Opinion ID: 1989271
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Prima Facie Case of Racial Discrimination

Text: Disparate treatment is the treatment of persons in a manner less favorable than others because of their race. ( International Bhd. of Teamsters v United States , 431 US 324, 335 n 15 [1977]; see also Raytheon Co. v Hernandez, 540 US 44, 52-53 [2003].) [10] `Disparate treatment' . . . is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment ( International Bhd. of Teamsters v United States , 431 US at 335 n 15). Disparate treatment applies to complaints about acts of discrimination against an individual brought under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (78 US Stat 253 as amended, codified at 42 USC § 2000e et seq. ). In order to establish at trial a claim of disparate treatment in employment based upon race, a prima facie showing of racial discrimination must be made ( see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green , 411 US 792, 802-804 [1973]). [11] According to Ferrante , in order to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, appellant has the initial burden [of] prov[ing] by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination (90 NY2d at 629; see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v Hicks , 509 US 502, 506 [1993]; Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v Burdine , 450 US 248, 252-254 [1981]; McDonnell Douglas , 411 US at 802). The following elements must be proven: (1) the complainant is a member of a class protected by the statute; (2) the complainant was actively or constructively discharged; (3) the complainant was qualified to hold the position from which she was terminated; (4) and the discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of race discrimination. Because Forrest is an African-American female, she is a member of a protected class. She resigned from her position, by letter effective October 22, 1994, but before the Guild received her letter, the Guild fired her, effective August 5, 1994, in a letter dated November 2, 1994. The resignation letter was marked by the Guild and received on November 4, 1994. In any event, the Guild states that it was not aware of the letter of resignation when the letter of termination was drafted and mailed. For the purposes of this motion for summary judgment, it must be assumed that Forrest was terminated. Accordingly, appellant meets criteria one and two of Ferrante . There is no dispute that Forrest was qualified for the position as evidenced by her credentials and tenure on the job. She was a professional music therapist with graduate degrees in music therapy and urban education. Appellant argues that she was discharged after filing several grievances and a little more than two months after filing a complaint with the New York City Commission on Human Rights for race and color discrimination in September 1994. [12] Thus, taken together, the racial epithets and assertions of disparate treatment are sufficient to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination.