Opinion ID: 1852417
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutionality of La.Rev.Stat. 15:1171-1179

Text: The burden of proving that an act is unconstitutional is upon the party attacking the act. Because the Legislature is entitled to exercise any power not specifically denied by the constitution, a party questioning the constitutionality of an act must point to a specific provision of the Louisiana Constitution which clearly prohibits the legislative action. Board of Directors of Louisiana Recovery District v. All Taxpayers, Property Owners, and Citizens of Louisiana, 529 So.2d 384 (La. 1988). Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of La.Rev.Stat. 15:1171-1179 on the basis that original jurisdiction in all civil matters is vested in the district courts by La. Const. art. V, § 16(A). [9] Plaintiff accordingly argues that a legislative act cannot divest the district courts of original jurisdiction over a tort action, which is clearly a civil matter. In Moore v. Roemer, 567 So.2d 75 (La. 1990), this court addressed an attempt, by legislative act, to eliminate the original jurisdiction of the district courts in workers' compensation actions and to create an administrative agency in the executive branch to adjudicate such actions, subject to review by the courts of appeal. Noting that a proposal to allow the Legislature to fix the jurisdiction of the district courts was defeated in the 1973 Constitutional Convention, this court held that the 1974 Constitution, which vested original jurisdiction in the district courts over all civil and criminal matters, [10] thereby precluded the Legislature from divesting the district courts of original jurisdiction in a civil matter involving workers' compensation benefits. We emphasized that the 1974 Constitution granted the district courts at least concurrent original jurisdiction over all civil and criminal matters, except for those matters in which original jurisdiction is otherwise authorized by the Constitution itself in other courts or in other adjudicative tribunals, [11] and that workers' compensation actions, from the time the cause of action was created through the adoption of the 1974 Constitution, had been filed in the district courts. The Moore decision construed the plain terms of the 1974 Constitution by a straightforward syllogism: [T]he legislature may not divest district courts of jurisdiction mandated by the state constitution, which includes original jurisdiction over civil matters; worker's compensation claims are civil matters; therefore no statute may vest any administrative organ with exclusive power bindingly to determine such claims in the first instance, at least in the absence of de novo review in the district courts. John Devlin, Developments in the Law, 1989-1990Louisiana Constitutional Law, 51 La.L.Rev. 295, 315 (1990). In the present case, the State contends that Moore is distinguishable in that the statute in Moore completely divested the district courts of any authority to adjudicate workers' compensation cases, while the statute in the present case simply requires a tort victim to submit to an administrative remedy procedure before filing suit in the district court. The State further contends that CARP does not divest district courts of the power to adjudicate civil matters or to grant relief. Contrary to the State's argument, the problem with La.Rev.Stat. 15:1171-1179 is not that the statutes completely eliminate the district courts (as in Moore ) from taking part in any manner in a certain category of civil cases, [12] or that the statutes add an administrative remedy procedure as a prerequisite to the district court's exercise of original jurisdiction (as in medical malpractice actions); the problem is that the statutes divest the district courts of the original jurisdiction granted by the Constitution in all civil matters and vest original jurisdiction in certain tort actions in the DOC officials who administer the administrative remedy procedure. Original jurisdiction is [j]urisdiction in the first instance  or [j]urisdiction to take cognizance of a cause at its inception, try it and pass judgment upon the law and facts. Black's Law Dictionary 991 (5th ed.1979). The DOC officials in the administrative remedy procedure adopted pursuant to La.Rev.Stat. 15:1711, who take cognizance of a tort claim by an offender at the inception of the action, try the claim, and pass judgment on the law and the facts of the action, clearly are exercising original jurisdiction, to the exclusion of the district courts. The conclusion that the DOC officials are exercising original jurisdiction under La.Rev.Stat. 15:1171-1179 (and that the district courts, therefore, are not) is emphasized by the judicial review provisions of La.Rev.Stat. 15:1177. The judicial review by the district court is on the record made up before the DOC officials, and the district court has only three options: (1) to affirm the adjudication by the DOC officials, (2) to remand the case to the DOC officials for additional evidence, or (3) to reverse or modify the adjudication, generally because it is manifestly erroneous or is arbitrary and capricious. [13] Therefore, in the judicial review under Section 1177, the district courts are precluded from exercising the original jurisdiction function of finding facts in the first instance and applying the law to the facts so found. Rather, the district courts, required by Section 1177A(9)(f) to give due regard ... to the agency's determination of credibility issues, are essentially exercising a limited judicial review function, on the administrative record, and clearly are not exercising original jurisdiction at the inception of the action. Original jurisdiction in tort actions under the administrative remedy procedure adopted by the DOC clearly is exercised exclusively by the DOC officials, in violation of the express terms of the Constitution. Moreover, the district courts historically have exercised original jurisdiction in tort actions as civil matters, and were doing so when the 1974 Constitution was adopted with the broad language all civil and criminal matters in Section 16(A) of Article V. While this court in In the Matter of American Waste & Pollution Control, 588 So.2d 367 (La.1991) arguably limited the scope of the Moore decision, the statutes at issue in American Waste (vesting an administrative agency with original jurisdiction in permit and enforcement actions, subject to review by the court of appeal) are vastly different from statutes granting original jurisdiction to an administrative agency in tort actions, even those in which the government is the alleged tortfeasor. [14] Since the Constitution fixes the original jurisdiction of the district courts in tort actions, that original jurisdiction cannot be changed by legislative act. Accordingly, we conclude that La.Rev.Stat. 15:1171-1179 is an invalid attempt to alter the original jurisdiction of the district courts by legislative act. This conclusion is strengthened by analogy to the express constitutional authority for the Legislature, notwithstanding any contrary provisions of La. Const. art. V, § 16(A), to provide, for example, for the jurisdiction of juvenile and family courts. See La. Const. art. V, § 18. We recognize that the Congress has delegated certain quasi-judicial powers to various federal administrative agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission, and the exercise of quasi-judicial functions by federal agencies of the executive branch has been upheld against attacks alleging violation of the constitutional requirement of separation of powers among branches of government. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985). See also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 106 S.Ct. 3245, 92 L.Ed.2d 675 (1986)(upholding an agency rule empowering the agency to adjudicate common law counterclaims in actions filed before the agency). However, our decision in the present case is not based on a separation of powers violation under La. Const. art. II, § 2, but on a violation of La. Const. art. V, § 16(A). There is no counterpart to Article V, Section 16(A) in the federal Constitution. Moreover, while the legislative branch in Louisiana has all powers not specifically prohibited by the Constitution, the broad constitutional grant of original jurisdiction to the district courts and the corresponding limited grant to the Legislature of the power to fix the jurisdiction of other specified courts effectively limits the powers of the Legislature and precludes the Legislature from changing the original jurisdiction of district courts fixed by the Constitution. We conclude that the Legislature cannot, by legislative act, divest the district courts of the original jurisdiction fixed by the Constitution in those civil matters, such as tort actions, [15] in which the Constitution does not otherwise provide for original jurisdiction in other tribunals. The Legislature, of course, is free to enact procedures for initial submission of tort claims by prison inmates to an administrative agency for review, for example, of frivolous claims, as long as the action of the administrative agency does not constitute the exercise of original jurisdiction. [16] Finally, we reject the State's argument that the administrative remedy procedure authorized by La.Rev.Stat. 15:1171 is analogous to the Medical Malpractice Act, which this court approved as constitutional in Everett v. Goldman, 359 So.2d 1256 (La.1978). That Act does provide a mandatory procedure for an initial (but nonbinding) determination by a medical review panel. However, the malpractice victim, after completing this administrative procedure, can then invoke the original jurisdiction of the district court. [17] The court thereafter has the power and authority to find facts in the first instance and to fully adjudicate the claim under its original jurisdiction, irrespective of the decision of the medical review panel. By contrast, in the administrative remedy procedure adopted by the DOC pursuant to La.Rev.Stat. 15:1171-1179, the district courts are deprived of their constitutionally granted original jurisdiction over civil matters in tort actions. Contrary to the State's argument, the administrative body does more than perform investigative and screening functions; as shown above, the administrative body exercises original jurisdiction in a clearly civil matter. Moreover, the administrative remedy procedure allows the DOC, in tort actions, to effectively adjudicate its own delictual liability, [18] and then requires the district courts to give manifest error rule deference to that adjudication. In summary, we conclude that the DOC officials, in the administrative remedy procedure adopted by the DOC pursuant to La.Rev.Stat. 15:1171-1179, exercise original jurisdiction in violation of La. Const. art. V, § 16(A), at least in tort actions, and that La.Rev.Stat. 15:1171-1179 are unconstitutional to the extent that the statutes are applied to tort actions.