Opinion ID: 2626390
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sexual Intercourse

Text: The standard rape instruction given here (CALJIC No. 10.00), like the rape statute itself (§ 261, subd. (a)), does not define sexual intercourse. Defendant claims the trial court erred in not sua sponte defining the term as vaginal penetration, and thereby violated his federal and state due process rights to a jury trial on all elements of first degree felony murder. Defendant assumes jurors mistakenly used evidence of anal penetration to find he raped Carol. However, as defendant concedes, we have held that sexual intercourse has a common meaning in the context of rape, that no technical elaboration is required, and that the term can only refer to vaginal penetration or intercourse. ( People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 676, 63 Cal. Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213; cf. People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 349-350, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432 [presuming jurors do not know legal definition of rape where court failed to instruct on rape as target offense of burglary].) Also, no risk of confusion exists where the court properly gives other instructions defining sodomy as anal penetration. ( People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 676, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213; see § 286, subd. (a); CALJIC No. 10.20.) Thus, defendant could not have been convicted of nonconsensual sexual intercourse and rape based on anal penetration used to prove sodomy. We see no basis on which to distinguish or reconsider People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th 619, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213. We therefore decline to do so.