Opinion ID: 2996658
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legality of Arrest

Text: The presence of probable cause to arrest Ochana for any offense with which he was charged (or any closely-related charge) also bars his unlawful arrest claim under § 1983. See Jones v. Webb, 45 F.3d 178, 183 (7th Cir. 1995); Calusinski v. Kruger, 24 F.3d 931, 935-36 (7th Cir. 1994); Marshall, 284 F.3d at 771; Biddle v. Martin, 992 F.2d 673, 676 (7th Cir. 1993). Here, Ochana does not challenge his obstruction of traffic charge. On the obstruction of traffic charge alone, the officers could lawfully have arrested Ochana. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (Fourth Amendment permits custodial arrests for non-jailable traffic offenses). Because there was probable cause to arrest Ochana for obstruction of traffic (or committing a closely-related offense of driving under the influence, driving recklessly, or driving negligently), the district court found that his unlawful arrest claim could not succeed. Ochana argues, however, that the presence of probable cause to arrest him for a mere traffic violation should not bar his unlawful arrest claim. He asserts that only the presence of probable cause to arrest for a more serious offense, such as possession of cocaine or forgery or alteration of a prescription, should bar a § 1983 unlawful arrest claim. In Ochana’s view, adopting the district court’s rule opens the door to a parade of horribles, by giving free rein to the police to arrest drivers for trumped-up criminal No. 02-2227 9 offenses without probable cause, so long as there is probable cause to believe that a minor traffic violation was also committed. Ochana’s argument fails for at least two reasons. If we were persuaded that Ochana would not have been arrested on the traffic violation alone, then we might address the issue of whether probable cause for any charge—no matter how minor or unlikely to have been the basis of the custodial arrest—bars a § 1983 unlawful arrest claim. We decline to reach that issue today, because those facts are not before us. It seems clear that Ochana, who had passed out and appeared drugged (at least prior to emerging from his vehicle), would not have been allowed back into his car and onto the road by any reasonable officer. Even if at this juncture we were to believe that Ochana was sufficiently alert to be allowed back into his car, there was probable cause to arrest Ochana for a more serious offense—possession of cocaine. Cocaine can come in a yellowish color, see, e.g., United States v. Linton, 235 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2000), and its scent can be masked, see, e.g. United States v. Koenig, 856 F.2d 843, 845 (7th Cir. 1988). Here the appearance of the powder was not all that roused the officers’ suspicion. The officers were also entitled to take into account the powder’s packaging, Ochana’s impaired behavior, and his failure to give a coherent explanation of what was in the bag at the time of the arrest. Taken together, these facts were enough to establish probable cause. The fact that Ochana later gave a coherent explanation for the powder does not alter the probable cause determination. See Garcia v. City of Chicago, 24 F.3d 966, 969-70 (7th Cir. 1994).