Opinion ID: 4543021
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Corrupt Practices.

Text: Beginning at least as early as the 1980s and continuing through the mid2010s, the process for selling both broadcasting and marketing rights to many of FIFA's tournaments became rife with corruption, as reflected in part by the successful prosecutions in the district court of persons associated with the organization. Officials of FIFA, CONCACAF, and CONMEBOL, including the leaders of many of the related national associations, accepted millions of dollars in bribes from sports media and marketing companies in return for arranging for those companies to receive broadcasting and marketing rights in connection with tournaments under the leaders' control. 14 In particular, according to the indictments in the case at bar, three South American companies routinely undertook schemes to bribe CONMEBOL officials in return for the officials awarding them exclusive broadcasting and marketing rights to CONMEBOL tournaments. The indictment identifies the companies as Torneos y Competencias S.A. (Torneos), an Argentinian media business that operates television stations throughout Latin America, United States v. Webb et al., No.15-cr-00252 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2015), Second Superseding Indictment (the S.S.I.), ECF No. 604 at 13, ¶ 33; Traffic Group (Traffic), a multi-national sports marketing company headquartered in São Paulo, Brazil, id. at 14, ¶ 37; and Full Play Group S.A. (Full Play), a sports marketing company headquartered in Buenos Aires, Argentina, id. at 17-18, ¶ 47.
1. The Copa América Scheme. The largest corrupt scheme was related to the Copa América tournaments. Between 1987 and 2010, Traffic had an agreement with CONMEBOL for the exclusive broadcasting and marketing rights to the Copa América. Id. at 33–34, ¶ 90. In order to secure that agreement, and to maintain its relationship with CONMEBOL thereafter, Traffic paid bribes to 15 various CONMEBOL officials, including the confederation's president, Nicolas Leoz. Id. In 2010, CONMEBOL ended its relationship with Traffic. Id. at 34, ¶ 91. Sometime that year, Full Play, led by its controlling principals, father-and-son Hugo and Mariano Jinkis, began negotiating with CONMEBOL to take over as the exclusive rights holder for the Copa América tournament. Test. of Luis Bedoya, Trial Tr. at 1581. As part of the negotiations, Mariano Jinkis offered bribes of $1 million to the presidents of the smaller national associations of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela, who had formed a coalition — known as the Group of Six — to attempt to wrest power within CONMEBOL from the historically dominant nations of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. S.S.I. at 13, ¶ 33, App. at 204. At that time, appellant Juan Ángel Napout was the president of the Paraguayan national association, the Asociación Paraguaya de Fútbol (APF), and the later-acquitted Manuel Burga was the president of the Peruvian national association, the Federación Peruana de Fútbol (FPF). Id. at 33–34, ¶ 90, App. at 203–04. Apparently as a result of Jinkis's offer of bribes, in June 2010, CONMEBOL entered into an agreement to provide Full Play with the exclusive broadcasting 16 and marketing rights to the 2015, 2019, and 2023 editions of the Copa América. Id. at 34, ¶ 91; Text of Translation of Agency Agreement Between CONMEBOL and Full Play Group, S.A. (June 8, 2010), App. at 809–19. In the following year, 2011, Traffic filed a lawsuit in Florida state court against CONMEBOL and Full Play alleging that their 2010 agreement had violated CONMEBOL's contract with Traffic. S.S.I. at 34, ¶ 92. To resolve the suit, Traffic and Full Play agreed to form, with Torneos, a joint-venture named Datisa Incorporated, of which each company would own a one third interest. Test. of Alejandro Burzaco, Trial Tr. at 416, App. at 441. CONMEBOL and Full Play then terminated their contract, and in May 2013, CONMEBOL, Datisa, and Full Play reached an agreement providing Datisa with the exclusive rights to the 2015, 2019, and 2023 editions of the Copa América. Purchase Contract Among CONMEBOL, Datista and Full Play (May 25, 2013), App. at 860. The agreement also gave Datisa exclusive rights to a special centennial edition of the Copa América scheduled to be played in 2016 in stadiums across the United States. Id. In exchange for the rights, Datisa agreed to pay CONMEBOL $80 million for each edition of the tournament. Id. Datisa also agreed to pay bribes ranging from $1–$3 million for each edition of the 17 tournament, in addition to a bonus payment of $1–$3 million, to the presidents of each of CONMEBOL's national associations except for Uruguay, an expansion from Traffic's practice of bribing only the presidents in the Group of Six. Test. of Alejandro Burzaco, Trial Tr. at 418–20, Gov't App. at 149. The bribes Datisa gave to the leadership of the Brazilian association, the CBF, were complicated by the fact that the association's former president, Ricardo Teixeira, had resigned from his position in the spring of 2012 after learning he was under criminal investigation for corruption in Switzerland and Brazil. Following Teixeira's resignation, Datisa began splitting their bribes to the CBF between appellant Marin, a former politician from São Paulo who had replaced Teixeira as CBF president, and Marco Polo Del Nero, who had replaced Teixeira on a FIFA leadership committee. 10 Test. of Alejandro Burzaco, Trial Tr. at 352–53, 419; see also Test. of Eladio Rodrigues, Trial Tr. at 2363. Like other CONMEBOL officials, Marin worked with Full Play, Traffic, and Torneos to keep his bribe payments secret. The money destined for him would frequently be deposited in a Swiss bank account of a Torneos-controlled shell company. Test. of IRS Special Agent Berryman, Trial Tr. 3430–40, App. at 594–95; 10 Upon Teixeira's resignation, Marin and Del Nero arranged for Del Nero to succeed Marin as CBF president in 2015. 18 Transcript of Recorded Conversation Among José Hawilla, Hugo Jinkis, Mariano Jinkis, and Marin at 21–22, (April 30, 2014), Gov't App. at 534–35. The money would be sent from the Swiss bank to an Andorran bank account controlled by Marin's associate, Wagner Abrahao. Id. Abrahao would then send installments from another of his Andorran bank accounts to a Morgan Stanley bank account in New York that Marin had opened in 2012 under the name Firelli International Limited, a shell company he owned and controlled for his own benefit. Id. 2. The Copa Libertadores Scheme. CONMEBOL's Copa Libertadores tournament was similarly subjected to bribery. Starting at least as early as 2006, Torneos paid annual bribes to CONMEBOL officials in exchange for the officials providing a Torneos affiliate, T&T Sports Marketing Ltd., with exclusive rights to broadcast Copa Libertadores matches on television. Test. of Alejandro Burzaco, Trial Tr. at 252, 295. In the scheme's earliest years, according to Torneos's Chief Executive Officer Alejandro Burzaco, annual bribes of $600,000 were paid to Leoz and five other CONMEBOL officials, including Teixeira. Id. In March 2008, CONMEBOL extended T&T's contract and sold to the company broadcasting rights to the 2014 through 2018 editions of the tournament. Id. at 310–11. Burzaco continued to pay bribes of between $500,000 and $1 million to the same six 19 CONMEBOL officials. Id. at 313–14. In 2010, Burzaco began paying annual bribes to, in addition to the six officials, the Group of Six presidents. Id. at 339. 11 Two years later in December 2012, after a vote by the organization's leadership, CONMEBOL extended T&T's contract through 2022. Agreement Between CONMEBOL and Torneos (Dec. 20, 2012), App. at 771–78. Burzaco continued to pay CONMEBOL officials, including the appellants Napout, and Marin, annual bribes of between $300,000 and $1.2 million. Test. of Alejandro Burzaco, Trial Tr. at 329–30, 339, 574. 3. The Copa do Brasil Scheme There were also bribes paid in connection with CONMEBOL's domestic soccer tournaments. For example, between 1990 and 2009, Traffic, through its owner José Hawilla, paid yearly bribes to Teixeira to obtain a series of contracts for the broadcasting and marketing rights for the Copa do Brasil. S.S.I. at 43, ¶ 116. The last of these, executed in 2009, provided Traffic with those rights to the 2009 through 2014 editions of the Copa do Brasil. Id. at 43–44, ¶ 117. In 2011, Klefer Produções e Promoções Ltda. (Klefer), a sports-marketing company, made payments to Teixeira to induce him to enter into an agreement Burzaco began splitting Teixeira's bribe payment between Marin and Del Nero 11 when Teixeira resigned in 2012, as Datisa had for the Copa América. Id. at 353. 20 with Klefer on behalf of CBF. Under the agreement, CBF provided Klefer with the rights for the 2015 through 2022 editions of CBF's Copa do Brasil. Id. at 45, ¶ 118; see also Test. of Jose Schettino, Trial Tr. at 2573–77. In 2012, Traffic and Klefer agreed to pool the marketing rights for the 2013 through 2022 editions of the Copa do Brasil; they also agreed to share the cost of the bribe payments to be made to CBF officials. S.S.I. at 45, ¶ 118. When Teixeira resigned from the CBF in 2012, Traffic and Klefer began paying annual bribes of 500,000 Brazilian Reais (approximately $211,864) to both Marin and Del Nero, like Datisa and Torneos had done in connection with the international tournaments. Trans. of Conversation Among José Hawilla, Kleber Fonseca de Souza Leite, and Maria Regina (April 2, 2014) at 4–6, Gov't App. at 559–61. 4. The Paraguayan World Cup Qualifying Scheme CONMEBOL officials also solicited and received bribes in return for broadcasting and marketing rights for the qualifying matches to be played by various CONMEBOL national teams in the run up to the 2014 and 2018 World Cups. In Paraguay, for example, during October 2011, the APF agreed to sell the rights to its national team's 2014 and 2018 qualifying matches to Ciffart Sports S.A. 21 (Ciffart), an intermediary for Full Play. Test. of Santiago Peña, 12 Trial Tr. at 1167– 71, Gov't App. at 123–27. In order to obtain these rights, Full Play agreed to pay Napout, then-president of the APF, bribes of $1 million for the matches related to the 2014 tournament and $1.5 million for those related to the 2018 tournament. Id. at 1172–73, Gov't App. at 128–29, 400 (the Peña Ledger). Like Marin, Napout arranged to receive payments discreetly, or — as he referred to it— in a safe way. Test. of Luis Bedoya, Trial Tr. at 1584. To keep Napout's involvement in the schemes from public view, Full Play would typically wire money from a United States bank account held in the name of a Seychelles company to an unrelated third party selected by a cambista (money changer); the third party would then deliver American cash to a safety box in Full Play's office, and Mariano Jinkis would then personally deliver the cash to Napout in Buenos Aires, usually meeting him in the Hilton hotel there. Test. of Santiago Peña, Trial Tr. at 1160–64, Gov't App. at 116–20. On occasion, Full Play also bribed Napout with concert tickets and a luxury vacation apartment in Punta del Este, 12Santiago Peña, a cooperating witness described by Marin as a co-conspirator, Marin Br. at 12, had been an employee of Full Play, Test. of Santiago Peña, Trial Tr. at 1047. As explained by the government in its brief, At trial, the government introduced a secret ledger of bribes paid to various soccer officials that was maintained by Full Play’s financial manager, Santiago Peña. Gov't. Br. at 10. 22 Uruguay, portions of which were also paid for by money wired from a United States bank. Id. at 1158–59, Gov't App. at 114–15.
In May 2015, a grand jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York handed down an indictment charging nine CONCACAF and CONMEBOL officials, including Marin, and five executives from sports marketing and media companies, with, among other things, racketeering conspiracy, wire fraud and wire fraud conspiracy, and money laundering and money laundering conspiracy. United States v. Webb et al., No.15-cr-00252 (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2015), ECF No. 1, App. at 42. The charges in the 47-count indictment arose out of the bribery schemes connected to the tournaments in violation of various laws of the United States. On May 27, 2015, Marin was arrested by Swiss authorities while he was in Zurich for FIFA-related meetings. United States v. Webb et al., No.15-cr00252 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2018), Letter in Support of CONMEBOL's Request for Restitution, ECF No. 968 at 6, App. at 1541. By the time of his arrest, Marin had 23 received more than $3 million in payments in connection with the Copa América, Copa Libertadores, and Copa do Brasil schemes.13 Napout, who by that time had begun serving as CONMEBOL's president, was not named in the original, May 2015, indictment. In the weeks following the filing of that indictment, he undertook efforts to hide the evidence of his involvement. United States v. Webb et al., No.15-cr-00252 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2017), Sealed Memo. & Order Granting Gov't Mot. for Partially Anonymous and SemiSequestered Jury, ECF No. 717. He hired an attorney to represent him in his personal capacity and instructed the attorney to hire another attorney — whom Napout had selected — to represent CONMEBOL. Id. at 3. Soon thereafter, Napout learned that he was a target of the U.S. government's ongoing investigation and instructed his personal attorney to enter into a common-interest agreement with CONMEBOL's attorney in an effort to shield Napout from criminal liability by controlling the material that CONMEBOL would turn over to the government. Id. at 7–8. 13 See, e.g., United States v. Webb et al., No.15-cr-00252 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2018), Judgment, ECF No. 1015 at 8, Gov't Special App. at 16 (ordering forfeiture in the amount of $3,335,593). 24 On November 3, 2015, after five months of incarceration in Switzerland, Marin was extradited to the United States and released here on bond. On November 25, the government filed a superseding indictment charging all but three of the original defendants, along with sixteen additional officials of CONCACAF and CONMEBOL, including Burga and Napout, with participating in the racketeering, money laundering and wire fraud conspiracies. United States v. Webb et al., No.15-cr-00252 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2015), Sealed Indictment of, inter alia, José Maria Marin, Juan Ángel Napout, and Manuel Burga, ECF No. 102, App. at 48–49. On December 3, 2015, Napout was arrested also while in Zurich for FIFArelated meetings. By that time, Napout had, like Marin, received more than $3 million in bribes in connection with the Copa América, Copa Libertadores, and Paraguayan World Cup qualifying matches. 14 Later that day, the CONMEBOL attorney who had been hired by Napout after the first group of officials were arrested in May, entered Napout's CONMEBOL office, and, acting pursuant to Napout's instructions, removed a computer that Napout knew contained material 14 See, e.g., United States v. Webb et al., No.15-cr-00252 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2018), Judgment, ECF No. 1008 at 8, Gov't Special App. at 8 (ordering forfeiture in the amount of $3,347,025.88); see also Gov't App. at 400 (Peña Ledger listing payments made to Napout). 25 relevant to the government's investigation, including evidence of Napout's relationship with defendants charged in the original indictment and evidence that he had accepted bribes. United States v. Webb et al., No.15-cr-00252 (E.D.N.Y. June 22, 2018), Memorandum & Order Regarding Post-Trial Motions, ECF No. 952 at 28–29, Special App. at 88–92. Several weeks after his arrest, Napout was extradited to the United States by Swiss authorities and, upon arrival, released on bond. A year and a half later, on June 14, 2017, after most of the defendants charged in the superseding indictment pleaded guilty to the charges, some of them having cooperated with prosecutors and investigators, the government filed a second superseding indictment naming only three defendants: Burga, Marin, and Napout. S.S.I., App. at 170–227. This second superseding indictment contained seven counts:
racketeering conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) and (5).
honest services wire fraud conspiracy arising out of the Copa Libertadores tournament, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349.
26 laundering conspiracy arising out of the Copa Libertadores tournament, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).
wire fraud conspiracy arising out of the Copa do Brasil tournament, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349.
conspiracy arising out of the Copa do Brasil tournament, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). 6. Count Six charged Marin and Napout with honest services wire fraud conspiracy arising out of the Copa América tournament, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. 7. Count Seven charged Marin and Napout with money laundering conspiracy arising out of the Copa América tournament, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).
Napout, Marin, and Burga proceeded to trial before a partially anonymous and sequestered jury 15 beginning on November 6, 2017. After six weeks of trial and five days of deliberations, on December 22, 2017, the jury returned its verdict. Burga was acquitted of the only count against him; Napout was convicted on the racketeering conspiracy and wire fraud conspiracy counts but acquitted of the 15The jurors' names were made available to the parties and their attorneys but were concealed from the public. The jurors were sequestered insofar as they were escorted into and out of the courthouse by U.S. Marshals and were transported from the courthouse to a central location each day before returning home. They were also sequestered during breaks in the trial, including lunchtime. 27 money laundering conspiracy counts; and Marin was convicted on all counts except for one count of money laundering conspiracy. On August 22, 2018, the court sentenced Marin to 48 months' imprisonment and two years' supervised release, and ordered him to pay a fine of $1.2 million and approximately $3.34 million in forfeiture. On August 29, the court sentenced Napout to 108 months' imprisonment and two years' supervised release; the court also ordered Napout to pay a fine of $1 million and approximately $3.35 million in forfeiture. Both Marin and Napout appeal.