Opinion ID: 1058577
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appeal of the Board Order

Text: Green's other appeal is from an Order of the Board which fixed a 45-day suspension of his license to practice law in the Commonwealth. The suspension was imposed so as to commence immediately upon the end of the six-month suspension imposed by the Panel. Green assigns error to the Board's Order on the grounds that (1) the Board imposed an improper enhanced sanction; (2) his demand for a three-judge panel was improperly denied; and (3) the Board failed to consider certain mitigation evidence.
This case is before us for the third time on appeal. A brief factual history of the proceedings is relevant to the issues raised by the instant appeal. On June 5, 2003, Rockingham County Circuit Court Judge John J. McGrath, Jr. filed a complaint with the Bar, which described instances of alleged professional misconduct by Green. Pursuant to Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(G) of the Rules of this Court, a Subcommittee of the Seventh District Committee of the Bar (as referenced in Part II herein, the Subcommittee) convened on April 15, 2004 and considered the allegations against Green. The Subcommittee certified charges of Green's misconduct to the Board, contending that Green violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 3.4, 4.4, and 8.4 of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct. The Subcommittee determination was promptly mailed and included a letter notifying Green that pursuant to Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(I)(1)(a) of the Rules, he had twenty-one days to either file an answer or demand that further proceedings be conducted before a three-judge court in accordance with Code § 54.1-3435. Green timely responded with an answer to the Subcommittee determination stating that he would enthusiastically embrace the opportunity to participate in a hearing before a panel of the Board. Following a November 19, 2004 hearing, the Board concluded that Green violated Rule 1.3(a) and 8.4(b) of the Professional Rules of Conduct, and the Board entered an order dated December 21, 2004, which suspended Green's license to practice law in the Commonwealth for sixty (60) days. Green appealed the Board's order to this Court, and we stayed the Board's sanction pending the appeal. In an unpublished order dated September 16, 2005, this Court affirmed the Board's order, in part, that Green violated Rules 1.3(a) and 8.4(b), but not as to all the charges found by the Board. We concluded that the evidence did not support all of the Board's findings related to alleged violations of Rule 1.3(a). Green v. Virginia State Bar , Record No. 050289 (September 16, 2005). Accordingly, we vacated that part of the Board's order suspending Green's license to practice law for 60 days, and we remanded the case to the Board for reconsideration of an appropriate sanction. Id. On remand, the Board advised Green that it would convene a hearing via telephonic conference call to reconsider the sanction. Green objected and argued he was effectively prevented from presenting evidence to substantiate the allegedly negative impact on his legal practice of an untimely press release by the Bar and other matters in mitigation. Green also submitted various documents to the Board that he wished to introduce in mitigation of any sanction. The Board overruled Green's objections and ruled that his proffered documents were irrelevant and inadmissible. The Board proceeded with the hearing and considered solely the record from the prior hearing on November 19, 2004. The Board again concluded that a 60-day suspension of Green's license to practice law was warranted and entered an order to that effect on January 24, 2006. Green appealed that order's 60-day suspension to this Court. In Green v. Virginia State Bar, 272 Va. 612, 636 S.E.2d 412 (2006), we again reversed the Board, vacated the sanction and remanded for further proceedings to consider an appropriate sanction. We found that the Board abused its discretion by failing to permit Green to introduce evidence in mitigation pursuant to Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(I)(2)(f)(2) of the Rules. Id. at 616-18, 636 S.E.2d at 415-16. We stated that Green was entitled to present evidence tending to mitigate the sanction to be imposed by showing to what extent he had already suffered adverse consequences because of the public dissemination of the . . . Board's findings that he had violated the . . . Rules and the suspension of his license to practice law. Id. at 617, 636 S.E.2d at 415. Pursuant to the second remand, the Board reconvened on January 26, 2007, heard argument and received evidence from Green and the Bar, including Green's evidence in mitigation. On February 28, 2007, the Board issued its Memorandum Order imposing a 45-day suspension of Green's license to practice law in Virginia. The Order provided for a delayed effective date of the sanction, July 1, 2007, which followed immediately the 6-month suspension imposed by the Panel that ran from January 1, 2007 to June 30, 2007.
Under the same standard of review as set forth in Part I, we now consider Green's assignments of error to the Board's order.
Green contends that the Board erred because it effectively enhanced the 60-day sanction it originally imposed on November 19, 2004 and which had twice been reversed by this Court. He argues that the sanction was enhanced by adding time between the hearing and July 1, 2007 to its sanction. The crux of Green's argument is that the sanction is a nine-month suspension and not one of 45 days. The Bar responds that the Board has the authority to state the effective date of the sanction imposed pursuant to Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(I)(2)(f)(2) of the Rules and that Green's 45-day suspension consecutively follows the six-month suspension imposed against him by the Panel concerning the matters in Part I, which began to run on January 1, 2007 (discussed infra, Part I). The Bar further argues that the Board did not enhance the sanction against Green because it reduced the 60-day sanction previously imposed to a 45-day sanction. We agree with the Bar. Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(I)(2)(f)(2) of the Rules provides [i]f the Board concludes that there has been presented clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent has engaged in Misconduct, after considering evidence and arguments in aggravation and mitigation, the Board shall impose one of the following sanctions and state the effective date of the sanction imposed.  (Emphasis added.) The Board, pursuant to the Rules of this Court, has the authority to impose the sanction and to set the effective date of the sanction. In determining the effective date of a sanction, we find that the Board's decision is subject to review for an abuse of discretion. Here, the Bar imposed Green's sanction and established the effective date the sanction was to commence. The Board did not abuse its discretion when it established the effective date of the sanction as July 1, 2007 because this date immediately followed a separate six-month suspension of Green on other unrelated charges. Green has no basis upon which to claim that the two separate suspensions could be required to run concurrently. See Conner v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 455, 457-58, 150 S.E.2d 478, 479-80 (1966) (describing a court's authority and the statutory presumption, in the criminal context, for sentences to run consecutively rather than concurrently). Upon consideration of the record in this case, we cannot say the Board abused its discretion in imposing the sanction of 45 days or in its setting the date of July 1, 2007 for that sanction to commence. Thus, Green's first assignment of error is without merit.
Green next assigns error to the Board's denial of his request for a three-judge panel. Green notes that after the remand of his second appeal, he demanded that further proceedings be conducted before a three-judge panel and not the Board. Green argues he could not have foreseen the severity of the damage caused to him by the Board's untimely release of information about his suspension, and he contends our decision in Cilman v. Virginia State Bar, 266 Va. 66, 580 S.E.2d 830 (2003) supports his claim that his demand for a three-judge court required that further proceedings only be before such a court and not the Board. The Bar responds that Green failed to make a timely demand to be tried by a three-judge court in response to the Subcommittee's initial certification in 2004. The Bar contends that a demand for a three-judge court must be made within twenty-one days after service of the original certification pursuant to Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(I)(1)(a)(1)(a) of the Rules of this Court, and Green's demand on December 18, 2006 was therefore untimely. The Bar also argues that Green's reliance on our holding in Cilman is misplaced because the attorney in that case was subject to additional discipline on new charges, and only the new charges were entitled to be tried by a three-judge court. We agree with the Bar. On July 12, 2004, Green responded to the certified charges against him with his strong preference that this matter be heard and adjudicated by the Board rather than the statutory alternative afforded by [Code] § 54.1-3935. Green never requested a three-judge panel until after the second remand from this Court. The only issue on remand was the imposition of a sanction based on the previously adjudicated misconduct. Neither our two previous remands of Green's appeals nor our holding in Cilman supports Green's contention that the continuing adjudication of sanctions on the same charges offers any right to demand a three-judge court more than two years after the twenty-one day initial response period expired. In Cilman, attorney Alan Jay Cilman had been subject to three separate proceedings before the Board. 266 Va. at 68, 580 S.E.2d at 831. In each instance, his license to practice law had been administratively suspended for varying periods of time. 266 Va. at 68-69, 580 S.E.2d at 831. Cilman failed to meet the requirements imposed upon him by the Board in the three previous proceedings regarding the notification of clients and related matters. Id. The Bar then brought a fourth proceeding to consider Cilman's failure to comply with the prior requirements. In this fourth proceeding, Cilman made a timely demand that further proceedings be conducted before a three-judge court in accordance with the provisions of Code § 54.1-3935. Id. at 69-70, 580 S.E.2d at 832. The Board denied Cilman's demand. Id. On appeal, we reversed the Board's order and found that Cilman made a timely request for a three-judge panel because the fourth proceeding related to new charges against him with the possibility of additional sanctions and was not simply completion of a pending adjudication. Id. at 72, 580 S.E.2d at 833. We explained that Cilman's alleged violation arose from his failure to comply with a prior order of the Board, and he was therefore permitted to request a three-judge court to consider the new charge of a rule violation, which could result in sanctions. Id. Unlike Cilman, Green was not subject to new charges in the case at bar. The Board heard Green's case as he requested in his July 12, 2004 response to the Subcommittee certification. His appeals to this Court raised issues relating only to the matter previously heard and considered by the Board. Throughout those appeals and our two remands of the Board's imposition of sanctions, no additional charges were brought against Green in this case, so Cilman is inapplicable. Green's remanded appeal to the Board for reconsideration did not trigger any new right for Green to then request a three-judge court pursuant to Code § 54.1-3915 and Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(I)(1)(a)(1)(a). As a result, his second assignment of error is without merit.
Green's final assignment of error is that the Board failed to consider the premature dissemination of information about his suspension in its determination of the sanction. He contends the Board's improper dissemination of information about him violated Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(N)(4) of the Rules of this Court. The Bar responds that at the January 26, 2007 hearing, Green was afforded the opportunity to present material evidence and argument in mitigation. Additionally, the Bar contends that the Board considered all of the Bar's evidence in aggravation along with Green's evidence in mitigation, before imposing a 45-day suspension. Again, we agree with the Bar. The record reflects that at the January 26, 2007 hearing, Green was afforded a full opportunity to present material evidence and argument in mitigation of any sanction to be imposed upon him by the Board. Green's primary argument at that hearing was based on the language of Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(N)(4), which prohibits an official of the Bar from communicat[ing] with a member of the media or the public concerning a matter that is confidential. Green argued that there is no way that I could be punished any more than I've been punished for two and a half years . . . and I ask you to take that into consideration. It is evident from the Board's Order that the Board considered the aggravating and mitigating factors, including any de facto suspension, before announcing its decision. This information included the newspaper articles and Bar website information introduced by Green. The Board concluded taking all of that into consideration, it is the unanimous decision of this panel that Mr. Green's license be suspended for 45 days effective July 1, 2007. Green was provided a full and fair opportunity to present evidence in mitigation, and the record supports that the Bar's position that the Board heard and considered that evidence. Based on our independent examination of the whole record, giving the factual findings [of the Board] substantial weight and viewing them as prima facie correct, El-Amin, 257 Va. at 612, 514 S.E.2d at 165 (emphasis omitted), we cannot say that the Board abused its discretion in fixing the period of suspension at 45 days to commence July 1, 2007.