Opinion ID: 2338070
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motions to Strike a Juror For Cause

Text: Fugett's third argument concerns the circuit court's decision to deny his motions to strike Jurors 119631 and 123804 for cause. The record established that he used all nine (9) of his peremptory challenges. Moreover, Appellant argues that, since he was forced to remove Jurors 119631 and 123804 with his peremptory challenges, when they should have been stricken for cause, he was denied a substantial right and tool necessary to selection of an impartial jury, as well as the right to an impartial jury. In Kentucky, the right to an impartial jury is protected by § 11 of the Kentucky Constitution, as well as the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. See Fugate v. Commonwealth, 993 S.W.2d 931, 939 (Ky.1999). Under RCr 9.36(1), a juror shall be excused for cause [w]hen there is reasonable ground to believe that a prospective juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict on the evidence[.] Fugett, however, made no attempt to show that the jury that heard his case was, in fact, impartial. Instead, he argues we should reverse our position in Morgan v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 99 (Ky. 2006), overruled by Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336 (Ky.2007), and return to the standard set out in Thomas v. Commonwealth, 864 S.W.2d 252 (Ky. 1993). [4] This we did, in our recent opinion of Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336 (Ky.2007). Thus, if a court abuses its discretion in denying a challenge for cause and the party had to use a peremptory challenge to strike the juror and, in fact, used all his peremptory challenges, it is reversible error. See Stopher v. Commonwealth, 57 S.W.3d 787, 796 (Ky.2001). As Fugett used all of his peremptory challenges, we are left to decide if the court abused its discretion in denying his challenges for cause as to either Juror 119631 or Juror 123804. Kentucky has long recognized that a determination as to whether to exclude a juror for cause lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and unless the action of the trial court is an abuse of discretion or is clearly erroneous, an appellate court will not reverse the trial court's determination. Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 83 S.W.3d 522, 527 (Ky.2002) (internal quotes and citations omitted). See also Soto v. Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d 827, 848 (Ky.2004) (A determination whether to excuse a juror for cause lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and is reviewed only for a clear abuse of discretion.). However, the decision to exclude a juror for cause is based on the totality of the circumstances, not on a response to any one question. See Morgan v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d at 104, overruled in part on other grounds by Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336 (Ky.2007). This recognizes the duty of the trial court to evaluate the answers of prospective jurors in context and in light of the juror's knowledge of the facts and understanding of the law. Stopher, 57 S.W.3d at 797. This having been said, [t]he test for determining whether a juror should be stricken for cause is `whether . . . the prospective juror can conform his views to the requirements of the law and render a fair and impartial verdict.' Thompson v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 22, 51 (Ky.2004) ( quoting Mabe v. Commonwealth, 884 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Ky. 1994)). As such, [t]he court must weigh the probability of bias or prejudice based on the entirety of the juror's responses and demeanor. There is no 'magic question' that can rehabilitate a juror as impartiality is not a technical question but a state of mind. Shane, 243 S.W.3d at 338. During voir dire, Juror 119631 stated that his wife's second cousin, a former Louisville police officer, Mackenzie Mattingly, was on duty when he shot and killed a drug suspect. Mattingly was subsequently charged and acquitted of murder. While he did not believe his relationship with Mattingly would factor into his jury service, he acknowledged that he would probably give more weight or greater credibility to the testimony of a police officer, simply because he was a police officer. He felt firmly about his belief that the police have greater credibility in their testimony and it would not depend on which officer testified; he simply felt police have more credibility than other witnesses. Juror 119631 also presented a problem in considering mitigating evidence in the penalty phase, stating his belief that punishment should be based only on what occurred on the day of the killing, rather than consideration of a person's past. He did not believe that a person's use, or abuse, of alcohol should have any effect on his actions, and so those factors should not be considered. Moreover, he believed that only a person's history of violence should be considered on the issue of punishment. When asked by the prosecution as to whether he would, in his sentencing decision, consider factors like a defendant's age, IQ, or the kind of home in which he was raised, he responded that he could consider age, if the person were 10, 11, or 12 years of age. Moreover, he stated in general he could consider other factors, but they would not have much effect on his opinion. Thereafter, he was informed by the court that if the defendant were convicted, there would be a penalty phase in which the Commonwealth would put on evidence of aggravation to obtain a sentence at the high end of the sentencing range and the defense could introduce mitigating evidence such as a defendant's age, IQ, home life as a child, and drug or substance abuse by him or his parents. The court then stated: The question is, is there any of that evidence that's described as mitigators that wouldn't have any bearing with you in setting a penalty? Because some people say I can consider all of that evidence and some people say well no in my view that's not proper. And again we're past the guilty and not guilty. We are at the penalty phase. So the question is, is it evidence that you would consider or is it evidence that you wouldn't consider? Juror 119631 then stated, I would consider it. The court then denied Appellant's motion to strike Juror 119631 for cause. In Stopher , this Court found no error in the trial court's refusal to strike a juror for cause when his father had been a police officer. There we found the juror did not have any preference for police officers and . . . his family connection to the law enforcement profession would in no manner affect his ability to decide the case based on the evidence presented. Stopher, 57 S.W.3d at 797. In Soto , the juror stated that he might give 'slightly' more weight to the testimony of a police officer than to that of a lay person. He also stated that he could render a fair and impartial decision concerning all the facts of the case, including the entire range of penalties and mitigating circumstances. Soto, 139 S.W.3d at 850. In Soto , we ruled that the response of the juror did not establish implied bias against the defendant based, in part, on there having been no testimonial inconsistencies between the officer's testimony and that of the lay witnesses. Id. Also in Sholler v. Commonwealth, 969 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Ky.1998), we ruled that it was not an abuse of discretion in failing to strike a juror who was a Secret Service Agent, because he did not indicate a bias against defendants, although he would tend to give credence to the testimony of a police officer. Id. This notwithstanding, when questioned by the defense, the juror admitted he was very pro-law enforcement and placed substantial credence in police officers. When asked if he thought all law enforcement officers told the truth, he replied, I don't know, I think so, yeah, I've never experienced one who lied in court. Id. at 708. We recently revisited this issue in Shane , where the juror in question, a Louisville Metro Police Officer, stated his association with police officers would not affect his ability to be an impartial juror, but then went on to say: he had an inside point of view; that he was absolutely pro-police; that while police are just like everybody else, he did not believe they would lie under oath because they took the oath more seriously; and that he would find it more likely that a police officer was telling the truth than a lay witness. Shane, 243 S.W.3d at 337. As a result, we held: Here, Juror 138's responses in their entirety indicated a probability that he could not enter the trial giving both sides a level playing field. His statement that he was absolutely pro-police and that he did not believe an officer would lie under oath clearly indicated that a defendant would have little or no chance of challenging an officer's testimony in this juror's mind. Id. at 338. Considering Shane , Stopher , Soto , and Sholler together, they support the conclusion that Juror 119631 should have been stricken for cause in this case. The statements made by the prospective jurors in Stopher , Soto , and Sholler were not as unequivocal as those made by the juror in Shane and Juror 119631 in this case, who indicated they would believe the testimony of a police officer, simply because he was a police officer and because police officers have greater credibility in their testimony than other witnesses. However, when contrasted directly with our finding in Shane  that he did not believe that they would lie under oath because they took their oath more seriously; and that he would find it more likely that a police officer was telling the truth than a lay witness  the factual similarity is apparent. Shane, 243 S.W.3d at 337. Moreover, as to the mitigation issue, the totality of the juror's responses form a reasonable basis to conclude that he could not consider all the mitigation evidence that the law demands. He believed that only a person's history of violence should be considered on the issue of punishment and he would consider age only if the person were 10, 11, or 12 years old. He said he could consider some factors such as the defendant's IQ or the kind of home in which he was raised, but they would not have much effect on his opinion. Nor did he believe that factors such as the use, or abuse, of alcohol should be considered. Any juror to whom mitigating factors are . . . irrelevant should be disqualified for cause, for that juror has formed an opinion concerning the merits of the case without basis and the evidence developed at trial. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 739, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 2235, 119 L.Ed.2d 492, 509 (1992). Thus, heeding our recent dictates in Shane , designed not only to insure an impartial jury, but to ensure a level playing field in the selection of a jury, we must conclude that the failure to excuse Juror 119631 for cause was an abuse of discretion in this case. On its facts, we can read Shane no other way. Fugett also challenged Juror 123804 for cause. Yet, during voir dire, the juror made it clear that he would consider the entire range of penalties. He indicated he would consider evidence of aggravating factors as well as mitigating factors. When asked if it was his expectation that the defendant should show the death penalty is not appropriate, the juror replied, Yes. However, when asked by the defense if he would impose death unless the defendant showed him otherwise, Juror 123804 replied, No. Fugett argued that Juror 123804's answers made it clear that he would improperly impose a burden on the defense during the penalty phase. The circuit court, however, properly considered the totality of the juror's answers within the appropriate context. The court reasoned that while Juror 123804's answers indicated that if mitigating evidence was going to be put on, it would logically be done by the defense, the court concluded that this did not indicate he was improperly imposing a burden on the defense. Further, the court noted that Juror 123804 had clearly indicated he would consider evidence of both aggravating and mitigating factors, and that he would consider the full range of penalties. Under these circumstances, the court did not err, or abuse its discretion, in denying Fugett's challenge for cause against Juror 123804. Relying on Shane , however, we find the court abused its discretion in not excusing Juror 119631 for cause, and thus committed error. For reasons that such substantial errors are not subject to harmless error review, we find the error to be cause for reversal.