Opinion ID: 729912
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Plaintiff's Subjective Allegations of Pain

Text: 26 In addition to discounting Dr. Hague's opinion, the ALJ also rejected Plaintiff's subjective allegations of pain: The undersigned [ALJ] finds the claimant's alleged pain is not supported by substantial medical evidence and is in fact contradicted by clinical and laboratory findings.... (R. at 81.) Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's negative credibility finding concerning her pain allegations should not be accorded deference by this court. We cannot disturb the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff's subjective pain allegations were not credible, unless the ALJ's findings are patently wrong. Rucker v. Chater, 92 F.3d 492, 495 (1996). And while this court cannot discredit a complaint of pain simply because a plaintiff did not introduce objective medical evidence to support the extent of the pain, we are  'neither required to give full credit to every statement of pain, and require a finding of disabled every time a claimant states that she feels unable to work.'  Id. at 496 (citation omitted). This court, in Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 485-86 (7th Cir.1993), developed an extensive framework for reviewing subjective allegations of pain that are unsupported by objective, medical evidence. In sum, Pope advises the following analysis: 27 If the allegation of pain is not supported by the objective medical evidence in the file and the claimant indicates that pain is a significant factor of this or her alleged inability to work, then the ALJ must obtain detailed descriptions of claimant's daily activities by directing specific inquiries about the pain and its effects to the claimant. She must investigate all avenues presented that relate to pain, including claimant's prior work record information and observations by treating physicians, examining physicians, and third parties. Factors taht must be considered include the nature and intensity of claimant's pain, precipitation and aggravating factors, dosage and effectiveness of any pain medications, other treatment for the relief of pain, functional restrictions, and the claimant's daily activities. 28 Luna, 22 F.3d at 691 (citing Pope, 998 F.2d at 485-86)). 29 The ALJ in this case considered Plaintiff's pain in light of most of the above criteria: He solicited the details of Plaintiff's daily activities, which included regular house cleaning (dusting, mopping, laundry, and cooking), shopping, attending her son's athletic events, helping her son with homework, visiting with friends and playing cribbage, working crossword puzzles, collecting ink pens, reading, and writing letters. (R. at 80.) The ALJ also noted the lack of clinical findings and medical opinions supporting Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff therefore argues that the ALJ improperly discounted her pain allegations merely because her doctors could not identify its physical etiology or cause. Rather than showing an inconsistency, Plaintiff contends that the medical record demonstrates that Plaintiff's pain is consistent with a Somatoform Disorder. But this reasoning does not get Plaintiff very far because she still cannot point to any medical evidence supporting her allegations of the severity of her Somatoform-related pain. See Herron, 19 F.3d at 334 (explaining that once the presence of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment is established that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain alleged, but the intensity or persistence is unsubstantiated by the medical record, then the ALJ is obliged to examine the factors identified in Pope ). Indeed, the record contains some contrary evidence, for instance, in the form of medical records showing that despite Plaintiff's allegations of pain, she had full range of motion and her joints did not show any evidence of tenderness. (R. at 228.). Additionally, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff's allegations of pain appeared inconsistent with her minimal reliance on pain medication and her refusal to seek treatment at the pain clinic. Reliance on this latter factor may be misplaced since it has not been shown that treatment at the pain clinic was prescribed or that it would have eliminated her disability, see DeFrancesco v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1040, 1043 (7th Cir.1989) ([I]f the claimant has inexcusably refused to follow prescribed medical treatment that would eliminate his total disability, then he isn't totally disabled.)). Still, it appears that the ALJ substantially considered the factors required by Pope. Under these circumstances, it appears that the ALJ was not patently wrong to discount Plaintiff's testimony. See Herron, 19 F.3d at 335 (stating that the court will not upset ALJ's credibility determinations on appeal unless they are patently wrong because the ALJ is in the best position to observe witnesses). Thus, this does not appear to be a case where the reasons given by the trier of fact do not build an accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the result. Sarchet, 78 F.3d at 306. 30