Opinion ID: 789163
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Scope of the Seizure

Text: 21 Russell and Davis also contend that the officers violated their rights by exceeding the scope of the warrant. In addition to those items specifically enumerated in the warrant, the officers seized DVDs, CDs, blank videotapes, and non-Nintendo brand video games. We conclude that this seizure, although broad, was constitutionally permissible. 22 An officer executing a search warrant may seize: (i) items named in the warrant; and (ii) evidence that, although not described in the warrant, is subject to seizure under the plain view doctrine. Hessel v. O'Hearn, 977 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir.1992). The plain view doctrine applies if the officer has a legal right to be in the place from where he sees the object subject to seizure[,] a `lawful right of access to the object itself,' and if the object's incriminating nature is `immediately apparent.' United States v. Cotnam, 88 F.3d 487, 495 (7th Cir.1996) (quoting United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1388 (7th Cir.1991)). The incriminating nature of an object is immediately apparent if, under the circumstances, the officer has probable cause to believe that the item is linked to criminal activity. United States v. Bruce, 109 F.3d 323, 328 (7th Cir.1997). 23 The media items not specified in the warrant were validly seized pursuant to this doctrine. The warrant gave the officers a legal right to enter plaintiffs' house. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 135-36, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990). Defendants discovered the property in question while searching those areas where they were likely to find the items expressly named in the warrant. Thus, the officers had a lawful right of access to the property. And under the circumstances, defendants had probable cause to believe that the items they seized were evidence of a crime. At the time the officers applied for the warrant, they had reasonable grounds to suspect that Russell and Davis were stealing hundreds of VHS movies and Nintendo N64 video games from Circus Video and selling these items online. The officers were justified in believing that incriminating evidence would be discovered in plaintiffs' house. Their suspicions were further supported when, upon executing the warrant, they discovered hundreds of videocassettes and Nintendo games. 3 Some of the CDs, DVDs, and non-Nintendo brand games were found in the same boxes as the items specifically named in the warrant. Others were found nearby. In light of the volume of the suspected thefts, the location where these items were found, and their similarity to the categories of items named in the warrant, the officers reasonably believed that they were evidence of theft. 24 Russell and Davis also contend that the officers blatantly exceeded the scope of the warrant by seizing every scrap of paper found in their house. Plaintiffs did not adequately raise this argument below. They argued to the district court that the warrant was insufficiently particular, and that a vague warrant potentially would allow for the seizure of any type of document. They did not assert, however, that the officers had seized all documents in the house. Other portions of plaintiffs' summary judgment filings resolve any doubt about what they argued below. Their memoranda opposing summary judgment asserted that the officers had exceeded the scope of the warrant by seizing all DVDs, all CDs, and all non-Nintendo equipment and games (Playstation, Sega, Gameboy, etc.), (R. 59 at 8; see also id. at 17; R. 38 at 8, 17), but did not complain of the seizure of records. Under the circumstances, plaintiffs did not sufficiently alert the district court of the factual basis of their claim. [A] party opposing a summary judgment motion must inform the trial judge of the reasons, legal or factual, why summary judgment should not be entered. If it does not do so, and loses the motion, it cannot raise such reasons on appeal. Sanders v. Village of Dixmoor, 178 F.3d 869, 870 (7th Cir.1999) (quoting Liberles v. County of Cook, 709 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir.1983)). Accordingly, this argument is forfeited.