Opinion ID: 181013
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Due Process Claim Fails

Text: Even if Promotor had not procedurally defaulted his due process claim, it would fail. Because the habeas petition in this case was filed under the AEDPA, the standard of review contained in that Act governs this appeal. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). When the state court has decided its case on the merits, a federal court can grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the state court's decision was contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent, involved an unreasonable application of such precedent, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Promotor argues that this deferential standard of review should not apply to his due process claim because the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not directly address the merits of the claim in finding that it was procedurally barred. However, in discussing the merits of Promotor's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court did make factual findings that are vital to the due process claim, and we will employ the deferential standard of review that the AEDPA prescribes in evaluating these findings. Promotor contends that his due process rights were violated because he was sentenced based on inaccurate information. He argues that a defendant has a constitutional due process right to be sentenced based on accurate information. He is correct. See, e.g., Ben-Yisrayl v. Buss, 540 F.3d 542, 554 (7th Cir.2008) (citing Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 92 L.Ed. 1690 (1948) and United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 92 S.Ct. 589, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972) for the general proposition that a criminal defendant has the due process right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate information.). But not all inaccuracies deprive a defendant of due process; the incorrect information must be materially untrue. Townsend, 334 U.S. at 741, 68 S.Ct. 1252. And a defendant who requests resentencing must establish that the sentencing court also relied on the critical inaccurate information when announcing its sentence. Simonson v. Hepp, 549 F.3d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir.2008). A sentencing court demonstrates actual reliance on misinformation when the court gives explicit attention to it, founds its sentence at least in part on it, or gives specific consideration to the misinformation before imposing sentence. Lechner v. Frank, 341 F.3d 635, 639 (7th Cir.2003) (quotations omitted). If the 23 beers figure in the Alternative Report was materially incorrect and the sentencing court relied on it in sentencing, Promotor would be entitled to a resentencing hearing. However, Promotor's case does not meet this standard because, as the Wisconsin Court of Appeals noted, the trial court did not rely on the figure. The court found that [b]ased on the [trial] court's comments at sentencing and in response to [Promotor's post-conviction] motion, we are satisfied that the sentence would have been the same even if the court had originally been given a lower figure for the number of beers Promotor consumed. We do not think it was unreasonable for the Wisconsin Court of Appeals to conclude that the trial court did not rely on the figure. It is true that the judge mentioned the 23-beer figure twice during sentencing. However, these mentions came but twice over the course of 26 pages of sentencing hearing transcript, in which the court thoroughly explained its considerations in determining Promotor's sentence: his decision to drink irresponsibly in spite of prior warning signs, the erratic and dangerous way in which he drove, his seriously impaired condition that caused him to forget significant portions of the evening, and the tragic result of his actions. And the court did state that it did not rely on the figure in its order denying Promotor's motion for post-conviction relief, which, although not dispositive, see, e.g., United States v. Montoya, 891 F.2d 1273, 1280-81 (7th Cir.1989), also supports the conclusion of the appellate court. Even if Promotor had not procedurally defaulted his claim of inaccuracy, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' finding that the trial court did not rely on the information was not unreasonable. The district court properly denied his request for a writ of habeas corpus.