Opinion ID: 2323975
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The trial judge correctly prevented Taylor's attorneys from arguing for GBMI over Taylor's objection.

Text: The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. [6] The United States Supreme Court has clarified that the right to counsel means the right to the effective assistance of counsel. [7] The purpose of this right is to ensure a fair trial and ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. [8] Accordingly, counsel may not so undermine[] the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. [9] When an attorney represents a defendant, the authority to manage the day-to-day conduct of the trial generally rests with the attorney. [10] An attorney who represents a criminal defendant has an overarching duty to advocate the defendant's cause and more particular duties to consult with the defendant on important decisions. [11] To be sure, the attorney's duty to consult with the defendant regarding important decisionsincluding questions of overarching defense strategydoes not require counsel to obtain the defendant's consent to every tactical decision. [12] Certain decisions regarding the exercise or waiver of basic rights are so personal to the defendant, however, that they cannot be made for the defendant by a surrogate. [13] A criminal defendant has ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal. [14] This Court has recognized that these choices implicate inherently personal rights which would call into question the fundamental fairness of the trial if made by anyone other than the defendant. [15] In fact, we have explicitly acknowledged that this principle may sometimes make the defendant worse off than if defense counsel had the final say in a disputed matter: Although these fundamental decisions are indeed strategic choices that counsel might be better able to make, because the consequences of them are the defendant's alone, they are too important to be made by anyone else. [16] Therefore, with regard to basic decisions about the objectives of representation, a lawyer must both consult with the defendant and obtain consent to the recommended course of action. [17] As an important corollary, counsel cannot undermine the defendant's right to make these personal and fundamental decisions by ignoring the defendant's choice and arguing affirmatively against the defendant's chosen objective. [18] As we explained in Cooke, this principle is consistent with the Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct. [19] One of the fundamental decisions a defendant alone is empowered to make is his plea. [20] In Delaware, [a] defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, nolo contendere, or guilty but mentally ill. [21] A Delaware defendant may also raise the `defense' of `guilty but mentally ill' at trial. [22] In Cooke, the defendant was competent to stand trial and decided, against the advice of counsel, to plead not guilty instead of pleading guilty but mentally ill. [23] Nevertheless, his attorneys advised the trial judge that they planned to ask the jury, over Cooke's vociferous and repeated protestations that he was innocent, to find him guilty but mentally ill. [24] This Court found Cooke's attorneys' conduct violated the United States Constitution for two reasons. First, Cooke completely lacked the assistance of counsel in pursuing his chosen trial objectivea not guilty verdict. [25] Because we presume prejudice in cases of the total failure of counsel, Cooke's attorneys' strategy violated his Sixth Amendment rights and warranted automatic reversal under United States v. Cronic . [26] Second, Cooke's attorneys' conduct denied him the benefit of the reasonable doubt standard and meaningful adversarial testing of the State's case against him. [27] Consequently, we concluded that Cooke's attorneys effectively negated his fundamental due process right to enter a plea of not guilty by pursuing their conflicting objective to have the jury find him guilty but mentally ill. [28] In the opinion, however, this Court acknowledged that the United States Supreme Court's holding in Florida v. Nixon instructed that we should not presume prejudice when defense counsel concedes guilt after consultation with the defendant yields no response. [29] In this appeal, Taylor's attorneys assert that Cooke does not establish a per se rule against arguing GBMI over a competent defendant's objection. We disagree. Specifically, his attorneys argue here that our opinion in Cooke requires a trial judge to inquire into the propriety of counsel's representation in each particular case and then decide who should make the ultimate decision whether to argue GBMIthe attorney or the client. This assertion misinterprets Cooke. Indeed, in Cooke, we stated plainly: The trial court [has] a duty to inquire into the propriety of the representation. [30] This statement means that the trial judge has a duty to determine whether there is indeed a conflict between attorney and client; it does not mean the judge has a dutyor the authorityto determine under specific factual circumstances whose views should prevail. If there is a conflict, under Cooke, the judge must protect the defendant's right to raise [or not raise] the `defense' of `guilty but mentally ill' at trial. [31] At oral argument, Taylor's appellate counsel argued that this case is wholly different from Cooke. She asserted that in Cooke the attorneys argued GBMI to the jury in direct contravention of the defendant's clearly stated intent, amounting to ineffective assistance of counsel. But, in this case, she asserted the attorneys wanted the same outcome as Taylor, but they wanted to keep GBMI as an arrow in the quiver as a sort of alternative argument. [32] According to Taylor's appellate counsel, the trial judge wrongfully denied them the ability to do this, thereby resulting in Taylor's counsel being constitutionally ineffective. Taylor's appellate counsel even directed this Court to citations in the appellate record that would prove that Taylor's attorneys wanted the same outcome that Taylor wanted. After examining the record, we disagree with appellate counsel and find this case is factually similar to Cooke. On the record before us, Taylor opposed his attorneys' attempt to argue to the jury that he was guilty but mentally ill of any offense. Taylor's trial counsel acknowledged as much in their Motion for Continuance. Even if Taylor's appellate attorneys are correct that Taylor's not guilty plea for the murder charge is logically consistent with arguing that GBMI should apply to one or more lesser included offensesa proposition that we do not decide hereTaylor opposed this strategy. At various points in time, to the judge and his attorneys, Taylor privately acknowledged that he may, indeed, be guilty of some offense other than murder. These private acknowledgements, however, are different from consenting to argue guilt or guilty but mentally ill to a jury. Therefore, an irreconcilable conflict existed between Taylor's desired result, a not guilty verdict, and his counsel's proposed strategy of rais[ing] the `defense' of `guilty but mentally ill' at trial. [33] The trial judge, after several ex parte hearings with Taylor and his counsel, concluded [t]he defense, throughout the trial, cannot admit guilt if the defendant wants to plead not guilty. Again, the defense counsel cannot undermine the defendant's testimony or his chosen theory of the case. In other words, the trial judge denied Taylor's attorneys the opportunity to present GBMI to the jury, thereby overriding Taylor's plain intent to seek a not guilty verdict. This ruling protected Taylor's individual right to determine whether or not to present a defense of GBMI to the jury, was appropriate under our law, and did not deprive Taylor of the effective assistance of counsel. [34] In deciding this case and applying our analysis from Cooke, we reaffirm Cooke. We do not agree, as Taylor's attorneys assert, that Cooke runs afoul of the Sixth Amendment standing alone or in its application here.