Opinion ID: 2635221
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Lawsuit And Testimony

Text: On March 3, 1998, the Appellants filed a first amended complaint against the State and the other defendants, [2] alleging, inter alia: (1) that the State negligently designed, constructed, and maintained the Pãhoa Bypass, such that the roadway was deficient, dangerous, and inadequate; (2) that the State failed to warn motorists adequately of the unsafe condition of the Bypass; and (3) that the State's negligence was the legal cause [3] of Klink's death. On June 12, 2001, the State filed a motion in limine to exclude police reports describing twenty-two prior accidents and five subsequent accidents near the site of the subject collision. The Appellants' counsel partially opposed the motion, seeking to have seven of the reports admitted for consideration by their accident reconstruction expert, Harry Krueper: [Counsel]: . . . I have no problem . . . with the real substance of the motion [to exclude the reports]. It's just that any time any expert analyzes a traffic accident he ordinarily looks at . . . incidences that occurred on the roadway. I don't believe . . . Krueper is gonna specifically refer to the factors . . . involved in other accidents but he would I believe . . . say that he looked at the other accidents to determine what other factors may have influenced his investigation. But beyond that I don't think that he's going to say that . . . because of an accident that occurred in 1992 he believes that this particular condition . . . is negligent. . . . The court: Is he offering an opinion as to negligence? [Counsel]: No, . . . not negligence, rather it's defective in design; excuse me. But I don't believe he's gonna refer . . . specifically to any other accidents. He will say . . . that he did look at all other incidences on this particular stretch of roadway to see if there was something there that clued him into what would be a design defect. . . . [O]ther than that I don't think he'll refer to anything specifically. The court: My experience with design is the facts stand on their own and that being its dimensions of angles. [Counsel]: That's correct. That is correct, yes. But . . . I think any expert looking at whether the roadway is . . . defective does consider other incidences that occurred on the roadway, which he certainly did, as did . . . [the State's expert, Andrew] Levitt, but he's not gonna specifically say that because of this accident[] or because of a factor in another accident that this indicates . . . a design defect[]. So I understand. . . . I really have no objection to the motion with that caveat, Your Honor. (Some capitalization altered.) The circuit court then granted the motion, noting with respect to the caveat, I am just wondering if there would be some sort of . . . objection as to relevancy . . . because I can't see how [the accident reports] would be relevant especially with respect to an expert opinion on design. The police reports that the Appellants' counsel sought to offer into evidence involved seven accidents that occurred prior to March 9, 1997 in rainy conditions at the following locations: Distance from Klink's Point Date of Accident of Impact [4] August 7, 1993 302 feet north February 17, 1994 457 feet north July 29, 1994 7392 feet north September 9, 1994 0 feet [5] August 25, 1995 528 feet north March 3, 1996 1056 feet north May 18, 1996 528 feet north The September 9, 1994 accident report and witness interview states that at 6:50 a.m., in rainy conditions, the driver of a northbound vehicle observed a southbound vehicle cross the center line and enter the northbound lane of travel. The northbound driver successfully avoided a collision by maneuvering onto the shoulder of the highway but observed in her rearview mirror that the southbound vehicle kept coming into the [north]bound lane, striking the vehicle following directly behind her. The accident occurred in the vicinity of the Reduced Speed 45 MPH sign where Klink's vehicle came to a rest on the day of the Klink accident. Aside from a notation indicating rain on the report under Weather Conditions, however, there is no mention made of the road conditions nor of the underlying cause of the southbound vehicle entering the oncoming lane of traffic. The August 25, 1995 accident report indicates that a southbound vehicle hydroplaned at a curve approximately 530 feet to the north of the Klink accident site, crossed the center line and collided head-on with a northbound vehicle. The remainder of the reports provide few details beyond the fact that the driver lost control or ran off the roadway. The circuit court also considered a motion filed by the Appellants to add Travis Henderson-Bell as a critical witness, based on the fact that, on December 4, 1998, Henderson-Bell was involved in a similar automobile accident approximately 920 feet northward from the site of Klink's accident. [6] The Appellants' counsel offered the following justification for adding Henderson-Bell as a witness: [Counsel:] [I]t is correct that the accident is not . . . at the exact same location. . . . [And] it is some time later. But what is relevant, Your Honor, is what happened to his car. The weather was substantially similar, [it] was in the early morning hours, it was raining, and, . . . the effect that the water had on his car is substantially similar. . . . The court: Well isn't the relevance substantial[] similarity of the conditions . . . ? [Counsel:] Well the problem with that, Your Honor, is that nobody can testify as to the exact water level, the exact amount of rain fallen on the roadway with respect to either of these two accidents. At most I can offer to that is it was raining and it was early morning hours in both accidents. They are located within a . . . hundred yards of each other. [A]nd the vehicles both reacted in the same or nearly the same manner. (Some capitalization altered.) The State sought to exclude all of Henderson-Bell's testimony on grounds of untimeliness and irrelevance. The circuit court orally denied the motion to add Henderson-Bell as a witness, opining that with regard to Mr. Henderson-Bell, it seems to me that his testimony would lack the necessary foundation for relevance and that foundation would go to the issue of similarity of conditions. [7] A bench trial commenced on July 23, 2001.
Shortly after the P&amacr;hoa Bypass was completed in 1991, an accident occurred in the area, prompting Haymore to conduct a [v]ery informal investigation of the scene. He drove the highway shortly thereafter in heavy rain, however, and observed water coming over the top of the cut bank flowing westward across the highway just south of the driveway, but could never determine the source of that flow, because it was his belief that the land on the eastern side of the road sloped away from the highway. The flow of water started south of the eastside driveway and flowed westward across the highway, cross[ing] both lanes of travel. He did not observe any water flowing from the eastside driveway itself. Haymore was troubled by what he had observed but could see no reasonable source for the water, testifying that I couldn't figure out how in the world it ever got there to start with. . . . [I]f I hadn't seen it, I would say that whoever saw it was off the deep end. Haymore discounted the incident as an anomaly which he presumed was caused by the adjacent landowner dumping water on the roadway and did not observe it again. Although Haymore realized that a repeat occurrence would be a problem, he did not conduct any further investigations to confirm his theory that the landowner had been dumping water and did not at the time formally report his concerns to the DOT. Haymore, as a DOT representative, regularly attended meetings of a community traffic organization, the Puna Traffic Safety Council [hereinafter, the Safety Council], and recalled at least two specific complaints concerning water traversing the P&amacr;hoa Bypass one from a private citizen concerning a section of roadway five hundred feet from the site of Klink's accident reporting water traversing the roadway, thereby making driving unsafe, and one from a police officer more generally describing flooding during heavy rainfall at the site of Klink's accident. Haymore asserted that none of the individuals expressing concern about the road's safety could tell [him] where the water came from that created the observed sheet flow. Nevertheless, as a result of citizens' concerns, Haymore was directed twice by his superiors to reinspect the area. His first investigation was conducted on a day when the weather was dry and clear. Haymore testified that his investigations were purely visual: basically all I did was look at the roadway. . . . I did not investigate any vehicles or anything else. He further testified that trying to figure out where the water came from was the big issue because [o]ne has to know[:] . . . if the water is coming across the entire roadway one inch thick, then I couldn't do anything about it. If it's coming across the roadway one inch thick in a localized area, I can do something about it. He clarified, however, that ascertaining  [W]here it was coming across [the roadway] was the critical feature. (Emphases added.) In addition to the inspections described in his testimony, Haymore also indicated that, because he was interested in responding to the community's complaints concerning water on the highway coming from the two driveways, he tried on several occasions when it was raining to run out and check it . . . [but was] unsuccessful [in] find[ing] any water. Nevertheless, following a second inspection that was prompted by another accident in the area, Haymore recommended that an interceptor ditch be placed on the eastern, high side of the superelevated curve of the highway to prevent water from flowing across the roadway at the site where Klink later lost control of his vehicle. In an August 1, 1996 e-mail to Bruce McClure, his superior at the DOT, regarding the site, he characterized the need for a drainage facility as imperative, see infra. On redirect examination, the Appellants' counsel questioned Haymore further regarding the source of the water and the decision to install the interceptor ditch in 1998 based on what Haymore had uncovered in his investigations: [Counsel]: You've testified that you saw water coming over the top of the bank? [Haymore]: One time, yes. [Counsel]: . . . And as a result of that, you put the interceptor ditch to stop that from occurring? [Haymore]: Well, that and people have told me water came down the driveway, so that I would put the interceptor ditch in to try and accumulate any water that might encounter the roadway from the upper side. [Counsel]: But the interceptor ditch does not extend across the driveways, does it? [Haymore]: It should dip across the driveways at the ditch. [Counsel]: If water should be coming across a cut bank in the manner which you've described, Mr. Klink would have encountered that water in the direction in which he was going. He would later have encountered water coming down from the driveway that enters onto Route 130 just north of . . . where the cut bank would be? [Haymore]: The driveway was north of where I saw the water. [Counsel]: So you're aware of two possible sources of water coming onto the high side of that super elevation curve which would then flow all the way across the roadway? [Haymore]: I can say I only feel there's one source of water, and that would be the driveway. Finally, Haymore testified that, pursuant to applicable safety standards, signs warning of flooded road conditions should be placed about five hundred feet in front of the occurrence.
McClure was employed as the DOT's district engineer for Hawai`i County from April 1996 through June 1997 and had overall responsibility for administration of the P&amacr;hoa Bypass. McClure testified that, even when road construction standards are met, a state engineer who notices a dangerous condition on the highway should alert the department so that necessary remedial actions could be taken and McClure would have expected Haymore to have done so. Beginning in April or May 1996, McClure began attending meetings of the Safety Council, where he received complaints from citizens and police officers about water crossing the P&amacr;hoa Bypass. In response, he ordered his staff to review accidents that had occurred in the vicinity. After his staff informed him that more than one wet-weather accident had occurred near the location, he recommended that warning signs immediately be installed a quarter of a mile northward and southward of the site of the water flow because water crossing the roadway would create a dangerous and unexpected condition. McClure's department considered the intermediate measure of grooving the pavement but, McClure testified, the best measure is always to try to get the water at its source and not have it cross the road, if possible. At the request of the Appellants' counsel, McClure then read into the record part of the August 1, 1996 e-mail from Haymore: [8] The other two accidents were probably caused by the water the greenhouse dumps over the top of the cut bank on the high side of the superelevated curve. This is not a new phenomenon but I did not realize it was a problem. About the only cure for this is to put a drainage facility on the high side of the super. . . . Possibly a gutter would work, but the slope on the low side of the super shows evidence of heavy water flow which would suggest a ditch on the top of the cut bank. My memory of the right of way in this area suggests that we do not have adequate room for a ditch on the top of the cut bank. This leads me to conclude that it may be necessary to move the top of the cut bank back to the right of way so as to widen the area available for the largest possible gutter. From the accident records it is imperative that we make some sort of drainage facility. Perhaps you should add this to my list of desirable projects. On the memo, in response, McClure wrote the following message: How about installing a `Road Floods During Rain' sign now[?] And how much would it cost to groove the road (to mitigate any hydroplaning, if it occurs,) until [we] could build an interceptor ditch[?]
Officer Ellazar testified that, before the Klink accident, he frequently traveled the subject area and observed the roadway under a variety of weather conditions and, on several occasions, during light rain, medium, to heavy downpour had observed water coming off the cutbank on the east side of the road in the location where the accident occurred and flowing across the roadway, onto the northbound lane and then further onto the southbound lane with not much variance in the flow regardless of the intensity of the rainfall. He further testified that, one evening during a heavy rain storm, he had almost lost control of his own vehicle due to water sheeting across the roadway.
HCPD Officer Lt. James Kelly attended the Safety Council meetings and recalled citizens expressing concerns specifically involving water conditions on the P&amacr;hoa Bypass near the eleven mile marker, the same area where Klink's accident occurred. Kelly testified that at least one DOT representative was present at each meeting, normally Haymore or McClure. In addition to the other complaints, at one meeting, the Safety Council's leader directly addressed the state representative and demanded that an investigation be undertaken of the particular stretch of highway. Lt. Kelly testified that he was disquieted by the citizens' concerns and that he twice undertook his own investigations of the subject area. He made it a point to inspect the highway during different levels of rainfall and testified that [t]he depth of the water was significant on the heavy downpour time. In fact, both regular rain conditions and a heavy downpour created a similar water pattern: [A]s the road is level and starts to curve and go down that the water would stay within the roadway and would follow the curve and follow the downward pattern of the roadway. It would sheet from that particular area, makai to mauka, [east to west, northbound to southbound lanes] inside corner, and then diagonally cross the road. There would be a noticeable sheet during the curve in the down sweep of the water running broadly across the road to the inside. The water would completely cross the roadway at that time. Lt. Kelly discussed his observations and concerns at length with a state representative. An employee of the DOT's Highways Division reported to the Safety Council that an investigation of the site revealed no problems with water on the roadway. Lt. Kelly got a little strong at that point and asked the representative if the State could groove the roadway, but [a]gain they said it wasn't a problem. Lt. Kelly was part of the investigative team that responded to the Klink accident. He recalled observing water running along the gutter located on the west side of the road. Based on the debris line at the gutter, he concluded that water [had been] there at a much higher level than when I got there. Lt. Kelly did not recall any running water or debris on the east side of the road, nor did he recall observing any water running off the east driveway or property.
Krueper testified for the Appellants as a traffic and civil engineer specializing in highway and accident reconstruction. He testified that, based on his measurements of the P&amacr;hoa Bypass and its surrounding landscape, water runoff would travel across the roadway any time it rained. He noted that it was standard practice in roadway design to intercept water entering the roadway offside from the hill, from the dirt shoulder and channel it along the outside edge of the road. Krueper believed that the interception capabilities of offside water at the site of the accident were inadequate. During a visit to the scene for his report, Krueper also observed water coming off the driveway and sheet flowing across the road while it was drizzling, although later, on cross-examination, he confirmed that he had not observed any other runoff during that inspection. He testified that the State should have constructed a dip at the bottom of the driveway to prevent water from entering the roadway. Ultimately he concluded that a film of water on the roadway resulted in a loss of traction to Klink's vehicle, causing the accident, in part based on observed water flow and debris and in part based on the dynamics of the accident, asserting that there's no way a person can turn that sharp on dry pavement without rolling over. He emphasized that he did not believe that true hydroplaningor a complete loss of contact between the tires and the road surfacecaused Klink's vehicle to follow the trajectory that it did but, rather, that the trajectory of the vehicle indicated that contact with the roadway was only partially lost, caused by a film of water being on the roadway's surface and further causing the rear of Klink's vehicle to swing around toward the front in a counter-clockwise direction as the lighter rear end failed to brake as effectively as the heavier, front end of the vehicle when Klink entered the downhill-sloping superelevated curve. He also testified that, based on his analysis of the vehicle, the condition of Klink's tires did not play a role in the accident. With regard to the sufficiency of the roadway's design, Krueper stated that broad standards of roadway construction cannot substitute for an engineer's professional judgment based on particular on-site conditions. He testified that a basic principle of road construction is dewatering the roadway before a driver enters a superelevation. In his opinion, the design of the P&amacr;hoa Bypass did not demonstrate professional engineering judgment because there was no drainage for uphill water. Accordingly, in Krueper's opinion, the lack of a feature, such as a ditch, to intercept the water from the land abutting the highway before it reached the road rendered the design of the highway defective. Krueper opined that, if the supervising engineer had observed water flowing onto the roadway from the shoulder shortly after the highway had opened, he should have investigated to ensure that the highway had been built according to design specifications. Krueper further testified that the engineer should then have notified a supervisor of the condition, warning signs should have been installed, and methods to intercept the water should have been undertaken immediately. In Krueper's opinion, Haymore's failure to take action when he first observed water coming over the cutbank in 1991 was a deviation from professional and ethical standards. Krueper also testified that warnings signs should be placed far enough in advance of the object that you are to warn of so a driver can reasonably perceive, react, and do what the sign intends to tell you to do before you get to that point. Specifically, pursuant to DOT guidelines, in Krueper's opinion the appropriate location for a sign warning of flooding would be at least 450 feet prior to the condition, 500 feet if the roadway was downhill, which for the present matter would be approximately 50 feet south of station 0+00 on Exhibit 27. Krueper believed that the Road Floods During Rain sign he observed during his site inspection, located roughly at station 3+00 on Exhibit 27 approximately 100 feet south of where Klink's car began its spin, and approximately 350 north from the location Krueper believed it should have been located to provide adequate warningwas nevertheless not present on the day of the Klink accident because it appeared to be brand new and there was no mention of it in the police report.
Ellison Ancheta, as supervisor for a DOT traffic services crew, was tasked with installing the Road Floods During Rain signs. He testified that the two signs, one for each direction of travel, were erected on August 7, 1996 and that the sign for the northbound lane was placed at least 600 feet before the spot where Klink's car began its skid. However, Ancheta conceded that he had not personally witnessed the installation of the northbound sign, but had only received oral confirmation from his work crew that it had completed the work, which had been assigned to it on the same day via a written DOT work order; [9] the oral confirmation and the fact that, upon the crew's return, the posts and signs were not present, led Ancheta to conclude that the crew had installed the signs. Ancheta confirmed, however, that the August 7, 1996 work order had called for the sign for northbound traffic to be installed approximately 250 feet farther north than it was, toward the site where the accident occurred, at a location where an intersection ahead sign was already located. Only after the Klink accident did he discover that the sign had, in fact, been installed farther south, when a report on the accident was issued and a state official had notified him that the sign was in the more southern location. He questioned his crew about the misinstallation and was informed that, because the intersection ahead sign was already located at the called-for coordinates, his crew had made a judgment call to install the road floods sign farther south, where Ancheta personally observed it during a site visit following Klink's accident. The Appellants objected to the testimony, arguing that Ancheta had no personal knowledge of the installation or location of the sign until after the accident and, hence, that his testimony, which was elicited to establish the existence and location of the warning sign on the day of the accident, constituted inadmissible hearsay. The circuit court allowed the State to continue its questioning, however, in order further to establish the foundation of Ancheta's knowledge. The circuit court then asked Ancheta to identify on Exhibit 27the diagram of the accident site prepared by Krueper(1) the location where the work order called for the sign to be placed and (2) the location where his crew had actually placed the sign on August 7, 1996. Ancheta then testified, referring to a March 27, 1997 daily maintenance report (DMR) introduced into evidence, that, following Klink's accident, the sign was moved to the second location nearer the east side driveway where it was subsequently observed by Krueper during his site inspection. The circuit court allowed the report into evidence, over the Appellants' counsel's objection that it does not identify the sign that was moved [or] where that sign was located, arguing that [t]here is nothing to show that this document is related in any fashion to the sign which is [the] subject of the inquiry. The circuit court thereafter made the following comments: [T]his is what I'm hearing and I'm going to share this right now with everyone on the record[Ancheta] remembers the accident maybe, not by date or time, but because it caused someone to tell him You got a sign in the wrong place, go out and change it. He went out to look for himself, he saw the sign in the wrong place. He told us where he [had] seen that sign, which is about 250 feet . . . to the right of where [Exhibit 27] ends. Now the only thing that we need to ascertain is the number of feet from the intersection sign to the end of the diagram. And my estimation is about 180 feet. . . . The Appellants further objected to the propriety of Ancheta referring to a work order not in evidence in testifying where the sign was originally installed. The circuit court responded that much of the confusion stemmed from the failure of either party to depose Ancheta prior to trial: [Appellants' counsel:] Well, Your Honor, I'm troubled by the fact that this witness obviously relied on documents for his testimony. . . . They've never been identified in this case up until today. And then they're not produced. And I think that is highly irregular. [The Court:] I don't know what you are talking about. [Appellants' counsel:] The work order that he's referring to for example. . . . [T]hat he looked at to determine the date. That's not in court. We've never seen it. It's never been identified. [The Court:] The point is what? You wanted the work order to determine the date of the accident or something else? [Appellants' counsel:] Well, no. I just think that they have an obligation to bring these documents if this witness is going to testify. . . . [The Court:] Well if we're going to talk about obligations and what we know and don't know then we are going to get to the issue of why [Ancheta]'s deposition was not taken. So I'm not going there. You do what you have to do, but don't mess up the witness, confuse him, confuse me, mess up the facts. Please, we're just trying to get clarity. Ancheta continued his testimony based upon the DMRs and his recollection of pertinent work orders that he had reviewed prior to trial.
As the DOT's head of the hyrdraulics design section, Francis Nishioka was charged with managing water runoff on the State's highway system, including standards compliance and drainage construction. He testified that, after three visits to the site and a review of all the relevant depositions and design plans, including pre-construction topographical maps, in his expert opinion the design of the highway met all criteria, including those pertaining to drainage, and was safe. He contested Krueper's expert opinion that custom and practice would have called for a drainage feature on the upper side of a superelevated highwayin the present matter, the east side of the roadby testifying that the topographical map he reviewed [10] indicated that water could not flow toward the road, [a]nd . . . since rainwater does not flow toward the road the cut-off ditch is not required. He furthered testified that, based on his reading of the pre-construction topographical map, water from the cut-bank directly fronting the highway would be very minimal and that the bulk of any water falling on the driveway would flow not onto the highway but would instead flow parallel to it into a gulch northward of the driveway. On cross-examination, however, Nishioka conceded that the actual topography of the site could have been altered by the construction process; Nishioka further conceded that, if Haymore had observed water coming off this cut bank flowing onto the roadway in this area and crossing the roadway, then there would be a dangerous condition. Nishioka contended that if the water originated from a private source, such as a greenhouse, then it would not be the DOT's responsibility to design for or address the problem; he admitted, however, that he was unaware of any investigation to determine the ultimate source of the water coming off of the cutbank and further testified that his department had not received any notification that water was crossing the highway until after Klink's accident. He was also unaware of any subsequent determination of the source of the water but confirmed that his department oversaw the installation of the interceptor ditch. He further conceded that the map upon which he was relying did not contain measurements of the slope of the roadway or the driveway and that, based on the measurements actually conducted by Krueper, rainwater either falling on the driveway or running parallel down the shoulder onto the driveway would eventually run onto the highway, at least at higher volumes of water.
According to her testimony, Danielle Alejandro [11] was tailgatingas close as one-half of a car lengthbehind Souder's vehicle when Klink's vehicle crossed the median strip and collided with Souder, but she was able to maintain control of her vehicle and avoid the collision. Alejandro testified that it was pouring rain leading up to and at the time of the accident and that Souder's vehicle was moving so slowly that she attempted to pass it several times but that it was pouring so hard that I was afraid to. She recalled water running on the roadway. On cross-examination, however, she also indicated that she did not see any water coming from the driveway or the grassy area along the northbound lane. In response to the confusion concerning Alejandro's testimony regarding water flow, the Appellants elicited the following testimony on redirect: Q: What you do recall, though, is that it was raining, and it had been raining hard since the time you got onto [the P&amacr;hoa Bypass]? A: Yes. Q: And water was running on the roadway on both sides of the roadway at the accident scene? A: I don't remember if it was running [on] both side[s], but I know Q: Water was running on the roadway? A: Yes.
In contrast to Alejandro's testimony, Souder maintained that, while it had rained earlier that morning, it was not raining at the time of the accident and he did not believe Alejandro's vehicle was following him particularly closely. He did not recall Alejandro's vehicle ever attempting to pass him. He became aware of Klink's vehicle when it was [v]ery, very close . . . [w]hen it took a sudden swerve into my lane of traffic. He recalled that Klink's vehicle took a slight jog to the right and then an immediate hard turn to the left. At the time Klink executed that maneuver, Souder insisted that there were no vehicles to his immediate left; to wit, no vehicle attempting to pass Souder; accordingly, Souder had no explanation as to why Klink drove as he did. He remembered Alejandro's vehicle passing through the accident scene immediately afterward. 10. Testimony of Andrew Levitt Andrew Levitt, the State's accident reconstruction expert, testified that, based on a review of the physical evidence and photographs of the accident, it was his expert opinion that the accident was not caused by hydroplaning but, rather, by Klink's attempts to avoid an unknown vehicle entering his lane of travel. He reasoned that, if Klink's vehicle had hydroplaned, denying Klink steering control, his vehicle would have continued northward in a straight trajectory until the roadway curved away toward the west and out from underneath it, sending the vehicle onto the east side shoulder. Levitt maintained that, in order to execute the maneuver that it dida radical change in the direction of the vehicle from northward to northwestwardthe vehicle's tires would have had to have remained in contact with the pavement, making steering input possible. He asserted that the turn and rotation of Klink's vehicle, as diagramed by Krueper, was not possible solely within the northbound lane of travel, that, in order to produce the evidence gathered at the accident site, Klink's vehicle would of necessity have first been steered eastward onto the northbound shoulder before turning westward across the highway, into the oncoming, southbound traffic, and that that maneuver required some degree of contact between the vehicle's tires and the roadway. He theorized that the vehicle driven by Alejandro had attempted to pass Souder's vehicle by entering the northbound lane, presenting Klink with the need to steer right, onto the shoulder, and then left, back onto the roadway, and to apply his brakes, thereby resulting in the accident. He maintained that, Alejandro having admitted tailgating the Souder vehicle and given the human reaction time necessary to avoid the collision, it was simply not possible for her to avoid becoming part of the accident without either being much farther behind the Souder vehicle than she claimed or off in the northbound lane in a passing mode. Levitt reviewed Krueper's testimony and contested Krueper's reconstruction, maintaining that it did not reproduce the rotation necessary to place Klink's vehicle where it was when it struck Souder's truck. On cross-examination, Levitt conceded that neither Souder nor Alejandro had testified that Klink's vehicle ever left the roadway. He also conceded that the police had not observed any tire marks on the pavement or the paved shoulder; he asserted, however, that it would not be uncommon, given the wet conditions, for a vehicle in such a scenario to fail to leave discernible marks. On the other hand, he conceded that if Klink's vehicle had lost traction in its rear wheels, perhaps due to water on the roadway, the rear of his vehicle would have drifted slightly to the right, which, in turn, could have caused Klink to overcorrect to the left, bringing him into the oncoming lane of traffic. Nevertheless, Levitt maintained that such a scenario would presuppose either that Klink was inattentive or that he was grossly overreacting to a stimulus. 11. Testimony of Dr. John Dracup Dr. John Dracup testified for the State as an expert in hydrology and hydraulic engineering. Relying on police photographs taken of the area on the day of Klink's accident, he opined that the shoulder sloped away from the roadway on the eastern side of the highway. The Appellants objected to this testimony as exceeding the scope of Dr. Dracup's expertise, but were overruled by the circuit court. Dr. Dracup's analysis did not rely on any independent survey of the topography of the site. Relying on Krueper's measurements of the site and meteorological data of the rainfall in the area during the morning of the accidentwhich reported 0.19 inches of rainfall in the hour before the accidentDr. Dracup opined that, even assuming all 0.19 inches fell in a sudden deluge, the water would drain completely from the roadway within fifty-four to eighty-five seconds. He conceded on cross-examination, however, that he did not include the driveway area in his calculations. The Appellants' counsel then asked Dr. Dracup to refer to photographs Dr. Dracup had taken in the course of his field investigation of the accident site. Dr. Dracup confirmed the photos were taken two hours after a light rain had fallen. He conceded that the photos exhibited water on the highway, water continuing to drain down the driveway, and water continuing to flow down the interceptor ditch, constructed subsequent to the accident, along the eastern shoulder.