Opinion ID: 871559
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Purpose Number Three: Rehabilitation Projects

Text: As to the third purpose, rehabilitation projects to include, but not limited to, educational, economic, political, social and cultural processes by which the general welfare and conditions of native Hawaiians are thereby improved, the delegates proposed that funding for this purpose come from the Native Hawaiian Rehabilitation Fund, and amended Section 213 of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act to establish this fund. Comm. Prop. No. 11, 2 Proceedings, at 808; Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 56, 2 Proceedings, at 635. The fund would consist of thirty percent of the state receipts derived from lands previously cultivated as sugarcane lands . . . and from water licenses[.] Id. DHHL was mandated to use this fund solely for the rehabilitation of native Hawaiians which shall include but not be limited to the educational, economic, political, social and cultural processes by which the general welfare and conditions of native Hawaiians are thereby improved and perpetuated. Id. This amendment closely tracked the language of Article XII, Section 1. The delegates did not extensively discuss this new provision beyond Delegate Les Ihara's observation: This fund will allow the Hawaiian homes commission to more economically utilize Hawaiian homestead lands and to promote a nonpartisan political education . . . This fund is not designed to relieve the State of its responsibilities to the people of Hawaii outside the Hawaiian homes commission. This fund is but one step toward maintaining and promoting the cultural heritage of our native Hawaiian people. Debates in the Committee of the Whole on Hawaiian Affairs Comm. Prop. No. 11, 1 Proceedings, at 422. No further discussion elucidated whether the delegates intended the legislature to provide more funding beyond the Native Hawaiian Rehabilitation Fund, and if so, how much funding would constitute sufficient sums for that purpose. In conclusion, the constitutional convention delegates made only passing references to the three remaining purposes under Article XII, Section 1. There was no discussion at all as to what would constitute sufficient sums as to any of the remaining three purposes. Therefore, the text of Article XII, Section 1, and its accompanying constitutional convention history, shed no light on how many home, agriculture, farm and ranch lots must be developed in a certain period of time, so that what would constitute sufficient sums to that end is not clear. Moreover, what would constitute sufficient sums for home, agriculture, aquaculture, farm and ranch loans, as well as rehabilitation projects, is also unclear. In Yamasaki, we held that the interpretation of the language of HRS § 10-13.5, directing [t]wenty per cent of all funds derived from the public land trust  to be expended by OHA, was nonjudicial fare, because the legislature had yet to define funds, and had acknowledged that the boundaries of the public land trust were undetermined. 69 Haw. at 172-73, 737 P.2d at 457-58 (emphasis added). Similarly, in the instant appeal, the language and constitutional convention history of Article XII, Section 1, contain undetermined goals for home, agriculture, farm, and ranch lots; home, agriculture, aquaculture, farm and ranch loans; and rehabilitation projects, barring judicial interpretation of sufficient sums as to those purposes. In short, Article XII, Section 1 and its accompanying constitutional convention history provide no judicially discoverable and manageable standards for determining sufficient sums for these three purposes without initial policy determination[s] of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion. 69 Haw. at 173, 737 P.2d at 457 (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691). The determination of sufficient sums for these three purposes, therefore, poses a nonjusticiable political question. We agree with the Plaintiffs that, the State has failed, by any reasonable measure, under the undisputed facts, to provide sufficient funding to DHHL[.] The State's track record in supporting DHHL's success is poor, as evidenced by the tens of thousands of qualified applicants on the waiting lists and the decades-long wait for homestead lots. See generally, A Broken Trust: The Hawaiian Homelands Program: Seventy Years of Failure of the Federal and State Governments to Protect the Civil Rights of Native Hawaiians (1991). With the benefit of 35-90 years of hindsight, it is clear that DHHL is underfunded and has not been able to fulfill all of its constitutional purposes. However, were we to remand this case to the circuit court to grant declaratory relief to Plaintiffs as to all of the constitutional purposes encompassed in Count 1, the circuit court still would not be able to mandate the affirmative injunctive relief that the Plaintiffs seek without encountering the same uncertainty with regard to what constitutes sufficient sums as to the remaining three purposes under Article XII, Section 1, explained supra. The Plaintiffs prayed for an injunction requiring the State to place as many beneficiaries on the department's waiting lists for residence, farms, and ranches on available Hawaiian home lands within a reasonable period of time. Article XII, Section 1 and its constitutional convention history shed no light on what those sufficient sums might be. Declaratory relief as to the other three purposes, then, is not available, pursuant to HRS § 632-1 (1993), which provides in relevant part, with emphasis added: Relief by declaratory judgment may be granted in civil cases where an actual controversy exists between contending parties, or where the court is satisfied that antagonistic claims are present between the parties involved which indicate imminent and inevitable litigation, or where in any such case the court is satisfied that a party asserts a legal relation, status, right, or privilege in which the party has a concrete interest and that there is a challenge or denial of the asserted relation, status, right, or privilege by an adversary party who also has or asserts a concrete interest therein, and the court is satisfied also that a declaratory judgment will serve to terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding. In this case, were the circuit court to declare that funding to DHHL for the other three purposes has been insufficient, such declaration would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding, as judicial determination of what affirmatively constitutes sufficient sums for the other three constitutional purposes is nonjusticiable, based on the political question doctrine.