Opinion ID: 1897636
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Judgment for the District

Text: As a preliminary matter, Gross asserts that the trial court's order should be reviewed as a dismissal in favor of the District under Rule 12(b)(6), and that his complaint clearly was not subject to dismissal on that basis. However, the District's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment presented substantial evidence beyond the pleadings, and both the District and Gross filed extensive exhibits and affidavits. The trial court thus was required to treat the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. [7] Super Ct. Civ. R. 12(b) states in pertinent part (emphasis added): If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the Court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. See, e.g., Kitt v. Pathmakers, Inc., 672 A.2d 76, 79 (D.C.1996) (citing American Ins. Co. v. Smith, 472 A.2d 872, 873-74 (D.C.1984)); Fulwood v. Porter, 639 A.2d 594, 598 (D.C.1994). Gross makes no claim that he did not have a sufficient opportunity to respond to the District's motion and to present all material pertinent to such motion. As we have often said, on appeals from the grant of summary judgment, [t]his court conducts an independent review of the record, but the substantive standard is the same as that utilized by the trial court. Millstein v. Henske, 722 A.2d 850, 853 n. 7 (D.C.1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, we turn our attention to the merits of the District's motion.
Local law claims against the District are barred if the plaintiff fails to comply with D.C.Code § 12-309. That section requires a plaintiff suing the District to file a written notice-of-claim with the Mayor within six months of the alleged injury. [8] In this case, the alleged injury occurred on or about February 16, 1993, and Gross notified the District of the decision to file suit on February 16, 1996, thirty-six months later. First, Gross argues that the statutory period should be tolled because James Spears has been non compos mentis since the time of the incident. Controlling case law dictates otherwise. `Because it is in derogation of the common law principle of sovereign immunity, section 12-309 is to be construed narrowly against claimants.' Doe by Fein v. District of Columbia, 697 A.2d 23, 29 (D.C.1997) (quoting District of Columbia v. Dunmore, 662 A.2d 1356, 1359 (D.C.1995)). This section does not function as a statute of limitations; rather, its function is to impose[] a notice requirement on everyone with a tort claim against the District of Columbia, and compliance with its terms is mandatory as a prerequisite for filing suit against the District. Dunmore, 662 A.2d at 1358 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also Gwinn v. District of Columbia, 434 A.2d 1376, 1378 (D.C.1981) (Section 12-309 was ... specifically designed to avoid, as applied to the District, the pitfalls of the statute of limitations.). Our cases make clear that tolling principles applicable to statutes of limitations do not apply in § 12-309 cases. See Doe by Fein, 697 A.2d at 29 (statute not tolled by minority status: The statute contains no exception to the time limit.... We hold that the statute does not permit equitable tolling.); Dunmore, supra, 662 A.2d at 1359-60 (discovery rule not applicable to § 12-309); Gwinn, 434 A.2d at 1378-79 (statute not tolled by minority status). Plaintiff's argument that the six-month time limit of § 12-309 should be tolled because Spears was non compos mentis is indistinguishable from the arguments for tolling that have been raised and rejected by this court in the past. [9] Second, Gross argues that, with respect to § 12-309's notice requirement, a police report may serve as an alternative to written notice, see supra note 8, and baldly asserts that there must be written police reports about this incident which have not been turned over by the District. The District asserts, as it did to the trial court, that no police reports relating to the alleged arrest or assault could be located. [10] Section 12-309 places a requirement on the plaintiff to show compliance with its provisions, a `prerequisite' to the filing of a suit against the District. Dunmore, supra, 662 A.2d at 1358 (citation omitted). See also Gwinn, supra, 434 A.2d at 1378 ([U]nless timely notice is given, no `right of action' or `entitlement to maintain action' accrues.). If Gross thought that additional time for discovery was necessary to try to locate any such police reports, it was his duty to clearly alert the trial court to this need in opposition to the summary judgment motion. See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(f). [11] In any event, his complaint on appeal about any discovery inadequacy comes too late. It was raised for the first time in appellant's reply brief, not with the trial court or in the opening brief; therefore, we do not consider it further. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Patterson, 667 A.2d 1338, 1346 n. 18 (D.C.1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1058, 117 S.Ct. 688, 136 L.Ed.2d 612 (1997). [12]
In addition to his common-law causes of action, Gross brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the District based on municipal liability for the unnamed officers' alleged actions of arresting Spears without probable cause and with excessive force. [13] Although a municipality is a person subject to suit within the meaning of section 1983, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). To establish municipal liability under section 1983, a plaintiff must prove that  deliberate action attributable to the municipality itself is the `moving force' behind the plaintiff's deprivation of federal rights. Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 400, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018; emphasis in original). A showing of simple or even heightened negligence will not suffice to establish municipal liability for constitutional torts. Id. at 407, 117 S.Ct. 1382; see also Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 382, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (quoting test rejected by the Court that municipal liability for failure to train could rest on municipal actions that were reckless, negligent, or grossly negligence). Rather, Gross must demonstrate that the municipal action was taken with `deliberate indifference' as to its known or obvious consequences with regard to violations of constitutional rights. Board of County Comm'rs, 520 U.S. at 407, 117 S.Ct. 1382 (quoting Harris, 489 U.S. at 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197). In Harris, supra, the Court applied Monell's principles in the context of police training. The Court adopted a high degree of fault and causation for such cases. See 489 U.S. at 390-92, 109 S.Ct. 1197. The Court stated that [o]nly where a failure to train reflects a `deliberate' or `conscious' choice by a municipality  a `policy' as defined by our prior cases  can a city be liable for such a failure under § 1983, id. at 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197, and that permitting cases against cities for their `failure to train' employees to go forward under § 1983 on a lesser standard of fault would result in de facto respondeat superior liability on municipalities  a result we rejected in Monell. Id. at 392, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (citation omitted). As to causation, liability can be established only by proving that the deficiency in training actually caused the police officers' indifference to [the plaintiff's rights]. Would the injury have been avoided had the [officers] been trained under a program that was not deficient in the identified respect? Id. at 391, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (footnote omitted). We turn then to Gross' proffer in opposition to summary judgment. Under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c), summary judgment should be entered only where the record shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., Partnership Placements, Inc. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 722 A.2d 837, 841 (D.C.1998). A motion for summary judgment may be granted if (1) taking all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, (2) a reasonable juror, acting reasonably, could not find for the nonmoving party, (3) under the appropriate burden of proof. Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 42 (D.C.1979) (footnote omitted; emphasis in original), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078, 100 S.Ct. 1028, 62 L.Ed.2d 761 (1980). Rule 56(c) `mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.' Fulwood, supra, 639 A.2d at 600 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). Conclusory allegations by the nonmoving party are insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact or to defeat the entry of summary judgment. Beard v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 587 A.2d 195, 198 (D.C.1991). Here it was Gross' burden to show that the need for more or different training [or supervision of police officers was] so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in a violation of constitutional rights, Harris, 489 U.S. at 390, 109 S.Ct. 1197, as to amount to a policy of deliberate indifference to citizens' constitutional rights on the part of the District. Gross' proposed evidence as to lack of training and supervision of MPD officers can be summarized as follows: (1) the following statements by his police expert, Robert W. Klotz: that there was a lack of adequate refresher training, that there was no system of officer evaluation, that the Civilian Complaint Review Board was ineffective and officers knew that they would seldom be disciplined for use of excessive force, that Chief Thomas had announced a need to overhaul training and recruiting in January 1993, that record keeping was so poor that auditors could not evaluate whether police recruits were adequately trained, and that these factors showed deliberate indifference and caused Spears' injuries; [14] (2) the District has failed to promulgate regulations regarding deadly use of flashlights as well as regulations expressly prohibiting officers from using batons as neck choking devices; (3) the District's failure to gather systematic data on internal training and evaluation, excessive use of force complaints, and lawsuits against the MPD alleging constitutional violations; (4) various clippings from news sources citing problems with the MPD's training and evaluation systems and with the CCRB; and (5) the facts of this case according to plaintiff's witnesses. We think this case to be similar to and controlled by Fulwood, supra . Fulwood addressed the issue of whether the chief of the MPD was qualifiedly immune from a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Chief Fulwood's deliberate indifference to a widespread pattern of police brutality and unlawful arrests caused the assault and injury of appellant by MPD officers. Although the issue was qualified immunity, Fulwood applied the same constitutional standards for deliberate indifference that apply to determining municipal liability under § 1983. See 639 A.2d at 599. We stated there that to establish a failure to supervise and train ... amounting to a `policy' of indifference, there must be evidence from which a trier of fact could find a widespread pattern of misconduct by subordinate officers which he reasonably may be said to have disregarded. [15] Id. at 600 (footnote and citations omitted). In Fulwood, the appellees attached the following exhibits to their opposition for summary judgment: (1) a list of court judgments entered against the District for § 1983 claims or alleged torts by MPD officers from 1987-91; (2) a list of pending suits alleging misconduct by MPD officers; (3) portions of appellant's answers to interrogatories; (4) a written opinion of appellant's expert, the same Robert Klotz as in the case before us, that appellant's injuries were caused by improper procedures and excessive force and reflected a lack of officer training and supervision; (5) a press release describing the results of a survey of members of the D.C. Fraternal Order of Police concerning the adequacy of their training; and (6) results of a GAO study of police training concluding that there was great inconsistency in training of new officers. Id. at 596. We concluded in Fulwood that the evidence provided was insufficient to demonstrate a triable issue as to Chief Fulwood's deliberate indifference. Id. at 601-02. The court found that conclusory statements by the same expert, Mr. Klotz, that training deficiencies caused the use of excessive force by officers in that instance did not adequately explain the link between statistics presented in that case regarding judgments and pending suits against the District for false arrest and assault and Chief Fulwood's deliberate indifference. Id. at 602 (Klotz's opinion fails to provide a matrix within which inferences about Fulwood's culpability can reasonably drawn from the numerical data alone). In this case, as in Fulwood, the District provided the affidavit of its police chief attesting to the MPD's training policies on use of force, as well as statutes, regulations, and MPD policies regarding minimum and reasonable use of force. In this case, Gross' exhibits failed to provide evidence of an essential part of the claim, to show the widespread pattern of police misconduct that we said in Fulwood was necessary to establish a failure to supervise and train ... amounting to a `policy' of indifference. Id. at 600. In Fulwood, the court was concerned with the failure of the police expert to adequately explain or link the statistics on excessive use of force with the alleged failure to train or supervise or to offer any other proof to enable a factfinder to conclude that the number of suits and judgments against the District demonstrated negligent training and supervision, let alone a policy of deliberate indifference. Id. at 601. The same deficiency exists in this case. Moreover, in contrast to Fulwood, no statistical or other evidence was even presented here to establish a widespread pattern of police misconduct, but only conclusory assertions in this regard. In both this case and Fulwood, appellant also alleged that inefficiencies in the CCRB's processing of complaints of police misconduct created municipal liability on the part of the District. The court in Fulwood concluded that there was no basis for attributing defects in the CCRB's procedures to Chief Fulwood since the CCRB was an independent adjudicative body created by the Council of the District of Columbia, see 639 A.2d at 602-03, a disposition not applicable here where the District was the defendant. Appellant cites to Cox v. District of Columbia, 821 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C.1993), aff'd without opinion, 309 U.S.App. D.C. 219, 40 F.3d 475 (1994). In that case, involving a § 1983 claim against the District by a citizen who was assaulted by several MPD officers, the district court found that inadequacies in the District's system for disciplining MPD officers, particularly the known lengthy delays in the processing of CCRB complaints, amounted to a policy or custom of deliberate indifference to citizens' constitutional rights. See 821 F.Supp. at 12-17. The court's finding in Cox was based in large part on the extremely detailed statistical evidence presented in that case. Id. at 13-15 (contrasting the evidence presented to that in Carter v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S.App. D.C. 71, 795 F.2d 116 (1986), where the court upheld a directed verdict, concluding that complaints, pleadings and press clippings concerning use of excessive force and some testimony concerning specific instances of excessive force were insufficient to establish municipal liability). The court further found that the District's system of inadequate discipline caused the police officers' violation of Cox's constitutional rights. 821 F.Supp. at 19-20. In Cox, the police officer who played the largest role in the assault had been the subject of a prior CCRB complaint for false arrest and excessive force which was supported by an uncontradicted affidavit from the complainant. As of the time of the incident in Cox, approximately one year after the first CCRB complaint against the officer was filed, no action had yet been taken by the CCRB. Id. at 19. The court concluded that had the CCRB functioned properly, the police officer in question would likely have been terminated from the police force, and at the very least subjected to an investigation, before the Cox incident occurred. Id. In this case, by contrast, Gross presented no specific evidence regarding the CCRB backlog, but merely his expert's statement: That the use of the CCRB to evaluate complaints of excessive use of force and harassment was inefficient and ineffective. There was such a backlog of cases within the CCRB, that officers of the MPD knew that they would seldom be disciplined by the Department for acts of excessive force and abuse of power. In 1995, when the board was abolished, almost two-thirds of the cases were over two years old. Moreover, no evidence was offered that any officers involved in the alleged incident here had a history of citizens complaints or that their actions were otherwise affected by deficiencies in the CCRB process, nor does Gross in any other way explicitly relate the CCRB backlog to the alleged events of this case. Indeed, in general, even if Gross' expert could show that the District's training and supervision of its officers were so inadequately implemented as to constitute a policy of deliberate indifference, he provides no evidence to show that any deficiency in training [or supervision] actually caused the police officers' indifference to [Spears' rights]. Harris, 489 U.S. at 391, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (emphasis added). Where a plaintiff claims that the municipality has not directly inflicted an injury, but nonetheless has caused an employee to do so, rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied .... Board of County Comm'rs, supra, 520 U.S. at 405, 117 S.Ct. 1382. To prevent municipal liability for a ... decision from collapsing into respondeat superior liability, a court must carefully test the link between the policymaker's inadequate decision and the particular injury alleged. Id. at 410, 117 S.Ct. 1382. The expert's conclusory assertions, without any detailed explanation of the link in this case, or, e.g., reliance on studies demonstrating a link between deficiencies in training and supervision and constitutional violations by police officers generally, were insufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that the District had a policy of deliberate indifference to training or supervision of its police officers that actually caused the alleged brutality by the unknown officers in this case. Under the exacting standards established by the Supreme Court for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we conclude summary judgment was proper here.