Opinion ID: 2546738
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Trial court's reasons for departing from sentencing guidelines

Text: ¶ 61 If the trial court is permitted to consider factors external to the crime itself as the basis for an exceptional sentence, then we must follow the plain language of the statute governing departures from the guidelines to determine whether the sentence was justified. It is an age-old principle that this court's prior interpretations do not control if the plain language of statute requires a different result. See, e.g., Maximillian v. Clausen, 117 Wash. 74, 80, 203 P. 379 (1922). ¶ 62 The majority cites State v. Pascal, 108 Wash.2d 125, 736 P.2d 1065 (1987), and two successor cases for the proposition that the purposes of the SRA cannot be used to justify an exceptional sentence. Majority at 9-11. However, the plain language of the SRA itself must control our analysis. ¶ 63 In June and July 2000, the period covering the second amended information to which Law pleaded, former RCW 9.94A.390 (1999) governed departures from the guidelines. Former RCW 9.94A.390 required a court to impose an exceptional sentence outside the standard sentence range in accordance with RCW 9.94A.120(2). Former RCW 9.94A.390. ¶ 64 Former RCW 9.94A.120 (1999) governed Sentences. Section (1) required trial courts to impose a sentence within the standard range for the offense except as authorized in subsections (2).... Former RCW 9.94A.120(2) provided: The court may impose a sentence outside the standard sentence range for an offense if it finds, considering the purpose of this chapter, that there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence. Former RCW 9.94A.120(2) (emphasis added). [13] ¶ 65 Former RCW 9.94A.390 contained a list of illustrative factors, but cautions that the factors are illustrative only and are not intended to be exclusive reasons for exceptional sentences. Id. As one commentator noted, Washington's courts have never provided a comprehensive definition of what constitute `substantial and compelling' reasons. 13B SETH A. FINE & DOUGLAS J. ENDE, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: CRIMINAL LAW § 3801, at 370 (2d ed.1998). ¶ 66 The statute specifically directs courts to assess a factor justifying an exceptional sentence by considering the purpose of this chapter. Former RCW 9.94A.120(2). The purposes of the chapter are set forth in RCW 9.94A.010, which today is substantively identical to the statute in effect in 2000: The purpose of this chapter is to make the criminal justice system accountable to the public by developing a system for the sentencing of felony offenders which structures, but does not eliminate, discretionary decisions affecting sentences, and to: (1) Ensure that the punishment for a criminal offense is proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and the offender's criminal history; (2) Promote respect for the law by providing punishment which is just; (3) Be commensurate with the punishment imposed on others committing similar offenses; (4) Protect the public; (5) Offer the offender an opportunity to improve him or herself; (6) Make frugal use of the state's and local governments' resources; and (7) Reduce the risk of reoffending by offenders in the community. RCW 9.94A.010. ¶ 67 The trial court found substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the standard sentence range given the purposes of the SRA. It noted incarceration which resulted in termination of Law's parental rights with her young son would be disproportionate punishment. Clerk's Papers at 22. Moreover, one purpose of the SRA is to provide proportionate punishment that was just. RCW 9.94A.010(2). The trial court found Law's participation in the Narcotics Anonymous (NA) program would help assure public safety, which serves the SRA purpose of protecting the public. RCW 9.94A.010(4). The trial court recognized Law's participation in the NA program offered her the opportunity to improve herself. RCW 9.94A.010(5). The trial court found that allowing Law to continue to develop her relationship with her son, and possibly to regain custody of her son, would make frugal use of the state's resources. RCW 9.94A.010(6). ¶ 68 Other jurisdictions have recognized this rationale as sufficiently compelling to allow downward departures from standard sentence guidelines. Courts have found amenability to drug treatment can be treated as evidence of presentence rehabilitation, which can serve as the basis for a downward departure from a sentencing grid. State v. Gebeck, 635 N.W.2d 385, 389-390 (Minn.Ct.App.2001). Herrin v. State, 568 So.2d 920, 922 (Fla.1990). And numerous courts have held family circumstances can serve as the basis for a downward departure from sentencing guidelines. [14] United States v. Leon, 341 F.3d 928 (9th Cir.2003); United States v. Norton, 218 F.Supp.2d 1014 (E.D. Wis.2002); United States v. Blackwell, 897 F.Supp. 586 (D.D.C.1995); United States v. Cabell, 890 F.Supp. 13 (D.D.C.1995). This is particularly true where, as here, incarceration might result in a young child being placed in foster care. United States v. Newell, 790 F.Supp. 1063 (E.D.Wash.1992). ¶ 69 The trial court's exceptional sentence under the facts of this case is neither contrary to the statute nor an abuse of discretion. I would affirm the trial court's exceptional sentence [15] and thus dissent. C. JOHNSON and MADSEN, JJ., concur.