Opinion ID: 1184955
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Seventh Was evidence of the radio broadcasts and of Diana Dawson's conversation with defendant hearsay and improperly received in evidence?

Text: No. Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously admitted hearsay evidence of the contents of two radio broadcasts and of his conversation with one of the rape victims. After defendant had raped Diana Dawson, he asked her for something to drink. She then walked over to the radio and turned it on. The 6 a.m. news came on. The broadcast included a report that two persons had been shot at the yacht club. Diana said, Oh, I wonder who that was. Defendant replied, That was Vic and his wife. The news broadcast then announced that the suspect was William Tahl. Diana said, Oh, no, and defendant stated, Diane, I didn't do it. Diana then suggested to defendant that he contact the police and tell them. Defendant said that he would do so, ran outside to a black 1957 Chevrolet, and left. Richard Bradford, an investigator for the San Diego district attorney's office, testified that at 7:15 a.m. on April 1, 1965, he heard a radio news broadcast describing the shootings which had taken place earlier that morning at the Mission Bay Yacht Club. The broadcast did not mention the names of the victims. The radio broadcasts and Diana's statements do not come within the accepted definition of hearsay. [15] The Hearsay rule excludes extrajudicial utterances only when offered for a special purpose, namely, as assertions to evidence the truth of the matter asserted. (6 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 1766, p. 178, cited with approval in People v. Bickley, 57 Cal.2d 788, 795 [22 Cal. Rptr. 340, 372 P.2d 100].) As said in People v. Marsh, 58 Cal.2d 732, 738 [6] [26 Cal. Rptr. 300, 376 P.2d 300]: Wigmore says, `Wherever an utterance is offered to evidence the state of mind which ensued in another person in consequence of the utterance, it is obvious that no assertive or testimonial use is sought to be made of it, and the utterance is therefore admissible, so far as the Hearsay rule is concerned.' (6 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) p. 235. See also 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (12th ed. 1955) p. 591, `The question is merely whether they had any effect upon the mental state of the defendant.') California is in accord with this general rule. (See also People v. Davis, 62 Cal.2d 791, 798 [5] [44 Cal. Rptr. 454, 402 P.2d 142].) [16] The radio broadcasts and Diana's statements were not admitted as evidence of the truth of the matter asserted, but, rather, as background to defendant's utterances showing his state of mind. The fact in controversy with respect to this evidence was defendant's state of mind upon hearing the broadcast, rather than the correctness of the broadcast. Defendant's statement, That was Vic and his wife, was significant in the context of Diana's testimony that the broadcast had mentioned the shootings at the yacht club but not the names of the victims, and that she had voiced aloud her curiosity as to who that was. Defendant's statement in this context was a clear demonstration of his knowledge of the victims' identity at a time less than two hours after the offense and apparently prior to the time the victims' names were broadcast to the public. When the broadcast continued and proceeded to name defendant as the suspect, and Diana said, Oh, no, defendant demonstrated his consciousness of guilt by at first denying his involvement and then running out of the house and departing in a vehicle which apparently had been stolen. Bradford's testimony as to the 7:15 a.m. news broadcast was intended simply to support Diana's testimony that radio broadcasts early that morning did not give the names of the victims and the inference that defendant's knowledge of the victims' identity was based upon his personal involvement in the offenses. Bradford's testimony was not offered as proof of the facts asserted in the broadcast, i.e., that defendant was the person who had shot the Bowens. The relevance of Bradford's testimony was a matter within the discretion of the trial court, but the principles stated above with respect to the admissibility of Diana's testimony concerning the 6 a.m. news broadcast apply equally to Bradford's testimony. The radio broadcasts in the present case were not basically different from the police broadcasts which this court and the Courts of Appeal of this state have on countless occasions permitted to be received in evidence for the sole purpose of showing the state of mind of the receiving officer, i.e., whether he had probable cause for an arrest. The rulings of the trial court with respect to Diana's and Bradford's testimony were not in error.