Opinion ID: 6221127
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Pulmonary-Function Tests

Text: In the final round of administrative proceedings, Samons asserted that the administrative law judge had committed two mistakes in the first round when holding that the pulmonary- function tests did not establish Casey’s total disability under § 718.204(b)(2)(i). The regulations rely on a miner’s height to identify the test score necessary for the miner to qualify as totally disabled, see 20 C.F.R. pt. 718, app. B, and Samons claimed that the judge inaccurately identified Casey’s height. Samons also argued that the judge wrongly credited Dr. Fino’s claim that Casey’s lack of effort during his test rendered its qualifying score invalid because other doctors had suggested that the score was valid. The Board did not consider these arguments on their merits because it found that “law of the case” excused it from reassessing whether the pulmonary-function tests established Casey’s total disability. Samons, 2020 WL 729893, at  n.9. 1 Samons asserts that the Board wrongly invoked the law-of-the-case doctrine to summarily reject these arguments in the fourth round of proceedings. We disagree. No. 20-3209 Samons v. Nat’l Mines Corp., et al. Page 9 The doctrine known as “law of the case” encapsulates a simple idea: courts generally decline to redecide issues that they have already decided. Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912). Law of the case thus promotes judicial efficiency by prohibiting parties from indefinitely relitigating the same issue that a court resolved in an earlier part of the case. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816 (1988); 18B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478, at 648 (3d ed. 2019). As a discretionary doctrine, however, law of the case does not bar a court from reassessing an issue if it believes good reasons exist to do so (such as a change in the law or an obvious mistake). See Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 506–07 (2011); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 236 (1997). (The relevant principles are different for the so-called “mandate rule,” a distinct rule sometimes associated with the law of the case that requires a lower court to follow an earlier decision of a higher court. See Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place, LLC v. Atrium Health Sys., 922 F.3d 713, 733– 34 (6th Cir. 2019) (Sutton, J., concurring).) But do these law-of-the-case principles apply in proceedings before the Board—an agency rather than a court? Cf. Bridger Coal Co. v. Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 669 F.3d 1183, 1192 (10th Cir. 2012); Biltmore Forest Broad. FM, Inc. v. FCC, 321 F.3d 155, 163 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Because Congress created the Board to perform the tasks previously undertaken by district courts, see Gibas v. Saginaw Mining Co., 748 F.2d 1112, 1118 (6th Cir. 1984), the Board presumably could adopt the usual case-processing rules that courts follow. Cf. Bryan, 937 F.3d at 751; Arangure v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 333, 343–45 (6th Cir. 2018). Indeed, since its creation, the Board has regularly invoked “law of the case” when refusing to reassess issues it resolved earlier in the case. See Gibas, 748 F.2d at 1116; Dixon v. John J. McMullen & Assocs., Inc., 19 Ben. Rev. Bd. Serv. (MB) 243, 244 (1986) (per curiam) (citing cases); see also Williams v. Healy-Ball-Greenfield, 22 Ben. Rev. Bd. Serv. (MB) 234, 237–38 (1989); McNeil v. Prolerized New England Co., 11 Ben. Rev. Bd. Serv. (MB) 576, 577 (1979). Be that as it may, Samons makes no claim that the Board lacks the authority to follow this procedural rule, so we need not resolve the point. That still leaves the question whether the Board correctly applied the law of the case when declining to review its earlier ruling about the pulmonary-function tests. What should our No. 20-3209 Samons v. Nat’l Mines Corp., et al. Page 10 standard of review be? Because law of the case is a discretionary doctrine, we generally review a district court’s decision to stick with (or depart from) an earlier ruling for an abuse of discretion. See Rouse v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 300 F.3d 711, 715 (6th Cir. 2002). We likely should review the Board’s law-of-the-case decision under the same deferential standard. Cf. Star Fire Coals, Inc. v. Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 792 F. App’x 372, 375 (6th Cir. 2019). But the parties have not discussed this standard-of-review issue either, so we opt not to decide it. We would uphold the Board’s decision even under de novo review. To establish Casey’s total disability, Samons could rely on, among other things, pulmonary-function tests or medical opinions (or both). 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(b)(2). In the first round of proceedings, the Board accepted Samons’s argument that the administrative law judge failed to properly weigh the medical opinions and vacated the denial of benefits under § 718.204(b)(2)(iv). Samons, 2012 WL 423892, at –4. But the Board found that Casey did not challenge the judge’s rejection of the pulmonary-function tests to prove total disability under § 718.204(b)(2)(i) and “affirmed” that part of the opinion on this forfeiture rationale. Id. at  n.7. The conclusion that Samons had forfeited a challenge based on the pulmonary-function tests itself became law of the case for the proceedings. Cf. Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., 875 F.3d 651, 660–63, 665 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Morris v. Am. Nat’l Can Corp., 988 F.2d 50, 52 (8th Cir. 1993). And in the final round before the Board, Samons raised no arguments rooted in law-of-the-case principles as to why the Board should depart from its earlier forfeiture decision. She, for example, did not argue that the relevant law had changed or that the Board had clearly erred in finding that she did not challenge the administrative law judge’s pulmonary-function-test finding. Samons’s responses lack merit. She claims that the Board’s statement that she did not challenge the judge’s handling of the pulmonary-function tests was dictum because the Board vacated the judge’s disability finding on other grounds. She adds that dicta generally cannot establish the law of the case. See Haddad v. Alexander, Zelmanski, Danner & Fioritto, PLLC, 758 F.3d 777, 781–82 (6th Cir. 2014) (per curiam); 18B Wright et al., supra, § 4478, at 636. But the Board’s forfeiture conclusion counted as a holding. The Board did not make a mere passing comment about the tests. Rather, it noted that Samons had not challenged the conclusion that the No. 20-3209 Samons v. Nat’l Mines Corp., et al. Page 11 tests did not establish a total disability and thus “affirmed” this conclusion. Samons, 2012 WL 423892, at  n.7. And this decision “contribute[d] to” its judgment: it did not simply vacate the judge’s decision outright but affirmed in part and vacated in part. Wright v. Spaulding, 939 F.3d 695, 701–02 (6th Cir. 2019); see Samons, 2012 WL 423892, at . Samons next claims that the Board lacks the power to issue this type of “limited” remand in which it affirms in part and vacates in part. Reply Br. 8. According to Samons, the Board may only affirm or vacate an administrative law judge’s disability finding outright. We fail to see this limit in the statutory scheme. The relevant statute allows the Board to remand “for further appropriate action.” 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(4). The relevant regulation allows the Board to remand for “such additional proceedings” and “such other action” as it directs. 20 C.F.R. § 802.405(a). This discretionary statutory and regulatory text conflicts with Samons’s all-ornothing proposition. And a remand on a narrow issue may be entirely “appropriate” in many situations. 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(4). Samons lastly argues that law of the case cannot apply because the parties did not brief any issues related to the pulmonary-function tests in her first appeal to the Board. The doctrine, Samons notes, applies only to issues that were actually raised and decided. See Burley v. Gagacki, 834 F.3d 606, 618 (6th Cir. 2016); 18B Wright et al., supra, § 4478, at 628. Admittedly, the Board did not resolve any merits issues related to the tests. But the Board did not apply law of the case to merits issues. It applied the doctrine to its decision that Samons had not challenged (and so had forfeited a challenge to) the judge’s handling of the tests. And law of the case can apply just as much to a prior forfeiture ruling as it can to a prior merits ruling. See Promega, 875 F.3d at 665. Perhaps if the Board had said nothing about the tests in the first appeal, “law of the case” would have been the wrong label. Cf. Howe v. City of Akron, 801 F.3d 718, 740 (6th Cir. 2015); Crocker v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 49 F.3d 735, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1995); 18B Wright et al., supra, § 4478.6, at 785–86. Then, National Mines might have argued that Samons forfeited use of the tests by failing to challenge the judge’s decision at the proper time. See Howe, 801 F.3d at 743. Here, however, the Board did issue a forfeiture holding and so it properly applied law of the case to that holding. No. 20-3209 Samons v. Nat’l Mines Corp., et al. Page 12 2 That said, our affirmance of the law-of-the-case ruling has a narrow effect. It means only that the Board did not commit a procedural error in the last round of proceedings by refusing to reconsider its earlier holding in the first round. But a lower court’s reliance on law of the case to refuse to reconsider an earlier ruling does not bar a higher court from reviewing that earlier ruling. See Church Joint Venture, L.P., ex rel. Chapter 7 Tr. v. Blasingame (In re Blasingame), 920 F.3d 384, 392 (6th Cir. 2019). A contrary view would allow a lower court to insulate a decision from appellate review merely by refusing to reconsider it at some later point in the proceedings. See Christianson, 486 U.S. at 817; 18B Wright et al., supra, § 4478.6, at 780. And we have extended the same principle to our review of the Board’s rulings. See Dixie Fuel Co., LLC v. Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 820 F.3d 833, 843 (6th Cir. 2016); Consolidation Coal Co. v. McMahon, 77 F.3d 898, 905 n.5 (6th Cir. 1996); see also W. Va. Coal Workers’ Pneumoconiosis Fund v. Bell, 781 F. App’x 214, 223–24 (4th Cir. 2019) (Richardson, J., writing separately and announcing the judgment). So the Board’s use of law of the case here does not prohibit us from reviewing the Board’s earlier holding that Samons had forfeited any challenge to the administrative law judge’s ruling on the pulmonary-function tests. Does it matter, though, that we have jurisdiction to review only a “final order” of the Board, and the forfeiture holding came in an earlier nonfinal order? 33 U.S.C. § 921(c). Not at all. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, interlocutory agency actions merge into the final order that triggers our jurisdiction. See 5 U.S.C. § 704. That practice also comports with the final-judgment rule governing our review of district-court decisions under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which likewise allows appellate courts to review most previous nonfinal orders once a district court enters a final judgment. See Cattin v. Gen. Motors Corp., 955 F.2d 416, 428 (6th Cir. 1992); cf. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Baker, 815 F.2d 422, 424 n.2 (6th Cir. 1987). True, our court once held that, even after the Board issued a final order, we lacked jurisdiction to review its earlier order vacating an administrative law judge’s decision and remanding. See Bartley v. L & M Coal Co., 901 F.2d 1311, 1313 (6th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). Yet Bartley’s logic does not apply in this case. There, the judge reversed course on remand and issued different findings before the Board entered the final order. Id. Here, the Board stuck with its No. 20-3209 Samons v. Nat’l Mines Corp., et al. Page 13 forfeiture ruling. Any broader reading of Bartley would put us at odds with the views of the other circuit courts—which have uniformly recognized that courts have jurisdiction to review rulings made in interlocutory orders once the Board issues a final order. See Bell, 781 F. App’x at 223 (Richardson, J., writing separately and announcing the judgment) (collecting cases). So neither law of the case nor the jurisdictional limit on nonfinal orders precludes our review of this forfeiture question. Nevertheless, the Board correctly found that, under its claims-processing rules, Samons did not properly challenge the pulmonary-function tests in her first appeal. Congress gave the Board the authority to review only “substantial question[s] of law or fact” that a party appeals from an administrative law judge’s decision. 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3). It did not give the Board the authority to conduct a “de novo proceeding or unrestricted review of a case brought before it.” 20 C.F.R. § 802.301(a); see Bryan, 937 F.3d at 750. Unlike the social-security laws, therefore, the Black Lung Benefits Act places the onus on litigants in agency appeals to identify alleged errors. Cf. Carr v. Saul, 141 S. Ct. 1352, 1358–59 (2021). Implementing this narrow review authority, the Department of Labor requires appellants to file petitions for review that state the “specific issues to be considered” by the Board and the evidence and legal authorities relevant to those issues. 20 C.F.R. § 802.211(a)–(b). If a party flouts this rule by raising a conclusory argument or an argument that does not identify any alleged errors in an administrative law judge’s decision, the Board has long held that the party forfeits any right to relief on the asserted ground. See Fish v. Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 6 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1–107, 1–109 (Ben. Rev. Bd. 1983) (per curiam); see also Hix v. Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 824 F.2d 526, 527–28 (6th Cir. 1987); Cox v. Benefits Rev. Bd.,