Opinion ID: 1749058
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Point Eight: Opening and Closing Arguments

Text: Anderson argues that the trial court erred in overruling his objections and request for a mistrial to the State's closing argument. First, Anderson contends that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to state in his closing arguments that mercy is something that is given to the weak and to the innocent and that Anderson does not qualify for mercy. Anderson's counsel objected to the prosecutor's comment, arguing that it was a misstatement of the law. Misstatements of the law are impermissible during closing arguments, and the trial judge has a duty to restrain such arguments. State v. Blakeburn, 859 S.W.2d 170, 174 (Mo.App.1993). The prosecutor's discussion of mercy, however, was not a misstatement of the law. Rather, the argument that mercy is for the weak and innocent was rhetoric designed to emphasize the State's position that mercy was inappropriate in this case, after Anderson had argued for mercy in his closing argument. This Court has repeatedly held that prosecutors may discuss mercy during closing arguments. State v. Forrest, 183 S.W.3d 218, 228 (Mo. banc 2006); State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831, 851 (Mo. banc 1998); State v. Mease, 842 S.W.2d 98, 109-10 (Mo. banc 1992); State v. Clemmons, 753 S.W.2d 901, 910 (Mo. banc 1988) (distinguishing between mercy and sympathy). The trial court did not err in allowing the prosecutor to discuss mercy in his closing argument. Second, Anderson claims that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to state in his closing argument that sending Anderson back to prison was doing nothing. The prosecutor quoted Edmund Burke, stating: The only thing necessary for evil to triumph is for good men to do nothing. I suggest to you that if you send this man back to prison, you will have done nothing. Anderson's attorney timely objected to this statement. In Forrest, 183 S.W.3d at 228, this Court upheld the use of the same quote, noting that the quote interrelate[d] with the concept of whether the jury should be merciful to Appellant. The use of this quote was permissible, and the trial court did not err in overruling Anderson's objection. Third, Anderson requests plain error review for the prosecutor's statement in closing arguments that for the ultimate crime, not once, but twice, two ultimate crimes, that the ultimate punishment is necessary and proper. Plain error relief is rarely appropriate for claims involving closing arguments because the decision to object is often a matter of trial strategy. Johnson, 284 S.W.3d at 573. Closing arguments must be examined in the context of the entire record. Id. Under plain error review, a conviction will be reversed for improper closing argument only when it is established that the argument had a decisive effect on the outcome of the trial and amounts to manifest injustice. Middleton, 995 S.W.2d at 456. The burden to prove decisive effect is on the appellant. State v. Parker, 856 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Mo. banc 1993). Anderson argues that the prosecutor's statement about two ultimate crimes was a thinly veiled attempt to tell the jury to sentence Anderson to death for Stephen Rainwater's murder. Anderson does not present any evidence indicating that the prosecutor's statement had a decisive effect on the outcome of this case. Further, whether the murder of Debbie Rainwater occurred in the commission of another unlawful homicide was an aggravating factor submitted to the jury. It was not plain error for the trial court to allow the prosecutor to speak of two ultimate crimes in his closing arguments.