Opinion ID: 2590262
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Chapter 28A.193 RCW and Article IX

Text: In determining whether chapter 28A.193 RCW satisfies article IX, we must first determine article IX's basic requirements. The inmates argue that chapter 28A.193 RCW violates article IX both on its face and as applied by creating a separate and inferior system of education for persons who are incarcerated in adult prisons in Washington. Under the inmates' theory, chapter 28A.193 RCW is presumed unconstitutional because it interferes with a fundamental right. See Br. of Resp'ts at 22. While we recognize that the State's paramount obligation to provide for basic education does not end with the establishment of a public school system, we also find the State is not obligated to provide an identical education to all children within the state regardless of the circumstances in which they are found.
It is a well-established general rule that where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, that statute is presumed constitutional and the burden is on the party challenging the statute to prove its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g., Island County v. State, 135 Wash.2d 141, 146-47, 955 P.2d 377 (1998) (citing cases). This demanding standard of review is justified because, as a co-equal branch of government that is sworn to uphold the constitution, we assume the Legislature considered the constitutionality of its enactments and afford great deference to its judgment. See Island County, 135 Wash.2d at 147, 955 P.2d 377. Additionally, the Legislature speaks for the people and we are hesitant to strike a duly enacted statute unless fully convinced ... that the statute violates the constitution. Id. (citing cases). In addition to the above standard of review, the court's focus when addressing constitutional facial challenges is on whether the statute's language violates the constitution, not whether the statute would be unconstitutional as applied to the facts of a particular case. See JJR Inc. v. City of Seattle, 126 Wash.2d 1, 3-4, 891 P.2d 720 (1995). `[A] facial challenge must be rejected unless there exists no set of circumstances in which the statute can constitutionally be applied.' In re Detention of Turay, 139 Wash.2d 379, 417 n. 27, 986 P.2d 790 (1999) (quoting with approval Ada v. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011, 1012, 113 S.Ct. 633, 121 L.Ed.2d 564 (1992) (Scalia, J. dissenting)). The practical effect of holding a statute unconstitutional on its face is to render it `utterly inoperative.' 139 Wash.2d at 417 n. 27, 986 P.2d 790. Here, to effectuate the facial challenge analysis we need to first determine what article IX requires, and then determine whether we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no set of circumstances in which chapter 28A.193 RCW could satisfy article IX. Article IX, section 2 clearly requires the State to create and provide for a general and uniform system of public schools.  (emphasis added). We have long held that this provision imposes upon the State a fundamental duty to create a common school system. In Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, we held that all children in Washington have a `right' to be amply provided with an education[; that] `right' is constitutionally paramount and must be achieved through a `general and uniform system of public schools.' 90 Wash.2d at 513, 537-38, 585 P.2d 71; see also Newman v. Schlarb, 184 Wash. 147, 153, 50 P.2d 36 (1935) (duty imposed upon Legislature to provide `a general and uniform system of public schools.') (quoting School Dist. v. Bryan, 51 Wash. 498, 502, 99 P. 28 (1909)). The Legislature satisfied part of its general obligation under article IX through Title 28A RCW's Common School Provisions, which includes the basic education act. However, as we stated earlier, the State's constitutional duty to provide educational services does not end with the creation of a general and uniform school system. In addition to the requirements under article IX, section 2, the State has a  paramount duty ... to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders.... Wash. Const. art. IX, § 1 (emphasis added); see also Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 90 Wash.2d at 499, 585 P.2d 71. Nothing in this provision, however, mandates that the education must be identical. We recognized as much in Tommy P. when we held that a different education program in juvenile detention centers might be necessary to reasonably address special needs of juvenile offenders. 97 Wash.2d at 398, 645 P.2d 697. [16] Having outlined the general requirements of article IX, the question remains whether we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no set of circumstances in which chapter 28A.193 RCW could meet the constitutional minimum due under article IX. Here, the educational program outlined in chapter 28A.193 RCW: must provide each offender a choice of curriculum that will assist the inmate in achieving a high school diploma or general equivalency diploma. The program of education may include but not be limited to basic education, prevocational training, work ethic skills, conflict resolution counseling, substance abuse intervention, and anger management counseling. The curriculum may balance these and other rehabilitation, work and training components. RCW 72.09.460(2). The statute also outlines the infrastructure and support services required, and the proper allocation of money received from the Legislature's biennial appropriations. RCW 28A.193.005, .050, .080. The inmates have failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that chapter 28A.193 RCW violates article IX. This statute makes ample provision for educational programs designed to address the special educational and rehabilitative needs of children incarcerated in adult prisons. As we have often held, it is not this court's role to micromanage education in Washington. See Tommy P., 97 Wash.2d at 398, 645 P.2d 697 (Legislature's need to customize education programs recognized); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 90 Wash.2d at 520, 585 P.2d 71 (While the Legislature must act pursuant to the constitutional mandate to discharge its duty, the general authority to select the means of discharging that duty should be left to the Legislature.). Consequently, we exercise judicial restraint and hold that under article IX's broad constitutional guidelines, chapter 28A.193 RCW is constitutional on its face. See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 90 Wash.2d at 518, 585 P.2d 71 (judiciary required to provide broad constitutional guidelines regarding education within which Legislature may work).
Regarding their as applied challenge, the inmates argue that chapter 28A.193 RCW is unconstitutional as implemented by the State for the 1998-99 school year. Br. of Resp't at 26-32. We disagree. The inmates' claim demonstrates a misunderstanding of the nature of as applied challenges. Under an as applied challenge, the party challenging the statute contends that the statute, as actually applied, violated the constitution. See Turay, 139 Wash.2d at 417 n. 27, 986 P.2d 790 (citing Ada, 506 U.S. at 1012, 113 S.Ct. 633 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Here, the inmates fail to provide any specific facts demonstrating that the State's application of chapter 28A.193 RCW has violated article IX. Rather, the inmates merely speculate about constitutional problems that could result from RCW 28A.193's application. [17] Consequently, the inmates' as applied challenge must fail. [18]