Opinion ID: 3063986
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Goveo-Zaragoza

Text: Goveo-Zaragoza was sentenced to 235 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, he contends that the district court erred in denying him a safety-valve reduction, as the government did not offer any evidence to demonstrate that his statements and testimony were not truthful and complete. He also argues that, although he was an operational officer on the boat, his sentence was unreasonable because many of his codefendants with “greater or equal culpability” received lesser sentences, and this constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Finally, Goveo-Zaragoza contends that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth 5 Amendment, because officials deprived him of his heart medication for four days.
We review a district court’s safety-valve fact-finding for clear error. United States v. Cruz, 106 F.3d 1553, 1557 (11th Cir. 1997). Under the safety-valve provision, a district court shall impose a sentence without regard to any statutory mandatory minimum if a defendant convicted of certain drug crimes satisfies certain criteria established in U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. Section 5C1.2(a) “requires a defendant to both truthfully and fully disclose information within [his] knowledge relating to the crime for which [he] is being sentenced.” United States v. Figueroa, 199 F.3d 1281, 1283 (11th Cir. 2000). After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err by failing to grant Goveo-Zaragoza a two-level safety-valve reduction because it found that he withheld information regarding how much he knew about the scope of the common scheme and how much compensation he would receive for his role in the criminal activity.
The Supreme Court has explained that the substantive reasonableness of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. ___, ___, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597, 169 L. Ed. 2d 445 (2007). The district 6 court must consider the following factors to determine a reasonable sentence: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). While the district court must consider the § 3553(a) factors, it is not required to discuss each factor. Id. We have declined to review a claim that a sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment when the argument was not raised in the district court. See United States v. Sanchez, 138 F.3d 1410, 1417 (11th Cir. 1998). Nevertheless, we generally review a constitutional challenge to a sentence not raised in the district court for plain error. United States v. Swatzie, 228 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 2000). To correct plain error, we first must find (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. “If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S. 7 Ct. 1544, 1548-49 (1997)). “In non-capital cases, the Eighth Amendment encompasses, at most, only a narrow proportionality principle.” United States v. Brant, 62 F.3d 367, 368 (11th Cir. 1995). We “must make a threshold determination that the sentence imposed is grossly disproportionate to the offense committed, and if it is grossly disproportionate, the court must then consider the sentences imposed on others convicted in the same jurisdiction and the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.” United States v. Reynolds, 215 F.3d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 2000). We conclude from the record that Goveo-Zaragoza’s sentence was substantively reasonable because, despite the fact that he received a higher sentence than some of his codefendants, he was not similarly situated to those codefendants. Further, his sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment because, based on his role as an operation officer, as well as the historic amount of cocaine involved and the severity of the offense in this regard, it cannot be said that his sentence was “grossly disproportionate” to the offense.
Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment. Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). This 8 is a constitutional tort, which is properly brought through a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action, and not on direct appeal. See Anderson v. City of Atlanta, 778 F.2d 678, 686 n.12 (11th Cir. 1985). Because Goveo-Zaragoza attempts to raise this claim on direct appeal, as opposed to a proper § 1983 action, we will not consider the claim. See id.