Opinion ID: 2435790
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Decisions of the Courts of Appeals

Text: In concluding that the Buys' residuary clause did not reach military retirement benefits, the court of appeals divided the reported cases into two inconsistent lines. The court then chose to follow the line it construed as requiring express mention of military retirement somewhere in the settlement agreement. We conclude the court of appeals erred in analyzing residuary clause opinions of other courts of appeals, as well as its own prior opinions. The court of appeals' analysis looked only at whether an opinion held that a residuary clause covered retirement benefits. The court of appeals did not differentiate the cases based on the different provisions in the residuary clauses, particularly whether the language of the specific residuary clauses at issue necessarily included retirement benefits. As examples, the court of appeals relied on Dunn v. Dunn, 703 S.W.2d 317 (Tex.App. San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Yeo v. Yeo, 581 S.W.2d 734 (Tex.Civ.App.San Antonio 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); and Dessommes v. Dessommes, 505 S.W.2d 673 (Tex.Civ. App.Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Each of these cases had a residuary clause referring to property in possession of the party. In these cases, the main holding was that retirement benefits were intangible and not possessed by the party whose employer granted them in his or her name. The residuary clauses did not unambiguously cover retirement benefits. In contrast, the courts in Tharp v. Tharp, 772 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.App.Dallas 1989, no writ), and Jacobs v. Cude, 641 S.W.2d 258 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.), considered broad residuary clauses without the possession language or a similar limitation. In those cases, the courts of appeals held the divorce judgments effective to convey the retirement benefits not otherwise specifically mentioned. Both opinions and commentary have elaborated on this distinction between possession residuary clauses and other clauses. See, e.g., Phillips v. Parrish, 814 S.W.2d at 504; Dunn, 703 S.W.2d at 319; William Reppy, Jr., The 1990 U.S.F.S.P.A. Amendment: No Bar to Recognition of Tenancy in Common Interests Created by Pre-McCarty Divorces That Fail to Divide Military Retirement Benefits, 29 Idaho L. Rev. 941, 971 n. 81 (1992). The court of appeals erred in its conclusion that cases such as Dunn , Yeo , and Dessommes held that a residuary clause could never divide military retirement benefits without specifically mentioning them.