Opinion ID: 2322362
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: cdw

Text: The CDW statute states that [n]o person shall carry within the District of Columbia either openly or concealed on or about their person ... any deadly or dangerous weapon capable of being so concealed. D.C.Code § 22-4504(a). In order to prove CDW when the weapon in question is a knife, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that the defendant carried the knife either openly or concealed, (2) that the defendant had the general intent to do the acts constituting the carrying of the knife, and (3) that the purpose of carrying the knife was its use as a dangerous weapon. Reed, 828 A.2d at 162. A deadly or dangerous weapon is one which is likely to produce death or great bodily injury by the use made of it. Scott v. United States, 243 A.2d 54, 56 (D.C.1968). All knives are not dangerous weapons per se, see Lewis, 767 A.2d at 222, and a knife may be legally carried as a tool or for another utilitarian purpose. See Reed, 828 A.2d at 162; Scott, 243 A.2d at 56. The carrying of an otherwise useful object is outlawed by the CDW statute where the surrounding circumstances, such as the time and place the defendant was found in possession of such an instrument, or the alteration of the object, indicate that the possessor would use the instrument for a dangerous purpose. Scott, 243 A.2d at 56. Another relevant surrounding circumstance is the conduct of the defendant immediately prior to arrest. Lewis, 767 A.2d at 223. The nature of the knife, namely its design or construction, is also important. See id. at 222-23 (citing Monroe v. United States, 598 A.2d 439, 441 (D.C.1991)). In sum, to determine whether the government has met its burden of proving that the knife was carried for use as a dangerous weapon, this court must ordinarily consider both the nature of the knife itself[ ] and the circumstances under which it was carried. Lewis, 767 A.2d at 223. We agree with M.L. that the type of knife he carried could be carried for a utilitarian or otherwise legitimate purpose. The question in this case is whether the nature of the knife and the circumstances in which M.L. was found with it reasonably support an inference that he carried the knife for use as a dangerous weapon on the evening of March 18. We hold that the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that M.L. carried the knife for the purpose of using it as a dangerous weapon. We first consider the nature of the knife itself, including its design and construction. The sharp portion of the blade was just shy of three inches long. It is beyond cavil that the blade itself was long enough that, when open, the knife could be used to inflict great, if not deadly, injury. See Mihas, 618 A.2d at 201 n. 1 ([E]ven a short knife, when wielded by one to use it unlawfully, can be dangerous.). The handle had a clip. The knife was a folding knife, and, as M.L. notes, because it folded, it could be kept on hand but safely carried during the performance of various lawful activities in which a knife is occasionally useful. M.L., however, was not carrying the knife in a folded position, an important circumstance in this case. The trial court found that the knife was open and ready to use while in M.L.'s pocket, and M.L. agreed at oral argument that the record supports this finding. In Gilmore v. United States, Gilmore testified that he used his knife for his job as a cement bag handler. 271 A.2d 783, 783-84 (D.C.1970). We noted that Gilmore's closed folding knife had been altered to open for use more quickly than a typical folding knife and found the evidence sufficient to support a CDW conviction. Id. at 783. Although M.L.'s knife was not altered, carrying an open folding knife is even more indicative of an intent to use it as a dangerous weapon than the alteration in Gilmore. Keeping the knife in an open position in his pocket, notwithstanding the danger of exposing his own body to the blade, strongly suggests that M.L.'s purpose for carrying the knife was to use it in a situation in which quick access to the blade was important, and it is difficult to imagine that quick access to the blade could be important for any use other than against another person, who is able to approach suddenly, fight back, and move around. Thus, the nature of M.L.'s knife (a folding knife with a nearly three-inch blade), combined with the fact that he carried it in his pocket in an open position, supports a reasonable inference that he carried the knife not for utilitarian purposes but to use it as a dangerous weapon. Turning to the other surrounding circumstances, we agree with the trial court that M.L.'s hiding in a crouched position behind Mrs. Johnson's car, in the dark, and wearing gloves on a night that Officer Wade credibly testified was not cold, also supports the finding that M.L. carried the knife for the purpose of using it as a dangerous weapon. In addition, the trial court permissibly used M.L.'s flight from Officer Wade as a factor in support of this finding. It is true that there are many reasons an innocent individual may flee from the police and therefore flight alone is not sufficient evidence of guilty knowledge. See In re D.P., 996 A.2d 1286, 1289 (D.C.2010). Flight, however, can be probative of guilt in conjunction with other factors. See In re T.T.B., 333 A.2d 671, 673 (D.C.1975). Along with the other circumstances on March 18, an inference that M.L.'s flight evidenced his guilty conscience was reasonable. [2] M.L. proposes two alternative explanations for his crouching beside Mrs. Johnson's car that he argues are as plausible as an inference that he was hiding because he intended to use the knife as a dangerous weapon: He briefly paused beside the car for a lawful purpose completely unrelated to the knife, or he was crouching because he intended to commit a property offense. We do not agree that the evidence supports either of these inferences. Turning to M.L.'s first alternative theory, it is illogical to suppose that he would have crouched behind the car, rather than stood upright, if he had paused for a lawful purpose. In addition, the evidence does not support an inference that M.L. had paused only briefly. After Mrs. Johnson saw M.L. moving alongside her car, Mr. Johnson looked and saw M.L. sliding behind the car. This credited testimony is inconsistent with the idea that M.L. had stopped momentarily. Furthermore, Officer Wade was actively looking for people on the street while he drove down Hanna Place, and he looked in his car's mirrors after he had parked but saw no one. If M.L.'s presence on Hanna Place after dark was innocent, why was M.L. hiding at least as soon as there were others on the street, if not earlier? As to an inference that M.L.'s purpose in carrying the knife was only to commit property damage, there was no evidence of damage to any of the cars on the street. Especially if we proceed from M.L.'s premise that he was already hiding on the street before the Wades turned on to Hanna Place, what was he waiting for? A street with parked cars but, as far as the evidence showed, no people was surely the ideal setting in which to commit a property offense, yet there was no evidence of any property offense already committed. Furthermore, there would be no reason for M.L. to risk injury by carrying the knife in an open position if it was to be used against objects that would not move away or fight back during the time it took to remove the knife from his pocket and open it. Therefore, an inference that he intended to use the knife for vandalism or theft was not equally or more plausible than an inference that he hid beside Mrs. Johnson's car because he was carrying the open folding knife for use as a dangerous weapon. Nor does our case law require that M.L. used or threatened to use the knife in order for the trial court to reasonably infer, after reviewing all of the circumstances, that his purpose in carrying the knife was to use it as a dangerous weapon. In numerous cases, we have affirmed a CDW conviction in the face of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence without any evidence that the appellant used or threatened to use the knife with which he was found. See Reed, 828 A.2d at 161, 163 (appellant was found sitting alone in a car late at night, in a neighborhood known for drug activity, with a substantial quantity of drugs in the pocket of his jacket and a three-inch dagger in his waistband); Lewis, 767 A.2d at 221 (during frisk after appellant admitted to having a weapon, a closed folding knife was found in appellant's back pants pocket); Monroe, 598 A.2d at 441 (appellant was attempting to check a briefcase, in which his knife was located, when he was arrested); Mackey v. United States, 451 A.2d 887, 888, 889 (D.C. 1982) (appellant accepted a machete-type knife from another individual and attempted to conceal it in his clothing and an officer who frisked appellant removed the knife from appellant's waistband); Gilmore, 271 A.2d at 783-84 (when police questioned appellant, who was in a bus station at 3:00 a.m. holding another person's bus ticket, appellant tried to dispose of pegged folding knife); Scott, 243 A.2d at 55 (police officer noticed appellant attempting to slide a yellow handled knife up the sleeve of his coat). In sum, the evidence was persuasive beyond a reasonable doubt that M.L. committed the offense of CDW. Rivas, 783 A.2d at 134. The government did not have to negate every possible inference of innocence, see Wheeler v. United States, 494 A.2d 170, 174 (D.C.1985); In re S.P., 465 A.2d 823, 826 (D.C.1983), and it was reasonable for the trial court to discount the other possible explanations of M.L.'s behavior as too unsubstantiated and implausible to dispel the inference that M.L., who fled from Officer Wade after he was discovered hiding behind Mrs. Johnson's car, in the dark, with an open folding knife in his pocket and gloves on his hands, carried the knife to use it as a dangerous weapon. See D.P., 996 A.2d at 1291 (Glickman, J., dissenting). We thus affirm the CDW conviction.