Opinion ID: 2659007
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: MERS's Ability to Transfer Serra's Mortgage

Text: Serra brings claims for wrongful foreclosure against Quantum and Wells Fargo. He also seeks to prove that Quantum engaged in unfair or deceptive business practices. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A (Chapter 93A). Because these claims are predicated on the same erroneous legal theory, we review and dismiss them together. In short, Serra claims that the MERS business model, under which MERS possesses a bare legal interest in a mortgage, transferable among MERS member institutions, is contrary to Massachusetts law. As a consequence, Serra theorizes, MERS lacked legal authority to transfer the Serra mortgage, rendering both its initial assignment and all subsequent transfers of the mortgage invalid. This argument willfully disregards our holding in Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs. of Neb., 708 F.3d 282 (1st Cir. 2013). In Culhane, we ruled unequivocally that MERS may validly possess and assign a legal interest in a mortgage. Id. at 292-93. Far from finding it contrary to law, we remarked that MERS's role as mortgagee of record and custodian of the bare legal interest as nominee . . . fit[s] comfortably within the structure of Massachusetts mortgage law. Id. at 293; see also Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 733 F.3d 349, 355 (1st Cir. 2013) (applying -5- Culhane to find that MERS, as the mortgagee of record, possessed the ability to assign [the] mortgage). Indeed, Serra conceded at oral argument that Culhane invalidates his claims and offered only the suggestion that we disregard the case in reaching our decision, given that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has not ruled expressly on this issue of state law.2 Of course it is true that Culhane resolved an issue of Massachusetts law, and thus it could theoretically be displaced by a contrary ruling arising from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. See Blinzler v. Marriot Int'l, Inc., 81 F.3d 1148, 1151 (1st Cir. 1996). In the absence of any such contrary holding, however, Culhane unquestionably binds this court: under Massachusetts law, MERS may validly possess and transfer a legal interest in a mortgage. See Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) ([A]ny departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification.). As presciently stated in Culhane itself, where litigants attempt to repackage old wine in a new bottle . . . we see no point in decanting it again. Culhane, 708 F.3d at 294. Put 2 Serra also urges us to disregard Culhane on the theory that the appellant's briefs in that case were of poor quality. Whatever the veracity of that claim, it has no effect on the binding nature of our precedent and, moreover, it certainly did not impede this court in Culhane from conducting a thorough and convincing analysis of Massachusetts law. As this claim is forwarded here by a litigant whose own briefs exhibit a grave dearth of developed argumentation, we are also reminded that counsel in glass houses ought not throw stones. -6- simply, Serra's theory has been foreclosed. The grant of summary judgment as to Serra's wrongful foreclosure and Chapter 93A claims is affirmed.