Opinion ID: 1133414
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trial court's refusal of defendant's proposed instructions

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give the jury several special instructions defendant had requested. We discuss each of these below. Special instruction D and special instruction E would have precluded the jury from considering as aggravating evidence the facts supporting the murder conviction and the special-circumstance findings unless those facts established something in addition to the elements of the crime or the special circumstance. According to defendant, without these instructions he was subjected to an arbitrary, capricious, death-biased, and unreviewable process in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. We find no error. [S]ection 190.3, factor (a), specifically permits the jury to consider at the penalty phase `[t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true....' As we have held, the trial court need not give a ` clarifying gloss' on factor (a) ` to inform the jury that its penalty determination must not be based on facts that are `common to all homicides. [Citation.] The argument to the contrary reveals `a basic misunderstanding of the statutory scheme since, in order to perform its moral evaluation of whether death was the appropriate penalty, the facts of the murder cannot comprehensively be withdrawn from the jury's consideration....' [Citation.] ( People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 965-966, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 897 P.2d 574.) In addition, there is no constitutional requirement that in considering the aggravating circumstances of a capital crime, the penalty phase jury must factor out those constituent parts common to all first degree premeditated or felony murders. ( Id. at p. 966, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 897 P.2d 574; accord, People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 164, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 954 P.2d 990 [rejecting the argument that double counting of facts common to all first degree murders as facts in aggravation precludes any meaningful distinction between those who are sentenced to death and those who are not].) The same is true with regard to facts establishing the special circumstances. In this case, however, the trial court did instruct the jury to factor out the elements of the capital offense when considering it as an aggravating circumstance. The trial court's instructions included CALJIC No. 8.88 (1989 rev.), which in relevant part told the jury: An aggravating factor is any fact, condition or event attending the commission of a crime which increases its guilt or enormity, or adds to its injurious consequences which is above and beyond the elements of the crime itself. Defendant's requested special instructions D and E would have been duplicative of this instruction. Special instruction F would have directed the jury's attention to the particular mitigating evidence defendant presented in this case. [14] We have previously held that instructions such as this are both argumentative and duplicative of the standard jury instruction directing consideration of factors in mitigation and aggravation (see CALJIC No. 8.85), and thus need not be given. ( People v. Musselwhite, supra, 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1269-1270, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475; People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 648, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160.) Special instruction I would have told the jury that the law of this state does not place any specific weight or numerical value on any particular aggravating or mitigating circumstance. It also stated that [o]ne mitigating circumstance may be sufficient to support a decision that death is not the appropriate punishment in this case and that [t]he weight you each give to any factor is for you individually to decide. Special instruction S read: The choice you make is not simply between good and bad, but between the punishment of life imprisonment without possibility of parole and death. To vote for a death sentence it is not enough to find more bad than good about Ricky Lee Earp. Rather, you must be persuaded that the unfavorable evidence is so substantial in comparison with the favorable that it warrants death instead of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. You are permitted to return a verdict for death only if you conclude that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating so substantially that a death sentence is justified and appropriate under all the circumstances. In such a case, you are permitted to return a verdict for death, but you are not required to do so. [Â] But if you conclude that the mitigating factors are equal to or outweigh the aggravating, you must return a verdict for confinement in the state prison for life without possibility of parole. Both the People and Ricky Lee Earp are entitled to the individual opinion of each juror. Each of you must decide the matter for yourself, after a full discussion of the evidence and instructions with the other members of the jury. Special instructions I and S were both properly rejected as duplicating aspects of the trial court's comprehensive instruction (CALJIC No. 8.88 (1989 rev.)) on weighing aggravating and mitigating evidence and deciding on the appropriate penalty. That instruction in relevant part told the jury: The weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances does not mean a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale, or the arbitrary assignment of weights to any of them. [Â] You are free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider. In weighing the various circumstances you determine under the relevant evidence which penalty is justified and appropriate by considering the totality of the aggravating circumstances with the totality of the mitigating circumstances. To return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole. Defendant's special instructions I and S also duplicated the trial court's advisement that [t]he People and the defendant are entitled to the individual opinion of each juror. (CALJIC No. 17.40 (1988 rev.).) A trial court need not give duplicative instructions. (See People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 314, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 793, 949 P.2d 890; People v. Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th 997, 1068, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388.) In addition, special instruction I was argumentative because it would have advised the jury that a single mitigating circumstance can be dispositive of penalty without stating the same as to a single aggravating circumstance. ( People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d 612, 697, 286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84.) The trial court did not err in declining to give these special instructions. In special instruction T, defendant asked the trial court to instruct that each juror individually bears the ultimate moral responsibility to determine the appropriate penalty.... The trial court properly declined this proposed instruction, which was argumentative and also duplicated the advisement in CALJIC 17.40 that each juror was to form an individual opinion. Also properly rejected was special instruction Y, which stated: The law does not have a preference for the punishment of death, but rather leaves it entirely up to you based upon the instructions I have given you, to determine which penalty is appropriate. A correct statement of the sentencing standard under California law is that our law expresses no preference as to the appropriate punishment. ( People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 852, 64 Cal. Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2; People v. Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d 577, 643, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376.) Therefore, by stating that the law does not have a preference for the punishment of death without also stating that it has no preference for the punishment of life without possibility of parole, special instruction Y was misleading and argumentative. (See People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d 612, 697, 286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84.) Special instruction V would have told the jury that the sentence of life in prison without parole means exactly what the words state, and that, if imposed, would require defendant to be confined in the state prison for his natural life without the possibility of parole. We have held that such instruction is inaccurate: `It is ... incorrect to tell the jury the penalty of death or life without possibility of parole will inexorably be carried out....' ( People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d 612, 701, 286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84; accord, People v. Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th 997, 1069, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388.) Defendant also contends that he was denied his rights under the federal Constitution's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments when the trial court refused to instruct the jury to consider as a factor in mitigation any lingering doubt about defendant's guilt of the capital crime. There is no constitutional entitlement to instructions on lingering doubt. ( Franklin v. Lynaugh (1988) 487 U.S. 164, 173-174, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155; People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th 894, 1027, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183; People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1252, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1.) This is not to say that the jury's consideration of any such doubt is improper; the defendant may urge his possible innocence to the jury as a factor in mitigation. ( People v. Johnson, supra, at p. 1252, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1.) Instructions directing the jury to consider the circumstances of the crime ( 190.3, factor (a)) and any other circumstance that extenuates the gravity of the crime ( id., factor (k)) necessarily encompass the concept of lingering doubt, and thus render any special instruction on the concept unnecessary. ( People v. Frye, supra, at p. 1027, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183; People v. Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th 997, 1068, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388.) Here, the question of lingering doubt was properly put before the penalty phase jury when defense counsel argued that jurors should consider whether they were absolutely certain that defendant killed 18-month-old Amanda. There was no error.