Opinion ID: 2669163
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: VICAR Instruction

Text: In Instruction No. 40, the district court stated that on the VICAR charge against Mr. Daniel Maumau, the Government had to prove: First, that on or about the time period described in this Second Superseding Indictment, TCG was a criminal enterprise; Second, that the enterprise engaged in racketeering activity; Third, that the particular Defendant assaulted with a dangerous weapon an individual, as described in the particular Count, as [the district court had] just defined those terms for [the jury], or aided and abetted in the assault with a dangerous weapon; Fourth, that the particular Defendant’s purpose in assaulting the individual with a dangerous weapon, or aiding and abetting in the act, was to maintain or to increase his position in the enterprise. The particular Defendant’s purpose to maintain or increase his position in the enterprise need not [have been] the only purpose for committing the act, but the government [had to] prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the purpose was an integral, or essential, purpose. Instruction No. 40, Daniel Maumau R. vol. 1, pt. 2, at 274 (emphasis added). Mr. Daniel Maumau asserts two errors with the fourth part of this instruction: (1) The jury could find guilt even if the shooting did not relate to the Defendant’s membership in TCG; and (2) the reference to an “integral or essential 47 purpose” did “not connect the essential or important purpose in committing the [Faamausili-home shooting] to membership in TCG.” Daniel Maumau’s Opening Br. at 30-31.
Mr. Daniel Maumau’s first challenge is based on his reading of United States v. Smith, 413 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hutchinson, 573 F.3d 1011, 1021 (10th Cir. 2009). In Smith, we concluded that the Government need only prove that the “crime was ‘committed as an integral aspect of membership’” in the enterprise to establish this element of a § 1959(a) offense, not that the defendant’s “sole or principal motive for conspiring to murder . . . was to maintain or increase his position in [the enterprise] in order for it to convict Mr. Smith under § 1959(a).” 413 F.3d at 1277-78 (quoting United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 817 (2d Cir. 1994)). We added that “‘the motive requirement is satisfied if the jury could properly infer that the defendant committed his violent crime because he knew it was expected of him by reason of his membership in the enterprise or that he committed it in furtherance of that membership.’” Id. at 1278 (emphasis added; quoting United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 671 (2d Cir. 2001)). Mr. Daniel Maumau’s argument is based on reading the “or” in this sentence in the conjunctive. Under his reading, the prosecution would have to establish two purposes: (1) that the defendant committed the violent crime because he knew it 48 was expected of him due to his membership, and (2) that the defendant committed the violent crime to further his membership. Instead, we read Smith’s language in the disjunctive. After all, in Smith, we used the word “or” rather than “and.” 16 Thus, we conclude that the district court did not have to require the jury to find that Mr. Daniel Maumau had fired the gun because he knew it was expected of him as a TCG member and that he had fired the gun in furtherance of that membership. Under Smith, either one would have sufficed. We also reject Mr. Daniel Maumau’s argument regarding the failure to include the second, alternative method of finding the required motive. This alternative would have made it easier to convict Mr. Daniel Maumau on this count; thus, even if the omission involved error, the error worked to the Defendant’s benefit.
Mr. Daniel Maumau also argues that the district court’s instruction could be read to mean that “this element is established if [he] had any essential or important 16 In his opening brief, Mr. Daniel Maumau seems to agree. While arguing that there was insufficient evidence to convict under VICAR, Mr. Daniel Maumau stated that the fifth element of VICAR required only that “the defendant knew it was expected of him due to his membership in the enterprise or that it was committed in furtherance of that membership.” See Daniel Maumau’s Opening Br. at 19 (emphasis added) (discussing the holding in Smith). Mr. Daniel Maumau’s counsel also stated in oral argument that these two methods of establishing the motive requirement were “alternatives.” 49 purpose in committing the act.” Daniel Maumau’s Opening Br. at 31 (emphasis added). We disagree. The instruction stated that “[t]he particular Defendant’s purpose to maintain or increase his position in the enterprise need not be the only purpose for committing the act, but the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the purpose was an integral, or essential, purpose.” Daniel Maumau R. vol. 1, pt. 2, at 274 (emphases added). “The purpose” in the second clause of this sentence refers to the purpose in the first clause, which was limited to maintaining or increasing a position in the enterprise. And, the first sentence in this part of the instruction made clear that the purpose was connected to TCG by requiring proof that the defendant’s purpose “in assaulting the individual with a dangerous weapon, or aiding and abetting in the act, was to maintain or to increase his position in the enterprise.” Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, we reject Mr. Daniel Maumau’s argument that the instruction allowed the jury to find guilt if he had any purpose, even a lawful one.