Opinion ID: 2637287
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the district court erred when it awarded pcmr summary judgment on mr. berry's gross negligence claim

Text: ¶ 25 PCMR does not claim that its release insulates it from liability for gross negligence. It argues instead that the precautions the sponsors of the King of the Wasatch race took, designed to minimize the risk of injury to participants without unduly compromising the competitive challenges, without which the contest would have little allure, were sufficient to overcome Mr. Berry's gross negligence claim as a matter of law. Without guidance anywhere in the record as to the applicable standard of care, we cannot conclude that PCMR was not grossly negligent as a matter of law. ¶ 26 We must initially return to the topic of the standard of review because its proper form and application largely determine the outcome of Mr. Berry's challenge to the district court's summary dismissal of his gross negligence claim. In securing recovery, the task confronting a plaintiff who claims injury due to a defendant's gross negligence is markedly greater than that of a plaintiff who traces his injury to ordinary negligence. Gross negligence requires proof of conduct substantially more distant from the appropriate standard of care than does ordinary negligence. We have characterized gross negligence as `the failure to observe even slight care; it is carelessness or recklessness to a degree that shows utter indifference to the consequences that may result.' Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah 1985) (quoting Robinson Ins. & Real Estate, Inc. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 366 F.Supp. 307, 311 (W.D.Ark.1973)). ¶ 27 When reviewing appeals from grants of summary judgment in cases of ordinary negligence, we have consistently followed the principle that summary judgment is generally inappropriate to resolve negligence claims and should be employed `only in the most clear-cut case.' White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994) (quoting Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126, 126 (Utah 1987) (per curiam)). Moreover, summary judgment is `inappropriate unless the applicable standard of care is fixed by law, and reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion as to the defendant's negligence under the circumstances.' White, 879 P.2d at 1374 (quoting Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 825 (Utah Ct. App.1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)). ¶ 28 Were we evaluating this case as one of ordinary negligence, we would have little difficulty discerning the presence of genuine issues of material fact sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment. Mr. Berry presented testimony of an experienced ski racer, coach, and jumper who witnessed Mr. Berry's accident and faulted the jump's design. A second expert in ski racecourse design and safety was likewise critical of the configuration of the accident site. ¶ 29 According to PCMR, this testimony is insufficient to overcome summary dismissal of Mr. Berry's gross negligence claim because evidence that would be adequate to take an ordinary negligence case to a jury cannot withstand uncontroverted evidence that PCMR exercised enough care to avoid a finding of gross negligence. PCMR urges that its production of evidence indicating that it used even slight care or displayed something more than complete and absolute indifference to the consequences that might have resulted from an improper design or construction of the tabletop jump and landing area is sufficient to remove Mr. Berry's gross negligence claim from the jury. We disagree. ¶ 30 The parties have not directed us to, nor have we been able to discover, a location in the record where the appropriate standard of care applicable to the design and construction of skiercross courses appears. We have held that where a standard of care is not fixed by law, the determination of the appropriate standard is a factual issue to be resolved by the finder of fact. Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 825. Identification of the proper standard of care is a necessary precondition to assessing the degree to which conduct deviates, if at all, from the standard of care  the core test in any claim of gross negligence. Absent the presence of an identified, applicable standard of care to ground the analysis, we hold that the district court improperly granted PCMR summary judgment and dismissed Mr. Berry's gross negligence claim.