Opinion ID: 4123136
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Instructions on consent

Text: LaVictor argues that the district court erred by rejecting his instructions on consent. At trial, the district court instructed the jury that consent was a factor for the jury to consider. Claiming error, LaVictor contends that consent is more than just a factor to be considered by the jury because if C.B. had consented, then LaVictor would have had a complete defense. This Court is unpersuaded. The district court does not have to accept the exact language of a defendant’s proffered jury instructions. United States v. McGuire, 744 F.2d 1197, 1201 (6th Cir. 1984) (“the district court has great latitude in phrasing [jury instructions].”). LaVictor cites two cases, neither of which provides any support for his contention that the jury instructions were incorrect. See United States v. Boyles, 57 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting consent instructions are only given in rare cases because the presence of force will generally obviate any defense of consent); United States v. Anderson, 467 F. App’x 474, 479 (6th Cir. 2012) (overturning a district court’s decision not to admit the defendant’s proffered Rule 412 evidence). Despite LaVictor’s contention that this does in fact represent one of those rare cases where a victim consents to sexual intercourse involving force, we find the district court’s instructions adequate to address the matter. Consent, as the jury was instructed, was a factor in the case. Whether it was the sole factor or one of several to be weighed by the jury is immaterial.