Opinion ID: 1153135
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the trial court erred in failing to ensure a fair and impartial jury.

Text: It is Toyota's contention that the jury selection process in this case should not be allowed to stand. It claims that because of this, its case was not heard by a fair and impartial jury. Toyota argues that because a substantial number of jurors had in the past been represented by the attorney for the plaintiff, the trial court erred in denying Toyota's challenges for cause and its other objections regarding jury selection. Thus, Toyota contends it is entitled to a new trial. McLaurin, on the other hand, urges that the defendant did receive a fair trial by an impartial jury. She would contend that the trial judge went to great lengths to ensure that an impartial jury was impaneled and that the actions of the trial judge did not constitute reversible error. On April 11, 1991, Toyota filed a Motion Relative to Voir Dire. In this motion, Toyota requested that the trial judge excuse for cause prospective jurors, which juror, or a family member of that juror, is currently being represented by Eugene Tullos (McLaurin's attorney), or who considers Mr. Tullos to be his/her attorney, has in the past been represented by Mr. Tullos, is related to Mr. Tullos by blood or marriage, is financially indebted to Mr. Tullos, or is in business with or owns property with Mr. Tullos. Toyota asked that prospective jurors who have had family members represented by Mr. Tullos in the past, or are friends, social acquaintances, or members of the same church or club as Mr. Tullos be sequestered and individually voir dired. In the alternative, Toyota prayed for a change of venue, additional peremptory challenges, or such other relief as the court might deem appropriate. The court denied this motion except to the extent it held that prospective jurors who are currently represented by any of the attorneys involved and those related to these attorneys would be excused for cause. Also, any prospective jurors who are financially indebted to or in business with the attorneys would be excused. Of the 130 residents of Smith County subpoenaed, only 40 were in attendance at the beginning of the voir dire process in the instant case. Of this 40, one did not remain for the entire voir dire. He was later excused by the court. This resulted in a jury panel consisting of 39 members. Of these 39 members, over 60% (24 of 39) had some type of relationship either with the plaintiff, McLaurin, or her attorneys. Within this 24, 19 members (or their family members) had been represented by Mr. Tullos in the past (this includes one member of the panel who was related to McLaurin), another who was related to McLaurin, three (or a family member) were currently represented by Mr. Tullos, and one was related to Mr. Tullos. Therefore, 22 of the 39 (or family members) were currently being represented by Mr. Tullos or had been represented by him in the past. Of these 22, only six responded to the trial judge's question pertaining to representation by these attorneys. Ten more acknowledged representation upon Toyota's questioning in voir dire. In chambers, Toyota noted the panel members' unresponsiveness as to questions regarding representation by the attorneys. While the trial judge did acknowledge that the jurors were not being very responsive, he stated that this was a common problem and was one that was not unique just to this county. At this point, Toyota requested that under the authority of Marshall Durbin, Inc. v. Tew, 381 So.2d 152 (Miss. 1980), Mr. Tullos be required to disclose any panel members that he had represented. Mr. Tullos revealed six other panel members that he had represented or had represented someone in their family. Also, 14 of the panel members said that they either regarded Mr. Tullos as his/her lawyer or would go to Mr. Tullos if he/she should need any legal assistance. Based upon the jury panel's unresponsiveness, Toyota made a motion to quash the jury panel, or in the alternative, for a change of venue. The trial judge ruled to hold in abeyance all motions pertaining to jury selection without the parties waving any of their rights by proceeding to select the jury. The court excused 8 panel members for cause, excluding the member who did not remain for voir dire. The court excused three because either that person or a member of his family was currently being represented by Mr. Tullos. Two were excused because they were related to McLaurin and one because she was related to Tullos. One was excused because her husband had a case pending before the court and another because of medical reasons. After these 8 challenges by the trial judge, a panel of 31 members remained. Of these 31, 18 of these members or a member of their family had been represented by Mr. Tullos. Toyota then challenged these members for cause and this motion to strike was overruled. The judge granted each side six (6) peremptory challenges. Toyota utilized all six (6) of its challenges. It used four (4) of its peremptory challenges on panel members that it had previously challenged for cause. The other two were used on persons who it had not challenged for cause but who had the same last name as the plaintiff. After the exercising of the peremptory challenges, the jury consisted of eight (8) persons who either he/she or a family member had been represented by Mr. Tullos. Also six (6) of these jurors regarded Mr. Tullos as their lawyer and would go to him if they needed an attorney. All of the jurors impaneled stated either in open court or in chambers that they could be fair and impartial. Following the impaneling of the jury, the defendants made a motion for a mistrial citing the jury selection process as the basis for this motion. The trial judge then overruled this motion. With regard to the importance of a fair and impartial jury this Court has stated: Respect for the sanctity of an impartial trial requires that courts guard against even the appearance of unfairness for public confidence in the fairness of jury trials is essential to the existence of our legal system. Whatever tends to threaten public confidence in the fairness of jury trials, tends to threaten one of our sacred legal institutions. Mhoon v. State, 464 So.2d 77, 81 (Miss. 1985) (quoting Lee v. State, 226 Miss. 276, 83 So.2d 818, 821 (1955)). In considering the issue of the impartiality of a juror two competing forces enter into the equation. These two forces are first the factor or circumstance which tends to indicate a potential for bias on the part of that juror and secondly the juror's promise that he or she can and will be impartial. In discussing this situation, this Court has stated: To the extent that any juror, because of his relationship to one of the parties, his occupation, his past experience, or whatever, would normally lean in favor of one of the parties, or be biased against the other, or one's claim or the other's defense in the lawsuit, to this extent, of course, his ability to be fair and impartial is impaired. It should also be borne in mind that jurors take their oaths and responsibilities seriously, and when a prospective juror assures the court that, despite the circumstance that raises some question as to his qualification, this will not affect his verdict, this promise is entitled to considerable deference ... These varied imponderables make selection of jurors a judgment call peculiarly within the province of the circuit judge, and one we will not on appeal second guess in the absence of a record showing a clear abuse of discretion. Scott v. Ball, 595 So.2d 848, 850 (Miss. 1992) (citing Harding v. Estate of Harding, 185 So.2d 452, 456 (Miss. 1966); Howell v. State, 107 Miss. 568, 573, 65 So. 641, 642 (1914)). However, the Court in Scott noted that the trial judge's discretion was limited by the holding in Hudson v. Taleff, 546 So.2d 359 (Miss. 1989), by stating: Our implicit, if not explicit holding in Hudson is that the circuit judge's discretion in determining a juror's qualification where a reasonable challenge has been made is considerably narrowed where, without great inconvenience, other prospective jurors may be readily summoned. Scott, 595 So.2d at 850. One case of great significance in this area is Mhoon v. State, 464 So.2d 77 (Miss. 1985). Mhoon involved a capital murder sentencing hearing. In Mhoon, the venire for this sentencing hearing consisted of 39 persons after challenges for cause. Of these 39 members, 12 were either policemen or were related by blood or marriage to a policeman. The jury was comprised of twelve (12) persons, six (6) of whom were police officers or were related to police officers. Mhoon, 464 So.2d at 80. The defendant claimed that because of the large number of law enforcement related persons on his venire and jury, he was not afforded a fair and impartial jury. This Court held that while a law enforcement official or a person related to a law enforcement official should not be per se precluded from serving on a jury, it did hold that under the unique situation in that case, the opportunity for undue influence over the opinions of other jurors was too great a risk. Id. at 82. The Court went further to say that given the statistical aberration in the jury pool, the trial judge could have done one of several things including: 1. he could have afforded counsel additional peremptory challenges, 2. he could have increased the size of the available venire as well as affording additional challenges, or 3. he could have sustained at least some of the challenges for cause. Id. at 81. This Court has held in a later case that this holding equally applies in civil cases. Hudson, 546 So.2d at 363. Also of great importance is the case of Hudson v. Taleff, 546 So.2d 359 (Miss. 1989). Hudson involved a medical malpractice suit. Hudson, 546 So.2d at 359-60. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the jury was not impartial because certain members of the panel or their family members had been treated by the defendant doctor or his partners or had been represented by the doctor's attorney. Of the 25 member jury panel, 48 percent of these had some relationship with the doctors or the attorney. Id. at 361-62. The plaintiff challenged 13 of these 25 panel members for cause and the trial judge granted two of these challenges. The plaintiff requested the court to summon additional jurors and grant additional challenges. The plaintiff also requested a mistrial. Id. at 362. This Court held on appeal that because of the `statistical aberration' of the makeup of the venire and the strong likelihood that the opportunity for undue influence over other jurors in this case was too great, this Court holds that the trial jury was not impartial. Id. at 363. Scott v. Ball, 595 So.2d 848 (Miss. 1992) also involved a medical malpractice action in which the plaintiff argued that jurors or their family members had a relationship with the defendant doctor. Scott, 595 So.2d at 849-50. In that case, the plaintiff challenged several jurors because either that person or a member of that person's family had been treated by the doctor who was being sued or his medical partners. Id. at 849. The trial court accepted this proposition as a basis for excusing some, but not all of those challenged for cause by the plaintiff. Id. This Court stated on appeal: When a rational challenge is made by a party to a prospective juror, and other jurors against whom no challenge is made are available, the circuit judge should ordinarily excuse the challenged juror. Id. at 850. The court noted that in this case, the trial judge could have excused these persons for cause and still had enough members remaining on the jury panel to form a jury. Also, the Court held that, if needed, the judge could have directed the circuit clerk to draw more names from the jury wheel. Id. Finally, in discussing the propriety of excusing for cause those members of the jury panel who either they themselves or a member of their family had been treated by the defendant doctor, this Court stated: In a suit in which a physician is a party, a circuit judge must be sensitive to the qualification of a juror who has himself or herself been treated by him, or whose family members have at one time or another been patients of his. This is especially true in our smaller cities and towns, where often there is a shortage of practicing physicians. Mississippians in less populated areas enjoy a close, fraternal relationship with their doctors, and regardless of a prospective juror's complete sincerity in his belief of his ability to be fair, it is only human nature that in most cases he will be more than reluctant to return a verdict against the physician. Id. at 850-51. This Court recognizes the position that a physician and an attorney occupy are not dissimilar. This is especially true in the more sparsely populated areas of our state, and where the attorney has a widely varied general practice. A circuit judge should carefully consider those instances in which a prospective juror or a member of that person's family has been in the past represented by one of the attorneys involved in the matter before him. As is the case with physicians, despite that prospective juror's honest and sincere belief that he or she can be completely fair and impartial, that person may find it very difficult to return a verdict against the client of an attorney to whom that person or a member of his or her family has turned for legal counsel in the past. Similar to the situations presented in Mhoon v. State and Hudson v. Taleff , in the instant case there existed a statistical aberration in the make-up of the venire and the jury. Due to the number of persons on the venire and on the jury who either he/she, or a member of that person's family, had been represented by Mr. Tullos in the past or would go to him should the need for legal assistance arise in the future, this Court holds that the opportunity for these persons to exercise their influence over the remainder of the jury was too great a risk to be taken in the instant case. Therefore, this Court cannot say with confidence that the trial of this cause was heard by a fair and impartial jury. Thus, this case must be reversed and remanded for a new trial on the basis that it cannot be said that the Toyota Motor Corporation was afforded the opportunity to present its defense to the fair and impartial jury to which it was entitled under the law. This Court does recognize the fact that Smith County is a sparsely populated county and that Mr. Tullos is a prominent lawyer and is well-known throughout the county. Further, in any gathering of people in Smith County, whether on a jury pool or otherwise, it is likely that a large number of these persons or someone related to that person would have been represented by Mr. Tullos on some matter in the past. However, this fact in no way diminishes the trial court's obligation to ensure the litigants before it that their case will be heard and decided by a fair and impartial jury. The circuit judge could have alleviated the problems presented in the instant case by enlarging the venire from which the jury was selected. It is important to note that this Court is not holding that a prospective juror who either he/she or a family member has been represented by an attorney in the present litigation in the past is per se precluded from serving on that jury. However, in the instant case, the statistical aberration and the potential for undue influence is just simply too great. One further note before we leave the issue of jury selection. McLaurin makes the argument that Toyota may not now appeal the refusal by the trial judge to excuse for cause those members of the jury panel who they or their family members had in the past been represented by Mr. Tullos because Toyota did not exercise all of its peremptory challenges on persons it had earlier challenged for cause. In support of her argument she cites the case of Capler v. City of Greenville, 207 So.2d 339 (Miss. 1968) cert. denied 392 U.S. 941, 88 S.Ct. 2323, 20 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1968). In Capler, the jury tendered to the defendant contained eleven (11) men and one (1) woman. The defendant challenged the woman for cause solely because she was a woman. This challenge for cause was denied by the trial court. The defendant then declined his opportunity to peremptorily challenge this woman even though he had three (3) challenges that were never used. Capler, 207 So.2d at 340. In that instance, this Court held that the defendant could not complain about the woman being on his jury because he did not challenge her peremptorily when he had peremptory challenges still available for his use. Id. at 341. However, Toyota's contention on appeal is rooted much deeper than the argument made by McLaurin. Toyota challenges the entire jury selection process in the instant case  from beginning to end. In addition, had Toyota exercised its other two peremptory challenges on prospective jurors who had been challenged for cause because of prior representation by Mr. Tullos, this in no way would have cured the problems presented in the case at bar. Therefore, this case must be reversed and remanded for a new trial.