Opinion ID: 161267
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: As Applied Challenge to the Unattended Display Ban: Selective Enforcement

Text: 66 As to the application of the policy, Plaintiffs have presented no probative evidence to counter Mr. Hall's testimony that the policy is and always has been enforced in a uniform, non-discriminatory manner, without regard to content or viewpoint. Aplt. App. at 92-93, 97, 107. We have given careful consideration to the Columbine displays, see Aplt. App. at 73, 77, 92-93, 97; Aplt. Add. at 5-8 (Pl. Ex. 7-10), taking judicial notice of the facts surrounding those displays, see Fed. R. Evid. 201(b), (c), and we conclude that the plaintiffs' selective enforcement claim is not supported by the record. On April 20, 1999, two masked gunmen opened fire on their fellow students at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado. The shooters murdered thirteen high school students, then killed themselves. An additional twenty-three students were hospitalized, twenty-one with gunshot wounds. On April 21-22, 1999, the City of Denver sponsored a memorial event in Civic Center Park, which is across the street from the City and County Building at issue in this appeal. Aplt. App. at 93. Simultaneous with that event, grieving citizens left various items in the nature of teddy bears, flowers, and notes on the interior sidewalks surrounding the East Steps in order to express solidarity with the victims and their families. Aplt. Add. at 5-8 (Pl. Ex. 7-10). 67 Despite the unattended display ban, which applies to the interior sidewalks as well as the East Steps, Mayor Webb elected to postpone removing those items for ten to fourteen days. Aplt. App. at 73, 97. According to Mr. Hall, the mayor's decision was based on the particularly tragic nature of that event, the heinous nature of the crime, and simply the outpouring of sympathy from Denver's community. Id. at 93. Like the district court, we believe that the Columbine shooting was so unique and so extraordinarily horrific that the mayor's decision not to remove the mourners' teddy bears and flowers is simply not probative as to the general operation of the unattended display ban. See id. at 140 (I can't really give weight to [the Columbine displays] as some evidence that there is no policy, because that was a totally unique situation. That was a situation which never arose before and probably hopefully never will arise again.) (statement by court). On direct examination, even Ms. Wells expressed doubts as to whether the Columbine display was properly described as an exception to their policy [concerning] unattended displays . . . . Id. at 73. 68 We must also reject Plaintiffs' contention that the district court erroneously denied them the opportunity to develop a complete factual record on the issue of selective enforcement. Aplt. Br. at 14. At the hearing on Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive relief, the City objected to the following question, posed to Mr. Hall: You think the Columbine situation is more important than Ms. Wells' sign? Aplt. App. at 98. The court sustained the objection on the grounds that the question was not only argumentative, but also irrelevant in that it asked the witness his personal views about which is more important. Id. at 99. We see no abuse of discretion in the court's ruling. 69 III. Free Exercise, Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Challenges 70 Plaintiffs' remaining constitutional arguments are somewhat elusive. The underlying premise for all three challenges is that the Winter Solstice sign is religious in the sense that atheism is a belief system that competes with theistic religions . . . . Aplt. Br. at 20. Plaintiffs cite no legal authority for this proposition, but as we did in Otero v. State Election Bd. of Okla., 975 F.2d 738, 740 (10th Cir. 1992), we will assume, without deciding, that atheism is a religion for First Amendment purposes. Next, the plaintiffs claim that: 71 By keeping [the Winter Solstice] sign off the steps of City [sic] and by imposing . . . restrictions on it that do not apply to the creche [presumably, the unattended display ban], the City is preferring Christianity over non-religion and theism over atheism. This abridges Wells' right . . . to free exercise of her religious beliefs under the First Amendment and is a denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. It is also an unconstitutional establishment of religion under the First Amendment because it violates the second prong [of] the Lemon test . . . . 72 Aplt. Br. at 20-21 (footnote omitted); cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (articulating three-part test for Establishment Clause challenges: first, the governmental action at issue must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, [it] must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Beyond Lemon, Plaintiffs cite no legal authority for these assertions. 73 Because the challenged policies are both generally applicable and neutral as to religion, the free exercise claims must fail. See Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F.3d 1180, 1181-82 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that religion-neutral law that is generally applicable does not violate Free Exercise Clause, despite incidental effect on religious practice); accord Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990). The plaintiffs' claims under the Establishment Clause are also unavailing. As to the exclusion of the Winter Solstice sign from the City's display, we find the reasoning employed by Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church & State v. City & County of Denver, 508 F. Supp. 823 (D. Colo. 1981), aff'd, No. 82-1022 (10th Cir. May 14, 1984) (unpublished order), to be persuasive. See supra note 3. The fact that the present plaintiffs seek to add to the City's display, rather than to dismantle it, makes no difference to the Establishment Clause analysis. Cf. Snyder, 159 F.3d at 1233 (rejecting Establishment Clause claim by individual seeking equal public access to a legislative body's program of invocational prayers). With respect to the unattended display ban, Plaintiffs fail on each prong of the Lemon test. 11 As explained in our discussion of the significant governmental interests supporting the policy, see supra at 1147-48, the unattended display ban has a secular purpose. Cf. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. There is no evidence that the policy's principal or primary effect either advances [or] inhibits religion, id. (citation omitted), nor does it foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. Id. at 613 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 74 Plaintiffs' equal protection claims are also without merit. Contrary to Plaintiffs' characterization, the display, including the Happy Holidays sign, is the City's speech. As explained, the plaintiffs have no First Amendment rights to dictate the content of that speech. Thus, there is no evidence that the plaintiffs have been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (citations omitted). Without such evidence, the equal protection claim must fail. Nor is there any evidence that similarly situated persons were subject to differential treatment with respect to the unattended display ban. As noted in our discussion of the plaintiffs' selective enforcement claim, the Columbine mourners were not similarly situated. See supra at 1151-52. 75 For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judgment is AFFIRMED. Addendum 76 [Tabular or Graphical Material Omitted] 77 Aplee. Supp. App. at 2 (Def. Ex. C). [Tabular or Graphical Material Omitted] 78 Aplt. Add. at 2 (Pl. Ex. 3).