Opinion ID: 71677
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony About the Cell Phone

Text: At trial, the Government’s case turned on whether they could successfully link Collins to Reed’s murder—a link that relied in large part upon circumstantial evidence. In particular, the Government presented evidence on the location of four cell phones on April 2 and 3, 2003. Three of the cell phones were clearly linked to Edmond, Nelson, and Walker—each one’s name was registered to the phone in the phone company’s records. The fourth phone was a demonstration phone that Nelson had stolen from a Sprint store; phone company records did not list a registered owner. Using phone records and information from cell phone towers, the Government showed that the four cell phones placed numerous calls amongst each other throughout the night of April 2 and into the morning of April 3. The locations and times of the calls roughly corresponded to the locations where Reed was attacked and her body was abandoned. In particular, the fourth phone moved from the area where Reed’s car window was broken (around 1:40 a.m.), to the area where Reed’s body was recovered (between 3:15 and 3:30 a.m.), and then to the area around the InTown Suites in Jackson, Mississippi, where Collins was staying (around 5:15 a.m.). After 5:15 a.m. on April 3, the fourth phone was not used again for two weeks. Edmond testified on direct examination that she knew Collins had used the fourth phone, but that she did not know whether he used the phone on the night of the murder. The exchange on direct examination went as follows: Q: [by prosecutor] How are you familiar with a stolen Sprint phone? A: It was a cell phone that my sister, Kathleen, took from the Sprint store. 12 Case: 08-61115 Document: 00511040046 Page: 13 Date Filed: 03/02/2010 No. 08-61115 Q: [by defense counsel] I object. Your Honor, I’m going to object unless there’s a basis of knowledge laid. Q: [by prosecutor] How would you know Kathleen took a phone from the Sprint store? A: I was with her when she took it. Q: Okay. And what happened to that phone, if you know? A: She had that phone that night, but I don’t know exactly, you know. Q: Do you know who might have used that phone? Q: [by defense counsel] Again, objection unless there’s a basis— A: Mr. — THE COURT: I sustain the objection. I sustain the objection to the form of the question “might have used.” Q: [by prosecutor] Do you know who used that phone? A: Mr. Joe — Q: [by defense counsel] Same objection, your Honor. THE COURT: She can answer. A: Mr. Collins. Q: [by prosecutor] Okay. But you don’t know if he had it that night. A: I can’t say. Q: All right. Q: [by defense counsel] Your Honor, I want to move to strike her answer earlier because there’s been no basis of knowledge for her earlier answer. THE COURT: I’ll let you cross-examine on that point. (emphases added). Defense counsel did not cross-examine Edmond on the basis for her knowledge. Collins argues that the district court abused its discretion in allowing this testimony, as the Government failed to establish that Edmond had personal knowledge that Collins had used the fourth phone. At oral argument, Collins clarified that he challenges Edmond’s basis of knowledge that he used 13 Case: 08-61115 Document: 00511040046 Page: 14 Date Filed: 03/02/2010 No. 08-61115 the fourth cell phone between the time Nelson stole it and the night of Reed’s murder, and he argues he was prejudiced because without the testimony linking him to the phone, the evidence regarding the location and movement of the four cell phones would not have come in. Rule 602 states that “[a] witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the witness’[s] own testimony.” F ED. R. E VID. 602. The proponent of testimony bears the burden of establishing that a witness has personal knowledge. Burton v. Banta Global Turnkey, Ltd., 170 F. App’x 918, 923 n.4 (5th Cir. 2006). “[A] witness to a fact which can be perceived by the senses must have had an opportunity to observe, and must have actually observed the fact.” 1 M CC ORMICK ON E VIDENCE § 10 (5th ed. 1999). However, the threshold for admitting testimony under Rule 602 is fairly low; if “reasonable persons could differ as to whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe, . . . the witness’s testimony should come in, and the jury will appraise his opportunity to know in evaluating the weight of the testimony.” Id. Arguably, Edmond had the opportunity to observe whether Collins used the fourth cell phone, as she, Collins, Walker, and Nelson were mutual friends and spent a lot of time together, especially in the weeks leading up to the murder. However, assuming without deciding that the district court abused its discretion by allowing Edmond to testify that Collins had used the fourth cell phone before that night, that error was harmless, because it did not affect the outcome of the district court proceedings. Edmond expressly stated that she did not know who used the phone on the night of the murder, and her testimony regarding his alleged prior use of the phone was brief and equivocal. Where “other extensive evidence” supports the jury’s verdict, an error does not affect a defendant’s substantial rights. United States v. Cooks, 589 F.3d 173, 14 Case: 08-61115 Document: 00511040046 Page: 15 Date Filed: 03/02/2010 No. 08-61115 180 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Clark, 577 F.3d 273, 288 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding that any evidentiary error would have been harmless “given the overwhelming evidence of [the defendant’s] guilt”). Here, the record contained extensive circumstantial evidence that allowed the jury to infer that Collins used the fourth phone on the night of the murder and that he acted with Edmond, Nelson, and Walker in planning and carrying out Reed’s murder. For example, the evidence from the phone records shows that the fourth phone was located directly in the vicinity of the InTown Suites, where Collins was staying, when the last call was made in the early morning of April 3. Edmond testified that she, Nelson, Walker, and Collins were all good friends. In fact, Edmond paid for Collins’s room at the InTown Suites in the weeks leading up to Reed’s murder, and Walker often stayed with Collins at the InTown Suites. Walker and Collins both initially told FBI investigators that they had been playing dominoes together on the night of the murder; however, both men eventually gave inconsistent statements that undercut the initial joint alibi. Collins also offered investigators a notebook with domino scores to support the claim that he and Walker had been in his room at the InTown Suites on April 2, but an FBI handwriting analyst determined that the date for the April 2 game had been altered—it was originally marked as April 3. Reed’s body was recovered from an isolated location, approximately a mile and a half from a house where Collins lived for seventeen years. In addition, the jury heard Edmond’s testimony that Collins was involved in the fraud scheme; he hatched the idea to kill Reed to prevent her from testifying; he admitted to strangling Reed with his belt; he asked Edmond and Nelson to clean up Reed’s car and gave them directions to the abandoned car; he and Walker dumped Reed’s body off Old River Road; he bragged about cutting off Reed’s hands and head and called himself the “Little Butcher”; he told Edmond, on the day the local news reported the discovery of Reed’s body, not to 15 Case: 08-61115 Document: 00511040046 Page: 16 Date Filed: 03/02/2010 No. 08-61115 ask about the contents of a bag in the backseat of his car (which Edmond presumed contained Reed’s head and hands); and he repeatedly exhorted the others to keep their stories straight and suggested alibis to tell the police.6 See United States v. Setser, 568 F.3d 482, 494–95 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding improper admission of expert testimony was harmless error where government presented “considerable” evidence against defendant and where improper testimony only made up two lines of testimony in an extended trial). Where, as here, extensive evidence supports the jury’s verdict, any error did not affect the outcome of the district court proceedings; Collins’s substantial rights were not affected; and, therefore, any error was harmless.