Opinion ID: 2080549
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Private Right of Action for Damages for the Unauthorized Practice of Law

Text: One of the lenders' arguments is that no private right of action for damages for the unauthorized practice of law exists in Illinois, absent allegations of otherwise actionable conduct. Although this court has not heretofore addressed this issue, the appellate court has had occasion to do so. Those cases have discussed the issue in the context of the Attorney Act. In Rathke v. Lidisky, 59 Ill.App.3d 560, 16 Ill.Dec. 764, 375 N.E.2d 871 (1978), the plaintiff was the buyer in a real estate transaction. The contract with the sellers was contingent on putting a new roof on the garage. The plaintiff filed suit against the sellers and the real estate agents, alleging that the defendants had fraudulently misrepresented the structural soundness of the residence. She also alleged that one or more of the real estate agents had inserted the contingency provision in the printed sales contract and that this constituted the unauthorized practice of law and a violation of the Attorney Act. She did not allege negligence or that the defendants represented themselves to be attorneys. She sought actual and punitive damages. The appellate court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the licensing provisions of the Attorney Act provide a basis for an actionable tort for the unauthorized practice of law because the statute had been enacted for her protection. The court concluded that the statute was intended to prevent the practice of a profession by those who are not licensed, rather than an attempt to legislate a standard of conduct. Rathke, 59 Ill.App.3d at 562, 16 Ill.Dec. 764, 375 N.E.2d 871. In Torres v. Fiol, 110 Ill.App.3d 9, 65 Ill.Dec. 786, 441 N.E.2d 1300 (1982), the plaintiffs filed suit against a non-attorney for the unauthorized practice of law. The trial court dismissed the complaint, citing the Rathke case for the proposition that no private cause of action for damages for the unauthorized practice of law is recognized in Illinois. The appellate court reversed and remanded, noting that the language of the Attorney Act explicitly provides that it does not preclude other theories of recovery against one who engages in the unauthorized practice of law and mishandles the matter. Since the plaintiffs alleged negligence on the part of the defendant in the handling of the legal services he undertook to render, they could proceed upon a negligence theory for the defendant's improper activities. Torres, 110 Ill.App.3d at 11, 65 Ill.Dec. 786, 441 N.E.2d 1300. Plaintiffs cite Richard F. Mallen & Associates, Ltd. v. Myinjuryclaim.com Corp., 329 Ill.App.3d 953, 263 Ill.Dec. 872, 769 N.E.2d 74 (2002), for the position that a private right of action for the unauthorized practice of law exists under the Attorney Act. The Mallen case, however, does not stand for that proposition. There, a law firm brought a class action lawsuit on behalf of all Illinois personal injury attorneys for an injunction against the defendant, an unlicensed business that operated a website advising people injured in automobile accidents concerning their legal rights. Count I of the complaint, alleging unauthorized practice of law, was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that plaintiff lacked standing to bring the cause of action. The appellate court reversed, finding that an attorney is a proper party to bring such an action because the practice of law by unlicensed persons constitutes an infringement upon the rights of those who are properly licensed. Mallen, 329 Ill.App.3d at 956, 263 Ill.Dec. 872, 769 N.E.2d 74. The difference between the Mallen case and this case is that, here, plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages in the counts of their complaints alleging a violation of the Attorney Act. The law firm in Mallen was not seeking damages, but rather an injunction, which is explicitly permitted by the Attorney Act. The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Carroll v. Paddock, 199 Ill.2d 16, 22, 262 Ill.Dec. 1, 764 N.E.2d 1118 (2002). The best evidence of legislative intent is the language used in the statute itself and that language must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill.2d 455, 466, 250 Ill.Dec. 758, 739 N.E.2d 521 (2000). Under the guise of construction, a court may not supply omissions, remedy defects, annex new provisions, substitute different provisions, add exceptions, limitations, or conditions, or otherwise change the law so as to depart from the plain meaning of language employed in the statute. [Citation.] If the language of the statute is clear, its plain and ordinary meaning must be given effect without resorting to other aids of construction. In re Marriage of Beyer, 324 Ill.App.3d 305, 309-10, 257 Ill.Dec. 406, 753 N.E.2d 1032 (2001). Section 1 of the Attorney Act provides that any person practicing, charging or receiving fees for legal services without being licensed to practice law by this court is guilty of contempt of court and shall be punished accordingly upon a complaint being filed against that person. The statute goes on to provide that the contempt proceedings shall be conducted in the same manner as in cases of indirect contempt in the county in which the alleged contempt was committed. Thus, the statute permits a contempt sanction for the unauthorized practice of law. Its plain language does not provide for any other remedy for a violation of the statute, although it does say that the contempt remedy is in addition to other remedies permitted by law. Thus, any remedies provided in other statutes or by the common law are not foreclosed by the existence of the contempt remedy in the Attorney Act. Had the legislature intended to provide a cause of action for damages for violation of the Attorney Act, it could have easily done so. Accordingly, we hold that there exists no private right of action under the Attorney Act for damages.