Opinion ID: 2599060
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the utah county attorney's office should have been disqualified from mcclellan's prosecution

Text: ¶ 19 The limited issue of whether an entire county attorney's office must be disqualified from a defendant's prosecution when that defendant's former defense counsel becomes employed by the county attorney's office is a question of first impression in Utah. McClellan urges us to adopt a rule requiring per se disqualification. We decline to do so. We agree with the court of appeals that a more flexible rule better reflects Utah's rules, precedent, and policy. Accordingly, we adopt the rule formulated by the court of appeals: [T]o ensure faith in the impartiality and integrity of the criminal justice system, and to prevent a chilling effect on a defendant's willingness to confide in defense counsel, the entire prosecutor's office will be assumed to be privy to the confidences obtained by the former defense lawyer. The prosecutor may rebut this presumption by showing that effective screening procedures have been used to isolate the defendant's former counsel from the prosecution of the substantially related criminal charges. State v. McClellan, 2008 UT App 48, ¶ 22, 179 P.3d 825. ¶ 20 While we have not previously addressed the precise question of the consequences of defense counsel's association with the prosecuting entity during the course of prosecution, the concerns underlying this issue are not new. In State v. Brown, this court adopted a rule prohibiting a city prosecutor from assisting in the defense of an accused, emphasizing that such dual representation would jeopardize[] the vital interests of the criminal justice system, and that fairness and impartiality in the adjudication process must be diligently maintained in order to ensure [public] faith in the impartiality and integrity of the justice system. 853 P.2d 851, 856-58 (Utah 1992). These same policy considerations are at issue here. A presumption of shared confidences between the former defense counsel and the county attorney's office adequately addresses these considerations. ¶ 21 In adopting this rule, we are also guided by the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. Clearly, under rule 1.9(a), a former defense attorney is prohibited from participating in the prosecution of his or her former client in the same or a substantially related matter absent that client's informed consent, confirmed in writing. Utah Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.9(a) (2009). Ordinarily, such a conflict of interest is attributed to all members of a disqualified attorney's firm. Id. R. 1.10. However, the Rules of Professional Conduct contemplate that the conflict need not be generally attributed if the personally disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom. Id. R.1.10(c)(1). While this rule applies specifically only to attorneys working in the private sector, it demonstrates our preference for screening over per se disqualification of an entire group of associated attorneys. ¶ 22 We note that other courts are divided over whether per se disqualification of the entire prosecutor's office is necessary to adequately protect the rights of the accused. Lux v. Virginia, 484 S.E.2d 145, 150 (Va. Ct. App. 1997). However, the majority of jurisdictions that have addressed this issue have rejected the inflexibility of a per se rule and have held instead that the entire staff ordinarily need not be disqualified from prosecuting the defendant if the staff member who had previously worked for the defendant is isolated from any participation in the prosecution of the defendant. New Mexico v. Pennington, 851 P.2d 494, 498 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993); see also Nebraska v. Kinkennon, 747 N.W.2d 437, 444 (Neb. 2008)([W]hen the disqualified attorney is effectively screened from any participation in the prosecution of the defendant, the prosecutor's office may, in general, proceed with the prosecution.); In re R.B., 583 N.W.2d 839, 842 (Based upon the extensive efforts made to screen [former defense counsel] from any communication with anyone in the State's Attorney's Office about this case after her employment with that office . . ., we find no error in the trial court's denial of [defendant's] motions to dismiss or recuse [the entire office].). ¶ 23 The rebuttable presumption of shared confidences which we adopt today avoids the drastic result of disqualifying an entire county attorney's office based on only the appearance of impropriety, without regard to whether any confidence was actually breached or any prejudice to the defendant actually resulted, while at the same time ensuring the rights of the accused are protected. See Kinkennon, 747 N.W.2d at 443. The rebuttable presumption allows the trial court [to] evaluate[] the circumstances of a particular case and then determine[] whether disqualification of the entire office is appropriate. Id. In order to rebut the presumption, the burden rests with the prosecutor's office to demonstrate that necessary and effective steps have been taken to prevent the transfer of any confidential information between former defense counsel and those conducting the prosecution. The prosecutor's office must show that it has implemented sufficient measures to screen former defense counsel and that it has consistently followed through with those measures. See Michigan v. Davenport, 760 N.W.2d 743, 750 (Mich Ct. App. 2008).
¶ 24 While we concur in the rule and reasoning adopted by the court of appeals, we disagree with that court's application of the rule. The court of appeals was unable to determine from the incomplete record extant in this case whether McClellan's former defense counsel Hadfield had or had not been suitably screened. Because a defendant bears the burden of ensuring an adequate record on which to prove ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal, see State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ¶ 16, 12 P.3d 92, the court of appeals construed the deficiencies in the record against McClellan and assume[d] that the prosecutor's office adequately rebutted the presumption of shared confidences. McClellan, 2008 UT App 48, ¶ 23. We disagree. ¶ 25 We begin with the presumption that when defense counsel Hadfield joined the Utah County Attorney's Office three days before McClellan's trial, an impermissible conflict of interest was created. That conflict should have been imputed to the entire county attorney's office unless it was rebutted. The county attorney's office was required to show that it had adopted effective measures to prevent the transfer of any of McClellan's confidences from Hadfield to those engaged in the prosecution. The record in this case is not simply inadequate on this point, it is nonexistent. There is no evidence of any attempt by the prosecutor to show that Hadfield was effectively screened because none was offered. Neither the prosecutor nor the court ever raised the issue. McClellan's new defense counsel also failed to raise the issue. However, no objection is required, and the lack of an objection does not change the analysis. ¶ 26 The presumption of impermissibly shared confidences was not rebutted, and consequently stands. The trial court was under an obligation to disqualify the entire Utah County Attorney's Office. Its failure to do so was error.
¶ 27 To support reversal on a finding of error, we require a showing of prejudice-a showing by the defendant in this case that absent the failure of the court to disqualify the prosecutor there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of his trial would have been more favorable. See State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, ¶ 26, 128 P.3d 1179. On the specific facts of McClellan's case, however, we will presume prejudice. It has taken more than twenty years for McClellan's first appeal, his constitutionally guaranteed right to review of his conviction, to reach us. Much of the record has been lost or destroyed. The exhibits have been destroyed. Prompt attention to motions, notices, and orders has been dramatically lacking. None of these difficulties appear to be McClellan's doing. We cannot in good conscience assume regularity in a circumstance when so much time has past, so many defense lawyers have come and gone, and so many mistakes have been allowed. In such a circumstance, it would be unjust to hold an incarcerated defendant responsible for the loss of the court records by requiring him to demonstrate the likelihood of a more favorable outcome. ¶ 28 We are also compelled to note that we are not pleased with the result we are forced to reach in this case. We have no reason to assume that the verdict that would have been reached on a timely retrial would have differed from that reached originally. However, McClellan's rights have been so severely trodden upon in this instance that it is impossible for us to do otherwise. After twenty years, this is McClellan's first appeal of right. It is an appeal that should have been heard in 1989 when the first notice of appeal was filed, but was not because of missteps outside of McClellan's control: the district court delayed for almost three years before transferring his file to the appellate court and his defense counsel never filed a brief on his behalf. Although the court eventually sought to remedy this error by ordering resentencing, McClellan was not informed of this result, the order was never filed, and resentencing did not take place until 2005. Meanwhile, the court record was destroyed. In the years since McClellan's conviction, his case has been passed from attorney to attorney. He has been ignored and forgotten. After twenty years in prison, McClellan is still entitled to a fair trial. We therefore remand for a new trial. ¶ 29 We recognize that this result is also unfair to McClellan's victim. She has absolutely no responsibility for the errors in this case. However, our constitutional system is primarily designed to protect the innocent, not punish the guilty. When, as here, the two are in conflict, the greater good lies in protecting the rights of the innocently accused rather than ensuring the conviction of all who are guilty. When the constitutionally protected rights of a defendant are blatantly violated, that violation must be corrected in order to prevent the same occurring to an innocent defendant in the future. Our constitutional compact has already made that choice.