Opinion ID: 2499407
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of gang affiliation evidence

Text: Gang affiliation evidence is admissible if relevant. State v. Brown, 285 Kan. 261, 297, 173 P.3d 612 (2007) (citing State v. Conway, 284 Kan. 37, 47, 159 P.3d 917 [2007]; State v. Ross, 280 Kan. 878, 885, 127 P.3d 249 [2006]). Relevant evidence is defined by statute as evidence that is both material and probative. K.S.A. 60-401(b). We review whether evidence is material under a de novo standard. State v. Shadden, 290 Kan. 803, 817, 235 P.3d 436 (2010). Materiality addresses whether `a fact . . . has a legitimate and effective bearing on the decision of the case and is in dispute.' State v. Reid, 286 Kan. 494, 505, 186 P.3d 713 (2008) (quoting State v. Garcia, 285 Kan. 1, 14, 169 P.3d 1069 [2007]). In other words, a fact is material if it is `significant under the substantive law of the case and properly at issue' Reid, 286 Kan. at 505, 186 P.3d 713 (quoting Goodson, 281 Kan. 913, 922, 135 P.3d 1116 [2006]). We review whether evidence is probative under an abuse of discretion standard. Shadden, 290 Kan. at 817-18, 235 P.3d 436. Evidence is probative if it has `any tendency in reason to prove any material fact.' State v. Houston, 289 Kan. 252, 261, 213 P.3d 728 (2009) (quoting K.S.A. 60-401[b]). For evidence of gang affiliation to be admissible there must be sufficient proof that gang membership or activity is related to the crime charged. State v. Tatum, 281 Kan. 1098, Syl. ¶ 3, 135 P.3d 1088 (2006). Even if evidence is deemed relevant, it may be excluded if it is more prejudicial than probative. See State v. Inkelaar, 293 Kan. 414, 424, 264 P.3d 81 (2011). We review a district judge's weighing of prejudice and probative value for an abuse of discretion. 293 Kan. at 424, 264 P.3d 81. Peppers first challenges this court's previous rulings that admission of gang affiliation evidence is not subject to further analysisincluding possible exclusion or limiting instructionunder K.S.A. 60-455 on other crimes and civil wrongs. See Conway, 284 Kan. at 48, 50, 159 P.3d 917 (The legislature specifically limited the admissibility of evidence of crimes and civil wrongs in K.S.A. 60-455; no similar legislative statement exists with regard to evidence of gang affiliation.); see Ross, 280 Kan. at 886, 127 P.3d 249; State v. Gholston, 272 Kan. 601, 614, 35 P.3d 868 (2001); State v. Hooks, 251 Kan. 755, 765-66, 840 P.2d 483 (1992); State v. Bailey, 251 Kan. 156, 166, 834 P.2d 342 (1992), modified on other grounds by State v. Willis, 254 Kan. 119, 864 P.2d 1198 (1993). He argues that jurors naturally associate gang membership with criminal activity, and thus evidence of gang affiliation needs to be treated like other evidence likely to be used by jurors as irrelevant proof of a defendant's general propensity for wrongdoing. In support, Peppers cites cases from other jurisdictions in which courts have noted the connection between gangs and criminal activity. See United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 204 (2d Cir.2008); Castaneda v. Olsher, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 827, 836 (Cal.App.4th Dist.2005); Medina v. Hillshore Partners, 40 Cal. App.4th 477, 481, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 871 (1995), K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 21-4704(k), which allows enhancement of a sentence for a felony connected to gang activity. We are unpersuaded that we should depart from our precedent on this point. As we said in Conway, 284 Kan. at 50, 159 P.3d 917, the legislature has demonstrated no inclination to treat gang affiliation evidence in the same way it treats evidence of other crimes and civil wrongs. Although evidence of a defendant's gang affiliation certainly may be prejudicial, so is most evidence sponsored by the State in any criminal trial. If the evidence is nevertheless relevant i.e., material and probativeand not unduly prejudicial, it may be admitted. See, e.g., State v. Dixon, 289 Kan. 46, 70, 209 P.3d 675 (2009) (not all inculpatory evidence qualifies as unduly prejudicial). Peppers next challenges the gang affiliation evidence in this case as forbidden res gestae. Peppers cites State v. Ventris, 289 Kan. 314, 315, 212 P.3d 162 (2009), which, in turn, relied upon our decision in State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, 59-63, 144 P.3d 647 (2006), for the statement that res gestae is no longer a valid independent legal basis for admitting evidence. Peppers over-reads Gunby, and therefore Ventris. In Gunby, this court departed from its previous practice of employing res gestae to circumvent the rules for admission of other crimes and civil wrongs evidence under K.S.A. 60-455 as well as the prohibition on hearsay. With regard to evidence of other crimes and civil wrongs, we said: Having explained the correct interpretation of K.S.A. 60-455, we . . . reject res gestae as a legitimate independent basis for the admission of other crimes and civil wrongs evidence in Kansas. Any other crimes and civil wrongs evidence that may be characterized as res gestae should henceforth be analyzed under K.S.A. 60-455. 282 Kan. at 59-60, 144 P.3d 647. More generally, Gunby stands for the principle that the admission of res gestae evidence should be governed by the same rules of evidence controlling admission of other evidence: The concept of res gestae is dead as an independent basis for admissibility of evidence in Kansas. That evidence may be part of the res gestae of a crime demonstrates relevance. But that relevance must still be measured against any applicable exclusionary rules. 282 Kan. at 63, 144 P.3d 647; see Ventris, 289 Kan. at 315, 212 P.3d 162. Peppers extrapolates from Gunby that the admission of gang affiliation evidence to explain events surrounding the commission of a crime violates this court's prohibition on res gestae. This is incorrect. Our decision in Gunby eliminated res gestae as an independent basis for the admission of evidence. It did not eliminate the admission of evidence of events surrounding a commission of the crime under the applicable rules of evidence. In fact, as noted by the State, this court has determined that gang-related evidence can be admissible when the evidence forms a part of the events surrounding the commission of the crime in post- Gunby cases. See Brown, 285 Kan. at 297, 173 P.3d 612 (citing Goodson, 281 Kan. at 922, 135 P.3d 1116); see also Tatum, 281 Kan. at 1109, 135 P.3d 1088; Winston, 281 Kan. at 1135, 135 P.3d 1072. Peppers next challenges the district judge's determination that the gang affiliation evidence was relevant, i.e., both material and probative. He relies on statements in earlier cases that suggest admissible gang evidence is limited to certain categories. See, e.g., Goodson, 281 Kan. at 922-23, 135 P.3d 1116 ([G]ang evidence may be material, and, therefore, relevant when the evidence provides a motive for an otherwise inexplicable act, forms a part of the events surrounding the commission of the crime, or shows witness bias.). Again, we have been misunderstood. Although certain of our earlier cases on gang evidence arose in particular circumstances, a list of those circumstances does not exhaust the possibilities when gang evidence is relevant and permissible. See Brown, 285 Kan. at 297-300, 173 P.3d 612. In Peppers' case, the district judge determined that the gang affiliation evidence provided a reason for the proposed meeting between Peppers and Hayes-Osby and provided an alternative motive for the shooting. The district judge later reiterated that the gang affiliation evidence was admissible because it showed motive and because it formed parts of the events surrounding the commission of the crime. The district judge correctly determined that the gang affiliation evidence was material. Because Peppers defended only by holding the State to its high burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as a matter of law, Peppers' identity and opportunity and motive had a `legitimate and effective bearing on the decision of the case' and were in dispute. See Reid, 286 Kan. at 505, 186 P.3d 713 (quoting Garcia, 285 Kan. at 14, 169 P.3d 1069), 507 (motive per se material fact); see also State v. Carapezza, 286 Kan. 992, 999, 191 P.3d 256 (2008) (State may admit evidence of motive even though motive not element of offense). We also see no abuse of discretion in the district judge's determination that the gang affiliation evidence was probative. Gang affiliation, hierarchy, and rules explained why Cunningham, Hayes-Osby, and Peppers ended up outside of Terry's simultaneously. Hayes-Osby had agreed to meet Peppers there because Peppers knew that Hayes-Osby had killed Harness. Hayes-Osby also knew that gang protocol made him subject to sanctions for the killing, to be decided by Peppers as chief of the TVLs. The necessity of the meeting arose out of gang life, and it was probative of Peppers' identity and opportunity to shoot at Hayes-Osby and the person with him, Cunningham. Gang rule enforcement or retaliation also provided potential explanation for why Peppers, in particular, would shoot Hayes-Osby and Cunningham, i.e., it demonstrates motive. This conclusion is consistent with several cases from this court in which we explained that gang evidence may be admissible if it is relevant to motive. See, e.g., Brown, 285 Kan. at 266, 173 P.3d 612; Conway, 284 Kan. at 50-51, 159 P.3d 917; Tatum, 281 Kan. at 1108-09, 135 P.3d 1088; Winston, 281 Kan. at 1129, 135 P.3d 1072; Lowe, 276 Kan. at 963, 80 P.3d 1156; Gholston, 272 Kan. at 614-15, 35 P.3d 868. Peppers argues that the evidence supported another motivethe close friendship between Peppers and Harness and thus Peppers' compulsion to avenge his friend's murderwhich means the crimes were not otherwise inexplicable. See Gholston, 272 Kan. at 615, 35 P.3d 868. Again, gang evidence need not fall into specific categories that happened to arise in previous cases in order to be relevant and admissible. The probative value of the gang evidence admitted here for the motive advanced under the State's theory was not lessened or erased by its probative value for the motive under an alternate theory. Evidence can be relevant to establish motive even if more than one theory or motive is presented. State v. Hughes, 286 Kan. 1010, 1022, 191 P.3d 268 (2008). The record before us also demonstrates that the shootings were gang-related. Despite Hayes-Osby's effort to distance himself from the term gang, he admitted that the shootings were related to the associations he described. Hayes-Osby's testimony revealed that he was a member of the Solids 4, which associated with the TVLs. Peppers was the chief of the TVLs, while Harness was a member. Hayes-Osby also testified that Harness owed him money and crack cocaine, which he had attempted unsuccessfully to collect through Harness' superior, Peppers. Even if Peppers had determined that Hayes-Osby would receive a punishment for killing Harness other than summary execution, other testimony by Hayes-Osby demonstrated that the punishment for certain other gang violations carried a penalty of death. We now turn to the final step in the analysis of the admission of gang affiliation evidence or, for that matter, any evidence: undue prejudice. The probative value of gang affiliation evidence must be weighed against its potential for prejudice. K.S.A. 60-445; Shadden, 290 Kan. at 817-18, 235 P.3d 436. [T]he prejudicial effect of such evidence may be cured by a limiting jury instruction, although a district court is not required to sua sponte give a limiting instruction on gang affiliation evidence. Brown, 285 Kan. at 300, 173 P.3d 612 (citing Ross, 280 Kan. at 887-88, 127 P.3d 249; Conway, 284 Kan. at 51, 159 P.3d 917). The giving of a limiting instruction in the context of gang affiliation evidence is one of many factors, not the sole factor, that a court ought to consider in determining prejudice. Conway, 284 Kan. at 47-48, 159 P.3d 917 (discussing Ross, 280 Kan. at 888, 127 P.3d 249). A district judge's balancing of probative value and prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Shadden, 290 Kan. at 817-18, 235 P.3d 436. Here, the prejudicial effect of the gang evidence was limited by the district judge's jury instruction. The court instructed the jury not to consider the gang affiliation evidence to prove that [Peppers] is a person of bad character or that [Peppers] has a disposition to commit crimes and instead to consider the evidence only for the purpose of determining if it tends to show part of the events surrounding the commission of the crime or the motive of the person who committed the crimes, if any, of which the defendant is accused. The district judge's . . . admonition to the jury emphasized the legitimate purpose of the admission. State v. Race, 293 Kan. 69, 77, 259 P.3d 707 (2011). This court generally presume[s] jurors follow the instructions given them in the district court. Race, 293 Kan. at 77, 259 P.3d 707 (citing State v. Becker, 290 Kan. 842, 856, 235 P.3d 424 [2010]). Assuming that the jury properly followed the judge's instructions in this case, the risk of undue prejudice was greatly reduced. And the probative value side of the balance on the gang affiliation evidence had substantial weight. The evidence supported Peppers' identity and opportunity by tying him to the scene of the crime and supported at least one of his possible motives. The district judge did not abuse her discretion by admitting the gang evidence with a limiting instruction.