Opinion ID: 1044031
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the Defendant's Action was Negligent or Intentional

Text: Metro next argues that it is immune from suit because the Defendant did not negligently cause injury to the Plaintiff, but instead committed the intentional tort of assault. In response, the Plaintiff and the Defendant contend that for an action to qualify as an assault, the tortfeasor must actually intend harm, and that because the Defendant did not intend to harm the Plaintiff and was merely engaged in horseplay, Metro is liable under the theory of negligence, an exception to the immunity reserved by the GTLA. The trial court ruled that the Defendant, while intend[ing] to drive the vehicle in a negligent or careless manner, did not commit the intentional tort of assault and that Metro was, therefore, liable pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-202(a). The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that because there was no evidence that the Defendant intended to harm the Plaintiff, he did not commit an assault. As we have stated, the GTLA sets forth the parameters of Metro's immunity from suit for actions that the Defendant took within the scope of his employment. There are two relevant exceptions to the general rule of immunity from suit in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-201. First, the GTLA removes immunity for all governmental entities for injuries resulting from the negligent operation by any employee of a motor vehicle or other equipment while in the scope of employment. Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-20-202(a). Second, the GTLA, more generally, provides that immunity is removed for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of any employee within the scope of his employment. Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-20-205. This latter provision is subject to several enumerated exceptions, including a list of intentional torts in section 29-20-205(2). Conspicuously absent from this list of exceptions are the torts of assault and battery. See Limbaugh v. Coffee Med. Ctr., 59 S.W.3d 73, 83 (Tenn. 2001). In Limbaugh, this Court ruled that a governmental entity, under appropriate circumstances, could be held liable for an assault and battery by an employee, observing that section 29-20-205 of the GTLA removes immunity for injuries proximately caused by the negligent act or omission of a governmental employee except when the injury arises out of only those specified torts enumerated in subsection (2). To immunize all intentional torts would result in an overly broad interpretation of the statute, and there is no indication that the legislature intended such a result. Indeed, we find it noteworthy that the legislature excluded the two intentional torts most likely to give rise to injury. Id. at 84 (citation omitted). In Limbaugh, a resident made a direct showing that the defendant nursing home, a governmental entity, had failed to take reasonable precautions to protect its residents from the risk of abuse by th[e] aggressive nursing assistant who committed an assault against the resident. Id. Because the governmental entity negligently supervised its employee, and the resident suffered an injury from an intentional tort, assault and battery, not included in the enumerated list in section 29-20-205(2), we held that the governmental entity's immunity from suit was removed. Id. Since 2001, the Court of Appeals has correctly interpreted Limbaugh to mean that the GTLA does not allow plaintiffs to hold governmental entities vicariously liable for intentional torts not exempted under section 29-20-205(2), but rather requires a direct showing [of] negligence on the part of the governmental entity. Pendleton v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., No. M2004-01910-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 2138240, at  (Tenn.Ct.App. Sept. 1, 2005); see also Baines v. Wilson Cnty., 86 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2002). Because an assault or a battery is not a negligent act, see Limbaugh, 59 S.W.3d at 84, the negligent act or omission required to waive immunity under section 29-20-205 does not refer to the intentional tort. When, therefore, there has been no showing of negligence by the governmental entity in supervision of one of its employees acting within the scope of employment, the exception to sovereign immunity set forth in section 29-20-205 will not apply. As the Court of Appeals observed in the case before us, the trial court concluded that the Plaintiff `failed to prove negligent supervision,' and this finding is not challenged on appeal. Hughes, 2010 WL 424240, at . Whether Metro's immunity is waived, therefore, depends on how we classify the Defendant's action. If the Defendant was negligent in his operation of the front-end loader, then Metro's immunity from suit would be removed under both Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-20-202(a) and 205. If the Defendant committed an assault, however, then neither of those sections would operate to remove immunity, and the Plaintiff's suit may proceed only as to the Defendant. Our consideration of whether the Defendant's act was negligent or intentional requires us to determine whether the commission of the intentional tort of assault requires an intent to actually harm another. The Court of Appeals, relying upon this Court's decision in Huffman v. State, 200 Tenn. 487, 292 S.W.2d 738 (1956), overruled on other grounds by State v. Irvin, 603 S.W.2d 121 (Tenn.1980), concluded that under Tennessee law, the intentional tort of assault requires a showing of intent to harm rather than mere intent to frighten. Hughes, 2010 WL 424240, at . In Huffman, this Court cited to 6 C.J.S. Assault & Battery § 60 for the proposition that `[a]n assault may consist of any act tending to do corporal injury to another, accompanied with such circumstances as denote at the time an intention, coupled with the present ability, of using actual violence against the person.' 292 S.W.2d at 742; see also Johnson v. Cantrell, No. 01A01-9712-CV-00690, 1999 WL 5083, at  (Tenn.Ct.App. Jan. 7, 1999) ([A] defendant is not subject to liability for assault unless he or she commits an intentional act creating a reasonable apprehension of imminent physical harm on the part of the plaintiff.). The Court of Appeals construed these statements to mean that in order to prevail on a claim of assault, a plaintiff must show that the defendant intended harm, although recovery is permissible if he [or she] is injured or if he [or she] reasonably apprehends physical harm. Hughes, 2010 WL 424240, at . In contrast, several modern treatises have suggested that one may be liable for assault if he or she merely intends to place another person in fear. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that a person may be held liable for an assault if (a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and (b) the other is thereby put in such imminent apprehension. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 21(1) (1965); see also id. at § 28 (If the actor intends merely to put the other in apprehension of a bodily contact, he is subject to liability for an assault to the other if the other, although realizing that the actor does not intend to inflict such a contact upon him, is put in apprehension of the contact.). [13] Other treatises also recognize that an assault may be predicated upon either intent to harm or intent to frighten. See, e.g., 6A C.J.S. Assault § 1 (2004) ([A]ssault occurs where a person: (1) acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such contact, and (2) the other is thereby put in such imminent apprehension.); 1 Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 33, at 63 (An assault is an act that is intended to and does place the plaintiff in apprehension of an immediate unconsentedto touching that would amount to a battery [and t]he plaintiffs subjective recognition or apprehension that [he or] she is about to be touched in an impermissible way is at the core of the assault claim.); W. Page Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 10, at 43 (5th ed. 1984) (The interest in freedom from apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact ..., as distinguished from the contact itself, is protected by an action for the tort [of] ... assault.). The Prosser & Keeton treatise further provides that [t]he defendant may be liable although intending nothing more than a good-natured practical joke, or honestly believing that the act would not injure the plaintiff. Id. § 8, at 36-37 (footnotes omitted). [14] While the tort of assault is not statutorily based, there is authority for the proposition that courts may refer to the statutory definition of the crime in civil actions. 6 Am.Jur.2d Assault & Battery § 85 (2008). In Tennessee, a person commits criminal assault who: (1) [i]ntentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; (2) [i]ntentionally or knowingly causes another to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury; or (3) [i]ntentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another and a reasonable person would regard the contact as extremely offensive or provocative. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-101(a) (2010). In State v. Wilson, 924 S.W.2d 648 (Tenn.1996), this Court considered the mens rea element of aggravated assault, a crime committed when a person [i]ntentionally or knowingly commits an assault as defined in [Tennessee Code Annotated section] XX-XX-XXX and either [c]auses serious bodily injury to another or [u]ses or displays a deadly weapon. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-102(a)(1) (2010). We held that it was not enough for the state to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant fired his weapon at the victims' residence and that the victims reasonably feared imminent bodily injury. Wilson, 924 S.W.2d at 650. Rather, in order to satisfy the mens rea element of the statute, the state had to prove either that defendant shot into the [victims'] home (a) for the purpose of causing the victims to fear imminent bodily injury (intentionally) or that defendant was (b) aware that the shooting would cause the victims to fear imminent bodily injury (knowingly). Id. at 651. Wilson confirmed that which is apparent from the statute: one may be guilty of criminal assault pursuant to section 39-13-101(a)(2) by acting with intent or knowledge and causing another to reasonably fear imminent harm. [15] In our view, if a defendant intends to create an apprehension of harm in the plaintiff, he or she has committed the intentional tort of assault. The weight of authority supports that determination. By so holding, we draw upon the definition of assault in our criminal statutes and the cases interpreting it. See 6A C.J.S. Assault § 1 (The elements of assault may be the same in criminal and civil cases.). The evidence in the record supports the conclusion that the Defendant, even if engaging in horseplay, [16] committed the intentional tort of assault because he intended to frighten the Plaintiff. The trial court found that the Defendant intended to carelessly drive the vehicle, making the noise and commotion that was going to be associated with it. The trial court further concluded that it was foreseeable that by causing that type of noise and commotion, that somebody might be startled, frightened, shocked, ... trip, and be hurt. Three eyewitnesses testified that immediately after the event occurred, the Defendant approached the injured Plaintiff to assure him that he was only trying to scare him, rather than actually harm him. [17] Although the Defendant denied making this statement or engaging in any sort of horseplay, the trial court rejected his testimony by holding that the Defendant intended to do something very foolish and cut up as he was coming through there and rev up his front[-]end loader and bounce it through this little spot and make a lot of noise. Because the evidence establishes that the Defendant intended to frighten the Plaintiff and perhaps others walking along the access road, he committed the intentional tort of assault. Evidence that the Defendant merely acted negligently in the operation of the front-end loader does not preponderate against the other findings of fact by the trial court. Further, there is no evidence that Metro was negligent in supervising the Defendant. Metro is, therefore, entitled to the protections of governmental immunity. The Plaintiff is, however, entitled to compensation from the Defendant for his injuries. The cause is, therefore, remanded for the entry of judgment.