Opinion ID: 4556341
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Requiring Defendant to Wear Stun Cuff

Text: {¶ 135} In his tenth proposition of law, Kirkland contends that the trial court denied him due process of law by requiring him to stand trial wearing a “stun cuff,” a remotely controlled taser worn around the ankle, underneath the pants leg. {¶ 136} Due process “prohibit[s] the use of physical restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court determination    that they are justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial.” (Emphasis added.) Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 629, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005). This applies to both phases of a capital proceeding. Id. at 632-633. {¶ 137} Before trial, at the request of the Hamilton County sheriff’s department, the trial court held a hearing on security measures. Deputy Sheriff Emily Rose testified, asking that Kirkland be ordered to wear a stun cuff. Although the defense questioned Rose, it did not object to or argue against the use of a stun 36 January Term, 2020 cuff. The trial judge granted the request, cautioning, “[The cuff] needs to stay not visible” to the jury. {¶ 138} Kirkland argues that the stun cuff was not needed to maintain courtroom security, because there was no evidence he was a security threat. He further contends that worrying about being tased distracted him from “adequately and effectively participat[ing] in his defense.” {¶ 139} By failing to object at trial, Kirkland forfeited all but plain error, and no plain error occurred here. The prohibition in Deck, 544 U.S. 622, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953, “concerned only visible restraints at trial” (emphasis sic), Mendoza v. Berghuis, 544 F.3d 650, 654 (6th Cir.2008), and thus, “a claim based on Deck ‘rises or falls on the question of whether the [restraining device] was visible to the jury,’ ” Leonard v. Warden, 846 F.3d 832, 842 (6th Cir.2017), quoting Earhart v. Konteh, 589 F.3d 337, 349 (6th Cir.2009). The trial court’s order specified that “[t]he physical restraints used at trial shall be concealed so as not to be visible to the jury.” And nothing in the record suggests that the jury could see the stun cuff. {¶ 140} Kirkland does not dispute that the cuff was concealed but argues that the officer holding the remote control was visible to the jury. Perhaps, but nothing in the record suggests that jurors could see the remote control either. Speculation about the remote control is not enough to establish plain error. Hence, Kirkland’s tenth proposition of law is overruled.