Opinion ID: 852655
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Some Aggravators Relating to Weight Are Permissible

Text: Judicial statements characterized as aggravators do not always constitute facts that need to be found beyond a reasonable doubt. Morgan v. State, 829 N.E.2d 12, 17-18 (Ind.2005). Rather, such statements merely describe the moral or penal weight of actual facts. Id. at 17. Such statements may serve as valid and separate aggravators so long as they are 1) supported by facts otherwise admitted or found by a jury and 2) meant as . . . concise description[s] of what the underlying facts demonstrate and therefore relies upon a legal determination otherwise reserved as a power of the judge. Id. at 18. In this case, the substantial risk and nature and circumstances aggravators fall into the broader category of statements meant as . . . concise description[s] of the facts related to the crime. The propriety of these aggravators is appropriately challenged because, for the most part, they rely on underlying facts not properly found or are in some other way improper. A. Substantial Risk Aggravator Not Permissible. The judge found there was a substantial risk that Haas would engage in future criminal activity. This aggravator was based on two underlying facts, Haas' extensive juvenile record and the nature and circumstances of the crime. (Appellant's App. at 358.) Ordinarily it would be appropriate for the substantial risk aggravator to be supported by the criminal history, or possibly some fact underlying the nature and circumstances aggravator. However, in this case these facts also served as distinct aggravators or supported another aggravator. Judicial statements describing the moral and penal weight of the underlying aggravating circumstances cannot serve as separate aggravating circumstances. Morgan, 829 N.E.2d at 17. As we explained in Trusley v. State, that limitation applies when the court tries to enhance a sentence based on both the underlying fact and the judicial statement, rather than using the judicial statement on its own to describe the weight of the underlying fact. 829 N.E.2d 923, 927 (Ind.2005). In this case, the trial court's sentencing order clearly indicates that it considered both the fact of the prior convictions and the underlying facts of the nature and circumstances aggravator as well as statements regarding the weight of those facts to be separate aggravators. This is not permissible, and the substantial risk aggravator was therefore not a proper basis for enhancement, unless found by a jury. B. The Nature and Circumstances Aggravator Permissible in Part. The nature and circumstances aggravator was based on several distinct underlying facts. Those facts included the age of the victims, that the conspirators, through planning and lying in wait, knew the Pohlgeers were home at the time of the burglary, that the conspirators engaged in extensive planning that included the carrying of weapons in committing the crime, that Haas had knowledge of the residence and its occupants gained through participation in a previous burglary of the same house, and that the conspirators attempted a dry-run of the robbery. Several of these facts were neither found by a jury nor admitted by the defendant. As for Haas' alleged involvement in a previous robbery, he denied that he had participated in any such event. (T.R. 86, 142.) [1] Although Haas admitted that the Pohlgeers' were an elderly couple (T.R. 93), there is no indication that Haas ever admitted that he knew the victims to be senior citizens in excess of sixty-five (65) years of age. (Appellant's App. at 359.) [2] Likewise, though Haas said in his statement to police that he was aware the Pohlgeers were home at the time of the burglary, he never admitted this fact before the court as part of the factual basis of his plea agreement, nor did he make such a statement during his testimony at the sentencing hearing. ( See Appellant's App. at 236-37; T.R. 14-16, 65-96, 142-46.) As the existence of these facts was never properly established they cannot support the enhanced sentence. During his testimony at the sentencing hearing, Haas downplayed his role as a planner of the burglary, suggesting that he was largely a passive participant in the conspiracy. In essence, he implied that his planning consisted of agreeing to the plan established by other members of the conspiracy. (T.R. 73-74, 76, 92, 94.) Haas also denied staking out the Pohlgeers' residence before the burglary and claimed that the police had misinterpreted his statement regarding a visit to the Pohlgeers' neighborhood the night before the burglary. (T.R. 88-89, 95.) He also denied any involvement in dry-runs of the burglary. (T.R. 91.) On this last point we agree with Haas. Although some evidence strongly suggests that Haas did, in fact, participate in a dry run ( See T.R. 112), Haas himself nowhere admits this fact before the court. Consequently, as this fact was never properly found, it cannot support the aggravator. On the other hand, in accepting the factual basis of his plea, Haas admitted to scoping out the Pohlgeers' residence on two different occasions and knowing that a weapon had been brought to the house by one of his co-conspirators. (T.R. 14-16.) Counsel rightly acknowledges Haas' admission of these facts. (Br. Appellant at 7.) As they were properly found, the court could consider these facts, and they are sufficient to support the description of the crime as heinous in nature. Haas argues that the fact he staked out the residence and that he knew a weapon was being brought by a co-conspirator were improperly considered as aggravators because they are elements of the crime to which he plead guilty. He is right insofar as they were the actions identified in the charging information as the acts taken in furtherance of the conspiracy, and that there is a general prohibition on using elements of a crime to support an enhanced sentence. Lemos v. State, 746 N.E.2d 972, 975 (Ind.2001). However, the trial court did not enhance the sentence because an overt act was taken, but rather found that the nature and circumstances of the crime were heinous, at least in part, because of the type of planning Haas and his confederates engaged in and what it said about the particular crime and the moral and penal culpability of the defendant. Such differentiation makes permissible the consideration of those facts for the purposes of sentencing. Id. The difference between the two reasons for imposing the enhancement is more than semantic. It explains the purpose of aggravating sentencesto impose a punishment that is appropriate to the particular crime and criminal. A different example may help to illustrate this point. It would certainly be improper for a judge to enhance a sentence for assault because the defendant was found to have hit someone, since the fact of the physical blow is an element of the crime. A judge might conclude, however, that the nature and circumstances of the assault warranted an enhanced sentence if it was also properly established that the defendant repeatedly struck the victim with a crowbar. In the first instance, the defendant would be receiving an enhanced term simply for committing a crime; in the second the defendant would receive additional punishment because of higher moral culpability reflected in the manner in which the crime was committed. Similarly, while a judge may not impose an enhanced sentence simply because a conspirator took a step in furtherance of the conspiracy, it would be appropriate to hold the defendant accountable when such acts are especially repugnant. Such is the case here where the nature of the planning and the steps taken by Haas and the conspirators to carry out their plan demonstrate a particularly high degree of purposefulness. Because the fact that he scoped out the residence, and the fact that he knew a weapon would be involved were admitted by Haas, and because they support an aggravator meant to describe their moral and penal weight, the use of the nature and circumstances aggravator is permissible to the extent it relies solely on these facts. Because the other facts supporting the aggravator were improperly found or considered, however, its weight is significantly reduced.