Opinion ID: 1175284
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: temporal lobe epilepsy

Text: Defendant claims his conviction was unconstitutional because the trial court denied his request for further medical tests. Defendant argues that this violated his due process and equal protection rights. Defendant relied on insanity as a defense and specifically that he had temporal lobe epilepsy. Dr. Bindelglas, a psychiatrist who testified for the defense, stated that there was a definite probability that defendant had temporal lobe epilepsy. However, Dr. Bindelglas testified that no one could positively conclude whether defendant had the physical condition unless defendant underwent further testing and observation. Dr. Bindelglas stated that no facilities in Arizona were suitable for this type of testing. Instead the defendant would have to be transported to an out-of-state facility and undergo observation for four to six weeks. The trial court appointed Dr. William Masland, a neurologist, to examine the defendant to determine if he needed further testing. The trial court stated in its minute entry that if Dr. Masland felt further tests were necessary, additional arrangements would be made. After reviewing the defendant's medical records and examining the defendant, Dr. Masland concluded that further diagnostic testing would be totally superfluous. Two other doctors (Maier I. Tuchler and John S. LaWall) testified that defendant did not have temporal lobe epilepsy. The court denied defendant's motion for further medical tests. At trial Dr. Tuchler testified: Q. Could that series of acts been the result of any kind of epileptic seizure or postictal seizure or anything of that sort? A. I have an opinion. This is an act that was planned that's characteristic of the person that was impulsive indeed, but not the product of a seizure. .. .       Now this is not a simple action. This is a complicated volitional act. It does not appear to be the kind of an act that would occur in an individual with a temporal lobe seizure disorder. Defendant, relying on Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), contends that the trial court violated his due process rights by not allowing him the full opportunity to prove his insanity defense. In Ake, the Supreme Court stated: [W]hen a defendant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial, the Constitution requires that a State provide access to a psychiatrist's assistance on this issue if the defendant cannot otherwise afford one. Id. at 74, 105 S.Ct. at 1091-92. The Supreme Court also delineated three factors to be considered in determining whether a state must provide the assistance of a psychiatrist: Three factors are relevant to this determination. The first is the private interest that will be affected by the action of the State. The second is the governmental interest that will be affected if the safeguard is to be provided. The third is the probable value of the additional or substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if those safeguards are not provided. Id. at 77, 105 S.Ct. at 1093. These factors may also be analyzed to determine if the state should provide the defendant with further testing. The first factor is the effect on the private interest if further testing is not provided. Id. Obviously, there is a heavy interest involved when a person's life and liberty are at stake. In the instant case, the court provided defendant with one expert (Dr. Bindelglas) and the question is whether the court must provide more. The second factor to consider is the effect on the state's interest. Id. In this case, ordering out-of-state testing would have been expensive and a burdensome security problem. The additional testing would have entailed transporting defendant out of state and keeping him under observation and under security for four to six weeks. The third factor the Court considered in Ake was the probable value of the additional testing and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if the testing is not provided. Id. In this case no indication exists that further testing would have helped defendant prove his insanity defense. The risk of error is minimal given the fact that three expert witnesses testified that the defendant could not have been suffering from a seizure at the time of the killing. Although we can envision fact situations in which the state could be required to shoulder the burden of additional testing, in this case it is not necessary in light of the questionable value to the defendant. We find that the trial court did not err in denying defense counsel's motion for further diagnostic testing. Defendant also claims that the denial of further medical tests violated the equal protection clause. We disagree. The United States Supreme Court has never held that equal protection requires the state to provide to an indigent defendant everything a wealthy person might be able to afford. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 2444-45, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974) (states are not required to purchase for the indigent defendant all the assistance that his wealthier counterpart might buy); see San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1291, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). We find no error.