Opinion ID: 2225822
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues

Text: Defendant alleges that the trial court's findings are inadequate to support enhancement of the presumptive sentence by two (2) years, pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-4.1-4-3 and Ind. Code § 35-4.1-4-7(c) [Burns Code Ed. 1979 Repl. (now Ind. Code 35-38-1-3 and 7(b)]. The trial court made the following statement to support enhancement of the presumptive sentence: The (2) years are added to the sentence because of the defendant's prior involvement in similar activities and because of his attitude in Court. Defendant argues that the trial court merely and erroneously repeated statutory language in referring to his prior criminal history. He also argues his attitude in court is not properly an aggravating factor pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-4.1-4-7(c). We agree that a trial court is required to make a statement of facts which are particular to the defendant and the crime involved when exercising its discretion to enhance a basic sentence. Page v. State (1981), Ind. 424 N.E.2d 1021, 1023. In order for us to review the trial court's exercise of its sentencing discretion, we must be made aware of its reasons for imposing a sentence. The trial court should not simply repeat statutory language. Id. The statutory factor pertaining to a defendant's criminal activity reads: The person has a history of criminal activity. Ind. Code § 35-4.1-4-7(c)(2). The trial court found that the Defendant had been involved in similar prior criminal activities, an important departure from mere repetition of the statute. Granted, the trial court could have specifically listed these prior offenses, but its failure to do so does not thwart our review, because his pre-sentence report was introduced at the sentencing hearing. It discloses that Defendant, as a juvenile, was charged with attempted rape, assault and battery, and molesting. This record supports the trial court's finding. Howard v. State (1984), Ind., 459 N.E.2d 29. We also note that these offenses do not comprise Defendant's entire prior criminal history. He has a prior federal conviction for heroin distribution and an armed robbery charge that was dropped because he was serving a federal sentence for the heroin conviction. Defendant argues that his attitude in court can be a mitigating factor pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-4.1-4-7(b)(8), but cannot be an aggravating factor. Ind. Code § 35-4.1-4-7(d) reads: The criteria listed in subsections (b) and (c) of this section do not limit the matters that the court may consider in determining the sentence. The factors enumerated in subsection (c) are not the only factors that a trial court may consider in determining sentencing. Kelley v. State (1983), Ind., 452 N.E.2d 907, 912. The judgment is affirmed. GIVAN, C.J., and PIVARNIK and SHEPARD, JJ., concur. DeBRULER, J., concurs in affirmance of conviction but votes to remand to trial court for more specific sentencing statement.