Opinion ID: 2330622
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Certification of the Plaintiff Class

Text: The last issue raised in Brighton's cross-appeal concerns class certification. We address its status to provide guidance to the district court on remand. Class actions are governed by K.S.A. 60-223, which was modeled after and has traditionally been interpreted like Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23. Dragon v. Vanguard Industries, Inc., 277 Kan. 776, 778, 89 P.3d 908 (2004) ( Dragon I ). The class in this case is composed of named plaintiff O'Brien and [a]ll persons who ... from January 1, 1997, ... to the date of trial, have purchased any Brighton product from any Brighton retailer. At the time this case was filed, K.S.A. 60-223(b)(3), the subsection of the statute that is relevant here, stated that a class should be certified if the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) The interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action. District Judge Richard T. Ballinger ordered certification of the class, Brighton filed an interlocutory appeal challenging that certification. The appeal was denied by the Court of Appeals without explanation. Brighton also moved to decertify the class in the district court, but, given Judge Goering's summary judgment ruling in favor of Brighton on antitrust injury, the judge never ruled on the motion to decertify. On its cross-appeal, Brighton challenges only Judge Ballinger's analysis of K.S.A. 60-223(b)(3), the predominance requirement. It seeks a ruling from us that the district judge abused his discretion in certifying the class. Brighton makes two arguments: (1) O'Brien and the class lack a method of common proof for showing injury, i.e., payment of a price higher than the price that would have been paid absent an unlawful restraint; and (2) O'Brien and the class lack a common method of proof for showing each Kansas retailer entered into an illegal arrangement with Brighton. In response to Brighton's first point, O'Brien asserts that there is common proof that every purchase was made at a fixed price in a distorted market. In response to Brighton's second point, O'Brien asserts that there is common proof of Brighton's written agreements, its pricing policy, and its monitoring and enforcement activitiesall of which, taken together, establish the extent of the arrangement. Under Dragon I, we do not judge `the propriety of a class certification by hindsight' but rather to ensure that the district judge applied and `rigorous[ly] analy[zed]' the requirements of K.S.A. 60-223 in its decision to certify the class. 277 Kan. at 780, 89 P.3d 908; see also Critchfield Physical Therapy v. Taranto Group, Inc., 293 Kan. 285, 292, 263 P.3d 767 (2011). If a district judge evaluates the proper factors, his or her decision will be granted deference on appeal. See 277 Kan. at 779, 89 P.3d 908. Here, the district judge incorporated the transcript of the oral argument on the motion for class certification into his decision in this case. During the oral argument, the judge stated that he had reviewed all of the documents filed by the parties, and he concluded that the requirements of 223(a)(1) through 4 are clearly met because [t]here's no factual issue. The legal issues are really common, whether or not there is one person or there are a thousand people who have bought belts from [Brighton]. Specifically regarding the factors to be considered on predominance, the judge said: The interest of the members, the extent and nature of the litigation controversy, the desirable concentration in the litigation, certainly the judicial economy comes into play in there, too, but of course that's not determinative, and the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of the class action, those are all considerations and clearly tend to show that a class action is appropriate in this case. In his journal entry, the judge repeated that he had considered and carefully examined the evidence in relation to: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; [and] (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of the class action. But, as at oral argument, the judge did not make factual findings or explain how he had considered or applied the statutory factors to arrive at his legal conclusions. He said merely that he had reached its ultimate conclusions regarding predominance in light of the evidence. After the district judge's certification ruling, we handed down our decision in Dragon v. Vanguard Industries, 282 Kan. 349, 144 P.3d 1279 (2006) ( Dragon II ). In that case, we determined that K.S.A. 60-252(a) and Supreme Court Rule 165 (2011 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 246)which require that a district court judge find, and either orally or in writing state, the controlling facts and the judge's conclusions of law thereon and state the controlling facts required by K.S.A. 60-252, and the legal principles controlling the decisionapply to a district judge's class certification decision. 282 Kan. at 356, 144 P.3d 1279. Generally litigants and their counsel bear the responsibility of objecting to inadequate findings of fact and conclusions of law to give the trial court the opportunity to correct them, and in the absence of an objection, omissions in findings will not be considered on appeal. [Citation omitted.] Where no objection is made, this court will presume the trial court found all facts necessary to support its judgment. However, this court may still consider a remand if the lack of specific findings precludes meaningful review. [Citation omitted.] Dragon II, 282 Kan. at 356, 144 P.3d 1279. In this case, it does not appear that Brighton objected specifically to inadequate findings and conclusions on certification, but it did attempt to pursue a timely interlocutory appeal. When the Court of Appeals rebuffed that effort, Brighton filed a motion to decertify the class. And it included the predominance issue in its prophylactic cross-appeal. Because Brighton made a consistent effort to keep its challenge to certification alive, both in the district court and before this court, and because the district judge's insufficient factual findings and legal conclusions preclude meaningful appellate review of class certification at this procedural juncture, we merely observe that Brighton's motion to decertify the class remains pending. It will, on remand, be ripe for decision. When that motion is heard and decided, the parties and the district judge will have the opportunity to ensure creation of a record adequate to support any future appropriate appellate review.