Opinion ID: 2116314
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Validity of 1991 Zoning Ordinance.

Text: We begin our discussion with QRS's assertion that the 1991 amendments to the zoning ordinance were ineffective to change the zoning classification applicable to its property. This assertion rests on two legal arguments: (1) QRS was entitled to personal notice of the proposed change in the zoning classification governing its property; and (2) QRS had a vested right to the original zoning designation. A. Requirement of personal notice. QRS contends that the United States Constitution and the City's zoning ordinance required the City to give it personal notice of the changes affecting its property resulting from the proposed amendments to the zoning ordinance. We disagree. 1. Constitutional claim. The Due Process Clause requires that any deprivation of property be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct. 652, 656-57, 94 L.Ed. 865, 873 (1950) (emphasis added); see U.S. Const. amend. XIV. In determining the notice required in a particular case, the court is required to balance the interest of the State and the individual interest sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Tulsa Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 484, 108 S.Ct. 1340, 1344, 99 L.Ed.2d 565, 574-75 (1988). The focus is on the reasonableness of the balance, and... whether a particular method of notice is reasonable depends on the particular circumstances. Id. at 484, 108 S.Ct. at 1344, 99 L.Ed.2d at 575. Thus, although personal service of notice is the classic form of notice, it is not always required. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, 70 S.Ct. at 657, 94 L.Ed. at 873. Moreover, it is appropriate to consider the practical difficulties and costs attendant on personal service of notice in determining whether such notice is constitutionally required. Id. at 317, 70 S.Ct. at 659, 94 L.Ed. at 875. Here, QRS's interest is its right to appear before the city council and express its views on the proposed comprehensive amendments to the zoning ordinance and the effect of the amendments on QRS's use of its property, an important interest as the facts of this case illustrate. On the other hand, the proposed amendments were comprehensive and affected the entire community. The task of providing personal notice to every property owner in the city is enormous. Furthermore, the city-wide scope of the proposed amendments makes it more likely that notice by publication will result in actual notice. The notice published by the City warned that the comprehensive amendments will affect all property in the City and will change or revise, in many instances, the permitted uses of property. (Emphasis added.) More specifically, the notice stated that the comprehensive amendments would also result in a change of zoning classification of some properties. Notice of such widespread changes in the City's existing zoning districts would surely generate some discussion among the general public as well as further publicity through the news media. In fact, the local media covered both the public meeting of the planning and zoning commission as well as the subsequent meeting of the city council held to consider the amendments. We think notice by publication under the circumstances of this case is reasonably certain to inform those affected. In balancing the interests of the City and the property owners, we conclude notice by publication is sufficient under the facts of this case to inform property owners such as QRS that their property may be affected by the proposed zoning amendments so as to satisfy the requirements of due process. See Fisette v. DiPietro, 28 Conn.App. 379, 611 A.2d 417, 420 (1992) (approving constructive notice for a comprehensive zoning change); Threatt v. Fulton County, 266 Ga. 466, 467 S.E.2d 546, 549 (1996) (holding personal notice of comprehensive land and water use plans not required); Fortier v. City of Spearfish, 433 N.W.2d 228, 229-30 (S.D.1988) (holding notice by publication of flood control ordinance affecting an entire community was constitutionally adequate). See generally 7 Patrick J. Rohan, Zoning and Land Use Controls § 50.03[1][c], at 50-35 to 50-42 (1991). 2. Notice required by ordinance. QRS also relies on the public notice procedure contained in the City's zoning ordinance as support for its contention that personal notice is required. As stated in the ordinance, these public notice procedures establish the minimum requirements for notice to be given with respect to procedural actions and public hearings required by the [zoning ordinance]. None of the procedures requiring personal notice, however, apply to the facts of the case before us. Rather, the personal-notice provisions pertain to special exceptions, variances, administrative appeals, and applications for rezoning. The adoption of comprehensive zoning amendments does not fall within the listed categories requiring personal notice. Nonetheless, QRS points out that, in some instances, the City's action on requests falling within these categories can result in a rezoning of property located in the City. While that may be so, the rezoning at issue here was accomplished by city-wide rezoning and a complete recodification of the City's zoning ordinance initiated by the City itself, rather than by the City's consideration of a particular application for rezoning filed by a property owner. Consequently, QRS's contention that the City's zoning ordinance mandated personal service of notice on QRS fails. B. Vested rights. QRS also argues that the 1991 zoning ordinance reclassifying its property cannot be applied to it because QRS had a vested right in the original zoning classification. We note initially that no property owner has a vested right in the continuation of a particular zoning classification. See Neuzil v. City of Iowa City, 451 N.W.2d 159, 164 (Iowa 1990). The only vested right that a property owner may acquire is the right to complete the development of his property in accordance with his plans as of the effective date of the new ordinance. See Board of Supervisors v. Paaske, 250 Iowa 1293, 1298-99, 98 N.W.2d 827, 831 (1959); Keller v. City of Council Bluffs, 246 Iowa 202, 213, 66 N.W.2d 113, 119 (1954). The planned development, when completed, becomes a nonconforming use under the zoning ordinance. See 83 Am.Jur.2d Zoning and Planning § 624, at 520 (1992). To determine whether a property owner has acquired a vested right, we engage in a two-part analysis: (1) did the property owner make substantial expenditures toward the use in question prior to the zoning change; and (2) were the expenditures made by the property owner lawful. See City of Lamoni v. Livingston, 392 N.W.2d 506, 510-11 (Iowa 1986); Paaske, 250 Iowa at 1298-1300, 98 N.W.2d at 830-31. This doctrine is recognized in the City's zoning ordinance, which provides that the new ordinance does not require a change in the plans, construction or designated use of any building on which actual construction was lawfully begun prior to the effective date of the ordinance. On appeal, the City does not contest that QRS made substantial expenditures on its building to accommodate a meat processing tenant prior to enactment of the comprehensive amendments to the zoning ordinance. (The record shows QRS spent $650,000 on these improvements prior to April 1991.) The City does argue, however, that QRS was required by the city ordinance to obtain a building permit authorizing this construction and that QRS's failure to do so makes its expenditures illegal. One of the City's ordinances prohibits a person from enlarging, altering, remodeling, or converting any building at a cost of more than $500 without first receiving a permit. QRS excuses its failure to obtain a permit by pointing to the City's knowledge that it planned to renovate the facility to house a meat processor and the City's encouragement of QRS's efforts to obtain such a tenant. [1] QRS does not cite to, nor have we found, any case holding that a property owner's failure to obtain a required building permit is excused by such conduct on the part of the municipality. In fact, this court has long held that acts by individual members of a public body, even when concurred in by the majority, cannot bind the municipality unless officially sanctioned in accordance with the statute. City of McGregor v. Janett, 546 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Iowa 1996); accord Alfredo v. Iowa Racing & Gaming Comm'n, 555 N.W.2d 827, 834 (Iowa 1996) (holding knowledge and approval of plaintiff's actions by commission staff cannot substitute for formal approval of commission, where such approval was required by statute and regulations). We conclude QRS's development of its property for meat processing purposes, although done in good faith, violated the city ordinance and was, therefore, illegal. This illegality precludes QRS's acquisition of a vested right to continue the development after adoption of the new zoning classification.