Opinion ID: 885048
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The rational basis test.

Text: ¶ 33 The rational basis test requires the government to show (1) that the statute's objective was legitimate, and (2) that the statute's objective bears a rational relationship to the classification used by the legislature. Stated another way, the statute must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. Heisler, 282 Mont. at 279, 937 P.2d at 50; Matter of S.L.M., 287 Mont. at 32, 951 P.2d at 1371. ¶ 34 In this case, the legislature specified its objective or governmental interest in 1987 when it made this sweeping declaration of public policy: Declaration of public policy. For the purposes of interpreting and applying Title 39, chapters 71 and 72 [the WCA and the ODA], the following is the public policy of this state : .... (2) A worker's removal from the work force due to a work-related injury or disease has a negative impact on the worker, the worker's family, the employer, and the general public. Therefore, it is an objective of the workers' compensation system to return a worker to work as soon as possible after the worker has suffered a work-related injury or disease. Section 39-71-105, MCA (emphasis added). ¶ 35 Because the legislature clearly stated its policy in unambiguous terms, there is no need to search the legislative history to ascertain the legislature's interest in its statutory scheme. Both Henry and amicus curiae agree that the early return to work of an employee following an injury or disease is a legitimate objective. We similarly conclude that returning a worker to work as soon as possible is a legitimate governmental interest. ¶ 36 We next analyze whether that objective bears a rational relationship to the classification used by the legislature. As this Court has stated: A classification that is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest offends equal protection of the laws. As we have previously held, equal protection of the laws requires that all persons be treated alike under like circumstances. Davis v. Union Pacific R. Co. (1997), 282 Mont. 233, 242-43, 937 P.2d 27, 32(citation omitted). ¶ 37 This Court has previously struck as unconstitutional provisions within the workers' compensation statutes that create arbitrary classes. See, e.g., Heisler, 282 Mont. 270, 937 P.2d 45 (holding workers' compensation statute which precluded claimants covered by certain insurance plans the right to change physician without prior authorization unconstitutional); Cottrill v. Cottrill Sodding Service (1987), 229 Mont. 40, 744 P.2d 895 (holding workers' compensation statute requiring family members to elect special coverage unconstitutional). ¶ 38 In this case, the issue is whether the elimination of workers suffering occupational diseases from the classification of injured workers having access to rehabilitation benefits bears a rational relationship to the legitimate governmental objective of returning workers to work as soon as possible. The inescapable answer is that it does not. ¶ 39 Rehabilitation services are the only mechanism provided to implement the legislature's explicit objective of returning workers to work, and yet those services are arbitrarily implemented for one class of employees and denied to the other. How does differentiating a worker who obtains a herniated disc over one shift from a worker who obtains a herniated disc over two shifts promote the policy of returning all such injured workers to work as soon as possible? What rational basis can there be for providing rehabilitation benefits to workers based simply on the number of work shifts over which a worker is injured? We can find none. ¶ 40 Any argument that economic reasons justify treating the two classes differently must be rejected. This Court has previously held that cost control alone is no justification. As we stated: Cost-control alone cannot justify disparate treatment which violates an individual's right to equal protection of the law. Discrimination, that is, offering services to some while excluding others for any arbitrary reason, will always result in lower costs. We do not, however, allow discrimination merely for the sake of fiscal health. Heisler, 282 Mont. at 283, 937 P.2d at 52. ¶ 41 In support of its position that there is a rational basis for such distinction, the State Fund argues that there is a historical basis for treating the two classes of workers differently, and it points to Eastman. In that case, Eastman challenged the legislature's classification of diseased workers under the ODA. He noted that had he been classified as an injured worker under the WCA, he would have received more benefits than he did under the ODA. Eastman contended that benefits payable under the WCA and the ODA should be the same. However, the Court rejected his argument and concluded that the equal protection clause does not require that all aspects of occupational disease and occupational injury be dealt with in the same manner. Eastman, 237 Mont. at 339, 777 P.2d at 866. Given the historical reasons for the enactment of the ODA and the treatment of workers suffering from an occupational disease, we held that there was a rational basis for the difference in benefits awarded under that statute. Accordingly, Eastman failed to establish a constitutional violation. Eastman, 237 Mont. at 339, 777 P.2d at 866. ¶ 42 Eastman is readily distinguishable from this case for two reasons. First, Eastman addressed the degree of benefits awarded to claimants under the WCA and the ODA, while this case deals with the provision of certain benefits to one group of workers and the wholesale denial of the same benefits to another similarly situated group. ¶ 43 Second, Eastman filed his claim for compensation benefits in 1985, prior to the 1987 amendments to the WCA and the ODA. As pointed out earlier, after the 1987 amendments to the WCA and the ODA, the definitions of injury and occupational disease no longer focus on the nature of the medical condition, but rather focus on the number of work shifts over which the worker incurs an injury. Thus the historical justification for treating workers differently under the WCA and the ODA no longer exists. Indeed, the entire underpinnings of Eastman have evaporated, rendering its continued validity questionable. ¶ 44 In sum, we can see no rational basis for treating workers who are injured over one work shift differently from workers who are injured over two work shifts. Simply put, a herniated disc is a herniated disc. Rehabilitation benefits promote the policy of early return to work for both classes of workers. ¶ 45 We conclude that providing rehabilitation benefits to workers covered by the WCA, but not to workers covered by the ODA, is not rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest of returning workers to work as soon as possible after they have suffered a work-related injury. We hold that the ODA violates the equal protection clause of the Montana Constitution to the extent that it fails to provide vocational rehabilitation benefits. The decision of the Workers' Compensation Court is reversed and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. J.A. TURNAGE, C.J., TERRY N. TRIEWEILER, KARLA M. GRAY, JAMES C. NELSON, W. WILLIAM LEAPHART, and JIM REGNIER, JJ., concur.