Opinion ID: 852787
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consecutive Sentences for December Incident Are Improper

Text: Mask's contention about his consecutive sentences rests on Ind.Code Ann. § 35-50-1-2(c) (West 2004), which prohibits the combined term of consecutive sentences arising out of an episode of criminal conduct from exceeding the presumptive term of the class of felonies one grade higher than that for the most serious felony of which the defendant is convicted. Specifically, Mask argues that although he received only three years of executed time for the class D felonies in the December incident, the total time he received for that criminal episode (nine years) exceeds the four years that is the presumptive for a class C felony. The Court of Appeals agreed, and so do we. Consecutive sentences cannot be imposed in the absence of express statutory authority. Baromich v. State, 252 Ind. 412, 416, 249 N.E.2d 30, 33 (1969). The statute that provides such authority is Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2. Subsection (c) of that statute provides in relevant part that: Except as provide in subsection (d) or (e), the court shall determine whether terms of imprisonment shall be served concurrently or consecutively.... However, except for crimes of violence, the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment,... to which the defendant is sentenced for felony convictions arising out of an episode of criminal conduct shall not exceed the presumptive sentence for a felony which is one (1) class of felony higher than the most serious of the felonies for which the person has been convicted. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-50-1-2(c) (West 2004). Mask's argument hinges on the meaning of the phrase terms of imprisonment. If the two, three-year suspended sentences for the December incident are not terms of imprisonment, then Mask's executed time would be less than the four year presumptive term for a class C felony. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-50-2-6 (West 2004). In State v. Price, we stated that for purposes of § 35-50-1-2(d), [a] `term of imprisonment' is a penalty under which the convict is sent to incarceration for some period ... and then released after the period has passed. 715 N.E.2d 331, 332 (Ind.1999). Incarceration in the context of subsection (c) does not mean the period of executed time alone. A suspended sentence differs from an executed sentence only in that the period of incarceration is delayed unless, and until, a court orders the time served in prison. See Beck v. State, 790 N.E.2d 520, 523 (Ind.Ct. App.2003) (Mattingly-May, J., concurring in result). In other words, the imposition of a suspended sentence leaves open the real possibility that an individual will be sent to incarceration for some period before being released from any penal obligation. This commonly occurs when probation or parole is revoked, and a defendant who received probation or parole is subject to incarceration until released. We hold that any period of a suspended sentence must be included when calculating the maximum aggregate sentence under Indiana Code § 35-50-1-2(c). In adopting this holding, we are influenced by the rule of lenity, which requires that criminal statutes be strictly construed against the state. Ellis v. State, 736 N.E.2d 731, 737 (Ind.2000) (quoting Walker v. State, 668 N.E.2d 243, 246 (Ind. 1996)). In this case, the phrase terms of imprisonment is left undefined by the General Assembly in § 35-50-1-2 and we believe that the phrase should be read in order to include any period of incarceration a defendant is sentenced to, even if all or a portion of that period of time is suspended. Thus, in this case the imposition of three, three-year consecutive sentences for the December incident was improper as exceeding the prescribed maximum.