Opinion ID: 1260414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutionality of the Plea Agreement

Text: Kling challenges the constitutionality of Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreements. He argues that because these agreements are binding on the court as well as the parties, the agreements unconstitutionally restrict the discretion of the district court in contravention of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). We disagree. Booker does not invalidate Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreements. A plea agreement under Rule 11(c)(1)(C), like all plea agreements, is binding on both the government and the defendant, but Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreements are unique in that they are also binding on the court after the court accepts the agreement. If the court does not accept the agreement, the court is not bound to sentence the defendant by its terms. Kling reads Booker incorrectly. Kling correctly notes that Booker treated the Sentencing Guidelines' Sixth Amendment infirmity by making them advisory rather than mandatory. Booker, however, did not address the sentencing discretion of the district court in accepting Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreements. Courts are not obligated to accept plea agreements and have discretion to reject those which are deemed involuntary or unfair. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(2) (Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and determine that the plea is voluntary and did not result from force, threats, or promises (other than promises in a plea agreement)); see also Government of the Virgin Islands v. Walker, 261 F.3d 370, 375 (3rd Cir.2001) (stating that [a] sentencing court can, of course, reject the results of a plea negotiation if it concludes that the resulting agreement is not in the best interest of justice). District courts had this power pre- Booker and still do. We hold that Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreements remain permissible post- Booker.