Opinion ID: 1356156
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alaska Law Regarding the Voluntariness of Confessions

Text: Legal principles derived from our previous decisions provide the framework for addressing the issues in the present case. A confession is not admissible into evidence unless it is voluntary. In determining whether a confession is the product of a free will or was the product of a mind overborne by coercion the totality of circumstances surrounding the confession must be considered. [7] Among the circumstances relevant to the court's determination of voluntariness are the age, mentality, and prior criminal experience of the accused; the length, intensity and frequency of interrogation; the existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment; and the existence of threat or inducement. [8] The prosecution must prove the voluntariness of the confession by a preponderance of the evidence. [9] When the accused is a juvenile, the state assumes a particularly heavy burden of proof. [10] We have also recognized [t]he manner of interrogation, including whether any threats or promises induced the confession, ... [as] an important factor to be considered. [11] We have repeatedly quoted the test enunciated in Bram v. United States [12] as a baseline for voluntariness analysis: [A] confession, in order to be admissible, must be free and voluntary; that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence. [13] Significantly, however, Bram 's seemingly absolute prohibition on all promises is not dispositive: [14] That language has never has never been applied with ... wooden literalness.... The Supreme Court has consistently made clear that the test of voluntariness is whether an examination of all the circumstances discloses that the conduct of law enforcement was such as to overbear (the defendant's) will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self determined. [15] We have noted that the facts of Bram, do not require a blanket rule against promise-induced confessions; that subsequent Supreme Court decisions demonstrate the importance of case-specific factual nuances in determining voluntariness; and that a per se approach might result in the loss of reliable and probative confessions. [16] We have thus expressly reject[ed] a per se rule which would condemn any incriminatory statement obtained by means of a promissory inducement, and have instead adopted a totality of circumstances approach in examining the voluntariness of an accused's confession. [17] We have employed this multi-factor analysis even when police have engaged in improper conduct to induce confessions, and we have affirmed the voluntariness of inculpatory statements induced by police trickery and misrepresentation of evidence. [18] But in Webb v. State [19] we recognized that certain improper conduct is so coercive as to render a Miranda waiver involuntary without regard to the totality of circumstances. [20] The police officer in Webb had conditioned the return of a suspect's driver's license to him upon his agreement to provide a statement. [21] We concluded that the officer's conduct was sufficiently coercive to render the suspect's confession involuntary notwithstanding the other factors surrounding the interrogation. [22] We noted that the suspect in Webb was presented with the illusory choice of exercising his right to remain silent and losing a valuable property interest, his driver's licence, and making an incriminating statement to secure [its] return. [23] Condemning this Hobson's choice, we held that Miranda waivers obtained by conditioning the exercise of the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination against the loss of another constitutionally protected interest were per se involuntary. [24]