Opinion ID: 1868873
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutionality of La. R.S. 51:712(A)(2)

Text: In order to obtain a criminal conviction, La. R.S. 51:712(A)(2) requires the prosecution to prove that defendants (1) willfully; (2) offered to sell or sold; (3) a security; (4)(a) by means of any oral or written untrue statement of material fact or (b) any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; and (5) the buyer not knowing of the untruth or omission. The defense provided by the statute requires the defendant to prove that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the untruth or omission thereby proving his lack of guilty intent. La. R.S. 51:712(A)(2). The issue in the instant case is whether the truth of the defense would necessarily negate the mens rea or willfulness element of the statute. The state contends that the last phrase of La. R.S. 51:712(A)(2) should be read as an affirmative defense. [4] According to the state, much like the affirmative defense of good faith under federal law, the last phrase of La. R.S. 51:712(A)(2) should be read as an affirmative defense which the defendant may chose to avail himself, although he is not required to do so. The state further argues that the language of the statute should be rectified with jury instructions. Admitting that La. R.S. 51:712(A)(2) places the burden of proof on the defendant, the state proposes that the jury is instructed that despite the plain language of La. R.S. 51:712(A)(2) referencing a burden on the defendant, (emphasis added) the state bears the burden of proving all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Due process requires that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072-73, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. 1 § 2; See also State v. McCoy, 395 So.2d 319, 323 (La.1980) (reh'g denied). In keeping with the mandates of In re Winship, however, states are not completely prohibited from reallocating burdens of proof on issues that have been removed from the definition of the crime, thereby converting those issues from elements into matters of mitigation or enhancement. Holloway v. McElroy, 632 F.2d 605, 624 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1028, 101 S.Ct. 3019, 69 L.Ed.2d 398 (1981). A classic example of this type of reallocating of the burden of proof is the affirmative defense of insanity. [5] In deciding, however, whether the state has permissibly or impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defense, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2327, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977), that an inquiry must be made as to whether the particular defense negates an essential element of the offense as defined by the legislature. See also, Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975). [T]he state may not place the burden of persuasion on [an] issue upon the defendant if the truth of the `defense' would necessarily negate an essential element of the crime charged. Holloway, 632 F.2d at 625. This court has held that proof of willful behavior requires the state to show that defendant acted knowingly and deliberately. State v. Main Motors, Inc., 383 So.2d 327, 329 (La.1979). Furthermore, in the civil context, the Fourth Circuit has held that La. R.S. 51:712(A)(2) requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant, knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have known, of the untruth or omission. Taylor v. First Jersey Securities, Inc., 533 So.2d 1383, 1386 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988), writ denied, 538 So.2d 593, 594 (La.1989) (citing, Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349, 1359 (5th Cir.1981); Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 695 (5th Cir. 1971).). Consequently, proof by defendant that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, would negate the statutory element that defendant acted willfully or knowingly. We therefore reject the state's argument that the burden shifting language of the statute operates as an affirmative defense in the criminal context. We further reject the state's proposition that we remedy the unconstitutional portion of the statute with jury instructions. By comparison, in Adkins v. Bordenkircher, 674 F.2d 279 (4th Cir.1982), the court held that the burden of proof as to the defense of alibi could not be placed on a defendant because proof of alibi necessarily negates the essential element of any crime that the defendant participated in the criminal conduct. Similarly, in Holloway v. McElroy, supra , the court held that where the law of criminal homicide is defined in terms of an unlawful killing, the burden of proof as to the defense of self-defense may not be placed on the defendant because a killing in self-defense is not unlawful. [6] Thus, based upon the applicable jurisprudence, we hold that the burden shifting language of La. R.S. 51:712(A)(2) is unconstitutional as applied in criminal cases, in that it impermissibly shifts the burden of proof of an essential element of the crime to defendants.