Opinion ID: 2407465
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: prejudicial error in restricting plaintiff's argument?

Text: Plaintiff makes a further point that The trial court erred in not allowing plaintiff's counsel to comment in argument on the absence from trial of defendant Watkins' employee, Chastain, because he was driving defendant's truck at the time and knew many pertinent facts. In defendant Watkins' separate answer to plaintiff's first amended petition, on which this case was tried, defendant Watkins specifically admitted paragraph 3 of that amended petition which read: 3. At all times herein mentioned Thomas D. Chastain was acting in his capacity as an agent, servant and employee of the defendant Watkins Motor Lines, Inc. All of the negligence pleaded by plaintiff against defendant Watkins pertained to the operation of the tractor and trailer rig while it was proceeding around Loop 29 headed in an easterly direction and was in the process of crossing Highway 71. Plaintiff's amended petition alleged: 8. The defendant Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., drove its tractor and trailer rig in a careless and negligent manner in one or more of the following particulars, then in four subparagraphs alleged that the defendant Watkins failed to keep a proper lookout, to stop at the stop sign, to yield the right of way to the northbound automobile which was driven by the deceased James Albert Judkins at the time in a northerly direction on Highway 71 and failed to observe the traffic control signs. Subparagraph 8 alleged Defendant Watkins Motor Lines, Inc. was grossly and wantonly careless in each of the above specifications. The evidence was that Chastain was the driver and sole occupant of the Watkins rig at the time of the collision. Chastain was not called to testify and no evidence was adduced to account for his absence or failure to testify. The action of the court in forbidding plaintiff's counsel to comment in argument on defendant Watkins' failure to produce the driver took place out of the hearing of the jury, after the court had determined the instructions that would be given, including plaintiff's verdict directing Instruction No. 3 (M.A.I. 17.02), which read: INSTRUCTION NO. 3 Your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe: First, defendant either: Violated the stop sign or failed to yield the right-of-way, and, Second, defendant's conduct in any one or more of the respects submitted in paragraph First was negligent, and, Third, as direct result of such negligence plaintiff sustained damage. [1] It is noted that no mention of the employment or agency of the driver was made in such instruction nor in any other instruction given, proposed or refused. It is quite likely that both counsel for plaintiff and the court believed that the agency and employment of Chastain were not in the case because of defendant's admission of paragraph 3 of plaintiff's petition, supra. After conference regarding instructions the following discussion took place out of the hearing of the jury: MR. HALE: We would like to bring to the court's attention the fact that I propose, in my argument, to comment upon the fact that the driver for Watkins Truck Lines was not brought to the courtroom and put on as a witness. MR. BROWN: We object to any such argument by plaintiff's counsel on the grounds there has been no showing in the evidence that the driver is employed at Watkins at the time of the suit and trial of this cause. There has been no showing that he is available to Watkins Motor Lines, and we feel it would be unfair and prejudicial to the defendant. THE COURT: Is he employed by Watkins Motor Lines? MR. BROWN: Now? THE COURT: At this time? MR. BROWN: No. THE COURT: How long has it been since he has been an employee of Watkins Motor Lines? MR. BROWN: The last of 1965 or early 1966. Let me say this. In truth and fact he has never been actually employed by Watkins. He was an employee of Ed Wright, who owned the tractor, as shown in the evidence, which tractor was leased to Watkins for the purpose of this load. He was an agent at the time of the accident. He is not an employee of Watkins at this time. THE COURT: The objection is sustained and counsel is instructed not to argue that point to the jury. We first note that the statements of Mr. Brown that Chastain was not employed by Watkins at the time of trial nor since The last of 1965 or early 1966 and that he has never been actually employed by Watkins. were statements of counsel to the court and did not constitute evidence in the case. However, there was some evidence in the case regarding Chastain's actual employment. Watkins' vice-president, John L. Horning, testified that he knew Chastain personally; that the vehicle involved in the collision consisted of an eight foot wide cab-over-diesel engine tractor weighing 14,850 lbs. and a 40 foot trailer weighing 17,270 lbs.; that this combination at the time of the collision was driven by Chastain for the purpose of hauling, for defendant Watkins, 38,950 pounds of meat (total load weight of rig and contents 71,070 lbs.) from Sioux City to Miami, Florida. Horning further testified that this particular vehicle was one of twenty identical tractor-trailer units purchased in a fleet by Watkins; that We had sold this unit to Mr. Wright who in turn leased it to us; that Horning knew Chastain was the driver of the tractor on the evening of January 8, 1965; that Chastain was an employee of Mr. Ed Wright the man who owned the truck. On cross-examination Mr. Horning testified that he directed Mr. Chastain where to go to pick up his load, where to take it,    Q And he was on that route at the time of this collision? A Yes, sir. Under all the circumstances of this case including defendant's admission contained in the pleadings, the facts adduced in evidence and the pleaded negligence against defendant Watkins which pertained only to the driving of the tractor and trailer rig, the driver thereof, Chastain, would be a logical witness for defendant Watkins to call to testify in its behalf. Defendant Watkins had made a solemn judicial admission in its answer to the effect that at the time of the collision at issue Chastain was acting in his capacity as an employee of defendant Watkins. Such admission relieved plaintiff of the duty of adducing proof of such issue. It should be construed to grant plaintiff's counsel all of the rights, in making his argument to the jury, to which plaintiff's counsel would have been entitled if Chastain's employment by defendant was an uncontroverted fact. In a recent case, Duboise v. Railway Express Agency (Mo.) 409 S.W.2d 108, 113, this court said: `The failure of an employer to call as witnesses or explain the absence of his employees who have knowledge of the facts in issue has often been held to justify an inference or presumption adverse to the party.' Annotation 5 A.L.R. 2d 893, 896.    and that,    more than twenty Missouri cases are noted in 68 A.L.R.2d l. c. 1075, that `it is permissible for counsel in a civil case, in his argument to the jury, to comment on the failure or omission of the adverse party to produce or examine as a witness on his behalf an employee of such party who is apparently qualified to testify in regard to the matter or question in issue.' Further in the Duboise case, supra, this court said, l. c. 114: Or conversely when a defendant was denied the right to comment on a plaintiff's failure to call a doctor: `It is not a question of sufficiency of the evidence. It is a question of a litigant having been denied the right of argument to a jury. There is no way to determine from the record the effect of this ruling on the verdict. It is clear that defendant was entitled to make the argument and have the jury consider same in determining the question of damages. The error was prejudicial, and the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded.' McInnis v. St. Louis-Southern, Inc., 341 Mo. 677, 684, 108 S.W.2d 113, 116. By the same token the error in this case was manifestly prejudicial and the trial court abused its discretion in not granting plaintiffs a new trial as to the respondent Railway Express Agency. We conclude that the trial court erred prejudicially in denying plaintiff's counsel the right to comment on the fact that the driver for Watkins Motor Lines was not brought to the courtroom and put on as a witness. We rule as this court did in the Duboise case, supra, that the trial court abused its discretion in not granting plaintiff a new trial as to the defendant Watkins Motor Lines, Inc. because of such prejudicial error. For the reasons indicated the judgment entered in favor of each of the defendants is reversed and this cause is remanded for a new trial against both defendants. HENLEY, P. J., and STORCKMAN, J., concur. SEILER, J., not sitting.