Opinion ID: 78489
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cause and Prejudice to Excuse Procedural Default

Text: Notwithstanding that a claim has been procedurally defaulted, a federal court may still consider the claim if a state habeas petitioner can show either (1) cause for and actual prejudice from the default; or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-86, 495-96, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2644, 2649, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986); Bailey, 172 F.3d at 1306. Maples argues that, even if they are procedurally defaulted, his ineffective-assistance claims should be heard by the federal court because he has demonstrated cause for and prejudice from the default. [13] Cause is established if some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S.Ct. at 2645. Such external impediments include evidence that could not reasonably have been discovered in time to comply with the rule; interference by state officials that made compliance impossible; and ineffective assistance of counsel at a stage where the petitioner had a right to counsel. Mize, 532 F.3d at 1190 (citing Murray, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S.Ct. at 2645). Here, the factor that resulted in Maples's defaultnamely, counsel's failure to file a timely notice of appeal of the Rule 32 Ordercannot establish cause for his default because there is no right to post-conviction counsel. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752, 111 S.Ct. at 2566 (stating that because [t]here is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings..., a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings); Jimenez v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 481 F.3d 1337, 1344 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 628, 169 L.Ed.2d 405 (2007) (A defendant cannot base his cause and prejudice for procedural default on his attorney's performance unless the attorney's performance was constitutionally ineffective... [and a] petitioner cannot establish constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in state post-conviction proceedings because there is no constitutional right to an attorney in such proceedings. (quotation marks and citation omitted)); Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 892 (11th Cir.2003) ([A]ny ineffectiveness of [counsel] could not be considered cause for the purposes of excusing the procedural default that occurred in ... state collateral post-conviction [proceedings].). Thus, Maples cannot show cause for the procedural default. [14]