Opinion ID: 2321578
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Juror Misconduct and Bias

Text: Appellants argue that the trial court abused its discretion by not granting a mistrial once defense counsel reported that two of the jurors had discussed the case outside of the jury room. On the second day of trial, Salamanca's investigator overheard two of the jurors discussing the case in the restroom during the luncheon recess. According to the investigator, one juror said, Spanish people love stabbing each other, and the other juror agreed. Out of the presence of the jury, the court conducted a voir dire of the two jurors the investigator identified as the ones she overheard. [51] The jurors denied talking about stabbing or groups of people in general, [52] and affirmed that they could be fair and impartial. The court concluded that the jurors could remain on the jury because: (1) they were adamant they could be fair; (2) there was no evidence that they had discussed the case with any of the other jurors; and (3) at most, they demonstrated some stereotypical thinking, a phenomenon almost unavoidable in any jury, but which they would not necessarily apply in this case. The trial court denied the defense motion for a mistrial, but did grant the motion to make the jurors alternates; and the jurors did not, in fact, participate in deliberations. We see no reason to reverse on this basis. The trial court conducted a full voir dire to examine the jurors' potential bias, during which defense counsel were able to question the jurors. See Parker v. United States, 757 A.2d 1280, 1287 (D.C. 2000) (When there is a claim of juror partiality, `the remedy ... is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.' (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982))); Shannon & Luchs Mgmt. Co. v. Roberts, 447 A.2d 37, 41 (D.C.1982). Following a proper hearing, the determination of juror bias or prejudice lies particularly within the discretion of the trial court, reversible only for a clear abuse of discretion, ... and the findings of fact underlying that determination are entitled to great deference. Medrano-Quiroz v. United States, 705 A.2d 642, 649 (D.C.1997) (quoting Washington v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 579 A.2d 177, 185 (D.C.1990)). Here, the trial court did not simply accept the jurors' denials and assertions of fairness, see Wilburn v. United States, 340 A.2d 810, 812 (D.C.1975) (finding the trial court abused its discretion by not excusing a juror who was more than mere acquaintances with a witness's mother based on the juror's self-evaluation that she could be impartial), but after hearing from the jurors, allowed that they had stereotypical thinking about Spanish people ( i.e., Hispanics) but determined that they could be fair. Moreover, appellants have shown no prejudice because the jurors in question did not engage in the deliberations. The only possible argument for mistrial would be that since both jurors were asked generally whether they had talked or heard about stabbing or groups of people, there was no guarantee of an effective voir dire unless the court confronted them point-blank about the comment one of them supposedly made, Spanish people love stabbing each other. [53] But this approachwhich defense counsel agreed would do more harmwould be fraught with its own risk of injecting bias. Even though it would indeed be troubling if the two jurors harbored some stereotypical thinking about Hispanics generally in a case where the defendants were Hispanic, there was no evidence that they had communicated these thoughts to their fellow jurors who delivered the verdict. On this record, we cannot say that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in finding no manifest prejudice to warrant a mistrial. [54]