Opinion ID: 777046
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review

Text: 19 Whether an injunction may issue under the Anti-Injunction Act is a question of law reviewed de novo. Prudential Real Estate Affiliates v. PPR Realty, Inc., 204 F.3d 867, 879 (9th Cir.2000). However, the decision to issue an injunction that comes within an exception to the Act is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 174 F.3d 1007, 1011 (9th Cir.1999). 20 The district court's interpretation of a consent decree is reviewed de novo. Gates v. Gomez, 60 F.3d 525, 530 (9th Cir.1995). However, we give deference to the district court's interpretation based on the court's extensive oversight of the decree from the commencement of the litigation to the current appeal. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 21 The district court had jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement because the district court incorporated the agreement into the Consent Decree. See Flanagan v. Arnaiz, 143 F.3d 540, 544 (9th Cir.1998). 22 Additionally, the district court had jurisdiction under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, which provides that federal courts may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law. 28 U.S.C. § 1651. 23 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. RES JUDICATA 24 The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, prohibits federal courts from enjoining state court actions except in specific and narrow circumstances. Prudential, 204 F.3d at 878; Alpine, 174 F.3d at 1014. Federal courts may enjoin state court actions if one of three exceptions is met: 1) as expressly authorized by Congress, 2) where necessary in aid of the federal court's jurisdiction, or 3) to protect or effectuate the federal court's judgments. Alpine, 174 F.3d at 1014. This third exception is known as the relitigation exception. Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc. v. Victa, 936 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir.1991). 25 The relitigation exception allows federal courts to enjoin state court proceedings to protect the res judicata effect of their judgments. Golden v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 786 F.2d 1425, 1427 (9th Cir.1986) (citation omitted). A relitigation injunction is proper where a federal litigant has prevailed on the merits, but is threatened with burdensome and repetitious relitigation of the same issues in subsequent actions. Id. 26 The Anti-Injunction Act applies although the injunction would be directed at a litigant (here, Randtron) instead of the state court proceeding itself. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1372, 1377-78 (9th Cir.1997). The Anti-Injunction Act also applies to declaratory judgments if those judgments have the same effect as an injunction. See Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 491, 506 (5th Cir.1988); Thiokol Chem. Corp. v. Burlington Indus., 448 F.2d 1328, 1332 (3d Cir.1971). 27 The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the relitigation exception of the Anti-Injunction Act applies to bar Randtron from asserting its res judicata defense in state court. 28 It was contemplated at the time of the Consent Decree that other actions would lie against Randtron and its insurers to the extent not covered under the settlement agreement. See Kelly v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 985 F.2d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir.1993) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26 cmt. a.) (A party can waive res judicata by consenting to split the claim into two suits.); see also United States ex rel. Barajas v. Northrop Corp., 147 F.3d 905, 911 (9th Cir.1998) (citations omitted) (A settlement can limit the scope of the preclusive effect of a dismissal with prejudice by its terms.). The Consent Decree only released future claims with regard to two insurance policies written by Wausau. 6 29 In addition to the express terms of the Consent Decree, we are also persuaded by the district court's interpretation. The district court stated that it would not have approved the Consent Decree or made a finding that the settlement was reached in good faith had the settlement freed Randtron and all of its insurers from any further liability upon the exhaustion of only the two Wausau policies. Randtron, 69 F.Supp.2d at 1269. We give deference to the district court's interpretation based on the court's extensive oversight of the decree from the commencement of the litigation to the current appeal. See Gates, 60 F.3d at 530. RIGHT TO SEEK CONTRIBUTION 30 Randtron contends that the district court's second order barring Randtron's contribution claim is inconsistent with its first order barring Randtron's res judicata defense. 7 According to Randtron, if the October 12, 1999 decision (Randtron I) is affirmed, the May 25, 2000 (Randtron II) decision must necessarily be reversed. In Randtron II, the district court considered Randtron's contribution argument and held: 31 the Consent Decree releases all of Randtron's claims against Lodi, specifically including contribution claims, whether or not known at the time of execution of the consent decree, which arise from or are related to the allegations of this action concerning hazardous substance contamination of soils and groundwater within the City of Lodi. 32 Randtron asserts that the reading and extension of Randtron I to its logical conclusion shows that Randtron did not release any claims for contribution that might arise beyond the $1 million payment made by Wausau under the terms of the Consent Decree. In other words, Randtron argues that it was precluded from asserting any contribution claims because its claims against the other responsible parties had not yet accrued. 8 33 In order to evaluate Randtron's claim, we must review the applicable release provisions. Provision X.A. of the Consent Decree provides: 34 Mutual Releases. Upon entry of this Consent Decree, the Plaintiffs, the Settling Defendants and Wausau mutually release one another ..., from all past, present and future claims, whether known or unknown, and whether direct or in contribution, which were brought or which could have been brought in this action and which arise from or are related to the allegations of this action ... or any claims which could be brought against the City of Lodi relating to or arising out of the settled matters or actions to be taken pursuant to this Consent Decree. 35 While Randtron is prevented from asserting any future contribution actions, Lodi is not because the broad scope of the general release provision is narrowed by certain exceptions. The fourth exception states: 36 Matters Not Covered by Disclosed Insurance. Any claims or rights (including those asserted in this action) that the Plaintiffs, or either of them, may have now, or may in the future acquire, against Randtron or Oldco Holz to the extent Randtron or Oldco Holz are protected from the liability asserted in those claims by any insurance not exhausted by this Consent Decree (i.e., insurance other than the limits of liability coverage provided by the general liability provisions of the combined single limits endorsements of policy numbers 0624-03-033933 and 0626-00-037304 issued by Employers Insurance of Wausau A Mutual Company); 37 Consent Decree Provision X.B.4. This provision allows the Plaintiffs, collectively or individually, to pursue an action for contribution against Randtron. Notably, this provision contains no language granting Randtron the same right. Under the terms of the Consent Decree, Randtron was not entitled to seek contribution from Lodi. Accordingly, the district court did not err in its rulings on this issue.