Opinion ID: 799732
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Martinetti

Text: Munoz asserted a claim against Martinetti, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on two theories. First, Munoz contends that Martinetti violated his procedural due process rights by failing to notify him before Martinetti made the decision to demolish the Building. Second, Munoz argues that Martinetti‟s decision to demolish the Building constituted a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. We agree with the District Court that Martinetti is entitled to qualified immunity under both theories. We will affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Martinetti. “The qualified immunity doctrine „protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.‟” Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). Martinetti is entitled to qualified immunity unless Munoz can demonstrate: (1) a violation of his constitutional rights; and (2) the right was clearly established, such that no reasonable official in Martinetti‟s position would have believed that Martinetti‟s conduct was constitutional. Id. Munoz cannot prevail on either prong. 1. Munoz’s Constitutional Rights Were Not Violated Munoz has alleged violations of both the Due Process Clause and the Takings Clause. We begin first with Munoz‟s procedural due process claim. 6 A plaintiff asserting the deprivation of procedural due process rights “must allege that (1) he was deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment‟s protection of life, liberty, or property, and (2) the procedures available to him did not provide due process of law.” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 234 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because Martinetti assumes, arguendo, in his brief that Munoz has been deprived of a protected property interest, we focus our inquiry on the second prong. While a due process hearing ordinarily should occur before an individual is deprived of his property, “in special circumstances, a state may satisfy the requirements of procedural due process merely by making available „some meaningful means by which to assess the propriety of the State‟s action at some time after the initial taking.‟” Elsmere Park Club, L.P. v. Town of Elsmere, 542 F.3d 412, 417 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986)). “Where there is „the necessity of quick action by the State,‟ or where „providing any meaningful pre[-]deprivation process‟ would be impractical, the Government is relieved of the usual obligation to provide a pre[-]deprivation hearing.” Id. (quoting Parratt, 451 U.S. at 539). Neither side disputes that Munoz did not receive a due process hearing prior to his Building being demolished. Of course, that is not dispositive. We must determine: (1) whether a pre-deprivation hearing was required; and (2) if not, whether the State‟s postdeprivation hearings were sufficient. See Elsmere Park Club, 542 F.3d at 417. 7 As to the first issue, we agree with Martinetti that the Building‟s structural instability created an exigent circumstance that warranted immediate and decisive action. The New Jersey administrative code contemplates such an emergency situation: When, in the opinion of the construction official, there is actual and immediate danger of collapse or failure of a building or structure or any part thereof which would endanger life, the construction official shall cause the necessary work to be done to render such building or structure or part thereof temporarily safe, whether or not the legal procedure herein has been instituted. Such work may include such demolition as may be necessary in order to eliminate any actual and immediate danger to human life; provided, however, that any demolition work shall not commence until at least 24 hours following service of notice of the pending demolition upon the owner, unless such service is not possible because the identity or the address of the owner cannot be determined from public records. Upon expiration of the 24-hour period, demolition may proceed unless stayed by order of the Superior Court. N.J. Admin. Code § 5:23-2.32(b)(2). Responsibility for executing this emergency mandate provision on September 9, 2006 lay with Martinetti, Union City‟s Construction Code Official. Based on his professional expertise and judgment, Martinetti determined that the fire had significantly compromised the structural integrity of the Building. Martinetti concluded that pressing safety concerns required the Building to be demolished as soon as possible. We find nothing in the record to undermine the propriety of Martinetti‟s decision.2 He acted 2 Munoz would have this Court repudiate Martinetti‟s decision based on Munoz‟s own interpretation of photographs of the fire damage, the statements of tenants who lived in the Building, and the investigation report filed by the Hudson County Prosecutor‟s Office. However, the common deficiency each of these sources suffers from is the lack of professional expertise in the field of assessing the architectural integrity of a structure. 8 based on “the necessity of quick action[,]” Parratt, 451 U.S. at 539, which obviated the need for a pre-deprivation hearing.3 Turning to the second prong of our inquiry, we conclude that Munoz received an adequate post-deprivation due process hearing to challenge all aspects regarding the demolition of the Building. Union City retained Biviano to preside over these hearings. Four hearings were held, in total, addressing both the costs associated with the demolition and the procedure by which Munoz was notified of the necessary demolition.4 On July 16, 2008, Biviano submitted his findings, concluding that Munoz received adequate notice of the demolition under New Jersey law and that Munoz was responsible for costs related to the demolition.5 We cannot give credence to the observations of lay individuals in a field dependent on the expertise of licensed individuals regarding matters of public safety. 3 The fact that Martinetti commenced demolition prior to the expiration of New Jersey‟s 24-hour notice period is inconsequential. Even if this failure rendered Martinetti “without authorization[,] . . . the state need only [have] provide[d] post-deprivation procedures.” Revell v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 598 F.3d 128, 138 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that post-deprivation proceedings can remedy the effects of a state official who acts without authority). Moreover, we are not guided by state law in determining whether Munoz has alleged a violation of his due process rights under § 1983. See Bayer v. Monroe Cnty. Children & Youth Servs., 577 F.3d 186, 193 n.6 (3d Cir. 2009). Although, it is worth noting, as Biviano concluded in his findings, that Martinetti orally informed Munoz that the Building needed to be demolished, to which Munoz responded by authorizing Martinetti to take whatever action was necessary. 4 Munoz alleges that the hearings were intended to address only the costs associated with the demolition and not any due process considerations. This assertion is controverted by the briefing submitted in connection with the hearings as well as Biviano‟s findings in which he addressed the due process issue. 5 As Biviano noted, his ability to render a final decision was repeatedly delayed by counsels‟ requests for adjournments and additional briefing, as well as the availability of witnesses. 9 The post-deprivation procedure followed here was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process. Although not discussed by the District Court, the exigent circumstances that obviated the need for a pre-deprivation hearing, coupled with the adequacy of the post-deprivation hearing, is sufficient to support the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment to Martinetti on Munoz‟s procedural due process claim. Munoz also asserted a § 1983 claim against Martinetti for an alleged violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. “The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government from taking private property for public use without providing just compensation.” Am. Express Travel Related Servs., Inc. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 359, 370 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing U.S. Const. amend. V). This applies with equal force through the Fourteenth Amendment where the state is the government actor. Id. Munoz argues that the demolition of the Building eviscerated the property‟s intended purpose of providing rental income. But the Takings Clause asks not whether the plaintiff‟s most profitable use of the property has been destroyed. A Takings Clause claim cannot lie where the plaintiff was not deprived of all beneficial uses of his property. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979). Munoz concedes that he retains a possessory interest in the property. Indeed, Munoz is still entitled to put the property to any number of beneficial uses. The record reflects that Munoz simply lacks sufficient funds to do so, at present. Even if Martinetti was without authority to order the demolition, Munoz‟s continuing possessory interest in the property prevents him from establishing a Takings Clause violation. 10 2. Martinetti Acted Reasonably Munoz also cannot demonstrate that no reasonable official would have believed that Martinetti‟s decision to demolish the Building was a reasonable one. Given that the Building‟s structural instability posed an imminent threat to public safety, we agree with the District Court that Martinetti acted reasonably in ordering the Building to be demolished.