Opinion ID: 454832
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: cogsa carriers

Text: 11 Plaintiffs may recover under COGSA only from the carriers of the cargo. COGSA defines carrier to include the owner or the charterer who enters into a contract of carriage with a shipper. 46 U.S.C. Sec. 1301(a). Accordingly, the plaintiffs must establish that a party defendant executed a contract of carriage. Associated Metals, 484 F.2d at 462. COGSA defines a contract of carriage as follows:The term contract of carriage applies only to contracts of carriage covered by a bill of lading or any similar document of title, insofar as such document relates to the carriage of goods by sea, including any bill of lading or any similar document as aforesaid issued under or pursuant to a charter party from the moment at which such bill of lading or similar document of title regulates the relations between a carrier and a holder of the same. 12 46 U.S.C. Sec. 1301(b). The district court found that TMM and Aquarius entered into a contract of carriage with Cargill and thus were carriers under COGSA, and that Greenwich did not enter into a contract of carriage as defined by the Act and thus was not a carrier. 13 Appellants challenge the district court's findings. The findings will not be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous: 14 In reviewing a judgment of a trial court, sitting without a jury in admiralty, the Court of Appeals may not set aside the judgment below unless it is clearly erroneous.... A finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. 15 Daniels Towing Service, Inc. v. Nat Harrison Associates, Inc., 432 F.2d 103, 105 (5th Cir.1970) (quoting McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 20, 75 S.Ct. 6, 8, 99 L.Ed. 20 (1954)). The fact that this case was submitted to the district court without oral testimony does not affect our standard of review: 16 If the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 342, 70 S.Ct. 177, 179, 94 L.Ed. 150 (1949); see also Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 102 S.Ct. 2182, 72 L.Ed.2d 606 (1982). 17 This is so even when the district court's findings do not rest on credibility determinations, but are based instead on physical or documentary evidence or inferences from other facts. 18 Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, North Carolina, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1512, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). TMM 19 The bills of lading were issued by Rogers Terminal and were signed: ROGERS TERMINAL & SHIPPING CORPORATION, AS AGENTS BY AUTHORITY OF THE MASTER. The district court found that in issuing the bills of lading, Rogers Terminal acted as agent for TMM and therefore TMM entered into a contract of carriage. TMM contends that this finding is clearly erroneous. We disagree and hold that there was sufficient evidence before the district court to support its finding. The voyage charter party entered into by TMM and Greenwich was incorporated into the bills of lading and provided, in part, that: 20 Owners [TMM] to instruct their New York bank to advise Owners' agents at loading port immediately freight received by cable that freight payment has been received and Owners to instruct their agents to release Bill/s of Lading immediately on receipt of such advice. If release of Bill/s of Lading should be delayed, the Owners shall pay interest at one per cent over the New York Prime Rate on Bill/s of Lading date/s, on the cost and freight value of the cargo from the day on which the freight payment is received by the Owners' New York bank until the day on which the Bill/s of Lading are actually released by the Owners' agents. 21 The evidence before the district court did not clearly disclose for whom Rogers Terminal acted when it issued the bills of lading. Under the voyage charter party, Greenwich was obligated to appoint and employ stevedores at the loading port. Rogers Terminal performed stevedoring services in New Orleans. However, the National Cargo Bureau's Certificate of Loading, issued after loading of the GLORIA was completed, stated, AGENT--ROGERS TERMINAL & SHIPPING CO.--T.M.M. CHARTERING. Moreover, the charter party states that TMM and/or its agents would be responsible for issuance of the bills of lading. The master of the GLORIA testified by deposition that he authorized Rogers Terminal to issue the bills of lading on his behalf. He also testified, however, that it was his belief that Rogers Terminal was acting on behalf of Greenwich. 22 The district court considered all of the evidence before it, and, relying primarily on the voyage charter party provision that TMM would issue the bills of lading upon payment of freight by Greenwich, the court found that the bills were issued by TMM through its agent, Rogers Terminal. The district court's finding, in light of the conflicting evidence, is not clearly erroneous and we affirm the holding that TMM entered into a contract of carriage with respect to the soybean cargo and is thus a carrier under the provisions of COGSA. Greenwich 23 The district court held that Greenwich was not a COGSA carrier because Greenwich did not issue the bills of lading and did not otherwise enter into a contract of carriage with Cargill. The court found that Greenwich acted simply on behalf of the shipper in finding a vessel to carry the cargo and paying the appropriate freight. Greenwich did not enter into a contract that was covered by a bill of lading or any similar document of title. See 46 U.S.C. Sec. 1301(b). 24 In addition to contending that Greenwich issued the bills of lading, appellants argue that Greenwich is a COGSA carrier because the bills of lading were issued in connection with the voyage charter and because, under the voyage charter party, Greenwich was responsible for loading, stowage, and discharge--duties which COGSA places on the carrier. See 46 U.S.C. Sec. 1303(2). First, we note that the voyage charter party merely states, Charterers to appoint and employ stevedores at loading port/s, and Charterers/Receivers Stevedores to be employed at discharging port/s. The charter party is not so explicit as appellants would have us believe. Moreover, even if Greenwich bore the responsibility under the voyage charter party for loading, stowage, and discharge, we do not believe this fact, alone, would make Greenwich a COGSA carrier. In Demsey & Associates v. S.S. SEA STAR, 461 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir.1972), the time charterer issued bills of lading in connection with a voyage charter. The court held that the time charterer was a COGSA carrier but that the voyage charterer was not. The court further held that the fact that the charter party required the voyage charterer to load, stow, and discharge the cargo created a duty running from the voyage charterer to the time charterer but did not affect the time charterer's obligations under COGSA and did not operate to make the voyage charterer a COGSA carrier. Id. at 1018-1019. We agree with the Second Circuit and we affirm the district court's finding that Greenwich is not a COGSA carrier. Aquarius 25 Appellants also argue that the district court erred by finding that Aquarius is a COGSA carrier. Since appellees' causes of action were based on COGSA, there can be in personam liability against the vessel owner only if the owner is a carrier. Associated Metals, 484 F.2d at 462. Appellants contend that Aquarius did not enter into a contract of carriage and did not become bound by the bills of lading merely because they were signed by authority of the master. 26 A contract of carriage with an owner may either be direct between the parties, or by virtue of a charterer's authority to bind the owner by signing bills of lading 'for the master.'  Matter of Intercontinental Properties Management, S.A., 604 F.2d 254, 258 n. 3 (4th Cir.1979). Appellees argue that the bills of lading were issued by Rogers Terminal--TMM's agent--with the actual authority of the vessel owner and that Aquarius is therefore bound. The circumstances under which the vessel owner may be bound by the bills of lading were well-stated by the First Circuit in EAC Timberlane v. Pisces, Ltd., 745 F.2d 715 (1st Cir.1984): 27 Generally, when a bill of lading is signed by the charterer or its agent for the master with the authority of the shipowner, this binds the shipowner and places the shipowner within the provisions of COGSA. E.g., Gans S.S. Line v. Wilhelmsen (The Themis), 2 Cir.1921, 275 F. 254, 262; Tube Products of India v. S.S. Rio Grande, 1971, S.D.N.Y., 334 F.Supp. 1039, 1041; see generally Bauer, Responsibilities of Owner and Charterer to Third Parties--Consequences under Time and Voyage Charters, 49 Tul.L.Rev. 995, 997-1001 (1975). When, however, a bill of lading is signed by the charterer or its agent for the master but without the authority of the shipowner, the shipowner is not personally bound and does not by virtue of the charterer's signature become a COGSA carrier. E.g., Associated Metals and Minerals Corp. v. S.S. Portoria, 5 Cir.1973, 484 F.2d 460, 462; Demsey & Associates, Inc. v. S.S. Sea Star, 2 Cir.1972, 461 F.2d 1009, 1015. 28 Id. at 719. Aquarius' liability depends on the effect of the signature caption by authority of the master. In order to determine the effect we must examine Rogers Terminal's authority to sign on behalf of the master and the master's authority to bind Aquarius. See Yeramex International v. S.S. TENDO, 595 F.2d 943, 946 (4th Cir.1979). 29 The district court's finding that the master authorized Rogers Terminal to issue the bills of lading on his behalf is not clearly erroneous. The captain of the GLORIA testified by deposition that he gave Rogers Terminal an undertaking that they should sign the bills of lading. Appellants presented no conflicting evidence. This case is therefore unlike those cited by appellants in which there was no evidence that the master authorized the charterer or its agent to sign on his behalf. See Demsey & Associates v. S.S. SEA STAR, 461 F.2d 1009, 1012-15 (2d Cir.1972); Thyssen Steel Corp. v. S.S. ADONIS, 364 F.Supp. 1332, 1335 (S.D.N.Y.1973); United Nations Children's Fund v. S/S NORDSTERN, 251 F.Supp. 833, 838 (S.D.N.Y.1965). 30 We must next determine whether the master had actual authority to bind the vessel owner to the terms of the bills of lading. The charter party between Aquarius and TMM contained the following provisions: 31 8. [T]he Captain shall prosecute his voyages with the utmost despatch, and shall render all customary assistance with ship's crew and boats. The Captain (although appointed by the Owners), shall be under the orders and directions of the Charterers [TMM] as regards employment and agency; and Charterers are to load, stow, and trim and discharge the cargo at their expense under the supervision of the Captain, who is to sign Bills of Lading for cargo as presented, in conformity with Mate's or Tally Clerk's receipts. 32 Rider 37. If required by Charterers and/or their Agents, Master to authorize Charterers or their Agents to sign Bills of Lading on his behalf in accordance with mates and/or tally clerks receipt with out prejudice to this Charter Party. 33 We hold that Rider 37 to the charter party empowered the master to authorize TMM's agent to sign the bills of lading and thereby bind Aquarius. The case cited by appellants, Yeramex International v. S.S. TENDO, 595 F.2d 943 (4th Cir.1979), is distinguishable. In Yeramex the charter party between the vessel owner and the time charterer contained a provision identical to clause 8 above. It also contained a provision that stated, in part: Charterers shall indemnify Owners from all consequences arising out of Master or agents signing Bills of Lading in accordance with Charterers' instructions, or from complying with any orders or directions of Charterers in connection therewith. Id. at 947. The court in Yeramex found that under the provisions of the charter party the charterer assumed exclusive responsibility for handling of cargo and for issuance of bills of lading. The court further stated: 34 In particular, we think all authority conferred by these provisions upon the vessels' masters for bills of lading issued by [time charterer] was authority which flowed, in fact, from [the time charterer] as principal to the masters as its agents, rather than as authority granted to [the time charterer] from the masters as the traditional personal agents of the owner.... No authority in fact existed for [the time charterer] to bind the owner to the terms of the bill of lading as a contracting party, and no liability in personam under COGSA will lie against the owner in favor of third parties. 35 Id. at 948. The Aquarius/TMM charter party did not contain a provision requiring TMM to indemnify Aquarius from all consequences arising out of the master or agents signing bills of lading. Moreover, Rider 37 to the charter party contains an express authorization that was not present in the Yeramex charter party. The district court's findings that TMM was authorized to bind Aquarius to the terms of the bills of lading and that Aquarius is a COGSA carrier are not clearly erroneous.