Opinion ID: 164068
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Suppression of Evidence Obtained Following Traffic Stop

Text: 33 As indicated above, an intercepted wiretapped telephone call between Cline and Shane Wright on December 14, 1999, indicated that Cline would be visiting Wright the next day between noon and 2:00 p.m. While agents suspected Cline was a supplier of pseudoephedrine to Wright, nothing in the intercepted call specifically referred to any such delivery. Agents had Cline's business, Biker's Dream, under surveillance, and followed his truck as he headed generally in the direction of Wright's house. 34 The investigating agents had previously met with a Kansas State trooper, Trooper Grassl, and arranged for him, accompanied by DEA Agent John Aldine, to follow Cline's vehicle. After following Cline's vehicle for several miles, Trooper Grassl observed Mr. Cline drift[] approximately one to two feet clear across the white line onto the shoulder area of the roadway and then pull[] his vehicle back. R. Vol. 14, doc. 985, at 19. Grassl testified that he thought Cline was actually going to hit the bridge rail. Id. at 20. Trooper Grassl and Agent Aldine followed Cline's vehicle for another mile and, once he started to turn off the highway on a road towards Wright's house, the trooper activated his flashing lights and pulled Cline over. The weather was clear but windy at the time of the stop. 35 When the trooper approached Cline's truck and informed Cline that he had stopped him because he had observed him swerve off onto the shoulder of the road, Trooper Grassl testified that Cline indicated that he was having a little trouble with his vehicle.... [H]e said basically something to do with his ball joint — front ball joint appeared to be leaking. He was having some trouble with it pulling. Id. at 23. Grassl obtained Cline's driver's license and returned to his car to run a check on it, while Cline waited in his truck. During some of this time, prior to running a check on Cline's license, Grassl waited while DEA Agent Aldine discussed what to do with other DEA agents. 36 After running a computer check on Cline's license, the trooper returned the license to Cline, issued him a warning, told him he was free to go, and then asked him if he (Grassl) could ask Cline a few more questions. Cline indicated he could. The traffic stop had lasted approximately eight and one-half minutes by the time Grassl asked Cline's permission to ask a few more questions. Grassl asked if Cline had been drinking or if he had anything illegal in the car, to which Cline responded he did not. Grassl then asked if he could search the vehicle for anything illegal, and Cline said he could. While searching the passenger area of the truck, Grassl removed a jacket lying on the passenger side floorboard. Under the jacket was a paper sack containing two ziplock baggies containing a large number of white pills which turned out to be pseudoephedrine. Trooper Grassl seized the pills and gave Cline an evidence custody receipt. 37 Cline argues that the traffic stop was invalid as unsupported by either reasonable suspicion or probable cause. He also argues that the detention exceeded the permissible scope and duration of an investigative detention because several minutes elapsed while Trooper Grassl waited for DEA Agent Aldine to discuss with other DEA agents what course of action to take, prior to Grassl's completion of the routine aspects of the traffic stop. Finally, he argues his consent to search was tainted and invalid because it followed so closely an illegal stop and detention. The district court denied Cline's motion to suppress the pills seized following the traffic stop, finding neither the initial stop, nor the detention nor the search pursuant to Cline's consent contravened the Fourth Amendment. 38 When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we accept the factual findings of the district court, and its determination of witness credibility, unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Cervine, 347 F.3d 865, 868 (10th Cir.2003). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's findings. Id. We review de novo the ultimate determination of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
39 We conduct a two-step inquiry when considering the constitutionality of a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment. First, we determine `whether the officer's action was justified at its inception.' Id. (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d 1479, 1483 (10th Cir.1994)). Second, we consider `whether the action was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that first justified the interference.' Id. (quoting Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d at 1483). `An officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation.' Id. (quoting Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d at 1483). 40 A valid traffic stop must be `based on an observed traffic violation' or a `reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring.' United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1286 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir.1995) (en banc)). In this case, Cline was stopped for violating Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1522, which provides that [w]henever any roadway has been divided into two (2) or more clearly marked lanes for traffic ... [a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1522(a). 7 41 Cline relies upon our decision in United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973 (10th Cir.1996), and a Kansas district court decision, United States v. Ochoa, 4 F.Supp.2d 1007 (D.Kan.1998), to argue that a single instance of swerving onto the shoulder of the road did not constitute a traffic violation. In Gregory we held that it was not a violation of a Utah traffic statute virtually identical to § 8-1522 for the driver of a U-Haul to swerve one time onto the shoulder of the road, 79 F.3d at 978, and in Ochoa a Kansas district court held that it was not a violation of section 8-1522 for a driver to drift once onto the shoulder of the road, 4 F.Supp.2d at 1012. 42 As we have subsequently held, however: decisions like Gregory do not establish an absolute standard or bright-line rule regarding what conduct constitutes a violation of statutes like Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1522, but instead highlight the need to analyze objectively all the surrounding facts and circumstances to determine whether the officer had the probable cause necessary to justify the stop. 43 United States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1198 (10th Cir.1999). Thus, in Gregory, the defendant was driving a U-Haul on a mountainous, winding road, in windy conditions. 79 F.3d at 975. On those particular facts, we held a single instance of swerving onto the shoulder did not constitute a traffic violation. Id. at 978. In Ochoa there was no evidence as to weather or road conditions, and the court found that the troopers caused or contributed to causing the drift. Ochoa, 4 F.Supp.2d at 1011-12 & n. 4. On those particular facts, the district court held that a single instance of swerving onto the shoulder was not a violation of section 8-1522. Id. at 1012. As Ozbirn makes clear, however, neither case stands for the proposition that a single instance of drifting onto the shoulder can never be a violation of a traffic statute like section 8-1522, which is what Cline, in effect, asks us to declare. Rather, the particular facts and circumstances of each case determine the result. 44 As the district court noted, Trooper Grassl testified that, while there was a brisk wind, it was not significant enough to have caused Cline's truck to swerve. R. Vol. 14, doc. 985, at 82. He further testified there was nothing else about the road conditions that would have caused the swerve and that nearly striking a bridge abutment was a dangerous driving violation. Id. at 82-83. Moreover, despite Cline's suggestion that the officers may have contributed to Cline's swerve by following him, the district court found that [t]here is no convincing evidence that this occurred here. Mem. and Order at 16, R. Vol. 8, doc. 940. 8 45 The fact that Trooper Grassl may have had other motivations in stopping Cline is irrelevant. See Cervine, 347 F.3d at 870-71 (The fact that the troopers had other motivations for stopping Mr. Cervine has no bearing upon this review.). Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). 46 In sum, given that Trooper Grassl needed only an articulable suspicion that a traffic violation had occurred, 9 we hold that the initial stop of Cline's truck was reasonable.
47 Cline next argues that, even assuming the initial stop was valid, the detention which followed exceeded the permissible scope of a routine traffic stop. He argues that several minutes elapsed prior to the time when Trooper Grassl actually contacted dispatch and transmitted Cline's driver's license information, during which time Agent Aldine was discussing with other DEA agents what course of action to pursue in their investigation of Cline, all of which was unrelated to the traffic violation. 48 [T]he Fourth Amendment reasonableness of a traffic stop based on probable cause must be judged by examining both the length of the detention and the manner in which it is carried out. United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1230 (10th Cir.2001) (en banc). The Supreme Court has stated that, in determining whether a detention is too long, we should examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). Other than the fact that some five minutes elapsed prior to Trooper Grassl's submission of Cline's driver's license to dispatch, nothing else about the detention was unusual or intrusive. Trooper Grassl testified that most traffic stops last between five and ten minutes. Cline's stop lasted approximately eight minutes. While Agent Aldine did, for a few minutes, discuss with DEA agents what course of action to pursue with respect to Cline, a person they suspected was involved in a methamphetamine drug organization they were investigating, those few minutes did not extend the length of the stop beyond that of a normal traffic stop. We accordingly agree with the district court that the detention was reasonable in scope and duration.
49 Cline argues that the consent to search, immediately following what he claims was an unlawful stop and detention, was tainted and therefore invalid. We have held that the stop and detention were both reasonable and valid under the Fourth Amendment. Trooper Grassl had returned Cline's driver's license to him and told him he was free to go. At that point, the trooper asked Cline if he (Grassl) could ask Cline a few more questions. Cline assented. When asked, Cline denied having anything illegal in the truck, and then agreed to let Grassl search the car. 50 It has long been established that an officer may conduct a warrantless search consistent with the Fourth Amendment if the challenging party has previously given his or her voluntary consent to that search. United States v. Ringold, 335 F.3d 1168, 1174 (10th Cir.2003). The district court found [t]he videotape is convincing evidence that ... Cline's consent to search the pickup was unequivocal and specific and freely given without duress or coercion. Mem. and Order at 30, R. Vol. 8, doc. 940. We agree with the district court that Cline's consent was voluntary and freely given.