Opinion ID: 629085
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Quid Pro Quo Discrimination

Text: 21 To prevail on a quid pro quo discrimination claim, the plaintiff must show that concrete employment benefits were conditioned on submission to sexual conduct. Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1413. The district court found that the plaintiff failed to present any evidence that her employment was conditioned on granting sexual favors to Gudgel. Order at 3. It also found that the plaintiff presented no facts in rebuttal of defendants' evidence that plaintiff's poor job performance, rather than Gudgel's advances explained her termination. Id. We agree. 22 The record is devoid of any evidence that Martin's employment was conditioned on granting sexual favors to Gudgel or to any of her supervisors or coemployees. In her submissions to this court, the plaintiff is unable to direct our attention to any examples of any such conditions occurring either within or outside of the time limitations imposed under Title VII. Instead, she relies only on her general conclusory allegations that she was terminated because of her refusal to submit to Gudgel's advances and her complaints about his behavior. Thus, Martin's quid pro quo claim is one for wrongful termination. 23 The Supreme Court has established, and this circuit has repeatedly adopted, a three-part test to determine whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie case under Title VII for a wrongful termination claim. Initially, the plaintiff must show that (i) she belongs to a protected class; (ii) she was qualified and satisfactorily performing her job; and (iii) she was terminated under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. See Allen v. Denver Pub. Sch. Bd., 928 F.2d 978, 985 (10th Cir.1991); McAlester v. United Air Lines, 851 F.2d 1249, 1260 (10th Cir.1988); see also Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 n. 6, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094 n. 6, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)). Once the plaintiff meets this burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the decision which adversely affected the employee. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. Once the defendant has set forth a facially nondiscriminatory reason for the decision, the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255, 101 S.Ct. at 1095. The plaintiff assumes the burden to prove that the employment decision was the result of intentional discrimination based on an impermissible motive. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095. The plaintiff can prevail either directly by proving that the employer acted with a discriminatory motive or indirectly by showing that the stated reason for the discharge was a pretext for the sort of discrimination prohibited by [Title VII]. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, --- U.S. ----, ---- n. 6, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2752 n. 6, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S.Ct. at 1825); E.E.O.C. v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1316-17 (10th Cir.1992). 24 In this case, the district court found that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case because she did not present any evidence that she was fired because she refused to submit to the sexual demands of Gudgel or his employees. As an alternate rationale for its holding, the court found that the plaintiff failed to rebut the defendants' legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for her termination. 8 25 In response to the initial complaint, the defendants proffered two reasons for Martin's termination: that she had attempted to conceal information about financial dealings from Gudgel, and that she failed to complete assignments when requested. To support these justifications, the defendants submitted the separation notice used when Martin was terminated as well as affidavits from a co-worker and the company bookkeeper. 9 In response, Martin submitted her own affidavit in which she asserted 26 The alleged basis for my termination was a pretext as I knew the allged [sic] basis was untrue, but was procedurally in keeping with the method Mr. Gudgel employed to rid himself of employees which might present him with legal problems. 27 We agree with the district court that Martin's conclusory statements concerning the validity of the defendants' justifications are inadequate to overcome summary judgment. At this stage of the analysis, we are charged to determine whether the evidence, interpreted favorably to the plaintiff, could persuade a reasonable jury that the employer had discriminated against the plaintiff. MacDonald v. Eastern Wyoming Mental Health Ctr., 941 F.2d 1115, 1121-22 (10th Cir.1991) (citations and quotations omitted); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In the face of the strong and detailed evidence presented by the defendants, Martin is unable to provide anything but her own unsupported assertion that the reasons given for her termination are a pretext for sexual discrimination. 10 Conclusory statements are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 82, 121 L.Ed.2d 46 (1992); Peppers v. Coates, 887 F.2d 1493, 1498 (11th Cir.1989); Schering Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.1983); DiIulio v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 682 F.2d 666, 671 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038, 103 S.Ct. 451, 74 L.Ed.2d 605 (1982); Thornhill Publishing Co. v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738-39 (9th Cir.1979). We find that Martin has failed to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants on the quid pro quo harassment claim.