Opinion ID: 1493887
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Runnells's Quantum Meruit Recovery

Text: [¶ 8] Quinn asserts that contract law barred the jury's consideration of a quantum meruit/implied contract award for Runnells. She maintains the claim is barred due to Runnells's failure to enter into written change orders with Quinn for the contract extras when their fixed price contract unambiguously provided that there be no extra costs for change orders unless in writing. [2] [¶ 9] Although the home construction contract required that all changes to the contract involving extra costs be in writing, this provision may be modified by the agreement of the parties. Granger N., Inc. v. Cianchette, 572 A.2d 136, 139 (Me. 1990). Such a provision does not preclude a contractor from recovering for work that was fully performed. Id. The jury's verdict establishes that the extra work at issue was requested by Quinn and performed by Runnells. [¶ 10] Quantum meruit claims involve recovery for services or materials provided under an implied contract, which is a contract inferred from the conduct of the parties. Paffhausen v. Balano, 1998 ME 47, ¶ 6, 708 A.2d 269, 271. A valid claim in quantum meruit requires: that (1) services be rendered to the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) with the knowledge and consent of the defendant; and (3) under circumstances that make it reasonable for the plaintiff to expect payment. Id. ¶ 8 (quotation marks omitted). See also Forrest Assocs. v. Passamaquoddy Tribe, 2000 ME 195, ¶ 11, 760 A.2d 1041, 1045. [¶ 11] Evidence in the record shows that Quinn asked Runnells to do additional work, for which she knew she would be charged additional costs. Thus, the jury could find that Runnells reasonably expected payment for this additional work that he had completed for Quinn with Quinn's knowledge. Therefore, the court did not err in denying Quinn's motion for judgment as a matter of law on Runnells's claim for quantum meruit/implied contract.