Opinion ID: 1310513
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: December the ninth? Uh well, I didn't I may have but it was because I was pressured into it by the Magistrate.

Text: The trial court upheld respondent's objection to this testimony based on § 56-5-6160, S.C. Code of Laws (1976), which provides that [n]o evidence of conviction of any person for any violation of this chapter [Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways] shall be admissible in any court in any civil action. Appellant asserts that a proper construction of the statute would not necessarily proscribe evidence of a plea of guilty. In support of her position, we are cited to cases from other jurisdictions which have adopted this view in construing statutes analogous to § 56-5-6160. These cited cases have allowed a defendant's plea of guilty for a traffic violation to be used as substantive evidence as well as for impeachment in a subsequent litigation arising out of that offense. Book v. Datema , 256 Iowa 1330, 131 N.W. (2d) 470 (1964). Harbor v. Campbell , 235 Ark. 492, 360 S.W. (2d) 758 (1963). Appellant's exceptions specify error only in the lower court's refusal to allow introduction of the driver's plea to impeach his earlier testimony and do not contend for its admission as substantive evidence. In our view the literal language of § 56-5-6160 does not bar the use of this evidence to impeach the credibility of a witness, whether or not such witness is a party to the action. We accordingly hold that the trial judge should have permitted appellant's counsel to cross-examine the respondent's driver on his guilty plea for the limited purpose of impeachment. Clearly, appellant was entitled to show such an act on the rationale that it was inconsistent with his testimony as to how and why the accident happened. For the foregoing reasons, these cases are reversed and remanded for a new trial. Reversed and Remanded. LEWIS, C.J. LITTLEJOHN and GREGORY, JJ., and JOSEPH R. MOSS, Acting Associate Justice, concur.