Opinion ID: 167896
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cross-Exam ination of the Alibi W itness

Text: Although M r. Thomas characterizes the prosecutor’s cross-examination of M s. Rhoden as “improper,” A plt’s Br. at 9, neither at trial nor in his appellate brief has he provided a more specific basis for his objection. He now cites decisions involving prosecutors’ misstating the terms of a stipulation, comm enting on a defendant’s failure to testify, and vouching for witnesses. See id. at 15-19 (citing United States v. M astrangelo, 172 F.3d 288 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Cotnam, 88 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Kerr, 981 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1992)). This case does not involve those kinds of prosecutorial misconduct. However, in examining the proper scope of the cross-examination of an alibi witness regarding a delay in coming forward, several decisions have applied Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Aguwa, 123 F.3d 418, 420 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that the defendant contended “that the -6- prosecution’s line of questioning and argument was improper because no meaningful inference can or should be drawn from the mere fact that a witness may not have immediately come forward and revealed the existence of an alibi for a defendant” and concluding that “although the defendant does not necessarily frame his argument in this fashion, he is claiming that such evidence is inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because its probative value is outweighed by other considerations”); United States v. Johns, 734 F.2d 657, 664 (11th Cir. 1984) (evaluating a challenge to cross-examination regarding the diligence of an alibi witness under Fed. R. Evid. 403). W e are persuaded by these decisions that Rule 403 offers the appropriate framew ork for analyzing M r. Thomas’s objection to the cross-examination of M s. Rhoden. Under that framew ork, our review of the trial judge’s decision to allow the prosecutor’s questioning is quite deferential. Generally, “[o]n cross-examination, it is within the trial judge’s discretion to exclude evidence.” Ew ing v. W inans, 749 F.2d 607, 616 (10th Cir. 1984). In balancing probative value and prejudice under Fed. R. Evid. 403, the district court is afforded the same discretion. See Deters v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs.,Inc., 202 F.3d 1262, 1274 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting that decisions whether to admit or exclude evidence under Rule 403 are reviewed for an abuse of discretion because the district court is “clearly in a superior position to perform this analysis”). -7- M orever, “[a] non-constitutional error, such as a decision whether to admit or exclude evidence, is considered harmless ‘unless a substantial right of [a] party is affected.’” United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1270 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)). An error affects a substantial right when it has a “substantial influence on the outcome or leaves one in ‘grave doubt’ as to whether it had such effect.” United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 (10th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)). “The government bears the burden to show that a nonconstitutional error is harmless by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Stiger, 413 F.3d 1185, 1190 (10th Cir. 2005). Applying those standards here, we discern some merit in each party’s position. As the government observes, a line of cases allows the government to cross-examine an alibi witness about his or her delay in coming forward with the alibi. See, e.g., Aguwa, 123 F.3d at 420-21 (“Under the circumstances presented in this case, w e find that the district court did not abuse its discretion, because w e are convinced that the witness’ delay in providing an alibi for her husband is an appropriate subject of inquiry.”); United States v. Laury, 985 F.2d 1293, 1305-06 (5th Cir. 1993) (“The prosecutor’s comments regarding the failure of the witnesses to come forward sooner with [the defendant’s] alibi was a permissible attack on their credibility.”); Johns, 734 F.2d at 664 (stating “[t]hat anyone, defendant or witness, fails to present a defendant’s alibi to law enforcement at the -8- earliest time possible has some logical negative reflection on the credibility of the alibi defense”). However, as M r. Thomas observes, the prosecutor here did more than merely challenge M s. Rhoden’s delay in reporting the alibi. In particular, the prosecutor’s questioning suggested that M s. Rhoden was not a credible witness because she had not interrupted the detention hearing by volunteering her alibi information to the prosecutor and the judge. The government cites no authority indicating that a w itness has a duty to report information in this context. As M r. Thomas observes, the information offered by M s. Rhoden was not relevant to the issue addressed at the detention hearing— whether M r. Thomas should be detained pending trial. Nevertheless, even assuming that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine M s. Rhoden about her failure to report the alibi information at the detention hearing, we conclude that this error was harmless. See Charley, 189 F.3d at 1270. As to the sexual assault charge, the jury had the opportunity to assess the credibility of TM C, and her testimony was corroborated by the nurse practitioner’s testimony regarding the bruise on her hip and, to some extent, by family members’ testimony about her reporting the assault. As to the firearm charge, five witnesses testified that they saw M r. Thomas carrying a gun with a sling. M oreover, we note that after the prosecutor’s cross-examination of M s. Rhoden, M r. Thomas’s attorney did not seek to rehabilitate her by asking about -9- her reporting the alibi information at the close of the detention hearing. His failure to do so undermines M r. Thomas’s assertion of prejudice. See Shultz v. Rice, 809 F.2d 643, 653 (10th Cir. 1986) (noting that a party’s opportunity to rehabilitate a witness undermined the allegation of prejudice); United States v. Taglione, 546 F.2d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1977) (concluding that a prosecutor’s closing remarks were not prejudicial in part because the defendant’s attorney “had ample opportunity for an effort to rehabilitate in his ow n closing remarks”). Accordingly, we conclude that the additional impeachment of M s. Rhoden afforded by the prosecutor’s cross-examination neither had a “‘substantial influence’ on the outcome” nor leaves us “in ‘grave doubt’ as to whether it had such effect.” Rivera, 900 F.2d at 1469 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765). Nor did the prosecutor’s closing argument affect the fairness of the trial. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).