Opinion ID: 564390
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consciousness of Guilt Instruction

Text: 12 The district court instructed the jury that false exculpatory statements could be considered as evidence of consciousness of guilt. 2 Perkins contends that his questioning while visiting his parole officer at the U.S. Courthouse was not sufficiently confrontational regarding his involvement in a criminal charge to justify the giving of the instruction. We hold the instruction proper in this case. 13 Agent Dezihan, one of the arresting officers, testified that Perkins was advised of and signed a written waiver of his rights prior to questioning. Dezihan first asked Perkins if he had been involved in any bank robberies. Perkins responded that he had not. The agent then inquired how Perkins got to the building and if Perkins owned a car. Perkins falsely responded that a friend, who had not parked but was just driving around the building dropped him off at the courthouse. Perkins also stated that he did not presently own a car because he had sold it. Following his arrest at the end of the interview, the officers discovered a blue Datsun registered to Perkins parked close to the building and found the keys to the car in his pocket. 14 If the jury credited Agent Dezihan's testimony, it could find that in response to the incriminating questions of an FBI agent, after waiving his Miranda rights, Perkins lied. Perkins's false exculpatory statements therefore properly could be considered as evidence of consciousness of guilt. 15 Perkins also challenges the instruction on the grounds that it permits the jury to consider the statements as evidence of guilt, rather than consciousness of guilt. The instruction does not instruct the jury that the conduct is evidence of guilt; rather, the instruction stresses that false statements may be considered as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt, and that it is up to the jury to determine the significance of the evidence. Perkins's reliance on United States v. Di Stefano, 555 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir.1977), is therefore misplaced. In Di Stefano, the instruction explicitly stated, the jury may consider [the false statements] as circumstantial evidence of the defendant's guilt. Id. at 1104. Second, we have approved the use of this instruction on false exculpatory statements. See United States v. Boekelman, 594 F.2d 1238, 1240 (9th Cir.1979) (court noted approval of standard Devitt & Blackmar instruction and distinguished Di Stefano in upholding a variation from the standard instruction); United States v. Wood, 550 F.2d 435, 443 (9th Cir.1976).