Opinion ID: 1060560
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Historical Use of Deterrence to Deny Alternative Sentencing

Text: The denial of probation or other alternative sentencing based solely upon the need for deterrence has been the subject of much controversy in the jurisprudence of this state. In Moten v. State, 559 S.W.2d 770 (Tenn.1977), this Court reviewed a denial of probation that was grounded in part on the need to deter others from committing similar crimes. In finding that deterrence could not serve as the sole ground supporting denial of probation, this Court said: Reliance upon this factor would defeat the whole concept of probation. While the other factors listed in Stiller [v. State, 516 S.W.2d 617 (Tenn.1974)] may or may not be present or applicable or significant in any given case, [deterrence] is a factor which is uniformly present. Thus, even if all factors gravitate in [the] defendant's favor in a given case, probation would be defeated by the fact that to suspend the sentence would destroy the conviction's deterrent value. Reliance on this factor is no more realistic or reasonable than denying probation on grounds that the defendant committed a crime. Id. at 773. In its very next session, and in direct response to Moten , the General Assembly amended Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-2904(a)(1) [4] to specifically provide that a trial judge may deny probation upon the ground of the deterrent effect upon other criminal activity. 1978 Tenn.Pub.Acts ch. 911, § 1. The General Assembly also recognized the principle that deterrence alone could serve as a basis for ordering incarceration when it enacted the 1982 Criminal Sentencing Reform Act. Section 40-43-103(1)(B) of the 1982 Act provided that confinement could be ordered by a sentencing court when confinement was particularly suited to provide an effective [deterrent] to others likely to commit similar offenses. This exact language was later recodified as part of the 1989 Criminal Sentencing Reform Act, see Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-103(1)(B) (1997), although the General Assembly has yet to give any further indication of when incarceration would be particularly suited to provide a deterrent effect. Shortly after the General Assembly's reinstatement in 1978 of deterrence as a ground upon which to deny probation, the Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged in dicta that a denial on the basis of deterrence alone must be supported by some proof that the sentence imposed will have a deterrent effect within the jurisdiction. State v. Horne, 612 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Tenn.Crim.App.1980). This Court reaffirmed the proof requirement following the passage of the 1989 Criminal Sentencing Reform Act, when we held that [t]he finding of deterrence [supporting denial of alternative sentencing] cannot be conclusory only but must be supported by proof. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d at 170. In so holding, we recognized that [a]n element of deterrence is present in every case but the degree of significance of this factor in restraining the offender or curbing the propensity for criminal activity in others, varies widely with the class of offense and the facts of each case. Id. (citing State v. Michael, 629 S.W.2d 13 (Tenn.1982)). [5] Because deterrence is a concept that frequently defies practical analysis, it should come as no surprise that the appellate courts of this State have had significant trouble in developing a consistent standard by which to determine when a defendant has been properly denied probation on deterrence grounds alone. At various times, courts have stated that deterrence may only be shown when: (1) crime is rampant, or at least on the increase in the area, Horne, 612 S.W.2d at 187; [6] (2) the crime committed was one frequently repeated by lawless members of society, State v. Kirk, 868 S.W.2d 739, 743 (Tenn.Crim.App.1993); (3) the crime is one that is unique to a particular jurisdiction, State v. Bryant, 775 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn.Crim.App.1988); [7] or (4) there is some special need or consideration relative to that jurisdiction which would not be addressed by the normal deterrence inherent in any criminal penalty. State v. Hartley, 818 S.W.2d 370, 375 (Tenn.Crim. App.1991). In addition to the inconsistent standard used to determine whether deterrence is properly considered, the courts have also been inconsistent as to what kind of proof can support a denial of probation on deterrence grounds. Some courts have affirmed a denial of probation when a community police officer testifies as to the need for incarceration for deterrence. See State v. McColgan, 631 S.W.2d 151, 156 (Tenn.Crim.App.1981) (affirming a denial of probation in part on deterrence grounds when the local sheriff testified that [Benton] county had a real problem with drug traffic and traffic in stolen property and that requiring the appellant to serve his sentence would deter others from criminal activity). [8] This Court in Ashby , however, rejected incarceration when the only proof of deterrence was that drugs have become such a problem not only in this county, but in the nation as a whole. 823 S.W.2d at 170. The Ashby decision seemed to require proof that the particular defendant had an observable effect on the drug problem before denial of probation was warranted. Id. (The trial judge noted that drugs are a problem in this country today, but there is no showing that this elderly man has had any increasing effect on the problem. There is no evidence that those likely to violate the criminal laws will be deterred by the incarceration of [the] appellant.). Moreover, the intermediate court has been divided as to whether the sentencing judge can provide the necessary proof of deterrence through his or her own observations of facts surrounding the case. In at least one case, the Court of Criminal Appeals has rejected a denial of probation on deterrence grounds when the trial judge made his own observation that there had been several of these type crimes in the recent past. State v. Grissom, 956 S.W.2d 514, 520 (Tenn.Crim.App.1997). In another case, however, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed denial of pre-trial diversion on deterrence grounds for a perjury charge despite the fact that the only proof of deterrence was the trial judge's observation of the `dramatic increase' in perjury in the community. State v. Perry, 882 S.W.2d 357, 360 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994). [9] Perhaps acknowledging the difficulty of determining whether sufficient proof of deterrence has been offered, some courts have eliminated the proof requirement entirely for certain types of crimes. For example, this Court in State v. Cleavor, 691 S.W.2d 541 (Tenn.1985), affirmed the denial of probation for a D.U.I. offender by finding that [t]he need for deterrence is obvious, even though the need for deterrence was not evident from the proof in the record. 691 S.W.2d at 543. In arriving at this conclusion, we acknowledged that there was currently an increased public awareness of the need to deter persons who would attempt to drive motor vehicles while intoxicated, as well as the growing concern of citizens about [t]he rising number of persons who drive while intoxicated and the rising number of deaths caused by such drivers. Id. Following our decision in Cleavor , the Court of Criminal Appeals in State v. Dykes, 803 S.W.2d 250, 260 (Tenn.Crim.App.1990), held that offenses involving the sale or use of drugs are deterrable per se. In so holding, the court took judicial notice that the gross sales and use of illicit narcotics continue to increase annually; and crimes that are directly related to the sale and use of illicit narcotics also continue to increase. Id. at 260. The court concluded by stating that There has been and is an increasing public awareness of the need to deter individuals who engage in the sale of illicit narcotics; and this awareness continues to be a matter of growing concern. Therefore, the appellant is not entitled to probation due to the deterrent effect that such a judgment will have on those who are engaged in like or similar conduct. Dykes, 803 S.W.2d at 260. [10]