Opinion ID: 1808830
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Provision for Gubernatorial Appointment in the 2006 Act is Unconstitutional

Text: The Talladega County parties contend that the provision in the 2006 Act allowing the governor to fill the office of the third circuit judgeship by appointment violates §§ 152 and 153, Ala. Const.1901 (Off.Recomp.). [8] An act of the legislature arrives with a presumption of constitutionality; a party challenging that constitutionality has the burden of overcoming that presumption. State ex rel. King v. Morton, 955 So.2d 1012 (Ala.2006). We note at the outset that the challenged provision of the 2006 Act (The additional judgeship created by this act shall be filled by appointment of the Governor on or after October 1, 2009, from a list of nominees by the Talladega County Judicial Commission.) does not refer to a vacancy. The 2006 Act admits of only one rational construction the governor shall appoint the first holder of the office. The State relies upon Griggs v. Bennett, 710 So.2d 411, 412 (Ala.1998), in which this Court stated: Although § 6.14 [of Amendment No. 328, now § 153, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off.Recomp.)] lists the usual causes of vacancydeath, resignation, retirement, or removal of an incumbent judgeit has long been recognized that vacancies may occur for reasons other than the usual causes listed in an appointment provision. [9] In Griggs, a statute enacted in 1990 created a judgeship; the initial officeholder was to be elected at the general election to be held in 1992. Litigation dealing with clearance of the statute under the Voting Rights Act prevented the election contemplated by the statute from taking place. In 1996, the United States Department of Justice granted preclearance for the new judgeship. The attorney general issued an opinion stating that under what is now § 153, the governor could fill a vacancy by appointment. The plaintiffs in Griggs filed an action seeking an order directing the secretary of state to place the judgeship on the ballot for the primary and general elections in 1996, rather than filling the office by appointment. The trial court denied relief, holding that the judgeship should be slated for election in 1998. On appeal, this Court affirmed, noting that vacancies may occur for reasons other than the usual causes listed in an appointment provision. 710 So.2d at 412. However, in no instance has this Court ever upheld the authority of the governor to fill a vacancy pursuant to a statute providing for appointment of the initial officeholder. We decline to extend Griggs so as to permit the complete disregard of § 153 and the emasculation of § 152, which provides: All judges shall be elected by vote of the electors within the territorial jurisdiction of their respective courts. We do not have the prerogative, by judicial fiat, of reviving a practice once permitted by our Constitution but subsequently repealed. [10]