Opinion ID: 784041
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ake Violations

Text: 125 Smith argues that the trial court's refusal to provide him with independent expert assistance during mitigation violated Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), and that trial counsel's failure to request that an expert be provided violated Strickland. 126 In Ake, the Supreme Court held that when a defendant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial, the Constitution requires that a State provide access to a psychiatrist's assistance on this issue, if the defendant cannot otherwise afford one. Ake, 470 U.S. at 74, 105 S.Ct. 1087; id. at 83, 105 S.Ct. 1087 (We therefore hold that when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.). The Ake Court also stated that a similar conclusion was required in the context of a capital sentencing proceeding, when the state presents psychiatric evidence of the defendant's future dangerousness. Id. at 83, 105 S.Ct. 1087. At the same time, the Ake majority emphasized that its ruling was limited to cases in which the defendant's mental condition was seriously in question upon the defendant's threshold showing. Id. at 82, 105 S.Ct. 1087. Furthermore, the Court held that the state was obliged merely to provide one competent psychiatrist, and that it could choose that psychiatrist. In other words, the defendant's right does not include the right to a psychiatrist of his choice. Id. at 83, 105 S.Ct. 1087 (This is not to say, of course, that the indigent defendant has a constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own.). 127 This Court has interpreted Ake as allowing psychiatric assistance during the sentencing phase if 1) the defendant's sanity was a significant factor at trial, or 2) the state presents at sentencing psychiatric evidence of future dangerousness. Mason, 320 F.3d at 615-16; Thompson, 315 F.3d at 588-89; Skaggs v. Parker, 235 F.3d 261, 272 (6th Cir.2000); United States v. Osoba, 213 F.3d 913, 917 (6th Cir.2000); Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091, 1120 (6th Cir.1990) (en banc opinion of Kennedy, J., with five Judges concurring and one Judge concurring in the result). 128 Smith's claim fails because Smith's sanity was not a significant issue during trial principally because Smith withdrew his insanity defense. Smith initially raised an insanity defense and, as a result, the trial court ordered three psychiatric evaluations prior to trial. Each expert uniformly concluded that Smith did not suffer from any mental illness. Smith then withdrew his insanity defense. Thus, he does not meet the first test under Skaggs. Smith also does not argue that the prosecution presented evidence of future dangerousness. He therefore did not have a right to any psychiatric assistance at sentencing. Mason, 320 F.3d at 616 (holding that the petitioner did not have a clearly established right to any psychiatric assistance at sentencing because the State of Ohio did not present any psychiatric evidence of the defendant's future dangerousness). 129 Even so, the trial court appointed Schmidtgoessling during the mitigation phase. Smith complains that he was entitled to an independent psychiatrist, rather than a friend of the court appointment. Ake does not entitle him to the psychiatrist of his choosing, only a competent psychiatrist. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83, 105 S.Ct. 1087; Mason, 320 F.3d at 616; Thompson, 315 F.3d at 588. 10 130 Smith's ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be rejected because, as he himself admits in his brief, his attorneys requested an independent psychiatrist for the mitigation phase, but the trial court denied the motion. Months prior to trial, the trial court denied a defense request for an independent mental health professional at the penalty phase. Brief at 53. Thus, Smith's trial counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to request an independent psychiatrist. Furthermore, [w]e have never found counsel to be ineffective solely because the expert used was on the State payroll. Martin v. Mitchell, 280 F.3d 594, 614 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1004, 123 S.Ct. 515, 154 L.Ed.2d 401 (2002). 131 Smith also argues that the trial court erred in denying him a drug and alcohol expert at the culpability phase. This argument must likewise be rejected. Dr. Schmidtgoessling testified to Smith's long history of substance abuse and its effects on him. Dr. Schmidtgoessling's testimony was sufficient for the Ohio Supreme Court to conclude that Smith's drug and alcohol abuse constituted a mitigation factor. See State v. Smith, 574 N.E.2d at 520. 132 For all the reasons discussed in the preceding section, Smith has not shown that he was prejudiced by counsel's use of Dr. Schmidtgoessling rather than some other hypothetical expert. Trial counsel is frequently faulted for failing to obtain the right expert. Unless habeas counsel can locate and produce this mythic expert, there can be no cause or prejudice. Such is the case here. As Dr. Schmidtgoessling stated, Smith has a personality disorder, most certainly caused by his unfortunate upbringing. But there is no proof that he has organic brain damage or any other diagnosed mental disease or defect. Indeed, at pretrial, three mental health experts failed to detect any indicators of possible organic brain damage. At post-conviction, three mental health experts, hand-picked by habeas counsel, failed to come up with a diagnosis of organic brain damage. It is therefore not possible to fault trial counsel for accepting the conclusion of three court-appointed mental health experts, and strategically deciding to rely on Dr. Schmidtgoessling to present an exhaustive presentation of the evidence she did have after an extensive review of numerous records. In short, Smith has not demonstrated that any of the alleged failings by trial counsel prejudiced his right to a fundamentally fair mitigation proceeding. Indeed, as every court that has reviewed the issue has determined, although there was certainly abundant mitigation evidence presented, it could not outweigh the aggravating circumstances found in this brutal crime. 133 We now turn to the remainder of Smith's arguments. Respondent argues that many of them have been procedurally defaulted. Because all are without merit, we will briefly dispose of them on those grounds, assuming without deciding, solely for purposes of expediting somewhat the analysis, that they have not been procedurally defaulted. 134