Opinion ID: 2390222
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Post-distribution evidence

Text: In order for a plaintiff to prove his case in a product liability action, he must show that the product was in a defective condition at the time that it left the hands of the particular seller ... and unless evidence can be produced which will support the conclusion that it was then defective, the burden is not sustained. Claytor v. Gen. Motors Corp., 277 S.C. 259, 264, 286 S.E.2d 129, 131-32 (1982) (emphasis added) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. g. (1965) adopted as legislative intent via S.C.Code Ann. § 15-73-30 (2005)); see also Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., 319 S.C. 531, 548-49, 462 S.E.2d 321, 331 (Ct.App.1995) (recognizing that the product must be `measured against a standard existing at the time of sale' and that `hindsight opinions by [...] experts suggesting that more should have been done ... are insufficient to discredit the conclusion that the manufacturer met the standard of care') (quoting Sexton ex rel. Sexton v. Bell Helmets, Inc., 926 F.2d 331, 337 (4th Cir.1991) and Doe v. Miles Labs., Inc., Cutter Labs. Div., 927 F.2d 187, 193 (4th Cir.1991)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2, cmt. a. (1998) ([F]or the liability system to be fair and efficient, the balancing of risks and benefits in judging product design ... must be done in light of the knowledge of risks and risk-avoidance techniques reasonably attainable at the time of distribution.). Because the claim here is against the manufacturer, the time of distribution is the time of manufacture. While we find Branham presented sufficient evidence to create a jury question on his design defect claim, we further find Ford was prejudiced by Branham's unrelenting pursuit of post-distribution evidence on the issue of liability. Given the extent of the improper post-distribution evidence introduced, the error cannot be considered harmless. We first clarify what is post-distribution evidence. Simply defined, post-distribution evidence is evidence of facts neither known nor available at the time of distribution. When assessing liability in a design defect claim against a manufacturer, the judgment and ultimate decision of the manufacturer must be evaluated based on what was known or reasonably attainable at the time of manufacture. [17] See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2, cmt. a. (1998). The use of post-distribution evidence to evaluate a product's design through the lens of hindsight is improper. See Gregory v. Cincinnati, Inc., 450 Mich. 1, 538 N.W.2d 325, 326 (1995) (Evidence of conduct after the date of manufacture improperly shifts the focus from the premanufacturing decision and has the potential to taint any finding of liability.). Hale's Ford Bronco II 4x2 was manufactured in 1986. The following is a sampling of the post-manufacture (or post-distribution) evidence. Branham introduced a memorandum dated April 14, 1989, dealing with a meeting that three Ford engineers had with six people from Consumers Report. The memorandum stated that: Our objective was to give it our best shot at diffusing a very negative story on the Bronco II in the June issue.... The magazine has done a comparative test of the Chevy S-10 Blazer, Geo Tracker, Dodge Raider and Bronco II. As the result of several calls from a Consumer Report writer, we were led to believe that the story could be nearly as negative as last summer's Suzuki Samurai story. Plus, NHTSA is currently conducting an engineering analysis of the Bronco II which creates a negative cloud. And, FARS [Fatal Analysis Reporting System] data shows Bronco II to have a higher fatal rollover rate relative to certain competitors. The memorandum went on to note the following: Our data are not terribly favorable. Our rollover rate is three times higher than the Chevy S-10 Blazer. This evidence of the Bronco II's rollover rate is post-manufacture evidence. Later in the same 1989 memorandum, as the engineers discuss how they thought they did, this comment is made: We think, however, that we have clouded their minds, loosened some conclusions they may have reached prior to our meeting and sent them off to search for additional information that could work to our advantage. The clouded their mind comment became a mantra for Branham on the issue of liability and otherwise. Through Branham's expert, Dr. Richardson, a 1989 film was introduced. Counsel emphasized this film, taped in 1989, comparing the S-10 Blazer and the Bronco II. As reflected in Plaintiff's exhibit 54A, which is the corresponding report to the videotape, Ford requested additional `J' turn tests on May 17, 1989 for various vehicles, including a 1989 Bronco II 4x4. The tape (post-manufacture evidence) revealed that the 1989 Bronco II did not handle as well as the S-10 Blazer. Dr. Richardson also testified to a document, Plaintiff's exhibit 168, referencing post-manufacture evidence that compared a 1989 Bronco II (referred to in the document as BII) to the UN46 prototype, now known as the Ford Explorer. This exhibit shows the additional evidence of the rollover tendency of the Bronco II that came to light after 1986: Current strategies for development of utility vehicle stability have changed over the past few years due (sic) the increased availability of rollover accident data and analyses. Previous strategies were partially driven by the Insurance Institute tests of the Jeep CJ7 in the early 80's which emphasized risk from rollovers caused by extreme (rate and magnitude) steering inputs in emergency maneuvers. Independent DOT, GM and Ford studies have confirmed that rollovers directly induced by extreme steering inputs are rare for any Utility vehicle (including the CJ7). The following quote from GM's recent SAE Paper (Reconstruction of Rollover Collisions, SAE 890857) summarizes current wisdom. A common pre-rollover maneuver is an off-road path by the car, followed by heavy steer correction back towards the road leading to a side slide, and, ultimately, a trip followed by the rollover. Based on this new information, the UN46 was developed using a handling philosophy notably different from the BII. [18] This post-distribution exhibit concludes: Based on an analysis of FARS accident summaries and BII & Competitive handling characteristics, it is impossible to identify any type of vehicle defect that could explain the BII FARS performance. It is most likely that the handling strategy used during the development of the BII, which fully exploited the vehicles (sic) inherent quickness (due to its short wheelbase), encourages aggressive driving and makes the vehicle more sensitive to the large steering wheel over-corrections that seem to be part of most rollover scenarios. This sensitivity is aggravated by the fact the (sic) most operators in rollover accidents are either inexperienced drivers, under the influence of alcohol or both. The UN46, designed with the benefit of the FARS experience for all utility vehicles, has been intentionally developed to resolve these issues. Yet another example of post-distribution evidence is found in a March 3, 1989 memorandum addressing an accident caused while testing a prototype anti-lock braking system (ABS) at the Dearborn Proving Grounds (DPG). The memorandum revealed that on February 28, 1989, a demonstration was conducted on an ice pad located on the DPG East-West runway and that the accident involved a Kelly-Wayes Company owned 1989 Bronco II with prototype ABS. The goal was to test the efficacy of the ABS system when running partially on ice and partially on dry ground. During the test procedure the Bronco II rolled over. The rollover occurred on ice. There are other examples of post-manufacture evidence, but the few examples cited illustrate the inherent prejudice that flows from post-distribution evidence. It is good when a manufacturer continues to test and evaluate its product after initial manufacture. As additional information is learned, changes may be made that improve product safety and function. As a matter of policy, the law should encourage the design and manufacture of safe, functional products. In holding manufacturers accountable for unreasonably dangerous products pursuant to a fair system, products liability law serves that goal. Moreover, the law should encourage manufacturers to continue to improve their products in terms of utility and safety free from prior design decisions judged through the lens of hindsight. Whether the 1987 Ford Bronco II was defectively designed and in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous must be determined as of the 1986 manufacture date of the vehicle. Ford's 1986 design and manufacture decision should be assessed on the evidence available at that time, not the increased evidence of additional rollover data that came to light after 1986.