Opinion ID: 486564
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Government's Closing Jury Argument

Text: 79 In its closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor stated at least eight times that the defendants or their lawyers had tried to disguise the truth and create doubt where none existed. Although no objection was made at trial, the defendants claim on appeal that the argument constituted misconduct and warrants reversal. 80 Though a prosecutor may state his views of the evidence and rebut the defense lawyer's closing argument, United States v. Strmel, 744 F.2d 1086, 1089 (5th Cir.1984), he should refrain from unfounded and inflammatory attacks on opposing counsel. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1043, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). We will reverse a conviction for prosecutorial misconduct, however, only if substantial rights of the accused have been affected. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52. To determine whether a prosecutor's misconduct was harmless, we may consider the prejudicial statements themselves, the efficacy of any cautionary instructions given by the district court, and the strength of the admissible evidence of guilt. United States v. McPhee, 731 F.2d 1150, 1145 (5th Cir.1984); United States v. Dorr, 636 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir.1981). Moreover, if the defendants do not object to improper argument, we reverse only in cases of plain error--that is, when the argument seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings and result[s] in a miscarriage of justice. United States v. Montemayor, 684 F.2d 1118, 1124 (5th Cir.1982) (quoting United States v. Graves, 669 F.2d at 971). 81 The prosecutor's statements--that the defense attorneys disguise the truth--while perhaps somewhat extreme in repetition, actually did no more than attack the inferences that the defense drew from the evidence and thus were no worse than borderline as to proper jury argument. Even if the statements could be seen as constituting an improper attack on the verity of opposing counsel, they fell far short of reversible error. The district court instructed the jurors that they alone were to weigh the credibility of the witnesses and determine the facts from the evidence and that the statements of the lawyers were not evidence. This instruction cured any prejudice created by the prosecutor's statements. See United States v. Shackelford, 709 F.2d 911, 913 (5th Cir.) (discussing similar instruction), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 899, 104 S.Ct. 253, 78 L.Ed.2d 239 (1983); United States v. Saenz, 747 F.2d 930, 943 (5th Cir.1984) (discussing similar instruction), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906, 105 S.Ct. 3531, 87 L.Ed.2d 655 (1985).