Opinion ID: 3188498
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Kinsey’s standing

Text: {¶ 45} In their amended complaint, appellants alleged that Kinsey “would engage in casino gaming in Ohio but for” Article XV, Section 6(C) of the Ohio Constitution, which “grant[s] a special and exclusive privilege to engage in casino gaming in Ohio to two gaming corporations.” Kinsey’s claim requests a declaration that Article XV, Section 6(C) of the Ohio Constitution, H.B. 1, H.B. 519, and H.B. 277 grant a monopoly on casino gambling to certain gaming companies and that this monopoly violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Appellants argue that Kinsey’s allegation that he would engage in casino gaming but for Article XV, Section 6(C)’s limitation is sufficient to survive appellees’ motion to dismiss for lack of standing. {¶ 46} “When the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of another group, a member of the former group seeking to challenge the barrier need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit but for the barrier in order to establish standing.” Northeastern Florida Chapter of Associated Gen. Contrs. of Am. v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993). “The ‘injury in fact’ in an equal protection case of this variety is the denial of equal 20 January Term, 2016 treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.” Id. For example, to establish standing to challenge a set-aside program based on the inability to compete on an equal footing in the bidding process, a party need only demonstrate that it is able and ready to bid on contracts and that a discriminatory policy prevents it from doing so on an equal basis. Id. The Sixth Circuit has applied those principles in a case alleging an equal-protection violation regarding the ability to apply for a casino license, stating that “ ‘the standing issue hinges on whether [the plaintiff] has sufficiently alleged that it is able and ready to bid for a casino license.’ ” Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Michigan Gaming Control Bd., 172 F.3d 397, 404 (6th Cir.1999), quoting the district court opinion. {¶ 47} Appellees correctly point out that Kinsey’s general allegation that he “would engage in casino gaming” but for Article XV, Section 6(C) of the Ohio Constitution is weaker than the allegations regarding standing in Lac Vieux. There, Lac Vieux alleged that it owned and operated another casino in Michigan, had arranged for development of a casino in Detroit, had selected a site for the casino, and was ready and able to submit the requisite information for a casinodevelopment proposal, along with the required fees. See Lac Vieux at 404-405. But Lac Vieux, as well as Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934 (9th Cir.2003), which appellees also cite, was decided on summary judgment, not a motion to dismiss. The level of specificity in Lac Vieux’s complaint is not required to survive a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, because at the pleading stage, we presume that general allegations embrace the specific facts necessary to support a claim. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351. Kinsey’s allegation that he would engage in casino gaming but for the bar in Article XV, Section 6(C) of the Ohio Constitution, is a sufficient allegation of injury to withstand a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss. 21 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 48} As noted above, under traditional standing principles, a plaintiff must show, at a minimum, not only that he or she has suffered an injury that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct, but also that the requested relief is likely to redress the injury. ProgressOhio.org, Inc., 139 Ohio St.3d 520, 2014-Ohio-2382, 13 N.E.3d 1101, at ¶ 7, quoting Moore, 133 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012Ohio-3897, 975 N.E.2d 977, at ¶ 22. Appellees argue that Kinsey lacks standing because the relief he requests would not redress his injury. {¶ 49} Kinsey requests relief in the form of a declaration that Article XV, Section 6(C) of the Ohio Constitution, H.B. 1, H.B. 519, and H.B. 277 violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. A declaration that those provisions are unconstitutional would rescind the limited grant of authority for casino gaming rather than allow all potential operators, like Kinsey, to conduct casino gambling in the state. But the injury here is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the limitations imposed by Article XV, Section 6(C) of the Ohio Constitution, H.B. 1, H.B. 519, and H.B. 277. See Northeastern Florida Chapter of Associated Gen. Contrs. of Am., 508 U.S. at 666, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586. While a declaration that those provisions violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution would not grant the general public permission to conduct casino gambling in Ohio, it would eliminate the current inequality in the opportunity to obtain that benefit. Accordingly, we conclude that Kinsey’s allegation is sufficient to meet the redressability element of standing. {¶ 50} Whether Kinsey could conclusively demonstrate standing were he faced with a motion for summary judgment is not before us. But under the standards prescribed for dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), Kinsey has sufficiently alleged standing to withstand appellees’ motion to dismiss. 2. Necessity of allowing an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal {¶ 51} Appellants’ final argument is that a court must allow a plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint before the court dismisses that complaint for 22 January Term, 2016 failure to show standing. But the facts of this case foreclose that argument. First, the plaintiffs in this case were, in fact, allowed an opportunity to amend their complaint, and they took full advantage of this opportunity by doing so. Moreover, they filed their amended complaint after the state filed motions to dismiss alleging that appellants lacked standing. Second, there is no evidence in the record that appellants requested leave from the trial court to file a second amended complaint or that they submitted a second amended complaint. By their own actions, appellants effectively waived this issue, and we decline to set forth a statement of law requiring courts to allow a plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint before the court dismisses a case based on a lack of standing. We accordingly decline to adopt appellants’ fourth proposition of law.