Opinion ID: 2293877
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: LURC's Failure to Hold an Evidentiary Hearing on Plum Creek's Final Amended Concept Plan

Text: [¶ 30] LURC, Plum Creek, Forest Society of Maine, and The Nature Conservancy contend that the court erred by concluding that LURC engaged in an unauthorized procedure that prejudiced Forest Ecology Network and NRCM's rights when LURC failed to reopen the evidentiary hearing after the concept plan was finally amended. We consider this question by (a) exploring the statutory framework for LURC's zoning authority, then (b) turning to the specific requirements of LURC's rules, and finally (c) applying the applicable statutes and rules to the circumstances of this case.
[¶ 31] Plum Creek's petition proposing a thirty-year concept plan sought to change the subdistrict boundaries in the plan area from Management, Development, and Protection subdistrict designations to a Resource Plan Protection Subdistrict. See 12 M.R.S. § 685-A(1); 4 C.M.R. 04-061 010-25 to -92 §§ 10.21-.23 (2011). The concept plan was reviewed by LURC pursuant to the statutory criteria set forth in 12 M.R.S. § 685-A(8-A). Section 685-A addresses land use districts and standards and grants LURC the authority to determine the boundaries of areas within the unorganized and deorganized areas of the State that fall into land use districts. 12 M.R.S. § 685-A(1). Subsection 7-A governs procedures for the establishment and amendment of land use district standards and boundaries and the amendment of the commission's land use maps. 12 M.R.S. § 685-A(7-A). The adoption and amendment of land use district standards, district boundaries, and maps are rulemaking procedures subject to the requirements of the rulemaking subchapter of the Maine Administrative Procedure Act. [6] 12 M.R.S. § 685-A(7-A)(B); see 5 M.R.S. §§ 8051-8064 (2011). [¶ 32] Although subsection 7-A does not address the specific question presented herewhether LURC must hold an additional hearing if it chooses to consider amendments to a concept plan for which it has previously completed a hearingsubsection 7-A(B)(3) does offer guidance. It provides: At any time prior to the date of adoption of proposed land use district standards, land use boundaries or land use maps, the commission may elect to reopen the public hearing record and extend the time period for public comment to such date as it may designate. 12 M.R.S. § 685-A(7-A)(B)(3) (emphasis added). Thus, the Legislature recognized that there would be instances when LURC would need to reopen the record following the completion of a public hearing to receive additional input from the public, but the Legislature did not direct that a new public hearing must be convened in order to accomplish this objective. [¶ 33] The Maine Administrative Procedure Act addresses notice and public hearings in rulemaking procedures in section 8052, which provides in relevant part: Notice; public hearing. Prior to the adoption of any rule, the agency shall give notice as provided in section 8053 and may hold a public hearing, except that a public hearing must be held if otherwise required by statute or requested by any 5 interested persons or if the rule is a major substantive rule as defined in section 8071, subsection 2, paragraph B. 5 M.R.S. § 8052(1) (emphasis added). Because a statute's words are given their plain, common and ordinary meaning unless the statute reveals a contrary legislative intent, Androscoggin Energy, LLC, 2003 ME 64, ¶ 10, 822 A.2d 1114 (quotation marks omitted), the use of the word may gives the agency discretion during rulemaking regarding whether to hold a public hearing, unless the exceptions apply. [7] See 1 M.R.S. § 71(9-A) (2011).
[¶ 34] LURC's internal rules of procedure also indicate that the decision whether to hold a public hearing in connection with a rulemaking proceeding addressing the amendment or adoption of district boundaries is discretionary. Chapter 4 of LURC's rules addresses rules of practice. 4 C.M.R. 04-061 004-1 § 4.01 (2011). Section 4.05 addresses petitions for adoption or amendment of land use district boundaries. 4 C.M.R. 04-061 004-6 to -8 § 4.05. Subsection 5 of that section provides: When to Hold a Public Hearing: The Commission shall consider all requests submitted in a timely manner for a hearing on a petition for a change in district boundaries. Holding the hearing is at the discretion of the Commission unless otherwise required by the Constitution of Maine or statute or if five or more interested persons request in writing that the Commission hold a hearing, in which case a hearing must be held. In determining whether a hearing is advisable, the Commission shall consider the degree of public interest and the likelihood that information presented at the hearing will be of assistance to the Commission reaching its decision. 4 C.M.R. 04-061 004-7 § 4.05(5) (emphasis added). [¶ 35] In addition, Chapter 5, which establishes LURC's rules for the conduct of public hearings, also grants the presiding officer the following authority: To the extent permitted by law, where good cause appears, the Presiding Officer may permit deviation from the procedural rules of the Commission insofar as compliance therewith is found to be impractical or unnecessary and the change does not prejudice any of the parties. 4 C.M.R. 04-061 005-1 to -2 § 5.06(2)(f) (2011) (emphasis added). Section 5.18, which addresses closure of the hearing, indicates: Reopening a hearing prior to a decision: Prior to issuance of a final order or decision, the Commission may elect to reopen a hearing and extend the time period for public comment in compliance with Chapter 4 of these rules. 4 C.M.R. 04-061 005-5 § 5.18(3) (emphasis added).
[¶ 36] LURC's statutory authority and procedural rules clearly establish that when LURC considers proposed amendments to land use district boundaries under the circumstances presented in this case, it has the discretion to decide whether to hold a hearing. The rules are silent on the precise question of whether LURC, having conducted a hearing, is free to entertain amendments to the petition before it without conducting an additional hearing. However, the rules are explicit in establishing that the Commission's presiding officer has considerable discretion in how hearings are conducted, so long as the process employed does not prejudice any of the parties. Moreover, both the statute12 M.R.S. § 685-A(7-A)(B)(3)and the rulessection 5.18recognize that at any time prior to adopting a proposed land use boundary, LURC may reopen the hearing record and request additional public comment. [¶ 37] Accordingly, LURC did not violate its procedural rules when it considered the final amendments to the concept plan without conducting an additional hearing because, first, the post-hearing process it employed assured all parties had ample opportunity to submit information regarding the post-hearing amendments, and, second, no party was prejudiced by the process that was employed. [¶ 38] LURC's review of the petition and concept plan was exhaustive. The record demonstrates that LURC made every effort to provide notice and receive comment from all interested parties at each critical stage of its review of the petition. At the conclusion of the hearing phase of review, LURC determined, and Plum Creek agreed, that the proposal could be improved and LURC invited the parties to comment on a post-hearing process in which LURC's staff might propose amendments to satisfy the statutory review criteria of section 685-A(8-A). LURC's Eleventh Procedural Order addressed the post-hearing process, directed LURC staff and consultants to draft proposed amendments, invited the parties to submit post-hearing briefs, and indicated that the record would remain open until further notice. All parties received a copy of the post-hearing schedule. Perhaps most importantly, the parties submitted lengthy and detailed comments on the proposed amendments. Given the already voluminous record, the significant cost in both time and resources required to reopen the hearing, and the fact that LURC gave the parties a fair opportunity to submit comments throughout the post-hearing process, including on the proposed amendments, LURC's decision not to reopen the hearing was reasonable and within the bounds of its discretion. See Fichter, 604 A.2d at 438 (finding that additional procedures were not necessary when the parties had ample opportunity to present evidence). [¶ 39] In addition, neither Forest Ecology Network nor NRCM has identified any actual prejudice resulting from the process that LURC employed, other than that they were denied the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses regarding the amendments drafted by LURC. A right to cross-examine witnesses in a rulemaking proceeding is not required by LURC's procedural rules, the Maine Administrative Procedure Act, or due process of law. The only part of LURC's rules that addresses cross-examination is chapter 5, which governs the conduct of public hearings and grants parties the right to cross-examine witnesses who have provided direct testimony when a hearing is held. 4 C.M.R. 04-061 005-4 § 5.16(1)(b). However, as we have explained above, LURC is not required to hold a hearing at all when considering petitions to change land use district boundaries, and the procedures specifically governing review of such petitions make no reference to a right of cross-examination. See 4 C.M.R. 04-061 004-6 to -8 § 4.05 (making no reference to cross-examination in procedures governing LURC's consideration of a petition to change land use district boundaries). Additionally, the Maine Administrative Procedure Act addresses cross-examination only in the context of an adjudicatory proceeding, and makes no reference to a right to cross-examine witnesses in the context of a rulemaking proceeding. 5 M.R.S. §§ 9056-9057 (2011); see 5 M.R.S. §§ 8051-8064 (Maine Administrative Procedure Act subchapter on rulemaking). Finally, due process does not require that an agency afford an opportunity for cross-examination of every witness in all administrative hearings: Where the administrative process could be characterized as quasi-legislative, or investigative, due process has been found not to require cross-examination. In re Me. Clean Fuels, Inc., 310 A.2d 736, 747 (Me.1973) (footnotes omitted); see Fichter, 604 A.2d at 436-37. [¶ 40] NRCM also asserts that LURC's decision to accept additional comments and evidence regarding the amendments after the close of the hearing was in error because LURC was required to make decisions based solely on the record generated during the public hearings. This assertion is unfounded. Although agencies must make decisions based on the administrative record, Forbes v. Town of Southwest Harbor, 2001 ME 9, ¶ 14, 763 A.2d 1183, the record consists of much more than simply the testimony and other evidence introduced at a hearing. [8] LURC's rules provide that the hearing record also includes any other evidence received or considered. 4 C.M.R. 04-061 005-5 § 5.19. The rules also authorize the Commission to reopen the hearing record prior to adopting proposed land use boundaries and to extend the time for public comment. 4 C.M.R. 04-061 004-7 § 4.05(10)(c). The rules thus envision varied means by which LURC may gather information as part of a rulemaking process. [¶ 41] We give considerable deference to an agency's interpretation of its own rules, and the agency's interpretation will not be set aside unless the regulation or rule compels a contrary interpretation. Nelson, 2008 ME 91, ¶ 17, 953 A.2d 378. Affording this deference to LURC's application of its chapter 4 and chapter 5 rules in this case, there is no discernable error of law or abuse of discretion in the process that was employed, nor was there any actual prejudice resulting from that process. See Androscoggin Energy, LLC, 2003 ME 64, ¶ 9, 822 A.2d 1114. Because LURC did not violate its own rules or exceed the bounds of its discretion by deciding not to conduct a new evidentiary hearing on the final amendments to Plum Creek's concept plan, we vacate the judgment of the court.