Opinion ID: 2614963
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Question of Respondent's Ineffective Representation

Text: Respondent asserts that the omissions pertaining to the criminal case were part of a deliberate trial strategy, rather than a product of misconduct. He maintains that because his client refused any incarceration as part of a plea arrangement, his alternatives were very limited. According to Respondent, because no agreeable plea offer was available, he knew that he would have to try the case. Respondent believed his client's only defense, in light of her wishes and the overwhelming evidence against her, was to cast her husband as a monster and portray her, like her child, as a victim of her husband's tyranny. Respondent's Opening Brief at 7. Respondent maintains that this lying in the weeds defense did not necessitate that he contest most of the prosecution's case. Therefore, according to Respondent, significant investigation was unneeded and could alert the prosecution to his defense strategy. Implicit in Respondent's argument is the concept that Respondent's representation was not ineffective but, instead, part of a coherent strategy. Respondent cannot escape the fact that he defends his conduct by challenging the judge's ruling in the Rule 32 Petition granted as a result of his ineffective criminal representation. He cites numerous cases in which this court and others have held that conduct alleged to be similar to his did not warrant reversal based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. [3] If, however, we were to rely on such authority, we simply could not ignore the one ineffective assistance of counsel case directly on point  his client's. Respondent would have us accept other ineffective assistance of counsel cases as persuasive in this proceeding but, at the same time, reject his case  truly the only case on all fours. This we decline to do. In a disciplinary matter arising from conduct that resulted in reversal based on ineffective assistance, we will not challenge the propriety of the earlier disposition in the Rule 32 Petition; therefore, we reject Respondent's arguments. This does not mean, however, that the judge's findings in the Rule 32 Petition are binding in this matter. Respondent correctly maintains that the disposition of the Rule 32 Petition is not dispositive on whether Respondent violated our ethical rules. Given the differences between the two proceedings, the differing standards of proof, [4] and the fact that Respondent was not a party in the post-conviction proceeding, we decline to adopt a per se rule that successful post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel automatically results in an ethical violation, or, conversely, that a denial of post-conviction relief will always insulate an attorney from professional discipline. This rule apparently represents the uniform rule followed by other courts. See, e.g., Florida State Bar v. Sandstrom, 609 So.2d 583, 584 n. 1 (Fla. 1992) (noting that most cases of ineffective assistance of counsel do not rise to the level of a disciplinary violation); In re Riccio, 131 A.D.2d 973, 517 N.Y.S.2d 791, 795 (1987) (finding that a prior ruling that attorney did not provide effective assistance of counsel did not necessarily establish the disciplinary violation of neglect); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. McKinney, 668 S.W.2d 293, 296-97 (Tenn. 1984) (holding that prior determination of whether attorney provided effective assistance is inadmissible in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding); In re Lewis, 445 N.E.2d 987, 989 (Ind. 1983) (holding that successful post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel is not controlling in a subsequent disciplinary matter). When a disciplinary proceeding follows successful post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel, we consider the outcome of the Rule 32 Petition as final with regard to the question of whether a lawyer's representation was legally ineffective and prejudicial but do not necessarily equate such a finding with a violation of our ethical rules. [5] Although a Rule 32 proceeding and a subsequent disciplinary proceeding may share the same universe of facts, this court must independently determine, under the proper standard, the existence of those facts salient to the disciplinary matter and whether those facts, even if identical to those established in the post-conviction proceedings, warrant discipline. See McKinney, 668 S.W.2d at 297; Lewis, 445 N.E.2d at 989. Therefore, in this case, we independently examine the record to determine whether Respondent's conduct violated the ethical rules as charged.