Opinion ID: 1057985
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: instruction regarding prior violent felonies

Text: The State introduced proof during the sentencing phase that Defendant had been convicted in 1974 of three counts of robbery with a deadly weapon and one count of rape. All of these convictions arose in Tennessee. The State also adduced proof that Defendant had been previously convicted in Mississippi of kidnapping and manslaughter, and in Alabama of robbery in the first degree. The trial court subsequently instructed the jury as follows: The defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies other than the present charge, the statutory elements of which involve the use of violence to the person. The state is relying upon the crimes of robbery first-degree, robbery with a deadly weapon, kidnaping, manslaughter, and rape, which are felonies, the statutory elements of which involve the use of violence to the person. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2). Defendant now contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that each of these felonies was a crime whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person, arguing that it was up to the jury to determine that issue. In making this argument, Defendant relies on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and its progeny. We have previously rejected this argument in State v. Cole, 155 S.W.3d 885, 904 (Tenn.2005). In Cole , we reexamined our decision in Sims, 45 S.W.3d at 11-12, in which we set forth the procedure for a trial court to follow where the State alleges that a capital defendant has a prior conviction for a felony whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person. In Sims , the defendant had two prior convictions for aggravated assault. Recognizing that the offense of aggravated assault may be committed with or without violence to the person, this Court held: In determining whether the statutory elements of a prior felony conviction involve the use of violence against the person for purposes of § 39-13-204(i)(2), we hold that the trial judge must necessarily examine the facts underlying the prior felony if the statutory elements of that felony may be satisfied with or without proof of violence. Sims, 45 S.W.3d at 11-12. Reexamining this holding in Cole in response to the defendant's Apprendi argument, we held: The Sims procedure involves a legal determination, and as such this procedure does not transgress the dictates of Apprendi and its progeny. The (i)(2) aggravating circumstance requires only that the statutory elements of the prior felony involve the use of violence to the person. The Sims procedure authorizes trial judges merely to examine the facts, record, and evidence underlying the prior conviction to ascertain which statutory elements served as the basis of the prior felony conviction. This is a legal determination that neither requires nor allows trial judges to make factual findings as to whether the prior conviction involved violence. This legal determination is analogous to the preliminary questions trial judges often are called upon to decide when determining the admissibility of evidence. Cole, 155 S.W.3d at 904. We again upheld the Sims procedure in two recent cases. In Rice, 184 S.W.3d at 668-69, we considered the Sims procedure in light of the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005). In Shepard , the Court held that, in determining the underlying character of a predicate offense to which the defendant had pled guilty, the trial court is generally limited to examining the statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented. Id. at 16, 125 S.Ct. 1254. When the prior conviction resulted from a jury trial, the trial court is limited to examining the charging documents filed in the court of conviction and instructions given to the jury. Id. at 20, 125 S.Ct. 1254 (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990)). In Rice, we determined that  Shepard does not change a judge's ability to find the `fact of a prior conviction,' but simply limits the scope of the judge's inquiry to reliable judicial records regarding the prior conviction and precludes the judge from re-examining the facts underlying that conviction. 184 S.W.3d at 669. Similarly, we held in State v. Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 132, 151 (Tenn.2006), that  Shepard clarifies but does not invalidate the procedures this Court adopted in Sims .  Thus, when the State alleges prior violent felony convictions, the statutory elements of which do not necessarily involve the use of violence to the person, the trial court must conduct the Sims analysis, limiting its inquiry to the records delineated by Shepard . We turn now to the prior felonies relied upon by the State in this case. [6] Defendant was convicted in 1974 of four felonies he committed in Tennessee in 1972: three robberies with a deadly weapon and one rape. In support of the robbery convictions, the prosecution provided to the trial court certified copies of the indictments and minute entries signed by the judge reflecting Defendant's pleas of guilty thereto. In 1972, our statute defining the crime of robbery provided that [r]obbery is the felonious and forcible taking from the person of another, goods or money of any value, by violence or putting the person in fear. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-3901 (Supp.1972). In Defendant's three cases, each of the indictments alleging the robberies specifies that Defendant committed the crime by use of a pistol and did then and there unlawfully and feloniously and with force and violence aforesaid, steal, take and carry away from the person of [the named victim] a sum of money. Defendant pleaded guilty to each of these indicted offenses as charged. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in determining that the statutory elements of these three crimes involved violence to the person. See McKinney, 74 S.W.3d at 305-06 (recognizing that the use of a deadly weapon, such as pointing a gun at the victim, constitutes violence.). As to the rape conviction, the indictment charging Defendant with this crime alleges that he did unlawfully and feloniously have unlawful carnal knowledge of [the named victim], a female, twelve (12) years of age, forcibly and against her will. A jury determined Defendant to be guilty of this crime as charged. In 1972, at the time Defendant committed this offense, rape was defined by our criminal code as the unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman, forcibly and against her will. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-3701 (1955). Thus, the trial court did not err in concluding that the statutory elements of this crime involve the use of violence to the person. Defendant pleaded guilty to committing robbery first degree in 1981 in Alabama. That crime is defined as the commission of a robbery in the third degree while armed with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, or in which the accused causes serious physical injury to another. Ala.Code 1975 § 13A-8-41 (2006). Robbery in the third degree is defined, in turn, as, in the course of committing a theft, the accused uses force against the person of the owner or any person present with intent to overcome his physical resistance or physical power of resistance, or threatens the imminent use of force against the person of the owner or any person present with intent to compel acquiescence to the taking of or escaping with the property. Id. at § 13A-8-43. The indictment alleging the crime to which Defendant pleaded guilty, a certified copy of which was admitted into evidence, provides that Defendant did, in the course of committing a theft, . . . use force against the person of [named victim], with the intent to overcome her physical resistance or physical power of resistance, while armed with a deadly weapon. Also in the record is a certified copy of Defendant's guilty plea to this charge. The trial court committed no error in determining that the statutory elements of the robbery to which Defendant pleaded guilty involved the use of violence to the person. It is obvious without further comment that the crime of manslaughter, which Defendant pleaded guilty to committing in November 1999 in Mississippi, [7] is an offense the statutory elements of which involve the use of violence to the person. We turn now to Defendant's conviction in Mississippi of kidnapping. In 1999, the Mississippi criminal code defined that offense as follows: Any person who shall without lawful authority forcibly seize and confine any other person, or shall inveigle or kidnap any other person with intent to cause such person to be secretly confined or imprisoned against his or her will, . . . shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned for life in the state penitentiary if the punishment is so fixed by the jury in its verdict. Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-53 (2000) (emphasis added). The Mississippi Supreme Court has recognized that, under this statute, the crime of kidnapping may be accomplished by trickery and deceit as well as by force. Wilcher v. State, 448 So.2d 927, 935 (Miss.1984). Thus, the statutory elements of this crime do not necessarily involve the use of violence to the person. The indictment charging Defendant with kidnapping [8] recites that, on or about November 15, 1999, Defendant did then and there unlawfully, willfully, feloniously and without authority of law forcibly seize and confine, inveigle, or kidnap the named victim. (emphasis added). The Judgment of Guilt on Jury Verdict reflects simply that the jury found Defendant guilty of kidnaping but are unable to fix the penalty. The State did not present the trial court with the jury instructions provided to the jury at Defendant's kidnapping trial. We conclude that the information provided to the trial court was not a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that the statutory elements of the kidnapping of which Defendant was convicted necessarily involved the use of violence to the person. [9] Accordingly, we are forced to conclude that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that it could consider Defendant's kidnapping conviction in determining whether to apply the (i)(2) aggravating circumstance. We determined in Ivy that the appropriate analysis to use in addressing this error is analogous to that utilized in State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 259-62 (Tenn. 1993), where an aggravating circumstance was held invalid but other valid aggravating circumstances remained. See Ivy, 188 S.W.3d at 152. In that event, the invalid aggravating circumstance is harmless if the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the sentence would have been the same had the jury given no weight to the invalid . . . aggravating [circumstance]. Howell, 868 S.W.2d at 262. We cautioned, however, that [i]n order to guarantee the precision that individualized sentencing considerations demand and provide a principled explanation for our conclusion in each case, it is important, when conducting harmless error review, to completely examine the record for the presence of factors which potentially influence the sentence ultimately imposed. These include, but are not limited to, the number and strength of remaining valid aggravating circumstances, the prosecutor's argument at sentencing, the evidence admitted to establish the invalid aggravator, and the nature, quality and strength of mitigating evidence. Id. at 260-61 (footnote omitted). In this case, the record demonstrates that the trial court's error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was properly instructed about Defendant's prior convictions of manslaughter, four counts of armed robbery, and one count of rape. These prior convictions, particularly the manslaughter and rape, were objectively reliable and qualitatively persuasive as to the (i)(2) aggravating circumstance. Furthermore, the jury was properly instructed on the (i)(6) and (i)(7) aggravating circumstances, i.e., the killing was committed to avoid lawful arrest or prosecution, and was knowingly committed in the perpetration of a theft. While the prosecutor made a brief reference to the kidnapping in her closing arguments and several references to seven prior convictions in support of the (i)(2) aggravating circumstance, the transcript demonstrates that the prosecutor's arguments would have been no less effective with no reference to the kidnapping and references to only six prior convictions. Moreover, the transcript demonstrates that the prosecutor placed about as much emphasis on the evidence supporting the other two aggravating circumstances. Finally, the nature, quality and strength of the mitigating evidence was minimal, as Defendant chose not to adduce any such proof. In sum, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have sentenced Defendant to death even without the trial court's erroneous instruction regarding Defendant's kidnapping conviction. Defendant is entitled to no relief on this basis.