Opinion ID: 702336
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Relocated Witness

Text: 45 During his closing argument, Assistant State's Attorney Timothy McMahon told the jury that it was understandable that Santana was reluctant to identify Rodriguez to the police because of her fear of retaliation, and remarked that after the police and her mother and her relatives reassure her not to be afraid, you will be protected, she tells the police [defendant's name]. During the defense counsel's closing argument, he responded with a comment that the prosecutor's statement about Santana being afraid to testify was not supported by the evidence. In rebuttal, Assistant State's Attorney Brian Telander argued that Santana was so fearful that the State decided she should be relocated to another state. After Telander made this statement to the jury concerning her relocation, defense counsel promptly objected and the judge immediately advised the jury that the fact of Santana's relocation was not the evidence and that where [Santana] is ... now has nothing to do with the case, ladies and gentlemen of the jury. Rodriguez claims that his right to due process was violated when Telander violated the in limine order and informed the jury of Santana's relocation. 46 The Illinois appellate court found that the prosecutor's remarks were improper, inflammatory and not based on evidence. Rodriguez, 89 Ill.Dec. at 410, 480 N.E.2d at 1153. However, the court continued by stating that these comments were not a material factor in defendant's conviction because the evidence of defendant's guilt, considered, in toto, was overwhelming, and the trial judge admonished the jury that the prosecutors [sic] comments were irrelevant and unsupported in the evidence. Id. Similarly, the federal district court found that the evidence of Rodriguez's guilt was overwhelming, and although the prosecutor's comments at trial were unprofessional, ... those poorly chosen comments did not affect the outcome of the trial because they bolstered Santana's credibility only tangentially, and the trial judge took the curative measure of admonishing the jury that the prosecutor's comments were irrelevant and unsupported by the record. Rodriguez v. Peters, No. 91 C 6563 (N.D.Ill. July 20, 1993). 47 We agree that the prosecutor's reply was ill-advised and improper in light of the trial judge's order, but it was far from inflammatory and does not rise to the level of preventing Rodriguez from receiving a fair trial; in fact, the problem probably would not have arisen if the defense counsel had not argued that the record did not support the prosecutor's comments that Santana was afraid of retaliation if she testified. 12 48 As soon as Telander informed the jury that Santana was relocated, Rodriguez's attorney objected to the comment. When the judge overruled his objection, he nonetheless issued a contemporaneous limiting and clarifying instruction to the jury stating, that's not the evidence, and that Santana's location at the time of the trial has nothing to do with the case. Additionally, during the final jury instructions, after arguments, the judge informed the jury that: 49 [c]losing arguments are made by the attorneys to discuss the facts and circumstances in the case, and should be confined to the evidence and to reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Neither opening statements nor closing arguments are evidence, and any statement or argument made by the attorneys which is not based on the evidence should be disregarded. 50 (Emphasis added). Jurors are presumed to follow ... [all] instructions from the court. Doe v. Johnson, 52 F.3d 1448, 1458 (7th Cir.1995) (quotation omitted); see also United States v. Davis, 15 F.3d 1393, 1402 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 250, 130 L.Ed.2d 171 (1994) (We rely on our belief that juries heed the instructions). 51 Finally, it is clear that the weight of the evidence against Rodriguez was not only convincing, but it was overwhelming. See, supra, Section A. Such strong evidence of guilt eliminates any lingering doubt that the prosecutor's remarks unfairly prejudiced the jury's deliberations. Gonzalez, 933 F.2d at 431-32. We hold that the prosecutors' comments concerning Santana's relocation did not so infect the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. Reed, 2 F.3d at 1450.