Opinion ID: 2828567
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Guilt-Phase Mental-Health Evidence

Text: Defendant argues that his trial attorneys were ineffective because they failed to present evidence of his mental defects during the guilt phase of the trial. Defendant’s theory is that this evidence would have borne “directly on what he perceived and what his (diminished) intent was in the midst of an unannounced raid led by an unmarked vehicle.” Aplt. Br. at 41–42. We need not decide whether Defendant’s trial attorneys should have investigated Defendant’s mental health more vigorously during the guilt phase of his trial because Defendant has failed to show prejudice. Our analysis is guided by United States v. Brown, 326 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2003). That opinion noted that “psychological or psychiatric evidence that negates the essential element of specific intent can be admissible,” but “[t]he admission of such evidence will depend upon whether the defendant clearly demonstrates how such evidence would negate intent rather than merely present a dangerously confusing theory of defense more akin to justification and excuse.” Id. at 1147 (internal quotation marks omitted). A court must “carefully scrutinize proposed psychiatric evidence to determine whether the evidence rests upon a legally acceptable theory for negating intent.” Id. This requires screening out invalid legal theories, such as those that show only “impaired volitional control or inability to reflect on the consequences of . . . conduct.” Id. The “proper focus” is on whether the evidence shows a “link or relationship between the specific 14 psychiatric evidence offered and the mens rea at issue in the case.” Id. at 1148 (internal quotation marks omitted). Yet Defendant points to no available expert testimony that he could not form the intent to shoot the victims (or any other relevant mens rea). We reject this claim of error.