Opinion ID: 613621
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Recency Points

Text: The district court's rejection of the requested variance to account for the inclusion in the Guidelines calculation of recency points did not render Ruiz's sentence substantively unreasonable. [7] At the time of Ruiz's sentencing, to calculate the criminal history score, the district court was to [a]dd 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense less than two years after release from imprisonment on a sentence counted under (a) or (b) or while in imprisonment or escape status on such a sentence. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e) (2009). [8] On January 21, 2010, however, the Sentencing Commission proposed Amendment 742, which eliminated the addition of points due to recency of a prior sentence. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.1(e) (Proposed Amendment 2010). In an April 19, 2010 press release, the Commission stated that the addition of recency points might result in a single criminal history event having excessive weight in the determination of the applicable guideline range. Press Release, U.S. Sent'g Comm'n, U.S. Sentencing Commission Votes to Send to Congress Guideline Amendments Providing More Alternatives to Incarceration, Increasing Consideration of Certain Specific Offender Characteristics During the Sentencing Process (Apr. 19, 2010). The Commission added that deletion of the provision did not detract from the overall ability of the criminal history score . . . to predict an offender's likelihood of recidivism. Id. In an April 30, 2010 policy statement on the proposed amendment, the Commission further explained that consideration of recency only minimally improves the predictive ability of the criminal history score, and that it had received public comment and testimony suggesting that recency does not necessarily reflect increased culpability. U.S. Sent'g Comm'n, Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, Policy Statements, and Official Commentary 14-15 (2010). The amendment took effect November 1, 2010; recency points are no longer included in the calculation of criminal history points. Ruiz argues that, in accord with the general parsimony principle of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court should have varied downward because recency points were empirically unjustified when he was sentenced. Ruiz cites Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007), in which the Supreme Court, addressing the crack and powder cocaine equivalencies, held that courts may vary from the Guidelines ranges based solely on policy considerations, including disagreements with the Guidelines, after considering the § 3553(a) factors, including the overarching parsimony provision. Id. (quotation omitted). The Kimbrough Court reasoned that the Commission's recommendations are generally based on empirical data and national experience, but that in formulating the crack cocaine ranges, the Commission was not permitted to consider such data. See id. at 109-10, 128 S.Ct. 558. The implication is that the Guidelines ranges are given more weight when they are based on the Commission's analysis of empirical data and national experience, and they are due less weight when they regularly result in sentences that are `greater than necessary' in light of the purposes of sentencing set forth in § 3553(a). See id.; see also Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 264-65, 129 S.Ct. 840, 172 L.Ed.2d 596 (2009). We have not previously addressed this recency points variance argument in a published opinion. The First Circuit has done so and has rejected it. See United States v. Adams, 640 F.3d 41, 43 (1st Cir.2011). In unpublished opinions, moreover, we, along with at least five other circuits, have similarly rejected versions of the argument that a variance was required after the Commission promulgated the amendment but before the amendment became effective. See, e.g., United States v. Prado-Figueroa, No. 10-10305, ___ Fed. Appx. ___, ___, 2011 WL 2784098, at  (9th Cir. Jul. 18, 2011); United States v. Rodriguez-Sanchez, No. 10-10217, ___ Fed.Appx. ___, ___, 2011 WL 1898202, at  (9th Cir. May 19, 2011); United States v. Gonzalez-Molina, 409 Fed.App'x. 751, 752 (5th Cir.2011) (per curiam); In re Anderson, 409 Fed.Appx. 593, 594 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); United States v. Gadsden, 412 Fed.Appx. 523, 525 (3d Cir.2011); United States v. Dennis, 412 Fed.Appx. 452, 454-55 (3d Cir.2011); United States v. Mitchell, 402 Fed.Appx. 560, 562 (2d Cir. 2010). No circuit has found a sentence substantively unreasonable where, after promulgation of the proposed amendment that reduced the sentencing range, a court declined to vary downward to account for inclusion of recency points in the Guidelines calculation. A sentencing court, of course, has the discretion to grant a variance from the Guidelines after promulgation but before adoption of a proposed amendment, based on its policy disagreement with the existing Guidelines provision, especially where, as here, the Commission has acted to remedy the basis for the court's disagreement. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 101, 128 S.Ct. 558. However, where an amendment has been promulgated but has not yet been adopted, district courts are not required to consider that amendment in the § 3553 analysis unless the amendment has been given retroactive effect by express decision of the Commission. See Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 348, 111 S.Ct. 1854, 114 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (In addition to the duty to review and revise the Guidelines, Congress has granted the Commission the unusual explicit power to decide whether and to what extent its amendments reducing sentences will be given retroactive effect.) (emphasis and citation omitted). [S]ubstantive amendments to the guidelines that occur between the date of sentencing and the resolution of an appeal have no retroactive effect unless specifically referenced in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10. United States v. Diaz-Cardenas, 351 F.3d 404, 409 (9th Cir.2003) (citing United States v. Aldana-Ortiz, 6 F.3d 601, 603 (9th Cir. 1993)). [9] Amendment 742 is not listed in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 (2010); indeed, the Commission explicitly chose not to make it retroactive. See U.S. Sentn'g Comm'n Public Meeting Minutes (Sept. 16, 2010), www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_ Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/ 20100916/20100916_Minutes.pdf. That the Commission has promulgated a not-yet-adopted amendment that is very likely to be adopted and that would result in reduced Guidelines ranges does not render a district court's failure to grant a variance substantively unreasonable. This is not to say that the district court could not have granted the requested variance after considering all of the § 3553 factors and the totality of the circumstances. Carty, 520 F.3d at 993. Therefore, the district court did not improperly include recency points in calculating the Guidelines range of 46 to 57 months of imprisonment. Though the government recommended 57 months of imprisonment, the district court reasonably imposed a sentence of 46 months of imprisonment. Had the district court not included recency points in Ruiz's criminal history score, the 46 months would also have been at the midpoint of the applicable Guidelines range of 41-51 months. We therefore conclude that the district court's rejection of this argument did not render the sentence substantively unreasonable.