Opinion ID: 482020
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appeal of Defendant Carrion

Text: 13 Carrion contends that the district court erred in declining to charge the jury on the issue of entrapment. We detect no error. 14 In United States v. Stanley, 765 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir.1985), the Court canvassed the principles governing the trial court's decision whether to instruct on entrapment: 15 The defendant has the initial burden of coming forward with evidence 'that the Government's conduct created a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person other than one ready to commit it.'  If the defendant fails to carry the burden of the entrapment issue forward, he is not entitled to have the issue submitted to the jury. On the other hand, once the defendant has met this burden, the government must, if it is to prevail, prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to commit the offense charged. 16 Id. at 1234-35 (citations omitted; quoting United States v. Webster, 649 F.2d 346, 349 (5th Cir.1981) (en banc)); see also United States v. Nations, 764 F.2d 1073, 1079-80 (5th Cir.1985). From the very beginning of his contact with agent Paiz, Carrion demonstrated that he was a person ready to deal in cocaine. At their first meeting, Carrion made clear that his  'occupation, experience and background,'  Stanley, 765 F.2d at 1234 (quoting Pierce v. United States, 414 F.2d 163, 168 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960, 90 S.Ct. 435, 24 L.Ed.2d 425 (1969)), was cocaine distribution. He explained that he could procure amounts as large as two kilograms and left his telephone number in case Paiz was interested in a cocaine venture. If Paiz later initiated telephone calls, so did Carrion. In this way and many others set forth in the statement of the facts, Carrion exhibited, throughout his interaction with Paiz, his readiness to deal in cocaine. We conclude that Carrion was not entitled to an entrapment instruction because the evidence did not provide a basis for a reasonable doubt on the ultimate jury entrapment issue of whether criminal intent originated with the government. Nations, 764 F.2d at 1080. 17 Carrion tends to argue that the Government converted a small-time dealer into a big-time dealer. Even if it is assumed that the argument could, despite the concession of predisposition to commit crime, have validity under extraordinary circumstances, Carrion's reliance upon the argument in this case is misplaced. Carrion, who told Paiz at their first meeting that he was capable of procuring up to one or two kilograms of cocaine, cannot be characterized as a small-time dealer. Moreover, the initial difficulty in dealing in yet larger amounts resulted, not from any reluctance or hesitation on Carrion's part, but from the conditions placed on Carrion by his sources, limiting him to undertaking bigger deals in the Los Angeles area. Carrion was prepared to deliver quantities even greater than one or two kilograms in Los Angeles. Having missed Paiz when Paiz travelled to Los Angeles for an eight kilogram deal, Carrion managed to have the Los Angeles restriction lifted so that he could travel to Dallas with as many as ten kilograms.