Opinion ID: 1713914
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the court erred in failing to grant lorraine permanent or long-term periodic rehabilitative alimony.

Text: ¶ 21. Lorraine's main contention was that she should be awarded more alimony because she believed Jay's interest in Craft Auto Sales should be included in the marital assets. Jay's interest in the partnership, as discussed in issue I., was considered by the chancellor. However, this Court has considered the following factors when awarding alimony: 1) the income and expense of the parties; 2) the health and earning capacity of the parties; 3) the needs of each party; 4) the obligations and assets of each party; 5) the length of the marriage; 6) the presence or absence of minor children in the home, which may require that one or both of the parties either pay, or personally provide, child care; 7) the age of the parties; 8) the standard of living of the parties, both during the marriage and at the time of the support determinations; 9) the tax consequences of the spousal support order; 10) fault or misconduct; 11) wasteful dissipation of assets by either party; or 12) any other factor deemed by the court to be just and equitable in connection with the setting of spousal support. Pearson, 761 So.2d at 165. ¶ 22. Lorraine has a separate income with the capacity to earn more. Lorraine was 39 years old at the time of the divorce, and Jay was 42. The chancellor stated that there was nothing to detract from Lorraine's employability and that she was in good health. The marriage lasted about 13 years. Any direct assistance in the husband's business was negligible. The fault of Jay in committing adultery, his dissipation of assets due to the gambling, and the standard of living of the parties were properly considered in determining the equitable division of the marital assets, as well as the award of alimony, which amounted to $175,000 in lump sum and $2,000 per month in periodic alimony for 2 years. The chancellor has considerable discretion in determining the amount and type of alimony. Id. This Court sees no reason to disturb that discretion in this case.