Opinion ID: 797053
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Defendants' Qualified Immunity

Text: 67 Based on our determination that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that DePietro and Borona's conduct violated Russo's Fourth Amendment rights, we move to the second step of the Saucier inquiry and assess whether these officers are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). 68 Qualified immunity protects public officials from liability for civil damages when one of two conditions is satisfied: `(a) the defendant's action did not violate clearly established law, or (b) it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe that his action did not violate such law.' Poe, 282 F.3d at 133 (quoting Tierney v. Davidson, 133 F.3d 189, 196 (2d Cir.1998)); see also Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 421 (2d Cir.1995) (summary judgment is appropriate if the only conclusion a rational jury could reach is that reasonable officers would disagree about the legality of the defendant['s] conduct under the circumstances). In this case, neither condition has been satisfied. 69 First, Russo had a clearly-established constitutional right to be free from prolonged detention caused by law enforcement officials' mishandling or suppression of exculpatory evidence in a manner which shocks the conscience. See Baker, 443 U.S. at 144, 99 S.Ct. 2689 (referring to such a right as [o]bvious[] in the context of a warranted arrest and protestations of innocence, and doing so as early as 1979); Wright, 21 F.3d at 499 n. 1 (quoting Baker 's statement); see also Cannon, 1 F.3d at 1564-65 (holding that a reasonable official would attempt to verify identifying information in the face of the plaintiff's assertions of mistaken identity). 70 Today we have clarified that Russo's claim should be treated under the Fourth Amendment, County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 849 n. 9, 118 S.Ct. 1708, rather than under substantive due process. But this clarification is of no consequence to the question of whether the right was clearly established, because the proper inquiry is whether the right itself—rather than its source —is clearly established. See, e.g., Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 716 (8th Cir.2000) ([T]here is no question that [plaintiff's] right to be free from excessive force was clearly established, even if there is some ongoing uncertainty about which constitutional text is the source of that right. (footnote omitted)); Alexander v. Perrill, 916 F.2d 1392, 1398 n. 11 (9th Cir.1990) (noting that the only issue before it with respect to qualified immunity was whether there was a clearly established duty to investigate; that its prior decision in Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir.1985) (en banc), answer[ed] that question in the affirmative; and that [f]or purposes of this appeal, it is unimportant that the Haygood court found the prison officials ultimately violated the plaintiff's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, rather than the right to due process and to be free from double jeopardy as alleged in this case). 71 As to the second condition, the proffered evidence would support a jury finding that DePietro and Borona acted intentionally in hiding exculpatory evidence and misleading Russo as to whether the videotape showed a perpetrator with tattoos. Hence, a reasonable trier of fact need not conclude that it was objectively reasonable for DePietro and Borona to believe their actions were lawful. See Lennon, 66 F.3d at 420. And, once again, it is of no consequence that we have clarified the source of this right. The question of reasonable disagreement turns on whether reasonable officers could disagree about whether conduct is illegal, not on whether they know the precise constitutional reason why it is not lawful. 72 Qualified immunity to DePietro and Borona is unavailable at summary judgment.