Opinion ID: 2268910
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Metadata is Subject to the PRA

Text: ¶ 12 The Court of Appeals ruled that metadata from Thwing's original September 18 e-mail to Fimia was a public record and that the O'Neills are entitled to it. O'Neill, 145 Wash.App. at 935, 187 P.3d 822. Metadata, while not defined in standard English dictionaries, has been defined in various other sources. Metadata is quite simply data about data, or hidden statistical information about a document that is generated by a software program. Cole, supra, at ¶ 7 (footnote omitted). `Metadata' is `information describing the history, tracking, or management of an electronic document.' Lake v. City of Phoenix, 222 Ariz. 547, 548 n. 1, 218 P.3d 1004 (2009) (quoting Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 646 (D.Kan.2005)). Examples of e-mail metadata include, among about 1,200 or more properties, such information as the dates that mail was sent, received, replied to or forwarded, blind carbon copy ... information, and sender address book information. WORKING GROUP ON ELEC. DOC. RETENTION & PROD., THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS AND PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 3 (2d ed. June 2007), available at http://www.thesedona conference.org/content/miscFiles/ publications_html?grp=wgs110. Metadata from electronic files can include `information about a particular data set which describes how, when and by whom it was collected, created, accessed, or modified and how it is formatted (including data demographics such as size, location, storage requirements and media information).' Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 646 (quoting Working Group on Best Practices for Elec. Doc. Retention & Prod., The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Guidelines: Best Practice Guidelines & Commentary for Managing Information And Records in the Electronic Age App. F at 94 (Sept. 2005), available at http://www. thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/ publications_html?grp=wgs110). Most metadata is generally not visible when a document is printed or when the document is converted to an image file. Id. We must decide here whether metadata needs to be disclosed under the PRA. ¶ 13 The public disclosure act, formerly chapter 42.17 RCW, was enacted in 1972 by initiative. Soter, 162 Wash.2d at 730, 174 P.3d 60 (citing Dawson v. Daly, 120 Wash.2d 782, 788, 845 P.2d 995 (1993)). The portion dealing with public records has since been recodified at chapter 42.56 RCW and renamed the [PRA]. Id. The PRA requires that [e]ach agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make available for public inspection and copying all public records, unless the record falls within the specific exemptions of ... this chapter, or other statute which exempts or prohibits disclosure of specific information or records. RCW 42.56.070(1). The PRA should be liberally construed and its exemptions should be narrowly construed in favor of disclosure. Former RCW 42.56.030 (2005). ¶ 14 We must decide whether the metadata associated with Thwing's original e-mail to Fimia is a public record subject to disclosure under the PRA. The PRA applies only to public records. RCW 42.56.070(1). `Public record' includes any writing containing information relating to the conduct of government or the performance of any governmental or proprietary function prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency regardless of physical form or characteristics. Former RCW 42.56.010 (2005) (codified as former RCW 42.17.020(41) (2005)). [1] In sum, public record is defined very broadly, encompassing virtually any record related to the conduct of government. ¶ 15 This is an issue of first impression that has been examined previously by only one court. The Arizona Supreme Court ruled that metadata in an electronic document is part of the underlying document [and] does not stand on its own. Lake, 222 Ariz. at 550, 218 P.3d 1004. It therefore held that when a public entity maintains a public record in an electronic format, the electronic version of the record, including any embedded metadata, is subject to disclosure under [Arizona's] public records law. Id. at 551, 218 P.3d 1004. Whereas no statute defined public records in Arizona, a very broad statute defining public records as nearly any conceivable government record related to the conduct of government is liberally construed in Washington. See former RCW 42.56.010 (codified as former RCW 42.17.020(41) (2005)), .030. Metadata may contain information that relates to the conduct of government and is important for the public to know. It could conceivably include information about whether a document was altered, what time a document was created, or who sent a document to whom. Our broad PRA exists to ensure that the public maintains control over their government, and we will not deny our citizenry access to a whole class of possibly important government information. We agree with the Supreme Court of Arizona that an electronic version of a record, including its embedded metadata, is a public record subject to disclosure. There is no doubt here that the relevant e-mail itself is a public record, so its embedded metadata is also a public record and must be disclosed. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals ruling that the metadata associated with Thwing's original e-mail to Fimia is subject to the PRA and must be disclosed. ¶ 16 As the Court of Appeals noted, the City admits that it has not provided the O'Neills with the metadata from Thwing's original e-mail to Fimia. O'Neill, 145 Wash. App. at 934, 187 P.3d 822. It is impossible to know at this point what information is contained within the metadata associated with that original e-mail. It is impossible to know this information because Fimia admittedly deleted the original e-mail from her computer, along with all of its associated metadata. Since we cannot see the metadata associated with Thwing's original e-mail to Fimia, we cannot see how it may be different from the metadata that the O'Neills have already received. It is important to note that the O'Neills have received only copies of metadata that are associated with other e-mails. They have never received a copy of the metadata from Thwing's original e-mail to Fimia on September 18. This is the metadata they had specifically requested on September 25, and this is the metadata that they have never received. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the City has not yet proved that it provided to O'Neill access to the metadata she requested. She is entitled to this public record. Id. at 935, 187 P.3d 822.
¶ 17 The petitioners ask us to consider the Guidelines as evidence that metadata need not be released under the PRA. They argue that the Guidelines authorize government agencies to delete certain records once they have been printed. This argument is unpersuasive. While the PRA implies that there are circumstances when public records can be scheduled for destruction, the PRA does not allow agencies to destroy records that are subject to a pending records request. It states that agencies shall retain possession of the record, and may not destroy or erase the record until the request is resolved. RCW 42.56.100. Here, the electronic version of the e-mail, including its embedded metadata, is a public record, so it could not be destroyed once Ms. O'Neill made a request for it. ¶ 18 The Frequently Asked Questions About E-Mail Retention section of the Guidelines states that employees can print messages and then delete them, provided [that] you print the following information with the message: name of sender, name of recipient, date and time of transmission and/or receipt. You then file the printed message with the appropriate records series and retain it according to the retention approved for that series by the Local Records Committee. CP at 92. These guidelines are generic references to the retention of e-mails; however, they certainly do not authorize state agencies to delete e-mails that are already subject to a pending records request, which would directly violate RCW 42.56.100. Furthermore, Fimia herself declared that she must have inadvertently deleted the e-mail with its associated metadata, CP at 22, so she can hardly claim that she consciously deleted it in accordance with the Guidelines. ¶ 19 Most importantly, the courts are charged with carrying out the PRA. We are here to declare the law and effect of the statute; we need provide no deference to an agency's interpretation of the PRA. Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wash.2d 123, 130, 580 P.2d 246 (1978). Furthermore, when there is the possibility of a conflict between the PRA and other acts, the PRA governs. Former RCW 42.56.030; Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y v. Univ. of Wash., 125 Wash.2d 243, 262, 884 P.2d 592 (1994). Even assuming arguendo that the Guidelines could be interpreted to allow for the destruction of e-mails, the broad, liberally construed PRA governs. For this reason, we hold that the Guidelines do not justify the deletion of e-mails that are subject to a pending PRA request. When a PRA request is made, a government agency must hold onto those records, including their metadata; they cannot be deleted. [3]
¶ 20 Next, we give the City the opportunity to inspect Fimia's home computer's hard drive for the requested metadata. While the City has searched Fimia's e-mail folder for the deleted e-mail and its associated metadata, the City has not inspected the hard drive of Fimia's home computer. The City has a duty to provide records to the public that are subject to the PRA. RCW 42.56.070(1). Information that must be disclosed under the PRA conceivably exists on the hard drive of Fimia's computer. If it is possible for the City to retrieve this information, the PRA requires that it be found and released to the O'Neills. We will not yet say unequivocally that the City violated the PRA. The City still has the opportunity to search for the requested metadata on Fimia's home computer's hard drive. We note that this inspection is appropriate only because Fimia used her personal computer for city business. [4] If government employees could circumvent the PRA by using their home computers for government business, the PRA could be drastically undermined. We remand the case for the trial court to give the City the chance to search for the requested metadata, and to determine whether the City has violated the PRA. ¶ 21 In sum, we affirm the Court of Appeals ruling that remanded the case to the trial court. If, on remand, the City refuses to inspect Fimia's home computer's hard drive for the metadata, the trial court should find that the City violated the PRA, as the City will not have provided the O'Neills with the requested metadata. If the City inspects Fimia's home computer's hard drive, however, the trial court will be better able to determine what the requested metadata looks like. If the requested metadata is discovered during this inspection, the City is required to provide it to the O'Neills. Of course, the O'Neills were provided with two other copies of metadata: one from Thwing's e-mail to Way, and one from when Thwing resent her e-mail to Fimia on September 29. If the trial court determines that the metadata already provided to the O'Neills is identical to the metadata that the O'Neills actually asked for, the already released metadata may be sufficient. If the metadata from the September 18 e-mail cannot be found on Fimia's computer or if the metadata on the September 18 e-mail is not identical to the already released metadata, the trial court must determine, consistent with this court's opinion, whether the City's deletion of the metadata violated the PRA. If appropriate, the trial court should determine the monetary penalty under the PRA.