Opinion ID: 197513
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Wrongful Discharge Claim Under ADEA

Text: Our analysis is governed by the familiar burden-shifting framework enunciated in McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 802-04, and adapted for use in ADEA cases, see, e.g., Woodman, 51 F.3d at 1091. Absent direct evidence of age discrimination, a claimant whose employment was terminated through a reduction in force (RIF) first must make a prima facie showing that: 1) he was at least forty years old; 2) met the employer's legitimate job expectations; 3) was fired; and 4) that age was not treated neutrally in implementing the RIF, or younger individuals were retained in the same position. Id. We need not consider the fourth prong, however, including Ruiz's contention that the Hotel retained two younger employees i.e., Rosado and Carrasquillo in the same occupational classification, since there is an alternative ground for affirmance. See Polyplastics, Inc. v. Transconex, Inc., 827 F.2d 859, 860-61 (1st Cir. 1987). We therefore assume, without deciding, that Ruiz made out a prima facie case of age discrimination by demonstrating that younger workers were retained in the same position. See Pages-Cahue v. Iberia Lineas Aereas De Espana , 82 F.3d 533, 538 (1st Cir. 1996).
In order to rebut the presumption that arises upon the establishment of a prima facie case i.e., that the employer engaged in intentional age-based discrimination, see Woodman, 51 F.3d at 1091 the employer need only produce enough competent 8 evidence, taken as true, to enable a rational factfinder to conclude that there existed a nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action, see St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 502, 509 (1993); Woodman, 51 F.3d at 1091 (same). At that point, the employee must demonstrate that the proffered reason for the adverse employment action was simply a pretext for age discrimination, Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1117 (1st Cir. 1993), which in turn requires that the employee proffer enough competent evidence to support two findings: 1) the employer's proffered reason was pretextual; and, 2) its true motive was age discrimination. Udo v. Tomes, 54 F.3d 9, 12-13 (1st Cir. 1995). The burden of persuasion remains on the plaintiff employee at all times. LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 842. There is no dispute that the Hotel experienced significant financial difficulties in the Spring of 1994 and terminated ten employees as part of a legitimate RIF. Moreover, Victoria Greber, the executive directly responsible for the decision to discharge Ruiz, attested that financial difficulties prompted the employee discharges, both in her own department and throughout the Hotel. She explained, again without contradiction, that she determined to discharge a Team Leader in the Housekeeping Department because she considered it an expendable medial position between the housekeepers, who do the cleaning, and the Hotel Ruiz so concedes on appeal. See Brief for Appellants at 14 (Ruiz does not contest that a reduction in force was necessary in order to confront the Hotel's economic problems. . . .). 9 management. She further explained that Ruiz was selected for termination because his employment record was the weakest among all Team Leaders. Careful review bears out that Greber's explanation is entirely consistent with the undisputed documentary evidence that Ruiz had received more disciplinary warnings, and the lowest average evaluation ratings, of any Team Leader in the Housekeeping Department, as well as the only negative written commentary. Thus, the Hotel met its burden of production under the second prong of the McDonnell Douglas test. See LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 844-45. Accordingly, the presumption of age discrimination has vanished, see id., and we inquire whether the evidence,  in its entirety, would permit a reasonable factfinder to infer that the proffered reason for the dismissal was pretextual and that the true reason was an age-based animus, see id. (emphasis added). In pursuing this inquiry, we focus on whether the employer believed that its proffered reason was credible. See Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 824 (1st Cir. 1991). That is, Ruiz must do more than cast doubt on the rationale proffered by the employer, see Connell v. Bank of Boston , 924 F.2d 1169, 1172 (1st Cir. 1991), the evidence must be of such strength and quality as to permit a reasonable finding that the . . . [termination] was obviously or manifestly unsupported. Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 346 (1st Cir. 1989) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). The summary judgment record generated no 10 trialworthy issue on the ADEA wrongful discharge claim. Ruiz attempted to demonstrate that Rivera was responsible for an atmosphere of age-based discrimination, in the Housekeeping Department, which influenced the decision to terminate him. He relied on an affidavit from Carmen Pena, age 54, formerly employed in the Housekeeping Department, who attested that Rivera expected more from her than from younger workers; asked her age; stated that she didn't look good for her age; inquired about her health and suggested that a job change might be beneficial. Pena acknowledged, however, that Rivera never asked, let alone ordered, her to transfer. Moreover, Pena attributed another remark to Rivera An affidavit from Miguel Moreales, formerly a housekeeper with the Hotel, concludes that Ruiz was an excellent supervisor, but does not purport to compare Ruiz's work record with that of other Team Leaders. Moreales also opines that Ruiz's disciplinary warnings were unfounded because Ruiz always assigned a housekeeper to clean, and checked the area afterward. However, these conclusory statements did not demonstrate that the areas about which Ruiz was warned had been properly cleaned on the particular occasions identified in the warnings he received, much less that the warnings were unfounded, nor that Victoria Greber who made the decision to fire Ruiz, see supra p. 5 could not reasonably have believed that the disciplinary warnings were warranted. Cf. Mulero-Rodriguez v. Ponte, Inc., 98 F.3d 670, 674-75 (1st Cir. 1996) (wherein plaintiff presented evidence that employer's cited reasons were pretextual). Similarly, Ruiz attests that he was discharged due to his age, a belief based on his judgment that he had a good employment record. Even assuming his employment record passed muster, however, Ruiz proffered no evidence which would enable a rational jury to find that the Hotel's employment action was not soundly founded on its determination that Ruiz possessed the least worthy work-performance-record among all competing Team Leaders. Finally, Ruiz alleged that the Hotel conducted a systematic purge of older workers, but admits he has no such personal knowledge or evidence. It is axiomatic that more is required than mere conclusory allegations and unsupported conjecture. See LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 841; Goldman, 985 F.2d at 1116. 11 that all female workers at the Hotel were overworked. In addition, the Moreales affidavit states, inter alia, see also supra note 9, that Rivera harbored an obvious bias toward younger workers. The only explication Moreales offered for this conclusion, however, was that Rivera had pressured older workers, unfairly reprimanded older workers in front of younger ones, and treated two older supervisors, including Ms. Pena, in a disrespectful manner, but without providing an evidentiary foundation upon which it might reasonably be inferred that any pressure, reprimand, or disrespect was either discriminatory or age-based. See LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 841. Although we have allowed as how circumstantial evidence of a general discriminatory environment may add color to an employer's decisionmaking process, see Conway v. Electro Switch Corp., 825 F.2d 593, 597 (1st Cir. 1987), we have explained that [p]roof of a general atmosphere of discrimination is not the equivalent of proof of discrimination against an individual, Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene State College , 604 F.2d 106, 113 (1st Cir. 1979). In all events, these proffers failed to establish a trialworthy claim that a general atmosphere of agebased discrimination existed in the Housekeeping Department, let alone that Ruiz was riffed for any reason other than the relative weakness of his work record. Instead, without confronting the Ruiz presented no competent evidence that the Hotel riffed him, or any other employee, based on age. There is no evidence of any comment by anyone associated with the Hotel, including Rivera and Greber, about Ruiz's age or that age played any part in determining which employees would be let go. Moreover, the 1993 annual rating received from Rivera was the second highest Ruiz ever 12 evidence, Ruiz concludes that he must have been discriminated against because his record had been improving before Rivera became his supervisor and because his eight-year employment record cannot fairly be compared to the records of Team Leaders with less tenure. Ruiz's logic escapes us on both scores. First, as already noted, Ruiz received his next best performance rating ever from none other than Rivera. Second, if Team Leaders with less tenure i.e. less experience received better performance ratings than the more experienced Ruiz, it is difficult to discern how their superior performance reflects less well on them. Furthermore, as we have stated repeatedly, we do not assume the role of a super personnel department[], assessing the merits or even the rationality of employers' nondiscriminatory business decisions. Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 825; see also LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 846 (similar). So it must be here. See Smith v. Stratus Computer, Inc., 40 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 115 S. Ct. 1958, 131 L.Ed.2d 850 (1995) (stating that relief will not be granted to a plaintiff who has been discharged unfairly, even by the most irrational of managers, received. Nor did Ruiz address the undisputed evidence that all but two employees riffed by the Hotel were under forty, see supra note 6, which tends to suggest that the alleged systematic purge of employees was age-blind. Cf. Hebert v. Mohawk Rubber Co. , 872 F.2d 1104, 1114 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting rather startling statistical evidence that 76% of all older employees were riffed). Finally, and most importantly, Ruiz proffered no evidence that he, among all employees holding a targeted Team Leader position, had not received the most disciplinary warnings, negative written comments, complaints from the night manager, and the lowest average annual performance rating an average compiled from ratings given by various supervisors in addition to Rivera. 13 unless the facts and circumstances indicate that discriminatory animus was the reason for the decision). For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Ruiz failed to proffer competent evidence adequate to ward off summary judgment on the ADEA claim for wrongful discharge.