Opinion ID: 707584
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Substantial Compliance Standard

Text: 7 The term substantial compliance appears in the consent decree and thus we treat it like a contract term. See United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236-38, 95 S.Ct. 926, 934-35, 43 L.Ed.2d 148 (1975) (explaining that consent decrees should be basically construed as contracts). Accordingly, we review the district court's definition of that term de novo. North Shore Lab. v. Cohen, 721 F.2d 514, 518-19 (5th Cir.1983) (interpretation of a consent decree, like that of a contractual provision, requires de novo review). See NLRB v. Monfort, Inc., 29 F.3d 525, 528 (10th Cir.1994) (reviewing special master's conclusions of law de novo ). 8 The phrase substantial compliance is not susceptible of a mathematically precise definition. In interpreting a similar phrase in a consent decree, the First Circuit in Fortin v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Mass. Pub. Welfare, 692 F.2d 790, 795 (1st Cir.1982) observed that: 9 no particular percentage of compliance can be a safe-harbor figure, transferable from one context to another. Like reasonableness, substantiality must depend on the circumstances of each case, including the nature of the interest at stake and the degree to which noncompliance affects that interest. 10 692 F.2d 790, 795 (1st Cir.1982) (internal citation omitted). See also Ruiz v. McCotter, 661 F.Supp. 112, 147 (S.D.Tex.1986) (citing Fortin and comparing concept to reasonableness). 11 We have explained that the contract law doctrine of substantial compliance 4 is:simply a doctrine to assist the court in determining whether conduct should, in reality, be considered the equivalent of compliance under the contract. See John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts Sec. 11-15, at 454 (3d ed. 1987) (If a party has substantially performed, it follows that any breach he may have committed is immaterial.). 12 Peckham v. Gem State Mut., 964 F.2d 1043, 1052 (10th Cir.1992). Judge Cardozo, in the seminal substantial compliance case of Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, concluded that performance of a contract will not be considered in substantial compliance of the contract if the deviation from the contract requirements ... in any real substantial measure ... frustrate[s] the purpose of the contract. 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (1921). Thus, the touchstone of the substantial compliance inquiry is whether Defendants frustrated the purpose of the consent decree--i.e. its essential requirements. 13 The consent decree's preamble clearly states that its essential purposes are to establish: 14 ... fair, reasonable and timely decision making with regard to access of adoption, and ... fair, reasonable and adequate procedures and practices necessary to insure access to permanent adoptive homes ... 15 Joseph A., 575 F.Supp. at 354. To accomplish this purpose, the consent decree endeavored to: 16 put in place a system, equivalent to regulations, for dealing with children in DHS [Department] custody. It requires planning, action, supervision, and oversight on a sequential timetable from first intake to final discharge. 17 Sp.Mast. at 3. Thus, substantial compliance with the decree contemplates more than a one-time 12 month period of fair, reasonable, and timely decision making with regard to adoption. Substantial compliance with the decree also requires enactment of fair, reasonable, and adequate procedures to effect long-term institutional reform of the New Mexico foster-care system. Id. (quoting Burciaga, J.). 5 Cf. Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 111 S.Ct. 630, 112 L.Ed.2d 715 (1991) (reviewing continued enforcement of a school desegregation decree). 18 The Special Master correctly noted that the substantial compliance analysis needed to focus on both the purposes of the decree--that is, the (1) timely; (2) fair; and (3) reasonable process of adopting foster care children--as well as the institutionalization of procedures to accomplish those ends. Sp.Mast. at 48. However, the Special Master cast some doubt on the legal standard he was using when he explained that substantial compliance reflected no absolutes and that the Court must subjectively weigh what was done against what was wanted. Id. The Special Master then referred to a circular definition of substantial compliance when he relied on the Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1961) which defined substantial as that is such in substance or in the main, as, a substantial victory, or considerable; large; as a substantial gain. Id. 19 This dictionary definition is most unhelpful and it suggests a degree of imprecision and latitude that goes beyond the legal concept of substantial compliance or substantial performance. On remand, the court should begin with the essential purposes of the consent decree which we have quoted from the Decree's preamble, and it should then consider the specific steps set forth in the consent decree by which those purposes may be satisfied. To the extent that any stipulated criteria has not been met, the court must determine whether that failure is immaterial to the overall objectives or, on the other hand, whether it had a material adverse impact upon the overall processing and placement of children into permanent homes. Because the consent decree sets forth specific criteria to be met, those criteria must be respected unless a deviation can be shown not to have a material effect upon the overall performance of the Department in processing and placing children into permanent homes. This kind of analysis is not reflected in either the Special Master's report or the district court opinion below.