Opinion ID: 434899
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Action Was a Civil Action Under Section 2412

Text: 14 In order to determine whether Boudin's original action was civil for purposes of section 2412(d)(1), we must first determine the nature of that action. Boudin styled her complaint as a verified petition for writ of habeas corpus, J.App. at 5, but also asserted that it was in essence a Bivens action. Reply Br. of Cross-Appellant at 18. We cannot rely, however, on the labels attached to the claim. Rather, we look to the substance of the remedy she sought. In this case, Boudin sought to be physically moved in order to remedy past constitutional violations. This is in substance a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 15 In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), the Supreme Court held that habeas corpus was the exclusive remedy for prisoners challenging the fact or duration of their confinement. An action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (Supp. III 1979) was held not to be available, even against prison administrators, where the challenge is just as close to the core of habeas corpus as an attack on the prisoner's conviction, for it goes directly to the constitutionality of his physical confinement itself and seeks either immediate release from that confinement or the shortening of its duration. Id. at 489, 93 S.Ct. at 1836. 16 Preiser stated that habeas might sometimes be available to challenge the conditions of confinement. Although it did not set forth those situations, it did state that one of them might be [w]hen a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody. Id. at 499, 93 S.Ct. at 1841. Habeas involves bringing the body of a prisoner before a court for an inquiry into the validity of his confinement, id. at 484-86, 93 S.Ct. at 1833-834; Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 283, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 1059, 92 L.Ed. 1356 (1948), and the remedy granted by a court on the body of a prisoner need not be limited to the four or five remedies arising from the common law forms of the writ. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. at 278-84 & n. 9, 68 S.Ct. at 1056-59 & n. 9 (granting habeas to allow prisoner to argue his own appeal). Thus, as long as a prisoner meets the custody or other jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241 (1982), habeas is the appropriate action to challenge conditions of confinement where the prisoner seeks to be moved in order to remedy past constitutional violations. See Roba v. United States, 604 F.2d 215, 219 (2d Cir.1979) (habeas appropriate vehicle to litigate propriety of transferring seriously ill prisoner as advance challenge to allegedly unlawful conditions of his imminent custody); see also Jackson v. Carlson, 707 F.2d 943, 946 (7th Cir.) (habeas the appropriate remedy when prisoner seeks transfer from disciplinary confinement), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 104 S.Ct. 189, 78 L.Ed.2d 167 (1983); Ali v. Gibson, 631 F.2d 1126, 1135 (3d Cir.1980) (court entertains and rejects on merits habeas petition seeking transfer based on conditions of confinement), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1129, 101 S.Ct. 951, 67 L.Ed.2d 117 (1981); Streeter v. Hopper, 618 F.2d 1178, 1181 (5th Cir.1980) (complaint seeking release from administrative segregation without due process appropriately treated as a habeas petition); Warren v. Cardwell, 621 F.2d 319, 322 (9th Cir.1980) (court requires exhaustion of state remedies when prisoner sought transfer to federal prison); but see Walker v. Lockhart, 713 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir.1983) (court reverses denial of section 1983 claim and orders prisoner's transfer). 17 Boudin was in federal custody and met the requirements of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241(c)(1) (1982). She sought to be moved out of administrative segregation because of the prison administration's previous constitutional violations. It is therefore appropriate to treat the part of Boudin's complaint seeking transfer to the general prison population as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 2 18 We next consider whether habeas petitions are civil actions under section 2412. We hold that they are not. 3 Appellee's argument to the contrary is that the statute applies to civil proceedings, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982), that habeas proceedings are generally labeled civil, e.g., Browder v. Director, Department of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 269, 98 S.Ct. 556, 563, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978), and that many of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in habeas proceedings, Fed.R.Civ.P. 81(a)(2); 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254, Rule 11 (1982). See Reply Br. of Cross-Appellant at 20-24. But the civil label does not mean that habeas proceedings are entirely civil in nature. See, e.g., Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487, 490 n. 4, 91 S.Ct. 995, 997, 28 L.Ed.2d 251 (1971) (28 U.S.C. Sec. 1391(e), applicable in civil proceedings against United States employees or officers, does not apply in habeas proceedings); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 293-94, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1087-88, 22 L.Ed.2d 281 (1969) (habeas proceeding is unique, and civil label is gross and inexact; Court holds Fed.R.Civ.P. 33 inapplicable to habeas proceedings). The civil label is undoubtedly attached to the extraordinary habeas proceeding to distinguish it from a criminal action, which is intended to punish and requires various constitutional guarantees. See, e.g., Ex parte Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 559, 2 S.Ct. 871, 872, 27 L.Ed. 826 (1883) (habeas is a civil proceeding because [p]roceedings to enforce civil rights are civil proceedings, and proceedings for the punishment of crimes are criminal proceedings). 19 The term civil action does not appear in the definitional section of the EAJA. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412(d)(2)(A) (1982). Because habeas actions are civil for some purposes but not others, there is an ambiguity on the face of the statute. We must therefore turn to the legislative history of the EAJA to determine whether Congress intended to include habeas petitions within the statute. Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2d 844, 849 (2d Cir.1974). 20 This Court is not persuaded that Congress meant to include the unique habeas corpus proceeding in the category of any civil action for the purposes of section 2412. Cf. Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. at 490 n. 4, 91 S.Ct. at 997 n. 4 ([t]hough habeas corpus is technically 'civil,' it is not automatically subject to all the rules governing ordinary civil actions; Court examines legislative history and finds no indication that statute providing for nationwide service of process in civil actions against United States officers or employees applies to habeas proceedings). Indeed, for the following reasons, we find that the Act's legislative history and the policies underlying the Act indicate that the Act was not meant to apply to habeas proceedings. 21
22 The EAJA was passed in part to ensure that certain individuals, partnerships, corporations and other organizations would not be deterred from contesting unreasonable government action simply because the amount of money involved would not make hiring a private attorney cost effective. See, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 4984, 4984. 4 Congress' intent in authorizing fee awards under the EAJA was clearly to ensure that the cost of litigating against unreasonable government action would not be disproportionate to the potential gain from winning the litigation: 23 For many citizens, the costs of securing vindication of their rights and the inability to recover attorney fees preclude resort to the adjudicatory process. When the cost of contesting a Government order, for example, exceeds the amount at stake, a party has no realistic choice and no effective remedy. In these cases, it is more practical to endure an injustice than to contest it. 24 Id. at 9, 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 4988. But unlike civil litigation against the government, there is no need for financial encouragement of habeas proceedings. First, where a (non-indigent) person's liberty or confinement is at stake, the costs will rarely deter the person from resorting to the adjudicatory process. Second, there are no considerations of whether the potential financial gain from a habeas action is outweighed by the costs because a habeas petition is not financial litigation. 25 Moreover, there is presently an equivalence between the financial criteria used to determine eligibility for government provided counsel in habeas proceedings and in criminal proceedings. Applying the EAJA to habeas proceedings would change that statutory equivalence. 5 A court, in its discretion, may appoint counsel for a habeas petitioner's evidentiary hearing if the petitioner meets the same financial requirement imposed on a criminal defendant who desires appointed counsel. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254, Rule 8(c) (1982); 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3006A(g) (1982). The financial requirement for criminal defendants and habeas petitioners alike is an inability to afford private counsel. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3006A(a), (g) (1982). But the EAJA is expressly inapplicable to criminal proceedings. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982). If Congress had wished to change the statutory equivalence between criminal and habeas cases by using the EAJA to authorize the government's funding of counsel in certain habeas cases but not equivalent criminal cases, we believe it would have said so. 26 Similarly, the purpose of appointing counsel in criminal and habeas cases is to assist those who cannot afford private counsel. See United States v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823, 826 (2d Cir.1976); Plan Under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, at 1 (Feb. 11, 1971) (approved, Judicial Council of the Second Circuit). Individuals with a net worth of under $1 million may be eligible for fees under the EAJA. If the EAJA were a means of providing government funded counsel in certain habeas cases, it would allow habeas petitioners who are virtual millionaires--and can thus easily afford counsel--to recover attorney's fees. Criminal defendants, by contrast, would still only receive government funded counsel if they could not afford counsel, because of their express exclusion from the provisions of the EAJA. 27 Finally, as discussed above, non-indigent habeas petitioners are much more likely to hire their own counsel than those who litigate against the government over small amounts. Therefore, the considerations behind funding counsel for the two types of litigants are very different. A statute authorizing payment for a private litigant's attorney should not be automatically construed to authorize payment for the attorneys of some persons who litigate over their liberty or confinement, merely because the label civil is broadly applied to both types of litigation. 28
29 The Act provides that fees may be awarded against the United States to the same extent that any other party would be liable under the common law or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an award. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412(b) (1982). See Premachandra v. Mitts, 727 F.2d 717, 726 (8th Cir.1984) (fees may be awarded if the United States was engaged in conduct that, if carried on by some 'other party,' would render that 'other party' liable under a statutory fee shifting provision); Lauritzen v. Secretary of the Navy, 546 F.Supp. 1221, 1229 (C.D.Cal.1982) (fees may be awarded if action is fundamentally analogous to an action in which some other party, either public or private, would be liable under existing fee-shifting statutes). A habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 challenging state custody would be analogous to Boudin's action. Attorney's fees thus could be awarded to Boudin if they could be awarded in the fundamentally analogous state custody habeas action. 30 But there is no authority for taxing attorney's fees against states in the analogous state custody habeas action. A congressional statute is required in order to award attorney's fees in federal court actions when, as is the case here, no common law exceptions apply. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 257-62, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 1621-24, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975). Congress has never passed a statute authorizing the award of attorney's fees in state custody habeas corpus cases litigated in the federal courts. Rutledge v. Sunderland, 671 F.2d 377, 382 (10th Cir.1982); see Larsen v. Sielaff, 702 F.2d 116, 118 (7th Cir.1983) (attorney's fees may not be awarded in habeas actions; 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 (Supp. IV 1980), which authorizes attorney fee awards in federal civil rights actions, is inapplicable to habeas proceedings), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 104 S.Ct. 372, 78 L.Ed.2d 330 (1983). Because there is also no common law provision authorizing fee awards in the analogous state habeas action, the EAJA does not authorize an award of fees against the United States in habeas actions litigating the propriety of federal custody. 31
32 The EAJA was passed partly to encourage challenges to improper actions by government agencies. The drafters perceived legal actions as helping to formulate public policy: 33 An adjudication or civil action provides a concrete, adversarial test of Government regulation and thereby insures the legitimacy and fairness of the law. An adjudication, for example, may show that the policy or factual foundation underlying an agency rule is erroneous or inaccurate, or it may provide a vehicle for developing or announcing more precise rules. The bill thus recognizes that the expense of correcting error on the part of the Government should not rest wholly on the party whose willingness to litigate or adjudicate has helped to define the limits of Federal authority. 34 See H.R.Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 4984, 4988-89. By contrast, habeas petitions are dedicated to vindicating individual rights based on the Constitution rather than refining rules and policy. They are no more public policy oriented than is a criminal trial. Moreover, we doubt that Congress felt a need to encourage the filing of habeas petitions; they flourished long before the Act was proposed. 35 The above considerations convince us that Congress either meant to exclude habeas petitions from the scope of section 2412 or overlooked the question. But because a waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States must be unequivocal and explicit, see, e.g., United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399, 96 S.Ct. 948, 953, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976), this Court need only consider whether Congress clearly manifested its affirmative intention to include habeas petitions within section 2412. Because we find that it did not, the mere inclusion in the statute of the words any civil proceeding should not be construed to authorize attorney's fees in habeas proceedings. Accordingly, the district court erred by characterizing a habeas proceeding as a civil action that falls under section 2412. See Boudin v. Thomas, 554 F.Supp. 703, 705 (S.D.N.Y.1982). 36 Thus, to the extent that Boudin's action was a petition for habeas corpus, the district court could not award her attorney's fees because the action did not fall within the provisions of the EAJA. However, Boudin also sought an injunction ordering prison authorities to allow her to have contact visits with her infant son. The district court granted the injunction on the ground that Boudin had a First Amendment right to contact visits. Boudin v. Thomas, 533 F.Supp. 786, 792-93 (S.D.N.Y.1982). The part of her complaint seeking this relief is without question a civil action for purposes of the EAJA. Cf. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 499 n. 14, 93 S.Ct. at 1841 n. 14 (claim exclusively cognizable under federal habeas corpus may be litigated simultaneously with federal civil rights claims). For this civil portion of Boudin's action, we must determine whether one of the exceptions to section 2412(d)(1) applies here, namely, whether the government can show that its position was substantially justified. 37