Opinion ID: 2751914
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Purported Breach.

Text: We turn next to the defendant's claim that the government failed to abide by the Agreement. Whether the government breached the terms of a plea agreement is usually a question of law, which 1 With minimal effort, the government could have drafted a waiver clause having the effect that it unrealistically ascribes to the language actually used in the Agreement. See United States v. Isom, 580 F.3d 43, 51 (1st Cir. 2009) (considering waiver provision that applied if the sentence imposed by the Court is within the guideline range determined by the Court or lower. (emphasis supplied) (internal quotation mark omitted)). -9- we review de novo. See United States v. Clark, 55 F.3d 9, 11 (1st Cir. 1995). But where, as here, the defendant fails to object to the purported breach before the district court, review is only for plain error. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 143 (2009); United States v. Rivera-Rodríguez, 489 F.3d 48, 57 (1st Cir. 2007). The path of plain-error review is well traveled. The appellant must shoulder the burden of showing (1) that an error occurred (2) which was clear or obvious and which not only (3) affected the defendant's substantial rights, but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2001); accord United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). Within this taxonomy, an error is deemed to affect substantial rights when it likely affected the outcome of the proceedings. See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135. The government perplexingly concedes that it breached the Agreement's prohibition against supporting further adjustments by advising the court that the record contained a factual basis for the restraint adjustment. A federal court in a criminal case is not obliged to accept the government's confession of error, see United States v. Mescual-Cruz, 387 F.3d 1, 8 n.2 (1st Cir. 2004), and we decline to do so here. Our cases make pellucid that the AUSA was under an unflagging duty, as an officer of the court, to -10- provide this accurate factual information to the sentencing judge once the judge had raised the issue. See United States v. Gonczy, 357 F.3d 50, 53 (1st Cir. 2004). Because the AUSA's statements did no more than fulfill this duty, they could not constitute a breach of the Agreement. We explain briefly. A defendant who enters a plea agreement waives a panoply of constitutional rights and, therefore, we hold prosecutors to the most meticulous standards of both promise and performance. United States v. Riggs, 287 F.3d 221, 224 (1st Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Clark, 55 F.3d at 12. Such standards require more than lip service to, or technical compliance with, the terms of a plea agreement. See Rivera-Rodríguez, 489 F.3d at 57; United States v. Saxena, 229 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2000). However, this principle does not operate in a vacuum. We repeatedly have emphasized that prosecutors have a concurrent and equally solemn obligation to provide relevant information to the sentencing court and that a plea agreement may not abridge that obligation. See, e.g., Gonczy, 357 F.3d at 53; Saxena, 229 F.3d at 6; see also United States v. Canada, 960 F.2d 263, 270 n.7 (1st Cir. 1992) (It is necessary at all times that the government 'level' with the court as to the correct facts and calculations relevant to guideline sentencing.). In this instance, the Agreement obligated the government to refrain from arguing further guideline adjustments to an -11- offense level of 25. But there is a material difference between answering questions asked by a sentencing court or bringing facts to the court's attention and affirmatively supporting an adjustment. See Clark, 55 F.3d at 13. The AUSA's statements here plainly were made in response to the district court's inquiry and to correct what the AUSA reasonably viewed as a misstatement of fact by defense counsel. Seen in this light, those statements did not cross the line into forbidden terrain: supporting an enhancement entails an element of advocacy, and there was no such advocacy by the prosecutor here. See Saxena, 229 F.3d at 7-8. It is equally plain that the AUSA's substantive sentencing argument did not transgress the Agreement. The AUSA made the following argument: Considering all of the facts and in this case we are talking about a defenseless female, 70 year old woman, attacked in a way that nobody should have to face a situation like this. When she is sleeping, in a vulnerable state, the way it happened and the vicious way that he committed the crime, when he assaulted her with no provocation on her part. The fact that she suffered severe bodily injury, she lost her right eye, and to this day she has almost lost her eyesight. She is basically blind at this point. She needs the continued help of her family. . . . . We stand by the plea agreement and in a sense we have to recommend to the Court the higher end of the guideline, not the lower end. That is considering the defendants [sic] background, all [section] 3553 factors and the need to protect the community from future -12- crimes of this defendant and send a message that crimes like this will not be tolerated. . . . . We are standing by the plea agreement with the guidelines negotiated by the parties. Following additional questioning from the court concerning the restraint adjustment, the AUSA reiterated that the government intended to adhere to the Agreement and twice recommended a 137month sentence. This sentencing recommendation tracked the Agreement, which expressly permitted the government to seek a sentence at the high end of the applicable GSR based on offense level 25. The defendant has a fallback position. He insists that the AUSA's conduct, taken as a whole, conveyed the government's tacit support for the restraint adjustment. A fair reading of the transcript of the disposition hearing belies the defendant's tendencious characterization. At no time did the AUSA advocate in favor of the newly emergent restraint adjustment. To the contrary, she repeatedly asserted that the government stood by the Agreement. To be sure, it is possible for a prosecutor to undercut a plea agreement while paying lip service to its covenants. Our decision in Clark illustrates this point. There, we found a breach of the plea agreement when the government, without formally opposing a downward adjustment that it had agreed not to oppose, -13- made it clear that it regarded the adjustment as inappropriate. See 55 F.3d at 12. We consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a prosecutor engaged in impermissible tactics. See, e.g., Gonczy, 357 F.3d at 53-54; Saxena, 229 F.3d at 6-7. Here, there is no basis for concluding that the prosecutor reaffirmed a promise to the defendant out of one side of her mouth and tried to subvert it out of the other side. The AUSA said nothing that could reasonably be construed as an indication that she supported the restraint adjustment. No more is exigible: the AUSA was not required to be effusive in refusing to support the adjustment. Cf. Canada, 960 F.2d at 270 (explaining that a prosecutor is not obliged to present an agreed representation with any particular degree of enthusiasm). In a final effort to save a sinking ship, the defendant suggests that there is more to the AUSA's argument than meets the eye. He says that, peeking beneath the surface of the recommendation, the AUSA insinuated that she was touting an overly lenient sentence only because she was precluded from arguing for a stiffer one. In particular, the defendant complains that the AUSA highlighted the vulnerable nature of the complainant and the impact on her daily life. He adds that the court's earlier -14- characterization of the recommended sentence as too lenient should have put the government on notice of the need to tread lightly.2 This plaint leads nowhere. The Agreement allowed the prosecutor to seek the upper end of the GSR contemplated by the Agreement, and the AUSA was within fair territory in emphasizing facts that made a sentence at the low end of that GSR inappropriate. See Rivera-Rodríguez, 489 F.3d at 58. The defendant admitted to committing a heinous crime resulting in horrific injuries, and nothing contained in the Agreement entitled him to have the government sugarcoat the facts. To say more on this point would be to paint the lily. Holding steady and true the delicate balance between the AUSA's dual obligations and considering the totality of the circumstances, no breach of the Agreement is evident.