Opinion ID: 787546
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Voir Dire Claims

Text: 17 As noted earlier, in Claim 4B, Clemons alleges that six prospective jurors were improperly excluded as not death-qualified. At the outset, we must address the state's procedural default argument. The state alleges that because defense counsel made inadequate objections at trial and did not include these claims in the motion for new trial, the state appellate courts did not review the voir dire issues. Thus, the state says, these jury selection issues are procedurally defaulted. 18 A federal district court is precluded from substantively considering a habeas corpus claim that a state court has disposed of on independent and adequate non-federal grounds, including state procedural grounds. Reagan v. Norris, 279 F.3d 651, 656 (8th Cir.2002). A state prisoner procedurally defaults a claim when he violates a state procedural rule that independently and adequately bars direct review of the claim by the United States Supreme Court, unless the prisoner can show cause and prejudice for the default, or actual innocence. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). In other words, a state prisoner who fails to satisfy state procedural requirements forfeits his right to present his federal claim through a federal habeas corpus petition, unless he can meet strict cause and prejudice or actual innocence standards. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 493-96, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). 19 For the federal court to enforce a state procedural bar, either the state court must have declined to reach the issue for procedural reasons or it is clear that the state court would hold the claim procedurally barred. The default must have been actually imposed; it is not enough that the state court could or should have imposed a default. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985). The federal court looks to the last, reasoned state court opinion dealing with the claim to determine whether a specific contention is procedurally defaulted. If the last state court to be presented with a particular federal claim reaches the merits, it removes any bar to federal-court review that might otherwise have been available. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991). And, federal courts should not consider whether the state court properly applied its default rule to the claim; federal courts do not sit to correct a state court's application of its procedural rules. Sweet v. Delo, 125 F.3d 1144, 1151 (8th Cir.1997). 20 In its ruling on Clemons's direct appeal and Rule 29.15 motion, the Missouri Supreme Court stated: 21 Appellant raises numerous claims of trial court error on direct appeal that were not properly preserved because they were either not objected to at trial or not raised in the motion for new trial. These claims are reviewable, if at all, only for plain error. The plain error rule is to be used sparingly and may not be used to justify a review of every point that has not been otherwise preserved for appellate review. Appellant must demonstrate that manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice will occur if the error is not corrected.... None of appellant's unpreserved claims raise a substantial ground for finding plain error. Therefore, we decline to subject these claims to our discretionary review under Rule 30.20. However, to the extent appellant properly raises the issue under Rule 29.15, we will review appellant's additional claims for ineffective assistance of counsel, either for failing to preserve the alleged trial error or for ineffective assistance regarding the circumstances of the trial error itself. 22 Clemons I, 946 S.W.2d at 224 (citations omitted). The Missouri Supreme Court then analyzed as a particular constitutional claim whether Clemons's two trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to object to the purportedly improper voir dire questions asked of the venire-members, thereby causing erroneous dismissals for cause. Id. 23 We agree with the state's contention that the Missouri Supreme Court applied a procedural bar to Clemons's substantive voir dire claim. Notwithstanding this unequivocal ruling, the district court found that this claim was properly preserved at trial, and that the Missouri courts improperly applied a procedural bar. The district court erred in this regard. As previously stated, federal courts do not look at whether state courts have correctly applied their own procedural rules. They simply determine whether those procedural rules were applied to bar the claim. Sweet, 125 F.3d at 1151. If they were, the petitioner is left to show cause and prejudice or actual innocence. Because counsel did not correctly 2 protect this voir dire issue for appellate review, the state supreme court declined to review the matter on appeal. 24 The Missouri court did, however, fully and independently review the ineffective assistance of counsel assertions arising from this unpreserved voir dire claim, but not its substantive merit, standing alone. Clemons argues that he fairly presented this claim to the state court, and should not be penalized for poor draftsmanship or inartful arguments. In this regard, however, Clemons makes an exhaustion argument, not a procedural bar argument, and the two concepts are quite separate. Justus v. Murray, 897 F.2d 709, 713 (4th Cir.1990). Exhaustion requires fair presentment of a claim to the state courts for initial adjudication, while procedural default requires the federal courts to abstain from considering an issue if that issue was decided on independent and adequate state grounds. Id. 25 Although Clemons did attempt to fairly present these claims to the state courts for purposes of exhaustion, 3 the failure of counsel to later preserve these claims prompted the state courts to dispose of the voir dire arguments on procedural grounds, an independent and adequate state basis. Absent any reason to lift the procedural bar (cause and prejudice or actual innocence), our review is precluded. 26 In his traverse to the district court, Clemons argued that an ineffective lawyer caused his procedural default, and that he was prejudiced by this mistake. In order for deficient trial work to constitute the kind of cause that would excuse a procedural bar, counsel must have been constitutionally ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (holding that to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, counsel's performance must have fallen below an objective standard of reasonableness that prejudiced the defendant). And, petitioner must have independently presented this ineffective assistance claim to the state court for adjudication. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 489, 106 S.Ct. 2639. 27 Clemons did present this ineffective assistance claim to the state courts. 4 Thus, if counsel was constitutionally deficient under Strickland standards, the cause factor necessary to lift the procedural bar is established. 28 But, even if counsel's performance with regard to Claim 4B fell below a standard of objective reasonableness as a result of an inadequate trial objection or an incomplete motion for new trial, we find, as did the Missouri Supreme Court, that under the second part of the Strickland test, Clemons was not prejudiced. 5 That is because the outcome of the state court proceeding would not have been different absent counsel's purported failures. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The trial court did not err in excluding these potential jurors and thus, their absence had no effect on the jury's imposition of the death penalty. 29 A trial court's finding of death qualification in the voir dire process is a factual determination entitled to the presumption of correctness established in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e). See Witt, 469 U.S. at 429, 105 S.Ct. 844 (holding that voir dire findings were factual issues entitled to the presumption of correctness formerly found in Section 2254(d)). Under this standard of review, Clemons has not shown that the trial court's finding was wrong under Witherspoon and Witt. The trial court concluded that, based on their answers to the prosecutor's questions, these prospective jurors' beliefs would prevent or substantially impair their performance as jurors. Each veniremember unequivocally stated that he or she could not impose the death penalty under the circumstances posed by the prosecutor. 30 Defense counsel asked each one if he or she could impose the death penalty, and each indicated yes. However, the prosecutor had asked these prospective jurors the same question. It was only when the prosecutor clarified that the jury might be asked to impose the death penalty for accomplice liability that the prospective jurors balked. Defense counsel only delved into accomplice liability with three of the six jurors, and two of them reiterated their earlier statement that they could not impose death for accomplice liability. One of them arguably agreed to impose death after much prodding by defense counsel. However, our review of the trial transcript indicates that the trial court reasonably could have construed the purported rehabilitation of this juror (Wetteroth) as inadequate. Faced with these prospective jurors' answers to the death qualification questions, the trial court's dismissal of these six veniremembers for cause withstands review under Section 2254(e). 31 Clemons makes much of the fact that the prosecutor's voir dire inquiry allegedly misstated the circumstances under which a Missouri jury could sentence a defendant to death. Specifically, Clemons charges the prosecutor with failing to include the cool reflection standard in his questioning and with injecting a robbery scenario into the hypothetical posed to some of the veniremembers. We find neither argument persuasive. We are not persuaded that the prosecutor misstated the law on cool reflection. The record indicates that before questioning the veniremembers individually, all six prospective jurors involved in Claim 4B heard, as a group, that the requisite mental state for first-degree murder was cool reflection. The prosecutor was not required to repeat each element of first-degree murder while individually questioning each prospective juror. Otherwise, we fail to see the point of addressing the venire as a group. 32 Clemons and the district court have both pointed to the prosecutor's robbery hypothetical as especially prejudicial. The prosecutor used this hypothetical to explain accomplice liability, while individually questioning prospective jurors other than the six in question here. Each of the six heard the hypothetical, but none of the prospective jurors were specifically and individually questioned with the robbery hypothetical. Instead, each was asked whether he or she could impose the death penalty if Clemons did not actually push the women off the bridge. We are satisfied that these prospective jurors knew that they were being asked if they could impose the death penalty under an accomplice to murder theory, not a robbery. 33 This is not to say that a misleading prosecutor could always exclude prospective jurors under Witherspoon and Witt without violating the defendant's constitutional rights. For example, if the prosecutor asks veniremembers, if I only prove that the killing was accidental, could you still impose the death penalty, and prospective jurors were excluded for cause when they answered no. Under such circumstances, the defendant's due process and Sixth Amendment rights would likely be violated. This is not that case. 34 Clemons has no claim that his procedural default should be excused. He cannot show cause. His counsel's performance, while possibly deficient, cannot be said to have affected the outcome of the proceeding. So, the prejudice portion of the ineffective assistance test has not been met. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The trial court's exclusion of these prospective jurors withstands scrutiny under Section 2254(e), and these voir dire claims are procedurally barred unless Clemons can establish actual innocence. 35 Clemons makes no argument in briefing to this court about actual innocence. In the district court, Clemons argued 6 that he was actually innocent because there was no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that he deliberated or planned to murder the Kerry sisters. The district court found that such evidence did exist and rejected Clemons's claim of actual innocence. 212 F.Supp.2d at 1114-15. We agree with the district court that Clemons failed to make the requisite showing of actual innocence. 7
36 Although it appears to us that the same procedural default analysis would apply to Juror Doss as to the Claim 4B jurors discussed above, in its briefing and at oral argument, the state has waived its procedural bar defense with regard to this claim. So we must review it on its merits. However, because the Missouri Supreme Court peripherally addressed the merits of this claim, but only as a subsidiary point in its analysis of whether Clemons was prejudiced by alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, it is unclear whether we have a state court adjudication that is entitled to Section 2254(d) deference. See ante, note 1. Assuming arguendo that the Doss claim was not adjudicated on the merits within the meaning of Section 2254(d), we likely should apply the pre-AEDPA standard of review. Robinson v. Crist, 278 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir.2002). Prior to AEDPA, we reviewed Sixth Amendment death qualification issues under the standards set forth in Witherspoon and Witt. Even then, however, a trial court's voir dire factual findings were entitled to a presumption of correctness, Witt, 469 U.S. at 429, 105 S.Ct. 844, which is essentially equivalent to the factual presumption of correctness currently found in Section 2254(e)(1). With this standard in mind, we analyze the trial court's voir dire findings with regard to Juror Doss. 37 Doss initially stated, unequivocally, that he could not apply the death penalty for religious reasons. Upon further questioning by the prosecutor, he equivocated and said there might be a factual scenario under which he could impose the death penalty. But when presented with the accomplice-liability theory, Doss stated that he could not impose the death penalty. Shortly after this statement, Doss reversed course and stated that he could impose death even if Clemons did not push the women off of the bridge. When questioned by defense counsel, Doss stated that he could impose the death penalty under the acting with another theory. 38 When Doss was dismissed for cause, the trial court stated: 39 And Mr. Doss initially said no death penalty, religious reasons, then backtracked a little. He initially said all doubt, and I don't think he has been rehabilitated by just asking, Well, would you follow the instructions? Would you do what the Judge tells you? I think these people need to be given an alternative to rehabilitate them.... He said no death penalty on acting with another. 40 App. Vol. II, at 397. 41 The trial court did mischaracterize Doss's statements regarding the death sentence for acting with another. Doss originally said that he could not impose the death penalty in those circumstances, though he later retreated from that position. But, we find that the trial judge was left with the firm conviction that Doss's religious beliefs would ultimately substantially impair his ability to act as a juror. This credibility determination is entitled to great deference at any level of review, but especially in a federal habeas proceeding. The Witt Court noted that a juror's bias need not be proved with unmistakable clarity, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, and it follows that the trial judge's findings attain the utmost importance. As the Witt Court stated: 42 Despite this lack of clarity in the printed record, however, there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law.... [T]his is why deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror. 43 Id. at 425-26, 105 S.Ct. 844. 44 Under Witt, and its mandate that we apply a presumption of correctness to the trial judge's impressions of prospective juror Doss, we cannot say that Clemons has overcome that presumption. Although the trial court did not remember that Doss changed his mind about imposing the death penalty for accomplice liability, he correctly remembered that Doss held strong beliefs against the death penalty and was therefore unconvinced that Doss had been rehabilitated. Indeed the Missouri Supreme Court observed that, Doss's equivocal and shifting responses to questions focusing on his ability to impose the death penalty provide a sufficient rationale for the trial court's decision to sustain the state's motion. Clemons I, 946 S.W.2d at 225. The printed record may show a lack of clarity on this issue, but as the Witt Court anticipated, the trial court's firsthand impressions trump the cold record. Accordingly, Clemons cannot prevail here.