Opinion ID: 2074377
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Default Judgment Claim

Text: A DNA analysis report dated July 15, 2004, showed that the blood on the vase was not that of Brookins, but that of Dugan. Relying on these DNA test results, Brookins moved for a new trial under Title 11, section 4504(b) of the Delaware Code. The trial judge ordered the State to respond to Brookins' motion by October 11, 2004. On October 7, the prosecutor to whom the case had been assigned wrote to the trial judge, asking for a 45-day extension to respond to the motion, because he was not the original prosecutor and due to the age of the case. Six days later, Brookins' defense counsel wrote to the judge, objecting to the State's request. The State's response was filed on November 22, and on December 17, defense counsel filed a reply to the State's answer. In July 2005, Brookins filed a motion for default judgment, charging that the State's response to the motion for a new trial was untimely, there being no indication that the Superior Court had ever granted the State's request for additional time. The Superior Court denied Brookins' motions for default judgment and for a new trial. We review the Superior Court's denial of Brookins' motion for default judgment for abuse of discretion. Brookins first argues that the Superior Court never made any inquiry or issued any decision on the request for continuance, and without doing so, cannot rationally make a decision on the motion for default judgment. In Guardarrama v. State, [4] we held that the trial court had the discretion to address the merits of an even unopposed motion for judgment of acquittal, if only to prevent a miscarriage of justice and to avoid undoing a conviction that was lawfully obtained. [5] Brookins argues that Guardarrama is distinguishable for two reasons: first, in his case the Superior Court made its decision based on the State's untimely submission; and second, the new trial requested here would not constitute a miscarriage of justice. The record reflects, however, that the facts in Brookins' case bear close resemblance to the facts in Guardarrama. In Brookins' case, the prosecutor wrote to the trial judge under Criminal Rule 45(b)(1), [6] seeking additional time to respond, and giving reasonable explanations for the continuance request. [7] The State's response was filed within the period of time requested by the prosecution, and Brookins filed a reply to that answer. Brookins cites no authority for his claim that the Superior Court abused its discretion by making no inquiry or issuing any decision on the request for the continuance. Here, as in Guardarrama, the Superior Court was empowered to prevent a miscarriage of justice and to avoid undoing a conviction that was lawfully obtained [8] by denying Brookins' motion for default judgment and proceeding to address the merits of his motion for a new trial. Alternatively, Brookins claims that the State's request for the continuance constituted an improper ex parte communication that deprived him of his due process rights. Black's Law Dictionary defines ex parte as something being made by one party: Done or made at the instance and for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to, or argument by, any person adversely interested; of or relating to court action taken by one party without notice to the other. [9] The record reflects the State properly requested an extension before the answer date fixed by the Superior Court. Six days later, Brookins was served with the State's request for an extension of time, and he filed his objection immediately upon receipt of the letter. Thus, the record does not support Brookins' contention that an ex parte communication occurred.