Opinion ID: 364165
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Negligence on the part of HUD

Text: 12 As the plaintiffs cannot recover from the United States for any negligence on the part of CRUV, they must rely on their second theory of recovery: that HUD and its employees were themselves negligent. See Logue, 412 U.S. at 532-33, 93 S.Ct. 2215. The court below excluded this possibility on the ground that no liability could arise from designing a 37.5 inch high balcony railing. Both parties take the position that whether the balcony was negligently designed was not before the court. The plaintiffs argue, in addition, that HUD's employees, 13 were responsible for changes in the height of the balcony parapets, . . . approved the plans and specifications for the deviations and . . . failed to inspect according to their own standards, 14 and that HUD was, 15 concerned with the safe, decent and sanitary conditions of its ultimate tenants. It exercised control over projects . . . and under the law was granting a warranty of habitability. It, through its own employees, and through its meticulous day-to-day supervision of the employees of contractors, breached its duty. 16 They argue that there was sufficient evidence of this in the record to create a genuine issue of fact, and that summary judgment was therefore improper. The United States, on the other hand, insists that the record contains no evidence of negligence on its part and asks us to affirm, although for reasons other than those provided by the district court. 17 For plaintiffs to prevail on the theory that HUD's own employees acted negligently, they must establish that the alleged defect in the balcony resulted from the breach of a duty owed by HUD to the tenants of Llorens Torres within the contours of Puerto Rican law. See Zabala Clemente v. United States, 567 F.2d 1140, 1143 (1st Cir. 1977), Cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006, 98 S.Ct. 1876, 56 L.Ed.2d 388 (1978). 10 The plaintiffs suggest that HUD had two duties, either of which, if violated, would allow them to recover. First, alluding to HUD's contractual right to review and approve the plans for Llorens Torres and to inspect the site, they suggest that HUD had an affirmative duty to ensure that Llorens Torres was safe. Thus they say that HUD failed to inspect according to (its) own standards. Second, they theorize that HUD caused the railing of the Ramos' balcony to be changed to an unsafe height. They argue that, if this fact could be established, then the United States could be liable for damages resulting from HUD's acts, presumably on the ground that HUD had a duty not to increase the risk of harm to the tenants. See Zabala Clemente, 567 F.2d at 1145. 18 Turning to the first theory, we find no basis for holding that HUD was under an affirmative duty to ensure that Llorens Torres was safe. The United States neither owned nor was in possession of the Llorens Torres site and thus could not have owed any duties to the project's tenants as a landowner. See Fisher v. United States, 441 F.2d 1288, 1291 (3d Cir. 1971); W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 63 (4th ed. 1971). HUD was a financier with rights to review the plans for Llorens Torres and to inspect the site. Neither of these rights, however, burdened it with an affirmative duty to guarantee the safety of the project's tenants. 19 There is no basis for imposing affirmative obligations on HUD merely because it reviewed the designs for Llorens Torres. Plaintiffs have not pointed to any legal doctrine under which HUD was required to establish safety standards for the projects it funded, and we can think of none. 11 Thus we attach no great significance to the fact that there apparently were no federal standards for balcony railings when Llorens Torres was built. More importantly, like the FAA safety inspection procedures at issue in Zabala Clemente, supra (1st Cir.), 567 F.2d 1140, whatever federal standards did exist were, in our view, established for the benefit of HUD, as guidelines to HUD's employees and as a means of ensuring that federal housing funds would be spent for their intended purpose. Tenants inevitably would benefit from the construction of housing in compliance with federal specifications, but the adoption of such standards cannot be said to have created duties owed to the general public. See id. at 1144-46; Kirk v. United States, 270 F.2d 110, 117 (9th Cir. 1959). 20 Nor did HUD's right to inspect the site give rise to a duty to ensure the safety of the project's tenants. HUD's interest in inspecting was to guarantee compliance with the applicable contracts; its employees were not conducting general safety inspections, but rather were at the site to ensure that the project was built according to plans and to protect HUD's financial interests. HUD did not agree to inspect as a service to CRUV or to CRUV's tenants, and hence did not undertake to fulfill CRUV's duties to future tenants, See Roberson v. United States, 9th Cir., 382 F.2d 714, at 721. As HUD merely reserved the right to inspect without more, it did not incur any duties to CRUV much less CRUV's tenants to discover any problems with the Llorens Torres construction. See Zabala Clemente, 567 F.2d at 1145, 1148-49; Fisher, 441 F.2d at 1291; Gowdy v. United States, 412 F.2d 525 (6th Cir.), Cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960, 90 S.Ct. 437, 24 L.Ed.2d 425 (1969); Wright v. United States, 404 F.2d 244, 247 (7th Cir. 1968); Roberson v. United States, 382 F.2d 714, 721 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Page, 350 F.2d 28, 30-31 (10th Cir. 1965), Cert. denied, 382 U.S. 979, 86 S.Ct. 552, 15 L.Ed.2d 470 (1966); See also Gercey v. United States, 540 F.2d 536 (1st Cir. 1976). Individuals deciding to move into Llorens Torres could not have reasonably relied on the fact that the United States might have inspected it. See Zabala Clemente, 567 F.2d at 1148; Roberson, 382 F.2d at 721; Cf. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955) (government may be liable where it gratuitously undertakes service upon which public justifiably relies). 21 As HUD did not have an affirmative duty to ensure that Llorens Torres was designed and built safely, the plaintiffs could recover from the United States only if they could point to some act of intervention by HUD in the design or construction process that could meaningfully be said to have caused the balcony railing to be unsafe, thereby increasing the risk of harm to the Llorens Torres tenants. See Zabala Clemente, 567 F.2d at 1145. As it was CRUV that had ultimate responsibility for designing the project, it would not be enough to show that the allegedly unsafe railing was a remote consequence of CRUV's efforts to deal with HUD's objections to another feature of the original plans. HUD was entitled to request improvements in CRUV's design without assuming responsibility for all changes CRUV thereafter might make in response to its requests. Only if HUD, as distinct from CRUV, could be said to have been the proximate, rather than merely the incidental, cause of Nancy Ramos' injury, could the United States be held liable. See W. Prosser, Law of Torts §§ 31, 42 (4th ed. 1971). Thus plaintiffs would have to prove that HUD either required the railings to be lowered or unreasonably insisted on some change that made the lowering of the railing unavoidable. 22 From the time they initiated their action the plaintiffs sought to obtain evidence that the United States had required the Ramos' balcony railing to be lowered from some greater height to 37.5 inches, but with scant success. The United States stated in sworn interrogatories that CRUV, not HUD, designed, approved and received the project, that HUD reserved the right to review and approve the plans for the sole purpose of safeguarding the financial interest of the United States in the project, and that the official CRUV construction plans of the project called for 37.5 inch high railings. It filed a sworn statement of a civil engineer stating that he had measured eighteen balconies of nine apartments in Llorens Torres, including the plaintiffs' and balconies on the first and second floor of their building, and that the railings of these balconies were uniformly between 36 and 37.5 inches high. It also filed the deposition of Mr. Servaites, who testified that HUD's primary interest in Llorens Torres had been financial and the CRUV had designed the project. 23 The plaintiffs submitted no affidavits or evidence to contradict or supplement this information. Instead they attempted in their cross-examination of Mr. Servaites to create an issue of fact concerning his office's role in designing Llorens Torres. Servaites indicated that his office had devoted considerable attention to the details of the project and said that it had gone over CRUV's designs until they met federal requirements. He also said that there had been a Manual of Policy and Procedures covering site selection and methods for reviewing documents. HUD had had minimum standards for materials used and minimum living space requirements, and the local authority would have had to meet these, unless they had obtained a waiver. He replied affirmatively when asked whether HUD's monitoring of the program was concerned with the safety and the safety of the eventual occupants of the apartments, and added that, you wouldn't deliberately go about building it defective so that it would be hazardous to health or good living. 24 Although he apparently could not recall any specific incidents, he stated that his office would have required revisions of the plans for Llorens Torres or the project itself at any stage, if it had, encountered an oversight here or an error there. . . . Asked whether he knew of any reason why the balcony railings on the upper floors in Llorens Torres might be lower than those on the lower floors, he replied that he did not. He recalled that the local authorities had been allowed to reduce the interior living area of the apartments because the outdoor porches were used as living space in the tropics. Plaintiffs' counsel read a letter 12 to him, stating that the interior area still did not meet the requirements for Puerto Rico and that the local authorities had agreed to widen the balcony and to raise a part of it adjacent to the kitchen to the level of the kitchen floor. Servaites could not recall the letter, but assumed, that was probably the best judgment then of the reviewer who was going over the plans. He stated that his office typically met with the local authorities, to iron out different views and different opinions and so forth. This was all part of our review of the plans and specifications. 25 Counsel for the plaintiffs had with him at the deposition some specifications which he did not identify clearly. Servaites surmised that these were HUD's standard specifications which were canned and preprinted and supplied with the bidding documents. 13 He said that, wherever there was variation to satisfy local deviations they inserted them in the specifications . . . . Counsel asserted that the specifications called for four-foot balcony railings on the lower floors and four-foot-one-and-a-half inch railings on the third floor. He then initiated the following, somewhat confusing exchange: 26 Q. Can you give any reason for approving such a specification (i. e., deviation) 14 27 A. I don't know of a single reason why that would have been the case. I know of no reason at any time where there should have been any deviation . . . in the height of the balconies. 28 Counsel then asked whether it was not possible that, when it was proposed to widen the balcony and to raise a part of the floor adjacent to the kitchen, it was not cheaper for the contractor and for the designers to propose raising the whole balcony five inches or six inches whatever it was . . . . Mr. Servaites replied that he did not know the answer. Finally, asked whether there had been federal specifications for balcony heights, he responded, I don't know that that was covered, frankly, I don't know. I am not that familiar with the specifications. He then said that, if there had been federal safety standards, HUD would have insisted that the local authority comply with them. At no point did he accept responsibility for the height of the balcony railings at Llorens Torres. 29 The plaintiffs would have us find that their cross-examination of Mr. Servaites created a genuine issue of material fact. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). It is clear that they would like to establish that HUD precipitated a change in the height of the balcony railings at Llorens Torres in order to accommodate a change in the balcony floor. They assert in their brief that HUD ordered the balcony floor raised and that, There was no companion order to raise the parapet six inches. These allegations find no support in the record, however. Neither the letter nor the specifications that counsel made reference to in cross-examining Servaites were filed with the court; at best a portion of the purported letter was quoted in an appendix attached to one of the plaintiffs' memoranda in opposition to the government's motion. Moreover, even if these facts had been or could be established, plaintiffs would have to show more: as HUD was under no affirmative duty and as CRUV had ultimate responsibility for the design of the project, it would not be enough that HUD failed to act or suggested one change in the plans that, through a long chain of reactions, led CRUV to lower the balcony railings. 30 We agree with the government that it met its burden of showing that there was no factual issue as to HUD's role in designing Llorens Torres. That role was not such that HUD can be held legally responsible for the height of the Ramos' balcony railing. There is nothing in the record to support a finding of the facts that plaintiffs could have to show in order to recover. Once the self-serving speculation and innuendo of plaintiffs' counsel is eliminated, what remains are a number of statements by Mr. Servaites indicating that his office was in close contact with CRUV as the plans for the Llorens Torres project were drafted and that HUD's interests extended to features that would affect the sound construction of the project and the general health and safety of its tenants, such as the floor area of the apartments and the quality of the building materials. These few statements must be taken in conjunction with the undisputed fact that HUD's primary interest was in the financial viability of the project and that the project was designed by CRUV's own architects. The fact that Servaites' officer reviewed the plans in close cooperation with CRUV does not contradict this. 31 The government having submitted material sufficient to establish that it had not designed the Ramos' balcony, it was incumbent on the plaintiffs to show that a trial was necessary by filing counter-affidavits or other attested documents indicating the existence of a contrary fact material to the litigation. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Mack v. Cape Elizabeth School Board, 553 F.2d 720, 722 (1st Cir. 1977); Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 464 (1st Cir. 1975). As they failed to do so, summary judgment was proper. 32 The plaintiffs, anticipating this ruling, complained in their brief and at oral argument that they had evidence of HUD's negligence and that the lower court was aware of this. They argue that the court unfairly surprised them by ruling on the issue of negligence, which they say was not before it. As nearly as we can ascertain, they take the position that the letter and the specifications that plaintiffs' counsel referred to in his cross-examination of Mr. Servaites would have established HUD's complicity in designing the balcony, and that they should have had an opportunity to present this evidence to the court. 33 We reject the plaintiffs' assertions that the district court acted prematurely in disposing of the issue of the government's liability for its own negligence. Although the parties had not addressed the question whether, as a matter of law, the balcony was constructed negligently, they did know that the government's responsibility for the design of the balcony was disputed and was material to the issue of negligence. Indeed, in an Opposition dated July 28, 1977, the plaintiffs themselves framed the issue as whether the United States, or any officer, agent or servant of the United States, (was) negligent, and if so, was that negligence the proximate cause of Nancy Ramos' injuries? 34 Plaintiffs' failure to specify or submit whatever factual materials it had cannot be excused. Both parties were aware that the government's motion would be considered as a motion for summary judgment and that they were to submit to the court any materials appropriate to establish or contradict the existence of a genuine issue of fact. The court first indicated this in November 1976, discovery was ordered continued then and again in January 1977, the parties submitted what evidence is in the record, and the court did not act until February 1978. The plaintiffs had amply opportunity to submit their evidence and were required to do more than suggest that something might turn up at trial, Soar v. N.F.L. Players' Association, 550 F.2d 1287, 1289 n. 4 (1st Cir. 1977). 35 Affirmed.