Opinion ID: 765611
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The March 26, 1986 Lajas Incident

Text: 45 Escobar argues that the court erred by allowing the introduction of evidence, including the testimony of co-operating co-defendant Soto, concerning the March 26, 1986 airdrop at Lajas (the Lajas incident). Escobar characterizes the Lajas incident as evidence of a prior bad act, and contends that the district court erred by concluding that it was admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) as proof of the Escobar organization's modus operandi, or, alternatively, as proof of the knowledge and intent of the organization's members to carry out a major drug trafficking scheme. 14 46 The district court's pre-trial order denying Escobar's motion in limine, however, did not premise the admissibility of the Lajas incident evidence solely on Rule 404(b) grounds. Rather, the court also ruled that the Lajas incident evidence was not prior bad act evidence at all, as the incident fell within the temporal scope of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment and pertained to the same conspiracy alleged in the indictment. 15 Because we agree with the latter theory of admissibility, we need not address the district court's determination that the evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b). See United States v. Arboleda, 929 F.2d 858, 865 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Tejada, 886 F.2d 483, 487 (1st Cir. 1989). 47 The indictment alleged that the conspiracy began on or about April 1986. The Lajas incident occurred on March 26, 1986. Given the closeness in time of the Lajas incident to April 1986, we have little difficulty concluding that the Lajas incident is fairly encompassed by the temporal scope of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment. See United States v. Paredes-Rodrguez, 160 F.3d 49, 56 (1st Cir. 1998) (reference to approximate dates in an indictment is not binding and thus the scope of the indictment may cover prior events) (citing United States v. Fisher, 3 F.3d 456, 461 n.12 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Crocker, 788 F.2d 802, 805 (1st Cir. 1986) (approximate dates in an indictment are not controlling)); see also United States v. Morris, 700 F.2d 427, 429 (1st Cir. 1983) (Where a particular date is not a substantive element of the crime charged, strict chronological specificity or accuracy is not required.). Moreover, the temporal proximity and factual similarity of the Lajas incident and the April 14th alleged airdrop provide adequate evidence that the Lajas incident stemmed from the same conspiratorial agreement to import and distribute cocaine. The events were separated by a period of only two-and-a-half weeks, employed nearly identical means (e.g., an airdrop at a clandestine airstrip illuminated by battery-powered lights), and involved the same illegal purpose of importing and distributing cocaine. In these circumstances, we conclude that the Lajas incident served as an additional overt act within the conspiracy charged, 16 and was properly admitted as direct evidence of the conspiracy itself. See Tejada, 886 F.2d at 487 (Where evidence of 'bad acts' is direct proof of the crime charged, Rule 404(b) is, of course, inapplicable.). 17