Opinion ID: 2342716
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Nixon's Other Arguments

Text: Nixon's remaining arguments may be disposed of summarily. We review his contention of trial court error with respect to the government's alleged improper impeachment of a central defense witness, Zenita Razanders who was the girlfriend of Nixon at the time he fired at Mr. Taylor's car, for plain error because the defense failed to object to the government's cross-examination during trial. See Hunter v. United States, 606 A.2d 139, 144 (D.C.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 991, 113 S.Ct. 509, 121 L.Ed.2d 444 (1992). The government presented direct and circumstantial evidence of Nixon's guilt and did not rely on its cross-examination of Ms. Razanders in making its closing argument. Therefore, even assuming error, without deciding, we cannot say that Nixon's substantial rights were so clearly prejudiced that the very fairness and integrity of the trial was jeopardized. Id. (citation omitted). Nixon's argument that the trial court erred in failing to keep its commitment to voir dire him on his decision not to testify has no support in the record. While the jurors were deliberating, the trial judge questioned Nixon about his decision not to testify, and advised him that: Only you can make the final decision as to whether to testify or not. Nixon acknowledged that his attorney informed him that the decision whether to testify was his alone to make; he decided not to testify; and he remained comfortable with that decision. Consequently, no error occurred. See Moctar v. United States, 718 A.2d 1063, 1068 (D.C.1998) (There is no blanket requirement that the validity of a waiver [of the right to testify] be determined at trial.). Nixon's assertion that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an inquiry into his request for a missing witness instruction is not persuasive. Defense counsel made the request for a missing witness instruction just prior to closing arguments. In making the request, defense counsel stated that she just want[ed] to comment on the fact that [the complaining witnesses who did not testify were] here [that is, in the courtroom]. We have stated that the decision to give a missing witness instruction or to allow counsel to make a missing witness argument is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. See Reyes-Contreras v. United States, 719 A.2d 503, 508 (D.C.1998) (citing Thomas v. United States, 447 A.2d 52, 58 (D.C.1982)). Moreover, on the record before us, we cannot say that defense counsel made the requisite showing that the missing witness[es]... [were] `peculiarly available' to the government. Id. (quoting Arnold v. United States, 511 A.2d 399, 415 (D.C. 1986)). Thus, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Nixon's request for a missing witness instruction. Finally, Nixon argues that the trial court erred in giving a Winters instruction to the jury which effectively coerced the verdict against him. In this case the jury began its deliberations at 10:25 a.m. on November 17, 1997. At 3:10 p.m. that same day the jury sent a note to the judge stating that it was deadlocked and asking: What happens next? [11] The judge instructed his courtroom clerk to tell the jury to continue deliberating. Shortly thereafter the judge called the jurors into the courtroom to dismiss them for the day. He told them in part: Well, if I agreed with your assessment that you were hopelessly deadlocked then what would happen is that I would declare a mistrial, declare that this was a hung jury. . . . However, at this stage I don't agree with your assessment of little prospect. And therefore, I ask you to return tomorrow at 9:30 to continue your deliberations. The next morning the jury began deliberations at 9:35 a.m. At 11:52 a.m. the jury sent a note advising the judge in part that: [T]here is no possibility of unanimity on the verdict, and that is the only thing of which we are all in agreement. After determining that the jury had been deliberating, the judge gave the Winters instruction. After lunch, the jury deliberated for about one hour before returning a guilty verdict on all counts. This case closely resembles Coleman v. United States, 515 A.2d 439 (D.C. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1006, 107 S.Ct. 1631, 95 L.Ed.2d 205 (1987). In Coleman, the jury advised the court three times that it would be unable to reach a decision. The jury deliberated about nine to ten hours in total. The first note came after two hours of deliberation; the judge spoke to the jurors and then dismissed them for the day. After an additional two and one quarter hours on the second day of deliberation, the jury sent a second note and the judge again instructed that the deliberations continue. The third note was sent in the afternoon of the second day of deliberation; the judge gave the Winters instruction. The next morning the jury reached a verdict. In reviewing Coleman, we said: [T]he court's decision to give the Winters instruction when it did was well within its discretion and did not result in a coerced verdict. Coleman, supra, 515 A.2d at 453. The same is true in Nixon's case. See also Chavarria v. United States, 505 A.2d 59, 64-65 (D.C.1985) (no coercion where jury returned guilty verdict an hour and a half after the Winters instruction). In short, nothing in the record on appeal persuades us that the trial judge coerced the jury's verdict by giving the Winters instruction. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we reverse Nixon's convictions for aggravated assault of Mr. Jones and Mr. Ball while armed because the government failed to prove that they suffered serious bodily injury within the meaning of D.C.Code §§ 22-504.1, -3202. In addition, we remand the case to the trial court, with instructions to vacate either Nixon's conviction for mayhem of Mr. Spencer while armed or aggravated assault of Mr. Spencer while armed and to merge his possession of a firearm during crime of violence convictions into one PFCV conviction. [12] In all other respects we affirm the trial court's judgment. So ordered.