Opinion ID: 616819
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Morgan's Strickland Claim

Text: Morgan also contends that he was deprived of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). According to Morgan, his counsel failed to perform the research and investigation necessary to assert a mental state defensevoluntary intoxication and an unreasonable belief of self-defenseat the guilt phase of his trial. Morgan also claims that his counsel was ineffective as a result of being absent during portions of his trial. These absences, according to Morgan, require a presumption of prejudice under Cronic, or, alternatively, under Strickland. Lastly, Morgan argues that he suffered overall prejudice from his counsel's deficient performance. We find that Morgan is not entitled to habeas relief on any of these grounds. To prevail under Strickland, Morgan must demonstrate that his counsel, Wolf Levin, provided deficient assistance and that there was prejudice as a result. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. To establish deficient performance, Morgan must show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. To establish prejudice, Morgan must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. It is not enough to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Id. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Counsel's errors must be so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable. Id. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Surmounting Strickland 's high bar is never an easy task. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010). And establishing on habeas review that a state court unreasonably applied Strickland under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult. Harrington v. Richter, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). We need not consider the first prong of the Strickland test if we find that counsel's alleged deficiency did not prejudice the defendant. Matheney v. Anderson, 253 F.3d 1025, 1042 (7th Cir.2001). As the Court noted in Strickland, [i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed. 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052. We heed this advice and now explain why the Illinois Supreme Court did not err under § 2254(d) when it determined that Morgan's claim fails because he suffered no prejudice under Strickland. First, the court correctly identified the Strickland standard and then, under the prejudice prong of Strickland, considered each mental state defense that Morgan argued should have been presented. Second, after its analysis, the state court concluded that, because none of Morgan's proposed defenses would have been successful, he was not prejudiced by a failure to investigate and present those defenses. The court recognized that although voluntary intoxication is normally not a defense to the commission of a crime, evidence that the intoxication was so extreme as to suspend the power of reason may be used to negate the existence of the mental state which is an element of the crime. Considering evidence of Morgan's mental impairments and affidavits from Gregson and Prater, the court found that nowhere in the affidavits relied upon by defendant is there evidence that defendant's purported intoxication was so severe that he could not form the requisite intent to support a first degree murder conviction. The court also concluded that there is no reasonable likelihood that testimony that defendant was intoxicated at the time of the murders would have successfully established the defense of voluntary intoxication. Based on the state court's findings, we cannot say that it was unreasonable for the Illinois Supreme Court to conclude that Morgan failed to show a reasonable probability of a different result. After rejecting the intoxication defense, the Illinois Supreme Court evaluated Morgan's likelihood of success if he had argued that he acted on a belief of self-defense. The court rejected this argument as well, finding that Morgan failed to make a substantial showing that there is a reasonable likelihood that the result of his trial would have been different had be put on that defense. Again, the Illinois Supreme Court correctly cited and articulated Strickland 's standard and properly considered Morgan's proposed self-defense claim under its prejudice prong. After citing the requirements for a self-defense claim in Illinois, the court concluded that Morgan's claim was barred as a matter of law because Morgan could not demonstrate that either victim used unlawful force against Morgan. In fact, the court concluded that the evidence overwhelmingly established that Morgan was the aggressor. Therefore, the court's conclusion that, had Morgan presented a self-defense claim, there is no substantial likelihood that his trial result would have been different and was not based on an unreasonable application of Strickland. For the same reasons, the Illinois Supreme Court applied Strickland in holding that Morgan was not prejudiced by the absence of a voluntary manslaughter jury instruction. Morgan's assertion that the Illinois Supreme Court unreasonably determined that he was the initial aggressor also fails. As the Illinois Supreme Court was clear to point out, there is no evidence of record that, at the time of the shootings, either Merkson or Motley made any threats of use of unlawful force against defendant that would lead a person to reasonably believe that there was an imminent danger of death or great bodily harm that required the use of deadly force in self-defense. In determining that Morgan was the initial aggressor, the court cited that the evidence demonstrates that Motley was shot while sitting on the couch making phone calls; Merkson was shot in the back of the head after Morgan asked him to kneel on the floor; and that at the time of Merkson's shooting, Morgan was armed with a shotgun and Motley's handgun. Given the strength of that evidence, it was certainly not against the clear weight of the evidence to conclude that Morgan was the aggressor. Morgan next argues that we should not apply the Strickland test but, instead, apply the standard set forth in United States v. Cronic because his attorney was absent during the following critical states of his trial: part of voir dire, opening statements, arguments on the admissibility of evidence, and the examination of seven state witnesses. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). These absences, Morgan argues, require a presumption of prejudice. We do not agree and find that the Strickland test governs Morgan's claim. Again, to find an error under the contrary to clause of § 2254(d)(1), the Illinois Supreme Court must have applie[d] a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases. Calloway, 512 F.3d at 943. The Supreme Court has consistently limited the presumption of prejudice to cases where counsel is physically absent at a critical stage. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988) (applying Cronic where defense counsel erroneously moved to dismiss any appeal leaving the petitioner completely without representation during the appeals court's actual decisional process); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60, 83 S.Ct. 1050, 10 L.Ed.2d 193 (1963) (presuming prejudice where defendant pleaded guilty at a preliminary hearing before he was appointed counsel); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54-55, 82 S.Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114, (1961) (presuming prejudice where defendant was completely without counsel when he pleaded guilty to a capital charge and irrevocably waived other pleas); see also Siverson v. O'Leary, 764 F.2d 1208, 1217 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying a presumption of prejudice where the defendant's trial counsel was absent during jury deliberations and at the return of the verdicts). Here, a counsel was physically present at all stages of the litigationLevin's co-counsel, Steven Decker represented Morgan in Levin's absenceand therefore, we cannot conclude that Morgan was denied counsel at critical stages of trial. The Illinois Supreme Court's determination to apply Strickland, instead of presuming prejudice under Cronic, was not contrary to clearly established federal law. The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that Morgan did not suffer prejudice per Strickland as a result of Levin's absences. The record shows that, during the trial, Levin served as Morgan's primary counsel, conducted the direct examination of two of the three defense witnesses, cross-examined the State's two key eyewitness, and delivered the closing argument. In Levin's absence, Decker conducted jury selection, delivered the opening argument, conducted the direct examination of one defense witness, and cross-examined several State witnesses. In doing so, Decker advanced the defense's theory of the casethat the State could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Morgan had committed the crimes for which he was charged. The Illinois Supreme Court determined that there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of Morgan's trial would have been different had Levin not been absent. This conclusion was not against the clear and convincing weight of the evidence; rather, the court reasonably concluded that Decker competently filled in for Levin, and that consequently, Morgan was not prejudiced. Since Morgan has not demonstrated any prejudice under his ineffective assistance claim, his claim for overall prejudice fails. See Alvarez v. Boyd, 225 F.3d 820, 825 (7th Cir.2000) (petitioner could not prevail on his cumulative effect argument because he failed to show that there was even a single error, much less two). In sum, Morgan is not entitled to habeas relief on the basis of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.