Opinion ID: 2599880
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Miscellaneous Claims (Lewis, Oliver)

Text: Defendants raise additional challenges to California's death penalty statute and to other aspects of California law. We affirm the decisions that have rejected similar claims, and decline to reconsider such authorities, as follows: Victim impact evidence does not violate due process or ex post facto principles. ( People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th 382, 394-395, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244.) The use of victim impact evidence is constitutionally permissible. ( Id. at p. 403, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244.) Standard penalty phase instructions do not inherently encourage the double counting of aggravating factors. ( People v. Ayala, supra, 24 Cal.4th 243, 289, 99 Cal. Rptr.2d 532, 6 P.3d 193.) Factor (b) of section 190.3 is not impermissibly overbroad or fundamentally unfair. (See People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 204-205, 222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480.) The judgment and sentence against defendants do not violate international law. ( People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th 382, 403-404, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244.) The record contains no suggestion that either defendant is a foreign national or a dual national. The death penalty law is not unconstitutional for failing to impose a burden of proof  whether beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence  as to the existence of aggravating circumstances, the greater weight of aggravating circumstances over mitigating circumstances, or the appropriateness of a death sentence. ( People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th 382, 401, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244.) Nor, contrary to defendants' assertion, does section 190.3's lack of imposition of a burden of proof violate Evidence Code section 300, which provides that Except as otherwise provided by statute, this code applies in every action before the Supreme Court or a court of appeal or superior court, including proceedings in such actions conducted by a referee, court commissioner, or similar officer, but does not apply in grand jury proceedings. Section 190.3 is such an excepting statute. Although we have said that [t]he California death penalty statute is silent on the burden of proof ( People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 417, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708), section 190.3 makes clear that the sentencing function `is inherently moral and normative, not factual; the sentencer's power and discretion . . . is to decide the appropriate penalty for the particular offense and offender under all the relevant circumstances.' [Citation.] Because of this, instructions associated with the usual fact-finding process  such as burden of proof  are not necessary. ( Id. at pp. 417-418, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708, ellipsis added here; see People v. Schmeck, supra, 37 Cal.4th 240, 262, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 397, 118 P.3d 451 [normative nature of penalty decision].) The trial court did not err in failing to instruct on which guilt phase instructions continued to apply at the penalty phase. ( People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 561, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420.) Nor, in that same area, did the court err in failing to provide the jury with CALJIC No. 8.84.1. ( People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1255, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225.) Its instructions, along with the jurors' understanding of the nature of the penalty phase, conveyed the substance of CALJIC No. 8.84.1 to the jury. (See id. at p. 1257, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225; see also id. at p. 1256, fn. 7, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225.) The trial court did not need to define the presumption of innocence, i.e., the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, at the penalty phase. ( People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1020, 30 Cal. Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248.) Notwithstanding defendants' motion to have the trial court instruct on lingering doubt, the trial court was within its authority to deny the motion. ( People v. Cleveland, supra, 32 Cal.4th 704, 739, 11 Cal. Rptr.3d 236, 86 P.3d 302; People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 77, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129.) In any event, there is no doubt that defendants committed the crimes. (See People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1187, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1 [Under these circumstances, we do not believe defendant would have derived any additional benefit had the requested instruction been given]; People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 864, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 831 P.2d 249 [same].) There is no requirement to define life imprisonment without possibility of parole. ( People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 269-271, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123.) The statutory scheme does not deny capital defendants the equal protection of the laws or any other constitutional right insofar as it does not contain disparate sentence review (i.e., comparative or intercase proportionality review). ( People v. Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th 102, 169, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614, 38 P.3d 461; see People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th 226, 276, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123.) Death by lethal injection is not cruel and unusual punishment under current law. ( People v. Martinez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 673, 704, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 648, 74 P.3d 748.) Defendants have not shown that the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation has violated due process principles or state law in respect of its standards for the administration of lethal injection under section 3604, and in any event, this type of claim does not entitle a criminal defendant to relief at this stage. ( People v. Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1234, 24 Cal. Rptr.3d 112, 105 P.3d 487; see People v. Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th 412, 485, fn. 55, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 677, 133 P.3d 581 [mentioning recent federal court challenge to validity of lethal injection procedures].) Any delay in carrying out the execution is not unconstitutional. ( People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th 382, 404, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244.) The death penalty law adequately narrows the class of death-eligible offenders. ( People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th 226, 276, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123.) Neither Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, nor Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556, has changed our prior conclusions regarding burden of proof or jury unanimity. In particular, the jury need not make a unanimous finding under section 190.3, factor (b), i.e., evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity involving actual or attempted force or violence or the express or implied threat of force or violence. (See People v. Griffin, supra, 33 Cal.4th 536, 585, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 93 P.3d 344; People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th 382, 402, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244; People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th 226, 275, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123.) The prosecutor's discretion whether to seek the death penalty does not impair any constitutional right. ( People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th 382, 403, 15 Cal. Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244.) CALJIC No. 2.90 is constitutional as currently phrased. ( People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 651-652, 106 Cal. Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392.) So are CALJIC Nos. 2.01, 8.83, 2.21.2 ( People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 428-429, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1), and 2.72 ( People v. Frye (1998)18 Cal.4th 894, 957-958, 959-960, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183). To refer to the complaining party as The People does not violate due process or other constitutional principles. (See People v. Black (2003) 114 Cal. App.4th 830, 832-834, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 902.)