Opinion ID: 4019715
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tapia Error

Text: Holdsworth also argues that the district court committed Tapia error by lengthening his sentence to provide rehabilitation opportunities. He acknowledges that the district court did not reference any specific Bureau of Prisons treatment program, as the court did in Tapia. Nevertheless, he relies on the district court's comment that two, three, four good years of sobriety and medication and stability may be needed for the defendant's safety and the safety of the community. He contends that this comment shows that the district court was thinking out loud as she steadily ratcheted up the amount of time the defendant needed to get and stay sober. Although he admits that the court also considered other factors such as public safety, he argues that it is plain that the length of [his] sentence was determined in significant part by impermissible consideration of [his] need for rehabilitation. In Tapia, the Supreme Court held that, under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a), district courts may not 'impose or lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offender to complete a treatment program or otherwise to promote rehabilitation.' United States v. Blackmon, 662 F.3d 981, 986 (8th Cir. 2011) (footnote omitted) (quoting Tapia, 564 U.S. at 335). Nevertheless, district courts are permitted to make recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) regarding treatment programs and can discuss the benefits of such programs with defendants at sentencing. Id. (citing Tapia, 564 U.S. at 334). Therefore, [a] district court commit[s] error that [is] plain . . . if . . . the district court lengthened [the defendant's] sentence to promote rehabilitation. Id. (citing United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 549 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (The plain error principle applies even when . . . the error results from a change in the law that occurred while the case was pending on appeal.)). Many potential Tapia errors will not require remand under plain error review. United States v. Olson, 667 F.3d 958, 962 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Blackmon, 662 F.3d at 987–88). -9- We conclude that the district court's remarks at sentencing do not suggest that it lengthened Holdsworth's sentence to promote rehabilitation. Not only does Holdsworth concede that the district court never referenced any specific BOP treatment program, but he also concedes that the district court discussed other factors such as the need for deterrence and protection of the public due to the defendant's criminal history. Moreover, it was Holdsworth—not the court—who suggest[ed] to the [c]ourt that treatment is the response here, noted that one of [the § 3553(a) factors to consider is the need for treatment; and requested that the court give him a chance to get back into treatment. See United States v. Werlein, 664 F.3d 1143, 1147 (8th Cir. 2011) (While the district court mentioned therapeutic intervention and treatment at the sentencing hearing, these references were made in the context of explaining why [the defendant] posed a risk of recidivism, responding to a request by [the defendant's] attorney that he be placed in a facility with treatment, and mentioning that [the defendant] might benefit from professional assistance. (citation omitted)); Blackmon, 662 F.3d at 987 (Indeed, the district court never expressed an intention to lengthen [the defendant's] sentence for rehabilitative purposes. Rather, it was [the defendant] who requested a downward variance based on his rehabilitative needs and the district court merely pointed out a mathematical flaw in his request.). Neither the isolated comment that Holdsworth identifies nor the record as a whole indicates that the district court chose Holdsworth's particular sentence for the specific purpose of ensuring that he could participate in a drug-treatment program. See, e.g., United States v. Replogle, 678 F.3d 940, 943 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that district court's remarks did not suggest that it had improperly used imprisonment as means of fostering defendant's rehabilitation; rather, the remarks were a proper discussion of opportunities for rehabilitation within prison or benefits of specific treatment or training programs; the court said one of the elements of sentencing . . . is to make sure you get the treatment and training and education necessary to help you to go forward, and that perhaps defendant's situation, his total disconnect between reality and his inability to conduct himself in a manner that allows him to be -10- a part of society, could be treated better somewhere else, but that the court lacked the tools to do so). Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not commit plain error under Tapia.