Opinion ID: 453514
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: James Error

Text: 30 Under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), evidence is not hearsay if it is offered against a party and is a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Although Rule 801(d)(2)(E) codified a long-standing exception to the hearsay rule, it altered the allocation of responsibility between the judge and the jury in determining whether the exception applied. Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules, the admission of coconspiratorial hearsay was governed by the rule of United States v. Apollo, 476 F.2d 156 (5th Cir.1973). The judge's role was merely to make a preliminary determination whether the proposing party had established a prima facie case--i.e., evidence sufficient to support a finding by the jury that the conspiracy existed and that the declarant and the defendant against whom the statement was offered were members of the conspiracy. See United States v. Oliva, 497 F.2d 130, 132-33 (5th Cir.1974). If the judge made this determination, it was then the jury's responsibility to determine whether a conspiracy in fact existed, whether the defendant and declarant were members of the conspiracy, and whether the statement was made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 31 As we held in James, however, the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, by giving the trial judge the sole responsibility for determining the admissibility of coconspiratorial hearsay, required that we overrule the Apollo procedures. 590 F.2d at 578-80. Because the judge now no longer shares responsibility with the jury for determining the admissibility of the evidence, it is no longer sufficient for him to make merely a preliminary determination about whether the proposing party has established a prima facie case. Instead, he must determine himself whether all of the conditions for the admission of the evidence have been met. Id. at 579-80. James counsels that, initially, the trial judge should make this determination when the hearsay evidence is offered, using a substantial, independent evidence standard. Id. at 581. Regardless, however, of whether the judge makes this preliminary determination or whether he admits the evidence subject to it later being connected up, James requires that at the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial court must determine as a factual matter whether the [proposing party] has shown by a preponderance of the evidence independent of the statement itself (1) that a conspiracy existed, (2) that the coconspirator and the defendant against whom the coconspirator's statement is offered were members of the conspiracy, and (3) that the statement was made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.... If the court concludes that the [plaintiff] has not borne its burden of proof on these issues, the statement cannot remain in the evidence to be submitted to the jury. Id. at 582-23 (emphasis added). 32 Although James was itself a criminal case, the court's construction of the requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) was not based upon considerations unique to criminal actions. Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1121 (5th Cir.1980). For this reason, we have adopted the James rules in the civil context. Id. In doing so, however, we noted that the district court's discretion in controlling the order of proof may be broader where a party seeks to introduce coconspirators' statements in a civil action rather than a criminal proceeding since the concern of avoiding any possible prejudice to a party from the admission of evidence later determined to be inadmissible is not as strong in the civil context. Id. 33 Here, the trial court declined to make a James finding when the hearsay statements of the alleged coconspirators were offered. 5 Supp.Rec. at 167-68. Given the discretion conferred on trial courts in civil cases to control the order of proof, Paul F. Newton, 630 F.2d at 1121, this decision was not erroneous. The district court could properly allow the evidence to be introduced subject to it later being connected up. United States v. Winship, 724 F.2d 1116, 1121 (5th Cir.1984). 34 At the conclusion of all the evidence, however, the trial court was required to determine whether the plaintiff had established a James predicate by a preponderance of the independent, non-hearsay evidence. Despite motions by the defendants' counsel, the trial court failed to do so. 16 Instead, it merely determined that there is a prima facie case shown, number one, of the existence of a conspiracy, and number two, of the membership of the Defendants on trial and other coconspirators in it, and that there is sufficient evidence to go to the jury on that for their decision. 25 Rec. at 3733. Later, the district court instructed the jury to determine, from a preponderance of the independent, non-hearsay evidence, whether a conspiracy existed, whether the particular declarant was a member of the conspiracy, and whether the offered statements were made in the course and furtherance of the conspiracy. 25 Rec. at 3883. In applying the now-defunct Apollo rule regarding a prima facie case, rather than determining by a preponderance of the evidence whether the plaintiff had established a James predicate, the trial court erred. 17 35 The James rule serves an essential function in upholding the integrity of the hearsay rule. It must not be banished to the purgatory of sporadic application. In the present case, because the hearsay statements of alleged coconspirators constituted a large proportion of the plaintiff's evidence, and because we do not believe that, as a matter of law, a James predicate was established, we cannot say that the trial court's error was harmless. Consequently, with respect to the liability of the two real estate companies, we are compelled to reverse and remand for a new trial. See DeRoche, 726 F.2d at 1029 (reversing and remanding for new trial due to failure to make James finding).