Opinion ID: 4527707
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State Silver Platter Doctrines

Text: When the Supreme Court decided Elkins and Mapp, the federal judiciary was at the forefront of defining the privacy rights guaranteed by our founding charters. See Julius Berman & Paul Oberst, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by an Unconstitutional Search and Seizure—Federal Problems, 55 NW . U. L. REV. 525, 532 (1960-61) (noting that, at the time the article was written, twenty-five states had not adopted the exclusionary rule). Pennsylvania, regrettably, was not among those states that adopted an exclusionary rule before Mapp. See Commonwealth v. Chaitt, 112 A.2d 379, 381-82 (Pa. 1955). But soon state courts began to take the lead. As Justice Brennan noted in 1977, “more and more state courts are construing state constitutional counterparts of provisions of the Bill of Rights as guaranteeing citizens of their states even more protection than the federal provisions, even those identically phrased.” William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 495 (1977); see also PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 91 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (calling this development “a very healthy trend of affording state constitutional provisions a more expansive interpretation than [the Supreme] Court has given to the Federal Constitution”). This “New Federalism” trend applied equally to state constitutional provisions pertaining to searches and seizures. See Mary Jane Morrison, Choice of Law for Unlawful Searches, 41 OKLA. L. REV. 579, 594-96 (1988). As state courts interpreted their state constitutions to provide greater protections than the Fourth Amendment, two new silver platter problems arose in state courts: (1) the “reverse silver platter” (evidence obtained by federal authorities, possibly in compliance with the Fourth Amendment, but in a way that violated the state’s constitution); and (2) the “interstate silver platter” (evidence obtained by a sister state’s authorities in a way that violated either the forum state’s constitution, the sister state’s constitution, or both). By [J-40-2019] [MO: Baer, J.] - 8 the mid-1970s, the need to address both the reverse and interstate silver platter problems was growing.3 In 1975, “[t]he view expressed in Lustig was also reflected in decisions by state courts concerned with the ‘interstate silver platter.’” Richard Tullis & Linda Ludlow, Admissibility of Evidence Seized in Another Jurisdiction: Choice of Law and the Exclusionary Rule, 10 U.S.F. L. REV. 67, 68 (1975). Since then-California Deputy Attorneys General Tullis and Ludlow wrote their influential article in 1975, see, e.g., State v. Lucas, 372 N.W.2d 731, 736-37 (Minn. 1985) (citing the article); Pooley v. State, 705 P.2d 1293, 1303 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (same); see also Britton’s Brief at 27-28 (citing Lucas and the article), state courts generally have taken one of two approaches to adjudicate reverse and interstate silver platter issues. First, some states employ a choice (or conflict) of law approach. Second, other states use an “exclusionary rule analysis.”
Under a choice of law analysis, “courts analyze the issue as if it were a civil case and apply the choice of law method of the forum state to determine whether the law of the forum state or the situs state should be followed, and what sanctions are to be used if the appropriate law is violated.” People v. Porter, 742 P.2d 922, 925 (Colo. 1987).4 The first question a court would ask is whether the rule pertains to procedure or substance, 3 At the time of Mapp, only six states with judicially-adopted exclusionary rules had considered the reverse silver platter, with five of those states excluding evidence obtained by federal officers. See Berman & Oberst, supra at 548. With regard to the interstate silver platter, five states had considered that doctrine, with mixed holdings on admitting the evidence. See id. at 549; Galler, supra at 459 n.23 4 The “forum state” refers to the state of the prosecution (in this case, Pennsylvania), while the “situs state” refers to the state of the search (in this case, California). In reverse silver platters, “situs” could also refer to the jurisdiction of the federal government, even though the search is taking place within the physical boundaries of the forum state. [J-40-2019] [MO: Baer, J.] - 9 as the trial court did in this instance. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/27/2016, at 4-5 (“Trial Ct. Op.”). In Burge v. State, 443 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the high court in that state for all criminal matters, concluded that determination of how to apply the exclusionary rule in an interstate silver platter case was a procedural, rather than a substantive, question. Id. at 723. With little analysis, the court simply stated that “in such instances the law of the forum (Texas in this case) governs as to procedure and rules of evidence,” citing three treatises. Id. The court found that “[a]ny other view would lead to endless perplexity.” Id. Courts that have selected other choice of law approaches, see, e.g., People v. Saiken, 275 N.E.2d 381, 383-85 (Ill. 1971), and exclusionary rule approaches, see, e.g., Lucas, 372 N.W.2d at 736-37, have rejected the idea that application of the exclusionary rule is a procedural choice of law matter. And the Burge approach has been much criticized in scholarly commentary. See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, 1 Search & Seizure § 1.5(c) (5th ed. 2019) (“The summary disposition in Burge on the ground that the law of the forum controls on matters of procedure has been justly criticized for its imprecision.”); Morrison, supra at 581 (“Although the exclusionary rule in criminal procedure governs the admissibility of evidence, it is neither a rule of procedure nor a rule of evidence for choiceof-law purposes.”); Tullis & Ludlow, supra at 85 (“The approach taken by the Burge court was criticized by one commentator as a ‘mechanical application of the substanceprocedure choice of law.’”) (quoting Note, Conflict of Laws—Criminal Procedure—Law of Forum Applies to Search and Seizure in Accused’s Out-of-State Residence, 23 VAND. L. REV. 425 (1970)). While application of the exclusionary rule fits into the broad category of law called “criminal procedure,” it is not procedural in the same way that rules of criminal or civil [J-40-2019] [MO: Baer, J.] - 10 procedure are. “Given this Court’s recognition that the exclusionary rule is essential to protect the individual rights enumerated in our own Pennsylvania Constitution,” Commonwealth v. Bishop, 217 A.3d 833, 853 (Pa. 2019) (Wecht, J., dissenting), and not essential to protect the individual rights enumerated in our Rules of Criminal Procedure, the designation of the exclusionary rule as merely a rule of procedure is unsatisfactory, as the trial court correctly found, see Trial Ct. Op. at 5 (“This issue is a constitutional law question involving the fundamental right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”). Other courts, however, have chosen to do a substantive choice of law analysis, whereby a court “adopt[s] one of the multifactor conflict-of-laws approaches that have arisen in the last century (or . . . create[s] a unique multifactor approach that draws on the factors used in more than one of the recently developed approaches),” such as those embodied in the Restatement (First) Conflict of Laws or Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws. Megan McGlynn, Note, Competing Exclusionary Rules in Multistate Investigations: Resolving Conflicts of State Search-and-Seizure Law, 127 YALE L.J. 406, 435 (2017). For example, the Illinois Supreme Court had to decide whether to apply the Illinois or Indiana exclusionary rules for a prosecution in Illinois court of a crime committed in Illinois, but where the search took place in Indiana and violated Indiana law. Saiken, 275 N.E.2d at 383-84. That court used a “significant relationship” or “center of gravity” test and considered a number of factors: The crime was committed in Illinois; it was being prosecuted there; the defendant was a resident and citizen of Illinois; the great majority of the witnesses, who would testify at the trial, were Illinois residents; Indiana had no vital contact with the crime; and the application of Illinois evidentiary law would not offend the comity of interstate relationships between Indiana and Illinois. [J-40-2019] [MO: Baer, J.] - 11 Id. at 385. Based upon those factors, the court concluded that the Illinois exclusionary rule should apply. Id. at 386. Similarly, the Rhode Island Supreme Court used a fivefactor test to determine whether the Rhode Island Constitution and its exclusionary rule should apply to statements given to the New Hampshire police. State v. Briggs, 756 A.2d 731, 739-40 (R.I. 2000). But there are significant criticisms of the substantive choice of law approach as well. A multi-factor balancing test, drawn from civil choice of law treatises, does not give serious consideration to the exclusionary rule, which is at the heart of the Pennsylvania Constitution’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. See McGlynn, supra at 437 (writing that the civil choice of law factors “give too little weight to the purposes of the exclusionary rule and too much weight to factors irrelevant to the administration of the criminal justice system”); Tullis & Ludlow, supra at 88 (“Many of the factors which are of significance in civil law are of little or no importance to a determination of whether evidence should be excluded because of a violation of a state rule.”). And such a test is both indeterminate and susceptible to reverse engineering. Additionally, the same criticism of treating the exclusionary rule as procedural applies to a substantive choice of law analysis. Just as our Rules of Criminal Procedure are promulgated by this Court, pursuant to authority granted by our Constitution, see PA. CONST. art. V, § 10, determination of which factors to choose in a choice of law analysis is within the purview of this Court, see Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 203 A.2d 796, 80001 (Pa. 1964). In that sense, the Rules of Criminal Procedure and choice of law analyses are subordinate to this Court. A constitution, in contrast, is “a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). This Court is subordinate to this Commonwealth’s Constitution and all that it dictates, including the exclusionary rule. To allow a choice of law analysis to control how [J-40-2019] [MO: Baer, J.] - 12 and when we apply our exclusionary rule would be to elevate this Court above our Constitution, a result that goes against the very nature of our form of government.
In contrast to a choice of law approach, “[u]nder an exclusionary rule analysis the court first identifies the principles to be served by the exclusionary rule, and then evaluates how the principles would be served by exclusion” if the forum or situs state’s law were to apply. Quigley, supra at 322. In other words, the court looks first at its own state constitutional provision protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures. The court then identifies the rationale for the exclusionary rule, such as deterrence or the protection of privacy rights. Finally, the court determines whether the rationale for the exclusionary rule would be served by excluding the evidence obtained in the foreign jurisdiction. Numerous courts across the country have adopted such an approach, either explicitly or implicitly. See, e.g., State v. Torres, 262 P.3d 1006 (Haw. 2011); Commonwealth v. Brown, 925 N.E.2d 845 (Mass. 2010); State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 25 P.3d 225 (N.M. 2001); State v Davis, 834 P.2d 1008 (Or. 1992); State v. Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315 (N.J. 1989); Porter, 742 P.2d 922; Echols v. State, 484 So.2d 568 (Fla. 1985); Lucas, 372 N.W.2d 731; People v. Blair, 602 P.2d 738 (Cal. 1979); Pooley, 705 P.2d 1293;5 see also McGlynn, supra at 442 (writing that this approach “enjoys the most widespread judicial and scholarly support”); Dana Perkins, Declining to Adopt an Agency Analysis in the Admissibility of Evidence Obtained in Another Jurisdiction Promotes Circumvention of the Connecticut Constitution. State v. Boyd, 992 A.2d 1071 (Conn. 5 Even some states that have adopted a conflict of laws analysis have also used an exclusionary rule analysis at some points. Compare Saiken, 275 N.E.2d 381, with People v. Coleman, 882 N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. 2008). [J-40-2019] [MO: Baer, J.] - 13 2010), 42 RUTGERS L.J. 1041, 1047 (2011) (“[M]ost [courts] agree that using an exclusionary rule analysis is preferable.”). As noted above, an exclusionary rule analysis recognizes the Constitution in its proper place, as the supreme law of the land. A state’s constitution takes priority over all other forms of law in a state, whether statutory, common law, or rules of procedure. By first examining the purpose of a state constitution’s exclusionary rule, a court properly subordinates its adjudication of a particular criminal case to that constitution. Accordingly, our Commonwealth should employ an exclusionary rule analysis to determine whether to resolve a suppression motion by applying Pennsylvania law or the law of a foreign sovereign. There is Pennsylvania precedent to suggest that our courts have used a choice of law approach in the past. For example, in Commonwealth v. Housman, 986 A.2d 822 (Pa. 2009), this Court’s approach emphasized “the policy of the jurisdiction most intimately concerned with the outcome” to find that a tape recording that complied with Virginia law, but violated Pennsylvania law, should not be suppressed. Id. at 842 (internal quotation marks omitted). Housman, in turn, relied upon Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 716 A.2d 1221 (Pa. 1998). The Sanchez Court used a civil choice of law analysis, which the Court found also should apply in the criminal context, and decided that California had a greater interest in a canine sniff that took place in California; thus, California law should govern suppression. Id. at 1223-24. Finally, Sanchez cited the Superior Court’s opinion in Commonwealth v. Bennett, 369 A.2d 493 (Pa. Super. 1976) (en banc). In Bennett, the court found that applying a Pennsylvania wiretap statute, which had greater protections than a New Jersey statute, was unwarranted because a Pennsylvania court “would not chastise errant law enforcement agencies or officers” in New Jersey. Id. at 495. [J-40-2019] [MO: Baer, J.] - 14 However, Bennett did not actually use a choice of law analysis. Rather, Bennett implicitly used an exclusionary rule analysis, albeit one based upon a statute, rather than the Constitution. In 1976, when the Superior Court decided Bennett, this Court had not yet issued an opinion stating that our exclusionary rule was based upon privacy rights, rather than deterrence. See Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991). When the Bennett Court reasoned that applying the Pennsylvania wiretap statute would not deter New Jersey law enforcement officers from violating Pennsylvania law, that court implicitly used an exclusionary rule analysis by finding that the purpose of the wiretap statute, as determined by the General Assembly, was to deter police misconduct, rather than to protect privacy rights. Judge Hoffman’s dissent in Bennett also used an exclusionary rule analysis, though he argued that the statute intended to protect privacy rights. Bennett, 369 A.2d at 501 (Hoffman, J., dissenting) (opining that the evidence should be suppressed under the Pennsylvania statute because “[t]he history [of the statute] indicate[d] that the Legislature did not seek primarily to deter the police, but rather intended to protect Pennsylvania citizens’ privacy from any electronic inclusion”). The Washington Supreme Court also interpreted Bennett as applying an exclusionary rule analysis. See Washington v. Brown, 940 P.2d 546, 579 n.159 (Wash. 1997) (applying an exclusionary rule analysis with a deterrence rationale and citing Bennett). To the extent that this Court in Housman relied upon Sanchez, and Sanchez relied upon Bennett, to employ a choice of law analysis, we mischaracterized Bennett. And it does not appear that this Court, at least in Housman, had the benefit of advocacy debating whether a choice of law or exclusionary rule analysis was more appropriate. Compare Housman’s Brief, 452 CAP, at 78 (citing Sanchez), and Commonwealth’s Brief, 452 CAP, at 74, 77-78 (citing Sanchez and Bennett), with Britton’s Brief at 27-36 (discussing the two approaches and arguing that the exclusionary rule analysis should govern), and [J-40-2019] [MO: Baer, J.] - 15 Commonwealth’s Brief at 10-13 (citing Bennett for the proposition that California law should determine suppression under a choice of law approach); see also Maj. Op. at 10 (“[T]he Commonwealth primarily contends that a conflict-of-law analysis, like that performed by the trial court, applies to and permits the secret recording of the statements that [Britton] made in her California home.”). Unlike in Housman, these arguments are now squarely presented. Britton’s arguments regarding use of an exclusionary rule analysis are compelling, and I would find that the exclusionary rule governs cases such as this.