Opinion ID: 4538314
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: PWDCRA Claim

Text: Holsapple also appeals the district court’s adverse summary judgment on his retaliation claim under the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA). Associated with this cause of action, Holsapple contends that Cunningham’s decision not to hire him in 2017 was retaliation for his “protected activity” of filing a state court lawsuit in 2012 against a number of Bay County officers, including Cunningham. In that lawsuit, Holsapple claimed that Miller’s firing of him constituted disability discrimination, also in violation of the PWDCRA. To establish retaliation under the PWDCRA, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) the defendant was aware of plaintiff’s protected activity; (3) the defendant took an employment action adverse to the plaintiff; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.7 Aho v. Dep’t. of Correction, 688 N.W. 2d 104, 108–09 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004). This suggests that Cunningham had an honest and genuine belief that Holsapple was ill-suited for the Road Patrol position. 7 To obtain relief under the PWDCRA, Holsapple was required to prove that (1) he was “disabled” as outlined under the PWDCRA; (2) the disability was unrelated to his ability to perform his job duties; and (3) he had been discriminated against in one of the ways outlined by the statute. See 17 Case No. 19-1455, Holsapple v. Cunningham In its summary judgment ruling on Holsapple’s PWDCRA claim, the district court did not answer definitively whether Holsapple’s 2012 state court lawsuit constituted a “protected activity.” However, in his briefing, Holsapple continues to allege that this litigation qualifies as a “protected activity” under the PWDCRA, and therefore, Cunningham’s decision not to hire Holsapple in 2017, represented prima facie retaliation against that “protected activity.” The district court appropriately decided not to even evaluate the question of whether Holsapple’s 2012 lawsuit sufficiently qualifies as “protected activity.” This is because Holsapple’s evidence in support of his PWDCRA claim—the same proof analyzed above as to his First Amendment claims—is insufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find the requisite causation between the assumed “protected activity” and Cunningham’s 2017 decision not to hire him. Furthermore, as explained earlier, Cunningham has proof of valid, expressed discretionary reasons for his decision not to hire Holsapple in 2017, all of which related to Holsapple’s (1) deemed subpar performance as an officer between 2011 and 2012; (2) negative demeanor and negative interactions with coworkers; and (3) “propensity to be untruthful.” Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Cunnington on the PWDCRA claim.