Opinion ID: 1389904
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Government's Breach

Text: Whether the government breaches a plea agreement by making allegedly impermissible comments to the sentencing court has been the subject of substantial discussion in this Circuit. Our cases have not yielded a bright-line rule as to the leeway the government has with respect to what it tells the court while operating under such an agreement. [The] circumstances must [therefore] be carefully studied in context, and where the government's commentary reasonably appears to seek to influence the court in a manner incompatible with the agreement, we will not hesitate to find a breach, notwithstanding formal language of disclaimer. United States v. Amico, 416 F.3d 163, 167 n. 2 (2d Cir.2005). Amico, upon which the government exclusively relies, [4] contains our most recent application of such a fact-specific analysis. There, the defendant-appellant made several arguments to support his contention that the government had breached its plea agreement with him. First, the defendant-appellant argued that the government's statement that it adopts the findings of the revised Presentence Investigation Report violated the plea agreement insofar as this endorsement advocated, by reference, the imposition of a higher sentence than that to which the parties agreed. Id. at 165. Once notified of this violation, however, the government filed an amended statement explaining that it expressly did not advocate the additional enhancements, and it reiterated that position several times thereafter. Id. We noted that a retraction of an argument advanced by the government in violation of its plea agreement would [not] always cure its breach, but concluded that, upon careful examination of all the circumstances, especially the mild, brief, and unassertive form of the statement and its rapid retraction, . . . the temporary breach was adequately cured. Id. Second, the defendant-appellant argued that a government memorandum of law, submitted in response to his objections to the Presentence Investigation Report, violated the plea agreement by advocating a position on an issue about which the plea agreement did not permit discussion. We rejected the argument, concluding: [The defendant-appellant] opened the door to this response when he attempted to characterize the criminal scheme in a manner favorable to himself, minimized the importance to the criminal scheme of the mortgage brokers, and claimed not to have known supporting documentation accompanying the loan applications was false. Id. Moreover, the government's discussion of the state of the law in response to the defendant-appellant's inaccurate description of the law was considered an appropriate response that was permitted by the agreement, particularly because it was surrounded by several statements to the effect that the government did not intend to advocate the imposition of the additional enhancement. Id. at 166. Similarly, in Riera, the prosecution and the defense agreed that neither party will seek . . . a departure, and that neither party will suggest that the Court sua sponte consider such a departure. 298 F.3d at 133-34. The plea agreement also permitted the parties to respond to inquiries from the district court in the event that the court contemplate[d] any Guidelines adjustments, departures, or calculations different from those stipulated to [in the agreement]. Id. at 134 (second brackets in original). The defendant asserted that the government breached the agreement when it argued by letter that the district court would be well within its discretion in upwardly departing before explaining in detail why such a departure would be appropriate. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We stated that the government's letter was too close in tone and substance to forbidden advocacy to have been well-advised, id. at 134, and came very close to breaching the agreement, id. at 135. We found no breach, however, for three reasons: First, the letter was submitted in response to a solicitation by the court. Id. at 134-35. Second, the plea agreement expressly permitted a response to a request from the district court to set forth the relevant facts and advise the court whether a departure would conform to the law. Id. at 135; see also United States v. Goodman, 165 F.3d 169, 172-73 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding no breach where the government responded to a specific request from the district court to supply the Court with the law and the facts without advocating that such an adjustment should be imposed), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 874, 120 S.Ct. 318, 145 L.Ed.2d 150 (1999). Third, the government did not explicitly advocate a departure and thereafter repeatedly asserted that it was responding to the court's request but was not advocating an upward departure, in line with the plea agreement. Id. at 135-36. In United States v. Vaval, 404 F.3d 144 (2d Cir.2005), we reached the opposite conclusion. There, the defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to robbery of federal property with a dangerous weapon. Id. at 149. According to the plea agreement, the government was not permitted to take [a] position concerning where within the Guidelines range determined by the Court the sentence should fall, or to make [a] motion for an upward departure, as long as no new information relevant to sentencing was discovered subsequent to the effective date of the plea agreement. Id. The plea agreement incorrectly calculated the defendant's criminal history to fall within category III rather than category II. Id. at 149. At sentencing, the government acknowledged that the plea agreement prevented the government from seeking an upward departure or recommending a particular sentence within the guideline range, but nonetheless stated, inter alia: I find this defendant's criminal history appalling. And the fact that he can sit here today and say that he made a mistake, I find completely disingenuous. Because it is a mistake that he has made over and over and over again in terms of robbing people at gun point and using violence to commit robberies. I understand that the guidelines preclude us from looking at or calculating certain offenses. But certainly this is not this defendant's first or second offense. Id. at 150. The government, after recounting the factual basis for the defendant's conviction, said: I just ask the Court to consider all of that when making the Court's decision about where to sentence this defendant. Id. The government concluded: [B]ased on the information that I had at [the] time [of the plea agreement,] I believed that the defendant was going to be in a[CHC] category three. He is in a category two. I think, technically, I could make an upward departure which I am not. Id. (first brackets added). The district court, which presided over the trial of Vaval's co-defendants, acknowledged the defendant's objections to the government's statements, but asserted that [t]he government's remarks do not change any view that the Court had of this case coming out here. Id. We first noted that statements by the government asserting that it did not intend to violate the plea agreement do not . . . insulate the government against a finding of breach if in fact what was said constituted an argument about where within the range to sentence appellant and/or whether to upwardly depart. Id. at 153. We then concluded that the government's highly negative characterizations of the defendant's criminal history did not qualify as mere information, and that a statement that the government technically could make an upward departure recommendation effectively qualified as such a recommendation. Id. (It is difficult to draw a principled distinction between the government actually moving for an upward departure and stating that it `technically' could move for such a departure and then adding arguments that would support such a departure.). Furthermore, unlike the government's court-solicited statements in Riera, all relevant legal and factual information had already been provided to the court, and the government's statements served no purpose other than to advocate that the court upwardly depart or impose a high sentence within the Guidelines range. Id. at 154. As a result, we decided, the government had breached the plea agreement. See also Lawlor, 168 F.3d at 637 (finding that the government breached the plea agreement by asserting that the PSR properly determined the Guidelines range where the plea agreement calculated the range under a different (and lower) Guidelines range); United States v. Enriquez, 42 F.3d 769, 770-71 (2d Cir.1994) (vacating the sentence based on the government's violation of the plea agreement by arguing against a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility where the plea agreement required the government to agree to a Probation Department finding that the defendant is entitled to a two-level adjustment for acceptance of responsibility). [5] We have also strictly enforced plea agreements against the government where, as here, the disputed issue concerned enhancements or adjustments to a defendant's total offense level rather than a specific sentence within a given Guidelines range or an upward or downward departure from that range. In United States v. Palladino, 347 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2003), the plea agreement prohibited the government from moving for an upward departure from the Guidelines range estimated in the agreement based on information known to [the United States Attorney's Office] at this time. Id. at 33. The estimated total offense level on which that range was based, however, was not binding on the government, and the defendant was not permitted to withdraw his plea if the government advocated for a different offense level. Id. The agreement calculated the adjusted offense level to be ten. Id. At sentencing, the government sought a six-level enhancement based on information it conceded was not new. Id. at 34. We concluded that this violated the language and the spirit of the plea agreement, id. at 30; at best, the language was ambiguous and was therefore construed against the government, id. at 34. In Griffin's plea agreement, the government committed itself not to oppose the recommendation that the Court apply the two (2) level downward adjustment of Guidelines § 3E1.1(a) (acceptance of responsibility) and further agree[d] to move the Court to apply the additional one (1) level downward adjustment of Guidelines § 3E1.1(b). Plea Agreement at ¶ 12. The agreement also permitted the government to respond at sentencing to any statements made by the defendant or on the defendant's behalf that are inconsistent with the information and evidence available to the government. Plea Agreement at ¶ 18b. [6] In response to the defendant's objections to the PSR, the government discussed the possible downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 in two separate written submissions to the district court. It first noted that the government is troubled by some of the defendant's objections which seem to raise questions regarding whether the defendant has truly accepted responsibility. Gov't March 31 Statement, at 1. But the submission continued: However, the defendant did timely notify authorities of his intention to enter a guilty plea, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the government and the court to allocate their resources efficiently. Id. at 1-2. The government then proceeded to recommend that the defendant receive the additional one-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b) should the district court find that the defendant is entitled to the two-level adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). Were this the government's only communication addressing acceptance of responsibility, we would have little trouble characterizing this submission as containing a few ill-advised descriptive words that fall short of breaching the plea agreement. See Riera, 298 F.3d at 135. But the government addressed the issue of acceptance of responsibility a second, separate time. In response to Griffin's arguments, permitted by the plea agreement, see Plea Agreement, at ¶¶ 8-9, that no relevant conduct was applicable to his sentencing beyond that to which he pleaded guilty, the government wrote that the defendant is attempting to limit his conduct to only that to which he pled guilty, which leads the government to question whether the defendant has truly accepted responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). Gov't April 15 Response, at 21. The government then reviewed the legal framework of a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, concluding: It is unclear whether the defendant's objections to the inclusion of all the relevant conduct rises to the level of outweighing his acceptance of responsibility. Suffice it to say that the defendant's objections to the relevant conduct raises [sic] questions on the issue of acceptance. Id. at 22. This was well beyond the pale. No discussion of an acceptance of responsibility adjustment was solicited by the court. Cf. Riera, 298 F.3d at 134-35. It was not an effort simply to correct an inaccurate representation of relevant sentencing law. See Amico, 416 F.3d at 166 (In view of the defendant's inaccurate description of the law relating to aggravating role, the government was entitled to explain the law concerning this adjustment without violating its agreement.). Nor did the government merely provide information or evidence in response to any statements by the defendant. Plea Agreement, at ¶ 18b. Instead, the government, on its own initiative, warned the court about what it considered to be troubling statements by the defendant in his submission to the court in anticipation of sentencing. The government did nothing to retract its questionable statements or otherwise ameliorate their impact. Cf. Amico, 416 F.3d at 165 (noting that a retraction of an argument advanced by the government in violation of its plea agreement would [not] always cure its breach, but concluding that the temporary breach of a mild, brief, and unassertive form, combined with a rapid retraction, sufficiently cured any breach). Instead, the government followed up its first statement of misgivings regarding the defendant's objections with both a reiteration of its doubts regarding the defendant's acceptance of responsibility and an unsolicited review of law relevant to denying the adjustment. See Gov't April 15 Response, at 21-22. The government argues that it adhered to its promise in the plea agreement throughout the sentencing hearing by advocating for a sentence within a Guidelines range that included the downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility and by expressly stating that it did not advocat[e] for anything beyond what's in the plea agreement. Sent'g Hrg. Tr, June 21, 2005, at 5, 15. These indirect references to an acceptance of responsibility adjustment do not, we think, effectively retract the previous statements or cure any breach. [7] And we have determined that statements by the government asserting that it did not intend to violate the plea agreement do not . . . insulate the government against a finding of breach if in fact what was said constituted an argument that violated the plea agreement. Vaval, 404 F.3d at 153. Given the government's often decisive role in the sentencing context, we will not hesitate to scrutinize the government's conduct to ensure that it comports with the highest standard of fairness. Lawlor, 168 F.3d at 637. This is not to say that the plea agreement required the government to remain silent were the defendant to make statements inconsistent with the government's understandings. It did not. But the government did more than correct inconsistencies in fact or law with information or evidence available to it, as permitted by the plea agreement. Instead, it offered a thorough legal analysis, unsolicited by the court, and concluded by noting its own skepticism as to whether the defendant satisfied the requirements for an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility as set forth by its analysis. To paraphrase our conclusion in Vaval, 404 F.3d at 153, it is difficult to draw a principled distinction between the government voicing outright opposition to a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility and stating that the defendant's conduct was troubling and raises questions on the issue of acceptance. Without expressly opposing such an adjustment, which would have been a more obvious and egregious breach of the plea agreement, the government could have done little more to attempt to persuade the court to deny an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. After the first letter directly addressing the issue of acceptance of responsibility, the government's statements served no purpose other than to advocate that the court deny an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. Id. at 154. That the district court disclaimed the government's statements does not alter our conclusion. Where the sentencing court has sentenced in accordance with a position improperly advocated, while claiming not to have been influenced by the improper advocacy, a reviewing court can do no more than speculate as to whether the judge was in fact influenced, even unconsciously. Amico, 416 F.3d at 168. We therefore conclude that although the government's mistake was a common one made in the course of strongly felt and doubtlessly well-intentioned advocacy, it breached the plea agreement by urging, in effect, that the district court deny a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.