Opinion ID: 622017
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: Smith repeats his arguments here—which essentially boil down to claiming the government must prove the existence of an enterprise in order to convict a defendant of a RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). The government contends Smith is not entitled to review of this issue because he invited the error below by not objecting to Instruction 32 or lodging a legal objection to the court’s response to the jury’s question. Indeed, in objecting to the court’s proposed response to the jury’s question, Smith stated the court should refer the jury to the original jury instructions, including Instruction 32, which informed the jury it need not find the existence of an actual enterprise in order to convict on Count 2. Even assuming we reach the merits of the issue, the government -7- says our review should be for plain error based on Smith’s failure to object. We disagree with the government that Smith is not entitled to review of this issue because he invited the error below. We distinguish between waiver and forfeiture. “[W]aiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right,” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (quotations omitted); it occurs when a party “deliberately considered the unraised issue and made an intentional decision to forego it.” United States v. Zubia-Torres, 550 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). Forfeiture, on the other hand, “is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. In other words, “waiver is accomplished by intent, but forfeiture comes about through neglect.” Zubia-Torres, 550 F.3d at 1205 (quotations omitted). One who has waived a right is not entitled to appellate review whereas one who has forfeited a right obtains plain error review. United States v. Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 2009). The invited error doctrine is a form of waiver. ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc. v. Bowers, 643 F.3d 735, 771 (10th Cir. 2011). It “precludes a party from arguing that the district court erred in adopting a proposition that the party had urged the district court to adopt.” Id. (quotations omitted); see also United States v. Edward J., 224 F.3d 1216, 1222 (10th Cir. 2000) (“The invited error doctrine prevents a party from inducing action by a court and later seeking reversal on the ground that the requested action was error.”) (quotations omitted). It prohibits a party “from lying in wait for potential mistakes, and then seeking to reverse the outcome of trial.” United States v. Oldbear, 568 F.3d 814, 826 (10th Cir. 2009). -8- Smith did not object to Instruction 32. Nor did he propose that instruction to the court. Therefore, his failure to object constitutes a forfeiture, not an invited error. Smith’s handling of the jury’s question is a closer issue. The jury’s question suggested it was confused as to whether Count 2 required proof of an enterprise to convict. And, in objecting to the court’s proposed response, Smith told the court it should simply refer the jury to the original instructions. Those instructions included Instruction 32, which told the jury the government was not required to prove the actual existence of an enterprise in order to convict on Count 2. Moreover, the court’s initial proposed response included a statement setting forth the difference between Count 1 and Count 2, i.e., Count 1 requires the existence of an actual enterprise whereas Count 2 simply requires the intent of two or more persons to accomplish such an enterprise. And Smith stated this proposed response did not “to [his] knowledge” misstate the law. (R. Vol. 3 at 81.) Nevertheless, taken in context, these actions do not amount to invited error. Smith did not affirmatively urge the court to inform the jury that an enterprise need not be established in order to convict on Count 2. Rather, his position was simply that the court should refer the jury to the original instructions so as not to place undue emphasis on certain instructions to the exclusion of others. While his actions teeter on the edge, they ultimately fall on the side of neglect, rather than intent. His failure to properly object to the jury’s question is a forfeiture, rather than an invited error. Our review is for plain error. Under the plain error test, Smith “must demonstrate the district court (1) committed error, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the plain error affected his substantial -9- rights. If these factors are met, we may exercise discretion to correct the error if (4) it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Cordery, 656 F.3d 1103, 1105 (10th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).