Opinion ID: 776954
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Patrick's exposure to prosecution

Text: 61 The Brady rule requires prosecutors to disclose any benefits that are given to a government informant, including any lenient treatment. See, e.g., Giglio, 405 U.S. at 150, 92 S.Ct. 763 (failure to disclose promise of immunity). During Benn's trial, Patrick was stopped for a traffic offense and arrested because he had outstanding warrants. He called the prosecutor from jail and the prosecutor arranged for him to be released without being charged. This benefit was never disclosed to the defense. Also during Benn's trial, the Fife police department asked the prosecution to charge Patrick with burglary, but the prosecutor's office dismissed the charges. Once again, this information was withheld from the defense. The prosecution also arranged to postpone the filing of a warrant that was supposed to issue because Patrick had violated his probation. The warrant was delayed for two weeks — until after the Benn trial ended. The government failed to inform defense counsel about this benefit as well. 62 We have explained the reason why information regarding prosecution-provided benefits constitutes Brady material. In Singh v. Prunty, 142 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.1998), we stated: 63 Disclosure of an agreement to provide such benefits, as well as evidence of the benefits themselves, could have allowed the jury to reasonably conclude that [the informant] had a motive other than altruism for testifying on behalf of the State. Such a finding could have substantially impeached [the informant's] credibility as a witness. 64 Id. at 1162. Here, too, a jury could have reasonably concluded that Patrick had a motive other than altruism. 65 The state contends that the information regarding benefits was cumulative and immaterial because the defense cross-examined Patrick about his immunity from arrest during the trial and about the reduced sentence he received in exchange for his testimony. The reduced sentence that Patrick received did not provide any significant benefit to him. With good time credits for his work in prison, Patrick would have served only an additional 35 days had he received the longer sentence originally sought by the prosecutors. In addition, the state effectively downplayed the importance of this benefit in closing arguments by stating, [t]he reward that he got was that in a 6 to 12 month sentence, he got six months instead of nine months. Big reward. 66 Moreover, as we pointed out earlier, the state cannot satisfy its Brady obligation to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence by making some evidence available and asserting that the rest would be cumulative. Rather, the state is obligated to disclose `all material information casting a shadow on a government witness's credibility.' Carriger, 132 F.3d at 481-82 (internal citations omitted). Here, the number and nature of the undisclosed benefits was such that they would have impeached Patrick more effectively than the evidence that he was immune from arrest during the trial. The undisclosed benefits that Patrick received added significantly to the benefits that were disclosed and certainly would have cast a shadow on Patrick's credibility. Thus, their suppression was material.