Opinion ID: 2809833
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: brown’s claims following remand

Text: Even with the new facts in the record following the revelations of alleged misconduct by certain OCME employees, Brown‟s conviction should not be reversed. Accordingly, we conclude that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 50 App. to Answering Br. at 176 (Tr. of Arguments, Sept. 10, 2013). 51 See 10 Del. C. § 4331 (defining the “chain of custody” as the seizing officer, packaging officer, and forensic chemist); see also Milligan v. State, 2015 WL 3622880, at  (Del. June 10, 2015) (quoting Demby v. State, 695 A.2d 1127, 1131 (Del. 1997)) (“We have never interpreted [Delaware‟s chain of custody law] as requiring the State to produce evidence as to every link in the chain of custody. Rather, the State must simply demonstrate an orderly process from which the trier of fact can conclude that it is improbable that the original item has been tampered with or exchanged.”). 52 Word v. State, 2001 WL 762854,  (Del. June 19, 2001) (citing Baker v. State, 1988 WL 137190 (Nov. 21, 1988)). 18 Brown‟s motion for a new trial on remand.53 As the Superior Court correctly noted, a new trial is warranted if: “(1) The new evidence is of such a nature that it would have probably changed the result if presented to the jury; (2) The evidence was newly discovered; and (3) The evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching.”54 In Brown‟s case, the Superior Court determined that the evidence of alleged misconduct by OCME employees was newly discovered and not merely cumulative or impeaching, which the State does not dispute. But the Superior Court found that “in the overall analysis, the Defendant‟s new trial motion must be denied because the evidence was not of a nature that it would have probably changed the result.”55 In his supplemental briefing, Brown contends that the Superior Court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial. Brown argues that without the drug evidence, he “arguably” would have been acquitted.56 He also points out that all charges were dropped against Jermaine Dollard, who was also convicted for his role in the Brooks‟ drug syndicate, after re-testing revealed that the substance seized from him was not in fact cocaine.57 53 Hicks v. State, 913 A.2d 1189, 1193 (Del. 2006) (“This Court reviews the denial of a motion for new trial for abuse of discretion.”). 54 State v. Brown, ID #1205025968A, at 2-3 (Del. Super. Dec. 18, 2014) (letter order) (quoting Hicks, 913 A.2d at 1194). 55 Id. at 3. 56 Supp. Opening Br. at 9. 57 Id. (citing State v. Dollard, No. 1206010837 (Del. Super.)). 19 But Brown‟s case is distinguishable from State v. Dollard, where the defendant maintained throughout trial and on appeal that the substance seized from him was not cocaine.58 When the State retested that substance following the revelations of OCME misconduct, it turned out not to be cocaine or any other drug. The State then dropped all charges against him.59 By contrast, Brown does not contest that the substance seized from him was cocaine; indeed, he requested that a letter he wrote to his attorney be placed on this Court‟s docket, in which he states, “I never contested that it was not cocaine. I am contesting the fact that drugs has come up missing.”60 In that letter, Brown asserts that he was arrested with over 29 grams of cocaine, more than any of the amounts suggested by Sergeant Skinner, Sergeant Lloyd, Master Corporal Lavere, OCME, or NMS. Even if that was true, all of the tests, and Brown‟s own statements, demonstrate that Brown had more than 20 grams of cocaine when he was arrested. Thus, by any count, Brown committed a Tier 4 offense, the level for which Brown was charged and convicted.61 The slight discrepancy among the measurements reported by the police (21.2 grams), OCME (23.23 grams), and NMS (22.05 grams) would not have changed the result, and there was thus no prejudice to Brown. 58 See App. to Supp. Opening Br. at 22 (Tr. of Oral Arg‟t, State v. Dollard, No. 1206010837 (Del. Super. Dec. 16, 2014)). 59 See Supp. Opening Br., Ex. E (order vacating Dollard‟s conviction, Jan. 14, 2015). 60 Brown v. State, No. 603, 2013, Filing ID 56928630 (letter dated March 12, 2015). 61 See 16 Del. C. §4751C(2)(a) (defining 20 grams or more of cocaine or of any mixture containing cocaine as a Tier 4 Controlled Substances Quantity). 20 The alleged lack of professionalism in evidence-handling by employees of OCME, which has been the subject of investigations by the Delaware State Police and Delaware Department of Justice, among others, is deeply troubling, and we in no way want to suggest that this Court does not take the problem seriously. But as we observed in State v. Ira Brown, “there is no evidence that the OCME staff „planted‟ evidence to wrongly obtain convictions. Rather, the employees who stole the evidence did so because it in fact consisted of illegal narcotics that they could resell or take for personal use.”62 The revelation that OCME employees may have stolen drugs for their own use or were sloppy in handling evidence in certain cases should not result in the issuance of automatic get-out-of-jail-free cards to defendants like Anzara Brown. Instead, we must focus on the specific facts of each case, in light of the appropriate standard of review, to determine if a defendant was unjustly convicted. No unjust conviction resulted here, because the Superior Court correctly held that there was no rational probability that Brown was convicted on false premises. The Superior Court properly found that the other evidence of Brown‟s guilt—including his own admission that he possessed and intended to sell over 20 grams of cocaine—was overwhelming. Thus, the Superior Court was within its discretion to deny Brown‟s motion for a new trial, and we affirm the Superior Court‟s judgment. 62 Brown v. State, 108 A.3d 1201, 1205 (Del. 2015). 21