Opinion ID: 2628126
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prosecutorial Misconduct as a Bar to Retrial

Text: The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution protects against (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. See, e.g., State v. Schoonover, 281 Kan. 453, 463, 133 P.3d 48 (2006) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 [1969], overruled on other grounds Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 [1989]). We have previously recognized that the language of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees no greater double jeopardy protection to an accused than does § 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights; the provisions are coextensive. See Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 474, 133 P.3d 48; State v. Thompkins, 271 Kan. 324, 336-37, 21 P.3d 997 (2001); State v. Williams, 268 Kan. 1, 6, 988 P.2d 722 (1999). The Kansas Legislature attempted to codify the constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy in K.S.A. 21-3107 and K.S.A. 21-3108. Thompkins, 271 Kan. at 336-37, 21 P.3d 997; Williams, 268 Kan. at 6-7, 988 P.2d 722. K.S.A. 21-3108 provides, in pertinent part, that a second prosecution is not barred if a subsequent proceeding resulted in the invalidation, setting aside, reversal, or vacating of the conviction, unless the defendant was adjudged not guilty. Whether a particular criminal defendant's protection against double jeopardy was violated is a question of law over which we have unlimited review. See Thompkins, 271 Kan. at 337, 21 P.3d 997. Generally, in Kansas, [a]n accused waives his right to plead double jeopardy when after conviction he applies for and is granted a new trial. State v. Bloomer, 197 Kan. 668, 675, 421 P.2d 58 (1966), cert. denied 387 U.S. 911, 87 S.Ct. 1697, 18 L.Ed.2d 631 (1967). Further, when a new trial is granted on the motion of the defendant in a criminal prosecution, the granting of the same places the party accused in the same position as if no trial had been had. [Citations omitted.] State v. Osburn, 216 Kan. 638, 641-42, 533 P.2d 1229 (1975). There is, however, a recognized exception to this general rule for certain egregious prosecutorial misconduct, under the authority of Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982). In that case, Bruce Kennedy had been charged with theft. A series of sustained objections prevented the prosecutor from eliciting certain testimony. The prosecutor nevertheless returned to the well one more time. He asked the witness if the reason he had never done business with the defendant was the defendant's status as a crook. Defendant's resulting motion for a mistrial was granted. After a second trial led to his conviction, Kennedy persuaded the Oregon Court of Appeals that double jeopardy should have barred the retrial because the prosecutor's conduct in the first trial was overreaching. 456 U.S. at 668, 102 S.Ct. 2083. The United States Supreme Court reversed the Oregon Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings, but it noted that double jeopardy would bar retrial if the prosecutor had intentionally provoked the defendant's request for mistrial. 456 U.S. at 676-79, 102 S.Ct. 2083. We have discussed Kennedy on several previous occasions. See State v. Williams, 268 Kan. 1, 7, 988 P.2d 722 (1999); State v. Muck, 262 Kan. 459, 467, 939 P.2d 896 (1997); State v. McClanahan, 259 Kan. 86, 102, 910 P.2d 193 (1996); State v. Cady, 254 Kan. 393, 399-400, 867 P.2d 270 (1994). In Cady, the defendant argued to this court that Kennedy should be extended to cover situations when a defendant obtains reversal of a conviction because of prosecutorial misconduct. 254 Kan. at 399, 867 P.2d 270. We declined to do so and remarked on the limits of the Kennedy rule in this way:  Kennedy applies to situations where the defendant's request for mistrial was inevitable because the prosecution subverted the defendant's right to a fair trial. . . . . . . [A] defendant should be allowed to freely choose whether he or she should request a mistrial and forego the right to have the matter decided by the first trier of fact. Where the prosecutor seeks to force the defendant into the choice, the choice is not freely made, and the prosecution has subverted the defendant's rights protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution. Cady, 254 Kan. at 399-400, 867 P.2d 270. Our subsequent discussions of Kennedy have consistently enforced these limits. Without prosecutorial intent to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial, the Kennedy rule does not apply. See Williams, 268 Kan. at 7, 988 P.2d 722 (Intentional prosecutorial conduct motivated by a desire to obtain a conviction but not by a desire to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial may be grounds for a mistrial but it does not preclude retrial of the case.); Muck, 262 Kan. at 470, 939 P.2d 896 (quoting Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 675-76, 102 S.Ct. 2083) (`Prosecutorial conduct that might be viewed as harassment or overreaching, even if sufficient to justify a mistrial on defendant's motion,. . . . does not bar retrial absent intent on the part of the prosecutor to subvert the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. . . . Only where the governmental conduct in question is intended to goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion.'); McClanahan, 259 Kan. at 102, 910 P.2d 193 (In evaluating [misconduct], the question remains whether the prosecutor's intentional attempt to introduce inadmissible evidence substantially prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial and required the defendant to ask for a mistrial. . . . [I]f the defendant was forced into requesting a mistrial by the prosecutor's intentional misconduct, retrial would be barred by K.S.A. 21-3108(1)(c) and by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Kansas and United States Constitutions). We have yet to apply Kennedy to bar retrial on double jeopardy grounds, although we have remanded for a supplemental finding of fact on the issue of whether or not the actions of the prosecutor prompting the mistrial motion were done with the intention of goading [defendant] into requesting a mistrial. Muck, 262 Kan. at 470, 939 P.2d 896 (citing State v. Rademacher, 433 N.W.2d 754, 757 [Iowa 1988], for a similar remand disposition). We note that other jurisdictions also have interpreted Kennedy narrowly. See, e.g., United States v. Gilmore, 454 F.3d 725, 730 (7th Cir.2006) (prosecutor's inadvertent mistake in opening, although it necessitated mistrial, did not bar retrial under Kennedy exception where there was no intent to precipitate mistrial, reprosecute defendant); United States v. Wharton, 320 F.3d 526, 531-32 (5th Cir.2003) (prosecution did not purposely elicit prejudicial hearsay evidence to goad defendant into seeking mistrial; thus retrial did not violate double jeopardy; evidence against defendant convincing; defendant had moved for mistrial three times before introduction of hearsay; prosecution did not stand to gain from mistrial, because witnesses from Haiti beyond district court's subpoena power); United States v. Santos-Garcia, 313 F.3d 1073, 1080 (8th Cir.2002) (when defendant's motion gives rise to mistrial, reprosecution prevented only if prosecution's conduct giving rise to successful motion intended to provoke defendant); United States v. Oseni, 996 F.2d 186, 187-88 (7th Cir.1993) (government cannot dismiss, reprosecute if case going badly; it cannot engage in trial misconduct intended to precipitate motion for mistrial by defendant; yet fact that the government blunders at trial and the blunder precipitates a successful motion for a mistrial does not bar a retrial); Rogers v. Goord, 371 F.Supp.2d 348, 354 (W.D.N.Y.2005) (mere bad faith conduct, harassment by prosecution resulting in mistrial insufficient to preclude retrial on double jeopardy ground; rather, court must determine whether prosecutor actually intended to provoke mistrial); State v. Thomas, 275 Ga. 167, 167-68, 562 S.E.2d 501 (2002) (where prosecutor stood to gain by aborting trial because expert's testimony favorable to defendant, record established prosecutor intended to goad defendant into moving for mistrial; double jeopardy bars retrial); State v. Keenan, 81 Ohio St.3d 133, 141, 689 N.E.2d 929 (1998) ( Kennedy will apply to bar retrial if prosecutorial misconduct was calculated to goad defendant into seeking mistrial, but Kennedy not extended to bar retrial where prosecutorial misconduct basis for appellate reversal). Defendant urges us to apply Kennedy here because in his view, the prosecutor committed deliberate misconduct during the first trial in order to get a new trial in which she could introduce Newhouse's previously excluded testimony. We see no support in the record for this position. There is no indication that the prosecutor intended to provoke defendant into moving for mistrial. Indeed, there was little motivation for her to do so. The testimony of the coroner already gave rise to a reasonable inference of a purposeful killing, rather than the random firing that defendant asserted. We therefore decline defendant's invitation to liberalize application of the Kennedy rule to fit the facts of this case. Kennedy requires something more than misconduct, even intentional and reversible misconduct, in order to bar retrial. It requires that the prosecutor intended to provoke a mistrial, to goad a defendant into sacrificing his or her choice to live with the outcome from the first jury. This outcome is consistent with our opinion on Morton's first appeal. We concluded then that the evidence of Morton's premeditation was not weak, but the jury's apparent hesitation on that issue made the prosecutor's misstatement of the law significant enough to require reversal. Morton, 277 Kan. at 585, 86 P.3d 535. Yet we observed that the statement did not appear to be deliberate or the product of ill will. Furthermore, it was tempered by the prosecutor's correct definition of controlling law in her multiple references to the jury instructions. Morton, 277 Kan. at 585, 86 P.3d 535. Under these circumstances, Kennedy did not bar retrial on double jeopardy grounds.