Opinion ID: 1312419
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Consent by Parent or Custodian

Text: The most troubling aspect of the confession is the fact that there appears to have been no meaningful parental protection and guidance available to Steven such as envisioned by the statutory provision requiring the presence and consent of a parent or custodian for the taking of the statement of a juvenile under sixteen-years-old. West Virginia Code § 49-5-2(1) (1996) provides as follows: (1) Extrajudicial statements, other than res gestae, which were made by a juvenile under fourteen years of age to law-enforcement officials or while in custody shall not be admissible unless such statements were made in the presence of the juvenile's counsel. Extrajudicial statements, other than res gestae, which were made by a juvenile who is under sixteen years of age but above the age of thirteen to law-enforcement officers or while in custody, shall not be admissible unless made in the presence of the juvenile's counsel or made in the presence of, and with the consent of, the juvenile's parent or custodian who has been fully informed regarding the juvenile's right to a prompt detention hearing, the juvenile's right to counsel, including appointed counsel if the juvenile cannot afford counsel, and the juvenile's privilege against self-incrimination. W. Va.Code § 49-5-2(1) (emphasis added). West Virginia Code § 49-1-5(5) (1996) defines custodian as a person who has or shares actual physical possession or care and custody of a child, regardless of whether such person has been granted custody of the child by any contract, agreement or legal proceedings[.] Id. In Sugg, we explained that [i]t is implicit that a child involved in the commission of an offense should be afforded protective counseling concerning his legal rights from one interested in his welfare. 193 W.Va. at 400, 456 S.E.2d at 481 [12] . The presence and consent of a parent or guardian, as required by statute, may be rendered meaningless where the parent or guardian has a conflict of interest with the child or has no real parental relationship with the child, as was the case here where the biological mother had not seen the child in four years. As the United States District Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reasoned in McBride v. Jacobs, 247 F.2d 595 (D.C.Cir.1957), [w]here the court finds for any reason the minor is not capable of a waiver the parent may so waive provided the court also finds there is no conflict of interest between them, and of course the waiver by the parent must be an intelligent, knowing act. Id. at 596. Rule 6(c) of the Arizona Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court provides guidance to the juvenile court, as follows: A child may waive counsel if the court finds that his waiver is knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily given in view of his age, education, apparent maturity and within the presence of his parents, guardian or custodian, at the time of waiver. The waiver of counsel should also be obtained from parents, guardian or custodian in attendance on behalf of the child and themselves. Waiver of counsel shall be set out in writing or in the minutes of the court. If there is a conflict of interest between the child and his parents, guardian or custodian, the court shall impose such safeguards on waiver of counsel as appear in the best interests of the child. Id. (Emphasis supplied). In Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 8 L.Ed.2d 325 (1962), the United States Supreme Court discussed the necessity of adult protection of juvenile rights, and explained as follows: [A] 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely to have any conception of what will confront him.... That is to say, we deal with a person who is not equal to the police in knowledge and understanding of the consequences of the questions and answers being recorded and who is unable to know how to protect his own interests or how to get the benefits of his constitutional rights. Id. at 54, 82 S.Ct. at 1212. The Court also emphasized that the child would have no way of knowing what the consequences of his confession were without advice as to his rights  from someone concerned with securing him those rights.... Id. In a compelling dissent penned by Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, in Little v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 957, 98 S.Ct. 1590, 55 L.Ed.2d 809 (1978), the issue of conflict of parental interest was addressed. Justice Marshall expressed the view that the Court should have granted certiorari to resolve the question whether, before a juvenile waives her constitutional rights to remain silent and consult with an attorney, she is entitled to competent advice from an adult who does not have significant conflicts of interest. Id., 435 U.S. 957, 98 S.Ct. 1590. The child, confessing to the murder of her father, had spent ten to fifteen minutes alone with her mother, who also believed herself to be a suspect in the murder investigation, prior to the confession. Id. Citing abundant authority for the proposition that a juvenile is entitled to consult with a parent or guardian, Justice Marshall observed that a parent or guardian may not always be in a position to provide the type of guidance contemplated by the requirement for parent or guardian consultation. In Little, for instance, the mother was plainly not in a position to provide rational advice with only the child's interests in mind, especially on the day of the murder. Id. at 959, 98 S.Ct. at 1592. Referencing the Supreme Court's recognition in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), that competence of parents is a relevant factor in the determination of the validity of a waiver of rights by the child, Justice Marshall stated as follows: And to uphold a child's waiver on the ground that she received parental advice is surely questionable when the parent has two obvious conflicts of interest, one arising from the possibility that the parent herself is a suspect, and the other from the fact that she is advising the person accused of killing her spouse. Little, 435 U.S. at 960, 98 S.Ct. at 1592. In the present case, although Steven's biological mother was present during his murder confession, [13] she had no legal custody and had not visited Steven for approximately four years prior to the murder. Subsequent to Ms. Milburn's arrest for Ms. Jenkins' murder, Steven saw his biological mother only on the morning of the interview, when she drove him to the police station. Although Ms. Whetzel possessed a document purporting to grant her custody of Steven, her potentially adverse interests cannot be ignored. Steven contends that Ms. Whetzel pressured him into confessing to the murder in order to protect Ms. Milburn, the woman with whom Ms. Whetzel allegedly maintained an intimate relationship. This juvenile was taken into custody while his adoptive mother/legal guardian, Ms. Milburn, was incarcerated. Three different individuals arguably constituted the parent or custodian referenced in the statute. See W. Va.Code § 49-5-2(1). Yet, under the circumstances here, it would be difficult to conclude that any of them had both the ability and the motivation to give this juvenile the adult interest in and protection of his legal rights and his personal well-being envisioned by the statutory requirement for parental or custodial presence. Indeed, the interests of Ms. Milburn and her alleged companion, Ms. Whetzel, were actually adverse to Steven's interests. It would be unrealistic and overburdensome to place upon law enforcement authorities the task of making inquiry into the nature of parent-child relationships. However, where law enforcement authorities seeking to interrogate a juvenile have knowledge regarding a potential conflict of interest between parent (or custodian) and child with respect to the matters which are the subject of the interrogation, such law enforcement authorities must make further inquiry regarding the appropriate person to be present with the juvenile pursuant to West Virginia Code § 49-5-2(1). [14] Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the murder confession was obtained as a result of the delay in presentment to a magistrate and that the delay was for the primary purpose of obtaining a confession. We therefore reverse the decision of the lower court and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded.