Opinion ID: 731006
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Initial Traffic Stop Was Properly Supported by Probable Cause.

Text: 32 Appellant argues that the actions of Officers Kula and Cooper were unlawful because the officers did not have a reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop. 7 Appellant claims the inconsistencies in the testimony of the two officers, combined with Officer Kula's allegedly disingenuous testimony, indicate that there was no reasonable suspicion for the stop. In particular, Appellant points to the discrepancies in the officer's testimony regarding the lighting, timing, and location of the stop. Further, Appellant claims that the writing on the drive-out tag was too small to have been observed by Officer Kula. The Government contends that the findings of the District Court were fully supported by the evidence. 33 In finding that Officer Kula did see the altered drive-out tag, the District Court addressed only the question of lighting. 8 The District Court stated that the discrepancies regarding the lighting conditions were likely the result of misunderstood questions at the initial hearing. 9 The District Court also noted that there was artificial lighting present at the point of the stop, and that Officer Kula's actions following the stop corroborate the claim that he observed the altered drive-out tag from his car. 10 34 The District Court's findings of fact should be upheld because they are not clearly erroneous. The Court accepted the testimony of the two officers and also articulated plausible explanations for any apparent inconsistencies in the testimony concerning the lighting conditions. The Court also implicitly found that any other factors, such as the exact time or location of the stop, were not relevant because they did not affect Officer Kula's ability to view the drive-out tag from his car. 11 Because the District Court was in the best position to judge credibility, and because that Court plausibly resolved the discrepancies in the testimony, its findings of fact should not be disturbed. 35 In light of these factual findings, it is clear that the initial stop of Appellant's vehicle was proper. This Court has held that so long as the officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred or was occurring, the resultant stop is not unlawful and does not violate the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 391 (6th Cir.1993). The probable cause determination turns on what the officer knew at the time he made the stop. Id. at 391 (emphasis in original). Under Ferguson, the focus in traffic stop cases is whether this particular officer in fact had probable cause to believe that a traffic offense had occurred, regardless of whether this was the only basis or merely one basis for the stop. 8 F.3d at 391 (emphasis added). 12 36 In the instant matter, the District Court found, and we have now affirmed, that Officer Kula did in fact view the altered drive-out tag from his vehicle before he stopped Appellant. Thus, Officer Kula's view of the altered drive-out tag provided probable cause for stopping Appellant's vehicle pursuant to a traffic violation. Consequently, the stop, the subsequent detention in the squad car, the plain view search of Appellant's vehicle, and the resulting arrest were all lawful and well within Ferguson. 13 37 C. Placing Appellant in The Police Car and Performing a Plain View Search of His Vehicle Fell Within The Scope of a Traffic Stop. 38 The U.S. Supreme Court has articulated two requirements for a valid plain view search: (1) the incriminating nature of the item in plain view must be immediately apparent, and (2) the officer must be lawfully located in a position from which he or she can plainly see the item and have lawful access to it. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2307-08, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990). The officer need not come across the seized item inadvertently. Id. at 130-31, 110 S.Ct. at 2304-05. Additionally, in a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court has stated that a motorist has no legitimate expectation of privacy shielding that portion of the interior of an automobile which may be viewed from outside the vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1542, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (citations omitted). 39 The District Court held that Officer Cooper satisfied the Horton requirements with respect to both the marijuana and the handgun found in the passenger compartment of Appellant's vehicle. Therefore, the Court concluded that the seizure of the marijuana and the handgun were valid plain view seizures . 14 40 Appellant asserts only one challenge to the plain view search of his vehicle. He claims that his detention in the police car amounted to an arrest without probable cause, and that Officer Cooper, therefore, did not lawfully arrive at a position from which the items in Appellant's car could be viewed lawfully. 15 He believes the confiscated items are fruits of an unlawful arrest and should be excluded. The Government argues that a person detained in a police car is not necessarily arrested for Fourth Amendment purposes. 41 Detention in a police car does not automatically constitute an arrest. See e.g., United States v. Parr, 843 F.2d 1228, 1230 (9th Cir.1988) (finding no per se rule that detention in a police car is tantamount to an arrest); United States v. Thompson, 597 F.2d 187, 189-90 (9th Cir.1979) (motorist's committing traffic infractions and his inability to produce identification at the subsequent traffic stop justified his detention in a police car while an identification search took place) 16 ; United States v. Rodriguez, 831 F.2d 162, 166 (7th Cir.1987) (detention in patrol car for several minutes is merely a normal part of police procedure for identifying delinquent drivers and does not constitute a custodial arrest). 17 42 Nevertheless, it is true that detention in a police car may rise to the level of an arrest under some circumstances. For example, in United States v. Mesa, 62 F.3d 159, 162 (6th Cir.1995), we found that a motorist could not be lawfully detained in a police car once the purposes of the initial traffic stop were completed. 18 43 Thus, the question becomes whether this detention 19 exceeded the purpose and objective of the stop. We find it did not. Officer Kula began to write a traffic citation when the radio checks came back negative. It was during this time that Officer Cooper discovered the marijuana and the handgun, thereafter presenting them both to Officer Kula. Based upon these facts, the initial detention of Appellant in the police car clearly did not exceed the scope of the traffic stop. Officer Kula could lawfully detain Appellant until he finished performing the radio checks and issuing the citation; this would be well within the bounds of the initial stop. 44 When the marijuana and the handgun were found in the vehicle passenger compartment and brought to Officer Kula's attention during Appellant's initial detention in the squad car, this clearly provided probable cause for further detention and the resulting arrest. Therefore, Mesa 's requirement that some additional suspicious activity is necessary to justify further detention beyond the scope of the original stop is met here. 45 In sum, because Appellant's detention in Officer Kula's police car was a legitimate exercise of valid routine police procedure, and because he was not detained for a period of time exceeding the purposes of the initial stop, all evidence in plain view within Appellant's car was lawfully seized.D. Seizure of The Crack Cocaine. 46 Having found that: (1) Appellant was lawfully stopped; (2) Appellant was lawfully detained in the police car; and (3) Officer Cooper's plain view search was valid, it follows that the subsequent arrest and search of Appellant were also valid. 20 47 It is well-settled that law enforcement officers are permitted to search an arrestee's person incident to an arrest. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S.Ct. 467, 476-77, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). In this instance, the search of Appellant revealed a hard substance located near the groin area of Appellant's pants. Before the officers could handcuff Appellant and determine what the object was, Appellant fled, and while fleeing, discarded the pill bottles. Appellant's unlawful flight does not allow him to abandon that which the officers would have otherwise lawfully seized from him. United States v. McLaughlin, 525 F.2d 517, 519-20 (9th Cir.1975) (seizure of abandoned marijuana lawful where defendant threw it from his truck while fleeing drug enforcement officers); United States v. Wider, 951 F.2d 1283, 1286 (D.C.Cir.1991) (search of bag containing cocaine rocks lawful where the appellant abandoned the bag by leaving it behind in a public place). See also, California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 1551-52, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (seizure of abandoned cocaine rock lawful where the defendant disposed of it while fleeing from police on foot). Therefore, the subsequent seizure of the discarded pill bottles containing crack cocaine was permissible. 48 E. Acceptance of Responsibility. 49 Lastly, we turn to Appellant's argument that he is entitled to a two point reduction in his federal criminal sentencing guidelines. As stated above, Appellant was convicted on two of the four counts in the Superseding Indictment: Count 3, being a felon in possession of a firearm, pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e); and Count 4, a violation of the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3146. Appellant was sentenced to 300 months on Count 3 and 27 consecutive months on Count 4, followed by three years of supervised release. 50 Prior to trial, Appellant failed to appear for arraignment and his bond was revoked. As discussed earlier, Appellant was finally located when the Trident Task Force received information indicating that Appellant was located at an apartment complex. Upon entering the specified apartment, the Task Force officers noticed that Appellant had created a hole in a bathroom wall and had escaped to the next-door apartment. Apparently, Appellant thereafter obtained a knife, which he held to the neck of one of the residents. Appellant was eventually apprehended in the next-door apartment and placed in custody. Thus, he made his initial appearance nearly 2 years after the date originally scheduled for his arraignment. 51 At the sentencing hearing, the District Court found that while Appellant was fleeing from the officers, he used a knife. According to the Court, Appellant's use of the knife recklessly endangered the occupants of the next-door apartment to which he had fled. Because the District Court found reckless endangerment, it denied Appellant a sentence reduction for Acceptance of Responsibility. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. In fact, the Court found that because of these circumstances, Appellant's sentence should be enhanced for Obstruction of Justice. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Nevertheless, Appellant claims that the denial of his Acceptance of Responsibility credit was improper because the District Court only considered the characteristics of Appellant's offenses, without due consideration being given to his acceptance of responsibility at trial. 21 52 The United States Sentencing Guidelines dictate that several factors should be taken into consideration in Acceptance of Responsibility claims. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. The relevant factors in this case are the following: 53
54
55
56 U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 (Commentary). Furthermore, the Guidelines indicate that conduct resulting in an enhancement for Obstruction of Justice under § 3C1.1 ordinarily indicates that a defendant has not accepted responsibility for his conduct. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. 57 Appellant's argument that the District Court did not sufficiently consider his admissions at trial might be valid if the Guidelines only took into consideration express admissions of responsibility at any point in time. This approach, however, is simply not the case. The Guidelines indicate that courts should weigh the totality of a defendant's conduct beginning at the commission of his offense, of which any admission of guilt is one factor. 58 Although Appellant admitted to some of the conduct underlying his charged crime in his trial testimony, he did not terminate his criminal conduct, and he did not voluntarily surrender to authorities in a prompt fashion. 22 Additionally, the Guidelines reflect that a sentence enhancement for Obstruction of Justice is inherently incompatible with a reduction for Acceptance of Responsibility. See, U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1; § 3E1.1. 59 On review, the determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great deference. United States v. Wilson, 878 F.2d 921, 923 (6th Cir.1989); see also U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, Commentary, Application Note 5. The determination of whether Appellant has accepted responsibility is a finding of fact, and enjoys the clearly erroneous standard of review. United States v. Lassiter, 929 F.2d 267, 270 (6th Cir.1991). Given this deferential standard of review, and considering the factors stated in the Sentencing Guidelines, we affirm the District Court's denial of the Acceptance of Responsibility.