Opinion ID: 4648101
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Recent Caselaw on Damages Claims Under the Iowa

Text: Constitution. We begin by summarizing briefly our recent caselaw on direct constitutional claims for damages. In 2017, in Godfrey II, our court ruled that direct claims could be brought under the Iowa Constitution without legislative authorization. 898 N.W.2d at 847 (plurality opinion), 880 (Cady, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Godfrey II did 11 not have a majority opinion. Casting the deciding vote, a concurrence in part made clear that the court should imply damage remedies under the Iowa Constitution only when the legislative remedies were inadequate. Id. at 880 (Cady, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The concurrence in part joined the plurality opinion “to the extent it would recognize a tort claim under the Iowa Constitution when the legislature has not provided an adequate remedy.” Id. The concurrence in part went on to find that the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) provided adequate remedies for Godfrey’s claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation, and therefore those remedies were exclusive. Id. at 880–81. Apart from recognizing the existence of a direct constitutional claim for damages, Godfrey II “express[ed] no view on other potential defenses which may be available to the defendants.” Id. at 880 (plurality opinion). Godfrey II, as already noted, involved claims against the State and state employees acting in their official capacity. See also id. at 845–46, 893–94 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). The following term, the Baldwin case came before us for the first time. Baldwin I, 915 N.W.2d 259. Baldwin was a federal court proceeding against a city and city officials where we were called upon to answer certified questions. Id. at 260. In 2018, in Baldwin I, we addressed whether a qualified immunity defense was available for a direct constitutional claim under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. Id. at 260–61. We declined to strictly follow the immunities in the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act (IMTCA)—or for that matter the ITCA. Id. As we explained, “The problem with these acts . . . is that they contain a grab bag of immunities reflecting certain legislative priorities. Some of those are unsuitable for constitutional torts.” Id. at 280. Instead, we determined that an official who had exercised “all due care” should not be liable for 12 damages, a standard that bears resemblance to one of the immunities set forth in the ITCA and the IMTCA. Id. at 279–80 (citing Iowa Code §§ 669.14(1), 670.4(1)(c)). Baldwin I expressly left open whether other provisions of the ITCA and the IMTCA would apply to constitutional tort claims against public officials and public agencies. Id. at 281. In 2019, in Baldwin II, we answered that open question as to the IMTCA. 929 N.W.2d 691. We held that the IMTCA generally governs constitutional tort damage claims against municipalities and municipal employees acting in their official capacities. Id. at 697–99 (quoting Iowa Code § 670.1(4)). Summing up, we said that “the IMTCA applies to Baldwin’s Iowa constitutional tort causes of action.” Id. at 698. Accordingly, we found that punitive damages and attorney fees could not be awarded against a municipality because the IMTCA did not allow such awards. Id. at 699–700. A partial dissent disagreed, arguing “it is critical that punitive damages be available against a government entity in a proper case in order to provide an adequate remedy to the state constitutional tort.” Id. at 703 (Appel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Just a few weeks later in Venckus, another 2019 case involving claims against municipalities and municipal officials, we reiterated that “[c]laims arising under the state constitution are subject to the IMTCA.” 930 N.W.2d at 808. Applying the IMTCA, we held in Venckus that the twoyear statute of limitations in Iowa Code section 670.5 governed constitutional tort actions against a municipality and its employees acting in their official capacity. Id. at 809. B. Relevant Language in the ITCA. The ITCA and the IMTCA are worded somewhat differently. The IMTCA by its terms applies to “actions based upon . . . denial or impairment of any right under any constitutional provision.” Iowa Code § 670.1(4). The ITCA, by contrast, does not 13 expressly cover “constitutional” tort claims. See id. § 669.3.3 In addition, the ITCA, unlike the IMTCA, excludes claims for assault or battery. See id. §§ 669.14(4), .23; Thomas v. Gavin, 838 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Iowa 2013) (“[T]here is no counterpart in section 670.4 to the ITCA’s exception for claims based on assault, battery, false arrest, or malicious prosecution.”). It should be remembered, of course, that neither the ITCA nor the IMTCA itself creates a cause of action. Venckus, 930 N.W.2d at 809; Rivera v. Woodward Res. Ctr., 830 N.W.2d 724, 727 (Iowa 2013); Minor v. State, 819 N.W.2d 383, 405 (Iowa 2012). Even though the ITCA does not specifically mention constitutional torts, it applies to: b. Any claim against an employee of the state for money only, . . . on account of personal injury or death, caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of 3The dissent suggests that this difference in language implies a conscious decision by the legislature, when it amended the IMTCA but not the ITCA in 1974, to allow constitutional tort claims against the State to proceed outside the ITCA. See 1974 Iowa Acts ch. 1263, § 2 (now codified at Iowa Code § 670.1(4)). An “exit ramp” so to speak. But this disregards several points. First, and most importantly, the established view in 1974 was that the State was immune from constitutional tort claims. As we discuss herein in the main text, there was no pre-Godfrey precedent allowing a direct constitutional claim for damages against the State or a state official. Godfrey II cites none and the dissent today cites none. As the main text explains, there was precedent against such claims. Municipal tort claims have always stood on a somewhat different footing from tort claims against the State. As discussed in Boyer v. Iowa High School Athletic Association, even before the IMTCA came along, there were some situations where municipalities could be sued. 256 Iowa 337, 340–41, 127 N.W.2d 606, 608 (1964). The concept was governmental immunity, not sovereign immunity. See id. Thus, in the 1974 amendment, and continuing to this day, the legislature has given a wider berth for claims against municipalities than claims against the State. Accordingly, the IMTCA contains, on the whole, a broader definition of “claim” and fewer exemptions. Compare Iowa Code §§ 670.1(4), .4, with §§ 669.2(3), .14. Another significant point overlooked by the dissent is that the legislature amended the ITCA the following year to require the State to indemnify and hold harmless state employees when sued for federal constitutional violations while acting within the scope of their employment. See 1975 Iowa Acts ch. 80, § 7 (now codified at Iowa Code § 669.22). If the legislature had any notion that such employees could be sued for state constitutional violations, why would it have not provided for that indemnification as well? 14 the state while acting within the scope of the employee’s office or employment. Iowa Code § 669.2(3)(b). Wagner’s claims against Officer Spece clearly involve alleged “wrongful act[s] or omission[s] of any employee of the state while acting within the scope of the employee’s office or employment.” Id. The federal district court so found in its certification order. So it would seem that any claim against Officer Spece under the Iowa Constitution would be literally covered by the ITCA unless it falls under the exception for assault and battery claims. See Iowa Code §§ 669.14(4), .23. Indeed, as observed by the federal district court in this case, there is an on-point federal precedent holding that direct claims under the Iowa Constitution against state employees come under the ITCA. McCabe v. Macaulay, 551 F. Supp. 2d 771, 785 (N.D. Iowa 2007). In McCabe v. Macaulay, a federal district court predicted (accurately, as it turned out) that our court would recognize a direct cause of action for violations of the Iowa Constitution. Id. However, based on the relevant language in Iowa Code section 669.2, the court then found that the claims were covered by the ITCA and the plaintiffs had to proceed under that statute. Id. at 786. As the court explained, Plaintiffs’ state constitutional claims are “claims” under the ITCA: Troopers Bailey and Busch are state employees, Plaintiffs seek monetary damages for personal injury caused by the wrongful acts of Troopers Bailey and Busch and Troopers Bailey and Busch were acting within the scope of their employment. Therefore, Plaintiffs are required to exhaust their remedies under the ITCA. Id. (citation omitted).4 4Iowa Code section 669.21 confirms that constitutional tort claims against state employees fall within section 669.2(3)(b). Section 669.21 provides that the State shall defend and indemnify any employee against “any claim as defined in section 669.2, subsection 3, paragraph ‘b,’ including claims arising under the Constitution, statutes, or rules of the United States or of any state.” Iowa Code § 669.2(1) (emphasis added). 15 One could argue that the ITCA does not govern constitutional tort claims against the State itself, because permissible claims against the State are limited to those that would be available against a private party. See id. § 669.2(3)(a) (defining “claim” as involving “circumstances where the state, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant for such damage, loss, injury, or death”). Usually, private persons, unless acting under color of state law, cannot commit constitutional violations. See Prager v. Kan. Dep’t of Revenue, 20 P.3d 39, 62 (Kan. 2001) (“Kansas has not waived its sovereign immunity under K.S.A. 75–6103(a) as it states that ‘each governmental entity shall be liable . . . if a private person would be liable.’ A private person is not liable for a constitutional tort and, therefore, the Kansas Department of Revenue and its employees are not liable and retain immunity.” (quoting Kan. Stat. Ann § 75-6103(a))); Zullo v. State, 205 A.3d 466, 479 (Vt. 2019) (“[T]he ultimate question of whether Trooper Hatch acted in compliance with plaintiff’s constitutional rights turns on law enforcement responsibilities that have no private analog.”); see also FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478, 114 S. Ct. 996, 1001 (2014) (discussing similar language in the Federal Tort Claims Act and concluding that “the United States simply has not rendered itself liable under § 1346(b) for constitutional tort claims”). By this chain of reasoning, claims of constitutional violations against the State would not fall within the ambit of the ITCA. This could lead to the incongruous situation where the constitutional claim originally asserted against the employee falls within the ITCA but the claim against the State itself does not. At least one jurisdiction has found that similar statutory language in its tort claims act does not prevent it from being applied to Hence, section 669.21 acknowledges that the definition of “claim” as to employees includes constitutional claims. Notably, the dissent disregards this point. 16 constitutional torts. In Brown v. State, the Court of Appeals of New York had to interpret a New York law that waived sovereign immunity “in accordance with the same rules of law as applied to actions in the supreme court against individuals or corporations.” 674 N.E.2d 1129, 1134 (N.Y. 1996). The State argued that this language rendered the New York law inapplicable, because “[i]ndividuals and corporations . . . cannot be sued for constitutional violations.” Id. at 1135. The court disagreed and found that the jurisdictional provisions of the act applied. Id. at 1135–36. It reasoned that the search and seizure and equal protection claims asserted by the plaintiffs were “sufficiently similar to claims which may be asserted by individuals and corporations in [trial court] to satisfy the statutory requirement.” Id. at 1136. Our only prior decision on point has followed the New York approach. In Adam v. State, we considered whether a damages claim for negligent licensing and inspection of a grain elevator by a state agency fell within the ITCA. 380 N.W.2d 716, 725 (Iowa 1986) (en banc). The State argued that it did not because private persons did not have a duty to inspect grain elevators, only the State did. Id. at 724. We pushed back on this line of thinking, stating: Inspecting and licensing functions are generally thought of as “uniquely governmental.” Where the governmental activity is not normally performed by private individuals, the question is whether a private individual doing what the government was doing would be liable for negligence. Id. (quoting Hylin v. United States, 715 F.2d 1206, 1210 (7th Cir. 1983), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 469 U.S. 807, 105 S. Ct. 65, 83 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1985)). We found the claim did fall within the ITCA, reasoning, “Under Iowa law private individuals would be liable for conduct such as we have here if the statute and regulations were directed at them.” 17 Id. By the same token, under the allegations of Wagner’s complaint, a private individual would have been liable for her son’s death if article I, sections 8 and 9 of the Iowa Constitution were directed at private individuals. In other words, Adam took the view that the ITCA applied even if the relevant duty only attached to the government, so long as the underlying conduct was tortious in nature and would have given rise to a tort claim against a private party if the same duty were imposed on a private party. By that standard, the ITCA could apply to the constitutional tort claims in this case. The gist of Wagner’s state constitutional claims is that Officer Spece seized Jensen with excessive force—indeed, killed him—and acted with indifference to his life in violation of article I, sections 8 and 9. Although a private party engaging in the same alleged conduct would not be committing constitutional violations unless acting under color of state law, that party would be committing several torts. “Constitutional torts are torts.” Baldwin I, 915 N.W.2d at 281. But there is additional language in the ITCA we must consider. Wagner maintains that all the claims in this case fall outside the ITCA because they involve assault, battery, or their functional equivalents. See Iowa Code § 669.14(4) (excepting claims for assault and battery from the ITCA). Literally, of course, a claim under the Iowa Constitution and common law assault and battery are two different causes of action. Iowa Code section 669.14(4) mentions the latter but not the former. However, some time ago this court held that the section immunized the State from suit on a federal constitutional claim that was “the functional equivalent” of an explicit section 669.14(4) exception. Greene v. Friend of Ct., 406 N.W.2d 433, 436 (Iowa 1987). Greene involved an individual who had been 18 allegedly jailed without due process and then brought suit for damages. Id. at 434. There we explained, The latter section [now section 669.14(4)] identifies excluded claims in terms of the type of wrong inflicted. The gravamen of plaintiff's claim in the present case is the functional equivalent of false arrest or false imprisonment, which are both [now section 669.14(4)] exceptions to the Iowa Tort Claims Act. Consequently, we agree with the position of [the Department of Human Services] that the State has not waived its sovereign immunity or that of its alter ego agencies with respect to the type of claim presented in this case. Id. at 436. In short, we decided that section 669.14(4) also foreclosed claims that were the functional equivalent of the identified claims. Id. We have reiterated this point in a number of cases. See, e.g., Smith v. Iowa State Univ. of Sci. & Tech., 851 N.W.2d 1, 20–21 (Iowa 2014) (“[W]e have made clear that if a claim is the functional equivalent of a section 669.14 exception to the ITCA, the State has not waived its sovereign immunity.”); Trobaugh v. Sondag, 668 N.W.2d 577, 584 (Iowa 2003) (“[W]here ‘[t]he gravamen of plaintiff’s claim . . . is the functional equivalent’ of the causes of action listed in Iowa Code section 669.14(4), the claim cannot be pursued successfully against the State.” (second alternation in original) (quoting Greene, 406 N.W.2d at 436)); Hawkeye ByProds., Inc. v. State, 419 N.W.2d 410, 411–12 (Iowa 1988) (en banc) (holding that when the gravamen of plaintiffs’ claims is covered by what is now section 669.14(4), “such claims will not lie against the sovereign”). The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) also excludes claims for “assault” and “battery,” although it excepts “acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Federal courts have found that this language excludes excessive force claims if the employee involved was not an 19 investigative or law enforcement officer. See, e.g., Stepp v. United States, 207 F.2d 909, 911 (4th Cir. 1953) (holding that a claim that arose when a sentry shot and killed a fleeing suspect was barred by the FTCA because “[i]t is well established that an intentional use of excessive force in making an arrest amounts to an assault and battery”). “We have . . . been guided by interpretations of the FTCA, which was the model for the ITCA, when the wording of the two Acts is identical or similar.” Thomas v. Gavin, 838 N.W.2d 518, 525 (Iowa 2013); see also Smith, 851 N.W.2d at 21. C. To Honor the Existing Legislative Framework to the Extent Possible, ITCA Procedures Should Apply to Constitutional Tort Claims Against the State. We assume, therefore, that the section 669.14(4) exclusion within the ITCA precludes Wagner’s constitutional claims. However, the legislature did not contemplate that such claims could be brought outside the ITCA. The ITCA states, “The immunity of the state from suit and liability is waived to the extent provided in this chapter.” Iowa Code § 669.4(3). In other words, the State’s immunity from suit and liability remains in effect unless the ITCA permits the claim. We have said as much on multiple occasions. See Trobaugh, 668 N.W.2d at 584 (“[T]he [functionally equivalent] claim cannot be pursued successfully against the State.”); Hawkeye By-Prods., 419 N.W.2d at 412 (“[S]uch claims will not lie against the sovereign.”). An underlying premise behind the ITCA was that it would cover all available tort damage claims against the State and state employees acting within the scope of their employment. None had been allowed before. “Prior to passage of the Iowa Tort Claims Act in 1965, the maxim that ‘the King can do no wrong’ prevailed in Iowa. No tort action could be maintained against the State or its agencies.” Don R. Bennett, Handling Tort Claims and Suits Against the State of Iowa: Part I, 17 Drake L. Rev. 20 189, 189 (1968) (footnote omitted); see also Montandon v. Hargrave Constr. Co., 256 Iowa 1297, 1299, 130 N.W.2d 659, 660 (1964) (“[The State] is immune from suit except where immunity is waived by statute and . . . there is no statutory waiver or consent to jurisdiction in tort actions.”). “[I]t must be remembered the State began from a position of complete immunity and waived that immunity on a limited basis by enacting the state tort claims act.” Speed v. Beurle, 251 N.W.2d 217, 219 (Iowa 1977). “Prior to enactment of [the ITCA], our courts lacked jurisdiction over suits brought against the state or its agencies sounding in tort.” Lloyd v. State, 251 N.W.2d 551, 555 (Iowa 1977). “The immunity of the State is from suit rather than from liability and remains the rule rather than the exception.” Id. “Claims which are outside the scope of the waiver must be denied.” Gartin v. Jefferson Cnty., 281 N.W.2d 25, 26 (Iowa Ct. App. 1979). “[Until the ITCA was enacted], tort suits could not be brought against the state because such suits were prohibited by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The state may now be sued in tort only in the manner and to the extent to which consent has been given by the legislature.” Hansen v. State, 298 N.W.2d 263, 265 (Iowa 1980). “The doctrine of sovereign immunity dictates that a tort claim against the state or an employee acting within the scope of his office or employment with the state must be brought, if at all, pursuant to [the ITCA].” Dickerson v. Mertz, 547 N.W.2d 208, 213 (Iowa 1996). The ITCA “waives sovereign immunity for tort claims against the State” and “provides a remedy for a cause of action already existing which would have otherwise been without remedy because of common law immunity.” Minor, 819 N.W.2d at 405 (quoting Engstrom v. State, 461 N.W.2d 309, 314 (Iowa 1990)). “By enacting the ITCA, the State waived this immunity and opened itself to suit, but it did so strictly on its terms.” Segura v. State, 889 N.W.2d 215, 21 221 (Iowa 2017). “Simply stated, the [ITCA] sets the metes and bounds of the State’s liability in tort.” Swanger v. State, 445 N.W.2d 344, 349 (Iowa 1989).5 In Godfrey II, we held that under certain circumstances, an aggrieved party could bring a constitutional claim against the State even though the legislature had not enacted a damages remedy for violation of that constitutional provision. 898 N.W.2d at 871–72 (plurality opinion), 880 (Cady, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). With our holding in Godfrey II, we overruled sub silentio cases like Speed, which confirmed the State’s “complete immunity,” 251 N.W.2d at 219, and Montandon, which proclaimed the State “is immune from suit except where immunity is waived by statute,” 256 Iowa at 1299, 130 N.W.2d at 660. To get there, we circled back to earlier Iowa caselaw. See Godfrey II, 898 N.W.2d at 862–63 (discussing McClurg v. Brenton, 123 Iowa 368, 98 N.W. 881 (1904); Krehbiel v. Henkle, 142 Iowa 677, 121 N.W. 378 (1909); State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 191 N.W. 530 (1923); and Girard v. Anderson, 219 Iowa 142, 257 N.W. 400 (1934)). Yet none of the cases we discussed involved damages claims against the State or state officials. All involved damages claims (actual or hypothetical) against local officials or private persons. Girard, 219 Iowa at 144, 257 N.W. at 400–01 (private individual); Tonn, 195 Iowa at 99–100, 191 N.W. at 532–33 (local officials); Krehbiel, 142 Iowa at 678–79, 121 N.W. at 379 (private individual); McClurg, 123 Iowa at 370, 98 N.W. at 882 (local official). Godfrey II cited no Iowa precedent for a direct constitutional claim for damages against the State or state officials. In fact, Iowa precedent was to the contrary. In Yoerg v. Iowa Diary Commission, we upheld the 5The pre-1965 immunity extended to state officials when performing official duties. See, e.g., Anderson v. Moon, 225 Iowa 70, 73, 279 N.W. 396, 397 (1938). 22 dismissal of a suit for recovery of tax payments alleging violations article I, sections 1, 6, and 9; article III, section 31; and article VII, sections 1 and 7 of the Iowa Constitution. 244 Iowa 1377, 1379, 1387, 60 N.W.2d 566, 567, 571 (1953). We decided that “the suit against the commission was substantially against the state, which was immune therefrom.” Id. at 1387, 60 N.W.2d at 571. In Collins v. State Board of Social Welfare, which involved a claim under article I, section 6 of the Iowa Constitution, we acknowledged “that in the absence of specific consent by the State, it or its agencies may not be sued in an action to obtain money from the State.” 248 Iowa 369, 372, 81 N.W.2d 4, 6 (1957). We granted relief in Collins only after determining that the suit was simply “to require [the State’s] officers and agents to perform their duty,” i.e., the equivalent of an equitable proceeding. Id. at 373, 81 N.W.2d at 6. So it is fair to say that when the ITCA was adopted in 1965, or even when it was subsequently amended, the legislature would not have considered it necessary to mention constitutional torts in the ITCA, because there was no Iowa precedent allowing the State or its officials acting within the scope of their employment to be sued in damages for a constitutional tort. By not mentioning such suits expressly in the ITCA, the legislature did not open the door for them to be brought in some other fashion. The ITCA drove home this point by limiting the waiver “to the extent provided in this [chapter].” 1965 Iowa Acts ch. 79, § 4 (now codified at Iowa Code § 669.4(3)). The ITCA allowed the State to be sued in tort for the first time and imposed a set of procedures for doing so. Id. We should not disregard those legislatively prescribed procedures. The question can be viewed as one of severability. See Iowa Code § 4.13 (stating that provisions and applications of legislation are intended to be severable in the event that a particular provision or application is 23 invalid). Again, Iowa Code section 669.4(3) waives the State’s immunity from suit only “to the extent provided in this chapter.” Iowa Code sections 669.14(4) and 669.23 preclude claims against the State and state employees acting within the scope of their employment for assault and battery or their equivalent. See Trobaugh, 668 N.W.2d at 584; Hawkeye By-Prods., 419 N.W.2d at 411–12. If we strike those limits on constitutional tort suits, does it follow we should strike all the procedures in the ITCA? We think not. Alternatively, the question can be viewed as one of the appropriate framework we should adopt for bringing constitutional torts. Should we use the existing statutory framework for other tort claims against the State? We think we should. For one thing, the legislature intended the ITCA to be the mechanism for suing the State in tort whenever tort suits were permitted. Also, not all constitutional tort causes of action fall under an Iowa Code section 669.14 exception. Such tort claims must be brought under the ITCA, at least when state employees are named, even without considering issues of severability. In our view, it does not make sense to have two different procedural pathways for constitutional tort claims, with the potential for uncertainty in a given case as to which pathway applies. In Godfrey II, we concluded, at least implicitly, that the ITCA did not foreclose a direct constitutional damages claim against the State and state employees acting in their official capacity. 898 N.W.2d at 871–72 (plurality opinion), 880 (Cady, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The issue before us now is whether the procedural limits of the ITCA should nonetheless apply to such a claim. It is logical to hold that constitutional torts, like other torts, are subject to the procedures set forth in the ITCA. Just because the substantive barriers to liability in the ITCA do not apply, that does not mean we should dispense with the entire ITCA. “The self24 evident purpose of the [ITCA] is to provide an orderly method by which to compensate those tortiously damaged by any officer, agent or employee of the state as defined by the Act.” Graham v. Worthington, 259 Iowa 845, 853, 146 N.W.2d 626, 632 (1966). In Godfrey II, the dispositive concurrence in part agreed with the lead opinion that tort claims for damages under the Iowa Constitution should be available even without legislative authorization. 898 N.W.2d at 880 (Cady, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Yet, it also concluded that the legislature could provide its own remedy for the constitutional violation in lieu of a court-devised remedy so long as it was an “adequate remedy.” Id. at 880–81. See also Baldwin I, 915 N.W.2d at 265 (summarizing Godfrey II). The procedural components of the ITCA, such as the requirement to present claims for adjustment and settlement before bringing suit and the two-year statute of limitations, see Iowa Code §§ 669.3, .5(1), .13, do not deprive a plaintiff such as Wagner of an adequate remedy. Unlike the immunities set forth in the ITCA, these procedural requirements don’t go to ultimate questions of liability and damages. The legislature intended the ITCA to be the only path for suing the State and state officials acting in their scope of employment on a tort claim. Consistent with Godfrey II, ITCA procedures should apply to constitutional torts.6 6The dissent urges that there is no issue of severability, rejects the ITCA altogether, and endorses a scheme for constitutional torts entirely free-formed by this court. To show why the dissent is incorrect, we restate our position. Until 2017, the only recognized way to sue the State on a tort damages claim, including a constitutional tort damages claim, was by legislative authorization. The ITCA had confirmed the general rule of “[t]he immunity of the state from suit,” but “waived” that immunity “to the extent provided in this chapter.” Iowa Code § 669.4(3). Prior to 2017, we had also repeatedly recognized that claims could not be pursued against the State that were the functional equivalent of a section 669.14(4) exclusion. See Trobaugh, 668 N.W.2d at 584; Hawkeye By-Prods., 419 N.W.2d at 411–12; Greene, 406 N.W.2d at 436. In Godfrey II, we said in effect those limits didn’t matter. The legislature can’t block constitutional tort claims completely; it can only regulate them. So Iowa Code sections 669.3(3)(a) and 669.14(4), 25 Baldwin I is also consistent with our answer to this certified question. In Baldwin I, we shaped and refined the independent damages claim for constitutional violations we had just recognized in Godfrey II. The immunity question we decided was one of substantive law. It presents no obstacle to today’s holding that ITCA procedures govern such claims. IV. Is the Available Remedy Under the Iowa Tort Claims Act for Excessive Force by a Law Enforcement Officer Inadequate Based on the Unavailability of Punitive Damages? If Not, What Considerations Should Courts Address in Determining Whether Legislative Remedies for Excessive Force Are Adequate? We now turn to whether punitive damages are potentially available when a plaintiff brings a direct constitutional claim based on a state law enforcement officer’s use of excessive force. The ITCA prohibits an award of punitive damages against the State. See Iowa Code § 669.4(2) (providing that “the state shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages”). Under the ITCA this bar operates regardless of how to the extent they may block Wagner’s tort claims, are unconstitutional. But we do not discard other statutory language regulating those claims. Ironically, the dissent accuses us of “judicial legislation.” But it is the dissent that wants free rein to devise procedures and remedies unimpeded by laws and precedent actually on the books. At the same time, we doubt the dissent believes there are really no existing limits on constitutional tort claims. For example, is there a statute of limitations? If so, where does it come from? If not from the ITCA, then from where? The dissent also suggests that the majority has proceeded in a manner that is procedurally unfair to Wagner. We respectfully disagree. The certified questions speak for themselves. The parties’ briefs on those questions are publicly available. Wagner elected to devote only minimal briefing—slightly over one page—to the central question of whether the ITCA applies to her constitutional tort claims. The defendants devoted fifteen pages of briefing to that issue. The defendants’ brief concludes that “the ITCA applies to constitutional tort actions against the state and state employees, and the ITCA’s terms are conditions of waiver of sovereign immunity that cannot be dissevered.” Unpacking the double negative (i.e., “cannot” and “dissevered”), this is another way of saying that the ITCA’s terms should stay in place to the extent possible and should therefore be applied to this case. That is essentially what we have concluded. Finally, in a footnote, the dissent engages in some hair-splitting over the meaning of the word “apply.” Obviously, the majority concludes that the procedural provisions of the ITCA apply to Wagner’s constitutional tort claims and the dissent concludes they do not. We have given reasons why they apply; the dissent disagrees with those reasons. 26 the State became a defendant—i.e., whether the State was an original defendant, was substituted as a defendant for a state employee, or both. See id. § 669.5(2)(a). Thus, if a state law enforcement officer acted within the scope of employment, the State will normally be substituted as a defendant, and any liability thereafter can rest only with the State. See id.; Godfrey v. State (Godfrey I), 847 N.W.2d 578, 588 (Iowa 2014); Iowa Beta Chapter of Phi Delta Theta Fraternity v. State, 763 N.W.2d 250, 267 (Iowa 2009) (explaining that Iowa Code section 669.5(2)(a) “relieve[s] a state employee from personal liability when the employee is acting within the scope of his or her employment”). We have determined in our answer to the previous question that the ITCA governs procedural aspects of state constitutional claims against the State. The availability of punitive damages, however, is a matter of substantive law, so that determination does not control here. A. Godfrey II and Baldwin II on Punitive Damages. Godfrey II recognized that a statutory cause of action will displace a direct constitutional claim for damages so long as the statute contains an adequate remedy. 898 N.W.2d at 880–81 (Cady, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Punitive damages were at the heart of this debate in Godfrey II. The ICRA, which authorizes a damages remedy for discrimination based on sexual orientation, does not permit punitive damages. Id. at 881. The concurrence in part, which cast the decisive vote, did not believe the absence of punitive damages rendered the ICRA remedy inadequate. Id. For that reason, the concurrence in part joined the dissent in refusing to recognize a parallel constitutional tort claim for damages for sexual-orientation discrimination under article I, section 6. Id. 27 The concurrence in part made several observations about the adequacy of remedies without punitive damages. It noted that “the remedies provided in the ICRA are robust, even without punitive damages.” Id. They include damages for emotional distress and attorney fees. Id. The concurrence in part also noted that “the claimed harm [to the plaintiff was] largely monetary in nature and [did] not involve any infringement of physical security, privacy, bodily integrity, or the right to participate in government, and instead [was] against the State in its capacity as an employer.” Id. Finally, the concurrence in part added that “[i]n the appropriate case, a remedy of punitive damages may be necessary to vindicate a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Id. Seemingly, on the question of whether punitive damages are necessary for an adequate remedy for a constitutional violation, the Godfrey II concurrence in part outlined a case-by-case approach rather than a single legal standard. Id. at 880–81. But Godfrey II was not our last word on the subject. Two years later, in Baldwin II, this court held that punitive damages are categorically unavailable against a municipality on a constitutional tort claim, upholding the limitation in section 670.4(1)(e) of the IMTCA. 929 N.W.2d at 698–99. Six members of the court joined the majority opinion in Baldwin II, including one who had been part of the plurality in Godfrey II and the author of the concurrence in part. Only one member of the court, in a partial dissent, urged that punitive damages should be available against a municipality in some circumstances “to provide an adequate remedy.” Id. at 703, 715 (Appel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The partial dissent insisted that the Baldwin II court was retreating from Godfrey II. See id. at 712– 13 (“For the majority of the Godfrey [II] court, it seems clear as a matter 28 [of] constitutional law that punitive damages should be available in at least some cases notwithstanding legislative action to the contrary.”). Baldwin II thus moved away from the case-by-case approach in the Godfrey II concurrence in part and indicated that the legislature could determine whether punitive damages would be available on a constitutional tort claim. B. Determining the Proper Approach Here. With respect to claims against the State and state employees for tortious conduct, the legislature has clearly indicated that punitive damages should not be available. See Iowa Code § 669.4(2). If we strictly followed Baldwin II, we could give Iowa Code section 669.4(2) the same conclusive effect that section 670.4(1)(e) received in Baldwin II. Or we could use as our guidepost the earlier Godfrey II concurrence in part. As already noted, the concurrence in part focused on the adequacy of the remedy for the constitutional violation. See Godfrey II, 898 N.W.2d at 880 (Cady, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referring to “an adequate remedy”). However, the concurrence in part did not provide a single standard for deciding whether a remedy was adequate. One key consideration was deterrence, i.e., whether the available remedies “suffice as an adequate deterrent of any alleged unconstitutional conduct.” Id. at 881. Elsewhere, the concurrence in part emphasized that the Godfrey case did not involve “physical invasion, assault, or violations of other liberty interests.” Id. It also highlighted the availability of attorney fees under the ICRA. Id. Still elsewhere, the concurrence in part pointed out that “Godfrey makes no claim that an action under the ICRA will not adequately compensate him for damages relating to the alleged unconstitutional conduct.” Id. Compensation is not necessarily the same thing as deterrence. 29 For the present case, we find persuasive the following reasoning that draws on both Baldwin II and the Godfrey II concurrence in part. The general assembly not only has prohibited excessive force claims against the State, it has prohibited awards of punitive damages against the State and state employees acting within their scope of employment. Even though we have decided that the first limit must give way to the paramount role of the Iowa Constitution in our system of government, we are still compelled to honor the second limit to the extent constitutionally possible. Almost by definition, punitive damages are not remedial. They punish. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266–67, 101 S. Ct. 2748, 2759 (1981) (“Punitive damages by definition are not intended to compensate the injured party, but rather to punish the tortfeasor whose wrongful action was intentional or malicious, and to deter him and others from similar extreme conduct.”). In another context, we have held there is no “vested right” to punitive damages prior to entry of judgment and the legislature may—in effect— confiscate most of them from a victorious plaintiff for the benefit of the State. Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assocs., 473 N.W.2d 612, 619 (Iowa 1991) (upholding the constitutionality of Iowa Code section 668A.1). We have also held repeatedly that punitive damages abate on the death of the wrongdoer, noting that this does not interfere with the plaintiff’s ability to receive “such sum as will fully compensate him for the injury sustained.” In re Vajgrt, 801 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Iowa 2011) (quoting Sheik v. Hobson, 64 Iowa 146, 148, 19 N.W. 875, 875 (1884)). It is difficult to see, therefore, that the unavailability of punitive damages would render a remedy inadequate in most cases. At least in an excessive force case without other unconstitutional conduct where any 30 actual damages will likely be significant, we are not persuaded to overturn the bar on punitive damages imposed by the legislature.7 Again, the answer we provide today would not necessarily be the same answer in a different kind of constitutional tort case. With other kinds of unconstitutional conduct, such as invidious discrimination or suppression of free speech, a traditional award of actual damages may not correspond with the harm actually caused. For example, if the unconstitutional conduct involved not merely excessive force but also a discriminatory use of force in violation of article I, section 6, a broader remedy might be appropriate.8 7Nothing herein, of course, prevents Wagner from pursuing punitive damages on her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Spece in his individual capacity. The dissent cites various cases for the proposition that “many excessive force cases have awarded both actual and punitive damages.” But every one of these citations involved an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, where punitive damages were awarded pursuant to a statute enacted by Congress. None involved a direct action under a state constitution. 8A brief comment should be made on Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971), and Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S. Ct. 1468 (1980). Discussing only those two cases does not paint an accurate picture of federal constitutional damages litigation. Carlson, decided forty years ago, was the last time the United States Supreme Court recognized a direct damages claim under the United States Constitution. Hernandez v. Mesa, ___, U.S. ___, ___, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743 (2020). Since 1980, the Court has “changed course,” id. at ___, 91 S. Ct. at 741, and “consistently rebuffed requests to add to the claims allowed under Bivens,” id. at ___, S. Ct. at 743. In an excessive force case decided this year, the Court not only rejected a direct constitutional damages claim against the federal government, it added that “it is doubtful that we would have reached the same result” if Bivens and Carlson were before the Court today. Id. at ___, S. Ct. at 742–43. Thus, in comparison with the constitutional tort remedy currently available for federal constitutional violations, the claim we recognized in Godfrey II is robust. In addition, the dissent to some extent conflates federal constitutional claims against the federal government with federal constitutional claims against municipalities and state and local officials. The latter are based on a statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983, unlike the ITCA, does not bar punitive damages. Rather, it states that the defendants “shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law.” Id. This has been interpreted as authorizing an award of punitive damages against individuals (but not governmental entities) in an appropriate case. See City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 267–68, 101 S. Ct. at 2760. 31 V. Are the Plaintiffs’ Claims Under the Iowa Constitution Subject to the Administrative Exhaustion Requirement in Iowa Code Section 669.5(1)? Yes. See the discussion in division III of this opinion. VI. Are the Plaintiffs Required to Bring Their Iowa Constitutional Claims in the Appropriate Iowa District Court Under Iowa Code Section 669.4? We begin with a point of federal law recognized by the federal district court. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” Although the Eleventh Amendment literally bars only lawsuits against states by persons residing outside the state, the United States Supreme Court has held for over a century that it also limits the ability of citizens to sue their own state in federal court. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15, 10 S. Ct. 504, 507 (1890). From this starting point, it follows that a citizen generally cannot sue a state on a state-law claim in federal court absent the state’s consent. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98–99, 104 S. Ct. 900, 907 (1984). Also, Eleventh Amendment immunity may only be “waived by consent or a voluntary appearance, by statute, or by the state’s conduct in the suit.” Shumaker v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 541 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Iowa 1995). Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to state-law claims asserted in federal court by way of supplemental jurisdiction. See Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 541–42, 122 S. Ct. 999, 1005 (2002). Moreover, Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to claims under a state constitution. See Vasquez v. Rackauckas, 734 F.3d 1025, 1041 32 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that the Eleventh Amendment barred a claim under the California Constitution against a state official); Spoklie v. Montana, 411 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Spoklie claims that I–143 violates his property rights under Article II, section 3, of the Montana Constitution. However, the Eleventh Amendment prevents him from asserting that claim in federal court. To the extent he seeks damages from the State and from DFWP, the Eleventh Amendment stands directly in his way.”); Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Some of Plaintiffs’ claims against the State of Ohio here are under the Ohio Constitution and Ohio common law. Although Ohio has statutorily waived its state sovereign immunity against certain state court actions by consenting to state suits in the Ohio Court of Claims, a State may retain Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court even if it has waived its immunity and consented to be sued in its state courts.” (citation omitted)); Vill. of Orland Park v. Pritzker, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, ___, 2020 WL 4430577, at  (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2020) (holding the Eleventh Amendment bars claims in federal court against the Governor of Illinois under the Illinois Constitution); Support Working Animals, Inc. v. DeSantis, 457 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1207 n.6 (N.D. Fla. 2020) (“Plaintiffs argue Florida waived its sovereign immunity for federal suits ‘based on violations of the state or federal constitution.’ The cases relied upon by Plaintiffs were both filed in state court and involved sovereign immunity under state law, not the Eleventh Amendment. . . . [T]his Court finds that Plaintiffs have not established that Florida has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity as to any of the claims in this case.” (citations omitted)); Veasey v. Perry, 29 F. Supp. 3d 896, 922 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (finding no jurisdiction over claims under the Texas Constitution because any waiver of the Eleventh Amendment would have to be “unequivocal” and “[n]o such 33 unequivocal consent appears here, where the State has asserted its Eleventh Amendment rights”); Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1358 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment precludes the Court from entertaining Plaintiffs’ claims asserted under the Georgia Constitution.”); Doe v. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs., 148 F. Supp. 2d 462, 492 (D.N.J. 2001) (dismissing claims based on the Eleventh Amendment and concluding that “[t]he plaintiffs have not identified any provision of state law where New Jersey has expressly consented to suit in federal court under . . . the New Jersey Constitution”). Additionally, we find no indication that the State of Iowa has generally waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court as to direct constitutional claims. No such language appears in the Iowa Constitution or the Iowa Code. And our precedents do not support such a waiver. Godfrey II didn’t address the issue. “[A] State’s consent to suit in its own courts is not a waiver of its immunity from suit in federal court.” Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 285, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1658 (2011). While Godfrey II emphasized the importance of an adequate remedy for violations of the Iowa Constitution, Godfrey II, 898 N.W.2d at 880–81 (Cady, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), nothing in Godfrey II or any of our subsequent opinions on direct constitutional claims for damages suggests that federal court access is the key to an adequate remedy. Godfrey II was a state court proceeding, and we found the remedies recognized therein to be adequate.9 9Of course, a state may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by its conduct in a particular case, for example by removing the case from state to federal court. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 624, 122 S. Ct. 1640, 1646 (2002). The present action was originally brought by Wagner in federal court, not removed there by the defendants. Wagner insists it is improper for the State to remove “select” cases arising under the Iowa Constitution to federal court, while it forces other such cases into state court by asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity. Wagner cites no authority for the proposition that selective assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity 34 Furthermore, as the federal district court noted, Iowa courts—as opposed to federal courts—have exclusive statutory jurisdiction over claims under the ITCA absent a waiver in a specific case. Iowa Code section 669.4(1) provides, The district court of the state of Iowa for the district in which the plaintiff is resident or in which the act or omission complained of occurred, or where the act or omission occurred outside of Iowa and the plaintiff is a nonresident, the Polk county district court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear, determine, and render judgment on any suit or claim as defined in this chapter. Far from being a consent to federal court jurisdiction, section 669.4(1)’s reference to “exclusive jurisdiction” is a command that such suits be brought only in state court. “We construe section 25A.4 [the predecessor of section 669.4] to give Iowa district courts (as distinguished from federal courts) exclusive jurisdiction over state tort claims.” Hyde v. Buckalew, 393 N.W.2d 800, 802 (Iowa 1986); see also Teska v. Rasmussen, 40 Fed.