Opinion ID: 218888
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Post-1935 Construction

Text: In 1935, Congress amended the FPA to require that persons ` intending to construct a dam or other project works' on nonnavigable streams obtain a license. Thomas Hodgson, 49 F.3d 822, 826 (second emphasis added) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 817(1)); see also Public Utility Act of 1935, ch. 687, sec. 210, § 23(b), 49 Stat. 803, 846 (1935). Thus, if post-1935 work constitutes construction within the meaning of the FPA and the other two prongs of Section 23(b) are met, a facility will be subject to the Commission's licensing jurisdiction. The Commission argues that, because Congress has not spoken on the precise question at issue herewhich it frames as what constitutes `construction' [10] we need only determine if its interpretation of Section 23(b) was unreasonable. See Section II.A., supra; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (explaining that when Congress implicitly delegates a question to an administrative agency, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency). The Commission contends that it was reasonable for it to determine that Starrett's proposed work would constitute post-1935 construction because the work would increase the Project's installed capacity. In addition, it notes that the Commission also found that the installation of the new generator would increase actual capacity, another indication that the proposed work constituted post-1935 construction. Alternatively, the Commission argues that it was reasonable for it to conclude that the proposal would result in post-1935 construction because it would increase the Project's head. [11] Starrett, on the other hand, argues that Congress has addressed the precise question at issue here by limiting the Commission's jurisdiction to post-1935 construction. Starrett contends that because the proposed work was merely a repair, and would not increase actual capacity beyond the 1992 installed capacity, it was not post-1935 construction.
We must first determine whether Congress unambiguously expressed an intent about the precise question at issue here. If we conclude that Congress did unambiguously express such an intent, our analysis ends there. If we conclude that Congress did not unambiguously express an intent on the precise question here, we must analyze whether the Commission's conclusion that the work here constituted jurisdictional construction was unreasonable. In determining congressional intent, we employ the traditional tools of statutory construction, including a consideration of the language, structure, purpose, and history of the statute. In re Hill, 562 F.3d 29, 34 (1st Cir.2009) (quoting McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418, 423 (1st Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our research has not uncovered, and the parties do not call to our attention, any legislative history that sheds light on where Congress would draw the line between jurisdictional construction and other work. Where [t]here is no legislative history that illuminates the purpose of a particular statutory term, we are left with language, structure, and evident purpose. Id.; see also Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) (The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.); Sebelius, 638 F.3d at 31 (To determine `whether a statute exhibits Chevron-type ambiguity . . . courts look at both the most natural reading of the language and the consistency of the interpretive clues Congress provided.' (quoting Succar v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8, 22 (1st Cir.2005) (quoting Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 586, 124 S.Ct. 1236, 157 L.Ed.2d 1094 (2004)))).
We begin with the actual language of the statute, and ask whether . . . [construction] has a `plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in [this] case.' Perez-Olivo v. Chavez, 394 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir.2005) (second alteration in original) (quoting Duckworth v. Pratt & Whitney, Inc., 152 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1998) (quoting Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340, 117 S.Ct. 843)). When Congress chooses not to define [a] phrase . . . in the statute itself, we can look to the dictionary for clarification of the plain meaning of the words selected by Congress. Id. Black's Law Dictionary defines construction as [t]he act of building by combining or arranging parts or elements. Black's Law Dictionary 355 (9th ed.2009). Another dictionary defines construction as the act of putting parts together to form a complete integrated object, and the verb construct as to form, make, or create by combining parts or elements. Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Philip Babcock Gove et al. eds., 1971). These definitions do not suggest that construction has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute here. Duckworth, 152 F.3d at 5 (quoting Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340, 117 S.Ct. 843). Rather, construction is a chameleon, capable of taking on different meanings, and shades of meaning, depending on the subject matter and the circumstances of each particular usage. Strickland v. Comm'r, Me. Dep't of Human Servs., 48 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir.1995).
If we conclude that the plain language of the statute, standing alone, is ambiguous, the next step is to ask whether this ambiguity can be resolved by looking to the `specific context in which [the] language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.' Perez-Olivo, 394 F.3d at 49 (quoting Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341, 117 S.Ct. 843) (alteration in original). The parties have not called to our attention, and we have not found in our review of the FPA, any clues about the meaning of the word construction as it applies here. Therefore, we move on to the second stage of the Chevron analysis.
The Commission argues that its conclusion herei.e., that Starrett's proposed work would constitute jurisdictional constructionwas reasonable because the proposed changes involved (1) an increase in installed capacity and (2) an increase in head. Responding to the Commission's argument about increased capacity, Starrett contends that the Project's new actual capacity (278 kW, up from 192 kW) would remain below the 1992 installed capacity (362 kW), and thus the Commission should not have exercised its jurisdiction. We conclude that the Commission's determination was reasonable because there is no doubt that, under Starrett's plan, there would be an increase in capacity no matter how the capacity was measured; both the actual and the installed capacities would be greater than their respective 1992 values. [12] For this reason, we need not analyze the head issue or resolve any of the factual disputes related to that issue. [13] Given the state of the law, we must conclude that the Commission's interpretation of construction as including the work here was reasonable. In 1965, the Supreme Court explained that [t]he central purpose of the Federal Water Power Act was to provide for the comprehensive control over those uses of the Nation's water resources in which the Federal Government had a legitimate interest; these uses included navigation, irrigation, flood control, and, very prominently, hydroelectric power-uses which, while unregulated, might well be contradictory rather than harmonious. Union Elec. Co., 381 U.S. at 98, 85 S.Ct. 1253. In 1986, Congress amended the FPA and made clear that when the Commission decides whether to grant a license under Section 23(b) and various other sections of the FPA, it should give equal consideration to (1) the power and development purposes for which licenses are issued and (2) the purposes of energy conservation, the protection, mitigation of damage to, and enhancement of, fish and wildlife (including related spawning grounds and habitat), the protection of recreational opportunities, and the preservation of other aspects of environmental quality. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e); Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-495, 100 Stat. 1243. We cannot say, as a matter of law, that it was unreasonable for the Commission to conclude that in order to ensure that the Nation's waterways be used in a harmonious fashion, and to ensure, among other things, that fish and wildlife were protected, it could interpret construction as including all increases in capacity. The cases that Starrett cites to support its position are distinguishable because they did not involve increases in capacity. In Thomas Hodgson, the court relied in part upon the fact that there was no increase in capacity when concluding that no post-1935 construction had occurred. See Thomas Hodgson, 49 F.3d at 828 (no post-1935 construction where dam owners restarted operation of inactive dam after twelve years but there was no project enlargement . . . in capacity, diversion, or physical plant (quoting Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 557 F.2d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir.1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The same can be said of Puget Sound. See 557 F.2d at 1316 (noting that the work there merely restored the . . . project to its original specifications and configuration and that there was no increase in the project's electrical generating capacity). Similarly, in Aquenergy Systems, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 857 F.2d 227 (4th Cir.1988), although the court ruled on another ground that the dam was subject to the Commission's licensing jurisdiction, it acknowledged that where a new project was carefully planned . . . to meet the specifications of the original project and where neither designed capacity, head, nor the amount of electricity generated was to increase, such work would not ordinarily constitute jurisdictional construction under Section 23(b). Id. at 229-30. In short, we conclude that the Commission's determination that Starrett's facility met the second required prong was not unreasonable.