Opinion ID: 1670906
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effect of Statutory Limitation on Amendment to Complaint

Text: T.C.A. § 2-17-105 is clear and unambiguous in its statement that [t]he complaint contesting an election under § 2-17-101 shall be filed within ten (10) days after the election. This special statute of limitations has long been strictly applied in election contests, which are purely creatures of statute and were not recognized at common law or in equity. Harmon v. Tyler, 112 Tenn. 8, 83 S.W. 1041, 1044 (1903). The proceedings in an election contest are said to be summary in nature, and the statutory prerequisites are considered jurisdictional. Id. Hence, the court cannot review grounds for invalidating election results unless they have been filed within the statutory period, rules of practice in civil actions to the contrary notwithstanding. Id. Indeed, the legislature has not only reaffirmed but also tightened the time limitation over the years, reducing the original 20-day filing period to the current limitation of ten days. Pub. Acts 1972, Ch. 740, § 1, codified at § 2-17-105. Because the statute controls, we reject the contestant's argument that the relaxed pleading requirements of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically provisions regarding the amendment of complaints found in Rule 15, have altered former case law in this respect. As late as 1978, seven years after the civil rules took effect, this Court held in a declaratory judgment action to invalidate the results of an election referendum that the ten-day statutory limitation applies to amendments and exhibits to complaints, as well as to complaints themselves. Dehoff v. Attorney General, 564 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tenn. 1978), citing State ex rel. Davis v. Kivett, 180 Tenn. 598, 603, 177 S.W.2d 551, 553 (1944). In State ex rel. Davis v. Kivett , this Court reiterated the well-established rule with regard to the statutory limitation in election contests, applying it strictly to those amended or other pleadings, making new charges on which to contest the election. Id. 177 S.W.2d at 553, quoting Harmon v. Tyler, supra, 83 S.W. at 1044. Of course, if the complainant seeks only to correct technical matters, the court may accept the late filing. Hollis v. Vaughan, 192 Tenn. 118, 237 S.W.2d 952, 953-954 (1951) (amendment perfecting a statement in a cause of action previously stated was proper). Amendments that merely allege in more detail grounds already alleged may also be allowed, in the discretion of the trial court. Blackwood v. Hollingsworth, 195 Tenn. 427, 260 S.W.2d 164, 166 (1953). In this case, Forbes's second amended complaint contains various allegations and grounds for her suit that did not appear in her previously filed complaint or in the initial amended complaint. For example, she attempted to delete paragraphs 3 through 8 of the amended complaint in their entirety and substitute new language. These new paragraphs contain matters not raised in the previously filed pleadings, such as a comparison of the ratio of absentee votes to votes cast in person in Hickman and Williamson Counties; a detailed listing of the alleged irregularities organized by precinct and voter; allegations of irregularities in the manner in which the votes of shut-in or institutionalized persons were cast; allegations of irregularities in the voting of specifically named persons not referred to in the previously filed pleadings; affidavits in support of the previously raised allegations regarding the use of paper ballot and boxes; and allegedly incorrect instructions given to voters by officials regarding whom they could vote for, depending on whether they voted in the Republican or Democratic primary. While these matters might well have been relevant at trial, they were raised too late to be considered in this case. We are thus left to review the propriety of the trial court's action based solely on the grounds stated in the original complaint and the timely-filed amendment to it.