Opinion ID: 1217183
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: defendant albanese

Text: The trial judge, in granting defendant Albanese's motion for directed verdict, concluded that Albanese owed no duty to plaintiff. Instead, the trial judge concluded that Albanese owed a duty only to defendant Koch, the contractor, and that Albanese had discharged that duty. It appears that the trial judge confused Albanese's contractual duty with his duty of reasonable care. Albanese owed a contractual duty to Koch which he apparently discharged. However, Albanese also owed a duty to exercise the ordinary skill of his profession in the inspection he made of the apartments. We agree with the Florida Supreme Court that: An architect may be liable for negligence in failing to exercise the ordinary skill of his profession, which results in the erection of an unsafe structure whereby anybody lawfully on the premises is injured.... They are under a duty to exercise such reasonable care, technical skill and ability, and diligence as are ordinarily required of architects in the course of their plans, inspections and supervisions during construction for the protection of any person who foreseeably and with reasonable certainty might be injured by the failure to do so. Conklin v. Cohen, 287 So.2d 56, 61 (Fla. 1973) (quoting Geer v. Bennett, 237 So.2d 311 (Fla.App. 1970)) (emphasis added). See also Karna v. Byron Reed Syndicate #4, 374 F. Supp. 687 (D.Neb. 1974). We hold, therefore, that defendant Albanese did owe a duty to plaintiff to exercise the ordinary skill of his profession, and that it is a jury question as to whether that duty was breached. Defendant Albanese argues that even if he breached a duty owed to plaintiff, any initial negligence on his part was superseded, as a matter of law, by the subsequent negligence of the other defendants and the city inspectors. We are not persuaded. We have previously held that an intervening, superseding cause will be deemed to supersede a prior cause only when the intervening cause is found to have been an extraordinary action that was unforeseen, unanticipated and not the probable consequence of the original negligence. Gavica v. Hanson, 101 Idaho 58, 608 P.2d 861 (1980); Dewey v. Keller, 86 Idaho 506, 388 P.2d 988 (1964). In addition, such a determination is one which should generally be left for the jury to make. Dewey v. Keller, supra . We are unwilling to conclude as a matter of law that the actions of Koch, Stearns and the city inspectors were so extraordinary and unforeseeable as to constitute intervening, superseding causes. It is a question for the jury. Therefore, we reverse the directed verdict in favor of defendant Albanese and remand for a new trial of plaintiff's negligence action against defendant Albanese.