Opinion ID: 22508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of intervention/substitution of counsel

Text: 16 Appellants argue that the district court erred in denying the motions for substitution of counsel and intervention because at least eighty percent of the class members supported substitution and Welch was not adequately performing his duties. Denials of motions for substitution of counsel are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Pettway v. American CastIron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157,1178 (5th Cir. 1978). We treat appellants' motion for intervention as one for intervention as of right under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a). The denial of that motion is reviewed de novo. See Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 999-1000 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). The facts of this case justify a finding that the district court committed reversible error under either standard in denying the motions for substitution and/or intervention. 5 We therefore reverse the denial of the motion for substitution. 6 17 Two main factors support substitution of counsel in this case. First, the sentiments of the class indicate a clear preference for a known substitute, i.e. the NPP attorneys. Second, and more importantly, Welch's nonfeasance and the constraints upon his ability adequately to prosecute the sub-class' case urge the rare remedy of substitution. District courts normally enjoy substantial latitude in deciding motions for substitution of counsel. In long-standing class actions, in particular, significant administrative difficulties could arise from frequent or competing motions for substitution or intervention, and we in no way wish to encourage the unjustified use of such motions. Mere dissatisfaction with class counsel's strategy or obtained results does not adequately support a motion for substitution of counsel. Nonetheless, the unique circumstances of this case do warrant substitution. 18 Appellees first urge that the class members' motions for intervention and substitution of counsel were untimely. However, such motions made during theongoing administration of a class action settlement by a district court are not per se untimely. See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 394-96 (1977) (putative class members' post-judgment motion to intervene was timely filed). The district court did not reject the motions as untimely, nor do we. 19 In Pettway, this Court reversed a denial of a motion for substitution of counsel where seventy percent of the class supported it, noting that class counsel may not substitute his own subjective judgment for that of the class on major questions of litigation. See Pettway, 576 F.2d at 1177. In this case, at least eighty percent of the class supported substitution. Welch's own words in letters to the class explain his deliberate intent to use his own subjective judgment regarding the objectives and appropriate relief for the class even as against a majority of the class members' explicit wishes. Thus, Welch's behavior is of a type that we recognized in Pettway as justifying substitution of counsel. 20 Welch's nonfeasance and mishandling of certain aspects of the case also warrant his substitution here. First, Welch is a solo practitioner with limited resources. Such a fact does not on its own justify substitution of counsel - numerous solo practitioners have demonstrated their ability and zeal in prosecuting even very large class actions. However, in this case, Welch's resources were already stretched by his representation of the Gates class as well as numerous other subclasses. More importantly, Welch's own admissions demonstrate his subjective belief that he was unable actively to prosecute the HIV-positive prisoners' claims. 7 His failure to secure outside expert review of the subclass members' medical care, even after this Court specifically noted the necessity of such review on a previous appeal, corroborates the limits of Welch's resources and ability to litigate the HIV-positive prisoners' case. 21 Appellants also argue that Welch has a conflict of interest inherent in his dual representation of the HIV-positive prisoners and of the general prison population in Gates because segments of that population might object to the HIV-positive prisoners gaining access to work training and other programs from which they are currently excluded. Welch disputes the existence of such a conflict, and the district court agreed with him, ruling that there was no apparent conflict of interest. The allegation of a conflict of interest is not self-evident; there is no necessary or inherent conflict between the objectives of the HIV-positive subclass and that of the general population. However, Welch explained to the class in responding to complaints about his inaction that he refrained from taking aggressive action on their desegregation claims in part because he feared the general population would object to it. We therefore have a direct admission by counsel that his advocacy was in fact impaired, at least at one time and as to one set of issues. That admission erases any doubt that would otherwise exist regarding conflict of interest difficulties faced by counsel. 22 Evidence of nonfeasance and mishandling of certain aspects of the case and the lawyer-client relationship also exists. The record indicates that Welch failed to give the class adequate notice and opportunity to object to the settlement he procured for them in 1995. 8 See Kincade v. GeneralTire & Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501, 507 (5th Cir. 1981) (notice and opportunity to object to settlement required for Rule 23(b)(2) classes). 23 Welch's relationship with members of the subclass deteriorated over time, particularly after the motions for intervention and substitution were filed. For example, Welch disclosed confidential communications from a class member in the public record. While Welch argues that he was entitled to disclose communications relevant to a claim against him, a motion for substitution does not constitute a classical claim against an attorney as would a malpractice suit. In addition, Welch apparently made no effort to redact the letter or limit it to in camera review. See MISS. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) and Cmt. (1999) (where disclosure is authorized to defend against a claim or assertion of wrongdoing, the lawyer must make every effort practicable to avoid unnecessary disclosure of information relating to a representation, to limit disclosure to those having the need to know it, and to obtain protective orders or make other arrangements minimizing the risk of disclosure); Flowers v. State, 601 So.2d 828, 832 (Miss. 1992)(lawyer may not reveal confidential communications without client's consent); Singleton v. Stegall, 580 So.2d 1242, 1245 (Miss. 1991) (lawyer owes duty of confidentiality to her client). 24 Welch also described the subclass in the national press as being manipulative. He was further quoted as saying that he had no sympathy for them and that they used their HIV status to garner the sympathy of the public. During the hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction prepared by NPP attorneys and joined by him, Welch appeared to take MDOC's side, conducting a cross-examination style interrogation of plaintiffs' expert witness. Such behavior undermines both an attorney's credibility with his clients and the chances of a successful motion. 25 Welch argues that the denial of substitution was not an abuse of discretion because the presumption of adequate representation identified in Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 1005 (5th Cir. 1996) was not overcome. We note, however, that the burden of showing that the presumption of adequacy should be overcome is minimal, id., and the facts noted above do overcome such a presumption as regards Welch's representation of this particular subclass. Welch's arguments regarding the adequacy of his representation essentially demonstrate his belief that a cooperative rather than combative style of advocacy is preferable in this case. We in no way disagree with the proposition that a cooperative style can accomplish more in some circumstances than an overly hostile and aggressive one. 9 However, Welch's actions, the constraints inherent in his situation, and the deteriorated state of his relationship with his clients necessitate his substitution as counsel.