Opinion ID: 801335
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fourth Amendment Protection

Text: Warrantless trespasses by the government into the home or its curtilage are Fourth Amendment searches. Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 950 n. 3 (Where, as here, the Government obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area, such a search has undoubtedly occurred). The scope of those constitutionally protected areas is rooted in the protection of private property rights. See id. at 949. Thus, as Justice Scalia wrote in Jones, our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass until at least the latter half of the 20th century. Id. (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001)). In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), the Court extended the protection against searches and seizures to places outside the home where a person had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 950. In the intervening years, this holding in Katz has created some confusion about the interaction between the reasonable expectation of privacy standard and the traditional pre- Katz interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 2.3(d) (4th ed.) (collecting and discussing cases). This confusion has persisted for decades. For example, in United States v. Magana, 512 F.2d 1169 (9th Cir.1975), we stated that `a reasonable expectation of privacy,' and not common-law property distinctions, now controls the scope of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1170-71 (citing Katz ). Relying on Magana, we repeated this error in a recent opinion that the government cited to the district court. See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir.2010), vacated, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1533, 182 L.Ed.2d 151 (2012). In Pineda-Moreno, despite the government's admission that agents had, without a warrant, entered the curtilage of the defendant's home to place a mobile tracking device on his car in his driveway, our court concluded that there was no Fourth Amendment violation because Pineda-Moreno had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the curtilage. Id. at 1215. The Supreme Court recently and emphatically repudiated this reasoning, explaining that as we have discussed, the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test. Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 952. After determining that the carport was part of the curtilage to the home, the district court erroneously concluded that the agents did not violate Perea-Rey's Fourth Amendment rights when they occupied the carport without a warrant. The Supreme Court has explained that the role of reasonable expectation analysis in evaluating the constitutionality of searches of the curtilage is only in determining the scope of the curtilage, and not the propriety of the intrusion. See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300, 107 S.Ct. 1134 ([T]he extent of the curtilage is determined by factors that bear upon whether an individual reasonably may expect that the area in question should be treated as the home itself.). The district court circularly reasoned that because the agents were able to freely enter the carport, Perea-Rey had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the carport. Yet, because it was curtilage, it was a constitutionally protected area, and the warrantless entry, search and seizure by the agents violated Perea-Rey's Fourth Amendment rights. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371 (It is a `basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.). No further showing was required of Perea-Rey. The district court also conflated the ability to observe inside the curtilage with the right to enter the curtilage without a warrant. Although a warrant is not required to observe readily visible items within the curtilage, and officers [need not] shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares, California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986), a warrant is required to enter the home. In Ciraolo, the Supreme Court held that warrantless aerial observation of the curtilage of a home was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that such observations could form the basis for probable cause to support a warrant to search the curtilage. Id. at 213-14, 106 S.Ct. 1809. Only after obtaining a warrant based on the observations did officers actually enter Ciraolo's curtilage. The ability to observe part of the curtilage or the interior of a home does not authorize law enforcement, without a warrant, to then enter those areas to conduct searches or seizures. See Struckman, 603 F.3d at 747 ([P]olice officers must either obtain a warrant or consent to enter before arresting a person inside a home or its curtilage or make a reasonable attempt to ascertain that he is actually a trespasser before making the arrest.). The agents here could observe the curtilage from the sidewalk and use those observations, as in Ciraolo, as the basis for a warrant application. But, the ability to see into the curtilage or the home does not, absent some other exception to the warrant requirement, authorize a warrantless entry by the government. Therefore, the district court erred by admitting the evidence simply because the officers could view the inside of the carport from the street.