Opinion ID: 2630479
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The ICA Erred In Affirming The Circuit Court's Inclusion Of Tupuola On The Special Verdict Form.

Text: Moyle next claims that the inclusion of Tupuola on the special verdict form was contrary to Hawai`i precedent and highly prejudicial to Moyle, inasmuch as it took the jury's focus away from the issues at hand, namely the Respondents' failure to provide security at the club and to render assistance. Moyle further asserts that, according to Gump I and Gump II, although placing nonparties on the special verdict form is a matter within the trial court's discretion, it is an abuse of discretion to do so where the defendant inordinately delays naming the nonparty as an additional party for tactical reasons and assumes the risk of non-inclusion. Gump I and Gump II looked to the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA), HRS §§ 663-11 to 663-17 (1993 & Supp.2003), to determine whether the trial court erred in declining to include McDonald's restaurant, a nonparty joint tortfeasor under HRS § 663-11, [7] on the special verdict form. See Gump I, 93 Hawai`i at 446, 5 P.3d at 436; Gump II, 93 Hawai`i at 422-23, 5 P.3d at 412-13. The Hawai`i legislature adopted the UCATA for the purpose, inter alia, of abrogat[ing] the common law rule that the release of one joint tortfeasor released all other tortfeasors. Saranillio v. Silva, 78 Hawai`i 1, 10, 889 P.2d 685, 694 (1995). HRS § 663-12 [8] provides in relevant part that the relative degrees of fault of the joint tortfeasors shall be considered in determining their pro rata shares, subject to [HRS § ] 663-17. HRS § 663-17(c) dictates that, [a]s among joint tortfeasors who in a single action are adjudged to be such, the last paragraph of [HRS § ] 663-12 applies only if the issue of proportionate fault is litigated between them by pleading in that action. Gump II applied the aforementioned UCATA provisions in concluding that Wal-Mart, although a joint tortfeasor under HRS § 663-11, had failed to cross-claim ( i.e., plead) against McDonald's and had therefore lost its right of contribution under HRS §§ 663-12 and 663-17. 93 Hawai`i at 422, 5 P.3d at 412. This court further noted that, under appropriate circumstances that did not exist in the present case, non-parties may be included on a special verdict form. Id. Three such appropriate circumstances were noted by Gump II, involving non-parties that were, respectively, (1) dismissed because their participation would destroy jurisdiction, see Wheelock v. Sport Kites, Inc., 839 F.Supp. 730, 734 (D.Haw.1993), (2) not named because of a bankruptcy stay that was effective throughout the course of the proceedings, see Kaiu v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 960 F.2d 806, 819 n. 7 (9th Cir.1992), or (3) released from the case through settlement, but included on the special verdict pursuant to terms of the release, see Nobriga v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 67 Haw. 157, 160, 683 P.2d 389, 391 (1984). The foregoing appropriate circumstances constituted exceptions to the explicit pleading requirement set forth in HRS § 663-17, either because of the infeasibility of pleading the nonparty into the case ( Wheelock/Kaiu ), or because the nonparties had agreed to be included on the special verdict ( Nobriga ). In other words, inclusion was approved in these cases because it precluded prejudice to otherwise vigilant parties. Gump I, 93 Hawai`i 428, 447, 5 P.3d 418, 437 (emphasis added). Wal-Mart, which declined the readily available opportunity to plead in McDonald's through a cross-claim, found itself in none of the three appropriate circumstances. Accordingly, Gump II held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in leaving McDonald's off the special verdict form. 93 Hawai`i at 423, 5 P.3d at 413. Gump II's determination that [n]on-parties may . . ., in the trial court's sound discretion, . . . be included on a special verdict form, id., begs further elaboration. UCATA, and specifically HRS § 663-17(c)'s unambiguous decree that the last paragraph of [HRS § ]663-12 applies only if the issue of proportionate fault is litigated between [joint tortfeasors] by pleading in that action, leads to a singular conclusion: although a trial court has discretion to include, or to decline to include, a non-party on a special verdict form, it does not, as a matter of law, have the authority to include a non-party who has not been brought into the case by pleading pursuant to HRS §§ 663-12 and 663-17(c). In this regard, the ICA in Moyle was incorrect when it surmised that, [c]onsonant with the reasoning in Gump I, the converse of the ICA's holding should also be true: exclusion is not mandated simply because a party has failed to protect its rights. 116 Hawai`i at 402, 173 P.3d at 549. Indeed, as a matter of law, exclusion is mandated when a party fails to protect its rights. The Respondents did attempt to plead Tupuola into the case by filing a third-party complaint against him. [9] As discussed above, however, the circuit court denied leave to file at a hearing on August 1, 2003, during which the court stated: My inclination is to deny the motion. This case has been pending since September, 2001. So I think it's rather untimely with an upcoming trial week four months away. And also I think there's at least a question about what's the main reason. But in addition, there's the question of whether there really is a claim for contribution against Mr. Tupuola in light of the manner in which the complaint was drafted. (Emphasis added.) The Respondents' eleventh hour attempt to claim contribution from Tupuola, after declining to do so for two years, was understandably viewed dimly by the circuit court and was well within the circuit court's discretion to deny. The case at hand is distinguishable from the appropriate circumstances noted in Gump II. The Respondents were not denied the opportunity to plead in Tupuola, as were the defendants in Wheelock and Kaiu, but instead failed to do so when they had the opportunity, just as Wal-Mart failed in Gump II. Accordingly, we believe that the Respondents failed to litigate the issue of proportionate fault with Tupuola by pleading, and, therefore, under HRS § 663-17(c), the Respondents were barred from having the relative degrees of fault of the joint tortfeasors . . . considered in determining their pro rata shares. HRS § 663-17(c). Because Tupuola could not have been included on the special verdict form as a matter of law, the ICA erred in concluding to the contrary. Justice Acoba's concurring opinion takes issue with the foregoing analysis and asserts that HRS §§ 663-12 and 663-17 apply to the issue of contribution, which is manifestly distinct from the issue of apportioning fault among all culpable parties. Concurring opinion at ___, 191 P.3d at 1087-88 (footnotes omitted). Justice Acoba's assertion misapprehends the purpose of the UCATA. Apart from superceding the old rule that mandated that the release of one joint tortfeasor released all others, see Saranillio, 78 Hawai`i at 10, 889 P.2d at 694, the UCATA was designed to telescope third-party practice claims for contribution into the main action, which increases judicial efficiency by obviating the need for separate actions determining the apportionment of fault and resultant contribution among joint tortfeasors. HRS § 663-12, and by extension HRS § 663-17, further the goal of settling the issues of apportionment and contribution in tandem. See Ozaki v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay, 87 Hawai`i 273, 284, 954 P.2d 652, 663 (App.1998) [hereinafter, Ozaki I ] (reciting the Commissioner's Note to UCATA § 4(2), which corresponds to HRS § 663-12, stating that [UCATA § 4(2)] would permit apportionment of pro rata shares of liability of the joint tortfeasors as among themselves. (citing 1939 UCATA, 9 U.L.A. 153, 159 (1951)) (brackets and emphasis added)); see also Carrozza v. Greenbaum, 591 Pa. 196, 916 A.2d 553, 566 n. 21 (2007) ([A]pportionment of liability among joint tortfeasors not only is permissible and familiar . . . but indeed it is ultimately necessary in the event of a contribution action brought by one joint tortfeasor against another upon satisfaction of the judgment by the party seeking contribution. (citation omitted)). Justice Acoba's analysis of HRS §§ 663-12 and 663-17's language in a vacuum, concurring opinion at 14-17, fails to take into account the paramount reason for the UCATA's existence. The UCATA was designed to facilitate this very telescoping mechanism for joint tortfeasors who are otherwise severally liable to obtain contribution from one another. If contribution is not possible, the UCATA is simply not implicated. If the UCATA is not implicated, there is no justification for putting joint tortfeasors on the special verdict form, apart from the exceptions noted in Gump II. The facts of the present case demonstrate the wisdom and efficacy of the UCATA's telescoping mechanism, inasmuch as any determination of the proper apportionment of fault with respect to Tupuola, a nonparty, via the special verdict would not collaterally estop Tupuola from litigating the claim in a subsequent action for contribution brought by the Respondents against Tupuola. See Kaho`ohanohano v. Department of Human Services, State of Hawai`i 117 Hawai`i 262, 178 P.3d 538 (2008) (setting forth four requirements for collateral estoppel, including, inter alia, that `the party against whom [collateral estoppel] is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication.' (brackets in original) (quoting Exotics Hawaii-Kona, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 104 Hawai`i 358, 365, 90 P.3d 250, 257 (2004))). [10] Justice Nakayama's concurring and dissenting opinion (dissenting opinion) also seems to discount the UCATA's telescoping mechanism. Justice Nakayama maintains that Montalvo v. Lapez, 77 Hawai`i 282, 884 P.2d 345 (1994), offers this court guidance regarding the propriety of the circuit court's inclusion of Tupuola on the special verdict form. Montalvo involved a plaintiff who was injured by the negligent operation of a City of Honolulu refuse truck driver. Id. at 284, 884 P.2d at 347. The plaintiff filed suit for negligence and ultimately received a jury verdict awarding damages. Id. One issue raised by the defense on appeal was whether the circuit court unfairly restricted the scope of the jury's deliberation by asking the jury to determine apportionment of fault via a single question on the special verdict form, instead of through separate interrogatories querying the specific amount of damages attributable to injuries prior to the incident, and the amount attributable to the incident itself. Id. at 292, 884 P.2d at 355. The Montalvo court held the following, upon which Justice Nakayama relies: A trial court has complete discretion whether to utilize a special or general verdict and to decide on the form of the verdict as well as the interrogatories submitted to the jury provided that the questions asked are adequate to obtain a jury determination of all factual issues essential to judgment. Although there is complete discretion over the type of verdict form, the questions themselves may be so defective that they constitute reversible error. Id. (citations omitted). This statement of the law is correct as a general proposition, but is not absolute. As discussed supra, while a trial court possesses complete discretion over whether or not to employ a special verdict form, and over the form that the special verdict form will take, such discretion is limited by HRS §§ 663-12 and 663-17 inasmuch as a trial court does not have discretion to include a nonparty on the special verdict form in the absence of appropriate circumstances. Gump II, 93 Hawai`i at 422, 5 P.3d at 412; HRS §§ 663-12 and 663-17. Justice Nakayama further states that, in the present case, Montalvo's framework is more on point than that of Gump II because the appellant in Montalvo asserted that the chosen contents of the special verdict form constituted an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Dissenting opinion at ___, 191 P.3d at 1081 ( citing Montalvo, 77 Hawai`i at 292, 884 P.2d at 355). We disagree and find Montalvo to be inapposite. Although Montalvo did deal with a special verdict form, that appears to be the extent of the parallel between it and the present case. Montalvo involved neither the issue of apportionment of liability nor whether a nonparty, or in Gump II's case, a former party, should be included on a special verdict form. Gump II, on the other hand, addressed these issues head on. Accordingly, we disagree with Justice Nakayama's reliance on Montalvo instead of Gump II in the present case. Justice Nakayama also states that, in light of the parties' arguments, the questions on the special verdict form, and the jury's allocation of responsibility, one could infer that the jury concluded that the Respondents were not negligent for their lack of security at the . . . Club, and that Tupuola's act was unforeseeable.. . . One could also infer that the jury concluded that, from a legal causation standpoint, responsibility was more appropriately allocated between Tupuola and Moyle. Dissenting opinion at ____, 191 P.3d at 1082-83. A more likely inference is that the jury found that the Respondents were not negligent due to the erroneous criminal acts instruction, which practically directed the jury to find that Tupuola's acts were unforeseeable because the circumstances were ordinary, thereby, ostensibly, obviating any duty on the Respondents' part to provide security. See supra section III.A.1. Furthermore, and crucially, it was not within the jury's purview to determine that responsibility was more appropriately allocated between Tupuola and Moyle, in light of Moyle's decision not to sue Tupuola but, rather, to limit his claim for relief to the Respondents' allegedly negligent omission. An assessment of who the ideal defendant is falls outside a jury's dominion. In supporting his contention that a nonparty may be placed on the special verdict at the discretion of the circuit court, Justice Acoba cites Doe Parents No. 1 v. State of Hawai`i, 100 Hawai`i 34, 58 P.3d 545 (2002), and Ozaki v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay, 87 Hawai`i 265, 954 P.2d 644 (1998) [hereinafter, Ozaki II ]. A brief review of each will demonstrate that they are inapposite to the present case. Doe Parents No. 1 involved a lawsuit brought by two elementary school students and their parents (collectively, the plaintiffs) against the Department of Education (DOE) stemming from the students' alleged sexual assault at the hands of their teacher, Norton. Id. at 41, 52, 58 P.3d at 552, 563. Although Norton was originally named in the complaint as a codefendant, and was subsequently named in a cross-claim by the DOE, he was ultimately dismissed from the case due to an apparent discharge of his debts following a voluntary bankruptcy petition. Id. at 56 n. 30, 58 P.3d at 567 n. 30. The circuit court ultimately determined that the DOE's degree of fault in causing the plaintiffs' injuries was forty-nine percent. Id. at 57, 58 P.3d at 568. As Justice Acoba notes, concurring opinion at ___, 191 P.3d at 1090 n. 10, Doe Parents No. 1 dealt largely with HRS § 663-10.5 (2001), [11] which altered the common law rule of joint and several liability among joint tortfeasors with respect to government entities. [12] The analysis set forth in Doe Parents No. 1, and in particular this court's conclusion that the statute's retroactivity provision did not ultimately shield the DOE from liability, are neither here nor there with respect to the issues confronting us in the present matter. Instead of dealing with the general contours of joint and several liability as provided by the UCATA, Doe Parents No. 1 focused on an exception to the UCATA for government entities. Justice Acoba emphasizes this court's statement, in dictum, that if the DOE had been found liable under the plaintiffs' theory of respondeat superior, it would have been necessary to apportion liability among both the DOE and Norton, who was dismissed from the case. Concurring opinion at ___, 191 P.3d at 1090. Justice Acoba is apparently undertaking to demonstrate an inconsistency with our present holding that, as a matter of law and pursuant to HRS §§ 663-12 and 663-17, a nonparty not pleaded into the case cannot be placed on the special verdict absent the appropriate circumstances set out in Gump II. There is, however, no such inconsistency. First, Norton, as required by HRS § 663-17(c), had been pleaded into the case via the plaintiffs' complaint. Doe Parents No. 1, 100 Hawai`i at 41, 58 P.3d at 563. Furthermore, Norton's discharge of debt through bankruptcy proceedings is akin to the nonparty in Kaiu, who was not named as a party due to a bankruptcy stay. 960 F.2d at 819 n. 7. Accordingly, Doe Parents No. 1 is completely compatible with our analysis in the present matter. Justice Acoba's reliance on Ozaki II, 87 Hawai`i 265, 954 P.2d 644, a case involving a woman who was murdered in her condominium by her estranged boyfriend, is equally confounding. Justice Acoba first notes that, [d]espite [the estranged boyfriend's] absence from the proceedings, he was included on the special verdict form. Concurring opinion at ___, 191 P.3d at 1091. This is unremarkable, inasmuch as the estranged boyfriend, like Norton in Doe Parents No. 1, was a party to the case, having been named as a defendant in the complaint by the plaintiffs. Moreover, the crux of Ozaki II was whether HRS § 663-31, which deals with comparative negligence, barred the plaintiffs' recovery from a defendant whose percent of fault was less than that of the victim. Given the immateriality of Tupuola's degree of responsibility for the plaintiff's injuries, HRS § 663-31 is tangential to the issue posed on appeal in the present case. We must also address the following language of the concurrence: Not only is the inclusion of the non-party joint (intentional) tortfeasors consistent with precedent, it also comports with underlying judicial policies. Allowing the finder of fact to consider the role of a nonparty joint tortfeasor serves the truth-finding function of the litigation process. In that connection, precluding the fact-finder from considering a non-party joint tortfeasor's actions could obscure the truth of which entities contributed to the plaintiff's injuries and to what degree. Concurring opinion at ___, 191 P.3d at 1086. The relevance of the foregoing statement is a mystery to us, inasmuch as we have nowhere suggested that evidence of Tupuola's conduct could not be presented to the jury, and such evidence was clearly and correctly offered in the circuit court. Tupuola's conduct was obviously relevant to the plaintiff's claim that the Respondents breached a duty to provide security. Omitting Tupuola's name from the special verdict, as required by law, would not have impeded the jury from its fact-finding objective. Moreover, if the Respondents were concerned that, somehow, Tupuola's absence from the special verdict would obscure the truth as to where the blame properly lay for the plaintiff's injuries, they had ample opportunity to timely plead Tupuola into the matter. This misunderstanding also infects Justice Acoba's observation that the Ozaki II court did not intimate that [the estranged boyfriend's] role in causing the plaintiffs' injuries should not have been considered in determining the relative fault of the parties. Concurring opinion at ___, 191 P.3d at 1091-92. While a fact-finder, where relevant, can certainly take into account the role of a nonparty in determining the liability of parties to an action, it does not follow that the nonparty should be included on the special verdict.