Opinion ID: 553843
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Challenges to Obstruction of Criminal Investigation Counts

Text: 30 Coiro asserts that the two obstruction of investigation counts, based on his participation in the concocting of the false story for Debany (Count Seven) and Dellentash (Count Eight) to tell the investigators, fail to charge cognizable offenses under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1510(a) and are multiplicitous, since they charge the same conduct. The government argues that such challenges to a potential defect in the indictment should have been made before trial and that, since they were not, Coiro has waived his claim. Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(2); 12(f). But neither the nature of Coiro's conduct nor the fact that Counts Seven and Eight charge the same conduct was evident from the face of the indictment. This could only be known upon the receipt of evidence that Coiro on a single occasion on May 7, 1982 reviewed false stories to be given to the investigators with Ruggiero, Carneglia, Gotti, Debany, and Dellentash, until Coiro approved the one that would be used. Further, we find that the two issues, which go to whether the conduct proved is punishable under the statute charged, are cognizable on appeal under the plain error doctrine, even though Coiro failed to raise them post-trial. See United States v. DiGeronimo, 598 F.2d 746, 752 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S.Ct. 180, 62 L.Ed.2d 117 (1979). 31 Coiro first argues that the two investigation obstruction counts, based on his participation in the concocting of the false story for Dellentash and Debany to tell the investigators, fail to charge cognizable offenses under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1510(a). 32 When the relevant conduct occurred, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1510(a), in pertinent part, punished: 33 Whoever willfully endeavors by means of bribery, misrepresentation, intimidation, or force or threats thereof to obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication of information relating to a violation of any criminal statute of the United States by any person to a criminal investigator.... 34 See Pub.L. 90-123, Sec. 1(a), Nov. 3, 1967, 81 Stat. 362. 1 35 Coiro argues that Sec. 1510(a) does not apply where the person who endeavors to obstruct the communication of information does so through an accomplice who agrees to lie to the investigator. He is incorrect. Section 1510 is violated whenever an individual induces or attempts to induce another person to make a material misrepresentation to a criminal investigator. United States v. St. Clair, 552 F.2d 57, 58 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 909, 97 S.Ct. 2976, 53 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1977). See also United States v. Daly, 842 F.2d 1380, 1392 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Giardina v. United States, 488 U.S. 821, 109 S.Ct. 66, 102 L.Ed.2d 43 (1988); United States v. Fitterer, 710 F.2d 1328, 1330-31 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 852, 104 S.Ct. 165, 78 L.Ed.2d 150 (1983). 36 Coiro's argument is supported by the Fifth Circuit's holding in United States v. Cameron, 460 F.2d 1394, 1400-02 (5th Cir.1972). But we have already rejected in St. Clair the reading of the legislative history followed in Cameron and, at least to the extent that Cameron purports to require that the misrepresentations be made to the one who communicates with the investigator, instead of solely to the investigator, we decline to follow it. See United States v. Fitterer. Thus, it was not error to charge Coiro with a violation of Sec. 1510(a) based on his conduct on May 7, 1982. 37 Coiro also attacks the two Sec. 1510 counts, Seven and Eight, because they derive from a single meeting where the story was constructed and transmitted simultaneously to Debany and Dellentash. He argues that the two counts charge the same conduct and are therefore multiplicitous, so that one of them must be vacated. The government admits that the interfering with Debany and Dellentash occurred in a single incident, but responds that it seems likely that Congress intended to make the tampering of each witness a separate offense. 38 The relevant inquiry in determining the unit of prosecution under a criminal statute is what Congress intended. When Congress has the will [to define a particular offense] it has no difficulty in expressing it.... Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83, 75 S.Ct. 620, 622, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955). In conducting the inquiry, we are informed by the rule of lenity, which dictates that in cases of ambiguity or doubt as to Congressional intent, only one offense may be charged. See Bell, 349 U.S. at 83, 75 S.Ct. at 622; United States v. Johnpoll, 739 F.2d 702, 715 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1075, 105 S.Ct. 571, 83 L.Ed.2d 511 (1984), reh'g denied, 469 U.S. 1197, 105 S.Ct. 982, 83 L.Ed.2d 983 (1985); United States v. Pelusio, 725 F.2d 161, 169 (2d Cir.1983); see also United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347, 92 S.Ct. 515, 522, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971) (rule supports two policies: (1) giving of fair warning to the world at large, and (2) leaving the definition of crimes within the province of the legislature, rather than the judiciary). 39 Here, neither the language of the statute nor the legislative history yields a clear answer as to what Congress intended as the unit of prosecution under Sec. 1510. Section 1510 does refer to the individuals whose communication is obstructed. The statute prohibits interference with communication by any person to a criminal investigator. The government argues this language must be read as an indication that Congress meant to make each individual interfered with the subject of a separate count under the statute. Obstructing both Debany and Dellentash from communicating information to the criminal investigator would thus constitute two Sec. 1510 violations, although Coiro accomplished this in a single endeavor. 40 We disagree with the government's reading of the statute. The modification of person by the word any makes that phrase ambiguous. In cases in this and other circuits, the word any has typically been found ambiguous in connection with the allowable unit of prosecution, for it contemplates the plural, rather than specifying the singular. United States v. Kinsley, 518 F.2d 665, 668 (8th Cir.1975) (possession of any firearm under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1202(a) ambiguous on whether unit of prosecution is single firearm); see Bell v. United States, supra (knowing transport of any woman or girl ambiguous as to whether unit of prosecution is single female); United States v. Rivera Ramos, 856 F.2d 420, 422 (1st Cir.1988), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 118, 107 L.Ed.2d 79 (1989) (finding unit of prosecution in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 111, which proscribes assault of any [federal officer] to be number of acts, rather than number of officers); United States v. Pelusio, 725 F.2d at 168 (statutory proscription of receipt of any firearm or ammunition by felon found ambiguous); cf. Sanders v. United States, 441 F.2d 412, 414 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 846, 92 S.Ct. 147, 30 L.Ed.2d 82 (1971) (under 26 U.S.C. Sec. 5861, which proscribes possession of a [unregistered] firearm, unit of prosecution is each firearm). 41 Further, Sec. 1510 speaks in terms of the act of obstructing, as well as the number of potential sources of information. Its language proscribes an endeavor to obstruct the communication of information. Under this reading, the single incident in which Coiro spoke to both Debany and Dellentash would be but a single statutory violation. 42 The legislative history does not clarify the ambiguity in the statutory language. The government quotes the House Report accompanying the bill, see H.R.Rep. No. 658, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1967 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1760, 1761, for the proposition that the unit of prosecution is the number of individuals tampered with. The Report states, It is our intention that the [statute cover the] actual procurement by a party of another party's misrepresentation.... (emphasis added), but the thrust of the sentence is to avoid a construction that would confine the misrepresentation to the person obstructing, and not to define the unit of prosecution. See United States v. St. Clair, supra. Elsewhere in the House Report, an analysis of the bill is offered which emphasizes the conduct of the individual, e.g., obstructing the communication of information to an investigator, rather than the number of sources of information tampered with. 43 [The proposed legislation] would prohibit willful attempts, by means of bribery, misrepresentation, intimidation ... to obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication to a Federal criminal investigator of information relating to a violation of a Federal criminal law. The subsection would also prohibit injuring any person ... on account of his communicating such information. 44 1967 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News at 1763 (emphasis added). The Senate Report accompanying the bill contains the identical language. See S.Rep. No. 307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2. 45 We find that Congress has not explicitly defined the unit of prosecution under Sec. 1510, either in the statute itself or in the legislative history accompanying the statute. Accordingly, the rule of lenity is applicable, and one of the two counts charging the Sec. 1510 violation as to Debany and Dellentash must be vacated. This is true, even though Coiro's sentences on the two counts were concurrent. A defendant suffers consequences of conviction apart than the sentence actually served. Such collateral consequences may include enhanced penalties under a recidivist statute, the future use of the conviction for impeachment of credibility, and the social stigma resulting from conviction. The second conviction is unauthorized punishment for the same offense, and must be vacated. Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 865, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 1673, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985). Following Ball, we remand the two convictions to the district court for obstruction of a criminal investigation with instructions to have the District Court exercise its discretion to vacate one of the[m]. 470 U.S. at 865, 105 S.Ct. at 1673. See also United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 904 n. 6 (2d Cir.1981).