Opinion ID: 204100
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interpreting lawful admission for permanent residence

Text: As used in the INA, [t]he term `lawfully admitted for permanent residence' means the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(p) (same, and providing further that [s]uch status terminates upon entry of a final administrative order of exclusion, deportation, or removal). In its October 27, 2008 order, the BIA, in issuing a final administrative order for Petitioner's removal, held that the IJ correctly found that Petitioner was not lawfully admitted to the United States as a permanent resident because his LPR status was acquired through the fraud or misrepresentation of third parties, the Walkers. The BIA noted that its determination was guided by its decision in Matter of Koloamatangi, in which the BIA determined that an alien who had acquired LPR status through fraud was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he had never been lawfully admitted. 23 I. & N. Dec. 548 (B.I.A. 2003). But in Koloamatangi, the BIA based its ruling on reasoning beyond mere fraud. In fact, the BIA considered sound observations from the Fifth and Ninth Circuits that the term `lawfully admitted for permanent residence' did not apply to aliens who had obtained their permanent resident status by fraud, or had otherwise not been entitled to it. Id. at 550 (emphasis added and citations omitted). In Koloamatangi, the BIA ultimately found that the correct interpretation of the term `lawfully admitted for permanent residence' is that an alien is deemed, ab initio, never to have obtained lawful permanent resident status once his original ineligibility therefor is determined in proceedings. Id. at 551. In that 2008 order, the BIA further noted that the same reasoning must apply in Petitioner's case. The BIA asserted that it does not matter that the [Petitioner] may have played no part in the fraud or misrepresentation which enabled him to acquire LPR status because no finding of fraud on his part is required to determine that the [Petitioner's] admission was not lawful. In re Walker, No. A043-219-583 (B.I.A. Oct. 27, 2008). As noted in Part II(A), we are required to afford some degree of deference to the BIA's interpretation in this matter. Our own precedent supports this outcome. In Mejía-Orellana, we found that the BIA's interpretation of lawfully admitted for permanent residence was reasonable when it concluded that an alien who has acquired his `[LPR] status' by fraud or misrepresentation has not been lawfully admitted and so is ineligible for a cancellation of removal. 502 F.3d at 14, 16. We reasoned that any other reading would encourage fraud and misrepresentation in the process of application for lawful permanent resident status. Id. at 16. We further noted, in citing case law from the Second, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, that [o]ther courts have upheld this interpretation of the same phrase in different sections of the [INA]: The natural reading of `lawful' connotes more than just procedural regularity; it suggests that the substance of an action complied with the governing law. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Petitioner argues in his brief that his lack of intent is crucial to this case. He contends that [i]ntent is what the statute requires. Pet'r's Br. at 8. To support his argument, he cites 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), which states that any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure . . . a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States . . . is inadmissible. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (emphasis added). [2] Petitioner also cites United States v. Dixon, which states that an act is done willfully if done intentionally and deliberately and if it is not the result of innocent mistake, negligence or inadvertence. 536 F.2d 1388, 1397 (2d Cir. 1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). Pet'r's Br. at 8. However, as respondent correctly points out: Walker's argument that intent to deceive or defraud is required under INA § 212(a)(6) (C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) is of no moment because Walker was not charged under this provision . . . . Rather, in addition to being charged as removable as an aggravated felon, he was charged with being inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), because he did not possess a valid unexpired immigrant visa at the time of his entry to the United States, a provision which, by its very language, does not require intent to deceive. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Resp't's Br. at 26-27 n.13. Petitioner also seeks to distinguish his case from Mejía-Orellana on the basis that Petitioner himself did not commit any wrongdoing and was a minor when he entered the United States. However, although Mejía-Orellana involved a party who committed fraud or misrepresentation himself (by failing to disclose his arrest on his application for adjustment of status), 502 F.3d at 14, the underlying policy concern is similar in this case. If Petitioner was considered to have been lawfully admitted for permanent residence, then the fraud or misrepresentation of third parties applying on his behalf would be encouraged. We thus conclude, based on our requisite deference to the BIA's interpretation and the rationale supporting our own precedent, that it is not determinative that Petitioner himself intended to commit fraud in obtaining admission to the United States for permanent residence. We are sympathetic to the fact, as Petitioner notes in his brief, that Petitioner was a child when he first entered the United States and had no control over the actions of his grandparents; in addition, he did not intend to break any immigration laws nor obtain admission for permanent residence through fraudulent means. Pet'r's Br. at 8. However, statutory interpretation is, in the first instance, the prerogative of the agency charged with interpreting the statute  in this immigration case, the BIA  and the agency's interpretation in this case is reasonable. Accordingly, there is no error of law and we are compelled to affirm.