Opinion ID: 1152402
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standards Employed in Other Jurisdictions

Text: The question before us is whether the terms compensation, perquisite or allowance encompass legislative retirement benefits. Although there is no New Mexico case specifically addressing this question, there are several cases from other jurisdictions which are directly on point. In Brown v. Meyer, 787 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. 1990), the Supreme Court of Texas confronted a similar question of constitutional interpretation. Brown, while acting as a State Senator, voted to increase the salaries of district court judges. Id. at 43. Because the retirement benefits paid to qualified elected officials in Texas were indexed to the salaries of state judges, the Senate vote had the effect of increasing retirement benefits for elected state officials. Brown then left the State Senate and attempted to run for the position of State Attorney General. Id. If he became Attorney General, Brown eventually may have been eligible to receive the retirement benefits that he had just voted to increase. However, the Texas Constitution provided that a state legislator is not eligible to run for a state office the emoluments of which may have been increased during that legislator's term. [4] Id. at 44. The Brown court examined whether retirement benefits constituted emoluments to determine whether the constitutional provision affected Brown's eligibility for the office of Attorney General. It held that the term emoluments, as used in the constitution, meant only actual pecuniary gain and not contingent and remote benefit. Id. at 45. The court explained, Whether a party will actually receive a retirement benefit is dependent on numerous variables. An employee must agree to participate in the program, requiring withholding of salary.... Also, the employee must accumulate the requisite number of years service credit before any benefit can vest. In the case of an elected official, this will generally require not only serving a full term, but also reelection to office. And the official must remain alive until the earliest time that benefits may vest. Id. The Brown court therefore concluded that retirement benefits for legislators and other elected officials are not embraced within the term `emoluments' as used in [the constitution]. Id. Another leading case which evaluated whether retirement benefits were encompassed within a similar constitutional provision is State ex rel. Todd v. Reeves, 196 Wash. 145, 82 P.2d 173 (1938) (en banc). In Reeves the plaintiffs challenged a State Senator's qualifications to run for the Washington Supreme Court because the Legislature had enacted a retirement system for the judiciary. Id. 82 P.2d at 174. The Washington State Constitution had a provision similar to that found in the Texas Constitution, prohibiting a legislator from running for an office after increasing the emoluments of that office. Id. The Reeves court noted that emolument is generally defined as profit from office, employment, or labor; compensation; fees or salary. Id. at 175 (referring to a dictionary definition). It then found that the word [emolument] was employed in the constitution in its ordinary sense, as implying actual pecuniary gain, rather than some imponderable and contingent benefit. Id. After defining emolument, the court reviewed the nature of retirement benefits. It noted that in order for the respondent to be eligible for the benefits, he would first have to be elected to the court for a second term, and he would have to survive to the age of seventy. Accordingly, the court concluded that [w]hile the provision for retirement makes the office more attractive, it does not constitute an emolument in violation of the constitutional provision. Id. We note that this approach has been adopted by courts in several other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Bulgo v. Enomoto, 50 Haw. 61, 430 P.2d 327, 330 (1967) (finding disability benefits to be too remote and contingent to constitute compensation (citing Reeves, 82 P.2d at 175)); State ex rel. Lyons v. Guy, 107 N.W.2d 211, 218-19 (N.D.1961) (noting that increase in percentage of governor's social security tax paid by the state is too remote to constitute an emolument under the constitution); State ex rel. Johnson v. Nye, 148 Wis. 659, 135 N.W. 126, 129 (1912) (constitutional disqualification based on increase in emoluments cannot be based on conjecture or speculation). But see State ex rel. Spire v. Public Employees Retirement Bd., 226 Neb. 176, 410 N.W.2d 463, 466 (1987) (finding legislative pension plan was a form of compensation and therefore violated the constitutional limitation). Cf. Chamber of Commerce v. Leone, 141 N.J.Super. 114, 357 A.2d 311, 319-21 (1976) (finding legislative pension plan constituted present compensation for services), aff'd, 75 N.J. 319, 382 A.2d 381 (1978); Boryszewski v. Brydges, 37 N.Y.2d 361, 372 N.Y.S.2d 623, 626-27, 334 N.E.2d 579, 582-83 (1975) (same). We recognize that these cases interpreted constitutional provisions addressing increases in compensation. Nonetheless, we find that the analysis employed is equally applicable to the constitutional provision in this case which limits compensation received. Indeed the West Virginia Supreme Court, in Campbell v. Kelly, 157 W.Va. 453, 202 S.E.2d 369, 375-76 (1974), adopted the approach expressed in Reeves in evaluating a constitutional challenge almost identical to the one brought here. In Campbell the court examined whether a legislative retirement plan violated a section of the state constitution. It analyzed the constitutionality of the retirement plan both under the original constitutional provision in place when the retirement plan was enacted and under the provision as subsequently amended by the electorate. Only the court's analysis of the retirement plan under the original constitutional provision prior to amendment is relevant to our discussion because it is the original constitutional provision that is similar to Article IV, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. The original provision of the West Virginia Constitution stated in relevant part, No other allowance or emolument than [the sum provided by this section] shall directly or indirectly be made or paid to the members of either house for postage, stationery, newspapers, or any other purpose whatever. Id. 202 S.E.2d at 373 (emphasis omitted). The Campbell court first conducted a historical analysis of the original constitutional provision and then looked to the established precedent of other jurisdictions. The court noted: This Court is persuaded that in the absence of evidence that it was the intent of the framers of our Constitution by Section 33 to prohibit pension plans under conditions as they have changed in the last century, our Constitution should be interpreted in conformity with the great weight of precedent from other jurisdictions interpreting similar provisions of other state constitutions. All the modern decisions interpreting the power of legislators to enact pension programs hold that constitutional limitations on allowances or emoluments do not apply to pension programs. Id. at 375. The court therefore concluded that the legislative retirement plan was constitutional under the original provision. Id. at 377.