Opinion ID: 2756145
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mr. Catchai’s Arguments

Text: Mr. Catchai argues that the BIA erred by failing to recognize that the IJ had an obligation to request additional corroborating evidence from him if his initial showing 5 was insufficient to meet his burden of proof. Construing this pro se argument liberally, see United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009), we note that “[w]here the trier of fact determines that the applicant should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (asylum proceedings); see also id. § 1229a(c)(4)(B) (for removal proceedings). This statute, however, does not affirmatively obligate the trier of fact to request corroborating evidence. Further, such a request first requires the trier of fact to find the testimony to be “otherwise credible.” Here the IJ did not so find, and the BIA agreed. The BIA credited the IJ’s adverse credibility determination for the following reasons: (1) Mr. Catchai’s testimony was inconsistent with other evidence of when he received various documents from church associates in Angola that purported to corroborate his story; (2) the certificate of translation of those documents apparently preceded Mr. Catchai’s alleged reception of them; (3) the statements in the documents were vague; (4) Mr. Catchai could not authenticate the signatures of the documents’ purported authors; and (5) the background materials did not support his account. These reasons are properly based on the record, and Mr. Catchai does not challenge the underlying findings. Consequently, his argument (and any implicit challenge to the credibility finding) is unavailing. 6
Mr. Catchai next argues that he was denied due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. One of his arguments appears to be that because the IJ characterized his application as “a very close case,” R. at 117, he met his burden of proof for asylum. A close case, however, is not the same thing as a winning one, and both the BIA and IJ opinions explicitly state that Mr. Catchai failed to carry his burden of proof. See id. at 4 (BIA opinion) (“Apart from the respondent’s discredited testimony, his corroborative evidence, including background materials did not independently satisfy his burden of proving his eligibility for asylum.”); id. at 50 (IJ opinion) (“[T]he Court finds that the respondent’s testimony is not sufficient to amount to reliable evidence sufficient for the respondent to meet his burden of proof.”). This argument fails. Mr. Catchai also appears to challenge his removal on the ground that the IJ and BIA were biased. He asserts that “they are supporting the dictatorship in Angola and the torture of young people because of the economic ties between the corrupted government of Angola and the United States.” Pet’r’s Br. at 17. Suffice it to say that he provides no supporting evidence. We reject the challenge.
Mr. Catchai argues that his removal would be contrary to the United States’ treaty obligations under the CAT. “To obtain relief under the Convention Against Torture, aliens must prove it is more likely than not they will be tortured upon return, although the 7 torture need not be on account of a protected status.” Uanreroro, 443 F.3d at 1202. The BIA ruled that Mr. Catchai relied upon the same discredited testimony for both his asylum and CAT claims and thus he had failed to demonstrate a clear possibility of torture upon his return to Angola. Because Mr. Catchai fails to articulate on appeal any reason why that ruling was erroneous, this argument, too, must fail. See Ritonga v. Holder, 633 F.3d 971, 979 (10th Cir. 2011).
Mr. Catchai’s final argument is that the BIA erred in assessing his asylum application as seeking protection from religious persecution rather than political persecution. True, the BIA did note that, according to Mr. Catchai’s background materials, the Angolan government does not interfere with the country’s churches or clergy. But the BIA referenced those materials as just one part of its assessment of the “totality of the circumstances and all relevant factors” supporting the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, R. at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted), and elsewhere it correctly stated that Mr. Catchai feared persecution “on account of his anti-MPLA political opinion,” id. at 3. Further, the BIA’s citation to Angola’s apparent respect for religion supports its conclusion that Mr. Catchai was not credible: if clergy in Angola are free from oppression in general, then they are likely free from oppression on the basis of both their religious and political views. Mr. Catchai’s argument here, like his others, can afford him no relief. 8