Opinion ID: 2671702
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Sentencing Based on Unproven Convictions

Text: The district court adopted the findings in Mr. Thomas’s presentence investigation report. II R. at 53. Consistent with the federal sentencing guidelines, the district court sentenced Mr. Thomas to concurrent 130-month sentences on each count based on a criminal history score of 12 (category V) and an offense level of 28. Id. at 21, 53; III R. at 323. The author of the presentence investigation report (and the district court) calculated Mr. Thomas’s criminal-history score as 12. II R. at 19-21. This score was based in part on 10 criminal-history points for convictions in 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2010, and 2012. Id. at 19-20. Because Mr. Thomas was still under probation for his 2010 conviction, 2 points were added to his criminal-history score under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.1(d) (2012). Id. at 21. With this score, the offense level was calculated at 28 based in part on a 2-level firearm enhancement. Id. at 13-15. 17 Mr. Thomas challenges his criminal history score, arguing that the government failed to prove his prior convictions by a preponderance of evidence. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 45-46. We agree and reverse and remand on this issue.
We review Mr. Thomas’s sentence for procedural reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 1124, 1160 (10th Cir. 2013). In considering procedural reasonableness, we engage in de novo review over the district court’s legal conclusions and apply the clear-error standard to factual conclusions. Id. A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the district court miscalculates the guideline range or “relies on clearly erroneous facts.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In the presentence investigation report, the probation department calculated Mr. Thomas’s criminal-history score based on convictions in 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2010, and 2012. II R. at 19-20. Mr. Thomas demanded proof of the convictions. Id. at 34; III R. at 302-03. Thus, the government had to show the convictions by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156 (1997) (per curiam). In response, the government presented documentation of convictions in 1995, 1996, 2001, and 2002. Gov’t Sentencing Ex. 1; see III R. at 304. Of these convictions, only the one in 2002 resulted in criminal-history points. See II R. at 17-19. But the documentation did not address the conviction in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2010, or 2012. Without these convictions, Mr. Thomas’s criminal-history score would have been less 18 than 12. See II R. at 19; U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, Sentencing Table, Ch. 5, Pt. A (2012).5 The government conceded the error in oral argument, but argued that it had provided Mr. Thomas with documents relating to his 2001, 2002, and 2003 convictions. Appellee’s Br. at 54. The argument is immaterial because Mr. Thomas challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, not the notice. Because the government did not prove the 2003, 2004, 2005, 2010, or 2012 convictions, they should not have been used to increase Mr. Thomas’s criminal-history score. By relying on these convictions, the district court abused its discretion. Thus, we reverse and remand for resentencing. With the remand, we must decide whether to give the government a second opportunity to present evidence of the prior convictions. “Although a remand for resentencing generally allows the district court to conduct de novo review, we exercise our discretion” and direct the district court to resentence Mr. Thomas based on the existing record. United States v. Forsythe, 437 F.3d 960, 963 (10th Cir. 2005). We are guided by three considerations: ● The government bore the burden to prove the prior convictions; 5 The district court added two points based on commission of the offense while under a sentence issued in 2010. See II R. at 20-21. Because the 2010 conviction was not proven, a further addition of two points may have been erroneous. But this issue has not been briefed. 19 ● Mr. Thomas alerted the government to the deficiency in its proof;6 and ● the government made no effort to cure the deficiency in its proof. Appellant’s App., vol. 3 at 309-12. In United States v. Forsythe, these considerations led us to confine the district court on remand to the existing record. Forsythe, 437 F.3d at 963-64. There we reversed the sentence because the government had failed to prove that a prior burglary conviction involved a dwelling. Id. at 962-63. The government asked us to remand for de novo resentencing so that it could present new evidence regarding the burglary. See id. at 963. We declined this request, concluding that the government should not have a second opportunity to make the record that it failed to make earlier. Id. at 963-64. For this conclusion, we relied on the government’s burden of proof, the defendant’s effort to alert the government to the deficiency in its evidence, and the government’s failure to cure the 6 The government presented an exhibit, stating that it “illustrate[s] the defendant’s criminal history.” Appellant’s App., vol. 3 at 304. Defense counsel then argued: [Government’s Exhibit 1] provides further confusion because those offenses that are listed there are not the ones in the presentence report that count. The 10 points don’t come from these offenses. One of them -- two of them are timed out. Three of them. An ’01 conviction, a ’94 conviction, a ’96 conviction. They’re timed out to begin with. And the last two that are mentioned, ’99 and 2000, they’re not in the presentence report. So there isn’t any correlation between what’s in the presentence report and the defendant’s criminal history in proving the defendant committed any of those offenses. Id. at 309-10. 20 deficiency. Id.; see also United States v. Campbell, 372 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 2004) (reversing and remanding for resentencing based on the existing record). The same factors apply here, and we too decline to give the government a second opportunity to make the record that it failed to make the first time. Thus, on remand, the district court must recalculate the criminal-history score based on the existing record. VIII. Sentencing Based on Conduct Not Involved in the Conviction Mr. Thomas raises three challenges to his sentencing based on conduct that was not involved in his convictions. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 41-45. He contends that: (1) the district court should have attributed only 1.49 grams of cocaine base to him (the total amount of cocaine base underlying the 3 sales involved in the present conviction); (2) the government failed to support the 2-level firearm enhancement; and (3) he was entitled to a 2-level deduction as a “minor participant.” Id. We reject these challenges. A. Drug Quantity Evidence The district court attributed 26.91 grams of crack cocaine to Mr. Thomas from three sources: (1) 22.18 grams found in an apartment; (2) 0.18 grams located in a nearby baggie; and (3) 4.55 grams charged in the indictment. II R. at 13. Mr. Thomas challenges the district court’s attribution of all but the 1.49 grams underlying his conviction. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 41-43. We review this contention for clear error. See United States v. Caldwell, 589 F.3d 1323, 1333 (10th Cir. 2009). Mr. Thomas argues that he was convicted of distributing only 1.49 grams of cocaine base and could not have been sentenced based on additional quantities because: (1) he was not charged with conspiracy or aiding and abetting and the jury made no such 21 findings, and (2) the district court impermissibly relied on Government Sentencing Exhibit 2 and unreliable hearsay. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 41-43. We reject both arguments. First, the district court could sentence Mr. Thomas based on uncharged conduct. Under the federal sentencing guidelines, Mr. Thomas bears responsibility for: (1) “all acts and omissions [he] committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused,” and (2) “all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of [a] jointly undertaken criminal activity.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(A), 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (2012). For use in sentencing, the government need not charge the conduct or present it to a jury. See United States v. Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d 1117, 1131 (10th Cir. 2006). Second, the district court did not impermissibly rely on Government Sentencing Exhibit 2 or unreliable hearsay. Instead, the district court relied on trial evidence to attribute 26.91 grams of cocaine base to Mr. Thomas. See III R. at 316-17. Based on that evidence, the district court found that: ● Mr. Thomas “was a lieutenant” in the overall drug operation, ● “he and Mr. Hayes were acting in concert in using a lot of [the] same people to sell from residences around Topeka,” and ● the additional sales were “reasonably foreseeable to [Mr. Thomas] in view of his joint operation with Mr. Hayes and others.” Id. at 317-18. Because the district court could include the quantities established by the trial evidence, we uphold the district court’s attribution of 26.91 grams to Mr. Thomas. 22 B. The Firearm Enhancement The federal sentencing guidelines require the district court to apply a two-level sentencing enhancement if the defendant possessed a firearm in connection with a drug offense. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) (2012). The district court applied this enhancement because police had found a gun under a couch and drugs in the apartment when they arrested Mr. Thomas. III R. at 314; see id. at 307. Mr. Thomas contends that the government has not shown that a firearm was connected to the offense. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 43-45. “The government bears the burden of proving possession [of a firearm] by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Roberts, 980 F.2d 645, 647 (10th Cir. 1992). Initially, the government need only show that the firearm was found in “physical proximity to the offense.” Id. If the government meets its initial burden, the defendant must show that it was “clearly improbable” that the weapon was connected to the offense. United States v. Heckard, 238 F.3d 1222, 1233 (10th Cir. 2001). The government met its initial burden. A gun was found in a residence with drugs, scales, plastic bags, and other drug paraphernalia. Gov’t Ex. 2 at 155; II R. at 13; III R. at 92, 313. The proximity of the gun and drug evidence sufficed for the government’s threshold burden. See United States v. Roederer, 11 F.3d 973, 982-83 (10th Cir. 1993). Because Mr. Thomas has not shown a “clear improbability” that the weapon was connected to the offense, we uphold the firearm enhancement. 23