Opinion ID: 874123
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The magistrate judge's finding was consistent with the appropriate legal standards and was supported by substantial and competent evidence.

Text: As Tomlinson indicates, the question of whether a material, permanent and substantial change in conditions exists is a preliminary question to whether and what changes in the custody order would be in the best interests of the child. The requirement reflects a policy against continuous relitigation and alteration of custody decisions. Chislett, 102 Idaho at 298, 629 P.2d at 694. In our decisions subsequent to Tomlinson, we have made it clear that whether a change in conditions is material or substantial depends upon the impact of the change upon the child. This Court addressed the subject at length in Poesy v. Bunney, 98 Idaho 258, 561 P.2d 400 (1977). While the material, permanent and substantial change standard is a sound legal principle, care must be exercised in its application. The tendency is to search for some greatly altered circumstance in an attempt to pinpoint the change called for by the rule. Thus, the emphasis is placed on defining some change, and making that change appear, in itself, to be material, permanent and substantial. This focus is misleading. The important portion of the standard is that which relates the change in conditions to the best interest of the child. The changed circumstance standard was designed, as a matter of policy, to prevent continuous re-litigation of custody matters. That policy goal, however, is of secondary importance when compared to the best interest of the child, which is the controlling consideration in all custody proceedings. The court must look not only for changes of condition or circumstance which are material, permanent and substantial, but also must thoroughly explore the ramifications, vis-a-vis the best interest of the child, of any change which is evident. What may appear by itself to be a small and insignificant change in circumstances may have significant effects insofar as children are concerned. Care must also be taken to avoid `compartmentalizing' consideration of a child's best interest in successive attempts at custody modification. The best interest of a child, like its growth, is a matter of development. An emerging pattern which is not apparent in a first consideration may come into focus at some later time. The court should allow and consider all evidence relevant to a child's interest, not just that evidence which has emerged since previous orders. Id. at 261-62, 561 P.2d at 403-04 (internal citations omitted). The Court has since relied on this statement from Poesy and has characterized it as a holding that the best interests of the child must take precedence in any analysis regarding a material change in circumstances. McGriff v. McGriff, 140 Idaho 642, 647, 99 P.3d 111, 116 (2004); see also Hawkins v. Hawkins, 99 Idaho 785, 787, 589 P.2d 532, 534 (1978) (A trial court is guided by the principle that the paramount consideration in any custody proceeding is the best interests and welfare of the children involved.). Likewise, the trial court must not only look to the substantial and permanent nature of any change in conditions proved by the proponent, but also thoroughly explore the ramifications of any such change vis-a-vis the children's welfare. Chislett, 102 Idaho at 298, 629 P.2d at 694. The magistrate judge made two findings that bear on the question of whether an abuse of discretion occurred here. First, in addressing the question of the admissions that, according to I.R.C.P. 36(a) were conclusively admitted by Sayler's failure to respond, the court stated: [I]f you move and whether or not you continue to do the things that you might have said you were gonna do, I don't know that that constitutes a material change. I mean when you decided you were gonna go to college and then decided not to go to college, I'm not sure that enhances your desirability as a parent. I mean we like people to improve themselves and so if you say that you're gonna do something and go move and then don't do it, I don't know that that's necessarily to your advantage. Later, the magistrate court concluded: And I think what I'm gonna find is that between January and May, Miss Sayler, you have failed to make a sufficient [sic] that there was a material change in circumstance. As you've indicated, the only change is that you're not going to school and you're workin' full-time but that, I don't think, is of sufficient significance that it would justify a change in the Order. I think the real thing that's happened here is that you regret signing that Orderor agreeing to that Order that was entered back in January. But it was agreed to. And I typically don'twhen parents agree, I just don't interfere because I feel that if parents agree to something and it seems workable, I don't live with the kids every day. Applying Poesy and its progeny to this case, we hold that the magistrate judge did not abuse her discretion. First, we note that the magistrate court's finding, that the decision to work full-time rather than go to college does not rise to the level of a substantial, material, and permanent change in circumstances, is supported by the record before the court. The magistrate court's decision focused on the permanent nature of the change. Sayler may decide to go to college at any timesimply because she is not presently attending college does not mean that her long-term plans have been altered. Indeed, to the extent that Sayler's argument relies on this point, it conflicts with the admission that Sayler does intend to attend college once this case is settled. Sayler's testimony during the trial also suggests that she still plans to go to college at some point. The magistrate court went on to address the other issues identified by Poesy. The court's statement that the decision not to go to college doesn't enhance[ Sayler's] desirability as a parent was a finding that the change did not advance the best interests of the children. In addition, the magistrate court was concerned with underlying policy behind the substantial, material, and permanent change requirement: to prevent continuous re-litigation of custody matters. Poesy, 98 Idaho at 261, 561 P.2d at 403. All of the testimony presented in this case tends to support the magistrate court's conclusion that Sayler was primarily motivated by buyer's remorse over her stipulation to the change in custody. The magistrate judge was not making a blanket statement that a parent who stipulates to a custody change cannot later demonstrate a change in circumstances. Rather, it was a finding that Sayler was motivated by her regrets, a finding supported by Sayler's own testimony. It is evident that the decision by the magistrate judge was consistent with the standard laid out in Poesy, was supported by substantial and competent evidence, and was reached through an exercise of reason. We therefore conclude that the magistrate court did not abuse its discretion and affirm.