Opinion ID: 884430
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Sundseths' Home

Text: The Sundseth home was originally located at Big Sky Mobile Homes where wheels were mounted to attached axles. It was then attached to a hitch and towed to the Sundseths' property where the wheels and axles were removed. The home was then fitted with masonite siding and asphalt shingles and attached to utilities. The Sundseths' 1995 Assessment Notice indicates that the home is taxed as personal property. The District Court held that the first sentence of Paragraph 5 of the covenants is ambiguous due to the absence of essential words. The court further held that the last sentence of the provision is ambiguous since it is unclear whether that sentence restricts only mobile homes that are temporary dwellings or all mobile homes, including those placed on cement blocks, permanently hooked up to utilities and sanitary facilities, and exhibiting the proper siding. We determine that the court's determination of ambiguity is based upon a distinction without a difference in light of our decision in Newman v. Wittmer (1996), 277 Mont. 1, 917 P.2d 926. Newman involved a covenant which read as follows: 4. Trailers, Mobile Homes, Basement Homes and Temporary Structures. No structure of a temporary character, including but not limited to trailers, mobile homes, basements, tents, shacks, garages, barns or other out-bildings [sic] shall be used upon any lot or portion thereof at any time as a permanent residence.... Newman, 917 P.2d at 929. In Newman, the Wittmers argued that the above covenant prohibited structures of a temporary nature, not permanent mobile homes and, alternatively, that their home was not a mobile home. Initially, we held that the covenant was not ambiguous; that it expressly prohibited use of mobile homes as permanent residences. Newman, 917 P.2d at 929. As to whether their home was a mobile home, we held that it was, despite the fact that Wittmers' mobile home was bolted to a concrete pad with skirting. In light of its dimensions, transportability and its DMV designation as a trailer and tax assessment designation as personal property, the home fit within numerous statutory definitions of mobile home. Newman, 917 P.2d at 930. Additionally, the home fit within our case law definition of a mobile home, citing, inter alia, Timmerman v. Gabriel (1970), 155 Mont. 294, 470 P.2d 528, in which we held that the fact that a trailer was placed on a foundation and connected to utilities did not transform it to a permanent residence within the meaning of a prohibitive covenant; that the nature of the construction of the home was determinative. Newman, 917 P.2d at 931. Here, the last sentence of the covenant in question provides that [n]o mobile homes or temporary dwellings may be used as the sole dwelling on any tract after July 1, 1977. This covenant, like the covenant in Newman, does not lend itself to a distinction between mobile homes which are used as temporary dwellings as opposed to mobile homes which are set on cement blocks with siding and used as permanent homes. Rather, given the broad definition of mobile home in Newman, the covenant unambiguously prohibits all mobile homes as permanent residences. Accordingly, we reverse the District Court judgment as to Sundseths and remand for entry of judgment in favor of the Toavses with regard to the Sundseths' property.