Opinion ID: 1309950
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Psychiatric Testimony.

Text: Outside the presence of the jury, an offer of proof was made relating to the reliability of Powers' testimony. Defendant offered the testimony of Dr. Orman, a psychiatrist, who would have testified that persons exhibiting symptoms such as those exhibited by Powers were unreliable and could not be believed under oath. He had formed this opinion on the basis of his review of a written statement given by Powers to police in November of 1973, as well as his observation of Powers on the witness stand for approximately one-and-one-half hours. The trial court ruled that the psychiatrist could not testify because an inadequate foundation existed for his opinions. The court pointed out that Dr. Orman admitted he had observed nothing unusual about Powers' behavior on the stand. Thus, the opinion was based solely on the statement given by Powers to the police. The court further observed that the full facts and circumstances under which the statement was given were not known. Defendant contends that failure to admit Dr. Orman's testimony regarding Powers' reliability as a witness constitutes reversible error. He directs the attention of this court to decisions rendered in other jurisdictions where such testimony was admitted, or where refusal to admit it was held to be reversible error. However, these cases are not applicable to the instant circumstances. This is so because in each case, either a more extensive foundation was shown to exist for the admission of the testimony or no discussion is undertaken regarding the basis on which the medical expert formed his opinion. When an adequate basis for forming an expert opinion is shown to exist, psychiatric testimony may be admissible, at least as it bears on the capacity of a party to the litigation, even if no personal examination has taken place. Cf. State v. Cadden (1972), 56 Wis. 2d 320, 325, 326, 201 N. W. 2d 773. However, the determination to admit or reject testimony of an expert witness is a matter of discretion for the trial court. Carstensen v. Faber (1962), 17 Wis. 2d 242, 248, 116 N. W. 2d 161. In rejecting the offer of proof made in the instant case, the trial court relied, to a certain extent, upon portions of the following analysis contained in McCormick, Evidence (hornbook series, 2d ed.), pp. 96, 97, sec. 45: ... Undoubtedly, if there is ground for believing that a principal witness is subject to some mental abnormality that may affect his credibility, a need for employment of the resources of psychiatry exist. Doubtless most courts today would accept the principle that psychiatric evidence should be received, at least in the judge's discretion, when its value outweighs the cost in time, distraction, and expense and other disadvantages. The value seems to depend first upon the importance of the appraised witness's testimony, and second upon the opportunity of the expert to form a reliable opinion. This first factor, the importance of the testimony, is a relevant factor at least from the standpoint of policy considerations relating to the feasibility and desirability of subjecting witnesses (even party-witnesses) to an ordeal of psychiatric attack which may or may not be justified. The above-mentioned second factor, opportunity to form a reliable opinion, raises difficulties. An opinion based solely upon a hypothetical question seems almost valueless here. Only slightly more reliable is an opinion derived from the subject's demeanor and his testimony in the court-room. Most psychiatrists would say that a satisfactory opinion can only be formed after the witness has been subjected to a clinical examination ... Only if there is no power to order an examination should expert opinion on the bases of courtroom observation and reading of the record be considered. Even then, permitting opinion based upon such material seems very questionable. The sole basis on which Dr. Orman formed his opinion was review of the statement given by Powers to the police. Dr. Orman himself indicated that no adverse opinion could be formed from observations of Powers on the witness stand. He also conceded that an absolute diagnosis would require an extensive interview and review of material on the subject's past life and behavior. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not commit error by refusing to admit Dr. Orman's testimony on the basis that an inadequate foundation existed for formation of a reliable opinion. Refusal To Permit Psychiatric Examination of Witness. After the trial court determined the psychiatric testimony offered was not admissible, counsel for the defendant moved that a psychiatric examination of witness Powers be allowed. This motion was made in the middle of the second day of a two-day trial. Powers had previously testified at the trial of Mathwick. The defendant had been bound over for trial after a preliminary examination held four months before his trial. Much of Powers' testimony had already been completed. Dr. Orman indicated the examination would take at least a couple of hours, possibly longer. The trial court denied the motion, based upon case law precedent, the time element involved and the lack of a prior or timely motion that the examination be made. In State v. Miller (1967), 35 Wis. 2d 454, 470-472, 151 N. W. 2d 157, the defense moved for a pretrial psychiatric examination of the complaining witness. In an accompanying affidavit, it was alleged that the witness had previously made false accusations and had received psychiatric care. This court found an abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to order an examination: In Goodwin v. State (1902), 114 Wis. 318, 320, 90 N. W. 170, this court stated: `Error is assigned because, after the complaining witness had testified, her cross-examination had been completed, and she had left the stand, on the following day the defendant asked the court, in the exercise of its discretion, to require the complaining witness to submit to an examination to determine whether or not she is afflicted with hysteria. This the court refused, saying that he was satisfied of the competency of the witness, both by previous observation and by her manner of testifying. Counsel responded that they desired it as a basis for evidence bearing upon her credibility, accuracy of memory, etc. In this ruling we discover no error. Counsel cites us no case, and we confidently believe there is no authority, to support the power of a court, after a witness has completed her testimony and left the stand, to compel her to submit to a medical examination, physical or mental. It would be such an invasion of the rights of personal liberty that arguments far more cogent than any suggested would be necessary to convince us of the existence of such power....' As pointed out in Goodwin in cases where the court has serious doubt of the mental capacity of a witness, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, it can order the witness to submit to a medical examination as a condition of allowing the witness to testify. Of course the witness might refuse, but there is no power in the court to compel such an examination. Because of the possible indignity of such an examination and the natural reluctance of persons to appear as witnesses if they were to be subjected to such examination, we believe a strong and compelling reason should appear before a trial court in the exercise of its discretion should order a medical examination even as a condition of testifying at the trial. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the motion for a pretrial psychiatric examination of the complaining witnesses. It is possible that a compelling reason might have justified granting a pretrial motion to require an examination of Powers as a condition to admission of his testimony, since he was the state's primary witness, and the charge against defendant rested largely on his description of the events that occurred. However, this was true also in State v. Miller, supra , wherein this court found no abuse of discretion even though a timely motion was made to conduct an examination of a primary witness. Here, the witness had already completed much of his testimony, and the trial court set forth sound reasons for the exercise of its discretion in denying the motion for the examination. The trial court did not commit reversible error by refusing to allow the requested psychiatric examination of the witness Powers.