Opinion ID: 2559108
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Arguments of the Parties and Amici Regarding the Council's Intent

Text: The parties, and amici curiae who presented oral argument, disagree on how to determine the Council's intent in enacting amendments to the CPPA. They also reach different conclusions as to whether the Council intended to eliminate this court's constitutional standing requirement. Appellants contend that the issue for this [c]ourt is a simple question of statutory construction of the meaning of the 2000 amendments to the CPPA, and that when it enacted those amendments, the Council [] deliberately and specifically eliminated the requirements of injury in fact and causation in representative actions. [41] Appellees reject what they describe as the plain language argument of appellants; they argue that there is no language in the amended statute that states that the Council intended to jettison well-settled District law and allowfor the first time evera plaintiff to bring an action without alleging injury-in-fact (emphasis in original). In its amici curiae brief supporting appellants, the Legal Aid Society of the District of Columbia asserts: [W]hatever prudential limits this [c]ourt may choose to adopt for lawsuits asserting common-law or constitutional causes of action, a legislature may override such prudential limits by granting an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules. The [ ] Council did precisely that when it enacted the 2000 amendments to the CPPA: After the amendments, a person may bring a CPPA action on behalf of the general public, whether or not that person has suffered an injury. But the District of Columbia, as amicus curiae in support of appellees, declares: There is nothing explicit, either in the CPPA as amended or in the legislative history of the CPPA amendments, that demonstrates an affirmative intent by the Council to displace the usual standing requirement that a plaintiffunless asserting associational standing on behalf of its membersbe either injured or threatened with imminent injury. Although the Division [of this court in the panel's Grayson decision] had a reasonable basis to conclude that the CPPA as amended does not incorporate that requirement, the en banc [c]ourt should not rule, absent clearer evidence, that such was the Council's intent. We next set forth the principles of statutory construction that will guide our analysis, and then we examine the Council's intent in enacting the year 2000 CPPA amendments.