Opinion ID: 1881923
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Davis's Statements

Text: Brooks' major complaint about hearsay is that the trial court erred in allowing numerous hearsay statements made by Davis out of court and well before any alleged conspiracy was established, evidencing his motive, plan, and intent to kill Carlson and her baby. Specifically, the State introduced the testimony of Steve Mantheny, a life insurance salesman. He testified that on February 20, 1996, almost two months before the murders, Davis applied for a life insurance policy naming his baby, Stuart, as the insured and himself as the primary beneficiary. At trial, Brooks objected not only to Mantheny's testimony but also to the introduction of the actual life insurance policy. Wayne Samms, a friend of Davis, was permitted to testify that about a month before the murders, Davis complained to him that Carlson kept bugging him and asking him for money, and that her and the little dip were done. He understood this to mean that Davis was going to kill them and that he was not going to pay them any more money. The State also introduced the testimony of David Johnson, a car dealer, who testified that in the early part of April, Davis talked to him about purchasing a car worth about $32,000 and that Davis was coming into some money. Similarly, Anthony Sievers, another friend of Davis, testified that Davis told him he was contemplating getting a new car and that there would be no payments involved. [3] Finally, Rochelle Jones, a friend of Davis, testified as to a conversation she had with Davis on Monday or Tuesday before the murders in which Davis told her that a man owed him money and he was going to get the money, but that he would have to smoke the dip with the baby because she would be able to tie him to that man. She understood smoking the dip with the baby to mean that he would have to kill that girl, the baby. As noted, the trial court also allowed these statements under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule of section 90.803(3). On appeal, the State now argues that they were properly admitted as statements of a co-conspirator under section 90.803(18)(e), claiming that a conspiracy existed between Davis, Brooks and Mark Gilliam. However, the State's argument on appeal is without merit because to qualify under the co-conspirator exception of section 90.803(13)(e), a statement must be made during the course of the conspiracy and in furtherance of it. See § 90.803(18)(e), Fla. Stat. (1997); see also Foster v. State, 679 So.2d 747 (Fla.1996). There is simply no record evidence even suggesting that at the time most of the above statements were made any conspiracy existed. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary and demonstrated that if any conspiracy existed it was formed shortly before the murders. [4] The State contends that these statements should be admitted even though they were made by Davis because of the close and inseparable connection between Brooks and Davis during Brooks' visit and stay in Florida. However, by this argument the State is ignoring the limitations of the co-conspirator hearsay exception of section 90.803(13)(e), which requires (1) that these statements be made during and in furtherance of a conspiracy, and (2) that independent evidence establish the conspiracy before the statements are allowed. The trustworthiness and rationale behind the co-conspirator hearsay exception is that a person who has authorized another to speak or to act to some joint end will be held responsible for what is later said or done by his agent, whether in his presence or not. United States v. Trowery, 542 F.2d 623, 626 (3d Cir.1976). As noted, at the time the above statements were made, there was no evidence of a conspiracy or that one would occur; therefore, those statements are devoid of the requisite trustworthiness contained in the co-conspirator exception. The statements are clearly hearsay not covered by any other recognized exception to the hearsay rule. As earlier noted, it is clear that section 90.803(3) allows the admission of a declarant's statements to prove only the declarant's state of mind or to explain or prove only the declarant's subsequent conduct. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 440 So.2d 570, 577 (Fla.1983); Bailey. Therefore, this rule also renders Davis's statements inadmissible to prove Brooks' intent and motive. See, e.g., Sandoval v. State, 689 So.2d 1258 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). In Sandoval, the defendant sought to introduce her codefendant's statements to show the defendant's state of mind and to explain her actions. The trial court sustained the State's objection to the introduction of the evidence. On appeal, the Third District agreed with the trial court and held: [S]ection [90.803(3)] permits the admission of a declarant's statements to prove the declarant's state of mind or explain the declarant's subsequent conduct. See e.g., Jones v. State, 440 So.2d 570, 577 (Fla.1983). The declarant here, is the co-defendant and not Sandoval. Id. at 1259. As in Sandoval, the trial court here should not have allowed Davis's statements to be used against Brooks to establish motive, absent any evidence of a conspiracy at the time the statements were made. Therefore, we find the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Davis's numerous statements to Samms, Johnson, Sievers, and Mantheny, and Brooks was substantially prejudiced as a result. [5]