Opinion ID: 2197889
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: James's Placement

Text: [¶15] In absolute terms, the issue now before us is whether the court erred in determining that the subsequent order committing James to DHHS custody takes priority over a previous order committing him to DOC custody. The statutes providing for the disposition of an individual convicted of a crime, 17-A M.R.S. § 1252(1)(B)(2) (2007), and of an individual found not criminally responsible, 15 M.R.S. § 103, are both nondiscretionary. Section 1252(1)(B)(2) provides that a court must... [c]ommit the person to the Department of Corrections if the term of imprisonment is more than 9 months, while section 103 states that, if a defendant is found not criminally responsible by reason of insanity, the court shall order the person committed to the custody of [DHHS].... Neither statute provides a mechanism for determining which disposition of James, delivery to DOC or to DHHS, would take priority in the event of a conflict. Again, we review this issue de novo. See Christian Fellowship & Renewal Ctr., 2006 ME 44, ¶ 9, 896 A.2d at 291; Shepley, 2003 ME 70, ¶ 9, 822 A.2d at 1150. [¶16] A review of the plain language of the statutes themselves does not assist us in our determination of priority, as they appear to be inconsistent. When construing statutes, however, we must attempt to determine the legislative intent demonstrated both by the language used in each statute, and by the entire statutory scheme in which the language is found. Jordan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 651 A.2d 358, 360 (Me.1994). When statutes appear to clash, we harmonize them if at all possible. Yeadon Fabric Domes, Inc., v. Me. Sports Complex, LLC, 2006 ME 85, ¶ 20, 901 A.2d 200, 206. [¶17] The State argues that the scenario presented by this case was contemplated by the Legislature when it enacted 15 M.R.S. § 2124(1-A), as that statute provides that a person may file a post-conviction review petition to challenge a future restraint or impediment due to an order of commitment to the custody of DHHS pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 103 when a sentence involving imprisonment is or will be served first. Given the placement of that language within the post-conviction statutory chapter, we cannot accept the State's assertion that it mandates that James serve his sentence before commitment. Section 2124(1-A) simply states that an order of commitment resulting from a determination that one is not criminally responsible does create a restraint or impediment sufficient to trigger post-conviction jurisdiction. [3] The Legislature's decision to include future commitments within the category of orders that establish possible avenues for post-conviction review does, however, preclude us from accepting James's assertion that 15 M.R.S. § 103 mandates his immediate commitment to DHHS. [¶18] In State v. Flemming, 409 A.2d 220 (Me.1979), we addressed the reverse, but analogous, situation from that presented here. Flemming was charged with murder and, after being found not guilty by reason of mental disease, was committed pursuant to 15 M.R.S.A. § 103 (Supp. 1974) for placement in a treatment facility. Flemming, 409 A.2d at 222. He was subsequently found guilty of escaping from the facility. Id. The sentencing court ordered Flemming to serve five years in prison, but stayed the imposition of the sentence until after he was discharged from the mental health institution. Id. We affirmed the court's order deferring Flemming's prison sentence noting first that, had Flemming been convicted of murder and then convicted of escaping from prison while serving his sentence for murder, a consecutive sentence would have been mandated. Id. at 224, 226. We stated, [b]y analogy to consecutive sentencing, therefore, it is not inconsistent to defer the execution of a criminal sentence until a discharge from a mental institution. Id. at 225. We suggested that doubt might arise if the trial court in that case had ordered that immediate incarceration superceded the original order of commitment. Id. at 226. Commitments, unlike sentences, are indeterminate, and are dependent upon the defendant's status and actions. Removing Flemming from his commitment before a determination was made that the commitment was no longer necessary could have undermined the purpose and efficacy of the commitment. [4] [¶19] As we consider the purposes to be served by incarceration, and the purposes to be served by commitment for treatment, we find that the statutory schemes supporting these disparate placements do not lend themselves to one resolution of this issue. We are unwilling to impose a one-size-fits-all solution to one of the most complex questions faced by society and courts, and we conclude that the better solution is one that relies on the measured judgment and discretion of the trial courts. By the time a defendant is found to be not criminally responsible, the trial court has had an opportunity to watch, listen to, and evaluate the defendant and the medical and psychiatric witnesses presented by him and by the State. The trial court is, therefore, in a position to decide whether the defendant's mental status is such that immediate commitment to DHHS is warranted, or whether, because of the lapse of time, the nature of the defendant's mental defect or disease, or some other factor or factors, immediate commitment is not warranted. [¶20] In Flemming, we noted that, when a defendant is found not criminally responsible, he enters an exceptional class such that the reasonable and humane response is to commit him to a hospital for treatment, noting also that the public acquire[s] a special interest in [the defendant's] confinement and release to ensure that he poses no threat to himself or to public safety. Id. at 225 (quotation marks and emphasis omitted). We also noted the potential beneficial impact of the trial court's decision to defer Flemming's prison sentence until his release from the mental hospital, stating that the decision permits Flemming, or one similarly situated, to continue treatment for his mental disease or defect prior to serving his specific sentence for criminal conduct. Id. [¶21] Although James was incarcerated at the time he committed new acts that comprised crimes, as soon as it was determined that he was not criminally responsible for those acts, he nonetheless became a member of the exceptional class for whom a reasonable and humane response is commitment to a hospital for treatment. The immediate commitment to DHHS of prisoners determined to be not criminally responsible while incarcerated does not detract from the penal purposes of criminal sentences, and does allow for the care and treatment required by those prisoners. For that reason, the Superior Court's decision to immediately commit James to DHHS custody does not constitute an abuse of discretion. [¶22] The holding in Flemming does not, however, preclude a trial court from deferring a prisoner's commitment to DHHS, based on any number of factors, including the State's obligation to provide adequate and appropriate medical and psychiatric treatment to its prisoners. The court presiding over the trial that results in a determination that the defendant is not criminally responsible is best able to judge whether hospital confinement is immediately necessary, or whether continued confinement by DOC until the defendant's sentence is discharged would serve the needs of the defendant and of the public. [5] [¶23] The State has argued that the public interest in confining James and ensuring both his safety and the public's safety is served by having him complete the remainder of his prison sentence before being committed to DHHS custody. It has argued that prisoners in DOC custody may be hospitalized under civil commitment provisions should they need acute psychiatric care pursuant to 34-A M.R.S. § 3069(1) (2007), referencing 34-B M.R.S. § 3863 (2007). While we hesitate to second-guess DOC's judgment in determining when those entrusted to its custody require hospitalization, we note that James was in DOC custody at the Maine State Prison, not placed in a mental health facility pursuant to section 3069, when the series of assaults occurred in 2004 and 2005, for which a jury determined he was not criminally responsible. [¶24] Pursuant to the terms of 15 M.R.S. § 104-A, James may be returned to DOC custody when it is determined that he does not present a danger to himself or others because of a mental disease or defect. As soon as a staff psychiatrist believes that James could be released or discharged without likelihood that [he] will cause injury to [himself] or to others due to mental disease or mental defect, a report to that effect must be sent to the Commissioner of DHHS, and the Commissioner is required to forward that report to the Superior Court. 15 M.R.S. § 104-A(3). The court must then hold a civil hearing to determine James's readiness for discharge. Id. § 104-A(1). James himself may also petition the court for release under this section. Id. § 104-A(3). We emphasize that the decision to be made by the psychiatrist and the court pursuant to section 104-A is whether James presents a danger because of his mental illness or defect. Even without the complication of mental illness, James may present a danger to others, but if any such continuing dangerous behavior is not due to mental illness, or if his mental illness is not amenable to treatment, then there may be no reason for James's continuing commitment.