Opinion ID: 2095080
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the disqualification of defense counsel

Text: Ten days after he was indicted, appellant retained an attorney, Douglas Wood, to represent him. In October 1996, approximately one year before trial, the government moved to disqualify Mr. Wood because of his successive representation of a potential government witness, David Henderson, who supposedly would testify that appellant had made a jailhouse confession of the murder. [4] Mr. Wood had previously represented Mr. Henderson in an unrelated criminal matter, and at the time the government filed its motion, Mr. Wood was representing him in a case in the United States District Court that was scheduled for sentencing, as well as an upcoming trial in the Superior Court. At the hearing on the motion to disqualify, the government asserted that Mr. Wood's representation of Mr. Henderson posed two conflicts. First, it argued that Mr. Wood's ethical obligations to Pinkney will clearly hinder his ability to negotiate for the witness any cooperation agreement with the United States .... Second, it maintained that Mr. Wood's ethical obligations to the witness will clearly hinder his cross-examination of the witness at trial. Mr. Wood responded by first informing the court that he had already moved to withdraw from his current representation of Mr. Henderson. He then proposed that the court appoint counsel for Henderson and hold an in camera hearing (1) to determine what Mr. Henderson's testimony would be, (2) to assess his credibility, (3) to determine whether Mr. Wood could effectively cross-examine him without addressing Mr. Wood's prior representation of him, and (4) to find out whether Mr. Henderson would waive any objection to Mr. Wood's disclosure of prior confidences. Mr. Wood also stated that he would rely only on information that was a matter of public record to impeach Mr. Henderson on cross-examination. About ten days later, after hearing further argument, the court granted the government's motion to disqualify Mr. Wood, stating: I frankly find, after reviewing all the relevant factors, that justice does require Mr. Wood's withdrawal and giving Mr. Pinkney an opportunity to choose new counsel. The reason I see that as necessary, recognizing that Mr. Pinkney does have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice, recognizing also that Mr. Pinkney has a right to conflict-free representation and to have vigorous representation without restraints on [Mr. Wood's] ability to do a thorough and effective cross-examination of a witness called against him. Recognizing also that Mr. Wood's former client has a right not to have any of his confidences exposed. And based on the proffers made at the last hearing, I understand that Mr. Pinkney is at least willing to consider a waiver of any conflict that might interfere with his right but obviously to determine whether a waiver is appropriate would want to know with some precision exactly what the witness' testimony would cover to have a realistic understanding of what kind of cross-examination would be necessary. It is also clear that Mr. Wood at least thought there was a possibility ... based on his relationship previously with the witness, that the witness might be willing to waive some of the confidences that could possibly be at issue. The court's concern, however, [is] that a knowing and intelligent waiver by either Mr. Pinkney or the witness is impossible. On Mr. Pinkney's side, the government is under no obligation to disclose pretrial the exact nature of the witness' testimony, and Mr. Pinkney can't know what he's waiving if he doesn't know what the testimony is going to be. The witness, on the other hand, the only way he could agree to have Mr. Wood free to take advantage of his knowledge of him in cross-examination would be if Mr. Wood not only knew what the testimony was going to be about, and therefore was able to decide in advance what kinds of things would be used in cross-examination, and that very disclosure ... would not only ... require the government to disclose something they don't have to disclose, but it would ... emasculate any cross-examination if you told the witness in advance what you'll be using, and that would clearly be unfair to Mr. Pinkney . . . . A new attorney later entered an appearance for appellant. After that attorney and two successors were allowed to withdraw for various reasons, a sixth attorney (Wood had been the second) entered the case and represented appellant through the trial and the sentencing. Before this court appellant argues that there was an insufficient record to enable the trial court to determine whether the government's assertions about Mr. Henderson's allegations were valid. Specifically, he faults the court for basing its decision solely on Mr. Henderson's unsworn hearsay assertion proffered by the prosecutor ... against appellant's in-court assertion that he had never discussed this case with Mr. Henderson without taking counsel up on his request for an in camera hearing so that the court could make a credibility assessment. Thus, argues appellant, the trial court acted arbitrarily. [5] We disagree. To protect [a defendant's] right to conflict-free counsel, the trial court has an affirmative `duty to inquire' into the effectiveness of counsel whenever `the possibility of a conflict' becomes apparent before or during trial. Douglas v. United States, 488 A.2d 121, 136 (D.C.1985) (citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (emphasis in Wood )); see also Singley v. United States, 548 A.2d 780, 784 (D.C.1988). Putting aside for now the issue of whether the disqualification of Mr. Wood was an abuse of discretion, we are satisfied that the court's decision was, at the very least, not arbitrary. On the contrary, the court held two hearings on the matter and allowed counsel for both parties to articulate their arguments fully. Moreover, even though the court did not indulge Mr. Wood's request to hold an in camera hearing, [6] it did listen to a lengthy proffer by the government, albeit ex parte, on what Mr. Henderson would testify about and how he obtained his information. In that proffer, the government set forth several details of the crime that Mr. Henderson would have had no way of knowing (because he was incarcerated at the time of the shooting) unless he did in fact discuss the incident with appellant. On this record we are satisfied that the trial court did not act arbitrarily. Appellant's main challenge to the disqualification of Mr. Wood raises a more complex issue. He argues that even if Mr. Henderson's allegations (presented through the government's proffer) were found somewhat credible, and therefore not simply a ploy by the government to have Mr. Wood disqualified, Mr. Wood's previous representation of Mr. Henderson still did not pose an actual conflict or a serious potential for conflict. We cannot agree. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused in a criminal case the right to the effective assistance of counsel for his or her defense. Gibson v. United States, 632 A.2d 1155, 1158 (D.C.1993) (citations omitted). Ordinarily, the deprivation of [a defendant's] counsel of choice would entitle [the defendant] to a reversal of his conviction as a matter of constitutional right. United States v. Childress, 313 U.S.App. D.C. 133, 176, 58 F.3d 693, 736 (1995) (citation omitted). However, while the right to select and be represented by one's preferred attorney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment, the essential aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). The right to counsel of one's choice is therefore circumscribed in several important respects, id., such as when a serious potential for conflict arises. Id. at 164. When that occurs, the trial court has discretionary authority to disqualify counsel. See id. (the presumption in favor of [a defendant's] counsel of choice ... may be overcome ... by a showing of a serious potential for conflict). [7] An actual conflict in successive representation may arise where the subject matter of the previous representation is substantially related to the case being tried, the attorney reveals privileged communications of the former client stemming from the previous representation, or the attorney's loyalties are otherwise divided. Veney v. United States, 738 A.2d 1185, 1193 (D.C.1999) (citations omitted; emphasis added); see United States v. Casiano, 929 F.2d 1046, 1052 (5th Cir.1991) (an attorney operates under an `actual conflict' when he represents a criminal defendant after having previously represented a government witness in a related matter  (citation omitted; emphasis added)). This court has never articulated a test by which a trial court may determine whether a potential conflict reaches the point at which disqualification is warranted. However, the Seventh Circuit has said that the trial court should evaluate the interests of the defendant, the government, the witness and the public in view of the circumstances of each particular case. United States v. O'Malley, supra note 6, 786 F.2d at 790 (citations omitted). Under this analysis, the trial court should examine whether the subject matter of the first representation is substantially related to that of the second, whether the conflict could cause the defense attorney improperly to use privileged communications in cross-examination, and whether the conflict could deter the defense attorney from intense probing of the witness on cross-examination to protect privileged communications with the former client .... United States v. Ross, supra note 7, 33 F.3d at 1523 (citations omitted). This raises the question of what it means for a previous representation to be substantially related to a current one. It is clear that Mr. Wood's representation of Mr. Henderson was not substantially related to the subject matter of appellant's trial i.e., the facts surrounding the killing of Mr. Baldwin. [8] However, the trial court raised a very important point: because appellant's defense would necessarily involve refuting Mr. Henderson's testimony, it would consist mostly of attacking his credibility on cross-examination. This situation is very similar to that presented in United States v. James, 708 F.2d 40 (2d Cir.1983), in which the Second Circuit observed that the danger in not protecting the former client's confidences could be highlighted by the nature of the questioning that can be anticipated. Id. at 45. Following that rationale, the Seventh Circuit noted in O'Malley that the credibility of the government witness, whom defense counsel had previously represented, was likely to be critical at trial. Because this impeachment could be accomplished by eliciting specific instances of misconduct involving matters of truthfulness, and because the trial court found that it was likely that [defense counsel] gained knowledge of such instances involving [the witness] through their attorney-client relationship, the trial court found that [defense counsel's] prior representation of [the witness] was relevant to `the issues and determinations presented in the instant case.' O'Malley, 786 F.2d at 792 (citation omitted). The Seventh Circuit's reasoning in O'Malley reflects that of the trial court here. That is, because impeachment of Mr. Henderson would be an important part of the defense, issues concerning Henderson's credibility were therefore substantially related to Mr. Wood's representation of appellant. We think the approach taken by the Second and Seventh Circuits is sound, and thus we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying Mr. Wood. [9] The fact that appellant waived his right to conflict-free representation does not persuade us otherwise. Appellant faults the trial court for creating a bright-line rule that, in order for a waiver to be knowing and intelligent, the defendant must know the exact nature of the witness' testimony. This standard, he contends, is impossible to meet because a criminal defendant can never know the exact nature of a government witness' testimony before the witness takes the stand. The right to conflict-free representation, like other constitutional rights, may be waived by a defendant who wishes to be represented by a particular attorney, though that attorney is burdened by a conflict of interest. Fitzgerald v. United States, 530 A.2d 1129, 1134 (D.C.1987) (citations omitted). However, [a]s with the relinquishment of other important constitutional rights, waivers of conflict-free counsel must be `knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.' Douglas, 488 A.2d at 138 (citation omitted). Therefore, before a waiver is accepted, the trial court should conduct, on the record, an inquiry sufficient to establish that the defendant is aware of the right to conflict-free representation; understands the nature of the risks and the potential adverse effects of foregoing that right; and knows that, if convicted, he or she will not be able to complain on appeal that the defense at trial was compromised by the conflict. Id. (citations omitted). The Supreme Court also made this clear in Wheat, holding that trial judges must be allowed substantial latitude in refusing waivers of conflicts of interest .... 486 U.S. at 163, 108 S.Ct. 1692. In coming to this conclusion, the Court declared that the best interest of the defendant was not the only factor at stake: Federal courts have an independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them.... Not only the interest of a criminal defendant but the institutional interest in the rendition of just verdicts in criminal cases may be jeopardized by unregulated multiple representation. Id. at 160, 108 S.Ct. 1692; see also Moscony, 927 F.2d at 749 (Such a waiver, however, does not necessarily resolve the matter, for the trial court has an institutional interest in protecting the truth-seeking function of the proceedings). Bearing in mind that the trial court has substantial latitude in dealing with these issues, we are not willing to say that the court in this case abused its discretion in refusing appellant's waiver. While we do not foreclose the possibility of an attorney's cross-examining a former client, the appearance of impropriety was too great under the circumstances presented here, and appellant simply had no way of knowing exactly what valuable information he might have been required to refrain from placing before the jury. The trial court's decision was bolstered by the fact that Mr. Wood, who surely learned confidential information during his representations of Mr. Henderson, [10] never came forward with a waiver from Mr. Henderson, whose rights were also entitled to protection. [11] Furthermore, we do not attach much significance to Mr. Wood's offer to keep his impeachment of Henderson limited to matters of public record. See United States ex rel. Stewart v. Kelly, 870 F.2d 854, 857 (2d Cir.1989) (To limit cross-examination of the informant to his rap sheet may have prejudiced [the defendant], had more searching inquiries been necessary .... Alternatively, not to limit the cross-examination might have violated the rights of the informant, if, for impeachment purposes, competent cross-examination would delve into matters not contained in the rap sheet). [12]