Opinion ID: 1301352
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: majority's analysis

Text: Shorn of its obfuscating fleece, the majority opinion holds that trespassers may not be enjoined from further trespassing so long as the trespassers are gathering signatures for an initiative petition. Because I believe that this case should be analyzed differently and resolved in plaintiff's favor, I dissent.
After stating the facts amidst occasional hypothesizing, the majority is emphatic in stating the well-recognized principle that a court should avoid constitutional adjudication when it may decide a case by resort to ordinary legal premises. This is a sound principle, established, no doubt, in deference to the legislature. It is the legislature, rather than this court, that should balance and accommodate competing public policies and interests. When possible, courts should thus avoid the granite of constitutional adjudication. Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, 192 Conn. 48, 469 A.2d 1201, 1210 (1984). The majority states that it will discuss constitutional provisions and interpretations without necessarily deciding any constitutional right or violation. 307 Or. at 680, 773 P.2d at 1297. (Emphasis added.) The majority's use of the word necessarily is puzzling. Does the majority wish to allow readers to divine for themselves whether the majority in fact decides constitutional rights or violations? Is the majority uncertain whether it determines constitutional rights or violations? Or, is the majority attempting to communicate that it unnecessarily decides constitutional rights or violations? In any event, a plain reading of the majority opinion makes it abundantly clear that the majority expressly decides several constitutional issues while swearing allegiance to the rule against premature constitutional adjudication. The majority comes on as a law court in chancellor's clothing. In the guise of performing only a subconstitutional analysis, the majority states: In this case, if a declaratory judgment and injunction properly applies ordinary equitable principles, it also will not violate the constitutional rights of plaintiff. Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution entitles plaintiff to a `remedy by due course of law for injury done' to its property interest; it does not entitle plaintiff to equitable intervention in advance of any injury. A proper order will not create an easement for signature-gatherers or anyone else, nor otherwise take plaintiff's property for public use without due process or just compensation contrary to Article I, section 18, of the Constitution or to the Fourteenth Amendment. See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 US 74, 100 SCt 2035, 64 LEd2d 741 (1980). 307 Or. at 688, 773 P.2d at 1302. Thus, even though the majority declares that [w]e need not engage in any federal or state constitutional declaration, 307 Or. at 689, 773 P.2d at 1302, it is clear that the majority has made several important Oregon constitutional holdings  (1) that plaintiff cannot get an injunction to remedy the present injury resulting from defendants' threatened future trespass and nuisance; and (2) that under a proper order, there will be no unconstitutional taking of plaintiff's property. The majority opinion clearly is not a subconstitutional analysis, and the majority should acknowledge that it has made constitutional holdings. The majority's constitutional holdings merit further comment. The majority notes that [a] court applying a common-law rule or fashioning an equitable order must observe constitutional principles as much as a legislative or administrative body. 307 Or. at 680, 773 P.2d at 1297. The majority then states the standard for determining whether a constitutional analysis is required: Whether a judicial decision of a private claim invades constitutional rights depends on whether the remedy fashioned by the court invades constitutional rights. 307 Or. at 680, 773 P.2d at 1297. Inexplicably, the majority ignores this standard. The majority's conclusory holding that Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution entitles plaintiff to a `remedy by due course of law for injury done' to its property interest; it does not entitle plaintiff to equitable intervention in advance of any injury, presumes that plaintiff has not suffered harm from defendants' threat to continue to trespass unless enjoined. The evidence in the record makes it clear that plaintiff's tenants do not want political activities carried on in the Center. It follows that if defendants are allowed compelled access to plaintiff's private property, plaintiff's property interest will incur present injury from defendants' threats to continue to trespass and create a nuisance because plaintiff would not be able to demand the same rents that it otherwise could, especially for space near compelled access sites. The majority recognizes that allowing defendants compelled access to plaintiff's private property under a proper order would cause injury to plaintiff's property interest: The court may, however, issue an injunction imposing reasonable restrictions on any attempted possession    by defendants of any part of plaintiff's premises and may also place reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of seeking petition signatures in plaintiff's mall and on its walkways so as to reduce or eliminate interference and distraction [in the mall]   .         When an order protects plaintiff's main interest in eliminating or minimizing interference with its tenants and their customers, any residual legal issues may well be left to plaintiff's remedies at law. 307 Or. at 687-688, 773 P.2d at 1301-1302. (Emphasis added.) Because the majority cannot properly issue an order which violates plaintiff's constitutional rights and because the so-called remedy fashioned by the majority opinion undoubtedly will injure plaintiff's constitutional rights under Article I, section 10, the majority opinion should have fully analyzed plaintiff's constitutional right to a remedy by due course of law for injury done. Even though the remedy fashioned by the majority will injure plaintiff's property rights, the majority refuses to engage in an Article I, section 10, discussion. Thus, the majority opinion reads into Article I, section 10, a requirement that a remedy may be obtained only for certain types of injuries, e.g., for an injury which is more than minimal or for an injury which has not been reduced or minimized. Article I, section 10, does not expressly or impliedly state that an injury must rise to a certain severity before it will be recognized as actionable; rather, this section provides that every man shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done him in his person, property, or reputation. The majority's constitutional holding that [a] proper order will not create an easement for signature-gatherers or anyone else, nor otherwise take plaintiff's property for public use without due process or just compensation contrary to Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution or to the Fourteenth Amendment, 307 Or. at 688, 773 P.2d at 1302, is absolutely devoid of analysis. The majority made this important Oregon constitutional holding with nothing more than a mere conclusory statement. The majority did cite a United States Supreme Court case for authority, but Oregon constitutional provisions are examined independent of federal analysis. [1] The Oregon Constitution, like the California State Constitution, certainly may be interpreted as providing more protection under these circumstances than the federal constitution. See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980). That the majority interpreted Article I, section 18, consistently with federal standards is no excuse for lack of reasoned analysis under Oregon law. Also, the majority opinion fails to articulate any test for determining what constitutes a taking without just compensation. Apparently, the use and nature of the private property is a consideration. Here a large mall is at issue, but what is the rule? Does size make a difference? If so, where is the cutoff  a mid-size shopping center, a free-standing grocery store, a convenience store, a small neighborhood store? Does the fact that a mall attracts large numbers of people make a difference? If so, where is the line with respect to other places where large numbers of people congregate, affording superior opportunities for signature-gathering, such as sports stadiums, convention halls, theaters, large office or apartment buildings, factories, supermarkets, or department stores? The majority provides no guidance. The nature of the signature-gathering apparently is also a consideration, but the vague directive the majority gives is that under a proper order there will be no taking without just compensation. Evidently, a proper order means an order stating reasonable time, place, and manner rules, but the majority should provide guidance as to what would constitute a proper order. [2] In sum, the majority's opinion clearly is not subconstitutional. Therefore, the majority's statement that we conclude on a subconstitutional level that plaintiff is not entitled to the broad injunction it sought and received, 307 Or. at 680, 773 P.2d at 1297, is simply incorrect. The majority's approach to this case requires constitutional holdings which should be addressed with reasoned analysis.
I now turn to the majority's discussion and holding concerning the trial court's injunction which provides, in part, that defendants are hereby restrained and enjoined from entering upon plaintiff's property to exercise their expressions of opinion. The majority correctly recognizes that this part of the injunction goes too far, but the majority opinion also goes too far. Simply stated, the facts are that [i]n December 1985, defendants entered the Center to gather signatures on three initiative petitions. [3] 307 Or. at 678-679, 773 P.2d at 1296. Defendants did not peaceably and unobtrusively talk politics at the Center. 307 Or. at 686, 773 P.2d at 1301. Because the instant facts involve signature-gathering rather than mere expression of opinion, the portion of the trial court's injunction about expression of opinion should be stricken. Rather than dealing with this part of the trial court's injunction in this simple and straightforward manner, the majority lapses into a lengthy and emotional discussion, and even concludes with a holding: [D]efendants cannot be enjoined from entering the Center to express their opinion, so long as they do so reasonably and without interfering with plaintiff's commercial enterprise. 307 Or. at 687, 773 P.2d at 1301. Because this discussion and holding have absolutely nothing to do with the facts and are unnecessary to the disposition of this case, they constitute dicta. If dicta had the force of law, I could perhaps understand [the majority's indulgence in dicta], but [i]t does not, and I object to `unnecessarily broad dicta,' which merely serves to confuse analysis. State v. Freeland, 295 Or. 367, 384, 667 P.2d 509 (1983) (Jones, J., dissenting; citation omitted). Dicta not only muddies the waters, but also is often wrong. Additionally, [w]e should not write dicta where we do not fully foresee the implications of our analysis or advice. Haynes v. Burks, 290 Or. 75, 97, 619 P.2d 632 (1980) (Tanzer, J., specially concurring). There are many ways for persons to exercise their expressions of opinion upon plaintiff's private property; some might not be trespassers, but some might be trespassers and, if so, could be barred from the Center by injunction. For example, if a person were to enter plaintiff's private property for the sole purpose of displaying a political sign while quietly walking throughout the Center, he might be a trespasser; but if several people were casually to discuss a political candidate while shopping at the Center (that is, while upon plaintiff's private property for a purpose within the scope of plaintiff's invitation to be there), they might not be trespassers. Because expressions of opinion take myriad forms and involve countless factual settings, the majority's extensive and overbroad dicta should be ignored. Apparently, as justification for its holding on facts not presented in this case, the majority goes through a number of hypotheticals. For example, the majority states: Taking plaintiff's position literally    it could allow solicitors to circulate petitions for measures favorable to its business interests but not for measures that it opposes. 307 Or. at 685, 773 P.2d at 1300. Despite the majority's statement that [o]f course, plaintiff does not exercise political discrimination among those who may enter its common areas, it only postulates a theoretical right to do so, 307 Or. at 686, 773 P.2d at 1300, it is the majority that is postulating plaintiff's rights to do so, not plaintiff. The majority states that courts need not issue declaratory or injunctive orders for hypothetical cases. 307 Or. at 686, 773 P.2d at 1300. (Emphasis added.) But this is not the rule. Simply stated, [d]eciding hypothetical cases is not a judicial function. Oregon Cry. Mfgs. Ass'n v. White, 159 Or. 99, 109, 78 P.2d 572 (1938). Furthermore, [n]either can courts, in the absence of constitutional authority, render advisory opinions. Id. To be sure, the majority's dicta does not merely explain something, rather the majority makes a holding based upon facts not at issue. Accordingly, the majority renders an advisory opinion based upon its own hypotheticals. Thus, this part of the majority's opinion should be replaced with a simple statement that the part of the trial court's injunction relating to expression of opinion is improper because it reaches too far.
I now turn to the majority's convoluted discussion of nuisance and trespass. Although the same conduct may constitute both a trespass and a nuisance, they are distinct torts. Furthermore, the question of whether an injunction should issue is analyzed differently under trespass and nuisance. The majority's implied assumption that there is no distinction between the law of trespass and nuisance is incorrect. The majority begins its discussion of continuing trespass and nuisance law with a partial statement of continuing trespass law. Rather than fully stating the law of continuing trespass, the majority then obscures continuing trespass law by making the misleading and overbroad statement that an injunction remains discretionary and subject to equitable considerations; it is not available as a matter of right. 307 Or. at 681, 773 P.2d at 1297. The majority then blends continuing trespass law and nuisance law by citing two inapposite nuisance cases as support for this overbroad statement about continuing trespass law. [4] The majority next provides an inapposite quote from Martin et ux v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Or. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959), cert. den. 362 U.S. 918, 80 S.Ct. 672, 4 L.Ed.2d 739 (1960). [5] The majority concludes by stating that the cases show that invasions of another's real property are not always enjoined, even when the invasion qualifies as `trespass' for purposes of liability for damages. 307 Or. at 683, 773 P.2d at 1299; see also 307 Or. at 687-689, 773 P.2d at 1301-1302. This proposition is terribly misleading because it is grossly overbroad and incorrectly implies that trespass law is devoid of structured rules. [6] The majority has cited only inapposite cases for this proposition, [7] and has failed to cite even one relevant trespass case as support. In short, in a desperate attempt to avoid a proper continuing trespass analysis, the majority has ignored existing law, cited inapposite cases, blended trespass and nuisance law, and made overbroad statements. Furthermore, because the majority turns its decision on nuisance law, everything that the majority states about trespass law is dicta and should be ignored.
The majority does not expressly state that it is employing nuisance law, but it does. The majority holds: The trial court went too far in issuing an injunction providing that `defendants are hereby restrained and enjoined from entering upon plaintiff's private property to exercise their expressions of opinion or to gather signatures in the initiative and referendum process without plaintiff's permission or consent.' Clearly they can if they do so reasonably and peaceably. Moreover, plaintiff is not entitled to an injunction to prohibit peaceful solicitation of signatures in the mall or on its walkways that does not substantially interfere with the commercial activity on the premises. The solicitation of signatures of patrons does not in and of itself constitute substantial interference. The public policy behind the signature-gathering process limits equitable enforcement of plaintiff's preferred total exclusion of signature solicitors. 307 Or. at 687, 773 P.2d at 1301. (Emphasis added.) The words reasonably and substantially interfere are labels that are used in determining whether a nuisance exists, but they do not apply under trespass law. Although the majority applies nuisance law, the majority provides only a partial statement of this law: In a case in which a very real public interest is at stake    the court should not issue an injunction if it would cause serious injury to the public interest unless without the equitable relief the owner or his equivalent would experience a more serious injury. 307 Or. at 684, 773 P.2d at 1299. The majority should have provided a complete discussion of nuisance law. A private nuisance is an invasion of an individual's interest in the use and enjoyment of land. Raymond v. Southern Pacific Co., 259 Or. 629, 634, 488 P.2d 460 (1971). An interference with the use and enjoyment of land is not actionable unless that interference be both substantial and unreasonable. Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 184 Or. 336, 348, 198 P.2d 847 (1948) (emphasis added); see also Jewett v. Deerhorn Enterprises, Inc., 281 Or. 469, 473, 575 P.2d 164 (1978). A general weighing process is used in determining the existence of a nuisance. See Gronn et ux v. Rogers Construction, Inc., 221 Or. 226, 232-33, 350 P.2d 1086 (1960). Whether a particular use of property constitutes an actionable nuisance cannot be determined by fixed general rules but depends on the individual facts of a particular case. Jewett v. Deerhorn Enterprises, Inc., supra, 281 Or. at 473, 575 P.2d 164. This court, however, has used a number of guidelines in assessing each fact situation. [8] See Jewett v. Deerhorn Enterprises, Inc., supra, 281 Or. at 473, 575 P.2d 164; Gronn et ux v. Rogers Construction, Inc., supra, 221 Or. at 233, 350 P.2d 1086; York v. Stallings, 217 Or. 13, 21-22, 341 P.2d 529 (1959); Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, supra, 184 Or. at 361, 198 P.2d 847. An injunction does not issue as a matter of absolute or unqualified right once a nuisance has been established. Jewett v. Deerhorn Enterprises, Inc., supra, 281 Or. at 478, 575 P.2d 164. Rather, the court employs a second balancing test to determine whether a defendant's conduct should be enjoined. See Jewett v. Deerhorn Enterprises, Inc., supra, 281 Or. at 478-80, 575 P.2d 164; York v. Stallings, supra, 217 Or. at 22-26, 341 P.2d 529. York refers to this second weighing process as the balancing doctrine. Although York does not clearly define the balancing doctrine, a close reading of the case shows that this doctrine involves two components  the relative injuries to the parties (the comparative injury doctrine, see 217 Or. at 23, 341 P.2d 529) and to the interest of the public. The comparative injury doctrine provides that a court may refuse an injunction in certain cases where the hardship caused to the defendant by the injunction would greatly outweigh the benefit resulting to the plaintiff. York v. Stallings, supra, 217 Or. at 22, 341 P.2d 529 (emphasis added); see also Jewett v. Deerhorn Enterprises, Inc., supra, 281 Or. at 478, 575 P.2d 164. York does not specifically state how the interest of the public factors into the balancing process. The public interest, however, must rise to the level of an important public interest before it will be given significant weight in the balancing process. See Jewett v. Deerhorn Enterprises, Inc., supra, 281 Or. at 479, 575 P.2d 164. Furthermore, the public interest should be protected only from serious inconvenience or loss. See York v. Stallings, supra, 217 Or. at 24, 341 P.2d 529. Accordingly, in this respect, a plaintiff's request for an injunction should be denied only if enjoining a defendant's conduct would amount to a serious public inconvenience or loss. Thus, in York, the court ordered that the case be remanded for further testimony concerning, inter alia, the feasibility of transporting the sawdust to another place for burning or disposal and whether such a program would be so burdensome as to cause a shut-down of the defendants' mill. 217 Or. at 26, 341 P.2d 529. [9] To be sure, a court need not decide whether to grant an injunction if there is no substantial and unreasonable interference with an individual's use and enjoyment of land; that is, if there is no nuisance. The majority, however, needlessly reaches the public interest issue because its nuisance analysis is backwards. A proper nuisance analysis first analyzes whether a nuisance exists, that is, whether there is a substantial and unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of land. Only if a nuisance exists does the analysis continue. The next step in the analysis is application of the comparative injury doctrine. The final step is determining whether there is serious public loss or inconvenience. The majority, however, begins with a discussion of the public interest at issue, [10] and concludes by stating:    Clearly [defendants] can [exercise their expression of opinion or gather petition signatures upon plaintiff's private property without plaintiff's consent] if [defendants] do so reasonably and peaceably. Moreover, plaintiff is not entitled to an injunction to prohibit peaceful solicitation of signatures in the mall or on its walkways that does not substantially interfere with the commercial activity on the premises. 307 Or. at 687, 773 P.2d at at 1301. (Emphasis added.) This is just another way of saying that plaintiff is not entitled to an injunction for intrusions that do not constitute a nuisance. Thus, it is abundantly clear that the majority's analysis turns on whether a nuisance exists. Apparently, the majority believes that plaintiff is entitled to an injunction for signature-gathering activity that constitutes a nuisance: The record reveals that some of the signature-gathering activity does temporarily interfere with the commercial activity at the Center. Some gatherers apparently `buttonhole' potential customers and others set up card tables in heavily trafficked areas to facilitate the project at hand. Such obtrusive activity can be enjoined. But not all petition signature-gathering activity on plaintiff's premises can be enjoined. 307 Or. at 687, 773 P.2d at 1301. (Emphasis in original.) Thus, for signature-gathering activity [that] does temporarily interfere with the commercial activity at the Center, the majority holds, without analysis, that (1) such activity constitutes a nuisance; (2) the comparative injury doctrine is decided in plaintiff's favor; and (3) enjoining such activity would cause no serious public loss or inconvenience. At bottom, the majority badly confuses nuisance law. [11] It is, however, clear that the majority's analysis thus turns on the first step of a nuisance analysis  whether a nuisance exists. Accordingly, the majority's discussion of the public interest is entirely unnecessary and irrelevant, and therefore constitutes dicta.