Opinion ID: 627222
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Spill-Over Effect from Pro Se Defendant

Text: Baranwal, Pickens, and Chebssi also argue that they were prejudiced by LaCour's decision to proceed pro se. This argument suggests that LaCour's representation of himself had a spill over effect. We have recognized that severance may be warranted [w]here a cumulative and prejudicial `spill over' effect may prevent the jury from sifting through the evidence to make an individualized determination as to each [d]efendant. Chavez, 584 F.3d at 1360-61. However, the mere fact that one of the defendants chooses to proceed pro se does not compel the conclusion that severance is warranted. United States v. Knowles, 66 F.3d 1146, 1160 (11th Cir.1995). And under our precedent, the possibility that a defendant might have had a better chance of acquittal if he could have gone it alone is also not sufficient. Chavez, 584 F.3d at 1361. In view of these principles, the appellants' argument must fail. The District Court took a number of steps to prevent any spill-over effect from taking place. Cf. Knowles, 66 F.3d at 1160. For instance, the District Court instructed the jury not to consider as evidence the statements that LaCour made in representing himself. The District Court also instructed the jury to give separate consideration to each defendant. In the end, the jury acquitted Baranwal, Pickens, and Chebssi of the conspiracy count with which they were charged, while convicting them of the various distribution counts. This verdict indicates that the jury was able to sift through the evidence and make an individualized determination as to each defendant. Schlei, 122 F.3d at 984 (quotation marks omitted).