Opinion ID: 1968444
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Separate and Distinct Evidence In A Single Trial

Text: The government maintains that under the second test set forth in Arnold, the evidence of the murders could be introduced in a trial including the ammunition charge, because the evidence as to each was separate and distinct, and thus unlikely to be amalgamated in the jury's mind into a single inculpatory mass, 511 A.2d at 404 (citation omitted). However, the way in which the trial developed made it virtually impossible to keep the offenses separate and distinct, and to avoid amalgamation in the jurors minds into a single inculpatory mass. The evidence concerning the murders and the ammunition possession, as the trial judge recognized, was related and temporally connected. Furthermore, the government did not isolate its witnesses on the murder charges from those on the ammunition offense. In fact, Officers Horne and Mattera, who testified regarding the ammunition charge, were followed by Detective Fox who testified regarding both the murder and the ammunition charges. The government called several witnesses after Detective Fox, including Robert Poole, a firearms expert who testified regarding the casings found at the scene of the crime and the bullets found in the victims' bodies; Dr. Humphrey Germaniuk from the medical examiner's office who discussed the autopsies of the victims' bodies; and Detective Jefferey Mayberry, Detective Fox's partner, who testified regarding his interviews with eyewitnesses Jordan and Boatwright. Moreover, the government linked the murder and ammunition charges by arguing that the jury should consider the.38 round of ammunition found in Bright's sleeping quarters as evidence that he committed the murders. Given the way in which the testimony concerning the murders and the ammunition possession charges was presented, it was [likely] to be amalgamated in the jury's mind into a single inculpatory mass, despite the trial court's general final instruction that [e]ach offense and the evidence which applies to it should be considered separately.... Accordingly, we reverse Bright's conviction on the ammunition possession charge because as to that count the trial court should have granted a severance. We do not reverse Bright's other convictions, however, because in a separate trial of those charges evidence of the ammunition possession would have been properly admitted  as it was here  for the reasons stated earlier. As to those counts, therefore, the failure to sever did not prejudice appellant. See D.C.Code § 11-721(e)(1995). [9]