Opinion ID: 2180253
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defense Counsel's Failure to Request a Compulsion Instruction

Text: Defendant further argues that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel at the second stage of her capital sentencing hearing by her attorneys' failure to have the jury instructed that compulsion is a statutory mitigating factor. The Illinois death penalty statute includes compulsion among the statutory mitigating factors a jury may consider: The court shall consider, or shall instruct the jury to consider any aggravating and any mitigating factors which are relevant to the imposition of the death penalty. Aggravating factors may include but need not be limited to those factors set forth in subsection (b). Mitigating factors may include but need not be limited to the following:       (4) the defendant acted under the compulsion of threat or menace of the imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(c) (West 1994). Although some statutory mitigating factors were included in the jury instructions, compulsion was not one of them. The jury did receive a general instruction that [w]here there is evidence of a mitigating factor, the fact that such mitigating factor is not a factor specifically listed in these instructions does not preclude your consideration of the evidence. Defendant contends, however, that a specific instruction regarding compulsion was necessary. According to defendant, such an instruction was warranted by evidence that her boyfriends, including Caffey, had abused her, and evidence that defendant had a dependent personality and attached herself to predatory males who could make her do things she would not normally do on her own. Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish (1) that defense `counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness' and (2) that `there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' People v. Morgan, 187 Ill.2d 500, 529-30, 241 Ill.Dec. 552, 719 N.E.2d 681 (1999), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693, 698. There is a strong presumption that the challenged action or inaction of counsel was the product of sound trial strategy and not of incompetence. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d at 397, 233 Ill.Dec. 789, 701 N.E.2d 1063. A defendant's failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland analysis will result in the rejection of his ineffective assistance claim. Shaw, 186 Ill.2d at 332, 239 Ill.Dec. 311, 713 N.E.2d 1161. We find that defendant in this case has failed to overcome the presumption that her attorneys' performance was adequate. A defendant is entitled to have the jury receive instructions on the law that applies to her theory of the case, provided there is evidence in the record to support that theory. People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill.2d 484, 519, 218 Ill.Dec. 884, 670 N.E.2d 606 (1996). The evidence in this case did not support an instruction on the statutory mitigating factor of compulsion. Although there was evidence that defendant was psychologically vulnerable to predatory males who could cause her to do things she would not normally do by threatening her, there was no evidence that Caffey or anyone else threatened defendant or that her actions were the result of threats. To the contrary, there was evidence that, against Caffey's wishes, defendant brought Joshua to the Schaumburg townhouse. Also, whereas there was evidence that Caffey had beaten defendant in 1994, there was no evidence that he had threatened her with any imminent death or great bodily harm, as required by the compulsion statutory mitigating factor. Given that the evidence did not support an instruction on the statutory mitigating factor of compulsion, defendant was not entitled to one, and we cannot say that defense counsel were deficient for failing to request a compulsion instruction. See Alvine, 173 Ill.2d at 297, 219 Ill.Dec. 546, 671 N.E.2d 713. Accordingly, we reject defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.