Opinion ID: 546391
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Provocation as Mitigation

Text: 31 One of the Douglas factors requires consideration of mitigating circumstances surrounding the offense[s] such as ... personality problems ... or provocation on the part of others involved in the matter[s]. 5 M.S.P.R. at 305. Moreover, unless all significant mitigating circumstance[s] are considered, the adverse action cannot be sustained. Van Fossen v. Department of Hous. and Urban Dev., 748 F.2d 1579, 1581 (Fed.Cir.1984) (emphasis added). 32 The dissent criticizes the Board for its failure to consider an important factor relating to mitigation regarding Webster's removal, namely the animus of Supervisor McCain towards Webster. Far from failing to consider it, the AJ discussed it explicitly. Further, he found the appellant's supercilious and boastful demeanor generated some personal animus with his supervisors. Webster, slip op. at 14 (emphasis added). Thus the AJ did address the animus of Supervisor McCain towards Webster, apparently finding it attributable more to Webster than McCain. The AJ also found that Webster actively sought to confront [McCain] at every opportunity. Regardless of its genesis, however, the AJ, by necessary implication, found that the animosity did not cause the removal. 3 Id. 33 But even assuming that personal animus against Webster was caused solely by McCain, and that it was a factor in McCain's recommendation of removal, Bickford, the removing official, was herself neutral and aware of McCain's prior attitude about Webster. Indeed, the year before she reduced the penalty recommended by McCain specifically because of turmoil in the branch. That she did not do so again in 1988 may suggest that she did not find turmoil or animus was a significant factor then. In any event, there is simply no record basis to question her neutrality. Webster has offered no direct evidence of animus on her part. The AJ made no finding of such animus. We cannot conclude he was compelled to make such an inference, either. See Frampton v. Department of Interior, 880 F.2d 1314, 1317 (Fed.Cir.1989) (Employee failed to prove his supervisor, the proposing official, was motivated by personal animus and neither showed nor even alleged that [the removing official] had a retaliatory motive.). Moreover, it appears she was two levels above McCain. Any animus between McCain and Webster, whether generated by Webster or by McCain, or by both, is therefore eliminated as a significant motivating factor in Bickford's decision to remove Webster. Her impartiality is apparent from her knowledge of McCain's attitude toward Webster, her reduction of the prior penalty, and her lack of personal involvement in either the tension between McCain and Webster or Webster's protected activity. It is not insignificant that Webster's complaint to the Postal Inspector and the Senator concerned McCain, but not Bickford. Indeed, the AJ effectively found Ms. Bickford was neutral when he referred to objective facts supporting the adverse action. Id. 34 The AJ clearly found that the penalty was reasonable, i.e., not grossly disproportionate, based on the gravity of the sustained offenses, Webster's prior disciplinary record, his short tenure, and his lack of remorse. The AJ discussed each of these items individually. Again, Bickford's neutrality is important because she actually made the decision to remove. The AJ concluded that animus was not a significant factor either as to taking an adverse action or as to selecting the penalty of removal. A fair reading of the AJ's opinion as a whole demonstrates that the AJ did not fail to consider animus as a mitigating factor in determining the lawfulness of the penalty, or to consider it adequately.