Opinion ID: 844217
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Absence of Instructions on Manslaughter

Text: The jury was instructed on first and second degree murder, and found the defendant guilty of the second degree murder of Adkins. Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to give requested instructions on voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter as lesser included offenses to the charge of murder in the Adkins case. He contends the court's refusal to instruct on these offenses deprived him of his state and federal constitutional rights to present a defense, to due process and a fair trial, to have the jury determine each material issue, to require the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt every elemental fact necessary to establish the offense, to have a reliable determination of guilt and penalty, and to a properly instructed jury. (16) Voluntary and involuntary manslaughter are lesser included offenses of murder. ( People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094] [voluntary manslaughter]; People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1145 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572] [involuntary manslaughter].) (17) An instruction on a lesser included offense must be given only if there is substantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant committed the lesser, uncharged offense but not the greater, charged offense. ( People v. Breverman, supra, at pp. 154, 162.) [ E ] very lesser included offense, or theory thereof, which is supported by the evidence must be presented to the jury. ( Id. at p. 155.) (18) Defendant contends that the jury should have been instructed on voluntary manslaughter because it could have reasonably concluded that he went into a rage after Adkins grabbed for the gun. Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. (§ 192, subd. (a).) An unlawful killing is voluntary manslaughter only if the killer's reason was actually obscured as the result of a strong passion aroused by a `provocation' sufficient to cause an `ordinary [person] of average disposition ... to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, and from this passion rather than from judgment.' [Citations.] ( People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 163.) The provocation must be such that an average, sober person would be so inflamed that he or she would lose reason and judgment. Adequate provocation... must be affirmatively demonstrated. ( People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 60 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 625, 971 P.2d 1001].) No substantial evidence was presented that any provocation by Adkins was sufficient to cause an ordinary person of average disposition to be so inflamed as to lose reason and judgment. As explained earlier, two eyewitnesses, Bertrand Dickson and Janice Chappell, testified about the circumstances leading up to the shooting. Dickson testified that shortly before the shooting defendant apologized to Chappell for the disturbance and stated that the men in the apartment don't know who I am. As defendant started to leave, Adkins said, You don't know who I am either. In response, defendant came back inside, put the gun between Adkins's eyes, and threatened to shoot him. Adkins then grabbed the gun. The two men started wrestling and two shots were fired. Even if defendant acted out of anger, Adkins's response to his threat was not sufficient to support a conviction for voluntary manslaughter. [S]uch predictable conduct by a resisting victim is not the type of provocation that reduces a murder charge to voluntary manslaughter. ( People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 306 [168 Cal.Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149].) (19) Defendant also contends that an involuntary manslaughter instruction should have been given because the jury could have concluded that the shooting occurred while defendant was engaged in the misdemeanor of brandishing a weapon and that the gun went off accidentally during the ensuing struggle. The misdemeanor of brandishing a weapon is committed when a person draws or exhibits a firearm, in the presence of another person, in a rude, angry, or threatening manner. (§ 417, subd. (a)(2).) A killing without malice in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to [a] felony is involuntary manslaughter. (§ 192, subd. (b).) Accordingly, an accidental shooting that occurs while the defendant is brandishing a firearm in violation of section 417 could be involuntary manslaughter. (See People v. Lee, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 60-61; People v. Southack (1952) 39 Cal.2d 578, 584 [248 P.2d 12].) Nevertheless, even if we assume that the evidence was sufficient to require an instruction on involuntary manslaughter, any error in failing to give that instruction was harmless. The failure to instruct on a lesser included offense in a noncapital case [11] does not require reversal unless an examination of the entire record establishes a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome. ( People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 165.) Such posttrial review focuses not on what a reasonable jury could do, but what such a jury is likely to have done in the absence of the error under consideration. In making that evaluation, an appellate court may consider, among other things, whether the evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable probability the error of which the defendant complains affected the result. ( Id. at p. 177.) Here, the evidence supporting the jury's verdict of second degree murder was compelling. Dickson testified that defendant put the gun between Adkins's eyes and threatened to blow [his] brains out. The gun went off twice, which a jury would be unlikely to believe occurred by accident. These circumstances strongly support a conclusion that the shooting was not accidental. (20) Even if the jury believed that defendant did not intend to pull the trigger, the evidence strongly supported a conclusion that defendant acted with malice. As the jury was instructed, malice is implied when the killing resulted from an intentional act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to human life, performed with knowledge of and conscious disregard for the danger to human life. ( People v. Dellinger (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1212, 1222 [264 Cal.Rptr. 841, 783 P.2d 200]; see CALJIC No. 8.11.) An unintentional shooting resulting from the brandishing of a weapon can be murder if the jury concludes that the act was dangerous to human life and the defendant acted in conscious disregard of life. ( People v. Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 108-109 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 864, 840 P.2d 969]; see also In re Russell H. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 916, 920-921 [242 Cal.Rptr. 488] [substantial evidence supported juvenile court's finding of second degree implied malice murder where the minor pointed a loaded gun at the victim and threatened to shoot him, and the gun went off when a third party attempted to take it away].) As noted above, an eyewitness testified that defendant put the gun to Adkins's head and threatened to kill him. Such conduct is highly dangerous and exhibits a conscious disregard for life. In order to find defendant guilty of only involuntary manslaughter, the jury would have had to conclude both that the shooting was accidental and that defendant had acted without malice. Based on the evidence presented, the jury was not reasonably likely to have convicted defendant of the lesser offense if instructions on involuntary manslaughter had been given.