Opinion ID: 2213342
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: whether the search was unreasonable

Text: Whether the window of Vrtiska's dwelling was open or the sheriff applied force to gain entry through that window, there was an intrusion into Vrtiska's dwelling, an entry which is subject to the safeguard of the fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Entry through a window is a rather uncommon or unusual entry into a dwelling. Cf. Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 88 S.Ct. 1755, 20 L.Ed.2d 828 (1968), where the U.S. Supreme Court, construing 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1964) (federal counterpart of § 29-411), held that a nonconsensual intrusion includes entry by a passkey, forcing open a chain lock on a partially open door, opening a locked door, or opening a closed but unlocked door. Nevertheless, in Vrtiska's case the question to be resolved is whether entry by officers and consequent search of the dwelling are unreasonable under the fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. A question involving a no knock, or unannounced, entry into a dwelling was presented to the U.S. Supreme Court in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963). In Ker, California police officers, without a warrant, came to Ker's apartment. Believing Ker was inside his apartment and about to destroy contraband, officers obtained a passkey, and, without announcing themselves or their purpose, entered the apartment, arrested Ker, and later discovered marijuana on the premises. California had a statute permitting an entry by officers after having demanded admittance and explained the purpose for which admittance is desired. 374 U.S. at 37 n. 8, 83 S.Ct. at 1631 n. 8. In Ker, the plurality of the Court noted that California law, which determined legality of Ker's arrest, allowed unannounced forcible intrusions in exigent circumstances, and then concluded: Here justification for the officers' failure to give notice is uniquely present. In addition to the officers' belief that Ker was in possession of narcotics, which could be quickly and easily destroyed, Ker's furtive conduct in eluding them shortly before the arrest was ground for the belief that he might well have been expecting the police. We therefore hold that in the particular circumstances of this case the officers' method of entry, sanctioned by the law of California, was not unreasonable under the standards of the Fourth Amendment as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. 374 U.S. at 40-41, 83 S.Ct. at 1633-34. The dissent in Ker took the position that an unannounced intrusion into a dwelling may violate the fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and, under the circumstances present in Ker: The protections of individual freedom carried into the Fourth Amendment ... undoubtedly included this firmly established requirement of an announcement by police officers of purpose and authority before breaking into an individual's home. Id., at 49, 83 S.Ct. at 1637. Later, in Sabbath v. United States, supra , the U.S. Supreme Court, referring to the dissent in Ker, supra, stated: Exceptions to any possible constitutional rule relating to announcement and entry have been recognized [in] Ker v. California .... 391 U.S. at 591 n. 8, 88 S.Ct. at 1759 n. 8. As we view Ker v. California, supra , the U.S. Supreme Court did not rule that the fourth amendment requires that police officers knock, announce their purpose, and be refused admittance before making a nonconsensual entry into a dwelling to execute a warrant. That constitutional question is still undecided, at least as indicated by Sabbath v. United States, supra , where the Court acknowledged exceptions to any possible constitutional rule. 391 U.S. at 591 n. 8, 88 S.Ct. at 1759, n. 8. See 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.8(a) (2d ed. 1987). Some jurisdictions have interpreted Ker v. California, supra , to require that officers announce themselves to an occupant of the premises and state the purpose for entry in order that a nonconsensual entry into a dwelling may be reasonable under the fourth amendment. See, United States v. Francis, 646 F.2d 251 (6th Cir.1981); State v. Valentine/Darroch, 264 Or. 54, 504 P.2d 84 (1972). Still other jurisdictions have determined that an officer's nonconsensual entry into unoccupied premises, including a dwelling, to execute a search warrant does not violate the fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690 (8th Cir.1976); Payne v. United States, 508 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir.1975); United States v. Gervato, 474 F.2d 40 (3d Cir.1973). Perhaps the U.S. Supreme Court will consider whether the fourth amendment includes a notice requirement, that is, announcement of office and purpose before police enter a dwelling for execution of a warrant and determine whether notice is constitutionally worthwhile to decrease potential violence associated with such entry; protect privacy associated with the premises or its occupant(s); and prevent destruction of property. See 2 W. LaFave, supra. As observed by Justice Brennan, dissenting in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 57, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 1641-42, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963), a constitutional requirement of announcement is justified under the fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution in order to avoid mistaken identity by police officers executing a warrant, inflicting trauma on anyone within a dwelling (shock, fright or embarrassment attendant upon an unannounced police intrusion), and minimization of hazards to police in their dangerous calling of executing a warrant. Under the circumstances, we believe, and, therefore, hold, that a nonconsensual and unannounced entry by a police officer for execution of a search warrant within an unoccupied dwelling is not, by itself and necessarily, an unreasonable intrusion prohibited by the fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, the entry and consequent search of Vrtiska's residence was not unreasonable.