Opinion ID: 1191871
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of the Children's Code

Text: {16} Martinez argues that the provisions of the Children's Code governing statements to the police by delinquent children apply to his statements because he was seventeen years old at the time of the questioning. See NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-14(C) to -14(E) (1993) (requiring that a delinquent child be advised of the child's constitutional rights and give a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of rights prior to being interrogated; requiring the State to prove a valid waiver of rights prior to admission of a statement at trial; and outlining the factors a court should consider in determining whether the State sufficiently proves a valid waiver). The State contends, on the other hand, that Section 32A-2-14(D) applies only to a delinquent child, see NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-3(B) (1993, prior to 1995 & 1996 amendments) (defining a delinquent child as a child who has committed a delinquent act), and that Martinez is a serious youthful offender, Section 32A-2-3(H) (defining serious youthful offender). The State therefore contends that Section 32A-2-14 does not apply because the Legislature has specifically provided that a serious youthful offender is not a delinquent child. Section 32A-2-3(H). {17} Section 32A-2-3(H) defines a serious youthful offender as an individual sixteen or seventeen years of age who is charged with and indicted or bound over for trial for first degree murder. The State charged Martinez with first degree murder and a grand jury indicted him for that crime. Thus, the State correctly identifies Martinez as a serious youthful offender. However, at the time the police questioned Martinez, he had neither been charged with nor indicted for first degree murder. Indeed, the purpose of the police interview was to determine Martinez's level of involvement, if any, in the three killings. If the police had surmised that Martinez committed only the crime of conspiracy or, for example, second degree murder, he would have been considered a delinquent child even after being charged and indicted. See Section 32A-2-3(C) (defining a delinquent offender), (I) (defining a youthful offender). Thus, we agree with Martinez that the provisions of Section 32A-2-14(E) guide our inquiry concerning the validity of Martinez's waiver of his constitutional rights. {18} Nonetheless, we recognize that the application of Section 32A-2-14 to the statement of a juvenile makes little practical difference in evaluating a waiver of rights by a juvenile over the age of fourteen. See § 32A-2-14(F) (providing that statements by a juvenile under the age of thirteen are inadmissible and that there is a rebuttable presumption that any confessions, statements or admissions made by a child thirteen or fourteen years old to a person in a position of authority are inadmissible). For juveniles over the age of fourteen and in contrast to Section 32A-2-14(F), Section 32A-2-14(E) provides that, [i]n determining whether the child knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived the child's rights, the court shall consider the following factors: (1) the age and education of the respondent; (2) whether or not the respondent is in custody; (3) the manner in which the respondent was advised of his rights; (4) the length of questioning and circumstances under which the respondent was questioned; (5) the condition of the quarters where the respondent was being kept at the time he was questioned; (6) the time of day and the treatment of the respondent at the time that he was questioned; (7) the mental and physical condition of the respondent at the time that he was questioned; and (8) whether or not the respondent had the counsel of an attorney, friends or relatives at the time of being questioned. Contrary to Martinez's contention that these factors establish a heightened protection for statements by juveniles, we have previously recognized that [t]his list is essentially a codification of the totality-of-circumstances test applied in evaluating a waiver of constitutional rights by an adult, though emphasizing some of the circumstances that may be particularly relevant for a juvenile, such as the presence of a relative or friend. State v. Setser, 1997-NMSC-004, ¶ 13, 122 N.M. 794, 932 P.2d 484. Thus, in evaluating the trial court's determination that Martinez knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights, we look to the totality of circumstances, giving particular emphasis to the factors listed in Section 32A-2-14(E).