Opinion ID: 1284866
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The threshold issue in this appeal is whether MEQC had jurisdiction over the CPA/UPA application for the designation of a corridor that CPA/UPA filed with MEQC on April 8, 1975. If, as appellants contend, MEQC did not have jurisdiction over the application, then this court would have to vacate the judgment of the district court panel and direct CPA/UPA to begin bargaining with the individual counties and municipalities through which it seeks to construct its HVTL, as it was in the process of doing at the time it voluntarily submitted its project to the jurisdiction of the PPSA. The statutory basis of appellants' claim that MEQC lacked jurisdiction over the routing of the HVTL is Minn.St. 1976, § 116C.67, the savings clause of the PPSA. Section 116C.67 provides in part: The provisions of sections 116C.51 to 116C.69 shall not apply to    high voltage transmission lines, the construction of which will commence prior to July 1, 1974; provided, however, that within 90 days following the date of enactment, the affected utility shall file with the council a written statement identifying such transmission lines, their planned location, and the estimated date for commencement of construction. CPA/UPA initially availed itself of the savings clause and documented its reasons for being exempted from the PPSA. All the parties agree that when MEQC granted their request on the ground that they had demonstrated that construction had begun prior to the July 1, 1974, deadline, it lost jurisdiction over the siting of the HVTL. The question is whether, once having lost jurisdiction over the project, such jurisdiction could be regained. The district court panel held that because § 116C.67 was a grandfather clause, it furnished the utilities with a special privilege, which they could, and did, relinquish and that the MEQC was acting properly when it accepted jurisdiction over the siting of the HVTL. Because this conclusion is based on legal rather than factual considerations, the reviewing court is not bound by the decision of the agency and need not defer to agency expertise. Minn.St. 15.0425. See, N. L. R. B. v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291, 85 S.Ct. 980, 988, 13 L.Ed.2d 839, 849 (1965). Moreover, as this court noted in Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, Minn., 256 N.W.2d 808, 822 (1977), We are of the opinion that in reviewing the decisions of administrative agencies this court performs essentially the same function as the district court and is governed by the same scope of review. Accordingly, the usual rule requiring deference to trial court decisions does not apply. Thus, the fact that the district court panel held that MEQC had jurisdiction over the HVTL application is not binding on this court, which can independently review the evidence and come to its own conclusion. Both respondents MEQC/MEA and CPA/UPA label § 116C.67 as a grandfather clause. [23] All cases construing grandfather clauses share one thought in common namely, that it is unfair to penalize the regulated party for something begun prior to the enactment of the statute. Thus, it would be unfair to penalize CPA/UPA for starting construction of the HVTL prior to the enactment of the PPSA, and the savings clause was probably included to preclude such a result. What makes this case different from all others in which savings clauses have been construed by the courts is that here the party to be regulated is asking for regulation. In all the reported cases, the appellant is fighting to get or retain his exemption; never has a heretofore-exempt party sought to relinquish being excluded from the burdensome regulations enacted by the legislature. [24] For this reason, the existing case law on the subject of grandfather clauses becomes largely irrelevant. Another way of conceptualizing the issue is in jurisdictional terms. Appellants argue that the legislature specifically limited MEQC's subject-matter jurisdiction to those HVTLs whose construction was to begin after July 1, 1974. Under this theory, once MEQC decided that CPA/UPA had begun construction on the HVTL prior to that date, it had no jurisdiction over it. [25] CPA/UPA responds by alleging that the savings clause defines not subject-matter jurisdiction but rather personal jurisdiction of MEQC. Since the subject matter of the PPSA is the siting of electric generating plants and HVTLs in Minnesota, and CPA/UPA plan to construct a HVTL in Minnesota, MEQC has subject-matter jurisdiction over questions surrounding its construction. The distinction is an important one because subject-matter, unlike personal, jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent of the parties. Huhn v. Foley Bros. Inc., 221 Minn. 279, 286, 22 N.W.2d 3, 8 (1946). Thus, if the court were to decide that the savings clause defined the subject-matter jurisdiction of the PPSA, MEQC was acting ultra vires by accepting CPA/UPA's application of April 8, 1975. [26] The savings clause can also be viewed in terms of the PPSA's retroactive or prospective application. From this perspective, the question becomes whether the legislature intended to regulate only construction begun after July 1, 1974, or that begun prior to July 1, 1974, as well. Minn.St. 645.21 provides that [n]o law shall be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the legislature. [27] Appellants contend that by accepting CPA/UPA's application MEQC was applying the statute retroactively. In response, it is argued that as of May 24, 1973, MEQC acquired jurisdiction over all siting decisions. Thus, when it decided to accept jurisdiction on April 8, 1975, it was only applying the statute prospectively. From the preceding discussion it becomes obvious that the parties are assuming their conclusions by labeling the savings clause as a grandfather clause or speaking of personal as opposed to subject matter jurisdiction or of retroactive as opposed to prospective application. The question must be resolved, not by applying labels, but by determining what the legislature intended to accomplish with this section of the PPSA. By enacting the PPSA, the legislature sought to ensure that the future siting of power plants and transmission lines would be carried out in an orderly fashion according to a rational design, rather than haphazardly, and possibly unnecessarily, at the whim of individual public utilities whose decisions might fail to consider or comport with the public interest. Minn.St. 1976, §§ 116C.55 to 116C.60. The two crucial concepts that permeate the entire act are that the process should be orderly and that there should be public participation in all stages of agency decision-making. It seems obvious that the legislature intended the savings clause to protect public utilities whose projects had already begun from being overly burdened by the new statute. Recognizing that such projects often took many years to complete, the legislature did not wish to impose conditions on the utilities for which they had been unable to plan. It is also possible that the legislature thought that such a moratorium would allow the state to develop its guidelines and standards without seeking to utilize the process immediately. Since the legislature probably did not expect a utility to seek to be regulated if it had an option, whether the legislature intended to permit utilities first to claim exemption from the operation of the PPSA and then later to submit to its procedures is not at all clear. In our effort to ascertain its likely intent, had it considered the question, we have been guided by the twin legislative goals of ensuring the orderliness of the decision-making process and providing the opportunity for public participation therein. Appellants contend that the administrative process, as it unfolded in this case, was neither orderly nor oriented toward meaningful public participation. Their position is expressed in the FACT brief as follows: The Act may be a pragmatic way to site long power lines and large power plants. However, the way in which the PPSA was applied in this case to a very delicate local situation defied the Act's objective to promote local and state cooperation. The inflammatory nature of this case may be due in part to the magnitude of the HVTL, but it may also be due to the fact that the process was yanked from the local level by the power companies which belatedly seized upon new legislation to circumvent the local political process. Because of the history of this case, the reliance of the citizens on the process which existed at the local level, and the intent of the legislature not to force the new legislation on pending projects, remand to the counties to finish their proceedings appears to be the alternative most likely to resolve the existing distrust and ill will. Respondents argue, in response to appellants' claims, (1) that the restrictions placed on the project by local county boards were not justified either in fact or in law and would have been corrected by available legal process; and (2) that the utilities submitted to the authority of MEQC to protect the project from future attack on the ground that they were improperly evading the restraints imposed upon them by the adoption of the PPSA. It must be acknowledged that, even after reflection, ascertainment of legislative intent is difficult. Although the legislative goals of orderliness and public participation could have been better achieved had the administrative procedures been fully developed prior to MEQC's decision to accept jurisdiction over the routing of this HVTL, centralized decision-making is more orderly than numerous duplicative local actions, and all interested citizens were given an opportunity to be heard in the public hearings conducted at each stage of the process. After long and serious deliberation, we have decided that the legislature would have intended MEQC to have jurisdiction based on our residual conviction that the legislature would have preferred the PPSA to apply to the fullest extent reasonably possible. Therefore, the legislature must have intended to permit the utilities to waive the exception it had carved out in their favor, even though exemption had previously been claimed and granted.