Opinion ID: 1792134
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Speedy Trial The Statutory Claim

Text: ¶ 28. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-17-1 (Rev.2000), known as the 270 day rule, provides: Unless good cause be shown, and a continuance duly granted by the court, all offenses for which indictments are presented to the court shall be tried no later than two hundred seventy (270) days after the accused has been arraigned. (emphasis added). ¶ 29. This Court has held that compliance with section 99-17-1 does not necessarily mean that a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been respected. Smith, 550 So.2d at 408. ¶ 30. Hersick was arraigned on January 30, 2002. His trial commenced on October 29, 2002. However, the total period of delay is 138 days, after tolling 49 days for the false identity period, tolling the period of time between finding out Hersick's true identity and being indicted by the next grand jury, 105 days for the continuance requested by defense counsel, and 92 days for continuance requested by the state because of the absence of Darryl Brewer, the arresting officer. Hersick objected to the State's request for this continuance, but the trial court granted the Motion, finding Brewer to be a material witness, and that good cause [5] existed for the continuance. ¶ 31. On October 1, 2002, following the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, the trial court found that Hersick's right to a speedy trial had not been violated. A trial judge's finding will not be reversed unless manifestly wrong. Mitchell v. State, 792 So.2d 192, 213 (Miss.2001), Humphrey v. State, 759 So.2d 368, 375 (Miss.2000). We are unable to say that the trial court's ruling was manifestly wrong. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.