Opinion ID: 1985231
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence Supporting Complainant's Character For Truthfulness

Text: The first issue before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence supporting complainant's character for truthfulness before she had even testified. Specifically, the trial court allowed the prosecution to present the testimony of complainant's teacher, complainant's brother, complainant's mother and the investigating police officer regarding complainant's good character for truthfulness. Resolution of this issue requires a determination whether defense counsel's opening statement attacked her character for truthfulness. MRE 608(a) states: The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise. Where a defense counsel attacks a witness' character for truthfulness in an opening statement, the prosecution may present evidence that supports the witness' character for truthfulness on direct examination. United States v. Cruz, 805 F.2d 1464, 1479-1480 (C.A.11, 1986); United States v. Jones, 763 F.2d 518, 522 (C.A.2, 1985). Here, in his opening statement, defense counsel stated that defendant's defense was that the charged incident didn't happen. Specifically, defense counsel stated in pertinent part: [T]here are only two people on the face of this Earth who [are] in a position to know what happened and there may be evidence from which you may come to the conclusion that one or both of them don't even know what happened. Because there is a potential for evidence that one of the witnesses that will be offering testimony has serious problems that may affect her ability to recount and describe. The trial court found that this opening statement attacked complainant's credibility and accordingly overruled defendant's objection to evidence supporting complainant's character for truthfulness. The trial court's ruling failed to note the distinction between credibility and character for truthfulness and the implications of this distinction. Credibility is defined as [w]orthiness of belief; that quality in a witness which renders his evidence worthy of belief. Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.), p. 366. Credibility may be attacked in numerous ways, e.g., demonstrating a witness' inability to perceive or remember the event at issue. Attacking a witness' character for truthfulness is one of the means by which a witness' credibility may be attacked. Thus, the two terms are not synonymous; rather, character for truthfulness is a specific aspect of credibility. MRE 608(a) states that credibility may be attacked or supported by opinion or reputation evidence, subject to two limitations: 1) that the evidence refer only to character for truthfulness and 2) that evidence supporting a witness' character for truthfulness is only admissible after the witness' character for truthfulness has been attacked. Here, defense counsel did not accuse complainant of intentionally lying, but he asserted that she had emotional problems that affected her ability to recount and describe and that the charged incident, which she was expected to describe, did not happen. These assertions indicated that her testimony would not be worthy of belief. Accordingly, defense counsel's opening statement did attack her credibility. But it did not attack her character for truthfulness, i.e., it did not suggest that she was lying. An attack on a witness' credibility, like the one at issue, that is not an attack on the witness' character for truthfulness does not trigger MRE 608(a)(2). In the absence of an attack on complainant's character for truthfulness, the prosecution was not entitled, under MRE 608(a), to support her character for truthfulness. Further, we note that evidence of complainant's character for truthfulness is simply unresponsive to defendant's contention that complainant suffered emotional problems that affected her ability to recount and describethe contention the bolstering evidence was allegedly admitted to rebut. Because the evidence bolstering complainant's character for truthfulness was inadmissible as a matter of law under MRE 608(a) when her character for truthfulness had not been attacked, the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the prosecution to introduce such evidence. Having concluded that the trial court erred in admitting this evidence, we must next determine whether this error requires reversal of defendant's conviction. In People v. Mateo, 453 Mich. 203, 212, 551 N.W.2d 891 (1996), this Court held: In Michigan, the harmless-error rule is primarily embodied in statute [MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096], with additional statements of the doctrine in our court rule [MCR 2.613(A) ] and evidentiary rule [MRE 103]. Section 26 provides in pertinent part: No judgment or verdict shall be ... reversed ... in any criminal case, on the ground of ... the improper admission... of evidence, ... unless in the opinion of the court, after an examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The Mateo Court held at 206, 551 N.W.2d 891: Under our statute, as under federal law, a reviewing court is not to find nonconstitutional preserved error harmless simply because it concludes the jury reached the right result. Disregarding errors that do not affect substantial rights, the reviewing court is to examine the record as a whole and the actual prejudicial effect of the error on the factfinder in the case at hand. Where the error asserted is the erroneous admission of evidence, the court engages in a comparative analysis of the likely effect of the error in light of the other evidence. [Citations omitted.] It explained, at 215, 551 N.W.2d 891: Simply stated, ... reversal is only required if the error was prejudicial. That inquiry focuses on the nature of the error and assesses its effect in light of the weight and strength of the untainted evidence. However, because it was unnecessary to the resolution of the matter before it, the Mateo Court did not decide the issue of the level of assurance an appellate court on direct review must have that a preserved, nonconstitutional error was not prejudicial and thus harmless. Id. at 218, 220-221, 551 N.W.2d 891. In People v. Gearns, 457 Mich. 170, 577 N.W.2d 422 (1998), a majority of this Court decided that issue by adopting the highly probable standard for preserved, nonconstitutional error. Under this standard, the test is whether it is highly probable that the [erroneously admitted] evidence did not contribute to the verdict[ ] in light of the strength and weight of the untainted evidence. Id. at 173, 577 N.W.2d 422. This test effectively creates a presumption that such an error justifies reversal of a conviction unless the prosecutor demonstrates that the error is harmless. The test articulated by the Gearns majority is inconsistent with § 26 because it places the burden on the prosecutor to demonstrate that a preserved, nonconstitutional error is harmless. In contrast, § 26 states that the types of error listed are not grounds for reversal unless it shall affirmatively appear that such an error resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Thus, § 26 creates a presumption that preserved, nonconstitutional error is harmless, which presumption may be rebutted by a showing that the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice. [1] The Mateo Court correctly so held, at 211, 551 N.W.2d 891: [Section 26] should not be construed to require actual innocence, but, rather, it should be viewed as a legislative directive to presume the validity of verdicts and to reverse only with respect to those errors that affirmatively appear to undermine the reliability of the verdict. [Emphasis added.] Section 26, with its rebuttable presumption, clearly places the burden on the defendant to demonstrate that a preserved, nonconstitutional error resulted in a miscarriage of justice. We are therefore convinced that the test adopted by the Gearns majority, which placed the burden on the prosecution to demonstrate that it was highly probable that a preserved, nonconstitutional error did not contribute to the verdict, is wrong because it conflicts with the burden of proof established by § 26. We accordingly overrule the Gearns test. [2] Both Mateo and Gearns indicated the necessity of determining a level of assurance for deciding whether a preserved, nonconstitutional error justified reversal of a conviction. In the context of § 26, with its rebuttable presumption of harmlessness, this would be articulated as the level of assurance that a preserved, nonconstitutional error resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The Mateo Court suggested three possible levels of assurance: highly probable, more probable than not, and reasonable likelihood. Mateo, at 219, 551 N.W.2d 891. Section 26 itself provides no specialized level of assurance. In the absence of any such provision in the statute, we believe that the more probable than not standard is proper. Given that § 26 places the burden on a defendant to demonstrate a miscarriage of justice, any higher standard, e.g., highly probable, would place a greater burden on defendants than § 26 envisions. It would be troubling indeed if a defendant's demonstration that it was more probable than not that a preserved, nonconstitutional error resulted in a miscarriage of justice was deemed insufficient to justify a new trial. On the other hand, a lower standard, like reasonable likelihood, would be inconsistent with § 26's rebuttable presumption of harmlessness. Accordingly, we conclude that the level of assurance that a preserved, nonconstitutional error justifies reversal of a conviction is the more probable than not standard. In summary, we reiterate that § 26 controls judicial review of preserved, nonconstitutional error. [3] Section 26 places the burden on the defendant to demonstrate that after an examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear that the error asserted has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. We agree with the Mateo Court's holding that reversal is only required if such an error is prejudicial and that the appropriate inquiry focuses on the nature of the error and assesses its effect in light of the weight and strength of the untainted evidence. Mateo, at 215, 551 N.W.2d 891. The object of this inquiry is to determine if it affirmatively appears that the error asserted undermine[s] the reliability of the verdict. Id. at 211, 551 N.W.2d 891. In other words, the effect of the error is evaluated by assessing it in the context of the untainted evidence to determine whether it is more probable than not that a different outcome would have resulted without the error. Therefore, the bottom line is that § 26 presumes that a preserved, nonconstitutional error is not a ground for reversal unless after an examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear that it is more probable than not that the error was outcome determinative. [4] Here, there was no physical evidence of the alleged assault. However, this case did not present a simple credibility contest between complainant and defendant. The testimony of complainant's brother (who is also defendant's son) included discussion of an apology by defendant in which he virtually confessed that he had sexually assaulted complainant. [5] Defendant testified at trial and contended that this apology did not relate to any sexual contact with complainant. However, defendant confirmed that he made such an apology and offered no explanation for his statements to the effect that it was complainant's idea to do these things and that she had eyes like her mother's. The apology, with these unexplained references, is strong evidence that defendant was admitting and apologizing for the charged conduct with complainant. Complainant's brother's testimony about this apology, confirmed in large part by defendant, is untainted by the improper bolstering of complainant's character for truthfulness. In the context of this untainted evidence, defendant has not demonstrated that it is more probable than not that the outcome would have been different without this error. Thus, it does not affirmatively appear that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, this preserved, nonconstitutional error is not a proper ground for reversal of defendant's conviction under § 26.