Opinion ID: 2341817
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Structure and Operation of MRPC 3.6

Text: MRPC 3.6 has three subsections, which all operate together to give the rule its full meaning. Subsection (a) announces a general prohibition against lawyers making extrajudicial statements that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know ... will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. This prohibition applies, however, only to those statements that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication. Subsection (b) provides examples of the types of extrajudicial statements that would have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. Under subsection (b), statements are prohibited that ordinarily [are] likely to include references to criminal matters that relate to, among other things, the criminal record of a party, the possibility of a plea of guilty, the existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement by a defendant, or any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant. Subsection (c) states, however, that circumstances exist where an attorney, without risking discipline, may make extrajudicial statements that fall under subsections (a) and (b). The provisions under subsection (c) are known as safe harbors. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1033, 111 S.Ct. at 2723, 115 L.Ed.2d at 897 (describing the provisions of Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177(3), which are substantively identical to MRPC 3.6(c), as safe harbors). For example, an attorney may disclose, through extrajudicial statements and without elaboration, the scheduling or result of any step in litigation, even if that information, in some way, would have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. MRPC 3.6(c)(4). Another such safe harbor permits attorneys to comment outside the courtroom and without elaboration on information contained in a public record. MRPC 3.6(c)(2).