Opinion ID: 1467920
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Plain Language of Springfield's Tax Ordinance

Text: Section 70-452 of the Springfield Code states that [e]very person engaged in the business of supplying telephones, and telecommunications and telephonic service, and telecommunications services, within the city shall pay as a license tax a sum equal to six (6) percent of the gross receipts from such business. The ordinance does not define the terms telephones, telecommunications, telephonic services, or telecommunications services. To ascertain the meaning of a city ordinance, we utilize the same rules of construction applied to statutes. Neske v. City of St. Louis, 218 S.W.3d 417, 424 (Mo.2007) (en banc). The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute. Missouri ex rel. Young v. Wood, No. SC 88840, 2008 WL 2346199, at  1 (Mo.2008) (en banc). The standard for determining whether a statute's terms are plain and clear is whether the terms are plain and clear to a person of ordinary intelligence. Wolff Shoe Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 762 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Mo.1988) (en banc). When the statute's language is unambiguous, a court must give effect to the legislature's chosen language. Missouri ex rel. Young, 2008 WL 2346199, at  1. In the absence of statutory definitions, we turn to the ordinary meaning of the statutory terms as derived from a dictionary and consider the context of the statute in which the language appears. Missouri ex rel. Burns v. Whittington, 219 S.W.3d 224, 225 (Mo.2007) (en banc). In so doing, we presume that the legislature did not intend the statute to create an absurd result. Weeks v. Missouri, 140 S.W.3d 39, 47 (Mo.2004) (en banc). The Springfield Code does not explicitly define the term telephone. The use of the term throughout the Code, however, provides some insight into its intended meaning. See Crum v. Vincent, 493 F.3d 988, 996 (8th Cir.2007) (Missouri law requires courts to read statutes in pari materia by harmonizing sections covering the same subject matter). Several sections list the information that must be provided to apply for a franchise or license. See, e.g., Springfield, Mo., Code §§ 70-323(a), 70-594(b), 100-5.1. Among the information required is the applicant's telephone number. Certainly the request for a telephone number in this context is not limited to the individual's land-line telephone, for a cell phone number would satisfy the purpose of these sections and it is unlikely an application would be denied on the basis that the applicant had a cell phone but not a land-line telephone. Additionally, section 78-62 describes the criminal offense of Harassment by telephone. Surely this section is not limited to callers who harass others via a land-line telephone. See also Springfield, Mo., Code § 120-152(f)(1) (to report a potential problem regarding a discharge, it is the responsibility of the industrial user to immediately telephone and notify the POTW of the incident). It is also true that some provisions in the Springfield Code refer to telephones and their accompanying wires or cables. For instance, section 98-46(b) specifies the proper placement of underground telephone cables, junction boxes and appurtenances thereto. See also Springfield, Mo., Code §§ 70-481, 70-482. It does not necessarily follow, however, that because some telephones have wires or cables, certain aspects of which are regulated by Springfield, those devices that do not have wires or cables are not telephones. The word telephonic appears in only two Articles of the Code. Once in Article XI, which contains the tax ordinance at issue in this case, and secondly in Article V related to underground facility safety and damage prevention. Neither use suggests that the definition of the term is limited to land-line telephones. Because the Springfield Code does not explicitly define the terms telephone or telephonic services, we also look to the dictionary definition of these statutory terms to determine their ordinary meanings. See Schumacher v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp., 515 F.3d 867, 871 (8th Cir.2008) (looking to Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary for the ordinary meaning of a statutory term). The district court analyzed definitions from older dictionaries to determine the meaning of the word telephone during the time when the original tax ordinance was in effect. See City of Jefferson V, No. 04-04099, 2007 WL 1965572 (W.D.Mo. July 3, 2007). The district court looked to the 1969 and 1982 editions of the American Heritage Dictionary, which both define a telephone as [a]n instrument that directly modulates carrier waves with voice or other acoustic source signals to be transmitted to remote locations and that directly reconverts received waves into audible signals; especially such an instrument connected to others by wire. The 1966 Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines telephone as an instrument for reproducing sounds esp. articulate speech at a distance. The district court also looked at the 2000 edition of the American Heritage Dictionary, which defines telephone as [a]n instrument that converts voice and other sound signals into a form that can be transmitted to remote locations and that receives and reconverts waves into sound signals. Although the district court noted that these definitions provide examples of telephones that use wires, the examples are not exhaustive and do not preclude the conclusion that a device that meets the definition of telephone but which does not have wires is nonetheless a telephone. Accordingly, we also believe the following definition of telephone is especially helpful: any of various devices (as a sound-signaling device or a speaking tube) resembling or suggesting the telephone. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2350 (1981). The 1999 edition of Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines telephonic as of, relating to, or conveyed by a telephone. Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1211 (10th ed.1999). The definition of telephonic in other dictionaries is substantially the same. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, for instance, defines telephonic as conveying sound to a distance, or of or relating to the telephone, or carried or conveyed by telephone. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2350 (1981). Applying Missouri's rules of statutory construction, we conclude that the plain language of the tax ordinance makes it clear that the ordinance was intended to cover all telephonic services, regardless of the type of technology used to provide the services. Cell phones are commonly described as telephones and are used to accomplish the same function and purpose as a land-line telephone. [12] Both devices convert voice and other sound signals into a form that can be transmitted to remote locations, both devices receive and reconvert waves into sound signals, and a cell phone resembles a telephone. Admittedly, cell phones have newer and more advanced features than the telephones commonly used when the tax ordinance was first enacted. Nevertheless, nothing about the term telephonic in the tax ordinance is limited to the technology generally used to operate telephones in 1944. In fact, cases dating back to pre-1944 which discuss telephones and telephone systems describe them in terms of their purpose and not with regard to the type of technology used to operate them. See Gilpin v. Savage, 60 Misc. 605, 112 N.Y.S. 802, 805 (N.Y.Sup.1908), rev'd on other grounds, 201 N.Y. 167, 94 N.E. 656 (1911) (The telephone is simply an instrument by which two persons may talk directly to each other.); see also Missouri ex rel. Baltimore & Ohio Tele. Co. v. Bell Tele. Co., 23 F. 539, 541 (C.C.E.D.Mo.1885) (A telephonic system is simply a system for the transmission of intelligence and news.). As the district court noted, there have been many advances in telephone technology over the past sixty years, and with each technological advancement we continue to refer to the product and services as telephonic. See City of Jefferson V, No. 04-04099, 2007 WL 1965572 (W.D.Mo. July 3, 2007). Springfield is not required to update its Code for the purpose of recognizing the advent of each new form of technology used to provide telephonic services. Accordingly, we conclude that the language of the tax ordinance is unambiguous and that the tax ordinance applies to cell phone services.