Opinion ID: 1435973
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Mitigating Factors and Mitigating Evidence

Text: In the penalty phase of capital litigation, the jury determines whether the State has presented proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of aggravating factors, and, if there is such proof, whether those aggravating factors outweigh any mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(a), (3). If the State satisfies both standards, the defendant is sentenced to death; if not, he is sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of thirty years without parole eligibility. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(3)(a)(c). In this case, the State alleged three aggravating factors: the murder involved aggravated assault or torture, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(c); the murder was committed to escape apprehension for another offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(f); and the murder was committed during commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing robbery or sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(g). Defendant may prove mitigation in the penalty phase by two different means, through the introduction of mitigating factors and through the introduction of mitigating evidence. The mitigating factors are set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(a)-(h). The jury weighs the mitigating factors against the aggravating factors in determining whether to impose a capital or non-capital penalty. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(3). Mitigating evidence is any evidence that supports a mitigating factor or undermines an aggravating factor. State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 86, 716 A. 2d 395, 437-38 (1998), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 932, 121 S.Ct. 1380, 149 L.Ed. 2d 306 (2001). In addition to the mitigating factors specifically enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(a)-(g), the catch-all provision allows the jury to consider [a]ny other factor which is relevant to the defendant's character or record or to the circumstances of the offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h). Defendant proposed eleven mitigating factors under the catch-all category. The State challenged two of those factors: 10. 5(h) The victim sold drugs for her boyfriend on the night she was killed. Individuals gave statements they bought drugs from the victim the night she was killed, and the victim and her boyfriend were overheard arguing about drugs the same night, thereby refuting the State's allegation that Steve Fortin robbed the victim. 11. 5(h) The victim's live-in boyfriend admitted engaging in consensual anal sex with the victim thus refuting the State's allegation that Steve Fortin sexually assaulted the victim. The State argued that those two mitigating factors did not relate to defendant's character or record, or to the circumstances of the offense. Defendant contended that the proposed mitigating factors rebutted the 4(g) felony murder-aggravating factorthat Fortin killed Padilla in the course of a robbery and sexual assault. The trial court rejected the proposed mitigating factors because they were not relevant to the statutory language of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h). We agree. We also find no support for defendant's contention that he was barred from introducing relevant mitigation evidence to undermine the existence of the State's aggravating factors. First, we address the basis for the trial court's rejection of the two mitigating factors. Our capital sentencing jurisprudence requires that courts grant defendants wide leeway in presenting evidence in mitigation of the death penalty. State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 157, 548 A. 2d 887, 904 (1988) ( Bey II ), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164, 115 S.Ct. 1131, 130 L.Ed. 2d 1093 (1995). Although the scope of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h) is broad, it is not unlimited. State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 103, 549 A. 2d 792, 824 (1988). Defendant does not claim that the proposed mitigating factors were relevant to his character or record. He does claim, however, that they were relevant to the circumstances of the offense. In Gerald, we construed the phrase circumstances of the offense to encompass only those circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime itself. Id. at 104, 549 A. 2d at 825. For example, the relative role of the defendant's participation in the crime meets that standard. Ibid. The jury may weigh whether the defendant was a ringleader or a lesser player in comparison to codefendants. Ibid. In contrast, the sentences received by codefendants are not a relevant mitigating factor. Ibid. In State v. Timmendequas, we rejected as a factor bearing on circumstances of the offense and character the defendant's offer to plead guilty in exchange for a life sentence. 161 N.J. 515, 626-27, 737 A. 2d 55, 115 (1999) ( Timmendequas I ), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed. 2d 89 (2001). For similar reasons, the period of parole ineligibility a defendant would serve if he received a non-capital sentence is not a mitigating factor. State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383, 466, 715 A. 2d 228, 270 (1998) ( Morton I ), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 931, 121 S.Ct. 1380, 149 L.Ed. 2d 306 (2001). On the other hand, a defendant's claim-of-right defense in the penalty phasehis honest belief that he was entitled to recover money from the person he murderedis a permissible mitigating factor that could have a countervailing effect on the 4(g) aggravating factor, murder committed during a felony. State v. Mejia, 141 N.J. 475, 500, 662 A. 2d 308, 321 (1995). Applying those principles to this case, the trial court properly rejected the two proposed catch-all mitigating factors. That Padilla sold drugs earlier in the evening bore no relationship to any of the circumstances of the offense. The proposed drug-dealing mitigating factor was a thinly disguised effort to demean the character of the victim while in no way lessening defendant's personal involvement or moral culpability in the murder. Contrary to defendant's assertion, Padilla's involvement in drugs did not refute the State's allegation that he committed a felony-robbery-murder or suggest that someone else robbed her. Her drug dealing was not germane to any legitimate defense or mitigating factor. In addition, the victim's prior sexual conduct was not relevant as a mitigating factor. That Padilla's boyfriend had anal sex with her one to two weeks before her murder did not qualify as a mitigating factor because it too bore no relationship to the crime. Such evidence did not refute the evidence that Padilla was the victim of a sexual crime at the time of the murder. Defendant was unable to present any evidence that the fresh wounds to Padilla's anus were caused by consensual sexual relations with her boyfriend. We next consider defendant's argument that he was denied the opportunity to present mitigating evidence. This Court has recognized that mitigating evidence serves multiple purposes: (1) to weaken the State's proofs concerning the existence of aggravating factors; (2) to establish the existence of mitigating factors; and (3) to bolster the weight of those mitigating factors found to exist in an attempt to have those factors outweigh the aggravating factors found to exist during the jurors' ultimate deliberation. [ State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 316, 619 A. 2d 1208, 1282 (1993) ( Martini I ), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875, 116 S.Ct. 203, 133 L.Ed. 2d 137 (1995).] The defendant has a right to both criticize the evidence supporting the aggravating factors as well as to present his own evidence supporting mitigating factors and undermining aggravating factors. State v. Josephs, 174 N.J. 44, 116, 803 A. 2d 1074, 1117 (2002); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(b) (providing that defendant may offer, without regard to the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials, reliable evidence relevant to any of the mitigating factors); N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(d) (providing that defendant and State may rebut any evidence presented during penalty trial and may argue adequacy of evidence establishing any aggravating or mitigating factor). In State v. Davis, this Court emphasized the different evidentiary standards applicable to the guilt and penalty phases. 96 N.J. 611, 619-20, 477 A. 2d 308, 312 (1984). Given this most sensitive and critical aspect of the capital punishment statute, the Court found that the Legislature intended a broad understanding of evidential relevance during the penalty phase. Id. at 619, 477 A. 2d at 312. The Court noted doubts must be resolved in favor of admission when evidence of a mitigating factor is offered by the defendant. Id. at 620, 477 A. 2d at 312. Additionally, evidence inadmissible during the guilt phase, such as a claim-of-right defense to robbery, may be admissible during the penalty phase to lessen the weight that a jury might give to the felony-robbery-murder aggravating factor. Mejia, supra, 141 N.J. at 500, 662 A. 2d at 320-21. However, the Court cautioned in Davis, supra, that a relaxation of the standards of admissibility is not the equivalent of automatic admissibility. 96 N.J. at 623, 477 A. 2d at 314. A court may exclude mitigation evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its unfounded or speculative character or by the risk it would cause confusion. Morton I, supra, 155 N.J. at 461, 715 A. 2d at 267. The drug sales evidence did not discredit the felony-robbery-murder aggravating factor because there was no evidence that connected drug dealing to the murder. We found the drug-dealing evidence irrelevant in the guilt phase; we find it irrelevant in the penalty phase as well. See supra Part IV.B. The trial court, nevertheless, gave defense counsel considerable latitude to explore this subject. Defense counsel elicited through cross-examination of the State's witnesses the drug milieu of the area in which the crime was committed. For instance, he established that Padilla was killed in an area spotted with welfare motels and known for drug activity. He also proved that a civilian witness had smoked crack cocaine with the victim in the room of a local motel and that a law enforcement officer had questioned several witnesses about the use of cocaine. Defendant was not inhibited in his presentation of mitigating evidence, even that of questionable relevance. Moreover, defendant's repeated assertions that he was not allowed to present evidence in rebuttal of the sexual assault aggravating factor is not supported by the record. At the penalty-phase hearing, in cross-examining Dr. Lawrence Ricci, the State's sexual assault expert, defense counsel relied on the statement given by Padilla's boyfriend to the police that he and the victim engaged in consensual anal sex one to two weeks before her death. Defense counsel suggested through his questioning that the injuries to Padilla's anus were caused by consensual sexual activity with the boyfriend. Dr. Ricci dashed that theory by testifying that the anal injuries, whether caused by consensual or non-consensual activity, were fresh injuries that occurred within twenty-four to forty-eight hours of death. Accordingly, there was no connection between the victim's sexual activity with her boyfriend and her injuries discovered at the time of her death. In sum, the trial court properly struck the two mitigating factors in question and gave wide latitude to the admission of mitigating evidence at the penalty hearing.