Opinion ID: 716670
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consensual Encounters

Text: 11 It is well established that not all personal contacts between law enforcement officers and citizens constitute seizures for Fourth Amendment purposes. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. at 1877 n. 16. A seizure does not occur simply because a law enforcement officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions or requests permission to search an area--even if the officer has no reason to suspect the individual is involved in criminal activity--provided the officer does not indicate that compliance with his request is required. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386-87, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). So long as a reasonable person would feel free  'to disregard the police and go about his business,'  the encounter is consensual and implicates no Fourth Amendment interest. Id. at 434, 111 S.Ct. at 2386 (quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 1552, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991)). During such an encounter, the person approached need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion). 12 Although there is no litmus test for determining when an encounter becomes a seizure, we have noted that circumstances indicative of a seizure may include  'the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled.'  United States v. Angell, 11 F.3d 806, 809 (8th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2747, 129 L.Ed.2d 865 (1994). The ultimate determination of whether a seizure occurred is a question of law which we consider de novo. Id. 13 The facts found by the district court, all of which are amply supported in the record, clearly demonstrate that White was no longer seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment after Wilson returned White's identification and issued a warning ticket. The district court found that Wilson displayed no weapons during the encounter, and that the tone of the entire exchange was cooperative. Although there were three officers present at the scene of the stop, the record indicates that Trooper Evans and Sergeant Schmidt were little more than passive observers prior to commencement of the search. While it is true that Wilson did not tell White he was free to leave after he returned White's license and registration, it was White who prolonged the encounter beyond that time by telling Wilson he would get some rest. Moreover, at the time Wilson asked to search the vehicle White had everything he needed to lawfully proceed on his journey. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 501, 103 S.Ct. at 1326 (individual seized when officers retained his airline ticket and driver's license during questioning). Under these circumstances, we believe a reasonable person in White's position at the time Wilson asked for permission to search would feel free to terminate the encounter and be on his way. Thus, Wilson's request to search came during the course of a consensual encounter and was permissible with or without reasonable suspicion. 2