Opinion ID: 1249738
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Gardner's Mental State.

Text: The prosecution sought to prove that Gardner was not inclined to attack Patch of his own free will, and the court allowed two witnesses to testify to Gardner's lack of a violent disposition. Defendant objected on the ground of improper character evidence to the testimony of the first witness, James T. Donovan, a guard. Donovan stated that Gardner felt that he had shown by his behavior that he had changed, that he had a different outlook, and that he had remained disciplinary-free for some time. A psychiatrist, Dr. Grant Garlock, testified without objection that Gardner stated again that he wanted to change his life around, that he had ambitions for himself to get things put together ...; he wanted to get out of prison and be a productive member of society, get married and settle down. While [h]istorically speaking ... he was reclusive, seclusive, hostile, defensive and highly aggressive, Dr. Garlock never knew him in that condition because the first time I ever met him he was docile, cooperative, reserved, quiet, distant, [and] very proper and polite.... He was an ideal model prisoner.... (5) Defendant complains of the foregoing evidence. He failed to object to Dr. Garlock's testimony, and hence has failed to preserve that claim of error. Donovan's testimony was not offered to prove Gardner's conduct on the occasion of his stabbing of Patch; Gardner's conduct was undisputed. Though Evidence Code section 1100 permits the introduction of character evidence except as otherwise provided by statute, a major exception is that such evidence is generally inadmissible to prove a person's conduct on a specific occasion. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) Thus, if Donovan's testimony had been offered to prove conduct, it is arguable that it should not have been admitted. But the evidence was offered as part of the prosecution's effort to prove that Gardner was an unconscious agent and hence defendant's act was the proximate cause of Patch's death. We find no error. Defendant also offered certain letters as evidence of Gardner's bad character. In defendant's view, Gardner's character was epitomized in one passage wherein Gardner stated, It would be no more wrong for me to kill those who hold me in bondage than it would be for me to get a drink of water when thirsty. The prosecution objected to the letters as irrelevant and as substantially more prejudicial than probative. The court sustained the objection, stating that the evidence would confuse the jury and was irrelevant. (Evid. Code, §§ 350, 352.) Defendant did not pursue the matter further. (6) He now maintains the court erred under state law and also violated his right to due process when it excluded the letters. He argues that he should have been allowed to show through proof of more than one act demonstrating bad character that the conduct was the function of a character trait rather than an aberration. ( People v. Castain (1981) 122 Cal. App.3d 138, 143 [175 Cal. Rptr. 651].) We disagree that the court erred under state law in excluding the epistolary evidence of Gardner's bad character. The court and counsel discussed two letters in detail. The defense conceded that the first letter related Gardner's attitude toward one correctional officer only and that it possessed other evidence of Gardner's bad character at Folsom Prison, whence the letter apparently was sent. It appears the letter may not have been dated; the court was concerned that it might have been written during one of Gardner's psychotic episodes. The second letter, in which Gardner says he could as soon kill those who hold him as quench his thirst, may have been written as early as a decade before his and Officer Patch's death. Moreover, the other evidence of Gardner's bad character that the defense introduced was strong: it described a course of conduct that included fighting with and seriously injuring guards as well as cursing them, and other bad acts that became the subject matter of both documentary and testimonial evidence. The court's finding that the letters were of dubious relevance because of their possible remoteness and Gardner's questionable mental state, and also that they were confusing, cannot be deemed an abuse of discretion. For the foregoing reason, no violation of federal due process appears; the due process clause does not entirely strip a trial court of its power to exclude evidence on grounds of irrelevance or potential confusion, and the rulings here did not, in our view, offend due process. (See People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 684-685 [248 Cal. Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253].)