Opinion ID: 2585950
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: we determine the standard of review for a mixed question of fact and law by employing a policy-based balancing test

Text: ¶18 In selecting the deferential standard of review that it applied to the trial court's custody determination in this case, the court of appeals engaged in an incomplete analysis of the factors that we discussed in State v. Pena [12] and did not adequately consider the policy implications that we highlighted in State v. Brake. [13] Given the lingering difficulties in the application of our standard of review jurisprudence, we take this opportunity to further discuss the role of policy in our selection of a standard of review and to refine our statement of the balancing test that we use in selecting a standard of review for a mixed question of fact and law.
¶19 We have previously explained that [t]he primary function of a standard of review is to apportion power and, consequently, responsibility between trial and appellate courts for determining an issue. [14] Standards of review should allocate discretion between the trial and appellate courts in a way that takes account of the relative capabilities of each level of the court system to take evidence and make findings of fact in the face of conflicting evidence, on one hand, and to set binding jurisdiction-wide policy, on the other. [15] These considerations are critical in selecting a standard of review from along a spectrum of deference that runs from highly deferential review under a clearly erroneous standard on one end to completely nondeferential review under a correctness standard on the other end. [16] ¶20 Because a trial court is in a better position to judg[e] credibility and resolv[e] evidentiary conflicts, an appellate court reviews the trial court's findings of fact for clear error. [17] Conversely, an appellate court reviews a trial court's conclusions of law for correctness because a single trial judge is in an inferior position to determine what the legal content of [a legal concept] should be [whereas] a panel of appellate judges, with their collective experience and their broader perspective, is better suited to that task. [18] Additionally, the published decisions of appellate courts provid[e] state-wide standards that guide law enforcement and prosecutorial officials. [19] ¶21 The analytical complexity of our standard of review is at its height when we review a trial court's application of a legal concept to a given set of facts. When we review so-called mixed questions of fact and law, the considerations that favor a more-deferential standard of review and those that favor a less-deferential standard of review compete for dominance, and the amount of deference that results will vary according to the nature of the legal concept at issue. Mixed questions of fact and law involving different legal issues will often require different standards of review. [20] ¶22 While we have said that, ultimately, the legal effect of [the] facts is the province of the appellate courts, [21] our prior decisions recognize that, with regard to many mixed questions of fact and law, it is either not possible or not wise for an appellate court to define strictly how a legal concept is to be applied to each new set of facts. [22] Where the correct application of a legal concept is difficult to explain using a generally applicable standard, overinvolvement by an appellate court can lead to confusing and inconsistent pronouncements of the law. [23] We have recognized that the application of such a legal concept incorporates a de facto grant of discretion to the trial court, and, accordingly, we review the trial court's decision on the mixed question of fact and law with deference commensurate to that discretion. [24] ¶23 But with regard to certain mixed questions where uniform application is of high importance, as in the context of Fourth Amendment protections, we have held that policy considerations dictate that the application of the legal concept should be strictly controlled by the appellate courts. [25] Thus, if we determine that society's interest in establishing consistent statewide standards outweighs other considerations, we grant no discretion to the trial court, and we review the mixed question for correctness. [26] ¶24 We have described the varying levels of discretion afforded trial courts in Pena and Brake using Professor Maurice Rosenberg's pasture metaphor, which describes the discretion given to a trial court on a particular mixed question as a pasture bounded by fences that represent the boundaries of the legal concept. [27] Because the established boundaries of each legal concept are unique, different mixed questions are associated with pastures of different sizes. [28] When a trial court stays within the pasture associated with a specific legal concept, it is free to reach one of several possible conclusions about the legal effect of a particular set of facts without risking reversal. [29] Discretion is broadestand the standard of review is most deferentialwhen the application of a legal concept is highly fact dependant and variable. [30] Discretion is most confinedand the standard of review is nondeferentialwhen the legal concept is easily defined by appellate courts or when appellate courts erect strict fences for policy reasons. [31]
¶25 In Pena and its progeny, we have articulated four factors to guide Utah appellate courts in the difficult task of selecting the appropriate standard of review for a mixed question of fact and law from the spectrum of possible levels of deference to a trial court. Most recently, we discussed these factors in State v. Virgin. [32] However, this four-factor test has continued to cause some confusion. As will be explained, we therefore take this occasion to refine the test by eliminating a factor that has proven to be unhelpful and rephrasing the others to better reflect the purpose of the test. Our revised test considers the following factors: (1) the degree of variety and complexity in the facts to which the legal rule is to be applied; (2) the degree to which a trial court's application of the legal rule relies on facts observed by the trial judge, such as a witness's appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to appellate courts; and (3) other policy reasons that weigh for or against granting discretion to trial courts. [33] ¶26 As to the first factor, the greater the complexity and variety of the facts, the stronger the case for appellate. deference. As to the second, the greater the importance of a trial court's credibility assessments that cannot be adequately reflected in the record, the stronger the case for appellate. deference. The third factor requires that we take into consideration policy factors related to the degree of deference that should be applied. Even where a case for appellate. deference is strong under the first two factors, policy considerations may nevertheless lead us to limit that deference. [34] ¶27 While the above balancing test reflects the principles relied upon in our opinions in Pena and its progeny and does not significantly depart from our prior statements regarding mixed questions of fact and law, we have rephrased the language of the factors and have eliminated the second Pena factorthe novelty of the situation. We have made these revisions to enhance the analytical consistency and clarity of the balancing test to be applied in placing different mixed questions along the spectrum of deference and discretion. ¶28 As the first three factors for determining the standard of review have been phrased in Pena and its progeny, their application suggested only yes or no answers, [35] making the factors ill-suited to use in a balancing test. Further, by quoting these first three Pena factors verbatim in the process of transforming them into a balancing test, we have in many of our earlier statements of the balancing test overemphasized their importance and artificially divorced them from our central concern with the policy implications of selecting a more-deferential or less-deferential standard of review. [36] In contrast, we have recently reaffirmed the centrality of policy considerations in our decision in Brake [37] and treated policy considerations as a fourth Pena factor in State v. Virgin. [38] Thus, to clarify the appropriate test, we have rephrased the factors here in a manner that better reflects their usefulness in selecting a standard of review from somewhere along the spectrum of deference. ¶29 In the process of rephrasing the test, we have dropped the novelty factor because it has rarely, if ever, proven to be helpful to our analysis. As it was phrased in Pena, the novelty factor considered whether the situation to which the legal principle is to be applied is sufficiently new to the courts that appellate judges are unable to anticipate and articulate definitively what factors should be outcome determinative. [39] The situations in which this factor required more deferential review were unclear. Our cases demonstrate that legal issues involving situations that are completely new to the appellate courts are rare. Furthermore, where a situation is novel, it is not self-evident that the appellate courts should restrain themselves from exercising searching review and should instead take a wait-and-see approach to establishing a legal test. In the language of the pasture metaphor, we are not convinced that we should necessarily refrain from establishing fences that restrain trial courts simply because a situation is novel and anticipating the future development of the law may be difficult. ¶30 Furthermore, because this novelty factor was prominent in the original Pena test despite its rare applicability, it has often proven unwieldy, cluttered the analysis, or been ignored. For example, we have sometimes stated that the situation presented was not new, but then have addressed whether we could articulate outcome determinative factors. [40] The later inquiry is substantially the same as the inquiry that we make under the first factor, namely: the degree to which the variety and complexity of the facts make it difficult to articulate a legal test or factors that are outcome determinative. Such mixing of the separate analytical inquiries from the first and second original Pena factors has only served to confuse the analysis and may have led appellate courts to place too much weight on the difficulty of articulating a rule. Ultimately, in the rare instances where this novelty of the situation factor may be important, it could fall under the umbrella of other policy considerations. ¶31 In making these changes to the way that we articulate the established standard, our intent is to improve upon our statement of the test that we apply to mixed questions of fact and law without changing its core substance. As before, our goal in applying the above balancing test is to allocate tasks between the trial and appellate courts based on their institutional roles and competencies.