Opinion ID: 715730
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Propriety of Court's Denial of Motion to Withdraw Plea

Text: 58 We review the District Court's denial of Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United States v. Wade, 940 F.2d 1375, 1376 (10th Cir.1991). We will not reverse unless Appellant can show that the trial court acted unjustly or unfairly. United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1573 (10th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1236, 127 L.Ed.2d 579 (1994). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(d) states that if a motion to withdraw is made before sentencing, a district court may permit withdrawal of the plea upon a showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason. Although the burden is on the defendant to show such a reason, we have held that motions to withdraw guilty pleas before sentencing are to be freely allowed, viewed with favor, treated with liberality, and given a great deal of latitude. United States v. Wade, 940 F.2d 1375, 1377 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Rhodes, 913 F.2d 839, 845 (10th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1122, 111 S.Ct. 1079, 112 L.Ed.2d 1184 (1991). 59 This Court has enumerated the following factors to consider in determining whether an accused has met the burden of establishing that there is a fair and just reason for allowing withdrawal of a guilty plea: 60 (1) whether the defendant has asserted his innocence; 61 (2) prejudice to the government; 62 (3) delay in filing defendant's motion; 63 (4) inconvenience to the court; 64 (5) defendant's assistance of counsel; 65 (6) whether the plea is knowing and voluntary; and 66 (7) waste of judicial resources. 67 United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1572 (10th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1236, 127 L.Ed.2d 579 (1994). We will take up each of these factors in turn. 68 1. Assertion of Innocence: The District Court, although highly skeptical of Appellant's assertion of innocence, held that this factor only requires that Mr. Carr assert his innocence, which he has done. Carr I, slip op. at 17-18. We agree with the District Court's conclusion. This factor weighs in Appellant's favor. 69 2. Prejudice to government: Allowing Appellant to withdraw his guilty plea would prejudice the government in several ways. At the time of the motion to withdraw the plea, three of the codefendants had already been sentenced and apparently had already received the benefit of government motions for substantial assistance. Consequently, their incentive to provide truthful and complete testimony in a future trial of Appellant is now greatly reduced. The government also states that it cannot now locate several original witnesses. Further, if Appellant is allowed to withdraw his plea and go to trial, the government will have to expend resources re-issuing approximately seventy subpoenas, and government personnel will have to disrupt work on current cases in order to revisit this case. Some degree of prejudice to the government is, of course, inevitable from a plea withdrawal; however, in this case the prejudice is substantial. 70 3. Delay in filing motion to withdraw plea. Appellant delayed three months in filing his motion to withdraw his plea. Such extended delays weigh against granting a withdrawal motion because they often result in substantial prejudice to the government and may suggest manipulation by the defendant. 71 [I]f the defendant has long delayed his withdrawal motion, and has had the full benefit of competent counsel at all times, the reasons given to support withdrawal must have considerab[le] ... force. The movant's reasons must meet exceptionally high standards where the delay between the plea and the withdrawal motion has substantially prejudiced the Government's ability to prosecute the case. 72 United States v. Vidakovich, 911 F.2d 435, 439-40 (10th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1089, 111 S.Ct. 968, 112 L.Ed.2d 1055 (1991) (delay of five months). 73 Indeed, in the instant case, the District Court found that Appellant was engaging in a manipulative course of conduct designed to avoid the consequences of his guilt, and that the delay between the plea and the withdrawal motion had substantially prejudiced the Government's ability to prosecute the case. Carr I, slip. op. at 13. While it appears from Appellant's pleadings that he may not have had the full benefit of his counsel for part of the three-month period of delay, he does not present forceful reasons to explain the entire period of delay. The total length of the delay along with its resulting prejudice to the government weigh heavily against Appellant's motion. 74 4. Inconvenience to the court. As with the prejudice factor, some degree of inconvenience to the court from a plea withdrawal is inevitable. In the instant case, the government alleges significant inconvenience, noting that it anticipates a four-week trial with seventy witnesses, should the Appellant's motion be granted. The anticipated length and complexity of the government's case against the Appellant should not necessarily weigh against the Appellant since he originally had a right to a jury trial. Nevertheless, inconvenience to the court, including the significant disruption of its docket and consequent delays in other pending cases, is a factor that must weigh against the Appellant. 75 5. Defendant's assistance of counsel. For the reasons discussed in Part A, supra, we hold that counsel's conduct was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. This factor does not weigh in Appellant's favor. 76 6. Voluntariness of guilty plea. For the reasons discussed in Part A, supra, we hold that the plea was voluntary. This factor does not weigh in Appellant's favor. 77 7. Waste of judicial resources. Again, some waste of judicial resources from a plea withdrawal is inevitable. Though there does not appear to be an inordinate waste in the instant case, this consequence must be taken into account and does weigh against the Appellant. 5 78 Conclusion: Taken together, the above factors weigh decidedly against Appellant. The Appellant has failed to show that the trial court acted unjustly or unfairly in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Consequently, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion.