Opinion ID: 76188
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The release of Garnto from jail

Text: 22 We first consider Defendants' release of Garnto from jail before the termination of his sentence. Despite Garnto's extensive criminal history and an outstanding warrant in Palm Beach County, Defendants released Garnto from jail on work-release. In addition, when Garnto was later arrested based upon a failure to appear warrant in Palm Beach County, Defendants again released Garnto after misleading Palm Beach County authorities to believe that Garnto would serve his sentence in that case concurrently with his pending sentence at the Hendry County Jail. 6 Although Hendry County officials argued that Garnto completed his sentences on the Hendry County and Palm Beach County convictions on 26 May 1998, it appears that HCSO gave Garnto improper good/gain time credit and disregarded the manner in which the concurrent sentences were to be served. 23 One might find fault in Defendants' behavior. But no substantive due process right exists to be protected generally from the release from confinement of persons convicted of crimes — even if the release violates state law. See Lovins v. Lee, 53 F.3d 1208, 1209 (11th Cir.1995). Furthermore, the record does not reflect Defendants knew about and disregarded an extremely great risk that Garnto would drive while intoxicated and cause a fatal car collision. Although Garnto previously had been convicted of driving while intoxicated, these offenses had occurred ten years earlier. The lapse of time and Garnto's maturing for a decade count in Defendants' favor. Moreover, although Garnto violated the terms of his release by wandering around Clewiston at night while intoxicated, he was not driving. 24 We cannot say that Defendants, at the time of Garnto's release, were on notice that Garnto would very, very probably cause an automobile collision with serious injuries due to his driving while intoxicated. See McClendon, 305 F.3d at 326. We recall that the pertinent collision occurred several months after Garnto's release. See Ruiz v. McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1183 (10th Cir.2002) (in state-created danger context stating that [a]ffirmative conduct for purposes of § 1983 should typically involve conduct that imposes an immediate threat of harm, which by its nature has a limited range and duration). The release in this case is no constitutional tort. 25