Opinion ID: 1539644
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Superior Court erred in granting partial summary judgment in favor of Paul on the breach of contract claim.

Text: Deloitte contends, on cross-appeal, that the Superior Court erred in granting Paul's motion for partial summary judgment on the breach of contract claim. Deloitte argues that the Admission Agreement required it only to specify the effective date of Paul's severance before May 7, 2004, rather than actually effectuate Paul's severance prior to that date. Deloitte also argues that Paul waived this condition by accepting his severance payment and return of capital and not returning or offering to return them. Deloitte's first argument requires an interpretation of the Admission Agreement. In analyzing disputes over the language of a contract, we give priority to the intention of the parties. [8] We start by looking to the four corners of the contract to conclude whether the intent of the parties can be determined from its express language. [9] In interpreting contract language, clear and unambiguous terms are interpreted according to their ordinary and usual meaning. [10] The language at issue on this appeal is § 5(b) of the Admission Agreement, which provides for severance of the partnership as of the date specified within two years after [May 7, 2002] by [the Committee of 6].... Both parties claim that the language clearly and unambiguously supports their interpretation; yet the parties' interpretations are irreconcilable. Paul claims that the phrase should be read as the date specified by the Committee of 6 must be within two years after May 7, 2002; and therefore he argues that he was improperly severed from Deloitte because he remained a partner for three weeks after May 7, 2004. Deloitte, on the other hand, claims that the phrase should be read as the date must be specified by the Committee of 6 within two years after May 7, 2002; and therefore it argues that it complied with the language of the Admission Agreement by specifying to Paul before the end of the two year period the date he would be severed. The parties' differing interpretations are, at bottom, a grammatical dispute. The word specified can act either as a verb or as an adjective. Paul advocates treating the word specified as an adjective describing the word date and the phrase within two years after May 7, 2002 as an adjective phrase also modifying the word date. However, this reading ignores the remainder of the clause which includes the additional phrase by the Committee of 6. The only way to read the entire clause giving effect to this second phrase is to treat both as adverbial phrases describing the verb specified, and not the noun date specified. This is illustrated by removing the word specified from the sentence: You shall be deemed to have severed your association with each Firm as of a date ... within two years after May 7, 2002 by the Committee of 6. While the phrase within two years after May 7, 2002 would still make sense within the context of the sentence, the phrase by the Committee of 6 would not. Therefore, the phrase by the Committee of 6 describes the word specified by indicating who or what specifies, and the placement of the phrase within two years after May 7, 2002 in medio indicates that it also describes the word specified by indicating when the specification must occur. As a result, § 5(b) did not require the effective date of Paul's severance to occur before May 7, 2004; instead, it required only that the Committee of 6 notify Paul of the effective date of his severance by May 7, 2004. Accordingly, the Superior Court erred in interpreting the clear and unambiguous language of § 5(b) of the Admission Agreement.