Opinion ID: 2971749
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State Law Discrimination Claims

Text: Under Kentucky law, it is unlawful for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against an individual . . . because of the individual’s . . . gender [or] age.” Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 344.040(1). Kentucky courts begin their examination of claims brought under this statute by utilizing the McDonnell Douglass burden-shifting analysis. Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Housing Authority, 132 S.W. 3d 790, (Ky. 2004) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 802 & n.8 (6th Cir. 1994) (“Kentucky courts apply the McDonnell Douglas framework to discrimination cases brought under state law.”) (citing Kentucky Ctr. for the Arts v. Handley, 827 S.W.2d 697, 699 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991)). The statute thus requires plaintiff employees to bear the initial burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating: (1) that she is a member of a protected class; (2) that she was qualified for the job; (3) that she suffered an adverse employment decision; and (4) that similarly situated non-protected employees were treated more favorably. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Upon the plaintiff’s establishment of a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer “to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason” for the decision. Id. Finally, the plaintiff must be afforded an opportunity to demonstrate that the stated reason is merely a pretext, masking a discriminatory motive. Id. at 804-05. -5- In granting summary judgment to the Co-op, the District Court presented two alternative grounds. First, the court ruled that Thomas failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, the court determined that even if Thomas had carried her preliminary burden, summary judgment would still be appropriate. While we find that the District Court erred in its prima facie determination, we affirm the court’s grant of summary judgment on these claims. The Co-op successfully articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for their employment decision, and Thomas failed to present evidence that this reason was a pretext for discrimination. The District Court found that Thomas met only three of the four prongs of McDonnell Douglas and thus failed to establish a prima facie case of age or sex discrimination. The court had little trouble determining that Thomas was a member of protected age and gender classes, that she suffered an adverse employment decision in not being hired for the revised dispatcher position, and that four of the five replacement dispatchers were younger men. Yet the court found that Thomas did not establish a prima facie case of age or sex discrimination as she was not “qualified” for the new dispatcher position. This ruling was based on the fact that Thomas did not have several of the “qualifications” for the job. She had not completed the lineman’s training course. Nor did she have field experience in line construction. But these education and experience criteria were listed in the job description as “desired” rather than “required.” The only “required” educational qualification was a high school diploma or equivalency, and there was no “required” level of experience. Employment discrimination actions are not defeated simply because plaintiffs do not have each and every desired qualification. “The prima facie burden of showing that a plaintiff is qualified can . . . be met by presenting credible evidence that his or her qualifications are at least equivalent to the minimum objective criteria required for employment in the relevant field.” Wexler v. White's Fine -6- Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 575-76. (6th Cir. 2003). Thomas plainly had the minimum objective qualifications for the revised position. Thus, the District Court erred in finding that Thomas failed to meet her prima facie burden. As Thomas successfully established a prima facie case of sex and age discrimination, the burden should have shifted to the Co-op to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for choosing the male candidates over the plaintiff. The evidence supports the District Court’s conclusion that the Co-op made a legitimate business decision to lodge greater technical and supervisory responsibilities in the revised dispatch position. In furtherance of this decision, the Coop chose to hire dispatchers who were more highly qualified than the plaintiff. Thomas contends that the position did not actually change significantly, and that she was capable of doing the job without the desired qualifications. But, it is well-established that “[t]he soundness of an employer’s business judgment may not be questioned as a means of showing pretext.” Chappell v. GTE Products Corp., 803 F.3d 890, 898 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Rowan v. Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc., 360 F.3d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 2004) (“The plaintiffs may not simply substitute their own business judgment for that of the defendant.”). In order to survive a summary judgment motion, the plaintiff must demonstrate that a reasonable jury could conclude that the proffered business decision was merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination. The evidence demonstrates that the Co-op made serious and real changes to the dispatcher position. The revised position had greater responsibility and authority, greater knowledge and skill requirements, and higher pay rates than the dispatch position held by Thomas. There is no evidence that these changes were made to camouflage the Coop’s attempt to replace their female employees with males or their older employees with younger -7- ones. We therefore affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant on the state law discrimination claims.