Opinion ID: 2353703
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Justification of Seizure of Cigarette Pack

Text: Encounters between a member of the public and law enforcement officers fall into one of four categories: consensual encounters, which are not considered seizures; investigatory detentions, commonly known as Terry stops (after Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 [1968], whose parameters are codified in K.S.A. 22-2402); public safety stops; and arrests. See Thompson, 284 Kan. at 772, 166 P.3d 1015 (citing State v. Parker, 282 Kan. 584, 588-89, 147 P.3d 115 [2006]). In the present case, we are dealing with an investigatory detention or Terry stop under K.S.A. 22-2402. K.S.A. 22-2402 provides: (1) Without making an arrest, a law enforcement officer may stop any person in a public place whom such officer reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime and may demand of the name, address of such suspect and an explanation of such suspect's actions. (2) When a law enforcement officer has stopped a person for questioning pursuant to this section and reasonably suspects that such officer's personal safety requires it, such officer may frisk such person for firearms or other dangerous weapons. If the law enforcement officer finds a firearm or weapon, or other thing, the possession of which may be a crime or evidence of crime, such officer may take and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which time such officer shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person. To perform the frisk or limited search permitted during an investigatory detention, [t]he officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868; see Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327, 330, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009). Reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of existing circumstances, taking into account an officer's reasonable inferences based on training, experience, and common sense. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). [I]n determining whether the officer acted reasonably . . ., due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or `hunch,' but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The officer must be able to point to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). A search for weapons during an investigative detention may include the area within a suspect's immediate control as well as his or her person. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). Terry recognized that a frisk for weapons constituted a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, but concluded that such a search was reasonable when weighed against the need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations where they may lack probable cause for an arrest. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25, 88 S.Ct. 1868. In this case, Tucker was investigating a reported burglary. At the time he spoke with Johnson in the kitchen, he did not yet know whether Johnson had permission from the tenant to remove his belongings from the apartment. But there was nothing about Johnson that heightened Tucker's suspicion that she was burglarizing the apartment, and he already knew that the landlord had confirmed Johnson's story about her boyfriend being the tenant whom the landlord had asked to leave the apartment the previous evening. Tucker also believed Johnson had a key to the apartment. And Johnson and the other woman had not attempted to leave. None of these facts would have led to a reasonable inference that Johnson was armed and dangerous or that she and the area within her control needed to be searched. The State nevertheless argues that Johnson fundamentally changed the dynamics of her interaction with Tucker when she disobeyed Tucker's directive when she continued to reach for her cigarettes after he told her not to do so. As Tucker testified, [T]he main thing that alerted me that night was that she was so adamant on gaining access to the cigarette pack. In addition, Tucker had experience in drug and prostitution cases in which suspects had hidden razors in cigarette packs. Both the district judge and the Court of Appeals majority characterized the question of whether officer safety concerns supported the seizure of the cigarette pack as a close one. We agree. We do not regard Tucker's experience with drug and prostitution cases as particularly relevant to his behavior in this case, which, at the time, he believed to be a burglary or no crime at all. But we are persuaded that Johnson's insistence on reaching for her cigarettes despite at least one order to do otherwise, particularly when accompanied by Tucker's explanation of why she had to wait to smoke, was a game changer. It gave Tucker an adequate basis for seizing the cigarette pack to protect himself and his fellow officers. K.S.A. 22-2402(2) permits a law enforcement officer to conduct an officer safety search and remove any potentially dangerous weapons from a suspect's person, as Officer Tucker did when he removed the cigarette pack from Johnson's possession. We hold that the seizure of the cigarette pack was justified under the facts in this case.