Opinion ID: 2628160
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: ASORA Is Punitive for Purposes of the Alaska Ex Post Facto Clause.

Text: The intent-effects test would usually first require us to consider whether the Alaska Legislature, when it enacted ASORA, intended to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and non-punitive. [59] If the purpose was not punishment but regulation, the test would next require us to determine whether the effects of regulation are so punitive that we must nonetheless conclude that ASORA imposes punishment. [60] It is not necessary to address the first step of the test  whether the legislature intended ASORA to punish convicted sex offenders  because the second part of the test  whether ASORA's effects are punitive  resolves the dispute before us. Assuming without deciding that the legislature intended ASORA to be non-punitive, [61] we therefore focus on the statute's effects to determine whether they are punitive. [62] In assessing a statute's effects, the Supreme Court indicated in Ward the seven factors it listed in 1963 in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez provide some guidance: [63] (1) [w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment  retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.[ [64] ] The Supreme Court has not explained the relative weight to be afforded each factor. But the Court has recognized that the factors often point in differing directions and that no one factor is determinative. [65] Determining whether a statute is punitive necessarily involves the weighing of relatively subjective factors. We address each of the factors in turn.
We first ask [w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint. [66] The state argues that ASORA involves neither because it imposes no physical restraint, has obligations less harsh than occupational debarment  which the Supreme Court has held to be non-punitive [67]  and, in the Supreme Court's words, restrains [no] activities sex offenders may pursue but leaves them free to change jobs or residences. [68] But even though the statute imposes no physical restraints, we agree with Justice Stevens's dissenting comments in Smith that ASORA impose[s] significant affirmative obligations and a severe stigma on every person to whom [it] appl[ies]. [69] First, ASORA compels affirmative post-discharge conduct (mandating registration, re-registration, disclosure of public and private information, and updating of that information) under threat of prosecution. [70] The duties are significant and intrusive, because they compel offenders to contact law enforcement agencies and disclose information, some of which is otherwise private, most of it for public dissemination. [71] Furthermore, the time periods associated with ASORA are intrusive. [72] Sex offenders convicted of an aggravated sex offense [73] or two or more sex offenses must re-register quarterly for the rest of their lives; all other offenders must re-register annually for fifteen years. [74] All sex offenders who change residences must notify the state trooper office or municipal police department closest to their new residences within one working day. [75] As we stated in Doe v. State, Department of Public Safety ( Doe A ), ASORA thus treats offenders not much differently than the state treats probationers and parolees subject to continued state supervision. [76] Second, we agree with the conclusion of Justice Ginsburg, also dissenting in Smith, that ASORA exposes registrants, through aggressive public notification of their crimes, to profound humiliation and community-wide ostracism. [77] In the decision reversed in Smith, the Ninth Circuit observed that [b]y posting [registrants'] names, addresses, and employer addresses on the internet, the Act subjects [registrants] to community obloquy and scorn that damage them personally and professionally. [78] The Ninth Circuit observed that the practical effect of this dissemination is that it leaves open the possibility that the registrant will be denied employment and housing opportunities as a result of community hostility. [79] As Justice Souter noted in concurring in Smith, there is significant evidence of onerous practical effects of being listed on a sex offender registry. [80] Outside Alaska, there have been reports of incidents of suicide by and vigilantism against offenders on state registries. [81] We also disagree with the Supreme Court's conclusion in Smith that the obligations ASORA imposes are less harsh than the occupational debarment which the Court has held to be non-punitive. [82] The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of post-conduct professional sanctions that included the prohibition of further participation in the banking industry [83] and revocation of medical licenses. [84] A comparable bar for sex offenders who pose a risk to children might be employment in places frequented by children. But the practical effects here can predictably extend to all employment opportunities as well as to all other non-employment aspects of life, including housing opportunities. There are published reports that offenders are sometimes subjected to protests and group actions designed to force them out of their jobs and homes. [85] We agree that [t]he practical effect of such unrestricted dissemination could make it impossible for the offender to find housing or employment. [86] The state argues, however, that the negative effects that Doe emphasizes (negative impacts on employment and housing opportunities) will exist even if Doe is not subject to ASORA because those consequences result not from registration and dissemination of information, but from the conviction itself. Moreover, the state asserts that there is no evidence that Alaskans have directed any wrath at convicted sex offenders and notes that the sex offender registry website warns viewers about using registry information to commit a criminal act. [87] Neither of these arguments is persuasive. ASORA requires release of information that is in part not otherwise public or readily available. Moreover, the regulations authorize dissemination of most ASORA registration information for any purpose, to any person. [88] Taken in conjunction with the Alaska Public Records Act, [89] ASORA's treatment of this information, confirmed by the regulations, seems to require that the information be publicly available. By federal law, it is disseminated statewide, indeed worldwide, on the state's website. [90] There is a significant distinction between retaining public paper records of a conviction in state file drawers and posting the same information on a state-sponsored website; this posting has not merely improved public access but has broadly disseminated the registrant's information, some of which is not in the written public record of the conviction. As the Alaska Court of Appeals noted, ASORA does provide for dissemination of substantial personal and biographical information about a sex offender that is not otherwise readily available from a single governmental source. [91] We also recognized in Doe A that several sex offenders had stated that they had lost their jobs, been forced to move from their residences, and received threats of violence following establishment of the registry, even though the facts of their convictions had always been a matter of public record. [92] We therefore conclude that the harmful effects of ASORA stem not just from the conviction but from the registration, disclosure, and dissemination provisions. We are also unpersuaded by the state's assertion that there is insufficient evidence to establish that harmful effects have actually occurred in Alaska. Doe's affidavit contains excerpts from affidavits submitted in the federal court. The excerpts recite instances of registrants losing employment, having difficulty finding housing and employment, and moving out of the marital home due to fear of the effects public dissemination would have on their families. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, when addressing Doe's earlier ex post facto challenge to ASORA, noted that the record before that court contained evidence that a sex offender suffered community hostility and damage to his business after printouts of the Alaska sex offender registration website were publicly distributed and posted on bulletin boards. [93]
We next determine whether [the statute's effects have] historically been regarded as a punishment. [94] ASORA does not expressly impose sanctions that have been historically considered punishment. [95] Because registration acts such as ASORA are of fairly recent origin, courts addressing this issue have determined that there is no historical equivalent to these registration acts. [96] Some courts have instead considered whether the acts are analogous to the historical punishment of shaming; these courts have concluded that they are not. [97] But the dissemination provision at least resembles the punishment of shaming [98] and the registration and disclosure provisions are comparable to conditions of supervised release or parole. [99] And these provisions have effects like those resulting from punishment. The fact that ASORA's registration reporting provisions are comparable to supervised release or parole supports a conclusion that ASORA is punitive.
Third, we consider whether [the statute] comes into play only on a finding of scienter. [100] The obligations of ASORA are not imposed solely upon the finding of scienter. [101] ASORA also applies to strict liability offenses, such as statutory rape, that the law deems sufficiently harmful to effectively assume scienter. [102] But even though ASORA applies to a few strict liability offenses, it overwhelmingly applies to offenses that require a finding of scienter for conviction. [103] The few exceptions do not imply a non-punitive effect, given the assumption of scienter for those exceptions and the fact that a reasonable-mistake-of-age defense is allowed in a charge of statutory rape. [104] This factor therefore receives little weight in our analysis; it weakly implies a punitive effect.
We next ask whether [the statute's] operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment  retribution and deterrence. [105] Although in State v. Chaney we identified four objectives of criminal sentencing  rehabilitation, isolation, deterrence of defendant and others, and reinforcement of societal norms [106]  the Mendoza-Martinez test focuses on retribution and deterrence. [107] The state argues that the registration and dissemination provisions are not retributive and that any deterrent effects of registration and dissemination are only incidental to the provisions' regulatory function. But ASORA's application to a broad spectrum of crimes regardless of their inherent or comparative seriousness [108] refutes the state's argument and suggests that such retributive and deterrent effects are not merely incidental to the statute's regulatory purpose. Every person convicted of a sex offense must provide the same information, and the state publishes that information in the same manner, whether the person was convicted of a class A misdemeanor or an unclassified felony. ASORA's only differentiation is in the frequency and duration of a person's duty to register and disclose. [109] But at any given moment the registration list does not distinguish those individuals the state considers to pose a high risk to society from those it views as posing a low risk. ASORA determines who must register based not on a particularized determination of the risk the person poses to society but rather on the criminal statute the person was convicted of violating. In Kansas v. Hendricks the Supreme Court determined that the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act is not retributive because it does not affix culpability for prior criminal conduct. [110] That act is not triggered by a criminal conviction, but rather by criminal conduct; it applies to individuals charged with sexually violent offenses but who may be absolved of criminal responsibility. [111] The Supreme Court there stated that [a]n absence of the necessary criminal responsibility suggests that the State is not seeking retribution for a past misdeed. [112] But as we discuss in Part III.C.5, ASORA applies only to those convicted of specified offenses. [113] Moreover, in Smith v. Doe the Supreme Court noted that the state had conceded that ASORA might deter future crimes, [114] an effect that would be punitive. Although the state has made no similar concession in this appeal, it is significant that the state there admitted that the same statute on the same facts currently before us could have deterrent effects. The state argues here that, in the Supreme Court's words, it would severely undermine the Government's ability to engage in effective regulation [115] to determine that a law is punitive because it also deters. We assume for sake of discussion that a statute limiting registration requirements and public dissemination to the extent necessary to protect the public could have a deterrent effect that would be merely incidental to its non-punitive purpose. But ASORA's registration and unlimited public dissemination requirements provide a deterrent and retributive effect that goes beyond any non-punitive purpose and that essentially serves the traditional goals of punishment.
Under the fifth factor we consider whether the behavior to which [the statute] applies is already a crime. [116] The fact that a statute applies only to behavior that is already, and exclusively, criminal supports a conclusion that its effects are punitive. [117] When analyzing ASORA the Supreme Court asserted in Smith that this factor was of little weight in this case. [118] The Court there stated that conviction is a necessary beginning point, for recidivism is the statutory concern. [119] But if recidivism, i.e., new sexual misconduct, were the only concern, the statute would apply not just to convicted sex offenders but to other individuals who may pose a threat to society even if they were not convicted. See, for example, the Washington registration act, upheld by the Ninth Circuit; it includes sex offenders not found guilty  including those incompetent to stand trial, those found not guilty by reason of insanity, and those committed as sexual psychopaths or sexually violent predators  as well as those who are convicted. [120] The Utah registration act, also constitutionally upheld, includes those found not guilty on the ground of mental incapacity. [121] As the state concedes, ASORA applies only to those convicted of specified offenses. [122] Defendants charged with sex offenses but who plead out to non-sex offenses such as coercion or simple assault do not have to register even though they may have engaged in the same conduct as individuals who do have to register. [123] Likewise, even convicted defendants whose convictions are overturned for reasons other than insufficiency of evidence of guilt do not have to register despite having engaged in the same conduct. [124] An adult who commits sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree by engaging in sexual penetration with a person under thirteen years of age, [125] but whose conviction is overturned due to an illegal search, does not have to register. Finally, ASORA does not require registration for those charged with sex offenses but acquitted, even though they may have engaged in the same conduct as convicted sex offenders and might even be found civilly liable under a lesser standard of proof. It is true that ASORA applies to individuals who either enter a plea of or are found guilty but mentally ill. [126] But we do not read this inclusion to make the scope of ASORA the same as that of the Washington and Utah registration acts previously discussed. Because including this class of offenders again looks to guilt, applying ASORA to those found guilty but mentally ill does not demonstrate any non-punitive effect. In other words, ASORA fundamentally and invariably requires a judgment of guilt based on either a plea or proof under the criminal standard. It is therefore the determination of guilt of a sex offense beyond a reasonable doubt (or per a knowing plea), not merely the fact of the conduct and potential for recidivism, that triggers the registration requirement. Because it is the criminal conviction, and only the criminal conviction, that triggers obligations under ASORA, we conclude that this factor supports the conclusion that ASORA is punitive in effect. [127]
We next ask whether, in the words of the Supreme Court, an alternative purpose to which [the statute] may rationally be connected is assignable for it. [128] We translate this as an inquiry whether ASORA advances a legitimate, regulatory purpose. ASORA can rationally be viewed as advancing a nonpunitive purpose. [129] When it enacted ASORA the legislature found that: (1) sex offenders pose a high risk of reoffending after release from custody; (2) protecting the public from sex offenders is a primary governmental interest; (3) the privacy interests of persons convicted of sex offenses are less important than the government's interest in public safety; and (4) the release of certain information about sex offenders to public agencies and the general public will assist in protecting the public safety.[ [130] ] The Ninth Circuit stated that the state's non-punitive interest in public safety unquestionably provides support, indeed, the principal support, for the view that the statute is not punitive for Ex Post Facto Clause purposes. [131] The Supreme Court also stated that ASORA's rational connection to a non-punitive purpose was a [m]ost significant factor in its determination that ASORA is non-punitive in effect. [132] We likewise conclude that ASORA advances a non-punitive interest.
Finally, we determine whether [ASORA] appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. [133] In analyzing this factor the Ninth Circuit addressed the scope of individuals subject to ASORA and the breadth of its dissemination provision; it determined that ASORA makes information as to all sex offenders . . . available without any restriction and without any regard to whether the individual poses any future risk. [134] The Ninth Circuit consequently concluded that ASORA's non-punitive purpose, while of unquestioned importance, does not serve to render a statute that is so broad and sweeping non-punitive. [135] The Supreme Court also addressed the scope and magnitude of ASORA's registration requirements and its dissemination provision, but concluded that ASORA is not excessive in relation to the state's interest in public safety. [136] In so deciding it determined that [t]he Ex Post Facto Clause does not preclude a State from making reasonable categorical judgments that conviction of specified crimes should entail particular regulatory consequences, [137] and that the duration of ASORA's reporting requirements and what the Court called ASORA's passive notification system are not so excessive as to be effectively penal. [138] The Court stated that the excessiveness inquiry is not an exercise in determining whether the legislature has made the best choice possible to address the problem it seeks to remedy. The question is whether the regulatory means chosen are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective. [139] As the legislature found when enacting ASORA, protecting the public from sex offenders is a primary governmental interest. [140] The state certainly has a valid interest in addressing not just the egregious and highly publicized crimes that gave rise to the Megan's Law movement, [141] but also other crimes of which the risk of repetition and grave harm is sufficiently predictable to justify the protections afforded by ASORA. But in the context of our ex post facto inquiry, we have an obligation to determine whether the means chosen to carry out legitimate purposes are excessive, i.e., not close enough to be classified as non-penal. We use means here to include the scope of the statute and the obligations it imposes on those subject to it and what the state can or must do in enforcing it. It is significant that ASORA's scope is broad; it encompasses a wide array of crimes that vary greatly in severity. [142] Moreover, ASORA provides no mechanism by which a registered sex offender can petition the state or a court for relief from the obligations of continued registration and disclosure. [143] Offenders cannot shorten their registration or notification period, even on the clearest determination of rehabilitation or conclusive proof of physical incapacitation. [144] Doe successfully completed a treatment program and was granted early release from mandatory parole. A superior court granted him legal custody of his minor daughter based on its determination that he was successfully rehabilitated and posed a very low risk of re-offending. [145] Despite this evidence of rehabilitation, ASORA requires Doe to register quarterly and requires the state to publicly disseminate his personal information for the rest of his life. [146] Under ex post facto analysis we further conclude that the statute's chosen means are excessive in relation to the statute's purpose because the statute is also underinclusive. As we discussed in Part III.C.5, ASORA only applies to those convicted of specified offenses. [147] It therefore excludes from its requirements individuals who may have committed the same acts and may pose threats to the public but who avoided conviction by pleading to a lesser charge or whose convictions were overturned. We do not mean to suggest that making the statute more inclusive would necessarily resolve ex post facto issues or that such changes would otherwise be constitutionally unobjectionable, but we point to this feature to illustrate that ASORA has a punitive effect. ASORA also imposes obligations that, for ex post facto purposes, are excessive in relation to the state's legitimate public safety interest. It is significant that the registration and re-registration requirements are demanding and intrusive [148] and are of long duration. [149] Finally, the provisions authorizing or requiring the state to disseminate the information are sweeping. ASORA is much broader than the Connecticut statute that authorizes courts to order the state to restrict dissemination if the court finds that dissemination is not required for public safety and that publication of the information would likely reveal the identity of the victim. [150] ASORA is much closer to the Kansas statute struck down on ex post facto grounds by the Kansas Supreme Court because of its unrestricted public access . . . [that] goes beyond that necessary to promote public safety. [151] We are not balancing the rights of sex offenders against the rights of their victims. [152] Rather, we are determining for ex post facto purposes whether the means chosen to protect the public have consequences to sex offenders that significantly go beyond the state's valid interest in public safety, and exclude individuals who may pose equivalent threats to public safety. Some sex offender registration statutes employ means that have been held to relate rationally and closely enough to the state's interest in public safety. For example, the Second Circuit concluded that the notification policy adopted by the Connecticut Office of Adult Probation was not excessive in relation to its purpose of enhancing public awareness and helping to prevent the recovering offender from harmful relapses. [153] Connecticut allows certain sex offenders convicted between October 1, 1988 and June 30, 1999 to petition the court to order the Department of Public Safety to restrict the dissemination of the registration information to law enforcement purposes only and to not make such information available for public access. [154] Connecticut also provides certain sex offenders the possibility of avoiding registration and dissemination upon a judicial determination that registration or public dissemination is not required for public safety. [155] A statute is not deemed punitive simply because it lacks a close or perfect fit with the nonpunitive aims it seeks to advance. [156] Although the non-punitive aims are undeniably legitimate and important, ASORA's registration and dissemination provisions have consequences to sex offenders that go beyond the state's interest in public safety; we must therefore conclude that the Alaska statute is excessive in relation to the state's interest in public safety.
Summing up the effects under the seven factors, we conclude that ASORA's effects are punitive, and convincingly outweigh the statute's non-punitive purposes and effects. We recognize that several of the factors seem closely related, and that discussion of one may overlap discussion of another. Nonetheless it is not the mere number of factors that leads us to our conclusion, but our assessment of those factors and their relative weight. Six of those factors lead us to disagree, respectfully but firmly, with the Supreme Court's analysis and its ultimate conclusion that ASORA is not penal. [157] Our decision is consistent with what we consider to be the compelling comments of dissenting justices in Smith [158] and with the majority of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel that, before reversal, discerned an ex post facto violation under federal law. [159] Because ASORA compels (under threat of conviction) intrusive affirmative conduct, because this conduct is equivalent to that required by criminal judgments, because ASORA makes the disclosed information public and requires its broad dissemination without limitation, because ASORA applies only to those convicted of crime, and because ASORA neither meaningfully distinguishes between classes of sex offenses on the basis of risk nor gives offenders any opportunity to demonstrate their lack of risk, ASORA's effects are punitive. We therefore conclude that the statute violates Alaska's ex post facto clause. [160]