Opinion ID: 2179099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: April 25 to May 16, 2001

Text: This period was excluded by the district court pursuant to § 29-1207(4)(f). It reflects the period of time between Feldhacker's filing of praecipes for transcriptions of various hearings which had been held in the district and county courts and the completion and delivery of the transcript to Feldhacker. The district court determined that the State had shown `good cause' for exclusion of this period from the speedy trial computation in that Feldhacker had requested the transcripts and other materials in order to prove at trial his claim that the State's case was fabricated and that he was innocent. The court specifically found that the delay was not attributable to any negligence or misconduct on the part of the State. In reversing the order of the district court on this issue, the Court of Appeals reasoned that because Feldhacker was entitled to the transcripts, their preparation was simply trial preparation and does not automatically become a period of delay under § 29-1207(4)(f). State v. Feldhacker, 11 Neb.App. 872, 874, 663 N.W.2d 143, 145 (2003). The court held that the State had the burden to prove that there was in fact a period of delay involved and that there was good cause to exclude that period of delay. Id. at 875, 663 N.W.2d at 146. In concluding that the burden was not met, the Court of Appeals noted: Here, the record shows nothing but a period of time of 22 days as opposed to a period of delay between praecipe and completion of transcript. There was no showing by the State that this period of time was outside the norm for preparation of such a record or that the court reporters were in any way delayed. Id. We agree with the State's argument on further review that there is no meaningful distinction between the phrases period of time and period of delay. Although § 29-1207(4) uses the phrase period of delay, any such period is necessarily described and quantified in terms of time. Thus, in interpreting and applying the speedy trial act, we have used the words time and delay interchangeably. For example, in State v. Murphy, 255 Neb. 797, 804, 587 N.W.2d 384, 389 (1998), we held that the period of time between a trial court's ruling on a motion for depositions until the depositions are completed is not excludable under § 29-1207(4)(a), but such a period may or may not be excluded under § 29-1207(4)(f). See, also, State v. Turner, 252 Neb. 620, 629, 564 N.W.2d 231, 237 (1997) (stating where the excludable period properly falls under § 29-1207(4)(a) rather than the catchall provision of § 29-1207(4)(f), no showing of reasonableness or good cause is necessary to exclude the delay,  and the plain terms of § 29-1207(4)(a) exclude all time between the time of the filing of the defendant's pretrial motions and their final disposition, regardless of the promptness or reasonableness of the delay  (emphasis supplied)); State v. Lafler, 225 Neb. 362, 372-73, 405 N.W.2d 576, 583 (1987) (stating the Nebraska Legislature, in § 29-1207(4)(a), has not indicated a limitation, restriction, or qualification of time to be excluded as the result of a defendant's specific pretrial act or conduct, that is, exclusion of a period of delay in computing the time for commencement of trial pursuant to the Nebraska speedy trial act (emphasis supplied)), distinguished on other grounds, State v. Oldfield, 236 Neb. 433, 461 N.W.2d 554 (1990). The phrase period of delay in § 29-1207(4)(f) refers to a specified period of time in which trial did not commence. The State must prove that there was good cause why trial did not commence during such period in order to exclude it from the speedy trial computation under § 29-1207(4)(f). If a trial court relies on that section in excluding a period of delay from the 6-month computation, a general finding of good cause will not suffice and the trial court must make specific findings as to the good cause or causes which resulted in the extensions of time. State v. Murphy, supra ; State v. Kinstler, 207 Neb. 386, 299 N.W.2d 182 (1980). Here, the district court made a specific finding that there was good cause to exclude the period during which the requested transcripts were being prepared because Feldhacker had represented to the court that he needed such transcripts, as well as other materials, to defend himself at trial by proving his claim that the charges against him were fabricated. The Court of Appeals was required to give deference to this factual finding unless it determined it to be clearly erroneous. See, State v. Baker, 264 Neb. 867, 652 N.W.2d 612 (2002); State v. Recek, 263 Neb. 644, 641 N.W.2d 391 (2002). Although the appellate court explained its disagreement with the reasoning underlying the district court's finding of good cause, it did not make a specific determination that the finding was clearly erroneous. The district court's finding of good cause was not clearly erroneous. The record supports a finding that Feldhacker had represented that he was not prepared to go to trial until he had the various items of evidence which he believed would prove his innocence. The State did nothing to delay the preparation of the transcripts. Thus, it was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to conclude that there was good cause why trial did not commence during the period between Feldhacker's formal request for the transcripts and their completion. Accordingly, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in determining that this period is not excludable from the speedy trial clock under § 29-1207(4)(f). However, we determine that the first day of the excludable period should have been April 26, 2001, the day after the praecipe was filed. See State v. Baker, supra . Thus, there are 21 excludable days.