Opinion ID: 676060
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Intermediate Scrutiny's First Requirement: An Important

Text: Government Interest in Gender-Based Relief 172 We are convinced that the City and Board have established a sufficiently important government interest to justify gender-conscious affirmative action. Under the intermediate scrutiny test, a local government must demonstrate some past discrimination against women, but not necessarily discrimination by the government itself. One of the distinguishing features of intermediate scrutiny is that, unlike strict scrutiny, the government interest prong of the inquiry can be satisfied by a showing of societal discrimination in the relevant economic sector. See, e.g., Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728-29, 102 S.Ct. at 3338 (comparing the social security preference upheld in Califano, which took into account that women had been hindered from earning as much as men, with the all-female nursing program in Hogan, struck down in part because the state had made no showing that women lacked opportunities in the field of nursing); cf. Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 932 (9th Cir.1991) (noting that [s]ome degree of discrimination must have occurred in a particular field before a gender-specific remedy may be instituted in that field, but that intermediate scrutiny does not require any showing of governmental involvement ... in the discrimination it seeks to remedy), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 875, 116 L.Ed.2d 780 (1992). The principal purpose of intermediate scrutiny is not so much to make sure that gender-based classifications are used only as a last resort, Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207, 217 (4th Cir.1993) (racial discrimination case), as it is to ensure that gender classifications are based on reasoned analysis rather than archaic stereotypes, see Contractors Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990, 1010 (3d Cir.1993) (The Supreme Court has stated that an affirmative action program survives intermediate scrutiny if the proponent can show it was 'a product of analysis rather than a stereotyped reaction based on habit.'  (quoting Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547, 582-83, 110 S.Ct. 2997, 3018-19, 111 L.Ed.2d 445 (1990))); Lamprecht v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 958 F.2d 382, 393 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1992) (majority opinion of Thomas, Circuit Justice) (noting that intermediate scrutiny is intended to ensure reasoned analysis of classifications, and commenting that analysis is never reasoned when it rests on stereotypes rather than facts); Recent Case, 106 Harv.L.Rev. 804, 808 (1993). In a case such as this, in which there is no allegation that gender-based affirmative action was adopted because of archaic and overbroad assumptions about the relative needs and capacities of the sexes, Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 3253, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984), the important government interest inquiry turns on whether there is evidence of past discrimination in the economic sphere at which the affirmative action program is directed. 173 The record before us contains substantial anecdotal and statistical evidence of past discrimination against women, including discrimination by both the City and the Board. For example, [f]or many years announcements for positions as police patrolman and firefighter were restricted to males only. United States v. Jefferson County, 28 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1834, at 1838, 1981 WL 27018 (N.D.Ala.1981), aff'd, 720 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir.1983). Coupled with that, women were grossly underrepresented in a variety of City positions at the time the consent decrees were negotiated. Id. These and related findings by the district court, see id., justify the district court's finding that there is more than ample reason for the Personnel Board and the City of Birmingham to be concerned that they would be in time held liable for discrimination. Id. We are satisfied that the City and Board have demonstrated an important government interest: eradicating gender discrimination against women in public employment. 174