Opinion ID: 2973705
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The parties’ prior litigation

Text: Before reaching either of its preemption arguments, however, DaimlerChrysler contends that prior litigation between the parties in the case of Roberts v. Baugh, 986 F. Supp. 1074 (E.D. Mich 1997), controls the outcome here based on the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and stare decisis. The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel prevent parties from relitigating issues that they had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in another forum. Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 467 (1982) (barring a plaintiff’s claims under Title VII in federal court because the state-court proceedings had provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate those claims). DaimlerChrysler argues that after the Baugh decision, which involved the “same parties” and the “same issues present in this case,” DaimlerChrysler “should not have been forced to seek relief in this action or any other action where the [state officials] seek to circumvent Baugh’s holding.” (Appellee’s Br. at 18-19) (emphasis omitted). We respectfully disagree. The district court in Baugh confronted different provisions of SCFRA that allow the state to appoint the Pension Plan as a receiver to control the prisoner’s assets and ultimately transfer them to the state. 986 F. Supp. at 1075. In provisions that are inapplicable to the present case, SCFRA gives the state the power to appoint a receiver “to protect and maintain assets pending resolution of an action” under SCFRA. Mich. Comp. Laws § 800.404a(2). As a further distinction between Baugh and the present case, the state officials in Baugh sought an order directly compelling DaimlerChrysler to send a prisoner’s pension benefits to his institutional account No. 05-1716 DaimlerChrysler Corp. et al. v. Cox et al. Page 6 pursuant to provisions of SFCRA that the state now concedes are preempted by ERISA in cases involving private pension plans. 986 F. Supp. at 1076. The present case, in contrast, concerns provisions of SCFRA that order the warden to notify a pension plan of a prisoner’s new address. DaimlerChrysler is therefore not being directly compelled by a state-court order to change participants’ addresses, but instead is being informed by the wardens that it should do so. Because Baugh concerned provisions of SCFRA inapplicable to the present case, the state did not—and was not required to—litigate the issues involved in the present case. We therefore hold that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not bar the state from opposing DaimlerChrysler’s declaratory action. Although the district court in this case adopted, in large part, the reasoning of Baugh, it understood that it was in not bound by that decision. DaimlerChrysler also argues that the doctrine of stare decisis required the district court to follow Baugh. This contention is without merit for the same reasons stated above.