Opinion ID: 2210281
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: minimum necessary flow

Text: In the fourth summarized assignment of error, the complaining objectors assert the director misinterpreted the meaning of the words minimum necessary in § 46-2,115(4) and, because of this misinterpretation, granted an appropriation in excess of that permitted by the statute. Section 46-2,115(4) requires the rate and timing of the flow to be the minimum necessary to maintain the instream use or uses for which the appropriation has been requested. The complaining objectors assert that this means the flow granted must be the least amount indispensably required for the continued survival of the fishery, brief for Ainsworth at 20, and that the director instead read minimum necessary as meaning appropriate for the use requested. We are again confronted with that protean term necessary. In this instance, however, it is not necessary for us to construe its meaning. The complaining objectors contend that by granting an appropriation which, under one method for measuring instream flows, would provide optimum to outstanding trout habitat rather than mere survival habitat, the director approved a flow which was more than the minimum necessary for the use requested. However, the real issue is not what minimum necessary means but, rather, what is the nature of the use for which the appropriation is requested. If the use is to provide a survival habitat, the director has erred. If, however, the use is to provide for the maintenance of the fishery at its present habitat quality, then the minimum necessary flow is the lowest flow rate which would assure no degradation in the quality of the habitat, and the director's determination is correct if supported by the evidence. According to a report which accompanied the application, the purpose of the application is to protect ... natural flow required to maintain the present fishery. A fishery resource specialist for the applicant testified that the application is intended primarily to preserve the fishery habitat. From this, it is clear that the use sought to be maintained is not merely the survival of some trout in the stream, but the continued existence of the present fishery. By using words such as maintain and preserve, it is likewise apparent that the application is intended to keep the quality of the fishery from degrading. The rate of flow which is the minimum necessary for the use before us is therefore the lowest rate which would assure no degradation in the quality of the fishery habitat. Clearly, this is something more than the survival habitat proposed by the complaining objectors. The director notes in his order that his interpretation of the phrase minimum necessary is based, in part, on his personal recollections of his own involvement in the drafting and passage of the instream flow statutes. Because the analysis set out above does not rely on the legislative history, we need not reach the propriety of the director's rationale. As we have often said, a correct result will not be set aside merely because it was based upon incorrect reasoning. Parker v. St. Elizabeth Comm. Health Ctr., 226 Neb. 526, 412 N.W.2d 469 (1987). This brings us to the complaining objectors' contentions regarding the director's determination that the flows requested meet this standard. They contend that the director rejected the applicant's method of determining the required flows and therefore erred in continuing to review the application and applying a different methodology.... Brief for 25 Corporation at 18. The fact is, however, that the director was presented with evidence as to the necessary flows based on several different methodologies, including negotiated or institutionally prescribed settlements based upon scientific studies, historical evidence, and professional judgment and observations. Although the majority of the testimony centered on the one particular methodology advocated by the applicant, it was by no means the only methodology discussed in the record, nor were these methodologies the only evidence presented on minimum necessary flow. Several of the experts discussed the methodology used by the director. One of the exhibits laid out the theory, explaining what information is needed for its application. It appears therefrom that in order to apply the director's methodology, the average annual flow of the stream segment must be determined. The record contains sufficient information to make this determination. The average annual flow is then multiplied by a percentage corresponding to the desired habitat quality. The resulting figure represents the flow regime which would sustain that habitat quality. The range of percentages developed by this methodology is from 60 to 100 percent for the optimum range, 40 percent from October to March and 60 percent from April to September for outstanding, 30 percent from October to March and 50 percent from April to September for excellent, 20 percent from October to March and 40 percent from April to September for good, 10 percent from October to March and 30 percent from April to September for fair, degrading, 10 percent for poor, minimum, and under 10 percent for severe degradation. Since the existing flow is in the optimum range, it follows that any flow regime which reduces the habitat quality below that range would not be preserving or maintaining the existing fishery at its present quality. The director found that the 60-percent figure yielded results nearly identical to the flows requested by the applicant. Since the 60-percent figure represents the lowest end of the optimum range, there is nothing improper in the director's finding concerning it. We also note that the director relied on more than this single method in reaching his conclusion that the requested flows were the minimum necessary to maintain the fishery. His order devotes considerable discussion to the evidence of a fish kill attributed to high water temperatures resulting, in part, from a period of low stream flow. He observed that the flows during this period exceeded those requested by the applicant and that the applicant's experts stood by the 50 cfs and 60 cfs requests despite the fact that they would feel more comfortable with a higher rate. It is only after recounting this evidence that the director expressed the view that the requested flows are in reasonable harmony with the results obtained by the methodology he employed. Had the application sought to appropriate the entire unappropriated flow, the evidence of the fish kill might have been sufficient to support a finding that that was the flow necessary to maintain the fishery. However, the director is not empowered to grant a larger appropriation than that requested. In light of his reliance on the evidence concerning the fish kill, the director's application of the methodology he selected simply constitutes confirmation that the requested flows are appropriate under the statute even if the other factors which led to the fish kill never reappear. Determining the minimum necessary flow for the maintenance of the use is a factual determination which, as noted earlier in part III(2), will not be disturbed unless it is unsupported by the evidence or is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. In truth, the complaining objectors' thesis is not that there is no evidence concerning the methodology used by the director but that there is more evidence concerning the applicant's methodology. The relevant inquiry, however, is not the comparative volume of testimony concerning the two methods, see Hillcrest Country Club v. N.D. Judds Co., 236 Neb. 233, 461 N.W.2d 55 (1990), but, rather, whether there is sufficient evidence to support the director's determination. Since there is, it cannot be said that the flow granted by the director is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.