Opinion ID: 543080
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Individual Claims of Friedman and Hughes

Text: 52 Friedman also argues that Charge II should be considered by us even though the Administrator has not yet ruled upon it, because the district court in its March 1990 opinion gave express permission to the Administrator to proceed with a disciplinary hearing on this charge. Friedman argues that Charge II is insufficient on its face for lack of requisite specificity in violation of the IBT Constitution, federal labor law and due process. Because Friedman has yet to be tried on this charge, his claim is premature and we decline to address it.
53 1. Binding Effect of Consent Decree on Nonparty. Hughes vigorously argues that because he was neither a party to the original lawsuit nor a signatory of the Consent Decree, he cannot be bound by it. 4 Quoting Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 268 U.S. 295, 304, 45 S.Ct. 551, 554, 69 L.Ed. 963 (1925), Hughes contends that the IBT cannot unilaterally change its Constitution, which constitutes the  'fundamental agreement of association'  between the IBT and its affiliated local unions and members, and then make the new terms binding on them. This is so, Hughes maintains, because various provisions of the IBT Constitution explicitly reserve the power of amendment to the International Convention of the IBT, by vote of its duly elected delegates. Hughes also argues that application of the terms of the Consent Decree to him would violate due process, because, citing Martin v. Wilks, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 2180, 2184 & n. 2, 104 L.Ed.2d 835 (1989), his interests were not adequately represented by those parties who, by entering into the Consent Decree, avoided substantial monetary penalties under the RICO forfeiture provisions. Hughes also argues that because the IBT and the GEB lacked the authority to amend the IBT Constitution, the purported amendments pursuant to the Consent Decree are void as to the affiliated locals and their members. He further contends that since the Consent Decree's amendment of the one-year statute of limitations contained in Article XIX, section 6(a), of the Constitution does not apply to him, the charges against him are time-barred. 54 These arguments are without merit. While we need not decide whether Hughes as a nonparty could be bound by each and every term of the Consent Decree, he clearly could be bound by the terms of the disciplinary mechanism set in place by the Consent Decree. This is so because the investigatory and disciplinary powers of the court-appointed officers are proper delegations of the powers of the IBT General President and the GEB within the scope of the IBT Constitution that binds all members of the IBT, and because the IBT Constitution, in Article XXVI, section 2, contemplates amendment by the GEB, under the circumstances of this case, as a result of judicial direction. 5 55 In addition, Hughes's reliance on the Court's decision in Martin is inapposite, since the Consent Decree does not curtail any independent right of a member beyond what the IBT itself already had power to control, that is, a member's discipline under the IBT Constitution. In contrast, the nonparty firefighters in Martin, who challenged the consent decree there, asserted their independent right to be free from employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Martin, 109 S.Ct. at 2186 n. 6. In this case, Hughes was subject to disciplinary oversight both before and after the entry of the Consent Decree, and the IBT merely exercised its discretionary authority under the Constitution to delegate the investigation and discipline of union misconduct to the court-appointed officers. 56 2. Non-IBT Wrongdoing. Hughes also claims that he does not come within the ambit of any grant of authority to the Administrator under the Consent Decree, since his conviction in Ohio was not based upon any wrongdoing in connection with the IBT. This claim is also without merit. Although the disciplinary charges against Hughes are based upon his conviction for wrongdoing in relation to a non-IBT labor union, the Administrator could reasonably have concluded that the conviction of Hughes, an officer of an IBT Local, in connection with a scheme to embezzle the funds of a non-IBT labor union, brought reproach upon the IBT. In addition, Article XIX, section 6(b), of the IBT Constitution, see note 3, provides that [t]he basis for charges against ... officers ... for which [they] ... shall stand trial shall consist of, but not be limited to specified violations directly related to the IBT. Accordingly, the Administrator's decision to impose discipline was consistent with the IBT Constitution and his powers under the Consent Decree. 57 We have considered all of appellants' arguments and, for the reasons given above, the orders of the district court are affirmed.