Opinion ID: 674597
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Contentions With Respect to the Jury

Text: 53 Defendants make several arguments focusing on the jury. They challenge the court's empaneling of an anonymous jury. In addition, they contend that the jury engaged in premature deliberations and that its verdict was the result of confusion.
54 The law is clear in this Circuit that when genuinely called for and when properly used, anonymous juries do not infringe a defendant's constitutional rights. United States v. Vario, 943 F.2d 236, 239 (2d Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 882, 116 L.Ed.2d 786 (1992). Anonymity may be warranted when the jury needs protection, as when the government has demonstrated a defendant's willingness ... to tamper with the judicial process, id. at 240; see also United States v. Amuso, 21 F.3d 1251, 1264 (2d Cir.1994); United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1365 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 819, 106 S.Ct. 66, 88 L.Ed.2d 54 (1985); United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1032, 106 S.Ct. 592, 88 L.Ed.2d 572 (1985), or when there has been extensive pretrial publicity in cases involving allegations of violent conduct, see, e.g., United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1192 (2d Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 3029, 120 L.Ed.2d 900 (1992). If an anonymous jury is warranted, a defendant's fundamental rights must be protected by the court's conduct of a voir dire designed to uncover bias as to issues in the cases and as to the defendant, and by t[aking] care to give the jurors a plausible and nonprejudicial reason for not disclosing their identities or for taking other security measures. Id. (internal quotes omitted). If there is evidence to support the district court's finding of reason to believe the jury needs protection, and if the court has taken reasonable precautions to minimize any prejudicial effects on the defendant and to ensure protection of his fundamental rights, the decision to empanel an anonymous jury is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Id. 55 In the present case, the government moved for an anonymous jury based in large part on evidence of defendants' acts of intimidation toward their crime victims, their attempts to kill certain of those victims, and the murder of Sen Van Ta because of his refusal to retreat from his complaints to the police. The government also maintained that jurors whose identities were disclosed would be at risk because BTK had at least 100 members, many of whom were not in custody. 56 The district court concluded that the grounds for empaneling an anonymous jury were compelling. Memorandum and Order Dated January 6, 1992, at 5. It found that the government had shown that at least two of the defendants on trial sought directly to interfere with the judicial process by threatening and ultimately killing a civilian witness in an effort to subvert prosecution of a pending robbery case against Born to Kill members, and this in itself was a powerful reason to select an anonymous jury. Id. at 6. The court also found that the case had attracted and would likely continue to attract extensive media coverage, id. at 6-7, and that because of the violent nature of the crimes and defendants' extensive criminal history, a juror would have a more than reasonable basis to fear for his or her safety, id. at 5-6. The court concluded for all of these reasons that an anonymous jury was warranted. 57 In order to protect defendants' interests in jury selection, the court fashioned, with the input of counsel, a 68-question juror questionnaire designed to elicit pertinent information as to possible bias. The questionnaire made extensive inquiries into the jurors' personal backgrounds; it explored possible bias resulting from prior involvement with the legal system or with any of the individuals involved in the case; and it examined other potential barriers to the rendering of a fair and impartial verdict. In order to provide a nonprejudicial reason for maintaining anonymity, the introduction to the questionnaire stated, with the approval of the parties, that [s]electing an anonymous jury is not an unusual practice and has been followed in many cases in Federal Court. Anonymity will ward off curiosity that might infringe on a juror's privacy.... 58 The record amply supported the district court's concern as to efforts by defendants to subvert the judicial process through intimidation and murder; and the court's questionnaire properly protected defendants' interests both in the selection of unbiased jurors and in the proffer of a nonprejudicial reason for the preservation of juror anonymity. We find no abuse of discretion in the use of an anonymous jury in the present case.
59 Defendants also contend that they were deprived of a fair trial because, notwithstanding the court's instructions at the commencement of trial that the jury was not [to] discuss the case among yourselves or with anyone else during any recess (Tr. 10), the jury on three occasions engaged in premature deliberations. Assuming that the record supports this characterization, we nonetheless find no basis for reversal. 60 As to the first incident, the record indicates that early in the trial, after the government's opening statement and the opening statements of several of the defendants, the jury sent a note to the judge that stated in relevant part, 61 Your Honor, a question came up in the jury room yesterday, that I believe could be resolved by hiring a non-partial translator/interpreter through the jury panel.... I suggest a jury-hired translator to positively eliminate the chance of any questionable evaluation. 62 (Tr. 87.) Defense counsel immediately expressed concern about premature deliberations, and the court reminded the jurors not to discuss the case, even among yourselves, until after the trial is over and you receive the--heard all the evidence, the summations, the instructions on the law, and are told to deliberate. (Tr. 87-88.) The court emphasized that this prohibition was necessary to ensure that the jury keep an open mind until you have heard everything, and it would interfere with that process to be discussing things as you went along. (Id. 88.) No defendant moved for a mistrial as a result of this incident or sought to have the court conduct any inquiry; no defendant objected to the court's handling of the matter. 63 The second incident occurred during the testimony of Tinh Ngo, one of the government's early witnesses, when the jury sent the court a note stating that the jury requests some sort of reidentification of the defendants with their nicknames and real names. We're getting confused by the testimony of the witness. (Tr. 689.) In conference with counsel, the court stated that the jury's concern seemed valid; the same concern was promptly echoed by various defense counsel. Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) Alan Vinegrad was urged to have the government's witnesses make clear in each instance which defendant was being described. Accordingly, the court advised the jury that the confusion with respect to the defendants' names and nicknames would probably be sorted out. (Tr. 693.) In addition, although no defendant had voiced this concern with respect to the second jury note, the court again emphasized that the jury should not discuss the case at all until after all the testimony was in, the summations had been made, and the court had instructed the jury on the law. A day or so later, the court received yet another note from the jury, requesting clarification but reassuring the court that there had been no further premature discussions. The note stated: 64 I am requesting clarification of the current testimony. 65 .... 66 The silence in the jury room after your last admonition was ample indication that everyone is very much aware of the importance of carrying out the responsibilities in a proper and correct manner as you have outlined these procedures. 67 This is however a very complicated and confusing group of names and I would like to be sure who is being spoken about. 68 (Tr. 851.) Upon receiving the note, the court told the attorneys you will be happy to know they are following the admonition not to discuss the case. (Id.) 69 The third incident relied on by defendants occurred during the cross-examination of Tinh Ngo. The court reported that two of the jurors had expressed to the courtroom deputy [t]heir concern with their inability to get along with [another juror]. As I understand they have expressed problems with his general demeanor and attitude toward them. I suppose the word obnoxious was used. (Tr. 1739.) The court further noted that the jurors mentioned an obnoxious attitude, use of bad language, derogatory remarks about participants in the proceeding, but I suppose there is not a need to do anything.... There is not a need to do anything until we see something further about it. (Tr. 1740.) No defendant moved for a mistrial or urged the court to take any action. 70 The handling of allegations of juror misconduct is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., United States v. Carmona, 858 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir.1988) (per curiam); United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d 777, 783 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944, 106 S.Ct. 308, 88 L.Ed.2d 285 (1985); United States v. Hockridge, 573 F.2d 752, 756 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821, 99 S.Ct. 85, 86, 58 L.Ed.2d 112 (1978). The court has broad flexibility in such matters, especially when the alleged prejudice results from statements made by the jurors themselves, and not from media publicity or other outside influences. Grooms v. Wainwright, 610 F.2d 344, 347 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 953, 100 S.Ct. 1605, 63 L.Ed.2d 789 (1980). In many instances, the court's reiteration of its cautionary instructions to the jury is all that is necessary. See, e.g., United States v. Panebianco, 543 F.2d 447, 457 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1103, 97 S.Ct. 1128, 1129, 51 L.Ed.2d 553 (1977). We are particularly loath to second-guess the actions of the district court when the defendant has failed to object at trial, lest the defendant be permitted to wait to hear the verdict before contesting the impartiality of the jury and then attack the court's refusal to investigate his allegation. United States v. Edwards, 696 F.2d 1277, 1282 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 909, 103 S.Ct. 1884, 76 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983). 71 The district court's handling of the juror conduct in this case was entirely proper. While the first note, and probably the second, suggest that there had been discussions of the case in the jury room, there was no indication that the discussions concerned anything other than a difficulty in keeping track of the names. The court properly reiterated its instruction not to engage in premature deliberations. There is no evidence that any further premature deliberations occurred. Though defendants contend that the incident in which two jurors complained that a fellow juror was obnoxious indicates that the jurors were continuing to discuss the case, we see no such indication. 72 In any event, at no time did any defendant object to the court's handling of these incidents, and there is no basis for relief on appeal.
73 Hoang Ngo argues that he was convicted principally because of juror confusion over names, and that this confusion denied him due process. We note that the other defendants have joined in the appellate arguments made by their codefendants to the extent applicable. Though there can be no dispute that many of the defendants had similar, or at least similar sounding, names or nicknames and that the jurors were initially apprehensive about the possibility of confusion, we find this contention to be meritless. 74 First, as indicated in the preceding section, the court took steps to minimize the possibility of confusion. Thus, the government was prompted to have its witnesses identify any mentioned defendant with clarity. In addition, without objection from defendants, the court allowed the government to have a defendant, when referred to by a witness, stand up, thereby giving the jurors visual confirmation as to which defendant was the subject of the testimony. All indications of jury confusion occurred early in the trial, and the record does not indicate that there was any further confusion. 75 Second, the suggestion that the jury remained unable to distinguish one defendant from another because of the similarity of their names or nicknames is belied by the fact that the other defendant tried with appellants, David Nguyen, was acquitted on all of the counts against him, despite the fact that (a) his last name was the same as that of two other defendants, (b) his first name was the same as that of one other defendant, and (c) his nickname, Dat, was similar to that of another gang member, White Dat, who was mentioned throughout the trial. Given its evident ability to sort through the evidence with respect to David Nguyen, we see no reason to conclude that the jury was unable to do the same with the other defendants. 76 Finally, as indicated in Part II.F. below, with one exception defendants have made no tenable challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence against them. With respect to Hoang Ngo, the evidence was ample. For example, he was charged with two RICO predicate acts in the indictment, i.e., the robberies of San Wa Fine Jewelry and Golden Star Jewelry. As to the former, Tinh Ngo testified that Hoang Ngo had helped plan the robbery; the owner of the Georgia pawn shop identified Hoang Ngo as the purchaser of four guns; and both Kenny Vu and Tinh Ngo testified that Hoang Ngo had driven one of the cars to and from the robbery. As to the Golden Star Jewelry robbery, Hoang Ngo had pleaded guilty in state court and his attorney conceded that he was guilty. 77 In sum, except with respect to one count against Thai, the evidence was sufficient to support defendants' convictions; we have seen in this record no indication that the jury confused any defendant with any other person.