Opinion ID: 2576356
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Challenge to the Spousal Limitations Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Alaska Constitution

Text: Article I, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution mandates `equal treatment of those similarly situated;' it protects Alaskans' right to non-discriminatory treatment more robustly than does the federal equal protection clause. [23] We have long recognized that [this clause] affords greater protection to individual rights than the United States Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment. [24] To implement Alaska's more stringent equal protection standard, we have adopted a three-step, sliding-scale test that places a progressively greater or lesser burden on the state, depending on the importance of the individual right affected by the disputed classification and the nature of the governmental interest at stake.... [25]
A person or group asserting an equal protection violation must demonstrate that the challenged law treats similarly situated persons differently. [26] Absent disparate treatment of similarly situated persons, the law as applied to the aggrieved group does not violate the group's right to equal protection. [27] We first consider whether, as the municipality contends, there is no evidence of differential treatment, making it unnecessary to engage in a sliding-scale analysis. [28] The plaintiffs assert that the defendant governments treat same-sex and opposite-sex couples differently. The defendants argue that their programs differentiate on the basis of marital status, not sexual orientation or gender. The municipality asserts that all married employees can confer benefits on their spouses, and no unmarried employees can confer benefits on their partners. It therefore argues that it treats same-sex couples no differently than any other unmarried couples, and that there is consequently no basis for an equal protection claim. Several courts examining similar programs have reached this conclusion. [29] We must therefore decide whether there is a classification that results in different treatment for similarly situated people. We agree with the plaintiffs that the proper comparison is between same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples, whether or not they are married. The municipality correctly observes that no unmarried employees, whether they are members of same-sex or opposite-sex couples, can obtain the disputed benefits for their domestic partners. But this does not mean that these programs treat same-sex and opposite-sex couples the same. Unmarried public employees in opposite-sex domestic relationships have the opportunity to obtain these benefits, because employees are not prevented by law from marrying their opposite-sex domestic partners. [30] In comparison, public employees in committed same-sex relationships are absolutely denied any opportunity to obtain these benefits, because these employees are barred by law from marrying their same-sex partners in Alaska or having any marriage performed elsewhere recognized in Alaska. Same-sex unmarried couples therefore have no way of obtaining these benefits, whereas opposite-sex unmarried couples may become eligible for them by marrying. The programs consequently treat same-sex couples differently from opposite-sex couples. [31]
The state argues that an intent to discriminate is, or should be, an essential element of a state equal protection claim in Alaska. Both defendants contend that there was no discriminatory intent, or evidence of animus against gays and lesbians. Plaintiffs respond that Alaska's equal protection clause does not require a showing of discriminatory intent. We need not resolve this dispute here because we conclude that the benefits programs are facially discriminatory. When a law by its own terms classifies persons for different treatment, this is known as a facial classification. [32] And when a law is discriminatory on its face, the question of discriminatory intent is subsumed by the determination that the classification established by the terms of the challenged law or policy is, itself, discriminatory. [33] To determine whether the benefits programs make a facial classification, we must therefore examine the meaning of the term spouse. The United States Supreme Court, in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney , considered whether a state statute granting a hiring preference to veterans violated equal protection on the basis of gender. [34] The Court concluded in part that the statute was gender-neutral because the definition of `veterans' in the statute ha[d] always been neutral as to gender and that Massachusetts ha[d] consistently defined veteran status in a way that ha[d] been inclusive of women who ha[d] served in the military.... [35] But unlike the neutral definition of veteran in Feeney, Alaska's definition of the legal status of marriage (and, hence, who can be a spouse) excludes same-sex couples. [36] By restricting the availability of benefits to spouses, the benefits programs by [their] own terms classif[y] same-sex couples for different treatment. [37] Heterosexual couples in legal relationships have the opportunity to marry and become eligible for benefits. In comparison, because of the legal definition of marriage, the partner of a homosexual employee can never be legally considered as that employee's spouse and, hence, can never become eligible for benefits. We therefore conclude that the benefits programs are facially discriminatory. [38] The next question is whether the disparate treatment is permitted under the sliding-scale analysis for equal protection challenges in Alaska. [39]
Having resolved these preliminary issues by determining (1) that it cannot be said as a matter of law that the benefits programs do not treat public employees with same-sex domestic partners differently, and (2) that the benefits programs are facially discriminatory, we turn to the three-step, sliding-scale analysis applicable to equal protection challenges under the Alaska Constitution. This approach involves the following process: First, it must be determined at the outset what weight should be afforded the constitutional interest impaired by the challenged enactment. The nature of this interest is the most important variable in fixing the appropriate level of review.... Depending upon the primacy of the interest involved, the state will have a greater or lesser burden in justifying its legislation. Second, an examination must be undertaken of the purposes served by a challenged statute. Depending on the level of review determined, the state may be required to show only that its objectives were legitimate, at the low end of the continuum, or, at the high end of the scale, that the legislation was motivated by a compelling state interest. Third, an evaluation of the state's interest in the particular means employed to further its goals must be undertaken. Once again, the state's burden will differ in accordance with the determination of the level of scrutiny under the first stage of analysis. At the low end of the sliding scale, we have held that a substantial relationship between means and ends is constitutionally adequate. At the higher end of the scale, the fit between means and ends must be much closer. If the purpose can be accomplished by a less restrictive alternative, the classification will be invalidated.[ [40] ] The plaintiffs advance four alternative arguments to support their equal protection challenge to the spousal limitation in the benefits programs. The first three ask us to apply a heightened level of scrutiny because the programs allegedly (1) discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation; (2) discriminate on the basis of gender; or (3) significantly burden at least one of several important personal interests. The plaintiffs alternatively contend that the programs cannot withstand even the minimum level of scrutiny, either because the governmental interests advanced are not legitimate, or because the eligibility restrictions do not bear a fair and substantial relationship to advancing those interests. Because we conclude that the benefits programs cannot survive minimum scrutiny, we need not address plaintiffs' alternative arguments.
The first step of our analysis requires us to determine what weight to give the individual interests affected by the benefits programs. [41] Plaintiffs contend that the spousal limitations significantly burden important personal interests, such as the right to intimate association, and are therefore subject to heightened scrutiny. But because minimum scrutiny is sufficient to resolve this case, we do not need to decide whether the plaintiffs' interests are important or whether a fundamental right is affected. [42] Government action affecting an economic interest receives minimum scrutiny, [43] and the employment benefits at issue here are undeniably economic.
The second step of the sliding-scale analysis requires us to consider the governmental interests advanced by a challenged law. [44] Under minimum scrutiny, these interests need only be legitimate. [45] The third step requires us to evaluate the means chosen to advance the interests identified from the second step. Minimum scrutiny requires a fair and substantial relation between the means (i.e., the classification) and the object of the legislation. [46] The state and the municipality contend that they have three legitimate interests  cost control, administrative efficiency, and promotion of marriage  in limiting employment benefits to spouses and dependent children. We must therefore consider whether these interests are legitimate and, if so, whether the classification bears a fair and substantial relationship to those interests. Cost control. The state and the municipality argue that cost control is a primary purpose of limiting the availability of benefits to spouses of married employees. The state explains that it must offer health insurance to attract and retain a qualified work force and that the legislature should be entitled to take reasonable measures to control the cost of that offering. As the number of program participants increases, so does the cost. The state also asserts that the legislature wanted to limit participation to that small group in a truly close relationship with the employee. The municipality asserts that it decided to limit employee benefits to a small, readily ascertainable group of individuals closely connected to the employee. These assertions indicate to us that the governmental interest here is more specific than just cost control. Indeed, if the governments were interested in simply saving money, the companion goal of promoting marriage would seem to do the opposite. As the benefits programs succeed in convincing couples to marry or to stay married, the governments have to provide benefits to more people. This apparent tension between cost control and promotion of marriage can be harmonized by more appropriately describing the governments' interest in cost control as an interest in controlling costs by limiting benefits to those people in truly close relationship[s] with or closely connected to the employee. We assume that limiting benefit programs to those in truly close relationships with the employee is a legitimate governmental goal. But we do not see how an absolute exclusion of same-sex domestic partners from being eligible for benefits is substantially related to this interest. Many same-sex couples are no doubt just as truly close[ly] relat[ed] and closely connected as any married couple, in the sense of providing the same level of love, commitment, and mutual economic and emotional support, as between married couples, and would choose to get married if they were not prohibited by law from doing so. Although limiting benefits to spouses, and thereby excluding all same-sex domestic partners, does technically reduce costs, such a restriction fails to advance the expressed governmental goal of limiting benefits to those in truly close relationships with and closely connected to the employee. Administrative efficiency. The state and the municipality argue that the need to efficiently administer the benefits programs justifies the spousal limitations. They argue that marriage provides a bright-line distinction that is easily applied, and that allowing employees to designate beneficiaries other than spouses will make it more difficult to administer the programs. The director of the benefits section of the Alaska Division of Retirement and Benefits explained during deposition the potential administrative difficulties that could arise if employees were allowed to designate benefits recipients other than spouses. She discussed theoretical burdens of determining who other than a spouse might be eligible for coverage. The municipality anticipates difficulty in deciding how long a same-sex relationship must last, whether the partners must reside in the same house, whether the relationship must be of a sexual nature, and when the relationship ends. We have recognized that administrative efficiency is a legitimate governmental interest. [47] There is no doubt that making a less-clearly-defined (compared to spouses) category of persons eligible for employment benefits would create administrative burdens. But Alaska's Equal Protection Clause requires more than just a rational connection between a classification and a governmental interest; even at the lowest level of scrutiny, the connection must be substantial. [48] It is significant that other agencies, political subdivisions, and states provide, or have provided, employment benefits to their employees' same-sex domestic partners. The state does not dispute the plaintiffs' contention that the University of Alaska does or did so and that it adopted qualifying criteria. [49] Likewise, other states [50] and municipalities, [51] including the City and Borough of Juneau, [52] offer the same health benefits to domestic partners, per their eligibility standards, that they offer to married couples. We do not assume, as plaintiffs assert, that the state and the municipality can simply adopt the methodology the University of Alaska adopted to administer its programs. The state has many more employees than the university. Nonetheless, that many other agencies, municipalities, and states offer employment benefits to their employees' same-sex domestic partners suggests that the governments' legitimate administrative concerns can be satisfied. The availability of these benefits elsewhere persuades us that administrative difficulties are not an insurmountable barrier to providing benefits if our constitution requires that they be provided. We therefore conclude that the absolute exclusion of same-sex couples is not substantially related to the goal of maximizing administrative efficiency. Promotion of marriage. The state and municipality assert that they have a legitimate interest in the promotion of marriage. To support this assertion, the municipality points to the ancient cultural and legal status of marriage and the place of a marriage between one man and one woman as the historic foundation of society. Amicus curiae Alaska Catholic Conference also contends that the promotion of marriage is a legitimate state interest. It cites in support several United States Supreme Court decisions that have recognized the right to marry as involv[ing] interests of basic importance in our society. [53] The Supreme Court has also explained that marriage is a social relation subject to the state's police power. [54] We have never considered whether the promotion of marriage is a valid governmental interest. Plaintiffs argue that whether or not the promotion of marriage is a legitimate governmental interest, the state is not truly interested in promoting marriage, because, if it were, it would not have prevented gays and lesbians from entering into married relationships. This argument has little merit. The state rightly argues that just because the legislature did not want to promote same-sex marriage does not mean it did not have a sincere interest in promoting traditional marriage. Plaintiffs also challenge the legitimacy of any interest in promoting marriage. They argue that the state and municipality may not assert an interest in promoting married relationships for its own sake. They claim that the government may not favor a class simply because it favors the class, and that discrimination is never a legitimate interest. That proposition is certainly correct, but the promotion of marriage in and of itself is not necessarily discriminatory. And it is not irrational. Among other things, it can encourage family stability (an undeniably valid public goal), as the Alaska Catholic Conference argues. As to this issue, plaintiffs' true challenge is to the decision to promote family stability among opposite-sex couples but not among same-sex couples. They argue that the social good from family stability in same-sex relationships is just as important and valuable as the social good from stable opposite-sex relationships. Assuming plaintiffs' argument is correct, it would not establish that an interest in promoting marriage is not legitimate. Given the social benefits potentially inherent in marriage and the Supreme Court's statement that marriage is subject to state regulation, [55] we conclude that the promotion of marriage is at least a legitimate governmental interest. We accept the state's contention that providing employment benefits to spouses of its employees may encourage persons to marry or stay married. Such benefits are financially valuable and their availability may be an important or even critical factor to persons deciding whether to marry. But the question here is whether the means chosen to advance the interest are substantially related to the governments' interest. The first part of the chosen means  providing a benefit to spouses  is directly related to advancing the marriage interest. But the second part of the chosen means  restricting eligibility to persons in a status that same-sex domestic partners can never achieve  cannot be said to be related to that interest. There is no indication here that denying benefits to public employees with same-sex domestic partners has any bearing on who marries. There is no indication here that granting or denying benefits to public employees with same-sex domestic partners causes employees with opposite-sex domestic partners to alter their decisions about whether to marry. There is no indication here that any of the plaintiffs, having been denied these benefits, will now seek opposite-sex partners with an intention of marrying them. And if such changes resulted in sham or unstable marriages entered only to obtain or confer these benefits, they would not seem to advance any valid reasons for promoting marriage. In short, there is no indication that the programs' challenged aspect  the denial of benefits to all public employees with same-sex domestic partners  has any relationship at all to the interest in promoting marriage. To repeat: making benefits available to spouses may well promote marriage; denying benefits to the same-sex domestic partners who are absolutely ineligible to become spouses has no demonstrated relationship to the interest of promoting marriage. The municipality raises several other arguments that justify brief response. It asserts that it can properly limit eligibility because the Marriage Amendment sanctions the marriage relationship. We discussed above the effect of the Marriage Amendment and rejected a contention that it altogether forecloses plaintiffs' equal protection claims. See Part III.B. Moreover, the marriage relationship sanctioned by the amendment cannot justify unequal treatment unless the means relate to the purpose. No one has suggested that the Marriage Amendment would permit the municipality to double the pay of only its married employees or permit it to hire only married persons. The municipality seems to imply that accepting the plaintiffs' arguments would require defendants to extend marriage benefits to members of other non-traditional marriages, such as persons in polygamous relationships. But polygamy is illegal in Alaska, [56] as are incestuous relationships. [57] Even though same-sex domestic relationships are not marriages in Alaska, [58] they are not illegal. And, following Lawrence v. Texas , they could not be made illegal. [59] Nothing we hold here would require public employers to extend to members of polygamous or incestuous relationships the employment benefits they provide to their employees' spouses.