Opinion ID: 2974477
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dendinger’s Rehabilitation Act Claim

Text: Dendinger also claims that BCI & I’s actions violated the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., which prohibits the exclusion of otherwise qualified, disabled individuals from programs receiving federal financial assistance. According to Dendinger, rather than reasonably accommodating her headaches, BCI & I instead punished her for them by denying her work assignments. To qualify as a person with a disability, a Rehabilitation Act plaintiff must show that she “has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more . . . major life activities.” 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B). “‘[S]ubstantially’ in the phrase ‘substantially limits’ suggests ‘considerabl[y]’ or ‘to a large degree.’” Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196 (2002) (first alteration in original).8 “‘Major life activities’ . . . refers to those activities that are of central importance to daily life,” such as “walking, seeing, and hearing.” Id. at 197. Dendinger has not shown that her headaches considerably limit her ability to engage in major life activities; the need to lie down occasionally in a dark, quiet room is not akin to blindness or the inability to walk. 8 The Toyota case is an ADA case, not a Rehabilitation Act case. By statute, however, Rehabilitation Act claims are subject to the same standard as are ADA claims. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791(g), 794(d). 10 Moreover, even were Dendinger able to prove that her headaches constitute a disability, she has not shown that she was terminated because of that disability, for the reasons set forth in the Title VII analysis above.