Opinion ID: 886928
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Waiver of At Will Termination Clause

Text: ¶ 32 Tvedt's next breach of contract claim asserts that Farmers' conduct waived any at will provisions in the Agreements. Specifically, Tvedt argues that, despite the at will termination language in the appointment agreements and a reference to the at will termination in the Standards, Farmers' express declarations and conduct reasonably induced a belief that it was waiving its discretion to terminate at will. In support of his argument, Tvedt cites the following language from the Standards: [I]ndividual District Managers must have a clear understanding of what is expected of them.... To determine whether the District Manager's contract is to be maintained or not, current year's ... results will be evaluated using the following General Component Criteria ... [and] These are the standards which all District Managers are expected to meet as a condition of continuing their District Managers' Appointment Agreement. Tvedt also states that language contained in correspondence from Bruce Gordon, Division Marketing Manager, also induced the belief that Farmers had waived its discretion to terminate at will: In 2001, you must achieve your net gain requirement of 19 full time agents by yearend. Failure to achieve this performance standard may result in the termination of your District Manager Appointment Agreement. ¶ 33 [W]aiver is a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right, claim or privilege which may be proved by express declarations or by a course of acts and conduct so as to induce the belief that the intention and purpose was to waive. Idaho Asphalt Supply v. DOT, 1999 MT 291, ¶ 19, 297 Mont. 66, ¶ 19, 991 P.2d 434, ¶ 19 (citing Kelly v. Lovejoy (1977), 172 Mont. 516, 520, 565 P.2d 321, 324). Waiver must be manifested in some unequivocal manner. Idaho Asphalt Supply, ¶ 23. Whether there has been such acquiescence as to defeat the enforcement of a valid restriction depends upon the circumstances of each case and the character and materiality of the permitted breach. Idaho Asphalt Supply, ¶ 23 (citing Kelly, 172 Mont. at 520, 565 P.2d at 324). ¶ 34 The District Court found that, while the Standards stated they would be used to determine whether the District Manager's contract is to be maintained or not and correspondence from Farmers to Tvedt urged him to meet them, the Standards also contained a clause stating: This program in no way modifies the Companies' right to terminate on 30-days notice, with or without cause, anytime during the measurement cycle. ¶ 35 Thus, in moving for summary judgment, Farmers established that it had reaffirmed its right to exercise the at will termination provision by reiterating the provision in the Standards. At that point, the burden shifted to Tvedt to demonstrate that Farmers unequivocally, intentionally, and voluntarily relinquished the right to enforce the at will provisions in the Agreements. However, Tvedt did not rebut Farmers' evidence, and thus failed to meet his burden. Farmers' effort to underscore its right, rather than relinquish it, is antithetical to a waiver. Idaho Asphalt Supply, ¶ 28. Thus, summary judgment in favor of Farmers on the issue of waiver is appropriate as a matter of law.