Opinion ID: 3003775
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Establishment Clause Violation

Text: The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is applicable to states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides, in relevant part, that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .” U.S. C ONST. amend. I. This clause sets forth 6 No. 08-1515 a principle of government neutrality. It prohibits the government from promoting “a point of view in religious matters” or otherwise taking sides between “religion and religion or religion and nonreligion.” McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court set forth, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, a three-part test to evaluate Establishment Clause claims. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Under the Lemon test, government action violates the Establishment Clause if it has any of the following characteristics: (1) a non-secular purpose; (2) the principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion; or (3) fostering an excessive government entanglement with religion. Id. at 612. The plaintiffs argue that the Sheriff’s actions had the purpose or effect of advancing religion, so we focus our analysis on the first two elements. The first prong of the Lemon test requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the government’s actual purpose was to endorse or disapprove of religion. Books v. Elkhart County, 401 F.3d 857, 863 (7th Cir. 2005). For this inquiry, we look through the eyes of an objective observer. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 862. Although the government’s articulation of a secular purpose is not sufficient to withstand First Amendment scrutiny, it is entitled to our deference “as long as it is not a sham.” Ind. Civil Liberties Union v. O’Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 771 (7th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that the government lacks a secular purpose under Lemon only when “there is no question that the statute or activity was motivated wholly by religious considerations.” Books, 401 F.3d at 863 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, No. 08-1515 7 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984)). As the Court recognized in McCreary, the government does not generally act unconstitutionally with the predominant purpose of advancing religion. 545 U.S. at 863. And few cases have involved conduct or factual circumstances so patently religious as to be dispositive of the government’s secular purpose. The second prong of the Lemon test, however, requires no inquiry into the government’s intent. The appearance of endorsement of religion alone can send a “message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, . . . and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders . . . .” Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Therefore, a government practice can also violate the Establishment Clause if a “reasonable person, apprised of the circumstances surrounding the [challenged government act], would conclude that [it] amounted to an endorsement of religion.” Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 705 (7th Cir. 2005). The objective “reasonable person” in this test is presumed to be “informed . . . [and] familiar with the history of the government practice at issue.” Vasquez v. L.A. County, 487 F.3d 1246, 1256 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Traditionally, outside organizations had limited access in disseminating information to the Sheriff’s deputies. Most sent flyers to be posted on the bulletin board or read aloud to the officers. Very few organizations had been invited to make personal presentations, and such invitations had been limited to groups that partnered with the department in some form. For instance, Johnson’s Bike Company, who also appeared at the conference, 8 No. 08-1515 supplied the department with bicycles, and Companions Rest, another invitee, donated money to the department’s canine unit. Indeed, the Centurions also provided a benefit to the officers in the form of a support group. But their unique faith-based approach sets them apart from the secular organizations invited to speak. The Centurions offered peer support, but also sought to foster discussion on how the officers could “impact others for Christ” and on Christ’s impact in their lives. This presents a problem for the Sheriff because the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from “promot[ing] or affiliat[ing] itself with any religious doctrine or organization.” County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 590 (1989). During the Centurions’ initial presentation at the leadership conference, Mr. Melang referenced Romans 13, from the Bible, which, according to him, “tell[s] us that [God] established government and that people in authority are ministers of God assigned to promote good and punish evil.” He also stated that “the same God who ordained authority inspired a book and sent a counselor that promises to give us guidance on how to navigate life’s road.” Following the speech, the Centurions made available a book entitled “Putting the Pieces Back Together; How Real Life and Real Faith Connect.” In light of the speaker’s comments during the presentations, one can argue that the Sheriff should have taken affirmative steps to avoid the appearance of endorsement. See Freedom from Religion Found. Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 497 (7th Cir. 2000). Instead, he promoted this perception earlier in the conference when he circulated a handout in which he underNo. 08-1515 9 lined “people of faith” as a quality leaders should look for when building their “inner circle.” Notably, this occurred during a discussion on promotions to the rank of Captain. The Sheriff’s perceived or actual endorsement of the Centurions’ message is readily apparent from these facts. The Supreme Court’s decision in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe presents a useful analogy. 530 U.S. 290 (2000). In determining that an invocation delivered before a football game created the perception of endorsement by the school, the Court in that case looked to the following factors: the invocation was “delivered to a large audience assembled as part of a regularly scheduled, school-sponsored function conducted on school property”; “the pregame ceremony [was] clothed in the traditional indicia of school sporting events . . . “; and the crowd included many who displayed the school colors and insignia. Id. at 307-08 (emphasis added). Based on these observations and others, the Court concluded that “members of the listening audience must perceive the pregame message as a public expression of the views of the majority of the student body delivered with the approval of the school administrator.” Id. at 308. In contrast, in Good News Club v. Milford Central School, the Court focused on the government’s neutrality, as other groups had access to the school, and the religious club’s meetings were held after school hours, were not sponsored by the school and were open to the public, in concluding that the Establishment Clause did not require the school to exclude the religious organization from its property. 533 U.S. 98, 113 (2001). 10 No. 08-1515 Although the above examples concern cases applying the First Amendment in the school context, they provide useful illustrations of what a reasonable person would perceive to be endorsement. In this case, the Centurions gave a heavily Christian-focused presentation at a mandatory conference for government employees, and the Sheriff subsequently invited them to present at mandatory roll calls during work hours, granting them unfiltered access to a captive audience of subordinates. At each roll call, they were personally introduced by the Sheriff’s command staff and were permitted to distribute additional Christian-focused literature. Even more telling was the Sheriff’s refusal to cease the presentations after some of the deputies complained of the Centurions’ proselytizing. He took no steps to disentangle himself or the Department from any of the religious messages, see Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 306, and his actions, at the least, appeared to place the Centurions’ in the same category as the other “partnering” organizations, like Johnson’s Bike Company—all of whom presumably received the Department’s approval. We do not suggest, however, that religiously affiliated groups are always constitutionally barred from working with or speaking to government employees. Rather, we limit our analysis to the facts of this case, where an authority figure invited a Christian organization that engaged in religious proselytizing to speak on numerous occasions at mandatory government employee meetings. A reasonable observer would have been well aware that the Sheriff did not extend such privileges lightly. Most other organizations that received similar No. 08-1515 11 access shared a common attribute: the Sheriff had expressed an interest in partnering with them.1 Indeed, it would be difficult to interpret the Sheriff’s actions as anything other than endorsement.