Opinion ID: 782196
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Does the Defender Have an Actual Conflict of Interest?

Text: 18 The Defender contends that because it concurrently represented Kaid and Oberoi, New York Disciplinary Rule 5-105 applies. This rule provides that 19 B. A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the lawyer's representation of another client, or if it would be likely to involve the lawyer in representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C). 20 Although the Defender argues that it falls within DR 5-105(B) because it represented Kaid and Oberoi at the same time, DR 5-105(B) governs continue[d] multiple employment. Once the district court relieved the Defender as Kaid's counsel, it no longer had multiple clients and its situation did not fit within DR 5-105(B). 21 DR 5-108 covers conflict of interest issues related to former and present clients and provides: 22 (A) ... a lawyer who has represented a client in a matter shall not, without the consent of the former client after full disclosure: 23 1. Thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client. 24 2. Use any confidences or secrets of the former client except as permitted by DR 4-101(C) or when the confidence or secret has become generally known. 25 DR 4-101(a) defines confidence as the information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law and secret, as other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client. DR4-101(B) states: 26 Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly: 27 (1) Reveal a confidence or secret of a client. 28 (2) Use a confidence or secret of a client to the disadvantage of the client. 29 (3) Use a confidence or secret of a client for the advantage of the lawyer or of a third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure. 30 The exception section, subdivision C, allows a lawyer to reveal ... [c]onfidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected, but only after a full disclosure to them. Because subdivision C governs  reveal[ing ] ... confidences or secrets upon consent of the client, the Defender argues that it does not authorize an attorney to  use a confidence or secret of a client to the disadvantage of the client even when the client consents. DR 4-101(B), (C) (emphases added). 31 The Defender's interpretation is plausible and, as one commentator points out, there are sound policy reasons for refusing to allow a criminal defendant to consent to the use of his secrets and confidences to his disadvantage. Gary F. Lowenthal, Successive Representation by Criminal Lawyers, 93 Yale L.J. 1, 51 (1983) (pointing out that attacking the credibility of a former client using information gained from that client may be humiliating to the witness and degrading to the witness's former lawyer and that a lawyer's discomfort in cross-examining a former client may be communicated subtly to the trier of fact to the disadvantage of the current client). 32 However, most authorities hold that an attorney may use the confidences of a former client to cross-examine that client if both the former and the current client consent. And, this court has suggested that, under some circumstances, the consent of the former client may be enough. 33 We first consider two opinions from the New York State Bar Association's Committee on Professional Ethics, New York Ethics Opinion 592 (1988) and New York Ethics Opinion 605 (1989). In Number 592, 1988 WL 236150 (June 9, 1988), the committee considered a situation in which a public defender represented two criminal defendants. The first client told the public defender that the second client had admitted to committing the crime with which the second client was charged. The first client also asked for help in obtaining favorable consideration from the district attorney in return for his testimony against the second client. Id. at . The committee found that the defender was faced with an actual conflict and must withdraw from representation of both clients. Id. at . However, the committee cited and relied on a county ethics opinion, which stated [i]f the lawyer in the course of his representation acquired confidential information from one of the parties that would operate to the disadvantage of either party in any matter where their interests were conflicting, he would have to withdraw from representation of both clients unless they consented to continued representation after full disclosure. Id. at  (quoting N.Y. County 646 (1975)). Thus, the committee apparently contemplated that consent, at least by both parties, could obviate the problem described in the county opinion. 34 The second ethics opinion, No. 605, 1989 WL 253477 (Nov. 17, 1989), addresses the question of an attorney who will have to reveal the confidences of a former client in order to effectively represent a new client. The opinion indicates that successive representation would be permissible if (1) the subject matter of the new employment is totally unrelated to the subject matter of the former representation (i.e., the underlying facts of each representation must be wholly distinct), (2) the new employment does not require the lawyer to use or attempt to use confidences and secrets obtained in the former representation, and (3) the new representation does not create an appearance of actually conflicting interests with, or professional disloyalty to, the former client. Id. at . However, the committee also stated in a completely different section of its opinion, [v]iewing this situation as a so-called Canon 4 conflict as we do, it is clear from the Code and our prior opinions that client consent may purge the conflict. DR 4-101(C)(1); N.Y. State 555 (1984); N.Y. State 490 (1978). Id. at . Although the Defender argues that the language of Ethics Opinion No. 605 requires the presence both of the three factors previously recited and of client consent to cure the conflict, the opinion cannot reasonably be read this way. 35 The committee went on to caution, however, that the deference given in prior cases to the current client's consent to the successive representation does not, in light of the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Wheat v. United States, [486 U.S. 153, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140] (1988), reflect the current approach by the courts, which must now look beyond the consent to ensure that criminal defendants receive a trial that is fair. Id. (internal citations omitted). 36 Reading both opinions together, it appears that the committee would allow use of a former client's confidences and secrets where (1) the first client consented to the defense attorney's revealing confidences and secrets; (2) the current client consented to continued representation by the attorney with the full knowledge that the attorney would have to cross-examine a former client; and (3) the court made an independent examination of the second client's ability to receive a fair trial with the defense attorney representing him. 37 Our cases also support allowing waiver of the conflict that arises when an attorney must cross-examine a former client in order to effectively represent a current client. In United States v. Lussier, 71 F.3d 456 (2d Cir.1995), we affirmed a criminal conviction despite a claim of actual conflict of interest based on defense counsel's prior representation of a government witness and current representation of the defendant, Roger Lussier. The witness waived attorney-client privilege and acknowledged that he knew defense counsel could cross-examine him. Id. at 460. And, Lussier waived any conflict of interest. Id. We agreed with the district court's conclusion that the primary area of conflict—[defense counsel's] potential inability to cross-examine [the witness] fully at trial—was significantly diminished by this waiver. Id. at 462. We held that [b]ecause there existed only a potential for a non-severe conflict, a valid waiver could be made. Id. In light of Lussier's sophistication, we found his in-court waiver sufficient despite the district court's failure to appoint independent counsel to advise him concerning his choices. Id. at 463. Finally, because the former client's testimony did not hurt Lussier, we concluded that, even if the waiver were somehow flawed, Lussier suffered no prejudice from [defense counsel's] purportedly deficient cross-examination of [the former client]. Id. at 464. 38 In United States v. Leslie, 103 F.3d 1093 (2d Cir.1997), we considered the conflict issue in the context of defense counsel's prior representation of a potential witness who ultimately did not testify. The former client's new counsel represented to the district court that his client was willing to waive any conflict. Id. at 1097. However, the district court did not question the former client or make a Curcio inquiry of the current client. Id. We affirmed the conviction, finding that the district court conducted a sufficient inquiry and correctly concluded that [the former client's] waiver obviated the need for a Curcio hearing. Id. at 1098. Alternatively, we held that even if defense counsel had a conflict of interest, it was at best, only a potential conflict, requiring Leslie to show prejudice, which he could not do because the former client never testified. Id. at 1099. 39 We draw from Leslie and Lussier the following clear principles: (1) a client will not be heard on appeal to complain of a conflict of interest premised on his attorney's prior representation of a government witness if both the witness and the defendant waived any potential conflict and (2) an appellant-defendant cannot raise as error a potential conflict based on his attorney's prior representation of a potential witness where that potential witness, through counsel, waived any conflict and, in any event, did not testify against the defendant. Leslie also suggests that a Curcio inquiry may not be necessary when the potential witness consented to his former attorney's use of confidences and secrets in cross examination. Thus, it may be that the Defender's continued representation of Oberoi would not have resulted in reversal of any subsequent conviction. 40