Opinion ID: 78503
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant Hodges

Text: Plaintiff Hart argues Defendant Hodges is not immune from suit for the following acts: (1) conspiring to cause the issuance of the second state warrant; (2) calling upon law enforcement officers in Arkansas to detain Hart upon his release from the federal prison; (3) conspiring with Amideo to issue a notice to surrender to Hart and threatening further prosecution; and (4) issuing statements to the Albany Herald. [8] The district court reasoned that because Hodges was attempt[ing] to achieve completion of the sentence he thought was ordered by the federal and state court judges[,] he was entitled to absolute immunity. D. Ct. Order at 12 (Mar. 30, 2009) (citing Henzel, 608 F.2d 657). As an initial matter, it is clear that Hodges is not absolutely immune for his alleged statements to the press. The Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons categorically forecloses absolute prosecutorial immunity for statements to the media. 509 U.S. at 278, 113 S. Ct. at 2618. The district court thus erred in granting absolute prosecutorial immunity to Defendant Hodges for his statements to the Albany Herald. Our consideration of the remaining conduct concerns whether that conduct was intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, 96 S. Ct. at 995. After review, we agree with the district court that Hodges is entitled to absolute immunity for his alleged actions in (1) causing the Georgia DOC to issue the second state warrant instructing federal and Arkansas officials to retake Hart for his return to the Georgia prison to serve his already-imposed state sentence, (2) arranging to have Hart detained at the federal prison after his release in order to return to Georgia, and (3) conspiring to threaten Hart with further prosecution if he did not return to Georgia. [9] Our previous decisions held prosecutors were absolutely immune for filing a baseless detainer and threatening further criminal prosecution, Henzel, 608 F.2d at 657, and for forwarding information about a defendant to the Parole Commission as a continuation of the sentencing process. Allen, 815 F.2d at 1434; see also Lucien v. Preiner, 967 F.2d 1166, 1167 (7th Cir. 1992) (state prosecutor entitled to absolute immunity for sending letter during inmate's executive clemency proceedings because, [a] determination of executive clemency, like a parole decision, is an extension of the sentencing process). We see no material distinction between those earlier cases granting immunity for certain post-sentencing conduct and this case. All of Hodges's actions were directly related to and intimately associated with the state trial court's sentence and his role as an advocate regarding the court's sentence. Hodges was working to advocate the judicial sentence he understood (whether correctly or mistakenly) had been imposed by the state trial court. While not undertaken literally at the direction of the court, [Hodges's] activities [we]re so intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process as to cloak [him] with absolute immunity from suits for damages. Allen, 815 F.2d at 1434. Hart's argument on appeal relies heavily on his assertion that a prosecutor should be categorically denied absolute immunity if he disobeys a judge's order (e.g., the second state sentence that Hodges appealed) outside the presence of the judge. This argument, however, misapprehends the functional analysis used in considering absolute immunity. As we repeatedly have stated, the determination of absolute prosecutorial immunity depends on the nature of the function performed, not whether the prosecutor performed that function incorrectly or even with dishonesty, such as presenting perjured testimony in court. Jones, 174 F.3d at 1289. Hart's argument that conduct violating a judge's order, or more broadly, violating a legal obligation, should not be entitled to absolute immunity is not consistent with the fundamental purpose of absolute immunity. Absolute immunity renders certain public officials completely immune from liability, even when their conduct is wrongful or malicious prosecution. Having absolute immunity in civil damages actions would be of little consequence if it could only be asserted when the defendant prosecutor correctly complied with all his legal obligations, in which case there would be no claim. [10] Marx, 855 F.2d at 791 (plaintiff's argument that unlawful conduct bars assertion of absolute prosecutorial immunity was clearly without merit); Webster v. Gerstein, 913 F.2d 510, 513-14 (8th Cir. 1990) (affirming immunity for prosecutor's disregard of a judicial order to file an information or release the defendant). Rather, the absolute doctrine has evolved such that even wrongful or malicious acts by prosecutors are allowed to go unredressed in order to prevent a flood of claims against the remainder of prosecutors performing their duties properly. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 426, 96 S. Ct. at 994. [11] Indeed, as it turns out here, the second state sentencing order, that Hodges allegedly violated through his actions, was later determined to be void under Georgia law, and Hart was remanded for re-sentencing by the state sentencing court. State v. Hart, 263 Ga. App. at 9, 587 S.E.2d at 166. Given the gap between the 27-month state sentence originally imposed and the 24 months Hart actually served in federal prison, the state sentencing court imposed yet a third sentence, of time served, that definitively concluded the imprisonment portion of Hart's state sentence. For all of these reasons, we affirm the district court's order granting immunity to Defendant Hodges, except as to his statements to the press.