Opinion ID: 367140
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Partial Approval of IPSFC Regulations.

Text: 25 Decker maintains that the United States failed to approve the regulations by attempting to approve them only partially and therefore that his conviction must be reversed because there were no valid regulations to violate. He argues that the treaty could not have contemplated partial approval because the resulting system of dual regulation is inconsistent with the treaty's purposes of assuring sufficient escapement of salmon to preserve the fishery and of achieving an equal division of the harvestable catch between Canadian and American fishermen. 9 He also asserts that this court's decree in United States v. Washington mandates that treaty Indians be subject to IPSFC regulations. 26 Exemption of treaty Indians from the 1977 IPSFC regulations was not inconsistent with the convention. Article VI merely states that the regulations are subject to approval of the two Governments. It does not state that each country is limited to approval or disapproval in whole, rather than in part. As long as the objectives of the convention were not impeded, we cannot say the United States violated the treaty here by approving Commission regulations only in part. 10 27 Regulations promulgated by the Department of the Interior for treaty Indians, although allowing them longer fishing periods, tracked the Commission's regulations in order to be responsive to the IPSFC need to meet spawning requirements and to prevent or correct any imbalance in the division of catch between the two countries. 11 The Department also undertook other measures to avoid impeding convention objectives. 12 The only reason the State Department selectively approved IPSFC regulations was to allocate the United States' share of fish among American fishermen. We are unpersuaded that this reallocation threatened the goals of the convention. 13 28 The attitude and practice of Canada is also relevant in determining whether partial approval of regulations is permissible under the convention because, when the meaning of a treaty provision is in doubt, a court may look to the practical construction placed upon it by the parties as an aid to interpretation. Pigeon River Improvement Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd.,291 U.S. 138, 158, 54 S.Ct. 361, 78 L.Ed. 695 (1934). 29 Canada did not object to the United States' partial approval of regulations affecting American fishermen. This is not surprising since Canada has always excluded its Indian fishing from Commission coverage. Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. United States Dep't of State, 584 F.2d 931, 933 n.1 (9th Cir. 1978). 30 Both Decker and Marriott maintain nevertheless that this court has already determined treaty Indians must abide by IPSFC regulations. In United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d at 690, we said: 31 Congress sufficiently indicated its intent that all persons, including Indians, be subject to Commission regulations . . . . 32 This passage does not sustain the appellants' argument. Under article VI of the convention, regulations for American convention waters are not effective unless they are approved by the United States. An unstated but necessarily implied condition precedent to applying IPSFC regulations to treaty Indians is that they are first properly approved. To hold otherwise would interpret the quoted language as requiring American fishermen to abide by any and all Commission regulations even if the government exercised its lawful article VI right to reject them. 33 Marriott argues that enforcement of IPSFC regulations that exempt treaty Indians is arbitrary governmental action that deprives him of equal protection of the law. This contention is without merit. 34 Traditional equal protection analysis, which requires a compelling state interest to justify invidious racial discrimination, does not apply to legislation or governmental action favoring Indians. As the Supreme Court noted in Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552-53, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 2483, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974): 35 Literally every piece of legislation dealing with Indian tribes and reservations . . . single out for special treatment a constituency of tribal Indians living on or near reservations. If these laws, derived from historical relationships and explicitly designed to help only Indians, were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of the United States Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively erased and the solemn commitment of the Government toward the Indians would be jeopardized. See Simmons v. Eagle Seelatsee, 244 F.Supp. 808, 814 n.13 (E.D.Wash.1965), aff'd, 384 U.S. 209, 86 S.Ct. 1459, 16 L.Ed.2d 480 (1966). 36 The propriety of preferential treatment for Indians, particularly when based upon treaty obligations, is rooted in the constitution 14 and has found frequent expression in Supreme Court opinions. 15 As long as the special treatment (for Indians) can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed. 417 U.S. at 555, 94 S.Ct. at 2485. 37 Here, we conclude that exemption of treaty Indians from IPSFC regulations in order to allow them longer fishing periods is rationally related to fulfilling the United States' treaty obligations as mandated in United States v. Washington. Appellants experienced no denial of equal protection. 38