Opinion ID: 2347897
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Trial Court's Standard of Review of a Hearing Panel's Decision

Text: The Panel conducted its hearing on February 17, 2006 and filed its judgment on March 30, 2006. The Board filed its Petition for Writ of Certiorari on May 2, 2006. On all of these dates, a trial court was required to review a hearing panel's decision under the same standard, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 1.3 (2005) (old standard). Effective July 1, 2006, the old standard was changed and replaced with a different standard of review. See Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 9, § 1.3 (2007) (new standard). The trial court's hearing in this matter was conducted on August 9, 2006, after the new standard became effective. Because this matter involves proceedings both before and after the new standard of review became effective, we must determine whether the trial court should have employed the old standard or the new standard in reviewing the Panel's decision. At the time of the Panel's hearing, Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 1.3, stated in pertinent part: The respondent or the Board may have a review of the judgment of a hearing committee in the manner provided by [Tennessee Code Annotated section] 27-9-101 et seq., except as otherwise provided herein. The review shall be on the transcript of the evidence before the hearing committee, its findings and judgment and upon such other proof as either party may desire to introduce. The trial judge shall weigh the evidence and determine the facts by the preponderance of the proof. Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 9, § 1.3 (2005). Under this standard, the old standard, [w]here the trial judge bases his or her decision on the same evidence that is before the hearing panel, the trial judge must affirm the panel unless that evidence preponderates against those findings. Cohn v. Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility, 151 S.W.3d 473, 481 (Tenn.2004) (internal quotations omitted). However, under the old standard, the trial court could admit any other proof as either party may desire to introduce. Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 9, § 1.3 (2005). Effective July 1, 2006, Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 1.3, was amended, and now states in pertinent part: The respondent-attorney (hereinafter respondent) or the Board may have a review of the judgment of a hearing panel in the manner provided by [Tennessee Code Annotated section] 27-9-101 et seq., except as otherwise provided herein. The review shall be on the transcript of the evidence before the hearing panel and its findings and judgment. If allegations of irregularities in the procedure before the panel are made, the trial court is authorized to take such additional proof as may be necessary to resolve such allegations. The court may affirm the decision of the panel or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if the rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the panel's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (1) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the panel's jurisdiction; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or (5) unsupported by evidence which is both substantial and material in the light of the entire record. In determining the substantiality of evidence, the court shall take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight, but the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the panel as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 9, § 1.3 (2007) (emphasis added). Under the new, more limited standard of review, the trial court may modify or reverse a panel's decision in only the five enumerated circumstances, and the trial court's review is limited to the transcript of the evidence before the panel unless allegations of irregularities in the procedure before the panel are made. Id. Therefore, given the greater limitations on a trial court's review under the new standard, we must determine which standard applied at the time of trial in order to determine whether the trial court erred in modifying the Panel's recommendations. In Doe v. Board of Professional Responsibility, we adopted the procedure for interpreting Rule 9 and other rules promulgated by this Court. 104 S.W.3d 465, 469 (Tenn.2003). Noting that there are well-established and well-known rules of construction which we apply when interpreting statutes enacted by legislative bodies, id., but that the rules of this Court are not drafted pursuant to a legislative delegation of power, [12] we resolved nonetheless to review this Court's rules in the same manner as statutes. As we stated, Upon due consideration, we conclude that it is prudent for this Court to likewise apply the traditional rules of statutory construction to Rule 9 of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court. Id. [13] Applying statutory construction principles, this Court, on numerous occasions, has addressed the circumstances in which a change in a statute applies either retroactively or prospectively. See, e.g., In re D.A.H., 142 S.W.3d 267, 273 (Tenn. 2004); Nutt v. Champion Int'l Corp., 980 S.W.2d 365, 368 (Tenn.1998); Kuykendall v. Wheeler, 890 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tenn. 1994). The Tennessee Constitution states that no retrospective law, or law impairing the obligations of contracts, shall be made. Tenn. Const. art. 1, § 20. Thus, a rule is presumed to operate prospectively unless there is a clear intent otherwise. There are, however, circumstances in which a rule may be deemed retroactive, even if no clear intent is provided. Nutt, 980 S.W.2d at 368. For example, rules considered remedial or procedural in nature apply retroactively, not only to causes of action arising before such acts become law, but also to all actions pending when the law took effect, unless a contrary intention is indicated or immediate application would produce an unjust result. Id.; Kee v. Shelter Ins., 852 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tenn. 1993); State Dep't of Human Servs. v. Defriece, 937 S.W.2d 954, 958 (Tenn.Ct. App.1996). Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 1.3, is procedural and remedial in nature. In Nutt, this Court defined remedial laws as those that provid[e] means or method whereby causes of action may be effectuated, wrongs redressed and relief obtained. 980 S.W.2d at 368 (quoting Defriece, 937 S.W.2d at 958). This Court's stated purpose for modifying the disciplinary system rules was to improve the disciplinary enforcement system for the benefit of the public and the members of the legal profession. Tenn. Sup.Ct. ORDER April 25, 2006. This language clearly suggests that amendments to the Tennessee Supreme Court rules were made to improve, or remedy, the disciplinary enforcement system. Moreover, as this Court stated in Nutt, a procedural statute is one that does not affect the vested rights or liabilities of the parties but instead addresses the mode or proceeding by which a legal right is enforced. 980 S.W.2d at 368. Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 1.3, does not affect Love's vested rights or liabilities. To the contrary, the rule focuses only on the way in which a trial court reviews a hearing panel's decision. And, because the new standard is procedural in nature and does not impair an obligation of contract, applying the new standard to trial court proceedings conducted after its effective date would not produce an unjust result. See Kee, 852 S.W.2d at 228. Accordingly, we hold that the new standard of review, which became effective July 1, 2006, was applicable during the trial court's August 9, 2006, hearing.