Opinion ID: 1433768
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The absence of express authority

Text: As a subordinate agency of the state, the County may seek judicial review of the Department's action only if the General Assembly so provided by express statutory authorization. See Maurer, 779 P.2d at 1320; Martin, 191 Colo. at 109, 550 P.2d at 866. Upon examining the relevant statute, see § 26-1-126(5), 8 C.R.S. (1997), we conclude that the General Assembly has not granted express authority to the County to sue the Department. Section 26-1-126(5) provides: Each county eligible for county contingency funds pursuant to this section shall only be responsible for an amount equal to the county's pro rata share of the general assembly's appropriation to the county contingency fund. If state and county appropriations are insufficient to meet the administrative and program costs of public assistance and the administrative costs of medical assistance and food stamps, then the executive director of the department of human services, the executive director of the department of health care policy and financing, and the state board of human services shall act pursuant to sections 26-1-121(1)(c) and 26-1-122(5) to reduce the rate of expenditure so that it matches the available funds.[ [10] ] Nowhere in the statute is it evident that the legislature has expressly conferred on counties, or any other subordinate state agency, standing to sue the Department. In further support, we contrast the present case with Maurer, 779 P.2d at 1317. In that case, we assumed that the Property Tax Administrator of the State of Colorado (the Administrator) was a subordinate state agency to the Board of Assessment Appeals (the Board), and concluded that the relevant statute in that case authorized the Administrator to sue the Board. See id. at 1321. Unlike section 26-1-126(5), however, the statute at issue in Maurer explicitly allowed the respondent to seek judicial review of the Board's decisions. Section 39-2-117(6), 16B C.R.S. (1988 Supp.), provided: If the decision of the board is against the respondent, the respondent, upon the recommendation of the board that it is a matter of statewide concern and within thirty days after such decision, may petition the district court of the county in which the property is located for judicial review pursuant to section 24-4-106, [10A] C.R.S. [1988]. Maurer, 779 P.2d at 1321 (emphasis added). After we concluded that the Administrator was a proper respondent, we logically held that the statute expressly allowed the Administrator to seek judicial review in the district court of the Board's decision. See id. at 1322-23. In contrast with the statute at issue in Maurer, however, here, section 26-1-126(5) is strikingly different. Section 26-1-126(5) authorizes the executive director and state board to reduce the rate of expenditures so that it matches the available funds when state and county appropriations are insufficient to meet social services program costs. Unlike section 39-2-117(6), in Maurer, which stated that the respondent agency may petition the district court, section 26-1-126(5) does not even mention judicial review, nor does it address any recourse in the event the Department does not act accordingly. Succinctly, subsection (5) simply does not provide the county with a right to seek judicial review in district court. Cf. Maurer, 779 P.2d at 1321. This is not an error of omission, but a statement of legislative intent. The General Assembly has created such a right elsewhere in our Human Services Code and did so by the use of unmistakable language. See § 26-1-120 (providing  [a] county board shall have the right to obtain judicial review of a decision of the merit system council concerning the county directly in accordance with section 24-4-106, C.R.S.1973) (emphasis added); see also Douglas County 829 P.2d at 1308 (statute at issue provided that each party to the action or proceeding before the commission shall have the right to appear in the review proceedings) (emphasis added). We find no such language in section 26-1-126(5). We therefore conclude that, under Martin and related case law, section 26-1-126(5) does not expressly grant a right to file suit. The County's reliance on subsection 5 for standing to seek judicial review of the Department's decision is misplaced.