Opinion ID: 2556570
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Contribution Action Independent

Text: Generally, [a] determination of when the statute of limitations begins to run on a right to indemnification is grounded, first, in the events giving rise to the claim; and second, in the identification of what specifically identifiable event starts the statute of limitations to run, as a matter of law. [35] This principle applies specifically to the type of contribution claim at issue here. As the Superior Court has explained: [w]hen the concurring negligence of joint tort-feasors gives the injured party a cause of action, the incidental right of a joint tort-feasor to compel contribution is created. However, this right remains contingent, subordinate, and inchoate until one of the joint tort-feasors pays more than his proportionate share of the underlying claim. Thus, the general rule is that the statute of limitations governing claims for contribution runs from the time of discharge of the obligation and not from the time when the original tort occurred. [36] While the basis for a claim for contribution is created the moment when the joint tort-feasors harm an injured party, the specific right to bring a contribution claim does not exist unless and until one of the joint tort-feasors pays more than his or her proportionate share of the settlement of the underlying claim. Therefore, contrary to Dr. Reddy's position in this appeal, the two-year tort statute of limitations applicable to the injured parties' claim for medical negligence, and the three-year statute of limitations applicable to the joint tort-feasor's claim for contribution are not the same. Moreover, they do not run simultaneously from the moment of harm to the injured party. Harbor Health brought a claim for contribution, pursuant to section 6302 of the Uniform Contribution Act against a fellow health care provider and joint tort-feasor. Nothing in section 6856 of the medical malpractice statute eliminates the independent nature of a claim for contribution among joint tort-feasors or alters the general three-year statute of limitations applicable to such a claim. Delaware law has consistently held that a claim for contribution is separate and distinct from an action for personal injury. As the Superior Court stated: This Court has held that the personal injury statute of limitations was not a bar to a defendant's third party complaint for contribution because the third party claim is not for recovery of personal injuries but for contribution. The Court based this result on two grounds. First, an action for contribution is a sort of equitable action between a defendant who has paid all or more than his fair share of a judgment for personal injuries and other joint defendants for a proration of their several liabilities among themselves and therefore, the personal injury statute of limitations does not apply. Second, a plaintiff may, and often does, wait until the day before the statute elapses before filing suit. Before the defendant is served the time has expired and he would be barred from seeking contribution, if the statute applied. The Court held the statute inapplicable to contribution because it was inconceivable that the Legislature should purport to grant the valuable right of contribution among joint tort-feasors but, for all practical purposes, place it within the power of the original plaintiff to decide whether or not it could be exercised. [37] That same reasoning applies to a claim for contribution that originates from an action for medical negligence. If the General Assembly intended for the medical malpractice two-year statute of limitations to trump the general three-year statute of limitations for purposes of a contribution claim, it could have created an express exception as it did with other causes of action. The General Assembly did not, however, include the medical malpractice statute of limitations as one of the exceptions to the general statute of limitations. [38] The fact that such an exception was not created reinforces the separateness of a claim for contribution from a cause of action for medical malpractice. A three-year statute of limitations separately governs contribution claims. Accordingly, we hold that Harbor Health's claim for contribution was timely filed.