Opinion ID: 1863727
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Systemic Problems with Ramos

Text: ś 95. In the period since our Ramos decision, we have come to recognize some of the systemic problems our decision has created. ś 96. There is seldom a litmus test for bias in voir dire. Challenges for statutory bias are relatively easy to decide and should not prove a difficulty for the circuit court; but all other challenges for cause involve an element of discretion. ś 97. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg summed up the dilemma in Martinez-Salazar. Twice she quoted Judge Pamela Ann Rymer of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals who wrote that `trial courts, state and federal, rule on cause challenges by the minute.' 528 U.S. at 310 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 146 F.3d 653, 659 (1998) (Rymer, J., dissenting)). Justice Ginsburg then added: Challenges for cause and rulings upon them, as Judge Rymer observed, see supra, at 778-779, are fast paced, made on the spot and under pressure. Counsel as well as court, in that setting, must be prepared to decide, often between shades of gray, by the minute. 146 F.3d, at 661. Id. at 316 (quoting Martinez-Salazar, 146 F.3d at 661). ś 98. The multitude of fact-intensive challenges involving shades of gray are bound to produce some trial court error. This error is not likely to be deterred by the sanction of a new trial because there is no intent by the circuit court to commit error. We recognize that circuit judges must deal with a diverse group of prospective jurors, some of whom are eager to serve even when they should not, others of whom will offer any excuse to escape from their civic duty. ś 99. One of our cases immediately after Ramos illustrates the difficulty. In State v. Ferron , the circuit court denied Ferron's request to excuse a prospective juror for cause after the juror said he would certainly try and probably could set aside his opinion that a criminally accused defendant who was truly innocent would take the stand and testify on his own behalf. This court determined that the prospective juror should have been excused because the juror was not a reasonable person who was sincerely willing to put aside his opinion or bias. 219 Wis. 2d at 489. ś 100. Ferron had used a peremptory challenge to remove the prospective juror before trial â so that he received a fair trial by an impartial jury â but our court ruled that Ferron was deprived of his statutorily-defined right to due process of law when he was compelled to use one of his peremptory challenges, as provided by Wis. Stat. § 972.03. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d at 485-86. This decision was grounded entirely on Ramos and the court declined the State's invitation to overrule the case.