Opinion ID: 702297
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Albright.

Text: 16 In concluding that Albright forecloses the use of Sec. 1983 to state a federal claim for malicious prosecution, the district court relied on the First Circuit's conclusion in Perez-Ruiz v. Crespo-Guillen, 25 F.3d 40 (1st Cir.1994), that Albright would appear virtually to foreclose reliance on substantive due process as the basis for a viable malicious prosecution claim under section 1983.... 25 F.3d at 42. We agree that, under Albright, the Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process will not support a federal claim for malicious prosecution; however, Albright does not bar Singer from asserting a federal claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment. 17 The plaintiff in Albright surrendered to the authorities after learning that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, and was released on bail subject to the usual restrictions on travel. The case was later dismissed on the ground that the charge--selling a look-alike substance as cocaine--did not state an offense under Illinois law. Albright, --- U.S. at ---- and n. 1, 114 S.Ct. at 810 and n. 1. Albright brought suit under Sec. 1983, alleging that the arresting officer had deprived [Albright] of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment--his 'liberty interest'--to be free from criminal prosecution except upon probable cause. Id. at ---- - ----, 114 S.Ct. at 810-811. The district court concluded that Albright failed to state a claim under Sec. 1983, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, holding that prosecution without probable cause is a constitutional tort ... only if accompanied by incarceration or loss of employment or some other 'palpable consequenc[e].'  Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 811 (alteration in original). The Supreme Court affirmed on the somewhat different ground that it is the Fourth Amendment, and not substantive due process, under which petitioner Albright's claims must be judged. Id. 18 Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Albright (joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Ginsburg) explained that, because Sec. 1983  'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' ... [t]he first step in any such claim is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Id. at ---- - ----, 114 S.Ct. at 811-812 (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 and 144 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2692 and 2694 n. 3, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979), and Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1870, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)). However,  'the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because the guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.' The protections of substantive due process have for the most part been accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 812 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1068, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)). Therefore, so long as a particular amendment 'provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, 'that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.'  Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 813 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1871, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)). The plurality opinion decided that the Fourth Amendment is the proper source of constitutional protection for claims, such as malicious prosecution, that implicate a person's liberty interest in respect of criminal prosecutions (and, in particular, one's pretrial liberty): We have in the past noted the Fourth Amendment's relevance to the deprivations of liberty that go hand in hand with criminal prosecutions. Id. Because the petitioner in Albright did not raise a Fourth Amendment claim, however, the Court refused to reach the question of whether the complained-of conduct actually violated the Fourth Amendment. 19 Although the concurring Justices published four separate opinions, there are at least two common propositions in all five opinions: (1) a claim of malicious prosecution may not be brought as a substantive due process claim; and (2) the Fourth Amendment provides the source for a Sec. 1983 claim premised on a person's arrest. 3 The extent of those rights, however, remains to be defined by the Court. 4 20 Singer's complaint states that, in causing him to be prosecuted, defendants violated Singer's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure of his person. In respect of pleading, Albright requires nothing more. (Whether Singer's prosecution deprived him of liberty to a sufficient extent to constitute a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes is largely a question of fact--one which the district court did not need to reach in this case.) That Singer has adequately pleaded a Sec. 1983 claim for malicious prosecution does not, however, end the matter. 21 Once a plaintiff presents a claim of malicious prosecution under Sec. 1983, the court must engage in two inquiries: whether the defendant's conduct was tortious; and whether the plaintiff's injuries were caused by the deprivation of liberty guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. We consider these in reverse order.