Opinion ID: 2519785
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Break in custody.

Text: Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, held that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. ( Id, at p. 484, 101 S.Ct. 1880, fn. omitted, italics added.) The United States Supreme Court has since described Edwards as providing that, once a suspect in custody invokes his Miranda right to counsel, his or her subsequent statements to police are presumed involuntary and inadmissible if obtained pursuant to an encounter [initiated by the police] in the absence of counsel ( assuming there has been no break in custody). ( McNeil, supra, 501 U.S. 171, 177, 111 S.Ct. 2204, italics added.) While the high court has never directly addressed whether a break in custody vitiates the Edwards no-recontact rule, California cases uniformly have held or assumed that the rule barring police recontact after a Miranda request for counsel applies only during continuous custody. ( In re Bonnie H. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 563, 579-585, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 513 ( Bonnie H.); People v. Scaffidi (1992) 11 Cal. App.4th 145, 152-153, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 167 ( Scaffidi ); see Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th 926, 992-993, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519 [citing McNeil]; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 128, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887 [citing McNeil ].) [6] The instant Court of Appeal concurred in these decisions. It held that [w]hen there is a break in custody of a sufficient length such that the suspect has time to consult with counsel or other advisors, the police may on their own initiative re-contact the suspect. This is so since the break in custody dissipates the inherently coercive effect of custody that is the basis for Miranda. [Citations]. We agree. The bright-line rule of Edwards was designed to protect an accused in police custody from being badgered by police officers in an effort to wear the suspect down and persuade him to incriminate himself notwithstanding his earlier request for counsel's assistance. ( Oregon v. Bradshaw (1983) 462 U.S. 1039, 1044, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405, italics added; see also Arizona v. Roberson, supra, 486 U.S. 675, 685, 108 S.Ct. 2093.) If [the defendant, during custodial interrogation, invokes his or her Miranda right to counsel, but] the police [then] release the defendant, and if the defendant has a reasonable opportunity to contact his attorney, there appears no reason under Edwards to forbid subsequent police contact. ( Dunkins v. Thigpen, supra, 854 F.2d 394, 397.) Once released, the suspect is no longer under the `inherently compelling pressures' of continuous custody where there is a reasonable possibility of wearing the suspect down by badgering police tactics to the point the suspect would waive the previously invoked right to counsel. A break in custody between the first and second interrogations also provides the suspect the opportunity to speak with an attorney, family member or any person the suspect cares to consult without police constraints. ( Bonnie H., supra, 56 Cal. App.4th 563, 583, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 513.) We therefore adopt the premise that `a ... break in custody where the defendant has a reasonable opportunity to contact his attorney [while free of custodial pressures] dissolves an Edwards ... claim. [Citations.]' [Citation.] ( Id, at p. 582, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 513.) [7] The narrow nature of our holding should be emphasized. We conclude only that Edwards is not violated when the police recontact a suspect after a break in custody which gives the suspect reasonable time and opportunity, while free from coercive custodial pressures, to consult counsel if he or she wishes to do so. We do not suggest the police can avoid Edwards simply by allowing the suspect to step outside the station house at midnight on a Saturday, then promptly rearresting him without affording any realistic opportunity to seek counsel's assistance free of the coercive atmosphere of custody. We are persuaded, however, that the two-day midweek hiatus at issue here, from Tuesday, November 19, 1996, to Thursday, November 21, 1996, was amply sufficient to dissipate custodial pressures and permit defendant to consult counsel. [8] Defendant urges that any break-in-custody exception cannot apply when the suspect's release is a mere ruse or pretext, undertaken in bad faith, to avoid the consequences of a prior Miranda violation. The Court of Appeal intimated that such considerations are irrelevant. However, we need not decide whether our analysis would change in the face of evidence of deliberate police misconduct because, as the Court of Appeal also observed, there is no such evidence here. At the outset, there is no indication the police had an advance plan to disregard defendant's Miranda rights. On the contrary, Detective Rowe's undisputed testimony indicates he belatedly realiz[ed] that [the station house interview] was tainted (dis. opn. of Chin, J., post, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 136, 52 P.3d at p. 73) by the failure to heed defendant's requests for counsel. Rowe halted the interview in midprogress, consulted the district attorney's office, and concluded the interview should end. Because the police had no other evidence linking defendant to the homicide, Rowe saw no legal basis to detain defendant further and concluded he had no choice but to release defendant. Thus, the record contains no hint that the police deliberately elicited an invalid confession in hopes it would help them obtain a valid confession after a break in custody, or that they released defendant for the purpose of manipulating the break-in-custody exception to their advantage. But despite their mistakes at the station house, the police remained obligated to press their investigation of an unsolved homicide. So long as there was a true break in custody, affording defendant reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel while free of custodial influences, the police thereafter had the right to recontact him without undue delay. Hence, no bad faith or pretext arises simply because Detective Rowe had formed such an intent at the time of defendant's release. Nor was defendant misled into a false sense of security. He knew he was the prime suspect, and the police said nothing to suggest he was permanently immune from further questioning. (See fn. 8, ante.) Indeed, before leaving the station house, defendant acknowledged Rowe's warning that the matter was not concluded. Thereafter, defendant remained at liberty, without interference by the police, for two midweek days (see fn. 8, ante), which gave him ample time and opportunity to rest, regroup, and obtain legal or other advice free of custodial pressure. He had the incentive to seek such help, and he had already indicated a desire for counsel's assistance. The authorities, in turn, took the risk that such a consultation would occur, and might effectively prevent them from obtaining defendant's further cooperation. (See fn. 8, ante.) Detectives subsequently conducted a consensual interview at defendant's apartment, at which the incriminating statements here at issue were elicited. Because, as defendant himself concedes, this was a noncustodial interview, Miranda procedures did not apply (see text discussion, post ), and the interviewers thus committed no ruse or pretext by failing to obtain a new Miranda waiver before they questioned him. We therefore reject any suggestion that the admissions elicited at his home were obtained by deceitful or improper means. Defendant asserts that a break-in-custody exception to Edwards cannot apply unless the suspect received new Miranda warnings before responding to police questioning following the custodial lapse. However, Miranda and Edwards apply only to custodial interrogation (e.g., McNeil, supra, 501 U.S. 171, 176-177, 111 S.Ct. 2204; Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. 477, 481-482, 101 S.Ct. 1880; Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 444-445, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694), and defendant concedes the November 21 interview was noncustodial. Bonnie H., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th 563, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 513, and Scaffidi supra, 11 Cal.App.4th 145, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 167, which defendant cites for this proposition, both involved custodial reinterrogations after lapses in custody, and are thus inapposite. [9] Finally, defendant insists that no break-in-custody exception should apply where, as here, the police recontacted him after they had already obtained incriminating statements in violation of Edwards. But for reasons we have already discussed in other contexts, a prior Edwards violation, even one that produced damaging admissions, does not mandate a bright-line rule that further police contact be forbidden (or as the dissenters suggest, artificially deferred) even after a break in custody sufficient to permit contact with counsel. Instead, the admissibility of statements defendant made when the police recontacted him must be determined under rules which apply to any claim that a later statement was the tainted product of an earlier one obtained in violation of Miranda procedures. We proceed to a discussion of that issue.