Opinion ID: 619314
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial-of-Access-to-Courts Claim

Text: It is well established that prisoners have a constitutional right to access the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). “The right of access to the courts requires that prisoners defending against criminal charges or convictions (either directly or collaterally) or challenging the conditions of their confinement . . . not be impeded from presenting those defenses and claims for formal adjudication by a court.” Bourdon v. Loughren, 386 F.3d 88, 96 (2d Cir. 2004). We need not decide whether Amaker is likely to succeed on his claim that the implementation of Directive 4913 interfered with his right to access the courts because he has failed to establish standing for this claim. To establish standing for a claim for the denial of access to the courts, an inmate must show that he has suffered an “actual injury” traceable to the challenged conduct of prison officials—that is, that a “nonfrivolous” legal challenge to his judgment of conviction or conditions of confinement “had been frustrated or was being impeded” due to the actions of prison officials. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351–53, 355 (1996). Amaker failed to show he suffered an “actual injury” as a result of the personal property limitation placed on him by DOCS’s policy. Amaker conclusorily asserts that he “has already suffered prejudice because an appeal was dismissed for not having the necessary low[er] court’s proceedings on [a] prior motion to dismiss[] and summary judgment,” and that legal papers were unavailable to him in “an appeal after a trial.” Although he does not specify what appeal was dismissed, he is presumably referring to his appeal in Amaker v. Goord, 09-2993-pr, from a judgment in an unrelated action he had brought in the Northern District of New York, an appeal that was dismissed by this Court in February 2011 after Amaker failed to file his appellate brief. materials from his five draft bags of legal materials.” 6 In asserting that he was prejudiced, Amaker makes no attempt to show that his appeal docketed under 09-2993-pr, or any other pending litigation, had any merit. Cf. Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1317 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (explaining that, in asserting a denial-of-access-to-courts claim, a plaintiff cannot rely on “conclusory allegations”). Nor did he make such a showing before the District Court. Accordingly, notwithstanding Amaker’s challenges to the implementation of Directive 4913, the Magistrate Judge did not err or “abuse his discretion,” see Sims v. Blot, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining “abuse of discretion”), in declining to grant a preliminary injunction insofar as Amaker’s motion was predicated on a denial-of-access-to-courts claim, as he failed to establish standing to assert such a claim.