Opinion ID: 1451124
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutionality of the Affirmative-Defense Provisions of the Capital-Murder Statute

Text: Jefferson contends that Ark.Code Ann. § 5-10-101(b) (Supp.2005) is unconstitutional because it establishes an affirmative defense which impermissibly shifts the burden of proof to the defendant with respect to the essential elements of the offense of capital murder. Section 5-10-101(b) provides: (b) It is an affirmative defense to any prosecution of subdivision (a)(1) of this section for an offense in which the defendant was not the only participant that the defendant did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, command, induce, procure, counsel, or aid in its commission. Jefferson submits that by requiring a defendant to show that he did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, command, induce, procure, counsel, or aid in its commission, the statute places an unconstitutional burden of proof on a defendant. Further, he states that, under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and analogous state provisions, it is the State's responsibility to prove all elements of the offense, i.e., that Jefferson committed the homicidal act or in some way solicited, commanded, induced, procured, counseled, or aided in its commission. By its phraseology, Jefferson contends, the statute has the effect of requiring him to prove that he was not involved in the homicidal act itself. Jefferson concedes that this court has previously rejected his argument in previous cases. Indeed, this court has repeatedly held that the affirmative-defense provision of the capital-murder statute does not unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof to the defendant. See Jones v. State, 336 Ark. 191, 984 S.W.2d 432 (1999); Fairchild v. State, 284 Ark. 289, 681 S.W.2d 380 (1984); Moss v. State, 280 Ark. 27, 655 S.W.2d 375 (1983). Jefferson urges that, to the extent that they hold the affirmative-defense provision constitutional, this court's decisions in Jones , Fairchild , and Moss should be overruled. In support of this argument, he cites Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979), and Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985). Further, he claims that, in Moss, supra , this court misconstrued Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977), which clarified Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975). We rejected these arguments in Jones , explaining: In Moss v. State, 280 Ark. 27, 655 S.W.2d 375 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1105, 104 S.Ct. 1606, 80 L.Ed.2d 135 (1984), this court was presented with this precise issue of shifting burden of proof. We held that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense charged but that it does not require the prosecution to prove the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses. In holding as we did, we emphasized that none of the elements of the § 5-10-101(b) affirmative defense, that is, that the defendant was not the only participant in the murder, did not commit the homicidal act, and did not in any way solicit, command, induce, procure, counsel, or aid in the homicide, were elements of the crime of capital felony murder. We further emphasized that the defendant did not have to prove the affirmative defense under § 5-10-101(b) until the prosecution had met its burden of proof on the charged offense. This court reiterated this holding in Fairchild v. State, 284 Ark. 289, 681 S.W.2d 380 (1984). Jones contends that this court should now reconsider the issue and overrule the Fairchild and Moss decisions in light of two United States Supreme Court cases. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). In Sandstrom , the Court framed the issue to be whether in a case where intent is an element of the crime charged, the jury instruction that the law presumes a person to intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts violated the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement that the prosecution prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant in Sandstrom was charged with an intentional homicide in that he purposefully or knowingly caused the victim's death. The Court held that this presumption that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his actions conflicted with the overriding presumption of innocence conferred on an accused. The Court's reasoning was that upon a finding of proof of one element of the crime (causing death) and of facts insufficient to establish the second element (the voluntariness and ordinary consequences of the defendant's actions), the jury could have reasonably concluded that it was directed to find against the defendant on the element of intent. Thus, because of the presumption that one intends the natural consequences of his actions, the prosecution was not required to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The situation in the instant case is categorically different. Capital felony murder does not require deliberate or purposeful intent as an element of the offense. Moreover, in the instant case, we are not faced with a presumption that shifts the burden of proving the elements of the charged offense to the defendant. Instead, after the State proves all the elements of the charged offense of capital felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant may prove as an affirmative defense under § 5-10-101(b) that he was not the trigger man or that he did not in any way assist in the murder. The second case relied upon by Jones is Francis v. Franklin, supra . The defendant in Francis was charged with deliberate murder, not felony murder. The Court instructed the jury that, [t]he acts of a person of sound mind and discretion are presumed to be the product of the person's will, but the presumption may be rebutted. A person of sound mind and discretion is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts but the presumption may be rebutted. Francis, 471 U.S. at 311, 105 S.Ct. 1965. The Court held that this instruction created a mandatory presumption because its language was in the nature of a command. The Court concluded that this part of the jury instruction directed the jury to presume an essential element of the offense, the intent to kill, and that this presumption in effect shifted the burden of proof and deprived the defendant of due process. In short, the issue in Francis was precisely the issue in Sandstrom . Again, intent is not an element of capital felony murder in the case at bar. The appellant also contends that our decision in Moss v. State, supra , misconstrued the Supreme Court's holding in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977) (clarifying its earlier decision of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975)). We disagree. In Patterson, the issue was an affirmative defense to murder allowing the defendant to show he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse. Patterson, supra, at 198, 97 S.Ct. 2319. In Moss , we noted the similarity between this affirmative defense and the one at issue in the case at bar. Contrary to Jones's assertion, we see nothing in our Moss opinion that misconstrues either Patterson or Mullaney. Jones, 336 Ark. at 199-201, 984 S.W.2d at 436-37. We do not lightly overrule cases and apply a strong presumption in favor of the validity of prior decisions. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 370 Ark. 70, 257 S.W.3d 92 (2007); State v. Singleton, 340 Ark. 710, 13 S.W.3d 584 (2000). As a matter of public policy, it is necessary to uphold our prior decisions unless a great injury or injustice would result. Thomas, supra . Here, Jefferson has failed to meet the high burden of showing that our refusal to overrule Jones , Fairchild , and Moss would result in great injustice or injury. The affirmative defense provision of Ark.Code Ann. § 5-10-101(b) does not shift the burden of proving the elements of the charged offense to the defendant. See Jones, 336 Ark. at 201, 984 S.W.2d at 436. Rather, after the State proves all the elements of the charged offense of capital felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant may prove the affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. We hold that the circuit court did not err in rejecting Jefferson's argument that the affirmative-defense provisions of the capital-murder statute unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Moreover, Jefferson has failed to present this court with convincing argument that Jones , Fairchild , and Moss should be overruled. Therefore, we decline to do so.