Opinion ID: 736293
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the military contractor defense

Text: 7 The military contractor defense 1 is an affirmative defense; Bell has the burden of establishing it. See McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 453 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043, 104 S.Ct. 711, 79 L.Ed.2d 175 (1984). The district court held that Bell has submitted sufficient evidence that it is entitled to the defense. Because the matter came before the court on motion for summary judgment, however, the issue was not whether Bell had produced sufficient evidence to establish the defense but whether it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, i.e., whether no reasonable jury could fail to find that the defense had been established. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 514, 108 S.Ct. 2510, 2519-20, 101 L.Ed.2d 442 (1988) ([W]hether the facts establish the conditions for the defense is a question for the jury.). Thus, we must review the record to determine whether, resolving disputed facts in favor of the parties opposing the motion, it would permit a reasonable jury to reject the defense. Because we conclude that a reasonable jury could find against Bell on the first element of the military contractor defense, we reverse. 2 8 The Supreme Court in Boyle stated the elements of the military contractor defense as follows: 9 Liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be imposed, pursuant to state law, when 10 (1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications; 11 (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and 12 (3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United States. 13 Id. at 512, 108 S.Ct. at 2518 (internal formatting added). The district court ruled in favor of Bell on all three elements. 14 The defense is intended to implement and protect the discretionary function exception under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). As the Court said in Boyle, [i]t makes little sense to insulate the Government against financial liability for the judgment that a particular feature of military equipment is necessary when the Government produces the equipment itself, but not when it contracts for the production. 487 U.S. at 512, 108 S.Ct. at 2518. 15 That rationale, however, is based not on a simple economic concern for government procurement costs, but on the government's need to exercise judgment about the appropriate design of equipment for which it contracts. As the Court observed: 16 [T]he selection of the appropriate design for military equipment to be used by our Armed Forces is assuredly a discretionary function ... [which] often involves not merely engineering analysis but judgment as to the balancing of many technical, military, and even social considerations, including specifically the trade-off between greater safety and greater combat effectiveness.... [P]ermitting second-guessing of these judgments through state tort suits against contractors would produce the same effect sought to be avoided by the FTCA exemption. 17 Id. at 511, 108 S.Ct. at 2518 (internal citation omitted). The purpose of the requirement that the government approve reasonably precise specifications is to ensure that the defense serves the policy underlying the discretionary function--as the Court put it, to assure that the design feature in question was considered by a Government officer, and not merely by the contractor itself. Id. at 512, 108 S.Ct. at 2518; see also Butler v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 89 F.3d 582, 584 (9th Cir.1996).