Opinion ID: 1436223
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The futile search for identifiable criteria derived from constitutional command.

Text: The primary criticism of the predominant interest test of Heinig by the previous majority opinion was that it required this court to decide cases based upon the court's own political judgment (281 Or. at 154, 576 P.2d 1204), whereas in such cases the court's decision must be derived from a constitutional standard   . (281 Or. at 147, 576 P.2d at 1210) The majority purports (at 767, 768) to find in the word charter in Art. XI, § 2, a basis to support its distinction between matters of procedure and substance as a distinction based upon what are described (at 771) as identifiable criteria, derived from constitutional command to the legislature to let local voters choose their own modes of government. For the reasons previously stated, it is submitted, with all due respect, that the word charter in Art. XI, § 2, provides no such identifiable criteria; that the procedure-substance dichotomy, which provides the basis for the proposed opinion, is invisible in the terms of the Home Rule amendments and that the application of that dichotomy, together with the exceptions which must also be applied under it, would continue to involve this court in the making of policy determinations, without the benefit of identifiable criteria based upon any constitutional command. Thus, in my view, the quest by the majority for a solution under which this court can decide Home Rule cases by the application of identifiable criteria derived from constitutional command has been vain and illusory. I would be the first to agree that, whenever reasonably possible, this court should not decide cases by the exercise of its political judgment and that if such identifiable criteria can be properly found in the words of the Home Rule amendments, they should be controlling in cases such as this. Unfortunately, it is one of the facts of life that constitutions do not always provide such identifiable criteria. A close analogy arises in cases involving the question of separation of powers. The constitution provides no identifiable criteria to be applied in cases such as the recent one in which the legislature sought to require that appointments by the governor be made subject to its approval. [14] Instead, as the Oregon Constitution is written, the people of Oregon have imposed upon this court the duty to act as a constitutional referee between the executive and legislative branches of government in cases involving matters over which each claims exclusive power. Similarly, the people of Oregon, in whom all sovereignty resides, can parcel out that sovereignty as they choose between the state and the cities. By adoption of the Home Rule amendments they have made a grant of power to the cities, including a grant of power to enact and amend charters including, by implication, ordinances pursuant to such charters (as the majority opinion would agree), and a grant to the voters of cities to do so by the exercise of initiative and referendum powers as to all local   and municipal legislation of every character. It follows, in my judgment, that even though no more identifiable criteria can be found in these terms than the words local and municipal legislation, the people of Oregon have imposed the duty upon this court to act as a constitutional referee to decide, by the application of these words, all disputes in cases in which the state legislature and a city claim exclusive power of legislation, just as this court must decide disputes between the legislature and the governor over claims of exclusive power, and without the guidance of any more identifiable criteria. Under the predominant interest test of Heinig, such cases would be decided by a balancing of the interests of the city against those of the state. There was nothing novel in the adoption of that approach. Indeed, the balancing test has been adopted by the courts in many types of cases in which there are no identifiable criteria based upon words in a constitution and such a test is no more improper than the test of fairness, as adopted by courts for application in other cases involving an absence of such identifiable criteria. (See original dissent, 281 Or. at 179, 576 P.2d 1204). Indeed, the majority states (at 770) that it reaffirms the Heinig test for application in cases involving matters of structure and procedures of local government. Finally, the majority (at 772) is critical of the petition for rehearing in that it debates only the general tenor of the opinion in this case, rather than the question actually at issue, the validity of the retirement and insurance statutes. The concern of the cities, however, as expressed both in their petition for rehearing and on oral argument, goes to more than the general tenor of the previous majority opinion. It goes to the adoption of a rule of legislative supremacy, based upon the distinction between matters of substance and procedures, because of the many problems that would result for cities by the adoption of such a rule, for reasons previously stated, and because such a rule would strip cities of much of their present local autonomy. Indeed, as previously stated, counsel for the cities conceded that the result in this case might be the same under the predominant interest test of Heinig. Upon the application of that test, however, the rationale would be that the interest of the state in police and fire protection is so great as to predominate. Such a decision would have support in respectable authority, as pointed out in my original dissent (281 Or. at 189, 576 P.2d 1204). Such a decision would not, however, as does the majority opinion in this case, provide a basis under which the legislature may, if it so chooses, enact a statute requiring cities to provide insurance policies and pension benefits to all city employees, and in amounts as provided by such a state statute. There may be no magic in the words predominant interest. Some other descriptive words might be more appropriate in deciding disputes as to what are proper matters of local    and municipal legislation. In my opinion, however, the predominant interest test, as stated in a scholarly opinion by Justice O'Connell and as adopted by a unanimous court in Heinig, provides the best and most practical solution to this difficult problem. This court has found it possible, without problems as evidenced by any dissenting opinion, to apply that rule in a number of subsequent cases, as noted in my original dissent (281 Or. at 164-165, 576 P.2d 1204), which also discussed the rationale of that rule and pointed out (at 177-178 and 159-160, 576 P.2d 1204) that the decision of this court in Heinig has been recognized by legal writers as a sound judicial decision and one consistent not only with decisions by the courts of other states, but with the recognized purpose of state Home Rule amendments as a distribution of power by the people between two levels of government  state and local. In contrast, the rule as adopted by the majority, based upon a distinction between matters of procedure and substance, has been disclaimed by all of the parties to this case, including the attorney for the cities of Oregon, the attorney representing the employees of the cities and the attorney representing the State of Oregon. It is a rule without precedent and a rule that will create more problems than it will solve. As noted in my previous dissenting opinion, most modern students in municipal affairs have urged the desirability of constitutional grants to cities of broad home rule powers. [15] In some states, however, the attainment of that objective has been impeded by narrow and restrictive judicial interpretations of such constitutional provisions. [16] For the past 40 years home rule in Oregon has not been subjected to this problem in view of unanimous decisions by this court which have liberally construed the Home Rule Amendments to the Oregon Constitution. It is thus particularly discouraging that the majority of this court has chosen to deliberately overrule that long line of unanimous decisions and to join those courts which have adopted a narrow and restrictive interpretation of Home Rule powers. It may be that history alone will judge the wisdom of that decision, unless the voters of Oregon do as the voters of some other states have done in response to such decisions, and adopt a new Home Rule amendment with an even clearer grant of exclusive Home Rule powers as to all matters of local and municipal concern. [17] For all of these reasons I dissent. HOWELL, J., joins in this dissent.