Opinion ID: 1800657
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver of Penalty Phase Claims

Text: The circuit court granted an evidentiary hearing on Garcia's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to present mitigation evidence, including evidence of Garcia's mental health and his difficult childhood. However, when the evidentiary hearing began, Garcia  against his counsel's advice  announced that he no longer wished to pursue any penalty phase claims. The circuit court, after conducting an extensive colloquy, accepted this waiver. Garcia now claims that the court erred by accepting the waiver without first requiring his counsel to proffer all available mitigation evidence into the record. We find no error. The precedents on which Garcia relies in demanding a full proffer of all available mitigation evidence did not involve the waiver of postconviction penalty phase claims; they involved the waiver of mitigation at the trial itself. In the pivotal case, Koon v. Dugger, 619 So.2d 246 (Fla.1993), we recognized the right of a competent defendant to waive presentation of mitigating evidence at trial. Id. at 249. To ensure a valid waiver, we imposed various procedural requirements, including that defense counsel explain whether he reasonably believes there to be mitigating evidence that could be presented and what that evidence would be. Id. at 250. More recently, in Muhammad v. State, 782 So.2d 343 (Fla.2001), we emphasized that the trial court should always consider all mitigating evidence `contained anywhere in the record, to the extent it is believable and uncontroverted,' even if the defendant wishes not to present mitigation. Id. at 363 (quoting Farr v. State, 621 So.2d 1368, 1369 (Fla. 1993)). We have not, however, extended this logic to a defendant's waiver of postconviction penalty phase claims. See, e.g., Ferrell v. State, 918 So.2d 163, 174 (Fla. 2005) (holding that a defendant who merely opted to forego the presentation of evidence thereby waived his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to seek a social worker's assistance) (quoting Owen v. State, 773 So.2d 510, 515 (Fla. 2000)). The two situations are drastically different. At trial, the sentencer needs to decide whether to impose the death penalty. Mitigation evidence is always relevant to that decision. Conversely, at the postconviction stage, prisoners need not argue at all trial counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to present mitigation evidence. Moreover, even if they do bring such claims, they must prove trial counsel's deficiency before the effect of that mitigating evidence becomes relevant. Because of these distinctions, we have not required a full proffer of available mitigation evidence before a postconviction waiver of penalty phase claims. We require only that such waivers be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Alston v. State, 894 So.2d 46, 57 (Fla.2004) (using this language in a different context, where a prisoner waived his rights to postconviction counsel and proceedings) (quoting Durocher v. Singletary, 623 So.2d 482, 485 (Fla.1993)). We conclude that Garcia did waive his postconviction penalty phase claims knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. According to his colloquy with the trial court, Garcia discussed the waiver many times with his counsel and understood its ramifications. Although Garcia may not have known every detail of his penalty phase claims, he attested in a sworn affidavit that he read his entire postconviction motion, which adequately summarized the additional mitigation evidence that his counsel intended to present. The record strongly supports the trial court's decision to accept his waiver as valid.