Opinion ID: 2257808
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: So-Called Prior Precedent

Text: Additionally the dissent relies on so-called prior precedent from Rhode Island, as well as our sister states, that has authorized a direct cause of action from their individual constitutions. We have little trouble distinguishing, this line of reasoning since these cases are not the least bit instructive on the question presented by this caseโwhether article 1, section 23, of the Rhode Island Constitution provides a direct cause of action. We too can cite a litany of cases from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that specific provisions of other states' constitutions either do or do not provide for a direct cause of action ( Bivens action). But none of these cases are persuasive to answer the specific question presented by this case, given the fact that Rhode Island's victims' rights amendment simply cannot be compared to New York's equal protection clause, North Carolina's free speech clause, or Maryland's due process or search and seizure clauses, as the dissent attempts to do. Similarly the dissent's reference to this Court's prior precedent with respect to takings clause cases suffers from the same infirmities. This distinction is highlighted by two glaring differences: (1) the takings clause is a self-executing provision, see, e.g., Annicelli v. Town of South Kingstown, 463 A.2d 133 (R.I.1983), and perhaps even more importantly, (2) the text of the takings clause expressly provides for a remedy. See art. 1, sec. 16 (Private property shall not be taken for public uses, without just compensation ) (emphases added). Therefore, while we sympathize with the dissent's predicament in espousing what are obviously deeply held beliefs, we recognize the dearth of case law on this significant subject and believe that the procrustean effort to analogize the case at bar to some so-called prior precedent is entirely misplaced. [18] It is perhaps for this reason that after much fanfare discussing issues that are either premature or not in controversy, [19] the dissent finally arrives at what it terms (and we agree) the overarching issue in this caseโwhether article 1, section 23, is self-executing. On this issue the dissent concludes that article 1, section 23, is self-executing because (1) the victims' rights amendment contains the specific right for crime victims to address the court before sentencing, (2) the amendment does not contain a directive to the Legislature for further enabling, (3) the motivating factor behind the victims' rights amendment was  the need for greater protection for victims of crime,' and (4) a preliminary draft of article 1, section 23, expressly provided crime victims with a remedy. However, the fact that the 1986 victims' rights amendment contains a provision entitling victims the right to address the court before sentencing is of little consequence since crime victims had enjoyed this right since 1983. Furthermore, the fact that article 1, section 23, does not contain an express directive to the Legislature for further enabling is of no aid to the dissent since the Judiciary Committee's report expressly mandated that the General Assembly (and not the courts) create specific provisions or mechanisms to implement an enforcement provision. We also place little value on the undisputed fact that the motivating factor behind the victims' rights amendment was the need for greater protection for victims of crime. It cannot be disputed that since article 1, section 23, was ratified, crime victims have been afforded greater protections. To illustrate this point, we refer to ง 12-28-10, entitled Victims' services unit, which was enacted by the General Assembly a mere one day after the framers ratified article 1, section 23, and is designed to assist victims through every stage of their ordeal. In addition the framers' desire to arm crime victims with greater protection can in no way be equated, ipso facto, with the dissent's conclusion that the framers intended for crime victims to have recourse in the law, which is but one way that the General Assembly could increase protection to crime victims. Had the framers actually intended for crime victims to have recourse in the law, they could quite easily have provided for this remedy within the text of article 1, section 23. On the contrary, the framers deleted the very provision, which would have given this precise right to crime victims. Faced with this undeniable fact, the dissent formulates its last-ditch argument that Resolution 86-140 was altered but only for the economy of language. We have already addressed this argument, and we shall not give it anymore attention than it deserves. Relying upon these subjective considerations, the dissent incorrectly determines that article 1, section 23, is self-executing and, after declaring that no special factors counseling hesitation exist, concludes that the Bandonis may be entitled to some type of unspecified remedy. Here again we part ways since we cannot agree with the bold and unsubstantiated conclusion that there are no special factors counseling hesitation when the United States Supreme Court itself has observed that the concept of `special factors counsel[]ing hesitation'    include[s] an appropriate judicial deference to indications that congressional inaction has not been inadvertent. Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 423, 108 S.Ct. at 2468, 101 L.Ed.2d at 381. If this case stands for no other proposition, it must stand for the fact that a majority of this Court does not view the Legislature's inaction as inadvertent, and thus this factor alone constitutes a special factor counseling hesitation.