Opinion ID: 1809453
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the special chancellor erred in denying the award of attorneys' fees.

Text: ¶ 68. O'Quinn argues on cross-appeal that the special chancellor erred in denying to award any attorneys' fees. O'Quinn states that the attorneys' fees are shown to be $42,473.64. [4] O'Quinn alleges that when Mr. Tolliver ceased to act as a conservator and assumed the role of the chancellor and court, he became liable in both his personal and professional capacity not only for the unauthorized amount withdrawn, but also for the cost of attorney's fees in rectifying the situation. To award anything less results in an unjust enrichment to Mr. Tolliver at the expense of the ward. ¶ 69. The special chancellor's decision denied the award of all attorneys' fees. Whether to award attorney's fees rests entirely within the discretion of the trial court. A trial court's decision on attorney's fees is subject to the abuse of discretion reviewed (citations omitted) ... It is well-settled that attorney's fees are not to be awarded unless the state or other authority so provides. Sentinel, 743 So.2d at 971. Unless the chancellor is manifestly wrong, his decision regarding attorney's fees will not be disturbed on appeal. Absent an abuse of discretion, the chancellor's decision in such matters will generally be upheld. Zeman v. Stanford, 789 So.2d 798, 806 (Miss.2001) (citations omitted). ¶ 70. We find that O'Quinn has failed to meet the abuse of discretion standard regarding the trial court's specific decision to not award attorney's fees. Therefore, this issue is without merit.