Opinion ID: 1708200
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: crashworthiness

Text: Plaintiffs allege the court erred in directing a verdict in defendants' favor on the issue of crashworthiness under both negligence and strict liability theories. In a court's review of a directed verdict, the party against whom a motion for a direction of liability is made is entitled to have every controverted fact resolved in his or her favor and to have the benefit of every inference which can reasonably be drawn from the evidence. If there is any evidence which will sustain a finding for the party against whom the motion is made, the case may not be decided as a matter of law. A directed verdict is proper only where reasonable minds cannot differ and can only draw one conclusion from the evidence. Where reasonable minds may draw different conclusions from the evidence, the question of negligence is for determination by the jury. Stoco, Inc. v. Madison's, Inc., 235 Neb. 305, 454 N.W.2d 692 (1990); Commerce Sav. Scottsbluff v. F.H. Schafer Elev., 231 Neb. 288, 436 N.W.2d 151 (1989); Raben v. Dittenber, 230 Neb. 822, 434 N.W.2d 11 (1989). In products liability, there is a significant distinction between a manufacturer's liability for the manufactured product on account of strict liability in tort, as opposed to liability based on negligence. In a cause of action based on negligence, the question involves the manufacturer's conduct, that is, whether the manufacturer's conduct was reasonable in view of the foreseeable risk of injury, whereas in a cause of action based on strict liability in tort, the question involves the quality of the manufactured product, that is, whether the product was unreasonably dangerous. Rahmig v. Mosley Machinery Co., 226 Neb. 423, 412 N.W.2d 56 (1987). To recover against the defendant on a claim of strict liability, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) The defendant placed the product on the market for use and knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that the product would be used without inspection for defects; (2) the product was in a defective condition when it was placed on the market and left the defendant's possession; (3) the defect is the proximate or a proximately contributing cause of plaintiff's injury sustained while the product was being used in the way and for the general purpose for which it was designed and intended; (4) the defect, if existent, rendered the product unreasonably dangerous and unsafe for its intended use; and (5) plaintiff's damages were a direct and proximate result of the alleged defect. (Syllabus of the court.) Rahmig v. Mosley Machinery Co., supra . Unreasonably dangerous means that the product has a propensity for causing physical harm beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary user or consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the foreseeable class of users as to its characteristics. Rahmig v. Mosley Machinery Co., supra ; Hancock v. Paccar, Inc., 204 Neb. 468, 283 N.W.2d 25 (1979). Crashworthiness cases involve allegations that a defective design in the vehicle made the vehicle unsafe to occupy during a foreseeable collision, and because of this defect the plaintiff's injuries were enhanced. See, Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762 (5th Cir.1976); Glyn-Jones v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 857 S.W.2d 640 (Tex.App.1993); Reed v. Chrysler Corp., 494 N.W.2d 224 (Iowa 1992); Jackson v. Warrum, 535 N.E.2d 1207 (Ind.App.1989); Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, 121 Wis.2d 338, 360 N.W.2d 2 (1984). In Friedrich v. Anderson, 191 Neb. 724, 217 N.W.2d 831 (1974), we extended liability for defective design claims to encompass those based on the vehicle's crashworthiness. Relying on Friedrich, we later stated in Hancock v. Paccar, Inc., 204 Neb. at 474-76, 283 N.W.2d at 32-33: One who is injured as a result of a mechanical defect in a motor vehicle should be protected under the doctrine of strict liability even though the defect was not the cause of the collision which precipitated the injury.... Since collisions for whatever cause are foreseeable events, the scope of liability should be commensurate with the scope of the foreseeable risks. .... ... No good reason exists for not applying the doctrine of strict liability to a case where the defective design results in an enhanced injury to the plaintiff even though the product [design] did not cause the initial collision. Under a theory of crashworthiness, the manufacturer is liable for only that portion of the damages caused as a result of the defective design. Therefore, the plaintiff must show that his injuries were enhanced as a result of the defective design of the vehicle. Harvey by Harvey v. General Motors Corp., 873 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir.1989); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir.1976); Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir.1968). This case presents the question of what burden of proof is placed on a plaintiff to prove that the manufacturer's defective design proximately caused his enhanced injuries. Two approaches have been taken in determining the plaintiff's burden of proof in establishing that a manufacturer's defective design enhanced the plaintiff's injuries. In some jurisdictions, the plaintiff is required to show the specific injuries attributable to the defective design of the vehicle and present an alternative design which would have prevented those injuries. Harvey by Harvey v. General Motors Corp., supra ; Curtis v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 808 (10th Cir.1981) (applying Colorado law); Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1978) (applying South Carolina law); Huddell v. Levin, supra ; Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co., supra ; Dorsett v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 805 F.Supp. 1212 (E.D.Pa.1992); Wernimont v. International Harvester Corp., 309 N.W.2d 137 (Iowa App. 1981). Under these theories, the plaintiff must show that the defective design was the sole cause of the plaintiff's enhanced injuries. Another approach allows the plaintiff to recover where there is an indivisible injury, if he presents evidence that shows that the alleged defect was a substantial factor in causing the enhanced injuries. See, Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, AG, 669 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir.1982) (applying Minnesota law); Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir.1978) (applying Wyoming law); Richardson v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 552 F.Supp. 73 (W.D.Mo.1982); Polston v. Boomershine Pontiac-GMC, 262 Ga. 616, 423 S.E.2d 659 (1992); Czarnecki v. Volkswagen of America, 172 Ariz. 408, 837 P.2d 1143 (Ariz.App.1991); Jackson v. Warrum, supra ; Fouche v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 103 Idaho 249, 646 P.2d 1020 (Idaho App.1982), aff'd 107 Idaho 701, 692 P.2d 345 (1984). The plaintiff is not required to show the specific injuries he would have received in the absence of the alleged defect or which injuries would have occurred had an alternative design been used. Id. In these jurisdictions, the plaintiff need not show that the defective design was the sole cause of the plaintiff's additional injuries. Instead, the defendant is liable if the defective design was a substantial factor in producing the plaintiff's additional injuries. Once proximate cause is established, then the burden is on the defendant to show apportionment of damages. Id. However, if the damages cannot be apportioned, then the defendant manufacturer may be held jointly and severally liable with the defendant responsible for the original collision. Smith v. Fiat-Roosevelt Motors, Inc., 556 F.2d 728 (5th Cir.1977) (applying Florida law); Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co., supra ; Richardson v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., supra . Defendants claim that plaintiffs failed to show an alternative design which would have resulted in less severe injuries. Nebraska no longer requires proof of an alternative design for a claimant to recover under a claim of defective design. See Rahmig v. Mosley Machinery Co., 226 Neb. 423, 412 N.W.2d 56 (1987). In Rahmig, this court overruled Nerud v. Haybuster Mfg., 215 Neb. 604, 340 N.W.2d 369 (1983), to the extent that it required a plaintiff to show an alternative design which would have made the product safer in order to recover in a defective design claim under strict liability and negligence theories. Although Rahmig involved a guillotine metal scrap shear, the same general principles apply to a claim of defective design where the design of a vehicle is at issue. For example, the court in Nerud relied on a reading of Hancock v. Paccar, Inc., 204 Neb. 468, 283 N.W.2d 25 (1979), to determine that a showing of an alternative design was necessary to establish a claim of product liability. The court suggested that Hancock, a case involving an allegedly defectively designed vehicle, hinted that a plaintiff was required to show an alternative design. Furthermore, in Hancock v. Paccar, 204 Neb. at 476, 283 N.W.2d at 33, this court stated that the rule regarding strict liability, as stated in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402 A, comment d. (1965), extends to any product sold in the condition, or substantially the same condition, in which it is expected to reach the ultimate user or consumer. Thus the rule stated applies to an automobile, a tire, an airplane, a grinding wheel, a water heater, a gas stove, a power tool, a riveting machine, a chair, and an insecticide.... Because of the foregoing discussion, we see no reason why a separate standard of proof should apply to vehicles on claims of defective design.