Opinion ID: 719818
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Motion to Dismiss Based on Testimony Before the Grand Jury

Text: 53 Lacey also appeals the district court's failure to grant his motion to dismiss on the ground that his compelled testimony before the grand jury tainted any future prosecutions resulting from that compelled testimony. We review for abuse of discretion the district court's ruling on a motion to dismiss an indictment. United States v. Strayer, 846 F.2d 1262, 1265 (10th Cir.1988). 54 In exchange for a grant of use immunity, Lacey was ordered to testify before the grand jury in July 1992. Lacey's testimony was compelled after Lacey was convicted in absentia at his first trial, but prior to the Supreme Court's reversal of that conviction and remand for retrial in 1993. Lacey now argues that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated at his retrial because the district court did not adequately determine whether the government's evidence on retrial was obtained independent of his compelled testimony, or whether his compelled testimony influenced the trial testimony of the government's witnesses. 55 The Fifth Amendment states that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.... U.S. Const. amend. V, cl. 3. In order to balance this fundamental right against the government's need to obtain information through subpoenaed testimony, Congress has authorized the grant of use immunity to those persons ordered to testify before a grand jury. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002. 13 Thus, once a defendant shows that he or she has been compelled to testify under a grant of use immunity about a matter relevant to his or her prosecution, the burden then shifts to the government to demonstrate that  'all of the evidence it proposes to use was derived from legitimate independent sources.'  Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated December 7 and 8 v. United States, 40 F.3d 1096, 1101 n. 4 (10th Cir.1994) (quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461-62, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 1665-66, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1957, 131 L.Ed.2d 849 (1995). 56 In the typical case involving use immunity, it is common for the district court to conduct a Kastigar hearing to determine whether a defendant's compelled testimony was used in violation of the defendant's right against self-incrimination. Grand Jury Subpoenas, 40 F.3d at 1101 n. 4. However, in this case, the government represented to the district court that its presentation on retrial would involve exactly the same witnesses as Lacey's first trial, and the government also offered the transcript of the first trial as a comparative means of evaluating whether any of Lacey's compelled grand jury testimony was in fact used in violation of his right against self-incrimination. See United States v. Pantone, 634 F.2d 716, 721 (3d Cir.1980) (The earlier trial, and its trial transcript, constitute the wholly independent source for any evidence adduced at the retrial that Kastigar demands.); United States v. Borello, 624 F.Supp. 150, 153 (E.D.N.Y.1985) ([I]n light of the availability of the transcript from the prior trial, and based on the prosecutor's representations, [the court] conclude[s] that the government has met its burden under Kastigar.). Moreover, although Lacey broadly asserts that any future prosecutions would be tainted by his forced appearance before the Grand Jury, he has not made any specific allegation that the government actually used his testimony, either directly or indirectly, so as to require the district court to conduct a full-blown Kastigar hearing. Cf. United States v. North, 920 F.2d 940, 944 (D.C.Cir.1990) (If the prosecutor were to demonstrate ... that the witness had set down his story before exposure [to the immunized testimony], then the burden of going forward would shift to the defendant to challenge that version.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 941, 111 S.Ct. 2235, 114 L.Ed.2d 477 (1991). 57 Importantly, the government in the present case also adopted a further precautionary measure by erecting a so-called Chinese Wall between those persons who were exposed to Lacey's grand jury testimony and those who were not. See United States v. Schwimmer, 882 F.2d 22, 26 (2d Cir.1989) (noting that on retrial, government should establish a Chinese Wall to bar all those persons exposed to the grand jury testimony from participation in the case), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071, 110 S.Ct. 1114, 107 L.Ed.2d 1021 (1990). Specifically, the government in Lacey's retrial denied its witnesses all access to Lacey's compelled testimony. It also assigned a different prosecutor to Lacey's case, one who had neither participated in nor been exposed to the grand jury proceedings. In light of the prophylactic measures taken by the government, the availability of the transcript from Lacey's first trial, and the failure of Lacey to allege any specific direct or indirect use of his compelled testimony, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion either by failing to conduct a Kastigar hearing, or by denying Lacey's motion to dismiss the indictment. 14