Opinion ID: 2159195
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Did the Trial Court's Failure to Instruct the Jury Concerning the Role of Sympathy in its Penalty Phase Deliberations Deprive Defendant of his Constitutional Rights?

Text: Defendant requested that the trial court give the following charge to the jury to clarify the relevance of sympathy and compassion in its penalty phase deliberations: Even if you find that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, you as the sentencing body may still determine that in fairness and mercy a sentence of death would be unjust. Any sympathy or compassion can be taken into consideration by you in coming to your decision as to a penalty. Thus only if you unanimously believe that death is the only appropriate punishment would you return such verdict. The trial court declined to charge the jury as requested. In its instructions, the trial court briefly summarized for the jury each of the mitigating factors defendant attempted to prove. Concerning factor c(5)(h), the Court instructed the jury that it was required to consider anything concerning the defendant's life and characteristics and the particular circumstances of the crime for which you have found him guilty. Unlike the charge in Ramseur, the court's instruction to the jury did not direct that the jury exclude sympathy from its deliberations, but simply omitted any mention of compassion, mercy, or sympathy. Defendant claims the charge constituted reversible error. In State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. 123, we held that an instruction that the jury should decide the case on the evidence without any bias, prejudice or sympathy    did not violate a defendant's constitutional rights, citing California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed. 2d 934 (1987). Id. 106 N.J. at 296-99. We noted that the instruction by the trial court in Ramseur did not preclude the jury from considering all possible mitigating circumstances and such sympathy as those circumstances might inspire, id. at 299, nevertheless cautioning against the use of a general admonition against sympathy if in a particular case it might conflict with the permissible role of sympathy specifically engendered by any mitigating factor. Ibid. Recently, in State v. Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 171, we upheld a trial court's refusal to direct a capital case jury to consider [a]ny sympathy or compassion which [the proffered] mitigating circumstances may engender   , id. at 171. We find no error in the trial court's refusal to give the requested charge. The court's instruction was significantly more neutral on the issue of sympathy than the charge we approved in Ramseur, and did not inhibit the jury from considering sympathy to the extent it may have been engendered by mitigating factors proved by defendant.