Opinion ID: 1453433
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Brinton

Text: The Government argues that the district court erred in rejecting the obstruction-of-justice enhancement for Brinton. We review de novo a sentencing court's determination that section 3C1.1 applies to specific conduct, but we review for clear error the court's factual findings. United States v. Hare, 49 F.3d 447, 453 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. McCoy, 36 F.3d 740, 742 (8th Cir.1994)). Section 3C1.1 applies if the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction. . . . U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. In this case, Brinton stipulated that she told her daughter to withhold information regarding Brinton's involvement in the criminal enterprise from investigators. The district court accepted the factual basis of the stipulation but determined that § 3C1.1 did not apply to this specific conduct. Therefore, our review is de novo. We note that Brinton did not challenge the obstruction-of-justice enhancement, as it would have been a breach of her plea agreement to do so; the district court raised the issue sua sponte. The district court, citing the Fifth Amendment, held that the enhancement should not apply where a mother simply advises her daughter to remain silent about criminal activity. However, the stipulation states that Brinton, after being approached by law enforcement and knowing that there was an investigation in this matter, attempted to influence her daughter not to reveal Brinton's involvement in the criminal enterprise to law enforcement: [Brinton] told her to not tell law enforcement anything about the defendant's [i.e., Brinton's] involvement in drug distribution and about defendant's [i.e., Brinton's] utilization of her juvenile daughter in the distribution of controlled substances. Brinton Plea Agreement ¶ 34F (emphases added). In other words, the stipulation demonstrates not advice to the daughter to keep silent to protect herself, but instructions to the daughter to conceal Brinton's involvement in the illegal activity, including Brinton's use of a juvenile, from investigators. This specific conduct certainly qualifies as an attempt[] to obstruct or impede . . . the administration of justice with respect to the investigation . . . of the instant offense of conviction. . . . § 3C1.1. The district court also relied on the absence of any evidence of threats or intimidation in the stipulation. The commentary to § 3C1.1 provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of applicable obstructive conduct including (a) threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully influencing a co-defendant, witness, or juror, directly or indirectly, or attempting to do so. § 3C1.1 cmt. n. 4. Because the list of examples is non-exhaustive, the district court erred to the extent it held that evidence of overt threats or intimidation is required in order to apply the enhancement. See, e.g., United States v. Holland, 884 F.2d 354, 358-59 (8th Cir.1989) (affirming application of the enhancement where the defendant requested a co-defendant not to mention the involvement of two individuals when making statements to law enforcement officials). We conclude that the district court erred in not applying the § 3C1.1 two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice to the stipulated conduct. An error in the advisory guidelines calculation requires remand unless the error is harmless. United States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1017 (8th Cir.2005) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1)). A district court's pronouncement of an alternative sentence may allow for such a finding of harmless error. United States v. Icaza, 492 F.3d 967, 970 (8th Cir.2007). [T]o support a finding of harmless error, the record clearly must show not only that the district court intended to provide an alternative sentence, but also that the alternative sentence is based on an identifiable, correctly calculated guidelines range. Id. at 971. In this case, the district court stated that were this court to hold on appeal that the obstruction-of-justice enhancement should have been applied, the district court would, in the alternative, vary downward not down to 210 but down to something close to 210 months based on the non-threatening nature of the obstruction. Brinton Resent. Tr. at 25. This statement, while suggesting an intent to pronounce an applicable alternative sentence, does not indicate precisely what the variance based on the non-threatening nature of the obstruction would have been. Moreover, it is unclear whether the district court would have increased the portion of the downward variance based on other factors to arrive at the same 160-month sentence. Because we have no specific alternative sentence to review, we must vacate Brinton's sentence based on the advisory guidelines calculation error and remand for resentencing without reaching the reasonableness of her sentence. See Mashek, 406 F.3d at 1017.