Opinion ID: 557349
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the district court erred in various rulings

Text: 51 related to the admission of evidence. 52 Defendants-appellants object to various of the district court's evidentiary rulings. A trial court has broad discretion in admitting and excluding expert testimony and its decisions will not be reversed unless manifestly erroneous. Taylor v. Burlington N.R.R., 787 F.2d 1309, 1315 (9th Cir.1986). Thus, its evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Roberts v. College of the Desert, 870 F.2d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir.1988). The admission or exclusion of evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 403 or 404 is reversible only for a clear abuse of discretion. Coursen v. A.H. Robins Co., 764 F.2d 1329, 1333, amended, 773 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir.1985).
53 Mason County contends that the district court improperly excluded the testimony of one of their police experts, Dr. Kevin Parsons. A district court may exclude relevant, but cumulative evidence, because of considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation. Fed.R.Evid. 403. The court ruled that each side was free to call two experts to the stand. Mason County argues that the testimony of their third witness, Dr. Parsons, was necessary, not cumulative, because he brought a different level of expertise and experience to the topic. But the County admitted that Sheriff Jones testified for them on the same topic. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion by excluding Dr. Parson's testimony as cumulative evidence.
54 Mason County maintains that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of former Mason County deputies Bryan Kelly and Mike Smith regarding the Taylor arrest. However, the district court did grant the County's motion to include Kelly to its witness list; Mason County never called Kelly. 55 Smith was not listed as a witness in the pretrial order, and it was not until late in the trial that Mason County moved to include him. Not only would Smith's testimony have been cumulative, Mason County offered no compelling reasons to add him. Fed.R.Evid. 403 gives the district court broad discretion in excluding cumulative evidence. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 127, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2912, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974). The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Smith's testimony.
56 The day before the Davis/Gardner incident, there was an altercation between John Davis and James Davies. Davies, allegedly drunk and annoyed at being caught behind Davis' wagon, attacked Davis' teenage son. In defending his son, Davis bloodied Davies' nose. Although Davis filed a police report reporting the incident, he did not press charges against Davies for initiating the attack, and the matter was dropped. Yet after the Davis/Gardner incident, the Sheriff's Department brought assault charges against Davis, who was acquitted in a jury trial. 57 Mason County sought to bring in evidence regarding this incident in order to show Davis' proclivity to violence. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) says, however, that [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. See Coursen v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 764 F.2d at 1335. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit evidence of the Davies incident.
58 Mason County objected to plaintiffs' police expert, Donald Van Blaricom, because he testified that Sheriff Stairs was reckless in his failure to adequately train his deputies, and that there was a causal link between this recklessness and plaintiffs' injuries. They contend that this was improper opinion testimony on a question of law. 59 This argument is without merit. Fed.R.Evid. 704 allows expert witnesses to express an opinion on an ultimate issue to be decided by the jury. Northrop Architectural Sys. v. Lupton Mfg. Co., 437 F.2d 889, 891 (9th Cir.1971). Moreover, Fed.R.Evid. 702 permits expert testimony comparing conduct of parties to the industry standard. Vucinich v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 803 F.2d 454, 461 (9th Cir.1986). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Van Blaricom's testimony. 60