Opinion ID: 534798
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: did the district court otherwise err in instructing the

Text: 109 JURY ON THE FAILURE TO WARN CLAIM? 110 Liggett contests several facets of the district court's jury charge on the failure to warn claim. Had the verdict on the failure to warn claim not been set aside on the grounds set forth in Part IV, we would have had to address these arguments in connection with Liggett's contention that the jury's answers to interrogatories 7, 8 and 9, in which it found that Liggett's failure to warn was a proximate cause of Mrs. Cipollone's injuries, should be set aside. We nonetheless discuss most of these issues because they are important for a proper retrial. 111 First, Liggett contends that it was under no duty to warn of the dangers of cigarettes because their dangers were commonly understood. We find that there is no basis for so holding as a matter of law, and that as a matter of fact the jury found otherwise. 13 112 Liggett next argues that (1) the district court erred in instructing the jury on Liggett's duty to disclose the results of its scientific tests and (2) the district court's use of the word obviousness confused the jury. We find both of these contentions to be without merit. Under New Jersey law, Liggett had a duty to conduct research, and to disclose significant dangers discovered as a result of that research. See Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 453-55, 479 A.2d 374, 386-88 (1984). Moreover, there was nothing confusing about the district court's use of the word obvious. The jury had no reason to think that it might be deciding an open and obvious danger case, see, e.g., Shaffer v. AMF, Inc., 842 F.2d 893 (6th Cir.1988), and therefore it could not have been prejudicially confused. 14 113 Liggett's more substantial contention has to do with the district court's instruction on causation, which defines proximate cause 15 as follows: 114 a cause which necessarily set the other causes in motion and was a substantial contributing factor in bringing about the injury. Proximate cause is defined as a cause which naturally and probably led to and might have been expected to produce the result complained of. 115 2 J.A. 91-92. The district court also instructed the jury that there may be two or more concurrent and directly cooperative and efficient proximate causes of an injury if the defendant was a substantial contributing factor in the plaintiff's injuries. 2 J.A. 93. 116 It is not exactly clear what fault Liggett finds with this instruction. Liggett claims that: Plaintiff was required to prove that 'but for' Liggett's claimed failure to warn Mrs. Cipollone would not have been injured--that had Liggett provided a warning prior to 1966 Mrs. Cipollone would have quit smoking or never started smoking, and by doing so, Mrs. Cipollone would have avoided lung cancer in 1981. Liggett Br. at 50. There are three possible interpretations of Liggett's objection. 117 First, Liggett may be arguing that, even if plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the totality of Liggett's violation of legal norms--its failure to warn and breach of warranty--was a but for cause of Mrs. Cipollone's lung cancer, the jury could not find for the plaintiff with respect to any individual Liggett violation unless the plaintiff demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that that individual violation caused Mrs. Cipollone's lung cancer. This bifurcation of Mr. Cipollone's lawsuit into two independent claims might allow Liggett to escape liability for the totality of its wrongful conduct. We find this argument untenable. 118 As a substantive matter, Liggett is liable if its behavior proximately caused Mrs. Cipollone's cancer. For pleading purposes, Mr. Cipollone divided Liggett's conduct up into different pre-established legal categories, i.e. a tort-based failure to warn claim and a contract-based express warranty claim. Although the elements of proof necessary to prove liability under these two legal theories differ, the procedural pleading and proof requirements do not transform Mr. Cipollone's allegations into two completely different lawsuits. Thus, Mr. Cipollone does not have to prove that each legal violation proximately caused his wife's cancer. He need only prove that the totality of Liggett's wrongful behavior, which as doctrinal matter is divided into a tort and contract claim, proximately caused her cancer. 119 Second, Liggett may be arguing that Mrs. Cipollone's conduct would have caused her cancer no matter what Liggett did, and that therefore Liggett's conduct cannot be considered the cause of Mrs. Cipollone's injury. This argument is plainly inconsistent with the established jurisprudence of concurrent causation. The substantial factor test has traditionally been used in concurrent cause cases, i.e. cases in which there are two or more causes each of which is sufficient to cause the injury. 16 See Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts 266-68 (5th ed. 1984). Our preemption decision makes this case quite comparable to a concurrent cause situation. Liggett's pre-1966 behavior might have been enough, by itself, to cause Mrs. Cipollone's cancer, and its post-1965 behavior might also have been enough to cause the cancer. Thus, just as it is unfair to let one tortfeasor completely escape liability for his fire merely because another tortfeasor caused another fire, so it is unfair to let Liggett completely escape liability for its pre-1966 behavior merely because its post-1965 behavior (or that of its codefendants), which was immunized from scrutiny at the trial, might also have caused enough damage, by itself, to kill her. 120 Third, Liggett may be arguing that Mr. Cipollone had to prove, to a greater degree of certainty than the district court's instruction required, that Liggett's failure to warn caused her injuries. Under this theory, the fact that defendant's conduct might have been a substantial factor in causing Mrs. Cipollone's cancer would not be enough; rather, Mr. Cipollone would have had to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that if Liggett had not breached its warranty and if it had warned consumers of the dangers of smoking, Mrs. Cipollone would not have contracted cancer. In other words, Liggett argues that plaintiff had to prove that but for Liggett's conduct, the injury would not have occurred. 17 We find this argument to be inconsistent with New Jersey law. 121 Liggett cites Campos v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 98 N.J. 198, 485 A.2d 305 (1984), which it claims rejected the substantial factor test and instead require a but for test in failure to warn situations. In Campos, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the plaintiff had the burden of proving that a proper warning would have prevented the injury caused by a tire assembly explosion. The plaintiff was arguably aware of the need to protect himself by keeping the tire in a safety cage, but he reached into the cage and was injured when the assembly exploded. The court quoted with approval from an article by Dean Keeton: 122 If the basis for recovery under strict liability is inadequacy of warnings or instruction about dangers, then plaintiff would be required to show that an adequate warning or instruction would have prevented the harm. 18 123 However, the court in Campos did not reverse the jury's verdict for the plaintiff. Instead, it remanded noting that there may be some question whether plaintiff sustained his burden of proving causation, see Brown v. United States Stove Co., [98 N.J. 155, 484 A.2d 1234 (1984) ]. Campos, 98 N.J. at 211, 485 A.2d at 312. Brown seems to endorse a substantial factor test: a tortfeasor will be held answerable if its 'negligent conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries.'  Brown, 98 N.J. at 171, 484 A.2d at 1243 (citations omitted). Thus, although the language quoted from Deen Keeton's article in Campos suggests that New Jersey might endorse a but for test in failure to warn cases, the citation to Brown indicates to the contrary. Subsequent New Jersey cases interpreting Campos also indicate to the contrary. 124 In Hull v. Getty Refining & Marketing Co., 202 N.J.Super. 461, 467, 495 A.2d 445, 448 (App.Div.1985), and Vallillo v. Muskin Corp., 212 N.J.Super. 155, 159-60, 514 A.2d 528, 530 (App.Div.1986), the New Jersey Superior Court cited Campos to support a substantial factor test. Determining proximate causation requires determining whether [the] breach of a duty enforceable within strict product liability against any defendant constituted a substantial factor in the causation of plaintiff's accident. Hull, 202 N.J.Super. at 467, 495 A.2d at 448. Describing why it was overturning a plaintiff's verdict (not remanding, as the court did in Campos ), the Vallillo court reasoned that in Campos [a] jury could have determined that the lack of a proper warning to rely on the cage's protection and to keep his arm out of the cage was at least a factor materially contributing to the happening of the accident. 212 N.J.Super. at 160, 514 A.2d at 530. In the case at bar, a jury could determine that Liggett's violations constituted a factor materially contributing to her injury. 125 New Jersey has also used the substantial factor test in nonfeasance situations. In Evers v. Dollinger, 95 N.J. 399, 471 A.2d 405 (1984), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that it was error to enter judgment for a doctor who failed to operate on a tumor for seven months. The court reasoned that, although the doctor's conduct did not cause the cancer, the seven-month delay could have been a substantial factor in causing the condition from which the plaintiff eventually suffered. In Hake v. Manchester Township, 98 N.J. 302, 486 A.2d 836 (1985), the same court held that plaintiff could establish causation in a wrongful death action by showing that defendant's negligent conduct negated a substantial possibility that plaintiff might have been saved after attempting to kill himself. Neither of these was a concurrent causation case and in neither case would defendant's conduct by itself have caused the injury. Yet, each defendant's conduct substantially increased the probability of the plaintiff's injury. In such situations the New Jersey courts have allowed recovery. 126 In light of these cases, we conclude that the district court did not erroneously instruct the jury as to the proximate cause requirement in Mr. Cipollone's failure to warn claim. The district court should again give a substantial factor charge on retrial. 19 127