Opinion ID: 2509099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Other claims of ineffective appellate counsel

Text: Browning claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that prosecutorial misconduct vitiated Browning's presumption of innocence and the concept of reasonable doubt. He complains about prosecutorial statements regarding the presumption of innocence and the jurors' duty to convict, the prosecutor's reference to reasonable doubt, and a jury instruction on flight. Browning failed to provide argument, authority, specific allegations, or reference to the record regarding any comment on the jurors' duty or an instruction on flight, so these issues warrant no discussion. The other aspects of this claim lack merit. Appellate counsel did assert numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct on direct appeal, but this court deemed only two worth discussing and determined that in light of the overwhelming evidence of Browning's guilt there was insufficient prejudice to reverse. [42] Counsel raised the issue of the prosecutor's disparagement of the presumption of innocence, and this court denounced the misconduct but concluded that it did not justify reversal. [43] Browning argues that appellate counsel should have federalized the issue and gained a more favorable standard of review. This argument is unpersuasive: this court recognized that the presumption of innocence is a fundamental and elemental concept ... solidly founded in our system of justice, but still determined that the misconduct did not warrant reversal. [44] Browning claims that the prosecutor supplemented the reasonable doubt instruction by stating so, don't anticipate answering all the questions in this case as a prerequisite to coming back with a guilty verdict. It has nothing to do whatsoever with reasonable doubt. This comment is certainly challengeablesome unanswered questions are pertinent to reasonable doubtbut did not violate our admonition to counsel not to explain, elaborate on, or offer analogies or examples based on the statutory definition of reasonable doubt. [45] Instead, the prosecutor basically argued that evidence and theories in the case before the jury either amount to or fall short of that definition, which is acceptable argument. [46] Next, Browning claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the admission of evidence of his thumbprint on a watch that was never linked to the crimes. We discern no prejudice. Even if it had been shown that his fingerprints were not found on any of the stolen jewelry, he was found in possession of the jewelry immediately after the crimes. Browning claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the prosecutor committed misconduct by concealing benefits given to Randy Wolfe in exchange for his testimony. There is now evidence of such benefits, and we consider that matter below under Brady v. Maryland. [47] But counsel explored this issue at trial and was not ineffective. Browning contends that appellate counsel failed to properly challenge the trial court's granting of a continuance. Though this issue was raised on appeal, [48] Browning asserts that counsel should have made several additional arguments. On appeal, this court concluded that in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt presented against him at trial, it is clear that any alleged prejudice would not rise to the level justifying dismissal of the charged crimes. [49] Browning's claim is without merit because he still fails to demonstrate prejudice. Next, Browning claims that appellate counsel failed to challenge the escape instruction and to argue that the district court should have instructed the jury on attempted escape. Trial counsel asked for an attempted escape instruction as a lesser included offense because Browning never made it out of the police station. NRS 212.090 states that a prisoner is guilty of felony escape if he is confined in a prison, or... in the lawful custody of an officer or other person, [and] escapes or attempts to escape from prison or custody, if he is held on a charge, conviction or sentence of: 1. A felony. Browning picked the lock on his handcuffs and escaped from the interview room. Although apprehended before he left the police station, he still escaped from where he was being detained. Therefore, the jury was properly instructed on the escape charge. Moreover, the escape statute encompasses attempted escape. Appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this claim on appeal because it had no reasonable probability of success. Browning claims that appellate counsel failed to challenge the adequacy of the jury instruction on premeditation. We decline to consider this claim because it lacks any cogent argument, legal analysis, or specific factual allegations to support it. Browning contends that appellate counsel should have argued that the trial court erred in failing to give the jury an addict-informer instruction regarding the Wolfes' testimony. He relies on Champion v. State, where this court held that it was plain error for the district court not to caution the jury regarding an addict-informer's testimony because such an instruction was central to the case. [50] Champion is distinguishable. In that case, the State conceded that the addict-informer was unreliable, and his testimony was the only evidence that the defendant had sold illegal drugs. [51] Here, the State has not conceded that the Wolfes were unreliable, and their testimony was corroborated by extensive evidence. Furthermore, the jury received a general cautionary instruction regarding the weight and credibility of witness testimony as well as one regarding the credibility of witnesses with felony convictions. The district court did not err by failing to give an addict-informer instruction; therefore, counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal. Browning also claims that appellate counsel should have challenged the trial court's failure to give the jury a convicted felon instruction. However, the jury received such an instruction, and Browning does not explain how it was insufficient. Next, Browning claims that appellate counsel failed to raise all instances of plain error, including the prosecutor's insertion of his personal beliefs, his references to facts not supported by the evidence, his comment on the defense's failure to call Gaylord as a witness, and his submission of victim impact evidence during the guilt phase. These claims lack any argument, legal analysis, or factual allegations to support them and do not warrant further discussion.