Opinion ID: 1345837
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: new issues

Text: As noted above, we will not consider even a new issue raised in a successive petition if the petitioner abuses the writ by raising that issue. In re Haverty, supra at 503 (following Sanders v. United States, supra ). [7] [6] Contrary to the suggestions on page 499 of Justice Brachtenbach's concurring/dissenting opinion, we are not creating a per se rule that the advancing of new issues in successive petitions constitutes an abuse of the [writ]. We hold only that, if the petitioner was represented by counsel throughout postconviction proceedings, it is an abuse of the writ for him or her to raise, in a successive petition, a new issue that was available but not relied upon in a prior petition. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 444 n. 6, 91 L.Ed.2d 364, 106 S.Ct. 2616 (1986). Not every new issue will meet this description. If the claim is based upon newly discovered evidence, for example, or upon intervening case law, it would not have been available in the prior petition. If, on the other hand, counsel was fully aware of the facts supporting the new claim when the prior petition was filed, and there are no pertinent intervening developments, raising the new claim for the first time in a successive petition constitutes needless piecemeal litigation and, therefore, an abuse of the writ. See Hamilton v. Vasquez, 882 F.2d 1469, 1473 (9th Cir.1989). We now apply this test to each of the claims petitioner describes as new. (We identify and number these issues as they appear in petitioner's brief.) 5. Newly discovered evidence. Brief of Petitioner, at 88. This claim involves evidence that the manager of a travel agency in Sequim saw three very sinister looking men in a big Buick with California license plates on the morning of March 19, 1983 (the last day the victims were seen alive.) Clerk's Papers, at 34. One of the men came inside the travel agency and asked for an address on Barr Road Extension and showed the manager a telephone number. She did not know where Barr Road Extension was and offered to call the number for the man. He grabbed the paper back and drove to a nearby gas station, presumably to get directions. Clerk's Papers, at 35. Defense counsel presented this evidence to the trial court in 1983, in support of an unsuccessful motion for new trial. Report of Proceedings 15C, at 23. The issue was therefore available to petitioner and his attorneys when he filed his first and second personal restraint petitions. To raise the issue for the first time in his third petition is an abuse of the writ. Additionally, newly discovered evidence is grounds for relief in a personal restraint proceeding only if [m]aterial facts exist which have not been previously presented and heard, which in the interest of justice require vacation of the conviction [or] sentence .... RAP 16.4(c)(3). The evidence petitioner relies upon was presented and heard by the trial court more than 6 years ago and does not in the interests of justice require vacation of his conviction or death sentence. Such relief would be merited only if, among other things, the evidence would have been admissible at trial and would probably have changed the outcome. E.g., State v. Williams, 96 Wn.2d 215, 223, 634 P.2d 868 (1981). In order to present the evidence of the three sinister looking men at trial, petitioner would first have had to lay a foundation tending to clearly point to those men as the guilty parties. State v. Mak, supra at 716. In its oral ruling denying the motion for new trial, the trial court noted that Barr Road Extension is not the Barr Road, the place of these crimes and that there was absolutely no evidence at all that ... there was a Buick with California plates at or near the scene of the crime. Report of Proceedings 15C, at 23. As we pointed out on appeal, there was a great deal of evidence placing petitioner at the scene of the crimes and in possession of the victims' money and property the day following their disappearances. Jeffries I, at 401-09. 6. Prejudicial testimony: petitioner in jail. Brief of Petitioner, at 96. This issue involves a prosecution witness' statement that he first heard of petitioner when petitioner was in jail in Canada. Report of Proceedings 4C, at 113. Defense counsel immediately objected to this remark and moved for a mistrial. The trial court directed the jury to disregard the remark, using language suggested by defense counsel, but denied the motion for a mistrial. As with the newly discovered evidence issue, this claim, which was known to trial counsel, was available to petitioner in the prior personal restraint proceedings. He is abusing the writ by raising the issue only now. [8] 9. Mitigating circumstances (plural). and 10. Having in mind the crime. Brief of Petitioner, at 107, 121. These two claims involve the jury interrogatory required by RCW 10.95.060(4): Having in mind the crime of which the defendant has been found guilty, are you convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency? Petitioner contends that the use of the plural circumstances required the jury to find at least two mitigating circumstances in order to vote against the death penalty. He also argues that beginning the inquiry with the phrase having in mind the crime invalidly limits the jury's consideration of mitigating factors to circumstances relating to the crime itself, thus eliminating consideration of factors relating to the defendant's personal characteristics. Petitioner did not make these particular arguments at trial, on appeal, or in his previous personal restraint petitions, although he was aware of the wording of the jury interrogatory on appeal and challenged it on other grounds at that time. Jeffries I, at 420-23. The legal theories underlying his present challenges to the same interrogatory are not based on intervening case law, and could have been identified and argued when he filed the prior petitions. This also is an abuse of the writ. [9] 14. Waiver of right to counsel. Brief of Petitioner, at 161. Petitioner next claims he invalidly waived his right to counsel in the penalty phase by requesting counsel not to present some available evidence in mitigation. Although this argument was not raised in either of the previous personal restraint petitions, petitioner relied on the same facts in his second petition to support a claim that his attorneys represented him ineffectively by acceding to his wish not to present evidence in mitigation. See Jeffries III, at 331-35 (rejecting that argument). Since the related theory of an invalid waiver of counsel was available when the prior petition was filed, petitioner's attempt to create a new ground for relief by reframing a previously rejected claim constitutes an abuse of the writ. [10] 29. Adamson procedural bar. Brief of Petitioner, at 282. Petitioner's final new claim is premised on an amicus curiae brief the State of Washington and other western states filed in support of Arizona's petition for certiorari in Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir.1988). Amici apparently expressed concern that, if the Ninth Circuit's decision invalidating Arizona's death penalty statute is upheld, other statutes, including Washington's, would be vulnerable to similar attacks. Petitioner contends that the State is now procedurally barred from arguing in support of Washington's death penalty statute. Since this claim is based on circumstances which arose after petitioner's first two petitions were dismissed, it could not have been raised in those proceedings. The claim is also frivolous. The asserted procedural bar can have no effect unless it is tied to petitioner's own renewed challenges to Washington's death penalty statute; there is no reason for the State to argue the validity of the statute unless it is challenged. [11] We rejected several challenges to the statute in one or more of petitioner's prior proceedings, and he has not shown good cause to reconsider those issues. RAP 16.4(d). To the extent he is now relying on Adamson as cause to reconsider those arguments, his reliance is misplaced. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the pertinent portions of the invalid Arizona statute are different from Washington's statute, which it had previously upheld. Adamson v. Ricketts, supra at 1043 n. 51 (distinguishing Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir.1987).