Opinion ID: 2816859
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Because this case involves a patent, our jurisdiction could be questioned. For actions filed before September 16, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from district-court decisions if the lower court’s jurisdiction rested in whole or in part on 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), which gives district courts jurisdiction over civil actions arising under patent legislation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006).1 Section 1295(a)(1) might seem to deprive this court of jurisdiction because a claim for patent infringement was included in Predator’s original complaint, as well as in Predator’s first, second, and third amended complaints, filed between May 2009 and March 2010. But at the time of Cogswell’s notice of appeal, the most recent complaint was Predator’s fourth amended complaint, filed in September 2010, which did not contain a patent-infringement claim. And it is that complaint which governs our jurisdiction. 1 As a result of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(b), 125 Stat. 284, 331–32 (2011), the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction has been changed. But the AIA applies only to civil actions commenced on or after September 16, 2011. See AIA § 19(e), 125 Stat. at 333; Wawrzynski v. H.J. Heinz Co., 728 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 3 This conclusion follows from two propositions. First, an amended pleading “supersedes the pleading it modifies and remains in effect throughout the action unless it subsequently is modified.” Gilles v. United States, 906 F.2d 1386, 1389 (10th Cir. 1990) (en banc); see Mink v. Suthers, 482 F.3d 1244, 1254 (10th Cir. 2007) (“an amended complaint super[s]edes an original complaint and renders the original complaint without legal effect” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Second, a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction ordinarily is determined by the situation at the time that jurisdiction is invoked. This is true of federal district courts. See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 570 (2004) (“the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the state of things at the time of the action brought”) (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. id. at 572 (noting exception to time-of-filing rule when lack of diversity jurisdiction is cured by dismissal of a party); 16 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 107.41[2][c] (3d. ed. 2011) (“Removability is ordinarily determined as of the date the notice of removal is filed.”). And it is also true of a federal appellate court, whose jurisdiction is invoked by a notice of appeal. Thus, the Federal Circuit has held that it lacked jurisdiction over an appeal because the patent claim originally brought in the district court had been voluntarily dismissed without prejudice before entry of final judgment and filing of the notice of appeal. See Gronholz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 836 F.2d 515, 518 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 835 (2002) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (“[I]f the only patent count in a multicount complaint was voluntarily 4 dismissed in advance of trial, it would seem . . . clear that the appeal should be taken to the appropriate regional court of appeals rather than to the Federal Circuit.”); id. at 840 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) (Because “no patent claim was actually adjudicated” in district court, Federal Circuit lacked appellate jurisdiction.). Here the notice of appeal was filed after the fourth amended complaint was filed. Later events—such as dismissal of a federal claim or mootness—can affect a court’s jurisdiction. See Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 473‒74 (2007) (“[W]hen a plaintiff files a complaint in federal court and then voluntarily amends the complaint, courts look to the amended complaint to determine jurisdiction.”); Winsness v. Yocom, 433 F.3d 727, 736 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Even if we assume that a credible threat of prosecution existed before this lawsuit was filed, the prosecutors’ [post-complaint] affidavits [disavowing an intention to prosecute] have rendered the controversy moot.”). But no such events after the notice of appeal have been presented to us.2 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and can proceed to the merits. 2 We note that in response to Predator’s fourth amended complaint, Gamo pleaded a counterclaim requesting a declaratory judgment that it had not infringed Predator’s patent, and that pleading was operative at the time of the notice of appeal. Such a counterclaim might now be sufficient to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal Circuit because under the AIA that exclusive jurisdiction now includes “an appeal from a final decision of a district court . . . in any civil action arising under, or in any civil action in which a party has asserted a compulsory counterclaim arising under, any Act of Congress relating to patents . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added); see AIA, § 19(b), 125 Stat. at 331–32. But before the AIA, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction depended on a claim “arising under” patent legislation. And “a counterclaim . . . cannot Continued . . . 5