Opinion ID: 2103508
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: testimony by child abuse victims over closed-circuit television in the absence of enabling legislation

Text: Appellant challenges the trial court's authority to permit a child abuse victim to testify at trial over closed-circuit television, out of the presence of the defendant and the judge. He contends that, in the absence of a District of Columbia statute authorizing such testimony, the Sixth Amendment takes precedence, meaning that he was entitled to direct confrontation in court by the complaining child victim in this case. It is true that many jurisdictions in the United States have statutes authorizing the use of closed-circuit television for adducing the testimony of victims of child abuse. [8] In Craig, the Supreme Court held that Maryland's statutory procedure allowing the use of one-way closed-circuit television for this purpose [9] when coupled with other safeguardsdid not violate the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 860, 110 S.Ct. at 3171. [10] Specifically, Craig approved the use of closed-circuit television for testimony by child abuse victims if the state demonstrates its necessity: [I]f the State makes an adequate showing of necessity, the state interest in protecting child witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a child abuse case is sufficiently important to justify the use of a special procedure that permits a child witness in such cases to testify at trial against a defendant in the absence of face-to-face confrontation with the defendant. Id. at 855, 110 S.Ct. at 3169 (emphasis added). The demonstration of necessity requires three trial court findings specific to the case: [1] [T]he trial court must hear evidence and determine whether use of the one-way closed-circuit television procedure is necessary to protect the welfare of the particular child witness who seeks to testify. [2] The trial court must also find that the child witness would be traumatized, not by the courtroom generally, but by the presence of the defendant.... [3] Finally, the trial court must find that the emotional distress suffered by the child witness in the presence of the defendant is more than de minimis, i.e., more than mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to testify. Id. at 855-56, 110 S.Ct. at 3168-69 (citations omitted). In the District of Columbia, unlike in Maryland, there is no statute authorizing the trial court to permit a victim of child abuse to testify over closed-circuit television. Thus, in this jurisdiction, unlike in Craig, the legislature has not articulated a public policy and procedures to govern the testimony of child abuse victims at criminal trials. Faced with the government's request that O.H.B.'s testimony be taken over closed-circuit television, and aware of the absence of a relevant local statute, the trial judge examined Craig and concluded that such a statute was not a prerequisite to constitutionality of the proposed procedure. More specifically, the trial judge concluded that, if he made the required finding of necessity applying Craig's criteria to the particular facts of this case, the child-victim could testify at the trial over closed-circuit television, without face-to-face confrontation of appellant. Appellant contends that the trial judge had no authority to employ the procedure approved in Craig because of the lack of enabling legislation in the District of Columbia. We cannot agree. Craig' s approval of closed-circuit television procedures based upon an adequate showing of necessity, id. at 855, 110 S.Ct. at 3169, is not premised on the existence of a state enabling statute. See Gonzales v. State, 818 S.W.2d 756, 766 (Tex. Crim.App.1991) (en banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1334, 122 L.Ed.2d 718 (1993) (we do not read Coy [11] or Craig as mandating some sort of enabling statute for the trial court's actions). Rather, the Supreme Court in Craig cited the Maryland statute only for the purpose of demonstrating that compliance with the statute, on the facts of that case, evidenced satisfaction of the third type of finding required for a showing of necessity. The Court was clear; it need not decide the minimum showing of emotional trauma required for use of the special procedure ... because the Maryland statute, which requires a determination that the child witness will suffer serious emotional stress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate, § 9-102(a)(1)(ii), clearly suffices to meet constitutional standards. Craig, 497 U.S. at 856, 110 S.Ct. at 3169. The Court did not say, or imply in any way, that, in evidencing satisfaction of the third required finding, the statute was necessary to that finding. Presumably, even in the absence of a statute, evidence can suffice to show that third finding (the emotional distress suffered by the child witness in the presence of the defendant is more than de minimis, id. at 856, 110 S.Ct. at 3169), just as other evidence can satisfy the first two required findings. The fact that Craig included two constitutional criteria, requiring specific trial court findings that the Maryland statute did not expressly address, helps make clear that Craig's constitutional criteria do not depend on the existence of a state statute. In sum, there is no hint in Craig that, to satisfy the Confrontation Clause, a court cannot permit a closed circuit television procedure for a child witness in the absence of an authorizing statute. All that is required is trial court findings reflecting compliance with the three necessity criteria specified in Craig (quoted above). See State v. Ford, 626 So.2d 1338, 1340, 1345-47 (Fla.1993) (approving closed circuit television testimony of child witness in murder case without Craig -type statute; absent appropriate authority[,] a trial court in a criminal case may employ a procedure if necessary to further an important public policy interest); Gonzales, 818 S.W.2d at 763-66 (same). But see Hochheiser v. Superior Court, 161 Cal.App.3d 777, 208 Cal.Rptr. 273, 276 (1984) (pre- Craig decision holding that closed-circuit television of child witness's testimony represented far-reaching innovation in a criminal trial more appropriately left to the Legislature for initial consideration). In the present case, the trial court made comprehensive findings, quoted above, which clearly satisfy all the Craig criteria. Courtroom procedures for the most part are dictated by statute and court rules, as well as by constitutional requirements; but, in addition, the trial court has inherent authority, unless otherwise specifically precluded, to control the conduct of the proceedings before it, in order to ensure that the proper decorum and appropriate atmosphere are established, that all parties are treated fairly, and that justice is done. See Guaranty Dev. Co. v. Liberstein, 83 A.2d 669, 671 (D.C.1951) ([i]t is a well settled rule that the mode of conducting trials ... [is a] matter[] belonging very largely to the practice of the court); 75 AM.JUR.2D Trial § 180 (1991). Indeed, innovative trial procedures are acceptable as long as they are administered carefully and meet the requirements of due process. United States v. Lewis, 230 U.S.App.D.C. 212, 219, 716 F.2d 16, 23, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 996, 104 S.Ct. 492, 78 L.Ed.2d 686 (1983) (sustaining trial of several criminal cases simultaneously before two juries absent evidence indicating dual jury caused specific prejudice to a defendant). In the present case, as indicated, the trial court, in affording the protections required by Coy, supra note 10, and by Craig, satisfied appellant's rights under the Confrontation Clause. Appellant, moreover, does not claim a violation of due process.