Opinion ID: 2175776
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: MS. McCONNELL'S PROPOSED TESTIMONY

Text: As I have noted in the preceding discussion, see page 496, supra, the trial judge invoked, in connection with the proposed testimony of Ms. McConnell, the same constricted notions of relevance which had led her not to permit Maurice Lewis to testify. Relevance rulings became to some extent academic in regard to Ms. McConnell, however, because her testimony was ultimately excluded for a different reason. After counsel was appointed for her, Ms. McConnell invoked her privilege against self-incrimination and declined to testify. The trial judge sustained her claim of privilege with respect to all of the questions which counsel for Collins proposed to propound to Ms. McConnell. I have no quarrel with that decision insofar as any inquiry regarding Ms. McConnell's drug use was concerned. Indeed, Collins claims no error in this regard, except that he says, contrary to controlling authority, that Ms. McConnell should have been required to take the Fifth in the presence of the jury. Judge Kotelly also declined, however, to permit Ms. McConnell to testify on subjects which had no potential for incriminating her. The judge so ruled on the ground that if Ms. McConnell were permitted to testify on direct examination with respect to matters which would not incriminate her, cross-examination would spill over into areas with respect to which the privilege applied, and could not be fairly limited without impairing the rights of the prosecution. My colleagues acknowledge, maj. op. at 491, that this decision was incorrect. I agree with them. Although a criminal defendant has the absolute right not to testify, a witness may invoke the privilege only as to those specific questions to which [the] answers would incriminate [her]. Wilson v. United States, 558 A.2d 1135, 1141 (D.C.1989). The trial judge must make a searching inquiry to determine whether the testimony sought to be elicited would in fact be incriminating and, if so, whether the risk of prosecution is real and substantial. Id. A witness may not assert a blanket privilege when a narrower assertion will suffice to protect her rights. Id. When a Fifth Amendment claim is asserted by someone other than a defendant, the court must ordinarily permit examination of the witness (out of the presence of the jury in a jury trial) and rule on the claim of privilege one question at a time. Id. at 1142 (citation omitted). A blanket ruling that a witness cannot be asked non-incriminating questions because a cross-examiner may later wish to cross into protected territory runs afoul of these principles. If the judge was concerned that it might be unfair to the prosecution to restrict both direct examination and crossexamination of Ms. McConnell to non-incriminating subjects, a voir dire examination outside the presence of the jury would have helped to flesh out the issue. Some reasonable accommodation could surely have been made between Collins' interest in calling his witness and the government's right to cross-examine her. There was no reason to believe, short of such a dry run, that reconciliation of these interests would not be possible. I am therefore compelled to conclude that Collins' right to present non-privileged testimony was not accorded the weight to which it was entitled.