Opinion ID: 2379681
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the challenge to the judge's instructions

Text: The defendant contends that the trial justice committed prejudicial error in refusing to charge the jury as follows: However, if in this case you find that the death of Arthur Almeida resulted from an accident, you must find the defendant not guilty. The defendant cites in support of this construction State v. Crough, 89 R.I. 338, 152 A.2d 644 (1959). In Crough the trial justice did instruct that if the death of a child occurred by accident, the defendant was entitled to an acquittal. The court held that the charge as a whole was correct and applied to the evidence. Id. at 353, 152 A.2d at 652-53. [1] In the case at bar the trial justice defined manslaughter in the following terms: Now, manslaughter may be either voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary manslaughter is defined as an intentional homicide without malice aforethought in the heat of passion as a result of adequate provocation. Heat of passion means any emotions of the mind such as rage and anger. Involuntary manslaughter is defined as an unintentional homicide without malice aforethought committed either in the performance of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony or in the performance of a lawful act with criminal negligence. Following its deliberations, the jury returned the verdict guilty of voluntary manslaughter.  We are of the opinion that defendant's contentions concerning the failure of the trial justice to give the requested instruction in this case are without merit. The trial justice's definition of voluntary manslaughter required an intentional killing in the heat of passion as a result of adequate provocation. Such an instruction completely precludes a nonculpable, accidental homicide. Further, the trial justice's definition of involuntary manslaughter also precluded an accidental death unless it was brought about by an unlawful act not amounting to a felony or in the performance of a lawful act with criminal negligence. We believe that the trial justice's instructions in this case were as adequate in excluding accident without criminal culpability as the instruction that was approved in State v. Crough, 89 R.I. at 353, 152 A.2d at 652-53. The term accident is a most indefinite term indeed. A death may well be brought about by unintentional means that could be termed accidental, but in the event that such death is the result of criminal negligence or an unlawful act not amounting to a felony, such homicide may well constitute manslaughter. Consequently, the instruction requested by defendant was highly susceptible of misleading the jury. This illustrates the danger of taking phrases from an appellate opinion without qualification as a basis for a charge to a jury. Appellate opinions are addressed to judges and lawyers and are not always appropriate for use in the communication of legal concepts to lay jurors. The verdict of voluntary manslaughter required a finding that the death was brought about by intentional means and that the homicide was reduced from the crime of murder only by the finding of adequate provocation or heat of passion. In any event, the trial justice's instructions on voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter of necessity negated an accidental death not brought about by culpable conduct on the part of the accused, either deliberate or criminally negligent. It is well settled that a trial justice need not adopt the language suggested by a defendant so long as those instructions reasonably set forth all of the propositions of law that relate to material issues of fact which the evidence tends to support. State v. Manning, R.I., 447 A.2d 393, 394 (1982); State v. Ahmadjian, R.I., 438 A.2d 1070, 1086 (1981); State v. Verdone, 114 R.I. 613, 619, 337 A.2d 804, 809 (1975). We conclude that in the case at bar the trial justice carried out his obligation and correctly framed the legal issues for the jury's consideration.