Opinion ID: 1442323
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disclosure of Defendant's Prior Reversed Death Sentence

Text: During the jury selection process, and on voir dire, the court informed the jurors that a previous jury had convicted defendant of first degree murder and burglary and had sentenced him to death, but that this court, on defendant's automatic appeal, had ordered a retrial of the special circumstance and penalty issues because the rules had changed regarding the need to instruct on the issue of defendant's intent to kill. Defendant made no objection to these voir dire disclosures. He now contends, however, that the trial court erred in relating the foregoing information to the jury. (2a) Defendant contends that, by reason of the court's disclosures, the jury improperly learned that a prior jury had found death to be the appropriate penalty for defendant, that the jury's verdict was subject to an automatic appeal to this court, and that we reversed the death judgment and special circumstance finding based on a change of rules regarding the need to prove defendant's intent to kill. Initially, defendant suggests that the foregoing information was irrelevant and potentially prejudicial, coming at a time (October and November 1985) when this court's disposition of death penalty cases was becoming a subject of discussion and controversy. Defendant argues that the jury was thereby led to speculate on impermissible matters, including the availability of an appeal to this court, a matter tending to reduce the jury's sense of responsibility regarding the seriousness of its task. (See Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320 [86 L.Ed.2d 231, 105 S.Ct. 2633]; People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 155-159 [207 Cal. Rptr. 800, 689 P.2d 430].) Although defendant does not concede the point, it seems clear that any possible prejudice resulting from the court's disclosures was limited to the jury's penalty determination, for the evidence supporting the felony-murder special circumstance was overwhelming. (3) As we recently observed, The fact that a first jury deadlocked, or the numerical vote of the first jury, is irrelevant to the issues before the jury on a penalty retrial. ( People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 178 [266 Cal. Rptr. 309, 785 P.2d 857], italics added.) Defendant argues that, by a parity of reasoning, the first jury's vote to impose death was irrelevant to the issues. No reason appears why the court could not have simply explained that the judgment had been reversed and remanded for retrial, without also disclosing the first jury's verdict. Defendant cites several federal cases recognizing the prejudicial nature of disclosing to a jury engaged in determining a defendant's guilt or innocence the fact that the defendant had been previously convicted on the same charges. (E.g., United States v. Bagley (9th Cir.1985) 772 F.2d 482, 488 [dictum]; United States v. Williams (5th Cir.1978) 568 F.2d 464, 471.) Defendant also cites an Illinois case ( People v. Hope (1986) 116 Ill.2d 265 [508 N.E.2d 202, 205-206]), which reversed a judgment on the ground that two jurors in the sentencing phase of a capital case were exposed to news stories indicating the defendant had been previously sentenced to death on charges unrelated to the capital case being tried. In the present case, the court disclosed that a prior jury had imposed the death penalty on defendant for the same offense. A similar disclosure was made to the jury in People v. Whitt, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pages 639-641, involving another retrial for Carlos error. In Whitt, without reaching the merits, we concluded that any error in informing the jury regarding the prior death sentence and subsequent reversal on automatic appeal was invited by defendant's own conduct in (1) submitting, at the court's direction, a proposed statement covering these matters (without referring to the automatic nature of the appeal), and (2) failing to object to the court's own statement covering these matters. We further opined that defense counsel had tactical reasons for not objecting to the statement, namely, his reliance on a penalty phase defense of Death Row redemption, to the effect that defendant had reformed after being initially sentenced to die. Similar reasoning governs our decision here. Prior to trial, defense counsel asked the court whether the jury would be told about the procedural history of the case. The court announced its intention to pretty much level with the jury and explain about the prior trial, death sentence, reversal on automatic appeal, and the reason for the reversal. Defense counsel was given a copy of the court's intended statement but failed to object or propose revisions to the draft. (4) As the People observe, objections to noninstructional statements or comments by the trial court must be raised at trial or are waived on appeal. (E.g., People v. Terry (1970) 2 Cal.3d 362, 398 [85 Cal. Rptr. 409, 466 P.2d 961]; People v. Cheary (1957) 48 Cal.2d 301, 316 [309 P.2d 431]; cf. § 1259 [objection not required to preserve claim of instructional error on appeal].) (2b) As in Whitt, supra, 51 Cal.3d 620, it seems apparent that defense counsel herein had a tactical purpose for declining to object to the court's disclosures regarding defendant's death sentence and subsequent reversal on automatic appeal. During the course of trial and in argument, counsel frequently referred to the prior death sentence and, as in Whitt, presented a Death Row redemption defense stressing defendant's changed attitude, reformed character and his many useful, redeemable skills. For example, counsel asked defendant whether his thinking had changed during the five years since he was sentenced to death. Defendant replied that the experience of being condemned to die made me grow up and realize that it was a serious matter. And I matured. And I realized there's more to life than living and the life that I had lived. And maybe I had a chance to change. (5) Regarding the reference to the automatic appeal, it is true that [a]s a general rule, the jury should not be advised regarding the availability of an appeal in death cases, because such information may dilute the jury's sense of responsibility in fixing the penalty. [Citations.] ( People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 584 [244 Cal. Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776]; see Caldwell v. Mississippi, supra, 472 U.S. 320.) But as Whitt explains (51 Cal.3d at p. 641), any reasonable juror, knowing that defendant was once sentenced to death and was now being retried for the same crimes, could easily infer that an appeal was available to him. (2c) We conclude that any error in the court's pretrial disclosures was waived by counsel's apparently tactical failure to object. We further conclude that it is not reasonably possible defendant was prejudiced by those disclosures. (6) In a related contention, defendant complains of the prosecutor's reference to the fact that defendant had previously received a death sentence which was unfortunately reversed. Thus, in the course of suggesting that defendant's redemption was feigned, the prosecutor observed that We had him here. We had him tried. We had him convicted. We had him sentenced to death.... And then unfortunately, the case was reversed and it came back to trial. No objection was made to these remarks (see People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 27 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468]), which included no factual information not already recounted by the trial court's pretrial disclosures. The prosecutor's disappointment with the reversal of the judgment was hardly a surprising revelation.