Opinion ID: 2582182
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: a change application can be defeated through the use of circumstantial evidence

Text: ¶ 55 While producing evidence sufficient to block approval of a change application is no doubt a difficult task for a protestant, illustrating impairment by means not reliant on conjecture or probability would, in many cases, be an impossible task. Determinations of whether impairment would result from application approval often hinge on probabilities. As we pointed out in Crafts v. Hansen , [t]he future impact of changes in allocation and use of water resources in a large geographical area is not generally susceptible of direct observation, measurement and calculation. Great reliance must be placed upon expert judgment based on professional knowledge and training, familiarity with the geography, and as much accurate data as can be acquired in the process of making future projections . . . . [W]e are not dealing so much with facts . . . as with the opinion of experts about the accuracy and legitimacy of the projections based upon the available facts. 667 P.2d 1068, 1081 (Utah 1983). Consequently, we cannot say that circumstantial evidence showing a possibility of impairment is, in all cases, insufficient to justify denying an application. ¶ 56 If the evidence produced by a protestant is compelling enough to undermine the reasonableness of the assertion that the proposed change will not impair vested rights, the state engineer should reject the application seeking to effect that change. We can envision situations in which circumstantial evidence could undermine an applicant's evidence to such an extent that it would be unreasonable to believe that the proposed change can be accomplished without impairing vested rights. Consequently, we decline to exclude circumstantial evidence from being weighed when a decision as to application approval must be made.