Opinion ID: 394125
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Initial Charge

Text: 30 Defendant claims the trial judge erred in his initial charge to the jury in three ways. First, defendant claims error in the judge's failure to charge the jury that when determining whether she was a member of the conspiracy, it should consider only her individual acts and statements and not the acts and statements of others. Second, defendant claims the judge charged the jury that mere presence can support a conviction in a conspiracy count. Finally, defendant claims the judge did not fairly apprise her attorney of what he was going to charge and, therefore, violated Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 31 Regarding defendant's first argument, we can conceive of a case in which it would be necessary to charge the jury that in determining defendant's membership in a conspiracy, it should consider only the evidence, if any, pertaining to defendant's own actions and statements. However, the absence of such a charge in this case is understandable. As has been discussed, the record contains a substantial amount of evidence demonstrating informed and voluntary activity by defendant sufficient to allow the jury to infer active participation in the conspiracy. This case does not exhibit a situation in which the record is so effectively devoid of evidence of any activity by defendant that in order to find membership on her part, the jury would have to rely on the acts and statements of others. The omission of the requested addition to the trial judge's charge if error at all was harmless. 32 In addition, we do not find the trial judge charged the jury that mere presence can support a conspiracy conviction. The judge charged the jury: 33 Now, the mere fact that someone is present during some part of a conspiracy or the fact that somebody knows about the conspiracy does not make them members of the conspiracy if they were innocently there and were not a part of it. 34 On the other hand, if it was part of the conspiracy that she be present and that her presence alone was part of a subterfuge to reduce suspicion ... and you believe the other elements as I've explained them to you ... then she would be guilty .... 35 On the other hand, if her presence was not there for that purpose ... then it would be your duty under the law to find her not guilty. 36 Record, vol. 3, at 369-71. 37 It is defendant's position that the court's comments regarding her presence being a part of the plan violated the basic law of conspiracy that mere presence is insufficient to prove participation in a conspiracy. However, the charge must be read as a whole. Davis v. McAllister, 631 F.2d 1256, 1260 (5th Cir. 1980). The trial judge specifically instructed the jury that the mere fact someone is present ... doesn't make them members of the conspiracy. This statement of the law immediately preceeded his comment regarding the way presence could amount to a part of the plan. Immediately following his allegedly erroneous comment, he again admonished the jury that if it finds she was not there for the purpose of subterfuge, then it had a duty to acquit her. When the charge is read as a whole, it becomes clear the judge did charge the jury properly regarding a person's mere presence. 3 38 We also find the trial judge substantially complied with Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 30 allows a party to file written requests that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the requests. The rule requires the court to inform counsel of its proposed action regarding the requests. United States v. Clarke, 468 F.2d 890, 891-92 (5th Cir. 1972). The judge did inform counsel of its proposed action. He specifically informed defendant's counsel he would charge on the presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, the difference between direct and circumstantial evidence, and a basic charge on conspiracy. He also informed counsel that, as to those instructions not overruled completely, his charge would contain the same substance as the issues requested by counsel, but the form would be different. In fact, that was the ultimate result. Since this Court requires that there be only substantial compliance with Rule 30, United States v. Jones, 642 F.2d 909, 915 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Mendoza, 473 F.2d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 1973), we find no reversible error in the judge's action.