Opinion ID: 1255473
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: assignability of the option

Text: In arguing against the assignability of the option to purchase, Koury relies heavily on Rease v. Kittle, 56 W.Va. 269, 49 S.E. 150 (1904), where we characterized an option to purchase real estate as a personal right. We held that in the absence of words of assignability, it could not be assigned. Here, we deal with a lease that does contain language of assignability. Furthermore, we have cases that recognize that a lease is ordinarily assignable unless there is some clear language prohibiting assignability, as we stated in Syllabus Point 2 of Easley Coal Co. v. Brush Creek Coal Co., 91 W.Va. 291, 112 S.E. 512 (1922): Being a restraint upon alienation, a condition against assignment by a lessee or an assignee of a lessee is governed by the rule of strict construction, and it does not exist unless it has been clearly and definitely provided in the lease or some other written instrument made collateral thereto. [2] See also Rees v. Emmons Coal Mining Co., 88 W.Va. 4, 106 S.E. 247 (1921); cf. Miller v. Fredeking, 101 W.Va. 643, 133 S.E. 375 (1926); 11B Michie's Jurisprudence Landlord & Tenant § 57 (1978). The general rule elsewhere is that unless there is some statutory prohibition or an express provision in the lease to the contrary, a lease on real property, other than a tenancy at will, is assignable. [3] Crump v. Tolbert, 210 Ark. 920, 198 S.W.2d 518 (1946); Kassan v. Stout, 9 Cal.3d 39, 106 Cal.Rptr. 783, 507 P.2d 87 (1973); Ochsner v. Langendorf, 115 Colo. 453, 175 P.2d 392 (1946); Rauch v. Circle Theater, 176 Ind.App. 130, 374 N.E.2d 546 (1978); Valley Oil Co. v. Barberian, 344 Mass. 759, 183 N.E.2d 109 (1962); Todd v. Board of Educational Lands and Funds of Neb., 154 Neb. 606, 48 N.W.2d 706 (1951); Kruger v. Page Management Co., Inc., 105 Misc.2d 14, 432 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1980); Gripentrog v. City of Wahpeton, 126 N.W.2d 230 (N.D.1964); Powerine Co. v. Russell's, Inc., 103 Utah 441, 135 P.2d 906 (1943); 49 Am.Jur.2d Landlord and Tenant § 398 (1970); 51C C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 31 (1968). In the present case, we note that the lease was assignable. Furthermore, we are aware of no statute that prohibits assignability of leases. [4] We do not appear to have a case where we have considered the question of whether a purchase option contained in an assignable lease is assignable and passes with the assignment of the lease. Other courts have held that where a lease is assignable and it contains an option to purchase, unless there is clear language in the lease that limits the assignability of the option, the option is also assignable. Berrien County Fruit Exchange v. Pallas, 314 Mich. 66, 22 N.W.2d 74 (1946); Jamson v. Poulos, 184 Neb. 480, 168 N.W.2d 526 (1969); Summa Corp. v. Richardson, 93 Nev. 228, 564 P.2d 181 (1977), appeal on remand, 95 Nev. 399, 596 P.2d 208 (1979); Holmes v. Harris, 33 N.J.Super. 395, 110 A.2d 329 (1954); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Lennon, 94 R.I. 509, 182 A.2d 306 (1962); Rickard v. Dana, 74 Vt. 74, 52 A. 113 (1902); 49 Am.Jur.2d Landlord and Tenant § 374 (1970). We believe this rule is consistent with our general rule favoring assignability as set out in Easley Coal Co. v. Brush Creek Coal Co., 91 W.Va. 291, 112 S.E. 512 (1922). In the case before us, we find no language in the lease that expressly provides that the option itself is not assignable. As previously noted, there is language in the option clause that suggests assignability but we need not rely upon this language in resolving the question before us. The inquiry ends when we find that the lease is assignable and contains no express language prohibiting assignment of the option. We, therefore, find no merit in regard to Koury's nonassignability issue.