Opinion ID: 1822772
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Consistency with Legislative Intent Is Necessary

Text: Adding to the legislatively prescribed remedies for breaches of a statutory duty by creating a new common law remedy without any meaningful examination of legislative intent is contrary to the judiciary's proper function in our form of government. It is contrary to the principle this Court recognized over twenty-five years ago, when it said: As a general rule, that part of the common law codified by section 2.01 should be changed through legislative enactment and not by judicial decision. Only in very few instances and with great hesitation has this Court modified or abrogated any part of the common law enacted by section 2.01, and then only where there was a compelling need for change and the reason for the law no longer existed. E.g., Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla.1973). Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So.2d 352, 353-54 (Fla.1979). Similarly, it is contrary to the principle recognized in Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So.2d 983, 985 (Fla.1994), where this Court unanimously agreed that legislative intent . . . should be the primary factor considered by a court in determining whether a cause of action exists when a statute does not expressly provide for one. (Emphasis added.) It is also contrary to the evolution in tort law that has been recognized by the Restatement (Second) of Torts since 1979, when the authors adopted section 874A (Tort Liability for Violation of Legislative Provision) to supplement the approach previously suggested by section 286 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A cmt. d (1979) (If the court has reached the conclusion that the legislative body did actually have the intent either to establish a civil remedy to protect and enforce the right or to limit the relief to that expressly provided for in the legislative provision, the issue is settled, and the court is warranted in declaring that it is complying with the legislative intent.). Raisen, Murthy, and section 874A of the Restatement recognized a fundamental, general principle: (1) if the Legislature expressly provides remedies for the breach of a new duty it imposes (and a private remedy is not included among these remedies), and (2) there is no indication that the Legislature intends to change the common law by providing a private remedy for a breach of that duty, the courts should not modify the common law in order to create a remedy. In other words, except in very unique cases, the courts should accept the Legislature's express choice of remedies for the breach of a duty it created and not modify the common law to create an additional remedy. As stated earlier, while the courts certainly have the discretion to add a private remedy to the remedies provided by the Legislature, they must be careful to exercise that discretion cautiously and soundly. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A cmt. d (1979). It must be exercised cautiously in order to preserve the important boundary between judicial and legislative powers. [10] And the thorough examination of legislative intent ensures that the court exercises its judicial powers cautiously and soundly. Section 874A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts suggests a meaningful method for thoroughly examining legislative intent. Under this method, the court initially considers whether the Legislature intended to create a private civil remedy or to modify the common law in order to provide a private remedy in tort. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A cmt. c (1979). If the court finds the legislature never contemplated the issue of a private civil remedy, the primary test for determining whether the courts should provide a tort remedy for violation of the legislative provision is whether this remedy is consistent with the legislative provision, appropriate for promoting its policy and needed to assure its effectiveness. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A cmt. h (1979). Using this Restatement method of examining legislative intent, I will establish that there is no basis to add to the remedies the Legislature expressly provided for when it developed Florida's strategy to confront the HIV/AIDS public health crisis and, as part of that strategy, created the duty of confidentiality for HIV testing.