Opinion ID: 1957308
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984

Text: [¶ 12] The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 restricts cable providers from releasing information about their subscribers. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 551(c) (West 2001 & Supp.2004). [3] Because the Act predates the rise of the Internet, courts have come to differing conclusions regarding the extent to which it regulates cable companies that provide Internet service. See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir.2000) (finding that provisions of the Act do not apply to broadband Internet service), but cf. MediaOne Group, Inc., v. County of Henrico, 97 F.Supp.2d 712, 715 (E.D.Va.2000) (concluding that cable modem service is covered by the Act), aff'd on other grounds, 257 F.3d 356, 365 (4th Cir.2001). [¶ 13] Doe argues that § 551(c) prohibits disclosure of the information held by Time Warner. Because § 551(c) only restricts cable operators from disclosing personally identifiable information, disclosure is prohibited only if Time Warner, Inc., qualifies as a cable operator. Section 551 defines a cable operator as including, in addition to persons within the definition of cable operator in § 602, [4] any person who (i) is owned or controlled by, or under common ownership or control with, a cable operator, and (ii) provides any wire or radio communications service. 47 U.S.C.A. § 551(a)(2)(C) (West 2001). [¶ 14] The definitions contained in § 551(a)(2) were added by an amendment enacted by Congress in 1992. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub.L. No. 102-385, § 20, 106 Stat. 1460, 1497 (1992). At least one court, interpreting similar language in 47 U.S.C.A. § 551(a)(2)(B) (West 2001), [5] has concluded that any wire or radio communications service plainly includes Internet service. In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 157 F.Supp.2d 286, 291 (S.D.N.Y.2001). Congress used comparable language in its primary regulation of Internet privacy, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2701 (West 2000 & Supp.2004). Thus, it would appear that Time Warner, which also operates a traditional cable system, would qualify as a cable operator for purposes of 47 U.S.C.A. § 551. [¶ 15] The resolution of this case, however, does not require us to determine whether Time Warner is a cable operator pursuant to § 551(a)(2)(C). Even if we accept Doe's position and assume that Time Warner is a cable operator, § 551(c) provides several exceptions to the Act's prohibition on disclosure. The trial court determined that Doe consented to disclosure, pursuant to § 551(c)(1). While we agree with Doe that this determination was erroneous based on the record in this case, we nonetheless affirm the judgment because disclosure is authorized by § 551(c)(2)(B).
[¶ 16] The trial court determined that Doe consented to disclosure of his identifying information as part of his agreement with Time Warner. In support of its decision, the court cited language from the privacy notice Fitch submitted to the court. [6] This notice stated, inter alia, that Time Warner may also disclose, pursuant to the consent you granted in your Subscription Agreement, the personally identifiable information ... to comply with criminal or civil legal process. The court found that this language constitutes notice to subscribers that they have consented to disclosure by Time Warner in the ordinary course of its business of the subscriber's identifying information in response to civil legal process. Because 47 U.S.C.A. § 551(c)(1) (West 2001) permits disclosure with the prior written or electronic consent of the subscriber, the court ordered disclosure. [¶ 17] In this case, the question of consent was a factual finding. We review findings of fact for clear error. Hartwell v. Stanley, 2002 ME 29, ¶ 10, 790 A.2d 607, 611. [¶ 18] The court's finding of consent is based entirely on the contents of the privacy notice Fitch attached to his final responsive pleading. M.R. Evid. 901(a) provides that [t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. Fitch did not submit any affidavit or testimony to establish that the privacy notice was authentic, or that it applied to Doe. Fitch's counsel conceded at oral argument that the privacy notice lacked foundation. [7] [¶ 19] Even if the privacy notice were established as authentic, it would be insufficient to establish that Doe consented to disclosure. By its very terms, the notice only authorizes consent to the extent that consent was previously authorized in the original subscriber agreement. Fitch did not submit Time Warner's subscriber agreement into evidence. Although Doe's anonymity may have made it difficult for Fitch to tender the actual document binding Doe and Time Warner, there were several other ways by which Fitch could have satisfied his burden of persuasion on the issue of consent. For example, Fitch could have presented evidence of Time Warner's routine business practice of requiring its subscribers to agree to consent. See M.R. Evid. 406. Alternatively, Fitch could have sought from Time Warner the terms of Doe's subscriber agreement, with any of Doe's identifying information redacted. [¶ 20] Instead, Fitch submitted a single document purporting to be a privacy notice sent to Time Warner subscribers. Fitch offered no proof that the document was, in fact, the applicable privacy notice. He submitted no evidence that the notice was sent to Doe. The court's conclusion that this document, by itself, was adequate to establish Doe consented to disclosure of his identifying information was clearly erroneous. [¶ 21] Although this case could be remanded on the issue of consent, we may affirm the trial court's order for reasons different than those stated by the trial court. Bouchard v. Frost, 2004 ME 9, ¶ 8, 840 A.2d 109, 111. The question of consent is irrelevant if disclosure would be authorized by one of the other exceptions to 47 U.S.C.A. § 551. Our focus in this case is on the exception contained in § 551(c)(2)(B).
[¶ 22] Even if the subscriber has not consented, the Cable Act authorizes disclosure of personally identifiable information if the disclosure is, subject to subsection (h) of this section, made pursuant to a court order authorizing such disclosure, if the subscriber is notified of such order by the person to whom the order is directed. 47 U.S.C.A. § 551(c)(2)(B). Subsection (h), which is referenced in § 551(c)(2)(B), provides a specific standard for disclosure when the government seeks personally identifiable information from a cable operator: (h) Disclosure of information to governmental entity pursuant to court order Except as provided in subsection (c)(2)(D) of this section, a governmental entity may obtain personally identifiable information concerning a cable subscriber pursuant to a court order only if, in the court proceeding relevant to such court order  (1) such entity offers clear and convincing evidence that the subject of the information is reasonably suspected of engaging in criminal activity and that the information sought would be material evidence in the case; and (2) the subject of the information is afforded the opportunity to appear and contest such entity's claim. 47 U.S.C.A § 551(h) (West Supp.2004). [¶ 23] Doe contends that the reference to § 551(h) at the beginning of § 551(c)(2)(B) serves to meld the sections into one specific exception, applicable only when a governmental entity is seeking disclosure. This misapprehends the plain language of the statute. Section 551(c)(2)(B) allows a cable operator to disclose subscriber information when ordered to do so by a court. Section 551(h) imposes a stricter burden when it is a governmental entity seeking that information. If the government wants the information, it must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 47 U.S.C.A. § 551(h)(1) (West Supp.2004). When the party seeking information is not a governmental entity, § 551(h) is not applicable. The use of the subject to language ensures that governmental entities will not be able to bypass § 551(h); it does not impose the requirements of § 551(h) on parties who are not governmental entities. [¶ 24] Our interpretation of § 551(c)(2)(B) is consistent with that of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in CSC Holdings, Inc., v. Redisi, 309 F.3d 988 (7th Cir.2002). In Redisi, the Seventh Circuit vacated a district court order denying the defendant's discovery request that the plaintiff, a cable operator, turn over copies of its subscriber lists. Id. at 996. Citing § 551(c)(2)(B), the Seventh Circuit flatly stated that [t]here is no privilege or restriction on releasing customer records to a non-governmental entity pursuant to a court order. Id. [¶ 25] Fitch is not a governmental entity. Because he is not a governmental entity, Time Warner is permitted to release the information in response to a valid court order, so long as it gives notice to the subscriber. 47 U.S.C.A. § 551(c)(2)(B). Because the record in this case establishes that Doe already has received notice, federal law does not bar Fitch's access to the material Time Warner submitted to the trial court.