Opinion ID: 1220467
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: law of plain error

Text: Since no objections were made to the supplemental instructions given by the trial court in response to the jury's questions during deliberations, this case must be decided under the plain error doctrine. Rule 49, W.R.Cr.P. We frequently have had the occasion to consider the plain error doctrine which requires the application of a three-part test: `   First, the record must be clear as to the incident which is alleged as error. Second, the party claiming that the error amounted to plain error must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated. Finally, that party must prove that a substantial right has been denied him and as a result he has been materially prejudiced.   ' Auclair v. State, Wyo., 660 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 909, 104 S.Ct. 265, 78 L.Ed.2d 249 (quoting Bradley v. State, Wyo., 635 P.2d 1161, 1164 (1981)). See Browder v. State, Wyo., 639 P.2d 889 (1982). Larsen v. State, Wyo., 686 P.2d 583, 584 (1984). Here, the focus of the inquiry involves the jury's questions and the trial court's reaction to the inquiries, and the record is clear as to that dialogue. The second prong of the test also is met in this case. The answer to the first jury question constituted a violation of a clear rule of law; however, the corrective action taken by the trial court in its answer to the second question cured any denial of a substantial right, and no prejudice resulted. Accordingly, appellant cannot succeed under the plain error doctrine. Appellant argues that the answer to question one, Does the presence of weapon in hand constitute a threat to use it? should have been no. Appellant argues further that the trial court's response, in effect, informed the jury that they could find a constructive threat, and that the instruction eviscerated the plain language of the charged statute which states that threatens to use is an element of the offense. Quite correctly, appellant observes that this court has not had the occasion to construe the words threatens to use in § 6-2-502(a)(iii). We will take that opportunity in this appeal. In contending that threatens to use requires an actual threat not a constructive threat, appellant cites several cases and authorities: In State v. Hentz, 663 P.2d 476 (Wash. 1983), the Washington Supreme Court construed the words threatens to use' by giving it a plain and ordinary meaning. Hentz at 477. The Court reasoned that `[p]ointing a gun at someone is clearly use of that weapon, whereas threat is defined as the expression of an intention to inflict injury.' Hentz at 478. In United States v. Baish, 460 A.2d 38 (D.C.App. 1983), the D.C. Appeals Court construed the word threatens. It stated `that a person threatens when she utters words, which are intended to convey her desire to inflict physical or other harm on any person or on property and these words are communicated to someone.' Baish at 42. See also, State v. Keller, 199 S.E. 620 (N.C. 1938). In WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1228 (9th ed. 1984), threaten is defined as `to utter threats against or    to give signs of warning of.' Use is defined as the `act or practice of employing something.' WEBSTER'S at 1299. In BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1327 (5th ed. 1979), threat is defined as a `communicated intent to inflict physical or other harm on any person or on property.' Use is defined as an `[a]ct of employing everything, or state of being employed;   ' BLACK'S at 1382. We find appellant's authority on actual threat to be persuasive. We agree and we hold that the phrase threatens to use in § 6-2-502(a)(iii), W.S. 1977 (Cum. Supp. 1986), requires proof of an actual threat of physical injury during the act of employing a deadly weapon. It was error for the trial judge to insinuate in his answer to the question that factual circumstances would govern in determining if the (mere) presence of a weapon in hand could constitute a threat to use. It cannot. Proof of a required ingredient of an element of a criminal offense to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt cannot be aided by such an inference, presumption or insinuation of the kind contained in the trial court's reply. Reversal of the conviction, however on the basis of this error is indicated only it all three prongs of the Larsen test are met. The trial court's answer to the second question removed all possibility of taint and prejudice possibly occasioned in the answer to the first question. Accordingly, when reading all the instructions together, as required by Cullin v. State, Wyo., 565 P.2d 445 (1971) and Horn v. State, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1141 (1976), the jury adequately and properly was informed of the essential law of the case. Were it not for the saving effect of the trial judge's second instruction, this court might well find the necessary prejudice to reverse appellant's conviction. Drawing upon the axiom that words in statutes are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning, Keller v. State, Wyo., 723 P.2d 1244, 1246 (1986), the trial judge instructed the jury in the form of a dictionary definition of the term threat directly in response to the second jury entreaty to do so. After lengthy colloquy between the trial court and counsel grappling with the proper way to handle the jury's inquiry, the trial court without objection answered: A threat is an expression of an intention to inflict pain, injury, or punishment. It may be expressed by words or acts, or a combination of words and acts. Considering all of the circumstances of the case, you must decide whether the defendant's words and acts amounted to an express or implied statement of his intention to use a drawn deadly weapon to inflict pain, injury, or punishment. We hold that this definition of threat is a proper statement of the law of aggravated assault and battery in the State of Wyoming. We also find, as a corollary ruling, that this second instruction mitigates any error or prejudice occasioned by the giving of the first instruction. Furthermore, we have said that    for an error to be regarded as harmful `   there must be a reasonable possibility that in the absence of the error the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant.'    Nimmo v. State, Wyo., 603 P.2d 386, 395 (1979). Concededly, whether prejudice resulted and whether the verdict would have been different are extremely difficult matters of proof  for we cannot divine the course of discussions during jury deliberations. Yet, in this case, we have some remarkable insights into the jury's thought processes in the context of the the issues surrounding the implications of the threat ingredient. Their very questions reveal a great deal about their struggle over the meaning of the term threat as it applied to this particular fact situation. From this window into the minds of the jurors, it is clear that whatever efficacy or prejudice occasioned by the trial judge's answer to their first question, the struggle over the threat issue resurfaced in the second question. Apparently, not satisfied that the first answer resolved their dilemma, the jury again focused on the threat issue. As if objecting themselves to the trial court's attempt to resolve the issue in the answer to the first question, the jury returned to the subject, essentially advising the court that the first answer was insufficient and entreatied more assistance in dealing with the thorny threat issue. It appears the jury was saying, (but judge,) Is threaten to use a weapon the same as threatened with a weapon? At this point, the judge answered the question directly and as we have held, correctly. The guilty verdict ensued. Any prejudice resultant from the first dialogue was removed by the proper and thorough instruction on the identical focus of inquiry in the second dialogue. The prophylactic effect of the second instruction discounts any reasonable possibility that the jury reached a guilty verdict on account of the first erroneous instruction. As a result, no prejudice resulted from the giving of the first instruction. Upon the jury's request embodied in the second question, the trial court effectively corrected itself. Accordingly, appellant has failed to show plain error.