Opinion ID: 2273949
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Other Delaware Cases

Text: In a case that predated Harris, Peninsula Methodist Homes and Hospitals, Inc. v. Architect's Studio, Inc., [35] the Superior Court found a contract to waterproof a balcony to be under seal in reliance on Beyea's Estate's rule that the word `seal' printed to the right of the parties' signatures is effective as a seal. [36] Although the contract there had the word seal below rather than beside each signature, the court's conclusion was buttressed by the presence of a testimonium clause immediately above the signatures, further evidencing the parties' intent to create a contract under seal. [37] Conversely, Kirkwood Kin Corp. v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc. [38] exemplifies where applying the Harris rule rather than the Peninsula/Beyea's Estate rule controls the outcome. The court there examined a franchise contract and a lease, each bearing only a corporate seal after the parties' signatures and a testimonium clause identical to the one in Peninsula. [39] The contracts were held not under seal because the the mere presence of a seal and a testimonium clause are not enough to create a sealed instrument; the court allow[ed] discovery to develop extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent with respect to sealing the agreements. [40] More recently, Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. [41] applied the Harris rule in the context of a construction contract and found that although [t]he signature clauses do make reference to the words `seal' and/or `sealed,' ... the significance of those references are unclear. [42] In the absence of any extrinsic evidence of intent or evidence of intent within the body of the contract, the Superior Court held the contract could not be considered a specialty. The court acknowledged Peninsula and distinguished it on policy  rather than factual  grounds, stating that to the extent that Peninsula represents a contrary holding in circumstances similar to those present herein, this court respectfully declines to follow it. [43] The court reasoned that no purpose would be served by according the same archaic presumptions applicable to mortgages as sealed instruments to documents other than mortgages absent clear evidence of the parties [sic] intent to do so. [44]