Opinion ID: 1274871
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statements of Recent Perception

Text: Austin testified that Connie gave him a handwritten note before he went to bed Sunday evening. The note said: Take this w/ you. When you go to school call the police & Tell them I'm being held hostage by Joe he has a loaded gun Tell them I'm going to die if They drive up cause he already told me. I love you. Austin further testified that, some time later that evening, Connie returned to his bedroom and told me everything was going o.k. and forget about it. Just not do anything about it unless she says. Judy testified that during the course of their telephone conversation on Monday morning, Connie stated that Joe had his gun with him and that it was loaded. When Judy asked if she should call the police, Connie responded, Judy no; don't call the police. Joe already said that if the police come to the door, he's going to shoot me. Finally, Larry testified that when he telephoned, Connie sounded odd and seemed to feign talking to her sister Judy. Larry testified that Connie stated, I can't even talk on the ... Joe, why are you holding me hostage? I can't even talk to my sister on the phone. These statements all constituted hearsay because the State offered them to prove the matters asserted in the statements: (1) that Joe was holding Connie hostage; (2) that he had a loaded gun in his possession; and (3) that he had threatened to kill Connie if the police came. [2] We conclude, however, that each of these hearsay statements was admissible as a statement of recent perception under SCRA 1986, 11-804(B)(2) (Repl. Pamp.1994). This exception, which has been removed from our evidence rules since the time of trial, [3] permits the introduction into evidence of a hearsay statement, not in response to the instigation of a person engaged in investigating, litigating or settling a claim, which narrates, describes or explains an event or condition recently perceived by the declarant, made in good faith, not in contemplation of pending or anticipated litigation in which he was interested, and while his recollection was clear. Id. Each of the statements at issue here describe[d] or explain[ed] an event or condition recently perceived by the declarant. The events and conditions which the statements described or explained were those of (1) Connie being held hostage; (2) Joe possessing a gun; and (3) Joe threatening Connie. Moreover, this Court's decision in State v. Martin, 101 N.M. 595, 686 P.2d 937 (1984), supports application of this hearsay exception under these circumstances. In Martin, the defendant was charged with murdering her husband. Id. at 598, 686 P.2d at 940. Citing the exception for a statement of recent perception, the trial court permitted the victim's lover to testify, over a hearsay objection, that the victim had told the witness that the defendant had threatened to kill both the victim and the witness. Id. at 607, 686 P.2d at 949. On appeal, this Court upheld the trial court's ruling. Id.; see also Robinson, 94 N.M. at 698, 616 P.2d at 411; State v. Maestas, 92 N.M. 135, 142, 584 P.2d 182, 189 (Ct.App.1978). Joe argues that none of Connie's hearsay statements is admissible under this exception because Connie intended to get a restraining order against Joe at the time she made the hearsay statements at issue. See SCRA 1986, 11-804(B)(2) (Repl.Pamp.1994) (exception does not apply to hearsay statements made in contemplation of ... anticipated litigation). Assuming that it was in fact Connie's intent to get a restraining order, the record does not support an inference that Connie made these statements in order to facilitate that process. Instead, the evidence indicates that Connie made all of the disputed statements out of concern for her own welfare. Connie did not initiate either of the two telephone conversations at issue. Judy testified that she telephoned in order to wish Connie a happy birthday. She further testified that Connie's disputed statements were in response to Judy's specific questions about whether Joe had a gun and whether she should call the police. Likewise, Larry testified that he telephoned because he intended to get together with Connie that day and because he was worried that he had not heard from her in several days. Connie herself initiated the note to Austin, but there is no basis in the record for the inference that she had any motive, other than her own survival, for doing so. This case is thus quite different from State v. Barela, 97 N.M. 723, 643 P.2d 287 (Ct.App. 1982), the case upon which Joe relies. Barela involved a statement of identification made by the victim to a police investigator who had come to the hospital for the specific purpose of interviewing the victim about the crime. Id. at 725, 643 P.2d at 289. At the time of the interview, the police investigation had already focused upon the defendant. Id. The Court of Appeals held that the statement of identification that resulted from this interview was in contemplation of litigation and thus outside the purview of the statement of recent perception exception. Id. Barela is inapposite because in that case it was apparent that the police investigator procured the victim's hearsay statements for purposes of a criminal investigation and possible prosecution. Here there is no connection, apart from Joe's unsupported inference, between the disputed hearsay statements and any anticipated restraining order. We conclude that Joe's reliance upon Barela is misplaced. Joe also points out that the statement of recent perception exception is not widely accepted, and New Mexico itself has abrogated it since the time of trial. It is true that this Court eliminated the exception from our hearsay rules effective January 1, 1995. See Order No. 94-8300 (N.M.Sup.Ct. Oct. 12, 1994). Nevertheless, the statement of recent perception exception was the law at the time of trial. Furthermore, the origins and policies of this somewhat obscure exception to the hearsay rule support its application in this case. This Court first adopted the statement of recent perception exception in 1973, taking it verbatim from the rules of evidence that the United States Supreme Court had proposed in 1972. See Order (N.M.Sup.Ct. Apr. 26, 1973); see also 4 David W. Louisell & Christopher B. Mueller, Federal Evidence 971-72 (1980). That rule was in turn based upon Rule 63(4)(c) of the 1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence. See 4 Jack B. Weinstein et al., Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 804(b)(5)[04], at XXX-XXX-XX (1995). Both Uniform Rule 63(4)(c) and Rule 804(B)(2) of the 1972 proposed federal rules applied to criminal as well as civil cases, Id. at 804-202, and the intent of these rules was to address those situations in which the litigant was unable to establish a claim or defense because the only witness with knowledge of what occurred [was] unavailable. Id. at 804-202. Professor McCormick hailed this new development in hearsay law as an attempt to answer a need which many judges and writers have expressed for a wider use of declarations of persons deceased or otherwise unavailable. Charles T. McCormick, Hearsay, 10 Rutgers L.Rev. 620, 624 (1956). He observed that the new rule would open the door to statements by victims of crime which can meet these conditions of trustworthiness, even though consciousness of impending death did not appear and hence they would not be eligible as dying declarations. Id. Given this historical backdrop, we find that this case presents a situation in which application of the statement of recent perception exception is particularly appropriate. Joe took the stand at trial and gave his version of the events that occurred in the hours that preceded Connie's shooting. Only two people  Joe and Connie  had direct knowledge of many of the events that occurred during the critical time period. Without Connie's statements, the jury would have heard only Joe's version. We think that the framers of the 1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence contemplated similar situations when they developed Rule 63(4)(c).