Opinion ID: 304291
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Staten Island.

Text: 20 Q. Did you have a conversation with him? 21 A. Yes, sir. I approached him. I asked him what was doing? He said, 'Nothing.' I said, 'When do you plan on seeing Angelo Mele? He said, 'Probably tonight.' 22 Q. Did Madonia tell you on that occasion that he, in fact, had seen Mele that night before in the Pussycat Cafe? 23 A. No. 24  25    26 Q. As a result of that conversation with Madonia, what, if anything, did you do? 27 A. I went to a telephone booth which was located near a diner on Highland Boulevard and Clo Road and we called the State Troopers. 28  29    30 Q. What did you tell or request of the troopers when you called on July 1st? 31 A. To surveil Mr. Madonia. 32 Q. Did you tell them where he might be found, and so on? 33 A. Yes, there were other agents present there that joined the troopers. I completely stayed away from there because they knew me but they were briefed as to Madonia's residence, and then he was to be tailed. 34 Q. Did you tell the state police that you expected a delivery to be made? 35 A. Yes. 36 After his arrest at his daughter's home about midnight July 1, 1969, Madonia voluntarily gave the arresting agents twenty-two kilograms of heroin that he had hidden under a bed in her home. However he was placed in jail under $100,000 bond until July 23 when he was released on $5,000 bond. The bail bonds of the remaining defendants were many times greater than Madonia's. Clearly, his low bond was because of his informer status, and this is buttressed by his continuing to inform. On July 28 Madonia contacted Supervisor Vecchione and offered to surrender a quantity of heroin which he had in his possession and which he later stated was part of a 24-kilogram cache [22 kilograms of which he voluntarily surrendered at the time of arrest around midnight on July 1st] seized by Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs on July 1, 1969 and July 2, 1969 in Brooklyn and Staten Island, New York. Vecchione advised Agents Kennedy and Caffrey of this offer and on July 28 Madonia voluntarily surrendered a package of heroin weighing 751.1 grams. On September 16, 1969, Madonia was registered by the Bureau as an exempt informer with the alias of Michael D. Arthur, the same name assigned to him on June 27, 1969. The records produced at the hearing on the motion for new trial include many narcotic agent reports concerning Madonia's cooperation as an informer. For example, Vecchione reported that Madonia has been in constant contact with Angelo Mele since his arrest; that Madonia told him that Mele has been since his arrest attempting another delivery so that he can leave his family money before going to jail. Another report recited that Vecchione instructed Madonia to maintain constant communication with Mele . . . and a later one noted that Madonia was socializing with Mele on a reguar basis and in a recent conversation Mele indicated that his partners had promised him a large amount of heroin by year end. This informer arrangement continued all during the trial with Madonia sitting each day at the defense table. Madonia and the appellants were convicted on March 16, 1971, and some two weeks later, on April 2, 1971, Supervisor Vecchione filed his report: 37 Other than the information that 0078 (Madonia) supplied relative to the case in which he was a defendant along with Angelo Mele, Vincent Beltempo, Ralph Cuomo he was not able to furnish any additional information. (Emphasis supplied) 38 He then recommended that Madonia's service be terminated. On April 6, 1971, Madonia was removed from his exempt status in view of his conviction, the fact that he has not furnished information of a substantial nature, and his claims that he is suspected of being an informant . . . 39 (2) The evidentiary hearing at the motion for new trial also revealed that the Chief Prosecutor had personal knowledge of the informer status of Madonia. Indeed, he delayed Madonia's arraignment in connection with the latter's June 27 arrest in order to give Madonia time to inform for the Government. The arraignment was never held, and instead of prosecuting Madonia under the charges connected with the June 27 arrest, and running the risk of disclosure of his informant role, the Government listed the heroin seized and Madonia's Cadillac car impounded at that time under the fictitious name of Michael D. Arthur. The report of this arrest; Madonia's voluntary surrender of 22 kilograms of heroin and the unusual circumstances of his arrest around midnight on July 1 at his daughter's home were all excised from the official reports turned over at the time of trial to the defense pursuant to the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3500. Moreover, this report was written so as to indicate that Madonia was arrested at his home, which was false. 40 (3) In the memorandum submitted by the Justice Department, we were assured that O'Brien and Maltz were not known to Madonia at the time of the meeting on June 30, 1969, when they observed him in the Pussy Cat Lounge. The evidentiary hearing revealed, however, that they had been the lead officers in the arrest of Madonia just three days before. On that occasion Agent Maltz actually took Madonia from his Cadillac and directed him to spread over the fender while he was being frisked. Agent O'Brien placed him under arrest, took the package of heroin from the front seat and read Madonia a statement of his rights. At that time, Maltz wore a bushy moustache, which the trial court found would have made him conspicuous. 41 (4) At the trial, Agent Maltz testified that he observed Madonia leave the premises of the Pussy Cat on June 30 in his 1963 Cadillac when in truth the car was impounded by the Government at that time. This testimony was in contradiction to Madonia's testimony that the Cadillac was stolen and Coniglio's testimony that Madonia borrowed his Buick fom June 30 to July 2 because his Cadillac had been stolen. The prosecutor made much of this conflict, pursuing it with Madonia and mentioning it in his summation to the jury. 2 Likewise it was emphasized in his affidavit to us. See App. A, p. 2. 42 In the evidentiary hearing, the agents confirmed that Madonia's car had been impounded on June 27, 1969, and had been in the Government's possession ever since. However, they had sought to conceal this fact from the defense, as is shown by the report of the narcotic agent O'Brien on the surveillance of Madonia on July 1, which was made available at trial: 43 On July 1, 1969, surveillance was established of Arthur Madonia at his residence 43 Neptune Street, Staten Island, N. Y. Madonia was known to operate a 1963 Cadillac Sedan New York License No. 6379 CR . . . 44 At approximately 9 p. m. Madonia was followed by the Agents of the Eighth Enforcement Group from his residence to Villa's Lounge . . . (Emphasis supplied) 45 Agent O'Brien knew at that time that Madonia's Cadillac had been seized by the Government three days before. Still he made this report knowing that it would be available to defense counsel in this case. And he inserted the italicized sentence in his report, indicating to a reader thereof that Madonia was driving the Cadillac on June 30 and July 1st. O'Brien knew that this was not true. Moreover, the deceit was carried forward in the cross-examination of Madonia. There he was asked: Now, you testified that you reported this car stolen to the police at the 17th Precinct, did you say? On the East Side? And when Madonia answered: I don't know what precinct it was, he was then asked: And have you checked recently with that station house about this larceny? Madonia's answer was No, sir but the prosecutor pressed, You didn't go over there in the course of this trial, to check their records?, and again Madonia answered, No, sir. The sole purpose of this questioning was to cast doubt on Madonia's testimony that his car had been stolen and was, therefore, not available which would question his general credibility as well as cast doubt on Coniglio's testimony that Madonia had borrowed his Buick. 46 We are told that the chief prosecutor did not know that the Cadillac had been impounded when he asked Madonia about it or when he made his statements in summation. We have received similar assurances on other facets of this case. We do know, however, that the chief prosecutor was advised when Madonia was arrested on a narcotics charge and had turned informer. Moreover, Agent Vecchione testified that he could have informed the prosecutor of the impounding of the Cadillac at the very time that the chief prosecutor was cross-examining Madonia. But even assuming that the chief prosecutor did not know, the record is clear that narcotics agents were present at the time of the cross-examination of Madonia who did know and had ample opportunity to correct any misapprehensions that the prosecutor might have had on this crucial point of the trial. As was said in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959): The same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears. At 269, 79 S.Ct. at 1177. 47 3. Government Suppression of Material Evidence 48 It is true that ordinarily a trial court need not grant a motion for new trial under Rule 33 unless the newly discovered evidence will probably result in a different verdict or sentence for the defendant. See, e. g., United States v. Cousins, 429 F.2d 1271 (9 Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400 U.S. 904, 91 S.Ct. 143, 27 L.Ed.2d 141 (1970). Due process requires, however, that a different rule be applied when prosecutorial suppression has caused the evidence not to be presented at trial. At least where the suppression is deliberate, the defendants need only show that the evidence is material and could in any reasonable likelihood have led to a different result on retrial. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). See also United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138 (2 Cir. 1968); Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507 (2 Cir. 1961). In these cases, where there has been a considered decision to suppress and where the value of the information could not have escaped the prosecutor's attention, United States v. Keogh, supra, at 147, it is not necessary to engage in any exact determination of the degree of prejudice to the defendants. 49 The reason why the showing of prejudice required to bring down the balance in favor of a new trial will vary from case to case is that the pans contain weights and counterweights other than the interest in a perfect trial. Sometimes only a small showing of prejudice, or none, is demanded because that interest is reinforced by the necessity that 'The administration of justice must not only be above reproach, it must also be beyond the suspicion of reproach,' . . . and by the teaching of experience that mere admonitions are insufficient to prevent repetition of abuse. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081. Kyle v. United States, supra, 297 F.2d at 514. 50 In this case it is clear from its very inception that the prosecution labored to keep vital information from the defense, the trial judge and the jury. In addition, in some official narcotics agents' reports slanted information was inserted and produced to the defense, the judge and the jury in order to enshroud the Government's initial deceit. Moreover, its initial equivocal statement both with the trial court and with us stating there was no credible and relevant evidence to support the charge that the Government had planted a paid informer within the intimate circle of the defense, even to the extent of his attendance at the defense table during the trial, is beyond our comprehension 3 and cannot be condoned. In our detailed examination of the pleading, the evidence and the argument of counsel we cannot say that in the light of these deliberate excisions, slanted reports and misrepresentations-made again and then again-that the jury could not in any reasonable likelihood have been affected in its verdict. Giglio v. United States, supra; Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959). 51 Of course, even in cases of extreme prosecutorial misconduct, a new trial is not granted if the suppressed evidence or the misleading portions of the Government's case could not possibly have had an effect on the jury's verdict. Our examination of the case here, however, convinces us that if the jury had known the full truth, it might reasonably have reached a different result. 52 (a) Madonia's double role 53 If the jury had known of Madonia's informer status and his acquaintance with Maltz and O'Brien, significant doubts would have been raised about the Government's case. First, since the jury could readily have found that Madonia would recognize Maltz and O'Brien, the jury might doubt that if he were in fact conspiring with Mele and Coniglio he would not have prevented the alleged conversation about the heroin that took place in the Pussy Cat Lounge while both agents were present and within hearing. The jury might conclude from this gap in the credibility of the Government's case that O'Brien and Maltz were not present or if they were, that they did not overhear the conversation to which they testified. The jury might also conclude that, if indeed the conversation did take place, it was a set-up and that Madonia was working for the Government in staging this conversation. 54 If the jury had known of Madonia's informer role, it might also inquire into the events of July 1, and it might choose to believe Madonia's statement that he received the two kilograms of heroin from the Government and planted it in the trunk of Beltempo's car. It might also choose to believe the testimony of Coniglio that he did not participate in the transfer; and it might find that Beltempo and Cuomo were entrapped. If the whole truth had been available, and if the defense were given the opportunity to explore the suppressed evidence, reasonable doubts about the defendants' guilt could certainly be raised. 55 (b) The Cadillac Testimony 56 If the jury had known the whole truth, i. e. that Madonia's Cadillac had been impounded on June 27, 1969, the first effect would be to cast serious doubt on the testimony of Maltz. 4 Maltz testified that on the night of June 30, 1969, Madonia left the Pussy Cat in his Cadillac and Coniglio left in his own Buick. Since this testimony is clearly false, the jury might conclude that Maltz was wrong in other particulars. The jury might then choose to believe instead Coniglio's testimony that Madonia had borrowed his Buick on June 30 and never returned it which was supported by the O'Brien report that the agents had seized the car from Madonia on his arrest around midnight on July 1st; the acceptance of Coniglio's version would, of course, mean that he had not made the heroin delivery. The jury might also reasonably believe Madonia's post-trial statement that he had received the heroin from the Government and had planted it in Beltempo's car. 57 The district court resolved all of these troublesome factual questions in favor of the Government, despite the unusual situations that we have outlined. We cannot but conclude that where the discrepancies between the Government's trial presentation and the true facts reach such proportions that only the jury can resolve the serious doubts remaining. 58 The Government insists, however, that its failure to disclose was justified since disclosure would create a serious threat to Madonia's life. We cannot accept this latter-day explanation. If the Government had been so eager to protect Madonia's life, why did it not oppose his $5000 bail, nor provide any protection to him, particularly in the six-week period between his admission of his informer role and his murder. Moreover, if this were the only reason for the Government's failure to disclose, why was the truth not immediately revealed to the district court and to this court after Madonia's death? Why did the prosecutor continue in his equivocation during oral argument before this court and for a month afterwards?Even if the Government had been motivated by the desire to protect Madonia, its deliberate suppression of evidence and preparation of false reports to mislead the defense cannot be accepted. The very least required of the Government was a complete disclosure of the truth to the district court in camera so that the balance of interest could be struck by one not involved in the all too often competitive enterprise of prosecution. United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735 (7 Cir. 1969); United States v. Palermo, 410 F.2d 468 (7 Cir. 1969). Particularly since the withheld evidence and the doctored reports were highly material to this case and would so clearly have affected the preparation of a defense, it is clear that some disclosure would have been required. United States v. Roviaro, 353 U.S. 53, 63-64, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957). 4. Conclusion: 59 While Attorney General of the United States I noticed an inscription that was carved in the oak panel of my anteroom and embossed in gold: The United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in its courts. We regret to say that the record here does not comport with that high standard. The judgment is Reversed.