Opinion ID: 170512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: ANALYSIS.Split verdict on theories underlying child abuse murder conviction

Text: Gilson was charged with first degree child abuse murder in violation of Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.7(C). That statute provides as follows: A person commits murder in the first degree when the death of a child results from the willful or malicious injuring, torturing, maiming or using of unreasonable force by said person or who shall willfully cause, procure or permit any of said acts to be done upon the child pursuant to Section 7115 of Title 10 of the Oklahoma Statutes. It is sufficient for the crime of murder in the first degree that the person either willfully tortured or used unreasonable force upon the child or maliciously injured or maimed the child. Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.7(C). According to the record, the State alleged two alternative theories of how Gilson violated § 701.7(C), i.e., that Gilson either was directly responsible for willfully or maliciously injuring, torturing, maiming or using unreasonable force upon Shane, or that he knowingly permitted Bertha Jean Coffman to do so. At trial, the State submitted a verdict form for the murder charge that listed not only the option of guilty or not guilty, but also stated: FURTHER, we make the following finding of fact as to the basis for our verdict of guilty: [] Unanimous as to child abuse murder [] Unanimous as to permitting child abuse murder [] Divided as to the underlying theory Gilson I, 8 P.3d at 898-99. Gilson objected to the underlying instruction that informed the jury that while their verdict of guilt as to first degree murder must be unanimous, they need not unanimously agree as to the theory under which they arrived at their verdict. Id. at 899. The state trial court overruled Gilson's objection and adopted the verdict form submitted by the State. When the jury concluded its deliberations and returned its verdicts, in addition to finding [Gilson] guilty, the last box listed above ('divided as to the underlying theory') was checked. . . . Id. In these federal habeas proceedings, Gilson argues that his conviction for capital murder, based on a divided jury verdict as to whether he was guilty of 'committing' the child abuse that led to Shane's death, or of `permitting' such abuse, is in violation of his constitutional right to due process. . . . Aplt. Br. at 22. a) Schad v. Arizona The clearly established federal law that Gilson cites in support of his argument is the Supreme Court's decision in Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991). The petitioner in Schad, Edward Schad, Jr., was charged in Arizona state court with firstdegree murder. During Schad's trial, the prosecutor advanced alternative theories of premeditated and felony murder, while Schad himself claimed that, at most, he was guilty of mere theft. The jury rejected Schad's assertions and, in a general verdict, convicted him of first-degree murder. Schad was subsequently sentenced to death in connection with this conviction. On direct appeal, Schad argued that the state trial court erred in not requiring the jury to agree on a single theory of firstdegree murder. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected that argument and affirmed Schad's conviction and sentence. Schad subsequently sought and was granted a petition for writ of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court on that issue. Although Schad urged the Supreme Court to decide th[e] case by holding that the. Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments require a unanimous jury in state capital cases, 501 U.S. at 630, 111 S.Ct. 2491, the Court [1] declined to do so. More specifically, the Court noted that it ha[d] never suggested that in returning general verdicts in such cases the jurors should be required to agree upon a single means of commission, any more than the indictments were required to specify one alone. [2] Id. at 631, 111 S.Ct. 2491. Instead, the Court concluded that Schad's real challenge [wa]s to Arizona's characterization of first-degree murder as a single crime as to which a verdict need not be limited to any one statutory alternative. . . . Id. at 630-31, 111 S.Ct. 2491. In other words, the Court concluded that the constitutional issue presented by Schad was one of the permissible limits in defining criminal conduct, as reflected in the instructions to jurors applying the definitions, and not one of jury unanimity. Id. at 631, 111 S.Ct. 2491. Addressing that constitutional issue head-on, the Court acknowledged that there was a point at which differences between means become so important that they may not reasonably be viewed as alternatives to a common end, but must be treated as differentiating what the [Due Process Clause] requires to be treated as separate offenses. Id. at 633, 111 S.Ct. 2491. For example, the Court noted, nothing in [its] history suggest[ed] that the Due Process Clause would permit a State to convict anyone under a charge of 'Crime' so generic that any combination of jury findings of embezzlement, reckless driving, murder, burglary, tax evasion, or littering . . . would suffice for conviction. Id. In attempt[ing] to define what constitutes an immaterial difference as to mere means and what constitutes a material difference requiring separate theories of crime to be treated as separate offenses subject to separate jury findings, id., the Court indicated it would afford substantial deference to a state court's interpretation of its own state statutes. Specifically, the Court stated that [i]f a State's courts have determined that certain statutory alternatives are mere means of committing a single offense, rather than independent elements of the crime, [it] simply [would] not [be] at liberty to ignore that determination and conclude that the alternatives [we]re, in fact, independent elements under state law. Id. at 636, 111 S.Ct. 2491. In Schad's case, the Court noted, by determining that a general verdict as to firstdegree murder [wa]s permissible under Arizona law, the Arizona Supreme Court ha[d] effectively decided that, under state law, premeditation and the commission of a felony [we]re not independent elements of the crime, but rather [we]re mere means of satisfying a single mens rea element. Id. at 637, 111 S.Ct. 2491. That still left, however, the issue of whether Arizona's choice [wa]s unconstitutional. Id. In resolving this issue, the Court began by stating that its sense of appropriate specificity [wa]s a distillate of the concept of due process with its demands for fundamental fairness . . . and for the rationality that is an essential component of that fairness. Id. Continuing, the Court stated that, [i]n translating these demands for fairness and rationality into concrete judgments about the adequacy of legislative determinations, [it would] look both to history and wide practice as guides to fundamental values, as well as to narrower analytical methods of testing the moral and practical equivalence of the different mental states that m[ight] satisfy the mens rea element of a single offense. Id. The enquiry, the Court held, is undertaken with a threshold presumption of legislative competence to determine the appropriate relationship between means and ends in defining the elements of a crime. Id. at 637-38, 111 S.Ct. 2491. The Court held that [t]he use . . . of due process as a measurement of the sense of appropriate specificity assumes the importance of history and widely shared practice as concrete indicators of what fundamental fairness and rationality require. Id. at 640, 111 S.Ct. 2491. Expanding on this notion, the Court explained: Where a State's particular way of defining a crime has a long history, or is in widespread use, it is unlikely that a defendant will be able to demonstrate that the State has shifted the burden of proof as to what is an inherent element of the offense, or has defined as a single crime multiple offenses that are inherently separate. Conversely, a freakish definition of the elements of a crime that finds no analogue in history or in the criminal law of other jurisdictions will lighten the defendant's burden. Id. Applying these principles to the circumstances presented by Schad's case, the Court concluded it was significant that Arizona's equation of the mental states of premeditated murder and felony murder as species of the blameworthy state of mind required to prove a single offense of first-degree murder f[ound] substantial historical and contemporary echoes. Id. From a historical perspective, the Court noted that at common law, [t]he intent to kill and the intent to commit a felony were alternative aspects of the single concept of 'malice aforethought.' Id. From a contemporary perspective, the Court noted that most state statutes retained premeditated murder and some form of felony murder . . . as alternative means of satisfying the mental state that first-degree murder presupposes. Id. at 641, 111 S.Ct. 2491. Further, the Court, citing a series of state-court decisions issuing from 1903 through the date of the Court's decision, concluded there [wa]s sufficiently widespread acceptance of the two mental states as alternative means of satisfying the mens rea element of the single crime of first-degree murder to persuade [it] that Arizona ha[d] not departed from the norm. Id. at 642, 111 S.Ct. 2491. Such historical and contemporary acceptance of Arizona's definition of the offense and verdict practice, the Court noted, [wa]s a strong indication that they d[id] not offen[d] some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. . . . Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court also considered the function that differences of mental state perform in defining the relative seriousness of otherwise similar or identical criminal acts. Id. at 643, 111 S.Ct. 2491. According to the Court, [i]f . . . two mental states are supposed to be equivalent means to satisfy the mens rea element of a single offense, they must reasonably reflect notions of equivalent blameworthiness or culpability, whereas a difference in their perceived degrees of culpability would be a reason to conclude that they identified different offenses altogether. Id. Applying these principles to Schad's case, the Court noted that [t]he question . . . [wa]s whether felony murder [could] ever be treated as the equivalent of murder by deliberation, and in particular whether robbery murder as charged in [Schad's] case [could] be treated as thus equivalent. Id. at 644, 111 S.Ct. 2491. Citing its decision in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987), the Court concluded that [w]hether or not everyone would agree that the mental state that precipitates death in the course of robbery is the moral equivalent of premeditation, it [wa]s clear that such equivalence could reasonably be found, which [wa]s enough to rule out the argument that this moral disparity bar[red] treating them as alternative means to satisfy the mental element of a single offense. Id. b) The OCCA's rejection of Gilson's Schad-feased argument Gilson first raised his due process, Shad -based argument on direct appeal. The OCCA purported to reject the argument on the merits. In doing so, the OCCA offered the following lengthy explanation for its decision: In the second part of his argument, [Gilson] asserts his right to a unanimous verdict was violated by the verdict forms allowing the jury to return a divided as to underlying theory guilty verdict. [Gilson] argues that as he was charged in the alternative with child abuse murder by the commission of child abuse or by the permitting of child abuse which resulted in first degree murder, the jury's verdict showed a disagreement as to just what [he] did. [citation and footnote omitted]. [Gilson] acknowledges this Court has said that a general verdict of guilt satisfies due process and unanimity concerns where a defendant is charged in the alternative with malice aforethought and felony murder, so long as a prima facie case is made for each alternative. See James v. State, 637 P.2d 862, 866 (Okl.Cr.1981). However, he asserts his case is distinguishable by its unique circumstances. [Gilson] submits that the jury disagreement in his case went to the legal, rather than the factual, basis of the crime charged, because 1) `committing' and `permitting' child abuse murder are conceptually distinct crimes and 2) these alternative theories of guilt are fundamentally repugnant to each other. [citation omitted]. [Gilson] argues the contradictory nature of the alternative crimes charged is illustrated by the differing actus reus requirements for each crime. The State argues in response that committing and permitting child abuse are merely different means by which child abuse murder may be committed. Citing cases from this Court, the State argues the jury was not required to agree on the specific means by which the crime was committed, only that the defendant committed the crime charged. Both [Gilson] and the State cite to Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991). [Gilson] argues that Schad supports a finding that first degree murder by the commission of child abuse and first degree murder by permitting child abuse are separate offenses containing independent elements upon which the jury must be in unanimous agreement. The State relies on Schad for the proposition that where there are alternatives to proving the actus reus of the offense, there is no general requirement that the jury reach a unanimous agreement on the preliminary factual issues which underlie the verdict. In Schad, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the Arizona Supreme Court's holding that a general verdict as to first-degree murder is permissible under Arizona law as premeditation and the commission of a felony are not independent elements of the crime, but rather are mere means of satisfying a single mens rea element. In its analysis, the Court looked both to history and wide practice as guides to fundamental values, as well as to narrower analytical methods of testing the moral and practical equivalence of the different mental states that may satisfy the mens rea element of a single offense. 501 U.S. at 637-38, 111 S.Ct. at 2500. The Court found the language of the Arizona first-degree murder statute was identical in all relevant respects to the language of the first statute defining murder by differences of degree, passed by the Pennsylvania Legislature in 1794. 501 U.S. at 641, 111 S.Ct. at 2502. The Court also looked to decisions from other state courts which agreed `it was not necessary that all the jurors should agree in the determination that there was a deliberate and premeditated design to take the life of the deceased, or in the conclusion that the defendant was at the time engaged in the commission of a felony, or an attempt to commit one; it was sufficient that each juror was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had committed the crime of murder in the first degree as that offense is defined by the statute.' Id., quoting People v. Sullivan, 173 N.Y. 122, 127, 65 N.E. 989, 989-990 (1903). [footnote omitted]. Although recognizing the state courts were not unanimous in this respect, the Supreme Court decided there was sufficient widespread acceptance of the two mental states of premeditation and felony-murder as alternative means of satisfying the mens rea element of the single crime of firstdegree murder to persuade the Court that Arizona had not departed from the norm. 501 U.S. at 641, 111 S.Ct. at 2502. Having made these determinations, the Court stated [t]he question, rather, is whether felony murder may ever be treated as the equivalent of murder by deliberation, and in particular whether robbery murder as charged in this case may be treated as thus equivalent. 501 U.S. at 644, 111 S.Ct. at 2503. The Supreme Court concluded: Whether or not everyone would agree that the mental state that precipitates death in the course of robbery is the moral equivalent of premeditation, it is clear that such equivalence could reasonably be found, which is enough to rule out the argument that this moral disparity bars treating them as alternative means to satisfy the mental element of a single offense. Id. at 501 U.S. at 644, 111 S.Ct. at 2503-4. While recognizing that their considerations [did not] exhaust the universe of those potentially relevant to judgments about the legitimacy of defining certain facts as mere means to the commission of one offense, the Supreme Court found the Arizona law did not fall beyond the constitutional bounds of fundamental fairness and rationality. 501 U.S. at 645, 111 S.Ct. at 2504. In the present case we are not concerned with the alternatives of premeditated and felony murder, but with those of child abuse murder by permitting child abuse and child abuse murder by the commission of child abuse. [Gilson] was charged under 21 O.S.1991, § 701.7(C) which provides: C. A person commits murder in the first degree when the death of a child results from the willful or malicious injuring, torturing, maiming or using of unreasonable force by said person or who shall willfully cause, procure or permit any of said acts to be done upon the child pursuant to Section 7115 of Title 10 of the Oklahoma Statutes. It is sufficient for the crime of murder in the first degree that the person either willfully tortured or used unreasonable force upon the child or maliciously injured or maimed the child. This section of the first degree murder statute sets out different ways in which the offense of first degree murder by child abuse may be committed. It may be committed by the willful or malicious injuring, torturing, maiming, or using of unreasonable force by the defendant upon a child, or by the defendant's willfully causing, procuring or permitting the acts of child abuse. This section specifically states that a person commits murder in the first degree when the death of a child results . . . from either willful or malicious injury or willfully permitting those acts to be done. Therefore, under the statutory language the crime of first degree murder by child abuse is committed under either circumstance. This provision is not unlike the felony-murder provisions of section 701.7(B) which set forth alternative ways of committing felony-murder. [Gilson] is correct in his argument that including the intent to commit child abuse into the first degree murder statute is a relatively recent enactment, see Tucker v. State, 675 P.2d 459, 461 (Okl. Cr.1984), and that the crime of child abuse murder by permitting child abuse did not exist prior to 1982. See 1982 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 279 § 1. However, the fact that the legal culpability of a defendant whose abuse of a child results in that child's death or who permits a child to be abused to the extent that death results has only recently been acknowledged by this State does not mean the Legislature cannot define first degree child abuse murder to have been committed either by the actual commission of the acts of abuse or by the willful permitting of the acts to abuse to occur. With the enactment of § 701.7(C) the Legislature has clearly stated its intention to punish as first degree murder the use of unreasonable force upon a child or the permitting of unreasonable force to be used upon a child when the death of a child results. Having found the commission of child abuse and the permitting of child abuse to be alternative means to committing the crime of first degree murder by child abuse, [t]he constitutional requirement of a unanimous jury verdict applies only to the ultimate issue of the appellant's guilt or innocence of the crime charged, not the alternative means by which the crime was committed. Rounds v. State, 679 P.2d 283, 287 (Okl. Cr.1984). In Powell v. State, 906 P.2d 765, 775-76 (Okl.Cr.1995), this Court stated: [T]his Court has reaffirmed its prior holdings that failure of a jury to indicate the basis of their finding of guilt was not error where there was but a single crime charged, i.e. first degree murder. Whether or not [murder] was committed with malice aforethought, or during the commission of a felony goes to the factual basis of the crime. When the jury verdict is unanimous that a defendant committed murder in the first degree, such a verdict satisfies due process. Further, there is no due process violation when all of the elements of the crime charged were proven, (citations omitted). See also Neill v. State, 896 P.2d 537, 552-53 (Okl.Cr.1994), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 1080, 116 S.Ct. 791, 133 L.Ed.2d 740 (1996); Crawford v. State, 840 P.2d 627, 640 (Okl.Cr.1992); Newsted v. State, 720 P.2d 734, 737-38 (Okl.Cr.), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 995, 107 S.Ct. 599, 93 L.Ed.2d 599 (1986); James v. State, 637 P.2d 862, 865 (Okl.Cr.1981). The evidence in the present case showed a prima facie case was made and all of the elements were proven to support a finding of guilt as to either child abuse murder by the commission of child abuse or child abuse murder by permitting child abuse. The evidence supporting the conclusion that [Gilson] was the perpetrator of the abuse inflicted upon Shane came from the other Coffman children who testified that both [Gilson] and their mother beat Shane the day of the murder, carried him to the bathtub, and stayed with him in the bathroom while he cried and screamed. Supporting evidence can also be found in Coffman's statement that she saw [Gilson] coming out of the bathroom and then found Shane in the bathroom not breathing. Evidence supporting a conclusion that [Gilson] permitted the abuse comes from Coffman's statement that she was in the bathroom struggling with Shane when the shower doors fell down. [Gilson] entered the bathroom, not once but twice to attend to the shower doors. [Gilson]'s own statement supports the conclusion that he was aware that Coffman was abusing Shane in the bathroom. The jury's verdict of guilt indicating it was divided as to the underlying theory was a disagreement as to the factual basis of the offense and as to the manner in which the crime was committed. As the Supreme Court stated in Schad: We have never suggested that in returning general verdicts in such cases the jurors should be required to agree upon a single means of commission, any more than the indictments were required to specify one alone. In these cases, as in litigation generally, different jurors may be persuaded by different pieces of evidence, even when they agree upon the bottom line. Plainly there is no general requirement that the jury reach agreement on the preliminary factual issues which underlie the verdict. (citation omitted). Id. at 501 U.S. at 631-32, 111 S.Ct. at 2497. Here, there was a single crime charged-first degree murder by child abuse. Whether or not it was committed through the commission of child abuse or through the permitting of child abuse goes to the factual basis of the crime. The jury verdict was unanimous that [Gilson] committed the crime. Such a verdict satisfies due process. See Plunkett v. State, 719 P.2d 834, 841 (Okl.Cr.), cert, denied 479 U.S. 1019, 107 S.Ct. 675, 93 L.Ed.2d 725 (1986). The enactment of § 701.7(C), a separate provision within the first degree murder statute to address the death of a child as a result of child abuse, is indicative of the Legislature's intent within the last two decades to draft legislation aimed specifically at the protection and welfare of children. See 10 O. S.Supp. 1993, § 401 et. seq. (Oklahoma Child Care Facilities Licensing Act); 10 O.S. Supp.1995, § 7001-1.1 et. seq. (the Oklahoma Children's Code); and, 10 O. S.Supp.1995, § 7101 et. seq. (Oklahoma Child Abuse Reporting and Prevention Act). Although specifically directed at situations where child abuse has resulted in death, by enacting 21 O.S.1991, § 701.7(C) the Legislature has merely created another way of committing first degree murder. The language of the statute, setting forth alternative means of committing the crime of child abuse murder, makes it analogous to the crime of felony-murder. Under 21 O.S.1991, § 701.7(B) felony-murder is committed when a death results from a defendant's commission of any of several specifically listed underlying felonies. In a felony-murder prosecution, proof of the underlying felony is needed to prove the intent necessary for a felony murder conviction. Fields v. State, 923 P.2d 624, 634 (Okl.Cr.1996), cert, denied, 520 U.S. 1216, 117 S.Ct. 1704, 137 L.Ed.2d 829 (1997). Further, when the crime is charged in the alternative, with more than one felony charged as the underlying felony, a constitutionally unanimous verdict is required only with respect to the ultimate issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence of the crime charged and not with respect to alternative means by which the crime was committed. Blackwell v. State, 663 P.2d 12, 16 (Okl.Cr.1983). We find the child abuse murder statute should be interpreted in the same manner as § 701.7(B). Proof of the underlying act of child abuse is needed to prove the intent necessary for a child abuse murder conviction. See Fairchild v. State, 998 P.2d 611, 618-19 (Okl.Cr. 1999) (holding crime of first degree murder by child abuse is a general intent crime). A constitutionally unanimous verdict is required only with respect to the ultimate issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence of the crime charged and not with respect to alternative means by which the crime was committed. Gilson I, 8 P.3d at 900-03 (internal paragraph numbers omitted). c) Gilson's entitlement to federal habeas relief on this claim The above-quoted language makes apparent that the OCCA properly conducted the first part of the Schad analysis. Specifically, it concluded as a matter of state law that, [w]ith the enactment of § 701.7(C), the [Oklahoma] Legislature ha[d] clearly stated its intention to punish as first degree murder the use of unreasonable force upon a child or the permitting of unreasonable force to be used upon a child when the death of a child results. Gilson I, 8 P.3d at 902. Unfortunately, however, the OCCA failed to conduct the second, and arguably more important, part of the Schad analysis, i.e., determining whether the Oklahoma Legislature's decision to treat the commission of child abuse and the permitting of child abuse [as] alternative means to committing the crime of first degree murder by child abuse was consistent with principles of due process. In place of this analysis, the OCCA simply reviewed the evidence presented at trial and concluded that a prima facie case was made and all of the elements were proven to support a finding of guilt as to either child abuse murder by the commission of child abuse or child abuse murder by permitting child abuse. Id. at 902. Conducting the second part of the Schad analysis de novo, we conclude that Oklahoma's choice is consistent with principles of due process. To be sure, Oklahoma's decision to directly include both the commission and permission of abuse resulting in the death of a child in its definition of first-degree murder appears to be unique among the states. [3] That said, however, there is contemporary support from other states for the notion of treating the willful commission and willful permission of child abuse as alternative means of satisfying the actus reus requirements of a single offense. In particular, several other states treat willful commission and willful permission as alternative means of satisfying the actus reus requirement of lesser criminal offenses. E.g., Cal.Penal Code § 11165.3 (defining the crime of Willful harming or endangering of child to include a situation in which any person willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon, unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering); Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53-21 (defining the crime of Injury or risk of injury to, or impairing morals of, children to include any person who wilfully or unlawfully causes or permits any child . . . to be placed in such situation that the life or limb of such child is endangered); Idaho Code Ann. § 18-1501 (defining the crime of Injury to children to include [a]ny person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12-21.6 (defining the crime of Endangering the life or health of a child to include any person who willfully cause[s] or permit[s] the life or health of a child under the age of 18 to be endangered); Nev.Rev.Stat. § 200.508 (defining the crime of Abuse, neglect or endangerment of child to include both wilfully caus[ing] and permit[ting] or allow[ing]); Va.Code. Ann. § 40.1-103 (defining the crime of Cruelty and injuries to children to include willfully . . . caus[ing] or permit[ting] the life of [a] child to be endangered); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-405 (defining the crime of Endangering children to include willfully caus[ing] or permit[ting]). [4] As noted by the Supreme Court in Schad, it is unlikely that such relatively common legal definitions would retain wide acceptance if they were at odds with notions of fairness and rationality sufficiently fundamental to be comprehended in due process. 501 U.S. at 642, 111 S.Ct. 2491. Moreover, Gilson has not established that the two means at issue, i.e., willful commission and willful permission, for proving the actus reus requirement of the first-degree murder charge at issue here are so disparate as to exemplify two inherently separate offenses. Id. at 643, 111 S.Ct. 2491. Thus, we conclude Gilson is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this issue.