Opinion ID: 1378445
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: This state statute, which provides a PROCEDURE for collective bargaining and a PROCEDURE for post-impasse settlement of disputes over wages for firemen and policemen by compulsory arbitration is a statute addressed to a concern of the state with the PROCEDURES for collective bargaining and for post-impasse settlement of such disputes as provided by city ordinances, such as the ordinance in this case.

Text: The opinion by the majority would hold that this statute, which provides a post-impasse procedure for compulsory arbitration, prevails over the Roseburg ordinance, which provides a different post-impasse settlement procedure, is not a statute   addressed to a concern of the state with the structure and procedures  of local government, so as to require the showing of a  need to safeguard the interests of    persons affected by the procedure provided by the Roseburg ordinance (the criteria prescribed in LaGrande/Astoria for procedural statutes), for the following reasons: (a) The dominant character of PECBA is that of `a general law addressed primarily to social, economic and other regulatory objectives of the state.' 96 (Emphasis added) (To the same effect, See 97 and 99.) (b) Local governments may prefer other policies or may prefer other means [i.e., other procedures ] of achieving these policies, but the legislature, by enacting PECBA, has made that substantive decision as a matter of state law. As substantive legislation, state law prevails unless it unlawfully interferes with the structure of local government. 97 (Emphasis added) As stated by the majority, however, this state statute includes the following policy statement: It is the public policy of the State of Oregon that where the right of employes to strike is by law prohibited, it is requisite to the high morale of such employes and the efficient operation of such departments to afford an alternate, expeditious, effective and binding procedure for the resolution of labor disputes   . ORS 243.742(1). (Emphasis added) Indeed, ORS 243.650(5) also provides that: `Compulsory arbitration' means the procedure whereby parties involved in a labor dispute are required by law to submit their differences to a third party for a final and binding decision. (Emphasis added) Thus, the statute in this case provides a procedure for collective bargaining for disputes involving wages of firemen and policemen and also provides a procedure for compulsory arbitration in the event of an impasse in collective bargaining. By statutory definition, this is a procedure. The Roseburg ordinance also provides a procedure for collective bargaining for disputes involving wages of firemen and policemen, but provides a different procedure for the settlement of such disputes in the event of an impasse in collective bargaining. [6] It would thus appear to be obvious not only: (1) that this statute is a state statute which provides a procedure for collective bargaining in disputes over wages for firemen and policemen and a procedure for the compulsory arbitration of such disputes in the event of an impasse in collective bargaining, but also (2) that in providing such statutory procedures for the settlement of such disputes, this statute is addressed to a concern of the state with the    procedures  for collective bargaining in such disputes as provided by ordinances such as the Roseburg ordinance and, in particular, with the procedures provided by such ordinances for the settlement of such disputes in the event of an impasse in collective bargaining. Indeed, this concern of the state with the procedures provided by such ordinances as the Roseburg ordinance is recognized by the majority (although not in terms of concern) by its statement that the purpose of this statute is to protect their [firemen and policemen] economic welfare during their employment and to provide a means [i.e., a procedure ] for them to affect certain negotiable working conditions and (by the providing of such a means, i.e., procedure ) to protect public safety by preventing interruption in the provision of essential government services. (96) The critical flaw in the opinion by the majority, however, is the giant jump in its reasoning, which is to the effect that (1) because the state has such a concern with the procedures for collective bargaining and post-impasse settlement procedures such as those provided by the Roseburg ordinance, and (2) because the state believes that its policies to protect the interests of firemen and policemen are better served by the procedures for collective bargaining and compulsory arbitration as provided by this statute, than by the procedures provided by such ordinances, it therefore follows that (3) this statute is not one addressed to a concern of the state with    procedures of local agencies (so as to be invalid in the absence of the showing of a  need to safeguard the interests of the persons    affected), but is somehow transformed into a statute addressed primarily to substantive social, economic, or other regulatory objectives of the state (so as to be valid unless the statute is shown to be irreconcilable with the local community's freedom to choose its own political form.). Presumably, all state statutes are addressed to some substantive social, economic or other regulatory objectives of the state, including purely procedural statutes. It does not necessarily follow, however, that because a state procedural statute is addressed to such an objective, the proper test to be applied in determining whether a procedure provided by such a statute prevails over a procedure provided by a city ordinance is the test as stated in LaGrande/Astoria for substantive statutes, a rigid test which places the burden on the city and is more favorable to the state, rather than the test stated in LaGrande/Astoria for procedural statutes, a test which requires a showing of need and is more favorable to cities. If this were so, the distinction made in LaGrande/Astoria between matters of procedure and those of substance, so as to give cities the benefit of some measure of protection from legislative interference in matters involving structure and procedures of local government by imposing the burden in such cases to show a need to safeguard the interests of persons or entities affected by the procedures of local government to justify such interference, would be rendered largely meaningless and illusory. Yet this is the essence of the reasoning by the majority in support of its strange conclusion that this statute is not one that is addressed to a concern of the state with the structure and procedures of local agencies, so as to be subject to the criteria as stated in LaGrande/Astoria for application in determining the validity of procedures provided by such a statute when in conflict with procedures provided by a city ordinance, as in this case. In support of its holding that the PECBA statute is substantive rather than procedural, the majority would make a distinction between: (1) a statute which mandates a city procedure by a city agency, and (2) a statute which does not mandate a city procedure by a city agency, but provides for a mandatory procedure by a state agency which supersedes and invalidates procedures provided by city agencies established under city charter or ordinance. According to the majority, because the PECBA statute is of the second type it is a substantive, not a procedural, statute. I disagree. Statutes of both types are statutes which are addressed to a concern of the state with the structure and procedures of local agencies because both have the purpose, as well as the effect, of superseding all existing and conflicting procedures established under city charters or ordinances. In my opinion, the distinction urged by the majority is one which could fool only a lawyer, to paraphrase a previous holding by this court. [7] As also recognized by this court in LaGrande/Astoria I, the legislature cannot do by indirection what it cannot do directly. (281 Or. at 151-52, 576 P.2d 1204). For all of these reasons, I am of the firm opinion that this statute is clearly a statute addressed to a concern of the state with the   procedures  of local government and, therefore, that the question whether that statute prevails over the conflicting procedures provided by the Roseburg ordinance must be determined by application of the criteria or test as stated by this court in LaGrande/Astoria for application in such cases, and as next discussed, i.e., whether the state concern has been    justified by a need to safeguard the interests of persons or entities affected by the procedures of local government. (281 Or. at 156, 576 P.2d 1204).