Opinion ID: 530567
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Issues Relating to Brown Individually

Text: 18 Appellant Brown argues that five of the six counts of distribution of cocaine must be reversed because insufficient evidence was presented to show that the substance involved was actually cocaine. 4 Brown claims that since the cocaine itself was not admitted into evidence, and no expert testimony was offered at trial to identify the substance delivered by Brown, the government failed to prove the identity of the substance as cocaine. 19 This Court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, under the requirements of Glasser. Additionally, we must affirm if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126. 20 Circumstantial evidence, supported by lay testimony, may establish the identity of the substance involved. United States v. Eakes, 783 F.2d 499, 504 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 906, 106 S.Ct. 3277, 91 L.Ed.2d 567. Several people involved in the conspiracy testified at trial that cocaine obtained from Price was delivered by Brown, and it was handled in essentially the same manner on each occasion. First, substantial sums of money were paid for it. After delivery, it was carefully tested and weighed. The substance was then divided into smaller amounts and packaged in plastic sandwich bags. It was then distributed to various crack houses where it was eventually resold. These operations were conducted covertly in private houses. Furthermore, the witnesses whose testimony supports the above, also testified that they were experienced in identifying cocaine. Evidence of this continuing pattern was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the substance involved was in fact cocaine. 21 Brown also argues that comments made by the government during closing argument require reversal. Since Brown made no timely objection at trial, it must appear that the comments amounted to plain error. United States v. Brooks, 786 F.2d 638, 642 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 855, 107 S.Ct. 193, 93 L.Ed.2d 126. Specifically, Brown contends that the prosecutor told the jury that the government's witnesses were obliged to tell the truth pursuant to their plea agreement with the government, and that if they did not, all deals are off and they get prosecuted. Record Vol. 7 at 230. This argument was made in response to Porter's implication that the government's witnesses may have lied due to their involvement or interest in the case. The prosecutor was entitled to fairly respond to this argument. Brooks, 786 F.2d at 642. Nevertheless, even if improper, the prosecutor's statement did not amount to plain error. 22 Next, Brown claims that the prosecutor improperly implied that extrinsic facts existed to impeach Brown, but that there was a time crunch, and he was unable to develop this. A prosecutor may not inject extrinsic matter into his argument, which does not have a basis in the evidence presented during the trial. United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1030 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136, 102 S.Ct. 2965, 73 L.Ed.2d 1354. The prosecutor cited several inconsistencies in Brown's testimony, and how her testimony was contradicted by other witnesses. However, this prosecutor's conduct did not amount to plain error; it did not undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial, or cause a miscarriage of justice. Brooks, 786 F.2d at 642. 23 Lastly, Brown contends that the prosecutor impermissibly appealed to the jury's emotion, by saying [d]rugs are a terrible thing and they are ruining the society ... [a]nd it's up to you to do something about it and that is returning a verdict of guilty on these charges. Record Vol. 7 at 235. While it is true that a prosecutor may not distract the jury's attention from applying the law, by making an appeal to passion or prejudice, [u]nless calculated to inflame, an appeal to the jury to act as the conscience of the community is not impermissible. United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d at 1030, quoting United States v. Lewis, 547 F.2d 1030, 1037 (8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1111, 97 S.Ct. 1149, 51 L.Ed.2d 566 (1977). In this case, the prosecutor's statements did not rise to the level of an improper law and order appeal. Even if construed to be improper, the argument did not amount to plain error.III. CONCLUSION 24 The convictions of Brown and Porter are affirmed, although this Court remands for resentencing of Count I, in accordance with this opinion. 25 AFFIRMED IN PART, REMANDED IN PART.