Opinion ID: 2624965
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Enforceability of the Covenant against Successive Owners

Text: The homeowners argue that this covenant may not be enforced against them on the theory exculpatory waivers do not run with the land and therefore cannot bind successors in interest. Accordingly, we turn now to the requirements for a covenant to run. Covenants are deeply rooted in our law, dating at least to the 14th century. Restatement (Third) of Prop: Servitudes: Introduction at 5 (2000). The seminal Spencer's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (Q.B.1583) established the general requirements. Spencer's Case involved a covenant by a tenant to build a wall. The tenant covenanted on behalf of himself and his executors, administrators, and assigns to build a brick wall on a leased lot. After executing the covenant, the tenant assigned the property to another. The new tenant refused to build the wall. Although there is some doubt from the report as to who won, the case is famous because the judges laid down three propositions about the running of the burden of covenants. Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, Property 856 (3d ed.1993). There must be intent to bind successors, the obligation must touch and concern the land, and there must be privity of estate. [3] Id. Otherwise, the covenant is merely a contract and will not bind future possessors of the land. William B. Stoebuck, Running Covenants: An Analytical Primer, 52 Wash. L.Rev. 861, 863-64 (1977). Through much of their history, the requirements for a covenant to run varied depending on whether it was real (developed and enforced in courts of law) or equitable (developed and enforced in the Chancery). However, the distinctions have largely vanished from our law. See Hollis v. Garwall, Inc., 137 Wash.2d 683, 690, 974 P.2d 836 (1999). Generally, there are five elements required for a covenant to run: (1) a promise which is enforceable between the original parties; (2) which touches and concerns; (3) which the parties intended to bind successors; and (4) which is sought to be enforced by an original party or a successor, against an original party or a successor in possession; (5) who has notice of the covenant or has not given value. Stoebuck, supra, at 909-10. Four of these elements are not seriously disputed by the parties before this Court. The issue before us is whether an exculpatory covenant touches and concerns the land. [4] Professor Stoebuck noted: If there ever was a rule that a running covenant had to touch and concern land in a physical sense, it has long since been abandoned in America. The most that can be said concerning American doctrine is that the meaning of touch and concern tends to become less clear as physical contact becomes less direct. Stoebuck, supra, at 870 (footnote omitted). This Court has not adopted a strict test for touch and concern, instead we have established an analytical approach: Generally speaking, a covenant touches or concerns the land if it is such as to benefit the grantor or the lessor, or the grantee or lessee, as the case may be. As the term implies, the covenant must concern the occupation or enjoyment of the land granted or demised and the liability to perform it, and the right to take advantage of it must pass to the assignee. Conversely, if the covenant does not touch or concern the occupation or enjoyment of the land, it is the collateral and personal obligation of the grantor or lessor and does not run with the land. Rodruck v. Sand Point Maint. Comm'n, 48 Wash.2d 565, 574-75, 295 P.2d 714 (1956), (quoting City of Seattle v. Fender, 42 Wash.2d 213, 254 P.2d 470 (1953) (quoting Pelser v. Gingold, 214 Minn. 281, 8 N.W.2d 36 (1943))). It is an open question whether a covenant warning of risk and exculpating liability for that risk touches and concerns the land. The only court to reach whether such covenant would run held, without analysis of touch and concern, that it did run. Phillips v. Altman, 1966 OK 46, 412 P.2d 199 (holding that a covenant not to sue for damages arising from oil and gas pollution ran with the land and was not void as against public policy). The city relies upon Hollis, 137 Wash.2d at 690, 974 P.2d 836 to support an argument that this Court has abandoned the requirement of touch and concern. Hollis does not extend so far. Hollis was limited to mutual covenants in a subdivision. The requirements for covenants running in subdivisions have been relaxed compared to covenants running in other contexts; it is even possible for covenants to be enforced against those who have no covenant appearing on their title. See Stoebuck, supra, at 908-10; see also 17 William B. Stoebuck, Washington Practice, Real Estate: Property Law § 3.2, at 127-28 (1995). Further, this Court was not considering in Hollis generalized rules governing covenants; instead, the argument focused on whether the liberalized parole evidence rule of Berg v. Hudesman, 115 Wash.2d 657, 801 P.2d 222 (1990) applied to covenants. This Court has not relaxed the touch and concern requirement for the enforceability of covenants in settings other than subdivisions and we decline to do so now. We conclude that this covenant satisfies the touch and concern doctrine as used in this State. Read as a whole, the covenant burdens the use of land, since the covenant is limited to the reasonable enjoyment of the land and limits rights normally associated with ownership. Further, few things touch and concern land more than the soil itself. This is sufficient to meet the requirements of Rodruck. The city is exculpated for losses that are not caused by the city's own negligence arising from soil movement, as reasonably contemplated by the parties to the covenant. Therefore, we hold that this covenant runs with the land.