Opinion ID: 78564
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Direct or Circumstantial Evidence of Discrimination

Text: A plaintiff in an ADEA claim may establish a claim of illegal age discrimination through either direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. [1]  Van Voorhis, 512 F.3d at 1300. Plaintiff's testimony that Rodriguez fired her because she was too old was substantiated by the affidavits of two other employees of Defendant. Rodriguez and Quevedo testified that no such comments were made, and Defendant contends that Plaintiff's proffered evidence is internally inconsistent. Plaintiff's claim depends on whether Rodriguez made these age-related remarks, because she relies on no other discriminatory conduct or statements during her employment at Defendant. The resolution of this case depends on whose account of the pertinent conversations a jury would credit. We conclude that a reasonable juror could accept that Rodriguez made the discriminatory-sounding remarks and that the remarks are sufficient evidence of a discriminatory motive which was the but for cause of Plaintiff's dismissal. Summary judgment for Defendant was therefore incorrect. We have considered cases factually similar to Plaintiff's. In Van Voorhis, we concluded that statements from a county official who didn't want to hire any old pilots were direct evidence of discrimination and that the burden should therefore shift to the defendant-employer. Van Voorhis, 512 F.3d at 1300. In Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir.1999), we likewise concluded that an employer's statement that he wanted `aggressive, young men' like himself to be promoted was circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Id. at 1362. See also Alphin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 940 F.2d 1497, 1499-1501 (11th Cir.1991) (finding remark by supervisor to plaintiff that he had been around too long and [was] too old and [was] making too much money immediately after a corrective interview to be circumstantial evidence of age discrimination). While these cases were litigated under the now-defunct ADEA mixed motive theory, they remain instructive. Plaintiff's situation is similar. A reasonable juror could find that Rodriguez's statements should be taken at face value and that he fired Plaintiff because of her age. For us to conclude otherwise would be to deny Plaintiff the benefit of resolving all reasonable inferences in her favor as the nonmoving party. Given the disputed question of material fact, Defendant was unentitled to a summary judgment. So we VACATE the judgment and remand for further proceedings. [2] VACATED and REMANDED.