Opinion ID: 2732311
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Summary Judgment as to Denise Cassese

Text: 22 Lastly, following denial of class certification, Appellant Denise Cassese proceeded individually with her claims. Summary judgment was granted to Appellees and denied as to Cassese on her various claims. Appellants object to only one aspect of that ruling, Cassese’s claim under New York General Business Law § 349. Under that law, Cassese was required to show that (1) Quest’s conduct was consumeroriented, (2) its conduct was materially deceptive, and that (3) she was injured thereby. Oswego Laborers’ Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 85 N.Y.2d 20, 25 (1995). The District Court held that Cassese had not produced evidence of any pecuniary injury, and the only claim of nonpecuniary harm came in one line of her deposition transcript where she was asked if she had been damaged by Quest. She responded: “Just basically harassed and billed and talked to them, and I think I paid them.” (App. 706) The Court found that this bare mention of being “harassed and billed” did not constitute a showing of non-pecuniary harm. (App. 74.) On appeal, Appellants challenge only the District Court’s conclusion that Cassese had not shown evidence of non-pecuniary harm. Appellants point out that non-pecuniary harm, such as emotional distress, is cognizable under New York General Business Law § 349. See Douyon v. N.Y. Med. Health Care, P.C., 894 F. Supp. 2d 245, 264 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); Oswego, 85 N.Y.2d at 26 (“[A] plaintiff seeking compensatory damages must show that the defendant engaged in a material deceptive act or practice that caused actual, although not necessarily pecuniary, harm.”). 23 However, given the posture of the case on summary judgment, we agree with the District Court that one bare mention of being “harassed and billed,” without more, is not evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Cassese suffered actual, though non-pecuniary, harm. She provided no facts, and nothing beyond a single word, that could allow a jury to infer that she suffered any actual harm because of Appellees’ actions. Accordingly, summary judgment was appropriately granted to Appellees and against Cassese on this claim.