Opinion ID: 728357
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Nighttime Search Issue

Text: Appellees make the further claim that appellants' nighttime search violated their Fourth Amendment rights, because, given the circumstances of this case, [n]o reasonable officer could have believed that the warrant authorized a nighttime search. Appellees' Br. at 11. The District's warrant form authorizes the officers to search in the daytime/at any time of the day or night. The judge who issued the warrant did not cross out, circle, or otherwise mark either in the daytime or at any time of the day or night. Appellees conclude that, [u]nder clearly established law, [this] silence cannot be read as approval of nighttime execution. Id. at 11-12. We can find no clearly established law under the Fourth Amendment that supports appellees' position that, under the circumstances here, [n]o reasonable officer could have believed that the warrant authorized a nighttime search. Id. at 11. There are several reasons why appellees' argument fails. First, as the Fourth Circuit noted in United States v. Rizzi, [t]he Supreme Court . . . has never held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits nighttime searches. 434 F.3d 669, 675 (4th Cir.2006). We agree. Appellants acknowledge that the timing of a search might affect its reasonableness, but they rightly argue that [t]he Fourth Amendment does not include a specific protection against executing a warrant at night. Appellants' Br. at 31. Second, in an effort to advance their respective positions, the parties point us to numerous cases addressing the validity of nighttime searches on assorted warrants under a variety of circumstances. Our review of these cases and our independent research of the issue convinces us that there is no clearly established law under the Fourth Amendment prohibiting nighttime searches where the warrant is unmarked or silent as to the authorized time of execution. In particular, we can find neither controlling authority nor a consensus of cases of persuasive authority, Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617, 119 S.Ct. 1692, to support appellees' claim that clearly established law under the Fourth Amendment required the nighttime search here to be explicitly authorized by the terms of the warrant. And we can find no such applicable authority to support appellees' claim that, given the particular circumstances of this case, a reasonable officer would have known that the nighttime search violated clearly established law under the Fourth Amendment. Third, we reject appellees' argument that no reasonable officer could have believed that a nighttime search conducted pursuant to a warrant authorizing only a daytime search was consistent with the Fourth Amendment, Appellees' Br. at 12, because this argument is based on a false premise. The warrant in this case does not authoriz[e] only a daytime search. Rather, the literal terms of the warrant authorize the officers to search in the daytime/at any time of the day or night, with no express limitation. Viewing this undisputed fact in the light most favorable to appellees, the warrant is silent on the time of execution. The language of the warrant certainly cannot be construed to authorize only a daytime search. Appellees urge that the search warrant in this case contravenes the law of the District of Columbia and thus violates their clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. On this point, appellees contend that under D.C. law, an issuing judge can authorize a nighttime search only if the requesting officer requests one and presents facts to establish one of three narrow statutory justifications for nighttime execution. The requesting officer in this case did neither. . . . [T]he constitutional violation was searching a home at 4 AM without a warrant authorizing the search (or exigent circumstances). Appellees' Br. at 12. Appellees essentially assert that where local law informs a constitutional requirementhere, the principle that warrants must be issued by neutral, disinterested magistrates, Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255, 99 S.Ct. 1682, 60 L.Ed.2d 177 (1979) (citation omitted)we should consider it. Relatedly, they urge that a reasonable officer cannot generally rely on a warrant that is inconsistent with the law, see Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 & n. 4, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004), and that the warrant itself sets the boundaries for a reasonable search, see Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 140-41, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990). As Appellees explain, The Constitution demands that the reasonableness of a search be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 [68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436] (1948). The need for such judicial supervision is nowhere more critical than when the police engage in a search like this onea destructive 4 AM home invasion. . . . . Reading the default form as allowing a nighttime search, rather than requiring specific authorization from the neutral judge, undermines the role of the judge in supervising when a nighttime search is warranted and in preventing unnecessarily intrusive searches. As the facts of this case demonstrate, reading the default form to allow a nighttime search would allow the District's officers routinely to evade this critical review, just as they did in this case. Appellees' Br. at 23-24. There are two problems with this argument, such that we cannot say that Appellees' understanding of the law accurately captures the clearly established law under the Fourth Amendment. First, the Supreme Court has held that the protections and strictures of the Fourth Amendment are not defined by local law. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 174, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (A State is free to prefer one search-and-seizure policy among the range of constitutionally permissible options, but its choice of a more restrictive option does not render the less restrictive ones unreasonable, and hence unconstitutional.); see also Dalia, 441 U.S. at 257, 99 S.Ct. 1682 (Nothing in the language of the Constitution or in this Court's decisions interpreting that language suggests that . . . search warrants. . . must include a specification of the precise manner in which they are to be executed.). Second, even assuming, arguendo, that state-law protections control our Fourth Amendment inquiry, D.C. law on nighttime searches is, at best, unclear. The D.C.Code provides that in the absence of express authorization in the warrant pursuant to section 23-521(f)(5), [a search warrant] shall be executed only during the hours of daylight. D.C. CODE § 23-523(b) (2001 & Supp.2011). Section 23-521(f)(5), in turn, stipulates that the warrant shall contain . . . a direction that the warrant be executed during the hours of daylight or, where the judicial officers have found cause therefor, including one of the grounds set forth in section 23-522(c)(1), and authorization for execution at any time of day or night. Id. § 23-521(f)(5). These statutory provisions do not address the circumstances that we face here, i.e., a situation in which the terms of the warrant authorize the officers to search in the daytime/at any time of the day or night, without any express limitations. Furthermore, section 23-521(f)(5) apparently contains a typographical error, substituting and authorization for an authorization. See D.C. CODE § 23-521(f)(5) (Supp. V 1978) (an authorization); id. (1981) (and authorization). We understand the correct words to be an authorization, and the parties agree. Regardless, the error only contributes to the statute's lack of clarity. The main point, however, is that an alleged violation of local law is not dispositive of the Fourth Amendment issue. We have little trouble in concluding that there is no clearly established law under the Fourth Amendment that prohibits the nighttime execution of a warrant, where, as here, the warrant does not prohibit such a search. Neither controlling precedent from the Supreme Court or this circuit, nor a consensus of persuasive authority from our sister circuits show that the nighttime search here violated the Fourth Amendment.