Opinion ID: 2052708
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The State's Alleged Failure to Preserve Potentially Exculpatory Evidence

Text: Dawson claims that the State failed to preserve certain allegedly exculpatory evidence in contravention of this Court's holding in Deberry v. State, Del.Supr., 457 A.2d 744, 752 (1983). Specifically, Dawson contends that several knives seized from Nave, McCoy and Irwin would have substantiated his claim that these individuals, and not Dawson, were responsible for the murder of Kisner. The Superior Court held that this claim was procedurally barred as a result of Dawson's failure to raise the issue on direct appeal. In light of Dawson's related ineffective assistance of counsel claim, however, the Superior Court analyzed the Deberry claim to determine if defense counsel had been responsible for Dawson's failure to raise this issue on direct appeal. After carefully analyzing Dawson's contentions in light of relevant precedents of this Court and the United States Supreme Court, the Superior Court concluded that Dawson's claim was without merit. We agree that Dawson's contentions are without merit, and hold that the Superior Court neither erred as a matter of law nor abused its discretion in finding the claim to be procedurally barred. This Court reviews for abuse of discretion the Superior Court's decision on an application for postconviction relief. Bailey v. State, Del.Supr., 588 A.2d 1121, 1124 (1991). Nonetheless, questions of law are reviewed de novo. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., Del. Supr., 498 A.2d 1108, 1113 (1985). Ordinarily, a claim based on allegedly improper destruction of evidence would be evaluated under the test established by this Court in Deberry, 457 A.2d at 751-52. In light of Dawson's failure to raise this issue in his direct appeal, however, the Court's review must follow the standards set forth in Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(3), which provides that a claim not previously raised will be procedurally barred unless the defendant can establish: (1) cause for the failure to raise the claim in the original proceeding, and (2) actual prejudice flowing from the failure to assert the claim. See also Younger v. State, Del.Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 555 (1990) (citing Johnson v. State, Del.Supr., 460 A.2d 539 (1983), and Conyers v. State, Del.Supr., 422 A.2d 345 (1980)). Although Dawson does not assert any particular cause for his failure to assert the Deberry claim, the Superior Court proceeded on the basis that Dawson's related ineffective assistance of counsel claim might be sufficient to establish cause under the first prong of the Rule 61(i)(3) test. In essence, the Superior Court reasoned that, if Dawson established the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance, it would be sufficient to show that the Deberry claim should have been raised on direct appeal. Thus, prior to analyzing the Deberry claim, the trial court turned to the merits of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Dawson's ineffective assistance claim is grounded on the fact that defense counsel did not make any effort to obtain or analyze the allegedly exculpatory knives. The standard by which an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is reviewed is well known. The defendant must show that: (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) the deficiencies in counsel's representation caused the defendant actual prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Counsel's efforts, however, enjoy a strong presumption of reasonableness. Flamer v. State, Del.Supr., 585 A.2d 736, 753-54 (1990). Additionally, prejudice in this context is defined as a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. Thus, Dawson's claim must overcome the two substantial hurdles set forth in Strickland. Upon review of the facts of record and the arguments presented, it is clear that Dawson cannot make a showing sufficient to meet either prong of the Strickland test. First, counsel's decision not to pursue the evidence seized from Nave, McCoy and Irwin was clearly reasonable. Dawson's efforts to implicate these three men were not credible. Dawson alleged that he was accompanied by the three men from the time they escaped from the Delaware Correctional Center until the time of the murder. Dawson further claimed that he left Nave, McCoy and Irwin at the Kisner household while he went to fill the Kisner car with gasoline. When he returned, Dawson contends, the three men were gone and Mrs. Kisner was dead. This version of the facts is, however, unsupported by the evidence. Wilbert Dill, the operator of a gas station near Fieldsboro, testified that he observed Nave, McCoy and Irwin near the gas station at approximately 6:40 a.m. Dawson apparently was not with the other prisoners. The record shows that a telephone call was placed from the gas station to Nave's sister, Kathy Spence, at 6:36 a.m. Thus, these three individuals were clearly in Fieldsboro at or near 6:40 a.m. Dawson claimed that the drive from Fieldsboro south to Kisner's home in Kenton took roughly two hours. This would have placed the four men in Kenton 10 minutes after Mrs. Kisner was scheduled to arrive at work. Even assuming that the ride from Fieldsboro to Kenton took less than two hours, physical evidence showed that the Seeney burglary was committed prior to the murder of Kisner. [3] Thus, it would not have been possible for Dawson to have been in Fieldsboro with the three other escapees and still be present in Kenton at the time of the Seeney and Kisner crimes. Further, the car which Dawson claims to have driven with the three other fugitives, was observed in Kenton as early as 6:00 a.m., but certainly no later than 6:30 a.m. Thus, Dawson must have been alone when he committed the crimes in Kenton since the other three men were known to have been in Fieldsboro at that time. Moreover, Dawson originally told trial counsel that he parted company with McCoy, Nave and Irwin at approximately 2:00 a.m., several hours prior to the Kisner murder. Dawson later changed his account of the events. This latter account apparently was intended to shift blame for the Kisner homicide to the three other inmates. In light of the apparent inconsistencies in Dawson's account, it was reasonable for counsel not to pursue the theory that Nave, Irwin and McCoy were the actual perpetrators of the Kisner homicide. The physical evidence adduced at trial lends additional support for counsel's decision not to investigate the knives seized from Nave, McCoy and Irwin. As the Superior Court found, there was no evidence presented that would link these individuals to the crime scene. In fact, the knives would not have been admissible at trial because the defense was incapable of laying the necessary foundation. [4] This fact provides further support for counsel's decision not to pursue this defense theory. Having concluded that defense counsel's decision not to examine the knives from McCoy, Nave and Irwin was reasonable, the trial court then proceeded to analyze the prejudice, if any, that flowed from the State's failure to maintain this evidence. Pursuant to the standard announced in Rule 61(i)(3), the trial court must review the merits of a claim that is procedurally barred only if the defendant shows cause for failure previously to pursue the claim and actual prejudice flows from the failure to pursue the claim. Having concluded that defense counsel's decision was reasonable, the Superior Court determined that cause for failure to state the claim previously could not be shown. Accordingly, there should have been no need to analyze the element of prejudice. Nevertheless, the court did analyze the prejudice aspect of Dawson's claim, and did so by applying the following factors announced by this Court in Deberry to determine if actual prejudice occurred: 1. The degree of negligence or bad faith involved; 2. The importance of the missing evidence considering the probable value and reliability of secondary or substitute evidence that remains available; and 3. The sufficiency of the other evidence produced at the trial to sustain the conviction. Dawson III, mem. op. at 15. The Superior Court correctly concluded that no prejudice was shown. First, no prosecutorial bad faith or negligence was demonstrated. The knives in question would not have been admissible at trial. The only connection between the knives and the State's case against Dawson was Dawson's own unsubstantiated account, which was substantially contradicted by the physical evidence. Thus, the State's decision to dispose of the evidence was neither negligent nor done in bad faith. Second, as discussed above, the evidence was not of any value to Dawson. Thus, the reliability of substitute evidence is not in issue. Finally, the other evidence adduced at trial was clearly sufficient to support Dawson's conviction. Dawson's jacket was found to contain traces of blood matching that of Mrs. Kisner's as well as fibers from Mrs. Kisner's robe. Also in Dawson's possession was a sock found to be identical in all observable respects to the sock used to gag Mrs. Kisner. This physical evidence substantially undermines Dawson's claim that he was not present during the murder of Kisner. In addition, the circumstantial evidence discussed above indicates that it was impossible for McCoy, Nave and Irwin to have been present at the crime scene. Thus, the evidence was sufficient not only to convict Dawson, but also to discredit his version of the events. In light of the above analysis, it is clear that the Superior Court did not err in holding that Dawson's Deberry claim was procedurally barred.