Opinion ID: 170512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Trial counsel's failure to present evidence of Gilson's brain damage

Text: In his final issue, Gilson argues that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate and present powerful evidence establishing [his] extensive and permanent brain damage. Aplt. Br. at 110. This information, Gilson argues, could have been used to challenge [his] mental capacity to commit the crime and, [m]ore importantly, . . . should have been used as mitigation and could very well have resulted in a sentence less than death. Id. In support of these arguments, Gilson asserts that he was temporarily paralyzed . . . and suffered prolonged unconsciousness as a result of an auto accident on March 12, 1993. Id. at 111. According to Gilson, [t]he impact caused severe head injuries including multiple, extensive facial and cranial fractures, and resulted in permanent organic brain damage. Id. In turn, Gilson asserts, citing various expert witnesses, that the brain damage had repercussions on his personality and behavior. Id. at 112. In particular, Gilson asserts that the brain damage resulted in severe executive and personality dysfunction, and a decreased ability to self-regulate behavior or inhibit impulses. . . . Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). These post-accident changes in behavior, Gilson contends, could have been affirmed by testimony from [n]umerous family members and acquaintances. . . . Id. at 113. a) Clearly established Supreme Court precedent Not surprisingly, Gilson identifies Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), as providing the clearly established federal law applicable to his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In Strickland, the Supreme Court held that [a] convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. First, the Court noted, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. Id. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Id. Second, the Court noted, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Id. Unless a defendant makes both showings, the Court held, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Id. b) OCCA's rejection of Gilson's claim Gilson first raised the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal. The OCCA rejected Gilson's arguments on the merits: [Gilson] contends in his thirteenth assignment of error that he was denied a fair trial and reliable sentencing proceeding by the ineffective assistance of counsel. An analysis of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim begins with the presumption that trial counsel was competent to provide the guiding hand that the accused needed, and therefore the burden is on the accused to demonstrate both a deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington , at 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. See also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). Strickland sets forth the two-part test which must be applied to determine whether a defendant has been denied effective assistance of counsel. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient, and second, he must show the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, [footnote omitted]. Unless the defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Id., 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. [Gilson] must demonstrate that counsel's representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that the challenged action could not be considered sound trial strategy. Id., 466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. The burden rests with [Gilson] to show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for any unprofessional errors by counsel, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id., 466 U.S. at 698, 104 S.Ct. at 2070. This Court has stated the issue is whether counsel exercised the skill, judgment and diligence of a reasonably competent defense attorney in light of his overall performance. Bryson v. State, 876 P.2d 240, 264 (Okl.Cr.1994), cert, denied 513 U.S. 1090, 115 S.Ct. 752, 130 L.Ed.2d 651 (1995).    Filed with the direct appeal is an Application for Evidentiary Hearing on Sixth Amendment Claim and Motion to Supplement, pursuant to Rule 3.11(B)(3)(b), Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (1998). [Gilson] asserts in the Application that counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and utilize available mitigating evidence. Attached to the Application are twelve (12) affidavits. The first two (2) affidavits are from [Gilson]'s trial counsel wherein they state they received boxes of medical records from Saint Anthony's Hospital pertaining to injuries [Gilson] suffered in a 1993 automobile accident. Both counsel state they did not see any reference to a C.A.T. (Computer Axial Tomograph) scan in the records, therefore they made no attempt to locate such. Both counsel also state that during their investigation of the case, they spoke to several people who mentioned drastic personality changes in [Gilson] since the 1993 accident. Counsel also stated that at the time of trial, they did not know the true extent of the physical and/or psychological damage suffered by [Gilson] as a result of the accident. (Exhibits A and B). The third affidavit is from Michael L. Johns, an investigator in the Capital Direct Appeal Division of the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System. Mr. Johns stated he reviewed the files provided by [Gilson]'s trial counsel and discovered two Radiological Reports which indicated that two series of C.A.T. scans were taken of [Gilson's] brain and skull. The first series was done on March 15, 1993, and the second series was done on March 22, 1993. Mr. Johns also stated that on May 6, 1999, he personally picked up from Saint Anthony's Hospital copies of all of the C.A.T. scans conducted on [Gilson]. (Exhibit C). The next three (3) affidavits are from C. Alan Hopewell, Ph.D., Albert V. Messina, M.D., and Jay A. Rosenblum, M.D. Dr. Hopewell stated he conducted a neuropsychological evaluation of [Gilson] on May 24, 1999, at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary. Based upon that testing, Dr. Hopewell concluded [Gilson] suffers from irreversible organic brain syndrome which is chronic in nature and which [is] classic for this type of damage and which is a direct result of traumatic head injury. (Exhibit D, pg. 18). Dr. Messina stated he evaluated the C.A.T. scans and medical records concerning [Gilson]. He concluded the records indicated extensive brain damage to [Gilson]'s right frontal lobe and right temporal lobe which remains and results from the prior motor vehicle accident on March 12, 1993. (Exhibit E). Dr. Rosenblum stated he evaluated the reports of Drs. Hopewell and Messina, as well as [Gilson]'s medical records. He verified the findings of Drs. Hopewell and Messina and concluded that [Gilson]'s severe brain damage in the area most affected is compatible with Dr. Hopewell's neuropsychological evaluation. As a result, [Gilson's] prognosis for improvement is very poor and permanent. (Exhibit F). The remaining six (6) affidavits are from family, friends and co-workers who state that [Gilson] exhibited drastic personality changes after the 1993 automobile accident. [Gilson]'s mother and step-father state that prior to the accident [Gilson] did not act out of the ordinary, and showed attention to his appearance and household. However, after the accident he withdrew, became careless with his appearance, and took on bizarre habits such as eating only certain foods and having an unnatural fear of other food items. (Exhibits G and H.) Friends and co-workers stated [Gilson] often seemed distant and unaware of his surroundings after the accident (Exhibits I, J, K, and L). [Gilson]'s Application contends the information contained in the affidavits constitute [sic] the clear and convincing evidence necessary under Rule 3. 11(B)(3)(b)(i) to demonstrate a strong possibility trial counsel was ineffective. Accordingly, [Gilson] urges this Court to so find and to order an evidentiary hearing to fully address the ineffectiveness issue. Rule 3.11(B)(3)(6) allows an appellant to request an evidentiary hearing when it is alleged on appeal that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to utilize available evidence which could have been made available during the course of trial. . . . Once an application has been properly submitted along with supporting affidavits, this Court reviews the application to see if it contains sufficient evidence to show this Court by clear and convincing evidence there is a strong possibility trial counsel was ineffective for failing to utilize or identify the complained-of evidence. Rule 3.11(B)(3)(b)(i). Upon review of the affidavits, we find trial counsel was aware of the automobile accident and any personality changes in [Gilson] since the accident. However, the record reflects that with that knowledge, counsel chose a defense of actual innocence, not one of diminished capacity. That strategic choice is not indicative of deficient performance as a defense of actual innocence was reasonable based upon information provided to counsel by [Gilson]'s family and friends. [A]n attorney who makes a strategic choice to channel his investigation into fewer than all plausible lines of defense upon which he bases his strategy are reasonable and his choices on the basis of those assumptions are reasonable . . ., An attorney's decision not to interview witnesses and to rely on other sources of information, if made in the exercise of professional judgment, is not ineffective counsel. Boltz v. State, 806 P.2d 1117, 1126 (Okl. Cr.1991), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 846, 112 S.Ct. 143, 116 L.Ed.2d 109 (1991), quoting United States v. Glick, 710 F.2d 639, 644 (10th. Cir.1983). Here, [Gilson] told police he never abused Shane, but merely assisted in the decision concerning what to do with the body and the removal of the body. Further, he said he never abused any of the other children, that it was Bertha Coffman who abused the children. [Gilson]'s mother and step-father testified they never saw [Gilson] abuse the children and that the children appeared to be fond of [Gilson]. Based upon this evidence, it was a reasonable decision based upon their professional judgment for defense counsel to focus on Bertha Coffman as the actual perpetrator and pursue a defense of actual innocence on [Gilson]'s part. That the strategy proved unsuccessful is not grounds for branding counsel ineffective. Absent a showing of incompetence, [Gilson] is bound by the decisions of his counsel and mistakes in tactic and trial strategy do not provide grounds for subsequent attack. Davis v. State, 759 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Okl.Cr.1988). To have also raised any type of mental disorder defense would have been inconsistent with a defense of actual innocence and would have considerably weakened both defenses. Counsel's decision in this case was reasonable trial strategy, which we will not second guess on appeal. Bernay v. State, 989 P.2d 998, 1015 (Okl.Cr.1999). Further, counsel was not ineffective for failing to present evidence of the injury during second stage. The record shows the second stage defense focused on [Gilson] being a productive and contributing member of society therefore, he deserved a punishment less than death. This included evidence of his lack of any prior violent conduct and his skills and ability to maintain employment. While evidence of [Gilson]'s mental condition and his inability to control his explosive behavior may have had some mitigating effect, this evidence could be a two-edged sword. Evidence that [Gilson] had poor control over his behavior had the potential of proving [Gilson] was a threat to society, including prison society, and could indicate a propensity for future violence. Such evidence would have been contradictory to mitigating evidence of [Gilson]'s lack of culpability and lack of violent conduct. Counsel's strategic decision to pursue a second stage defense that [Gilson] was less culpable than Coffman, and highlight the positive traits of his character instead of focusing on any mental problems he might have was well within the range of professional reasonable judgment. While [Gilson] has provided a great deal of information in his affidavits, we find he has failed to set forth sufficient evidence to warrant an evidentiary hearing. He has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence a strong possibility that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to utilize the complained-of evidence, [citation omitted]. Accordingly, we decline to grant [Gilson]'s application for an evidentiary hearing. Gilson I, 8 P.3d at 926-29 (internal paragraph numbers omitted). c) Gilson's challenge to the OCCA's analysis Gilson argues that the OCCA's decision was flawed in two related respects. Aplt. Br. at 116. First, Gilson argues that the OCCA's decision overlook[ed] the requirement that counsel conduct a `thorough' mitigation investigation. Id. (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)). Second, Gilson complains that the OCCA's determination[] as to counsel making a strategic decision [was] based on sheer speculation, which is not enough. Id. In this regard, Gilson argues that the affidavits he submitted to the OCCA from his trial counsel say nothing of a strategic decision to intentionally omit the evidence, and in fact suggest there was no strategic decision, as they admit they overlooked the reference to CAT scans and were not aware of the true nature and extent of [his] head injuries. Id. at 117. We find it unnecessary to address Gilson's arguments, both of which focus on the first Strickland prong, because we conclude, applying a de novo standard of review, that Gilson cannot satisfy the second Strickland prong. Turning first to Gilson's complaint that his trial attorneys failed to present evidence of his auto accident and its effects during the first-stage proceedings, we conclude that Gilson was not prejudiced by this purported failure. [18] Although the OCCA recognized a defense of complete insanity at the time of Gilson's trial, it had never recognized, and appears to this date to have never recognized, a defense to first degree murder positing that the defendant was incapable of forming the specific intent due to a mental illness short of complete insanity. See Grant v. State, 58 P.3d 783, 795 (Okla. Crim.App.2002) (We need not reach the issue of a `diminished capacity' defense in this [first degree murder] case, as Grant's evidence regarding his mental illness did not show that he suffered mental infirmities that would have rendered him incapable of forming the specific intent necessary.). Moreover, none of the evidence submitted by Gilson to the OCCA in connection with his ineffective assistance claim establishes that he lacked the ability to form the specific intent necessary to be found guilty of first degree murder. To the contrary, the clinical neuropsychologist who examined Gilson (Dr. C. Alan Hopewell) concluded that Gilson had an overall IQ score of 92, Hopewell Report at 8, and technically `kn[e]w right from wrong' but was often unable to `conform his behavior to the right' due to impulsivity, poor judgment, and the failure to see or understand the consequences of his actions. Id. at 10. Thus, the purported failure of Gilson's trial attorneys to pursue a diminished capacity defense to the first degree murder charge, based on Gilson's alleged post-accident changes in behavior, simply did not prejudice Gilson. We reach a similar conclusion with respect to Gilson's claim that his trial attorneys erred in failing to present accident-related evidence during the second-stage proceedings. With respect to this claim, it is not entirely clear whether the OCCA intended to address the second prong of the Strickland test, but its opinion does contain the following language that is relevant to our second prong analysis: While evidence of [Gilson]'s mental condition and his inability to control his explosive behavior may have had some mitigating effect, this evidence could be a two-edged sword. Evidence that [Gilson] had poor control over his behavior had the potential of proving [Gilson] was a threat to society, including prison society, and could indicate a propensity for future violence. Such evidence would have been contradictory to mitigating evidence of [Gilson]'s lack of culpability and lack of violent conduct. Counsel's strategic decision to pursue a second stage defense that [Gilson] was less culpable than Coffman, and highlight the positive traits of his character instead of focusing on any mental problems he might have was well within the range of professional reasonable judgment. Gilson I, 8 P.3d at 928. Whether or not we owe any deference to these conclusions, we believe they are entirely accurate. To be sure, the evidence presented by Gilson to the OCCA in connection with his ineffective assistance claim persuasively established that he was involved in a 1993 automobile accident, sustained a serious brain injury as a result of the accident, and has experienced negative physical and mental effects' since the accident (e.g., a constant global headache; photophobia; increased sensitivity to auditory stimuli). Dr. Hopewell's neuropsychological consulting report, however, paints a bleak and ominous picture of Gilson's personality, behavior, and likely future conduct. For example, Hopewell noted that Gilson had a tendency to become agitated and belligerent easily when frustrated. Hopewell Report at 12. Indeed, Hopewell reported that this tendency actually played out during their interview, with Gilson becoming frustrated at Hopewell and at times throwing his pencil across the room, yelling, answering in gibberish, and refusing to continue with requested testing. Hopewell opined that Gilson w[ould] have extreme difficulties in terms of frustration tolerance as well as restrictions in abilities to deal with complicated, stressful, complex, and ambiguous situations. Id. at 8. Relatedly, Hopewell concluded that Gilson would have difficulty conforming his behavior to societal norms due to impulsivity, poor judgment, and the failure to see or understand the consequences of his actions. Id. at 10. Hopewell also concluded that Gilson had ah inability to regulate behavior or inhibit impulses and thus w[ould] often act before thinking. Id. at 18. Given these extremely negative descriptions of Gilson's likely behavior, we conclude that the presentation of this evidence to the jury during the second-stage proceedings would not have resulted in a different outcome. In particular, we conclude that the presentation of this evidence would likely have weighed against Gilson by erasing any lingering doubts that may have existed as to his role in Shane's murder, and by confirming the jury's conclusion that he represented a continuing threat, even if confined in prison for life. Thus, we conclude Gilson was not prejudiced by the failure of his trial attorneys to gather and present this evidence to the jury during the second-stage proceedings. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.