Opinion ID: 784664
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Questioning on Specific Mitigating Factors

Text: 74 Dennis contends that his rights to a fair trial and fair sentencing under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by the trial court's refusal to permit him to ask questions about specific mitigating factors during voir dire. Specifically, Dennis claims that he was foreclosed from asking prospective jurors questions regarding Dennis's age, lack of prior criminal history, environment, and other mitigating factors. The trial judge ruled that specific mitigating factors shouldn't be delved into, stating that [t]he significant part is will they [the jurors] listen to what the mitigating factors are and will they consider them. I think that is the bottom line. 75 The Ohio Supreme Court found no error. 76 In Proposition of Law No. 6, Dennis complains that he was denied due process when the trial court precluded defense counsel from questioning prospective jurors about specific mitigating factors. However, as Dennis concedes, we rejected this same argument in State v. Wilson (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 381, 385-387, 659 N.E.2d 292, 300-301. Similar to Wilson, the trial court here allowed adequate, detailed questioning of prospective jurors to expose faults that would render a juror ineligible. No abuse of discretion is apparent, and, therefore, this proposition of law is overruled. 77 State v. Dennis, 683 N.E.2d at 1105. 78 The district court held that the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court case law. Dennis v. Mitchell, 68 F.Supp.2d at 890. 79 As the Supreme Court observed in Morgan, [t]he Constitution ... does not dictate a catechism for voir dire, but only that the defendant be afforded an impartial jury. Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729, 112 S.Ct. 2222. At the same time, integral to the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury is an adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors. Id. (citations omitted). Thus, the trial judge's discretion to restrict questioning is nonetheless `subject to the essential demands of fairness.' Id. (quoting Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 310, 51 S.Ct. 470, 75 L.Ed. 1054 (1931)). See also Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 425-26, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991) (stating that [t]o be constitutionally compelled ... it is not enough that such questions be helpful. Rather the trial court's failure to ask these questions must render the defendant's trial fundamentally unfair). 80 For example, the Supreme Court has required voir dire on the issue of racial prejudice in situations of extreme racial tension, see Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 93 S.Ct. 848, 35 L.Ed.2d 46 (1973) (holding that voir dire on race was constitutionally required where defendant, a civil rights activist, claimed that he had been framed because of his race); and interracial violence, see Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27 (1986) (holding that voir dire regarding racial bias was constitutionally required in case involving interracial violence). By contrast, the Supreme Court has ruled that the mere fact that the defendant was black and the victim white was an insufficient basis, standing alone, to constitutionally require voir dire on racial bias. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 598, 96 S.Ct. 1017, 47 L.Ed.2d 258 (1976). In Mu'Min, the Supreme Court held that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process were not violated by the trial judge's refusal to question prospective jurors about specific contents of news reports to which they had been exposed. The Court held sufficient the trial judge's question of whether any information would affect the juror's impartiality. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 431-32, 111 S.Ct. 1899. 81 In other words, the Constitution requires only that voir dire be conducted in a manner which ensures fundamental fairness. Dennis has not made this showing. The record reflects that, even though defense counsel were eventually limited in asking particularized questions, the trial court permitted considerable latitude in the questioning of jurors during voir dire. Dennis's counsel was permitted to ask a number of veniremen questions regarding mitigating factors without interference from the trial judge. The following colloquy with Juror Wiggins exemplifies counsel's inquiry: 82 MR. WHITNEY: Our legislature has told us — as the Judge told you, Mr. Carroll told you, basically, that we have a two-part trial here. The first part has to do with guilt and innocence. The second part has to do with penalty. 83 Our legislature has told us that there are certain circumstances under which, even if a person is found guilty of a capital offense, that a jury can render a verdict for a life sentence. 84 Are you going to be able to accept what the Judge tells you regarding what we call mitigating factors, things like age and things like mental defects, if there is any, things like the upbringing of a person, those things? Can you take those things into consideration? 85 JUROR WIGGINS: Yes. 86 MR. WHITNEY: Do you think they are important in determining penalties? 87 JUROR WIGGINS: Yes. 88 MR. WHITNEY: What has been going on in this man's life before and how old he is and what kind of environment he came from. 89 Are those things going to be important to you in passing on a verdict of death or life, if the Judge tells you they are important? 90 JUROR WIGGINS: Yes, I think so. 91 MR. WHITNEY: If the Judge says they are factors that you can consider, then you would consider them? 92 JUROR WIGGINS: Yes. 93 Defense counsel followed this pattern of questioning for a number of witnesses Later, defense counsel asked the panel as a whole if any one had any strong feelings about evidence of a psychological nature, evidence of behavior, social kind of evidence, psychological kind of evidence, upbringing, discipline, lack of discipline. 94 The trial court did not interfere with the questioning until defense counsel's colloquy with Juror Martin became more particularized. At that point the trial court cautioned simply that [o]nce again, without interrupting, the questions are tough. But one of the things that has to be understood here is that the Court will instruct you on what mitigating factors you may consider. The trial judge instructed counsel to keep questioning as general as possible. 95 In short, the record reflects that Dennis's counsel was able to question the jurors regarding their ability and willingness to follow the law in the penalty phase. The Ohio Supreme Court's conclusion that the trial court allowed adequate, detailed questioning of prospective jurors is not an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the record. Finally, Dennis failed to establish that the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling is contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent. The district court did not err in rejecting this claim.