Opinion ID: 2624872
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Reasonable Detention to Issue Civil Infraction

Text: Although we decline to extend Terry to the civil infraction at issue here, chapter 7.80 RCW provides an independent basis that could justify a stop for the investigation of a civil infraction. RCW 7.80.050(2) explicitly states, [a] notice of civil infraction may be issued by an enforcement officer when the civil infraction occurs in the officer's presence. Alternatively, RCW 7.80.050(3) provides that [a] court may issue a notice of civil infraction if an enforcement officer files with the court a written statement that the civil infraction was committed in the officer's presence or that the officer has reasonable cause to believe that a civil infraction was committed. Neither Renihan nor Hockett filed such a statement with the court. Thus, to determine whether the initial stop of Duncan was justified we must evaluate whether the offense occurred in the officers' presence. The trial court held, as a matter of law, that the officers here did not have reasonable grounds to determine that Duncan possessed alcohol in public in violation of SMC 12A.24.025. [5] We agree. Because no actual possession occurred, the State relies on an argument that there was constructive possession. State v. Weiss, 73 Wash.2d 372, 375, 438 P.2d 610 (1968) (court found constructive possession of marijuana confiscated from house where defendant was sleeping); State v. Partin, 88 Wash.2d 899, 905, 567 P.2d 1136 (1977) (court will analyze totality of circumstances to determine constructive possession). The State argues that the trial court erred when it based its ruling on a conclusion that the officers could not have proven that Duncan possessed the alcohol in public. The State asserts that the officers need show only reasonable suspicion of a violation to detain and question an individual and that an initial detention is reasonable if the officer can point to specific and articulable facts that support a reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity. Pressley, 64 Wash.App. at 595-96, 825 P.2d 749. The State is correct in its assertion that it need not be able to prove all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt before an officer can stop an individual to investigate a suspected crime. Id. However, for a permissible detention, the officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion of a substantial possibility that a crime has occurred or is about to occur. State v. Kennedy, 107 Wash.2d 1, 726 P.2d 445 (1986). Because a crime is not involved here and we have declined to extend Terry, we rely on the statute previously cited, and an assessment of whether the infraction occurred in the officers' presence. Furthermore, Hockett testified that he routinely made stops similar to this one, evidencing a lack of any particularized articulable suspicion. [6] In Hornaday, this court interpreted what is meant to possess or consume alcohol in the presence of an officer for a minor in possession of alcohol, a misdemeanor. There, a police officer observed that Kevin Hornaday, the defendant, appeared to be intoxicated. 105 Wash.2d at 122, 713 P.2d 71. The officer approached Hornaday and could smell a strong odor of alcohol on the defendant's breath. Id. The officer requested Hornaday's identification and learned that the defendant was only 20 years old. Id. The officer then arrested the defendant for illegal consumption or possession of alcohol in violation of RCW 66.44.270. Id. On appeal we evaluated whether the misdemeanor occurred in the presence of the officer. Id. at 123, 713 P.2d 71. Applying RCW 10.31.100 [7] we held that possessing or consuming alcohol is not committed in an officer's presence if the officer does not witness the person's ingestion of the alcohol, but only senses symptoms indicating that the person is presently intoxicated. Id. at 129, 713 P.2d 71. We also evaluated possession and reasoned that a defendant `possesses' a controlled substance when the defendant knows of the substance's presence, the substance is immediately accessible, and the defendant exercises `dominion or control' over the substance. Id. at 125, 713 P.2d 71 (quoting In re Interest of R.B., 108 Wis.2d 494, 496, 322 N.W.2d 502 (1982)). We noted that possession can include constructive as well as actual possession and that constructive possession of liquor denotes control of the substance. Id. While this court is not asked to determine whether Duncan actually violated the open container ordinance, Hornaday is still instructive because there we recognized that [t]he question is whether the officer had probable cause to believe that a crime was being committed in his presence. Discovery of alcohol on a minor's breath may provide an officer with probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed, but not that it is presently being committed. Id. at 126, 713 P.2d 71. The Court of Appeals here relied on State v. Morgan, 78 Wash.App. 208, 896 P.2d 731 (1995), and State v. Haggarty, 20 Wash.App. 335, 579 P.2d 1031 (1978), to conclude that the facts were sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that Duncan had committed an open container violation. Duncan, 105 Wash.App. 1007, 2001 WL 181114, at . In Morgan the police officer arrested the driver and passenger of a vehicle who had drug paraphernalia spread on the hood of their truck. 78 Wash.App. at 210, 896 P.2d 731. The Court of Appeals reasoned that both the driver and the passenger had equal access to the paraphernalia; therefore, the arrest was proper even though the evidence was insufficient to prove possession beyond a reasonable doubt. In Haggarty, the officers smelled marijuana and observed marijuana residue within arm's length from the defendant who appeared to be under the influence of a narcotic. 20 Wash. App. at 337, 579 P.2d 1031. Based on these facts, the Court of Appeals concluded that there were ample grounds for arrest. Id. at 339, 579 P.2d 1031. These cases are distinguishable. In the case before us, the officers observed a bottle sitting on a bus stop bench and three men standing at the bus stop. The bottle was accessible, but no one was holding the bottle, or otherwise exhibiting dominion or control demonstrative of possession as interpreted in Hornaday. The trial court noted that [a]ll that we have, apparently, from the officers' testimony is three men standing at a bus shelter and there is a brown bag inside the bus shelter with a bottle sticking out. From the officers' approach we don't even at that point know it's beer.[ [8] ] Unlike in Morgan, where the drug paraphernalia was spread across the hood of the owner's vehicle, Duncan and his companions were standing in a public place. The fact that the defendants in Morgan were inside the vehicle displaying the illegal materials lends more credence to a suspicion of ownership of the contraband than three men at a public bus stop with a bottle nearby. While the bottle was close to Duncan, the officers did not observe Duncan open, touch or drink from the bottle. Nor does the record indicate that Duncan stood or moved away from the bottle when he saw the police approach. Unlike in Haggarty, there is no evidence suggesting that Duncan exhibited the effects of intoxication and there is conflicting testimony from the officers whether Duncan smelled of alcohol. [9] The officers stated that the bottle was cold to the touch. This could have resulted from the chilly October weather and the bottle could just as easily have been warm to the touch if Duncan had been holding it. We have recognized that proximity and evidence of temporary handling may be insufficient to establish constructive possession. State v. Callahan, 77 Wash.2d 27, 31, 459 P.2d 400 (1969). Significantly, both Morgan and Haggarty involved criminal violations, not civil infractions, making them distinguishable from Duncan's situation. Thus, considering the officers did not witness Duncan drinking the alcohol, or holding the bottle, or reacting to their approach, the violation did not occur in their presence.