Opinion ID: 1102227
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Private Interests Affected

Text: We turn now to the application of the Eldridge factors to the instant case in light of the above jurisprudence on pre- and post-deprivation hearings. The first step in the balancing process mandated by Eldridge is identification of the nature and weight of the private interest affected by the official action challenged. The private interest affected here is the owner's interest in his motor vehicle. More particularly, it is his interest in continued possession and use of his motor vehicle pending the outcome of the hearing due him. Even a temporary, nonfinal deprivation of property is nonetheless a deprivation within the contemplation of the Fourteenth Amendment and entitled to due process protection. Paillot v. Wooton, 559 So.2d 758, 760 (La.1990). Furthermore, as we recognized in Wilson v. City of New Orleans, 479 So.2d 891 (La.1985), a vehicle is not only a necessity of modern day life, but deprivation of a person's mode of transportation, even for short periods, can significantly affect that person's livelihood. On the other hand, the State is not seeking to actually take ownership of the vehicle but only to temporarily suspend its use pending presentation of proof of insurance. Although the deprivation is significant, it is only temporary, and the Supreme Court has recognized that in determining what process is due, account must be taken of the length and finality of the deprivation. Gilbert, supra, 117 S.Ct. at 1813. See also Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 12, 99 S.Ct. 2612, 2618, 61 L.Ed.2d 321 (1979) (The duration of any potentially wrongful deprivation of a property interest is an important factor in assessing the impact of official action on the private interest involved.). So long as the motor vehicle owner receives a sufficiently prompt postdeprivation hearing or opportunity to be heard, the financial loss incurred because of the temporary impoundment of the vehicle is relatively insubstantial when compared to the types of deprivations which the Supreme Court has held require predeprivation hearings such as termination of employment, Loudermill, or civil forfeiture of a home, U.S. v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 114 S.Ct. 492, 126 L.Ed.2d 490 (1993). Additionally, although our constitution grants to persons the right to acquire, own, control, use, enjoy, protect, and dispose of private property, this right is subject to reasonable statutory restrictions and the reasonable exercise of the police power. La. Const. Art. I, § 4. As such, it is firmly established that the right to operate a motor vehicle in Louisiana is a privilege granted by the State and not a constitutional right, Progressive Security Ins. Co. v. Foster, 97-2985, p. 4 (La.4/23/98), 711 So.2d 675, 682. Consequently, the State has and can enact numerous conditions on that privilege, one of which is the requirement that motor vehicles be insured and that documentary proof of such insurance be contained at all times in the vehicle. We recognize the owner also has a financial interest in the personal inconvenience and economic hardship he will suffer as a result of the impoundment as well as the towing and storage fees he will have to pay, regardless of whether he, in fact, has motor vehicle liability insurance. However, the law at issue here premises impoundment on the requirement that a motor vehicle contain certain documentary proof of insurance, not on the fact of whether or not that vehicle is actually insured. The legislature has chosen to make it a violation of Louisiana law for a motor vehicle to fail to contain certain documentary proof of insurance.