Opinion ID: 1946118
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: prima facie fraud

Text: Defendants claim that plaintiffs' fraud claims are based on the alleged assurances by Mrs. Hubbs that their treatment would be complete within one year of its commencement. The gravamen of the complaint, however, was defendants' alleged representations of fact that they could effect the permanent removal of hair. The representations were allegedly made by Mrs. Hubbs personally as well as by the newspaper advertisement plaintiffs saw in the Mobile Press Register. [1] There is nothing in the record to indicate that defendants are generally incapable of effecting a permanent removal of hair; there is evidence only that defendants were unable to effect a permanent removal of plaintiffs' facial hair within a time satisfactory to plaintiffs. The alleged representation that defendants would effect a permanent removal of plaintiffs' facial hair related to a future event. Where an alleged misrepresentation relates to a future event, plaintiff must not only prove the usual elements of fraud i.e., falsity, reliance, and damagesbut plaintiff must also prove that at the time the statement or promise about the future was made, there was actual fraudulent intent not to perform the act promised and intent to deceive plaintiff. Kennedy Elec. Co. v. Moore-Handley, Inc., 437 So.2d 76 (Ala.1983); Old Southern Life Insurance Co. v. Woodall, 295 Ala. 235, 326 So.2d 726 (1976). The mere failure to perform, alone, is not evidence of intent not to perform at the time the promise was made. If it were, a mere breach of contract would be tantamount to fraud. Old Southern Life Insurance Co., supra. Plaintiffs argue that there was enough evidence to submit the issue of present intent to the jury and to support the jury's finding that there was no intent to fulfill the promises when they were made. This evidence includes (1) the testimony of Ms. Owens that the plaintiffs' conditions 16 months later were inconsistent with effective electrolysis treatment; (2) the newspaper advertisement and Mrs. Hubbs's alleged representation that she could permanently remove hair coupled with the lack of success within one year as Mrs. Hubbs allegedly estimated; (3) the testimony of Ms. Owens that implied that perhaps the tweezer method, a nonpermanent method of hair removal, was used rather than electrolysis. We hold that this evidence is not sufficient to establish present intent to deceive. The testimony of Ms. Owens as to the plaintiffs' conditions when she first saw them in March 1979 had no bearing on defendants' intent 16 months earlier. Any assurances by Mrs. Hubbs that she could clear up plaintiffs' conditions within a year were expressions of opinion and not statements of material fact and therefore not actionable fraud. Cf. Accident Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Feely, 279 Ala. 74, 181 So.2d 889 (1966), and Harrell v. Dodson, 398 So.2d 272 (Ala.1981). Finally, Ms. Owens's testimony that Mrs. Hubbs perhaps did not use the permanent method of hair removal known as electrolysis, but might have instead used the non-permanent tweezer method, was not supported by any other evidence. In fact, one of the plaintiffs described her treatment in a manner entirely consistent with the filament electrolysis method. In addition, Ms. Owens herself testified that she could not definitely tell whether Mrs. Hubbs had used the tweezer or electrolysis method on plaintiffs. Moreover, the plaintiffs failed to establish a course of conduct on the part of the defendants showing a present intent to defraud, and they also failed to present any evidence that the treatment did not generally work. Fraud must be clearly and satisfactorily proved by the party seeking relief upon that basis. Rankin v. First Nat. Bank of Alabama, 437 So.2d 503 (Ala. 1983). This burden was not met. While intent is generally a question for the trier of fact, its determination is not within the jury's untrammeled discretion. Any finding on the issue of intent must be based on reasonable inferences from the evidence. Walker v. Woodall, 288 Ala. 510, 262 So.2d 756 (1972); Universal Brokers, Inc. v. Higdon, 56 Ala.App. 184, 320 So.2d 690 (1975). A careful study of the record reveals that the reasonable inferences from the record do not support a finding of intent. In the absence of a scintilla of evidence of present intent to deceive, defendants were entitled to a directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, on the grounds that plaintiffs failed to prove a prima facie case of fraud. Burroughs Corp. v. Hall Affiliates, Inc., 423 So.2d 1348 (Ala.1982).