Opinion ID: 2762459
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: facts

Text: In his complaint, Mr. Singer alleged that he was an investigator for the Claremore Police Department, Ms. Steidley was an Oklahoma district attorney and Mr. Lair was an assistant district attorney who worked for Ms. Steidley. In retaliation for Mr. Singer’s criticism of Ms. Steidley and Mr. Lair, they allegedly manufactured evidence that Mr. Singer had acted improperly during his investigation of a sexual assault case. Ostensibly relying on their duties under Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972),1 they then communicated, distributed, or disclosed the existence of this manufactured evidence to several persons or entities, including a United States attorney; Mr. Singer’s superior at the Claremore Police Department; the Chief of the Pryor Police Department; the criminal defense counsel in a Rogers County District Court case; a friend of Mr. Lair who in turn disclosed its existence on the Oklahoma Criminal Defense Lawyers Association (OCDLA) website; and a Claremore newspaper. Mr. Singer alleged that these retaliatory actions had caused significant, irreparable damage to his reputation and employment. He asserted claims under § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation and for deprivation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. He also requested exemplary damages, declaratory judgment that 1 Giglio requires the prosecution to disclose to a criminal defendant information bearing on a witness’s credibility where that evidence may be material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment. See United States v. Harmon, 742 F.3d 451, 459 (10th Cir. 2014) (discussing Giglio rule). -2- the manufactured materials did not constitute Giglio material, and an injunction against the defendants’ further dissemination of the materials. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting among other defenses absolute prosecutorial immunity concerning all claims and qualified immunity concerning the Fourteenth Amendment claim. The district court dismissed the complaint in part. It granted the defendants absolute prosecutorial immunity to the extent Mr. Singer’s claims relied on disclosures of Giglio material to the United States attorney and to defense counsel. It granted them qualified immunity on the Fourteenth Amendment claim because it found the alleged liberty interest was not clearly established. It also dismissed the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The partial dismissal left intact Mr. Singer’s First Amendment retaliation claim based on the disclosures to the Claremore and Pryor police chiefs, the defense attorney website, and the Claremore newspaper; and his claim for exemplary damages. With the district court’s permission, Mr. Singer then filed a first amended complaint. He reasserted his First Amendment retaliation and exemplary damages claims and added state-law claims for defamation, libel and slander. The defendants sought summary judgment on the amended complaint. In their motion, they did not renew their arguments for absolute or qualified immunity. Instead, they contended that summary judgment should be granted because they did not actually disclose the Giglio materials to the police chiefs, the Claremore newspaper, or the Oklahoma -3- Criminal Defenders’ website, and because Mr. Singer failed to establish the elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim.2 In its summary judgment order the district court did not discuss whether the defendants were entitled to either absolute or qualified immunity. Rather, it concluded that reasonable jurors could disagree concerning whether the defendants had disclosed Giglio materials to the police chiefs and the newspaper.3 It further 2 The defendants’ summary judgment briefs did contain some passing references to immunity. They argued that they did not lose the absolute immunity connected with the fulfillment of their duties under Giglio merely because third parties disseminated the Giglio materials to the police chiefs, the newspaper, and the website. The district court never reached this argument, because it found sufficient evidence that it was the defendants themselves who disseminated the materials to the police chiefs and the newspaper. We lack appellate jurisdiction to resolve a dispute concerning this factual finding in a qualified immunity appeal. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995) (holding district court’s determination that summary judgment record raised genuine issue of fact concerning petitioners’ involvement in unconstitutional conduct did not constitute appealable final decision). To the extent we may reach factual issues in an appeal from the denial of absolute immunity, see Malik v. Arapahoe Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 191 F.3d 1306, 1313 (10th Cir. 1999) (addressing factual issues in interlocutory appeal from denial of absolute immunity), the defendants have not renewed their argument that absolute immunity is unaffected by disclosures made only by third parties, and so that argument is not before us. See Aplt. Br. in Chief at 20-24; Reply Br. at 6-9. In addition, the defendants argued that “all disclosures made were objectively reasonable and are covered under either absolute or qualified immunity.” Aplt. App. at 167. We do not read this argument as an assertion of immunity for their disclosure of materials to others besides the United States attorney or defense counsel. In their summary judgment brief, the defendants did not admit to making such disclosures. In any event, the district court was not required to consider such a cursory and conclusory argument in ruling on summary judgment. 3 The district court determined that “no reasonable jury could conclude that defendants provided Giglio material to the OCDLA or that [Mr. Lair’s friend] posted (continued) -4- determined that Mr. Singer presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on the issues of whether he suffered a “chilling” injury and whether the defendants’ actions were substantially motivated as a response to his constitutionally protected conduct. Aplt. App., Vol. II at 616-19. Accordingly, it denied summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation claim.4