Opinion ID: 2630926
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Set Aside the Burglary Charges and Special Circumstance Allegations (Letner, Tobin)

Text: Following the filing of the complaints and amended complaints, a preliminary hearing was held. At the conclusion of the hearing, the magistrate declined to hold defendants to answer on the burglary charges and the burglary special circumstance allegations, finding the evidence did not establish that defendants intended to commit a felony when they entered Pontbriant's house. The magistrate held defendants to answer on the remaining charges of murder, robbery, attempted rape, and theft of a vehicle, and the remaining special circumstance allegations. The information subsequently filed in the superior court, however, included the burglary charges and burglary special circumstance allegations, despite the earlier ruling. Defendants each filed a motion under section 995, seeking to set aside the burglary charges and special circumstance allegations in the information on the ground the magistrate's determination was a factual finding that precluded the refiling of the burglary charges. The trial court denied their motions, finding there was sufficient evidence to hold the defendants to answer on all charges, and on all special allegations. Tobin challenged the trial court's denial of his motion by seeking a writ of prohibition from the Court of Appeal, but that court denied the petition. Letner did not file such a petition. On appeal, defendants contend the magistrate's ruling precluded the prosecution from refiling the burglary charges. [6] We do not reach the merits of the question whether the trial court erred by denying the section 995 motions, because defendants cannot establish that any error in this regard was prejudicial. (1) In People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519 [165 Cal.Rptr. 851, 612 P.2d 941] ( Pompa-Ortiz ), we reconsidered the rule announced in People v. Elliot (1960) 54 Cal.2d 498 [6 Cal.Rptr. 753, 354 P.2d 225], which we described as advanc[ing] the broad proposition that if the defendant has not been `legally committed' and the trial court nonetheless erroneously denies the motion to set aside the information and permits the action to proceed to judgment, the resulting conviction must be reversed. ( Pompa-Ortiz, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 527.) We observed that the Elliot rule was based upon the notion that the absence of a legally proper commitment deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over the defendant, and therefore reversal on appeal was warranted even in the absence of a showing of prejudice at trial. We further explained, however, that the source of the difficulty in Elliot is the uncritical use of the term `jurisdiction' when assessing the effect of an illegal commitment on the trial in superior court. ( Pompa-Ortiz, at p. 528.) We therefore discarded the Elliot rule, and held the following: Henceforth irregularities in the preliminary examination procedures which are not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense shall be reviewed under the appropriate standard of prejudicial error and shall require reversal only if defendant can show that he was deprived of a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejudice as a result of the error at the preliminary examination. The right to relief without any showing of prejudice will be limited to pretrial challenges of irregularities. ( Pompa-Ortiz, at p. 529, italics added; see also People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 461-462 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271].) (2) We acknowledge that our statement of the rule in Pompa-Ortiz reflects the circumstance that we were addressing an alleged irregularity that occurred during the preliminary hearing itself, whereas in the present case we are concerned with an alleged error that occurred in the trial court subsequent to the preliminary hearing. We conclude the rule nonetheless should apply in these circumstances as well. The error complained of in the present case that the trial should not have proceeded on charges the magistrate ruled were unfoundedis not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense, as we have defined that term. As we recently explained, [a] lack of jurisdiction in its fundamental or strict sense results in `an entire absence of power to hear or determine the case, an absence of authority over the subject matter or the parties. [Citation.] On the other hand, a court may have jurisdiction in the strict sense but nevertheless lack `jurisdiction' (or power) to act except in a particular manner, or to give certain kinds of relief, or to act without the occurrence of certain procedural prerequisites. [Citation.] When a court fails to conduct itself in the manner prescribed, it is said to have acted in excess of jurisdiction.' [Citations.] ( People v. Lara (2010) 48 Cal.4th 216, 224-225 [106 Cal.Rptr.3d 208, 226 P.3d 322].) `[F]undamental jurisdiction cannot be conferred by waiver, estoppel, or consent ...' [whereas] `an act in excess of jurisdiction is valid until set aside, and parties may be precluded from setting it aside by such things as waiver, estoppel, or the passage of time.' ( Id. at p. 225.) Defendants' claims, which they were required to raise at trial by way of their section 995 motions in order to preserve them (see § 996), cannot be considered as raising a challenge to the trial court's fundamental jurisdiction over the case. (Cf. People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 990-991 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 467, 140 P.3d 775] [Errors in the denial of a section 995 motion claiming insufficiency of the evidence are not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense.]; People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 873 [268 Cal.Rptr. 802, 789 P.2d 983].) Indeed, we observe that a magistrate's ruling pursuant to section 871 that certain charges have not been sustained, even if that decision is properly supported by the facts and the law, does not absolutely deprive the prosecution of the opportunity to bring the charges at issue. As long as the restrictions of section 1387 on the number of times charges may be dismissed and refiled are satisfied, the prosecution may move to dismiss the case and either file a new complaint that includes all the charges, which would lead to a second preliminary hearing, or seek an indictment by the grand jury. (See, e.g., Burris v. Superior Court (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1012, 1019 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 876, 103 P.3d 276]; Ramos v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 26, 29 [184 Cal.Rptr. 622, 648 P.2d 589].) Accordingly, pursuant to the rule we set forth in Pompa-Ortiz, on appeal defendants are required to establish not only that the denial of their section 995 motions was erroneous, but also that they were prejudiced by such error. Letner and Tobin cannot do so, because the jury convicted them of the burglary charges and found the burglary special circumstance allegations true after a trial in which, as discussed, post, in part II.B.2.c., the prosecution presented sufficient evidence as to those matters. (See People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 137 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887] [Even ``[i]f there is insufficient evidence to support the commitment, the defendant cannot be said to be prejudiced where sufficient evidence has been introduced at ... trial'' to support the jury's finding as to the charge or as to the truth of the allegation.].) We therefore conclude defendants' claims are without merit.