Opinion ID: 223161
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Sixth Amendment - Apprendi

Text: Romero argues that the district court’s reliance on his prior convictions to increase the presumptive maximum sentence for aggravated animal cruelty from 18 months to 36 months violates Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). There, the Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 490. “[T]he ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (emphasis omitted). We review de novo the issue of whether Romero’s sentence violates Apprendi. See United States v. Holyfield, 481 F.3d 1260, 1261 (10th Cir. 2007). Romero’s argument is a non-starter, as Apprendi clearly allows a judge to consider as fact a prior conviction when imposing an enhanced sentence. See United States v. Harris, 447 F.3d 1300, 1303, 1307 (10th Cir. 2006). Romero attempts to avoid this principle by asserting that the district court examined the qualitative nature of his prior convictions and found that they were extraordinary and aggravating. Further, he asserts that Colorado’s aggravating sentencing -4- statute requires facts beyond the defendant’s record of convictions. He is wrong on both counts. First, the district court did not address the nature of Romero’s prior felonies. Rather, the court simply noted the large number of felony convictions, stating, “[T]his is Mr. Romero’s 11th felony conviction. When you get to No. 11, you should assume that you are going to be given the maximum sentence regardless of the nature of the crime.” R., Vol. 2 at 52-53. Second, Colorado’s aggravated sentencing statute does not require a factual inquiry regarding prior convictions beyond the defendant’s record of convictions. Instead, it requires a sentence within the presumptive range, here 12-18 months, unless “extraordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances are present.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3- 401(6). A large number of prior convictions can constitute an extraordinary aggravating circumstance regardless of the nature of those offenses. See People v. Blessett, 155 P.3d 388, 397-98 (Colo. App. 2006). 3 3 To the extent Romero suggests that the district court aggravated his sentence based on the cruel nature of the instant offense and his post-arrest conduct, he misrepresents the record. The district court’s observation that this was a “particularly cruel” and “particularly shocking” offense, R., Vol. 2 at 55, was not made in the context of determining the maximum sentence, but rather, in the context of determining where in the sentencing range of 12-36 months to place Romero based on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553 factors. The same is true of the district court’s observation that Romero first attempted to avoid responsibility for the crime but then decided to plead guilty. This observation was not made in the context of deciding whether to apply an aggravated sentence. -5- Romero also claims that Colorado’s aggravated sentencing statute violates Apprendi because the statute requires the trial judge to find that an aggravated range sentence “better serves the purposes of this code with respect to sentencing,” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(6). But as noted by the Colorado Supreme Court, the statute “does not mandate a restricted or increased sentencing range based on judicial fact-finding.” Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713, 716 (Colo. 2005) (en banc). Indeed, when a judge exercises his or her discretion to consider an aggravated sentence based on the fact of a prior conviction, “[t]he sentencing judge then has full discretion to sentence within this widened range according to traditional sentencing considerations.” Id. Romero further contends that even if there is no constitutional error, remand is necessary because the district court failed to consider the purposes of sentencing when sentencing him within an aggravated range. Because Romero did not raise this argument at sentencing, we review only for plain error. See United States v. Steele, 603 F.3d 803, 808 (10th Cir. 2010). To succeed, Romero must demonstrate “(1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) which affects substantial rights, and (4) which seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. But Romero discusses none of these factors. Moreover, we note that the district court during sentencing did discuss sentencing purposes. See, e.g., R, Vol. 2 at 52-55. There is no plain error. -6-