Opinion ID: 2085062
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Challenges for Cause to Some Prospective Jurors

Text: A prospective juror must give an unequivocal assurance that he or she can be fair and impartial ( People v Johnson, 94 NY2d 600 [2000]). In People v Johnson this Court stated: Thus, from the statute [CPL 270.20] and case law, the guiding principles are perfectly plain: when potential jurors reveal knowledge or opinions reflecting a state of mind likely to preclude impartial service, they must in some form give unequivocal assurance that they can set aside any bias and render an impartial verdict based on the evidence. Obviously, when potential jurors themselves openly state that they doubt their own ability to be impartial in the case at hand, there is far more than a likelihood of bias, and an unequivocal assurance of impartiality must be elicited if they are to serve (94 NY2d at 614 [emphasis in original]). Thus, a trial court must excuse a prospective juror who displays a disqualifying state of mind unless the juror gives a clear and unambiguous assurance that he or she can be impartial. [T]he Trial Judge should require the prospective juror to `expressly state that his prior state of mind . .. will . . . not influence his verdict, and . . . that he will render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence' ( People v Johnson, 94 NY2d at 613, quoting People v Biondo, 41 NY2d 483, 485 [1977]). A general statement of impartiality that does not explicitly address the specific cause of the preexisting bias is not sufficient. Instead, jurors must clearly express that any prior experiences or opinions that reveal the potential for bias will not prevent them from reaching an impartial verdict. If there is any doubt about a prospective juror's impartiality, trial courts should err on the side of excusing the juror, since at worst the court will have `replaced one impartial juror with another' ( People v Arnold, 96 NY2d 358, 362 [2001]). Defendant argues that the trial court should have dismissed prospective juror No. 23 and should have rejected the People's cause challenge with respect to prospective juror No. 855. While recognizing that some of the initial answers given by those prospective jurors could arguably reflect on their ability to be impartial on the guilt phase, I join the Court in its conclusion that the potential lack of impartiality of these two prospective jurors affected their impartiality only as to the sentencing phase of the trial.