Opinion ID: 4510976
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: State Legislature Interpretations

Text: Defendants draw our attention to the Senate vacancy statutes enacted by most state legislatures shortly after the Seventeenth Amendment’s ratification. Defendants argue that these statutes demonstrate that the correct interpretation of the Vacancy Clause is one that permits a vacancy election at the next even-year election, or the second even-year election if the vacancy happens within some months of the first one. See Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 858–59 (where there is ambiguity or doubt, contemporaneous and subsequent state practice is persuasive evidence of the best constitutional construction) (citing McPherson v. Blacker, TEDARDS V. DUCEY 39 146 U.S. 1 (1892); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932)). We agree that these statutes provide persuasive evidence in favor of this conclusion. However, we note several caveats. Forty States enacted Senate vacancy statutes between 1913 and 1915. See Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 857 tbl.1, 871– 75 (App’x B). Nineteen States specifically required— whether expressly by reference to biennial or congressional elections, or implicitly by reference to the state’s general elections—that vacancy elections take place at the next even-year election. 30 Four States required that vacancy elections take place at the next even-year election following some additional time for nominations. 31 Four States required that vacancy elections take place at the next annual election. 32 Eight States required a special election within less than one year of the start of the vacancy. 33 The 30 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2870 (1913) (but authorizing Governor to call special election if this would result in lapse of over six months); 1913 Cal. Stat. 237 (but requiring vacancy election during any statewide special election if sooner); 1913 Fla. Laws 277; 1913 Ga. Laws 135; 1913 Ill. Laws 307; 1915 Ind. Acts 13; 1914 Ky. Acts 98; 1915 Mich. Pub. Acts 261; 1913 Minn. Laws 756; 1915 Mont. Laws 281; 1915 Nev. Stat. 83; 1915 N.H. Laws 32; 1915 Okla. Sess. Laws 57; 1915 S.D. Sess. Laws 367; 1913 Tenn. Pub. Acts 396; 1915 Utah Laws 54; 1915 Vt. Acts & Resolves 70; 1913 Wis. Sess. Laws 825 (but authorizing Governor to call special election sooner); 1913 Wyo. Sess. Laws 100. 31 See 1915 N.M. Laws 39 (30 days); 1913 N.C. Sess. Laws 206 (30 days); 1914 Ohio Laws 8 (180 days); 1913 Pa. Laws 995 (60 days in advance of the primary). 32 See 1913 Colo. Sess. Laws 267; 1914 Md. Laws 1337; 1913 N.Y. Laws 2419 (plus 30 days); 1914 Va. Acts 252. 33 See 1915 Ala. Laws 364 (60 days, or 4 months if upcoming general election); Del. Rev. Code § 1890 (1915) (one year); 1914 La. Acts 471 (100 days); 1915 Me. Laws 35 (“forthwith”); 1914 Miss. Laws 40 TEDARDS V. DUCEY remaining five States did not set a deadline but appear to have left the timing of vacancy elections entirely or primarily to the Governor’s discretion. 34 The number of state legislatures apparently interpreting the Seventeenth Amendment to afford them discretion to postpone a Senate vacancy election for up to two years or slightly more is persuasive evidence that this interpretation reflects the original public understanding. Even the statutes providing for special elections within thirteen months or less do not necessarily evince an interpretation that the state legislature lacked discretion to postpone the election longer. 35 Nor can we entirely dismiss the interpretations of contemporary state legislatures as coming from the political bodies that the Seventeenth Amendment had just divested of power. The majority of state legislatures supported some form of the Seventeenth Amendment, and many had already implemented state-level reforms to create de facto direct election of Senators. Albert, supra, at 46–48. But we also do not find the state statutes conclusive as to the proper interpretation of the Seventeenth Amendment Vacancy Clause. The evidence we have examined in this portion of our analysis tells us no more than that twenty192 (90 days, or calendar year of general election); 1914 R.I. Pub. Laws 65 (“as early . . . as will admit of compliance with . . . law”); 1914 S.C. Acts 592 (90 days); 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws 101 (90 days). 34 See 1913 Conn. Pub. Acts 1839; 1913 Mass. Acts 1059; 1915 Mo. Laws 280; 1915 Or. Laws 59; 1915 Wash. Sess. Laws 232 (not less than 25 days from issuance of writ). 35 Indeed, many States that originally provided for prompt special elections later amended their statutes to postpone vacancy elections until the next even-year election. See Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 857 tbl.1, 871– 75 (App’x B). TEDARDS V. DUCEY 41 three state legislatures enacted statutes in the wake of the Seventeenth Amendment’s ratification that postponed a vacancy election to the next (or next practicable) even-year election. We do not know the extent to which that choice represented the state legislatures’ debate or deliberation, as opposed to uncontested assumption, regarding the meaning of the Seventeenth Amendment. We do not know how state or federal courts might have interpreted the Seventeenth Amendment if those statutes had occasioned contemporary challenges. 36 Cf. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 823 (1995) (“One may properly question the extent to which the States’ own practice is a reliable indicator of the contours of restrictions that the Constitution imposed on States, especially when no court has ever upheld [the challenged state practice].”). And we do not know whether the state legislatures that enacted speedier special election laws may have specifically interpreted the Seventeenth Amendment to so require. We do note that we have no example within contemporary state practice—or any subsequent state practice—of a State attempting to extend a vacancy or interim appointment by significantly more than the two-year gap between even-year elections. In sum, postratification state statutes favor, but do not compel, an interpretation of the Seventeenth Amendment Vacancy Clause that leaves States broad discretion to schedule a vacancy election up until the next general election preceded by some reasonable period of time in which to hold the election. 36 We do know that many state courts had interpreted similar vacancy provisions in their own state constitutions to require prompt special elections. See Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 883 (Frankel, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). 42 TEDARDS V. DUCEY