Opinion ID: 2623595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Allegedly Improper Excusal of Prospective Juror B.

Text: Coffman contends the trial court deprived her of her state and federal constitutional rights of due process, equal protection and an impartial jury in granting a challenge for cause, joined by the prosecutor and both defendant Marlow's counsel and her own, to Prospective Juror B. Coffman further contends her counsel rendered ineffective assistance in joining in the challenge. Her contentions lack merit. Preliminarily, respondent argues Coffman invited any error by joining defendant Marlow's challenge. As articulated in People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 330, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531: The doctrine of invited error is designed to prevent an accused from gaining a reversal on appeal because of an error made by the trial court at his behest. If defense counsel intentionally caused the trial court to err, the appellant cannot be heard to complain on appeal. . . . [I]t also must be clear that counsel acted for tactical reasons and not out of ignorance or mistake. In cases involving an action affirmatively taken by defense counsel, we have found a clearly implied tactical purpose to be sufficient to invoke the invited error rule. (See People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 150, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357; People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 657-658, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788, 854 P.2d 80; People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 152, 5 Cal. Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781.) Here, Coffman's counsel did not merely acquiesce, but affirmatively joined in the challenge to Prospective Juror B., and thus cannot be heard to claim the court erred in excusing her. In any event, the trial court did not err. On appeal, we will uphold a trial court's ruling on a challenge for cause by either party `if it is fairly supported by the record, accepting as binding the trial court's determination as to the prospective juror's true state of mind when the prospective juror has made statements that are conflicting or ambiguous.' ( People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 537, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931.) Although Coffman urges that Prospective Juror B.'s remarks were, at most, ambiguous and reflected merely hesitancy or reluctance and not outright refusal to impose the death penalty, read in context the prospective juror's comments indicated that, while she favored the death penalty as a sentence for first degree murder, she could not personally impose it owing to her religious background. Because excusal therefore was appropriate, trial counsel did not perform deficiently in joining the challenge.