Opinion ID: 2352048
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Insufficient to Inform the Voters

Text: The rules and standards governing initiatives under Amendment 7 are well established in Arkansas. The various tests focus on whether the ballot title is (1) intelligible, (2) honest, and (3) impartial. Leigh v. Hall, 232 Ark. 558, 339 S.W.2d 104 (1960). However, this court is neither to interpret a proposed amendment nor discuss its merits or faults. Ferstl v. McCuen, 296 Ark. 504, 758 S.W.2d 398 (1988). The ballot title must be an impartial summary of the proposed amendment and it must give voters a fair understanding of the issues presented and the scope and significance of the proposed changes. Kurrus v. Priest, 342 Ark. 434, 29 S.W.3d 669 (2000); Parker v. Priest, 326 Ark. 123, 930 S.W.2d 322 (1996). The ballot title must be free from misleading tendencies that, whether by amplification, omission, or fallacy, thwart a fair understanding of the issues presented. Parker v. Priest, supra ; Bradley v. Hall, 220 Ark. 925, 251 S.W.2d 470 (1952); Westbrook v. McDonald, 184 Ark. 740, 43 S.W.2d 356 (1931). It is insufficient if it omits material information that would give the voter serious grounds for reflection. Christian Civic Action Committee v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 241, 884 S.W.2d 605 (1994). It may also be safely stated that, if the ballot title identifies the proposed amendment and fairly alleges the general purposes thereof, it is sufficient. Porter v. McCuen, 310 Ark. 562, 839 S.W.2d 512 (1992); Newton v. Hall, 196 Ark. 929, 120 S.W.2d 364 (1938). Our long-settled rule is that a ballot title is sufficient if it recites the general purposes of the proposed law and if the ballot title contains enough information to sufficiently advise voters of the true contents of the proposed law. Walker v. Priest, 342 Ark. 410, 29 S.W.3d 657 (2000); Newton v. Hall, supra . Furthermore, it must be complete enough to convey an intelligible idea of the scope and import of the proposed law. Roberts II, 341 Ark. 813, 20 S.W.3d 376 (2000); Bradley v. Hall, supra . The party challenging the ballot title has the burden of proving that it is misleading or insufficient. Ark. Const. amend. 7; Parker v. Priest, supra . The popular name of a proposed constitutional amendment is primarily a legislative device that is not held to the same stringent standards and need not be as explicit as a ballot title. Roberts II, supra . Its purpose is to identify the proposal for discussion prior to the election. Arkansas Women's Political Caucus v. Riviere, 283 Ark. 463, 677 S.W.2d 846 (1984). However, it cannot contain catch phrases or slogans that tend to mislead or give partisan coloring to a proposal. Id. Furthermore, when we review the sufficiency of the ballot title and popular name, we will construe the two provisions together. Roberts II, supra . Additionally, this court does not defer to the Attorney General's certification of the ballot title or give it presumptive effect. Crochet v. Priest, 326 Ark. 338, 931 S.W.2d 128 (1996); Bailey v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 277, 884 S.W.2d 938 (1994). Our most significant rule in determining the sufficiency of the title is that it be given a liberal construction and interpretation in order that it secure the purposes of reserving to the people the right to adopt, reject, approve, or disapprove legislation. Gaines v. McCuen, 296 Ark. 513, 758 S.W.2d 403 (1988). The ballot title at issue in this original action defines food and medicine by using cross-references to state and federal nutrition and healthcare assistance programs. Specifically, the ballot title and the amendment state that food means any item that was eligible for purchase with Federal Food Stamps on April 1, 2001 or is otherwise available under any state or federal nutrition assistance program existing on April 1, 2001, and that medicine means any item being furnished or available at a reduced cost under any state or federal health care assistance program on April 1, 2001. APPLES maintains that the cross-references to federal and state nutrition and health care assistance programs are insufficient to explain the scope of the proposed amendment to the voters. APPLES relies on a line of authority culminating in Kurrus v. Priest, supra , decided by this court in 2000. In Kurrus , the petitioner argued that the organization of the ballot title effectively concealed the controversial aspects of the proposal. The court agreed and struck the ballot title, holding that the ballot title was insufficient because it did not inform the voter that by approving the measure, he or she may risk losing government services. Kurrus v. Priest, 342 Ark. 434, 29 S.W.3d 669. The ballot title before the court today clearly informs the voter that a loss of services or an increase in taxes or both may occur with passage of the amendment. The Kurrus decision further held that the definition of tax increase in both the ballot title and the text of the amendment itself did not sufficiently convey the legal differences between the terms tax and fee, and thus, the ballot title was misleading. In contrast, the ballot title and amendment here give the voter an established benchmark. The definitions of food and medicine are keyed to government programs that have been in existence for many years, such as the Federal Food Stamp Program for low-income families, and the Medicare and Medicaid programs for the elderly and low-income families. In summing up the ballot title's deficiencies in Kurrus , the court determined that the ballot title did not honestly and accurately reflect what [was] contained in the proposed amendment. Kurrus v. Priest, 342 Ark. at 445, 29 S.W.3d at 675. Here, the language in the ballot title, as in Becker v. Riviere, 270 Ark. 219, 604 S.W.2d 555 (1980), virtually tracks the language of the proposed amendment. As ALERT suggests, the most accurate way to reflect what is contained in the proposed amendment is to nearly repeat the proposed amendment word for word. Likewise, in Christian Civic Action Committee v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 241, 884 S.W.2d 605 (1994), we struck a ballot and held unacceptable the combination of length and the strategic employment of abstract terminology to mask plain meaning and the tactical placement of key elements relating to for-profit gambling in the middle or near the end of the title's text. 318 Ark. at 248, 884 S.W.2d at 609. The sponsors scrupulously avoided the use of the term casino to describe the enterprise, and they affirmatively stated that the measure would prohibit casinos, gambling houses, and gambling operations and other gambling and gaming activities, thereby misleading the electorate. 318 Ark. at 249, 884 S.W.2d at 610. The court concluded that euphemistic language designed to cloak in semantic obscurity the actual nature of the proposed enterprise impermissibly paints a ballot title with partisan coloring. Christian Civic Action Committee v. McCuen, supra . In a similar vein, this court struck the ballot title in Crochet v. Priest, 326 Ark. 338, 931 S.W.2d 128 (1996), where we held that the use of the term video terminal games was a euphemistic disguise for slot machines and created a fatally misleading tendency in the ballot title and tinged it with partisan coloring. Crochet v. Priest, supra . Here, the length of the ballot title is certainly of no concern. Furthermore, there is no strategic masking of words. The definitions of food and medicine in the ballot title incorporate an established benchmark. There is no attempt to pull the wool over the eyes of the voter. Another case cited by APPLES, Arkansas Women's Political Caucus v. Riviere, 283 Ark. 463, 677 S.W.2d 846 (1984), involved a partisan naming of a ballot title. We held that the popular name The Unborn Child Amendment was designed to evoke a passionate, rather than a reasoned, response from the electorate where the subject matter of the amendment was abortion. The ballot title's popular name here, Amendment Eliminating Taxes on Food and Medicine, is not emotionally charged. It is an honest and impartial description that adequately identifies the proposed amendment. Another inapposite case is Roberts II, where this court held that internal inconsistencies rendered the ballot title insufficient. 341 Ark. 813, 20 S.W.3d 376. We looked at the terminology in the proposed initiative itself only to show that it was just as incomprehensible as the ballot title. Id. The ballot title before us does not contain any inconsistencies, whether they be internal or between the ballot title and the proposed amendment. In essence, APPLES urges this court to hold that the use of cross-references, specifically those to legislative acts, renders a ballot title per se insufficient. In Ragan v. Venhaus, 289 Ark. 266, 711 S.W.2d 467 (1986), and Daniel v. Jones, 332 Ark. 489, 966 S.W.2d 226 (1998), we stated that voters do not have ready access to the acts of the legislature. Ragan and Daniel were both illegal exaction cases dealing with the issue of disclosure on local tax initiatives. In Ragan , the ballot title did not inform voters that they were not only authorizing a sales tax but also a use tax. Ragan v. Venhaus, supra . Specifically, the ballot stated that the ordinance would impose a sales tax pursuant to an act that had been amended by another act. Id. The amended act provided that both a sales tax and use tax would be levied. Id. In holding the ordinance was an attempt to enact a tax without a referendum, we stated that [e]mploying the phrase `sales tax' with no mention of `use tax' is at best misleading, even if a referenced act in the ballot title clearly and specifically requires a use tax to be imposed if a sales tax is imposed. Id. at 271, 711 S.W.2d at 469. Similarly, the cross-reference in Daniel was misleading and was not used to define a term. The Daniel ballot cross-referenced an act that required a certain distribution of the funds collected through a tax. Daniel v. Jones, 332 Ark. 489, 966 S.W.2d 226. The Daniel court found an illegal exaction where the ordinance allowed tax revenues to be spent on purposes other than those revealed on the ballot. Specifically, the cross-referenced act allowed funds to be distributed to cities for general use after a three-percent service charge was paid to the State Treasurer; whereas, the ballot title stated that the funds would be used in their entirety for five specified purposes. Id. We stated that voters could not have known that the cities would receive funds and spend them for purposes other than those designated on the ballot by a mere reference that the ordinance was pursuant to an act. Id. Ragan and Daniel are inapposite. Here, there is full disclosure that the proposed amendment will abolish taxes on food and medicine as those terms are defined. The definitions of the terms food and medicine in the ballot title adopt an established benchmark. In the case of food, that benchmark is the Federal Food Stamp program and any state or federal nutrition assistance program. Any state or federal health care assistance program is its benchmark for medicine. Once again, a reasonable voter would recognize that these definitions are keyed to government programs that offer assistance to elderly and low-income families. As such, a reasonable voter would be sufficiently informed of the scope and import of his or her vote. [1] APPLES next asserts that the ballot title is insufficient in that the definitions of food and medicine in the ballot title and the text of the amendment are different from their meaning to the average voter. Relying largely on Scott v. Priest, 326 Ark. 328, 932 S.W.2d 746 (1996), the contention is that the voters would not reasonably expect certain items that were eligible for purchase or otherwise available on April 1, 2001, under the identified government programs to be considered food and medicine. APPLES explains that under the Federal Food Stamp program, codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2012(g), food is defined as any food or food product for home consumption except alcoholic beverages, tobacco, and hot foods or hot food products ready for immediate consumption followed by eight additional clauses, two of which define food in ways APPLES contends no reasonable person would think of as food. Particularly, APPLES claims that a reasonable voter would not think of food as seeds and plants for use in gardens to produce food for the personal consumption or equipment for procuring food by hunting and fishing, such as nets, hooks, rods, harpoons, and knives. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(g)(2),(6). ALERT disagrees, stating that equipment for procuring food is only food in remote regions of Alaska and inapplicable while the notion that seeds and plants constitute food is either reasonable or immaterial. As to the definition of medicine in the ballot title, APPLES maintains that the proposed amendment includes medical equipment and medical devices beyond the common understanding of medicine to the voters. Furthermore, APPLES asserts that voters will be surprised to learn that some over-the-counter products but not others will be covered by the definition of medicine. In response, ALERT maintains that voters are familiar with the proposed amendment's definition of medicine and will not be surprised by its impact. ALERT concludes that exploration of the issue is immaterial where under the proposed amendment voters will simply vote on the policy of taxing food and medicine as the government defines those terms. Had the ballot title listed all provisions that arguably constitute food or medicine under federal and state nutrition assistance programs or medical assistance programs, the voter would likely get lost in governmental minutiae and bureaucratese. As previously stated, a ballot title is sufficient if it identifies the proposed Act and fairly alleges the general purpose thereof. Porter v. McCuen, supra ; Coleman v. Sherrill, 189 Ark. 843, 75 S.W.2d 248 (1934). More importantly, it is not our function in the present litigation to interpret the amendment or explain how it is to be implemented. Ferstl v. McCuen, 296 Ark. 504, 510 758 S.W.2d 398, 401 (1988); see also Mason v. Jernigan, 260 Ark. 385, 391, 540 S.W.2d 851, 854 (1976) (Let it be remembered that the purpose of a ballot title is not to `interpret' the amendment, but only to summarize adequately the provisions of such amendment; nor is it our function in the present litigation to interpret the amendment itself). APPLES's position in this original action is also not supported by our decision in Scott v. Priest, 326 Ark. 328, 932 S.W.2d 746 (1996), where the ballot title failed to mention preferential treatment that was granted by the proposed amendment itself. Scott v. Priest, supra . The court held that such an omission would give the voters serious grounds for reflection. Id. Further, the court concluded that the definition of gross revenues was misleading as it was later defined as an amount received less an amount paid. Id. Additionally, the court found other descriptions that were spelled out in the amendment but left out of the ballot title. Id. The Scott decision simply held that ballot title was insufficient inasmuch as it omitted numerous provisions in the amendment's text. Id. The ballot title before us does not present such facts. Indeed, the ballot title clearly defines the scope of the amendment by virtually reproducing the amendment's language word for word. Ultimately, the central question to be resolved is whether the voter is capable of understanding that any item eligible to be purchased or otherwise available under any state or federal nutrition or health care assistance program will no longer be taxed. The answer is yes because no material omissions or misleading tendencies result from the ballot title's wording that [would] thwart a fair understanding of the [amendment's] purposes. Walker v. Priest at 426, 29 S.W.3d at 664.