Opinion ID: 2192862
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Equitable Estoppel Against the Government

Text: [¶ 14] The common law prohibition against the assertion of equitable estoppel against the government or its officials has been relaxed in recent decades, and we have held unequivocally that application of equitable estoppel based on the discharge of governmental functions is not completely barred. See M.S.A.D. No. 15, 413 A.2d at 533. Nonetheless, the ability of a party to assert an estoppel defense against the government may be limited depending upon the totality of the circumstances involved, including the nature of the government official or agency whose actions provide the basis for the claim and the governmental function being discharged by that official or agency. F.S. Plummer Co. v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 612 A.2d 856, 861 (Me.1992) (emphasis added). [¶ 15] When the governmental function at issue is the discharge of responsibilities regarding taxation, we have consistently held that estoppel may never be invoked. See Town of Freeport v. Ring, 1999 ME 48, ¶ 13, 727 A.2d 901; Flower, 644 A.2d at 1031; A.H. Benoit & Co., 160 Me. at 210, 202 A.2d 1; Dolloff v. Gardiner, 148 Me. 176, 186-87, 91 A.2d 320 (1952); Town of Milo v. Milo Water Co., 131 Me. 372, 378-79, 163 A. 163 (1932). [4] [¶ 16] Notwithstanding the consistent application of the prohibition in past cases, Fitzgerald urges us to relax the rule. Even if we were to consider a relaxation of the rule, however, we would not do so on the facts presented here. [5] [¶ 17] Equity will not protect a party who has slept on his rights or failed to act with reasonable diligence. See Searles v. Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co., 128 Me. 34, 40, 145 A. 391 (1929). [6] Fitzgerald simply did not act with the reasonable diligence necessary for us to consider a change in our longstanding rule that the government cannot be estopped from exercising its power of taxation. Fitzgerald neither claims that he was misled as to the status of the lien on the Freese's building, nor that he made an attempt to pay the taxes on the Freese's building. Rather, he made a calculated decision to allow the City to foreclose the lien on the Freese's building, and chose instead to wait until the very last minute to pay the taxes on the Dakin's building. [¶ 18] Although Fitzgerald correctly asserts that the law allows him to pay the taxes in the last hour of the final day in the period of redemption, if he chooses to delay until that time, he may do so to his detriment. His eleventh hour decision, even if based on misinformation obtained from the city clerk, is not the solid foundation which we would require before considering the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel in this context. On these facts, we decline to reexamine the rule that equitable estoppel may not be applied against the government when it is acting to discharge its responsibilities regarding taxation. [7] [¶ 19] Fitzgerald may not, therefore, invoke equitable estoppel to challenge the City of Bangor's claim of title to the Freese's Building through foreclosure of its tax lien. The Superior Court properly applied the correct law to the facts and did not exceed the bounds of its discretion in granting the City's motion in limine. The entry is Judgment affirmed.