Opinion ID: 1124716
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Privileged Communication Between Attorney and Client.

Text: Prior to the discovery of Mr. Sullivan's body, defendant consulted Stanley L. Conroy, a member of the bar of this state. He subsequently defended Mrs. Sullivan on the charge of first-degree murder. After the state had examined 17 witnesses, the prosecuting attorney called defense counsel to the witness stand. Surprise could not have been claimed. Mr. Conroy was named on the list of state witnesses filed by the prosecuting attorney, pursuant to RCW 10.37.030. In addition, the deputy prosecuting attorney said in his opening statement: We will have Mr. Conroy on the stand ... He then outlined evidence the state would adduce from Mr. Conroy. Introductory to later objections, defense counsel testified: Q. On the 18th day of January, 1961 did you call Robert Twitchell, the sheriff of this county? A. Yes, sir, I think it was the 18th. I called him one evening, at any rate. Q. And do you recall what it was about that you were calling him? A. Yes, I had some information that I thought would be of value. Q. And what was that information? A. It was regarding a missing person. Q. And who was the missing person? A. The missing person was Lloyd Sullivan.... Q.... What did you inform Mr. Twitchell as to Lloyd Sullivan. In the absence of the jury, defense counsel objected to this line of questioning on two grounds: (1) it involved privileged communication between attorney and client; and (2) it was hearsay. The trial court sustained the objection to conversations between defense counsel and Sheriff Twitchell, but overruled the objection that a privileged communication was involved. Thereafter, defense counsel testified: Q. Mr. Conroy, on the 18th day of January, 1961, did you give information to the sheriff of Snohomish County as to where the body of Lloyd Sullivan was? A. More or less, in an indirect way, I did. Q. Where it might be found? A. Where it might be, yes, uh-huh. Q. Then, the following morning did you again see Mr. Twitchell? A. Yes. Q. And the following morning you accompanied Mr. Twitchell to the Sullivan trailer, or to the Sullivan Property, did you not? A. Yes, Sir. About twenty people, I would say, went. RCW 5.60.060 provides, in part: The following persons shall not be examined as witnesses: ... (2) An attorney or counselor shall not, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment.... In State v. Emmanuel, 42 Wn. (2d) 799, 815, 259 P. (2d) 845 (1953), this court said: The same privilege accorded the attorney is extended to the client under the common-law rule. State v. Ingels, 4 Wn. (2d) 676, 104 P. (2d) 944. (Certiorari denied. 311 U.S. 708, 85 L.Ed. 460, 61 S.Ct. 318.) Such statutes are merely declaratory of the common law. 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses, § 463. [1] The privilege is that of the client and only he can waive it. State v. Ingels, supra ; State v. Emmanuel, supra . Although a third party overhearing a conversation between an attorney and client may testify, the attorney is not thereby qualified. Hartness v. Brown, 21 Wash. 655, 59 Pac. 491 (1899); State v. Falsetta, 43 Wash. 159, 86 Pac. 168 (1906). Although a client's communications to his lawyer are not confidential or privileged when conveyed to counsel for the purpose of public disclosure ( Green v. Fuller, 159 Wash. 691, 294 Pac. 1037 (1930)), the gravity of the charge in the instant case, and the character of the evidence sought do not permit the inference that Mrs. Sullivan consulted defense counsel for the purpose of having him disclose the nature of her communication. In fact, the contrary appears. The following occurred in the absence of the jury: [Q.] Mr. Zempel: ... Did your client ask you to give the sheriff this information? [A.] Mr. Conroy: My client didn't even know what she was doing when I talked to her. Mr. Zempel: That is not answering the question. Mr. Conroy: Of course she didn't. She belonged in the hospital when I talked to her. It is obvious. [2] We believe it immaterial that the lawyer, when called upon to testify, was questioned concerning what he told others, but was not questioned concerning the confidential communication of his client to him. If the former must be obviously based upon the latter, the client's privilege prohibits the attorney from testifying. The rule as to privileged communications between attorney and client applies regardless of the manner in which it is sought to put the communications in evidence, whether by direct examination, cross-examination, or indirectly as by bringing out facts brought to knowledge solely by reason of a confidential communication.  58 Am. Jur., Witnesses § 466, p. 262. (Italics ours.) [3] The prosecuting attorney could have had only one intent and purpose when he called defense counsel as a state witness: to prejudice the jury by giving it an opportunity to draw the inescapable inference that defendant had told defense counsel where she had buried her husband's remains. This was privileged under the statute, and it was prejudicial error to force Mr. Conroy to testify concerning it.