Opinion ID: 540898
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Erosion of External Corroboration.

Text: 43 A requirement that the immigration judge must find the alien's testimony incredible signals the further erosion of external corroboration requirements. Although the alien must produce some evidence to show that persecution, if carried out, would be directed toward the alien as an individual, Estrada v. INS, 775 F.2d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir.1985), the alien may produce such evidence in our circuit by means of his own testimony. See, e.g., Artiga-Turcios, 829 F.2d at 723. 44 Such evidence is highly subjective, and being filtered through the lense of the alien's experience, it may be distorted. Accordingly, every circuit but this one has required external corroborating evidence. See, e.g., Gumbol v. INS, 815 F.2d 406, 409, 412 (6th Cir.1987) (finding petitioner's own testimony without more evidence insufficient to show clear probability of future persecution); Cruz-Lopez v. INS, 802 F.2d 1518, 1520-21 (4th Cir.1986) (following Seventh Circuit requirement that alien must offer specific facts that he will more likely than not be singled out for persecution) (quoting Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 573 (7th Cir.1984)); Farzad v. INS, 802 F.2d 123, 125 (5th Cir.1986) (per curiam) (finding petitioner's own testimony insufficient without external evidence of political dissidence for showing of persecution); McLeod v. INS, 802 F.2d 89, 93 (3d Cir.1986) (requiring aliens to present some objective evidence establishing a realistic likelihood that he would be persecuted in his native land); Carvajal-Munoz, 743 F.2d at 573 (requiring specific, objective facts that this particular alien is being singled out for persecution). 45 The case before us illustrates our failure to require corroboration. The letter would perhaps have been such evidence, but Mendoza is unable to produce it. We do not require its production. It is thus unlikely that Mendoza would prevail in any circuit but this one. 46 An equally troubling dimension of this erosion of external evidentiary requirements is that it underscores our departure from the general rule of deference to administrative decisions. The extent to which the other circuit courts of appeal disagree with our court's approach is well-illustrated by a recent decision of the Eleventh Circuit. Unlike the Ninth Circuit, that court deferentially reviews decisions of the executive branch in this field. In Perlera-Escobar v. Executive Office for Immigration, 894 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir.1990), the court recently upheld an order denying a withholding of deportation because it found no linkage between the persecution and the alien's political opinion, as required by the statute. In a revealing passage, made all the more so by the striking difference it exposes between the approaches of these two circuits, the court stated: 47 Where Congress has made either an explicit or an implicit delegation of authority to an agency to fill the gaps in a statute and to provide meaning to particular terms of a statute, we must give considerable weight to the executive department's construction. See Chevron [v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) ] at 843, 104 S.Ct. [2778] at 2781-82 [81 L.Ed.2d 694]. We may not substitute our own construction for a reasonable interpretation made by the BIA. Id.; see also INS v. Cardoza Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1222, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987) (in the process of filling 'any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress,' the courts must respect the interpretation of the agency to which Congress has delegated the responsibility for administering the statutory program.); Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285, 289 (5th Cir.1987) ([W]e accord deference to the Board's interpretation of immigration statutes unless there are compelling indications that the Board's interpretation is wrong.). We conclude that the BIA's determination that neither the retribution Escobar fears from the guerillas for having deserted them nor the investigation that he fears the government will undertake and the punishment it might exact because of his association with the guerrillas constitutes persecution ... on account of ... political opinion is reasonable. 48 Id. at 1296-97 (footnote omitted). 49 We of the Ninth Circuit do not speak in those tones. 50