Opinion ID: 1285479
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: S00A0027 DAVIS v. STATE.

Text: 1. Reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found Henry Davis guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted. [3] Contrary to his contention, Davis was not merely a bystander during the commission of the murder. Rather, the evidence showed that Davis quarreled with the victim, then left the premises, returning with a gun and two armed men. The three men pursued the victim throughout the house until he was cornered in a bedroom behind the door. The victim was then shot repeatedly. While Hill reloaded his weapon, Davis exhorted Hill to pop him again. Additionally, eyewitnesses testified that Davis hit the victim in the head with his weapon. 2. Vincent Henderson testified that after Davis left his house, he tried to get Ray Barlow to leave also, because he knew Davis was fixing to go home and get something. When the state inquired what Henderson meant by that, Henderson replied, I know he was going home and get a gun or something. Davis then moved for a mistrial, arguing that this testimony impermissibly placed his character in evidence. The court denied the motion for mistrial, but stated that it would instruct the jury to disregard this statement. However, no curative instructions were given. On appeal Davis maintains that the state elicited this testimony in order to show that he had a reputation for bad character. We do not agree. Gun ownership and the custom of carrying a gun do not, by themselves, impute bad character. [4] Further, Henderson's statement was relevant to his testimony that he asked Barlow to leave because he was attempting to break up an escalating argument. It was additionally relevant to other testimony that Davis did, in fact, return with a gun and two armed men. Evidence relevant to an issue in the case is not rendered inadmissible because it may incidentally place the defendant's character in issue. [5] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. 3. Nor did the trial court err in denying Davis's motion for mistrial following an emotional outburst in the courtroom. During the state's case the investigating officer was asked to identify clothing the victim had been wearing at the time of the murder. A member of the victim's family began to cry and left the courtroom; other spectators followed her. The record does not indicate whether the jury was aware that the outburst involved the victim's friends or relatives. The trial court denied Davis's motion for a mistrial, but gave curative instructions to the jury to disregard the incident. In these circumstances there was no abuse of the trial court's discretion. [6] 4. After Davis was implicated in the crime by eyewitnesses, police obtained a search warrant for his residence. During the search police found a loaded .38 caliber handgun. Davis contends that the trial court erred in admitting this gun in evidence because the state failed to prove that this was the weapon he allegedly used to strike the victim. The eyewitnesses to the crime testified that Davis pistol-whipped the victim with a handgun. The medical examiner testified that the wounds on the victim's head were consistent with those which would be made by a handgun such as the one seized from Davis's residence. A weapon is generally admissible if it is similar to the one used in the crime even though it is not conclusively shown to be the same one. [7] The jury in this case was authorized to determine whether the gun admitted in evidence was the weapon used by Davis to strike the victim. [8] Any discrepancies between the eyewitnesses' description of the weapon used by Davis went to the weight and credibility of the evidence rather than to its admissibility. [9]