Opinion ID: 1196239
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: imposition of life sentence without minimum term

Text: Ryan was sentenced to serve the remainder of his natural life in prison; a sentence authorized by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-104. No minimum term was established by the district court. Ryan contends that the court was prohibited from imposing a definite term, and that a minimum term must be established. An illegal sentence is one which exceeds statutory limits, imposes multiple terms of imprisonment for the same offense, or otherwise violates constitutions or the law. Sanchez v. State, 982 P.2d 149, 150 (Wyo.1999) (citing Duran v. State, 949 P.2d 885, 887 (Wyo.1997)). The determination of whether a sentence is illegal is made by reference to the authorizing statute or applicable constitutional provisions and is, therefore, a matter of statutory interpretation. Interpretation of statutes is a question of law, which we review de novo. French v. Amax Coal West, 960 P.2d 1023, 1027 (Wyo. 1998); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State, 918 P.2d 980, 983 (Wyo.1996). Statutory interpretation begins by looking at the plain and ordinary meaning of the language of the statute to determine whether it is ambiguous. Bolack v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 963 P.2d 237, 240-41 (Wyo. 1998); Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042-43 (Wyo.1993). A statute is unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree as to its meaning with consistence and predictability. [A] statute is ambiguous only if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations. [W]hether an ambiguity exists in a statute is a matter of law to be determined by the court. Bolack, 963 P.2d at 241 (citations omitted), Parker Land and Cattle Company, 845 P.2d at 1043 (quoting Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219-20 (Wyo.1991)). If a statute's meaning is plain, we apply it without further inquiry. Id. If we determine, however, that a statute is ambiguous, we will consider extrinsic evidence in our attempt to ascertain legislative intent. Parker Land and Cattle Company, 845 P.2d at 1044. [I]n ascertaining the legislative intent in enacting a statute    [we]    must look to the mischief the act was intended to cure, the historical setting surrounding its enactment, the public policy of the state, the conditions of the law and all other prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances that would enable the court intelligently to determine the intention of the lawmaking body. Id. (quoting Carter v. Thompson Realty Company, 58 Wyo. 279, 291, 131 P.2d 297, 299 (1942)). Ryan contends that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-201 requires that the district court establish a maximum and minimum term in all felony cases where a life sentence is not mandatory. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-201 (LEXIS 1999) provides: Except where a term of life is required by law, or as otherwise provided by W.S. § 7-13-101, when a person is sentenced for the commission of a felony, the court imposing the sentence shall not fix a definite term of imprisonment but shall establish a maximum and minimum term within the limits authorized for the statute violated. The maximum term shall not be greater than the maximum provided by law for the statute violated, and the minimum term shall not be less than the minimum provided by law for the statute violated, nor greater than ninety percent (90%) of the maximum term imposed. The statute obviously breaks down where, as here, a life sentence is authorized by the statute, but not required. As it is not required, the district court appears to be compelled to establish a minimum term which is no more than 90% of the life sentence. We cannot envision the mathematics involved in such a calculation. An early predecessor to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-201 provided: When a convict is sentenced to the state penitentiary, otherwise than for life, for an offense or crime, the court imposing the sentence shall not fix a definite term of imprisonment, but shall establish a maximum or minimum term for which said convict shall be held in said prison. The maximum term shall not be longer than the longest term fixed by law for the punishment of the offense of which he was convicted, and the minimum term shall not be less than the shortest term fixed by law for the punishment of the offense of which he was convicted. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-313 (Michie 1957). We held in Jaramillo v. State, 517 P.2d 490 (Wyo.1974), and Dolence v. State, 921 P.2d 1103 (Wyo.1996), that the requirement for setting maximum and minimum terms did not apply to life sentences because Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-313 applied to sentences otherwise than for life. Jaramillo, 517 P.2d at 492; Dolence, 921 P.2d at 1104. In 1986 we were called upon to decide whether a difference of a single day between the maximum and minimum terms was proper under the statute. We concluded that it was: [T]here is nothing in the statute which requires any fixed period of time between the minimum and maximum, and this court would be interfering with an important legislative function if it undertook to establish such a period. We doubt that the legislature overlooked the obvious possibility that a judge might impose the sentences imposed here. Justice Brown, in a concurring opinion in Jahnke v. State, Wyo., 682 P.2d 991, 1010-1011 (1984), noted that such sentences would be possible under the statute. He stated that the judge in that case could have sentenced Richard [Jahnke] to not less than nineteen years, eleven months and twenty-nine days. The legislature has not amended the statute in response to Justice Brown's observation. Duffy v. State, 730 P.2d 754, 756 (Wyo.1986). The legislature took notice of Duffy and in the next legislative session changed Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-201 into its present form. From the timing of the amendment, we conclude that the legislature intended to address Justice Brown's concerns. The preamble to the applicable session law also reflects that the statute was being amended to provide that in imposing an indeterminate sentence in a felony case the court shall set the minimum term at no more than 90% of the maximum term imposed. 1987 Wyo. Sess. Laws, Ch. 157. As we find no indication that the legislature intended to abrogate the holdings in Jaramillo and Dolence, we interpret the statute to mean that the district court is not required to establish a minimum term where a life sentence is imposed but was not required by statute. We are mindful of the rule of statutory construction which provides that if the legislature deletes an express provision in a statute, it must have meant to change the law in some way. Nylen v. Dayton, 770 P.2d 1112, 1116 (Wyo.1989). An opposite interpretation of the statute, however, would not only fail to cure the ambiguity in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-201, but would also effectively abrogate the permissive life sentence provision in the second degree murder statute. We must assume that the legislature did not intend for us to interpret Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-201 in a manner which produces that result. Ryan's sentence was not illegal.