Opinion ID: 3157773
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alan Elm’s Testimony

Text: ¶30 WCU argues that the District Court improperly considered the testimony of real estate broker Alan Elm when making its findings. Elm did not testify, but his affidavit valuing the property was previously filed as an attachment to Defendants’ pleadings. Defendants argue that because WCU’s counsel mentioned Elm’s work in opening statements and in cross examination of Lard, WCU included Elm’s opinion in the 2 Counsel for Defendants Prindivilles asked Mr. Lard, “So getting back to that percentage adjustment, if you were going to attempt to say what might be an appropriate adjustment – even though of course you didn’t make one and you said you didn’t think such an analysis would be appropriate, but what percentage type would you be considering to try to do that with?” Mr. Lard stated: “Based on an appraisal my associate, Mary Arndt, did in Niarada last summer we were looking at sales throughout Sanders County, in Flathead County and Lake County, and it appears that property values are less than half of what we are in this county. So location adjustment I would have made it in excess of a hundred percent.” 14 proceeding and “should not now be claiming error.” The District Court’s Order relied on the Elm affidavit and erroneously stated that he testified: Defendants Prindiville also engaged Alan Elm to appraise the property. Mr. Elm submitted his affidavit and he testified at trial; he placed a value on the property as of the June 12, 2012, the date of Sheriff’s sale, to be at least $2,400,000. Mr. Elm is a licensed real estate broker in Montana and is competent to testify as an expert. This value is close to the valuation placed on the property by Mr. Barrie, the real estate appraiser engaged by Plaintiff, Whitefish Credit Union. ¶31 We disagree with the argument that WCU counsel’s opening remarks that Elm was expected to testify served to introduce Elm’s testimony into evidence, or that referencing Elm’s work during cross examination of Lard served to introduce Elm’s affidavit as substantive evidence. Elm did not testify and his report should not have been admitted, although the record does not appear to contain a specific ruling from the District Court on admitting Elm’s affidavit. In any event, to the extent that the District Court admitted and relied upon Elm’s affidavit for the value of the Patrick Creek property, this was error. ¶32 “An abuse of discretion in an evidentiary ruling does not necessarily constitute reversible error, however. . . . In other words, ‘a reversal cannot be predicated upon an error in admission of evidence, where the evidence in question was not of such character to have affected the result.’” In re A.N., 2000 MT 35, ¶ 55, 298 Mont. 237, 995 P.2d 427 (citation omitted). Here, the District Court received significant evidence regarding the value of the property that was improperly admitted, and relied upon that evidence in entering its findings, which clearly affected the outcome of the hearing. 15