Opinion ID: 2220705
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Krebs consented to the search of the interior of his car.

Text: For consent to a search to be valid, the totality of the circumstances must indicate that it was voluntarily given. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2058-59, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 875 (1973); State v. Woods, 374 N.W.2d 92, 100 (S.D.1985). The presence or absence of consent to search is a question of fact. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49, 93 S.Ct. at 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d at 875; State v. Nemeti, 472 N.W.2d 477, 478 (S.D. 1991); Zachodni, 466 N.W.2d at 628. The state bears the burden of demonstrating consent. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49, 93 S.Ct. at 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d at 875; Woods, 374 N.W.2d at 100. Our standard of review concerning consent to search is as follows: Because the presence or absence of consent to search is a question of fact, the trial court's resolution of that question will be upheld unless our examination of the evidence, construed in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings, convinces us that the finding was clearly erroneous. Nemeti, 472 N.W.2d at 478. Krebs' testimony indicates he left his automobile voluntarily; he was not coerced to leave the vehicle. There is no indication that Krebs was verbally threatened in order to obtain his consent to the search. Nor is there any evidence Krebs was physically threatened or given any promises in return for his consent to the search. The only physical contact the record indicates was an officer restraining Krebs' arm when he made an aggressive movement toward Wermers. Krebs claims he consented to a search but then limited Wermers' search to the cigarette package and lighter. Wermers testified Krebs agreed to the search as long as Krebs could watch. Wermers agreed that Krebs could watch him as long as Krebs did not stand near his right side, within reach of his weapon. The trial court, which is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witness, found the only condition Krebs put on his consent to search was that he wished to watch the procedure. The United States Supreme Court has recently stated that the scope of a search pursuant to consent is circumscribed by the officer's reasonable belief as to the extent of consent. United States v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. ___, ___, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1804, 114 L.Ed.2d 297, 302 (1991). We agree. Where Wermers believed Krebs consented to a search contingent only upon being allowed to watch, and the trial court so found, a review of the record, examined in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings, does not reveal the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous.