Opinion ID: 2612
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Challenged Credibility Finding

Text: At the outset, we note that petitioner's brief to this court simply repeats, word for word, her brief to the BIA. To the extent the brief fails to cite a single decision of this court in support of the arguments advanced, it obviously fails to comply with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Fed. R.App. P. 28(a)(9)(A). Counsel is cautioned that the future filing of such an inadequate submission will be grounds not only for rejection of the brief but for formal reprimand or other sanction. For purposes of our review today, however, we note simply that the brief filed with this court does not challenge three significant findings that informed the IJ's adverse credibility determination, specifically, the inconsistencies between Li's relief application and her hearing testimony about the circumstances of her arrest, Li's unconvincing demeanor, and her failure to adduce available corroborative evidence from her husband. Thus, any challenge to these findings is both unexhausted and waived. See Lin Zhong v. United States Dep't of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 123 (2d Cir.2007) ([O]ur circuit applies an issue exhaustion doctrine to petitions for review from the BIA.); Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 542 n. 1 (2d Cir.2005) (Issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived .... (quoting Norton v. Sam's Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir.1998))). The waiver is significant because these findings could, by themselves, support an adverse credibility determination in this case. See generally Zhou Yun Zhang v. INS, 386 F.3d 66, 73-78 (2d Cir.2004), overruled on other grounds by Shi Liang Lin v. United States Dep't of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 305 (2d Cir.2007) ( en banc ). We cannot, however, make that decision ourselves, and, for reasons stated in the remainder of this opinion, we cannot confidently predict that the IJ would have so ruled in the absence of other findings to which petitioner did raise objection and which, in light of recent decisions by this court, are erroneous.

The IJ concluded that Li's persecution claim was not credible, in part, because her testimony was extremely vague and general. In re Shunfu Li, No. A95 462 260, at 7-8. As noted in our discussion of the facts of the case, this vagueness characterization is not without some support in the record. A fact finder may understandably find detailed testimony more convincing than vague testimony. See Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 152 (2d Cir.2003) (acknowledging that IJ may fairly wonder whether [very spare testimony] is fabricated), overruled on other grounds by Shi Liang Lin v. United States Dep't of Justice, 494 F.3d at 305; see also Zhou Yun Zhang v. INS, 386 F.3d at 79 n. 11. Nevertheless, the law in this circuit holds that, in a proceeding wherein an alien seeks relief from removal, a finding of testimonial vagueness cannot, without more, support an adverse credibility determination unless government counsel or the IJ first attempts to solicit more detail from the alien. See Ming Shi Xue v. BIA, 439 F.3d at 122-23; Jin Chen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 426 F.3d at 114. In other circumstances, our credibility review is much more deferential. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobo, 934 F.2d 411, 418 (2d Cir.1991) (noting that, when confronted with vague trial testimony, sentencing court was free to draw whatever inference seem[ed] appropriate to it, or to have [the] witness recalled in order to clarify his testimony); United States v. Hernandez, 588 F.2d 346, 349 n. 2 (2d Cir.1978) (upholding instruction to jury that, when evaluating credibility of witnesses whose testimony was, inter alia, vague, jurors (who lack power to question witnesses) must exercise their own judgment [and] give the testimony of each witness such credibility, if any, that [they] may think it deserves); see also United States v. Castelli, 306 F.2d 640, 641 (2d Cir.1962) (holding that district court was free to reject Sixth Amendment challenge to conviction supporting deportation where alien offered only vague in the extreme testimony that he was deprived of counsel); see generally NLRB v. Dinion Coil Co., 201 F.2d 484, 488-89 (2d Cir.1952) (observing that methods of evaluating the credibility of oral testimony do not lend themselves to formulations in terms of rules). Our approach to review of credibility determinations is generally guided by the characteristics of the particular context in which those determinations were made. In the context of removal proceedings, we have concluded that requiring IJs to solicit additional details from witnesses before rejecting their testimony as incredible on vagueness grounds serves a useful prophylactic purpose by protecting against arbitrary differences  actual or perceived  in the detail required by different IJs who hear thousands of applications for relief, many premised on what appear to be similar factual scenarios. See generally Ming Shi Xue v. BIA, 439 F.3d at 124 (describing rule as having a logical basis in the particular relationship between decisions of the immigration judges and the appellate courts called on to review these decisions). In other administrative law contexts, such as Social Security disability cases, the agency's own regulations require administrative law judges affirmatively to assist claimants in developing the record, and our review correspondingly extends to the question of whether the judge satisfied his duty to develop the record in each case. Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir.1996); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(d), (e). [5] Because this vagueness rule was announced only after the IJ's challenged finding in this case, it is not surprising that the IJ did not solicit more detail from Li with respect to vague aspects of her testimony. In the absence of such an attempt, however, we conclude that it was error to rely on vagueness in making the challenged adverse credibility finding. See Gelman v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 150, 152 n. 1 (2d Cir.2002) (noting that remand for reconsideration in light of case law decided while case was on appeal is routine procedure for addressing an issue that has not received consideration by the initial decision-maker, whether it is a district court or an administrative agency like the BIA); United States v. Kostakis, 364 F.3d 45, 51 (2d Cir.2004) (noting that unless Ex Post Facto Clause is implicated, appellate court applies law in effect at time of appeal).
The IJ also concluded that Li was not credible because her testimony as to the position she held within Falun Gong was contradicted by information downloaded from a website. [6] This conclusion is not reasonably supported by the record. See Lin Zhong v. United States Dep't of Justice, 480 F.3d at 129 (remanding where IJ's characterization of evidence was unsupported by the record). The IJ cited the website for the proposition that there are no leaders within Falun Gong. Tr. of Hr'g at 8. The actual website quotes a Falun Gong spokesperson's statement that [t]here is no leader of Falun Gong, an assertion made within the context of explaining that Falun Gong is not a cult, religion, or sect. CAR at 97. Nothing on the website indicates that no persons within Falun Gong ever assume organizational or leadership responsibilities; to the contrary, the site notes that four top organizers  were imprisoned in 1999, affirmatively suggesting that the movement does in fact have some type of leadership structure. Id. at 98 (emphasis added). Thus, the website statement cannot fairly be construed to contradict Li's testimony that she held an unpaid local leadership position. Indeed, to the extent the website states that all work within Falun Gong is done by volunteers, id. at 97, it is consistent with Li's testimony that she served without remuneration.
Li's claim of past persecution and feared future persecution found its strongest corroboration in a group of purportedly official documents that (1) had authorized her 2000 arrest and the seizure of Falun Gong materials from her home, and (2) now authorize her arrest upon return to China. If these documents are as represented, i.e., if Li was in fact arrested for Falun Gong activities and if Chinese officials are now looking to arrest Li upon her return to China, this evidence might cast Li's testimony in a decidedly more favorable light. The IJ never considered this possibility. She concluded that the documents were entitled to no weight because they were not authenticated pursuant to relevant regulations. While the IJ did not identify the regulations relied upon, we presume that she was referring to 8 C.F.R. § 287.6, which generally requires official records from foreign countries to be authenticated by (1) an official publication thereof, or (2) a copy attested by an officer so authorized. 8 C.F.R. § 287.6(b)(1). In Cao He Lin v. United States Dep't of Justice , decided after the challenged agency ruling in this case, this court held that an IJ may not dismiss evidence based merely on an applicant's failure to authenticate it pursuant to [§ 287.6], 428 F.3d at 405. This rule derives from our recognition that asylum applicants can not always reasonably be expected to have an authenticated document from an alleged persecutor and, therefore, the BIA's authentication regulation is not the exclusive means of authenticating records before an immigration judge. Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 148 (2d Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Xue Deng Jiang v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir.2007) (identifying error where IJ rejected documents solely because they were not authenticated in strict conformity with the regulation (emphasis in original)). In affording an IJ discretion to determine documents' authenticity by reference to the totality of the evidence, we have ruled that such evidence includes any adverse finding respecting a petitioner's credibility. See Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d at 147 (holding agency may use general adverse credibility finding in support of its refusal to credit the authenticity of document submitted by petitioner). At the same time, however, we recognize the possibility that, in circumstances where an IJ is satisfied as to the authenticity of certain documents without regard to a petitioner's testimony, those documents may then shed favorable light on the credibility of that testimony. In sum, while we have rejected any requirement that corroborative documents strictly comply with the BIA's authentication regulations, we afford IJs considerable flexibility in determining the authenticity of such documents from the totality of the evidence and in using documents found to be authentic in making an overall assessment of the credibility of a petitioner's testimony and, ultimately, of her persecution claim. We express no view as to the reliability of the documentary evidence here at issue or the weight that it might bear if found to be authentic. We hold only that, in light of Cao He Lin, we now conclude that the IJ erred in finding that the lack of § 287.6 authentication required her to reject the evidence and to give it no weight at all in determining Li's credibility.
Where the adverse credibility determination supporting denial of relief from removal is a product of some agency findings infected by legal error and others that are not, our decision to uphold the agency decision or to remand for further proceedings depends on how confidently we can predict that the agency would reach the same decision absent the errors that were made. Xiao Ji Chen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 339 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Cao He Lin v. United States Dep't of Justice, 428 F.3d at 401-02 (indicating that confident prediction of same result absent identified errors demonstrates futility of remand). In this case, we cannot confidently predict what credibility determination the agency would make upon remand if (a) it not only correctly recognized that the Internet material did not contradict Li's testimony; but, (b) by further inquiry, it were able to clarify vague aspects of Li's testimony; and (c) upon recognition of its discretion to determine document authenticity by reference to the totality of the evidence, it were to find the submitted warrants reliable. Accordingly, we cannot uphold the agency decision on the record before us; instead, we must remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and the recent precedents discussed herein.