Opinion ID: 4368537
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: All Other Applicable Federal Laws

Text: The Attorney General next argues that the Certification Condition is authorized by 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(5)(D). This section of the Byrne JAG statute requires applicants to certify that they “will comply with all provisions of this part and all other applicable Federal laws.” Id. § 10153(a)(5)(D) (emphasis added). The Attorney General argues that Section 1373— discussed supra, I. B., prohibiting restrictions on the sharing of information regarding immigration status—is an applicable federal law, as it applies to local government entities. Accordingly, he argues that he is authorized to require applicants to Attorney General’s authority to impose substantive conditions in a subsection dedicated to conferring power on the AAG.”); New York, et al., 2018 WL 6257693, at  (“[Section 10102] would be an odd place indeed to put a sweeping power to impose any conditions on any grants—a power much more significant than all of the duties and powers that precede it in the listing, and a power granted to the Assistant Attorney General that was not granted to the Attorney General.”) (quoting Chicago II, 888 F.3d at 285). 25 certify their compliance with that law. The City responds, however, that the Applicable Laws Clause only covers laws that “expressly govern federal grants or grantees.” Philadelphia Br. 20. At first blush, both parties’ interpretations have merit—the text does not explicitly indicate to whom, or to what, the laws must be applicable. But closer scrutiny of the text, structure, and history of the provision leads us to reject the Attorney General’s expansive view. Starting with the text, we observe that 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(5)(D) contains an initial specific phrase followed by a general phrase: a grant applicant must certify that it “will comply with [1] all provisions of this part and [2] all other applicable Federal laws.” In these situations, the principle of ejusdem generis teaches that “the general term should be understood as a reference to subjects akin to the one with specific enumeration.” Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991). But “[t]he absence of a list of specific items undercuts the inference embodied in ejusdem generis.” Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 225 (2008) (emphasis added). If the general phrase (“all other applicable Federal laws”) were preceded by a list of specific federal laws, then our task would be much easier. But here we find only “one specific and one general category.” Id. Moreover, the specific phrase (“all provisions of this part”) tells us little about the meaning of the general phrase. In short, ejusdem generis does not get us very far in interpreting “all other applicable Federal laws.” But several other considerations all suggest that Section 1373 is not an “applicable” law. First, the canon against surplusage counsels us to read the term “applicable” in a way that gives it some independent heft. See Paek v. Att’y Gen., 793 F.3d 330, 337 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The canon against surplusage 26 counsels us to give effect to every word of a statute.”). Here, the term “applicable” avoids being redundant only by doing some limiting work beyond delineating the set of all federal laws that would “appl[y]” to an entity like Philadelphia. Otherwise, Congress could have simply written that a grant applicant must certify compliance with “all other Federal laws.” See San Fransisco, 2018 WL 4859528 at  (“[I]t is superfluous to interpret ‘all other applicable Federal laws’ as ‘all Federal laws.’”). Thus, the word “applicable” must have a narrower meaning than one that sweeps in all possible laws that independently apply to a grant applicant. Second, the noscitur a sociis canon—discussed supra, III. A. 2.—provides further guidance. The Applicable Laws Clause is located in the fourth of four subsections, all of which require certifications that must be included in a Byrne JAG application. These four requirements provide that an “application shall include … [a] certification … that”: (A) the programs to be funded by the grant meet all the requirements of this part; (B) all the information contained in the applica- tion is correct; (C) there has been appropriate coordination with affected agencies; and (D) the applicant will comply with all provisions of this part and all other applicable Federal laws. 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(5). These requirements all relate to the programs that will be funded under the grant. See San Francisco, 2018 WL 4859528, at  (“[A]ll the other conditions in Section 10153(a) apply to the grant itself.”); New York, et al., 2018 WL 6257693, at  (“The structure of § 10153, which 27 concerns requirements pertaining to the grant and the application, points toward the [more narrow] reading.”). This is evident on the face of the first requirement. The second requirement necessarily deals with programs funded under the grant, as the bulk of information contained in the application is regarding the use of grant funds. And we can infer that the requirement that there “has been appropriate coordination with affected agencies” relates to coordination that had occurred in compiling a grantee’s application. Although not dispositive, these narrow neighboring provisions counsel against a broad interpretation of the Applicable Laws Clause. Thus, it would be reasonable to view “all other applicable Federal laws” to refer specifically to laws that apply to operations relating to the grant, not to require the City to certify compliance with every single law that might apply to it. Third, the historical practice of the Justice Department is also an important interpretive tool. See N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014) (“[T]he longstanding ‘practice of the government’ can inform our determination of ‘what the law is.’”) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 401 (1819), and Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803)). Here, the Justice Department’s historical practice does not comport with the broad interpretation that it urges in this case. Every condition that is authorized by the Applicable Laws Clause applies specifically to programs funded under the grant, not more generally to the grantee. 12 12 While the Attorney General does not expressly state the statutory authority for each condition, the City does. See App. 391-400. The Attorney General does not take issue with the City’s account. 28 The Attorney General points to several conditions—such as compliance with laws regarding human research, body armor purchases, and military equipment purchases—as establishing a practice of conditioning Byrne JAG funds on certification of compliance with broader categories of federal law. But these conditions are not blanket requirements with which the grantee must comply under all circumstances; rather, their applicability is conditioned on whether federal funds are used in a particular area. See, e.g., App. 379 (requiring compliance with 28 C.F.R. § 46, which sets out regulations for human research that is “conducted or supported by a federal department or agency”). For example, if a grantee uses funds to purchase body armor or military style equipment, then it must comply with the applicable federal regulations regarding those purchases. And if a grantee uses funds to conduct research on human subjects, then it must comply with the applicable federal regulations in that area. The Certification Condition is written differently: regardless of how a grantee uses its funds, it must certify compliance with this federal law. The Attorney General has not pointed to any historical precedent for the kind of unconditional requirement it now seeks to impose. Fourth, as we have noted, Congress structured the Byrne JAG program as a “formula grant,” under which a jurisdiction’s award is calculated through a formula that considers only population and violent crime statistics. The Attorney General asserts that the Applicable Laws Clause authorizes him to condition Byrne JAG funds on compliance with any law in the U.S. Code. But that reading of the Clause would destabilize the formula nature of the grant. Allowing the Attorney General to withhold all funds because a jurisdiction does not certify compliance with any federal law of the Attorney General’s choosing undermines the predictability and consistency embedded in the program’s design, thus turning the formula grant 29 into a discretionary one. Moreover, if Byrne JAG were intended to be a discretionary grant, one would think that Congress would house it in the section of the U.S. Code containing discretionary Justice Department grants, see 34 U.S.C. Subt. I, Ch. 101, Subch. V, Part B (“Discretionary Grants”), not its own, neighboring section, see 34 U.S.C. Subt. I, Ch. 101, Subch. V., Part A (“Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program”). Finally, there is reason to doubt that even under a broad reading of the Applicable Laws Clause, Section 1373 would apply. In the “Administrative Provisions” section of the same chapter of the code as the Applicable Laws Clause, Congress provided: Nothing in this chapter or any other Act shall be construed to authorize any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States to exer- cise any direction, supervision, or control over any police force or any other criminal justice agency of any State or any political subdivision thereof. 34 U.S.C. § 10228. Under the plain terms of this provision, the Applicable Laws Clause “shall” not be “construed” to authorize the Department to “exercise any direction, supervision, or control” over Philadelphia Police. But under the Attorney General’s reading of the Applicable Laws Clause, Section 1373 would authorize the Department to direct, supervise, or control Philadelphia Police communications with ICE. Section 10228 may therefore be a statutory limit to which laws are “applicable” under the Applicable Laws Clause. Accordingly, we find that Section 1373 is not an applicable law for the purposes of Byrne JAG. 30