Opinion ID: 2393195
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Standing as a Resident of Yemassee

Text: The annexation ordinance at issue recites that annexation was achieved pursuant to section 5-3-150(3), the 100% petition method. The Private Party Appellants argue that, because the State is the presumptive owner of the annexed marshlands and the State did not sign the petition, the annexation was not proper under the 100% petition method. On this premise, Appellants contend the annexation was actually achieved by 75% petition. If the annexation was by 75% petition, Appellant Yisrael had standing to bring his challenge. [3] § 5-3-150(1)(5) ([T]he municipality or any resident of it ... may institute and maintain a suit in the court of common pleas, and in that suit the person may challenge and have adjudicated any issue raised in connection with the proposed or completed annexation.). The circuit court found the State's signature was not required for the 100% petition annexation, and therefore, Mr. Yisrael did not have standing under the 75% petition method. While we disagree with the circuit court's interpretation of the statute, we can only reach that question if presented by a party with standing. See, e.g., ATC South, Inc. v. Charleston County, 380 S.C. 191, 194-95, 669 S.E.2d 337, 339 (2008) (We are obligated before reaching the merits of the rezoning question to determine whether ATC has standing to press its complaint.); Joytime Distribs. and Amusement Co. v. State, 338 S.C. 634, 639, 528 S.E.2d 647, 649 (1999) (Standing to sue is a fundamental requirement in instituting an action.). We reject the suggestion that the perceived merits of the underlying claim may influence the standing determination. This basic principle defeats the Private Party Appellants' claim. The ordinance recites that the annexation was achieved using the 100% petition method. If we went behind that assertion without a proper plaintiff, we would be inviting a sliding scale for standing: the more meritorious a claim appears, the more relaxed the standing requirement would be. We rejected such reasoning when we overruled Quinn v. City of Columbia. [4] See St. Andrews Public Service District, 349 S.C. at 605, 564 S.E.2d at 648 (overruling the Quinn rule that a stranger to an annexation may challenge the annexation if the ordinance is absolutely void). Adhering to our precedent, we must determine standing without regard to the merits of the underlying claim. Accordingly, we cannot use the alleged flaws in the 100% petition to find standing pursuant to the 75% petition method.