Opinion ID: 488034
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ashcraft & Gerel

Text: 55 Ashcraft & Gerel, a Washington, D.C. law firm that assisted the PMC in this action between March of 1983 and October of 1983, appeals the district court's fee and expense award. In its initial fee calculations, the district court awarded Ashcraft & Gerel fees in the amount of $78,935 and expenses in the amount of $46,233.18. The district court limited the fees and expenses to the work performed between the above dates. Pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate, Ashcraft & Gerel's fee and expense awards then were increased to $138,788 and $54,897.39. This increase primarily reflected the recommendation of the Magistrate that review of Ashcraft & Gerel's work not be limited to the short time period, but should include as well the period prior to March of 1983. 56 The Magistrate's recommendation, adopted by the district court, also reflected a negative quality multiplier of .25 on the ground that in 1983 the firm had withdrawn from the litigation when the PMC refused its request to be given exclusive control of the action. When the firm withdrew, other counsel involved were forced to perform numerous services that Ashcraft & Gerel already had performed. The Magistrate thus concluded that the firm failed to discharge [its] burden when it decided to cease work on the case, thereby requiring other attorneys to duplicate its work. Agent Orange, 611 F.Supp. at 1367. 57 In adopting the Magistrate's recommendations, however, the district court offset the fee awarded to Ashcraft & Gerel against the benefits obtained by the firm's many opt-out clients from the use of discovery materials assembled through the multidistrict discovery process and paid for by the class. Id. at 1343. The district court further found that the value of such services for the opt-outs far exceeded the firm's services to the class. Consequently, the court abrogated any fee award to the firm, but maintained the modified expense award. 58 While we find that the district court's award of fees and expenses prior to abrogation reflects fair and just compensation for Ashcraft & Gerel's services to the class, we conclude that abrogation of the fee award constituted an abuse of discretion. In analyzing the general problem of individual use of discovery materials, the district court properly determined that, in return for the use of discovery materials obtained in the multidistrict litigation, such individual plaintiffs could be assessed a reasonable fee, to be paid back into the fund as their fair share of the legal expenses assumed by the class. Id. at 1317. The court then suggested two ways in which this could be done. First, the court could require counsel in the opt-out cases to report to the district court any fee received from the opt-out plaintiffs so that the court could deduct the appropriate amount. Id. Second, the court could assess the opt-out plaintiffs for the cost of the discovery at the time they made use of it. Id. 59 Neither of these means of assessment permitted the court to offset Ashcraft & Gerel's opt-out clients' payments for use of discovery materials against fees awarded to the firm for its representation of class members. The fee awarded the firm here has no relation to services performed for the opt-outs. Abrogation of the fee, therefore, has the net effect of relieving the class from its responsibility to pay Ashcraft & Gerel fair and just compensation for services it provided, rather than assessing the opt-out plaintiffs for use of the discovery materials. 60 Accordingly, we conclude that Ashcraft & Gerel should be awarded the fee that the district court, accepting the Magistrate's recommendation, determined to be fair and just.