Opinion ID: 1638588
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Complete Contract 15 by the Deadline for Performance

Text: In a brief argument inserted in the midst of the Board's discussion of anticipatory repudiation, the Board states: Also, where termination is for failure to meet a performance deadline, the law eliminates the notice requirement. Abcon Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 44 Fed.Cl. 625, 631 ([ ]1999). Harbert admittedly did not meet the December 29, 1996, contract completion date. In fact, as of the date of termination, December 8, 1997, Harbert's time for performance of Contract 15 had expired by 346 days. On July 14, 1997, Harbert gave the Board notice that it had `ceased' or discontinued Reactor Basin 2 work on July 11, 1997. Then, just so there would be no doubt, on August 18, 1997, Harbert again stated 'For the record, all work on Reactor No. 2 ceased August 13, 1997.' By its words and actions, Harbert manifested a clear intent not to complete Contract 15. It abandoned the work and refused demands to finish. Harbert and Federal have not responded to the Board's argument that Harbert's failure to timely complete Project 15 eliminated any requirement that the Board provide Harbert with notice under subsection 8.11, nor have Harbert and Federal discussed the pertinence of Abcon Associates, Inc. v. United States, 44 Fed.Cl. 625 (1999). However, after reviewing Abcon, we are not convinced by the Board's ephemeral, conclusory argument, even if Abcon correctly reflects the law in Alabama, an issue we do not decide. In Abcon, the Court of Federal Claims concluded, based on the language of the contract at issue there and a pertinent federal regulation governing contracts with the United States Postal Service, that in order [t]o terminate for a failure to make progress, an agency must provide a ten-day cure notice under the terms of the contract, whereas a termination for failure to meet deadlines requires no such notice. 44 Fed.Cl. at 631. The federal regulation discussed in Abcon is not pertinent to the present case, and the Board has directed us to no part of Contract 15, including the standard specifications, that relieved it of its obligation to comply with subsection 8.11 when termination of the contract was based on Harbert's failure to complete the project by the scheduled completion date. It is the appellant's burden to refer this Court to the parts of the record relied on in support of its argument for reversal. Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.App. P. This Court does not have the obligation to search the record for substantiation of unsupported factual matter appearing in an appellant's brief in order to determine whether a judgment should be reversed. Friedman v. Friedman, 971 So.2d 23, 31 (Ala.2007). Also, as noted above, it is not the function of this Court to do a party's legal research or to make and address legal arguments for a party based on undelineated general propositions not supported by sufficient authority or argument. Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So.2d 248, 251 (Ala.1994); see also Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.App. P. Based on the Board's failure to adequately develop its argument that it had an no obligation to provide Harbert with notice of default because Harbert did not complete the project by the scheduled completion date for Contract 15, we will not further address that argument, nor will we reverse the trial court's judgment based on that argument.