Opinion ID: 1560229
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Child Witness Support Person

Text: Czech's first argument on appeal is that the trial judge abused her discretion by permitting a support person (the complainant's mother) to sit behind the child complainant while she was testifying before the jury. Czech argues that special accommodation prejudiced him, heightened sympathy for the complainant, and enhanced her credibility because the jury may have perceived the mother's presence as the trial judge's endorsement of the child's testimony. Specifically, Czech asserts that the trial judge erred by: first, suggesting the special accommodation sua sponte; second, not requiring a foundation to be laid for the presence of the support person; and third, denying Czech's request for a special jury instruction explaining that the presence of the support person should not affect the jury's assessment of the complainant's credibility. The question of whether it is permissible for an adult support person to sit in close proximity while a child complainant testifying before a jury is one of first impression in Delaware. Such accommodations have, however, been addressed and approved by several other jurisdictions providing that adequate procedural safeguards are imposed. [6] For example, in State v. T.E., the New Jersey Court of Appeals held that upon a showing of substantial need, with appropriate safeguards imposed, and a cautionary instruction given, a trial judge's discretion is not abused in permitting an adult support person to sit in close proximity to a young child while testifying before a jury. [7] Other jurisdictions have required similar procedural safeguards including; requiring the state to prove there was a compelling need to have the support person sit next to the child; [8] issuing a cautionary instruction both to the jury and to the support person, [9] or allowing the defendant to suggest alternatives to the procedure. [10] The use of such safeguards allows a trial court to strike the proper balance between the possible prejudice to the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial and the interest of the State in presenting testimonial evidence. [11] In Czech's case, the Superior Court made the special accommodation without performing a balancing analysis and without implementing any procedural safeguards. [12] First, Czech notes that the trial judge suggested sua sponte that the mother be seated behind the child on the witness stand. The trial judge then advised the jury, The testimony of Ms. Smith is complete and she is excused as a witness. However, the State has made a request that she be permitted to sit up here because her daughter is going to be called as a witness and I have granted the State's request. The record reflects, however, the State only requested that the child's mother sit in the courtroom gallery. That placement would have been consistent with a Delaware statute and far less intrusive and less likely to have an impact on the jury. [13] This Court appreciates that the nature of this case and the young age of the child complainant undoubtedly motivated the judge's suggestion to place the mother behind her child on the witness stand. In the absence of extraordinary circumstances, however, a trial judge should not make special accommodations sua sponte. We hold that such special accommodations should only be made if it has been determined, upon motion, that the requesting party has demonstrated a substantial need for their implementation. Czech's second contention is that because the trial judge suggested the procedure sua sponte, the appropriate foundation was not laid for the special accommodation. Czech urges this Court to follow the precedent in Hawaii which requires a showing of a compelling necessity for allowing [this practice]. [14] We decline to adopt that standard. We have already held that a preliminary showing must be made to establish a substantial need for special accommodation. Although the trial judge indicated that the decision to allow the child's mother to sit behind her on the witness stand was to provide comfort for the child, the trial judge did not make any particularized findings on the record that demonstrated a substantial need for the special accommodation and the State did not make any such preliminary showing to that effect. Third, Czech argues that because the use of this type of special procedure is fraught with potential to influence the jury, the trial judge erred by denying his request for a cautionary jury instruction. The record reflects that the trial judge summarily rejected Czech's request for a contemporaneous jury instruction. We review de novo the Superior Court's denial of a requested jury instruction. [15] The trial judge provided no explanation for denying such an instruction. Where, as here, there is an undisputed risk of prejudice to the defendant due to the use of special accommodations, a summary denial of a mitigating instruction constitutes error. A specific, contemporaneous instruction explaining the purpose of the support person and that the jury was to draw no inference from that person's presence would have mitigated concerns over the accommodation's impact on the jury. [16] It is well-settled that a trial judge is responsible for management of the trial and is vested with broad discretion to perform that function. Delaware Rule of Evidence 611(a) recognizes that the trial judge has authority to determine the mode and manner of a witness's testimony. The Rule states: (a) Control by court. The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment. This Court reviews trial management decisions for an abuse of discretion. [17] An abuse of discretion occurs when a court has exceeded the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances, or so ignored recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice. [18] The record reflects that the trial judge's discretion was not properly exercised in Czech's case. Nevertheless, we have concluded, that although the use of the special accommodation in Czech's case may have been prejudicial, any prejudice was harmless. Harmless errors are those that do not constitute significant prejudice to the adversely affected party that would operate to deny that party a fair trial. [19] A review of the child complainant's trial testimony shows it had little probative value. Even with her mother seated behind her, Mary's in-court testimony shed little light on the prosecution's case against Czech. The child's answers were generally one word responses that, at times, were contradictory and did not implicate the defendant. The record reflects that Mary was ill when she testified and threw up during the luncheon recess. In fact, the prosecution presented the substance of its case again through the CAC interviews that were shown to the jury after Mary finished testifying, but before she was formally excused as a witness. [20] Because the child complainant's trial testimony did little, if anything, to advance the State's case, we find that the judge's special accommodations were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [21] This Court recognizes that sensitive issues may arise during a trial where young children will be subject to the extraordinary pressures of testifying. The Delaware's General Assembly has also stated its view that child witnesses should be treated with additional consideration when involved in Superior Court criminal proceedings. Del.Code Ann. tit. 11, § 5131 states: The General Assembly finds that it is necessary to provide child victims and witnesses with additional consideration and different treatment that that usually required for adults. It is therefore the intent of the General Assembly to provide each child who is involved in a criminal proceeding within the Superior Court with certain fundamental rights and protections. Accordingly, the propriety of allowing a support person to accompany some child witnesses while they testify is not in question. When ruling upon a request for special accommodations in the future, however, the New Jersey decision in State v. T.E. is particularly instructive on the issue because it thoroughly considered the competing interests of the State, the defendant and the child witness. [22] We cite with approval the following six factors that the New Jersey court outlined to guide the trial judge's exercise of discretion in acting upon motions for special accommodations: (1) A preliminary showing must be made to establish a substantial need for the procedure. It must be demonstrated that without accompaniment, the child is likely to be substantially nonresponsive, and that with accompaniment, the child is likely to provide meaningful, probative testimony. The court may consider the age of the witness, the nature of the testimony, evidence of fear, embarrassment or inability to testify, and the degree of trauma experienced by the witness in the underlying event and by the courtroom experience. (2) A defendant should be given the opportunity to suggest alternatives. [Examples Deleted]. (3) Choice of the support person should minimize potential prejudice. A parent or other close relative will more likely be viewed as family support than vouching for the witness' credibility, as might result with a counselor, therapist or other professional. The advisability of identifying the status of a non-family support person should be considered. Whether the support person is also a witness in the trial should be considered; for example this might impact a sequestration order, and, depending upon the scope and extent of the support person's testimony it might tend to unduly bolster the child's testimony. A representative of the prosecutor's office should not be used. (4) The logistics should be only as intrusive as necessary to accomplish the purpose of the procedure. Placing the support person in the front row of the gallery or at counsel table, for example, would be minimally intrusive. Permitting the support person to stand behind or sit alongside the witness is moderately intrusive. Contact, such as holding the child's hand or permitting the child to sit on the support person's lap is highly intrusive and should be considered only as a last resort. The view of the child by the defendant and the jury should not be obstructed. (5) A cautionary instruction should be given to the support person not to speak, prompt, communicate by signals or expression, and to give no indication of approval or disapproval of the answers. (6) An appropriate instruction should advise the jurors that the purpose of the support person is to attempt to place the child at ease while testifying and that the presence of the support person should not affect their assessment of the credibility of the child's testimony. The standard passion, prejudice or sympathy charge should also be given. [23]