Opinion ID: 1780764
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Ex parte Thicklin to the Lewises' Magnuson-Moss and express-warranty claims

Text: The WLS defendants contend, contrary to the assertions of the Lewises, that the Lewises cannot use our recent decision in Ex parte Thicklin, supra , as a defense to arbitration because, they say, that case does not apply to these facts. We agree. Ex parte Thicklin involved the sale of a mobile home. The buyer was given a written warranty that did not mention arbitration. The buyer sued the seller and the manufacturer, asserting various claims, including claims alleging Magnuson-Moss and express-warranty violations. Relying on Cunningham v. Fleetwood Homes of Georgia, Inc., 253 F.3d 611 (11th Cir.2001), we held that because the written warranty did not disclose to the buyer any arbitration requirement as it was required to do by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, the trial court could not compel the buyer to arbitrate his Magnuson-Moss and express-warranty claims. Ex parte Thicklin, 824 So.2d at 728. The disclosure requirements mentioned in Ex parte Thicklin applied specifically to a written warranty, a term defined in the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act as follows: (6) The term `written warranty' means (A) any written affirmation of fact or written promise made in connection with the sale of a consumer product by a supplier to a buyer which relates to the nature of the material or workmanship and affirms or promises that such material or workmanship is defect free or will meet a specified level of performance over a specified period of time, or (B) any undertaking in writing in connection with the sale by a supplier of a consumer product to refund, repair, replace, or take other remedial action with respect to such product in the event that such product fails to meet the specifications set forth in the undertaking, which written affirmation, promise, or undertaking becomes part of the basis of the bargain between a supplier and a buyer for purposes other than resale of such product. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6). In order to invoke Ex parte Thicklin as a defense to arbitration, a party resisting arbitration would have to demonstrate initially that a written warranty of the type described in 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6) had been issued by the party seeking arbitration. In this case, the Lewises have offered no written warranty given by the WLS defendants. In fact, the record reflects that the WLS defendants not only gave no written warranties, but that both express and implied warranties were specifically (and repeatedly) disclaimed in both the purchase agreement and the installment agreement. In their brief to this Court, the Lewises argue that the existence of a written warranty is evidenced by 1) the existence of a one-year warranty from the manufacturer mentioned in the purchase agreement, and 2) the indication in both the purchase agreement and the installment agreement that the mobile home purchased by the Lewises was new. However, neither of these facts bolsters the Lewises' argument. First, the one-year warranty mentioned in the purchase agreement was not given by the WLS defendants, but by the manufacturera fact made clear by the following language in the purchase agreement: 11. MANUFACTURER'S WARRANTIES. I UNDERSTAND THAT THERE MAY BE WRITTEN WARRANTIES COVERING THE UNIT PURCHASED, OR ANY APPLIANCE(S) OR COMPONENT(S), WHICH HAVE BEEN PROVIDED BY THE MANUFACTURER OF THE UNIT OR MANUFACTURER OF THE APPLIANCE(S) OR COMPONENT(S). YOU WILL GIVE ME COPIES OF ANY AND ALL WRITTEN WARRANTIES SUPPLIED BY THE MANUFACTURERS. DELIVERY BY YOU TO ME OF THE WARRANTY BY THE MANUFACTURER OF THE UNIT PURCHASED, OR ANY APPLIANCE(S) OR COMPONENT(S) DOES NOT MEAN YOU ADOPT THE WARRANTY(S) OF SUCH MANUFACTURERS. I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THESE EXPRESS WARRANTIES MADE BY THE MANUFACTURER(S) HAVE NOT BEEN MADE BY YOU EVEN IF THEY SAY YOU MADE THEM OR SAY YOU MADE SOME OTHER EXPRESS WARRANTY. YOU ARE NOT AN AGENT OF THE MANUFACTURER(S) FOR WARRANTY PURPOSES EVEN IF YOU COMPLETE, OR ATTEMPT TO COMPLETE REPAIRS FOR THE MANUFACTURER(S). . . . . I UNDERSTAND THAT THERE IS A ONE YEAR WARRANTY ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MOBILE HOME FROM THE MANUFACTURER. I ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT THIS WARRANTY DOES NOT COME FROM [WLS, Inc.], I HAVE PERSONALLY EXAMINED THE MOBILE HOME.... Second, even if the indication that the mobile home was new could be construed to be a warranty under state law, see Ala.Code 1975, § 7-2-313 (an issue on which we express no opinion), it would not fit either definition of a written warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. It certainly does not fit the definition in § 2301(6)(B), and, with regard to 6(A), a statement that a product is new simply does not affirm[ ] or promise[ ] that [the] material or workmanship [in the mobile home] is defect free or will meet a specified level of performance over a specified period of time. Because the Lewises did not produce a written warranty given by the WLS defendants, any defense to arbitration stemming from our decision in Ex parte Thicklin is unavailable.