Opinion ID: 1881490
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: intentional murder conviction.

Text: Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it found him guilty of intentional murder because he did not, himself, pull the trigger and there was no evidence that he intended the death of Sharon Fink. Under the former felony murder doctrine, Appellant could have been convicted of intentional murder based on his intent to participate in the underlying felony. Tarrence v. Commonwealth, Ky., 265 S.W.2d 40, 50 (1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 899, 75 S.Ct. 220, 99 L.Ed. 706 (1954). In effect, the intent to participate in the felony was transferred to the homicide so as to make the latter offense a killing with malice regardless of the evidence. Id. at 51. With the adoption of the Model Penal Code in Kentucky, however, the felony murder doctrine was abrogated. Bennett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 978 S.W.2d 322, 327 (1998); Kruse v. Commonwealth, Ky., 704 S.W.2d 192, 193 (1985). Nevertheless, under Kentucky's complicity statute, a defendant can be held liable for the actions of another under two circumstances. Under KRS 502.020(2), complicity to the result, a defendant is criminally liable when he acts with the same degree of culpability with respect to the result that would be sufficient for the commission of the offense. Tharp v. Commonwealth, Ky., 40 S.W.3d 356, 361 (2000), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 289, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2001). Under KRS 502.020(1), complicity to the act, criminal liability requires that the defendant intended that the victim be killed. Harper v. Commonwealth, Ky., 43 S.W.3d 261, 266 (2001). Thus, even if the defendant, himself, did not pull the trigger, he may still be convicted of intentional murder if he was an accomplice to an offense and intended that the victim would be killed during the course of the commission of that offense. Harper, supra, at 266; Tharp, supra, at 361. Even absent proof of an agreement to kill anyone who gets in the way of the commission of the felony, see Kruse, supra, at 194, intent may be inferred from the actions of a defendant or from the circumstances surrounding those actions. Harper, supra, at 265; Talbott v. Commonwealth, Ky., 968 S.W.2d 76, 86 (1998); Tungate v. Commonwealth, Ky., 901 S.W.2d 41, 42 (1995). Intent may also be inferred from knowledge. Davis v. Commonwealth, Ky., 967 S.W.2d 574, 581 (1998). However, although intent that a victim be killed may be inferred from conduct or knowledge, such intent may not be predicated on the mere intent to participate in the underlying felony. Kruse, supra, at 194. And a defendant's liability for the acts of a coconspirator must be determined by the defendant's own mental state, not that of the coconspirator. Id. Based on the execution-style shootings of the victims, there is no doubt that Mark Downey intended to kill both Sharon and Joseph Fink. Appellant's intent that the Finks be killed is less obvious, but the fact-finder has wide latitude in inferring intent from evidence of the defendant's conduct and knowledge, and/or the surrounding circumstances. Davis, supra, at 581; Tungate, supra, at 42. The key evidence concerning Appellant's intent that the Finks be killed came from Richard Strode's girlfriend, Kim Long. After the burglary, Long conversed with all three perpetrators about the events that occurred earlier that morning. During that conversation, Mark Downey told Long that, prior to the shootings, Appellant told him he did not want to be there when the couple was shot and that he did not want to see it. This testimony indicates that Appellant was more than just a surprised bystander to the murder. He knew Downey intended to shoot the Finks and acquiesced. Kim Long also testified to an admission made by Appellant that he physically assaulted Mr. Fink by kicking him and knocking him over in his chair. The trial judge could reasonably infer from Appellant's own actions and statements that he knew and intended that the Finks would be killed during the course of the burglary. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to convict him of intentional murder under KRS 502.020(1). The hearsay aspects of Long's testimony will be discussed infra.