Opinion ID: 1226361
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constructive Amendment to Count 6 of the Indictment

Text: Kuehne contends that count 6 of the indictment was constructively amended by the district court when the court instructed the jury regarding the use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). As noted above, a constructive amendment occurs where the indictment is effectively altered by the presentation of evidence and jury instructions which change the material elements of an offense. To determine whether a constructive amendment has occurred, therefore, we review the language of the indictment, the evidence presented at trial, the jury instructions and the verdict forms utilized by the jury. See United States v. Brown, 332 F.3d 363, 371 (6th Cir.2003). Count 6 of the indictment alleged that Kuehne aided and abetted the use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). However, when instructing the jury regarding the offense, the district court erroneously asserted that Kuehne was charged with using and carrying a firearm. In particular, the district court stated: Count 11 [5] charges on or about December 13th, 2002 in the Southern District of Ohio and elsewhere John David Kuehne, Jr. aided and abetted a person known to the grand jury carrying and/or using two firearms, to wit: A Taures Model PT 92[.]9 millimeter pistol, serial number TUE4914 and a Colt model 19110-A1 [.]45 caliber pistol, serial number CV 19208 during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime for which he may be prosecuted in the United States. . . . (J.A. at 1681-82) (emphasis added) Although the district court properly instructed the jury regarding the elements that must be proven in order to convict Kuehne of the use offense and specifically defined use within the meaning of the statute, its initial error in stating that Kuehne was charged with both using and carrying a firearm was repeated on the verdict forms given to the jury. The verdict form for count 6 stated [w]e, the Jury, find Defendant John David Kuehne, Jr. `Guilty Beyond a Reasonable Doubt' of Aiding and Abetting Using or Carrying [a] Firearm in Relation to a Drug Trafficking Crime, on or about December 13, 2002, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 324(c) and 2. (J.A. at 42) Indeed, when reading the verdict on count 6, the jury foreperson stated that the jury found Kuehne guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aiding and abetting using and carrying a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime[.] (J.A. at 1710) The difference between the words use and carry is not merely semantic inasmuch as each has distinct meanings within § 924(c)(1). In Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995), the Supreme Court held that the term use is to be construed narrowly and its application limited to the active employment of a firearm. Active employment includes brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with, and, most obviously, firing or attempting to fire a firearm. Id. at 148, 116 S.Ct. 501. The term carry, however, as used by the statute is construed broadly and retains its ordinary meaning. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 131, 118 S.Ct. 1911, 141 L.Ed.2d 111 (1998). A defendant carries a firearm when he conveys or moves the firearm, including via a vehicle, and when there is personal agency and some degree of possession over the firearm. Id. at 137, 118 S.Ct. 1911; see id. (holding that the term carry includes driving a car with guns locked in the glove compartment or the trunk). As the Supreme Court has noted, a firearm can be used without being carried, e.g., when an offender has a gun on display during a transaction, or barters with a firearm without handling it; and a firearm can be carried without being used, e.g., when an offender keeps a gun hidden under his clothing throughout a drug transaction. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 146, 116 S.Ct. 501. Based on the disparate meanings of the terms use and carry, the introduction of the term carry broadened the basis for conviction on count 6. Although the jury instructions broadened the basis upon which Kuehne could have been convicted, this fact alone does not resolve the question of whether a constructive amendment or a variance occurred in this case. This court has held that a constructive amendment occurs where both the jury instructions and the evidence at trial vary from the indictment to broaden the basis for conviction. See United States v. Cusmano, 659 F.2d 714, 718 (6th Cir.1981); see also Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 213, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960). We have also found constructive amendments where jury instructions differ from an indictment, even in the absence of varied evidence, to charge the jury on a separate offense that was not listed in an indictment. See United States v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925, 936 (6th Cir.2004). However, where the jury instructions alone differ from the indictment to charge the same crime, but on an alternative theory, a mere variance occurs and a defendant must demonstrate prejudice. See Budd, 496 F.3d at 522, 525; Martin v. Kassulke, 970 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir.1992). As an initial matter, Kuehne has not alleged that the evidence offered at trial varied from his indictment. Consequently, Kuehne may demonstrate a constructive amendment only upon a showing that the district court charged the jury on an alternative crime rather than an alternative method[ ] by which one crime . . . could have been committed. Budd, 496 F.3d at 522. We find that Kuehne has not made this showing. As we noted in Combs, § 924 criminalizes two distinct offenses. The first offense criminalizes the use or carrying of a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime, while the second criminalizes the possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. Combs, 369 F.3d at 931. Thus, following the logic of Combs, the term use and carry provides two alternative methods of conviction for the during and relation to offense. See also United States v. Washington, 127 F.3d 510, 514 (6th Cir.1997) ([A] defendant can be convicted under § 924(c)(1) if he either uses or carries a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense.). Inasmuch as the jury was charged regarding two different methods of committing the same offense rather than a wholly distinct offense, a variance occurred and Kuehne must demonstrate that his substantial rights were affected by the district court's erroneous jury instruction. [I]n this context, substantial rights are affected only when a defendant shows prejudice to his ability to defend himself at trial, to the general fairness of the trial, or to the indictment's sufficiency to bar subsequent prosecutions. Hynes, 467 F.3d at 962. In the instant case, we find that Kuehne has not established that his substantial rights were impacted by the erroneous jury instruction. Kuehne's ability to defend himself at trial was not undermined by the instruction because his defense was premised on an assertion that he did not participate in any of the alleged crimes. Moreover, Kuehne has not suggested that the general fairness at trial was compromised or that the indictment will subject him to future prosecutions. Inasmuch as Kuehne has failed to establish that his substantial rights were affected by the jury instruction, he has not shown a prejudicial variance and is therefore not entitled to relief. See United States v. Blankenship, 923 F.2d 1110, 1116 (5th Cir.1991) (finding that an indictment charging the use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense was not constructively amended by the district court's addition of the term carry when instructing the jury).