Opinion ID: 2297864
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Maine Law and Other State Court Precedents

Text: [¶ 11] Our decisions have been generally consistent with United States Supreme Court precedent regarding collateral challenges to prior convictions. For example, in State v. Vainio, 466 A.2d 471, 472, 476 (Me.1983), we addressed whether a defendant's 1962 felony conviction could be challenged in a 1982 prosecution for unlawful possession of a firearm. In rejecting the defendant's collateral attack on the 1962 conviction, we relied on Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65-68, 100 S.Ct. 915, 63 L.Ed.2d 198 (1980), in which the Supreme Court affirmed a comparable federal conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm, despite assuming that the underlying state conviction was constitutionally invalid. Vainio, 466 A.2d at 476-77. Expressing our agree[ment] with the principles set forth in Lewis,  we held that a person charged with possession of firearms prohibited under 15 M.R.S.A. § 393 ... cannot collaterally attack the underlying conviction which serves as a basis for the firearm prosecution, and that in such circumstances there is no violation of the United States Constitution, nor of the State Constitution. Vainio, 466 A.2d at 477. Both Vainio and Lewis predated Custis, and we noted in Vainio that Lewis distinguished firearms offenses from other enhancements based on uncounseled convictions because firearms laws focus not on reliability, but on the mere fact of conviction, or even indictment, in order to keep firearms away from potentially dangerous persons. 466 A.2d at 476 n. 5 (quoting Lewis, U.S. at 67, 100 S.Ct. 915). [¶ 12] Our case law has also tracked the Supreme Court's developing jurisprudence regarding whether uncounseled misdemeanor convictions may be used to enhance punishment in subsequent prosecutions. Compare Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748-49, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 128 L.Ed.2d 745 (1994) (overruling Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 100 S.Ct. 1585, 64 L.Ed.2d 169 (1980), and holding that an uncounseled but constitutional misdemeanor conviction could be used to enhance punishment for a subsequent conviction), with State v. Cook, 1998 ME 40, ¶¶ 2, 11-12, 706 A.2d 603 (adopting Nichols and overruling State v. Dowd, 478 A.2d 671 (1984), which had previously adopted Baldasar ). [¶ 13] We recently decided a case procedurally similar to the one now before us. In State v. Galarneau, 2011 ME 60, 20 A.3d 99, we addressed a defendant's collateral challenge to a 2008 OUI conviction used to support an enhanced Class C charge of operating after habitual offender revocation, 29-A M.R.S. § 2557-A(1)(A), (2)(B). As the basis for his collateral attack, the defendant argued that his 2008 conviction was unconstitutional because his representation by the lawyer for the day amounted to a denial of the right to counsel and because the court did not inform him of his right to counsel. Galarneau, 2011 ME 60, ¶ 1, 20 A.3d 99. Addressing the merits of the collateral attack, we concluded that the defendant's 2008 conviction was constitutional because his representation by the lawyer for the day satisfied the right to counsel. Id. ¶¶ 7-10. Although we did not discuss the issue, Galarneau's Gideon -based collateral attack, which was ultimately unsuccessful, would have been allowed under Custis. [¶ 14] Beyond Maine, the majority of state supreme courts that have faced this question have concluded that the reasoning of Custis is sound. They have concluded that the right to collaterally attack a conviction that will enhance a new charge or sentence should be, for solid constitutional and policy reasons, limited to a claim that the defendant was deprived of the fundamental Sixth Amendment right to counsel. [7]