Opinion ID: 596547
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Post-Arrest Detention

Text: 8 Bostic complains that the defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights when, on July 3, 1985, they arrested him without a warrant and kept him in custody for more than 48 hours without a judicial probable cause determination. 1 We disagree. 9 In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest. Id. at 114, 95 S.Ct. at 863. This judicial determination, the Court stated, must be a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty, and this determination must be made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest. Id. at 125, 95 S.Ct. at 868. The Court has recently clarified what it meant in Gerstein by promptly after arrest. [A] jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein. City of Riverside v. McLaughlin, --- U.S. ----, ----, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 1670, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991). The Court in Riverside established 48 hours as the point at which the burden of proof shifts. If an arrested individual does not receive a probable cause determination within 48 hours, the arrested individual does not bear the burden of proving unreasonable delay. Rather, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance. Id. The Court cautioned that this is not a rigid standard for courts to apply blindly. 10 In evaluating whether the delay in a particular case is unreasonable, however, courts must allow a substantial degree of flexibility. Courts cannot ignore the often unavoidable delays in transporting arrested persons from one facility to another, handling late-night bookings where no magistrate is readily available, obtaining the presence of an arresting officer who may be busy processing other suspects or securing the premises of an arrest, and other practical realities. 11 Id. 12 In this case, Bostic's detention was not unreasonable. The parties do not dispute that he was released at 1:30 a.m. on July 5, 1985. Under Riverside, Bostic bears the initial burden of persuasion. He must show that he was arrested by 1:30 a.m. on July 3, 1985 to shift that burden to the defendants. Once he establishes that more than 48 hours elapsed, the burden shifts to the defendants to show that his detention was reasonable. Id. At his deposition, Bostic stated that he went to the police station at 12:35 a.m. on July 3, 1985. Bostic Dep. at 216. He said that he was taken to a room where he talked with Detective Pienta and his partner for roughly, about half an hour. Id. He did not say, however, how much time elapsed between 12:35 and the time he went to speak with Pienta. When asked if he recalled what time it was when he went into the room with Pienta, Bostic answered, No sir. No, I don't even know the time. Id. Bostic claims that after his approximately half hour talk with Pienta, he was locked in a room. Bostic thus presents no evidence that he was arrested before 1:30 a.m. on July 3, 1985. Therefore, under Riverside, he retains the burden of proving that his detention was unreasonable. Id. 13 He has not satisfied that burden. Allowing for the substantial degree of flexibility required by Riverside, we note that Bostic was arrested late at night when it is likely that no magistrate was readily available. The police arrested Bostic only after a witness identified him as Cotton's murderer. After the arrest, the police acted with reasonable promptness to complete the investigation, rather than releasing a suspected murderer without charges. The Fourth Amendment, as interpreted in Gerstein and Riverside, requires no more. Bostic's detention after his July 3, 1985 arrest was not unlawful.