Opinion ID: 1673907
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of secondary-gain expert testimony

Text: Appellants' final point on appeal is that the trial court erred by allowing Dr. Stephen Cathey to testify regarding secondary-gain motivation. They claim that the highly prejudicial testimony significantly outweighed any slight probative value. We find merit in appellants' argument, and we reverse and remand on this issue. Dr. Cathey explained the concept of secondary-gain motivation to the jury at some length and implied that plaintiffs in personal-injury cases may exaggerate their symptoms in order to receive some financial benefit. In fact, Dr. Cathey opined that in those situations, doctors frequently see secondary gain. He also commented that a lack of objective findings, as Dr. Cathey had observed in Rodgers's case, enters into the possibility of diagnosing someone with secondary gain. Significantly, Dr. Cathey affirmed during cross-examination that he was not testifying that he believed that appellant was malingering or implying that Rodgers had secondary gain involved in this case. Dr. Cathey unequivocally stated that he was not giving testimony that it was his opinion that there was any secondary gain involved in appellant's case. As a result, we must agree with appellants that the testimony was irrelevant, particularly when Dr. Cathey was unprepared to state that it was a relevant issue in Rodgers's case. Ark.R.Evid. 401 defines relevant evidence as evidence having a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Given Dr. Cathey's admission, we conclude that the testimony should have been excluded pursuant to Ark.R.Evid. 402, which states that evidence that is not relevant is not admissible. Further, even if the evidence had some slight relevance, the testimony should have been excluded per Ark. R.Evid. 403 because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading of the jury. The jury could easily have concluded that secondary-gain issues were relevant to the case. In light of the foregoing, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Dr. Cathey's expert testimony regarding secondary-gain motivation. Reversed and remanded. IMBER, J., not participating.