Opinion ID: 725049
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sasso v. Vachris.

Text: 32 As the district court recognized, New York's highest court reached the opposite conclusion on the preemption issue in Sasso v. Vachris, 66 N.Y.2d 28, 32-35, 494 N.Y.S.2d 856, 858-60, 484 N.E.2d 1359, 1361-63 (1985). The principal grounds of decision in Vachris were: (1) that a series of cases had limited ERISA's preemption to state enactments that bear upon the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans; and (2) that § 630 is a remedial statute that adds an enforcement mechanism without changing the plans' terms and conditions. 33 In Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133, 137 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1008, 105 S.Ct. 2702, 86 L.Ed.2d 718 (1985), we said that a state law must 'purport[ ] to regulate, ... the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans' to fall within the preemption provision. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(2)). We drew that deduction from ERISA § 514(c)(2), which defines the word State (for purposes of ERISA § 514(a), id. § 1144(a)) as any state or local authority which purports to regulate, directly or indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans. Id. § 1144(c)(2). 34 Relying on Rebaldo, Vachris held that § 630 was not preempted, principally because the New York statute did not purport to regulate the terms or conditions of employee benefit plans. 66 N.Y.2d at 32, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 858, 484 N.E.2d at 1361. However, in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 141-42, 111 S.Ct. 478, 484-85, 112 L.Ed.2d 474 (1990), the Supreme Court specifically held that the ERISA definition of State does not control or narrow ERISA § 514(a)'s broad preemption of all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to ERISA plans: 35 Had Congress intended to restrict ERISA's pre-emptive effect to state laws purporting to regulate plan terms and conditions, it surely would not have done so by placing the restriction in an adjunct definition section while using the broad phrase relate to in the pre-emption section itself. 36 Id. at 141, 111 S.Ct. at 484. We have since acknowledged that, in light of Ingersoll-Rand, further reliance on Rebaldo is unwarranted. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 719 (2d Cir.1993) (Rebaldo 's fundamental premise was rejected by the Supreme Court.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Blue Cross, 514 U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1676; see also Smith v. Dunham-Bush, Inc., 959 F.2d 6, 9 n. 3 (2d Cir.1992). The same fundamental premise that poisoned Rebaldo 's analysis, Travelers Ins. Co., 14 F.3d at 719, afflicts Vachris as well. 37 The Vachris court also considered whether Congress intended to preempt statutes such as § 630 when Congress adopted the 1980 amendments to ERISA, which, inter alia, added a provision requiring employers to contribute to multi-employer plans in accordance with the plans themselves or pursuant to collective bargaining agreements. See 29 U.S.C. § 1145. The Vachris court reviewed the legislative history, and found signs that Congress intended its 1980 ERISA amendments to supplement, rather than replace, state-law remedies. 66 N.Y.2d at 34-36, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 860-61, 484 N.E.2d at 1363-64. According to the Vachris court, the 1980 amendments merely added a statutory obligation upon employers to make contributions ... as required by the terms of the employee benefit plan or the collective bargaining agreement[,] and provided a civil cause of action in favor of fiduciaries to enforce this obligation. Id., 66 N.Y.2d at 35, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 860, 484 N.E.2d at 1363 (citations omitted). 38 The problem with this particular line of analysis in Vachris is that it too is foreclosed by Ingersoll-Rand. There, the Supreme Court considered a Texas common-law cause of action for wrongful discharge based specifically on an employer's desire to avoid contributions to or payments from an employee's pension; the Court found that this cause of action was preempted by ERISA. 498 U.S. at 143-45, 111 S.Ct. at 485-86. Although the Texas cause of action was intended to afford heightened protection for ERISA beneficiaries, the Court characterized it as conflict[ing] directly with an ERISA cause of action, because it falls squarely within the ambit of ERISA § 510, id. at 142, 111 S.Ct. at 484-85, a substantive provision that is enforceable by ERISA § 502(a). See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1140, 1132(a). 39 The Court in Ingersoll-Rand made clear that state statutes that augment ERISA remedies are preempted, as well as state statutes that impair ERISA remedies: 40 The six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in § 502(a) of the statute as finally enacted ... provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly. 41 Id. at 144, 111 S.Ct. at 485 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Supreme Court concluded that this exclusivity of remedy constituted precisely the kind of special feature that warrants pre-emption of what might otherwise be viewed as supplemental state remedies unavailable under federal law. Id. at 144, 111 S.Ct. at 485 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court drew no distinction between whether the state-law cause of action impacts on the original ERISA provisions or impacts only on subsequent amendments. In short, the remedies provided by ERISA § 502(a) are exclusive. 42 We have already said that ERISA §§ 502(a)(3)(B) and 515, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(3)(B), 1145, together create a cause of action by which appropriate plaintiffs may enforce an employer's obligations to make contributions to employee benefit plans. 5 We think it is clear under IngersollRand that § 630 would interfere with the exclusivity of ERISA § 502(a) and is therefore preempted, notwithstanding Vachris. 43