Opinion ID: 1319069
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: (1b) The People's right to reopen a suppression ruling is governed by section 1538.5, subdivision (j).

Text: The People finally argue that the trial court erred in suppressing Gonzales' anticipated trial testimony, since the implied finding Gonzales will not ultimately testify on his own free will is necessarily an exercise in sheer guesswork. They speculate that intervening events may well transform Gonzales into a most willing and enthusiastic ally of the prosecution, and further suggest that [t]here [is] no reason why the claim cannot be litigated pretrial, as in the present case, reserving only for trial resolution where appropriate the question of the witness' willingness and motivations in testifying as a foundational inquiry and condition precedent to proffering the witness' testimony (Evid. Code, §§ 402, 403, 405). The People do not make any showing that there are or will be such intervening events and did not avail themselves of the extraordinarily lengthy section 1538.5 proceedings to show that some act of free will occurred subsequent to the events reviewed here. Thus their argument reduces to the claim that the section 1538.5 procedure is inadequate to the task of adjudicating an issue of attenuation involving trial testimony and that the trial court cannot rule on the issue before the moment arrives for the introduction of the testimony. We disagree with the People's contention. Section 1538.5 provides the method under California practice for determining whether evidence, including testimonial evidence, should be suppressed as the product of an illegal search or seizure. The issue of attenuation is frequently litigated and resolved in such proceedings. (See, e.g., Lockridge v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 166 [89 Cal. Rptr. 731, 474 P.2d 683].) As Justice Blease observed below, [t]here is no substantive or procedural warrant for the piecing off of the attenuation issue from the Fourth Amendment claims. The issue of attenuation is but one side of the coin of derivative illegality. Even when the issue of attenuation depends in part on the state of mind of the witness, as in the present case, the section 1538.5 procedure ordinarily operates sufficiently close to trial to provide the People with an adequate opportunity to show that the witness' anticipated testimony is independent of any prior unlawful police activity. The witness's motive and state of mind at the time of that hearing would in most cases reasonably forecast his motive and state of mind at the time of trial a short while thereafter. The People in this case had ample opportunity to litigate the issue of attenuation in the year and one-half during which the trial court conducted the section 1538.5 proceedings. They elected to rely upon events immediately following the illegal search and seizure to prove attenuation, but they failed in their burden of proof. Under these circumstances, the People's right to reopen the suppression issue is limited by the terms of Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (j). That subdivision provides that [i]f defendant's motion is granted at a special hearing in the superior court, the people, if they have additional evidence relating to the motion and not presented at the special hearing, shall have the right to show good cause at the trial why such evidence was not presented at the special hearing and why the prior ruling at the special hearing should not be binding, or the people may seek appellate review as provided in subdivision (o).... If the people prosecute review by appeal or writ to decision, or any review thereof, in a felony or misdemeanor case, it shall be binding upon them. [7] The People may reopen a suppression ruling only pursuant to the restrictive terms of this provision. They make no claim to have complied with this provision in the present case. [8] Accordingly, we deny the peremptory writ of mandate, and discharge the alternative writ previously issued by the Court of Appeal.