Opinion ID: 199884
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interest in being free from criminal investigation and prosecution

Text: 32 The district court concluded that appellees have a fundamental, constitutionally protected liberty interest in being free from investigation and prosecution for criminal offenses in a manner that tramples upon the procedural protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment. Aponte, 176 F.Supp.2d at 156. To support this conclusion, the court looked to Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969), which it determined governs this case. Aponte, 176 F.Supp.2d at 160. We disagree and hold that appellees have asserted no constitutionally protected interest because there has been no adjudication of criminal liability or of appellees' legal rights. 33 In Jenkins, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that the subject of a public investigation carried out by the Labor-Management Commission of Inquiry (Louisiana Commission) stated a valid due process claim when he challenged the procedures of the Louisiana Commission. 395 U.S. at 431, 89 S.Ct. 1843. A key finding on which the plurality relied is that the Louisiana Commission was empowered to be used and allegedly [was] used to find named individuals guilty of violating the criminal laws. Id. at 428, 89 S.Ct. 1843. Therefore, the Louisiana Commission exercise[d] a function very much akin to making an official adjudication of criminal culpability. Id. at 427, 89 S.Ct. 1843. This finding distinguishes Jenkins from the earlier case of Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1960). 34 Hannah addressed whether due process rights were implicated by public investigations of the Civil Rights Commission. This commission had been charged by Congress with investigating allegations of voting deprivations. Id. at 421-23, 80 S.Ct. 1502. Several citizens, called as witnesses by the commission, filed suit to enjoin the investigation, alleging infringements of their due process rights. 5 Id. at 423-30, 80 S.Ct. 1502. The Court began by noting that the Civil Rights Commission does not adjudicate. It does not hold trials or determine anyone's civil or criminal liability.... Nor does it indict, punish, or impose any legal sanctions. Id. at 441, 80 S.Ct. 1502. The Court then continued to explain that when there is no adjudication of legal rights, the due process clause is not implicated to the same degree: 35 [W]hen governmental agencies adjudicate or make binding determinations which directly affect the legal rights of individuals, it is imperative that those agencies use the procedures which have traditionally been associated with the judicial process. On the other hand, when governmental action does not partake of an adjudication, as for example, when a general fact-finding investigation is being conducted, it is not necessary that the full panoply of judicial procedures be used. 36 Id. at 442, 80 S.Ct. 1502 (emphasis added). The Court also looked, quite specifically, at the use of other investigative bodies in our government. It found a long history of fact-finding investigations that used procedures similar to those employed by the Civil Rights Commission. Id. at 443-52, 80 S.Ct. 1502. To stress this point, the Court went so far as to append an extensive list of various administrative agencies which conduct investigations without trial-like rights attaching. Id. at 454-92, 80 S.Ct. 1502. Because the Court found that the Civil Rights Commission was more like an investigative agency, it held that the plaintiffs' due process rights had not been violated. 37 The Court has steadfastly maintained this distinction between general fact-finding investigations and adjudications of legal rights. It is precisely on this point that Jenkins turns. There, the Court distinguished the Louisiana Commission from the Civil Rights Commission by saying: 38 We are not presented with a case in which any injury to appellant is merely a collateral consequence of the actions of an investigatory body. Rather, it is alleged that the very purpose of the [Louisiana] Commission is to find persons guilty of violating criminal laws without trial or procedural safeguards, and to publicize those findings. 39 395 U.S. at 424, 89 S.Ct. 1843 (emphasis added). The Court noted that the Louisiana Commission was both required to make probable cause findings and able to file charges against individuals. Id. at 416-17, 89 S.Ct. 1843. Furthermore, the Louisiana Commission was concerned only with exposing violations of criminal laws by specific individuals. Id. at 427, 89 S.Ct. 1843. These specific characteristics of the commission made it more like an adjudicatory body than an investigatory body. Therefore, due process rights attached. 40 In contrast, it is clear that investigations conducted by administrative agencies, even when they may lead to criminal prosecutions, do not trigger due process rights. In SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 104 S.Ct. 2720, 81 L.Ed.2d 615 (1984), the Court considered a challenge to a private SEC investigation. 6 The plaintiffs challenged the ability of the SEC to issue third-party subpoenas without informing the parties under investigation. The Court, once again, looked to the difference between adjudication and investigation: the Due Process Clause ... is [not] offended when a federal administrative agency, without notifying a person under investigation, uses its subpoena power to gather evidence adverse to him. The Due Process Clause is not implicated under such circumstances because an administrative investigation adjudicates no legal rights. Id. at 742, 104 S.Ct. 2720. The key distinction is that the SEC investigated whether violations of various securities laws may have occurred, not whether plaintiffs should be held legally responsible for any such violations. For plaintiffs to be held legally responsible, they would have to be found guilty after a formal adjudication, during which full due process rights would attach. 41 To the extent that the district court found that appellees have a constitutionally protected interest in being free from investigation, the court erred as a matter of law. The foregoing discussion shows that investigations, alone, do not trigger due process rights. There must also be an adjudication. Without an adjudication of legal rights, Hannah and Jerry T. O'Brien are clear: the Due Process Clause does not require that the full panoply of judicial procedures be used. Hannah, 363 U.S. at 442, 80 S.Ct. 1502. 42 However, it is not clear whether the district court also found that there was an adjudication of appellees' legal rights. Aponte, 176 F.Supp.2d at 156 (stating that appellees have an interest in being free from both investigation and prosecution). We know that the Blue Ribbon Commission investigates government transactions in private, and, thereafter, makes a variety of recommendations. Included within those recommendations may be the suggestion that criminal, civil, or administrative actions be brought against certain individuals. In both the Barbosa and PRIME Reports, the Commission recommended that further actions be taken against appellees. The question, then, is whether the Commission has adjudicated appellees' legal rights in making these recommendations. 43 The question of whether there has been an adjudication does not turn on the language of the Order or the Commission's self-described role. Rather, it is a functional question. See Cooper v. Salazar, 196 F.3d 809, 815 (7th Cir.1999) (holding that administrative investigation into alleged civil rights violations which resulted in determination of whether there was substantial evidence on which to proceed was a functional adjudication because, in event of negative determination, claimant could only appeal denial of claim to state supreme court). If any action of the Commission alters the appellees' legal rights, then there has been an adjudication. Hannah, 363 U.S. at 441, 80 S.Ct. 1502; Cooper, 196 F.3d at 815. 44 Without making an explicit finding, the district court suggests that the Commission conducts adjudications because it makes actual findings that named individuals are guilty of criminal violations as part of a process of criminal prosecution. Aponte, 176 F.Supp.2d at 161. However, the court's findings as to the subsidiary facts belies the conclusion. See Alfaro De Quevedo v. De Jesús Schuck, 556 F.2d 591, 593 (1st Cir.1977) (finding that factual findings which are internally inconsistent are clearly erroneous). Additionally, our independent review of the Barbosa and PRIME Reports shows that the district court's conclusion is clearly erroneous. 7 See Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) (establishing that factual findings shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous); see also Water Keeper Alliance, 271 F.3d at 30 (applying clearly erroneous standard in review of preliminary injunction denial). 45 When the district court referred to the actual findings of criminal conduct, Aponte, 176 F.Supp.2d at 161, it was apparently referencing the probable cause determinations that the court found in the Barbosa and PRIME Reports. 8 See id. at 144 (probable cause to believe that violations of Puerto Rico criminal law have occurred). However, a close reading of the district court's factual findings shows that the Commission does not make binding probable cause determinations. Rather, the Commission simply recommends that individuals be investigated further. The district court, itself, said that the Commission only makes accusations of criminal misconduct. Id. at 148. Throughout its discussion, the district court said that the Barbosa and PRIME Reports accuse appellees of crimes and that appellees are at risk of prosecution. See, e.g., id. at 157. Furthermore, it also recognized that appellees have not yet been indicted. See id. at 156 (noting that appellees have not yet been formally charged). Finally, the district court observed that, the reports issued by the Blue Ribbon Commission are not obligatory, and the Commission can only offer recommendations that [Governor] Calderón refer a particular matter to the Department of Justice for prosecution. Id. at 160. Therefore, it is unclear how the court concludes that [t]he Commission makes actual findings that named individuals are guilty of criminal violations as part of a process of criminal prosecution. Id. at 161. In fact, this finding is internally inconsistent with the numerous findings that the reports only accuse appellees of criminal conduct and that the Commission's recommendations are neither binding nor work as a formal indictment or charge against appellees. 46 The district court opinion is unclear on whether the Barbosa or PRIME Reports actually accuse appellees of specific crimes. See, e.g., id. at 157 (The Commission concluded that [appellee] Pagán had committed undue intervention in the performance of contracts, bidding procedures or government operations in violation of Section 4353a of the Penal Code....). Therefore, we conducted an independent review of the evidence. We conclude that the reports do accuse appellees of misconduct. For example, the Barbosa Report finds, at the very least [appellees] were grossly negligent. The PRIME Report says appellee Pagán improperly intervened in the bidding procedures and, in its most damning accusation, concludes that he ordered the president of the bid board to cause the disappearance of the documents. However, the reports never make reference to any provisions of the Puerto Rican Penal Code. They never accuse appellees of specific criminal conduct. Furthermore, the reports are very clear that they only suggest referring the matters to various administrative departments for further investigation. There is no specific recommendation that either appellee be prosecuted, much less any finding of probable cause or actual institution of legal action against appellees. Therefore, the district court's conclusion that the reports make specific and binding determinations of criminal conduct is clearly erroneous. See United States v. Ortiz, 177 F.3d 108, 109 (1st Cir.1999) (holding that to the extent that a district court's findings are inconsistent with the uncontroverted evidence, they are clearly erroneous). 47 Additionally, the Order, By-Laws, and Guidelines are all explicit that the Commission is not given the power to adjudicate legal rights. The Commission cannot independently initiate or file any civil, criminal, or administrative charges. Rather, the Commission is only given the power to make recommendations to the Governor, who then makes her own determination about whether to pursue further investigations. 48 Therefore, we find that the Commission did not and cannot adjudicate the legal rights of appellees or any other individual. There is no adjudication, functional or otherwise. Accordingly, the Due Process Clause has not been triggered. 49 With this conclusion in mind, we would like to emphasize the district court's conclusion that appellees have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in ensuring that the state acts in accordance with due process standards in the prosecution of [appellees]. Aponte, 176 F.Supp.2d at 158 (emphasis added). The fact that the district court failed to consider the difference between a prosecution and an investigation does not undercut this point. If appellees are ever prosecuted, they will be entitled to the full protections of the Due Process Clause, just like any other individual.