Opinion ID: 844274
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Refusal of Juror Misconduct Hearing

Text: Defendant challenges the trial court's failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing to investigate alleged jury misconduct. He claims these errors violated section 1120 and deprived him of various constitutional rights. Because there was no evidence that any misconduct occurred, we conclude the decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing was well within the court's discretion. Defendant's complaints concern Juror William M., a first-year law student who served as the foreperson during the guilt and penalty phases of trial. William M. had completed one semester of law school when trial started, and he had not yet taken any criminal law courses. During voir dire, William M. said he understood he could not consult law books or research death penalty law. He also confirmed that he could follow the court's instructions on the law even if they conflicted with his legal training. On the morning of the third day of penalty phase deliberations, defense counsel went on record to express concern that William M. was serving as foreperson for the penalty phase, when he had previously filled this role in guilt phase deliberations. Counsel was displeased that the jury had chosen a law student as foreperson, especially because counsel had seen William M. during a recent break talking to various jurors, huddling with them, and he has had law books with him, studying law books during deliberations . . . . Counsel believed the jury's note of the previous day, asking about the consequences of a lack of unanimity, was curiously framed . . . as if [the foreperson] had read the 1977 [death penalty] law and was expressing independent knowledge of the law to other jurors. He expressed fear that some holdout jurors might be intimidated by William M. and not understand that they could communicate directly with the court about a deadlock. The court responded that there was absolutely no evidence jurors felt coerced or intimidated by the foreperson; however, the court was concerned that defense counsel had seen the juror studying a law book. Defense counsel clarified that he did not know if it was a criminal law book, and he had no independent knowledge that the juror was researching criminal issues or communicating any legal knowledge to his fellow jurors. The court questioned William M. about defense counsel's accusations. The juror said that he was still attending classes, but he had not studied or researched anything relating to criminal law or procedure. The book he was reading during breaks was a property law textbook. Nor had William M. talked with other jurors about criminal law. He sent out the previous day's jury note because the group as a whole wanted these questions answered. Based on these responses, the court decided not to inquire further, and the jury resumed its deliberations. (45) `When a trial court is aware of possible juror misconduct, the court must `make whatever inquiry is reasonably necessary' to resolve the matter.' ( People v. Hayes, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1255.) Although courts should promptly investigate allegations of juror misconduct `to nip the problem in the bud' ( People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 532 [250 Cal.Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081]), they have considerable discretion in determining how to conduct the investigation. ( People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 274, italics omitted.) The decision whether to investigate the possibility of juror bias, incompetence, or misconductlike the ultimate decision to retain or discharge a jurorrests within the sound discretion of the trial court. [Citation.] The court does not abuse its discretion simply because it fails to investigate any and all new information obtained about a juror during trial. ( People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 343 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846].) Here, the court considered the speculative concerns posed by counsel. It directly questioned William M. and evaluated his responses. The trial court did not abuse its considerable discretion in declining to hold a further evidentiary hearing. Not every incident of potential misconduct requires further investigation. ( People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, 478 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 313, 21 P.3d 1225].) [A] hearing is required only where the court possesses information which, if proven to be true, would constitute `good cause' to doubt a juror's ability to perform his duties and would justify his removal from the case. [Citations.] ( People v. Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 343.) The parties knew William M. was a first-year law student. Neither side challenged him. Consistent with his statements during voir dire, William M. affirmed that he had not studied or researched criminal law during the trial and had not talked with other jurors about these issues. He was never forbidden to read a textbook on property law during court breaks, and defendant did not suggest this study of an unrelated area of law was improper. Nor was any evidence presented supporting defense counsel's speculation that William M. may have done anything improper or intimidated other jurors into believing they could not inform the court of a deadlock. In short, there was nothing to indicate William M. had violated the court's instructions or committed misconduct of any kind. Under these circumstances, the trial court properly declined to investigate defendant's unsubstantiated claims further.