Opinion ID: 55800
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: “In a habeas corpus appeal, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo, applying the same standards to the state court’s decision as did the district court.” Busby v. Dretke, 359 F.3d 708, 713 (5th Cir. 2004). 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d) provides: “An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim— (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 10 established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.A. §2254(d) (West 2006).7 This court reviews both pure questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact under § 2254(d)(1), while it reviews questions of fact under § 2254(d)(2). Martin v. Cain, 246 F.3d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 2001). Because Horn’s claims for which he has been granted a certificate of appealability involve mixed questions of law and fact, we look to § 2254(d)(1) in our analysis. See Gochicoa v. Johnson, 118 F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir. 1997) (whether defendant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation right was violated is a mixed question of law and fact); Gunsby v. Wainwright, 596 F.2d 654, 655 (5th Cir. 1979) (voluntariness issue involves mixed questions of law and fact). Under section 2254(d)(1): “[T]here are two categories of cases in which a state prisoner may obtain federal habeas relief with respect to a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court: if the state court decision was either ‘contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court’ or ‘involved an unreasonable application of[] clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court’.” Martin, 246 F.3d at 476 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established 7 The quoted current version of § 2254(d) reflects amendments to § 2254 made by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (AEDPA). Because Horn’s federal habeas application was filed after AEDPA’s enactment, AEDPA is applicable to it. See Martin v. Cain, 246 F.3d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 2001). 11 federal law within the meaning of the first category of cases eligible for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) “if it relies on legal rules that directly conflict with prior holdings of the Supreme Court or if it reaches a different conclusion than the Supreme Court on materially indistinguishable facts.” Busby, 359 F.3d at 713 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has not considered the use of two-way closed-circuit television in relation to the Sixth Amendment, nor has it ruled in a case that was “materially indistinguishable” from Horn’s. Thus, the state court decision Horn challenges was not “contrary to” clearly established federal law because “it did not apply a rule contradictory to applicable Supreme Court precedent; and it did not reach a result, under ‘materially indistinguishable’ facts, in conflict with such precedent.” Martin, 246 F.3d at 476. We therefore focus on whether the state court’s decision constituted an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent to the facts. See id. A state court’s decision constitutes an “unreasonable application” of “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,” “‘if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from [Supreme Court] decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case.’” Busby, 359 F.3d at 713 (quoting Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002)). “We cannot reverse the denial of habeas relief simply by concluding that the state court 12 decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously,” but rather, “we must conclude that such application was also unreasonable.” Martin, 246 F.3d at 476; see Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 233 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam) (denying habeas relief where state court’s conclusion was incorrect but not unreasonable).8 Lastly, “we presume that the state court’s factual determinations are correct, and we may grant relief only if a factual determination is unreasonable based on the evidence presented to the state court.” Busby, 359 F.3d at 713 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), (e)(1)).