Opinion ID: 2519215
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Peak's Cross-Appeal

Text: Peak raises a contingent cross-appeal, arguing two points of error to be considered only if Parnell's appeal is not affirmed.
First, Peak challenges the superior court's order granting summary judgment to Parnell on the issue of Peak's vicarious liability for Dougherty's actions. Peak contends that this ruling ignore[d] the overwhelming factual evidence showing that Dougherty was not acting in the course and scope of his employment with Peak, as well as established case law requiring that an employee's activities be designed to serve the employer's interests before liability can be imposed. Peak emphasizes that Dougherty was not employed as a crew driver; the accident occurred before Dougherty's normal shift began and at a distance of several miles from the worksite; and Dougherty was not paid for this travel time to and from the jobsite. Citing several cases holding that driving a company-owned vehicle does not necessarily bring an employee's conduct within the course of employment, [27] Peak insists that the facts clearly show that Dougherty was using Peak's truck to further his own interests, not Peak's. Parnell responds that the superior court properly held that Peak would be vicariously liable if Dougherty were found negligent, because the undisputed facts show that Dougherty was essentially acting as a bus driver in furtherance of Peak's interests. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is liable for the negligent acts or omissions of an employee only if the acts or omissions occur within the course and scope of employment. [28] For purposes of determining whether a particular act occurred in the course and scope of employment we have customarily looked to the standards set out in sections 228 and 229 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency. [29] Section 228 describes the circumstances required to bring conduct within the scope of employment as well those establishing conduct fully outside that scope: (1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, and (d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the master. (2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master. [30] Section 229 elaborates on the circumstances required under section 228 and lists several factors relevant to determining their presence. This section provides that, [t]o be within the scope of the employment, conduct must be of the same general nature as that authorized, or incidental to the conduct authorized. It then explains that considerations relevant in determining whether an act meets these standards include whether the act is one commonly done by such servants; whether the master has reason to expect that such an act will be done; whether the instrumentality by which the harm is done has been furnished by the master to the servant; and the extent of departure from the normal method of accomplishing an authorized result. [31] Comment d of section 229 specifically addresses driving that occurs while an employee is going to and from work: If the master supplies the servant with a vehicle in order that the servant may go to or from work, it is important to ascertain whether the vehicle is supplied primarily for the purpose of assisting the master's work or for the purpose of assisting the employee to perform what is essentially his own job of getting to or from work. The mere fact that the employer supplies a vehicle does not establish that those who avail themselves of it are within the scope of employment while upon it, especially if the use is merely casual. [32] Illustration 13 of section 229 addresses this comment and is squarely on point with this case: P employs men to do logging five miles from the nearest habitation. In order to be certain that they arrive on time, P habitually supplies and keeps in repair a truck which his workmen, who live in the nearest town, use in going to and from work. It is driven usually, but not invariably, by the one acknowledged to be the best driver. These facts will support a verdict that in driving to and from work, the driver is within the scope of employment. [33] While Peak did not pay Dougherty for driving other employees to the Swanson River worksite, it is undisputed that the company allowed Dougherty to have the truck with the understanding that he would use it to commute to the jobsite with his co-employees; it is further undisputed that Dougherty was en route to pick up other workers and drive them to the jobsite when he hit the moose, and that Peak authorized Dougherty to perform this task on a regular basis and derived a significant benefit from Dougherty's willingness to do so. By driving other employees to work each day, Dougherty helped to ensure that they would reach Peak's remote jobsite on time, at the same time reducing traffic and related impacts on the gravel road leading to the jobsite. As the superior court correctly recognized in applying the Restatement's analysis, these undisputed circumstances establish that, at the time of the accident, Dougherty was acting in the course of his employment with Peak. Although Peak correctly points out that driving an employer-owned vehicle to work is not itself dispositive of the issue, the additional facts here clearly support a finding that Dougherty was acting within the scope of employment. We thus affirm the superior court's order granting summary judgment to Parnell on the issue of Peak's vicarious liability as Dougherty's employer.
At trial Peak moved for an order allowing its accident reconstruction expert, Michael DiTallo, to supplement his pre-trial report with  and then to testify about  new information DiTallo had just gained from a recently identified witness. The trial court denied Peak's motion. Peak now challenges this ruling, arguing that Peak acted diligently in acquiring the new information; that the evidence had significant value; and that its exclusion resulted in unwarranted prejudice to Peak. In response, Parnell argues that the court properly excluded DiTallo's supplemental report and testimony because the evidence was untimely and would have left her with insufficient opportunity to respond, since her own experts had already testified and left town. We find it unnecessary to resolve this point on its merits. Parnell's objections to this evidence and the superior court's order declining to allow its admission both appear to have been based on concerns over potential prejudice that might arise if the new information were admitted at the last minute. Because the disputed evidence will not be cause for surprise in future proceedings, we see no reason to expect that the same concerns would prompt the superior court to exclude the evidence on remand. As matters now stand, then, the controversy over the evidence's last-minute admission appears to be moot. [34]