Opinion ID: 794054
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issue presented by this appeal

Text: 13 Neither party disputes that New York law applies in this diversity case. The narrow question before this Court is whether involuntary termination in the context of New York's employee choice doctrine should be governed by the constructive discharge test from federal employment discrimination law. 14
15 We explored the contours of New York's common law employee choice doctrine in Lucente v. IBM Corp., 310 F.3d 243 (2d Cir.2002). As a general rule, New York courts disfavor restrictive covenants in the employment context and will generally enforce them only to the extent they are reasonable and necessary to protect valid business interests. Id. at 254 (citing BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 93 N.Y.2d 382, 690 N.Y.S.2d 854, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1222-23 (1999); Post v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 48 N.Y.2d 84, 421 N.Y.S.2d 847, 397 N.E.2d 358, 359-60 (1979)). However, the employee choice doctrine establishes an important exception to this rule, and New York courts will enforce a restrictive covenant without regard to its reasonableness if the employee has been afforded the choice between not competing (and thereby preserving his benefits) or competing (and thereby risking forfeiture). Lucente, 310 F.3d at 254 (citing Post, 421 N.Y.S.2d 847, 397 N.E.2d at 359-60). As originally explained in Kristt v. Whelan, 4 A.D.2d 195, 164 N.Y.S.2d 239 (N.Y.App.Div.1957), aff'd without opinion, 5 N.Y.2d 807, 181 N.Y.S.2d 205, 155 N.E.2d 116 (1958), [i]t is no unreasonable restriction of the liberty of a man to earn his living if he may be relieved of the restriction by forfeiting a contract right or by adhering to the provisions of his contract. Id. at 243. Thus, the employee choice doctrine assumes that an employee who elects to leave a company makes an informed choice between forfeiting a certain benefit or retaining the benefit by avoiding competitive employment. Lucente, 310 F.3d at 254 (citing Kristt, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 243). 16 Though we admitted that the New York courts have not sketched out every detail of the employee choice doctrine, we noted in Lucente that the following three elements were bold and clear: 17 First, an employer can rely on the doctrine only if it can demonstrate its continued willingness to employ the party who covenanted not to compete. Second, when an employee is involuntarily discharged without cause, the employer cannot invoke the benefits of the doctrine. Enforcing the non-competition provision under such circumstances would be unconscionable because it would destroy the mutuality of obligation on which a covenant not to compete is based. Third, the factual determination whether an employee was involuntarily terminated is generally not appropriate for summary judgment. 18 Id. at 254-55 (internal citations omitted) (citing Post, 421 N.Y.S.2d 847, 397 N.E.2d at 360-61). 19
20 The district court correctly recognized that the New York common law employee choice doctrine controls and that the dispositive question was whether Morris quit or was fired. See Morris, 2005 WL 167608, at ; cf. Lucente, 310 F.3d at 254. As previously noted, the district court ultimately analyzed this question by borrowing the constructive discharge standard from federal employment discrimination law, 3 citing IBM v. Martson, 37 F.Supp.2d 613 (S.D.N.Y.1999), in support of this approach. See Morris, 2005 WL 167608, at . 4 21 Unfortunately, neither the New York Court of Appeals, nor any other New York state court, has provided guidance on what legal test courts should apply when an employee claims that he was involuntarily terminated and that the employee choice doctrine should not apply. 5 In light of this lacuna, we explore whether certification is warranted. 22