Opinion ID: 712236
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Marital Property--Unit 9 and the $13,050

Text: 26 Ms. May bases her claim to Unit 9 and the $13,050 on allegations that both, although not titled in her name, were derived from marital funds. She does not dispute the axiom that under Colorado law a spouse has only an inchoate interest in marital property titled in the other spouse. However, she contends that her inchoate interest is one that Congress meant to protect. She also contends that Colorado law allows a spouse's interest in marital property to vest at the commencement of a civil forfeiture action. Neither argument is persuasive. 27
28 Ms. May's argument from congressional intent is based on the legislative history of the 1984 amendment to § 881(a)(6) that established the innocent owner defense. See Joint Explanatory Statement of Titles II and III, Pub.L. No. 95-633, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9518, 9522 (stating that [t]he term 'owner' should be broadly interpreted to include any person with a recognizable legal or equitable interest in the property seized). However, this appeal to legislative history incorrectly presupposes that Congress, not the state, defines which legal or equitable interests are recognizable. On the contrary, federal courts must look to state law in determining what property interests a claimant may assert. United States v. 1980 Lear Jet, 38 F.3d 398, 402 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. 1977 Porsche Carrera 911, 946 F.2d 30, 34 (5th Cir.1991). However broadly ownership may be construed in light of § 881's legislative history, it does not encompass interests that state law recognizes neither at law nor in equity. 4 29
30 As the district court noted, a Colorado spouse has only an inchoate interest in marital property titled in the other spouse's name. In re Questions, 517 P.2d at 1335. An inchoate interest is neither a present nor a vested interest, but may ripen into a vested estate, if it is not barred, extinguished, or divested. Galleria Towers, Inc. v. Crump Warren & Sommer, Inc., 831 P.2d 908, 911 (Colo.Ct.App.1991). As the district court recognized, the In re Questions rule generally prevents a spouse without title from asserting an interest, either legal or equitable, in marital property. 31 Ms. May nonetheless argues that her inchoate interest is legally protected as an exception to Colorado's general rule on marital property, citing the following: During the marriage, and absent any divorce action, the parties have their separate property and, possibly subject to an exception or two, can dispose of it as he or she desires.... That right, prior to the dissolution action and possibly subject to an exception or two, is completely inchoate. In re Questions, 517 P.2d at 1335 (emphasis added). She contends that the institution of a civil forfeiture proceeding must count as an exception. We disagree. 32 In re Questions is concerned with characterizing for tax purposes a court-ordered transfer of property from husband to wife following divorce, and provides no explicit guidance on whether Colorado would countenance civil forfeiture among the exception or two to the rule stated above. However, the In re Questions court stated earlier in its opinion that it was following the philosophy of two Oklahoma cases, Collins v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290 (Okla.1968), and Sanditen v. Sanditen, 496 P.2d 365 (Okla.1972). In re Questions, 517 P.2d at 1334. Sanditen does provide guidance on the issue. In that case, a wife sought to recover one-half of eight million dollars which her husband had given away. The Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that the wife had no vested interest in the money, but that she nonetheless had a contingent interest which the law protects. 496 P.2d at 367 (emphasis added), quoted in In re Questions, 517 P.2d at 1334. The Sanditen court went on to conclude that a wife's contingent interest would be protected in a number of circumstances: an incomplete gift depriving the wife of her inheritance rights, a pre-divorce gift intended to defeat property division, the transfer of funds so great that the husband could no longer support the wife, or the disposition of the homestead. Sanditen, 496 P.2d at 367. In all of these instances the principle criteria [sic] is the fraudulent intent of the husband to deprive the wife of her marital rights as provided by statute. Id. at 368. 33 We conclude that the exceptions referred to in In re Questions were founded on the court's reading of Sanditen and encompass only situations evincing one spouse's fraudulent attempt to deprive the other of a legal right. Cf. Love v. Olson, 645 P.2d 861, 863 (Colo.Ct.App.1982) (holding that a spouse's interest vests only in the event of a statutorily enacted contingency). Civil forfeiture is not such a contingency, and there is no reason to suppose that Colorado intends to include civil forfeiture per se as an exception under some other theory. 5 We therefore affirm the district court's conclusion that Ms. May had no legally enforceable interest in Unit 9 or in the $13,050.