Opinion ID: 2828566
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tax Evasion Trial

Text: Mr. Kupfer and his wife jointly filed federal income taxes from 2004 to 2006, but failed to report over $790,000 in gross income. The government charged Mr. Kupfer with three counts of tax evasion and aiding and abetting, one count for each year. See 26 U.S.C. § 7201; 18 U.S.C. § 2. Mr. Kupfer admitted that he had failed to report a substantial amount of gross income, but denied that his underreporting was willful. The jury disagreed and found Mr. Kupfer guilty on each count. On appeal, he challenges the adequacy of the jury instructions and the district court’s response to an allegation of jury misconduct. 1 On both issues, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion.
The district court instructed the jury that it could find guilt only if Mr. Kupfer’s under-reporting of income had been willful. According to Mr. Kupfer, the court should have gone further, instructing the jury that the under-reporting would not have been considered “willful” if it had been merely negligent, inadvertent, accidental, mistaken, or reckless. We rejected this contention in 1 Ms. Elizabeth Kupfer filed her own appeal in the tax evasion case, and Mr. Kupfer joins in her arguments. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(i). We more fully addressed the issues on the tax counts in United States v. Kupfer (Elizabeth), No. 13-2138, __ F.3d __, 2015 WL 4081108, at -3 (10th Cir. July 7, 2015). -3- deciding Ms. Kupfer’s appeal. United States v. Kupfer (Elizabeth), No. 13-2138, __ F.3d __, 2015 WL 4081108, at –3 (10th Cir. July 7, 2015). Based on our opinion in that appeal, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in declining to include Mr. Kupfer’s proposed language.
After the trial ended, Ms. Kupfer submitted an affidavit from a juror stating that a fellow juror had commented about other charges during jury deliberations. Based on this affidavit, Mr. Kupfer requested a new trial on the ground of juror misconduct. The district court declined to conduct a hearing or grant a mistrial. We conclude that these rulings fell within the district court’s discretion because the court could reasonably determine on the record it had that (1) a hearing was unnecessary and (2) the improper remarks were harmless. When a defendant presents credible evidence of prejudicial information during jury deliberations, a presumption of prejudice arises and the trial court must investigate. United States v. Davis, 60 F.3d 1479, 1484–85 (10th Cir. 1995). To carry out that duty, trial courts must ordinarily hold a hearing; but in rare exceptions, the court need not hold a hearing if it would not be useful. United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1186 (10th Cir. 1998). -4- As explained in our opinion addressing Ms. Kupfer’s appeal, the district court acted within its discretion in declining to conduct a hearing and in denying the motion for a mistrial. United States v. Kupfer (Elizabeth), No. 13-2138, __ F.3d __, 2015 WL 4081108, at –6 (10th Cir. July 7, 2015).