Opinion ID: 2547964
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Penalty Phase Admission of Testimony of Original and Amended Prior Charges.

Text: Appellant next argues that the penalty phase introduction of the original dismissed charges from his prior convictions was erroneous. Specifically, the Commonwealth elicited testimony from the deputy circuit clerk as to Appellant's original 2001 charges of trafficking in a controlled substance and trafficking in marijuana, which were later amended to possession of a controlled substance and possession of marijuana; he was convicted of the amended charges. The Commonwealth also elicited testimony as to Appellant's original 2006 charges of trafficking in a controlled substance and trafficking in marijuana, which were also later amended to possession of a controlled substance and possession of marijuana; he was again convicted of the amended charges. This issue is unpreserved; however, we invoke our authority under RCr 10.26 and review for palpable error. [11] During the penalty phase of a jury trial, KRS 532.055(2)(a)(2) allows the jury to hear [t]he nature of prior offenses for which [the defendant] was convicted. Appellant argues that this does not include the original charges of an indictment that was amended prior to final judgment and conviction. We agree. Nothing in KRS 532.055(2)(a) permits a jury to hear evidence during the penalty phase of prior charges that have been amendedit is only permitted to hear evidence of the nature of the prior offenses for which [the defendant] was convicted. KRS.055(2)(a)(2) (emphasis added). And we have recognized that it is also well settled that the Commonwealth cannot introduce evidence of charges that have been dismissed or set aside. Cook v. Commonwealth, 129 S.W.3d 351, 365 (Ky.2004) (citations omitted); see also Robinson v. Commonwealth, 926 S.W.2d 853, 854 (Ky. 1996) (holding that KRS 532.055(2)(a) permits the introduction of prior convictions of the defendant, not prior charges subsequently dismissed). For purposes of the penalty phase, criminal charges that have subsequently been amended are the functional equivalent of dismissed charges, which we have established to be impermissible as evidence in a sentencing hearing. See Chavies v. Commonwealth, 354 S.W.3d 103, 115 (Ky.2011) (holding that the introduction of the indictment showing the charges that were later dismissed and amended was erroneous) (emphasis added). The prosecution may only introduce evidence of the nature of a defendant's prior offenses, including the charges for which he was convicted, and the trial court erred by permitting introduction of the pre-amended charges. However, for Appellant to be successful on this issue we must also find that this error was palpable. In arguing that the error was indeed palpable, Appellant contends that he was prejudiced as evidenced by the jury's recommendation of the maximum sentence on each of the underlying charges. As such, he argues, prejudice can be presumed. Under the facts presented in this case, we agree. We recently addressed a very similar issue in Chavies, where the defendant's indictment, showing dismissed and amended charges, was introduced during the penalty phase of his trial. In that case we concluded that the error was not palpable. In support of that conclusion, we noted that (1) the defendant did not receive the maximum penalty for one of the convictions for which he was being sentenced, and (2) the dismissed and amended offenses were never pointed out to the jury by the trial judge, the Commonwealth, or the Commonwealth's witness. Id. at 115. Here, the opposite is true. Appellant received the maximum penalty on all counts for which he was convicted. Moreover, the Commonwealth not only elicited the testimony from the deputy circuit clerk regarding the original charges, but it also emphasized the prior amended charges in its closing argument to the jury. [12] To be sure, there is no way of knowing whether or to what extent the introduction of the original charges influenced the jury to recommend the maximum penalty on all convictions. However, in reversing a similar decision we noted the following: It has been observed that the maximum sentence has been imposed by the verdict, and it would be pure speculation for us to ponder what, if any, portion of the punishment stemmed from the improper argument of counsel. Taulbee v. Commonwealth, 438 S.W.2d 777, 779 (Ky.1969) (reversing and granting defendant new trial after the prosecutor made improper comments during closing arguments). We conclude that introducing the original charges of Appellant's prior convictions constitutes palpable error in that it affected a substantial right to due process, resulting in a manifest injustice. See RCr 10.26. We therefore reverse and remand to the trial court for a new penalty phase, with instructions that the trial court not permit the Commonwealth to introduce prior amended charges for which Appellant was not convicted.