Opinion ID: 852114
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statements of Prosecutor

Text: Cain’s second claim is that the prosecutor’s closing argument during the sentencing phase of his trial was improper. (Appellant’s Br. at 25–28.) When a prosecutor is alleged to have made an improper argument at either the guilt or penalty phase of a trial, the defendant should request an admonishment from the trial court. Cooper, 854 N.E.2d at 835. If the defendant believes the admonishment to be insufficient, he should move for a mistrial. Id. When the claim of prosecutorial misconduct has been properly preserved through this procedure, we examine it in two steps. ―[W]e determine (1) whether the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, and if so, (2) whether the misconduct, under all of the circumstances, placed the defendant in a position of grave peril to which he or she would not have been subjected.‖ Id. Cain neither objected nor requested an admonishment, nor moved for a mistrial. He may obtain review and relief only if his claim qualifies as fundamental error, meaning a ―clearly blatant violation[] of basic and elementary principles,‖ that if left uncorrected ―would deny a defendant fundamental due process.‖ Warriner v. State, 435 N.E.2d 562, 563 (Ind. 1982). There must be ―an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.‖ Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ind. 2002). Such was not the case here. Cain challenges a portion of the prosecutor’s closing argument in which she mentions term-of-years sentences and how they are impacted by policies that reduce sentences when prisoners at the Department of Corrections participate in education and other programs: Oh, yes, let’s not forget how the Department of Corrections has a way of finding reasons to cut the time down. They are over-crowded, you know. And they get to make a lot of their own little rules. We start with fifty percent and they get to cut it down. Now people that are convicted of murder are pretty much on the bottom of their list to give ʼem deals. But they have a lot of power to do that, unless you sentence Jeff Cain to life without parole. 10 (Tr. at 766.) In the penalty phase of a case in which life without parole is sought, the jury’s process is strictly limited by Section 35-50-2-9. The Code assigns jurors the task of determining whether the alleged aggravating circumstances are proven and authorizes them to recommend life if they find that those circumstances outweigh any potential mitigating circumstances. Ind. Code § 3550-2-9; Cooper, 854 N.E.2d at 840. It is misconduct for a prosecutor to ask the jury to return a recommendation of life without parole for anything other than the weighing test of Section 3550-2-9. Cooper, 854 N.E.2d at 841. The prosecutor was correct that there are multiple grounds for sentencing credit available to offenders serving fixed terms. See, e.g., Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3.3 (2008 & Supp. 2010). Indiana’s prison population ballooned by over forty percent between 2000 and 2008, and projects to increase by another twenty-one percent between 2010 and 2017.15 A necessary response to this challenge—and one consistent with the reformative goal of our criminal justice system—has been legislation creating and offering treatment and education programs for offenders in exchange for additional sentence reductions.16 Inaccurate as the prosecutor’s portrayal of these programs was, it seems apparent that the level of intentionality in Cain’s conduct (that being the charged aggravator) was very high. We 15 Justice Center, The Council of State Governments, Justice Reinvestment in Indiana: Summary Report & Policy Framework 3 (2010), http://www.justicereinvestment.org/states/indiana (select ―Publications & Maps‖ tab; then select ―Download the Report‖ hyperlink). 16 The sad irony is some of these opportunities are relatively more accessible to offenders convicted of major crimes than those convicted of relatively minor offenses. See id. at 11. For example, class D felons are imprisoned for an average of eight months. However, admittance to the Therapeutic Communities program (which provides prison-based treatment plans for substance abuse and mental health disorders) is restricted to those offenders with between fourteen and thirty-six months remaining on their sentence, and the program is twelve months in duration. Id. On the other hand, the prosecutor was completely wrong to declare that these chances for additional credit time are the product of DOC’s ―own little rules.‖ 11 conclude that this single paragraph in a closing argument that ran to over seven pages of transcript was not fundamental error.