Opinion ID: 1309738
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: use district restrictions

Text: IV. West Des Moines enacted a comprehensive municipal zoning ordinance pursuant to Code chapter 414. The text thereof establishes fifteen district classifications, including, for example, six residential districts designated R-1, R-1-A, EU-1, R-2, R-3, and R-4. The fourteenth district listed in the ordinance is an Agricultural District, designated as A in the text. Moreover, the text does not subclassify agricultural districts as A-1, A-2, etc.; the only agricultural district classification is A. In contrast to the ordinance text, however, the zoning map shows the proposed mortuary site is located in an A-1 district. The map is made a part of the ordinance by reference. But, as above noted, there is no A-1 district in the text. The parties have stipulated that in drafting the ordinance more than one agricultural district was contemplated. When enacted, however, the map was inadvertently left uncorrected. Notwithstanding this stipulation, defendants assert the effect of the foregoing discrepancy is to leave the entire tract (Resthaven's 35.93 acres and Rippers' 16.37 acres) unzoned. They thereupon take the position Article XX of the ordinance, regulating A agricultural districts, is inapplicable. We disagree. Municipal zoning regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan, to encourage the most appropriate use of land throughout such city. Code § 414.3. See also Brackett v. City of Des Moines, 246 Iowa 249, 256-257, 67 N.W.2d 542 (1954); Plaza Recreational Center v. Sioux City, 253 Iowa 246, 257-258, 111 N.W.2d 758 (1961). Judged by the statutory standard of comprehensive zoning throughout the city, it cannot be logically maintained the subject property was meant to be an unzoned island. The discrepancy resulted from a draftsman's oversight. It will be treated accordingly. In the abstract, we agree with defendants' admonition that generally correction should be made by legislative enactment, not by judicial interpretation. But there is a distinction between judicial interpretation and judicial paralysis. As stated in Jones v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 207 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 1973): We reiterate that authority to make changes in legislative enactments should be exercised with `extreme caution and great reluctance,' but it does not follow we must remain idle and helpless while permitting inadvertent clerical errors or omissions to frustrate obvious legislative intent. The proposed mortuary site is subject to Article XX of the zoning ordinance, governing uses in A agricultural districts. V. The next question before us is the extent to which Article XX applies. Resolution of this problem requires reference to several interrelated sections of the ordinance. Article XXI is entitled unclassified and Special Uses. Section 1 thereof states: The regulations set forth in this Article or elsewhere in this Ordinance which are applicable shall apply to the Unclassified and Special Uses listed in this Article. By virtue of Art. XXI, § 4(L), a mortuary is designated a special use. The same article provides, in § 5(A)(1): A special use permit shall not authorize a use which does not comply with the minimum requirements of the district in which it is located.  (emphasis supplied). Plaintiffs protest the instant permit violates § 5(A)(1) because it authorizes a special use which does not comply with the minimum requirements of an A agricultural district. More specifically, we are referred to Article XX, captioned `A' Agricultural District. Section 4 thereof includes this table of minimum requirements which shall be observed in agricultural districts: Side yard Width minimum Front Least width Sum of Rear Principal Lot Lot Yard On any one Both side Yard Use area Width Depths Side Yards Depths 20 All uses acres 200 ft. 50 ft. 50 ft. 100 ft. 50 ft. Because all uses must satisfy the 20-acre minimum requirement in an agricultural district, plaintiffs insist each use must meet this area requirement. Since McLaren has an option to lease only 2.88 acres of the 16.37 acre Ripper tract, it is urged the proposed mortuary site fails to comply with the acreage minimum imposed by Art. XX, § 4. We are thus called upon to determine whether the words all uses demand 20 or more acres devoted exclusively to each use. Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Nicholas, 258 Iowa 115, 121, 137 N.W.2d 900, 904 (1965), seemingly lends some support to plaintiffs' argument. Interpreting statutory use of the word all we there observed: The word `all' is commonly understood and usually does not admit of an exception, addition, or exclusion. See also Cedar Rapids Com. Sch. Dist. v. City, 252 Iowa 205, 211, 106 N.W.2d 655 (1960). Even more favorable to plaintiffs are cases which say all includes each and every. See e. g., Knox Jewelry Co., Inc. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 130 Ga.App. 519, 203 S.E.2d 739, 740-741 (1974) and Baker v. Brown's Estate, 365 Mo. 1159, 294 S.W.2d 22, 25 (1956). Standing alone, these interpretations of all would suggest each use of agriculturally zoned land must contain at least 20 acres devoted to such use. But defendants advance three persuasive arguments to the contrary. First, Art. XX, § 4, supra, specifies both a minimum area of 20 acres and minimum lot width of 200 feet. Thus, if a rectangular lot is only 200 feet wide (as the ordinance permits), the 20-acre minimum could not be satisfied unless the lot were 4356 feet long, more than eight-tenths of a mile. Plaintiffs attempt to downplay this interpretation of § 4 by hypothesizing a trapezoidal lot of less extreme dimensions. While their ingenuity is estimable, the shape and dimensions of their hypothetical tract can only be described as uncommon. We do not, however, rest our decision on this premise alone. Second, Art. XX, § 4 literally applies only to principal uses of agriculturally zoned land. Art. XX, § 2(A)(1)-(10) specifically lists principal uses for A agricultural districts, and mortuaries are not included. Rather, they are classified as special uses in Art. XXI, § 4(L). Defendants thus argue all uses refers only to all principal, not special uses. Hence, mortuaries are not subject to the 20-acre minimum lot area requirement of Art. XX, § 4. Tending to support this view is Pearson v. Shoemaker, 233 N.Y.S.2d 674, 676 (S.Ct.1960). Finally, defendants' most persuasive contention stems from an internal ambiguity in Article XX. Section 2 thereof says, in relevant part: A building or premises [in an A agricultural district] shall be used only for the following purposes:     2. Truck gardening and nurseries, provided that no permanent dwelling units shall be erected thereon unless the tract contains twenty (20) or more acres.  (emphasis supplied). Art. XX, § 4, previously noted, apparently requires a minimum lot area of twenty acres for any use of agriculturally zoned property, including truck gardening and nurseries. If so, however, the italicized words in § 2, quoted above, are superfluous. In other words, if, as plaintiffs insist, any use in an A district must contain at least 20 acres, a truck garden or nursery must likewise contain 20 acres, whether permanent dwelling units shall be erected thereon or not. But the clear inference to be drawn from the proviso of § 2 is that truck gardening and nursery lots, having no permanent dwellings, need not satisfy the 20-acre minimum. We are satisfied the foregoing arguments collectively betray a facial ambiguity as to the extent of applicability of the ordinance. VI. The next step of our inquiry focuses upon the effect of such ambiguity. In Jersild v. Sarcone, 260 Iowa 288, 296, 149 N.W.2d 179, 185 (1967), we said: [T]he rule of strict construction of restrictions on the free use of property is applicable where the wording of the restriction is ambiguous. [Citations]. Furthermore, the restrictions of a zoning ordinance should not be extended by implication or interpretation. See Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Liddle, 253 Iowa 402, 411, 112 N.W.2d 852 (1962), and citations. See also 2 Anderson, American Law of Zoning, §§ 12.02-12.03 (1968 ed.). Applying these rules to the case at hand, we hold Art. XX, § 4 of the ordinance is inapplicable to the extent it would require developers of the proposed mortuary (a special use as defined by Art. XXI, § 4(L)) to comply with the 20-acre minimum lot area provision. Any other view would contravene the rule thus stated in Livingston v. Davis, 243 Iowa 21, 26, 50 N.W.2d 592, 596 (1951): A zoning ordinance should not be extended by implication to prevent a use not clearly prohibited. [Citations]. (emphasis supplied). While the 20-acre restriction arguably prohibits the special use here involved, it does not clearly do so. VII. Alternatively, even if the 20-acre minimum were applicable, plaintiffs have still failed to discharge their burden of demonstrating the special use permit was illegally granted. As explained earlier, defendants jointly petitioned for the permit. McLaren, holding a lease option on 2.88 acres of Rippers' 16.37 acre tract, apparently suspected the 20-acre minimum lot restriction might apply. Resthaven accordingly contributed its property to the effort. Collectively, defendants thereby surpassed the 20-acre minimum. Plaintiffs vehemently object to this tacking stratagem and insist the required 20 acres must be in single ownership. For a general discussion of permissible tacking as applied to adjacent lots held in single or common ownership see Newport Associates, Inc. v. Solow, 36 A.D.2d 519, 317 N.Y.S.2d 715, rev. 30 N.Y.2d 263, 267, 332 N.Y.S.2d 617, 620, 283 N.E.2d 600, 602 (1972), cert. den., 410 U.S. 931, 93 S.Ct. 1372, 35 L.Ed.2d 593 (1973), reh. den., 411 U.S. 977, 93 S.Ct. 2140, 36 L.Ed.2d 699 (1973); Gaudet v. Building Inspector of Dracut, 358 Mass. 807, 265 N.E.2d 375 (1970); Markey v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 409 Pa. 430, 187 A.2d 175, 176-177 (1963); 101 C.J.S. Zoning § 144; 1 Rathkopf, Law of Zoning and Planning, ch. 34, § 2, at 34-11 (3d ed. 1956). The authorities above cited recognize tacking as a legitimate means of compliance with lot area zoning regulations. Even so, plaintiffs complain, The petitioners joining the mortuary developers have merely lent their names to the special use. They have not devoted their lands. Therefore, their lands may not be `tacked'. If this argument condemns defendants' motive for jointly seeking the permit, it stands on an irrelevant premise. As stated in Shorehaven in Manhasset v. Village of Great Neck Estates, 22 N.Y.S.2d 944, 946 (S.Ct. 1940): The petitioner's motive in assembling the plottage is of no importance. Important only is the fact that it has complied with the minimum area requirements. Moreover, the ordinance defines a lot as:     a parcel of real property of at least sufficient size to meet the minimum zoning requirements for use, coverage and area   . Such lot   may consist of   : 1. A combination of complete lots of record, of complete lots of record and portions of lots of record, or of portions of lots of record.  (emphasis supplied). Thus the ordinance itself contemplates tacking, where necessary, to meet the minimum zoning requirements for use, coverage and area. This is, in fact, the prevailing view. See generally 2 Anderson, supra, § 12.11, at 518; 1 Rathkopf, supra. On the other hand, the narrow question posed by plaintiffs is whether adjacent tracts in separate and uncommon ownership may be tacked. This issue is resolved to our satisfaction in Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Village of Wilmette, 66 Ill.App.2d 326, 214 N.E.2d 336, 341 (1966): [T]hroughout this litigation plaintiffs have regarded the subject parcels as a single tract for the purpose of common development since they did not consider parcels 1 and 2 by themselves to be of sufficient size for use as a service station.    Therefore, since the proposed use encompasses all three [separately owned] parcels, the parcels were properly considered as one tract. See also Menzel v. Tubbs, 51 Minn. 364, 53 N.W. 653, 654 (1892); cf. Wellman v. Haug, 146 Colo. 186, 360 P.2d 972, 974-975 (1961); Lindsay v. Board of Appeals of Milton, 362 Mass. 126, 284 N.E.2d 595, 597 (1972). In light of this holding, coupled with the fact the ordinance does not prohibit tacking of separately owned tracts, plaintiffs' instant contention is without merit. VIII. Plaintiffs voice yet another argument against the tacking procedure. Essentially they object to potential overlapping of substandard lots, individually too small to satisfy minimum area provisions but more than adequate when tacked together. They seek to fortify their position with this example: [T]ake the case of two adjacent lots each of insufficient size to meet a minimum area requirement. The owners could collaborate first by joining together for a special permit for the one and then obtain a special permit by joining together for the other. Thus, the minimum area requirement is emasculated if not eliminated. That argument is untenable for two reasons. First, courts have not been insensitive to this problem in the relatively few instances where it has surfaced. Compare Appeal of Brosnan, 330 Pa. 161, 198 A. 629, 631-632 (1938), aff'g 129 Pa.Super. 411, 195 A. 469 (1937), with McGlasson Builders, Inc. v. Tompkins, 203 N.Y.S.2d 633 (S.Ct.1960). Furthermore, the West Des Moines ordinance defines lot in such a way as to avoid the emasculation of the minimum area requirement feared by plaintiffs. Their overlap objection is aptly resolved in 1 Rathkopf, supra, 1973 cumulative supplement, at 34-11: Land required to be used to calculate the required minimum area of one lot cannot also be used to calculate the minimum area of an adjacent lot. Most zoning ordinances make this clear by the definition of a `lot' as a parcel of land of sufficient size for a structure and all required yards. To the extent, therefore, that the land is required for a yard, the same land cannot be used for another required yard. Second, the premise underlying plaintiffs' objection to potential overlapping is not supported by the record. The McLaren-Ripper tract comprises 16.37 acres, only 3.63 acres short of the 20-acre minimum which we assume, for purpose of discussion, is applicable. Resthaven owns 35.93 acres, 5.53 of which are taxable and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, available for private use. Thus, assuming the 5.53 acres of non-dedicated Resthaven property adjoin the 16.37 acre McLaren-Ripper tract (an assumption resolved infra ), defendants collectively possess 21.90 acres, more than enough to comply with the minimum area requirement. Hence, no overlap is involved. IX. Pursuing the matter further, plaintiffs insist there is no evidence in the record showing where Resthaven's 5.53 taxable, presumptively non-dedicated acres, are located. We are told it cannot be assumed they adjoin Rippers' 16.37 acre tract. Hence, plaintiffs say the record does not support a finding that the 20-acre minimum is satisfied. Admittedly, the record does not indicate the precise location of Resthaven's non-dedicated property. While it is clear 30.40 Resthaven acres are dedicated to public use as a cemetery, plaintiffs argue it cannot be positively stated the remaining 5.53 acres adjoin the McLaren-Ripper acreage. But acceptance of plaintiffs' conclusion that a reversal is therefore necessary would effectively reward their unexplained failure to request a clarification by the Board of its findings in this respect. We refuse to indulge plaintiffs' uncertain assumption in preference to another when the result defeats the judgment reached. See Hammer v. County of Ida, supra . X. Finally, on this subject, plaintiffs maintain the Board violated its duty to find the 20-acre minimum requirement was in fact satisfied. In course of the September 8, 1971 hearing, counsel for plaintiffs stated: I still don't understand what amount of land would be leased by McLaren for the purpose of this funeral home and I can say for certain that it couldn't be twenty acres because this land has been dedicated for cemetery purposes.    That land has been deeded and restricted by covenants for the purposes of cemeteries and cemeteries alone. While the Board made no specific finding in this regard, some members opined the tacking issue would ultimately have to be resolved in the courts, but, because defendants collectively held approximately 52 acres, the Board should proceed on the assumption the minimum area requirement was satisfied. Minutes of the Board hearing reveal plaintiffs offered no evidence to support counsel's argument that the entire Resthaven tract has been dedicated to public use. Unquestionably 30.40 acres are tax-exempt; thus, an inference that the remaining 5.53 acres are (1) taxable and (2) not dedicated to public use, is fully warranted. Cf. Mulroy v. Churchman, 52 Iowa 238, 240, 3 N.W. 72 (1879); Id., 60 Iowa 717, 719, 15 N.W. 583 (1883); State v. Ritschel, 220 Minn. 578, 20 N.W.2d 673, 675 (1945). Although the Board was not justified in assuming the entire Resthaven tract was available for a special use, a less extreme assumption, i. e., 5.53 acres were available, is justified by evidence presented to the Board, absent evidence to the contrary. Added to Rippers' 16.37 acres, defendants' joint petition for the permit embraced a total of 21.90 usable acres. There is abstract merit in plaintiffs' contention to the effect publicly dedicated land may not be tacked to private property so as to achieve artificial or manufactured compliance with minimum lot area regulations. Several cases touching on this subject are collected in Metzenbaum v. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea, 234 Cal.App.2d 62, 44 Cal.Rptr. 75 (1965). See also 101 C.J.S. Zoning § 144; cf. Jersild v. Sarcone, supra, 260 Iowa at 297-299, 149 N.W.2d 179. But the problem envisioned by plaintiffs had not materialized here because more than enough non-dedicated land (21.90 acres) is deemed available for the proposed special use. Similarly, there is theoretical soundness in plaintiffs' objection to the Board's assumption the minimum area requirement was met. Again, however, their objection is not borne out by the facts. As aforesaid, defendants presented evidence to the Board from which it could find more than 20 acres of land were available, if necessary, to satisfy the minimum lot area requirement. Only on the strength of this showing did the Board see fit to assume basically that they are a bona fide applicant and to assume now that they had the proper twenty acres in a way that would make them a proper applicant. While choice of the word assume was unfortunate, we think plaintiffs' objection is merely one of semantics. The evidence presented supports a finding of compliance with the 20-acre minimum provision, and such was obviously the basis of the Board's assumption of compliance. Consequently, we cannot agree the Board abdicated its duty to find facts necessary for issuance of the permit. Had defendants presented no evidence as to the size of their lot, it would of course be improper for the Board to assume now that they had the proper twenty acres. Such, however, is not the case here. The distinction is inversely illustrated in Kenan v. Board of Adjustment of Town of Chapel Hill, 13 N.C.App. 688, 187 S.E.2d 496, 499-500 (1972), cert. den., 281 N.C. 314, 188 S.E.2d 897 (1972): The ordinance requires that certain conditions be met before a special use permit can be granted. The petitioner has the burden of satisfying the Board that it meets these conditions. [Citation]. The Board in this case has not found as a fact that petitioner fails to meet the conditions set forth in the ordinance. It has merely found that petitioner has failed to produce sufficient evidence for the Board to make the required findings. There are no presumptions in favor of the petitioner and the petitioner merely failed in proof. Petitioner had the burden of introducing evidence that the conditions required by the ordinance had been met. He failed to introduce such evidence. (emphasis supplied). In the case at bar, there was no presumption in favor of defendants, but, unlike Kenan, there was no failure of proof. Because defendants produced sufficient evidence for the Board to make the required findings, it cannot be said the Board impermissibly indulged a presumption of compliance with the minimum lot area requirement. XI. As the foregoing intimates, the instant question actually turns on the broader burden of proof issue. At the outset, it is well settled issuance of special use permits is a quasi-judicial or administrative function. See City of Des Moines v. Lohner, supra, 168 N.W.2d at 784. And, in administrative proceedings, as well as in court proceedings, the burden of proof, apart from statute, is on the party asserting the affirmative of an issue. Wonder Life Company v. Liddy, 207 N.W.2d 27, 31 (Iowa 1973). See also Iowa R.Civ.P. 344(f)(5). Although special use permits and variances are distinguishable, see Buchholz v. Board of Adjustment of Bremer County, 199 N.W.2d 73, 75 (Iowa 1972), the burden of proof is generally placed upon an applicant in either case. See generally 101 C.J.S. Zoning § 306, cited in Deardorf v. Board of Adjustment, etc., supra, 254 Iowa at 385, 118 N.W.2d 78; Board of Adjustment of City of Des Moines v. Ruble, 193 N.W.2d 497, 502 (Iowa 1972). It is thus apparent defendants had the burden of proof in the Board proceedings. It is equally evident they successfully made at least a prima facie showing of compliance with the minimum area provision of the ordinance. While such showing does not shift the burden of proof, we are satisfied the burden of going forward with rebuttal evidence devolved upon plaintiffs. The latter burden was not discharged. In this regard 2 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, § 391, at 197-198 says: As in court proceedings, the burden of proof, apart from statute, is on the party asserting the affirmative of an issue before an administrative tribunal. This is usually the claimant, complainant, or applicant, but the party resisting a claim may have the burden of proving a bar to such claim, such as a statutory exception, and, while the burden of proof never shifts, the burden of proceeding with the presentation of evidence does shift.    some statutes provide that one presenting a claim under their terms shall be presumed to be within the provisions of the act.    Where facts are shown which give rise to a presumption, the ordinary function of the presumption is to constitute prima facie proof as to the issue involved and to shift to the other party the burden of going forward with the evidence as to that issue.  (emphasis supplied). Although the ordinance in question does not mention such a presumption, the distinction between static burden of proof and shifting burden of going forward with the presentation of evidence is sound, and finds case support in this jurisdiction. Howard & Harper v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 196 Iowa 1378, 1383-1384, 195 N.W. 153, 155 (1923) says: While it is true that the `burden of proof' rests upon him who asserts it, it is also true that, when the party having such burden has made his prima facie case the `burden,' or `duty,' rests upon the opposite party to go forward with his proof to meet the prima facie case so made. See also Hoover v. First Am. F. Ins. Co., 218 Iowa 559, 570-571, 255 N.W. 705 (1934). See generally McCormick, Evidence, § 355 (2d ed. 1972). Plaintiffs' multiple assignments based on the minimum lot area requirement, Art. XX, § 4 of the ordinance, are without merit.