Opinion ID: 787177
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: competence of counsel's performance

Text: 66 Lin asserts several grounds on which counsel's representation constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. For clarity of discussion, we group them under five headings. No single factor need be dispositive in establishing the claim.
67 It is not clear even from counsel's declaration that she ever actually spoke to Lin about the substance of his case, nor is there any other evidence aside from her own declaration that she spoke to Lin at all. There is no evidence that she conducted any research specifically on Lin's claim or prepared him for his hearing. None of her behavior in the hearing contradicts Lin's stated hypothesis that her preparation for the hearing consisted of nothing more than reading over Lin's brief written statement to her shortly before the hearing began. Her assertion that she had sent the actual case and the money to Guajardo and her evident expectation that she would not be responsible for argument before the IJ strongly suggest that her contact with Lin was inadequate. Given the factual uncertainties over what degree of contact she did have with Lin and how much preparation she undertook, however, we do not base our finding of ineffectiveness entirely on this claim.
68 The BIA notes counsel's uncorroborated assertion that she relied heavily on conversations with Zhong, Lin's New York relative, wherein she informed him of the need for documentary evidence, and that she had several phone conversations with Lin. It does not adopt these as findings, nor does it find that the content of any conversations with Lin were about the substance of the case as opposed to prodding Zhong to finalize arrangements to retain her. The BIA makes no finding that counsel's preparation for the hearing extended beyond these conversations of unknown content. The balance of the record offers little evidence that she engaged in more than a perfunctory review of the facts of the case prior to the hearing. Counsel never collected available material testimony and documentary evidence, and never presented to the IJ the basics of his claim: that Zheng was forcibly sterilized, 6 the significance of the large fine, 7 that government persecution forced him to hide and drop out of school, and a legal argument that Lin qualified as a refugee on account of a protected status. 69 Counsel's unreasonable failure to investigate and present the factual and legal basis of Lin's asylum claim would itself amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. Cf. Escobar-Grijalva v. INS, 206 F.3d 1331, 1335 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that attorney who was unprepared to argue and unknowledgeable about the facts of an asylum case could not have provided effective assistance of counsel), amended on other grounds by 213 F.3d 1221 (9th Cir.2000). If counsel was unprepared to present Lin's claim, she should have sought to withdraw as counsel, even as late as the date of the hearing. Lin's right to a full and fair presentation of his claim included the right to have an attorney who would present a viable legal argument on his behalf supported by relevant evidence, if he could find one willing and able to do so. See 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (recognizing right to privately retained counsel); Rios-Berrios v. INS, 776 F.2d 859, 863 (9th Cir.1985) (granting relief because petitioner's asylum case will be more advantageously presented by retained counsel). Zhong indisputably tried to arrange such representation on Lin's behalf. Prior counsel's pretense that she would offer such representation denied Lin the opportunity to seek an attorney who would research, investigate, and present his legal claim, and thus denied him due process. 70 The above principles apply to all asylum claims, but our concern about their proper implementation is intensified when the petitioner is a minor. Indeed, the right of minors to competent counsel is so compelling that we have joined other circuits in holding that a guardian or parent cannot bring a lawsuit on behalf of a minor in federal court without retaining a lawyer. Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir.1997). In Johns, we joined the Second and Third circuits in endorsing the holding of Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir.1986) (per curiam). We explained: 71 The choice to appear pro se is not a true choice for minors who under state law, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 1(b), cannot determine their own legal actions. There is thus no individual choice to proceed pro se for courts to respect, and the sole policy at stake concerns the exclusion of non-licensed persons to appear as attorneys on behalf of others. 72 It goes without saying that it is not in the interest of minors or incompetents that they be represented by non-attorneys. Where they have claims that require adjudication, they are entitled to trained legal assistance so their rights may be fully protected. 73 Johns, 114 F.3d at 876-77 (citations omitted).
74 After two continuances, the IJ criticized counsel for taking West Coast asylum cases when she was unable to appear. After a continuance of several months, she reluctantly agreed to participate in the hearing by telephone after receiving a call from the IJ commanding her to do so. Lin claims that she was unable to participate fully in the hearing by telephone. The transcript of the hearing demonstrates that the courtroom was not well-equipped for a telephonic hearing, and that New York counsel could neither hear nor be heard clearly at numerous points. For example, counsel did not hear Lin's answer when she asked him what consequences he would face if he were returned to China. This is critical, given that the government argues that Lin may not raise on appeal the argument that he will be jailed for having fled the country in contravention of Chinese law. Further, counsel clearly had no opportunity to consult with Lin before the hearing, nor had she prepared for the hearing. The government argues that counsel's effectiveness was not vitiated by her appearance by telephone rather than in person. This may be true, but only in the damning sense that counsel was so unprepared to argue the case that it hardly mattered whether she was heard at all.
75 Lin asserts that his counsel asked very few questions, all taken from a half-page summary of his situation that Lin had previously sent her at the IJ's urging. She was hampered because she had not heard his answers fully nor had she discovered the critical information necessary to establish Lin's asylum claim. She failed to argue at all that Lin's flight was on account of persecution or fear of future persecution, and offered no theory as to why he was part of a protected group. She also made no attempt to rehabilitate Lin after a damaging cross-examination.
76 In the direct appeal, counsel did nothing to rectify the errors made in her presentation to the IJ. Although she advised the BIA that she would submit a brief, she neither did so nor requested an extension, and still never interviewed Lin. The BIA noted in dismissing the motion to reopen 8 that it did not reject the direct appeal on the ground that counsel had failed to file a brief, a disposition that would have been within its discretion. However, in the context of her earlier actions, the failure to file a brief compounded the ineffectiveness of her assistance. 77
78 The BIA's conclusion that the deficiencies in counsel's performance did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel turns on its legal determination that greater effort was not required because Lin fails to show that another counsel could have made a viable case for refugee status. We address the question of prejudice below; here we focus solely on whether counsel's performance rendered the proceeding ... so fundamentally unfair that [Lin] was prevented from reasonably presenting his case. Lopez, 775 F.2d at 1017. 79 Lin had a statutory right, in his removal proceedings and his appeal, to be represented (at no expense to the Government) by such counsel, authorized to practice in such proceedings, as he shall choose. 8 U.S.C. § 1362. Although a deportation hearing is not a criminal matter and[an alien has] no Sixth Amendment right to appointment of counsel at government expense, due process mandates that he is entitled to counsel of his own choice at his own expense under terms of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Rios-Berrios v. INS, 776 F.2d at 862 (citation omitted). 80 Having retained counsel, as was his legal right, Lin was entitled to have that counsel perform with sufficient competence. See Lopez, 775 F.2d at 1017. We do not require that Lin's representation be brilliant, but it cannot serve to make Lin's immigration hearing so fundamentally unfair that [he] was prevented from reasonably presenting his case. Lopez, 775 F.2d at 1017. 81 Counsel's actions in this case do not clear even this low bar. She was unprepared; had not expected to argue; did not seek out the evidence she should have found; did not present effectively the evidence she had at hand; presented no legal framework for an asylum claim; and left her client alone, bewildered, and unrehabilitated as a witness. None of this was trial strategy, sound or otherwise. Indeed, her actions left Lin worse than unrepresented, because her acquiescence in proceeding as counsel for the hearing kept the IJ from taking further remedial action. Whatever minimal prior contact counsel may have had with Zhong — or with Lin — the record compels the conclusion that counsel providing effective assistance would not have been as woefully unprepared to present Lin's case as Lin's counsel was on the day that she did so before the IJ. We conclude that the quality of her representation deprived Lin of his Fifth Amendment due process right to a full and fair hearing. We proceed to consider whether Lin was prejudiced as a consequence of this deficiency.