Opinion ID: 54617
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Oliver’s claims for which he received a COA

Text: The district court rejected Oliver’s request for habeas relief but granted a COA on two claims related to several jurors’ alleged use of the Bible during jury deliberations. Oliver contends that evidence from his state court post-conviction hearing on his motion for a new trial, as well as additional evidence uncovered after that hearing, demonstrates that jurors consulted the Bible when considering whether to impose death or life imprisonment during the punishment phase of his trial. Oliver argues that any use of the Bible during jury deliberations violated his rights under the Sixth and Eighth Amendments. Oliver also asks this court either to stay this proceeding so that the state court can conduct an additional hearing based on the newly-discovered evidence or remand to the federal district court for an evidentiary hearing. 1. Oliver’s request for a stay and abatement or for an evidentiary hearing is without merit Oliver argues that he is entitled to, and never received, a hearing on the additional evidence he uncovered from an interview between a foreign journalist and juror Michael Brenneisen (the “Brenneisen interview”). This interview took place in February 2002, one month after Oliver had timely submitted his habeas application to the TCCA. In the interview, Brenneisen stated that jurors relied on the Bible in making their decision during the punishment phase of 3 We also note that Oliver’s requested jury instruction would amount to a “new rule” in violation of the non-retroactivity principle of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989). See Thacker, 396 F.3d at 617 n.15 (“Although [the habeas petitioner] argues at length that applying Simmons in the way he proposes would merely be an unremarkable application of existing precedent, this is plainly not the case. Given the volume of caselaw in this circuit holding that, despite Simmons, the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments do not require Texas to allow discussion of parole eligibility in capital trials, a decision to the contrary here would undoubtedly constitute a ‘new rule’ under Teague and is therefore barred.”). 12 No. 06-70006 deliberations.4 Upon learning of the interview, Oliver submitted to the TCCA an “Objection[] to Disposition Without Evidentiary Hearing and Motion for Extension of Time to File Habeas Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.” The TCCA deemed this motion to be a subsequent application for habeas corpus because Oliver submitted it after the state law deadline for an initial writ of habeas corpus. The court therefore dismissed the subsequent application as an abuse of the writ. Oliver then filed his federal habeas application in the district court. The court denied his motion to stay the federal proceeding so that he could seek a hearing in state court based on his “new” evidence. The court determined that “the appropriate relief [when a habeas applicant asserts that he has not exhausted his claim in the state court based on newly discovered evidence] . . . is for the federal court to consider the new evidence, not to remand the case to the state court.”5 Oliver submitted a transcript of the interview to the district court. The court denied Oliver’s request for a federal hearing on this issue. In particular, the court ruled that under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), Oliver was not entitled to a hearing because he did not act with “due diligence” to exhaust his claim in the state post-conviction hearing. The district court also ruled that Oliver failed to meet the second prong of § 2254(e)(2) because he failed to show that “but for relying on the Bible, no reasonable juror would have answered the special issues in the way that resulted in his receiving a death sentence.” The district court then denied habeas relief on his two claims related to the jury’s use of the Bible. 4 Oliver claims that Brenneisen’s interview confirms and bolsters the evidence from the four jurors who testified during the state post-conviction hearing. 5 It is not clear whether the district court relied on the Brenneisen interview in making its decision on the merits of Oliver’s claim. Instead, the district court focused on whether Oliver was entitled to a hearing and spent little time analyzing the underlying substantive issues. 13 No. 06-70006 Oliver argues that this court should stay and abate the federal proceeding so that he may go back to the state court and obtain a hearing on his claim. The flaw in Oliver’s argument, however, is that the state court already refused to grant him a hearing. The TCCA already considered his request to stay the proceeding so that he could seek a hearing regarding the information from the Brenneisen interview, and it deemed Oliver’s request to be a subsequent application for habeas corpus that is barred under state law. Oliver presents no arguments as to why the state court would now grant him a hearing. A stay and abatement, therefore, would amount to nothing more than an unnecessary and fruitless delay. Nor is Oliver entitled to a hearing in federal court. The district court applied the correct standard under § 2254(e)(2) regarding Oliver’s request for an evidentiary hearing in federal court. Section 2254 (e)(2) provides: If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that— (A) the claim relies on— (i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and (B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. As the district court correctly noted, Oliver fails to meet subsection (A)(ii) because Oliver could have discovered the evidence from the Brenneisen 14 No. 06-70006 interview through the exercise of due diligence.6 All Oliver had to do to uncover Brenneisen’s testimony was to call him to the stand during the state postconviction hearing.7 In sum, Oliver has presented no authority that would allow us to stay and abate this proceeding so that the state court can conduct an evidentiary hearing. Even if we did stay the federal proceeding, Oliver has failed to show why the state court would grant him a hearing after it denied the exact same request in its habeas decision. Further, Oliver failed to meet the stringent standard in § 2254(e)(2) that would allow a federal court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Congress has decided that a habeas applicant must jump a high hurdle before a federal court can grant an evidentiary hearing, especially when the applicant failed to develop the factual basis of his claim in state court. Therefore, we DENY Oliver’s request for a stay and abatement and for an evidentiary hearing. 2. Substantive merits of Oliver’s Bible claims Oral argument will assist the court in determining if Oliver is entitled to habeas relief given the evidence presented in the state court post-conviction hearing regarding the jury’s consultation of the Bible during deliberations. Specifically, the parties are directed to focus on the following two issues: (1) as 6 We make no decision regarding whether the district court correctly found that Oliver failed to meet subsection (B) because, “but for relying on the Bible, no reasonable juror would have answered the special issues in the way that resulted in [Oliver] receiving a death sentence.” We note, however, that subsection (B) requires the habeas applicant to show that “no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense,” not that no reasonable factfinder would have imposed the same sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Oliver’s failure to meet subsection (A) makes the district court’s application of subsection (B) moot. As to the substance of the district court’s statement that the jurors did not improperly rely on the Bible in making its decision, the court will consider this issue after further briefing and oral argument. 7 Oliver claims that he did not call Brenneisen to testify because Brenneisen would have been hostile to his lawyer and would not have cooperated. This is mere speculation, however, and does not excuse Oliver’s failure to call Brenneisen—or any of the other jurors—at the hearing. 15 No. 06-70006 a matter of law, did the jurors’ consultation of the Bible in the jury room constitute an external influence that raises a presumption of prejudice under clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; and (2) if so, has the state rebutted that presumption here? The clerk will issue a briefing schedule for the parties to submit supplemental briefs on these questions and will schedule oral argument in due course.