Opinion ID: 2335616
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Other Bad Acts, Drug Use, and Hearsay

Text: The third issue is whether the Superior Court reversibly erred in admitting evidence of other bad acts, drug use, and hearsay. We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. But, where (as here) there is no timely objection to the evidence, the review is for plain error. [21] A plain error is one so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process. [22] Wilson first claims that references to his drug use should not have been admitted. The fact that Wilson and Wilkinson robbed the Speedy Mart to get money to buy drugs, and that Wilkinson received half an OxyContin pill as payment for the second robbery, were admitted into evidence through the testimony of Wilkinson and Officer Morrissey, and Wilkinson's videotaped confession. Defense counsel did not object to Wilkinson's and Officer Morrissey's testimony about Wilson's drug use. Defense counsel objected only to the admission into evidence of Wilkinson's videotaped confession. The trial court admitted the videotape into evidence, with the segment referencing other robberies redacted. The segment referencing Wilson's drug use was not redacted, because the trial court held that [i]t goes to motive and intent and reason for the robbery . . . [and is] 404(b) appropriate. D.R.E. 404(b) allows the admission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts for proving motive or intent [23] and in Getz v. State [24] this Court established guidelines for the admissibility of such evidence. Here, the Superior Court did not make a complete Getz analysis or give a limiting instruction. [25] That was error, but it was not plain error, because the evidence of drug use shown on the videotape was merely repetitive of other testimonynot objected to that the jury had already heard. Therefore, the error did not jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial. Wilson's second claim of error is that Officer Morrissey should not have been allowed to testify about Wilkinson's admission that he and Wilson committed other robberies. As explained above, defense counsel did not object when the officer testified on that subject, but he did object to the admission into evidence of Wilkinson's videotaped confession, wherein Wilkinson mentioned the other robberies. Here again, the Superior Court did not make a complete Getz analysis under D.R.E. 404(b). Nor did it give a curative instruction, although any mention of the other robberies was redacted from the videotape before the tape was played to the jury. In view of the other evidence against Wilson, the brief mention of the other robberiesby Officer Morrissey, not by Wilkinsondid not rise to the level of plain error. Wilson's third claim of error is that the two police officers who testified should not have been allowed to summarize statements made by Rabari and Wilkinson to the police, because that testimony was hearsay. Wilson's claim lacks merit because Rabari and Wilkinson's out-of-court statements were admissible under 11 Del. C. § 3507. That statute creates an exception to the hearsay rule in criminal cases where a declarant is present and subject to cross-examination. [26] Here, both Rabari and Wilkinson testified and were subject to cross-examination. Wilson has, therefore, failed to demonstrate plain error on this issue. Wilson's final claim is that Wilkinson's videotaped confession to the police should not have been admitted. Because Wilson fails to state why the videotape was not properly admitted under 11 Del. C. § 3507 or why its admission constituted plain error, this claim must also be rejected.