Opinion ID: 2153490
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Search of Clark's Car

Text: Clark contends that his car was searched by fire investigators without a warrant, in violation of the fourth amendment. As a result, Clark argues that none of the fruit of the illegal search should have been admitted at trial. Clark sought to suppress the results of the search through a pre-trial motion in limine. After holding a suppression hearing, the trial judge denied the motion. Clark's objection at trial was overruled. Rather than address the merits of Clark's claim, the State argues that this issue is waived because of Clark's failure to include in the record on appeal a copy of the transcript of the suppression hearing. Clark has indeed failed to include a transcript. This failure raises a procedural problem that must be addressed before this Court can turn to the merits. Appellant bears the burden of presenting to this Court a record that is complete with respect to the issues raised on appeal. Rondon v. State (1987), Ind., 534 N.E.2d 719, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 418, 107 L.Ed.2d 383 (1989). This burden includes the duty to ensure that the appellate court has before it a transcript of the trial proceedings or, where no transcript is available, an affidavit setting forward the content of the proceedings. Ind. Appellate Rule 7.2(A); Dunbar v. State (1974), 160 Ind. App. 191, 194-95 & 195 n. 3, 311 N.E.2d 447, 450-51 & 450 n. 3; see also Ruetz v. State, 268 Ind. 42, 373 N.E.2d 152, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 897, 99 S.Ct. 261, 58 L.Ed.2d 245 (1978) (substitution of affidavit in place of verbatim transcript not an unconstitutional denial of due process). Failure to do so can result in a waiver of the issue on appeal. Rondon, 534 N.E.2d at 729. Waiver is not, however, an automatic result. Indiana appellate courts may also order up the missing part of the record. A lengthy sentence and a strong likelihood of success on the merits would suggest that the remaining record should be ordered. In this case, we see no need to order a transcript of the suppression hearing. Although the appellant was sentenced to a substantial term, he has little likelihood of success on the merits of his fourth amendment claim. Under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, warrantless searches by the government are per se unreasonable, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). The remedy for an illegal warrantless search is the suppression of the evidence obtained from the search. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). Although the police in this case eventually obtained a search warrant, several searches of Clark's car were made before any warrant was obtained. These warrantless searches must first survive constitutional scrutiny if the evidence they revealed is to be admitted into court. The first search of Clark's car was performed by his father, not by a government official. Even though fireman Scott Adam was present at this search, the facts clearly show that he did not initiate it. Searches performed by non-governmental actors are not controlled by the fourth amendment. Sizemore v. State (1985), Ind., 483 N.E.2d 56. The subsequent warrantless searches of the car, however, were performed by arson investigators in furtherance of their criminal investigation. Without the support of a warrant, these governmental searches can survive scrutiny only if they fall within one of the few exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Buxton (1958), 238 Ind. 93, 148 N.E.2d 547. Consent is one exception. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219, 93 S.Ct. at 2043. Here, the evidence strongly suggests that Clark's father consented to the searches. Consent by a third party is valid if that party has a sufficient relationship to the place searched; we conclude that Clark's father did have a sufficient relationship to Clark's car. Cf. Jackson v. United States, 404 A.2d 911, 920-21 (D.C. 1979) (consent obtained from husband of registered owner of car validated warrantless search of automobile; husband had a sufficient connection to the car). None of the warrantless searches appear to have violated the fourth amendment. Accordingly, the trial court properly declined to suppress the fruits of the searches.