Opinion ID: 6321287
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Katz's remaining claims

Text: Beyond fraud, Katz asserts several causes of action, all of which are equally unsuccessful in the absence of wrongdoing or foreseeable damages.
There are two types of civil conspiracy under Massachusetts law: One, based on section 876 of the Restatement [(Second) of Torts], is a form of vicarious liability for the tortious conduct of others . . . The other, drawn from the common law, amounts to a very limited cause of action in Massachusetts for civil conspiracy based on the defendants' allegedly unique ability to exert a peculiar power of coercion when acting in unison. Snyder v. Collura, 812 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2016) (emphasis added) (quotations and citations omitted). The record reflects that Katz - 20 - is asserting the former, which requires an underlying tort.1 Taylor v. Am. Chemistry Council, 576 F.3d 16, 35 (1st Cir. 2009). Having already rejected Appellant's theory of fraud, her civil conspiracy claim necessarily faces the same fate.
It is uncontested that neither Belveron nor Sisler had a fiduciary duty towards Katz under the law or the Partnership Agreement. Instead, Appellant alleges that through their conduct, i.e. by acting as the de facto general partner and assuming an authoritative role over the future of the Property, they imposed a fiduciary duty upon themselves. Massachusetts courts have recognized that though business transactions conducted at arm's length generally do not give rise to fiduciary relationships, such a relationship can develop where one party reposes its confidence in another. Indus. Gen. Corp. v. Sequoia Pac. Sys. Corp., 44 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). To determine if this transformation has occurred, courts look to the defendant's knowledge of the plaintiff's reliance and consider the relation of the parties, the plaintiff's business capacity contrasted with that of the defendant, and the readiness of the plaintiff to follow The district court's order granting summary judgment notes 1 that Plaintiff correctly disclaimed a 'coercion' conspiracy claim at the hearing[.] Katz's Brief on appeal is consistent with this. - 21 - the defendant's guidance in complicated transactions wherein the defendant has specialized knowledge. Smith v. Jenkins, 732 F.3d 51, 63 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Indus. Gen. Corp., 44 F.3d at 44) (internal quotation marks omitted). Katz's testimony reflects a lack of trust in Sisler and, by extension, Belveron. Therefore, it is contradictory to claim that she relied on their statements. Even more so considering she opted not to enter a business transaction or agreement with them. See Indus. Gen. Corp., 44 F.3d at 45 (finding no fiduciary duty between product developer and parts' supplier, despite developer's overall 'management' role in supplier's transaction with contract manufacturer, where developer did not direct the terms of the transaction, but merely directed [supplier] to deal directly with [manufacturer]). Lastly, all parties involved were sophisticated and experienced with analogous real estate ventures. There is no evidence that Katz had such a disparate capacity or knowledge that a fiduciary duty could be imposed on Sisler or Belveron.
Katz's request for equitable relief also lacks merit. An unjust enrichment claim cannot stand where there is an existing, express contract, unless the contract is not valid. Philibotte v. Nisource Corp. Servs. Co., 793 F.3d 159, 167 (1st Cir. 2015) (emphasis added); see also Shaulis v. Nordstrom, Inc., - 22 - 865 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2017) (Massachusetts law does not permit litigants to override an express contract by arguing unjust enrichment.) (internal quotation omitted); Skyview Fin. Co., LLC v. Kearsarge Trading, LLC, Civil Action No. 20-11666-PBS, 2021 WL 1930609, at  (D. Mass. Feb. 24, 2021) (Because the relationship between the parties is governed by contract, unjust enrichment is not an available remedy.). Katz sold her Special Interest to AHP for $1.5 million via a written Agreement. We have already rejected Appellant's contention that she was fraudulently induced into this sale. Furthermore, Katz has not proffered any other grounds that could render the existing Agreement invalid. See Monus v. Colo. Baseball 1993, Inc., 103 F.3d 145, at  (10th Cir. 1996) (unpublished) (Having received the benefit of the bargain he agreed to, plaintiff has made no showing that there are inequitable circumstances justifying his claim of unjust enrichment.). Therefore, the Agreement precludes her unjust enrichment claim as to AHP. We recognize that neither Sisler, Orne, nor Belveron were parties to this Agreement. However, [t]o recover for unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must establish not only that the defendant received a benefit, but also that such a benefit was unjust. Baker v. Equity Residential Mgmt., L.L.C., 390 F. Supp. 3d 246, 258 (D. Mass. 2019) (internal quotation omitted). Katz - 23 - has not evinced that Sisler or Orne personally benefited from the sale of her Special Interest. Rather, she merely posits that such personal gain can be inferred. Yet, it was not Belveron but the affiliated Fund, who is not a party in this lawsuit, that obtained a portion of Katz's Special Interest from AHP. Thus, there are no grounds on which to find that Belveron received a benefit.
To prevail on a claim for tortious interference with a contract or business relations, a plaintiff must prove that: 1) he or she has a contractual or advantageous relationship with another, 2) the defendant knowingly induced a breach of that contract or relationship, 3) the defendant's interference, in addition to being intentional, was improper in 'motive' or 'means' and 4) the plaintiff was harmed by the defendant's actions. Carp v. XL Ins., 754 F. Supp. 2d 230, 233–34 (D. Mass. 2010) (citing Cancellieri v. Northeast Hosp. Corp., No. CIVA 07-01659C, 2009 WL 765060, at  (Mass. Super. March 20, 2009).2 Even supposing Katz had a contractual or advantageous business relationship with the Falls View Partnership, we agree with the district court's reasoning that no improper motive was at work. Here, Appellant 2 In the operative complaint, Katz labels her claim for tortious interference as one with contract. However, she discusses both types in her opposition to AHP's motion for summary judgment. Ultimately, the District Court dismissed her claims for tortious interference both with contract and with an advantageous business relationship. - 24 - avers that misrepresentations are a quintessential form of improper means. However, given that fraud has not been established, Katz has not shown that the Appellees employed improper means or otherwise acted out of any purpose beyond the 'legitimate advancement of [their] own economic interest[.]' FAMM Steel, Inc. v. Sovereign Bank, 571 F.3d 93, 107 (1st Cir. 2009) (emphasis added) (quoting Pembroke Country Club, Inc. v. Regency Sav. Bank, F.S.B., 815 N.E.2d 241, 245-46 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004)). Katz entered into a valid agreement to sell her Special Interest, for which she was well compensated. The fact that she could have eventually profited more had she foregone the sale and retained her interest does not render the defendant[s'] effort[s] tortious. Pembroke Country Club, Inc., 815 N.E.2d at 246.
Chapter 93A, known as the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, creates a cause of action for any person who, when engaging in trade or commerce, suffers a loss of money or property as a result of the use or employment by another person who engages in any trade or commerce of an unfair method of competition or an unfair or deceptive act. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 11. In this context, an act is deemed unfair or deceptive if it is (1) within the penumbra of a common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; or (3) causes substantial injury to - 25 - competitors or other business people. Morrison v. Toys R Us, Inc., 806 N.E.2d 388, 392 (Mass. 2004). Evident from this definition is that what constitutes an actionable 'unfair or deceptive act or practice' [under Chapter 93A] goes far beyond the scope of the common law action for fraud[.] Cardiaq Valve Techs., Inc. v. Neovasc Inc., No. 14-cv-12405-ADB, 2016 WL 1642573, at  (D. Mass. Apr. 25, 2016) (internal quotation omitted). Conceding arguendo that unfair or deceptive practices were at play, Katz still cannot establish the requisite loss. To recover damages under Chapter 93A, a party must show a causal connection between the deception and the loss and that the loss was foreseeable as a result of the deception. Int'l Fid. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 443 N.E.2d 1308, 1314 (Mass. 1983) (citing Kohl v. Silver Lake Motors, Inc., 343 N.E.2d 375, 379 (Mass. 1976)). The only loss Katz has alleged is that she was not able to participate in the unexpected 2016 sale of the Property. However, none of the alleged misrepresentations have a causal link with the subsequent sale or increase in value of the Property. The record reflects that the changes in the real estate market, the sale of the Property, and the ultimate sales price of the same were all unforeseeable. Thus, Katz cannot recover damages under Chapter 93A.