Opinion ID: 176780
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: DiFolco's Statements of Claims Examined

Text: DiFolco's complaint on its face clearly alleges a breach of her employment contract with MSNBC. In brief, she alleges that she was subjected to intolerable working conditions and that she was fired when she complained about the conditions. She also asserts that defendants improperly interpreted certain of her e-mails as notices of resignation. The District Court referred to e-mails from DiFolco that were said to be incorporated by reference in the complaint in concluding that DiFolco did indeed repudiate her contract by resignation and therefore that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The District Court referred to those e-mails dated August 23 and August 31 in arriving at a conclusion that [b]oth of these e-mails from Plaintiff constituted repudiation of the Contract and relieved MSNBC of future obligations. DiFolco, 2007 WL 959085, at . Under New York law [a] repudiation can be either `a statement by the obligor to the obligee indicating that the obligor will commit a breach that would of itself give the obligee a claim for damages for total breach' or a `voluntary affirmative act which renders the obligor unable or apparently unable to perform without such a breach.' Norcon Power Partners, L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 458, 682 N.Y.S.2d 664, 705 N.E.2d 656, 659 (1998) (quoting RESTATEMENT [SECOND] OF CONTRACTS § 250) (citing II Farnsworth, Contracts § 8.21; UCC § 2-610, Comment 1 (2001)). However, a repudiation can be determined to have occurred only when it is shown that the announcement of an intention not to perform was positive and unequivocal. Tenavision, Inc. v. Neuman, 45 N.Y.2d 145, 408 N.Y.S.2d 36, 379 N.E.2d 1166, 1168 (1978); see also De Lorenzo v. Bac Agency, Inc., 256 A.D.2d 906, 681 N.Y.S.2d 846, 848 (1998) (indicating that repudiation occurs where the repudiating party has indicated an unqualified and clear refusal to perform); Rachmani Corp. v. 9 E. 96th St. Apt. Corp., 211 A.D.2d 262, 629 N.Y.S.2d 382, 385 (1995) (explaining that repudiation occurs when there is a definite and final communication of the intention to forego performance). Generally, [t]he issue of repudiation or abandonment is an issue of fact. Bercow v. Damus, 5 A.D.3d 711, 776 N.Y.S.2d 289, 290 (2004). An exception applies where the repudiation is in writing, in which case the court may resolve the issue of repudiation as a matter of law. See York Agents, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 36 A.D.2d 62, 318 N.Y.S.2d 157, 158-59 (1971). Even if the repudiation is in writing, however, where the written expressions are ambiguous as to their meaning, then such determination [ i.e., repudiation] is to be made by the jury. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Wesolowski, 33 N.Y.2d 169, 172, 350 N.Y.S.2d 895, 305 N.E.2d 907 (1973). Because DiFolco referred in her complaint to her e-mails to Kaplan of August 23, 2005, and August 24, 2005, the District Court could deem them incorporated in the complaint and therefore subject to consideration in its review of the adequacy of the complaint. Although DiFolco wrote in her e-mail of August 23 that she wished to discuss [her] exit from the shows and to give MSNBC ample time to replace [her], these statements can be taken as indicative of her desire to get out from under the direction of the people with whom she had problems rather than leaving MSNBC altogether. Also, her statement that she wanted to be a part of [MSNBC's] team for a long time to come and that she asked for a meeting with Kaplan to discuss matters further may point in the direction of her desire to continue employment on a different level. DiFolco's e-mail to Kaplan on the very next day, August 24, in which DiFolco inquired about the cancellation of her fashion week assignment, included the following: [T]o be clear, I did not resign yesterday and was really giving you significant notice of my intention so you could begin thinking about alternatives for next year. [A]s always, count on my continued professionalism. Kaplan's e-mail response of August 28, 2005, ignored the foregoing altogether and stated the following: My complete impression is that you had resigned . . . and your obvious intent is to leave. Kaplan may well have put this spin on the earlier e-mail in an attempt to rid MSNBC of an employee he considered troublesome. In any event, we do not agree with the District Court that [p]laintiff's 8/23 e-mail is . . . unambiguous in expressing [DiFolco's] intention to leave, DiFolco, 2007 WL 959085, at , as a matter of law. There are at least factual issues as to whether DiFolco had made a final and definite communication of an intent to forego performance or had indicated her refusal to perform in a clear and unqualified way such as to justify a conclusion that she had repudiated her contract. As further support for its conclusion that DiFolco had repudiated her contract, the District Court referred to an e-mail communication from DiFolco to Kaplan, dated August 31, 2005, see id., following Kaplan's August 28 e-mail that included language that it would be [b]est for all that DiFolco leave quickly and that sooner is better. The August 31 e-mail was not attached to the complaint, was not incorporated by reference in the complaint, and was not integral to the complaint. Neither was it relied upon in any way in DiFolco's claim for breach of contract. Moreover, it was sent after Kaplan's August 24 e-mail setting forth his complete impression that DiFolco had resigned and terminated her employment. The District Court therefore erred in considering the August 31 e-mail. Moreover, the August 31 e-mail was ambiguous as well. On the one hand, as the District Court noted, DiFolco wrote: It was my intention to give you long-term notice that I was terribly disappointed in the way I was treated and was not planning on returning for the second year of my contract. On the other hand, DiFolco wrote in the same e-mail: So we went from your agreement to meet with me to discuss the issues to you having a `complete impression' of my resignation, which was never given.... Even if you were unclear from my original e-mail, ... what part of `I did not resign yesterday and was merely giving you significant notice of my intention so you could begin thinking about alternatives for next year' in my follow-up did you not understand? No notice was given, no formal letter of resignation was sent. No time frames were offered. The August 31 e-mail is a lengthy one and cannot as a matter of law be said to manifest a clear and unequivocal repudiation. In ruling on a motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the duty of a court is merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof. Cooper v. Parsky, 140 F.3d 433, 440 (2d Cir.1998) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The District Court here assay[ed] the weight of the evidence of repudiation and improperly chose between reasonably competing interpretations. Because we find that a claim has been stated for a breach of contract and that repudiation has not been established as a matter of law, we reinstate DiFolco's breach of contract claim as well as her corresponding claim brought pursuant to the provisions of New York Labor Law §§ 190-199-A for failure to pay wages.
The District Court determined that two of the allegedly defamatory statementsthe statement on the Inside Cable website that DiFolco had resigned from MSNBC in the middle of her contract and the statement on the News-Blues website that Claudia DiFolco has quit MSNBC in the middle of her contract[we]re true . . . and thus not actionable. DiFolco, 2007 WL 959085, at . This determination was based on the court's conclusion that DiFolco repudiated her contract as a matter of law, a conclusion that we have rejected as premature. Accordingly, we are constrained to reinstate the defamation claims, which are pleaded properly to state claims in any event. The complaint alleges that the statements were untrue and defamatory and were published with malice and with knowledge of their falsity and/or with a reckless disregard for their truth or falsity. DiFolco further alleges that these statements were willful and intended to seriously harm [her] . . . career. According to the complaint, the defamatory statements impugn Ms. DiFolco's honesty, trustworthiness, dependability, and professional fitness and abilities by falsely charging her with conduct that would tend to injure her in her trade or business. These and other allegations in the complaint are adequate to support a claim based on a writing which tends to disparage a person in the way of [her] office, profession, or trade. Nichols v. Item Publishers, Inc., 309 N.Y. 596, 132 N.E.2d 860, 862 (1956). The complaint describes statements that, if true, would tend to prove [DiFolco] unfit to continue [her] calling. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The complaint sets forth the necessary elements to make out a claim for defamation in New York, including the element of malice. See generally Liberman v. Gelstein, 80 N.Y.2d 429, 590 N.Y.S.2d 857, 605 N.E.2d 344, 349-50 (1992). As to the third alleged defamatory statementthe TVSpy website statement that DiFolco relied on cleavage and makeup to advance her career, ignored directions, refused alternate takes, pouted, and was not a team playerthe District Court also was premature in its dismissal. The District Court determined that a reasonable reader would conclude from both the broader context and the immediate context that the third allegedly defamatory statement consists of opinions, not facts. DiFolco, 2007 WL 959085, at . However, `[o]pinions based on false facts are actionable . . . against a defendant who had knowledge of the falsity or probable falsity of the underlying facts.' Davis v. Ross, 754 F.2d 80, 86 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir.1977)). Such knowledge of falsity is properly alleged here, and DiFolco is entitled to show that the negative characterization presented on the website is coupled with a clear but false implication that the author is privy to facts about the person that are unknown to the general reader. Davis 754 F.2d at 85-86.
In order to recover for tortious interference with prospective business relations, a plaintiff must plead and prove: (1) business relations with a third party; (2) the defendant's interference with those business relations; (3) the defendant acted with the sole purpose of harming the plaintiff or used dishonest, unfair or improper means; and (4) injury to the business relationship. Nadel v. Play-By-Play Toys & Novelties, Inc., 208 F.3d 368, 382 (2d Cir.2000). Noting the statement of counsel that Plaintiff relied solely on defamation as the wrongful act predicating the claim of tortious interference and that it had dismissed the defamation claims, the District Court found no further basis for proceeding with the tortious interference claim and dismissed it for failure to state a claim. DiFolco, 2007 WL 959085, at . Our reinstatement of the defamation claim eliminates the District Court's rationale for dismissal of the tortious interference claim. However, our review of the District Court's 12(b)(6) rulings being de novo, we are free to affirm the decision below on dispositive but different grounds. Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 219 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir.2000). We affirm the dismissal of tortious interference claim for the reasons given below. In the third claim, entitled Tortious Interference with Contractual and/or Prospective Business Relations, DiFolco alleges that [d]efendants intentionally interfered with Plaintiff's professional relationships and opportunities for employment and that [d]efendants' actions permanently injured Plaintiff's business relationships in the [news and entertainment] industry. According to the complaint, these actions gave rise to damages flowing from harm to DiFolco's career development, economic harm in the form of lost income and benefits, harm to her professional and personal reputation, and harm consisting of mental anguish and emotional distress. Aside from the fact that these allegations are too conclusory, vague, and lacking in a factual basis to make out DiFolco's tortious interference claim, see Black Car and Livery Ins., Inc. v. H & W Brokerage, Inc., 28 A.D.3d 595, 813 N.Y.S.2d 751, 752 (2006), the complaint fails entirely to describe any third party with whom DiFolco had prospective business relations to be interfered with, see Nadel, 208 F.3d at 382-83. The lack of such an allegation is fatal to this claim.