Opinion ID: 75961
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of AEDPA to Isaacs' Petition

Text: 26 The first issue that we will address — whether AEDPA is applicable to Isaacs' § 2254 petition — affects our review of all of Isaacs' claims. The relevant facts, as mentioned above, are that Isaacs filed a motion for appointment of habeas counsel, and the district court granted that motion, prior to the effective date of AEDPA. However, Isaacs did not file his actual habeas petition until after the effective date. The Supreme Court subsequently held that the new AEDPA standards did not apply to pending cases. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). So, the critical issue becomes whether Isaacs' habeas case was pending, for purposes of AEDPA's applicability, from the time that Isaacs moved for appointment of counsel, or only from the later time when he filed his habeas petition. As a matter of first impression in this Court, we agree with the district court, and the majority of the other circuits which have addressed this narrow issue, 1 and hold that Isaacs' habeas case was pending only from the time that he filed his actual § 2254 petition, and therefore that AEDPA applies to this case. 27
28 The relevance of determining the point from which Isaacs' case should be considered to have been pending derives from the Supreme Court's decision in Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). In that case, the Supreme Court considered whether the provisions of AEDPA applied retroactively to pending cases. The Court's decision that AEDPA should not be applied to most pending habeas cases was based largely on the fact that § 107(c) of the Act expressly stated that chapter 154 of AEDPA — a chapter which sets out special rules expediting § 2254 cases when states satisfy certain requirements — should be applied to pending cases. See id. at 327, 117 S.Ct. at 2063. No such retroactivity provision was included in AEDPA chapter 153, the chapter applicable to other § 2254 petitions (including Isaacs' petition, if AEDPA applies). The Court noted that [i]f ... Congress was reasonably concerned to ensure that chapter 154 be applied to pending cases, it should have been just as concerned about chapter 153, unless it had the different intent that the latter chapter not be applied to the general run of pending cases. Id. at 329, 117 S.Ct. at 2064. Because Congress considered the two chapters together, the Court stated that the negative implications raised by disparate provisions are strong[]. Id. at 330, 117 S.Ct. at 2065. After discussing alternative interpretations of the statutory provisions, the Court stated: We hold that the negative implication of § 107(c) is that the new provisions of chapter 153 generally apply only to cases filed after the Act became effective. Id. at 336, 117 S.Ct. at 2068. 29 Although Lindh clearly establishes that AEDPA does not apply to pending cases, it does not address the issue presented in this case of what event marks the beginning of a habeas case. In addressing that issue, Isaacs points to other recent Supreme Court cases interpreting habeas provisions in a way that supports his contention that a habeas case begins at the time a petitioner files a motion for appointment of counsel. 30 First, Isaacs directs us to the Supreme Court's opinion in McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 114 S.Ct. 2568, 129 L.Ed.2d 666 (1994). In that case, the Supreme Court considered two statutory provisions related to habeas cases: 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B), which creates a statutory right to qualified legal representation for capital defendants in federal habeas proceedings, and 28 U.S.C. § 2251, which grants a federal judge before whom a habeas proceeding is pending the power to stay any related state court proceeding. The lower courts in McFarland had refused to appoint habeas counsel for the defendant pursuant to § 848(q)(4)(B) because the defendant had not yet filed a habeas petition. Id. at 851-54, 114 S.Ct. at 2570-71. 31 The Supreme Court began by noting that § 848(q)(4)(B) grants indigent capital defendants a mandatory right to qualified counsel and related services `[i]n any [federal] post conviction proceeding,' but that the statute did not specify how the right was to be invoked. Id. at 854, 114 S.Ct. at 2571 (quoting § 848(q)(4)(B)) (brackets in original). In particular, the statute did not define a `post conviction proceeding' under § 2254 or § 2255 or expressly state how such a proceeding shall be commenced. Id. In light of other related provisions, however, the Court held that § 848(q)(4)(B) ... established a right to preapplication legal assistance. Id. at 855, 114 S.Ct. at 2572. The Court found that the interpretation [of the statute to permit the appointment of counsel prior to the filing of a formal petition] is the only one that gives meaning to the statute as a practical matter, and concluded that: 32 The language and purposes of § 848(q)(4)(B) and its related provisions establish that the right to appointed counsel includes a right to legal assistance in the preparation of a habeas corpus application. We therefore conclude that a post conviction proceeding within the meaning of § 848(q)(4)(B) is commenced by the filing of a death row defendant's motion requesting the appointment of counsel for his federal habeas corpus proceeding. 33 Id. at 855-57, 114 S.Ct. at 2572-73. 34 After reaching that conclusion, the Supreme Court went on to address the similar issue of whether a federal court has authority to stay state court proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2251 prior to the filing of a formal habeas petition. Section 2251 grants any federal judge before whom a habeas corpus proceeding is pending power to enjoin related state court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2251. McFarland argued that his request for counsel in a `post conviction proceeding' under § 848(q)(4)(B) initiated a `habeas corpus proceeding' within the meaning of § 2251, and that the District Court thus had jurisdiction to enter a stay. McFarland, 512 U.S. at 857, 114 S.Ct. at 2573. The Court held that: 35 The language of these two statutes indicates that the sections refer to the same proceeding. Section 848(q)(4)(B) expressly applies to any post conviction proceeding under section 2254 or 2255 — the precise habeas corpus proceeding[s] that § 2251 involves. The terms post conviction and habeas corpus also are used interchangeably in legal parlance to refer to proceedings under §§ 2254 and 2255. We thus conclude that the two statutes must be read in pari materia to provide that once a capital defendant invokes his right to appointed counsel, a federal court also has jurisdiction under § 2251 to enter a stay of execution. 36 Id. at 858, 114 S.Ct. at 2573. 37 Because the McFarland Court held with respect to both § 848 and § 2251 that habeas proceedings were commenced with the filing of a motion for appointment of counsel, Isaacs argues that we should also find that his habeas case was pending, for purposes of determining whether AEDPA applies, as of the time he filed his motion for appointment of counsel. If we were to do so then it would follow, of course, that AEDPA would not apply to his petition. 38 The second Supreme Court case on which Isaacs relies is Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 118 S.Ct. 1969, 141 L.Ed.2d 242 (1998). In Hohn, the Court considered whether it had jurisdiction to review a decision by a court of appeals denying an application for a certificate of appealability (COA). To resolve this issue, the Court had to decide whether a court of appeals' consideration of a COA application constituted a case. Id. at 241, 118 S.Ct. at 1972. The Court concluded that it did, stating: 39 There can be little doubt that Hohn's application for a certificate of appealability constitutes a case under § 1254(1). As we have noted, [t]he words `case' and `cause' are constantly used as synonyms in statutes ..., each meaning a proceeding in court, a suit, or action. Blyew v. United States, 13 Wall. 581, 595, 20 L.Ed. 638 (1871). The dispute over Hohn's entitlement to a certificate falls within this definition. It is a proceeding seeking relief for an immediate and redressable injury, i.e., wrongful detention in violation of the Constitution. There is adversity as well as the other requisite qualities of a case as the term is used in both Article III of the Constitution and the statute here under consideration. This is significant, we think, for cases are addressed in the ordinary course of the judicial process, and, as a general rule, when the district court has denied relief and applicable requirements of finality have been satisfied, the next step is review in the court of appeals. 40 Id. 41 The Hohn Court also rejected the suggestion that an application for a COA was a threshold matter separate from the merits and over which appellate courts lack jurisdiction, stating: 42 Precedent forecloses this argument. In Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 63 S.Ct. 1, 87 L.Ed. 3 (1942), we confronted the analogous question whether a request for leave to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was a case in a district court for the purposes of the then-extant statute governing court of appeals review of district court decisions. See 28 U.S.C. § 225(a) First (1940 ed.) (courts of appeals had jurisdiction to review final decisions [i]n the district courts, in all cases save where a direct review of the decision may be had in the Supreme Court). We held the request for leave constituted a case in the district court over which the court of appeals could assert jurisdiction, even though the district court had denied the request. We reasoned, [p]resentation of the petition for judicial action is the institution of a suit. Hence the denial by the district court of leave to file the petitions in these causes was the judicial determination of a case or controversy, reviewable on appeal to the Court of Appeals. 317 U.S., at 24, 63 S.Ct., at 9. 43 Id. at 246, 118 S.Ct. at 1974-75. Isaacs contends that, in light of McFarland and Hohn, the Court should hold that he instituted his habeas case at the time that he filed his motion for appointment of counsel. 44 Arguably pointing in the other direction, however, is another recent Supreme Court case that has not yet been discussed by any of the other circuits in connection with the issue before us. In Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000), the Supreme Court addressed whether pre or post-AEDPA rules should apply to an appeal filed pursuant to § 2253 after AEDPA became effective, when the original petition was filed with the district court before AEDPA. 2 The Court noted that just as § 2254 was directed to petitions filed in district courts after AEDPA, Section 2253 was directed to proceedings initiated in appellate courts after the Act's effective date. Id. at 481, 120 S.Ct. at 1602. Therefore, the Court concluded that AEDPA's rules applied to appeals filed after AEDPA, even though appellate courts would be required to apply pre-AEDPA law in reviewing the trial court's ruling. Id. 45 As the State points out, the Slack Court's holding indicates that, at least when a case moves from the district court to appellate court level, it may be divisible so that AEDPA would apply to one aspect of the proceeding, but not to the other. The Supreme Court recognized this fact, explaining: 46 While an appeal is a continuation of the litigation started in the trial court, it is a distinct step. We have described proceedings in the courts of appeals as appellate cases. Under AEDPA, an appellate case is commenced when the application for a COA is filed. 47 When Congress instructs us (as Lindh says it has) that application of a statute is triggered by the commencement of a case, the relevant case for a statute directed to appeals is the one initiated in the appellate court. Thus, § 2253(c) governs appellate court proceedings filed after AEDPA's effective date. 48 Id. at 481-82, 120 S.Ct. at 1602-03 (citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, a case isn't always just a case. Instead this Court must consider the relevant case in order to determine which set of standards apply.
49 Having set out the Supreme Court authority relevant to the issue of whether AEDPA applies to Isaacs' petition, we will now discuss the competing approaches taken by our sister circuits in this regard. 50 As mentioned above, five circuits have considered this exact issue, and all but one have found AEDPA to be applicable under these circumstances. The only circuit so far to have accepted Isaacs' position on when a habeas case is instituted is the Ninth. In Calderon, the en banc Ninth Circuit overruled the position announced in previous decisions and held that, for purposes of determining whether a case was pending when AEDPA took effect in April 1996, courts should look to the date on which the defendant filed a motion for appointment of counsel. 163 F.3d at 539-40. Its previous cases had interpreted the Supreme Court's McFarland decision as applying only to the two statutory provisions presented in that case (the provisions allowing for appointment of habeas counsel and providing district courts with authority to stay state court proceedings), but not to the question of whether a case was pending for AEDPA purposes. Id. at 539 (discussing cases). The Calderon court found, however, that the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Hohn required it to revisit and reverse its position. 51 In Calderon, the Ninth Circuit interpreted Hohn as indicating that a habeas case may be initiated by the filing of an application for a COA. Id. The court focused on the Supreme Court's rejection of the notion that a COA is a threshold matter separate from the merits of a habeas case. Id. The court then reasoned that: 52 In the wake of Hohn, we must overrule [the Ninth Circuit precedent] holding that a habeas corpus case is not pending until the habeas petition itself has been filed. Hohn 's holding, as well as its reliance on Ex Parte Quirin that a threshold request for leave to file a petition for habeas corpus commences the habeas case, is simply irreconcilable with [those cases]. Like a request for leave to file a habeas petition, a petition for the appointment of counsel to prepare and file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, accompanied by a motion for a stay of execution under McFarland, is a threshold action that presents a case to the district court. By analogy to Hohn, it follows that a petition for appointment of counsel under McFarland creates a pending habeas case. Accordingly, we overrule those [cases] that held that a habeas corpus case is pending only when the habeas petition itself has been filed. A petition for the appointment of counsel to prepare and file a habeas petition, coupled with a motion for a stay of execution, also suffices. 53 Id. at 540. See also Garceau v. Woodford, 275 F.3d 769, 772 n. 1 (9th Cir.2001) (following Calderon ); Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 771 (9th Cir.2001). 54 Contrary to the Ninth Circuit, four courts of appeals have held that AEDPA applies to § 2254 petitions filed after the Act became effective, even if the defendant had filed a motion for appointment of counsel or for a stay prior to the effective date. The courts which have taken this position have found the Supreme Court cases discussed above distinguishable for several reasons. 55 The Sixth Circuit's decision in Williams v. Coyle, 167 F.3d 1036 (6th Cir.1999), is a good example that contains most of the reasons cited by the other circuits for the conclusion that a habeas case is only pending from the time that an actual petition is filed. The Williams court began by noting that [i]n ordinary usage a case is pending when a complaint or petition is filed. Id. at 1038. Also, the Sixth Circuit noted that habeas cases are generally subject to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Rule 11 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, and Rule 3 of those rules states that [a] civil action is commenced by the filing of a complaint with the court. Id. After stating that no habeas rules address the specific issue, the court conclude[d] that Fed.R.Civ.P. 3 yields a presumption that a federal habeas corpus case is filed with the filing of an application for the writ. Id. The court found that [t]his presumption is reinforced by the language of the habeas corpus provisions, because, for example, Section 2254(e) refers to a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. 56 After discussing these reasons to believe that a habeas case is only pending after a petition is filed, the Williams court turned to the Supreme Court cases discussed above. The court noted that McFarland held that a motion for the appointment of counsel constitutes a post conviction proceeding for purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B), and that a motion for appointment of counsel was sufficient to enable a district court to stay an execution pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2251, which literally grants this power to a judge `before whom a habeas corpus proceeding is pending.' Id. The Sixth Circuit concluded that McFarland did not indicate that a habeas case was pending, for purposes of AEDPA's applicability, simply because a motion for appointment of counsel had been filed, stating: 57 [B]oth holdings of McFarland appear to rest on the necessity of expanding the ordinary meaning of a pending case in order to give effect to clear congressional intent. By contrast, we perceive no compelling reason to depart from plain meaning in the present case. The problem the Court addressed in McFarland was of an ongoing nature and had nothing to do with the effective date of any statutory provision. In the present case, on the other hand, the defendant faces additional procedural hurdles post-AEDPA, but there is no ongoing rationale for stretching the pending period to reach prior to the actual filing of the application as there was in McFarland. Once all cases in which a petitioner initiated some habeas corpus-related legal action prior to the effective date of the AEDPA have been resolved, the point at which a § 2254 case is filed will become irrelevant. 58 Id. at 1039. Williams acknowledged that McFarland contains language which could be interpreted as meaning that a § 2254 case in general begins with the filing of a motion for appointment of counsel, but rejected such a broad reading, concluding instead that this reading is warranted only to the extent necessary to give effect to § 848(q)(4)(B). Id. 59 The Sixth Circuit then turned to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Calderon, and rejected the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the effect of the Supreme Court's Hohn decision. Id. The court stated that: 60 In our opinion Hohn and Ex parte Quirin stand only for the proposition that the denial by the district court of a motion for the issuance of a COA, a motion for leave to file a petition for the writ, or, as in our case, a motion for the appointment of counsel pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) would constitute an appealable case. This does not imply, however, that the petitioner's habeas corpus case has been initiated by the filing of such a preliminary motion. Although the Court in Hohn rejected the contention that the filing of a preliminary motion should be regarded as a threshold inquiry separate from the merits, Hohn, 118 S.Ct. at 1974-75, the holding and logic of the case were limited to the determination that the rejection by the district court of the preliminary motion constitutes an appealable case. Thus, we do not believe that Hohn dictates the result sought by Williams. 61 Id. at 1040. 62 Having rejected an interpretation of Hohn that would have the motion for appointment of counsel mark the beginning of a habeas case, the Sixth Circuit then stated that it agreed with a pre- Hohn Seventh Circuit opinion that stated: 63 Although it is linguistically possible for this preapplication legal assistance to open a case having some affinity to a petition under § 2254 ... the motion for counsel is not itself a petition, because it does not call for (or even permit) a decision on the merits. And it is the merits that the amended § 2254(d)(1) is all about. 64 Id. (quoting Holman v. Gilmore, 126 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir.1997)). Therefore, the Sixth Circuit concluded that a federal habeas corpus case is filed or pending for purposes of Lindh and the AEDPA only when the petition for the writ is filed. Id. 65 More recently, the Seventh Circuit addressed the effect of Hohn and the Ninth Circuit's Calderon opinion, and Judge Easterbrook stood by the court's earlier approach, stating: 66 The question in Hohn was whether an application for a certificate of appealability is a case in the court of appeals, and therefore amenable to review on writ of certiorari under 28 U.S.C. § 1254. The answer to that question does not bear on the issue in Holman and Calderon: whether an application for counsel under 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4) is a case pending under Chapter 153 of the Judicial Code — the critical question for application of the AEDPA. We did not doubt in Holman that a request for counsel is a case in the sense that it is subject to appellate review (and, if need be, review by the Supreme Court). Indeed, Gosier's request for counsel was reviewed by this court on appeal, after the district judge dismissed his application. But a request for counsel under § 848(q)(4), part of Title 21, is not a case under Chapter 153 of Title 28 — that is, the request is not a collateral attack on a criminal judgment. This rationale of Holman was ignored by the ninth circuit, and we are not persuaded by a decision that avoided the fundamental issue. So we apply the AEDPA to Gosier's case. 67 Gosier v. Welborn, 175 F.3d 504, (7th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). 68 The opinions of the other circuits add little to the analysis performed by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. In two opinions, both of which pre-dated Hohn, the Fifth Circuit found that McFarland simply did not address the issue of when a case was pending for AEDPA purposes, but was instead intended to resolve practical procedural problems related to the two specific statutory provisions at issue in that case. Williams v. Cain, 125 F.3d 269 (5th Cir.1997); see also Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 414 (5th Cir.1997) (same). Similarly, in Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir.1999), the Tenth Circuit agreed that  McFarland focused on the need to expand the ordinary meaning of a pending case to give effect to Congressional intent, and did not address when a case is pending for AEDPA purposes. Id. at 1162.
69 We conclude that the better reasoned approach is the one taken by the majority of the other circuits that have faced the issue before us, and we hold that the relevant date for purposes of judging AEDPA's applicability to a habeas petition is the date on which the actual § 2254 petition was filed. 70 In reaching this conclusion, we acknowledge that some of the language used by the Supreme Court in McFarland and in Hohn supports Isaacs' contention that his case began with the filing of a motion for appointment of counsel. However, we think that the best reading of McFarland is that it was concerned only with interpreting and giving effect to two, narrow statutory provisions. It would be a stretch to find that the decision indicates that for all purposes, a habeas case is pending from the time that a motion for appointment of counsel is filed. Nothing in McFarland precludes the result we reach today. 71 Likewise, Hohn was limited to the relatively narrow issue of whether an application for a COA initiated a case or controversy over which appellate courts could exercise jurisdiction consistent with Article III of the Constitution. We agree with the Seventh Circuit that [t]he answer to that question does not bear on ... whether an application for counsel ... is a `case pending' under Chapter 153 of the Judicial Code — the critical question for application of the AEDPA. Gosier, 175 F.3d at 506. 72 We are persuaded that the Seventh Circuit's approach in Gosier is the correct one. We agree that, in a sense, the filing of a motion for appointment of counsel or other threshold motions might initiate some form of case, at least in the constitutional sense. However, such a motion does not necessarily mark the genesis of the habeas case under § 2254. A motion for appointment of counsel has no relation to the merits of a habeas petition and does not seek any form of merits relief from a district court. Such a motion does not even assure that a habeas case will ever materialize. For example, an appointed counsel could well conclude that the would-be petitioner has no colorable claims to present. Therefore, only when an actual habeas petition is filed seeking relief from a conviction or sentence does § 2254 come into play. 73 Furthermore, the Supreme Court's opinion in Slack supports the idea that all proceedings that have any relation to a habeas petition do not have to be viewed as a unified whole for purposes of AEDPA. Instead, Slack expressly recognized that a court, in order to determine the applicable law, must determine what is the relevant case. Id. at 482, 120 S.Ct. at 1603. We believe that it follows — from the Supreme Court's recognition that an appellate case may be subject to AEDPA even though the underlying district court proceedings were not — that even though a motion for appointment of counsel was filed before AEDPA and was not subject to its provisions, a later-filed habeas petition may nonetheless be governed by the stricter AEDPA standards that took effect in the interim. The simple fact is, at the time AEDPA became the law, Isaacs' habeas case was not pending because it had not yet been filed and he had not asked the district court for any type of merits relief that could be characterized as habeas relief. We hold that the relevant case was not pending when AEDPA became effective, and the district court properly considered Isaacs' petition under AEDPA's standards. 74