Opinion ID: 2679691
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: improper-remarks claim

Text: Wallace claims that his trial counsel’s performance was also constitutionally ineffective because counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s improper remarks. Wallace identifies three categories of improper remarks made by the prosecutor during closing argument: (1) comments emphasizing the strength of the State’s case and denigrating the defense’s theory of the case, (2) comments that misrepresented the testimony of the witnesses, and (3) comments that mischaracterized the law as applied to the evidence produced at trial. In its decision on the postconviction appeal, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that Wallace’s “brief contain[ed] a number of grounds on which he believes trial counsel was deficient, including trial counsel’s failure to . . . object to the State’s expressions of opinion on witness credibility . . . [and] object to the State’s expression of opinion regarding the strength of evidence against the Petitioner relative to similar cases.” Wallace, 2009 WL 3031261, at .5 With respect to the improper-remarks claim, the only claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that was properly presented, the Tennessee court denied relief: The state court did not consider the parts of Wallace’s improper-remarks claims based 5 on counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s mischaracterizations of the evidence and the law because those claims were not presented in his counsel’s brief. As we discussed in relation to Wallace’s defense-theory claims, the alleged deficient performance of his post-conviction appellate counsel is not cause to excuse the procedural default of the claims Wallace included only in his supplemental pro se brief. Accordingly, we do not reach the merits on the portion of Wallace’s improper-remarks claim that were procedurally defaulted. For ease of reference, we will refer to the portions of this claim that were presented to the post-conviction appellate court as Wallace’s “improper-remarks claim.” 22 No. 13-5331, Wallace v. Sexton We decline to address the issue of whether trial counsel was deficient in his representation on these issues. The Petitioner has simply not demonstrated that the result of his trial would have been different but for the alleged errors. After our review of the record, we cannot conclude that the post-conviction court erred in holding that the Petitioner was not prejudiced by any alleged deficient representation. The State presented a strong case against the Petitioner, including the testimony of several eyewitnesses to the shooting. Other witnesses established that the Petitioner was with the victim in a vehicle matching the description of the one seen at J.T.’s Bait Shop and that he had a shotgun with him. Witnesses also established that the victim’s body had been driven to a remote location and discarded. Based on our review of the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in finding that the Petitioner was not entitled to postconviction relief based on the ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at . The state court adjudicated the improper-remarks claim on the merits, and we apply AEDPA deference to its determination. However, “[w]hen a state court relied only on one Strickland prong to adjudicate an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, AEDPA deference does not apply to review of the Strickland prong not relied upon by the state court.” Rayner v. Mills, 685 F.3d 631, 638 (6th Cir. 2012). Because the state court “decline[d] to address the issue of whether trial counsel was deficient in his representation,” Wallace, 2009 WL 3031261, at , and instead ruled that Wallace had not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s errors, we review the deficiency prong of this claim de novo and the prejudice prong with AEDPA deference. Wallace identifies several remarks made by the prosecutor during closing argument that he claims were improper because they denigrated his theory of the case while emphasizing the strength of the prosecution’s case: ● “Common sense will tell you that regardless of what he wanted to say about . . . this being an accident and [Perrin] picking up the gun and 23 No. 13-5331, Wallace v. Sexton playing with it, that’s a bunch of bull.” R. 17-7 (Trial Tr. at 608) (Page ID #928). ● “[The defense is] trying to put the most favorable light on what is clearly a smoking gun case.” Id. at 632–33 (Page ID #952–53). ● “I submit to you that it will probably take you less time to come back with a verdict in this case than [counsel] took in his opening statement, because the facts are not that hard in this case.” Id. at 633 (Page ID #953). ● “If I adopted [defense counsel’s] circumstances here, we ought to be trying a littering case. The only thing wrong that happened in this case, was that his client had a panic attack and just dumped the body in the wrong place. . . . [I]t’s ridiculous and that dog won’t hunt.” Id. ● “I call it a smoking gun case, it’s kind of a prosecutor’s dream.” Id. at 642 (Page ID #962). Wallace argues that his counsel’s failure to object to these improper comments was constitutionally deficient performance, which deprived him of a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. Wallace claims that the prosecutor’s improper remarks that Wallace’s defense theory was “ridiculous” and “a bunch of bull,” passing without objection, were so outrageous that they created a “reasonable probability” that “the result of the proceedings would have been different.” Id. at 694. The two prongs of the Strickland test need not be applied in order, and if the defendant fails to make the requisite showing on one prong, we need not address the other. Stanford v. Parker, 266 F.3d 442, 454 (6th Cir. 2001). In this case, it is not necessary to consider whether Wallace has demonstrated that his counsel’s performance was deficient because he cannot satisfy his burden on the prejudice prong—that is, he cannot show that the state court’s determination that he was not prejudiced by his counsel’s error was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. The state court’s analysis was imprecise, to be sure. The state court concluded that, in light of the eyewitness evidence, the outcome of Wallace’s trial would not have been different, 24 No. 13-5331, Wallace v. Sexton even if his counsel had objected to the prosecutor’s improper remarks. Wallace, 2009 WL 3031261, at . The state court’s conclusion is problematic for two reasons: First, the state court applied the wrong standard. The proper inquiry is not whether “the result of [Wallace’s] trial would have been different but for the alleged errors,” id., but whether there is a “reasonable probability” that the outcome of the trial would have been different absent counsel’s errors. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. Second, the state court’s reasoning is unpersuasive because the evidence identified by the state court demonstrates only that Wallace was involved in Perrin’s death. The prosecutor’s remarks, on the other hand, improperly undercut Wallace’s theory that he did not have the mens rea necessary to be convicted for the intentional killing of Perrin; he does not dispute that he was in some way involved in her death. Thus, the eyewitness testimony relied upon by the state court does not truly answer Wallace’s complaint that the prosecutor improperly denigrated his accident-based theory of defense. We are not convinced that the state court reasonably applied Supreme Court precedent when denying Wallace’s claim. However, we are not limited to considering only the state court’s articulated reasons for its decision; rather, “the habeas petitioner’s burden . . . must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. We conclude that there was a reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief on Wallace’s improper-remarks claim. The defense theory argued by Wallace’s counsel—that Perrin inadvertently shot herself while “teasing” Wallace—was flatly inconsistent with the testimony of the medical examiner, who stated that it would have been very difficult for Perrin to have shot herself. Wallace, 1998 WL 670627, at . Thus, there was strong evidence to 25 No. 13-5331, Wallace v. Sexton undermine the defense theory presented to the jury, and it is possible that the jury concluded on its own that Wallace’s theory of defense had no merit. Although the prosecutor’s comment that the defense theory was “ridiculous” certainly may have been improper, see United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 17–19 (1985) (finding that the prosecutor’s expressions of personal opinion concerning the guilt of the defendant were improper), fairminded jurists could conclude that it is not reasonably probable that the outcome of the trial would have changed had Wallace’s counsel objected. The state court’s conclusion that Wallace could not demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s comments was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of the Supreme Court’s precedent. Accordingly, Wallace is not entitled to relief on his improper-remarks claim.