Opinion ID: 1060373
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 27

Heading: Refusal to Instruct Jury as to Sentences Received by Co-Defendants

Text: The Appellant argues that numerous constitutional rights were violated by virtue of the trial court's failure to instruct the jury to consider the sentences received by co-defendants Terry Casteel and Jack Charles Blankenship as non-statutory mitigating circumstances. [6] The trial court refused to so instruct the jury, finding: . . . [U]nder the statutory definition of accessory before the fact, it says, the sentence may be, and I'm paraphrasing, I don't even have it in front of me, may be life or death. And then that extra line follows that. It says, regardless of punishment for the principal or other people involved. And as a result of that statutory scheme, I felt it's inappropriate to bring that up. And as a result, I did not put it in there. [7] Conceding that the statute provides that an accessory may receive a more severe sentence than the principal, the Appellant maintains that this fact does not preclude consideration of the punishments received by co-defendants as a mitigating factor in determining the appropriate sentence for an accessory before the fact. In support of his position that sentences received by equally culpable defendants be instructed as a mitigating circumstance, the Appellant relies upon our supreme court's opinion in State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18 (Tenn.1996), and the fact that the federal capital sentencing provisions expressly provide that the non-death sentences received by equally culpable defendants may be considered as a mitigating factor. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 3592(a)(4) (Law. Co-op.2000 Supp.). In State v. Odom , our supreme court held that, although TENN.CODE ANN. § 39-2-204(e)(1)(1991), requires trial courts to instruct the jury on any mitigating circumstances raised by the evidence at either the guilt or sentencing hearing, or both, neither the United States Constitution nor the Tennessee Constitution requires the trial judge to read or submit non-statutory mitigating circumstances to the jury. Id. at 28-30. The trial court, additionally, noted that the law prior to 1989, TENN.CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(e) (1982), did not require that non-statutory mitigating factors be expressly instructed. Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 29 (citations omitted); see also Smith, 993 S.W.2d at 32, (Appendix) ( Odom 's interpretation of TENN.CODE ANN. § 39-2-204(e)(1) not applicable to sentence imposed under prior sentencing law). Because the offense for which the Appellant was convicted was committed in 1977, the supreme court's interpretation of TENN.CODE ANN. § 39-2-204(e)(1), involving post-1989 capital convictions, has no application to this case. The sentencing law in effect at the time of the offense, i.e., TENN.CODE ANN. § 39-2404(e), did not require that the jury be instructed as to non-statutory mitigating circumstances. [8] See Smith, 993 S.W.2d at 32 (§ 39-2-203(e) does not require instruction on non-statutory mitigating circumstances). [9] Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury as to the sentences received by the Appellant's co-defendants as such an instruction was neither statutorily nor constitutionally required. [10]