Opinion ID: 314281
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellant's Common Law Defense

Text: 25 Let us see how far the logical basis of appellant's argument would inexorably take us. Bear in mind that this logical extension of the argument appellant makes here was foreseen by Justice Black and others of the Supreme Court in Robinson and Powell, as discussed infra, which may account for the limits written into those decisions, limits which appellant would have this court take upon itself to expand.
26 According to appellant this case has one central issue: 27 Is the proffered evidence of Appellant's long and intensive dependence on (addiction to) injected heroin, resulting in substantial impairment of his behavior controls and a loss of self-control over the use of heroin, relevant to his criminal responsibility for unlawful possession. . . . 7 28 In other words, is appellant's addiction a defense to the crimes, involving only possession, with which he is charged? Arguing that he has lost the power of self-control with regard to his addiction, appellant maintains that by applying the broad principles of common law criminal responsibility we must decide that he is entitled to dismissal of the indictment or a jury trial on this issue. The gist of appellant's argument here is that the common law has long held that the capacity to control behavior is a prerequisite for criminal responsibility. 8 29 It is inescapable that the logic of appellant's argument, if valid, would carry over to all other illegal acts of any type whose purpose was to obtain narcotics for his own use, a fact which is admitted by Judge Wright in his opinion 9 Appellant attempts to justify only the acts of possession and purchase of narcotics, both illegal, and both prohibited because if successfully prohibited they would eliminate drug addiction. The justification is on the basis that the addict has lost the power of control over his choice of acts. Appellant argues that the same rationale, justifying a tolerance of these two illegal acts by this court, or a strained construction of the statute that Congress really did not intend to prohibit such acts, or that it is constitutionally impermissible to prohibit such acts, would not carry over to other actions for the same purpose of obtaining narcotics for his own use. 30 In the case of any addict there are two factors that go to make up the self-control (or absence thereof) which governs his activities, and which determines whether or not he will perform certain acts, such as crimes, to obtain drugs. One factor is the physical craving to have the drug. The other is what might be called the addict's character, or his moral standards. In any case where the addict's moral standards are overcome by his physical craving for the drug, he may be said to lose self-control, and it is at this point, and not until this point, that an addict will commit acts that violate his moral standards. For our purposes here, we may think of such acts as crimes to obtain drugs. 31 The legally determinative matter under appellant's theory must be the sum or result of the two factors. Putting it in mathematical terms, if the addict's craving is 4 on a scale of 10, and his strength of character is only 3, he will have a resulting loss of self-control and commit some illegal act to acquire drugs, perhaps only an illegal purchase and possession. For a different example, let us assume a medically induced addict, whose craving is 6, but whose strength of character is 8; with him there will be no resulting loss of self-control, and presumably no illegal acts of any kind. A third example, an addict with a craving of 8, and a strength of character of 3, may result in a loss of self-control to a degree that the addict robs a bank at gunpoint to obtain money to buy drugs. 32 In all these examples the legally important factor is the resulting loss of self-control. Drug addiction of varying degrees may or may not result in loss of self-control, depending on the strength of character opposed to the drug craving. Under appellant's theory, adopted by the dissenters, only if there is a resulting loss of self-control can there be an absence of free will which, under the extension of the common law theory, would provide a valid defense to the addict. If there is a demonstrable absence of free will (loss of self-control), the illegal acts of possession and acquisition cannot be charged to the user of the drugs. 33 But if it is absence of free will which excuses the mere possessor-acquirer, the more desperate bank robber for drug money has an even more demonstrable lack of free will and derived from precisely the same factors as appellant argues should excuse the mere possessor. 34 In oral argument appellant maintained that there are different kinds of addicts, that is, some who are able to confine their law violation to possession and acquisition for their own use and some who will commit crimes other than possession or acquisition to feed their habits; and that it is only the latter whom we should punish for their addiction. This position of appellant is, unfortunately, logically untenable, if one accepts appellant's own rationale that we must not punish addicts for possession because of the compulsion under which they act to acquire the drugs. 35 By definition we have assumed crimes of two classes-first, simple possession and acquisition, or second, greater crimes such as robbery-both motivated by the compulsive need to obtain drugs resulting in loss of self-control. If we punish the second, we can do so only because we find free will. If free will can exist for the second, it likewise must exist for the first class. If, like appellant, one takes the position that any addict who commits crimes (i.e. robbery) to feed his habit may be punished, one is making a judgment that this addict possesses free will, that he is somehow guilty in a way that the addict who does not commit such crimes to feed his habit (other than the crimes of acquisition and possession) is not. In other words, it follows necessarily that the quality that makes this addict commit such crimes to obtain the drugs is not the compulsion of addiction and the loss of self-control, but is something apart from his addiction-but if we are dealing with a motivating factor other than drugs, this is another case, it is not the example called for by appellant's rationale. What the analysis just made demonstrates, even in the case of the addict-robber, is that his crime is caused by the same compulsion, his loss of self-control, due to his addiction. 36 Although attempted by appellant here, there can be no successful differentiation between the source of the drive, the compulsion and resulting loss of control which, appellant argues, vitiates legal accountability, hence the same compulsion would necessarily serve as the basis of the defense for each of the posited illegal acts. It is only a matter of degree. In fact, it seems clear that the addict who restrains himself from committing any other crimes except acquisition and possession, assuming he obtains his funds by lawful means, has demonstrated a greater degree of self-control than the addict who in desperation robs a bank to buy at retail. If the addict can restrain himself from committing any other illegal act except purchase and possession, then he is demonstrating a degree of self-control greater than that of the one who robs a pharmacy or a bank, and thus his defense of loss of control and accountability is even less valid than that of the addict who robs the pharmacy or the bank.
37 From the dissenting opinions it is not clear whether they ignore the logical inconsistency of this position, or whether the dissenters vaguely recognize the inconsistency and arbitrarily draw a line beyond which, to crimes other than acquisition and possession by a proven addict, the defense of lack of free will may not be deployed. Certainly Justice Marshall, writing for four members of the Court in Powell, declared that the limitation proposed by Justice Fortas regarding the defense of chronic alcoholism was merely limitation by fiat. 10 And so it would be here. 38 The obvious danger is that this defense will be extended to all other crimes-bank robberies, street muggings, burglaries-which can be shown to be the product of the same drug-craving compulsion. Not only would the extension of the defense be on the same logical basis as the defense urged here, and as made indubitably certain in Judge Bazelon's separate opinion, but the words of Judge Wright indicate that the door would be open to another possible extension of the newly created defense not hitherto envisaged: 39 While these comments in Powell were offered simply as dicta, they do indicate the position of the Court. Consequently [we limit] the availability of the addiction defense to only those acts which, like mere purchase, receipt or possession of narcotics for personal use, are inseparable from the disease itself and, at the same time, inflict no direct harm upon other members of society. 11 40 We find cold comfort in Judge Wright's words. 41 If mere purchase by the addict is protected, what about mere sale to the same addict? Could not the sale of narcotics to a poor drug-crazed addict, driven by the compulsion of his unsatisfied needs, be defended as a humane act inflict[ing] no direct harm upon other members of society? Why would the supplying of narcotics by an illicit trafficker to a certified addict be any less humane, or inflict any more harm on other members of society, than the supplying of narcotics to the same addict by a licensed member of the medical profession? 12
42 1. All of this points up the wisdom of Justice Black's observations in Powell, where he reached the conclusion that questions of voluntariness or compulsion should not be controlling on the question [of] whether a specific instance of human behavior should be immune from punishment as a constitutional matter; his arguments also show how the so-called common-law defense of compulsion may be unwisely applied here: 43 When we say that appellant's [act] is caused not by his own volition but rather by some other force, we are clearly thinking of a force that is nevertheless his except in some special sense. [Footnote omitted.] The accused undoubtedly commits the proscribed act and the only question is whether the act can be attributed to a part of his personality that should not be regarded as criminally responsible. Almost all of the traditional purposes of the criminal law can be significantly served by punishing the person who in fact committed the proscribed act, without regard to whether his action was compelled by some elusive irresponsible aspect of his personality. As I have already indicated, punishment of such a defendant can clearly be justified in terms of deterrence, isolation, and treatment. On the other hand, medical decisions concerning the use of a term such as disease or volition, based as they are on the clinical problems of diagnosis and treatment, bear no necessary correspondence to the legal decision whether the overall objectives of the criminal law can be furthered by imposing punishment. 13 44 Just as Justice Black turned away from the proposed constitutional rule, we spurn the proposed common law rule, not only because the recently created statutory scheme of dealing with narcotics addicts stands a reasonable chance of reaching the objectives of deterrence, isolation, and treatment, but also because the particular nature of the problem of the heroin traffic makes certain policies necessary that should not be weakened by the creation of this defense. There is no compelling policy requiring us to intervene here. 14 45 2. Furthermore, if such a judgment weighing and balancing conflicting public interests and policies is to be made, it should be made by Congress, which, as we explore more fully infra, has by its activity in this area demonstrated both that it possesses more adequate facilities to deal with the problems of narcotic addiction, and that we in the judiciary are somewhat circumscribed in our activity in this area. 15 46