Opinion ID: 1041672
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hearing Transcript

Text: The transcript of a proceeding is so closely related to the ability to attend the proceeding itself that maintaining secrecy is appropriate only if closing the courtroom was appropriate.10 The district court’s decision to keep parts of the hearing transcript under seal was supported by the findings contained in its order of June 6, 2012.11 Dorsett IV, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 193‐96. The district court relied primarily on one broad category of countervailing factors: “whether public 10 As noted above, however, even where prudence might have counseled closure ex ante, the inquiry concerning the release of the transcript proceeds with the benefit of hindsight, so that release of the transcript may be required even where closing the courtroom was justified given what might reasonably have been anticipated in advance. 11 The district court made no on‐the‐record findings before sealing the courtroom. That was error, albeit error we need not address further because the issue is moot. 20 access to the materials at issue is likely to impair in a material way the performance of Article III functions.” Dorsett IV, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 194, quoting Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1050. The district court concluded that because it had an interest in enforcing its own confidentiality order, and because opening contempt hearings to the public would put district courts in the absurd position of either maintaining the secrecy of the underlying materials or undermining their own protective orders, the First Amendment right was outweighed in this case. Nevertheless, the district court conducted a thorough review and reduced the extent of redaction from the transcript after determining that much of the testimony did not reveal any confidential information. After conducting our own independent review of the hearing transcript, we conclude that the district court’s concerns do not outweigh the public’s First Amendment presumptive right of access to court proceedings. No portion of the hearing transcript reveals information that is sufficiently confidential that its disclosure would impair in any material way the performance of Article III functions. The portions of the transcript that remain redacted after Judge Spatt’s order reveal only information about the date of the Report, the number of police officers mentioned in it, and how many of those officers were female. None of 21 these bits of information raises significant confidentiality concerns that would in themselves warrant sealing the courtroom or the transcript. We therefore conclude that the district court erred by concluding that the First Amendment right was defeated in this instance. We note that we are not presented with the situation in which the hearing transcript did in fact contain significant confidential material. There may be circumstances in which a contempt proceeding will turn on specific confidential facts. We also note that there are several ways district courts may structure such proceedings to minimize the likelihood of disclosure. For example, it will often be possible in a case such as this one to enter a stipulation concerning the statements made and the contents of the confidential documents. Absent such an agreement, courts may limit questioning to address only whether the information stated publicly was in fact contained in the confidential materials.12 Because we conclude that nothing in the portions of the transcript that remain redacted presents confidentiality concerns that outweigh the public’s First Amendment right of access to judicial proceedings, we direct the district court to 12 We do not here decide whether specific, on‐the‐record findings about the difficulty of undertaking such minimization procedures could serve to defeat the First Amendment presumptive right of access. 22 release a full, unredacted copy of the hearing transcript.13