Opinion ID: 514584
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Kale's Substantive Shortcomings.

Text: 58 Combined next argues that sanctions should be imposed on Kale for his continued litigation of a claim that lacks substantive merit. It contends that while appellant may have pleaded the elements of a claim for age discrimination, the facts as revealed by discovery, particularly appellant's [Kale's] deposition, show that there was no evidence whatsoever supporting an inference of unlawful age discrimination by Combined. In other words, Combined believes Kale has failed both to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination and to demonstrate that Combined's proffered reasons for his dismissal were pretexts for what was in fact a discriminatory firing. For the reasons that follow, we do not find that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to impose Rule 11 sanctions on this ground. 59 To recover under the ADEA, a plaintiff must show that age was a determining factor in his dismissal. See Cuddy v. Carmen, 694 F.2d 853, 856-57 & n. 19 (D.C.Cir.1982); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1013-14, 1019 (1st Cir.1979). When the plaintiff makes a prima facie case, an inference arises that age was a determining factor. See id. The standard for establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination is well settled in this circuit. A plaintiff must show: 60 that he was in the protected age group [40-70], that he was performing his job at a level that met his employer's legitimate expectations, that he nevertheless was fired, and that [the employer] sought someone to perform the same work after he left. 61 Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (establishing virtually same test for Title VII cases); Johnson v. Allyn & Bacon, Inc., 731 F.2d at 70-71 (applying same test to cases of sex discrimination). The burden next shifts to the employer to produce, i.e., simply state, a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for the plaintiff's firing. See Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1011. Plaintiff then has the final burden of persuading the court that the employer's stated basis for his firing is actually a pretext designed to cover-up a discriminatory dismissal. See id. at 1011-12. 62 In the case at bar, Combined alleges that Kale has satisfied only the age prong of the prima facie case. Combined states that it did not hire a younger employee to replace Kale and that Kale's own deposition admits that he had been criticized for his work performance for several years. Neither of these assertions negates plaintiff's prima facie case. First, there is no requirement that plaintiff show a younger employee was hired to replace him. It is enough for plaintiff to show that the employer sought some form of replacement performance, which would demonstrate its continued need for the same services and skills. Id. at 1013. Plaintiff has met this burden here, since Combined revealed in its answers to one of Kale's interrogatories that [p]laintiff's job functions were absorbed by several different employees of defendant. 14 63 Second, while it is true Kale admitted in his deposition that he had been criticized for inadequate performance for years, his affidavit counters that these criticisms were malicious and false, blaming him for others' delays. In essence plaintiff is arguing that he met his employer's legitimate expectations of performance but that his efforts were met with illegitimate condemnation. We believe such a contention would sustain a prima facie case by plaintiff. 15 64 A closer question is whether Kale's allegation of improper criticism and pretext will overcome the defendant's articulation of a legitimate non-discriminatory basis for the dismissal. It is true that a mere allegation of pretext, with little or no factual support, cannot easily overcome a valid reason proffered for a firing. See Selsor v. Callaghan & Co., 609 F.Supp. 1003, 1008-10 (D.Ill.1985). Yet we are mindful of the lower court's words in this case that in age discrimination cases that turn on the question of pretext, the defendant's intent is difficult to establish except through discovery; imposing sanctions in cases such as this runs the risk of chilling meritorious litigation. 16 We agree. The issue here is not whether Kale's assertions are weighty enough to survive a summary judgment motion, see Selsor, 609 F.Supp. at 1010 & n. 8 (affirming entry of summary judgment under similar facts), but whether they are so objectively unsound as to warrant sanctions. We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to impose sanctions. 65