Opinion ID: 199256
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Federal Gratuities and Honest Services Mail Fraud Statutes

Text: 24 Sawyer contends that the Supreme Court's decision in Sun-Diamond provides grounds for vacating his conviction. In that opinion, the Court interpreted the federal gratuities statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, 5 to mean that the prosecution must prove a link between an object of value given to a public official and a specific official act for or because of which it was given. See Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 406. Sawyer argued in his petition for coram nobis that the analogous gratuity statute in Massachusetts, chapter 268A, section three (section three), should be construed similarly to require proof of a specific official act for which the gratuity was given. Indeed, since Sawyer filed his petition - and since the district court decided to grant the writ - the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has ruled, relying partly on Sun-Diamond, that to establish a violation of section three, there must be proof of linkage to a particular official act. Scaccia v. State Ethics Comm'n, 431 Mass. 351, 356 (2000). Sawyer claims that the information to which he pled guilty was based on his violation of section three, requiring the government to have demonstrated a link between his allegedly illegal gratuities and specific, identifiable official acts of Massachusetts legislators. Because the prosecution did not attempt to offer such proof, he believes that Sun-Diamond renders his conviction unjust. We disagree. 25 Sawyer pled guilty to one count of honest services mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1346. 6 We have recognized previously that Congress enacted this statute [§ 1341] in 1872, as 'a general proscription against using the mails to initiate correspondence in furtherance of any 'scheme or artifice to defraud.'' United States v. Grandmaison, 77 F.3d 555, 565 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987)). The legislative history of § 1341 suggests that Congress intended to shield people from schemes to deprive them of their money or property in passing the statute. McNally, 483 U.S. at 356. More recently, the Supreme Court has interpreted the meaning of fraud in § 1341 to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law in the absence of explicit evidence of Congressional intent to the contrary. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 23 (1999). 26 Before 1987, most courts interpreted § 1341 broadly to reach schemes to defraud people of intangible property interests - such as the honest services of their public officials - as well as tangible property rights. See Grandmaison, 77 F.3d at 565. The Supreme Court held in McNally, however, that § 1341 did not reach schemes to defraud citizens of their intangible right to the honest government services of their public officers. See McNally, 483 U.S. at 355. Congress promptly responded to this decision by enacting § 1346, which proscribes schemes to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (emphasis added). We have recognized that § 1346 was intended to overrule McNally by placing honest services mail fraud within the ambit of § 1341. See, e.g., Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 723; Grandmaison, 77 F.3d at 565-66. 27 Underlying the applicability of §§ 1341 and 1346 to government officials is the notion that a public official acts as 'trustee for the citizens and the State . . . and thus owes the normal fiduciary duties of a trustee, e.g., honesty and loyalty' to them. United States v. Silvano, 812 F.2d 754, 759 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1363 (4th Cir. 1979)). Theft of honest services occurs when a public official strays from this duty: 28 When a government officer decides how to proceed in an official endeavor - as when a legislator decides how to vote on an issue - his constituents have a right to have their best interests form the basis of that decision. If the official instead secretly makes his decision based on his own personal interests - as when an official accepts a bribe or personally benefits from an undisclosed conflict of interest - the official has defrauded the public of his honest services. 29 United States v. Lopez-Lukis, 102 F.3d 1164, 1169 (11th Cir. 1997). 30