Opinion ID: 2219084
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Job Classification

Text: This is the first time Hough has attempted to challenge the professional staff classification given to him by the department. Both the IDOP and the district court determined Hough's position with the department was considered merit-exempt. Hough now argues the department did not follow the correct procedure in classifying his job as professional, and even if it did comply with the rules of classification, he asserts the department's classification is wrong. The department, as the employing agency, has the authority to designate its employees as professional or nonprofessional. Id. § 17A.2(2). Hough argues there was no appeal process available to him to challenge his job classification. However, Iowa Code chapter 17A addresses agency action and the appeal process. Specifically, state agency action may be challenged by requesting a contested case proceeding. See id. § 17A.12(9) (1997). [1] Hough could have challenged his professional staff classification to the department in 1998 at the time of his last promotion to a merit-exempt position. See id. §§ 17A.2(2) (1997) (agency action), 17A.12(9). Additionally, when Hough brought his challenge to the IDOP, he could have challenged his employment classification pursuant to Iowa Administrative Code rules 5813.4(3) (1997) (position classification reviews may be initiated by incumbent) and 3.5 (1997) (articulating procedure for classification appeals). Hough has articulated that he could not have challenged his job classification at the time of any of his promotions. He argues there was no cause to challenge the classification because there was no injury present until he was fired. At first blush, this argument is appealing. However, there were real ramifications at the time Hough was promoted to his final position before termination. All of the evidence shows Hough was aware of his classification. He had been working for the department for twelve years. Certainly during this span of time, Hough became familiar with the difference between a merit and a merit-exempt employee. In 1998, when Hough was promoted for the final time, his classification as professional staff carried with it real significance. Binding arbitration and collective bargaining were not available to Hough. Most importantly, he was classified as an at-will employee. The nature of his employment was that he worked at the pleasure of the director of the department. See Lee v. Halford, 540 N.W.2d 426, 429 (Iowa 1995) (purpose of exempting employees from merit system is to assure that certain policymaking employees should serve at the pleasure of the agency head). This meant from the day of his promotion, the department could have fired him at any time and for any reason not in violation of public policy. Hough did not have any property interest in continuing employment. See id. Because these potentially negative consequences of his classification were apparent from the date of promotion, Hough should have challenged his professional staff status in 1998. Because Hough did not challenge the classification, we have no ruling from the department to review on appeal. As such, we find Hough failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(1) (2001) (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before judicial review of the matter). For the purposes of this appeal, we accept the department's conclusion that Hough's position was properly classified as professional staff and therefore merit-exempt. Even assuming, arguendo, Hough did not fail to exhaust his administrative remedies, we find substantial evidence in the record to support the department's classification. Hough's assertion that he was unaware of his position as a merit-exempt employee is unconvincing. The facts and circumstances of this case lead to the conclusion that Hough knew he was classified as professional staff. The facts as they were known to Hough are the following. In 1987, Hough began his career with the Iowa Department of Economic Development working as an Administrative Assistant IV. His first position was classified as exempt. Hough signed a letter accepting his employment as a non-merit employee. Hough was subsequently promoted twice. His first promotion was to the position of Public Service Executive 3, a full-time, non-merit system position. [2] After yet another promotion in 1998, Hough worked as Public Service Executive 4, also a full-time, non-merit covered position. As to this position, Hough again signed a letter accepting the terms of his employment as being exempted from merit rules. Hough received each promotion without going through the procedures of the merit system. See id. § 19A.2A; Iowa Admin. Code r. 5815 (2000). Hough's former supervisor testified the department considered Hough professional staff and exempt from the merit system. The pay stubs attached to checks from the state payroll system clearly showed Hough's final position was that of a permanent, full time, non-merit employee. The nature of Hough's position was that of professional management program services, supervisory services and skills, administration of programs, development of procedures and policies, and selection of personnel. Hough also served as the co-leader of community volunteerism and leadership, co-team leader of the business development team, and the department representative on the Rural Development Council. He was involved in the community development fund. Considering the above facts, we turn to the definition of professional staff to determine whether substantial evidence shows Hough's position was properly classified. Neither the Iowa Code nor the administrative rules define the phrase professional staff as contemplated by Iowa Code section 15.106(2). Hough contends we should adopt the definition of professional employee found in Iowa Code chapter 20. [3] We decline to do so. The legislature created chapter 20 to apply exclusively to public employees subject to collective bargaining agreements. See Iowa Code § 20.1 (1997). Because Hough is a merit-exempt employee, he is not entitled to collective bargaining, among other things. Iowa Code section 15.106(2) says professional staff is exempt from the merit system. This section does not refer to the definition of professional employee in chapter 20. The legislature enacted chapter 20 (Collective Bargaining) twelve years before it enacted chapter 15 (Department of Economic Development). See 1974 Iowa Acts ch. 1095, § 3 (codified at Iowa Code § 20.3(9)); 1986 Iowa Acts ch. 1245, § 806 (codified at Iowa Code § 15.106(2)). There is nothing in the code that suggests the legislature intended we apply the chapter 20 definition to Iowa Code section 15.106(2). The term professional staff is not defined, in part, because the legislature intended to grant flexibility to existing agency heads and ensure successors would have the same flexibility as to the members of their professional staff. See Lee, 540 N.W.2d at 429. Because the legislature left professional staff undefined, we look to the ordinary, commonly understood meaning of the word. The American Heritage Dictionary defines professional, in relevant part, as Having great skill or experience in a particular field or activity. The American Heritage Dictionary 989 (2d college ed.1985). A professional is One who has an assured competence in a particular field or occupation. Id. Staff is the personnel who assist a director in carrying out an assigned task. Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1140 (10th ed.2002). Iowa Code section 15.106(2) does not say professionals are merit exempt. Rather it states professional staff  is merit exempt. The word staff makes the scope of those who are considered a member of the professional staff even more broad. The ordinary meaning of professional staff precisely describes the nature of Hough's work as shown by the record. Hough served in high-level positions. One of his job titles included the word professional. He worked in management and supervisory positions and operated at the policy-making level. When Hough was first hired by the department in 1987, the department described Hough saying Mr. Hough has advanced educational training and over ten years experience in economic development through varied responsibilities with the Chamber of Commerce resulting in his present position of Executive Vice President for the Harlan Chamber of Commerce and the Harlan Industrial Foundation. He has progressively responsible offices in a number of organizations including the Vice Chair of the Regional Coordinating Council for Economic Development. Hough's ten years of experience in economic development certainly supports the conclusion that he was professional staff. Hough earned approximately $75,000 per year for his work with the department. Given all of the above circumstances, a reasonable person could conclude Hough was properly classified as professional staff. In sum, there is substantial evidence to conclude Hough was aware of his classification as a merit-exempt employee. If he was dissatisfied with that classification, he should have challenged it at his promotion in 1998. The classification has only now become an issue because of his termination. In the time prior to the termination, Hough repeatedly accepted the department's designation of his position as professional and merit-exempt. He received the benefits of his classification as merit-exempt and now wants the protection of the merit system. Hough failed to avail himself of the review processes for employment classifications. When the department designated Hough's position as professional staff, it acted with statutory authority. See Iowa Code § 17A.2(2). The department's action was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. Based upon the evidence, the IDOP correctly denied Hough a contested case hearing to challenge his termination.