Opinion ID: 2087700
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Background for Sentencing Issues

Text: In the aggravation/mitigation phase of the sentencing hearing, the State introduced evidence to show that defendant participated in an armed robbery/murder that had occurred in Chicago in November 1975. Defendant pleaded guilty to the charges and was sentenced to 25 to 50 years for murder and 25 to 50 years for attempted armed robbery, each sentence to be served concurrently. Defendant was imprisoned from November 1976 to September 1985. Defendant did not complain of any psychiatric problems or any psychological trauma or ailment. Cameron Forbes, a record officer supervisor at Joliet Correctional Center, testified that he reviewed defendant's penitentiary records for the period that defendant was imprisoned for his 1975 conviction. He stated that while the defendant was incarcerated, defendant was a member of the Black Gangster Disciples street gang. Inmate records indicated that defendant had four major infractions and numerous minor infractions. Defendant was periodically found to have unauthorized items in his cell, including pieces of metal that could be used as weapons, and items representing membership in a gang. During the hearing it was also established that defendant completed his GED while he was in prison, and that it was indicated, on various reports, that defendant's behavior was excellent. After presenting this evidence, the State rested its case. John David Sturman, a mitigation specialist and assistant director of the Alternative Sentencing Project, testified in defendant's behalf. Sturman reviewed defendant's police reports, prison records, and various documents relating to his educational and employment history. Sturman also interviewed defendant's family and friends, spoke to prison personnel who were acquainted with the defendant, and met with the defendant. In addition, Sturman retained the services of Dr. Carl Wahlstrom, an attending psychiatrist at Rush-Presbyterian-St. Lukes Medical Center. Sturman stated that he relied upon Dr. Wahlstrom's report in reaching his conclusions. Sturman testified that he made certain findings significant to defendant's case. The first was that defendant was born into poverty and extreme deprivation. Sturman related that this deprivation pertained not only to a lack of material belongings, but also involved a lack of close positive significant peer relationships. Defendant's mother was very hard working, but his father was always absent. Sturman stated that defendant was left to fend for himself and was raised by another child in the family. As a result, defendant did not have a significant adult male role model or a parental model. As a second finding, Sturman noted that defendant was largely self-taught in terms of his adaptive and coping mechanisms. Sturman explained that defendant's life was difficult while he was growing up in Mississippi. When defendant and his family moved to Chicago, defendant encountered additional difficulties. Defendant was victimized by gangs and was assaulted. He developed an avoidance pattern of behavior, so that he could head off victimization and violence and survive without further victimization. The adaptive and coping skills that he learned in his youth were employed in Chicago in ways that were not self-fulfilling or positive. As a result, during his adolescence, defendant became involved in destructive behavior. Sturman found it significant that the defendant made educational achievements while he was in prison and noted that defendant had adapted in a positive manner while imprisoned. Based upon his investigation, experience and training, Sturman recommended that defendant not be sentenced to death. On cross-examination, Sturman acknowledged that he did not believe in the death penalty. Members of defendant's family, including his mother and several of his siblings, testified to defendant's troubled childhood and their love and affection for the defendant. In rebuttal, the State elicited the testimony of Pearl Williams, the daughter of victim Robert Nelson. Pearl recounted to the court the economic and personal hardships that her family suffered from Nelson's death. The trial court sentenced the defendant to death, finding no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of this sentence.
The defendant argues that the trial court erred when it ruled inadmissible the substance of Dr. Wahlstrom's report of his interview with the defendant wherein the psychiatrist gave his opinion regarding defendant's psychiatric condition. Dr. Wahistrom's report was referred to and relied upon by Sturman, defendant's mitigation specialist, in Sturman's testimony and opinion regarding the mitigating factors that weighed against imposing the death penalty for defendant's convictions. According to Sturman, Dr. Wahlstrom's report indicated that defendant suffered from substance abuse (cocaine and PCP). The report also revealed that defendant suffered from post-traumatic stress syndrome that had been brought on by an attack while defendant was imprisoned for his 1975 murder conviction. Dr. Wahlstrom's report of his interview stated that defendant's substance abuse was in complete remission, and that his suffering from post-traumatic stress syndrome was in partial remission. Dr. Wahlstrom represented that the prognosis with regard to the post-traumatic stress syndrome was very good if defendant were serious about treatment. The record reflects that during defense counsel's closing argument to the court, the trial court pointed out to the defendant's attorney that Dr. Wahlstrom's report made no mention of whether defendant was suffering from a mental disability at the time he committed the offenses at the Nelson apartment. Counsel offered to call Dr. Wahlstrom to the stand to give his opinion with respect to this issue, and the trial court granted the defense a continuance in order to present Dr. Wahlstrom to testify. When the court reconvened, the State advised the trial court that it had interviewed Dr. Wahlstrom and discovered that the doctor would, if cross-examined, testify to statements made by the defendant to the doctor. The State represented that these remarks would be damaging to the defendant. Defense counsel stated that he had conferred with the defendant and that the defendant had nevertheless chosen to call Dr. Wahlstrom to testify at the hearing. The trial court undertook voir dire of the defendant, questioning whether the defendant wanted Dr. Wahlstrom to testify in his behalf. After this questioning, the defendant indicated to the court that he had changed his mind and that he no longer wanted Dr. Wahlstrom to testify at the sentencing hearing. In light of this decision by the defendant that Dr. Wahlstrom should not be called to testify in his behalf, the trial court also struck Dr. Wahistrom's report from evidence and excluded it as a basis for the opinion of Sturman, defendant's mitigation specialist. The defendant objected to this ruling, arguing that without Dr. Wahlstrom's report, there was no evidence regarding defendant's psychiatric condition to aid the court's decision with respect to whether defendant should be sentenced to the death penalty. On appeal, defendant renews this objection to the trial court's ruling. The defendant claims that the trial court's decision to strike Dr. Wahlstrom's report was erroneous because it is common for an expert, such as a mitigation specialist, to rely upon the reports of other individuals who are not called to testify at trial. We need not reach this question. It is well established that the erroneous exclusion of evidence is ground for a new proceeding where it can be said that the excluded evidence, if considered, would have altered the outcome of the proceeding. (See, e.g., People v. Enis (1990), 139 Ill.2d 264, 290, 151 Ill.Dec. 493, 564 N.E.2d 1155.) Even assuming arguendo that the trial court erred in striking Dr. Wahlstrom's report as a basis for Sturman's opinion in mitigation, the record fails to demonstrate that the trial court's sentencing decision would have been different, if the report had been included. Defendant offered Dr. Wahlstrom's report as evidence that defendant suffered from a mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the crimes. Such disturbance is a statutory mitigating factor with respect to imposition of the death penalty. (720 ILCS 5/9-1(c)(2) (West 1992).) However, as the trial court noted in the instant cause, Dr. Wahlstrom's report did not shed any light on the critical question of whether defendant was suffering from a mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the commission of his crimes. Dr. Wahlstrom's report indicated that defendant suffered from substance abuse but that such abuse was in complete remission. The report further stated that defendant also suffered from post-traumatic stress syndrome which was in partial remission. The report did not state whether these conditions amounted to a mental disturbance from which the defendant was suffering at the time of his commission of the crimes. It is highly unlikely that the information provided in the psychiatrist's report would have altered the outcome of defendant's sentencing hearing. Dr. Wahlstrom's report established at best that defendant suffered from partially recovered post-traumatic stress syndrome. In our view, a rational finder of fact would not have found this evidence of defendant's mental condition a sufficiently mitigating circumstance to avoid imposition of the death penalty. The State's evidence established that defendant participated in the brutal, premeditated murder of two persons who knew and befriended the defendant and his co-felon. Defendant had a previous murder conviction and had a history of infractions while imprisoned. Considering all of the evidence, we conclude that the information contained in Dr. Wahlstrom's report would not have persuaded the trial court, sitting as finder of fact, to reject imposition of the death penalty.
Defendant also argues that the trial court should have appointed substitute counsel to represent him with respect to an allegation that the defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel at his sentencing hearing. The record reflects that after the sentencing hearing, defense counsel filed a motion to reconsider. In this motion, defendant's attorney claimed that he had given erroneous advice to the defendant with respect to calling Dr. Wahlstrom as a witness in defendant's behalf. Counsel represented that he had informed defendant that Dr. Wahlstrom, if asked, would testify to self-incriminating statements made by the defendant to the psychiatrist. The attorney also told defendant that these self-incriminating statements could be used against him in the event of a retrial. Defense counsel stated in his motion that upon further research, he believe[d] he erroneously advised the defendant as to the effects of his waiver on a retrial of the instant case. The trial court denied the defense counsel's motion to reconsider the defendant's sentence. Upon review, defendant asserts that the trial court should have appointed another attorney to argue the motion to reconsider filed by his sentencing attorney. A defendant's post-trial argument that he has been deprived of the effective assistance of counsel may warrant appointment of a new attorney to present the defendant's claims. ( People v. Krankel (1984), 102 Ill.2d 181, 189, 80 Ill.Dec. 62, 464 N.E.2d 1045.) However, there is no per se rule that requires appointment of different counsel whenever the defendant makes an argument of incompetent representation. ( People v. Nitz (1991), 143 Ill.2d 82, 134, 157 Ill.Dec. 431, 572 N.E.2d 895.) Whether new counsel should be appointed depends upon the nature and substance of the defendant's argument. If there is no validity to the defendant's claim, or if the defendant's claim pertains to a matter of trial strategy, then new counsel need not be appointed. If the defendant's contention indicates that his attorney may have neglected the defendant's case, then new counsel should be appointed. Nitz, 143 Ill.2d at 134, 157 Ill.Dec. 431, 572 N.E.2d 895; People v. Ramey (1992), 152 Ill.2d 41, 52, 178 Ill.Dec. 19, 604 N.E.2d 275. Defendant does not argue that his sentencing attorney may have neglected defendant's case at the sentencing hearing. Defendant claims that new counsel, if appointed, could have undertaken an investigation to determine whether his sentencing attorney did, in fact, neglect defendant's case. For example, defendant suggests that this new attorney could have investigated in greater detail and could have provided a record to show precisely what incriminating statements defendant made to Dr. Wahlstrom. Defendant also suggests that new counsel could have shown, of record, the precise nature and substance of sentencing counsel's advice to defendant. Defendant suggests that substitute counsel was necessary to determine whether or not the advice which defense counsel gave to the defendant was accurate. Defendant also offers that substitute counsel might have found alternate methods to examine Dr. Wahlstrom without revealing the circumstance that defendant had made incriminating statements to the psychiatrist. We do not believe that defendant's allegations rise to the level of neglect of a client's case that would warrant appointment of substitute counsel. Defendant presents arguments that amount to no more than speculation that substitute counsel may have discovered new or additional information or a different legal theory in defendant's behalf. In order to show that he is entitled to appointment of new counsel, defendant must present a record that offers more than conjecture and speculation. We find defendant's arguments an inadequate basis to justify the conclusion that the trial court should have appointed substitute counsel in defendant's behalf to argue the merits of a motion to reconsider. In addition, we believe that defendant's claim raises a matter pertaining to a strategic decision made during the course of the defendant's sentencing hearing. Generally, the decision to call a witness to the stand is a matter of trial strategy. ( E.g., People v. Hobley (1994), 159 Ill.2d 272, 305, 202 Ill.Dec. 256, 637 N.E.2d 992.) We note that the defendant made the final decision not to call Dr. Wahlstrom to the stand. Given these considerations, we find no error in the trial court's failure to appoint new counsel to represent defendant with respect to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at his sentencing hearing. Defendant contends that he decided not to call Dr. Wahlstrom to testify because defendant's attorney gave defendant incorrect advice regarding the scope of Dr. Wahlstrom's testimony. However, defendant cites to no case law authority or other precedent to support his argument that the advice given to defendant by his sentencing attorney was inaccurate. Furthermore, the record indicates that the defendant was aware that the psychiatrist's report of his interview with the defendant was not confidential. It appears from the record that defendant's attorney advised him that if Dr. Wahlstrom were called to testify, he would be subject to examination that would reveal defendant's incriminating statements regarding his involvement in the crimes. Dr. Wahlstrom's report of his interview with the defendant specifically noted that the psychiatrist had informed the defendant that the interview was nonconfidential in that a copy of the report would be sent to the attorneys working with him, and that it then may be seen by the judge and the state's attorney. In light of these circumstances, we conclude that defendant was not entitled to substitute counsel to argue the motion to reconsider submitted by his sentencing hearing.
Defendant argues that there was reversible error in the allegedly improper introduction of evidence that defendant was a member of a gang while he was imprisoned for his 1975 murder conviction. Relying on Dawson v. Delaware (1992), 503 U.S. 159, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 117 L.Ed.2d 309, defendant claims that the erroneous introduction of this evidence violated his due process rights to a fair trial. In People v. Coleman (1994), 158 Ill.2d 319, 198 Ill.Dec. 813, 633 N.E.2d 654, this court explained that the Dawson Court held unconstitutional the introduction of an accused's membership in a gang where the evidence was not linked to the murder committed and had no relevance to the sentencing proceeding. ( Coleman, 158 Ill.2d at 355, 198 Ill. Dec. 813, 633 N.E.2d 654.) We additionally noted that evidence of gang affiliation is admissible when it pertains to the defendant's prison behavior, violations, and discipline and is offered to show defendant's character and record in prison. Coleman, 158 Ill.2d at 356, 198 Ill.Dec. 813, 633 N.E.2d 654. In the present cause, evidence regarding the defendant's gang membership was introduced to show that defendant's infractions while in prison arose from gang-related activities. According to testimony presented by the State at defendant's sentencing hearing, defendant had committed various infractions of prison rules. A number of these infractions arose from his possession of gang items or documents. Consequently, the evidence of defendant's gang affiliation pertained to defendant's prison record, and was therefore admissible at defendant's sentencing hearing. The trial court committed no error in admitting this evidence. See also People v. Ward (1992), 154 Ill.2d 272, 341-44, 181 Ill.Dec. 884, 609 N.E.2d 252.
Defendant claims that his 1975 murder conviction could not be used to find him eligible for the death penalty. Section 9-1(b)(3) of the Criminal Code of 1961 states that conviction for two murders renders a defendant eligible to be sentenced to death. (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1992).) The trial court found the defendant eligible because he had committed a murder in 1975 and was also responsible for the murder of Robert Nelson. Defendant claims that his 1975 murder conviction could not be the basis of his eligibility for the death penalty because he was 17 years old when he committed the crime. However, this court has already rejected such an argument. In People v. Lear (1991), 143 Ill.2d 138, 149, 157 Ill.Dec. 412, 572 N.E.2d 876, the court held that the sentencer may rely on a murder committed while the defendant was a juvenile as an aggravating factor that renders the defendant eligible to receive the death penalty. Defendant offers no sound reason to deviate from that holding. We continue to adhere to the court's position in Lear, and on that basis conclude that defendant's 1975 murder conviction was properly relied upon by the trial court to find that defendant was eligible to receive the death penalty. Defendant also argues that his 1975 murder conviction could not be relied upon by the sentencer because the death penalty statute was not in effect when that prior conviction was entered. However, in People v. Franklin (1990), 135 Ill.2d 78, 107-08, 142 Ill.Dec. 152, 552 N.E.2d 743, the court held that there is no violation of constitutional principles of ex post facto when a court relies upon a conviction that was entered before the effective date of the death penalty statute. (See also People v. Edgeston (1993), 157 Ill.2d 201, 228, 191 Ill.Dec. 84, 623 N.E.2d 329.) Defendant suggests no ground to overrule this precedent. We remain persuaded by the analysis in Franklin, and accordingly reject defendant's argument in the present cause.
Defendant argues that this court must vacate one of his two home invasion convictions because the State's evidence proved only one illegal entry into Nelson's apartment. The prosecution charged defendant with two counts of home invasion, alleging that defendant entered Nelson's apartment and threatened Nelson with imminent use of force (count I), and also threatened Brown with imminent use of force (count II). The offense of home invasion occurs when a person, without lawful authority, enters the home of another and [w]hile armed with a dangerous weapon uses force or threatens the imminent use of force upon any person or persons    whether or not injury occurs, or    [i]ntentionally causes any injury to any person or persons within such dwelling place. (720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1992).) Defendant contends that it is well settled that a defendant can stand convicted of only one count of home invasion where there was only one entry regardless of the number of victims. ( People v. McDarrah (1988), 175 Ill.App.3d 284, 300, 124 Ill.Dec. 827, 529 N.E.2d 808; see also People v. Shriner (1990), 198 Ill.App.3d 748, 755, 144 Ill. Dec. 738, 555 N.E.2d 1257; People v. Criss (1988), 169 Ill.App.3d 926, 931-32, 120 Ill. Dec. 224, 523 N.E.2d 1135; People v. Parker (1988), 166 Ill.App.3d 123, 130, 116 Ill.Dec. 635, 519 N.E.2d 703; People v. Yarbrough (1987), 156 Ill.App.3d 643, 646, 109 Ill.Dec. 86, 509 N.E.2d 747; People v. Triplett (1985), 138 Ill.App.3d 1070, 1074, 93 Ill.Dec. 595, 487 N.E.2d 39; People v. Morrison (1985), 137 Ill.App.3d 171, 177, 91 Ill.Dec. 770, 484 N.E.2d 329; People v. Hawkins (1984), 125 Ill.App.3d 520, 523, 80 Ill.Dec. 847, 466 N.E.2d 299; People v. Ammons (1983), 120 Ill.App.3d 855, 861, 76 Ill.Dec. 377, 458 N.E.2d 1031.) The State concedes error on this point. Consequently, we hereby vacate one count of the home invasion convictions entered against the defendant. However, we decline defendant's invitation to remand the matter for an additional sentencing hearing with respect to defendant's death penalty sentence. This court has held that a finding of eligibility based upon one statutory factor is not rendered invalid simply because the sentencer may have also relied upon another statutory eligibility factor that is subsequently held invalid. (See People v. Todd (1992), 154 Ill.2d 57, 74-75, 180 Ill.Dec. 676, 607 N.E.2d 1189.) In the present case, the trial court determined that defendant was eligible for the death penalty because he had murdered two persons (see 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1992) (murder of two or more persons is statutory ground to impose death penalty)) and because he had committed other felonies, such as armed robbery, home invasion, and residential burglary, during the course of the murders (see 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1992) (commission of armed robbery, home invasion, or residential burglary during course of murder is statutory ground for eligibility for death penalty)). Thus, the record shows that the trial court found two separate and independent grounds for defendant's eligibility for the death penalty. Neither of these grounds involved defendant's having been convicted of two counts of home invasion. As a result, vacatur of one count of home invasion does not undermine the validity of the trial court's finding of eligibility for the death penalty in the present case.
Defendant raises two arguments wherein he challenges the constitutionality of the Illinois death penalty statute. Neither has merit, however, since they have been repeatedly rejected by this court. Initially defendant claims that the death penalty statute is unconstitutional because it places a burden of proof on the defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of evidence presented in mitigation. We have rejected this argument in previous capital cases and continue to adhere to that position in the present cause. ( People v. Page (1993), 155 Ill.2d 232, 283, 185 Ill.Dec. 475, 614 N.E.2d 1160; People v. Mitchell (1992), 152 Ill.2d 274, 345-46, 178 Ill.Dec. 354, 604 N.E.2d 877.) We similarly reject defendant's argument that the statute is unconstitutional because it does not sufficiently minimize the risk of arbitrarily or capriciously imposed sentences, having considered and rejected this challenge in prior decisions of this court. People v. Patterson (1992), 154 Ill.2d 414, 488, 182 Ill.Dec. 592, 610 N.E.2d 16; People v. Fields (1990), 135 Ill.2d 18, 75, 142 Ill.Dec. 200, 552 N.E.2d 791. For the reasons stated above, we vacate defendant's conviction of one count of home invasion. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County. We direct the clerk of this court to enter an order setting Tuesday, January 9, 1996, as the date on which the sentence of death entered by the circuit court is to be carried out. The defendant shall be executed in a manner provided by law (725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1992)). The clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this case to the Director of Corrections, the warden at Stateville Correctional Center, and the warden of the institution where the defendant is now confined. Affirmed.