Opinion ID: 642
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Correction-Officer Defendants

Text: Williams alleges excessive force and deliberate indifference, both in violation of the Eighth Amendment, based on the correction-officer defendants' purportedly retributory and malicious behavior in purposefully removing the shield, exposing him to radiation, and ignoring demands to replace the shield or deactivate the light. We first address the excessive force claim. It is well established that a malicious and sadistic use of force by a prison official against a prisoner, done with the intent to injure and causing actual injury, is enough to establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause. Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687, 702 (8th Cir.2001). The Supreme Court recently clarified that the extent of any resulting injury, while material to the question of damages and informative as to the likely degree of force applied, is not in and of itself a threshold requirement for proving this type of Eighth Amendment claim. See Wilkins v. Gaddy, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1175, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2010) (per curiam). In doing so, the Court expressly rejected the theory that lower courts may dismiss such claims based solely on the de minimis nature of the resulting injury. Id. at ___-___, 130 S.Ct. at 1177-78. The Court, however, left open the possibility of dismissal where the injury conclusively shows that the force applied was not unconstitutional. Id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 1180. The Court's analysis rested on the well-established rule that, [t]he `core judicial inquiry' ... [is] not whether a certain quantum of injury was sustained, but rather `whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.' Id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 1177-78 (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992)). In other words, because not... every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action, a de minimis application of force will not give result in a constitutional violation. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9, 112 S.Ct. 995; see also Wilkins, at ___-___, 130 S.Ct. at 1177-78, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (An inmate who complains of a push or shove that causes no discernable injury almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim.) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where the force applied is excessive, however, a constitutional claim may survive summary dismissal even if the resulting injury is de minimis. Wilkins, at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 1180. Here, the correction-officer defendants present two arguments, one factual and one legal, in attempting to show that there was no violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Neither argument provides a basis for relief at this stage of the proceedings. Regarding the factual argument, the officers rely on their own version of the facts to assert that they took no malicious or retaliatory action towards Williams. Such an argument may be presented at trial, but in our review, we must interpret the record in the light most favorable to Williams. Howard v. Kansas City Police Dep't, 570 F.3d 984, 988 (8th Cir.2009). Accordingly, for the purpose of this appeal, we interpret the record as showing that the officers acted in response to derisive inmate comments, removed the shield as a retaliatory act, ignored inmate complaints and requests to deactivate the light, and made a comment to inmates in the room demonstrating a malicious and retaliatory intent. We make no judgment as to the strength of the officers' contrary factual assertions. We note only that the officers' assertions are largely irreconcilable with Williams's affidavit and deposition testimony. As such, we need not address further any arguments that rely upon the officers' disputed assertions. The officers' legal argument merits more consideration. The officers argue that reasonable correction officers in their position would not have known that disinfecting ultraviolet radiation could be harmful and that, in the absence of authority holding that inmates have a clearly established right to be free from such radiation, qualified immunity applies. In this regard, the officers assert that Williams will need an expert to prove causation and that if experts can debate the level of hazard posed by the radiation, a right to be free from such radiation could not have been clearly established. We believe this argument overstates the degree of specificity required in existing law for a constitutional right to be clearly established. It also ignores the importance of reasonable factual inferences that we must draw against the officers. In presenting qualified immunity arguments, plaintiffs and defendants often spar over the appropriate level of specificity to apply in assessing whether there has been a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. In the present case, Williams argues that the officer defendants are attempting to make his rights seem trivial and obscure by framing them very narrowly. He concludes that it is not surprising that he and the district court cited no cases dealing with disinfecting ultraviolet radiation because, [c]ase law is unable to keep up with the countless tools and methods by which a state official might physically harm a prisoner. Qualified immunity analysis `must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.' Smook v. Minnehaha County, 457 F.3d 806, 813 (8th Cir.2006) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)). That having been said, officers cannot escape suit merely because no prior case involved exactly the same facts as alleged by the plaintiff. Rather, the contours of an alleged constitutional right must be `sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.' Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). In other words, the rights as set forth in the holdings of existing cases are clearly established not only as to the facts of the prior cases, but also as applied in contexts that reasonable officers would understand to fall within the scope of those rights. We have often stated that [o]fficials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing bright lines. Littrell v. Franklin, 388 F.3d 578, 582 (8th Cir.2004) (quotation omitted). We have never held, however, that bright lines only exist where facts as alleged are identical to what a court has previously addressed. Rather, [t]he Supreme Court has clearly stated that in establishing qualified immunity, the test must be applied at a level of specificity that approximates the actual circumstances of the case. Engleman v. Murray, 546 F.3d 944, 949 n. 4 (8th Cir.2008). Here, for purposes of our review, the allegations in the case involve the malicious and retaliatory exposure of inmates to an apparently intended harm without a penological purpose. In our view, these are the allegations that matter when approximat[ing] the actual circumstances of the case, and we emphasize the allegations of purposefulness and retaliation. Id. We do not believe that qualified immunity in this context hinges on the question of whether prior cases referenced the particular, technological manner in which force was applied. Similarly, we do not believe qualified immunity applies simply because the precise degree of harm likely to result was uncertain. As already discussed, the material inquiry is not the degree of harm, but rather, the degree of force applied and the reason for applying that force. The constitution clearly protects against the sadistic use of force by a prison official, Foulk, 262 F.3d at 702. As such, reasonable officers are on sufficient notice that they may not purposefully expose prisoners to potentially harmful radiation in the complete absence of a penological purpose. Importantly, the record here taken in a light most favorable to Williams shows just such a complete absence of a penological purpose in removing the shield and in failing to deactivate the light immediately upon removal of the shield. Given the reasonable inference that the officers acted maliciously in an effort to cause harm, and the allegations that an injury did result, the correction-officer defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity at this time. Similarly, in this case, the same rationale supports the denial of qualified immunity as to the related claim of deliberate indifference.