Opinion ID: 1275377
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Arbitration Under Act 312

Text: The second prong of Jaklinski's argument is that her right to arbitration was a condition of employment frozen in place during the pendency of Act 312 interest arbitration. It is helpful to distinguish at the outset between grievance and interest arbitration. The former involves arbitration of disputes arising under an existing collective bargaining agreement; the latter involves arbitration of the terms to be included in a new collective bargaining agreement after the parties have negotiated to impasse. Binding interest arbitration is the statutory right of fire fighters and police officers (including sheriff's deputies) and their public employers. 1969 PA 312, MCL 423.231; MSA 17.455(31). After Act 312 interest arbitration is invoked, neither party to the dispute may alter existing wages, hours, [or] other conditions of employment without the consent of the other during the pendency of proceedings before the arbitration panel. MCL 423.243; MSA 17.455(43). These statutes evince the Legislature's particular concern that public employees who provide vital services to their communities, and who are therefore deprived of the right to strike, have a forum available to resolve labor disputes which is more expeditious and less expensive than the courts. This statutory scheme does not, however, support Jaklinski's claim that she is entitled to arbitrate her failure to be reappointed. First, the compulsory arbitration provided for in Act 312 is not available to individuals with grievances regarding the interpretation of an existing or expired collective bargaining agreement. Local 1518, AFSCME v St Clair Co Sheriff, 407 Mich 1, 12; 281 NW2d 313 (1979). Second, the wages, hours, [or] other conditions of employment which are frozen in place during the pendency of Act 312 arbitration are those which exist at the time such arbitration is invoked. Therefore, Jaklinski's right to arbitrate her failure to be reappointed could not be preserved under Act 312 unless it survived the expiration of the old collective bargaining agreement on December 31, 1979, and then remained viable during the hiatus between that date and the invocation of Act 312 arbitration in April, 1980. Lastly, nothing in these statutes indicates that invocation of Act 312 proceedings should revive rights which terminated at the expiration of an old collective bargaining agreement. Thus, we conclude that the second prong of Jaklinski's argument is without merit unless it can be shown that her rights survived the hiatus between January 1 and April 29, 1980, a proposition we next examine.