Opinion ID: 867213
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Discovery Sanctions against the State

Text: ¶ 48 Cota contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for mistrial and imposing insufficient sanctions for discovery violations by the State. We review for abuse of discretion. State v. Kuhs, 223 Ariz. 376, 380 ¶ 18, 224 P.3d 192, 196 (2010).
¶ 49 Shannin Guy of the DPS crime lab performed DNA testing. Her report and notes were disclosed before trial and included the hand-written acronym EDNA in three locations. After Guy left DPS, the State could not initially locate her, so it notified Cota on March 12, 2009, that it would call Scott Milne, another DPS analyst, who would conduct new testing. ¶ 50 Jury selection began on April 2. Milne's report was completed on April 3 and a copy provided to defense counsel the next day. Milne was unable to retest some items consumed by Guy's testing. However, using a relatively new method, Milne tested items on which previous tests were inconclusive, including Cota's tennis shoe. The State made additional disclosure concerning Milne's report and notes on April 24. His notes also included one notation of EDNA. ¶ 51 On the eve of trial, the State located Guy. The State notified Cota that it intended to call both witnesses and on April 30 defense counsel interviewed Milne and Guy. ¶ 52 On May 11, Cota claimed that the State did not provide him with all of Milne's electronic data. The trial court found no bad faith, but ordered the State to disclose the data. The State provided Cota with electronic data that afternoon. ¶ 53 Guy testified on May 14 and May 18. She opined that the sample from Cota's shoe contained DNA from Cota and other unknown contributors. Milne later testified that he had identified both victims' DNA in the sample. ¶ 54 On May 19, Cota filed a motion asking the State to produce Guy's electronic data and the laboratory's corrective actions log and extraneous DNA [EDNA] log. The trial court granted the motion. On June 1, Cota still had not received Guy's electronic data. The court ordered that it be turned over for use in cross-examining Milne. The trial court also ordered Milne to provide additional data. ¶ 55 The EDNA log had been disclosed on May 21, and contained a list of all contaminated samples. DPS procedure was not to disclose the EDNA log unless it was specifically requested. On June 8, Cota filed a motion to dismiss for Brady violations. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Cota argued that the EDNA log was clearly exculpatory and that he could not have been expected to know what EDNA meant when it was handwritten on the reports and no other explanation was given. ¶ 56 The court found that DPS improperly withheld the EDNA log and certain electronic data. The court found, however, that any prejudice to Cota could be cured without a mistrial or preclusion of all DNA evidence. Neither Guy nor Milne had testified about any sample in the EDNA log. The court allowed Cota to re-call Guy for additional cross-examination, re-interview Milne before his testimony, interview another person at the lab, and tour the lab. The court also granted a continuance until June 22 to allow Cota's experts to review the materials. ¶ 57 On June 22, Cota filed another motion to dismiss, alleging that some of Guy's electronic data was still missing. The trial court found that some data was missing because it had been improperly backed up. It also found that some of Guy's files were either destroyed or not retrievable. The court struck Guy's testimony and instructed the jury not to consider it. ¶ 58 The court, however, denied Cota's request to preclude Milne's testimony. After Cota argued that striking Guy's testimony deprived him of the ability to demonstrate deficiencies in the DPS lab, the court allowed Cota to re-call her. Cota cross-examined Milne at length but did not re-call Guy. At Cota's request, the court instructed the jury that DPS had a duty to disclose all relevant information to the defense and ordered the State not to argue that the EDNA log need not have been disclosed.
¶ 59 Cota argues that a mistrial should have been granted or, at the least, Milne's testimony precluded. But preclusion is required only when no less stringent sanction will suffice. State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz. 227, 246, 686 P.2d 750, 769 (1984). We apply a four factor test to determine whether preclusion is appropriate: (1) how vital the precluded witness is to the proponent's case, (2) whether the opposing party will be surprised and prejudiced by the witness' testimony, (3) whether the discovery violation was motivated by bad faith or willfulness, and (4) any other relevant circumstances. State v. Smith, 123 Ariz. 243, 252, 599 P.2d 199, 208 (1979). ¶ 60 The trial court appropriately considered these factors. It found Milne's testimony extremely relevant and important to the State's case and that there was no bad faith. It also found that any prejudice to Cota could be cured by additional disclosure, interviews, and continuances. Cota had access to all relevant information before cross-examining Milne and identifies no area in which the cross-examination would have materially differed had he been granted more time. ¶ 61 Cota argues that a new trial is ordinarily the remedy for a Brady violation. But many Brady violations are discovered after trial, when no other remedy could suffice. Here, the trial court had other options and did not abuse its discretion by using them. The sanctions imposed sufficiently protected Cota's due process rights. Cf. State v. Jessen, 130 Ariz. 1, 4, 633 P.2d 410, 413 (1981) (finding no reversible error when previously undisclosed exculpatory information is revealed at trial and presented to the jury).