Opinion ID: 1310247
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Existence of Expectation of Privacy in This Case

Text: In the instant case, we recognize that the canine sniff was not conducted inside the apartment; however, the information gained by the canine alert as to the existence of contraband inside the apartment emanated from inside the apartment and was detected outside at its threshold. In this regard, it has been held that [i]ndiscriminate monitoring of property that has been withdrawn from public view would present far too serious a threat to privacy interests in the home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984). It has also been observed that the reach of the Fourth Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 353, 88 S.Ct. 507; that the Fourth Amendment forecloses a distinction between `worthy' and `unworthy' objects which are the subject of investigation, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982); and that [t]hose suspected of drug offenses are no less entitled to [Fourth Amendment] protection than those suspected of nondrug offenses, United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. at 717, 104 S.Ct. 3296. In connection with assessing the expectation of privacy in Ortiz' hallway for Fourth Amendment and Nebraska constitutional purposes, we note that the `Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. ' (Emphasis in original.) State v. Havlat, 222 Neb. 554, 558, 385 N.W.2d 436, 439 (1986), quoting Katz v. United States, supra . See, also, State v. Ramaekers, 257 Neb. 391, 597 N.W.2d 608 (1999). As noted above in Katz, the electronic device affixed to the outside of a telephone booth was determined to violate the Fourth Amendment because the user of the telephone booth had a legitimate expectation of privacy upon closing the door to the telephone booth and placing a call. It has been stated: What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S at 351-52, 88 S.Ct. 507. In Katz, Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, cautioned that the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional `right to privacy.' 389 U.S. at 350, 88 S.Ct. 507. Justice Harlan, concurring, said the extent of Fourth Amendment protection is determined by reference to a place. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 361, 88 S.Ct. 507. The principles enunciated in Katz have long been relied upon in our jurisprudence. State v. Havlat, supra . Because the situs of the canine sniff in this case is the threshold to Ortiz' apartment, we must make reference to the adjoining dwelling in our analysis of privacy in this appeal. In cases such as the one before us, to determine whether an individual has an interest protected by the Fourth Amendment and Neb. Const. art. I, § 7, one must determine whether an individual has a legitimate or justifiable expectation of privacy in the place subjected to canine scrutiny. Ordinarily, two inquiries are required. First, the individual must have `exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,'  and second, the expectation is one that `society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.' Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 n. 7, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984). This two-part inquiry has been adopted and utilized by this court. See, State v. Ramaekers, supra ; State v. Merrill, 252 Neb. 510, 563 N.W.2d 340 (1997). The ultimate question is whether one's claim of privacy from governmental intrusion is reasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances. Hudson v. Palmer, supra . See, also, Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990) (apparently combining Hudson v. Palmer two-part inquiry into one). Reasonable expectations of privacy vary according to the context of the case, O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987). It has been observed: Legitimation of expectation of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). There can be little doubt, and the cases confirm, see, e.g., Wilson v. Layne , ___U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999), that a home, including an apartment home, is considered by both occupants and society to be entitled to greater privacy than objects of a less intimate nature, such as a storage locker, Com. v. Johnston, 515 Pa. 454, 530 A.2d 74 (1987); or of a more transient nature, such as a package entrusted to the postal service, State v. Morrison, 243 Neb. 469, 500 N.W.2d 547 (1993), disapproved on other grounds, State v. Johnson, 256 Neb. 133, 589 N.W.2d 108 (1999); or a vehicle, State v. Pellicci, 133 N.H. 523, 580 A.2d 710 (1990). See, also, State v. Konfrst, 251 Neb. 214, 556 N.W.2d 250 (1996). In this regard, we note that case law recognizes that there is a greater degree of privacy expected in the home than in a hotel or a motel. See Commonwealth v. Panetti, 406 Mass. 230, 547 N.E.2d 46 (1989). In assessing the privacy interest in the apartment hallway, we must evaluate whether, under the circumstances, the area of the hallway should be placed under the home's `umbrella' of Fourth Amendment protection. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987) (defining, inter alia, curtilage). In this regard, it should be noted that given the undisputed fact that the officers went to the hallway outside Ortiz' apartment on one occasion solely to deploy Pogo, in analyzing this case, we are not obliged to speculate as to whether the police might have been lawfully present in the apartment hallway unaccompanied by the canine whose purpose in being there was to detect illegal drugs. We recognize, as noted earlier in this opinion, that the authorities are split as to whether an occupant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallway outside his or her apartment. We agree with the courts which hold that there is some measure of privacy at the threshold of an apartment dwelling. For example, in People v. Killebrew, 76 Mich.App. 215, 218, 256 N.W.2d 581, 583 (1977), it was stated that [g]enerally, a hallway shared by tenants in a private multi-unit dwelling is not a public place. It is a private space intended for the use of the occupants and their guests, and an area in which the occupants have a reasonable expectation of privacy. For the sake of completeness, we note that under the case law, the degree of privacy society is willing to accord an apartment hallway may depend on the facts, such as whether there is an outer door locked to the street which limits access, e.g., People v. Trull, 64 Ill.App.3d 385, 20 Ill.Dec. 960, 380 N.E.2d 1169 (1978); the number of residents using the hallway, e.g., United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709 (9th Cir.1976); the number of units in the apartment complex, e.g., People v. Killebrew, supra ; and the presence or absence of no trespassing signage, e.g., State v. Taylor, 763 S.W.2d 756 (Tenn.Crim.App.1988). Where the police unaccompanied by a canine are merely pursuing an investigation, it has been held that they may go to the stairway leading to an apartment, State v. Breuer, 577 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 1998), or walk around to the rear of a defendant's home, United States v. Anderson, 552 F.2d 1296 (8th Cir.1977), notwithstanding an occupant's expectation of some measure of privacy in these locations and that that which an officer observes in plain view while lawfully pursuing an investigation is not protected by the Fourth Amendment. We have recently observed that Objects, falling within the plain view of an officer, who has the right to be in the position to have such view, does not constitute a search. State v. Ramaekers, 257 Neb. 391, 397, 597 N.W.2d 608, 613 (1999). See, also, State v. Pope, 239 Neb. 1009, 480 N.W.2d 169 (1992). To the foregoing we add: That which a law enforcement officer detects using his or her unaided senses while lawfully present does not violate Fourth Amendment or Nebraska constitutional principles, because that which is voluntarily exposed to the general public and observable from an unprotected area without using sense-enhancing devices is not part of a person's private affairs. See State v. Dearman, 92 Wash.App. 630, 962 P.2d 850 (1998) (holding, inter alia, that canine sniff of residential garage was search under Washington constitution). It has also been observed: What can be heard by the naked ear, when the ear is where it has a right to be, is not protected by the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 331 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 834, 101 S.Ct. 107, 66 L.Ed.2d 40. In contrast to the officers' observations obtained by plain view, the use of a canine such as occurred in this case is not a mere improvement of [the officers'] sense of smell, as ordinary eyeglasses improve vision, but is a significant enhancement accomplished by a different, and far superior, sensory instrument. United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359 at 1367 (2d Cir.1985), cert. denied, Fisher v. United States, 474 U.S. 819, 106 S.Ct. 66, 88 L.Ed.2d 54, reversed in part on other grounds 6 F.Supp.2d 254(S.D.N.Y.1998). Like the electronic surveillance equipment in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), the results of which surveillance were suppressed as obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the information originate[d] from inside a private area and travel[ed] beyond its perimeters, People v. Price, 54 N.Y.2d 557, 565, 431 N.E.2d 267, 271, 446 N.Y.S.2d 906, 910 (1981) (Meyer, J., concurring) unexposed to all except those with supersensitive detection devices. See 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, a Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 2.2(f) (3d ed.1996). By using a canine to sniff for illegal drugs in a hallway outside Ortiz' apartment, the police have engaged an investigative technique by which they are able to obtain information regarding the contents of a place that has traditionally been accorded a heightened expectation of privacy. See People v. Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d 19, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 563 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1990), cert. denied 501 U.S. 1219, 111 S.Ct. 2830, 115 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1991). While such an investigative technique may be minimally intrusive, it nevertheless implicates the Fourth Amendment and Neb. Const. art. I, § 7, and requires independent reasonable suspicion. Id. The canine sniff for illegal drugs at the threshold of a dwelling is an investigative tool which may be used to build a case of probable cause for issuance of a search warrant if there is reasonable suspicion to take the canine to the location of the test.