Opinion ID: 1868375
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: want of jurisdiction and inadequate remedy by appeal

Text: Due to the extraordinary nature of its reliefinterlocutory intervention by an appellate court, [10] the writ of prohibition remedy is reserved for exceptional circumstances [11] and therefore should be granted only upon a showing that (1) the lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside its jurisdiction and there is no adequate remedy by appeal, or (2) the lower court is about to act incorrectly, although within its jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury would result. [12] Appellants argue that a writ of prohibition is appropriate in this case under the first criterion because (1) the trial court acted outside its jurisdiction by restraining a non-party, Lewis LP Gas, from engaging in normal business decisions with regard to the purchase and sale of its assets, and (2) the corporation has no adequate remedy by appeal. Appellants also stress that irreparable injury may occur if it is prohibited from selling its Ferrellgas shares, which are volatile in value. Appellee responds that the trial court has jurisdiction over Lewis LP Gas because the corporation is Randy's alter ego. [13] Thus, Appellee asserts that the trial court could pierce the corporate veil to obtain jurisdiction over Lewis LP Gas. [14] Although we agree that the alter-ego rule may confer jurisdiction over a corporation under certain circumstances, we disagree that it is applicable here. The alter-ego doctrine is reserved for situations in which incorporation is accomplished to invoke fraudulent protection against personal liability. [15] [T]he elements thereof have been defined as follows: (1) that the corporation is not only influenced by the owners, but also that there is such unity of ownership and interest that their separateness has ceased; and (2) that the facts are such that an adherence to the normal attributes, viz[.], treatment as a separate entity, of separate corporate existence would sanction a fraud or promote injustice. [16] In sum, under the alter-ego theory, assets owned by the corporation are inseparable from those controlled by its owner. [17] That is not the case here. Lewis LP Gas was incorporated as a family business and continues as such. Although the nature of its business has changed, with Randy Lewis and his mother at the helm, it continues as a separate business from its owners. Its major holding, Ferrellgas stock, is an independent asset of the corporation. Although Randy Lewis owns the majority of the Lewis LP Gas's stock, he does not own all of its stock and the corporation's separateness still exists. Thus, the alter-ego doctrine is inapplicable in the present case and may not be used as a jurisdictional hook for the trial court to exert control over Lewis LP Gas. Because Lewis LP Gas and Aileen Lewis are not parties to the underlying dissolution action, they cannot appeal the trial court's order restraining the sale by Lewis LP Gas of its Ferrellgas' shares. [18] Consequently, Lewis LP Gas and Aileen Lewis do not have an adequate remedy by appeal.