Opinion ID: 3207079
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Significance of the Historical Context

Text: It remains for me to determine the significance of the historical context. After all, I did say that we are not strictly limited by the meaning of a constitutional provision that would have been generally accepted in 1857. But I also said that, as our precedents correctly require, we cannot simply ignore the historical context. Whatever construction we adopt must be faithful both to the text and the general purposes reflected by the context in which that text was adopted. In this case, the text reflects no particular purpose in limiting the substantive authority of the Oregon legislature. Rather, it speaks to the courts (“No court shall . . .”) about the authority of the courts and the responsibilities of the courts—to ensure that justice is administered openly, speedily, affording every person remedy by due course of law. The historical roots of the wording of remedy guarantees lay in concern with executive interference with the 280 Horton v. OHSU courts. From Coke to Blackstone and into the early years of the republic, the basic idea was that courts must be free to administer justice to all, without interference from the executive. I find little, if any, historical support for a broader notion that remedy guarantees might also have been designed to curb legislative excesses. As I have explained, that notion is an anachronism, contrary to the sort of notions of legislative supremacy that prevailed at the time. Although, strictly speaking, state remedy guarantees are rooted in concern about interference from the executive—and not the legislature—I do not oppose drawing from the historical context a broader principle that would prohibit interference from the legislature as well.15 But that principle does not automatically carry with it the more expansive notion still that remedy guarantees also limit legislative authority to determine the nature of injuries that must be remedied by due course of law. That is a qualitatively different proposition. Legislative determination of the nature of injuries that may be remedied and the nature of those remedies in no way interferes with the court’s constitutional obligation to see that justice is administered openly, speedily, afford- ing every person remedy by due course of law. It is for the legislature to determine what the due course of law entails. And, under the remedy guarantee, it is for the courts to see to it that all persons are given remedy by it. The potential fly in the ointment, so to speak, is the existence of a number of early to mid-nineteenth century 15 There is ample precedent for that much. Article I, section 9, for example, is addressed to the legislature (“No law shall . . .”), and such search and seizure provisions historically were understood not to apply directly to executive branch law enforcement authorities. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-andSeizure History: Now Forgotten Common-Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original Understanding of “Due Process of Law,” 77 Miss LJ 89, 90 (2007) (“The current notion that constitutional standards, such as search-and-seizure standards, address the conduct of ordinary [police] officers dates back only to the beginning of the twentieth century. Under framing-era doctrine, legislation and court orders were governmental in character, so it was possible to conceive of an ‘unconstitutional’ statute or an ‘unconstitutional’ general warrant issued by a court. However, there was no conception that an ordinary officer could act ‘unconstitutionally.’ ”). Nevertheless, this court—like most courts—has construed the constitutional provision to state a broader principle that applies to all branches of government. See generally State v. McDaniel, 115 Or 187, 209, 231 P 965 (1925). Cite as 359 Or 168 (2016) 281 decisions from other states that hold that state constitutional remedy guarantees also prohibit legislation that retroactively alters vested rights. But, as I have explained, a more careful examination of the underlying rationale for those decisions makes clear that they actually line up quite nicely with what the text and the historical underpinnings of the remedy guarantee so strongly suggest. Those decisions hold that retroactive alteration of vested rights violates state remedy guarantees because such legislation was regarded as a violation of the judicial function, viz., to apply the law that applied at the time rights vested. I hasten to add that I do not suggest that our reading of the remedy guarantee should be constrained by nineteenth-century conceptions of vested rights and retroactivity. As I have said—and as our cases hold—we attempt to draw from historical context more general principles that may be applied to modern circumstances. In this case, the broader principle that I draw from the early to mid-nineteenth century cases is simply that state constitutional remedy guarantees constrain not only executive interference with judicial independence and access to the courts, but legislative interference as well. I should add that reading the remedy clause to forbid only interference with judicial independence and access to courts—and not as a limitation on the authority of legislatures to define injuries and remedies—is not an unusual or retrograde interpretation. It is, in fact, what most other state courts make of their constitutional remedy guarantees.16 16 As the Montana Supreme Court explained in Stewart v. Standard Pub. Co., 102 Mont 43, 55 P2d 694, 696 (1936): “A reading of the [state remedy guarantee] discloses that it is addressed exclusively to the courts. The courts are its sole subject matter, and it relates directly to the duties of the judicial department of the government. It means no more nor less than that, under the provisions of the Constitution and laws constituting them, the courts must be accessible to all persons alike, without discrimination, at the time or times, and the place or places, appointed for their sitting, and afford a speedy remedy for every wrong recognized by law as being remediable in court.” See also, e.g., O’Quinn v. Walt Disney Productions, Inc., 177 Colo 190, 195, 493 P2d 344, 346 (1972) (remedy clause “simply provides that if a right does accrue under the law, the courts will be available to effectuate such right”); Hawley v. Green, 117 Idaho 498, 500-01, 788 P2d 1321, 1323-24 (1990) (state remedy guarantee “merely admonishes the Idaho courts to dispense justice and to secure citi- zens the rights and remedies afforded by the legislature or by the common law”); 282 Horton v. OHSU I am aware of the fact that adopting that view of the remedy guarantee of Article I, section 10, would require overruling a lot of case law, and I do not take that fact lightly. But this court’s case law is so hopelessly conflicting that I do not understand how we can move forward— particularly if we hope to provide the bench and bar with anything close to helpful doctrine—without overruling something. As I mentioned at the outset of this opinion, stubborn adherence to case law that is in conflict and demonstrably in error is not costless. It produces its own threats to stability and predictability—the very virtues that stare decisis is supposed to promote. III. SOME PRACTICAL CONCERNS That last point concerning the costs of adhering to erroneous precedent leads me to conclude with some observations about the practical consequences of the majority’s decision. To begin with, it is not clear what remains of our prior case law. The majority overrules Smothers, and Smothers alone. But it strikes me that the decision to do that may have ripple effects back through a number of earlier decisions. Smothers itself overruled a number of prior cases, such as Perozzi and Noonan. I presume those have once again been resuscitated. But Smothers also relied on other cases for its holding that the remedy clause applies only to common-law actions existing at the time of the adoption of our constitution. Stewart, for example, concluded that “[t]he purpose of this provision is to save from legislative abolishment those jural rights which had become well established prior to the enactment of our Constitution.” 127 Or at 591. That is precisely the proposition of law that the majority in this case abjures in overruling Smothers. Aside from that, it is also unclear to me what stan- dard applies to remedy-clause challenges going forward. The majority offers three “categories” of legislation with three MJ Farms, Ltd v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 998 So 2d 16, 37 (La 2008) (state remedy clause “operates only to provide remedies which are fashioned by the legislature”); Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 308 NC 419, 444, 302 SE2d 868, 882 (1983) (“[T]he remedy constitutionally guaranteed must be one that is legally cognizable. The legislature has the power to define the circumstances under which a remedy is legally cognizable and those under which it is not.”). Cite as 359 Or 168 (2016) 283 different tests concerning the limits of legislative authority. First, there are statutes that leave in place a duty but deny a remedy for breach of that duty. 359 Or at 219. Second, there are statutes that adjust an individual’s rights and remedies as part of a “larger statutory scheme” that extends benefits to some while limiting benefits to others. Id. Third, there are statutes that wholly eliminate claims and underlying duties. According to the majority, whether such statutes are constitutionally permissible depends on whether the action that was modified “continues to protect core interests” or whether, in light of changed circumstances, those interests “no longer require the protection formerly afforded them.” Id. I don’t begrudge the majority its attempt to rec- oncile our existing cases by coming up with new tests for evaluating remedy-clause challenges. If we are not going to overrule any of them, those cases fairly cry out for such an effort. This, however, is but the latest in a series of attempts by this court to accomplish that very feat. Each of those prior attempts has failed to offer any real doctrinal clarity, by this court’s own reckoning. And I fear that the majority’s effort in this case will fare no better. The majority’s first category seems unobjectionable to me. It requires that statutes altering remedies for existing duties not be “insubstantial.” As we explained in Howell, that’s what the prior case law says, even if it leaves something to be desired in the way of clarity. 353 Or at 388. The second category, likewise, appears supported by case law, although the nature of the quid pro quo test itself has proven somewhat elusive. Compare Howell, 353 Or at 376 (applying Hale’s “balance” analysis), with 353 Or at 393-94 (DeMuniz, pro tem, dissenting) (contesting majority’s reading of Hale). It is the majority’s third category that gives me pause. To begin with, I do not know where it comes from. The majority asserts that, in assessing whether the legislature constitutionally abolished an underlying duty or a claim, we must take into account whether “core interests” remain protected. I have searched in vain for a single decision of this 284 Horton v. OHSU court that even uses the phrase, much less identifies it as a relevant consideration in remedy-clause analysis. It appears that the majority is assuming that, while the legislature may have the authority to alter the common law, there remains something of an irreducible quantum of interests formerly protected by the common law that must remain protected. I am at a loss to explain the source of such interests. Whether they are rooted in a notion of natural law (which, it seems to me, would be awfully close to the very “absolute” rights analysis that the majority says it rejects) or something similar, the majority does not explain. Smothers, for all its faults, at least supplied a point of reference in defining the constitutionally irreducible minimum of rights in terms of common-law claims that existed at the time of the state’s founding. 332 Or at 124. The majority, however, does away with that, leaving in its place nothing but a bare reference to “core interests.” It could be argued that the text of Article I, section 10, supplies the “core interests” in declaring that everyone must have remedy by due course of law for injury to “person, property or reputation.” Nothing in the constitution, however, bars the legislature from redefining the nature of the “person” or the “property” or the “reputation” interests that are subject to protection. Consider, for example, the common-law claims of alienation of affection and criminal conversation.17 Historically, the claims were rooted in the Anglo-Saxon idea 17 The tort of alienation of affection finds its genesis in the early English common-law action of enticement, that is, inducing a woman to leave her husband through fraud, violence, or some other wrongful conduct. See generally W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 124 (5th ed 1984). The tort of criminal conversation similarly is rooted in the English claim of seduction, which required that the wife have engaged in adultery, without regard to whether she actually left her husband. Id. The torts initially were recognized in this country in 1866, Heermance v. James, 47 Barb 120, 127 (NY Gen Term 1866), and ultimately were acknowledged by every state save Louisiana (which viewed marriage as a civil contract). See generally Michele Crissman, Alienation of Affections: An Ancient Tort—But Still Alive in South Dakota, 48 SD L Rev 518, 520 (2003). Oregon came to recognize both torts. See, e.g., Saxton v. Barber, 71 Or 230, 139 P 334 (1914) (alienation of affection); Pitman v. Bump, 5 Or 17 (1873) (criminal conversation). Cite as 359 Or 168 (2016) 285 that married women were the property of their husbands. See generally Jill Jones, Fanning an Old Flame: Alienation of Affections and Criminal Conversation Revisited, 26 Pepperdine L Rev 61, 75 (1998) (“[B]oth alienation of affection and criminal conversation were historically grounded in the property notions that wives were chattel.”).18 In the twentieth century, legislatures across the country— including Oregon’s, see ORS 31.980 (“There shall be no civil action for alienation of affection.”); ORS 31.982 (“There shall be no civil cause of action for criminal conversation.”)— abolished the claims entirely. See generally Jamie Heard, The National Trend of Abolishing Actions for Alienation of a Spouse’s Affection and Mississippi’s Refusal to Follow Suit, 28 Miss C L Rev 313 (2009). State legislatures, in other words, redefined the nature of “property” interests that, in their judgment, deserve protection through civil actions for damages.19 No one doubts the constitutionality of that legislation. This court said as much in Noonan. 161 Or at 249 (noting with approval that courts in other states had upheld the constitutionality of legislative abrogation of alienation of affection and like actions). The point is that the constitution, merely by declaring that everyone must have remedy by due course of law for injuries to “person, property or reputation,” doesn’t tell us what those terms irreducibly mean. To the contrary, at least to some extent, the legislature remains free to define them. The majority appears to acknowledge the point in suggesting that, even if certain interests otherwise might be regarded as “core,” the legislature may constitutionally 18 Blackstone, for instance, noted that a husband has a property interest in the “company, care, or assistance” of his wife. William Blackstone, 3 Commentaries on the Laws of England 142-43 (1st ed 1768); see also Hipp v. DuPont, 182 NC 9, 108 SE 318, 319 (1921) (“[T]he husband could maintain an action for the injuries sustained by his wife    by reason of the fact that the wife was his chattel.”). 19 The “heartbalm” torts of alienation of affection and criminal conversation, by the way, are not the only examples. Quite a number of torts have fallen by the wayside over the last century, including a wife’s claim for damages arising out of a husband’s alcoholism, the claim of mishandling of a corpse, the tort of insult (separate from defamation), actions against “common scolds,” and certain aspects of nuisance law, among others. See generally Kyle Graham, Why Torts Die, 35 Fla St U L Rev 359, 364-73 (2008). 286 Horton v. OHSU reevaluate them as having become, in effect, vestigial. But, once again, where the majority finds support for its analysis is unstated. It supplies no references in this court’s case law, and I am aware of none. Of particular concern to me is the fact that the majority doesn’t explain by what standard the bench and bar—and the legislature, it should not be forgotten—is to evaluate when an interest may constitutionally be reconsidered and moved from being “core” to being of a lesser nature that no longer requires constitutional protection. The majority hints that “the reasons for the legislature’s actions can matter,” but it offers no clues about what sorts of reasons might matter. The hint sounds suspiciously like substantive due process analysis, under which legislation altering existing rights may be justified—depending on the nature of the rights involved—by a reasonable connection with legitimate state interests. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 720-21, 117 S Ct 2258, 138 L Ed 2d 772 (1997) (setting out federal substantive due process analysis); MacPherson, 340 Or at 140 (applying same analysis). But, at this point, we can merely guess. In my view, given the woeful state of the current remedy-clause case law, this court should not be satisfied with tinkering with only one aspect of that law. By overruling only the portion of Smothers that limits the remedy to claims existing in 1857, I fear the majority only makes matters worse. In effect, it returns us to the sort of caseby-case incrementalism that got us in trouble in the first place. This court’s existing cases construing the remedy provision of Article I, section 10, cannot be squared with the text of the clause or its historical context. I would overrule those cases and hold that the provision protects against executive and legislative interference with judicial independence and access to the courts, but does not impose a limitation on the otherwise plenary authority of the legislature to determine rights and remedies. It is for that reason that the trial court erred in concluding that the cap on damages at issue in this case violated Article I, section 10. And it is for that reason that I concur in the result in this case as to the disposition of the parties’ remedy-clause claim. Cite as 359 Or 168 (2016) 287 WALTERS, J., dissenting. Together, Article I, section 10, and Article I, section 17, ensure that an individual who suffers personal injury will have legal remedy for that injury, and that a jury will determine the extent of that injury and the monetary sum necessary to restore it. Together, those two provisions place coherent constitutional limitations on legislative action: The remedy clause precludes the legislature from denying remedy for personal injury, and the right to jury trial precludes the legislature from eliminating or interfering with the jury’s role in restoring that injury. But those two provisions also do more. They define what we mean when we use the word justice, and they make jurors its defender. Article I, section 10, stems from Lord Coke’s interpretation of the Magna Carta and his understanding that justice must be “full, because justice ought not to limp.” 359 Or at 200 (translating Edward Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 55-56 (1797 ed)). Article I, section 17, guarantees a right to a jury trial that is “one of the most important safeguards against tyranny which our law has designed.” Lee v. Madigan, 358 US 228, 234, 79 S Ct 276, 3 L Ed 2d 260 (1959). Today, the majority not only deprives the Horton family of the right to the restorative remedy that the jury awarded, it also bargains away and belittles two constitutional provisions designed to guarantee justice for all. I dissent. I. The remedy clause guarantees that “every man shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done him in his person, property, or reputation.” Or Const, Art I, § 10. In this case, no one contests that plaintiff’s son suffered injury to his person; the question is whether the legislature violated his right to remedy for that injury when it imposed a cap on his damages. The majority begins its analysis of that question with Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or 83, 23 P3d 333 (2001), a case that did not involve a damages cap. In fact, in Smothers, the court explicitly reserved the constitutionality of such caps for later decision. Id. at 120 n 19. That decision came in Clarke v. OHSU, 343 Or 581, 288 Horton v. OHSU 606, 175 P3d 418 (2007), and Clarke should have been the starting point for the court’s analysis here. Before I explain how the majority should have used Clarke to resolve this case, I want to note my agreement with the majority’s clarification of the court’s decision in Smothers. I agree that the meaning of the remedy clause is not tied to its meaning in 1857. 359 Or at 187. That clarification is important, and it corrects the mistake that the court made in Howell v. Boyle, 353 Or 359, 298 P3d 1 (2013). In Howell, the court interpreted Smothers to require a two-step process to determine whether the remedy clause is violated. Id. at 385-86. First, the court said in Howell, a court must ascertain the damages that the plaintiff would have received at common law; then, the court must compare those damages to the damages that the plaintiff received at trial. Id. at 385-86. If the plaintiff would have received less at common law than the plaintiff received at trial, then, the court explained, capped damages can be considered “fully restorative” of a common-law negligence claim. Id. at 386 (internal quotation marks omitted). In reaching that conclusion, the court recognized that “it is exceedingly difficult to determine the state of Oregon law over 150 years ago,” but, it reasoned, “that is what Smothers requires.” Id. If that case-within-a-case analysis is what Smothers requires, then it is important to disavow it. And it is equally important to disavow Howell. Howell was dependent on the same faulty reasoning that the majority identifies in Smothers, and, if the majority is correct that Smothers must be overruled because that court’s conclusion was dependent on faulty reasoning, then Howell, too, must be overruled. 359 Or at 183. That leaves us with Clarke, a case that the majority in this case does not overrule and that is not dependent on the faulty reasoning present in Smothers and Howell. In Clarke, this court considered whether the capped damages that the Oregon Tort Claims Act (OTCA) provided were sufficiently restorative to satisfy the requirements of Article I, section 10. 343 Or at 588. The court viewed the plaintiff’s economic damages of over $12 million as “representative of the enormous cost of lifetime medical care Cite as 359 Or 168 (2016) 289 currently associated with [the] permanent and severe personal injuries” that defendants had caused, and held that the capped damages available under the OTCA were insufficient and violated the remedy clause. Id. at 609-10. That analysis should have compelled the same result here. Plaintiff’s economic damages of over $6 million are similarly “representative of the enormous cost of lifetime medical care currently associated with [the] permanent and severe personal injuries” that defendants caused. Id. at 609. And the capped damages available to plaintiff in this case are nowhere near capable of restoring those injuries. This court should have held that the limited remedy available to plaintiff was not sufficiently restorative to meet Article I, section 10, requirements. The majority reasons otherwise. According to the majority, the disavowal of Smothers leaves us with all of the decisions in our remedy clause cases except Smothers, and the three categories into which the majority says those cases fall. This case, the majority says, falls into the second category—the category in which the legislature does not alter a defendant’s duty to exercise reasonable care but limits a plaintiff’s remedy for breach of that duty as part of a “comprehensive statutory scheme intended to extend benefits to some persons while adjusting the benefits to others.” 359 Or at 221. For that category of cases, the majority opines, providing an “insubstantial remedy for a breach of a recognized duty” may violate the remedy clause. 359 Or at 219. However, the majority explains, when the legislature has sought to “adjust” a person’s rights and remedies “as part of a larger statutory scheme that extends benefits to some while limiting benefits to others,” a court can consider that “quid pro quo” in determining whether the remedy clause is violated. Id. I agree with the majority that, to satisfy Article I, section 10, the remedy that the legislature provides cannot be “insubstantial.” By that, I take the majority to mean that the legislative remedy must be substantially restorative. As this court said in Clarke, “Article I, section 10, does not eliminate the power of the legislature to vary and modify both the form and the measure of recovery for an injury, as long 290 Horton v. OHSU as it does not leave the injured party” with a remedy “that is incapable of restoring the right that has been injured.” 343 Or at 606 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court arrived at that understanding of the remedy clause by looking at its words and this court’s prior cases. When Article I, section 10, was drafted, the word “remedy” meant, among other things “that which counteracts an evil of any kind,” and “that which repairs loss or disaster.” Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 837 (1854). And since 1925, this court has held that the right to a remedy precludes the legislature from taking an individual’s right to “a good common-law remedy for a private injury committed by a private citizen” and giving that individual a remedy that is “wholly inadequate” to its purpose. West v. Jaloff, 113 Or 184, 194-95, 232 P 642 (1925). The overruling of Smothers neither compels nor permits a different conclusion. The words of the remedy clause continue to have substantially the same meaning that they had at common law, see Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1920 (unabridged ed 2002) (defining “remedy”), and West and Clarke are still good law. West was decided before Smothers; Clarke discusses Smothers, but does not rely on the Smothers analysis that the majority here disavows. Clarke, 343 Or at 605-06. Accordingly, the proper remedy clause inquiry continues to be whether a statutory limitation on damages leaves the plaintiff with a remedy that is “incapable of restoring the right that has been injured.” Id. at 606 (internal quotation marks omitted; quoting Smothers, 332 Or at 119-20). The majority does not reason otherwise. Instead, the majority relies on the second consideration that it finds applicable to this category of cases—the quid pro quo that results when the legislature has sought to adjust a person’s rights and remedies as “part of a larger statutory scheme that extends benefits to some while limiting benefits to others.” 359 Or at 219. Relying on only one case for that proposition, Hale v. Port of Portland, 308 Or 508, 523, 783 P2d 506 (1989), the majority concludes that, in this case, the state’s constitutionally recognized interest in sovereign immunity justifies the cap on plaintiff’s damages. 359 Or at 224. Cite as 359 Or 168 (2016) 291 In Clarke, the court did not consider the state’s interest in sovereign immunity in its analysis and cited Hale only to distinguish it. 343 Or at 608-09. In this case, the majority should have followed suit. As the court explained in Clarke, the statute that the court upheld in Hale limited the size of the award that a plaintiff could obtain from a municipal defendant, but it did not limit a plaintiff’s right to obtain a fully compensatory award from municipal employees.1 Id. Consequently, the plaintiff in Hale was entitled to a remedy capable of restoring his injuries, and the court had no cause to hold, and did not hold, that the legislature could deprive an individual of the right to a restorative remedy to extend a benefit to others. Hale, 308 Or at 523-24. In Hale, the court described the applicable limitation on damages as widening the class of plaintiffs who could recover for injuries against an otherwise immune municipality while at the same time imposing “a counterbalancing” limit on the size of the award that could be recovered. Id. at 523. However, that description of the statute did not represent the holding of the case. In fact, what the court said in Hale was that “all who had a remedy continue to have one.” Id. The majority in this case is wrong in departing from the interpretation of Hale provided by the unanimous court in Clarke. The majority then compounds that error when it broadly reasons that the legislature may “extend[ ] an assurance of benefits to some while limiting benefits to others,” 359 Or at 224, effecting a “quid pro quo,” 359 Or at 225. The remedy clause grants an individual right, not a bargaining chip. This court has never held, in this or any other context, that the legislature may bargain away an individual constitutional right for something of benefit to others, and the majority jeopardizes all individual rights by starting down that path.2 1 The case that the court in Hale cited in support of its conclusion was Noonan v. City of Portland, 161 Or 213, 88 P2d 808 (1939), a case in which the court upheld a charter provision that made city employees liable for negligence, but granted immunity to the city itself. 2 I do not mean to suggest that the legislature is precluded from providing all injured persons with a substituted restorative remedy that is different from the remedy available at common law. What I mean is that the legislature is precluded from providing one injured person with a less than restorative remedy to extend benefits of constitutional dimension to others. 292 Horton v. OHSU And even if a bargain such as that described in Hale were permitted, no such bargain is provided or permitted here. In this case, the OTCA does not provide this plaintiff or this class of plaintiffs with a benefit of constitutional dimension such as that provided in Hale. This plaintiff’s claim is a claim against a governmental employee.3 Governmental employees are not entitled to sovereign immunity, and, absent the OTCA, all plaintiffs injured by governmental employees would have claims against those employees for unlimited damages. See Gearin v. Marion County, 110 Or 390, 396-97, 223 P 929 (1924) (county employees not entitled to sovereign immunity). The OTCA does not widen the class of plaintiffs entitled to sue that class of defendants. Thus, the constitutional benefit that was described in Hale—the widening of the class of plaintiffs who could sue the relevant class of defendants (there, municipalities)—is not present here. Hale, 308 Or at 523. The OTCA also does not provide plaintiffs with a benefit of practical consequence. The OTCA does permit plaintiffs to recover from governmental entities but limits the amount that plaintiffs may recover from those entities. Plaintiffs’ common-law right against individual governmental employees is a right to unlimited damages. An exchange of that right for the right, under the OTCA, to seek a more limited remedy from a governmental entity may or may not be of practical value to this class of plaintiffs. For instance, in this case, the state’s waiver of immunity and its duty to indemnify defendant did not confer a benefit that plaintiff would not have had but for the OTCA. Like all physicians, defendant here had his own liability insurance. Absent the OTCA, that insurance would have been available to cover the costs of defendant’s negligence.4 3 Plaintiff’s claim at issue on appeal is a claim against a state employee. Plaintiff also brought a claim against OHSU, but the trial court ruled that, because sovereign immunity applies to OHSU, the legislature constitutionally may limit the damages for which OHSU is liable. See Clarke, 343 Or at 600 (so holding). Plaintiff’s claim against OHSU is not at issue on appeal. 4 Although the majority labels defendant’s transection of blood vessels “inadvertent[ ],”359 Or at 171, and although defendant’s act was certainly not intentional, it is more correct to acknowledge that defendant’s act was negligent. The purpose of liability insurance is to ensure that the costs of a tortfeasor’s negligence are not borne by the person whom the tortfeasor injures. Cite as 359 Or 168 (2016) 293 Furthermore, a plaintiff’s ability to collect a judgment is not a benefit of constitutional dimension and can have no place in the court’s constitutional analysis. See Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O’Leary, 303 Or 297, 305, 736 P2d 173 (1987) (witness’s interest in secrecy is not of constitutional dimension in Article I, section 10, analysis); Mattson v. Astoria, 39 Or 577, 580-81, 65 P 1066 (1901) (when plaintiff has claim against individual employee, plaintiff is not wholly without remedy); Batdorff v. Oregon City, 53 Or 402, 408-09, 100 P 937 (1909) (same). The majority does not grapple with those concerns. Instead, the majority focuses on the benefit that the state receives in the bargain. The majority explains that the OTCA “accommodates the state’s constitutionally recognized interest in asserting its sovereign immunity with the need to indemnify its employees.” 359 Or at 222 (emphasis added). It is true that the state has a constitutional interest in sovereign immunity, but its choice to indemnify its employees is a choice of practical, and not of constitutional, significance. The state is immune from suit because it is a sovereign. By design, sovereign immunity does not extend to state employees; state employees, including those who perform important, high-risk functions, are liable for their torts. See Gearin, 110 Or at 396 (county employees). Thus, although the state can act only through its agents and employees, the individual liability of state employees is an inherent limitation on the state’s immunity. The state may choose to assure its employees that they will be indemnified for their negligence, but it does not need to do so. Private employers, by law, are vicariously liable for the torts of their employees. Minnis v. Oregon Mutual Ins. Co., 334 Or 191, 201, 48 P3d 137 (2002). Although the state may wish to compete with private employers by placing itself on the same footing, its voluntary choice to do so is not an interest of constitutional dimension. The idea that the Oregon Constitution permits the legislature to bargain away a plaintiff’s constitutional right to remedy in these circumstances is so repugnant that I wonder whether the majority means to endorse it. Perhaps, instead, what the majority intends to endorse is balancing— 294 Horton v. OHSU a weighing of the competing individual and state constitutional interests. Balancing may seem more acceptable than bargaining, but it has no greater textual support in Article I, section 10, and it has the same potential to trump and thereby trample constitutional rights. Until this day, a bedrock of our constitutional jurisprudence has been that “a state legislative interest, no matter how important, cannot trump a state constitutional command.” State v. Stoneman, 323 Or 536, 542, 920 P2d 535 (1996). In Oregonian Publishing Co., 303 Or at 302, this court said that “[s]ection 10 is written in absolute terms; there are no explicit qualifications to its command that justice shall be administered openly.” As a result, the court rejected the idea that it was appropriate to balance the secrecy interests of a witness who would be compelled to testify at a hearing against the interests of those who sought an open court. Id. at 305. The same is true of section 10’s guarantee that “every” person “shall” have remedy for personal injury. That guarantee is written in absolute terms and should not be subject to balancing. If that is what the majority intends, then, in its stare decisis analysis, the majority should, at the very least, have acknowledged the fundamental change that it is making and provided a firm basis for its departure. And the majority should candidly have explained how the constitutional right to remedy, which this court described in Gearin, 110 Or at 396, as “one of the most sacred and essential of all the constitutional guaranties” without which “a free government cannot be maintained or individual liberty be preserved,” will be given the weight necessary to ensure that it is not easily overborne by the interests of the day. The majority reassures us that its holding in this case is limited to cases in which the OTCA is applicable— cases in which the state has a constitutional interest in sovereign immunity. The majority also expresses no opinion on whether damages caps which do not implicate the state’s sovereign immunity and are not a part of the quid pro quo that the majority sees in the OTCA would comply with Article I, section 10. 359 Or at 225-26. And even when the OTCA applies, the majority “doubt[s] highly” that the legislature’s interest in sovereign immunity would justify a damages cap Cite as 359 Or 168 (2016) 295 that results in a plaintiff receiving a “paltry fraction” of the damages that the plaintiff incurred. 359 Or at 224 n 28. That handle of hope is helpful, but it does little for plaintiff and her son, Tyson, and those who suffer similar tragic consequences at the hands of governmental employees.5 And it does little for those who are unable to determine, before a jury renders its verdict, what fraction of damages the statutory cap on damages will represent, and therefore whether or not a defendant’s liability will be limited. As the