Opinion ID: 213981
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Analysis of Turner's Claims

Text: When we weigh Turner's application and supporting evidence against the entire record in this case, we conclude Turner has not met his burden of showing a reasonable likelihood that he is mentally retarded. First, Turner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that he satisfies the first prong of Florida's mental retardation test, that of significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning. Turner primarily points to penalty-phase testimony from: (1) a school records custodian, who testified Turner earned a score of 72 on an IQ test taken when he was in grade school; and (2) forensic psychiatrist Dr. Ernest Miller, who testified he believed Turner was of borderline intelligence, which meant a state of being marginal between normal intelligence and ... [i]ntellectually handicapped or retarded. However, this IQ score is not below the 70-IQ cutoff Florida has established for the intellectual functioning prong of the mental retardation test. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317, 122 S.Ct. at 2250 ([W]e leave to the States the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon their execution of sentences. (brackets omitted)). [7] And, Dr. Miller opined not that Turner was mentally retarded, but that he instead fell between normal intelligence and mental retardation. Moreover, in state postconviction proceedings pursuant to Rule 3.203, Turner was tested and earned IQ scores of 98 and 108, indicating average intelligence. [8] And the fact that Turner graduated from high school in the third quartile of his class and attended junior college also refutes Turner's contention that he suffered from significantly subaverage intellectual functioning. See In re Hicks, 375 F.3d 1237, 1240-41 (11th Cir.2004) (concluding there was no reasonable likelihood petitioner Hicks was mentally retarded because he had an IQ score of 94, a psychiatrist testified he had low-average intelligence but was not mentally retarded, and he obtained his GED and earned a year of college credit while incarcerated). Additionally, Turner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that he satisfies the second prong of the mental retardation test, i.e., deficits in adaptive behavior. Florida defines adaptive behavior as the effectiveness or degree with which an individual meets the standards of personal independence and social responsibility expected of his or her age, cultural group, and community. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.203(b). See also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n. 3, 122 S.Ct. at 2245 n. 3 (citing clinical mental retardation definitions requiring significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety). Turner relies on affidavits from friends, family members, and acquaintances that Turner, among other things: (1) wasn't very smart in class and had a hard time keeping up; (2) was slow to learn; (3) was always easily led by others; (4) was a marginal student at best; (5) was really the worst student in the family and just barely got by in school; and (6) had a very difficult time trying to understand even simple things. However, the record also shows that Turner: (1) played high school football and graduated high school; (2) attended junior college; (3) joined the Air Force and served in Vietnam; (4) was quite skilled at tailoring work and had always been a great worker when he was a child; (5) had a stable job history as an adult and required very little supervision at work; (6) helped care for his mentally disabled younger brother; (7) owned his own home, kept it up very well, and did repair work on the home by himself; (8) was married for more than a decade; and (9) was a terrific father to his daughters. In short, Turner's claim of adaptive deficits is belied by the record as a whole. Accordingly, based on the entire record, Turner has failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable likelihood that he is in fact mentally retarded. Therefore, he has not satisfied the requirement of § 2244(b)(3)(C) that he make a prima facie showing that he is entitled to file a successive § 2254 petition asserting a claim under Atkins. See Holladay, 331 F.3d at 1173-74. [9]