Opinion ID: 2197495
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Scope of Private Easement.

Text: 1. Scope of easement as applied to proposed residential development. In their petition, plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that their easement over the Fischer property is unlimited and is sufficient for . . . residential development purposes. The Fischers resisted, arguing that the easement was limited in scope and did not allow for such a dramatic expansion of use. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Fischers, holding that whatever the scope of the easement, it was not broad enough to cover the proposed residential development. The only evidence in the record related to the scope of the easement came from affidavits submitted by the Fischers. The affidavits generally stated that the easement over the Fischer property was granted to allow access to farm property first to Rosa Birkel and then to two farm property owners to the north. These facts were not disputed by any party. In light of the undisputed nature of the facts, the case was ripe for summary judgment. We next turn to the law of easements. It is well-settled that the dominant estate acquires no greater use[] than the parties intended when an easement was created. Schwob v. Green, 215 N.W.2d 240, 243 (Iowa 1974). Ordinarily, however, where the easement involves ingress and egress, a mere increase in the frequency of use will not constitute an additional burden. Id. Additionally, easements will accommodate technological developments. See generally Skow v. Goforth, 618 N.W.2d 275, 278 (Iowa 2000) (noting that an easement for horse and buggy access may be used by dominant estate for modern vehicles). The proposed use of Kress Lane for a major residential development, however, greatly expands the original scope of the easement, which was granted to two farm properties at a time when comparatively dense residential development was not contemplated. See Flynn v. Mich.-Wis. Pipeline Co., 161 N.W.2d 56, 61 (Iowa 1968) (scope of easement, if not defined, is only that which is reasonably necessary and convenient for the purposes for which it was created). Residential and agricultural access to two farm properties at the turn of the century is a much different proposition than access to a modern residential development. It is not a mere increase in use, but a change in use that could not have been within the contemplation of the parties when the original easement was granted. See Boudreau v. Coleman, 29 Mass.App.Ct. 621, 564 N.E.2d 1, 5-6 (1990) (finding residential development to be an additional burden outside the intent of the parties); Leffingwell Ranch, Inc. v. Cieri, 276 Mont. 421, 916 P.2d 751, 756-58 (1996) (finding subdivision of dominant estate into 174 parcels not within parties' intent and inconsistent with historical use); Nadeau v. Town of Durham, 129 N.H. 663, 531 A.2d 335, 337-38 (1987) (finding development of housing for senior citizens with fourteen units not reasonably foreseeable); Restatement (Third) of Property § 4.1(1), at 496-97 (2000) (A servitude should be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the parties ascertained from the language used in the instrument, or the circumstances surrounding creation of the servitude, and to carry out the purpose for which it was created.). We recognize that there is some authority that appears to be more amenable to alterations in the use of easements. See Shooting Point, L.L.C. v. Wescoat, 265 Va. 256, 576 S.E.2d 497, 503 (2003) (finding subdivision of dominant tenement into residential lots an increase in the degree of burden but not an imposition of an additional burden); Clain-Stefanelli v. Thompson, 199 W.Va. 590, 486 S.E.2d 330, 337 (1997) (finding prescriptive easement supported future residential development because residential access was original purpose and use of easement). We conclude, however, that the better view under the undisputed facts of this case is that the original grantors did not contemplate the expansive use of the easement now sought by the plaintiffs and that this fact is dispositive. As a result, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the Fischers on the issue of the scope of the private easement. [2] 2. Failure of district court to delineate precise scope of easement. The plaintiffs further argue that the district court did not fully resolve the issues in the litigation by simply declaring that the easement was insufficient to support the proposed residential development. They argue that the district court should have further clarified the scope and dimensions of the private easement, even if it was insufficient to accommodate the proposed development. In a declaratory action, the ordinary rules of pleading apply. Smith v. Bitter, 319 N.W.2d 196, 201 (Iowa 1982). Declaratory actions are thus governed by the same liberal pleading standards that are applied in other civil actions. As in any other action, an issue may be directly, or impliedly, raised by the pleadings. See Frederick v. Shorman, 259 Iowa 1050, 1056-57, 147 N.W.2d 478, 482 (1966). Issues may also be tried by consent of the parties even if the issue is not expressly framed by the pleadings. Rouse v. Rouse, 174 N.W.2d 660, 666 (Iowa 1970) (issues may be tried by consent, though not specifically presented in the pleadings); Bloomfield v. Weakland, 224 Or.App. 433, 199 P.3d 318, 326 (2008) (finding express easement claim tried by implied consent in declaratory action). Nonetheless, the mere mention of a subject in a petition for declaratory action does not open the door to resolution of any and all hypothetical issues. Instead, the issues decided by the district court should be limited to those directly or impliedly raised by the pleadings or litigated with the consent of the parties. There must be a live case or controversy that is actually being litigated in order for a court to declare the rights of the parties. See Trans Pac. Leasing Corp. v. Aero Micronesia, Inc., 26 F.Supp.2d 698, 712 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (holding where parties have failed adequately to present the issue to the Court, a declaratory ruling is not available); Canyon Lake Park, L.L.C. v. Loftus Dental, P.C., 700 N.W.2d 729, 736 (S.D.2005) (finding trial court not required to rule on whether easement allowed tenement owner to take full count of parking spaces where issue was outside scope of pleadings); Gwinn v. Collier, 247 Va. 479, 443 S.E.2d 161, 164 (1994) (holding property owner not entitled to declaratory relief on whether use of property for storage purposes complied with zoning ordinance where owner had not requested relief on that issue). In this case, the pleading states that the issue before the court is whether plaintiffs' access over the easement is unlimited and would include access sufficient to support a rezoning of the Kress Stew-Mc property for residential development. . . . The pleading is narrow and does not raise the issues that the plaintiffs now seek to litigate. Moreover, our review of the record indicates that the issue of whether the easement could support the proposed residential development was the only one that was truly litigated by the parties. Other issues related to the easement's precise dimensions, location, and scope were simply not explored with sufficient intensity to characterize them as litigated by consent. As a result, the district court did not err in declining to grant relief beyond that necessary to decide the present controversy. C. Abuse of Process. After trial, the district court ruled against the Fischers with respect to their claim for abuse of process. The district court found that the plaintiffs' primary purpose in filing their action was to establish a prescriptive easement and secure declaration of their rights under [the] easement. The district court further found that Herrig's alleged statements, even if assumed to be true, were general statements that were insufficient to establish a claim of abuse of process. Upon review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the district court. The district court applied the correct legal standard in examining an abuse-of-process claim. To prove a claim of abuse of process, a plaintiff must show (1) use of the legal process, (2) in an improper or unauthorized manner, and (3) that damages were sustained as a result of the abuse. Gibson v. ITT Hartford Ins. Co., 621 N.W.2d 388, 398 (Iowa 2001). With respect to the second element of the cause of action for abuse of process, `[t]he plaintiff must prove that the defendant used the legal process primarily for an impermissible or illegal motive.' Id. (quoting Wilson v. Hayes, 464 N.W.2d 250, 266 (Iowa 1990)). After reviewing the evidence, the district court made a factual determination that the primary purpose of the litigation was to establish a prescriptive easement and their rights thereunder. There is substantial evidence to support the district court's determination, including testimony by the plaintiffs' original counsel. There was, moreover, a substantial legal issue in this case, namely, whether the use of the Kress property by many landowners in a proposed residential development amounted to a change in the scope of the easement or merely an increase in use. As noted above, there is some division in the authorities on this issue, and the question often involves a matter of degree. Because the district court applied the correct law on the abuse-of-process claim and because the district court's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the abuse-of-process claim. Because of our ruling on the merits, it is not necessary for us to address the timeliness of the motion to amend the pleadings to assert a claim for attorneys' fees based upon abuse of process.