Opinion ID: 1730477
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE STATE TO PEREMPTORILY STRIKE JUROR NUMBER 14 IN VIOLATION OF BATSON v. KENTUCKY

Text: Carr, a black man, was convicted of the capital murder of four white victims and sentenced by an all-white jury. Carr contends that the prosecution violated the principle set out in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), by improperly using a peremptory challenge to excuse a potential juror, who was black. After excusals for cause, Ms. Wicks was the sole potential black juror. Carr objected during the jury selection process, and now contends that the peremptory challenge of the sole black juror violates Batson, which prohibits the exclusion of persons from a jury on the basis of race. During voir dire, the trial court asked the venire panel if the fact that the jurors selected to hear this case would have to be sequestered for the course of the trial would present an undue hardship. Several of the venire responded affirmatively, including Ms. Wicks, who stated: I also have two children to support and my husband works shift work, and I don't have any relatives here in Corinth. THE COURT: Is there not anyone, Ms. Wicks, that could take care of your children this week? MS. WICKS: Well, I could ÔÇö I don't know of anybody. My husband has a few relatives here, but I don't know if they will be willing to take care of them or not. Those jurors who had responded affirmatively to the question of hardship were questioned individually in chambers. Ms. Wicks, questioned by the court and counsel, again indicated her concern regarding child care for her thirteen year old daughter and nine year old son. She indicated that she and her husband did not leave the children home alone at night and that she did not know what kind of arrangements could possibly be made in the event she was selected for this jury. Defense counsel wanted Ms. Wicks to be allowed to call home to see if she could possibly make arrangements regarding child care. The trial judge denied this request, stating he did not want jurors calling and discussing the case. When the prosecution peremptorily challenged Ms. Wicks, Carr objected, noting that Ms. Wicks was a black panel member. The prosecution stated that the race neutral reason for the peremptory challenge was based on the difficulty Ms. Wicks had indicated she would have finding suitable child care. The trial court ruled that the prosecution's challenge was a neutral, nondiscriminatory reason for exercising a peremptory challenge. [3] Batson set forth a three-part test for a defendant to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in jury selection: [t]o establish such a case, the defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits `those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.' Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. This combination of factors in the empaneling of the petit jury, as in the selection of the venire, raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination. 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 87-88 (citations omitted). The fact that Carr is a black man, and that the prosecution peremptorily challenged Ms. Wicks, a black woman, meets the first and second prongs of the Batson test. The third prong of the Batson test requires that Carr show that the prosecution used its peremptory challenges for the purpose of excluding minorities. See Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1346, 1349 (Miss. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210, 108 S.Ct. 2858, 101 L.Ed.2d 895 (1988). The trial court found that the reason stated by the prosecution for the peremptory challenge of Ms. Wicks was racially neutral, especially given the fact that two white women had been excused earlier for cause due to hardship for factually similar reasons. This Court gives great deference to the trial court's findings of fact on this issue. Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660, 672 (Miss. 1991) ( citing Bradley v. State, 562 So.2d 1276, 1283 (Miss. 1990)). As long as the trial court was within its authority when it determined that the State articulated a `neutral, non-race based explanation,' we will not reverse. Willie, 585 So.2d at 672 ( quoting Chisolm v. State, 529 So.2d 635, 639 (Miss. 1988)). We find the trial court did not exceed its authority in finding the State's exercise of its peremptory challenge of Ms. Wicks race neutral. This assignment of error has no merit.