Opinion ID: 2977272
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to reinstate Fourth Amendment claim

Text: Vakilian appeals the denial of his motion to reinstate his Fourth Amendment claims. Vakilian’s motion asked the district court to grant relief from this Court’s decision in Vakilian I based on “new” evidence as well as alleged misrepresentations made to the Sixth Circuit during oral argument in Vakilian I. Although the mandate rule requires a district court to adhere to the decisions of the court of appeals within a given case, there are limited exceptions that allow the district court to reopen an issue decided on appeal. See Mitchell v. Rees, 261 F. App’x 825, 828 (6th Cir. 2008) (relief from court of appeals mandate may be granted where “substantially different evidence [is] raised on subsequent trial” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We construe the motion as one under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) for relief from a final order, see, e.g., id., and therefore 10 Vakilian v. Shaw Case No. 07-1576 apply an abuse of discretion standard. See Futernick v. Sumpter Twp., 207 F.3d 305, 313 (6th Cir. 2000); see also McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 326-27 (7th Cir. 2000) (reviewing denial of motion to reinstate claim for abuse of discretion). Vakilian’s argument for reinstatement is meritless because the new facts and fraudulent representations he alleges do nothing to alter this Court’s prior ruling on this very issue. In Vakilian I, we explained that to overcome Shaw’s entitlement to qualified immunity, Vakilian was required to establish: (1) a substantial showing that Shaw stated a deliberate falsehood or showed reckless disregard for the truth, and (2) that the allegedly false or omitted information was material to the finding of probable cause. Vakilian I, 335 F.3d at 517. We assumed, for the sake of argument, that Vakilian had made a showing that Shaw lied in his testimony in support of the warrant request when he stated that Vakilian knew of the illegal kickback scheme. Id. at 518. We went on to find that under Michigan law at the time the warrant was obtained, the MFCA contained no requirement of knowledge that the kickback being received was in fact a kickback—rather, it simply required a showing that the defendant received a kickback. Therefore, all of the “new” statements showing that Defendants believed they were required to show knowledge of the kickback scheme are immaterial, as are the comments of Defendants’ counsel at oral argument discussing what Defendants believed at the time they obtained the warrant. Id. Under law-of-the-case doctrine, both the district court and we are precluded from revisiting our prior holding, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Vakilian’s motion to reinstate his Fourth Amendment claim. See McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 219 F.3d 508, 513 n.3 (6th Cir. 2000) (law of the case is binding absent substantially different evidence, a change in controlling law, or clear error and manifest injustice). 11 Vakilian v. Shaw Case No. 07-1576