Opinion ID: 2823848
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The UMDDA

Text: Â¶22Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The UMDDA provides that â[a]ny person who is in the custody of the department of corrections . . . may request final disposition of any untried indictment, information, or criminal complaint pending against him in this state.â Â§ 16-14-102(1). Once the trial court and the prosecution receive such a request, the prisoner must be brought to trial on the relevant charge within 182 days. Â§ 16-14-104(1). We have recognized that the Actâs primary purpose is âto provide a mechanism for prisoners to insist upon speedy and final disposition of untried charges . . . so that prison rehabilitation programs initiated for the prisonersâ benefit will not be disrupted.â People v. Higinbotham, 712 P.2d 993, 997 (Colo. 1986). We have also observed, however, that the UMDDA functions as âone of several Colorado statutes implementing the speedy trial rights guaranteed to a defendantâ under the United States and Colorado Constitutions. Id. at 996; see also Johnson v. People, 939 P.2d 817, 820 (Colo. 1997) (noting that the UMDDA âreflect[s] the . . . policy of facilitating the speedy disposition of untried charges upon a proper request by an incarcerated personâ). Consonant with that purpose, the Act mandates that if a prisoner invokes his rights but the trial court fails to comply with the 182-day deadline, âno court of thisÂ state shall any longer have jurisdictionâ over the relevant charge, and âthe court shall dismiss it with prejudice.â Â§ 16-14-104(1). Â¶23Â Â Â Â For a prisoner to invoke his rights under the Act, his request must be in writing and must be addressed both âto the court in which the indictment, information, or criminal complaint is pending and to the prosecuting official charged with the duty of prosecuting it.â Â§ 16-14-102(1). But while the Act requires prisoners to address their requests to the court and the prosecutor, it does not contemplate them actually sending such requests to those parties directly. Rather, the UMDDA provides that any request âshall be delivered to the superintendent where the prisoner is confined.â Â§ 16-14-103(1), C.R.S. (2014). The superintendent must then send a registered copy of the prisonerâs request to both the court and the prosecutor. Â§ 16-14-103(1)(b). Conforming with the Actâs requirements in this manner is known as âstrict compliance.â See People v. Fleming, 900 P.2d 19, 22 n.6 (Colo. 1995). Â¶24Â Â Â Â Strict compliance, however, is not the only manner by which a prisoner can invoke his right to speedy disposition under the UMDDA. That is, even when a prisoner fails to send his request to the superintendentâand thus fails to strictly comply with the Actâwe have determined that he nevertheless invokes his rights under the UMDDA if (1) his request substantially complies with the Actâs requirements, and (2) the prosecution receives âactual noticeâ of the request. See Mascarenas, 666 P.2d at 106. 6 The first element is not at issue in this case, as it is undisputed thatÂ McKimmyâs separate lettersâeach of which âformally request[ed] protection under the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Actâ and included an accompanying citation to section 16-14-102 of the Colorado Revised Statutesâall substantially complied with the Act. See People v. Campbell, 742 P.2d 302, 310 (Colo. 1987) (holding that a letter that made âno mention of the [UMDDA] by name or statutory citationâ but âsimply [made] a âdemand for trialâ and for a âspeedy trialââ was âtoo indefinite to constitute a request for disposition of the defendantâs untried [charge] under the [UMDDA],â whereas a different letter that âwas couched in terms of a motion to dismiss for failure to have complied with the âUNIFORM MANDATORY DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS ACT, found in Article 14 of the Colorado Revised Statutes,â . . . sufficiently identified the Act to constitute a requestâ). But substantial compliance alone is insufficient to satisfactorily invoke a prisonerâs UMDDA rights. In addition, the prosecution must receive âactual noticeâ of the prisonerâs request. Accordingly, we now turn to the issue squarely before us in this case: the proper definition of âactual noticeâ for purposes of substantial compliance under the UMDDA.