Opinion ID: 1386894
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Petition for Review and Assertions Contained Therein

Text: Petitioner contends that a physical ailment prevented him both from attending the hearing of the State Bar Court and from filing a motion seeking relief within the statutory period for filing such motions. He asks this court to grant him relief from his default and to remand the matter to the State Bar Court for another opportunity to present evidence on the merits. He claims to have first become aware of the default in January 1990, long after the 75-day period for setting aside the default. His declaration states that he contacted the State Bar at that time and made full restitution to Rhodes. According to petitioner, the State Bar advised petitioner on May 30, 1990, that it was too late to obtain relief from default in the State Bar Court and advised him that the State Bar Court would be filing its recommendation with the Supreme Court soon. After the State Bar Court filed its recommendation with this court, petitioner filed a timely petition for review. In support of his request to be granted a belated relief from default, petitioner documents that he suffers from temporal lobe epilepsy. Petitioner's history with this ailment stems from an injury to his head in 1971. He had a generalized seizure in 1984, for which he was treated with various drugs. The drugs had adverse side effects upon petitioner, and he discontinued their use in 1986 or 1987. During this time, petitioner believed that he was suffering from depression and was aware of some memory loss, for which he received counseling through 1988. Apparently petitioner then sought no further aid until December 1989, when he turned to a new doctor for medical treatment. Petitioner found this treatment ineffective and sought out another medical team in March 1990. For the first time, petitioner's temporal lobe epilepsy was diagnosed and effectively treated. Petitioner argues that his illness created a `false memory' which prevented him from defending himself insofar as he falsely believed that he had provided the State Bar with exculpatory evidence when in fact he had not. He further attributes to the illness his failure to respond to the hearing judge's filed decision of October 6, 1989. Petitioner thus points out that his failure to file a request for review of the decision by November 6, 1989, was during a time when [petitioner] was not properly diagnosed for his illness. Petitioner does not argue that his illness was the underlying cause of the violations alleged by the State Bar; [3] instead, he argues that his disability prevented him from defending himself in the State Bar proceedings. Petitioner submitted a letter dated May 11, 1990, in which his physician explains petitioner's treatment with Tegretol, the drug of choice for seizure control and limbic epilepsy. The doctor anticipated that [petitioner] will be stabilized on Tegretol and require this medication for life if it does control his symptoms. [She did] not anticipate any worsening of his symptoms or the development of an actual psychiatric illness at this point in his life. Petitioner, in his declaration in his petition for review, asserts that since receiving the Tegretol treatment, [he had] not experienced any additional lapses of consciousness or memory problems.

(1a) Petitioner requests that we grant him relief from default and remand the matter to the State Bar Court for a new hearing on the merits. (2) We are generally unsympathetic to attorneys' claims for relief from default in the State Bar Court. [A]n accused attorney has the obligation to obtain representation if he wants it, to appear at the hearing, and to present evidence. The hearing may proceed despite his voluntary absence, and his failure to participate is not grounds for a rehearing to present additional evidence. [Citations.] ( Hawk v. State Bar (1988) 45 Cal.3d 589, 597 [247 Cal. Rptr. 599, 754 P.2d 1096].) Petitioner did not appear. Further, after the default was entered, petitioner was sent notice of the default and was advised that he had 75 days after the entry of default to file a motion seeking relief. (See former Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 555.1(b).) He did not file such a motion. Instead, petitioner now seeks relief from his default more than 75 days after the entry of default. (1b) The State Bar argues that petitioner's explanation for his failure to respond to the State Bar's charges is implausible, and that his motion to remand his case to the State Bar Court should be denied on this basis. [4] The State Bar presents two particular indicia that petitioner did know, or should have known, of the nature and outcome of the charges the State Bar filed against him. First, during the period from May 10, 1989, to October 6, 1989, petitioner received multiple notices of the State Bar proceedings to which he responded, in one instance, on July 7, 1989. The State Bar thus points out that petitioner knew of the proceedings at one point, and argues that this knowledge in itself clearly establishes his awareness that disciplinary proceedings had not been terminated. Second, the State Bar notes that the letter that petitioner has submitted from his supervisor at the State Public Defender's office indicates that from the first day of his employment as a deputy state public defender on December 18, 1989, through the diagnosis of his illness in March 1990, petitioner had completed his case assignments (according to a letter from the chief assistant state public defender) as a deputy state public defender in a capable, diligent manner. Indeed, the chief assistant state public defender noted that he had seen no evidence of aberrant behavior in petitioner. The State Bar argues that it is curious that evidence of petitioner's illness was entirely absent among the persons with whom petitioner worked, in spite of the fact that for much of this time his temporal lobe epilepsy was undiagnosed and while, presumably, petitioner continued to suffer from symptoms such as false memory. We agree with the State Bar that petitioner's claim that temporal lobe epilepsy precluded him from responding in the State Bar proceedings is implausible. Though his doctor attests that petitioner suffers from temporal lobe epilepsy, the doctor does not suggest that this ailment would account for petitioner's failure to respond to the charges filed against petitioner by the State Bar; indeed, after describing false memory as a symptom of temporal lobe epilepsy, petitioner notes that the false memories are not permanent but generally recede after a few days. Yet petitioner implies that this particular memory, that the State Bar charges had been dismissed, never receded even in the face of notices to the contrary. We find other facts which undermine petitioner's claim regarding the effect his disability had on his ability to respond to the State Bar proceedings. As the State Bar notes, the fact that petitioner practiced competently as a deputy state public defender for three and a half months before receiving effective treatment for his epilepsy suggests that petitioner was capable of assimilating and acting upon pertinent information. We see no reason to distinguish his clients' cases from petitioner's own case. Finally, petitioner was aware of recurring problems caused by symptoms of temporal lobe epilepsy [5] at the time of the State Bar proceedings. This awareness establishes, at the very least, petitioner's inexcusable neglect in not providing some mechanism to prevent exactly this situation from arising (e.g., by retaining counsel to represent him or by alerting a secretary or other such person to monitor the progress of the proceeding). (See former Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 555.1(a); Code Civ. Proc., § 473.) For all of the above reasons, we do not find that remand of petitioner's case to the State Bar Court is warranted. Accordingly, this request is denied.
(3) Our principal concerns in State Bar disciplinary proceedings are always the protection of the public, the preservation of confidence in the legal profession, and the maintenance of the highest possible professional standards for attorneys. ( Young v. State Bar (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1204, 1215 [270 Cal. Rptr. 315, 791 P.2d 994].) Though we exercise our independent judgment in determining the discipline to be imposed on an attorney for disciplinary violations ( Greenbaum v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 543, 550 [237 Cal. Rptr. 168, 736 P.2d 754]), we accord the findings and recommendations of the State Bar great weight in determining the appropriate disciplinary sanctions. ( In re Basinger (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1348, 1358 [249 Cal. Rptr. 110, 756 P.2d 833].) Petitioner submits his declaration, which asserts that his clients' grievances were the result of their own actions  not petitioner's conduct. (4) We have repeatedly asserted our reluctance to consider evidence that has not been presented in State Bar proceedings. `[T]his court hesitates to rely upon any documentary evidence that is extrinsic to the record of the proceedings before the State Bar.' [Citations.] `Such evidence is virtually impossible to evaluate in the absence of cross-examination....' ( Bercovich v. State Bar (1990) 50 Cal.3d 116, 126 [266 Cal. Rptr. 341, 785 P.2d 889], italics in original; see also Lydon v. State Bar (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1181, 1187 [248 Cal. Rptr. 830, 756 P.2d 217]; Rosenthal v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 658, 663 [238 Cal. Rptr. 394, 738 P.2d 740].) In the absence of cross-examination, we are unable to evaluate petitioner's own, self-serving, out-of-court statements. ( Lydon v. State Bar, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1187.) Accordingly, we decline petitioner's invitation to consider his declaration as it relates to the substantive State Bar charges and limit our review to the facts described in the record. (5) In this case, the State Bar recommends that we discipline petitioner for: withdrawing from employment without taking reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his clients in the Hubbard, Fields, and Bilson matters; willfully failing to perform services in a competent manner in the Hubbard, Bilson, and Rhodes matters; willfully failing to respond to a client's status inquiries or keep his client reasonably informed of significant developments in the Hubbard, Fields, Bilson, and Rhodes matters; and withdrawing from employment without promptly refunding an unearned advanced fee in the Fields, Bilson, and Rhodes matters. It is beyond question that petitioner's alleged acts of misconduct warrant discipline: We have considered abandonment of clients and retention of unearned fees as serious misconduct warranting periods of actual suspension.... ( Matthew v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 784, 791 [263 Cal. Rptr. 660, 781 P.2d 952].) A summary review of cases involving client abandonment and retention of unearned fees supports this assertion. In Lester v. State Bar (1976) 17 Cal.3d 547 [131 Cal. Rptr. 225, 551 P.2d 841], four instances in which the attorney retained unearned fees resulted in the attorney's six-month actual suspension from practice. In Smith v. State Bar (1985) 38 Cal.3d 525 [213 Cal. Rptr. 236, 698 P.2d 139], an attorney was found to have abandoned one client (resulting in the issuance of a contempt order against the client) and retained the unearned fees of another; for his misconduct, we imposed thirty days' actual suspension. In Stuart v. State Bar (1985) 40 Cal.3d 838 [221 Cal. Rptr. 557, 710 P.2d 357], an attorney who had been privately reproved in a different matter eight years before was actually suspended for thirty days for one instance of client abandonment (resulting in the dismissal of that client's case). In light of this precedent, the discipline recommended by the State Bar may appear lenient. [6] We note, however, the hearing judge's obvious concern about the adequacy of the case presented by the State Bar in petitioner's absence. In the Hubbard matter the hearing judge found the State Bar's assertions about petitioner's misconduct insufficiently supported by evidence and was therefore unable to conclude that petitioner had refused to refund advanced fees or had abandoned his client. In the Fields matter there was no finding of prejudice to the client, and the decision notes that Fields might well have been jailed earlier than he would likely otherwise have been but for petitioner's actions on Fields's behalf. In the Bilson matter the hearing judge was skeptical that petitioner went to the trouble of showing up at Bilson's hearing and then did absolutely nothing, as the State Bar suggests. [7] Only in the Rhodes matter did the hearing judge not articulate serious misgivings about the adequacy of the evidence presented against petitioner. While the ultimate responsibility for imposing disciplinary sanctions upon attorneys falls to this court, we have repeatedly emphasized our reliance on factual findings made by hearing judges. We generally give more weight to the factual findings of the hearing panel since it has a better opportunity to observe the testimony of various witnesses. ( In re Young (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 264-265 [261 Cal. Rptr. 59, 776 P.2d 1021]; see also Hartford v. State Bar (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1139, 1149 [270 Cal. Rptr. 12, 791 P.2d 598]; Dixon v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 728, 736 [187 Cal. Rptr. 30, 653 P.2d 321].) In this instance, the hearing judge's recommendation followed his finding that the State Bar had failed to establish several of the acts of misconduct that it alleged petitioner had committed. In no case was significant prejudice to a client established; it is clear from the record that  with the exception of Kendell Rhodes  the clients' unreturned fees were nominal. In sum, we find that on the facts that we have adopted, the hearing judge's recommendations state appropriate disciplinary sanctions for petitioner's misconduct. The object of disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public and the courts, and to preserve confidence in the legal profession. ( Young v. State Bar, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1215.) We find this objective sufficiently served by imposition of the discipline recommended by the hearing department. Further, in light of his treatment with the appropriate medication and the assurances of his employer that his clients will be protected in the event of a relapse, [8] we see no need to impose additional disciplinary sanctions as a prophylactic measure.
We adopt the findings and recommendations of the Hearing Department of the State Bar Court in its decision filed on October 6, 1989. It is hereby ordered that petitioner Jay P. Colangelo be suspended from the practice of law for one year, and that execution of the order be stayed and petitioner be placed on probation for a period of eighteen months subject to the conditions recommended by the hearing department in the decision filed on October 6, 1989. [9] We further order that petitioner take and pass the Professional Responsibility Examination within one year from the effective date of this order; and that he offer evidence satisfactory to the State Bar that his temporal lobe epilepsy does not and will not affect his fitness as an attorney, or that he has taken measures adequate to protect his clients should memory loss and associated symptoms impair his ability to function as an attorney. This order shall be effective upon finality of this decision in this court. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 953(a).) BAXTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting. I agree that petitioner has demonstrated no excuse for his failure to pursue timely remedies before the State Bar Court. Petitioner's false memories theory is inherently implausible. Thus, as the majority conclude, no remand to the State Bar Court is justified, and this court should not consider petitioner's exculpatory evidence for any reason. I respectfully dissent, however, from much of the remaining analysis, and from the discipline imposed. An independent assessment of the evidence demonstrates a serious pattern of prejudicial misconduct warranting actual suspension. The majority suggest that the hearing judge's recommendation of leniency stemmed from his belief that several of the charges had not been established by the declaratory evidence. However, the hearing judge ultimately found multiple counts of abandonment (Hubbard, Fields, and Bilson), over-commitment (Hubbard and Fields), retention of unearned fees (Fields, Bilson, and Rhodes), incompetence (all four matters), and failure to communicate (all four matters). Except in the Bilson case, the undisputed evidence supporting each of these findings was clear and convincing, and they should be upheld. [1] The majority also stress the hearing judge's impression that petitioner's misconduct caused no substantial harm to his clients. However, the hearing judge's opinion on that subject deserves no special deference. The State Bar Court's findings ... are not binding on this court. [Citation.] We generally give more weight to the factual findings of the hearing [judge] since [he or she] has a better opportunity to observe the testimony of various witnesses. [Citation.] However, we must independently examine the evidence and determine its sufficiency in State Bar disciplinary matters. [Citation.] ... ( In re Young (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 264-265 [261 Cal. Rptr. 59, 776 P.2d 1021].) Our duty of independent review obliges us to draw our own inferences from undisputed facts, and to reach our own conclusions of law. If this process exposes flaws in the premises upon which the State Bar Court rested its disciplinary recommendation, the recommendation itself must be discounted accordingly. Contrary to the hearing judge's suggestion, the undisputed evidence shows that petitioner's misconduct caused substantial harm to clients Hubbard, Fields, and Rhodes as a matter of law. As the hearing judge conceded, Ms. Hubbard's arrest and temporary incarceration occurred at least in part because petitioner wilfully ignored her requests for guidance about fulfilling the plea bargain she had retained him to negotiate. [2] In the Fields matter, petitioner's inaction caused the plain loss of criminal appeal rights, a serious matter. [3] Petitioner's persistent failure to return unearned fees in the Rhodes matter forced the client to resort to legal remedies for collection. Indeed, petitioner steadfastly refused to honor the judgment obtained, even after the client contacted the State Bar. As the majority acknowledge, actual suspension is a traditional discipline for multiple acts of abandonment and failure to return fees, where harm to clients is involved. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 1266, and cases there cited.) The State Bar's sanctions for professional misconduct suggest disbarment for a pattern of abandonment, and that suspension is appropriate for individual instances of abandonment or failure to communicate with resulting harm. (See Transitional Rules Proc. of State Bar, div. V, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, std. 2.4(a), (b).) In my view, petitioner's delay in honoring the Rhodes judgment is an aggravating circumstance warranting enhanced discipline. ( Id., std. 1.6(b)(i).) I conclude that our duty to protect the public and the courts can only be fulfilled by requiring a period of actual suspension. I would order petitioner's suspension from the practice of law for two years, and that he be actually suspended for sixty days as a condition of probation.