Opinion ID: 72657
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consistency of the Juries' Verdicts

Text: 49 TRS asserts that the district court erred by granting judgment for DMSI based on the juries' special verdicts because the juries' answers to the special verdict interrogatories were inconsistent. Both juries in this case were given a special verdict form pursuant to Rule 49(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See generally 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 2505-2510 (2d ed.1994) (discussing special verdicts). In evaluating a claim that a jury's answers to a Rule 49(a) special verdict are inconsistent, 50 the Seventh Amendment demands that, if there is a view of the case which makes the jury's answers consistent, this Court must adopt that view. It does not matter whether [the appellant] can suggest equally plausible reasons for the verdict that would require reversal. The test to be applied in reconciling apparent conflicts between the jury's answers is whether the answers may fairly be said to represent a logical and probable decision on the relevant issues as submitted.... 51 Aquachem Co., Inc. v. Olin Corp., 699 F.2d 516, 521 (11th Cir.1983) (citations and internal quotations omitted). See also Hattaway v. McMillian, 903 F.2d 1440, 1449 (11th Cir.1990); Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1489 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102, 104 S.Ct. 1599, 80 L.Ed.2d 130 (1984). [I]t is the duty of the courts to attempt to harmonize the answers, if it is possible under a fair reading of them: 'Where there is a view of the case that makes the jury's answers to special interrogatories consistent, they must be resolved that way.'  Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 119, 83 S.Ct. 659, 666, 9 L.Ed.2d 618 (1963) (quoting Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 364, 82 S.Ct. 780, 786, 7 L.Ed.2d 798 (1962)). 52 a) The First Jury's Verdict 53 In order to prove a § 1 tying arrangement that is per se illegal, a plaintiff must establish at least the following basic elements: 54 1) that there are two separate products, a tying product and a tied product; 2) that those products are in fact tied together--that is, the buyer was forced to buy the tied product to get the tying product; 3) that the seller possesses sufficient economic power in the tying product market to coerce buyer acceptance of the tied product; and 4) involvement of a not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce in the market of the tied product. 55 Tic-X-Press, Inc. v. Omni Promotions Co., 815 F.2d 1407, 1414 (11th Cir.1987). See also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 462, 112 S.Ct. 2072, 2079-80, 119 L.Ed.2d 265 (1992); Thompson v. Metropolitan Multi-List, Inc., 934 F.2d 1566, 1574 (11th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 903, 113 S.Ct. 295, 121 L.Ed.2d 219 (1992). 56 In evaluating TRS's § 1 tying claim, the first jury answered No Decision to interrogatory 8 regarding whether there were separate markets for Dornier lithotripters, the tying product, and service for Dornier lithotripters, the tied product. The jury answered no to interrogatory 9 regarding whether DMSI possessed sufficient economic power in the lithotripter market to force buyers of Dornier lithotripters to purchase service for the lithotripters, and no to interrogatory 10 regarding whether DMSI forced the buyers to purchase the tied product. TRS argues that the jury's answers to interrogatories 9 and 10 are inconsistent with the jury's inability to answer interrogatory 8. TRS contends that a jury could not answer interrogatories 9 and 10 without first deciding what the relevant market is for this case because definition of the relevant market is necessary in order to assess whether DMSI possessed sufficient power in that market to engage in unlawful tying. 57 Judge Fawsett agreed with TRS's argument and denied DMSI's motion for judgment on the § 1 tying claim. However, after this case was transferred to Judge Bechtle following the first jury trial, Judge Bechtle reconsidered Judge Fawsett's ruling and granted DMSI's motion for judgment on the § 1 tying claim. 9 We agree with Judge Bechtle that the first jury's answers to interrogatories 9 and 10 are not fatally inconsistent with the jury's failure to answer interrogatory 8 and require judgment for DMSI on the § 1 tying claim. 58 Interrogatory 9 asked the jury whether TRS had proven that DMSI had sufficient economic power in the lithotripter market to coerce the buyer to purchase service for Dornier lithotripters, the tied product. (emphasis added). This phrasing in effect asked the jury to assume arguendo that there are separate markets for lithotripters and lithotripter servicing, and then to evaluate whether or not DMSI possessed sufficient economic power in the lithotripter market to coerce buyers to purchase Dornier lithotripter servicing. Thus, a reasonable explanation for the jury's answer to interrogatory 9 is that although the jury was unable to agree as to whether or not there were separate markets for Dornier lithotripters and Dornier lithotripter servicing, the jury assumed without deciding, for the purpose of answering interrogatory 9, that there were separate markets, and then concluded that even if this assumption were true, DMSI did not possess sufficient economic power in the lithotripter market. 10 Similarly, a reasonable explanation for the jury's answer to interrogatory 10, which asked the jury whether TRS had proven that DMSI forced buyers to purchase the tied product, is that the jury assumed without deciding that there are in fact separate markets for Dornier lithotripters and Dornier lithotripter servicing, but that even if this assumption were true, TRS failed to prove that DMSI forced buyers to purchase servicing. 59 As the above discussion indicates, there is a fair and reasonable reading of the jury's answers that makes them consistent; we therefore accept that view. See Gallick, 372 U.S. at 119, 83 S.Ct. at 666; Aquachem, 699 F.2d at 521. Because the jury concluded that DMSI did not possess the requisite economic power in the tying product market (interrogatory 9) and because the jury found that DMSI had not forced the buyer to purchase the tied product (interrogatory 10), we conclude that Judge Bechtle did not err by entering judgment for DMSI on the § 1 tying claim based on the partially completed special verdict form. The jury's unanimous findings that TRS failed to prove two elements that are essential to a successful tying claim compel the grant of judgment for DMSI on the § 1 tying claim, despite the jury's inability to answer the other tying claim interrogatories. Regardless of how the jury might have answered interrogatory 8, or for that matter, interrogatories 11 and 12, the jury's negative answers to interrogatories 9 and 10 conclusively preclude TRS from prevailing on its tying claim. See Bristol Steel & Iron Works v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 41 F.3d 182, 190-91 (4th Cir.1994) (affirming entry of judgment based on a partially completed special verdict form); Audette v. Isaksen Fishing Corp., 789 F.2d 956, 958 (1st Cir.1986) (same); Skyway Aviation Corp. v. Minneapolis, Northfield & Southern Ry. Co., 326 F.2d 701, 704 (8th Cir.1964) (same). 60 b) The Second Jury's Verdict 61 TRS also argues that the second jury's answers to the special verdict interrogatories regarding TRS's § 2 claims are inconsistent. TRS brought two claims under § 2 of the Sherman Act: a monopolization claim and an attempt to monopolize claim. A § 2 monopolization claim has two elements: 62 (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident. 63 Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 481, 112 S.Ct. at 2089 (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71, 86 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966)). See also Levine v. Central Florida Med. Affiliates, Inc., 72 F.3d 1538, 1555 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 75, 136 L.Ed.2d 34 (1996); T. Harris Young & Assocs. v. Marquette Elecs., 931 F.2d 816, 823 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1013, 112 S.Ct. 658, 116 L.Ed.2d 749 (1991). 64 In order to prove an attempt to monopolize claim under § 2, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct, (2) the defendant engaged in such conduct with the specific intent to monopolize, and (3) there existed a dangerous probability that the defendant might have achieved monopoly power. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456, 113 S.Ct. 884, 890-91, 122 L.Ed.2d 247 (1993); U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus., Inc., 7 F.3d 986, 993 (11th Cir.1993). Additionally, in evaluating a § 2 attempt to monopolize claim, it is necessary to consider the relevant market and the defendant's power in that market. Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 459, 113 S.Ct. at 892; U.S. Anchor Mfg., 7 F.3d at 994; T. Harris Young & Assocs., 931 F.2d at 823. 65 A defendant can escape § 2 liability if the defendant's actions can be explained by legitimate business justifications. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483 & n. 32, 112 S.Ct. at 2091 & n. 32; Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 627, 73 S.Ct. 872, 890, 97 L.Ed. 1277 (1953). 66 In deciding TRS's § 2 claims, the second jury defined the product market narrowly, as TRS proposed, to include only the servicing of Dornier lithotripters (interrogatory 1). The jury found that DMSI possessed monopoly power in the Dornier lithotripter servicing market (interrogatory 2), but that DMSI did not willfully maintain that monopoly power by anticompetitive means or for anticompetitive purposes (interrogatory 3). The jury further found that DMSI did not have the specific intent to achieve a monopoly in the Dornier lithotripter servicing market (interrogatory 5). 67 A fair and reasonable reading of the jury's verdict is that the jury chose to credit some or all of DMSI's business justifications, and consequently concluded that DMSI did not willfully maintain its monopoly power and did not have the specific intent to achieve a monopoly. Challenging this conclusion, TRS argues that DMSI's only attempt to explain its behavior was to state that it was responding to competition from other original equipment manufacturers. TRS asserts that this explanation was irrelevant because the jury found that the relevant market was the servicing of Dornier lithotripters, and other original equipment manufacturers did not service Dornier lithotripters. We reject TRS's argument because its premise is faulty. 11 DMSI's attempts to explain its behavior were not limited to the one explanation identified and challenged by TRS. In addition to stating that it was responding to competition from other original equipment manufacturers, DMSI also asserted, inter alia, the following business justifications, which are not rendered irrelevant by the jury's definition of the relevant market: (1) concerns about its product liability exposure, (2) a desire to guarantee quality service and parts availability to its customers, (3) the need to protect its trade secrets and proprietary information, (4) the decision not to assume the added costs of becoming a parts wholesaler, (5) the past litigiousness of, and prior disputes with, TRS, and (6) a decision not to help its rival, TRS. We conclude that the jury could have chosen to credit some or all of these asserted business justifications. 12 68 TRS argues that the second jury's answers to the interrogatories are fundamentally inconsistent with the conclusion that the jury chose to credit some or all of DMSI's business justifications. To support this argument, TRS points to the jury's failure to answer interrogatories 4 and 8, which asked whether DMSI had proven a legitimate business justification. However, the jury's failure to answer interrogatories 4 and 8 is amply explained by an examination of the jury's instructions. The special verdict form explicitly instructed the jurors that if they answered interrogatory 3 no, which they did, they should skip interrogatory 4 and go to interrogatory 5. Similarly, the special verdict form also instructed the jurors that if they answered interrogatory 5 no, which they did, they should skip interrogatories 6--8 and go to interrogatory 9. Judge Bechtle so instructed the jury when giving the jury instructions; and when the special verdict was read in open court, the jury foreperson indicated that the jury so understood the instructions. In light of these instructions, it is not inconsistent for the jury both to have credited some or all of DMSI's business justifications and not to have answered interrogatories 4 and 8. Cf. Gallick, 372 U.S. at 118-22, 83 S.Ct. at 666-67 (focusing on the trial court's instructions to the jury in resolving a challenge to the consistency of a special verdict). Because there is a reading of the jury's verdict which makes the verdict consistent, we must adopt that view. Id. at 119, 83 S.Ct. at 666; Aquachem, 699 F.2d at 521. We thus conclude that the second jury's verdict was not fatally inconsistent. 69 Because the jury found that DMSI had not willfully maintained its monopoly power by anticompetitive means or for anticompetitive purposes, TRS failed to prove an essential element of its § 2 monopoly claim. Similarly, because the jury found that DMSI did not have the specific intent to achieve a monopoly in the relevant market, TRS failed to prove an essential element of its § 2 attempt to monopolize claim. These dispositive jury findings compel us to conclude that Judge Bechtle properly entered judgment for DMSI on the § 2 claims.