Opinion ID: 1697544
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency-of-the-Evidence.

Text: A. Claim. The defendant contends the district court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict on the child-endangerment charges. He asserts the State failed to establish his guilt on those counts because the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he knowingly subjected his nephews to a substantial risk of physical harm. B. Scope of review. Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are reviewed for the correction of errors of law. Arnold, 543 N.W.2d at 602. Our goal is `to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the offense charged' beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Anspach, 627 N.W.2d 227, 231 (Iowa 2001) (citation omitted). C. Discussion. We begin our discussion with a review of the statute under which the defendant was convicted, as the parties disagree on the requirements of this law. The defendant was convicted of violating section 726.6(1)( a ), which provides in pertinent part: 1. A person who is the parent, guardian, or person having custody or control over a child or a minor under the age of eighteen with a mental or physical disability, commits child endangerment when the person does any of the following: a. Knowingly acts in a manner that creates a substantial risk to a child or minor's physical, mental or emotional health or safety. Iowa Code § 726.6(1)( a ). The parties' dispute centers on the knowledge element of the statute, specifically, whether knowingly modifies acts or modifies acts in a manner that creates a substantial risk. We recently addressed this precise issue in State v. James, 693 N.W.2d 353 (Iowa 2005). In James, this court held that to establish a violation of section 726.6(1)( a ), the State must prove a defendant acted with knowledge that he or she was creating a substantial risk to the child's safety. 693 N.W.2d at 357. Thus, it is the appreciation of the risk to the child or minor posed by one's conduct that creates criminal culpability under this statute. Notwithstanding the defendant's protestations to the contrary, we think there is sufficient evidence he acted with the required knowledge. In this regard, we note the defendant's knowledge may be proved not only by direct evidence, but also by reasonable inferences drawn from the circumstances surrounding the accident. See State v. Miller, 308 N.W.2d 4, 7 (Iowa 1981) (Knowledge or intent is seldom capable of direct proof, but usually is established from the surrounding circumstances.). The trial court specifically found the defendant was aware there was substantial risk associated with children riding in the back end of an unenclosed truck. The court noted the defendant testified his nephews had ridden in the back of the truck on a number of occasions, and each time the defendant would instruct them how to ride there. The court concluded the fact the defendant thought it necessary to instruct his nephews as to how to ride in the back of the truck indicated the defendant's awareness of the substantial risk to children riding in that location. The court also discounted the defendant's testimony that the children always obeyed his instructions, observing the defendant had been made aware earlier the same day that one of the boys was not following the rules. Although the defendant contended he had placed the children among the brush, the testimony of witnesses clearly placed the boys atop the brush pile. As the court pointed out, even if the children had been situated down in the brush initially, the boys, acting as kids do, repositioned themselves later. The court further observed, Kids being kids always require close monitoring, especially when they have been placed in questionable safety situations. We think there was substantial evidence to support the court's decision on this disputed issue of fact, as the court itself explained in its ruling. The defendant argues, however, that children have long ridden in the back of pickup trucks and surely adults permitting this activity are not guilty of child endangerment. The problem with the defendant's example is that the situation presented by the case before us is more egregious than children simply riding in the back of a pickup. Cf. Anspach, 627 N.W.2d at 233 (considering the totality of the circumstances in determining whether person would know his actions placed children in articulable danger). The bed of the defendant's truck was equipped with side panels, but only had a wooden plank across the end that provided little protection against persons or branches falling or being blown out the back of the truck. Moreover, the children were young, and the defendant had placed them amidst improperly loaded tree limbs that had not been secured to the truck bed. It was easily foreseeable that the branches might be blown off the truck, taking the children with them. See Miller, 308 N.W.2d at 7 (stating knowledge may be inferred from circumstances). Such an event presented a substantial risk to their safety. That is all the State was required to prove: defendant's knowledge that the children were in a position of substantial risk. See State v. Riggs, 2 S.W.3d 867, 873 (Mo.1999) (holding, under identical statutory language, that prosecution need not prove defendant knew death would result from his conduct, only that child would be endangered by his conduct); see also Anspach, 627 N.W.2d at 232-33 (holding section 726.6(1)( a ) does not require proof that injury was likely, only that there was a very real possibility of danger to a child's physical health or safety). Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to grant the defendant's motion for directed verdict on the child-endangerment charges.