Opinion ID: 76031
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Suspect Class or Fundamental Right

Text: 7 Ordinance 45-99 classifies persons based upon age. See City of Warner Robins, Ga., Code § 4-4(b)(1)-(2) (prohibiting persons under the age of twenty-one from entering or working at noneating establishments). Age, however, is not a suspect class. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000); Mason, 562 F.2d at 346. 6 Therefore, unless the ordinance infringes upon a fundamental right, it will be scrutinized under the rational basis test. See Joel, 232 F.3d at 1357. 8 [A] fundamental right must be objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if [the right] were sacrificed. Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 955 (11th Cir.2001) (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Gary contends that the ordinance infringes upon her fundamental rights of freedom of association and freedom of movement as an adult. Specifically, she alleges that the ordinance restricts her freedom of association and freedom of movement, because she cannot work in an establishment that sells alcohol until she is twenty-one, but she can draft a will, 7 consent to sexual intercourse, 8 and refuse medical treatment. 9 9 Freedom of association is a fundamental right that encompasses two forms, namely intimate association and expressive association. McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1562-63 (11th Cir.1994). Intimate association is the right to maintain certain intimate human relationships, and expressive association is the right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment — speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984). Freedom of movement generally is associated with the fundamental right to travel. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-27, 78 S.Ct. 1113, 2 L.Ed.2d 1204 (1958) (The right to travel is a part of the `liberty' of which the citizen cannot be deprived without the due process of law.... Freedom of movement across frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers as well, was part of our heritage.). 10 The ordinance, however, does not infringe upon Gary's freedom of association or her freedom of movement. First, there is no generalized right to associate in alcohol-purveying establishments with other adults. See City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25, 109 S.Ct. 1591, 104 L.Ed.2d 18 (1989) (finding that the Constitution does not recognize[] a generalized right of `social association' that includes chance encounters in dance halls). Therefore, to the extent that Gary alleges that the ordinance infringes upon a generalized right to associate with other adults, her claim lacks merit. 11 Second, in Artistic Entertainment, Inc. v. City of Warner Robins, 223 F.3d 1306, 1308, 1311 (11th Cir.2000) (per curiam), we upheld the City's right, under Ordinance 19-97, to prohibit adult businesses from obtaining liquor licenses. Consequently, Gary no longer has a right to engage in nude dancing in an alcohol-licensed establishment in the City. See id. Thus, whatever impact Ordinance 45-99 might have had on Gary's freedoms if Ordinance 19-97 did not exist, it has no impact on those freedoms at the present time. Gary remains free to observe and engage in nude dancing, but she cannot do so in Warner Robins in establishments that primarily serve alcohol. 12 Therefore, because the ordinance does not involve a suspect class nor infringe upon a fundamental right, analysis under the rational basis test is appropriate. See Joel, 232 F.3d at 1357.