Opinion ID: 887287
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Did the District Court fail to ensure Riggs' presence at all critical stages of the trial?

Text: ¶ 42 Riggs contends that his right to be present during trial, a right guaranteed to him by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution, was impermissibly infringed by the District Court, when it spoke to two jurors outside Riggs' presence. We disagree. ¶ 43 After M.J.'s mother, Jan Davis, testified on the third day of the trial, the District Court recessed for lunch, and the record shows that the jury was excused. The District Court then advised defense counsel that the bailiff had indicated that a juror wished to speak with the District Court about an unknown matter. The prosecutor stated that she had been informed that the last witness, Ms. Davis, had recognized one of the jurors, Mr. Flory, as her philosophy professor at Montana State University. The prosecutor speculated that Mr. Flory had recognized the witness as one of his students and wanted to inform the District Court of this fact. Defense counsel stated that if that was the case, he was inclined to have the juror simply confirm that his knowledge of the witness would not affect his ability to be fair and impartial. The prosecutor agreed, and the District Court sent the bailiff to ask the juror about his concern. ¶ 44 The bailiff reported back and confirmed the prosecutor's speculation as to the substance of the juror's concern. The District Court then summoned Mr. Flory in order that he might have the opportunity to express his concern and know that it had been addressed. The District Court then briefly questioned Mr. Flory, both counsel agreed that the juror may continue to serve, and the District Court concluded the matter. Riggs claims that these events occurred outside his presence. Though the record is silent on this point, we assume, arguendo that this claim is accurate. ¶ 45 During the fifth day of trial, with the jury having been excused, the District Court raised the matter of a juror, Mr. Fisher, who had expressed concern that he might have to forfeit the non-refundable airline tickets that he held for a flight which was scheduled to depart on the following morning. The District Court and counsel agreed that Mr. Fisher could come in and talk separately about his concern. After the settlement of instructions, Mr. Fisher met with the District Court and counsel, whereupon the District Court advised him that he would not have to sacrifice his tickets, that he might have to deliberate into the night, and that he should not discuss the situation with the other jurors. Riggs claims that these events, too, occurred in his absence, a claim which the record appears to support. ¶ 46 The federal constitutional right to be present at all criminal proceedings is one of the most basic rights contained in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Illinois v. Allen (1970), 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058, 25 L.Ed.2d 353, 356. The defendant's right to be present at all proceedings ... which may take his life or liberty is designed to safeguard the public's interest in a fair and orderly judicial system. Sturgis v. Goldsmith (9th Cir. 1986), 796 F.2d 1103, 1109. ¶ 47 In Montana, the right of a criminal defendant to be present at his trial is expressly guaranteed by the Montana Constitution: In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel[.] Art. II, Sec. 24, Mont. Const. Since the right to appear and defend in person is found within Montana's Declaration of Rights, it is a fundamental right. A right is fundamental under Montana's Constitution if the right either is found in the Declaration of Rights or is a right without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would have little meaning. Butte Community Union v. Lewis (1986), 219 Mont. 426, 430, 712 P.2d 1309, 1311. ¶ 48 This Court recognized as early as 1922, when interpreting an identical provision of the 1889 Montana Constitution, that the defendant must be present throughout the entire trial. State v. Reed (1922), 65 Mont. 51, 56, 210 P. 756, 757 (emphasis added). We stated in Reed: No principle of law, relating to criminal procedure, is better settled than that, in felony cases, nothing should be done in the absence of the prisoner. It is his unquestioned right to be confronted with his accusers and witnesses. He has the legal right to be present when the jury are hearing his case, and at all times during the proceeding of the trial, when anything is done which in any manner affects his right[.] Reed, 65 Mont. at 58, 210 P. at 758 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See State v. Bird, 2001 MT 2, ¶¶ 23-26, 308 Mont. 75, ¶¶ 23-26, 43 P.3d 266, ¶¶ 23-26. ¶ 49 In Bird, we held that the defendant has both a state and federal constitutional right to be present during certain critical stages of the trial proceedings. We held that one critical stage occurs when the judge conducts individual voir dire in chambers: In the case sub judice, the in-chambers voir dire was conducted specifically to elicit prospective jurors' personal feelings and experiences regarding domestic violence. Since [the defendant] was excluded from the in-chambers voir dire, he never heard those prospective jurors' responses. In particular, he did not have the opportunity to hear the emergency room nurse explain her biases in seeing repeat incidences of domestic violence. This prevented [the defendant] from knowing about her prejudices and from insisting that defense counsel strike her with a peremptory challenge. Bird, ¶ 28. ¶ 50 In State v. Tapson, 2001 MT 292, 307 Mont. 428, 41 P.3d 305, we held that another such critical stage of trial proceedings occurred when the judge enters the jury room during deliberations to give further instructions to the jury. Tapson, ¶¶ 27-28. ¶ 51 In both these cases, we distinguished United States v. Gagnon (1985), 470 U.S. 522, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 84 L.Ed.2d 486, on the grounds that the occurrence at which the trial court in that case failed to ensure the defendant's presence did not constitute a critical stage of trial. Bird, ¶ 34; Tapson, ¶ 37. ¶ 52 In Gagnon, the United States Supreme Court, interpreting the Confrontation Clause and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, ruled that the defendant's due process guarantees were not violated when the district court met with a juror in chambers, together with counsel for one of the defendants but in the absence of the defendants themselves, to address his concern regarding the fact that one of the defendants was sketching the jury. The Court stated: The mere occurrence of an ex parte conversation between a trial judge and a juror does not constitute a deprivation of any constitutional right. The defense has no constitutional right to be present at every interaction between a judge and a juror[.] Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 1484, 84 L.Ed.2d at 490 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court goes on to state that a defendant has a due process right to be present at a given proceeding whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge. Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 1484, 84 L.Ed.2d at 490. ¶ 53 We conclude that the present case is more similar to Gagnon than to either Bird or Tapson. The defendant in Bird was denied a crucial opportunity to shape the strategy guiding his own defense. Bird, ¶ 28. In Tapson, the judge's entry alone into the jury room could have prejudiced the defendant, and the deficit in the record made it impossible to say beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not. Tapson, ¶ 30. ¶ 54 In the present case, by contrast, the defendant has made no persuasive claim of prejudice arising out of the episodes under consideration. Both interactions between judge and juror were brief interludes in a complex trial, Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 527, 105 S.Ct. at 1484, 84 L.Ed.2d at 490, and defendant had no role to play at either, Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 527, 105 S.Ct. at 1484-85, 84 L.Ed.2d at 490. Moreover, in each instance defense counsel was consulted and consented to the court's approach. We therefore conclude that the defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution, were not infringed. ¶ 55 We affirm. KARLA M. GRAY, C.J., JOHN WARNER, PATRICIA O. COTTER and W. WILLIAM LEAPHART, JJ., concur.