Opinion ID: 2614045
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Legal Costs

Text: In its findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment, the district court ruled as follows: IT IS ... ORDERED that a hearing on a recall petition is not a special proceeding within the contemplation of NRS 18.020(4), and therefore, no costs are awarded to Mr. Foley or Ms. Sparks under this statute; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that even if an award of costs was within this Court's discretion, no costs would be awarded in this type of matter. Cross-appellant Sparks contests the district court's denial of recovery of costs. She argues that the hearing on a recall petition is a special proceeding and consequently, that NRS 18.020(4) [6] mandates recovery of the prevailing party's costs. We agree. NRS 18.020(1)-(3) and (5) [7] mandates an award of costs to the prevailing party in the actions specified therein, which are fairly all-encompassing, including actions concerning property and actions for money damages. NRS 18.020(4) provides for an award of costs to the prevailing party in any special proceeding. We have recognized this statute's mandatory language dealing with special proceedings. See, e.g., Day v. West Coast Holdings, Inc., 101 Nev. 260, 264, 699 P.2d 1067, 1070 (1985) (costs are mandatory to the prevailing party in an action falling under NRS 18.020). Since Sparks ultimately prevailed against Citizens in their effort to effectuate her recall, the issue concerning her entitlement to costs involves a determination as to whether the proceedings against her fall within the purview of a special proceeding. [8] It may be said generally that any proceeding in a court which was not under the common-law and equity practice, either an action at law or a suit in chancery, is a special proceeding. Schmaling v. Johnston, 54 Nev. 293, 301, 13 P.2d 1111, 1113 (1932) (quoting In re Central Irrigation Dist., 117 Cal. 382, 49 P. 354, 356 (1897)) aff'd on rehearing, 55 Nev. 164, 27 P.2d 1059 (1934). The following language from Avelar v. Superior Court, 7 Cal.App. 4th 1270, 9 Cal. Rptr.2d 536 (1992), albeit in a context other than costs, explains the term special proceeding: The difference between an action and a special proceeding, as defined by the statutes, is in the remedy sought. (See Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 709, 714, 196 Cal.Rptr. 920.) A special proceeding is confined to the type of case which was not, under the common law or equity practice, either an action at law or a suit in equity. ( Tide Water Assoc. Oil Co. v. Superior Court (1955) 43 Cal.2d 815, 822, 279 P.2d 35 [emph. supp.].).... .... .... By describing a special proceeding as any remedy not available in an action, the Legislature must have meant to create and recognize two roughly equivalent levels of independent procedures to be directed towards the attainment of different, but similarly final remedies. Id. 9 Cal.Rptr.2d at 539-40. The hearing at issue was held pursuant to the former version of NRS 306.040, [9] which required the Registrar, upon the filing of a recall petition, to automatically submit the petition to the district court for a public hearing on the petition's sufficiency. Nevertheless, Sparks and the organizers of the recall petition were deemed the real parties in interest in the Registrar's filing, and both parties hired attorneys to represent their divergent interests at the hearing. Because the mechanism (judicial hearing) for determining a recall petition's sufficiency is strictly a creature of statute, underived from the panoply of remedies traditionally available in actions at law or suits in equity where one party has sued the other, we conclude that the proceeding was a special proceeding. Since Sparks prevailed in the proceedings below, we hold that Sparks is entitled to her mandatory award of costs under NRS 18.020(4). (Foley is entitled to his costs under the same reasoning.) We thus reverse the lower court's ruling as it relates to costs. In ruling as we have, we are not unmindful of the competing constitutional interests affected by this decision, i.e., the property interest held by the challenged elected official in the office to which he or she has been elected, and the right of individuals to legitimately seek recall of officials who are viewed as having failed in their public trust. See Crowe v. Lucas, 595 F.2d 985, 993 (5th Cir.1979); Brown v. Perkins, 706 F.Supp. 633, 634 (N.D.Ill.1989). Under today's ruling, it is apparent that accessing and asserting the referenced constitutional rights will ultimately redound to the financial detriment of the losing party. Despite our ruling, and in view of the potential problems and consequences that may result therefrom, we strongly invite the Legislature to address these issues. The legislative laboratory is well-suited to entertain the study, debate and public input necessary for a wise and fair resolution of the various ramifications and results of this decision. Of primary concern is the chilling effect the statutes, as interpreted here, may have on citizens legitimately trying to exercise their constitutional rights. Specifically, well-meaning citizens who fail in their attempt to exercise their constitutional right to recall an elected official are subject to an award of costs. Of perhaps equal concern is the chilling effect spurious recall efforts could have on the willingness of public officials to subject themselves to substantial cost awards in the event the recall effort is successful. In the latter case, public officials unendowed with an abundance of personal financial resources, could simply find the alternative of resignation more palatable than the prospect of a costly and perhaps unavailing defense. This alternative could have special attraction to a public official subjected to irresponsible, concentrated media efforts to promote the recall.