Opinion ID: 6982600
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Establishing Persecution

Text: As to the BIA’s first reason, this court has consistently defined persecution as “the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ (in race, religion or political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive” and conducted a fact-intensive analysis of specific claims of persecution. See Korablina, 158 F.3d at 1043; see also Ghaly, 58 F.3d at 1431. We have used the label “discrimination” for, e.g., “generalized economic disadvantage,” Raass v. INS, 692 F.2d 596, 596 (9th Cir.1982), or where ethnic Fijians “threw rocks at [the house of a Fijian of Indian descent], damaged some of her property, burglarized her home on one occasion, and stole laundry, coconuts, and items from her garage.” Singh III, 134 F.3d at 968-69. In contrast, we have consistently found persecution where, as here, the petitioner was physically harmed because of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. See, e.g., Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d 732 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc); Korablina, 158 F.3d 1038. In Korablina, this court’s most recent case distinguishing discrimination from persecution, we reversed the BIA’s decision that the petitioner had experienced a serious form of discrimination on account of her Jewish heritage, but had not established persecution. 158 F.3d at 1044. Our holding that Korablina 'had, in fact, suffered persecution relied on the cumulative effect of several instances of violence and harassment directed toward the petitioner by Ukrainian ultra-nationalists. Id. Kor-ablina testified that she witnessed repeated violent attacks and experienced one such attack herself, all of which were motivated by an ultra-nationalist hatred of Jews. Id. Like Guinac’s experiences, Kor-ablina’s occurred in the context of widespread discrimination against individuals who possessed a particular “offensive” characteristic. This context strengthened, rather than weakened, her claim of persecution. See also Singh II, 94 F.3d at 1358 (BIA erred by disqualifying Singh from asylum eligibility merely because other Indo-Fijians were subject to the same discrimination, harassment, and violence). In the case before us, Guinac’s credible, uncontroverted testimony establishes that he was the specific target of repeated beatings coupled with explicit expressions of ethnic hatred — all because he was an “Indian.” When Guinac tried to discuss with his commanding officer the violence that he both witnessed and experienced, in order to bring it to the attention of the “authorities,” he was threatened with death and warned not to try to desert. No case or statute provides that physical harm and death threats rise only to the level of discrimination, and not persecution — quite the contrary. See, e.g., Borja, 175 F.3d at 736-37 (finding past persecution where petitioner suffered injury and death threat); Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1487 (9th Cir.1997) (threats of violence and death sufficient to establish persecution). The suffering inflicted on Guinac because of his indigenous heritage was not simply a “minor disadvantage or trivial inconvenience.” Korablina, 158 F.3d at 1045 (quoting Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir.1969)). Rather, it “amounted to ‘the infliction of suffering or harm upon [one] who differfs] (in race, religion, or political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive’.” Id. The conclusion that these incidents constitute persecution is further strengthened by the fact that the treatment was conducted by an arm of the Guatemalan government. In Ghaly, “private” discrimination by Moslems against Coptic Christians was held not to rise to the level of persecution because it was neither “condoned by the state nor the prevailing social norm.” 58 F.3d at 1431. Here, however, it was members of the national military that repeatedly beat and verbally assaulted Gui-nac on account of his race. Under the controlling case law, Guinac clearly suffered persecution.
The Board’s second reason was also contrary to law. In its decision, the BIA cites to reports in the administrative record regarding widespread racial discrimination against Indians in Guatemala, but apparently concludes that they fail to provide adequate support for Guinac’s claim of persecution. We reject the BIA’s analysis, because the purpose of country conditions evidence, such as the State Department Report and Profile submitted here, is not to corroborate specific acts of persecution (which can rarely be corroborated through documentation), but to provide information about the context in which the alleged persecution took place, in order that the factfinder may intelligently evaluate the petitioner’s credibility. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (the testimony of the applicant, if credible [in light of general conditions in the applicant’s country of nationality or last habitual residence,] may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without corroboration). The BIA’s own decisions, as well as the immigration regulations, make clear the proper role of country information in an asylum determination. See, e.g., In re S-M-J-, Interim Decision 3303, 1997 WL 80984 (BIA 1997) (“Where the record contains general country condition information, and an applicant’s claim relies primarily on personal experiences not reasonably subject to verification, corroborating documentary evidence of the asylum applicant’s particular experience is not required.”). In the instant case, Guinac’s testimony was wholly consistent with the information in the record about conditions in Guatemala. As the BIA stated in its decision, the country conditions evidence shows that “Guatemala is a country in which governmental forces have committed serious human rights abuses.” The specific events Guinac described are consistent with the information in the record regarding the general political and social turmoil in that country, and the particular abuse to which members of indigenous groups are subjected. See Committee on Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1995 431 (Joint Comm. Print 1994). We hold that the BIA’s determination that the threats and beatings Guinac suffered on account of his race constituted merely discrimination and not persecution is not “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336, 338 (9th Cir.1995). Moreover, Guinac’s undisputed and credible testimony regarding the physical and mental abuse he experienced is wholly consistent with the documentary evidence introduced by the INS and compels the conclusion that he was a victim of persecution.