Opinion ID: 3164661
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Helen C. Rivera

Text: On June 3, 2013, Rivera was driving a black SUV northbound on Beach Drive in Bethesda, Maryland. As Rivera approached a group of bicyclists who were riding on the street, she began to drive aggressively. Upon passing the first bicyclist, Rivera swerved the SUV in the bicyclist’s direction and slammed on her brakes. The bicyclist was able to avoid falling or colliding with the SUV. Rivera then repeated this behavior with a second bicyclist, using her SUV to physically push the bicyclist off the roadway. Rivera yelled, “There’s a bike path for people like you!” After being struck by the SUV, the second bicyclist fell to the ground, injuring his left rotator cuff and sustaining numerous abrasions. Instead of stopping, Rivera fled the scene and drove home. On September 12, 2013, a Montgomery County Grand Jury indicted Rivera for 7 criminal and traffic offenses: two counts of second-degree assault; one count of failure to remain at the scene of an accident involving bodily injury; one count of reckless driving; and one count of negligent driving. On February 4, 2014, during criminal proceedings in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, a jury found Rivera guilty of two counts of second-degree assault under Md. Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2015 Cum. Supp.), § 3-203 of the Criminal Law Article, and one count of failing to remain at the scene of an accident involving bodily injury under Md. Code (1977, 2012 Repl. Vol.), § 20-102(a) of the Transportation Article. The State entered a nolle prosequi as to the reckless driving and negligent driving charges. On February 28, 2014, Judge Terrence J. McGann of the Circuit Court sentenced Rivera to six months, suspended, for each count of second-degree assault. The sentencing judge, specific to the two counts of assault, granted Rivera’s motion to be placed on probation before judgment. For the one count of failure to remain at the scene, Rivera was sentenced to six months, suspended, to run concurrent to the sentence for the assault counts. The Circuit Court ordered a two-year period of probation, fined Rivera $350, and imposed a special condition of probation: Rivera was prohibited from driving a motor vehicle until “February 27, 2015 or until [the] Motor Vehicle Administration permits you[, Rivera,] to drive, whichever is later in time.” The sentencing judge elaborated: “So if [the] MVA says [] [you] can drive tomorrow [] [you] can’t drive for a year. If after a year[, however, the] MVA’s still got her suspended[,] she still can’t drive . . . .” Rivera consented to the terms of probation 8 and signed the probation order. On July 29, 2015, the MVA held an administrative hearing and suspended Rivera’s license for thirty days. Rivera appealed the no-driving special condition of probation to the Court of Special Appeals, contending that the restriction on driving rendered her sentence illegal.8 In an unreported opinion, our brethren on the Court of Special Appeals held that Sheppard was controlling and concluded that “the trial court abused its discretion in suspending Rivera’s driving privileges . . . .” In an unreported opinion, the intermediate appellate court reasoned that under the statutory scheme established by the General Assembly, the authority to restrict driving privileges is delegated solely to the MVA, not the Judiciary. Further, the court held that the trial court had exceeded its authority by, in effect, revoking Rivera’s driver’s license because the no-driving special condition “significantly undermine[s] the effectiveness of the legislatively-empowered MVA.” Rivera’s case was then remanded to the Circuit Court with directions to that court to vacate the no-driving condition of probation. We granted certiorari to address the issues raised in the State’s petition in State v. 8 Of the three convictions, Rivera was only eligible to appeal the conviction for failure to remain at the scene of the accident involving bodily injury. Rivera waived her right to appeal the two counts of assault because she had been granted probation before judgment. Pursuant to Md. Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2015 Cum. Supp.), § 6-220(e) of the Criminal Procedure Article, “[b]y consenting to and receiving a stay of entering of the judgment . . . the defendant waives the right to appeal at any time from the judgment of guilt.” 9 Helen C. Rivera, 442 Md. 194, 112 A.3d 373 (2015).9