Opinion ID: 2767628
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the license application is invalid.

Text: ¶14. The Court will not interfere with the findings of a chancellor unless the findings were “manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or applied the wrong legal standard.” Bluewater Logistics, LLC v. Williford, 55 So. 3d 148, 166 (Miss. 2011) (quoting Powell v. Campbell, 7 912 So. 2d 978, 981 (Miss. 2005)). The Chancery Court of Harrison County stated in its Final Judgment that it had “considered [the] testimony of parties and other witnesses as well as documentary proof and evidence and argument of counsel” and, further, that it had “judged and weighed the credibility and veracity of the witnesses [and] documentary evidence submitted” to conclude that Hotboxxx had not submitted a valid and proper application. The Court upholds the chancery court’s finding that the privilege license application was incomplete and invalid. ¶15. On February 25 and 26, 2013, the chancery court held a hearing on the issue of whether the privilege license application was valid. At the hearing, testimony went back and forth concerning which version of the three versions presented was actually the privilege license application submitted to the city. Artz claimed that the application introduced as Exhibit 11 was a photocopy of the application introduced as Exhibit 4, and Exhibit 11 contained the additional pages missing from Exhibit 4. In his bench ruling, the chancellor ultimately concluded, based on the testimony and evidence, that the privilege license application marked as Exhibit 4 was the actual application submitted to the city on September 17, 2009, and Exhibit 4 was incomplete and thus invalid. We can discern no reversible error in the chancellor’s finding. ¶16. The record contains instructions for completing a privilege application. The instructions read, in pertinent part: Application must be signed by owner or authorized agent. Print name under signature. Enter title of applicant. Application must be signed in the presence of a notary, who will complete the affidavit section or signed in the presence of an authorized person in the 8 General Finance Department. If signed in office, the staff person will complete the affidavit portion. (Emphasis added.) Exhibit 4 is missing the required signature by the applicant and is not notarized or completed by a member of the General Finance Department. The instructions clearly require the application to be signed in the presence of the General Finance Department or otherwise notarized. Artz testified he did not sign the application in the presence of the department, and it was not notarized. Thus, regardless of any discrepancies about which exhibit was the submitted application, the application was not complete. B. Whether, regardless of the invalid application, Hotboxxx has standing. ¶17. Hotboxxx argues that the determination of standing should not be based solely on the whether it submitted a business license application to the City of Gulfport. Hotboxxx cites Fordice v. Bryan, 651 So. 2d 998 (Miss. 1995), for the rule that standing should be based on whether Hotboxxx “assert[s] a colorable interest in the subject matter of the litigation or experience[s] an adverse effect from the conduct of the defendant . . . .” Id. at 1003. Hotboxxx argues that its lease of the commercial building constitutes a colorable interest, giving it standing to challenge the zoning ordinance restriction. Hotboxxx states that its chosen location for the business is in violation of the ordinance, and therefore, it experienced an adverse effect from the enactment of the ordinance. ¶18. The City of Gulfport argues that standing requires a party to point to specific evidence illustrating an injury in fact. See Lujan v. Defender of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 563 (1992). Gulfport states that Hotboxxx did not have an injury because Hotboxxx submitted an improper application; therefore, regardless of the Ordinance, Hotboxxx was not able to 9 engage in the business. Gulfport then argues that the colorable interest claims by Hotboxxx do not prove an injury because they must be supported either with evidence found in the record or presented at trial, and Hotboxxx’s lease states it is void if it is unable to obtain a license. ¶19. Standing is a jurisdictional issue. City of Madison v. Bryan, 763 So. 2d 162, 166 (Miss. 2000); In re City of Biloxi, 113 So. 3d 565, 570 (Miss. 2013). Thus, it may be raised by the Court sua sponte or by any party at any time, and the standard of review is de novo. Bryan, 763 So. 2d at 166; In re City of Biloxi, 113 So. 3d at 570. The district court found a lack of standing for Hotboxxx to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance because Hotboxxx had not submitted a valid license application. Subsequently, in its Final Judgment after the February 25-26, 2013, hearing, the chancery court found that Hotboxxx had failed to submit a proper license application, and therefore, it had no standing. ¶20. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that “the constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not bound by the limitations of a case or controversy or other federal rules of justiciability even when they address issues of federal law, as when they are called upon to interpret the Constitution or . . . a federal statute.” ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989). In Mississippi, standing depends on whether the plaintiff asserts a “colorable interest in the subject-matter of the litigation or experience[s] an adverse effect from the conduct of the defendant, or as otherwise provided by law.” Kinney v. Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, Inc., 142 So. 3d 407, 412-13 (Miss. 2014) (quoting Schmidt v. Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, 18 So. 3d 814, 826-27 (Miss. 2009)). Thus, while standing in federal court requires an “injury in fact,” standing in 10 Mississippi courts is more liberal and requires a “colorable interest in the subject matter.” See Kinney, 142 So. 3d at 412. ¶21. The Court has further defined a colorable interest as “whether the particular plaintiff had a right to judicial enforcement of a legal duty of the defendant or . . . whether a party plaintiff . . . can show in himself a present, existent actionable title or interest, and demonstrate that this right was complete at the time of the institution of the action.” City of Picayune v. S. Reg’l Corp., 916 So. 2d 510, 526 (Miss. 2005) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also In re City of Biloxi, 113 So. 3d at 570. An inchoate or not fully developed right is not sufficient. Cumbest v. Commissioners of Election of Jackson County, 416 So. 2d 683, 687 (Miss. 1982) (citing American Book Co. v. Vandiver, 178 So. 598, 599 (Miss. 1938)). ¶22. As discussed above, Hotboxxx did not submit a valid license application, but Hotboxxx maintains that it had signed a lease and claims it was fully registered as a business entity with a business plan. Although Hotboxxx may have been registered as a business with a business plan, the signed lease is the only evidence in the record linking Hotboxxx to the zone of the city affected by the ordinance. ¶23. The Court also has held that “[A]ny property owner or person having an interest in property which is or may be affected by a permit or variance illegally issued or denied is an aggrieved party and may apply to the court for relief.” Belhaven Improvement Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Jackson, 507 So. 2d 41, 46 (Miss. 1987) (quoting Mayor, etc., City of Pontotoc v. White, 93 So. 2d 852, 856 (Miss. 1957)). The lease dated July 14, 2009, for 1820 Pass Road, Gulfport, Mississippi, at first glance appears to present an interest in property affected 11 by the ordinance. However, the lease provides, “In the event that the Lessor cannot obtain the necessary business licenses and or approvals from the City of Gulfport to operate their business, this contract shall become void.” Although Hotboxxx had an interest in land affected by the ordinance, when Hotboxxx failed to submit a valid application and failed to obtain a license, the lease became void, and Hotboxxx no longer had an interest in the land. ¶24. The Court has stated: “[S]tanding must exist when litigation is commenced and must continue through all subsequent stages of litigation, or the case will become moot.” In re City of Biloxi, 113 So. 3d at 572 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Court in Bryan determined that Bryan did not have standing to appeal the city’s veto of his site plan because his option to purchase the land had expired, and he did not have “any other encumbrance upon the property.” Bryan, 763 So. 2d at 166. In the instant case, Hotboxxx’s lease was pendent on obtaining the appropriate licenses. The chancery court held the application for the privilege license to be invalid, and we upheld that finding. Thus, the lease is void, and Hotboxxx has no interest in the land, and therefore, under Mississippi case law, no standing. ¶25. Alternatively, Hotboxxx cites to the dissent in Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning v. Van Slyke, 510 So. 2d 490, 496 (Miss. 1987), to claim that “Mississippi courts are able to grant standing to parties who seek review of governmental actions.” Although parts of the argument made by Justice Prather were later adopted by the