Opinion ID: 2057290
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Intentional Act Exclusion

Text: Security Mutual first argues that the intentional act exclusion applies because France's misconduct is so heinous that it must be deemed intentional as a matter of law. In thus framing the argument, the insurer concedes that there is no evidence that France actually intended to injure Slayko. The evidence shows that the two young men were friends up until the shooting; that France was surprised when the gun discharged; and that he took prompt measures to mitigate the harm he had caused. Because France did not intend to injure Slayko, the intentional act exclusion could apply only if the injury were inherent in the nature of the wrongful act ( see Allstate Ins. Co. v Mugavero, 79 NY2d 153, 161 [1992]). Security Mutual maintains that France's act was inherently harmful because pointing any gun is dangerous and France undisputedly intended to point the gun and pull the trigger. We have long recognized, however, that insurable accidental results may flow from intentional causes ( see McGroarty v Great Am. Ins. Co., 36 NY2d 358, 364 [1975]). Mugavero identifies a narrow class of cases in which the intentional act exclusion applies regardless of the insured's subjective intent. There, faced with an implausible argument that the insured did not intend the injuries he caused, we found wisdom in the public perception that molesting a child without causing harm is a virtual impossibility (79 NY2d at 161). The same cannot be said here, as the gun could have been empty. Thus, France's conduct, though reckless, was not inherently harmful for the purpose of the intentional act exclusion. The general rule remains that more than a causal connection between the intentional act and the resultant harm is required to prove that the harm was intended ( id. at 160). Under this standard, as the Appellate Division correctly held, the exclusion does not apply.