Opinion ID: 2633550
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Accommodating the General Assembly's Intent and Troxel

Text: In applying the Supreme Court's Troxel opinion, state appellate decisions typically articulate a standard that accommodates Troxel, their best interests of the child statutes, and case law precedent. See, e.g., Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 774 N.E.2d 1052, 1060 (2002) (adopting a state standard that requires grandparent to allege and prove that parent's failure to grant visitation will cause the child significant harm by adversely affecting the child's health, safety, or welfare); see also Hamit v. Hamit, 271 Neb. 659, 715 N.W.2d 512, 519-24 (2006) (discussing Troxel's due process requirement in the context of Nebraska statutes that include a clear and convincing evidence standard). Turning to how Colorado accommodates the General Assembly's best interests of the child standard of the grandparent visitation statute consistent with Troxel, we observe first that Colorado's grandparent visitation statute differs from the Washington statute at issue in Troxel. Colorado's statute does not suffer from the same breathtakingly broad scope of the Washington statute. Washington's statute allowed any person to petition for visitation at any time; Colorado's statute is more limited. In contrast, Colorado's statute concentrates on grandparent visitation in the limited circumstance of a court proceeding wherein there is or has been a child custody case or a case concerning the allocation of parental responsibilities relating to that child. § 19-1-117(1), C.R.S. (2005). This statute prohibits a court from entering a grandparent visitation order unless the court finds that it is in the best interests of the child. § 19-1-117(2). In construing a statute involving the best interests of the child, our objective is to interpret the statute in a manner consistent with the plain language and with our understanding of the General Assembly's intent. In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 146-47 (Colo.2005). The legislature intends a statute to be constitutional; accordingly, we must construe a statute in a manner that avoids constitutional infirmity, if possible. Bd. of Dirs., Metro Wastewater Reclamation Dist. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 105 P.3d 653, 656 (Colo.2005). When the case presents an issue of law of first impression to us, we may look to instructive decisions of other jurisdictions. Ciesluk, 113 P.3d at 142. We determine that Colorado's grandparent visitation statute can be construed and implemented consistent with the due process requirement announced in Troxel. In doing so, we agree with the court of appeals that Colorado courts must give special weight to parental determinations when considering grandparent visitation petitions. See In re Custody of C.M., 74 P.3d 342, 345 (Colo.App.2002). We also agree with the court of appeals that adoptive parents have the same right as natural parents in controlling the upbringing of their child. R.A. II, 121 P.3d at 298. Section 19-5-211(1) of our statutes provides that the person adopted shall be, to all intents and purposes, the child of the adoptive parent. We disagree, however, with the court of appeals ruling in favor of a standard that requires grandparents to demonstrate parental unfitness, or substantial or significant harm to the child from the parental determination. First, the Supreme Court declined to impose such a standard on state courts, so long as they give special weight to parental determinations. Second, when it incorporated its oft-spoken best interests of the child lodestar into the grandparent visitation statute, the General Assembly intended Colorado courts to have the authority to impose grandparent visitation schedules in appropriate cases, despite parental wishes, so long as they are consistent with constitutional requirements. The court of appeals' reliance on the Oklahoma case, In re Herbst, does not give sufficient latitude to the General Assembly's grandparent visitation statute or the record in this case. Other jurisdictions recognize that best interests of the child judicial decisions, consistent with Troxel, can include circumstances where there has been a significant pre-existing relationship between child and grandparent prior to the court proceeding, see Blixt, 774 N.E.2d at 1060, or when a bond of care and affection develops between grandparent and grandchild and is continued or commenced after the death of one or both parents, see Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84, 827 A.2d 203, 223-24 (2003). The case before us may involve such a circumstance. We use these examples, not by way of limitation, but to illuminate that Colorado's standard should turn upon a presumption and burden of proof requirement in favor of parental determinations that also takes into account the child's interest in maintaining the grandparent/grandchild relationship. Troxel cautions that judges must avoid the temptation to substitute the court's judgment for the parent's judgment: [T]he Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a `better' decision could be made. 530 U.S. at 72-73, 120 S.Ct. 2054. As opposed to the contesting parents we had before us in Ciesluk, 113 P.3d at 146-47, wherein we rejected a presumption in favor of one parent over the other because each parent shares equally in the burden of demonstrating how the child's best interests will be impacted by the proposed relocation of one of the parents, a dispute between parents and grandparents regarding grandparent visitation is not a contest between equals. See Stacy v. Ross, 798 So.2d 1275, 1280 (Miss.2001) (The determination whether parents are unreasonable in denying visitation in whole or part to grandparents is not a contest between equals.); Glidden v. Conley, 175 Vt. 111, 820 A.2d 197, 205 (2003) (stating that a dispute between a fit custodial parent and the child's grandparent over grandparent visitation is not a contest between equals). Applying Troxel to its best interests of the child grandparent visitation statute, the Montana Supreme Court has implemented a requirement that the petitioning grandparent prove by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the child's best interests to have contact with the grandparent, and, in the case of an objecting fit parent, that the presumption in favor of the parents' wishes has been rebutted. See Polasek v. Omura, 332 Mont. 157, 136 P.3d 519, 521-22 (2006). The Montana approach, as opposed to the Oklahoma approach, would better accommodate the General Assembly's best interests of the child intent consistent with Troxel. In adopting this standard, we take into account section 13-25-127, C.R.S. (2005). This statute generally provides that the burden of proof in a civil action is preponderance of the evidence. Nevertheless, to comply with constitutional requirements, a different burden of proof may apply. Id. In People in re A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625, 631 (Colo.1982), we adopted a clear and convincing evidence standard for parental rights termination proceedings to implement the Supreme Court's decision in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). The legislature then amended our statutes to incorporate such a standard into the statute addressing termination of parental rights. § 19-3-604(1). In section 2-4-201(1)(a)-(d), the General Assembly has expressed its intentions with regard to the enactment of statutes; it intends compliance with constitutional requirements, effectiveness of the entire statute, a just and reasonable result, and a result feasible of execution. While it did not expressly include the clear and convincing standard in the grandparent visitation statute, we conclude upon reading our statutes in context that the General Assembly intends courts to make grandparent visitation determinations in appropriate proceedings that accord with due process requirements respecting parental determinations. Employing the clear and convincing evidence standard in judicial grandparent visitation proceedings will accord due process to parents, as it does in the parental rights termination context. Thus, in order to effectuate the General Assembly's intent consistent with Troxel, we construe Colorado's statute to contain a presumption that parental determinations about grandparent visitation are in the child's best interests. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67, 120 S.Ct. 2054 ([T]here is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children.). However, this presumption is rebuttable in the context of a section 19-1-117 petition when the grandparent articulates facts in the petition and goes forward with clear and convincing evidence at a hearing that the parent is unfit to make the grandparent visitation decision, or that the visitation determination the parent has made is not in the best interests of the child. If the grandparent meets this evidentiary burden, the burden then shifts to the parent to adduce evidence in support of the parental determination. The grandparent bears the ultimate burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the parental determination is not in the child's best interests and the visitation schedule grandparent seeks is in the child's best interests. This intermediate standardmore stringent than a preponderance of the evidence but less stringent than a substantial harm standardis appropriate to reconcile the General Assembly's intent and Troxel. This heightened standard will ensure that trial courts, in looking to the best interests of the child as directed by the grandparent visitation statute, will adequately give the special weight required by Troxel to parental determinations. In order to satisfy the second requirement of Troxel, that in issuing a grandparent visitation order a court must identify those special factors justifying the order, trial courts must make findings of fact and conclusions of law supported by evidence in the record. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (holding that courts must demonstrate consideration and resolution of those special factors that might justify the State's interference with the parents' decision).