Opinion ID: 4515489
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Purportedly Protected Disclosures

Text: Johnson primarily argues that her communications related to the use of the DCCSES database were protected disclosures. 5 Because she points to multiple 5 While Johnson’s arguments in the trial court pointed to a variety of complaints as potentially protected disclosures—nineteen in total—she does not offer argument as to most of them in her appellate brief. Therefore, we focus where she centers her attention: the continued use of the automated DCCSES (continued…) 13 moments in time, claiming each incident individually constituted a protected disclosure about the continued use of the DCCSES database, we address each alleged disclosure chronologically. In 2009, CSSD decided to utilize the DCCSES database in a new way by automating the process for generating establishment petitions and civil contempt motions.6 At this time, CSSD had maintained and utilized the DCCSES database for other functions for more than twenty years and it was passing its annual data audits. As the internal memorandum distributed to staff explained, the goal of this transition was to “improv[e] agency performance and efficiency.” The management team began the transition with a two-week trial period, followed by a ninety-day pilot period, both designed “to identify any problems associated with (…continued) database to generate filings and her dissatisfaction with the related reorganization effort. Although she occasionally refers in her brief to some of these other complaints, we hold that any claims based upon them are waived. “Issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.” McFarland v. George Washington Univ., 935 A.2d 337, 351 (D.C. 2007). “[I]t is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel’s work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones.” Gabramadhin v. United States, 137 A.3d 178, 187 (D.C. 2016). 6 Though Johnson had argued to the trial court that the 2009 decision violated the DCWPA, she now seems to concede that the initial decision to automate the process was a “debatable policy call.” However, because it provides vital context for later issues with the database, we address it at some length. 14 the process including, but not limited to, system programming, policy or procedures.” The memorandum actively solicited feedback, encouraging staff members to “[p]lease report all system problems and concerns” and creating multiple levels of review to consider responses. As part of the management team, Johnson participated in numerous conversations about the decision to make this change. The relevant positions of the management team members are undisputed. In short, Johnson believed that the electronic system could not be as effective or accurate as more stringent attorney review; Rice would reply that “there were federal time lines and measures that needed to be met and that the Agency was moving away from paper files.” Meanwhile, Day thought the processing by Johnson’s unit “was inefficient and that it was slowing the process to bring these matters to Court” and had “an excessive level of review” because the cases “were not that complicated.” These conversations reflected a debate within the management team about the benefits and risks of moving to a more automated process. As Johnson stated in her deposition, she “had an overall general concern” that it was not the right decision to ramp up use of the DCCSES database. But Johnson’s general concern cannot change the essential character of this decision; it was “an exercise of . . . 15 administrative discretion” on a “policy choice.” Zirkle, 830 A.2d at 1258, 1260. “Mere differences of opinion between an employee and an agency supervisor as to the proper approach to a particular problem or the most appropriate course of action do not rise to the level of gross mismanagement.” Poindexter, 104 A.3d at 855 (brackets omitted). Johnson’s concerns do not evidence a contemporaneous belief that the transition was gross mismanagement. See Wilburn, 957 A.2d at 926 (“In none of her communications . . . did Wilburn . . . us[e] the language of ‘gross’ waste or abuse, or of ‘violations,’ or any of the other abuses listed in section 615.52(6), or any similar language.”). Johnson’s claims thus fail for at least three independent reasons: (1) she has not presented evidence that she had—and expressed—a contemporaneous belief that using the DCCSES database as part of an increasingly automated process was such a grievous error that it threatened the very mission of CSSD; (2) she has not presented evidence showing that this belief, if she had held it, would have been objectively reasonable; and (3) the issue is not appropriately classified as whistleblowing, but was instead a question of policy that was being discussed among the management team (of which Johnson was a member). 16 The next instance appellant points to is the September 2010 discovery that the automated process was producing some previously undiscovered errors, such as listing incorrect birthdates for dependent children or misidentifying their parents. However, even assuming that Johnson’s amplification of these issues—which were actually discovered by another employee—could qualify as whistleblowing,7 Johnson has not demonstrated that this claim differs in any significant way from the concerns she voiced in 2009. She again presents general arguments against using the automated system—and the management team was already well aware of her displeasure with the DCCSES database—but the only change between the initial management decision and this moment in time was that an uncertain number of new errors were discovered by another person. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to appellant, the crux of the conversations between appellant and other members of the management team appears to be a continuation of the same policy debate—one in which appellant “believe[d] . . . that it was worse than [she] had previously thought.” But Johnson has not presented evidence that her concerns in September 2010 differed in kind from what she admits was a policy call in 2009; she merely adds additional 7 Cf. Wilburn, 957 A.2d at 925–26 (citing cases reasoning that “disclosures” cannot already be publicly known, known to the persons the putative whistleblower reported to, or known by other supervisors). 17 evidence for her perspective on one side of that policy debate. Johnson also has not presented any evidence that these new errors impacted any particular court proceeding, let alone put CSSD’s mission itself at risk. Because of those deficiencies, no reasonable juror could find that these errors were so grave as to make the conclusion that the agency erred to such a significant degree that its mission was threatened “non-debatable.” See Poindexter, 104 A.3d at 856 (granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the management decision was “merely debatable” and “was not erroneous beyond debate”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Johnson comes closer to pointing to a particular disclosure, rather than a generalized grievance, when she implies that the show-cause order issued to Adrianne Day in April 2011 was related to the ongoing use of the DCCSES system. In that incident, Day signed a petition to establish paternity in a case that had been dismissed without prejudice in 2007. The 2007 petition, which included the same parties, was dismissed because CSSD was unable to complete the necessary genetic testing, and the court instructed CSSD to not re-file the case “until the government locate[d] the petitioner” and completed the necessary testing. Because the CSSD attorney—an attorney in Johnson’s section, rather than Day’s—was unable “to represent to the court that [CSSD] ha[d] complied with the 18 condition . . . placed upon further action,” the court issued a show-cause order, asking why it should not sanction Day for violating Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 11.8 Johnson now contends that the order was “due to the inadequacy of the automated system Appellee Rice insisted on using.” However, there is no evidence that the show-cause order Day received related to any flaws in the database, let alone that Johnson contemporaneously believed there to be a relationship and believed that the issue exposed gross mismanagement or a violation of law. “The DCWPA . . . makes clear that an employee must have had such a belief at the time the whistle was blown in order to state a claim under the DCWPA.” Freeman, 60 A.3d at 1143 (emphasis in original). Johnson’s contemporaneous reaction was not to point to the database as the culprit, but rather to blame the judge who issued the order for bias and “inappropriate . . . conduct.” 8 Rule 11(b) states that “[b]y presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper, including an electronic filing—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney . . . certifies” that the motion is “warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law” and that “factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” 19 Johnson also never disputed the evidence in the record indicating that the petition in question was properly filed, and that the order instead stemmed from a lack of preparation by one of the attorneys Johnson supervised. Moreover, Johnson was not making a true disclosure when she told others about the order. The order was issued to Day, its existence was commonly known among several people within the office, and it was a matter of public record. See Wilburn, 957 A.2d at 925–26 (“disclosure of information that is publicly known is not a disclosure under the WPA” and “issues already known to either the persons [the plaintiff] reported to, or at least to other supervisory persons,” are not disclosures). Her post hoc allegations that the use of the DCCSES database was related to this show-cause order do not, and cannot, transform her report of the show-cause order into a protected disclosure under the DCWPA. At certain points, appellant seems to suggest that events in April 2011 bolster her claim that she was making protected disclosures in 2009 and 2010.9 The first flaw in this claim is the previously mentioned failure to connect the showcause orders to any error traceable to the DCCSES database. The second flaw is 9 Johnson implies that the issues CSSD encountered in April 2011 with the show-cause order demonstrate that Johnson’s earlier warnings were proven correct—and thus that her warnings had correctly identified the breadth and magnitude of the issues created by increased reliance on the database. 20 that pointing to the negative effects of managerial decisions does not, by itself, establish that the initial decision was gross mismanagement. We cannot review effects in isolation, but instead must look to the contemporaneous context, including the reasons for the change, whether any negative effects were foreseeable, how likely they were to occur and how harmful they were likely to be, and what other factors—such as legal necessity, expected positive results, and any need for expeditious action—may be relevant to determining whether the decision was “non-debatabl[y]” a mistake and was creating “a substantial risk . . . to the agency’s . . . mission.” Poindexter, 104 A.3d at 855. See also Rodriguez v. District of Columbia, 124 A.3d 134, 143–44 (D.C. 2015) (holding that alleged negative effects of investigation conducted by defendants were not dispositive of whether those actions constituted gross mismanagement, as the larger context revealed that “it would be tantamount to dereliction of duty if OAG had swept the . . . problem under the rug”). Lastly, Johnson claims that her numerous complaints about the proposed reorganization of CSSD were protected disclosures. Among other things, she alleges that her new duties would have caused her workload to be so onerous that it would have violated her ethical duties as an attorney. However, she did not make a record to show that her increased workload would violate Rule 1.3 of the D.C. 21 Rules of Professional Conduct or any other objective standard.10 More generally, it is clear that Johnson’s purported “disclosures” with regard to the proposed reorganization are not protected, nor are they truly disclosures. She was not disclosing anything unknown to defendants, but rather resisting the policies they had decided to promulgate. Johnson’s discussions regarding these decisions are textbook examples of an employee being given an opportunity to comment on potential organizational changes; she made her comments, they were considered, and then the team finalized its decisions after taking her comments into account, though not allowing her perspective to be dispositive. The DCWPA is intended to protect employees who disclose matters of public import rather than to authorize judicial review of personnel decisions or second-guessing of administrative priorities. We conclude that none of the complaints Johnson presents on appeal can survive summary judgment under the DCWPA. 11 10 Rule 1.3(a) provides that “[a] lawyer shall represent a client zealously and diligently within the bounds of the law.” Comment 1 to Rule 1.3 states that “[a] lawyer’s workload should be controlled so that each matter can be handled adequately.” 11 Because of our holding that there were no protected disclosures related to the DCCSES database or the 2011 CSSD restructure, we do not reach the issue of causation on Johnson’s primary arguments. However, we briefly discuss three additional events that the trial judge ruled could be protected disclosures but did not survive summary judgment because there was no proof of causation. In short, Johnson claims that she disclosed to Rice and Chandler that: (1) a contract employee presented a CSSD line attorney with a forged statement that had been (continued…) 22 C. Appellant Has Not Produced Evidence That the Reason Given for Her Termination Was a Pretext for Racial Discrimination 1. Legal Standard The DCHRA has a burden-shifting framework. The employee is initially (…continued) notarized by another District employee in August 2009; (2) around March 2010 a CSSD caseworker “inappropriately executed an Acknowledgement of Paternity in a case in which she had a familial relationship”; and (3) at some point in time, Day instructed caseworkers to white-out and amend interstate petitions and to file these altered petitions with the Superior Court. Two of those events occurred twenty-five and eighteen months, respectively, before Johnson’s termination. Appellant was unable to specify a date when the third “disclosure” may have occurred. As a result, Johnson has not carried her burden to show temporal proximity that can support an inference of causation. See Johnson v. District of Columbia, 935 A.2d 1113, 1120 (D.C. 2007) (holding that “a stretch of four months realistically cannot constitute temporal proximity”). Johnson also has not presented any evidence from which a “pattern of antagonism” can be discerned. See Tingling-Clemmons v. District of Columbia, 133 A.3d 241, 247 (D.C. 2016) (a pattern of antagonism can imply a causal connection, but must occur “soon after the disclosure and continu[e] to the alleged retaliation”) (internal quotation marks omitted). No reasonable jury could find that appellees were motivated by these disclosures when terminating Johnson long after the events in question, especially when Johnson has produced no evidence that any of the issues were ever mentioned in the intervening period. Given the paucity of facts in the record about these three alleged disclosures, and their lack of temporal proximity to appellant’s termination, they do not create a prima facie case of a DCWPA violation. 23 required to establish a prima facie case that she had been terminated because of her . . . race. If such a showing is made, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate basis for the employee’s termination. If the employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for the employee’s termination, the burden shifts back to the employee to demonstrate that the employer’s action was pretextual. Although the burden of production may shift from the employee to the employer and back to the employee, the employee retains the ultimate burden of persuading the finder-of-fact that the employer acted with discriminatory animus. Blackman v. Visiting Nurses Ass’n, 694 A.2d 865, 868 (D.C. 1997). In order to make out a prima facie case, the employee must show that: (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the job at which she suffered the prohibited action; (3) the prohibited action occurred despite her employment qualifications; and (4) the prohibited action was based on the protected characteristic. Id. at 868–69. In order to show that the prohibited action was based on the protected characteristic, employees may either offer direct evidence of discrimination or present facts raising an inference of discrimination. An inference of discrimination can be raised by presenting evidence that a “similarly situated” employee who did not share the protected characteristic engaged in the same conduct, but was treated differently. Hollins v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, 760 A.2d 563, 578 (D.C. 2000). “An employee is considered 24 similarly situated to the plaintiff for the purpose of showing disparate treatment when all of the relevant aspects of the plaintiff’s employment situation are nearly identical to those of the other employee.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The similarity between the two comparators “must exist in all relevant aspects of their respective employment circumstances, which would surely include both their rank in the company and the alleged misconduct.” Id. (citation omitted). To show that alleged misconduct is sufficiently similar, the plaintiff and the comparator must have “engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them for it.” Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Toledo Hospital, 964 F.2d 577, 538 (6th Cir. 1992)). If the plaintiff and the comparator are sufficiently similar, but do not share the protected characteristic, a jury may infer that the prohibited action was based on the protected characteristic. Id. at 576 (“[I]n order to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the decision to terminate, appellant had to come forward with evidence that he was fired from a job for which he was qualified while white employees, similarly situated to him, were not terminated, but rather treated more leniently.”) (brackets omitted). If the prima facie case is established, the employer must proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the prohibited action. If that occurs, the burden of 25 production shifts back to the employee to demonstrate that the ostensibly legitimate reason was pretextual; that is, “that the employer’s stated justification for its action was not its true reason but was in fact merely a pretext to disguise discriminatory practice.” Hollins, 760 A.2d at 571 (internal quotation marks omitted). “This burden merges with the ultimate burden of persuasion on the question of intentional discrimination.” Atl. Richfield Co. v. District of Columbia Comm’n on Human Rights, 515 A.2d 1095, 1100 (D.C. 1986). To carry that ultimate burden, the employee must show “both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.” Hollins, 760 A.2d at 571–72 (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993)) (emphasis in original). Thus, appellant must “present evidence showing not only that [the proffered justifications] were a pretext for terminating [her] but also that they were a pretext for terminating [her] because of [her] race, i.e., that race was the real motivating factor.” Id. at 573 (emphasis in original). 2. Adverse Employment Actions Johnson initially alleged that she had suffered multiple adverse employment actions. However, during oral argument, counsel conceded that Johnson had not established a prima facie case of pay disparity. Additionally, Johnson’s claim that 26 her workload increased to the point where it became a prohibited employment action is not supported by the record; indeed, one of the core issues surrounding her termination is that she never assumed many of the duties she was assigned. She has not produced nearly enough evidence to demonstrate that her workload increased to the point where it would become an act of discrimination cognizable under the DCHRA. Because “mere conclusory allegations” do not suffice at the summary judgment stage, Kotsch v. District of Columbia, 924 A.2d 1040, 1045 (D.C. 2007), her complaints about workload do not merit further analysis. Lastly, she claims that the denial of her request for a transfer is an additional violation of the statute. While the denial of a transfer may qualify as a prohibited employment action under some circumstances, 12 here that denial is inextricably wrapped up within her termination. Because the two essentially occurred simultaneously, we do not see good reason to analyze them as separate events, and instead proceed to discuss the termination issue.13 12 See, e.g., Lively v. Flexible Packaging Ass’n, 830 A.2d 874, 889 (D.C. 2003) (listing “denial of transfer” as a potential “discrete retaliatory or discriminatory act”). 13 While we ultimately affirm, we do not rely on the trial court’s statement that “it is clear from the oral argument that Plaintiff is not claiming discrimination under the DCHRA. She is claiming that others were accommodated, and she was not. That is not the law.” The denial of “accommodation” in the form of a transfer may be an adverse employment action. See Lively, 830 A.2d at 889. More (continued…) 27