Opinion ID: 2161022
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the department of labor was clearly erroneous in its finding concerning the reason rasmussen was discharged from his employment?

Text: In her finding of fact VII, the hearings officer for the Department of Labor found that, [w]hen [Rasmussen] could not obtain a CDL, the Employer could not allow [Rasmussen] to continue to work as a truck driver. As his second issue, Rasmussen essentially challenges the accuracy of the finding that he was discharged for his DUI and inability to obtain a CDL. In that regard, Rasmussen points out that, after he could no longer drive a truck, H & I offered him continued employment operating a grinder. He asserts that it was his inability to operate the grinder rather than his inability to obtain a CDL that ultimately led to his separation from employment. Rasmussen submits that a discharge under these circumstances is not a discharge for work-connected misconduct that disqualifies him from receiving unemployment insurance benefits. We agree. In unemployment insurance appeals where the issue is a question of fact, this Court must ascertain whether the administrative agency was clearly erroneous. Kotrba, supra . A finding is `clearly erroneous' when after reviewing all of the evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. Selle v. Pierce, 494 N.W.2d 634, 636 (S.D.1993). Here, we find that such a mistake was made. In reviewing an individual's eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits and considering the reasons for the claimant's separation from his employment, this Court has looked to the causal connection between the claimant's act and the loss of employment. In S.D. Stockgrowers Ass'n v. Holloway, 438 N.W.2d 561 (S.D.1989), the claimant resigned from his employment in April 1987 but the resignation was not acted on or accepted and the employment was later continued on an at will basis. The claimant continued working until the following September when he was advised that he had been replaced. However, the employer did ask the claimant to stay on until the following month to train his replacement. The claimant refused and left the employment at the end of September. The claimant's unemployment insurance claim was granted on the basis that he was discharged under nondisqualifying circumstances. In a later appeal to this Court, the employer contended that the claimant was not discharged but voluntarily quit his employment. In support of that contention, the employer strongly relied on the claimant's April 1987 resignation. This Court rejected that argument observing: [B]oth the hearings examiner and the circuit court focused on the events of September 23, 1987, as actually precipitating [the claimant's] separation. Both the hearings examiner and the circuit court found that [the claimant's] choice to resign rather than to continue his employment until his termination date of October 15 constituted a discharge rather than a voluntary quit under the unemployment insurance law. Thus the central issue is whether quitting employment after notice of discharge but prior to the effective date of the discharge is a discharge or a voluntary quit under the unemployment insurance law. Stockgrowers, 438 N.W.2d at 562-63 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The record in this case makes clear that the event actually precipitating Rasmussen's separation from employment was not his DUI, his inability to obtain a CDL or his inability to drive a truck. Rather, after Rasmussen could no longer drive a truck, he was offered continued employment operating a grinder. The employer's testimony in that regard was as follows: I felt that if [Rasmussen] could run a grinder down there that we have here at Hetlin, it would be a chance for him to continue having employment and having some work come in and we tried for about a week there on the grinder and it just didn't seem to work. The minute that we had to go home or leave him down there by himself, ah, the machinery would plug up. I'd no more and get home and sit down for supper and I'd have to run back in and it just looked like to me that it wasn't going to work at all and the last time when it plugged it up very seriously we had a chance of having a serious fire plus burning out a $10,000 motor and I just made up my mind that this, this wasn't going to work. I told him when he no longer could drive the truck that we would try it, if it worked fine, if it didn't why he'd just have to do something else. That's the only thing that I have at my place here that he could work at without a CDL. (emphasis added). This testimony establishes that it was Rasmussen's inability to run the grinder rather than his inability to drive a truck that ultimately led to the loss of his employment. Even H & I's brief concedes that, [h]ad [Rasmussen] been able to operate the hay grinder he probably would have continued employment with H & I Grain. Since there is no allegation or argument that there was any misconduct involved in Rasmussen's operation of the grinder and his difficulties with the grinder were attributed to his inability, we hold that Rasmussen's discharge falls within the following category defined by SDCL 61-6-14.1: [M]ere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure to perform as the result of inability or incapacity, a good faith error in judgment or discretion, or conduct mandated by a religious belief which belief cannot be reasonably accommodated by the employer is not misconduct. (emphasis added). It follows from the above that Rasmussen's discharge was under nondisqualifying circumstances for purposes of his receipt of unemployment insurance. Reversed. MILLER, C.J., and AMUNDSON, J., concur. WUEST and HENDERSON, JJ., dissent.