Opinion ID: 853621
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The VanValkenburg Formulation

Text: During his service on the Court of Appeals, Justice Rucker provided a helpful way of answering such a question in Van-Valkenburg v. Warner, 602 N.E.2d 1046 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). Julie VanValkenburg was a student in a class taught by Warner at Indiana State University. Upon leaving the course's final session, held at Warner's residence, she fell on the front porch and broke her ankle. Without filing a tort claim notice on either the university or Warner, she sued Warner for negligent maintenance of his home. Warner claimed the protection of the Tort Claims Act, saying he was acting within the scope of his employment when he conducted the class. Relying on our opinion in Poole v. Clase, 476 N.E.2d 828 (Ind.1985), the VanValkenburg court held that governmental employment, standing alone, does not trigger the notice provisions of the Indiana Tort Claims Act. VanValkenburg, 602 N.E.2d at 1049. Rather, the court said, notice is required only if the act or omission causing the plaintiff's loss is within the scope of defendant's employment. Id. It concluded that since maintenance of Warner's residence was not a thing he did in service of the university, it was beyond the scope of his employment. In this case, the act causing the plaintiff's loss consisted of several statements, three sentences in all, that were part of a longer discussion between the fire chief and the owner of a business being inspected prior to the start of Celebration's tenancy. We think that splitting out these sentences so as to place Smith outside the scope of his employment puts too fine a point on the matter and helps neither employees nor claimants. If employees were easily declared outside the scope of the act for things they say during the otherwise ordinary course of their employment, the threat to their independent judgment necessary to carry out their duties, Stagg, 556 N.E.2d at 1343, would be greater. Moreover, claimants would more often find themselves limited to recovery against the private assets of employees rather than those of governments. This is not to say whether, had notice been given, Celebration might have been entitled to a judgment or whether the chief might have been entitled to one of the enumerated immunities of the Act. We conclude only that Judge Embrey was correct in holding that the chief's statements were incidental to an activity that was part of the chief's duty, inspecting business premises.