Opinion ID: 1896138
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does the doctrine of equitable estoppel prohibit the State from initiating civil commitment proceedings?

Text: The second question we answer is whether under these circumstances equitable estoppel bars the State from seeking civil commitment. The First District found that this is a classic case for the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Harris, 879 So.2d at 1227. The elements of equitable estoppel are (1) a representation as to a material fact that is contrary to a later-asserted position, (2) reliance on that representation, and (3) a change in position detrimental to the party claiming estoppel, caused by the representation and reliance thereon. See State Dep't of Revenue v. Anderson, 403 So.2d 397, 400 (Fla.1981). The First District found that elements one and two are easily satisfied in that the state clearly represented to Harris the sentence he would receive in exchange for his plea, and he relied on the representation. Harris, 879 So.2d at 1227. As to the third element, the First District concluded that the state subsequently changed its position in a manner detrimental to Harris by filing the civil commitment action against him. Id. The court noted that the Legislature's subsequent passage of the Ryce Act did not render the State's future compliance with the agreement impossible, in part because the State is given discretion whether to file a civil commitment action. In other words, because the State was clearly under no compulsion to file a petition, the State violated its own solemn agreement that appellant serve no more than a split sentence of incarceration and probation. Id. The First District's reasoning assumes that civil commitment under the Ryce Act is punishment. We already have held that it is not. See Westerheide, 831 So.2d at 98-104; see also § 394.910, Fla. Stat. (2000). Thus, the State, by initiating civil commitment actions against respondents, did not change [its] position detrimental to the party claiming estoppel. The plea agreements are still completely in effect, notwithstanding the civil commitment. [4] Moreover, because respondents Harris and Gentes executed their plea agreements before the Ryce Act was enacted, neither party could have contemplated the possibility of involuntary civil commitment. Therefore, we agree with the dissent's position below that [t]he plea agreement in the criminal proceeding is a separate event from the civil commitment that was not contemplated by the parties. Therefore, Appellant could not have relied on any representations by the State to his detriment regarding civil commitment, and the State has not changed its position from the plea agreement. Harris, 879 So.2d at 1235 (Polston, J., dissenting). We also note that [a]s a general rule, equitable estoppel will be applied against the state only in rare instances and under exceptional circumstances. Anderson, 403 So.2d at 400. This is not one of them.