Opinion ID: 1058712
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: United States v. Grubbs

Text: Ward contended at trial, and on appeal, that the affidavit tendered to the trial judge who issued the search warrant was facially invalid because it failed to establish a nexus between the address on the package, 129 Church Street and the address to be searched, 129 South Old Church Street. Specifically, Ward contends [w]here there are two distinctly different addresses, the failure of the affidavit to include any information supporting a conclusion that the package was incorrectly addressed renders that affidavit facially invalid because there is insufficient probable cause to sustain the issuance of a warrant for 129 S. Old Church St. Ward argues that a controlled delivery by police raises the possibility of government abuse because government agents could direct the evidence that is the object of the warrant to be sent to the address to be searched and thereby place contraband at a location where it would otherwise not be. Courts have addressed this problem by holding that probable cause to issue an anticipatory search warrant does not exist unless the government can demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the parcel and the address to be searched. E.g., Dennis, 115 F.3d at 530; United States v. Hendricks, 743 F.2d 653, 654 n. 1, 655 (9th Cir.1984). This nexus requirement may be fulfilled by showing that the package was initially placed on a sure course to the address to be searched by actors other than law enforcement personnel. Dennis, 115 F.3d at 530; see also Hendricks, 743 F.2d at 655; United States v. Dornhofer, 859 F.2d 1195, 1198 (4th Cir. 1988). Ward contends that the package in the instant case was not on a sure course to his home because the address on the package was different from his own. He argues that the only reason the package was delivered to his home was that the police diverted it there. Furthermore, Ward asserts that an affidavit offered in support of a request for a search warrant, must `provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause.' Because there was no nexus between the address on the package and the address listed in the warrant, Ward contends the requisite probable cause was lacking and the warrant was therefore invalid when issued. The Court of Appeals determined that the `sure course' analysis does not require that law enforcement officials had no involvement whatever in placing the package in the mail or in effecting its delivery to the particular location to be searched. Ward, 47 Va.App. at 746, 627 S.E.2d at 527. Citing federal appeals court decisions, [1] the Court of Appeals opined that in determining the validity of an anticipatory warrant, a court may consider the facts surrounding its execution. Id. at 744, 627 S.E.2d at 526. Specifically addressing the failure of Detective Riley's affidavit to establish a nexus between 129 Church Street and 129 South Old Church Street, the Court of Appeals stated: We hold that, in a case involving such an address discrepancy, conditioning execution of a warrant for the search of the residence on knowing acceptance of the package by someone at that address  acceptance by someone who has had the address discrepancy pointed out to him or her  and the taking of the item into the residence adequately protects individuals residing at that address from Fourth Amendment abuses that might otherwise result from execution of an anticipatory warrant. The warrant and search challenged in appellant's case met these conditions. Id. at 747, 627 S.E.2d at 527. [2] In retrospect, had Detective Riley's affidavit contained the mail delivery history as explained by mailman Saunders, any claimed sure course infirmity in the issuance of the search warrant would likely be moot. However, the Court of Appeals did not rely on Saunders' statements to assuage any nexus defect in the sure course of the package for probable cause purposes. Instead, it relied on the events ex post the issuance of the search warrant. In particular, the Court of Appeals relied upon the actual satisfaction of the affidavit's triggering condition, the acceptance of the package at 129 South Old Church Street. On the same date the Court of Appeals opinion in Ward was issued, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in United States v. Grubbs, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1494, 164 L.Ed.2d 195 (2006). The Court there defined an anticipatory search warrant as a warrant based upon an affidavit showing probable cause that at some future time (but not presently) certain evidence of a crime will be located at a specified place. Id. at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 1498 (quoting 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.7(c), p. 398 (4th ed.2004)). The warrant before us in this case is such an anticipatory search warrant. The Supreme Court then noted that when an anticipatory warrant is issued, the fact that the contraband is not presently located at the place described in the warrant is immaterial, so long as there is probable cause to believe that it will be there when the search warrant is executed. Id. at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 1499 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This probable cause determination, sufficient to authorize the issuance of an anticipatory search warrant, was then described by the Supreme Court as a two-pronged inquiry by the issuing magistrate: [F]or a conditioned anticipatory warrant to comply with the Fourth Amendment's requirement of probable cause, two prerequisites of probability must be satisfied. It must be true not only that if the triggering condition occurs there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place, Gates, [462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317], but also that there is probable cause to believe the triggering condition will occur. The supporting affidavit must provide the magistrate with sufficient information to evaluate both aspects of the probable-cause determination. See Garcia, [882 F.2d] at 703. Grubbs, ___ U.S. at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 1500. In the present case, it appears self-evident that the first prong of the Grubbs inquiry, the probability that the package would be found at 129 South Old Church Street, was satisfied by the terms of Detective Riley's affidavit. The second prong of the Grubbs probable cause analysis, where the magistrate determines if there is probable cause to believe the triggering condition will occur, is not so easily answered. Grubbs may limit the probable cause analysis only to that information before the magistrate at the time the decision to issue the warrant is made: The supporting affidavit must provide the magistrate with sufficient information to evaluate both aspects of the probable-cause determination. If that is so, then events ex post the issuance of an anticipatory search warrant could not be used to satisfy the probable cause requirement. However, it is unnecessary for us to resolve whether the Court of Appeals analysis meets the requirements of Grubbs because the Commonwealth's assignment of cross error is dispositive in this case. Accordingly, we will assume, but expressly do not decide, that the search warrant in this case failed to meet the second prong of the probable cause analysis in Grubbs and turn our attention to the assignment of cross error.