Opinion ID: 2338704
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Harn's possible giggle.

Text: Appellants next argue that the possibility that Harn may have been sort of giggling in response to Juror No. 9's disparagement of Peay's planting defense compounded Juror No. 9's alleged lack of impartiality. They point out that Harn was a criminal lawyer who practices before the Superior Court, and that Juror No. 9 knew of Harn's profession and presumably viewed him as an expert on criminal trials. Harn's possible chortle, according to appellants, conveyed to Juror No. 9, from a seemingly authoritative sourceindeed, from a sort of expert witness [16]  the idea that the juror's ridicule of Peay's defense was right on target. We are not persuaded. The safeguards of juror impartiality, such as voir dire and protective instructions from the trial judge, are not infallible; it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence that might theoretically affect their vote. Smith, supra, 455 U.S. at 217, 102 S.Ct. at 946. Accordingly, as Judge Henry Friendly has written, [t]he touchstone of decision in a case such as we have here is thus not the mere fact of infiltration of some molecules of extra-record matter, with the supposed consequences that the infiltrator becomes a witness and the confrontation clause automatically applies, but the nature of what has been infiltrated and the probability of prejudice. United States ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 818 (2d Cir.1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906, 91 S.Ct. 1373, 28 L.Ed.2d 646 (1971) (citations omitted). In the present case, the allegedly infiltrated molecules of extra-record matter alleged to warrant reversal consist of the possibility of a lawyer's responsive giggle. Harn was not sure if he giggled. If he did, it is not readily apparent that Juror No. 9 would have known what, if anything, Harn was seeking to convey by means of this wordless intimation of mirth. Harn testified unequivocally that he did not say anything to Juror No. 9 about the case or about planting defenses. If the trial judge viewed the giggle as inconsequential, we cannot fault him for that. [17] In any event, Juror No. 9 first expressed his skepticism about the planting defense immediately after Peay's attorney had made her opening statement. No evidence was introduced in support of defense counsel's theory, and nothing occurred at trial which would have compelled a reasonable juror to alter his initial negative impression of counsel's theory. The trial judge could quite properly conclude that, insofar as the giggle that may have been was concerned, the probability of prejudice, McMann, supra, 435 F.2d at 818, was nil. In other words, the judge discerned no appreciable possibility that the verdict as to any defendant would have been different if Harn had kept a straight face. This assessment did not constitute an abuse of the judge's considerable discretion.