Opinion ID: 773307
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Visitation Conversation Recordings

Text: 12 Citing the Fourth Amendment and Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. 2510 et seq. (1994)) (federal wiretap law), the defendants moved to suppress the recordings of their in-person visits at the CCA facility. Both defendants contend that these conversations were protected by the federal wiretap law as wire communications, oral communications, or both. They argue that because they had a reasonable expectation of privacy during the visits, the recordings constituted an unconstitutional search. Additionally, Peoples argues that the recordings were inadmissible against him because, as a visitor to the CCA facility, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy even if Lightfoot did not because of his inmate status. Following a hearing, the magistrate judge issued a detailed report recommending denial of the motions. The district court adopted the magistrate's report and recommendation and denied the motions. 13 On appeal of the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review the court's factual findings for clear error and the court's application of the law to those facts de novo. United States v. Tavares, 223 F.3d 911, 914 (8th Cir. 2000). We will affirm a district court's denial of such a motion 'unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence, based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, or, based on the entire record, it is clear that a mistake was made.' Id. (quoting United States v. Murphy, 69 F.3d 237, 240 (8th Cir. 1995)). The federal wiretap law protects only those statements that meet the statutory definition of wire or oral communications. 18 U.S.C. 2511(1)(c), 2515 (1994). 14 The defendants' argument that the CCA conversations were protected as wire communications is incorrect. In order to be a protected wire communication, a conversation must be transmitted via facilities furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. 2510(1) (1994). During no-contact visits at the CCA facility, inmates and visitors sit in different rooms, separated from each other by clear glass. Each visiting station is separated from the adjacent ones by cement block partitions. Visitors communicate with prisoners through an internal communication device that physically resembles a telephone handset. The device, however, is an entirely internal system connecting only the two visiting rooms. It is not connected to any facility capable of transmitting interstate or foreign communications. Accordingly, the visitation conversations were not wire communications protected by the federal wiretap law. 15 The conversations were also not protected oral communications because the defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy. The federal wiretap law defines an oral communication as any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation. 18 U.S.C. 2510(2). Before the interception of a conversation can be found to constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment or an oral communication under the federal wiretap law, therefore, the individuals involved must show that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in that conversation. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a 'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' that has been invaded by government action); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (government's surreptitious listening to and recording of telephone conversation violated the privacy on which [petitioner] justifiably relied); Angel v. Williams, 12 F.3d 786, 789-90 (8th Cir. 1993) (oral communication is a term of art under the federal wiretap law, referring only to communications uttered by a person reasonably expecting them to be private). 16 Although the defendants claim to have believed that their conversations were private and could not be overheard, any expectation of privacy was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. Prison inmates necessarily have reduced privacy rights because of the nature of incarceration and the myriad of institutional needs and objectives of prison facilities. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524 (1984); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974). We agree with the district court's conclusion that CCA had legitimate security reasons for monitoring the conversations and that the recordings were not made in an attempt to gather evidence about the robberies or the murder. Because CCA's practice of monitoring and recording prisoner-visitor conversations was a reasonable means of achieving the legitimate institutional goal of maintaining prison security and because those conversing in a prison setting are deemed to be aware of the necessity for and the existence of such security measures, we agree with the district court that the defendants' rights were not violated by the introduction of the recordings. 17 Nor did the fact that Peoples was a visitor and not a prisoner give him an independent reasonable basis for an expectation of privacy in his conversations with Lightfoot. Although a visitor has a right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures in a prison, CCA's monitoring of these conversations was not unreasonable, nor was it physically invasive of Peoples's person. Cf. Hunter v. Auger, 672 F.2d 668, 674-75 (8th Cir. 1982) (visitors to a correctional facility may be strip searched to ensure institutional security if the administration has reasonable suspicion that the particular visitor might compromise security). The practice of monitoring conversations reflects CCA's efforts to ensure a high level of security in its facility, and there is no reason to believe that a visitor who converses with an incarcerated person has any more reasonable basis for his expectation that the conversation will remain private than has the inmate. 18 The defendants assert that certain factual findings relied upon by the district court in denying their motions to suppress were clearly erroneous. After a thorough review of the record, we find no clear error in the district court's findings of fact. Similarly, the defendants' contention that the recordings violated state eavesdropping statutes are of no moment because state law is inapplicable to this federal proceeding and cannot serve as a basis for suppression. See United States v. Hornbeck, 118 F.3d 615, 617-18 (8th Cir. 1997). We therefore find no error in the district court's denial of the motions to suppress the recordings.