Opinion ID: 3009623
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: Appellants, John P. Armbruster et al. (Armbruster Group),0 seek reversal of an order granting summary judgment in favor of appellee, Unisys Corporation (Unisys), on their claim of age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).0 The Armbruster Group consists of fourteen Unisys employees who were terminated in February 1991 in the course of a reduction-in-force (RIF) at Unisys. The Armbruster Group claims Unisys targeted them for termination because of their age and sought to mask its illegal discrimination by selecting them for a new work group the company created for older persons it intended to terminate. Unisys then fired them almost immediately after the formation of the new group, ostensibly because the group had no work. 0 The fourteen appellants making up the Armbruster Group are John Armbruster, Shirish K. Divecha, James G. Dodson, Jon E. Kinard, William D. Miller, William N. Moritz, John Patton, Jerome I. Robin, Edward L. Showalter, Thomas C. Stevens, James Turner, Michael J. Yagley, William P. Yanan and Basil Iwashyna. 0 The district court also entered summary judgment in favor of Unisys on the Armbruster Group's claim that Unisys terminated them to limit their pension benefits in violation of section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1140 (West 1985). The Armbruster Group does not raise this issue in its brief on appeal and therefore we will not consider it. 3 On appeal the Armbruster Group contends they produced evidence sufficient to show what is commonly referred to as a mixed motives age discrimination case by introducing overt evidence of discriminatory animus of the kind Justice O'Connor described in her concurrence in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).0 They also contend that the district court should not have granted summary judgment because it failed to view the evidence of pretext in the light most favorable to them, made its own credibility determinations, ignored evidential facts as well as reasonable inferences arising from them and 0 The Armbruster Group also argues section 107(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act), codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m) (West Supp. 1994), applies retroactively to entitle them to a liability finding once they prove age was a motivating factor in the employment decisions surrounding their transfer into and termination from the new work group. The parties failed to brief the question whether section 107(a) applies to ADEA as well as Title VII actions. Even if it applied to ADEA, we believe section 107(a) would not govern preenactment conduct. In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 62 U.S.L.W. 4255 (U.S. 1994) and Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 62 U.S.L.W. 4271 (U.S. 1994), the United States Supreme Court held sections 102 and 101, respectively, are not retroactive. Section 102 imposes additional liability for compensatory and punitive damages when a violation of Title VII has been shown. The Court looked to the text of the amendments and the legislative history and concluded there was no expression of Congressional intent to apply section 101 or section 102 retroactively. Therefore, they could not receive retroactive application because they altered the extent of a party's liability. Landgraf, 62 U.S.L.W. at 4266-67. To prevail, the Armbruster Group would have to persuade us that section 107(a) did not alter the standard of causation and the extent of liability by removing an employer's complete Price Waterhouse defense that it would have taken the same employment action based on a nondiscriminatory consideration. See H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 45, 48-49, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 586-87 (legislative history of 1991 Act); see also infra n.14. We will not decide that issue absent full briefing. 4 incorrectly excluded as hearsay an alleged discriminatory statement made by a Unisys manager. We hold that the district court correctly concluded the Armbruster Group's evidence of discrimination does not make out a Price Waterhouse case. We also hold, however, that the district court erred in granting summary judgment against the Armbruster Group because the circumstantial evidence present on this record, viewed in the light most favorable to the Armbruster Group, leaves a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Unisys's proffered explanation for its termination of the members of the group was a pretext for discrimination.0