Opinion ID: 1757072
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the trial court's denial of bethlehem's cr 60.02 motion was erroneous

Text: Following this Court's initial opinion and prior to the scheduling of oral argument on Bethlehem's petition for rehearing, the heirs of Miles Smallwood moved to intervene in the underlying action in the Pike Circuit Court. As predecessors in interest to the Johnsons in a portion of Tract 42, the Smallwood heirs claim that the deed purporting to convey that interest excepted all mineral rights. After voluntarily withdrawing their motion, the Smallwood heirs filed a separate quiet title suit against the Johnson heirs. Thus the Smallwood heirs' complaint made no title claim against Bethlehem, but asserted instead an interest as tenants-in-common with the Johnson heirs with respect to one-half interest in a portion of the Tract 42 acreage to which the Johnsons were adjudged to have superior title. As Bethlehem is the stakeholder of the judgment to which the Smallwood heirs claim a share, Bethlehem was joined as a party-defendant to that action. Based upon the foregoing turn of events, Bethlehem filed a motion to vacate the trial court's judgment under CR 60.02(f), alleging the existence of extraordinary cause. Judge Bayard V. Collier held oral argument on the motion, at which time the court granted leave to the parties to address by memoranda any legal authority on the issue of the appropriateness of delaying or abating ruling on the CR 60.02 motion until the conclusion of the pending Smallwood action. Thereafter finding no extraordinary cause to exist, the trial court denied Bethlehem's motion to vacate the judgment. By motion for discretionary review, Bethlehem appealed the denial to the Court of Appeals. This Court granted transfer and ordered consolidation of Bethlehem's motion for oral argument with the petition for rehearing already pending in this Court. Having heard oral argument and considered the issues Bethlehem raises on appeal, for the reasons below, we affirm. The bottom line of Bethlehem's attempt to establish extraordinary cause under CR 60.02(f) is the argument that the claims of the Smallwood heirs, if proved, would produce contradictory results and thus undermine the basis for the trial court's title judgment. The theory is that if the Smallwood heirs prevail, then because the Johnson heirs cannot have exclusive title, the previous title, trespass, and damage determinations of the Pike Circuit Court are thereby destroyed[ed]. Bethlehem also argued that even the mere assertion of the Smallwood heirs' claims directly controverts the trial court's finding with respect to the willful character of the trespass. The trial court found these arguments to be unpersuasive. The standard of review for this Court dictates that a trial court's denial of CR 60.02(f) motion will not be reversed except for an abuse of discretion. Fortney v. Mahan, Ky., 302 S.W.2d 842, 843 (1957); Schott v. Citizens Fidelity Bank and Trust Company, Ky., 692 S.W.2d 810, 814 (1985). In Fortney , we stated that two factors are to be considered by the trial judge in exercising its discretion. They are (1) whether the moving party had a fair opportunity to present his claim at the trial on the merits and (2) whether the granting of CR 60.02(f) relief would be inequitable to other parties. Id. at 842. Under the present facts, both considerations weigh in favor of the conclusion that the trial judge acted well within the bounds of his discretion. Bethlehem had a full, fair and lengthy opportunity to litigate its title theories. Evidence of the Smallwood heirs' claim was on record and thus, available, at the time of trial. The fact that Bethlehem did not thoroughly investigate and uncover the discoverable evidence it now seeks to use to upset the trial court's judgment does not constitute extraordinary cause under the rule. Further, the relief Bethlehem seeks would not only be inequitable to the parties who prevailed after thirty years of litigation, but it would also set an indefensible precedent. The result under Bethlehem's hypothesis would be that ostensibly final title judgments, theoretically, would never be safe from the risk of a stranger to the original litigation asserting an interest in the subject matter of the dispute by the mere filing of a claim. This is an effect that is obviously totally contrary to the sound policy of finality incorporated by the provisions of CR 60.02. For the reasons stated above, it is clear that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bethlehem's motion for CR 60.02(f) relief. Accordingly, we affirm. LAMBERT, LEIBSON, REYNOLDS, SPAIN and STUMBO, JJ., concur. WINTERSHEIMER, J., concurs in result only.