Opinion ID: 1190662
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: decisions stake out clear-cut policy respecting sec. 4706

Text: Fairly extensive research reveals some sixteen decisions of this court from 1917 to date wherein § 4706 might have been interpreted and construed. It may not be particularly pertinent, but recovery was allowed to injured students in nine of those cases, there being no recovery allowed in seven. It is interesting to note that in the case of Rice v. School Dist. No. 302, 140 Wash. 189, 248 Pac. 388, recovery was approved but no reference whatsoever was made to § 4706. It is also interesting to note the policy of the court in the case of Morris v. Union High School Dist. A, 160 Wash. 121, 294 Pac. 988, where no reference was made to § 4706 in the majority opinion; Holcomb, J., made note of that fact and aggressively attempted to direct the court's attention to the statute in a strongly worded dissent. Running through the sixteen cases since the enactment of § 4706: The court appears to have slowly and cautiously worked out a very clear-cut policy. In the bulk of the cases, the court seems to have felt that the statute was ambiguous, and has not hesitated to use extrinsic aids and to search for legislative materials in seeking to determine the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. In other words, throughout the series of cases, the court, with little reluctance, has engaged in statutory interpretation and construction in an effort to determine the meaning and application of the statute. The policy established seems to be a clear-cut one of strict interpretation and application of the statute, limiting immunity fairly consistently to situations involving a user of athletic or manual training apparatus, or appliance, or equipment. In situations involving a nonuser of athletic apparatus, or appliances, or manual training equipment, where a student has been a nonactor, negligence being imputable to the school district, the court has always denied immunity and permitted recovery. At one point in the judicial history of the statute, the court was almost too sympathetic in denying immunity to a school district and in sustaining the claim of an injured student. That was in the case of Bowman v. Union High School Dist. No. 1, 173 Wash. 299, 22 P. (2d) 991 (1933), which subsequently was overruled squarely in the case of Casper v. Longview School Dist. No. 122, 5 Wn. (2d) 403, 105 P. (2d) 503 (1940), the court, referring back to the case of Swanson v. School Dist. No. 15, 109 Wash. 652, 187 Pac. 386 (1920), indicating the reasoning and the decision of the Swanson case should have prevailed in the Bowman case. It seems to the writer that the decisions of this court with respect to the statute strongly imply ambiguity; that throughout those decisions the court has resorted to extrinsic aids, legislative history, interpretation and construction; that the court has, over a period of years, slowly and cautiously staked out a policy approving immunity in situations involving a user of athletic or manual training instrumentalties, but has been equally cautious in outlining a clear-cut policy of nonimmunity in cases involving a nonuser of athletic apparatus and appliance, or manual training equipment. In support of this analysis, a chronological listing and thumb-nail brief of nineteen decisions of this court, relating to interpretation and application of Rem. Rev. Stat., § 4706, is set out as follows: