Opinion ID: 2622030
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: ¶ 9 In his supplemental brief, Quismundo concedes that the proper remedy at trial should have been dismissal without prejudice. [2] He asks this court to so order now. Supp'l Br. of Pet'r at 7, 13. Likewise, the State concedes that because the first amended information was constitutionally defective, the proper remedy at trial should have been dismissal without prejudice. But for a variety of reasons discussed below, the State argues that the trial court properly allowed the State to reopen its case and amend the insufficient information. We disagree. ¶ 10 Under our state constitution, it is a constitutionally mandated rule that all essential elements of a charged crime must be included in the charging document. Vangerpen, 125 Wash.2d at 788, 888 P.2d 1177. The essential elements rule recognizes a defendant's article [I], section 22 ... right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him or her. Id. at 789, 888 P.2d 1177. In a criminal case, once the prosecution has rested, it may not amend an insufficient information. In State v. Pelkey, 109 Wash.2d 484, 491, 745 P.2d 854 (1987), this court held that an information may not be amended after the State has rested its case in chief unless the amendment is to a lesser degree of the same crime or a lesser included offense. Any other amendment is deemed to be a violation of the defendant's article [I], section 22 ... right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him or her. Id. Instead, the proper remedy is dismissal of the charge without prejudice. Id. at 792-93, 888 P.2d 1177. Moreover, where an information is deemed insufficient in such a context, the defendant need not show prejudice to effect dismissal; the insufficiency alone is enough to warrant dismissal. Id. at 790, 888 P.2d 1177. ¶ 11 The trial court here should have dismissed the charges against Quismundo without prejudice once the insufficiency of the first amended information was revealed; on this point the parties agree. Supp'l Br. of Pet'r at 13; Supp'l Br. of Resp't at 5. The question now is whether its failure to do so was an abuse of discretion warranting reversal of Quismundo's conviction. ¶ 12 A court abuses its discretion when an order is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wash.2d 299, 339, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993). A discretionary decision is based `on untenable grounds' or made `for untenable reasons' if it rests on facts unsupported in the record or was reached by applying the wrong legal standard.  State v. Rohrich, 149 Wash.2d 647, 654, 71 P.3d 638 (2003) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Rundquist, 79 Wash.App. 786, 793, 905 P.2d 922 (1995)). Indeed, a court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law. Fisons, 122 Wash.2d at 339, 858 P.2d 1054. ¶ 13 Here, the trial court based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law and therefore abused its discretion. The trial court believed that it could dismiss without prejudice to the State only if Quismundo showed that the insufficient information prejudiced him. RP at 90-91. This is incorrect under Pelkey and Vangerpen. Pelkey, 109 Wash.2d at 491, 745 P.2d 854; Vangerpen, 125 Wash.2d at 790, 888 P.2d 1177. Moreover, the remedy the trial court selected was unavailable under Vangerpen. We have repeatedly and recently held that the remedy for an insufficient charging document is reversal and dismissal of charges without prejudice to the State's ability to refile charges, Vangerpen, 125 Wash.2d at 792-93, 888 P.2d 1177, not midtrial amendment and refiling. We hold the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the remedy it did. To hold otherwise would invite erosion of the clear rule in Pelkey and Vangerpen. [3] ¶ 14 The State argues, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that because Quismundo himself requested an erroneous remedydismissal with prejudicethe trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting that remedy. Supp'l Br. of Resp't at 10-11; Quismundo, 2007 WL 959893 at , 2007 Wash. App. LEXIS 576, at . The question is not whether the trial court properly refused dismissal with prejudice, however, but whether it abused its discretion in allowing amendment of the insufficient charging document after the State had rested its case. The abuse of discretion standard does not allow us to excuse an order based on an erroneous view of the law because the trial court considered and rejected an equally erroneous argument. [4] ¶ 15 Finally, the State appears to argue that Quismundo invited the error himself by going forward with his trial on the second amended information and cannot now ask for dismissal without prejudice. Supp'l Br. of Resp't at 10-11. But at the point at which Quismundo withdrew his continuance request, the trial court had already erred and Quismundo's actions at that point have no bearing on the posture of this case. ¶ 16 A trial court's obligation to follow the law remains the same regardless of the arguments raised by the parties before it. Although Quismundo erroneously requested the wrong remedy for the insufficient charging document, under Pelkey and Vangerpen the trial court was precluded from allowing a midtrial amendment of the charges and was required to dismiss the charges without prejudice.