Opinion ID: 812677
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Sole Proximate Cause Bar

Text: As alluded to above, the district court granted Shein’s motion to dismiss after holding that Peeler and its progeny foreclosed Huerta’s claims. In Peeler, the plaintiff had pled guilty to a federal crime pursuant to a plea agreement. 909 S.W.2d at 496. After subsequently learning that her defense attorney allegedly had neglected to inform her of a prior offer of transactional immunity, she sued the attorney for malpractice. Id. In addressing her claim, the Texas Supreme Court first noted that, “[g]enerally, to recover on a claim of legal malpractice, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the attorney owed the plaintiff a duty, (2) the attorney breached that duty, (3) the breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries, and (4) damages occurred.” Id. The court explained, however, that additional public policy concerns are implicated when a criminal defendant sues her defense attorney for malpractice. Id. at 496–97. In particular, the court found that permitting the plaintiff to pursue her malpractice claim would thwart the public policies of “prohibit[ing] convicts from profiting from their illegal conduct” and “impermissibly shift[ing] responsibility for the crime away from the convict.” Id. at 498. In light of these policy concerns, the court held “that, as a matter of law, it is the illegal conduct rather than the negligence of a convict’s counsel that is 5 Case: 12-50346 Document: 00512064515 Page: 6 Date Filed: 11/27/2012 No. 12-50346 the cause in fact of any injuries flowing from the conviction, unless the conviction has been overturned.” Id. Accordingly, “plaintiffs who have been convicted of a criminal offense may negate the sole proximate cause bar to their claim for legal malpractice in connection with that conviction only if they have been exonerated on direct appeal, through post-conviction relief, or otherwise.” Id. at 497–98. Because the plaintiff in Peeler had not been exonerated of her crime, the court held that she had no cognizable malpractice claim, since, as a matter of law, “her illegal acts remain[ed] the sole proximate and producing causes of her indictment and conviction.” Id. at 498.
While acknowledging Peeler’s general force, Huerta argues that its sole proximate cause bar is inapplicable to this case because the facts here are distinguishable from those of Peeler and, relatedly, the policy justifications for imposition of the bar would not be advanced by its application here. In particular, Huerta contends that, unlike counsel in Peeler, Shein’s representation was not “in connection with” Huerta’s conviction, because Shein was not his trial counsel, nor did they represent him on direct appeal. Thus, Huerta argues that because Shein’s alleged malpractice occurred “in connection with” his habeas application rather than the underlying trial or direct appeal, the policy concerns at issue in Peeler would not be defeated by permitting Huerta to pursue his professional negligence claim. As such, Huerta maintains that the Texas Supreme Court would not apply Peeler’s sole proximate cause bar to this case, were it to decide the issue. We are not persuaded that Peeler itself does not control the outcome of this case. Nonetheless, even if we grant as much, Huerta acknowledges that several intermediate appellate courts in Texas have applied Peeler to facts materially indistinguishable from those presented here. In Falby v. Percely, for example, inmate Allen Falby hired an attorney and the attorney’s unlicensed associate to 6 Case: 12-50346 Document: 00512064515 Page: 7 Date Filed: 11/27/2012 No. 12-50346 file a state habeas application on Falby’s behalf. No. 09-04-422-CV, 2005 WL 1038776, at  (Tex. App.—Beaumont May 5, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.). For unexplained reasons, neither man actually filed Falby’s application. Id. Falby subsequently brought suit, alleging that because of the attorney’s negligence “in failing to file a state writ, a deadline for filing a federal writ passed.” Id. Applying Peeler, the lower court granted the attorney’s motion for summary judgment. Id. at . On appeal, Falby argued that Peeler was inapplicable because, as a habeas applicant, his suit against his attorney was “unrelated to his conviction.” Id. The appellate court rejected this argument, however, finding that “the gravamen of [Falby’s] complaint [was] that he [had] lost the ability to challenge his conviction through a federal post-conviction writ of habeas corpus because of [his attorney’s] negligence.” Id. The court thus held that Peeler’s sole proximate cause bar precluded Falby’s recovery because his habeas application related to, and flowed from, his conviction. Id. at –3. Similarly, in Meullion v. Gladden, an inmate who had hired an attorney to prepare his habeas corpus application later sued the attorney for fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and a Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”) violation. No. 14-10-01143-CV, 2011 WL 5926676, at  (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 29, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). The lower court dismissed the inmate’s suit after applying Peeler’s sole proximate cause bar. On appeal, the inmate argued that the lower court erred in applying Peeler’s bar because his attorney “was not connected to the conviction as trial counsel, nor was he the attorney on direct appeal.” Id. at  (internal quotation marks omitted). In analyzing the inmate’s claim, the Meullion court noted that several other courts had “declined to distinguish between the application of Peeler to suits against a convict’s trial counsel, counsel on direct appeal, or counsel retained in connection with seeking habeas or other post-conviction relief.” Id. 7 Case: 12-50346 Document: 00512064515 Page: 8 Date Filed: 11/27/2012 No. 12-50346 at . Aside from Falby, the court also cited to Nabors v. McColl, in which another Texas appellate court applied Peeler’s bar after finding that the inmate’s illegal conduct, rather than the attorney’s alleged negligence in handling a postconviction matter, was the sole proximate cause of the inmate’s injuries. Id. (citing Nabors, No. 05-08-01491-CV, 2010 WL 255968, at –3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 25, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.)); see also Butler v. Mason, No. 11-05-00273-CV, 2006 WL 3747181, at –2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Dec. 21, 2006, pet. denied) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (holding that Peeler precluded an inmate’s suit against his attorney for the attorney’s alleged mishandling of the inmate’s habeas applications). The Meullion court agreed, adopted the reasoning of these other cases, and concluded that the inmate’s “claims concern[ed] the quality of legal counsel retained ‘in connection with’ [the inmate’s] conviction.” 2011 WL 5926676, at . Because the inmate’s criminal conduct was “the only cause in fact of any injuries ‘flowing from the conviction,’” the court held that his claims were precluded under Peeler. Id. (citing Peeler, 909 S.W.2d at 498). Although Huerta admits that these cases are squarely on point, he essentially argues that were the Texas Supreme Court to consider this precise issue, it—unlike the state’s intermediate appellate courts—would not extend Peeler to negligence claims brought against post-conviction counsel. Aside from general public policy statements, however, Huerta points to no authority from a Texas court that supports his assertion. We therefore defer to the state’s intermediate appellate court decisions and hold that Peeler’s sole proximate cause bar precludes Huerta’s negligence claim against Shein.2 2 Given that we do not agree with his argument that Peeler does not extend to negligence claims brought against post-conviction counsel, Huerta requests that we certify the questions raised in this case to the Texas Supreme Court. While we may appropriately seek the guidance of a state’s supreme court when the state’s law is “genuinely unsettled,” we unduly impose upon those courts when we certify questions as to which the law is not 8 Case: 12-50346 Document: 00512064515 Page: 9 Date Filed: 11/27/2012 No. 12-50346
Alternatively, Huerta contends that even if Peeler’s sole proximate cause bar precludes, as a matter of law, his negligence claim, the district court erred in applying it to his other claims. Huerta correctly asserts that, by its terms, Peeler concerned only claims brought against an attorney for malpractice and violations of the DTPA.3 See 909 S.W.2d at 498. Common to both causes of action, the Peeler court explained, was “the element of cause in fact,” meaning that, to prevail, the plaintiff was required to show “that the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury which would not otherwise have occurred.” Id. The plaintiff could not show this, however, since the court concluded that “as a matter of law, it is the illegal conduct rather than the negligence of a convict’s counsel that is the cause in fact of any injuries flowing from the conviction.” Id. In light of the court’s analysis, Huerta maintains that Peeler operates only to bar claims that require a showing of proximate cause. As such, he submits that his claims for breach of contract, money had and received, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty—none of which, he argues, requires a showing of proximate cause—should have survived Shein’s motion to dismiss, because they are independent of his negligence claim. Under Texas law, however, “[w]hether allegations against a lawyer, labeled as breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, or some other cause of action, are actually claims for professional negligence or something else is a question of law to be determined by the court.” Nabors, 2010 WL 255968, at . “Texas courts unsettled. DiPascal v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 255, 260 (5th Cir. 1985). Here, the Texas courts have “given us ample guidance in the decisions cited in this opinion.” Id. 3 Although the suit in Peeler originally also had included claims for breach of contract and breach of warranty, those issues had not been preserved for appeal. 909 S.W.2d at 499. The Peeler court thus “express[ed] no opinion about them.” Id. 9 Case: 12-50346 Document: 00512064515 Page: 10 Date Filed: 11/27/2012 No. 12-50346 do not allow plaintiffs to convert what are really negligence claims into claims for fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, or violation of the DTPA.” Murphy v. Gruber, 241 S.W.3d 689, 693 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied). “[T]his prohibition does not necessarily foreclose the simultaneous pursuit of a negligence-based malpractice claim and a separate breach of fiduciary duty or fraud claim when there is a viable basis for doing so.” Meullion, 2011 WL 5926676, at . Nevertheless, to do so, “the plaintiff must do more than merely reassert the same claim for legal malpractice under an alternative label. The plaintiff must present a claim that goes beyond what traditionally has been characterized as legal malpractice.” Duerr v. Brown, 262 S.W.3d 63, 70 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.). “Regardless of the theory a plaintiff pleads, as long as the crux of the complaint is that the plaintiff’s attorney did not provide adequate legal representation, the claim is one for legal malpractice.” Kimleco Petroleum, Inc. v. Morrison & Shelton, 91 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied). Accordingly, we must turn to Huerta’s complaint to determine the precise character of his claims, viewing the pleaded facts, as we must, in the light most favorable to him. At the outset, we note that Huerta’s complaint describes the nature of the action as one “involving breach of contract, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, actual fraud, and fraudulent concealment of facts, which relate to Mr. Huerta’s underlying claim that Defendant’s [sic] engaged in legal malpractice when they represented him.” Huerta’s claims therefore are set forth as follows: his breach of contract claim is based on the allegation that Shein failed to perform their contractual obligations “by failing to timely file Plaintiff’s §2255 Habeas Corpus Motion”; Huerta’s money had and received claim is grounded on the assertion that Shein “received monies from Plaintiff” to prepare and file the motion and that the “monies in equity and good conscience . . . belong[] to Plaintiff”; the breach of fiduciary duty claim is based on the 10 Case: 12-50346 Document: 00512064515 Page: 11 Date Filed: 11/27/2012 No. 12-50346 contention that Shein “failed to inform Plaintiff of their mistake associated with the untimely filing of his” motion and erroneously informed him that the courts’ rulings were incorrect; and Huerta’s fraud claims are grounded on the allegation that Shein failed to disclose and misrepresented certain facts “regarding their failure to timely file Plaintiff’s” motion. Thus, the crux of Huerta’s complaint is that Shein: (1) failed timely to file Huerta’s section 2255 motion, which led to its dismissal; (2) did not disclose the untimely nature of the filing to Huerta; and (3) erroneously advised Huerta to pursue an appeal because the law supported his position. Though framed as multiple causes of action, we conclude that these claims all sound in negligence, essentially amounting to the assertion that Shein committed legal malpractice. Our conclusion finds ample support in Texas caselaw. In Murphy, for example, the court explained that, as alleged here, a lawyer commits “professional negligence by giving an erroneous legal opinion or erroneous advice, by delaying or failing to handle a matter entrusted to the lawyer’s care, or by not using a lawyer’s ordinary care in preparing, managing, and prosecuting a case.” 241 S.W.3d at 693; see also id. at 692–93 (“Professional negligence, or the failure to exercise ordinary care, includes giving a client bad legal advice or otherwise improperly representing the client.”). Because acts of this nature constitute professional negligence, Texas courts repeatedly have declined to permit plaintiffs to convert claims for these acts into breach of contract actions. See Nabors, 2010 WL 255968, at  (collecting cases). Likewise, “Texas courts have consistently held that the failure to disclose significant information about a client’s case is professional negligence and not a breach of fiduciary duty.” Kemp v. Jensen, 329 S.W.3d 866, 872 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied) (reviewing cases); see also Murphy, 241 S.W.3d at 694 (explaining that Texas appellate courts have “differentiated between claims against a lawyer for 11 Case: 12-50346 Document: 00512064515 Page: 12 Date Filed: 11/27/2012 No. 12-50346 professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty” and discussing cases so holding). Indeed, this case is analogous to Nabors. There, an attorney (“McColl”) had represented a defendant (“Nabors”) charged with various drug-related offenses in both federal and state court. Nabors, 2010 WL 255968, at . After Nabors entered into a plea agreement, McColl allegedly informed him that additional charges that had been pending in Dallas County, Texas were dismissed. Id. Later, while serving his federal sentence, Nabors attempted to enroll in a residential drug and alcohol treatment program in exchange for a reduced sentence, but was informed that he was ineligible because his Dallas County case was still pending. Id. Nabors contacted McColl, who informed Nabors that the problem was simply a “bureaucratic error.” Id. Although McColl subsequently determined that Nabors’ Dallas County case remained open, he did not inform Nabors of this fact until several months later. Id. Nabors eventually sued McColl for legal malpractice, DTPA violations, fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, and conversion. Id. At the outset, the court affirmed summary judgment against Nabors’ malpractice claim after holding that, as a matter of law, Peeler’s sole proximate cause bar precluded recovery for malpractice. Id. at –2. The court then considered whether Nabors’ additional claims were “subsumed in his legal malpractice claim.” Id. at . In analyzing that issue, the court began by examining Nabors’ complaint, explaining: Nabors’ claim for breach of contract is based on McColl’s failure to “fully perform his agreement to represent [Nabors] in the Dallas case and timely complete” it and on Nabors’ claim that McColl failed to earn the $25,000 fee in the Dallas case. Nabors’ breach of fiduciary relationship claim is based on McColl’s failure to disclose that the Dallas case was not dismissed, McColl’s misrepresentations that the case was dismissed, and McColl’s refusal to turn over 12 Case: 12-50346 Document: 00512064515 Page: 13 Date Filed: 11/27/2012 No. 12-50346 certain client files and accounting records. Nabors’ common law fraud claim is also based on McColl’s alleged intentional nondisclosure of the fact the Dallas case had not been dismissed. Id. at . The court noted that “[a] cause of action claiming bad legal advice or improper representation is one for legal malpractice,” and similarly, “[a]n attorney’s misrepresentations about the status of litigation being handled by the attorney constitutes a claim for malpractice rather than breach of fiduciary duty.” Id. Thus, the court held, “Nabors’ claims were an impermissible attempt to convert what were really negligence claims into claims of breach of contract, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty.” Id. The court therefore affirmed summary judgment against Nabors, as it was “well settled” that his claims were barred by law. Id. at . Likewise here, Huerta’s claims all amount to the assertion that Shein committed professional negligence. We are therefore constrained by Peeler’s sole proximate cause bar to affirm the district court’s dismissal of those claims.