Opinion ID: 783238
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to accommodate theory of liability

Text: 15 Russell first argues that the District Court erred in granting TG Missouri summary judgment on her disability discrimination claim. She begins with the premise that [a]n employer commits unlawful discrimination under the ADA if the employer does not make reasonable accommodations to the known mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business. Brief for Appellant at 24 (citing Cannice v. Norwest Bank, 189 F.3d 723, 726 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1019, 120 S.Ct. 1421, 146 L.Ed.2d 313 (2000); Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944 (8th Cir.1999); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(B)(5)(A)). According to Russell, failure to accommodate is a specifically prohibited form of unlawful disability discrimination under the ADA. Id. at 26. Therefore, she continues, TG Missouri's proffered nondiscriminatory reason for her termination is completely irrelevant to this aspect of her claim. Id. at 26-27. Russell contends that, when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to her, including all reasonable inferences which can be drawn in her favor, there are genuine issues of fact as to whether TG Missouri knew or should have known that she required a restriction on the total number of hours she could work per week as a result of her disability and whether TG Missouri failed to engage in good faith in an interactive process toward a reasonable accommodation of her disability. See id. at 36-38 (citing Fjellestad, 188 F.3d at 952-53; Cravens v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 214 F.3d 1011, 1021 (8th Cir.2000)). She concludes that these genuine issues of fact preclude summary judgment on her claim that TG Missouri failed to act in good faith to reasonably accommodate her known mental disability, bipolar disorder, resulting in her termination. 16 In support of these points, Russell emphasizes the following language from Dr. Moran's letter to Blaylock requesting a workplace accommodation: `[P]lease return her to a more reasonable 8 hour per day schedule as soon as possible as she is unable to maintain the more demanding routine.' See Brief for Appellant at 29 (citing Appellant's Appendix at 262) (emphasis added by appellant). Russell argues: 17 Viewed in the light most favorable to Russell, considering her recent stress leave, her mental disorder and the fact that she was not being required to work more than five days per week at that time, and granting her all reasonable inferences that may be drawn in her favor, Russell's request for accommodation can be interpreted as asking that she not be required to work overtime. 18 Id. at 30. 19 Russell further maintains that the events of Friday, October 22, 1999, provide [t]he most probative evidence that [TG Missouri] failed to act in good faith to provide [her] reasonable accommodation. Id. at 32. Russell points out, among other things, that her immediate supervisor, Carla Robertson, was well aware of her bipolar disorder. Nevertheless, when Russell was having an apparent anxiety attack that Friday morning, Robertson was unwilling to let her leave, despite Robertson's knowledge of her condition and Robertson's willingness just the day before to give her the whole Friday off. 6 She concludes that these facts reveal not only that TG Missouri failed to make a reasonable accommodation for a qualified individual with a disability, but also that TG Missouri wanted to get rid of her because she had requested an accommodation in her work schedule. Id. at 36. 20 To begin, we disagree with Russell's contention that Dr. Moran's letter of August 13, 1999, can reasonably be interpreted as stating a need for a forty-hour-per-week accommodation. The letter was written by Russell's treating physician. It notes the adverse effects of the twelve-hour work days on Russell's mental status and refers to Russell's inability to maintain the more demanding routine. It specifically asks for a more reasonable 8 hour per day schedule. Under these circumstances, the only reasonable interpretation is that Russell's disability required her to work no more than eight hours per day, and TG Missouri fully complied with that request. We cannot say, based upon Dr. Moran's letter to Blaylock, that there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether TG Missouri knew or should have known that Russell also required an accommodation in terms of her hours per week. 21 As to Russell's argument that there is at least a genuine fact issue as to whether TG Missouri failed to engage in good faith in the interactive process, we again disagree. It is not genuinely disputed that, in early September 1999, Blaylock contacted Dr. Moran's office to inquire as to whether Russell could work a six-day schedule, and, shortly thereafter, he told Russell that he had called her doctor and was advised that there was no restriction on the number of days she could work per week. Therefore, regardless of whether Blaylock received unauthorized information from Dr. Moran's office or misinterpreted the information he received, Russell clearly knew that Blaylock believed that she could work a six-day schedule consistent with her restrictions. Under these circumstances, if she indeed needed a forty-hour weekly limitation, and she believed that Dr. Moran had intended to include such a limitation in his request, it was incumbent upon her to follow up to correct Blaylock's assumption. Her failure to do so, despite having the opportunity, supports the conclusion that she, not TG Missouri, stalled the interactive process insofar as her weekly hours are concerned. Consequently, it cannot reasonably be inferred from these facts that TG Missouri failed to engage in good faith in the interactive process. 22 As to the events of Friday, October 22, it is undisputed that Russell left her post in the middle of her shift after being told that doing so would result in an unscheduled absence. 7 At the time Russell left her post, she told Carla Robertson: I need to leave, and I need to leave right now. Appellant's Appendix at 199 (deposition of Taunya Russell). The only reason she gave for needing to leave was that she was not feeling well. Id. Given Russell's failure to make any reference to her bipolar disorder or her mental condition at that time, it simply cannot reasonably be inferred that Robertson failed to accommodate her disability. In sum, we hold that there is no genuine issue of fact as to whether TG Missouri failed to act in good faith to reasonably accommodate Russell's disability within the meaning and requirements of the ADA. 23