Opinion ID: 765540
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: FRSA Preemption

Text: 12 [T]he Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. Federal law, therefore, preempts state law. The Supreme Court summarized how the courts are to analyze preemption issues: 13 In the interest of avoiding unintended encroachment on the authority of states, however, a court interpreting a federal statute pertaining to a subject traditionally governed by state law will be reluctant to find pre-emption. Thus, pre- emption will not lie unless it is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. Evidence of pre- emptive purpose is sought in the text and structure of the statute at issue. If the statute contains an express pre-emption clause, the task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress' pre-emptive intent. 14 CSX Transport, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 663-64 (1993) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Because federal preemption is a question of statutory interpretation, we review this issue de novo. 15 In response to a perceived need for comprehensive rail safety regulation, Congress passed the Federal Rail Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA), as amended 49 U.S.C. sec. 20101 et seq. 3 The purpose of the FRSA was to promote safety in every area of railroad operations and reduce railroad-related accidents and incidents. 49 U.S.C. sec. 20101. Thus, the Secretary of Transportation was given broad power to regulate and a mandate to use that power: The Secretary of Transportation, as necessary, shall prescribe regulations and issue orders for every area of railroad safety. 49 U.S.C. sec. 20103. The Secretary regulates rail safety through the also advanced the goal of national uniformity of regulation because one of its provisions expressly preempts state laws regulating rail safety. 49 U.S.C. sec. 20106. Because the FRSA contains an express preemption provision, our task principally is to apply the provision according to its terms. Section 20106 provides: 16 Laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad safety shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable. A state may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety until the Secretary of Transportation prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the state requirement. A state may adopt or continue in force an additional or more stringent law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety when the law, regulation or order-- 17 (1) is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard; 18 (2) is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or order of the United States Government; and 19 (3) does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce. 20 Under this scheme, then, state regulations can fill gaps where the Secretary has not yet regulated, and it can respond to safety concerns of a local rather than national character. Wisconsin does not justify sec. 192.25 as a response to a local safety hazard, so the precise issue before us is whether the Secretary prescribe[d] a regulation or issue[d] an order covering the subject matter of sec. 192.25. This issue requires us to answer three sub-issues: What is the subject matter of the state requirement? What action by the Secretary amounts to issuing an order? (Prescrib[ing] a regulation is a clear enough term.) When does such an order or regulation cover the subject matter of a state requirement? 21 The third question is the most easily answered because in Easterwood the Supreme Court thoroughly analyzed when FRA regulations cover the subject matter of a state requirement. Noting that cover was a somewhat restrictive term, the Court held that [the party asserting preemption] must establish more than that [the regulations] . . pre-emption will lie only if the federal regulations substantially subsume the subject matter of the relevant state law. 507 U.S. at 664-65 (citations omitted). Importantly, preemption does not depend on a single federal regulation itself covering the subject matter of the state law. In Easterwood the Court found preemption by examining related safety regulations and the context of the overall structure of the regulations. Id. at 674. 22 What constitutes an order for FRSA preemption is less clear. This term is not defined in the FRSA, and the Supreme Court has not had occasion to define it. The district court relied upon the definition of order in the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. sec. 551(6), which defines an order to include a final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form[,] . . . other than rule making. Certainly if an agency action constitutes an order under the APA definition, it would be an order for FRSA preemption. Because the actions in this case fit the APA definition, we need not decide whether an action that does not fit that definition could nonetheless be an order under sec. 20106. But we also note that final disposition includes informal decisions. See Atchison, T. & S. F. R.R. v. Pena, 44 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (letter from the FRA's Chief Counsel announcing change in the FRA's interpretation of law was final agency action because letter made the FRA's position absolutely clear), aff'd sub nom. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.R., 516 U.S. 152 (1996) (not addressing issue of final agency action); see also United Transp. Union v. Lewis, 711 F.2d 233, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (court reviewed agency's interpretation of law expressed in letter). For preemption, the important thing is that the FRA considered a subject matter and made a decision regarding it. The particular form of the decision is not dispositive. 23 The subject matter of the state requirement is the safety concerns that the state law addresses. See Burlington N. R.R. v. Montana, 880 F.2d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 1989) ([The FRSA] preempts all state regulations aimed at the same safety concerns addressed by FRA regulations.). Generally, determining the safety concerns that a state or federal requirement is aimed at will necessarily involve some level of generalization that requires backing away somewhat from the specific provisions at issue. See Shots v. CSX Transp., Inc., 38 F.3d 304, 307 (7th Cir. 1994) (in analyzing preemption of state negligence claim for inadequate warning device at rail crossing, court referred to subject matter of highway safety at that crossing). Otherwise a state law could be preempted only if there were an identical federal regulation, and, as we noted, Easterwood teaches that this is not so. See 507 U.S. at 674 (preemption found through series of related regulations and overall structure of the regulations, although no regulation directly addressed the state requirement); see also Burlington N. R.R., 880 F.2d at 1106 (FRA regulation permitting telemetry device rather than visual inspection preempted state law requiring trains to have a caboose because both were aimed at the safety concern of monitoring brakes and signals at the rear of the train). But with too much generalizing--public safety or rail safety--our analysis would be meaningless because all FRA regulations cover those concerns.