Opinion ID: 1822508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Jury's Findings are Supported by the Evidence.

Text: ¶ 38. In addressing Prudential's contentions that the Stewarts failed to present sufficient evidence to support their claims, and that the trial court erred in denying Prudential's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, it is the responsibility of this Court to consider the standard that the trial judge follows in denying or granting a J.N.O.V. Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 566 So.2d 1172, 1177 (Miss.1990). Deference is accorded to the trial judge's determination to deny the motion because legal issues were decided by the jury. Id. Deference will also be accorded the jury's fact-finding because of its position  unlike this Court's  to evaluate and weigh the truthfulness of a witness' testimony. The demeanor or bearing of voice, the attitude and appearance of the witnesses, all are primarily for inspection and review by the jury. The jury not only has the right and duty to determine the truth or falsity of the witnesses, but also has the right to evaluate and determine what portions of the testimony of any witness it will accept or reject. Id. (citation omitted). ¶ 39. It is not the place of this Court to determine what we, as individuals, would have done had we been called as jurors in the instant case. It is the responsibility of this Court to examine the evidence presented by both parties and determine whether the evidence is of such quality that reasonable and fairminded jurors in the exercise of fair and impartial judgment might reach different conclusions. Poole v. Avara, 908 So.2d 716, 726 (Miss.2005) (citation omitted). Evidence presented could support both the finding that a contract was formed, or the finding that a contract was not formed. In the present case, substantial evidence exists to support the establishment of all the requisites for formation of an insurance contract and therefore, I would find that the jury's findings should be upheld. The jury was allowed to hear all of the relevant testimony and evidence offered by both the plaintiffs and the defendants. [6] Further, the jury had the advantage of assessing the credibility of all witnesses. Having done that, the jury found that a contract had been formed.
¶ 40. As discussed by the majority, this Court has explained two routes by which an offer to enter an insurance contract may be presented. Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co., 566 So.2d at 1177-78. A potential insurer as well as potential insured may make an offer for insurance. Id. In two previous decisions this Court has found that the insurer made an offer which the potential insured accepted by submitting an application. In Andrew Jackson Life Insurance Company, an offer by the insurance company was sufficiently shown through the affirmative actions of the agents, who extended an offer of immediate coverage, gave assent on behalf of the insurer to all essential terms and expressed the agreed upon terms in writing. Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co., 566 So.2d at 1178-79. Also, in Safety Drivers Insurance Corporation v. Waggener , this Court found that the insurer made an offer. Safety Drivers Ins. Corp. v. Waggener, 219 Miss. 372, 380-81, 68 So.2d 452 (1953). The evidence presented included documents from the insurer signed by the vice-president of the insurance company, soliciting the insured to purchase insurance and declaring all of the essential terms and conditions precedent, which the plaintiff was required to meet in order to consummate the contract. Id. at 379-80, 68 So.2d 452. ¶ 41. The Stewarts assert that Prudential, through its agent, Bateman, made the offer in the instant case. At trial the Stewarts offered evidence in the form of documentation and testimony that on August 19, 1999, Prudential's underwriter offered to insure Dr. Stewart at Select H coverage, which set the underwriting requirements. Larry testified and further offered documentation that Prudential provided the Stewarts with an illustration, dated August 19, 1999. The cover page of the illustration specifically stated: Pruco Life Variable Universal Life A Variable Life Insurance Contract An Illustration Presented to: Dr. Edsel Stewart by Jim Bateman, CLU [Chartered Life Underwriter [7] ], Registered Representative for use in the state of Mississippi The purpose of the illustration was to show how premiums' payments, loans and withdrawals made on [the Contract] may result in or affect cash values and death benefits. The contract description page specifically states:  Proposed Insured: Dr. Edsel Stewart[,] Male[,] age 73[,] Select Preferred with Ratings[,] 1,000,000 Variable Universal Life[,] Type A Death Benefit. Initial Annual Premium Outlay $105,000.00. (Emphasis added). The illustration included all of the essential terms to constitute an offer by the insurer's agent, Bateman. The illustration expressly provided that: (1) Dr. Stewart was the proposed insured; (2) the period of coverage was from his current age to his death, (3) the yearly premium was $105,000; (4) and the amount of the policy was for $1,000,000 payable upon the death of Dr. Stewart. Also, it is undisputed that the parties understood the terms contained within the illustration. ¶ 42. Prudential argues that Larry, as trustee of the Trust, merely submitted an application to Pruco, and in doing so made an offer. Prudential offered evidence that on August 23, 1999, Larry, acting as trustee, applied for a variable life insurance policy with a face amount of $1,000,000 at a premium of $100,000, which Pruco was free to accept, reject, or make a counteroffer. Moreover, Larry's trial testimony revealed that he understood that the application did not create coverage.
¶ 43. Determining whether the evidence is sufficient to demonstrate an acceptance begins with the identification of what constitutes an acceptance. To create a contract of insurance there must be an agreement between the insurer and the insured. There must be a meeting of the minds . . . [also known as acceptance]. Nunley v. Merrill, 513 So.2d 582, 586 (Miss.1987). Acceptance may be implied from the actions of the insured. Old Equity Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 217 So.2d 648, 650 (Miss. 1969). In Andrew Jackson Life Insurance Company, this Court upheld the jury's verdict against the insurer where an insurance agent offered to insure the insured. Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co., 566 So.2d at 1180. In that case the court found that acceptance of the offer was manifested through the . . . [insured's]: (1) remittance of seven premiums deducted from his paycheck, and (2) completion of the application which contained the essential terms. Id. at 1179. ¶ 44. The Stewarts contend that the offer to insure Dr. Stewart was accepted by the signing of the Supplement to the Application on August 31, 1999, by both the Prudential agent, Bateman, and Dr. Stewart. Furthermore, the record reflects that Larry signed another document on August 31, 1999, certifying that this contract meets my insurance needs and financial objectives. Lastly, in addition to signing the additional papers on August 31, 1999, Dr. Stewart paid a sum of $20,000 to Bateman in the form of a check. The Stewarts assert the check for $20,000 was the first premium payment, which exceeded the initial minimum premium requirement in the amount of $10,308.15. ¶ 45. The record also reflects that on September 9, 1999, Batemen sent a fax to Larry indicating that he would deliver the policy the following week. In further support of their contention, the Stewarts produced a letter written by Prudential, dated on September 17, 1999, thanking Dr. Stewart for purchasing this life insurance policy from Pruco Life. In a letter dated September 20, 1999, Prudential wrote to Dr. Stewart stating, Thank you for your application for life insurance with Prudential. We are pleased to issue you a contract. ¶ 46. Prudential argues that the submission of the application was the offer to provide insurance coverage. Prudential offered evidence that on September 17, 1999, without knowledge of Dr. Stewart's comatose state, they issued a policy which constituted a counteroffer because it (1) had a premium that was $5,000 per year higher than the policy requested in the application, (2) was endorsed to require delivery, and (3) required that Dr. Stewart have continued good health. In both applications, signed on August 23, 1999, and on August 31, 1999, the Stewarts listed a premium of $100,000. The policy issued differed from the Stewarts' application in that the policy required a premium of $105,000, $5,000 higher than the application. However, the Illustration listed the premium as $105,000. ¶ 47. Prudential contends that upon learning of Dr. Stewart's comatose state, they decided not to make the counteroffer of coverage because Dr. Stewart was unable to confirm that his health remained as reported in the application and that Dr. Stewart failed to satisfy the condition precedents outlined in the application. [8] In particular, Dr. Stewart's health had not remained the same as stated in the application; he had been in a coma for more than two weeks by the time that the policy was issued by Pruco on September 17, 1999. ¶ 48. The policy was endorsed to provide that coverage did not start until the contract was delivered, and to require the proposed insured to sign a good health statement at delivery. Prudential asserts that the policy was never accepted as issued because it was never offered or communicated to the policyowner, the Trust, by Bateman or Pruco. The Stewarts contend that sending the policy to Bateman was tantamount to delivery to the Trust. ¶ 49. Adhering to this Court's rationale in Andrew Jackson Life Insurance Company, the Stewarts presented sufficient evidence to the jury to support its findings of acceptance of the insurance contract on August 31, 1999. The Stewarts introduced testimony to show that Dr. Stewart's health condition did not change until September 1, 1999. Additionally, this Court in Thurman v. Farmers' Mutual Fire Insurance Company, an action on an insurance premium note, held that the question of whether the defendant with full knowledge made the application and got the kind of policy for which he applied, was for the jury. Thurman v. Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 102 Miss. 77, 81, 58 So. 777 (1912). Accordingly, the issue of whether the policy was a counteroffer which was withdrawn or a contract was an issue that was properly submitted to and resolved by the jury. Because the issue was properly considered by the jury, this Court must give deference to the jury's findings of fact. Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co., 566 So.2d at 1177.
¶ 50. Finding that there was no offer and acceptance, and therefore no contract was formed, the majority finds no need to address whether consideration was tendered. However, because I find that there was sufficient evidence of both offer and acceptance, I will examine the issue of consideration. All that is needed to constitute valid consideration to support a contract is a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee. Frierson v. Delta Outdoor, Inc., 794 So.2d 220, 224 (Miss.2001) (citations omitted). In Andrew Jackson Life Insurance Company, this Court held that the insurer received sufficient consideration in the form of the seven premiums. Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co., 566 So.2d at 1178. ¶ 51. The Stewarts assert that Dr. Stewart paid the first premium in the amount of $20,000 for the life insurance contract. Prudential contends that the payment of $20,000 was not a premium for insurance, but rather a fee paid to Bateman for his estate planning services. The record reflects that Dr. Stewart and Batemen met on August 31, 1999, to sign a Supplemental Application for insurance, and it was at that time that Dr. Stewart gave Batemen the $20,000 check. At the request of Dr. Stewart, Bateman wrote out the check for him to sign, writing on the For line the word fee, and making the check out to JMB Financial Group, Bateman's company. While Prudential contends that the $20,000 was a fee for Bateman's services to Dr. Stewart, there is no evidence on the record that Dr. Stewart had ever paid any other fee or any other amount of money to Bateman at anytime for his estate planning services or for any other reason. Moreover, there exists no documentary evidence with regard to the purpose of this payment. ¶ 52. Further, Prudential offered evidence of the terms of the application, which indicated that no premium could be submitted with the application because of Dr. Stewart's medical history, and therefore argues that the $20,000 check did not constitute consideration. It alleges that Bateman did not have the authority to accept premiums on the company's behalf before delivery of the policy and satisfaction of delivery requirements. ¶ 53. Again, considering the conflicting evidence, it is without question that a reasonable and fair-minded juror could have found that sufficient consideration existed to form a contract. More importantly, the jury heard all of the evidence from both parties and decided that a contract existed. Moreover, Prudential makes no argument that substantial evidence in support of its defense was not heard by the jury. Clearly, sufficient evidence was presented to support the jury's finding that a life insurance contract existed and that the award of compensatory damages was appropriate.