Opinion ID: 2575864
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Instructions on Conspiracy

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court's instructions to the jury defining the charged offense of conspiracy omitted part of the specific intent element of that crime and that, during jury deliberations, the trial court erred in failing to dispel the jurors' confusion about the overt act element of conspiracy. He further contends that these errors denied him his rights under the federal Constitution to due process, to proof of each element beyond a reasonable doubt, to a fair and impartial jury trial, and to reliable factfinding in a capital case. The trial court instructed the jury with two modified versionsone spoken, one writtenof CALJIC No. 6.10 defining the crime of conspiracy. As here relevant, the spoken version stated: A conspiracy is an agreement entered into between two or more persons with the specific intent to commit a crime, in this case alleged to be the crime of murder, the murder of Teresa Holloway, followed by an overt act committed by one or more of the parties for the purpose of accomplishing the object of the agreement. (Italics added.) As here relevant, the written version stated: A conspiracy is an agreement entered into between two or more persons with the specific intent to agree to commit the public offense of murder, followed by an overt act committed in this state by one or more of the parties for the purpose of accomplishing the object of the agreement. (Italics added.) The written version was given to the jury for its use during deliberations. As this court has explained, the crime of conspiracy requires dual specific intents: a specific intent to agree to commit the target offense, and a specific intent to commit that offense. ( People v. Russo, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1131, 108 Cal. Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641; People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 600, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 909 P.2d 994.) We have cautioned trial courts not to modify CALJIC No. 6.10 to eliminate either of these specific intents. ( People v. Marks (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1335, 1345, 248 Cal.Rptr. 874, 756 P.2d 260.) Here, neither of the modified versions of the standard instruction expressly mentioned both of the required specific intents. The written instruction mentioned only the specific intent to agree, while the spoken instruction mentioned only the specific intent to commit the target offense of murder. As defendant points out, when the jury has received an instruction in both spoken and written forms, and the two versions vary, we assume the jury was guided by the written version. ( People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 542, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 138, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887; People v. McLain (1988) 46 Cal.3d 97, 111, fn. 2, 249 Cal.Rptr. 630, 757 P.2d 569.) Although the trial court erred in modifying CALJIC No. 6.10 to delete mention of the required specific intent to commit the target offense of murder, defendant suffered no prejudice. For a conspiracy to commit murder, intent to commit the target offense means an intent to kill. ( People v. Swain, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 607, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 909 P.2d 994.) As defendant concedes, the jury's verdict that defendant was guilty of the first degree murder of Teresa Holloway necessarily included a finding that defendant himself had that intent. He argues, however, that the jury made no similar finding for either Denise Shigemura or Anna Humiston, the other alleged conspirators. But defendant does not identify any evidence in the record that could lead a rational juror to conclude that Shigemura and Humiston agreed to kill Holloway, with the specific intent to agree to do so, but without a specific intent to actually kill her. Because we find in the record no evidence that could rationally lead to such a finding, we are satisfied that the instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 9, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35; People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 564, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 96, 115 P.3d 417.) During guilt phase deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial judge. It read: Is the jury merely deciding whether the overt acts alleged actually occurred, or are we also determining whether or not the acts do indeed meet the requirements of being overt acts as defined in CALJIC 6.10[?] The trial court sent the jury this written response: As [CALJIC No.] 6.10 states, in order to find Mr. Jurado guilty of conspiracy, you must unanimously find to be true at least one of the alleged Overt Acts, as that term is defined in 6.10.  (Italics added.) Defendant maintains that this response did nothing to answer the jury's question, and that there is an unacceptable risk that the jury merely determined whether the conduct charged as overt acts occurred, without also determining whether any of the acts was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. We disagree. The trial court's response expressly directed the jury's attention to the definition of an overt act in CALJIC No. 6.10, which stated that `overt act' means any step taken or act committed by one or more of the conspirators . . . in furtherance of the accomplishment of the object of the conspiracy.  (Italics added.) That the jury so understood the court's response is conclusively shown by the jury's findings on the overt acts. The jury found not true the overt act allegations that defendant, Denise Shigemura, and Anna Humiston met with Teresa Holloway at Mark Schmidt's residence and that they left Schmidt's residence with Holloway in Humiston's car. Because undisputed evidence established that both of these acts occurred, the jury's not true finding can be explained only by inferring that the jury was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that these acts were done in furtherance of the conspiracy.