Opinion ID: 2105193
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Possible Cause of Action Standard

Text: The plaintiff argues that the possible cause of action standard announced in Moll and applied in Gebhardt should not apply in the medical malpractice context. We disagree. This Court adopted the possible cause of action standard for determining when the discovery rule period begins to run in Moll. The majority concluded that an objective standard applied in determining when a plaintiff should have discovered a claim. Further, the plaintiff need not know for certain that he had a claim, or even know of a likely claim before the six-month period would begin. Rather, the discovery rule period begins to run when, on the basis of objective facts, the plaintiff should have known of a possible cause of action. The majority explained: We find that the best balance is struck in the use of the possible cause of action standard. This standard advances the Court's concern regarding preservation of a plaintiff's claim when the plaintiff is unaware of an injury or its cause, yet the standard also promotes the Legislature's concern for finality and encouraging a plaintiff to diligently pursue a cause of action. Once a claimant is aware of an injury and its possible cause, the plaintiff is aware of a possible cause of action. We see no need to further protect the rights of the plaintiff to pursue a claim, because the plaintiff at this point is equipped with sufficient information to protect the claim. This puts the plaintiff, whose situation at one time warranted the safe harbor of the discovery rule, on equal footing with other tort victims whose situation did not require the discovery rule's protection. [ Moll at 23-24, 506 N.W.2d 816 (emphasis added).] While Moll involved pharmaceutical products liability claims, the majority's analysis is not specific to those types of claims. Quite the opposite, the analysis supports applying the standard in the context of other types of tort suits that are subject to the discovery rule. This Court's opinion in Gebhardt bears this out. In that case, we applied Moll's possible cause of action standard to the statutory six-month discovery rule applicable to legal malpractice claims. M.C.L. § 600.5838; M.S.A. § 27A.5838, as amended by 1986 P.A. 178. [3] The rationale of Moll applies equally to malpractice actions, whether legal or medical. Once a plaintiff is aware of an injury and its possible cause, the plaintiff is equipped with the necessary knowledge to preserve and diligently pursue his claim.
Application of the possible cause of action standard to the facts of Mrs. Solowy's medical malpractice suit supports the Court of Appeals conclusion that her suit is barred. Before applying this standard to the facts of the present case, we must set forth general principles that apply to the discovery rule. In Moll at 18, 506 N.W.2d 816, we succinctly set forth some of these principles: Michigan jurisprudence compels not only the use of an objective standard for determining when an injury is discovered, but it also compels strict adherence to the general rule that subsequent damages do not give rise to a new cause of action. ... The discovery rule applies to discovery of an injury, not to the discovery of a later realized consequence of the injury. Further, the plaintiff need not be able to prove each element of the cause of action before the statute of limitations begins to run. Moll at 21, 506 N.W.2d 816; Warren Consolidated Schools v. W R Grace & Co., 205 Mich.App. 580, 583, 518 N.W.2d 508 (1994), citing Detroit Bd. of Ed. v. Celotex Corp. (On Remand), 196 Mich.App. 694, 706, 493 N.W.2d 513 (1992). Mrs. Solowy was aware of a possible cause of action no later than March 27, 1992, the date of her first visit with Dr. Laing. At this visit, Dr. Laing informed her that the lesion on her ear was either a recurrence of the cancer or seborrheic keratosis. She was also aware at this point that her symptoms were identical to those she had experienced five years earlier. The plaintiff's pleadings and deposition testimony allege that had Drs. Chapel told her that the cancer could recur and that follow-up visits would be necessary, she would have sought treatment earlier and consequently, she would not have suffered the degree of injury that she did. Therefore, as of March 27, the plaintiff knew of an injury, i.e., the progression of the lesion on her ear, and its possible cause, i.e., the failure of Drs. Chapel to inform her that the cancer could recur and that she should seek follow-up treatment. The possible cause of action standard does not require that the plaintiff know that the injury to her ear, in the form of the advancement of the disease process, was in fact or even likely caused by the defendant doctors' alleged omissions. Neither does the standard require that the plaintiff be aware of the full extent of her injury before the clock begins to run. Consequently, it is irrelevant that the plaintiff was not yet aware that the progression of cancer would eventually necessitate removal of the upper portion of her left outer ear. In summary, after the March 27 visit, the plaintiff, while lacking specific proofs, was armed with the requisite knowledge to diligently pursue her claim.