Opinion ID: 1918264
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The plaintiff's invocation of Title VII as a basis for her retaliation claim.

Text: The plaintiff first challenges Judge Winfield's ruling that the allegations of retaliation in the complaint were based solely on the DCHRA. This contention is critical to the plaintiff's case for, as we have noted previously, her claim that the initial salary reduction was retaliatory had been presented to the OHR, which had found no probable cause. Having failed to seek judicial review of that finding, the plaintiff is barred by the doctrine of election of remedies from litigating the DCHRA retaliation claim in court. See Brown, supra note 12, 425 A.2d at 1311-12. Dr. Carter-Obayuwana's resort to an administrative complaint to the OHR does not, however, preclude her from pursuing the claim under civil rights law. This is so because Title VII confers upon the plaintiff the right to de novo judicial consideration of her allegations. Eg. Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 795-96, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986). Congress did not intend unreviewed state administrative proceedings to have preclusive effect on Title VII claims. Id. at 796, 106 S.Ct. 3220. The question whether Dr. Carter-Obayuwana's complaint alleges retaliation against her in violation of Title VII requires a careful examination of the entire pleading. Before focusing on the language of the complaint, however, we think it appropriate to consider, first, the applicable principles of construction and, second, the positions taken by the parties during the course of the litigation regarding the scope and meaning of the complaint. Each of these inquiries provides strong support for the plaintiff's position. We begin with the principle that liberal rules of pleading normally protect a plaintiff against dismissal of an ambiguous complaint when it can be said to state a claim if all reasonable inferences are drawn in the plaintiff's favor. Bible Way Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ v. Beards, 680 A.2d 419, 430 (D.C.1996). [A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Our rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep... may be decisive to the outcome. Id. at 48, 78 S.Ct. 99; see also, e.g., Francis v. Recycling Solutions, Inc., 695 A.2d 63, 78 (D.C.1997). Rather, the rules manifest a preference for resolution of disputes on the merits, not on technicalities of pleading. Keith v. Washington, 401 A.2d 468, 470 (D.C.1979). [P]leadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 8(f). [T]he purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (citation omitted). In construing the complaint, we must be particularly mindful of the fact that this is a civil rights case in which the defendants are alleged to have engaged in discrimination against the plaintiff based on sex and to have retaliated against her for exercising her rights under the civil rights statutes. The right to equal opportunity without discrimination based on race or other such invidious ground[, including sex,] is protected by a policy to which both this nation and its capital city have accorded the highest priority. Harris v. District of Columbia Comm'n on Human Rights, 562 A.2d 625, 626 (D.C. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211, 93 S.Ct. 364, 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972)). It is especially in civil rights disputes that we ought to be chary of disposing of [cases] on the pleadings, for courts do in fact have a predilection for allowing civil rights cases to proceed until a comprehensive record is available to either support or negate the facts alleged. Sisters of Providence v. City of Evanston, 335 F.Supp. 396, 399-400 (N.D.Ill.1971). Civil rights statutes are accorded a generous construction to ensure their vitality. Trafficante, supra, 409 U.S. at 212, 93 S.Ct. 364; see also Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, 715 A.2d 873, 889 (D.C.1998). Dr. Carter-Obayuwana's complaint, which is grounded in two of these statutes, should be liberally construed with the foregoing principles in mind, and we should read her pleading as asserting a retaliation claim under Title VII unless such a construction is plainly unreasonable. Moreover, it appears that, before the second trial judge ruled otherwise, all parties-not only the plaintiff and the first trial judge, but also, quite explicitly, the defendants-viewed the case as including a Title VII retaliation claim. In the parties' Joint Pretrial Statement, which was filed prior to the first trial, the Nature of the Case  Defendants' View was described as follows: Plaintiff Dr. Ann Carter-Obayuwana is suing Howard University and Dr. Frederick D. Harper for gender discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and the D.C. Human Rights Act. (Emphasis added.) In his order dismissing Counts I and II of the Complaint, Judge Satterfield specifically held that the plaintiff must be permitted to proceed in Count Three under Title VII and the D.C. Human Rights Act. (Emphasis added.) The first trial on the retaliation count proceeded on that basis, without objection by the University. The purpose of a pleading is to put the opposing party on notice of the nature of the pleader's claims. See, e.g., Scott v. District of Columbia, 493 A.2d 319, 323 (D.C.1985); Lee v. Foote, 481 A.2d 484, 487 n. 8 (D.C.1984) (per curiam). Given the parties' understanding, as reflected in the Joint Pretrial Statement, that the plaintiff had alleged retaliation in violation of Title VII, the University can assert no plausible claim of surprise or prejudice if the complaint is construed as including a claim under Title VII regarding the initial reduction in 1993 of the plaintiff's salary. Construction of the complaint as not including a retaliation claim under Title VII, on the other hand, would result in prejudice to the plaintiff, who had a right to rely on the University's understanding as reflected in the Joint Pretrial Statement. If the defendants had taken the position at the pretrial stage that they take now  namely, that retaliation in violation of Title VII was not alleged  then the plaintiff would have had the opportunity to seek leave to amend her complaint and to eliminate from the case the perceived defect in her pleading. With these considerations in mind, we turn to the complaint itself. We have set forth in the footnote at the conclusion of this sentence all of those allegations in the plaintiff's pleading which bear on the issue under discussion, and we have italicized the language which, in our view, supports the plaintiff's reading of the complaint. [17] Although the complaint is not a model of clarity with respect to the statutory bases for each allegation, [18] it can, at the very least, be reasonably read as invoking Title VII for the plaintiff's claims of retaliation. The first paragraph of the pleading states that the complaint is filed pursuant to both the DCHRA and Title VII. Paragraph 1. The alleged wrongs of which the plaintiff complains specifically include the initial reduction of her salary. Paragraph 31. Count I, which alleges unlawful discrimination, is explicitly brought both under Title VII and under the DCHRA. The plaintiff alleges in paragraph 39, which is part of Count I, that the reduction of her salary constituted unlawful discrimination... and retaliation.  (Emphasis added.) The retaliation claim is thus explicitly linked in the complaint to both statutory bases identified in the heading of Count I  the DCHRA and Title VII. Count III of the complaint is entitled Reprisal and Retaliation. In the first paragraph of this Count, the plaintiff explicitly repeats and incorporates by reference the prior allegations of the complaint. Paragraph 44. The pleader has thus reiterated in Count III, under the heading of Reprisal and Retaliation, the allegation in paragraph 39 that the initial reduction of Dr. Carter-Obayuwana's salary was retaliatory. Paragraph 39, as we have seen, is part of a claim that is expressly based, inter alia, on Title VII. The University points out, correctly, that in Count III, the plaintiff has specifically cited the DCHRA, but not Title VII. A careful reading of Count III, however, does not support the University's argument that the citation of the DCHRA, to the exclusion of Title VII, was intended to apply to the allegations regarding the original reduction of the plaintiff's salary. In Paragraphs 46 and 48, the plaintiff has cited the DCHRA  but not Title VII  as the legal basis for complaining (1) of the University's refusal to provide her with a computer, Paragraph 46, and (2) of the denial of her application for reappointment to the Graduate Faculty, Paragraph 48. These are the only alleged reprisals specifically linked in the pleading solely to the DCHRA. The invocation exclusively of the DCHRA for these particular allegations might reasonably be construed as indicating that other claims of reprisal were not intended to be so restricted. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. In any event, the pleader's implied disclaimer of Title VII in connection with a coveted computer, and in relation to a position with the Graduate Faculty, cannot logically be extended to the plaintiff's claim of a retaliatory reduction of her salary. Especially in light of the applicable principles of construction and the language of the Joint Pretrial Statement, we conclude that the complaint fairly invokes Title VII, as well as the DCHRA, as a statutory basis for the claim that the plaintiff's salary was reduced in 1993 in reprisal for her having engaged in protected activity.