Opinion ID: 4556600
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: biased jury claim

Text: Mr. McWhorter’s biased jury claim centers around his theory that Ms. Burns lied during voir dire when she said she did not know anyone who was the victim of a crime. The backstory is as follows. When Ms. Burns was a child, her father, Olive Daniels, went out one night with two other men, Langford Crawley and Charles Taylor, to a pond in an abandoned rock mine. The next morning, an officer came to Ms. Burns’s house and told her family that Mr. Taylor had been beaten to death and Mr. Daniels was missing. A police diver then found Mr. 14 Case: 19-11535 Date Filed: 08/18/2020 Page: 15 of 35 Daniels dead at the bottom of the pond with bruises around his neck. However, the autopsy concluded that Mr. Daniels’s cause of death was drowning. Mr. Crawley was charged with and convicted of the murder of Mr. Taylor, but no charges were ever brought against him for Mr. Daniels’s death. During voir dire at Mr. McWhorter’s trial, the prospective jurors were given a questionnaire. Ms. Burns answered question 21 as follows: 21. Have you, any member of your family or anyone you know ever been the victim of a crime? yes If yes, who and what relationship? Steve Burns Brother-in-law What was the crime? Drugs Was anyone arrested in connection with the crime? yes Was anyone convicted in connection with the crime? yes When Mr. McWhorter’s counsel questioned Ms. Burns about her response to question 21, she agreed with counsel’s suggested clarification and said that her brother-in-law had been convicted of a drug crime. At no point in time did Ms. Burns disclose that her father died under suspicious circumstances. She was ultimately selected as a juror. Mr. McWhorter says his constitutional rights were violated because he was deprived of an unbiased jury by Ms. Burns’s failure to disclose the facts surrounding her father’s death. He first claims the CCA unreasonably agreed with the state court’s finding that Ms. Burns was not intentionally dishonest when she 15 Case: 19-11535 Date Filed: 08/18/2020 Page: 16 of 35 answered the juror questionnaire. Second, he claims the CCA’s application of Alabama’s biased jury standard was contrary to clearly established federal law. In reviewing Mr. McWhorter’s claims, we first describe the standard he must meet to show that Ms. Burns was biased and that bias affected his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. Next, we hold that the state court’s determination that Ms. Burns was not intentionally dishonest was not unreasonable because her testimony about how she believed her father died was equivocal. Finally, we hold that the state court’s application of Alabama’s version of the biased-jury analysis was not contrary to clearly established federal law.
Voir dire protects the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury “by exposing possible biases, both known and unknown, on the part of potential jurors.” McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554, 104 S. Ct. 845, 849 (1984). In McDonough, the Supreme Court held that to obtain a new trial when a juror gives a “mistaken, though honest response” to a voir dire question, the defendant (1) “must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire,” and (2) “then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.” Id. at 555– 56, 104 S. Ct. at 849–50. This is because “[t]he motives for concealing 16 Case: 19-11535 Date Filed: 08/18/2020 Page: 17 of 35 information may vary, but only those reasons that affect a juror’s impartiality can truly be said to affect the fairness of a trial.” Id. at 556, 104 S. Ct. at 850. The first prong of the McDonough test requires us to determine whether Ms. Burns was intentionally dishonest in answering the questionnaire; “that is, whether [she] was aware of the fact that [her] answers were false.” United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519, 1531 (11th Cir. 1984). The second prong—whether a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause— requires us to determine whether Ms. Burns’s nondisclosure resulted from actual bias that would disqualify her. Id. at 1532; see United States v. Carpa, 271 F.3d 962, 967 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). Bias may be shown in two ways: “by express admission or by proof of specific facts showing such a close connection to the circumstances at hand that bias must be presumed.” Perkins, 748 F.2d at 1532 (quotation marks omitted). Often, the juror’s dishonesty in and of itself is “a strong indication” that she was not impartial. See id. 2. The CCA Did Not Unreasonably Determine that Ms. Burns Was Not Dishonest. Mr. McWhorter argues that the CCA unreasonably determined that Ms. Burns was not intentionally dishonest. He relies on two points to show Ms. Burns’s alleged dishonesty: (1) her failure to disclose during voir dire that she believed her father was murdered; and (2) her “tearful[]” statements, made to other jurors during deliberations, about her belief that her father’s murderer received 17 Case: 19-11535 Date Filed: 08/18/2020 Page: 18 of 35 lenient treatment. In support of these claims, Mr. McWhorter points to the testimony of Ms. Burns describing “her lifelong belief that her father had been murdered.” And, to the extent that Ms. Burns’s testimony was equivocal about whether she believed this was true, Mr. McWhorter says “any doubt” is erased by Ms. Stonecypher’s testimony that a crying Burns told the other jurors that her father had been murdered.2 Based on our review of Ms. Burns’s testimony at the Rule 32 hearing, we conclude her testimony was equivocal as to whether she believed her father had been murdered. For instance, Ms. Burns said she “always thought that [her] father was killed” by Mr. Crawley. But at other points during the hearing, she reiterated the opposite and agreed that she believed her father had drowned based on the official cause of death and that her only basis for thinking her father had been murdered came from family rumors during her childhood. As the CCA pointed out, whether Ms. Burns was dishonest turns on her understanding what it means to be a “victim” of a crime. McWhorter, 142 So. 3d at 1218–19. Ms. Burns’s lack of understanding, both at trial and years later at the 2 Traditionally, the failure to disclose information and the insertion of extraneous information into deliberations are analyzed as separate instances of misconduct. Perkins, 748 F.2d at 1531, 1533 (analyzing separately allegations of nondisclosure of information during voir dire and insertion of extraneous information into jury deliberations). Mr. McWhorter is appealing only the nondisclosure claim here because, as he acknowledges, the Rule 32 court admitted Ms. Stonecypher’s testimony about Ms. Burns’s deliberation statements only with respect to McWhorter’s nondisclosure claim, not his extraneous evidence claim. 18 Case: 19-11535 Date Filed: 08/18/2020 Page: 19 of 35 Rule 32 hearing, is evident from the record. For example, Ms. Burns responded to the juror questionnaire by saying her brother-in-law had been the victim of the crime of drugs—while later explaining, in response to questions from trial counsel, that her brother-in-law was convicted of a drug crime. And when Mr. McWhorter’s postconviction counsel tried to flesh out her understanding at the Rule 32 hearing, Ms. Burns testified as follows: Q. Now, when you said a moment ago that you weren’t thinking about your father’s death when you answered that item on the questionnaire; is that correct? A. Yes. Q. Well, you also said a moment ago, didn’t you, that you believe your father was not a victim because no one had been officially charged in your father’s murder? A. Now, wait. You say my father was not a victim? Q. That you -- I believe -- did you say a moment ago to [the prosecutor] that you didn’t believe your father was a victim because no one had been officially charged with killing him? A. Yes, I said that. Q. Now, did you answer the question in the way you did, namely, not mentioning your father because no one had been officially charged with killing him? A. No one -- I guess, because no one had been charged with his death. ... Q. Now, was this belief or knowledge that no one had been officially charged the reason why you didn’t mention him in response to this question on the questionnaire? A. Well, I don’t know. I still -- I’m still confused about what you’re asking me. I’m sorry. I did not put his name on there because he was not murdered. He was drowned. 19 Case: 19-11535 Date Filed: 08/18/2020 Page: 20 of 35 Ms. Burns’s “varied responses [about the] question on voir dire testify to the fact that jurors are not necessarily experts in English usage.” McDonough, 464 U.S. at 555, 104 S. Ct. at 849. Because the record indeed reflects that Ms. Burns’s testimony was equivocal, the state court’s finding that Burns was not intentionally dishonest was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts under § 2254(d). See McDonough, 464 U.S. at 555–56, 104 S. Ct. at 849–50 (declining to invalidate trial based on juror’s “mistaken, though honest response”). Mr. McWhorter insists that, despite Ms. Burns’s equivocal voir dire statements, we can resolve this issue in his favor and conclude she was dishonest. He points to Ms. Stonecypher’s testimony that Ms. Burns told the other jurors that “her father had been murdered” years before the trial. In response, the State argues that we cannot consider Ms. Stonecypher’s testimony about Ms. Burns’s deliberation statements under Alabama Rule of Evidence 606(b).3 We need not reach that issue here. Ms. Burns’s testimony about her state of mind during voir dire provides evidence to support the Rule 32 court’s factual findings and credibility determinations. See Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 313–14, 135 S. 3 Rule 606(b) provides that “a juror may not testify in impeachment of the verdict . . . as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing the” juror’s decision. However, this rule does allow a juror to testify “on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.” 20 Case: 19-11535 Date Filed: 08/18/2020 Page: 21 of 35 Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015) (“We may not characterize these state-court factual determinations as unreasonable merely because we would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” (alteration adopted) (quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, the CCA’s finding that Ms. Burns did not “fail[] to respond truthfully” to the voir dire questionnaire, McWhorter, 142 So. 3d at 1218–19, was not an unreasonable determination of the facts. 3. The CCA’s Failure to Apply the McDonough Test Was Not Contrary to Clearly Established Law. In analyzing the second prong of Mr. McWhorter’s biased jury claim, the CCA required him to show “that he ‘might have been prejudiced’ by the jurors’ failure to respond truthfully to a question posed on voir dire.” McWhorter, 142 So. 3d at 1219 (quoting Ex parte Stewart, 659 So. 2d 122, 124 (Ala. 1993) (per curiam)). Mr. McWhorter thus challenges the CCA’s failure to apply the second prong of the McDonough test—that “a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause,” 464 U.S. at 556, 104 S. Ct. at 850—because he asserts that failure is contrary to clearly established law. Alabama courts have not adopted either prong of the McDonough test. See Brown v. State, 807 So. 2d 1, 9 n.6 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (per curiam). Instead, Alabama courts say the proper standard for determining whether juror misconduct warrants a new trial “is whether the misconduct might have prejudiced, not whether it actually did prejudice, the defendant.” Ex parte Dobyne, 805 So. 2d 21 Case: 19-11535 Date Filed: 08/18/2020 Page: 22 of 35 763, 771 (Ala. 2001). Whether this rule—and the CCA’s application of it in Mr. McWhorter’s case—is “contrary to” McDonough under § 2254(d) depends on whether it “contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases.” Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640, 123 S. Ct. 1848, 1853 (2003) (quotation marks omitted). The CCA’s analysis appears to be in accordance with McDonough. The CCA acknowledged that under Alabama’s might-have-prejudiced standard, the “form” of prejudice that would entitle Mr. McWhorter to relief would be the nondisclosure’s “effect, if any, to cause the party to forgo challenging the juror for cause or exercising a peremptory challenge to strike the juror.” McWhorter, 142 So. 3d at 1211 (quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 1212 (addressing McWhorter’s claims “[i]n light of the foregoing”). The CCA then asked whether the facts showed “there was probable prejudice,” and looked to certain factors, including “temporal remoteness of the matter inquired about, the ambiguity of the question propounded, the prospective juror’s inadvertence or willfulness in falsifying or failing to answer, the failure of the juror to recollect, and the materiality of the matter inquired about.” Id. at 1211 (quotation marks omitted). This analysis by the CCA mirrors the analysis our Court has followed under McDonough, which looks to facts “showing . . . a close connection” between the biased juror and the circumstances of the case. See Carpa, 271 F.3d at 967. Said 22 Case: 19-11535 Date Filed: 08/18/2020 Page: 23 of 35 another way, both Alabama’s might-have-prejudiced standard and McDonough depend on whether the juror’s bias may have influenced the verdict against the defendant. Compare McDonough, 464 U.S. at 554, 104 S. Ct. at 849 (holding that a “touchstone of a fair trial is an impartial trier of fact”) with Ex parte Dobyne, 805 So. 2d at 771 (explaining that the focus of whether a defendant was prejudiced is grounded in whether the juror might have unlawfully influenced the verdict). Neither did the CCA unreasonably apply these standards. In concluding that Ms. Burns’s nondisclosure on the juror questionnaire did not prejudice Mr. McWhorter, the CCA relied on the Rule 32 court’s finding that Burns “was unequivocal that her father’s death did not affect her role as a juror.” McWhorter, 142 So. 3d at 1221 (quotation marks omitted). The CCA also cited favorably to facts established in the Rule 32 proceedings. Those facts included that Mr. Daniels’s death was not close in time to when Mr. McWhorter was tried; Ms. Burns’s failure to provide the information was “less likely to have affected her role as a juror” due to her uncertainty over the circumstances of her father’s death; and she testified she did not want to “vindicate the death of her father through this trial.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). In conducting this type of analysis, our Court has looked to similar factors, including whether the juror expressly admitted bias, was intentionally dishonest, or was “closely connected to the case or to either party.” See Carpa, 271 F.3d at 967; BankAtlantic v. Blythe Eastman Paine 23 Case: 19-11535 Date Filed: 08/18/2020 Page: 24 of 35 Webber, Inc., 955 F.2d 1467, 1473 (11th Cir. 1992). The CCA, in effect, performed the same analysis required by McDonough. Because the CCA’s analysis was not contrary to McDonough under § 2254(d)(1), and because, as we have already described, Mr. McWhorter failed to carry his burden on the first prong of the McDonough test, we need not reach the merits of whether there would have been a valid basis to challenge Ms. Burns for cause pursuant to McDonough’s second prong. Cf. BankAtlantic, 955 F.2d at 1473 (declining to reach the first prong “because the district court properly found that BankAtlantic failed to show that correct responses from [the jurors] would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause”). Thus, we affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Mr. McWhorter’s biased jury claim.