Opinion ID: 4556153
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Intellectual Disability Developments

Text: ¶7 In Atkins, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty on intellectually disabled individuals. 536 U.S. at 307. There, Atkins—who had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death—claimed he was intellectually disabled based on evidence that he was “mildly mentally retarded,” as defined by the medical community, and that the imposition of the death penalty on an intellectually disabled person violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 307– 10 & n.3, 318. The Supreme Court agreed, concluding that executing the intellectually disabled would not “advance the deterrent or the retributive purpose of the death penalty.” Id. at 321. It concluded that imposing the death penalty on intellectually disabled defendants was an excessive punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. ¶8 In barring enforcement of the death penalty against the intellectually disabled, the Supreme Court left “to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences” and determine who is “in fact” intellectually disabled. Id. at 317 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405, 416–17 (1986)). 4 STATE V. HON. KEMP/APOLINAR ALTAMIRANO Opinion of the Court ¶9 The Arizona legislature enacted A.R.S. § 13-703.02(K)2 to enforce the constitutional prohibition on executing the intellectually disabled. In Grell II, we stated that § 13-703.02(K) requires an “overall assessment of the defendant’s ability to meet society’s expectations of him. [But] [i]t does not require a finding of [intellectual disability] based solely on proof of specific deficits or deficits in only two areas.” 212 Ariz. at 529 ¶ 62. ¶10 Twelve years after Atkins, the Supreme Court decided Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014), and provided additional guidance in determining whether a defendant is intellectually disabled. It concluded that Florida’s law foreclosing further exploration of a defendant’s intellectual disability if his IQ score was higher than 70 created an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disabilities would be executed. Id. at 723–24. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s determination that Hall was not intellectually disabled. Id. at 724. It noted that pursuant to Florida’s mandatory IQ cutoff, the sentencing court could not “consider even substantial and weighty evidence of intellectual disability as measured and made manifest by the defendant’s failure or inability to adapt to his social and cultural environment,” some of which would, in persons with severe adaptive behavior problems, reduce the person’s actual functioning comparable to that of an individual with a lower IQ score. Id. at 712. The Hall Court clarified that “Atkins did not give the States unfettered discretion to define the full scope of the constitutional protection” and that “[t]he legal determination of intellectual disability is distinct from a medical diagnosis, but it is informed by the medical community’s diagnostic framework.” Id. at 719, 721. ¶11 In State v. Escalante-Orozco, 241 Ariz. 254 (2017), we addressed Hall’s requirement that a legal determination of intellectual disability be informed by the medical community. We clarified that § 13-753(K)(1), Arizona’s intellectual disability statute, “differs from a clinical definition, which bases an impairment in adaptive functioning on deficits in at least two life-skill categories without considering strengths.” Escalante-Orozco, 241 Ariz. at 267 ¶ 16 (citing State v. Boyston, 231 Ariz. 539, 547 ¶ 34 (2013); Grell II, 212 Ariz. at 529 ¶ 62), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135 (2018). We also concluded that “Arizona’s failure to precisely align its definition of adaptive behavior with the prevailing medical definition does not violate the Eighth Amendment” because “the required ‘overall assessment’ permits consideration of deficits in the life-skill categories identified by medical clinicians.” Id. at 268 ¶ 17 (citations 2 Renumbered as § 13-753 effective January 1, 2009. 5 STATE V. HON. KEMP/APOLINAR ALTAMIRANO Opinion of the Court omitted). Although Arizona’s statute may differ from a clinical definition of adaptive behavior, the medical community also recognizes that adaptive behavior requires a consideration of “how well a person meets community standards of personal independence and social responsibility, in comparison to others of similar age and sociocultural background.” DSM-5, supra ¶ 1 n.1, at 37; see also AAIDD Guide, supra ¶ 1 n.1, at 25 (“[L]imitations in . . . present functioning must be considered within the context of community environments typical of the individual’s age peers and culture.”). ¶12 Recently, the Supreme Court decided Moore I and disapproved the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ (“CCA”) reliance on factors to determine intellectual disability that were not informed by the medical community. 137 S. Ct. at 1044 (vacating the CCA’s determination that Moore was not intellectually disabled). Although the CCA relied on factors set forth in its prior case law in assessing Moore’s claim of intellectual disability, the Supreme Court found that the CCA’s reliance on these factors was not “informed by the views of medical experts.” Id. (quoting Hall, 572 U.S. at 721). It determined that in departing from the views of the medical community, the CCA’s intellectual disability analysis “creat[ed] an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability [would] be executed.” Id. (quoting Hall, 572 U.S. at 704). The Court further faulted the CCA for “overemphasiz[ing] Moore’s perceived adaptive strengths” in certain life-skill categories (conceptual, social, and practical) when the “medical community focuses the adaptive-functioning inquiry on adaptive deficits.” Id. at 1050. ¶13 Subsequently, in Moore II, the Supreme Court reiterated that although “Atkins and Hall left to the states the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the restriction on executing the intellectually disabled,” a “court’s intellectual disability determination must be informed by the medical community’s diagnostic framework.” 139 S. Ct. at 668–71 (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶14 We distill from Moore I and Moore II the principle that, although the states retain a measure of flexibility in enforcing the ban on executing the intellectually disabled, the legal determination of intellectual disability must be informed by the views of the medical community. With this understanding, we turn to the law in Arizona to determine whether its procedures for determining intellectual disability comport with existing federal law. 6 STATE V. HON. KEMP/APOLINAR ALTAMIRANO Opinion of the Court