Opinion ID: 396198
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: police chief gable

Text: 57 As the majority acknowledges, the case law is clear that to obtain relief against Gable, Allentown's Chief of Police, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that he played an affirmative role in the deprivation of their rights. Specifically, there must be a causal link between Gable's actions and Stephens' challenged misconduct. 58 In Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976), the Supreme Court articulated the standard governing liability of municipal officials for police misconduct. As this court observed in Lewis v. Hyland, 554 F.2d 93, 98 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 931, 98 S.Ct. 419, 54 L.Ed.2d 291 (1977), Rizzo was aimed at the failure of plaintiffs to prove the existence of an unconstitutional policy or plan adopted and enforced by the official defendants. Throughout, the Court emphasized the complete absence of any causal link between the individual police officers' conduct and the responsible authorities. Mere invocation of the words 'pattern' or 'plan' did not suffice without this causal link. Accord, Commonwealth of Pa. v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306 at 336 (3rd Cir. 1981) (en banc) (opinion of Garth, J.). 59 In Lewis, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief against the New Jersey State Police for an alleged pattern and practice of unconstitutional searches of vehicles and travelers by various State Troopers. In affirming the denial of injunctive relief, this court concluded: 60 Plaintiffs' evidence here demonstrated at most an unfortunate insensitivity on the part of responsible officials toward reports of abuses by individual Troopers. The department's apparent obliviousness to citizens' complaints reinforces an impression of official indifference. Beyond these factors, however, and aside from the statistical number of incidents proved, there is no evidence of a causal link between, on the one hand, either the State Police hierarchy or any department-wide directive, and, on the other, the constitutional violations. 61 554 F.2d at 101 (footnotes omitted). 62 Thus, if Police Chief Gable and the City of Allentown are to be held liable, the record evidence must disclose that Officer Stephens' actions toward Mr. and Mrs. Black on the evening in question were affirmatively linked to some action taken by Police Chief Gable. As the following discussion of the record reveals, the evidence adduced at trial cannot support such a conclusion.
63 The record shows that Chief Gable wrote and distributed to each Allentown police officer a manual containing, within the section headed, Citizen Complaints Against Police Officers, the following provision: Please note: Where a complaint alleging misconduct on the part of an officer arises from an incident where the officer made an arrest, disciplinary hearings will not take place until after the arrest charges are finally adjudicated. App. at 43-44 (Exh. Q); Trial Tr. Vol. 4 at 121-22 (emphasis added). The majority's position is that the mere existence of this regulation, coupled with the finding that Stephens filed additional charges against Black after learning of Black's complaint against him, is sufficient basis for the jury's finding that the regulation proximately caused Stephens to arrest and file the additional charges. The majority reaches this conclusion despite the absence of any evidence in the record that Stephens ever knew of the regulation, that he was motivated by it to file the additional charges, or that the regulation would in fact have been of any benefit to him in avoiding the consequences of any misconduct on his part. 64 Contrary to the suggestions of the majority, there is nothing sinister about the police department regulation in question. As the evidence discloses, the regulation is designed to provide for an orderly disposition of both the criminal charges against the complainant and the complainant's charges against the police officer, and to prevent each inquiry from interfering with the other. As Gable testified at the trial: 65 In my opinion, first things come first. The arrest was first.... Now, there is a pending criminal case. If I would get into an employer-employee relationship for internal discipline prior to that case being heard, it would be almost impossible to separate the two. In other words, our internal case would be intertwined in a criminal case and I would have no control over the testimony. 66 When you get a chance to see this complaint form, I think you will note that lawyers would be present for each side. They could cross-examine each other and it would so entwine a criminal and an employee personnel case that it couldn't be severed and could actually harm a criminal case. 67 Trial Tr. Vol. 7 at 131-32. Although one consequence of disposing of the criminal charges before addressing the allegations of police misconduct is that disciplinary proceedings may be delayed, the explicit terms of the regulation preclude any interpretation that the regulation was designed to provide a means by which an officer could shield his conduct from departmental scrutiny. The regulation merely delays disciplinary hearings; it does not dispense with them or allow the police officer ultimately to avoid them. As Gable explained at trial: 68 I considered that any delay could certainly not have high priority. Our employees are constant; we don't lay them off every week or two or every year. In fact we don't lay them off, so that discipline could eventually occur but the discipline in most cases would range from a reprimand to a day or two without pay up to ten days. If I felt that it warranted more than that, I had the privilege of going to City Council and attempting to get a higher penalty or dismissal. 69 Id. at 132. When asked at trial whether it had ever come to his attention that any officers on the Allentown police force were filing false charges because of the regulation, Gable replied, No, it didn't. I don't see what could be gained .... Id. 70 The majority's conclusion that the record evidence supports a causal link between the regulation and Stephens' filing of additional charges against Black depends on a string of tenuous inferences that do not constitute  'that minimum quantum of evidence from which a jury might reasonably afford relief.'  Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 959 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 101 S.Ct. 1418, 67 L.Ed.2d 383 (1981) (quoting Denneny v. Siegel, 407 F.2d 433, 439 (3d Cir. 1969)). There is no direct evidence that Stephens was ever aware of the regulation's existence; at trial, he testified that he had never read the regulation before. Trial Tr. Vol. 4 at 45. The jury would have had to infer that Stephens actually had read the regulation from the fact that he had received a copy of the police manual. Maj. op. at 190 n.7. 71 But even assuming Stephens knew of the regulation, nowhere in the record is there evidence that he was prompted by the regulation to file the three additional charges against Mr. Black, much less that Gable lent his support and encouragement to the filing of those charges. See Porter, supra, at 321 (opinion of Gibbons, J.). The majority points to no evidence that Stephens' charges were motivated by the regulation. Indeed, the majority relies solely upon the timing of the charges that Stephens filed against Black to supply this critical element. Maj. op. at 191. The thrust of the majority's nexus theory is that because Stephens did not file the three additional charges against Black until some few days after Gable had advised Stephens of Black's complaint and had sought to obtain Stephens' version of the incident, the causal nexus requirement has been satisfied. The majority opinion states that it was reasonable for the jury to infer that Stephens filed the three additional charges in an effort to delay any disciplinary hearing on the incident. Id. (footnote omitted). Not only is the reasonableness of such an inference questionable since, as noted above, Stephens would have had little to gain by filing additional charges, but if Stephens had indeed violated departmental rules, the additional charges would not and could not prevent disciplinary sanctions from ultimately being imposed. 2 Moreover, the record is completely barren of any evidence which could support a connection between the regulation in question, which did no more than delay departmental hearings, and the charges that Stephens filed against Black. 72 Furthermore, there is no evidence from which the jury could reasonably have concluded that Gable supported and encouraged the filing of additional charges against Black. Gable did no more than advise Stephens of the complaint against him and ask Stephens for his version of the events. Indeed, I suggest that any police chief who did not take these steps to investigate a citizen complaint would be derelict in his duty. This case is quite unlike Porter, supra, in which this court upheld an injunction against Police Chief James Porter on the ground that he supported and encouraged misconduct on the part of one of his officers, Frank Baranyai. In Porter, the district court had found that 73 despite complaints Porter never found fault with Baranyai pertaining to the charges (of misconduct). He took no action to discipline him after he was convicted in criminal court of malfeasance in office, he has publicly supported Baranyai in all instances, he could not give a single instance of a report of an investigation to the complainant, and he retaliated against other officers ... who testified or otherwise complained relative to Baranyai's conduct. 74 Porter, supra, at 311 (opinion of Gibbons, J.) (quoting Commonwealth of Pa. v. Porter, 480 F.Supp. 686, 701 (W.D.Pa.1979)). 75 The majority opinion acknowledges that Gable's activities in connection with the Black complaint against Stephens were limited to (speaking) with Stephens to inform him of Black's complaints and get(ting) his version of the incident. Maj. op. at 190 (citation omitted). It is this evidence, and this evidence alone, that the majority opinion claims supports the jury's finding of the encouragement and support required to hold Chief Gable liable under section 1983. Id. How Gable's informing Stephens about the Black complaint and Gable's inquiry of Stephens about the Black incident can constitute the encouragement and support required by Rizzo, Lewis, and Porter is never explained by the majority. I suggest an explanation is lacking because there is no evidence in the record that can fill this evidentiary gap.
76 The majority also strains to find support in the record for the jury's determinations that Chief Gable had a policy of encouraging members of the Allentown Police Department to engage in the use of excessive force and that that policy proximately caused Stephens to use excessive force against the plaintiffs. Even so, the majority concedes that the evidence is not overwhelming. Maj. op. at 190. The majority's argument can be summarized as follows: Gable's policy may be found from the procedure used in the filing of complaints made against officers and from his attitude (testimony) concerning the role of force in the proper functioning of a police department. I suggest that there is no evidence in this record from which a jury could have discovered such a policy and that even if such a policy existed, which the record does not reflect, no causal connection was established between that policy and Stephens' actions. 77 While the majority finds the evidence nonetheless sufficient, it does so only by a selective reading of the record. The majority opinion tries to make it appear that Gable encouraged and expected his officers to use force as a routine part of their job, even when the use of force was not necessary. A more complete examination of the record, however, reveals that, far from taking a cavalier attitude toward the use of force, Gable adopted a restrained and professional approach, tempered by the realization that in today's world, a policeman frequently must use force where necessary to overcome resistance to law enforcement. 78 The majority states that Chief Gable's policy concerning the use of excessive force ensured that a citizen's complaint about excessive force never went into a police officer's permanent personnel file.... Indeed, such a complaint could only get into an officer's record if the officer put it there himself. Id. (citation omitted). A fuller reading of Gable's trial testimony, on which the majority relies, reveals that in fact, Gable had no policy on the use of excessive force. Gable testified: I don't remember when I got (a complaint concerning excessive force), other than this one. So I had no policy, really. Trial Tr. Vol. 4 at 134. This testimony stands uncontradicted. 79 As disclosed by the record, Gable's handling of complaints concerning use of excessive force was not, as the majority suggests, that of a Chief trying to insulate his officers from public accountability. True, some of these complaints never went into a police officer's personnel file, but this was only the case if the complaints were presented orally. When complaints were made in written form, whether they were major or minor, they would be put in the officer's personnel record. Even with oral complaints, Gable would make a written note of the complaint and retain it in a file in his office, and any negative results of a subsequent disciplinary hearing were placed in the officer's personnel records. Id. Vol. 4 at 133-35; Vol. 7 at 121-22, 138-39. 80 The majority quotes Gable as stating that any officer 'worth his salt' would use force every week of his career because very few arrests are made without it. Maj. op. at 190 (footnote and citation omitted). When the trial transcript is read, however, Gable emerges not as trigger-happy, but as a police chief with a restrained but realistic perspective on the use of force by police officers: 81 Q. Would I be safe in assuming that you expect your police officers to use force on the job? 82 A. Yes, I expect that. 83 Q. And as a matter of fact, would it be safe to say that would you use the term, a police officer who is worth his salt is going to use force on the job? 84 A. I think he has to. 85 Q. Would it also be your view that a police officer who is not using force is not doing his job? 86 A. I think I can state unequivocally, that if a police officer is on duty day in and day out and makes arrests and attempts to do his job in the climate of today's society, he has to use some kind of force. 87 Q. Would you estimate for us how often you would expect the average police officer to use force on the job? 88 A. Would you like to define force for me? Q. We are talking about 89 A. People have many versions of what force is and I want your definition, so that I can answer properly. 90 Q. Physical force. 91 A. Physical force. How often, you say? 92 Q. Yes. 93 A. A week; a year; what? 94 Q. Maybe this will refresh your recollection? 95 A. Whenever it is necessary. 96 Q. How often would you, as Chief, expect your officers to use physical force? 97 A. I think it depends on the type of calls we get on a given day. Physical force is only to be used to overcome resistance. If we get ten people resisting one day, I expect ten people to be overcome by force. If no one resists that day, I don't want any physical force used, obviously. 98 I would say of course for the record that every policeman uses force almost every week of his career if he is doing his job, because today, very few arrests are made without it. 99 Q. Your feelings on use of force that a good officer uses it once a week, every week of his career; you communicated that to your men? 100 A. I certainly don't tell the patrolman to say if you don't use force every week you are not doing your job. 101 Q. They know what your feelings were? 102 A. They know I was a cop for 32 years and I know what occurs on the street and certainly I don't want them to turn their backs or run away from any problems that might (a)ffect the public. 103 Trial Tr. Vol. 4 at 135-38 (emphasis added). 3 104 The majority also discovered a policy of promoting excessive force from Gable's testimony that, in the majority's words, Stephens probably would not have been promoted to detective if he had been the type of officer who backed down when force was involved. Maj. op. at 190 (citation omitted). But again, when the actual testimony is examined, it becomes clear that Gable's view was not that an officer should be quick to draw his gun but that timidity is not a desirable trait in a police officer: 105 Q. Are you saying that if he was one of these other cops that you referred to, the type that backed down; the type who exercised restraint, that wouldn't have mattered? 106 A. I didn't say that. 107 MR. STEVENS (counsel for defendants): I object. There is a difference in backing down and exercising restraint. It is unfair to tie those two together in one question. 108 MR. ORLOSKI (counsel for plaintiffs): I will rephrase the question. 109 THE COURT: All right. 110 Q. If Wayne Stephens was the other type of policeman, the type you referred to as the type who backed down 111 A. Does not hide when threatened. 112 Q. If he was the other type, would that would you still have made him a Detective? 113 A. Probably not. Trial Tr. Vol. 4 at 145-46. 4 114 Finally, the majority cites two other incidents prior to the one involving the Blacks where citizens complained about Stephens, as evidence of Gable's policy of encouraging the use of excessive force and of that policy's relationship to Stephens' acts toward the plaintiffs. Maj. op. at 191 n.9. Although the opinion does not make the relevance of these incidents clear, they could only have been cited for the theory that their occurrence is an indication of Gable's encouragement of excessive force and that Gable's failure to discipline Stephens for those two incidents led Stephens to believe that use of such force would be accepted in the future. 115 Even if one accepts the view that the evidence permits a conclusion that excessive force was used in the two incidents, 5 they are insufficient to establish liability. First, the fact that a few isolated incidents involving excessive use of force occurred or that no disciplinary action was taken in response to them is insufficient to show the existence of a policy encouraging the use of such force. See Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 196, 202-03 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 101 S.Ct. 577, 66 L.Ed.2d 475 (1980). Second, Gable's failure to discipline Stephens cannot, under Rizzo and Lewis, satisfy the requirement of a causal link between official action and the police misconduct. As a majority of this court, sitting en banc, stated in Porter, supra : 116 (T)he officials' misconduct cannot be merely a failure to act. Such officials must have played an affirmative role in the deprivation of the plaintiffs' rights, i. e., there must be a causal link between the actions of the responsible officials named and the challenged misconduct. 117 Here, ... the gravamen of the charge against the Council members is that complaints were made, but no action was taken. However, Lewis also held that no evidence of the essential causal link existed where there was no more than an unfortunate insensitivity on the part of responsible officials toward reports of abuses.... 118 Id. at 336, 337 (opinion of Garth, J.) (citations omitted). 119 Moreover, I believe the record evidence falls so far short of showing that Gable had a de facto policy of encouraging the use of excessive force, or that Stephens acted pursuant to such a policy in his treatment of the plaintiffs on the night in question, that no jury question was presented. Dawson, supra, at 959. The plaintiffs have failed to prove the existence of an unconstitutional policy or plan adopted and enforced by the official defendants. Lewis, supra, 554 F.2d at 98. As in Rizzo, supra, and Lewis, there is a complete absence of any causal link between the individual police officer('s) conduct and the responsible authorities. Lewis, supra, 554 F.2d at 98.