Opinion ID: 516020
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: An Inevitable Accident

Text: 25 The DAUNTLESS interests fare no better in their argument that the district court inappropriately determined that the Great Barge Breakaway was a vis major, thereby precluding a finding of negligence on Combi's part for the CBLL-01315's breakaway. We agree with Combi that the breakaway is more properly classified as an inevitable accident. 8 Nevertheless, the district court had ample evidence to support its finding. 26 The determination of inevitability is primarily a finding of fact governed by the evidence. See The Anna C. Minch, 271 F. 192 (2nd Cir.1921); Griffin, The American Law of Collision, Sec. 238 (1949). The district court found that, The Great Barge Breakaway was unique in its magnitude. It made no distinction between barges located in riverbends and those on the straightaway, or between those moored six across and those moored directly to shore.... No fleet could have been designed to hold fast against this particular breakaway. The record thoroughly supports the court's finding. Combi's fleeting position, although in a river bend, was located at a site selected by the New Orleans Dock Board and approved by the Corps of Engineers. Many fleets were located in the bend. Even some barge fleets in the straight stretches of the Mississippi River were struck by the drifting vessels. In fact, Charlton Nettles, Chief of the Operations Division of the COE in New Orleans, testified that no fleet could be designed to ensure that its vessels would remain secure against drifting vessels from upriver. 27 In Dow Chemical Company v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 463 F.2d 120 (5th Cir.1972), we held that the mere location of an object on navigable waters, in technical violation of federal statute, did not amount to negligence on the part of the owners when the object (in this case a fender system) was struck by barges. There we found that the fender system neither obstructed navigation nor was inherently dangerous, and we further found that a different design or placement of the structure could not necessarily have avoided the collisions. We said, The record refutes any suggestion that the fender system 'caused or contributed to' the collision simply by being there. 463 F.2d at 122. Similarly, in the present case, the record indicated that the barges cascading down the Mississippi did not discriminate between barge fleet locations or tiering lengths. Charlton Nettles, a professional engineer himself, testified that a different fleeting design or placement could not have prevented uncontrolled, drifting vessels from dislodging moored vessels. 28 Unlike the arrival of a hurricane, the barge breakaway occurred without warning. Cf. Boudoin v. J. Ray McDermott & Company, 281 F.2d 81 (5th Cir.1960) (barge operator had ample warnings of Hurricane Audrey's approach and failed to take appropriate cautions). We are reminded that under the inevitable accident doctrine, [T]he highest degree of care is not required. It is sufficient if the navigator has complied with the tests of ordinary prudence ... Griffin, Sec. 238; See also The Grace Girdler, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 196, 203, 19 L.Ed. 113 (1879). Combi has satisfied this standard. 29 The DAUNTLESS interests also allege that Combi violated the terms of the COE permit by maintaining a barge tier length in excess of four barges and that this behavior constituted a statutory violation under the Pennsylvania Rule. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125, 22 L.Ed. 148 (1874). If this permit violation constituted a statutory violation under the Pennsylvania Rule, then Combi must prove that its violation could not have been one of the causes of the breakaway. 9 This burden of proof is extremely difficult to satisfy. 30 The record, however, lacks evidence to support the DAUNTLESS interests' claim that Combi violated the COE permit. Charlton Nettles testified that the COE permit would be violated only if it was a regular practice in [the] fleet to have barges in excess of four wide for lengthy periods of time. Nettles testified that it was common and acceptable practice for fleets to exceed the permit tier lengths for intervals of up to several hours. 10 The record is void of any evidence to show that Combi made a practice of exceeding its tier lengths for significant periods of time. In fact, the only testimony touching on this subject was provided by Anthony Valence. Valence did not indicate how often Combi exceeded the tier length or the duration of these excesses. He had worked at the Combi site for only six months prior to the breakaway. Equally important, Valence's testimony at trial was, at several points, atodds with his earlier deposition statements, and thus called his credibility into question. 31 The DAUNTLESS interests had the burden of proof that Combi violated a statute. Having carefully reviewed the record, we find that they have failed to meet this burden.