Opinion ID: 1803440
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testimony of the Victim's Attorney Concerning Conversations with the Victim and the Defendant's Attorney.

Text: The first two assignments of error involve testimony given by an attorney with whom Nancy Williams was consulting in regard to bringing an action to dissolve her marriage to defendant. These consultations occurred on January 7, 1986, and again on January 9, 1986, the day Nancy died. Nancy's attorney was permitted to testify over a hearsay objection that during the January 9 consultation Nancy told him that defendant, on the previous day, had threatened to throw her through a plate glass window and use the broken glass to cut her head off. Also received over objection was testimony by this witness concerning a conversation he had on January 9 with another lawyer who he believed was representing defendant with respect to his domestic problems. Nancy's lawyer testified that this attorney told him during their conversation that, as a result of his conversations with defendant, he believed defendant might kill Nancy if served with an injunction. Defendant asserts this testimony by Nancy's lawyer was inadmissible hearsay. When analyzed in accordance with the dictates of Iowa Rule of Evidence 801, this contention appears to be correct. [1] In the first item of challenged testimony, the witness was repeating Nancy's out-of-court statement to him about a threat which defendant made to her. The only discernible purpose of this testimony was to establish the threat was made. That, of course, depends on the truth of the matters asserted by Nancy. The second item of challenged testimony, in order to be relevant, must be viewed as a repetition by defendant's domestic relations attorney of threats made by defendant toward Nancy. Such relevance depends on the truth of the matters asserted by defendant's lawyer. Consequently, this item of challenged testimony also falls within the definition of hearsay contained in Iowa Rules of Evidence 801(c), (d). The State argues Iowa law recognizes a special exception to the hearsay rule in homicide cases for threats made to the victim which are communicated by the victim to a third party. As support for this contention, it relies on State v. Hinkle, 229 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Iowa 1975). We believe the admissibility of the alleged hearsay statements in Hinkle was justified, if at all, on the ground they were not being offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted. [2] The record in the present case does not suggest the State was offering the challenged evidence for a purpose in which the truth of the hearsay statements was not an issue. The State also relies on the doctrine of curative admissibility to sustain admission of the testimony concerning what defendant's domestic relations lawyer told Nancy's attorney. At the time this evidence was elicited at trial, the following colloquy took place: Q. I think you indicated on cross-examination that Mr. Gallner [defendant's domestic relations attorney] told you she [Nancy] took property and money and left the house with it.... [H]e must have got that information from Mr. Williams. Do you remember that? A. Yes. Q. Did Mr. Gallner tell you anything else that made you concerned for your client's safety? [DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY]: I object to that. Incompetent, immaterial, and irrelevant and beyond the scope of direct. It is hearsay. [PROSECUTING ATTORNEY]: Can I respond to that objection? There was a hearsay thunderstorm on cross-examination. I'm just here with a little bucket trying to catch a little of it, Judge. I'm completing the story. With respect to the doctrine of curative admissibility, we have recognized in State v. Padgett, 300 N.W.2d 145, 147 (Iowa 1981), and State v. Pepples, 250 N.W.2d 390, 394 (Iowa 1977), that when one party introduces inadmissible evidence, with or without objection, the trial court has discretion to allow the adversary to offer otherwise inadmissible evidence on the same subject when it is fairly responsive. Notwithstanding our recognition of this principle, we fail to see how the hearsay testimony which came in on direct examination concerning Nancy's removal of certain personal property justified the receipt of the challenged hearsay testimony concerning threats against the victim's life. The district court erred in receiving the testimony of Nancy's attorney concerning conversations with her and with defendant's domestic relations attorney about threats made by defendant.