Opinion ID: 1684864
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The Solvey Shooting

Text: For his next point, Anderson argues that the circuit court erroneously permitted the State to treat all three crimes, i.e., the Magee burglary, the Solvey shooting, and the Creech murder, as one continuing criminal episode during the guilt phase of the trial and then did an about-face and permitted the State to use the Solvey shooting as an aggravator and a separate prior violent felony during the sentencing phase. The State argues that this precise argument was not made to the circuit court. Anderson counters that he objected each time the Magee burglary or Solvey shooting was mentioned. We agree with Anderson that the issue he raises about the necessity for the circuit court to intervene to correct a serious error is one requiring review under Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure  Criminal 10. See also Wicks v. State, 270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980). Anderson's assertion, however, is meritless. As already referenced in this opinion, the introduction of the Magee burglary and the Solvey shooting during the guilt phase of the trial was necessary for the State to meet its burden of proving Anderson's premeditated and deliberate intent to kill Ms. Creech. Anderson relies on this court's decision in Parker v. State, 292 Ark. 421, 731 S.W.2d 756 (1987), but that reliance is misplaced. In Parker , this court reversed Parker's convictions for capital felony murder based upon the facts of that case. In that case, we observed that the State's evidence showed that Parker had entered the home of his victims with only one purpose  to commit murder. Although Parker committed burglary as well when he entered his victims' home unlawfully to commit the offenses, this court found that the killings were not in the furtherance of the burglary, as required for capital felony murder. We further examined whether the circuit court erroneously instructed the jury on previously committed felonies, when there was no evidence that Parker had previously committed another felony, other than shooting at a third person in the home which took place contemporaneously with the other killings. We noted that Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1303(3) (Repl. 1977), dealing with aggravating circumstances, applied to crimes not connected in time or place to the killing for which the defendant has just been convicted. We concluded that because the shooting at this third person was so closely connected in both time and place to the killings, it did not present a portrait of the defendant as having previously demonstrated a character for violent crimes or a history for committing such crimes. 292 Ark. at 428, 731 S.W.2d at 759. The Parker case is inapposite. Anderson stipulated to the submission of the Solvey attempted capital murder as an aggravating circumstance, as evidenced by the trial court's instruction to the jury: ... Ladies and gentlemen, the parties, the state and the Mr. Anderson [sic] have stipulated that Justin Anderson was previously convicted of another felony, an element of which was the use or threat of violence to another person that created a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another person, and have stipulated that there is, or could be, proof beyond a reasonable doubt of that fact. You should accept that as a fact proven to your satisfaction at this trial. But equally as important, the Solvey shooting was not admitted as part of a criminal episode but to prove intent on the part of Anderson. We find no reversible error on this point.