Opinion ID: 716733
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: United States v. Halper: Objective Purpose through Proportionality

Text: 73 Almost thirty years later, in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), the Court articulated an objective legislative intent test----the test central to the arguments of both Artway and the State. Halper held that a sizeable fine, imposed in a civil proceeding after the defendant's conviction for Medicare fraud, violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court analyzed the issue by determining whether the fine served the purposes of punishment, including retribution and deterrence, or instead satisfied a remedial purpose. Simply put, a civil as well as a criminal sanction constitutes punishment, the Court said, when the sanction as applied in the individual case serves the goals of punishment. Id. 74 We have recognized in other contexts that punishment serves the twin aims of retribution and deterrence. Furthermore, retribution and deterrence are not legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectives. From these premises, it follows that a civil sanction that cannot be fairly said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand that term. 75 Id. at 448, 109 S.Ct. at 1902 (citations and internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). 76 The Court found that the fine in that case----$130,000----bore no rational relation to the legitimate remedial purpose----compensating the government for its $16,000 in costs. Id. at 449, 109 S.Ct. at 1902. Therefore, the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the additional civil sanction after criminal punishment to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution. Id. at 448-49, 109 S.Ct. at 1902. 16 77 Because Halper occupies such a central role in the punishment inquiry, a number of explanatory observations are in order. The first is a matter of semantics: a clear understanding of the terms retributive, deterrent, and remedial is critical to applying the Halper test. We therefore explain how we think the Supreme Court is using the terms; at least the reader will know how we are using them. Retribution is vengeance for its own sake. It does not seek to affect future conduct or solve any problem except realizing justice. Deterrent measures serve as a threat of negative repercussions to discourage people from engaging in certain behavior. Remedial measures, on the other hand, seek to solve a problem, for instance by removing the likely perpetrators of future corruption instead of threatening them (De Veau ), or compensating the government for costs incurred (Halper ). 78 Of course, as the cases point out, a measure could serve all three functions. For instance, putting someone in jail for a sex offense serves the retributive function of hurting that person, the deterrent purposes of convincing him and others not to engage in that behavior to avoid the adverse consequences, and the remedial purpose of keeping him away from others (at least outside the prison). Another complication is that measures can have one or more of these effects without having that purpose. 79 With this lexicon in mind, we turn to an explication of the Halper calculus, which evaluates the proportionality of ends to means. To recapitulate, the Halper test is whether a civil sanction that cannot be fairly said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment. Id. at 448, 109 S.Ct. at 1902. (emphasis added). The threshold question is thus whether a remedial purpose can explain the sanction. Only if the remedial purpose is insufficient to justify the measure, and one must resort also to retributive or deterrent justifications, does the measure become punitive. Only then can the measure only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes. 80 To illustrate with a venerable statutory interpretation hypothetical, assume that someone is sent to the store in the snow for soupmeat. The trip can be explained solely by the remedial purpose of obtaining food, even though the trip through the cold could also serve retributive purposes. See id. at 447 n. 7, 109 S.Ct. at 1901 n. 7 ([O]ur cases have acknowledged that for the defendant even remedial sanctions carry the sting of punishment.). It therefore qualifies as non-punishment under Halper. On the other hand, assume now that, without additional justification, the agent is sent without clothes. This additional aspect of the trip cannot be explained by the remedial purpose of obtaining food; this excursion can only be explained as partly serving retributive purposes. It therefore constitutes punishment under the Halper test. 17 81 Halper thus contributes an important element to our analysis: it adds an objective inquiry to supplement the actual legislative purpose test of De Veau. This constitutional protection is intrinsically personal. Its violation can be identified only by assessing the character of the actual sanctions imposed on the individual by the machinery of the state. Id. at 447, 109 S.Ct. at 1901; see also id. at 453, 109 S.Ct. at 1904 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (Today's holding, I would stress, constitutes an objective rule that is grounded in the nature of the sanction and the facts of the particular case.). 18 82 By acknowledging that civil penalties may constitute punishment, Halper departs from the practice of placing talismanic significance on the legislative labels affixed to the disputed provision and searching for the frequently unknowable and nondispositive subjective intent of the legislative body: [T]he labels 'criminal' and 'civil' are not of paramount importance .... The notion of punishment ... cuts across the division between the civil and the criminal law. Id. at 447-48, 109 S.Ct. at 1901. 19 83 The Halper objective ends-means test is a step down the road to limiting especially harsh effects, but still any sting could be permissible with a sufficient post hoc remedial purpose. For example, the need for supper could explain the trip through the snow even if the temperature were below zero. 84