Opinion ID: 516947
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: alleged improper reliance by the district court on

Text: 39 EXTRAJUDICIAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE UNDERLYING FACTS 40 Itel claims the trial court relied upon personal knowledge of matters outside the trial record, which allegedly circumvented the administration of justice. 41 While it is clear the judge made several comments throughout the trial which implied knowledge of the construction industry, Itel fails to show any improper reliance on that knowledge by the trial judge or any prejudice to its case by any possible improper reliance. Price Bros. Co. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 649 F.2d 416, 420 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1099, 102 S.Ct. 674, 70 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981). This Court discussed the role of a trial court judge in the handling of a protracted bench trial in Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1129 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042, 103 S.Ct. 1438, 75 L.Ed.2d 795 (1983). We said: 42 Though the trial judge must be neutral, he should not be a passive spectator ... He may, when in his sound discretion he deems it advisable, comment on the evidence, question witnesses, elicit facts not yet adduced or clarify those previously presented, ... 43 Itel fails to show where the district judge moved beyond his proper role or how Itel was prejudiced. As the finder of fact, a judge must rely upon his or her experience and common sense. No more was involved here.