Opinion ID: 216683
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Piercing of the Attorney-Client Privilege

Text: During discovery, the district court pierced Rambus's attorney-client privilege on the basis of the crime-fraud exception, relying on California Penal Code § 135, which prohibits destruction of documents about to be produced in evidence. On appeal, Rambus argues that if this court vacates the district court's spoliation decision, it should also vacate the piercing of the attorney-client privilege because Rambus's conduct was not within the scope of California Penal Code § 135, because the delay between Rambus's destruction of documents and its filing suit undermined the temporal closeness necessary for a violation of § 135, based on People v. Prysock, 127 Cal.App.3d 972, 180 Cal.Rptr. 15, 31 (1982). This court rejects Rambus's argument. As discussed in Micron II, this case is distinguishable from Prysock, because there the defendant controlled the timing of the destruction of relevant evidence, while law enforcement, acting independently, controlled the timing of the initiation of the investigation that would trigger the application of § 135, whereas here, Rambus controlled the timing of both events. Micron II, 645 F.3d at 1330. Under a reasonable reading of § 135, Rambus's destruction of documents in preparation of its suit against the DRAM manufacturers could reasonably constitute a crime, and this court finds no error in the district court's determination that the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege applies. See id. at 1330-31.