Opinion ID: 779163
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The BIA's Refusal to Reopen on its Own Motion

Text: 17 The Ekimians next argue that the BIA abused its discretion in refusing to reopen sua sponte. The BIA's sua sponte power to reopen deportation proceedings such as the Ekimians' is described in 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(a): 18 (a) General. The [BIA] may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision. A request to reopen or reconsider any case in which a decision has been made by the [BIA], which request is made by the [INS], or by the party affected by the decision, must be in the form of a written motion to the [BIA]. The decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen or reconsider is within the discretion of the [BIA], subject to the restrictions of this section. The [BIA] has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief. 19 (Emphasis added, last italic in original.) The italicized sentence provides that the BIA may reopen on its own motion at any time, but it does not specify a standard (even a discretionary standard) that the BIA should apply in deciding whether to reopen. The italicized sentence contrasts with the unitalicized sentences that follow. Those sentences specify that if the parties to the case (the INS or the party affected by the decision) wish to ask the BIA to reopen a case, they must do so by means of a written motion. They also specify that the BIA's decision to grant or deny such a party-filed motion is within the discretion of the [BIA], subject to the restrictions of this section. 20 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C)(i), IIRIRA's codification of 8 U.S.C. § 3.2(c)(2), a party has ninety days from the BIA's final administrative order to file a motion to reopen. By contrast, no statutory language authorizes the BIA to reopen a deportation proceeding sua sponte. The only basis for any BIA authority to reopen sua sponte is found in 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(a). 21 The Ekimians argue that the BIA's power to reopen a case on its own motion, like its power to grant a party-filed motion, is within the discretion of the [BIA]; that the BIA's discretion may be abused; and that this court has jurisdiction to review for abuse of discretion the BIA's refusal to reopen. In refusing to reopen sua sponte in the Ekimians' case, the BIA wrote only the following: The respondents, through counsel, have requested that we reopen their proceedings sua sponte. We do not find sufficient grounds here to warrant reopening this matter sua sponte. See Matter of J-J-, Interim Decision (BIA) 3323, 1997 WL 434418 (BIA 2997)[sic]. The BIA's order does not discuss the I 140 petition that had been approved by the INS just before the motion to reopen was filed, or the DOL's two-year delay in processing Ekimian's labor certification petition. Indeed, the order provides virtually no explanation as to why the BIA declined to exercise its sua sponte power to reopen in this case. The only fact we can be certain the BIA considered is the date on which the Ekimians filed their motion to reopen. 22 In In re J-J-, referred to as  Matter of J-J-  in the BIA's order, the BIA had previously written: [T]he Board retains limited discretionary powers under the regulations to reopen or reconsider cases on our own motion. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(a). That power, however, allows the Board to reopen proceedings sua sponte in exceptional situations not present here. 21 I. & N. Dec. 976, 984, 1997 WL 434418 (1997) (emphasis added). The Ekimians contend that we have jurisdiction to review the BIA's determination that exceptional situations do not exist, and that the BIA's failure to reopen was a reviewable (and reversible) abuse of discretion. See also In re X-G-W, 22 I. & N. Dec. 71, 73, 1998 WL 378104 (1998) ([T]he Board retains limited discretionary powers under [8 C.F.R. § 3.2 of] the regulations to reopen or reconsider cases sua sponte in unique situations where it would serve the interest of justice.  (Emphasis added.)), superseded on other grounds by In re G-C-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 359, 2002 WL 1001051 (2002). 23 The text of § 3.2(a) does not provide a standard controlling or directing the BIA's decision whether to reopen, and similarly provides no standard for reviewing the BIA's decision. We take some guidance from the Supreme Court's decision in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985), where prison inmates in Texas and Oklahoma sought to compel the Food and Drug Administration to enforce a federal law prohibiting the unapproved use of an approved drug— i.e., the unapproved use of particular drugs for human execution. Id. at 823, 105 S.Ct. 1649. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that the decision of an administrative agency to exercise its discretion not to undertake certain actions is presumed to be immune from review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). 470 U.S. at 834, 105 S.Ct. 1649. Emphasizing that agencies are better equipped than courts to prioritize administrative concerns and actions, the Court held that: 24 even where Congress has not affirmatively precluded review, review is not to be had if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion. In such a case, the statute (law) can be taken to have committed the decisionmaking to the agency's judgment absolutely.... [I]f no judicially manageable standards are available for judging how and when an agency should exercise its discretion, then it is impossible to evaluate agency action for abuse of discretion. 25 Id. at 830, 105 S.Ct. 1649. 26 The Ekimians suggest that In re J-J- provides a meaningful judicial standard for reviewing the BIA's discretion because it indicates that the BIA will reopen a proceeding sua sponte when exceptional situations exist. We do not believe that an acknowledgment by the BIA that it may reopen proceedings, and a statement that it will do so under exceptional situations, without more, authorizes us to review the BIA's decision for abuse of discretion. In In re J-J-, the BIA acknowledged only that § 3.2(a)  allows the Board to reopen proceedings in exceptional situations; it did not hold that the regulation requires the Board to reopen proceedings in exceptional situations. Moreover, the BIA provided no explanation as to what constitute exceptional situations—except that the facts in In re J-J- failed to describe them. 27 The cases in which we have reviewed a BIA decision under an exceptional circumstances standard have been those in which a relevant statute explicitly defined what Congress considers an exceptional circumstance. In Sharma v. INS, 89 F.3d 545 (9th Cir.1996), we reviewed whether the BIA erred in refusing to rescind the Sharmas' deportation order after the petitioners claimed they failed to appear for their deportation hearing because of exceptional circumstances. Under existing immigration law, the Sharmas could justify their failure to appear at the deportation proceeding by showing that exceptional circumstances excused their absence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(c)(3)(A) (1994) (repealed). 4 Exceptional circumstances was defined in the statute as circumstances beyond the control of the alien, exemplified by serious illness of the alien or death of an immediate relative of the alien, but not including less compelling circumstances. Id. at § 1252b(f)(2) (1994) (repealed). Guided by a statutory definition, we were able to review whether the Sharmas had missed their deportation hearing because of exceptional circumstances, and we held that they had not. Likewise, in Singh Bhathal v. INS, 170 F.3d 943 (9th Cir.1999), we concluded that petitioner Singh Bhathal's untimely motion to reopen was barred by statute, and held that even if Singh-Bhathal had filed a timely motion to reopen, he could not show that exceptional circumstances, as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(f)(2), justified his failure to appear at his deportation hearing. See also Farhoud v. INS, 122 F.3d 794 (9th Cir.1997) (alien failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances to excuse his failure to appear at the deportation hearing). Unlike the Sharmas and Singh Bhathal, the Ekimians cannot point to any statutory, regulatory, or caselaw definition of exceptional circumstances applicable to the BIA's sua sponte power under § 3.2(a). 28 Because we cannot discover a sufficiently meaningful standard against which to judge the BIA's decision not to reopen under § 3.2(a), we hold that we do not have jurisdiction to review the Ekimians' claim that the BIA should have exercised its sua sponte power. In doing so, we join the First Circuit, which, in Luis v. INS, 196 F.3d 36 (1st Cir.1999), affirmed the BIA's denial of a motion to reopen on the grounds that the motion was untimely and that petitioner Luis failed to argue to the BIA that it should have exercised its sua sponte power. It then stated: 29 Assuming arguendo that Luis would have exhausted her administrative remedies [by raising the sua sponte argument below], this court still has no jurisdiction to review this claim because the decision of the BIA whether to invoke its sua sponte authority is committed to its unfettered discretion. Therefore, the very nature of the claim renders it not subject to judicial review. 30 Id. at 40 (emphasis added). The First Circuit wrote that under Heckler, the lack of guidelines and standards dictating the BIA's sua sponte power deprived the court of jurisdiction to review Luis's claim that the BIA should have invoked its sua sponte authority to reconsider her motion to reopen the deportation proceedings. Id. at 41. See also Prado v. Reno, 198 F.3d 286, 292 (1st Cir.1999) ([B]ecause `the decision of the BIA whether to invoke its sua sponte authority is committed to its unfettered discretion,' Prado's claim is simply not justiciable. (citation omitted)). 31 The position of other circuits on this issue is somewhat ambiguous, but no other circuit has squarely held that the BIA's refusal to invoke its sua sponte authority under § 3.2(a) is subject to judicial review. Cf. Socop Gonzalez v. INS, 208 F.3d 838 (so holding), vacated by 229 F.3d 860 (9th Cir.2000) (ordering rehearing en banc). In Wang v. Ashcroft, 260 F.3d 448 (5th Cir.2001), the Fifth Circuit noted but failed to reach the question of reviewability. In Anin v. Reno, 188 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir.1999), the Eleventh Circuit wrote that § 3.2(a) gives the BIA non-reviewable discretion to dismiss Anin's claim. We can find no abuse of discretion here. The Anin court seemed to state simultaneously (and inconsistently) that the BIA's discretion to deny a motion to reopen is nonreviewable, and that in reviewing the denial it found no abuse of discretion. (Or it is conceivable that the Anin court, in saying that it can find no abuse of discretion, meant that it had no jurisdiction to find otherwise.) Cf. Mejia Rodriguez v. Reno, 178 F.3d 1139, 1145 n. 5 (11th Cir.1999) (stating the BIA did not abuse its discretion [under § 3.2(a)] in concluding that Mejia's arguments did not justify the reopening of his deportation proceedings).