Opinion ID: 386948
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discussion of Stop and Frisk

Text: 4 Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has seized that person. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 45, 50, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2640, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979); United States v. Palmer, 603 F.2d 1286, 1288 (8th Cir. 1979). A seizure may be accomplished either by physical restraint or by sufficient show of authority. Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 16, 88 S.Ct. at 1877. Thus, when Sgt. Moss ordered appellant into the house at gunpoint, he restricted appellant's motion and performed a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment. 5 We must determine initially whether Sgt. Moss' action was justified at its inception and, if so, whether the subsequent pat down was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. Id. at 19, 20, 88 S.Ct. at 1878, 1879. 6 In determining whether Sgt. Moss had a basis for initiating a frisk, there are two inquiries to be made: whether the officer was rightfully in the presence of the party frisked so as to be endangered if that person was armed, and whether the officer had a sufficient degree of suspicion that the party to be frisked was armed and dangerous. Brown v. Texas, supra, 443 U.S. at 50-53, 99 S.Ct. at 2640-2642. 7 Only specific articulable facts taken together with rational inferences warrant the intrusion of an investigatory search. Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1879. In making an assessment whether the seizure of appellant was justified, we judge the facts using an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of seizure warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate to protect his life or the life of innocent bystanders? Id. at 21, 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1879, 1880. 8 First, we consider whether Sgt. Moss possessed specific, objective facts sufficient to establish that the initial seizure of appellant was justified. In his testimony, Sgt. Moss said that the search of Donald Love's house had taken place during the evening hours; that marijuana, firearms and ammunition had been discovered in the house previous to appellant's arrival; and that he knew Love was known to be armed and dangerous. In addition, Sgt. Moss testified appellant's hesitation in complying with the order to enter the house and the danger associated with a white officer in a predominantly black neighborhood placed him in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm. The district court held that these many specific facts quite naturally led (Sgt. Moss) to a reasonable suspicion that any person that came to the door was potentially armed and dangerous. United States v. Clay, No. 79-00117-01-CR-W-4 (W.D.Mo. Dec. 6, 1979) (order denying defendant-appellant's motion to suppress). We disagree. 9 An experienced police officer should not be apprehensive about executing a search warrant during the early evening hours in a predominantly black neighborhood that is not a high crime district. There is nothing inherently suspicious about a black man walking up to a private home on a street in a black neighborhood at 7:30 p. m. See United States v. Beck, 602 F.2d 726, 729 (5th Cir. 1979). Police cannot have grounds for suspicion based solely on the race of the suspect. United States v. Rias, 524 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1975). Although color of skin is an identifying factor, United States v. Collins, 532 F.2d 79, 82 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 836, 97 S.Ct. 104, 50 L.Ed.2d 102 (1976), this court has consistently rejected the use of race in combination with other factors to justify investigative searches and seizures. United States v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1971). 2 In the case at bar, like Nicholas, we think that, at best, the police were acting upon a generalized suspicion that any black person ... might be engaged in criminal activity. Id. at 625. 10 Appellant's conduct alone was not suspicious under the circumstances; he merely hesitated and took a step or two backwards (but did not turn around) when confronted at the door by an armed man in plain clothes from inside his cousin's house. The government's emphasis that appellant's hesitancy created individualized suspicion falls far short of those cases dealing with flight, 3 furtive gestures, 4 or otherwise inexplicable sudden movements toward a pocket or other place where a weapon could be concealed. 5 Thus, appellant's action in stepping backwards did not justify the search. 11 The question remains whether the evidence of criminal activity within the house being searched justified the police in searching anyone who approached the premises. The warrant is of no help to the government in its attempt to justify the search. The warrant only gave the police authority to be on the premises, not to search anyone that came to the door during the time of the search. 12 Because Sgt. Moss' actions towards appellant were taken without an arrest warrant, the information to be considered is that available to the officer at the time of the stop and frisk. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). Sgt. Moss had no factual data about appellant that would have given rise to a probability of illegal activity. (A) person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) (warrant to search bar and bartender cannot normally be construed to authorize a search of each individual at the club). An investigatory search will be found constitutionally permissible only when supported by reasonable suspicion directed to the person to be searched, and (this) requirement cannot be undercut or avoided by simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally there exists probable cause to search or seize another or to search the premises where the person may happen to be. Id. at 89-91, 100 S.Ct. at 341-42. 6 13 Beyond dispute, the police may take appropriate action to ensure their own protection when officers are carrying out their duty in executing a search warrant. The scope of that protection, however, is balanced against the fourth amendment rights of others. See note 9 infra. 14 The government relies in part upon the fact that firearms, marijuana, cocaine and heroin were found in the apartment prior to appellant's arrival. Nothing in the record, however, establishes a nexus between the contraband discovered inside the house and appellant at the time he was stopped and frisked. Under the circumstances, it was plainly unreasonable to infer that no one other than a user of narcotics would be allowed on the premises. See United States v. Peep, 490 F.2d 903, 906 (8th Cir. 1974). 15 The government also urges the court to put great weight on the fact that Love, the target of the search, was known to be armed and dangerous. This argument is diminished largely because at the suppression hearing Sgt. Moss testified that he did not mistake appellant for the owner of the premises. Sgt. Moss also testified that he did not know that appellant had been previously convicted of a felony. Thus, the facts here do not distinguish appellant from anyone else who may have approached the house. The fourth amendment does not authorize the detention and search of all persons who may be present, United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 591, 68 S.Ct. 222, 227, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948), or all persons who may enter a premises, United States v. Branch, 545 F.2d 177 (D.C.Cir. 1976), during the time of the warrant's execution. In Branch, the court held that the search of a shoulder bag belonging to a visitor who arrived at an apartment during the execution of a warrant was not authorized under the circumstances. Id. at 185. 7 16 Furthermore, the Terry majority held that under usual circumstances an officer is obligated to conduct some form of cursory investigation prior to frisking, perhaps so that the suspects may readily explain their actions before being subjected to the additional intrusion. In stating the holding of the court, Chief Justice Warren stated: 17 (W)here in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his or others' safety, he is entitled ... to conduct a carefully limited search. 18 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884 (emphasis added). 19 Not all stops call for a frisk. 8 Protective searches are authorized only when the police officer has suspicion that the individual before him may be armed or otherwise presently dangerous. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65-67, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904-05, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). 20 Because there was an opportunity for inquiry when appellant appeared at the door, inquiry should have been made. An officer is not warranted in relying upon circumstances deemed by him suspicious, when the means are at hand to either verify or dissipate those suspicions without risk. See, e. g., United States v. Magda, 547 F.2d 756, 759 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878, 98 S.Ct. 230, 54 L.Ed.2d 157 (1977); Stone v. Patterson, 468 F.2d 558 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Harflinger, 436 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973, 91 S.Ct. 1660, 29 L.Ed.2d 137 (1971); Hooks v. Oklahoma, 394 F.Supp. 1262, 1266 (W.D.Okl.1975). This is particularly true where the person in question is only a visitor to the premises and there is no evidence that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a type of crime for which the offender would likely be armed or dangerous. Sgt. Moss should have provided appellant with an opportunity to explain his presence before subjecting him to a search. 21 To justify a search of this type, the officer must have knowledge that the visitor previously had been engaged in serious criminal conduct, Stroeber v. Commission Veteran's Auditorium, 453 F.Supp. 926, 931 (S.D.Iowa 1977), or that suspicion exists sufficient to draw a reasoned conclusion that the visitor is involved in the criminal activity that constituted the basis of the issuance of the search warrant, United States v. Peep, supra, 490 F.2d at 905-06, or that other exigent circumstances exist that justify a determination that the person with whom the officer is dealing may be armed or presently dangerous, United States v. Santana, 485 F.2d 365, 368 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931, 94 S.Ct. 1444, 39 L.Ed.2d 490 (1974). 22 The initial frisk of appellant was simply not supported by a reasonable belief that he was armed and presently dangerous, a belief which the Supreme Court has invariably held must form the predicate to a pat down search of a person for weapons. See, e. g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (stop and frisk authorized when lone police officer, at night in a high crime district, approached a person he had previously observed and had reason to believe to be in possession of a gun and narcotics). 23 The state has asked this court to extend the narrow scope of the Terry doctrine to permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked, simply because the person happens to arrive at the premises where an authorized narcotics search is taking place. We reject the invitation to do so. 9 Recently, the Fifth Circuit also rejected that argument in United States v. Cole, 628 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1980). In that case, state police officers lawfully obtained a warrant to search an apartment for narcotics. As the police approached the apartment, they observed Cole parking his truck at the carport attached to the rear of the premises. Cole was not a target of the warrant and was merely a visitor on the premises. Cole got out of his truck and immediately an officer frisked him for weapons, uncovering a small pistol tucked behind his belt. At trial, Cole moved that the gun be suppressed. That motion was denied and the district court later convicted Cole of unlawful possession of firearms. 24 The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision on that count 10 holding that, in the absence of specific articulable facts to believe that appellant was armed and dangerous, Cole's mere presence on the premises did not justify a personal search. Id. at 899. The governing principle in both cases is the same 11 : an officer's pat down of a person cannot be justified solely by the individual's mere presence on the premises described in the search warrant. 25 In our view, Sgt. Moss had nothing more than mere suspicion of possible criminal activity or danger based upon appellant's approach to the house. After reviewing the circumstances surrounding the stop as a whole, we conclude that Sgt. Moss did not have reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts that Clay was involved in any criminal activity. We hold that on the facts presented, the district court erred in refusing to suppress the gun seized. Such error went to the heart of the government's case. The judgment of the district court is reversed and vacated.