Opinion ID: 1277356
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the Trial Court Deprived Defendant of His Right to a Fair and Impartial Jury by Failing to Dismiss Juror Venable for Hardship

Text: At the time of trial, Juror Mike Venable operated a crop-dusting business in which his income depended on seasonal work. At various points during the trial, Venable expressed to the court his concern regarding whether the proceedings would conclude in time for him to participate in the crop dusting he had planned to perform. Defendant contends that because juror Venable faced extreme hardship, the trial court erred in failing to dismiss Venable for good cause, as permitted by section 1089, leading to an abridgment of defendant's right to a fair trial, a fair and impartial jury, a reliable determination of guilt, due process, and fundamental fairness under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and their state constitutional analogues. [13] Defendant is mistaken. Near the outset of voir dire, Venable stated that I don't think a killing alone warrants the death penalty, and that he would be able to evaluate the case based upon the evidence presented. Shortly thereafter, defense counsel passed for cause. In response to the prosecutor's inquiry regarding why Venable could take the time to sit as a juror, Venable responded: I'm seasonal work, my primary duty is I cropdust and we're pretty seasonal. And the summer months are the busiest months. I do have other duties, but they're very light. Venable did not claim that jury service would pose a financial hardship (as did several other prospective jurors). Shortly after Venable was selected as a juror, on December 17, 1987, the following colloquy ensued: Venable: The question I have, you estimate approximately two and a half months? The Court: Right. Venable: If this thing runs in the end part of March and April that would present a  especially the month of April, will present a problem for me. The Court: What happens in April? Venable: That's when I make my money. The Court: What do you do? Venable: I'm a cropduster. The Court: Okay. Venable: I'm real seasonal. The Court: I don't think that will be a problem. If it is a problem, both counsel know about it, you've told us about it ahead of time and perhaps they can stipulate to an alternate coming in rather than excusing you [for] undue hardship. Venable: Okay. On the following day, December 18, 1987, Venable contacted the court (apparently by telephone) to express his misgivings regarding jury service. A note from the court clerk read as follows: Juror # 3, Mike Venable, contacted the court and indicated the more he thought about the length of this trial and he thought it may interfere with his cropdusting. He indicated his busiest time is the last part of February and the full month of March. (This is when he makes his money), [¶] The clerk called him back and indicated `it was too late.' He [Venable] just stated to me that we (the court) are aware of the problem with his job. The jury reached its guilt phase verdict on February 9, 1988, and was ordered back to court on February 22, to begin the penalty phase. The following colloquy ensued on February 9: The Court: Hello, Mr. Venable. You gave me a note that you had a question? Venable: Yes, Your Honor. As twice before I've talked to you about, you know, the time schedule of this has kind of lingered on longer than I thought I would be here. I wondered if it would be a good time where maybe you could bring in an alternate in my place to finish this trial, so I could get back to work. The Court: All right. Let me discuss that with counsel and then get back to you. But in the meantime could you plan to be here on the 22nd of February? Venable: Uh-huh. . The Court: We'll see you at that time, and I'll bring this to the attention of the attorneys. They've both heard your request. On February 11, 1988, the trial court made the following observations to counsel: Mr. Venable obviously does not want to be here. And if he's going to be forced to be here, I don't know what [his] reaction [to] that would be. I can understand that he has already voted for guilt and heard the evidence and already been a part of the chemistry of this particular jury, and perhaps for that reason, the District Attorney would like to keep him. But the other thing that could enter into it is if he becomes upset and starts to blame the Court and the District Attorney and the defense, he might not be the best of jurors. I suspect that what he tells me is not good cause, from what I've heard, to release him. But, if counsel would stipulate to ... release him I would obviously do that. But if counsel want to keep him I would not force a stipulation on you. The prosecutor thereafter indicated his concern that if Juror Venable were excused, other jurors might submit similar requests. Accordingly, the prosecutor expressed a preference that Juror Venable remain on the jury. Defense counsel indicated that he was prepared to stipulate to Venable's excusal. Noting that Venable still had Friday through Sunday each week to perform his work, the trial court informed counsel that Venable would remain on the jury. On February 23, 1988, just after the commencement of the penalty phase, the trial court informed counsel: Mr. Venable did come in and speak to me, he was very understanding and indicated that he's been able to work his schedule out so far and will continue to try to do so. [¶]... [¶] He also indicated on the week of March 19th, [Venable has] a contract ... to go down to Guadalajara and spray down there. He wouldn't be available then the week of the 21st through 25th, and he wanted to bring that to both your attention and if that can be worked around he said he'd be very appreciative of that fact and that other than that he thinks he can continue being a juror. [¶] My expression to him was he should show up at 9:15 tomorrow, I would bring this to both your attention, he could explain it to both of you tomorrow and you can ask him questions about that, and that in all likelihood we'll probably at least keep him here until he has to go to Guadalajara, we'd just see how the case progresses at that point. On the following day, February 24, 1988, the trial court engaged Juror Venable in the following colloquy: The Court: We had a brief conference, discussion late Monday and you brought to my attention the fact that your father's business, that is who you work for, has an obligation the week of March 19 involving Guadalajara. I brought that to the attention of both attorneys, I thought you should explain this to them and they could ask you additional questions. You can go ahead and tell me what you told me in chambers. Venable: Basically we are getting down to short strokes of the early fire season in Mexico. We have three airplanes going to leave the 20th of March. Now I can sit through this thing until that point but at that point I am going to need at least a couple weeks' leave of absence if this thing is going through that. I have management duties, flying duties, and basic everyday duties I do now. The Court: You told me that if possible you could take care of your duties down there in one week as opposed to two weeks? Venable: I can be relieved, all I got to do is get equipment there, people come off other contracts and they will come down and take those seats. The Court: So, basically, if we tried to work our schedule around being in recess from the 21st to the 25th, which would then leave you the weekends of the 19th all the way through the 27th, that would give you enough time and you'd be able to resume again on the 28th if necessary? Venable: Yeah, as I sit here, yeah, but a day or two either way is kind of tough when you're down there. The Court: All right. Venable: I can safely say now the whole month of April I'll be locally available, you know. The schedule you guys kept here for these last five weeks hasn't been as strenuous as I thought it was going to be. You left me two or three days and I can go to work from 7:00 to 8:30 and get the guys working in the morning and I am back by 4:00. That's why I have been able to sit through as long as I have sat through. I thought it would be done by February 15th, but I can see we're probably going to be looking at April now, aren't we? The Court: When we actually went through the initial questioning we were pretty clear on telling everybody that this was going to be to the end of March. ....................................... Venable: Uh, then when you specifically brought that point up that's when the first time I stood up and says, well, that is going to kind of infringe on me a little bit. You said, well, we'll work that out when we get to it. The Court: Okay. Following the exchange noted above, the court asked the prosecutor and defense counsel if they had any additional questions of Juror Venable. Each replied that he did not. Later that same day, the trial court inquired of Juror Venable whether he would be inconvenienced if the trial were conducted on Friday (normally the day in which the court addressed its other pending cases): I know you have got a problem with your crop dusting. Do you think you can work that out, you will have two days next week to do it, otherwise  Juror Venable replied: At this point I'd say push it just as fast as you can get it done, for me. On March 7, 1988, Juror Venable expressed concern to the trial court whether it's going to be three weeks to finish this up... or four weeks with the week we're taking off. (The one-week recess in trial was taken in part to accommodate Juror Venable's desire to crop dust in Mexico.) The trial court replied that [I]t may go to the week of [April] 4th, but that will be it for sure it looks like. Okay? Juror Venable: Okay. A trial court's decision whether to discharge a juror for good cause under Penal Code section 1089 is subject to review under the abuse-of-discretion standard. ( People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 989, 39 Cal. Rptr.2d 607, 891 P.2d 153, citing People v. Ashmus. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 986-987, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214; In re Mendes (1979) 23 Cal.3d 847, 852, 153 Cal.Rptr. 831, 592 P.2d 318,) As we shall explain, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to discharge Juror Venable. The record indicates that from the time Venable was selected as a juror, he repeatedly expressed concern to the trial court regarding the possibility that his service on defendant's jury might interfere with his crop-dusting duties. Venable assured the court, however, that if a one-week recess were granted in March to accommodate his desire to fulfill a particular crop-dusting job, he could continue serving as a juror. The court granted the recess, and Venable evidently was present in court whenever his attendance as a juror was required. There is no indication that he was unable to discharge his duties as a juror. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to discharge Juror Venable.' Although it is true that Juror Venable expressed an interest that the proceedings continue apace, the record does not indicate that he lacked the spiritual contentment and mental detachment that good jurors require, as alleged by defendant. (See Thiel v. Southern Pacific Company (1946) 328 U.S. 217, 232, 66 S.Ct. 984, 90 L.Ed. 1181.) Nor does the record demonstrate that Venable was unable to perform the functions of a juror. ( People v. Compton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 55, 60, 98 Cal.Rptr. 217, 490 P.2d 537.) Rather, Venable's comments suggest that he was concerned the trial might not conclude within the time period originally estimated by the trial court. In a lengthy capital trial, such concerns are not unusual; we perceive no abuse of discretion in the manner in which the trial court addressed those concerns. (See Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., supra, 328 U.S. at p. 224, 66 S.Ct. 984 [Jury service is a duty as well as a privilege of citizenship; it is a duty that cannot be shirked on a plea of inconvenience or decreased earning power. Only when financial [discomfort] is such as to impose a real burden and hardship does a valid excuse of this nature appear.].) We therefore reject defendant's contention that the trial court erred in refraining from excusing Juror Venable.
Defendant contends that the trial court violated his federal and state constitutional rights to due process of law, a fair trial, and an impartial jury when it denied defendant's pretrial motion for change of venue. (U.S. Const., Amends. V, VI, XIV; Cal. Const., art I, §§ 1, 15, 16; see also § 1033, subd. (a).) As we shall explain, the contention was waived below, but in any event, it lacked merit. Defendant submitted his motion for change of venue prior to the selection of the jury. The trial court rejected defendant's contention that pretrial publicity likely would sway public opinion within Riverside County toward the belief that defendant was guilty of the charged offenses. The trial court therefore denied the motion without prejudice to its renewal, stating that once jury selection commenced, the court would entertain another motion for change of venue at that time. Defendant refrained from renewing the motion. Under very similar circumstances, this court concluded in People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 654, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752, that the defendant, by failing to renew his change of venue motion after voir dire, had failed to preserve the issue for appeal. We stated in Williams: As we explained in People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1166 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315], when a trial court initially denies a change of venue motion without prejudice, a defendant must renew the motion after voir dire of the jury to preserve the issue for appeal. Here, although expressly invited by the court to renew the motion after jury selection, defendant failed to do so. (16 Cal.4th at pp. 654-655, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752; see generally, 4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal.Criminal Law (2d ed. 1989) Jurisdiction and Venue, § 1889, pp. 2226-2227, and cases cited.) Accordingly, defendant has failed to preserve the claim for appeal. Further, even if defendant properly had preserved the issue, his contention is without merit. The applicable law is settled. A change in venue must be granted when the defendant shows a reasonable likelihood that a fair trial cannot otherwise be had. The trial court typically considers the nature and gravity of the offense, the size of the community, the status of the defendant and the victim, and the nature and extent of the publicity. On appeal, the defendant must show that denial of the venue motion was error (i.e., that it was reasonably likely a fair trial could not be had at the time the motion was made) and that the error was prejudicial (i.e., that it was reasonably likely a fair trial was not in fact had). We will sustain the court's determination of the relevant facts where supported by substantial evidence. We independently review the court's ultimate determination of the reasonable likelihood of an unfair trial. ( People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 224, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643; see also People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1166-1167, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 806-807, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436; People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 941-942, 251 Cal.Rptr. 467, 760 P.2d 996.) The charged offenses were serious and had attracted the attention of the media. However, every capital case involves a serious charge. While this factor adds weight to a motion to change venue, it does not in itself require a change. ( People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1167, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.) Accordingly, this factor is not dispositive. ( People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 224, 10 Cal. Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643; People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d 787, 807, 1 Cal. Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436.) At the time of the guilt phase of the trial, which commenced in 1987, Riverside County had a population approaching 900,000 people. This circumstance did not weigh in favor of a change of venue. (See People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 852, 277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906 [rejecting a motion to change venue away from Riverside County, at a time when the population was described in the trial court as over 600,000]; People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1131, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306 [characterizing the size of Riverside County's population as a neutral factor]; see also People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 224, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643 [rejecting a motion to change venue away from Sacramento County, observing that the size [population in excess of 875,800] and metropolitan nature of the county weighed heavily against a change of venue]; People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1167, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315 [rejecting a motion to change venue away from Tulare County, with a population of 253,000, and observing that most recent successful venue motions have involved communities with substantially smaller populations].) Neither defendant's status, nor that of his victims, suggested a basis for a change in venue. Although these individuals were residents of Riverside County, the record is devoid of evidence suggesting that any one of them had attained a level of prominence that possibly might support a motion to change venue. As defendant himself has conceded, both the murder victim and defendant were relatively unknown citizens in the community. The extent of the pretrial publicity generated in the present case was not unusual or extreme. Apparently, only three articles appeared in a local newspaper. Two of the articles appeared in August 1986, well over one year prior to the commencement of trial in November 1987. Two of the three articles noted that defendant had been treated as a mentally disordered sex offender for nearly three years in Patton State Hospital, located in San Bernardino, and had been released despite warnings from doctors that he was still dangerous to others. These articles also noted that defendant had pleaded innocent to the charges filed against him. The third article, which emphasized a lawsuit filed by the surviving victim against the Riverside County Sheriffs Department (stemming from the department's treatment of her in the immediate aftermath of her ordeal), was published in July 1987, four months prior to trial. Defendant also alleged below that an undisclosed number of radio broadcasts addressed the story. The trial court found the reporting neutral, not inflammatory, and insufficient to sway public opinion. Nothing contained within the record leads us to reach a different conclusion. The publicity described in the present case was insignificant in comparison with other cases in which a denial of a motion to change venue was upheld. (See, e.g., People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 677, 250 Cal.Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217, overruled on other grounds by People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673 [media coverage noted defendant's history of mental illness, his convictions of 10 counts of murder, and death sentence]; Odle v. People (1982) 32 Cal.3d 932, 938-939, 187 Cal.Rptr. 455, 654 P.2d 225 [more than 150 newspaper articles, 70 of which mentioned the defendant in the headlines].) The circumstance that the articles attached to defendant's motion to change venue were printed well before trial commenced also weighed against a change of venue. (See People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d 787, 808, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436; People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1237, 283 Cal.Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163.) No evidence was submitted regarding the nature or length of the radio broadcasts. Defendant contends that six of the twelve jurors who eventually sat on [his] jury, in addition to two of the four alternates, stated during voir dire that they had heard something about the case through media reports. He asserts that the jurors' recollections demonstrate the pervasiveness, extent, and adverse impact of the media coverage, thereby presenting undeniable proof that the jury pool could not be impartial. Defendant is mistaken. Six prospective jurors expressed knowledge of the case; of these, three were excused, prior to the commencement of the trial. Our own review of the responses furnished by the three remaining prospective jurors who actually sat on defendant's jury reflects only a slight level of awareness. Although these individuals expressed a general familiarity with the crimes, none recalled seeing or hearing any reports regarding defendant. Moreover, the jurors stated that they could set aside anything they previously had heard or seen in the media in favor of the evidence presented at trial. None of the alternate jurors were empaneled as jurors, and thus they did not participate in the jury's deliberations. In view of the foregoing, it is clear that defendant has not established error or prejudice in the denial of his motion for change of venue. (See People v. Daniels, supra, 52 Cal.3d 815, 853-854, 277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906 [upholding denial of motion for change of venue away from Riverside County, even though eight of twelve jurors were exposed to pretrial news coverage, and where defendant had failed to exhaust his available peremptory challenges].)

At the guilt phase of the trial, defendant made three motions to relieve his appointed counsel, pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44 ( Marsden) . These motions were heard on September 28, 1987, October 30, 1987, and February 4, 1988. At each one of these hearings (conducted outside the jury's presence), the trial court afforded defendant an opportunity to enumerate his concerns. Defendant did so, on each occasion failing to persuade the trial court that denial of his request to substitute counsel would substantially impair his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. (See People v. Ortiz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 975, 980, fn. 1, 275 Cal.Rptr. 191, 800 P.2d 547.) The trial court therefore denied defendant's motions. Defendant contends that the trial court prejudicially erred in denying his Marsden motions. Before examining the governing legal principles in this area, we review the factual bases for defendant's claims.
At the first Marsden hearing, defendant contended that: (1) he had not seen trial counsel for approximately seven and one-half months, despite numerous requests, and counsel had failed to keep appointments with defendant on nine occasions; (2) defense investigators had not visited him with sufficient frequency and seemed unfamiliar with certain evidence that interested defendant; (3) he gave a defense investigator questions for trial counsel three months earlier and had not received a reply; (4) he told investigators he was mad, leading trial counsel to inform him that he [counsel] didn't care how I felt; (5) No one was ever interviewed on my case; and (6) trial counsel hasn't discussed anything with me. Trial counsel informed the court that he had announced his readiness to go to trial on April 24, 1987, but that the trial did not proceed on that date in deference to the request of cocounsel, who was preparing for the possibility of a penalty phase trial in this case and had requested a continuance. Trial counsel explained to the court that the necessary interviews had been conducted and the forensic evidence has all been reviewed heavily and thoroughly. Counsel added that defendant was free to call him collect at any time. Counsel believed that, in view of the readiness of the defense case, additional visits would not have been a productive use of time, and he did not believe the attorney client relationship with defendant had deteriorated. After hearing defendant's concerns, the trial court found that the nature of the relationship between defendant and his trial counsel had not reduced the likelihood that defendant would receive a fair trial or the effective assistance of counsel. The court concluded there had not been a deterioration of the attorney-client relationship sufficient to warrant granting defendant's Marsden motion to relieve counsel.
At the second Marsden hearing, defendant contended that: (1) trial counsel had performed an inadequate investigation, including a failure to interview witnesses; (2) trial counsel had not kept defendant adequately apprised of the progress of the case (for example, failing to permit defendant to read the police reports); and (3) trial counsel was very intimidating and had caused defendant to lose confidence in him. Trial counsel explained to the court that the pertinent witnesses had appeared at the preliminary hearing, so the defense knew the nature of their potential testimony at trial. He noted that the key prosecution witness  the surviving victim, Amy  refused to consent to an interview. He stated the rest of the case hinged on forensic evidence, and we have hired a forensic expert that has gone over totally and completely and very thoroughly the forensic evidence ... to be presented against Mr. Hart. Trial counsel stated that he had reviewed with defendant the evidence noted in the police reports. Counsel made the tactical decision not to provide defendant copies of the police reports, themselves, based on a concern that if read by another inmate, the reports might lead that other inmate to testify falsely against defendant. He believed defendant's biggest complaint was that he was lonesome.... In denying defendant's motion, the trial court informed defendant that counsel had more experience in capital cases than any other attorney in the county, adding: I find that the attorney-client relationship has not really broken down and that if there is a problem here, that problem is really a misplaced [one].... The court also observed: Because it's a difficult case does not mean that your attorney is not concerned and not working for you.
At the third Marsden hearing (conducted after the parties had rested their guilt phase cases), defendant contended that: (1) trial counsel was remiss in not challenging the lineup in which the surviving victim identified him (even though defendant acknowledged we're not disputing the fact I was up there [at the crime scene]); and (2) trial counsel failed to impeach the victim regarding certain aspects of her testimony, or to call witnesses who would have done so. Trial counsel explained that the issues of concern to defendant had been considered and investigated and would be noted in his closing argument to the jury, which he had discussed with defendant. Trial counsel indicated that he had rejected defendant's suggestion to present a defense based on his cocaine usage, noting that such a defense would not be applicable in this case (because the prosecution's theory of the case was that the murder was committed in the course of a rape, thereby obviating the need for the prosecution to prove premeditation or deliberation). Counsel acknowledged that defendant had expressed an interest in testifying at the guilt phase; in counsel's view, under no circumstances could a competent attorney allow Mr. Hart to get on the stand during this phase of the trial and allow him to be cross-examined by the prosecution when ... we are doing our best to keep from [being placed] in front of the jury the factors in aggravation which have already been filed. The trial court denied defendant's Marsden motion. In so doing, the court observed: For the record ... the investigation is perhaps even more extensive than I had anticipated and I anticipated even an extensive investigation, so from what I've heard here, everything brought up, you have already looked to, Mr. Barnett, so I commend you on that.
The governing legal principles are well settled. When a defendant seeks to discharge his appointed counsel and substitute another attorney, and asserts inadequate representation, the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of the attorney's inadequate performance. [Citation.] A defendant is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the first appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation [citation] or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result [citations].' ( People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 854, 251 Cal.Rptr. 227, 760 P.2d 423; see also People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 124-125, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44.) ( People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 204, 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302.) [Substitution is a matter of judicial discretion. Denial of the motion is not an abuse of discretion unless the defendant has shown that a failure to replace the appointed attorney would `substantially impair' the defendant's right to assistance of counsel. ( People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 435, 285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273, citing Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, 123, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44; see also Bland v. Dept. of Corrections (9th Cir.1994) 20 F.3d 1469, 1475 [trial court's refusal to substitute counsel is reviewed for abuse of discretion; denial of a motion to substitute counsel implicates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel].) At each one of three Marsden hearings conducted in the present case, the trial court provided defendant with an opportunity to set forth his complaints regarding the assistance he was receiving from appointed counsel. The trial court also invited comment from defendant's trial counsel, who indicated on each occasion that he had investigated the case thoroughly and was aware of defendant's concerns. Although counsel did not share defendant's view as to the significance of the matters that defendant cited, counsel never wavered from his belief that defendant could benefit from his representation and that the attorney-client relationship had not deteriorated to a degree that would warrant substitution of counsel. The trial court concluded that counsel's representation of defendant neither was inadequate nor marked by irreconcilable conflict. The record amply supports each one of the trial court's rulings denying defendant's Marsden motions. At the first hearing, the trial court reasonably concluded that trial counsel was prepared for trial and therefore did not need to visit defendant on a regular basis. [T]he number of times one sees his attorney, and the way in which one relates with his attorney, does not sufficiently establish incompetence. ( People v. Silva (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604, 622, 247 Cal.Rptr. 573, 754 P.2d 1070.) At the second hearing, the trial court reasonably concluded that trial counsel's decision not to provide defendant with copies of the police reports was a tactical decision made in defendant's best interests. (See People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 859-860, 251 Cal.Rptr. 227, 760 P.2d 423 [A disagreement concerning tactics is ... insufficient to compel the discharge of appointed counsel, unless it signals a complete breakdown in the attorney-client relationship.].) At the third hearing, the trial court recognized the tactical bases for trial counsel to refrain from challenging the testimony of victim Amy R. regarding minor details of her testimony, and reiterated the view that trial counsel's investigation had been more than adequate. In sum, the record is clear that the trial court provided defendant with repeated opportunities to voice his concerns, and upon considering those concerns reasonably found them to be insufficient to warrant relieving trial counsel. We therefore find no basis for concluding that the trial court either failed to conduct a proper Marsden inquiry or abused its discretion in declining to substitute counsel. ( People v. Fierro, supra, 1 Cal.4th 173, 206-207, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302; People v. Silva, supra, 45 Cal.3d 604, 622, 247 Cal.Rptr. 573, 754 P.2d 1070.)
Amy filed a civil suit alleging that the Riverside County Sheriffs Department mistreated her and lied to her at the time she reported the murder of her friend, Diane. Prior to commencement of the parties' opening statements (at a hearing conducted outside the jury's presence pursuant to Evidence Code section 402), the trial court ruled that the allegations set forth in the civil suit would be inadmissible as character evidence against sheriffs department officials, but might be admissible as impeachment evidence if discrepancies appeared in the testimony offered at trial by Amy and the officials. During trial, defendant's counsel requested a second hearing on this issue outside the jury's presence. At that hearing, counsel contended that evidence pertaining to Amy's civil suit was relevant in that it might be motivation for Amy to make a stronger statement for herself, and for the officers to make a protective statement for themselves. The prosecutor contended that evidence of Amy's civil suit was irrelevant and, even if it were relevant, should be excluded pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. [14] In support of his argument, the prosecutor observed that 90 percent of the investigative reports prepared by the detectives in this case or  who are the subjects of the civil lawsuit, were prepared at sometime prior to the lawsuit even being filed. The trial court found: Th[is] court's confident that within the meaning of Evidence Code section 352, whatever probative value that evidence would have, and I can't think of very much, is substantially outweighed by the probability that it ... will first of all necessitate undue consumption of time and will create a substantial danger, undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, and of misleading the jurors. [¶] I think that what goes into filing a lawsuit [] that motivation is really impossible for us to know, and what [e]ffect that lawsuit has on people testifying, especially when there are written police reports, especially when there are statements made before a lawsuit was even conceived as a possible way to go. [¶] It strikes me that there's just not probative value to that. So, for those reasons, the court will exclude that evidence. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in excluding evidence of Amy's civil suit. In defendant's view, evidence of that lawsuit provided a relevant basis upon which to attack [Amy's] credibility. (Evid Code, § 780.) [15] Defendant contends that he was entitled to expose the biases or motives to lie that may have been held by the witnesses who testified against him, and that the trial court's ruling infringed upon his rights to a fair trial, to counsel, to confront the witnesses against him, to due process of law, and to a reliable verdict under the United States and California Constitutions. Defendant's position regarding the probative value of evidence concerning Amy's civil suit has evolved during this litigation. At trial, defendant sought to introduce the evidence to highlight the Character of sheriffs department officers and, subsequently, to impeach their testimony and that of Amy. On appeal, however, defendant contends, among other things, that the evidence would have informed the jury that the Sheriffs Department itself suspected [Amy] of. involvement in the murder of Diane Harper. To the extent that defendant's assertion of evidentiary error rests upon a theory of admissibility not presented to the trial court, we conclude that defendant has waived this claim. In any event, defendant's contentions do not withstand scrutiny. Assuming, without deciding, that evidence of Amy's civil suit satisfied the definition of relevancy set forth in Evidence Code section 210, [16] we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered evidence pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. In basing its ruling upon the principles set forth in the latter statute, the trial court accepted defendant's contention  at least, for purposes of argument  that the proffered evidence had some relevance. As noted, the trial court thereafter concluded that Amy's civil suit had only minimal probative value, and that such value was substantially outweighed by the probability that presentation of the evidence would require the undue consumption of time and would create a substantial risk of confusing the issues and misleading the jurors. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. When an objection to evidence is raised under Evidence Code section 352, the trial court is required to weigh the evidence's probative value against the dangers of prejudice, confusion, and undue time consumption. Unless these dangers `substantially outweigh' probative value, the objection must be overruled. (See People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 688, 248 Cal.Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253.) On appeal, the ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 973, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214.) ( People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 609, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635.) Here, the trial court properly could conclude the circumstance that Amy filed a civil suit against the Riverside County Sheriffs Department was of attenuated significance to the issues contested at trial, particularly inasmuch as the observations of sheriffs deputies that were material to the present case were set forth to a great extent in reports prepared well before Amy filed her civil suit, and because the deputies' observations and recollections could be tested on cross-examination on the basis of those reports. Further, the trial court properly could determine that the admission of evidence of Amy's civil suit would have permitted the focus of the testimony to shift away from the events leading to and involving the charged offenses, to the conduct of law enforcement officers after those offenses had been committed. The trial court acted within its discretion in determining that such a shift presented a substantial risk of confusing or misleading the jury. Nor do we find any constitutional infirmity in the trial court's ruling. The court merely exercised its discretionary power to preclude examination on collateral matters. (See Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674.) Finally, even if we were to assume that the trial court erred in excluding this evidence, reversal would not be warranted. Defendant's involvement in the murder of Diane Harper and the sexual assault of Amy was firmly established. His defense focused upon the nature of the sexual misconduct committed at the crime scene. Hence, under any prejudicial error standard, the asserted error was harmless. (See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705; People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1125, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243.)
Defendant contends that while it was clear that [he] was with the [victims on the day the crimes were committed], and had been at the murder scene, the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of the first degree murder of Diane with special circumstances, and of the sexual offenses committed against Amy. In addressing defendant's contention, we apply well settled law. 'In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence for a special circumstance  as for a conviction  the question we ask is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the allegation beyond a reasonable doubt.' ( People v. Rowland [(1992)] 4 Cal.4th [238,] 271, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 841 P.2d 897, quoting People v. Mickey [(1991)] 54 Cal.3d [612,] 678, 286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84, italics in original.) ( People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1090, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40, fn. omitted, overruled on other grounds, People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) As we shall explain, in view of the standard set forth in the decisions cited above, defendant's contention is without merit.
The prosecution tried the case under a theory that the murder of Diane either was premeditated or was perpetrated during the commission of a rape or attempted rape. Defendant's claim of insufficiency of the evidence thus relates to the issues of intent to kill, the underlying felony of rape, and an independent felonious purpose on his part. (See People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1090, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40.) Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that he committed the murderous act. The evidence of defendant's culpability in the charged offenses, noted below, makes clear that a rational trier of fact could have found that defendant, having committed or attempted a sexual assault upon Diane, thereafter killed her, and that both the prosecution's premeditation and felony-murder theories were established beyond a reasonable doubt. Our decision in People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th 1048, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40, summarized the principles that guide our analysis of defendant's contentions relating to the first degree murder of Diane: `Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being ... with malice aforethought.' (... § 187, subd. (a).) [¶] As pertinent here, `[a]ll murder which is perpetrated ... by any... kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing ... is murder of the first degree....' (... § 189.) The mental state required is, of course, a deliberate and premeditated intent to kill with malice aforethought. (See ... §§ 187, subd. (a), 189.) [¶] Similarly, `[a]ll murder ... which is Committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate,' certain enumerated felonies, including rape, is `murder of the first degree....' (... § 189.) The mental state required is simply the specific intent to commit the underlying felony; neither intent to kill, deliberation, premeditation, nor malice aforethought is needed. (See ... People v. Coefield (1951) 37 Cal.2d 865, 868-869, 236 P.2d 570; see, generally, 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal.Criminal Law [(2d ed.1988)], Crimes Against the Person, § 470, p. 528; see also People v. Hernandez (1988) 47 Cal.3d 315, 346, 253 Cal.Rptr. 199, 763 P.2d 1289 [stating that `[w]e have required as part of the felonymurder doctrine that the jury find the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit one of the enumerated felonies, even where that felony is a crime such as rape'].) There is no requirement of a strict `causal' (e.g., People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1016, 248 Cal.Rptr. 568, 755 P.2d 1017) or `temporal' (e.g., People v. Hernandez, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 348, 253 Cal.Rptr. 199, 763 P.2d 1289) relationship between the `felony' and the `murder.' All that is demanded is that the two `are parts of one continuous transaction.' (E.g., People v. Ainsworth, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1016, 248 Cal.Rptr. 568, 755 P.2d 1017; see, e.g., People v. Hernandez, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 348, 253 Cal.Rptr. 199, 763 P.2d 1289.) There is, however, a requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the underlying felony. (See, e.g., People v. Whitehorn (1963) 60 Cal.2d 256, 264 [32 Cal.Rptr. 199, 383 P.2d 783].) ( People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1085, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40.) A rational trier of fact readily could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted with premeditation and deliberation in intentionally killing Diane. Dr. Dewitt Hunter, the Riverside County pathologist who performed the autopsy on the victim, testified that at least five distinct blows  each one of which was capable of rendering the victim unconscious  were exerted against the back of the victim's head, probably with the use of a rock or a brick like instrument. The victim's skull was fractured, a circumstance that required a large amount of force. Her head was driven six inches into the ground. Beside her was a shoe impression that matched one of defendant's shoes, as well as a beer bottle that matched the beer that the trio had purchased earlier that day. Amy testified that defendant declared to her: [L]ook, you're friend was an asshole, she called me a few names, and I think she's dead. The nature and severity of Diane's wounds, together with defendant's own statements, support a finding that defendant willfully and with premeditation murdered her. (See People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 433, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388; People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 270, 221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861; see also People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 247, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643 [the jury could conclude that the defendant killed his victim to silence her as a possible witness to her own sexual assault].) [17] Similarly, a rational trier of fact could have determined with the requisite degree of certainty that defendant murdered Diane while he was engaged in raping her or attempting to rape her. Her partially clothed body (naked from the waist down, with panties wrapped around one leg), the evidence of force and violence including abrasions and contusions on the victim's thighs, the presence of a foreign pubic hair on her thigh, the reddening of her vaginal area, and the discovery of a Vaseline-like substance near her vaginal entrance (the same substance defendant used in his rape of Amy), support the reasonable inference that a rape or attempted rape occurred. ( People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 405, 276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221; People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 553, 257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244.) Amy testified that when defendant attempted to sodomize her, and had difficulty obtaining an erection, he informed her: [I]t's hard for me to get it up after I just got it on with your friend. In view of the evidence presented, a rational trier of fact reasonably could have found that defendant committed the first degree murder of Diane while engaged in the course of a rape or attempted rape.
Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence in support of the special circumstances involving rape and sodomy. He specifically challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as it pertained to whether penetration had occurred, whether Diane was alive when the crimes of rape and sodomy allegedly were committed, and whether the rape and sodomy were part of a continuous transaction with the murder. None of defendant's challenges have merit. The prosecution's pathologist testified there was no physical evidence of forcible sexual entry into Diane's vaginal or anal orifices. Defendant seizes upon the absence of physical evidence of penetration to assert the insufficiency of the evidence in support of the special circumstances of rape and sodomy. The pathologist's testimony, however, did not suggest that penetration could not have occurred, and the jury reasonably could have found from the other evidence reviewed above, including defendant's statement to Amy, that a completed rape and sodomy had occurred. Furthermore, the prosecution was not required to establish the completion of the underlying felonies in order to establish the special circumstances. Either of the respective special circumstances at issue may be found true if the murder was committed while defendant was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of rape or sodomy. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(C), (D); People v. Wright, supra, 52 Cal.3d 367, 405, 276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221.) As noted above, there was overwhelming evidence to support a finding that defendant had sexually assaulted Diane and at least had attempted to rape and sodomize her, and that the murder occurred during the commission of these offenses. Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence that the murder occurred during the commission of, or attempted commission of, or in flight immediately following the commission of, rape or sodomy. The evidence, however, supported a finding that Diane resisted defendant's assault, called him some names, was sexually attacked, and thereafter was killed. The prosecution's pathologist opined that there had been at least an attempt to sexually assault Diane prior to her death. According to the testimony given by Amy, defendant explained that his impotence was related to having just got it on with the murder victim. The evidence supports a finding that the murder occurred during, or immediately after, the commission or attempted commission of, the underlying felonies of rape and sodomy of Diane. Defendant also challenges the adequacy of the evidence in support of the special circumstances, contending that the prosecution failed to establish that Diane was alive when the crimes of rape and sodomy allegedly were committed. The evidence, however, refutes defendant's position; contusions on Diane's thighs and reddening of her vaginal area were consistent with a forcible sexual assault, and defendant's statements to Amy that Diane called him a few names, and I just got it on with your friend, indicate that Diane had attempted to resist defendant's attack and that defendant had committed or attempted to commit rape and sodomy While Diane still was alive. Thus, the jury reasonably could conclude that Diane was alive during defendant's sexual attack upon her. Moreover, when an individual attempts to rape (or sodomize) a victim, reasonably or mistakenly believing that the victim is alive, the perpetrator is guilty of having attempted the underlying felony. (See People v. Thompson (1993) 12 Cal. App.4th 195, 203, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 333; see also People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 525, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385 [it... does not matter whether actual penetration did not occur until after death for purposes of the special circumstance]; People v. Guzman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 915, 949-952, 248 Cal.Rptr. 467, 755 P.2d 917 [explaining the scope of the rape special circumstance].) Accordingly, we reject defendant's claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the rape and sodomy special circumstances.
Defendant contends that the evidence relating to the sexual offenses committed against Amy was insufficient. In fact, however, the evidence was abundant. Amy's own testimony, which provided graphic detail of the attack, would have been sufficient by itself. That testimony was corroborated by physical evidence: seminal fluid was found on Amy's slip, bruises and abrasions were found on her body, her perineum was injured and there was much sand in this area, and sand-type particles also were found inside her vagina. In addition to the emergency room physician's testimony voicing the opinion that Amy had been sexually assaulted, and Amy's own testimony to the same effect, the physical evidence clearly was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of the sexual offenses committed against her. [18]

Defendant contends that the admission of sixteen photographic slides, three photographs, and one videotape prepared by investigators, depicting the route to the crime scene, was unduly cumulative and prejudicial and demonstrated a clear abuse of discretion. He further alleges that the admission of this evidence violated his constitutional rights to due process of law, a fair trial, and a fair and reliable determination of guilt and penalty. (See U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th, and 14th Amends.) As we shall explain, defendant's failure at trial to interpose a timely objection to the photographic evidence constitutes a waiver of the present challenge. Further, even if defendant timely had objected, the trial court clearly would have acted within its discretion in admitting the evidence he challenges on appeal. The sixteen slides depict Diane's body as follows: Six slides show the body, partially clothed, lying facedown at the crime scene. Two other slides show the victim's feet, lying upon shopping bags, and a third slide shows the shopping bags only. Another slide shows the victim's feet, with her underwear nearby. One slide shows her hip. One slide shows the bloodied rear of her skull. One slide shows blood on debris nearby. Three slides show the body after investigators had rolled it over, including one close-up of the victim's face. The three photographs (eight inches by ten inches in size) representing, prints of photographic slides, depict the following: one photograph shows the victim's body lying facedown, partially clothed; a second shows a beer bottle and a depression in the ground, and the third photograph is an autopsy photograph depicting the victim's mouth, trachea, and larynx, showing debris. As noted, the videotape shows the route to the crime scene. It was made by investigators on April 15, 1986, approximately three weeks after the crimes were committed. A portion of the videotape was taken from a passenger vehicle, and the balance was made while the cameraman walked along a dirt footpath, as marked by sheriffs yellow tape, to the crime scene. The tape includes minimal discernible sound, other than the cameraman's footsteps and breathing.
Prior to the giving of opening statements, the following colloquy ensued between the attorneys and the court (outside the jury's presence), regarding the photographic slides. Defense counsel: Your Honor, the first matter I think we should cover is that [the deputy district attorney] intends to use some slides during his opening presentation Monday, his opening statement, I went to his office yesterday, and spent, I guess, an hour and a half going over the slides, et cetera, with [him] and even seeing them  I mean not just going over them. I saw them projected on the wall, et cetera, et cetera. I find there is no slide there that I could object to. The court: In terms of being outrageously gross? Defense counsel: That's right. Under [Evidence Code section] 352, I could not say that they were more hurtful than beneficial to him or anything else. They portray factual reality. Some of them may not be what I would like to see, but I want to go on the record that I can't raise a single objection, and I would not if we were here and he was having to show them against the wall today. The court: I take it we don't have any autopsy picture where the body is cut open or anything like that. Defense counsel: No. The only picture we have  I mean  there is a picture of the body, of the deceased girl at the scene in about two or three positions, but one is as she was found, one as she is turned over, and one a little closer. There are footprint, tire print, pathway [slides]. The court: Immediately near the body? Defense counsel: Yes. The court: Okay. I agree with you then. I would in all likelihood  Defense counsel: In fact, I would say having seen a ton of pictures, these are as little inflammatory as possible to get the opening statement made. The court: All right. Defense counsel: So I cannot object about those, so I want that on the record so that when we start tomorrow, we'll understand. [¶] As we proceed, there may be a time when we have to have a brief [Evidence Code section] 402 hearing on other pictures, but as of this point, that's fine. The court: All right.... [¶] I might indicate for the record that I was advised that there was the intention  it was the intention of the District Attorney to use slides, and it seems to me the law is quite clear that slides can be used as part of an opening statement to illustrate the testimony.... [I]t's been my experience in this county that slides have been used on numerous occasions and other counties almost without exception at this point in time. Defense counsel: Yes, Your Honor. These are slides  this is a portrayal that the jury would see all of that in the form of introduced evidence. The court: All right. Defense counsel: So there is no objection as to the slide show that we will be subjected to Monday morning on the 11th. The prosecutor thereafter displayed the slides during his opening statement. The defense did not lodge an objection. During the prosecution's case-in-chief, the slides were shown in the course of the testimony given by Riverside County Detective Michael Lackie. Again, the defense did not lodge an objection. When the prosecutor subsequently moved that the slides be introduced into evidence, defense counsel interjected: Well, I object to all of them but I don't have any grounds for them, so let them have their slide show. During Detective Lackie's testimony, the prosecutor offered to play the videotape, showing the route to the crime scene. The court asked defense counsel if he had any objection. Defense counsel responded in the negative, leading to the following colloquy. The court: Have you had a chance to review [the videotape]? Defense counsel: No, but we have talked about it, [the prosecutor] and I, and it's just a  The court: Demonstrative evidence? The prosecutor: `Yes, and the defense has been provided a copy of this video previously. Defense counsel: We talked about it, it's fine. The prosecutor thereafter played the videotape for the jury, while asking Detective Lackie certain questions regarding the scenes shown on the tape. The court admonished the jury that the infrequent bits of dialogue heard on the videotape  primarily, instructions to the cameraman  were not admitted for any evidentiary purpose and should be disregarded.
As noted, defendant challenges the trial court's rulings that permitted the introduction of the photographic evidence. Because defendant failed to interpose an objection that set forth the specific grounds for the objection, the issue may not be raised for the first time on appeal. (Evid.Code, § 353, subd. (a); People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 979-980, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704; see also People v. Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d 152, 187-188, 279 Cal.Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949 [explaining the purpose of the requirement]; People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 788, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330 [rejecting the defendant's constitutional claims based upon his failure to set forth a sufficient constitutional objection when the evidence was introduced].) Even if defendant's challenge had been preserved, we find no error in the trial court's rulings admitting the photographic evidence. `The admission of photographs of a victim lies within the broad discretion of the trial court when a claim is made that they are unduly gruesome or inflammatory. [Citations.] The court's exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless the probative value of the photographs clearly is outweighed by their prejudicial effect. [Citations.]' ( People v. Crittenden [(1994)] 9 Cal.4th [83,] 133-134 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887].) ( People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 18, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 939 P.2d 748.) The photographic evidence corroborated the testimony given by prosecution witnesses regarding evidence found at the crime scene and events that transpired on the day the crimes were committed. Specifically, the challenged slides depict the remote area in which Diane's body was found and her partially clothed body (supporting the prosecution's theory that defendant sexually assaulted her), certain grievous wounds she suffered (probative of the issues of intent and malice), and evidence that linked defendant to the crime scene (corroborating Amy's testimony). The photographic evidence clearly was probative of the planning and deliberation with which the crimes were committed. ( People v. Scheid, supra, 16 Cal.4th 1, 18, 65 Cal. Rptr.2d 348, 939 P.2d 748; see also People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 134, 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887; People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th 140, 180-182, 24 Cal. Rptr.2d 664, 862 P.2d 664.) Insofar as defendant is contending that the trial court was required to exclude some or all of the photographic evidence under Evidence Code section 352, because such evidence was cumulative of the testimonial evidence presented, the contention lacks merit. (See People v. Scheid, supra, 16 Cal.4th 1, 19, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 939 P.2d 748, and cases cited therein.) To the extent defendant is contending that the photographic evidence was unduly cumulative to other physical evidence or cumulative in and of itself, we reject that theory as well. (See People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 115, 246 Cal.Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37 [Even somewhat cumulative photographic evidence may be admitted if relevant.].) The amount of photographic evidence admitted was not excessive, in view of the particular facts of the case. Further, the record reflects that each of the challenged slides had probative value, as did the videotape. With regard to the issue whether the photographic evidence had a prejudicial effect, `[w]e have described the prejudice referred to in Evidence Code section 352 as characterizing evidence that uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against a party as an individual, while having only slight probative value with regard to the issues. [Citation.] As we previously have observed, victim photographs and other graphic items of evidence in murder cases always are disturbing. [Citation.]' [Citations.] ( People v. Scheid, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 19, 65 Cal. Rptr.2d 348, 939 P.2d 748.). Our independent review of the photographic evidence introduced at the trial convinces us that, although a few of the slides and photographs are unpleasant, none is unduly gory or inflammatory. As aptly observed by defense counsel at the pretrial hearing, the photographic evidence portray[s] factual reality.... I would say having seen a ton of pictures, these are as little inflammatory as possible to get the opening statement made.... The photographic evidence clearly is not unduly gruesome relative to the evidence admitted in other cases involving murder victims. (See People v. Scheid, supra, 16 Cal.4th 1, 19, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 939 P.2d 748 [upholding admission of photograph of bloodied gunshot victims, handcuffed together]; People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th 140, 180-182, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 664, 862 P.2d 664 [upholding admission of photograph of mummified bodies following exhumation]; People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 897, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712 [upholding admission of large photographs of murder victim and her girlfriend found in a ravine]; People v. Thompson, supra, 45 Cal.3d 86, 115-116, 246 Cal.Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37 [upholding admission of photographs of victim's head and ear, through which fatal stab wound was inflicted].) Of the sixteen slides challenged here, only one slide shows Diane's face, and two others show the front of her body. The other slides show the victim facedown, or not at all. Among the three challenged photographs is one of the victim lying facedown at the crime scene, and one autopsy photograph of her mouth, trachea, and larynx, showing debris. These photographs have probative value and are unlikely to have provoked an inflammatory response among the jurors. Nor is there anything revealed in the videotape that could be construed as unduly gruesome or inflammatory. In sum, we find that the trial court reasonably could determine that the probative value of the photographic evidence outweighed its potentially prejudicial effect. We thus conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 in admitting the photographic evidence. (See People v. Scheid, supra, 16 Cal.4th 1, 20, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 939 P.2d 748, and cases cited therein.) [19]
Defendant contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by informing the jury on nine occasions that he (the prosecutor) personally had been involved in critical aspects of the investigation, including visits to the crime scene and the subsequent autopsy of Diane. Defendant asserts that such references were calculated to influence the jury improperly by casting the prosecutor in the role of unsworn witness. (See, e.g., U.S. v. Edwards (9th Cir.1998) 154 F.3d 915, 921.) The challenged comments were made at various stages of defendant's trial, and are set forth in the margin. [20] As defendant acknowledges, none of the references challenged here were the subject of an objection interposed at trial. Defendant contends, however, that his failure to object should not operate as a waiver of the claim (see People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 171, 5 Cal. Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781 [failure to object to misconduct generally waives claim]; People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 447, 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610 [same]), because the harm could not have been cured by a prompt objection and admonition to the jury. (See People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d 754, 794, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330; People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 34, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468; People v. Kirkes (1952) 39 Cal.2d 719, 249 P.2d 1.) Further, defendant contends that the asserted misconduct by the prosecutor was prejudicial and requires reversal of the judgment. We previously have rejected arguments that were virtually identical to the claimed exception to the waiver rule asserted by defendant here. (See, e.g., People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 473, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373; People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1215, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 456, 892 P.2d 1199.) We perceive no reason why a prompt objection and admonition could not have cured the asserted harm of the prosecutor's remarks and perhaps averted many of the references by the prosecutor. (See, e.g., People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 473, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373; People v. Rowland, supra, 4 Cal.4th 238, 274-275, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 841 P.2d 897; People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 566-567, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290.) Therefore, we conclude that defendant did not properly preserve this claim for appeal. [21] Moreover, even if defendant had preserved his claim and we were to assume that the challenged remarks of the prosecutor constituted misconduct, we would conclude that in view of the overwhelming evidence against defendant and the nature of the prosecutor's comments, there is no possibility that the jury would have reached a verdict more favorable to defendant in the absence of these comments. ( People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 261, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 421, 861 P.2d 1107.)
At the prosecutor's request, and without objection from the defense, the trial court instructed the jury regarding destruction of evidence, pursuant to the pattern instruction set forth in CALJIC No. 2.06. [22] Defendant contends that in so instructing the jury, the trial court committed reversible error, because the record does not demonstrate that evidence was destroyed. We conclude this claim lacks merit. Well settled standards apply: It is an elementary principle of law that before a jury can be instructed that it may draw a particular inference, evidence must appear in the record which, if believed by the jury, will support the suggested inference. ( People v. Carmen (1951) 36 Cal.2d 768, 773, 228 P.2d 281.) Whether or not any given set of facts may constitute suppression or attempted suppression of evidence from which a trier of fact can infer a consciousness of guilt on the part of a defendant is a question of law. Thus in order for a jury to be instructed that it can infer a consciousness of guilt from suppression of adverse evidence by a defendant, there must be some evidence in the record which, if believed by the jury, will sufficiently support the suggested inference. ( People v. Hannon (1977) 19 Cal.3d 588, 597, 138 Cal.Rptr. 885, 564 P.2d 1203.) To support an inference that the defendant attempted to suppress evidence, the record need not establish that the evidence actually was destroyed. (See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, supra, 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1139-1140, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1 [CALJIC No. 2.06 properly given where circumstantial evidence suggested that defendant threw a knife from a motor vehicle, although the knife subsequently was recovered]; People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 304, fn 7, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585 [CALJIC No. 2.06 properly given, based upon evidence of defendant's postoffense substitution of the license plates on the victim's car]; People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 797-798, 833, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865 [rejecting the defendant's contention that the giving of CALJIC No. 2.06 was improper absent a showing that he was aware that the items he destroyed constituted evidence, where the defendant admitted throwing his prison clothes and prison-issue tennis shoes into the ocean]; see also People v. Echevarria (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 444, 451, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 840 [CALJIC No. 2.06 properly given based upon evidence that, after the murder, defendant shaved off his beard and mustache and cut his hair]; People v. Fitzpatrick (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1290, 1296-1297, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 808 [CALJIC No. 2.06 properly given based upon circumstantial evidence indicating that defendant threw murder weapon into a gutter, where pieces of a rifle were located in a nearby storm drain catch basin].) In the present case, the record discloses evidence that, after Diane was murdered, defendant disposed of her purse, including her identification, at Lake Matthews, removed and replaced bumper stickers on his car, burned a pair of tennis shoes, and used plywood to shield his car from view. Furthermore, when defendant was arrested, he wore his hair parted in the middle, wavy and fluffy, similar to the style Amy had described, but at the in-person lineup, defendant wore his hair wet or oily, and combed straight back. The next day, defendant returned to his previously preferred dry look. The jury reasonably could infer from the foregoing evidence that defendant attempted to suppress evidence. Actual destruction of that evidence was not required. The trial court therefore properly instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.06. ( People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1140, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1.) [23]
At trial, the prosecution's theory of the case was that defendant's effort to entice the girls into his vehicle and drive them to a remote area was part of a premeditated plan to commit rape, and that the murder of Diane was committed in the course of perpetrating rape. As noted, the defense did not deny that defendant was the man who took the girls to the remote area and assaulted them, killing Diane; instead, defense counsel argued to the jury that the evidence suggested Diane had been killed in the course of defendant's having committed, or having attempted to commit, sodomy, and therefore supported no more than a verdict of second degree felony murder. (See fn. 2, ante. ) The trial court instructed the jury on the law of murder (CALJIC No. 8.10 (1983 rev.)), further explaining the elements of first and second degree murder as well as felony murder. With respect to the latter theory, the trial court instructed the jury that under the law applicable at the time, a killing committed during the course of a rape or attempt to commit rape was first degree felony murder, and that a killing committed during the course of a sodomy, or attempt to commit sodomy, was second degree felony murder. Defendant did not object to any of these instructions. Defendant now contends that the jury instructions were impermissibly ambiguous and that the trial court failed to fulfill its sua sponte duty to offer clarifying instructions informing the jury that a first degree murder could not be based upon the underlying felony of sodomy or attempted sodomy, even though first degree murder committed in the commission of such crimes could support a special circumstance finding. Defendant's failure to request such a clarifying instruction at trial, however, waives his claim on appeal. (See People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1024, 264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627, [A party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete unless the party has requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language.]; People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 218, 260 Cal.Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285 [same].) Moreover, the jury instructions were not ambiguous. The jurors were instructed that if they found defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, then they were to determine whether either special circumstance was true. The jurors also were instructed to decide each special circumstance separately. These instructions correctly stated the law; if defendant wanted additional, clarifying instructions, he should have requested them. No ambiguity appearing, the trial court complied with its duty to fully instruct the jury on the law applicable ( People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 323, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311, overruled on other grounds, People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 200, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531) and had no duty to further instruct the jury. [24] Relying upon Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809, defendant further contends that the trial court had a duty to instruct specially on partial verdicts and to provide separate verdict forms as to possible levels of murder, in order to ensure that the jury considered the rape and sodomy special circumstances separately. Defendant's reliance upon Stone is misplaced, however, as that case involved a jury that was unable to reach a verdict. (31 Cal.3d at pp. 507-509, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809.) In the present case, there was no indication of a deadlocked jury.
Defendant contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel based upon certain failings of his attorney prior to and during the guilt phase of the trial. Specifically, defendant contends that trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to (1) challenge an allegedly coercive and suggestive lineup, conducted in the absence of an attorney (at a time when defendant was represented by the Office of the Riverside Public Defender), (2) seek the exclusion of physical evidence derived from statements that purportedly were obtained in violation of defendant's rights under Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, (3) prepare and articulate a defense, (4) request a hearing pursuant to Evidence Code section 402 regarding the prosecution's electrophoresis evidence, (5) challenge the admissibility of the testimony of Dr. Rath, a psychologist who testified for the prosecution, and (6) present an adequate closing argument. [25] Defendant argues that trial counsel's performance fell below the standard expected of reasonably competent counsel, thereby depriving defendant of his constitutional rights to a fair trial, effective assistance of counsel, a reliable verdict, due process of law, and fundamental fairness. After setting forth the well settled rules that guide our inquiry, we shall address each of defendant's contentions in turn. We recently reiterated the applicable principles: To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must establish not only deficient performance, i.e., representation below an objective standard of reasonableness, but also resultant prejudice. ( People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216, 217 [233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839].) Tactical errors are generally not deemed reversible; and counsel's decisionmaking must be evaluated in the context of the available facts. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 690, 104 S.Ct. at p. 2066.) To the extent the record on appeal fails to disclose why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, we will affirm the judgment `unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation....' ( People v. Pope [(1979)] 23 Cal.3d [412,] 426, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859, fn. omitted.) Finally, prejudice must be affirmatively proved; the record must demonstrate `a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052; People v. Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 217-218, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) ( People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 333, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374; see also Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 [A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.]; People v. Mendoza Telle, supra, 15 Cal.4th 264, 266, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134 [``[If] the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged[,]... unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation, the claim on appeal must be rejected.']; People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 581, 189 Cal.Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144 [on appeal, a conviction will be reversed on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel only if the record on appeal affirmatively discloses that counsel had no rational tactical purpose for his act or omission].)
Shortly after defendant's arrest, the Riverside County Sheriffs Department conducted a lineup that consisted of defendant and four other participants. At the time of the arrest, defendant was represented by the Office of the Riverside Public Defender. Prior to the lineup, a deputy public defender appeared at the station. Upon seeing the composition of the lineup, the public defender objected on the basis that the lineup was unfair, and departed. Defendant was left without counsel and initially refused to participate in the lineup. According to defendant (who testified outside the jury's presence, in the context of a Marsden hearing discussed ante, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d at pages 165-167, 976 P.2d at pp. 716-718), a detective informed him: If you refuse to take this lineup, I will drag you in by your fucking neck. Defendant informed the court that he feared for his own safety and therefore participated in the lineup, in which he was identified by the surviving victim. On appeal, defendant contends that his trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to challenge the evidence obtained as a result of the lineup. Defendant maintains that such evidence could have been suppressed on the ground that defendant was coerced into participating in the lineup, that his counsel was not present at the lineup, and that the lineup was suggestive. We observe initially that this ineffective assistance claim cannot properly be raised on appeal, because the record before us does not reveal the basis for trial counsel's decision not to object to the lineup, and that decision is not of the type for which there could be no satisfactory explanation. (See People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th 264, 266, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134; People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 936, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212; People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d 572, 581, 189 Cal.Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144.) Counsel reasonably may have concluded that in view of the physical evidence that linked defendant to the crimes, and the extended period of time during which Amy had an opportunity to observe defendant on the day the crimes were committed, there was little to be gained by challenging the validity of the lineup. Such tactics would be consistent with counsel's overall trial strategy not to challenge defendant's presence at the crime scene, but instead to claim that the killing of Diane did not constitute first degree murder. Thus, regardless whether trial counsel successfully might have objected to the lineup or its fruits, counsel could have had a reasonable tactical basis for not challenging the admission of this evidence at trial. Furthermore, on the merits, defendant has failed to demonstrate that an objection to the evidence obtained as a result of the lineup would have been successful. Although it is true that a lineup represents a critical stage to which a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches ( United States v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149; People v. Bustamante (1981) 30 Cal.3d 88, 177 Cal.Rptr. 576, 634 P.2d 927; People v. Fowler (1969) 1 Cal.3d 335, 82 Cal.Rptr. 363, 461 P.2d 643), the public defender's refusal to attend the lineup cannot be equated with a denial of defendant's right to counsel, and a defendant generally has no right to refrain from participating in a lineup. (See People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1221-1222, 14 Cal. Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1.) Nor does the record on appeal suggest that the lineup, as conducted, was improperly suggestive or unfair. [26] In sum, the record on appeal does not support defendant's claim that his trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to object to the evidence obtained as a result of the lineup.
On May 4 and 5, 1986, Ronald Wade, a homicide investigator for the Riverside County Sheriffs Department, observed a vehicle in defendant's driveway that was similar to the suspect vehicle description given in the investigation of Diane's homicide. On May 6, Wade and another investigator visited defendant at the mobilehome on the property. Wade asked defendant to describe the nature of his employment; defendant responded that he was a construction worker who drove big rigs to landscape development property. In response to Wade's inquiry regarding where defendant had worked in March of 1986, defendant replied that he worked in the Riverside/La Sierra area around McKinley and Magnolia. To confirm the location of his jobsite, defendant offered to retrieve his appointment book, which he used to keep track of the money owed to him. Defendant opened the book for Wade, revealing the word MAG written on March 24, which defendant indicated meant that he had worked at McKinley and Magnolia on that day. Wade departed from defendant's residence without arresting defendant or seizing the appointment book. Defendant contends that the investigators improperly failed to advise defendant of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, prior to questioning him. As a result, according to defendant, he unknowingly provided the officers with evidence which later was used against him, including his statements and tangible evidence, such as the appointment book. Defendant alleges that such evidence was the fruit of the poisonous tree, and could have formed the basis for a meritorious challenge to the legality of defendant's arrest and the admissibility of all statements and evidence obtained as a result of the interrogation. (See Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441; People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 135 Cal.Rptr. 786, 558 P.2d 872.) He further contends that trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to challenge the admissibility of the physical evidence derived from the statements made by defendant to the investigators. Defendant's contentions are unavailing, because the record on appeal does not disclose the basis for trial counsel's failure to object to this evidence, and the matter is not one in which there could be no satisfactory explanation for counsel's conduct. (See People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th 264, 266, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134; People v. Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 926, 936, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212; People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d 572, 581, 189 Cal.Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144.) The evidence adduced at trial suggests that defendant's statements to the investigators were made voluntarily in a noncustodial setting, and indicates that all of the physical evidence in question, including defendant's appointment book, subsequently was seized pursuant to a valid search warrant. On the basis of the facts disclosed by the record, trial counsel reasonably could have concluded that an objection on Miranda grounds would lack merit (because the initial questioning of defendant occurred in a noncustodial setting) and that the investigating officers' failure to give a Miranda warning during this conversation thus provided no basis for excluding the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant. Accordingly, there is no merit in defendant's claim that trial counsel performed deficiently in this respect. [27]
Defendant raises a general challenge to his counsel's performance at trial, alleging that counsel's representation at the guilt phase was substandard due to counsel's lack of investigation, preparation, and inability to articulate a defense. In support of his challenge, defendant cites counsel's single visit to defendant in seven and one-half months, and counsel's failure to investigate or present any evidence of defendant's mental history (including defendant's classification as a mentally disordered sex offender) or competence to stand trial. Defendant's contentions are unpersuasive, because the record before us does not disclose that trial counsel lacked a tactical basis for representing defendant in the manner now challenged, and counsel's performance was not of the sort for which there could be no satisfactory explanation. (See People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th 264, 266, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134; People v. Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 926, 936, 13 Cal. Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212; People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d 572, 581, 189 Cal.Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144.) Defendant's position also is flawed because, in large measure, his argument merely recasts certain contentions that the trial court properly rejected in the context of the Marsden hearings held prior to and during defendant's trial. (See pt. II.A., ante, at pp. 165-167.) To the extent such arguments do not reiterate those that we already have rejected, we find them to be without merit. As noted previously, trial counsel was confronted with overwhelming evidence that defendant killed Diane in the course of a sexual assault, and the manner of killing (repeated powerful blows to the back of the head with a rock), combined with defendant's statement to Amy that your friend was an asshole, she called me a few names, and I think she's dead, strongly suggested that he acted with the intent to kill. In view of these circumstances, trial counsel could have had a reasonable tactical basis for deciding to forego the presentation of a mental state defense in favor of a defense challenging the prosecution's forensic evidence. Counsel's strategy conceivably could have persuaded the jury to acquit defendant of the charge that he raped Diane and to convict him only of second degree murder. Defendant's defense at the guilt and penalty phases of trial was not presented by the same attorney. Thus, his contention that his guilt phase attorney failed to investigate evidence pertaining to defendant's mental history merely begs the question, as such evidence was investigated by defendant's penalty phase attorney, and the record does not suggest that the two attorneys failed to communicate with one another in their representation of defendant. Having made the tactical decision not to present a mental state defense at the guilt phase, and instead to challenge the evidence regarding certain sexual offenses defendant was alleged to have committed against Diane and Amy, defendant's guilt phase attorney did not perform deficiently by failing to personally investigate mental health issues further or visit defendant more frequently. (See, e.g., People v. Silva, supra, 45 Cal.3d 604, 622, 247 Cal.Rptr. 573, 754 P.2d 1070 [rejecting defendant's complaint that his attorney had visited him only once, observing that the number of times one sees his attorney, and the way in which one relates [to] his attorney, does not sufficiently establish incompetence].) Further, because of the incriminatory nature of defendant's history of committing sex crimes, it seems clear that such evidence, had it been presented at the guilt phase, would have been unhelpful  if not highly prejudicial  to defendant's claim of innocence. Nor did counsel render inadequate assistance in failing to raise the issue of defendant's competency to stand trial; the record is devoid of evidence suggesting any basis for such a challenge. In sum, the record on appeal does not support defendant's claim that his counsel performed deficiently in preparing or presenting a defense.
James Hall, the prosecution's criminalist, testified that a stain found on Amy's slip tested positive for both blood and seminal fluid, although neither substance could be typed using electrophoresis. Thus, the testimony did not establish whether it was defendant who deposited the stain. Notwithstanding the inconclusive nature of Hall's testimony, defendant contends that his trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to request a hearing pursuant to Evidence Code section 402, or to seek a Kelly-Frye hearing, to challenge the electrophoresis evidence. (See People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 30, 130 Cal.Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240; Frye v. United States (D.C.Cir.1923) 293 F. 1013, 1014.) Defendant's contention is unavailing, because the record on appeal fails to disclose that trial counsel lacked a tactical basis for declining to challenge the electrophoresis evidence, and counsel's decision was not one for which there could be no satisfactory explanation. (See People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th 264, 266, 62 Cal. Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134; People v. Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 926, 936, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212; People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d 572, 581, 189 Cal.Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144.) Although the criminalist testified that the contributor of the stain might have been a nonsecretor (as was defendant), the criminalist also testified that the inability to type the stain could have been due to the insufficient strength of the stain, or due to degradation attributable to the passage of time. Thus, as noted, the evidence did not identify defendant as the contributor. Trial counsel therefore reasonably may have concluded that the evidence was not particularly prejudicial, and on that basis reasonably could have made a tactical decision not to challenge the admissibility of this evidence, or the reliability of the electrophoresis testing. During cross-examination, trial counsel exploited the weakness of this evidence, asking questions that emphasized its inconclusive nature. Defendant's assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel's failure to request a Kelly-Frye hearing similarly is unpersuasive. Again, the record before us fails to disclose that trial counsel lacked a tactical basis for declining to request such a hearing, nor was counsel's decision to refrain from doing so one for which there could be no satisfactory explanation. (See People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th 264, 266, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134; People v. Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 926, 936, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212; People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d 572, 581, 189 Cal.Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144.) At the time of defendant's trial, electrophoretic typing of dried bloodstains had gained general acceptance in the scientific community. ( People v. Reilly (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1127, 1148-1153, 242 Cal.Rptr. 496.) Trial counsel was under no obligation to interpose a meritless challenge to a generally accepted scientific technique. (See In re Lower (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 144, 149, fn. 3, 161 Cal.Rptr. 24[[T]here is no obligation on the part of any attorney to embark on a program of fruitless, time-consuming, nonproductive motions which ... may make a dandy record but be of little or no value to his client.].) We therefore reject defendant's contention that trial counsel performed deficiently regarding this issue, and find no basis for his related contention that counsel's performance deprived defendant of his constitutional rights.
The prosecution called Dr. Craig Rath, a licensed clinical psychologist at Patton State Hospital, to testify as an expert witness regarding two principal matters: (1) memory repression by someone who has experienced a traumatic event, and (2) an emotional about-face and showing of remorse on the part of someone who has just committed a sexual assault. Rath's testimony apparently was intended to assist the jury in understanding certain aspects of Amy's testimony. On cross-examination, Rath acknowledged that he was unfamiliar with defendant or the surviving victim, not having interviewed either individual. On appeal, defendant contends that trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to challenge Rath's qualifications or competence to testify as an expert regarding the matters about which he testified, particularly his testimony concerning the common conduct of binge rapists. Defendant's claim cannot be sustained on appeal. The record on appeal fails to disclose that trial counsel lacked a tactical basis for declining to challenge Dr. Rath's qualifications or competence to testify as an expert, and counsel's decision to refrain from doing so was not one for which there could be no satisfactory explanation. (See People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th 264, 266, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134; People v, Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 926, 936, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212; People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d 572, 581, 189 Cal.Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144; see also People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 490-491, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249 [Because the decision whether to object is inherently tactical, the failure to object to evidence will seldom establish incompetence.].) At the time of defendant's trial, Rath had performed more than 2,000 courtdirected psychological evaluations and had testified a couple of hundred times in nine counties in California and four other states, and there is no indication in the record that he did not have expertise with regard to the matters to which he testified. Thus, on the record before us, we perceive no deficiency on counsel's part in failing to challenge Dr. Rath's qualifications.
Defense counsel's closing argument urged the jury to reject the prosecution's theories that the murder of Diane either was premeditated or occurred during the commission of a rape. Defense counsel instead acknowledged that defendant was present at the crime scene with the victims, and that circumstantial and physical evidence linked defendant to the crimes. He further acknowledged the reasonableness of finding that defendant had committed a sodomy or attempted sodomy, but not rape or attempted rape. In so doing, counsel urged the jury to find defendant guilty of second degree felony murder under the law as it applied at defendant's trial  thereby precluding penalty phase proceedings. (See 85 Cal.Rptr.2d p. 152, fn. 2, 976 P.2d p. 703, fn. 2, ante. ) On appeal, defendant contends that trial counsel's strategy improperly led the jury to return a finding of true with respect to the special circumstance of sodomy, ensuring that the case would proceed to a penalty phase, and thereby depriving defendant of the effective assistance of counsel. We have rejected similar claims in other cases involving concessions made by defense counsel in closing argument, where the incriminating evidence was strong and counsel offered some other choice in the defendant's favor. We do so here, as well. (See, e.g., People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th 297, 334-335, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374 [rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel related to counsel's concession of some measure of culpability, as a valid tactical choice given the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt]; People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1186-1187, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146 [rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel related to counsel's concession in closing argument that defendant had been present at the scene of the crime, repudiating the defendant's alibi testimony]; see also People v. Wade (1988) 44 Cal.3d 975, 988, 244 Cal.Rptr. 905, 750 P.2d 794 [In light of the overwhelming evidence of his client's guilt, trial counsel had little choice but to candidly acknowledge guilt, concede the heinous nature of the offense, and concentrate instead on convincing the jury of the legitimacy of defendant's mental defenses.]; People v. Ratliff (1986) 41 Cal.3d 675, 697, 224 Cal.Rptr. 705, 715 P.2d 665 [Counsel's tactical decision to argue a particular personal view of the evidence, indicating that his client may have committed only a lesser offense, is not akin to pleading guilty to that offense.]; People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 293, 168 Cal.Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149 [`[G]ood trial tactics demanded complete candor' with the jury.].) Although it is true that counsel's closing argument was not lengthy  13 pages in the reporter's transcript  the record on appeal discloses nothing to suggest that counsel's decision to thus limit his argument was unreasonable. To the contrary, the overwhelming nature of the evidence against defendant left counsel with little opportunity to mount a persuasive summation. The surviving victim had testified in graphic detail regarding defendant's involvement in the charged offenses. Defendant's fingerprint was found on a beer bottle recovered from the remote crime scene. Other physical and circumstantial evidence linked defendant to the crimes. In view of the evidence presented against defendant, trial counsel reasonably could have concluded that challenging the evidence more vigorously in his argument risked alienating the jury and perhaps lessening his odds of success at the penalty phase. (See People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th 297, 335, 75 Cal. Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374 [Since counsel could also reasonably anticipate having to conduct a penalty phase, it also allowed him to preserve his credibility in arguing mitigation.]; People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 661-662, 280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351 [rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where, for tactical reasons, defendant's attorney declined at the guilt phase to present any evidence or argument in response to the evidence presented by the prosecutor].) Counsel's decision to acknowledge defendant's culpability  but to a lesser extent than that urged by the prosecution, in an effort to spare his client from a penalty phase  was not a tactical choice that could not be satisfactorily explained. No deficiency appears. [28]
The record on appeal fails to shed light on the basis for counsel's decisions in his representation of defendant at trial. For that reason, and because none of counsel's purported failings cannot be explained as part of a reasonable trial strategy, we reject defendant's contention that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. (See People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th 264, 266, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134; People v. Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 926, 936, 13 Cal. Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212; People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d 572, 581,189 Cal.Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144.) Moreover, based upon the record before us, none of the purported failings by counsel fall below an objective standard of reasonableness ( People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216, 217, 233 Cal. Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839), and for that additional reason we reject defendant's claim that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Apart from these flaws in his argument on appeal, defendant fails to establish prejudice in light of the overwhelming evidence introduced against him. He fails to establish that his trial counsel's performance deprived him of any meritorious defense, or to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result would have been more favorable to him in the absence of any alleged ineffectiveness. (See Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 687-689, 104 S.Ct. 2052; People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th 297, 333, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374; People v. McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1187, 9 Cal. Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146.)

Defendant contends he was denied his constitutional rights to counsel, a fair trial, a reliable verdict, and due process of law when, without notice, waiver, consent or order of court, his second counsel, Steven Harmon, represented him at the penalty phase of the trial. Defendant also asserts' that Harmon could not adequately assist him at the penalty phase because Harmon was not present at either the jury selection or the guilt phase of trial and lead attorney Barnett was not present to assist Harmon at the penalty phase. Defendant implies that Attorney Harmon was forced upon him at the penalty phase, or was otherwise improperly substituted for lead defense counsel. This argument is without merit. At a pretrial hearing conducted on February 19, 1987 (nearly one year prior to the commencement of the guilt phase of the trial), lead counsel for the defense, William Barnett, moved for appointment of second counsel, pursuant to section 987.2. Barnett described second counsel Harmon as eminently qualified and very experienced. Barnett thereafter informed defendant: Mr. Hart, I just introduced you to Steve Harmon, explained to you that we were going to cocounsel and come up and talk to you; do you agree Mr. Harmon can co-counsel with me in your case? Defendant replied: Yes. The trial court thereafter appointed Harmon as cocounsel. The record is devoid of any suggestion that second counsel Harmon was substituted for lead counsel Barnett, forced upon defendant, or revealed to defendant in an untimely fashion. Defendant's consent to Attorney Harmon's assistance in the representation of defendant was clear and unequivocal, as was the trial court's discretionary decision ( Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 424, 180 Cal.Rptr. 489, 640 P.2d 108) to permit Harmon to serve as co counsel. In view of the prosecution's intention to present at the penalty phase defendant's numerous prior convictions as well as the evidence linking him to the murder of Shelah McMahan, the appointment of Harmon was well within the trial court's discretion ( Keenan v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d 424, 430-432, 180 Cal.Rptr. 489, 640 P.2d 108) and facilitated the preparation and presentation of a full and complete defense. ( People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 163, 158 Cal.Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587.) The circumstance that defendant's two attorneys shared the representation of defendant by having lead counsel Barnett handle the guilt phase of the trial, and cocounsel Harmon the penalty phase, did not reflect a substitution of the latter attorney for the former. Defendant raises a related contention that the substitution of counsel led to a disturbing pattern of ineffective assistance of counsel. In support of this contention, defendant argues that Harmon was unfamiliar with the record, surprised by Cindy Widney's testimony, and cursory in his examination of Criminalist Faye Springer. In order to establish his claim, however, defendant must point to a deficiency so egregious that his attorney's conduct fell outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and that he was prejudiced by the deficiency. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674; In re Jones (1996) 13 Cal.4th 552, 561, 54 Cal. Rptr.2d 52, 917 P.2d 1175.) He fails to do so. As noted, there was no substitution. Nor does the record support a claim of ineffective assistance. To the contrary, defense counsel at the penalty phase vigorously cross-examined key prosecution witnesses, sought to cast doubt on the case against defendant involving Shelah, and presented a thorough case in mitigation. During the penalty phase, defendant expressed his high regard for defense counsel, informing the court: As for phase two, I am totally pleased with both my counsel. In view of the foregoing, we reject defendant's contention that the appointment of Attorney Harmon to the defense team denied defendant his constitutional right to counsel. [29]
Defendant contends that his trial counsel committed three critical errors at the penalty phase, denying defendant his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, defendant asserts that counsel inappropriately failed to (1) challenge certain scientific evidence pertaining to the murder of Shelah, (2) fully impeach jailhouse informant Randy Gresham, and (3) investigate and present a mental health defense. In reviewing defendant's claims, we apply the same standards we discussed in evaluating defendant's assertion that counsel performed deficiently at the guilt phase: defendant must establish not only deficient performance, i.e., representation below an objective standard of reasonableness, but also resultant prejudice. ( People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th 297, 333, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374; People v. Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d 171, 216, 217, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) Defendant can prevail on appeal only if the record on appeal affirmatively discloses that counsel had no rational tactical purpose for his act or omission. ( People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d 572, 581, 189 Cal.Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144.) The record also must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052; People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th 297, 333, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374.)
At the penalty phase, the prosecution introduced evidence of electrophoretic testing of dried blood that had been found on handcuffs recovered from a shed located behind defendant's residence. (Electrophoretic testing allows typing of individual blood proteins and enzymes found in a blood sample by a method that separates electrically charged molecules ( People v. Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d 152, 206, 279 Cal.Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949.).) The blood was similar in type to Shelah's. The prosecution also introduced evidence related to electrophoretic testing of a semen stain found on Shelah's sweatpants; on cross-examination, the prosecution's expert acknowledged that no conclusion could be drawn as to typing the semen donor, or as to the age of the stain. Defendant contends that, at the time of his trial, there was considerable debate regarding the admissibility of electrophoretic evidence, citing People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 230 Cal.Rptr. 834, 726 P.2d 516, reversed on other grounds, California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934, a decision in which we held that testimony of the same forensic expert, Faye Springer, regarding electrophoretic evidence should have been excluded from the trial. Defendant contends that trial counsel's failure to object to the admission of the electrophoretic evidence, and counsel's failure to request a foundational hearing pursuant to Evidence Code section 402, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant's position is unpersuasive, because the record on appeal fails to reflect that trial counsel lacked a tactical basis for declining to challenge the electrophoresis evidence or request a foundational hearing, and counsel's decisions regarding those matters were not ones for which there could be no satisfactory explanation. (See People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th.264, 266, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134; People v. Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 926, 936, 13 Cal. Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212; People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d 572, 581,189 Cal.Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144.) Defendant's reliance upon People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d 512, 230 Cal.Rptr. 834, 726 P.2d 516, is misplaced. In Brown, we held that the trial court erred in overruling an objection on the ground of improper foundation to admitting forensic analysis of blood and semen stains. Contrary to defendant's position, we did not reject the reliability of electrophoretic analysis generally; rather, we did so in that case based upon the inadequate trial court record. Moreover, in People v. Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d 152, 279 Cal.Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949, we held that admission of electrophoresis testing was generally accepted in the scientific community in 1987  a date prior to its introduction at the penalty phase in defendant's trial. ( Id. at pp. 206-208, 279 Cal.Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949; see also People v. Reilly, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d 1127, 242 Cal.Rptr. 496.) Defense counsel was not required to mount a meritless challenge to the acceptance of, such evidence. We therefore perceive no deficiency in counsel's performance regarding the prosecution's presentation of electrophoretic evidence.
As noted, Randy Gresham, a jailhouse informant, testified for the prosecution. When defendant was arrested, Gresham was a convicted felon awaiting trial in Riverside County. Shortly after defendant's arrest, Gresham was housed in the same county jail cell as defendant. During the time the two were cellmates, defendant made a number of damaging admissions to Gresham regarding the murder of Shelah. Gresham subsequently conveyed this information to law enforcement authorities, who offered Gresham a five-year reduction in his prison sentence if he testified against defendant. Gresham did so. Defendant contends that Gresham was a government agent employed to elicit incriminating information from defendant. (See Maine v. Moulton (1985) 474 U.S. 159, 173, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481.) He further contends that the manner in which the prosecution procured Gresham's testimony violated defendant's constitutional rights to counsel, a fair trial, due process of law, fundamental fairness, and a fair and reliable penalty determination. (See Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246; Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215.) In view of Gresham's status, defendant contends that his trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to challenge the admission of Gresham's testimony under Massiah and Brady. We reject defendant's contention that his trial counsel performed deficiently in not seeking to exclude Gresham's testimony, because the record before us does not reveal that counsel lacked a tactical basis for declining to contest the admission of this testimony, and counsel's decision was not one for which there could be no satisfactory explanation. (See People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th 264, 266, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134; People v. Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 926, 936, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212; People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d 572, 581, 189 Cal.Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144.) We also observe that counsel's cross-examination of Gresham was zealous and thorough. Counsel sought to undermine Gresham's credibility by focusing upon Gresham's opportunism in testifying against defendant. Defendant's related contention that Gresham acted as a government agent similarly is unsupported by the record on appeal. Gresham testified that defendant made his admissions before Gresham spoke with law enforcement officers regarding the possibility of trading testimony against defendant for a reduction in Gresham's prison sentence. After disclosing his information to police investigators, Gresham immediately was moved into a protective-custody cell, and defendant no longer spoke to him regarding the case. On these facts, a reasonably competent defense attorney could have concluded that there existed no obligation to challenge Gresham's testimony on the ground that defendant's admissions had been improperly obtained. Based upon the record before us, we conclude that defendant has failed to establish that counsel's performance in addressing the damaging nature of Gresham's testimony was constitutionally deficient.
As noted, defendant committed several sexual assaults against women prior to his arrest for the sexual assault and murder of Diane Harper. His involvement in these previous crimes led to his commitment as a mentally disordered sex offender at Patton State Hospital. At the penalty phase of defendant's trial, defense counsel did not present evidence regarding the basis for defendant's commitment to the state hospital, or otherwise attempt to offer evidence to explain why defendant behaved violently toward women. On appeal, defendant contends that counsel performed deficiently in failing to offer evidence that would explain the basis for defendant's violent conduct. According to defendant, counsel's failure to use qualified mental health experts to place in context defendant's childhood head injury and adult commitment to a state hospital led to the presentation of a constitutionally inadequate defense. We are unpersuaded by defendant's argument, because the record before us does not reveal that counsel lacked a tactical basis for refraining from presenting evidence that would seek to explain defendant's violence toward women, and counsel's decision was not one for which there could be no satisfactory explanation. (See People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th 264, 266, 62 Cal. Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134; People v. Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 926, 936, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212; People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d 572, 581, 189 Cal.Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144.) Because the record on appeal contains no details of the mental health evidence that may have been available to trial counsel, and similarly contains no indication of the potentially damaging aspects of such evidence that might have been rendered admissible had defendant chosen to proffer his mental health background as a mitigating factor, we cannot conclude that there was no conceivable, reasonable tactical basis for trial counsel's actions. (See, e.g., People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 189-190, 284 Cal. Rptr. 511, 814 P.2d 290.) Accordingly, defendant's claim that trial counsel was deficient in failing to present evidence of his mental health background cannot succeed on appeal. We further observe that, although trial counsel did not present the mental health defense that defendant now contends was necessary, counsel did present considerable evidence that sought to portray defendant as a victim of numerous unfortunate circumstances. For example, the defense presented evidence of defendant's childhood head injury, his father's alcoholism and detachment from the family, and defendant's first wife's extramarital affair and his ensuing use of drugs. Although such matters did not comprise a mental health defense based upon the testimony of various mental health experts, they did provide the jury with the opportunity to consider certain factors in mitigation  without exposing the jury to potentially damaging rebuttal evidence regarding defendant's mental health. In view of defendant's lengthy history of behaving violently toward women, and the interest of the defense in portraying defendant as favorably as possible, we cannot say on this record that there could not be a reasonable tactical basis for trial counsel's decision to rely solely upon mitigating evidence that showed defendant to be the victim of numerous unfortunate circumstances, in an effort to generate sympathy, and perhaps leniency, from the jury at the penalty phase. On the record before us, no constitutionally deficient representation appears.
Prior to the commencement of trial, the prosecution filed a Notice of Intention to Produce Evidence in Aggravation Pursuant to Section 190.3 of the Penal Code. The notice informed defendant of the prosecution's intention to present evidence at the penalty phase regarding the circumstances of the crimes committed against (1) Diane and Amy, (2) Shelah, (3) Debra B., (4) Valerie T., (5) Priscilla N., (6) Marilyn S., and (7) Deborah T. (The notice also named an eighth victim of sexual assault, but evidence pertaining to that incident ultimately was not presented at the penalty phase.) A defense motion challenging the adequacy of the notice was denied by the trial court. On appeal, defendant renews his challenge to the adequacy of the notice, contending that it failed to satisfy the requirements of section 190.3. In pertinent part, that statute provides: Except for evidence in proof of the offense or special circumstances which subject a defendant to the death penalty, no evidence may be presented by the prosecution in aggravation unless notice of the evidence to be introduced has been given to the defendant within a reasonable period of time as determined by the court, prior to trial. Defendant contends that evidence means testimony, writings, material objects, or other things presented to the senses that are offered to prove the existence or nonexistence of a fact. (See Evid.Code, § 140.) He argues that because the notice failed to identify the specific evidence that the prosecution planned to introduce  for example, the testimony of a particular witness the notice was deficient, requiring reversal of the penalty phase judgment. We repeatedly have rejected arguments similar to that made by defendant here. (See, e.g., People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 259, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643; People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 71, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 96-97, 241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127.) The purpose of the notice required by section 190.3 is to advise the accused of the evidence against him so that he may have a reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense at the penalty phase. ( People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 96, 241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127.) A capital defendant is entitled to notice of other violent crimes or prior felony convictions offered in the prosecution's penalty case-in-chief before the cause is called to trial or as soon thereafter as the prosecution learns the evidence exists. ( People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 879 [277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906]; People v. Jennings (1988) 46 Cal.3d 963, 987 [251 Cal.Rptr. 278, 760 P.2d 475].) However, the prosecutor is not prevented from introducing all the circumstances of a duly noticed incident or transaction simply because each and every circumstantial fact was not recited therein. (See, e.g., People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 424-425 [243, Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279].) The notice is sufficient if it gives defendant `a reasonable opportunity' to prepare a defense to the allegations. ( Howard, supra, at p. 425 [243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279].) ( People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 258, 10 Cal. Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643.) We previously have held: Notice that evidence will be presented regarding a specific prior crime or crimes should alert counsel that evidence of all crimes committed as part of the same course of conduct may be offered, and, therefore, substantially complies with the notice requirement of section 190.3. ( People v. Visciotti, supra, 2 Cal.4th 1, 70, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388; People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d 771, 842, 281 Cal. Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865; People v. Walker (1988) 47 Cal.3d 605, 637, 253 Cal.Rptr. 863, 765 P.2d 70.) In the instant case, the prosecution's notice informed the defense of the names of each one of the women who had been victimized by defendant's sexual assaults, the specific dates on which those assaults took place, and the counties in which the crimes occurred. The notice was filed well before the commencement of the guilt phase proceedings. In view of these circumstances, the prosecution's notice adequately apprised defendant of the evidence in aggravation that the prosecution intended to introduce. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to strike the notice of aggravation. [30]
Prior to the commencement of the penalty phase, the defense submitted a motion to revoir dire the jury, in order to establish that there was good cause for impaneling a new jury for the penalty phase. The motion was based on section 190.4, subdivision (c). In pertinent part, that statute provides: If the trier of fact which convicted the defendant of a crime for which he may be subject to the death penalty was a jury, the same jury shall consider ... the penalty to be applied, unless for good cause shown the court discharges that jury in which case a new jury shall be drawn. The motion requested that the court allow defendant's trial counsel to inquire whether the sitting jurors could keep an open mind. As was the case with a motion for separate juries submitted by defendant at the pretrial stage, the trial court denied the request. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying the motion, because good cause existed to impanel a new jury prior to commencement of the penalty phase. Specifically, defendant asserts that his decision to absent himself from the guilt phase proceedings prior to the giving of closing arguments likely was interpreted as an admission of guilt and prejudiced him in the eyes of the jury. Defendant further alleges that certain jurors had preconceived views about the case, that Jurors Oran Pentz and Deborah Wallen related experiences similar to those described at trial, that defendant's penalty phase counsel, Steven Harmon, was absent during the guilt phase, and finally that the prosecution had elected to introduce evidence of a totally new unrelated homicide (Shelah McMahan) at the penalty phase. Defendant maintains that in view of these specific factors, good cause existed to grant the motion. Defendant's argument is unavailing. Section 190.4, subdivision (c), expresses the long-standing legislative preference for a single jury to determine guilt as well as penalty in capital cases. ( People v. Taylor (1990) 52 Cal.3d 719, 738, 276 Cal.Rptr. 391, 801 P.2d 1142; People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1028-1029, 248 Cal.Rptr. 568, 755 P.2d 1017; People v. Gonzales (1967) 66 Cal.2d 482, 499, 58 Cal.Rptr. 361, 426 P.2d 929.) Although good cause in the context of impaneling a new penalty phase jury is an elusive concept (see People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 27-28, 252 Cal.Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249; People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1199, 240 Cal.Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301), it seems clear that, similar to the situation found in the cases cited, defendant's speculative assertions in the present case were insufficient to impose any duty of inquiry on the part of the trial court. The court explained to the jury that defendant voluntarily had requested to be absent from closing argument, and later admonished the jury prior to the giving of opening statements at the penalty phase that it was customary for one defense attorney to work on the guilt phase and the other on the penalty phase. The subject of the jurors' attitudes had been examined thoroughly during the voir dire examination conducted at the outset of the guilt phase of the trial. There was nothing unusual about the prosecution's properly noticed intention to introduce evidence, at the penalty phase, of an additional, unadjudicated murder. (See, e.g., People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 906-907, 274 Cal.Rptr. 849, 799 P.2d 1282.) To permit a convicted capital defendant to delay commencement of the penalty phase proceedings on such a speculative basis would contravene the purpose of section 190.4, subdivision (c). The trial court did not err in denying defendant's request to re-voir dire the jury.
At the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of defendant's 1973 assault on Debra B. Because defendant had pleaded guilty to misdemeanor charges in that case, the prosecution introduced evidence pertaining to this allegation under section 190.3, factor (b). [31] The prosecution also introduced evidence involving the 1975 attempted burglary with intent to commit rape, involving Deborah T. Because defendant had pleaded guilty to this felony offense, the prosecution introduced testimonial evidence pertaining to this allegation under section 190.3, factor (c). [32] On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to present evidence of the facts and circumstances of defendant's prior convictions. Specifically, he contends that the admission of this evidence over his objection (set forth in a motion to exclude) violated the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy (by impermissibly allowing the jury to hear evidence in support of defendant's conviction of an offense greater than the one of which defendant was convicted by the prior jury), resulted in the introduction of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence, and violated his rights to equal protection of the laws, to a speedy trial, and to a reliable sentencing determination. Defendant's position lacks merit. [33] We previously have rejected arguments that double jeopardy and speedy trial principles apply to the admission of evidence in aggravation presented at the penalty phase. (See, e.g., People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 71-72, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224 [double jeopardy]; People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th 140, 199-200, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 664, 862 P.2d 664 [same]; People v. McDowell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 551, 568, 250 Cal.Rptr. 530, 763 P.2d 1269 [speedy trial].) Nor was the evidence of defendant's prior convictions irrelevant or unduly prejudicial; defendant's choking attack upon Debra B. clearly involved force or violence within the meaning of section 190.3, factor (b), and his conviction of attempted burglary with the intent to commit rape, stemming from the incident involving Deborah T., fell squarely within the meaning of section 190.3, factor (c), allowing consideration of any prior felony conviction. Contrary to defendant's equal protection argument, the prosecution was not limited to showing that defendant had, in fact, been convicted, but was free to elicit the testimony of witnesses for the purpose of establishing the criminal conduct underlying defendant's prior convictions. (See People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 640, 250 Cal.Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189; People v. Gates, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1203, 240 Cal.Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301.) We previously have held that the use of live testimony to establish a defendant's prior criminal conduct does not violate a defendant's right to a reliable sentencing determination. (See, e.g., People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1339, 18 Cal. Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1.)
As noted above, the prosecution presented evidence of unadjudicated criminal offenses committed by defendant in 1973 and 1975. On appeal, defendant contends that such offenses were stale at the time of defendant's trial in 1987-1988, that prosecution of these offenses was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and that the trial court therefore erred in permitting the introduction of this evidence. Defendant's position is without merit. ( People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 772, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2 [neither remoteness nor the expiration of the statutory limitations period bars admission of a defendant's prior unadjudicated criminal activity for purposes of section 190.3, factor (b)]; People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th 140, 199, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 664, 862 P.2d 664, and cases cited therein.)
On March 5, 1975, as part of the investigation into the incident involving Deborah T., Imperial Beach Police Officer Charles Hamilton informed defendant of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, and upon obtaining defendant's waiver, proceeded to ask defendant certain questions involving the matter. Defendant denied having been near the victim's window. After the interview concluded, Hamilton learned that a fingerprint expert had matched defendant's fingerprints to those found on Deborah T.'s window. The following morning, Hamilton visited defendant at Ream Field, the naval facility where defendant was stationed, and reread defendant his Miranda rights. Defendant said that he understood those rights, and asked: I have the right to an attorney? Hamilton responded affirmatively. When defendant asked, What if I can't afford one?, Hamilton replied, Then the court will appoint you one. Defendant thereafter asked whether the legal officer of the naval base could serve as his attorney. A naval investigator informed defendant that such an officer could not represent defendant in a civilian court of law. Defendant asked Hamilton whether he was going to be arrested. Hamilton responded affirmatively, informing defendant that approximately four hours would be required to obtain an arrest warrant. Defendant responded: Okay, I'll talk to you, what do you want to talk about? He thereafter described his involvement in other attacks upon women. At trial, defendant objected to the introduction of evidence pertaining to his confession to the unadjudicated offenses, on the ground that the foregoing colloquy evidenced defendant's invocation of his right not to speak with Hamilton. The trial court denied the challenge. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence of defendant's confession, because Hamilton improperly refused to honor defendant's purported request for an attorney. Defendant's contention is unpersuasive. His inquiries of Officer Hamilton were insufficient to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege to consult with counsel. ( People v. Maynarich (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 476, 481, 147 Cal.Rptr. 823.) Moreover, after considering Hamilton's responses to his questions, defendant said, Okay, I'll talk to you, thereby waiving his right to speak with an attorney. ( People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 321, 949 P.2d 18.) The record is devoid of evidence that coercion or deception played any role in the interrogation. On these facts, the trial court properly found that defendant had knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights.
Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in permitting the prosecution to introduce numerous photographs and photographic slides relating to Shelah's homicide, because such evidence was gruesome, inflammatory and cumulative. Defendant further alleges that the admission of this evidence violated his constitutional rights to due process of law, a fair trial, a reliable verdict, and fundamental fairness. (See U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th, and 14th Amends.) We apply the same standard as that used to evaluate defendant's challenge to the photographic evidence introduced against him at the guilt phase of the trial: `The admission of photographs of a victim lies within the broad discretion of the trial court when a claim is made that they are unduly gruesome or inflammatory. [Citations.] The court's exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless the probative value of the photographs clearly is out-weighed by their prejudicial effect. [Citations.]' ( People: v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th [83,] 133-134 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887].) ( People v. Scheid, supra, 16 Cal.4th 1, 18, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 939 P.2d 748.) As we shall explain, the trial court clearly acted within its discretion in admitting the challenged items. The photographic evidence served to illustrate and corroborate the testimony given by prosecution witnesses regarding Shelah's death and the ensuing investigation.
Exhibits Nos. 80:1-18 and 80:28 are aerial views of the area in which the body of Shelah McMahan was found, as well as ground-level shots showing portions of the same general area. Exhibits Nos. 80:26 and 80:27 depict the bottom of Shelah's feet. Exhibits Nos. 83:1-14 and 84:1-10 depict the Widney property. At a hearing held outside the jury's presence to consider the admissibility of this photographic evidence, defense counsel specifically indicated that he had no objection to these slides. To the extent that his present appeal challenges any one of these slides, we conclude that the failure to interpose a timely objection has waived the claim. (Evid.Code, § 353, subd. (a); People v. Zapien, supra, 4 Cal.4th 929, 979-980, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704.) Even if defendant properly had preserved the issue, our review of the evidence leads us to conclude that the trial court acted well within its discretion in allowing these slides to be introduced. They depict nothing that even remotely could be considered unduly gruesome in nature.
Exhibit No. 80:19 depicts Shelah's blood-spattered body at the location where she was discovered, wedged beneath a large rock ledge, her shirt pulled down. Exhibit No. 80:20 shows the body from a different angle, revealing her bound forearms. Exhibit No. 80:21 shows a close-up view of the rear portion of Shelah's head, revealing a cord draped around her neck. Exhibit No. 80:22 reveals one of Shelah's bare feet. Exhibit No. 80:23 depicts Shelah's swollen, bloodstained forearms, a cable tie binding her wrists. Exhibit No. 80:24 is a closer shot of Shelah's forearms, more clearly revealing the bloodstains and ligature marks. Exhibit No. 80:25 shows Shelah's body from behind, lying on a red law enforcement body bag and revealing her torn T-shirt, pulled down. Defendant objected to the introduction of each one of the foregoing seven slides, requesting that the trial court exclude them pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. After reviewing each slide and considering the parties' arguments, the trial court overruled the objections. The court did exercise its discretion to exclude an eighth slide, which it found to be cumulative, as well as a photograph  Exhibit No. 82  that shows Shelah when she was alive, which the trial court excluded on the basis that it could have been construed as a then impermissible form of victim impact statement. [34] Our own review of the slides that were admitted leads us to conclude that they were highly probative in illustrating the vicious nature of the killing. The unusually small amount of blood depicted in the slides supported the prosecution's theory that Shelah probably was killed elsewhere, then transported to the dump. None of the slides are unduly gruesome or likely to inflame the passion of a jury. Nor are the slides improperly cumulative; each has distinct probative value and, contrary to defendant's contention, the prosecution was not compelled to rely upon only one slide to depict the condition of Shelah's body. (See, e.g., People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th 324, 440-441, 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610.)
Exhibit No. 81:1 is an autopsy slide that shows one of Shelah's forearms, revealing ligature marks. Exhibit No. 81:2 shows the same forearm from a different angle, revealing a more deeply colored ligature mark. Exhibit No. 81:3 shows the discolored underside of one of Shelah's wrists. Exhibit No. 81:4 is a different view of one of Shelah's wrists, showing ligature marks. Exhibit No. 81:5 reveals a closer view of the wrist depicted in Exhibit No. 81:4. Exhibit No. 81:6 reveals an abrasion and ligature mark on one of Shelah's wrists. Exhibit No. 81:7 is a close-up view that shows primarily the front and right side of Shelah's neck, revealing numerous abrasions. Exhibit No. 81:8 is a close-up view of the front and left portions of Shelah's neck, showing abrasions. Exhibit No. 81:9 is a closer view of the abrasions on the right side of Shelah's neck; some of the abrasions appear to correlate to the outline of a hand. [35] Defendant objected to the introduction of each one of the foregoing nine slides, requesting that the trial court exclude them pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. After reviewing each slide, and considering the parties' arguments, the trial court overruled the objections. The trial court's rulings were correct. The autopsy slides provided a vivid illustration of the bondage endured by Shelah. This evidence supported the prosecution's theory that the killing was premeditated. (See People v. Scheid, supra, 16 Cal.4th 1, 18, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 939 P.2d 748; see also People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 134, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887; People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th 140, 180-182, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 664, 862 P.2d 664.) The evidence also links defendant  a man known to favor handcuffs and to have access to cable ties  to the killing. The slides that show Shelah's neck wounds suggest the savage nature of the killing. This photographic evidence is highly probative and neither unduly gruesome nor inflammatory. Nor is the evidence cumulative; because several of the slides show the ligature marks from different angles, they aided the prosecution in establishing that Shelah had been bound by the handcuffs and the type of cable tie that officers recovered in or around defendant's residence.
Exhibit No. 90 is a color photograph that shows a cable tie recovered from defendant's residence. Exhibit No. 91 is a photograph that shows a case for a set of handcuffs. Exhibits Nos. 92 and 93 show the handcuffs partially buried in the shed behind defendant's residence. Exhibit No. 94 shows the disturbed dirt floor area of the shed. These photographs illustrate the testimony of law enforcement officers who searched defendant's residence and the surrounding area shortly after his arrest. The images further link defendant to the killing. The trial court properly found that these photographs are probative and neither inflammatory nor unduly gruesome.
As noted earlier, Criminalist Faye Springer testified regarding the handcuff marks found on Shelah's forearms. As part of her testimony, she explained that she had applied the handcuffs recovered by the police during their search of defendant's residence and the surrounding area, to her husband's wrist in an effort to create marks on his skin that could be compared with those found on Shelah's wrists. Exhibit No. 101 shows the handcuffs on her husband's wrist, and Exhibits Nos. 102-104 show the marks left by the handcuffs. This photographic evidence is probative insofar as it helped the prosecution establish that the handcuffs located by the police in their search were capable of making the marks found on Shelah. The evidence therefore was probative. It was neither unduly gruesome nor inflammatory. [36]
Exhibit No. 111 shows Shelah's body lying facedown on the body bag, similar to the view depicted in Exhibit No. 80:25, but also depicting a police evidentiary ruler, which provided a sense of scale to the image. Exhibit No. 113 is a small photograph showing the dump area and a portion of a law enforcement vehicle. Exhibit No. 114 is identical to Exhibit No. 80-18, showing Shelah's body nestled beneath the rock ledge and partially obscured by weeds and bags. Exhibit No. 115 also depicts the partially obscured body, from an angle that shows the body wedged beneath the rock ledge. This photographic evidence aided the jury in visualizing the rural setting where the body was found, the body's remote resting place, and the obviously criminal nature of the victim's death. The evidence is probative and not unduly gruesome or inflammatory.
Insofar as defendant contends that the trial court was required to exclude some or all of the prosecution's photographic evidence under Evidence Code section 352 because such evidence was cumulative of the testimonial evidence presented, the trial court correctly overruled his objection. (See People v. Scheid, supra, 16 Cal.4th 1, 19, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 939 P.2d 748, and cases cited therein.) To the extent defendant contends that the photographic evidence was unduly cumulative to other physical evidence or cumulative in and of itself, we reject that theory as well. (See People v. Thompson, supra, 45 Cal.3d 86, 115-116, 246 Cal.Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37.) The prosecution was entitled to rely upon photographic evidence to help establish the vicious, premeditated nature of the killing, as well as the connection to defendant. Crime scene and autopsy photographs that graphically depict the circumstances of the crime are plainly relevant to a jury's determination as to whether the death penalty is appropriate. ( People v. Wash, supra, 6 Cal.4th 215, 266, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 421, 861 P.2d 1107; People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th 870, 914, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712.) The trial court reasonably could have found that the probative value of the photographic evidence outweighed its potentially prejudicial effect. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 in admitting the photographic evidence. (See People v. Scheid, supra, 16 Cal.4th 1, 20, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 939 P.2d 748, and cases cited therein.) [37] Moreover, a great deal of other evidence linked defendant to Shelah's murder, including his confession to Randy Gresham, physical evidence (handcuffs, cable ties), and defendant's interest in the bondage of women. Thus, even if we were to agree with defendant that the photographic evidence was unduly cumulative in nature, any error in admitting a few too many images clearly would be harmless.
As discussed above, as part of its case-in-aggravation the prosecution introduced evidence involving the murder of defendant's niece and next-door neighbor, Shelah, pursuant to section 190.3, factor (b). Defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error in admitting such evidence. Specifically, he asserts: (1) the court should have excluded evidence of uncharged criminal activity that occurred subsequent to the charged capital offense in this case, (2) the court erred in denying his request for an advisory jury or, in the alternative, for a hearing pursuant to Evidence Code section 402, (3) the evidence pertaining to Shelah's murder was insufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the murder, and (4) the court erred in denying defendant use immunity to enable him to testify on his own behalf. As we shall explain, none of defendant's assertions have merit.
We repeatedly have rejected claims, identical to that made by defendant, that criminal activity occurring subsequent to the commission of the charged offense is inadmissible under section 190.3, factor (b). (See, e.g., People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 201-204, 222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480; see also People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 577-579, 244 Cal.Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776.) Defendant urges this court to reconsider that line of case authority, but fails to provide us with a persuasive basis for reconsidering our prior holdings. We therefore decline to do so.
Prior to the commencement of trial, defendant moved to impanel an advisory jury or, alternatively, to conduct a hearing pursuant to Evidence Code section 402 for the purpose of determining whether the penalty phase jury should consider evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity, most notably the evidence linking defendant to Shelah's murder. The trial court denied defendant's request, instead requiring the prosecution to make a foundational offer of proof. The prosecution made its offer to the satisfaction of the trial court. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion. His position is unpersuasive. The trial court was not required to engage either in the time-consuming process of impaneling an advisory jury, or conducting an evidentiary hearing that might have required witnesses to testify once at the hearing and again at the penalty phase. The trial court correctly determined that a juror at the penalty phase was entitled to consider other crimes evidence in aggravation that he or she found to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d 57, 97-98, 241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127.) Contrary to the implication inherent in defendant's contention, the jury need not have unanimously agreed that the prosecution met its burden of proof as to the other crimes evidence before a single juror could consider that evidence. (See People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 106, 270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23; People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 99, 241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127.) Unanimity was mandated only with regard to the final determination as to penalty. ( People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 773-774, 239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250.) The jury was so instructed.
Defendant contends that the evidence pertaining to Shelah's murder was insufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he committed the murder. We disagree. The evidence established that defendant was the last person to see Shelah alive. He had ready access to the residence where she slept. His whereabouts during the early morning period when the murder occurred were inconsistently explained to investigators. The evidence presented to the jury indicated that Shelah was not the sort of child to leave the residence with a stranger; defendant, however, was her uncle. There were no signs of a struggle in the area where she slept. When Shelah's body was recovered, her forearms and wrists bore ligature marks, suggesting that she had been handcuffed. Defendant owned handcuffs and had expressed an affinity for sexual bondage. In a shed near defendant's residence, investigators recovered buried handcuffs stained with blood of a type consistent with Shelah's. Only eight out of one thousand individuals share this blood type. The handcuffs also bore fiber evidence similar to the fibers from the T-shirt Shelah was wearing when her body was discovered. Shelah's wrists were bound with a black cable tie that was identical to one found in defendant's residence. Shortly after Shelah's murder, defendant was seen grading his yard. Defendant's cellmate, Randy Gresham, testified that defendant admitted killing Shelah and demonstrated how he had stabbed her. Defendant also expressed concern that investigators might uncover evidence in his yard. The foregoing evidence was sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant murdered Shelah.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion that he be granted use immunity to enable him to testify in his own behalf regarding the murder of Shelah. He asserts that his inability to testify without relinquishing fundamental rights, such as the privilege against self-incrimination, reinforced the inference of guilt and hence, the jury's prejudice against him. Both the United States Supreme Court and this court have considered and rejected similar arguments. (See McGautha v. California (1971) 402 U.S. 183, 213-220, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed.2d 711, vacated on other grounds in Crampton v. Ohio (1972) 408 U.S. 941, 92 S.Ct. 2873, 33 L.Ed.2d 765; People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 852, 254 Cal. Rptr. 298, 765 P.2d 460.) Defendant fails to persuade us to reexamine the merits of these prior decisions.