Opinion ID: 1351604
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The zoning and uses of properties nearby;

Text: C. The suitability of the subject property for the uses to which it has been restricted; D. The extent to which removal of the restrictions will detrimentally affect nearby property; E. The length of time the subject property has remained vacant as zoned; F. The relative gain to economic development, public health, safety and welfare by the reduction of the value of the landowner's property as compared to the hardship imposed by such reduction upon the individual landowner; G. The recommendations of permanent or professional staff; H. The conformance of the requested change to the adopted or recognized Comprehensive Plan being utilized by the City. Other factors relevant to a particular proposed amendment may be considered. The trial court found that the City failed to follow the requirements of its zoning ordinance § 21.802, which prevented the court from reviewing the reasonableness of the City's action. The Golden factors were included in the City's minutes and made a part of the written record by virtue of David Greenamyre's statements. In the transcript of the September 9, 1986, meeting, David Greenamyre states: I will try to fit my closing remarks around the questions that the Staff said that the Commission needs to consider in a rezoning like this. He then addressed each of the Golden factors. A summary of Greenamyre's comments was placed in the minutes of the September 9 meeting. A discussion of Greenamyre's presentation took place during that meeting with both the public and the commissioners participating. At the end of the discussion, the City took its second vote on the rezoning ordinance, which was to approve the PUD. The City gave consideration to each of the factors as mandated by the ordinance, even though brought up by the developer. The evidence considered was made a part of the written record. Further evidence exists in the record to support a finding of sufficiency. At the August 12, 1986, City Commission meeting, in which the first vote was taken, the City made specific findings that (1) the PUD was not in conflict with the City's comprehensive plan and (2) there would be no substantially adverse effect on the neighborhood. ( Golden factors 8 and 4, City zoning ordinance § 21.802 factors H and D.) These two Golden factor findings obviously formed, in part, a basis for the City's decision to grant the rezoning request. In that same meeting, the City also addressed the need for this type of development, the current zoning classification, the density of the development, and the traffic needs and problems. Throughout the meetings of the Planning Commission and the City, many residents in the area of the proposed PUD spoke against the project because of the perceived negative impact it might have on property values. This evidence addresses the factors set forth in the City's zoning ordinance § 21.802. The City, by including such information in the meeting transcripts, complied with the mandate of zoning ordinance § 21.802. The trial court stated that, since the City did not specifically adopt Greenamyre's comments as its own, the decision to approve the PUD could have been made on other grounds. Although this is a true statement, zoning ordinance § 21.802 only requires that the City consider the factors and that the factors be included in the minutes or otherwise made a part of the written record. The ordinance also allows consideration of other relevant factors. It does not require that the basis for the City's decision be specifically enumerated or specifically based upon the eight Golden factors. A reading of both Golden and Landau indicates that the Golden factors were meant to aid both cities and courts in addressing zoning decisions and are not to be rigidly applied as the only basis for zoning determinations. In Landau, we specifically stated that a City's actions are not per se unreasonable solely because the factors are not enumerated. 244 Kan. at 263. In the present case the factors were specifically set forth in the City's meetings. The City Commissioners had the information before them to consider. There was discussion of that information. The minutes and transcripts of the City's meetings reflect a lively and thoughtful discussion with input by individual commissioners, the developer, surrounding property owners, the public (pro and con), and the planning staff. In Landau we held the Golden factors are merely guidelines or suggested factors (Syl. ¶ 1); a City's decision will not be found unreasonable merely because the Golden factors were not specifically enumerated or subjected to an issue-oriented analysis (Syl. ¶ 2); and elected officials are closer to the electorate than the courts and, consequently, are more reflective of the community's perception of its image (Syl. ¶ 4). 244 Kan. 257. In the case at bar, the City found that the PUD was not in conflict with the existing comprehensive plan and that the PUD would not have a substantially adverse effect on the neighborhood. The record indicates that the Planning Commission recommended approval and that the City accepted this recommendation. These findings coincide with Golden factors four and eight. The surrounding property owner objections were based on keeping the neighborhood single family. The property owners' objections addressed Golden factors one, two, and four. In Landau, we specifically stated that a City's actions are not per se unreasonable solely because the Golden factors are not enumerated. 244 Kan. at 263. We find from a review of the record that it is adequate to enable the trial court to make a reasonableness determination under K.S.A. 12-712. Syllabus ¶ 9 of Landau Modified The trial court's ruling sustaining the Davises' motion for summary judgment was filed December 20, 1988. Our opinion in Landau was issued in January of 1989. Our reasoning in Landau on judicial review of municipal zoning ordinances was not available to the trial court. In Landau we stated: If, in the view of the trial court, the findings of fact and conclusions of law are deficient under Golden and inadequate for a `reasonableness' determination, the trial court may, in exercising its discretion, select the alternative of remanding the case to the local governing authority for further findings and conclusions. (Emphasis added.) 244 Kan. at 274. However, the Landau syllabus reads: If, in the view of the trial court, a city's or county's findings of fact and conclusions of law are deficient under Golden v. City of Overland Park, 224 Kan. 591, 584 P.2d 130 (1978), and inadequate for a `reasonableness' determination, the case is to be remanded for further findings and conclusions by the local governing authority. (Emphasis added.) 244 Kan. 257, Syl. ¶ 9. Our omission of the discretionary word may in syllabus ¶ 9 was inadvertent. Remand by the trial court is discretionary. Syllabus ¶ 9 is hereby modified to conform with the language of our opinion. 244 Kan. at 274. The modified syllabus ¶ 9 in Landau is: If, in the view of the trial court, a City's or county's findings of fact and conclusions of law are deficient under Golden v. City of Overland Park, 224 Kan. 591, 584 P.2d 130 (1978), and inadequate for a `reasonableness' determination, the trial court may, in exercising its discretion, select the alternative of remanding the case to the local governing authority for further findings and conclusions. The Davises contend that an alternative to remanding the case to the zoning body is a per se finding of unreasonableness. We agree with the reasoning of the Court of Appeals that a finding of unreasonableness may not be based merely on an inadequate record. The trial court found that a reasonableness determination could not be made. The Davises' burden to show that the ordinance was unreasonable had not been met and thus it was improper to hold that the City's rezoning decision was unreasonable. In Landau we referred to the trial court's alternative of receiving evidence on the issue of reasonableness. The trial court has discretion either to remand or to receive additional evidence on the issue of reasonableness. Zoning Ordinance  Reasonable as a Matter of Law We disagree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the adequacy of the record upon which to base a reasonableness determination. In our view, the record was adequate. We have held that a trial court has the inherent authority to summarily dispose of a matter on its own motion where: (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains, and (2) giving the benefit of all reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, the judgment must be for one of the parties as a matter of law. Phillips v. Carson, 240 Kan. 462, 474, 731 P.2d 820 (1987). We have the same inherent authority. In the case at bar, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. The parties have assured us that the complete record was put before the trial court and that the same record is before us. We may summarily dispose of this case and enter judgment as a matter of law. We must make the same review of the City's action as did the trial court. Whether the City's action was reasonable is a question of law to be determined upon the basis of the facts which were presented to the City. The City's rezoning action would be unreasonable only when such action was taken without regard to the benefit or harm involved to the community at large, including all interested parties, and was so wide of the mark that its unreasonableness lies outside the realm of fair debate. Combined Investment Co. v. Board of Butler County Comm'rs, 227 Kan. 17, 28, 605 P.2d 533 (1980). Applying the rationale of Landau and Golden to the instant record, judgment must be entered for the City as a matter of law. The rezoning decision of the City was reasonable, and ordinance No. 6482, authorizing the Planned Unit Development, is valid. The Court of Appeals is reversed. The trial court is reversed. Judgment is entered for the City of Leavenworth. ABBOTT, J., not participating.