Opinion ID: 172312
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of the accessory-after-the-fact cross reference guideline

Text: Leifson argues that the district court erred by applying U.S. S.G. § 2J1.3 (c), which instructs the sentencing court to apply the accessory-after-the-fact cross reference guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2X3.1, if the perjury was in respect to a criminal offense. Leifson contends that his grand jury perjury was not in respect to a criminal offense because his false testimony did not obstruct[ ] the investigation of the criminal offense. Aplt. Br. at 13. We interpret the phrase, in respect to, in U.S.S.G. § 2J1.3(c) according to its plain meaning. Olsen, 519 F.3d at 1105. The defendant does not need to commit nor be charged with the underlying offense for the cross reference guideline to apply. Id. Perjury is made in respect to a criminal offense when it is related to the criminal offense in a very entwined and enmeshed way. United States v. Renteria, 138 F.3d 1328, 1334 (10th Cir.1998) (internal quotations and citation omitted). However, the false statement need not refer specifically to the underlying offense: To perform its broad investigative function, the grand jury must be able to ask questions intended to probe witnesses for information about knowledge or conduct relevant to the criminal offense being investigated. Such questions need not always specifically refer to the underlying offense and would sometimes be ineffective if they did. A witness, punishable for any false answer, deserves enhanced punishment for a false answer that obstructs an inquiry concerning a criminal offense, and a witness, informed of the subject of such an inquiry, may not avoid the enhancement just because the question to which he gave a false answer did not alert him to the precise link between the question and the offense under inquiry. United States v. Suleiman, 208 F.3d 32, 40 (2d Cir.2000). Perjury is in respect to a criminal offense so long as the defendant knew or had reason to know, at the time of his perjury, that his testimony concerned such a criminal offense. . . . United States v. Rude, 88 F.3d 1538, 1543 (9th Cir.1996). Under 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a), perjury, to which Leifson pleaded guilty, has the following elements: (1) the defendant made a declaration under oath before a grand jury; (2) such declaration was false; (3) the defendant knew the declaration was false, and (4) the false declaration was material to the grand jury's inquiry. United States v. Clifton, 406 F.3d 1173, 1177 (10th Cir.2005). To be material, the false declaration must have a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the decision required to be made. United States v. Durham, 139 F.3d 1325, 1329 (10th Cir.1998) (internal quotations, brackets, and ellipses omitted). Leifson argues that the cross reference guideline does not apply unless there is proof that the perjury obstructed the investigation of the [underlying] criminal offense. Aplt. Br. at 13. Leifson contends that his perjury did not obstruct the investigation because [i]t would have made no material difference to the grand jury's investigation if Leifson had frankly discussed his emotional upset pertaining to Olsen and the accusations he made against Leifson. Id. at 14 (emphasis added). He further states, Leifson's perjury did not pertain to a crucial element of an investigation.. . . Id. at 15 (emphasis added). Leifson's argument confuses the materiality element of perjury with the cross reference guideline requirement that the perjury be in respect to a criminal offense. Leifson filed a signed statement prior to his guilty plea which stated that he understood the elements of perjury and intended to plead guilty. Additionally, Leifson stated, I knowingly gave false material testimony, while under oath, before the Grand Jury of the United States District Court, District of Utah when questioned about statements made regarding the disappearance of Kiplyn Davis. Supp. Vol. II, at 14 (Doc. 29). Leifson cannot now argue that his false statements were not material to the grand jury investigation into Davis's disappearance and presumed death, or that he did not know that his false statements were material. In support of his argument, Leifson relies on the following language from Olsen: [T]he text of the perjury guideline, combined with the cross reference, requires perjury which obstructs an investigation into a criminal offense to be punished more severely than other sorts of perjury. ... 519 F.3d at 1106 (emphasis added). However, our opinion in Olsen simply refers to the combination of the perjury guideline (which requires the perjury to be material) and the cross-reference guideline (which requires the perjury to be in respect to a criminal offense). In other words, perjury that is material to the investigation of a criminal offense will be punished more severely than other sorts of perjury by operation of the cross reference guideline. However, it is not enough that the defendant make a material false statement and that the sentencing court conclude that the grand jury investigation pertained to murder. The defendant must have some knowledge of the subject matter of the grand jury investigation in order for the perjury to be in respect to a criminal offense such that the accessory-after-the-fact cross reference guideline applies. See Blanton, 281 F.3d at 776 (holding that a witness must be put on notice ... of the nature of the grand jury's inquiry either prior to or during her grand jury testimony (emphasis added)); Suleiman, 208 F.3d at 39 ([A]s long as the witness has been alerted to the fact that the grand jury is investigating a criminal offense, false answers to material questions will almost always merit enhanced punishment. (emphasis added)); Rude, 88 F.3d at 1543 (explaining that perjury is in respect to a criminal offense so long as the defendant knew or had reason to know, at the time of his perjury, that his testimony concerned such a criminal offense (emphasis added)). Here, Leifson knew that the grand jury was investigating Davis's disappearance and whether she was murdered. Leifson was a target of the grand jury investigation and was served with a target letter. He was told in the first minutes of his grand jury testimony that the purpose of the grand jury was to investigate, and where probable cause is found, to return indictments of violations of federal criminal law. ROA, Vol. I, at 2 (Grand Jury Tr.). While gathering biographical information, the focus of the questioning was about his years in high school, near the time of Davis's disappearance. Davis's name was mentioned for the first time when Leifson was asked if he knew Davis, which was before the grand jury took a break for lunch. Id. at 33. After the lunch break, he was asked about Davis's disappearance, id. at 36, and death. Id. at 38. Leifson was asked about confronting Olsen for telling the authorities that [he was] involved with the disappearance or the murder of a 15 year old girl. ... Id. at 40. Leifson admitted that he stopped talking to Olsen [p]robably because of the whole Kiplyn Davis issue. Id. at 89. And only then did Leifson utter the false statements that give rise to Count III of Leifson's indictment. Id. at 90-92. The district court did not err by concluding that Leifson's perjury was in respect to a criminal offense and applying the accessory-after-the-fact cross reference guideline.