Opinion ID: 65054
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Appointment of counsel and the RLUIPA

Text: Garner requested appointment of counsel in the district court; his request was denied. There is no automatic right to appointment of counsel in a civil case. Jackson v. Dallas Police Dep’t, 811 F.2d 260, 261 (5th Cir. 1986). A federal court may, however, appoint counsel for an indigent if doing so would advance the proper administration of justice. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1982). Appointment of counsel in a civil rights case is generally reserved for cases presenting “exceptional circumstances.” Id. While no precise formulation of such circumstances can be stated, courts generally look at the following: [i] the type and complexity of the case; [ii] the petitioner’s ability adequately to present and investigate his case; [iii] the presence of evidence which largely consists of conflicting testimony so as to require skill in presentation of evidence and in cross-examination; and [iv] the likelihood that appointment will benefit the petitioner, the court, and the defendants by shortening the trial and assisting in just determination. Murphy v. Kellar, 950 F.2d 290, 293 (5th Cir. 1992) (citation and internal quotations omitted). 6 No. 07-41015 The district court concluded that this was not a novel or complex case and that Garner could adequately present the issues to the court. With respect to the matters already discussed, we find no abuse of discretion in this conclusion. However, our review of the relevant case law and statutory developments causes us to conclude that this is a case of first impression under the RLUIPA. As such, it may be a case in which appointment of counsel is appropriate.2 Garner claims that the TDCJ’s grooming and head-coverings policies violate the RLUIPA. The RLUIPA mandates that [n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person-- (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). “[The] RLUIPA thus protects institutionalized persons who are unable freely to attend to their religious needs and are therefore dependent on the government’s permission and accommodation for exercise of their religion.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 721 (2005). We have recognized that “the RLUIPA standard poses a far greater challenge than does [traditional free exercise analysis] to prison regulations that impinge on inmates’ free exercise of religion.” Freeman v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 369 F.3d 854, 858 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004). Moreover, Congress has mandated that courts construe the Act “in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise,” to the maximum extent permitted by law. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g). Initially, the burden rests on the religious adherent to demonstrate that the challenged governmental policy substantially burdens the adherent’s 2 We recently appointed appellate counsel in another RLUIPA case presenting issues of first impression. See Sossamon, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 3701, at . 7 No. 07-41015 exercise of religion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b). This requires courts to answer two questions: (1) Is the burdened activity “religious exercise,” and if so (2) is the “burden substantial”? The RLUIPA defines “religious exercise” to include “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-7(A). The activities alleged to be burdened in this case – the wearing of a quarter-inch beard and a Kufi – easily satisfy this broad definition of “religious exercise.” Thus, this case presents the question of whether the TDCJ’s grooming and head-coverings policies “substantially burden” Garner’s exercise of religion. Although not defined by statute, this circuit has held that a government regulation substantially burdens a “religious exercise” for the purposes of the RLUIPA if it “truly pressures the adherent to significantly modify his religious behavior and significantly violate his beliefs.” Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2004). This test requires a “case-by-case, fact-specific inquiry to determine whether the government action or regulation in question imposes a significant burden on an adherent’s religious exercise.” Id. at 571. In conducting this inquiry, courts are forbidden from asking whether the practice at issue is central to the adherent’s religious-belief system. Id. at 570. This limitation, however, “does not relieve a complaining adherent of the burden of demonstrating the honesty and accuracy of his contention that the religious practice at issue is important to the free exercise of his religion.” Id. If the TDCJ’s policies impose a substantial burden on Garner’s religious exercise, the defendants must then establish that the policies further a compelling government interest and are the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b). In conducting this inquiry, courts are guided by the Supreme Court’s recognition that the RLUIPA does not “elevate accommodation of religious observances over an institution’s need to maintain order and safety.” Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722. 8 No. 07-41015 Indeed, “prison security is a compelling state interest, and [ ] deference is due to institutional officials’ expertise in this area.” Id. at 725 n.13. Nevertheless, we do not believe that the Supreme Court intended these pronouncements to relieve prisons from the express mandate placed on them by Congress: that policies which substantially burden the religious practice of inmates be predicated on a compelling interest, that they further that interest, and that they do so in the least restrictive manner possible. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b). Our circuit has never addressed the question of whether a religion-based request to have a quarter-inch beard is a significant burden on the adherent’s religious exercise of the Islamic religion or whether the clean-shaven policy is the least restrictive manner of furthering a compelling interest. Green, 229 F.3d 486, is not dispositive as it was decided based upon law from a time when RLUIPA’s predecessor statute, the Religious Freedoms Restoration Act (RFRA), had been found unconstitutional and the RLUIPA had not yet been passed. We have upheld a TDCJ policy banning long hair under the RFRA, based on some of the same interests asserted by the TDCJ here. See Diaz v. Collins, 114 F.3d 69, 73 (5th Cir. 1997). Although the RFRA has since been held unconstitutional, the RLUIPA adopts the same heightened standard of scrutiny as the RFRA. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 715-16. In a recent unpublished opinion, however, we noted that Diaz’s reasoning concerning long hair is not dispositive of the issue presented by quarter-inch beards. Gooden v. Crain, 255 Fed. App’x 858, 861 n.1 (5th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (reversing summary judgment because the issues involving the quarter-inch beard policy were contested fact questions). The district court did not have the benefit of our decision in Gooden when it denied relief. Our circuit has expressed the view that a case of first impression might present an “exceptional circumstance” justifying appointment of counsel. Santana v. Chandler, 961 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1992) (concluding, however, that the 9 No. 07-41015 presence of law in other circuits lessened the need for counsel); see also Duran v. Reno, 193 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1999) (counsel appointed on appeal because the case presented an issue of first impression). The district court viewed this case as one presenting a well-settled issue – citing Diaz and the since-reversed district court opinion in Gooden – rather than a case of first impression. The court stated: “plaintiff’s claims do not present any complexities that are unusual in prisoner actions.” Thus, the court’s analysis of the need to appoint counsel failed to take into account the particular complexity and legal novelty of this case. As noted above, we conclude that this case is not the usual one. Because appointment of counsel in the district court is a question of discretion – albeit discretion exercised under the proper analysis of the situation – we conclude that the appropriate course of action is to vacate the district court’s rulings on the RLUIPA claims and the appointment of counsel motion and remand for reconsideration of the latter first followed by the former in light of the opinion here stated.