Opinion ID: 2995334
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Reyes next claims that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction on Counts 4 and 5 of the indictment. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction poses a nearly insurmountable burden. United States v. Frazier, 213 F.3d 409, 415 (7th Cir. 2000). When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, it is not our function to reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for the decision of the jury, and we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, making all reasonable inferences in its favor, and will affirm the conviction so long as any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Neville, 82 F.3d 750, 757 (7th Cir. 1996). This being a criminal case, we will reverse a conviction only when the record is devoid of any evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which a jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Garcia, 35 F.3d 1125, 1128 (7th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added).
the AECA Count 4 charged that on or about June 16, 1997, Reyes did knowingly and willfully export and attempt to export from the United States defense articles, that is, aircraft component parts which were designated as defense articles on the United States Munitions List, without having first obtained from the Department of State a license for such export . . . all in violation of Title 22, United States Code, Section 2778(b)(2) and (c)[.] Conviction on this count required that the government prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Reyes willfully exported or attempted to export an item on the United States Munitions List without having first obtained a license. United States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441, 449- 50 (7th Cir. 1980). At trial, the prosecution submitted a mountain of evidence to establish that Reyes was aware of his legal duty not to export Munitions List articles to Iran or any foreign country without a license. This evidence included expert testimony establishing that the aircraft parts Reyes attempted to export were designed exclusively for use on a TF-30 military aircraft engine (which is used on F-111 and F-14 military aircraft), as well as many documents (several with Reyes’ handwritten notes on them) seized from Reyes’ private office, that helped to establish Reyes’ knowledge of the Munitions List and the law restricting exports of items on that list./7 The evidence also included the tape-recorded phone conversation between Reyes and Bembenek in which Reyes explicitly acknowledges both the illegality of shipping to Iran without a license and his awareness of the fact that Texam was shipping the parts it ordered to Iran. This combination of direct and circumstantial evidence was overwhelming and obviously more than sufficient to convict Reyes of Count 4 of the indictment. Circumstantial evidence is of equal probative value to direct evidence, United States v. Vega, 860 F.2d 779, 793 (7th Cir. 1988), and in some cases it is even more reliable. United States v. Ranum, 96 F.3d 1020, 1026 (7th Cir. 1996). Not only is the use of circumstantial evidence permissible, but circumstantial evidence ’may be the sole support for a conviction.’ Vega, 860 F.2d at 793-94. All of the material seized from Reyes’ office, combined with the recorded conversation with Bembenek, and Agent Heyer’s testimony that during his interview Reyes (1) admitted knowing that the shipment of aircraft parts destined for Iran was prohibited by federal law; and (2) acknowledged that he was aware that Siraj had registered with the State Department for eligibility to obtain Munitions List export licenses, provided more than a sufficient basis for the jury to conclude that the defendant was aware that he had to ascertain whether an aircraft component part was on the Munitions List. The evidence also overwhelmingly demonstrated his awareness of the requirement to obtain a license prior to exporting any aircraft part on the Munitions List. Reyes’ obvious disregard for his known legal duties in attempting to export items on the Munitions List without a license, provided more than sufficient grounds for the jury’s finding of a willful violation of the AECA. We thus hold that the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of Count 4 of the indictment.
the IEEPA Count 5 of the indictment charged that on or about June 16, 1997, Reyes did knowingly and willfully export and attempt to export from the United States to Iran through Geneva, Switzerland, certain goods, namely aircraft component parts . . . all in violation of Title 50, United States Code, Section 1705(b), 18 U.S.C. sec. 2, 31 C.F.R. sec.sec. 560.203, 560.204, and Executive Orders 12957 and 12959. The government was required to establish that Reyes willfully attempted to export goods to another country, knowing the ultimate destination was an embargoed country, without a license. 50 U.S.C. sec. 1705(b); 31 C.F.R. sec. 560.203-204, issued pursuant to Executive Order 12959, sec. 1(b) and 1(g), 60 Fed. Reg. 24757, 15 C.F.R. sec. 785.4(b)(2), 15 C.F.R. sec. 787.5(b). Reyes contends that the government failed to present sufficient evidence to establish his knowledge that the June 16, 1997 shipment to Texam was destined for Iran, but his argument ignores the substantial evidence presented by the prosecution. During Agent Heyer’s interview with Reyes on June 19, 1997, he acknowledged that he was aware of the illegality of shipping parts to a customer who in turn forwarded them to an Iranian destination, and he falsely stated that he had never been told by anyone, and had no reason to suspect, that shipments sent to Texam Holding were subsequently being forwarded to Iran. The government also introduced a document faxed to Siraj on March 3, 1997, from Texam’s Swiss bank, bearing the notation F/A Iran Aircraft Industries, Tehran, Texam Holding Ltd., Geneva, and referencing Texam’s payment for a shipment to Texam. Another damaging piece of evidence introduced against the defendant was a fax from Texam to its Swiss bank (and on which Siraj was copied) dated May 19, 1997, containing a re line reading Air shipment from Geneva/ Switzerland to Tehran/Iran. The government also offered evidence through the use of expert computer forensics tes timony demonstrating that the fax machine at Siraj received two faxes in December, 1996, (again from Texam to its Swiss bank and on which Siraj had been copied) containing a re line stating Air shipment from Geneva/Switzerland to Tehran/Iran. Further, Debra Martell testified that Texam was Reyes’ personal client, that he was the only Siraj employee authorized to speak on the telephone with Bani, and, importantly, that all incoming faxes from Texam were to be delivered to and handled exclusively by Reyes. Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, and making all reasonable inferences in its favor, Neville, 82 F.3d at 757, we hold that when considering the totality of the evidence offered by the prosecution, it was sufficient for the jury to find that Reyes attempted to export parts to Texam without a license and that he had knowledge that the aircraft parts would be forwarded to Iran, in violation of the IEEPA. Reyes’ challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction on Count 5 of the indictment is without merit.