Opinion ID: 1451006
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Courts Correctly Refused To Suppress Henry's Statements Because the Public Safety Exception to Miranda Applies.

Text: As the parties correctly observe, our review of a suppression ruling requires a two-step determination.... The factual findings by the trial court are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, and the application of the law to those facts is conducted under de novo review. Cummings v. Commonwealth, 226 S.W.3d 62, 65 (Ky.2007) (citing Welch v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 407 (Ky.2004)). Here, although Henry's suppression hearing description of his arrest differed in certain particulars from that of the arresting officer, there is no real dispute about the pertinent facts as summarized above. The officers had warning that Henry had thrown a gun into the area they later saw him approaching  an area open to pedestrian traffic between two businesses  and immediately upon apprehending Henry one of the officers, without first giving the Miranda warnings, asked him where the gun was. Henry contends that the apparent Miranda violation requires that his unwarned statements be suppressed. We disagree. Under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, of course, Henry has a right not to be compelled to incriminate himself. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000). To protect that right and to guard against the compulsion inherent in custodial circumstances the United States Supreme Court established, in Miranda v. Arizona, supra , the now familiar rule that a defendant's statements during custodial interrogation will generally not be admissible at trial unless prior to the statements the defendant was advised of Miranda's four basic warnings: (1) that the suspect has the right to remain silent, (2) that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, (3) that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and (4) that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Dickerson v. United States, supra . In New York v. Quarles, supra , however, the Supreme Court recognized an exception to the Miranda warning requirement. In Quarles , a police officer was attempting to apprehend a rape suspect, Quarles, believed to be armed, in a grocery store. The suspect fled to the back of the store, and the officer momentarily lost sight of him. When moments later Quarles was captured, his shoulder holster was empty, and without giving the Miranda warnings, the officer asked him where the gun was. Quarles indicated a nearby box, where, indeed, the officer found a gun. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression of the gun and Quarles's pre-warning statements as inadmissible under Miranda . The United States Supreme Court reversed. It held that on these facts there is a public safety exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence, and that the availability of that exception does not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved.... Whatever the motivation of the individual officers in such a situation, we do not believe that the doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda require that it be applied in all its rigor to a situation in which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655-56, 104 S.Ct. 2626. We agree with the courts below that this public safety exception to Miranda applies to Henry's case, which is strikingly similar to Quarles . The officer here, as in Quarles , had reason to believe that Henry had abandoned a gun in an area accessible by the public, and as in Quarles , the officer limited his pre-warning questions to those designed to locate the gun and remove the hazard. Because the officer's questions were reasonably prompted by a concern for public safety, under Quarles they did not violate Miranda 's warning requirement. Against this conclusion, Henry raises three arguments. He contends, first, that regardless of Miranda and its exceptions, his statements should be suppressed as the fruit of an illegal detention, the argument apparently being that the officers lacked a reasonable basis for stopping him and questioning him at all. Not only was this argument not presented to the trial courts and so not preserved for review, but it is patently meritless. At the very least, the assault complaint and the report that Henry had abandoned a gun authorized the officers to make an investigatory stop, Adkins v. Commonwealth, 96 S.W.3d 779 (Ky.2003) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)), and the gun report as well as the fact that Henry was stopped in the area where a gun was thought to be located justified their beginning the stop with a weapons frisk. Id. The discovery of the crack pipe and the outstanding warrant then justified Henry's arrest. Henry's statements were not the fruit of an illegal detention. Henry next contends that the officers were not truly concerned for public safety, since they pursued him briefly before they returned to look for the gun, and that public safety here did not require the sacrifice of his Miranda rights, since the area where the gun was thought to be could have been cordoned off while the police searched. The officers' brief attempt to find Henry does not suggest a lack of concern for public safety because he was the person best able to tell them where the gun was located. Indeed, their immediate request for additional officers to search for the gun suggests public safety was of paramount concern. As the Quarles Court emphasized, moreover, the availability of the public safety exception does not depend on the officer's subjective motivation, but rather on the circumstances reasonably prompting a safety concern. That concern was reasonably prompted here by a credible report that Henry had abandoned a gun in an open, public place. The concern was reasonable notwithstanding the fact that an alternative approach to protecting the public was available. The Quarles majority faced a similar argument that rather than questioning Quarles the police officers could have cordoned off the grocery store,  Quarles, supra , (Justice Marshall dissenting)  but it nevertheless held that Miranda did not require such alternative action and that questions limited to locating the gun were reasonably prompted by the obvious safety concerns that abandoned guns pose. Finally, Henry argues that even if the officer's questions did not violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as interpreted in Miranda and Quarles , they did violate Section Eleven of the Kentucky Constitution, which, like those amendments, offers protection against self-incrimination and ensures the right to counsel. Henry urges us to construe Section Eleven more broadly than the corresponding federal provisions and in particular as being incompatible with the public safety exception announced in Quarles . We have held, however, as a general rule, that Section Eleven is coextensive with the corresponding federal constitutional protections. Commonwealth v. Cooper, 899 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Ky.1995) (Section Eleven of the Constitution of Kentucky and the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States are coextensive and provide identical protections against self-incrimination.); Cain v. Abramson, 220 S.W.3d 276, 280-81 (Ky.2007) (The right of counsel guaranteed by Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution is no greater than the right of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution). Departure from this general rule, we have indicated, is appropriate and will be entertained only where the Kentucky constitutional text, the Debates of the Constitutional Convention, history, tradition, and relevant precedent call for it. Commonwealth v. Cooper, 899 S.W.2d at 78. Henry has failed to identify anything in the text of Section Eleven or in our Kentucky tradition that would compel departure from the United States Supreme Court's lead in Quarles . He relies on Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152, 224 S.W. 860 (1920), a prohibition era case construing Section Ten of our Constitution, which, like the federal Fourth Amendment, limits the state's search and seizure authority. In Youman , police officers seized evidence during a warrantless search of Youman's home, and the Court held that the illegally obtained evidence should not have been admitted at Youman's trial. Although in reaching its conclusion the Court relied heavily on United States Supreme Court decisions construing the Fourth Amendment, Henry asserts that Youman represents an independent Kentucky tradition of excluding tainted evidence not simply to deter police misconduct but more broadly to ensure that courts do not become implicated in constitutional violations. This single, factually dissimilar case is far too thin a reed to support a departure from Quarles . Quarles did not concern an exception to the exclusionary rule, but considered rather whether Quarles's unwarned statements elicited by the officer's public safety questions were tainted at all. It concluded that they were not tainted, and thus that the exclusionary rule simply did not apply. Even if Kentucky's exclusionary rule were broader than the federal one, therefore (and it is not, Crayton v. Commonwealth, 846 S.W.2d 684 (Ky.1992)), that fact would not render Quarles inconsistent with Kentucky law. On the contrary, our pre- Miranda cases construing Section Eleven did not anticipate Miranda , and our cases since that landmark decision have consistently indicated that the Miranda requirements are at, if not beyond, the outer boundary of protections afforded by Section Eleven. Hourigan v. Commonwealth, 962 S.W.2d 860 (Ky.1998). The Supreme Court's construction of Miranda , therefore, is unlikely to conflict with our law, and Henry has demonstrated no conflict in this case. Henry having failed to justify a departure from Quarles under Kentucky law, we conclude that the Quarles public safety exception to Miranda is not precluded by Section Eleven and that the courts below correctly applied that exception when they ruled that Henry's statements in response to the officer's where is the gun? questions were admissible.