Opinion ID: 2089120
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interest on the amount awarded.

Text: The trial court, after awarding the appellants $4,200 for rental loss, allowed interest from March 1, 1967 (the date of the taking) until May 1, 1969 (three days after the signing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law) in the amount of $455. It is the position of the respondents that such allowance of prejudgment interest was error because the amount of rental loss owed was not liquidated and will not be determined until the decision of this court. Recently this court has stated that: ... As long as there is a genuine dispute about the amount that is due, [one] should not have to pay interest until the amount has been determined and judgment entered thereon. [20] It is the position of the appellants that since a claim was filed for thirty-two months' loss at $350 a month and since it is undisputed that the impending taking caused the loss, the damages were, in effect, liquidated. This argument, however, ignores the fact that appellants themselves have attacked the very statute under which rental loss was computed. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to see how the amount due them could be readily determined. Only if this court were to affirm the respondents' original computation of the appellants' compensable rental loss could such loss be considered liquidated at the date of taking. Since we hold the statute insofar as it limits compensation unconstitutional, the rental loss suffered by appellants was not liquidated at the time of the taking and prejudgment interest should not be allowed. By the Court.  That part of the judgment appealed from which holds that sec. 32.19 (4), Stats., is not inconsistent with the provision of art. I, sec. 13, Wisconsin Constitution, and that part of the judgment appealed from which holds that plaintiffs are entitled to interest from the date of taking are reversed; that part of the judgment awarding plaintiffs the amount of $4,200 is modified to increase the amount to $11,200 and, as modified, affirmed. WILKIE, J. ( dissenting ). Art. I, sec. 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides simply: The property of no person shall be taken for public use without just compensation therefor. As this provision clearly contemplates, before just compensation is required, there must be a taking of a person's property. The majority conclude that the rental loss sustained by the appellants due to the pending acquisition of their property by the Expressway Commission constituted a taking. I respectfully disagree. This rental loss, while it may be a significant sum, is, in my opinion, merely consequential or incidental damage to the property of the appellants. As the majority opinion indicates, this court has previously adhered to the proposition that mere consequential damage to property resulting from governmental action is not a taking. [1] In order for there to be compensation for consequential damages, some statute must so provide. Here, sec. 32.19 (4), Stats., provides for rental loss compensation limited to the year preceding the taking of the property. The majority now hold this limitation to be unconstitutional. In effect, the majority find that the taking for which compensation is required occurred at the time the appellants' tenant learned of the planned acquisition by the commission and refused to renew its lease. Under the guise of declaring the statute unconstitutional, the majority are actually enlarging its coverage. The majority, by equating loss of rent with a taking, are construing the constitutional provision as if it read: The property of no person shall be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation therefor. This is an unfortunate, and in my opinion an impermissible judicial amendment to the constitution.