Opinion ID: 714879
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Liability Under the Clean Water Act

Text: 29 As noted, the CWA imposes a zero discharge standard in the absence of an NPDES permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). The question is whether Congress intended for this zero discharge standard to apply in the circumstances of this case. 30 In interpreting the liability provisions of the CWA we realize that Congress is presumed not to have intended absurd (impossible) results. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 464, 468, 130 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994); Towers v. United States (In re Pacific-Atlantic Trading Co.), 64 F.3d 1292, 1303 (9th Cir.1995). Courts will not foolishly bind themselves to the plain language of a statute where doing so would compel an odd result. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509, 109 S.Ct. 1981, 1984, 104 L.Ed.2d 557 (1989). For,  'it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.'  Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454-55, 109 S.Ct. 2558, 2567, 105 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989) (quoting Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 326 U.S. 404, 66 S.Ct. 193, 90 L.Ed. 165 (1945)). Cf. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. at 527-30, 109 S.Ct. at 1994-95 (Scalia, J., concurring) (We are confronted here with a statute which, if interpreted literally, produces an absurd, and perhaps unconstitutional, result. Our task is to give some alternative meaning to the [language] ... that avoids this consequence....). 31 Our jurisprudence has eschewed the rigid application of a law where doing so produces impossible, absurd, or unjust results. [I]f a literal construction of the words of a statute would lead to an absurd, unjust, or unintended result, the statute must be construed so as to avoid that result. United States v. Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285, 1288 (5th Cir.1978) (citing Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459, 12 S.Ct. 511, 512, 36 L.Ed. 226 (1892)); see also United States v. Castro, 837 F.2d 441, 445 (11th Cir.1988). [E]ven when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole this Court has followed [the purpose of the act], rather than the literal words. Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 400, 86 S.Ct. 852, 857, 15 L.Ed.2d 827 (1966) (internal quotation marks omitted). 32 As is often the case, the legislature will use words of general meaning in a statute, 33 words broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to include the particular act. 34 Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 454, 109 S.Ct. at 2566-67 (quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459, 12 S.Ct. 511, 512, 36 L.Ed. 226 (1892)) (emphasis supplied). Thus, this court has found that 35 [g]eneral terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language which would avoid results of this character. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter. 36 Zwak v. United States, 848 F.2d 1179, 1183 (11th Cir.1988) (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 447, 53 S.Ct. 210, 214, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932)). For instance, common sense says that a law making it a felony for a prisoner to escape from jail does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on fire--'for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt.'  United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 487, 19 L.Ed. 278, 280 (1869). 37 In this case, once JMS began the development, compliance with the zero discharge standard would have been impossible. Congress could not have intended a strict application of the zero discharge standard in section 1311(a) when compliance is factually impossible. The evidence was uncontroverted that whenever it rained in Gwinnett County some discharge was going to occur; nothing JMS could do would prevent all rain water discharge. George Fritcher, the county inspector charged with monitoring JMS's compliance with Gwinnett County's development permit, deposed that it was simply impossible to stop sediment from leaving the subdivision when there was a rainfall event. [Z]ero discharge of storm water will never be achieved because rainfall must find its way back into the streams and rivers of this state. Georgia EPD Amicus Brief, at 13 (emphasis supplied). Doug Ballard, president of JMS, similarly testified on cross-examination by Hughey's counsel that he could not stop the rain water that fell on his property from running downhill, and that nobody could. The rain that fell on his property is designed to go down those curbs and designed to go down those pipes and unless you go out there and collect it in your hand some way or other it's going to have to go somewhere. 38 Moreover, JMS obtained from Gwinnett County a development permit that was issued pursuant to the County's authority under Georgia's Soil Erosion and Sedimentation Control Act of 1975 (SESCA), O.C.G.A. §§ 12-7-1 et seq. That Georgia statute, like the CWA, limited stormwater discharges during the applicable period. See O.C.G.A. § 12-7-6(18) (1992). Moreover, Georgia EPD's proposed standards for a general NPDES permit for stormwater discharges are similar to the standards for stormwater discharges contained in SESCA. David Word, the Chief of the Water Protection Branch of Georgia EPD, testified by affidavit that the general NPDES permit proposed for stormwater runoff from construction activities ... will require permitees to perform certain erosion and sedimentation control practices, [which are] currently required under authority of the Erosion and Sedimentation Control Act of 1975. Accordingly, the fact that JMS was issued a development permit by Gwinnett County suggests that JMS would have been able to obtain an NPDES permit from Georgia EPD, had such a permit been available. 39 The facts of this case necessarily limit our holding to situations in which the stormwater discharge is minimal, as it was here. The district court found that JMS's discharges pose no threat to human health, and that much of the damage [caused by such discharges] will be reversed with the passage of a relatively short amount of time. 40 This was not a case of a manufacturing facility that could abate the discharge of pollutants by ceasing operations. Nor did the discharger come to court with unclean hands: JMS made every good-faith effort to comply with the Clean Water Act and all other relevant pollution control standards. The discharges were minimal, and posed no risk to human health. In sum, we hold that Congress did not intend (surely could not have intended) for the zero discharge standard to apply when: (1) compliance with such a standard is factually impossible; (2) no NPDES permit covering such discharge exists; (3) the discharger was in good-faith compliance with local pollution control requirements that substantially mirrored the proposed NPDES discharge standards; and (4) the discharges were minimal. Lex non cogit ad impossibilia: The law does not compel the doing of impossibilities. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 912 (6th ed. 1990). 41 Practically speaking, rain water will run downhill, and not even a law passed by the Congress of the United States can stop that. Under these circumstances, denying summary judgment to JMS was an error of law. Cf. Menzel v. County Utilities Corp., 712 F.2d 91, 95 (4th Cir.1983) (refusing to impose CWA liability for discharges during period in which effectiveness of NPDES permit was stayed by state court, since subjecting discharger to liability would serve no statutory purpose).B. The Permanent Injunction--Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 42 In addition to the fact that an injunction based upon an erroneous conclusion of law is invalid, see United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1520 n. 21 (11th Cir.1983), Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates dissolution of the injunction. 43 Rule 65(d) sets forth the standards of specificity that every injunctive order must satisfy. 44 Every order granting an injunction shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; [and] shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained.... 45 Rule 65 serves to protect those who are enjoined 46 by informing them of what they are called upon to do or to refrain from doing in order to comply with the injunction or restraining order. As a result, one of the principal abuses of the pre-federal rules practice--the entry of injunctions that were so vague that defendant was at a loss to determine what he had been restrained from doing--is avoided. The drafting standard established by Rule 65(d) is that an ordinary person reading the court's order should be able to ascertain from the document itself exactly what conduct is proscribed. 47 11A WRIGHT, MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 2955 (1995) (footnotes omitted). In addition to giving those enjoined fair and precisely drawn notice of what the injunction actually prohibits, Epstein Family Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 771 (3d Cir.1994), the specificity requirement of Rule 65(d) serves a second important function: 48 Unless the trial court carefully frames it orders of injunctive relief, it is impossible for an appellate tribunal to know precisely what it is reviewing. We can hardly begin to assess the correctness of the judgment entered by District Court here without knowing its precise bounds. In the absence of specific injunctive relief, informed and intelligent appellate review is greatly complicated, if not made impossible. 49 Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476, 94 S.Ct. 713, 715, 38 L.Ed.2d 661, 664 (1974). 50 Consistent with the two foregoing purposes, appellate courts will not countenance injunctions that merely require someone to obey the law. Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 565 F.2d 895, 897-98 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 835, 99 S.Ct. 118, 58 L.Ed.2d 131 (1974). 11 Broad, non-specific language that merely enjoins a party to obey the law or comply with an agreement ... does not give the restrained party fair notice of what conduct will risk contempt. Epstein Family Partnership, supra. Because of the possibility of contempt, an injunction must be tailored to remedy the specific harms shown rather than to enjoin all possible breaches of the law. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). An injunction must therefore contain an operative command capable of 'enforcement.'  Longshoremen's Ass'n. v. Marine Trade Ass'n., 389 U.S. 64, 73-74, 88 S.Ct. 201, 206-07, 19 L.Ed.2d 236, 244 (1967). See also United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 598 F.2d 363, 368 (5th Cir.1979) (party subject to contempt proceeding may defend on basis that compliance was not possible). 51 Here, the district court's order granting permanent injunctive relief only stated: 52 Defendant shall not discharge stormwater into the waters of the United States from its development property in Gwinnett County, Georgia, known as Rivercliff Place if such discharge would be in violation of the Clean Water Act. 53 (emphasis supplied). 54 Not only was this an obey the law injunction, it was also incapable of enforcement as an operative command. The court's order merely required JMS to stop discharges, but failed to specify how JMS was to do so. Discharges, though not defined by the order, occurred only when it rained, and any discharge was a violation of the order. Rain water ran into the subdivision's government-approved streets and storm sewers; then into the small stream that started on the subdivision property; on into a tributary stream; and eventually into the Yellow River. Was JMS supposed to stop the rain from falling? Was JMS to build a retention pond to slow and control discharges? Should JMS have constructed a treatment plant to comply with the requirements of the CWA? 55 The injunction's failure to specifically identify the acts that JMS was required to do or refrain from doing indicates that the district court--like the CWA, the EPA, Georgia EPD, and Mr. Hughey--was incapable of fashioning an operative command capable of enforcement. As such, we must vacate this obey the law injunction. 12 C. Award of Attorney Fees and Costs 56 A court issuing any final order in a Clean Water Act citizen's suit may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any prevailing party or substantially prevailing party, whenever the court determines such award is appropriate. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d). A prevailing or substantially prevailing party is one who prevailed in what the lawsuit originally sought to accomplish. Washington Public Interest Research Group v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, 11 F.3d 883, 887 (9th Cir.1993). 57 The district court here awarded Hughey more than $115,000 in attorney fees and costs. However, for the reasons stated above Hughey's citizen suit has not accomplished its original objective. Hughey is not a prevailing or substantially prevailing party and is thus not entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs. See Save Our Community v. United States EPA, 971 F.2d 1155, 1167 (5th Cir.1992) (where district court erred in finding defendant liable under the CWA, the award of attorney fees based thereon was also inappropriate).