Opinion ID: 369349
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Sentencing of Kaye

Text: 113 Defendant Kaye, points to the following statements of the court as evidencing reversible error in sentencing: 114 The Court: All right. Let the record reflect that the Court in imposing sentence will never consider anything except the does not consider particularly in this case anything except the prior conviction of Mr. Kaye and the evidence introduced against him at the trial of this action, which did reflect that one individual was defrauded of some $70,000, minimum of $70,000, possibly as much as $127,000. I think that's sufficient as to what transpired at the trial. 9 115 In the defendant's view, this remark shows that the court improperly considered Clifford Fallen's testimony as having shown that he was defrauded by Kaye. Kaye submits that nothing in Fallen's testimony directly indicates any such illegality. We reject this argument. 116 Kaye concedes that courts have wide latitude in the matters that may be considered in determining the appropriate sentence. E. g., United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446-47, 92 S.Ct. 589, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972). Certainly this includes the evidence produced at trial. As noted above, Fallen's testimony (if that is what is being referred to in the above passage) showed that he had invested funds with Kaye in the belief that they would be used to purchase coal property. Kaye's records showed, however, that the money was apparently diverted to other purposes. Fallen never recovered his investment. We note that Kaye's contention here that the evidence disclosed no fraud is at odds with his contention in Part V that the jury might well have drawn precisely that conclusion from Fallen's testimony. We find no abuse of discretion in the court's consideration of this evidence as it decided on the appropriate sentence. Cf. Collins v. Buchkoe, 493 F.2d 343, 345 (6th Cir. 1974) (per curiam). 117 The sentences imposed were permitted by the statutes for the violation of which appellants were convicted. We see no reason to remand for resentencing. 118 The judgments of convictions are affirmed.