Opinion ID: 2630568
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: damages against both knapp and university properties

Text: ¶ 36 Defendants contend that plaintiff may not recover punitive damages against both Knapp and University Properties, since University Properties was owned and controlled by Knapp and there is no evidence to suggest that University Properties' participation was more active than mere ratification. This claim is without merit. Corporations ordinarily act only through their agents, and, when the agent acts within the scope of his employment, the agent's liability generally becomes the liability of the employer. The Restatement (2d) of the Law of Agency confirms that [a] master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219 (1958). That liability may extend to liability for punitive damages: Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other principal because of an act by an agent if, but only if ... the principal or a managerial agent authorized the doing and the manner of the act.... Restatement (Second) of Torts § 909(a) (1979). Mere ratification by an employer is precisely what justifies an employer's liability for the agent's actions. ¶ 37 We have relied on these provisions in defining the circumstances under which an employer can be liable for the intentional torts of an employee, and have found that an employer is liable for the torts of its employees that are committed within the scope of employment, even if the tortious acts were intentional and not done solely to further the interests of the employer. Hodges v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991). See also Clark v. Pangan, 2000 UT 37, ¶ 8, 998 P.2d 268 (This court has long recognized that an employer can be vicariously liable for the intentional tortious acts of employees under the theory of respondeat superior if those acts are conducted within the scope of employment.) Defendants' protestations that University Properties was wholly controlled by Knapp serve to illustrate the extent to which Knapp's actions were authorized by his employer and to make plausible the inference that these acts were undertaken at least in part to further the interests of University Properties. These facts enhance rather than diminish the liability of University Properties. [21] It was well within the jury's province to make awards against both Knapp and his employer, University Properties.