Opinion ID: 2099123
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Expert Testimony Admission Standards

Text: D.R.E. 702 is identical to the corresponding current version of the Federal Rule that bears the same number. On December 21, 2000, Federal Rule of Evidence (F.R.E.) 702 was amended in an attempt to codify the United States Supreme Court trilogy of cases known as Daubert, [9] Joiner [10] and Kumho. [11] The amendment sets forth three standards that must be met before a challenged expert's testimony can be admitted. Federal Rule 702 in its entirety states: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. [12] The issue in Perry's case is controlled by subsection (1). The Advisory Committee Note to the 2000 Amendment explains the purpose of subsection (1) of the amended rule: Subpart (1) of Rule 702 calls for a quantitative rather than qualitative analysis. The amendment requires that expert testimony be based on sufficient underlying `facts or data'.... There has been some confusion over the relationship between Rules 702 and 703. The amendment makes clear the sufficiency of the basis of an expert's testimony is to be decided under Rule 702. Rule 702 sets forth the overarching requirement of reliability, and an analysis of the sufficiency of the expert's basis cannot be divorced from the ultimate reliability of the expert's opinion. In contrast, the `reasonable reliance' requirement of Rule 703 is a relatively narrow inquiry. When an expert relies on inadmissible information, Rule 703 requires the trial court to determine whether that information is of a type reasonably relied on by other experts in the field. If so, the expert can rely on the information in reaching an opinion. However, the question whether the expert is relying on a sufficient basis of information whether admissible information or notis governed by the requirements of Rule 702. [13] Further illuminating the drafters' intent in including subsection (1) in the 2000 amendments to F.R.E. 702, the Federal Rules of Evidence Manual explains that: If an expert has engaged in insufficient research, or has ignored obvious factors, the opinion must be excluded under this prong of the test. In other words, the expert must have a sufficient foundation for the testimony. Judge Becker has stated that the foundation requirement, while well developed in the case law and in the experience of trial lawyers and judges has not been expressly grounded in one of the Federal Rules. [14] The Advisory Committee recognized that there was a gap in the Rules, and also that the Court in Daubert implicitly required a foundation requirement for expert testimony. The Advisory Committee decided to avoid any ambiguity and to make the foundation requirement a specific part of Rule 702. [15] Although F.R.E. 702 provides no procedural guidelines or instructions to trial courts with respect to defining sufficient facts or data, a review of several treatises is didactic. First, The New Wigmore, in its volume on Expert Evidence, explains that an expert's conclusions are necessarily dependent upon an understanding of the factual foundations of the case on which he or she is to opine: In contrast to the background information on which an expert draws is information about the facts of the case at bar. On what adjudicative factsdata about the specifics of the litigated casecan an expert opinion be based? ... Intertwined with the question of the types of information on which expert testimony may be based is the question of validity, the necessary degree of reliability that expert evidence must have before being permitted in court. Essentially, there are three related questions: First, on what categories of material may experts rely? Second, how reliable must the expert's case-specific information be to constitute a permissible basis for a conclusion? Third, to what extent must the general background information and methods put to use by the expert be proven valid? These three inquiries are necessarily linked. The legitimacy of the basis for an expert's conclusions cannot be disentangled from the validity of these conclusions. If an expert bases an opinion on an erroneous factual foundation, the inaccurate premises invalidate the conclusion even if the expert's methods are generally valid. [16] Similarly, Moore's Federal Rules Pamphlet explains that where an expert opinion is fundamentally unsupported by the facts of the case, it should be excluded on the ground that it will be of no assistance to the fact finder in deciding the case. [17] Weinstein's Federal Evidence states that under F.R.E. 702(1), [t]o be admissible, expert opinions must be based on sufficient facts or data. Thus, an expert's testimony is inadmissible if it is based on suppositions rather than facts. [18] That treatise has collected various case law addressing the standard for admissibility under this section. [19] The Virginia Supreme Court's analysis of its common law equivalent to Rule 702 is also helpful to this inquiry. Virginia law contains a common law requirement that a proffered expert witness have a sufficient understanding of the case's factual foundation, in order for his or her testimony to be admitted at trial. In Vasquez v. Mabini, [20] in reviewing the admission of expert testimony, the Virginia Supreme Court concluded that [e]xpert testimony founded upon assumptions that have no basis in fact is not merely subject to refutation by cross-examination or by counter-experts; it is inadmissible. [21] Further, [f]ailure of the trial court to strike such testimony upon a motion timely made is error subject to reversal on appeal. [22]