Opinion ID: 2240281
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Henrici Settlement

Text: The last issue concerns the second of these consolidated cases. In this case Henrici was named as a third-party defendant in a counterclaim seeking contribution filed by Coast and Coleman. Before trial, the plaintiff settled with Henrici for $15,000 and the city for $37,500. The court approved of the settlement, finding that it was made in good faith. The appellate court held that, because the plaintiff's cause of action against Henrici was barred by the statute of limitations at the time the settlement was entered into, it lacked consideration and thus does not constitute a good-faith settlement as required by the Contribution Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 70, par. 301 et seq. The Contribution Act provides that if a settlement is made in good faith, the settling tortfeasor is discharged from all liability for contribution. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 70, pars. 302(c), (d).) This court recently expounded upon the purpose of the Contribution Act. In Rakowski v. Lucente (1984), 104 Ill.2d 317, 325, this court stated: As a matter of public policy the settlement of claims should be encouraged. If we were now to add limitations not expressed in the general language of the settlement instrument or in the provisions of the Contribution Act, we would make those who desire to end litigation wary and uncertain of what they would accomplish by settlement. What tortfeasor would be expected to settle with another tortfeasor when he does not know whether he remains open to claims for contribution in uncertain amounts from one with whom he has settled? Holding the parties to the language of their release has the advantage of providing certainty and thereby encouraging settlement. Keeping this purpose in mind, we must determine whether the settlement was made in good faith. Admittedly, the plaintiff's cause of action against Henrici could have been barred by the statute of limitations at the time the settlement was entered into had such a defense been raised. However, as we stated in Doyle v. Rhodes (1984), 101 Ill.2d 1, 10-11, the potential for tort liability exists until the defense is established. Since the statute had not been raised, Henrici was still potentially liable, and therefore consideration was given by the plaintiff for the settlement. In reaching the conclusion that the settlement was entered into in good faith, we are not wearing blinders. We are mindful that the entire circumstances surrounding a settlement must be taken into account. In the case at bar, the record indicates that the trial judge was involved in the entire settlement process. He was convinced that the settlement was entered into in good faith. Therefore, based on these facts, we disagree with the appellate court's finding that the settlement lacked good faith. For the aforementioned reasons, we hold that collateral estoppel does not apply; that the evidence of prior accidents was properly admitted; that the introduction of evidence concerning the city's remedial acts was harmless error; that damages for pain and suffering were properly awarded; that punitive damages were improperly awarded; that there is a presumption of loss of society for an adult child; that the jury instruction given regarding proximate cause was proper; and that Henrici's settlement was made in good faith. The appellate court is affirmed insofar as it reversed the award of punitive damages; the judgment is otherwise reversed. For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the circuit court of Sangamon County is affirmed, except as to the award of punitive damages, which is reversed. Along with these consolidated cases, we also considered Henrici's motion to supplement the record. The material Henrici wished to supplement relates to matters in the Ogg case. Said materials are not relevant to any of the issues raised in this appeal. Therefore, Henrici's motion is denied. Appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part; circuit court affirmed in part and reversed in part; motion denied. JUSTICE MILLER took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.