Opinion ID: 659581
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Deprivation of Property Interest

Text: 32 Scales additionally claims that defendants deprived him of a property interest without due process of law. Scales points to Jeffersonville City Ordinance Sec. 35.16, enacted November 15, 1986 by the Common Council of Jeffersonville, which states, in relevant part, (A) The ... discharge of regular employees shall be for cause. Scales asserts that he was terminated for other than just cause, and without an opportunity to be heard. 33 In response, defendants point to Ind.Code Sec. 36-4-11-2, which provides The executive may suspend or remove from office any officers, deputies, or other employees of the city appointed by him or a prior executive, by notifying them to that effect and sending a written statement of the reasons for the suspension or removal to the city legislative body. Defendants contend that, because the building commissioner is an appointed position, with policymaking powers, this statute allows the mayor to fire Scales at the mayor's discretion. 34 Generally, a protectible property interest is a legitimate claim of entitlement which may be created by express or implied contracts, municipal ordinances or state law. Myers v. City of Fort Wayne, Indiana, 729 F.Supp. 625 (N.C.Ind.1990) (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Normally, the Jeffersonville ordinance would create a property interest in favor of Scales. In the instant case, however, we find that the Jeffersonville ordinance is either inapplicable to Scales, or is in conflict with Sec. 36-4-11-2. 35 The Jeffersonville ordinance states that regular employees shall only be fired for cause. This Court has found no cases that interpret the city ordinance, but the inclusion of the limiting word regular suggests that the ordinance does not apply to all employees. It is reasonable to believe that the Jeffersonville City Council did not intend to limit the ability of the mayor to discharge appointed policymakers. 36 Even if the ordinance did apply to Scales, it would conflict with Sec. 36-4-11-2. Defendants are correct that an ordinance is void insofar as it conflicts with a statute. Hobble By And Through Hobble v. Basham, 575 N.E.2d 693, 607 (Ind.App. 4 Dist.1991). The same rule applies to Scales' contention that the defendants violated Jeffersonville Resolution Number 86-R-29. 2 37 In City of Peru v. Utility Service Board of the City of Peru, 507 N.E.2d 988 (Ind.App. 4 Dist.1987), the court discussed the history and legislative intent behind Sec. 36-4-11-2. Citing the Indiana Supreme Court case of State ex rel. O'Donnell v. Flickinger, 7 N.E.2d 192 (Ind.1937) which interpreted the predecessor statute to Sec. 36-4-11-2, the Peru court noted that the legislature intended to place the responsibility of appointment and discharge of all mayoral appointees directly upon the mayor, at his pleasure and discretion, so as to make these appointees directly responsible to him. City of Peru, 507 N.E.2d at 992. The court went on to state that in interpreting statutes it is important to recognize what statutes do not say as well as what they do say. There is no exception in the statute that suggests that the executive is limited to for cause hirings. The statute clearly contemplates discretionary discharges. Id. 38 The Indiana legislature has recognized, as has the Supreme Court in Elrod and Branti, that an executive must have the discretion to hire and fire those individuals who advise him, who set policy, or who are directly responsible for implementing city policy. Scales is such a person, and Sec. 36-4-11-2 allows the mayor to discharge such employees appointed by him or a prior executive. 39 Finally, plaintiff contends that defendants deprived him of due process because they failed to comply with Sec. 36-4-11-2(d), which provides that the executive, in discharging an appointee, should send a written statement of the reasons for the suspension or removal to the city legislative body. We agree with defendants that these procedures alone do not create an entitlement, and failure to comply with these procedures does not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation. 40 In order to give rise to a constitutionally protected property interest, a statute must go beyond mere procedural guarantees to provide some substantive criteria limiting the state's discretion--as can be found, for example, in a requirement that employees be fired only for cause. Cain v. Larson, 879 F.2d 1424 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 992, 110 S.Ct. 540, 107 L.Ed.2d 537 (1989). If a statute merely delimits what procedures must be followed before an employee is fired, then it does not contain the requisite substantive predicate. Id. 41 Parker's discretion was in no way limited by Sec. 36-4-11-2, and in fact, the statute allows for discharge without any substantive limitation. Given the amount of discretion accorded the mayor by Sec. 36-4-11-2, we find that Scales did not have a property interest in his employment. We thus grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the claim of deprivation of a property interest, and deny plaintiff's cross-motion. 42 III. Claim Against the Defendants in their Official Capacity, and Claim Against City of Jeffersonville 43 Scales has asserted claims against Parker in his official capacity, against Harold Lakeman in his official capacity as Personnel Director of Jeffersonville, and state law claims against the City of Jeffersonville itself. A Sec. 1983 suit against an official in his official capacity is treated as a suit against the governmental entity itself. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55, 99 S.Ct. 2018, 2035, n. 55, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). 44 In his brief, Scales concedes that the City of Jeffersonville had a firm policy prohibiting unconstitutional firings, and thus cannot be liable under Sec. 1983. Scales asserts a different theory of liability. He asserts a pendent claim, contending that the City is liable under a theory of respondeat superior because Parker, Gillenwater, and Lakeman violated the City's ordinances. 45 After the decision in Monell, it is clear that the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable in Sec. 1983 cases. Even though Scales states that his claim against the city is not a Sec. 1983 claim, we decline to allow the plaintiff the opportunity to ignore the custom or policy requirement and sue municipalities through the back door of respondeat superior. 46 In Phipps v. City of Chicago, 718 F.Supp. 719 (N.D.Ill.1989), the court reached the same conclusion when faced with an analogous question. The plaintiffs in Phipps attempted to assert that the City of Chicago was a pendent party to the case, after they had dropped the City as a defendant on the Sec. 1983 claim. The court declined to haul municipalities into federal court through the back door, i.e., via pendent party jurisdiction. Id. at 720. (citing Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 2413, 49 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976) for the proposition that if a municipality cannot be sued under Sec. 1983, the municipality cannot be brought into federal court as a pendent party). 47 We therefore grant defendants' motion for summary judgment on the claims against the defendants in their official capacity, and against the City of Jeffersonville, and deny plaintiff's cross-motion.