Opinion ID: 1754584
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: was the mississippi board of nursing's decision to revoke the nursing license of terry lynn hanson supported by substantial evidence found to be clear and convincing or was it arbitrary and capricious?

Text: ¶ 13. The Board found the evidence to revoke the nursing license of Hanson to be clear and convincing. The Chancery Court found that the Board's decision was not supported by substantial evidence and was arbitrary and capricious. ¶ 14. In Charge # 1 of the Board's complaint, Hanson is accused of violating Mississippi Code Ann. § 73-15-29(1)(c) and (e) by holding a naked infant around its neck with one hand while making jests. An investigation began on December 15, 1993, led by Anita Wren, Head Nurse of the Newborn ICU at University of Mississippi Medical Center. The investigation revealed three nurses who were eyewitnesses to the alleged event: Nurse Dianne Brewer, Nurse Dovina Layton, and Nurse Barbara Gillespie. All three nurses testified that they witnessed Hanson holding a naked baby in an unsafe manner. Although there are variances in the testimony of the three nurses and two of the nurses did not report the incident for at least thirty days, the Board found their testimony to be conclusive proof of Hanson's guilt. In response, the Board found that Hanson held a neonatal intensive care patient in a manner which posed a danger and threat to such baby. ¶ 15. In contrast, the trial court placed great emphasis on the testimony of Dr. Mitchell Gruich, a medical doctor and second year pediatric resident at University of Mississippi Medical Center. Dr. Gruich testified that a baby held in the manner indicated by the accusing nurses would need emergency treatment almost immediately. The infant did suffer episodes of apnea and bardycardia (A and B) the following day when Nurse Hanson was not working. Dr. Gruich testified that these episodes of A and B could not be attributed to any mishandling of the baby the night before the episodes. ¶ 16. The trial court found the testimony of Dr. Gruich to be determinative. The court held: The discrepancies in Brewer's, Layton's and Gillespie's testimonies, the failure by Brewer and Gillespie to timely report such misconduct when it could have been easily documented with an incident report (forms readily available), and the misidentification of the person in charge, lead the Court to rely heavily on the testimony of Dr. Mitchell Gruich, the aforementioned medical doctor who works in the subject unit. Dr. Gruich accurately described the results and immediate symptomology that would be suffered by an infant held in the manner charged. Since the referenced infant did not suffer such immediate or near immediate symptom ology and no evidence is presented of that infant nor of any other infant who did experience such symptom ology or injury, the testimony of Appellant's accusers must by substantially discounted. Based on the considerations described above, the trial court found that the evidence against Hanson was not substantial and could not be viewed by a fair-minded fact-finder as clear and convincing. Therefore, the trial court reversed the license revocation as to Charge # 1. ¶ 17. Although there are some discrepancies in the testimony of the nurses, it must be remembered that three people allegedly witnessed the charged conduct. Hanson offered no evidence into the record as to the reason that these nurses would falsely accuse her. The fact that they did not report the incident immediately is of concern to the Court, but acts of this nature are often unreported because of personal feelings, work relations, etc. The confusion over the charge nurse at the time of the incident does make the nurses' testimony appear less credible, but their testimony should not be totally disregarded because of this error. In its own words, the trial court gave great deference to the testimony of Dr. Gruich. Dr. Gruich testified that the baby would need medical treatment almost immediately if held in the manner charged. Since the baby suffered no immediate trauma and needed no immediate treatment, the trial court concluded that the incident did not happen. ¶ 18. In regard to Charge # 1, the Board's holding that Hanson violated Miss. Code Ann. § 73-15-29(1)(c) and (e) is supported by substantial evidence that could be viewed as clear and convincing by a fair-minded fact finder. The Board observed the testimony of the witnesses and weighed the evidence accordingly. The trial court reweighed the evidence placing an emphasis on the testimony of Dr. Gruich. Therefore, as to Charge # 1, the decision of the Board should be reinstated. ¶ 19. Hanson admitted to the practices outlined in Charges # 2, # 3, and # 4. In her written statement, Hanson admitted to carrying babies by the armpits. Hanson also admitted that she carried infants to the scales and to the sink to wash their heads. In her testimony, she admitted to flipping the levers on the isolettes to stimulate the babies but does not admit to doing it rapidly. ¶ 20. The Board found Hanson's conduct to be inconsistent with the health and safety of the patients under her care and outside of the generally accepted standards of nursing practice. We agree. ¶ 21. The Board's authority to suspend or revoke nursing licenses arises from the Legislature's desire to protect the public from improper nursing practices. It is the Board's responsibility to oversee the actions of Registered Nurses around the State and to discipline any nurse who endangers the health or safety of the public. The Board found the practices employed by Hanson to be contrary to the best interest of the patients at the University of Mississippi Medical Center and revoked her license to practice nursing in order to protect the public. ¶ 22. The trial court found the Board's decision to be arbitrary and capricious because many other nurses admitted to using the same improper practices as Hanson. Hanson's wrongdoing should not be justified by the wrongs of others. In the interest of public policy, this Court will give deference to the determination of the Nursing Board and reverse the decision of the trial court as to this issue.
¶ 23. This issue was not addressed in the trial court's decision to reverse the findings of the Nursing Board. This issue can be divided into two questions. Did the Board afford Hanson due process? Was the Board biased? The answer appears clear as to the first issue. Hanson was informed of the time and place of the hearing. She was also informed that she had the right to appear, either personally or by counsel, or both, to produce witnesses or evidence in her behalf, to have subpoenas issued by the Board, and to cross-examine any witnesses introduced by the Board. Hanson took advantage of all the aforementioned rights at the hearing. This Court has held this process to be satisfactory in regard to the due process requirements of both the Mississippi and the United States Constitutions. Mississippi State Board of Nursing v. Wilson, 624 So.2d 485, 494-495 (Miss. 1993). ¶ 24. Hanson also argues that the Board was biased because she had named each member individually in a federal lawsuit, therefore she could not receive a fair hearing. Hanson claims that the Board conducted the hearing in such a manner as to deprive her of justice. The Board counters Hanson's assertions by quoting the opinion of United Cement v. Safe Air for the Environment, Inc., 558 So.2d 840, 842-843, which states: Administrative hearings of the character involved here are not trials and they are not governed by the same rules which apply in a court of law. New South Communications v. Answer Iowa, Inc., 490 So.2d 1225, 1227 (Miss. 1986). Further, there is a presumption that the officers conducting the hearing and the members of the Board behave honestly and fairly in the conduct of the hearings and in the decision-making process. Harrison County School Board v. Morreale, 538 So.2d 1196, 1202 (Miss. 1989). Absent some showing of personal or financial interest on the part of the hearing officer or evidence of misconduct on the officer's part, this presumption is not overcome. Hanson did not meet the standard required by United Cement because she showed neither pecuniary interest by the Board in revoking her license, nor prejudgment by the Board. As evidence, Hanson points to the federal lawsuit. In voir dire at the hearing, each member of the Board stated that they had no knowledge of the lawsuit. The lawsuit in question seeks injunctive relief not damages, so there is no pecuniary interest by the Board even if they were aware of the lawsuit. ¶ 25. Hanson makes repeated objections to the way the hearing was conducted. The Board is correct in citing New South Communications, in that the hearing does not have to meet trial standards. Hanson does not meet the standard required by United Cement, therefore, this issue should be decided in favor of the Board.
¶ 26. This issue is not challenged by Hanson. It is directly within the power of the Nursing Board as stated in Miss. Code Ann. § 73-15-29(1). Therefore, it has no relevance to the case at hand. ¶ 27. REVERSED AND RENDERED. DAN LEE, C.J., PRATHER and SULLIVAN, P.JJ., and BANKS, JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., SMITH and MILLS, JJ., concur. McRAE, J., not participating.