Opinion ID: 1101356
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the evidence fails to support martin's conviction for a schedule ii controlled substance.

Text: ¶ 31. Martin was indicted, tried, and convicted of possession of morphine in violation of Miss.Code Ann. § 41-29-139(c)(1), which provides: (c) It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess any controlled substance ... Any person who violates this subsection with respect to: (1) A controlled substance classified in Schedule I or II, as set out in Sections 41-29-113 and 41-29-115, except marihuana, is guilty of a felony and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than three (3) years and shall be fined not less than One Thousand Dollars ($1000.00) nor more than Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00) or both; Miss.Code Ann. § 41-29-139(c)(1) (1993). Miss.Code Ann. § 41-29-115(A)(a)(1)(xiii) (1993) lists morphine as a Schedule II substance. However, Miss.Code Ann. § 41-29-117(A)(d)(8) (1993) lists morphine as a Schedule III substance if it is in a quantity not more than 50 milligrams. Possession of a Schedule III substance is punishable, as a misdemeanor, under Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-139(c)(3) (1993), which provides: (3) A controlled substance classified in Schedule III, IV, or V as set out in Sections 41-29-117 through XX-XX-XXX, upon conviction, may be confined for not more than one (1) year, or fined not more than Five Thousand Dollars ($5000.00), or both. Miss.Code Ann. § 41-29-139(c)(3) (1993). ¶ 32. Martin argues, that at trial, the evidence failed to prove the amount of morphine possessed. This is true. The only evidence from the pathologist concerning the morphine was that the syringe did, indeed, contain morphine. Martin argues that this Court has long recognized the rule that where it is unclear which of two penalties applies, a defendant must be sentenced under the law which imposes the least severe penalty. ¶ 33. In this case, Martin was convicted of possession of morphine. The question is whether he was entitled to be sentenced under a statute carrying a lesser penalty where the state did not prove the amount of morphine that he possessed. This Court addressed this situation in Clubb v. State, 672 So.2d 1201, 1204 (Miss.1996), where it said: As held by this Court in Beckham v. State, 556 So.2d 342, 343 (Miss.1990), where two or more statutes could apply to the same conduct, the State is not required to prosecute an individual under a statute providing for a lesser penalty. But where two or more statutory provisions could apply to the defendant's conduct, and the indictment itself is ambiguous as to which statute is being charged, a defendant may be sentenced only under the provision providing the lesser penalty. Clubb, 672 So.2d at 1204. Under Clubb, Martin should be resentenced under Count I of the indictment. Two or more statutory provisions apply here, and the indictment is silent as to the amount of morphine Martin was charged with possessing. Therefore, Martin should have been sentenced under the misdemeanor provision. ¶ 34. However, this issue may be moot, if the trial court, on remand, finds that a clerical error existed in the transmission of the jury's verdict. In that case, the trial court will enter a verdict of not guilty on Count I. If the trial court finds that there was no clerical error in the reporting of the jury's verdict, and that Martin was in fact found guilty on Count I, then Martin should be resentenced under the misdemeanor provision as is discussed above.