Opinion ID: 2211572
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: MUDEL v. GREAT ATLANTIC & PACIFIC TEA CO.

Text: In Mudel, plaintiff John Mudel worked for defendant A & P, [12] in various capacities, for almost fifty years. He began employment with A & P as a bagger in 1944, at age sixteen. He soon moved to the position of night stocker, which he performed for eleven years. In 1953, Mudel began working as a meat cutter, and he remained in that position for thirty-nine years, until his last day of work. As a meat cutter, Mudel was required to spend a great deal of time standing, walking, and lifting, in cold temperatures. On April 1, 1992, after working most of a typical shift, Mudel began to feel ill and left work, thirty minutes early. When he arrived home, he told his wife that his left leg felt sore. At 2:00 A.M. the following morning, Mudel awoke in severe pain. His wife drove him to the hospital emergency room, where Doctor Dennis Lynch diagnosed Mudel's condition as acute deep vein thrombosis (DVT) of the left leg. [13] Mudel never returned to work. Mudel applied for worker's compensation benefits on July 28, 1992, alleging disabling injuries to his leg and back. The magistrate concluded that Mudel suffered from an occupational disease and entered an open award of benefits. A & P appealed from the magistrate's decision to the WCAC, arguing that Mudel was not entitled to benefits. Alternatively, A & P argued that the magistrate should have entered a closed award of benefits, on the theory that work activities did not cause, but only temporarily aggravated, Mudel's DVT. Mudel neither appealed nor cross-appealed from the magistrate's favorable ruling. The WCAC, on administrative appeal, determined that the magistrate's findings of fact regarding occupational disease were not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. However, the WCAC affirmed the magistrate's award of benefits by correcting the statutory basis for that award from an occupational disease compensable under  401 to a personal injury compensable under  301. [14] As the WCAC held: There was no testimony presented in this matter to suggest that prolonged standing was unique to defendant's business, or that moving from warm to cold temperatures in and out of the freezer, combined with the prolonged standing, was unique to defendant's business. While it is clear that plaintiff suffers from a work-related disability, the finding of an occupational disease is not sustainable. We affirm the decision of the Magistrate with a modification to reflect that plaintiff is disabled pursuant to  301(4). [1997 Mich. ACO 1285, 1287.] A & P sought leave to appeal from the WCAC's decision to the Court of Appeals, which denied leave to appeal. [15] A & P then applied to this Court for leave to appeal, which we granted. [16] A & P first argues that the WCAC committed legal error by addressing issues not raised by either party when it corrected the statutory basis for Mudel's wage loss benefits from a  401 occupational disease to a  301 personal injury. Specifically, A & P argues that the WCAC violated M.C.L.  418.861a(11); MSA 17.237(861a)(11), which provides: The commission or a panel of the commission shall review only those specific findings of fact or conclusions of law that the parties have requested be reviewed. A & P avers that the only issue properly before the WCAC was the magistrate's award of benefits on the basis of an occupational disease. Once the WCAC determined that Mudel's DVT did not qualify as an occupational disease, A & P contends that the WCAC was required to end its analysis there and terminate Mudel's disability benefits, regardless of whether Mudel's DVT qualified as a compensable personal injury. [17] On the contrary, our review of the record reveals that Mudel did request the WCAC to review whether he was entitled to benefits for a  301 personal injury. Mudel filed a brief with the WCAC responding to A & P's appeal, which stated as follows: However, even if plaintiff does not have a compensable occupational disease, he does have a compensable personal injury pursuant to M.C.L.  418.301(1); MSA 17.237(301)(1).... Based upon plaintiff's credible testimony, coupled with that of Dr. Lynch, it is clear plaintiff has a work-related disability, be it on the basis of a personal injury or an occupational disease. We decline A & P's invitation to decide whether M.C.L.  418.861a(11); MSA 17.237(861a)(11) would prevent the WCAC from resolving the issues in this case if Mudel had not raised the alternative grounds in his responsive pleading, because that factual situation is not currently before us. A & P next contends that the WCAC made impermissible factual findings not supplied by the magistrate, regarding the causal relationship between Mudel's employment and his DVT. Although A & P candidly acknowledges that the WCAC may properly engage in independent factual findings, and affirmatively argues for the reversal of Layman, it nevertheless contends that the WCAC impermissibly conducted independent fact finding in this case, and seeks reversal on that ground. As set forth above, the WCAC has statutory authority to make findings of fact independent of those made by the magistrate. Furthermore, the judiciary applies the any evidence standard of review to the WCAC's findings of fact. As long as any evidence exists in the record to support the WCAC's determination that Mudel's employment caused his DVT, and the WCAC did not misapprehend its administrative appellate role in reviewing decisions of the magistrate, this Court must treat the WCAC's factual finding as conclusive. MCL 418.861a(14); MSA 17.237(861a)(14). On review of this case, we are convinced that the WCAC properly understood and exercised its administrate appellate reviewing function. Moreover, it is clear that, contrary to the dissent's assertion that Layman is not implicated in the present case, the WCAC did clearly engage here in independent fact finding. First, the WCAC identified medical testimony that the magistrate ignored-the testimony of Mudel's treating physician that the precipitating cause [of Mudel's DVT] was his occupation and that standing in cold temperatures for long periods was a primary cause [of] his DVT. Second, the WCAC appears to have thoroughly reviewed the expert medical testimony presented below and exercised care in its consideration of this case-it did not simply substitute its judgment for that of the magistrate. Further, it articulated adequate reasons grounded in the record for concluding that Mudel's DVT was caused by his employment. Thus, Layman, holding that it is impermissible for the WCAC to make independent factual findings, is implicated and we have not reach[ed] beyond the issues presented to overrule precedent. Op. at 627. Because we find no clear indication that the WCAC misapprehended its administrative appellate role or that it otherwise exceeded its authority, we defer to its findings, which were supported by record evidence. A & P argues in the alternative that the WCAC should have awarded Mudel benefits for a closed period because his DVT was only aggravated and not caused by his employment with A & P. The WCAC expressly rejected this argument, stating as follows: Defendant next argues that at most, plaintiff experienced an exacerbation of his deep vein thrombosis and should, at most, be entitled only to a closed award of benefits. In making this argument, defendant relies upon the testimony of its examining physician, Dr. Aboulafia. In making this argument, however, defendant ignores the specific testimony of plaintiff's treater, Dr. Lynch, who testified that the deep vein thrombosis did, in fact, damage plaintiff's deep venous system. This is clear evidence of a pathological change which is more than a temporary exacerbation of an underlying condition. Moreover, there is competent, material, and substantial evidence to support the magistrate's conclusion that the condition remains disabling. [1997 Mich. ACO 1287.] Because the WCAC's factual findings on this issue are supported by record evidence, we must affirm. Finally, A & P contends that the WCAC committed legal error requiring reversal by failing to apply the significant manner standard of M.C.L.  418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2). [18] However, this argument was never advanced before the magistrate, the WCAC, or the Court of Appeals. Because the issue was not preserved, we decline to address it. For the reasons set forth above, we conclude in Mudel that the WCAC acted within its authority when it affirmed the magistrate's open award of benefits but altered the statutory basis for that award, and we affirm the holding of the WCAC.