Opinion ID: 847207
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: what constitutes a hearing under the draa

Text: M.C.L. § 600.5081 is the statutory provision that governs vacation and modification of arbitration awards under the DRAA. M.C.L. § 600.5081(2) provides: If a party applies under this section, the court shall vacate an award under any of the following circumstances: (a) The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means. (b) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, corruption of an arbitrator, or misconduct prejudicing a party's rights. (c) The arbitrator exceeded his or her powers. (d) The arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing on a showing of sufficient cause, refused to hear evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing to prejudice substantially a party's rights. The Court of Appeals concluded that the arbitrator violated M.C.L. § 600.5081(2)(d). It reasoned that the informality of the hearing prejudiced plaintiff's rights. The question is whether, in proceedings under the DRAA, the statute precludes hearings being conducted as the hearing was conducted in this case. In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals majority relied primarily on M.C.L. § 600.5074(1), which provides: An arbitrator appointed under this chapter shall hear and make an award on each issue submitted for arbitration under the arbitration agreement subject to the provisions of the agreement. [Emphasis added.] The DRAA does not define the term hear or hearing. Moreover, it sets no procedural requirements for arbitration. Rather, it specifically eschews them. For example, M.C.L. § 600.5077 requires, with certain exceptions, that the arbitrator not make an official record of most arbitration proceedings. [2] This purposeful requirement of little or no record shows that the Legislature intended not to require specific procedures in arbitration proceedings. Without a record, reviewing courts cannot assess what procedures have been followed. The Legislature's failure to provide specific arbitration procedures is consistent also with tradition. Historically, judicial review of arbitration awards is highly limited. Gavin, 416 Mich. at 433-434, 331 N.W.2d 418. This Court has characterized arbitration procedures as informal and sometimes unorthodox.... Id. at 429. Consequently, courts should not speculate why an arbitrator ruled in one particular manner. Id. Rather than employ the formality required in courts, parties in arbitration are able to shape the parameters and procedures of the proceeding. The DRAA requires that they first sign an agreement for binding arbitration delineating the powers and duties of the arbitrator. M.C.L. § 600.5072(1)(e). The act also contemplates that the parties will discuss with the arbitrator the scope of the issues and how information necessary for their resolution will be produced. M.C.L. § 600.5076. The act contemplates that the parties will decide what is best for their case. Nowhere in the DRAA are procedural formalities imposed that restrict this freedom. This Court has consistently held that arbitration is a matter of contract. It is the agreement that dictates the authority of the arbitrators[.] Rowry v. Univ. of Michigan, 441 Mich. 1, 10, 490 N.W.2d 305 (1992). In this case, the Court of Appeals decision infringes on the parties' recognized freedom to contract for binding arbitration. It restricts the parties' freedom to decide how the arbitration hearing should be conducted. [3] Plaintiff presents no convincing argument that the Legislature intended all DRAA hearings to approximate traditional court hearings. We know of none. [4] It is inappropriate for a court to read into a statute something that was not intended. AFSCME v. Detroit, 468 Mich. 388, 412, 662 N.W.2d 695 (2003). Significantly, in this case, the parties specifically agreed to allow the arbitrator to conduct the hearing in two separate rooms. If the parties and the arbitrator thought that this was the best way to hold their hearing, they were at liberty to make that agreement. Because it is the agreement of the parties that dictates arbitration, the Court of Appeals should not have altered the agreement. Rowry, 441 Mich. at 10, 490 N.W.2d 305.