Opinion ID: 1034416
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Carrigan's prior convictions

Text: Carrigan's prior convictions, all under Massachusetts law, include: (1) a March 1996 conviction for armed robbery; (2) an October 2000 conviction for resisting arrest; (3) a December 2000 conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon; and (4) two May 2006 convictions for assault and battery on a police officer and assault and battery with a dangerous weapon. Carrigan concedes his 1996 conviction for armed robbery is a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA. He argues, however, that his other convictions cannot be considered violent felonies under the ACCA in his case because in 2008, when the arrest in this case took place, no court had yet -19- found those specific offenses to be ACCA predicates. He thus argues that counting these convictions against him violated his due process rights. In support of this argument, he cites United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997), where the Supreme Court explained the fair warning requirement. He thus requests that the we apply in his case the canon of strict construction of criminal statutes, or rule of lenity, [which] ensures fair warning by so resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly covered. Id. at 266. Contrary to what Carrigan argues, Lanier stands for the proposition that the due process clause bars the application of a novel construction of a statute where the scope of the statute is ambiguous. See id. at 267 ([T]he touchstone [of the due process inquiry] is whether the statute, either standing alone or as construed, made it reasonably clear at the relevant time that the defendant's conduct was criminal.). Lanier does not apply where the scope of a statute is ascertainable from the plain meaning of its words. As explained above, the scope of application of the ACCA is fairly clear both under the force clause and the residual clause as to the type of offenses covered. The fact that at the time Carrigan committed the instant offense no court had found that the specific convictions Carrigan has under his belt were ACCA predicates does not mean that the ACCA was ambiguous at that time -20- and that the application of the rule of lenity is warranted. We thus find Carrigan's argument under Lanier unavailing. As discussed below, two of the convictions in question are ACCA predicates which the district court correctly considered in sentencing him as an ACC.2 Those two convictions, plus Carrigan's conviction for armed robbery, which he concedes is an ACCA predicate, properly constitute three prior convictions for violent felonies. We take each argument in turn. We first tackle Carrigan's argument that his 1998 conviction for resisting arrest cannot be considered a violent felony under the ACCA. He argues that the crime of resisting arrest may be committed recklessly, but does not further develop this issue. In United States v. Weeks, we said that resisting arrest [under Massachusetts law] qualifie[s] as a 'crime of violence' under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 [the career offender guideline], and because that Guideline and the ACCA are similarly worded, a court may treat a conviction for resisting arrest as a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA. 611 F.3d 68, 73 (1st Cir. 2010) 2 Carrigan also argues that his December 2000 assault with a dangerous weapon conviction should not count under the ACCA since the Boston Municipal Court had determined his guilty plea to be the result of ineffective counsel. The same municipal court also rejected Carrigan's request to have his plea set aside because Carrigan had not been prejudiced as he would be serving time for the conviction concurrently with another offense. We need not determine if this conviction would qualify Carrigan as an ACC because we find that his three other violent felony convictions suffice the statutory requirements. -21- (citing United States v. Almenas, 553 F.3d 27, 34 n.7 (1st Cir. 2009) ([F]or both prudential and precedential reasons, we have read [the ACCA] and the almost parallel guideline language at issue [in the guidelines definition of crime of violence] as being in pari passu.)); see also United States v. Hart, 674 F.3d at 41 n.5 (1st Cir. 2012) (The Sentencing Guidelines' term 'crime of violence' and ACCA's term 'violent felony' are defined almost identically. Accordingly, decisions construing one term inform the construction of the other. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). Furthermore, contrary to what Carrigan argues, the two methods of resisting arrest proscribed by Massachusetts law require knowledge. See Mass. Gen Laws ch. 268, § 32B(a).3 Both methods fall under either the force clause, see id. § 32B(a)(1), or the residual clause, see id. § 32B(a)(2). Almenas, 553 F.3d at 33, 35. 3 In pertinent part, Mass. Gen Laws ch. 268, § 32B(a) states: A person commits the crime of resisting arrest if he knowingly prevents or attempts to prevent a police officer, acting under color of his official authority, from effecting an arrest of the actor or another, by:
force or violence against the police officer or another; or
substantial risk of causing bodily injury to such police officer or another. (emphasis supplied). -22- Therefore, we conclude that the district court acted correctly in finding that Carrigan's conviction for resisting arrest could be considered, along with his conviction for armed robbery, as a crime of violence for purposes of sentencing under the ACCA. We must now determine whether Carrigan's conviction for assault and battery with a deadly weapon and assault and battery of a police officer also count as violent felonies for purposes of the ACCA. In Hart, we held that assault and battery with a deadly weapon under Massachusetts law categorically qualifies as an ACCA predicate under the ACCA's residual clause. 674 F.3d at 41-44. We reasoned that the offense in question clearly poses a serious potential risk of injury, comparable to the degree of risk posed by the enumerated offenses [of the residual clause]. Id. at 42. In Hart, we also found that even if a conviction for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon under Massachusetts law may sometimes rest on a recklessness theory, our analysis under the residual clause is explicitly, and necessarily, limited to the 'ordinary case.' Id. at 43 (citing James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208 (2007)); see also id. at 43 n.7 (explaining that [r]egardless of the underlying theory, [assault and battery with a deadly weapon] requires 'general intent to do the act causing injury.' (quoting Commonwealth v. Appleby, 380 Mass. 296, 308 (1979))). Prior to issuing Hart, we had ruled that assault and -23- battery with a deadly weapon under Massachusetts law is a violent felony under the career offender guidelines. See United States v. Glover, 558 F.3d 71, 79-82 (1st Cir. 2009). Finally, Carrigan argues that the ACCA's residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. He acknowledges, however, that his arguments may be foreclosed by this circuit's rulings in Weeks, Hart and United States v. Dancy, 640 F.3d 455 (1st Cir. 2011). He does not offer any new authority and he has not reformulated the vagueness argument in any way that would prompt us to revisit our previous rulings.4