Opinion ID: 2635308
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: application of the nhca to walters

Text: ¶ 5 In this matter of first impression, we must determine whether the Department's regulatory authority provided by the NHCA extends to the entire population, as urged by the Department, or is, instead, limited to licensees, owners and facilities. The interpretation to be given to a statute is a question of law, subject to our plenary, independent and non-deferential examination. State ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Little, 2004 OK 74, ¶ 10, 100 P.3d 707, 711. We review this case under the de novo standard of review. Id. ¶ 6 Legislative intent governs statutory interpretation and this intent is generally ascertained from a statute's plain language. The Pentagon Academy, Inc. v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Tulsa County, 2003 OK 98, ¶ 19, 82 P.3d 587, 591. However, where a strict, literal interpretation of the statute would lead to inconsistent or incongruent results between the enactment's different parts, judicial interpretation becomes necessary to reconcile the discord. McNeill v. City of Tulsa, 1998 OK 2, ¶ 11, 953 P.2d 329, 332. ¶ 7 In the interpretation of statutes, we do not limit our consideration to a single word or phrase. Instead, we construe together the various provisions of relevant enactments, in light of their underlying general purpose and objective, to ascertain legislative intent. World Publishing Co. v. Miller, 2001 OK 49, ¶ 7, 32 P.3d 829, 832; McNeill, supra, 1998 OK 2 at ¶ 11, 953 P.2d at 332. Words and phrases of a statute are to be understood and used not in an abstract sense, but with due regard for context and they must harmonize with other sections of the act to determine the purpose and intent of the legislature. McNeill, supra at ¶ 11, citing Groendyke Transport Inc. v. Gardner, 1960 OK 153, 353 P.2d 695. ¶ 8 The purpose of the NHCA is to provide a comprehensive system of licensure and certification for facilities in order to, primarily, protect the health, welfare and safety of its residents. 63 O.S.Supp.2006, § 1-1904(A)(1). The NHCA is replete with provisions concerning regulations for, and redress of violations by, licensees, applicants for licenses, owners and facilities. See, e.g., 63 O.S.2001, §§ 1-1906(F)(1), 1-1912, 1-1914.1 and 1-1916.1(C). The Act, however, is silent regarding actions by those other than the aforementioned. ¶ 9 In its administrative petition, the Department contended Walters provided false and misleading information to the Department and was part of the conspiracy to conceal Jiles' involvement in the VanMeter bribe, all violations of 63 O.S.2001, § 1-1916(A). [2] The Department contends the trial judge erred in issuing her writ of prohibition and injunction because it has the authority, pursuant to 63 O.S.2001, § 1-1916.1, to impose a civil penalty upon any person who has violated any provision of the NHCA. ¶ 10 In response, Walters argues the Department had no authority under the NHCA to impose an administrative civil monetary penalty against him as an accountant, and independent contractor, for a nursing home management company. Walters further responds that even if he could be liable for a violation of § 1-1916, only a district attorney or the Attorney General can prosecute such a violation. [3] ¶ 11 The Department's statutory construction argument relies strictly on the use of the term any in 1-1916.1 which provides that any person who has been determined by the Department to have violated any provision of the NHCA may be liable for an administrative penalty for each day the violation continues. [4] The Department maintains that this language allows it to broadly enforce the NHCA's regulations upon anyone. This construction ignores the language in, among others, § 1-1903 which exempts certain facilities from the scope of the NHCA, such as those facilities operated by the Oklahoma Department of Veterans Affairs and those facilities not being compensated for their services rendered. Thus, by its very terms, the NHCA does not apply to everyone. ¶ 12 Indeed, a review of several other provisions of the NHCA reveals that the Legislature intended the NHCA to apply only to licensees (and applicants for licenses), owners and specifically-defined facilities. See, e.g., 63 O.S.2001, §§ 1-1906(F)(1), 1-1912, 1-1914.1 and 1-1916.1. Section 1-1906(F)(1) provides that the Department, after notice to the applicant or licensee, may suspend, revoke, refuse to renew a license or assess administrative penalties for violation of the NHCA. The Department must promptly serve such notice upon a licensee and give time for the licensee to file a plan of correction. 63 O.S.2001, § 1-1912. Section 1-1914.1 provides that for violations of the NHCA, the Department shall seek remedial action against a licensee, owner or operator of a facility and may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, impose remedies intended to gain compliance and provide for the health, safety and welfare of the facility's residents. A facility can appeal any sanction imposed, and a licensee can avoid a penalty entirely by simply surrendering his/her license. 63 O.S.2001, § 1-1916.1. [5] There is no similar option for non-licensees, such as Walters. We believe this is because the Legislature never intended such penalties under the NHCA to apply to non-licensed individuals. Certainly, the Legislature could not have intended to expose third parties to greater liability than the heavily-regulated licensees, owners and facilities. ¶ 13 We have previously recognized that the NHCA is not a model of clarity and precision. Morgan v. Galilean Health Enter., Inc., 1998 OK 130, ¶ 8, 977 P.2d 357, 361; Fanning v. Brown, 2004 OK 7, ¶ 9, 85 P.3d 841, 845. In Fanning, a private litigant sought to enforce the provisions of the NHCA against individual shareholders of a nursing home facility's operating company. At issue in the case was the construction of the term owner as used in the NHCA and whether the individual shareholders could be identified as such. 63 O.S.Supp.2001, § 1-1902(16). [6] In finding the Legislature did not intend the NHCA to extend to the individual shareholders, this Court held: In our view, the profit or lose language in the second sentence does not extend liability beyond the specific person or entity which has responsibility for providing the relevant services. We believe the Legislature intended the language to be construed narrowly so that it would not extend liability to other persons and entities which have some sort of legal interest in the facility but are not the owner. (Emphasis added). Fanning, 2004 OK at ¶ 13, 85 P.3d at 846. The Court, mindful not to allow the joinder of defendants clearly never intended by the Legislature under the NHCA, affirmed the trial court's ruling dismissing the NHCA claim against the shareholders. Id. at ¶ 14. ¶ 14 As we read the sections of the NHCA, it is clear the Legislature intended the application of the NHCA to cover licensees, owners and facilities, and not unsuspecting third parties, such as Walters. The Department is without statutory authority to sanction persons other than those specifically targeted by the NHCA and defined thereunder. As such, the trial court was correct in issuing the writ of prohibition enjoining the Department from further proceeding against Walters.