Opinion ID: 184204
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: C Redressability

Text: I also consider redressability, the third prong of the standing analysis. Determining redressability requires an analysis of whether the court has the power to right or to prevent the claimed injury. Gonzales v. Gorsuch, 688 F.2d 1263, 1267 (9th Cir.1982). Again, the majority opinion analyzes Barnum's second theory of harm that the inclusion of Redwood Creek on the Section 303(d) listing will directly cause a decrease in property valueand concludes that this prong of the standing test is met. I disagree with the majority on this inquiry as well.
Barnum does not show a likelihood of redressability. [6] The mere fact that Section 898 refers to a Section 303(d) listing in one of its subsections does not itself show that the removal of Redwood Creek from the 303(d) list would likely redress Barnum's claimed injury. Barnum incorrectly claims that because the Section 303(d) listing triggers the application of Section 898 to Redwood Creek, EPA's inclusion of Redwood Creek on the list is the but for cause of its injury. As described earlier, the CWA leaves the implementation of clean water regulations to the states' discretion. California has implemented a comprehensive system of regulations for timber harvesters, which comprehensively regulate [Barnum's] conduct irrespective of Redwood Creek's Section 303(d) listing. Thus, though one state regulation is tied to the Section 303(d) listing, the California regulations in total would impose costs upon Barnum even if Redwood Creek is removed from the Section 303(d) list. Moreover, even if Redwood Creek is removed from the Section 303(d) list, Section 898 itself might cause California to require Barnum to consider measures to improve the water in the Redwood Creek watershed. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit.14 § 898. Accordingly, I believe that Barnum fails to show that its alleged injury would be redressable because California regulations would continue to impose costs potentially affecting property values near Redwood Creek.
The majority opinion's analysis of standing's third element concludes that Barnum's alleged injurya decrease in property valuecould be redressed by a ruling favorable to Barnum. However, for many of the same reasons that Barnum's argument fails to satisfy standing's second prong, I find that Barnum fails to establish that its alleged injury could be redressed by a favorable ruling. California continues to control the implementation of the land management practices in that state, and an order against EPA would not redress Barnum's alleged injury. Indeed, California has not yet developed any specific TMDL that impacts Barnum. And, even if they are developed, Californianot EPAwill decide how and if it will implement them. Pronsolino, 291 F.3d at 1140. As the district court noted, at root, the injuries plaintiff alleges arise from California's forestry regulations, and not [from] any action of the EPA. See San Diego County, 98 F.3d at 1130; see also Levine v. Vilsack, 587 F.3d 986, 995 (9th Cir.2009) (holding alleged injury not redressable where it depended upon the conduct of a third party); Arakaki v. Lingle, 477 F.3d 1048, 1064 (9th Cir.2007) (holding that an injury is not redressable where the potential benefit of suit is speculative); Boating Industry Ass'n v. Marshall, 601 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir.1979) ([I]f the injury stems not from the government action disputed, but from an independent source, a federal court cannot provide the plaintiff redress by directing the government to alter its action.). Accordingly, as I find that neither of Barnum's theories of harm establish that the injury alleged can be redressed by the relief requested, I would also affirm the judgment of the district court on this ground.