Opinion ID: 6316806
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Williams’s Appeal Waiver

Text: In assessing plea agreements, we construe all the agreement’s provisions together. United States v. Gordon, 480 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2007). In negotiating key terms of the Plea Agreement, the parties agreed to the following appeal waiver: The defendant is aware that 18 U.S.C. § 3742 affords him the right to appeal his sentence, including the manner in which that sentence is determined. Understanding this, and in exchange for the concessions made by the government in this agreement, the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives the right to appeal any matter in connection with this prosecution, conviction, or sentence unless it meets any[5] of the following criteria: (1) the sentence exceeds the maximum penalty provided in the statutes of conviction . . . .[6] 5 The word “any” is handwritten into the Plea Agreement and initialed by counsel. R. vol. 1 at 118. 6 The other two conditions apply if the court imposes a sentence beyond a defined upper limit (which didn’t happen in this case) and if the government appeals (which again didn’t happen). 10 Appellate Case: 19-1229 Document: 010110565060 Date Filed: 08/23/2021 Page: 11 R. vol. 1 at 118. 7 And in a section entitled “STATUTORY PENALTIES,” the Plea Agreement provides some guidance on the meaning and application of “maximum penalty”: The maximum statutory penalty for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 is: not more than 360 months of imprisonment; a fine of not more than $1,000,000 or the greater of twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss from the offense, or both a fine and imprisonment; not more than 5 years of supervised release; a $100 special assessment fee; plus restitution. Id. at 119. Though the “plus restitution” term by itself doesn’t specify a maximum restitution, the Plea Agreement provides that “[t]he parties agree that the [MVRA] applies, and that the amount of restitution in this case is $1,146,828.28.” Id. at 118. We recognize that restitution presents a less-obvious sort of “maximum” than do the other categories of penalties. For instance, the statutory maximum prison time of 30 years is self-evident. Determining the maximum restitution requires more work. In identifying the MVRA’s limits in a particular case, a district court must find facts and then apply them through a multi-layered legal framework. For instance, the amount of restitution a court may order to most victims is limited to the losses directly and proximately caused by the defendant’s conduct underlying the offense of conviction, 7 Remember, the Plea Agreement provides that if any of the three appealwaiver exceptions applies, Williams “may appeal on any ground that is properly available in an appeal that follows a guilty plea.” R. vol. 1 at 118. Without this provision, the appeal waiver would bar his present appeal of his prison sentence, because his sentence doesn’t “exceed[] the maximum sentence within the advisory guideline range that applies to a total offense level of 20[.]” Id. And it would bar his apportionment-of-restitution argument because that doesn’t relate to a maximum sentence when Williams would otherwise owe the total restitution to WebBank. 11 Appellate Case: 19-1229 Document: 010110565060 Date Filed: 08/23/2021 Page: 12 though the amount of restitution a court may order to some victims is limited to the losses directly caused by a defendant’s conduct in a scheme. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2). But the government drafted the Plea Agreement, including the appeal waiver and associated provisions. And we read any ambiguities in appeal waivers against the government and in favor of a defendant’s appellate rights. Lonjose, 663 F.3d at 1297 (citations omitted). On appeal, Williams has made a sufficient threshold argument that the total restitution exceeds the MVRA’s limit (i.e., what the district court had authority to order paid to WebBank) that he may proceed to the merits. See Gordon, 480 F.3d at 1208–10 (reading the plea agreement as a whole in determining that the terms of the appeal waiver didn’t waive the defendant’s ability to challenge the restitution order as illegal under the MVRA); cf. United States v. Cooper, 498 F.3d 1156, 1158–60 (10th Cir. 2007) (enforcing an appeal waiver of the “sentence as imposed by the Court and the manner in which the sentence is determined” against a challenge to restitution). If the government expects us to enforce an appeal waiver in circumstances like these, it needs to write a better appeal waiver. We conclude that Williams’s appeal waiver doesn’t bar his appeal of the restitution order.