Opinion ID: 66548
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Due Process and Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(i)(1)(C)

Text: “We review de novo constitutional challenges to a sentence, assuming they 9 are properly preserved.” United States v. Brown, 526 F.3d 691, 708 (11th Cir. 2008), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. No. 08-5564) (July 28, 2008).3 The provision in Rule 32 on which Brasfield relies to support his due process argument provides: “At sentencing, the court . . . must allow the parties’ attorneys to comment on the probation officer’s determinations and other matters relating to an appropriate sentence.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(i)(1)(C). In this case, defense counsel did not receive the police chief’s letter before sentencing and the district court relied on the letter at sentencing. Nonetheless, we decline to decide whether this constituted a violation of Rule 32(i)(1)(C) because, even if it did, it was harmless error. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a) (“Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”); United States v. Patrick, 988 F.2d. 641, 647-49 (6th Cir. 1993) (applying harmless error where the sentencing court failed to notify the defendant before sentencing that it would rely on extraneous evidence).4 This is so because the information contained in the police chief’s letter was 3 There is confusion among the parties as to whether we should review Brasfield’s argument for plain error. However, because we reject Brasfield’s argument under a de novo standard of review, we do not decide whether Brasfield sufficiently objected to the police chief’s letter at sentencing. 4 We do note, however, that other circuits have held that this sort of failure to disclose violates Rule 32(i)(1)(C). See, e.g., United States v. Warr, 530 F.3d 1152, 1161-63 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Meeker, 411 F.3d 736, 741 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Nappi, 243 F.3d 758, 762-68 (3d Cir. 2001). 10 also contained in the PSI, which defense counsel admittedly received and reviewed before sentencing. Although most of the letter refers to Brasfield’s criminal history, the district court relied only on the following sentence in the letter: “Since the arrest and incarceration of Mr. Brasssfield [sic] we have seen a drastic decrease of criminal activity from the Alberta City’s Gang.” The court relied on this statement in analyzing the need to protect the public from further crimes by Brasfield. However, this statement is contained in the PSI, where the probation officer, in making his sentencing recommendation, states: “It is noteworthy that the Tuscaloosa Chief of Police has recognized a drastic decrease in ABC Gang activity since the defendant’s absence.” Defense counsel had the opportunity to object to this statement in either his written objections or at sentencing, but he failed to do so. In this respect, the Sixth Circuit has found harmless error under similar circumstances: Where the evidence upon which the sentencing court relies without previously notifying the defendant is of the same character, allows the same inferences, and, most importantly, is subject to the same arguments in rebuttal as evidence in the record of which the defendant is already aware, it seems logical to conclude that advance notice would not give the defendant any additional incentive or ability to challenge the evidence. Accordingly, we hold that, because advance notice would not have given Patrick any increased incentive or ability to introduce evidence or make arguments in rebuttal, the sentencing court’s failure to provide advance notice of its intention to rely on matters outside the record constitutes harmless error. 11 Patrick, 988 F.2d. at 648-49 (citations omitted); see also Nappi, 243 F.3d at 77172 (concluding that the defendant could not show that his substantial rights were affected under the third prong of plain error review in part because the information contained in an undisclosed state PSI, upon which the sentencing court erroneously relied, was “largely cumulative” to the information contained in the federal PSI). In sum, because the contents of the letter upon which the court relied were made available to defense counsel before sentencing, any error in failing to disclose the letter before sentencing was harmless.