Opinion ID: 4677816
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under PSTCA Shortly before the scheduled oral argument in this appeal, Douglas County moved for summary dismissal or, in the alternative, summary affirmance, claiming we lack subject matter jurisdiction over Edwards’ claim under the PSTCA. The county contends, summarized, that Edwards’ claim is barred by sovereign immunity because the PSTCA’s exemption for claims “arising out of assault” 6 applies. In support of its argument, the county relies on this court’s recent opinion in Moser v. State, 7 which was released after the initial briefing in this case was complete. Edwards filed a brief in opposition to the county’s motion, and we deferred ruling on the motion until plenary submission. Because the county’s motion presents a question of subject matter jurisdiction under the PSTCA, we address it as a threshold matter. 8 No party raised the applicability of any exemption under the PSTCA while this case was before the district court, but whether an exemption applies presents a jurisdictional issue which may be raised for the first time on appeal. 9 Simply put, a political subdivision’s sovereign immunity from suit is a jurisdictional issue that an appellate court cannot ignore. 10 6 § 13-910(7). 7 Moser, supra note 3. 8 See Lambert v. Lincoln Public Schools, 306 Neb. 192, 945 N.W.2d 84 (2020) (explaining because question is jurisdictional, courts should determine applicability of statutory exemptions under PSTCA before considering nonjurisdictional grounds for summary judgment). 9 Moser, supra note 3. See, also, Amend v. Nebraska Pub. Serv. Comm., 298 Neb. 617, 905 N.W.2d 551 (2018). 10 See Moser, supra note 3. Accord Davis v. State, 297 Neb. 955, 902 N.W.2d 165 (2017). - 266 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 308 Nebraska Reports EDWARDS v. DOUGLAS COUNTY Cite as 308 Neb. 259 The sovereign immunity of the State and its political subdivisions is not a matter of judicial fiat; it is constitutional. Neb. Const. art. V, § 22, provides: “The state may sue and be sued, and the Legislature shall provide by law in what manner and in what courts suits shall be brought.” Earlier versions of our state constitution did likewise. 11 We have long held that this constitutional provision is not self-executing and that no suit may be maintained against the State or its political subdivisions unless the Legislature, by law, has so provided. 12 The Legislature has enacted the PSTCA to govern tort claims against political subdivisions. [4] Under the PSTCA, a political subdivision has no liability for the torts of its officers, agents, or employees, “except to the extent, and only to the extent, provided by the [PSTCA].” 13 In suits brought under the PSTCA, a political subdivision is “liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances,” except “as otherwise provided in the [PSTCA].” 14 Through the PSTCA, the Legislature has allowed a limited waiver of a political subdivision’s sovereign immunity with respect to some, but not all, types of tort claims. 15 [5-7] Section 13-910 of the PSTCA expressly exempts certain tort claims from the limited waiver of sovereign immunity. Stated differently, the exemptions in § 13-910 describe the types of tort claims for which a political subdivision has not consented to be sued. When an exemption under the 11 See State v. Mortensen, 69 Neb. 376, 95 N.W. 831 (1903). 12 See, e.g., Burke v. Board of Trustees, 302 Neb. 494, 924 N.W.2d 304 (2019); McKenna v. Julian, 277 Neb. 522, 763 N.W.2d 384 (2009), abrogated in part, Doe v. Board of Regents, 280 Neb. 492, 788 N.W.2d 264 (2010), overruled, Davis, supra note 10. 13 § 13-902. See Britton v. City of Crawford, 282 Neb. 374, 803 N.W.2d 508 (2011). 14 § 13-908. 15 See Rutledge, supra note 3. - 267 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 308 Nebraska Reports EDWARDS v. DOUGLAS COUNTY Cite as 308 Neb. 259 PSTCA applies, the political subdivision is immune from the claim and the proper remedy is to dismiss it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 16 Because it is jurisdictional, courts should determine the applicability of a statutory exemption under the PSTCA before considering nonjurisdictional grounds for summary judgment. 17 Immunity for Claims Arising Out of Assault As pertinent here, § 13-910(7) of the PSTCA exempts from the waiver of sovereign immunity “[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.” We have sometimes referred to this exemption broadly as the “intentional tort” exemption. 18 And because the language of the intentional tort exemption is nearly identical under both § 13-910(7) of the PSTCA and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-8,219(4) (Reissue 2014) the State Tort Claims Act (STCA), 19 we have applied our cases construing the exemption under the PSTCA to cases under the STCA, and vice versa. 20 [8-11] When construing any statutory exemption under the PSTCA or the STCA, courts apply settled propositions of statutory construction. Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. 21 Additionally, Nebraska 16 See Lambert, supra note 8. 17 Id. 18 See, e.g., Moser, supra note 3; Rutledge, supra note 3; Britton, supra note 13. 19 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 81-8,209 to 81-8,235 (Reissue 2014). 20 See, Moser, supra note 3; Amend, supra note 9. 21 Moser, supra note 3. - 268 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 308 Nebraska Reports EDWARDS v. DOUGLAS COUNTY Cite as 308 Neb. 259 courts have long followed the rule that statutes purporting to waive the protection of sovereign immunity are to be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign and against waiver. 22 As a corollary to this canon of construction, and in order to strictly construe the PSTCA against a waiver of sovereign immunity, we apply a broad reading to statutory exemptions from a waiver of sovereign immunity. 23 A waiver of sovereign immunity is found only where stated by the most express language of a statute or by such overwhelming implication from the text as will allow no other reasonable construction. 24 Over the past 15 years, this court has issued five published opinions addressing the meaning and scope of the phrase “[a]ny claim arising out of assault” as used in the intentional tort exemptions of the PSTCA and the STCA. 25 When analyzing this language, most of our cases have given the phrase its plain meaning and faithfully applied principles of strict construction to avoid judicially expanding the Legislature’s 22 See, e.g., id.; Brown v. State, 305 Neb. 111, 939 N.W.2d 354 (2020); Jill B. & Travis B. v. State, 297 Neb. 57, 899 N.W.2d 241 (2017); Geddes v. York County, 273 Neb. 271, 729 N.W.2d 661 (2007); Hoiengs v. County of Adams, 245 Neb. 877, 516 N.W.2d 223 (1994); Wiseman v. Keller, 218 Neb. 717, 358 N.W.2d 768 (1984); Gentry v. State, 174 Neb. 515, 118 N.W.2d 643 (1962); Rumbel v. Ress, 166 Neb. 839, 91 N.W.2d 36 (1958), modified on denial of rehearing 167 Neb. 359, 92 N.W.2d 904; Frye v. Sibbitt, 145 Neb. 600, 17 N.W.2d 617 (1945); Anstine v. State, 137 Neb. 148, 288 N.W. 525 (1939), overruled on other grounds, Beatrice Manor v. Department of Health, 219 Neb. 141, 362 N.W.2d 45 (1985). 23 See, Brown, supra note 22; Reiber v. County of Gage, 303 Neb. 325, 928 N.W.2d 916 (2019); Stick v. City of Omaha, 289 Neb. 752, 857 N.W.2d 561 (2015). 24 Moser, supra note 3; Jill B. & Travis B., supra note 22. 25 See, e.g., Moser, supra note 3; Rutledge, supra note 3; Britton, supra note 13; Doe v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 273 Neb. 79, 727 N.W.2d 447 (2007), overruled, Moser, supra note 3; Johnson v. State, 270 Neb. 316, 700 N.W.2d 620 (2005). - 269 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 308 Nebraska Reports EDWARDS v. DOUGLAS COUNTY Cite as 308 Neb. 259 limited waiver of sovereign immunity. 26 Some of our cases have considered U.S. Supreme Court opinions construing the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which also excludes certain intentional torts, including assault, from the federal government’s waiver of sovereign immunity. 27 But we have not always agreed with the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court majority, 28 in part because that Court does not always adhere to the same strict construction principles this court follows when construing statutes purporting to waive sovereign immunity. 29 And of course, neither the reasoning nor the holdings of federal cases construing the FTCA have any binding precedential effect on this court’s construction of Nebraska’s statutory language. 26 See, Moser, supra note 3 (applying strict construction principles to determine scope of assault and battery exemption); Rutledge, supra note 3 (same); Britton, supra note 13 (same); Johnson, supra note 25 (same). Compare Doe, supra note 25 (making no reference to strict construction principles when determining scope of assault and battery exemption). 27 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2018). 28 See, e.g. Moser, supra note 3 (rejecting reasoning of U.S. Supreme Court majority and agreeing instead with reasoning of dissent in Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 108 S. Ct. 2449, 101 L. Ed. 2d 352 (1988)); Johnson, supra note 25 (agreeing with reasoning of Sheridan concurrence rather than majority). 29 See, Moser, supra note 3 (observing U.S. Supreme Court does not uniformly apply strict construction principles to waivers of sovereign immunity under FTCA); Davis, supra note 10, 297 Neb. at 974, 902 N.W.2d at 183 (observing U.S. Supreme Court “has refused to hold that the FTCA exceptions are subject to the general rule that a waiver of sovereign immunity will be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign”). See, also, 14 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3658.2 at 688 (4th ed. 2015) (observing that when interpreting scope of exceptions to waivers of sovereign immunity under FTCA, the U.S. Supreme Court has said rules of strict construction are not implicated and “‘unhelpful’” to inquiry); Gregory C. Sisk, Twilight for the Strict Construction of Waivers of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 92 N.C. L. Rev. 1245 (2014) (same). - 270 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 308 Nebraska Reports EDWARDS v. DOUGLAS COUNTY Cite as 308 Neb. 259 Before addressing the arguments advanced by the parties in this appeal, it is helpful to review our previous opinions construing the scope and meaning of the intentional tort exemption. In the 2005 case of Johnson v. State, 30 a prisoner brought a tort action against the State, seeking to recover damages for personal injury after being sexually assaulted by a prison guard. The trial court found that her claim arose out of an assault and was barred by sovereign immunity. On appeal, the prisoner argued that her claim did not arise out of assault, but instead arose from independent acts of governmental negligence that allowed the assault to occur, including the State’s negligent hiring and supervision of the prison guard. Applying principles of strict construction, Johnson held that even though the claim had been framed as the negligent failure to prevent an assault, it fell squarely within the intentional tort exemption. Johnson agreed with Justice Kennedy’s concur- rence in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Sheridan v. United States, 31 quoting: “If the allegation is that the Government was negligent in the supervision or selection of the employee and that the intentional tort occurred as a result, the intentional tort exception . . . bars the claim. Otherwise, litigants could avoid the substance of the exception because it is likely that many, if not all, intentional torts of Government employees plausibly could be ascribed to the negligence of the tortfeasor’s supervisors. To allow such claims would frustrate the purposes of the [intentional tort] exception.” 32 Johnson also quoted the reasoning of four U.S. Supreme Court justices in United States v. Shearer, 33 stating that a plaintiff 30 Johnson, supra note 25. 31 Sheridan, supra note 28 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 32 Johnson, supra note 25, 270 Neb. at 322, 700 N.W.2d at 625 (quoting Sheridan, supra note 28 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 33 United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 105 S. Ct. 3039, 87 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1985). - 271 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 308 Nebraska Reports EDWARDS v. DOUGLAS COUNTY Cite as 308 Neb. 259 “‘cannot avoid the reach of [the intentional tort exemption] by framing her complaint in terms of negligent failure to prevent the assault and battery.’” 34 Two years after deciding Johnson, we again considered the scope and application of the intentional tort exemption. In Doe v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 35 a student sued the school district for personal injury after being sexually assaulted by a classmate on school grounds. The trial court found the claim arose out of an assault and was barred by the PSTCA’s intentional tort exemption. On appeal, the student argued the claim did not arise out of assault, but instead arose from the school district’s negligent failure to protect her from a foreseeable act of sexual violence by a classmate. We identified the dispositive issue as “determin[ing] the breadth of the phrase ‘[a]ny claim arising out of assault’ as it is used in § 13-910(7).” 36 But in addressing this issue, Doe neither referenced nor applied traditional principles of strict construction. Our opinion in Doe acknowledged that if the student had been sexually assaulted by an employee of the school district, her claim would be barred by sovereign immunity under the holding and reasoning in Johnson. But because the student had been sexually assaulted by a classmate, rather than a governmental employee, Doe implied that different reasoning was appropriate. While Johnson had rejected the reasoning of the Sheridan majority in favor of the concurrence, Doe expressly relied on the majority’s reasoning that “the negligence of other Government employees who allowed a foreseeable assault and battery to occur may furnish a basis for Government liability that is entirely independent of [the assailant’s] employment status.” 37 Doe described this reasoning as persuasive and held that the student’s claim was not barred by sovereign 34 Johnson, supra note 25, 270 Neb. at 320, 700 N.W.2d at 624. 35 Doe, supra note 25. 36 Id. at 86, 727 N.W.2d at 455. 37 See Sheridan, supra note 28, 487 U.S. at 401. - 272 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 308 Nebraska Reports EDWARDS v. DOUGLAS COUNTY Cite as 308 Neb. 259 immunity because it did “not arise from an assault, but, rather, from an alleged negligent failure to protect a student from a foreseeable act of violence.” 38 We next considered the scope of the intentional tort exemption in 2009, when deciding McKenna v. Julian. 39 There, the plaintiff sued the city and a city police officer, seeking to recover damages based on allegations that the officer had assaulted him during an improper arrest. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit, finding, among other things, that the claims were barred by the PSTCA’s intentional tort exemption. On appeal, the plaintiff argued his claims did not arise from assault, battery, or false arrest, but instead arose from the officer’s negligent use of excessive force. We rejected this argument. Applying strict construction principles and our reasoning in Johnson, we found that even when framed as a claim of excessive force, the arrestee’s claim was barred as a matter of law by the intentional tort exemption. In the 2011 case of Britton v. City of Crawford, 40 police officers shot and killed a 16-year-old burglary suspect during a standoff. The personal representative for the suspect’s estate brought a wrongful death and survival action against the city under the PSTCA, alleging police were negligent in the tactics used when confronting the suspect. The trial court dismissed the action, finding the claims were barred by the assault and battery exemption under § 13-910(7) of the PSTCA. We affirmed, explaining that the intentional tort exemption “‘“does not merely bar claims for assault or battery; in sweeping language it excludes any claim arising out of assault or battery.”’” 41 Britton applied principles of strict construction and held the language of the exemption includes 38 Doe, supra note 25, 273 Neb. at 86, 727 N.W.2d at 456. 39 McKenna, supra note 12. 40 Britton, supra note 13. 41 Id. at 384-85, 803 N.W.2d at 517 (emphasis in original). - 273 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 308 Nebraska Reports EDWARDS v. DOUGLAS COUNTY Cite as 308 Neb. 259 claims that “‘“sound in negligence but stem from [an assault or] battery,”’” 42 reasoning: While other factors may have contributed to the situa­ tion which resulted in [the suspect’s] death, but for the battery, there would have been no claim. No semantic recasting of events can alter the fact that the shooting was the immediate cause of [the suspect’s] death and, consequently, the basis of [the personal representative’s] claim. Even if it is possible that negligence [of the officers] was a contributing factor to [the suspect’s] death, the alleged negligence was inextricably linked to a battery [and the claim] is thus barred by the PSTCA. 43 We again considered the scope of the intentional tort exemption in the 2019 case of Rutledge v. City of Kimball. 44 There, the plaintiff alleged she had been attacked and choked by a city employee while visiting a city building. She sued the city under the PSTCA, alleging it negligently failed to supervise its employee and failed to protect the public from the employee despite knowledge of his violent propensities. The district court granted the city’s motion to dismiss, finding the claim was barred by the PSTCA exemption for claims arising out of assault. On appeal, the plaintiff relied on our opinion in Doe to argue that her claim did not arise out of an assault, but instead arose from the city’s breach of an independent duty to protect her from foreseeable acts of violence by its ­employee. 45 We found Doe was inapplicable because, among other things, the assailant in Doe was not a governmental employee. We instead applied our reasoning from Johnson and principles of strict construction to conclude that the plaintiff could not avoid the intentional tort exemption by reframing 42 Id. at 385, 803 N.W.2d at 517. 43 Id. at 386, 803 N.W.2d at 518. 44 Rutledge, supra note 3. 45 See id. See, also, Doe, supra note 25. - 274 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 308 Nebraska Reports EDWARDS v. DOUGLAS COUNTY Cite as 308 Neb. 259 her claim as the negligent failure to prevent a foreseeable assault by a governmental employee. 46 We reasoned: While [the plaintiff’s] claim is characterized as one of negligence, no claim would exist but for [the employee’s] alleged battery. At oral argument, [the plaintiff] conceded that there never would have been a lawsuit had she not been assaulted. Thus, regardless of how the claim is pled, [the plaintiff’s] claim is inextricably linked to a battery. Accordingly, the alleged negligence falls within the [assault and battery] exception to the PSTCA and the [c]ity has not waived its sovereign immunity. 47 The concurring opinion in Rutledge agreed that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by the intentional tort exemption, but questioned whether Doe had been correctly decided, noting that its reasoning was contrary to principles of strict construction and its holding was inconsistent with the rest of our cases construing the plain language of the intentional tort exemption. 48 Our most recent opportunity to consider the scope of the intentional tort exemption was the 2020 case of Moser. 49 In Moser, we applied the intentional tort exemption to bar a negligence claim brought by the estate of a man who was fatally assaulted by a cellmate while housed in a state prison facility. The decedent’s estate alleged the State had negligently doublebunked the two inmates and had failed to protect the decedent from a foreseeable assault. The district court dismissed the suit, finding the State was immune under the STCA’s discretionary function exemption. 50 We affirmed the dismissal, but 46 See Rutledge, supra note 3. See, also, Johnson, supra note 25. 47 Rutledge, supra note 3, 304 Neb. at 602, 935 N.W.2d at 753. 48 See Rutledge, supra note 3 (Papik, J., concurring). See, also, Doe, supra note 25. 49 Moser, supra note 3. 50 See § 81-8,219(1). - 275 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 308 Nebraska Reports EDWARDS v. DOUGLAS COUNTY Cite as 308 Neb. 259 on different sovereign immunity grounds. Moser concluded the negligence claim arose out of an assault and fell squarely within the STCA’s exemption for “[a]ny claim arising out of assault.” 51 Moser reexamined our reasoning in Doe and expressly overruled it, describing Doe as an “outlier” 52 and concluding it was inconsistent with the rest of our cases construing and applying the intentional tort exemption. Moser correctly observed that neither Doe, nor the majority opinion in Sheridan on which it relied, purported to apply principles of strict construction when determining the scope of the intentional tort exemption. 53 Because the reasoning in Doe could not be reconciled with the rest of our cases and was contrary to the settled principle that courts must apply a broad reading to statutory exemptions in order to strictly construe waivers of sovereign immunity, 54 Moser concluded that Doe had been wrongly decided. The reasoning in Doe had been premised on the same semantic recasting we had consistently rejected in cases where the assault was committed by a governmental actor, 55 and Moser emphasized that when the statutory text is given its plain meaning, there is no principled reason why the scope and meaning of the phrase “arising out of assault” should be construed differently depending on whether the assailant was a governmental or a nongovernmental actor. 51 § 81-8,219(4). 52 Moser, supra note 3, 307 Neb. at 28, 948 N.W.2d at 202. See, also, Doe, supra note 25. 53 See Moser, supra note 3. See, also, Sheridan, supra note 28. 54 See, Moser, supra note 3; Brown, supra note 22; Jill B. & Travis B., supra note 22; Geddes, supra note 22; Hoiengs, supra note 22; Wiseman, supra note 22; Gentry, supra note 22; Rumbel, supra note 22; Frye, supra note 22; Anstine, supra note 22. 55 See, e.g. Moser, supra note 3; Rutledge, supra note 3; Britton, supra note 13. - 276 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 308 Nebraska Reports EDWARDS v. DOUGLAS COUNTY Cite as 308 Neb. 259 We pause here to note that in Moser, and again in this case, our dissenting colleague suggests that the exemption in § 13-910(7) for “[a]ny claim arising out of assault” should be construed to apply only to claims that arise out of assaults “committed by governmental employees.” But the qualifying language urged by the dissent appears nowhere in § 13-910(7). And given that other PSTCA exemptions expressly reference claims based on the acts “of an employee” 56 or “by an employee,” 57 the omission of such qualifying language from § 13-910(7) cannot be ignored. Nor do we find persuasive the dissent’s suggestion that the PSTCA’s definitions of a “[t]ort claim” 58 or “[e]mployee” 59 make it necessary to read into the plain language of § 13-910(7) the qualifying phrase “committed by governmental employees.” It is not within the province of the courts to read a meaning into a statute that is not there or to read anything direct and plain out of a statute. 60 The language used by the Legislature in § 13-910(7) is strikingly broad; without qualification or limitation, it exempts from the waiver of sovereign immunity “[a]ny claim arising out of 56 § 13-910(1) (referring to “[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of a political subdivision”). See, also, § 13-901(2) (referring to “[a]ny claim based upon the exercise or performance of . . . a discretionary function or duty on the part of the political subdivision or an employee of the political subdivision”). 57 § 13-910(4) (“[n]othing in this subdivision shall be construed to limit a political subdivision’s liability for any claim based upon the negligent execution by an employee of the political subdivision in the issuance of a certificate of title”). See, also, § 13-910(8) (referring to “[a]ny claim by an employee of the political subdivision which is covered by the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act”); § 13-910(10) (“[n]othing in this subdivision shall be construed to limit a political subdivision’s liability for any claim arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle by an employee of the political subdivision”). 58 See § 13-903(4). 59 See § 13-903(3). 60 State ex rel. BH Media Group v. Frakes, 305 Neb. 780, 943 N.W.2d 231 (2020). - 277 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 308 Nebraska Reports EDWARDS v. DOUGLAS COUNTY Cite as 308 Neb. 259 assault.” We respectfully disagree with the dissent’s suggestion that this language can reasonably be construed to exempt only claims arising out of assaults committed by governmental employees. And even if we could find plausible textual support for the alternative construction urged by the dissent, it would not satisfy our long-established rule that a waiver of sovereign immunity is to be found only where stated by the most express language of a statute or by such overwhelming implication from the text as will allow no other reasonable construction. 61 There is no basis in the plain text of § 13-910(7), or in our binding precedent construing that statute, for the alternate interpretation urged by the dissent. [12] Instead, with the exception of Doe, our cases have construed the intentional tort exemption to give it the full breadth demanded by its plain text and our canons of construction. We have said the exemption applies whenever an assault “is essential to the claim,” 62 and it bars claims against the government which “sound in negligence but stem from [an assault or] battery.” 63 We have also said the exemption encompasses claims that “would not exist without an assault or battery,” 64 and claims which are “‘inextricably linked to [an assault or] battery.’” 65 All of these articulations speak to the same point: when a tort claim against the government seeks to recover damages for personal injury or death stemming from an assault, the claim necessarily “arises out of assault” and 61 See, e.g., Moser, supra note 3; Jill B. & Travis B., supra note 22; Lamb v. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 36, 293 Neb. 138, 876 N.W.2d 388 (2016); Zawaideh v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 285 Neb. 48, 825 N.W.2d 204 (2013); Britton, supra note 13; King v. State, 260 Neb. 14, 614 N.W.2d 341 (2000); Logan v. Department of Corr. Servs., 254 Neb. 646, 578 N.W.2d 44 (1998); Wiseman, supra note 22. 62 Moser, supra note 3, 307 Neb. at 29, 948 N.W.2d at 202. 63 Britton, supra note 13, 282 Neb. at 385, 803 N.W.2d at 517. 64 Moser, supra note 3, 307 Neb. at 29, 948 N.W.2d at 202. 65 Id. at 27, 948 N.W.2d at 201 (quoting Britton, supra note 13). - 278 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 308 Nebraska Reports EDWARDS v. DOUGLAS COUNTY Cite as 308 Neb. 259 is barred by the intentional tort exemption under the PSTCA. The plain language of the exemption and our principles of strict construction require this result no matter how the tort claim has been framed 66 and regardless of the assailant’s employment status. 67 Edwards’ Claim Arises Out of Assault On appeal, Douglas County contends that no matter how Edwards frames her negligence claim against the county, it “aris[es] out of assault” 68 and thus falls squarely within the PSTCA’s intentional tort exemption. Edwards concedes that her damages stem from the assault by Clark, but she argues that her claim does not arise out of the assault, and instead is based on “a completely independent incident . . . the delay of law enforcement arriving to the scene of the emergency caused by Douglas County’s failure to exercise reasonable care in handling [John’s 911 calls].” 69 For the same reasons we concluded the negligence claims in Johnson, McKenna, Britton, Rutledge, and Moser arose out of assault and were barred by sovereign immunity, we must likewise conclude that Edwards’ negligence claim against Douglas County arises out of an assault and is barred by § 13-910(7). Edwards alleges that the county negligently mishandled the 911 calls with John and that, as a result, emergency personnel did not arrive in a timely manner and Edwards “continue[d] to be held hostage [and was] sexually assaulted at gunpoint” 66 See Moser, supra note 3; Rutledge, supra note 3; Britton, supra note 13. 67 See Moser, supra note 3. Accord Sheridan, supra note 28, 487 U.S. at 411 (O’Connor, J. dissenting; Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J., join) (observing that plain language of FTCA intentional tort exception applies “whether the person committing the intentional tort is a Government employee, a nonemployee, or a Government employee acting outside the scope of his office”). 68 See § 13-910(7). 69 Memorandum brief for appellant in opposition to appellee’s motion for summary dismissal or affirmance at 3. - 279 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 308 Nebraska Reports EDWARDS v. DOUGLAS COUNTY Cite as 308 Neb. 259 by Clark. At oral argument before this court, Edwards’ counsel conceded that all of Edwards’ claimed damages stemmed from the assault by Clark. This presents a classic example of a claim which sounds in negligence but which stems from, and is inextricably linked to, an assault or battery. Edwards is alleging that, because of the government’s negligent handling of the 911 calls, she was injured by an intentional assault. And while it is conceivable there could be circumstances where the claim is so attenuated from an assault that it cannot fairly be characterized as arising out of the assault, we do not have such a claim before us today. [13] We understand Edwards’ briefing to suggest that her negligence claim is factually different from those considered in Johnson, McKenna, Britton, Rutledge, and Moser, because those plaintiffs alleged the government was negligent in failing to protect against a foreseeable assault, and Edwards is alleging the government’s negligence delayed its response to an assault in progress. This argument relies on the sort of semantic recasting of events this court has consistently rejected. 70 Plaintiffs cannot circumvent the assault and battery exemption through “artful pleading.” 71 Because the Legislature has broadly exempted from the PSTCA “[a]ny claim arising out of assault,” 72 it is immaterial whether Edwards has alleged the assault occurred because the government negligently failed to prevent it or because the government negligently delayed in responding to it. No matter how it is framed, Edwards’ claim of governmental negligence arises out of assault and is barred by sovereign immunity under § 13-910(7) of the PSTCA. Nothing in this opinion should be understood to diminish the seriousness of the assault experienced by Edwards or to excuse any mishandling of the 911 calls for help. But the Legislature has expressly preserved the government’s sovereign immunity for negligence claims that arise out of 70 See, Moser, supra note 3; Britton, supra note 13. 71 Jill B. & Travis B., supra note 22, 297 Neb. at 93, 899 N.W.2d at 265. 72 § 13-910(7). - 280 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 308 Nebraska Reports EDWARDS v. DOUGLAS COUNTY Cite as 308 Neb. 259 assaults, and Edwards has brought such a claim. The provisions of § 13-910(7) are plain and unambiguous, and this court must apply those provisions as written. 73 The sweeping language of the exemption simply allows no other reasonable construction. 74 [14] The dissent asks important public policy questions about the impact of immunizing the government from a claim that it failed to respond quickly enough to stop a violent assault against an innocent victim. Important public policy questions are also presented by calls to waive immunity and expand the types of claims that can result in money judgments against a political subdivision and impact the public fisc. But balancing these public policy concerns is not a matter the Nebraska Constitution leaves to the courts. 75 No matter how compelling the facts of a particular case may be, the judiciary does not have the power to waive sovereign immunity. 76 [15,16] Neb. Const. art. II, § 1, precludes us from exercising powers belonging to the Legislature, and decisions on whether and how to limit the government’s potential tort liability belong to the Legislature. 77 Courts must not, through judicial construction, usurp the Legislature’s role in drawing the line between governmental liability and immunity. 78 Prior courts have strayed from this foundational principle. 79 This court will not. 73 See Glasson v. Board of Equal. of City of Omaha, 302 Neb. 869, 925 N.W.2d 672 (2019). 74 See, Moser, supra note 3; Jill B. & Travis B., supra note 22. 75 See Neb. Const. art. V, § 22. 76 See id. See, also, McKenna, supra note 12. 77 See Neb. Const. art. V, § 22. 78 See Jill B. & Travis B., supra note 22. 79 See Brown v. City of Omaha, 183 Neb. 430, 434, 160 N.W.2d 805, 808 (1968) (plurality holds that while Legislature might have “the ultimate word,” courts also have power to abrogate sovereign immunity from tort liability arising out of ownership, use, and operation of motor vehicles). See, also, Doe, supra note 25. - 281 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 308 Nebraska Reports EDWARDS v. DOUGLAS COUNTY Cite as 308 Neb. 259 We therefore leave to the Legislature, after careful study and full debate of the social and economic consequences, the public policy decision of whether to expand the government’s tort liability for claims arising out of assault. For the sake of completeness, we note that because Edwards’ claim against the county is plainly barred by the intentional tort exemption, we express no opinion on whether it is otherwise the type of claim for which a private person would be liable in tort under Nebraska law. 80 No Waiver of Sovereign Immunity Under § 86-441 In opposing the county’s motion for summary affirmance on grounds of sovereign immunity, Edwards argues that even if her claim is barred by the PSTCA’s intentional tort exemption, we should consider whether the ETCSA operates as a waiver of sovereign immunity “separate and apart from that provided for in [the PSTCA].” 81 Edwards refers this court to § 86-441 of the ETCSA, which provides: In contracting for such 911 service and in providing such 911 service, except for failure to use reasonable care or for intentional acts, each governing body, public safety agency, and service supplier and their employees and agents shall be immune from liability or the payment for any damages in the performance of installing, maintaining, or providing 911 service. 80 See § 13-903(4) (“[t]ort claim shall mean any claim against a political subdivision for money only on account of . . . personal injury or death, caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the political subdivision . . . under circumstances in which the political subdivision, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant for such damage”); § 13-908 (“in all suits brought under [the PSTCA] the political subdivision shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances”). 81 Memorandum brief for appellant in opposition to appellee’s motion for summary dismissal or affirmance at 4. - 282 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 308 Nebraska Reports EDWARDS v. DOUGLAS COUNTY Cite as 308 Neb. 259 Before the district court, Edwards argued this statutory provision established Douglas County’s legal duty. But on appeal, we understand Edwards to contend that § 86-441 should be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity for claims alleging negligence against any provider of 911 services. We disagree. The Legislature has declared: [N]o political subdivision of the State of Nebraska shall be liable for the torts of its officers, agents, or employees, and that no suit shall be maintained against such political subdivision or its officers, agents, or employees on any tort claim except to the extent, and only to the extent, provided by the [PSTCA]. 82 [17] As such, the PSTCA provides “‘the exclusive means’” 83 by which to maintain a tort claim against a political subdivision and its employees. The PSTCA does expressly reference and incorporate some statutes outside the PSTCA, 84 but the PSTCA makes no reference to § 86-441 or to any other statute contained in the ETCSA. Similarly, the ETCSA makes no reference whatsoever to the PSTCA. 85 [18] Moreover, we see nothing in the express language of § 86-441 which indicates the Legislature intended to waive sovereign immunity for claims against political subdivisions. The 82 § 13-902. 83 Connelly v. City of Omaha, 284 Neb. 131, 151, 816 N.W.2d 742, 760 (2012). Accord Geddes, supra note 22. 84 See, e.g., §§ 13-903 to 13-907; § 13-909; § 13-910; §§ 13-912 to 13-915; § 13-917; § 13-918; §§ 13-923 to 13-925; § 13-928. 85 Compare, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-2520 (Reissue 2012) (joint public agency may be sued subject to PSTCA); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 47-1005 (Supp. 2019) (tort claims for violation of Healthy Pregnancies for Incarcerated Women Act governed by PSTCA); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-15,168(1) (Reissue 2018) (tort claims against housing agency governed by PSTCA); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-2328 (Reissue 2018) (claims under One-Call Notification System Act subject to PSTCA). - 283 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 308 Nebraska Reports EDWARDS v. DOUGLAS COUNTY Cite as 308 Neb. 259 plain text of the statute provides “immun[ity] from liability” 86 to governing bodies, public safety agencies, and service suppliers and their employees and agents, “except for failure to use reasonable care or for intentional acts.” 87 This language appears to except both negligent and intentional acts, and it is thus unclear what sort of immunity the Legislature intended to confer. But we express no opinion in that regard, because whatever the proper interpretation may be of the language in § 86-441, it is not a waiver of sovereign immunity. As stated, statutes purporting to waive the protection of sovereign immunity are strictly construed in favor of the sovereign and against the waiver. 88 A waiver of sovereign immunity is found only where stated by the most express language of a statute or by such overwhelming implication from the text as will allow no other reasonable construction. 89 If there is any doubt as to whether immunity has been waived, the sovereign must prevail. 90 Applying these settled principles, we do not construe § 86-441 as an express waiver of sovereign immunity.