Opinion ID: 782410
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Conscious Avoidance Jury Instruction

Text: 95 Prior to Schultz's trial, the government requested that the court charge the jury on the doctrine of conscious avoidance, and submitted a proposed jury instruction on that issue. The district court included an instruction on conscious avoidance in its charge, which was provided to the parties prior to the charge conference, but the court's charge did not use the language suggested by the government. Schultz did not object to the use of a conscious avoidance charge or to the specific language proposed by the district court. On appeal, Schultz contends that the district court's instruction to the jury on the doctrine of conscious avoidance was erroneous.
96 Because defendant did not object to the charge at trial, our review is for plain error. United States v. Bala, 236 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir.2000); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b). The parties agree that this is the proper standard of review. 97 To establish plain error, a court must find 1) an error, 2) that is plain, 3) that affects substantial rights.... If an error meets these first three requirements, the Court engages in a fourth consideration: whether or not to exercise its discretion to correct the error. The plain error should be corrected only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 98 United States v. Keigue, 318 F.3d 437, 441-42 (2d Cir.2003) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Gore, 154 F.3d 34, 43 (2d Cir.1998) (A `plain' error is an error so egregious and obvious as to make the trial judge and prosecutor derelict in permitting it, despite the defendant's failure to object.). Schultz bears the burden of persuasion to show that the district court's charge amounts to plain error. United States v. Vasquez, 267 F.3d 79, 87 (2d Cir.2001). 99 We do not review portions of [jury] instructions in isolation, but rather consider them in their entirety to determine whether, on the whole, they provided the jury with an intelligible and accurate portrayal of the applicable law. United States v. Weintraub, 273 F.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir.2001).
100 The district court charged the jury as follows: 101 [A] defendant may not purposefully remain ignorant of either the facts or the law in order to escape the consequences of the law. Therefore, if you find that the defendant, not by mere negligence or imprudence but as a matter of choice, consciously avoided learning what Egyptian law provided as to the ownership of Egyptian antiquities, you may [infer], if you wish, that he did so because he implicitly knew that there was a high probability that the law of Egypt invested ownership of these antiquities in the Egyptian government. You may treat such deliberate avoidance of positive knowledge as the equivalent of such knowledge, unless you find that the defendant actually believed that the antiquities were not the property of the Egyptian government. 102 Schultz argues, correctly, that the Second Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that, in giving the conscious avoidance charge, the district judge should instruct the jury that knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is established (1) if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, (2) unless he actually believes that it does not exist. United States v. Feroz, 848 F.2d 359, 360 (2d Cir.1988) (per curiam). In Schultz's estimation, the charge given by the district court failed to convey these essential points to the jury. The government concedes that the language of the charge did not precisely mirror the language set out in prior Second Circuit cases, but contends that the charge as given was sufficiently clear and contained all of the necessary elements. 103 We have stated before that no jury instruction is ever perfect. United States v. Joyner, 313 F.3d 40, 47 (2d Cir.2002). We do not review a jury instruction to determine whether it precisely quotes language suggested by Supreme or Appellate Court precedent. Instead, we review the court's instructions to determine whether considered as a whole, [the instructions] adequately communicated [the essential] ideas to the jury. United States v. Velez-Vasquez, 116 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir.1997). We cannot place the talismanic weight urged by [the defendant] on [the] exact wording [of a controlling opinion] and do not believe the district court needed to echo the opinion paragraph by paragraph to convey adequately its import to the jury. United States v. Schatzle, 901 F.2d 252, 255 (2d Cir.1990); see also United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181, 1196 (2d Cir.1989) (finding no error in conscious avoidance charge even though it arguably could have led the jury to draw an unwarranted inference); United States v. McBride, 786 F.2d 45, 51 (2d Cir.1986) (finding no error in conscious avoidance charge because [t]he charge made reference to purposeful avoidance of the truth, awareness of a high probability of the fact at issue, and the absence of the defendant's actual belief in the nonexistence of the crucial fact); cf. DeFalco v. Bernas, 244 F.3d 286, 312 n. 16 (2d Cir.2001) (finding no plain error where, [a]lthough the language of the jury instruction [was] not ideal, the charge as a whole did not reveal an error `so serious and flagrant that it goes to the very integrity of the trial,' or one that `deprived the jury of adequate legal guidance to reach a rational decision'); Owen v. Thermatool Corp., 155 F.3d 137, 139 (2d Cir.1998) (finding no error in jury charge that failed to use the more precise and more typical phrasing set forth in precedent, because charge adequately stated the law). 104 Here, the charge given by the district court adequately stated the law of conscious avoidance. The court set forth both essentials required by Feroz. The charge informed the jury that it could find conscious avoidance only if it found both (1) that Schultz avoided gaining actual knowledge because he implicitly knew that there was a high probability that the law of Egypt invested ownership of these antiquities in the Egyptian government and (2) that Schultz did not actually believe[ ] that the antiquities were not the property of the Egyptian government. The court also gave a good faith instruction and reiterated, immediately after giving the conscious avoidance charge, that Schultz could be found guilty only if the jury found that he had participated in the conspiracy knowing that it contemplated the acquisition and/or sale of antiquities that had been stolen from Egypt.  (emphasis added). 105 It is true that the district court's instructions on this point could have been more precise. United States v. Bonito, 57 F.3d 167, 174 (2d Cir.1995). At trial, had objection been lodged to the imprecision, the judge would have been well advised to correct it. But on appeal, and in light of the charge as a whole, we see no error so obvious and seriously prejudicial to [the defendant's] substantial rights as to constitute plain error. Id. The instruction as given was sufficient to inform the jury of the law of conscious avoidance, and did not constitute plain error. 13 106 IV. Admission of Testimony of Witnesses Other than Schultz Regarding Their Personal Knowledge of Law 117 107 Schultz contends that the district court erred in permitting the government to elicit testimony from five witnesses — James Romano and Edna Russman, curators of the Brooklyn Museum of Art; Edmund Pillsbury, head of the Kimbell Museum; Blake Woodruff, a former employee of Schultz; and Betsy Bryan, a professor of Egyptology — regarding those witnesses' personal knowledge of Law 117. Schultz objected to this testimony in the district court; it appears that the basis for the objection was that the testimony was irrelevant. The standard of review applicable to the evidentiary rulings of the district court is abuse of discretion. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 174 n. 1, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997). Unless a district court's determination of relevance is arbitrary or irrational, it will not be overturned. Conway v. Icahn & Co., 16 F.3d 504, 511 (2d Cir.1994). 108 `Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 401 (2002). There is no dispute that the fact of Schultz's knowledge of Law 117 is of consequence to the determination of the action at hand. Id. The only question is whether the district court abused its discretion in determining that this testimony had any tendency to make that fact more probable or less probable. 109 The government contends that this testimony was relevant to the question whether Schultz was aware of Law 117 because evidence that the Law was widely known among those in Schultz's field tended to make it more probable that Schultz, who had worked in the field for decades, also knew about it. Furthermore, as the government emphasizes, each of the witnesses that was asked about his or her own knowledge of Law 117 had dealt directly with Schultz. Schultz had offered to sell George and the Amenhotep sculpture to James Romano and Edmund Pillsbury, respectively, using the Thomas Alcock Collection story. Schultz provided false information about the Amenhotep sculpture to Betsy Bryan, and showed George to Edna Russman, telling her it came from an old collection. Blake Woodruff had been employed by Schultz at Schultz's art gallery. The district court concluded that these witnesses' testimony tended to show that even an ignoramus in this field would know at least about patrimony laws. 110 Schultz relies on United States v. Patrisso, 262 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.1958). 14 In Patrisso, one of the defendants, Mankes, was convicted of knowingly possessing stolen property, in part on the strength of evidence that the person who sold the goods to Mankes knew the goods were stolen. See id. at 195, 197. The Court reversed the conviction, finding that the evidence admitted regarding Mankes' codefendants' knowledge that the property was stolen was prejudicial to Mankes. See id. at 198. Patrisso is not on point, for at least three reasons. 111 First, Patrisso is not a relevance case. The Court never held that the evidence admitted was irrelevant as to Mankes, only that it was so prejudicial to him as to be inadmissible. See id. at 197. Here, the defendant has argued that the evidence was not admissible because it was irrelevant, not because it was prejudicial. 112 Second, the factual circumstances of the Patrisso case differed materially from those present here. In Patrisso, the Court noted that Mankes' behavior was not consistent with consciousness of guilt; he made no effort to conceal the stolen property. See id. at 198. As noted above, Schultz's behavior indicated a consciousness that his actions were illegal in some way. Mankes, however, was at least four steps removed from the actual theft: Patrisso obtained the property from the person who stole it and sold the property to Ellis; Ellis sold the property to Postrel; Postrel sold the property to Mankes. See id. at 196. Schultz, on the other hand, was actively involved in obtaining the antiquities, smuggling them out of Egypt, and disguising their true origins. The nature of the property at issue in Patrisso — television tubes — was not such that a person would naturally inquire about its source, whereas the evidence in this case established that persons considering purchasing Egyptian antiquities make extensive inquiries into the provenance of the antiquities. 113 Third, and most important, the type of knowledge at issue in Patrisso is materially different than the type of knowledge at issue here. Schultz was an acknowledged expert in the field of Egyptian antiquities, with many years of experience. It would have been natural for Schultz to know about Law 117. To the contrary, it would not have been natural for Mankes' codefendants to tell him that the goods he was buying were stolen, and there was no other possible way for Mankes to have obtained that knowledge. Knowledge of a duly adopted, widely publicized, and vigorously enforced law such as Law 117 is quite different from knowledge of the specific theft of a specific product in Patrisso. Testimony from colleagues who worked with Schultz as to their own understanding of Egyptian law was relevant both to explain the practice of the industry in which this prosecution arose and to establish what someone with [the defendant's] extended background in the industry probably would know. United States v. Leo, 941 F.2d 181, 197 (3d Cir.1991). 114 Evidence need not be conclusive in order to be relevant. Contemporary Mission v. Famous Music Corp., 557 F.2d 918, 927 (2d Cir.1977). Nonconclusive evidence should still be admitted if it makes a proposition more probable than not; factors which make evidence less than conclusive affect only weight, not admissibility. S.E.C. v. Singer, 786 F.Supp. 1158, 1166 (S.D.N.Y.1992). Schultz's defense at trial was that he was unaware of the existence of Law 117. Evidence that those with whom Schultz dealt in the antiquities profession knew of Law 117, and particularly that Schultz's own employee knew of the Law, goes directly to the plausibility of Schultz's defense. Determinations of relevance are entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial judge. United States v. Quiroz, 13 F.3d 505, 514 (2d Cir.1993). Here, we see no abuse of that discretion.