Opinion ID: 761804
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Sentencing Guideline Amendment

Text: 31 Campbell argues that even if this court holds that the remand was limited, a change in the law authorizes and obliges the district judge to consider the new law in resentencing. This court has held that exceptions to the law-of-the-case doctrine arise where there is 'substantially different evidence raised on subsequent trial; a subsequent contrary view of the law by the controlling authority; or a clearly erroneous decision which would work a manifest injustice.'  Moored, 38 F.3d at 1421 (citing White v. Murtha, 377 F.2d 428, 431-32 (5th Cir.1967)). See also 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4478, at 790 (2d ed. 1981 & Supp.1998) (writing that the major grounds that justify reconsideration involve an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice). Additionally, as discussed above, the presumption of de novo consideration at resentencing relaxes the law of the case doctrine, and has prompted this court to remark that the doctrine has little applicability in the sentencing arena. United States v. Hebeka, 89 F.3d 279, 284 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 999, 117 S.Ct. 496, 136 L.Ed.2d 388 (1996). Whether or not the list of exceptions is broader in the area of sentencing, we can find no exception here. We conclude that there was not an intervening change in the law. 32 Amendment 439 revised Sentencing Guideline § 1B1.3 in 1992 to provide that a defendant will be held accountable for the conduct of others only when the conduct was reasonably foreseeable. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (U.S.S.G.) app. C, amend. 439 (1994). Although not originally part of the Sentencing Guideline itself, this standard was set forth in the application notes as early as 1989. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, Application Note 1 (1989). Campbell argues that a four-kilogram transaction of cocaine occurring after his incarceration was not reasonably foreseeable. 33 A number of circuits have held that Amendment 439 did not substantively alter the guideline, but merely clarified or explained it. See United States v. Lambert, 995 F.2d 1006, 1009 n. 3 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 926, 114 S.Ct. 333, 126 L.Ed.2d 278 (1993); United States v. Evbuomwan, 992 F.2d 70, 74 n. 1 (5th Cir.1993). Furthermore, in Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 42-43, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993), the Supreme Court held that the commentary interpreting or explaining one of the Sentencing Guidelines has as much binding force as the text and policy statements of the Sentencing Guidelines themselves, even though such commentary is not reviewed by Congress. See Stinson, 508 U.S. at 38, 113 S.Ct. 1913 (holding that commentary that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline). 34 The case law clearly explains that the change in the law asserted by Campbell was merely a clarification of the Sentencing Guidelines, and not a change in any underlying principles. Indeed, the reasonably foreseeable standard had been recognized by this court in cases before Campbell's sentencing. See United States v. Rodriguez, 896 F.2d 1031, 1033 (6th Cir.1990); United States v. Williams, 894 F.2d 208, 211-12 (6th Cir.1990) . 4 The language Campbell relies on, namely the reasonably foreseeable language, was simply transferred from the commentary to the actual text of the guideline. Under the precedent cited above, this constitutes no change in the law at all. If Campbell thought that the district judge misapplied the Sentencing Guidelines, he should have raised this on his initial appeal.