Opinion ID: 2621092
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Constitutional Challenges to the California Death Penalty Statute

Text: Defendant raises numerous challenges to the California death penalty statute (§ 190 et seq.), which we have long rejected. Contrary to defendant's contention, section 190.2 is not impermissibly broad. ( People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1050, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044; People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1058, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544; People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 356-357, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846.) We have noted that the categories of special circumstances have not been construed in an unduly expansive manner. ( People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 187, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) Contrary to defendant's suggestion, we see no basis to revisit the issue. We conclude that [h]aving been found guilty of intentional murder in the course of robbery, defendant falls within the `subclass' of murderers who are eligible for the death penalty. (Ibid.) Defendant also argues that section 190.3, factor (a)which allows the jury to consider the circumstances of the crime as an aggravating factoris impermissibly vague. Pointing to cases in which the aggravating circumstances were arguably inconsistent (e.g., the defendant killed with a motive to rob or the defendant killed for no reason at all; the victim had children or the victim had no chance to have children), he asserts that section 190.3, factor (a) has been used in ways so arbitrary and contradictory as to violate the federal guarantee of due process of law. Both the United States Supreme Court and this court have rejected this claim. ( Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 976, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750; People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1050-1053, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) Finding that section 190.3, factor (a) provides adequate guidance to a jury in sentencing, we have concluded that the jury in determining penalty should consider circumstances of the crime, but that this is an individualized, not a comparative function. ( People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1052, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) As such, [t]he ability of prosecutors in a broad range of cases to rely upon apparently contrary circumstances of crimes in various cases does not establish that a jury in a particular case acted arbitrarily and capriciously. (Id. at p. 1053, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044, italics omitted.) Accordingly, defendant's claim must similarly fail. Contrary to defendant's contentions, juries are not required to (1) make written findings regarding aggravating circumstances, (2) achieve unanimity as to aggravating circumstances, (3) find beyond a reasonable doubt that either aggravating circumstances are proved (other than other criminal conduct) and the aggravating circumstances outweigh those in mitigation, or that death is the appropriate penalty. ( People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1053, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044, citing People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 190, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980; People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 935-936, 269 Cal.Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676; People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 777, 230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113.) Also, a trial court need not instruct as to any burden of proof when determining the sentence to be imposed. ( People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1053-1054, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) We also reject defendant's claim that because it does not require intercase proportional review, the California death penalty statute ensures arbitrary, discriminatory, or disproportionate impositions of death sentences. [U]nless a defendant demonstrates that the state's capital punishment law operates in an arbitrary and capricious manner, the circumstance that he or she has been sentenced to death, while others who may be similarly situated have received a lesser sentence, does not establish disproportionality violative of the Eighth Amendment. ( People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 157, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) Moreover, we disagree that defendant is denied equal protection and substantive due process because noncapital defendants receive some comparative review under the determinate sentencing law. [ People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1053, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) Defendant also asserts that the jury improperly considered defendant's unadjudicated criminal activity (purse snatchings, assaults, arson) introduced by the prosecution. He maintains the jury's use of this evidence during the penalty phase violates his right to due process, and the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, thus rendering his death sentence unreliable. He is wrong. ( People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1054, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) Contrary to defendant's assertions, the `[u]se of the words extreme and substantial in section 190.3, factors (d) and (g), does not impermissibly limit consideration of mitigating factors in violation of the federal Constitution.' { People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1054-1055, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) The trial court is not required to identify which sentencing factors are aggravating and which are mitigating. { People v. Davenport (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1229, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 800, 906 P.2d 1068.) Moreover, the trial court here instructed that the absence of a mitigating factor should not count as a factor in aggravation.