Opinion ID: 2708678
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Stage 1

Text: The remedial work of Stage 1, on the other hand, is complete, so we can review plaintiffs’ claims about Stage 1 that 16 No. 13-2142 are not directly affected by Stages 2 and 3. Plaintiffs raise three such claims about Stage 1 on appeal. First, they argue that the EPA failed to prepare the functional equivalent of a remedial investigation and feasibility study (“RI/FS”) before selecting the Stage 1 remedies as required by CERCLA because the EPA did not consider whether Stage 1 would stop all PCB releases into the environment. Second, plaintiffs argue that selecting Stage 1 violated CERCLA’s mandate to protect human health and the environment because Stage 1 did not stop all releases of PCBs into the environment. Finally, plaintiffs argue that the EPA violated CERCLA’s mandate that all agreements with parties be entered as consent decrees in the district court because the EPA did not modify the consent decree before implementing Stage 1. Our review of the EPA’s actions is limited. What is now § 310 of CERCLA permits citizen suits against the EPA only if they allege a failure to perform an act or duty under CERCLA “which is not discretionary.” 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(2). The Supreme Court has interpreted identical language in the Endangered Species Act citizen suit provision to allow review only of whether the EPA followed required decision-making procedures. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 172 (1997); see also Scott v. City of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992, 995 (7th Cir. 1984) (interpreting identical language in the Clean Water Act the same way). The substance of the EPA’s decisions, on the other hand, is at least partly discretionary, and therefore beyond the scope of these citizen suit provisions. Scott, 741 F.2d at 995 (applying citizen suit provision of Clean Water Act). The scope of judicial review under these provisions is therefore much narrower than the scope of judicial review under the No. 13-2142 17 Administrative Procedure Act, which allows judicial review of the substance of an agency’s action under a deferential abuseof-discretion standard. See Scott, 741 F.2d at 995; Little Company of Mary Hospital v. Sebelius, 587 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 2009) (discussing the deferential standard of review under the Administrative Procedure Act). Plaintiffs have not argued that § 310(a)(2) should be interpreted differently from the citizen suit provisions in the Endangered Species Act and Clean Water Act, and we see no reason to do so. We thus read CERCLA’s citizen suit provision to allow review of claims regarding whether the EPA complied with required procedures under CERCLA, but not claims regarding the substance of the EPA’s decisions, which is a matter of discretion for the agency. Given these constraints on our review, we must make sure that plaintiffs’ claims are within the scope of § 310(a)(2) before analyzing them further. We agree with plaintiffs that the EPA had a non-discretionary duty to prepare the functional equivalent of an RI/FS for Stage 1. See 42 U.S.C. § 9616 (requiring commencement of RI/FS for pre-1986 National Priorities List sites); 40 C.F.R. § 300.430 (detailed requirements of an RI/FS); see also Frey v. Environmental Protection Agency, 2006 WL 2849715, at – (S.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2006) (the RI/FS is the functional equivalent of the Environmental Impact Statement required by NEPA, so the RI/FS must be mandatory). We therefore can review whether the EPA 18 No. 13-2142 completed the necessary components of an RI/FS.5 We also agree with plaintiffs that the EPA had a non-discretionary duty to select remedial actions that are protective of human health and the environment, 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1), but again, we can review only whether the EPA determined that, in its estimation, Stage 1 was protective of human health and the environment. Finally, the EPA has a non-discretionary duty to enter party agreements as consent decrees in the district court, 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(1)(A), so we are free to review whether it did so. We proceed to this limited review of the merits. We agree with the district court that the undisputed facts show that the EPA completed the functional equivalent of an RI/FS prior to selecting Stage 1. Contrary to plaintiffs’ assertions, the EPA did consider whether Stage 1, standing alone, would stop all PCB releases from the sites into the environment. It concluded that Stage 1 would significantly improve soil quality at the sites but that further remediation of the contaminated groundwater and sediment would be needed. In other words, the EPA considered Stage 1 to be a good first step toward preventing all PCB releases into the environment from the sites and explained 5 The EPA argues that it did not have to prepare the functional equivalent of an RI/FS for Stage 1 because the 1985 consent decree was adopted before the RI/FS requirement was added to the statute. However, Stage 1 was selected and the amendment to the consent decree was approved long after the RI/FS requirement was added in 1986. CERCLA subjects clean-up sites to the RI/FS requirement even if they were added to the National Priorities List before the requirement was enacted, see 42 U.S.C. § 9616(d), so the Bloomington sites were not somehow grandfathered out of the RI/FS requirement. No. 13-2142 19 that future steps would be needed to solve the problem fully. The RI/FS regulations did not require more. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430; Frey II, 403 F.3d at 834 (recognizing that site clean-up often proceeds in stages). The EPA also determined that Stage 1 was protective of human health and the environment. Again, our review of that determination is deferential. It is clear that the EPA made the required determination. Here, the EPA concluded that Stage 1 was protective of human health and the environment because it would reduce PCB contamination at the sites. That determination is sufficient to comply with CERCLA’s mandate, and plaintiffs’ challenge accordingly fails. To the extent that plaintiffs argue that the EPA did not protect human health and the environment because it did not select the most protective remedy, we note that the EPA is not required to do so. In fact, the EPA is explicitly directed to consider other factors, including cost, when selecting a remedy. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1). Finally, plaintiffs’ claim that the EPA violated CERCLA’s consent decree requirement is moot. Plaintiffs’ complaint asked the court to make the EPA amend the 1985 consent decree. The EPA has now filed and the district court has approved an amendment to the consent decree that incorporates all of the Records of Decision for each site. The court could no longer provide meaningful relief, so plaintiffs’ claim is moot. See Cornucopia Institute v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 560 F.3d 673, 676 (7th Cir. 2009). Plaintiffs argue that rather than declaring their claim moot, we should find them to be prevailing parties and award attorney fees because the EPA amended the consent decree in 20 No. 13-2142 response to their lawsuit. However, the Supreme Court has rejected this “catalyst theory” for most federal statutes that award attorney fees to prevailing parties. Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001); Walker v. Calumet City, 565 F.3d 1031, 1033–34 (7th Cir. 2009). Buckhannon held that a plaintiff does not become a prevailing party when her lawsuit brings about a voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct without a court order that materially alters the legal relationship between the parties. Id. This circuit has adopted “a strong presumption that Buckhannon applies to each fee-shifting statute that awards fees to ‘prevailing parties.’” T.D. v. LaGrange School District No. 102, 349 F.3d 469, 475 (7th Cir. 2003). For Buckhannon not to apply, the text, structure or legislative history of a particular statute must clearly indicate a different definition of “prevailing party.” Id. Nothing in the text, structure, or legislative history of CERCLA clearly indicates that we should interpret its feeshifting provision differently from that in Buckhannon, so we see no reason why it should not apply here. See City of Waukesha v. PDQ Food Stores, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1122 (E.D. Wisc. 2007) (applying Buckhannon to CERCLA’s feeshifting provision); Lucia A. Silecchia, The Catalyst Calamity: Post-Buckhannon Fee-Shifting in Environmental Litigation and a Proposal for Congressional Action, 29 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1 (2004) (assuming Buckhannon applies to fee-shifting under CERCLA and calling for legislation). Applying the Buckhannon definition of “prevailing party,” plaintiffs’ claim for attorney fees fails. Plaintiffs’ lawsuit did No. 13-2142 21 not result in a court-ordered change in the legal relationship between the plaintiffs and the EPA. Even if we accept plaintiffs’ contention that the EPA amended the 1985 consent decree in response to their lawsuit, plaintiffs were not parties to the enforcement action, so the decree did not change their legal relationship with the EPA. Plaintiffs’ claim regarding the consent decree is therefore moot, and they are not prevailing parties on that claim.