Opinion ID: 1672000
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Future Dangerousness and Parole Ineligibility [7]

Text: As his first penalty phase claim of error, Walker maintains that a new sentencing trial is warranted because the prosecutor improperly interjected future dangerousness as an nonstatutory aggravating circumstance into the proceedings. In the course of questioning Dr. Eisenstein about his opinion that Walker could not conform his conduct to the requirements of the law at the time of the offense, the prosecutor asked: Well, do you think also that [Walker] may kill again? [8] This Court has explained that the probability of recurring violent acts by the defendant if he is released on parole in the distant future is not a proper aggravating circumstance in Florida. Miller v. State, 373 So.2d 882, 886 (Fla.1979); White v. State, 403 So.2d 331, 337 (Fla.1981). Moreover, the State may not attach aggravating labels to factors that actually should militate in favor of a lesser penaltylike, as in this case, the defendant's mental impairment. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2747, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). We agree with Walker that the prosecutor's question was wholly improper and in no way related to probing Dr. Eisenstein's opinion that Walker's ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired at the time of the offense. A review of the record further reflects that any prejudice resulting from the question was not dissipated by the fact that Walker's immediate objection was sustained and the expert did not answer the question. In other words, the bell was rung by the question itself; and was not unrung by the fact that the question was not answered. Nevertheless, we note that the prosecutor neither repeated or rephrased the improper question, nor argued to the jury in closing that Walker would or might kill again. While the prosecutor's question to Dr. Eisenstein clearly was improper, this instance of misconduct was an isolated one. Moreover, the trial court properly instructed the jurors as to the aggravating factors they could consider. Consequently, we find no reasonable possibility that this error contributed to the jury's recommendation and conclude that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986). Walker makes the further argument that the unfair prejudice to him resulting from the improper questioning of Dr. Eisenstein is compounded by the trial court's error in rejecting his request to determine prior to the penalty phase trial whether Walker's sentences for capital murder would be consecutive or concurrent, as well as the sentences for Walker's noncapital convictions so that the jury could be apprised and instructed accurately on Walker's parole ineligibility. [9] In his penalty phase closing argument, Walker argued to the jury that he could receive consecutive life sentences that would preclude him from ever being released from prison during his natural life. Our caselaw is adverse to Walker's position. In Nixon v. State, 572 So.2d 1336 (Fla.1990), we construed Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.390(a) to prohibit instructions regarding the possible penalties a capital defendant could receive for his contemporaneous felony convictions, adding, [a]s to offenses in which the jury plays no role in sentencing, the jury will not be advised of the possible penalties. Id. at 1345. Florida's sentencing scheme simply does not require the trial court to sentence the defendant for noncapital convictions before the penalty phase proceedings. Moreover, Walker's request that the trial court determine whether it would sentence him to consecutive or concurrent life sentences for the murders is inconsistent with Florida's jury override provision. See § 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1995). In any event, a pre-penalty phase determination of the defendant's sentence for the capital offenses should the jury return verdicts of life would be premature given that the trial court would not have available for its consideration the facts and circumstances surrounding the offenses and the defendant's life historyinformation adduced at the penalty phase proceeding. We conclude that Walker was afforded what Florida and U.S. Supreme Court caselaw deem sufficient, i.e., the opportunity to argue to the jury potential parole ineligibility as a mitigating factor. [10] Consequently, we find that the trial court's denial of all aspects of Walker's claim was an appropriate exercise of its discretion. See Turner v. Dugger, 614 So.2d 1075, 1080 (Fla.1992); Jones v. State, 569 So.2d 1234, 1239-40 (Fla.1990). [11] Walker next contends that the trial court erred in allowing the medical examiner to testify about the panic and struggle inherent in death by drowning as support for the heinous, atrocious or cruel (HAC) aggravating factor in this case because the State failed to prove that Ms. Jones was conscious when she was thrown into the canal. Here Walker explained in his statement to police that he physically fought with Ms. Jones, choked her, knocked her down, bound her with duct tape, and threw her over the fence into the canal in Sewell Park. We find that Walker's statement, together with Dr. Williams' testimony that drowning was a cause of death and that Ms. Jones was alive when she was thrown into the water, is sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that she was conscious. Consequently, Dr. Williams' testimony was admissible under sections 90.401 and 90.403 as relevant and probative of the struggle and panic Ms. Jones likely experienced after being thrown into the canal. We note also that the HAC aggravator is amply supported by the record in this case independent of Ms. Jones' consciousness when she was thrown into the canal. We have stated that the fear and emotional strain preceding the death of the victim may be considered as contributing to the heinous nature of a capital felony. Adams v. State, 412 So.2d 850, 857 (Fla.1982). The record reflects that Ms. Jones struggled against appellant for some time before her death as there were blood stains all over the interior of her car, strips of duct tape containing her blood and hair were found inside, the car was in complete disarray, and Ms. Jones sustained numerous abrasions and contusions all over her body. Moreover, Ms. Jones undoubtedly contemplated before her death that her infant son also faced great danger and potential harm.