Opinion ID: 808185
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: NMFS complied with NEPA.

Text: 20 and 21 and in a single EIS. The plaintiffs argue that a single EIS was required for Amendments 20 and 21 under two NEPA regulations: 40 10774 PACIFIC COAST FEDERATION v. BLANK C.F.R. §§ 1502.4(a) and 1508.25(a)(1). Section 1502.4(a) states that “[p]roposals or parts of proposals which are related to each other closely enough to be, in effect, a single course of action shall be evaluated in a single impact statement.” Section 1508.25(a)(1), meanwhile, directs agencies to study “connected actions” in “the same impact statement,” and sets forth criteria for determining whether actions are “connected.” [8] As an initial matter, the plaintiffs argue that a single EIS was separately required under both sections. However, § 1502.4(a) does not impose an independent test for determining when to study related actions in a single EIS. Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. BLM, 387 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2004). Rather, as the section’s full language makes clear, it directs agencies to § 1508.25 to make that determination: Agencies shall make sure the proposal which is the subject of an environmental impact statement is properly defined. Agencies shall use the criteria for scope (§ 1508.25) to determine which proposal(s) shall be the subject of a particular statement. Proposals or parts of proposals which are related to each other closely enough to be, in effect, a single course of action shall be evaluated in a single impact statement. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(a) (emphasis added). Thus, whether an agency must prepare a single EIS for more than one proposal turns on the criteria set forth in § 1508.25.12 12 This conclusion is not undermined by dictum in Native Ecosystems Council v. Dombeck, 304 F.3d 886, 893 (9th Cir. 2002), that “[a] single NEPA review document is required for distinct projects when there is a single proposal governing the projects, [citation], or when the projects are ‘connected,’ ‘cumulative,’ or ‘similar’ actions under the regulations implementing NEPA.” (Emphasis added.) Both Native Ecosystems Council and the case it cites, Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 399, 410 (1976), were concerned with whether an EIS was required for nonexistent proPACIFIC COAST FEDERATION v. BLANK 10775 [9] Turning to those criteria, the plaintiffs argue that Amendments 20 and 21 are “connected” actions. Actions are “connected” if they: (i) Automatically trigger other actions which may require environmental impact statements. (ii) Cannot or will not proceed unless other actions are taken previously or simultaneously. (iii) Are interdependent parts of a larger action and depend on the larger action for their justification. Id. § 1508.25(a)(1). By contrast, “[w]hen one of the projects might reasonably have been completed without the existence of the other, the two projects have independent utility and are not ‘connected’ for NEPA’s purposes.” Great Basin Mine Watch v. Hankins, 456 F.3d 955, 969 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The crux of the [independent utility] test is whether each of two projects would have taken place with or without the other . . . .”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). [10] Amendments 20 and 21 have independent utility, and thus are not connected actions under § 1508.25(a)(1). First, the two amendments have overlapping, but not co-extensive, goals. Whereas Amendment 20’s goals are to increase net economic benefits, maximize allowable trawl harvests, consider environmental impacts, and improve individual accountgrammatic proposals, not whether two or more existing proposals were a “single course of action.” In any event, we have since reaffirmed that § 1502.4(a) “directs the agency to use the ‘scoping’ provisions contained in 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25 to determine whether nominally separate proposals are a ‘single course of action.’ ” Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr., 387 F.3d at 998; cf. Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 351 F.3d 1291, 1306 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that Ninth Circuit case law requires “the preparation of a comprehensive EIS only for cumulative and connected actions,” not “similar” actions). 10776 PACIFIC COAST FEDERATION v. BLANK ability of catch and bycatch, Amendment 21’s goals are to simplify allocation decisions, support Amendment 20, and limit Pacific halibut bycatch. Similarly, whereas Amendment 20 is limited to trawling, Amendment 21 allocates catch limits between trawl and non-trawl sectors. While it is true the record is replete with statements about how Amendments 20 and 21 are linked, two actions are not connected simply because they benefit each other or the environment. See Nw. Res. Info. Ctr. v. NMFS, 56 F.3d 1060, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 1995) (two actions were not connected merely because they both would benefit salmon); Sylvester v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 884 F.2d 394, 400 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[E]ach [action] could exist without the other, although each would benefit from the other’s presence.”). Perhaps more important than parsing NMFS’s words or predicting whether it would adopt one Amendment without the other is answering the question whether, in preparing separate EISs, NMFS evaded its duty to fully study the combined effects of Amendments 20 and 21. This is the real concern behind § 1508.25. See Great Basin Mine Watch, 456 F.3d at 969 (“The purpose of this requirement is to prevent an agency from dividing a project into multiple ‘actions,’ each of which individually has an insignificant environmental impact, but which collectively have a substantial impact.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); W. Radio Servs. Co. v. Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that NEPA prevents an agency from “illegally segmenting projects in order to avoid consideration of an entire action’s effects on the environment”) (citing Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding connected actions under § 1508.25)). [11] This “divide and conquer” concern is not present here. NMFS prepared lengthy EISs that thoroughly studied the direct, indirect, and cumulative effects of Amendments 20 and 21, individually and together. The plaintiffs nonetheless argue that studying the two Amendments in separate EISs allowed PACIFIC COAST FEDERATION v. BLANK 10777 NMFS to “dismiss public comments . . . on the basis that they were made on the wrong EIS or were outside the scope of the particular amendment.” However, the plaintiffs’ record citations, and indeed the record as a whole, show just the opposite: NMFS clarified what each amendment did and substantively addressed the misdirected comment or referred the reader to the appropriate EIS, where those issues were always addressed. NMFS’s decision to prepare two amendments, and hence two EISs, did not undermine its compliance with NEPA. 2. NMFS studied a reasonable range of alternatives. [12] NEPA requires an agency to study a range of reasonable alternatives to the proposed action. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.1, 1502.14, 1502.16; Westlands Water Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 376 F.3d 853, 865 (9th Cir. 2004). The alternatives analysis is the “heart” of an EIS. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 623 F.3d 633, 642 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). We “review an agency’s range of alternatives under a ‘rule of reason’ standard that requires an agency to set forth only those alternatives necessary to permit a reasoned choice.” Presidio Golf Club v. Nat’l Park Serv., 155 F.3d 1153, 1160 (9th Cir. 1998) (quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted); see also N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. Kempthorne, 457 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Under NEPA, ‘an agency’s consideration of alternatives is sufficient if it considers an appropriate range of alternatives, even if it does not consider every available alternative.’ ” (quoting Headwaters, Inc. v. BLM, 914 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1990))).13 13 The Supreme Court has made clear that “inherent in NEPA and its implementing regulations is a ‘rule of reason.’ ” Dep’t of Transp. v Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004); see also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 551 (1976) (“Common sense also teaches us that the ‘detailed statement of alternatives’ cannot be found wanting simply because the agency failed to include every alternative device and thought conceivable by the mind of man.”). 10778 PACIFIC COAST FEDERATION v. BLANK [13] In this case, NMFS studied enough alternatives “to permit a reasoned choice.” In Chapter 2 of the Amendment 20 EIS, NMFS studied in detail seven alternatives (four primary alternatives, two of which had sub-alternatives). These alternatives varied in many respects, ranging from how they managed catch, initially allocated privileges, and treated processors to the accumulation limits they set and the species they covered. The alternatives’ most important difference was their “catch control tool”; whereas the “no action” or “status quo” alternative would have used trip and seasonal limits, the other alternatives proposed various types of quota systems or cooperatives. For Amendment 21, NMFS studied six alternatives in detail, which differed primarily based on how they allocated groundfish stocks among different sectors. The plaintiffs object that NMFS considered only quota programs in the Amendment 20 EIS, “with no variations at all from NMFS’s initial proposal (such as community shares, auctions, limited term shares, etc.).” In the plaintiffs’ view, NMFS was required to “embrace the range of options an agency can lawfully pursue under its substantive mandates.” This argument fails as a matter of law and a matter of fact. “An agency need not . . . discuss alternatives similar to alternatives actually considered, or alternatives which are ‘infeasible, ineffective, or inconsistent with the basic policy objectives’ ” of the project. N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr., 457 F.3d at 978 (quotation omitted); Westlands Water Dist., 376 F.3d at 868, 871. NMFS identified Amendment 20’s “purpose and need” as providing a trawl rationalization program that would improve economic efficiency and stability, consider environmental impacts, and reduce bycatch through individual accountability. NMFS reasonably determined that quota programs would be most effective in meeting these goals for most sectors, but it studied alternatives that differed in how those programs would be designed and implemented.14 These 14 Because project alternatives are based on an EIS’s “purpose and need,” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.13, an agency’s alternatives analysis may be PACIFIC COAST FEDERATION v. BLANK 10779 alternatives allowed NMFS to fully vet the consequences of its actions. Moreover, NMFS did consider catch control tools besides quotas. Most obviously, NMFS studied in detail a “no action” alternative that would have used trip and seasonal limits (the Pacific Council’s current management tools) in place of quotas. NMFS also studied in detail three alternatives that would have used cooperatives rather than quotas, although only for sectors not at issue in this litigation. NMFS also briefly considered and rejected auctions, performance-based allocations, and area-based management. NEPA permits agencies to eliminate alternatives from detailed analysis so long as they “briefly discuss the reasons for their having been eliminated.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a). As for Amendment 21, the plaintiffs complain that NMFS studied alternatives that uniformly were based on recent catch inadequate if it draws its purpose and need statement too narrowly, Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. BLM, 606 F.3d 1058, 1070-72 (9th Cir. 2009). Only amicus Food & Water Watch argues that NMFS committed this error here; the plaintiffs do not raise this issue except in their reply brief, and then only tersely. See Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1022 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e decline to consider an argument raised only by [amicus] on appeal.” (alteration in Simmons) (quotation marks and citation omitted)); Turtle Island Restoration Network v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 672 F.3d 1160, 1166 n.8 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A]rguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). Even if this issue were properly before us, we would conclude that NMFS drafted reasonable statements of purpose and need for Amendments 20 and 21. See Friends of Southeast’s Future v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 1059, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining that “this court has afforded agencies considerable discretion to define the purpose and need of a project,” and accordingly reviews such a statement for reasonableness). NMFS’s statements sought to further MSA-compliant management goals and were not so narrow as to leave only one viable alternative. See Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n, 606 F.3d at 1070; City of Carmel-By-TheSea, v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 123 F.3d 1142, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 1997). 10780 PACIFIC COAST FEDERATION v. BLANK histories, with only “minor variations in the allocation methodology.” As with Amendment 20, the plaintiffs overlook Amendment 21’s purpose and need, which was to simplify management decisions by making fixed allocations, support trawl rationalization by eliminating the uncertainty of biennial allocations, and limit Pacific halibut bycatch. Thus, while the alternatives take the similar approach of making fixed allocations for certain stocks, they differ materially in how they would make those allocations—i.e., based on recent total catch percentages for some or all sectors, on historical landed catch for some sectors, or on recent catch with carve-outs for certain species. These material differences allowed NMFS to thoroughly study the potential consequences of its action. Finally, the plaintiffs contend that NMFS’s decision was predetermined because NMFS “had selected all of the key features of their proposed trawl [quota] Program by September 2006,” before NMFS prepared the EISs. The plaintiffs are incorrect. NMFS identified preferred alternatives at various points in the NEPA process, just as NEPA requires. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(e); see also Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 2000) (“NEPA does not require that agency officials be ‘subjectively impartial,’ ” only that “projects be objectively evaluated.” (citation omitted)). However, NMFS did not select alternatives until the conclusion of the NEPA process. The planning and evaluation for Amendments 20 and 21 took seven years, during which time NMFS appropriately winnowed its options. 3. NMFS adequately evaluated impacts on fish habitat and non-trawl fishing communities. [14] An EIS must contain “a reasonably thorough discussion of the significant aspects of the probable environmental consequences” of a proposed action. City of Carmel-By-TheSea, 123 F.3d at 1150 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Alternatively phrased, we review agency decisions to ensure that ‘the agency has taken a “hard look” at the potential enviPACIFIC COAST FEDERATION v. BLANK 10781 ronmental consequences of the proposed action.’ ” Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. NMFS, 460 F.3d 1125, 1133 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr., 387 F.3d at 993). Excluding appendices, the Amendment 20 and 21 EISs contain 384 and 102 pages of detailed effects analysis, respectively. The plaintiffs nonetheless complain that this analysis is inadequate because it focuses mostly on socioeconomic impacts; only a small portion is devoted to the Amendments’ environmental effects, and an even smaller portion to the Amendments’ effects on groundfish habitat specifically. In the plaintiffs’ view, NEPA requires more, especially since the Amendments will, in their view, “ensure the long-term domination of trawling” in the fishery and trawling is harder on fish habitat than fishing using fixed gear. [15] The plaintiffs are incorrect. Amendments 20 and 21 will not necessarily favor trawling over fixed gear relative to current management. The EISs explain that trawling is permitted under the existing fishery management plan and is responsible for the majority of the catch. Amendments 20 and 21 may actually decrease trawling’s dominance by consolidating the trawling fleet, allowing trawlers to switch to fixed gear, and allocating more fish to non-trawlers than they have caught in recent years. NMFS will re-evaluate Amendment 21’s allocations every five years. The record is candid that the effects of Amendments 20 and 21 on groundfish habitat are less conclusive. The Amendment 20 EIS discusses “general shifts in fishing location [that] would translate to either an increase or decrease of trawling in certain areas.” Rationalization would allow for shifts between trawl gear and fixed gear. Although fixed gear “is thought to be less destructive to bottom habitat” than trawl gear, and therefore could “reduce the impacts to habitat that is currently trawled,” that switch also could aggravate adverse impacts by exposing currently-untrawled areas to fishing. The EIS supports this discussion with modeling, incorporates by 10782 PACIFIC COAST FEDERATION v. BLANK reference, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 1502.21, a previous comparative analysis of the effects of different types of gear on fish habitat, and refers readers to Amendment 19, which was specifically aimed at protecting fish habitat. See 71 Fed. Reg. 27,408 (May 11, 2006) (codified, as amended, at 50 C.F.R. pt. 660). As for Amendment 21, NMFS explained that it would “not provide more bottom trawl opportunity than status quo management measures and allocations,” and in fact would provide higher non-trawl allocations for most species than the status quo or any other alternative. Thus, even if trawl gear has more impacts than fixed gear on fish habitat, “potential adverse impacts from trawl gear could be expected to be lower under the proposed action than under” current management or other alternatives. These discussions may be less robust than the discussions of socioeconomic effects, but NEPA only requires agencies to discuss impacts “in proportion to their significance.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2(b). The plaintiffs’ two remaining arguments lack merit. First, the Amendment 20 and 21 EISs extensively discuss potential effects on non-trawl communities. While the plaintiffs point specifically to the non-trawl community of Port Orford, Oregon, the Amendment 20 EIS at least mentions that community at several points, and the plaintiffs make no showing that the EISs’ more general discussion of non-trawl communities does not apply to Port Orford. Second, in arguing that NMFS failed to adequately study the impacts of trawling on groundfish habitat, the plaintiffs contend that NMFS also failed to comply with MSA National Standard 2, which provides that “[c]onservation and management measures shall be based upon the best scientific information available,” 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2), and with various other “action forcing” National Standards that promote conservation, see id. § 1851(a)(1), (4), (5), (9). NMFS, however, explained why Amendments 20 and 21 comply with each of PACIFIC COAST FEDERATION v. BLANK 10783 the National Standards; disclosed the potential impacts of trawling on habitat and identified uncertainty where it exists; and ultimately settled on amendments that promote conservation by posting observers on all boats, improving economic efficiency and individual accountability, and reducing bycatch.15 4. MNMFS adequately considered mitigation. [16] NEPA’s implementing regulations require agencies to discuss potential mitigation measures in their EISs and decision documents. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.14(f), 1502.16(e)-(h), 1505.2(c), 1508.25(b)(3); see also id. § 1508.20 (defining “mitigation”). Mitigation must “be discussed in sufficient detail to ensure that environmental consequences have been fairly evaluated.” Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. at 353. Such discussion necessarily includes “an assessment of whether the proposed mitigation measures can be effec15 The National Standards, and the MSA more generally, require NMFS to balance conservation with yield, not favor one at the expense of the other. See Alliance Against IFQs v. Brown, 84 F.3d 343, 349 (9th Cir. 1996) (observing this “tension” in the Standards). As NMFS explained, As management needs arise, the Council and NMFS respond to them. Amendment 19 established extensive protections for habitat. Amendment 20 maintains those protections while specifically addressing a separate management need for rationalization as described in the purpose and needs statement. While [fishery management plan] amendments must comply with the broad array of policy objectives in the MSA’s National Standards and within the FMP, not every [plan] amendment will thoroughly address every management need in the fishery simultaneously. NMFS and the Council will continue to review the best available information regarding habitat needs and develop additional management measures if necessary and appropriate. Cf. Nw. Res. Info. Ctr., 56 F.3d at 1069 (“[W]e . . . cannot force an agency to aggregate diverse actions to the point where problems must be tackled from every angle at once. To do so risks further paralysis of agency decisionmaking.”). 10784 PACIFIC COAST FEDERATION v. BLANK tive.” S. Fork Band Council of W. Shoshone of Nev. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 588 F.3d 718, 727 (9th Cir. 2009). Amendment 20 contains two primary mitigation features. The first is an “adaptive management program” under which up to ten percent of the quota shares each year will be set aside to address unforeseen effects, such as harm to fishing communities and barriers to entry for new participants. In the record, NMFS discussed, but did not adopt, criteria for deciding when and how to allocate these reserve shares, and stated that shares not used for adaptive management would be proportionally distributed to privilege holders. The second mitigation feature is a quadrennial review to make sure the program is meeting its goals, with the first review occurring five years after program implementation. The review process includes a community advisory committee. Amendment 20 also contains other measures expected to meaningfully reduce the impacts of trawl rationalization on fishing communities, such as caps on the accumulation of quota shares and an initial two-year moratorium on transferring shares. Amendment 21 contains a five-year review provision, but no other mitigation. [17] The plaintiffs argue that these mitigation measures are vague, uncertain, and inadequate. However, we previously have found reasonably detailed mitigation evaluations like the ones at issue here to be sufficient. See, e.g., Okanogan Highlands Alliance v. Williams, 236 F.3d 468, 476-77 (9th Cir. 2000); City of Carmel-by-the-Sea, 123 F.3d at 1154; see also Tillamook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 288 F.3d 1140, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002) (“While the [agency] was required to develop the proposed mitigation measures ‘to a reasonable degree,’ it was not required to develop a complete mitigation plan detailing the ‘precise nature . . . of the mitigation measures.’ ” (quoting Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1121))). The plaintiffs also argue that there is no assurance that adaptive management reserve shares will be allocated to fishing communities. However, an “assurance” that a particuPACIFIC COAST FEDERATION v. BLANK 10785 lar number of privileges will go to a particular purpose at a particular time is not only inconsistent with the notion of “adaptive management,” it is not required by NEPA: “a mitigation plan need not be legally enforceable, funded or even in final form to comply with NEPA’s procedural requirements.” Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 222 F.3d 677, 681 n.4 (2000); see also Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. at 352 (“There is a fundamental distinction, however, between a requirement that mitigation be discussed in sufficient detail to ensure that environmental consequences have been fairly evaluated, on the one hand, and a substantive requirement that a complete mitigation plan be actually formulated and adopted, on the other.”).16 Moreover, NMFS explained that waiting to distribute privileges under the adaptive management program makes sense; the Amendments will be easier to implement, their effects will be more discernible, and the program will be better developed.