Opinion ID: 4543682
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Malicious Prosecution (Count IV)

Text: Richards further asserts that Berent lied in his police report and at trial about witnessing Richards “pushing” Johnson, fueling an improper prosecution in retaliation for Richards’s threat to sue the officers who had arrested him. To establish a malicious-prosecution claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: “(1) the defendant made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute the plaintiff; (2) there was no probable cause for the criminal prosecution; (3) as a consequence of the legal proceedings, the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty apart from the 9 Case No. 18-2432, Richards v. Cty. of Washtenaw, et al. initial arrest; and (4) the criminal proceeding was resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.” Webb v. United States, 789 F.3d 647, 659 (6th Cir. 2015). Richards has not put forth evidence to create a genuine dispute over whether Berent “made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute.” We have held that “[t]o be liable for participating in the decision to prosecute, the officer must participate in a way that aids in the decision, as opposed to passively or neutrally participating.” Webb, 789 F.3d at 660. The crux of Richards’s claim is that Berent lied about his witnessing Richards push Paramedic Johnson. But Richards did not allege to the district court or here on appeal that Berent furthered the prosecution in any way beyond filing the initial police report and testifying at trial. Neither action is sufficient to defeat Berent’s qualified immunity on this count. Testifying at trial can never be the basis of a malicious prosecution claim, as “a trial witness has absolute immunity with respect to any claim based on the witness’ [sic] testimony.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 367 (2012). Moreover, merely filing an allegedly misleading case report, without more active participation, qualifies only as “passive or neutral” participation and is thus an insufficient basis for a malicious-prosecution claim. In Skousen v. Brighton High Sch., 305 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2002), the plaintiff asserted a malicious-prosecution claim against a state trooper who had submitted an investigatory report concerning allegations that the plaintiff had struck her daughter. From the record, it was undisputed that “after [defendant] turned in his investigative report [he] did nothing more than fingerprint [plaintiff] at the police station and testify at her trial.” Id. at 525. Although the plaintiff alleged that there were deliberate lies and misrepresentations in the report, we held that because there was “no evidence that [the defendant] made or even was consulted with regard to the decision to prosecute,” the defendant was entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 529. Notably, as in the 10 Case No. 18-2432, Richards v. Cty. of Washtenaw, et al. present case, the district court in Skousen had denied summary judgment because discovery was not yet complete; nevertheless, we reversed. Id. at 522. Cases after Skousen have continued to apply its holding that filing a case report, taken alone, is insufficient to support a malicious-prosecution claim. See Miller v. Davis, 653 F. App’x 448, 455–56 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that a detective’s report to prosecutors, even if “fundamental to the commencement of the criminal proceedings” was by-itself insufficient for a maliciousprosecution claim); Kinkus v. Vill. of Yorkville, 289 F. App’x. 86, 91 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that an officer’s actions of only filing a police report, signing a blank criminal complaint, and soliciting a written report from another officer was insufficient). We therefore hold that Berent is entitled to qualified immunity on Richards’s Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim.