Opinion ID: 1981283
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: was the plaintiff in the course of his employment at the time of the injury?

Text: The plaintiff's argument was accepted by the Court of Appeals which concluded: The term course of employment as used in the statute is the equivalent of the `service of the ship' formula used in maintenance and cure cases. Braen v Pfeifer Oil Transportation Co, 361 US 129; 80 S Ct 247; 4 L Ed 2d 191 (1959). The United States Supreme Court has long held that a seaman on shore leave is in the service of the ship. Warren v United States, 340 US 523; 71 S Ct 432; 95 L Ed 503, 509 (1951). A seaman on shore leave is, therefore, in the course of his employment. Central Gulf Steamship Corp v Sambula, 405 F2d 291, 298-299 (CA 5, 1968); Marceau v Great Lakes Transit Corp, 146 F2d 416, 418-419 (CA 2, 1945). Defendant concedes that a seaman on shore leave is in the service of the ship for purposes of recovering maintenance and cure. However, defendant argues that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that a seaman on shore leave is in the course of his employment for the purposes of the Jones Act. Our review of the cases cited by both parties convinces us that the Court of Appeals clearly erred, and that defendant was entitled to a directed verdict. In Braen, supra, pp 132-133, petitioner was ordered to replace worn decking on a repair raft. He was injured when a catwalk gave way, and he brought suit under the Jones Act. In reviewing whether the injury occurred in the course of petitioner's employment, the United States Supreme Court stated: The fact that the injury did not occur on the vessel is not controlling, as Senko v LaCrosse Dredging Corp, [352 US 370, 373; 77 S Ct 415; 1 L Ed 2d 404 (1957)], holds. A seaman may often be sent off ship to perform duties of his employment. O'Donnell v Great Lakes [ Dredge & Dock ] Co, [318 US 36; 63 S Ct 488; 87 L Ed 596 (1943)]. In Marceau v Great Lakes Transit Corp , (CA 2 NY [1945]) 146 F2d 416, a ship's cook was allowed to recover under the Jones Act when, pursuant to duty, he was returning to the ship and was injured on the dock while approaching a ladder used as ingress to the vessel. We held that a seaman who was injured on the dock while departing from the ship on shore leave was in the service of the vessel and was entitled to recover for maintenance and cure in Aguilar v Standard Oil Co, 318 US 724 [63 S Ct 930; 87 L Ed 1107 (1943)]. It was there recognized that a seaman is as much in the service of his ship when boarding it on first reporting for duty, quitting it on being discharged, or going to and from the ship while on shore leave, as he is while on board at high sea. Id., at 736-737. We also held that a seaman injured in a dance hall while on shore leave was in the service of his ship in Warren v United States, 340 US 523, 529. These two cases were not brought under the Jones Act but involved maintenance and cure. Yet they make clear that the scope of a seaman's employment or the activities which are related to the furtherance of the vessel are not measured by the standards applied to land-based employment relationships. They also supply relevant guides to the meaning of the term course of employment under the Act since it is the equivalent of the service of the ship formula used in maintenance and cure cases. See Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty, p 284. And see O'Donnell v Great Lakes [ Dredge & Dock ] Co , supra at 43; Marceau v Great Lakes Transit Corp, supra . Petitioner in the present case was ordered by a superior to perform some carpentry work on a raft which lay between the lighter and the dock. Petitioner was injured, as we have said, while on the catwalk attempting to move the raft into position for boarding. The raft was used to facilitate chipping, painting and welding on respondent's vessels. Cf. Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co v Rohde, 257 US 469 [42 S Ct 157; 66 L Ed 321 (1922)]. New decking was to be installed on the raft. The fact that the raft was not presently being used to repair respondent's barge is in our view immaterial. Petitioner was acting in the course of his employment at the time of the injury, for at that moment he was doing the work of his employer pursuant to his employer's orders. No more is required by the Jones Act, as the O'Donnell case indicates, petitioner being a seaman who was injured as a consequence of the negligence of his employer. [Emphasis supplied.] We agree with the defendant that the Court of Appeals placed improper emphasis on portions of Braen, while ignoring its holding. Aguilar and Warren are relevant guides in determining the meaning of in the course of his employment, but those cases involved claims for maintenance and cure. As interpreted by Braen, the seaman must be doing the work of his employer pursuant to his employer's orders at the time of the injury. No more is required under the act ( Braen, supra ), but we are asked whether the act can be satisfied with less. Cf. Vincent v Harvey Well Service, 441 F2d 146, 148 (CA 5, 1971). [6] In answering this question, we note that recovery under the Jones Act does not depend on the location of an injury, but instead on the nature of the service and its relationship to the operation of the vessel plying in navigable waters. O'Donnell, supra, pp 42-43. We cannot ignore the phrase in the course of his employment, because it was intended to mean what it says. Id. Under these facts, we find that the Court of Appeals erred by taking an analytical step which implies that a seaman on shore leave is always in the course of his employment. The Court of Appeals cited Marceau, supra, and Sambula, supra, in support of its analytical step. In Marceau, the plaintiff was ashore on personal business, but was ordered to return at a designated time to provide the night lunch. He slipped on the dock near the ship's ladder, and sued for damages under the Jones Act. The Marceau court stated: The defendant's other two contentions are likewise without merit. The plaintiff was acting under orders when he returned to the ship. Consequently at the time of the accident he was not only acting in the course of his employment but suffered his injuries while on property in the possession and under the control of the defendant as lessee and over which the plaintiff had to pass in order to return to his work. Under the decisions a man is acting in the course of his employment when coming to or returning from work, and upon the employer's premises or upon adjacent property if approaching by a customary route. Wong Bar v Suburban Petroleum Transport, 2 Cir, 119 F2d 745 [1941]. [Emphasis supplied. Id., p 418.] Even though the Marceau court did not have the benefit of the Braen analysis at the time it rendered a decision, Marceau still emphasized that the plaintiff was acting under orders when he returned to the ship. Szopko notes that Braen cited Marceau. However, Braen also noted that the petitioner in Marceau was acting pursuant to duty. Thus, the relevant focus in Marceau was on whether the plaintiff was performing his duty in the course of his employment at the time of the injury. [7] The Court of Appeals also cited Sambula. In that case, the plaintiff was assaulted while on shore leave and received a cut beside his eye. The plaintiff was taken to a public hospital and later allowed to join his vessel for the remainder of the voyage. Complications resulted in the loss of the plaintiff's eye. The plaintiff argued that he should have been treated by a specialist and that the shipowner was negligent in the administration of medical care. The Sambula court stated: In Nowery v Smith, ED Pa 1946, 69 F Supp 755, aff'd 3 Cir 1947; 161 F2d 732, it was held that a seaman was in the course of his employment, as that phrase is used in the Jones Act, while enjoying his shore leave in a foreign port. [405 F2d 298.] However, the court also noted: The preceding language from Nowery v Smith does not mean that a seaman may recover under the Jones Act for all injuries sustained while he is on shore leave; it means only that recovery cannot be denied solely on the ground that a seaman, while on shore leave, is not in the course of his employment. Annot, 4 L Ed 2d 1777, 1782 at fn 5. [ Id., p 298, n 4.] Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in citing Marceau and Sambula for the proposition that a seaman on shore leave is always in the course of his employment. We hold that, for purposes of a Jones Act claim, a seaman is in the course of his employment if he is doing the work of his employer pursuant to his employer's orders, Braen, supra, or when the nature of the service rendered and its relation to the operation of the vessel, O'Donnell, supra, is of such a nature that a seaman may be deemed in the course of his employment. We decline to adopt a more precise rule since this determination should be made case by case. However, given the facts of the present case, we find that plaintiff was not in the course of his employment at the time of the injury. By his own admission, he was off duty and on his own time. He did not have to return to work until 8:00 A.M. the next morning. He was returning from several hours of drinking, clearly a personal excursion. [8] Plaintiff finally argues that he was in the course of his employment because he was returning with a carton of cigarettes he purchased at the request of his supervisor. The Court of Appeals analysis did not require a discussion of this theory. However, even taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the proofs indicate that this action was strictly a personal favor as opposed to an order from a supervisor. According to Szopko's own testimony, he was off duty until his regular shift started the next morning and was not working at the time of the injury. [9] For all of these reasons, we hold that the lower courts erred in failing to direct a verdict in defendant's favor, because plaintiff was not in the course of his employment at the time of his injury.