Opinion ID: 884980
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Police officer's duty to protect a person in his custody or control

Text: ¶ 32 In his brief to the District Court, Stephen cited Krieg as support for his argument that Officer Driscoll owed a special duty to protect Trina. In Krieg, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against the decedent's landlord claiming that the landlord was negligent in failing to prevent the decedent's suicide. While walking past decedent's open apartment door, the landlord observed the decedent holding a pistol and threatening suicide. The landlord managed to take the gun from the decedent and, thinking the decedent to have calmed down, placed the gun on top of the closet in decedent's room and left. Decedent thereafter shot and killed himself. Krieg, 239 Mont. at 470-71, 781 P.2d at 278. ¶ 33 In ruling on the issue of the landlord's negligence, we noted the general rule that negligence actions for the suicide of another will not lie because the suicide is considered a superseding, intervening act. We also noted an exception to this rule. The exception imposes a duty to prevent suicide when a custodial relationship exists and the suicide is foreseeable. We ultimately held that the landlord was not liable for the decedent's death because there was no custodial relationship between the two. Krieg, 239 Mont. at 472-73, 781 P.2d at 279. We impliedly held that a landlord-tenant relationship is not custodial by nature. Krieg, 239 Mont. at 473, 781 P.2d at 279. ¶ 34 Stephen maintains that the facts of this case mandate the opposite result from that reached in Krieg. He argues that here, a custodial relationship was created when Officer Driscoll directed Trina to park her car and instructed her that either she could walk home or he would give her a ride home. We disagree. ¶ 35 As discussed in the preceding section, the terms custody and custodial relationship contemplate a degree of control akin to possession, or a degree of control which results in a physical or legal restraint on one's liberty. Examples of relationships which are custodial in nature include the following: school-minor pupil, parent-child, jailer-inmate, carrier-passenger, innkeeper-guest, and hospital-patient. See Graham v. MSU (1988), 235 Mont. 284, 288-89, 767 P.2d 301, 303-04 (school-minor pupil); Azure v. City of Billings (1979), 182 Mont. 234, 242-43, 596 P.2d 460, 465(jailer-inmate). See generally Speiser, supra § 4:11 at 602; Prosser and Keeton, supra § 56 at 376-77; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A(4) at 120-21, § 320 at 130. Here, the facts do not establish that Officer Driscoll exerted the requisite degree of control over Trina sufficient to create a custodial relationship. Although Officer Driscoll directed Trina to park her vehicle and instructed her not to drive, his actions do not amount to possession of her, or a physical or legal restraint of her liberty. The right to drive a car is not a fundamental right, but a privilege that may be revoked. State v. Skurdal (1988), 235 Mont. 291, 295, 767 P.2d 304, 307. Once Trina parked her vehicle, she was free to go and then do as she pleased. On this basis, we conclude that no custodial relationship existed between Officer Driscoll and Trina giving rise to a special duty to protect her from harm.