Opinion ID: 411109
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pollutant

Text: 46 Low dissolved oxygen, cold, and supersaturation do not plainly fall within the statutory list of pollutants in Sec. 502(6), 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1362(6)--dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water. 47 These dam-induced changes are water conditions, not substances added to water. Section 502(6), however, primarily lists substances; heat is the only listed water condition. 48 Moreover, the wording of Sec. 506(6) makes us cautious in adding new terms to the definition. Congress used restrictive phrasing--[t]he term 'pollutant' means dredged spoil, [etc.]--rather than the looser phrase includes, used elsewhere in the Act. 49 As a general rule,  '[a] definition which declares what a term means ... excludes any meaning that is not stated.'  Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 n.10, 99 S.Ct. 675, 684 n.10, 58 L.Ed.2d 596 (1979) (quoting C. Sands, Statutes and Statutory Construction Sec. 47.07 (4th ed. Supp.1982) ). 47 The Wildlife Federation argues that supersaturation and changes in temperature and oxygen level are indisputably pollution as that term is defined in Sec. 502(19), 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1362(19), and that it would be pointless to recognize dam-induced water changes as pollution without treating these same changes as involving a pollutant. 50 The argument has some superficial appeal. The Supreme Court, however, has ruled that certain radioactive materials are not pollutants even though they undoubtedly emit pollution. Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 1938, 48 L.Ed.2d 434 (1976). Moreover, under usual rules of statutory construction, use of two different terms is presumed to be intentional, see, e.g., Russell v. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 637 F.2d 354, 356 (5th Cir.1981), especially when the legislation specially defines both terms. Finally, EPA's policy-oriented explanation for the distinction--that Congress purposely limited the federal NPDES permit program to certain well-recognized pollutants and left control of other water-altering substances or conditions to the states under Sec. 208--is quite plausible. 48 The legislative history, while not entirely consistent with the statutory language, further suggests that the Act does not require EPA to treat dam-induced water conditions as pollutants. Prior law (the Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. Sec. 407), had required a permit only for industrial discharges of refuse into navigable waters. The definition of pollutant in Sec. 502(6) was designed to add municipal discharges to the basic formula of the Refuse Act. S.Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1971) (S.Rep.), reprinted in 2 Congressional Research Service, Environmental Policy Division, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, at 1415, 1494 (Comm.Print 1973) (1972 Leg.Hist.) and in 1972 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 3668, 3742. 51 Thus, while Congress did not specifically exclude dams from the NPDES program, it expressed neither specific intent to include them nor general intent to equate pollutant and pollution. Also, the broad term refuse was replaced with a list of specific items so that litigable issues are avoided over the question of whether the addition of a particular material is subject to control requirements. Id. Needless to say, if pollutant was intended to be as all-encompassing as pollution, there would have been no need to fear litigation over what it included, and hence no need for such a definitional list. 52 49 The reasonableness of EPA's distinction between pollutant and pollution is reinforced by the changes made in conference. Both the Senate and the House had used inclusive phrasing--[t]he term 'pollutant' means, but is not limited to, dredged spoil, ..., and industrial, municipal, agricultural, and other waste discharged into water. 53 The conference committee deleted the inclusive phrases but is not limited to and other waste, albeit without explanation. S.Rep. No. 1236 (Conf.Rep.), 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 143-44 (1972), 1972 Leg.Hist. 281, 326-27, U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 3776, 3821. 50 And, while Congress did not intend the term pollutant to be all-inclusive, we find, at the same time, strong signals in the legislative history that it also entrusted EPA with at least some discretion over which pollutants and sources of pollutants were to be regulated under the NPDES program. Of course, Congress generally intended that EPA would exercise substantial discretion in interpreting the Act. As the Conference Report states: 51 In the administration of the Act, EPA will be required to establish numerous guidelines, standards and limitations.... [T]he Act provides Congressional guidance to the Administrator in as much detail as could be contrived. Virtually every action required of the Administrator by the Act, however, involves some degree of agency discretion, judgments involving a complex balancing of factors that include technological considerations, economic considerations, and others. 52 Id. at 149, 1972 Leg.Hist. 332, 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News at 3826. It also specifically expected EPA to have some power to determine both what is a point source and what is a pollutant. Senator Muskie, the principal sponsor of the Act, stated: 53 Guidance with respect to the identification of point sources and nonpoint sources, especially as related to agriculture, will be provided in regulations and guidelines of the Administrator. 54 117 Cong.Rec. 38,816 (1971), 1972 Leg.Hist. 1299. 54 Similarly, with regard to pollutant, Senator Muskie stated:Again, I do not get into the business of defining or applying these definitions to particular kinds of pollutants. That is an administrative decision to be made by the Administrator. Sometimes a particular kind of matter is a pollutant in one circumstance, and not in another. 55 117 Cong.Rec. 38,838 (1971), 1972 Leg.Hist. 1347. 55 56 Given this focused legislative intent concerning deference to EPA's interpretation of these definitional provisions, we must accept that interpretation unless it is manifestly unreasonable. See Lead Industries Association v. EPA, 208 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 647 F.2d 1130, 1147, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042, 101 S.Ct. 621, 66 L.Ed.2d 503 (1980) (where a statute vests an agency with a considerable amount of discretion, its interpretation must be upheld unless plainly unreasonable). In fact, EPA has given the statute a natural reading, both on its face and in light of the legislative history. We will consider in the next section whether, as the district court found, EPA's reading is inconsistent with general congressional purposes; however, after the foregoing analysis, it will take powerful evidence to convince us that EPA's conclusion that low dissolved oxygen, cold, and supersaturation are not pollutants is unreasonable. 56 57