Opinion ID: 2050825
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: Appellant argues that in demanding an admission of guilt before allowing the defense of duress to be presented to the jury, the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard. Specifically, appellant contends that because we permit the use of inconsistent defenses, he should have been allowed to put forth a duress defense even though he did not admit to committing a crime. The government, on the other hand, concurs with the trial court's decision, adding that appellant was not entitled to a duress instruction because he did not attempt to escape or notify law enforcement officials during the commission of the crime. We hold that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the duress defense and to give the duress instruction. As a general proposition a defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor, Simpson v. United States, 632 A.2d 374, 376 (D.C.1993) (quoting Bostick v. United States, 605 A.2d 916, 917 (D.C.1992)), keeping in mind that trial judges properly deny instructions which require the jury to engage in `bizarre reconstructions of the evidence.' Adams v. United States., 558 A.2d 348, 349 (D.C.1989) (quoting Wood v. United States, 472 A.2d 408, 410 (D.C.1984)). Once the defendant requests an instruction, it is not necessary that the evidentiary basis for the instruction stem from the defendant's evidence; it may also be derived from the government's evidence. See Wilson v. United States, 673 A.2d 670, 673 (D.C. 1996) ([A]n accused is entitled to a self-defense instruction if the evidence, either that of the defense or prosecution, fairly raises the issue) (emphasis added) (quoting Guillard v. United States, 596 A.2d 60, 63 (D.C.1991)); Reid v. United States, 581 A.2d 359, 367 (D.C.1990) (holding that the testimony of the defendant is not necessary to put a claim before the jury). In addition, this court has consistently held that a defendant may put on different or even contradictory defenses. See, e.g., Adams, 558 A.2d at 350 (holding that the trial court erred in denying a self-defense instruction when the defendant denied that weapons were even used because mere inconsistency between defenses does not constitute a proper basis for the denial of a defense instruction); Reid, 581 A.2d at 367 (holding that a defendant may put on contradictory defenses without jeopardizing the availability of a self-defense instruction); Gray v. United States, 549 A.2d 347, 349 n. 2 (D.C.1988) ([A] defendant is entitled upon request to an instruction on any issue fairly raised by the evidence, regardless of whether it is consistent with the defense theory of the case or the defendant's testimony.). In Guillard, a case similar to this one, we held that the trial court erred in denying the self-defense instruction because the defendant denied committing the crime, reasoning that the jury reasonably could credit the testimony of the government's [witnesses] . . . to find that [the defendant] did assault [the complainant]. 596 A.2d at 63. Thus, a defendant does not have to admit guilt in order to present a defense of duress, as long as the evidence reasonably supports that defense. See id.; Wilson, 673 A.2d at 673. The proper inquiry, therefore, is whether there is evidence, either that of the defense or the prosecution, [that] fairly raises the issue. Guillard, 596 A.2d at 63 (quoting Harling v. United States, 387 A.2d 1101, 1103 n. 1 (D.C.1978)). A duress instruction is appropriate if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the defendant participated in the offense as the result of a reasonable belief that he would suffer immediate serious bodily injury or death if he did not participate in the crime. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 409, 100 S.Ct. 624, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980) (holding that a defendant claiming duress must show that there was no opportunity to refuse the criminal act and avoid the threatened harm); Jenrette, 240 U.S.App.D.C. at 196, 744 F.2d at 820-21 (same); Stewart v. United States, 370 A.2d 1374, 1376 (D.C.1977) (holding that duress is available in the presence of a well grounded apprehension of immediate death or serious bodily injury). The defendant should have no reasonable, legal alternative to avoiding the harm. See Bailey, 444 U.S. at 409, 100 S.Ct. 624. It is uncontested that the government's witness, White, would testify that appellant participated in the crime. [4] Cf. Guillard, 596 A.2d at 63. (It was necessary to consider also the testimony of the government witnesses to determine whether there was any evidence that fairly raised the issue . . .). Appellant testified at trial that to the extent he participated, it was because he was instructed to do so at gunpoint by Bey Bey. If appellant's testimony was believed by the jury, it could find that appellant acted under Bey Bey's compulsion. The government argues, based on Jenrette, 240 U.S.App. D.C. at 197, 744 F.2d at 821, that appellant was unable to avail himself of the duress defense because he did not offer an explanation for his failure to take alternative action, such as notifying law enforcement officials after the commission of the crime. We note that in Jenrette, the court concluded that Jenrette did not prove imminent danger because of many factors, including a failure to notify law enforcement officials during the two days that lapsed while the crime was being committed. See id. During oral argument, the government conceded that the defense of duress does not require the defendant to notify the authorities after the crime is completed. Moreover, the government acknowledged during argument that the correct standard is whether during the commission of the crime the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to escape. See id. This is not to say, however, that a jury could not infer a lack of duress from the purportedly unwilling participant's failure to contact police once he was able to do so. But that is a jury question. If appellant's testimony in this case is credited by the jury, it could find that there was no time to call law enforcement officials, nor an opportunity to escape, if Bey Bey was pointing a gun at him while appellant was in White's home. Although appellant later left the house to go to an ATM machine, and presumably could have escaped or notified the police during that time, he was charged only for the events that took place in White's home. We note also that there was sufficient evidence that appellant had a reasonable belief of serious bodily injury or death. Cf. id. Upon being asked if he was afraid of Bey Bey, appellant replied, [w]ho wouldn't be afraid . . . he's shot at people, shot people, shot himself . . . he's done a lot of vicious things and then he had the gun pointed at me. . . . From this testimony the jury could have found that McClam feared serious bodily injury and had no reasonable alternative but to assist Bey Bey. Cf. Guillard, 596 A.2d at 63 (discussing the evidentiary basis for a self-defense instruction). Moreover, we do not believe that the jury would have needed to engage in bizarre reconstructions of the evidence to consider the issue of duress. Adams, 558 A.2d at 349 (quoting Wood, 472 A.2d at 410). Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred in refusing to allow appellant to present a duress defense and denying the duress instruction. [5] Reversed and Remanded.