Opinion ID: 1463044
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hate Crime Motivation

Text: When imposing a sentence, the district court must begin by correctly calculating the applicable guidelines range. United States v. Foster, 514 F.3d 821, 823-24 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting Gall v. United States, ___ U.S. ____, 128 S.Ct. 586, 596, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007)). Under the guidelines, the defendant's offense level must be increased by three levels [i]f the finder of fact at trial . . . determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally selected any victim or any property as the object of the offense of conviction because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any person. . . . United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 3A1.1(a). We review the district court's application of the sentencing guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Foster, 514 F.3d at 823-24. Because the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Weems and Mitchell selected the victim because of his race, the district court should have applied the three-level enhancement when calculating the correct guidelines range. See United States v. Pospisil, 186 F.3d 1023, 1031 (8th Cir. 1999) (the jury's finding provided sufficient basis to impose enhancement). Applying the hate crime motivation enhancement for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241 is not duplicative because the race of the victim is not an element of § 241, and it is not incorporated in the applicable base offense level. See U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1(a); United States v. McDermott, 29 F.3d 404, 411 (8th Cir.1994). Moreover, the district court applied the hate crime motivation enhancement to Baird, who pleaded guilty to violating § 241. Thus, the district court erred by not applying the enhancement when it calculated the applicable guidelines ranges for Weems and Mitchell. A nonharmless error in the calculation of the applicable guidelines range requires a reviewing court to vacate the sentence and remand the case for resentencing. See United States v. Icaza, 492 F.3d 967, 970 (8th Cir.2007). In this case, the district court's error was not harmless. The guidelines range that results after applying the three-level enhancement is higher than the guidelines range used by the district court. See United States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1017 (8th Cir.2005) (noting that an error in calculating the applicable guidelines range would be harmless if the sentence imposed by the district court fell within both the correct and incorrect guidelines ranges). Additionally, the district court noted at sentencing that it intended to sentence the defendants within the applicable guidelines range because it did not see any reason to grant downward departures. Tr. 600-03. Weems and Mitchell assert that it is unreasonable to increase their offense levels for hate crime motivation because their coconspirator, Baird, was given a lesser sentence than what they face, even though Baird was allegedly responsible for many of the significant steps in building and burning the cross. This argument, however, ignores the fact that coconspirators can receive different sentences if, inter alia, they are eligible for offense level reductions for substantial assistance and acceptance of responsibility. See United States v. Ball, 499 F.3d 890, 900 (8th Cir. 2007). Baird entered a guilty plea and received reductions in his offense level for acceptance of responsibility and cooperation with the government. Thus, the fact that the defendants face higher guidelines ranges than the sentencing range Baird faced does not make application of the enhancement for hate crime motivation unreasonable.