Opinion ID: 1264813
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court Correctly Denied Barnett's Motion to Dismiss.

Text: In ruling on the motion to dismiss, the district court found that the immunity agreement was rendered null and void once the state determined soon after the execution of the agreement that Barnett had been untruthful to the investigators. [1] The district court also found that the immunity agreement had been superseded by the parties' Rule 11 plea agreement; and thus the court declined to hold a hearing on whether the immunity agreement had been breached by either party. Concluding that the state was no longer bound by the immunity agreement, the district court denied Barnett's motion to enforce the agreement and dismiss the murder charge. The decision whether to grant or deny the motion to dismiss was dependent upon the district court's interpretation of the agreement between the defendant and the government and whether that agreement was violated. See United States v. Plummer, 941 F.2d 799, 803 (9th Cir.1991). Therefore, the standard of review of the district court's denial of the motion is the same as in civil contract cases. Id. The interpretation of a contract's meaning and legal effect are questions of law to be decided by the Court if the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous. City of Idaho Falls v. Home Indemnity Co., 126 Idaho 604, 888 P.2d 383 (1995). The meaning of an unambiguous contract and the intent of the parties must be determined from the plain meaning of the contract's own words. Id. Where a contract is determined to be ambiguous, interpretation of it is a question of fact that focuses on the intent of the parties. Ada County Assessor v. Taylor, 124 Idaho 550, 861 P.2d 1215 (1993). Whether the facts establish a violation of the contract is a question of law reviewed de novo. United States v. Plummer, supra . We summarize Barnett's issues on appeal relating to the immunity agreement. Barnett argues that the immunity agreement is still in effect because it has not been declared null and void by the state. He claims that the state improperly filed a murder charge against him in contravention of the agreement; consequently, he claims that he was entitled to a dismissal of the murder charge and enforcement of the terms of the immunity agreement. This argument simply is not supported by the facts in the case. Immediately after the immunity agreement was executed, the prosecutor informed defense counsel that the authorities had determined that Barnett was untruthful. This declaration by the state was within the immunity agreement and, at no time, did Barnett challenge this determination. It is clear also that the prosecutor, within about a week, filed an information charging Barnett with first degree murder, demonstrating the state's intent not to be bound by the agreement that would have permitted the state to file only a charge of voluntary manslaughter. After the information was filed, Barnett did not move to enforce the immunity agreement, implicitly recognizing that the agreement was no longer binding on the parties. Then, Barnett entered into a plea agreement to an amended charged of second degree kidnaping. Again Barnett did not assert the immunity agreement, demonstrating further that he did not expect that the immunity agreement had any continuing force or effect. Finally, when the plea agreement was rejected by the district court, Barnett followed the terms of the plea agreement rather than the immunity agreement and returned to the magistrate division for a preliminary hearing as provided by the plea agreement. All of this conduct demonstrates that Barnett intended or recognized that the immunity agreement no longer existed or was enforceable but that it had been, in effect, declared null and void by the state. We hold the immunity agreement invalid as a matter of law and not viable as a basis for Barnett to assert a right to a maximum charge of voluntary manslaughter in connection with the death of Jeffrey Towers. The district court's order denying the motion to dismiss, which relied on this conclusion, is hereby affirmed.