Opinion ID: 2536409
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Majority Misapplies The Continuing Tort Doctrine

Text: The majority opinion undermines the continuing tort doctrine, which tolls prescription on tort claims as long as the offending action continues to cause successive damages to plaintiff. When the damages claimed are predicated on alleged continuous wrongful acts, causes which are supposed to occur daily, and to produce effects daily repeated . . . `prescription, whatever the length of time, has no application.' Di Carlo v. Laundry & Dry Cleaning Service, 178 La. 676, 152 So. 327, 329 (1933)(quoting Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 668-69, 24 L.Ed. 1036 (1878)). A continuing tort exists whenever the operating cause of injury is a continuous one and gives rise to successive damages. Crump v. Sabine River Authority, 98-2326, p. 7 (La.6/29/99), 737 So.2d 720, 726. The continuing tort doctrine has been applied by Louisiana courts for nearly eighty years. We most recently considered the doctrine in Hogg v. Chevron, 2009-2632 (La.7/6/2010), 45 So.3d 991. In Hogg, plaintiff landowners sued a service station owner whose underground tanks had leaked, spilling chemicals which contaminated plaintiffs' land. Id. at 994. Although the leaking tanks were replaced in 1997, the chemicals were not remediated and continued migrating from defendant's land towards plaintiffs' land and into their stream. Despite the continuously increasing nature of this contamination, this Court nonetheless found the operating cause of injury was the leaking tanks, not the contamination itself. Prescription therefore began to run the day the tanks were replaced. Id. In my view, Hogg was wrongfully decided. See Id. at 1007 (Knoll, J., dissenting). The majority artificially limited the continuing tort doctrine even where the injury-causing activity (i.e., the contamination) remained under plaintiffs' land, causing additional damages. As long as harmful chemicals remain under plaintiffs' land, the trespass continues, and prescription cannot begin while the wrongful conduct is still ongoing. Id. at 1003. This rationale applies equally in the case currently before us, and I dissent for the same reasons set forth in Hogg. Arguendo, even if Hogg were a correct statement of law, the majority opinion misapplies Hogg and expands its holding well beyond its facts. The primary question in any continuing tort case is whether the operating cause of injury is a continuous one. Crump v. Sabine River Authority, 98-2326, p. 7 (La.6/29/99), 737 So.2d 720, 726. In Hogg, after the leaking gas tanks were removed, no additional chemicals entered the land. [1] The Court defined the operating cause of injury as the leak itself, which ceased when the tanks were removed. Here, unlike the leaking tanks in Hogg, the unlined waste pits remain on plaintiffs' property and continue to leach additional noxious chemicals into the soil. As each additional ounce of waste migrates under plaintiffs' land, the level of contamination increases, and plaintiffs' successive damages increase. Here, through faulty analysis, and despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the majority somehow concludes that the continued leakage from the pits does not constitute a continuing tort. Instead, it holds the operating cause of injury was the actual disposal or storage of the oilfield waste in unlined pits on plaintiffs' property. This is untenable. There is nothing inherently injurious about a mineral lease operator disposing of oilfield wastes pursuant to the parties' lease. Put otherwise, plaintiffs have no actionable claim based on the mere digging of the pit or the placing of waste in that pit. The claim arises only when contaminants begin to seep out of that pit and into the plaintiffs' soil. A simple hypothetical will demonstrate the flaw in the majority's position. Assume the pits dug by Exxon in the 1940s were properly lined, and the contaminants were safely stored. However, over the years the lining began to deteriorate. In 1991, for the first time, contaminants began to escape from the pits and enter plaintiffs' land. If, as the majority holds, the wrongful conduct terminated when the pits were closed, plaintiffs' claim would have prescribed when the pit was closed in the 1940s, many years before any contaminants entered the property. Plaintiffs would be precluded from seeking any relief for any contamination, no matter how serious, resulting from the oilfield operations. The majority's position is inequitable, contrary to established law, and creates bad policy.