Opinion ID: 2613254
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: availability of reciprocal discovery

Text: As noted above, the trial court concluded that section 190.3, with its specific reference to penalty phase evidence, constituted the sole discovery provision applicable to such evidence. Section 190.3 in pertinent part states: Except for evidence in proof of the offense or special circumstances which subject a defendant to the death penalty, no evidence may be presented by the prosecution in aggravation unless notice of the evidence to be introduced has been given to the defendant within a reasonable period of time as determined by the court, prior to trial. Evidence may be introduced without such notice in rebuttal to evidence introduced by the defendant in mitigation. (1) Defendant, observing that we have construed section 190.3 as requiring production of the actual evidence on which the prosecutor intends to rely (see People v. Jennings (1988) 46 Cal.3d 963, 987 [251 Cal. Rptr. 278, 760 P.2d 475], and cases cited), contends that the section was thus intended to constitute a nonreciprocal discovery provision that would preclude prosecutorial discovery under section 1054.3. The Court of Appeal herein disagreed, finding nothing in section 190.3 that would preclude application of the new reciprocal discovery provisions. (Accord, People v. Superior Court ( Sturm ) (1992) 9 Cal. App.4th 172, 181-182 [11 Cal. Rptr.2d 652] [hereafter Sturm ].) As the Court of Appeal herein observed, section 1054, subdivision (e), quoted above, expresses an intent to allow reciprocal discovery in all criminal cases unless contrary to some express statutory provision or the United States Constitution. Because section 190.3 does not by its terms prohibit reciprocal discovery, section 1054, subdivision (e), should apply. We agree with the Court of Appeal. Although section 190.3 does not affirmatively authorize reciprocal discovery, the omission is not significant. At the time section 190.3 was adopted, discovery by the prosecution was precluded by judicial decisions interpreting the state Constitution. (See Izazaga, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 369-371, and cases cited.) The state Constitution now expressly provides for reciprocal discovery in criminal cases. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 30, subd. (c); see also § 1054 [expressing purposes of reciprocal discovery to ascertain truth, save court time, and protect victims and witnesses in criminal cases].) Defendant asserts that the penalty phase is a sentencing proceeding and not part of a criminal case or trial within the meaning of the foregoing provisions. (See People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 896 [231 Cal. Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288] [term trial is ambiguous as to whether it includes proceedings following the determination of guilt prior to sentencing]; People v. Gilbert (1944) 25 Cal.2d 422, 428 [154 P.2d 657]; People v. Williams (1939) 14 Cal.2d 532, 536-537 [95 P.2d 456].) As the People observe, however, we have confirmed that the penalty phase of a capital trial is merely a part of a single, unitary criminal proceeding. ( People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 45-46 [255 Cal. Rptr. 631, 767 P.2d 1109].) In Robertson, construing the similar notice provision in former section 190.3, we observed that [w]here the question of notice arises in the context of the initial trial in which the guilt and penalty phases occur in immediate sequence and thus are part of a unitary proceeding, we have construed `trial' as the whole proceeding; hence notice must be given in advance of the guilt phase. ... We conclude, therefore, that the `trial' to which former section 190.3 refers embraces the original trial, as defined above, or the retrial, be it of the entire proceeding or the penalty phase only. ( People v. Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 45-46, italics added; see also People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 94-95 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781].) As the Court of Appeal herein observed, [a]lthough Robertson did not consider the issue before us, its language embracing the penalty phase within the concept of the `trial' under section 190.3 is authority that the proceeding is unitary and should not be arbitrarily broken down into distinct and separate procedures. From this it follows that section 1054, which refers to regulation of discovery in a criminal trial, applies to the penalty phase, which is part of the trial. (See also § 190.1 [A case in which the death penalty may be imposed ... shall be tried in separate phases....]; People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 311-312, and fn. 10 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585] [general discovery principles apply to penalty phase evidence]; Izazaga, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 375 [The phrase `at trial' means exactly that  at the trial, not merely during the prosecution's case-in-chief.].) Sturm, supra, 9 Cal. App.4th at page 179, is directly on point, holding that, under the plain language of the statutory scheme in place when Proposition 115 was enacted, the jury's penalty determination was a part of the trial. [¶] Moreover, the stated purpose of Proposition 115 is `to restore balance to our criminal justice system.' [Citation]. To accomplish that goal to the greatest extent possible in a capital case, the penalty phase would have to be included in the reciprocal discovery provision. (Fn. omitted.) Defendant, disagreeing with Sturm, analogizes the penalty phase of a capital trial to a sentencing hearing in a noncapital trial, and argues that because discovery is unavailable at sentencing hearings, it is unfair, and a denial of equal protection, to allow it in capital cases. Although the issue is not presently before us, Sturm suggested that reciprocal discovery may indeed be available as to sentencing proceedings under the new provisions of Proposition 115. The broad language of section 1054.3, requiring disclosure of evidence to be elicited at the trial, could well encompass such proceedings. (See Sturm, supra, 9 Cal. App.4th at p. 185.) The Court of Appeal herein acknowledged that There are cases holding that sentencing hearings differ from trials in some respects. For instance, strict evidentiary rules do not always apply at sentencing hearings and rules of procedure may differ. [Citations.] Also, in capital cases, evidence at the penalty phase is specially regulated by statute. (See § 190.3.) However, the fact that sentencing procedures may differ from procedures at the guilt phase does not necessarily imply anything about discovery rights, except perhaps that they may be even broader at the sentencing phase, given the relaxation of traditional strict rules of evidence at that point. Thus, defendant's concern that penalty phase reciprocal discovery could deny him equal protection is founded on the unsettled and questionable premise that defendants in noncapital cases will not be required to disclose evidence to be revealed at sentencing hearings. In any event, capital case sentencing, with its relatively unrestricted scope of mitigating evidence the defendant is permitted to offer, cannot readily be compared to ordinary sentencing. As we recently stated in the context of admissibility of other crimes evidence, capital case sentencing involves wholly different considerations than ordinary criminal sentencing.... [Citation.] This distinction between capital and noncapital cases adequately justifies the differences in treatment cited by defendant. [Citations.] ( People v. Danielson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 691, 720 [13 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 838 P.2d 729]; see also People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 194-195; People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1286-1288 [232 Cal. Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115]; Sturm, supra, 9 Cal. App.4th at p. 185.) For this reason, defendant's equal protection challenge to reciprocal penalty phase discovery must be rejected. Defendant argues that because an application for investigative funds in a criminal case is confidential pursuant to section 987, subdivisions (c) and (d), and because the new discovery statutes do not require the defense to disclose privileged material (see § 1054.6), penalty phase evidence likewise should be deemed privileged and confidential. We reject the contention. Defendant has not raised a specific claim of privilege or confidentiality as to any material required to be disclosed herein. Defendant argues that the application of reciprocal discovery at the penalty phase violates the cruel and unusual punishment proscription of the Eighth Amendment. The Court of Appeal herein rejected the claim by observing that Limitations on mitigating evidence have been found to violate due process (e.g., Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1 [90 L.Ed.2d 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669]), but a notice requirement is not a limit on substantive evidence. Nor is there any authority whatsoever treating the procedural rules governing criminal trials as `punishment.' (Accord, Sturm, supra, 9 Cal. App.4th at p. 184, fn. 12.) As stated in Sturm, full disclosure should heighten `reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.' [Citation.] ( Ibid. ) We agree with that analysis. Defendant fears that premature disclosure of his penalty phase evidence may jeopardize his defense at the guilt phase. The People suggest that such concern is unduly conjectural (see Izazaga, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 379 [doubtful that the defendant would call damaging witnesses to testify on his behalf]). But we can readily conceive of situations in which advance disclosure of the defendant's penalty phase evidence could prejudice his guilt phase presentation. Nonetheless, such potential prejudice constitutes no legal impediment to reciprocal penalty phase discovery, because, as we explain post (pt. III), the trial court retains discretion in an appropriate case to defer all or part of such disclosure to the prosecution until the guilt phase has concluded. Defendant also suggests that the different standards of proof applicable to the guilt and penalty phases should exclude disclosure of mitigating evidence. He argues that, unlike the guilt phase, in which the People must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the People have no proof burden as to the ultimate issue of appropriate penalty and, accordingly, have no need for discovery on that issue. Additionally, defendant suggests, the prosecution and defense have different goals. According to defendant, While the [guilt phase] trial is essentially `factual' in character, the function of choosing a penalty is `inherently moral and normative, not factual.' [Citation.] At the penalty phase, defendant notes, the defendant seeks to introduce mitigating evidence to support a life verdict, whereas the People focus on aggravating aspects of the case. Thus, reciprocal discovery supposedly does not assume the same importance to the prosecution. We disagree with defendant's purportedly pragmatic analysis of the supposed lesser need for discovery at the penalty phase of a capital case. Despite differing proof burdens and goals in the penalty phase, the People nonetheless have a demonstrable need to appraise the defendant's proposed mitigating evidence so that rebuttal evidence may be gathered. And despite the normative nature of the penalty decision itself, a substantial part of the mitigating evidence typically adduced by the defendant at the penalty phase concerns such factual matters as the nature of his character and background, the extent of his rehabilitation or remorse, or the existence of any mental defect or disease. Similarly, a significant portion of the prosecutor's aggravating evidence involves the defendant's prior offenses. Thus, whether aggravating or mitigating, the penalty phase evidence may raise disputed factual issues, making advance disclosure of the evidence helpful to both sides. (See Sturm, supra, 9 Cal. App.3d at pp. 180-181; cf. People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 50 [23 Cal. Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673] [instructing jury on witness credibility is appropriate at penalty phase in light of factual issues presented].)] In any event, as the Court of Appeal herein recognized, The issue is not whether section 1054 ought to grant reciprocal discovery at the penalty phase, but whether it does; whether the statute, which expressly provides reciprocal discovery at trials, provides that same right at the penalty phases of trials. We agree with the court's conclusion that reciprocal discovery is available (and, indeed, is constitutionally and statutorily mandated) as to penalty phase evidence.