Opinion ID: 2318562
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Claim's Dependence Upon the Expertise of the Agency

Text: Lastly, we face conflicting arguments over the dependence of a merits analysis of Carter's claim upon the exercise of the MIA's expertise. Carter argues that the Manual of Charges describes a simple test for whether a homeowner qualifies for the mortgagee reissue chargethe homeowner must have had the title to the property insured as owner, within the prior ten (10) years.... Huntington cautions, however, that there is more to the analysis than meets the eye. At oral argument, Huntington claimed that the statute plays some part in this calculus, arguing [i]f one starts with the statute, it says if you qualify for this reduced rate, then you get it. The word `qualification' is a matter within the ken of the [MIA].... After a thorough review of the Insurance Article, we found no support for this averment. In hopes of illuminating its point, Huntington described a hypothetical example, where a couple is divorced five years after purchasing title insurance, and the husband remarries five years later and decides to refinance with his new spouse. According to Huntington, the husband and new mate may not qualify automatically for the reissue rate. We look somewhat wryly at Huntington's unsupported, but strenuously-made avouchments. Nonetheless, standing in the lengthy shadow of the multi-volume Insurance Article, we are reluctant to say confidently that, in practice, unique situations will not arise, requiring agency expertise to help determine whether a homeowner/borrower qualifies for the reissue rate. Moreover, we appreciate that agency expertise could play a role in other areasmost notably, in deciding whether [a] person [or insurer] ... willfully collect[ed] a premium or charge for insurance in violation of § 27-216(b). [13] In addition, presumably, the General Assembly would not have begun many of the penalty provisions with the phrase [i]f the Commissioner finds unless it intended the Commissioner to exercise his or her institutional expertise in fashioning an appropriate remedy in certain casesone which not only makes the consumer whole, but also advances the cause of insurance regulation in this State. Lending further support to the notion that the Legislature wanted the Commissioner to exercise his or her expertise in such cases is the fact that many of the remedies under the statute are unavailable traditionally in law or equity. Indeed, while the Insurance Article authorizes the Commissioner to revoke a license to sell insurance, for example, there is no evidence that such a remedy would exist in a court of this State. The General Assembly appears to have enacted the Insurance Article not only to create such remedies (which were necessary assumedly for a healthy insurance environment), but also to place their judicious allotment in the hands of the Commissioner. Converge Servs. Group, LLC v. Curran, 383 Md. 462, 485, 860 A.2d 871, 884 (2004) (There is little doubt that a reviewing court would be in a better position to render global and appropriate relief in this dispute were it to have the benefit of the Division's final view on the panoply of claims.). In these circumstances, i.e., for this type of statutory violation claim, the Zappone factors augur for the primary jurisdiction presumption. Indeed, they reveal an affirmative legislative grant to the MIA of such jurisdiction in such cases.