Opinion ID: 3157590
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Determining âReasoablenessâ Requires Consideration of All Facts Found by the Hearing Officer

Text: Â¶43Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The Boardâs failure to ground its findings of ultimate fact in the hearing officerâs evidentiary findings, as determined above, means that its reasonableness determination was not âfully warrantedâ by those findings and was therefore arbitrary and capricious. âFully warrantedâ cannot solely mean based exclusively on the hearing officerâs findings and incorporating no others; it must also encompass a requirement to consider the entirety of the hearing officerâs evidentiary determinations. Thus, in order for a school boardâs reasonableness determination to survive arbitrary and capricious review, it must be made in consideration of all the hearing officerâs evidentiary findings. Â¶44Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In other contexts, we have recognized that an inquiry into what is reasonable necessarily requires an examination of the underlying circumstances. See, e.g., Herr v.Â People, 198 P.3d 108, 114 (Colo. 2008) (âWhat constitutes a reasonable effort [to secure a ruling on a Crim. P. 35(b) motion] by the defendant is dependent on the unique circumstances of the case.â (emphasis added)); Farmers Grp., Inc. v. Trimble, 691 P.2d 1138, 1142 (Colo. 1984) (â[T]he standard applicable to establish the tort of bad faith remains one of reasonableness under the circumstances.â (emphasis added)); Spensieri v. Farmers All. Mut. Ins. Co., 804 P.2d 268, 270 (Colo. App. 1990) (holding that when an attorney fee award is made under a statute that does not define âreasonable,â the award should be determined âin light of all circumstancesâ (emphasis added)). ConsistentÂ with these cases, Blackâs Law Dictionary defines âreasonableâ as â[f]air, proper, or moderate under the circumstances; sensible.â 1456 (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added) . Â¶45Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Importing these general guidelines into the present inquiry, we conclude that a board cannot appraise reasonableness in a vacuum, turning a blind eye to the attending circumstances or entertaining only those facts that allow it to achieve a preordained result. The Boardâs dismissal order here does both. Â¶46Â Â Â Â Â Â Â First, the Boardâs dismissal order is contrary to the hearing officerâs finding that the Districtâs order was pretextual and made âwith an eye to developing an additional basis to dismiss [Ritzert] for insubordination.â The hearing officer concluded that the District, faced with having to prove the actual and more substantial charges of neglect of duty and other good and just cause, seized on the opportunity to tack on the insubordination charge when it learned about Ritzertâs new employment. Â¶47Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Blackâs Law Dictionary defines âpretextâ as a âfalse or weak reason or motive advanced to hide the actual or strong reason or motive.â 1380. Here, it is evident that the hearing officer found the insubordination charge to be a false or weak reason justifying Ritzertâs dismissal in light of the Districtâs âoverall conduct toward [her]â and the limited number of grounds for dismissal specified under TECDA. Â¶48Â Â Â Â Â Â Â This finding is not speculation or a mere expression of disapproval for how the Board handled Ritzertâs situation. The hearing officer made this finding after he considered the entire constellation of facts, including the testimony from the Districtâs witnesses and the evidence of its collective actions leading up to Ritzertâs noncompliance. The finding is an inference based on a credibility determination thatÂ the hearing officer was both empowered and expected to make as a neutral adjudicator. deKoevend, 688 P.2d at 226 (âIt is the hearing officer, rather than the board, who âis empowered to assess credibility, weigh conflicting evidence and draw factual inferences from the testimony and exhibits introduced by the parties.ââ (quoting Ricci, 627 P.2d at 1119)); see also Blaine, 748 P.2d at 1286â87 (âThe function of the hearing officer is to review the evidence and testimony, to assess the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh conflicting evidence, [and] to draw reasonable inferences from the facts . . . .â). Â¶49Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Second, the Board did not mention the following additional undisputed evidentiary facts in its Order of Dismissal: (1) when the District placed Ritzert on leave, Air Academyâs principal told her she would not be returning to work at the school; (2) on May 10, 2012, the Assistant Superintendent for Human Resources for the District asked Ritzert to resign; (3) he asked her again two days later; (4) he also told her that the Board would dismiss her at its upcoming June meeting; and (5) the District did not show any interest in having Ritzert return to work until it learned about her employment with Falcon, which was after the date on which teachers were required to report for work in the District. By omitting these facts and focusing solely on Ritzertâs refusal to comply with the Districtâs order, the Board failed to meet the basic standard of assessing the reasonableness of a districtâs directive on a case-by-case basis. The Boardâs reasoning focused solely on the legitimacy of the Districtâs authority to issue the order but insulated the District from having to prove the order was reasonable under the circumstances. The Boardâs inadequate consideration of the full extent of theÂ hearing officerâs findings leads us to conclude that it did not properly assess the reasonableness of the Districtâs order and that its action was arbitrary and capricious. Â¶50Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Upholding the Boardâs order here would allow a school district to place a teacher on indefinite administrative leave, advising her that she will return from leave only if she prevails in the dismissal proceeding. If the teacher gets a job in another district while she awaits the proceedingâs outcome, the first district can order the teacher back to work merely to force her to choose which contractual obligation to honor. If the teacher chooses not to return, under the Boardâs reasoning, the district avoids any accountability for its conduct towards the teacher, including its manipulation of the situation to trigger the insubordination used to justify the teacherâs dismissal. This would nullify the statutory grounds for dismissal designed to protect teachers from arbitrary and capricious termination, thereby contravening a fundamental purpose of the dismissal procedures provided for under TECDA.