Opinion ID: 1386274
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Instruction of the Circumstances of the Crime, Other Violent Criminal Activity, and Prior Felony Convictions

Text: The trial court instructed the jury that in determining penalty, they should consider, inter alia, (1) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant has been convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true; (2) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence, or the express or implied threat to use force or violence; and (3) The presence or absence of any felony convictions. The ultimate source of the foregoing language is, of course, section 190.3. The words of the instruction differ from those of the statute on only one point significant here: the former refer to any felony convictions, the latter to any prior felony convictions (italics added). (46) The scope of the three applicable penalty factors defined by section 190.3 is established. Plainly, the factor involving the circumstances of the present crimes covers the offenses of which the defendant is convicted in the capital proceeding. (E.g., People v. Bonin, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 703.) By contrast, the factor relating to other violent criminal activity embraces such activity other than that underlying the offenses in the capital proceeding. (E.g., People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 105-106 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127].) Similarly, the factor pertaining to prior felony convictions includes such convictions other than those in the capital proceeding ( ibid. )  so long as they were entered before the capital crime was committed ( People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 203). (47) Defendant contends that the trial court's instruction on the penalty factors of other violent criminal activity and prior felony convictions was erroneous. Specifically, he argues that the instruction incorrectly or at least inadequately delimited the scope of each of those factors. As explained above, in deciding whether a claim such as the present is sound, we must ascertain the meaning of the instruction and to do so, we must determine how a hypothetical reasonable juror would have, or at least could have, understood its words. After close consideration, we find no error in the instruction on the penalty factor of other violent criminal activity. A reasonable juror would have understood its words to refer to violent criminal activity other than that underlying the offenses in the present proceeding. Such a juror could not have taken the language to reach further. The instruction on the penalty factor of the circumstances of the present crimes allowed full consideration of each and every one of those offenses. A reasonable juror could not have believed that the instruction in question allowed any re consideration whatever. (Compare People v. Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 457 [arriving at substantially the same conclusion regarding substantially the same instruction].) (48) We reach the opposite result as to the instruction on the penalty factor of prior felony convictions. To be sure, a reasonable juror would have understood the words of the instruction  even without the statutory adjective prior  to refer to felony convictions other than those in the present proceeding, and could not have been led to expand their compass. As stated above, the instruction on the penalty factor of the circumstances of the present crimes allowed full consideration of those offenses, and a reasonable juror could not have believed that the instruction here allowed reconsideration. (Compare People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 106 [arriving at a similar conclusion regarding a similar instruction].) A reasonable juror, however, would undoubtedly have understood the instruction's language to embrace defendant's conviction of the felony of assault with intent to commit rape. But that conviction, entered as it was after the commission of the capital offense, is outside the scope of the penalty factor here. Having found error on this point, we must consider its consequences. Just as the improper admission of prior-felony-conviction evidence at the penalty phase is subject to harmless-error analysis under the reasonable possibility standard, so too, we believe, is improper instruction thereon. Evidence of defendant's conviction of the felony of burglary was properly admitted on the issue of prior felony convictions. More important, evidence of the facts underlying his conviction of the felony of assault with intent to commit rape was properly admitted on the issue of other violent criminal activity. We presume, as we must, that a reasonable juror would have improperly considered the latter conviction under the instruction here determined erroneous. But we simply cannot conclude that such a juror could have given that conviction any appreciable weight independent of its underlying facts. Accordingly, there is no reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome. [24]