Opinion ID: 1547174
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: The Merger Issues

Text: We turn now to the merger issues. [25] All of the appellants contend that some of their convictions must be merged. Invoking the constitutional Double Jeopardy Clause and its prohibition against multiple punishment, Mr. Brooks argues that the multiple enhancements under § 22-104a [§ 22-1804a] properly merge into one enhancement; and alternatively, that the enhancements under these sections should be merged because of the rule of lenity since he was sentenced to a maximum term of more than his natural life on each count. Mr. Sanders asserts that the three individual robbery counts merge into one robbery, and that the [ADW] [c]ounts likewise merge into the one robbery count and must therefore be dismissed. He also argues that the three PFCV counts merge into one. In addition, Mr. Sanders maintains that the armed robbery and ADW counts merge, and that he should have been sentenced on a single PFCV count. The government agrees that the separate counts of ADW merge with the separate armed robbery convictions. See Simms v. United States, 634 A.2d 442, 447 (D.C.1993) (citing Owens v. United States, 497 A.2d 1086, 1096 (D.C.1985) (when the assault is done in order to effectuate the robbery, it is not a separate offense)). The government acknowledges trial court error with regard to two of the five PFCV convictions, specifically those based on counts 9 (PFCV based on ADW against Chanh Ngo) and 12 (PFCV predicated on ADW against Kim Nguyen) because these PFCV convictions are each predicated on an ADW conviction that merges with appellants' convictions for armed robbery. The government insists, however, that the three remaining PFCV convictions do not merge. The government's position regarding the ADW-based convictions is consistent with Morris, supra (where the ADW conviction merges with an armed robbery conviction, the ADW conviction merges with the PFCV conviction relating to the same armed robbery conviction). Consequently the count 9 and count 12 PFCV convictions should be merged upon remand. Whether the remaining PFCV convictions should be merged is a close question. As the government points out, we have held that multiple PFCV convictions based on separate independent crimes do not merge. See Hanna v. United States, 666 A.2d 845, 855 n. 12 (D.C. 1995) (Each time the defendant commits an independent violent crime, a separate decision is made whether or not to possess the firearm during the crime.); see also Stevenson v. United States, 760 A.2d 1034, 1035 (D.C.2000). In this case, the three remaining PFCV convictions are based upon predicate offenses that do not merge under Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) and Byrd v. United States, 598 A.2d 386, 390 (D.C.1991) (en banc): burglary while armed (supporting PFCV count 3), armed robbery (supporting PFCV count 7), and assault with intent to kill and mayhem (both supporting PFCV count 16). Second degree burglary while armed (count 2) and armed robbery (counts 4-6) do not merge because each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not. See Hanna, supra, 666 A.2d at 856. The assault with intent to kill and mayhem charges arising from the shooting of Mr. Ngo also do not merge because these crimes were committed after the robbery was completed and not to effect the robbery. See Owens v. United States, 497 A.2d 1086, 1096 (D.C.1985). The fact that the underlying offenses do not merge does not end our inquiry, however. In Nixon v. United States, 730 A.2d 145 (D.C.1999), we applied the rule of lenity to two PFCV counts to avoid any serious constitutional question of double jeopardy. We concluded that, under the circumstances of that case, the PFCV conviction based on the merged aggravated assault/mayhem counts against one victim merged with a PFCV conviction grounded on assault with intent to kill pertaining to four victims. Id. at 153. We said: [T]he District's legislature (the Council of the District of Columbia) has not clearly or unequivocally stated that a single possession of a single weapon during a single violent act may give rise to multiple PFCV prosecutions, and under the circumstances presented in this case, the rule of lenity should be applied. Id. at 153. In Stevenson, we clarified that Nixon's holding was limited to situations where a single violent act gives rise to multiple predicate offenses. Stevenson, supra, 760 A.2d at 1036. In Nixon, a single perpetrator committed multiple predicate offenses by a single act of firing shots into a car with four occupants. See Nixon, supra, 730 A.2d at 153. Because each offense arose from a single violent act, the rule of lenity dictated that the single act should support only one PFCV conviction. See id. The test for distinguishing single acts from multiple acts was whether the defendant had reached a `fork in the road,' leading to a `fresh impulse' which resulted in a separate offense. Stevenson, supra, 760 A.2d at 1037 (quoting M addox v. United States, 745 A.2d 284, 294 (D.C.2000)). The perpetrators in Stevenson committed armed burglary by entering a clothing store with an intent to rob the store. They then briefly talked to the store manager and another employee before brandishing a gun and completing the armed robbery. See id. at 1035. Although there was only a brief interval between the two crimes, the robbers had an opportunity to reflect, or to reach a fork in the road before their decision to commit the robbery. Id. at 1037-38. As a result, the two crimes could support separate PFCV convictions. As in Stevenson, in the case before us, appellants reached a fork in the road between their decisions to commit burglary while armed (count 3) and armed robbery (count 7). After they entered the jewelry store, the appellants asked to see some of the jewelry and were shown some rings. They did not begin the armed robbery until Mr. Ngo entered the display area. The decision to commit this separate crime of armed robbery supports separate PFCV convictions for the burglary charge and the armed robbery offense. Similarly, Mr. Brooks' decision to shoot Mr. Ngo as the men were leaving the store was a separate criminal act that supported a PFCV conviction (count 16) based on the underlying crimes of mayhem and assault with intent to kill. In short, we conclude that the circumstances of the case before us are not controlled by Nixon, supra, and thus, application of the rule of lenity is inappropriate. On remand, the trial court should not merge counts 3, 7, and 16. Appellants further assert that the crimes of unlawful possession of a pistol merge with carrying a pistol without a license. The Blockburger/Byrd legal principle also applies to these convictions: Where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. Byrd, supra, 598 A.2d at 389. Under this principle, convictions for these crimes do not merge. See Palmore v. United States, 290 A.2d 573, 584-85 (D.C.1972). Furthermore, appellants contend that their three convictions for armed robbery should have merged because the robbery was committed against one entity the store. Their argument fails under Davis v. United States, 498 A.2d 242, 246 (D.C.1985). There, this court remarked, robbery under D.C.Code § 22-2901 is basically a crime against the person. Id. (citation omitted). In light of this fact, more than one armed robbery occurs where [e]vidence shows that each [person] was the victim of a robbery because separate acts of violence were required to prevent each of them from retaining control of the property for which they were responsible. Id. (citation omitted). [26] Thus, appellants armed robbery convictions do not merge.