Opinion ID: 792193
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Warrant Extension

Text: 16 Appellant argues that the police held the computer for an unreasonable amount of time and violated Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(e)(2)(A), 4 which states that a warrant must command an officer to execute the warrant within a specified time no longer than 10 days. 17 The government argues that the ten-day stricture in Rule 41 is not applicable because there is no evidence that the search was federal in nature. Appellant responds that the state law enforcement officials intended to turn the evidence over for federal prosecution at the time they searched the computer, thus triggering the ten-day time limit of Rule 41. If the warrant is a proper state warrant, then each requirement of Rule 41 is not necessary even though federal officials participated in its procuration or execution. United States v. Krawiec, 627 F.2d 577, 581 (1st Cir.1980) (citation omitted). 18 In this case, the computer search that yielded evidence later used in a federal prosecution was conducted by state law enforcement pursuant to a state court search warrant. There is no evidence that federal agents participated in the state investigation, procurement of the warrant, or request for extension. Therefore, the investigation was not federal in character, and the ten-day stricture of Rule 41 does not apply. 19 [T]he Fourth Amendment, not federal rules or state law, governs the admissibility of evidence obtained by state officers but ultimately used in a federal prosecution. United States v. Clyburn, 24 F.3d 613, 616 (4th Cir.1994); see also United States v. Jones, 185 F.3d 459, 463 (5th Cir.1999) (The question that a federal court must ask when state officials secure evidence to be used against a defendant accused of a federal offense is whether the actions of the state officials violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. (internal quotations and citation omitted)). The products of a search conducted under the authority of a validly issued state warrant are lawfully obtained for federal prosecutorial purposes if that warrant satisfies constitutional requirements and does not contravene any Rule-embodied policy designed to protect the integrity of the federal courts or to govern the conduct of federal officers. United States v. Mitro, 880 F.2d 1480, 1485 (1st Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Sellers, 483 F.2d 37, 43 (5th Cir.1973)); see also United States v. Crawford, 657 F.2d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir.1981) (holding that if the search is federal in character, then the legality of the search should be analyzed in light of federal constitutional requirements and those provisions of Rule 41 designed to protect the integrity of the federal courts or to govern the conduct of federal officers. (citation omitted)). 20 The Fourth Amendment itself contains no requirements about when the search or seizure is to occur or the duration.  United States v. Gerber, 994 F.2d 1556, 1559-60 (11th Cir.1993). However, unreasonable delay in the execution of a warrant that results in the lapse of probable cause will invalidate a warrant. United States v. Marin-Buitrago, 734 F.2d 889, 894 (2d Cir.1984). The restrictions in Rule 41 not only ensure that probable cause continues to exist, but also that it is the neutral magistrate, not the executing officers, who determines whether probable cause continues to exist. Id. The policy behind the ten-day time limitation in Rule 41 is to prevent the execution of a stale warrant. A delay in executing a search warrant may render stale the probable cause finding. United States v. Gibson, 123 F.3d 1121, 1124 (8th Cir.1997). 21 A delay in execution of the warrant under Rule 41 does not render inadmissible evidence seized, absent a showing of prejudice to the defendants resulting from the delay. See United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489, 499 (3d Cir.1973). Courts have permitted some delay in the execution of search warrants involving computers because of the complexity of the search. See, e.g., United States v. Gorrell, 360 F.Supp.2d 48, 55 n. 5 (D.D.C.2004) (ten-month delay in processing of computer and camera seized, although lengthy, did not take the data outside the scope of the warrant such that it needs to be suppressed); United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 31, 66 (D.Conn.2002) ([C]omputer searches are not, and cannot be subject to any rigid time limit because they may involve much more information than an ordinary document search, more preparation and a greater degree of care in their execution.). 22 The primary question is whether, under the policies embedded in Rule 41, the one-year extension order issued by the court because of a backlog in computer crimes investigations provided an excessive amount of time to allow for the search of a computer already in police custody pursuant to a warrant. Under the circumstances, the five-month delay did not invalidate the search of appellant's computer because there is no showing that the delay caused a lapse in probable cause, that it created prejudice to the defendant, or that federal or state officers acted in bad faith to circumvent federal requirements. 23 Finally, Defendant argues that the search warrant violated the Fourth Amendment because the request for an extension was not supported by an affidavit, but instead consisted of a one-page motion. In some cases, where a request for extension implicates the continued existence of probable cause to search, an affidavit is necessary under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. McElrath, 759 F.Supp. 1391, 1395-96 (D.Minn.1991) (allowing a motion to suppress because an officer sought and obtained an extension of a warrant via an unsworn telephonic communication which undermined the earlier finding of probable cause). Here, however, the computer was already in the government's possession, and the request for an extension to review a large number of encrypted images because of a backlog was wholly unrelated to the probable cause determination.