Opinion ID: 874293
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court Was Within Its Discretion in Awarding Only a Portion of Pre-Arbitration Attorney Fees

Text: The Harneses next contend that I.C. § 12-120(3) mandates that they receive all the fees they incurred in compelling arbitration. [3] While the UAA has provisions applicable to attorney fees incurred during and after arbitration, it is silent as to the litigation preceding arbitration. See I.C. § 7-910 (prohibiting fees incurred during arbitration); Driver v. SI Corp., 139 Idaho 423, 429-30, 80 P.3d 1024, 1030-31 (holding that § 7-914 of the UAA governs post-arbitration fees). As previously stated, I.C. § 12-120(3) entitles the prevailing party to reasonable attorney fees for any civil action in a commercial transaction. I.C. § 12-120(3); City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 664, 201 P.3d 629, 637 (2009). [W]hether a statute awarding attorney's fees applies to a given set of facts is a question of law. Ransom v. Topaz Mktg., 143 Idaho 641, 644, 152 P.3d 2, 5 (2006). However, setting a reasonable attorney fee is left to the discretion of the trial court. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3); Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 432, 196 P.3d 341, 350 (2008). The standard of review is whether the court perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it, and reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Read v. Harvey, 147 Idaho 364, 369, 209 P.3d 661, 666 (2009). Of course, the litigation that took place prior to arbitration was a civil action because Grease Spot had filed a complaint for breach of contract against the Harneses. Lowery v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 117 Idaho 1079, 1082, 793 P.2d 1251, 1254 (1990) (citing I.R.C.P. 3(a)). It became apparent that the Harneses were the prevailing party for purposes of receiving attorney fees once they prevailed in compelling arbitration, thereby terminating consideration of the merits of the action. See I.C. § 12-120(3). The district court below awarded attorney fees to the Harneses for only the work it attributed to compelling arbitration, not to defending the merits of the case itself, which as explained above, was work that belonged in arbitration and was not compensable. The Harneses offer no explanation for why the district court exceeded the boundaries of its discretion in awarding only some of the fees they incurred before arbitration. The court granted a reasonable fee to compensate the Harneses for attorney time incurred in compelling the arbitration. Accordingly, the district court's decision awarding some of the Harneses' requested fees is affirmed. [4]