Opinion ID: 838255
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Objections to the Court of Appeals Analysis

Text: The Court of Appeals ultimately adopted a totality of the circumstances test and stated that no one factor was dispositive. Smith, supra at 203-204, 748 N.W.2d 258. Nonetheless, its apparent endorsement of the Ohio test raises doubts about the standard it articulates. Proof of shared expenses, sustained duration, and a marriage-like commitment are all potentially relevant factors, but they are not the sine qua non in determining whether cohabitation exists. Nor do I believe that these factors amount to the principal relevant considerations, id. at 202, 748 N.W.2d 258, in determining whether a couple is cohabiting. Many dictionary definitions include the analogy to marriage that our Court of Appeals cited, see, e.g., Merriam Webster's Online Dictionary (11th ed.) (to live together as or as if a married couple); Webster's New World Law Dictionary (to live together as husband and wife, esp. when not married); Law.com Dictionary ([l]iving together in the same residence, generally either as husband and wife or for an extended period of time as if the parties were married). Others, however, define cohabitation as merely living together in a sexual or intimate relationship, see, e.g., Cambridge Dictionary of American English ((esp. of a man and woman who are not married) the act of living together); The Online Plain Text English Dictionary ([t]he living together of a man and woman in a supposed sexual relationship); Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1913 ed.) (same); Wiktionary ([a]n emotional and physical intimate relationship which includes a common living place and which exists without legal or religious sanction). I believe that the latter definitions provide a more accurate reflection of contemporary cohabiting arrangements. Recent social science research suggests that the commitments of cohabiting couples are not equivalent to those of married couples. On the contrary, the behaviors, understandings, and attitudes of cohabitants typically differ dramatically from those of married couples. Garrison, Marriage Matters: What's Wrong with the ALF's Domestic Partnership Proposal, Reconceiving the Family, Critique on the American Law Institute's Principles of the Law on Family Dissolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 307. In fact, cohabitants overwhelmingly see cohabitation as a substitute for being single, not for being married. Id. at 310. Moreover, Professor Garrison argues that cohabitants do not typically follow the relational norms associated with marriage: they are much less likely than married couples to have children together, to pool their resources, to feel secure and unconflicted in their relationships, to value commitment, or to express commitment to their partners. Id. at 308-309 (footnotes omitted). A test that essentially equates cohabitation with common-law marriage fails to account for the significant differences between married and cohabiting couples. Our survey of out-of-state caselaw reveals that many cases, like those cited by our Court of Appeals, define cohabitation in a manner that does not reflect the current reality, as documented by the social science research mentioned above. These cases view cohabitation as a substitute for marriage, and inappropriately emphasize the financial arrangements and duration of the new relationship. See, e.g., Rose v. Csapo, 359 N.J.Super. 53, 59, 62, 818 A.2d 340 (2002); Pellegrin v. Pellegrin, 31 Va. App. 753, 767, 525 S.E.2d 611 (2000); Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 202, 729 A.2d 7 (1999); Sanders v. Burgard, 715 So.2d 808, 811-812 (Ala.Civ.App., 1998); Gordon v. Gordon, 342 Md. 294, 308-310, 675 A.2d 540 (1996); Moell v. Moell, supra at 883-884. Some courts, however, have recognized that proof of shared expenses should not be a controlling factor. In In re Marriage of Edwards, 73 Or.App. 272, 279-280, 698 P.2d 542 (1985), the Oregon Court of Appeals decline[d] to adopt [the ex-]wife's suggestion that financial benefit to the supported spouse that permanently affects the need for the decreed spousal support is a prerequisite to a finding of cohabitation. It agreed with the trial court that the ex-wife was cohabiting, even though the couple had kept their finances separate. Id. at 275, 279, 698 P.2d 542. Similarly, in Bell v. Bell, 393 Mass. 20, 22-23, 468 N.E.2d 859 (1984), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts concluded that the ex-wife was living with a man so as to give the outward appearance of marriage, and ordered the termination of alimony payments, even though the two maintained separate bank accounts and never comingled any assets. Moreover, New York's highest court very recently reversed the finding of the intermediate appellate court that cohabitation had a plain meaning under New York caselaw that contemplated changed economic circumstances and required shared finances. The majority held that the term was ambiguous as used in the parties' settlement agreement because neither New York caselaw nor dictionary definitions revealed a plain meaning, and courts of other states had not uniformly defined the term. Graev v. Graev, 11 N.Y.3d 262, 270-271, 869 N.Y.S.2d 866, 898 N.E.2d 909. The dissenting judge disagreed because he concluded that the inclusion of a specific period rendered the cohabitation provision unambiguous (the agreement provided that the ex-husband's maintenance obligation would terminate in the event of the ex-wife's cohabitation with an unrelated adult for a period of 60 substantially consecutive days). Graev, supra at 265-267, 272-274, 869 N.Y.S.2d 866, 898 N.E.2d 909 (Graffeo, J., dissenting). Significantly, the majority and dissent agreed that financial interdependence is not a sine qua non of cohabitation. The dissent stated: Today, as a Court, we unanimously reject the rule that economic interdependence is a sine qua non of cohabitation. Aside from the textual and contractual considerations, that rule makes little sense practically because a party receiving maintenance can easily evade the consequence of a termination provision and receive more than the benefit of his or her bargain. Mrs. Graev and M.P., for example, would be free to continue their relationship in its current form indefinitely without violating the termination provisionthey could be together 24 hours a day and sleep together every night for yearsbut as long as they maintain separate bank accounts and do not share expenses, they would not be cohabitating under the economic unit concept. This is not how a cohabitation clause is supposed to work; nor is it what other parties anticipate when including similar cohabitation clauses in their agreements. [ Id. at [275-276, 869 N.Y.S.2d 866, 898 N.E.2d 909] (Graffeo, J., dissenting).] The facts of this case are somewhat similar to the hypothetical situation Judge Graffeo describes. Defendant and her partner have decided to postpone marriage until her spousal support automatically expires. Defendant's partner claims to have resided with his ex-wife, then at least part-time at his former marital home, rather than with defendant, but his ex-wife's testimony about the mailing address he used and the minimal utility bills suggest that these claims were a further attempt to avoid triggering the termination provision in the parties' judgment of divorce. I share Judge Graffeo's view and the view of the Graev majority that a test that focuses primarily on the degree of the parties' financial interdependence does not fully capture the reality of cohabitation in cases like this. I would grant leave to appeal to clarify that no single factor is dispositive under a totality of the circumstances test for cohabitation. The primary goal of the finder of fact should be to distinguish between dating relationships and cohabitation by first considering the extent to which the parties share a common residence. Courts should thus consider such factors as whether each party has keys to the residence, keeps personal items there, and uses it as a mailing address; whether the parties share household duties; and the amount of time each party spends at any separate residence. Second, courts should consider the extent to which the parties have an intimate relationship or engage in sexual relations; they need not inquire whether the couple's commitment to one another resembles a marriage. The social science data show otherwise. Third, while courts may consider the parties' financial situation, including shared expenses and joint accounts, I would clarify that sharing expenses is not controlling. As Judge Graffeo notes in his dissent, financial interdependence is not the sine qua non of cohabitation. It is possible that one cohabiting party would pay all the expenses. I would also emphasize that the length of the parties' relationship is not dispositive. In short, I believe that the problem posed by this case is jurisprudentially significant. I would grant leave to appeal to explore the parameters of an appropriate test for cohabitation.