Opinion ID: 3149633
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Dean’s statement in allocution

Text: {¶ 314} Before final sentencing, Dean thanked his attorneys and thanked the judge for being fair and just throughout the whole trial. Dean also made a plea based on the fact that he was not the principal offender, stating: 89 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO You, I, God, and everybody in this courtroom knows I didn’t kill Titus Arnold; and I don’t have no bitterness, no angry [sic], no animosity toward the family. I really never could wrap my mind around the tragedy that they’re going through; but, once again, I played no part in Titus Arnold’s murder. (Emphasis added and brackets sic.) {¶ 315} The statutory mitigating factors under R.C. 2929.04(B) include R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) (victim inducement); (B)(2) (duress, coercion, or strong provocation); (B)(3) (mental disease or defect); (B)(4) (youth of the offender); (B)(5) (lack of a significant criminal record); (B)(6) (accomplice only); and (B)(7) (any other relevant factors). {¶ 316} The first five statutory mitigating factors do not apply. However, R.C. 2929.04(B)(6) does apply because Dean was not the principal offender in killing Arnold. Indeed, Dean argues that he should not receive the death penalty because Wade fired the shot that killed Arnold. {¶ 317} Yet Dean’s participation in Arnold’s murder and the attempted murders was extensive. The evidence shows that Dean was 30 years old and Wade was only 16. Dean exercised great influence over Wade and supplied the car and the weapons used in the offenses. Dean also attempted to shoot Arnold before Wade killed him. {¶ 318} When the offender plays a critical role as a leader, we have held that the R.C. 2929.04(B)(6) factor will carry less weight. See Were, 118 Ohio St.3d 448, 2008-Ohio-2762, 890 N.E.2d 263, at ¶ 267-269 (a leader in Lucasville prison riots who was not an actual killer); State v. Robb, 88 Ohio St.3d 59, 91, 723 N.E.2d 1019 (2000) (same); State v. Cunningham, 105 Ohio St.3d 197, 2004-Ohio-7007, 824 N.E.2d 504, ¶ 136; (no evidence was shown that defendant killed either victim, but he was a crucial participant in the murders); State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 71- 90 January Term, 2015 72, 752 N.E.2d 904 (2001) (participant in murder for hire even though shooter and others did not receive death penalty). Dean played a critical role in Arnold’s death, and we give little weight to the R.C. 2929.04(B)(6) factor. {¶ 319} Some weight should also be given to other mitigating evidence under the catchall provision of R.C. 2929.04(B)(7). Such evidence includes the love that Dean shares with members of his family. His expression of sympathy towards the victim’s family is also entitled to weight. {¶ 320} We find nothing mitigating in the nature and circumstances of the offenses. Dean and Wade went on a four-day crime spree that culminated in the shooting death of Arnold. Dean and Wade stole approximately six dollars from Arnold after he was shot and killed. But Dean’s history, character, and background provide some mitigating value. Dean grew up in a dysfunctional family. His parents neglected Dean, did not value his school attendance, and abused alcohol and marijuana in the home. Dean’s father whipped Dean with a belt to impose discipline and showed his son no affection. Dean’s mother smoked pot with Dean and turned a blind eye to stolen property that her sons brought into the home. Dean’s parents also engaged in physical altercations on a frequent basis in front of Dean. On the other hand, Elliott, Dean’s aunt, helped raise Dean and his brothers and brought a degree of stability into their lives. Elliott described Dean as “a basically good boy” and stated that he followed her rules and respected her. {¶ 321} Certainly, Dean lacked parental oversight and had a poor upbringing. Thus, we give weight in mitigation to Dean’s background and upbringing. But we have upheld the death penalty for defendants with backgrounds similar to or worse than Dean’s. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 141 Ohio St.3d 171, 2014-Ohio-3707, 23 N.E.3d 1023, ¶ 280-291; Elmore, 111 Ohio St.3d 515, 2006Ohio-6207, 857 N.E.2d 547, at ¶ 149-159; State v. Campbell, 95 Ohio St.3d 48, 5054, 765 N.E.2d 334 (2002). Moreover, as the state points out, there is no evidence 91 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO that Dean suffered from sexual abuse, intellectual deficits, or psychological impairment, which are often factors in many death-penalty cases. {¶ 322} Dean argues that he should not receive the death penalty because Wade received a life sentence. See State v. Wade, 2d Dist. Clark No. 06-CA-108, 2007-Ohio-6611. Wade’s lesser sentence is entitled to consideration as a nonstatutory mitigating factor. See Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d at 208-209, 702 N.E.2d 866. But Wade was a juvenile and not subject to the death penalty. Moreover, we have held that “[d]isparity of sentence does not justify reversal when the sentence is neither illegal nor an abuse of discretion.” State v. Jamison, 49 Ohio St.3d 182, 191, 552 N.E.2d 180 (1990); see also State v. Stumpf, 32 Ohio St.3d 95, 108, 512 N.E.2d 598 (1987) (co-defendant’s life sentence for his part in the victim’s murder not an impediment to affirming the death sentence in defendant’s case). Thus, we do not give significant weight to the disparity in sentences between Dean and Wade. {¶ 323} We weigh the aggravating circumstance of the course-of-conduct specification under R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) against these mitigating factors. Dean was complicit in Arnold’s murder, attempted to murder Piersoll and Lyles at the Mini Mart, and attempted to murder Shanta and Hassan Chilton and Shani and JaeAda Applin on the porch at 609 Dibert Avenue. Dean’s mitigating evidence is weak in comparison. Dean also showed little remorse for what happened. We find that the aggravating circumstance outweighs the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. {¶ 324} Finally, we hold that the sentence is both appropriate and proportionate. See State v. Foust, 105 Ohio St.3d 137, 2004-Ohio-7006, 823 N.E.2d 836 (one murder and one attempted murder); State v. Beuke, 38 Ohio St.3d 29, 526 N.E.2d 274 (1988) (one murder and two attempted murders). {¶ 325} In reaching this conclusion, we reject Dean’s argument that any meaningful proportionality review should include Wade’s case. See Steffen, 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 509 N.E.2d 419, at syllabus (“The proportionality review required 92 January Term, 2015 by R.C. 2929.05(A) is satisfied by a review of those cases already decided by the reviewing court in which the death penalty has been imposed”). We also reject the claim that Steffen’s limited proportionality review is constitutionally flawed. See id. at 123.