Opinion ID: 729764
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The September 30, 1986 Balance Sheet

Text: 54 MHC also sought damages based on the $10.6 million balance sheet. MHC relied upon the warranty in the SPA providing that Baxter would pay MHC the amount of any overstatement in the balance sheet. Thus, the district court found that the award must be justified by reference to the breach of contract claim. 55 MHC produced one witness, Michael Reagan of the accounting firm of Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, to testify to the amount of overstatement. Reagan testified that a 40 percent reduction of the balance sheet was appropriate, resulting in approximately $4.1 million in damages. The jury returned a verdict in the amount of $2,225,000. 56 Reagan analyzed the balance sheet overstatement line-item by line-item. For each item that he concluded that Baxter had overstated in the balance sheet, he testified as to why he reached this conclusion and by how much Baxter had overstated the value of the asset. Reagan was cross-examined on each balance sheet line-item. He also testified extensively on both direct and cross examination regarding his workpapers, which were provided to the jury as exhibits. In addition, Baxter called an accounting expert, who rebutted each of Reagan's opinions line-item by line-item. Baxter's expert also suggested that Reagan's entire analysis should be rejected and that there were flaws that should lead to partial rejection of some line-items. 57 The district court again found that the jury was not capable of adjusting the damages award. 58 [MHC] asserts that the jury had Reagan's working papers, permitting the jury to determine the proper amount to reduce the balance sheet. These voluminous papers are unintelligible to a lay person. They do not provide guidance to the jury. . . . [MHC]'s evidence did not permit the jury to adjust its verdict downward if it decided only to partially accept Reagan's qualified opinion that the balance sheet should be reduced by $4,000,000. Since the $2,225,000 verdict is not rationally related to the evidence, the verdict is set aside. 59 (MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER, 6/29/90, 1990 WL 104039 at  14.) Again, the district court's finding contradicts Illinois law and underrates the jury's abilities. The jury's function is to decide which evidence to accept and which evidence to reject. The jury took into account Baxter's numerous challenges to Reagan's analysis and the testimony of Baxter's own expert. The jury then determined that the balance sheet was overstated by only $2,225,000. As MHC points out, there are numerous permutations that would permit the jury to arrive at a verdict of $2,225,000 rather than $4.1 million. See Wagner v. City of Chicago, 626 N.E.2d 1227, 1240 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (A jury's award will not be subject to remittitur where it falls within the 'flexible range' of conclusions which can be reasonably supported by the facts.), aff'd, 651 N.E.2d 1120 (Ill. 1995). 60 Even if we assume that the jury could not run the exact numbers and calculations of Reagan's model with mathematical certainty (which we are hesitant to assume), the jury was entitled to reduce an expert's damage calculations without invalidating the verdict. F.L. Walz, Inc., 586 N.E.2d at 1319. Under the appropriate standard, Illinois law, the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence. 61