Opinion ID: 2976987
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jury instructions claim

Text: The district court determined that Gonzales had failed to preserve his federal constitutional challenge to the jury instructions given by the trial court because his arguments in state court were based solely upon state law. A habeas petitioner must exhaust “the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(1)(A). To fulfill this exhaustion requirement, a petitioner must fairly present the factual and legal basis for his claims in order to give state courts a full and fair opportunity to adjudicate such claims. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6-7 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). The Supreme Court has held that this requirement of fairly presenting a federal claim to state courts does not require extensive elaboration: A litigant wishing to raise a federal issue can easily indicate the federal law basis for his claim in a state-court petition or brief, for example, by citing in conjunction with the claim the federal source of law on which he relies or a case deciding such a claim on federal grounds, or by simply labeling the claim “federal.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004). The Supreme Court recently examined the specificity necessary to fairly present a federal claim to state courts when it reversed this Court’s decision in Dye v. Hofbauer, 111 F. App’x 363 (6th Cir. 2004). In Dye v. Hofbauer, 546 U.S. 1 (2005), the Court held that a petitioner fairly presented his federal claims when he argued in a state court brief 18 No. 06-4437 that he was denied due process of law and a fair trial, linked his argument to constitutional amendments, and cited federal cases. Id. at 3-4. In order to determine whether a claim has been fairly presented to state courts, this Court examines whether the petitioner presented his claim in one of four ways in state court: (1) rel[ying] upon federal cases employing constitutional analysis; (2) rel[ying] upon state cases employing federal constitutional analysis; (3) phrasing the claim in terms of constitutional law or in terms sufficiently particular to allege a denial of a specific constitutional right; or (4) alleging facts well within the mainstream of constitutional law. Whiting v. Burt, 395 F.3d 602, 613 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting McMeans v. Brigano, 228 F.3d 674, 681 (6th Cir.2000)). Applying this test to Gonzales’ case leads to the conclusion that Gonzales fairly presented his federal claims to the state courts. In his brief to the Ohio Court of Appeals, Gonzales stated: “The Sixth Amendment right to jury trial includes the right to a jury that is fairly and properly instructed. Cheek v. United States (1991), 498 U.S. 192, 111 S.Ct. 604.” (J.A. 930.) He then proceeded to argue that his right to a jury trial was denied. On the face of the brief, it is clear that Gonzales both relied “upon federal cases employing constitutional analysis” and phrased “the claim in terms of constitutional law.” Whiting, 395 F.3d at 613. The district court disregarded this portion of Gonzales’ brief, noting that the analysis of jury instructions conducted in Cheek was not relevant to the jury instructions at issue in this case. While the district court is correct that Cheek does not lend much support to Gonzales’ claim, this observation is largely beside the point. The Cheek court held that it was error for a trial court to instruct the jury to disregard evidence that could have been interpreted to negate the government’s 19 No. 06-4437 proof of an element of the crime charged and that such error raised serious Sixth Amendment concerns. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 203 (1991). Despite the weakness of his claim under this precedent, by citing Cheek, Gonzales made clear “the federal law basis for his claim,” Baldwin, 541 at 32, in this case the jury trial right embodied in the Sixth Amendment. See Fulcher v. Motley, 444 F.3d 791, 798 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that petitioner who discussed federal constitutional violations but “cited the wrong cases in support of his constitutional claim” fairly presented his federal claim). Because Gonzales fairly presented his jury instructions claim, this claim cannot be dismissed on exhaustion grounds. The State attempts to justify the district court’s determination that Gonzales’ Sixth Amendment jury instruction argument was not fairly presented to the state courts by citing Slaughter v. Parker, 450 F.3d 224 (6th Cir. 2006). In Slaughter this Court determined that a claim was not fairly presented where the petitioner made a general reference to the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments. Slaughter, 450 F.3d at 236. This Court found that one general reference to the Constitution was insufficient to fairly present a federal claim to state courts. Id. Although Slaughter is arguably inconsistent with the Supreme Court precedent discussed above, see id. at 251-52 (Cole, J., dissenting), Gonzales’ has fairly presented his claims to the state courts even under the strict interpretation of this requirement espoused by Slaughter. Gonzales’ presentation to the state appellate courts was more detailed than Slaughter’s inasmuch as Gonzales cited not only the constitutional amendment relevant to his claim, but also a federal case specifically addressing denial of the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. See Slaughter, 450 F.3d at 236 (distinguishing the Supreme Court’s decision in Dye from Slaughter’s case because Dye had “explicitly referenced four 20 No. 06-4437 federal cases, all of which addressed due process violations”); see also Scuba v. Brigano, 527 F.3d 479, 486 (6th Cir. 2007) (remarking that a federal issue is fairly presented where petitioner cites the applicable federal constitutional amendment and a case applying the constitutional principle at issue). As a result, Gonzales fairly presented his Sixth Amendment jury instructions argument to the state courts and has thus preserved this issue for review before this Court.
Gonzales claims that the trial court’s erroneous jury instructions deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Generally, the constitutionality of jury instructions is governed by the Due Process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991) (due process is violated where a defective instruction “infected the entire trial”). However, the Sixth Amendment is implicated if defective instructions remove from the jury’s consideration a necessary element of the prosecutor’s case. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 203. Gonzales has presented no proof that such a situation existed at his trial. Gonzales claims that the judge should not have given a complicity instruction and should have given Gonzales’ proposed instruction regarding the credibility of a co-defendant’s testimony. Gonzales does not claim that the judge’s instructions usurped the jury’s factfinding role in any way. Gonzales instead argues that the jury instructions violated Ohio law. These arguments are irrelevant to this Court’s analysis inasmuch as “the fact that the instruction[s] w[ere] allegedly incorrect under state law is not a basis for habeas relief.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991). Because there is no indication that the jury instructions given in this case violate federal constitutional law, Gonzales’ jury instructions claim lacks merit. 21 No. 06-4437