Opinion ID: 387318
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 19 The threshold question is whether the District Court's order denying White's motion to quash enforcement of the subpoena duces tecum and ordering his appearance is reviewable. We hold that it is not.A. 20 As an initial matter, Feeney argues that the District Court improperly allowed the intervention of White. Generally, persons affected by the disclosure of allegedly privileged materials may intervene in pending criminal proceedings and seek protective orders. United States v. RMI Co., 599 F.2d 1183, 1186 (3d Cir. 1979). Under the circumstances presented here, this rule applies. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 99 S.Ct. 1667, 60 L.Ed.2d 156 (1979); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974). 21 White's intervention was to protect himself from disclosure of accusations made against him before the grand jury. Douglas Oil v. Petrol Stops Northwest, supra, 441 U.S. at p. 218 n. 8, 99 S.Ct. at 1672 n. 8. As such, he had standing to object to any disclosure, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) and the right to intervene to protect his interests. Once White's motion for a protective order was withdrawn, however, he retained no legally cognizable interest in the proceedings and should have been dismissed as a party. 1 B. 22 Both the Government and Feeney contend that we have no jurisdiction to review, in an appellate setting, the District Court's order denying White's motion to quash. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides for appeal only from all final decisions of the district courts, except where direct appeal to the Supreme Court is provided. This requirement promotes judicial efficiency and embodies a strong congressional policy against piecemeal reviews, and against obstructing or impeding an ongoing judicial proceeding by interlocutory appeals. United States v. Nixon, supra, 418 U.S. at 690, 94 S.Ct. at 3098-3099; United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 98 S.Ct. 1547, 56 L.Ed.2d 18 (1978) (denial of motion to dismiss indictment on speedy trial grounds not appealable order). 23 The Supreme Court has consistently held an order denying a motion to quash and requiring the production of evidence pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum ... is not final and hence not appealable. Id. 418 U.S. at p. 691, 94 S.Ct. at 3099. The subpoenaed party is put to the choice between compliance with a trial court's order to produce prior to any review of that order, and resistance to that order with the concomitant possibility of an adjudication of contempt if his claims are rejected on appeal. United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533, 91 S.Ct. 1580, 1582, 29 L.Ed.2d 85 (1971). 24 Recognizing these precedents, White seeks refuge under Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 38 S.Ct. 417, 62 L.Ed. 950 (1918) and our decision in Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 964, 85 S.Ct. 1110, 14 L.Ed.2d 155 (1965). In Perlman, the subpoena was directed to a third party demanding the production of documents owned by the appellant. The order denying the motion to quash enforcement of the subpoena was held immediately appealable because the third party would not risk a contempt citation to preserve the appellant's claim of privilege. The subpoena here is directed to White, not a third party. Perlman is inapposite. See generally, In re Grand Jury, 619 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir. 1980). 25 In Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., supra, we recognized an exception to the finality requirement allowing appeal where the order is collateral, separable from the main litigation, and related to an injured non-party. Under Covey, however, appeal is allowed only (w)hen and if a subsequent order of the court imposes a harmful sanction. Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 342 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096, 97 S.Ct. 1113, 51 L.Ed.2d 543 (1977). No sanctions have been imposed here by the District Court. As such, the appeal is premature. In re Westinghouse Electric Corp., 563 F.2d 992, 995 n.  (10th Cir. 1977). 2 26 The District Court's denial of the motion to quash is not appealable. The appeal in United States v. Krown, No. 80-2211 is dismissed. C. 27 As an alternative to appellate jurisdiction, White and the Government contend that review is available under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). 28 We have held today in United States v. Winner, supra, that mandamus is available to review orders compelling the production of documents or testimony claimed to be privileged in certain extraordinary situations. The power to issue extraordinary writs exists, and will be exercised by this Court in its discretion, only where exceptional circumstances demand its use. Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402-403, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 2123-2124, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976). A judicial readiness to issue the writ of mandamus in anything less than an extraordinary situation would run the real risk of defeating the very policies sought to be furthered by ... Congress. Id. at p. 403, 96 S.Ct. at p. 2124. Even though hardship may result, extraordinary writs are not substitutes for appeal. Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 74 S.Ct. 145, 98 L.Ed. 106 (1953). 29 If White believes the subpoena duces tecum is invalid, he must risk contempt and appeal from that citation should it be imposed. 3 The petition for writ of mandamus in White v. Winner, No. 80-2206, is dismissed. The temporary stay previously granted by this Court is dissolved. 30 DISMISSED.