Opinion ID: 1960245
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: firearm possession: sufficiency of the evidence.

Text: Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions of the underlying offenses of possession of marijuana, methamphetamine, or drug paraphernalia. Constructive possession is a well-established principle in the criminal law of Kentucky, and we have held in several cases that a defendant may be convicted of drug possession or possession of drug paraphernalia even though the illegal drugs or paraphernalia were not within the defendant's actual possession. E.g., Young v. Commonwealth, Ky., 25 S.W.3d 66, 70 & n. 1 (2000). Appellant also does not argue that there was insufficient evidence that he possessed the firearm, itself. We held in Houston v. Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 925 (1998), that a drug violation penalty may be enhanced under KRS 218A.992 if the violator has constructive possession of a firearm. Id. at 927; see also Johnson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 90 S.W.3d 39, 42 (2002); Burnett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 31 S.W.3d 878, 881 (2000). Appellant challenges only whether the evidence supported a finding that there was a nexus, as required by KRS 218A.992 and Montaque, supra , between the pistol and his possession of the marijuana, methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia. Montaque, supra , is our guidepost for when the Commonwealth must prove a nexus pursuant to KRS 218A.992. [W]henever it is established that a defendant was in actual possession of a firearm when arrested, or that a defendant had constructive possession of a firearm within his or her immediate control when arrested, then ... the Commonwealth should not have to prove any connection between the offense and the possession for the sentence enhancement to be applicable .... [W]hen it cannot be established that the defendant was in actual possession of a firearm or that a firearm was within his or her immediate control upon arrest, the Commonwealth must prove more than mere possession. It must prove some connection between the firearm possession and the crime. 23 S.W.3d at 632-33 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Under Montaque , if the defendant had constructive possession of a firearm and the firearm was within his immediate control when he was arrested, no further proof of a nexus need be shown. [1] Appellant claims that the firearm was not within his immediate control when he was arrested because he was arrested outside the residence whereas the firearm was in the living room. Nevertheless, the undisputed evidence was that Appellant was found and his person was seized in his living room. Deputy Sheriff Gregory Clark testified that Appellant was in the living room when he arrived with the warrant. Clark escorted Appellant outside only because Clark was being attacked by Appellant's dog. Once Appellant had secured the dog, Clark searched Appellant and handcuffed him. Appellant's daughter confirmed that Appellant was sitting on a stool in the living room when the officers arrived. Although another deputy, Norman Payton, testified that he first saw Appellant outside the house, Payton's testimony merely showed that he did not arrive until after Clark had escorted Appellant out of the house. See Jordan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 74 S.W.3d 263, 266 (2002) (For the purpose of ruling on [a motion for a directed verdict], the trial court must assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to such testimony.). Since the pistol was also found in the living room, Appellant was in the same room as the firearm at the time of his actual detention. The search video, which was shown to the jury as discussed infra, indicates that the living room was not so large as to render the firearm not readily available to Appellant. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (construing the area within a defendant's immediate control as the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.). The gun was loaded and under a chair in the same room as Appellant. Id.; cf. United States v. Mackey, 265 F.3d 457, 462 (6th Cir.2001) (In order for the possession to be in furtherance of a drug crime, the firearm must be strategically located so that it is quickly and easily available for use.). Thus, the firearm was within Appellant's immediate control when he was arrested. See Chimel, supra, at 763, 89 S.Ct. at 2040 (any room other than that in which an arrest occurs would not necessarily be within the defendant's immediate control (emphasis added)); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2864, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981) (entire interior of a vehicle and all containers therein were within defendant's immediate control); Collins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 574 S.W.2d 296, 298 (1978) (air conditioner which was four to seven feet from defendant's position in the motel room was within his immediate control); see also United States v. Williams, 104 F.3d 213, 215 (8th Cir.1997) (noting that there are numerous cases in which a nexus was found when weapons and drugs were located in different rooms within a residence, but were found to be readily available during the drug transactions.). Accordingly, under Montaque , the Commonwealth was not required to introduce additional proof of a nexus between the firearm and the drugs and drug paraphernalia that defendant admits were within his constructive possession.