Opinion ID: 2538873
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Application of NRS 41.133 and NRS 41.141

Text: NRS 41.133 provides that [i]f an offender has been convicted of the crime which resulted in the injury to the victim, the judgment of conviction is conclusive evidence of all facts necessary to impose civil liability for the injury. NRS 41.133 mandates that conviction of a crime resulting in injury to the victim is conclusive evidence of civil liability for the injury. Langon v. Matamoros, 121 Nev. 142, 143, 111 P.3d 1077, 1077 (2005). In Langon, the court concluded that NRS 41.133 applies to convictions for malum in se offenses. Id. at 144-45, 111 P.3d at 1078. The court distinguished malum in se offenses, which legislators clearly intended NRS 41.133 to include from malum prohibitum offenses, which the court concluded were not included in NRS 41.133. [2] Id. at 145, 111 P.3d at 1078. The court also discussed the legislative history of NRS 41.133, noting that when the bill was approved, the companion provision became NRS 41.135, which enumerates the malum in se offenses that legislators clearly intended NRS 41.133 to include. Id. NRS 41.135 clearly enumerates convictions for felonies. Therefore, we conclude that NRS 41.133 was clearly intended to apply to felony convictions, which includes Wilson's convictions for felony DUI and felony reckless driving. In considering the application of NRS 41.133, the Langon court noted the scope of NRS 41.133 is inherently unclear, particularly in relation with other statutory measures governing tort liability. Id. at 144, 111 P.3d at 1078. We now address the potential conflict between NRS 41.133 and NRS 41.141 that the Langon court identified. NRS 41.133 is silent about whether the defendant may argue comparative negligence pursuant to NRS 41.141 in situations where the judgment of conviction is conclusive evidence of all facts necessary to impose civil liability. Since NRS 41.133 does not exclusively limit defenses or abrogate statutorily created defenses such as NRS 41.141, it seems that the affirmative defense of comparative negligence should be permitted to refute liability in the instant case. However, such an application might work to negate the intended effect of NRS 41.133. Thus, in construing these statutes, we attempt to give effect to both NRS 41.133 and NRS 41.141. To give effect to both statutes, we must first clarify the court's statements in Langon. In Langon, the court concluded that the application of NRS 41.133 to misdemeanor traffic violations would render the comparative negligence scheme of NRS 41.141 meaningless. Id. at 145, 111 P.3d at 1079. The court was concerned that when NRS 41.141 applies, it insulates a defendant from liability in cases in which a plaintiffs comparative negligence exceeds that `of the parties to the action against whom recovery is sought.' Id. (quoting NRS 41.141). We agree that there are situations where the application of NRS 41.141 could theoretically insulate a defendant from liability, if the jury determined that the plaintiffs comparative negligence exceeded that of the defendant. This would thwart the legislators' purpose in passing NRS 41.133, which was intended to expand the rights of victims in litigation against offenders. Hearing on A.B. 268 Before the Assembly Judiciary Comm., 63d Leg. (Nev., March 20, 1985). However, we believe that it is possible to construe the language of both statutes so as to give each of them force without nullifying their manifest purpose. NRS 41.133 only establishes liability, but does not mention damages. Simply because liability is established does not mean that a party is automatically entitled to damages. Therefore, application of NRS 41.133 allows a party to avoid having to prove liability, but does not provide an automatic recovery of damages, and a plaintiff must still establish damages. In establishing damages, defenses to damages such as comparative negligence are still permitted because they do not interfere with the determination of liability, only the amount of damages recoverable. Thus, while application of comparative negligence may in some circumstances result in no damages awarded to a plaintiff ( i.e., if the plaintiff is found to be more than 50 percent at fault), this result is not contrary to NRS 41.133 because that statute only establishes liability, not a guaranty that the plaintiff is entitled to collect damages. [3]