Opinion ID: 2575903
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Court's Agreeing to Excuse Defendant From the Courtroom

Text: In an argument that he presents in the alternative to claim IV, ante, defendant claims that the trial court violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution (specifically his rights to due process and to confront the witnesses against him), and his rights under sections 977 and 1043 to be present during the trial, when it acceded to his wishes to be excused on certain days. There was no reversible error, and no violation of the Fifth or Sixth Amendments. First, defendant maintains that the trial court erred in not requiring him to waive in writing his presence during voir dire or other proceedings for which former section 977 did not compel his presence but required a written waiver if he wanted to be absent. (Former ї 977, subd. (b), as amended by Stats.1968, ch. 1064, ї 1, pp. 2064-2065.) To the extent that these proceedings occurred before the day on which he disrupted the trial, and to the extent that the court required only oral waivers and did not attempt to obtain them in writing, it erred. ( People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 782, 254 Cal. Rptr. 257, 765 P.2d 419.) The errors, however, were harmless ( People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243), because the record makes clear that defendant voluntarily waived his right to be present, if only orally. ( Garrison, supra, at pp. 782-783, 254 Cal.Rptr. 257, 765 P.2d 419; People v. Ruiz (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 162, 169, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 640.) Second, defendant complains that the trial court should not have honored his requests to be excused from court sessions involving the taking of evidence at the guilt phase after he assaulted his counsel. As stated, the version of section 977 in effect at the time of the guilt phase trial and section 1043 provide that capital defendants may not voluntarily absent themselves during the taking of evidence at their trials unless they have disrupted the trial and the court has reason to believe the disruptive behavior will continue. From all that appears in the record, the trial court was entitled to conclude, following defendant's assault on his counsel, that defendant would continue to disrupt the proceedings if forced to attend them. Under the circumstances, it did not abuse its discretion in not forcing defendant, following his assault on counsel, to attend on those days that he did not wish to do so. (See People v. Gutierrez (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1196, 1208, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 917, 63 P.3d 1000.) [9] Defendant further maintains that, no matter what statutory law may provide, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the federal Constitution require the attendance of capital defendants at trial, even if they do not wish to be present. Defendant correctly notes that we have previously rejected this argument. ( People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1210, 56 Cal. Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254; People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 405, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610.) We adhere to the view we expressed in Jackson and Price.