Opinion ID: 1107717
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applying the Standard to Carratelli's Case

Text: Having determined that the prejudice standard applicable to Carratelli's postconviction claim is whether the juror is actually biased, we consider the circumstances of this case. As stated above, Carratelli's case was the subject of much pretrial publicity, including an article appearing in the Palm Beach Post the day before jury selection began. The undisputed facts were that Carratelli was speeding through a red light when his car collided with another vehicle, killing all six passengers. Carratelli's reported defense, which he used at trial, was that he was unconscious at the time because of a medical condition attendant to his Type I diabetes. Carratelli I, 832 So.2d at 857. Potential jurors were questioned about their exposure to media reports and their opinions about the case. When Mr. Inman  the only juror at issue  was questioned, he stated that he had heard a recent newscast about the incident; had overheard  but did not participate in  a discussion in a barbershop about it; and had read the recent Post article. Although the barbershop patrons opined that Carratelli was guilty, Inman had no opinion. Asked if he could listen to the evidence, ignore the media reports and conversations he had overheard, and follow the law, Inman replied: I believe that I could, and listen to what was here and what was said to be the law and I would follow that. Defense counsel questioned him about the barbershop conversation, and Inman responded that the barbershop patrons did not believe Carratelli's explanation for the incident. Emphasizing that he had not joined the conversation, Inman said that after hearing it, he had not form[ed] any definite opinion of yes or no about the case. Questioned whether he had any indefinite opinion, Inman said he knew nothing about diabetes, but he thought there should have been some kind of forewarning [of the reaction], because of when you get sick you have some kind of forewarning. He did not have the opinion that Carratelli was guilty. The following exchange then occurred: DEFENSE COUNSEL: So when you left [the barbershop] you felt that the defense that was being asserted didn't make some sense? INMAN: That's basically it, that was my thought. Asked about the article in the Post, Mr. Inman said he found it too editorialized. Defense counsel continued: DEFENSE COUNSEL: How did that do  what did that [the article] do to the opinion that you had already held about the defense not making sense? INMAN: I believe in my own mind that if there is some  I will call them doctors, whatever that can say, that there would be no forewarning of any symptoms to cause him to stop or continue or anything like that, I would listen to it. Later, the following exchange ensued: DEFENSE COUNSEL: Would you say that this is a fair statement that you have an opinion about the defense but it's not  you have not positively made up your mind? INMAN: That's correct. DEFENSE COUNSEL: But it would certainly be more difficult for Mr. Carratelli to convince you of his innocence now than if you had not read the article had not been involved in that discussion? INMAN: I believe that's a fair statement. The court then questioned Mr. Inman as follows: COURT: Mr. Inman, you used a phrase a minute ago but I don't want to put words in your mouth, as to this type of defense; I gather that you think it's possible there is a medical explanation that would explain the situation? INMAN: Well, there's a possibility that that could happen. COURT: And regardless of what discussions you had already, you'd be willing as a juror, to sit here and listen to whatever medical testimony you hear? INMAN: Absolutely. COURT: Whether it makes sense or it doesn't? INMAN: Yes. COURT: Would you be able to set aside any input you had, bias or prejudice, and sit here and assure us all that you can be a fair and impartial juror? INMAN: If I come in here as a juror, I will sit down with an open slate and listen to what is said and make up my mind from there. (Emphasis added.) After reviewing this same record on direct appeal, the Fourth District affirmed without discussing Carratelli's claim that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his cause challenge to juror Inman. See Carratelli I, 832 So.2d at 855. Then, in reviewing Carratelli's ineffective assistance claim in his 3.850 motion, the en banc court applied to these facts the actual bias standard we adopt here and held that [j]uror Inman's slight familiarity with the case did not rise to that level of actual bias necessary for postconviction relief. Carratelli II, 915 So.2d at 1261. We agree. The record plainly shows that juror Inman held no firm opinion except that he could be fair, listen to the evidence, and follow the law. Thus, Carratelli fails to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland.