Opinion ID: 2569807
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Does Laches Bar the State's Action Against Schnell's License?

Text: Schnell alternatively argues that we should affirm because laches barred the state from acting. The state argues that Schnell cannot overcome the threshold question in such cases: whether the doctrine applies. [30] It also argues that Schnell cannot satisfy the two-part test for applying the doctrine, and that applying laches for nonenforcement of law for agency delay would be contrary to the public interest. Whether the doctrine of laches applies here is a question of law not involving agency expertise. We therefore apply the substitution of judgment standard of review. [31] As we stated in Concerned Citizens of South Kenai Peninsula v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, [32] the doctrine of laches creates an equitable defense when a party delays asserting a claim for an unconscionable period. [33] To bar a claim under laches, [a] court must find both an unreasonable delay in seeking relief and resulting prejudice to the defendant. [34] Laches is usually invoked to bar a claim because the plaintiff has unreasonably delayed seeking relief or protecting a known right. [35] Laches has been invoked in special circumstances to bar claims due to prosecutorial delay, [36] but it does not bar claims due to adjudicatory delay. The division did not delay seeking relief or prosecuting its case. It sought revocation of Schnell's license in July 1992, two months after he was sentenced for false declaration. The revocation hearing was held in November 1992 and the hearing officer issued his recommendation in December. The division's delay therefore was not in seeking relief, but in rendering its decision and imposing sanctions. Schnell concedes as much when he states in his appellate brief, [T]he concern here is not about the director's delay in first raising issues ... in 1992, but about the delay of directors in promulgating sanctions after the 1992 hearing until 1995. Because the division's delay here was adjudicatory, we decline to apply the doctrine of laches to bar the state's action against Schnell's license.