Opinion ID: 2517672
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Hardy I

Text: Petitioner filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Hardy I with this court on July 26, 1991, and filed a set of supplemental allegations on February 24, 1992. In those filings, petitioner alleged his trial attorney was constitutionally ineffective in three ways: (1) for failing to call available witnesses at the penalty phase who would have provided mitigating evidence; (2) for failing to investigate to determine whether such witnesses existed; and (3) for making an unreasonable tactical decision to rely solely on a lingering doubt defense at the penalty phase. For example, petitioner alleged in Hardy I that several family members and friends, if called, would have testified to his positive attributes and difficult upbringing. Petitioner alleged that his father was schizophrenic and had physically abused him as a child, one time holding him out of a 12th floor window and threatening to drop him. After his father's hospitalization, petitioner alleged he assumed the role of father figure to his siblings and the family lived in a poor area of Newark, New Jersey. Declarations accompanying the petition in Hardy I alleged that petitioner was a caring and considerate child who did well in school and that he did not finish high school, leaving school at age 16 to marry Patricia May, the mother of his child. The declarants asserted petitioner had a second child before divorcing, and that later in life, petitioner was a devoted and loving father. These declarants stated it was inconceivable petitioner could have murdered a child. In addition to the suicide of petitioner's brother, the petition in Hardy I revealed two other major incidents that greatly affected him. First, Tina, his live-in lover whom he planned to marry, was killed in a car accident. Declarations filed in support of the petition in Hardy I state that after Tina died, petitioner didn't want to do anything with his life [and] had no ambition for a long time. A second incident involved petitioner's involuntary commitment to a state mental hospital after a drug-induced psychotic episode. The tentative diagnosis of mental health professionals was chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia. Petitioner's children, who were ages 11 and eight at the time of trial, declared that they would have testified they loved petitioner, that he was a very good and caring father, and that they would have asked the jury to spare their father's life. Petitioner alleged Demby provided no reason why he did not call the children to testify at the penalty phase. In his supplemental allegations, petitioner alleged his trial attorney should have presented evidence that petitioner, then working as a municipal bus driver, had acted heroically when he intervened to stop the robbery of an elderly woman on his bus. Petitioner allegedly sustained serious injuries as a result. After receiving appropriate briefing, this court issued an order directing the Director of Corrections to show cause why petitioner is not entitled to reversal of the penalty judgment because his trial attorney rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to call, at the penalty phase of the trial, available witnesses who would have presented evidence of mitigating circumstances. (Italics added.) We then referred the matter to a referee to resolve disputed allegations of fact. Our order of reference, as later amended for reasons unnecessary to relate here, provided: (1) Did petitioner Hardy engage in an act of heroism while employed as a driver for the Southern California Rapid Transit District? [¶] (2) Was defense counsel Michael Demby made aware of the facts surrounding the incident? [¶] (3) What were Mr. Demby's reasons why he did not present evidence of this incident, or the uncontradicted evidence of other available witnesses who would have provided mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of the trial? [¶] (4) Were Mr. Demby's reasons supportable? After an evidentiary hearing, the referee filed his report on September 21, 1999. Petitioner then filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Hardy II, alleging based on facts adduced at the hearing for Hardy I that he was entitled to relief not just from his penalty judgment but from his guilt judgment as well. Based on some of the allegations in the Hardy II petition, we issued an order to show cause on February 14, 2001, and have held Hardy I in abeyance. As we explain post, because we conclude petitioner is entitled to relief from his penalty judgment based on the allegations in his Hardy II petition, we address that petition here and dismiss the Hardy I petition as moot.