Opinion ID: 6335617
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Challenge to Sufficiency of the Evidence

Text: Fitzpatrick first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction on Count 1, which charged Fitzpatrick with joining a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana. Notably, proof of guilt on Count 1 was, itself, an element of Count 2. Because he stayed in the car while the others discussed the plan, Fitzpatrick argues that “there was no evidence whatsoever presented at trial that [he] was aware of any plan, or joined any agreement, to resell marijuana that was apparently the object of the robbery.” 8 No. 21-1286 “De novo review applies to the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal; practically speaking, however, the standard of review is that for sufficiency of the evidence.” United States v. Peterson, 823 F.3d 1113, 1120 (7th Cir. 2016). “In a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge after a jury verdict, we review the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the government and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.” United States v. Anderson, 988 F.3d 420, 424 (7th Cir. 2021). “We will overturn a conviction only if, after reviewing the record in this light, we determine that no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. This burden is a high one—one we have described as “nearly insurmountable.” Id. (quoting United States v. Faulkner, 885 F.3d 488, 492 (7th Cir. 2018)). Turning to the essential elements for Count 1, “[a] conspiracy requires a showing that (1) two or more people entered into an agreement to distribute drugs, and (2) the defendant knowingly and intentionally joined in the agreement.” United States v. Pulgar, 789 F.3d 807, 813 (7th Cir. 2015). For this offense, the government must prove that the co-conspirators had the joint criminal objective of distributing drugs. United States v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565, 569–70 (7th Cir. 2008). Nonetheless, as long as a defendant “knew the essential nature and scope of the charged conspiracy,” he “need not [have] join[ed] a conspiracy at its inception or participate[d] in all of the unlawful acts in furtherance of the conspiracy to be convicted.” United States v. Orlando, 819 F.3d 1016, 1022 (7th Cir. 2016). The government may rely on circumstantial evidence to prove these elements, but “the Supreme Court has warned that ‘[i]n some cases reliance on [circumstantial] evidence perhaps has tended to obscure the basic fact that the agreement is No. 21-1286 9 the essential evil at which the crime of conspiracy is directed.’” United States v. Cruse, 805 F.3d 795, 811 (7th Cir. 2015) (alterations in original) (quoting Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 n.10 (1975)). Circumstantial or not, “[w]hether the evidence establishes a conspiratorial agreement must ultimately be determined by the totality of the circumstances, and we conduct a ‘holistic assessment of whether the jury reached a reasonable verdict.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Brown, 726 F.3d 993, 1002 (7th Cir. 2013)). In summary, Fitzpatrick contends that “the government fell far short of” introducing substantial evidence that he (1) knew of the illegal objective of the conspiracy (here, drug distribution) and (2) that he agreed to participate, as necessary to convict him on Count 1. See United States v. Corson, 579 F.3d 804, 810 (7th Cir. 2009). The district court explained its rejection of this argument in a written opinion after the jury handed down its verdict: In reviewing the evidence, a reasonable jury could find that Fitzpatrick was part of a plot to steal and later distribute marijuana. Cherry ex- plained to Fitzpatrick that the robbery involved stealing marijuana from a known drug dealer, consuming a portion of it, and selling the rest. Cherry intended to share his portion of the pro- ceeds with Fitzpatrick. Fitzpatrick went with Cherry to the drug dealer’s house and was given an assault rifle. After being involved in a shoot out and loading his friend who had been shot into the car, he showed up at a friend’s house with blood on him…. This is sufficient ev- idence for a reasonable jury to find that 10 No. 21-1286 Fitzpatrick was involved in the conspiracy to rob a drug dealer with intent to possess and later distribute marijuana, as charged in Count 1. Fitzpatrick claims the court’s recollection of the testimony was incorrect; specifically, he contends that there was no direct evidence that Fitzpatrick was told the home invasion robbery was, at least in part, for the resale of the drugs. But even if the record does not directly demonstrate Fitzpatrick was privy to the discussion on plans to resell, Seventh Circuit precedent establishes the appropriate role of circumstantial evidence in establishing intent to distribute. In United States v. Lewis, 641 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2011), the defendants were convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and carrying and possessing a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Id. at 776. In that case, defendants planned an armed robbery of a cocaine stash house, intending to surprise the occupants, tie them up, steal the drugs and weapons, and later sell the drugs. Id. at 777–78. The stash house, however, turned out to be a fictitious part of an undercover police investigation. Id. at 777. Like Fitzpatrick, one of the defendants in Lewis argued on appeal that “although he may have been part of a conspiracy, this was just a conspiracy to rob a stash house for drugs, and there was no evidence of his intent to distribute or knowledge that his co-conspirators were intending to distribute.” Id. at 782. We rejected that argument in Lewis, concluding that “[a] jury could reasonably believe that [defendant] … was aware that such a large amount of [drugs] was optimal No. 21-1286 11 for distribution.” Id. Even more convincingly, the Court reasoned: A jury could equally reasonably believe that no sane person would rob a stash house guarded by armed gang members to score some recrea- tional drugs for personal use. For a jury to reach such a conclusion hardly requires the impermis- sible piling of inference upon inference, but ra- ther is the sort of rational result from circum- stantial evidence we ask juries to determine every day. Id. The same logic applies in this case. It was reasonable for the jury to find it unlikely that Fitzpatrick or his co-conspirators would have endeavored to carry out this dangerous operation requiring armament if the reward was merely marijuana for recreational use. See Lewis, 641 F.3d at 782; see also United States v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1105, 1113 & n.11 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding presence of weapons may point in the direction of distribution). Even factoring in any learning disability, Fitzpatrick was savvy enough to provide coverage fire while his co-conspirator was being pulled out of the house, to avoid capture at Nieto’s, and to wash off and burn away traces of the crime. Nothing on the record precludes the jury from reasonably concluding Fitzpatrick was capable of understanding that the goal of the robbery was at least, in part, to acquire drugs for resale as opposed to purely recreational use. From our standpoint on review, proving that no jury could reasonably believe Fitzpatrick could make this connection is a formidable 12 No. 21-1286 hurdle. See United States v. Kindle, 698 F.3d 401, 405 (7th Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds on reh’g en banc sub nom. United States v. Mayfield, 771 F.3d 417 (7th Cir. 2014). “Overturning a guilty verdict for lack of evidence is serious business; we are essentially asked to take the case out of the jury’s hands, something we will do only if the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 406 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). With this in mind, we see no evidentiary deficiency. There is evidence, namely the fact that Fitzpatrick armed himself with an assault rifle to steal drugs, that the jury could have relied on to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, we affirm Fitzpatrick’s conviction.