Opinion ID: 902256
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Improper Guidelines Calculations

Text: 6 Case: 12-14435 Date Filed: 06/13/2013 Page: 7 of 11 Krocka argues that the district court erred by not grouping together all of his convictions. He also argues that the district court erred by sentencing him using § 2B3.2, governing economic offenses, when the jury never made a finding that Krocka received any economic gain. “With respect to Sentencing Guidelines issues, this Court reviews purely legal questions de novo, a district court’s factual findings for clear error, and, in most cases, a district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts with due deference.” United States v. Garcia-Sandobal, 703 F.3d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). Under the law of the case doctrine, “[a]n appellate decision binds all subsequent proceedings in the same case not only as to explicit rulings, but also as to issues decided necessarily by implication on the prior appeal.” Tamayo, 80 F.3d at 1520. Moreover, [u]nder the law of the case doctrine, a legal decision made at one stage of the litigation, unchallenged in a subsequent appeal when the opportunity existed, becomes the law of the case for future stages of the same litigation, and the parties are deemed to have waived the right to challenge that decision at a later time. United States v. Escobar-Urrego, 110 F.3d 1556, 1560 (11th Cir. 1997). We have held that an issue is waived for purposes of a second appeal where the issue was never raised in the district court or on the defendant’s first appeal. United States v. Fiallo-Jacome, 874 F.2d 1479, 1481-83 (11th Cir. 1989). The district court and this Court are bound by the findings of fact and conclusions of law made in a prior 7 Case: 12-14435 Date Filed: 06/13/2013 Page: 8 of 11 appeal of the same case unless: “(1) a subsequent trial produces substantially different evidence, (2) controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of law applicable to that issue, or (3) the prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work manifest injustice.” United States v. Stinson, 97 F.3d 466, 469 (11th Cir. 1996). With respect to Krocka’s argument that the district court improperly grouped his convictions, we expressly rejected this argument in Krocka’s first appeal, concluding that it was “without merit.” See United States v. Krocka, No. 0911245, manuscript op. at 2 n.2 (11th Cir. April 28, 2010). As Krocka has not provided any basis for an exception to the law of the case doctrine, this conclusion is binding and Krocka is barred from re-litigating the issue in the present appeal. See Stinson, 97 F.3d at 469; see also Tamayo, 80 F.3d at 1520. Krocka’s argument that he was improperly sentenced pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2 is also barred by the law of the case doctrine because Krocka was sentenced pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2 during his first sentencing hearing and had the opportunity to raise this issue in his first appeal. As such, Krocka waived this argument for purposes of the present appeal. See Fiallo-Jacome, 874 F.2d at 148183. III. Condition on Imprisonment and Supervised Release 8 Case: 12-14435 Date Filed: 06/13/2013 Page: 9 of 11 Krocka argues that the district court’s imposition of the special condition prohibiting him from having contact with witnesses from his trial is unreasonable and, because it relates both to imprisonment and supervised release, it is overbroad. We generally review the imposition of special conditions on supervised release for abuse of discretion; however, objections not raised in the district court are reviewed for plain error. United States v. Moran, 573 F.3d 1132, 1137 (11th Cir. 2009). We have described that plain error review applies when parties do not raise objections clearly in the district court so as to put the district court on sufficient notice of the legal basis for the objection. See United States v. Massey, 443 F.3d 814, 818-19 (11th Cir. 2006). We have held that when a discrepancy exists between an orally imposed sentence and a written order of judgment, the oral sentence controls. United States v. Khoury, 901 F.2d 975, 977 (11th Cir. 1990). Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a), “the Bureau of Prisons . . . shall have charge of the management and regulation of all Federal penal and correctional institutions . . . [and] provide for the protection, instruction, and discipline of all persons charged with or convicted of offenses against the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a). Although the government argues that this issue should be reviewed for plain error, this argument is unavailing. The district court imposed the special condition of incarceration and supervised release after it had imposed Krocka’s sentences, 9 Case: 12-14435 Date Filed: 06/13/2013 Page: 10 of 11 and the district court did not ask Krocka if he had any objections to the newly imposed condition. Moreover, as the government correctly noted, there was a discrepancy between the oral judgment and written judgment, and five days after the resentencing hearing, Krocka filed a motion for clarification with regard to the condition prohibiting him from having contact with witnesses and requested that he be permitted to have continued contact with his sons, who were witnesses at his trial. In light of these circumstances, Krocka did raise his objection to the condition and made his grounds for the objection clear to the district court in his motion for clarification, and therefore, we will review the “no contact” condition for abuse of discretion. See Massey, 443 F.3d at 818-19. As noted above, there is a conflict between the district court’s oral pronouncement of the “no contact” condition, which the district court clearly intended to apply during both Krocka’s imprisonment term and supervised release, and the actual written judgment, which only makes the “no contact” condition a special condition of supervised release. Because of this discrepancy, the district court’s oral judgment controls. See Khoury, 901 F.2d at 977. As the government readily concedes, the district court’s oral judgment imposing a condition on both Krocka’s incarceration and supervised release was erroneous, as there is no statutory authority for the district court to impose such a condition on Krocka’s term of imprisonment. The district court abused its discretion in imposing such a 10 Case: 12-14435 Date Filed: 06/13/2013 Page: 11 of 11 condition because the Bureau of Prisons, and not the district court, controls the management and regulation of federal penal institutions and its inmates. See 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a). Therefore, we vacate the condition prohibiting Krocka from having contact with witnesses and remand to the district court so that it can amend its judgment pertaining to this condition. AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART. 11