Opinion ID: 64984
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hill’s Disparate Treatment Claim

Text: The complaint alleges that Hill was forced to resign by the Hospital because of his age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (“It shall be unlawful for an employer . . . to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 3 No. 08-60532 because of such individual’s age.”). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary on Hill’s disparate treatment claim, finding that Hill had produced no evidence of age discrimination. On appeal, Hill argues that summary judgment was improper because he has presented both direct and circumstantial evidence of the Hospital’s discriminatory animus. See Berquist v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 500 F.3d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting that a plaintiff can demonstrate age discrimination through either direct or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory animus). Hill contends that he submitted direct evidence of discriminatory animus in the form of remarks by his superiors that he “should just retire” during the meeting at which he was placed on leave. In its summary judgment order, the district court noted that it was unable to locate in the record any testimony or other evidence that Hill was ever told that he “should just retire”—and Hill’s brief to this court still fails to identify the relevant evidence in the record. Nevertheless, even assuming that the evidence exists, this court has previously held that a suggestion that an employee retire does not constitute direct evidence of discriminatory animus because there is no “necessary” link between retirement and age. Martin v. Bayland Inc., 181 F. App’x 422, 423–24 (5th Cir. 2006). Alternatively, Hill argues that he has presented sufficient circumstantial evidence of discriminatory animus to survive summary judgment. An ADEA plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of age discrimination based on circumstantial evidence by showing that “(1) he was discharged; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was within the protected class at the time of discharge; and (4) he was either i) replaced by someone outside the protected class, ii) replaced by someone younger, or iii) otherwise discharged because of his age.” Berquist, 500 F.3d at 349. As to the first element, the Secretary disputes Hill’s claim that he was “constructively discharged” because he was essentially 4 No. 08-60532 forced to resign in order to preserve his medical insurance coverage. We need not decide whether this case warrants application of the “constructive discharge” doctrine however, because Hill has clearly not satisfied the fourth element of his prima facie case. Hill does not allege that he was replaced by someone outside the protected class or younger than him, nor has he properly shown that he was discharged because of his age. Hill relies on statements allegedly made to him by two of his colleagues, who informed him that he was on a “hitlist of older, experienced physicians that the administration wanted out.” However, we agree with the district court that these statements are inadmissible hearsay that cannot be used to oppose summary judgment. Hill has presented no evidence that his two colleagues were involved in employment decisions concerning him; these statements therefore do not fall within the party opponent exception under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D). See Ramirez v. Gonzales, 225 F. App’x 203, 210 (5th Cir. 2007). Finally, Hill purports to present other circumstantial evidence of age discrimination, including the termination of another senior physician after a similar peer review process. This evidence is not before us, as it was not presented to the district court in the proceedings below. See, e.g., Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir.1994) (noting that it is not the duty of this court or the district court to “sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment”). Accordingly, Hill has failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, and the district court properly granted summary judgment on his age-based disparate treatment claim.