Opinion ID: 2351922
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Self-Representation Includes Bench Conferences

Text: The United States Supreme Court has held that the right of self-representation in all criminal prosecutions is implicit in the Sixth Amendment. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 816-19, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2531-33, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); see also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984). Although the Federal right to self-representation is only implicit in the Sixth Amendment, the right of self-representation is set forth explicitly in the Delaware Constitution: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath a right to be heard by himself and his counsel,.... Del. Const. art. I, § 7. The venerable history relating to the right of self-representation that is guaranteed by the Delaware Constitution was reviewed by this Court in Hooks v. State, Del.Supr., 416 A.2d 189, 198-99 (1980). [1] The record reflects that Snowden made a timely request to represent himself at trial. The conditions precedent to granting an accused the Sixth Amendment right to conduct his or her own defense, are a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel and an agreement to adhere to the tribunal's rules of procedure. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. at 173, 104 S.Ct. at 948. Accordingly, the Superior Court made a comprehensive inquiry before ruling upon Snowden's motion to proceed pro se. Briscoe v. State, Del. Supr., 606 A.2d 103 (1992). The Superior Court granted Snowden's motion for self-representation, but imposed a critical condition. It ruled that Snowden must remain at counsel table throughout the trial. The trial judge also appointed a standby attorney for Snowden. [2] As a result of the Superior Court's order to remain at counsel table, Snowden was excluded from all sidebar conferences. Instead, Snowden's standby attorney was requested to come forward for those stages of the trial. Snowden contends that the Superior Court violated his right of self-representation by barring him from participating in sidebar conferences. Several state and federal courts have addressed the issue of excluding a pro se defendant from participating in sidebar conferences. The most analogous cases are: United States v. McDermott, 64 F.3d 1448 (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 930, 133 L.Ed.2d 857 (1996); People v. Rosen , N.Y.Ct.App., 81 N.Y.2d 237, 597 N.Y.S.2d 914, 613 N.E.2d 946 (1993); Oses v. Massachusetts, 961 F.2d 985 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 954, 113 S.Ct. 410, 121 L.Ed.2d 334 (1992); and United States v. Mills, 895 F.2d 897 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 951, 110 S.Ct. 2216, 109 L.Ed.2d 541 (1990). In McDermott, the Tenth Circuit held that barring the defendant from participating in bench conferences violated his Sixth Amendment right of self-representation. United States v. McDermott, 64 F.3d at 1451-54. In Oses, the First Circuit held that the combination of three errors, one of which was exclusion of the defendant but not standby counsel from bench conferences, violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right of self-representation. Oses v. Massachusetts, 961 F.2d at 986. Conversely, in Mills, the Second Circuit found no violation of that Sixth Amendment right when the defendant was excluded from sidebar conferences at which his standby counsel participated, because it concluded that taking the trial as a whole, Mills had `a fair chance to present his case in his own way.' United States v. Mills, 895 F.2d at 905 (citing Wiggins ). In Rosen, the New York Court of Appeals held that when the trial court advanced no reason for its refusal to permit [the] defendant to attend sidebars ... that defendant's State constitutional right to self-representation was violated. People v. Rosen, 613 N.E.2d at 950, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 918. In determining whether a defendant's Faretta rights have been respected, the primary focus must be on whether the defendant had a fair chance to present his case in his own way. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. at 177, 104 S.Ct. at 950. In Mills, the Second Circuit relied heavily on the foregoing statement. See United States v. Mills, 895 F.2d at 905. In McDermott, however, the Tenth Circuit found that two additional considerations in Wiggins constrained its analysis. Those considerations are as follows: First, the pro se defendant is entitled to preserve actual control over the case he chooses to present to the jury. This is the core of the Faretta right. If standby counsel's participation over the defendant's objection effectively allows counsel to make or substantially interfere with any significant tactical decisions, or to control the questioning of witnesses, or to speak instead of the defendant on any matter of importance, the Faretta right is eroded. Second, participation by standby counsel without the defendant's consent should not be allowed to destroy the jury's perception that the defendant is representing himself. The defendant's appearance in the status of one conducting his own defense is important in a criminal trial, since the right to appear pro se exists to affirm the accused's individual dignity and autonomy. In related contexts the courts have recognized that a defendant has a right to be present at all important stages of trial,.... United States v. McDermott, 64 F.3d at 1453-54 ( quoting McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. at 178, 104 S.Ct. at 951) (emphasis added). The record reflects that both of the foregoing considerations were implicated when the Superior Court barred Snowden from participating in all sidebar conferences. In describing the essential elements of the first consideration, the United States Supreme Court stated that standby counsel may not, over the defendant's objection, speak instead of [the] defendant on any matter of importance.... McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. at 178, 104 S.Ct. at 951. That directive was elaborated upon, as follows: The pro se defendant must be allowed to control the organization and content of his [or her] own defense, to make motions, to argue points of law, to participate in voir dire, to question witnesses, and to address the court and the jury at appropriate points in the trial. Id. at 174, 104 S.Ct. at 948. The right to address the court at appropriate points in the trial on any matter of importance undoubtedly includes the right to be heard at sidebar conferences. The parameters of the second consideration set forth in Wiggins were also implicated by Snowden's exclusion from bench conferences. The guidance on those parameters was specific in Wiggins: [T]he Faretta right must impose some limits on the extent of standby counsel's unsolicited participation. . . . . . Participation by standby counsel in the presence of the jury is more problematic. It is here that the defendant may legitimately claim that excessive involvement by counsel will destroy the appearance that the defendant is acting pro se. This, in turn, may erode the dignitary values that the right to self-representation is intended to promote and may undercut the defendant's presentation to the jury of his own most effective defense. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. at 177, 181-82, 104 S.Ct. at 950, 953. By barring Snowden from sidebar conferences, the trial judge may have adversely affected the jury's perception that Snowden was representing himself, i.e., destroyed Snowden's dignity and autonomy. The State acknowledges that trial counsel for any defendant is entitled to participate in all sidebars. The State also acknowledges that the denial of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to self-representation is not subject to a harmless error analysis. Nevertheless, the State argues that, to the extent standby counsel participated in the sidebar conferences without Snowden's objection, it may be presumed Snowden waived his right to personally discharge that particular function at trial. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. at 182, 104 S.Ct. at 953. [3] The record reflects that Snowden did not waive his right to represent himself at bench conferences. When the fifth sidebar conference was convened, the following exchange took place between Snowden's standby counsel and the trial judge: STANDBY COUNSEL: I'm sorry. Past sidebars I've come forward. I'm becoming increasingly uncomfortable because I'm only standby counsel. You must bear in mind that Mr. Harvey [Snowden] is representing himself. I don't know what else to do, but  I just am increasingly uncomfortable with the level of involvement. The way this thing is proceeding is putting me in  I am not the attorney. He is his attorney. He must be allowed to come to sidebar and present his views or the jury must be removed from the courtroom in order to have these sidebars.... THE COURT: I do understand that, ... However, I believe that the prejudice to the defendant of having him traipse across here with two officers behind him each time there's a sidebar conference is greater than the disadvantage of his not being present. It's just happening far too often for me to excuse the jury each time. So the Court recognizes that you do not represent him and the Court has also taken note that each time there was a decision to be made or something to explain, that you have gone over to the defendant to make sure he was fully apprised. I understand that does not take place of his being present here, ... Accordingly, the record reflects that Snowden's absence from all sidebar conferences was imposed by the trial judge and not the result of a waiver by Snowden. Accord People v. Rosen , N.Y.Ct.App., 613 N.E.2d 946, 949, 597 N.Y.S.2d 914, 917, 81 N.Y.2d 237 (1993). The United States Supreme Court has held that a denial of the right of self-representation is not amenable to harmless error analysis. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. at 177 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. at 950 n. 8. Its rationale was a recognition that, when the right of self-representation is exercised, the likelihood of a trial outcome unfavorable to the defendant usually increases. Id. Therefore, the question for this Court is straightforward: was Snowden's right of self-representation respected or denied? Id. Snowden's right of self-representation afforded him the opportunity to address the court ... at appropriate points in the trial, including sidebar conferences. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. at 174, 104 S.Ct. at 949. Thus, Snowden's exclusion from all bench conferences was a denial of his Sixth Amendment right of self-representation. Accord Del. Const. art. I, § 7. Consequently, because the denial of that right is not subject to a harmless error analysis, Snowden must be granted a new trial.