Opinion ID: 2976633
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: On appeal, Wise argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion for acquittal on all counts, both at the close of the government’s evidence and again at the close of his case. The standard of review for Wise’s challenge as to the sufficiency of the evidence is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” See United States v. Davis, 473 F.3d 680, 681 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). For purposes of clarity, the sufficiency of evidence as to each count of conviction is discussed separately below.
For Wise to have been found guilty under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), the Government was required to prove that: (1) Wise traveled in interstate commerce; (2) his purpose was to engage in illicit sexual activity with a minor (person less than 18 years of age); and (3) the intended sexual act would have been in violation of federal law had it been committed. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b); see also United States v. Oliver, 32 F. App’x 806, 808 (9th Cir. 2002). It appears that Wise’s main arguments with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence is that the victim lied to her parents and law enforcement, and that the victim was a willing participant in the relationship with Wise. Foremost, it is not the role of this court to assess the credibility of a -7- witness when evaluating a sufficiency of the evidence challenge. See United States v. Crumb, 187 F. App’x 532, 536 (6th Cir. 2006) (“In assessing the merits of such a challenge, we may not weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of the witnesses who testified, or substitute our judgment for the jury’s.”). Moreover, the victim’s alleged consent to the relationship is of no consequence to our decision. Cf. United States v. Wilcox, 150 F. App’x 458, 461 (6th Cir. 2005) (stating that “a minor can’t give legal consent to sexual intercourse”); see also United States v. Abad, 350 F.3d 793, 798 (8th Cir. 2003) (“When sexual assaults are committed upon children . . . , consent is not a defense. The reason is that the victims in these cases, because of ignorance or deceit, do not understand what is happening to them. Therefore their ‘consent’ is of no significance.”)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). First, there was sufficient evidence that Wise traveled in interstate commerce, including: (1) testimony regarding him renting a car from January 13 through January 16 and related paperwork that confirmed said car would be used to travel through Kentucky, Tennessee, and Arkansas; (2) testimony regarding Wise staying at a hotel in Arkansas from January 14 through January 16 and hotel security video that confirmed his stay in the hotel; (3) the victim’s testimony that she met and engaged in sexual activity with Wise when he traveled to Arkansas; (4) testimony that Wise told Dunn that he traveled to Arkansas, stayed in a motel there, and played “spin the bottle” with the victim, J.A. 133-34; and (5) Wise’s own trial testimony that he went to Arkansas on January 14, 2006. Second, there was sufficient evidence that Wise’s purpose for his travel to Arkansas was to engage in illicit sexual activity with a minor, including: (1) the victim’s testimony that she was 14- -8- years-old at the time Wise traveled to Arkansas and that she had been engaged in a romantic relationship with Wise for some time before his visit; (2) the victim’s testimony that she told Wise months prior to his visit to Arkansas that she was only 14-years-old, and in a November 15, 2005 e-mail she wrote to him stating “I’m sorry, Charles, for lying to you about my age . . .”, J.A. 156-60; (3) the victim’s mother’s testimony that she told Wise that her daughter was only 14-years-old prior to his visit to Arkansas; (4) a police officer’s testimony that the officer informed Wise that the victim was a minor; and (5) another police officer’s testimony that the officer specifically informed Wise that the victim was 14-years-old. Not only was there sufficient evidence that Wise knew the victim was a minor, but there was also sufficient evidence that his purpose was to engage in illegal sexual activity with her, including that: (1) prior to Wise’s visit to Arkansas they engaged in telephone sex and exchanged sexually explicit pictures of each other and (2) shortly after Wise’s arrival in Arkansas they did, in fact, engage in sexual activity. Third, there was sufficient evidence that the intended sexual act would have been in violation of federal law had it been committed. Here, Wise traveled to Arkansas to knowingly engage in sexual acts with the 14-year-old victim, when he was approximately 37-years-old, making any sexual acts between the two of them in violation of federal law. See 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a). Ample evidence supports that a rational trier of fact could have found all three elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we find that sufficient evidence existed as to count three.
For Wise to have been found guilty under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), the Government was required to prove that Wise: (1) knowingly transported a minor across state lines and (2) did so with the intent -9- to engage in sexual activity with the minor for which any person could be charged with a crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a); see also United States v. Chambers, 441 F.3d 438, 450 (6th Cir. 2006). First, there was sufficient evidence that he knowingly transported a minor across state lines, including: (1) the victim’s testimony that Wise traveled to Arkansas on January 20, 2006 by car to pick her up and then took her back to Kentucky; (2) Dunn’s testimony that Wise told him he was going to get the victim in Arkansas and then Wise showed up with the victim the next morning at Dunn’s residence in Kentucky; and (3) Wise’s own trial testimony that he picked the victim up in Arkansas and brought her back to Kentucky. Second, there was sufficient evidence that he transported her with the intent to engage in sexual activity with her, including the victim’s testimony that prior to her arrival in Kentucky: (1) they engaged in telephone sex and exchanged sexually explicit pictures of each other; (2) they had, in fact, engaged in sexual activity on prior occasions, including during his prior visit to Arkansas to see her; and (3) they had discussed her coming to live with Wise and marriage. The victim also testified that she performed oral sex on Wise during the trip from Arkansas to Kentucky and that Wise visited her hotel room in Kentucky multiple times to engage in sexual activity, including fondling, oral sex, and anal sex. In addition, DNA evidence confirmed that a mixture of Wise’s and the victim’s DNA was found on items seized from the hotel room. There also was evidence that Wise conducted internet searches on his computer about teen marriage laws, the legal age to live with someone, information regarding power of attorney, and the legal age for sex. There also was sufficient evidence to show that the victim was under 18-years-old. As discussed supra, the victim testified she was 14-years-old at the time of the incidents at issue here. - 10 - Wise also knew the victim was 14-years-old when he visited her in Arkansas on a prior occasion and therefore he also knew her age when he subsequently transported her from Arkansas to Kentucky. Lastly, there was sufficient evidence that Wise’s conduct would be a criminal offense. See Kentucky Revised Statute § 510.090. A voluminous amount of evidence supports that a rational trier of fact could have found the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we find that sufficient evidence existed as to count four.
For Wise to have been found guilty under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), the Government was required to prove that Wise: (1) knowingly possessed electronic storage media which contained a visual depiction of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct and (2) that the visual depictions had been either mailed, shipped or transported in interstate commerce or were produced using material that had been mailed, shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B); see also Chambers, 441 F.3d at 451. First, there was sufficient evidence that Wise knowingly possessed a computer hard drive that contained visual depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct, including: (1) the victim’s testimony that she took sexually explicit pictures of herself and sent them to Wise upon his request; (2) both images of the victim’s vagina found on Wise’s hard drive had been sent from Wise’s cellular telephone to his e-mail address; (3) forensic testimony and evidence that Wise transferred the images from his cellular telephone to his e-mail account and said images were located on his computer hard drive; and (4) Dunn’s testimony that he saw pictures of the victim on Wise’s - 11 - computer, including a picture of her vagina, saw Wise delete those pictures, and Wise told Dunn that he wanted to delete them in case the FBI got involved. Wise also knew the victim was 14-years-old and therefore a minor prior to the seizure of Wise’s computer on January 24, 2006. Second, there was sufficient evidence that the visual depictions had been either mailed, shipped or transported in interstate commerce, including the victim’s testimony that she took the sexually explicit pictures in Arkansas and sent them via cellular telephone to Wise in Kentucky. See J.A. 165-75; cf. United States v. Clayton, 108 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Telephones are instrumentalities of interstate commerce.”); United States v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating “cell-phone calls . . . are part of interstate commerce”). The evidence supports that a rational trier of fact could have found the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we find that sufficient evidence existed as to count five.
For Wise to have been found guilty under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), the Government was required to prove that Wise: (1) knowingly and intentionally made false and fictitious statements to FBI agents; (2) said statements were material; and (3) said statements were made with the purpose of misleading FBI agents. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a); see also United States v. Grenier, 513 F.3d 632, 636 (6th Cir. 2008). There was sufficient evidence that Wise made several knowingly and intentionally false and fictitious statements to FBI agents, including Special Agent Kacey Gabriel’s testimony that Wise falsely stated to her during interviews that: (1) he had no knowledge about the victim’s whereabouts; (2) he had no involvement with the victim’s disappearance; (3) he did not have a relationship with - 12 - the victim; (4) he only knew the victim because his children had been communicating with her; (5) he had not given the victim any gifts; (6) no one in his family had been in contact with the victim in several weeks; (7) he needed to leave the interview because he had to unlock a vehicle for someone in his capacity as the town’s only locksmith; (8) it was not his voice on a message in which he stated he loved the victim; and (9) even after explaining that the victim was safe, he stated she was in Clay City or Winchester, Kentucky before finally admitting that he knew she was in a hotel in Sterling, Kentucky. Based on the nature of the abovementioned false and fictitious statements, a rational juror also could have concluded that such statements both were material and made to mislead the FBI in their investigation. In his brief on appeal, Wise does not argue to the contrary and his own trial testimony largely confirms his many lies to the agents. Indeed, the evidence shows that a rational trier of fact could have found the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we find that sufficient evidence existed as to count six.