Opinion ID: 2236352
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of the Law to Appellants' Additional Arguments

Text: Executive Order No. 27 is on its face valid, reflecting the authority granted the Governor by article IV, § 3 of the New York Constitution together with Executive Law § 63 (2). Appellants challenge its legality on several additional grounds. The major thrust of appellants' argument  asserted from the vantage point of both the District Attorney and Bronx voters  is that the District Attorney, a constitutional officer accountable to the local electorate, is insulated from nonconsensual superseder by a zone of independence based on a delegation to him of exclusive authority to prosecute crimes in Bronx County ( see , NY Const, art XIII, § 13; County Law § 700 [1]). Relatedly, appellants argue that the power of superseder is limited to subordinates in the executive branch (which do not include the District Attorney) or to instances where the District Attorney is disabled from acting, as by reason of local conflict of interest. The Constitution provides for the offices of Governor, Attorney-General and District Attorneys, but it does not identify particular  let alone exclusive  prosecutorial duties or allocate the responsibility among them. Rather, the delineation of law enforcement functions has consistently been left to the Legislature ( see, e.g. , Matter of Schumer v Holtzman , 60 N.Y.2d 46, 53). While prosecutorial authority over the decades has in fact passed from the Attorney-General to the District Attorneys, the Legislature has recognized for more than 150 years the authority of the Attorney-General to prosecute crimes, even at the local level, when properly directed to do so by the Governor ( see , Executive Law § 63; CPL 1.20 [32]; Matter of Dondi v Jones , 40 NY2d at 19, supra ; Pitler, 41 Fordham L Rev at 518-522, op cit. ). Nor has such authority been restricted to instances where a local conflict of interest disabled a District Attorney, an officer within the executive branch ( see , People v Leahy , 72 N.Y.2d 510, 513), from prosecuting a matter. No such limitation appears in the Constitution or statutes, and none has been found in prior case law dealing with these very issues ( see , Mulroy v Carey , 58 AD2d at 208-209, 214-215, supra ; Matter of Turecamo Contr. Co. , 260 App Div 253, 256-258; People v Malek , 99 Misc 2d 439, 442-443; Berger v Carey , 86 Misc 2d 727, 728). Similarly, we are unpersuaded by the contention that Executive Law § 63-d, passed in connection with the recent death penalty legislation (L 1995, ch 1), implicitly repealed the portion of Executive Law § 63 (2) pertaining to first-degree murder prosecutions. Section 63-d permits the Governor to direct the Attorney-General, when requested by the District Attorney , to assist in a potential death penalty case ( see , Governor's Mem approving L 1995, ch 1, 1995 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 2283, 2288; Mem of Assembly Codes Comm, 1995 NY Legis Ann, at 1, 14-15). Nothing in or about that section evinces a legislative intention to limit a Governor's supersession authority. In short, these statutes simply provide two different, but complementary, avenues by which the Attorney-General can exercise the limited prosecutorial authority of that State office. There is no repugnancy indicating implicit repealer. Appellants next improperly analogize Executive Order No. 27 to the invalidated order in Rapp v Carey (44 N.Y.2d 157). The challenged order in Rapp  issued pursuant to article IV, § 3 of the State Constitution and section 74 of the Public Officers Law  required a wide range of State employees to file extensive personal financial statements and to abstain from various activities. This Court held that while the Governor has the power to enforce legislation and is accorded great flexibility in determining the methods of enforcement by the take care clause of the State Constitution, the Governor's rule-making Executive Order actually conflicted with the Legislature's intent and negated the statute it purported to administer (44 NY2d at 163). Consequently, we concluded that the order represented an unconstitutional encroachment on the powers of the legislative branch (44 NY2d at 163-167, supra ). By contrast, Executive Order No. 27 does not promulgate any rules requiring District Attorneys to seek the death penalty and directs only supersession, as contemplated by Executive Law § 63 (2). Clearly then, the separation of powers concerns motivating Rapp are absent here. Finally, we reach appellants' argument that the Governor abused his authority in choosing to supersede the District Attorney merely because he disagreed with the District Attorney's discretionary decision about sentencing. Although a Governor is not obliged to state reasons for superseder, Executive Order No. 27 does in fact detail Governor Pataki's reasons for superseding the District Attorney in this instance, and they go beyond disagreement with a discretionary decision in a particular matter. We need not define whether a standard of review, if one is applicable at all, should be reasonableness, necessity or some other standard. In any event, we agree with the trial court and Appellate Division that the challenged Executive Order expresses the Governor's executive judgment that there was a threat to faithful execution of the death penalty law that supported this particular superseder.