Opinion ID: 2433171
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the ray matter

Text: Ms. Deveri Ray employed respondent to represent her in a medical malpractice suit involving the stillbirth of her child. At the time Ms. Ray became pregnant she lived in Texas. She moved to Missouri in February 1986, several months prior to the birth of her child and prior to the time that the alleged tort occurred. The doctors named as defendants in the suit were all domiciled in Missouri, and the hospital named as a defendant was incorporated in Missouri. On January 30, 1987, the date suit was initiated in the United States District Court, Eastern District of Missouri, Ms. Ray resided with her mother in St. Peters, Missouri. The complaint alleged, however, that Ms. Ray was a resident of Texas, although she had told respondent she lived in St. Peters, having moved to Missouri in February 1986. During the course of discovery, defendants filed interrogatories inquiring into Ms. Ray's place of residence. In providing respondent with written information to be used in answering the interrogatories, Ms. Ray again informed respondent that she resided in St. Peters, Missouri. In spite of Ms. Ray's assertions, respondent filed interrogatory answers with the court stating that since February 1986 Ms. Ray had resided in Fairview Heights, Illinois. The address listed was, in fact, that of respondent's mother, Mrs. Dorothy Goode Oberhellmann. Ms. Ray had no knowledge that respondent had listed her address as Fairview Heights, Illinois, in the interrogatory answers until immediately before she was deposed. At that time respondent advised Ms. Ray that she should state that she resided with Dorothy Goode at Fairview Heights, Illinois, and to further state that Goode was her cousin. Ms. Ray testified as instructed, although she had never been to Fairview Heights, nor had she previously heard of Dorothy Goode. Before the deposition, respondent told Ms. Ray that if he tapped her foot or nudged her knee during the deposition she should respond to the question then being asked by stating that she did not know or did not recall. Following her counsel's instruction, Ms. Ray gave additional false answers at the deposition, one of which touched upon her knowledge of where her former husband was then living. Defendants discovered the deception and filed a motion to dismiss for lack of diversity of citizenship. The district court ordered the plaintiff to show cause why the case should not be dismissed. Shortly thereafter, an attorney associated with respondent sought and was granted leave to dismiss the case without prejudice. After the dismissal, respondent advised Ms. Ray that she should establish an Illinois address after which he would refile the lawsuit. In May of 1988, Ms. Ray leased an apartment in Granite City, Illinois, and changed her mailing address to Granite City. On June 24, 1988, respondent refiled Ms. Ray's complaint in federal court. The complaint alleged that Ms. Ray was a resident of Illinois. In August of 1988, defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of diversity of citizenship. On February 9, 1989, the court ordered Ms. Ray to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of diversity jurisdiction. Respondent voluntarily dismissed the second case. The informant charged in Count I of the information that respondent violated Rule 3.3(a)(1) and (4) by knowingly offering false evidence of Ms. Ray's residence. Rule 3.3(a) provides in pertinent part: A lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;... or (4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. The record shows that respondent filed a complaint alleging Ms. Ray was a resident of Texas in spite of the fact that Ms. Ray informed respondent that she lived in St. Peters, Missouri. Ms. Ray testified that respondent told her that she would receive a higher damage award if the case were tried in federal court. Once discovery commenced, diversity jurisdiction based on Texas residency could not be sustained. Although respondent testified that he used the Illinois address during discovery to avoid disclosure of Ms. Ray's actual residence to Ms. Ray's former husband, his testimony is not credible. This Court finds that respondent's actions were designed to create and retain federal diversity jurisdiction. Respondent contends that the false statements he made to the tribunal were not material because where a case is tried is immaterial. Irrespective of speculation about perceived differentials in damage awards in federal and state courts, respondent's contention is without merit. His contention evidences either a lack of understanding of the need for respect of jurisdictional issues in the justice system, or, worse, a flagrant disregard of the significance of jurisdiction. The federal court obtained jurisdiction over Ms. Ray's case because of diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988). A fact that invokes the jurisdiction of a court is a material fact. A court's lawful exercise of authority is not to be taken lightly; the extent or limits within which a court or judge's authority is exercisable is founded in federal and state constitutions. Jurisdiction has a territorial significance and may also be a matter of competence. By seeking to retain federal diversity jurisdiction by claiming Ms. Ray was a resident of a state other than Missouri, respondent knowingly made a false statement of material fact. Respondent violated Rule 3.3(a)(1) and (4). The informant charged in Counts II and III of the information that respondent violated Rule 3.4(b) by advising Ms. Ray to give false deposition testimony about her place of residence and about her knowledge of where her former husband was living. Rule 3.4(b) provides in pertinent part that a lawyer shall not counsel or assist a witness to give false testimony. As noted above, respondent concedes that he advised Ms. Ray to give false deposition testimony concerning her place of residence. He does not concede, however, that he instructed Ms. Ray to lie about the whereabouts of her former husband. Ms. Ray testified at the Master's hearing that respondent directed her to give false testimony about the residence of her former husband. In response, respondent merely states that there was no reason why he would want Ms. Ray to testify falsely regarding where her former husband lived. Irrespective of the issue of credibility on the question of the former husband's residence, this Court finds that respondent violated Rule 3.4(b) by advising Ms. Ray to give false testimony regarding her residency. Count IV of the information charged respondent with violation of Rule 8.4(a) and (c), which provides, in pertinent part: It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct ...; .... (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. The fact that respondent violated Rules 3.3(a) and 3.4(b) conclusively establishes that respondent violated Rule 8.4(a) and (c).