Opinion ID: 1027202
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The July 11 Order

Text: Reliance next contends that if an ERISA appeals notice to Gagliano was required, based on the new grounds in the Second Termination Letter, it was relieved of that requirement by the directory language of the July 11 Order, to render a final decision on plaintiff's administrative appeal. As just noted above, however, the Second Termination Letter did not address the subject matter of Gagliano's administrative appeal (the reason for denial of benefits in the Initial Termination Letter), but made a final decision to deny benefits on a wholly new ground (pre-existing condition). Nothing in the July 11 Order limited Reliance's statutory duty to comply with the mandates of ERISA while making a final decision, even though the Second Termination Letter effectively made an initial decision on new grounds. Moreover, we are aware of no provision in ERISA or otherwise, which would permit the district court, by judicial fiat, to abrogate and nullify a claimant's validly existing statutory entitlements under ERISA. The force of such a rule, making the party act on pain of certain punishment regardless of the validity of the order violated or the court's jurisdiction to enter it as determined finally upon review, would be not only to compel submission. It would be also in practical effect for many cases to terminate the litigation, foreclosing the substantive rights involved without any possibility for their effective appellate review and determination. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 351-52, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947). Putting aside the frailty of Reliance's proposed judicial limitation of a claimant's statutory rights, it is evident from the plain language of the July 11 Order that the district court did not direct Reliance to ignore Gagliano's ERISA rights during the process of an administrative review or purport to grant Reliance the authority to do so.