Opinion ID: 172342
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defense Counsel's Deficiencies

Text: The Kansas Supreme Court identified four errors defense counsel Kurth made during Floyd's trial: (1) an analogy to Susan Smith during voir dire; (2) introducing two-year-old Cody Bledsoe's hearsay statements; (3) not objecting to Detective Frost's improper credibility vouching for Floyd's interrogation statements; and (4) not objecting to factual errors in the prosecutor's closing arguments. The Kansas Supreme Court found that none of these errors prejudiced Floyd. The Kansas Supreme Court denied Floyd habeas relief because he failed the second prong of the Strickland test for an ineffective assistance of counsel claimalthough there were four instances where the Kansas Supreme Court found counsel's representation to be deficient, none of the deficiencies were found by the court to be prejudicial when the totality of the evidence was considered. The federal district court, on the other hand, found that these deficiencies [1] were prejudicial and granted habeas relief. We agree with the Kansas Supreme Court that these deficiencies, whether considered individually or cumulatively, were not prejudicial, and, therefore, reverse the district court.
The Kansas Supreme Court found that an analogy to Susan Smith, while objectively unreasonable and therefore deficient, was not prejudicial. Near the close of Kurth's voir dire, Kurth said to the prospective jury: Everybody remember the Susan Smith case? I know it's been a few years. Anybody recognize that name? Little gal that finally fessed up to drowning her little children? Anybody remember that now few years ago? Remember how she went on TV in front of everybody saying, asking where her children were and what happened and it was emotional, just like this one will be, and you wanted to believe her because you couldn't believe that somebody would do that to her own children. Ladies and gentlemen, I'm going to tell you that's the same kind of situation we have here. Don't decide this case until you've heard it all, because you're definitely going to hear two sides. [2] ROA, Vol. II, at 362-63. The Kansas Supreme Court stated: We agree that Kurth's analogy to the Smith case during voir dire was objectively unreasonable. We can think of many better examples he could have cited to illustrate his point that the jury must reserve judgment until it had heard both sides of the story, examples that would not have had the unfortunate parallel of Smith's televised pleas for return of her children. 283 Kan. at 105, 150 P.3d 868. The Kansas Supreme Court ultimately found that the Susan Smith analogy, while clumsy and regrettable, did not prejudice Floyd. Id. at 106, 150 P.3d 868. The federal district court disagreed. The district court stated: In a case where the credibility of Tom Bledsoe versus [Floyd Bledsoe] was critical, counsel's errors in voir dire placed [Floyd] in a bad light, arguably comparing his trial to a case involving a woman who had murdered her children and blamed another person on television before their bodies were found. Mem. and Order at 37. We agree with the state that the district court failed to give the rulings of the Kansas Supreme Court proper deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The district court agreed with the conclusion of the Kansas Supreme Court that the Susan Smith analogy painted Floyd in a bad light. However, the district court did not give proper deference to the Kansas Supreme Court's equally reasonable conclusion that the analogy was not prejudicial because the point of the analogy was the value of waiting to hear both sides of the story. The Kansas Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Strickland to the facts before it. The Kansas Supreme Court's conclusion that the Susan Smith analogy was not prejudicial to Floyd was not objectively unreasonable under the AEDPA's standards.
During the trial, hearsay statements made by Floyd's two-year-old son, Cody, were admitted into evidence during the examination of witnesses Rosa Bolinger and Heidi Bledsoe. Kurth introduced Cody's hearsay statements that Tom killed C.A. in his cross-examination of Rosa Bolinger, a government witness. Specifically, Bolinger testified that she spoke with the sheriff's department to report that Cody had been telling things that [Bolinger] didn't think a two-year-old should know. ROA, Vol. II, at 410. The testimony continued as follows: [Kurth]: Says Captain Turner spoke with you and you said that Cody would be three in March and he's saying things that concerned you and that he may have witnessed something or at least Tom, Tom Bledsoe may have told him something about the homicide. Is that correct? [Bolinger]: That he had got his information somewhere. [Kurth]: (Reading) Rose said Cody told her that Tom shot her, boom, boom, boom, boom, and dumped her in the water. Tom put his, Cody's, blanket around [C.A.] and also put [C.A.'s] blanket around her. Tom put her in a dump truck that goes beep, beep, beep. Tom closed [C.A.'s] eyes and he kissed her cheeks. There was red stuff on her legs. Shoes were wet and her shirt was wet. [Bolinger]: Yes. And later when I talked to Cody, because I talked to him sometime after that, and it was not a dump truck, it was a dump, and that was before I knew, you know, anything. Id. at 410-11. Cody's statements that Tom committed the murder were inadmissible hearsay, offered for their truth. They also opened the door for the prosecutor to later admit additional hearsay statements made by Cody. Bolinger testified on re-direct that she believed Cody had seen the murder and was not just repeating what he had been told. [Prosecutor]: [B]ased on your perceptions did it appear to you that somebody had told [Cody] about [C.A's murder] or that he had seen it? [Bolinger]: No. He had seen it. It was real to him. Id. at 413. Heidi, also a government witness, testified on direct examination as follows: Rose had told me that Cody had been talking and she thought I needed to hear it so we took Cody downstairs, it was Rose and I and Cody. She said, Cody what happened to [C.A]? And he said, Uncle Tom shot [C.A], bang, bang, bang.... I, I believe he said we, or he wrapped her in a blanket. At the time we thought he was saying dump truck but we, we figured out that, I think it was the following day or something, that he was saying dump, he put her in a dump. I think he said when, when she got shot she fell down and she shook. Id. at 433. When asked by the prosecutor if Cody's story ever changed, Heidi testified that after about a week after the murder, he says Daddy shot [C.A]. Id. at 434. Heidi testified that when she took Cody to C.A.'s grave, Cody said, [C.A.], I didn't shoot you, it wasn't me. Id. Heidi was asked by the prosecutor without objection: But [Cody's] original story was graphic enough and his actions were graphic enough to indicate to you that he observed what he was saying? Heidi answered, Yes. Id. at 435. The Kansas Supreme Court stated: According to Kurth, Cody's initial statement that Tom did it was an integral element of proof that Tom, rather than Floyd, committed the crime. Kurth testified at the [Kansas district court § 1507] hearing that the decision not to object to Cody's later statement that Daddy did it was a risk he weighed, and that he concluded the risk was worth taking. Considering, as we must, all of the circumstances at the time and granting Kurth all the deference he is due, we nevertheless conclude that his strategy regarding Cody's statements was objectively unreasonable. Cody was only 2 years old when he implicated first his uncle, then his father. In addition, even without Cody's statements, there was considerable evidence pointing to Tom as the perpetrator: His gun was the murder weapon; he had purchased the bullets; he initially confessed to having killed C.A.; and he led police to the body, which was buried behind the house where he lived. Kurth could have relied on this evidence to support the defense theory. Instead, he doggedly pursued a strategy that he knew would reveal that Floyd's own son eventually pointed his small finger at Floyd. We agree with [Jean] Phillips[, a legal expert called by Floyd at the habeas hearing,] that this strategy was a huge mistake, particularly when it included no plan to mitigate Cody's damaging Daddy did it statement. Such mitigation might have taken the form of expert testimony on the likelihood that Cody's original statement implicating Tom was more accurate than his later statement implicating Floyd, perhaps because the latter was a product of hearing others discuss his father's arrest. Had such testimony been introduced, Kurth could have argued this implication in closing, particularly after the State made its closing argument suggesting that Cody was an eyewitness who originally said Tom did it because his father told him to. But Kurth did none of these things. He put the exculpatory statement in front of the jury, knowing that the inculpatory statement would follow, and did nothing to explain the difference or its significance. Under these circumstances, the mere invocation of the word strategy does not insulate Kurth's performance from constitutional criticism. 283 Kan. at 94-95, 150 P.3d 868. To determine if Kurth's performance was deficient, the relevant inquiry is whether trial counsel's decision was an informed tactical decision that was reasonable under the circumstances of the case. Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1369 (10th Cir.1994). Further, the mere incantation of `strategy' does not insulate attorney behavior from review. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). Kurth articulated a strategic reason for introducing Cody's hearsay statements Cody said that Tom shot C.A., which directly supports the defense's theory of the case that Tom, not Floyd, was guilty. However, even though Kurth thought the risk [that Cody's statements implicating Floyd would be admitted] was worth taking, 283 Kan. at 94, 150 P.3d 868, this strategy was unreasonable under the circumstances of the case. Kurth opened the door for additional statements made by Cody that Floyd committed the murder, and Kurth had no strategy to mitigate the negative impact of Cody's additional statements implicating his client. The prosecutor, at the state district court § 1507 hearing, testified that he offered these statements not for their truth, but merely to establish that Cody was present when C.A. was shot, no matter who the shooter may have been. Indeed, the federal district court summarized the importance of Cody's statements to the prosecution: If Cody saw the crime occur, as the prosecutor argued, Tom could not have committed the crime, since he was not with Cody on November 5 or 6, 1999. Mem. and Order at 36. Even if Cody's statements were not offered for their truth, they are still objectionable. The Kansas Supreme Court was not objectively unreasonable for concluding that the admission of Cody's statements, while demonstrative of counsel's deficient performance, was not prejudicial to Floyd. As the Kansas Supreme Court stated: Although Cody's statement was damaging, given the jury's knowledge of his age, and inconsistency, we are not prepared to say that it prejudiced Floyd's case. The State introduced other, far more damaging evidence, principally Tom's recitation of Floyd's admissions the day after C.A.'s disappearance.... Tom's credibility was critical; and the jury chose to believe him. 283 Kan. at 106, 150 P.3d 868. Because of the obvious reliability issues with Cody's statements and the other evidence against Floyd, the Kansas Supreme Court determined that the admission of Cody's statements was not prejudicial. We agree that, considering all of the evidence and noting that the jury had the opportunity to hear Tom's testimony and judge his credibility, there is not a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors the result of the proceeding would have been different. The Kansas Supreme Court's determination that the admission of this evidence did not prejudice Floyd is not an unreasonable application of Strickland.
During the direct examination of Detective Troy Ryan Frost, Floyd's counsel did not object when Frost was asked about whether he believed certain statements Floyd made to him. Frost said that Floyd told him he loved C.A., and that he had visited the trailer on the afternoon of her disappearance. These two facts are important, because they gave Floyd motive and opportunity. The objectionable trial testimony between the prosecutor and Frost about Frost's conversation with Floyd is as follows: [Prosecutor]: When [Floyd] said that he had gone to the trailer that day did you believe him? [Frost]: I believed him. [Prosecutor]: What he was indicating to you through your questions and his statement how he felt about her was, you think he was being genuine? [Frost]: Oh yes. ROA, Vol. III, at 511. It is improper for a witness to vouch for the credibility of someone else's statement. Credibility determinations are within the province of the jury. United States v. Toledo, 985 F.2d 1462, 1470 (10th Cir.1993) (explaining that the credibility of witnesses is not an appropriate subject for expert testimony because it usurps a critical function of the jury, is not helpful to the jury, which can make its own determination of credibility, and may be prejudicial and unduly influence[] the jury). The Kansas Supreme Court and the federal district court both found that Floyd's counsel's failure to object to this testimony was unreasonable. The Kansas Supreme Court concluded that Kurth was objectively unreasonable for failing to object to Frost's credibility vouching: Kurth did not object to this questioning and testified at the [habeas] hearing that he could not recall any strategic reason for not doing so. Floyd is correct; this was objectionable testimony that invaded the province of the jury. 283 Kan. at 98, 150 P.3d 868. However, the Kansas Supreme Court found that this testimony was not prejudicial because it involved such a small part of the evidence presented and, even if Frost's objectionable statements had been omitted, the jury still would have heard Floyd's statements [as reported by Detective Frost] that [Floyd] went to the trailer the day C.A. disappeared and that [Floyd] loved her. Id. at 106, 150 P.3d 868. The federal district court disagreed, stating that the Kansas Supreme [C]ourt again ignored the emphasis placed by the prosecutor in closing argument upon [Floyd's] alleged `love' for C.A. as a motive for the crime. Mem. and Order at 34. However, the Kansas Supreme Court was not objectively unreasonable for concluding that Frost's credibility vouching was not prejudicial to Floyd. Frost's credibility vouching was a very small part of the evidence presented, and, thus, there is not a reasonable probability that, but for the credibility vouching, Floyd would not have been found guilty. We note that Floyd does not challenge Frost's credibility when he testified that Floyd got real emotional and then told him he went to the trailer that day, and that he loved C.A. ROA, Vol. III, at 510. Additionally, as the state argued, Frost's statements did not concern Tom's credibility, which was the single most decisive factor for the jury to consider. Aplt. Br. at 33. The Kansas Supreme Court's determination that this deficiency was not prejudicial is not objectively unreasonable under the AEDPA's standards.
There were also several instances during closing argument where the prosecutor misrepresented the evidence and Kurth made no objection. However, the court did instruct the jury prior to counsels' closing arguments that an attorney's statements are not evidence and should be disregarded if the statements are not supported by the evidence. Mem. and Order at 35. The Kansas Supreme Court found Kurth's failure to object deficient: [The prosecutor's] statements were outside the wide latitude given a prosecutor in discussing the evidence and thus could have been subject to a sustainable objection.... Lacking any strategic explanation in the record for Kurth's failure to object, and given the repeated nature of the prosecutor's behavior, we agree that Kurth was ineffective by failing to object to these statements. 283 Kan. at 101-02, 150 P.3d 868 (internal citations omitted). The Kansas Supreme Court found that the prosecutor's misstatements were not prejudicial because the misstatements were not enough to take the jury's eyes off the ball. Id. at 106, 150 P.3d 868. The district court again disagreed, finding that the failures to object, combined with the other deficiencies in Kurth's performance at trial, were prejudicial, and noting that each misstatement of fact related directly to the `Tom versus [Floyd]' issue. Mem. and Order at 34. The Kansas Supreme Court found three of the prosecutor's statements during closing argument to be troubling. 283 Kan. at 101, 150 P.3d 868. First, the prosecutor erroneously said that [t]he physical evidence shows that Tom didn't do it. ROA, Vol. IV, at 986. There was no physical evidence that excluded Tom as the killer. Further, there was physical evidence linking Tom to the crime. The gun was Tom's; the bullets were purchased by Tom. Second, the prosecutor misquoted Cody's hearsay testimony in closing argument. The prosecutor stated: [Floyd] wasn't alone. We know there w[ere] at least three people there, him and [C.A.], and he brought his son. His son sat in the vehicle and he watched Floyd Scott Bledsoe put the gun to the back of his aunt's head and pulled the trigger. Floyd takes care of the body, gets back in the car, Cody says, You killed [C.A.]. Imagine what went through that boy's mind. When Floyd Scott Bledsoe convinced his two-year-old son to say Tom did it, as soon as that powerful influence of his father was out of his presence he was comfortable with telling the truth, spontaneous comments by two-year-old children, going to the grave site, a spontaneoustwo-year-old children don't use a lot of reasoning or deduction, but when he goes to [C.A's] grave he explains to her, because he was there, that he didn't do it. [C.A.], I didn't kill you, my dad did. Id. at 986. However, according to Heidi's testimony, Cody did not say, [C.A.], I didn't kill you, my dad did, as reported by the prosecutor in his closing argument. Instead, Heidi testified that Cody said, [C.A.], I didn't shoot you, it wasn't me. Id., Vol. II, at 434. While it is true that at some point after Floyd's arrest, according to Heidi, Cody began to implicate Floyd in the murder, there was no evidence that Cody implicated Floyd when he was taken to the grave site. The prosecutor misrepresented the evidence by misquoting Heidi's testimony. Finally, the prosecutor erroneously said that a psychologist testified that Cody was present during the murder. Near the end of his initial closing, the prosecutor said: Ladies and gentlemen, Mom, Floyd, and Cody explained to you it was Floyd. Tom couldn't have done it. [Floyd's] wife, his wife explains to you, and she, her testimony clearly wasn't skewed. It didn't present all kinds of bolstering testimony for the State to show that her husband had killed her sister. What it did do was it reinforced the fact that Cody was there. Her perception, she'd raised him since he was young, Cody was there. A psychologist, based on the information she said, Cody was there. There's only one way Cody would have been there, ladies and gentlemen. He didn't walk, he didn't crawl, he didn't ride a horse; he was with his father when [C.A.] was killed. He was never with Tom that whole evening. He was with Floyd. Id., Vol. IV, at 989. No psychologist testified that Cody was there. The only psychologist to testify at the trial (Claudine Boldridge) said that some students had come in complaining that Tom had messed with other kids on a fishing trip, and one had heard Cody talking at church about C.A.'s murder. Id., Vol. II, at 416, 418. However, Boldridge did not testify as an expert and did not give her opinion about whether Cody actually witnessed the murder. Kurth's failure to object during closing argument does not establish prejudice. A jury instruction may minimize the impact of any error made by misstating the evidence in closing arguments. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Mullin, 422 F.3d 1113, 1134 (10th Cir.2005) (explaining that a judge's instructions that the jury should consider only the evidence introduced at trial, that the attorneys' statements and arguments are not evidence, and that the jury bore the responsibility of determining the credibility of each witness may minimize the impact of a prosecutor's misstatements). We agree with the Kansas Supreme Court that the prosecutor's misstatements, particularly in light of the court's instruction that attorneys' statements are not evidence, were not enough to take the jury's eyes off the ball. 283 Kan. at 106, 150 P.3d 868. The Kansas Supreme Court's determination that this deficiency was not prejudicial is not objectively unreasonable under AEDPA standards.
Floyd and Tom's mother, Catherine Bledsoe (Catherine), testified that she told Floyd she knew Tom did not murder C.A., and Floyd agreed with her that Tom did not do it. ROA, Vol. IV, at 776. Specifically, Catherine said, [Floyd] called me and he said that he didn't do it and I says, `Well, I know Tom didn't do it.' Id. Catherine's testimony was not found to be objectively unreasonable by the Kansas Supreme Court. The Kansas Supreme Court stated: At trial, Catherine Bledsoe related a conversation she had with Floyd shortly after he was arrested and Tom was released, in which she and Floyd agreed that Tom did not kill C.A. Floyd argues that this was inadmissible, damaging, prejudicial testimony concerning Floyd's mother's opinion of Tom's culpability. We agree with the [Kansas] district court's determination that Floyd fails to meet his burden to show that Kurth's representation was constitutionally deficient on this point. 283 Kan. at 100, 150 P.3d 868. The federal district court found the failure to object to Catherine's testimony objectively unreasonable. The district court characterized Catherine's testimony as the credibility call of a mother in a swearing match between two brothers. Mem. and Order at 47. The district court found that not objecting to this testimony was both deficient and prejudicial. The Kansas Supreme Court reasonably concluded that Kurth's failure to object to Catherine's testimony was not deficient. Catherine's testimony could easily indicate that she thought neither of her sons capable of murder. Even assuming Kurth's failure to object to Catherine's testimony was deficient, such a deficiency would not be prejudicial. Finally, the Kansas Supreme Court was not objectively unreasonable under the AEDPA's standards when it determined that the cumulative effect of counsel's deficiencies was not prejudicial to Floyd.