Opinion ID: 1890785
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's Answers to Interrogatories

Text: Next, plaintiff asserts that the trial justice erred in refusing to permit counsel to introduce into evidence two answers to interrogatories provided by defendant. The record discloses that defendant testified before the jury that he first saw plaintiffs vehicle from a distance of approximately 80 to 100 feet away. The plaintiff thereupon directed defendant's attention to his previous deposition testimony in which he stated that he first saw plaintiffs vehicle at 150 to 200 yards away. The plaintiffs counsel then proceeded to a different line of questioning and concluded his examination without eliciting any further testimony about defendant's out-of-court statements, particularly his interrogatory responses. Before closing plaintiff's case, counsel sought permission to read into evidence two answers to interrogatories that contradicted defendant's in-court testimony about his distance when he first saw plaintiff's vehicle. In interrogatory number 4, defendant testified that he was approximately forty to fifty feet from plaintiff's car when he first observed it, and in interrogatory number 29, he said he was about forty feet from plaintiff's vehicle when he first applied his brakes. Counsel argued that the answers constituted admissions or previous inconsistent statements of defendant. To support his argument, plaintiff pointed to Rule 33(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. [3] Noting that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not govern the admissibility of evidence, the trial justice found that admissibility was controlled by the Rules of Evidence. The trial justice concluded that although a party's admission is admissible under Rule 613 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, a condition precedent to admissibility is a proper foundation. Counsel then requested permission to recall defendant to ask these two questions. At that point, defense counsel, when asked by the trial justice if he intended to call defendant as a witness, responded that he had not yet decided, but I'm tending to think that I will[.] The trial justice observed that the interrogatory answers fell squarely within Rule 613 and that this testimony underscores an inconsistency between the prior statement and the trial testimony that may have been less confusing, less prejudicial had it [been] done all at the same time[.] The trial justice found that the evidence was offered for impeachment purposes and she disallowed it. We deem this to be error. In reviewing evidentiary rulings, we note that [t]he admission of evidence rests in the sound discretion of the trial justice and will not be disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion. Tinney v. Tinney, 770 A.2d 420, 434 (R.I. 2001) (quoting Graff v. Motto, 748 A.2d 249, 252 (R.I.2000)). Pursuant to Rule 33(b), answers to interrogatories may be used to the extent permitted by the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Ordinarily, the admissibility of extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statements is governed by Rule 613(b), [4] which provides that [e]xtrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same   . However, Rule 613(b) specifically exempts from its provisions admissions of a party-opponent as defined in Rule 801(d)(2). The rule requiring that the witness must have been warned when on the stand, and asked whether he [or she] had made the statement about to be offered as a self-contradiction   , has usually been understood not to be applicable to the use of a party's admissions, i.e., they may be offered without a prior warning to the party. 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1051 at 12 (Chadbourn rev. 1972). Several jurisdictions also permit the introduction of extrinsic evidence of a party's admission without advance warning to the party, whether or not the party is on the witness stand. Lexington Insurance Co. v. Cooke's Seafood, 835 F.2d 1364, 1368-69 (11th Cir.1988); United States v. Cline, 570 F.2d 731, 735 (8th Cir.1978); United States v. Robinson, 530 F.2d 1076, 1083 (D.C.Cir.1976). The rationale behind this exception to Rule 613, is that [t]here is less danger of surprising a party than a witness, and the party will have ample opportunity to deny or explain after the inconsistent statement is proved; as a litigant, the party can simply call himself [or herself] as a witness later. 1 McCormick on Evidence, ch. 5 at 138 (John W. Strong 5th ed. 1999). This Court has also recognized that where the facts of a case clearly disclose that [a non-party] witness could be reasonably expected to have had full knowledge of the nature of the statement and the circumstances under which it was made,    the trial court should not require the formal laying of a foundation. State v. Fates, 114 R.I. 519, 522, 335 A.2d 920, 922 (1975). Although we subsequently have held that the Fates exception [5] is to be narrowly construed, we deem the reasoning of Fales to be persuasive. Because defendant's interrogatory answers are admissions of a party opponent, and defendant had full knowledge of his answers and the circumstances under which they were given, the interrogatory answers are admissible without requiring a formal foundation pursuant to Rule 613(b). Moreover, counsel candidly admitted that he simply overlooked this evidence during his direct examination of the defendant and he requested the court's indulgence to permit him to recall the defendant for this limited purpose before he rested his case. Although we are satisfied that recalling the defendant for the limited purpose of introducing his previous admission was not required by the Rules of Evidence, by refusing this request the trial justice abused her discretion.