Opinion ID: 1873301
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State v. Waalen

Text: ¶ 30 This court's decision in Waalen is central to resolving the issue before us; therefore, it is appropriate to review Waalen before proceeding to analyze whether the circuit court's response to the jury's request for clarification was error. ¶ 31 A jury convicted David A. Waalen (Waalen) of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, a violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) (1981-82) of the Motor Vehicle Code. Waalen, 130 Wis.2d at 19, 386 N.W.2d 47. The Waalen case involved a single issue: whether the circuit court properly instructed the jury regarding the definition of `under the influence.' Id. at 20, 386 N.W.2d 47. The circuit court instructed the jury as follows: The phrase under the influence of an intoxicant covers not only the well-known and easily recognized conditions and degrees of intoxication but also any abnormal mental or physical conditions which [are] the result of indulging in any degree in intoxicating liquors, including beer, which tends to deprive one of the clearness of intellect and self control which one would otherwise possess. Not every person who has consumed alcoholic beverages falls within the ban of the statute. If that consumption of alcoholic beverages does not cause the person to be influenced in the ordinary and well-understood meaning of the term, the person is not under the influence of an intoxicant within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 22, 386 N.W.2d 47. The circuit court's instruction was based largely on the 1981 version of the standard jury instruction for operating while under the influence of an intoxicant, Wis JICriminal 2663 (1981). Waalen, 130 Wis.2d at 22, 386 N.W.2d 47. The 1981 standard instruction was, in turn, virtually identical to language this court had previously endorsed in Fond du Lac v. Hernandez, 42 Wis.2d 473, 167 N.W.2d 408 (1969). [9] Waalen, 130 Wis.2d at 26, 386 N.W.2d 47. ¶ 32 Waalen contended that the circuit court erred in instructing the jury because its instruction describing under the influence differed from language used to define the term in the 1982 standard jury instruction as well as the definition found in Wis. Stat. § 939.22(42) of the Criminal Code. Waalen, 130 Wis.2d at 20, 386 N.W.2d 47. He asserted that the following instruction should have been given: Under the influence of an intoxicant means that a driver's ability to operate a vehicle is materially impaired because of his consumption of an alcoholic beverage. Not every person who has consumed alcoholic beverages is under the influence as that term is used here. What must be established is that the person has consumed a sufficient amount of alcohol to cause him to be substantially less able to exercise the clear judgment and steady hand necessary to handle and control a motor vehicle. It is not required that impaired ability to operate be demonstrated by particular acts of unsafe driving. What is required is that the person's ability to safely control his vehicle be materially, that is substantially, impaired. Id. at 21, 386 N.W.2d 47 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Waalen's proposed jury instruction was the standard instruction found in Wis JICriminal 2663 (1982). Waalen, 130 Wis.2d at 21, 386 N.W.2d 47. ¶ 33 In essence, Waalen argued that the 1982 standard jury instruction was mandatory. He asserted that the definition of under the influence in the Motor Vehicle Code should align with the definition of under the influence of an intoxicant in the 1982 standard jury instruction, based on the Criminal Code at Wis. Stat. § 939.22(42). Waalen, 130 Wis.2d at 23, 386 N.W.2d 47. In short, Waalen argued that to prove a defendant was under the influence for purposes of the Motor Vehicle Code, the state was required to demonstrate that a person's consumption of alcohol materially or substantially affected his ability to drive his vehicle, as indicated in the 1982 standard jury instruction's interpretation of under the influence of an intoxicant in the Criminal Code. Id. at 23-24, 386 N.W.2d 47. ¶ 34 This court rejected Waalen's arguments. Id. at 26-28, 386 N.W.2d 47. First, it expressly upheld the circuit court's jury instruction, id. at 28, 386 N.W.2d 47, noting that the instruction was almost identical to the 1981 standard instruction and the one in Hernandez. Id. at 26, 28, 386 N.W.2d 47. The court concluded that the circuit court's instruction was not inconsistent with the Criminal Code definition of `under the influence.' Id. at 28, 386 N.W.2d 47. It also indicated that the circuit court's definition of under the influenceabnormal mental or physical conditions . . . which tends to deprive one of the clearness of intellect and self control which one would otherwise possesswas an accurate description of when a driver is under the influence for a jury to infer that a defendant was materially impaired or incapable of safely driving. [10] Id. ¶ 35 Second, the Waalen court rejected part of the 1982 standard instruction and clarified the meaning of material impairment, holding that material impairment does not mean substantial impairment. Id. at 27, 386 N.W.2d 47. [11] ¶ 36 The Waalen court explained why material impairment and substantial impairment are incompatible: Material impairment should not be given a definition that is inconsistent with the purpose of the statute, which is to foster highway safety. In the preface to the 1981 revisions of the Criminal Code, the legislature expressly stated that its purpose was to provide maximum safety for all users of the highways of this state from the harm threatened by persons who operate motor vehicles while under the influence of an intoxicant. Laws of 1981, ch. 20, secs. 2051(13)(a)1 and 2051(13)(b)1. See State v. Caibaiosai, 122 Wis.2d 587, 591, 363 N.W.2d 574 (1985). Requiring substantial impairment of an individual's ability to operate a vehicle before that person could be found under the influence would be inconsistent with the expressed legislative intent because it would not provide maximum safety for all users of state highways. Waalen, 130 Wis.2d at 27, 386 N.W.2d 47. ¶ 37 The Waalen court then gave two examples of material impairment, stating that `material impairment' under sec. 939.22(42), Stats., exists when a person is incapable of driving safely, or is without proper control of all those faculties . . . necessary to avoid danger to others. Id. at 27, 386 N.W.2d 47 (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This quoted languagethe Waalen languageis central to the issue before us.