Opinion ID: 549855
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: background of the four cases

Text: 4 These appeals involve the attempts of four claimants, Doris Myers, Althea Parker, Carolyn Grimes, and Mary Cohen, to obtain attorney's fees under the EAJA after having successfully challenged the Secretary's decision denying requested Social Security disability or Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits. We briefly summarize the proceedings leading up to the present appeal in each case. 5 Doris Myers: Myers applied for both SSI and Social Security benefits on May 15, 1986. After her application was denied, she requested and was granted an administrative hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ, although finding that Myers suffered from severe hypertension and atherosclerotic vascular disease, concluded that Myers did not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments which met or equaled one listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404 and 416, Subpart P, App. 1 (1986). The ALJ found that Myers's allegations of pain were not credible and were unsubstantiated by objective medical evidence; the ALJ further determined that Myers possessed the residual functional capacity to perform work-related activities which were not strenuous. As a result of these findings, the ALJ ruled that Myers was not entitled to receive benefits under either program. 6 Myers timely requested review of her petition before the Appeals Council, which denied her petition for review. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g), she then initiated civil proceedings in the Middle District of Florida. 7 While her case was pending, Myers received notices from the Secretary that, on the basis of a subsequently filed application for benefits, she had been awarded Social Security disability benefits commencing July 21, 1987 and SSI benefits commencing September 17, 1987. As a result, the issue in the federal court litigation became solely a question of whether the Secretary erred in not also awarding Myers disability benefits from May 15, 1986 through July 21, 1987, and SSI benefits from May 15, 1986 through September 17, 1987. 8 For approximately two months, Myers and the Secretary unsuccessfully engaged in settlement negotiations. Once negotiations for settlement became futile, Myers filed a motion to remand the case to the Secretary for consideration of new, noncumulative evidence which became available after the Secretary's decision was rendered. In response, the Secretary conveyed his agreement with Myers's position, stating that The Defendant has no objection to the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and agrees to pay benefits to the claimant from the onset date of May 2, 1986, the date she became disabled. 9 In light of this representation, the magistrate recommended the case be remanded to the Secretary for further proceedings. On June 23, 1988, the district court adopted this recommendation and remanded the case over the objection of Myers, who argued that judicial economy would best be served by immediately resolving the case on the basis of the Secretary's apparent concession. 10 On September 7, 1988, the Appeals Council issued a decision finding that Myers was entitled to Social Security and SSI disability insurance benefits for a period of disability commencing May 2, 1986. On November 8, 1988, Myers returned to the district court and requested that the district court enter a judgment reversing the Secretary's initial decision and awarding her Social Security and SSI disability benefits consistent with the Appeals Council's decision. 11 On November 28, 1988, having received no filing from the Secretary, the district court issued a judgment affirming the Secretary's decision on remand and dismissing the case. A little less than three months later, on February 27, 1989, Myers moved for attorney's fees pursuant to the EAJA. The district court sua sponte issued a show cause order questioning whether Myers's petition for EAJA attorney's fees was timely filed. After receiving briefing from both parties, the district court concluded that Myers's motion was untimely and dismissed her attorney's fee request. Myers v. Sullivan, 710 F.Supp. 1333 (M.D.Fla.1989). 12 Althea Parker: Parker filed four applications for Social Security benefits and supplemental income on July 10, 1979, June 22, 1981, January 11, 1982, and March 29, 1983. Each application was denied by the Secretary. After the March 29, 1983, application was denied, Parker commenced suit in federal district court to review the Secretary's denial of that application. In this suit, she alleged that the Secretary erred in concluding that she did not suffer from a severe impairment. 13 Over the objections of the Secretary, the magistrate reviewing the case concurred with Parker. The magistrate found that the ALJ erred in concluding that Parker was not suffering from a severe impairment. Finding that there was not substantial evidence in the record to support this conclusion, the magistrate recommended the case be remanded to the Secretary for further consideration. This recommendation was adopted by the district court and the case was remanded. 14 Upon remand, the Secretary concluded that Parker was entitled to receive benefits with an onset date of December 1, 1982. Parker returned to district court, this time challenging the onset date selected by the Secretary. She argued that the Secretary should have reopened her earlier applications for benefits in light of the fact that she was suffering from a mental impairment and was proceeding without counsel at the time that those applications had been denied. Relying principally upon Elchediak v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 892 (11th Cir.1985), the magistrate concluded that the Secretary should have reopened Parker's applications if Parker's mental illness disability was responsible for her failure to challenge the Secretary's denial of her earlier applications. The magistrate recommended that the case be remanded to the Secretary for consideration as to whether Parker's mental illness prevented her from pursuing her initial claims. 15 The district court adopted this recommendation and the case was remanded to the Secretary a second time. Upon this second remand, the ALJ recommended that Parker be awarded benefits commencing on January 8, 1979. This recommendation was adopted by the Appeals Council on March 4, 1988. Responding to a motion by the Secretary requesting that the district court affirm his decision on remand, the district court, on May 18, 1988, affirmed the Secretary's new final decision and dismissed the case. 16 On August 16, 1988, Parker filed a motion for EAJA attorney's fees. After the Secretary filed his response objecting only to the amount of compensation requested by Parker's counsel, the district court sua sponte issued a show cause order to determine whether Parker's fee petition was timely filed. After considering Parker's response to the show cause order, 3 the district court concluded that Parker's fee petition was untimely and dismissed her motion. 17 Carolyn Grimes: Grimes filed an application for Social Security disability and SSI disability benefits on June 1, 1981, alleging disability since March 3, 1979, due to lupus and heart problems. After exhausting her administrative remedies before the Secretary, Grimes brought suit in federal district court to challenge the Secretary's decision denying her benefits. In this litigation, Grimes presented the following challenges: (1) that the Secretary erred as a matter of law in not finding that her Systemic Lupus Erythematosus was a listed impairment as defined by 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Appendix 1, Sec. 10.04; (2) that the Secretary erred as a matter of law in failing to evaluate Grimes's complaints of severe pain and in failing to make a determination regarding her credibility; and (3) that the Secretary's decision was not based on substantial evidence. She also filed a motion requesting that, in the event the district court upheld the Secretary's decision, a remand be ordered to consider new, noncumulative, material evidence not in existence at the time of her administrative hearing. 18 In response to Grimes's various claims, the Secretary defended his initial decision denying her application for benefits. Additionally, the Secretary informed the court that [s]hould the Court rule in favor of the Secretary in the present action, the defendant does not oppose a remand for a reconsideration in light of the newly submitted medical evidence. 19 The magistrate recommended that the district court remand Grimes's claim to the Secretary for additional consideration. The magistrate premised this recommendation on the fact that the ALJ did not discuss evidence of Grimes's pain in its decision and that Grimes's complaints of pain coupled with the objective medical symptoms causing that pain could be sufficient to constitute a legal disability. Accordingly, the magistrate recommended that the case be remanded for appropriate discussion and findings relating to Grimes's pain allegations. The magistrate also recommended that Grimes's newly submitted medical evidence be considered upon remand. On May 13, 1985, the district court adopted this recommendation and remanded the case to the Secretary. 20 On remand, the Appeals Council issued a decision dated July 30, 1986, awarding Grimes Social Security disability insurance benefits and SSI commencing April 15, 1979. On July 29, 1988, Grimes filed a motion with the district court requesting that the court enter a judgment reversing the Secretary's initial final decision and awarding her disability benefits as found by the Appeals Council. On February 2, 1989, having received no response from the Secretary, the district court affirmed the Secretary's decision subsequent to remand and dismissed the litigation. 21 Grimes then filed a motion for EAJA attorney's fees on March 23, 1989. The Secretary moved to dismiss the fee application, arguing that Grimes did not timely file her fee petition. Agreeing with the Secretary, the district court granted the Secretary's motion and dismissed Grimes's motion for attorney's fees. 22 Mary Cohen: Cohen filed an application for SSI benefits on October 4, 1984. Once that application was denied, she pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies. Subsequently, on November 13, 1985, she initiated judicial proceedings to review the Secretary's decision denying her benefits. 23 Upon review of Cohen's claim, the magistrate found that the ALJ had made several errors in concluding that Cohen was not disabled. Because Cohen was suffering from a non-exertional impairment, the magistrate concluded that the ALJ should not have relied exclusively upon the Medi-Vocational Guidelines found at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2 (1985). See Francis v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 1562, 1566 (11th Cir.1985). The magistrate discounted the ALJ's contrary decision, observing that the ALJ discredited Cohen's assertions of pain based solely upon observations during the administrative hearing. Following this court's decision in Wilson v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 513, 517 (11th Cir.1984), the magistrate ruled that invocation of such a sit and squirm test by the ALJ was improper. 24 The magistrate recommended that the case be remanded to the Secretary for further proceedings. The magistrate also recommended that Cohen receive a vocational expert's testimony during these additional proceedings. Finally, the magistrate observed that the plaintiff had new evidence that was not in existence at the time of the original administrative proceedings. Concluding that this new evidence was material and not cumulative and that good cause existed for Cohen's failure to present the evidence during the original proceeding, the magistrate recommended that this evidence be considered on remand. 25 On August 1, 1986, the district court adopted the magistrate's report and remanded the case to the Secretary. After additional proceedings on remand, the Appeals Council issued the final decision of the Secretary on February 26, 1988, holding that, on the basis of her October 4, 1984, application for benefits, Cohen was disabled and entitled to receive benefits. On April 29, 1988, the Secretary filed a motion with the district court requesting that the district court affirm the final decision of the Secretary issued subsequent to the remand order. This motion was granted on May 19, 1988, and the litigation was dismissed. 26 On August 17, 1988, Cohen filed her application for EAJA attorney's fees. On September 19, 1988, the Secretary filed a memorandum challenging certain requests for fees made by Cohen, but not challenging her entitlement to receive EAJA attorney's fees. On June 6, 1989, the district court denied Cohen's motion for attorney's fees, ruling that the motion was not timely filed and that, consequently, it was without jurisdiction to consider the motion on its merits.