Opinion ID: 4469363
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Brunton’s Motion to Vacate

Text: On September 20, 2018, Desmond Brunton—through his current counsel at Akerman LLP—moved the district court to vacate the final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) and (6). Brunton’s argument is rather novel. Regarding Rule 60(b)(4), which allows the court to “relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” if “the judgment is void,” Brunton argued that he was not served with process in the underlying lawsuit and that the Southern District of Florida lacked personal jurisdiction over him. And as to Rule 60(b)(6), which allows a district court to relieve a party of a judgment, order, or proceeding for “any other reason that justifies relief,” Brunton argues that “attorneys that were never engaged by [him] or authorized to represent him took multiple positions in this case on his behalf that were contrary to the facts and against [his] interests.” In other words, the attorneys ostensibly representing him were not actually representing him, and therefore, he was entitled to relief from the district court’s order. A&F responded to Brunton’s motion with a fourfold argument: (1) that Brunton’s motion was untimely; (2) that Brunton did participate in the litigation; (3) that Brunton also participated in the arbitration; and (4) that Brunton waived any defense relating to personal jurisdiction or lack of service of process. A&F attached to its response several exhibits, including the response filed by Spencer 4 Case: 19-12103 Date Filed: 01/03/2020 Page: 5 of 12 Sax of Sax Sachs Caplan, who represented that he was Brunton’s counsel, on March 4, 2015 (“Exhibit B”); a request for documents filed by Payton Bidari on December 31, 2015, who ostensibly represented Brunton (“Exhibit E”); an affidavit sworn by Bidari under penalty of perjury on January 15, 2016, stating that he represented Brunton (“Exhibit F”); a motion for dismissal filed by Bidari on Brunton’s behalf on January 15, 2016, which argued, inter alia, that personal jurisdiction against Brunton “is absent” 2 (“Exhibit H”); a response to A&F’s request for production of documents filed by Bidari on Brunton’s behalf on February 3, 2016 (“Exhibit G”); an affidavit from Brunton stating that he had made travel arrangements to visit his son, Geno Brunton, starting on April 25, 2016, and that he would be in California until May 1, 2016, or longer (“Exhibit J”); and an affidavit from attorney Matthew R. Kamula, of Dunlap Bennett & Ludwig PLLC, stating that he had served Brunton and his son with notices of the arbitration hearing, supplemented with email messages and postal delivery slips (“Exhibit K”). Brunton responded by arguing that there was no time requirement for his motion; that he was not represented by Sachs Sax Caplan or Dunlap Bennett & Ludwig PLLC; and that he did not participate in the arbitration proceedings. In an 2 Here, Bidari’s argument was that none of the respondents, including Brunton, “are residents of Florida except for the defunct corporate claimant,” “none of the respondents consented to jurisdiction,” and that “none of the named respondents are present in Florida.” 5 Case: 19-12103 Date Filed: 01/03/2020 Page: 6 of 12 attached affidavit (“Exhibit 1”), he stated that he did not engage or authorize Bidari, Kamula, or their law firms to represent him in the arbitration proceeding. Brunton subsequently filed several additional documents in support of his motion. These documents included a retainer agreement produced by Sachs Sax Caplan signed by Brunton’s son, ostensibly “on behalf of” Brunton (“Exhibit 1”); a letter from Sachs Sax Caplan stating that it “possesses no information relative to direct written or oral communications with Desmond Brunton” (“Exhibit 2”); and an email from Kamula stating that he had no documents in response to A&F’s request for documents evidencing an attorney-client relationship with Brunton (“Exhibit 3”). The district court denied Brunton’s motion. Regarding Brunton’s Rule 60(b)(4) claim, it concluded that Brunton waived his service and personal jurisdiction-based arguments “because he appeared through counsel and failed to raise that argument in his motion to dismiss,” in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). Moreover, even assuming arguendo that Brunton was correct that the counsel ostensibly representing him wasn’t actually doing so, the district court concluded that the 11-month delay between Brunton’s admitted awareness of the judgment against him in October 2017 and moving to vacate the judgment in September 2018 constituted “unjustified delay.” Accordingly, it concluded that Brunton had sat on his rights and waived his right to object to the judgment under 6 Case: 19-12103 Date Filed: 01/03/2020 Page: 7 of 12 Rule 60(b)(4). As to Brunton’s claim under Rule 60(b)(6), the district court concluded that Brunton had not raised it within a “reasonable time,” as the Rule requires, and therefore it rejected the argument. Brunton timely appealed to us.