Opinion ID: 888275
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Did the District Court err in admitting testimony about the extent of the victims' injuries?

Text: ¶ 28 District courts have broad discretion in determining the relevance and admissibility of evidence, and we will overturn evidentiary rulings only upon a showing of abuse of that discretion. State v. Hicks, 2006 MT 71, ¶ 19, 331 Mont. 471, ¶ 19, 133 P.3d 206, ¶ 19. ¶ 29 Pol contends the court erred in admitting testimony about both victims' injuries, in light of the stipulation as to Bernie Kuhns' injuries. At the beginning of trial, the District Court read preliminary instructions to the jury, and then read the parties' stipulation to certain facts regarding the collision. The stipulation included that Bernard Kuhns suffered serious bodily injury, as a result of the collision, in that he suffered a broken clavicle. Based on that stipulation, Pol claims on appeal that Kuhns should not have been allowed to testify about his injuries. We first recap the portions of Kuhns' testimony at issue here. ¶ 30 The prosecution's direct examination of Kuhns at trial began with questions about Kuhns' and his wife's activities just before the collision and the facts of the collision, culminating in Kuhns' testimony that he saw Pol's truck coming into his lane of traffic from the front and then woke up on the ground. Kuhns then testified without objection that, when he woke up, his leg, shoulder and head hurt. He testified he sustained a broken clavicle and a contusion on his scalp. The prosecutor's next question was how was your collarbone treated? Pol's counsel objected on relevance grounds, but the court overruled the objection, and Kuhns testified he wore a sling for about five weeks and was given pain and sleep medication. Kuhns then testified without objection that he was still using sleep medication at the time of trial, because of pain and missing his wife. The prosecutor next asked Kuhns whether he had to take time off work as a result of the collision, and Pol's counsel again objected on relevance grounds. The court overruled the objection, and Kuhns testified he had missed about five weeks of work and still was unable to perform all the tasks he normally performed in his job. Finally, the prosecutor asked Kuhns whether his injuries had impaired his ability to take care of his children, and Pol's counsel objected that the question was irrelevant. The court overruled the objection and Kuhns testified his mother had taken his youngest son back to West Virginia with her because Kuhns was unable to lift the child. ¶ 31 Chad Ward, who witnessed the collision, testified that he stopped his car and went over to the two people who were on the motorcycle. The Prosecutor asked Ward what he saw and Ward testified, without objection, that he got to the man first and saw that he had a huge gash on his head. He stated he then looked at the woman who was lying ten or twelve feet away on her stomach and a saw a pool of blood forming under her head, so went and knelt over her to see if there was anything he could do. The Prosecutor asked, [a]nd what happened then? Pol objected on grounds of relevance and Rule 403. The court overruled the objection. Ward stated that the woman was bleeding from her nose and the side of her head and that he yelled to someone to bring some towels. He stated that the woman had a pulse but did not appear to be breathing and that she appeared to be in very dire shape and he wasn't comfortable doing anything else. ¶ 32 In support of his argument that Kuhns' and Ward's testimonies were inadmissible, Pol advances cases addressing the admission of otherwise relevant photographs, in which the issue was whether the probative value of the photographs was outweighed by their prejudice to the defendant. See State v. Mayes, 251 Mont. 358, 371, 825 P.2d 1196, 1204 (1992); State v. Henry, 241 Mont. 524, 531, 788 P.2d 316, 320 (1990). In that regard, we have long recognized the special visual capacity of photographs to arouse human feelings of sympathy or prejudice. See e.g. State v. Bischert, 131 Mont. 152, 308 P.2d 969 (1957). ¶ 33 The special visual capacity of photographs is not at issue in the present case, and Pol concedes he has not located Montana law directly on point in support of his argument. The appellant bears the burden of establishing error. State v. Buck, 2006 MT 81, ¶ 31, 331 Mont. 517, ¶ 31, 134 P.3d 53, ¶ 31 (citation omitted). We hold that, while the challenged responses were arguably cumulative to the stipulated facts, Pol has failed to establish that the court abused its discretion in allowing them.