Opinion ID: 2590048
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: statutory authorization for closing shoreham

Text: The Executive Branch and its agencies may not go beyond stated legislative policy and prescribe a remedial device not embraced by the policy in contravention of the separation of powers doctrine ( Matter of Broidrick v Lindsay , 39 N.Y.2d 641, 645-646). However, only executive acts inconsistent with or arrogative of the Legislature's prerogatives violate the separation doctrine ( Clark v Cuomo , 66 N.Y.2d 185, 189; Matter of Nicholas v Kahn , 47 N.Y.2d 24, 30; Rapp v Carey , 44 N.Y.2d 157, 163; Matter of Broidrick v Lindsay , supra , at 645-646). A check-and-balance in the distribution of powers is that the Legislative Branch may not delegate away its fundamental lawmaking powers or policymaking choices. The Legislature may, however, declare its policy in general terms by statute, endow administrative agencies with the power and flexibility to fill in details and interstices and to make subsidiary policy choices consistent with the enabling legislation ( Boreali v Axelrod , 71 N.Y.2d 1, 10; Matter of Nicholas v Kahn , supra , at 31; Matter of Bates v Toia , 45 N.Y.2d 460, 464). The Legislature is not required in its enactments to supply agencies with rigid marching orders, especially in a field as complex as nuclear power regulation, which is simply incapable of statutory completion and where flexibility in the adaptation of the legislative policy to infinitely variable conditions constitute[s] the very essence [of the Act] ( Matter of Nicholas v Kahn , 47 N.Y.2d 24, 31, supra ). The intricate nuances of the policy determinations required under the LIPA Act deserve some respect from the Court. The specialized entity, LIPA, was created by the Legislature to concentrate on and resolve these matters within a reasonably defined and delegated range of expertise ( see , Matter of Memorial Hosp. v Axelrod , 68 N.Y.2d 958, 960; Matter of Great Lakes-Dunbar-Rochester v State Tax Commn. , 65 N.Y.2d 339, 343). The wisdom and prudence of the Legislature's flexible approach are not ours to question. Nor may the Court weigh the fiscal quid pro quos of the Settlement Agreement. Our role is simply to construe the enactment, its validity and its implementation. There can be little doubt that the Act authorizes LIPA to acquire and close Shoreham. It allows LIPA to acquire all or any part of the securities or assets of LILCO, as the authority in its sole discretion may determine (Public Authorities Law § 1020-h [2] [emphasis added]; see also , § 1020-f [d]; § 1020-g [c]; § 1020-h [6] [a]). The Legislature wanted Shoreham closed and decommissioned, and it expressly declared its legislative policy that LIPA's acquisition, closure and decommissioning of Shoreham would accomplish an objective of the Act (Public Authorities Law §§ 1020-a, 1020-h [9]; § 1020-t; cf. , Matter of Campagna v Shaffer , 73 N.Y.2d 237, 243; Boreali v Axelrod , 71 N.Y.2d 1, 6, 11-16, supra ; Under 21, Catholic Home Bur. for Dependent Children v City of New York , 65 N.Y.2d 344, 356; Subcontractors Trade Assn. v Koch , 62 N.Y.2d 422, 429-430; Matter of Broidrick v Lindsay , 39 N.Y.2d 641, 646-647, supra ). In fact, closure of Shoreham was one of the overriding engines driving the emergency legislative initiative and package. The language of the Act and its legislative history cogently portray the Act's objectives: LIPA's acquisition and closure of Shoreham, or LIPA's takeover and replacement of LILCO as a utility provider, or both, dependent only on control of rates ( see , Public Authorities Law §§ 1020-a, 1020-h). The objectives were not expressed as mandatory or paramount or indispensably linked or preconditioned upon each other. Thus, respondents cannot be said to have arrogated by administrative or executive fiat that which was not contemplated or delegated by the Legislature ( Matter of Campagna v Shaffer , 73 N.Y.2d 237, 242, supra ), and did not effect [their own] vision of societal policy choices ( id. , at 242) or act on a clean slate, thereby invading the nondelegable legislative policymaking function ( Boreali v Axelrod , 71 N.Y.2d 1, 13, supra ). To be sure, this Settlement Agreement did not, by any stretch of the facts, result from executive fiat; rather, it was the product of a constitutional and statutorily authorized resolution of the Shoreham crisis by LIPA, LILCO and the Governor and executive agencies ( contrast , Youngstown Co. v Sawyer , 343 US 579 [a totally inapposite case, cited by the dissenters at 428-429, whose essential facts are the seizure of the country's steel mills unilaterally by President Truman to deal with a strike during the Korean War]). Appellants and the dissenters would have the Court construe the comprehensive statute (Public Authorities Law § 1020-h [9]) in a strained and inflexible fashion, producing absurd results. Their legislatively unintended all-or-nothing approach would reinstate the Shoreham crisis, producing a plain contradiction of a critical objective of the statute. The Act conferred broad discretion on LIPA, delegated to it all of the powers necessary or convenient to implement its multipronged, complicated purposes (Public Authorities Law § 1020-f), and provided for liberal construction of its terms to effectuate its purposes (Public Authorities Law § 1020-ff). Appellants' and the dissenters' interpretation, relying on an inference by negative implication that the Public Authorities Law withholds authority from LIPA to close Shoreham, unless it completely takes over LILCO, is simply wrong. The pertinent subdivisions, the strained cross-incorporation by reference of general preamble language, and the Act overall do not impose or create such a requirement. Further, the negative inference approach is a disfavored interpretive tool, especially in the face of a broad delegation of appropriate discretion and authority designed to effect the stated legislative goals of closure, found throughout the whole Act read as an integrated, complex, emergency package of legislation (see , Matter of City of New York v State of New York Commn. on Cable Tel. , 47 N.Y.2d 89, 92; see also , Clark v Cuomo , 66 N.Y.2d 185, supra) . Indeed, none of the legislative history on which the dissenters rely supports their judicial incorporation into the Act of a conditional restriction that LIPA was without authority to acquire Shoreham in a negotiated agreement unless it simultaneously engaged in a full scale buyout and replacement of LILCO. The only condition attached to LIPA's decision to acquire any or all of the assets or stock of LILCO is LIPA's determination that such acquisition would result in rates to LILCO's customers not higher than LILCO would have charged had there been no such acquisition (Public Authorities Law § 1020-h [2], [4], [10]). Once that threshold is satisfied, LIPA is empowered  but not required  to make any such acquisition. No provision can be found anywhere in the Act which expressly or by reasonable implication requires that LIPA must exert its full acquisition authority contemporaneously with the acquisition and decommissioning of Shoreham itself, i.e., making LIPA's authority to acquire any part of the LILCO property conditional on LIPA's replacing LILCO (dissenting opn, at 418; see also , 419, 420, 424-425, 427-428). No matter how many times or different ways such an unfounded interpretation is repeated, the fact remains that the Act simply does not condition LIPA's acquisition of Shoreham on its acquisition also of all of LILCO's assets and replacement of privately owned LILCO with a public utility provider. One would, in any event, expect a critical precondition feature of this kind to be expressed or readily ascertainable if it were ever intended. It is not, and that is not surprising, for that could have paralyzed LIPA from bringing about a plainly intended goal: the closing of Shoreham. Appellants claim that the Agreement, because it provided for the continued operation of LILCO, conflicts with the legislative goal to put LILCO out of business by a takeover and substitution with a public power supplier. While the Legislature indicated in the Act that it contemplated  based on information and conditions at the time of enactment  that replacement of LILCO with a publicly owned power authority would be the best or most appropriate method of remedying the host of emergency problems addressed by the Act (especially closing Shoreham) ( see , Public Authorities Law §§ 1020-a, 1020-h [1] [a], [n]), the Legislature reposed in LIPA the flexible authority to make the ultimate choice among statutory alternatives. LIPA was authorized to acquire all or any part of LILCO's stock and assets (Public Authorities Law § 1020-h), but the Act does not mandate or direct LIPA to do so or to replace LILCO at any given time or as a precondition to achieving other key legislative objectives. Acquisition of all of privately owned LILCO's assets by eminent domain or otherwise would cost billions of taxpayer dollars (hardly a bail out [dissenting opn, at 418]); this is a factor the Legislature recognized in affording LIPA broad authority with respect to whether such a total acquisition was feasible, or necessary, or might contribute to higher rather than lower rates because of the financing costs alone of such a monumental public acquisition of a privately owned utility (Bill Jacket, L 1986, ch 517, Budget Report on Bills, at 7; id. , Report of Comptroller, at 19). We emphasize that the recurring and unavoidable theme reflected in the legislative history is that the intended sine qua non objective of the Act was to give LIPA the authority to save ratepayers money by controlling and reducing utility costs (Bill Jacket, Assembly Mem, at 14; id. , Budget Report, at 6; id. , Executive Approval Mem, at 12; id. , Executive Mem, at 15). It was not to force LIPA to replace LILCO as the service area utility provider in order to achieve the legislative objective of closure of Shoreham and elimination of Shoreham's impact on utility rates. Indeed, the Governor, in approving the LIPA Act legislation, emphasized that the core objective of the Act was to produce ratepayer savings, which he recognized might not necessarily be achieved by a complete conversion to public power through LIPA's replacement of LILCO (Governor's Approval Mem, 1986 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 3178). Further, under the terms of the Agreement, LIPA did not permanently forego the exercise at some time of its delegated power to acquire and supplant LILCO should it decide in its sole discretion that doing so would accomplish the Act's objective of controlling utility costs to LILCO customers ( see , Public Authorities Law § 1020-h [2]). The Agreement is not structured to expressly prohibit acquisition by LIPA of any part of LILCO other than Shoreham, as the Agreement in no way precludes LIPA from exercising its full range of statutory choices under the LIPA Act depending on the time and circumstances, including market conditions and the State's fiscal situation. Rather, the Agreement plainly accomplished an urgent objective of the Act: the prevention of further rate increases attributable to the Shoreham enterprise. We emphasize that our decision in this respect focuses solely on the statutory interpretation concerning the delegation, implementation and distribution of governmental public utility power as it pertains to Shoreham. We imply no views  which would be irrelevant and inappropriate in any event  about the wisdom of nuclear power, public power, or punishment of private power companies for failed and costly enterprises. We conclude only that a rational choice was made by the entities charged with the implementing authority  legitimate means  based on delegated power and on the record before us to achieve a legislative goal  the legitimate end of Shoreham (dissenting opn, at 428).