Opinion ID: 1847393
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the award of physical and legal custody of the child to respondent was in the best interest of the child based on the evidence?

Text: ¶ 24. The standard of review in a child custody case is quite limited in that the chancellor must be manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or apply an erroneous legal standard in order for this court to reverse. Wright v. Stanley, 700 So.2d 274, 280 (Miss. 1997) (citing Williams v. Williams, 656 So.2d 325, 330 (Miss.1995)). The polestar consideration in child custody matters is the best interest of the child, not marital fault. Moak v. Moak, 631 So.2d 196, 198 (Miss.1994). ¶ 25. Mrs. Rushing complains the trial court granted sole legal and physical custody of the minor child to Mr. Rushing because it appeared Mrs. Rushing was involved in an adulterous interracial relationship. We disagree. Mrs. Rushing conceded the issue of child custody in open court. Mrs. Rushing then entered an agreed consent judgment granting custody of the minor child to Mr. Rushing subject to the reasonable visitation rights of Mrs. Rushing. We can find no reason, such as fraud, to disturb that which Mrs. Rushing, with the advice of counsel, settled by agreement and consent. ¶ 26. Mrs. Rushing also complains the chancellor failed to issue specific findings of fact as to why Mr. Rushing is better able to care for the minor child than she, and he failed to refer to the factors enunciated by this Court in Moak v. Moak, 631 So.2d 196 (Miss.1994), when determining the custody issue. Neither of these arguments has merit. Again, Mrs. Rushing conceded the issue of child custody in open court, and she entered an agreed consent judgment. Therefore, the chancellor was not required to issue specific findings of fact nor was he required to determine the issue of child custody. ¶ 27. Mrs. Rushing further argues the chancellor committed reversible error when he restricted Mrs. Rushing's visitation rights with the minor child. The chancellor has broad discretion when determining appropriate visitation and the limitations thereon. Harrington v. Harrington, 648 So.2d 543, 545 (Miss.1994) (citations omitted). In determining visitation, the chancellor must continue to keep the best interest of the child as his paramount concern while always being attentive to the rights of the non-custodial parent, recognizing the need to maintain a healthy, loving relationship between the non-custodial parent and his child. Id. ¶ 28. In Dunn v. Dunn, 609 So.2d 1277, 1286 (Miss.1992), the Court stated that evidence must be presented that a particular restriction on visitation is necessary to avoid harm to the child before a chancellor may properly impose the restriction. Otherwise, the chancellor's imposition of a restriction on the non-custodial parent's visitation is manifest error and an abuse of discretion. In Dunn, we found the chancellor erred by restricting visitation where no evidence was presented that the child was being harmed or was in any danger because of contact with the non custodial parent's lover. Also, in Morrow v. Morrow, 591 So.2d 829, 833 (Miss. 1991), we stated [a]n extramarital relationship is not, per se, an adverse circumstance. ¶ 29. In the case sub judice, the chancellor restricted Mrs. Rushing from visiting with the minor child in the company of any man not a member of her family. Mrs. Rushing claims this restriction is not supported by the overwhelming weight of the evidence. We agree. The record simply does not support the chancellor's restriction on Mrs. Rushing's visitation with the minor child. The chancellor was manifestly wrong to restrict Mrs. Rushing's visitation rights in this manner simply because she conceded the issue of her adultery.