Opinion ID: 1851620
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: crime without death

Text: It has been argued that the death penalty should not be an option when the crime committed produces no death. The Supreme Court has held that the death penalty is an excessive penalty for a robber who does not take a human life. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982). In Enmund, the defendant was the driver of the getaway car. His accomplices had robbed and shot two people. The shooter and Enmund were convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court overturned Enmund's sentence of death holding that the Eight Amendment does not permit the imposition of the death penalty of a defendant who aids and abets a felony in course of which murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that killing take place or that lethal force will be employed. Enmund, supra at 795, 102 S.Ct. at 3375-3376. The Court goes on to say that we have no doubt that robbery is a serious crime deserving serious punishment. It is not, however, a crime `so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death.' Enmund, supra at 798, 102 S.Ct. at 3377 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2930, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976)). The Court focused on Enmund's conduct in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty. In Enmund, the defendant simply aided and abetted a robbery which, as the Court holds, is not deserving of the death penalty. However, La. R.S. 14:42(C) contemplates a defendant who rapes a child. The legislature has determined that this crime is deserving of the death penalty because of its deplorable nature, being a grievous affront to humanity. Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell, and Justice Rehnquist, dissented in Enmund finding that the death penalty is not disproportionate to the crime of felony murder, even though the defendant did not actually kill or intend to kill his victims. Enmund supra at 826, 102 S.Ct. at 3391-3392 (O'Connor, J. dissenting). Justice O'Connor continues saying that the Court should not only consider contemporary standards in deciding if the death penalty is disproportionate to the crime, but should also consider the harm the defendant caused to the victim. Enmund supra at 816, 102 S.Ct. at 3386-3387. Contemporary standards as defined by the legislature indicate that the harm inflicted upon a child when raped is tremendous. That child suffers physically as well as emotionally and mentally, especially since the overwhelming majority of offenders are family members. Louisiana courts have held that sex offenses against children cause untold psychological harm not only to the victim but also to generations to come. Common experience tells us that there is a vast difference in mental and physical maturity of an adolescent teenager ... and a pre-adolescent child ... It is well known that child abuse leaves lasting scars from generation to the next ... such injury is inherent in the offense. State v. Brown, 660 So.2d 123, 126 (La.App. 2d Cir.1995). ... Aggravated rape inflicts mental and psychological damage to its victim and undermines the community sense of security. The physical trauma and indignities suffered by the young victim of this offense were of enormous magnitude ... State v. Polkey, 529 So.2d 474 (La.App. 1 Cir.1988). ... the child's tender age made her particularly vulnerable and capable of resisting... considering acutely deleterious consequences of conduct on an eight-yearold child. State v. Jackson, 658 So.2d 722 (La.App. 2d Cir.1995). Four of the nine justices of the Supreme Court find that the death penalty is permissible in situations when the defendant has neither killed or intended to kill anyone. [10] The Court in Coker went even further in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987), when it held that the death penalty is not disproportionate when the defendant plays a major part in a felony that results in murder, although the defendant did not actually commit the murder, and the defendant's mental state is only one of reckless indifference to life. The Court also declined to draw a clear line between crimes that warrant the death penalty and those that do not. Tison, supra at 157, 107 S.Ct. at 1687-1688. While the Eighth Amendment bars the death penalty for minor crimes under the concept of disproportionality, the crime of rape when the victim is under the age of twelve is certainly not a minor crime. The Coker Court recognized the possibility that the degree of harm caused by an offense could be measured not only by the injury to a particular victim but also by the resulting public injury. This implies that some offenses, in particular the rape of a child, might be so injurious to the public that death would not be disproportionate in relation to the crime for which it is imposed. In part, capital punishment is an expression of society's moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct. This function may be unappealing to many, but it is essential in an ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on legal processes rather than self-help to vindicate their wrongs. Gregg, supra at 183, 96 S.Ct. at 2930. Thus, we conclude that given the appalling nature of the crime, the severity of the harm inflicted upon the victim, and the harm imposed on society, the death penalty is not an excessive penalty for the crime of rape when the victim is a child under the age of twelve years old.