Opinion ID: 1751529
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: whether the prosecutor's misconduct in this trial violated the state and federal constitutions and deprived jimmie mack of a fundamentally fair trial?

Text: The defense contends that the prosecutor acted improperly during voir dire where he twice sought promises from potential jurors that they would return a death sentence. The transcript of the voir dire reflects the following: BY MR. MELLEN: Now, the Judge asked a lot of questions yesterday, very thoroughly, concerning that. Now, you have had a night to think about it so there may be some responses this morning that wasn't there yesterday concerning this aspect of the trial. And I will get to that. But let me ask you this. When you decide guilty or innocence, can you do so, then, based on the facts and also based upon  there will be in an instruction that the Judge gives you at the end of the trial, if you are on that jury and you will hear this instruction, based upon your good common sense and your sound honest judgment. And when he says your he is talking about your individual judgment  good common sense and sound honest judgment. Do you agree to do that? Is there anybody who just wouldn't agree to do that? For instance, you get to thinking, well, this is such a great case. It's involving  may even get into the death penalty so I would hold the prosecution to a higher burden and I would find not guilty in order to not to get to get to that phase. Do you understand what I am saying? Is there anybody who would shirk their responsibility even if we prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt? Anybody who would shirk their responsibility? Then I take it that you, if we prove guilt of the crime, that you would find him guilty. Would you do that? BY MR. WONG: Objection, Your Honor. This is asking for  BY THE COURT:  I sustain the objection. They have already told the Court that they would follow the law, Mr. Mellen. Later during voir dire, the following conversation also took place: BY MR. MELLEN: Mrs. Key has answered. Is there anyone else in the jury box? Anybody in the courtroom? All right. Again I say this, if selected on the jury you would, if you find guilt in this case in which he is charged, then you would go into that second phase and the responsibility than would be on the jury concerning the sentence to be imposed. And my question is  of course, you do have the opportunity at that point  well, actually three things that you can do. You can impose the death sentence, you can impose a life sentence and you can impose nothing, at which time the Court has instructed you that it would be a requirement of the Court then to impose a life sentence at that point. Now, my question is this. If the facts in this case justify it and, of course, the law, then I want a jury that would, when seated up here, would not just exclude the death sentence because this is a unique type case. Do you understand? If you are seated on that jury, then that would be a point for you to consider, not only consider, but you are agreeing that you could, under the law you could impose the death sentence. Do you understand? BY MR. WONG: Objection, Your Honor. I think this is a question in another form asking for a promise. BY THE COURT: All right. Don't ask for promises. They have told the Court they could follow the law, counsel. Mack relies on Stringer v. State, 500 So.2d 928, 938 (Miss. 1986), to support his contention that it is reversible error for a prosecutor to elicit promises from prospective jurors that they will return a particular verdict. If it is impermissible for a prosecutor to seek promises of a particular verdict, Mack reasons that it is also error for the prosecutor to seek promises from jurors that they will impose a particular penalty. While Mack correctly reasons that a prosecutor is prohibited from eliciting promises that a jury will impose the death penalty, it does not follow that a prosecutor cannot properly inquire into jurors' beliefs about the death penalty or inform jurors that the death penalty is among the forms of punishment available in a capital murder case. In a capital murder case, inquiry into the venire members' views about the death penalty is of critical importance to the state, the defendant and the court. It is the duty of all concerned to investigate those views thoroughly in order to assemble the most qualified jury. State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. 1987). Here, the prosecutor informed jurors of the available options should Mack be found guilty of murder. The prosecutor first tried to ascertain what prospective jurors would do if the prosecutor proved its case against Mack beyond a reasonable doubt. This inquiry did not elicit a promise that jurors would impose the death penalty. Instead, the prosecutor was attempting to ascertain whether after all the evidence has been introduced jurors would be able to put their personal feelings aside and follow the law, even if it meant that the result would be unfavorable to Mack. Mack also contends that the prosecutor wrongfully elicited prejudicial responses from two witnesses. The following colloquy took place during the direct examination of Charles Washington: Q. And where did you go then? A. He took the old man and he drug him out there in the bushes and throwed [sic] him off in the bushes and covered him up. Then he backed back up there to his auntie's house. And he told his auntie that he had killed the old man, to not go down the street. Q. All right. Now, you were still in the truck, weren't you? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did you hear the exact words he said down there? A. No, sir. His auntie said it, said it in court. BY MR. WONG: Objection, Your Honor. BY THE COURT: Sustain the objection. The jury will disregard that statement. On redirect examination of the chief of police, the following testimony was given: Q. Now, Chief, I want to ask you concerning the truck, in your investigation, did you ever search the truck and go through any items that might have been in the truck or in the bed of the truck? A. Yes, sir. I took statements from all three subjects that early morning, around 12:00 o'clock, or it might have been a little after. It looked like it was going to rain and I went out there and took a  BY MR. PEARSON:  May we approach the bench, Your Honor? BY THE COURT: All right. WHEREUPON, THE ATTORNEYS APPROACHED THE BENCH FOR A BRIEF CONFERENCE OUT OF THE HEARING OF THE JURY. (BENCH CONFERENCE) IN THE HEARING OF THE JURY. BY THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, you are to completely disregard the testimony from this witness as to the taking of three statements. That was totally unresponsive to the question asked of him. Other than Stringer, Mack fails to cite any authority to support his claim that the prosecutor's questioning of Washington or the police chief resulted in reversible error. Mack attempts to stack the prosecutor's elicitation of prejudicial responses on the prosecutor's alleged effort to obtain promises that the jurors would impose the death penalty. That questioning was not error and thus cannot be combined with other prosecutorial misconduct to warrant a reversal. Moreover, this Court also held that where the trial judge sustains appellant's objection to the testimony and instructs the jury to disregard same, prejudicial error does not result from that testimony. Shelby v. State, 402 So.2d 338 (Miss. 1981), citing Herron v. State, 287 So.2d 759 (Miss. 1974), cert. den., 417 U.S. 972, 94 S.Ct. 3179, 41 L.Ed.2d 1144. Both statements complained of were unresponsive to the questions asked. As this Court pointed out in Bullock v. State, 391 So.2d 601 (Miss. 1980), reversible error does not occur where a witness' response is unresponsive to a question asked by a prosecutor, if certain procedures are followed. Id. at 609. Those procedures were followed in the instant case. Mack objected. The trial judge sustained Mack's objection and ordered the jury to disregard both statements. Mack also contends that the prosecutor asked a clearly improper question of another witness. Q. Do you know who that was? A. No, I don't. Q. Now, what I am asking you is this. Do you know that it was or was not or did you pay any attention as to who it was? Could it have been, for instance, Jimmie Mack  BY MR. WONG:  Object, Your Honor. BY THE COURT: I sustain the objection. She said he didn't know, counsel. A.  That's probably who it was  BY THE COURT:  I sustained the objection. Q. Did you pay attention as to who it was? A. No, I didn't. Here, the trial court prevented the prosecutor's conduct from resulting in reversible error. When the prosecutor attempted to suggest that Mack was the person the witness saw coming out of Fulton's house, Mack objected. The trial judge sustained the objection on the basis that the witness had already told the prosecutor that she did not know whom she had seen at Fulton's house. Mack also points out that the court had to admonish the prosecutor not to tell a witness how he wanted his question answered. The colloquy between the prosecutor and the witness was as follows: Q. Are you sure about the pistol? Who did you see with the pistol? A. Jimmie Mack. Q. Did Charles Washington have that pistol  did you see him holding that pistol, shooting it  A.  I seen him hold it. Q. You saw him holding it. A. That's when they went into the house. I ain't going to say who stole the pistol out of the house, but I seen Charles with the pistol and then he gave it to Jimmie Mack. Q. Okay. Did Jimmie Mack show him that pistol and then he handed it back to Jimmie Mack  A.  Yes. BY MR. PEARSON: We object, Your Honor. BY THE COURT: I sustain the objection. You can't tell a witness what you would like for him to answer and then have him say yes or no. And you can't cross-examine your witness. BY MR. MELLEN: May I approach the bench, Your Honor. Mack cites McDavid v. State, 594 So.2d 12 (Miss. 1992), in support of his contention that such errors on behalf of the prosecutor warrant reversal. In McDavid this Court reversed because the trial court allowed the prosecutor to repeatedly ask leading questions of witnesses. There is a key distinction between the instant case and McDavid. In McDavid the trial judge allowed the prosecutor to repeatedly ask leading questions and permitted witnesses to answer the objectionable questions. In the instant case, the defense attorney objected when the prosecutor suggested the answer to Washington on direct examination. The objection was sustained. As such, no error resulted from the objectionable leading question. In addition to the alleged errors above, Mack argues that the prosecutor committed numerous instances of misconduct in closing arguments at both phases of the trial. First, Mack contends that during the guilt phase, the prosecutor defined the term reasonable doubt in a manner that allowed the jury to base its finding of guilt on a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause. The state's closing argument follows: BY MR. MELLEN: Thank you, your honor. That's exactly right. The instructions read and the law is that the State is obligated to prove to a jury before they can find guilt, prove to them evidence sufficient that it would be beyond a reasonable doubt and that includes the word reasonable. It doesn't say every doubt. It says a reasonable doubt  a reasonable doubt. It says a reasonable doubt  a reasonable doubt. And the defense has argued up here and has made, for instance two comments: One is that when the truck was backed up there to the Dawkins' house, while it was there, the Defendant got out and that he, himself, was afraid because the two people in the truck had a shotgun. Now, is that reasonable? It didn't even have shells. And he knew that. He had stolen it. The argument was that he didn't have blood on his clothes. Well, he did, he didn't have a shirt because when he jumped out of that truck that night he got shot up in his shoulder. They took his shirt out there so the policemen didn't wind up with the shirt. Mack cites Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990), in support of the proposition that it is error for a prosecutor to define reasonable doubt. There the court held that a jury instruction defining reasonable doubt in terms of grave or substantial uncertainty and as moral certainty violated the due process requirement that criminal convictions be based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. There is nothing in this record to indicate the prosecutor attempted to define reasonable doubt, much less define reasonable doubt in a manner that contravenes with the Due Process Clause. The prosecutor merely emphasized the word reasonable without trying to contrast it with other words or otherwise elaborate upon it, assuming that he informed the jury of the state's obligation to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the prosecutor did not define reasonable doubt, Mack's contention must fail. Additionally, Mack failed to object to the argument at trial. Even if the argument could be faulted, his failure to object would be fatal to his contention here. Mack also contends that it was error for the prosecutor to argue in his personal expert opinion Jimmie Mack, and only Jimmie Mack, committed capital murder. Below is an excerpt of the prosecutor's closing remarks that Mack finds objectionable. This is life and it may be a part of life that most of us don't see, but this is a part of life people indulge in. Hopefully, not everybody. Because we had, at least, one person at home that afternoon and he was dead within a few hours because there was some who were going for bad. And I don't apologize at all for these people. Percy Monroe. Charles Washington and the defendant over here, Jimmie Mack. That fact that I had to put on two of those witnesses, and I do not stand behind those witnesses to say that those people are good people at all. But they witnessed a crime and they were going for bad. And they were involved in all kinds of conflicting statements going on. But I do know this, the two of them were involved as accessories after the fact to capital murder. And what I need to stress to the jury is this, a crime was committed and that crime was capital murder. That crime was committed. And there were three people there when that crime was committed and two of them, at least, were involved as accessories after the fact and that evidence came out. They were charged with accessory after the fact of capital murder. And Jimmie Mack is the one that committed the capital murder. And what I am doing right now is trying to in your mind, at least, distinguish some crimes that were committed. One person picked up that bar and bashed Mr. Fulton's head in and killed him. And the evidence shows who that person is. The killer is Jimmie Mack. Mississippi courts have long recognized that a prosecutor has a right to comment on the evidence. However, like other courts, this State does not allow a prosecutor to comment on his personal beliefs about a defendant's guilt or innocence. Jones v. Butler, 864 F.2d 348, 359-60 (5th Cir.1988); accord, Quinlivan v. State, 579 So.2d 1386 (Ala.Cr.Appl. 1991). A defendant's guilt or innocence is to be determined by a jury of his or her peers after the presentation of evidence. Here, the prosecutor's repeated reference to what I know as opposed to what the state or we know may have suggested to the jury that the prosecutor had some information or knowledge that was not presented to the jury. The prosecutor overstepped his bounds in arguing to the jury. The prosecutor's comments would have been permissible comment had he not repeatedly used the pronoun I. The use of I leaves open the inference that the prosecutor personally believed that Mack committed the capital murder. That said, however, we find the error harmless in this instance. Mack contends that in the sentencing stage, the prosecutor sought to assure the jury that it was not sending Jimmie Mack to the death chamber. In his closing argument in the sentencing phase, the prosecutor said: You are not asked to kill. You are asked to come up here and to express justice  justice. We ask for nothing in this courtroom but justice. And that would be justice because that man is gone. He lived almost 90 years and the lives he affected during that time are everywhere. His memory is around, but's he gone. But we deserve justice because of what was done that afternoon. Ladies and gentlemen, go back and do justice. Let justice resound from this courtroom this afternoon. He is guilty of capital murder. Let the penalty be commensurate with what Jimmie Mack did to Mr. Henry Fulton. Thank you. In Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 2634, 86 L.Ed.2d 231, 231 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court held that it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere. There the prosecutor made the following remarks in the state's closing argument of the sentencing phase of the Caldwell's trial: ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY: Ladies and gentlemen, I intend to be brief. I'm in complete disagreement with the approach the defense has taken. I don't think it's fair. I think it's unfair. I think the lawyers know better. Now, they would have you believe that you're going to kill this man and they know  they know that your decision is not the final decision. My God, how unfair can you be? Your job is reviewable. They know it. Yet the . .. COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I'm going to object to this statement. It's out of order. ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY: Your Honor, throughout their argument, they said this panel was going to kill this man. I think that's terribly unfair. THE COURT: Alright, go on and make the full expression so the Jury will not be confused. I think it proper that the jury realizes that it is reviewable automatically as the death penalty commands. I think that information is now needed by the Jury so they will not be confused. ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY: Throughout their remarks, they attempted to give you the opposite, sparing the truth. They said `Thou shalt not kill.' If that applies to him, it applies to you, insinuating that your decision is the final decision and that they're gonna take Bobby Caldwell out in the front of this Courthouse in moments and string him up and that is terribly, terribly unfair. For they know, as I know, and as Judge Baker has told you, that the decision you render is automatically reviewable by the Supreme Court. Automatically, and I think it's unfair and I don't mind telling them so. The Supreme Court found that the delegation of sentencing responsibility that the prosecutor here encouraged would thus not simply postpone the defendant's right to a fair determination of the appropriateness of his death; rather it would deprive him of that right, for an appellate court, unlike a capital sentencing jury, is wholly ill-suited to evaluate the appropriateness of death in the first instance. Here the prosecutor's remark did not rise to a level as to suggest to the jury that someone other than the jury had the power to decide Mack's fate. The prosecutor's comments never lead the jury to believe that the jury was not the final arbiter of Mack's destiny. Such misconduct as was engaged in by the prosecutor did not rise to the level of reversible error.