Opinion ID: 202519
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Building or other structure

Text: 12 We review the determination that a defendant is subject to an ACCA sentencing enhancement de novo, United States v. Mastera, 435 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir.2006), but we review the district court's factual findings underlying the determination for clear error, United States v. Delgado, 288 F.3d 49, 52 (1st Cir.2002). We begin our review with the Rhode Island statute under which Bennett was convicted for the predicate crime at issue, entitled Breaking and entering other buildings with criminal intent — Railroad cars — Tractor trailers. R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-8-5. The first clause of the statute makes it unlawful to break and enter or enter in the nighttime, with intent to commit [a crime] in it, any barn, stable, carriage house, or other building. Id. The second clause addresses the similar breaking and entering of railroad cars and tractor trailers. Id. 13 Because the statute defines burglary more broadly than Taylor did, including the breaking and entering of more than just buildings and structures, we look to the record before the court to determine under which clause Bennett was convicted. 3 The transcript of the plea colloquy clearly shows that Bennett was convicted under the first clause of the statute, involving the burglary of other buildings, and therefore we base our determination of whether the conviction qualifies as generic burglary on the elements required for conviction under the other buildings clause. 14 Bennett contends that to meet the Taylor definition of generic burglary, the structure involved in a predicate crime must be occupiable, in the sense that it must be large enough to accommodate a person. He points to a Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Sparks, 265 F.3d 825, 835 (9th Cir.2001), which found that the burglary of a storage locker that would not accommodate a person does not fall within the definition of generic burglary. Bennett also asserts that Rhode Island law suggests a requirement of habitability or occupiable space. 15 The types of buildings to which the Rhode Island statute refers, such as barns, stables, and presumably, steel storage sheds, clearly fit within Taylor's definition of generic burglary; they are, by the plain language of the statute, buildings or other structures. They clearly do not comprise such items as automobiles, boats, railroad cars, tents, or vending machines, which Taylor rejected as structures for purposes of generic burglary. Taylor also rejected the idea that state law defines the contours of burglary under the ACCA, and therefore we decline to look to Rhode Island law to resolve this question. Furthermore, Sparks is inapposite, because the statute at issue plainly concerns the burglary of buildings as opposed to smaller enclosed spaces such as storage lockers. Bennett was convicted of entering into a steel storage shed, and therefore we know that the structure was large enough to be entered by a person. Thus this case does not raise any issue about structures not large enough to permit human entry.