Opinion ID: 6226542
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Co-defendant disparity

Text: Next, Edward contends that there was an unwarranted disparity between the sentence he received and the sentences his co-conspirators received on resentencing. In imposing sentence, a district court must consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Though that is typically concerned with national disparities, we have also considered claims that a sentence is substantively unreasonable because of a disparity relative to a co-defendant's sentence. See United States v. Grullon, 996 F.3d 21, 35 (1st Cir. 2021). Not all co-defendant disparities in sentencing yield a substantively unreasonable sentence. As we've explained, [t]he key word is 'unwarranted' -- that is, § 3553(a)(6) does not ban all disparities, just 'unwarranted' ones. United States v. Romero, 906 F.3d 196, 211 (1st Cir. 2018). A defendant is not entitled to a lighter sentence merely because his co-defendants received lighter sentences. United States v. Dávila-González, 595 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Wallace, 573 F.3d 82, 97 (1st Cir. 2009)). To make out a well-founded claim of sentencing disparity, a defendant must compare apples to apples. United States v. Mateo-Espejo, 426 F.3d 508, 514 (1st Cir. 2005). Among other things that may throw off a direct comparison, we have - 40 - looked at a co-defendant's cooperation, the nature of her cooperation, and her choice to plead guilty instead of going to trial, see United States v. Reyes-Santiago, 804 F.3d 453, 467 (1st Cir. 2015) (collecting cases), as well as her relative culpability or role in the crime, see United States v. Reverol-Rivera, 778 F.3d 363, 366 (1st Cir. 2015). In the end, cases of identically situated defendants are unusual to say the least. Grullon, 996 F.3d at 35-36. Applying those principles here, Edward's challenge fails. Edward clamors that his co-defendants each received sentences of time served on resentencing even though their original sentences were substantially higher than what they had to that point served.13 Yet Edward fails to grapple with the reasons the sentencing judge gave for the disparity. First, the judge explained that Elaine, Riley, and Gerhard each showed that they had learned during their prison terms that what they had done was wrong. As the judge put it, [t]hey appeared broken by the period of incarceration, leaving 13 At the time of resentencing, Elaine had served 85 months of her 420-month sentence. Mot. on Resentencing at 1 & n.2, United States v. Brown, No. 09-cr-30 (D.N.H. Jan. 16, 2020), ECF No. 311. Riley had served, as best we can tell, around 12 years of his 36year sentence. And Gerhard, too, had served over 12 years of his original 20-year prison sentence. Def.'s Obj. to Resentencing & Sentencing Mem. at 3, United States v. Gerhard, No. 07-cr-189 (D.N.H. Jan. 20, 2020), ECF No. 713. - 41 - the judge with no doubt that there was no risk that any of them would engage in the same behavior. Edward, though, didn't give the judge the same confidence given his comments that he still thinks he did nothing wrong, and about the authority of the law and the courts. Second, Edward acknowledges that he may have been more culpable than his co-defendants but suggests he wasn't moreculpable enough to justify serving almost double time in prison. Yet the district court disagreed. It noted that Edward was the leader and instigator of the entire standoff. It also emphasized that Edward dragged others into his crime to support his standoff, brainwash[ing] one of the co-defendants. Both rationales were supported by the record. Ultimately, the sentencing judge assessed Edward's greater culpability, combined with all the other factors relevant to his sentencing (including his continued belief he did nothing wrong), and concluded that he merited a substantially higher sentence than his co-defendants. He gave a plausible rationale and reached a defensible result relative to Edward's codefendants, so we find no abuse of discretion. See Grullon, 996 F.3d at 36; Reverol-Rivera, 778 F.3d at 367.