Opinion ID: 662244
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of the Three Motions for Mistrial

Text: 19 McCord asserts that the trial court erred in denying each of his three motions for a mistrial. 20 The district court's decision to deny a motion for a mistrial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Homick, 964 F.2d 899, 906 (9th Cir.1992); United States v. Segal, 852 F.2d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir.1988). In deciding whether to declare a mistrial, the district court should take all relevant circumstances into account rather than apply an abstract formula. United States v. Sommerstedt, 752 F.2d 1494, 1498 (9th Cir.) (citation omitted), amended, 760 F.2d 999, cert denied, 474 U.S. 851 (1985). Appropriate factors for a court to consider include: whether an error has occurred which is certain to result in reversal, see United States v. Bates, 917 F.2d 388, 395 (9th Cir.1990); whether testimony was allowed which unfairly prejudiced the defendant, Homick, 964 F.2d at 906; and whether an instruction to a jury can adequately repair any injury, Bates, 917 F.2d at 396. 2 The trial court's determination is given substantial deference on review. Id. at 394. Nevertheless, the reviewing court cannot condone irrational or irresponsible behavior by the trial judge. Id. at 395. 21 McCord's first motion for a mistrial concerned the prosecution's remarks in the opening statement that McCord's clients trusted him and that McCord broke that trust. McCord contends that this constituted a misstatement of the law requiring a mistrial because trust was not an element of any offense charged. 22 We hold that it was not an abuse of discretion to deny the mistrial. The jury was properly instructed that the opening statement contained only the prosecutor's idea of what the evidence would show, not actual evidence. The jury could not have been led to believe that trust was an element of the crime. Therefore, the trial court was well within its discretion when it denied the motion for a mistrial. 23 McCord's second motion concerned the statement of a prosecution expert witness concerning the extent of McCord's churning of client accounts. McCord claims that the statement was irrelevant and that it should have been excluded under a Rule 403 balancing of probative value and unfair prejudice. 24 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the second mistrial motion. Even assuming the motion was timely, which the government disputes, the questioning was proper. Expert witness testimony is intended to assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. Fed.R.Evid. 702. Churning is a technical concept suitable for expert testimony. See Shad v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 799 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir.1986). Here, the witness's statement that he had never seen churning to such an extent could have helped the jury to understand McCord's knowledge and intent to churn client accounts. Thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to declare a mistrial based on the disputed question and answer. 25 Finally, McCord made his third motion for a mistrial when the government asked a witness about his knowledge of one of McCord's client's health, after the parties had agreed not to raise the client's physical condition before the jury. McCord claims that these questions were not asked in good faith and that he was therefore deprived of a fair trial. McCord himself opened the door to questions concerning the client's health, however, and her physical condition was later explained to the jury by stipulation. Thus, McCord has no claim of unfair prejudice here or prosecutorial bad faith. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion for mistrial.