Opinion ID: 154170
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The felony stop

Text: 48 At 3:55 a.m., the officers at the scene received information that led them to believe that defendant Smith was armed and dangerous. The defendants in the Pontiac and the U- Haul were detained for an additional fifteen minutes while the officers waited for backup. All six defendants then were forcibly removed from their vehicles at gun point, patted down, handcuffed, and ordered to kneel on the pavement until the procedure was completed at approximately 4:45. The district court concluded that this use of force transformed the lawful stop into an unlawful arrest. 49 We have stated that [s]ince police officers should not be required to take unnecessary risks in performing their duties, they are `authorized to take such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of [a Terry] stop. Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1462. [T]he use of firearms, handcuffs, and other forceful techniques does not necessarily transform a Terry detention into a full custodial arrest--for which probable cause is required--when the circumstances reasonably warrant such measures. United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1052 (10th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Such measures are warranted, however, only if the facts available to the officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 50 The district court held that the identification of William Smith as the individual referenced in the NCIC teletype was unreasonable. The court found that the officer and dispatcher had confirmed only two pieces of information in the teletype, the birth date and the surname Smith. Because Smith is a common name, the court reasoned that the likelihood of a match to the defendant was remote. The court found a lack of similarity between the name William Smith and any of the aliases, and further found that officer Reinhart behaved unreasonably in failing to confirm the physical description of the suspect with Maschmeier, the only officer who was aware of Smith's height and weight. The court concluded that the NCIC teletype could not provide the officers with a reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant Smith was armed and dangerous. Cf. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d at 1052-53 (felony stop unreasonable when there was no evidence or testimony from the police that they had reason to believe these particular suspects had guns or were violent or that the circumstances of this particular encounter warranted the unusual intrusiveness of the felony stop procedures). 51 The district court went on to consider whether a dispatcher's error should lead to application of the exclusionary rule. See Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995) (holding error by court employee does not require application of exclusionary rule ). In Evans, the Supreme Court reiterated that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to safeguard against future violations of Fourth Amendment rights through the rule's general deterrent effect. Id. at 1191. The Court refused to apply the rule when a violation of the Fourth Amendment resulted from the error of a court employee in failing to note in the court records that an outstanding warrant had been quashed. Id. at 1193. The Court found that such employees are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Id. Therefore, applying the rule in that context would serve no deterrent purpose. Id. at 1193. 52 The district court distinguished Evans and held that the exclusionary rule should be applied when a dispatcher's error leads to a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court reasoned that while a dispatcher is not a law enforcement officer, she is clearly an adjunct[] to the law enforcement team engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. [Id.] Her status differs significantly from the court employees involved in Evans. The dispatcher is in a position of extreme importance to the police since she is responsible for obtaining, relaying and recording information to and from the officers in the field. . . . 53 This decision will no doubt cause law enforcement agencies to ensure that dispatchers are properly trained and capable of handling their duties. . . . In sum, this decision should have a deterrent effect on law enforcement agencies. 54 Dist. Ct. Mem. & Order at 40. We agree with the district court that the exclusionary rule applies when an error by a dispatcher or an officer leads to a Fourth Amendment violation. See also State v. White, 660 So.2d 664 (Fla. 1995) (applying exclusionary rule where failure of police personnel to maintain accurate computer records leads to violation of Fourth Amendment). 55 In the present case, however, we find the officer's and the dispatcher's conclusion that they had an NCIC hit reasonable. Thus no violation of the Fourth Amendment occurred. Although the name in the NCIC teletype, Karlton Wilbur Smith, was not identical to the defendant's name, William D. Smith, the report listed 18 aliases, of which several resemble William, and one of which was Willie. In addition, the officer accurately confirmed four, not two, pieces of information in the teletype: the defendant's last name, date of birth, sex and race. 56 The district court found that Sergeant Reinhart did not know defendant Smith's height or weight. Therefore, the court refused to consider the similarity in height and weight between the defendant and Karlton Smith in determining whether the officer's conduct was reasonable. The government, however, urges us to look to the collective knowledge of the officers to determine whether their conduct was reasonable, and to attribute Officer Maschmeier's knowledge of defendant Smith's height and weight to Sergeant Reinhart. 57 We have said that in assessing the justification for an investigatory stop, we look to the knowledge of all the police involved in [the] criminal investigation. United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1268 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 916 (1983). However, this concept has limits. The cases in which we have applied the collective knowledge rule all have involved actual communication to the arresting officer of either facts or a conclusion constituting probable cause, or an arrest order. 4 See, e.g., United States v. Maestas, 2 F.3d 1485, 1493 (10th Cir. 1993) (where roving agents communicated facts to fixed checkpoint, information collected by all agents could be pooled to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion); United States v. Matthews, 615 F.2d 1279, 1284 n.5 (10th Cir. 1980) (information collected by several officers considered in determining probable cause, because officers shared the various pieces of information with each other); United States v. Goeltz, 513 F.2d 193, 197 (10th Cir.) (finding probable cause based on collective knowledge of officers on the scene where each officer communicated his observations to his associates), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 830 (1975); Wood v. Crouse, 436 F.2d 1077 (10th Cir.) (arresting officer may rely on sheriff's arrest order where sheriff has probable cause), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1010 (1971). 58 In this case, however, the district court found that Officer Maschmeier had not communicated defendant Smith's height and weight to Sergeant Reinhart. Our prior cases have not considered whether a stop or an arrest can be justified by looking to the collective knowledge of officers, absent evidence that the officers communicated with each other, or, as here, in the face of a specific finding that they have not communicated. Other Courts of Appeals to consider this issue have allowed the knowledge of officers working closely together on a scene to be mutually imputed without requiring proof of actual communication, see, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 885 F.2d 377, 383-383 (7th Cir. 1989) (imputing knowledge of one arresting officer to another because officers made the arrest together), and even in the face of a specific finding that pertinent facts were not communicated, see Collins v. Nagle, 892 F.2d 489, 495 (6th Cir. 1989) (knowledge of investigators working together on the scene is mutually imputed). Cf. United States v. Kapperman, 764 F.2d 786, 791 fn.5 (11th Cir. 1985) (looking to collective knowledge of officers where there was minimal communication between officers); United States v. Nafzger, 974 F.2d 906, 911 (7th Cir. 1992) ([W]hen officers are in communication with each other while working together at a scene, their knowledge may be mutually imputed even when there is no express testimony that the specific or detailed information creating the justification for a stop was conveyed . . . ). Other courts reject the idea of imputing knowledge, even among officers working closely together. United States v. Del Porte, 357 F. Supp. 969, 974 (S.D. N.Y.), aff'd, United States v. St. Jean, 483 F.2d 1399 (2d Cir. 1973); State v. Cooley, 457 A.2d 352 (Del. 1983); People v. Brnja, 406 N.E.2d 1066 (N.Y. 1980). 5 And even courts that impute knowledge among officers working closely together will not do so absent a close working nexus between the officers during the stop or arrest. See, e.g., Edwards, 885 F.2d at 382 (A supervising officer's knowledge about a defendant cannot be relied upon to provide probable cause for his arrest where there is no evidence that such knowledge was communicated to the agents on the scene who actually made or ordered the defendant's arrest.); accord United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d 242, 260 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977). 59 We can see the value in imputing knowledge among officers working closely together. A presumption of communication often will reflect what has actually taken place and communication among officers during the exigencies of a stop or arrest may often be subtle or nonverbal. However, in this case, the presumption of communication is rebutted, because the district court found that in fact the information had not been shared. Even in the absence of evidence of communication among officers, however, when officers act collectively it may sometimes be appropriate to look to their collective knowledge in determining whether they behaved reasonably. For example, where two officers are working closely together at the scene and each has observed suspicious circumstances that the other has not observed, even absent evidence of communication between the officers, we might be willing to aggregate their knowledge in deciding whether they behaved reasonably. 6 That is not the case here, however. The district court found that Officer Maschmeier alone knew defendant Smith's height and weight; Sergeant Reinhart alone knew the height and weight listed on the NCIC report. Thus neither officer knew the significance of the information, and the information could contribute to neither officer's suspicion of the suspect. Under these circumstances, we decline to hold that Officer Maschmeier's knowledge of Smith's height and weight can be attributed to Sergeant Reinhart or that the similarity between the defendant's and Karlton Smith's height and weight could contribute to the officers' reasonable suspicion that defendant Smith was wanted in Florida. 60 However, even excluding the evidence of height and weight to bolster the likelihood of a match between Smith and the Karlton Smith in the NCIC teletype, we conclude that the other similarities between Smith and Karlton Smith, when considered together with the defendants' other suspicious conduct, gave the officers reasonable suspicion that defendant Smith was the individual in the teletype, and was armed and dangerous. In determining whether an officer has reasonable suspicion, we examine the totality of the circumstances. McRae, 81 F.3d at 1534 (citing United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 878 (10th Cir. 1994)). In addition to the NCIC information which matched defendant Smith as to last name, exact birth date, race, sex and similarity of aliases, the officers knew that the defendants were traveling in a convoy, had failed to stop when the officer signaled, had failed to produce driver's licenses, and had lied to officer Maschmeier. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682 n.3 (pickup trucks with camper shells traveling in tandem and taking evasive action when followed by police can give rise to reasonable suspicion), Jones, 44 F.3d at 872 (failure to stop in response to flashing police lights is factor supporting reasonable suspicion). We emphasize that reasonable suspicion does not amount to probable cause. It requires considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, but something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d at 1051 (internal quotation marks omitted). 61 We reject the district court's finding that Sergeant Reinhart behaved unreasonably in failing to confirm the physical description of the suspect with Officer Maschmeier. In determining whether police conduct during an investigatory stop is reasonable, a court should take care to consider whether police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such cases the court should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686. The two officers were confronting six suspects at 3:30 a.m. Sergeant Reinhart had confirmed that a suspect's name, birth date, sex and race matched that of an armed and dangerous felon under suspicious circumstances where the suspect did not have a driver's license or other adequate identification. We are unwilling to hold that he should have discussed the situation with Officer Maschmeier further before taking precautions for the officers' safety. 62 The defendants argue that the NCIC bulletin for Karlton Wilbur Smith could not provide reasonable suspicion to detain a different individual. We disagree. A mistaken premise can furnish grounds for a Terry stop, if the officers do not know that it is mistaken and are reasonable in acting upon it. United States v. Ornelas-Ledesma, 16 F.3d 714, 718 (7th Cir. 1994), judgment vacated on other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996). In United States v. Lang, 81 F.3d 955 (10th Cir. 1996), federal agents were investigating a person suspected to be involved in armed robbery and murder. One agent believed he saw the suspect enter a vehicle. The agents surrounded the vehicle, ordered the occupants out, and patted them down for weapons, discovering cocaine on the passenger. The only basis for the stop and the search was the agents' belief that their suspect was in the vehicle--a belief that, immediately after the search, the agents discovered was mistaken. Id. at 958-60. We upheld the district court's denial of defendants' motion to suppress, concluding: (1) the agents had a reasonable suspicion that their suspect was involved in the robberies and murder; (2) the agents' misidentification of defendant as their suspect was reasonable under the circumstances; and (3) it was reasonable, given the agents' legitimate belief that the defendant might be armed and dangerous, for the agents to conduct a pat down search to protect the agents' safety. Id. at 965-966. See also United States v. Walraven, 892 F.2d 972 (10th Cir. 1989) (deputy's stop of vehicle reasonable although based on dispatcher's mistaken transposition of two numbers on license plate; officer's failure to catch mistake was reasonable under circumstances and his understanding of situation provided reasonable suspicion). 63 The fact that the police reasonably suspected Smith of being armed and dangerous does not, of course, answer the question whether the display of firearms and use of handcuffs was reasonable as to the other five defendants. In Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979), the Supreme Court cautioned that a person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person. In Ybarra, police officers with a warrant to search a tavern and its proprietor for drugs searched a customer as well. The Court invalidated the search of the customer, because the state did not articulate specific facts that would have justified suspicion of the customer. The Court noted that the lighting in the tavern was bright enough to allow the officers to observe that the customer's hands were empty and that he posed no threat to the officers' safety. Id. at 93. Ybarra is distinguishable. The officers in that case had no reason to believe that there was a connection between the customer and the proprietor other than the customer's presence in the bar. Here, the officers reasonably concluded that the defendants were traveling together. In Ybarra, the officers were looking for drugs. Here the police suspected that one of the defendants was armed and dangerous. The defendants' conduct in failing to produce licenses or to pull over when signaled by the police gave the officers individualized suspicion of the other defendants. Perhaps most important, the police confronted the defendants in their cars, at night. Unlike the officers in Ybarra, the officers here could not tell whether the defendants had weapons on their persons or within reach. Although the officers had not been informed that the other defendants were dangerous, we believe that in this case a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety . . . was in danger. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. See also United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1561 (10th Cir. 1993) (The governmental interest in the safety of police officers outweighs the individual's Fourth Amendment interest when an officer has an objective basis to believe the person . . . detained is armed and dangerous.); United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir. 1982) (knowledge that arms were found at suspect's residence and information that the suspect should be considered armed justifies suspicion that suspect and unidentified companions may be armed); United States v. Del Toro, 464 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1972) (approving protective frisk of unidentified companion of narcotics dealer); United States v. Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1976) (approving frisk of passengers in car when driver is arrested and officers are aware of facts suggesting they are in danger), overruled in part on other grounds, United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987). 64 The reasonable belief that the defendants posed a danger justified the procedures in this case. The officers were entitled to display their weapons, to separate defendants from their vehicles, to conduct a pat down search, and to restrain the defendants with handcuffs until the officers had completed securing all the defendants. See Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1467 (ordering defendant to exit car and to lie on ground, displaying firearms, and using handcuffs did not transform Terry stop into arrest because measures were reasonable); King, 990 F.2d at 1557 (protective frisk within bounds of lawful Terry stop). For their own safety, the officers were entitled to remove the defendants one by one, which, because of the number of defendants, necessarily took time. We therefore conclude that [a]lthough bordering on an illegal arrest, the precautionary measures of force employed by the officers were reasonable under the circumstances. Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1463. 65