Opinion ID: 1619299
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedural Due Process Required

Text: Once it is determined that a public employee may not be dismissed without due process, the inquiry shifts to the extent of process due. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). This inquiry takes several factors into account: the nature of the individual's property interest and its importance to him or her; the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest resulting from inadequate procedural safeguards; any value that additional procedures might provide; and the burden imposed by providing such additional procedures. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). However, [t]he fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard `at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' Id. at 333, 96 S.Ct. 893 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965)); see also Lynch, 205 S.W.3d at 391. In the seminal case of Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985), the United States Supreme Court considered the minimum procedural due process to which a public school employee was entitled in conjunction with his dismissal by a board of education. The Court first reiterated the long-standing rule that an employee who has a constitutionally protected property interest in her employment is entitled by the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution to `some kind of a hearing' before her discharge. Id. at 542, 105 S.Ct. 1487 (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 569-70, 92 S.Ct. 2701). The Court also recognized, however, that the pretermination `hearing,' though necessary, need not be elaborate. Id. at 545, 105 S.Ct. 1487. Rather, `[t]he formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings, ' id. (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971)) (emphasis added), and, [i]n general, `something less' than a full evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action, id. (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343, 96 S.Ct. 893). The pre-termination hearing need be designed to function simply as an initial check against mistaken decisionsessentially, a determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are true and support the proposed action. Id. at 545-46, 105 S.Ct. 1487. The Court reasoned as follows: The essential requirements of due process . . . are notice and an opportunity to respond. The opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not be taken is a fundamental due process requirement. The tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story. To require more than this prior to termination would intrude to an unwarranted extent on the government's interest in quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee. Id. at 546, 105 S.Ct. 1487 (citations omitted) (emphases added). Accordingly, a pre-dismissal hearing may constitutionally be limited to an opportunity to respond to charges in writing, even for tenured teachers. Significantly, the Court declared that its analysis rested in part on the provisions in [state] law for a full post-termination hearing, id., and emphasized that the existence of post-termination procedures is relevant to the necessary scope of pre-termination procedures. Id. at 547 n. 12, 105 S.Ct. 1487. In Loudermill , the employee was entitled under state law to a post-termination full administrative hearing and judicial review. Id. at 545, 105 S.Ct. 1487. In light of these post-termination procedures, all that federal due process required at the pre-termination stage was an opportunity to respond. Id. at 547-48, 105 S.Ct. 1487. Thus, the scope of the pre-dismissal opportunity to respond that must be afforded a public employee who possesses a property interest in his or her job is examined in tandem with the post-dismissal procedures available to such employees. See Carter v. W. Reserve Psychiatric Habilitation Ctr., 767 F.2d 270, 273 (6th Cir.1985) (recognizing that, under Loudermill , it is clear that the required extent of post-termination procedures is inextricably intertwined with the scope of pre-termination procedures); Case v. Shelby County Civil Serv. Merit Bd., 98 S.W.3d 167, 173 (Tenn. Ct.App.2002) (recognizing that pretermination and posttermination procedures are intertwined and must be reviewed together to determine whether due process has been satisfied). In Carter , the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered the plight of Paul Wade, a classified civil service employee of the Western Reserve Psychiatric Habilitation Center. Wade claimed that he had been discharged without first receiving a proper pre-termination hearing and without receiving a meaningful post-termination hearing. 767 F.2d at 272. The court determined that, prior to his termination, Wade had appeared before the Patient Abuse Committee and that this pre-termination hearing was constitutionally sufficient as a matter of law. Id. at 273 n. 2. With respect to a post-termination hearing, however, the court reasoned as follows: Where [only an abbreviated pre-termination hearing is provided for], due process requires that a discharged employee's post-termination hearing be substantially more meaningful. At a minimum, this requires that the discharged employee be permitted to attend the hearing, to have the assistance of counsel, to call witnesses and produce evidence on his own behalf, and to know and have an opportunity to challenge the evidence against him. The severity of depriving a person of the means of livelihood requires that such person have at least one opportunity for such a full hearing, so that he may challenge the factual basis for the state's action and may provide reasons why that action should not be taken. Id. at 273 (citing Loudermill, 105 S.Ct. at 1494, 1496). Because the record did not reveal what, if any, post-termination hearing Wade had received, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for a determination of whether Wade had been afforded a constitutionally sufficient post-termination procedure. Id. at 273-74. See also Mitchell v. Fankhauser, 375 F.3d 477, 481 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that, where employee was afforded only an abbreviated pre-termination hearing, he was entitled to a more meaningful post-termination hearing). On the basis of Loudermill and its progeny, including Carter , we are persuaded that a nontenured, nonlicensed employee under the jurisdiction of a director of schools and subject to the provisions of section 49-2-301, is, prior to dismissal for cause, entitled only to notice of the charges against him or her, an explanation of the administration's evidence, and an opportunity to respond in writing. See Enochs v. Nerren, 949 S.W.2d 686, 689-90 (Tenn.Ct.App.1996) (recognizing that  Loudermill does not require a full evidentiary hearing before an administrative body takes adverse action against an employee). If dismissal ensues, the employee is thereafter entitled to an opportunity for a full and complete hearing before an impartial hearing officer, an opportunity to be represented by counsel, an opportunity to call and subpoena witnesses, an opportunity to examine all witnesses, and the right to require that all testimony be given under oath. See Case, 98 S.W.3d at 174-75 (holding that, where a classified civil service employee may be terminated only for cause, due process requires that the post-termination hearing afford the employee the opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. . . where the facts giving rise to termination are in dispute or where the severity of the discipline is challenged). In combination, the applicable provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-2-301 and BCBOE Policy 5.202 satisfy these due process requirements. [13]