Opinion ID: 2995079
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecutor’s remarks during closing

Text: argument Manjarrez’s final claim of error can be dismissed with dispatch. Manjarrez argues that the government improperly suggested to the jury that a defendant could be found guilty of conspiracy under an aiding-and-abetting theory of liability. He notes, correctly, that the district court had earlier rejected the government’s proposed instruction which specifically addressed aiding-and- abetting liability in the context of a conspiracy charge, and instead subsequently issued an aiding and abetting instruction which was not expressly tied to either the conspiracy charge (Count One) or to the substantive offense (Count Two). Manjarrez maintains that given the weakness of the government’s case and the subsequent juror confusion, the Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA)’s improper argument was prejudicial and likely induced the jury to convict in derogation of the trial court’s instructions and in violation of Manjarrez’s due process right to a fair trial./5 We disagree. As we recently noted, [i]n reviewing allegations of improper comments by a prosecutor, we employ a two-step process. We first look at the comments in isolation to determine if they were improper. . . . If we find the comments are proper, the analysis ends. If we find they are improper, we must then examine the comments in light of the record as a whole to determine whether the comments deprived the defendant of a fair trial. United States v. Castillo, 148 F.3d 770, 775 (7th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). A close reading of the allegedly improper remark and of the context in which it occurred reveals that the AUSA made the remark in an attempt to demonstrate Manjarrez’s guilt of the possession charge, not the conspiracy charge. The AUSA stated: I believe Judge Castillo is going to instruct you . . . that [the defendant is] guilty if he’s aiding and abetting someone else’s possession of the marijuana. That is, Mr. Manjarrez is renting the truck or driving the counter- surveillance, or both, so that he could help someone else possess this marijuana and move it . . . and he does that knowingly, then he is guilty of that charge. (emphasis supplied). The plain language of the statement refers exclusively to the possession charge, and the AUSA made the statement while discussing the facts and evidence pertinent to that charge, after he had finished discussing the conspiracy charge. The district court ultimately gave a generic aiding-and-abetting instruction, and Manjarrez does not argue (nor can he) that the jury could not find him guilty of the possession charge if they determined that he aided and abetted the commission of that offense. Therefore, the AUSA’s comment was entirely consistent both with the instructions given by the district court and with the law. Hence, we find that the remark was perfectly proper. It caused Manjarrez no prejudice, and it certainly did not deprive him of a fair trial.