Opinion ID: 2570148
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Danny Johnson

Text: Danny Johnson, defendant's half brother, related that he was physically abused by their mother while living in the park. He left the park before defendant was born. Danny did not really know defendant until defendant was about 16 or 17 years old, when they began working together. Danny had a real problem with the park ever since [he] left, and had spent about twenty-six years trying to forget as much as [he] could. He speculated that some family members opposed defense efforts to describe life in the park because it brought up events they had also been trying to forget, or for which they might face incarceration. Defendant contends the court erred by not allowing Danny to testify about how he was affected by his experiences in the trailer park. He did in fact testify to this effect. The court excluded as irrelevant only testimony about Danny's experiences with persons other than his mother at the park before defendant was born. This limitation was well within its discretion. Defendant also argues that the court improperly sustained a hearsay objection to Danny's testimony that one of defendant's cousins, David Daulton, had drawn a gun on a police officer and if the police officer hadn't have known him and had to repeatedly tell him, `Put the gun down,' he would have shot him. Danny learned of the incident from David Daulton. Defense counsel asserted without elaboration that the statement was against penal interest, and that even if it was hearsay, he was simply offering it for the effect, the state of mind of my client and the effect of all of the family members on my client and what has happened to them. The court properly ruled that the testimony was hearsay, as an out-of-court statement offered to prove the incident occurred. (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) The court noted that if there was evidence that the defendant was told of a particular incident, then of course that can come in, not for the truth of the matter asserted, but simply to show what he was told . . . for the purpose of showing what effect that information might have had on him. The court allowed Danny to testify that siblings of David Daulton had been in jail. (8) We need not decide whether the court should have admitted the testimony about the gun incident as a statement against David's penal interest. Hearsay testimony must meet an exception, but it must also be relevant. Counsel below claimed the purpose of the testimony was to show the effect of the incident on defendant's state of mind, but did not demonstrate that defendant knew of the incident. It was, therefore, irrelevant. (9) Defendant further contends the statement was admissible under Green v. Georgia (1979) 442 U.S. 95 [60 L.Ed.2d 738, 99 S.Ct. 2150], to show the effect of a common upbringing on defendant and his family. Green holds that a defendant's due process rights are violated when hearsay testimony at the penalty phase of a capital trial is excluded, if both of the following conditions are present: (1) the excluded testimony is `highly relevant to a critical issue in the punishment phase of the trial,' and (2) there are substantial reasons to assume the reliability of the evidence. ( People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 704 [276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278], quoting Green, at p. 97.) Defendant did not rely on this theory of admissibility below, and the claim is therefore forfeited. ( People v. Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 995.) It is also meritless. Even assuming reliability, evidence that defendant's cousin had drawn a gun on a police officer was not highly relevant to a critical issue in the penalty phase. In Green, the evidence was highly probative of the defendant's innocence. ( People v. Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 996; see Green v. Georgia, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 97.) Here, by contrast, the evidence was cumulative to other evidence that children from the park had committed crimes, and tangential because it had no bearing on defendant's character. Exclusion of such evidence does not deny a defendant due process of law. ( Smithey, at p. 996.)