Opinion ID: 2674690
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Kerr’s Competency

Text: Due process “‘prohibits the criminal prosecution of a defendant who is not competent to stand trial.’” United States v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217, 1232 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 439 (1992)). A defendant is not competent, and the criminal proceeding against him may not progress, when his “mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975). This constitutional right is safeguarded by 18 U.S.C. § 4241, which requires the district court, upon its own motion if necessary, to hold a competency hearing “if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a); see also United States v. Zhou, 428 F.3d 361, 379 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that the standards under due process and § 4241 are “essentially equivalent” (citing Nicks v. United States, 955 F.2d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 1992))). The existence of “reasonable cause” is a highly particularized assessment that “‘varies in each case.’” Zhou, 428 F.3d at 379 (quoting United States v. Nichols, 56 F.3d 403, 414 (2d Cir. 1995)). We have identified several factors upon which the district court may rely when making the reasonable cause determination, including psychiatric reports assessing the defendant’s competence, see Zhou, 428 F.3d at 379, and the court’s own “observations of the defendant’s demeanor during the proceeding,” Quintieri, 306 F.3d at 1233. See also Drope, 420 12 11‐5462‐cr(L) United States v. Kerr U.S. at 180 (explaining that there are “no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine [the defendant’s] fitness to proceed”). The right not to be prosecuted while incompetent “spans the duration of a criminal proceeding.” United States v. Arenburg, 605 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 2010). A district court must therefore “‘always be alert to circumstances suggesting a change that would render the accused unable to meet the standards of competence to stand trial,’” id. at 168-69 (quoting Drope, 420 U.S. at 181) (emphasis in original), an obligation that “takes on increased significance where, as here, a criminal defendant elects to proceed pro se,” id. at 169. We review a district court’s decision not to order a competency hearing for abuse of discretion. Id. Here, the district court acted well within its discretion when it declined to order a competency hearing before accepting Kerr’s April 16, 2010 guilty plea. Although the court was obviously troubled by Kerr’s pretrial behavior, it was entitled to rely on the March 19, 2010 forensic report that found him competent to understand the proceedings and capable of working with his attorney if he so chose. Zhou, 428 F.3d at 379. In addition, the district court had the benefit of observing Kerr during the March 31 pretrial conference and the April 14-16 trial. The transcripts of those proceedings show that although he was unfamiliar with the law and court procedure, Kerr vocally advocated on his own behalf, made relevant objections during the government’s direct examination of witnesses, and consulted with standby counsel when necessary. During the change-of-plea hearing, Kerr also responded cogently to the district court’s inquiries and displayed his understanding of the charge. In short, we discern no unusual circumstances that should have given the district court pause before accepting Kerr’s plea. See Quintieri, 306 F.3d at 1233; see also Wojtowicz v. United States, 13 11‐5462‐cr(L) United States v. Kerr 550 F.2d 786, 791 (2d Cir. 1977) (where a defendant has been found competent following a court-ordered evaluation, a district court generally is “not required to hold a competency hearing before accepting a plea”); Saddler v. United States, 531 F.2d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1976) (district court under no obligation to question a defendant’s competency when his “answers to the court’s Rule 11 inquiries, his demeanor and his testimony . . . all appeared to be rational and coherent”).5 Having concluded that the district court was not required to hold a competency hearing before Kerr’s April 16 plea, we must now assess whether the record reflects any “circumstances suggesting a change that would render [Kerr] unable to meet the standards of competence” by the time of his August 4 sentencing. Arenburg, 605 F.3d at 168-69 (internal quotation marks omitted). In his counseled brief, Kerr contends there were two such circumstances: his “erratic” and “irrational” post-plea behavior, and Wells’s representations that the FMC psychologists “missed something” and that Kerr was unable to help him prepare for sentencing. We first hold that, upon consideration of the whole record, Kerr’s post-plea behavior was not so “erratic” that it should have given the district court reason to doubt his competency. Indeed, the record reflects that Kerr’s obstinate, belligerent, and obsessive behavior remained a constant throughout the entire proceedings. The district court ordered the pretrial competency evaluation after it became increasingly disturbed by Kerr’s obsession with his pro se theories of defense to the exclusion of other issues, his refusal to cooperate or 5 Given this conclusion, we reject any suggestion in counsel’s brief that Kerr was “likely” incompetent at the time of his trial and plea. See Appellant Br. at 45 & n.12. 14 11‐5462‐cr(L) United States v. Kerr communicate with his attorneys, and his insistence on subpoenaing irrelevant witnesses. This is precisely the same behavior Kerr flags as “erratic” in the post-plea phase of the case, when he cut off communication with Wells and repeatedly attempted to press his theories of defense despite having pled guilty. Although the “obligation to be vigilant for reasonable cause [to question the defendant’s competency] . . . does not disappear upon a pretrial finding that the defendant is competent to stand trial,” Arenburg, 605 F.3d at 170 (internal quotation marks omitted), under the circumstances of this case we will not fault the district court—which observed Kerr over the entirety of the proceedings below—for not twice questioning the same behavior. Kerr’s situation is therefore distinguishable from those cases in which we have found it necessary for courts to revisit their initial reasonable cause determinations. See id. at 169-71 (district court erred by suggesting that a magistrate judge’s pretrial competency determination was dispositive of the defendant’s competence at trial and was required to revisit the reasonable cause determination where, at trial, the assigned AUSA questioned the defendant’s mental stability and the defendant, who had a history of mental illness, made numerous incoherent statements); Wojtowicz, 550 F.2d at 789-90 (remanding to the district court for an evidentiary hearing where defendant, who was assessed as competent before the entry of his plea, submitted a post-judgment affirmation stating that he had attempted to commit suicide on the morning of sentencing). Kerr’s obsession with his defensive theories, his distrust of his attorneys, and his belligerent attitude were also not so bizarre as to require the district court to question his competency for a second time. Compare Arenburg, 605 F.3d at 171 (reasonable cause to reconsider defendant’s competency where “he made repeated references to ‘radio waves,’ 15 11‐5462‐cr(L) United States v. Kerr ‘microwave channels,’ and a conspiracy involving MGM Studios and the government with the object of publicly broadcasting his thoughts”), and United States v. Auen, 846 F.2d 872, 874-75, 878 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding reasonable cause for a competency hearing and remanding for the district court to conduct such a hearing where defendant, inter alia, compared the agent investigating his case with a cat he had put down, complained that he had been the victim of “psychopolitical terrorism by the Internal Revenue Service,” and threatened the government’s attorneys), with Zhou, 428 F.3d at 380-81 (no reasonable cause to question defendant’s competency where the district court had observed the defendant “over a substantial period of time” and the defendant was found competent in a medical report that described him as “defensive, stubborn, and evasive regarding the details of his case”). Disputes between criminal defendants and their attorneys are not at all uncommon, see United States v. White, 174 F.3d 290, 296 (2d Cir. 1999), and many defendants “assert that their rights have been denied at every turn,” “demonstrate that they do not understand how