Opinion ID: 4109135
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reasonableness of Allen’s Sentence

Text: “Sentences in criminal cases are reviewed for procedural and substantive reasonableness.” United States v. Freeman, 640 F.3d 180, 185 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). “This review is conducted under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Id. Allen argues that his sentence was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
For a sentence to be procedurally reasonable, we must ensure that the district court: (1) properly calculated the applicable advisory Guidelines range; (2) considered the other [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors as well as the parties’ arguments for a sentence outside the Guidelines range; and (3) adequately articulated its reasoning for imposing the particular sentence chosen, including any rejection of the parties’ arguments for an outside-Guidelines sentence and any decision to deviate from the advisory Guidelines range. United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 581 (6th Cir. 2007). With respect to the sentence imposed, Allen asserts that the sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to “adequately address” her mental illness as part of her “history and characteristics,” as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3353(a), and dismissed her mental illness as a “non-issue.” With respect to sentencing a defendant, this circuit has stated the following: When sentencing a defendant, the district court “‘must make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented’ and upon a thorough consideration of all of the § 3553(a) factors.” Bolds, 511 F.3d at 580 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007). The district court commits procedural error where it fails to set forth a statement of reasons sufficient to satisfy the appellate court that it has considered the parties' arguments and has a reasoned basis for imposing a particular sentence. Id.; see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). 6 No. 15-5785, USA v. Desera Allen The court need not “make specific findings related to each of the factors considered.” Bolds, 511 F.3d at 580 (quoting United States v. McClellan, 164 F.3d 308, 310 (6th Cir. 1999)). However, “when ‘a defendant raises a particular argument in seeking a lower sentence, the record must reflect both that the district judge considered the defendant’s argument and that the judge explained the basis for rejecting it.’ ” United States v. Jones, 489 F.3d 243, 251 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 437 F.3d 550, 554 (6th Cir. 2006)); see also Simmons, 587 F.3d at 360 (“A sentencing judge must explicitly consider factors that are raised by the defendant or that are otherwise especially relevant to the case at bar.”) United States v. Daniels, 641 F. App’x 481, 488 (6th Cir. 2016) (internal citations updated). At the sentencing hearing, while considering the history and characteristics under 18 U.S.C. § 3353(a), the district court stated that “[t]he court must recognize the mental condition, and we will address that later.” The next time Allen’s mental health was addressed was when the court imposed its sentence, during which the district court stated that “[t]he court will recommend that [the defendant] receive a physical and a mental health evaluation and needed treatment while in the custody of the bureau of prisons,” and further, that upon release from imprisonment, “[the defendant] shall participate in a program of mental health treatment as directed by the probation officer until such time as [the defendant is] released from the program.” After the district court imposed its sentence, Allen’s attorney stated the following to the court: Your honor, just an inquiry. When you were going over the relevant sentencing factors, you stated that you would address the mental health issue, I’m not sure the court addressed the mental health issue, just as it pertained to the sentence. I think the court just addressed it as to her incarceration, but I didn’t know if the court was going to go into anything further in sentencing regarding her mental health, so that’s the inquiry I have for the court. (R. 234, Hr’g Tr. at Pg. ID 1117.) 7 No. 15-5785, USA v. Desera Allen The government thereafter clarified defense counsel’s statement, stating that “I think what [counsel] is referring to is the motion for variance, to be clear for the record,” to which the district court responded: Well, the motion is denied. We understand that [the defendant] has mental problems. . . . but under the circumstances, you know, it was quite clear that nobody filed a motion for a mental evaluation in this case . . . so that’s a non-issue as far as I’m concerned. The people I had in court today, most of them had mental problems, and I think you said that more than half the people in the federal penitentiary have mental problems . . . I don’t doubt that. (R. 234, Hr’g Tr. at Pg. ID 1117–18.) Allen asserts that the district court’s statements demonstrate that it ignored her history and characteristics as they pertain to her mental health. Allen’s assertion is incorrect. The district court’s sentence was procedurally reasonable because the record reflects that the district court’s individualized assessment did not ignore Allen’s mental health. Rather, the record reflects that the district court considered Allen’s argument for further variance based upon her mental health, and in rejecting that argument remarked on the commonness of mental illness among federal offenders, implying the court did not consider Allen’s mental illness to be exceptional enough to justify a lower sentence.1 When read in its full context, the district court’s statement does not demonstrate that it ignored Allen’s diagnosis of bipolar disorder, nor does it suggest that the court considered her disorder irrelevant. Rather, we understand the court’s explanation to mean that while taking Allen’s mental health into account, all that was known was that she was recently diagnosed with bipolar disorder, and given that Allen had already received a downward departure and a sentence below the suggested guidelines, a downward 1 We also read the district court’s explanation in the context of the guidelines’ policy statement that “[m]ental health and emotional conditions may be relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted, if such conditions, individually or in combination with other offender characteristics, are present to an unusual degree and distinguish the case from the typical cases covered by the guidelines.” U.S.S.G. 5H1.3 (emphasis added). 8 No. 15-5785, USA v. Desera Allen variance based solely on the fact that she was recently diagnosed with bipolar disorder was unwarranted. In noting that no mental evaluation had been requested, the court essentially explained that it was provided no medical evidence demonstrating that Allen’s bipolar disorder had any influence on her criminal conduct. Thus, given that no further details about Allen’s diagnosis were presented to the court, it did not abuse its discretion in denying further departure or variance. The record further demonstrates that the district court considered Allen’s arguments about her mental health, and made an individualized assessment, when it recommended that Allen should receive a mental health evaluation and needed treatment for her mental health issues while incarcerated. Further, the district court ordered Allen to participate in a program of mental health treatment as directed by the probation officer upon release from incarceration. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion with respect to the procedural reasonableness of Allen’s sentence, given that the district court explicitly considered the mental health argument she raised in seeking a lower sentence.
When reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard, we “‘tak[e] into account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.’” United States v. Sandoval, 501 F. App’x 491, 492 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). “The essence of a substantive-reasonableness claim is whether the length of the sentence is ‘greater than necessary’ to achieve the sentencing goals set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. (quoting United States v. Tristan–Madrigal, 601 F.3d 629, 632–33 (6th Cir. 2010)). “For a sentence to be substantively 9 No. 15-5785, USA v. Desera Allen reasonable, it must be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances of the offense and offender, and sufficient but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of § 3553(a).” United States v. Curry, 536 F.3d 571, 573 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Allen asserts that her sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court purportedly “failed to recognize that the nature and impact of mental illness in her circumstances necessitated a lesser sentence.” Specifically, she states that her “bipolar diagnosis while incarcerated prior to sentencing, as well as her family’s unfortunate history of mental illness, cast a pall over the proceedings that the district court failed to fully appreciate.” Allen’s argument is unavailing. Based upon a base offense level of 31, a criminal history category of VI, and her status as a career offender, Allen’s sentencing range was 188 to 235 months of imprisonment. But after granting the government’s motion for a downward departure, the district court sentenced Allen to 151 months of imprisonment. Allen’s assertion that her below-guidelines sentence is unreasonably severe, because it should have been shorter, does not give rise to a presumption of unreasonableness. Curry, 536 F.3d at 573. In fact, this court has held that “it follows from simple logic that [a] below-Guidelines sentence is presumed . . . not to be unreasonably severe.” United States v. Bailey, 264 F. App’x 480, 485 (6th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original). The district court recognized Allen’s mental health diagnosis, made note of her troubled upbringing, and accordingly ordered mental health treatment and imposed a sentence at the low end of the departure range, making readily apparent to this court that the district court’s sentence was proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances of the offense and offender, and sufficient but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of § 3553(a). 10 No. 15-5785, USA v. Desera Allen Allen’s argument that the district court’s sentence was substantively unreasonable because it failed to consider “the impact of her mental illness in her circumstances” when imposing its sentence, is unpersuasive because Allen provided the district court with no expert testimony, or any form of medical evidence demonstrating that her mental illness was longstanding or that her disorder had an impact on her criminal conduct. Thus, for the abovementioned reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in not awarding further variance.