Opinion ID: 1386595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Free Exercise Clause, RFRA and RLUIPA Claims

Text: Under the Free Exercise Clause, RFRA and RLUIPA, Patel must first raise a material question of fact regarding whether the BOP has placed a substantial burden on his ability to practice his religion. See Weir v. Nix, 114 F.3d 817, 820 (1997) (Free Exercise Clause); 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (RFRA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (RLUIPA). [6] Once it is determined that a regulation imposes a substantial burden on a prisoner, the review of that burden under the Free Exercise Clause differs from RFRA and RLUIPA, see, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005), but we need not reach that issue because we conclude. Patel has not put forth sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury could conclude that his ability to practice his religion has been substantially burdened. Substantially burdening one's free exercise of religion means that the regulation must significantly inhibit or constrain conduct or expression that manifests some central tenet of a person's individual religious beliefs; must meaningfully curtail a person's ability to express adherence to his or her faith; or must deny a person reasonable opportunities to engage in those activities that are fundamental to a person's religion. Murphy v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 372 F.3d 979, 988 (8th Cir.2004) (quotation and alterations omitted). When the significance of a religious belief is not at issue, the same definition of substantial burden applies under the Free Exercise Clause, RFRA: and RLUIPA. See id. [7] Courts generally have found that no substantial burden exists if the regulation merely makes the practice of a religious belief more expensive. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961) (plurality opinion) (holding that a law that operates so as to make the practice of . . . religious beliefs more expensive did not sufficiently burden plaintiffs under the Free Exercise Clause); Donovan v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 722 F.2d 397, 403 (8th Cir.1983) (concluding that legislation otherwise legitimate does not violate the Free Exercise Clause merely because financial detriment results); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 n. 11 (11th Cir.2004) (acknowledging that the economic reality of the, marketplace does not constitute a substantial burden under RLUIPA); Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 762 (7th Cir.2003) (requiring more expensive building guidelines did not impose a substantial burden on a church under RLUIPA); Goodall by Goodall v. Stafford County Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168, 172 (4th Cir.1995) (placing economic burden of purchasing speech services for a student attending a private school did not impose a substantial burden on plaintiffs under RFRA). Patel argues that the alternative means by which he may practice his Muslim faith through dietary accommodation offered by the BOP are inadequate. He could self-select a vegetarian diet from the hot bar, but he claims that the food is cross-contaminated. He could supplement the Common Fare meals from the salad bar, but he claims that the food and serving pans are also cross-contaminated. He could consume the Common Fare meals, but he would be forced to refrain from consuming kosher meat entrées, which make up ten of the fourteen dinner meals every two weeks and which he claims do not satisfy his stricter halal requirements. [8] Patel also has the option of purchasing halal vegetarian entrées from the commissary and substituting them for kosher meat entrées on days meat is served at dinner. Patel claims, [I]f I had to purchase those meals on a daily basis, I think the cost would be prohibitive. He, however, provides no financial information to support his claim. Patel would not need to purchase meals on a daily basis, but on the five days each week when a kosher meat entree, not a kosher and halal vegetarian entrée, is served. While this option places a financial burden upon him, Patel has not shown that it is substantial. He only offers his single, vague and unsupported statement about the potential cost, and the record offers no evidence regarding Patel's financial status. [9] Requiring him to purchase commissary meals does not significantly inhibit, meaningfully curtail, or deny Patel a reasonable opportunity to practice his religion. Patel has not offered sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient for a jury to find that his ability to practice his religion has been substantially burdened. Patel relies upon our decision in Love v. Reed, 216 F.3d 682 (8th Cir.2000), which found that the prison placed a substantial burden upon inmate Love's ability to practice his religion based on the prison's refusal to allow Love to store food in his cell. In that case, Love converted to the Hebrew religion, which required strict Sabbath observance. Id. at 685-86. His beliefs prevented him from eating food prepared by others or receiving food from others on the Sabbath. Id. at 686. The prison refused to allow him to store peanut butter and bread from the kitchen in his cell, which he claimed would allow him properly to observe the Sabbath. Id. The prison argued that Love could purchase food from the commissary. The district court concluded that the prison had violated Love's rights under the Free Exercise Clause. Id. It found that Love proved that he was indigent and, in any event, that any money he did receive must be used to purchase food from the commissary first, requiring Love to exhaust alternative means of observing the Sabbath before seeking an accommodation. Id. at 689. On appeal, we agreed that Love's indigency would mean that the dietary restrictions placed a substantial burden upon his ability to practice his religion and that the prison must accommodate him but only after he exhaust[ed] alternative means. Id. at 689-90. In this case, however, Patel neither pleads nor provides any evidence that he is indigent. Additionally, Love was required to purchase meals from the commissary with his own funds if he were able in order to exhaust alternative means. Id. at 689. Patel does not offer to purchase meals from the commissary but instead demands that he receive meals from the commissary at the BOP's expense, regardless of whether he is able to purchase them. Furthermore, the record does not reflect that Patel has exhausted alternative means of accommodating his religious dietary needs. For instance, Patel complains that he has observed prisoners dropping food into the vegetarian dishes on the hot bar, but he could simply request to be first in line to avoid prisoner cross-contamination concerns. The record does not indicate whether Patel requested or would be allowed to store halal food from the kitchen in his cell, such as peanut butter and bread, so that he could have a halal meal on days that kosher meat entrées are served. Also, Patel does not address why less expensive food items available at the commissary, such as beans, rice, tortillas, cheese, oatmeal, and peanut butter, could not serve as a substitute for the kosher meat entrées. He only claims that halal entrées from the commissary might be cost prohibitive but does not argue that purchasing less expensive but religiously acceptable food items would be. Finally, the Ninth. Circuit has suggested that an alternative means of pursuing a halal diet may exist in finding an outside religious organization to provide halal meals. Watkins v. Shabazz, 180 Fed.Appx. 773, 775 (9th Cir.2006) (unpublished memorandum). Therefore, we conclude that Patel has not presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that his right to exercise his religion was substantially burdened, and summary judgment was appropriate. [10]