Opinion ID: 1312308
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Impeachment of Prosecution Witnesses

Text: (14b) Defendant next argues counsel unreasonably failed to impeach three prosecution witnesses, Jones, Avery and Collette. As we explain below, after reviewing the record, we are satisifed that defense counsel's failure to impeach these witnesses involved sound tactical decisions. ( Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 158.) We therefore conclude that counsel acted as a conscientious and diligent advocate at all times during the trial. ( Ibid.; Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 583-584; Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d 412, 423-425.) Jones testified that he was intoxicated on the night of the Crumb murders and that he did not remember seeing defendant in front of the Long Beach apartment complex where the Crumbs resided. Defendant now claims that counsel should have impeached Jones with testimony he gave at the trial of Lee Edward Harris (which preceded defendant's trial), in which Jones stated he was sober on the night in question. Defendant fails to point out, however, that at the Harris trial, Jones also testified that he did not remember seeing defendant at the complex entrance. Because the critical portion of Jones's testimony supported defendant's alibi (that he was not at the Crumbs' apartment when they were murdered), we do not agree that counsel's failure to impeach Jones resulted in the withdrawal of a potentially meritorious defense ( Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 425), or that a determination more favorable to defendant would have resulted had Jones been impeached. ( Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 584.) Indeed, because Jones's testimony was favorable to defendant, it appears counsel's decision to avoid impeaching Jones with a prior inconsistent statement was a reasonable tactical choice. ( Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 158.) [6] Similarly, our review of the record reveals that counsel's decision not to impeach Avery was also well within the range of competency contemplated by our decisions in Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pages 423-425, and Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d at page 584. Defendant complains that counsel failed to impeach Avery in regard to the following three inconsistencies in her testimony: (i) Avery testified at trial she saw defendant stab Crumb in the back, whereas the autopsy revealed he was stabbed in the chest, abdomen, and back of the scalp; (ii) Avery testified at the preliminary hearing that three knives were used in the Crumb murders, whereas at trial she testified that only two knives were used; [7] and (iii) she falsely testified at trial she turned herself in when it was actually her mother who phoned the police and told them Avery was staying with her and had been an accomplice to murder. The record reveals that counsel had reviewed the transcript of the Harris trial and chose to refrain from impeaching Avery on the above points because he did not want to distract the jury by pointing out relatively minor inconsistencies in Avery's recollection of the details surrounding the execution of the crime. Instead, counsel believed it would be best to restrict [his] argument to whether or not defendant was [at the Crumb apartment on the night of the murders] in the first place. In this regard, the record shows counsel cross-examined Avery on the following points: (i) her prior inconsistent statement that she stabbed Mrs. Crumb twice which conflicted with her trial testimony that she stabbed Mrs. Crumb once; and (ii) evidence that Avery admitted lying to the police when she first admitted she had knowledge of the Crumb murders by telling the police she never entered the Crumb apartment. Finally, the record shows that before the defense closing argument, defendant asked to speak with the trial judge to discuss his dissatisfaction with counsel and to request that he jointly argue the case to the jury or represent himself in the final argument. An in camera discussion between defendant, the court and defense counsel followed and counsel explained, to the court's satisfaction, his tactical decision not to impeach Avery or Collette on their recollection of specific details of the crime or its investigation. [8] In denying (without prejudice) defendant's request to act as cocounsel, or in the alternative to represent himself during final argument, the court opined that defendant was well represented by counsel and that counsel's tactical decisions appeared well reasoned. We agree with the trial court's determination that counsel adequately represented defendant at trial. He cross-examined Avery on key inconsistencies in her pretrial statements and his closing argument stressed the inconsistencies in her overall testimony, including her lapse in memory regarding the specific details of the crime. We cannot therefore find counsel was unreasonable in his tactical choices.