Opinion ID: 3065248
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: LASO Attorneys

Text: The individual LASO attorneys’ separately contend that they are entitled to summary judgment on their as-applied challenge to the PIR. Their argument runs as follows: LSC, in an official guidance document and in audits of other grantees, has stated that if more than ten percent of a larger grantee’s attorneys work part-time for a particular unrestricted affiliate, the grantee is likely not in compliance with the PIR. Therefore, at least some LASO attorneys that wish to do so (they offer affidavits from individual LASO attorneys suggesting that more than ten percent of LASO’s attorneys do in fact wish to work for OLC part-time), are effectively barred from exercising protected speech rights. The district court denied the attorneys’ motion for partial summary judgment, concluding that they had failed to show any specific instance where LSC had denied an individual LASO attorney’s request to work parttime (or on his or her own time) for an unrestricted organization.11 [11] We agree that the individual LASO attorneys have failed to show that LSC’s enforcement of the PIR effectively cuts off alternative channels for engaging in protected speech. 11 An attorney working full-time for an LSC grantee may only engage in the outside practice of law under limited circumstances. See 45 C.F.R. § 1604.4. 15514 LEGAL AID v. LEGAL SERVICES CORP. A 1997 LSC Guidance Memorandum states the following: There is no per se bar against a recipient employing part-time staff who are also employed part-time by an organization which engages in restricted activity. Generally speaking, however, the more staff “shared,” or the greater the responsibilities of the staff who are employed by both organizations, the more danger that program integrity will be compromised. Sharing an executive director, for example, inappropriately tends to blur the organizational lines between the entities. Likewise, sharing a substantial number or proportion of recipient staff calls the recipient’s separateness into question. In a footnote, the memo explains that “[f]or larger organizations, 10% of the recipients’s attorney/paralegal staff should serve as a guide. However, for recipients with smaller staffs, the program director should use his or her best judgment to determine whether part-time staff constitute a substantial proportion of the recipient’s legal workforce.” The above statements outline LSC’s general methodology for determining whether a grantee and an unrestricted affiliate are sufficiently separate. The rough “10 percent rule” that the LASO attorneys rely on does not suggest that only 10 percent of LASO’s staff may engage in restricted activity part-time, or on their own time, but rather that, under normal circumstances, no more than 10 percent of LASO’s legal staff may work part-time at the same unrestricted organization. That the PIR prevents at least some LASO attorneys from working part-time for OLC does not establish that it effectively cuts off alternative channels for engaging in protected speech. As we recognized in LASH III, LASO attorneys are free to pursue a variety of alternative avenues for expressing restricted speech, including working full-time for an unrestricted organization, or alternatively, continuing to work for an LSC LEGAL AID v. LEGAL SERVICES CORP. 15515 grantee organization and engaging in restricted activities on their own time. See LASH III, 145 F.3d at 1029. [12] The district court thus did not err in denying the individual LASO attorneys’ motion for partial summary judgment. III. Motion for New Trial and Related Discovery Issues [13] Plaintiffs contend that the district court abused its discretion in denying their motion for a new trial and their motions to compel the production of documents relating to LSC’s enforcement of the Restrictions. We disagree. The basic premise underlying both Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial and their motions to compel discovery — that the Restrictions and the PIR can be challenged in separate asapplied claims — is flawed. As we have explained, under LASH III, the Restrictions are constitutional so long as LSC’s enforcement of the PIR provides grantees with alternative channels through which they can direct restricted speech. Velazquez III did not disturb the holding in LASH III; thus, the district court properly focused the litigation below on the manner in which LSC has interpreted and applied the PIR.