Opinion ID: 2633881
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Pretrial Motion to Exclude Defendant's Confessions

Text: As mentioned above, defendant participated in a series of eight interviews with representatives of law enforcement after he was arrested: the first three with officers from the Placer County Sheriffs Department regarding the murders of Garcia and Sorensen; the next two with officers from the Sacramento County Sheriffs Department regarding other murders they were investigating that had similarities to the Garcia and Sorensen cases; one interview with officers from the City of Sacramento Police Department regarding the Lactawen murder; another interview with Sacramento County Sheriffs officers; and finally an interview with Dr. Irwin Lyons, a psychiatrist who was evaluating defendant on behalf of the district attorney's office. Defendant was advised repeatedly of his Miranda rights, waived those rights, and agreed to talk. Nonetheless, he moved before trial to suppress the statements he made to the officers as involuntary and as obtained in violation of Miranda, on the ground the waivers were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. The trial court, conducting a hearing at which several officers testified, found the waivers valid and the statements voluntary. Defendant's motion later was expanded to include the statements he made to Dr. Lyons, and a second pretrial hearing was held at which Dr. Lyons, various peace officers, and defendant testified. [9] In light of the new testimony offered, the trial court reconsidered its earlier ruling on the admissibility of the statements made to the officers, but again found that all of the statements, including those made to Dr. Lyons, were voluntary and that defendant's Miranda waivers were valid. Critical to the trial court's decision were its findings that (1) although the Sacramento County officers made some representations to defendant about possible leniency and psychological treatment, these statements were not specific promises but were statements of the generalized benefit to be gained by speaking; (2) these representations were not the cause of defendant's decision to make the statements; and (3) defendant never invoked his right to remain silent or to the assistance of counsel, even though he once asked the Sacramento County officers to stop questioning him, and mentioned an attorney during the interview with Dr. Lyons. During the guilt phase of the trial, over defendant's renewed objection, a Placer County officer testified concerning defendant's confessions to the Garcia and Sorensen murders. At the penalty phase, again over renewed objection, tape recordings of defendant's confessions to the Lactawen murder were played to the jury, and Dr. Lyons testified concerning defendant's confessions. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by not suppressing his statements. We are not persuaded. The admission at trial of a defendant's statements made involuntarily to government officials violates the defendant's federal due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. ( Dickerson v. United States (2000) 530 U.S. 428, 433-434, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 ( Dickerson ).) Similarly, a defendant must be advised of his or her Miranda rights, and must make a valid waiver of these rights, before questioning begins or any statements resulting from interrogation can be admitted. ( Id. at p. 435, 120 S.Ct. 2326; Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602.) When a defendant challenges the admission of his or her statements on the ground they were involuntarily made, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the statements were, in fact, voluntary. ( People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1093, 40 Cal. Rptr.3d 118, 129 P.3d 321 ( Guerra ).) A statement is involuntary if it is not `the product of a rational intellect and a free will.' ( Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 398, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 ( Mincey ).) The court in making a voluntariness determination examines `whether a defendant's will was overborne' by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession. ( Dickerson, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 434, 120 S.Ct. 2326.) Coercive police tactics by themselves do not render a defendant's statements involuntary if the defendant's free will was not in fact overborne by the coercion and his decision to speak instead was based upon some other consideration. ( Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 ( Connelly) ; People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 404-405, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1 ( Maury ).) The determination whether the authorities improperly coerced a defendant's statements involves an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the interrogation and the circumstances relating to the particular defendant. ( Dickerson, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 434,120 S.Ct. 2326.) The same inquiry applies when a court evaluates the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver. ( Connelly, supra, 479 U.S. at pp. 169-170, 107 S.Ct. 515.) Such a waiver must be knowingly and intelligently made, meaning that the defendant must have been capable of freely and rationally choosing to waive his or her rights and speak with the officers. ( People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 988, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183 ( Frye ). ) Even if a defendant voluntarily has waived his or her Miranda rights to remain silent and to have counsel present, the defendant later may revoke the waiver. In such a case, once a defendant has indicated an intent to assert his right to remain silent or to counsel, all further attempts at police interrogation should cease. ( People v. Jennings (1988) 46 Cal.3d 963, 977, 251 Cal.Rptr. 278, 760 P.2d 475.) In order to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege after it has been waived, and in order to halt police questioning after it has begun, the suspect 'must unambiguously ' assert his right to silence or counsel. ( Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 ( Davis ), italics added.) It is not enough for a reasonable police officer to understand that the suspect might be invoking his rights. ( Ibid. ) Faced with an ambiguous or equivocal statement, law enforcement officers are not required under Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, either to ask clarifying questions or to cease questioning altogether. ( Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 459-462, 114 S.Ct. 2350.) ( People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 535, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 182 ( Stitely ).) A defendant has not invoked his or her right to silence when the defendant's statements were merely expressions of passing frustration or animosity toward the officers, or amounted only to a refusal to discuss a particular subject covered by the questioning. ( Ibid.; Jennings, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 978, 251 Cal.Rptr. 278, 760 P.2d 475; People v. Silva (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604, 629-630, 247 Cal.Rptr. 573, 754 P.2d 1070; see also Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 473-74, 86 S.Ct. 1602.) On appeal, we review independently the trial court's legal determinations of whether a defendant's statements were voluntary ( Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1093, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, 129 P.3d 321), whether his Miranda waivers were knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made ( People v. Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 172, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 852 P.2d 331 ( Mayfield )), and whether his later actions constituted an invocation of his right to silence ( People v. Gonzalez (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1111, 1125, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 295, 104 P.3d 98). We evaluate the trial court's factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the defendant's statements and waivers, and `accept the trial court's resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if supported by substantial evidence.' ( Ibid.; Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 1092-1093, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d. 118, 129 P.3d 321.)
Defendant first contends he invoked his right to remain silent at the conclusion of the first interview with the Placer County officers at the Carson City jail when he told them he wanted to stop the interview because he had a headache and wished to return to his cell. Defendant never raised this claim in the trial court. He filed only a generic written motion requesting the suppression of all statements made to the authorities, without any discussion of which particular grounds for suppression existed; indeed, his attorney conceded after the first suppression hearing that there was no basis to challenge the admission of the statements made by defendant to Placer County officers on grounds of involuntariness, and never mentioned an invocation of the right to silence. No further testimony or argument regarding an invocation of the right to remain silent during the interviews conducted by the Placer County officers was offered at the second hearing, and the trial court made no finding regarding whether defendant invoked his right to silence at the conclusion of the first interview. Evidence Code section 353, subdivision (a) allows a judgment to be reversed because of erroneous admission of evidence only if an objection to the evidence or a motion to strike it was `timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the objection.' Pursuant to this statute, `we have consistently held that the `defendant's failure to make a timely and specific objection' on the ground asserted on appeal makes that ground not cognizable. `[Citation.] ( People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 20, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229 ( Demetrulias). ) To satisfy Evidence Code section 353, subdivision (a), the objection or motion to strike must be both timely and specific as to its ground. An objection to evidence must generally be preserved by specific objection at the time the evidence is introduced; the opponent cannot make a `placeholder' objection stating general or incorrect grounds (e.g., `relevance') and revise the objection later in a motion to strike stating specific or different grounds. ( Id. at p. 22, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407,137 P.3d 229.) Thus, defendant's entirely generic motion to exclude all of his statements to law enforcement officers, coupled with the absence of specific argument that defendant had invoked his right to silence at the end of the first interview, failed to preserve this claim for appeal. [10] (See also People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 434-35, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765 ( Partida ).) Even if this claim had not been forfeited, it is without merit. Defendant's request to stop the interview at the Carson City jail was not an assertion of his right not to incriminate himself. Defendant already had confessed to the Garcia murder and provided the officers with a map showing where the body was located. Defendant had not expressed any reluctance to speak further about the murder before asking to stop the interview because he had a headache. Immediately after defendant asked to end the interview, the officers, in fact, stopped the questioning, and asked him only whether they could pose more questions during the next few days, .to which he answered, Yes. Defendant never testified during the suppression hearing that when he asked to stop the interview because he had a headache, he at that time had decided not to speak further with the officers at any future occasion concerning the crimes. In fact, defendant's testimony was to the contrary: that he always intended to cooperate with the authorities because he thought that's what you do. It is clear from this record that defendant did not invoke his right not to incriminate himself, but merely asked for a break from questioning. The statements made by defendant during the later session with the officers, including the questioning by the Sacramento officers, therefore were not the fruits of any constitutional violation resulting from the continued questioning of defendant after he asked for a temporary suspension of questioning for the night.
Defendant contends his confessions to the Lactawen murder, which were admitted at the penalty phase of the trial, should have been suppressed because they were the product of improper coercion by officers from the Sacramento County Sheriffs Department. We disagree. After defendant confessed to the Garcia and Sorensen murders, the Placer County officers contacted homicide investigators in the Sacramento County Sheriffs Department who were investigating a series of other murders of young women in the Interstate Highway 5 corridor in Sacramento County (the 1-5 murders). During the first interview with the Sacramento County officers, defendant denied any involvement in any murders other than the two to which he had confessed. In a second interview, defendant continued to deny involvement in the 1-5 murders but admitted having committed another murder, which turned out to be the Lactawen homicide. After defendant provided details of that incident, the officers realized the murder was under the jurisdiction of the City of Sacramento Police Department and contacted homicide officers in that agency. Those officers then conducted a third interview, during which defendant provided more details of the Lactawen murder. [11] These interviews were tape-recorded, and a redacted recording of the second interview, with references to the 1-5 murders excised, was played to the jury along with a recording of the third interview. Defendant argues these recorded statements were involuntary, and thus improperly admitted, because his will was overborne when the Sacramento County officers, during their second interview, threatened to withhold psychiatric treatment if defendant did not confess, promised him leniency and treatment if he did confess, and predicted defendant's mental difficulties would seriously worsen if he did not talk but would lessen if he did. The trial court found the officers did make inducements but their statements did not extend beyond suggestions defendant would realize some generalized benefit by speaking. More significantly, the court found the representations that were made were not the cause of defendant's decision to make the statements. Rather, the trial court concluded, defendant chose to confess because of his preexisting belief that that's what you did and his desire to unburden himself. On appeal, defendant argues primarily that the trial court erred by finding that the actions of the officers did not constitute improper coercion. We need not resolve that question. Even assumingwithout decidingthe statements made to defendant might constitute improper promises or threats under some circumstances, we conclude the trial court did not err by finding that a preponderance of the evidence in this case established defendant's decision to confess to the Lactawen murder was voluntary and was completely separate and apart from any apparent inducements that [the officers] might have given to him. (See Connelly, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 167, 107 S.Ct. 515; Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 404-405, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1.) Defendant's challenge to the trial court's finding of a lack of causation centers on the circumstance that his confession to the Lactawen murder followed close in time to when the officers made their representations in attempting to convince him to talk. He argues, relying upon the Court of Appeal's decision in People v: Cahill (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 296, 316, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, that there is a rebuttable presumption, his confession resulted from the representations, because of their temporal proximity. Assuming, without deciding, defendant's reading of People v. Cahill, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th 296, 28 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, is a correct statement of the law, [12] we nonetheless conclude the totality of the circumstances in this case establishes defendant's confession was not the product of the representations made by the officers. First, the tape-recorded statements upon which defendant relies were made after defendant had admitted committing a third murder. As the officer testified at the suppression hearing, the first interview conducted by the Sacramento County officers concerning the 1-5 murders was unproductive. The officers then returned a few minutes later with their supervisor, who covered a lot of the ground [they] had already talked about ... and got the same sort of denials that [they] had earlier encountered. Approximately 27 minutes into the second interview, defendant told the officers he had not committed any of the killings about which they were questioning him, but had committed another murder. It was at this point that the tape recorder was turned on. Although this tape recording begins with the officers discussing possible benefits defendant might receive by telling the officers about the murder, defendant's initial admission obviously came before those particular statements. Indeed, defendant testified at the hearing that the first time the Sacramento County officers mentioned obtaining help for him was when an officer made a statement about another murderer who supposedly was placed in a prison psychiatric facilitya statement found more than one minute into the tape (that is, after defendant had admitted committing another murder). There was no testimony at the suppression hearing concerning any promise, threat, or other inducement having been made before the tape recorder was turned on. Thus, the record does not contain evidence suggesting the officers made any representations before defendant confessed to the Lactawen murder, although defendant, apparently, had not yet supplied them with the details. Second, as the trial court observed, it appears from statements made by defendant during the interviews that he never believed he would receive the benefits discussed by the officers. Despite their statements that defendant could receive help if he talked, he repeatedly expressed his belief that even if he spoke to them he would be sent to prison, forgotten about, and receive no help. He continued to voice this belief even after providing the details of the murder. At no point during the interview did defendant explicitly state or even imply that he had been convinced otherwise. Although defendant testified at the suppression hearing that he believed, even before speaking to the authorities, he would receive help from them, this after-the-fact, self-serving testimony is directly contradicted by the prior contemporaneous expressions of his state of mind: that he would not receive any help, but instead would be sent to prison and forgotten. [13] In fact, on cross-examination, defendant testified he told the officers during the interviews he would not be offered a beneficial deal because the way the people were cussing at me and stuff out in the booking room, I figured it was over. [14] Third, defendant's own testimony at the suppression hearing established that his decision to confess to the three murders was based upon his own preexisting personal belief that a person should cooperate with the authorities and tell them what he knows about a crime, completely separate from any representations made by the officers. On direct examination, when asked about his Miranda waivers, defendant said, I figured I had to cooperate. I always did before. When I got in trouble in Idaho, I did it then. On cross-examination and redirect examination, defendant reiterated many times his belief that confessing is what you do when you are caught by the law. Indeed, the trial court examined defendant briefly, specifically asking him: When you say you felt you had to cooperate with [the officers], that was something you felt from before this ever started and you believed that all the way through? Defendant responded, Yes, because you tell them what you know. [15] In addition, the circumstance that defendant had confessed to the Placer County officers concerning two murders, although those officers had not given any inducements, is further evidence of his state of mind concerning his willingness to admit his role in the Lactawen murder regardless of any representation made by the Sacramento County officers. In sum, there is ample evidence supporting the conclusion that defendant's decision to confess to the Lactawen murder was not the product of any coercive tactic by the officers, but rather was based upon defendant's free will and his preexisting belief that when questioned by the authorities, a person should tell what he knows. This evidence substantially outweighs any implication arising from defendant's decision to confess to the Lactawen murder a relatively short time after the officers made their representations about defendant receiving helpthe primary circumstance cited by defendant in support of his claim of error. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress these statements.
Defendant challenges the admission of Dr. Lyons's testimony regarding statements made by defendant during the interview conducted in the Placer County jail soon after his arrest. Defendant contends these statements should have been excluded on the ground the waiver of his Miranda right to remain silent was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, because his preoccupation with receiving psychological treatment rendered him unable to appreciate the circumstance that Dr. Lyons was acting on behalf of the prosecution. Defendant also claims his statements were involuntary because they were the product of the prosecution's highly disturbing practice of sending a psychiatrist to visit a mentally disturbed defendant. Defendant never raised these specific claims below, and the trial court accordingly made no finding on these issues. [16] The only issues raised and addressed by the trial court in this regard were whether defendant had invoked his right to silence at the conclusion of the interview with the Sacramento County officers immediately prior to Dr. Lyons's interview, and whether defendant invoked his right to counsel during Dr. Lyons's interview. [17] Defendant does not renew those issues on appeal, and therefore they are waived. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [former rule 14(a)(1)(B)]; People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 846, fn. 9, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 420, 94 P.3d 551.) The claims he does raise regarding his statements to Dr. Lyons are forfeited. ( Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 22, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229.) Even if they were not forfeited, defendant's claims that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights and that his waivers and statements to Dr. Lyons were involuntary would fail, because there is no evidence supporting them. To the contrary, Dr. Lyons testified in detail concerning his giving defendant the Miranda advisements, including informing defendant that Lyons had been appointed by the district attorney and might testify against defendant at trial, and that his purpose in meeting with defendant was not to provide him with medical or psychiatric treatment. Dr. Lyons testified defendant stated that he understood his rights and Dr. Lyons's role before agreeing to speak to Dr. Lyons. Defendant repeatedly and emphatically stated he wished to speak to Dr. Lyons despite Lyons's potentially adverse role in the case. Throughout the interview, defendant appeared to understand Dr. Lyons's questions and was able to communicate. [18] Moreover, defendant testified he generally realized from the various Miranda advisements he received that what he said would be used in court, and although he testified he believed he would receive help from the authorities, he never stated his own thinking was so affected by his desire for help that he did not understand the implications of speaking with Dr. Lyons or felt unable to exercise his free will to refuse to do so. Although defendant's answers on cross-examination were somewhat evasive, defendant, when asked whether he realized his statements to Dr. Lyons might be used against him answered, I didn't know what extent he would, no. When specifically asked whether he voluntarily spoke with Dr. Lyons about his crimes, defendant answered, Yes. That's what his job was. He wanted to know my state of mind, how I felt about the crimes. It was not until defendant was asked somewhat leading questions on redirect examination that he testified his principal motivation for speaking to Dr. Lyons was his desire to receive help from him. Even if this claim is true, it does not establish that defendant's decision to speak with Dr. Lyons was the result of any coercive activity by Dr. Lyons, as opposed to defendant's internal beliefs and desires. Defendant argues on appeal, however, that the very circumstances of the interview were improperly coercive, because prior to meeting Dr. Lyons, the officers had told defendant they had arranged for psychological help for him. This argument, however, is refuted by the evidence in the record. Dr. Lyons testified he repeatedly told defendant he was not meeting with him to provide psychiatric help, and defendant, in fact, understood this and did not expect help from Dr. Lyons, but rather expressed his desire for future psychological help in a general sense. Thus, any misapprehension defendant initially may have had regarding Dr. Lyons's role and what defendant might gain from speaking with him would have been dispelled during the interview. There is no evidence in the record supporting defendant's claim that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights before speaking with Dr. Lyons, or that his statements were otherwise involuntary because of improper coercion.
Defendant makes an additional claim on appeal that was not raised below: he asserts his statements to the officers concerning the Lactawen murder and to Dr. Lyons were involuntary because of the extensiveness of the interrogations. Defendant stresses the total amount of time he was interrogated on the day he was transferred from Nevada to California. (See Mincey, supra, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290; Spano v. New York (1959) 360 U.S. 315, 322, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265.) Again, this claim was not raised or addressed in the trial court and therefore is forfeited. ( Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 22, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229.) Additionally, even if not forfeited, this claim is without merit. Unlike the situations in Mincey and Spano, here there was no single interview that lasted many hours, ultimately resulting in a confession after the defendant earlier had refused to speak. (See Mincey, supra, 437 U.S. at p. 401, 98 S.Ct. 2408 [four-hour interrogation of a seriously and painfully wounded man on the edge of consciousness that stopped only during those periods when he was unconscious]; Spano, supra, 360 U.S. at p. 322, 79 S.Ct. 1202 [eight-hour interrogation at night with only one break while defendant was moved to a new location for further questioning].) Rather, there was a series of relatively short interviews by various officers about different crimes, often with significant breaks in between, including the first night after his arrest and a dinner break the next day when he arrived at the Placer County jail. Even during the first two interviews with officers from the Sacramento County Sheriffs Department, which were separated by only a few minutes, defendant admitted to the Lactawen killing after less than one hour of questioning in total. There simply is no evidence in the record, including the tape-recorded statements and defendant's testimony at the suppression hearing, suggesting that the authorities exploited the slowly mounting fatigue resulting from prolonged questioning, or that such fatigue occurred or played any role in defendant's decision to confess. (Compare Spano, supra, 360 U.S. at p. 322, 79 S.Ct. 1202.)