Opinion ID: 786874
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Merits of Prevailing Party Issue

Text: 22 PVUSD argues that the Shapiros were not the prevailing parties because the judgment in their favor was technical and de minimis, citing Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001), and Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., No. 3, 31 F.3d 1489 (9th Cir.1994). In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court held that the term `prevailing party,' as it is used in various attorney's fees statutes, requires a `material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties.' 6 Bennett v. Yoshina, 259 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir.2001) (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604, 121 S.Ct. 1835). Buckhannon concerned the attorney's fees provisions of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and the Americans with Disabilities Act. We have not yet had occasion to determine whether Buckhannon applies to the IDEA's attorney's fees provision. We have, however, applied Buckhannon to a number of other attorney's fees statutes. See, e.g., Kasza v. Whitman, 325 F.3d 1178, 1180 (9th Cir.2003) (applying Buckhannon to the fee-shifting provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e)); Perez-Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791, 793-94 (9th Cir.2002) (applying Buckhannon to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)); Bennett, 259 F.3d at 1100-01 (applying Buckhannon to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988). 23 Moreover, all of the other circuits to confront the issue have held that Buckhannon applies to the attorney's fees provision of the IDEA. See T.D. v. LaGrange Sch. Dist. No. 102, 349 F.3d 469, 471 (7th Cir.2003) (holding that Buckhannon applies to the attorney's fees provision of the IDEA); John T. v. Del. County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 555-58 (3d Cir.2003) (same); J.C. v. Reg'l Sch. Dist. 10, 278 F.3d 119, 123-25 (2d Cir.2002) (same); see also G ex rel. RG v. Fort Bragg Dependent Sch., 343 F.3d 295, 310 (4th Cir.2003) (relying on Buckhannon in an IDEA case); Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35 v. Mr. & Mrs. R., 321 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir.2003) (same). We see no reason not to follow this consistent line of precedent from our own and other circuits applying Buckhannon. We therefore conclude that Buckhannon's definition of prevailing party applies to the IDEA's attorney's fees provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). 24 PVUSD correctly contends that a plaintiff is not the prevailing party if his or her success is purely technical or de minimis. Parents of Student W., 31 F.3d at 1498. Nevertheless, it is also true that a party may be accorded prevailing party status by being awarded some relief by the court, even if only an award of nominal damages. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603-04, 121 S.Ct. 1835; see also Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35, 321 F.3d at 15 (stating that a prevailing party must succeed on the merits of a claim or defense, but that a party may be considered `prevailing' even without obtaining a favorable final judgment on all (or even the most crucial) of her claims). Thus, [e]ssentially, in order to be considered a `prevailing party' after Buckhannon, a plaintiff must not only achieve some `material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties,' but that change must also be judicially sanctioned. Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir.2003). There is no question that the Shapiros prevailed on several significant aspects of their claim and were awarded money damages by the court. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the Shapiros were the prevailing parties for IDEA purposes.