Opinion ID: 785473
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bi's Claims of Property Damage

Text: 48 We reach a different conclusion as to the dismissal of Bi's claims of property damage, for, although CPLR § 214-c governs those claims as well, a plaintiff's discovery of one injury does not necessarily mean that she discovered a separate and distinct injury simultaneously. See, e.g., State v. Fermenta ASC Corp., 238 A.D.2d 400, 402, 656 N.Y.S.2d 342, 345 (2d Dep't) (mem.), lv. denied, 90 N.Y.2d 810, 664 N.Y.S.2d 271, 686 N.E.2d 1366 (1997); Bimbo v. Chromalloy American Corp., 226 A.D.2d 812, 815, 640 N.Y.S.2d 623, 625-26 (3d Dep't 1996). The question of whether two claimed injuries are separate and distinct or whether, instead, one was an outgrowth, maturation or complication of a previously discovered — and now time-barred — injury is a question of fact. State v. Fermenta ASC Corp., 238 A.D.2d at 402, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 345 (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Bimbo v. Chromalloy American Corp., 226 A.D.2d at 815, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 625. The question of when a plaintiff actually discovered a given injury is also a question of fact. See, e.g., Glod v. Morrill Press Division of Engraph, Inc., 168 A.D.2d at 956, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 908. The question of the time by which the plaintiff had constructive knowledge of the injury, i.e., the time by which she could with reasonable diligence have discovered the injury, CPLR § 214-c(2), is ordinarily a mixed question of law and fact, Glod v. Morrill Press Division of Engraph, Inc., 168 A.D.2d at 955, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 908. The existence of material factual disputes concerning such questions precludes summary dismissal of the action. 49 In Bimbo v. Chromalloy American Corp., for example, the plaintiffs, who knew in 1978 that their well water was contaminated, brought suit for contamination of the shallow groundwater on their property after they were warned of the latter contamination in 1992. The defendants moved to dismiss on statute-of-limitations grounds. The trial court denied the motion because of conflicting evidence as to the relationship between the contamination of the shallow groundwater and the contamination of the well water. See 226 A.D.2d at 812-15, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 624-25. The Appellate Division affirmed, stating that because the defendants had not definitively shown that the plaintiffs' claimed damage to shallow groundwater was an outgrowth, maturation or complication of a known but different injury, id. at 815, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 625 (internal quotation marks omitted), summary dismissal of the groundwater damage claim would have been premature, id. 50 In the present case, the district court dismissed Bi's claims of property damage on the ground that the manifestation of her personal injuries in 1990, which she attributed to contaminated well water, gave her constructive knowledge, as a matter of law, of the damage to her property. We disagree. Although the amended complaint alleged that defendants had discharged chemicals, pesticides, and other pollutants onto property owned by Bi and the organizations' members ( see, e.g., Amended Complaint ¶¶ 207, 191), with the result that [p]laintiff's [ sic ] properties and environment are highly contaminated with toxic substances ( id. ¶ 211), the record is silent as to when Bi first learned of the contamination of her property. Her realization in 1990 that she was suffering bodily injury from contaminated well water is not dispositive because the affidavit indicates that the well from which she obtained water was not on her property. ( See Bi Aff. ¶ 6 (describing Bi's use of the handpump water well near where I live) (emphasis added).) 51 Defendants have not called to our attention any evidence that shows definitively the date on which Bi knew or with reasonable diligence should have known that her property was contaminated. They contend that the 1999 Greenpeace report, on which Bi relied as the basis for her allegation that her property is contaminated, provided no information that was not available to Bi in 1990, and that Bi thus knew or should have known of this injury in 1990. We disagree. As discussed in Part I.A. above, findings of no contamination emanating from the plant site were reported by the Indian governmental organization NEERI in 1990 and 1997. ( See First NEERI Report at unnumbered Foreword page ([i]nvestigations revealed that the land and water environment have not been contaminated....); Second NEERI Report at unnumbered page 5 of Executive Summary (reaffirming First NEERI Report's finding of no groundwater contamination in and around the plant site).) In contrast, the Greenpeace Report issued in November 1999 stated that contamination was found on land both within and surrounding  the former UCIL plant site. (Greenpeace Report at 4 (emphasis added).) Given the contrary prior reports by NEERI, a factfinder could permissibly infer that Bi in fact gained from the Greenpeace Report material information that she lacked earlier. Thus, there are questions of fact to be resolved as to when Bi learned, or with reasonable diligence should have learned, of the alleged damage to her property. 52 Finally, as discussed above, CPLR § 214-c provides a limitations period only with respect to claims for damages. Thus, to the extent that the relief requested by Bi on her property damage claims included injunctive relief in the form of remediation of her property or remediation of the former UCIL plant site, those claims are not barred by § 214-c, although, as discussed in Part II.C. below, the latter form of relief may be impracticable. 53 In considering Bi's property damage claims on remand, the district court may also consider whether Bi is qualified to serve as a class representative to litigate such claims for damages or injunctive relief on behalf of similarly situated individuals. We express no view as to the merits of that question. 54