Opinion ID: 205003
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Prohibition on Contact with Children Condition

Text: Mike presents two challenges to this condition. [4] The first is that the condition is vague and suffers from overbreadth, as it offers no guidance in determining what constitutes contact with children and effectively excludes him from all places where children may be. The second is that the condition violates the Fifth Amendment by plac[ing] [Mike] in a position necessitating a choice `between making incriminating statements and jeopardizing his conditional liberty by remaining silent.' Appellant Br. 29-30 (quoting Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984)). Mike fairly raised these challenges to the district court so our review is for abuse of discretion. In support of his first argument, Mike cites United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79 (2d Cir.2001), and United States v. Smyth, 213 Fed.Appx. 102 (3d Cir.2007) (unpublished). In Peterson, the Second Circuit vacated a condition prohibiting the defendant from being on any school grounds, child care center, playground, park, recreational facility or in any area in which children are likely to congregate on the ground that is was ambiguous, and, depending on its construction, excessively broad. 248 F.3d at 86. In Smyth, the Third Circuit vacated a condition stating that the defendant shall not associate with children, other than his own children, under the age of 18. 213 Fed.Appx. at 104. As is clear from its opinion, the Smyth court's decision hinged on the fact that the sentencing court itself could not say how the condition would be imposed when pressed by defense counsel. Id. at 107. Peterson and Smyth are distinguishable from the present case. To begin with, the condition vacated in Peterson is different in kind from the one at issue here, as it imposed a location restriction, not an associational restriction. Furthermore, the Third Circuit's ruling in Smyth was motivated by the fact that not even the sentencing judge could tell the defendant how the restriction would be imposed, a fact not present here. As a consequence, both of these cases' holdings are of little persuasive value in this case. Two cases that we believe are more on point are United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251 (3d Cir.2001), and United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155 (5th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1002, 122 S.Ct. 1571, 152 L.Ed.2d 492 (2002). In Loy, the Third Circuit rejected the defendant's contention that a condition barring him from having any unsupervised contact with minors was vague because it was unclear whether it applied to casual or unavoidable contact made in public places. 237 F.3d at 268. The court premised its rejection on the fact that it is well established that associational conditions do not extend to causal or chance meetings. Id. at 269. In Paul, the defendant challenged, among other things, a condition requiring him to avoid direct and indirect contact with minors on overbreadth grounds. 274 F.3d at 165. The defendant claimed that the inclusion of the word indirect meant that the condition encompassed chance or incidental encounters with children. Id. at 166. Citing to Loy, the Fifth Circuit denied this challenge, stating that, properly interpreted, the condition did not include such encounters. Id. We believe the Third and Fifth Circuits' interpretation of associational restrictions similar to the one here is correct. As a result, we find no merit to Mike's vagueness and overbreadth arguments. We also find that Mike's Fifth Amendment argument is meritless. The Fifth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that no person  shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). In claiming that this condition runs afoul of this provision, Mike cities to United States v. Saechao, 418 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir.2005). In Saechao, the defendant was trying to have incriminating statements he had already made to his probation officer suppressed on the ground that one of his conditions of release compelled him to make the statements. 418 F.3d at 1076. Mike's reliance on Saechao is misplaced, as a crucial distinction exists between that case and this one: the defendant here has yet to make any incriminating statements. Because no incriminating statements have been made, the Fifth Amendment is not implicated. As a result, the condition will not be vacated on this ground. See United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1091-92 (11th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the defendant's argument that a condition requiring him to be subjected to polygraph testing violated his Fifth Amendment rights because the defendant had not yet been compelled to give incriminating statements).