Opinion ID: 765595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Title 42 U.S.C. S 6928(d)(1)

Text: 31 The indictment charged Fiorillo and Krueger with knowingly stor[ing] corrosive hazardous waste in violation of 42 U.S.C. S 6928(d)(2) 6 and with knowinglytransport[ing] and caus[ing] to be transported a corrosive hazardous waste in violation of 42 U.S.C. S 6928(d)(1). 7 The jury found both defendants guilty on both counts. Fiorillo and Krueger challenge their convictions for violating subsection 6928(d)(1), asserting that its causes to be transported provision applies only to those who generate hazardous waste for transport by others. The Government argues that the causes to be transported prohibition is not limited to hazardous waste generators and that the defendants properly were convicted of both storing and causing transportation of hazardous waste. We agree with the defendants that a person who merely receives hazardous waste does not cause[ ] that waste to be transported under section 6928(d)(1). We nevertheless affirm the defendants' convictions because the record shows that Fiorillo and Krueger took responsibility for and carried out the transportation of the Eclipse and Slurry from Diversey's storage location to the West Coast warehouse. 32 We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. See United States v. Doe, 136 F.3d 631, 634 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1338 (1999). Examination of the plain language of the statute itself always marks the starting point of our analysis. See Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 415 (1990). In addition to the particular statutory language, however, we look to the design of the statute as a whole. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990). If application of these guidelines reveals a clear meaning, we examine the legislative history only to determine whether there is clearly expressed legislative intention contrary to[the statutory] language, which would require us to question the strong presumption that Congress expresses its intent through the language it chooses. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca , 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987) (quotation omitted). With these principles in mind, we turn to the task of examining section 6928(d)(1). 33 Fiorillo and Krueger assert that their actions of unlawfully receiving and storing hazardous waste did not cause[ ] the transportation of that waste under section 6928(d)(1); the Government refutes this contention. 8 The word cause has a plethora of meanings. Among its common definitions are to bring about, to compel, see Black's Law Dictionary 200 (5th ed. 1979), and to effect by command, authority, or force, see Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 175 (1979). Various legal standards draw fine lines between types of causation -ranging from an indirect, peripheral contribution to an immediate and necessary precedent of an event. Looking at the word cause itself, therefore, does not allow us to discern the specific actions to which Congress intended to attach criminal liability under section 6928(d)(1). The statute's overall structure reveals, however, that as Congress used the phrase here, causes to be transported does not include a warehouse's receipt of hazardous waste pursuant to a contract. 34 Section 6928(d) contains a comprehensive, seven-item list of acts related to hazardous waste management for which the Federal government imposes criminal penalties. Each of the seven subdivisions addresses a particular category of prohibited activity. For example, subsection (d)(3) pertains to making false representations in required documentation of hazardous waste; subsection (d)(4) pertains to the destruction of, alteration of, or failure to file any required documentation; and subsection (d)(6) pertains to the exportation of hazardous waste to other countries. See 42 U.S.C.S 6928(d). More pertinent to the issue before us, subsections (d)(1) and (d)(2) penalize two distinct sets of acts involving the handling of hazardous waste without a permit. Subsection (d)(1) addresses transporting and causing to be transported hazardous waste to a facility lacking a permit, whereas subsection (d)(2) addresses treating, storing, and disposing of hazardous waste without or in violation of a permit. See id. By dividing these activities into two categories, Congress demonstrated that, despite the similarities between the prohibitions in subsections (d)(1) and (d)(2), it intended to distinguish between these two groups of conduct in some way. The principal distinction is that subsection (d)(1) describes activities connected to the creation and shipping of hazardous waste, while subsection (d)(2) covers only the receipt and processing of the waste. Stated another way, subsection (d)(1) pertains to the direction of hazardous waste to a facility that lacks a permit, whereas subsection (d)(2) addresses activities occurring at the unpermitted facility. 35 We acknowledged this distinction between subsections (d)(1) and (d)(2) when discussing a different aspect of those provisions in United States v. Speach, 968 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1992). Speach presented the issue of whether the Government must prove that a section 6928(d)(1) defendant knew that the recipient facility of the hazardous waste lacked a permit. We answered this question in the affirmative, relying in part upon the following reasoning: 36 [T]he two provisions [(d)(1) and (d)(2) ] target different groups of defendants. Section 6928(d)(2)(A) imposes criminal liability on the person who knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of waste, when he or his facility lacks a permit, whether or not he knew that the permit was lacking . . . . 37 In contrast, section 6928(d)(1) deals not with the violator's lack of a permit, but with the lack of a permit on the part of the person to whom the violator delivers hazardous waste. 38 Id. at 797. In this passage, Speach implicitly recognized that the violator of subsection (d)(1) is the person responsible for making the delivery of hazardous waste, not the person who merely accepts the shipment. 9 39 The duplicate coverage of the same conduct that would result if we adopted the Government's interpretation of section 6928(d)(1) supplies additional structural evidence supporting our understanding of this provision. The Government contends that any person who, without a permit,receive[s] hazardous waste after it has been shipped from the generating facility causes to be transported that hazardous waste in violation of subsection (d)(1). 10 If this interpretation of the statute were correct, the same act--receiving hazardous waste --would subject the actor to liability under subsection (d)(2)(A) as well as subsection (d)(1). 11 This construction would contradict logic and ignore the basic assumption that Congress does not use different language in different provisions to accomplish the same result. 12 Following this presumption, therefore, we construe section 6928(d)(1) as applying to conduct other than that covered under section 6928(d)(2). 40 Another of the seven categories of criminal conduct listed in section 6928--subsection (d)(5)--provides the final piece of structural evidence upon which we rely in concluding that subsection (d)(1) does not apply to a person who merely receives and stores hazardous waste without a permit. Subsection (d)(5) imposes criminal penalties on any person who knowingly transports without a manifest, or causes to be transported without a manifest, any hazardous waste [required] to be accompanied by a manifest.  42 U.S.C. S 6928(d)(5). A manifest is the form used for identifying the quantity, composition, and the origin, routing, and destination of hazardous waste, 42 U.S.C. S 6903(12); various provisions of the federal hazardous waste management laws hold generators of hazardous waste responsible for providing this form to the transporter. 13 Subsection (d)(5), therefore, proscribes the same two activities that subsection (d)(1) addresses--transporting and causing to be transported 14 and imposes conditions with which only a generator of hazardous waste reasonably can comply. This provision reinforces our understanding that subsection (d)(1) pertains to persons responsible for the delivery of hazardous waste, not merely the receipt of it, because only a generator (who supplies the manifest) or a transporter (who must obtain it before undertaking the transportation) reasonably could be expected to comply with these requirements. 41 In light of our conclusion, based upon our examination of the face of the statute, that Congress did not intend section 6928(d)(1) to apply to persons who do no more than receive hazardous waste, we examine the provision's legislative history only to determine whether Congress failed to express its actual intent in the language of the statute. When Congress enacted section 6928 in 1976, subsection (d)(1) prohibited only knowingly transport[ing] . . . hazardous waste . . . to a facility which does not have a permit. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795, 2812 (1976). In 1984, Congress amended the statute, adding the causes to be transported  language. The House Report accompanying the 1984 amendments explains the reasoning behind this addition: 42 This provision clarifies the criminal liability of generators of hazardous waste who knowingly cause the waste to be transported to an unpermitted facility. Because the generator is in the best position to know the nature of his waste material, the regulatory scheme established by RCRA places a duty on the generator in the first instance to make arrangements to transport and dispose of his waste properly. EPA's ability to obtain criminal penalties against generators who knowingly cause the transportation of hazardous waste to an unpermitted facility is essential to the regulatory scheme. 43 H.R. Rep. No. 98-198, pt. I (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5613. Far from indicating that Congress meant subsection (d)(1) to apply to anyone who merely accepts delivery of a shipment of hazardous waste, the House Report strengthens our understanding, based upon the statute's language and structure, that this provision applies only to those persons responsible for initiating, arranging for, or actually performing the transportation of the waste. 44 The Government contends that other circuits have interpreted section 6928(d)(1) to apply to persons who participate but minimally in facilitating the transportation of hazardous waste. In particular, the Government cites the First Circuit case of United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991), in which MacDonald & Watson, a company in the business of transporting and disposing of waste oils and contaminated soil, id. at 39, one of its officers, and two of its employees were convicted of violating subsection (d)(1). See id. at 39-40. One of the employees challenged her conviction, contending that insufficient evidence existed that she caused the transportation of the hazardous waste, but the court affirmed the conviction based upon evidence that her role in negotiating, reviewing and facilitating the contract on behalf of MacDonald & Watson directly assisted in causing the transportation of the material. Id. at 42 n.4 (emphasis added). The Government erroneously focuses upon the arguably supplemental part this employee played in arranging the transportation and the First Circuit's upholding of her conviction in spite of that role. For purposes of assessing the scope of subsection (d)(1), the critical point in MacDonald & Watson is that this employee worked for the company that removed the contaminated soil from its point of origin and transported it to a disposal facility, activities that all parties in this case concede subsection (d)(1) covers. The court's conclusion regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support the employee's conviction simply pertains to her degree of responsibility for MacDonald & Watson's conduct; that her participation, if significant enough to implicate her at all, related to the transportation of the hazardous waste, was never in doubt. See id. (noting employee's position of responsibility with MacDonald & Watson and fact that she reviewed the contracts on behalf of the company in finding evidence sufficient to support her conviction). 45 Although MacDonald & Watson's sufficiency of the evidence discussion merely confirms the obvious--that transporters of hazardous waste may be liable under subsection (d)(1)--other portions of the opinion support our reading of the statute. In comparing subsection (d)(1) to subsection (d)(2), the First Circuit stated: 46 Since generators and transporters have little control over either the operation of the facility or the manner of disposal after the wastes are delivered to the facility, it is not surprising that subsection (d)(1) omits a provision relating to manner of disposal, and limits generator and transporter responsibility to ensuring that the facility has an appropriate permit for the type of waste being delivered. Id. at 49 (emphasis added). 15 47 We must clarify that our interpretation of this provision does not mean that a person must be in the business of generating or transporting hazardous waste in order to run afoul of section 6928(d)(1). In some circumstances, the intended recipient of hazardous waste may also violate subsection (d)(1) by personally undertaking the transportation of the hazardous waste or by making arrangements for a third party to perform that task. Recognizing this possibility, we decline to adopt the interpretation of the statute, advocated by the defendants, that subsection (d)(1) applies only to generators and transporters of hazardous waste. Instead, we hold that the language of section 6928(d), its structure, and its legislative history dictate that subsection (d)(1) does not apply to a person who does not participate in or direct the transportation of hazardous waste, but merely receives that waste. 48 Turning our attention to these defendants' conduct, we first note that, because the jury found both defendants guilty of violating subsection (d)(1), we must construe the record in the light most favorable to the Government. 16 According to Farris, he solicited bids from three companies, including SafeWaste, when he learned Diversey needed to dispose of the Eclipse and Slurry. In response to this inquiry, Fiorillo submitted to Farris a written proposal, dated January 26, 1993. 17 Farris accepted Fiorillo's bid because it was the lowest and because they previously had had a good working relationship. 18 On February 24, 1993, Farris, Fiorillo, and Krueger signed another document printed on West Coast letterhead that was substantially identical to the January 26 letter and that also was styled as a proposal letter from Fiorillo to Farris. 19 As Farris testified, however, and as the writing itself indicates, the February 24 document actually was a memorialization of a meeting among the three men, and it constituted the contract to which all three were parties. 20 The contract states: 49 Per our meeting today with yourself [Farris], Art Krueger (Safewaste Corp.) and myself [Fiorillo], regarding your warehoused hazardous material. The following is our proposal for handling, transportation, disposal and EPA compliance documentation for Diversey products Eclipse, Slurry, and PEP in one and six gallon containers. Service Cost 50 . . . . 51 Freight (from current ware$1,760.00 per load house location or any in-line multiple stop locations to disposal site). 52 . . . . Terms 53 A. On a load by load basis, 50% of the billing amount is to be paid upon confirmed pick-up of the product from your warehouse site or the last stop on a multiple site pick-up. 54 . . . . Assumptions 55 . . . . 56 2. You will deliver to us an accurate location, address, contact name and phone number of all inventory as described on your product disposal form. 57 3. You will give us the authority to request an accurate inventory and product condition description for each location. 21 Below Fiorillo's signature is the heading Sign Off An [sic] Approval. 22 Signature lines for Fiorillo, Krueger, and Farris as representatives of their respective corporations appear under this heading; all three signed this document on February 24, 1993. 23 58 Other evidence exists that Krueger and Fiorillo actually arranged for and conducted the transportation of the Eclipse and Slurry from Diversey's storage facilities. Throughout his extensive testimony, Farris frequently asserted that Fiorillo undertook the transportation 24 and that Kruegerparticipated in this activity, as well. 25 Farris also offered examples of contacts he had had with both defendants that supported his account of Fiorillo's and Krueger's responsibilities. 26 Significantly, there is no evidence in the record contradicting Farris's account that defendants undertook and incurred the costs of transporting the Eclipse and Slurry. Based upon this evidence, the jury reasonably could have determined that Fiorillo and Krueger did much more than simply receive the hazardous waste and store it: they proposed (and Farris agreed) that Diversey would pay them to make arrangements for transporting the waste to the West Coast warehouse. 59 We are at a loss to understand why the Government argued on appeal that Section 6928(d)(1) applies to those who merely receive hazardous waste, implicitly asserting that we would have to adopt that construction of the statute in order to affirm these convictions, when the record plainly reveals that even under our narrower interpretation of subsection (d)(1), Fiorillo and Krueger violated this provision. Irrespective of the Government's failure to frame this issue appropriately either in its brief or at oral argument, however, we may not ignore record evidence that unquestionably supports the reasonableness of the jury's verdict. Despite our conclusion that section 6928(d)(1) does not apply to persons who merely receive hazardous waste, therefore, we affirm the defendants' convictions for transporting or causing the transportation of hazardous waste to a facility lacking a required permit.