Opinion ID: 1607200
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Medical Examiner Opinion Testimony

Text: During redirect questioning, the State asked the medical examiner a hypothetical question relating to Brown's death. The State asked the following hypothetical: Let's assume for a moment that a woman named Cynthia is a material witness in a homicide case. Assume the defendant in that homicide case hired her boyfriend to kill her. Further assume, for the purpose of this hypothetical, Doctor, that the defendant in this homicide case did not want bullets involved. Assume the defendant in the homicide case that hires the boyfriend does not want bullets involved because he does not want it to come back to him. And assume also that he wants her strangled or suffocated. Assume the lady, the material witness, Cynthia, was taken to a hotel by a boyfriend  by her boyfriend and assume the boyfriend places a pillow over her face and assume she struggles to get her breath, to get the pillow off of her face, but died from asphyxia, from a lack of oxygen. Are your findings, Doctor Lew, consistent with that hypothetical? Defense counsel objected to the question as being compound, confusing, and narrative, which the court sustained. The State then presented the same hypothetical set of facts but omitted the name of the witness. The State asked, Based on your training and expertise and analysis of that hypothetical, are the physical findings of asphyxia consistent with that scenario? The defense objected that it was not a proper basis for this expert's opinion, which the court sustained. The State then asked the expert witness to assume the facts in the second hypothetical and whether those facts were consistent with asphyxia as a cause of death and homicide. The witness replied in the affirmative. Defense counsel did not object to this last question but instead moved for a mistrial, which the court denied. Smith claims that this hypothetical question was erroneous and the trial court erred by not granting his motion for a mistrial. Section 90.704, Florida Statutes (2007), permits an expert to base an opinion on inadmissible facts or data made known to the expert outside the courtroom. Section 90.705(1) permits the expert to testify without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data. Thus, an expert may express an opinion and base the opinion on facts of which the expert does not have personal knowledge without the use of a hypothetical question. The Florida Evidence Code does not prohibit counsel from using a hypothetical question and permits counsel to decide whether to do so. See Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 704.2, at 755-56 (2007 ed.). While the Florida Evidence Code does not specify the manner in which a hypothetical question can be used, Florida courts have established a number of guidelines. A hypothetical question must be based on facts that are supported by evidence which has been introduced at trial. See North Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Johnson, 538 So.2d 871 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). In framing the question, counsel may rely on the evidence introduced during trial in the light most favorable to his theory. Therefore, the question may be based on a fact in dispute as long as there is evidence in the record to support the fact. See Autrey v. Carroll, 240 So.2d 474, 476 (Fla.1970); Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 222 So.2d 754 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969). In the instant case, defense counsel's objections to the State's first hypothetical question were as to the form of the question itselfthat it was in a narrative form and compoundnot that the State's hypothetical question was based on facts not in evidence. The defense's objection to the second version of the hypothetical was, This is not a proper basis for this expert's opinion. The court sustained that objection. But defense still did not object that the question assumed facts not supported in the evidence. Defense counsel never objected to the third question. This exchange involved the way the question was being asked, not whether the hypothetical itself could be asked. Thus, the trial court sustained defense counsel's objection to the form of the question, not to the fact that the question could be asked if properly phrased, which the State did on its final try, and to which defense counsel did not object. Instead, defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on the improper and inappropriate hypothetical question that had to do exactly with the facts of the case they asked of a witness that they knew could not give such an opinion. The trial court denied the defense motion for a mistrial. The standard of review applied to motions for mistrial is abuse of discretion. See Floyd v. State, 913 So.2d 564, 576 (Fla.2005). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial. In fact, a proper hypothetical question must be based on the facts of the case that have been presented at trial. Further, it is entirely permissible for an expert to give an opinion based on a hypothetical question. Therefore, a mistrial was not appropriate because the question and answer were not improper. Smith is not entitled to relief on this claim.