Opinion ID: 1925723
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Analysis of law of eminent domain prior to 1929

Text: The statute's significance can best be appreciated if we first examine the state of our law on the subject of eminent domain as it existed at the time of the legislative action. In 1929 it had been well settled for over a century that the state, as an attribute of sovereignty, through the legislature, may take private property for public purposes upon the legislature's determination that a necessity exists. [2] Spring v. Russell, 7 Me. 273 (1831); Cottrill v. Myrick, 12 Me. 222 (1835). It was clearly established in Maine that when the legislature undertakes to take particular land for public purposes the determination of necessity is a political question for the legislature alone. [3] Spring v. Russell, supra; Kennebec Water Dist. v. City of Waterville, 96 Me. 234, 52 A. 774 (1902). It was equally clear that when the legislature has made the initial general determination that the public exigencies require that some property be taken for a certain defined public purpose, the administrative agency to which the legislature has delegated the authority may make the specific determination that the public exigencies require the taking of particular property. The agency's determination of exigency is also a political decision and not subject to judicial review. In re Conant, 83 Me. 42, 21 A. 172 (1890). See also Rubin v. W. H. Hinman, Inc., Me., 253 A.2d 708 (1969); Smith v. Speers, Me., 253 A. 2d 701 (1969); 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 3.21 [3] (rev. 3d ed. 1973). [4] The legislature, after such an initial finding of necessity, may similarly delegate a nonreviewable determination of necessity to a quasi-municipal corporation (Kennebec Water Dist. v. City of Waterville, supra; Bowden v. York Shore Water Co., 114 Me. 150, 95 A. 779 (1915)) or even to a private corporation which is to take land for a public use. The private corporation then stands in the same position as the legislature. There is nothing better settled than the power of the legislature to exercise the right of eminent domain, for purposes of public utility. This may be done through the agency of private corporations, although for private profit when the public is thereby to be benefitted. . . . The use being public, the determination of the legislature that the necessity which requires private property to be taken, exists, is conclusive. Riche v. Bar Harbor Water Co., 75 Me. 91, 96 (1883). The delegation of an unrestricted agency to take by eminent domain includes the determination of the suitability of the property for the particular public use and the extent to which the property must be taken to satisfy the exigency. Hayford v. City of Bangor, 102 Me. 340, 66 A. 731 (1907). Thus, it will be seen that courts have no power to re-examine the question of necessity or exigency, or the extent to which land may be taken for a public use, unless that power is expressly reserved to them. (Emphasis added.) 102 Me. at 345, 66 A. at 733. The Hayford Court added a generally accepted qualification of this last statement which recognizes the court's power to act if the determination of necessity is made in bad faith or through an abuse of power. See also Bowden v. York Shore Water Co., supra. Only three years before the legislature passed the statute in question, the Court had said, in Smith v. Western Maine Power Co., 125 Me. 238, 239, 132 A. 740, 741 (1926): The Legislature has properly delegated [in 1907] to the corporation the power to determine whether `public exigencies' require the taking of a new route for its transmission line. No abuse of power appearing, the court will not and cannot for this reason interfere. Thus, at the time the legislature enacted the statute under consideration it was well settled that it could delegate a determination of what particular land should be taken for public purposes and that this determination was subject to judicial review only when exercised in bad faith or as an abuse of power. But, as the language of Hayford reminds us, the legislature may place limits upon the discretion it gives its agencies and may make their determinations subject to a more extensive review. At the time of the legislature's action, the powers to take by eminent domain which it had chosen to delegate to the various public service corporations were not identical. The charters of many private water companies (Moseley v. York Shore Water Co., 94 Me. 83, 46 A. 809 (1900)), private electric companies (Smith v. Western Maine Power Co., supra) and railroad corporations (Hall v. Pickering, 40 Me. 548, 555 (1855)) had given them the power to take by eminent domain for public purposes, unlimited except by the common law principle that they may not act in bad faith or in an abuse of power (or by subsequent general law). The general law had also conferred upon railroad corporations (R.S.1916, ch. 56, §§ 24, 26), street railway corporations (R.S. 1916, ch. 58, §§ 15, 17) and telephone and telegraph companies (R.S.1916, ch. 60, § 17) the power of eminent domain (some of them with limitations to be discussed later) but corporations organized under the general law for the purpose of manufacturing and selling electricity, although permitted to construct and maintain their lines along the public streets and highways, were not empowered to take by eminent domain (R. S.1916, ch. 60, §§ 10, 13). We must remember, however, that many private electric companies had acquired their corporate existence through charters which had given them eminent domain powers.