Opinion ID: 2517801
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Penalty trial error issues

Text: Defendant urges that admission, as aggravating evidence, of the unadjudicated sexual assault against Alexandra M. violated his federal constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, a fair and impartial jury, and a reliable penalty verdict. (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.) [38] He asserts that jurors who had found him guilty of capital offenses could not impartially judge his guilt of the aggravating crime, and that he was denied the protection of a unanimous jury verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. We reject the contention, as we have many times before. (E.g., Stanley, supra, 39 Cal.4th 913, 962, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 420, 140 P.3d 736; Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th 543, 584-585, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347; Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th 900, 1054, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044; People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 863, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2; Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d 144, 204-205, 222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480.) Defendant also claims his federal and state due process rights were violated by virtue of the preaccusation delay in prosecuting the 1982 sexual assault on Alexandra M. But we have consistently held that the prosecution may offer in aggravation the defendant's violent criminal activity that occurred at any time. Absent demonstrable prejudice, the remote time at which that activity occurred does not violate the defendant's due process, speedy trial, or fair trial rights. (E.g., People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 136-138, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166; People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1088, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 46 P.3d 335; Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th 543, 585-586, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347; Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th 694, 772, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2.) Though defendant claims prejudice, he demonstrates none except the damaging nature of the evidence. The evidence was admissible. [39]
At the outset of the penalty trial, defendant moved for permission to allocute before the penalty jury, i.e., to make a personal statement immune from cross-examination. Counsel's attached declaration stated that, if permitted to do so, defendant would speak about the constructive worth and value of his life even as it may exist in prison, the artistic and vocational activities he might wish to undertake behind bars, his opportunity to teach other inmates based on his experience and knowledge, his love for his children, and [h]is promise of good behavior while serving out the remainder of his life in prison. The motion was denied. [40] Defendant now urges the denial of allocution was error. The consequence, he insists, was a violation of his federal constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and a reliable penalty verdict. (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.) In particular, he asserts, he was treated unequally compared to noncapital defendants, who do have a right of allocution at sentencing. As defendant concedes, we have repeatedly rejected similar arguments. (E.g., People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1276, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 117 P.3d 544; Lucero, supra, 23 Cal.4th 692, 717, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 871, 3 P.3d 248; People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 1036-1037, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099 [summarily dismissing equal protection argument]; Keenan, supra, 46 Cal.3d 478, 511, 250 Cal.Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081; People v. Robbins (1988) 45 Cal.3d 867, 888-890, 248 Cal.Rptr. 172, 755 P.2d 355 ( Robbins ).) We have held generally that capital and noncapital sentences are not similarly situated for purposes of equal protection. (E.g., People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 488, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 759, 122 P.3d 968; People v. Williams, supra, 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1330, 248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221.) With regard to allocution specifically, we have explained that noncapital sentencees have no other right to express themselves about the appropriate sentence, while capital defendants may take the stand and testify on that issue. ( Robbins, supra, 45 Cal.3d 867, 889, 248 Cal.Rptr. 172, 755 P.2d 355.) In the latter context, a right of allocution immune from cross-examination contravenes the capital sentencing law's purpose to provide the sentencer with all relevant information bearing on the appropriate penalty. ( Keenan, supra, 46 Cal.3d 478, 511, 250 Cal.Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081.) Defendant urges that because he did not intend to discuss facts in his statement, cross-examination would be irrelevant. But his promises to behave well and be a constructive presence in prison would be a legitimate subject for cross-examination to test their sincerity based on past conduct. Defendant's claim lacks merit.