Opinion ID: 6215960
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Finality in Deferred Restitution Cases

Text: We turn now to the next question: if restitution is part of the judgment of conviction, has Anthony’s judgment of conviction become final? As we explain below, a judgment of conviction becomes final for § 2255 limitations purposes when there is no further avenue for direct appeal of any portion of the sentence, including restitution. Thus, Anthony’s judgment of conviction will not become final until the pending restitution proceedings conclude.
“Finality is variously defined; like many legal terms, its precise meaning depends on context.” Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527 (2003). In the context of § 2255(f)(1), we have made it clear that “§ 2255’s use of ‘final’ plainly means ‘a decision from which no appeal or writ of error can be taken.’” United States v. Burch, 202 F.3d 1274, 1277 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 629 (6th ed. 1990)). Thus, a judgment becomes final when the defendant’s time to file a direct appeal expires or when there is no further avenue for direct appeal (i.e., the Supreme Court affirms the defendant’s conviction and sentence or denies the defendant’s petition for a writ of certiorari). See Clay, 537 U.S. at 527 (under § 2255(f)(1), “[f]inality attaches when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires”); United States v. Prows, 448 F.3d 1223, 1227–28 (10th Cir. 2006). -15- Appellate Case: 20-6134 Document: 010110642395 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 16 As we explained above, it is settled law that the judgment of conviction is not final until the sentence is final. See Berman, 302 U.S. at 212 (“Final judgment in a criminal case means sentence. The sentence is the judgment.”); Burton, 549 U.S. at 156–57 (explaining the defendant’s one-year limitations period under AEDPA “did not begin until both his conviction and sentence became final”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Corey v. United States, 375 U.S. 169, 176 (1963). If any part of the sentence—including restitution—has not been finalized, then the judgment of conviction is not final. This means that a remand for resentencing delays finality until the defendant is resentenced and direct review of the new sentence is complete. 9 United States v. Carbajal-Moreno, 332 F. App’x 472, 474–75 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (“[A] case on remand for resentencing [is] not final for purposes of habeas proceedings . . . until the resentencing and the direct appeal thereof [are] complete.”) (citing Burton, 549 U.S. at 156). Applying these principles to the facts at hand, we conclude that Anthony’s § 2255 motion was timely. The district court entered an initial judgment containing Anthony’s convictions and custodial sentence on October 26, 2017. But that judgment was not final for § 2255 purposes because the amount of 9 This rule applies unless “the resentencing is purely ministerial, such that the district court is limited on remand.” Najera v. Murphy, 462 F. App’x 827, 829 (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublished). A ministerial remand is one that requires a “routine, nondiscretionary act by the district court that could not have been appealed on any valid ground.” Carbajal-Moreno, 332 F. App’x at 476 (citing Burrell v. United States, 467 F.3d 160, 161, 165–66 (2d Cir. 2006)). -16- Appellate Case: 20-6134 Document: 010110642395 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 17 restitution had yet to be determined. When the district court entered the restitution amount on March 5, 2018, Anthony appealed the restitution portion of his sentence. Anthony’s appeal further delayed the finality of the judgment of conviction for § 2255 limitations purposes. See Burton, 549 U.S. at 156–57. After we vacated the district court’s first restitution order, the district court entered a second amended judgment with a new restitution amount, which the government appealed. Like Anthony’s appeal of the first amended judgment, the government’s appeal postponed the finality of Anthony’s judgment of conviction. The district court concluded the deferred restitution order and remand for resentencing did not “extend” Anthony’s limitations period. R., Vol. 6 at 58. The government similarly characterizes the issue in this case as whether a deferred restitution order “restarts” the limitations period. Aple. Br. at 10. The issue before us is not whether Anthony’s § 2255 period of limitations was extended or restarted—rather, the issue is whether Anthony’s one-year period under § 2255 ever started in the first place. Because restitution proceedings are still pending, we conclude Anthony’s § 2255 limitations period has yet to begin. 10 10 Our holding is consistent with the Second Circuit’s decision in Gonzalez v. United States, 792 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2015). In that case, the Second Circuit was confronted with facts similar to the facts before us. The district court entered an initial judgment with a term of imprisonment but noted that restitution would be determined later. Id. at 233. The district court dismissed the defendant’s § 2255 motion as untimely because he filed it more than a year after the initial judgment, even though the motion was filed within one year of the entry of an amended judgment following a remand for the recalculation of the restitution amount. Id. at 234. The Second Circuit reversed and held that the AEDPA limitations period “begins to run only when the revised restitution order becomes final.” Id. at 233. -17- Appellate Case: 20-6134 Document: 010110642395 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 18 The government’s argument that Anthony’s judgment of conviction has already become final is twofold. The government argues (1) there were two final judgments in Anthony’s case, and (2) because the second judgment containing only the restitution order is not subject to collateral attack, the first judgment must be the judgment of conviction for § 2255 purposes. For support, the government relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Manrique, in which the Court held that there are two final appealable judgments in deferred restitution cases. 137 S. Ct. at 1272–73. The government also relies on our prior cases holding that a restitution order is not subject to collateral attack under the habeas statutes. We begin with the government’s argument that there were two final judgments in this case based on Manrique. In Manrique, like here, the district court entered an initial judgment without determining the amount of restitution. Id. at 1270. The defendant timely appealed the initial judgment and the court later entered an amended judgment with the restitution amount. Id. Although the defendant never appealed the amended judgment, the defendant attempted to challenge the restitution amount through his earlier appeal of the initial judgment. Id. at 1270–71. The defendant claimed that his appeal of the initial judgment “springs forward” to appeal the amended judgment imposing restitution. Id. at 1272. The Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that the defendant forfeited his right to challenge the restitution order because he failed to file a notice of appeal from that order. Id. -18- Appellate Case: 20-6134 Document: 010110642395 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 19 Relevant here, the Court also rejected the defendant’s argument that in a deferred restitution case, there is only one “judgment” as that term is used in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i) (notice of appeal must be filed within 14 days after “the entry of either the judgment or the order being appealed.”). The defendant argued that the initial judgment and amended judgment imposing a restitution amount had merged to become a single judgment for appellate review purposes. Manrique, 137 S. Ct. at 1272. The Court disagreed, explaining that “deferred restitution cases involved two appealable judgments, not one.” Id. at 1272–73 (citing Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605, 618 (2010)). According to the Court, both the initial judgment and the subsequent order of restitution are each “immediately appealable final judgments.” Id. at 1272. The government relies on Manrique to argue that there were two final judgments in Anthony’s case—the first being the conviction and initial sentence and the second being the restitution order. While it is true that there are two final judgments in deferred restitution cases for direct appeal purposes, the government’s argument that there are two final judgments for AEDPA purposes is misplaced. Under § 2255(f)(1), there is only one final judgment of conviction. This difference between the direct appeal context and AEDPA context can be seen in the text of the applicable statutes. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 provides in relevant part that a criminal defendant must file his notice of appeal within 14 days after “the entry of either the judgment or the -19- Appellate Case: 20-6134 Document: 010110642395 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 20 order being appealed.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i). By its plain language, the rule contemplates that there may be more than one judgment or order. On the other hand, § 2255 speaks of a single judgment, the judgment of conviction: “The limitation period shall run from . . . [t]he date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1) (emphasis added). So while there can be multiple judgments in a deferred restitution case for direct appeal purposes, only one final judgment exists for § 2255(f)(1) purposes. For this reason, it does not matter that restitution is not subject to collateral attack. See Erlandson v. Northglenn Mun. Ct., 528 F.3d 785, 788 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding the payment of restitution on its own is not a “significant restraint on liberty” contemplated in the custody requirement of the federal habeas statutes). Nor does it matter that Anthony never appealed his conviction or initial sentence within the 14-day window. Because there is only one judgment of conviction for § 2255 purposes and restitution is part of the judgment of conviction, Anthony’s § 2255 limitations period will only begin once restitution proceedings conclude. The government’s application of Manrique to the § 2255 context not only conflicts with the language of the statute, but it is also inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147 (2007). In Burton, the defendant challenged the dismissal of his § 2244 petition as an unauthorized successive petition. Id. at 152. The defendant filed his first habeas petition after he was convicted but before the state review of his sentencing claims was -20- Appellate Case: 20-6134 Document: 010110642395 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 21 complete. Id. at 151. Later, the defendant filed a second habeas petition challenging his new sentence imposed after resentencing. Id. at 151–52. The lower court dismissed the second petition as an unauthorized successive petition. Id. at 152. On appeal, the defendant argued that he had to file his first petition before the state review of his sentencing claims was complete because if he did not, he risked losing the opportunity to collaterally attack his conviction due to AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. Id. at 156. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, explaining that the defendant’s AEDPA limitations period “did not begin until both his conviction and sentence ‘became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.’” Id. at 156– 57 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)). Because we conclude that restitution is part of the sentence and direct review of the restitution amount is pending, we hold that Anthony’s AEDPA limitations period has not commenced. 11 Thus, the district court erred by 11 We recognize that our ruling could lead to delays in federal habeas review. But even though AEDPA “seeks to eliminate delays in the federal habeas review process . . . [i]t did not seek to end every possible delay at all costs.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 648, 649 (2010). In any event, Anthony did not cause the delay in this case; the parties agreed to continue the restitution hearing because “Anthony ha[d] only recently been sentenced and Defendant Baker [had] yet to enter his guilty plea.” Supp. R., Vol. 2 at 27–28. Moreover, Congress has authorized district courts to delay the determination of restitution for up to 90 days after sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5); see also Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605, 607–08 (2010) (a court may delay ordering restitution for more (continued . . .) -21- Appellate Case: 20-6134 Document: 010110642395 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 22 dismissing Anthony’s § 2255 motion as untimely. 12
We turn now to the final unresolved issue in this case: whether the district court erred in concluding that Anthony’s time to appeal his conviction and initial sentence expired 14 days after the entry of the initial judgment. While the Supreme Court decided in Manrique that a direct appeal of an initial judgment does not include an appeal of a subsequent restitution order, the Court left open the converse question of whether a direct appeal of a subsequent restitution order can include an appeal of the initial judgment. The Supreme Court’s decision in Corey sheds some light on the question. There, the trial court imposed a preliminary sentence, including custody, but deferred imposing a final sentence until after the Bureau of Prisons completed a study of the defendant pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4208(b). Corey, 375 U.S. at 170. After the Bureau completed the study, the district court reconsidered its initial sentence and imposed a final sentence of probation rather than imprisonment. Id. The defendant appealed the new sentence, but the appeal was dismissed as than 90 days after sentencing so long as the court informs the defendant that restitution will be imposed). 12 The fact that Anthony’s one-year limitations periods has not started does not mean that Anthony needs to wait until restitution proceedings conclude to challenge his conviction and custodial sentence under § 2255. So long as there is no potential conflict between the collateral proceedings and the direct appeal— and there is no conflict in Anthony’s case—a district court may entertain a § 2255 motion while a direct appeal is pending. See Prows, 448 F.3d at 1228. -22- Appellate Case: 20-6134 Document: 010110642395 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 23 untimely on the ground that the time to appeal had expired ten days after entry of the initial sentence. Id. at 170–71. The Supreme Court reversed and held that the defendant’s appeal was timely. Id. at 175. The Court explained that while the defendant could have filed his appeal after the initial sentence, he was not required to do so: “While an initial commitment under § 4208(b) is . . . freighted with sufficiently substantial indicia of finality to support an appeal, the fact remains that the proceedings in the trial court are not actually terminated until after the period of diagnostic study, review of the same by the district judge, and final sentence.” Id. “Long- accepted and conventional principles of federal appellate procedure require recognition of the defendant’s right to await the imposition of final sentence before seeking review of the conviction.” Id. at 176. Consistent with Corey, other circuits have held that a defendant in a deferred restitution case may wait until restitution is ordered before filing an appeal. See United States v. Muzio, 757 F.3d 1243, 1250 (11th Cir. 2014) (“The Supreme Court has . . . recognized that if the defendant chooses to do so, he may avoid bifurcation of his appeal by waiting until restitution has been resolved to appeal.”) (citing Corey, 375 U.S. at 175); United States v. Shehadeh, 962 F.3d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[W]here a district court defers its restitution order, a defendant wishing to appeal his conviction and sentence of imprisonment may enter a notice of appeal either within fourteen days following the district court’s -23- Appellate Case: 20-6134 Document: 010110642395 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 24 entry of the custodial sentence, or within fourteen days of the entry of the amended judgment.”). Our own precedent supports this conclusion. In United States v. Paup, 933 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2019), we held that “a defendant sentenced to imprisonment need not wait until restitution is finally resolved . . . before being allowed to challenge her conviction and sentence on appeal.” Id. at 1230 (emphasis added). This language implies that a defendant may wait to appeal his conviction and initial sentence until after restitution is ordered. This makes sense. A defendant may want to challenge a custodial sentence as soon as possible, even if collateral matters are yet to be resolved. 13 We thus conclude that in a deferred restitution case a defendant may file his appeal of his conviction and sentence within 14 days of either (1) the entry of the initial judgment or (2) the entry of the amended judgment containing the restitution amount. 14 See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i); Paup, 933 F.3d at 1230. 13 Our conclusion promotes judicial economy. See Shehadeh, 962 F.3d at 1100 n.2 (“The government’s proposed rule would require a defendant to appeal twice: first, immediately after the custodial sentence is imposed, and then again after the amount of restitution is determined. This rule would be inefficient, and it is required neither by Manrique nor by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.”). 14 To be clear, a remand for resentencing does not reopen the door for a defendant to appeal aspects of his conviction or sentence not previously appealed. See United States v. Mendes, 912 F.2d 434, 437 (10th Cir. 1990) (“The grant of remand on appeal does not reopen the order appealed from[.]”). Nor does resentencing following a probation violation resurrect time-barred challenges to a conviction or sentence. See Prendergast v. Clements, 699 F.3d 1182, 1187 (10th Cir. 2012). -24- Appellate Case: 20-6134 Document: 010110642395 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 25 We note in closing that such a rule reinforces our conclusion that Anthony’s judgment of conviction has yet to become final. Because a defendant can wait until after the entry of a restitution order to appeal his initial sentence, it would be incongruent to hold that the judgment of conviction becomes final prior the determination of restitution. If a defendant’s judgment of conviction became final for AEDPA purposes after the initial judgment but the defendant did not have to appeal until after restitution is ordered, there is a possibility that the defendant’s one-year period of limitations would run before the defendant ever had a chance to directly appeal his conviction and initial sentence (e.g., if the district court deferred imposing restitution until a year or more after the initial sentence was entered). 15 This would be contrary to § 2255 and the overall AEDPA scheme, which require the completion of the direct review before collateral attack. See Burton, 549 U.S. at 156–57 (AEDPA limitations period “did not begin until both his conviction and sentence ‘became final by the 15 The district court cited the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Gilbert, 807 F.3d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 2015), as support for the proposition that restitution proceedings do not extend the § 2255 limitations period. See R., Vol. 6 at 58. In Gilbert, the Ninth Circuit held that “when a judgment imposes a sentence but leaves the amount of restitution to be determined, the one-year statute of limitations to file a § 2255 motion does not restart when the specific amount of restitution is later entered.” Id. at 1201. We disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion and side with the Second Circuit. See Gonzalez, 792 F.3d at 233–34. If a defendant can wait until after restitution is ordered to file his direct appeal, then it does not make sense that a defendant’s § 2255 clock would start before a final restitution amount is determined, as Gilbert holds. The Ninth Circuit’s more recent decision in Shehadeh highlights this tension. It holds that a defendant can wait until after the restitution order is entered to appeal his conviction and sentence. See Shehadeh, 962 F.3d at 1099. -25- Appellate Case: 20-6134 Document: 010110642395 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 26 conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.’”) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)). In sum, Anthony did not need to appeal his conviction and sentence within 14 days of the district court entering the initial judgment. Anthony could have challenged the initial judgment when he appealed the first restitution order.