Opinion ID: 2038838
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Date of Appraisal

Text: In its fifth assignment of error, L & H argues that the $30,000 value testified to by Big River's appraiser, George Tesar, Jr., was not sufficient proof of the value of the building because the appraisal reflected the value on March 7, 2002, not July 31, 2001. At trial, L & H objected to Tesar's appraisal on the basis of foundation and relevance. The district court overruled the foundation objection and overruled the relevancy objection at the present time on relevancy, subject to a motion to strike if there is no relationship back to the appropriate date. Tesar then testified to his $30,000 appraisal of the leased property on March 7, 2002. In its oral findings, the district court stated: There is testimony in, and there is testimony in that the value of the improvements as of March 7th of 2002 w[as] $30,000. I received that testimony and indicated at the time that objections on foundation and relevancy were overruled subject to a motion to strike. There was never a motion to strike made. So I do have in front of me testimony that the value of the leasehold improvementsand that obviously means improvements after the deduction of the ground. The value of the ground was $30,000 as of March 7th. I think it's within my prerogative as a finder of fact to assume that they were at least that much as of July 31st of 2001. There was no testimony or evidence at all that there was any waste orcommitted on the property that required any kind of substantial payment by ... Bebout. Although the district court did not expressly refer to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-104(2) (Reissue 1995), it appears its ruling with regard to Tesar's appraisal testimony was based on this statute. That statute provides [w]hen the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the judge shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition. This court in Reavis v. Slominski, 250 Neb. 711, 724-25, 551 N.W.2d 528, 540 (1996), noted that [t]he everyday method of handling the situation when the adversary objects to the relevancy or the competency of the offered fact is to permit it to come in conditionally, upon the assurance, express or implied, of the offering counsel that [he] will `connect up' the tendered evidence by proving, in the later progress of his case, the missing facts.... ... The burden is on the objecting party to object if the offering counsel fails to connect up, and this is generally done with a motion to strike. Following L & H's objection to Tesar's testimony, it was proper for the district court to overrule the objection and allow Big River to connect up the period of time between March 7, 2002, and the July 31, 2001, expiration of the lease. If L & H believed that Big River's counsel did not adequately show the relationship of the appraisal back to the expiration of the lease term, it should have made a motion to strike Tesar's testimony on that point. No such motion to strike was made. As a result, Tesar's appraisal was properly before the district court, and the district court did not err in relying on the appraisal in determining the value of Big River's improvement. We determine that L & H's fifth assignment of error is without merit.