Opinion ID: 2449953
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The district court's basis for summary judgment

Text: The resolution of the Halvorsons' tort claims predicated upon injury to their property requires a determination of whether Camps Canyon Road is a public highway in order to evaluate whether an invasion of their rights has occurred. The district court found that Camps Canyon Road is a public highway by prescription as defined by I.C. § 40-202(3) (all highways used for a period of five (5) years, provided they shall have been worked and kept up at the expense of the public, or located and recorded by order of a board of commissioners, are highways). This conclusion was based on the district court's finding that [t]he record ... establishes that the public has used the road for more than five years, and that the Highway Department has worked and maintained the road at the expense of the public. In addition, the Plaintiffs do not refute that the Camps Canyon Road is a public highway. With regard to public use, the district court cited the Halvorsons' failure to dispute that Camps Canyon Road was a public highway, the official 1986 map of the Highway District, and the affidavit of Orland Arneberg describing public use of Camps Canyon Road dating back to the 1930s. As for the second requirement, that Camps Canyon Road be worked and kept up at the expense of the public, the Highway District provided an affidavit from Dan Payne in which he stated that he has personal knowledge of the Highway District's upkeep of Camps Canyon Road since at least 1974. The Halvorsons offered no evidence that Payne's affidavit is anything but reliable and, indeed, they rely on that affidavit at various points in their briefing. The Halvorsons dispute the district court's reliance on the 1986 Highway District map, citing Homestead Farms, Inc. v. Board of Commissioners of Teton County, 141 Idaho 855, 862, 119 P.3d 630, 637 (2005) (Eismann, J. concurring). The Halvorsons are correct in this regard. [I]f a road is not properly created as a public highway, its inclusion on an official county highway system map does not make it so, nor does it impose any requirement on a property owner to vacate what has never been established as a public roadway. Id. at 860, 119 P.3d at 635. However, the remaining evidence, Arneberg's affidavit, Payne's affidavit, and the Halvorsons' concession, remain undisturbed. If the moving party has demonstrated the absence of a question of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate an issue of material fact that will preclude summary judgment. Wattenbarger v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho 308, ___, 246 P.3d 961, 970 (2010) (citing I.R.C.P. 56(e)). Thus, when the Halvorsons argue that there is no evidence of extensive public use of [Camps Canyon Road] ... in the public or agency record to support the conclusion that Camps Canyon Road is a public highway, they are simply incorrect: there is evidence to support that proposition and, just as important, the Halvorsons offered no evidence to contradict that proposition. Even drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Halvorsons, the Halvorsons have failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. The district court properly concluded that Camps Canyon Road is a public highway as defined in I.C. § 40-202(3).