Opinion ID: 3149417
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consideration of Defendant’s Prior Offenses

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in permitting the penalty jury to consider the two sex offenses he committed against children in Colorado years after the murder in this case.
After the guilt verdict, defendant objected to the penalty jury‟s considering the evidence of the Colorado sex offenses that had been admitted in the guilt phase. He argued that the evidence did not constitute proper aggravating evidence under section 190.3. The court agreed the crimes were not admissible under 42 section 190.3, factor (b), because they did not involve force or violence or the threat of force or violence. However, it found the evidence was relevant as a circumstance of the crime under section 190.3, factor (a), and also potentially as rebuttal evidence if defendant placed his character in issue. The court explained: “The acts of molestation committed by Mr. Cordova in Colorado logically . . . tend[] to show the nature of the crime that he committed in 1979 here in San Pablo; that is, that not only was it a murder, but it was indeed, as is alleged by the People in their special circumstances allegations and found to be true by the jury, that . . . this murder was committed while he was engaged in an act of rape and in an act of lewd and lascivious conduct. For those reasons, it will be admitted.” Later the court explained further that defendant‟s “proclivity to commit sexual crimes [was] evinced by his post-crime molestations.” During the penalty phase, defendant presented several witnesses who testified about his character. The direct or cross-examination of these witnesses mentioned the Colorado crimes several times without objection, and the jury was already aware that defendant had been convicted of them. When he testified, defendant denied committing those crimes. In instructing the jury, the court defined the statutory factors listed in section 190.3, including factor (b), then specified what alleged crimes the jury could consider under that factor. It told the jury it could not consider any other evidence under factor (b). Specifically, the court instructed the jury that the Colorado sex offenses “did not disclose the commission of crimes covered by factor (b) and may not be considered as an aggravating factor pursuant to the paragraph. Such evidence, however, may be considered by you, if you so find, as aggravating pursuant to factor (a) and also to negate any mitigating evidence if and to the extent that you find that it does so.” 43 In her argument to the jury, the prosecutor told the jury that the only convictions it could consider under section 190.3, factor (c), were convictions defendant suffered before the crime in this case. She said, “You can‟t consider felony convictions that occurred afterwards.” She discussed defendant‟s 1970 forgery conviction and his 1977 conviction for possessing a sawed-off shotgun in this regard but not the two Colorado convictions. She referred to the Colorado crimes only briefly in discussing defendant‟s character evidence in mitigation. She did not argue that the evidence of the crimes was itself aggravating.
Section 190.3 lists factors for the jury to consider in deciding penalty, including factor (a) (“The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstance found to be true . . . .”), factor (b) (“The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence.”), and factor (c) (“The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction.”). The penalty jury may consider in aggravation only matters coming within one of section 190.3‟s factors. (People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 774.) As the trial court recognized, the Colorado sex offenses did not involve force or violence or the threat to use force or violence. Accordingly, they did not come within section 190.3, factor (b). Additionally, this court has held that felony convictions suffered after commission of the capital crimes do not come within section 190.3, factor (c). (People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 201-203.) Accordingly, the Colorado convictions, suffered after the capital crime in this case, also do not come within factor (c). Thus, we must decide whether the court properly permitted the jury to consider the crimes under section 190.3, factor (a) 44 (circumstances of the crime and special circumstances) and to rebut defendant‟s character evidence. The Attorney General argues that defendant has forfeited part of his argument. We agree that, to the extent, if any, he argues the trial court erred in permitting use of the sex offenses to rebut defendant‟s character evidence, he has forfeited that claim. He did not object on the ground that the evidence was improper rebuttal either before or when the evidence was presented. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a); People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1207.) But the main thrust of his argument — that the court should not have permitted the jury to consider the sex offenses under section 190.3, factor (a) — is preserved. Defendant did object on this basis, and he may argue that the court erred on this ground. Because defendant presented his character evidence only after, and in light of, the ruling that the evidence was admissible under factor (a), he may also argue that error on this ground was prejudicial notwithstanding the fact the evidence was later used as rebuttal. He is merely precluded from arguing that admitting the evidence as rebuttal was an additional error. Turning to the merits, we see no error. The court properly admitted the evidence on both grounds that it stated. The Colorado crimes were admitted in the guilt phase because they showed defendant‟s propensity to commit sex offenses against young children which, in turn, helped the jury understand the circumstances of the capital crime. (See p. 34, ante.) “So long as it considered the evidence offered at the guilt phase of trial solely for this purpose, the jury was entitled to take into account all of the evidence offered at the guilt phase as part of the „circumstances of the crime,‟ an aggravating factor that the jury may consider in its penalty deliberations. (§ 190.3, factor (a).)” (People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 947.) “Factor (a) of section 190.3 allows the prosecutor and defense counsel to present to the penalty 45 phase jury evidence of all relevant aggravating and mitigating matters „including, but not limited to, the nature and circumstances of the present offense, . . . and the defendant‟s character, background, history, mental condition and physical condition.‟ ” (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1154, some italics added.) The evidence may be relevant “under section 190.3, factor (a), to the extent that [it] gives rise to reasonable inferences concerning the circumstances of the crime and defendant‟s culpability.” (People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 321-322.) The court properly permitted the jury to consider the evidence for this limited purpose. The court also properly permitted the jury to consider the evidence to rebut defendant‟s mitigating evidence. Evidence rebutting character evidence is admissible if it relates to a particular character trait defendant has offered in his behalf. The evidence is permissible to undermine the defendant‟s claim that his good character warrants the jury‟s exercise of mercy and to present a more balanced picture of that character. The broader the range of the defendant‟s character evidence, the broader may be the range of the rebuttal evidence, as long as the rebuttal evidence relates to some character trait the defendant has placed into evidence. Whether to admit rebuttal evidence comes within the trial court‟s discretion, reviewable for abuse of that discretion. (People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 169-170; People v. Loker (2008) 44 Cal.4th 691, 709.) Defendant presented substantial and wide-ranging evidence of his good character. For example, one of defendant‟s sisters testified that he “was always a nice, kind person,” that her daughters “loved him,” that he was “always nice” to them, and that she never had any concern leaving him alone with them. She never saw “him do anything that [she] thought was wrong or weird.” In light of this and other testimony, the trial court acted within its discretion in permitting the jury to 46 consider the Colorado sex offenses to present a more balanced picture of defendant‟s character. 2. Evidence of Defendant’s Threat to Kill a Prosecutor Defendant contends the court erroneously admitted evidence that he once threatened to kill a prosecutor. a. Factual Background The prosecution sought to present evidence in aggravation that defendant once threatened to kill a female prosecutor in Colorado. The prosecution‟s offer of proof was that in 1994, the woman was prosecuting defendant for domestic violence. During a therapy session while he was out of custody, defendant told the therapist that he wanted to kill the prosecutor and would have done so if he had had a gun. The therapist took the threat seriously enough that she informed the prosecutor of it, and, as a result, defendant‟s bail was revoked. The prosecutor here sought to have the therapist testify. Defendant objected, arguing the threat did not amount to a crime. After a hearing, the court agreed with defendant and ruled the threat was not admissible as evidence of other criminal conduct involving force or violence under section 190.3, factor (b). Accordingly, the prosecution did not present the evidence as part of its case in aggravation, and the therapist never testified. Defendant called as a witness in mitigation his sister-in-law, Vicki Cordova. She testified on direct examination that she had “never seen [defendant] mistreat any woman or be violent with any woman.” On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked the witness about incidents of violence against women, including this question: “And you didn‟t know anything about, until this trial, that he threatened to kill a female DA that was prosecuting him?” The witness responded, “I never heard that until the trial.” Outside the jury‟s presence, defendant objected 47 on the ground that the question “exceed[ed] the bounds” of the character evidence he had presented. The court overruled the objection. It stated that “the implication certainly of the testimony is that he‟s a person of good character, especially dealing with women. In light of that, that was certainly fair questioning.” When defendant testified, the prosecutor cross-examined him about incidents of violence against women. He admitted telling the therapist “I was mad enough I could have killed” the prosecutor, and that “if I would have had a gun, I would have killed that bitch.” But he said he was just expressing his anger because it was an anger management class, and he was not actually threatening to kill her. The court instructed the jury that “[t]he evidence you heard regarding a comment made by defendant concerning a district attorney did not disclose a crime covered by factor (b) [of section 190.3] and may not be considered by you as an aggravating factor under that paragraph. It may, however, be considered by you for the purpose and to the extent that it may serve to negate any mitigating evidence.” In her argument to the jury, the prosecutor discussed defendant‟s witnesses who “come in and talk about how good the defendant treats women.” As part of this discussion she referred to the threat. She added that nothing about the threat “can be aggravating, but there‟s nothing about his relationships with women or his treatment of women that is mitigating.” b. Analysis Defendant contends the court erred “in admitting evidence of nonstatutory aggravation in the form of [his] threat at a prison anger management session to kill a deputy prosecutor.” 48 Preliminarily, noting that defendant referred to this incident in some of his own questioning of defense witnesses and, when the parties discussed jury instructions, he agreed the evidence might be proper rebuttal, the Attorney General argues that the claim is forfeited. We disagree. The actions the Attorney General cites occurred after defendant‟s objection to Vicki Cordova‟s cross-examination had been overruled, and the jury had already heard about the incident. At that point, defendant was merely trying to deal with the ruling as best he could. In discussing instructions, defense counsel argued, successfully, that the jury should be told it could not consider the incident in aggravation, although he conceded the incident could serve to impeach some of the mitigating evidence, a concession that merely recognized the court‟s previous ruling. Defendant‟s initial objection preserved the contention. The contention, however, lacks merit. The court ruled the evidence not admissible in aggravation and so instructed the jury. It only permitted use of the evidence to rebut defendant‟s character evidence. Doing so was within its discretion. As we have explained, the court has discretion to permit evidence that rebuts defendant‟s character evidence. Here, defendant presented specific evidence that he treated women well and was not violent toward them. Evidence presenting a different picture was admissible to rebut that evidence. (People v. Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 169-170; People v. Loker, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 709.) Defendant also contends the evidence was privileged under the psychotherapist-patient privilege of Evidence Code section 1014, which generally makes privileged “a confidential communication between patient and psychotherapist.” (See Menendez v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 435.) Defendant may not raise that claim on appeal, however, as he did not object on that basis at trial. (People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 863.) Moreover, on 49 this record, we cannot say that an objection, if made, would have been meritorious. The record does not show that the therapist was a psychotherapist, or defendant a patient, within the meaning of the privilege, or that the remaining requirements of the privilege were met. Moreover, the privilege does not exist “if the psychotherapist has reasonable cause to believe that the patient is in such mental or emotional condition as to be dangerous to himself or to the person or property of another and that disclosure of the communication is necessary to prevent the threatened danger.” (Evid. Code, § 1024.) Here, the offer of proof indicated that the therapist took the threat by defendant, who was out of custody, seriously enough to warn its target, leading to the revocation of defendant‟s bail. No reason exists to find the threat was privileged. 3. Claims of Instructional Error Defendant contends the court misinstructed the jury in two respects. a. Instruction During Jury Selection Defendant contends that during jury selection, the court “misled the jury into believing that, in some cases, the death penalty was mandated by law” in violation of cases such as Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370 and People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512 (Brown). To obtain sufficient jurors, the court examined three panels of prospective jurors. It described to each of the panels the trial process the jury would encounter. Quoting some of the court‟s language out of context, defendant claims it told the jury that imposition of the death penalty was mandatory in some situations. Although, as we explain, the court used some language that should be avoided, in context, it made clear that the penalty decision was a weighing process, and the death penalty was never mandated. 50 The court informed the first panel that “what is envisioned is that the jury will weigh the circumstances in aggravation and the circumstances in mitigation. They will compare them and weigh them . . . and ultimately make a decision as to whether . . . or not the circumstances — or how the circumstances in aggravation compare to the circumstances in mitigation. If the jury found that the circumstances in aggravation so substantially outweigh those in mitigation that it warrants the imposition of the death penalty, they will vote for the death penalty. If it finds that they do not, then they will vote for life without the possibility of parole. This weighing process, it‟s not a mechanical counting. . . . So ultimately the weighing process is a qualitative — in fact, it‟s a moral decision that ultimately you make. A better word is normative decision. You will make a decision as to what you believe — what penalty should be imposed in light of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, weighed against each other, attributing each of these factors whatever value, moral value, you think they deserve. And that‟s the nature of the decision you‟re going to be called upon to make.” (Italics added.) At another point, the court specifically told the panel that if the jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder with special circumstances, “you can consider the imposition of the death penalty, but you‟re not required to vote for the death penalty.” It also explained, “You can vote for death or life without the possibility of parole depending on what you feel is warranted after considering the circumstances in aggravation and in mitigation.” The court informed the second panel that “the law does not require one or the other of these penalties [death or life without parole], however. Under California law, the death penalty, for example, is never mandatory.” It said “the choice as to whether it will be death or life without the possibility of parole is up to the jury to decide after a consideration of what are called aggravating factors and mitigating factors.” It also explained that the jury “must consider the 51 aggravating factors and the mitigating factors, compare them, weigh them and determine if you can — whether the aggravating factors so substantially outweigh the mitigating factors as to warrant the death penalty. And if you find that the aggravating factors so substantially outweigh . . . the mitigating factors as to warrant imposition of the death penalty, then you should vote for the death penalty.” (Italics added.) The court informed the third panel that “you look at these aggravating factors, and you weigh them against the mitigating factors or vice versa, and then you determine, if you can, what the appropriate penalty should be in this case. The process is not . . . a mathematical one. It‟s not quantitative. . . . It‟s a qualitative one. You accord whatever weight and value to them as you think is important, according to your value system.” It also explained, “If you find, and only if you find, that the aggravating factors so substantially outweigh the mitigating factors that in your mind it warrants the imposition of death, then you vote for death. And only if you find that the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors that the life without the possibility of parole is warranted, then you should vote for that.” (Italics added.) Later, the court stated that “under California law, the imposition of the death penalty is never mandatory.” Defendant contends the language italicized in the above quotations misled the jury into believing that the death penalty might be mandatory in some situations. We have explained that an instruction that the jury “shall” impose the death penalty if it finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances might in some cases mislead the jury regarding its sentencing discretion, and we suggested alternative language. (Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 544-545 & fns. 17, 19.) In isolation, some of the court‟s language came perilously close to saying the jury “shall” impose the death penalty in some situations. Using the word “shall,” or, as here, language suggesting the jury will or should impose 52 the death penalty, is “potentially confusing only in particular circumstances. We must therefore uphold the judgment if satisfied from the individual facts that a reasonable jury could not have been led astray.” (People v. Murtishaw (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1001, 1030.) In context, the court made clear during jury selection that the death penalty is not mandatory and, largely employing the language we suggested in Brown, supra, at page 545, footnote 19, stated that the jury was to return a verdict of death only if, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors, it found the aggravating factors so substantially outweigh the mitigating factors that death is warranted. Moreover, the purpose of the explanations during jury selection “was to give prospective jurors, most of whom had little or no familiarity with courts in general and penalty phase death penalty trials in particular, a general idea of the nature of the proceeding.” (People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 840.) “If defendant wanted the court to give a fuller explanation during jury selection, he should have requested it.” (Id. at p. 841.) He did not do so. The court instructed the jury fully after the evidence portion of the penalty phase. Defendant seems to limit his challenge to the instructions during jury selection. But the court also used some problematic language at the end of the trial. At that point, the court instructed the jury, “The weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors does not mean a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale or the arbitrary assignment of weights to any of them. You are free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider. In weighing the various factors, you determine under the relevant evidence which penalty is justified and appropriate by considering the totality of the aggravating factors with the totality of the mitigating factors. To return a judgment of death, each of you 53 must be persuaded that the aggravating factors are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating factors that it warrants death instead of life without the possibility of parole.” This instruction correctly tracked the language we suggested in Brown, supra, 40 Cal.4th at page 545, footnote 19. However, the court also instructed, “If, in accordance with the instructions that I have given to you, you consider that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of death. If, in accordance with the instructions I have given, you determine that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of confinement in state prison for a term of life without possibility of parole.” The phrasing in this last instruction, “you shall impose a sentence of death,” can be misleading if viewed in isolation. “When such instructions have been given without clarification, . . . we must determine based on our review of the entire record, including the instructions as a whole and the argument of counsel, whether the jury may have been misled with respect to its sentencing discretion and responsibilities.” (People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 632.) In context, it is not reasonably likely the jury was misled. First, the problematic instruction was not given “without clarification.” (People v. Clark, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 632.) The court used the clarifying language suggested in Brown, supra, 40 Cal.4th at page 545, footnote 19, which made clear the jury could impose the death penalty only if each juror believed the aggravating factors were so substantial compared to the mitigating factors that death was warranted. Immediately before the “shall impose a sentence of death” language, the court also instructed, “While the existence of factors in aggravation and mitigation depend upon the evidence, their proper evaluation ultimately requires a normative 54 or moral judgment as to which penalty, death or life without the possibility of parole, should be imposed.” This language emphasized the fundamentally subjective nature of the jury‟s decision and likely tempered any potential confusion the problematic instruction might have caused. Additionally, the court repeatedly emphasized the normative nature of the jury‟s decision throughout the closing instructions, not just in the final paragraphs quoted above. It instructed: (1) “The law of the State of California expresses no preference as to which punishment is appropriate. That is for you to determine in accordance with the instructions that I am now giving to you.” (2) “Both the People and the defendant have a right to expect that you will consider all of the evidence, follow the law, exercise your discretion conscientiously and reach a just verdict.” (3) “A jury in the penalty phase of a capital case is charged with a responsibility different in kind from that of a jury in the culpability phase. Its role is not merely to determine facts, but ultimately to render an individualized, normative and moral determination in accordance with the law set forth in these instructions about the penalty appropriate for the defendant, that is, whether he should live in prison for the rest of his life or be put to death.” (4) The jury should consider in mitigation “[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime . . . that you find serves as a basis for a sentence less than death.” (5) “[Y]ou should also consider and weigh as mitigating . . . any circumstance . . . that suggests that death is not the appropriate penalty or punishment.” Further, because counsel delivered closing arguments after the jury instructions, the trial court‟s questionable use of the word “shall” was not the last thing the jury heard before deliberations. Counsel for both sides accurately described the jury‟s task. 55 The prosecutor explained that each juror would have to “individually assign normative or moral values to each fact found. You can decide how much weight to give each fact. What‟s important to you morally or normatively? What does this mean to you?” She repeatedly reminded the jury of the trial court‟s statement that the “weighing” of factors was not a “mechanical weighing or calculating.” She couched her forceful appeal for a death verdict in language demonstrating the proper legal framework, arguing that there was “only one verdict that‟s appropriate in this case.” The prosecutor never suggested the penalty verdict should result from a deterministic or quantitative reasoning process or that the jury‟s discretion could be limited by any of their factual findings. Likewise, defense counsel began by telling the jury that the “awesome responsibility” over defendant‟s life was “going to get handed off” and “become yours and your alone.” He explained that there is “no automatic death penalty,” but that the jury would have to “consider everything,” and that if there were “any one thing, any one thing that strikes in any of your hearts that appeals to any of your morality about anything relating to Joseph Cordova then you should spare his life. That is your direction.” Counsel continually emphasized the normative nature of the jury‟s decision. Accordingly, the closing arguments correctly presented the law and consistently reinforced the trial court‟s proper instructions. After reviewing the entire record, we conclude that the penalty jury was properly informed of its sentencing discretion and the weighing process. However, once again, we admonish courts to avoid the potentially misleading language the trial court employed here. The death penalty is not mandatory, and the court should avoid any language that might suggest it is mandatory. The court should employ the language suggested in Brown, supra, 40 56 Cal.3d at page 545, footnote 19, and should not, under any circumstances, add language suggesting that jury “shall” (or will or should) impose the death penalty.
During the direct examination of defendant‟s sister-in-law, Vicki Cordova, defense counsel asked why she did not believe defendant should receive the death penalty. She responded, “Because he has a family who care about him and . . . that would be devastating for the family.” The prosecutor objected and asked the comment be stricken. The court instructed the jury to disregard the comment and said, “The impact on defendant‟s family of the penalty that‟s imposed is not relevant. You‟ll disregard that.” The court‟s instructions to the jury at the end of the evidence portion of the penalty phase included the following: “Sympathy for the family of the defendant, as opposed to defendant himself, is not a matter you can consider in mitigation. Evidence, if any, of the impact of an execution on family members should be disregarded unless and to the extent it illuminates some positive quality of the defendant‟s background or character.” Defendant contends the court erred in instructing the jury not to consider in mitigation evidence of the impact his execution would have on his family. The Attorney General argues that the claim is forfeited. During the penalty trial, defense counsel recognized that the law was as the court instructed and, accordingly, did not object to the instruction. Instead, he argued that the instruction should include the qualifying language permitting the jury to consider such evidence to the extent it illuminates some quality of defendant‟s background or character. However, even absent an objection, a defendant may argue an instruction is erroneous “if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby.” (§ 1259.) Defendant contends the instruction violated his substantial 57 rights. Accordingly, we will consider the contention on the merits. (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 503.) The contention lacks merit. We have repeatedly upheld this instruction. (People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 197-198, and cases cited.) Defendant asks us to reconsider these cases, but he presents no good reason to do so. Except as it may illuminate some quality of the defendant‟s background or character, the impact of execution on the defendant‟s family is simply irrelevant to the penalty determination. The court did not restrict defendant‟s ability to present evidence that illuminated his background or character.