Opinion ID: 169172
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Springer I and Springer II

Text: W e have conducted a de novo review of the holding in Springer I that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the AIA, see Ambort v. United States, 392 F.3d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir. 2004), and affirm on that basis. W e affirm Springer II on the ground that the Tax Court had exclusive jurisdiction over that case. See United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 542 n.6 (10th Cir. 1994) (explaining that we are free to affirm on any grounds for which there is a sufficient record to permit conclusions of law ). The AIA provides that, subject to certain statutory exceptions, “no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.” 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a). The purpose of the AIA “is to permit the United States to assess and collect taxes alleged to be due without judicial intervention, and to require that the legal right to the disputed -7- sums be determined in a suit for refund.” Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962). Because penalties and interest arising from the failure to pay taxes are assessed as taxes, see 26 U.S.C. § 6665(a)(2), the A IA bars actions seeking to enjoin their assessment. See Nuttelman v. Vossberg, 753 F.2d 712, 714 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (holding that penalties and interest are subject to the A IA); cf. Souther v. M ihlbachler, 701 F.2d 131, 132 (10th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (holding that civil penalties imposed under 26 U.S.C. § 6682 for making false statements in connection with withholding are taxes within the meaning of the A IA). The statutory exception to the AIA that Springer raised in the district court is 26 U.S.C. § 6330(e)(1). 2 Section 6330(e)(1) permits a party to seek injunctive relief in a proper court when the IRS initiates a levy during the statutory period of suspension that is triggered by the request for a CDP hearing. Hart v. United States, 291 F. Supp. 2d 635, 645 (N.D. Ohio 2003). Contrary to Springer’s 2 In relevant, part, 26 U.S.C. § 6630(e)(1) provides: [I]f a [CDP] hearing is requested under subsection (a)(3)(B), the levy actions which are the subject of the requested hearing . . . shall be suspended for the period during which such hearing, and appeals therein, are pending. In no event shall any such period expire before the 90th day after the day on which there is a final determination in such hearing. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 7421(a), the beginning of a levy or proceeding during the time the suspension under this paragraph is in force may be enjoined by a proceeding in the proper court, including the Tax Court. -8- argument, the exception is not triggered by the mere issuance of a notice of intent to levy. As the district court correctly determined, Springer had not alleged that the IRS had begun to levy his assets during the pendency of his CDP hearing, and the record indicates that the IRS had in fact suspended collections. Thus, Springer failed to bring himself within this statutory exception. 3 Springer also relied on a judicially created exception to the AIA that allow s an injunction if it is clear that “under no circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail” and if equity jurisdiction otherw ise exists, see Enochs, 370 U.S. at 7. Springer cannot meet either of these requirements. The government ultimately could prevail in levying Springer’s assets because the issue of his income tax liability for 1990-1995 was finally determined in his earlier suit, 26 U.S.C. § 6331(a) authorizes the IRS to impose the levy, and the levy could be sustained if the CDP hearing comported with applicable law. As to the second requirement, an adequate remedy at law will preclude the exercise of equity jurisdiction. See Wyo. Trucking Ass’n v. Bentsen, 82 F.3d 930, 935 (10th Cir. 1996). Springer cannot show the absence of an adequate legal remedy. To the contrary, he already has availed himself of an adequate legal remedy 3 The district court also concluded that to the extent he relied on the § 6330(e)(1) exception, Springer had brought his claims in the wrong court. Because we agree that the IRS had suspended its collection activities and therefore Springer could not invoke the exception, we need not address the district court’s alternate conclusion. -9- concerning his liability— he litigated in the Tax Court and lost. Additionally, his ability to appeal the result of the CDP hearing under 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1) provides him with an adequate legal remedy concerning the levy procedure. Springer II was an appeal from the notices of determination issued at the conclusion of the CDP hearing. Springer, however, brought the appeal in the wrong court. Under the statute as it read at the time he filed Springer II, he was required to bring his appeal in the Tax Court, not the district court, because the underlying tax liability concerned income taxes. See 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1) (2000) (providing that an appeal of a CD P determination must be brought to the Tax Court if it has jurisdiction of the underlying tax liability); 4 Voelker v. Nolen, 365 F.3d 580, 581 (7th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (Tax Court has jurisdiction over appeals from CDP hearings involving income taxes); accord M arino v. Brown, 357 F.3d 143, 146 (1st Cir. 2004) (per curiam). For this reason, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and we need not address the preclusive effect of Springer I on Springer II. Springer’s argument that one of the notices of determination directed him to appeal to a United States District Court does not defeat the fact that the district court lacked jurisdiction. Parties cannot confer 4 In 2006, Section 6330(d)(1) was revised to direct all appeals from CDP hearings to the Tax Court. See Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 855(a), 120 Stat. 780, 1019 (2006). The revision does not affect our review. -10- subject matter jurisdiction on a federal court by their actions. Prier v. Steed, 456 F.3d 1209, 1214 (10th Cir. 2006). 5