Opinion ID: 2279745
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Issue on Appeal Section 722 Factors

Text: In this appeal, the Mother contends that the Family Court abused its discretion in awarding the Father sole custody of the parties' children by failing to properly apply the factors set forth in Section 722. Section 722 provides: (a) The [Family] Court shall determine the legal custody and residential arrangements for a child in accordance with the best interests of the child. In determining the best interests of the child, the Court shall consider all relevant factors including: (1) The wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his or her custody and residential arrangements; (2) The wishes of the child as to his or her custodian(s) and residential arrangements; (3) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parents, grandparents, siblings, persons co-habitating in the relationship of husband and wife with a parent of the child, any other residents of the household or persons who may significantly affect the child's best interests; (4) The child's adjustment to his or her home, school and community; (5) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved; (6) Past and present compliance by both parents with their rights and responsibilities to their child under § 701 of this title; and (7) Evidence of domestic violence as provided for in Chapter 7A of this title. 13 Del.C. § 722. The Mother acknowledges that the Family Court considered and addressed all of the factors in Section 722 when it determined temporary custody at the May 12, 1995 hearing and in the opinion that followed on May 18, 1995. The Mother argues, however, that the Family Court failed to consider and address the Section 722 factors properly when the Family Court made its ultimate custody determination on February 8, 1996. According to the Mother, the Family Court erred by relying exclusively on the testimony of Dr. Jemail when it awarded the Father sole legal custody. The record reflects that in its February 8, 1996 decision, although the Family Court did not specifically address each of the factors in Section 722, the Family Court did state that it had reviewed all of the factors set forth in [Section] 722. This Court has previously considered the issue of whether a Family Court decision should be set aside because the trial judge failed to explicitly address each of the statutory factors in Section 722. Jones v. Lang, Del.Supr., 591 A.2d 185 (1991). In Jones, even though this Court found no error of law or abuse of discretion by the Family Court, we expressed our concern about a custody disposition that merely considered but did not address each factor in Section 722, stating: Notwithstanding the trial court's failure to make explicit reference to the controlling statutory factors of section 722, we think that a fair reading of the decision below demonstrates implicit application of the statutory factors in the court's effort to reach a decision on modification that accords with the best interests of the child. . . . . ... While it would have been clearly preferable for the court to explicitly refer to section 722's statutory factors, we cannot find that the court disregarded factors (3), (4) and (5) of section 722. Id. at 188 (emphasis added).