Opinion ID: 1709398
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: On plaintiff Marshall's appeal.

Text: The questions raised on this appeal: whether the case was properly submitted on excessive speed and/or failure to keep a careful lookout; whether there was evidence that excessive speed and/or failure to keep a careful lookout was a proximate cause of the collision, must be answered in the affirmative. The proper test of speed as a proximate cause of a collision is whether the speed prevented the driver from avoiding the collision. Buzbee v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., Mo.Sup., 467 S.W.2d 933, and five cases cited 1. c. 935. The proper test of failure to keep a careful lookout as a proximate cause is whether in the exercise of the highest degree of care the driver of the defendant's vehicle could have seen the other vehicle in time to have taken effective precautionary action in avoidance. O'Neill v. Claypool, Mo.Sup., 341 S.W.2d 129; Zalle v. Underwood, Mo.Sup., 372 S. W.2d 98. The evidence in this case, considered in the light most favorable to plaintiff, warrants a jury finding that in both respects (speed and lookout) Bobbitt was negligent. There was evidence that the driver of a northbound vehicle could have seen the top of a vehicle in the side road when the northbound vehicle was 375 feet south of the side road. Bobbitt says that when he first saw the pickup truck he was 160-175 feet south of the side road at which time the pickup truck was back in the side road several feet, proceeding toward the highway. From his testimony it was apparent to him that the pickup truck was moving inexorably toward and would enter the highway (without stopping). Other testimony (from plaintiff and the other passenger in the pickup truck) indicates that as the pickup truck approached the highway it stopped 4 or 5 feet east of the pavement; that the driver looked to his left and said it was all clear on his side; that plaintiff looked in both directions and the other passenger looked to the right; that none of the three saw any traffic, whereupon the pickup truck moved out onto the highway. Under the latter version of the facts the jury could find that the two vehicles came into view of each other shortly after the pickup started forward from its stopped position and that Bobbitt could have seen it entering the highway at a time when the Dodge was nearly 375 feet south of the side road. The jury was not obliged to credit Bobbitt's testimony that he turned to the left (presumably causing his left wheels to leave the northbound lane, cross the center line and run in the southbound lane) when he first saw the pickup truck. The jury could find that Bobbitt was already running with his left wheels across the center line when the Dodge was 375 feet south of the side road. The jury could further find that if at the time the pickup truck first became visible to Bobbitt the latter had seen it and taken precautionary action by reducing his speed and moving back entirely within the northbound lane, the collision could have been avoided. The trouble is that Bobbitt did not see the pickup truck until he was 160-175 feet south of the side road, as he himself admitted, and that at the high speed he was traveling he was prevented from taking effective preventive measures. Bobbitt argues that he acted as soon as he saw the pickup truck; he concedes (and asks for exoneration on the basis that) once he applied the brakes and commenced to skid he lost all control of the Dodge and there was nothing further he could do to avoid the collision. As pointed out by appellant, even under Bobbitt's version of the facts, the latter had 100 feet after reaction time within which to slacken the brake pressure, regain control and move back into the northbound lane, and the jury could have found that if his speed had not been excessive he could have done so, but due to his tardy lookout and excessive speed, he hit his brakes, went into a skid and became a deadly instrumentality. Under the favorable evidence, if Bobbitt had maintained a careful lookout ahead and laterally as required in the exercise of the highest degree of care he could have seen the pickup truck, sensed the danger and taken preventive measures at a point 200 feet south of the point where Bobbitt says he first saw the pickup truck. Had he done so and had he been traveling at a reasonable speed it could reasonably be found that he could have applied the brakes sooner than he did, thereby giving the driver of the pickup truck more time to escape the path of the Dodge or turn the pickup truck to his right so the vehicles would miss each other, and Bobbitt would have had more time to steer to the right in avoidance or, having locked the brakes and gone into the lock-in collision course, more time within which to release the brakes, regain control and bring the Dodge entirely back into the northbound lane. Under all the circumstances of this case, including the fact that Bobbitt was thoroughly familiar with the area and the side road, and is held in the exercise of the highest degree of care to anticipate the possibility of vehicles suddenly emerging from side roads; that he had the duty of maintaining sufficient lookout and control over his vehicle as to be able to avert an accident in such a contingency; that he was not entitled to wait until the moment of actual peril before beginning to reduce speed; having in mind the estimates of high speed at which the Dodge was traveling; the considerable distance and time available to him to take preventive action after the pickup truck first became visible to Bobbitt; Bobbitt's failure to see the pickup truck at the earliest possible momentthat he could have seen it when the Dodge was 200 feet farther south than it was when he did finally see it; the length of skid marks laid down by the Dodge prior to PC; Bobbitt's failure to swerve to the right back into his own lane; the fact that Bobbitt locked his brakes when the Dodge was in a fixed course with its left wheels west of the center line; the absence of evidence that Bobbitt released his brakes prior to PC in an attempt to swerve the Dodge to the right in avoidance; the speed of the Dodge at PC; the violence of the impact; the speeds of both vehicles as they continued north after the momentum-absorbing impact; and the length of the skid marks of both vehicles from PC to where they came to rest, we are firmly of the opinion that the evidence was sufficient to support an inference of failure to keep a careful lookout, and excessive speed, and to authorize submission of lookout failure and excessive speed as causative factors. Buzbee v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., supra; Hamilton v. Slover, Mo.Sup., 440 S.W.2d 947, 956[11]; Baumle v. Smith, Mo.Sup., 420 S.W.2d 341, 345[4]; Wolfe v. Harms, Mo.Sup., 413 S.W.2d 204, 210[2-7]; Burks v. Leap, Mo.Sup., 413 S.W.2d 258, 263[3]; Calvert v. Super Propane Corporation, Mo.Sup., 400 S.W.2d 133, 139[5-7]; Bramblett v. Harlow, Mo.App., 75 S.W.2d 626, 630[7-9].