Opinion ID: 864531
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: the claim regarding the refusal to grant a

Text: CONTINUANCE BY THE TRIAL COURT IS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA. ¶73. Walker next reasserts the claim made on direct appeal regarding the failure of the trial court to grant a continuance based on Jason Riser's guilty plea. This claim was addressed on the merits on direct appeal and decided against Walker. Walker cannot raise this claim again on post-conviction review. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(3); Wiley v. State, 750 So.2d 1193, 1200 (Miss. 1999); Foster v. State, 687 So.2d 1124, 1129, 1138, 1140 (Miss. 1996); Wiley v. State, 517 So.2d 1373, 1377 (Miss. 1987). IV. THE CLAIM BASED ON TISON v. ARIZONA IS PROCEDURALLY BARRED FROM CONSIDERATION FOR THE FIRST TIME ON POST-CONVICTION REVIEW. ¶74. Walker next raises for the first time a claim that the sentencing instruction given in this case violates the teachings of Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137,107 S.Ct. 1676, 95L.Ed.2d 127 (1987), in that it only 32 required the jury to find that he “contemplated that lethal force would be used.” First, no such claim was raised at trial or on direct appeal in this case; and therefore, the claim is barred for failure raise the claim at the proper time or in the proper manner. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(1); Brown v. State, 798 So.2d 481, 491 (Miss. 2001); Wiley, 750 So.2d at 1208; Foster, 687 So.2d at 1138. Walker is barred from raising this claim for the first time in this post-conviction application unless he can demonstrate cause and actual prejudice. ¶75. Walker cannot demonstrate the requisite cause and actual prejudice to overcome the procedural bar in this case. Looking to the record in this case, we find that the entire premise underpinning this claim is without merit. The jury was properly instructed that it could consider all of the intent factors contained in Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(7). This Court has held the jury can be instructed on all of these factors at the conclusion of the sentencing phase. The jury may properly find one or all as the evidence dictates. Jordan v. State, 786 So.2d 987, 1026, 1052-53 (Miss. 2001); Watts v. State, 733 So.2d 214, 242, 283-85 (Miss. 1999); Carr v. State, 655 So.2d 824, 838-39 (Miss. 1995); Conner v. State, 632 So.2d 1239, 1273 (Miss. 1993); Lanier v. State, 533 So.2d 473, 491-92 (Miss. 1988); Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1317, 1338 (Miss. 1987); Jones v. State, 517 So.2d 1295, 1302 (Miss. 1987). In order to return a death sentence, the jury must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, at least one of these factors. See White v. State, 532 So.2d 1207, 1219-22 (Miss. 1988); Pinkton v. State, 481 So.2d 306, 308-10 (Miss. 1985). Of course, there must be sufficient evidence to support the factor or factors found by the jury. Carr v. State, 655 So.2d 824, 838-39 (Miss. 1995); Abram v. State, 606 So.2d 1015, 1042 (Miss. 1992); White v. State, 532 So.2d 1207, 1219-22 (Miss. 1988). 33 ¶76. In the case at bar the jury made a finding of two of these factors beyond a reasonable doubt. The sentencing verdict contains the following factors: 1. That the Defendant intended that the killing of Konya Rebecca Edwards take place, and 2. That the Defendant contemplated that lethal force would be employed. Walker's argument here completely overlooks the first finding of the jury and concentrates solely on the second finding. NeitherTison, nor its predecessor, Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), require more than one of these findings. Thus, assuming arguendo, that Walker's argument regarding the contemplated use of lethal force finding has any merit, his claim still fails. The jury clearly found that Walker intended that Konya Edwards be killed. That is sufficient under both Enmund and Tison. Because the underlying claim is totally without merit, Walker cannot show the requisite cause and actual prejudice to overcome the procedural bar for failing to raise this claim at the proper time and in the proper manner. This claim is barred from consideration for the first time in this post-conviction proceeding. Walker is entitled to no relief on this claim. ¶77. Walker further argues that the Mississippi death penalty statutes are unconstitutional in that they are applied to felony murders and “ignore the mental state and relative culpability of the defendant.” Again, this claim was not raised at trial or on direct appeal and is procedurally barred from consideration for the first time in this post-conviction petition. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(1); Brown v. State, 798 So.2d at 491; Wiley, 750 So.2d at 1208; Foster, 687 So.2d at 1138. Therefore, absent a showing of cause and actual prejudice to overcome the procedural bar, this claim cannot be considered. ¶78. Walker cannot show cause or actual prejudice as this claim has been ruled upon on numerous occasions. The Court has held that the fact Mississippi's capital murder scheme makes the death penalty a possible punishment for felony murder where there is no requirement to prove an intent to kill, and not 34 premeditated murder, does not make the Mississippi capital murder statute unconstitutional. See Grayson v. State, 806 So.2d 241, 252 (Miss. 2001); Simmons v. State, 805 So.2d 452, 507 (Miss. 2001); Edwards v. State, 737 So.2d 275, 307 (Miss. 1999); Berry v. State, 703 So.2d 269, 286 (Miss. 1997); Evans v. State, 725 So.2d 613, 683-84 (Miss. 1997); West v. State, 725 So.2d 872, 894-95 (Miss. 199S); Holland v. State, 705 So.2d 307, 319-20 (Miss. 1997); Gray v. State, 351 So.2d 1342, 1344 (Miss. 1977); Bell v. Watkins, So.2d 118,124 (Miss. 1980); See also Gray v. Lucas, 671 2d 1086,1104 (5th Cir.), reh’g denied, 685 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1982). This same argument has been rejected as it relates to depraved heart murder. See Grayson v. State, 806 So.2d at 252. ¶79. In addition, the factors contained in Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(7), require that the jury find the requisite intent set forth in Enmund and Tison before a death penalty verdict can be returned. The jury was properly instructed pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(7) and found two of those factors. That is all that is required by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the federal constitution. Walker has failed to show the necessary cause and actual prejudice to overcome the procedural bar to consideration of this claim. The claim is procedurally barred from consideration for the first time in this postconviction application. Walker is entitled to no relief on this claim.