Opinion ID: 2572638
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The trial court erred in characterizing the Edward Jones IRA as Michael's separate property.

Text: Christina next contests the trial court's characterization of the Edward Jones IRA as Michael's separate property. She argues that the IRA is marital property because an increase in its value during marriage represents retirement contributions from marital earnings. We have held that [t]o the extent that a party earns retirement benefits during marriage, the benefits are marital assets and are subject to equitable division. [63] Christina is entitled to a share of the marital portion of the IRA. [64] Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's determination that the IRA is Michael's separate property and remand to the superior court to determine the amount of the IRA that is marital and thus subject to division. C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Declining To Award Additional Interim Attorney's Fees to Christina. Christina moved for interim attorney's fees of $15,000 in March 2002. The court ordered Michael to pay Christina $5,000 in attorney's fees and directed Michael to pay Christina's counsel an equivalent amount that he pays his own counsel during the course of the proceedings. Shortly after the superior court's order, Christina filed a corrected certificate of counsel in support of her motion for attorney's fees. Because Christina's counsel had changed her billing system, Christina's expenses were higher than noted in her motion for fees. In her memorandum in support of her second motion to continue the trial, Christina again argued her need for attorney's fees. She asserted that the trial court's order regarding fees had impacted her trial preparation, as Michael had not paid her. Christina also claimed that she did not benefit from the trial court's order that Michael pay her the same amount that he paid his attorney because Michael stopped paying his attorney's bills in March 2002. Michael testified at trial that he did not even know how much money he owed his attorney because he had not opened the bills. The superior court declined to award Christina further interim attorney's fees, noting that, if necessary, it would adjust attorney's fees awards at the end of the case. Christina moved to reconsider that order, arguing primarily that the court's denial of an additional fee award to Christina prevented her from litigating on an equal playing field with Michael. The trial court denied reconsideration of its order on attorney's fees. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law at the end of trial, however, the superior court awarded Christina an additional $10,000 in attorney's fees. Under AS 25.24.140, trial courts may award attorney's fees in divorce cases. [65] The trial court has broad discretion in awarding these fees. [66] Costs and attorney's fees awards must be based primarily upon the parties' relative economic situations and earning capacities. [67] When the parties' economic situations and earning capacities are comparable, each party should bear his or her own costs. [68] Otherwise, awards of attorney's fees are committed to the trial court's discretion. [69] In divorce actions, the purpose of awarding attorney's fees is to assure that both spouses have the proper means to litigate the divorce action on a fairly equal plane. [70] Christina argues that the court abused its discretion in its order for interim attorney's fees in failing to award sufficient fees to `level the playing field'.... Christina's argument that interim attorney's fees are integral in equalizing the playing field between divorce litigants is correct. We recognize the importance of interim attorney's fees in divorce proceedings. Such fee awards ensure that marital litigation is shaped not by the power of the bankroll but by the power of the evidence. [71] Situations where the economically disadvantaged spouse does not receive interim attorney's fees may result in injustice to that spouse. [72] And as discussed above, Michael's circumvention of the court's order that he pay Christina the same amount of fees that he paid his own attorney during the course of the proceedings may have jeopardized her ability to prove that Schmitz & Buck appreciated in value during the course of the marriage. By remanding to allow Christina to present proof of the business's value, we have remedied any inequity. But to analyze the overall adequacy of attorney's fees in this case, we must also consider a related issueChristina's sale of the family's Ford Expedition. Christina sold a Ford Expedition, a marital asset, receiving $14,500 in cash plus a replacement car worth $2,495. Christina testified that she sold the vehicle to pay for her attorney's fees. She did not inform Michael of the sale, nor did she split the proceeds with him. Because the trial court found that the sale violated the standing order, [73] it attributed the difference between the fair market value and the actual proceeds from the sale to Christina. [74] Because Christina sold the Ford Expedition, receiving $14,500 plus a replacement car worth $2,495, she received the equivalent of $16,995 from the sale of the Ford Expedition. In the property division, the superior court valued the Ford Expedition at $23,525, but credited Christina with only $6,525, the difference between the car's value, $23,525, and the amount that Christina received for the car, $14,500 plus a $2,495 replacement vehicle. By crediting Christina with only $6,525, the superior court gave her a benefitalthough Christina received $14,500 in cash from the sale of the vehicle, plus a replacement car, the court credited her with $6,525, leaving Christina with $7,975 in cash proceeds to be applied to attorney's fees. Because we cannot say that the court's award of almost $13,000 in interim attorney's fees ($5,000 plus $7,975) to Christina, in addition to an order requiring Michael to pay her interim attorney's fees equal to his own, was an abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court's decision. However, as discussed above, because Michael avoided paying Christina's pre-trial fees, as required by the trial court's order, by failing to pay his own attorney's fees, we have remanded to the trial court the issue of whether Schmitz & Buck's value increased during the marriage in order to avoid unfairness to Christina.