Opinion ID: 1309503
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hospital Access

Text: Advancing an alternative theory, the defendant insists that the hospital requirement is constitutionally defective because, he says, it unreasonably limits a pregnant woman's access to medical care and thereby abridges her right under Roe to elect to abort. Dr. Soyster testified that only two hospitals in Northern Virginia permit second-trimester abortions, and Dr. Belinsky knew of none in that area that did not require parental consent for abortions on minors. Noting that his patient, a minor, was anxious to conceal her condition from her parents and that she was unable to afford the expense of hospitalization, the defendant maintains that hospital access was virtually unavailable. This, he argues, shows that the hospital requirement is unreasonable as applied in this State. The defendant cites two opinions of federal district courts in other states. In Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F.Supp. 181 (E.D.La.1980), none of the Louisiana hospitals performed second-trimester abortions. In Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 483 F.Supp. 679 (W.D.Mo.1980), argued, No. 80-1130 (8th Cir. Nov. 17, 1980), only one hospital in Missouri did so. But, as acknowledged by the defendant on brief, two hospitals in Northern Virginia and 24 hospitals located elsewhere in the State were providing abortion services in 1977. More to the point, to the extent access to hospital abortion services was inconvenient or conditioned upon parental consent, the limitations were not obstacles created by the state. [8] While Code § 18.2-75, the so-called conscience clause, permits private hospital corporations to place certain restrictions on abortion services or to refuse them altogether, it does not require them to do so. And it need not forbid them to do so. [A]lthough government may not place obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its own creation. Harris v. McRae, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 2688 (1980) (rejecting the contention that denial of public funding of abortion services was an unconstitutional infringement of the right to abort). See also Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 97 S.Ct. 2391, 53 L.Ed.2d 528 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 97 S.Ct. 2376, 53 L.Ed.2d 484 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 97 S.Ct. 2366, 53 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977). Applying that rule, we reject the defendant's contention here. Courts accord legislative enactments a presumption of constitutionality, and the burden rests upon those who question their validity to overcome the presumption. We find that the defendant has not carried his burden, and we hold that the hospital requirement of Article 9 is constitutionally permissible. [9]