Opinion ID: 196752
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Equitable Estoppel and Promissory Estoppel

Text: 35 Hodgkins also seeks damages under theories of equitable estoppel and promissory estoppel. Under Maine law, equitable estoppel bars the assertion of the truth by one whose misleading conduct has induced another to act to his detriment in reliance on what is untrue. See Anderson v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Human Servs., 489 A.2d 1094, 1099 (Me.1985) (adding that [a] misunderstanding will not support application of equitable estoppel). According to Maine law on promissory estoppel, [a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. Martin v. Scott Paper Co., 511 A.2d 1048, 1050 (Me.1986). 36 Hodgkins contends that, taken as a whole, the IAW program encouraged the submission of ideas and made specific representations to employees, including Hodgkins, about the evaluation process and the compensation to be paid for ideas that produced financial results. Hodgkins argues that under Maine's doctrine of equitable estoppel, NET's course of conduct precludes NET from asserting rights of contract against Hodgkins, since Hodgkins in good faith relied upon NET's conduct and was led thereby to change his position for the worse. See, e.g., Waterville Homes, Inc. v. Maine Dep't of Transp., 589 A.2d 455, 457 (Me.1991). Citing Martin, 511 A.2d at 1050 (Me.1986), Hodgkins also argues that promissory estoppel similarly applies. 37 The district court found this argument unconvincing because it concluded that since the various IAW program publications made it clear that NET retained complete discretion as to the evaluation methods and conclusions, it would have been unreasonable for Hodgkins to conclude that such publications promised him an award. Furthermore, the district court found that Hodgkins could not have reasonably relied on the NET employee newsletter of January 3, 1991, listing him as having submitted a winning idea, since: (1) Hodgkins knew that the announcement was made before his idea was even implemented, let alone evaluated after one year; (2) the newsletter reference to 15 percent of the estimated savings is a clear reference to an Initial Award for a tangible idea, not a Special Merit Award; and (3) the announcement's reference to a Tangible Award for Hodgkins clearly meant an Initial Award, since the IAW program rules and publications use the term tangible to describe Initial Awards for tangible ideas, but not Special Merit Awards. 38 On appeal, Hodgkins attempts to sidestep the district court's analysis in two ways. First, he asserts that a factual question existed as to whether Hodgkins' reliance on NET's promise was reasonable, since he had used his experience projecting costs for NET to estimate the likely savings that NET would realize from implementing his idea. Second, Hodgkins contends that taken as a whole, rather than looking at the IAW program publications and the NET newsletter in isolation, NET's conduct justifies both estoppel theories. 39 We find the district court's analysis convincing nonetheless. With respect to his first assertion, regardless of his assessment of likely savings from his idea, under an equitable estoppel theory Hodgkins was required to show he reasonably relied or that NET made statements which it should reasonably have expected to induce Hodgkins' actions. The argument that a factual question existed as to his estimates simply does not respond to the crux of the district court's analysis: that his reliance was not reasonable. With respect to Hodgkins' emphasis on the IAW program taken as a whole forming an issue of triable fact, that allegation by itself does not convert the issue into a question of fact for the jury. Because Hodgkins has failed in his brief to point to evidence other than that considered by the district court in assessing NET's conduct under equitable estoppel, we cannot determine what additional facts Hodgkins may be referring to by his invocation of a holistic approach. As a result of this failure to point to other competent evidence to surmount a supported summary judgment motion, see Thomas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 505, 510 (1st Cir.1994) (noting that [t]o avoid summary judgment, a nonmoving party must be able to point to some specific, competent evidence in support of its claim); Cloutier v. Town of Epping, 714 F.2d 1184, 1192 (1st Cir.1983) (surmount[ing] a supported motion for summary judgment requires that plaintiffs set forth specific facts showing a triable issue), we conclude that the IAW program publications and the NET newsletter compose the competent evidence regarding the relevant course of conduct for both estoppel theories. We agree with the district court's discussion of this evidence, and find that, under an equitable estoppel theory, Hodgkins could not have reasonably relied on statements or conduct as evidenced in these sources. For the same reasons, under a promissory estoppel theory, NET should not reasonably have expected to induce Hodgkins' actions in reliance. 3