Opinion ID: 198347
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Length of the Stop

Text: 39 In evaluating the propriety of the Tennessee stop, we apply a two-prong test. First, we must determine whether the officer[s'] actions were justified at [their] inception, and if so, whether the actions undertaken by the officer[s] following the stop were reasonably responsive to the circumstances justifying the stop in the first place as augmented by information gleaned by the officer[s] during the stop. United States v. Sowers, 136 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 105, 142 L.Ed.2d 84 (1998). 40 Owens does not challenge the initial automobile stop for speeding as invalid under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) ([T]he usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so called 'Terry stop' ... than to a formal arrest.). Rather, he contends that the fifty-minute detention was too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop. Thus, his argument hinges on whether the length of the detention converted the otherwise valid investigative stop into a de facto arrest for which probable cause was lacking. 41 The reasonableness inquiry is almost always fact specific. See United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971, 975 (1st Cir.1994) (noting that [t]here is no scientifically precise formula that enables courts to distinguish between valid investigatory stops and de facto arrests). The Supreme Court has directed courts making this inquiry to examine 42 whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant. A court making this assessment should take care to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such cases the court should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing. 43 United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (citations omitted). 44 The fifty-minute detention was indeed a lengthy one, and in other circumstances would perhaps weigh in favor of finding a de facto arrest. A long duration, however, does not by itself transform an otherwise valid stop into an arrest. See McCarthy, 77 F.3d at 530 (stating that there is no talismanic time beyond which any stop initially justified on the basis of Terry becomes an unreasonable seizure under the [F]ourth [A]mendment) (citation omitted). Here, the period of detention was justified. The officers necessarily spent the first twenty minutes trying to ascertain whether Robinson had a valid driver's license, which he did not. It was only after arresting Robinson that the officers faced the problem of whether to permit Owens to drive a car that he did not own. Moreover, events unfolded in such a manner as to raise the officers' suspicions regarding Owens's authority to drive the car: Robinson and Owens gave conflicting stories about who owned the car and Owens was evasive and avoided eye-contact during police questioning. 45 In responding to the circumstances, the officers diligently pursued a means of investigation that would dispel their suspicions. They initiated a number of computer checks on the car and its occupants and reasonably awaited the results. Cf. United States v. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200, 203 (10th Cir.1990) (holding that detention of defendants' vehicles was reasonable during time that officers completed inspections of defendants' documents); United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 816 n. 2 (10th Cir.1991) (suggesting in dicta that length of detention would have been reasonable if police were waiting for results of an NCIC, license, or registration inquiry). 46 Under these particular facts, the detention was not a de facto arrest and the district court's finding that the officers responded reasonably to the circumstances as they developed is supported by the evidence. 47