Opinion ID: 42300
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Guidelines Calculations on Remand

Text: Following Booker, district courts, while not bound by the Sentencing Guidelines, must continue to consult the provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines and consider them in sentencing. United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1178 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Jordi, 418 F.3d 1212, 1215 (11th Cir. 2005). “This consultation requirement, at a minimum, obliges the district court to calculate correctly the sentencing range prescribed by the Guidelines.” Crawford, 407 F.3d 9 at 1178. Further, “[a] misinterpretation of the Guidelines by a district court effectively means that the district court has not properly consulted the Guidelines.” Id. (quotation marks, citations and punctuation omitted). “[A]pplication of the guidelines is not complete until the departures, if any, that are warranted are appropriately considered. . . .If the district court failed in [correctly applying the law in determining the applicability of the departure], it by necessity failed to properly consider the guidelines.” Jordi, 418 F.3d at 1215. Given that the government has cross-appealed the district court’s downward departure and its failure to consider Pyne as a career offender, we discuss these two Guidelines issues in order to allow the district court to calculate properly the Guidelines range on remand. First, we address the downward departure. The government has shown that there was no legally permissible basis in the Guidelines for the district court’s downward departure from criminal history category VI to category IV. We recognize that the Sentencing Guidelines allow for a downward departure where “the defendant’s criminal history category substantially over-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history.” U.S.S.G. §4A1.3(b)(1).3 However, where the defendant is a career offender, such departure may not exceed 3 U.S.S.G. §4A1.3(b)(1) states: “STANDARD FOR DOWNWARD DEPARTURE.—If reliable information indicates that the defendant’s criminal history category substantially overrepresents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes, a downward departure may be warranted.” 10 one criminal history category. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(3)(A).4 Moreover, the district court erred by basing its §4A1.3(b)(1) downward departure at least in part on the underlying facts of Pyne’s prior convictions, rather than on their timing or pattern. See United States v. Rucker, 171 F.3d 1359, 1363 (11th Cir. 1999) (district court may not base a downward departure on the court’s view that defendant’s prior convictions involved relatively minor crimes). Second, we address Pyne’s classification as a career offender. Under U.S.S.G. §4B1.1, “[a] defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” For purposes of determining career offender status, a defendant has “two prior felony convictions” if (1) the defendant’s prior convictions were for “either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense,” and (2) “the sentences for at least two of the aforementioned felony convictions are counted separately under the provisions of §4A1.1(a), (b), or (c).” U.S.S.G. §4B1.2(c) (emphasis added). 4 U.S.S.G. §4A1.3(b)(3)(A) states: “LIMITATION ON EXTENT OF DOWNWARD DEPARTURE FOR CAREER OFFENDER.—The extent of a downward departure under this subsection for a career offender within the meaning of §4B1.1 (Career Offender) may not exceed one criminal history category.” 11 Thus, the career offender provision in §4B1.2(c) refers back to counting under §4A1.1, which governs assessment of points to determine a defendant’s criminal history category. Only unrelated convictions are counted separately under §4A1.1(a), (b), or (c). U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(a)(2). Therefore, to qualify for career offender status, Pyne’s two prior convictions must be unrelated. See United States v. Duty, 303 F.3d 1240, 1241 (11th Cir. 2002) (“To qualify as two prior felony convictions [for the purpose of career offender status], the prior offenses must be unrelated”); United States v. Vasquez, 389 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2004) (“‘related’ felony convictions count as one for purposes of the career offender guideline”); United States v. Martins, 413 F.3d 139, 151 (1st Cir. 2005) (same). Pyne was classified as a career offender based on his two prior convictions for attempted home invasion, offenses that the original PSI classified as unrelated. Although these two felonies are “crimes of violence” for purposes of the Guidelines, see U.S.S.G. §4B1.2(a)(2), there is a question in this case as to whether the convictions are related and thus his sentences on them are not counted separately under §4A1.1(a), (b) or (c), but rather his second conviction is counted under §4A1.1(f). 5 5 “Prior sentences imposed in related cases are to be treated as one sentence for purposes of §4A1.1(a), (b), and (c).” U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(a)(2). Where two violent felonies are related, the first is counted under §4A1.1(a), (b), or (c), while the second is counted under §4A1.1(f). See also U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, cmt. n. 3 (“The provisions of §4A1.2 (Definitions and Instructions for Computing 12 At sentencing, Pyne argued that his two prior convictions were related for the purpose of computing criminal history points because the convictions were consolidated for sentencing. The PSI indicates that (1) Pyne’s two attempted home invasions occurred on August 15, 1996, and August 21, 1996, respectively; (2) Pyne was arrested for these offenses on August 22, 1996; and (3) the sentencing hearing for both offenses was held on October 16, 1996. According to the Guidelines, in the context of computing criminal history points, “[p]rior sentences are not considered related if they were for offenses that were separated by an intervening arrest. . . . Otherwise, prior sentences are considered related if they resulted from offenses that . . . were consolidated for trial or sentencing.” U.S.S.G. §4A1.2, cmt. n. 3. The government argued that despite the consolidation of Pyne’s two home invasion felonies for sentencing, the offenses were separated by an intervening arrest and should therefore be classified as unrelated convictions. The government’s argument was based on the PSI’s statement that Pyne had been arrested in between his commission of the first and second attempted home invasions. According to the PSI, on August 20, 1996, police were dispatched to Criminal History) are applicable to the counting of convictions under §4B1.1 [i.e., the career offender provision].”). 13 break up a fight in which Pyne was involved.6 On October 22, 1996, Pyne pled guilty to a disorderly conduct charge arising from the fight and served ten days in county jail. Because the fight occurred after Pyne’s August 15, 1996 offense but before his August 21, 1996 offense, the government argued that the two offenses were “separated by an intervening arrest” and were therefore not related. Although the PSI lists August 20, 1996 as the “date of arrest” for Pyne’s disorderly conduct citation, the Probation Officer orally clarified at the sentencing hearing that Pyne was never arrested for the August 20, 1996 disorderly conduct incident; he was merely cited. Based on this testimony, the district court found that the disorderly conduct citation did not constitute an “intervening arrest” and that the two attempted home invasions were therefore related. Because Pyne’s two prior convictions were related, the district court then reduced Pyne’s criminal history points from eight to seven points.7 The Guidelines problem as to Pyne’s career offender status arises because the court’s holding that 6 In one place, the PSI states incorrectly that the incident occurred on April 20, 1996; the remainder of the PSI and the sentencing hearing make clear that August 20, 1996 is the correct date. 7 The district court explained that the disorderly conduct citation “is not an intervening event for purposes of 4A1.1(f) . . . however, because the second [attempted home invasion] is – or does constitute a crime of violence, it will be scorable with one [criminal history] point as opposed to the two that were given.” Based on this change, the district court assessed Pyne with seven criminal history points, as opposed to the eight originally assessed by the PSI. See also U.S.S.G. §4A1.1(f) (assigning one criminal history point for a crime of violence related to another crime already scored). 14 Pyne’s prior convictions were “related” for purposes of calculating his criminal history points also potentially impacts his career offender status. The district court appears to have believed that whether or not the attempted home invasions were “related” affected only the calculation of Pyne’s criminal history points and not the determination of his career offender status. We say potentially because there is some confusion in the record regarding when or whether Pyne was arrested for the disorderly conduct offense or the first home invasion offense. This confusion makes it unclear whether Pyne’s attempted home invasions were separated by an intervening arrest and therefore whether the offenses were unrelated or related. There is also uncertainty as to whether any of Pyne’s other convictions than the attempted home invasions would qualify Pyne for career offender status. Because there is ambiguity in the record concerning the circumstances of Pyne’s prior convictions and concerning the district court’s relevant findings, we conclude that the career offender issue should be addressed by the district court in the first instance at the new sentencing hearing. Both parties should be given the opportunity on remand to present anew evidence and briefs relevant to whether Pyne has two prior convictions that qualify him for career offender status.