Opinion ID: 1706470
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appearance of partiality

Text: Canon 2A, Code of Judicial Conduct, requires a judge to act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The legal system depends on public confidence in judges, whose power rests in large measure on the ability to command respect for judicial decisions. In re Miera, 426 N.W.2d at 855. Public confidence in the judiciary suffers if the public perceives that, by virtue of their unique access to judges, court employees can obtain preferential treatment for themselves or for their family members. Public confidence in the judiciary suffers further when matters involving court employees or their family members are resolved behind closed doors, even if the disposition would have been the same in open court. See In re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235, 237 S.E.2d 246, 257 (1977) (The objective observer    would surely think he had reasonable cause to believe that those who knew the judge, or knew a deputy sheriff who knew the judge, could receive more favorable treatment than the average traffic offender.); Cynthia Gray, Ticket-Fixing, Jud. Conduct Rep., Summer 2006, at 1, 5-6 (arguing that ticket fixing is a violation of the code of judicial conduct and ought to be discouraged). The clerk and Judge Murphy offered dramatically different accounts of her presentation of the ticket. The clerk testified that she entered the judge's chambers and announced, [t]his is my son's ticket. He got a speeding ticket and, instead of him taking the day off of work and missing the pay, and instead of him pleading guilty to it and paying it and it going on his driving record, is there something that you could do? Judge Murphy testified that the clerk handed her the ticket, he asked her whose it was, and she provided the defendant's name (the defendant and the clerk did not have the same last name). He testified that he did not inquire further into the defendant's identity or the reason why the ticket was before him. He also indicated in his letter to the board and in his testimony that he remembered the incident pretty well because it was unusual and that the clerk was somewhat evasive. The panel found that the clerk announced that the ticket belonged to her son, but Judge Murphy was busy reviewing mail and files and did not hear her. We cannot reconcile the panel's finding with the testimony of the clerk and Judge Murphy. Either the clerk was straightforward and announced that the ticket was her son's, or she was evasive; she could not have been both. We note that, although the panel made no express credibility determination, it accepted the clerk's testimony that she announced that the ticket belonged to her son. In contrast, despite Judge Murphy's testimony that he remembered the incident well because it was so unusual, the panel's findings did not credit his testimony that he asked to whom the ticket belonged or his testimony that the clerk was evasive. Perhaps more importantly, the panel only addressed the issue of whether Judge Murphy knew that the ticket had been issued to the clerk's son; it did not address the issue of whether Judge Murphy should have known that the ticket was issued to the son. The latter issue is important because Judge Murphy's handling of the ticket deviated even from the relaxed procedures for petty misdemeanors that are common in Dakota County. Although ex parte, in chambers resolution of petty misdemeanor traffic tickets is not unusual in Dakota County, no one testified that it is common for a Dakota County judge to resolve a ticket without knowing to whom it belongs, why it is before the judge, or what resolution the defendant seeks. Judge Spicer testified that he does not take representations from a clerk and that [n]o clerk will bring you a ticket in Dakota County without the original ticket with the police officer's notes. Judge Murphy testified that his usual practice is to require an admission to the offense from the defendant before ordering a continuance for dismissal and that people who come to the desk at the courthouse with a ticket typically are not seeking a continuance for dismissal because they don't know anything about that. By his own account, Judge Murphy failed to make any meaningful inquiry into the circumstances surrounding an unusual request by an evasive staff member for an ex parte, in chambers disposition of a ticket. Judge Murphy deviated from standard Dakota County practice when he issued a continuance for dismissal on the ticket without obtaining an admission from the defendant, without verifying that the defendant understood the disposition, without requiring that the defendant or someone representing the defendant be present in the courthouse, and without even knowing who the defendant was. Judge Murphy indicated in his letter to the board that his mistake was not inquiring further into this matter. We agree and find that the evidence shows, clearly and convincingly, that Judge Murphy should have made an inquiry sufficient to determine that the defendant was the clerk's son. We therefore hold that Judge Murphy's conduct violated Canon 2A, Code of Judicial Conduct, because he did not avoid the appearance of impropriety and did not act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. We must decide what discipline to impose for this violation. The board recommends that Judge Murphy receive a public reprimand, and we adopt this recommendation. The dissent concludes that Judge Murphy should not be publicly disciplined for his disposition of the traffic ticket. The dissent relies on the panel's factual finding that the clerk announced that the ticket belonged to her son, but Judge Murphy did not hear her. As we have explained, this finding is incompatible with Judge Murphy's own testimony before the panel. Exercising our authority to independently review the record and factual findings, we conclude that this finding cannot possibly be correct. The dissent agrees with our conclusion that Judge Murphy should have inquired further into the identity of the ticketed driver, and presumably agrees that the failure to make such an inquiry was a violation of Canon 2A, Code of Judicial Conduct. Notwithstanding the argument of the dissent for a private warning, our purpose in imposing judicial discipline is to restore public confidence in the system and its officers. In re Miera, 426 N.W.2d at 858. We must impose a sanction designed to announce our recognition that misconduct has occurred, and our resolve that similar conduct by this or other judges will not be condoned in the future. Id. Because Judge Murphy's conduct may have created the impression among the public that court employees and their families may use their access to judges to obtain preferential treatment for traffic violations, we conclude that our obligation to preserve the integrity of the judicial system requires us to issue a public reprimand to Judge Murphy. Based on the foregoing, it is the order and judgment of this court that Judge Thomas M. Murphy be, and hereby is, publicly reprimanded. Concurring in part and dissenting in part, ANDERSON, PAUL H. and PAGE, JJ. ANDERSON, PAUL H., J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur with the court's determination that Judge Murphy be publicly reprimanded for his attempt to influence the testimony of a witness in these disciplinary proceedings; but, I disagree with the court's determination to publicly reprimand Judge Murphy for his disposition of the traffic ticket. As I did in Stacey, I rely on the three-member panel's finding that although the clerk said the ticket belonged to her son, Judge Murphy did not hear her. See In re Stacey, 737 N.W.2d 345, at 353-54 No. A06-305 (Minn. 2006) (Anderson, Paul H., J., dissenting). I therefore conclude that the board has failed to prove by the requisite clear and convincing evidence that Judge Murphy in fact knew the ticket he was dismissing had been issued to a family member of a court employee. But I conclude that Judge Murphy should have known that the clerk's request violated county policy, because the circumstances of the clerk's request should have led Judge Murphy to make further inquiry. For the reasons I expressed in Stacey, I conclude that the appropriate discipline for Judge Murphy's conduct with respect to the traffic ticket is a private warning from the Board of Judicial Standards, not a public reprimand from this court. Id. at 354. PAGE, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).