Opinion ID: 2978708
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Arban v. West Publishing Corp.

Text: This court reviewed and approved FMLA jury instructions in Arban, 345 F.3d at 404. The court found that the instructions in that case sufficed for an FMLA interference or retaliation claim. Id. at 405. The court concluded that because “the instructions, taken as a whole, indicate that the jury was required to find that the ‘true reason for [the Plaintiff’s] termination was that he took a medical leave,’ no error has been demonstrated.” Id. The relevant instructions given by the district court in the present case are nearly identical in a word-for-word comparison with those given in Arban. Weimer attempts to distinguish Arban on its facts. Arban’s employer alleged that Arban was discharged for a reason totally separate from his taking of FMLA leave. Specifically, the employer alleged that Arban was discharged for misrepresenting a preexisting account as new sales activity in violation of company policy, for engaging in improper account name-switching, and for other acts of gross negligence, fraud, deceit and lack of moral character. None of these proffered reasons were connected to Arban’s exercise of FMLA leave rights. Arban later took FMLA leave before being discharged, and prevailed in proving to a jury that the non-leave-related reasons proffered by the employer were pretextual, and that he was really discharged because he had taken FMLA leave. Weimer argues that, in the present case, the reason given by Honda for Weimer’s discharge was inextricably intertwined with the exercise of FMLA leave rights. Weimer cites to the testimony of the decision-maker: Q. Isn’t it true that the misrepresentation that you’re speaking of is, you’re saying that Mr. Weimer misrepresented that he had a serious health condition under the Family Medical Leave Act, and you’re saying that was his misrepresentation? 7 No. 08-4548 Weimer v. Honda of America A. Correct Without citing any authority, Weimer argues that where the stated reason for discharge is that the employee lied about qualifying for FMLA leave, the pretext line of cases do not apply, and the jury instructions approved of in Arban are not appropriate. The legal analysis is not changed in this case because the reason given for Weimer’s discharge is that he lied about his medical symptoms and the activities he engaged in while on leave. Ultimately, the jury was called upon to decide whether Honda terminated Weimer for violating its Standards of Conduct by lying, or whether Honda terminated Weimer for exercising his FMLA rights by taking FMLA leave. The specific subject of Weimer’s alleged misrepresentation is not relevant. What is relevant is whether Honda had cause to terminate Weimer for misconduct and in fact did terminate him for that reason, or whether Honda terminated Weimer for taking FMLA leave. Although we are bound by Arban to conclude that the district court did not err in instructing the jury, an apparent flaw in this circuit’s FMLA jurisprudence should be noted in this opinion. Despite laying out separate prima facie elements for interference versus retaliation claims, the court in Arban dissipated any meaningful distinction between the two with regard to jury instructions by affirming a district court’s use of jury instructions that omitted the prima facie elements of an interference claim and provided the elements of a retaliation claim only. See id., at 404-05. The court held that the instructions sufficiently explained both claims, id., even though they provided the elements for the retaliation claim only. 8 No. 08-4548 Weimer v. Honda of America By repeating almost verbatim the instructions quoted in Arban, the district court in the present case committed the same error. The court instructed the jury as follows: Under the Family and Medical Leave Act, it is unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise any right under the FMLA. It is also unlawful under the FMLA for an employer to discharge or in any other manner retaliate against an employee for exercising his rights under the FMLA. In order for Plaintiff to prove that Defendant interfered with, restrained, discriminated, or retaliated against him because he took leave, Plaintiff must establish the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence: 1. That he engaged in any activity protected by the FMLA; 2. That this exercise of his protected rights was known to Defendant; 3. That Defendant thereafter took an employment action adverse to Plaintiff; and 4. That there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. (Emphasis added.) Because these instructions purport to cover both types of FMLA claims, yet provide the prima facie elements for a retaliation claim only, they merge the two theories. This blending is not especially troublesome in the instant case because Weimer refused to make known under which theory he was proceeding, but it could be problematic in other cases, particularly those in which a plaintiff has a strong interference claim. Thus, noting this flaw does not compel a different result in this case.