Opinion ID: 2978474
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Error in Electronic Indictment

Text: “We review the sufficiency of an indictment de novo.” United States v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925, 934 (6th Cir. 2004). Indictment by a grand jury protects an accused’s Sixth Amendment right to notice of the charges against him as well as his Fifth Amendment rights against double jeopardy and against answering for crimes not indicted by a grand jury. Id. at 935. Accordingly, the rules governing indictments should be applied in a way to uphold these rights, but not in a way to defeat justice. Id. Simms does not argue that his Fifth Amendment rights have been violated; he concedes that the grand jury probably indicted him for the events of November 9, 2005. He argues only that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated. We bear this in mind when evaluating his claim. The Sixth Circuit recognizes three types of modifications to an indictment: an actual amendment, a constructive amendment, and a variance. United States v. Budd, 496 F.3d 517, 521 (6th Cir. 2007). The first type of modification, an actual amendment, occurs when the prosecutor changes the actual text of the indicting instrument. Id. The second type of modification, a constructive amendment, arises when the terms of the indictment are changed through the -4- No. 07-4512 USA v. Antrown Simms presentation of evidence and jury instructions such that the essential elements of the offense charged have been changed. Id. This type of modification is per se prejudicial and always requires reversal. United States v. Nance, 481 F.3d 882, 886 (6th Cir. 2007). A variance, the final type of modification, “occurs when the charging terms are unchanged, but the evidence at trial proves facts materially different from those alleged in the indictment.” Id. at 886 (internal quotations omitted). Variances are not per se prejudicial and require reversal only if the defendant shows that a substantial right has been affected, such as his ability to defend himself at trial or to have a generally fair trial. United States v. Kuehne, 547 F.3d 667, 683 (6th Cir. 2008). The defendant bears the burden of showing that his substantial rights have been affected by a variance. Id. at 685. While the exact nature of Simms’s arguments are difficult to ascertain, he seems to contend that either a constructive amendment or a variance occurred in his case because the electronic indictment bore an August 2006 date but the evidence presented at trial focused on a November 2005 date. Simms does not contend that an actual amendment occurred. Turning to Simms’s constructive amendment argument, the clerical error here does not amount to a constructive amendment. In prior cases, we have recognized constructive amendments where the defendant was convicted of a crime or event different from that charged in the indictment. See, e.g., United States v. Hunter, 558 F.3d 495, 501–02 (6th Cir. 2009) (reversing the conviction where the jury was instructed on possession of a firearm “during and in relation to” drug trafficking, rather than in “furtherance” of drug trafficking as required by the statute); Combs, 369 F.3d at 936 (holding that a constructive amendment occurred where the jury instruction broadened the scope of liability from “possession” of a firearm to “use” of a firearm); United States v. Ford, 872 F.2d 1231, 1236 (6th Cir. -5- No. 07-4512 USA v. Antrown Simms 1989) (finding a constructive amendment where the jury conviction could have rested on an event different from that charged in the indictment). But Simms was both charged with and convicted of the same crime and event—the foot chase occurring in November 2005. Thus, no constructive amendment occurred. Nor does the error rise to the level of a reversible variance. The government was clearly sloppy in its prosecution of this case, but reversal is not necessary because Simms has not carried his burden of showing that his substantial rights have been affected. Kuehne, 547 F.3d at 685. Simms claims that his Sixth Amendment right to notice of the charges against him were violated due to the error in the electronic indictment. Under the Sixth Amendment, “a criminal defendant has the right ‘to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation’ against him.” United States v. Maney, 226 F.3d 660, 663 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI). The Sixth Amendment’s Notice Clause gives a defendant the opportunity to adequately prepare a defense by knowing the charges against him. United States v. Cor-Bon Custom Bullet Co., 287 F.3d 576, 580 (6th Cir. 2002). Simms’s claim of a constitutional violation is simply not supported by the record. Defense counsel admits that he first became aware of the indictment error early in the trial. Further, the record indicates that numerous references were made to the offense date throughout the trial, including many by Simms’s own attorney, and all of the references used the November 2005 date. Additionally, the government read a correct version of the indictment, containing the November 2005 date, during its opening statements. Finally, Simms had the benefit of pretrial discovery and was therefore apprised of the correct offense date when he learned that the government intended to use the audio recordings from his November 2005 stay in the Richland County jail. In short, Simms -6- No. 07-4512 USA v. Antrown Simms has not shown that the date error in the electronic indictment deprived him of his ability to adequately prepare a defense. See Cor-Bon Custom Bullet Co., 287 F.3d at 580.