Opinion ID: 747642
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Santiago Proffer

Text: 38 Prior to trial, Mrs. Yoon filed a motion in limine asking the district court to require the government to make a proffer pursuant to United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir.1978) if the government intended to use David Yoon's conduct against Mrs. Yoon at trial. The government filed its Santiago proffer on January 25, 1996, detailing what the evidence at trial would show. This included the proposed testimony of Rasho, Heller, and Zalud, which we have already outlined above, regarding Mrs. Yoon's participation in the scheme and her knowledge of the office finances. Attached to the proffer was the August 3, 1990 note with Mrs. Yoon's handwriting. 39 On the first day of trial, March 25, 1996, the district court orally ruled that the Santiago proffer was sufficient to establish a conspiracy and Mrs. Yoon's part in it, such that David Yoon's conduct and statements could be admitted against her as co-conspirator statements. See FED.R.EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). Mrs. Yoon now argues that the district court erred in admitting this evidence against her because the proffer and the evidence adduced at trial did not sufficiently establish independent evidence of her agreement to join the scheme. Further, because David Yoon is a fugitive from justice and unavailable for cross-examination, she contends that the use of his conduct and statements against her violated her rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 40 We review the district court's decision to allow evidence pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E) for clear error. United States v. Godinez, 110 F.3d 448, 454 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 404, 408-11 (7th Cir.1992) (stating that we review district court findings under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) based on pre-trial Santiago proffers for clear error). Using this standard, we will reverse the district court's ruling only if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the court made a mistake. Under Santiago and its progeny, in order to allow the admission of coconspirator statements, the government must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a conspiracy existed, that the defendant and the declarant were members of that conspiracy, and that the statements sought to be admitted were made during and in furtherance of that conspiracy. Santiago, 582 F.2d at 1134; Rodriguez, 975 F.2d at 406. 41 This Santiago argument is not unlike Mrs. Yoon's sufficiency of the evidence argument. Most of the arguments made here actually boil down to the same sufficiency issues. See, e.g., United States v. Velasquez, 67 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir.1995). We have already dispensed with Mrs. Yoon's contentions that the evidence did not sufficiently establish that she was a member of this check-kiting scheme. Similarly, we have reviewed the Santiago proffer and have no doubt that it was more than sufficient to establish the admissibility of David Yoon's conduct and statements against Mrs. Yoon. The proffer explicitly set forth how the government would prove the existence of the check-kiting scheme, that both Yoons knowingly participated in it, and that David Yoon's conduct was undertaken during and in furtherance of it. The proffer relied on much more than mere statements by Mrs. Yoon or by her co-conspirator husband, but, rather, relied on testimony that would be provided by independent witnesses who were not participants in the scheme. The proffer met the preponderance of the evidence test, and we are certain that the district court did not err in admitting the evidence.