Opinion ID: 2550043
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Constitutionality of Placing the Burden on the Probationer to Prove Inability to Pay

Text: Once the State has established sufficient evidence for the trial court to make a determination of willfulness, under the statute, the burden is then on probationer to prove inability to pay. We consider this issue in the context of the constitutional protections afforded to the probationer. Although protection guaranteed to probationers in revocation hearings are less than those in criminal proceedings, probation revocation proceedings that result in a deprivation of liberty must comport with the due process clauses of both the Florida and United States Constitutions. The requirement that a willful and substantial violation of probation be found before probation can be revoked is rooted in the fundamental fairness notion required by due process. The United States Supreme Court has stated that depriv[ing] the probationer of his conditional freedom simply because, through no fault of his own, he cannot pay the fine would be contrary to the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672-73, 103 S.Ct. 2064. The Florida Constitution also explicitly provides: No person shall be imprisoned for debt, except in cases of fraud. Art. I, § 11, Fla. Const. Thus, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the corresponding provisions of the Florida Constitution mandate that certain protections be in place. We conclude that because the State is required to produce sufficient evidence in order for the trial court to make a determination of willfulness, shifting the burden to the probationer to then rebut this is constitutionally permissible. However, we conclude that the higher burden of clear and convincing evidence imposed on the probationer cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny under these circumstances. Although the standard for proving a probation violation is the preponderance of the evidence, the defendant is required to meet a heightened burden of clear and convincing evidence to establish inability to pay. This imbalance in the scales of justice is even more significant considering the following: (1) when imposing restitution, the trial court no longer (as of 1995) considers the financial resources of the defendant and must impose restitution unless there are clear and compelling reasons not to do so; and (2) in a civil enforcement action where incarceration is not at stake, the probationer is held only to a preponderance of the evidence standard to demonstrate his or her financial resources. We further consider that the Legislature has not amended section 948.06(5) with respect to placing the burden on the probationer to prove inability to pay by clear and convincing evidence since adding the requirement in 1984at which time the financial resources of the defendant were a factor that the trial court was required to consider at the time that restitution was assessed and imposed. This higher standard placed on the probationer distinguishes this case from those in the criminal context where the State bears the burden to prove the crime beyond a reasonable doubta higher standard than clear and convincing. Accordingly, although at least one affirmative defense requires a defendant to prove the defense by clear and convincing evidence, [9] that standard is actually lower than the standard imposed on the State in that context. Here, however, it is the opposite: the probationer bears the higher standard of proof to rebut the State's case. As articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996), the more stringent the burden of proof a party must bear, the more that party bears the risk of an erroneous decision. Id. at 362, 116 S.Ct. 1373 (quoting Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 283, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 111 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990)). We conclude that imposing a burden of clear and convincing evidence on the probationer creates an impermissible risk that a person will be imprisoned simply because, through no fault of his or her own, he or she cannot pay the monetary obligation. Such an error is one of constitutional magnitude, contrary to the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Bearden, 461 U.S. at 673, 103 S.Ct. 2064, and in violation of the Florida Constitution. See art. I, § 11, Fla. Const. The State points to many jurisdictions that have upheld the practice of shifting the burden to prove inability to pay to the probationer. However, we note that these jurisdictions do not shift the burden to the defendant to prove inability to pay by the heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence. [10] Further, the Florida Constitution contains explicit protection against imprisonment for debt. Thus, the provision requiring the probationer to prove inability to pay by clear and convincing evidence is constitutionally infirm because it requires the defendant to bear a greater risk of an erroneous decision resulting in imprisonment for debt, despite an explicit protection in Florida's Constitution against imprisonment for debt. See art. I, § 11, Fla. Const. This risk is constitutionally unacceptable.