Opinion ID: 2508322
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Specific instances of misconduct

Text: When the issue focuses on comments made by the prosecutor before the jury, the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion. ( People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1072, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40, overruled on another point in People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 822-823, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673; accord, People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705.) A prosecutor is given wide latitude during closing argument. The argument may be vigorous as long as it is a fair comment on the evidence, which can include reasonable inferences or deductions to be drawn therefrom. `A prosecutor may vigorously argue his case and is not limited to `Chesterfieldian politeness' [citation], and he may use appropriate epithets....' [Citations.] ( People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 567-568, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290.) A defendant's conviction will not be reversed for prosecutorial misconduct ... unless it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached without the misconduct. ( People v. Crew, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 839, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 733, 74 P.3d 820.)
Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by arguing to the jury that defendant enjoyed killing Robinson; that he enjoyed killing Thompson with the relish and degree [ sic ] of a little kid opening his toys at Christmas; that he plotted to kill Davis because he likes to kill, likes to intimidate, and likes to bully and strong-arm; and that in his glee, with [h]is mind made up to kill Davis, he jumped into the back seat [with Davis], gun exposed to smell and feel the last bit of life he's going to take. These statements did not exceed the bounds of proper argument. Given the evidence that defendant killed Thompson and Robinson in cold blood, at point-blank range, apparently over a fraudulent cocaine purchase, and that a week later he tried to kill Davis after he had shared beer and taken a car ride with him, the prosecutor's characterizations of defendant fell within the permissible bounds of argument. Defendant also complains about the prosecutor's description of defendant as a prowler and a denizen of the night who was in his element at night, and the prosecutor's repeated references to defendant as a man of concealed intent. Through these descriptions the prosecutor evidently was alluding to a March 1987 incident when the police saw defendant, who was loitering at night in a crime-ridden area, pull a gun from under his jacket and toss it away. Defendant did not object to the admission of evidence of this incident, and thus cannot complain about it now. In any event, the prosecutor's descriptions of defendant were permissible comments on the evidence. As for the later description of defendant as a man of concealed intent, the prosecutor argued defendant intended to harm Thompson and Robinson as he stood outside Lisa McKaufman's house during the early morning hours of April 28, and that he had a similar intent toward Davis during the car trip on May 4, 1987. Again, based as they were on the evidence, these comments did not exceed the bounds of proper argument. Defendant also contends the prosecutor improperly argued defendant was a habitual killer. Specifically, defendant cites as improper these descriptions of him: a creator of victims ... who turns people from life into death; the executioner; the terminator of precious life; a head hunter; one who had no respect for the dead, the living, or anybody; and one who kills or threatens, threatens or kills, whatever serves his purpose. Defendant further contends the prosecutor improperly argued: This is a one-man crime wave. He may not be a serial killer, but killing is his byline. Two deaths and an attempt and an invitation and threats to back it up. A one-man gang, a worldly [ sic ] dervish of energy, poised and striped [ sic ] to kill. That's [defendant]. The challenged statements did not exceed the bounds of proper argument, given the evidence that defendant shot two people in the head at point-blank range over a purchase of fake cocaine. Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly urged the jury to convict him of murder based on an alleged predisposition to kill, based on these comments: [Defendant] decides to execute in cold blood two helpless human beings that never ever saw this coming. Snatches with the left, shoots with the right, similar to the way he attacked Olin [Davis]. [¶] So, ladies and gentlemen, he had a predisposition to kill and he acted it out. And he got them to where he could mutilate them where nobody could see it and he did it.... (Italics added.) The Attorney General counters that predisposition to kill was the prosecutor's shorthand way of saying that defendant intended to kill Thompson and Robinson when Thompson could not get the money back for the fake rock of crack cocaine she had bought for defendant and Johnson. We need not decide what the prosecutor meant by his statement, for any misconduct was harmless. The statement was a tiny part of an otherwise permissible argument that spanned two days. That a more favorable verdict would have been received in the absence of the error is not reasonably probable, given the strong evidence that defendant shot Thompson and Robinson at point-blank range. Defendant also cites as misconduct the prosecutor's assertion that defendant wanted to kill Olin Davis's brother Bruce at the same time he killed Olin: And he wants to take Bruce along too so he can talk to Bruce. That's four. That's four. That's four. Another double homicide is contemplated on May 4th. Defendant objected to this comment, and the court sustained the objection, stating that the prosecutor was in excess of the instruction on the purpose for which Mr. Davis' testimony was limited. The court told the prosecutor to confine [his] remarks to the evidence as limited. The admonition cured any harm. Defendant also contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by describing defendant as evil. The prosecutor argued: The case was about defendant's utter evil; dealing with defendant was like peeling the skin of an onion, with every layer being a level of evil and every layer peeled being that much closer to the evil hard-core; defendant was the lowest common denominator and the complete and total essence of evil; and [t]he layers of evil within [defendant] surrounded a cold unyielding heart. None of these characterizations exceeded the permissible scope of closing argument.
Toward the end of his rebuttal argument at the guilt phase of trial, the prosecutor said he had to look at something to make sense out of this, something to put this into some perspective because in 45 years [he had not] seen anything that [he could] compare ... to this case. He stated that although he was not a religious person by any stretch of the imagination he had read about the apocalypse as described in Revelation, the last book of the Bible. [T]he word apocalypse, he said, put defendant's conduct in proper perspective, except that in contrast to the apocalypse, defendant did not have the necessary mandate to carry out his actions. The prosecutor explained that in the apocalypse, a crowned rider on a white horse who came to conquer the world was followed by three other men on horses who came to kill and take peace away so that the world could start anew. Describing the apocalypse as the mandate of God, the prosecutor argued to the jury: On what steed, with whose authority does [defendant] cut a path through the City of Oakland leaving murder and death and destruction and utter annihilation in his wake? By what authority is he guided? [¶] This man is the disciple of Satan, ladies and gentlemen. He has worked his way up into this community from the deep inner core of this planet like a sour foul putrid weed. He has cracked the soil and killed all before him so he can live, and when the sun goes down he comes out and he slaughters and he maims and he murders. [¶] But, ... he's not the judge and jury in this case, you are, and that's where he comes up short. The man is the utter harbinger of senseless total annihilation, no more, no less. You must take the sword from him and cast it down and tell him that he was wrong and he may go no further. The prosecutor continued: [T]he institutions that govern the conduct of the people in this world are to be taken most seriously. The Penal Code of this state consists of thousands of laws but they mean nothing until you give them life through your verdict and set the appropriate standard of conduct. We repeatedly have held that prosecutors may not appeal to religious authority in a closing argument to the jury. Our opinions have most often discussed such arguments when made at the penalty phase of a capital case, because the decision whether to impose the death penalty is an ethical and normative question that at first glance seems amenable to religious argument. As we have explained, such argument is improper, because to invoke God may diminish the jurors' sense of personal responsibility for the decision whether to impose the death penalty or may encourage jurors to base their penalty decision on a different or higher law than that found in the California Penal Code. ( People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 100, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506; People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 761-762, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754; People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 519-521, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 487, 966 P.2d 521; People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 836-837, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673; People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1063, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544; People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 260-261, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 421, 861 P.2d 1107; People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 193-194, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862.) Here, the prosecutor's biblical reference came at the guilt, not the penalty, phase of trial. Appeals to religious authority at the guilt phase are also impermissible, but for a different reason than at the penalty phase. The jury at the guilt phase is not charged with making an ethical or normative decision; instead, it decides questions of historical fact based on the evidence and applies to those facts the law as articulated by the trial court. Religious input has no legitimate role to play in this process. (See generally People v. Williams (2001) 25 Cal.4th 441, 463, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 21 P.3d 1209.) But not every reference to the Bible is an appeal to religious authority. Not only is the Bible a religious text, but it is also generally regarded as a literary masterpiece; indeed, it is among the oldest and best-known literary works in our culture. The English departments of major secular universities teach courses on the Bible as literature. [4] And this court has repeatedly held that in closing argument attorneys may use illustrations drawn from common experience, history, or literature.  ( People v. Love (1961) 56 Cal.2d 720, 730, 16 Cal.Rptr. 777, 366 P.2d 33, italics added; see also People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 463, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1026, 108 Cal. Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519; People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 819, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 221, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710; People v. Sandoval, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 193, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862; People v. Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 567, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290; People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 922, 254 Cal.Rptr. 508, 765 P.2d 940; People v. Thornton, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 763, 114 Cal.Rptr. 467, 523 P.2d 267.) As an article in a respected law journal explains, fiction, anecdotes, jokes and Bible stories are commonly regarded as acceptable in closing argument. (Levin & Levy, Persuading the Jury with Facts Not in Evidence: The Fiction-Science Spectrum (1956) 105 U.Pa. L.Rev. 139, 147, italics added.) When references to the Bible are involved, the line between literary allusion and religious appeal is often a fine one. A prosecutor who mentions the Bible in closing argument runs a grave risk that a reviewing court will find that the line has been crossed and will reverse the defendant's conviction. Because any use of biblical references in argument must be carefully scrutinized, cautious prosecutors will choose to avoid such references. Nevertheless, so long as they do not appeal to religious authority, prosecutors may refer to the Bible in closing argument to illustrate a point. Here, a reasonable juror likely would understand the prosecutor's biblical references merely as a powerfully dramatic illustration of the gravity and enormity of defendant's crimes. The prosecutor did not argue that biblical law or doctrine required defendant's conviction of the charges against him. [5] Indeed, he prefaced his remarks with a statement that he himself was not a religious person. Because the prosecutor did not use the biblical allusion as an appeal to religious authority, we do not find prosecutorial misconduct in this case.
In his closing argument, the prosecutor said in reference to defendant's attempted murder of Davis: [W]hen [defendant] gets out of that car, he comes around with the gun extended in his right hand up in the ready position, he opens the door, he looks at his friend [Davis] and he says, `My friend, you are through, you're through. I'm going to kill you. You're not going to live to testify against me in the superior court trial. You're going to die. ' That's exactly what his intention is. (Italics added.) Pointing out that Davis testified defendant said only you're through after opening the car door, defendant contends the prosecutor fabricated evidence. While counsel is accorded `great latitude at argument to urge whatever conclusions counsel believes can properly be drawn from the evidence [citation],' counsel may not assume or state facts not in evidence [citation] or mischaracterize the evidence [citation]. ( People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th 73, 133-134, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296.) Whether the inferences the prosecutor draws are reasonable is for the jury to decide. ( People v. Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 522, 71 Cal. Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035.) Here, the prosecutor did not fabricate evidence. After making the argument in question, he immediately said, That's exactly what [defendant's] intention is. The prosecutor thus merely suggested an inference that the jury could draw from Davis's testimony.