Opinion ID: 2975318
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Asylum-Only Proceedings

Text: Petitioners argue that they should not have been subjected to asylum-only proceedings under the VWPP because they “did not knowingly and intelligently” waive their rights to full removal proceedings and did not agree to the terms of the VWPP prior to entering the United States. Petitioners maintain that they thought they were coming to the United States on a visitor visa and that because the VWPP program was only forty-six days old at the time, “it is doubtful [Mr. Vang] was told anything about it.” (Pet. Br. 18-19.) Respondent correctly points out that the “knowingly and intelligently” test applies to only -6- the waiver of a constitutional right and that Petitioners’ claims regarding waiver in this case are not constitutional claims because at the time the Vangs signed the waivers, they were aliens residing outside of the United States. The Supreme Court has noted that “an alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative.” Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982); see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (“[A]liens receive constitutional protections [only] when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with the country.”). Because the Vangs were not waiving rights of constitutional significance when they signed the visa waiver forms prior to entering the United States, the knowing and intelligent waiver test does not apply. Moreover, the Vangs’ contention that they were not informed about the VWPP and “were not told by anyone that they would be waiving their rights to a removal proceeding” are contradicted by the record evidence. (Pet. Br. 19.) The Vangs signed waiver forms, which stated that for admission to the United States under the VWPP “you must . . . [w]aive all rights of review or appeal of admissibility determination made by an immigration officer, and all rights to contest action in deportation, except for asylum.” (J.A. 248-57.) In Wigglesworth v. INS, 319 F.3d 951 (7th Cir. 2003), the petitioner also claimed that her waiver pursuant to the VWPP was not knowingly made. Id. at 959. The Seventh Circuit disagreed, holding that the petitioner’s waiver was valid. The court reasoned in part that “the waiver form was exceptionally clear that, in signing the form, [petitioner] was waiving her rights to a hearing before an IJ, an administrative appeal to the BIA and judicial review of the administrative decision.” Id. Because the Vangs signed the waivers, we find, like the -7- court in Wigglesworth, that Petitioners’ waiver of their rights to contest removal proceedings was valid. Thus, Petitioners were properly placed in asylum-only proceedings.