Opinion ID: 1333121
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Child Preference Clause and examination of Jack.

Text: The Deahls challenge the trial court's ruling that Jack could not be asked whether he approved of the termination. Pointing to Code § 16.1-283(E) [3] , they submit that since Jack was almost 14, he should have had some input in determining his future. In the alternative, they argue that the trial court should have granted their motion for continuance, waited until Jack reached his 14th birthday, and allowed him to determine his fate. They further note that if the trial court felt the youth was incapable of testifying because of his age or some other reason, he should not have been permitted to testify on any matter. The Department replies that the court acted within its discretion in allowing Jack to testify to everything but his views on the termination. It states that before deciding to limit the examination of Jack the trial court properly considered such factors as potential damaging effect the question would have on this youth, his possible reluctance to concur in the termination in front of others, and the advice of Jack's guardian ad litem. Code § 16.1-283(E) explicitly states that when the court determines that a child less than 14 years of age is otherwise at an age of discretion, the youth's objection to termination will bar further proceedings. Here, the record is silent as to whether the trial court made a threshold determination whether Jack was at the age of discretion. Instead, the court refused to allow Jack to be asked the ultimate question, while going ahead and allowing counsel to secure by indirection Jack's wishes as to his termination. The statute does not define age of discretion. [4] By analogy, we examine that phrase in child custody cases. In Hepler v. Hepler, 195 Va. 611, 620-21, 79 S.E.2d 652, 658 (1954), we said: Where ... [the] child has reached the age of discretion, his wishes should be considered and given weight, though they are not conclusive. [Citations omitted.] In Nelson v. Nelson [43 Wash.2d 278] 260 P.(2d) 886, 887, it is said, The rule is that when children have reached an age of discretion, their wishes on the issue of custody may be considered but are not controlling    And as to what is an age of discretion in this regard (note the qualifying words), the authorities hold that the test is whether the child is sufficiently mature to have intelligent views and wishes on the subject. Later, in Addison v. Addison, 210 Va. 104, 109, 168 S.E.2d 281, 284 (1969), a child custody controversy growing out of a divorce suit, we said: We have here two children ... who will soon be 16 years old ... and ... 13 years old .... Manifestly we are no longer dealing with very young children, but with teenagers whose wishes and attitudes should not be disregarded, and whose opinions are entitled to weight. We think that the definition of the age of discretion as approved in Hepler should be applied here. We fully appreciate the commendable efforts of the trial court to shield this youth from the realities of a hard choice made from the witness stand, but we do not think the ruling meets the requirements of the statute. As we construe the statute, the child must be afforded a meaningful opportunity to object if he is 14 or over or has atained the age of discretion. The trial judge is uniquely qualified to appraise the effect of interrogation in each individual setting, including psychological and emotional factors. We are content to leave to his judicial discretion the methods of approaching and resolving this ultimate issue. In the record before us, a strong argument can be made that this child objected to termination and that the lower court ignored his sentiments. The trial record should be devoid of any possible ambiguities on this point. In this case the trial judge should have determined whether Jack was of the age of discretion and, if so, whether he objected to the termination, and the court order should reflect these findings. It may not always be necessary that the bald question be propounded to the child provided the record otherwise clearly indicates the child's wishes. This judgment does not meet that standard; therefore, we reverse it. The decree of the trial court will be reversed and the case remanded to that court for the procedure required under Code § 16.1-283(E). Reversed and remanded. COMPTON, J., dissents in part.