Opinion ID: 2796625
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard of Review & Legal Framework

Text: A patent must “conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as [the] BIOSIG INSTRUMENTS, INC. v. NAUTILUS, INC. 5 invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2 (2006). 1 A claim is invalid for indefiniteness if its language, when read in light of the specification and the prosecution history, “fail[s] to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.” Nautilus II, 134 S. Ct. at 2124. We review the district court’s indefiniteness determination de novo. Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2014). A patent is presumed valid under 35 U.S.C. § 282 and, “consistent with that principle, a [fact finder is] instructed to evaluate . . . whether an invalidity defense has been proved by clear and convincing evidence.” Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2241 (2011). “In the face of an allegation of indefiniteness, general principles of claim construction apply.” Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “In that regard, claim construction involves consideration of primarily the intrinsic evidence, viz., the claim language, the specification, and the prosecution history.” Id. Though the ultimate construction of a claim term is a legal question reviewed de novo, underlying factual determinations made by the district court based on extrinsic evidence are reviewed for clear error. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 842 (2015). In contrast, “when the district court reviews only evidence intrinsic to the patent (the patent claims and specifications, along with the patent’s prosecution history), the judge’s determination will amount solely to a 1 Paragraph 2 of 35 U.S.C. § 112 was replaced with newly designated § 112(b) when § 4(c) of the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112–29, took effect on September 16, 2012. Because the application resulting in the patent was filed before that date, we will refer to the pre-AIA version of § 112. BIOSIG INSTRUMENTS, INC. v. NAUTILUS, INC. 6 determination of law, and the Court of Appeals will review that construction de novo.” Id. at 841. When a “word of degree” is used, the court must determine whether the patent provides “some standard for measuring that degree.” Enzo Biochem, 599 F.3d at 1332; Seattle Box Co., Inc. v. Indus. Crating & Packing, Inc., 731 F.2d 818, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Recently, this court explained: “[w]e do not understand the Supreme Court to have implied in [Nautilus II], and we do not hold today, that terms of degree are inherently indefinite. Claim language employing terms of degree has long been found definite where it provided enough certainty to one of skill in the art when read in the context of the invention.” Interval Licensing, 766 F.3d at 1370. Moreover, when a claim limitation is defined in “purely functional terms,” a determination of whether the limitation is sufficiently definite is “highly dependent on context (e.g., the disclosure in the specification and the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art area).” Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in this case, a claim was indefinite when it was “insolubly ambiguous” or “not amenable to construction.” Datamize, 417 F.3d at 1347 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In Nautilus II, the Supreme Court observed that § 112, ¶ 2 requires “a delicate balance.” 134 S. Ct. at 2128 (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002)). On one hand, the Court noted, the definiteness requirement must take into account the inherent limitations of language. “Some modicum of uncertainty,” the Court recognized, is the “‘price of ensuring the appropriate incentives for innovation.’” Id. (quoting Festo Corp, 535 U.S. at 741). On the other hand, the Court explained, a patent must be precise enough to afford clear notice of what is claimed, thereby “appris[ing] the public of what is still open to them. Otherwise there BIOSIG INSTRUMENTS, INC. v. NAUTILUS, INC. 7 would be a zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation may enter only at the risk of infringement claims.” Id. at 2129 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court further explained the policy rationale: “absent a meaningful definiteness check . . . patent applicants face powerful incentives to inject ambiguity into their claims.” Id. Balancing these competing interests, the Supreme Court held that “[t]o determine the proper office of the definiteness command, . . . we read § 112, ¶ 2 to require that a patent’s claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.” Id. (emphasis added). “The standard adopted” by the Supreme Court “mandates clarity, while recognizing that absolute precision is unattainable.” Id. at 2129. It also accords with opinions of the Court stating that “the certainty which the law requires in patents is not greater than is reasonable, having regard to their subject-matter.” Id. (quoting Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 270 (1916) (emphasis added)). II. The Sole Issue Presented Here Is Indefiniteness On remand from the Supreme Court, the sole issue presented to this court is whether the district court erred in holding the ’753 patent invalid for indefiniteness. In particular, the district court held that “spaced relationship” as recited in claim 1, and referring to the spacing between the common and live electrodes, was not distinctly pointed out and particularly claimed in the patent in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. Before this court, Nautilus and Biosig dispute whether the Supreme Court articulated a new, stricter standard or whether, in rejecting the phrases “insolubly ambiguous” and “amenable to construction,” the Court was primarily clarifying that a patent’s claims must BIOSIG INSTRUMENTS, INC. v. NAUTILUS, INC. 8 inform those skilled in the art with “reasonable certainty” of what is claimed. Nautilus argues the Supreme Court’s mandate requires this court to find the term “spaced relationship” indefinite because “the original intrinsic evidence point[s] in two opposite directions, leaving the claims’ boundaries—and thus the potential avenues for follow-on innovation—fundamentally uncertain.” Nautilus’s Supp. Br. 14. According to Nautilus, “spaced relationship” could mean “a special spacing critical in some way to the recited result” or it could mean the opposite, that it is not limited or linked by the recited result. Id. at 14, 17. Biosig counters that “‘reasonable certainty’ is not a new standard; it is the degree of clarity in patent claiming that has governed for nearly one hundred years.” Biosig’s Supp. Br. 3. According to Biosig, “the Supreme Court did not indicate that [this court, in Nautilus I,] had been led astray by either of the disapproved phrases. Its main concern, rather, was that the use of those phrases by the Federal Circuit could send the wrong message to district courts and the patent bar.” Id. at 4 (citing Nautilus II, 134 S. Ct. at 2130 & n.8).