Opinion ID: 2982507
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Direct Evidence of Judnic’s Discrimination

Text: “[D]irect evidence is that evidence which, if believed, requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the employer’s actions.” Jacklyn, 176 F.3d at 926. Direct evidence “does not require a factfinder to draw any inferences.” Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 865 (6th Cir. 2003). Appellants contend that Judnic’s saying “no woman should be making that kind of money” amounts to direct evidence of sex-based discrimination. This argument has several fatal defects. First, this statement was isolated and ambiguous—particularly given Caldwell’s inability to recall its details. As such, it does not constitute direct evidence of discrimination. See Phelps v. Yale Sec., Inc., 986 F.2d 1020, 1025-26 (6th Cir. 1993). Nothing in the statement indicates that it was made regarding Foster or BBF. See Griffin v. Finkbeiner, 689 F.3d 584, 595 (6th Cir. 2012) (“The fact that the statements do not specifically mention [plaintiff] means only that they are not direct evidence of discrimination . . . .”). Also, Judnic did not make this statement in the context of an evaluation or other adverse employment action. “Statements by decision makers unrelated to the decisional process itself can not suffice to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating animus.” Bush v. Dictaphone Corp., 161 F.3d 363, 369 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). If comments suggesting animus were present, we then would consider whether Judnic took an adverse action “because of [his] predisposition to discriminate” against a protected class. - 25 - Case No. 13-2209 BBF Eng’g Servs. Co. PC v. Michigan DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 416 (6th Cir. 2004). Given that—even in Caldwell’s fuzzy recollection—this statement was singular, there is no evidence in the record that Judnic harbored animus. Compare Hopkins v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 196 F.3d 655, 661 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that a single slur was not direct evidence of discrimination) with Talley v. Bravo Pitino Restaurant, Ltd., 61 F.3d 1241, 1249 n.2 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he repeated usage of racial slurs in this case cannot be termed isolated or abstract.”). Finally, the timing of the statement—sometime in 2006 and thus roughly three years before the evaluation and two years before a timely claim could have accrued—undercuts finding that it is direct evidence. See Hein v. All Am. Plywood Co., Inc., 232 F.3d 482, 489 (6th Cir. 2000) (explaining that comments made five months before an employee’s termination were too far removed to be direct evidence); Phelps, 986 F.2d at 1026 (stating that comments made “nearly a year” before an adverse action “were made too long before . . . to have influenced the . . . decision”); but see DiCarlo, 358 F.3d at 416 (holding that racial slurs made three weeks before termination constituted direct evidence). The district court did not err in concluding that Appellants’ failed to point to direct evidence of Judnic’s discrimination. 2. Circumstantial Evidence of Judnic’s Discrimination To make a prima facie case of discrimination under § 1983, Appellants must sufficiently indicate that Judnic took an adverse action against them. See, e.g., Rushton v. City of Warren, 90 F. App’x 912, 916 (6th Cir. 2004); Policastro v. N.W. Airlines, Inc., 297 F.3d 535, 539 n.1 (6th Cir. 2002). An adverse action is “a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions” of Appellants’ work; examples include “termination of employment, a demotion . . . a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation.” Hollins v. Atl. Co., Inc., 188 F.3d - 26 - Case No. 13-2209 BBF Eng’g Servs. Co. PC v. Michigan 652, 662 (6th Cir. 1999). De minimis actions are not materially adverse. As we explained fifteen years ago, if every action that made an employee “unhappy or resentful” was materially adverse, then supervisors could be liable for “criticism or even facial expressions indicating displeasure.” Primes v. Reno, 190 F.3d 765, 766 (6th Cir. 1999); accord Williams v. BristolMyers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Otherwise, every trivial personnel action that an irritable, chip-on-the-shoulder employee did not like would form the basis of a discrimination suit.”). Appellants’ circumstantial evidence of discrimination fails to indicate that Judnic was “personally involved in the alleged misconduct.” Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 817 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005). For example, in 2010 when BBF was not being paid for its work as a subconsultant on the Gateway Project, Appellants do not dispute that the delay in payment was because URS—the prime consultant—initially failed to submit BBF’s invoices to Judnic. Appellant’s point to this temporary nonpayment as an adverse action, contending that Judnic neglected to investigate this issue promptly or thoroughly. This argument is flawed for several reasons. First, this allegation appears to be less of a claim of intentional discrimination and more of a claim sounding in negligence. Second, this claim appears indistinguishable from Rasins Landscape & Assocs., Inc. v. MDOT, 528 F. App’x 441 (6th Cir. 2013), where we held that an MDOT subcontractor lacked standing to bring a claim against MDOT for a prime contractor’s failure to pay contract proceeds. Id. at 444-45. Appellants’ other aspects of circumstantial evidence fail to indicate that Judnic took a materially adverse action against them. Many of Appellants’ other pieces of evidence— including having to submit a FOIA request to see subconsultant evaluations, Judnic’s holding a telephonic meeting instead of an in-person one, and Judnic’s having another engineer meet with - 27 - Case No. 13-2209 BBF Eng’g Servs. Co. PC v. Michigan Foster—fall into the category of de minimis actions that are not materially adverse. See Primes, 190 F.3d at 766. Further, Appellants contend that Judnic took a materially adverse action by requiring extra training for Stewart. Unrefuted evidence in the record, however, indicates that Judnic had no hand in this requirement. Appellants also contend that Judnic took a materially adverse action against them by inserting the leased-vehicle requirement into an RFP in 2010. This requirement, however, was not materially adverse because it applied across-the-board to any consultant who wished to submit a proposal for the project. Appellants’ strongest adverse action argument is Judnic’s giving BBF two “7 out of 10” scores in his evaluation of BBF’s performance on Contract 2006-0490. Indeed, the district court found that this evaluation was materially adverse. To reach this conclusion, the district court relied on our decision in Blizzard v. Marion Technical College, 698 F.3d 275, 290 (6th Cir. 2012), which in turn relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), to apply a “reasonable worker” standard—that an adverse action is material if it would dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. Appellees, however, contend that the district court relied on the incorrect definition of “adverse action.” They assert that Burlington Northern established the reasonable worker standard for retaliation but did not relax the standard for disparate-treatment. We agree; although Burlington Northern certainly expanded the definition of adverse employment action for the purposes of retaliation, it left the term undisturbed in the discrimination context. See Tepper v. Potter, 505 F.3d 508, 515 n.1 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining that Burlington Northern expanded the definition of “adverse employment action for a Title VII retaliation claim” but that “Burlington Northern did not expand or alter this Court's formulation of an adverse employment - 28 - Case No. 13-2209 BBF Eng’g Servs. Co. PC v. Michigan action for purposes of the discrimination claim before us” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)); Michael v. Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp., 496 F.3d 584, 595-96 (6th Cir. 2007) (emphasizing the distinction between a prima facie discrimination claim and a prima facie retaliation claim). For a disparate-treatment discrimination claim, a “mid-range, performance evaluation of ‘fully successful’” is not an adverse action sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Primes, 190 F.3d at 766; see also James v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 243 F. App’x 74, 79 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that an adverse evaluation did not constitute a materially adverse action before Burlington Northern). Judnic’s assigning BBF two scores of seven on a one-to-ten scale appears decidedly mid-range. But even if this evaluation did indicate that BBF had not been fully successful, Appellants would still need to indicate that they “suffered, or [are] in jeopardy of suffering,” a concrete action “because of the downgraded evaluation.” Morris v. Oldham Cnty. Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 789 (6th Cir. 2000). Unless this negative evaluation had palpable negative effects, it is not actionable. See Vaughn v. Louisville Water Co., 302 F. App’x 337, 348 (6th Cir. 2008); Morris, 201 F.3d at 789; cf. White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 403 (6th Cir. 2008) (“By receiving a lower salary increase than he would have without the more negative evaluation, White was denied an increase in pay to which he allegedly was entitled.”). Appellants fail to identify any contracts that BBF and Foster were not awarded as a result of either the evaluation for Contract 2006-0490 or Judnic’s conduct generally. Foster does offer some highly speculative testimony claiming that BBF was not awarded contracts because of Judnic’s actions, but a plaintiff’s subjective beliefs are “wholly insufficient evidence to establish a claim of discrimination.” Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 584 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Shaheen v. Naughton, 222 F. App’x 11, 13-14 (2d Cir. 2007) (affirming summary judgment - 29 - Case No. 13-2209 BBF Eng’g Servs. Co. PC v. Michigan where a plaintiff “merely speculates that her failure to secure another residency must have been a result of negative evaluations”). Rather, Appellants acknowledge that BBF struggled to obtain work before Judnic’s evaluation and, conversely, that a panel chaired by Judnic selected BBF for a contract after this evaluation. Additionally, “Past Performance” ratings on BBF’s pre- and post-evaluation proposals remained largely consistent. Because Appellants do not offer evidence that Judnic’s evaluation either was noticeably worse than prior evaluations or that it meaningfully affected BBF’s ability to secure future work, this evaluation does not constitute a materially adverse action. Because Appellants do not sufficiently assert that Judnic took a materially adverse action against them, their disparatetreatment-based equal protection claim against Judnic fails.5 D. Section 1983 claims against Stuecher Appellants do not appear to challenge the district court’s holding that Stuecher’s alleged statement—“I hate her”—was not direct evidence of either race or gender discrimination. We therefore only analyze whether the district court erroneously concluded that Appellants did not put forth a prima facie § 1983 disparate-treatment claim using circumstantial evidence. As this claim was resolved at the summary judgment stage, we must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Accordingly, although the record is conflicted regarding whether Stuecher unilaterally changed BBF’s evaluation scores during the selection process for the 2009 ARRA contract, we assume that he did at this stage. This modification of BBF’s scores such that BBF did not progress to the second round of evaluation constitutes a materially adverse action. 5 Based on this holding, we need not examine whether Appellants can point to evidence that Judnic treated any similarly situated consulting firms differently. Nonetheless, we note that Appellants are unable to do so for the reasons explained below in the next section, addressing whether Appellants can identify any similarly situated consulting firms that Stuecher treated differently. - 30 - Case No. 13-2209 BBF Eng’g Servs. Co. PC v. Michigan To prevail on their § 1983 disparate treatment claim, however, Appellants must also indicate that Stuecher treated BBF differently from other similarly situated consulting firms. The Equal Protection Clause is “essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). A prima facie case of discrimination requires a plaintiff to show that she was treated differently than others outside of the protected class. See, e.g., Younis v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., 610 F.3d 359, 363 (6th Cir. 2010). “[T]o be deemed ‘similarly-situated’, the [firms] with [which] the plaintiff seeks to compare [her] treatment must have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards and have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of them for it.” Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992). Appellants “need not demonstrate an exact correlation,” but their comparators “must be similar in ‘all of the relevant aspects.’” Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original) (quoting Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 802 (6th Cir. 1994)). The district court found that Appellants had, at best, identified three alleged comparators—Wade Trim Associates, HNTB, and Great Lakes Engineering—but that Appellants did not provide any factual bases to support a finding that these firms were similarly situated. Appellants now claim both that there are no firms comparable to BBF and that all the “majority” consulting firms—HNTB; Fishbeck, Thompson, Carr & Huber; Great Lakes Engineering; URS Corporation; and Wade Trim Associates—are similarly situated. Moving beyond the inconsistency of this argument, because Appellants did not assert that all of these - 31 - Case No. 13-2209 BBF Eng’g Servs. Co. PC v. Michigan firms were similarly situated in the district court, we need not consider these new arguments. See Coach, 717 F.3d at 502. We nevertheless note that Appellants have not presented sufficient evidence to indicate that any of these firms are similarly situated. To have a sufficient comparator, Appellants need to identify a nonprotected firm that “engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish [its] conduct or the employer’s treatment of them for it” and was “subject to the same standards.” Mitchell, 964 F.2d at 577. Appellants offer no evidence regarding the experience, qualifications, or size of these supposedly similarly situated firms beyond conclusory statements that the firms were similarly situated. Indeed, of all the firms that Appellants attempt to use as comparators, only two—HNTB and URS—submitted proposals for the 2009 ARRA contract. Although HNTB was more highly scored than BBF and did ultimately receive the contract, the record does not support Appellant’s contention that BBF and HNTB are similarly situated with regard to the 2009 ARRA contract. Turning to URS, even if it were similarly situated (and nothing in the record indicates that it is), it still would not make for an apt comparator because URS actually received lower scores than BBF. In sum, Appellants have not satisfied the similarly-situated element for a prima facie case of § 1983 discrimination. They have not offered evidence that Great Lakes, HNTB, Wade Trim, or any other “majority” firm dealt with the same supervisors, offered substantially similar proposals to MDOT, had substantially similar employee teams, or had substantially similar evaluations and scores as they were going into the 2009 ARRA evaluation process. Accordingly, Appellants have not satisfied the elements of a prima facie case, and the district court properly granted summary judgment to Stuecher on this claim. - 32 - Case No. 13-2209 BBF Eng’g Servs. Co. PC v. Michigan E. Due Process Claims under § 1983 The district court denied Appellants leave to add a § 1983 due process claim regarding Judnic’s “low” evaluation to their amended complaint. The district court found that this amendment would be futile because BBF did not have a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest in an evaluation or a protected interest in MDOT’s contracting procedures. Giving Appellants every benefit of the doubt, they appear to challenge this ruling on appeal by claiming that BBF was entitled to contracts which were awarded and then wrested away. This cursory argument does not identify any specific contracts that were “wrested away.” Based on our best guess, Appellants are referring to the M-10 portion of Contract 2006-0490 that was split away and awarded to another firm. If so, that claim would fail because BBF could not have had a property interest in the contract since it was not yet “actually awarded” when its scope was reduced. See United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Solomon, 960 F.2d 31, 34 (6th Cir. 1992); see also 40 U.S.C. § 1104(b). Moreover, this claim from 2006 would fall outside of § 1983’s threeyear statute of limitations. Accordingly, the district court properly concluded that this claim would be futile. III. Claims under the Michigan Whistleblower Protection Act The district court found four independent grounds on which to grant summary judgment on Appellants’ individual-capacity WPA claims against Judnic and Stuecher: (1) BBF and Foster were not “employees” of MDOT; (2) Appellants did not identify an adverse action taken within the WPA’s ninety-day statute of limitations; (3) Appellants failed to identify any adverse actions taken after Foster engaged in a protected activity; and (4) Appellants did not identify any adverse actions Judnic or Stuecher took after they knew the protected activity. Appellants challenge all of these findings and assert that factual issues preclude summary judgment. - 33 - Case No. 13-2209 BBF Eng’g Servs. Co. PC v. Michigan We analyze claims under Michigan’s WPA using the burden-shifting framework for retaliatory discharge claims under the Elliot Larsen Civil Rights Act. See Taylor v. Modern Eng’g, Inc., 653 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002); accord Pethers v. Metro Lift Propane, No. 09-CV-10516, 2010 WL 3023887, at  (E.D. Mich., July 29, 2010). Under this framework, a plaintiff first must establish a prima facie case under the WPA. E.g., West v. Gen. Motors Corp., 665 N.W.2d 468, 471-72 (Mich. 2003). Once a plaintiff has made this showing, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nonretaliatory explanation for its adverse employment action. E.g., Roulston v. Tendercare (Michigan), Inc., 608 N.W.2d 525, 530 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000). If the defendant proffers a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason, the plaintiff then has the opportunity to prove that the defendant’s purported legitimate reason was merely pretext for the discharge. Taylor, 653 N.W.2d at 628 (citing Roulston, 608 N.W.2d at 530). To make a prima facie WPA case, Appellants must show: (1) that they were engaged in a protected activity under the WPA; (2) that they suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. West, 665 N.W.2d at 471-72. Assuming for the sake of argument that Foster and BBF were MDOT employees, Appellants have nonetheless failed to assert a prima facie WPA case against Judnic or Stuecher. Foster’s filing complaints with the FHWA satisfies the protected activity prong of a prima facie WPA case. Appellants, however, stumble at the second and third prongs. The WPA has a ninety-day statute of limitations. Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.363(1). Although they claim that there are questions of fact regarding this statute of limitations, Appellants do not identify any adverse actions that Judnic or Stuecher allegedly took after Foster first filed her complaints in June 2010. Accordingly, the district court properly concluded that Appellants have not - 34 - Case No. 13-2209 BBF Eng’g Servs. Co. PC v. Michigan sufficiently alleged a causal connection between any adverse actions by Judnic and Stuecher and Foster’s filing Title VI complaints with the FHWA. Appellants also challenge the district court’s dismissal of their WPA claims against MDOT, the State of Michigan, and Judnic and Stuecher in their official capacities. Appellants acknowledge that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for damages against a state in federal court but then argue, “However, this does not preclude non-equitable relief. Plaintiffs may proceed against the State and its agencies with their WPA claims.” This statement is both befuddling and flatly wrong; under the Eleventh Amendment, “the States’ constitutional immunity from suit prohibits all state-law claims filed against a State in federal court, whether those claims are monetary or injunctive in nature.” Ernst v. Rising, 427 F.3d 351, 368 (6th Cir. 2005). The district court properly dismissed these claims.