Opinion ID: 2791033
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dr. DePaula

Text: Dr. DePaula is Ms. Duncan’s treating orthopedic surgeon. Ms. Duncan argues that the ALJ was “silent” as to the weight accorded Dr. DePaula’s opinions and failed to follow the sequential two-step inquiry in determining the weight assigned to a treating source’s medical opinion. Aplt. Opening Br. at 27-28; see also Krauser v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 1324, 1330 (10th Cir. 2011) (discussing two-step analytical framework for dealing with treating medical source opinions). In support, Ms. Duncan states that Dr. DePaula found that she had peripheral neuropathy with numbness at the wrist, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, diabetic neuropathy, and cervical disc disease but that the ALJ “gave no credit to these assessments and objective findings.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 28. Ms. Duncan is mistaken. The findings of Dr. DePaula identified by Ms. Duncan constitute the medical opinion of Dr. DePaula regarding medical diagnoses, which the ALJ properly considered and did not reject. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2) (providing that medical opinions are statements from physicians that reflect judgments concerning a claimant’s symptoms and diagnosis). Indeed, the ALJ found diabetes with diabetic neuropathy, mild carpal tunnel syndrome bilaterally, and degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine to be severe impairments. Ms. Duncan does not point to medical opinions of Dr. DePaula regarding work-related limitations attributed to the impairments he diagnosed or the placement of any significant exertional restrictions. See, e.g., Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1299 - 12 - (assessing treating source medical opinion concerning nature and severity of impairment that rendered claimant “unable to work an eight-hour day doing anything, sitting or standing” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Krauser, 638 F.3d at 1330 (assessing treating source’s opinion regarding exertional restrictions); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2) (providing that physician’s medical opinion may include opinion on what claimant can still do despite impairments and physical or mental restrictions). Given that the ALJ did not reject the medical impairments found by Dr. DePaula and there were no medical opinions regarding Ms. Duncan’s work-related functional limitations, there was no opinion on such matters by Dr. DePaula for the ALJ to weigh. Cf. Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1300-01 (reversing judgment of the district court where ALJ failed to perform analysis regarding weight to assign treating source’s opinion that claimant could not do anything sitting or standing in eight-hour workday). Ms. Duncan further faults the ALJ for failing to credit a parking placard application in which Dr. DePaula indicated the basis for the application was Ms. Duncan’s severely limited ability to walk due to her diabetic peripheral neuropathy. Dr. DePaula did not, however, identify a similar work-related restriction in his medical notes. In any event, the ALJ’s RFC limited Ms. Duncan to sedentary work and standing and/or walking to two hours in an eight-hour workday. Finally, Ms. Duncan’s claim of error regarding Dr. DePaula’s opinion that Ms. Duncan is disabled and should get vocational rehabilitation is meritless. As the ALJ explained, - 13 - that is an opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner and, therefore, is not entitled to controlling weight or special significance. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3).