Opinion ID: 3134369
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Ill App. 3d 48 (1980); Sullivan v. Board of Fire & Police

Text: Commissioners, 103 Ill. App. 3d 167 (1981). Nevertheless, defendants argue that plaintiffs' reliance on the Barrows line of cases was unjustified because it represented a minority viewpoint in Illinois--the First, Third and Fifth Districts of the Appellate Court had taken the opposite view. Defendants, however, ignore the fact that when conflicts arise amongst the districts, the circuit court is bound by the decisions of the appellate court of the district in which it sits. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Yapejian, 152 Ill. 2d 533, 539-40 (1992). In view of these circumstances, we do not think it was unreasonable for plaintiffs, faced with conflicting appellate authority, to rely upon the authority from their home appellate district. The second Chevron factor consists of  `weigh[ing] the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and [determining] whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.'  Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-07, 30 L. Ed. 2d at 306, 92 S. Ct. at 355, quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629, 14 L. Ed. 2d 601, 608, 85 S. Ct. 1731, 1738. In its decision in Mueller, the appellate court rejected the analysis contained in Barrows and its progeny because of the split of authority on the question of the applicability of the administrative review law to actions concerning police promotions. See Mueller, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 731. Moreover, the court noted that its departure from the prior settled rule in the district was warranted in order to promote incongruous results. Mueller, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 732-33. A nonretroactive application of Mueller to the parties in this case does not frustrate these concerns. The appellate court here noted that it was applying Mueller prospectively to the parties because the facts of the instant case and its timing vis a vis Mueller are so unique. No. 2--94--0987 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Therefore, the nonretroactive application was expressly limited to the facts of the case and could not have retarded the future operation of Mueller. In addition, the appellate court issued its decision as an unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23 (134 Ill. 2d R. 23). As a result, the appellate court's decision in this case has no precedential value and does not in any way overrule or modify the rule announced by the Second District in Mueller. That decision remains intact in the absence of a contrary ruling from this court. For these reasons, prospective application of Mueller in this case will not dilute the operation of the rule announced in Mueller in the Second District. The final element of the Chevron test concerns whether substantial inequitable results would be produced if the former decision is applied retroactively. Chevron, 404 U.S. at 107, 30 L. Ed. 2d at 306, 92 S. Ct. at 355. In this case, the effect of a retroactive application of Mueller would be that plaintiffs' lawsuit is time-barred. More important, such an application would deprive plaintiffs of any remedy whatsoever due to a superseding legal doctrine that was unforeseeable. In this respect, this case is similar to Chevron, in which a plaintiff's cause of action was terminated by the retroactive application of the former case. The United States Supreme Court there noted that it would be substantial[ly] inequitable  to hold that the [plaintiff] `slept on his rights' at a time when he could not have known the time limitations that the law imposed upon him. Chevron, 404 U.S. at 108, 30 L. Ed. 2d at 306-07, 92 S. Ct. at 356. We share this view in this case and find that the balance of equities falls in plaintiffs' favor. In view of the circumstances of this case, we reject defendants' contention that the appellate court erred in finding that plaintiffs satisfied the criteria for a prospective application of Mueller to their cause of action.