Opinion ID: 214874
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Similarity to the Enumerated Offenses: Purposeful, Violent, and Aggressive

Text: A more difficult question is whether facilitation of the burglary of a building is similar in kind to the offenses listed in the otherwise clause of the ACCA; specifically whether it is purposeful, violent, and aggressive. Begay, 553 U.S. at 144-45, 128 S.Ct. 1581. As noted, in Begay, the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's finding that driving under the influence constitutes a violent felony. Id. at 148, 128 S.Ct. 1581. The Court reasoned that while driving under the influence created a serious risk of physical injury to another, because it did not require that the defendant have acted with any intent to cause such injury, it was essentially similar to crimes which imposed strict liability on offenders. Id. at 145, 128 S.Ct. 1581. Such crimes, because they imposed liability on the defendant regardless of the intent he or she possessed at the time of the crime, were clearly different from the crimes Congress listed in the ACCA, each of which involved purposeful conduct on the part of the defendant. Id. at 146, 128 S.Ct. 1581. Accordingly, Congress when creating the clause was not referring to such crimes: We have no reason to believe that Congress intended to bring within the statute's scope these kinds of crimes, far removed as they are from the deliberate kind of behavior associated with violent criminal use of firearms. Id. at 147, 128 S.Ct. 1581. Though they were not before the Court, the Supreme Court additionally listed several other offenses which only require that the defendant have acted recklessly as examples of crimes not sufficiently purposeful such that the ACCA's otherwise clause covers them. See id. at 146, 128 S.Ct. 1581 (listing reckless pollution and reckless tampering with consumer products as crimes not typically committed by armed career criminals). The Sixth Circuit, among others, has since followed suit finding that several crimes which only require a mens rea of recklessness or gross negligence do not qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA. See United States v. McFalls, 592 F.3d 707 (6th Cir.2010) (holding that defendant's conviction under South Carolina's aggravated assault statute did not qualify as a crime of violence because it only required that the defendant acted recklessly); United States v. Baker, 559 F.3d 443 (6th Cir.2009) (finding that violation of Tennessee reckless endangerment statute did not qualify as a crime of violence); United States v. Johnson, 308 Fed.Appx. 968 (6th Cir.2009) (same); United States v. Culbertson, 389 Fed. Appx. 515, 520 (6th Cir.2010) (concluding that Michigan manslaughter with a motor vehicle conviction was not a violent felony because defendant must only have acted with gross negligence); United States v. Johnson, 376 Fed.Appx. 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2010) (concluding that because a Pennsylvania terroristic threats offense requires a minimum mens rea of recklessness rather than intent, it is not a `crime of violence' for purposes of § 2L1.2.). [4] Meanwhile, courts have continued to find that the ACCA covers aggressive and violent offenses which require that the defendant have acted intentionally. United States v. Young, 580 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that violation of Michigan fleeing and eluding statute that required the defendant have acted willfully was a violent felony); United States v. Sykes, 598 F.3d 334 (7th Cir.2010) (concluding that conviction under Indiana's fleeing and eluding statute was violent felony because the defendant must have acted knowingly and intentionally); United States v. Noah, 401 Fed.Appx. 54 (6th Cir.2010) (finding that Tennessee crime which required that defendant have unlawfully and intentionally fled from an officer was a crime of violence). Similarly, other circuits that have addressed the issue have found that crimes which require that the defendant have acted knowingly are sufficiently purposeful to be considered violent felonies for the ACCA's purposes. United States v. Crews, 621 F.3d 849 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that Oregon second degree assault statute requiring that defendant acted knowingly or intentionally was a crime of violence); United States v. Dismuke, 593 F.3d 582 (7th Cir.2010) (concluding that Wisconsin vehicular fleeing offense that punished knowing conduct was a violent felony); United States v. Hampton, 585 F.3d 1033 (7th Cir.2009) (holding that Indiana residential entry statute punishing knowing or intentional conduct is a violent felony); United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 203 (3d Cir.2009) (finding that Pennsylvania simple assault statute that criminalized knowing actions was a crime of violence); United States v. Wilson, 568 F.3d 670 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding that knowing or intentional conduct prohibited by Missouri child abuse statute was purposeful); United States v. Spells, 537 F.3d 743 (7th Cir.2008) (finding conduct criminalized by Indiana fleeing and eluding statutes was purposeful because it requires that the defendant have acted knowingly or intentionally). The Sixth Circuit, however, has yet to directly address the matter. In United States v. Mosley, this Court considered whether a Michigan statute criminalizing the knowing failure to comply with an officer's lawful demand described a crime of violence. 575 F.3d 603, 606-07 (6th Cir. 2009). While the Court noted that such conduct will often be purposeful, it did not conclusively address the matter. Rather, the Court concluded that because the statute encompassed conduct that was neither violent nor aggressive, the conduct was not a crime of violence, regardless of whether it was purposeful. Id. at 607. This is one of the rare cases in which a statute criminalizing knowing conduct does not describe conduct sufficiently purposeful to qualify as a violent felony. See id.; Crews, 621 F.3d at 857 n. 7 (We do not hold that `knowingly' always suffices under Begay, for perhaps there are some offenses that, while committed `knowingly,' do not typically involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.). Importantly, this case is distinguishable from each of the aforementioned in that it presents the novel question of whether an individual commits a purposeful crime when he acts with the knowledge that another intends to commit a crime, but without the intent to commit or assist in the commission of the crime itself. As noted above, to be guilty of facilitation of a burglary, an individual, by definition, must have acted without the intent required for criminal responsibility for the ultimate criminal act. TENN.CODE ANN. § 39-11-403. This key distinction provides the basis for our decision today. Not only do statutes which criminalize knowing conduct generally not exclude individuals who act intentionally, but they, in most cases, assume that the individual, in fact, acted with such intent. For example, in Crews, the defendant challenged the lower court's classification of his prior conviction for knowingly us[ing] a deadly weapon to assault another as a crime of violence. 621 F.3d at 855-57. The defendant argued, among other things, that the conduct described by the statute was not sufficiently purposeful to justify a sentencing enhancement. Id. at 856. The court rejected this argument, explaining that even though the statute only required that the defendant have acted knowingly, in almost every instance the individual would also have acted intentionally: We have trouble imagining a circumstance in which a person could knowingly use a dangerous weapon without intending to do so. Indeed, Crews has not provided any case in which an individual who knowingly engaged in an assault by means of a deadly or dangerous weapon acted without the intent to cause harm. In short, convictions involving knowing use of a deadly weapon typically involve purposeful conduct within the meaning of Begay. Id. at 856-57. An examination of the other knowing crimes found to be sufficiently purposeful to be considered violent felonies or crimes of violence reveal that they likewise would almost always require the defendant to have acted intentionally. [5] This case, in contrast, presents a situation in which the intent to commit or assist will be lacking not merely in one instance, but in every instance. [6] Our decision is further buttressed by the fact that facilitation of burglary is not necessarily the type of violent or aggressive crime generally characterized as a violent felony. Aggressive, violent acts are aimed at other persons or property where persons might be located and thereby injured. United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1351 (11th Cir.2008). They involve overt, active conduct that results in harm to a person or property. United States v. Polk, 577 F.3d 515, 519 (3d Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Herrick, 545 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir.2008) ([A]ggressive may be defined as `tending toward or exhibiting aggression,' which in turn is defined as `a forceful action or procedure (as an unprovoked attack) esp[ecially] when intended to dominate or master.' Violence may be defined as `marked by extreme force or sudden intense activity.' (citation omitted)). A cursory review of convictions under the statute reveals that the actions of defendants guilty of facilitation of the burglary of a building may not meet this standard. For example, in Tennessee v. Monholland, No. 03C01-9410-CR00396, 1995 WL 489438, 1995 Tenn.Crim.App. LEXIS 689 (Aug. 16, 1995), the defendant was convicted of facilitating the burglary of a building because: 1) he provided directions to the home of the victim to a third-party driver on the day of the crime; and 2) was a passenger in a car driven by a third party to the scene of the crime. Id. at -3, 1995 Tenn.Crim.App. LEXIS 689, at -8. The third-party driver ultimately relied on directions provided by the burglar when driving to the victim's home. Id. at , 1995 Tenn.Crim.App. LEXIS 689, at . At no point did the government present any evidence that the burglar and the defendant spoke of the robbery. Even assuming, as the state court did, that the defendant passenger was aware of the burglar's plan to rob the home, id. at -3, 1995 Tenn.Crim.App. LEXIS 689, at , it is questionable whether simply providing directions to a third party, which the third party did not rely upon, would be the type of violent and aggressive conduct towards which the otherwise clause is directed. Regardless, the government presents little reason for us to doubt our decision. Rather than addressing the novel issue before this Courtwhether facilitation of burglary is sufficiently purposeful, violent, and aggressiveit devotes the virtual entirety of its brief, save one paragraph, to the discussion of whether facilitation of burglary creates a serious risk of violence. As noted, the Supreme Court's decision in Begay did nothing to undercut our previous decision on this point. It appears that the government mistakenly conflates the first and second prongs of the test pronounced in Begay. While they sound similar, whether an act creates a serious risk of physical injury and whether an act is violent and aggressive are two distinct inquiries. While in many cases an act that creates a serious risk of physical injury will be violent and aggressive, the presence of the former in no way dictates the latter.  Begay's second requirement entails more than a mere likelihood that another will be physically injured as a result of the offenseit requires conduct that is similar [in kind] to the comparative offenses.... United States v. Marquez, 626 F.3d 214, 230-31 (5th Cir.2010) (Dennis, J., dissenting). Ultimately, the sole argument the government provides in support of its position as to the second prong is the fact that this Court has found convictions under Michigan's fleeing and eluding statute to qualify as violent felonies. Unfortunately for the government, this argument is of little usefulness. That one crime was found to be a violent felony in no way implies that another crime with entirely different elements and circumstances should likewise be classified as such. The crimes are readily distinguishable. Michigan's fleeing and eluding statute, by definition requires that the assailant have acted purposefully, applying only to those who willfully fail [] to obey [an officer's] direction. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.602a. As explained above, Tennessee's facilitation statute extends beyond such persons to include those who do not share the chief perpetrator's intent to burglarize the building.