Opinion ID: 199640
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Maine Assault Statute.

Text: 38 The grand jury denominated the appellant's prior conviction under the Maine general-purpose assault statute as the predicate offense underlying the violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). As previously stated, the Maine statute provides that [a] person is guilty of assault if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury or offensive physical contact to another. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 207(1). Based upon the statute's disjunctive structure, either bodily injury or offensive physical contact constitutes a sufficient actus reus. In the pages that follow, we explore the scope of these two varieties of assault, according respectful consideration and great weight to the views of Maine's highest court. Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938). 39 1. Bodily Injury. Parsing the bodily injury variant of assault is a straightforward task. Maine's criminal code defines bodily injury as physical pain, physical illness or an impairment of physical condition. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 2(5). The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (the Law Court) has imported this definition of bodily injury into Maine's general-purpose assault statute. See State v. Griffin, 459 A.2d 1086, 1091 (Me. 1983); State v. Carmichael, 405 A.2d 732, 735 (Me. 1979). Thus, the latter statute, under the bodily injury variant, proscribes acts that cause physical pain, physical illness, or impairments of physical condition. 40 2. Offensive Physical Contact. The definition of offensive physical contact, as used in Maine's general-purpose assault statute, is more elusive. Maine's criminal code does not explicate the phrase. There is, however, pertinent case law, which arises in two contexts: lesser included offenses and jury instructions. We examine those precedents. 41 In State v. Rembert, 658 A.2d 656 (Me. 1995), the defendant appealed from a robbery conviction premised upon a statute that included, as a required element, the use of physical force. 4 The defendant maintained that it was impossible to commit robbery involving physical force without also committing criminal assault involving offensive physical contact. The state attempted to distinguish the two on the ground that robbery involving physical force did not necessarily entail any bodily contact between robber and victim, whereas assault involving offensive physical contact required a direct touching of the victim. Id. at 657-58. In rejecting the state's argument, the Law Court subscribed to the Restatement position, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 18 cmt. c (1965), originally formulated in the context of civil battery. Accordingly, the Law Court held that offensive physical contact was not limited to direct touchings, but also could be effected by indirect touchings (e.g., the touching of items intimately connected to the body, such as clothing or a cane, customarily regarded as part and parcel of an individual's person). Rembert, 658 A.2d at 658. Since the use of physical force on another necessarily involved some type of offensive physical contact, assault was a lesser included offense of robbery. Id. 42 Contrary to the government's importuning, Rembert's conclusion that the use of physical force invariably involves some type of offensive physical contact does not definitively establish the converse proposition: that offensive physical contact necessarily entails the use of physical force. Rather, Rembert leaves open two possibilities: offensive physical contacts may categorically entail the use of physical force, or, alternatively, offensive physical contacts characterized by the use of physical force may represent a subset of a broader universe of offensive physical contacts. We shall return to, and resolve, this question in Part IV, infra. 43 In determining the scope of offensive physical contact, as that term is used in Maine's general-purpose assault statute, we also derive enlightenment from State v. Pozzuoli, 693 A.2d 745 (Me. 1997). There, the defendant was convicted on a charge of assault (an offense which, as we have explained, may consist of offensive physical contact). The Law Court approved a jury instruction that defined offensive physical contact as: 44 [K]nowingly intending bodily contact or unlawful touching done in such a manner as would reasonably be expected to violate the person or dignity of the victim. 45 It's something less than bodily injury . . . but requires more than a mere touching of another. And basically it's a question of was the contact under the circumstances such that a reasonable person would find it to be offensive. 46 You may consider what a reasonable person might consider under the circumstances to be offensive . . . . 47 Id. at 747. 48 For present purposes, the lesson to be learned from this approved instruction is that offensive physical contact entails something less than bodily injury . . . but requires more than a mere touching of another. The first part of this definition reiterates the Law Court's view that the presence or absence of bodily injury distinguishes the two variants of assault contemplated under Maine's general-purpose assault statute. See Carmichael, 405 A.2d at 735 (We view section 207 as specifying two independent types of simple assault, one where bodily injury results and another where there is merely an offensive physical contact without resulting bodily injury.). The second part of the definition emphasizes that not every physical contact is actionable under the general-purpose assault statute. Two factors distinguish mere touchings from offensive physical contacts: the mens rea requirement, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 207(1), and the application of a reasonable person standard to determine whether a contact is offensive, see Pozzuoli, 693 A.2d at 747-48; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 19 (A bodily contact is offensive if it offends a reasonable person's sense of dignity.).