Opinion ID: 2334569
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Owner's Claims

Text: Owner and Insurer agree that the trial court correctly found that Texas substantive law governs whether the trial court properly granted Insurer's motion for summary judgment based on a release contained in the proof of loss Owner signed. In substantive matters, Missouri follows the most significant relationship test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, section 188, in determining what law applies. Dillard v. Shaughnessy, Fickel & Scott Architects, Inc., 943 S.W.2d 711, 718 (Mo.App.1997). As to procedural matters, such as summary judgment standards, this Court applies Missouri procedural law. Id.
Appeals from summary judgment are essentially reviewed de novo. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). Summary judgment is only proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 74.04. The moving party's right to summary judgment differs depending on whether the moving party is a claimant or a defending party. ITT, 854 S.W.2d at 381. A claimant is one who seeks to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment. Rule 74.04(a). A defending party is one against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought. Rule 74.04(b). Insurer's motion for summary judgment addressed only claims Owner asserted against it. Therefore, for purpose of summary judgment, Insurer was a defending party. A defending party may establish a right to summary judgment by showing: (1) facts negating any one of the claimant's elements; (2) that the party opposing the motion has presented insufficient evidence to allow the finding of the existence of any one of the claimant's elements; or (3) that there is no genuine dispute as to the existence of each of the facts necessary to support a properly pleaded affirmative defense. ITT, 854 S.W.2d at 381.
Insurer relies on a release contained in the proof of loss Owner signed as an affirmative defense. The release stated: In consideration of such payment said Company is hereby discharged and forever released from any and all further claim, demand or liability whatsoever for said loss and damage, under the Policy herein referred to, repairs and/or replacements having been made to my entire satisfaction. Under Texas law, to release a claim, the releasing document must `mention' it. Memorial Medical Center of East Tex. v. Keszler, 943 S.W.2d 433, 434 (Tex.1997). In Keszler , a doctor signed a release in settlement of his suit against a hospital for disciplinary action taken against him. Id. In the release, the doctor and the hospital agreed that the doctor would release all claims related to [the doctor's] relationship with [the hospital]. Id. at 435. The Texas Supreme Court held that this release barred the doctor's later suit for fraud and negligence based on exposure to a toxic sterilizing agent the hospital used during his employment because those claims were related to his relationship with the hospital, and, therefore, mentioned in the release. Id. In this case, the release signed by Owner stated that Insurer is discharged and forever released from any and all further claim, demand or liability whatsoever for said loss and damage, under the Policy herein referred to, repairs and/or replacements having been made to my satisfaction. (Emphasis added). In light of the trial court's grant of summary judgment finding no material facts in issue, the said loss and damage language in the release appears to refer to the loss of the airplane. All of Owner's claims related to the incident that damaged its airplane and were, therefore, mentioned in the release contained in the proof of loss signed by Owner. By executing the release and accepting the $1.5 million in settlement funds, Owner relinquished any claims against Insurer arising out of, related to, or involving the incident that damaged Owner's airplane, including the claims of negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and bad faith. Owner argues that the release contained in the proof of loss signed by Owner was similar to the release in a Texas federal district court case, Vaughan v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co., 277 F.Supp.2d 682 (N.D.Tex.2003), in which the court held the release was not broad enough to cover the claims asserted. Regardless of the Texas federal district court's decision in Vaughan , the Texas Supreme Court is the ultimate authority on the interpretation and application of Texas law. See Tex. Const. art. V, sec. 3. This Court must follow the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Keszler in finding that Owner's claims were mentioned in the release. Owner voluntarily released these claims against Insurer, and Insurer is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Owner also argues that the trial court incorrectly applied a $50,000 credit, the settlement from Adjuster, when it calculated the damages due from Hauler. The trial court subtracted the Adjuster's settlement from the total jury award after apportioning the damages between Owner and Hauler according to the jury verdict. The proper method for calculating damages is first to deduct from the total damages the amount the plaintiff received from settling defendants and then to apportion the remaining damages between the plaintiff and non-settling defendants according to their respective percentages of fault. Jensen v. ARA Servs., Inc., 736 S.W.2d 374 (Mo. banc 1987). In this case, the trial court erred in subtracting the Adjuster's settlement from the total jury award after apportioning the damages. As a result, Owner's recovery was reduced by $15,000. The judgment of the trial court finding Owner's award to be $1,435,000 is reversed, and the case is remanded.