Opinion ID: 1422776
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Compliance With the Statute Authorizing Good-Time Credits

Text: Grinter alleges a substantive due process violation because Henderson, Jones, and Hern violated the Kentucky good-time credit statute, Kentucky Revised Statute § 197.045, denying him the ability to accumulate sixty days of good-time credits. Grinter had already forfeited 2400 days of good-time credit and avers he had no more good-time credit to forfeit at the time he was denied the possibility of accumulating sixty days of good-time credits. The statute provides in part, The department may forfeit any good time previously earned by the prisoner or deny the prisoner the right to earn good time in any amount if during the term of imprisonment, a prisoner commits any offense or violates the rules of the institution. Ky.Rev.Stat. § 197.045(1). As the Due Process Clause itself does not create a liberty interest in credit for good behavior, Sandin, 515 U.S. at 477, 115 S.Ct. 2293, the question is whether the Kentucky statute creates such an interest. A Kentucky inmate possesses no inherent constitutional right ... to accumulate good time credits. Hopewell v. Berry, No. 89-5332, 889 F.2d 1087 (table), 1989 WL 137177, at  (6th Cir. Nov.15, 1989) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)). Furthermore, [p]rison officials clearly have discretion under state law to deny a prisoner future good time. Id. (citing Ky.Rev.Stat. § 197.045(1)). As there is no right to accumulate good-time credits, Henderson, Jones, and Hern did not commit a constitutional violation. Grinter's substantive due process rights were not violated because of his inability to accumulate good-time credits.