Opinion ID: 77376
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Burden of Establishing Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Text: 10 The CAFA authorizes removal of a class action in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1446, 3 without regard to whether any defendant is a citizen of the State in which the action is brought, except that such action may be removed by any defendant without the consent of all defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b). A class action includes a civil action which, like Miedema's, is filed under a State . . . rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more representative persons as a class action. Id. § 1332(d)(1). Under CAFA, federal courts [] have original jurisdiction over class actions in which the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000 and there is minimal diversity (at least one plaintiff and one defendant are from different states). Evans, 449 F.3d at 1163, 2006 WL 1374688, at  (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)). 4 11 Maytag contends that the district court, in evaluating Miedema's motion to remand, erred by applying the traditional rule that the removing defendant bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Maytag concedes [t]he text of CAFA does not address which party has the burden of proof in establishing federal jurisdiction when a class action is removed to federal court, but argues the legislative history expresses a clear intent to require that an objecting plaintiff demonstrate removal was improvident, i.e., that all applicable jurisdictional requirements were not met. Specifically, Maytag points to language in the Senate Committee Report: 12 If a purported class action is removed pursuant to these jurisdictional provisions, the named plaintiff(s) should bear the burden of demonstrating that the removal was improvident (i.e., that the applicable jurisdictional requirements are not satisfied). And if a federal court is uncertain about whether all matters in controversy in a purported class action do not in the aggregate exceed the sum or value of $5,000,000, the court should err in favor of exercising jurisdiction over the case. 13 S.Rep. No. 109-14, at 42 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 40; see also 151 Cong. Rec. H723, H727 (2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (If a purported class action is removed under these jurisdictional provisions, the named plaintiff(s) should bear the burden of demonstrating that removal was improper. And if a federal court is uncertain about whether the $5 million threshold is satisfied, the court should err in favor of exercising jurisdiction over the case.). Thus, Maytag concludes, the district court should have placed the burden on Miedema to prove that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking. 14 We disagree. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have, in detailed opinions, rejected the very kind of argument Maytag now presents. See Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that CAFA's naked legislative history does not alter the well established rule that a proponent of subject matter jurisdiction bears the burden of persuasion on the amount in controversy); Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 686 (9th Cir.2006) (per curiam) (CAFA's silence, coupled with a sentence in a legislative committee report untethered to any statutory language, does not alter the longstanding rule that the party seeking federal jurisdiction on removal bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction.). In Evans —which was decided after the instant case was fully briefed-this Circuit agreed with the Seventh and Ninth Circuits that CAFA does not upset the traditional rule that the removing party bears the burden of proof with regard to establishing federal court jurisdiction. 449 F.3d at 1164, 2006 WL 1374688, at . Moreover, this Circuit previously explained that, `[w]hile a committee report may ordinarily be used to interpret unclear language contained in a statute, a committee report cannot serve as an independent statutory source having the force of law.' United States v. Thigpen, 4 F.3d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir.1993) (en banc) (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local Union No. 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 712 (D.C.Cir.1987)); cf. Rural Electrification Admin. v. Cent. La. Elec. Co., 354 F.2d 859, 865 (5th Cir.1966) (Certainly, the demands of Congressional Committees do not have the force of law.). Thus, `courts have no authority to enforce principles gleaned solely from legislative history that has no statutory reference point.' Thigpen, 4 F.3d at 1577 (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 814 F.2d at 712). 5 15 For similar reasons, we also reject Maytag's argument, based on the legislative history described above, that the district court should have resolved any doubts about the amount in controversy in favor of finding jurisdiction. As with the burden of proof, CAFA itself is silent on the matter. The rule of construing removal statutes strictly and resolving doubts in favor of remand, however, is well-established. See, e.g., Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108, 61 S.Ct. 868, 872, 85 L.Ed. 1214 (1941) ([T]he policy of the successive acts of Congress regulating the jurisdiction of federal courts is one calling for the strict construction of [removal statutes].); Syngenta Crop. Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32, 123 S.Ct. 366, 369, 154 L.Ed.2d 368 (2002) ([S]tatutory procedures for removal are to be strictly construed.); Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir.1994) ([R]emoval statutes are construed narrowly; where plaintiff and defendant clash about jurisdiction, uncertainties are resolved in favor of remand.); Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411 (11th Cir. 1999) ([A]ll doubts about jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court.). Statements in CAFA's legislative history, standing alone, are a insufficient basis for departing from this well-established rule. See Thigpen, 4 F.3d at 1577; cf. Abrego, 443 F.3d at 686; Brill, 427 F.3d at 448. 16 Maytag contends that adherence to these well-established rules runs contrary to one of the overriding purposes of CAFA, which Maytag characterizes as fix[ing] the flaw in 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and throw[ing] open the doors of the federal judiciary to defendants who are sued in state court class actions. 6 While the text of CAFA plainly expands federal jurisdiction over class actions and facilitates their removal, [w]e presume that Congress legislates against the backdrop of established principles of state and federal common law, and that when it wishes to deviate from deeply rooted principles, it will say so. United States v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 345 F.3d 866, 900 (11th Cir.2003); see White v. Mercury Marine, Div. of Brunswick, Inc., 129 F.3d 1428, 1434-35 (11th Cir.1997) (Congress is assumed to act with the knowledge of existing law and interpretations when it passes new legislation.). For example, Congress inserted language into CAFA that clearly suspends the well-established rule of unanimity 7 for purposes of class action removals. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (stating that a class action may be removed by any defendant without the consent of all defendants); Abrego Abrego, 443 F.3d at 681 (noting that § 1453 overrides the judicially developed requirement that each defendant consent to removal). Likewise, Congress expressly imposed a special rule of construction on CAFA's provisions requiring that certain state and federal officials be notified of proposed class action settlements. See 28 U.S.C. § 1715(f) (Nothing in this section shall be construed to expand the authority of, or impose any obligations, duties, or responsibilities upon, Federal or State officials.). Thus, Maytag's generalized appeals to CAFA's overriding purpose are unavailing in the face of CAFA's silence on the traditional, well-established rules that govern the placement of the burden of proof and the resolution of doubts in favor of remand. 8 17 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district court did not err by placing the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction on Maytag, or by invoking the rule that doubts are to be resolved in favor of remand.