Opinion ID: 2676152
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: August 2012 Trial

Text: At trial, the government’s witnesses testified about Bowleg’s role piloting the boat from the Bahamas to the United States. After the government rested, Bowleg moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts of the indictment. The district court denied the motion as to Counts 1 through 4 and reserved on Counts 5 and 6. Bowleg’s counsel informed the district court that he wished to call Pratt as a witness. Bowleg’s counsel sought to ask Pratt about a handwritten letter that Pratt 10 Case: 12-15797 Date Filed: 05/28/2014 Page: 11 of 36 purportedly drafted and sent to Bowleg’s counsel sometime prior to Bowleg’s trial. The letter, dated May 30, 2012, stated: (1) Bowleg was not Pratt’s “helper” or “assistant” on the boat; (2) Pratt was the captain; and (3) Bowleg “was only a passenger.” Rather than testify, Pratt invoked his right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment. Pratt believed that testifying could subject him to a prosecution for perjury or like charges. 6 On June 22, 2012, prior to Bowleg’s trial, Pratt pled guilty to one count of smuggling an alien for financial gain, pursuant to a written plea agreement. At his plea colloquy, Pratt affirmed, under oath, the facts set forth in his plea agreement, including the fact that Bowleg and Pratt together had “operated” the boat.7 Bowleg moved for a mistrial because Pratt would not testify. The district court denied the mistrial motion because Pratt had validly invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.8 6 If Pratt testified, he would have been immune from prosecution by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida for any additional offense arising out of the May 5-6 voyage, with the exception of crimes of violence. Pratt would not have been immune to a prosecution for perjury or like charges. 7 The district court determined that, based upon its “standard practice,” Pratt would have sworn to the truth of the facts in his plea agreement before the district court would have accepted Pratt’s plea. A transcript of Pratt’s plea hearing was not prepared, however. 8 Bowleg does not challenge the district court’s determination that Pratt validly invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, and thus, we do not address this issue on appeal. 11 Case: 12-15797 Date Filed: 05/28/2014 Page: 12 of 36 After Bowleg rested, Bowleg renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal. The district court denied the motion as to Counts 1 through 4 and again reserved on Counts 5 and 6. D. Bowleg’s Request to Admit Pratt’s Statements to Agent Cisneros After the government and defense had rested, but before closing arguments, the government notified Bowleg, for the first time, that Agent Cisneros had interviewed Pratt sometime between Pratt’s June 22, 2012 guilty plea and Bowleg’s August 2012 trial. During this interview, Pratt informed Agent Cisneros that, although Bowleg, along with other passengers on the boat, “held the wheel for [Pratt] briefly a couple of times,” Pratt was the captain of the boat, and Bowleg was a passenger. Bowleg’s counsel requested the district court to allow him to reopen his case and have Pratt testify about the statements made during that interview. Pratt again invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent based on the possibility that testifying could result in him being charged with perjury. Bowleg’s counsel then requested that the district court allow him to reopen his case and have Agent Cisneros testify about Pratt’s statements made at the interview. Bowleg’s counsel claimed that, during the interview, Agent Cisneros likely spoke to Pratt about the May 30 letter and that Agent Cisneros could testify about that letter too. 12 Case: 12-15797 Date Filed: 05/28/2014 Page: 13 of 36 The government objected to the admission of this evidence as inadmissible hearsay. Bowleg argued that Agent Cisneros’s testimony about Pratt’s interview statements was admissible under Rule 804(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, an exception to the hearsay rule. The district court sustained the government’s hearsay objection. The court determined that Pratt’s interview statements were untrustworthy and thus not admissible under Rule 804(b)(3). Bowleg again moved for a mistrial because, if Pratt’s exculpatory statements were not introduced into evidence, Bowleg could not have a full and fair trial. The court denied Bowleg’s motion for a mistrial.9 E. Jury Verdict After deliberations, the jury found Bowleg guilty of four counts of alien smuggling for financial gain (Counts 1 through 4) and one count of aiding and assisting an alien convicted of an aggravated felon to enter the United States (Count 6). The jury found Bowleg not guilty of conspiracy to allow, procure, and permit an alien convicted of an aggravated felon to enter the United States (Count 5). The court denied Bowleg’s motion for acquittal (upon which the court had reserved ruling) as to Count 6 and adjudicated Bowleg guilty of Counts 1 through 4 and Count 6. F. Presentence Investigation Report 9 Because of the district court’s rulings, Agent Cisneros did not testify about Pratt’s statements before the jury. Pratt also did not testify before the jury. 13 Case: 12-15797 Date Filed: 05/28/2014 Page: 14 of 36 Bowleg’s presentence investigation report (“PSI”) calculated a total offense level of 32 and a criminal history category of I, yielding an advisory guidelines range of 121 to 151 months’ imprisonment. The total offense level of 32 consisted of: (1) a base offense level of 23 under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(a)(2); (2) a 3-level increase for transporting 13 unlawful aliens under § 2L1.1(b)(2)(A); (3) a 2-level increase for smuggling a minor unaccompanied by a parent or grandparent under § 2L1.1(b)(4); (4) a 2-level increase for intentionally or recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person under § 2L1.1(b)(6); and (5) a 2-level increase for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Although the PSI recommended a 2-level increase for use of a special skill under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, that increase was not used to calculate the total offense level of 32. Therefore, the guidelines calculation did not include a twolevel increase for use of a special skill under § 3B1.3. Counts 1 and 2 had a statutory mandatory minimum sentence of three years and a maximum sentence of ten years. Counts 3 and 4 had a mandatory minimum sentence of five years and a maximum sentence of fifteen years.10 Count 6 had a maximum sentence of ten years. 10 A defendant convicted for the first or second time of smuggling an alien for financial gain must be sentenced to at least three years’ imprisonment, but no more than ten years’ imprisonment. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii). The statutory sentencing range for subsequent convictions is five to fifteen years’ imprisonment. Id. Thus, Counts 3 and 4 had increased statutory penalties due to Bowleg’s convictions on Counts 1 and 2. 14 Case: 12-15797 Date Filed: 05/28/2014 Page: 15 of 36 G. Bowleg’s October 2012 Written Objections to the PSI In his written objections to the PSI filed in October 2012, 11 Bowleg objected to: (1) the two-level increase for creating a substantial risk of death or serious injury to another; (2) the two-level increase for obstruction of justice; and (3) the absence of a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Bowleg also requested that the district court vary downward from the advisory guidelines range based on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and impose a total sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment because, inter alia, Bowleg (1) had no prior criminal history; (2) was abused as a child and had a drug addiction; (3) would be deported and thus would not be a threat to society; and (4) was a passenger on the boat, as shown by Bowleg’s trial testimony and Pratt’s May 30 letter. Further, a higher sentence would create an unwarranted disparity between Bowleg’s and Pratt’s sentences, as Pratt received a sentence of only 36 months’ imprisonment. H. November 2, 2012 Sentencing Hearing At the sentencing hearing on November 2, 2012, Bowleg reiterated his written objections to his guidelines calculations and objected to the two-level increase for transporting a minor because Bowleg had no knowledge that the individual was a minor. He also objected to the district court applying a § 3B1.3 11 The PSI Addendum stated that Bowleg had no objections. On September 14, 2012, Bowleg received the PSI, and on October 18, 2012, he filed written objections. 15 Case: 12-15797 Date Filed: 05/28/2014 Page: 16 of 36 increase, despite the fact that his guidelines calculation did not include the § 3B1.3 increase. The court overruled Bowleg’s objections to the guidelines calculations. The district court thus adopted the advisory guidelines range set forth in the PSI, 121 to 151 months’ imprisonment. As we have said, the guidelines calculations in the PSI, which the district court adopted, did not include the § 3B1.3 increase. After considering the § 3553(a) factors and the statements of the parties, the district court sentenced Bowleg to 84 months’ imprisonment on each of the five counts of conviction, to run concurrently to each other. The district court stated that Bowleg had perjured himself and abused his right to a trial by jury, and thus, a higher sentence than Pratt’s 36-month sentence was warranted. The district court varied downward, however, because of the disparity between Pratt’s sentence and Bowleg’s advisory guidelines range of 121 to 151 months’ imprisonment.