Opinion ID: 614580
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sports equipment

Text: The term sports equipment is not defined in the HTSUS, so we are to look to the common and popular meaning of the term. Bauer, 393 F.3d at 1250. Here, the CIT correctly cited the dictionary definition of equipment to find that [t]o qualify as `equipment' for a sport, the good should generally provide `what is necessary, useful, or appropriate [for that sport].' CIT Decision, at 1383 (citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary 768 (2002)). We have employed this same definition for the term sports equipment in our prior decisions. See Rollerblade, 282 F.3d at 1354; Bauer, 393 F.3d at 1250-51. In Rollerblade, we accepted a definition offered for this term that includes those articles that are necessary and specifically designed for use in athletics and other sports. 282 F.3d at 1354. In Bauer, we again considered the definition of sports equipment when we addressed the proper classification for ice-hockey pants. 393 F.3d at 1250-51. There, we found that the CIT erred in applying our Rollerblade decision too strictly when it found that equipment meant only articles that are indispensible to a sport or athletic activity. Because hockey could be played without ice-hockey pants, the CIT held that such pants were not necessary for that sport and, therefore, not eligible for classification as sports equipment. Id. at 1250. We reversed, explaining that, while the term sports equipment includes items that are necessary for a sport, it also includes items that are appropriate and useful for a sport. Id. We concluded that, [b]ecause it is undisputed that Bauer's pants were specially designed and intended for use only while playing ice hockey, we hold, contrary to the [CIT's] conclusion, that the pants are prima facie classifiable under subheading 9506.99.25 as ice-hockey equipment. Id. at 1251. Relying on the dictionary definition of equipment and our case law, LeMans argues that sports equipment means either those goods that are necessary, useful, or appropriate for a sport or those goods that are specially designed and intended for use in a particular sport, even if they might otherwise be wearing apparel. Appellant's Br. 12. According to LeMans, the subject merchandise falls squarely within either definition, particularly in light of the CIT's statement that the subject merchandise is designed, engineered, and produced exclusively for use while participating in motocross activities and other power sports riding. CIT Decision, at 1376 (quoting Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s First Interrogs. & Reqs. for Produc.). Under LeMans's theory, the fact that the merchandise is designed exclusively for use in a particular sport should compel the conclusion that the merchandise is prima facie classifiable as sports equipment, and the court (and Customs before it) should proceed to an analysis under GRI 3(a) to determine which heading provides greater specificity. We do not agree with LeMans that the analysis is so narrow. First, we find LeMans's heavy reliance on Bauer misplaced. LeMans argues that the CIT's holding in this case is directly at odds with our decision in Bauer, which LeMans believes is controlling. As discussed above, Bauer turned on whether the CIT was correct in concluding that, in order for articles to be sports equipment, they must be indispensable for a sport. 393 F.3d at 1250. The CIT's decision in Bauer that the ice-hockey pants were not classifiable as sports equipment hinged entirely on the fact that hockey could be played without such protective pants: While the hockey pants provide protection to the wearer, and are specially designed for use in the sport of ice hockey, Plaintiff concedes that it is possible to engage in the sport of ice hockey without wearing the merchandise in question. As such, the Court finds that the subject merchandise is not essential or necessary for participation in that sport. Consequently, Plaintiff's ice hockey pants are not articles of sports equipment, and are therefore not classifiable as such. Bauer Nike Hockey USA, Inc. v. United States, 305 F.Supp.2d 1345, 1357 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003) (internal citation omitted), rev'd, 393 F.3d 1246 (Fed.Cir.2004). In deciding that merchandise can be sports equipment as long as the goods are useful or appropriate for a sport, we did not address the extent to which the Explanatory Notes to Section 9506 clarified the meaning of the term sports equipment, an issue we find persuasive in this case, as discussed below. The ice-hockey pants at issue in Bauer, moreover, are distinguishable from the subject merchandise. The ice-hockey pants were constructed of a nylon or polyester textile shell and had an internal assembly of hard plastic guards and foam padding. Bauer, 393 F.3d at 1248. Accordingly, they were much more like the examples of pads and guards listed in EN 95.06(B)(13), the subsection of the Explanatory Notes that the CIT distinguished from the subject merchandise in this case. Indeed, the plaintiff-appellant in Bauer expressly argued, both before the CIT and on appeal to this court, that its ice-hockey pants fell squarely within the range of examples of protective equipment for sports listed in EN 95.06(B)(13). Thus, despite LeMans's argument to the contrary, we find that Bauer does not compel the result LeMans urges. Next, as discussed below, resort to the Explanatory Notes to Section 9506 supports the conclusion that the subject items are not classifiable as sports equipment, as LeMans urges.