Opinion ID: 2069162
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Exclusion of the Lease

Text: In a related matter, plaintiff claims that the trial justice erred by excluding evidence of a 1977 lease involving property located at Gage Street in Providence, Rhode Island. The plaintiff intended to use the lease to impeach defendant's testimony that he had not collected rents on the property from 1974 to 1980. It is undisputed that, despite the Mandarellis' pretrial discovery request to plaintiff to produce for inspection and copying all documents in the possession of plaintiff relating to the Gage Street property, plaintiff failed to produce the subject lease prior to trial. Moreover, in excluding the evidence when it was offered for the first time at trial, the trial justice found the lease irrelevant for impeachment purposes, reasoning that the document simply listed Roger Mandarelli as owner of the property, a fact that was not disputed. The trial justice also noted that the document was not produced pursuant to discovery requests, that it had little bearing on the truth-finding process at trial, and that its admission into evidence at such a late point in the proceedings would be prejudicial to the Mandarellis' case. The plaintiff, however, claims that when a defendant introduces evidence of a new and relevant part in his [or her] defense, the plaintiff is entitled to meet and discredit such evidence in rebuttal and the denial of this right    [is] error. McGonagle v. Souliere, 113 R.I. 683, 689, 324 A.2d 667, 670 (1974). We find plaintiff's argument unpersuasive. The exclusion of evidence on the grounds of relevancy is within the sound discretion of the trial justice, and this court will not disturb a trial justice's ruling on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. State v. Neri, 593 A.2d 953 (R.I. 1991). In this instance, the subject lease in no way contradicted defendant's denial pertaining to the collection of rents on the Gage Street property. The document is simply a 1977 lease purporting to reflect defendant as the owner of the property and another person as a tenant of the property. As such, the document has limited, if any, impeachment value with respect to defendant's denial that he collected any rents on this property, especially given the other evidence in the case that the person collecting rent on any given property may or may not have had any ownership interest therein. Further, plaintiff's reliance on McGonagle, 113 R.I. at 689, 324 A.2d at 670, is of no assistance here. McGonagle can be cited for the narrow proposition that, notwithstanding a plaintiff's failure to list a testifying witness in answers to interrogatories, highly relevant rebuttal testimony bearing directly on a key issue in a case should generally be received into evidence. However, in this case, for the reasons previously stated, the rebuttal evidence had little or no bearing on any disputed issue and its impeachment value was dubious at best. Hence, McGonagle is inapplicable.