Opinion ID: 2272236
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Identification Procedure

Text: Appellant next argues that his right to confrontation was violated when Kustes failed to show up at a pre-trial suppression hearing concerning the admissibility of her identification of him. This Court does not agree. First and foremost, the U.S. Supreme Court has never held that the right to confront witnesses applies to pre-trial hearings. In fact, to the contrary, it has repeatedly described the right as a trial right. E.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (The opinions of this Court show that the right to confrontation is a trial right ....) (plurality opinion); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) ([I]t is this literal right to `confront' the witness at the time of the trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause.); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968) (The right to confrontation is basically a trial right.). The Court's recent decisions, such as Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), do not indicate a change to this long-lived understanding. For that reason, every other state ruling on this issue rejects claims that the Confrontation Clause applies to pre-trial hearings. E.g., State v. Sherry, 233 Kan. 920, 667 P.2d 367, 376 (1983) (There is no constitutional right to allow the accused to confront witnesses against him at a preliminary hearing.); State v. Timmerman, 218 P.3d 590, 594 (Utah 2009) ([T]he federal Confrontation Clause does not apply to preliminary hearings.) Every other state also agrees that the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decisions do not indicate otherwise. E.g., State v. Woinarowicz, 720 N.W.2d 635, 641 (N.D.2006) (In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court did not indicate it intended to change the law and apply the Confrontation Clause to pretrial hearings.); People v. Brink, 31 A.D.3d 1139, 1140, 818 N.Y.S.2d 374 (N.Y.App. 2006) (We reject the contention of defendant that Crawford v. Washington applies to his pretrial suppression hearing and that reversal is required because his right of confrontation was violated at that hearing.). Notably, Appellant does not cite any authority to the contrary. In fact, in his reply brief, Appellant admits that no court has held that the right to confront witnesses attaches at a pre-trial hearing. Given the abundance of courts that have ruled on this issue, Appellant's inability to find any authority to support his position speaks volumes. And based on our independent research, this Court also cannot find any authority to support his position. There is good reason to apply a different standard to pre-trial hearings. A trial focuses on the ultimate issue of an accused's guilt or innocence, whereas in a pretrial hearing the focus is generally on the admissibility of evidence. State v. Rivera, 144 N.M. 836, 192 P.3d 1213, 1216 (2008). Consequently, the interests at stake in a suppression hearing are of lesser magnitude than those in the criminal trial itself. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 679, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980) (citations omitted). For that reason, out-of-court statements are admissible at pre-trial suppression hearings for whatever they might be worth in resolving, one way or another, the issues raised. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 176, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974); accord KRE 104(a) (prohibition against hearsay does not apply to [preliminary questions concerning ... the admissibility of evidence). This is true even when the issue is one of reliability of the declarant. Thompkins v. Commonwealth, 54 S.W.3d 147, 152 (Ky.2001) (allowing hearsay to determine reliability of confidential informant at pre-trial hearing); see also McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311-13, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967). It appears that the issue of whether Crawford applies to pre-trial hearings is an issue of first impression for Kentucky. Ultimately, this Court rejects Appellant's argument because we are persuaded by the above authorities. Neither the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution nor Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution applies to pretrial hearings. There was no violation of Appellant's right to confront his accuser in this case. That being said, just because the use of hearsay in pre-trial hearings does not violate the right of a defendant to confront his accuser does not mean that over-reliance on hearsay cannot be problematic for other reasons. In-court statements are better than hearsay, and should therefore be generally favored; thus, over-reliance on hearsay could conceivably call into question whether the trial court had sufficient grounds on which to base its findings. However, that is not a concern in this case. It was reasonable to rely on the testimony of Detective McGaha at the hearing rather than Kustes, given that the principal concern was that the police, upon McGaha's request, constructed an unduly suggestive photo-array lineup.
Appellant's next argument concerns the merits of the trial court's ruling that Kustes's identification was admissible. Ultimately, this Court finds no error. An in-court identification violates due process if the pretrial identification procedures were so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Dillingham v. Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d 377, 383 (Ky.1999) (quoting Thigpen v. Cory, 804 F.2d 893, 895 (6th Cir.1986)). Deciding whether an in-court identification is so suspect as to violate due process involves a two-step test. The first step is to determine whether the procedures under which the identification was secured were unduly suggestive. Gerlaugh v. Commonwealth, 156 S.W.3d 747, 751 (Ky.2005) (quotation omitted). Under the second step, an unduly suggestive identification may still be admissible if, under the totality of the circumstances, it had sufficient independent indicia of reliability. Thigpen, 804 F.2d at 895; accord Gerlaugh, 156 S.W.3d at 751. In this case, the trial court ruled that the identification procedures were not unduly suggestive under the first step, and so it never reached the second step. This Court has reviewed the array and agrees with the trial court's assessment. The key to the first step is determining whether Appellant stood out of the lineup so much that the procedure was unduly suggestive. To illustrate, if the defendant has extremely light skin in an array otherwise composed of dark-skinned participants, the lineup is unduly suggestive. United States v. Fernandez, 456 F.2d 638, 641-43 (2d Cir.1972). An identification can also be unduly suggestive if the defendant stands out of the lineup because of his height and because he was wearing clothing resembling that worn by the criminal. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 443, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969). However, a photo-array lineup is not unduly suggestive if the defendant is the only participant with a fade haircut, Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 906 N.E.2d 299, 310 (2009), or if the defendant has a different eye color, Commonwealth v. Crork, 966 A.2d 585, 589-90 (Pa.Super.2009), as long as he has reasonably similar features to the other participants. Similarly, a lineup is not unduly suggestive if the photograph of the defendant was the most clearly focused, People v. Sawyer, 253 A.D.2d 501, 501, 677 N.Y.S.2d 799 (N.Y.App.1998), if the defendant's photo is a full length shot while the rest of the photos are bust shots, United States v. Bell, 457 F.2d 1231, 1235 (5th Cir.1972), or if the defendant was the only participant depicted in a single, front-view photograph and the only one who was clean shaven, United States v. Harrison, 460 F.2d 270, 271 (2d Cir.1972) (per curiam). This Court has said that a photo-array lineup was not unduly suggestive where only the defendant wore glasses and a jacket, given that the photos were otherwise similar. King v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 645, 650 (Ky.2004). Turning to this case, the photo-array lineup was not so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Dillingham, 995 S.W.2d at 383 (quoting Thigpen, 804 F.2d at 895). Appellant and the other five participants are all white males with very short hair and roundish heads. Appellant appears to have blue eyes, like four out of the five others; and, he and four of the others appear to have average builds. In short, Appellant's features are similar to those of the other participants. It is true, however, that Appellant's photo stands out to some extent. In particular, he was wearing a colored shirt with a collar, whereas the other participants appear to be wearing white or black t-shirts. In addition, his photo appears to be taken at a higher resolution; the other photos are of lower quality and lack proper gradation of shades and tones in some places, particularly around the participants' necklines. [1] And the lighting in the other photos appears to be brighter. However, all of the photos are single, simple front-view headshots, taken against a solid white background. Appellant does not stand out so much in the photo-array lineup that admitting Kustes's identification of him violated due process. Appellant's features resemble those of the other participants, and the difference in quality of the photos is not so great as to prevent reasoned consideration of the other participants. The differences here are no worse than in King, where the defendant was the only participant with glasses and a jacket, 142 S.W.3d at 650. The problems with the lineup seem analogous to the defendant having a different haircut, cf. Silva-Santiago, 906 N.E.2d at 310, having the only single, front-view photo, cf. Harrison, 460 F.2d at 271, or having the only full-length body shot in the lineup, cf. Bell, 457 F.2d at 1235, all of which have been held to not be unduly suggestive. Consequently, this Court concludes Kustes was properly allowed to give an in-court identification of Appellant. Last, it is worth noting that even if this Court were to find that the lineup was unduly suggestive, it would still be saved by sufficient independent indicia of reliability in Kustes's identification. Kustes had described the perpetrator as having a tattoo on his neck reading D W Ba tattoo which, it turns out, is also on Appellant's neck. Kustes had viewed Appellant for some time at White Castle and so she was familiar with his appearance. She had, as the trial court described, expressed a great deal of certainty in her identification. And, as Appellant concedes, [t]he time between the crime and the confrontation was relatively short. Thus, even if this Court were to conclude that the photo-array lineup was unduly suggestive under the first step, we would nevertheless conclude that the identification was admissible under the second step. There was no error.