Opinion ID: 3015311
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Remedy for Brady Violation

Text: As noted previously, the Supreme Court held in Brady that “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence 6 is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87. The issue we must determine is when, if ever, dismissal with prejudice is an appropriate remedy for a Brady violation.4 Fahie argues that dismissal is an appropriate remedy for due process violations where the defendant demonstrates prejudice or a substantial threat of prejudice. The Government contends that dismissal of a case during trial violates the separation of powers that gives only the prosecutor the right to try the case. We have not yet decided when, if ever, dismissal with prejudice is a proper response to a Brady violation, or if retrial is the most severe remedy available. Nor has the Supreme Court directly addressed the issue. While the Court has assumed that Brady violations that have affected the judgment of a jury normally will be remedied by a new trial, it has left open the possibility of barring retrial in response to particularly egregious due process violations. Compare Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (“A new trial is required if [the Brady violation] could ...in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury.”); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973) (“[W]e may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law 4 The Government contends that there was no Brady violation in this case because the ATF Report was not material. We have jurisdiction to consider the question under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 48 U.S.C. § 1613. For purposes of our analysis, we will assume without deciding that the Appellate Division correctly held that there had been a Brady violation. 7 enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction.”). We too have left open the possibility that “the government’s conduct in withholding Brady materials could . . . be sufficiently egregious to bar prosecution of a defendant on due process grounds.” United States v. Coleman, 862 F.2d 455, 466 n.8 (3d Cir. 1988). In deciding when dismissal might be appropriate, we find instructive the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Morrison, which discussed whether dismissal was proper in a case where prosecutors attempted to deprive a defendant of her right to an attorney. 449 U.S. 361 (1981). Because their attempt failed, there was no prejudice to the defendant. Id. After discussing a number of cases involving violations of defendants’ constitutional right to counsel, the Supreme Court in Morrison observed that “[n]one of these deprivations . . . resulted in the dismissal of the indictment. Rather, the conviction in each case was reversed and the Government was free to proceed with a new trial.” Id. at 365. The Court discussed the appropriate remedy for a pretrial violation of defendant’s rights as follows: [W]hen before trial but after the institution of adversary proceedings, the prosecution has improperly obtained incriminating information from the defendant in the absence of his counsel, the remedy characteristically imposed is not to dismiss the indictment but to suppress the evidence or to order a new trial if the evidence has been wrongfully admitted and the defendant convicted . . . [A]bsent demonstrable prejudice, or substantial 8 threat thereof, dismissal of the indictment is plainly inappropriate, even though the violation may have been deliberate. Id. Thus, the Supreme Court has expressed a preference for suppression of evidence or retrial as a more appropriate remedy for a pre-trial constitutional violation. Id. In Morrison, however, because there was no prejudice – indeed, not even a “claim of any discernible taint” – the Court determined that “even the traditional remedies were beside the point.” Id. at 365 n.2. Morrison therefore clearly precludes dismissal absent a showing of prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 365; see also Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988) (holding that an indictment should be dismissed for errors in grand jury proceedings only if they prejudiced the defendants). Morrison also teaches that the intentional character of the government’s misconduct affects the appropriate remedy.5 The 5 In United States v. Mitchell, we held that while “as a legal matter, the question of good faith versus bad faith is a distinction without a difference in the Brady context,” “the existence of bad faith on the part of the prosecution is probative of materiality because it is ‘doubtful that any prosecutor would in bad faith act to suppress evidence unless he or she believed it could affect the outcome of the trial.’” 365 F.3d 215, 255 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Jackson, 780 F.2d 1305, 1311 n. 4 (7th Cir. 1986)). We believe that bad faith may be of additional relevance in the context of choosing a remedy for a Brady violation. 9 Court noted, for example, that a “pattern of recurring violations by investigative officers . . . might warrant the imposition of a more extreme remedy in order to deter further lawlessness.” Morrison , 449 U.S. at 365 n.2. This statement suggests that the Court was concerned with both prejudice and deterrence, and that when both of those factors call for a particularly harsh sanction, dismissal – the harshest available sanction for a Brady violation – may be proper. See United States v. Isgro, 974 F.2d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Dismissal of an indictment with prejudice is the most severe sanction possible.”). Other cases demonstrate similar attention to prejudice and willful misconduct. In United States v. Marion, the Supreme Court reversed a dismissal of an indictment where defendant failed to show either that “actual prejudice” resulted from the government’s pre-indictment delay or “that the Government intentionally delayed to gain some tactical advantage over appellees or to harass them.” 404 U.S. 307, 325 (1971). And, in Maine v. Moulton, the Court noted the relevance of willful misconduct when it observed that incriminating statements relating to pending charges may be held inadmissible as to those charges “if, in obtaining this evidence, the State violated the Sixth Amendment by knowingly circumventing the accused’s right to the assistance of counsel.” 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985). Thus, the Supreme Court has declined to impose the harshest penalties for government misconduct where a defendant has not demonstrated that the misconduct was willful and resulted in actual prejudice. In our own decisions addressing remedies for constitutional violations, we too have suggested that willfulness 10 and prejudice are important considerations. See United States v. Rosenfield, 780 F.2d 10, 11 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that dismissal is warranted “only where the defendant is actually prejudiced . . . the challenged activity was something other than an isolated incident unmotivated by sinister ends or . . . misconduct challenged has become entrenched and flagrant”); United States v. Costanzo, 740 F.2d 251, 257 (3d Cir. 1984) (affirming refusal to dismiss indictment on grounds of a Sixth Amendment violation where “[n]one of the disclosures . . . were the product of intentional intrusion into the defense camp . . . or were accompanied by a showing of prejudice”). These decisions imply that a court fashioning a remedy for a Brady violation should take into account the particular character and consequences of the government’s actions. Some Courts of Appeals have remarked or implied that no harsher sanction than a new trial is ever available to remedy a Brady violation. See United States v. Mitchell, 164 F.3d 626 (4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision); United States v. Davis, 578 F.2d 277, 280 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Evans, 888 F.2d 891, 897 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Others, however, have held or implied that dismissal may sometimes be appropriate. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 368 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Courts . . . can dismiss actions where government attorneys have willfully deceived the court an engaged in conduct utterly inconsistent with the orderly administration of justice.”) (internal quotation omitted); see also United States v. Fletcher, 801 F.2d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir. 1986) (“Absent evidence of police or prosecutorial bad faith or misconduct, dismissal of an indictment is warranted only if the missing evidence possesses an exculpatory value that was 11 apparent before the evidence was destroyed.”). Notably, in all jurisdictions, dismissal with prejudice is in practice a rare sanction for any constitutional violation.6 In light of the foregoing, we conclude that dismissal for a Brady violation may be appropriate in cases of deliberate misconduct because those cases call for penalties which are not only corrective but are also highly deterrent.7 Deliberate misconduct is targeted for extra deterrence because we expect willful misbehavior to be the most effectively deterred by enhanced penalties. See Nat. Hockey League v. Met. Hockey 6 Our research discloses no case where a federal appellate court upheld dismissal with prejudice as a remedy for a Brady violation. For an exceptional case in which a district court dismissed charges following a Brady violation, see United States v. Dollar, 25 F. Supp.2d 1320 (N.D. Ala. 1998). In Dollar, the government failed repeatedly to disclose undeniably probative documents. Id. at 1332. The District Court found that the government had “breached the duty of professionalism and candor owed to the court” and doubted “whether it [had] proceeded . . . in good faith.” Id. 7 Because a new trial cures completely any prejudice to a defendant from a Brady violation, prejudice alone cannot justify dismissal. See Morrison, 449 U.S. at 364 (observing that remedies should be narrowly tailored). For similar reasons, new evidence discovered after the close of trial, if from a neutral source, results only in a new trial. Only when there is willful misconduct will deterrence justify dismissal with prejudice. 12 Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976) (“[T]he most severe in the spectrum of sanctions provided by statute or rule must be available to the district court in appropriate cases, not merely to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent”). While retrial is normally the most severe sanction available for a Brady violation, where a defendant can show both willful misconduct by the government, and prejudice, dismissal may be proper.8
We now apply the above standard to the facts of this case. We note first that the record does not support a finding that the prosecutor knew that it was required to disclose the ATF Report, but intentionally withheld it. The Territorial Court 8 Although Fahie does not appeal his Double Jeopardy claim to this Court, we write in the margin to note that the Double Jeopardy Clause normally will not limit the range of remedies available for a Brady violation. See Coleman, 862 F.2d at 458. If a defendant cannot show that dismissal is proper because the government withheld documents in bad faith or reckless disregard for the defendant’s rights, he cannot show that retrial would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause on the grounds that the government intentionally triggered a mistrial by withholding documents. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 (1982) (holding that to claim double jeopardy bar defendant must show “government conduct in question [was] intended to ‘goad’ the defendant into moving for a mistrial”). 13 made no findings to that effect, and the District Court did not address the issue. From the record, it appears that the prosecutor was more misguided than calculating in her handling of the ATF Report. Detective Monoson testified that ATF supplied firearms trace reports to the Government on a routine basis and that the prosecutor was aware of the report because he had discussed it with her. But when defense counsel first objected, the prosecutor initially denied withholding anything, claiming that “the Government did turn over what it had.” When the judge demanded the report and inquired further, the prosecutor responded “I don’t know, Your Honor. I don’t have it.” After a brief recess, she produced the report (“we do have the information now, Your Honor. We just received the information.”). From these facts, it appears that the prosecutor overlooked the significance of the ATF Report – perhaps because, under the Government’s own theory that the gun was stolen, the original ownership, based on a purchase made 13 years prior in Virginia, was not obviously important.9 Having failed to appreciate its significance to the defense, the prosecutor may have simply lost track of the report between the time it was produced, in late July, and the start of trial in October. While her error compromised Fahie’s due process rights, we do not believe – nor is it alleged – that the prosecutor’s misconduct was willful. 9 That is not to take issue with the analyses of the Territorial Court and the Appellate Division, both of which concluded that knowledge of the original owner could have been helpful to Fahie in locating the true owner at the time of his arrest. 14 Although Fahie does not try to show that the prosecutor knew she was required to disclose the ATF Report but withheld it anyway, Fahie does attempt to establish a pattern of discovery abuse. A pattern of constitutional violations may indeed be used to show recklessness on the part of a prosecutor. See Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1117 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[T]he existence of a pattern of constitutional violations may provide a basis for implying deliberate indifference.”); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994) (“[A]cting or failing to act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk.”); see also Morrison, 449 U.S. at 365 n.2 (noting that higher penalties may be warranted where there is a pattern of misconduct). Moreover, a constitutional violation that results from a reckless disregard for a defendant’s constitutional rights constitutes willful misconduct. See Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 282 (3d Cir. 1980) (“only three degrees of culpability are associated with the term ‘willful’: intentional, knowing, or reckless”); cf. United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200, 208-09 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that “willful[ ]” in federal criminal civil rights statute, 18 U.S.C. § 242 “means either particular purpose or reckless disregard”); United States v. Frost, 999 F.2d 737, 743 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that “in order to secure suppression of the fruits of [a search based on a misleading search warrant affidavit], a defendant must show . . . that bad faith or reckless disregard existed on the part of the affiant”); Polselli v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 747, 751 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding, in the insurance context, that “recklessness . . . can support a finding of bad faith”). Thus, reckless misconduct, if prejudicial, may sometimes warrant dismissal. Otherwise, a prosecutor who sustains an erroneous 15 view of her Brady obligations over time will be inadequately motivated to conform her understanding to the law. In this case, however, Fahie fails to demonstrate a pattern of violations by which he can demonstrate reckless, and therefore willful, misconduct. Fahie points to the fact that during the suppression hearing, a Government witness represented that no fingerprint analysis had been conducted on the gun. Later, however, the Government supplemented its discovery with a July 9, 2001 memo indicating that a fingerprint test had been conducted but that it was inconclusive. Fahie also claims that because the Government failed to follow proper protocol in the handling of evidence, specifically, the gun, he could not do an independent fingerprint analysis. It appears that Fahie’s allegations are not without merit, since the Territorial Court suppressed the fingerprint analysis upon Fahie’s motion in limine. However, the events surrounding the fingerprint test appear to us to support the view that the prosecutor was at times disorganized, but not reckless. Because Fahie cannot show willful misconduct, we need not address the question of prejudice in this case.10 In the absence of any evidence of willful misconduct, dismissal with 10 In order to find a Brady violation in the first place, a court must find that some prejudice ensued to the defendant. See Stricker v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). Only if a defendant has demonstrated that his rights were violated and that the violation was willful need a court again consider the degree of prejudice in fashioning an appropriate remedy. 16 prejudice was improper.