Opinion ID: 1910282
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Challenge to Jury Selection

Text: Appellant first asserts that the trial court erred in preventing him from interrogating venirepersons after they had expressed unbending opposition to capital punishment and stated that they would be unwilling and unable to impose the death sentence under any circumstances and irrespective of their obligation to follow the court's instructions. His argument is that somehow the jurors might have been rehabilitated and that he should have been afforded an opportunity on voir dire to accomplish that purpose before they were excused. The trial record shows that the following venirepersons were excused for cause after questioning by the prosecution: Sharon Ellison (firmly opposed to the death penalty on religious grounds, T.T., 3/9/88, pp. 282-285); Bernice Bolden (unalterable religious opposition to the death penalty, T.T., 3/11/88, pp. 530-533); Doris Reimer (fixed opposition to capital punishment, T.T., 3/11/88, pp. 530-533): John McTanney (fixed opposition to death, T.T., 3/11/88, pp. 535-537); Mary Magee (personal beliefs too strong to impose death, T.T., 3/11/88, p. 631); Sophia Skiba (a nurse dedicated to preserving life and would not vote to take it, T.T., 3/11/88, pp. 645-647); Danielle Levin (absolutely would not impose a death sentence, T.T., 3/14/88, pp. 692-693); and Diana Freeman (distrust of police so strong that she would not follow the court's instructions, T.T., 3/10/88, pp. 364-365). Appellant concludes that the exclusion for cause of prospective jurors from a panel because of their expressed views on capital punishment violated Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), reh. denied, 393 U.S. 898, 89 S.Ct. 67, 21 L.Ed.2d 186 (1968). The Witherspoon doctrine holds that jurors cannot be challenged for cause based on their general opposition to the death penalty; it must be made unmistakably clear that they would be unable to set aside their personal beliefs in deference to the law as required by their oath as jurors. As noted in Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 511 Pa. 299, 513 A.2d 373 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070, 107 S.Ct. 962, 93 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1987), Witherspoon has been refined by the United States Supreme Court. In its recent examination of the Witherspoon standard, the United States Supreme Court chose the test set forth in Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980), as preferable to the original standards of Witherspoon. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). The Adams test is whether the juror's views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Adams, supra, 448 U.S. at 45, 100 S.Ct. at 2526. (511 Pa. at 311, 513 A.2d at 379). See also, Commonwealth v. Lewis, 523 Pa. 466, 567 A.2d 1376 (1989); and Commonwealth v. Colson, 507 Pa. 440, 490 A.2d 811 (1985). The rule, therefore, is that venirepersons who are unable to perform their duties impartially and faithfully at the sentencing stage of the trial may be excused for cause. Lewis, supra, and Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, 519 Pa. 236, 546 A.2d 1101 (1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1169, 107 L.Ed.2d 1072 (1990), incorporating Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986). This includes prospective jurors who clearly express such antagonism to testimony by police that they will be prejudiced in the case. In her opinion on post-trial motions, the trial judge summarized her decisions as follows (Trial court opinion, p. 17): We made each judgment to exclude these prospective jurors only after carefully and patiently listening to the views expressed by each potential juror. We listened and watched their demeanor on the witness stand and made our judgment on credibility. After having done so, there was no necessity or reason to permit further repetitious inquiry by defense counsel in a vain hope that somehow one or more jurors would throw away or bend long-held, fixed views on such a passionate question. Any juror who claimed that by the miracle of additional questioning by defense counsel he or she had been rehabilitated would have been absurd. In any event, any professed retreat from the already expressed views would have been wholly unworthy of belief and, further, would have served no purpose other than allowing the Commonwealth to raise another challenge for cause. It is useless to engage in such colloquies once a juror has made it abundantly clear that his resolute opposition to capital punishment is fixed in all cases. It must be noted that the Commonwealth, as the party seeking to remove the prospective juror for cause, has the burden of establishing the reason for removal. If the Commonwealth's questions are sufficiently precise and on point and the venireperson's answers are certain and unequivocal, it is certainly possible for the court to determine that cause has been shown such that further questioning is unnecessary. A trial judge has wide latitude in supervising the manner in which voir dire is conducted, including the power to prevent further voir dire when responses to death qualification questions prove that additional inquiry will be fruitless. [6] We are satisfied that the procedure and decisions of the court in excusing potential jurors was constitutionally firm in all respects. Appellant's challenge on this point is rejected.