Opinion ID: 1060419
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Retribution and Moral Blameworthiness

Text: As for the former objective, the retributive value of capital punishment is closely tied to the defendant's culpability, as evidenced by the Supreme Court's statement that retribution is an appropriate consideration so long as the punishment is tailored to the defendant's personal responsibility and moral guilt. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801. As one member of the present majority has noted with regard to retribution in the capital context, this justification for punishment may be characterized as the need to offset a criminal act by a punishment of equivalent `moral quality.' See Van Tran, 6 S.W.3d at 277 (Birch, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). When viewed in this light, the retributive aspect of capital punishment is an expression of society's moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct. This function may be unappealing to many, but it is essential in an ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on legal processes rather than self-help to vindicate their wrongs. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183. The majority takes substantial issue with the notion that some mentally retarded offenders can possess any moral culpability for their criminal actions, and it holds that the mere status of mental retardation is sufficient to render a defendant utterly incapable of acting with the level of personal culpability that would justify a capital sentence. Indeed, while the majority notes that mental retardation exists in several degrees of severity, ranging from mild to profound, it makes no practical distinction between these degrees in its analysis of moral blameworthiness. Taken to its logical extreme, the majority's rationale posits that the mere label of mental retardation is sufficient to remove any notion that a defendant can possibly be morally blameworthy. This conclusion cannot invariably follow, because it ignores the differing mental capacities, life experiences, and general abilities possessed by individuals within the majority's large and diverse class of persons. Directly contradicting conclusions similar to those advanced by the majority in this case, Justice O'Connor examined the record in Penry a record, incidentally, that was more fully developed and supplemented than the record in this caseand concluded the following as to the abilities of this class of defendants: Mentally retarded persons are individuals whose abilities and experiences can vary greatly.... In addition to the varying degrees of mental retardation, the consequences of a retarded person's mental impairment, including the deficits in his or her adaptive behavior, may be ameliorated through education and habilitation. Although retarded persons generally have difficulty learning from experience, some are fully capable of learning, working, and living in their communities. In light of the diverse capacities and life experiences of mentally retarded persons, it cannot be said on the record before us today that all mentally retarded people, by definition, can never act with the level of culpability associated with the death penalty. 492 U.S. at 338-339 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Therefore, while the majority's conclusions may follow in some, if not many, cases, these generalities are overbroad at best, and, at worst, they can lead to manifest injustice in individual cases. Indeed, if one needs proof of the veracity of this proposition, one should look no farther than to the petitioner's case before us now. Assuming that the petitioner falls within the majority's new class of capitally ineligible defendants, a tragic error will occur if the majority's assumptions as to the general abilities of this class are given effect in this case. Let only three facts be submitted for candid and objective consideration: First, the petitioner has not alleged, either in his petition or through accompanying affidavits, that his mental condition affected his ability to understand what would happen if he pulled the trigger of a loaded pistol. In fact, no evidence has ever suggested that Van Tran was unaware that people could die if shot in the throat and head, as was the case with Kai Yin Chuey. Instead, the petitioner's original description of the events provides considerable evidence that he was acutely aware of the consequences of his deadly actions, and a different score on an updated I.Q. test simply does not change this conclusion. Second, the petitioner has not alleged, either in his petition or through accompanying affidavits, that his mental condition affected his ability to understand that it was morally wrong to murder or that it otherwise affected his ability to kill with premeditation or deliberation. Van Tran's awareness of the moral wrongfulness of his conduct can be seen not only in his six-month flight and evasion of authorities, but also from the fact that he knowingly gave a false name to police officers upon his arrest in Houston. Moreover, no evidence from any proceeding has ever suggested that Van Tran was somehow incapable of forming an intent to kill. To the contrary, two members of the present majority closely reviewed the record in 1993 and specifically found that the murder of Kai Yin Chuey involved the intentional and senseless killing of a helpless, elderly victim during a robbery. Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d at 482 (emphasis added). I agree with their assessment. Third, and finally, the petitioner has not alleged, either in his petition or through accompanying affidavits, that his mental condition affected his ability to behave in a lawful manner or that it otherwise compelled him to execute Kai Yin Chuey. Indeed, before his horrific criminal episode, he apparently had no criminal record, and I am aware of no similar conduct since that day in 1987. Surely, the majority must concede that a different score on a revised I.Q. test does not change the fact that Van Tran is capable of behaving in a lawful manner. Given that Van Tran has not even alleged that his cognitive, moral, or volitional capacities were affected by his mental condition, it is difficult to understand that this Court could conclude that he is somehow not morally blameworthy for his crimes. In fact, it is precisely because he possesses these capacities that he is morally blameworthy for the murder of Kai Yin Chuey. While I agree that in some cases mental retardation will substantially affect a defendant's cognitive, moral, or volitional capacities to such an extent that capital punishment would be unconstitutional, Van Tran's case illustrates perfectly that the offender's mental condition does not invariably affect these processes. As to these offenders, then, retribution remains a valid and material penological justification supporting capital punishment. [14] Because I am able to assert that the petitioner has always possessed the cognitive, moral, or volitional capacities to commit first degree murder, the majority posits that I have somehow engaged in an improper fact-finding exercise of reviewing this case. My conclusions regarding the petitioner's relative capacities were not found by me on some fact-finding exercise; they are implicit in the jury's verdict and sentence of death. I am fully confident that these findings are correct, because the petitioner has never contested their veracity in any proceeding, not even before this Court today. Moreover, the record of that case was carefully reviewed by the Court of Criminal Appeals and by this Court, and each court necessarily concluded that the petitioner did possess the necessary cognitive, moral, and volitional capacities to commit first degree murder, as evidenced by their affirmance of his convictions. Therefore, while the majority has taken a different approach to constitutional adjudication, I am certain that my uncontested assertions as to the petitioner's cognitive, moral, and volitional capacities are the result of legitimate, and constitutionally accepted, methods of appellate review.