Opinion ID: 1363141
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The trial court erred, as a matter of law, in denying defendant's motion for discharge on Counts 1 and 2, the kidnapping of Bullock and Bennett.

Text: Defendant was charged in Counts 1 and 2 with taking and confining Bullock and Bennett with intent to hold to facilitate the flight and to facilitate the commission of the crime of Aggravated Robbery, and to terrorize the victim. Defendant contends the confinement and transportation of Bullock and Bennett was not shown by the evidence to facilitate the commission of the crime of aggravated robbery, or substantially lessen the risk of detection. Defendant and the State rely on State v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203, 216, 547 P.2d 720 (1976), as the applicable law: We therefore hold that if a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the commission of another crime, to be kidnapping the resulting movement or confinement: ( a ) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the other crime; ( b ) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other crime; and ( c ) Must have some significance independent of the other crime in that it makes the other crime substantially easier of commission or substantially lessens the risk of detection. The two victims were made to lie on the floor at gunpoint in a house in Wichita. They were then robbed. Subsequently, they were forced, again at gunpoint, to get into the trunk of a car into which they were locked and driven to Kansas City. Upon their arrival in Kansas City they were let out of the trunk by defendant (the individual with the gun at all earlier events), and were told to leave. Defendant then fired several shots to hasten their departure. The transportation of the victims was not slight, inconsequential or merely incidental to the aggravated robberies; was not of a kind inherent to aggravated robbery; and substantially lessened the risk of detection. In addition to lessening the risk of detection of the aggravated robberies, there was evidence that defendant told Simmons he needed to get away from Wichita because of the murder and that he wanted to take the next car that came through. There was also evidence that the police had been seeking defendant in the home in which he was hiding (and in which the robberies occurred) in connection with the murder. This point is held to be without merit. VII. The trial court erred, as a matter of law, in submitting to the jury Instruction No. 10 on aiding and abetting, there being no evidence to support said instruction. The trial court gave the following instruction: NO. 10 A person is criminally responsible for a crime committed by another if he intentionally aids, abets, advises, hires, counsels or procures the other to commit the crime. You are, therefore, instructed in this case that if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly counseled, aided, abetted, advised or procured another in the commission of the crime or crimes charged in the information, as elsewhere defined in these instructions, then he, individually, is guilty of such crimes as though he, by himself, without assistance, committed those crimes. A person who is guilty under the principle of law set forth in this instruction is also criminally responsible for any other crime committed in pursuance of the intended crime if reasonably foreseeable by him as a probable consequence of committing or attempting to commit the crime intended. K.S.A. 21-3205(1) provides: A person is criminally responsible for a crime committed by another if he intentionally aids, abets, advises, hires, counsels or procures the other to commit the crime. Defendant contends there was no evidence that he aided or abetted anyone as Simmons testified that her involvement in the aggravated robberies and kidnappings was the result of compulsion. This proposition might have some merit except for certain other factors present in the case. The victims' testimony does not corroborate this position and the evidence before the jury showed Simmons had previously been convicted of these crimes. Simmons' involvement was extensive and was under circumstances when she had opportunities to disassociate herself therefrom. The jury could conclude that she was an active and voluntary participant, as the jury in her own case had done. Under the totality of the circumstances the instruction was proper.