Opinion ID: 1387078
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: payment of deficiency

Text: The Maryboys assert that the Commission's order requiring them, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-505, [3] to deposit the deficiency of income taxes, penalties, and interest prior to pursuing this appeal violated their constitutional right to have open access to the courts of this state. They assert that the uncontradicted evidence presented at the hearing on limited remand demonstrated that they did not have sufficient liquid assets available to pay the deficiency and that virtually all of their discretionary income would be spent in loan payments if they obtained a loan to pay the deficiency. Thus, they contend that, under Jensen v. State Tax Commission, 835 P.2d 965, 969 (Utah 1992), the Commission should have allowed them to seek judicial review without paying the deficiency. We disagree. In reviewing the Commission's order, we grant the Commission deference concerning its factual determinations, applying a substantial evidence standard of review. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1)(a) (Supp.1994); see Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1385 (Utah 1993). Substantial evidence is `that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.' Utah Assoc. of Counties v. Tax Comm'n ex rel. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 895 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah 1995) (quoting U.S. West Communications v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 882 P.2d 141, 146 (Utah 1993)). We do not reweigh the evidence but defer to the Commission to resolve issues involving conflicting views if its findings are supported by substantial evidence. See Utah Assoc. of Counties, 895 P.2d at 821. Our review of the record reveals substantial evidence to support the Commission's findings on limited remand. The Commission found that the Maryboys had a combined income in 1992 of over $77,000. The Commission also found, In addition to owning savings bonds and maintaining a pension plan worth $47,000, [the Maryboys] own two residences and two relatively new vehicles. On the basis of that evidence, the Commission determined that the Maryboys had the ability to pay the deficiency, but found it inconvenient to do so. Relying on Jensen, the Commission found that the inconvenience the Maryboys would suffer in procuring the $10,855.38 deficiency was not sufficient to deny them reasonable access to judicial review. We agree. In Jensen, this Court addressed whether § 59-1-505 violates the open courts provision, article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution. [4] The petitioners in Jensen had been assessed a deficiency of $344,419 in income taxes, penalties, and interest. They were unable to comply with § 59-1-505, and thus strict application of that section precluded judicial review of the Commission's final order. We stated that to the extent § 59-1-505 precludes reasonable access to judicial review, it violates the open courts provision and held, as applied to the facts of that case, that it was an effective bar to judicial review and was unconstitutional as applied. Jensen, 835 P.2d at 969. Unlike the petitioners in Jensen, the Maryboys were financially able to pay the $10,855.38 deficiency. Although the requirement in § 59-1-505 inconvenienced them, it did not deny them reasonable access to judicial review. As we made clear in Jensen, § 59-1-505 is not unconstitutional in all cases. When a taxpayer is able to meet the requirement, the deposit must be paid. 835 P.2d at 969. This is just such a case. Affirmed in part; reversed in part. ZIMMERMAN, C.J., and DURHAM and RUSSON, JJ., concur.