Opinion ID: 2544933
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Defendant's Claim of Mental Retardation

Text: The defense claims the defendant is mentally retarded and therefore exempt from capital punishment under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), and La.C.Cr.P. art. 905.5.1(A). [19] The defense alleges defendant's I.Q. is within the range for mental retardation, he had significant academic problems as a child, and he has severe deficits in adaptive functioning, such as difficulty learning basic skills involving self-care from childhood through adulthood, trouble comprehending instructions, and trouble learning tasks at work and in moving between assigned projects. He attributes the jury's finding to the contrary, in part, to frequent misstatements by the state about the nature of mental retardation during voir dire. [20] He alleges these misstatements were left uncorrected and that the district court, in fact, never defined mental retardation for the jurors. [21] The defense also complains that the court misinformed jurors that there was the requirement of unanimity in a finding of mental retardation, which he contends runs afoul of Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988). The defense also attributes the jury's determination to a lack of evidence that resulted from defendant's decision to forego the assistance of counsel, the lack of expert assistance discussed above, and the district court's refusal to provide additional time for reappointed counsel to prepare for the penalty phase. [22] Based on what it characterizes as an inadequate record, the defense asks, at the minimum, that the matter be remanded for evidentiary hearings on the issue of mental retardation. Finally, the defense argues that the district court should have granted the Motion for New Trial based on the new evidence provided therein of defendant's deficits. The United States Supreme Court in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), held the execution of mentally retarded individuals is excessive under the Eighth Amendment and does not measurably advance the deterrent or the retributive purpose of the death penalty. Id., 536 U.S at 321, 122 S.Ct. at 2252. Atkins was based on the evolving standards of decency that have occurred since the Supreme Court's decision in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), allowed the execution of a mentally retarded defendant. State v. Williams, 01-1650 (La.11/1/02), 831 So.2d 835. In Atkins, the Supreme Court found the deficiencies of the mentally retarded do not exempt them from criminal sanctions but do diminish their personal culpability, as they are far more likely to act on impulse rather than premeditation, and in a group setting they are more often followers than leaders. Id., 536 U.S. at 318, 122 S.Ct. at 2250. The Atkins Court reiterated one of the purposes of capital punishment is to deter offenders who act with premeditation and deliberation. Id., 536 U.S. at 319, 122 S.Ct. at 2251. Because a mentally retarded offender acts on impulse and not premeditation, the intended deterrent effect of the punishment fails to serve its purpose. Id. The capital punishment exemption for mentally retarded offenders was codified in Louisiana by the legislative enactment of La.C.Cr.P. art. 905.5.1, which provides a procedure to be used in the event that a capital defendant raises a claim of mental retardation. Under the article, such a defendant has the burden of proving mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence. La.C.Cr.P. art. 905.5.1(C)(1). The article defines mental retardation as: a disability characterized by significant limitations in both intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills. The onset must occur before the age of eighteen years. La.C.Cr.P. art. 905.5.1(H)(1). The article concludes with an advisory list of several medical conditions that do[] not necessarily constitute mental retardation, which includes learning disabilities. La. C.Cr.P. art. 905.5.1(H)(2)(j). The American Psychiatric Association (APA) provides a similar definition as follows: The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety (Criterion B). The onset must occur before age 18 years (Criterion C). Mental Retardation has many different etiologies and may be seen as a final common pathway of various pathological processes that affect the functioning of the central nervous system. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 41 (4th ed.2000). Mild mental retardation is typically used to describe people with an I.Q. level of 50-55 to approximately 70. Id., at 42-43. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308, 122 S.Ct. 2242 at 2245, n. 3, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). In State v. Turner, 05-2425 (La.7/10/06), 936 So.2d 89, this Court upheld the constitutionality of La.C.Cr.P. art. 905.5.1 generally, and further upheld the statute's provision that a jury decide the question of mental retardation during a capital sentencing hearing. The statutory procedure was followed in the instant case and the defense offers no controlling or persuasive authority for revisiting Turner, in which this Court found nothing . . . to support a determination that a jury is unreliable for deciding the factual issue of whether the defendant is mentally retarded. Turner, 05-2425 at 11, 936 So.2d at 98. Despite defendant's characterization of the record as incomplete, it contains extensive evidence pertaining to this issue. A school evaluation conducted when defendant was in the fifth grade shows he performed for the most part at the third and fourth grade level, and that he was identified as having a learning disability, which the defense expert conceded is not the same as mental retardation. At his mother's request, the defendant was never placed in any special education classes. Further, defendant continued reading close to grade level before he dropped out of school. His sixth-grade teacher noted in his school record, Anthony is in the sixth grade and frequently misses school. He has poor study habits, and almost never brings supplies to class. Anthony needs one-on-one instruction in order for him to accomplish anything, not because he can't but because he won't. Although the defense expert, Dr. Mark Zimmerman, initially diagnosed defendant as mentally retarded with an I.Q. in the 50s, the state's expert, Dr. Donald Hoppe, was suspicious at the outset that the defendant was malingering to make it appear he was significantly mentally challenged. As Dr. Hoppe obtained additional information, he became firmly convinced the defendant was, in fact, malingering, that his I.Q. scores were invalid, and that he functioned in the normal range. Dr. Hoppe compared Dr. Zimmerman's test results with his own administered three months later. [23] He found while the results were somewhat consistent overall, internally they were very inconsistent. Defendant's abilities had changed from test to test. Things he could do and abilities he possessed for Dr. Zimmerman's test he no longer exhibited for Dr. Hoppe's test, and vice versa. Also, Dr. Hoppe testified that the practice effect, the improvement on tests after repeated administration, was not present even though the last test date was within three months. Dr. Hoppe testified that, according to the large body of research on the practice effect, if two I.Q. tests are administered within a three to six month window, the subject's verbal I.Q. typically increases by three points, the non-verbal I.Q. typically increases by ten to eleven points, and the overall score usually increases by six to seven points. Dr. Hoppe pointed out the defendant's scores in his verbal I.Q., non-verbal I.Q., and full-scale I.Q. all decreased by at least three points. Furthermore, the defendant read at a second-grade level when Dr. Zimmerman administered the test, and three months later told Dr. Hoppe that he was completely illiterate and could not read a single word. Notably, although defendant claimed to be wholly illiterate, at a pre-trial motion hearing he referred to the notes he had made on his copy of his motion: That's right here, but that's my copy to argue. I've written all over it. The defendant even answered incorrectly when asked his own age, which was a major red flag to Dr. Hoppe, because even most mentally retarded patients know their own age. Dr. Hoppe concluded the defendant was malingering, placing both I.Q. scores in serious doubt. Based on all the information, Dr. Hoppe concluded that the defendant was definitely not mentally retarded and, instead, actually functions at a higher level. However, even Dr. Zimmerman retracted his original conclusion that defendant was mentally retarded when new information became available and indicated, considering all the factors the state pointed out, that malingering should be investigated. Dr. Zimmerman could only offer his unsupported belief, based on clinical impressions, that the defendant was not malingering Dr. Zimmerman also stated that based on what he had seen and heard, he no longer had enough information to conclude the defendant was mentally retarded. During the court's determination of the defendant's competency, a third expert, Dr. John Thompson, was called in by the court to review the previously administered tests and also to perform his own evaluation of the defendant. Dr. Thompson believed the defendant was not putting forth the best effort during his testing, and the defendant actually understood much more about the proceedings than he exhibited. He believed that the defendant had deliberately failed the court competency test and thus, expressed some hesitancy in the test conclusions. Like Dr. Hoppe, Dr. Thompson also believed that the defendant was deliberately underperforming on tests so as to appear severely mentally retarded. Thus, Dr. Thompson found that the defendant was likely competent to stand trial. Several of the defendant's former employers also testified. The defendant was previously employed at A & R Transport as a tank washer, which also involved filling out inspection reports and certificates of cleanliness. He was later promoted to rack supervisor at A & R, in which he supervised a team of three or four in the disassembly and washing of tanks that house medical pellets. [24] As the supervisor, defendant also trained individuals on the proper procedures for tank truck cleaning at A & R. Defendant was also previously employed as a stocker and cashier at both Winn-Dixie and Piggly Wiggly with no reported problems in functioning. Robert Brown, Erica Bell's brother, also testified that he worked at Southland Marble with the defendant. The defendant actually assisted Robert Brown in getting a job, and on the day of Robert's interview, defendant opened up the shop and waited for the boss. At Southland, the defendant and Robert Brown had to measure, mix, pour, and cut marble to specifications. Robert Brown testified that math was involved in the job, and the defendant had no problems with his math skills while working at Southland. Dr. Zimmerman, the defense expert, testified he had spoken with one of the defendant's previous employers, Terry Maddie, who indicated that defendant, though a hard worker, needed to be supervised closely, did not multitask, and could only perform simple tasks. Dr. Zimmerman relied in part on the information from Maddie as evidence the defendant had a deficiency in adaptive functioning related to work history. However, Dr. Zimmerman did not know and his report was silent as to the type of work defendant performed and the time frame in which the defendant worked with Maddie. [25] Overall, the evidence of defendant's work history supports a finding that he has no adaptive functioning issues related to work. In addition to the expert and fact testimony, the jury observed the defendant's self representation during the guilt phase of the trial. There is nothing in the record from which it can be concluded that the jury erred in rejecting the defendant's claim of mental retardation. [26] The remainder of the defendant's complaints regarding the jury's determination can be quickly dismissed. Although the defense attributes the finding to comments made by the state during voir dire, the jury's determination seems more readily attributable to the evidence. The statements at issue [27] were introductory in nature, consisted of only a small portion of the state's presentation on this issue, and are not wholly inconsistent with Atkins, in which the Supreme Court devoted considerable attention to proportionality and the relationship between mental retardation and the penological purposes served by the death penalty, Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317-21, 122 S.Ct. at 2250-52. Nor does the defendant explain how the state's comments altered his burden of proving mental retardation by a preponderance or otherwise misled the jury. Regardless, the defense did not object at the time the statements were made and the claim is therefore not preserved for review. [28] Although defendant on appeal complains the prosecutor's statements were highly significant and that they were a fruit of the district court's ruling permitting him to represent himself, this claim is reminiscent of an assertion that he provided himself with ineffective assistance, which a self-represented defendant may not make. [29] Finally, regarding the claim that there is new evidence pertaining to the allegation that defendant is mentally retarded and therefore a new trial is appropriate, the evidence attached in support of the Motion for New Trial was all readily available at the time of trial. [30] This Court has repeatedly noted that to obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the defendant has the burden of showing that (1) the new evidence was discovered after trial, (2) the failure to discover the evidence at the time of the trial was not caused by lack of diligence, (3) the evidence is material to the issues at trial, and (4) the evidence is of such a nature that it would probably have produced a different verdict. State v. Hammons, 597 So.2d 990, 994 (La.1992); State v. Knapper, 555 So.2d 1335 (La.1990); State v. Prudholm, 446 So.2d 729 (La.1984); State v. Talbot, 408 So.2d 861 (La.1980). In the instant case, the defense fails to show the new evidence was discovered after trial and that the failure to discover the evidence was not caused by lack of diligence. Therefore, the district court correctly denied the motion for new trial.