Opinion ID: 4286605
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: On appeal, Norton challenges his conviction on two bases. First, he argues that the district court erred by introducing the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop. Second, he contends that the district court erred by admitting the informant’s statements from the October 2 recording. For the reasons explained below, both arguments fail. A. The district court correctly decided Norton’s motion to suppress. An officer has probable cause to conduct a stop when he reasonably believes that the driver is speeding. Whren v. No. 17-2898 5 United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). Norton contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress because it could not have reasonably concluded that he was driving at 72 mph before he was stopped. We review such factual findings for clear error. United States v. Breland, 356 F.3d 787, 791 (7th Cir. 2004). This highly deferential standard is met only when the court “cannot avoid or ignore a ‘definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.’” United States v. Jackson, 598 F.3d 340, 344 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Burnside, 588 F.3d 511, 517 (7th Cir. 2009)). Moreover, we give “special deference” to credibility determinations and will “uphold them unless ‘completely without foundation’ in the record.” United States v. Nichols, 847 F.3d 851, 857 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Freeman, 691 F.3d 893, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). The district court based its conclusion that Officer Shultz had probable cause to stop Norton on the finding that Norton had exceeded the speed limit. This factual finding is not clearly erroneous. At the evidentiary hearing, Officer Shultz testified that Norton was exceeding the speed limit based on his radar reading and the speed of his own car. That testimony was consistent with Agent Robertson’s testimony that Norton’s speed was “in the range of 70 to 75.” (R. 121 at 94.) It’s true that another federal agent testified that Norton was travelling at 70 or 71 mph before the stop. But the district court is entitled to resolve discrepancies and credit the testimony of some witnesses over others. Here, the district court credited Officer Shultz’s testimony and we do not have a definite and firm conviction that it was a mistake to do so. The district court therefore did not err by denying Norton’s motion to suppress. 6 No. 17-2898 B. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the informant’s statements. Norton also argues that the district court erred by admitting the informant’s statements from the October 2 recording. We review the district court’s decision to admit evidence for abuse of discretion and will reverse that decision “only when the record contains no evidence on which the district court rationally could have based its ruling.” United States v. Quiroz, 874 F.3d 562, 569 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Gorman, 613 F.3d 711, 717 (7th Cir. 2010)). An out-of-court statement admitted for the truth of the matter asserted is inadmissible hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 801. But when the statement is offered to provide context for the words or actions of others rather than the statement’s truth, it is admissible. Quiroz, 874 F.3d at 569–70. Contrary to Norton’s belief, this exception is not limited to conversations between two parties so long as the out-of-court statements provide context. Here, the informant’s statements provided context for the statements and actions of the conversation’s other participants. Take, for instance, the following discussion between Norton and the informant about how to cut heroin: Informant: No, no, this, this shit, I’d make so much more off this if, if I learn how to cut it, if I learn how to cut it, as long as it’s raw it’s in chunk form and you can’t taste anything nasty, it don’t, it don’t taste funny … Norton: (Unintelligible) Informant: … it’s smooth they think it’s raw. Norton: That’s why you put milk sugar on it. Milk sugar don’t have no taste and what it does is you put No. 17-2898 7 it in the oven so the milk sugar match, match, match the, uh China white. Informant: Match the color? Norton: Yeah. And then all you gotta do is lay a line out. (Appellee’s App. at 42.) In this exchange, the informant’s statements clarify Norton’s statements about milk sugar. His comments are similarly helpful throughout the recording. Moreover, the district court twice provided the jury with a limiting instruction. United States v. Zizzo, 120 F.3d 1338, 1348 (7th Cir. 1997) (approving the use of limiting instructions when admitting informant’s statements to provide context and presuming that jurors follow them). The district court therefore did not err by admitting the statements. Regardless, any error would be harmless. Norton challenges only the informant’s statements from the recording. He does not contest his own statements or those of his coconspirators. And in the recording, those parties discuss the strength of their heroin, how to dilute it, and other elements of business strategy. Those statements are sufficiently inculpatory. Thus, the exclusion of the informant’s statements would not have affected the outcome of Norton’s case. See Quiroz, 874 F.3d at 571.