Opinion ID: 2765004
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The majority’s assessment of Mann’s counsel is

Text: neither “highly deferential” nor shorn of “the distorting effects of hindsight.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). The record makes clear that trial counsel conducted considerable investigation into Mann’s background in an effort to dig up mitigating sentencing 2 The majority’s view is also in deep tension with at least two other circuits. See Bledsoe v. Bruce, 569 F.3d 1223, 1232 (10th Cir. 2009) (stating that “despite its ‘may is not good enough’ language, the Kansas Supreme Court applied the correct [Strickland] standard”); Parker v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 331 F.3d 764, 786 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Despite the imprecise language used by the Florida Supreme Court, we conclude the court understood and applied the correct prejudice standard from Strickland.”). 46 MANN V. RYAN evidence. In fact, the sentencing court commended counsel on doing a “very thorough job” in presenting his mitigation case. Counsel consulted with the Arizona Capital Representation Project. He suggested the trial court appoint a psychologist from the court clinic to evaluate Mann. He subpoenaed documentary evidence from government agencies with previous contact with Mann. He had Mann write an autobiography, and investigated details of that autobiography. He arranged for Mann’s daughter, mother, former employer and former co-worker to testify on Mann’s behalf during sentencing. These efforts were fruitful: The sentencing judge determined that Mann had demonstrated seven mitigating factors, all of which arose out of counsel’s investigation. Despite all this, the majority asserts that “there can be little doubt that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Maj. Op. at 26. The focal point of the majority’s Strickland analysis is its assertion that counsel should have obtained Mann’s medical records, id. at 27, and pursued further evidence of Mann’s alleged brain injury.3 As the majority notes, counsel could have called for more evaluations and for expensive neurological testing (though, of course, there’s no indication 3 The majority also faults counsel for not calling Mann’s ex-girlfriend Karen Miller as a witness during sentencing. But it was Miller who turned Mann in to the police, and then offered negative testimony about him during trial. Counsel had no way of knowing what Miller would say if called—her testimony could easily have worsened things for Mann. Given the “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct f[ell] within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, it certainly wasn’t a blunder not to call a volatile and heretofore adverse witness during sentencing. Indeed, had counsel called Miller, the majority would likely have pointed to that decision as proof that counsel was incompetent: “What a moron! He even put the snitch on the stand.” MANN V. RYAN 47 the trial court would have paid for such expensive procedures). But why? The neutral, court-appointed psychologist didn’t suggest any reason to suspect brain injury. Counsel is entitled to rely on such an expert’s view in deciding whether or not to pursue a defense theory related to mental illness. See Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1038–39 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1405 (2011) (it was “a reasonable penalty-phase strategy to focus on evoking sympathy for Pinholster’s mother,” rather than Pinholster’s alleged brain injury, in part because the single psychiatric expert counsel retained “told counsel that Pinholster did not appear to suffer from brain damage”). From counsel’s perspective at the time of trial, “there were any number of hypothetical experts . . . whose insight might possibly have been useful,” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 789, and there was no indication that a brain trauma specialist was the magic bullet the majority now construes it to be. Counsel was already armed with substantial evidence of Mann’s dysfunctional childhood and long-term substance abuse. Further evidence of diminished capacity could have proven counter-productive. Such evidence can be a “two-edged sword that [a sentencing judge] might find to show future dangerousness” or use to conclude that a defendant is “simply beyond rehabilitation.” Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1410 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, Arizona courts in 1995 frequently gave short shrift to mitigation evidence not causally related to the offense. See Schad v. Ryan, 671 F.3d 708, 723 (9th Cir.