Opinion ID: 781217
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Accurate Portrayal of the Informant's History and Motives

Text: 23 Elliott next argues that the district court clearly erred in finding that Officer Kempke, in preparing the affidavit, did not intentionally or recklessly describe (1) Lindsey's criminal history, (2) his personal conduct while he was acting as an informant, and (3) the exact consideration he was seeking from the police. Even assuming arguendo under the first step of the Franks analysis that the district court's finding was clearly erroneous, we conclude under the second step that the affidavit nonetheless established probable cause. 24 Probable cause to search exists when there is a `substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]' that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). It is well-settled that the determination of probable cause is based upon the totality of the circumstances known to the officers at the time of the search. United States v. Bishop, 264 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir.2001) (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317). When a search warrant is based solely on an informant's tip, as in this case, the proper analysis is whether probable cause exists from the totality of the circumstances to determine a sufficient level of reliability and basis of knowledge for the tip. Id. at 924. In this case, Elliott does not challenge Lindsey's basis of knowledge, but challenges only Lindsey's credibility. 25 Any crime involving dishonesty necessarily has an adverse effect on an informant's credibility. Reeves, 210 F.3d at 1045. Therefore, when an informant's criminal history includes crimes of dishonesty, additional evidence must be included in the affidavit to bolster the informant's credibility or the reliability of the tip. Id. Otherwise, an informant's criminal past involving dishonesty is fatal to the reliability of the informant's information, and his/ her testimony cannot support probable cause. Id. (citing United States v. Meling, 47 F.3d 1546, 1554-55 (9th Cir.1995)). 26 Lindsey's record of providing six reliable drug-related tips in the preceding three months was sufficient to overcome any doubts raised by his motives and prior criminal and personal behavior. See Reeves, 210 F.3d at 1044-45 (three prior reliable tips leading to arrests and drug seizures were sufficient to outweigh the doubts about the informant's credibility raised by the [undisclosed] history of criminal conduct involving dishonesty); see also United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir.1986) (an informant may be presumed trustworthy when he has previously provided accurate information, and the inference of trustworthiness is even stronger [w]hen the information provided in the past involved the same type of criminal activity as the current information) (citations omitted). Thus, probable cause was not lacking to issue a warrant to search Elliott. III 27 PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH ELLIOTT IN PLACES OTHER THAN THE KELLY RESIDENCE 28 Elliott argues that Officer Kempke's generalized statement in the affidavit that drug traffickers commonly keep controlled substances and related evidence... on their person was insufficient to overcome the lack of evidence that Elliott engaged in drug trafficking outside the Kelly residence, and thus was insufficient to establish probable cause to search him anywhere but at the Kelly residence. We are not persuaded by this argument. First, his argument misses the mark — probable cause to believe that a person conducts illegal activities in the place where he is to be searched is not necessary; the proper inquiry is whether there was probable cause to believe that evidence of illegal activity would be found in the search. Gates, 462 U.S. at 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317. 29 More importantly, we faced a very similar issue in United States v. Spearman, 532 F.2d 132, 133 (9th Cir.1976). In Spearman, police sought a warrant to search the defendant's automobile. The affidavit stated that the defendant had engaged in drug-related activity at his apartment, however, there was no specific information that drugs were ever in the defendant's automobile. The affidavit stated, as in this case, that [i]t is commonplace for dealers of heroin to have heroin that is packaged for sale in the place where they live or sell from, in their vehicles or on their persons. Id. We held that the magistrate was justified in inferring probable cause that Spearman would also have heroin concealed in his automobile. Id. 30 A magistrate is entitled to draw reasonable inferences about where evidence is likely to be kept, based on the nature of the evidence and the type of offense. Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d at 1399. We see no difference between the inferences the magistrate could draw from the affidavit in Spearman and those the magistrate could draw from the affidavit in this case. The distinction that Spearman involved an automobile search whereas this case involves the search of a person is immaterial to the ultimate question of whether there was a substantial basis for concluding that evidence would be found in the search. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317. The combined effect of information about Elliott's recent drug activity and the declaration that drug traffickers commonly carry related evidence on their person allows a reasonable inference that evidence was likely to be kept on Elliott's person. Accordingly, the search warrant was supported by probable cause to search Elliott even when he was away from the Kelly residence. 31 AFFIRMED.