Opinion ID: 799337
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: CWA: Case Plan Provisions (Count Eight)

Text: Count Eight of the complaint seeks injunctive relief for a class of children who have not received a case plan as required by the CWA. The case plan provisions of the CWA are codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(16) and 675(1). Section 671(a)(16) states that: In order for a State to be eligible for payments under this part, it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary which... provides for the development of a case plan (as defined in section 675(1) of this title) for each child receiving foster care maintenance payments under the State plan.... Section 675(1) provides a detailed definition of what a case plan must include, such as the child's health and educational records, a description of the child's permanency plan, and a plan for ensuring the child's educational stability. The district court concluded that these provisions do not contain sufficient rights-creating language to satisfy the first prong of the Blessing test. We disagree and join the majority of federal courts in holding that the case plan provisions are enforceable through § 1983. See, e.g., L.J. v. Massinga, 838 F.2d 118, 123 (4th Cir.1988); Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504, 512 (1st Cir.1983); Sam M. v. Chafee, 800 F.Supp.2d 363, 386-88 (D.R.I. 2011); Connor B. v. Patrick, 771 F.Supp.2d 142, 170-72 (D.Mass.2011); Kenny A. v. Perdue, 218 F.R.D. 277, 292-93 (N.D.Ga.2003); Brian A. v. Sundquist, 149 F.Supp.2d 941, 946-49 (M.D.Tenn. 2000); Jeanine B. v. Thompson, 877 F.Supp. 1268, 1283-84 (E.D.Wis.1995); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F.Supp. 1387, 1402 (N.D.Ill.1989). But see Carson P. v. Heineman, 240 F.R.D. 456, 544 (D.Neb. 2007); Olivia Y. v. Barbour, 351 F.Supp.2d 543, 562 (S.D.Miss.2004); Charlie H. v. Whitman, 83 F.Supp.2d 476, 489-90 (D.N.J.2000). Section 671(a)(16) unambiguously requires the State to provide for the development of a case plan for each child. As the Massachusetts district court wrote recently in Connor B., rights-creating language is readily discernible in § 671(a)(16) because it expresses a clear mandate by using the term `shall' and discusses how the state must distribute benefits to each child.  771 F.Supp.2d at 171. Plainly, these directives are both couched in mandatory terms and are unmistakably focused on the benefitted class, i.e., foster children. Id. Our court's precedent also supports this conclusion. We have concluded in two different cases that other provisions of the CWA contain rights-creating language. [8] In ASW, we held that §§ 671(a)(1) and 673(a)(3) create a right to individualized adoption assistance payment determinations and that § 671(a)(12) creates a right to a hearing when adoption assistance payments are reduced. 424 F.3d at 975-79. In California State Foster Parent Association v. Wagner, we held that §§ 672(a) and 675(4)(A) create a right to foster care maintenance payments that cover certain enumerated costs. 624 F.3d 974, 978-82 (9th Cir.2010). Both of these decisions recognized the importance of language phrasing the benefit in terms of each child, see id. at 979-81, or each family, see ASW, 424 F.3d at 976 (citing Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, 362 F.3d 190, 201 (2d Cir. 2004)). As in those cases, the reference here to a case plan for each child focuses squarely on the protected individual, rather than an aggregate interest or a regulated entity. See Wagner, 624 F.3d at 980 (citing Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 288-89, 122 S.Ct. 2268). Defendants' argument to the contrary is not persuasive. Defendants maintain that Congress only required the State to have a plan to `develop' a case plan for each child. But as we recognized in ASW, Congress has directed that statutory provisions within the Social Security Act should not be deemed unenforceable because of its inclusion in a section ... requiring a State plan or specifying the required contents of a State plan. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2; ASW, 424 F.3d at 977 n. 11. [9] We conclude that the first Blessing factor weighs in favor of an enforceable right. The second and third Blessing factors also show that the case plan provisions are presumptively enforceable. The requirement that each child have a case plan is not so vague and amorphous that its enforcement would strain judicial competence. Watson, 436 F.3d at 1158 (internal quotation marks omitted). The definition provided in § 675(1) describes exactly what a case plan must include; as in ASW, there is no ambiguity as to what [the state is] required to do[.] 424 F.3d at 976. In Wagner, we held that another detailed definition in § 675, which provided an itemized list of what expenses foster care maintenance payments must cover, satisfied the second Blessing prong. 624 F.3d at 981. We conclude that § 675(1) does so as well. Finally, we have already determined that the repeated use of the word shall in the CWA shows that the statute is written in mandatory rather than precatory terms. Id. at 982. We now turn to whether the presumption that the case plan provisions are enforceable is rebutted by Congressional action that has expressly or impliedly foreclosed enforcement under section 1983[.] Watson, 436 F.3d at 1158. In Wagner, we recognized that the CWA provides no administrative forum through which aggrieved foster children or parents can seek redress, which weighs in favor of enforcement through § 1983. 624 F.3d at 982. Here, however, Defendants argue that because Congress created an express cause of action to enforce § 671(a)(18), it could not have intended the other subsections of § 671(a) to be privately enforceable. See Charlie H., 83 F.Supp.2d at 489. The district court also relied on this reasoning. This argument, however, has been implicitly rejected by our holding in ASW that § 671(a)(12) creates an enforceable right. Furthermore, because the express cause of action created for § 671(a)(18) is actually broader than § 1983, it does not suggest an intent to limit § 1983 enforcement. See Joseph A. v. Ingram, 275 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir.2002); cf. ASW, 424 F.3d at 978 ([T]he dispositive issue is whether the private remedy provided by statute is more restrictive than those available through a § 1983 action, such that the § 1983 action would function as an end run around the enforcement mechanism Congress provided.). We conclude that the case plan provisions of the CWA, codified at §§ 671(a)(16) and 675(1), are enforceable through § 1983. We therefore reverse the district court's dismissal of Count Eight.