Opinion ID: 2817717
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Airgas LLC

Text: Lee devotes approximately five pages of his opening brief to attacking the district court for “never address[ing] the lack of standing or jurisdiction issues as to Airgas [LLC],” which he claims “should have been raised by the court on its own motion.” Lee’s contentions fall short. Lee first believes Airgas LLC had “no standing . . . to file the motion to dismiss” because (1) Airgas LLC never “made clear that it assumed the debts and liabilities of Airgas [Mid-South],” and (2) “no Airgas entity has admitted that it -3- supplied the oxygen tank at issue.” However, Airgas LLC conceded that, as the surviving entity of the merger, it assumed by statute the liabilities of Airgas MidSouth, and for the purposes of this action, “Airgas [LLC] is Airgas [Mid-South].” See Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-209(g) (“[A]ll debts, liabilities and duties of each of the said domestic limited liability companies and other business entities that have merged or consolidated shall thenceforth attach to the surviving or resulting domestic limited liability company . . . , and may be enforced against it to the same extent as if said debts, liabilities and duties had been incurred or contracted by it.”). Lee’s claims are therefore assertions of Airgas LLC’s liability, against which Airgas LLC has every right to defend. Despite Lee’s claims to the contrary, the existence of a case or controversy here does not depend upon proof or concession, particularly at the pleading stage, that Airgas LLC (or any other Airgas entity) actually supplied the oxygen tank in question. See Hutterville Hutterian Brethren, Inc. v. Sveen, 776 F.3d 547, 553-54 (8th Cir. 2015) (explaining that general factual allegations may suffice at the pleading stage and standing does not depend on the plaintiff’s ability to prove misconduct). Lee, apparently dissatisfied with his own choice of forum, also questions diversity of citizenship, believing the district court failed to inquire about the citizenship of Airgas LLC’s members and “should have . . . raised” the issue “on its own motion.” Yet, it is undisputed Airgas LLC’s only member is Airgas, Inc., and Airgas, Inc. is not a citizen of Arkansas. See GMAC Commercial Credit LLC v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 357 F.3d 827, 829 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[A]n LLC’s citizenship is that of its members for diversity jurisdiction purposes.”).
Lee does not dispute the three-year statute of limitations applicable to his product liability claims, see Ark. Code Ann. § 16-116-103, ran in August 2013. Lee first named Airgas Mid-South as a defendant in his February 20, 2014 amended -4- complaint, but he argues these claims are not time-barred because the amended complaint relates back to his original August 20, 2013, complaint. “Such an amendment ordinarily will not be treated as relating back to the prior pleading, unless certain conditions set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) are satisfied.” Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687, 696 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dep’t, 66 F.3d 466, 467 (2d Cir. 1995), modified, 74 F.3d 1366 (2d Cir. 1996)). An amendment which “changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted” relates back if (1) “the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original pleading”; (2) “the party to be brought in by the amendment . . . received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits”; (3) that party “knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity”; and (4) the second and third of these requirements were met “within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B), (C). The district court determined, and we agree, that even if Lee satisfies the first three of these requirements, Lee’s case fails on the fourth. Lee must show Airgas LLC received notice of this lawsuit “within 120 days after the complaint [wa]s filed.”3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Lee provides neither argument nor evidence showing Airgas LLC had notice of the action any earlier than March 10, 2014, when Lee served Airgas LLC’s agent. Instead, Lee proposes his 3 The 120-day requirement also can be extended by any service-of-process extensions the district court might grant for “good cause.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, advisory committee’s note (1991) (“[T]his rule allows not only the 120 days specified in [Rule 4(m)], but also any additional time resulting from any extension ordered by the court pursuant to that rule.”). Lee never asked for an extension and does not appeal the district court’s conclusion that he failed to establish good cause for delay. -5- December 18, 2013, motion for leave to file an amended complaint “tolled” the 120day service period for purposes of Rule 15(c)(1)(C). We cannot accept Lee’s tolling proposal. “[F]iling an amended complaint in itself does not toll the service period” or reset the 120-day clock; at best, “adding a new party through an amended complaint initiates a new 120-day timetable for service upon the added defendant.” 4B Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1137 (4th ed. 2015) (emphasis added); see also Bolden v. City of Topeka, Kan., 441 F.3d 1129, 1148 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he 120-day period provided by Rule 4(m) is not restarted by the filing of an amended complaint except as to those defendants newly added in the amended complaint.”); see, e.g., Carmona v. Ross, 376 F.3d 829 (8th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (affirming the finding of late service of defendants named in initial complaint but giving plaintiff a new 120-day clock for serving new defendants added in amended complaint). And for Lee’s purposes, a new 120-day timetable for newly added defendants is irrelevant because Rule 15(c)(1)(C) looks to the Rule 4(m) period for serving the original complaint. See, e.g., Garvin v. City of Philadelphia, 354 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting the newly added defendants “must have received notice of the institution of the action within 120 days following the filing of the action”); Barrow, 66 F.3d at 469 (explaining Rule 15(c)(1)(C) requires notice “within 120 days of the filing of the original complaint”). Were Rule 15(c)(1)(C) to reset its 120-day requirement every time a defendant is added, its notice requirement would be a practical nullity with the plaintiff’s existing obligation under Rule 4(m) to serve the new defendant within 120 days of the amended complaint (which would notify him of the lawsuit). Rule 15(c)(1)(C) imposes an independent requirement for relation back, not satisfied here, that the newly added defendant must have had notice of the suit within 120 days of filing the original complaint.4 4 This result is not altered by Lee’s use of John Doe pleadings under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-125. In Arkansas, “before a real party can be substituted for a John Doe -6-