Opinion ID: 746435
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Likely to Prevail at Trial

Text: 48 Anderson sued the Government under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 11 To make out a cause of action under Section 1983, Anderson must show that (1) the defendants acted under color of law; and (2) their actions deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 184 (3d Cir.1993). 49 Count VIII of Anderson's First Amended Complaint states that the Government engaged in illegal surveillance of Anderson. In his Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Anderson specifically alleged that the Government's surveillance constituted retaliation for his initiation of the present lawsuit. Following the district court's two-day hearing on Anderson's motion, the district court found the Government's witnesses completely uncredible and held that the sole reason for the Government's surveillance of Rohn and Anderson was the filing of Anderson's lawsuit. On appeal, the Government does not dispute this finding of fact. Rather, it contends that, no matter how reprehensible the Government's motives, they do not support any claim (injunctive or monetary) for relief under Section 1983. We disagree. 50 The gravamen of Anderson's complaint is the following: the Virgin Islands Police Department commenced an extensive and substantial surveillance operation of him and his attorney solely in response to his filing of an employment discrimination complaint. According to Anderson, the Police Department's retaliatory surveillance is actionable under Section 1983. We agree. 51 We begin by conceding that the Government's surveillance of individuals in public places does not, by itself, implicate the Constitution. The Government, however, takes this argument one step further by arguing that the Virgin Island Police Department's retaliatory motive in setting up this surveillance operation is irrelevant. According to the Government, this contention is supported by the Supreme Court's decision upholding an Army surveillance operation in Laird v. Tatum. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972). The Government misreads the Court's decision in Laird. 52 In Laird, the Court considered the justiciability of a class action suit for injunctive and declaratory relief from the Army's domestic surveillance system, which included the observation of public civilian activity. The plaintiffs' case in Laird was based on the vague fear that the Army might improperly use the information contained in its surveillance reports sometime in the future in an improper fashion. See Laird, 408 U.S. at 11, 92 S.Ct. at 2324. Beyond their own discomfort with the notion that the Army was watching them, the plaintiffs were unable to articulate with any specificity the harm that they had suffered or might suffer in the future from the Army's surveillance. The Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiffs' fear of future misuse of information was too speculative and too unsubstantiated to support a case or controversy under Article III. Consequently, the Court held that, despite the subjective feelings of the individuals whose actions were observed, their First Amendment rights could not be chilled bythe mere existence, without more, of a governmental investigative and data-gathering activity that is alleged to be broader in scope than is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of a valid governmental purpose. Laird, 408 U.S. at 10, 92 S.Ct. at 2324. 53 This Circuit followed Laird several years later, when we held that police surveillance of public meetings, by itself, was legally unobjectionable. Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of Religious Society of Friends v. Tate, 519 F.2d 1335, 1337-1338 (3d Cir.1975) (subjective chill from surveillance no substitute for claim of specific present harm or threat of specific future harm). 54 The Government would have us believe that this case falls within the Laird and Philadelphia Yearly line of cases. It does not. Unlike Laird and Philadelphia Yearly, this case involves a pre-existing complaint, lodged with the EEOC, that was reported to be the precursor to an employment discrimination lawsuit that was potentially embarrassing to the defendants. In addition, this case also involves a finding by the district court, unchallenged on appeal, that the Government's surveillance operation was targeted at two individuals, Anderson and his attorney Ms. Rohn, and was initiated solely in response to Anderson's lawsuit. Thus, this case differs greatly from Laird and Philadelphia Yearly because the harm alleged is more specific and less speculative than the chilling effect alleged in those cases. Unlike the plaintiffs in Laird and Philadelphia Yearly, Anderson has articulated a specific present harm, which is the Government's retaliation in response to his exercise of protected activity under the First Amendment. 55 The Supreme Court has explicitly held that an individual has a viable claim against the government when he is able to prove that the government took action against him in retaliation for his exercise of First Amendment rights. See Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). In the seminal case of Mt. Healthy, a non-tenured teacher brought suit against the local school Board when it declined to renew his contract. See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 276, 97 S.Ct. at 570. The Court held that, even though the teacher lacked any expectation in further employment, the teacher still could make out a claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments if he could show that the Board fired him in retaliation for speech. As the Court explained:Even though [the teacher] could have been discharged for no reason whatever, and had no constitutional right to a hearing prior to the decision not to rehire him ... he may nonetheless establish a claim to reinstatement if the decision not to rehire him was made by reason of his exercise of constitutionally protected First Amendment freedoms. 56 Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 283, 97 S.Ct. at 574 (citations omitted). 57 Under Mt. Healthy and its progeny, an otherwise legitimate and constitutional government act can become unconstitutional when an individual demonstrates that it was undertaken in retaliation for his exercise of First Amendment speech. 12 This doctrine demonstrates that, at least where the First Amendment is concerned, the motives of government officials are indeed relevant, if not dispositive, when an individual's exercise of speech precedes government action affecting that individual. 13 58 To prevail on his retaliation claim, Anderson would have to prove three things: first, that he engaged in protected activity; second, that the Government or Police Department responded with retaliation; and third that his protected activity was the cause of the Government's retaliation. Based on the facts in the record, the district court could easily conclude that Anderson was likely to prevail on a First Amendment claim. 59 First, Anderson's filing of his EEOC complaint and his employment discrimination suit against the Virgin Islands Police Department constituted protected activity under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has consistently held that an individual's constitutional right of access to court is protected by the First Amendment's clause granting the right to petition the government for grievances. The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510, 92 S.Ct. 609, 612, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972). See also Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1111 (3d Cir.1990). 60 Numerous claims brought under Mt. Healthy--both in this Circuit and in others--have involved fact patterns in which the government took retaliatory action in response to an individual's filing of a lawsuit. In Milhouse v. Carlson, a prisoner brought suit against employees of the United States Bureau of Prisons, claiming that they had disciplined him for initiating a civil rights suit. See Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 373-74 (3d Cir.1981). The district court had dismissed the case on the ground that the prisoner had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We reversed and held that a prisoner's constitutional right to access was indeed violated when he suffered retaliation in response to his filing a civil rights lawsuit. We explained: 61 We read appellant's complaint as alleging that he was subjected to a conspiratorially planned series of disciplinary actions as retaliation for initiating a civil rights suit against prison officials. Such allegations, if proven at trial, would establish an infringement of Millhouse's first amendment right of access to the courts. 62 Milhouse, 652 F.2d at 373. Thus, our holding in Milhouse demonstrates that, at the very least, Anderson may have a viable claim against the Police Department and its officials. 63 Our holding in Milhouse is not limited to prisoners. In Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Education, we held that a school-teacher could make out a claim against a school board if she could prove retaliation in response to her filing of a lawsuit. See Bradley, 910 F.2d 1172, 1177 (3d Cir.1990) (An action that would otherwise be permissible is unconstitutional if it is taken in retaliation for the exercise of the right of access to the courts). Similarly, other Circuits have uniformly held that retaliation for exercise of one's right to access constitutes a violation under the Constitution. See, e.g., Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir.1989); Harrison v. Springdale Water & Sewer Comm'n, 780 F.2d 1422 (8th Cir.1986). 64 More generally, under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, 14 we have held that official retaliation for the exercise of any constitutional right creates an actionable claim under Section 1983. Retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally protected rights is itself a violation of rights secured by the Constitution actionable under section 1983. White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 111-12 (3d Cir.1990) (doctor's retaliatory charges against prisoner who exercised right to be informed about treatment constituted violation of prisoner's substantive due process rights). Although a plaintiff ordinarily must show that his speech was a matter of public concern to qualify it as protected activity under the First Amendment, see Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983), this Circuit has held that this requirement does not apply in cases where the speech itself constitutes the plaintiff's lawsuit. See San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424, 434-443 (3d Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1082, 115 S.Ct. 735, 130 L.Ed.2d 638 (1995). In San Filippo, we held that a plaintiff need only show that his lawsuit was not frivolous in order to make out a prima facie retaliation claim. Id. 65 This case is somewhat different from San Filippo because Peter Anderson had not yet filed his lawsuit when the Police Department commenced surveillance of him and his attorney. Nevertheless, the right of access to court doctrine still applies. First, Anderson had already lodged a formal complaint with the EEOC on January 25, 1996. Second, the record indicates that Ms. Rohn had provided the Government with written notice of her intention to file a claim on behalf of her client as early as January 23, 1996. Finally, the St. Croix Avis reported Anderson's intention to file a lawsuit against the Government and the Department on February 22, 1996. We conclude that these actions were sufficient to implicate Anderson's right to petition the government for redress of his grievances. 66 In justifying our holding in San Filippo, we explained the fundamental importance of the right to petition as a check against the government's abuse of power: 67 [W]hen government--federal or state--formally adopts a mechanism for redress of those grievances for which government is allegedly accountable, it would seem to undermine the Constitution's vital purposes to hold that one who in good faith files an arguably meritorious petition invoking that mechanism may be disciplined for such invocation by the very government that in compliance with the petition clause has given the particular mechanism its constitutional imprimatur.... [W]hen one files a petition one is not appealing over government's head to the general citizenry; when one files a petition one is addressing government and asking government to fix, what allegedly, government has broken or has failed in its duty to repair. 68 Id., 30 F.3d at 442. Our argument in San Filippo is particularly applicable to the facts of this case. By lodging a complaint with the EEOC, itself a precursor to his employment discrimination suit, Anderson was petitioning the government to fix a problem within the Virgin Islands Police Department. Instead of engaging in such repair, the Government compounded Anderson's grievances by initiating its surveillance operation. Were we to ignore the Government's retaliation, we would render Mr. Anderson's First Amendment petition right effectively useless. Officials could simply engage in harassment any time an individual filed, or announced his intention to file, a lawsuit against them. This result is hardly consistent with the fundamental principles of orderly protest, which our Constitution sought to preserve by protecting our right petition the government for redress. 69 In addition to demonstrating that he was engaging in protected activity, Anderson must also show that the Police Department's surveillance of him and his attorney constituted retaliation for his exercise of First Amendment rights. Although Mt. Healthy is most often applied in employee dismissal cases, many courts have expanded Mt. Healthy 's doctrine to different types of official retaliation. See, e.g., Nestor Colon Medina & Sucesores, Inc. v. Custodio, 964 F.2d 32, 40-41 (1st Cir.1992) (denial of residential site permit); Newsom v. Norris, 888 F.2d 371 (6th Cir.1989) (failure to reappoint prisoners as inmate advisors); Soranno's Gasco, 874 F.2d at 1314 (suspension of petroleum permits); Harrison, 780 F.2d at 1428 (filing of frivolous condemnation counterclaim against landowners); Packish v. McMurtrie, 697 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir.1983) (denial of firefighter's indemnification request); McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 18 (1st Cir.1979) (transfer of prisoner to another prison). In each of the above cases, the plaintiff was denied a benefit simply because he exercised his First Amendment rights. In this case, Mr. Anderson was denied the benefit of initiating litigation without the harassment of otherwise uncalled for surveillance, simply because he filed a potentially vexatious lawsuit against his former employers. This type of retaliation falls squarely within the Mt. Healthy line of cases. 70 Finally, Anderson must also show that the Government's conduct was motivated by his attempts to commence litigation against the Government and the Department. Based on the district court's factual findings, Anderson should have no problem meeting this prong. The district court found that the defendants had engaged in surveillance of Peter Anderson and Lee Rohn as a direct result of the lawsuit Mr. Anderson filed. Anderson, No.1996-118, at 8. The Government has not challenged this finding on appeal. Consequently, we must further conclude that Anderson would prevail on the third prong of Mt. Healthy, since the Government has effectively abandoned its attempt to come up with a credible reason for investigating or following Mr. Anderson. 71 In sum, the record demonstrates the likelihood that Anderson would prevail on the merits of a First Amendment retaliation claim under the three-pronged test set forth by the Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy. The fact that Anderson harbored no constitutional right to be free from government surveillance does not affect his claim under this doctrine. What matters is that the Government undertook to visibly and obviously surveil him because he exercised his First Amendment rights. See Bradley, 910 F.2d at 1177. Assuming Anderson can demonstrate some form of injury, he can successfully make out a claim for relief. 15