Opinion ID: 2833602
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Perlman Doctrine Provides Jurisdiction to

Text: Review Fattah’s Claims Under the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine. Fattah contends that the Perlman doctrine provides appellate jurisdiction for this Court to review the merits of his attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine claims regarding inadequate filtering procedures. We agree. Unlike Fattah’s Speech or Debate Clause claim, this claim succeeds because it is predicated on legally cognizable privileges continuously recognized under the Perlman Doctrine.52 Because the attorney-client privilege and work-product 52 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 745 F.3d at 686. 22 doctrine are non-disclosure privileges that may in fact be destroyed by a disinterested third-party, Perlman applies. On the merits of this issue, Fattah argues that the District Court erred in approving the Government’s proposed filtering procedures regarding documents protected by the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine. These procedures involved the use of a “taint team” to review for privileged documents, a common tool employed by the Government.53 The team, however, is structured to include a non-attorney federal agent at the first level of review, followed by review by independent attorney federal agents. Moreover, Fattah contends that he does not have the opportunity to assert his privilege with respect to certain documents deemed to be “clearly not privileged” until after they are turned over to those prosecuting his case. 53 Certain courts have limited the circumstances in which prosecutors may employ taint teams during criminal investigations. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 454 F.3d 511, 522 (6th Cir. 2006). But because Fattah does not argue that the use of a taint team is inappropriate in his case, we have no occasion to consider the appropriate limits, if any, on their use. Of course, a court always retains the prerogative to require a different method of review in any particular case, such as requiring the use of a special master or reviewing the seized documents in camera itself. See, e.g., Klitzman, Klitzman & Gallagher v. Krut, 744 F.2d 955, 962 (3d Cir. 1984); Black v. United States, 172 F.R.D. 511, 516 (S.D. Fla. 1997); United States v. Abbell, 914 F. Supp. 519, 520–21 (S.D. Fla. 1995); In re Search Warrant for Law Offices Executed on Mar. 19, 1992, 153 F.R.D. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 23 Fattah maintains that only attorneys should be involved in this type of privilege review and that the District Court did not realize a non-attorney agent would be the first line review.54 Thus, Fattah argues that “eliminated from the initial determination of what may be privileged is the only professional qualified to make that determination.”55 Fattah also argues that he should have an opportunity to work with prosecutors to identify privileged documents and that he should be entitled to a court ruling on any documents he claims are privileged before the filter agents turn these documents over to the prosecutorial arm of the Department of Justice (DOJ). Because of the legal nature of the privilege issues involved, we agree that the first level of privilege review should be conducted by an independent DOJ attorney acceptable to the District Court. Fattah's remaining arguments regarding the structure of the review process, we believe, are more appropriately addressed by a district court in the first instance on a case-by-case basis. On remand, the District Court may thus, in its discretion, implement those procedures it deems necessary to protect Fattah’s privileges. 54 Indeed, the District Court held that the use of “taint teams” had been cited with approval in this Circuit. The cases the District Court cited to, however, all involved an attorney at the first level of review. See, e.g., Manno v. Christie, No. 08cv-3254, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31470 (D.N.J., Apr. 13, 2009). Likewise, the District Court never explicitly acknowledged that review would be conducted by a nonlawyer. Rather, the court stated review would be conducted by “FBI Special Agents not involved in the investigation.” App. 10. 55 Fattah Br. 61. 24 C. Fattah’s Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) Motion Fattah also styled his pre-indictment motion as a request for relief under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) and contends that under this rule we have appellate jurisdiction. The Rule sets out the procedures criminal defendants should employ for the return of property, providing: (g) Motion to Return Property. A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property or by the deprivation of property may move for the property's return. The motion must be filed in the district where the property was seized. The court must receive evidence on any factual issue necessary to decide the motion. If it grants the motion, the court must return the property to the movant, but may impose reasonable conditions to protect access to the property and its use in later proceedings. Denial of a pre-indictment Rule 41(g) motion is immediately appealable, only if the motion is: (1) solely for the return of property and (2) is in no way tied to an existing criminal prosecution against the movant.56 In this case, the 56 Di Bella, 369 U.S. at 131-32; see also In re Grand Jury, 635 F.3d 101, 103-05 (3d Cir. 2011). 25 warrant has yet to be executed, and the Government has yet to seize the evidence Fattah seeks returned. Therefore, there is no property to return. As such, we lack appellate jurisdiction under this ground as well.