Opinion ID: 779740
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Firearm Enhancements

Text: 30 Both McMurtry and Starks appeal the district court's application of a two-level sentence enhancement for possession of a firearm during the commission of a drug-related offense arguing that neither had knowledge of the guns found in the apartment. Starks objected to the enhancement at sentencing, preserving the issue for appeal. Thus, in Starks's case, we review the district court's factual determination in applying the enhancement under the clearly erroneous standard and will overturn that determination only if after considering all the evidence, [we are] left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. Messino, 55 F.3d 1241, 1247 (7th Cir.1995) (quotations omitted). Unlike Starks, McMurtry did not object to the enhancement at his sentencing hearing and has thus forfeited this issue on appeal. As such, we could only overturn McMurtry's enhancement if the district court committed a plain error that, if allowed to stand, would substantially impair the fairness and integrity of the judicial process. United States v. Noble, 246 F.3d 946, 955 (7th Cir.2001). Since we hold that the district court did not clearly err in applying the enhancement as to Starks, we need not address whether the asserted error could withstand McMurtry's higher plain-error scrutiny. 31 The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) provides, [i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed, increase by 2 levels. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) (2002). The commentary to this section states that [t]he adjustment should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense. Id. § 2D1.1(b)(1) cmt. n. 3. The enhancement accounts for the increased danger to law enforcement presented when drug dealers and traffickers arm themselves. United States v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir.2000). 32 Under § 2D1.1(b)(1), the government must first establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant possessed a weapon in a place where drugs were present, before the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that it was clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the drug offense. United States v. Grimm, 170 F.3d 760, 767 (7th Cir.1999). The government may meet its burden by showing actual or constructive possession. See United States v. Wetwattana, 94 F.3d 280, 283 (7th Cir.1996). Possession of an object, whether actual or constructive, exists when a person exercises control over the object. Id. at 283-84 & n. 4 (citing United States v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1105, 1110 (7th Cir. 1990)). We have found that a defendant exercised control over guns — and therefore possessed them for purposes of § 2D1.1(b)(1) — when the defendant was within arm's reach of those guns at the time of arrest. See id. at 284 & nn. 4-5 (finding defendant exercised control over and therefore possessed firearm contained in tissue box found sitting next to him in back seat of car; refusing to reach the issue of whether that control was indicative of actual or constructive possession). 33 Reviewing the evidence in this case, we are not convinced that the district court erred in finding that Starks and McMurtry possessed a firearm at the time of their arrest. First, we find there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to refute Starks's claim that he didn't know there were guns in the house. As discussed above, this was an active crack house with a significant amount of crack cocaine present. Agent Mascari testified that it was common for drug dealers to fortify crack houses with weapons in order to protect the drugs and drug proceeds from robbery. Indeed, Starks admitted at his sentencing hearing that he feared being robbed while working at the house that day. And even if all three guns found at the house were concealed, agents recovered multiple boxes of ammunition sitting in plain view of anyone in the house. It was reasonable for the district court to conclude from these facts that the defendants were aware of the presence of guns in the house: 34 [W]e know that he was aware of the bullets. They were clearly visible. And anybody who sees bullets in several places in an apartment that is not really a place where anyone lives or has personal effects[,] and anyone who is in that apartment with the drugs that Mr. McMurtry and Mr. Starks had[,] certainly had to be aware that guns were in or about the premises. 35 (R. 47 at 15:7-13.) 36 Second, both Starks and McMurtry ran to and were found hiding in a closet that housed a loaded firearm. That gun was recovered from a lone shoebox on the closet's top shelf — an area within reach of the defendants. As in Wetwattana, the fact that the weapon was found inside the shoebox is immaterial since there was no evidence ... that [the defendants were] unable to open the box and thereby immediately access the gun. Wetwattana, 94 F.3d at 284 n. 5. Because the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to establish that both defendants knew about the presence of guns in the house and because those defendants exhibited control over one of those guns by running to and being found within reach of it at the time of their arrest, the district court did not clearly err in determining that they possessed a weapon for purposes of § 2D1.1(b)(1). 2 37 Once the government established that the defendants were in possession of weapons, the burden shifted to Starks to show that the weapons were not clearly connected to the offense. This he failed to do. The district court correctly inferred from the close proximity of the guns to the drugs recovered from the house that they were connected to the offense. United States v. Zehm, 217 F.3d 506, 517 (7th Cir.2000); Grimm, 170 F.3d at 767 (Guns found in close proximity to illegal drugs are pre-sumptively considered to have been used in connection with the drug-trafficking offense.). We therefore find no clear error in the gun-possession enhancement and reiterate that we also find no plain error as to McMurtry's claim.