Opinion ID: 848702
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: MCL 600.2912b(4)(b): STANDARD OF PRACTICE OR CARE

Text: The Court of Appeals panel declined to find fault with plaintiff's statements of the standard of care, noting that (1) defendants direct us to no authority to establish that the stated standard of care is incorrect, nor do they direct us to what they believe is the proper standard of care, and (2) [t]he statute does not require that the claimant accurately or correctly state the standard of care nor does it declare the notice to be inadequate if the plaintiff is incorrect in stating the standard of care. 252 Mich.App. at 670, 653 N.W.2d 441. With respect to the panel's first point, it is plaintiff's burden to establish compliance with § 2912b and, in turn, to establish entitlement to application of the notice tolling provision, § 5856(d). See Roberts I, supra at 64, 642 N.W.2d 663. With respect to the panel's second point, we acknowledge that the notice of intent is provided at the earliest stage of a medical malpractice proceeding. Indeed, the notice must be provided before the action can even be commenced. At the notice stage, discovery as contemplated in our court rules, MCR 2.300 et seq., has not been commenced, and it is likely that the claimant has not yet been provided access to the records of the professional or facility named in the notice. [5] It is therefore reasonably anticipatable that plaintiff's averments as to the applicable standard may prove to be inaccurate or erroneous following formal discovery; moreover, it is probable that the alleged standard of care will be disputed by the defendants. [6] In light of these circumstances, the claimant is not required to craft her notice with omniscience. [7] However, what is required is that the claimant make a good-faith effort to aver the specific standard of care that she is claiming to be applicable to each particular professional or facility that is named in the notice. [8] Here, several different medical caregivers were alleged to have engaged in medical malpractice. Yet, rather than stating an alleged standard of practice or care for each of the various defendants  a hospital, a professional corporation, an obstetrician, a physician's assistant, and an emergency room physician  plaintiff's notices of intent allege an identical statement applicable to all defendants [9] in response to § 2912b(4)(b): [T]he applicable standard of care required that [the hospital, the P.C., Desnoyers, and Davis] provide the Claimant with the services of competent, qualified and licensed staff of physicians, residents, interns, nurses and other employees to properly care for her, render competent advice and assistance in the care and treatment of her case and to render same in accordance with the applicable standard of care. With respect to the hospital and the professional corporation, this statement does not allege a standard applicable specifically to a hospital or professional corporation as opposed to any other healthcare professional or facility. Moreover, this statement fails to indicate whether plaintiff was alleging that these defendants were vicariously or directly liable to her. [10] Although it appears from plaintiff's complaint that she is claiming that the hospital and the professional corporation are vicariously liable for the negligence of their agents, the notices of intent implied that plaintiff alleged direct negligence against these defendants for negligently hiring or negligently granting staff privileges to the individual defendants. Thus, plaintiff's notices neither alleged a standard specifically applicable to the defendant facilities, nor did they serve as adequate notice to these defendants that plaintiff planned to proceed under a vicarious liability theory at trial. The section of plaintiff's alleged standard of care that appears to be relevant to individual defendants DesNoyers and Davis states that the applicable standard of care required that ... [they] render competent advice and assistance in the care and treatment of her case and to render same in accordance with the applicable standard of care. Thus, in response to the statutory query, What is the applicable standard or practice or care alleged by the claimant?, plaintiff has essentially answered in part: The standard of care required that defendants adhere to the standard of care. Obviously, this statement is tautological and unresponsive, and it cannot be viewed as minimally compliant with § 2912b(4)(b). The alleged standard also observes that defendants DesNoyers and Davis were required to properly care for plaintiff and to render competent advice and assistance. Such general averments, however, are not adequately responsive to the statutory requirement that the claimant allege an applicable standard of practice or care relevant to the defendant. [11] Again, plaintiff was not required to provide a statement of alleged standards of care or practice that might ultimately be proven, after discovery and trial, to be correct and accurate in every respect. However, plaintiff was required to make a good-faith averment of some particularized standard for each of the professionals and facilities named in the notices. [12] We conclude that plaintiffs' notices fail to comply with § 2912b(4)(b) with respect to each defendant.