Opinion ID: 2362938
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Duty of Grondin

Text: [¶ 8] A general contractor is liable to third parties who are damaged by the conduct of a subcontractor if the general contractor knows that the activities of the subcontractor involve an unreasonable risk of physical harm to those third parties and the general contractor fails to exercise reasonable care to protect the third parties from that harm. [¶ 9] RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413 (1965) provides: One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize as likely to create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to them by the absence of such precautions if the employer . . . fails to exercise reasonable care to provide . . . for the taking of . . . precautions. [¶ 10] From its response to paragraph 1 of Maravell's statement of additional material facts quoted above, it is undisputed that Grondin knew that Maravell's office was sufficiently close to the blast site to pose a substantial risk of physical harm to Maravell if reasonable precautions were not taken. [¶ 11] In determining the nature of the appropriate standard of care or practice, expert testimony may be necessary where the matter in issue is within the knowledge of experts only, and not within the common knowledge of lay[persons]. Cyr v. Giesen, 150 Me. 248, 252, 108 A.2d 316, 318 (1954) (quotation marks omitted); see Searles, 1997 ME 128, ¶ 10, 695 A.2d at 1210 (deeming expert testimony necessary to establish the duty applicable to licensed medical professionals, professional engineers, and attorneys). [E]xpert testimony may not be necessary[, however,] `where the negligence and harmful results are sufficiently obvious as to lie within common knowledge. . . .' Id. (quoting Cyr, 150 Me. at 252, 108 A.2d at 318). [¶ 12] While the standard of care of a blasting contractor may lie within common knowledge, see Albison v. Robbins & White, Inc., 151 Me. 114, 125, 116 A.2d 608, 613 (1955) (holding that, where a blaster knew that its blasts were damaging nearby homes, its failure to apply common knowledge and employ a slower method with more moderate charges was negligence) and Cratty v. Aceto & Co., 151 Me. 126, 130-32, 135, 116 A.2d 623, 626-28 (1955) (holding that, where common knowledge indicated that the damage to plaintiff's home was unusual and would not have occurred had due care been used, res ipsa loquitur allowed an inference of negligence against a blaster engaged in nearby operations), the standard of care of a general contractor does not. Indeed, a layperson could not say precisely what provisions a general contractor is required to make for the taking of precautions. Expert testimony is, therefore, necessary to establish the duty of a general contractor. [¶ 13] Maravell designated Jim Ludwiczak, the president of Blasting and Mining Consultants, Inc., as her expert witness with respect to blasting. She supported the designation with a report that Ludwiczak had prepared for her earlier litigation against McGoldrick. The report details McGoldrick's duty to control the adverse effects of blastingi.e., flyrock, ground vibration, airblast, and noise. It notes that McGoldrick should have better controlled these effects by, among other things, decreasing the hole depth and diameter; reducing the number of holes per blast and pounds per delay; providing ear protection; and constructing artificial noise barriers. Although the report does not reference Grondin's duties, a fact-finder could reasonably infer that Grondin was required to exercise reasonable care to ensure that McGoldrick took the above-mentioned precautions. [¶ 14] Ludwiczak's report, which is referenced throughout the parties' statements, details McGoldrick's failure to control the adverse effects of the blasting and concludes: the blasting operation and program (monitoring) was not conducted within . . . acceptable industry standards. If proven, this conclusion would support a finding that McGoldrick breached its duties. Such a finding would allow an inference that Grondin breached its duty to exercise reasonable care to ensure that McGoldrick took the necessary precautions. Ludwiczak's report further concludes: the noise and air pressure levels were sufficient to cause damages to [Maravell's] hearing. Maravell similarly states that she believes that her hearing was damaged as a result of the blasting. If proven, these statements would support a finding that Grondin's breach caused Maravell's damages. [¶ 15] We conclude that the statements and accompanying documentation (specifically, Ludwiczak's report) are sufficient to set forth a prima facie case for each of the four elements of negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages. The court, therefore, erred in granting Grondin's motion for a summary judgment.