Opinion ID: 1330383
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Circuit Court's Summary Judgment as to Appellee Steiner

Text: Appellant Keesecker testified in his deposition that he was aware that his father's will had created a life estate of Highwood House for Emily Keesecker, and upon her passing it would be mine and all the contents. During the period appellee Steiner managed Emily Keesecker's affairs, the appellant testified he would visit the Highwood property at least once a year. The appellant knew that Mr. Steiner was acting as his step-mother's committee, and testified that Mr. Steiner had tried to buy his interest in the estate. During Mr. Steiner's tenure as committee, the appellant noted that the real property was falling into a state of disrepair, and that the personal property also was not being cared for. The appellant held the opinion that the serious dilapidation of the house commenced the day his father died in 1975. The appellant was not immediately aware of the change of committee over his step-mother's estate in 1986. However, he testified in his deposition that he ... just had hearsay, people had said ... [and] I believed from what I had heard that Mr. Bird was managing the estate, which I guess I would assume was committee because Mr. Steiner had moved to Tennessee and left Mr. Bird in charge. That was my understanding. Although the record is unclear on the exact date, it appears that during Mr. Bird's tenure as committee the appellant visited Highwood House. The appellant again found significant deterioration, finding bricks had fallen off a chimney and cut holes in the metal roof. He testified he repaired the holes to minimize damage to the house that would obviously further deteriorate the house. The appellant alleges that appellee Steiner's failure to make basic repairs to Highwood House and its contents between 1981 and 1986 constitutes waste under West Virginia law. The appellee argues that the appellant's claims, if any, are barred by the statute of limitation because the appellant waited nearly six years to initiate this action for waste. We agree with the appellee. There are four steps to determining if a claim is barred by a statute of limitation. The first step in analyzing any statute of limitation question is to determine the applicable statute. Waste is a property damage tort consisting of an injury to the freehold by one rightfully in possession of land. [15] Cecil v. Clark, 49 W.Va. 459, 470, 39 S.E. 202, 206 (1901). A plaintiff need not be in possession of the land to initiate action. The action is not one to recover damages for injury to the possession of the land ... [but for] permanent injury done to the freehold.... Crowder v. Fordyce Lumber Co., 93 Ark. 392, 394, 125 S.W. 417, 418 (1910). A life tenant owes a duty to a remainderman not to commit either voluntary or permissive waste. Waste is any permanent or lasting injury done or permitted to be done by the holder of the particular estate to lands, houses, or other corporeal hereditaments, to the prejudice of the heir or of him in remainder or reversion. Gwinn v. Rogers, 92 W.Va. 533, 540, 115 S.E. 428, 430 (1922). Waste, injury to the freehold by a tenant for life or years, is actionable at common law, whether it result from affirmative wrongful acts or mere omission to perform duty. Talbott v. Southern Oil Co., 60 W.Va. 423, 427, 55 S.E. 1009, 1011 (1906). [16] The term waste implies neglect or misconduct resulting in material damage to or loss of property, but does not include ordinary depreciation of property due to age and normal use over a comparatively short period of time. Moore v. Phillips, 6 Kan.App.2d 94, 97, 627 P.2d 831, 834 (1981). Voluntary or commissive waste involves the commission of the deliberate, willful or voluntary destruction or carrying away of something attached to the freehold. See, e.g., Gwinn v. Rogers, supra (tenant not liable to landlord for holes dug for tent posts and trampled grass in striking miners' camp, as it is not a permanent injury rising to the level of waste); Hardman v. Brown, 77 W.Va. 478, 88 S.E. 1016 (1916) (co-tenant liable to other co-tenant for wantonly removing timber); Cecil v. Clark, supra , (co-tenant liable to other co-tenants for mining of coal); Bettman v. Harness, 42 W.Va. 433, 26 S.E. 271 (1896) (landlord may obtain injunction against tenant for removing oil and gas, if irreparable harm and title to land by landlord is established); Rogers v. Coal River Boom & Driving Co., 41 W.Va. 593, 23 S.E. 919 (1896) (landlord stated claim against tenant for waste, when tenant built logging boom in river which diverted the water flow, thereby damaging landlord's soil); Koen v. Bartlett, 41 W.Va. 559, 23 S.E. 664 (1895) (it is not waste for life tenant to operate mines or oil and gas wells existing when life estate created); McDodrill v. Pardee & Curtin Lumber Co., 40 W.Va. 564, 21 S.E. 878 (1895), overruled on other grounds, Ritz v. Kingdon, 139 W.Va. 189, 79 S.E.2d 123 (1953) (Plaintiffs, owners of land subject to a life estate, entitled to damages for waste or trespass for timber cut by defendant; amount of recovery dependent upon whether defendant was a co-tenant or stranger); Williamson v. Jones, 39 W.Va. 231, 19 S.E. 436 (1894) (petroleum and mineral oil are as much a part of the realty as timber, coal, iron ore, or salt water; removal by a life tenant constitutes waste); Dunlap v. Hedges, 35 W.Va. 287, 13 S.E. 656 (1891) (because insolvent mortgagor of property was cultivating land in a wasteful and destructive manner, holder of deed of trust was entitled to appointment of receiver to manage property); University v. Tucker, 31 W.Va. 621, 8 S.E. 410 (1888) (contingent remainderman entitled to injunction against waste caused by life tenant taking clay from the soil to use in manufacturing bricks); Core v. Bell, 20 W.Va. 169 (1882) (seller of land on a purchase contract may enjoin buyer from cutting timber or committing other waste, if such cutting is calculated to diminish the value of the land so that the land will not be sufficient to pay the unpaid purchase money); Frank & Co. v. Brunnemann, 8 W.Va. 462 (1875) (when a tenant is, by the terms of a lease, restricted to a particular use of the land a court may enjoin the tenant from other land uses such as cutting timber). Permissive waste is the failure of the tenant, under the circumstances, to exercise the ordinary care of a prudent man for the preservation and protection of the estate. Moore v. Phillips, 6 Kan.App.2d at 97, 627 P.2d at 834; Fisher's Executor v. Haney, 180 Ky. 257, 259, 202 S.W. 495, 496 (1918). See, e.g., Greathouse v. Greathouse, 46 W.Va. 21, 32 S.E. 994 (1899) (widow with dower interest not liable to reversioner for natural wear and tear damages totaling less than $35, including allowing property to grow up in briars, allowing buildings and fencing to decay, and cutting a tree worth $15); Dunlap v. Hedges, supra, (because insolvent mortgagor of property suffer[ed] said real estate to deteriorate in value by allowing the fences to go down, holder of deed of trust was entitled to appointment of receiver to manage property). It appears that the appellant is alleging the appellees allowed permissive waste, an injury to property, to occur to Highwood House. Accordingly, the applicable statute of limitation in this case is found in W.Va.Code, 55-2-12 [1959] [17] which requires that an action for damage to property be brought within two years of the date the action accrued. The second step in evaluating a statute of limitation question is to establish when the requisite elements of the alleged tort occurred, such that the cause of action accrued. In this case, assuming arguendo that appellee Steiner owed Emily Keesecker a duty to faithfully manage her life estate property in West Virginia, and a duty to not commit waste to the appellant's remainder interest in the property, the latest possible breach of that duty would have occurred in 1986 when he relinquished his committeeship to appellee Bird. Accordingly, any cause of action against appellee Steiner accrued in 1986, and any lawsuit for property damage would have had to have been filed by 1988. The next step is to determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of the ameliorative effects of the discovery rule. Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations is tolled until a claimant knows or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know of his claim. Syllabus Point 1, in part, Cart v. Marcum, 188 W.Va. 241, 423 S.E.2d 644 (1992). The `discovery rule' is generally applicable to all torts, unless there is a clear statutory prohibition of its application. Syllabus Point 2, Id. In Syllabus Point 4 of Gaither v. City Hospital, Inc., 199 W.Va. 706, 487 S.E.2d 901 (1997), we set forth the test which circuit courts must use to determine the applicability of the discovery rule: In tort actions, unless there is a clear statutory prohibition to its application, under the discovery rule the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should know (1) that the plaintiff has been injured, (2) the identity of the entity who owed the plaintiff a duty to act with due care, and who may have engaged in conduct that breached that duty, and (3) that the conduct of that entity has a causal relation to the injury. We stated that [t]his rule tolls the statute of limitations until a plaintiff, acting as a reasonable, diligent person, discovers the essential elements of a possible cause of action, that is, discovers duty, breach, causation and injury. 199 W.Va. at 714, 487 S.E.2d at 909. Applying Gaither to the case at hand, it is clear that the appellant cannot benefit from the discovery rule. The appellant testified that he knew as far back as 1975 that the property was deteriorating, and that permanent damage was occurring to his remainder interest in the property throughout appellee Steiner's tenure as committee. Second, the appellant knew that Mr. Steiner was acting as his step-mother's committee, and knew that he may have been failing to properly care for Emily Keesecker's life estate property. The appellant also knew that Mr. Steiner had relinquished his duties in 1986 and moved on, thereby ending any day-by-day breach of duty. Lastly, the appellant knew by 1986 that any breach of duty by the appellee was causing the alleged damage to the appellant's property interest. Hence, in 1986 or shortly thereafter, the appellant knew all of the elements of a possible cause of actionbut failed to take any action. The appellant knew he that had an injury; knew that Mr. Steiner owed the appellant a duty of care, and knew that Mr. Steiner may have breached that duty; and knew that the potential breach was a cause of the injury. Therefore, the appellant is not entitled to the protection of the discovery rule. The last step in the statute of limitation analysis is to determine if the limitation period is tolled by some misconduct of the defendant. In Cart v. Marcum, supra , we recognized that in some circumstances causal relationships are so well established that we cannot excuse a plaintiff who pleads ignorance. In those instances where a cause of action should be patently obvious (such as in the case under consideration), the plaintiff cannot claim ignorance. The only way a plaintiff can toll the statute of limitation in such circumstances is to make a strong showing ... that some action by the defendant prevented the plaintiff from knowing of the wrong at the time of the injury. Syllabus Point 3, Cart, supra . Our review of the record shows no competent evidence by the appellant that appellee Steiner did anything to hide his actions from the appellant. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court correctly ruled that any causes of action which the appellant may have had against appellee Steiner were barred by the statute of limitation. [18]