Opinion ID: 1226896
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Refusal to Excuse Prospective Juror Because of Views on the Death Penalty

Text: (44a) Defendant contends that the trial court erred under former Penal Code section 1073 (Code Amends. 1873-1874 (Pen. Code) ch. 614, § 56, pp. 441-442) and also, inter alia, the impartial-jury guaranty of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section 16, of the California Constitution when it refused to excuse prospective juror Jose J. Perez because of his favorable views on the death penalty. At individual sequestered voir dire, defendant challenged prospective juror Perez for actual bias arising out of his support for capital punishment. The People presented opposition. The court overruled the challenge. Subsequently, the 12 jurors were selected and sworn. Neither the People nor defendant exhausted the 26 peremptory challenges allotted to each side; neither party expressed any dissatisfaction with the panel. The four alternates were then selected and sworn. The People did not exhaust their four peremptory challenges, but defendant did; again, neither party expressed any dissatisfaction. Perez was not among those chosen to serve. He had not been drawn into the jury box as a potential juror. He had, however, been called as a potential alternate, but was removed by defendant's second peremptory challenge. Before the guilt phase opened, the court excused one of the jurors for hardship and randomly selected alternate Sarah J. Quinn to take his place. Quinn had been the last person drawn as a potential alternate, and the only person drawn after defendant had exhausted his peremptory challenges. At individual sequestered voir dire, defendant had expressly passed Quinn for cause. Apparently, at no time did he manifest any concern whatever about her fairness or impartiality. Defendant claims that the trial court erred by overruling his for cause challenge against prospective juror Perez. For purposes here, we shall assume the court did indeed err. But as will be shown, reversal is not required. (45) It appears that with the exception of an improper ` Witherspoon exclusion'  which, of course, is not presented here  an erroneous ruling on a `for cause' challenge is not automatically reversible but is subject to scrutiny for prejudice under harmless-error analysis. ( People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1247.) This principle applies generally: it matters not whether the error merely offends state law or amounts to a violation of the United States Constitution. (See ibid. ) Prejudice turns on whether the defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury was affected. That is certainly true when state law is implicated. (See People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1087 [259 Cal. Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659].) It is also true, we believe, when a federal constitutional violation is involved. State-law error of this sort, bearing as it does on penalty in a capital case, is reviewed under the reasonable possibility standard of People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 446-448 [250 Cal. Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135]. Error of federal constitutional dimension, by contrast, is scrutinized under the reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711]. ( People v. Coleman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 749, 768 [251 Cal. Rptr. 83, 759 P.2d 1260].) (44b) After review, we can discern no prejudice flowing from the assumedly erroneous overruling of defendant's for cause challenge against prospective juror Perez  whether any error involves state law only or amounts to a federal constitutional violation. It is evident that defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury was not affected thereby. Perez did not sit on the jury. On this record, he could not have tainted the panel's members with his alleged bias. Accordingly, he could not have influenced the process or result of the deliberations. Defendant disagrees with our conclusion that reversal is not required. He may be understood to argue against the applicability of harmless-error analysis. He is too late. Such a point has already been rejected. ( People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1247.) He then argues that he did indeed suffer prejudice. We cannot agree. That he was compelled to use a peremptory challenge against Perez as a potential alternate, subsequently exhausted his allotment, had no peremptory challenge remaining to use against Quinn, and finally saw Quinn placed on the jury, does not support an inference that his right to a fair and impartial jury was affected in any way. People v. Helm (1907) 152 Cal. 532 [93 P. 99], on which he relies, provides no support. There, this court held that the erroneous overruling of a good challenge for cause, thereby compelling the use of a peremptory challenge, is not prejudicial error where  as here  it is not made to appear that the challenger was obliged afterward to accept an objectionable juror, without power to use a peremptory challenge upon him.... ( Id. at p. 535.)