Opinion ID: 740573
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Procedure for return

Text: 36 The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state shall deprive any person of ... property, without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment places procedural constraints on the actions of government that work a deprivation of interests enjoying the status of 'property' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9, 98 S.Ct. 1554, 1560, 56 L.Ed.2d 30 (1978). Those procedural constraints require that the property's owner be given notice and an 'opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'  Schneider v. County of San Diego, 28 F.3d 89, 92 (9th Cir.1994) (as amended) (quoting Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 261, 107 S.Ct. 1740, 1747, 95 L.Ed.2d 239 (1987)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1155, 115 S.Ct. 1112, 130 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1995). Although Perkins regained his property more than a year later, even a temporary, nonfinal deprivation of property is nonetheless a 'deprivation' in the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 85, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 1996, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972). 37 Procedural due process generally requires a hearing prior to deprivation, but a limited number of extraordinary situations justify postponing notice and the opportunity for a hearing until after the seizure of the property. Id. at 90-91, 92 S.Ct. at 1999-2000. Those situations involve seizures that are necessary to an important public interest; present a special need for prompt action; and utilize legitimate force which the government strictly controls. Id. at 91, 92 S.Ct. at 2000. There is thus no requirement of a prior hearing before the seizure of possessions under a search warrant: 38 First, a search warrant is generally issued to serve a highly important governmental need--e.g., the apprehension and conviction of criminals--rather than the mere private advantage of a private party in an economic transaction. Second, a search warrant is generally issued in situations demanding prompt action. The danger is all too obvious that a criminal will destroy or hide evidence of fruits of his crime if given any prior notice. Third, the Fourth Amendment guarantees that the State will not issue search warrants merely upon the conclusory application of a private party. It guarantees that the State will not abdicate control over the issuance of warrants and that no warrant will be issued without a prior showing of probable cause. 39 Id. at 93-94 n. 30, 92 S.Ct. at 2001 n. 30. In such situations, 40 either the necessity of quick action by the State or the impracticality of providing any meaningful predeprivation process, when coupled with the availability of some meaningful means by which to assess the propriety of the State's action at some time after the initial taking ... satisf[ies] the requirements of procedural due process. 41 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1915, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). 42 The city claims that the California Penal Code affords adequate post-deprivation process. Section 1536 of the Code provides: 43 [A]ll property or things taken on a warrant must be retained by the officer in his custody, subject to the order of the court to which he is required to return the proceedings before him, or of any other court in which the offense in respect to which the property or things taken is triable. 44 Case law clearly establishes that both during and after the pendency of a criminal action, section 1536 empowers the court to entertain a summary proceeding by 'nonstatutory' motion, for the release of property seized under a search warrant. People v. Icenogle, 164 Cal.App.3d 620, 210 Cal.Rptr. 575, 577 (1985). (In this case, the motion filed by the city to obtain the release of Perkins' property was such a nonstatutory motion, citing § 1536.) Officers seizing property do so on behalf of the court for use in a judicial proceeding, and they must respond to court orders to release the property. Id. The officers have no right in the property or in its possession, and have no authority over it except as the court may order. Oziel v. Superior Court, 223 Cal.App.3d 1284, 273 Cal.Rptr. 196, 201-02 (1990). 45 Perkins argues that a nonstatutory motion under § 1536 was not an adequate remedy. He claims his money could not have been released, because it was never introduced into evidence in a criminal case. The court has control over seized property, however, even when as in this case, the property is never used in the underlying criminal proceeding:  '[E]ven as to property not yet offered or received in evidence ... judicial control still exists.'  Id. (quoting Gershenhorn v. Superior Court, 227 Cal.App.2d 361, 38 Cal.Rptr. 576, 579 (1964)). California Penal Code § 1540 provides: 46 PROPERTY, WHEN TO BE RESTORED FROM PERSON FROM WHOM IT WAS TAKEN. If it appears that the property taken is not the same as that described in the warrant, or that there is no probable cause for believing the existence of the grounds on which the warrant was issued, the magistrate must cause it to be restored to the person from whom it was taken. 47 Because one may secure a determination whether the property should be returned immediately after the seizure ... under section[ ] ... 1540 of the Penal Code, this and other remedies such as mandamus satisfy the requirements of due process.... The purpose of section[ ] 1540 is to provide one whose property is seized with a speedy remedy in a readily accessible court. Aday v. Superior Court, 55 Cal.2d 789, 13 Cal.Rptr. 415, 421-22, 362 P.2d 47, 53-54 (1961). A motion to return is expressly authorized under the statute, Gershenhorn, 38 Cal.Rptr. at 578, and [t]he determination may be had in advance of the trial of the criminal action which ordinarily follows the seizure. People v. Bonanza Printing Co., 271 Cal.App.2d Supp. 871, 76 Cal.Rptr. 379, 381 (1969). This motion is separate from a nonstatutory motion under § 1536. Buker v. Superior Court, 25 Cal.App.3d 1085, 102 Cal.Rptr. 494, 497 (1972). 48 Perkins thus had available to him postdeprivation procedure for the return of his property--a nonstatutory motion under § 1536, and a § 1540 motion. We agree with the California Supreme Court that [t]hese various remedies satisfy the requirements of due process. Aday, 13 Cal.Rptr. at 422, 362 P.2d at 54.