Opinion ID: 1375029
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Failure to Instruct on Other Offenses Involving Children

Text: (44a) Defendant contends with regard to his conviction of Carter's murder  which, if decided on a theory of felony murder, required a conclusion that he violated or attempted to violate section 288  that the court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte on what he calls lesser included offenses of section 288, namely misdemeanor child molest under former section 647a and contributing to the delinquency of a minor under Penal Code section 272. He maintains that the error deprived him of a right he asserts to a reliable guilt determination under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. When defendant killed Carter, former section 647a provided in relevant part: Every person who annoys or molests any child under the age of 18 is a vagrant and is punishable upon first conviction by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500) or by imprisonment in the county jail for not exceeding six months or by both.... (See Stats. 1976, ch. 1139, § 262, p. 5136; see now § 647.6.) Defendant argues in essence that the jury might have found he intended only to annoy Carter by photographing him. It has been held that misdemeanor child molestation under former section 647a was a lesser included offense of section 288. ( People v. Poon (1981) 125 Cal. App.3d 55, 80 [178 Cal. Rptr. 375].) Even if that is so, and even if defendant was entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense in the felony-murder context, in which the rationale for instructing on lesser included offenses may not be implicated (cf. People v. Geiger (1984) 35 Cal.3d 510, 518-520 [199 Cal. Rptr. 45, 674 P.2d 1303])  issues we do not decide  we disagree that he was entitled to an instruction on that offense. (45) A criminal defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense only if (see People v. Morrison (1964) 228 Cal. App.2d 707, 712-713 [39 Cal. Rptr. 874]) there is evidence which, if accepted by the trier of fact, would absolve [the] defendant from guilt of the greater offense ( id. at p. 712) but not the lesser. (Accord, People v. Green (1971) 15 Cal. App.3d 524, 529 [93 Cal. Rptr. 84]; see also People v. Berry (1976) 18 Cal.3d 509, 518-519 [134 Cal. Rptr. 415, 556 P.2d 777]; People v. McCoy (1944) 25 Cal.2d 177, 187-188 [153 P.2d 315]; People v. Lesnick (1987) 189 Cal. App.3d 637, 642-643 [234 Cal. Rptr. 491]; People v. Chambers (1982) 136 Cal. App.3d 444, 455-456 [186 Cal. Rptr. 306]; People v. Ellers (1980) 108 Cal. App.3d 943, 954 [166 Cal. Rptr. 888]; People v. Salas (1978) 77 Cal. App.3d 600, 607-608 [143 Cal. Rptr. 755].) (44b) In this case, there was no evidence that, if accepted by the trier of fact, would absolve defendant of having violated section 288 but would not absolve him of having violated former section 647a. Specifically, defendant was not entitled to an instruction based on section 647a if there was no evidence that one or more of the elements peculiar to a violation of section 288 was absent but that all of the elements required to establish a violation of former section 647a were present. Assuming that former section 647a is a lesser included offense of section 288, it must be so because it lacks the element of a lewd touching. (46) [T]he primary distinction between section 288, subdivision (a), and section 647.6 is that the former requires that a touching or constructive touching occur, and that the touching is lewd. It is this type of overt contact, or intrusion upon the body of the child done with lewd intent, that distinguishes a section 288, subdivision (a), offense from the less serious offense defined by section 647.6. ( People v. Levesque (1995) 35 Cal. App.4th 530, 539 [41 Cal. Rptr.2d 439].) (44c) That primary distinction was also true of section 647a, the predecessor of section 647.6. ( People v. La Fontaine (1978) 79 Cal. App.3d 176, 185 [144 Cal. Rptr. 729] [discussing version identical, as relevant here, to that in effect when defendant killed Carter; see Stats. 1967, ch. 154, § 1, p. 1241; Stats. 1976, ch. 1139, § 262, p. 5136].) There was evidence from which a rational trier of fact could conclude that a violation of section 288 occurred. It will be recalled that defendant confessed that he brought Carter to his apartment intending to take nude pictures of him. He admitted disrobing him, although he stated that he did so after death. But the jury could conclude, notwithstanding that part of defendant's confession, that he disrobed Carter while alive, either at his command or by an actual touching, with lewd or lascivious intent, and then, as the prosecutor argued, sodomized or attempted to sodomize him while alive. [T]he jury may believe a part and reject the remainder of a confession [citations]. ( People v. Garcia (1935) 2 Cal.2d 673, 679 [42 P.2d 1013]; cf. People v. Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 1176 [270 Cal. Rptr. 286, 791 P.2d 965] [jury could find sexual acts took place while victim was alive in the absence of any evidence of intent to have sexual conduct with a corpse]; accord, People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 46 [40 Cal. Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224].) The disrobing while alive, actual or constructive, if accepted by the trier of fact, establishes a violation of section 288. ( People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 176 [284 Cal. Rptr. 511, 814 P.2d 290].) What was missing, however, was any evidence that a lewd touching was absent but that all of the elements of a violation of section 647a  i.e., lewd conduct without a lewd touching  were present. Defendant interpreted the evidence as not establishing any criminally lewd act or act of criminal annoyance at all: indeed, on appeal he maintains that the evidence showed only that he brought Carter to his home to photograph him, Carter wanted to leave, and he impulsively strangled him. His closing argument proceeded along similar lines. For its part, the prosecution relied on evidence that he violated or attempted to violate section 288. Under these circumstances, he was not entitled to an instruction based on former section 647a. We turn to the other offense to which defendant refers. When he killed Carter, section 272 provided in relevant part, Every person who commits any act or omits the performance of any duty, which act or omission causes or tends to cause or encourage any person under the age of 18 years to come within the provisions of Sections 600, 601, or 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code or which act or omission contributes thereto, or any person who, by any act or omission, or by threats, commands, or persuasion, induces or endeavors to induce any person under the age of 18 years or any ward or dependent child of the juvenile court to fail or refuse to conform to a lawful order of the juvenile court, or to do or to perform any act or to follow any course of conduct or to so live as would cause or manifestly tend to cause any such person to become or remain a person within the provisions of Sections 600, 601, or 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, is guilty of a misdemeanor.... (See Stats. 1976, ch. 1125, § 16, p. 5037.) It has been held that contributing to a minor's delinquency under section 272 is not a lesser included offense to performing a lewd or lascivious act with a child under 14 as proscribed by section 288, subdivision (a). (See People v. Vincze (1992) 8 Cal. App.4th 1159, 1162-1164.) Accordingly, we find defendant's contention unpersuasive. In sum, there was no error. Nor was there any violation of the Eighth Amendment. ( People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1081, fn. 9.)