Opinion ID: 1801800
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claims of Evidentiary Error

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his request to call Raymond Stevens, a private investigator, as an expert to explain how an inmate informant can obtain information used to concoct a confession that was never made. Defendant contends that this testimony would have been relevant to show how David DeSoto could assemble information about the accusations against [defendant] in order to create a fictitious confession . . . . Defendant specifically disavows any claim that he sought to have Stevens's testimony introduced to have Stevens render an opinion about DeSoto's credibility under Evidence Code section 801. Rather, he argues the evidence was admissible under Evidence Code section 720, which defines the qualifications of an expert witness. Defendant contends that the latter statute would have permitted Stevens to testify to the procedure [in the Los Angeles County jail] whereby inmates can gain information about cases which the inmate believes the prosecutors would be willing to offer to the inmate . . . and that the procedures are such that the inmate can find out the foundational information without in fact having a conversation with a particular individual and from which the informant can cobble together a fictitious confession. After an extended colloquy, the trial court denied the request on grounds of relevancy, speculation, Evidence Code section 801. It invades the province of the jury under Evidence Code section 780. It calls for inadmissible lay opinion testimony. [14] We find no abuse of discretion. At trial, defendant sought to admit the testimony of Raymond Stevens. Stevens was a 24-and-a-half year veteran of the Ventura County Sheriff's Department before becoming a private investigator who worked on contract with the State Public Defender's Office. After the trial court sustained prosecution objections to questions about whether Stevens had dealt with inmate informants, a hearing was held outside the presence of the jury in which the defense made an offer of proof as to Stevens's testimony. Characterizing DeSoto as an inmate informant, defense counsel stated that Stevens had qualified as an expert to render testimony about inmate informants, the process, the methods of selecting, evaluating and determining the truthfulness of their representations and would render his opinion regarding the validity of Mr. DeSoto in his role of an inmate informant. In this connection, defense counsel argued that sections of the Penal Code that singled out inmate informants recognized them as a special breed of persons and witness [ sic ]. Initially, the defense cited Evidence Code section 801  permitting expert opinion testimony  as the basis of its request. The prosecution objected on the grounds that there was insufficient foundation for the characterization of DeSoto as a long-term inmate informant, that there was insufficient foundation that the subject of inmate informants was a matter for expert testimony, that the proposed testimony was neither material nor relevant, and that the proposed testimony would invade the jury's province as the sole evaluator of witness credibility. The trial court agreed that there was no support for permitting expert testimony on the subject of a witness's credibility. At that point, the defense backed away from its offer of proof, claiming it was not offering Stevens as an expert on whether DeSoto was being truthful, but about the processes that were operative in L.A. County [jail] which would have been operative in the utilization of Mr. DeSoto as an inmate informant in this case . . . . Pressed by the court for specifics, the defense said that Stevens would testify that there's a regular flow of information in and about the area, how they gather it without talking with the person. The only prerequisite that a person who wants to be an inmate informant really has is to be able to show at some point . . . being in the physical presence of another person. According to the defense, the inmate informant gets that information by the flow of prisoners in and out of his environment, the use of the media, discussions with other people, phone calls to law enforcement officers, and that law enforcement should use safeguards to avoid false testimony by inmate informants. Asked by the court whether Stevens's testimony was, in effect, a criticism of the law enforcement conduct in interviewing and accepting Mr. DeSoto's statements without applying such safeguards, defense counsel said, That's part of it. The trial court replied that whether police applied such standards or procedures was irrelevant when the only issue was DeSoto's credibility, which was a matter for the jury to decide. The court referred to section 1127a, which sets forth the special instruction to be given for the jury to assess the testimony of an in-custody informant. [15] The court rejected the notion that, because the Legislature had adopted this statute, there is a newly recognized field of expertise concerning inmate-informants . . . . [¶] The relevant part of Mr. DeSoto's testimony is what he had to say, whether there is any evidence of motive, bias, et cetera, which would have to be based on facts. And it is simply a matter of assessing the veracity of a witness. Whether some inmate-informants lie and some don't is a truism . . . . [¶] I think it comes back to the defense wanting this witness to give speculative information as to why this jury should conclude that this witness is not telling the truth. You haven't given me any specific offer of proof as to evidence that would rebut Mr. DeSoto's testimony that the sole source of [his] information was [defendant], other than saying there is a methodology and it is something that occurs in detention facilities where inmate-informants have access to other information, and sometimes or frequently use that information as a basis for snitching and then claim that another inmate gave him that information and confessed, when it wasn't the case. That strikes me as pure speculation, something that I can't let this jury do. (6) In assessing defendant's claim that the trial court erroneously excluded Stevens's testimony, we apply the deferential abuse of discretion standard. ( People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 805 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 98, 126 P.3d 938] [`[A]n appellate court applies the abuse of discretion standard of review to any ruling by a trial court on the admissibility of evidence. . . .'].) We find no abuse here. We agree with the trial court that, to the extent the purpose or effect of Stevens's testimony was to render an opinion about DeSoto's credibility, the testimony was inadmissible. ( People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 82 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30] [The general rule is that an expert may not give an opinion whether a witness is telling the truth, for the determination of credibility is not a subject sufficiently beyond common experience that the expert's opinion would assist the trier or fact; in other words, the jury generally is as well equipped as the expert to discern whether a witness is being truthful.].) To the extent the purpose of the testimony was to demonstrate how inmate informants confabulate testimony, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence on grounds of insufficient foundation in the absence of evidence either that DeSoto was a repeat inmate informant or of evidence contradicting his testimony that defendant was the sole source of his information. Therefore, we reject defendant's claim that the trial court erred when it excluded Stevens's testimony. [16]
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion and violated various constitutional provisions when it refused to allow into evidence various articles from The Fresno Bee about defendant's case because, had they been read by DeSoto, they may have provided him with information from which he could have concocted his testimony. The trial court rejected the articles on the ground that, in the absence of any evidence that DeSoto had seen the newspaper articles, defendant's use of them was speculative. (7) His claim is without merit. Because, as the trial court noted, there was no evidence that DeSoto had obtained his information about the case from any source other than defendant himself, admission of this evidence was not relevant to any disputed fact but would simply have invited the jury to speculate that DeSoto, from his jail cell in Los Angeles, had somehow come across these newspaper articles and used them to confabulate his testimony. The trial court properly excluded the evidence. ( People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 711 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 682, 101 P.3d 568] [Evidence is irrelevant. . . if it leads only to speculative inferences.].)
During defendant's cross-examination of DeSoto, defense counsel asked DeSoto whether he had asked to be placed in protective custody in prior cases in order to demonstrate that DeSoto had acted as an informant in those prior cases. The trial court permitted defense counsel to ask DeSoto whether he had sought protective custody in this case, but not as to an earlier period of time, and sustained relevancy objections to those questions. Defendant maintains this was error because the question was relevant to whether DeSoto was testifying in hope of receiving benefits from the prosecutor. Not so. Whether DeSoto sought to be placed in protective custody in other cases at earlier times was not relevant to whether he had received any benefits in connection with his testimony in this case. The trial court did not abuse its considerable discretion in sustaining the objection.
Defendant's theory at trial was that Steven Farmer, and not defendant, assisted Duane Holt in the murder of Richard Urban. Farmer refused to testify, invoking his privilege against self-incrimination. Instead, the defense called Cliff Garoupa, a defense investigator for Duane Holt. He testified that when he had visited Farmer in custody, after telling him that Grajiola had accused him of being involved in the Urban murder, Farmer told him to convey a message to a member his family to get rid of a pair of boots. The purpose of this evidence was to establish a consciousness of guilt on Farmer's part. In rebuttal, the prosecution was allowed to call Detective Pete Chavez. Chavez testified that Farmer had told Chavez he spent the night of the murder at his parents' house. The trial court admitted the testimony over a defense hearsay objection under Evidence Code section 1235, as a prior inconsistent statement. On appeal, defendant contends, and the Attorney General concedes, that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony under this section because that section applies only when the [prior] statement is inconsistent with [the witness's] testimony at the hearing . . . (Evid. Code, § 1235, italics added), and, in this case, Farmer did not testify. Nonetheless, the Attorney General contends the statement was admissible under Evidence Code section 1202 and, in any event, any error was harmless. (8) Evidence Code section 1202 states in part: Evidence of a statement or other conduct by a declarant that is inconsistent with a statement by such declarant received in evidence as hearsay evidence is not inadmissible for the purpose of attacking the credibility of the declarant though he is not given and has not had an opportunity to explain or to deny such inconsistent statement or other conduct. Section 1202 creates `a uniform rule permitting a hearsay declarant to be impeached by inconsistent statements in all cases, whether or not the declarant has been given an opportunity to explain or deny the inconsistency.' (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B, pt. 4 West's Ann. Evid. Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 1202, p. 27.) [¶] The purpose of section 1202 is to assure fairness to the party against whom hearsay evidence is admitted without an opportunity for cross-examination. ( People v. Corella (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 461, 470 [18 Cal.Rptr.3d 770].) We find Evidence Code section 1202 to be inapplicable. Farmer's statement was not hearsay but simply verbal conduct consisting of a directive that was neither inherently true nor false. Furthermore, the statement was offered for the nonhearsay purpose of demonstrating consciousness of guilt. Accordingly, as he was not a hearsay declarant, section 1202 does not apply. Thus, there was no basis upon which to permit Chavez's testimony. It should be noted, however, that the testimony was less than compelling rebuttal since, if Farmer had been involved in Urban's murder, it can be assumed he would have lied to a police detective questioning him about it. Moreover, any error was harmless given the powerful evidence of defendant's guilt that included evidence that he and Holt had left Holt's residence with Urban the day of the murder, defendant's possession of the rings Urban had offered to Holt as payment for drugs and defendant's admissions to Baxter and DeSoto that he had shot and killed Urban.