Opinion ID: 15662
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: failure to sequester case agents

Text: 15 During the trial, the district court permitted Detective Clifton Orr of the Beaumont Police Department to sit at counsel's table along with the FBI case agent, Ed Keeler. Because both Keeler and Orr were to testify, the defendants objected, invoking Rule 615 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (referred to as the Rule). Without making any specific finding, the district court overruled the defendants' objections. On Appellant Limbrick's request, the district court instructed the two case agents not to discuss the case with the other Government witnesses. However, they were not precluded from discussing the case with each other. Rule 615 provides: Exclusion of Witnesses 16 At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order of its own motion. This rule does not authorize exclusion of (1) a party who is a natural person, or (2) an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person designated as its representative by its attorney, or (3) a person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the party's cause. 17 We review a district court's compliance with Rule 615 for abuse of discretion, and we will only reverse if the appellants can demonstrate prejudice. See United States v. Payan, 992 F.2d 1387, 1394 (5th Cir.1993). 18 On appeal, all appellants complain that it was improper for the trial court to excuse Orr and Keeler from sequestration and allow them both to be present in the court room during trial and hear the testimony of witnesses including each other's testimony. Appellants rely on United States v. Farnham, 791 F.2d 331 (4th Cir.1986), in which the Fourth Circuit reversed convictions because two case agents were excused from the Rule, reasoning that the dictates of Rule 615 are mandatory, and not susceptible to trial court discretion or to a strict prejudice requirement. See id. at 335. We find Farnham neither controlling nor persuasive, especially in light of its explicit rejection of the Fifth Circuit's approach to Rule 615. See id. at 335 (Ignoring the mandatory ('shall') language of the rule, the Fifth Circuit invoked an abuse of discretion standard to uphold a trial court's refusal to exclude one of two ... case agents from the proceedings.... United States v. Alvarado, 647 F.2d 537, 540 (5th Cir.1981).). 19 This court has never directly decided whether the Government can designate more than one individual as its representative under Rule 615(2). See United States v. Payan, 992 F.2d 1387, 1394 (5th Cir.1993). But we have approved the use of two case agents at trial, where a second agent's non-exclusion could be justified under the essential-presence exception of Rule 615(3). See United States v. Alvarado, 647 F.2d 537, 540 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981). The Government argues that the complexity of this case justified a second case agent being excused from the Rule because two agents were essential to the presentation of the case. However, the prosecution did not invoke the third exemption at trial and the district court made no such finding. Further, we are not persuaded that this string of simple armed robberies falls within the ambit of Rule 615(3)'s complexity exception. Because neither the Government nor the district court has articulated a sound basis justifying the exemption of two agents from the requirements of Rule 615 and because, on review of the record, we can discern no such basis, we hold that the district court abused its discretion in overruling the Appellants' objection to the presence of both agents during the trial of this case. 20 Even so, Appellants have shown no prejudice. The purpose behind the sequestration of witnesses is to discourage and expose fabrication, inaccuracy and collusion, see Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules, and to minimize the opportunity that each witness will have to tailor his testimony. See United States v. Ramirez, 963 F.2d 693 (5th Cir.1992). Orr testified about the AutoZone robbery, the chain of custody of some items of evidence, the arrest of Appellant McCray, various witness statements that were taken and general Beaumont geography. Keeler testified that the incidents charged occurred in the Eastern District of Texas, that there was no Catfish King in Jasper, but there was a Catfish Cabin located in Jasper. Keeler also testified concerning a photo lineup, two uncharged robberies and about the effect of the robberies on interstate commerce. Generally, the two officers testified about different subject matter. In two instances during the cross examination, Keeler directly contradicted testimony given earlier by Orr. Therefore, we find that the two officers' testimony was not tailored due to the district court's failure to exclude one of them from the courtroom. In fact, the Appellants have not identified and we cannot discern any prejudice growing out of the district court's error. Therefore, we conclude that there was no reversible error in the district court's decisions regarding Rule 615.