Opinion ID: 2087709
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Removal of Juror Warner

Text: The defendant asserts that a new trial is warranted on the ground that the prosecution improperly used one of its peremptory challenges to excuse venireperson Sharon Warner. During the voir dire, the defendant objected to the State's use of its peremptory challenges to remove black venirepersons and asked for a hearing pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, to determine if the State's challenges were racially motivated. As to each of the excused jurors, the trial court found that the defendant had not established a prima facie showing that the State was exercising peremptory challenges based on race, but also went on to make the finding that the prosecutors' articulated reasons for their exclusion were race-neutral. The defendant sets forth the arguments made by the parties and the trial court's rulings as to a number of the black jurors excused by the State. However, as to all but juror Warner, the defendant concedes that the trial court's ruling, that racial discrimination had not occurred, was correct. The defendant takes exception only to the trial court's ruling that the exclusion of Warner was not racially motivated. The United States Supreme Court has instructed that an objection of racial discrimination under Batson is to be subjected to a three-step process: First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. [Citation.] Second, if the requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question. [Citation.] Finally, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. ( Hernandez v. New York (1991), 500 U.S. 352, 358-59, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866, 114 L.Ed.2d 395, 405.) In this case, the prosecution volunteered its explanations for excusing the challenged venirepersons, without the trial court first determining that the defendant had established a prima facie case. Under these circumstances, the question of whether the defendant satisfied step one of the Batson inquiry is rendered moot. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359, 111 S.Ct. at 1866, 114 L.Ed.2d at 405. The defendant claims that the prosecution failed to satisfy its burden of articulating a race-neutral reason for the exclusion of Warner. The Supreme Court has dictated that a race-neutral explanation, within the context of the Batson inquiry, is an explanation: based on something other than the race of the juror. At this step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral. ( Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360, 111 S.Ct. at 1866, 114 L.Ed.2d at 406.) The Supreme Court has recently further clarified the meaning of race-neutral explanation. In Purkett v. Elem (1995), 514 U.S. ___, ___, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1771, 131 L.Ed.2d 834, 839 ( per curiam summary disposition), the Court stated that [t]he second step of [the Batson] process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible. A legitimate reason, the Court stated, is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection. ( Purkett, 514 U.S. at, 115 S.Ct. at 1771, 131 L.Ed.2d at 840.) In Purkett, the Court addressed a black defendant's objection, under Batson, to the prosecution's use of a peremptory challenge to remove a black venireman. The Court held that the reason proffered by the prosecutor in that case, that the venireman was excused because of long, unkempt hair, a mustache, and a beard, was race-neutral and satisfied the prosecutor's burden of articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for the strike. Accordingly, the Court held, the inquiry properly proceeded to step three, where the trial judge found that the prosecutor was not motivated by discriminatory intent. We conclude that, under these precedents, there is no basis for reversing the trial court's ruling upholding the removal of Warner by the State. The prosecutor proffered several reasons for the removal of Warner. The prosecutor explained that Warner's background did not make her the kind of juror the State wanted on this jury, citing her occupation (freelance writer), residence (Hyde Park) and religion (Buddhist). The trial court ruled that the defendant had failed to show purposeful discrimination. The trial court stated, there were good neutral reasons, it seems to me just obvious from looking at these three people (Warner and two other jurors whose exclusion was challenged under Batson) and the way that they responded to questions why the State would choose to exclude them. Under Hernandez and Purkett, the reasons asserted by the State here were race-neutral within the context of Batson. None of the reasons proffered, occupation, residence or religion, were based upon the race of the jurors, and discriminatory intent is not inherent in any of those explanations. This court, too, has previously recognized that both the employment and the residence of a potential juror may constitute race-neutral reasons for excluding the juror. ( People v. Kitchen (1994), 159 Ill.2d 1, 22, 201 Ill.Dec. 1, 636 N.E.2d 433 (employment); People v. Mack (1989), 128 Ill.2d 231, 241, 131 Ill.Dec. 551, 538 N.E.2d 1107 (employment); People v. Andrews (1993), 155 Ill.2d 286, 302, 185 Ill.Dec. 499, 614 N.E.2d 1184 (residence near scene of crime).) Those explanations may, therefore, properly be considered race-neutral. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360, 111 S.Ct. at 1866, 114 L.Ed.2d at 406. Given the State's articulation of race-neutral explanations, it was appropriate for the trial judge to proceed to make the factual determination of whether purposeful discrimination had been shown. A trial judge's determination on the issue of purposeful discrimination at a Batson hearing is a finding of fact that is to be accorded great deference on review. ( Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364-65, 111 S.Ct. at 1869, 114 L.Ed.2d at 409; People v. Wiley (1995), 165 Ill.2d 259, 274, 209 Ill. Dec. 261, 651 N.E.2d 189; People v. Williams (1994), 164 Ill.2d 1, 19, 206 Ill.Dec. 592, 645 N.E.2d 844.) Such deference is owed because the determination will be largely a matter of credibility, which is uniquely within the province of the trial judge. ( Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365, 111 S.Ct. at 1869, 114 L.Ed.2d at 409; Wiley, 165 Ill.2d at 274, 209 Ill.Dec. 261, 651 N.E.2d 189.) The trial judge's ruling will be set aside only if it is clearly erroneous. Williams, 164 Ill.2d at 19, 206 Ill.Dec. 592, 645 N.E.2d 844. We cannot say that the trial judge's determination, that the exclusion of Warner was not the result of purposeful discrimination, was clearly erroneous. As noted, there was nothing inherently discriminatory in any of the reasons asserted by the State. The trial judge was in the best position to assess the answers given by the potential jurors as well as the credibility of the prosecutor in asserting his reasons for excluding Warner. See People v. Fair (1994), 159 Ill.2d 51, 74, 201 Ill.Dec. 23, 636 N.E.2d 455. The defendant argues further that reversal is required because Warner's equal protection rights were violated, asserting that Warner's removal was based upon her religion. The defendant overlooks the fact that religion was just one of three race-neutral reasons proffered by the prosecution for the removal of Warner. We find that the prosecutor's reasons, exclusive of Warner's religion, were sufficient to satisfy the State's burden at step two of the Batson inquiry under the applicable precedents. Accordingly, we hold that the State's removal of juror Warner does not warrant reversal of the defendant's convictions.