Opinion ID: 2555590
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Litigation Protection as a Term or Condition of Employment

Text: A threshold questionand one on which the Commonwealth Court panel was dividedis whether Paragraph 18 pertains to a term or condition of employment that is bargainable under Section 701 of PERA. See 43 P.S. § 1101.701 (requiring collective bargaining with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment). If it does not, then the provision was in excess of the arbitrators' authority, the Commonwealth Court was correct to vacate it on that basis, and our inquiry will be at an end. [16] In PLRB v. State College Area School District, 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975), this Court distinguished between bargainable terms and conditions under Section 701, and items that constitute matters of inherent managerial policy under Section 702. The Court indicated that, in drawing such a line, the directness of the impact of the issue on the wellbeing of the employee must be weighed against its effect on the operation of the agency in question. See id. at 506-07, 337 A.2d at 268 (citing Nat'l Educ. Ass'n of Shawnee Mission v. Bd. of Educ. of Shawnee Mission Unified Sch. Dist. No. 512, 212 Kan. 741, 512 P.2d 426 (1973)). Although Section 702 is not directly at issue here, we find the analysis employed in State College Area School District helpful because it illustrates that the range of items comprising bargainable terms and conditions of employment may vary depending on the activities entailed by the employment in question. Thus, we need not decide whether litigation protection in the nature of that sought by the Union constitutes a term or condition of employment for every type of public employee, but whether it is a bargainable item for H-1 bargaining unit members. State College Area School District also reflects the reality that some items may be of fundamental concern to the employees' interest in wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, while still implicating, or at least touching on, basic managerial policy. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 461 Pa. at 507, 337 A.2d at 268. Indeed, two recent decisions of this Court recognize that these categories can intersect, see Borough of Ellwood City v. PLRB, ___ Pa. ___, ___, 998 A.2d 589, 599 (2010) ([M]atters that constitute working conditions may also implicate matters of inherent managerial prerogative, which are not subject to collective bargaining.); City of Phila. v. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 22, ___ Pa. ___, ___, 999 A.2d 555, 570 (2010) ( IAFF ) (Because management decisions regarding policy or direction almost invariably implicate some aspect of employer-employee relations or the workplace, disputed arbitration awards more often than not concern both the terms and conditions of employment and the public employer's managerial prerogatives.), as does Section 702 itself. See 43 P.S. § 1101.702 (subjecting items that fall into both categories to a meet-and-discuss requirement ( see infra note 17)). In view of this overlap, IAFF and Ellwood City clarified that, under the excess-powers prong of narrow certiorari, the following test applies: first, the court asks whether the item in dispute is rationally related to the terms and conditions of employment, i.e., whether it is germane to the working environment. If not, then the item is not subject to mandatory bargaining. If a rational relationship does exist, however, the court then inquires whether collective bargaining over the topic would unduly infringe upon the public employer's essential managerial responsibilities. If so, the award reflects an excess of the arbitrators' powers. See Ellwood City, ___ Pa. at ___, 998 A.2d at 600; IAFF, ___ Pa. at ___, 999 A.2d at 571. [17] Accordingly, and as already stated, our first task is to determine whether the litigation benefits in issue constitute terms or conditions of employment for H-1 bargaining unit members. By the nature of their jobs, these employees come into daily, physical contact with prison inmates or patients at state mental hospitals in a manner that tends to expose them to a heightened probability of lawsuits and potentially frivolous criminal complaints filed by the persons over whom they exercise authority. For example, the Union references aspects of the record reflecting the litigious nature of the inmates and patients; it emphasizes that hundreds of lawsuits are filed against H-1 unit members in any given year, see, e.g., R.R. 363a (hearing exhibit), and that a number of these actions include criminal charges that are ultimately dismissed as frivolous. The Union additionally observes that, during the hearings, it highlighted the unique functions performed by its members, arguing that these functions set them apart from all other state-employee bargaining units except the Pennsylvania State Police: [O]nly a handful of Commonwealth employees are ... expected, as a condition of their employment, to interact with other individuals who desire to ... injure or kill [them]. During the hearings, the [Union] presented evidence showing that the animosity of the jailed toward their jailers is expressed in many forms, one of which was the filing of frivolous lawsuits against [Union] members. Brief for Union at 10-11 (emphasis omitted) (citing R.R. 243a, 253a, 363a, 441a-443a); see also id. at 42 ([I]nmates have no love lost for the very people whose jobs are to keep them from loosing themselves upon ... society.). These averments, moreover, are not presently contradicted by the Commonwealth. Thus, we agree with the Union that, in view of this unique set of circumstances under which the employees must perform their jobs, litigation protection is a term of employment for H-1 unit members. The next question is whether Paragraph 18's directive that such protection be provided unduly infringes upon the Commonwealth's inherent managerial prerogatives. Since the Office of General Counsel already has discretion under the Pennsylvania Code to provide such representation or indemnification for legal fees and judgments, it would be difficult for the Commonwealth to argue that requiring it to supply these benefits unduly infringes upon its managerial prerogatives as an employer. Thus, in performing the analysis required by Ellwood City and IAFF, we find that Paragraph 18 pertains to bargainable subject matter for H-1 employees. Accord State v. Pub. Safety Employees Ass'n, 93 P.3d 409, 415 (Alaska 2004); cf. Appeal of Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 483 Pa. 134, 144, 394 A.2d 946, 951 (1978) (stating that fringe benefits for school employees, including reimbursement for tuition expenses, constitute bargainable wages under Section 301(14) of PERA, 43 P.S. § 1101.301(14), which defines that term to include compensation for services rendered). [18]