Opinion ID: 3153427
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The upward variance

Text: “[A]ppellate courts may not presume that every variance from the advisory Guidelines is unreasonable.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 355 (2007). We must “take into account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In this Circuit, we apply an abuse of discretion standard to substantive sentencing appeals. United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 121 (2d Cir. 2009). And we evaluate whether an upward variance “represents an abuse of discretion based on the reasons given by the district court when imposing the sentence.” United States v. Douglas, 713 F.3d 694, 700 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Sindima, 488 F.3d 81, 85–86 (2d Cir. 2007)). The district court calculated a Guidelines range of 70–87 months, and imposed a 33 month upward variance from the top of that Guidelines range. When the district court imposed the sentence in this case, she explained that the upward variance was due to Davis’s continuation of his scheme after his cohorts were indicted and even after he was arrested for his participation and had pled guilty. On this record there are “‘sufficiently compelling’ reasons to support the deviation.” United States v. Aldeen, 792 F.3d 3 247, 254 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc)). Defendant contends, briefly and for the first time on appeal, that the upward variance imposed by the district court resulted in his receiving an unjustifiably disparate sentence when compared to his codefendant Oluwole Ojudun. Ojudun, however, was not charged with or convicted of possession of stolen mail. Nor did Ojudun abuse a position of public trust or continue the scheme post-plea. The district court did not exceed the bounds of its discretion by imposing disparate sentences under these circumstances. We have considered all of Davis’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 4