Opinion ID: 2763627
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Petitioner’s Brady Claim

Text: Petitioner asserts that the state prosecutor failed to honor its obligation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) to disclose information favorable to Petitioner during his trial. Specifically, Petitioner claims that “[t]he State failed to disclose more than [170] pages of evidence that detailed their investigation into the death of Aaron Raines.” (Pet’r’s Br. at 8.) Petitioner’s Brady claim was presented to the Ohio Court of Appeals during his postAtkins petition for post-conviction review. That court addressed the Brady claim as follows: In his fifth claim, Gumm sought relief from his conviction on the ground that the state had failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in the form of information developed by the police during their investigation. . . . No. 11-3363 Gumm v. Mitchell Page 15 ... In support of his fifth claim, Gumm offered Crimestopper reports, lead and tip sheets, and investigation notes and summaries memorializing information received and gathered by the police during their investigation. These records showed what the investigating officers had stated at Gumm’s trial: that the police had initially had few leads and had cast a very wide net to find the killer. The officers inquired about sex offenders known to live in or frequent the neighborhood surrounding the abandoned building where the victim had been found. They followed tips, often based on rumor and second- and third-hand information, concerning individuals who had made incriminating statements or had exhibited suspicious behavior, individuals who had been seen in or around the abandoned building or the surrounding neighborhood, and individuals who had been seen with the victim around the time of the murder. They also obtained information that impeached the victim’s brother’s [Dallas Haynes] credibility and contradicted the state’s theory concerning when the murder had occurred. From our review of the record, we conclude that the undisclosed evidence, viewed collectively, was not “material” in that it could not “reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict[s].”3 Therefore, the state’s failure to disclose the evidence did not deny Gumm his constitutional right to a fair trial.4 Moreover, the record will not permit the conclusion that, but for the state’s failure to disclose the evidence, no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty of the offenses of which he was convicted. Thus, Gumm failed to satisfy the [Ohio Revised Code §] 2953.23 jurisdictional requirement of outcome-determinative constitutional error. We therefore hold that the common pleas court properly declined to entertain his fifth postconviction claim.5 Gumm, 864 N.E.2d at 133 (footnotes in original). While the Ohio Court of Appeals cited relevant Brady case law and seems to have made a pronouncement on the merits of Petitioner’s claim, the court ultimately held that it was without jurisdiction to “entertain” Petitioner’s Brady claim because Petitioner failed to meet the requirements of Ohio Revised Code § 2953.23(A). After reviewing this decision and relevant Ohio case law, the magistrate judge found that § 2953.23(A) requires “that petitioners demonstrate outcome-determinative constitutional error by clear and convincing evidence as a prerequisite to the courts’ subject matter jurisdiction.” 3 “See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. [419,] 435 [(1995)].” 4 “See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. [83,] 87 [(1963)].” 5 “See [Ohio Rev. Code §] 2953.23(A)(1)(b).” No. 11-3363 Gumm v. Mitchell Page 16 Gumm, 2009 WL 7785750, at  (collecting cases). The magistrate judge went on: “Taken to its logical conclusion, that interpretation leaves the state courts with jurisdiction only over winning claims.” Id. The magistrate judge concluded that because the Ohio Court of Appeals found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and because “a judgment rendered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction is void ab initio,” id. (quoting Patton v. Diemer, 518 N.E.2d 941, 944 (Ohio 1988)), the court of appeals’ conclusions on the merits of Petitioner’s Brady claim were not entitled to AEDPA deference. The magistrate judge applied de novo review to Petitioner’s Brady claim, and the district court adopted that analysis.
Although the Ohio Court of appeals conducted a brief Brady analysis, it went on to conclude that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain Petitioner’s second petition for postconviction relief. See Gumm, 864 N.E.2d at 133. De novo review is appropriate in this case because the state court did not adjudicate this claim on the merits and did not address the issue in an opinion in which the court had jurisdiction over the matter.6 This Court and others have held that where a state court decides a petitioner’s claim on alternative grounds, one on the merits and the other on a procedural bar ruling, a federal habeas court may still review that court’s merits analysis and apply AEDPA deference to that adjudication. See Brooks v. Bagley, 513 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 2008); Hoffner v. Bradshaw, 622 F.3d 487, 505 (6th Cir. 2010), cert denied, 131 S. Ct. 2117 (2011); Busby v. Dretke, 359 F.3d 708, 721 n. 14 (5th Cir. 2004), cert denied 541 U.S. 1087 (2004); Johnson v. McKune, 288 F.3d 1187, 1192 (10th Cir. 2002), cert denied, 537 U.S. 1050 (2002). However, this case is not such a case. Instead, the Ohio courts have clearly indicated that § 2953.23 denies courts subject matter jurisdiction over claims that cannot meet the statute’s stringent requirements. The Ohio courts have interpreted their own law to conclude that where a court lacks jurisdiction, any judgment on the merits is rendered void ab initio. This Court should not reinterpret an issue of state law that has already been interpreted by the state courts. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991) (explaining that “it is not the province of 6 It does not appear that the warden appeals the magistrate judge and district judge’s application of de novo review or the conclusion that the claim is not procedurally defaulted. No. 11-3363 Gumm v. Mitchell Page 17 a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.”). Therefore, we apply de novo review to Petitioner’s Brady claim. Relief on Petitioner’s Brady claim is warranted because there was an unquestionable and egregious Brady violation in this case.
The goal of the criminal justice system, as set forth in Brady and its progeny “is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. To achieve this goal, “Brady held ‘that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused . . . violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432 (1995) (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87). Because a Brady duty is triggered even if the “evidence [is] ‘known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor,’” compliance with Brady imposes a duty on the prosecutor “‘to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in this case, including the police.’” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280-81 (1999) (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437-38). In sum, “regardless of request, favorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its suppression by the government, if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433 (internal quotation marks omitted). Or, put another way, “[t]here are three components of a true Brady violation: [(1) t]he evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; [(2)] that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and [(3)] prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler, 527 U.S. 281-82. Taken together, the materiality and prejudice prongs do not require a defendant to show that disclosure of the evidence would have ultimately led to an acquittal. Instead, the defendant must establish only that in the absence of the evidence he did not receive a fair trial, “understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. If the undisclosed evidence “could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to No. 11-3363 Gumm v. Mitchell Page 18 undermine confidence in the verdict,” then a Brady violation has occurred. See id. at 435. See also Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[E]vidence is material within the meaning of Brady when there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”). “A reasonable probability does not mean that the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, only that the likelihood of a different result is great enough to undermine[] confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Id. at 630 (internal quotation marks omitted). Significantly for this case, withheld information is material under Brady only if it would have been admissible at trial or would have led directly to admissible evidence. United States v. Ogden, 685 F.3d 600, 605 (6th Cir. 2012). “[Inadmissible] information ‘is not evidence at all’ for purposes of Brady and thus can have no ‘direct effect on the outcome of a trial.’” Wogenstahl v. Mitchell, 668 F.3d 307, 325 n.3 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 6 (1995)). A federal habeas court’s conclusion that undisclosed inadmissible evidence would lead directly to admissible evidence may not be based “on mere speculation.” Wood, 516 U.S. at 6. Importantly, when viewing the undisclosed evidence, courts are to focus on the cumulative effect of the undisclosed evidence on the jury’s verdict. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 43637 (holding that undisclosed evidence should be “considered collectively, not item by item”).
Petitioner identifies several categories of evidence that the state failed to turn over prior to his trial. This includes evidence regarding other suspects, some of whom confessed to having committed the crime, evidence regarding the prosecutor’s implied timeline of the crime, and impeachment evidence.
The state failed to disclose a substantial collection of tips, leads, and witness statements relating to other individuals who had been investigated for the murder of Aaron Raines. On its face, the nondisclosure of the identities of these suspects—two of whom were reported to have No. 11-3363 Gumm v. Mitchell Page 19 confessed to the murder—is an egregious breach of the state’s Brady obligations. See D’Ambrosio v. Bagley, 527 F.3d 489, 498-99 (6th Cir. 2008); Jamison v. Collins, 291 F.3d 380, 390-91 (6th Cir. 2002). Prosecutors are not necessarily required to disclose every stray lead and anonymous tip, but they must disclose the existence of “legitimate suspect[s],” D’Ambrosio, 527 F.3d at 499, especially when such information has been specifically requested by the defendant, as it was in this case. “Withholding knowledge of a second suspect conflicts with the Supreme Court’s directive that ‘the criminal trial, as distinct from the prosecutor’s private deliberations, [be preserved] as the chosen forum for ascertaining the truth about criminal accusations.’” United States v. Jernigan, 492 F.3d 1050, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 440).
Police investigators amassed a number of reports that Cordray had confessed to the murder of Aaron Raines, and witnesses told police that Cordray was known to sleep in the abandoned building where Aaron’s body was found. One witness, George Putteet, told police that he had seen Aaron in the vicinity of the abandoned building around 10:30 p.m. on the night of the murder. Putteet further stated that a group of unidentified individuals “were messing with drunks in the alley,” including Cordray, and were “calling him names & getting him to chase them.” (J.A. at 55.) Although many of the witnesses’ statements were second-hand, it was widely believed that Cordray had admitted to numerous people that he was guilty of the crime, and indeed that he had bragged about it and was “glad Aaron was dead.” One witness reported that another man “beat up” Cordray after he said that he and a friend had killed Aaron. Cordray allegedly threatened a woman named Christine Robertson that he would harm her if she told anyone about a coat belonging to him that was discovered in the abandoned building. Anthony Steele and Theresa Wright-Steele told police that Cordray had approached them and said, “I did it. I killed the little kid.” (Id. at 39.) They further reported that Cordray’s hands and knuckles were “all scraped up,” and although Cordray was drunk and high on Valium at the time, they believed him when he confessed to killing Aaron. (Id.) Police investigated Cordray further, but they could not match his shoes to the footprints found at the crime scene. There were “some similarities” between the ridge pattern of Cordray’s palm print and the prints found at the No. 11-3363 Gumm v. Mitchell Page 20 scene, but the police were unable to make a positive identification. (Id. at 41.) Cordray denied any involvement in Aaron’s murder when speaking with the police, and there was no further investigation because the investigating officer drafting the report thought Cordray was being truthful. The magistrate judge described the overwhelming evidence pertaining to Cordray as follows: The “Crime-Stoppers” tips include information that an individual by the name of Roger was known to sleep in the building where Aaron’s body was found. Roger also frequently drank in the building next door. Another tip came from Barb Desborough, who indicated that Roger Cordray confessed to the murder. Desborough also informed police that Vivian Stimetz might know who heard Roger confess, but the tip sheet stated that Vivian had not been located as of May 18, 1992. Barb Desborough reported hearing from people who attended Aaron’s funeral that Roger Cordray was bragging that he had killed Aaron, and that he was glad Aaron was dead. The police eventually found Vivian Stimetz, who was Aaron’s aunt, and interviewed her. She stated that Betty Gumm, Petitioner’s sister, communicated a rumor to Stimetz that Cordray was bragging about how he had beaten Aaron. Stimetz also repeated the rumor that Cordray lived in the abandoned building where Aaron’s body was found, but stated that she had never seen him anywhere but on the street. There is a reference to Cordray’s having been taken away by the paramedics after he said this, but the context of that comment is unclear. The police also interviewed Christine Robertson, who said that supposedly there was a coat belonging to Cordray found in the building where Aaron’s body was discovered. Robertson stated that she had been threatened by Cordray not to say anything about the coat or he would harm her. Anthony Steele told the police that Roger Cordray had confessed to him that he had killed the little kid. Steele noticed that Cordray’s hands and knuckles were scraped up, too. Steele also stated that Cordray had confided to him that Cordray was a suspect in the murder, but that he could never do that because he loves kids. In an investigative summary, a police officer described a meeting with Anthony and Theresa Steele, who stated they were near the murder scene with Cordray on an unspecified date when Cordray told them he had killed the little kid. Although both Anthony and Theresa were under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time, both believed Cordray was being honest with them. The officers returned to the Steele home to talk with Anthony and Theresa again. The Steeles repeated their story with somewhat more detail during the second conversation. The officers eventually located Cordray and took pictures of his shoes and fingerprinted him. Cordray described his activities on the night of the murder and denied knowing Aaron Raines or seeing him the night of the murder, and stated No. 11-3363 Gumm v. Mitchell Page 21 he would never do anything to hurt a child. In addition, the tread on Cordray’s shoes did not match from the crime scene. A comparison of Cordray’s palm print to one found at the scene revealed similarities, but no points upon which an identification of the found print as Cordray’s might be made. The author of the investigative summary expressed his belief that Cordray was being truthful, and skepticism that Cordray was involved in Aaron’s murder. In notes from an interview of Betty Gumm, Petitioner’s sister, it stated that Donna Jones heard Roger Cordray state that he killed Aaron. There is also a note indicating that Paul Worthington heard Cordray “bragging to the cops + priest that he had done the killing.” Talk around the neighborhood was that Cordray had committed the murder. Another investigative summary basically repeats the information gathered from Barb Desborough. A conversation with Roberta Shinkle indicated that William O’Malley beat Cordray because Cordray said he and a friend had killed Aaron. One story that traveled through several people before reaching the police involved Rick Baker’s desire to have a pair of very bloody jeans washed. Baker explained the blood on his jeans by stating that after Cordray was beaten, he helped Cordray, getting Cordray’s blood on his jeans in the process. An unidentified individual stated that he or she saw Aaron the night he was murdered, and that he or she saw Cordray with two other men sitting on some steps in the vicinity that same night. Gumm v. Mitchell, No. 1:98–cv–838, 2009 WL 7785750, at -21 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2009).
Police received numerous reports potentially implicating Raymond Moore, who had apparently previously lived in the abandoned building where Aaron’s body was found. The police records include a statement from a witness who saw Moore enter the abandoned building around 7:00 p.m. on the night of the murder, which is around the same time that Petitioner and Michael Bies were seen in the adjacent park. Moore stated that he knew Aaron and he had looked for him for several hours after being asked to help search by a police officer around 9:00 p.m.; however, Aaron had not been reported missing until 11:00 p.m. Aaron’s uncle, William Raines, told police that following Aaron’s murder, he noticed Moore acting strangely and that he seemed to be avoiding Aaron’s mother. A police officer “looked at it and he said he didn’t feel that [Moore’s palm print] matched what he had from the crime scene.” (Id. at 116.) After speaking with Moore, the police determined that they “kind of” believed him and effectively eliminated him as a suspect, particularly after Moore admitted that he had a “shot” memory and his shoes did not match the prints found at the crime scene. (Id. at 118–19.) No. 11-3363 Gumm v. Mitchell Page 22
Although Roger Cordray and Raymond Moore were the most notable and talked-about alternative suspects, the undisclosed police files are replete with references to other individuals who may have had some involvement in Aaron’s murder. For example, a boy named Larry Peters told the police that Reggie Hetsler approached him at a bus stop in Cincinnati and told him that he killed and raped the little boy along with his brother, Steve Pence. Several undisclosed documents concerned Garland Inman, an individual who had previously been adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for the sexual assault of several family members. Inman had recently been released from juvenile detention, was seen by a named, identified witness near the scene of the crime on the night of the murder, and a number of individuals believed he might have been involved in the crime. Another suspect was Claude Justice, who was the subject of a “crime-stoppers” tip. An anonymous caller reported that Justice is a homosexual man who often propositioned young boys for sex. The tipster stated that he had seen Justice on prior occasions emerge from the building where Aaron was found, often followed by a boy. Several witnesses, including Aaron’s uncle Clayton Raines, believed that a man named Luther Hatton had been involved in Aaron’s murder because he had a violent criminal history, had been seen near the abandoned building, and mysteriously disappeared after a night of drinking around 10:00 p.m. on the night of the murder. Additionally, according to an ex-convict, word around a local prison was that Hatton had killed Aaron. An anonymous tipster referenced Cody Duffey acting strangely, harassing “neighborhood kids,” and carrying a crowbar. The tipster said that Duffey had approached her after Aaron’s murder and asked her what she thought she might do if someone had killed her child. Duffey’s cold demeanor led her to believe that Duffey knew something about the murder. Raines also mentioned a man named Carl Miller to the police. Raines believed Miller might have been involved because he wanted to get out of town quickly on the night Aaron was murdered.
The state offered the testimony of Aaron’s brother, Dallas Hayes, but did not disclose that he had failed a polygraph examination and that the polygraph operator believed that Dallas “was lying on all questions that had to do with Aaron’s death.” (J.A. at 177.) However, as the district No. 11-3363 Gumm v. Mitchell Page 23 court found, Ohio has long prohibited the admission of polygraph evidence unless both the prosecutor and defendant agree to admission and numerous safeguards are observed by the trial judge. See State v. Souel, 372 N.E.2d 1318, 1321-23 (Ohio 1978). Therefore, it is unlikely that the polygraph evidence would have been admissible, even if the State had disclosed its existence to Petitioner. A Crime Stoppers tip sheet showed that an anonymous tipster believed the police should look into Hayes because he had been playing in the abandoned building where Aaron’s body was found only five days before the murder. Additionally, Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to access to a statement by one of Hayes’ friends, who stated that Hayes wanted more freedom and wished that his mother would spend more time with him. However, in that same statement, the friend stated that Hayes loved his brother and would not let anything happen to him. c. Evidence Undermining the State’s Theory of the Case Petitioner also points to undisclosed evidence that Aaron had been seen in the abandoned building in the past, which contradicts the state’s argument at trial that Aaron was afraid of the dark and would not have entered the building unless coerced by another person. Although the question of how Aaron entered the building appears largely irrelevant to Petitioner’s guilt or innocence, it potentially undermines the state’s narrative of the crime and contradicts details provided in Petitioner’s statements to the police. Next, Petitioner argues that the state’s timeline of events is contradicted by undisclosed evidence. Specifically, Petitioner identifies numerous witness statements placing Aaron at a local ice cream stand as late as midnight on the night of the murder. This information was garnered by the police from firsthand accounts of named, identified people in the neighborhood. Although the state never definitively established a timeline of Aaron’s movements on the night of the murder and the medical examiner could not determine a time of death, the state did present evidence that Petitioner and Bies were last seen in the park adjacent to the abandoned building around 7:00 p.m., and Aaron’s brother Hayes testified that he last saw Aaron in the evening before it became dark outside. By suppressing evidence that numerous witnesses had seen Aaron later that evening, the state likely reinforced its case against Petitioner by suggesting that he and Aaron were last seen at approximately the same time. Therefore, this undisclosed No. 11-3363 Gumm v. Mitchell Page 24 contradictory evidence could have been used by the defense to disrupt the state’s narrative of the crime.

The state’s primary argument against the materiality of the undisclosed evidence in this case is that much of it is inadmissible hearsay and could not have led to the discovery of admissible evidence. As the Supreme Court and this Court have explained, without some indication of admissibility, such evidence cannot be considered material for purposes of Brady. See Ogden, 685 F.3d at 605. And this indication cannot be merely speculative. Wood, 516 U.S. at 6. The magistrate judge concluded that “[m]uch of the alleged Brady material is nothing more than rumor, hearsay, hearsay upon hearsay, hearsay upon hearsay upon hearsay, or worse. Gumm has not explained how any of that ‘evidence’ would have been rendered admissible in court, or how it would have led to admissible evidence.” Gumm, 2009 WL 7785750, at . The district court did not adopt this portion of the magistrate judge’s report and instead concluded that while it agreed that “much of the undisclosed evidence was itself inadmissible, . . . that does not necessarily mean that it would not lead to admissible evidence or that it was not subject to disclosure.” Gumm, 2011 WL 1237572, at . In Wood, a habeas petitioner alleged that the state had violated Brady by failing to disclose the results of a polygraph examination that could have been used to impeach a witness. 516 U.S. at 5-6. The Ninth Circuit granted the writ, finding that although the polygraph results were themselves inadmissible, their disclosure could have led to admissible evidence or affected defense counsel’s preparation for trial. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that neither the Ninth Circuit nor the petitioner could identify precisely how the trial could have been affected, or admissible evidence discovered, had the admittedly inadmissible polygraph results been disclosed. Id. at 6-7. The Court further reasoned that the results would have had no material effect under Brady because the remainder of the evidence against the petitioner was overwhelming. No. 11-3363 Gumm v. Mitchell Page 25 Courts applying Wood have rejected the writ when a single piece of inadmissible evidence such as a polygraph examination or hearsay statement was not disclosed by the state, concluding that the result of the trial could not have been altered by the nondisclosure of only inadmissible evidence. See, e.g., Hutchison v. Bell, 303 F.3d 720, 743 (6th Cir. 2002) (addressing a single hearsay statement). However, this case is not one where a petitioner is complaining about the failure to disclose a single inadmissible statement or polygraph test. On the contrary, Petitioner alleges that the state failed to disclose a small mountain of favorable evidence that he and his counsel would have used to undermine the prosecution’s case. Some of this evidence consists of rumors and double-hearsay statements which would likely have been inadmissible at trial, but much of the evidence could very well have been admitted or clearly led to the discovery of admissible evidence. To prevail on a Brady claim, a petitioner need only show that the undisclosed evidence was “likely admissible under Ohio law.” Wogenstahl, 668 F.3d at 325 n.3. Of course, when subject to AEDPA deference, it must be that any reasonable jurist would believe that the inadmissible evidence would lead to admissible evidence. That is clear in this case. First, Cordray’s various confessions would have come into evidence in some manner had Petitioner known about the statements. Petitioner would have called Cordray to testify and three things could have happened: (1) Cordray could have testified consistent with his prior statements, thereby confessing in court to Aaron’s murder; (2) Cordray could have denied murdering Aaron, in which case, his prior confessions could come in by way of impeachment, as prior inconsistent statements under Ohio Rule of Evidence 613; or, perhaps most likely, (3) Cordray would not have appeared or would have appeared but asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In this third scenario, Cordray would have been unavailable under Ohio Rule of Evidence 804(A)(1) such that his prior confessions could have come in as statements against interest under Ohio Rule of Evidence 804(B)(3). See State v. Landrum, 559 N.E.2d 710, 719-20 (Ohio 1990). Rule 804(B)(3) permits an unavailable declarant’s statement to be admitted if it “tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability . . . that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless the declarant believed it to be true,” if that statement is accompanied by “corroborating circumstances [which] clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.” In Landrum, the No. 11-3363 Gumm v. Mitchell Page 26 Ohio Supreme Court found sufficient corroborating circumstances where the declarant “spontaneously” confessed shortly after a murder and there was additional evidence tying the declarant to the murder. 559 N.E.2d at 720 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 30001 (1973)). Like in Landrum, Cordray’s confessions were spontaneous: he walked up to the Steeles and told them that he killed “the little kid” and bragged to others in the neighborhood about killing Aaron. Additionally, other reports place Cordray near the scene of the crime and gave him motive for killing Aaron. Therefore, a court would find that there were sufficient corroborating circumstances to render Cordray’s confessions admissible. See Landrum, 559 N.E.2d at 720. Further, the fact that Cordray had a similar palm print to the one left at the scene could have been admitted by calling the forensic investigator, and Petitioner could have called Putteet to testify about witnessing Aaron teasing Cordray on the night in question. Additionally, much of the evidence given to the police was in the form of eyewitness statements from named, identified individuals whose testimony would be admissible at trial. Had Petitioner known of the existence of these witnesses, he could have offered testimony of the following: (1) Roger Cordray was known to sleep in the abandoned building where Aaron’s body was found; (2) a group of people was seen on the night of the murder “messing with” Cordray in a nearby alley; (3) Anthony Steele observed that Cordray’s hands and knuckles were scraped; (4) there were “some similarities” between Cordray’s palm print and the print recovered at the crime scene; (5) Raymond Moore lived in the abandoned building where Aaron’s body was discovered at some point; (6) Moore was seen entering the building several times on the night of the murder; (7) Moore was acting strangely and avoiding Aaron’s mother; (8) Garland Inman, a convicted sex offender, was seen near the crime scene on the night of the murder; (9) Claude Justice was known to use the abandoned buildings for sex; and (10) Luther Hatton had been seen near the abandoned building and mysteriously disappeared around 10:00 p.m. on the night of the murder. None of this was inadmissible as hearsay or for any other reason. Although some of the evidence against the multiple other suspects might have been inadmissible, the fact that police had received reports about multiple other suspects could have been introduced at trial to call into question the thoroughness of the investigation. Therefore, No. 11-3363 Gumm v. Mitchell Page 27 contrary to the magistrate judge’s conclusion that much of the evidence was immaterial for Brady purposes, Petitioner has correctly identified a whole slew of undisclosed, material evidence, much of which was admissible or could easily have led to admissible evidence.
When the prosecution fails to turn over numerous pieces of favorable evidence, the proper focus of Brady’s materiality inquiry is on the cumulative effect of the unsuppressed evidence on the jury’s verdict. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436-37. “[T]he omission[s] must be evaluated in the context of the entire record.” United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976). Considering the quality and quantity of the evidence that the state failed to disclose, the potential for that evidence to have affected the outcome of Petitioner’s trial is inescapable. Even armed with only the evidence implicating Roger Cordray, defense counsel would have easily constructed an alternative narrative of the crime. Defense counsel would have been able to establish through eyewitnesses that a group of people, which may have included Aaron Raines, was taunting Cordray near the abandoned building around 11:00 p.m. on the night of the murder. Witnesses place Aaron in the same area at approximately the same time. Cordray, who was known to sleep in the abandoned building, later confessed to numerous people that he had murdered Aaron. After the murder, a witness noticed that Cordray’s knuckles were scraped. Even though the police identified “some similarities” between Cordray’s palm print and the print found at the scene of the crime—a similarity they were unable to establish with Gumm’s print— they eliminated Cordray as a suspect because they simply believed him when he denied involvement in the crime. Taken together, these facts demonstrate that Cordray had the means, motive, and opportunity to murder Aaron. These facts, had they been disclosed, would have provided a compelling counter-narrative to the state’s theory of the case and would have called into question the thoroughness of the police investigation. The capacity for the undisclosed evidence to have affected the outcome of Petitioner’s trial becomes even clearer when viewed in light of the small amount of evidence that the state adduced at Petitioner’s trial. In fact, the prosecutor admitted in his opening statement to the jury that “the police had very little concrete evidence” and that the case came down to what neighbors had seen that night. (J.A. at 242-43.) The prosecutor framed the case as the neighbors No. 11-3363 Gumm v. Mitchell Page 28 coalescing around Petitioner as the murderer, but the evidence regarding Cordray and the holes that the neighbors could have poked in the police’s timeline would have been directly contradictory to the prosecutor’s view of the crime. The state never discovered any physical evidence linking Petitioner to the crime. Instead, the state focused on the fact that Petitioner was seen in a park near the abandoned building around 7:00 p.m. on the night of the murder. However, the relevance of this fact is clearly dubious given the numerous witnesses who saw Aaron much later that night—evidence which was admissible but never disclosed to the defense. Second, the state brought in inflammatory and prejudicial evidence, which this Court finds was unrelated to the crimes and was of questionable validity. Additionally, much of that inflammatory evidence was unreliable hearsay, hearsay upon hearsay, and hearsay upon hearsay upon hearsay. Finally, and most importantly, the state relied on Petitioner’s own confession to the murder. Undoubtedly, a confession “is strong evidence of [] guilt,” Harbison v. Bell, 408 F.3d 823, 824 (6th Cir. 2005), but there are numerous reasons why a jury would have discounted Petitioner’s statements to the police, taking into account Petitioner’s diminished mental capacity, especially had it been presented with a compelling alternative theory of the crime based on this mountain of exculpatory evidence. In fact, the only defense witness at Petitioner’s trial testified regarding the weakness of Petitioner’s confession. Petitioner’s statements to the police were far from overwhelming evidence of his guilt. Petitioner had a questionable capacity to understand what was happening to him, and he likely could not distinguish between what he was told during his encounters with the police and what he actually remembered from the day of the murder. Although the jury was presented with Petitioner’s recorded confession, the jury also listened to extensive testimony by the defense’s expert witness, who provided strong reasons for discounting Petitioner’s confession. Some excerpts from the trial transcript are particularly telling of Petitioner’s capacity to provide a reliable confession in this case. Defense counsel asked Dr. Leland for his opinion regarding whether petitioner “would be able to relate the same set of facts accurately two times in a row or several times.” (J.A. Vol. II, at 284.) The following colloquy ensued: No. 11-3363 Gumm v. Mitchell Page 29 A. He could relate the same type – the same type of facts consistently as long as there was no other intrusion of new facts. Q. What would happen if there was an intrusion of new facts? A. Then he – then that would contaminate the original memory, and he wouldn’t be sure which he was remembering and which he wasn’t; that is, it would become jumbled sets of information because he at no time would have been able to synthesize them to make them into a real idea. Q. Do you have an opinion with reasonable psychological certainty as to whether or not he would confuse what he had witnessed, he would get them very confused. A. Well, it would – if what he had been told concerned what he had witnessed, he would get them very confused. (Id.) Although the expert witness did not view the recordings of Petitioner’s confessions, Dr. Leland did view a recording of Petitioner’s walk-through of the abandoned building in which Aaron Raines’ body was found. Dr. Leland was questioned regarding his opinion as to the reliability of the statement Petitioner made during that walk-through. He stated in response, “I think it’s even less reliable . . . . Because, after watching the tape and comparing the two programs, I find that Darryl primarily was agreeing with the policemen. As the policemen said things, Darryl would shake his head, meaning yes, and occasionally add things. But the things that he was asked and added had nothing to do with the testimony in this case.” (Id. at 285–86.) Finally, Petitioner’s counsel asked Dr. Leland whether, based on his examination of Petitioner and his review of the psychiatric reports, he had an opinion as to whether Petitioner had “the ability to accurately describe an event or facts which occurred ten weeks prior to the time he described them.” (Id. at 287.) In response, Dr. Leland responded, “I don’t think he has the ability to accurately describe any series of events. I, for example, asked him what he had been doing in jail for the last three, four days, and he couldn’t describe that.” (Id.) On crossexamination, Dr. Leland also stated that he did not believe Petitioner “understands what the truth is as you would define the word truth. You can’t judge a damaged brain the way you would judge a normal brain.” (R. 170-8, Leland Testimony, at 895.) Dr. Leland also testified on cross- examination that Petitioner “had difficulty synthesizing what he remembers. . . . [And t]he problem with depending on that is if you introduce other isolated facts that relate the same situation that he doesn’t know, he may remember them also, in which case he doesn’t know which the real facts are and which are the ones you’ve introduced.” (Id. at 895–96.) No. 11-3363 Gumm v. Mitchell Page 30 Upon his second petition for post-conviction relief, Petitioner was found to be mentally retarded by the Ohio state courts. According to a psychological evaluation performed by licensed psychologist Dr. David A. Ott, which was submitted to the district court during Petitioner’s second evidentiary hearing, mentally retarded individuals use a “cloak of competence” in an “attempt to present themselves as ‘normal’ (or at least more capable than they actually are) as a means of avoiding the stigma of being identified as mentally retarded.” (R. 170-18, Ott Psych. Eval., at 7.) Dr. Ott explained that Petitioner’s behavior in response to the officers’ questioning was consistent with this notion. (Id. (“Although the contact note indicates the officer’s perception that ‘most of the conversation’ was ‘macho talk,’ Mr. Gumm’s apparent efforts to present himself as a capable farmer and pool player despite the significant adaptive deficits he exhibited are consistent with the notion of the cloak of competence. . . . Mr. Gumm appeared to the officers as a follower, indicating the ineffectiveness with which he attempted to portray himself as more competent.”).) This observed behavior is very much consistent with the Supreme Court’s concerns expressed in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002) about the heightened possibility of false confessions from mentally retarded individuals. The Court recognized that while mentally retarded individuals “frequently know the difference between right and wrong,” their impairments cause “diminished capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand others’ reactions.” Id. at 318. Mentally retarded individuals are particularly “susceptible to the perceived wishes of authority figures.” Morgan Cloud et al., Words without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 495, 511 (2002). This is true “[e]ven when no direct pressure is exerted on them [because] they may be inclined to make false statements out of a desire to please perceived authority figures.” Id. “If an authority figure such as a police officer makes it clear to the individual that he wants a confession, even an innocent disabled person may confess so a law enforcement officer will not become angry with him.” Id. at 512. Additionally, “[w]hen faced with a coercive situation . . . mentally retarded persons generally have difficulty finding refuge even in silence, as often they feel compelled to answer – even when the questions are beyond their abilities.” Paul T. Hourihan, Earl Washington’s Confession: Mental No. 11-3363 Gumm v. Mitchell Page 31 Retardation and the Law of Confessions, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1471, 1493 (1995). This means that “mentally retarded defendants are more likely to confess when placed in an interrogational situation, less likely to give a truthful statement, and yet more likely to be found by a court to have voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently relinquished his or her constitutional right against self-incrimination.” Id. at 1494. In fact, as the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation recognized, numerous studies reveal that “the mentally retarded are disproportionately represented in ‘false confession’ cases.” Gumm, 2009 WL 7785750, at  (citing Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 55, 88-89 (2008); Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 891, 920, 971 (2008)). While a jury could have accepted (and did accept in this instance) that Petitioner’s confession was genuine, notwithstanding these problems, the jury was not presented with any counter narrative of the crime. Instead, what was placed before the jury was a confession of minimal reliability, inflammatory statements by the prosecutor, heavily prejudicial testimony from Petitioner’s former housemates, and hearsay statements lacking any indicia of reliability contained in the psychiatric reports. Although the jury likely viewed Petitioner’s confession with some skepticism following this testimony, without a counter narrative of the crime and with all of the egregious “bad acts” evidence that came into the record, the jury likely placed greater weight in the confession than was warranted. In this context, the state’s failure to turn over this evidence implicating other individuals in the murder and calling into question the state’s own account of the crime can “reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435.
Although AEDPA does not apply to Petitioner’s Brady claim, even if we were confined by the stringent limitations in § 2254(d)(1), habeas relief is still appropriate because no reasonable jurist could find that the disclosure of the small mountain of exculpatory evidence in this case would not undermine confidence in the verdict. In its recent decision in Woodall, the Supreme Court clarified application of § 2254(d)(1) as follows: No. 11-3363 Gumm v. Mitchell Page 32 Section 2254(d)(1) provides a remedy for instances in which a state court unreasonably applies [Supreme] Court[] precedent; it does not require state courts to extend that precedent or license federal courts to treat the failure to do so as error. Thus, if a habeas court must extend a rationale before it can apply to the facts at hand, then by definition the rationale was not clearly established at the time of the state-court decision. 134 S. Ct. at 1706 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the Court held, habeas relief is improper where a state court’s decision constituted an unreasonable failure to extend clearly established federal law. This holding does not apply in the instant case because Petitioner’s Brady claim falls directly under the Supreme Court’s clearly established law as dictated in Brady and its progeny, and does not require an extension of current law. Therefore, even under AEDPA deference, habeas relief is appropriate in this case. This is not a difficult finding to make. In this case, there was no physical evidence linking Petitioner to the crime. The police were unable to locate Petitioner’s shoes to match those to the prints found at the crime scene. Police were also unable to match Petitioner’s palm print to the palm print uncovered at the scene. As a result, the prosecutor made his case through Petitioner’s demonstrably unreliable confession and egregiously prejudicial and unreliable testimony and hearsay statements contained in the psychiatric reports. On the other hand, the undisclosed evidence, much of which would have been admissible in some form at trial, demonstrated that other suspects were near the scene at the approximate time of the crime. One of those suspects confessed on at least two occasions to two different people. That same suspect who confessed to the crime was seen in the area around the time of the crime, being harassed by a group of kids. That same suspect’s palm print had some similarities with the palm print obtained from the scene. Where the evidence against Petitioner was so weak in this case and the undisclosed evidence so strong, it is impossible for this Court to conclude that reasonable jurists could disagree as to whether the undisclosed evidence, when considered together, “could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435. The Supreme Court found in Kyles that “[t]here was a considerable amount of [] Brady evidence on which the defense could have attacked the investigation as shoddy.” Here, it is no different. Even prior to anyone mentioning Petitioner as a possible suspect, the police had a No. 11-3363 Gumm v. Mitchell Page 33 great deal of evidence, much of which would have been admissible in some form, showing that other individuals could have been involved in the crime, yet police ended their investigations of these individuals based on little more than a whim that the individuals were being truthful. Two identified witnesses came forward stating that Cordray had confessed to the murder and two additional people were believed to have heard Cordray confess. Cordray’s palm prints were a partial match to the palm prints retrieved at the scene of the crime. Defense counsel could have conducted additional investigation by interviewing Anthony and Theresa Steele, Donna Jones, and Paul Worthington, and calling them during trial to ask about Cordray’s confessions. Although the latter two individuals did not provide direct statements to the police, the undisclosed evidence indicates that they overheard Cordray confessing that he killed Aaron Raines. Despite all of this evidence amassed against Roger Cordray, the police officers merely decided they believed his story and ended their investigation into that suspect. After locating Cordray, photographing his shoes, and fingerprinting him, the police interviewed Cordray about his activities on the night of the murder. When he denied knowing Aaron Raines or seeing him that night and indicated that he would never hurt a child, “[t]he author of the investigative summary expressed his belief that Cordray was being truthful, and skepticism that Cordray was involved in Aaron’s murder.” Gumm v. Mitchell, No. 1:98–cv–838, 2009 WL 7785750, at  (S.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2009). Had all of this material been presented to the jury, Petitioner’s defense counsel could have attacked as “shoddy” this decision to end the investigation. Similarly, police received a number of reports implicating Raymond Moore in the crime, including one from Aaron’s uncle. Apparently Moore lived in the abandoned building and a witness saw him entering the building around 7:00 p.m. on the night of the murder. Moore made a number of strange and questionable statements to the police regarding his conduct on the night of the murder. Despite all of this evidence, the police simply determined that they “kind of” believed Moore and eliminated him as a suspect, without pressing any further. This evidence would have allowed Petitioner to “undermine the ostensible integrity of the investigation.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 447. This Court is confident that even under AEDPA deference, Petitioner is entitled to habeas relief. The Ohio Court of Appeals unreasonably applied clearly established federal law including No. 11-3363 Gumm v. Mitchell Page 34 Brady, Kyles, and their progeny. A habeas petitioner need not demonstrate that undisclosed Brady evidence would have rendered a different outcome in his trial or demonstrated that he was factually innocent. To prevail under Brady, a petitioner need only establish that the undisclosed evidence, when considered collectively, “could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” The Ohio Court of Appeals’ measly statement regarding the merits of Petitioner’s Brady claim constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law because no reasonable jurist could have found that the disclosure of this small mountain of exculpatory evidence, much of which was admissible or would clearly have led to admissible evidence, would not have undermined confidence in the verdict in this case.