Opinion ID: 2258806
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendants Encouraged Contact Between Vincelette and the Children As a Result, Vincelette Sexually Abused Brandi

Text: In counts IV through VI, plaintiff Jeffrey Billado complains that defendant Woodward failed to investigate and report sexual abuse of his minor children by Joseph Vincelette. In counts VII through IX, plaintiff Brandi Billado, through Jeffrey Billado, complains that defendant Woodward failed to investigate her complaint of sexual abuse by Vincelette. Counts X through XXI are based on the allegation that defendant Appel encouraged Melanie Billado to reside with Joseph Vincelette and allowed contact between him and the children. This contact is alleged to have resulted in extreme mental anguish and acute mental distress for Jeffrey, Jeffrey, Jr., and Courtney Billado. With respect to Brandi Billado, the complaint alleges that Vincelette sexually abused her as a direct result of defendants' conduct. These counts share with those above the allegation that the investigation of a sexual abuse complaint was inadequate, although with a different result. Here, the result was lack of substantiation of abuse, whereas the result with respect to Jeffrey was allegedly an improper accusation of sexual abuse. To the extent the asserted wrong was failure to investigate properly a report of sexual abuse, we conclude that qualified immunity protected defendant Woodward's actions. Plaintiffs had no constitutional right to a proper investigation or any right involved was so amorphous or conditional that defendant could not have known that her actions were in violation of plaintiffs' constitutional right. In reaching this conclusion, we emphasize that there is no allegation that, as a result of Woodward's failure to investigate properly, Brandi was a victim of continuing sexual abuse. Plaintiffs argue for the first time in this Court that although Woodward may be immune from damages on a family integrity theory, she is not immune from a claim that she denied plaintiffs access to the juvenile court, in violation of their due process rights. [3] This claim is based on the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Chrissy F. v. Mississippi Department of Public Welfare, 925 F.2d 844 (5th Cir.1991). Because this theory is more clearly raised with respect to defendant Appel, we consider it below. The remainder of the allegations in these counts charge that defendant Appel failed to protect the children, and Brandi in particular, by allowing and encouraging contact between them and a known sexual abuser. Defendant argues that pursuant to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989), her actions were protected by qualified immunity because there was no clear constitutional right to the protection plaintiffs allege was absent. DeShaney involved a failure of county social workers to investigate and take action on continuous reports that a father physically abused his four-year-old child. In the last incident, the father beat the child so severely that the child fell into a life-threatening coma and suffered severe brain damage. The child sued the workers claiming they had a constitutional duty to render assistance. The Supreme Court dismissed the suit holding that a state's failure to protect an individual against private violence does not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 197, 109 S.Ct. at 1004. The Court further held that the general rule was not modified by the State's knowledge of the individual's circumstances or by expressions of intent to help. Id. at 200, 109 S.Ct. at 1005-06. For example, the Court held that the fact that the State once took temporary custody of the plaintiff, in response to an earlier report of abuse, does not impose constitutional liability on the State or its workers after they returned the child to the father. Id. at 201, 109 S.Ct. at 1006. The Court distinguished situations where the State has created or assumed a special relationship with the injured individual. Such circumstances arise only where the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, because the State has rendered the person unable to care for himself. Id. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. at 1005. Although defendant Appel argues that DeShaney holds that no constitutional right is violated by her alleged conduct, the real issue before us is whether defendant is charged with violating a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have notice. DeShaney was decided February 22, 1989, shortly before Melanie moved out of her home with Jeff, which triggered the action and inaction on which the complaint is based. Unless a later controlling precedent created the clearly established constitutional right we must find to overcome qualified immunity, we must use the DeShaney standard. We find no such later controlling precedent in the short period between DeShaney and defendant's acts. In applying DeShaney, we have looked carefully at plaintiffs' allegations. Although the complaint broadly charges that between September 1989 and June 1991 defendant encouraged and allowed contact between Vincelette and the children and this conduct led to Vincelette's sexual abuse of Brandi, the allegations are narrowed in plaintiffs' arguments to this Court. Plaintiffs' arguments make clear that the alleged abuse, reports of abuse, and encouragement of contact occurred [when] SRS did not have custody of the children between November 1989 and June 1990. Thus, plaintiffs describe the claim in their brief: The Defendants had custody, then returned the children to their mother, at a time [when] the mother was living with Mr. Vincelette, someone SRS knew to be an abuser. The Defendants later received reports of abuse by Mr. Billado and failed to remove the children. Their argument, stressed repeatedly, is that defendants knew Melanie, and therefore the children, were living with Vincelette, the contact between Vincelette and the children was in direct violation of the abuse prevention order, defendants failed to enforce the abuse prevention order or inform the court of the violation, defendants failed to protect the children from Vincelette, and the sexual abuse of Brandi resulted. There is no statement in the complaint, or any of the papers submitted to this Court or the superior court, that the children were in SRS custody when the abuse by Vincelette allegedly occurred. This factual narrowing is important because a number of post- DeShaney decisions have found clearly established constitutional rights to be involved where children in the custody of a state or local social services agency are abused, particularly if the abuse is perpetrated by foster parents. See Norfleet v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 292-93 (8th Cir.1993); Yvonne L. v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 893 (10th Cir.1992); K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 853-54 (7th Cir.1990). But see Camp v. Gregory, 67 F.3d 1286, 1298 (7th Cir.1995) (although state child protection agency was guardian of juvenile, child protection worker was entitled to qualified immunity when juvenile was killed because juvenile was placed with a relative and theory of liability was inadequate supervision and intervention, not abuse by caretaker). This is not such a case. We see no significant difference between this case and DeShaney such that a clearly established constitutional right was involved here. Relying primarily on pre- DeShaney cases, plaintiffs argue that there was a special relationship between SRS and the children based on the fact that SRS did have custody during the fall of 1989. The Court specifically rejected such a special relationship theory in DeShaney on similar facts, involving prior social services intervention and some monitoring of the family situation. Nor do we find the situation different because of the outstanding abuse prevention order prohibiting contact between Vincelette and the children. The order was issued in a private proceeding between Melanie and Jeff, and SRS workers have no obligation to enforce the terms of that private order. To the extent there is a public responsibility to enforce such orders, it lies by statute with prosecutors and law enforcement officers, including state and local police and sheriffs. See 13 V.S.A. § 1030 (commission of act prohibited by abuse prevention order is a crime); 15 V.S.A. §§ 1107, 1108. Defendant is not a prosecutor or law enforcement officer. As noted above, plaintiffs rely on a new theory of liability in this Court: that defendant Appel prevented plaintiffs' access to the juvenile court by failing to act on their abuse complaints in violation of their right to due process of law. They find this theory in Chrissy F. v. Mississippi Department of Public Welfare, 925 F.2d at 852, where the court concluded that qualified immunity did not cover the actions of defendant social workers. We agree that, broadly read, the initial decision in Chrissy F. appears to accept plaintiffs' theory and hold that the constitutional right involved  i.e., access to the courts  is so clearly accepted that qualified immunity does not apply. The court held that the defendants' alleged actions of failing to investigate the plaintiff child's complaints of abuse and reporting them to the Mississippi Youth Court, as required by Mississippi statute, made out a constitutional claim of violation of meaningful access to the court. 925 F.2d at 851. The court further held that the right was clearly established, and qualified immunity did not apply. Id. at 852. Plaintiffs argue that Chrissy F. means that whenever child protection workers fail to do an adequate investigation of an abuse claim and, as a result, fail to file a CHINS petition to protect the child, they are liable for violating the child's right of access to the juvenile court and any resulting damages. This broad reading of Chrissy F. is belied by later actions in the same case. On remand, the District Court held against the plaintiff on the access theory, with the following analysis: Consistent with [the DeShaney ] ... reading of the due process clause, the Court concludes that state actors have no general duty to affirmatively aid individuals in securing their fundamental right of access to courts. While a state certainly may not act to impede an individuals [sic] exercise of this fundamental right, this Court can find no precedent in right of access cases or in due process analysis generally which suggests that state actors must affirmatively act to secure an individual's rights as guaranteed under the fourteenth amendment. Accordingly, the Court concludes that, as to those claims asserting a deprivation of the right of access to courts based upon the failure of certain of the Defendants to take affirmative action on behalf of Chrissy, Plaintiff has failed to establish a right of recovery on that basis. Chrissy F. v. Mississippi Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 780 F.Supp. 1104, 1125 (S.D.Miss.1991). This holding was affirmed on appeal by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Chrissy F. v. Mississippi Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 995 F.2d 595, 600 (5th Cir.1993). We need not decide whether we would follow Chrissy F. [4] The only violation of access to the courts plaintiffs allege is the failure to bring a CHINS petition to separate Vincelette from the children. Plaintiffs have no constitutional right to insist that defendants intervene and provide that access by filing a CHINS petition.