Opinion ID: 2623595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Alleged Juror Bias and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Failing to Exercise Challenges

Text: Coffman argues we must reverse her conviction and sentence because four of the jurors who decided her case were biased in favor of the death penalty. She acknowledges her trial counsel failed to challenge any of the four, either for cause or by using available peremptory challenges, and thus forfeited any appellate claim of error in the seating of those jurors. (See People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 184, 279 Cal.Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 394, 889 P.2d 588.) She asserts, however, that she should be relieved of the consequences of counsel's inaction because they rendered ineffective assistance in this regard. On this record, we conclude her claims lack merit. As noted above, a prospective juror may be challenged for cause based upon his or her views regarding capital punishment only if those views would `prevent or substantially impair the juror's performance of the duties defined by the court's instructions and his or her oath.' ( People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 975, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519, quoting Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424, 105 S.Ct. 844.) A prospective juror who would be unable conscientiously to consider all of the sentencing alternatives, including, when appropriate, the death penalty, is properly subject to excusal for cause. ( People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 987, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) Our review of the record confirms that none of the four jurors who defendant asserts were biased would have been properly excused under this standard, as each expressed a willingness to consider all the evidence presented before reaching a decision as to penalty. Counsel therefore did not perform deficiently in not challenging those jurors for cause. (See Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 [claims of ineffective assistance of counsel entail deficient performance assessed under an objective standard of professional reasonableness and prejudice measured by a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome in the absence of the deficient performance]; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-218, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) Nor can we say counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to exercise peremptory challenges with respect to these jurors: `Because the use of peremptory challenges is inherently subjective and intuitive, an appellate record will rarely disclose reversible incompetence in this process.' ( People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 485, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249, quoting People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 911, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277.)