Opinion ID: 2994162
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rodney Ellis

Text: Ellis raises several challenges to the district court’s determination of his sentence. Ellis first contends that the district court erred in its application of sec. 2S1.1(b) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (the Guidelines). Ellis further asserts that the district court abused its discretion by sentencing him at the high end of his Guidelines range. Ellis’s sec. 2S1.1(b) argument is two-fold. First, Ellis argues that the district court’s decision to apply both subsection (1) and subsection (2) of sec. 2S1.1(b) resulted in impermissible double counting, citing United States v. Atterson, 926 F.2d 649, 660 (7th Cir. 1991). The present case, however, is distinguishable from Atterson. The district judge did not base Ellis’s sec. 2S1.1(b)(2) enhancement on the street value of the quantity of drugs involved in the conspiracy, but rather on actual instances of money laundering. See United States v. House, 110 F.3d 1281, 1285 n.3 (7th Cir. 1997) (distinguishing Atterson). There is no impermissible double enhancement. Alternatively, Ellis contends that the district court’s finding under sec. 2S1.1(b)(2) that the value of funds laundered exceeded $2 million was unsupported by the evidence./4 The district court arrived at this value by holding Ellis responsible for (1) $750,000 to $1 million laundered through Pocketown in 1993; (2) $1.5 million laundered into the JetStar aircraft, a seventy-two foot yacht, and a speed boat which accompanied the yacht; and (3) $1,107,000 laundered through Reasons. At sentencing, Ellis challenged the inclusion of the amounts relating to the plane, the yacht and speed boat, and Reasons. On appeal, Ellis challenges only the district court’s valuation of Hill’s investment in Pocketown and the inclusion of amounts relating to the yacht and accompanying speed boat. As previously noted, Ellis did not object to the valuation of the Pocketown investment at sentencing. Therefore, our review with respect to this issue is for plain error. United States v. Monem, 120 F.3d 645, 647 (7th Cir. 1997). At sentencing, the district court adopted the $750,000 to $1 million value for the Pocketown investment. This value is supported by Michael Jefferson’s trial testimony and by the calculations set out in the presentence report. There is no plain error, and we turn to the inclusion of the value of the yacht and speed boat. Because Ellis objected to this inclusion at sentencing, we review for clear error. United States v. Gwiazdzinski, 141 F.3d 784, 788 (7th Cir. 1998). Under this standard, we will reverse only if the district court’s findings are without foundation in the evidence, such that we are ’left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ House, 110 F.3d at 1283 (quoting United States v. Herrera, 54 F.3d 348, 356 (7th Cir. 1995)). Under U.S.S.G. sec. 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), Ellis is liable for funds laundered by his coconspirators as long as the acts were reasonably foreseeable. Ellis argues that there was no evidence that he ever used or even knew of the yacht; however, the trial testimony of Elisha Tapes supports a finding that Ellis at the very least had knowledge of the yacht. Tapes described a trip to Houston, Texas which included Tapes, Nate Hill, Hill’s mother, and Ellis, among others. The group flew to Texas on Hill’s JetStar aircraft. During the flight, Hill boasted that he owned the plane and was proud of it. Tapes further testified that, at one point during the Houston trip, Ellis was present during a conversation in which Nate Hill, together with the man who arranged the yacht’s purchase, were describing and bragging about it. The district court’s inclusion of the value of the yacht and its accompanying speed boat in its sec. 2S1.1(b)(2) calculation was not clearly erroneous. Ellis’s remaining challenge to his sentence is also unpersuasive. Ellis contends that the district court abused its discretion by sentencing him at the high end of his Guidelines range, arguing that the district court’s stated reasons for imposing a sentence at the top of the Guidelines range were contradictory and, therefore, inadequate under 18 U.S.C. sec. 3553(c). A review of the transcript of the sentencing hearing reveals that the district court provided a detailed and internally consistent explanation to justify its decision. The court recognized that Ellis was not required to confess, but stated that a sentence at the high end of the Guidelines range was appropriate because Ellis failed to show one ounce of remorse, one ounce of acceptance of responsibility, one ounce of some sort of understanding of why you are here and what you did[,] . . . one ounce of humanity, [or] one ounce of recognition. The court informed Ellis that it would have been nice at some point for you, in whatever oblique way you wanted to do it, to recognize that society was harmed by your activity. The district judge further noted that despite Ellis’s insistence that some of the witnesses lied, he thought the evidence against Ellis was overwhelming. This explanation is both proper and sufficient to satisfy 18 U.S.C. sec. 3553(c). Therefore, as Ellis’s sentence was imposed pursuant to the law and within the applicable Guidelines range, we lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s placement of the sentence within the range. See United States v. Solis, 923 F.2d 548, 551 (7th Cir. 1991). Ellis’s sentencing challenges fail.