Opinion ID: 844274
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prospective Alternate Juror Tracey S.

Text: Prospective Alternate Juror Tracey S. worked as a registered nurse with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, treating inmates at the Men's Central Jail. She came into contact with deputy sheriffs but none were her friends. At sidebar, defense counsel disclosed that defendant remembered being treated by Tracey S. in the past. Defendant had seen her talking to deputies and believed she dated deputies. Defense counsel challenged Tracey S. for cause out of an abundance of caution and conceded the challenge was not based on anything specific. Counsel explained that he would feel uncomfortable having Tracey S. as a juror given that she could encounter defendant at the jail during the trial and we're trying to pretend he's not in custody. The court observed that Tracey S. would not have contact with defendant if she served as a juror because she obviously wouldn't be going to work; she would be coming here. Nevertheless, the court asked if Tracey S. recognized anyone at counsel table, and she replied that she did not. The court denied the challenge. Immediately after this ruling, defense counsel declined to exercise a peremptory challenge against Tracey S. and expressly accepted the alternate jurors. Tracey S. was sworn as an alternate and eventually sat as a regular juror. (9) Defendant now claims the court erred in denying his challenge. Assuming this claim was not waived by defense counsel's express acceptance of the alternate jurors, it fails on the merits. Tracey S. said she did not recognize anyone at the defense table. Defense counsel could not identify any specific reason why Tracey S. could not serve as a fair and impartial juror. He referred only to his discomfort, defendant's speculation, and counsel's conjecture that Tracey S.'s job, which she would be away from during trial, might alert her to defendant's custodial status. These vague and speculative objections were not sufficient to support a dismissal for cause, and the trial court's denial of the challenge is supported by substantial evidence. (See People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1035 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 988 P.2d 531].) However, defendant insists that the challenge should have been granted because, almost a month later, Tracey S. did see defendant at the jail. Jurors were excused from court for one day after the close of evidence in the guilt phase. Tracey S. went to work that day and saw defendant standing in line outside the jail's clinic with a group of inmates. They did not speak. Tracey S. walked by defendant, had no more contact with him, and did not try to find out more about him. Thus, while she learned that defendant was in custody, she knew nothing else about him, and she did not remember having ever treated him. Defense counsel asked Tracey S. several questions about the incident, and she repeatedly said it would not affect her ability to serve as a juror. At the court's request, she also agreed not to mention the sighting to other jurors. Counsel did not move to dismiss Tracey S. or make any attempt to show she was disqualified from serving as a juror. Plainly, if a defendant desires the trial court to fashion an appropriate remedy under these circumstances, the request must be timely to afford the opportunity to rule when the ruling will be meaningful. [Citation.] ( People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1160 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950].) Because no objection was made below, to the extent defendant contends the court erred in failing to discharge Tracey S. from the jury, the claim has been forfeited. ( Ibid.; see also § 1089 [permitting discharge of a juror at any time upon ... good cause shown to the court  (italics added)].) (10) Even if the claim had been preserved, it would fail on the merits. A juror may be discharged if, at any time before or after final submission of the case, the court upon good cause finds the juror unable to perform his or her duty. (§ 1089.) We generally uphold a trial court's decision regarding discharge if there is any substantial evidence to support it, although, if a juror is discharged, his or her inability to perform as a juror must `appear in the record as a demonstrable reality.' [Citation.] ( People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 843 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280].) The record does not support defendant's claim that Tracey S.'s ability to serve was compromised because she saw him in custody. Tracey S. immediately reported the incident to the court, repeatedly assured the court the incident would have no effect on her decisionmaking, and agreed to say nothing about it to other jurors. [8]