Opinion ID: 1942621
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Estate properly substituted a defendant for a fictitious party.

Text: ¶ 12. The Amended Defendants argue that the Estate failed to properly substitute the seven new defendants named in the amended complaint for a fictitious party pursuant to M.R.C.P. 9(h). The Estate argues that the new defendants were not substituted pursuant to M.R.C.P. 9(h) because it met the requirements of M.R.C.P. 15(c). ¶ 13. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h) provides: (h) Fictitious Parties. When a party is ignorant of the name of an opposing party and so alleges in his pleading, the opposing party may be designated by any name, and when his true name is discovered the process and all pleadings and proceedings in the action may be amended by substituting the true name and giving proper notice to the opposing party. (Emphasis added). Therefore, a proper amendment pursuant to Rule 9(h) will relate back to the date of the filing of the original complaint. M.R.C.P. 15(c)(2); M.R.C.P. 9(h). In Doe v. Mississippi Blood Services, Inc., 704 So.2d 1016, 1019 (Miss.1997), this Court held: The purpose of Rule 9(h) is to provide a mechanism to bring in responsible parties, known, but unidentified, who can only be ascertained through the use of judicial mechanisms such as discovery. It is not designed to allow tardy plaintiffs to sleep on their rights. See also Wilner v. White, 929 So.2d 315, 322 (Miss.2006); Ralph Walker, Inc. v. Gallagher, 926 So.2d 890, 896 (Miss. 2006). [I]n order for Rule 9(h) to apply, there must be a substitution of a true party name for a fictitious one. Walker, 926 So.2d at 896. In Womble v. Singing River Hosp., 618 So.2d 1252 (Miss.1993), this Court set forth a guideline to determine if a party was ignorant of the name of an opposing party pursuant to Rule 9(h). It is a principle of general application, though, that ignorance of the opposing party for fictitious party practice extends beyond mere lack of knowledge of the opposing party's name. Even if the plaintiff knows the true name of the person, he is still ignorant of his name if he lacks knowledge of the facts giving him a cause of action against the that person. Womble, 618 So.2d at 1267. Rule 9(h) exists for the benefit of a party who is `ignorant of the name of an opposing party and so alleges in his pleadings.' Wilner, 929 So.2d at 322. This Court has also acknowledged a reasonable diligence test when substituting unknown parties pursuant the M.R.C.P. 9(h). Wilner, 929 So.2d at 322-23 (citing Doe, 704 So.2d at 1018-19); see also Womble, 618 So.2d at 1266-68. Reasonable diligence is a standard only for determining the efforts made to discover the true identity of a named fictitious party under Rule 9(h). Nguyen v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 859 So.2d 971, 978-79 (Miss.2002). The relation back privilege provided for fictitious parties under Rule 15(c)(2) requires the plaintiff to actually exercise a reasonably diligent inquiry into the identity of the fictitious party. Doe, 704 So.2d at 1019. Wilner, 929 So.2d at 323. In Doe, this Court found that Doe merely substituted Mississippi Blood Services, Inc., for a named party, United Blood Services. Doe, 704 So.2d at 1018. Doe failed to substitute the new defendant for a John Doe defendant. Id. More recently in Wilner, White was added as a new defendant to Wilner's lawsuit. Wilner, 929 So.2d at 317. Wilner simply added White's name to the amended complaint and failed to substitute White's name for one of four John Doe defendants listed in the original complaint. Id. at 323. The four John Does originally named in the complaint remained as defendants in the amended complaint. Id. This Court found that Wilner improperly substituted White as a party pursuant to M.R.C.P. 9(h). Id. Like Doe, this Court in Wilner also determined that the appellants were not ignorant of the appellees pursuant to M.R.C.P. 9(h), therefore, Wilner [could] seek no shelter from Rule 9(h), and her amended complaint [could not] relate back under Rule 15(c)(2). Id. ¶ 14. This Court has interpreted ignorance of the opposing party in Rawson v. Jones, 816 So.2d 367, 371 (Miss.2001). In Rawson, this Court held that Jones was not ignorant of the defendants based on her knowledge of the newly added defendants, a doctor and medical group, since the death of her child. Id. In Womble, the plaintiff did not request the medical records relating to Womble's treatment until almost two years after her death. Womble, 618 So.2d at 1266. The Court found that the plaintiff was not ignorant of the newly added defendants because the plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to discover their identities which would have been revealed by the medical records. Womble, 618 So.2d at 1266. ¶ 15. Here, the Estate filed a motion to substitute parties on July 16, 2003. In the motion, the Estate also requested leave to file an amended complaint and to dismiss some Original Defendants without prejudice. The Estate's motion for substitution stated: Plaintiff, pursuant to M.R.C.P. 15, moves to substitute parties [sic] Defendant [sic] and for leave to amend Plaintiff's Complaint in this matter to be in the form of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint attached hereto as Exhibit A. Plaintiff's amendments are necessary for the proper trial of all the issues in this matter, and the proposed amendment will not prejudice Defendants. The purpose of this amendment is to substitute Defendants, specifically, M.E. McElroy, Inc., HMP Management, Bedford Care Center-Warren Hall, L.L.C. and Bedford Care Center-Monroe Hall, L.L.C. in place of Unidentified Entities 1-4; and Michael E. McElroy, Jr., Gina Simonetti and Robert Perry in place of John Does 1-3. Plaintiff will dismiss Defendants Bedford Care Center of Hattiesburg, L.L.C., Nicole M. Bevon, Frances Griffin, Brenda J. Leone and Mike Hatten from this action, without prejudice. The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that amendments shall be freely given when justice so requires. Estes v. Starnes, 732 So.2d 251 (Miss. 1999), citing Frank v. Dore, 635 So.2d 1369 (Miss.1994). Thus, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to permit the substitution of parties requested herein. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that this Court grant Plaintiff's motion to substitute M.E. McElroy, Inc., HMP Management, Bedford Care Center-Warrren Hall, L.L.C. and Bedford Care Center-Monroe Hall, L.L.C. in place of Unidentified Entities 1-4, and Michael E. McElroy, Jr., Gina Simonetti and Robert Perry as John Does 1-3 in this action. As such, the amended complaint failed to properly substitute any defendant for a fictitious party under Rule 9(h). In other words, Rule 9(h) does not apply in this case. ¶ 16. We find that the motion to substitute clearly shows that the Estate simply substituted one set of new defendants for some of the named parties in the original complaint much like the facts in Doe. The Estate merely substituted M.E. McElroy, Inc.; HMP Management; Bedford Care Center-Warrren Hall, L.L.C.; Bedford Care Center-Monroe Hall, L.L.C.; Michael E. McElroy, Jr.; Gina Simonetti; and Robert Perry for the named parties in the original complaint, Bedford Care Center of Hattiesburg, L.L.C.; Nicole M. Bevon; Frances Griffin; Brenda J. Leone; and Mike Hatten. While the Estate, unlike the facts in Doe, replaced the corresponding Unidentified Entities 1-4 and John Does 1-3 with the new defendants, the effect is of no consequence. The Estate agreed to dismiss five Original Defendants named in the original complaint. However, the Estate merely added the seven new defendants under the guise of substituting them for the fictitious party names of Unidentified Entities 1-4 and John Does 1-3. In other words, the Estate sued five incorrect defendants in the original complaint. The Estate sought to remedy the problem by dismissing these five Original Defendants and erroneously substituting the new defendants as fictitious parties. However, the Estate actually made a blatant change of these five Original Defendants for the seven new defendants, not fictitious parties. ¶ 17. Further, the deposition testimony taken from Hawthorne indicated that she referred to Williams' place of residency as Northgate or Warren Hall. Hawthorne visited Williams at this location about four to six times a month and saw him many Sundays at church. The church was located across the street from Williams' residence. This testimony indicated that Hawthorne knew Williams resided at Northgate or Warren Hall and not at the Hattiesburg location. [2] Therefore, the name of the correct nursing care facilities and the corresponding identities of the officers, licensees, and administrators clearly were known to Hawthorne at the time of filing the complaint. The record is not clear concerning whether Hawthorne was able to receive medical or corporate records. The deposition testimony indicated that Hawthorne reviewed some kind of records, but it was not clear exactly what kind of records to which she was referring in her deposition testimony. Clearly, the correct nursing facility and therefore the correct employees were known to Hawthorne. ¶ 18. We find that since the amended complaint did not add true fictitious parties, then pursuant to M.R.C.P. 15(c), M.R.C.P. 4(h) controls the time period for service of an amended complaint. M.R.C.P. 4(h) concerns the time limit for service of a summons and provides: If a service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint and the party on whose behalf such service was required cannot show good cause why such service was not made within that period, the action shall be dismissed as to that defendant without prejudice upon the court's own initiative with notice to such party or upon motion. (Emphasis added). See also Walker, 926 So.2d at 895 (Walker received no notice within 120 days of filing the complaint and the amended complaint was filed more than two years after original complaint). The record clearly demonstrated that the seven newly added defendants in the amended complaint, those being, M.E. McElroy, Jr.; M.E. McElroy, Inc.; HMP Management; Bedford Care Center-Monroe Hall, L.L.C.; Bedford Care Center-Warren Hall, L.L.C.; Robert Perry; and Gina Simonetti, were not served with the amended complaint within 120 days of filing the original complaint. Indeed, the original complaint was filed on December 13, 2002, and the amended complaint was filed on August 26, 2004. These two events occurred over two and a half years apart, unequivocally outside of the 120 day time frame imposed by M.R.C.P. 4(h). See Walker, 926 So.2d at 895 Therefore, we must now turn to Rule 15(c) to determine if the Amended Defendants had notice within 120 days of the filing of the original lawsuit.