Opinion ID: 1338683
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Comparison of the VWCA and the LHWCA

Text: A review of the Federal and State Acts supports the conclusion that irreconcilable differences do not exist between state and federal policies or interests in this area. Accordingly, it is not necessary to preclude application of the VWCA in this case. Both the VWCA and the LHWCA were enacted to provide a no-fault recovery mechanism in exchange for making the cost of the compensation a cost of doing business for the industry. Both establish a workers' compensation scheme as the primary source of compensation for work-related injuries. See, e.g., Griffith v. Raven Red Ash Coal Co., 179 Va. 790, 20 S.E.2d 530 (1942); 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 2734, 2740. Both allow the bringing of a common law negligence action against a third party under certain circumstances. Griffith, supra ; Va. Code § 65.2-309; 33 U.S.C. § 903(b). Most important for this case, both statutes prohibit common law negligence actions against fellow employees. Va. Code § 65.2-307; 33 U.S.C. § 933(i). The Virginia Act's prohibition clearly precludes Mizenko's action against Electric Motor. Congress specifically adopted the same exclusive remedy policy in the LHWCA: that the right to compensation under the LHWCA shall be the exclusive remedy to an employee when he is injured ... by the negligence or wrong of any other person or persons in the same employ. 33 U.S.C. § 933(i). Differences which may arise in determining who are fellow employees, others, strangers to the employment, or persons in the same employ, as developed on a case-by-case basis in the respective jurisdictions, do not undercut the identity of the policy endorsed by both jurisdictions. [6] Under the standard of review discussed above, therefore, giving effect to a policy providing for an exclusive remedy for work-related injuries caused by fellow employees as interpreted by Virginia law does not frustrate the federal law. Furthermore, the Virginia law is consistent with the interpretation of the phrase persons in the same employ contained in 33 U.S.C. § 933(i). Calder v. Crall, 726 F.2d 598 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 857, 105 S.Ct. 185, 83 L.Ed.2d 118 (1984), involved a lawsuit filed by a cafeteria cashier against a carpenter and a noncommissioned air force officer for injuries sustained when a nail from a fastener gun penetrated a wall and struck the cashier in the leg. The cashier was employed by the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES). The AAFES is a nonappropriated fund instrumentality which is an enterprise controlled by the federal government, but not supported by federally-appropriated funds. AAFES pays its employees' salaries and benefits with funds generated from its activities. The carpenter was a civilian who was employed on the same air force base, and the officer was assigned to the base on active duty. Under federal law, employees of the AAFES are subject to the LHWCA. However, both the officer and the carpenter were subject to federal workers' compensation acts other than the LHWCA. The Court in Calder determined that the phrase persons in the same employ contained in the LHWCA included the carpenter and the officer, although they were not employees of AAFES as was the cashier. The Court noted that AAFES employees are federal employees who may not sue the United States in a personal injury action, but who are limited to remedies under the LHWCA. The Court found that AAFES was an integral part of the military structure, was providing funds for supplemental welfare and recreational activities for the army and air force, and was ultimately responsible to the Secretaries of the Army and of the Air Force. Consequently, the Court held that the employment of all three persons on the air force base under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Air Force constituted working in the same employ under 33 U.S.C. § 933(i). 726 F.2d at 601. The fact that the officer, the carpenter, and the cashier received paychecks from different entities, were supervised by independent entities, were engaged in different types of activities, were covered by different compensation laws, and were not the direct employees of the same employer, was not determinative. Rather, the Court looked to the identity and nature of the common employer, and the work of the employees in question as it related to that of the common employer. This analysis emulates that used to determine whether an alleged tortfeasor is a stranger to the business or an other party under Virginia workers' compensation jurisprudence. Therefore, applying Virginia jurisprudence does not frustrate the federal statute and, in my opinion, applying either statute to the instant case precludes Mizenko's action against Electric Motor. [7] IV.