Opinion ID: 774059
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applying the Gordon Test to This Case

Text: 47 Before turning to the district court's application of the Gordon test, it is important to note that this court reviews the district court's decision whether to grant a defendant's motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. Lewis, 338 F.2d at 139. Factual findings of the district court that are clearly erroneous constitute an abuse of discretion. Turns, 198 F.3d at 586. While we apply a relatively lenient standard of review to a district court's decision regarding a new trial motion, weighing against this is the fact that new trial motions are disfavored and should be granted with caution. Id. Furthermore, as the district court recognized in its opinion, affidavits by witnesses recanting their trial testimony are to be looked upon with extreme suspicion. J.A. at 52 (Dist. Ct. Order) (citing Chambers, 944 F.2d at 1264). The district court also acknowledged that the skepticism with which a court examines such an affidavit only heightens when the recanting witness is a family member and the witness has feelings of guilt or the family members seek to influence the witness to change his story. J.A. at 52 (Dist. Ct. Order). Despite these inherent concerns with the credibility of Richard Warren's affidavit in this case, the district court granted, in part, Willis's motion for a new trial. We now examine whether the district court abused its discretion in doing so. 48 1.The District Court Must Be Reasonably Well Satisfied That the Trial Testimony Given by Richard Warren Was False 49 The first requirement of the Gordon test is that the district court must be reasonably well satisfied that the original trial testimony given by the government witness is false. It is essential to note that the district court, by presiding over the trial at which the recanting government witness first testified, is uniquely qualified to address the defendant's motion for a new trial based on the witness's posttrial recantation. Chambers, 944 F.2d at 1264. In this case, after having presided over the original trial and assessing the recanting witness's credibility, the district court held that it was satisfied that Richard Warren was not telling the truth at trial. 50 In reaching this determination, the district court noted that, during the trial, the court itself had concerns about the veracity of Warren's trial testimony. J.A. at 53 (Dist. Ct. Order). At trial, the district court openly voiced its concerns about Richard Warren having been picked up by a police car with [Richard's] brother telling him to get [to court] or [Richard] may be arrested[.] J.A. at 547 (Richard Warren Voir Dire). The district court also noted in its order granting Willis's motion for a new trial that, during the [s]idebar, it was clear that Warren was frightened and scared that he would either be accused of the crimes against Defendant or other crimes if he did not testify against Defendant. J.A. at 53. 51 Not only did the district court believe that Richard Warren's testimony at trial was of questionable veracity, but it also found the timing of his testimony to be suspicious. The district court stated that, after the government had presented its case, there still was no evidence linking Willis to the clothes in the padlocked closet in which the drugs were found. Furthermore, it was not until after the defense had presented its case, and it appeared possible that the drugs in the residence at 2267 E. 83rd St. may have belonged to one or several of the Warren brothers, that Richard Warren came forward to testify. Both Montgomery and Fitzgerald testified for the defense that several of the Warren brothers had been seen entering the residence, that the brothers had keys to the residence after May 1997, and that William and Charles Warren even lived in the residence for some period of time after May 1997. Only after the defense presented its evidence did Richard Warren agree to testify, and the district court's examination of Richard Warren showed that he took the stand having been told by his brother, William, that various people in court were trying to set him up on drug charges. Richard Warren was further informed by his brother, William, that if Richard did not protect himself by testifying in court, the government would have a warrant out for Richard's arrest. As the district court noted, all of these facts gave Richard Warren an incentive to lie. J.A. at 53-54 (Dist. Ct. Order). In concluding its analysis of the Gordon test's first element, the district court explained that, unlike Richard Warren's self-exculpatory trial testimony, the trustworthiness of Richard's posttrial affidavit was bolstered by the fact that his recantation opened the way for perjury and possibly drug charges to be brought against him. 52 In light of the suspicious circumstances surrounding Richard Warren's testimony, we cannot hold that the district court abused its discretion in determining that it was satisfied that Richard Warren's trial testimony was false. Although the government is correct in noting that this court should be highly suspicious of exculpatory affidavits submitted by one of the defendant's family members, this suspicion does not outweigh the deference we must give to the factfinder's unique qualification to judge the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence presented at trial. Chambers, 944 F.2d at 1264. 53 2.Without the Evidence, the Jury Might Have Reached A Different Conclusion 54 The second part of the Gordon test requires the court to find that without the false testimony the jury might have reached a different conclusion. Gordon, 178 F.2d at 900. Other circuits have criticized this element of theGordon/Larrison test as being too easy for the defendant to satisfy. United States v. Williams, 233 F.3d 592, 593-95 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Huddleston, 194 F.3d at 220; Sanders v. Sullivan, 863 F.2d 218, 225-26 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting disenchantment with the more liberal Larrison standard and applying it only in cases in which the government deliberately used perjured testimony); United States v. Krasny, 607 F.2d 840, 843-45 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 942 (1980). Indeed, it is in this respect that the Barlow and Gordon tests are arguably the most different. Whereas the Barlow test holds that newly-discovered evidence can merit a new trial only if that evidence would likely produce an acquittal if the case were retried, Barlow, 693 F.2d at 966 (emphasis added), the Gordon test permits a new trial motion to be granted if, without the recanting witness's testimony, the jury might have reached a different conclusion[.] Gordon, 178 F.2d at 900 (emphasis added). 55 While the Gordon test requires only the possibility of a different outcome without the now-recanted testimony, the district court in this case actually applied a probability standard when examining the chances of an acquittal had the jury not heard Richard Warren's testimony. See J.A. at 55 (Dist. Ct. Order) (stating the test as follows: Without The Recanted Testimony, Is It Likely A Jury Would Reach A Verdict of Acquittal?); J.A. at 56 (holding that it is highly likely that the jury would have reached a different outcome without Warren's testimony). Although we are bound by the possibility standard as stated in Gordon, it is significant that even under a more exacting standard the district court held that the second element of the Gordon test had, indeed, been satisfied. 56 In holding that it is highly likely that the jury would have reached a different outcome if not for Richard Warren's testimony, the district court stated that, while the government had offered evidence connecting Willis with the house at 2267 E. 83rd St., it had presented no evidence other than Richard Warren's testimony connecting Willis with the clothes recovered at the home in which the drugs and money were found. J.A. at 56 (Dist. Ct. Order). The court noted that the government had presented no evidence showing that any of the keys in Willis's possession at the time of his arrest could be used to unlock the 2267 E. 83rd St. residence or the padlocked closet in the home's bathroom. 57 The court also explained that, while personal papers apparently belonging to the defendant were found throughout the house, including in the padlocked closet, such papers do not necessarily link him to the drugs and money found in the locked closet[,] especially considering that the personal papers of others were also found throughout the home. J.A. at 55 (Dist. Ct. Order). 58 Finally, the court stressed the testimony of Montgomery and Fitzgerald, who both testified that Willis stopped living in the house as of August 1996. Because a number of individuals had personal items at 2267 East 83rd Street and could have lived in the house, the district court held that it was highly likely that the jury would have reached a different outcome without Warren's testimony, as there would have been a reasonable doubt as to whether the clothes (with the drugs and the money) belonged to the Defendant. J.A. at 56 (Dist. Ct. Order). 59 After a thorough review of the record, we are confident that the district court did not rely on any clearly erroneous findings of fact in reaching its determination regarding the recanted testimony's likely effect on the jury's verdict. We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in holding that the second element of the Gordon test has been met in this case. 60 3.Was Willis Taken By Surprise When the False Testimony Was Given, and Was He Unable to Meet This Testimony or Learn of Its Falsity Until After the Trial Concluded? 61 Although the Gordon court announced this as a factor to be considered when determining whether to grant a motion for a new trial based on the recantation of a government witness, it quickly backpedaled on the necessity of satisfying this element of the test before a new trial motion could be granted. After announcing the test as it was stated in Larrison, theGordon court then held that, given the special circumstances of its case, in which all of the testimony given by a material government witness is recanted, the requirements of surprise and an inability to meet the testimony at trial were not pertinent. Gordon, 178 F.2d 900. 62 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the circuit that first developed this test, has also openly questioned the importance and necessity of the surprise element of the test. United States v. Leibowitz, 919 F.2d 482, 484-85 (7th Cir. 1990). In Leibowitz, Judge Posner explained that while surprise is surely relevant in some cases, it should not be required in every case, especially where the principal (though not the only) evidence of guilt is the testimony of an accomplice or eyewitness, [and] the only resource of the defendant in unmasking the falsity, even with all the advance warning in the world, may be cross-examination, which -- much mythology to the contrary notwithstanding -- is not an infallible lie detector. Id. at 484. 63 Just as in Gordon and Leibowitz, a crucial government witness in this case has recanted all of his damaging testimony. We follow both Gordon and Leibowitz in holding that the satisfaction of the final element of the Gordon/Larrison test is not a condition precedent to the defendant receiving a new trial. As the district court stated in this case, [i]f Warren's testimony concerning Defendant's clothes and living residence was false, Defendant surely knew of it at the time of his testimony. J.A. at 57 (Dist. Ct. Order). Furthermore, while the defense counsel was able to impeach Richard Warren on the witness stand, there is only so much the attorney could do to refute Richard Warren's potentially false testimony stating that he had seen the defendant wearing the jacket which was later found in the padlocked closet at 2267 E. 83rd St. 64 The granting of a defendant's motion for a new trial is a substantial remedy that must be exercised with caution. Nevertheless, we review the trial court's decision with respect to these motions only for an abuse of discretion. Inherent in this standard of review is the notion that the district court, the trier of fact, is in a far superior position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence presented at trial, and to decide whether a new trial is needed to avoid the substantial risk of an injustice. The district court in this case, after presiding over the trial and examining the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence, believed, in light of Richard Warren's recantation, that an injustice was likely if Willis's drug possession convictions were allowed to stand in the face of the government's tainted testimonial evidence. From our review of the record, we find no basis upon which to state that the district court, in arriving at its conclusion, abused its discretion.