Opinion ID: 4525281
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Registration in the Election District

Text: {¶ 27} The board alludes to a requirement that a candidate must be registered in the election district at the time he or she signs a declaration of candidacy. However, the board’s argument is rooted in a statutory scheme that the General Assembly significantly altered in 1994. The board cites a passage from Morris that addresses R.C. 3513.261, which requires independent candidates to state in the declarations of candidacy on their nominating petitions, “I am an elector 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO qualified to vote for the office I seek.” R.C. 3513.07’s form declaration of candidacy for partisan candidates does not include this statement, but both statutes require the candidate to make the similar statement, “I am a qualified elector in the precinct in which my voting residence is located.” {¶ 28} With respect to R.C. 3513.261’s requirement that the candidate state that he or she is qualified to vote for the office sought, Morris said, “To be qualified to vote for the office, the prospective candidate must be registered to vote at an address within the election district at the time he or she signs the statement.” Morris, 143 Ohio St.3d 507, 2015-Ohio-3659, 39 N.E.3d 1232, at ¶ 22. However, as O’Neill points out, this statement was dicta in Morris because the candidate there had provided the board with a change of address before signing his declaration. Id. at ¶ 10-16. More importantly, however, the statement in Morris relied on State ex rel. Walsh v. Ashtabula Cty. Bd. of Elections, 65 Ohio St.3d 197, 203-204, 602 N.E.2d 638 (1992), a case decided under the statutory scheme that was significantly altered in 1994. {¶ 29} When Walsh was decided in 1992, R.C. 3503.11(A) provided that any change of address made less than 29 (or 30, depending on whether the change was made at a temporary or permanent registration office and on the type of election) days before the election was invalid for that election. The General Assembly removed that language from the statute in 1994, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 300, 145 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2516, 2529. At the same time, it enacted provisions allowing registered voters to change their address on election day and cast a provisional ballot in that election—even if moving from one county to another. R.C. 3503.16(A) and (C), 145 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 2536-2539; R.C. 3503.19(A), 145 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 2541-2543. {¶ 30} R.C. 3501.01(N) provides, “ ‘Elector’ or ‘qualified elector’ means a person having the qualifications provided by law to be entitled to vote.” Article V, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 3503.01(A) set forth the applicable 10 January Term, 2020 qualifications, and together, they provide that a qualified elector is someone who (1) is a United States citizen, (2) is 18 or over, (3) has been an Ohio resident for 30 days immediately preceding the election, (4) is a resident of the county and precinct in which he or she offers to vote, and (5) has been registered to vote for 30 days. O’Neill, who registered to vote in Ohio on October 4, met all of these requirements. {¶ 31} Because O’Neill met the above requirements, she was a qualified elector. And because she was a registered voter who resided in the 94th House District in November 2019 and was therefore eligible to vote there, she was a qualified elector in that district at the time she signed her first declarations of candidacy. The board therefore abused its discretion by rejecting O’Neill’s petition. D. Laches {¶ 32} In its answer, the board asserted the affirmative defense of laches. The elements of laches are “(1) unreasonable delay or lapse of time in asserting a right, (2) absence of an excuse for the delay, (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the injury or wrong, and (4) prejudice to the other party.” State ex rel. Save Your Courthouse Commt. v. Medina, 157 Ohio St.3d 423, 2019-Ohio-3737, 137 N.E.3d 1118, ¶ 17. Despite invoking the doctrine in its answer, however, the board presents no argument regarding laches in its brief and has therefore waived the defense. See, e.g., State ex rel. Mun. Constr. Equip. Operators’ Labor Council v. Cleveland, 114 Ohio St.3d 183, 2007-Ohio-3831, 870 N.E.2d 1174, ¶ 83 (claim raised in complaint is waived if not addressed in merit brief). {¶ 33} Moreover, while it is true that O’Neill filed her complaint four weeks after the board issued written notice of its decision, the board has identified no prejudice resulting from this delay. This case would have been expedited under S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08 regardless of any delay. And O’Neill’s name is already on the prepared ballots; the only question is whether votes cast for her unopposed 11 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO candidacy will be counted after the conclusion of absentee voting, which has been extended to April 28. Laches does not preclude us from issuing the writ.