Opinion ID: 1385357
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Concluding Remarks

Text: Part III of this opinion reflects a hope that further discussion of recusal and disqualification may be nurtured. My intent is to imply no criticism of any judge. Like Justice Rehnquist (quoted above), I note that, fair-minded judges might disagree. Yet I believe strongly that the troubling issues should be aired and that precedential rulings should not be entombed in unpublished orders and other papers available only in court clerks' offices. I have not yet discussed procedures for disqualification. The rules are complex. Not enough is known about them or their history in California, especially as to appellate judges. Appropriate analysis requires the untangling of a morass of precedents and practices that unjustifiably would lengthen my comments here. (See the brief discussion of Code Civ. Proc., § 170.6 at the beginning of my Part III, above; cf. the 2d par. (et seq.) of subd. 5 of § 170 (Annex B here), which governs trial judges only.) New law on the role of substitute courts and the rule of necessity that could have great procedural impacts was indorsed in Mosk v. Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 474, 482 [159 Cal. Rptr. 494, 601 P.2d 1030] (where ... all the Supreme Court justices were ultimately disqualified, the Chief Justice is empowered to make the assignment [of pro tem justices] under the rule of necessity). (Cf. Kleps, Disqualifications, Substitute Courts and Assigned Judges, L.A. Daily Journal (Oct. 3, 1979); and see the last paragraph of Annex P here; also Annex Q. [5] ) For full awareness of the innumerable rules that do affect the well and faithful discharge of judges' duties, not only our consciences but also both substantive and procedural requirements will have to be searched and researched with much care. Temptations to recuse and formal motions for disqualification are likely to multiply because (1) more and more lawyers may decide to exploit challenges as newly honed weapons of advocacy, and (2) challenges inevitably will be part of the now-recognized and disturbing politicization of many judicial concerns. (Cf. fn. 3, ante; People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514, 545-546 [156 Cal. Rptr. 450, 596 P.2d 328].) California will benefit, I suggest, if its judges respond to those problems as they do to the many other problems involving law that often confound us sorely but impede us not. The petition of appellant Cory for a rehearing was denied May 30, 1980. Bird, C.J., and Tobriner, J., did not participate therein. Brown (G.A.), J., [] and Racanelli, J., [] participated therein. Newman, J., and Racanelli, J., [] were of the view that the petition should be granted and then rendered the following separate opinions dissenting to the denial of rehearing. NEWMAN, J. Dissenting. On May 30, 1980, five justices concluded (1) that in this case there should be no rehearing, and (2) that nonetheless their opinion must be modified. I set forth here (in Part I) the reasons for my belief that a rehearing is needed and also (in Part II) the modifications of my earlier opinion that, because of the majority's modifications and because of facts and arguments that seem to me to appear only in the rehearing documents, I now regard as essential. I dissent: