Opinion ID: 1966073
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion for Continuance to Secure Other Counsel

Text: On the eve of trial, Mr. Bido did make, however, an oral motion to secure new counsel. During the course of Mr. Bido's remarks, the trial justice recommended to him that he let his lawyer speak for him, and defendant agreed. Mr. Bido's counsel had been involved with the case at least since August 26, 2005, eight months before trial. Defense counsel informed the trial justice that Mr. Bido wanted a postponement to find a new lawyer. Mr. Bido's counsel represented to the court that as far as my not representing Mr. Bido or Mr. Bido not wanting me to represent him, this is the first I heard of it today. This is the date of trial. I just heard about this in the cell block a couple of hours ago. The attorney also told the trial justice that he had informed defendant about the state's plea offer on several occasions. Defense counsel explained that I learned of Mr. Bido's not wanting me to represent him today when I informed him that a critical witness for the State, Mr. Bido's wife, was, in fact, going to be coming in to testify   . The attorney represented to the court that he was comfortable going forward with the case and with his representation of Mr. Bido. The state objected to defendant's motion for a continuance to secure other counsel. The prosecutor noted that the case had been pending for a number of years. The state explained that it had flown in witnesses from two other states, in addition to arranging Ms. Colon's travel plans, and they all were expected to arrive either that day or the next day. The state represented to the trial justice that it was ready to go forward, and it objected to Mr. Bido's motion for a continuance because it's a date certain and because of the fact that we have all these witnesses who are already here. The trial justice denied defendant's motion for a continuance. The court recognized that its function was to balance the interests of the defendant and the state. The trial justice first reviewed the interests of the state. The court noted that the state had expended considerable funds to get these witnesses here in Rhode Island for trial, and that the witnesses might not be able to return at a later date. The trial justice explained that those considerations, in addition to the fact that fifteen years had passed since the crime occurred, emphasized the need for finality. The trial justice also reviewed Mr. Bido's interests. The court found that there was no indication that another attorney had been retained and was ready to step in and start the trial. The trial justice said that there was just some speculation about talking about wanting to get someone else, and he explained that he believed that defense counsel was fully capable of representing defendant effectively. The court determined that the need for finality outweighed defendant's desire to seek other counsel, and he denied the request for a continuance. Before this Court, Mr. Bido relies upon the provisions in the state and federal constitutions that guarantee the assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. Amend. VI; R.I. Const. art. 1, sec. 10. Mr. Bido acknowledges that the right to secure counsel of one's choice is not an unqualified one, but argues that in this case his interest is greater than the public's right to the efficient and effective administration of justice. Mr. Bido points out that the communication between himself and his attorney broke down on the eve of trial and that nothing indicates he was embarking on a deliberate tactic to delay the proceedings. To the contrary, defendant reasons that he was not in the habit of dismissing his attorneys; and he points out that he presented the court with specific reasons why he wanted alternate counsel, namely his dissatisfaction with the lack of communication about plea offers and his speedy-trial concerns. It is well settled that the decision whether to grant a defendant's request for a continuance to secure alternative counsel lies within the sound discretion of the trial justice. State v. Snell, 892 A.2d 108, 120 (R.I.2006); State v. Bleau, 668 A.2d 642, 645 (R.I. 1995). In exercising that discretion, the trial justice must weigh the interest of the defendant in securing counsel of his choice against the interest of the public in an efficient and effective judicial system.' Snell, 892 A.2d at 120 (quoting State v. Ashness, 461 A.2d 659, 663-64 (R.I.1983)). Whether the trial justice's denial was so arbitrary as to constitute a violation of due process `depends upon the particular circumstances of each case and the reason asserted for the request.' Id. (quoting Ashness, 461 A.2d at 664). We further elaborated as follows in Snell: Some of the factors to be weighed in the balance include the promptness of the continuance motion and the length of time requested; the age and intricacy of the case; the inconvenience to the parties, witnesses, jurors, counsel, and the court; whether the request appears to be legitimate or merely contrived foot dragging; whether the defendant contributed to the circumstances giving rise to the request; whether the defendant in fact has other competent and prepared trial counsel ready to pinch-hit; whether there are multiple codefendants, making calendar control more difficult than usual; and any other relevant factor made manifest by the record. Id. (quoting State. v. Moran, 699 A.2d 20, 26 (R.I.1997)). We are mindful that [j]udges must be vigilant that requests for appointment of a new attorney on the eve of trial should not become a vehicle for delay. Snell, 892 A.2d at 120 (quoting State v. Monteiro, 108 RI. 569, 576, 277 A.2d 739, 743 (1971)). A' defendant's right to choose his own counsel cannot be manipulated to delay proceedings or hamper the prosecution. Snell, 892 A.2d at 120 (quoting United States v. Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d 813, 816 (1st Cir.1987)). We have stated that to work a delay by a last minute discharge of counsel, there must exist exceptional circumstances   . Id. (quoting Monteiro, 108 R.I. at 575, 277 A.2d at 742). The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit similarly has held that [w]hen a defendant attempts to substitute counsel at the eleventh hour or in mid-trial, he must show good cause such as a conflict of interest, a breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable dispute with his attorney. Id. (quoting Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d at 816). We are satisfied that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in denying Mr. Bido's motion for a continuance to secure other counsel. Applying the above-listed factors from Snell, we are persuaded that the trial justice did not act arbitrarily in this particular case. Mr. Bido had no private counsel prepared to proceed on his behalf when he made the motion for a continuance. See Snell, 892 A.2d at 119; State v. Austin, 642 A.2d 673, 676 (R.I. 1994), Mr. Bido had been represented by the public defender for at least eight months, but he waited until the very last minute before trial to make the motion. See State v. Moran, 699 A.2d 20, 26 (R.I. 1997); State v. Kennedy, 586 A.2d 1089, 1091 (R.I.1991). Mr. Bido had ample time after the public defender was appointed to secure other counsel and make the court aware of his dissatisfaction. See Ashness, 461 A.2d at 664. The case had been reached for trial, and the state had arranged for transportation for several outof-state witnesses who were prepared to testify. See id.; see also State v. Sampson, 884 A.2d 399, 404 (R.I.2005); 668 A.2d at 646. Further, his requested delay appeared to be a stratagem to avoid the day of reckoning rather than for legitimate reasons. See Moran, 699 A.2d at 26. His defense lawyer represented to the court that he told Mr. Bido about the state's plea offer on several occasions and that Mr. Bide expressed dissatisfaction with his representation only after he heard that Ms. Colon would be arriving shortly to testify against him. These circumstances, taken together, demonstrate that the interest of the public in an efficient and effective judicial system outweighed Mr. Bido's purported interest in securing counsel of his choice. See Snell, 892 A.2d at 120-21; Ashness, 461 A.2d at 663-64. No exceptional circumstances were present to constitute good cause for Mr. Bido to discharge his lawyer. In sum, the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in denying defendant's attempt to secure new counsel.