Opinion ID: 1189464
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: In support of his argument that the district court should have ordered a competency hearing, Marks points to his courtroom demeanor, his doggedness in arguing that the district court had no jurisdiction over him, and his second appointed counsel's representation, in filing a motion for Marks to proceed pro se, that he had no relationship with Marks that could assist him in representing Marks. It is true that Marks sometimes was rude to the court, that he repeatedly argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over him, and that he refused to work with, and consider himself represented by, appointed counsel. However, the record demonstrates that these acts simply reflected Marks' claimed beliefs that the court lacked legal authority over him and could not be trusted to appoint effective and neutral counsel to help him. While Marks' claimed beliefs may have been unorthodox and wrongheaded, they were not indicative of an inability to understand the proceedings against him or conduct his own defense. Despite sometimes being disrespectful to the court, Marks generally followed courtroom rules, was polite in addressing the jury and witnesses, and asked pertinent questions on cross-examination that reflected his understanding of the case and that could have been effective in undercutting the government's case against him. Accordingly, we conclude that Marks' conduct does not constitute substantial evidence of incompetence to stand trial. See Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 645 (9th Cir.2004) (Although there is little doubt that Davis was recalcitrant and acted in ways that were detrimental to his case, his interactions with the trial judge indicated that he understood what was at stake during the penalty phase and could make informed decisions.); United States v. Mills, 597 F.2d 693, 699 (9th Cir.1979) (holding that district court was not required to sua sponte inquire into defendant's competency where defendant was alert, rational and responsive throughout the trial); see also United States v. Auen, 864 F.2d 4, 5 (2d Cir.1988) (upholding finding of competency where defendant's odd behavior arose out of his position with respect to the tax law rather than mental disease and where defendant was able to understand the nature and consequences of the proceeding against him, and had he so chosen, could have cooperated with counsel). The cases on which Marks relies are distinguishable. In Chavez v. United States, 656 F.2d 512 (9th Cir.1981), the evidence of incompetence included a history of antisocial behavior and treatment for mental illness; several emotional outbursts, one of which resulted in the defendant's removal from the courtroom; a previous psychiatric finding of insanity based on psychoneurosis and the use of drugs; the defendant's firing of his attorneys; and an inference that the defendant had not attempted to plea bargain. Id. at 519. In United States v. Williams, 113 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir.1997), the defendant, who had a history of drug addiction and was taking an antidepressant, repeatedly interrupted the court, was prone to making outbursts, was at one point crying and unable to control herself, announced that she was firing her attorney, and, on the second day of her two-day trial was out of control. Id. at 1157-58. While Marks did reject the assistance of two appointed attorneys and, during his cross-examination of Agent Dowling, had what the court described as an out-burst, Marks was by no means out of control, displayed no pattern of antisocial behavior throughout the 37-day trial, has presented no evidence of a history of mental illness, and has pointed to no evidence that he did not attempt to plea bargain. Accordingly, the district court did not plainly err in not sua sponte examining Marks' competency.