Opinion ID: 430978
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Relevance of Contemporaneous Evaluative Data

Text: 13 Congress adopted EHA to remedy the condition of [m]ore than half of all handicapped children in the United States [who] are not receiving an education appropriate to their needs. H.R.Rep. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1975), see Hendrick Hudson Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179-82, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3037-38, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (Rowley ). The Act provides federal funding to state and local school systems for the purpose of special education, and conditions the grant of funds on the school system's compliance with federal standards. See note 2, supra. 14 If a school system is liable for the special placement of a student under the Act, it is also liable for the cost, if any, of transporting the student to and from the special placement. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1401(17) and (18) (1982). On the other hand, if a student does not fall within the Act's definition of handicapped, the school is not liable for special placement and would not be liable for the cost of transporting the child to any special placement facility. 15 Before a school system becomes liable under the Act for special placement of a student, it is entitled to up-to-date evaluative data. See Zvi D. v. Ambach, 694 F.2d 904, 907 (2d Cir.1982) (no school system liability for unilateral placements by parents). Further, the school system may insist on evaluation by qualified professionals who are satisfactory to the school officials. Vander Malle v. Ambach, 673 F.2d 49, 53 (2d Cir.1982) (defendant school officials are entitled to have [student] examined by a qualified psychiatrist of their choosing.). Since the school system's liability under the Act for the cost of transporting a student to a special placement depends on its liability for the special placement, current evaluative data must be obtained before the school system may be required to pay transportation costs. 16 These principles are not altered in the present case by the fact that the Weston Board agreed to pay the educational expenses of Scott at Karafin. If Scott was not handicapped within the meaning of the Act, the Board could not have been compelled to provide such funding and any attempt to compel it to fund related noneducational expenses must similarly fail. 17 In sum, we reject Dubois's contention that the hearing officer was not entitled to order the development of evaluative data on Scott in order to determine Dubois's claim for transportation expenses. 18