Opinion ID: 468842
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantive Limitations on Discretion:

Text: 13 The trial court determined that, standing alone, the general Immigration and Naturalization Service regulations regarding parole, 8 C.F.R. Sec. 212.5(d) (1985), created no liberty interest because these regulations presented fewer discretionary limitations than did the since-repealed Attorney General's Status Review Plan. That determination was not in error. But the court further determined that the President's open arms invitation, coupled with the creation of the special Cuban/Haitian Entrant (Status Pending) parole category, evidenced the existence of restrictions on the discretion of executive actors sufficient to constitute an actionable liberty interest in continued parole. This was error. 14 Appellees provide us with no precedent 5 or logical basis for the proposition that the President or one of his subordinates can, through written or oral public statements alone, create actionable liberty interests. 6 The long-range implications of such a holding would be both profound and dangerous. It is a hallmark of our system of government that certain rights and liberties are enshrined in the social compact. These guarantees may be expanded or contracted through any of several constitutionally provided-for processes. But to give countenance to the notion that one of the political branches can simply wave a magic wand and create (and by implication extinguish) constitutional rights would be to undo completely the notion of limited government through separated, checked and balanced powers. This is a step we decline to take. 15 Appellees also note the creation of a special parole category by the Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980: Cuban/Haitian Entrant (Status Pending). It is true that in a number of respects appellees were treated more generously than is normally the case with excludable aliens. But as the Supreme Court held in Dumschat, the mere fact that a wholly and expressly discretionary state privilege has been granted generously in the past does not prove the existence of a constitutional entitlement. Rather, the basis for such claim must be found in statutes or other rules defining the obligations of the authority charged with exercising clemency. 452 U.S. at 465, 101 S.Ct. at 2464. Justice Brennan has suggested that a party must show by reference to statute, regulation, administrative practice, contractual arrangement or other mutual understanding--that particularized standards or criteria guide the State's decisionmakers. The structure of the State's decisionmaking process is thus as significant as the likely result of that process. [Parties must show] that the [agency] is required to base its decisions on objective and defined criteria. Id. at 467, 101 S.Ct. at 2465 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted; emphasis in original). 16 The special treatment that the appellees received will not support a due process claim unless they can point to substantive limitations on official discretion or particularized standards or criteria [to] guide the State's decisionmakers, Olim, 461 U.S. at 249, 103 S.Ct. at 1747, in making parole decisions. The record here is simply barren of such evidence. Congress declined to adopt any special legislation of the sort Olim contemplates, and the language of the 1980 Act can in no way be read to set in place the fetters on discretion that must be evident. The 1980 Act did create a special status for appellees, but only for the purpose of providing social welfare benefits. The Act clearly states that the President shall exercise authorities with respect to Cuban and Haitian entrants which are identical to the authorities which are exercised under chapter 2 of title IV of the Immigration and Nationality Act [section 1521 et seq. of this title]. 1980 Act, Title V Sec. 501(a)(1) (brackets in original). The purpose of chapter 2 is to provide welfare, medical, educational, and other benefits designed to aid in resettlement, not to effect parole. See also 1980 Act, Title V Sec. 501(b), (c)(1)(A). 17 The 1980 Act is devoid of language that in any way modifies the usual rules regarding parole determinations set forth at 8 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1182 (1985). There is no question but that the Mariels were paroled under the general alien parole statute, 8 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1182(d)(5), and were thus treated no differently than any other aliens. Nor has the Justice Department or the Immigration and Naturalization Service promulgated any special rules or regulations. This case is simply not distinguishable from the holding of Dumschat. There is no nonconstitutionally-based liberty interest of the sort described in Olim at stake here that obtains for either the First or Second Group.