Opinion ID: 2356190
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Constitutionality of Juvenile Sex Offender Registration

Text: The juvenile-justice system exists independently from the adult criminal system, and the objective underlying each system is distinct. See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L.Rev. 821, 824-25 (1988). The primary goals of the juvenile-justice system are protection, rehabilitation, and treatment of the offender, whereas the criminal system seeks to punish the offender. Id. at 824. The respondent contends that the Registration Act blurs the two schemes and defeats the confidentiality inherent in the juvenile-justice system, thereby producing a stigma that would last respondent's lifetime, long after he attains the age of majority. The respondent also asserts that the Registration Act undermines the basis upon which the juvenile-justice system is founded and, therefore, renders the juvenile adjudication tantamount to an adult criminal conviction, thereby implicating his right to a jury trial. This Court has yet to address the constitutionality of the Registration Act with respect to juveniles. In In re Christopher S., 776 A.2d 1054, 1057 (R.I.2001), we declined to address this precise issue. The Family Court had certified three questions to this Court: (1) Is the Rhode Island Registration and Community Notification Act, Chapter 37.1 of R.I.G.L. as applied to juveniles constitutional? (2) If it is constitutional, in light of the fact that the Act removes the confidentiality that has thus far been an essential part of the juvenile system, are juveniles accused of sexual offenses entitled to a trial by jury? (3) Does a juvenile have the right to a jury trial, if he/she is subjected to registration as a sex offender past his/her twenty-first birthday? In re Christopher S., 776 A.2d at 1055. Despite the certification, this Court opted not to answer the first question because the constitutionality of the Registration Act was neither raised in nor decided by the Family Court. Id. The instant matter, however, is properly before this Court because respondent raised the issue of the Registration Act's constitutionality immediately after the trial justice's delinquency determination. We have held that [i]n dealing with constitutional issues, `[b]ecause of the broad plenary power of the General Assembly, this [C]ourt's evaluation of legislative enactments has been extremely deferential; moreover, we have interfered with such enactments only when the legislation at issue palpably and unmistakably could be characterized as an excess of legislative power.' In re Christopher S., 776 A.2d at 1057 (quoting City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 44-45 (R.I.1995)). Therefore, Unless the party challenging the statute's constitutionality can `prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the act violates a specific provision of the constitution or the United States Constitution, this Court will not hold the act unconstitutional.' Mackie v. State, 936 A.2d 588, 595 (R.I.2007) (quoting Cherenzia v. Lynch, 847 A.2d 818, 822 (R.I.2004)). 1