Opinion ID: 1695849
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Directed verdict on claims of fraud, conversion, and money had and received.

Text: The insureds raise as error on appeal the trial judge's action in directing verdicts for the defendants on the claims of fraud, conversion, and money had and received. Alabama Code 1975, § 6-2-39, provides that fraud actions filed on or after January 9, 1985, are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. The statutory period begins to run when the fraud is discovered. Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-3. `Fraud is deemed to have been discovered when it ought to have been discovered. It is sufficient to begin the running of the statute of limitations that facts were known which would put a reasonable mind on notice that facts to support a claim of fraud might be discovered upon inquiry.' Osborn, 468 So.2d 103, 111, quoting Jefferson County Truck Growers Association v. Tanner, 341 So.2d 485, 488 (Ala.1977) (emphasis added in Osborn). Generally, the question of when a plaintiff discovered an alleged fraud is a question for the jury; however, even matters that are usually considered to be jury questions can be resolved by directed verdict when the evidence clearly warrants it. Osborn, supra . The insureds contend that they never wanted these insurance policies and that they were forced to purchase the policies in order to get a loan. Reasonable men could conclude only that the insureds were or should have been aware of the alleged fraud at the time they claim they were forced to do something against their will. Edna Higgins pledged her policy of insurance as collateral on loans in 1982 and 1983. Dewayne Higgins pledged a policy of insurance as collateral on a loan in 1982, and Miles Johnson pledged a policy of insurance as collateral in 1983. Thus, because this cause of action was not filed until 1986, their claims are barred by the statute of limitations. The insureds also argue that the trial judge erroneously directed a verdict against their claim for conversion of the money paid by the insureds for their policies. Conversion has been defined as a wrongful exercise of dominion over property in exclusion or defiance of the plaintiff's rights. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc. v. Sanders, 508 So.2d 689, 691 (Ala.1987). In order to maintain a conversion action, the plaintiff must have possession or an immediate right to possession of the property. Edwards v. Vanzant, 492 So.2d 990 (Ala.1986). Specifically, `trover lies for the conversion of ear marked money or specific money capable of identification, e.g., money in a bag or coins or notes which have been entrusted to defendant's care.' Hunnicutt v. Higginbotham, 138 Ala. 472, 475, 35 So. 469, 470 (1903) (quoting from 21 Enc.Pl. & Prac. 1020, 1021); United Merchants & Mfrs., supra ; Lewis v. Fowler, 479 So.2d 725, 726 (Ala.1985). In other words, an action alleging conversion of money lies only where there is an obligation to deliver the specific pieces of money in question or money that has been specifically sequestered, rather than a mere obligation to deliver a certain sum. Here, there was no specific, identifiable coin or bill, nor was there evidence that the money had been placed into a separate account. The insureds merely seek to recover a certain sum of currency paid for the purchase of insurance policies. Therefore, the trial judge correctly directed verdicts as to the insureds' claims for conversion. Finally, the insureds claim that the trial judge erroneously directed verdicts against their claims for money had and received on the basis of a two-year statute of limitations, contending that actually there is a six-year statute of limitations for that cause of action. They are correct in that this action is governed by a six-year statute of limitations. Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Watson, 226 Ala. 526, 147 So. 817 (1933). However, we affirm the judgment insofar as it is based on the directed verdicts against the plaintiffs' claim for money had and received, because the evidence presented at trial does not support that claim. A trial judge does not commit reversible error in directing a verdict on an erroneous ground if the moving party is otherwise entitled to the directed verdict on any ground raised in his motion. King v. Winslett, 287 Ala. 98, 248 So.2d 566 (1971). The essence of [a claim for] money had and received is that facts can be proved which show that [the] defendant holds money which in equity and good conscience belongs to the plaintiff or was improperly paid to the defendant because of mistake or fraud. Foshee v. General Tel. Co., 295 Ala. 70, 322 So.2d 715 (1975). At trial, the insureds established that they paid money to the defendant, LICA, for premiums on life insurance policies that were pledged as collateral for loans they had obtained from the Bank. The evidence shows that the insurance policies were issued and that the insureds received the protection afforded by the policies they purchased. Thus, the insureds have not shown that they were improperly required to pay money to the defendants, or that the trial judge erred in directing verdicts against the claims for money had and received.