Opinion ID: 1891504
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence from Simmons' Vehicle

Text: Simmons also challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle on December 7, 2001, under a search warrant. Simmons alleges that factual inaccuracies plague the affidavit that supported the magistrate's decision to grant the search warrant. Simmons alleges that, after excising those portions of the affidavit that are inaccurate, the State is left with nothing upon which the magistrate could have found probable cause to authorize a search. Deliberate falsity or reckless disregard for the truth in an affidavit that gives rise to a search warrant can, in some instances, lead to suppression of evidence obtained under that warrant. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). However, we have held that an erroneous statement will only invalidate a search warrant if, after excising the erroneous statement, the remaining true statements are insufficient to establish probable cause. See Terry v. State, 668 So.2d 954, 958 (Fla.1996). In the instant case, the trial court ruled that there were, in fact, no intentionally or recklessly false statements. First, Simmons alleges that the affidavit provides an inaccurate description of Detective Brewer's qualifications by stating that Detective Brewer had been a law enforcement officer since 1979 because Detective Brewer's certification lapsed for twenty years while he pursued a career as an attorney. The record, however, indicates that Detective Brewer was a sworn officer at the time that he signed the affidavit and that his experience as an officer dated back to 1979. Further, although Detective Brewer's Florida certification did lapse during the 1980s, his certification as a military police officer continued during this period and never lapsed. Given this evidence, we conclude the trial court did not err in concluding that the portion of the affidavit regarding Detective Brewer's qualifications was not false. Next, Simmons alleges that the affidavit misstates the information that detectives obtained from Ms. Renfro. Detective Brewer's affidavit indicates that a witness observed a woman who matched the description of the victim and was screaming and attempting to flee a white Chevrolet Corsica-type car. Simmons cites to Ms. Renfro's statement to the police, which indicated that the woman that Ms. Renfro saw was in her mid-fifties, had short brown hair, and was wearing a white T-shirt. Because Tressler was actually forty-eight, had long black hair, and was wearing a grey shirt, Simmons argues that Ms. Renfro's description did not match the description of Tressler and that the affidavit is materially false. However, as the trial court properly noted, Detective Purdue testified that Ms. Renfro positively identified Tressler's picture as the same woman she saw in the car. Therefore, despite the slight variations Simmons notes between Ms. Renfro's description and Tressler's actual appearance, the trial court properly concluded that the portion of the affidavit regarding Ms. Renfro's description of Tressler was not misstated. Next, Simmons alleges an inaccuracy in the portion of the affidavit that indicates that Detective Brewer personally observed several visible stains consistent with dried blood in the back of Simmons' vehicle. This is because the trial judge personally examined the sheet and found no blood. While there does appear to be an inconsistency between Detective Brewer's and the trial judge's observations of the sheet, the record does not refute Detective Brewer's testimony that he personally observed blood stains prior to preparing the warrant. The trial court found that the officer's observations and conclusions were not unreasonable considering the circumstances of the observations. The trial court also noted that [t]he observation of the blood-stained sheet may be superfluous under Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970), because the initial Fourth Amendment intrusion was the seizure of the vehicle, and a proper analysis would be to review of [sic] the facts as they existed at that time. In Chambers, the United States Supreme Court stated: For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 399 U.S. at 52, 90 S.Ct. 1975. We find no error in the rulings of the trial court. Simmons further alleges that the testimony as to when Detective Brewer signed the affidavit and when the magistrate issued the search warrant indicates that Detective Brewer never saw the vehicle before signing the affidavit. The trial court acknowledged that although there was some question as to when the affidavit and warrant were presented to the magistrate, the trial court did not find the discrepancy in time [to be] any indication of untoward action on behalf of the Lake County[ ] Sheriff's Department. Considering the totality of the circumstances and the deference we give to the trial court regarding factual determinations, we find no error. Based on the analysis concerning Simmons' statements and the search of his vehicle, we also find no merit to Simmons' contention that the arrest of Simmons was the result of police misconduct.