Opinion ID: 2166571
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: a record must be made as to whether defendant's constitutional speedy trial right was violated

Text: The United States and Missouri Constitutions provide equivalent protection for a defendant's right to a speedy trial. See Bolin, 643 S.W.2d at 810 n. 5 (the Missouri constitutional provision protecting the right to a speedy trial is not any broader in scope than is the sixth amendment). To assess whether the constitutional right to a speedy trial has been respected or denied, the Court must balance four factors: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. See State v. Edwards, 750 S.W.2d 438, 441 (Mo. banc 1988); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). In this case, there is no dispute about the length of the delay. As of the date of this opinion, Mr. McKee has been detained awaiting trial for over 18 months. Missouri courts have held that delays longer than eight months are presumptively prejudicial to the defendant. State v. Williams, 34 S.W.3d 440, 447 (Mo.App. S.D.2001) (eight months or longer is presumptively prejudicial); see also State v. Farris, 877 S.W.2d 657, 660 (Mo.App. S.D. 1994) (citing cases holding eight months or longer is presumptively prejudicial). Moreover, the accusations levied against Mr. McKee represent, at most, ordinary street crimes. [T]he delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182; see also Bolin, 643 S.W.2d at 814 (for this `ordinary street crime' . . . a delay of seven months . . . is presumptively prejudicial). The delay in bringing a defendant to trial is measured from the time of arrest, not from the time that the right is first asserted. Bolin, 643 S.W.2d at 813 (the protections of the speedy trial provisions attach when there is a formal indictment or information or when actual restraints [are] imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge) (internal quotations omitted); United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982) (In addition to the period after indictment, the period between arrest and indictment must be considered in evaluating a Speedy Trial Clause claim). But, the timely assertion of the right to speedy trial is a factor in determining whether the speedy trial right has been violated. Id. at 814. Although `[a] defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial,' `failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.' Id. ( citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 527, 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182). Here, there is little dispute that defendant timely filed pro se motions asserting his right to speedy trial. He filed his first motion one month after his indictment, when he had already been incarcerated for just over three months. In the intervening year, he filed repeated requests to be brought to trial quickly. The two factors that do present live disputes in this mandamus petition are the reasons for the many delays and the prejudice inuring to Mr. McKee from those delays. Mr. McKee asserts that the state is entirely responsible for the delay in this case. The record discloses at least four continuances of the trial date with almost no information regarding why they were continued. The January date was continued to April at the request of the court, but the record contains no information regarding why the April, July, and October dates were continued. Since each continued trial date prompted Mr. McKee to file another motion for speedy trial, it seems evident that none of these continuances were entered at his request. It is unclear whether some were at the behest of the circuit attorney, or whether some or all occurred because of dockets so congested that the case simply could not be reached. Counsel at oral argument were unable to provide the Court with any clarity on the reason for these continuances. To the extent that these delays are due to the court's docket they should be weighted less heavily [against the state than deliberate delays to hamper the defense] but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Respondent asserts that Mr. McKee is responsible for two of the delays, citing instances in January and July 2007 in which Mr. McKee expressed a willingness to plead guilty and then did not go forward with that plea at the hearing. Although the record does contain some references to a plea hearing, there is nothing in the record before this Court that discloses the circumstances of those plea hearings, who scheduled them and what exactly took place. For example, the record contains a letter from Mr. McKee file-stamped August 3, 2007, that indicates he appeared before Judge Riley briefly on July 27, 2007, and that it was his sincere intention to resolve this cause with a plea agreement with the state but that he was unable to do so due to unfamiliarity with the procedure one should practice when standing before you. [12] The docket entries reflect no activity on July 27, however, leaving this Court unable to discern from this record what, if anything, took place at this alleged appearance. If the parties expected the case to be resolved at these plea hearings and then, due solely to a change of heart by defendant it was not, then some associated delay would be attributable to the defendant. But Respondent also acknowledged that there was a factual error in the indictment as to the felony count on the date of the apparent January plea hearing, an error corrected by a superseding information filed on January 31, 2007. A defendant's unwillingness to plead guilty to a factually inaccurate indictment is unlikely to be a delay attributed to the defendant. It is ultimately the duty of the state to bring a defendant to trial. Bolin, 643 S.W.2d at 814. Respondent also argues that it deferred its efforts to obtain blood and saliva samples from Mr. McKee at the request of defense counsel, who the circuit attorney says represented that such efforts would be detrimental to the plea negotiations. [13] Presuming a record of such an agreement could be made below, it might well justify some delay in testing until a plea hearing could be held. But, once the plea agreement failed in January 2007, the case was set for trial in April and the state subpoenaed its witnesses for that date. It does not appear reasonable on this record for the prosecution to have delayed pursuit of this evidence after the January plea negotiations failed. Certainly when the plea agreement allegedly failed again in July 2007, the prosecution had no basis to further delay taking steps to secure scientific evidence it apparently felt might identify the culprit. A speedy trial is not only for the benefit of the defendant, it is also for the benefit of society. State ex rel. Kemp v. Hodge, 629 S.W.2d 353, 356 n. 4 (Mo. banc 1982). See also Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 126 S.Ct. 1976, 1985, 164 L.Ed.2d 749 (2006) (holding that federal speedy trial statute protects both the interests of the defendant and the public in the speedy disposition of criminal charges). Based on the uncertainties in the record on this petition, this Court simply lacks a sufficient record from which it can determine to whom the delays in bringing Mr. McKee to trial should be attributed and, if some is attributable to the defendant, how much of the overall delay is attributable to his conduct. Without that record, this Court lacks sufficient information regarding the causes of the delays to reach a conclusion whether Mr. McKee's right to a speedy trial has been violated. Such a determination should be made  indeed it should have already been made  by the trial court in the first instance. The failure to provide any reasons for granting continuances in a criminal case coupled with the complete absence of record entries reflecting significant actions in the case is exceedingly troubling. It leads to a lack of confidence in the record as a whole and in the record-keeping practices of the trial court. Since a hearing will be required to determine the reasons for the lengthy delay in this case, the Court will also entrust to the trial court an inquiry regarding the specific prejudice this delay has caused Mr. McKee. The present record discloses a lengthy period of pretrial incarceration, which in some cases would provide sufficient prejudice to conclude that the defendant's constitutional rights were violated. See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992) (the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time). There may be other factors relevant to prejudice that can be developed at an evidentiary hearing (e.g., availability of witnesses, loss or spoliation of evidence, particular harm flowing from the defendant's pretrial incarceration). In considering how to weigh any delay caused by crowded dockets, this Court and Respondents must take into consideration that the delay in this case is not unique. Numerous other petitions for writs have been filed in this Court by persons incarcerated while awaiting disposition of their charges in this and on some occasions in other jurisdictions, similarly alleging lengthy delays. The right to a speedy trial is an important right that the courts of this state are duty-bound to honor, even in the face of heavy trial dockets and competing demands for trial. Protracted and unreasonable delays in criminal cases due to crowded dockets cannot become routine. Neither is it acceptable for the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel to accept or request such routine continuances without objection. The defendant's right to a speedy trial and the public's interest in timely resolution of criminal cases demands that this and other similar cases receive more expeditious treatment, even in the face of competing demands on counsels' and the court's time. This Court does not mean to suggest that any party to this proceeding has intended to violate any defendant's speedy trial rights, but unreasonable delay in run-of-the-mill criminal cases cannot be justified by simply asserting that the public resources provided by the State's criminal-justice system are limited and that each case must await its turn. Barker, 407 U.S. at 538, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (White, J., concurring). Mr. McKee is entitled to a prompt hearing on his claim that his constitutional rights have been violated and, if they have not yet been, then he is entitled to a prompt trial on the merits of these charges.