Opinion ID: 867568
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether a single act of negligence triggers APSA

Text: ¶ 10 We turn first to Plaintiffs' suggestion that we must apply A.R.S. § 1-214 and thus construe the plural phrase negligent acts or omissions in APSA to include any single negligent act or omission. [7] We do not agree with Plaintiffs' submission that the provisions of A.R.S. § 1-214(B) that a statute's words in the plural number include the singular should be applied rigidly and thus determine the resolution of this case. [8] We do not believe rigid application of A.R.S. § 1-214 is appropriate, given the statute laying down the general rule requiring us to interpret statutes liberally and in such a manner as to effect their objects and to promote justice. A.R.S. § 1-211(B). Further, we are commanded not to apply the statutory rules of construction when such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature. A.R.S. § 1-211(A). ¶ 11 Our courts have always construed A.R.S. § 1-214 as a permissive statute, permitting us to interpret the singular as the plural and the plural as the singular when such an interpretation will enable us to carry out legislative intent. See Long v. Napolitano, 203 Ariz. 247, 259 ¶ 43, 53 P.3d 172, 184 ¶ 43 (App.2002) (legislature's use of singular any county does not require us to apply statute to only one county simply because A.R.S. § 1-214(B) says use of singular includes plural); In re Ryan A., 202 Ariz. 19, 25 ¶ 25, 39 P.3d 543, 549 ¶ 25 (App.2002) (use of parent in statute may be construed to mean both parents); see also State v. Shepler, 141 Ariz. 43, 44, 684 P.2d 924, 925 (App.1984) (use of plural includes singular). ¶ 12 Our court of appeals has held that the provisions of A.R.S. § 1-214 must be applied consistently with those of A.R.S. § 1-211, which require us to effect legislative intent. Homebuilders Ass'n of Central Arizona v. City of Scottsdale, 186 Ariz. 642, 649, 925 P.2d 1359, 1366 (1996). As the court of appeals has held, the purpose of the statute construing plural and singular nouns and verbs interchangeably is to avoid requiring the legislature to use such expressions as `person or persons,' `he, she, or they,' and `himself or themselves.' Id. (citing EARL P. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 374 (1940)); see also 2 A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.34 (6th ed.2000). We thus interpret A.R.S. § 1-214 as a permissive statute rather than a mandatory injunction of interpretation. ¶ 13 Finally, rigid application of the rules of construction in A.R.S. § 1-214 would violate the general precepts of statutory construction we have adopted in the past. Hayes v. Continental Ins. Co., 178 Ariz. 264, 268, 872 P.2d 668, 672 (1994) (where statute's text is clear and unambiguous, we apply it without resorting to other methods; where there is ambiguity, we interpret by attempting to determine legislative intent; where we cannot ascertain legislative intent on specific issue, we interpret in manner that furthers perceived goals of relevant body of legislation). ¶ 14 We do not believe interpreting APSA so as to apply to any and every single act of medical malpractice would be consistent with the legislature's obvious intent to protect a class of mostly elderly or mentally ill citizens from harm caused by those who have undertaken to give them the care they cannot provide for themselves. Consider for a moment the situation of a surgeon who, while operating on a patient, negligently fails to remove an instrument or discover a perforation in the viscera. Such negligence and the resulting injury can afflict anyone, not just the incapacitated, and is completely separate from the unique role of caregiver and incapacitated recipient. Thus, it would fall only within MMA, not APSA. ¶ 15 But Defendants and amici argue that abuse-negligent acts or omissions-must always involve multiple acts committed over a period of time. Thus, they say, a single act of simple negligence can never constitute abuse or neglect under APSA. Brief of American Association of Physicians and Surgeons at 14. Putting aside the difficulty of separating simple from complex negligence, we nevertheless conclude that such an easy solution, appealing as it may be, will not serve the purposes for which APSA was enacted. Consider, for example, the nurse who places an incapacitated person in a bathtub, turns on the water at too high a temperature, and is distracted for a moment. This single and simple act of neglect is directly related to the caregiver's responsibility in caring for the incapacitated patient and is one from which that patient may not be able to protect him or herself. ¶ 16 We therefore conclude that we can neither automatically limit the negligent act or omission wording of A.R.S. § 46-451(A)(1) to a series of negligent acts nor say that a single act of negligence involving an incapacitated person will never give rise to an APSA action. We hold instead that to be actionable abuse under APSA, the negligent act or acts (1) must arise from the relationship of caregiver and recipient, (2) must be closely connected to that relationship, (3) must be linked to the service the caregiver undertook because of the recipient's incapacity, and (4) must be related to the problem or problems that caused the incapacity. ¶ 17 We are well aware that this formulation does not provide an easy, bright-line test for judges and juries. But we believe it best serves the purposes of the legislation and addresses the problems the legislature sought to correct.