Opinion ID: 195655
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: challenges raised separately by kenney

Text: Indictment Under Interstate Agreement on Detainers Appellant Kenney argues that the district court erred in refusing to dismiss his indictment under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, 2, Art. IV, 18 U.S.C. App. (IAD or Act). The IAD establishes procedures for transfer of prisoners incarcerated in one jurisdiction to the temporary custody of another jurisdiction where criminal charges are pending. It sets time limits for trying prisoners transferred under its provisions, with the purpose of encouraging the expeditious and orderly disposition of outstanding charges. IAD, Art. I. Kenney argues that the indictment should have been dismissed based on the following violations of the IAD: Violation of Art. IV(a), which provides for a thirty-day period after receipt by the appropriate authorities before the request [for temporary custody] be honored, within which period the Governor of the sending State may disapprove the request for temporary custody or availability, either upon his own motion or upon motion of the prisoner; -44- Violation of Art. IV(d), which indicates that the Act does not deprive a prisoner of any right to contest the legality of his extradition to the receiving state; Violation of Art. IV(c), which provides that trial shall be commenced within one hundred and twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving State, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. Kenney failed to raise Articles IV(a) and IV(d) as a basis for his motion to dismiss below; hence, he has waived those arguments pursuant to Fed. R. Crim P. 12(b) and 12(f). We have considered whether these claims constitute plain error and have concluded that they do not. Kenney did raise Art. IV(c) on several occasions as a basis for objecting to motions for continuances filed by codefendants and ultimately in a motion to dismiss his indictment, arguing that the court failed to try him within 120 days of his appearance in the jurisdiction of New Hampshire. Kenney was brought to the District of New Hampshire on May 7, 1992, and trial, pursuant to a strict application of the 120-day deadline, should have commenced on September 8, 1992.25 In denying Kenney's motion to dismiss, the judge indicated that continuing the trial until October 5 did not violate the 120-day provision because the clock had been tolled for twenty-eight days, from August 4 through August 31, 1992, 25 September 5, 1992, was exactly 120 days, but that date fell on a holiday weekend. -45- while the magistrate judge resolved pretrial motions filed by Kenney. The judge also ruled that delays attributable to the disposition of motions filed by other co-defendants constituted good cause under the IAD and were also excluded from the computation. This Court has recently suggested that delay caused by a court's resolution of pending co-defendant motions may qualify as excludible time under Article IV(c) of the IAD which states, for good cause shown in open court . . . the court . . . may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. Whiting v. U.S., No. 92-1182, slip op. at 29-30 (1st Cir. July 6, 1994). However, the facts of this case allow us to affirm the court's denial of Kenney's motion to dismiss on a narrower ground; i.e., that delay attributable to the disposition of motions filed by the defendant, himself, is excludible from the 120-day computation. Art. VI(a) of the IAD provides that the 120-day clock shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to stand trial. This Court has generally interpreted this provision to allow for tolling during the time that it takes for the court to resolve matters raised by the defendant who is claiming rights under the IAD. Whiting, No. 92-1182, slip op. at 27-28; United States v. Walker, 924 F.2d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1991), United States v. Taylor, 861 F.2d 316, 321-22 (1st Cir. 1988). We have held out the possibility, however, that where a defendant timely advises the court that he or she is claiming protections under the IAD and the court takes more time than is necessary to -46- resolve the defendant's pretrial motions, then the delay may not be fully excluded from the 120-day clock. In this case, Kenney first informed the court on June 5 that he refused to waive any rights under the IAD in response to a Government motion relating to bail. On August 4, he filed seven pretrial motions but did not refer to his reliance on the IAD to notify the magistrate that an expedited decision was, perhaps, warranted. The Government submitted responses on August 14, and the magistrate ruled on the motions on August 31. Kenney informed the court that he was specifically relying on the 120day trial provision on September 1, when he filed objections to motions by co-defendants seeking a continuance of the trial date. In these circumstances, the Court finds that a 28-day delay in resolving defendant's own motions was not unreasonable and that after excluding this delay, trial was properly commenced within the 120-day deadline.26 Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Kenney's motion to dismiss his indictment. B. The Court's Admission into Evidence of Semi-Automatic Handgun Appellant Kenney challenges the court's admission into evidence of Government exhibit 42, a .32 caliber semi-automatic handgun. Specifically, Kenney argues that the Government failed to introduce sufficient evidence that (1) the gun had not been 26 According to this Court's calculations, the 120-day period, excluding the twenty-eight-day delay occasioned by defendant, ran on October 3, 1992, which was a Saturday. Trial was properly commenced on the first day of the business week, October 5, 1992. -47- altered subsequent to the crime and (2) the gun was the actual gun used in the crimes in question. We need not belabor the point because we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the handgun. Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) requires the trial court to determine if there is a reasonable probability that the evidence is what it is purported to be. Evidence before the court indicated that the gun had been stored in a garage for thirteen days. Even though the garage was used as a storage facility by several people, testimony at trial indicated that a co-conspirator's relative retrieved the handgun from the same place that it had been left by Kenney and Flynn. Considering the nature of the handgun, circumstances surrounding its preservation, and the scant likelihood of intermeddlers, the judge properly determined that it was in substantially the same condition. The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in determining that there was a reasonable probability that the handgun was the same gun used in the robberies. Three coconspirators identified the handgun, and a co-conspirator's relative identified the case in which the handgun was found and testified that she heard Flynn tell Kenney to hide the case in the garage. In addition, testimony by witnesses to the robberies described a gun matching the Government's exhibit. -48-