Opinion ID: 3009773
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the solid waste commerce clause jurisprudence

Text: The Early Cases The Supreme Court first recognized that the interstate hauling of solid waste was commerce for the purposes of Commerce Clause analysis in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). In that case, the Court struck down a New Jersey ordinance that prohibited the importation of solid or liquid waste that originated out-of-state. While New Jersey could pursue its goal of restricting access to its diminishing waste disposal facilities, it could not do so by blocking only out-ofstate waste. Id. at 626-27. The Court explained that such a clear example of purposeful economic protectionism -- a virtual import ban -- is subject to a per se rule of invalidity. Id. at 625. Despite the solid waste disposal crisis of the 1980s, the Supreme Court has invalidated each of the ordinances that attempted to ban or to levy differential surcharges on waste generated out-of-state. See, e.g., Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2019 (1992) (invalidating regulation prohibiting out-of state waste in the landfill unless authorized by Congress); Oregon 24 Waste Sys. Inc. v. Dept. of Environmental Quality of Oregon, 114 S. Ct. 1346 (1994) (voiding differential charge); Chemical Waste Management Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992) (same). In response to these successful constitutional challenges, municipalities sought other means of managing solid waste disposal. Instead of attempting to limit the quantity of waste by banning or discouraging the importation of out-of-state waste, local governments opted to expand the capacity of their waste disposal facilities. They obtained the financing for these expansions by adopting flow control ordinances, which were necessary to reassure the bondholders (and the underwriters). Dormant Commerce Clause challenges to these statutes ensued.