Opinion ID: 1124291
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficient Evidence Exists to Support Defendant's Convictions of Accessory Liability.

Text: (10) Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support Defendant's convictions for accessory to assault with intent to commit a violent felony (robbery), accessory to aggravated battery, and accessory to false imprisonment, under the New Mexico uniform jury instructions. If there was insufficient evidence, then the charges must be dismissed as a matter of law. See State v. Garcia, 114 N.M. 269, 275-76, 837 P.2d 862, 868-69 (1992) (reversing first-degree murder conviction on grounds of insufficient evidence and barring re-trial on double jeopardy grounds). To reverse a conviction for lack of evidence, an appellate court determines whether any rational jury could have found each element of the crime to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. This does not involve substituting the appellate court's judgment for that of the jury in deciding the reasonable-doubt question, but it does require appellate court scrutiny of the evidence and supervision of the jury's fact-finding function to ensure that, indeed, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential facts required for a conviction. Garcia, 114 N.M. at 274, 837 P.2d at 867. Applying UJI 14-2822, we affirm the Court of Appeals' holding that a rational jury could find, based on the evidence presented at trial, that Defendant is guilty of accessory to assault with intent to commit a violent felony (robbery), aggravated battery, and false imprisonment. (11) In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, this Court will `view the evidence in the light most favorable to supporting the verdict and resolve all conflicts and indulge all inferences in favor of upholding the verdict.' Bankert, 1994 NMSC 051, 117 N.M. at 617, 875 P.2d at 373 (citing State v. Hernandez, 1993 NMSC 007, 115 N.M. 6, 26, 846 P.2d 312, 332 (1993)). The test is whether substantial evidence of either a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction. Bankert, 1994 NMSC 051, 117 N.M. at 617-18, 875 P.2d at 373-74 (citing State v. Sutphin, 107 N.M. 126, 131, 753 P.2d 1314, 1319 (1988)). Substantial evidence is defined as that evidence which a reasonable person would consider adequate to support a defendant's guilt. See State v. Sparks, 102 N.M. 317, 320, 694 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Ct.App.1985). (12) Based on the evidence introduced at trial, a rational jury could reasonably determine that Defendant intended the criminal activity and that his role was to keep the car engine running outside the store in order to facilitate a fast getaway once his companions robbed the store. [2] Defendant was the only witness for the defense. Defendant admitted driving the vehicle the night of the criminal incident, and he admitted that he, Padron and Moncayo had been cruising and drinking. Defendant testified he had driven the car earlier in the evening. Later that night, according to Defendant's testimony, Padron began driving the car and Defendant fell asleep. Defendant testified that when he awoke, the car was parked on the side of a building. (13) The State presented evidence that the car driven by Defendant was parked in a location near Allsup's where it could not be seen from inside the store. After Padron and Moncayo ran from the store, there was evidence that the car was quickly driven away from the area. Defendant himself testified at trial that he drove the car away from Allsup's after Moncayo and Padron ran out because he figured they had done what they had to do. (14) Defendant also testified that he was an Allsup's employee for approximately five or six months. Defendant had worked at Allsup's as a clerk, and he testified that his work duties and hours were similar to those of the battered clerk, Juanelle Gonzales. From this testimony, a rational jury reasonably could have inferred that Defendant knew the best time to rob an Allsup's, that only one employee would be working during the graveyard shift, and that few customers would be in the store. Based on the above evidence, we hold that a rational jury could have inferred, under the instructions given, that Defendant intended the false imprisonment, assault with intent to commit a violent felony, and aggravated battery on the store clerk be committed to accomplish the robbery. Of course, a rational jury could infer based on this evidence that Defendant did not have the intent required for these offenses. The import of our review of Defendant's contention that the evidence was insufficient is only to say that the evidence here is not so thin that we can say as a matter of law that no rational jury could find the required facts to support conviction and that the charges should be dismissed. We do not mean to pass judgment on Defendant's guilt or innocence of the charges brought against him; we mean only to say that the evidence is not insufficient to support conviction. (15) The State has argued that Defendant is criminally liable for every act committed in the course of the attempted robbery. Defendant has argued that the State was required to produce other evidence, in addition to that summarized above, before the jury was entitled to find, as a matter of fact beyond a reasonable doubt, that he shared Padron's intent in assaulting, battering and falsely imprisoning the store clerk. We do not agree with either position. (16) It is true that the Court of Appeals has said that: As a general rule, one who participates in a criminal venture is treated by the law as if he or she had committed all of the criminal acts of the other participants. An accessory (say, the getaway driver) is prosecuted and punished as a principal. . . . A conspirator is ordinarily responsible for the criminal acts of coconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy. . . . Consequently, each member of a band of thieves that loots a warehouse is treated as having taken all the loot. State v. Armijo, 1995 NMCA 158, ¶ 5, 120 N.M. 702, 905 P.2d 740 (citations omitted). (17) Nevertheless, there are limits to the liability of an accomplice. See Model Penal Code § 2.06 cmt. 6(b). One who solicits an end, or aids or agrees to aid in its achievement, is an accomplice in whatever means may be fairly employed, insofar as they constitute or commit an offense fairly envisaged in the purposes of the association. But when a wholly different crime has been committed, thus involving conduct not within the conscious objectives of the accomplice, he [or she] is not liable for it unless the case falls within the specific terms of Subsection (4). Id. at 311. (18) Under New Mexico's statute, the Legislature has expressed the limits it intended for accessory liability. See § 30-1-13. Under our statute, one must procure, counsel, aid or abet. Id. We have said that an accessory must share the criminal intent of the principal. Ochoa, 41 N.M. at 599, 72 P.2d at 615. We see no reason to retreat from that principle. We believe it is consistent with the Model Penal Code as well as Section 30-1-13. See generally Model Penal Code § 2.06(3) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1962). Under the Model Penal Code, a person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of the offense if: (a) with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he [or she] (i) solicits such other person to commit it, or (ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it . . . Id. at 296. (19) Under Section 30-1-13 and Ochoa, the evidence in this case is sufficient to support liability. If the jury believed, for example, that Defendant actually conceived of the idea of committing the robbery, the jury was entitled to infer that he intended either Padron or Moncayo would neutralize the clerk while the other opened or attempted to open the safe. The jury also was entitled to infer that someone had to either falsely imprison, threaten injury, or injure the clerk in order to reach the safe and that in conceiving the plan, Defendant intended one or more of these acts. We cannot say that Defendant was not an accomplice to all of Padron's acts because he did more than was necessary to accomplish the objectives of the conspiracy.