Opinion ID: 2633789
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: State v. Favela

Text: In reversing the sentencing court's decision to issue a departure sentence, the Court of Appeals relied on Favela, 259 Kan. 215, 911 P.2d 792. There, the defendant had witnessed his brother being stabbed by Willard LaGrange. After taking his brother to the hospital, the defendant returned to the scene of the stabbing and brandished a gun, threatening to kill LaGrange but not pointing his gun at any person. Eventually, he surrendered to the police without firing a shot. He pled no contest to attempted second-degree murder, which with a criminal history of H carried a presumptive prison sentence of 51 to 59 months, with postrelease supervision of 24 months. 259 Kan. at 216-17, 911 P.2d 792. The defendant filed a motion for departure from the presumptive sentence, listing six mitigating circumstances which he contended justified departure. The sentencing court, finding that the crime committed was more like an aggravated assault, granted both a durational and dispositional departure. The defendant was sentenced to a reduced prison term of 14 months, the term of imprisonment was suspended, and the defendant was placed on probation for a term of 36 months during which the defendant was to be supervised by community corrections. In Favela, the Court of Appeals concluded that the sentencing court's reasoning that the defendant was over-charged is not a substantial and compelling reason to depart. State v. Favela, 21 Kan.App.2d 202, 212, 898 P.2d 1165 (1995), rev'd 259 Kan. 215, 911 P.2d 792 (1996). On petition for review, this court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision to vacate and remand for resentencing. The Favela court noted that the sentencing court specifically based the departure on other factors-the degree of harm associated with the crime was less than typical and the victim was an aggressor or participant in the underlying altercation. Also, the sentencing court adopted the mitigating factors set out in the defendant's motion for departure as justifications, such as age, immaturity, and lack of a serious prior record. See 259 Kan. at 222-26, 234-39, 911 P.2d 792. The Favela court further rejected, the State's contention that this type of sentence departure violated separation of powers by negating the prosecutor's decision to prosecute the defendant for attempted second-degree murder: [T]he [sentencing] court here accepted the defendant's plea of no contest for attempted second-degree murder, thereby acknowledging that the county attorney has the right to determine what crime a defendant is charged with. The court did not attempt to dismiss or amend the defendant's charge as the court in [ State v. ] Williamson [, 253 Kan. 163, 853 P.2d 56 (1993),] did. The sentencing court merely exercised its power of sentencing under K.S.A.1994 Supp. 21-4716, which grants the sentencing judge the right to depart from a presumptive sentence. 259 Kan. at 222, 911 P.2d 792. The Favela court found that, after determining there were substantial and compelling reasons to depart, the sentencing court viewed the penalty for aggravated assault and determined that a similar sentence would be appropriate. Although the sentencing court might have chosen different words that would have made its intention more clear, the Favela court's examination of the record showed that the judge was merely explaining why he chose the particular sentence and was not usurping the prosecutor's power. 259 Kan. at 224, 911 P.2d 792. Under the circumstances and after considering the mitigating factors in favor of departing from the presumptive sentence, the Favela court upheld the defendant's departure sentence. 259 Kan. at 244, 911 P.2d 792.