Opinion ID: 2318232
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Restitution Orders

Text: Both Donna and Hilton Silver argue that the trial court exceeded its authority when it ordered them, as a condition of probation, [15] to pay restitution for the care of animals with regard to whom animal cruelty charges were not pursued by the State. We review the trial court's restitution order for abuse of discretion. See Goff v. State, 387 Md. 327, 350, 875 A.2d 132, 146 (2005); In re Delric H., 150 Md. App. 234, 240, 819 A.2d 1117, 1121 (2003). Although, generally, a trial court has broad power to order conditions of probation, its discretion has limits, and we have previously invalidated certain restitution orders. See Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 862 A.2d 419 (2004) (restitution order regarding damaged police cruiser was inappropriate for conviction of second degree assault because the damage was not a direct result of the assault); [16] Chaney v. State, 397 Md. 460, 473, 918 A.2d 506, 513 (2007) (restitution order invalid because [i]t had no evidentiary basis and [defendant] was never given the opportunity, prior to its entry, to contest or defend against it.). Relevant here, we have previously addressed when it is permissible to order restitution for alleged crimes of which the defendant was not convicted, in Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422, 488 A.2d 949 (1985) and Lee v. State, 307 Md. 74, 512 A.2d 372 (1986). Those cases control here. In Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422, 488 A.2d 949 (1985), we held that a trial court may not order a criminal defendant to pay restitution to a victim of a crime for which he was not convicted. Id. at 433, 488 A.2d at 954. There, Walczak was alleged to have robbed two victims at gunpoint, and agreed to plead guilty to one count of robbery with a deadly weapon if the State would nolle pros the remaining charges. At sentencing, the Circuit Court ordered Walczak to pay restitution to both victims as a condition of probation. Id. at 424, 488 A.2d at 950. At the time, Walczak did not object, and signed the order of probation which required the restitution payments to both victims. On appeal to this Court, Walczak argued that the restitution order was improper. [17] We reviewed the statutes governing the imposition of restitution, and concluded: Clearly ... restitution is punishment for the crime of which the defendant has been convicted. Restitution depends on the existence of that crime, and the statute authorizes the court to order restitution only where that court is otherwise authorized to impose punishment. Id. at 429, 488 A.2d at 952. Walczak thus limits the sentencing court's ability to order restitution to other alleged victims. The general rule in Walczak is subject to one narrow exception. In Walczak, we observed that some courts allow more expansive restitution orders in cases in which a defendant has entered a plea agreement for restitution of greater amounts than those involved in the crime for which conviction was had. Walczak, 302 Md. at 432 n. 3, 488 A.2d at 954 n. 3. One year after Walczak, we considered such a plea agreement in Lee v. State , where the question presented was whether, in light of Walczak ..., a defendant in a criminal case may, as part of a plea agreement, lawfully be ordered to pay restitution in an amount greater than that involved in the crime of which he was convicted. 307 Md. 74, 75-76, 512 A.2d 372, 373 (1986). [18] We first observed that allowing restitution as part of plea bargaining served important policy goals, especially in multi-count indictments. [P]lea-bargaining in situations involving multi-count indictments would be severely restricted. If a defendant could not consent to make restitution for the actual loss caused by his or her conduct relating to the indictment, and have such be a condition of any probation he or she might receive, then the government would have little reason to dismiss indictment counts in order to limit a defendant's potential period of incarceration. More importantly, however, it would frustrate the rehabilitation goals of the probation system. Id. at 80-81, 512 A.2d at 375 (quoting United States v. McLaughlin, 512 F.Supp. 907 (D.Md.1981)). We applied these principles in light of our earlier decision in Walczak: In the present case ... [t]he guilty plea was in pursuance of a plea agreement, the State agreeing to nol-pros the theft count upon the further understanding with the defendant that he would expressly consent, as a condition of probation, to the payment of full restitution for the theft offense. Thus, in addition to the forgery conviction, there was a judicial admission of guilt to the criminal acts underlying the theft loss, together with Lee's consent to make restitution in the full amountall as part of a plea agreement between the parties. Id. at 81, 512 A.2d at 376. Walczak and Lee thus instruct that a restitution order regarding alleged crimes for which the defendant was not convicted is valid only if the defendant freely and voluntarily agrees to make restitution to victims of the other, alleged crimes as part of a plea agreement. [19] Applying the standards of Walczak and Lee in this case, it is clear that the Circuit Court's order of restitution for the surviving horses was invalid. The restitution order was not part of a plea agreement, and the Silvers never agreed to pay for the rehabilitation of the two surviving horses. This case, therefore, falls under the general rule of Walczak, and the court was only permitted to order restitution relating to the crimes of which each of the Silvers was convicted. The State claims that the restitution order in this case was valid because the Silvers accept[ed] [ ] responsibility for the damages caused as to all counts[.] According the State, the record shows that [the] Silver[s] acknowledged [their] responsibilitypursuant to an Alford plea in District Courtfor the conduct underlying the other counts giving rise to the harm for which the restitution was ordered[.] Alternatively, the State argues that by accepting the Circuit Court's imposition of conditions of probation, and in return for a reduced sentence, the Silvers have waived any claim that the restitution was unauthorized. The State has, in effect, asked for an expansion of the Lee exception to cases where the defendant has acknowledged, at any point in the criminal proceedings, some general responsibility for the underlying, allegedly criminal, conduct, even though that defendant has not agreed to pay restitution. The foundation of our decision in Lee, however, was not the defendant's general admission of guilt, but his specific agreement to pay restitution as part of the plea bargaining process. As such, the State's arguments on this point are addressed and effectively rebutted by Walczak. Indeed, the plea agreement to which the Silvers agreed in the District Court is indistinguishable from the plea deal in Walczak, where the defendant agreed to plead guilty to one count, and the State agreed to drop the remaining counts. Under the State's argument, Walczak, too, would have acknowledged [his] responsibility... for the conduct underlying the other counts giving rise to the harm for which the restitution was ordered[,] and accept[ed] the challenged restitution as a condition of probation in lieu of serving a portion of a sentence of incarceration. Walczak's restitution order, however, was still invalid. So too is the order in this case. [20] The State further warns that this holding create[s] the ability for a defendant to `game the system[,]' by agreeing to certain probation terms involving restitution as part of a plea bargain, but then avoiding any obligation to pay by invoking the Walczak rule. We are not convinced. The problem here is less a result of the Silvers gaming the system, and more the result of a procedural mistake by the State. The Silvers clearly signaled an intent to contest their guilt in the Circuit Court, as they were entitled to by law, by filing a timely appeal. At that point, the State was completely free to re-file, in the Circuit Court, the charges that had been nolle prossed in the District Court. Had the State re-filed those charges, it would have preserved the full range of sentencing options, including restitution for those counts, and avoided this procedural quandary. Unfortunately, it did not. Adopting the State's appellate position, in contrast, would allow the State to request criminal penalties for criminal charges without proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was guilty of those crimes. We decline to open that door. As Walczak and Lee have long since established, the State may request, in plea negotiations, that a criminal defendant agree to pay restitution for related, though uncharged, crimes. If the defendant freely and voluntarily agrees to pay such restitution, it is permissible under Lee. Where, as here, the defendant does not agree to pay restitution to the victims of the other alleged crimes, the State must charge and convict the defendant of those crimes before requesting restitution. Finally, if a defendant agrees to a plea deal in District Court, but then exercises his right to a de novo appeal in Circuit Court, the State should take the necessary steps to protect its interests and preserve its sentencing options.