Opinion ID: 4126188
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Accident Theory of the Case

Text: Part of trial counsel's strategy was to present the theory that Stone did not intend to shoot and kill Sergeant Kubala. PCR counsel stated in their brief: It is important at the outset to note that Stone does not take issue with trial counsel's basic strategy. It was a plausible defense (in fact it was the only plausible defense), it was advocated by their client, and it was consistent with the evidence and Stone's statements to law enforcement. However, Stone argues trial counsel failed to properly implement the strategy because they did not thoroughly investigate and present evidence supporting the accidental shooting theory. We disagree.
As part of their investigation, trial counsel retained Don Girndt, a former agent of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) with expertise in firearms. Girndt examined the murder weapon and visited the crime scene. Girndt informed trial counsel it was impossible to determine whether the shooting was accidental or intentional. Rather than put Girndt on the stand to testify, trial counsel chose to elicit facts that supported the accident theory through cross examination. Girndt assisted trial counsel by sitting with trial counsel during the State's presentation of evidence and offering advice on how to effectively cross examine the State's witnesses, including firearms expert Ira Parnell—also a former SLED agent. During cross examination, Parnell admitted the trigger pull on [Stone's pistol] was very light. Trial counsel also asked Parnell, One final thing. [Stone's pistol] being a target gun set up with very light trigger pull, the play in the trigger was very slight as opposed to a gun with a heavy pull; isn't that right? Parnell responded, That's true. Trial counsel also elicited facts supporting the accident theory on cross examination of other witnesses. Deputy John Prince testified he arrived at the scene within probably two minutes at the most and the left side of the house where Sergeant Kubala was found [was] completely dark. Ray MacKessy, the State's crime scene technician, testified the porch wall was boarded up in a way that made it difficult for Stone to see someone approaching the porch. The only facts PCR counsel argues trial counsel should have presented regarding the accident theory—but did not present—related to the trajectory of the bullets. As PCR counsel argues, this evidence indicates Stone shot from waist level. However, the fact Stone shot from the waist does not support the theory he shot accidentally. At the PCR trial, PCR counsel presented the testimony of Wayne Hill—an expert in homicide reconstruction. Hill testified the trajectory of the bullets upward from Stone's waist striking Sergeant Kubala in the neck and ear are more consistent with somebody who is doing what's called cowboy action shooting, whereas you would know from the Western shooting from the hip. We find it difficult to imagine three accidental shots fired from the hip upward to the height of another man's head. Trial counsel was wise not to present this evidence. During closing, trial counsel used these facts—not including that Stone shot from the hip—to argue the accident theory of the case. Specifically, trial counsel argued the State failed to meet its burden as to the malice element of murder because Sergeant Kubala simply surprised Stone, who—in his drunken state—turned and accidentally shot Kubala. Trial counsel stated, The little porch is boarded up to an elevation that was . . . taller than Sergeant Kubala. . . . If Sergeant Kubala is walking right next to the house, how is Bobby Stone going to see him? How was Bobby Stone going to hear him if Bobby Stone is knocking on the door? Trial counsel continued, He's in the dark and suddenly he is startled by a voice. And he turns and as he told you in his statement, the hair trigger done again went off. Apparently three shots. We find trial counsel's approach to the accident theory in general, and hiring of Girndt in particular, was reasonable. First, trial counsel's investigation of the accident theory is consistent with the ABA Guidelines. Guideline 11.4.1—which relates to counsel's investigation of the case—states, Counsel should conduct independent investigations relating to the guilt/innocence phase and to the penalty phase of a capital trial. Both investigations should begin immediately upon counsel's entry into the case and should be pursued expeditiously. ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 11.4.1.A (1989).8 Regarding the use of expert witnesses, section 7 of Guideline 11.4.1 provides, Counsel should secure the assistance of experts where it is necessary or appropriate for: (A) preparation of the defense; (B) adequate understanding of the prosecution's case; (C) rebuttal of any portion of the prosecution's case at the guilt/innocence phase or the sentencing phase of the trial; (D) presentation of mitigation. ABA Guidelines 11.4.1.7. Trial counsel's investigation of the accident theory began with hiring Girndt, an expert. Girndt provided valuable assistance to trial counsel by examining the evidence, informing trial counsel of his opinion, and advising trial counsel how to effectively cross examine the State's witnesses. The PCR court found trial counsel was not deficient in their investigation. We find ample evidence to support this finding. Stone does not argue trial counsel should have called Girndt to testify. In light of Girndt's opinion that he could not say the shooting was accidental, trial counsel's decision not to present his testimony to the jury was clearly reasonable. Stone argues, however, trial counsel should have found another expert—one who would testify the shooting was an accident. The PCR court found trial counsel was reasonable in making the decision not to pursue another expert. The evidence supports this finding, and we agree. The prevailing norms that guide our judgment as to whether counsel's performance was reasonable do not require counsel to pursue a second expert after a qualified expert has given an adverse opinion. See Poyner v. Murray, 964 F.2d 1404, 1419 (4th Cir. 1992) (The mere 8 During Stone's 1997 trial, the applicable version the ABA Guidelines was the 1989 version. fact counsel did not shop around for a psychiatrist willing to testify to the presence of more elaborate or grave psychological disorders simply does not constitute ineffective assistance.); Pruett v. Thompson, 996 F.2d 1560, 1574 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding counsel was not ineffective for failing to further investigate a theory after counsel had good cause to believe the theory was incredible). After trial counsel learned Girndt was unable to give an opinion that supported the accident theory, trial counsel's decision not to seek an expert with a different opinion was reasonable. Moreover, Stone did not demonstrate the availability of such a witness. PCR counsel presented Hill and Dr. Merikangas at the PCR trial to support the accident theory. Hill's only testimony favorable to the accident theory was that there was no physical evidence contradicting Stone's version of what happened. We find Hill's opinion to be no more favorable to Stone than Girndt's opinion. In fact, Hill's opinion did not withstand cross examination at the PCR trial. First, Hill admitted the facts and circumstances do not exclude the possibility that Stone intentionally aimed and fired the gun. Second, Hill admitted it would take three separate trigger pulls to fire the semi-automatic pistol three times. Trial counsel would prefer not to see these key admissions from his own expert. We likewise find Dr. Merikangas—a neurologist and psychiatrist—to be unconvincing on the accident theory. The weakness of Hill and Merikangas's testimony underscores the reasonableness of trial counsel's decision not to use Girndt or an expert similar to Hill at trial. We find Stone did not prove trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness in investigating or presenting evidence to support the accident theory of the case.
Stone also argues trial counsel failed to properly support the accident theory in the 2005 resentencing proceeding. The PCR court found trial counsel's performance in this respect was reasonable. The evidence supports the finding. At the time of the resentencing proceeding, Girndt was still unable to testify the shooting was accidental. Trial counsel once again decided to use cross examination to establish the few facts that supported the accident theory, and he once again argued those facts in closing. We find trial counsel fulfilled his obligation to thoroughly investigate and present evidence of the accident theory of the case.