Opinion ID: 849265
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Public Offices Held By A Public Official

Text: We reject defendant's initial argument [6] that her positions are not incompatible offices because her position as delinquent personal property tax coordinator is not a public office. The question is one of statutory construction, which we review de novo. The Herald Co. v. Bay City, 463 Mich. 111, 117, 614 N.W.2d 873 (2000). Our task is made difficult by the Legislature's inartful draftsmanship. In particular, the Legislature used the undefined term public official in defining the phrase incompatible offices instead of the defined terms public officer and public employee. Construing the act as a whole, however, we conclude that the phrase public offices held by a public official encompasses public employment. In considering a question of statutory construction, this Court begins by examining the language of the statute. Sun Valley Foods Co. v. Ward, 460 Mich. 230, 236, 596 N.W.2d 119 (1999). We read the statutory language in context to determine whether ambiguity exists. Id. at 237, 596 N.W.2d 119; see Consumers Power Co. v. Public Service Comm., 460 Mich. 148, 163, n. 10, 596 N.W.2d 126 (1999). If the language is unambiguous, judicial construction is precluded. Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marlette Homes, Inc., 456 Mich. 511, 515, 573 N.W.2d 611 (1998). We enforce an unambiguous statute as written. Sun Valley Foods, supra at 236, 596 N.W.2d 119. Where ambiguity exists, however, this Court seeks to effectuate the Legislature's intent through a reasonable construction, considering the purpose of the statute and the object sought to be accomplished. Frankenmuth Mut Ins, supra at 515, 573 N.W.2d 611. The statute involved in this case defines the phrase incompatible offices as public offices held by a public official which, when the official is performing the duties of any of the public offices held by the official, results in the subordination of one public office to another, the supervision of one public office by another, or a breach of duty of public office. MCL 15.181(b); MSA 15.1120(121)(b). We construe the undefined terms public office and public official according to the common usage of the language. Consumers Power, supra at 163, 596 N.W.2d 126. The dictionary definitions of the words public, official, and officer suggest that the terms public official and public officer are synonymous. [7] Words, however, are given meaning by context or setting. Id. at 163, n. 10, 596 N.W.2d 126. In defining the phrase incompatible offices, the Legislature used the term public official, rather than the term it defined in the statutepublic officer. The Legislature's use of this undefined term when it could have easily employed the defined term suggests that the terms are not synonymous for purposes of this statute. See 82 CJS, Statutes, § 310, pp. 400-401. We therefore conclude that the statutory language public offices held by a public official is ambiguous. To resolve this ambiguity, we examine the other provisions of the act to ascertain whether the Legislature intended to include positions of public employment within the prohibition on incompatible offices. We construe an act as a whole to harmonize its provisions and carry out the purpose of the Legislature. Farrington v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 442 Mich. 201, 209, 501 N.W.2d 76 (1993); Gusler v. Fairview Tubular Products, 412 Mich. 270, 291, 315 N.W.2d 388 (1981), reh. gtd. 414 Mich. 1102, 323 N.W.2d 909 (1982), app. dis. 414 Mich. 1102, 323 N.W.2d 909 (1983). [T]he interpretation to be given to a particular word in one section [is] arrived at after due consideration of every other section so as to produce, if possible, a harmonious and consistent enactment as a whole. Grand Rapids v. Crocker, 219 Mich. 178, 182-183, 189 N.W. 221 (1922). We conclude that §§ 2 and 3 of the incompatible offices act evince a legislative intent to include positions of public employment within the scope of the act. MCL 15.182; MSA 15.1120(122) provides that a public officer or public employee shall not hold 2 or more incompatible offices at the same time. The section prohibits particular individuals from holding two or more incompatible offices at the same time. The Legislature could have simply omitted any reference to public employees if it intended that the prohibition apply only to positions held by public officers. The statute would have provided that a public officer shall not hold 2 or more incompatible offices at the same time. Under this alternate language, a public employee would not have been prohibited from holding one public office because the employee would not become a public officer until elected or appointed to the first office. The employee would then only hold one public office, not two. Accordingly, on review of § 2 of the act, we conclude that the Legislature's inclusion of public employees within the prohibition evinces an intent that positions of public employment are public offices held by a public official. [8] The exceptions contained in the act, M.C.L. § 15.183; MSA 15.1120(123), similarly reveal a legislative intent that positions of public employment fall within the scope of the act. Exceptions (1), (3) and (4) expressly apply to public officers or public employees. Moreover, the prefatory phrase of those exceptions (Section 2 does not ...) signals that the prohibition contained in § 2 generally applies to both public officers and public employees. If the prohibition did not apply to public employees, no need would exist to include public employees within the exception. On review of the statute as a whole, we thus conclude that the phrase public offices held by a public official encompasses positions of public employment. Although the Legislature could have evinced its intent in clearer terms, we join the Attorney General [9] and the Court of Appeals [10] in adopting this reasonable construction of the statutory language because it best furthers the Legislature's intent, as reflected in the other provisions of the act. [11] We therefore conclude that defendant's positions as delinquent property tax coordinator and township trustee both are public offices held by a public official for purposes of the incompatible offices act. We thus turn to the question whether defendant's performance of the duties of one of the offices resulted in one of the three situations set forth in M.C.L. § 15.181(b); MSA 15.1120(121)(b).