Opinion ID: 2974278
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motion for New Trial Based on Juror’s Comments

Text: The Kelleys argue that the jury engaged in misconduct and that a new trial is warranted because jurors spoke to the Detroit Free Press about their views on whether the Kelleys should have testified on their own behalf. Specifically, a juror stated that “I was also struck by the fact that neither of the Kelleys testified. If they were innocent, they would have testified.” (J.A. 464.) The district court denied the post-trial motion for a new trial, finding that this evidence was insufficient to grant a new trial. We agree. A district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Greenwell v. Boatwright, 184 F.3d 492, 499 (6th Cir. 1999). “Abuse of discretion is defined as a definite and firm conviction that the trial court committed a clear error of judgment.” Id. (quoting Powers v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 83 F.3d 789, 796 (6th Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The jurors’ statements to the newspaper fall within the scope of FED. R. EVID. 606(b), which states: (b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror’s mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror’s affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes. FED. R. EVID. 606(b). Under Rule 606(b), any evidence regarding a juror’s thoughts about the trial, if offered to impeach the jury’s verdict, is incompetent and cannot be admitted. United States v. Gonzales, 227 F.3d 520, 524 (6th Cir. 2000). Post-trial jury scrutiny is disfavored because of its potential to undermine “full and frank discussion in the jury room, jurors’ willingness to return an unpopular verdict, and the community’s trust in a system that relies on the decisions of laypeople.” Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120-21, 107 S. Ct. 2739 (1987). The only two exceptions to this rule occur when extraneous prejudicial information is improperly brought to the jury’s attention, and when outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. FED. R. EVID. 606(b). The question before the court is whether a juror’s consideration of a defendant’s failure to testify constitutes a permissible internal influence or an impermissible external or extraneous influence. In United States v. Rodriquez, 116 F.3d 1225 (8th Cir. 1997), the defendant raised the same argument that the Kelleys make on their appeal, namely that his failure to testify was not evidence and should not have been considered; and accordingly that this testimony is the type of “outside influence” to which the jurors are allowed to testify. Id. at 1226-27. The court rejected this argument, noting: That Rodriquez did not testify is not a fact the jurors learned through outside contact, communication, or publicity. It did not enter the jury room through an external, prohibited route. It was part of the trial, and was part of the information each juror collected. It should not have been discussed by the jury, and indeed was the subject Nos. 05-1361/1435 United States v. Kelley, et al. Page 12 of a jury instruction to that effect. But it was not “extraneous information,” and therefore does not fall within the exception outlined in Rule 606(b). Id. at 1227. We agree with our sister circuits that because the juror did not learn of the Kelleys’ failure to testify through improper channels, a juror’s discussion regarding this fact does not fall within either Rule 606(b) exception. See, e.g., United States v. Rutherford, 371 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2004) (juror discussion of defendant’s failure to testify in violation of court’s instructions is inadmissible); United States v. Tran, 122 F.3d 670, 672-73 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that discussions of defendant’s failure to testify were “not ‘extraneous prejudicial information,’ and therefore [did] not fall within the exception outlined in Rule 606(b)”) ; United States v. Martinez-Moncivais, 14 F.3d 1030, 1036-37 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 816, 115 S. Ct. 72 (1994) (holding that post-trial statements that juror believed that if the defendant had been innocent, he would have taken the stand, did not fall into the “narrow exception that arises when there is evidence of outside influences on the jury”); United States v. Voigt, 877 F.2d 1465, 1469 (10th Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. Friedland, 660 F.2d 919, 927-28 (3d Cir. 1981) (same); see also United States v. Pavon, 618 F. Supp. 1245, 1247 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (holding jury deliberations focused on discussions concerning defendant’s failure to testify, contrary to court instructions, did not entitle defendant to judicial investigation of jury deliberations), aff’d, 802 F.2d 1397 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Edwards, 486 F. Supp. 673, 674 (S.D.N.Y) (same), aff’d, 631 F.2d 1049 (2d Cir. 1980). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision to deny the Kelleys a new trial.