Opinion ID: 1892316
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Board's Alleged Failure to Follow Statutory Procedures of SDCL ch. 13-21.

Text: Crowleys first argue that Board's failing to declare the school site surplus or abandoned, and to then proceed to put the property up for sale, under SDCL ch. 13-21 (amended by 1988 S.D.Sess.L. ch. 64 (S.B. 18)see SDCL ch. 6-13), is amenable to mandamus proceedings. This Court, in Crowley I, 408 N.W.2d 332 (S.D.1987), held that Crowleys lacked standing to challenge Trezona's default judgment because the property was never sold and they, therefore, had no projectable interest under SDCL 13-21-6. [3] Given our holding in Crowley I, Crowleys' current appeal depends on the nature of the procedures on their new attempt to achieve standing through reliance on SDCL 13-21-1, repealed, 1988 Sess.L. ch. 64, § 61, reenacted in ch. 64, § 1 (see SDCL 6-13-1) which provided, in pertinent part: Whenever any school district in this state shall have property consisting of land, structures, supplies, equipment, or other property which shall be determined by resolution of the school board to be no longer necessary, useful, or suitable for school purposes, such school board may, by resolution, order the sale, trade-in, destruction or other disposal of said property. (Emphasis supplied.) SDCL 13-21-2, repealed by 1988 Sess.L. ch. 64, § 62, reenacted by ch. 64, § 2 (see SDCL 6-13-2), directed school boards [u]pon such resolution being made, to have such property appraised, with no appraisal required for [e]quipment or supplies which are to be traded in for other equipment or supplies and property which is deemed no longer useful and is to be destroyed by resolution of the school board need not have its value appraised as herein provided. Under SDCL 13-21-2, it can be assumed, this school site would have to be appraised, if the school district still owned it. SDCL 13-21-3, -4, and -5 dealt with the process of selling properties. SDCL 13-21-3, -4, and -5 were repealed by 1988 S.D.Sess.L. ch. 64, §§ 63, 64, and 65, respectively, and are now codified as SDCL 6-13-4, -5, and -6. Under the above scheme, Crowleys argue that Board either had no discretion and was required by statute to pass a resolution setting a course toward sale, or abused its discretion in failing to do so. In either event, they believe mandamus is now appropriate. We disagree. The answer appears to lie in South Dakota Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. South Dakota Department of Transportation, 305 N.W.2d 682 (S.D.1981), which contains extensive discussion of the mandamus remedy: Generally, for a party to be granted a writ of mandamus `... he must have a clear legal right to have a service performed by the party to whom he seeks to have the writ directed.` (Citations omitted.) If the service or action which one seeks to compel is discretionary the proper exercise of such discretion will not be interfered with. This is not to say that there are no checks on such discretion. `... The discretion must be exercised under the established rules of law, and it may be said to be abused within the foregoing rule where the action complained of has been arbitrary or capricious, or based on personal, selfish, or fraudulent motives, or on false information, or on a total lack of authority to act, or where it amounts to an evasion of a positive duty ... or where the exercise of the discretion is in a manner entirely futile and known by the officer to be so and there are other methods which if adopted would be effective.` State v. Richards, 61 S.D. 28, 38-39, 245 N.W. 901, 905 (1932) (citations omitted). Moreover an erroneous view of the law is sufficient to constitute an abuse of discretion. Richards, supra . We must therefore determine whether the issuance of these permits is a discretionary function. If it is merely ministerial, mandamus will lie. If it is discretionary, we must further ascertain whether the Board abused its discretion and if so, mandamus will lie; otherwise, mandamus is improper. S.D. Trucking Ass'n, at 684. Crowleys' argument fails because they have failed to establish a clear legal right to have the Board determine by resolution, under SDCL 13-21-1, that the property was surplus and to be sold. Board, under SDCL 13-21-1, had discretion to initiate the process leading to ultimate sale. The operative word is may. See SDCL 13-21-1, set forth above. As the statute gives discretion to the Board, we view our duty to decide if its conduct prompted by a misconstruction of the law involved to such a degree as to render it an arbitrary action and an abuse of discretion. S.D. Trucking Ass'n, at 685. Mandamus is not available to establish legal rights, but only to enforce legal rights that are clear and certain. Stafford v. Valley Community School District, 298 N.W.2d 307, 309 (Iowa 1980). As Board points out, the validity of Crowleys' claim to a right is controverted. Mandamus does not lie where the obligation to be compelled is of doubtful validity. Bailey v. Lawrence County, 2 S.D. 533, 51 N.W. 331 (1892). Again, Crowleys have not established a clear legal right; perforce, their argument falls. Further, mandamus is inapplicable to undo an act already done in violation of public or official duty. State ex rel. Vig v. Lehman, 45 S.D. 394, 187 N.W. 720 (1922) (interpreting S.D.Rev.Code 1919, Sec. 3006, which is substantively the same as our current mandamus provision in SDCL 21-29-1). The gist of Crowleys' claim is that transfer of the property to Trezona must be undone. The property has passed on to Trezona through a quiet title action. [4] The threshold question of establishing that the school district owns the property is unanswered, a prerequisite, we opine, to declaring the property surplus, again; mandamus is simply unavailable. Stafford at 309.