Opinion ID: 439951
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Composition of the Title VII Class

Text: 75 NWA challenges the composition of the Title VII class on several grounds. It argues that the district court's order of December 5, 1980, J.A. 168, improperly added to the class hundreds of new employees who had been hired after the cut-off date for the last round of notices of the class action. NWA Brief at 55-56. NWA also appeals from the district court's order of June 6, 1980, J.R.E. 162, which included in the Title VII class two groups of stewardesses which NWA seeks to exclude--those on leave from their jobs as stewardesses as of the cut-off date who subsequently decided not to return to work, and those who as of the cut-off date had transferred permanently to non-stewardess jobs at NWA. We consider each of these arguments separately. 76
77 In its February 1971 order, the district court certified the instant case as a class action under both Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). The court defined the Title VII class as all female in-flight cabin attendants currently employed by [NWA] and/or employed by [NWA] any time since July 2, 1965. 321 F.Supp. 1041, at 1043. Thereafter, two rounds of notices were sent to class members, in 1971 and 1972, pursuant to the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(2). 78 The district court, in its 1974 Remedial Order, again defined the term Title VII plaintiff(s) to include all female cabin attendants employed by [NWA] at any time on or after July 2, 1965, excluding only those who filed timely written elections with this Court to be excluded from this lawsuit in its entirety. 374 F.Supp. at 1384. In its appeal from this order in Laffey I, NWA did not challenge the foregoing definition of the class on the grounds it now advances. NWA did, however, challenge the inclusion of stewardesses whose employment with NWA was terminated prior to the ninetieth day preceding the first filing with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The Laffey I court agreed, and directed the district court to exclude this group of ex-employees from the class. See infra section III.C.2. On remand, the district court corrected its earlier error (and another, minor mistake as to the actual date of the first EEOC filing). It redefined the Title VII class to include only stewardesses who were employed by NWA on or after January 29, 1970. Employees terminated prior to this date were to be included only on a showing of certain extenuating circumstances. This redefinition was reflected in the district court's Order Respecting Computation of Backpay and Implementation of Final Judgment, November 30, 1982. 31 Thus, NWA had scrutinized the Title VII class definition at the time of Laffey I. 79 Seeking to avoid waiver and law of the case obstacles to appellate review, NWA claims, in effect, that it was not on notice at the time of Laffey I that the district court would include in the class stewardesses never furnished the requisite notice or opportunity to opt out under Rule 23(b)(3). NWA interprets the district court's refusal to exclude those stewardesses who had not received notice of the class action, J.A. 168, as dependent upon the district court's view that the parties and the court had shared, as of the time of the 1971 and 1974 orders, the intent and understanding that the definition of the Title VII class adopted therein was broad enough to encompass the disputed group of stewardesses. NWA Brief at 56-57. 80 NWA argues that there was no such understanding between the parties, and claims that it proceeded to trial with the understanding that the backpay class had been fixed by the universe of cabin attendants to whom notice was sent. NWA Brief at 57. It further argues that the December 1980 order was improper, inasmuch as Rule 23(c)(1) permits a court to alter a class certification only prior to the decision on the merits. NWA perceives here the evil of one-way intervention. 81 Appellees, on the other hand, heatedly dispute NWA's claim as to the original understanding that the Title VII class did not include the disputed group of stewardesses. Appellees cite to substantial portions of the record as support for the true understanding of an open-ended class. 32 Under appellees' theory, NWA had full knowledge of the manner in which the class definition would be applied and thus waived the arguments now advanced here because it did not assert those contentions in the proceedings leading up to the 1974 Remedial Order or in its appeal to this court in Laffey I. Appellees further argue that Laffey I established the open-ended class definition as the law of the case, which, as an additional ground, bars NWA from now attacking inclusion of the disputed group of stewardesses. 82 Without deciding whether the parties had the disputed understanding as to the meaning of the 1971 definition of the Title VII class, we conclude that NWA's attack on the 1980 order (and definition) is barred by the doctrines of waiver and law of the case. We reach this conclusion in light of the fact that the 1974 Remedial Order, issued long after the 1972 cut-off date now urged by NWA, contained essentially the same open-ended class definition as the 1971 certification order. NWA knew, or should have known, that the express terms of the 1974 order--sweeping into the class all female cabin attendants employed by [NWA] at any time on or after July 2, 1965  (emphasis added)could manifestly be read as extending beyond 1972. It was up to NWA to test the meaning of the 1974 order as to stewardesses who had not received notice of the class action, if it so desired, in its appeal from that order--the appeal which culminated in Laffey I. NWA failed to do so. NWA, albeit represented now by different counsel, must be held to have waived the opportunity to raise this issue. For the reasons stated supra at pp. 1089-1090, we must recognize the law of the case established in Laffey I. 83 In addition, we note that NWA's argument regarding the impropriety of one-way intervention has been rejected by other courts which have held that classwide backpay under Title VII can be awarded in a [Rule 23] (b)(2) class action. 33 This development in Title VII law, signalled by the Fourth Circuit's 1971 decision in Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006, 92 S.Ct. 573, 30 L.Ed.2d 655 (1971), was well under way as of NWA's appeal in Laffey I. Had NWA wished to clarify the definition of the Title VII class in relation to this expansion of (b)(2) actions, it clearly had the opportunity to raise the issue in Laffey I. 34
84 In Laffey I, NWA argued that the district court erred, in its 1974 Remedial Order, in granting relief pursuant to Title VII in the form of backpay to stewardesses whose employment with [NWA] [had] terminated more than ninety days prior to the first filing by an employee of [a] ... charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 567 F.2d at 472. NWA's argument was based upon the settled rule that only those employees who could have filed charges with the Commission individually when the class filing was made are properly members of the ... class. Id. NWA reasoned that the discrimination in this case could not be deemed continuing as to those who left [NWA's] employ more than ninety days prior to the class filing with the [EEOC], id. at 473, and that, as a result, those employees were not entitled to recover as members of the Title VII class. 85 The Laffey I court agreed with NWA's contention in this respect: 86 A severing of the employment relationship ordinarily terminates a discrimination against the severed employee, and activates the time period for filing charges with the Commission concerning any violation which occurred at separation or which may have been continuing up to the date thereof. To hold otherwise would effectively read the timely-filing requirement out of the statute. 87 Id. (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Laffey I opinion directed the district court, on remand, to exclude from the Title VII recovery those employees whose connection with NWA was dissolved more than ninety days before the class filing with the [EEOC], while retaining those terminated stewardesses who would have brought themselves within the Equal Pay Act class .... Id. at 476. 88 After remand, NWA then sought the exclusion of two additional groups of ex-stewardesses: those on leaves of absence on the 90th day prior to the filing of the first EEOC charge and who, subsequent to that date, left the employ of NWA without having returned to work as stewardesses; and those who were employed by NWA at least until the 90th day prior to the first EEOC filing, but who had transferred to non-stewardess positions. The district court denied NWA's requested exclusions in an order dated June 6, 1980. J.R.E. 162. This denial was based on the district court's understanding that Laffey I had resolved this issue. See District Court's Order of February 19, 1981, denying reconsideration of its June 6, 1980 order. J.A. 172, 173. 89 NWA challenges the June 6, 1980 order, arguing that the district court misunderstood Laffey I. Downplaying the fact that Laffey I dealt explicitly only with terminated stewardesses, NWA claims that a truer indication of that court's mandate was its recognition that only those employees who could have filed charges with the Commission individually when the class filing was made are properly members of the litigating class. 567 F.2d at 472. This language, NWA argues, empowered the district court to consider its claims that certain stewardesses, other than those in the terminated group expressly dealt with in Laffey I, had no viable claims allowing their inclusion in the class. NWA traces the district court's failure to so interpret the mandate of Laffey I to its overly wooden reliance on the phrase 'left the Company's employ ....'  NWA Brief at 61. 90 Without reaching the merits of NWA's arguments against inclusion of the two disputed groups of stewardesses, we hold that the district court correctly construed the Laffey I mandate. NWA had the opportunity in Laffey I to raise the issue of the status of these two additional groups of class members, just as it had the opportunity to raise the issue of the terminated stewardesses. NWA simply and indisputably failed to do so. Its failure to raise these arguments constituted a waiver of them. See supra at pp. 1089-1090. Moreover, as to the law of the case, in Laffey I the court affirm[ed], 567 F.2d at 478, the award of backpay to all class members except those whose connection with [NWA] was dissolved more than 90 days before the class filing with the Commission. Id. at 476 (emphasis added). NWA's attack on the district court's December 1980 ruling is thus barred by the principles of waiver and law of the case. 91