Opinion ID: 2640711
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: [¶10] Mr. Butz claims the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove the knowingly and willfully element of the crime. In determining whether there was sufficient trial evidence to sustain a conviction, we apply the following standard of review: [W]e examine and accept as true the State's evidence and all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from it. We do not consider conflicting evidence presented by the defendant. We do not substitute our judgment for that of the jury; rather, we determine whether a jury could have reasonably concluded each of the elements of the crime was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard applies whether the supporting evidence is direct or circumstantial. Martin v. State, 2007 WY 2, ¶ 32, 149 P.3d 707, 715 (Wyo. 2007), citing Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, ¶ 16, 123 P.3d 543, 549 (Wyo. 2005). [¶11] The district court instructed the jury on the elements of the charged crime, as follows: Instruction No. 4 The elements of the crime of Endangering Children, as charged in this case are: 1. On or about the 2nd day of August, 2005. 2. In Sheridan County, Wyoming. 3. The Defendant, 4. Having the care and custody of a child 5. Knowingly and willingly (sic) [1] 6. Permitted the child to remain in a dwelling where the Defendant knew that methamphetamine was possessed. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty. If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty. (footnote added). [¶12] Mr. Butz argues: The State should have been required to prove that (1) Mr. Butz knew that methamphetamine was possessed in the room where his daughters were present; and (2) that he knowingly and willfully endangered his daughters by permitting them to remain in that room. Using this standard, Mr. Butz claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict him because there was no evidence he knowingly and willfully placed his children in danger. In fact, he argues, the evidence is to the contrary because he secured the methamphetamine in the tobacco can and placed it away from his daughters in Mr. Raths' bedroom. [¶13] Mr. Butz's argument implicates the difference between general and specific intent crimes. This distinction has been described as follows: When the statute sets out the offense with only a description of the particular unlawful act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, the trial judge asks the jury whether the defendant intended to do the outlawed act. Such intention is general intent. When the statutory definition of the crime refers to an intent to do some further act or attain some additional consequence, the offense is considered to be a specific intent crime and then that question must be asked of the jury. Britt v. State, 752 P.2d 426, 430 (Wyo. 1988), quoting Dorador v. State, 573 P.2d 839, 843 (Wyo. 1978). [¶14] We have consistently ruled that criminal statutes including the mental elements knowingly and/or willfully describe general intent crimes. See, e.g., Tillett v. State, 637 P.2d 261, 264-65 (Wyo. 1981); King v. State, 2002 WY 27, ¶ 23, 40 P.3d 700, 706 (Wyo. 2002). Mr. Butz argues, nevertheless, that we should interpret § 6-4-405(b) as requiring the State to prove that he knowingly and willfully placed his daughters in danger by allowing them to remain in the area with the methamphetamine. His interpretation urges adoption of a specific intent because it would require the State to prove that he intended a further consequence, to endanger his daughters, when he permitted them to remain in the house with the methamphetamine. [¶15] Under the clear language of § 6-4-405(b), the State was simply required to prove that Mr. Butz knowingly and willfully permitted the children to remain in a place where he knew methamphetamine was possessed. The statute contains no additional requirement that the State prove he knowingly and willfully placed the children in danger by allowing them to remain in the place. Section 6-4-405(b), therefore, describes a general intent crime. The legislature made the policy determination that performing the act forbidden by the statute, i.e. permitting a child to remain in an area where the person knows methamphetamine is possessed, with the requisite mental state, i.e., knowingly and willfully, was sufficient to endanger the child and, consequently, legislated against it. Mr. Butz's position that the State should be required to prove he knowingly and willfully placed the children in danger enlarges the State's burden under § 6-4-405(b) beyond that imposed by the legislature. [¶16] Mr. Butz admitted that he had found the packet of methamphetamine and placed it in the tobacco can; thus, the trial evidence clearly showed that he knew methamphetamine was possessed in the home. The undisputed evidence established that Mr. Butz brought his daughters with him to Mr. Raths' house on August 2, 2005, and they were still in the home when law enforcement arrived to execute the search warrant, which was after Mr. Butz had already found the packet of methamphetamine and placed it in the tobacco can. Consequently, the trial evidence, together with the reasonable inferences flowing from it, was clearly sufficient to justify the jury's finding that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt he knowingly and willfully allowed the children to remain in the dwelling where he knew methamphetamine was possessed.