Opinion ID: 2531181
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Application of Barker Test

Text: ¶ 50 With respect to the first factor, the length of the delay, we note that short delaysof perhaps a month or so need less justification than longer delays. $ 8,850, 461 U.S. at 565, 103 S.Ct. 2005. The second factor is closely related to the first and concerns the reason the government assigns to justify the delay. Id. at 565, 103 S.Ct. 2005. Here, the same attorney represented all of the claimants in each of the three consolidated cases. The State filed its complaints for forfeiture within 22, 20 and 20 days of the seizures, respectively. Indeed the statute requires such a prompt filing. This is because after a vehicle is seized it must forthwith be delivered to the sheriff, who then has 15 days to notify the State's Attorney of the seizure. The State's Attorney in turn must then exercise his discretion promptly as to whether to return the vehicle where there was no willful negligence or intention to violate the law on the part of the owner. See 720 ILCS 5/36-2(a) (West 2006). If the State's Attorney decides not to remit the vehicle, he is to forthwith bring an action for forfeiture. See 720 ILCS 5/36-2(a) (West 2006). ¶ 51 Claimants argue that the words forthwith and promptly are of little value in ensuring timeliness. Claimants' argument is not persuasive. Just because the statute does not specify the exact number of days for filing a complaint does not mean that the timeline is open-ended or that it does not comply with due process demands. The words forthwith and promptly have recognized legal meanings that are consistent with their commonly understood dictionary definitions, which indicate that the action to be performed must be done within a short time and without undue delay. See Black's Law Dictionary 680 (8th ed. 2004) (defines forthwith as 1. Immediately; without delay. 2. Directly; promptly; within a reasonable time under the circumstances); Scammon v. Germania Insurance Co., 101 Ill. 621, 626 (1881); (In Illinois, the words `forthwith,' and `as soon after as possible,'    mean within `a reasonable time,' `without unreasonable delay,' and are the equivalent of `due diligence.'); Morgan v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 388 Ill.App.3d 633, 673, 328 Ill.Dec. 139, 903 N.E.2d 799 (2009) (promptly has been defined as `without appreciable delay.' (quoting Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 66, 99 S.Ct. 2642, 61 L.Ed.2d 365 (1979))); Black's Law Dictionary 1214 (6th ed. 1990) (something done promptly is done without delay and with reasonable speed). ¶ 52 Claimants further argue that the problem with the statute is that it contains no specific deadline within which the forfeiture hearing must take place. But this of course is not lethal to the facial constitutionality of the statute. The statute at issue in $8,850 did not contain a requirement for a prompt report of the seizure by Customs to the United States Attorney for purposes of instituting the forfeiture proceeding. $ 8,850, 461 U.S. at 558 n. 3, 103 S.Ct. 2005. Nor did it specify a specific number of days within which the proceeding had to be instituted, or a hearing thereon commenced or completed. The statute did require that once the report was made, the United States Attorney was to immediately inquire into the facts, and if it appeared probable that a forfeiture has occurred, to forthwith commence the proceedings and prosecute without delay. $ 8,850, 461 U.S. at 558, 103 S.Ct. 2005 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1604). But it is clear from the Court's holding that the without delay language cannot mean absolutely no delays, as the Court recognized that the filing of the proceedings could be reasonably delayed during pendency of the criminal charges without offending principles of due process. Id. at 567, 103 S.Ct. 2005. Although it is not necessary here, we could easily read a prosecuted without unreasonable delay requirement into the Illinois forfeiture statute given the manifest intent of the statute. See Community Consolidated School District Number 210 v. Mini, 55 Ill.2d 382, 386, 304 N.E.2d 75 (1973) (collecting cases for the proposition that if the main intent and purpose of the legislature can be determined from a statute, words may be modified, altered or even supplied so as to obviate any repugnancy or inconsistency with the legislative intention). It is clear from the legislature's use of the words forthwith and promptly in connection with the instigation of forfeiture proceedings that it intended an expeditious prosecution and resolution of the proceedings so far as practical. ¶ 53 The short time it took to initiate the proceedings in this case is in sharp contrast to the 18-month delay in $8,850, which although described by the Supreme Court as substantial was held not to be unconstitutional. $ 8,850, 461 U.S. at 569-70, 103 S.Ct. 2005. We also note that claimants here filed their answers within a month and a half of the seizures. The cases would have soon been ready to proceed to a hearing on the merits had claimants wanted a timely resolution. Instead, claimants filed several motions for continuances before finally attacking the statute as facially unconstitutional. The delay in this case is entirely attributable to claimants. Accordingly, we conclude that the first two Barker factors strongly favor the State. ¶ 54 The third factor to be considered is the claimant's assertion of the right to a judicial hearing. $ 8,850, 461 U.S. at 568-69, 103 S.Ct. 2005. In considering this factor, the Court in $8,850 looked to what steps the claimant could have taken on her own to accomplish an earlier return of her vehicle-such as filing a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e) for return of the seized property or filing a petition for remission-and concluded that the failure to use these remedies can be taken as some indication that [the claimant] did not desire an early judicial hearing. $ 8,850, 461 U.S. at 569, 103 S.Ct. 2005. Here, it does not appear that claimants took any steps to obtain an early return of their vehicles. Claimants did not seek discretionary return of their vehicles by filing petitions for remission with the Attorney General. Nor does it appear that they filed any motions pursuant to section 114-12(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 for return of their seized property. See 725 ILCS 5/114-12(a) (West 2006). Instead, claimant in the lead case filed several motions for continuances before waiting several months to file a motion to dismiss that requested the court to strike the statute as unconstitutional. ¶ 55 The final factor is whether claimants have been prejudiced by the delay. Under this prong, the main inquiry is whether the delay hindered the claimant in presenting a defense on the merits, especially in terms of the loss of witnesses or other evidence. $ 8,850, 461 U.S. at 569, 103 S.Ct. 2005. Here, claimants have not alleged any undue delay, let alone prejudice stemming from the delay. Claimants do allege that they have been deprived of their vehicles while the forfeiture proceedings are pending. But something more than this must be alleged to satisfy this prong. See 1998 Ford Explorer, 399 Ill. App.3d at 103, 339 Ill.Dec. 524, 926 N.E.2d 999 (citing Von Neumann, 474 U.S. at 251, 106 S.Ct. 610).