Opinion ID: 1060459
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Psychological and Medical Records

Text: The defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to admit records regarding Brian Lovett's medical and psychological treatment for the purpose of impeaching the witness and raising residual doubt as to the defendant's role in the offense. The State counters that the defense was allowed to inquire extensively into Brian Lovett's medical and psychological background and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the underlying medical records. The defendant relies in part upon Tenn. R. Evid. 617, which provides that a party may offer evidence that a witness suffered from impaired capacity at the time of an occurrence or testimony. As we discussed above, however, the admissibility of evidence in a capital sentencing proceeding is largely governed by a statute that should be interpreted to allow trial judges wider discretion than would normally be allowed under the Tennessee Rules of Evidence.... State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d at 14. [8] We also observed in Sims : The Rules of Evidence should not be applied to preclude introduction of otherwise reliable evidence that is relevant to the issue of punishment, as it relates to mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the nature and circumstances of the particular crime, or the character and background of the individual defendant. As our case history reveals, however, the discretion allowed judges and attorneys during sentencing in first degree murder cases is not unfettered. Our constitutional standards require inquiry into the reliability, relevance, value, and prejudicial effect of sentencing evidence to preserve fundamental fairness and protect the rights of both the defendant and the victim's family. The rules of evidence can in some instances be helpful guides in reaching these determinations of admissibility. Trial judges are not, however, required to adhere strictly to the rules of evidence. These rules are too restrictive and unwieldy in the arena of capital sentencing. Id. at 14 (emphasis added). The defendant also correctly asserts that a defendant is permitted to present evidence of residual doubt as a non-statutory mitigating factor in a re-sentencing proceeding. State v. Teague, 897 S.W.2d 248, 256 (Tenn.1995). We recently have explained: By definition, residual doubt is established by proof that casts doubt on the defendant's guilt. It is not limited to proof that mitigates the defendant's culpability for the crimes. While we agree ... that not all impeachment proof will be relevant to show residual doubt, it does not logically follow that impeachment proof will never be relevant to establish residual doubt about the defendant's guilt. Where ... the proffered residual doubt is impeachment of the testimony of the only witness who offered direct rather than circumstantial proof of the defendant's involvement in the crime, such proof clearly is relevant and admissible to establish residual doubt as a mitigating circumstance. State v. Hartman, 42 S.W.3d 44, 57 (Tenn.2001). With these principles in mind, the defendant argued that he wanted to use the records to show that Brian Lovett had a history of mental health problems; that he had been discharged from treatment against medical advice shortly before the offense; and that his capacity to recall and relate facts was impaired. Moreover, the defendant argued that because Brian Lovett was the main witness against him, the impeachment evidence necessarily raised doubt as to the defendant's role in the offense. The record reveals that the trial court gave careful consideration to this issue. The court conducted several jury-out hearings on the issue and did not foreclose any efforts made by the defendant to question the witness with regard to his history of suicide attempts, mental health treatment, and drug abuse. The trial court even signed an order allowing the defense to obtain certain medical and psychological records. During the sentencing, Brian Lovett testified about his two suicide attempts, one of which occurred one month before the offense, and he testified that he had been treated in two mental health facilities. He testified that his sister had committed suicide several months before the murder. Finally, Lovett admitted his history of using marijuana, cocaine, alcohol, and speed. When denying the motion for a new trial on this issue, the trial court made the following findings: Defense counsel asked Bryan [sic] Lovett about the information in the records and the witness admitted everything. Thus, the jury heard the evidence from the witness himself, there was nothing to impeach, and the defense was free to argue Bryan [sic] Lovett's credibility to the jury in closing argument. Moreover, as the Court of Criminal Appeals observed, the evidence failed to show that the witness's alleged impaired capacity existed at the time of the offense or at the time of the witness's testimony. See Tenn. R. Evid. 617. Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant was not denied an opportunity to use evidence of Brian Lovett's medical and psychological history for the purpose of impeaching the witness's testimony or raising any doubts about the defendant's role in the offense. In short, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the mental and psychological records were cumulative to the testimony and therefore inadmissible.