Opinion ID: 1057790
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Evidence Concerning

Text: Other Ford Windstar Fires Because the admissibility of evidence depends on the plaintiff's theory of the case, the admissibility of the prior Ford Windstar fires must be determined in the context of Funkhouser's claim that Ford failed to warn of the danger of key-off electrical dashboard fires. See Breeden v. Roberts, 258 Va. 411, 416, 518 S.E.2d 834, 837 (1999) (evidence is relevant if it tends to establish a party's claim or defense or adds force and strength to other evidence bearing upon an issue in the case). Under Funkhouser's theory that Ford failed to warn of the danger of key-off electrical dashboard fires, Funkhouser must prove Ford (a) knew or had reason to know that the Funkhouser minivan was or was likely to be dangerous for the use 17 for which it was supplied to Funkhouser, (b) had no reason to believe that Funkhouser would realize the minivan's dangerous condition, and (c) failed to exercise reasonable care to inform Funkhouser of the minivan's dangerous condition or the facts which make it likely to be dangerous. Featherall v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 219 Va. 949, 962, 252 S.E.2d 358, 366 (1979) (applying Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 (1965)). A product is unreasonably dangerous if it is defective in assembly or manufacture, unreasonably dangerous in design, or unaccompanied by adequate warnings concerning its hazardous properties. Morgen Industries, Inc. v. Vaughan, 252 Va. 60, 65, 471 S.E.2d 489, 492 (1996). In this case, Funkhouser asserts the Windstar minivan supplied to it by Ford was unreasonably dangerous because it was unaccompanied by adequate warnings concerning the potential for key-off electrical dashboard fires. We have traditionally permitted a plaintiff to prove notice of a dangerous condition through evidence of another similar incident or occurrence  'provided the prior incident occurred under substantially the same circumstances'  and was  'caused by the same or similar defects and dangers as those in issue.'  Jones v. Ford Motor Co., 263 Va. 237, 255, 559 S.E.2d 592, 601 (2002)(quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Phelps, 239 Va. 272, 276-77, 389 S.E.2d 454, 457 (1990) (quoting General Motors Corp. v. 18 Lupica, 237 Va. 516, 521, 379 S.E.2d 311, 314 (1989))); see also Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Watson, 243 Va. 128, 137, 413 S.E.2d 630, 635 (1992); Roll 'R' Way Rinks, Inc. v. Smith, 218 Va. 321, 325, 237 S.E.2d 157, 160 (1977). Such evidence may only be admitted to prove notice and actual knowledge by the defendant of the dangerous condition, not to provide corroboration of the existence of such condition. Jones, 263 Va. at 255, 559 S.E.2d at 601. Thus, upon a timely request, a defendant will be entitled to a cautionary instruction informing the jury of this limited purpose. Roll 'R' Way Rinks, 218 Va. at 327, 237 S.E.2d at 161. 1 1 In Spurlin v. Richardson, 203 Va. 984, 989, 128 S.E.2d 273, 277 (1962), this Court first enunciated the test for determining when evidence of prior occurrences may be admitted to prove notice. The Court borrowed its standard from Hendricks v. Monongahela West Penn Public Service Co., 163 S.E. 411, 415 (W. Va. 1932), in which the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia stated that such prior occurrences must relate to accidents or injuries or defects existing at substantially the same place and under substantially the same conditions as those involved in the action and caused by the same or a similar defect or danger or by the acts of the same person (Emphasis added.) Funkhouser points out that when this Court adopted the West Virginia similar occurrences standard, reciting the test as requiring the prior occurrences be caused by the same or similar defects and dangers, its use of and instead of or was neither intentional nor meaningful. It is unnecessary to resolve this question, though, because under Virginia law, the terms defects and dangers are interchangeable. See, e.g., Morgen Industries, 252 Va. at 65, 471 S.E.2d at 492 (A product is unreasonably dangerous if it is defective in assembly or manufacture, unreasonably dangerous in design, or unaccompanied by adequate warnings concerning its hazardous properties.). 19 Applying these principles, the evidence in the record establishes the Mulkey, Tirone, Carf, and Roth fires occurred under substantially the same circumstances and were caused by the same or similar defects and dangers as those in [the Funkhouser fire]. Jones, 263 Va. at 255, 559 S.E.2d at 601. All four fires occurred when the vans were parked, not in operation, and with no key in the ignition. The cause and origin of each of the fires was professionally investigated and determined to be electrical in nature, to have originated in the dashboard area of the vans, and to have been caused by the failure of electrical wiring or components within the dashboard area. The information regarding these fires contains no evidence of arson, misuse or some external cause for the fires. Since Funkhouser claims that his minivan was unreasonably dangerous for its intended use due to the danger of key-off electrical dashboard fires, evidence of these four Windstar van fires is admissible to prove Ford had notice and actual knowledge of the danger of key-off electrical dashboard fires. 2 With regard to the Arencibia, Bryan, and Pell fires, however, I agree the evidence regarding these fires does not sufficiently establish that they were caused by the same or 2 This conclusion is not reached by relaxing the substantial similarity test. Rather, it is compelled by properly applying the test in the context of Funkhouser's theory against Ford, which the circuit court neglected to do. 20 similar defect and danger as that alleged in the Funkhouser fire. While these fires occurred when the vans were not in operation and with no key in the ignition, there is no evidence of any investigation into the cause or origin of these fires. Absent sufficient evidence that these fires were caused by the failure of electrical wiring or components in the dashboard area, the evidence does not show that they were caused by the same or similar defects and dangers as the Funkhouser fire. In ruling that all seven fires were inadmissible, the circuit court erred, in the first place, by framing the issue before it as whether Ford should be charged with notice and knowledge of a defective condition requiring warning of that condition. In particular, the circuit court stated that [t]he legal issue here is whether Ford should be charged with notice and actual knowledge of a defective condition requiring the warning of that defective condition. (Emphasis by court.) Ruling that the Funkhouser defect must be identified with specificity to charge Ford with actual notice of that defect, the court concluded the required specificity was absent such that it was not fair to charge Ford with notice of a defective condition. The issue before the court, however, was whether the other Windstar fires occurred under substantially the same circumstances and were caused by the same or similar defects and dangers as those alleged in the Funkhouser fire. Jones, 21 263 Va. at 255, 559 S.E.2d at 601 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Whether the Funkhouser minivan is unreasonably dangerous and whether Ford knew or should have known of the unreasonably dangerous condition are essential elements of Funkhouser's failure to warn claim and were not proper issues for the court to resolve on Ford's motion to exclude evidence of the other Windstar van fires. The circuit court also applied incorrect legal principles in finding that there is not enough specificity noted in the seven fires to say what the defect was that Ford had to warn of or correct because the circuit court required Funkhouser to provide a level of specificity not required for a failure to warn claim such as this under Virginia law. 3 Funkhouser is asserting that the minivan was unreasonably dangerous due to the potential for key-off electrical dashboard fires, not due to a specific design or manufacturing defect. Thus, the issue presented by Ford's motion to exclude evidence of the other Windstar van fires was whether the other fires were caused by 3 Reasoning that the defects and dangers asserted by Funkhouser must be identified with the same level of specificity as those in Jones and Lupica, the circuit court failed to give due regard to the distinctions between the theories advanced by the plaintiffs in those cases and the theory asserted by Funkhouser. In both Jones and Lupica, the plaintiffs alleged negligent design claims against the manufacturers and, therefore, those plaintiffs were necessarily required to identify a specific design defect. Funkhouser does not advance a defective design theory and should not be required to do so in order to introduce evidence of other similar occurrences. 22 the failure of electrical wiring or components within the dashboard area. Funkhouser was not required to allege a specific mechanical defect to establish the similarity of the fires. We have previously found evidence of prior similar occurrences admissible to prove notice of a dangerous condition in the context of a failure to warn case without proof of a design or manufacturing defect. In Owens-Corning, we held that evidence of a summary of 44 workers' compensation claims filed by installers of insulation materials alleging they acquired lung diseases caused by exposure to asbestos dust was admissible in an action alleging Owens-Corning failed to warn of the dangers associated with use of insulation products containing asbestos. 243 Va. at 137, 413 S.E.2d at 635-36. As we concluded, the summary of workers' compensation claims was admissible to prove that Owens-Corning had notice that insulators were at risk of contracting lung diseases from the use of insulation products which contained asbestos. Id. As our analysis in Owens-Corning indicates, in determining whether other occurrences are caused by the same or similar defects and dangers, the terms defects and dangers are necessarily interchangeable in the context of a failure to warn claim since liability is based on the manufacturer's duty to warn if it knows or has reason to know that its product is 23 dangerous. Id. at 134, 413 S.E.2d at 634. The substantial similarity test was satisfied in Owens-Corning because the insulators in the workers' compensation claims alleged they acquired lung diseases caused by exposure to asbestos dust while using insulation products, which was the same or similar dangers claimed by plaintiff. Id. at 137, 413 S.E.2d at 636. Although the majority acknowledges that Funkhouser's theory is that Ford negligently failed to warn of the potential for key-off electrical dashboard fires, not that it negligently designed or manufactured its minivan, the majority defends the circuit court's analysis by creating additional factors that must be satisfied for the admission of similar occurrences proof. In Spurlin v. Richardson, 203 Va. 984, 989, 128 S.E.2d 273, 277 (1962), when this Court first enunciated the similar occurrences test, we stated that such evidence is admissible when those prior accidents or occurrences happened at substantially the same place and under substantially the same circumstances, and had been caused by the same or similar defects and dangers as those in issue, or by the acts of the same person. Id. (emphasis added). Under the majority's standard, in order for evidence of prior occurrences to be admissible, a plaintiff must now identify as the cause of the prior occurrences a defect attributable to the defendant. Thus, not only must plaintiff identify a specific defect, the defect 24 must be attributable to the defendant, which in this case is the manufacturer. Although the majority does not specify whether a design or manufacturing defect must be identified, it must be in the nature of one or the other since it must be attributable to this defendant. 4 Accordingly, the majority's new standard for admission of prior occurrences can only be satisfied if a plaintiff can prove a cause of action for design or manufacturing defect. According to the majority, the requirement that a plaintiff establish the prior similar occurrences were caused by a defect attributable to defendant is necessary because otherwise a plaintiff could establish that a manufacturer knows or has reason to know of a danger based on prior incidents that were not attributable to that manufacturer. The majority's concern is misplaced because a plaintiff is not required to establish that the product's dangerous condition is caused by a defect attributable to the defendant in order to succeed under a 4 The majority explains that Funkhouser has conceded he cannot show the prior fires were caused by the same or similar defects as he amended his complaint from a design defect claim to a failure to warn claim because he realized that he could not definitively prove the specific defect that caused the fire. According to the majority, because he cannot prove what defect, if any, caused the fires . . . the circuit court did not err in excluding the evidence of the other seven fires. The majority's subsequent statement that its holding does not mean that Funkhouser must identify the specific defect that caused the fire in his van or the other seven vans is simply irreconcilable with its express holding otherwise. 25 failure to warn theory. Furthermore, the requirement that prior incidents be caused by a defect attributable to the defendant has never been a prerequisite to their admission. See Spurlin, 203 Va. at 989, 128 S.E.2d at 277 (such evidence is admissible when those prior accidents or occurrences happened at substantially the same place and under substantially the same circumstances, and had been caused by the same or similar defects and dangers as those in issue, or by the acts of the same person) (emphasis added). The majority is conflating a cause of action based on negligent manufacture or negligent design with a cause of action based on the negligent failure to warn by reformulating the similar occurrences standard to require proof of a specific design or manufacturing defect and incorporating that requirement into the elements of a failure to warn claim. It is beyond dispute that [a] manufacturer is not an insurer of its product's safety. Owens-Corning, 243 Va. at 134, 413 S.E.2d at 634. The cause of action for failure to warn is not a theory of strict liability. The plaintiff must prove that the product was dangerous, that the defendant knew or had reason to know of this dangerous condition, and that the defendant had no reason to believe the plaintiff would realize the dangerous condition. Furthermore, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care to warn of 26 the dangerous condition of the product it supplied to the plaintiff and that its failure to exercise such care caused plaintiff's damages. See Featherall, 219 Va. at 962, 252 S.E.2d at 366 (discussing elements of such claims as set forth by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388). The jury is instructed on these elements, and it is unnecessary for this Court to augment the currently existing elements of the cause of action for failure to warn to ensure the jury follows its instructions to hold the defendant liable only where it knows or has reason to know of the product's dangerous condition. The flaw in the majority's analysis becomes evident when it is applied to a supplier other than a manufacturer. A failure to warn claim can be asserted against any supplier of a product, and the elements are the same regardless of whether the defendant is the manufacturer or another person that supplies the product. 5 The cause of the dangerous condition is not an 5 In Featherall, 291 Va. at 962, 252 S.E.2d at 366, this Court adopted § 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states: One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier (a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is 27 element of a failure to warn claim because the negligence for which the supplier is held liable is the failure to exercise reasonable care in warning of the product's dangerous condition. Yet, by requiring a plaintiff to prove notice to a supplier through similar occurrences caused by defects attributable to that supplier, a plaintiff could never prove a failure to warn claim against a supplier other than a manufacturer. 6 And against a manufacturer, the plaintiff could only prove a failure to warn claim if he or she can also prove negligent design or negligent manufacture. Thus, under the majority's test for establishing notice of a dangerous condition, the viability of a failure to warn claim in Virginia is substantially limited, if not entirely extinguished. Unlike the majority, I would hold that evidence of the Mulkey, Tirone, Carf, and Roth fires is admissible. However, supplied, and (b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous. 6 In requiring that plaintiff prove a defect attributable to the manufacturer, it is unclear whether the majority is attempting to limit this new standard for admission of similar occurrences proof to actions against manufacturers. Any such limitation would be illogical, though, since the elements of a cause of action for failure to warn are the same regardless of whether the defendant is a manufacturer or another supplier. 28 because I would hold that, under the proper analysis, evidence of the Arencibia, Bryan, and Pell fires is inadmissible, I concur in the majority's holding to that extent.