Opinion ID: 1120896
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Aggravated Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon

Text: Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-502 (1988) provides in pertinent part: (a) A person is guilty of aggravated assault and battery if he:       (ii) Attempts to cause, or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon[.]       (b) Aggravated assault and battery is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years. The necessary elements of the crime of aggravated assault and battery which the State must have proved pursuant to § 6-2-502(a)(ii) are that (1) the crime occurred in Laramie County on September 23, 1989, and (2) Appellant attempted to cause or intentionally or knowingly caused bodily injury to another (3) with a deadly weapon. Thom v. State, 792 P.2d 192 (Wyo. 1990); Lauthern v. State, 769 P.2d 350 (Wyo. 1989). Appellant was charged with aggravated assault and battery with a deadly weapon for attempting to injure or intentionally injuring Officer Allsop as he stood near the intersection shining his flashlight into Appellant's car. The record demonstrates, and Appellant does not contest, that the alleged crime occurred within Laramie County on September 23, 1989. There is also no disagreement that the car used in the alleged aggravated assault and battery was a deadly weapon. See Laing v. State, 746 P.2d 1247 (Wyo. 1987). The only element of the crime which remains in question is Appellant's intent: Did the State present sufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant attempted to cause or that he intentionally or knowingly caused bodily injury to Officer Allsop? Appellant contends that the State's evidence was insufficient regarding his specific intent to cause bodily injury to Officer Allsop. Appellant argues that the only evidence of his intent was the subjective feeling that Officer Allsop expressed at trial that Appellant intended to hit him with his vehicle because Appellant drove it straight at Officer Allsop as he stood holding his flashlight. Appellant further contends that there was no corroborative evidence of specific intent and that Appellant's conduct was equally consistent with avoidance of a collision with the patrol car parked in the intersection. In Garcia v. State, 777 P.2d 1091, 1095-96 (Wyo. 1989), a recent case involving, among other offenses, a felony conviction for aggravated assault and battery with a deadly weapon against a police officer, we noted: [S]pecific intent may be properly proven by reasonable inferences from the character of such acts and their surrounding circumstances. In particular, the specifics of a defendant's conduct and other circumstantial evidence may permit the jury to infer that he acted with the specific intent to cause bodily injury.       Viewing only the State's evidence, and in the light most favorable to the State, we find that this evidence would not necessarily cause a reasonable jury to harbor a reasonable doubt as to appellant's specific intent to cause bodily injury to [the police officer]. To the contrary, such a jury could reasonably infer from this evidence the existence of such intent beyond a reasonable doubt. The question is not whether other inferences would be possible. Rather, the question is whether a rational jury could possibly make this particular inference without entertaining a reasonable doubt as to the truth of the inferred fact. (Emphasis in original.) Though the defendant's guilt in Garcia was decided by a jury rather than a judge, the reasoning is dispositive. As in Garcia, the record in this case is replete with evidence that Appellant intentionally directed his car at the exact spot where Officer Allsop was standing. Two witnesses testified that Appellant accelerated his car as he approached the intersection and that the car climbed the curb near where Officer Allsop was standing. Officer Allsop was forced to jump from the path of Appellant's rapidly approaching car to avoid being struck. Officer Allsop sustained an injury as a result of Appellant's decision to drive his car straight at the flashlight. From this evidence, it was reasonable for the district court to find that Appellant saw Officer Allsop's flashlight, that Appellant knew someone was holding the flashlight, and that Appellant either attempted or intended to strike the person holding the flashlight. One who knowingly drives an automobile directly at another person can reasonably be found to have intended to do bodily injury to that person. Under these facts, there was sufficient evidence for the district court to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was guilty of attempting to cause or intentionally or knowingly causing bodily injury with a deadly weapon pursuant to § 6-2-502(a)(ii). Affirmed.