Opinion ID: 2599941
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Definition of malice

Text: Defendant complains that the jury instruction on malice defined that word as intent to kill, without explaining that the concept of malice (at the time of defendant's offenses) also included the ability to comprehend the duty to comply with the law and the ability to act in accordance with that duty. (See People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1110-1111, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588; People v. Poddar (1974) 10 Cal.3d 750, 758, 111 Cal.Rptr. 910, 518 P.2d 342; People v. Conley (1966) 64 Cal.2d 310, 322, 49 Cal.Rptr. 815, 411 P.2d 911.) We conclude that the instructions, taken as a whole, fully conveyed these requirements. The jury in the present case was told that murder requires proof of malice, and that malice is express when there is manifested an intention unlawfully to kill a human being. (CALJIC No. 8.11.) In instructing the jury on the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter, the court explained: There is no malice aforethought if the evidence shows that due to diminished capacity caused by mental illness, mental defect, or intoxication, the defendant did not have the capacity to form the mental state constituting malice aforethought, even though the killing was intentional, voluntary, deliberate, and unprovoked. (CALJIC No. 8.41.) The jury further was told that if it found that defendant's mental capacity was substantially reduced at the time of the offense, you must consider what effect, if any, this diminished mental capacity had on the defendant's ability to form any of the specific mental states that are essential elements of murder. . . . [I]f you find the defendant's mental capacity was diminished to the extent that you have a reasonable doubt whether he was able to form the mental state constituting express malice aforethought, you cannot find him guilty of murder. . . . If you have a reasonable doubt whether he was able to form an intention unlawfully to kill a human being, or whether he was aware of the duty imposed on him not to commit acts which involve the risk of grave injury or death, or whether he did act despite that awareness, you cannot find that he harbored express malice. (CALJIC No. 8.77.) We reject defendant's argument that the jury, by focusing upon the initial definition of express malice, might have concluded that defendant was guilty of murder as soon as it concluded he intended to kill, without further considering whether diminished capacity negated malice. The jury was instructed: Do not single out any particular sentence or any individual point or instruction and ignore the others. Consider the instructions as a whole and each in light of all the others. We presume the jury followed these instructions. (See People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 129, 29 P.3d 209.)