Opinion ID: 2556812
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Postconviction Relief Hearing

Text: Based on § 10-9.1-6(c), [7] the state on January 4, 2007 moved for summary disposition requesting denial of Laurence's application for postconviction relief. At the hearing on January 26, 2007, the trial justice permitted the state, Dwyer, and Laurence [8] to present their arguments on the validity of the postconviction-relief claims. Because the Shatney memorandum disposed of the O'Connor claim and the psychiatric-records claim as having no merit, the state's attorney explained that its position focused on Laurence's spying allegation. First, she stated that Laurence's affidavit, intended to describe his personal knowledge of an in-cell camera, actually did not present any relevant information to that effect. [9] She then attested, as the trial prosecutor, that she never received any videotape, pictures, or the like depicting Laurence's legal work and also presented the court with an affidavit from Sgt. Douglas Newberg (Newberg), who attested to the same. [10] Newberg was the law enforcement case agent for the prosecution of [Laurence's] case. Accordingly, because the Shatney memorandum found no merit to the O'Connor claim or the psychiatric-records claim, and because the spying claim could not survive summary judgment, the state maintained that Laurence's postconviction-relief application should fail. Before permitting Laurence to argue on his behalf, the trial justice noted that months prior to the hearing, mindful that Laurence's initial allegation of spying lacked any credible evidence, he had at Mr. Dwyer's request[,] made available some state funds to pursue with a detective or some other appropriately trained person in an effort to locate videos or to somehow conclude that this [spying] took place. [11] The trial justice also remarked that nothing    went on in the trial that gave him any reason to believe that the state had improperly intruded into [Laurence's] cell or any place else at the prison in order to secretly tape him or watch him or listen to him putting his case together in order to defend himself. He then concluded that at the time of the postconviction-relief hearing there [was] simply no proof that there [was] any videotaping or any other untoward or improper action that went on on the part of law enforcement officials, state police officers, prison officials or the Attorney General's Office that intruded upon Mr. Laurence's preparation of his trial papers or his strategy. Laurence then addressed the court. He first disputed that the O'Connor conflict-of-interest claim had already been decided. The trial justice stopped Laurence mid-argument and explained that given the Supreme Court's refusal to hear the claim on reargument in 2004 and the trial justice's own opinion that the problem with John O'Connor was fully explored at trial, he declined to further address this issue. The trial justice specifically stated that he already had ruled at trial that O'Connor had done nothing that affected [Laurence's] ability to get a fair trial or defend [himself] and [O'Connor] didn't do anything to sell [Laurence] down the river or had [Laurence] do anything that prejudiced [his] position. Laurence objected to the trial justice's ruling. Focusing next on the second claim of error that a camera hidden in his cell at the ACI had been used to tape his trial preparations, Laurence acknowledged that he had been provided funds for an investigator, but he insisted that his ability to prove his allegations depended on obtaining depositions of certain state police officers and ACI guards. The trial justice, however, disagreed that Laurence had presented the court with enough evidence to open[] the door that would justify taking depositions. He accordingly dismissed Laurence's claim, finding that [t]here is not a shred of credible evidence in front of me relative to the use of videotaping or any other intrusion into your preparations. Laurence again objected to the trial justice's ruling. At the hearing, Laurence did not mention anything about the Shatney memorandum's and the state's opinion that his claim concerning the court's consideration of the psychiatric records lacked merit. The trial justice likewise did not address this claim. The trial justice also did not address any of Laurence's claims concerning Sollitto's ineffective assistance of counsel, which were not included in the Shatney memorandum and were not discussed by Laurence at the postconviction-relief hearing. An order dismissing Laurence's application entered on February 2, 2007. Laurence made several attempts to file a notice of appeal in Superior Court, finally succeeding on February 15, 2007 [12] within the twenty-day time limit articulated by Article I, Rule 4(b) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure.