Opinion ID: 1900201
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Permit Cross-Examination of Witnesses

Text: In the hearing held before the Health Systems Agency, each party was afforded full opportunity to present its view and to criticize the other's, but certain features of adjudicatory hearings such as the opportunity for cross-examination of witnesses were not present. The plaintiffs challenge the Department's procedures, relying upon the Maine Administrative Procedure Act, due process, and federal law.
The plaintiffs argue that the certificate proceedings are adjudicatory proceedings as defined in the APA, 5 M.R.S.A. § 8002(1), and therefore adjudicatory features such as cross-examination and swearing of witnesses are required. See 5 M.R. S.A. §§ 9056(2), 9057(3). It is not at all certain that the plaintiffs properly preserved this issue for review by previously raising it in their request for reconsideration. Assuming that the issue is properly before us, we conclude that the statutory scheme of the Certificate of Need Law as a whole indicates a legislative intent that the hearing and review process be separate from the APA. See Sanford Highway Unit of Local 481 v. Town of Sanford, Me., 411 A.2d 1010 (1980). Therefore, the APA adjudicatory procedures are not required. Several characteristics of the Certificate of Need Law are inconsistent with the APA's adjudicatory procedures. First, the expeditious review and hearing process, required by the time limits imposed by 22 M.R.S.A. § 307(3), would be difficult to meet if the APA's adjudicatory hearing provisions apply. Second, the provisions for a hearing in the review process clearly are inconsistent with adjudicatory safeguards. For example, a hearing is held if requested during the course of a review by either the department or the Health Systems Agency. 22 M.R.S.A. § 307(2). At this hearing, any person may present testimony. See 42 C.F.R. § 123.407(7)(i). The administrative record does not immediately close following the hearing. The Department is not precluded from taking additional information, especially where, as here, the hearing was held by the Health Systems Agency. Although the Health Systems Agency issued an opinion after the hearing, that opinion did not bind the Department. In contrast, the APA limits public participation in adjudicatory proceedings, 5 M.R. S.A. § 9054, and requires that the decision be based only on evidence or other material submitted by the parties and entered in the record. Id. § 9059(4). Furthermore, the Department's choice between competing applications need not be based solely on a determination of which of the two facilities meets predetermined standards. The Department must conduct a wider range of independent investigation to determine facts and . . . a more complex balancing and reconciliation of interrelated interests, both public and private, to arrive at its conclusions. Cumberland Farms Northern, Inc. v. Maine Milk Commission, Me., 428 A.2d 869, 874 (1981). Based on these distinctions, we conclude that the APA's adjudicatory procedures do not apply.
The requirements of due process vary with the type of proceeding. [I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional of substitute procedural requirement would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 33 (1976); see In re Maine Clean Fuels, Inc., Me., 310 A.2d 736, 746-48 (1973). Wyman contends that the Department's procedures deprived it of due process in that the parties should have been granted the right of cross-examination at the hearing. The Superior Court observed that for the certificate of need proceedings due process required that the applicants have the opportunity to present their proposals and that the applicants and the public be able to comment critically on competing applications. We agree with the Superior Court's assessment of what process was due, and with the court's conclusion the adequate procedures were provided. Moreover, we do not see what additional benefit the plaintiffs would have gained from cross-examining witnesses. The applicants had ample opportunity at the hearing to furnish to the MHSA material both in support of their own application and critical of the competing application. Further, the parties were permitted to comment on criticisms of their proposals. The plaintiffs have not demonstrated how they were prejudiced by lack of cross-examination. See In re Maine Clean Fuels, Inc., 310 A.2d at 748. In short, we find no deprivation of due process resulting from the procedures used by the Department.
The plaintiffs raise for the first time on appeal their contention that a 1979 amendment to the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300k-300n-5 (1974-1980 Supp. Pamphlet), required the Department to provide trial-type procedures during the review of certificate of need applications. This amendment, Pub. L. No. 96-79, § 116(d) states: The following procedural requirements with respect to proceedings under a certificate of need program: (A) Hearings under a certificate of need program shall be held before a State Agency or a health systems agency to which the State Agency has delegated the authority to hold such a hearing. In a hearing under the program, any person shall have the right to be represented by counsel and to present oral or written arguments and evidence relevant to the matter which is the subject of the hearing, any person directly affected by the matter which is the subject of the hearing may conduct reasonable questioning of persons who make factual allegations relevant to such matter, and a record of the hearing shall be maintained. The requirements of this subparagraph do not apply to hearings held by a health systems agency in the performance of a review under section 300 l -2(f) . . . . 42 U.S.C.A. § 300n-1(b)(12) (1974-1980 Supp.Pamphlet). This amendment, however, would not apply in the instant matter if the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare determined that the amendment's effective date should be delayed with respect to proceedings in this State. See Pub. L.No.96-79, § 129(b)(2). The defendants furnished to this Court documents purporting to show that the Secretary of H.E.W. made the necessary determination that would delay the amendment's effective date. Wyman filed a motion to strike these documents. We do not reach this issue because Wyman failed to preserve this issue for review. The applicability of this amendment depends on a factual finding of whether the Secretary made the necessary determination; that factual finding should be made at the administrative level. See August Realty, Inc. v. Inhabitants of Town of York, Me., 431 A.2d 1289, 1290 (1981). The parties in an administrative proceeding must raise any objections to the agency's practice at the administrative level in order to preserve their rights to appeal. Mechanic Falls Water Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, Me., 381 A.2d 1080, 1105 (1977). The reason for the rule is so the agency and not the appellate court should have the first opportunity to rule on the objectionable practice. Id. By failing to properly raise the issue when they had the opportunity, the plaintiffs forfeited the possibility of appellate review. [4]