Opinion ID: 1366261
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Amendment History

Text: Finally, an additional significant extrinsic aid in the interpretation of statutes is the action of the legislature on amendments proposed during the course of consideration in the legislature. Milka, 159 Colo. at 120, 410 P.2d at 184. See generally 2A Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 48.18. As introduced in the house, H.B. 1282 applied only to county employees. Section 8-13-105(2) read as follows: (2) In the event any county employee works more than forty hours in any calendar week, the board of county commissioners shall compensate for hours in excess of forty in a calendar week at one and one-half times the regular hourly rate in cash or in compensatory time at one and one-half times the number of excess hours as in the board's discretion it may deem advisable. Given the references in the above passage to both county employees and board of county commissioners, it is apparent that H.B. 1282 as introduced covered only county employees, and that in the board's discretion, referred to a board of county commissioners. As the court of appeals correctly noted, before being passed by the House of Representatives, H.B. 1282 was materially revised. 744 P.2d at 764. As ultimately passed by the house, the bill read as follows: 8-13-105. Emergency Cases and Otherwise. (1) Nothing in section 8-13-104 shall be construed to prevent work in excess of eight hours a day in emergencies involving the endangering of life or property; but, when any employee subject to the provisions of said section is required to work twelve or more hours in any period of twenty-four hours, he shall be compensated in money for all hours in excess of eight at one and one-half times his regular hourly rate or in compensatory time at one and one-half times the number of excess hours worked, at the discretion of the employer.... (2) When any employee referred to in section 8-13-104 is required to work more than forty hours in any calendar week, whether or not because of an emergency, the employer shall compensate him for hours in excess of forty in a calendar week at one and one-half times the regular hourly rate in money or in compensatory time at one and one-half times the number of excess hours, in the board's discretion. As passed, the phrase county employee in section 8-13-105(2) had thus been amended to read any employee referred to in section 8-13-104. The words board of county commissioners were changed to read employer. Given these changes, the court of appeals concluded that the legislative intent is ... manifest. 744 P.2d at 764. A bill that was first introduced to apply only to county employees was specifically and deliberately changed to include the employees of other public agencies delineated in 8-13-104. Id. Although the court of appeals assumed that [i]t appears obvious that the House of Representatives, acting as a whole, intended to enlarge the scope of section 8-13-105(2) to cover more than just county employees, 744 P.2d at 764, another perfectly rational explanation exists for the amended language adopted by the house. This alternative explanation has the added advantage of being consistent with the bill's title, and the overall purpose of the legislative scheme. People v. Green, 734 P.2d 616, 621 (Colo.1987); Engelbrecht v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 680 P.2d 231, 233 (Colo.1984). The change made in section 8-13-105(2) from county employee to any employee referred to in section 8-13-104 was accomplished to limit subsection 105(2) to particular county employees, i.e., mechanics, workingmen, or laborers, the beneficiaries of section 8-13-104, rather than to apply the overtime compensation scheme to all employees of the county or their contractors. Overtime compensation was thus limited to certain county employees, without any attempt to award such compensation to all employees of state, county, or municipal entities. Further, the change from board of county commissioners to employer was a recognition of an intent on the part of the house to have the statute apply to workers hired directly by county officials, as well as workers hired by employers engaged in a contracting or subcontracting relationship with the county, to remain consistent with the dictates of section 8-13-104. After all, if the house had intended to broaden the scope of section 105(2) to include municipalities, presumably it would also have stricken the phrase in the board's discretion, and replaced it with language suggestive of a generic governing authority which would include more than county officials. In the senate, a further amendment was made to H.B. 1282. The senate amendment consisted of deleting from H.B. 1282 as passed by the house that portion of section 105(1) providing for daily overtime compensation. [1] No changes were made by the senate to section 105(2). The effects of this amendment are difficult to discern. The senate preserved the emergency exception of section 8-13-105, but the scope of this exception is unclear. The senate eliminated the reference in section 105(1) to the employer, which could be construed to expand the coverage of the legislation to more than county employees. Nevertheless, contrary to the conclusion of the court of appeals, it is far from obvious that the intention of either the house or the senate was to apply section 8-13-105 to municipal employees. In any event, a conference committee was formed to reconcile the differences between the two chambers. The discussion indicates that members of this committee were concerned that H.B. 1282, as passed by the house, might be interpreted as applying to more than county employees, which would conflict with the title of the legislation, and therefore, raise a problem under Colorado Constitution art. V, § 21. In addressing this problem, one member of the committee asked another: Was it your intent to limit it to county employees all along? To which the apparent sponsor of the legislation replied, Yes. Transcript of Conf. Comm. Meeting on H.B. 1282, 50th Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (June 10, 1975). The conference committee decided that inserting the words by county employees in section 8-13-105(1) would conform the bill to the sponsor's intention as well as its title, thereby avoiding constitutional problems arising under Colo.Const. art. V, § 21. This change appears as part of the enacted legislation. See S.J.Res. 1673, 50th Leg., 1st Sess. (1975); section 8-13-105(2), 3 C.R. S. (1975 Supp.). Given the reasonable assumption that the committee members viewed the words in the board's discretion as clearly referring to a board of county commissioners, no change was thought necessary to similarly clarify section 105(2). Toward the end of the conference committee meeting, one member asked another (presumably a member of the house) whether the house would know the difference if we add these two words up here, referring to county employees. The response was no, because we were dealing with county employees all the time. We didn't change anything. This exchange provides some additional evidence that H.B. 1282, as amended and passed by the house, was understood by that body to apply exclusively to county employees. The legislative history of section 8-13-105, taken as a whole, in combination with the reasonable construction of the language chosen by the legislature, demonstrates that the statute was intended to apply only to county employees, and not to employees of other governmental entities.