Opinion ID: 1791597
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Past-Due Child Support and SSI

Text: Jones next argues that the trial court erred in awarding Billingsley a judgment for past-due child support because his sole source of income was SSI benefits. In support of this argument, he cites Davis v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 341 Ark. 349, 20 S.W.3d 273 (2000). In that case, we held that Arkansas courts cannot order child-support payments based on income from federal SSI disability benefits. Id. at 358, 20 S.W.3d at 278. We stated: We hold, however, that although SSI comes within the definition of income for child-support purposes, it is not subject to state court jurisdiction. Congress has made no sovereign immunity exception for non-remunerative federal benefits such as SSI. Hence, those benefits remain free from execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process. Id., 20 S.W.3d at 278. Jones argues that [t]he language used by the Davis court clearly indicates that SSI benefits are not subject to state court child-support orders. He adds that [c]onsequently, the order granting [Billingsley] judgment for past-due child support is erroneous, contrary to Arkansas and federal law and therefore should be reversed. Here, the order of support was made in 1995 and entered in 1996, prior to the ruling in Davis, supra . Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-234 (Repl.2002), a support order shall be a final judgment subject to writ of garnishment or execution as to any payment accrued until the time either party moves through proper motion to set aside, alter, or modify the support. The court may not set aside, alter, or modify any decree, judgment, or order which has accrued unpaid support prior to the filing of the motion. See Ark.Code Ann. § 9-14-234(c) (Repl.2002). Billingsley contends that this support order is enforceable because Jones made no motion to modify, set aside, or alter the order. We disagree with Billingsley's assertion that Jones made no motion to modify, set aside, or alter the order; however, we agree with Billingsley's contention that the support order is enforceable. The record reflects that Jones filed a timely motion to vacate the support order on March 26, 1996. The record contains no order on the motion. Where the circuit court neither grants nor denies a motion to vacate, within thirty days of its filing, the motion shall be deemed denied by operation of law as of the thirtieth day, and the notice of appeal shall be filed within thirty days from that date. Ark. R.App. P.Civ. 4(b)(1). No notice of appeal was ever filed; accordingly, the support order remains in effect and is enforceable. At no time subsequent to the filing of the motion to vacate in 1996 has Jones contended that the support order should be vacated; thus, the issue of whether the support order should be vacated is not before us. [3] What is before us in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in entering a judgment on past-due child support. Jones contended in his counterclaim that Billingsley's petition for judgment should be denied because his only source of income is SSI benefits and that income is not subject to collection of support. In this case, the trial court did not order that child support be paid from SSI benefits. Rather, it found that Jones was indebted to Billingsley for past-due child support arrearages. The arrearages were based on the 1996 order that has not been modified, altered, or set aside. In entering judgment for past-due child support, the trial judge was not attempting to levy or execute on the SSI benefits. That issue was not before the trial court, nor is it before this court now. The trial court simply reduced the past-due child support to judgment. We find no error. Affirmed.