Opinion ID: 772978
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: 51 The appellants have raised three challenges to the district court's March 1999 order granting summary judgment for the appellees: (1) that the order was erroneous since the court had previously found that there were genuine issues of material fact in denying the appellants' motion for summary judgment in April 1997; (2) that a district court may not grant summary judgment when the non-moving party has alleged that the movant committed fraud; and (3) that they filed affidavits in opposition to the appellees' motion that the district court did not adequately consider. 52 The appellants' first argument merits little attention. There may be genuine issues of fact precluding summary judgment on behalf of one party while at the same time the undisputed facts warrant summary judgment for the other party. In addition, over the course of the two years between the two motions, the parties engaged in discovery and presented additional evidence to the district court. 53 The appellants' second argument is also unconvincing. The appellants cite Haung Tang v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 523 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1975), for the proposition that summary judgment is never appropriate when a party's state of mind is at issue. See 523 F.2d at 814 (When an issue requires determination of state of mind, it is unusual that disposition may be made by summary judgment.) (quoting Consolidated Elec. Co. v. United States, 355 F.2d 437, 438 (9th Cir. 1966)). The appellants' contention fails for three reasons. First, Haung Tang is distinguishable as addressing the defense of insanity rather than fraud. Unlike an allegation of fraud, a person asserting an insanity defense may be able to raise a genuine issue merely by declaring that he was insane. Evidence of fraud, however, must reveal the opposing party's state of mind, rather than the mental state of the party asserting the affirmative defense. The appellants cannot preclude summary judgment simply by alleging that Goldstein committed fraud; they must raise a genuine issue of material fact as to each of the elements of that defense. 54 Second, the appellants' mere assertion that Goldstein committed fraud is not in itself sufficient to prevent summary judgment. A party opposing summary judgment may not simply question the credibility of the movant to foreclose summary judgment. Instead, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and by its own evidence set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that the non-moving party must identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment). If the non-moving party fails to make this showing, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Here, the appellants failed to present evidence of fraud to prevent summary judgment. Indeed, the appellants did not even dispute Goldstein's assertion that he hired the group members to be a backup band for Burdon, suggesting that Goldstein and the Far Out entities were the rightful owners of the trademark from the beginning. See Robi, 173 F.3d at 740 (noting that the manager of a singing group may have trademark rights to the name of the group that are superior to the rights of the band members). 55 Third, it is not clear that the appellants' allegations of fraud in the Florida judgment are relevant to the present litigation. Even if Goldstein committed fraud in obtaining the trademark in the 1979 contracts, the parties signed new contracts in 1987 in which the appellants transferred their interest in the trademark to the appellees. The appellants did not present any evidence that the appellees procured the 1987 agreements through fraud. Thus, even if Goldstein had fraudulently obtained the trademark originally, the district court could properly grant summary judgment on the ground that the appellees had common law trademark rights based on the 1987 agreements. 56 Finally, the appellants' third argument--that the district court did not adequately consider affidavits that raised a genuine issue--is similarly unpersuasive. As an initial matter, the affidavits in the Excerpts of Record are unsigned and undated. Leaving aside whether the affidavits are legitimate, admissible evidence, they are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. As the district court noted in detail at the March 1999 summary judgment hearing, the affidavits are entirely conclusory. The declarations do not present any specific facts to support the appellants' claims of fraud or to establish that the appellants were entitled to payments that they did not receive. 57 Thus, the appellants failed to set forth specific facts or identify with reasonable particularly the evidence that precluded summary judgment. The district court therefore did not err in granting the appellees' motion for summary judgment. 58