BIA does not validly reject as clearly erroneous the finding of coercive sterilization and nonetheless rules that Huang has not satisfied her burden of showing an objectively reasonable fear of persecution, it will have to provide sufficient explanation to permit proper appellate review by this Court. See Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir.2005) (Despite our generally deferential review of IJ and BIA opinions, we require a certain minimum level of analysis from the IJ and BIA opinions denying asylum, and indeed must require such if judicial review is to be meaningful.).