Opinion ID: 1880248
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Smoking Paraphernalia

Text: The association also raises a void-for-vagueness challenge to the subsection of the ordinance that provides, [a]ll ashtrays and other smoking paraphernalia shall be removed from any area where smoking is prohibited by Sections 14-97 to 14-104 and shall not be permitted by the owner, operator, manager, or other person having control of the establishment[.] Lexington-Fayette Urban County Code of Ordinances § 14-99(3). We agree with the association that Section 14-99(3) is unconstitutionally vague because the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Council has failed to define or otherwise clarify the meaning of smoking paraphernalia, and, consequently, entities that are subject to the ordinance will have to rely on conjecture, speculation, and guesswork when they attempt to bring themselves into compliance by removing smoking paraphernalia from their premises. In doing so, we observe that the association's brief appears to correctly construe the scope of Section 14-99(3), i.e., [e]ach and every affected business, whether it is a restaurant that sells cigarettes and matches from behind the bar, a liquor store that contains a small cigar and accessories shop, or Kroger and Wal-Mart, must remove any and all items qualifying as `paraphernalia' from within its premises or be subject to prosecution by the Appellees. The urban county government's protestations that the Lexington-Fayette County Health Department has no intention of enforcing the statute in this manner are not relevant to the construction of the provision as enacted. The plain meaning rule tells us that the best indication of the council's intent is the language of Section 14-99(3) itself. See, e.g., Griffin v. City of Bowling Green, Ky., 458 S.W.2d 456, 457 (1970) (Where the words used in a statute are clear and unambiguous and express the legislative intent, there is no room for construction and the statute must be accepted as it is written.). And, Section 14-99(3) expressly and unequivocally requires the removal of ashtrays and other smoking paraphernalia from any building that is not exempted under Section 14-98(1)(a)-(g). The council could easily rectify the discontinuity between what Section 14-99(3) says and how they intend to enforce it by appropriately defining smoking paraphernalia and amending Section 14-99(3) to require the removal of smoking paraphernalia intended for use on the premises from any area where smoking is prohibited by Sections 14-97 to 14-104[.] [A] proper analysis of a statute claimed to be facially unconstitutional for vagueness is whether a person disposed to obey the law could determine with reasonable certainty from the language used whether contemplated conduct would amount to a violation. Commonwealth v. Foley, Ky., 798 S.W.2d 947, 951 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Martin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 96 S.W.3d 38 (2003). See also Gurnee, supra at 856 (1999) (The fact that a statute ... is susceptible to more than one interpretation does not require a holding that the statute is unconstitutional if, as the circuit court determined, those who are affected by the statute can reasonably understand what the statute requires of them.); Sasaki v. Commonwealth, Ky., 485 S.W.2d 897, 901 (1972) (The accepted test in determining the required precision of statutory language imposing criminal liability is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.). The void for vagueness doctrine, therefore, attempts to ensure fairness by requiring an enactment to provide: (1) fair notice to persons and entities subject to it regarding what conduct it prohibits; and (2) sufficient standards to those charged with enforcing it so as to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory application. State Board for Elementary Education v. Howard, Ky., 834 S.W.2d 657, 662 (1992) (In reviewing the standard for vagueness, this Court and the United States Supreme Court have followed two general principles underlying the concept of vagueness. First, a statute is impermissibly vague if it does not place someone to whom it applies on actual notice as to what conduct is prohibited; and second, a statute is impermissibly vague if it is written in a manner that encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.); Hardin, supra at 660; Commonwealth v. Kash, Ky.App., 967 S.W.2d 37, 42 (1997) (The void-for-vagueness doctrine emanates from the due process provisions of the United States and Kentucky Constitutions. To survive vagueness analysis a statute must provide `fair notice' of prohibited conduct and contain `reason-ably clear' [sic] guidelines to thwart `arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.' (citations omitted)); Raines v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 731 S.W.2d 3, 4 (1987). Section 14-99(3), as written, flunks the so-called man on the street test and provides insufficient guidance for both those entities seeking to comply with it and those directed to enforce it. Paraphernalia is defined, generally, as [t]he articles used in a particular activity; equipment, American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed.2000), and [a]ppendages; ornaments; finery; equipments[.] Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1998). Thus, we can infer a working definition of smoking paraphernalia as the articles or equipment used to smoke. The void-for-vagueness problem presented here is that the reasonable parameters of exactly what constitutes such equipment are unstated and potentially boundless. Although Section 14-99(3) identifies ashtrays as one type of smoking paraphernalia, it offers no other guidance as to what else might constitute such paraphernalia. And smoking paraphernalia could reasonably be interpreted to include any or all of the following: cigarettes, cigars, pipes, rolling tobacco, pipe tobacco, rolling papers and cigarette tubes (with or without filters), rolling machines, pipe tampers, pipe cleaners, pipe brushes, pipe covers and screens, cigarette and cigar cases, cigarette holders, humidors, humidifiers and hygrometers, cigar cutters, matches, lighters, butane lighter fluid, flints, cigarette snuffers, air freshener, breath mints, and smoking jackets. Although the Constitution does not require impracticable or impossible standards of specificity[,] Sasaki, supra at 901, or idealistic perfection in preciseness, Colten v. Com., 467 S.W.2d 374, 378 criminal statutes must be sufficiently specific that an individual has fair notice of what conduct is forbidden. Kash, supra at 43. Section 14-99(3) falls short of such specificity. On two (2) separate occasions, the United States Supreme Court has considered void-for-vagueness challenges to criminal enactments relating to drug paraphernalia. And, although the Court rejected the constitutional challenge in each case, the statutes at issue went far beyond Section 14-99(3) in their efforts to define the types of paraphernalia prohibited. In Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982), the Court addressed a challenge to an ordinance that required businesses to obtain a license if they sold any items that are designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs and was accompanied by [a] series of licensing guidelines prepared by the Village Attorney [that] define[d] `Paper,' `Roach Clips,' `Pipes,' and `Paraphernalia,' the sale of which [was] required to be licensed. Id., 455 U.S. at 492, 102 S.Ct. at 1190, 71 L.Ed.2d at 368. The Court found the ordinance to be sufficiently clear, Id., 455 U.S. at 500, 102 S.Ct. at 1194, 71 L.Ed.2d at 372, but remarked in a footnote that [w]e agree with the Court of Appeals that a regulation of `paraphernalia' alone would not provide much warning of the nature of the items regulated. Id., 455 U.S. at 500 n. 17, 102 S.Ct. at 1194 n. 17, 71 L.Ed.2d at 373 n. 17. Later, in Posters `N' Things v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 114 S.Ct. 1747, 128 L.Ed.2d 539 (1994), the Court considered a similar challenge to the Mail Order Drug Paraphernalia Control Act, 21 U.S.C. § 857, which contained a lengthy definition of drug paraphernalia, Id., 511 U.S. at 517 n. 6, 114 S.Ct. at 1750 n. 6, 128 L.Ed.2d at 547 n. 6; Id., 511 U.S. at 519 n. 7, 114 S.Ct. at 1751 n. 7, 128 L.Ed.2d at 548 n. 7, which is similar to those found in Kentucky's Controlled Substances Act. See KRS 218A.500; KRS 218A.510. The Court agreed that § 857(d) establishes objective standards for determining what constitutes drug paraphernalia, Posters `N' Things , supra at 511 U.S. at 518, 114 S.Ct. at 1750, 128 L.Ed.2d at 547, and thus rejected the void-for-vagueness challenge: Petitioners argue that § 857 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to them in this case. [T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Whatever its status as a general matter, we cannot say that § 857 is unconstitutionally vague as applied in this case. First, the list of items in § 857(d) constituting per se drug paraphernalia provides individuals and law enforcement officers with relatively clear guidelines as to prohibited conduct. With respect to the listed items, there can be little doubt that the statute is sufficiently determinate to meet constitutional requirements. Many items involved in this caseincluding bongs, roach clips, and pipes designed for use with illegal drugsare among the items specifically listed in § 857(d). Second, § 857(e) sets forth objective criteria for assessing whether items constitute drug paraphernalia. These factors minimize the possibility of arbitrary enforcement and assist in defining the sphere of prohibited conduct under the statute. Section 857(f)'s exemption for tobacco-related products further limits the scope of the statute and precludes its enforcement against legitimate sellers of lawful products. Finally, the scienter requirement that we have inferred in § 857 assists in avoiding any vagueness problem.... Id. at 511 U.S. at 525-26, 114 S.Ct. at 1754-55, 128 L.Ed.2d at 551-52. Unlike the enactments at issue in Hoffman Estates and Posters `N' Things , Section 14-99(3) gives no guidance beyond the words smoking paraphernalia. Although it is likely a fair assumption that the ordinance is intended to require the covered entities to remove direct smoking paraphernalia such as cigarettes and cigars, but not breath mints and air freshener, [l]ying between those extremes ... is a vast middle ground which is subject to characterization as lawful or unlawful in the discretion, Foley, supra at 950, of the enforcing authorities. Because the entities subject to the ordinance have no means to reasonably predict the scope of smoking paraphernalia that they must remove, Section 14-99(3) is void-for-vagueness. The invalidity of Section 14-99(3), however, does not render the entire ordinance invalid because the code contains a severability provision, § 1-5, and it is clear that the remainder of the smoking ban ordinance is not so essentially and inseparably connected with and dependant upon [Section 14-99(3)] that the [council] would not have enacted the valid provisions without the invalid provisions. Martin, supra at 58. Accordingly, we grant partial CR 65.09 relief, reverse the trial court's summary judgment for the urban county government in part, and remand the case for entry of judgment declaring Section 14-99(3) unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement.