Opinion ID: 565106
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reopening for Material Error

Text: 13 Idaho further contends that the Commission abused its discretion in reopening its November decision, which denied UP's petition to abandon the branch. We disagree. It is well settled that the decision whether to reopen is committed to the Commission's discretion and that decision should not be overturned except in the most extraordinary circumstances, Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 296, 95 S.Ct. 438, 447, 42 L.Ed.2d 447 (1974), upon a showing of the clearest abuse of discretion. United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, Inc., 327 U.S. 515, 535, 66 S.Ct. 687, 697, 90 L.Ed. 821 (1946). 14 Section 10327(g)(1) provides that [t]he Commission may, at any time on its own initiative because of material error, new evidence, or substantially changed circumstances (A) reopen a proceeding ... and (C) change an action of the Commission. 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10327(g)(1). Both Idaho and the Commission agree that the Commission's actions rest on the material error clause. Idaho contends, however, that the Commission did not explicitly find and identify a material error in its November decision. Idaho argues that the only reason the Commission reviewed and set aside its November decision was that a new Commissioner disagreed with the vote of his predecessor. But the Commission's March decision did find a number of material errors and discussed each of these in some detail. 5 Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in reopening the case because of material error in the earlier decision.