Opinion ID: 780062
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fifth Amendment and the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility challenges

Text: 65 Randall's next contention is that the introduction into evidence of his incriminating statements made to the confidential informants violated his Fifth Amendment rights, and that the government's working with confidential informants to elicit incriminating information at a time when he was represented by an attorney violated DR 7-104(A)(1) of the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility. Because Randall raises these issues for the first time on appeal, he must meet the plain error standard of review in order to prevail. United States v. Modena, 302 F.3d 626, 630 (6th Cir.2002) (requiring that the error be obvious, affect the substantial rights of the defendant, and seriously impact the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings).
66 The Fifth Amendment provides criminal defendants with a right against self-incrimination. U.S. Const. amend. V (No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.). Fifth Amendment rights, unlike a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, are not offense specific. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988). In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court held that once an individual in custody invokes his or her Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present, and the defendant must have [counsel] present during any subsequent questioning in the absence of a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S.Ct. 1602; see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (holding that it was unconstitutional to reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his right to counsel). 67 The Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination, however, does not apply to noncoercive conversations with undercover informants. In Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 110 S.Ct. 2394, 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990), the Supreme Court held that an undercover law enforcement officer posing as a fellow inmate need not give Miranda warnings to an incarcerated suspect before eliciting incriminating information. Id. at 296-98, 110 S.Ct. 2394. The Perkins Court explained that speaking with undercover government informants while incarcerated does not create a coercive atmosphere, and thus does not implicate the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 298, 110 S.Ct. 2394. Because Randall's Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination did not apply when he talked with the confidential government informants, the district court did not commit any error, much less plain error, when it admitted the incriminating statements that Randall made to them.
68 Randall also claims that the government's working with confidential informants who engaged in conversations with Randall violated DR 7-104. This Disciplinary Rule provides in pertinent part as follows: 69 During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not ... [c]ommunicate or cause another to communicate on the subject to the representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by law to do so. 70 Randall has cited no authority, nor have we found any, to support his contention that the government's working with confidential informants to elicit incriminating information from a represented defendant violates DR 7-104. Cf. United States v. Heinz, 983 F.2d 609, 618 (5th Cir.1993) (The use of informants to gather evidence against a suspect will generally, if not almost always, fall within the ambit of the `authorized by law' exception to DR 7-104.) (emphasis omitted). In the absence of authoritative support, and after taking into account that the Supreme Court has allowed such informant testimony, Perkins, 496 U.S. at 296-98, 110 S.Ct. 2394, we are unable to conclude that plain error occurred in allowing the testimony in question.