Opinion ID: 864448
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether judge pigott erred in refusing to

Text: AWARD ATTORNEY FEES TO SNOW AND HARRELL WHERE 2 $45,000 of this went to Wright, who represented Jonathan for 45 days before giving the case to Waller. 3 Snow and Harrell were reimbursed their remaining expenses of $20,847 in the Hawkins case. 6 THEY WERE THE ONLY ATTORNEYS WHOSE CONTRACT WAS APPROVED PRIOR TO THE INSTITUTION OF SUIT AND WHERE THEY DID A MAJORITY OF THE WORK ON THE WRONGFUL DEATH SUIT. ¶14. Mississippi’s wrongful death statute, Miss Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 2002), created a cause of action unknown to the common law. The wrongful death action is not part of the estate of the deceased. Partyka v. Yazoo Dev. Corp., 376 So. 2d 646, 650 (Miss. 1979) (citing Byars v. Austin, 218 So. 2d 11, 15 (Miss. 1969)). Only those individuals listed in the wrongful death statute may bring this independent cause of action. Partyka, 376 So.2d at 650 (citing Hasson Grocery Co. v. Cook, 196 Miss. 452, 459, 17 So.2d 791 (1944)). On appellate review, we strictly construe Mississippi’s wrongful death statute. Smith v. Garrett, 287 So. 2d 258, 260 (Miss. 1973) (collecting authorities). ¶15. The wrongful death statute recites a list of those persons who may act as the named plaintiff in an action but it does not give preference to one potential plaintiff over another. The only limitation in the statute is that, no matter which of the multiple persons authorized to bring the suit actually does so, “there shall be but one (1) suit for the same death which shall ensue for the benefit of all parties concerned . . . .“ Miss. Code. Ann. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 2002) (italics added). A basic tenet of statutory construction is that “shall” is mandatory and “may” is discretionary. Planters Bank & Trust Co. v. Sklar, 555 So.2d 1024, 1027 (Miss. 1990); Murphy v. State, 253 Miss. 644, 649, 178 So. 2d 692 (1965). Thus, in most wrongful death cases, the first wrongful death lawsuit filed represents the interests of all the wrongful death heirs, to the exclusion of any subsequently filed lawsuits. Because there may be but one lawsuit filed in any wrongful death case, this “first-to-file” rule gives preference 7 to the first case filed. However, it does not prohibit the court from ordering multiple wrongful death suits to be joined. Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City R.R. v. Hicks, 91 Miss. 273, 46 So. 360, 397 (1908). Indeed, the statute explicitly allows all interested parties to join in the suit. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13. See also M.R.C.P. 20. Because the two Franklin heirs each brought a wrongful death lawsuit for the same death, they obviously ran afoul of the statute. Thus, Judge Kitchens’s November 1999 order combining Heather and Jonathan’s wrongful death cases was proper. The question remains whether his apportionment of attorney fees between the parties according to their pre-existing contracts and allowing Snow and Harrell to participate in the joined lawsuit was also proper or, as Judge Pigott held, in error. ¶16. Judge Pigott’s award on June 5, 2001, of all the attorney fees to Waller came a year and a half after Judge Kitchens’s order allowing Snow and Harrell to participate in the lawsuit. Judge Pigott held that, though Heather had a right to participate in the wrongful death action, control of the suit was in the hands of Jonathan and his attorneys since his suit was filed first. Snow and Harrell argue this was error. They offer proof of the substantial amount of time and work expended by them in preparing the Franklin case for trial and contrast it to the de minumus amount they claim was expended by Waller. They claim that under Mississippi law, an attorney whose efforts contribute to obtaining a settlement or in enhancing a settlement is entitled to attorney fees. They also argue that Waller’s claim of entitlement based on filing first is not determinative and ask the Court to give priority to their contract because it was approved by the chancery court. 8 ¶17. The Court of Appeals has held that a chancellor erred in awarding all attorney fees to an attorney who represented an illegitimate child found to be the decedent’s sole wrongful death beneficiary and thereby denying fees to an attorney who filed the wrongful death suit, acting in good faith and with due diligence, when the former attorney did nothing to obtain settlement, but only represented the illegitimate child’s interest. In re Estate of Brewer, 755 So. 2d 1108 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). “[I]t makes no sense to deprive the attorney . . . of any compensation and instead award the full contractual fee to another attorney who did nothing in pursuit of the claim . . . Because we find [the attorney’s] right of compensation is so clear as a matter of law, we reverse and render on the issue.” Id. at 1115. The court directed that the attorney’s “court sanctioned and fully performed contract be honored.” Id. Snow and Harrell rely heavily on Brewer to support their position that an attorney who contributes to an award should himself be awarded. Waller argues that the Brewer case is distinguishable from the case sub judice in that only one wrongful death lawsuit was filed therein and the attorney ultimately awarded compensation was also the attorney who initially filed the lawsuit. However, Brewer nonetheless stands for the proposition that an attorney who substantially contributes to a wrongful death settlement should be compensated for his time and effort. ¶18. There is no question that Snow and Harrell performed under their contract and their work benefitted both their clients (Heather and the estate) and Waller’s client (Jonathan) by enhancing the settlement value of the lawsuit. Snow’s office investigated the accident by obtaining photographs and interviewing witnesses. He sent out a 60 page settlement 9 package. He researched the types of experts needed and ultimately hired an accident reconstruction expert and an expert on hedonic damages. Waller did not attend all of the depositions, including that of the accident reconstruction expert. In the depositions he did attend, Snow asked 91% of the questions and Waller asked only 9%. Snow propounded written discovery, answered discovery and filed numerous motions to compel. He also filed five briefs, including responses to two summary judgment motions. The only written discovery filed by Waller was propounded to a defendant who was later dropped from the lawsuit.4 Snow prepared and filed 89% of the plaintiffs’ pleadings while Waller’s office filed 11%. Snow and Harrell conducted a mock trial and made a videotape on the issue of liability for use at trial. Snow had expenses of $41,694;5 Waller’s expenses were $10,500. ¶19. Waller does not deny that Snow and Harrell did most of the work. Rather, he argues that the amount of work done by Snow and Harrell was unnecessary because it was a “slam dunk” case. Waller argues that there was no benefit, direct or indirect, received from the activities of Snow and Harrell since liability was admitted and the other matters dealt primarily with attempting to elevate the case from actual damages to punitive damages. The Franklin case was settled based on actual damages claimed and the rather outrageous activities of Snow and Harrell in attempting to establish punitive damages were of no benefit to the Franklin settlement whatsoever. 4 Defense counsel Toney testified that “much more” of the paperwork was generated by Snow’s office. “[A]ll the paperwork that came in the mail, it - it came from your - your [Snow’s] place.” Other than motions opposing the daughter’s joinder in the case, Waller filed interrogatories and request for production to Jerry Hobbs, who was later dropped from the lawsuit. He answered interrogatories and requests for production for the son. He designated experts, but failed to provide expert reports. 5 Half of which were reimbursed from the Hawkins' settlement. 10 ¶20. Conversely, Snow and Harrell argue that the defendants did not admit liability until the day before trial. Until that time, they insist, liability was vigorously contested. They point to the testimony of defense counsel John Toney, where he admits that until the day before trial in the Hawkins’s case, liability was vigorously contested. Since the issue of liability was the same in Franklin as it was in Hawkins, Snow and Harrell argue this statement demonstrates the defense’s denial of liability in Franklin. They further claim that it was only their vigorous preparation that compelled this last second concession. ¶21. Snow and Harrell also argue that the case was not as open and shut as Waller alleges and that a punitive damage award was not outrageous as Waller claimed, but a very real possibility. Their investigation and discovery had revealed that punitive damages might be available based upon the defendant’s gross negligence. Both drivers of the tractor trailers that caused the accident which killed Franklin and Hawkins had applied for protective orders and refused to answer discovery, presumably because of their potential personal liability. Snow and Harrell filed motions to compel and responded to the motions for a protective order, and were able to force the drivers to be deposed and to answer discovery. Waller participated in none of this. Moreover, only Snow responded to and prevailed against defendant’s motion for summary judgment with regard to punitive damages. ¶22. Witness Lance Stevens testified that if all of Snow’s time had been spent on liability issues, the case would have indeed been overworked. However, he explained that liability was not the only issue. He testified that there was going to be a very serious dispute as to who among the defendants had what percentage of liability and where the punitive damages 11 would lie. Stevens further testified that the fair market value of the cases would have been much less had the possibility of a punitive damage award not existed, and that Snow’s expenses in the case were not unreasonable. Interestingly, after the judge in the Hawkins case ordered that the jury could consider punitive damages, that case settled for $250,000 more than the compensatory award. Since the evidence of liability was the same in both cases, the trial court’s decision in Hawkins regarding punitive damages illustrates that the effort by Snow in establishing the gross negligence of the defendants was not a waste of time. This possibility of a large punitive damages award was no doubt a factor in settlement, and, combined with the large amount of other work contributed by Snow and Harrell, demonstrates that the contributions of Snow and Harrell conferred a benefit upon all the heirs in the case. As Brewer makes clear, an attorney whose efforts contribute to obtaining a settlement or in enhancing a settlement is entitled to attorney fees. ¶23. Waller points out that the Hawkins and Franklin cases were consolidated for the purpose of discovery and events leading up to the trial. He contends there is no way for Snow and Harrell to separate their trial preparation for Hawkins from that of Franklin or vise versa. Moreover, he argues, the evidence fails to address the question of whether that work was also necessary and required to prosecute and engage in a lengthy jury trial in the Hawkins case. Pursuant to Judge Pigott’s order, Snow and Harrell received 100% of the attorney fees in the Hawkins case, thus, Waller argues, they have been fully compensated for their time and effort. 12 ¶24. This argument is not well taken since Waller is requesting 100% of the fees from a case in which it is uncontradicted that he only did 10% of the work, as well as the untenable position that he should somehow be entitled to a portion of the fees from the Hawkins case. In any event, Snow and Harrell received attorney fees in the Hawkins case because they had a contract with Hawkins’s heirs. Similarly, Snow and Harrell have a contract with Heather Franklin. Both Hawkins’s heirs and Heather Franklin chose to be represented by Snow and Harrell; neither chose to be represented by Waller. ¶25. Nonetheless, Waller’s argument that Snow and Harrell’s work on the Franklin case was only a result of their work on the Hawkins case has some appeal. Its force is diminished, however, by the testimony of defense counsel John Toney. Toney testified that the facts in the two cases were almost identical, thus most of the discovery and investigation was necessary for both cases. However, Toney testified that in the defense’s opinion the damages issues in the two cases were different. They believed the Franklin case was worth more than Hawkins because a minor child was left fatherless in Franklin, and Snow’s work on the Franklin heir’s damage claim differed from that of the Hawkins heirs. ¶26. Waller’s primary contention for entitlement to all the attorney fees is that he is counsel of record representing all heirs, because he filed the first wrongful death lawsuit. He argues that strict construction of the wrongful death statute, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13, is required and one suit for the same death is the focus of the legal issues before the Court, citing Pannell v. Guess, 671 So.2d 1310 (Miss. 1996) and Smith v. Garrett, 287 So.2d 258 (Miss. 1973). He contends that the first lawsuit filed by a legal representative excludes any 13 other lawsuits regardless of the circumstances as to the second lawsuit and regardless of any Order consolidating the second lawsuit with the first lawsuit for the purposes of trial. He argues that the only one lawsuit provision of the wrongful death statute has been upheld numerous times and is referred to as the rule “first in time, first in right.” See Southern Pine Elec. Power Ass'n v. Denson, 214 Miss. 397, 57 So. 2d 589 (1952); Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Smith, 169 Miss. 447, 153 So. 376 (1934); J.J. Newman Lumber Co. v. Scipp, 128 Miss. 322, 91 So. 11 (1922). Waller claims this rule means that the first lawsuit has paramount right to recover all damages regardless of when or where a subsequent suit is filed. ¶27. Snow and Harrell counter that Waller’s claim of entitlement based on first filing is not determinative, citing Moreland v. Riley, 716 So. 2d 1057 (Miss. 1998). In Riley, attorneys of an administratrix filed a wrongful death action. Their client was later replaced with a more appropriate administratrix and the case went to trial, producing a substantial award. The attorneys for the original (replaced) administratrix and those representing the new one both claimed the attorney fees. The attorneys of the original administratrix were unable to adduce any proof as to any work they did in the case and they were awarded nothing. On appeal, this Court affirmed because the attorneys “failed to carry [their] burden of proving entitlement to a fee” for work done on the wrongful death case. Riley, 716 So. 2d at 1063. ¶28. Similarly, in the case sub judice, Waller has not presented substantial evidence illustrating that the value of his services to either Jonathan or Heather warrant 100% of the 14 attorney fees. Snow and Harrell presented to the Court that, in the depositions he did attend, Waller only asked 9% of the questions, whereas Snow and Harrell asked 91%. Snow and Harrell filed 83 pleadings, while Waller only filed 10. Waller did present evidence pertaining to his involvement in the settlement of the case, alleging that he independently settled the Franklin lawsuit. However, this assertion is not supported by the record. Testimony revealed that both Waller and Snow were involved in settlement negotiations, and Waller just happened to be the one that received and communicated to the court the final settlement offer. Defense counsel Toney testified that all the defense attorneys and all the plaintiff’s attorneys were negotiating the case until the last day before trial. Toney further testified that the settlement would have been the same whether they had dealt with Waller or with Snow. ¶29. Moreover, a good settlement was achieved by the foundation laid by the diligent preparation of Snow and Harrell. Had they not been prosecuting the case, the plaintiffs would not have been able to use the leverage of punitive damages6 and the plaintiffs would have had no expert testimony.7 In other words, the case would not have been prepared for trial and, consequently, would have been worth considerably less on the eve of trial. In this 6 Snow and Harrell, not Waller, responded to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on punitive damages; Snow and Harrell, not Waller, responded to the truck drivers’s motions for protective orders, thereby securing their presence at depositions and developing a case for gross negligence. 7 Though he designated expert witnesses, Waller never presented the defense attorneys with any expert witness reports. 15 Court’s opinion, Waller did not contribute more to settlement of the case than did Snow and Harrell. ¶30. When Judge Kitchens ordered the two Franklin cases joined, he also ordered that Snow and Harrell participate in working up the case. In reliance on that order and the chancery court approved contract, Snow and Harrell diligently pursued the wrongful death case. Mississippi law is clear that an attorney who has the authority to pursue the wrongful death case and then works the case up to a successful conclusion is entitled to a fee. In re Estate of Brewer, 755 So.2d 1108 (Miss. Ct. App.1999) (attorney who had a court approved contract and diligently pursued wrongful death case was entitled to his fee notwithstanding that the administratrix he represented was not an heir and not entitled to any of the proceeds). The attractive settlement position created by Snow and Harrell, as well as their thorough investigation of the case and preparation for trial contributed significant benefits upon both heirs and to award Waller all the attorney fees is to give him an undeserved windfall. ¶31. In Pannell v. Guess, 671 So.2d 1310 (Miss. 1996), the father of the deceased hired counsel and brought suit for the wrongful death of his son. Although there were six heirs, the contract was signed only by the father. The other five heirs were unrepresented. After the attorney obtained a settlement of $150,000, the chancellor ruled that the attorney was entitled to his contingency fee only from the father’s share of the settlement. On appeal, this Court reversed. Because the other heirs derived benefit from the attorney’s actions and the heirs acquiesced to the amount negotiated by the attorney, this Court held the chancellor 16 should have conducted a hearing in which the attorney could prove his right to compensation from the other heirs. Pannell, 671 So.2d at 1315. Similarly, Waller acquiesced in Snow and Harrell’s participation in this case, and his client benefitted from this acquiescence. Though it is true as Waller argues, that he opposed the consolidation of the cases, Waller allowed Snow and Harrell to continue to be involved in the case. The defendants knew Snow had diligently prepared the case for trial and was prepared to proceed to trial and verdict. They were aware of the possibility of a high punitive damage award based on the outcome in the Hawkins case, and Snow and Harrell have proved that their efforts in the prosecution of the case conferred substantial benefits on all the Franklin heirs. ¶32. As in Brewer, Snow and Harrell’s contract with Heather and the estate was approved by the chancery court before the suit was filed. Waller’s was not. Snow and Harrell ask this Court to grant them priority based on that approval. Pannell illustrates that obtaining court approval of contingency contracts in wrongful death cases is the preferred procedure. 671 So. 2d at 1315. However, as Waller points out, the wrongful death statute does not require the plaintiff to obtain authorization to bring a lawsuit. In addition, the statute plainly states that the estate is not a part of the wrongful death claim, except for funeral, medical, and other related expenses. Therefore, Snow and Harrell’s approved contingency contract, though the preferred procedure, gives them no priority in this dispute. In any event, this issue is really a non-issue in that Snow and Harrell are entitled to compensation based upon their contribution to the case and their justifiable reliance on Judge Kitchens’s November 1999 order. 17