Opinion ID: 1208799
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Daubert, Kumho Tire and Wilt

Text: In Daubert, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the traditional general acceptance test enunciated in Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 47, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923), which required that a scientific technique be generally accepted as reliable in the scientific community in order to be admissible, was superseded by the adoption of the federal rules of evidence. 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469. The Court, in stating that the rules provide the standard for admitting expert testimony, analyzed Rule 702 and found that nothing in the rule stated that general acceptance was a prerequisite to admissibility. Subsequently, in Wilt, 191 W.Va. 39, 443 S.E.2d 196, this Court concluded that Daubert's analysis of Federal Rule 702 should be followed in analyzing the admissibility of ex, pert testimony under Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence. Neither decision explicitly, or implicitly, cautions against utilizing summary judgment in the expert admissibility context. To the contrary, the Daubert Court specifically cautioned that the Rules themselves place no limits on the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence. Nor is the trial judge disabled from screening such evidence. To the contrary, under the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588, 113 S.Ct. at 2795. It is well recognized that because [t]he law must seek decisions that fall within the boundaries of scientifically sound knowledge, Honorable Stephen Bryer, Introduction to Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 4 (2d ed.2000), Daubert imposed a gatekeeping function for trial courts to ensure that only relevant and reliable scientific evidence reaches the jury. (emphasis added). Rule of Evidence 702 imposes a special obligation upon a trial judge to ensure that any and all scientific testimony . . . is not only relevant, but reliable. ' Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1177, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999)(quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786) (emphasis added). The very purpose of Daubert, is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.  Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (emphasis added). The trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable. Id., 526 U.S. at 151, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (emphasis added). It is crucial that the factor of reliability continue to be determined by the circuit court, in its gatekeeper capacity; not the jury, under the rubric of weight. Because reliability is properly an issue of admissibility, not weight, this is not an issue within the province of the jury to conclude. I fear that holdings such as the majority's opinion herein will give the illusion that reliability is, in essence, virtually an issue of weight. We must be reminded that, In analyzing the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, the trial court's initial inquiry must consider whether the testimony is based on an assertion or inference derived from the scientific methodology. Moreover, the testimony must be relevant to a fact in issue. Further assessment should then be made in regard to the expert testimony's reliability by considering its underlying scientific methodology and reasoning. This includes an assessment of (a) whether the scientific theory and its conclusion can be and have been tested; (b) whether the scientific theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; (c) whether the scientific theory's actual or potential rate of error is known; and (d) whether the scientific theory is generally accepted within the scientific community. Syl. Pt. 2, Wilt v. Buracker, 191 W.Va. 39, 443 S.E.2d 196 (emphasis added). Undoubtedly, when an expert opinion is based on data, a methodology, or studies that are simply inadequate to support the conclusions reached, Daubert and Rule 702 mandate the exclusion of that unreliable opinion testimony.  Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 266 (2d Cir.2002) (emphasis added).