Opinion ID: 1133490
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: probability of a fair trial in doņa ana county

Text: {80} House asserts that he was prejudiced by the change of venue to Doņa Ana County. Throughout the legal proceedings in this case, House and his supporters have accused the prosecution of vilifying House because he is a Native American.50 Consistent with this accusation, he charges that the State sought to offensively use the venue statute against him by obtaining a new venue that is largely devoid of Native Americans. Furthermore, House argues that, with this scheme to deprive him of a racially fair jury pool, the State intended to seat a jury that would be more likely to convict. The Court of Appeals in the opinion below focused on whether the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that Taos was a biased venue. The Court did not address House's claim, discussed in the briefs of both parties to this Court, that he suffered prejudice from the choice of Doņa Ana County as a venue. {81} The trial court and all the participants in this trial were well aware that Taos County has a 6.5% Native American adult population while Doņa Ana County has only about 0.8%. See Venue Order, slip op. at 19 (Finding of Fact 21). House claimed that the State sought a venue free from the influence of Native American jurors because it could not get a conviction of a Native American defendant after twice trying unsuccessfully in a district with a significant Native American population. Thus, House argues that the district court abused its discretion by acceding to the move to Doņa Ana County and by failing to earnestly question the State's motives in seeking a venue with a Native American population of less than 1%. {82} The practical impact of such a venue, according to House, is that it deprived him of a jury that would understand aspects of his defense that were cognizable only in the context of Native American culture. For example, much was made of the fact that House did not mention to emergency room personnel that he was suffering from a migraine headache when he was brought to the hospital immediately after the accident. This showed, according to the State, that House was disoriented, not because of a blinding headache, but because he was drunk. House countered with evidence that he did not mention the headache because Navajos do not discuss pain and are taught to deal with it on an internal basis. Navajo medicine men testified at trial about these cultural traditions and House's earlier treatment for migraine headaches.51 The President of the Navajo Nation wrote a letter to Judge Blackmer, urging him to select a venue that would be sensitive to this type of evidence: It would be a travesty of justice to see the third trial take place in a community that has little or no familiarity with our customs or culture. We have often experienced misunderstanding and discrimination. We realize that stereotypes are common where contact and communication with our people does not occur. We ask that you consider the importance of having jurors who are not hostile to nor ignorant of our culture consider this case. Letter from Albert Hale, President of the Navajo Nation to Hon. James F. Blackmer (circa April 5, 1995). Thus, House suggests that he suffered prejudice from the change of venue because his defense rested largely on such cultural evidence and would not be understood by jurors in Doņa Ana County. Though House's claims of prejudice may raise disturbing questions, these claims are inconsequential unless there is substantial evidence in the record proving that he received an unfair trial in Doņa Ana County. No such evidence was provided.
{83} When addressing the racial composition of groups of citizens who may be empaneled to decide a case, courts have applied different rules depending upon whether the question concerns the racial makeup of a venue, which is the particular geographical area, usually a county or judicial district, in which a court will hear and determine a case; a venire, which is the jury pool or group of citizens from whom a jury is chosen in a given case; or a petit jury, which is an ordinary jury selected from a venire, sworn to hear the evidence presented at trial and to declare a verdict of guilt or innocence. House appears to be urging that venire and petit jury principles should be applied, by analogy, to the selection of a venue. However, our research has disclosed few courts or judges that have been willing to consider such a theory.
{84} It is well established in Federal and New Mexico law that the State may not, during the jury selection process, use its peremptory challenges to exclude otherwise unbiased and well-qualified individuals solely on the basis of their race, gender, economic status, or any other similar discriminatory characteristic. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 145-46, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994) (gender); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) (race); State v. Gonzales, 111 N.M. 590, 597-600, 808 P.2d 40, 47-50 (Ct.App.1991) (gender); State v. Tapia, 81 N.M. 365, 366, 467 P.2d 31, 32 (Ct.App.1970) (race, economic status). Such purposeful exclusions violate the constitutional right to equal protection of the laws of both the defendant and the potential jurors. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-88, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986); Gonzales, 111 N.M. at 595, 808 P.2d at 45 (prospective jurors). This type of discrimination is deemed to be so invidious that a defendant may establish a prima facie case of discrimination even if the defendant's racial group is not substantially underrepresented on the jury. Gonzales, 111 N.M. at 595, 808 P.2d at 45. Even a single instance of purposeful exclusion may establish a prima facie case of discriminatory intent. See id. House contends that selecting a specific venue to purposefully preclude a particular race from a petit jury is just as unconstitutional as using peremptory challenges to systematically exclude a particular race from a petit jury.
{85} As with the petit jury, the venire must be selected in an entirely neutral and nondiscriminatory manner. The Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the State will not exclude members of his race from the jury venire on account of race or on the false assumption that members of his race as a group are not qualified to serve as jurors. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (citations and footnote omitted). The State may not pass laws or promulgate rules that expressly exclude, on the basis of race, qualified individuals from the jury pool. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308-09, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1879). Nor may government officials implement a neutral venire selection law in a discriminatory manner. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976) (A statute, otherwise neutral on its face, must not be applied so as invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race.). House seeks to apply these notions to adjudicating the racial composition of a venue.
{86} We have said that the State is forbidden from accomplishing indirectly at the selection of the petit jury what it has not been able to accomplish directly at the selection of the venire. State v. Aragon, 109 N.M. 197, 201, 784 P.2d 16, 20 (1989). By analogy to this principle, House argues that the State cannot indirectly accomplish, with the selection of a particular venue, the exclusion of a particular racial group, when it is prohibited from directly discriminating in the selection of the venire. {87} House is echoing Justice Marshall's dissent in Mallett v. Missouri , which concerned an African American defendant charged with murdering a white state trooper whose trial was transferred to a venue with no citizens of the defendant's race: Just as state prosecutors may not use peremptory challenges to exclude members of the defendant's race from the jury, state trial courts may not transfer venue of the trial to accomplish the same result by another means. Mallett v. Missouri, 494 U.S. 1009, 1009, 110 S.Ct. 1308, 108 L.Ed.2d 484 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in that case, and Justice Marshall's argument in favor of granting certiorari is one of the few judicial pronouncements that we have found discussing this principle. See id. at 1009-12, 110 S.Ct. 1308; see also State v. Lozano, 616 So.2d 73, 76 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1993) (reviewing trial court's decision to change venue based on the race of the victim); Osmulski v. Becze, 638 N.E.2d 828, 834-35 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) (in a personal injury action, applying Batson analysis, and holding that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of the discrimination in the defendant's use of the venue-change statute, and that the defendant utilized the automatic change of venue in such a manner that it resulted in changing the jury pool from one with twenty-five percent African-Americans to one with less than one percent African Americans, effectively operating as strikes against every potential African-American juror in Lake County); State v. Harris, 282 N.J.Super. 409, 660 A.2d 539, 542-45 (App. Div.1995) (concluding trial court should have considered racial demographics in selecting source from which to draw foreign jury). {88} House's argument that a particular racial group is excluded by the selection of a venue can be analyzed from two different perspectives: On the one hand, a defendant may allege that the State or the trial court deliberately selected a particular venue with the objective of excluding a racial group; the venue was chosen with discriminatory intent. On the other hand, because the move to a particular venue has resulted in the reduction or exclusion of a racial group, the defendant may claim he or she will not receive a fair trial; the venue change has had a discriminatory impact. House's arguments raise both of these possibilities.
{89} As to the first possibility, House suggests that the State deliberately sought a venue with fewer Native Americans than Taos County and thus acted with discriminatory intent. House has failed to prove this contention. The right to equal protection prevents a trial court or a prosecutor from intentionally choosing a venue so as to exclude from the venire persons of a particular race. The Fourteenth Amendment forbids the State from engaging in all actions that are intentionally discriminatory on the basis of race. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 409, 111 S.Ct. 1364 (discussing the importance of race neutrality injury procedures in maintaining the integrity of the justice system). {90} As indicated above, we have found surprisingly little jurisprudence on this question. There is no generally accepted test for evaluating discriminatory intent in the selection of a venue. However, we believe that the so-called Batson test may be adapted for this purpose. The United States Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712, created, and subsequently refined, a three-part test to evaluate whether peremptory challenges were used to purposefully exclude a particular race from the petit jury. [] The Court succinctly described the test in Purkett v. Elem : Under our Batson jurisprudence, once the opponent of a peremptory challenge has made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination (step one), the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation (step two). If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide (step three) whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (per curiam). This test can be modified to examine, in a contested change of venue, the intentions behind the State's or the trial court's choice of a particular locale. Cf. Martin v. Amoco Oil Co., 679 N.E.2d 139, 146 (Ind.Ct.App. 1997), vacated on other grounds, 698 N.E.2d 1191, and then aff'd, 696 N.E.2d 383 (Ind. 1998) (using Batson test to evaluate whether change of venue from community with 25% African-American population to community with only 1% was the equivalent of a wholesale peremptory challenge of African-Americans). {91} The application of a modified Batson test is further justified by the fact that, unlike a mandatory change of venue under Section 38-3-3, a change of venue in the trial court's discretion effectively requires the trial court to engage in a Batson -like inquiry. In other words, a trial court's findings of fact that a fair trial cannot be obtained in the current venue and that an alternate venue is free from exception necessarily determines that a change of venue is justified by race-neutral reasons, thereby satisfying step two of the Batson test. Cf. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 362-63, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (While the reason offered by the prosecutor for a peremptory strike need not rise to the level of a challenge for cause, [ Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712], the fact that it corresponds to a valid for-cause challenge will demonstrate its race-neutral character.). {92} Though there was no express use of such a test by the trial court, the issue of intentional discrimination was raised below and the record contains ample evidence applicable to each step in the test. In the first step, House, as opponent of the venue change, needed to make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the State's motion to select a particular venue, in this case Doņa Ana County. The opponent will rely on the facts concerning the selection of the specific venue in establishing a prima facie case. Batson, 476 U.S. at 95, 106 S.Ct. 1712. House presented a prima facie case of racial discrimination with his cultural arguments and his evidence that, after he twice had a hung jury in a community that had a significant Native American population, the State advocated the move to a venue with few Native Americans. The first part of the test is satisfied by circumstantial evidence that the prosecution proposed a venue solely on the basis of race. {93} In the second step, the State, as proponent of that venue, must present a race-neutral explanation. Throughout this case the State was accused of racism and, in arguing in favor of the move to Doņa Ana, presented several race-neutral explanations. The State's explanations included the fact that, in contrast to Taos County, Doņa Ana County had not been subjected to the frequent, pervasive, contemporaneous, and highly prejudicial publicity regarding the case. Moreover, Doņa Ana had a much larger population than the small close-knit community of Taos and would be less likely to be tainted by the prejudicial publicity. The State's justifications are `plausible' though there is no requirement that they be even minimally persuasive. See Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769 (quoting with disapproval and reversing Elem v. Purkett, 25 F.3d 679, 683 (8th Cir.1994)). This is because the ultimate determination of discriminatory intent rests with the discretion of the trial court in the third part of the test. Id. {94} In the third step, once a race-neutral explanation has been tendered, the trial court must exercise its discretion in determining whether the opponent of the venue change has proven intentional racial discrimination. The trial court in its Venue Order reiterated many of the State's arguments in enumerating those factors that rendered Doņa Ana suitable and Taos unsuitable as a venue for this trial. As our discussion of the Venue Order establishes, most of the trial court's reasons are supported by substantial evidence and show no abuse of discretion. We note that the Mallett dissent focused primarily on the discrimination of the trial court. No such discrimination has been shown here. We conclude that the selection of Doņa Ana County as a new venue was race-neutral and that there is no proof of discriminatory intent.
{95} As to the question of discriminatory impact, House argues that, in ordering the venue change, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to conclude that an unfair trial was more probable because fewer Native Americans live in Doņa Ana than in Taos. We disagree. There is simply no constitutional requirement in New Mexico that, prior to a venue change, a court must consider the percentage of prospective jurors who are of the same race as the defendant. There is no outstanding precedent for requiring a trial court to consider demographic composition sua sponte every time a venue change is requested. The Equal Protection Clause does not require exactitude of this nature. Rogers v. Director, TDCJ-ID, 864 F.Supp. 584, 598 (E.D.Tex.1994). {96} Courts have overwhelmingly been unwilling to summarily conclude that the citizens in an entire geographical regionâ all the potential jurors in a county or judicial districtâ are tainted by racial prejudice. This is why the mere statistical measure of a venue's ethnic proportions cannot, by itself, lead to the presumption that a person of a given race will be unable to receive a fair trial in that venue. There may be such homogenous geographical pockets of prejudice in America, but, even in such cases, the unsuitability of a venue can only be demonstrated in the microcosm of the venire, not in the macrocosm of census figures about the venue's ethnic composition. It is, in fact, preposterousâ and a form of racismâ to presume that persons of a particular color will perform jury duty in a particular way. A person's race is utterly unrelated to his or her suitability as a juror. State v. Guzman, 119 N.M. 190, 192, 889 P.2d 225, 227 (1994); see also Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227, 66 S.Ct. 984, 90 L.Ed. 1181 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (stating the color of a man's skin is unrelated to his fitness as a juror). In the selection of a jury, race may be used neither to justify a person's removal nor to compel a person's inclusion. Cf. Powers, 499 U.S. at 409, 111 S.Ct. 1364 (An individual juror does not have a right to sit on any particular petit jury, but he or she does possess the right not to be excluded from one on account of race.). {97} That is why Judge Blackmer emphasized that Doņa Ana was chosen to promote and protect BOTH Parties' RIGHT to a fair and impartial trial and a fair and impartial jury and that his decision and order selecting Doņa Ana County as Venue for retrial of this case is NOT based (in whole or in part) on any other factor or consideration (including, but not limited to, ethnic/racial considerations or racial/ethnic populations or proportions in various Counties of New Mexico. . .). Venue Order, slip op. at 19 (Finding of Fact 22). Only by conducting voir dire, and listening to the racial opinions of individual potential jurors, can it be demonstrated that a particular venue cannot provide a jury free from racial prejudice. Through careful voir dire, fair-minded jurors can most likely be found, even in a community which has few members of the defendant's race. {98} That is what happened in this case. The trial court conducted exhaustive voir dire in Doņa Ana County. After voir dire, House did not object that, because he is Native American, he would receive an unfair trial before the petit jury that was finally seated. Nor has he suggested in retrospect that it has been revealed that the jury was tainted by racial prejudice. There is simply no evidence that House received an unfair trial because Doņa Ana County has a Native American population of less than 1%. {99} Thus, in the selection of the venue of Doņa Ana County, House has shown neither that the State acted with discriminatory intent, nor that the venue change had a discriminatory impact on his fight to a fair trial.
{100} House asserts that the State's choice of venue deprived him of his right to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). Though the phrase fair cross section does not appear in either the New Mexico or the United States Constitution, it has been held to be implicit in the right to a fair trial. See N.M. Const. art. II, § 14 (impartial jury); N.M. Const. art. II, § 18 (due process); U.S. Const. amend. VI (impartial jury); see also Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480, 110 S.Ct. 803, 107 L.Ed.2d 905 (1990) (implicit). House's argument is somewhat unclear, but he seems to be contending that the State, by choosing a venue with a small Native American population, has racially distorted the jury pool, and has deprived him of a fair cross section of citizens from whom a fair-minded jury could be selected. The purposeful conduct of the State has, as House says, dramatically diluted the representation of the defendant's race within the cross section of the particular community represented by the venire. The practical consequence of House's interpretation of the fair-cross-section principle would be an increased likelihood of representation by Native Americans on the petit jury in this case. {101} Once again, House is asking us to intermingle incompatible principles that apply variously to the seating of a petit jury, the composition of the venire, and the selection of a venue. The fair-cross-section requirement applies neither to the venue nor the petit jury. It addresses the constitutional fight to a venire which fairly represents the community from which it is drawn. Thus, there is no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population. Defendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538, 95 S.Ct. 692. It is the venire from which the petit jury is chosen that must constitute a representative cross section of the community in which the trial takes place. See Aragon, 109 N.M. at 198-99, 784 P.2d at 17-18. {102} The use of peremptory challenges by the parties to exclude individuals thought to be inclined against their interests is likely to result in a jury that does not mirror the community. See Holland, 493 U.S. at 480, 110 S.Ct. 803. However, the purpose of the fair-cross-section requirement is to assure, not a petit jury that includes members of the defendant's race or that represents the community from which it is drawn, but rather an impartial petit jury. See Id. Thus, Judge Blackmer, noting that Doņa Ana County has a smaller Native American population than Taos, emphasized that the determining factor is not ethnicity, but rather whether the jurors are qualified and impartial. Venue Order, slip op. at 18 (Finding of Fact 21(D)). {103} Just as the fair-cross-section requirement has no bearing on the racial mix of a petit jury, it does not affect the considerations involved in a change of venue. It refers only to the composition of the venire once a venue has been selected. Nothing in our law demands that the ethnic makeup of a new venue be similar to that of any of the preceding venues. The trial court may in its discretion determine, when selecting a new venue, that a fair trial in a particular case will be impossible unless ethnic proportions remain unchanged. But there is no requirement that the fair cross section of the old venue mirror the fair cross section of the new venue. In New Mexico, such a consideration is left to the discretion of the court. The fair-cross-section principle would have no relevance whatsoever in our review of the choice of a venue; it is relevant only to the selection of the jury pool from that venue.
{104} The importance of cultural evidence to House's defense does indicate the potential for prejudice in a venue whose jurors might be insensitive to Native American culture. However, House has not offered any evidence of actual, presumed, or probable prejudiceâ nor even the appearance of prejudiceâ during the third trial in Doņa Ana County. The dearth of any evidence in the record that House received an unfair trial, more than any other factor, persuades us that the Court of Appeals should be reversed and the trial court affirmed. {105} House offered no evidence that the petit jury selection process in his third trial was anything but proper. He did not contend that the prosecution used peremptory challenges to impermissibly distort the racial composition of the petit jury. If House were to challenge, on equal-protection grounds, the racial fairness of the petit jury selection process, he would have had to establish a prima facie case that potential jurors were excluded from the jury for reasons of race. Cf. Aragon, 109 N.M. at 198, 784 P.2d at 17 (discussing exclusion of jurors of defendant's race). We note that equal protection in this context does not necessarily turn on the race of the defendant. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 48-55, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992) (concluding that a defendant's discriminatory exercise of a peremptory challenge is a violation of equal protection). Our cases list several indicia that circumstantially demonstrate purposeful exclusion by the State. Aragon, 109 N.M. at 200, 784 P.2d at 19 (listing such factors as `disproportionate number of peremptories against' a racial group (quoting Fields v. People, 732 P.2d 1145, 1156 (Colo.1987))). House brought no such challenge to the selection of the jury in Doņa Ana County. {106} Moreover, House offered no proof that he was tried before a biased jury in Doņa Ana County. He presented no evidence that any of the jurors who actually heard the case were in any way tainted by publicity, fixed opinions, racial prejudice, or any other factor that would bring the fairness of his trial into question. Cf. Shawan, 77 N.M. at 357-58, 423 P.2d at 42 (describing jurors who had been influenced by prejudicial publicity). {107} Similarly, House attempted to make no prima facie case that would show that the venire was unconstitutionally selected. If House were to bring a prima facie equal-protection challenge to the racial composition of the venire, he would have to prove the degree of under representation [of a particular racial group] by comparing the proportion of the group in the total population to the proportion called to serve as . . . jurors, over a significant period of time. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977). He would then need to support the presumption raised by the statistical evidence with evidence of a selection procedure that is susceptible of abuse or is not racially neutral. Id. [A] factual inquiry is necessary in each case that takes into account all possible explanatory factors. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 630, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972). House made no such challenge. In fact, though Doņa Ana County has a Native American population of 0. 8%, Native Americans comprised 4.42% of the jury pool in the third trial. {108} Though House emphasizes that a small number of Native Americans lived in Doņa Ana County, he offers no evidence that Doņa Ana County was an unfair venue in which to try this case. He never suggests that the people of that community, as reflected by the opinions of prospective jurors in voir dire, had such fixed opinions about this case that the jurors were incapable of laying aside their preconceived notions and basing their judgment exclusively on the evidence presented at trial. In other words, he makes no showing of actual prejudice. Similarly, he offers no evidence of the kind of presumed prejudice that rendered Taos County an unfair venue in this case. If anything, the trial court offered strong evidence to the contrary, showing that there was no inundation in the community of inflammatory publicity that would give reason to presume that the trial would be unfair. We conclude, based upon exhaustive examination of the record, that House did receive a fair trial in Doņa Ana County. {109} The trial court diligently sought a fair venue in which to hold the third trial. Judge Blackmer, in examining the various venues proffered by the parties, attempted to balance the demographic composition of the community with the amount of prejudicial publicity to which the citizens had been exposed. The trial court noted that the television stations in Albuquerque had, more than any other television market, given the House case extensive and inflammatory coverage. Doņa Ana County was among those New Mexico counties that receive little coverage from Albuquerque broadcasters. See Venue Order, slip op. at 11-12 (Finding of Fact 17(A)). The trial court drew similar conclusions about the limited influence of Albuquerque radio and newspaper coverage on Doņa Ana County. See Id. at 13-14 (Findings of Fact 17(B)-(C)). {110} In Doņa Ana County the trial court conducted extensive voir dire that included questions about pre-trial publicity and inquiry about racial attitudes. The trial court granted all but one of House's challenges for cause. House struck from the panel two of the jurors who identified themselves as Native Americans. House has offered no evidence that any of the prosecution's challenges involved the ethnicity of any juror. House did not object to the racial composition of the jury that was eventually seated. See United States v. Morales, 815 F.2d 725, 732-34 (1st Cir.1987) (describing, in sensational case in small community, exhaustive voir dire of nearly 200 potential jurors which lasted 17 days and concluding that the record shows jury was impartial). The trial court's determination as to the impartiality of jurors may be set aside only for manifest error. Id. at 733. There is no evidence in the record that the trial court's decision departed from the dictates of law, caution, and prudence. Alaniz, 55 N.M. at 318, 232 P.2d at 985. {111} Trial courts have not only the duty to insure a fair trial, but also significant power to take precautions when prejudice threatens to deny the defendant an impartial jury. See Martin v. Beto, 397 F.2d at 749. The court can fulfill this duty by such measures as beginning the trial after prejudicial publicity has dissipated, conducting rigorous voir dire directed at exposing prejudice in the community, and changing venue to a community that has little awareness of the case. See id. (listing steps court can take to insure fair trial); Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 424, 111 S.Ct. 1899 ([T]he trial court retains great latitude in deciding what questions should be asked on voir dire. ). House fails to show any abuse of discretion in the trial court's efforts to insure a fair trial.