Opinion ID: 2748856
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Purpose and Relevance of Nationwide’s Role

Text: ¶10. To be admissible in its role as evidence, the fact of Nationwide’s role in this case required some demonstration of relevance.5 Evidence is relevant only where it has a “tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” 6 ¶11. The admissibility of all evidence begins with an examination of its purpose. We are unable to discern the purpose or relevance of Nationwide’s role, and it is noteworthy that Cheri suggests no purpose or theory of relevance for us to analyze. Indeed, where insurance is concerned, our rules of evidence provide that “[e]vidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue whether he acted negligently or 4 James v. Carawan, 995 So. 2d 69, 75 (Miss. 2008) (citing Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So. 2d 110, 113 (Miss. 1999)). 5 Miss. R. Evid. 402. 6 Miss. R. Evid. 401. 4 otherwise wrongfully.” 7 And it is “well established in this state that evidence of insurance or lack thereof may not be presented at a trial to show who would have to pay the judgment.” 8 For example, we have held that an uninsured defendant is prohibited from telling the jury that he or she lacks insurance and would have to pay any judgment.9 ¶12. We agree with the view of the Supreme Court of New Jersey that, “in the context of a [underinsured motorist] trial, in which the circumstances of the underlying accident are the focus, . . . the insurer’s identity is ordinarily irrelevant,” and “[w]hether the jury knows the underinsured motorist insurer’s identity should have no impact on its evaluation of the extent of the plaintiff’s injuries.” 10 This reasoning is highly persuasive. Other courts, including those in Virginia, have followed New Jersey’s approach under similar circumstances.11 7 Miss. R. Evid. 411. 8 Capital City Ins. Co. v. G.B. “Boots” Smith Corp., 889 So. 2d 505, 510 (Miss. 2004) (citing Morris v. Huff, 238 Miss. 111, 118-19, 117 So. 2d 800, 802-03 (1960); Snowden v. Webb, 217 Miss. 664, 675-76, 64 So. 2d 745, 750 (1953)). 9 Capital City Ins. Co., 889 So. 2d at 510 (quoting Snowden, 64 So. 2d at 750). 10 Bardis v. First Trenton Ins. Co., 971 A.2d 1062, 1069 (N.J. 2009). 11 See Mattingly v. Stinson, 281 S.W.3d 796, 798 (Ky. 2009) (prohibiting the disclosure of an underinsured motorist carrier’s identity where the tortfeasor remained a real party to the action); Wineinger v. Ellis, 855 N.E.2d. 614, 620 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding a trial court’s order that an underinsured motorist carrier’s identity not be disclosed at trial, because the only issue at trial was the extent and nature of injuries); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wade, 579 S.E.2d 180, 183-84 (Va. 2003) (recognizing that sometimes the knowledge that a party is uninsured can actually prejudice the plaintiff and deflate the jury’s verdict against the uninsured defendant); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lobello, 186 S.E.2d 80, 82 (Va. 1972) (holding that it was error to inject the issue of uninsured motorist coverage at trial). 5 ¶13. The only issue in this case was the amount of Cheri’s damages. We see no reason for the jury to be informed of Nationwide’s role as Cheri’s underinsured motorist insurer. This information would have been of no help in deciding the issues before the jury; indeed, the trial judge would have risked a mistrial by allowing the plaintiff to use insurance to prove the defendant’s negligence.12 ¶14. We find Nationwide’s role in this case—insofar as the jury was concerned—was irrelevant. And, although irrelevant evidence occasionally finds its way into the record, it is never admissible under the Mississippi Rules of Evidence.13 B. Application of the Rule 403 Balancing Test to Nationwide’s Role ¶15. Even if Nationwide’s role had some minimal theory of relevance, it nevertheless properly would have been excluded under Rule 403, which requires exclusion of relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.14 ¶16. We agree with the New Jersey court’s finding that informing the jury that a party provides underinsured motorist coverage on the plaintiff’s car actually “increase[s] the risk of jury confusion[,] because the jury would first be told that the defendant is an insurer, but 12 See Miss. R. Evid. 411. 13 Miss. R. Evid. 402. 14 Miss. R. Evid. 403. 6 would then be advised that this is irrelevant and should play no role in their evaluation of the claim.” 15 C. Judges’ Control Over the Trial ¶17. The plaintiff also argues that it was “inherently unfair” for the jury not to know of Nationwide’s role in the litigation. The trial judge found nothing unfair about it. This Court has “unflagging support” for a trial judge’s power to control the progress of a trial.16 The trial judge was well within his discretion in finding that identifying Nationwide as party would disrupt the trial on Cheri’s damages and create confusion for the jury. As stated, trial judges have the authority, power, and responsibility to prevent confusion and undue prejudice. ¶18. The plaintiff correctly points out that our views are in disagreement with those of the Supreme Court of Florida, which holds that full disclosure of a underinsured motorist company’s identity at trial “protects the integrity of the jury system and prevents charades at trial.” 17 But having made this bold statement, the Florida court fails to explain how or why the jury system’s integrity depends to any degree on informing the jury of information it is