Opinion ID: 1118488
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the superior court err in awarding attorney's fees?

Text: Van Huff's final claim of error involves a two-pronged attack upon the superior court's award of attorney's fees to Sohio. The court awarded Sohio $117,251.50 in attorney's fees pursuant to Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82. Van Huff claims that this award was excessive, and that Rule 82 violates the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. Van Huff's constitutional argument is that if Rule 82 is used to award attorney's fees against good-faith plaintiffs, the risk of incurring a large attorney's fee award will deter many plaintiffs from bringing suit, effectively depriving these litigants of access to the courts. Using his case as an example, he claims that it is unfair to expect an unemployed laborer to pay the attorney's fees of a large corporation after litigation of a non-frivolous wrongful termination claim. [6] We reject Van Huff's constitutional argument for the same reasons we rejected that argument in Stepanov v. Gavrilovich, 594 P.2d 30, 37 (Alaska 1979). The argument completely ignores the financial burden that such plaintiffs impose upon those who are forced to defend against such actions in equal good-faith. Id. We understand that attorney's fees can be very burdensome, but we do not believe that Rule 82, as applied in this case, violates the state or federal constitutional guarantees of due process of the law. [7] We also reject Van Huff's argument that the attorney's fee award was excessive. [8] As Sohio notes, a large fee was required because the case was actively pending for over five years, there was extensive pretrial discovery, numerous complex legal issues were briefed and argued before the trial court, the trial lasted thirteen days, and Sohio won a total victory in the case. Judge Hunt therefore did not abuse her discretion in awarding 30 percent of Sohio's actual fees, particularly when one considers that Van Huff opposed Sohio's request for 60 percent of its actual fees with a request that the court award 20 percent of the actual fees. [9] AFFIRMED.