Opinion ID: 2111915
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: Filed on June 26, 1989, an information charged Sumstine with second degree arson, a Class III felony, and alleged that Sumstine intentionally set fire to her apartment building at 837 G Street on April 29, 1989, a violation of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-503(1) (Reissue 1989): A person commits arson in the second degree if he or she intentionally damages a building by starting a fire.... After Sumstine's arraignment on June 28, 1989, at which her trial was scheduled for September 11, the State, on September 7, obtained the court's permission to endorse the information with the names of 3 witnesses in addition to the 29 witnesses already endorsed on the information and take depositions within 40 days, but apparently did not take those depositions. While the record fails to disclose the nature of the proposed amendment to the information, on October 18 the court authorized the State to file an amended information against Sumstine within 7 days, but the State did not file the amended information. However, on November 9, the prosecutor appeared before the court and, without explanation reflected in the record, dismissed the pending second degree arson charge against Sumstine. On January 8, 1990, the State filed an information against Sumstine charging her with first degree arson, a violation of § 28-502(1), which states: A person commits arson in the first degree if he or she intentionally damages a building by starting a fire ... when another person is present in the building at the time and either (a) the actor knows that fact, or (b) the circumstances are such as to render the presence of a person therein a reasonable probability. The 1990 arson charge alleged that Sumstine set fire to her apartment building at 837 G Street on April 29, 1989, and, in accordance with § 28-502(1), contained the allegation concerning a person's presence in the building set afire. At her arraignment on January 10, 1990, Sumstine pled not guilty to the first degree arson charge. Immediately before trial on April 9, Sumstine moved for dismissal of the pending arson charge against her and based her claim to dismissal on the State's failure to comply with the Nebraska speedy trial act and bring her to trial within 6 months after the second degree arson information was filed in June 1989. Section 29-1207(1) of Nebraska's speedy trial act provides: Every person indicted or informed against for any offense shall be brought to trial within six months, and such time shall be computed as provided in this section. Section 29-1207 thereafter sets forth the method of computing the 6month period for commencement of trial after an information has been filed, including specified periods of time excludable for the computation and a catchall exclusion: Other periods of delay not specifically enumerated herein [shall be excluded], but only if the court finds that they are for good cause. § 29-1207(4)(f). Section 29-1208 of the speedy trial act states: If a defendant is not brought to trial before the running of the time for trial, as extended by excluded periods, he [or she] shall be entitled to his [or her] absolute discharge from the offense charged and for any other offense required by law to be joined with that offense. In arguing her dismissal motion in the district court, Sumstine contended that the previous second degree arson charge in 1989 was a lesser grade felony included within the pending first degree arson charge in 1990; therefore, the time during which the second degree charge was pending should be tacked to the period of pendency for the first degree arson charge, resulting in expiration of 6 months without Sumstine's trial and entitling her to absolute discharge from the first degree arson charge. The doctrine of tacking allows joining or combining periods which have a nexus for continuity of time involved in separated events or actions, for example, tacking based on privity of estate for adverse possession of realty, see Bryan v. Reifschneider, 181 Neb. 787, 150 N.W.2d 900 (1967), and Thomas v. Flynn, 169 Neb. 458, 100 N.W.2d 37 (1959), and tacking in reference to an extension of authority for motor carrier routes under Public Service Commission jurisdiction, see Nebraska State Railway Commission v. Seward Motor Freight, Inc., 188 Neb. 223,196 N.W.2d 200 (1972). In opposing Sumstine's dismissal motion, the State asserted that the two arson informations related to two different cases and that, in cases such as Sumstine's, the practice of a prosecutor's voluntarily dismissing and refiling charges was done all of the time and done in the past and will be done in the future. Responding further to Sumstine's motion, the prosecutor stated: I don't think there has been any prejudicial effect of any kind. I am not sure what the tactical advantage was by filing one or the other [charge against Sumstine]. It doesn't appear to me to make any particular difference at this particular time. Again, it has been done numerous times. There is no showing of any kind of prejudice, wrongful doing by the State in so doing and I just think that again it's ready to go to trial and the State is ready. The district court overruled Sumstine's dismissal motion based on the speedy trial act. Sumstine was tried and convicted, and has appealed with the assignments of error previously mentioned.