Opinion ID: 1874414
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Medication Hearing

Text: Alley claims that the trial judge erred and denied him due process of law by declining jurisdiction and, thereby, failing to hold a hearing to determine whether he should be forcibly medicated at his trial. The medication in question was prescribed pursuant to a diagnosis and treatment plan of doctors evaluating and treating Alley. It had been prescribed by the medical staff because of his need for medication, which in fact assisted him in becoming and remaining competent and able to function on a daily basis. This included the ability of the defendant to participate and assist counsel in the presentation of his defense. Defense counsel filed a motion asking the trial judge to order that Alley's psychiatric medication be stopped prior to trial and not resumed until after trial. The basis of the motion was that Alley was not on medication at the time of the offense and the jury should be entitled to see and hear his true physical and mental state on that day. It was argued that to have the defendant continue to take the medication which masks his true mental state would deny his right to the insanity defense. At a hearing on the motion, the prosecutor objected on the grounds that the trial judge had no authority to intervene with the defendant's medication and that doing so could lead to security risks in the courtroom. Further, he stated that the issue was whether the defendant was insane at the time of the offense, not his state of mind at trial. The trial judge noted that the defendant was not under any court order for medication and that nobody was ordering Alley to take it. Considering what was presently before him, the trial judge stated that he could not direct Alley either to take or not to take his medications. He observed that he may be able to do that if the proper motion was before him, but it wasn't at this time. Responding to the ruling by the trial judge, defense counsel stated that's fine. He later indicated that if that was the casethat it was not required of Alley to take his medicationthat was fine. We understand that. It is clear from our review of the record that the trial judge never declined jurisdiction, but correctly determined that the proper motion was not before him. Defense counsel recognized that and clearly acquiesced in the decision. Consequently, this issue has been waived. This issue is also completely without merit. If a defendant claimed he was not culpable for a crime because he was intoxicated, should he be permitted to get drunk during trial in order to demonstrate his state at the time of the offense? Clearly not and it is equally preposterous to ask the court to order Alley to stop his medication so that he could exhibit his mental instability. As correctly noted by the Commonwealth, the issue in the case was whether the defendant was insane at the time of the offense, not his state of mind at trial. Alley cites numerous legal authorities in support of his argument, but all of those cases are distinguishable from the situation here. They do not stand for the proposition that the trial judge is required to consider the question of medication. The elements discussed by Alley arise only when a trial judge exercises authority to address the issue of medication, which is not the case here. Turner v. Commonwealth, 860 S.W.2d 772 (Ky.1993), does provide that a trial judge has authority to order involuntary medication prior to and during trial. However, that case does not go so far as to require the trial judge to exercise such authority. In this case, the evidence indicated that the medication program produced stabilization of the mental problems and allowed him to remain competent and able to participate in his own defense. It clearly supports the decision by the trial judge not to interfere in the medical decision to place him on the medication. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 123 S.Ct. 2174, 156 L.Ed.2d 197 (2003), holds that the government may involuntarily administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing criminal charges in order to render the defendant competent to stand trial, but only if the treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial and, taking account of the less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-related interests. Sell, supra , goes on to state that assuming the defendant was not a danger to himself or to others, he could not be ordered involuntarily to take antipsychotic drugs solely to render him competent to stand trial without consideration of other important questions. This decision mirrors similar opinions rendered in Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 112 S.Ct. 1810, 118 L.Ed.2d 479 (1992) and Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990). All of the federal cases are premised on the idea that the medication is required or ordered by the trial judge. That is not the situation here because the medication has been ordered by independent medical officials. Alley was not entitled to a hearing on this issue. The trial judge did not err in denying relief on the grounds that the motion was not properly before him.