Opinion ID: 244942
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony of a Perjurer

Text: 17 The witness Bonnie Barrett readily admitted on direct examination that she had been convicted of perjury before the grand jury. Because of this, says appellant, 'the court must charge the jury that the testimony of such a witness must be scrutinized with care.' This is so, says appellant, because 'the only evidence in the case at bar, that directly connects appellant with the sale of narcotics,' is the testimony of Barrett and Sabbath. We have said enough concerning the evidence above to indicate that we cannot agree with such a statement. 18 Further, the sole appellate court case 7 which appellant cites to support his position (which it does) says this: 19 'The appellant contends that because Sands was an admitted perjurer his testimony should not have been considered. Even a convicted perjurer, however, may testify competently. The jury must determine his credibility. 2 The court must charge that the testimony of such a witness must be scrutinized with care. The learned District Judge's charge was adequate.' 20 Note 2 to the above quotation points out that that court relies on Hammer v. United States, 271 U.S. 620, 46 S.Ct. 603, 70 L.Ed. 1118, in which 'there was no evidence to corroborate the testimony of the witness who had previously committed perjury.' That is not the case here, as we have pointed out above. 21 The Katz 8 and Segelman 9 cases in the District Court are not persuasive that plain error was committed. Katz quotes language in United States v. Manton 10 as pertinent: 22 It is true that    in the main, the evidence tending to show Manton's partnership in the conspiracy came from the lips of convicted co-conspirators and other witnesses of bad or dubious character. Indeed, in a case like this, it is unlikely that it would be otherwise. But the credibility of these witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, as we have already said, were questions for the jury and are matters beyond the scope of judicial review. United States v. Katz, D.C.M.D.Pa.1948, 78 F.Supp. 435, 438. 23 Segelman quotes the Margolis language of Judge Biggs, quoted above, and reverses the conviction because appellant was not permitted to prove the witness had been convicted of perjury. That witness (Mehlman) was not only a key witness, but 'the indictment could not be sustained without his testimony.' Segelman was convicted without the jury knowing that the key witness Mehlman had been convicted. 24 Here Barrett was no key witness. In fact, she was not called by either side at the first trial, though both knew her. 25 Further, here the jury knew of Bonnie Barrett's conviction of a felony from her own lips. They knew Sabbath had pleaded guilty and was an accomplice awaiting sentence. 'The warning flags were up,' as was stated on oral argument. We believe the court's instructions on how to judge the credibility of the witnesses were adequate, in view of all the testimony before the jury, and no clear error was committed in the court's failure to instruct further. 26