Opinion ID: 1408550
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Special Circumstance of Murder to Avoid Arrest or Perfect an Escape.

Text: The 1978 initiative added a new special circumstance of murder committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or to perfect, or attempt to perfect an escape from lawful custody. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(5).) The jury, instructed in the words of the statute without explanation of its terms, found the special circumstance to be true. (12a) We find no evidence in the record that Cherry was murdered to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest. At the time of the killing Bigelow and Ramandonovic were not under arrest and were not threatened with imminent arrest. Although the prosecutor surmised that Cherry was killed so that he would not report the robbery and kidnaping  a report which might eventually lead to the men's arrest  this argument is totally speculative. It is also an unreasonably expansive reading of the special circumstance of avoiding arrest, a reading which would cause that circumstance to overlap extensively with felony murder. [13] We believe the special circumstance of avoiding arrest should be limited to cases in which the arrest is imminent. The only evidence that Cherry was killed to perfect an escape is Bigelow's response to leading questions put by Detective Harris: MR. HARRIS: Now when you guys left Spy Hill, you knew you were running from the law at that time; didn't you? THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. MR. HARRIS: Uh-huh. And you used this stealing the car and this whole thing just to keep from getting caught; is that correct? THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. MR. HARRIS: Uh-huh. And you kept running to keep from getting caught, and you kept pulling crimes; is that it? THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. (13a) Despite this evidence, we believe that Cherry's murder as a matter of law cannot be considered one committed to perfect an escape. This special circumstance logically requires that the murder occur before the escape has been perfected, when the act of escaping is still in progress. In the present case, Bigelow and Ramandonovic had completed their escape long before the Cherry murder. (14a) Defendant cites cases which suggest that an escape is perfected as soon as the inmate has left the physical confines of the prison. (See People v. Guevara (1979) 88 Cal. App.3d 86, 90 [151 Cal. Rptr. 511]; People v. Bailey (1974) 38 Cal. App.3d 693, 701 [113 Cal. Rptr. 514]; People v. Fain (1971) 18 Cal. App.3d 137, 145 [95 Cal. Rptr. 562].) Other cases hold that it is only necessary that the defendant leave the portion of the prison where he is confined; thus, in People v. Temple (1962) 203 Cal. App.2d 654, 658 [21 Cal. Rptr. 633], the court approved a jury instruction that `[a]n escape is the unlawful departure of a prisoner from the limits of his custody even though he did not leave the prison property.' The cited cases consider whether a defendant can be separately sentenced for escape and crimes committed during an escape, and how to distinguish escape from attempted escape. They do not provide a satisfactory definition of the duration of escape for the purpose of the special circumstance in the 1978 initiative. We are confident that the special circumstance of murder to perfect an escape was intended to apply to an inmate who kills while breaking out of a prison, even though he has already escaped from his cell; it should likewise apply to an inmate who kills during hot pursuit after departing the prison confines. The limiting language suggested by defendant's cases would exclude such murders on the ground that the defendant had already left the portion of the prison to which he was legally confined. The broad test suggested by the Attorney General is equally unsatisfactory. Under his concept of once an escapee, always an escapee, a murder 20 years after an escape would fall within the special circumstance if motivated in part by a desire to avoid returning to custody. Under this reasoning, an escape could never be perfected, a view which is inconsistent with the statutory language. We adopt a middle position, drawing upon the test used in felony-murder cases to determine when a killing is so closely related to an underlying felony as to justify an enhanced punishment for the killing. (15) Under this test, even though every element of a crime has been fulfilled (and thus in a sense, the crime has been perfected), the crime continues until the criminal has reached a place of temporary safety. In the case of robbery, for example, the crime is committed  as distinct from a mere attempt  when the defendant removes the victim's property. (See People v. Gibbs (1970) 12 Cal. App.3d 526, 548 [90 Cal. Rptr. 866]; People v. Green (1979) 95 Cal. App.3d 991 [157 Cal. Rptr. 520].) The robbery continues, however, until the robber has escaped with his loot to a place of temporary safety. (See People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 365-367 [197 Cal. Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680]; People v. Salas (1972) 7 Cal.3d 812, 824 [103 Cal. Rptr. 431, 500 P.2d 7, 58 A.L.R.3d 832]; People v. Laursen (1972) 8 Cal.3d 192, 199-200 [104 Cal. Rptr. 425, 501 P.2d 1145]; People v. Powell (1974) 40 Cal. App.3d 107, 164 [115 Cal. Rptr. 109].) Once the defendant has reached a place of temporary safety, the robbery is at an end. (See People v. Ford (1966) 65 Cal.2d 41, 57 [52 Cal. Rptr. 228, 416 P.2d 132].) (14b) We adopt the same standard for the special circumstance of murder to perfect an escape. To come within this standard, the killing must not only be motivated by the goal of escaping custody, but must take place before the defendant has departed the confines of the prison facility and reached a place of temporary safety outside the confines of the prison. Upon reaching a place of temporary safety, the escape is perfected within the meaning of the statutory language, and the special circumstance is inapplicable to any subsequent killing. (13b) Under this standard, it is plain that the special circumstance is inapplicable to the murder of John Cherry. When defendant reached Sacramento on July 30, 1980, he had remained at liberty for twelve days after his escape, and traveled across an international boundary to a destination over a thousand miles from his place of confinement. No hot pursuit was underway. Here, if not earlier, he had reached a place of temporary safety, and for the moment made good his escape. (12b), (13c) The court therefore erred in submitting this special circumstance to the jury, and the verdict finding the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest or perfecting an escape is not supported by substantial evidence.