Opinion ID: 2427524
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court Reasonably Rejected Sabir's Batson Challenge

Text: Sabir, who is African-American, argues that the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges to excuse five African Americans from the jury in his case violated the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection as construed by the Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). [28] After an extensive inquiry, the district court rejected this argument, finding that each of the five challenges was supported by credible non-discriminatory reasons. Such a ruling represents a finding of fact, which we will not disturb in the absence of clear error. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364, 369, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality opinion); see United States v. Lee, 549 F.3d 84, 94 (2d Cir.2008); United States v. Taylor, 92 F.3d 1313, 1326 (2d Cir.1996). We identify no such error in this case. A three-step inquiry guides a district court's evaluation of a Batson challenge: First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race; second, if that showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question; and third, in light of the parties' submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 476-77, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). For purposes of this appeal, we assume that Sabir satisfied the minimal burden of a prima facie showing, Overton v. Newton, 295 F.3d 270, 279 n. 10 (2d Cir.2002), as he could do by reference to the government's overall exclusion rate for African-American prospective jurors, see Jones v. West, 555 F.3d 90, 98-99 (2d Cir.2009). Nor need we discuss the second prong of Batson analysis as Sabir does notand cannotcontend that the government failed to proffer reasons for its challenges that were racially neutral on their face. See generally Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. at 360, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (observing that at second step of Batson analysis, explanation need not be persuasive; it need only be based on something other than the race of the juror). Instead, we focus on Sabir's argument that with respect to three of the five challenged African Americansprospective jurors # 5, # 26, and # 27the reasons the government advanced were clearly pretextual. Appellant's Br. at 57, 59, 61. [29] Sabir's pretext argument is based largelythough not exclusivelyon the prosecution's purported failure to apply its proffered race-neutral reasons for excusing African Americans to similarly situated prospective jurors of other races or ethnicities. Such inconsistency can demonstrate a discriminatory intent. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) (observing that [m]ore powerful than ... bare statistics in evidencing pretext for discrimination are side-by-side comparisons of some black venire panelists who were struck and white panelists allowed to serve); United States v. Thomas, 303 F.3d 138, 145 (2d Cir.2002) (Support for the notion that there was purposeful discrimination in the peremptory challenge may lie in the similarity between the characteristics of jurors struck and jurors accepted. (internal quotation marks omitted)). The record in this case, however, does not demonstrate sufficient juror similarity to render clearly erroneous the district court's rejection of Sabir's Batson claim.
The government cited three race-neutral reasons for excusing prospective juror # 5: (1) his failure to secure appointment to the Boston police force might cause him to lean against law enforcement; (2) he was somewhat equivocal about his ability to set aside the view that he was frequently a victim of race discrimination, see Voir Dire Tr. at 11 (I think I can give it the college try and be as fair as any other person could be.); and (3) his employment working with autistic children might make him less sympathetic to prosecution witnesses. In arguing pretext, Sabir notes that the prosecution showed no comparable concern for equivocal responses from other jurors whose backgrounds raised questions about their impartiality. We need not resolve the parties' dispute about the relative degrees of equivocation in various jurors' responses because the district court did not rely on this second proffered prosecution reason in rejecting Sabir's Batson challenge. Nor did it rely on the third reason, which the government does not maintain on appeal. Instead, the district court found that the prosecution had credibly demonstrated that it would have excused prospective juror # 5 for the first reason articulated regardless of race. See generally United States v. Douglas, 525 F.3d 225, 239 (2d Cir.2008) (observing that where prosecution articulates multiple reasons for peremptory challenge, one of which is race, it must demonstrate that challenge would have been exercised for race-neutral reason in any event). In challenging this conclusion, Sabir suggests that the lost job opportunity was effectively irrelevant as prospective juror #5 conceded that he did not satisfy the residency requirement for appointment. The district court, however, concluded from its own questioning of the juror that he manifested excessive defensiveness about the circumstances relating to his failure to secure the police appointment, which provided the government with a credible race-neutral basis for concern about his ability to be impartial toward law enforcement officials. Voir Dire Tr. at 123. This finding turned largely on the district court's assessment of the juror's demeanor and credibility, a matter peculiarly within [its] province, Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. at 477, 128 S.Ct. 1203 (internal quotation marks omitted), to which we accord great deference, United States v. Lee, 549 F.3d at 94. Accordingly, we conclude that Sabir has failed to identify clear error in the district court's rejection of his Batson challenge with respect to prospective juror # 5.
The government advanced four reasons for excusing prospective juror #26: (1) her work as a home health aide might cause her to sympathize with Sabir, a physician; (2) her friend's daughter's marriage to a man from Yemen might also make her sympathetic to Sabir's circumstances; (3) her purportedly disheveled appearance and lack of focus in responding to questions raised attentiveness concerns; and (4) her regular viewing of three CSI television shows might lead her to have unrealistic expectations as to the prosecution's ability to produce technical and scientific evidence of guilt in every case. [30] While the district court did not agree with the prosecution's characterization of the prospective juror's appearance, it found the other identified concerns, including the juror's lack of focus, to constitute credible race-neutral grounds for the prosecution's exercise of a peremptory challenge. In maintaining his claim of pretext on appeal, Sabir observes that the prosecution did not excuse non-African American venirepersons who worked in health care, notably prospective juror #19, who worked in a veterans' hospital. Nor did it excuse non-African Americans with ties to Muslims, such as prospective juror # 69, who had dated a Muslim. The argument ignores the fact that neither of these prospective jurors demonstrated the range of concerns presented by prospective juror # 26. [31] Certainly, neither presented a focus concern. As to prospective juror # 26, the district court expressly found that she had a more distracted attitude than other members of the venire, which she manifested by persistently looking over toward her left during the questioning. Voir Dire Tr. at 129. We defer to the district court's considerable voir dire experience in making demeanor observations, see Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. at 477, 128 S.Ct. 1203, and we note that such distractedness is, by itself, a sufficient race-neutral ground to support exercise of a peremptory challenge, see generally Brown v. Kelly, 973 F.2d 116, 121 (2d Cir.1992) (An impression of the conduct and demeanor of the prospective juror during the voir dire may provide a legitimate basis for the exercise of a peremptory challenge.). Accordingly, we identify no clear error in the district court's rejection of Sabir's Batson challenge with respect to prospective juror # 26.
The prosecution offered two race-neutral reasons for excusing prospective juror # 27: (1) the person's thirty-year career in the New York City Department of Social Services might cause him to be sympathetic to persons in difficult straits as well as more skeptical of government authority, and (2) his frequent television viewing of the three CSI television shows might make him reluctant to convict in the absence of scientific evidence. See Voir Dire Tr. at 131. In Messiah v. Duncan, 435 F.3d 186 (2d Cir.2006), we observed that [i]t is not implausible for a prosecutor to think that a social service provider who has dedicated his professional life to helping others might have more sympathy for a defendant than other prospective jurors. Id. at 200. That conclusion, like many others informing peremptory challenges, may be based on a group stereotype, but not one that violates equal protection. Cf. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 142 n. 14, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994) (distinguishing peremptory challenges based on race from those based on occupation). Similarly, it was plausible for the prosecutor to think that a juror who regularly watched television shows in which forensic science conclusively solved crimes might be more inclined to demand such evidence in order to convict. See United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 355 n. 39 (5th Cir. 2007) (observing that claim that CSI shows cause jurors to demand scientific evidence was plausible even though not proven empirically). The district court having found the prosecution credible in its profession of these concerns with respect to prospective juror #27, we identify no clear error in its rejection of Sabir's Batson argument with respect to the exercise of this peremptory challenge. In sum, we reject Sabir's equal protection challenge to his conviction as without merit.