Opinion ID: 6226276
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues

Text: We review the Claims Court’s summary judgment de- cision de novo. As we explained in Jones II, issue preclusion is available as a defense where the following four elements are met:
the one presented in the action in question. 2. The prior action has been finally adjudicated on the merits. 3. The party against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior adjudication. 4. The party against whom the doctrine is raised had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action. Jones II, 846 F.3d at 1361 (citing Park Lake Res. Ltd. Liab. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 378 F.3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir. 2004)). As in our prior decision, only the first and fourth factors are under dispute. In Jones II, we instructed the Claims Court to consider whether any spoliation sanctions it decided to impose would “change the evidentiary landscape.” Id. at 1363–64. We explained that, if its spoliation sanctions did not change the evidentiary landscape, the Claims Court could consider anew the application of issue preclusion. Id. But, if its spoliation sanctions changed the evidentiary landscape, we instructed the Claims Court to “independently consider [Mr. Murray’s parents’] substantive allegations of bad men violations.” Id. at 1364. Case: 20-2182 Document: 57 Page: 25 Filed: 02/16/2022 JONES v. US 25 The Claims Court found that the sanction it devised for the “spoliation of the .380 handgun reduces the evidence available to the United States to argue that Mr. Murray shot himself, but it does not augment the evidence that is available to the plaintiffs . . . to prove that Officer Norton shot Mr. Murray.” Issue Preclusion Order, 149 Fed. Cl. at 353. It thus concluded that the evidentiary landscape was unchanged, as Mr. Murray’s parents were able to provide no new evidence of their son’s alleged murder. Mr. Murray’s parents argue on appeal that the Claims Court’s determination that the spoliation of the handgun did not change the evidentiary landscape is incorrect. We agree. There was a change in the evidentiary landscape, and the Claims Court committed two errors in coming to the opposite conclusion. First, the Claims Court misinterpreted our instruction to consider whether its sanction “change[s] the evidentiary landscape” when it used the evidence on which the district court based its summary judgment decision as the baseline against which any change in the evidentiary landscape should be measured. Issue Preclusion Order, 149 Fed. Cl. at 353 (noting that Officer Norton’s motion for summary judgment in the district court did not rely on the spoliated gun). The proper baseline against which to measure a change in the evidentiary landscape is not the evidence relied on in the district court decision, but the evidence as it existed before the spoliation. The district court case was filed after the gun was destroyed, and, thus, the district court could not rely on the gun as it had already been destroyed. Although a spoliation sanction concerning some other, less critical, evidence may not have changed the evidentiary landscape—spoliation of the alleged suicide weapon did. Second, as we have already explained, the Claims Court abused its discretion in awarding a sanction that did not augment the evidence available to Mr. Murray’s parents. Had the Claims Court measured the change in the Case: 20-2182 Document: 57 Page: 26 Filed: 02/16/2022 26 JONES v. US evidentiary landscape from a time before the spoliation of the Hi-Point .380 handgun, or had it applied an appropriate sanction augmenting the evidence available to Mr. Murray’s parents, it would have found that the spoliation of the gun changed the evidentiary landscape. Because the evidentiary landscape is changed, we reverse the Claims Court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for it to “independently consider [Mr. Murray’s parents’] substantive allegations of bad men violations.” See Jones II, 846 F.3d at 1364.