Opinion ID: 2163595
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: due process and ex post facto claims

Text: The defendant next claims that the application of the born alive rule to his conduct, rather than prospective application only, violates his right to fair notice under the due process and ex post facto clauses of the United States constitution. See footnote 29 of this opinion. He further contends that the court's novel integration of the born alive rule and the doctrine of transferred intent created an unconstitutionally vague theory of murder as applied to [his] conduct.... In other words, the defendant contends that a reasonable person in his position, at the time he assaulted Rodgers, could not be presumed to have known that his actions violated the murder and capital felony statutes with respect to Antonia. We also disagree with these claims. The basic principle that a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime has often been recognized by [the United States Supreme] Court. Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350-51, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964). The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954). It is settled that the fair-warning requirement embodied in the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause prohibits the [s]tates from holding an individual criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49, 96 S.Ct. 243, 46 L.Ed.2d 185 (1975). There are three related manifestations of the fair warning requirement. First, the vagueness doctrine bars enforcement of a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. [70] ... Second ... the canon of strict construction of criminal statutes, or rule of lenity, ensures fair warning by so resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly covered. [71] ... United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997). Third, [t]here can be no doubt that a deprivation of the right of fair warning can result ... also from an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of narrow and precise statutory language. Bouie v. Columbia, supra, 378 U.S. [at] 352 [84 S.Ct. 1697]. In each of these guises, the touchstone is whether the statute, either standing alone or as construed, made it reasonably clear at the relevant time that the defendant's conduct was criminal. United States v. Lanier, supra, [at] 267 [117 S.Ct. 1219]. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Miranda, supra, 260 Conn. at 103, 794 A.2d 506. The defendant invokes what is best described as a combination of the first and third of these manifestations of the fair warning doctrine in challenging the constitutionality of the born alive rule as applied to the present case. [72] In Rogers v. Tennessee, supra, 532 U.S. at 451, 121 S.Ct. 1693, the United States Supreme Court addressed those aspects of the fair warning requirement and, in so doing, reaffirmed the approach that it previously had articulated in Bouie v. Columbia, supra, 378 U.S. at 347, 84 S.Ct. 1697, explaining: Reviewing decisions in which we had held criminal statutes void for vagueness under the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause, we noted [in Bouie ] that this [c]ourt has often recognized the basic principle that a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime.... Deprivation of the right to fair warning ... can result both from vague statutory language and from an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of statutory language that appears narrow and precise on its face.... For that reason ... [i]f a judicial construction of a criminal statute is unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue, [the construction] must not be given retroactive effect. [73] (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rogers v. Tennessee, supra, at 457, 121 S.Ct. 1693. In essence, therefore, the due process clause requires only that the law give sufficient warning that men may conduct themselves so as to avoid that which is forbidden, and thus not lull the potential defendant into a false sense of security, giving him no reason even to suspect that his conduct might be within its scope. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rubin v. Garvin, 544 F.3d 461, 469 (2d Cir.2008). Furthermore, the unavoidable ambiguities of language do not transform every circumstance in which judicial construction is necessary into a violation of the fair notice requirement: `The root of the vagueness doctrine is a rough idea of fairness. It is not a principle designed to convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in drawing criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited.' Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972).... (Citations omitted.) Ortiz v. N.Y.S. Parole in Bronx, N.Y., 586 F.3d 149, 159 (2d Cir.2009). In other words, [d]ue process does not require statutes to provide a laundry list of prohibited conduct. [L]aws may be general in nature so as to include a wide range of prohibited conduct. The constitution requires no more than a reasonable degree of certainty. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilchinski, 242 Conn. 211, 224, 700 A.2d 1 (1997). Moreover, [d]ue process is not ... violated simply because the issue is a matter of first impression. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ortiz v. N.Y.S. Parole in Bronx, N.Y., supra, at 159. Thus, the retroactive application of a judicial decision will be deemed to represent an exercise of the sort of unfair and arbitrary judicial action against which the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause aims to protect only if that decision constitutes a marked and unpredictable departure from prior precedent.... Rogers v. Tennessee, supra, 532 U.S. at 467, 121 S.Ct. 1693. Subsequent to Rogers, this court, in State v. Miranda, supra, 260 Conn. at 93, 794 A.2d 506, observed that the fair warning principles articulated in Rogers and Bouie are in accordance with our fair warning jurisprudence. We consistently have held that [w]hile we also recognize that criminal statutes are to be construed strictly, the language in a criminal statute need not be given its narrowest possible construction.... A statute is not unconstitutional merely because a person must inquire further as to the precise reach of its prohibitions.... In addition, [r]eferences to judicial opinions involving the statute, the common law, legal dictionaries, or treatises may be necessary to ascertain a statute's meaning to determine if it gives fair warning.... We [also] can use as a guide judicial opinions that, [although] not binding on this court, refer to the statute in question or to a statute that uses similar language. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 105-106, 794 A.2d 506; see also Rose v. Locke, supra, 423 U.S. at 50, 52, 96 S.Ct. 243 (court considered judicial interpretations of similar state statutes in rejecting claim that Tennessee sodomy statute prohibiting `crimes against nature' was unconstitutionally vague). Furthermore, because this court routinely relies on settled principles of statutory interpretation to ascertain the meaning of an ambiguous statute, our reasoned application of those ordinary tools of construction no doubt will result in an interpretation of the statute at issue that is both foreseeable and defensible for purposes of due process. See State v. Miranda, supra, 260 Conn. at 109, 794 A.2d 506 (To reach the conclusion that we did, we relied on ordinary tools of statutory construction. Those tools of statutory construction demonstrated that by reference to the law as it then existed, it was neither unexpected nor indefensible to [interpret the statute in the manner that we did].) This same standard applies to the defendant's closely related vagueness claim. In view of the fact that a statute is not unconstitutional merely because it is ambiguous or requires further investigation, the defendant can prevail on his claim under the vagueness doctrine only if he can demonstrate that the statutory meaning cannot be fairly ascertained upon application of established principles of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., State v. Ehlers, 252 Conn. 579, 591, 750 A.2d 1079 (2000) ([i]f the meaning of a statute can fairly be ascertained through judicial construction... it need not be stricken for vagueness [internal quotation marks omitted]). In other words, a statute that is not clear on its face will survive a vagueness challenge if its meaning can be discerned by use of ordinary tools of statutory construction. See id. Finally, as we previously have noted, to prevail on [a vagueness] claim, [a] defendant must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute, as applied to him, deprived him of adequate notice of what conduct the statute proscribed.... (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Knybel, 281 Conn. 707, 714, 916 A.2d 816 (2007). Our inquiry under the ex post facto clause proceeds along similar lines. The ex post facto prohibition forbids ... the [s]tates [from] enact[ing] any law [that] imposes a punishment for an act [that] was not punishable at the time it was committed ... or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed.... Through this prohibition, the [f]ramers sought to assure that legislative [a]cts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed.... Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981). [T]wo critical elements must be present for a criminal or penal law to be ex post facto: it must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it. Id., [at] 29 [101 S.Ct. 960]. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Washington v. Commissioner of Correction, 287 Conn. 792, 805, 950 A.2d 1220 (2008). We have recognized that the judicial construction of a statute can operate like an ex post facto law and thus violate a criminal defendant's right to fair warning as to what conduct is prohibited. See, e.g., Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 288 Conn. 53, 58-59 n. 4, 951 A.2d 520 (2008). The United States Supreme Court has observed, [a]s the text of the [ex post facto] [c]lause makes clear, it is a limitation [on] the powers of the [l]egislature, and does not of its own force apply to the [j]udicial [b]ranch of government.... Rogers v. Tennessee, [supra, 532 U.S. at 456, 121 S.Ct. 1693]. Nevertheless, limitations on ex post facto judicial decisionmaking are inherent in the notion of due process. Id. In Bouie v. Columbia, [supra, 378 U.S. at 347, 84 S.Ct. 1697], the United States Supreme Court observed: If a state legislature is barred by the [e]x [p]ost [f]acto [c]lause from passing such a law, it must follow that a [s]tate Supreme Court is barred by the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause from achieving precisely the same result by judicial construction.... If a judicial construction of a criminal statute is unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue, it must not be given retroactive effect.... Id., [at] 353-54 [84 S.Ct. 1697]; see also State v. Hart, 221 Conn. 595, 612-13 n. 15, 605 A.2d 1366 (1992). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Washington v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 287 Conn. at 805-806, 950 A.2d 1220. [A] judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to that construction.... Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312-13, 114 S.Ct. 1510, 128 L.Ed.2d 274 (1994). [Thus], when [a] court construes a statute, it is explaining its understanding of what the statute has meant continuously since the date when it became law. Id., [at] 313 n. 12 [114 S.Ct. 1510]. Washington v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 287 Conn. at 810-11, 950 A.2d 1220. In determining whether a judicial construction of a statute effectively operates as a prohibited ex post facto law, [t]he question ... is whether [the] decision was so unforeseeable that [the defendant] had no fair warning that it might come out the way it did. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 809, 950 A.2d 1220. Put differently, [t]he key test in determining whether the due process clause precludes the retrospective application of a judicial decision... is whether the decision was sufficiently foreseeable so that the defendant had fair warning that the interpretation given the relevant statute by the court would be applied in his case. Aue v. Diesslin, 798 P.2d 436, 441 (Colo.1990). Applying these principles to the present case, we find no merit to the defendant's first contention that he lacked fair notice that his actions violated the murder and capital felony statutes with respect to Antonia. Our previous analysis leading to the rejection of the defendant's claim concerning the inapplicability of the born alive rule and, in particular, our reasons for concluding that the term person, as used in this state's murder statute, includes an infant who suffers injuries in utero, is born alive and subsequently dies from those injuries, necessarily are fatal to the defendant's due process and ex post facto claims. See State v. Winot, 294 Conn. 753, 759, 988 A.2d 188 (2010) (criminal statute not void for vagueness if its meaning can be discerned by resort to extratextual sources and tools of construction); Washington v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 287 Conn. at 803-804, 810-11, 950 A.2d 1220 (retroactive application of judicial interpretation of statute did not operate as functional equivalent of ex post facto law and violate due process when interpretation was based on reasoned application of tools of construction and thus could not be considered unforeseeable and indefensible); State v. Miranda, supra, 260 Conn. at 109-10, 794 A.2d 506 (in concluding that fair notice component of due process was not violated by retroactive application of judicial construction of criminal statute, court observed that construction had been reached by resort to ordinary tools of statutory construction). In light of the fact that the born alive rule has been embodied in our Penal Code since the code's adoption nearly four decades ago, our recognition of the rule reasonably cannot be characterized as a departure from settled law, let alone a radical and unforeseeable change in the law. In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Schaller nevertheless asserts that our recognition of the born alive rule violates due process, apparently because, in his view, doing so represents an unexpected and indefensible interpretation of the law as it existed when the defendant killed Rodgers and Antonia. [74] Justice Schaller's assertions notwithstanding, our analytical approach and conclusion is entirely consistent with, and is dictated by, the analysis and holdings of two seminal and controlling cases in this area, namely, Rogers v. Tennessee, supra, 532 U.S. at 451, 121 S.Ct. 1693, and State v. Miranda, supra, 260 Conn. at 93, 794 A.2d 506. [75] In these cases, the United States Supreme Court and this court, respectively, rejected the same essential due process claim that the defendant raises in the present case, but in both Rogers and Miranda, the statutory construction that each court upheld as consistent with the fair notice requirement was far less predictable and foreseeable than our construction of ง 53a-54a as incorporating the born alive rule. We therefore reject as contrary to settled lawโand to the commonsense principles that underlie that lawโJustice Schaller's assertion that only if the defendant was clairvoyan[t] when he launched his vicious and lethal attack on Rodgers and Antonia could he have been expected to understand the criminal consequences of his conduct. In Rogers, the petitioner, Wilbert K. Rogers, was convicted of second degree murder in Tennessee state court for the stabbing death of the victim. Rogers v. Tennessee, supra, 532 U.S. at 454, 121 S.Ct. 1693. The victim, who had suffered life threatening injuries to his heart, survived for approximately fifteen months, after which he died from those injuries. Id. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, Rogers claimed that Tennessee's common-law year and a day rule, pursuant to which a defendant cannot be convicted of murder unless the victim has died as a result of the defendant's conduct within one year and one day of that conduct, precluded his conviction for the murder of the victim. State v. Rogers, 992 S.W.2d 393, 394 (Tenn.1999). Although the Tennessee statutes did not expressly refer to the year and a day rule, the Supreme Court of Tennessee acknowledged that it had recognized the viability of the rule in 1907, and both parties agreed that the rule was part of the state's common law. See id., at 396, 399. After observing that the rule had been legislatively or judicially abolished in most jurisdictions and that the original justifications for the rule no longer existed, the court abolished the rule. Id., at 398, 401. The court affirmed Rogers' conviction, concluding that it did not offend principles of due process to apply its holding abolishing the year and a day rule to Rogers' case. Id., at 401-403. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Tennessee; Rogers v. Tennessee, supra, 532 U.S. at 467, 121 S.Ct. 1693; stating that [t]here is ... nothing to indicate that the Tennessee's court abolition of the rule in [Rogers'] case represented an exercise of the sort of unfair and arbitrary judicial action against which the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause aims to protect. Far from a marked and unpredictable departure from prior precedent, the court's decision was a routine exercise of common law decisionmaking in which the court brought the law into conformity with reason and common sense. It did so by laying to rest the archaic and outdated rule that had never been relied [on] as a ground of decision in any reported Tennessee case. Id., at 466-67, 121 S.Ct. 1693. The court in Rogers reiterated that Bouie restricted due process limitations on the retroactive application of judicial interpretations of criminal statutes to those that are `unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct at issue.' Id., at 461, 121 S.Ct. 1693, quoting Bouie v. Columbia, supra, 378 U.S. at 354, 84 S.Ct. 1697. In Miranda, the defendant, Santos Miranda, who was twenty-one years old, resided with his sixteen year old girlfriend and her two year old son and four month old daughter. State v. Miranda, supra, 260 Conn. at 97, 794 A.2d 506. Although Miranda was not the biological father of either child, he took care of them and considered himself to be their stepfather. Id. Several months after Miranda had started living with his girlfriend, her four month old daughter was taken to the hospital, where it was determined that she previously had sustained a number of serious and apparently unrelated injuries, including multiple rib fractures that were approximately two to three weeks old, two skull fractures that were approximately seven to ten days old, an injury to her left arm, a rectal tear that was bleeding, and nasal hemorrhages. Id. Even though the state did not contend that Miranda himself had caused the injuries to the four month old child, he was arrested and charged with risk of injury to a child and multiple counts of assault in the first degree. Id., at 96-97, 99 and n. 4, 794 A.2d 506. Following a court trial, the court concluded that [Miranda] had a legal duty to protect the health and well-being of the child based on the undisputed facts that he had established a familial relationship with the child's mother and her two children, that he had voluntarily assumed responsibility for the care and welfare of both children, and that he considered himself [to be] the [child's] stepfather. Id., at 99, 794 A.2d 506. The trial court also found that, in light of the nature and extent of the child's injuries and in view of the fact that the child resided with Miranda, he necessarily was aware that there existed a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the child would be exposed to conduct that created a risk of death, and that, despite this knowledge, he had failed to help the child. Id., at 98, 794 A.2d 506. On the basis of these circumstances, the trial court found Miranda guilty of one count of risk of injury to a child and six counts of assault in the first degree. Id., at 99, 794 A.2d 506. On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed Miranda's conviction for risk of injury to a child but reversed his assault convictions, concluding that he had no legal duty to act under the circumstances. State v. Miranda, 41 Conn.App. 333, 341, 675 A.2d 925 (1996). We granted the state's petition for certification to appeal and concluded that, [on the basis of] the trial court's findings that [Miranda] had established a familial relationship with the [child's] mother and [the] two children, had assumed responsibility for the welfare of the children, and had taken care of them as though he were their father, [Miranda] had assumed a legal duty to protect the [child] from abuse. State v. Miranda, supra, 260 Conn. at 99, 794 A.2d 506; see State v. Miranda, supra, 245 Conn. at 226, 230, 715 A.2d 680. We therefore reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court in part and remanded the case to that court for consideration of Miranda's evidentiary insufficiency claims and any constitutional claims of due process and double jeopardy arising as a result of this court's decision. State v. Miranda, supra, 260 Conn. at 100, 794 A.2d 506; see State v. Miranda, supra, 245 Conn. at 231, 715 A.2d 680. On remand, the Appellate Court affirmed Miranda's conviction for risk of injury to a child. See State v. Miranda, 56 Conn.App. 298, 313, 742 A.2d 1276 (2000). With respect to Miranda's assault convictions, however, the Appellate Court concluded that convicting him of assault in the first degree would be a violation of due process because a person of ordinary intelligence in his circumstances would not have known that he had a duty to protect the child. Id., at 305-306, 308, 742 A.2d 1276. The Appellate Court therefore reversed the judgment of conviction with respect to the assault counts and remanded the case with direction to render judgment of not guilty with respect to those counts. Id., at 313-14, 742 A.2d 1276. Following our granting of certification, and in reliance on the then recent opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Rogers, we concluded that the Appellate Court improperly had determined that Miranda's assault convictions deprived him of due process of law. [76] State v. Miranda, supra, 260 Conn. at 100-101, 109-10, 794 A.2d 506. In particular, we concluded that our determination that the first degree assault statute applied to the facts of Miranda's case was reasonably foreseeable, such that a person of ordinary intelligence in Miranda's position should have anticipated that this court would find that he had a common-law duty to help the child in this case and that his violation of that duty subjected him to conviction under the first degree assault statute. Id., at 109-10, 794 A.2d 506. In reaching this conclusion, we explained that, in recognizing the common-law duty to act under the facts of the case and in construing our assault statute to encompass Miranda's failure to act, we had employed ordinary tools of statutory construction, which included an examination of the plain language of our first degree assault statute, the language of other Connecticut statutes governing similar conduct, the common law of this state and other jurisdictions, and treatises addressing the issue. [77] Id., at 106-109, 794 A.2d 506. As we have indicated, it is readily apparent that the holdings in Rogers and Miranda represented a relatively broad and sweeping modification of then existing law, whereas our holding in the present case merely reflects our recognition and application of a well established common-law doctrine in accordance with settled principles of statutory construction. Indeed, in Rogers, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the Tennessee Supreme Court's abolition of the common-law year and a day rule could be applied retroactively to a defendant whose conduct occurred before the court's repudiation of that common-law rule. Under Rogers, therefore, the fair notice requirement is not necessarily violated even when a state's highest court reverses course completely with respect to an existing rule or interpretation and applies that change in the law retroactively to conduct that occurred prior thereto. In contrast to Rogers, the present case does not involve any expansion of the scope of criminal liability beyond that indicated by previous decisional law. Ortiz v. N.Y.S. Parole in Bronx, N.Y., supra, 586 F.3d at 158. In other words, unlike in Rogers, we have not reversed prior precedent resulting in criminal liability where none previously had existed. In fact, no court of this state has ever even suggested that the born alive rule is inapplicable to our murder statute; on the contrary, as we have explained, the common-law roots of the rule, both in this state and elsewhere, are well established. Moreover, in light of the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Rogers, even if the born alive rule previously had not been recognized in this state, our decision to do so today would constitute nothing more than a clarification or illumination of our murder statute as applied to the facts of this case, based on our considered view of what the legislature likely intended. In such circumstances, the conclusion of the court in Rogers concerning the Tennessee Supreme Court's repudiation of the year and a day rule would be equally applicable to our recognition of the born alive rule: Far from a marked and unpredictable departure from prior precedent, the court's decision was a routine exercise of common law decisionmaking in which the court brought the law into conformity with reason and common sense. Rogers v. Tennessee, supra, 532 U.S. at 467, 121 S.Ct. 1693. Thus, even in the absence of evidence of the born alive rule in this state's common-law history, our decision to adopt the rule could not possibly be characterized as unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 462, 121 S.Ct. 1693. Our holding in Miranda also represents a significantly less foreseeable or predictable application of the common law to a statutory provision than our application of the born alive rule in the present case. In fact, the Appellate Court originally concluded in Miranda that applying the assault statute to Miranda's passive conduct was unjustifiable because Miranda had no legal duty to act under the circumstances. See State v. Miranda, supra, 41 Conn.App. at 339-40, 675 A.2d 925. Moreover, when we concluded otherwise; State v. Miranda, supra, 245 Conn. at 230, 715 A.2d 680; the Appellate Court, on remand, determined that our decision was so unexpected and unforeseeable that it violated Miranda's right to fair notice to apply the decision to his case. See State v. Miranda, supra, 56 Conn.App. at 305-308, 742 A.2d 1276. Notwithstanding this court's subsequent contrary determination; State v. Miranda, supra, 260 Conn. at 109-10, 794 A.2d 506; we thereafter concluded that our original interpretation of the assault statute as encompassing a nonparent's failure to come to the aid of a child with whom he has a parent-like relationship was clearly wrong; State v. Miranda, supra, 274 Conn. at 734, 878 A.2d 1118; because it represented an unwarranted expansion of the assault statute. See id., at 733-34, 878 A.2d 1118; see also id., at 749, 878 A.2d 1118 ( Borden, J., concurring) (rejecting this court's previous interpretation of assault statute as representing unwise ... extension of that statute resulting in provision with unacceptably amorphous boundaries); id., at 762, 878 A.2d 1118 ( Vertefeuille, J., concurring) (concluding that assault statute should not be extended by implication to encompass [Miranda's] failure to act). Nevertheless, as we explained, this court previously had determined that our use of ordinary tools of statutory construction had led to a foreseeable interpretation of the assault statute, such that Miranda had fair notice that even his failure to act could constitute an assault. State v. Miranda, supra, 260 Conn. at 109-10, 794 A.2d 506. Simply put, it is not possible to abide by the fair notice principles articulated and applied by the United States Supreme Court in Rogers and by this court in Miranda โcases that represent binding precedentโand also to conclude that our recognition of the born alive rule in the present case violates those principles. Because neither Rogers nor Miranda represented a marked or unforeseeable departure from then applicable law, the present case, which represents a considerably more conventional and foreseeable example of common-law adjudication, certainly cannot be deemed to run afoul of due process requirements. For this reason, the due process analysis in Justice Schaller's concurring and dissenting opinion is flawed. [78] Justice Schaller's analysis suffers from another fatal infirmity, namely, his assertion that the trial court incorrectly concluded that State v. Anonymous (1986-1), supra, 40 Conn.Supp. at 498, 516 A.2d 156, placed the defendant on notice of the born alive rule because the court's discussion of the rule in Anonymous was merely dictum. [79] Contrary to Justice Schaller's contention, the court in Anonymous relied expressly on the born alive rule in concluding that a fetus killed in utero is not a person for purposes of our homicide statutes. [80] In Anonymous, the state had sought an arrest warrant in contemplation of charging the accused with the murder of a viable fetus in utero. Id. As the court in Anonymous stated, [t]hat application require[d][the] court to decide whether an unborn but viable fetus is a `human being' within the meaning of the Connecticut statutes defining murder. Id. In concluding that it did not, the court observed, first, that the codes from which our Connecticut law was drawn [namely, the New York Penal Law and the Model Penal Code] limit the words `human being' to those who have been born alive.... Id., at 501, 516 A.2d 156. The court further observed that the fact that these two bodies of law have adopted the born alive standard supports the position that Connecticut's legislature did not intend to define a `human being' as an unborn but viable fetus. Id. The court thereafter turned to the common law and, after noting that [our] legislature, in enacting the murder statute, [presumably] was familiar with the general rules of common law on [the] subject when it enacted ... [our] [P]enal [C]ode; id., at 502, 516 A.2d 156; explained that, as a principle of statutory construction, [a] statute should not be construed as altering the common law rule, farther than the words of the statute import, and should not be construed as making any innovation [on] the common law which the statute does not fairly express. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., quoting State v. Kish, 186 Conn. 757, 764, 443 A.2d 1274 (1982). The court, citing to Sir Edward Coke, explained that it is well settled that the common law, as far back as 1648... held that an unborn fetus, viable or otherwise, could not be the subject of [a] homicide. (Citation omitted.) State v. Anonymous (1986-1), supra, 40 Conn. Supp. at 502, 516 A.2d 156. The court then cited nine cases in support of its assertion that almost every state court that has had a homicide statute, similar to Connecticut's, that did not define `human being' explicitly to include a fetus [has] held [that] the words `person' or `human being' would not include the unborn child or fetus. Id., at 503, 516 A.2d 156. The courts in each and every one of the cases cited by the court in Anonymous expressly relied on the born alive rule in rejecting a claim that a homicide prosecution could lie for the killing of a fetus that died in utero. [81] The court also acknowledged that two other sister state courts, each operating in a jurisdiction with common-law crimes, that is, the legislature in [those] states merely codified existing criminal common law by prescribing penalties for existing common law crime, had recognized that the preexisting common law did not recognize the killing of an unborn child as `homicide,' but felt that they had the authority to change the law prospectively and to treat an unborn child as a person. Id., citing Commonwealth v. Cass, supra, 392 Mass. at 799, 467 N.E.2d 1324, and State v. Horne, supra, 282 S.C. at 444, 319 S.E.2d 703. These two courts, which then represented the distinct minority view, expressly had abrogated the born alive rule in favor of including a fetus within the class of potential victims protected under the homicide statutes of those states. See Commonwealth v. Cass, supra, at 807, 467 N.E.2d 1324; State v. Horne, supra, at 447, 319 S.E.2d 703. The court in Anonymous then considered the possible due process consequences of applying retroactively a new interpretation of our murder statute that would include within its purview a viable fetus. State v. Anonymous (1986-1), supra, 40 Conn.Supp. at 503-504, 516 A.2d 156. Turning to Cass and Horne, the court explained that even those courts have agreed with majority jurisdictions that to apply a new interpretation of the words `human being' retroactively to include a viable but unborn fetus would violate constitutional principles that prohibit retroactive criminal laws. Id.; see Commonwealth v. Cass, supra, 392 Mass. at 807-808, 467 N.E.2d 1324; State v. Horne, supra, 282 S.C. at 447, 319 S.E.2d 703. After quoting with approval from a third case, namely, Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal.Rptr. 481 (1970), in which the Supreme Court of California had rejected the state's request to abolish the born alive rule and to expand the definition of person in the California homicide statutes to include a viable fetus; id., at 631, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481; the court in Anonymous stated that, to charge the accused with the murder of the unborn but viable fetus would violate the accused's due process rights. State v. Anonymous (1986-1), supra, at 504, 516 A.2d 156. Finally, the court in Anonymous observed that its decision to invoke the born alive rule applied only to the crime of murder and not to tort law. Id., at 505, 516 A.2d 156. The court explained: American courts [that] have extended the benefits of tort law to fetuses have also, in the absence of specifically inclusive language, uniformly refused to change the born-alive rule in criminal cases .... The rationale is that [d]iffering objectives and considerations in tort and criminal law foster the development of different principles governing the same factual situation. (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Thus, the court clarified that its rationale for applying the born alive rule for purposes of the criminal law was not applicable to tort law. The court thereafter denied the application for an arrest warrant. Id. As the foregoing discussion clearly demonstrates, the court in Anonymous declined to expand the definition of the term person under our murder statute to include an unborn but viable fetus because of its predicate determination that the born alive rule had been incorporated into the statute, and that to abolish the rule in favor of a broader definition of person would be incompatible with an accused's due process right to fair notice. See id., at 503-504, 516 A.2d 156. Consequently, the court's recognition of the born alive rule in Anonymous was necessary to its conclusion and, therefore, part of its holding rather than dictum. See footnote 79 of this opinion. That the court's recognition of the born alive rule in Anonymous was a critical aspect of its holding is reflected by the fact that a multitude of courts and commentators have identified Anonymous as a case in which the court recognized and applied the born alive rule. See, e.g., Vo v. Superior Court, 172 Ariz. 195, 203, 836 P.2d 408 (App.1992); State v. Courchesne, supra, 46 Conn.Supp. at 72, 757 A.2d 699; State v. Lamy, supra, 158 N.H. at 517 and n. 3, 969 A.2d 451; State v. Beale, 324 N.C. 87, 92, 376 S.E.2d 1 (1989); Commonwealth v. Booth, supra, 564 Pa. at 238 n. 7, 766 A.2d 843; J. Brobst, The Prospect of Enacting an Unborn Victims of Violence Act in North Carolina, 28 N.C. Cent. L.J. 127,135 (2006); M. Fleming, Feticide Laws: Contemporary Legal Applications and Constitutional Inquiries, 29 Pace L.Rev. 43, 48 n. 27 (2008); T. Hartsoe, Person or ThingโIn Search of the Legal Status of a Fetus: A Survey of North Carolina Law, 17 Campbell L.Rev. 169, 212 and n. 233 (1995); C. Ramsey, Restructuring the Debate over Fetal Homicide Laws, 67 Ohio St. L.J. 721, 739 n. 84 (2006); M. Kime, note,  Hughes v. State: The `Born Alive' Rule Dies a Timely Death, 30 Tulsa L.J. 539, 543 and n. 39 (1995); C. Leventhal, comment, The Crimes Against the Unborn Child Act: Recognizing Potential Human Life in Pennsylvania Criminal Law, 103 Dick. L.Rev. 173, 176 and n. 27 (1998); S. Locke, note, Abortion Revived: Is the Fetus a Person? Can the Present Law Remain in Light of State v. Courchesne?,  23 T. Jefferson L.Rev. 291, 304 (2001). Thus, as the court stated in State v. Courchesne, supra, 46 Conn.Supp. at 63, 757 A.2d 699, because Anonymous expressly follow[ed] the common-law [born alive] rule; id., at 71, 757 A.2d 699; the published decision in that case can be considered to have actually given notice that the defendant's actions concerning Antonia constituted murder separate from that of her mother [Rodgers]. [82] Id., at 72, 757 A.2d 699. This is especially true in light of our recent decision in State v. Fernando A., supra, 294 Conn. at 20 n. 15, 981 A.2d 427, which permits us to presume, first, that the legislature is aware of officially published decisions of the Superior Court and, second, that the legislature's failure to respond to such a decision reflects the legislature's acquiescence in it. If an officially published decision of the Superior Court is sufficiently important to give rise to an inference that the legislature will take action if it disagrees with that decision, then such a decision certainly is sufficient to place the public on notice, for due process purposes, of the legal principles articulated therein. [83] We also reject the defendant's claim that applying the born alive rule in combination with the doctrine of transferred intent violated his rights under the due process and ex post facto clauses. The born alive rule and the doctrine of transferred intent are well established. The born alive rule has deep roots in our common law, as we have explained, and our murder statute, namely, ง 53a-54a(a), expressly incorporates the transferred intent principle. We can think of no reason why the application of these two doctrines renders the defendant's conviction constitutionally infirm merely because the defendant's conduct implicated both doctrines and, consequently, together formed the basis of the defendant's culpability for the murder of Antonia. The application of these doctrines to the defendant was not unforeseeable, novel or otherwise unfair. On the contrary, as one court has stated in addressing a similar contention: [I]t is impossible to perceive how an individual of even less than ordinary intelligence can fail to be aware that [stabbing a pregnant woman repeatedly in the chest and back] is not lawful conduct, and, in fact, [the perpetrator's] behavior after the [stabbing] in immediately [fleeing and] divesting himself of the [knife] ... clearly indicates that he recognized the criminality involved in his actions.... [I]t is simply ludicrous to suppose that a particular statute fails to provide fair notice of forbidden conduct if it does not expressly anticipate every possible criminal contingency.... [I]t is fatuous for [the perpetrator] to complain that he did not receive fair notice that he was acting in a criminal manner [and could be held criminally liable if the pregnant woman's baby was born alive but subsequently died]. (Citation omitted.) People v. Hall, supra, 158 App.Div.2d at 79-80, 557 N.Y.S.2d 879; see also United States v. Spencer, supra, 839 F.2d at 1342-44 (rejecting claim that defendant could not have foreseen that kicking and stabbing pregnant woman in stomach could result in murder conviction for death of baby ten minutes after birth); State v. Cotton, supra, 197 Ariz. at 589-90, 5 P.3d 918 (application of homicide statutes to conduct that resulted in postpartum death of baby did not violate defendant's due process rights). We acknowledge that, under our interpretation of the relevant statutory scheme, a person who assaults a pregnant woman and causes the death of the fetus in utero will be subject to a lesser sanction than a person who commits the same assault when the fetus is born alive and subsequently dies of injuries resulting from that assault. [84] The defendant contends that such a result is arbitrary and unfair and creates a perverse incentive for criminals not to render aid to their dying victims, or to secrete their bodies to ensure that medical aid cannot be rendered to the fetus. In State v. Cotton, supra, 197 Ariz. at 590-91, 5 P.3d 918, the Court of Appeals of Arizona addressed and rejected this very argument, and we agree with that court's analysis and conclusion. In Cotton , the defendant, Lawrence Cotton, was charged with two counts of second degree reckless murder after he accidentally shot and killed his girlfriend, who was eight and one-half months pregnant. Id., at 586, 5 P.3d 918. The baby was born alive but died one day after being born. Id. Cotton urged the Arizona Court of Appeals to extend its reasoning in Vo v. Superior Court, supra, 172 Ariz. at 195, 836 P.2d 408, in which the court had concluded that the definition of person under the Arizona first degree murder statute did not include a fetus. Id.; see State v. Cotton, supra, 197 Ariz. at 587, 5 P.3d 918. In Vo, the court held that the trial court should have dismissed murder charges against the defendants for the death of a fetus that occurred after one of the defendants shot the pregnant mother; State v. Cotton, supra, at 587, 5 P.3d 918; reasoning that, in enacting the statute, the legislature had not expressed an intent to deviate from the common law principle that only persons `born alive' could be the victims of homicide. Id., citing Vo v. Superior Court, supra, at 200, 206, 836 P.2d 408. The court in Vo had found support for [its] conclusion ... in the fetal manslaughter statute ... which, by defining the killing of an unborn child as a separate offense from the killing of a `person,' evidenced a legislative determination that a fetus was not to be considered a person within the meaning of the murder statute. (Citation omitted.) State v. Cotton, supra, at 587, 5 P.3d 918, citing Vo v. Superior Court, supra, at 201, 836 P.2d 408. Cotton nevertheless maintained that his case presented a scenario that was legally indistinguishable from Vo, and that, if it was not murder for the ... defendants [in Vo ] to cause the death of an unborn child, it similarly should not be murder or manslaughter for [Cotton] to have harmed a fetus who later died of her injuries after birth. State v. Cotton, supra, 197 Ariz. at 587, 5 P.3d 918. The court disagreed, noting that Cotton had caused the death not of a fetus, but of a child who had been born. Id. The court also rejected Cotton's contention that Arizona's fetal manslaughter statute reflect[ed] a legislative determination that the [s]tate's other homicide statutes should not apply to situations in which fatal injuries are inflicted on a fetus, even if death does not result until after the child is born. Id., at 588, 5 P.3d 918. The court explained: By its terms, the fetal manslaughter statute applies only to the killing of an unborn child. It reflects a legislative decision to afford protection to unborn children that was not available under traditional homicide statutes because of the common law born alive rule.... Absent any legislative history to the contrary, we presume that the legislature's adoption of [the fetal manslaughter statute] merely reflects a desire to afford greater protection to the unborn fetus than was available under common law, not less protection to a child who, despite the homicidal conduct of another, happens to survive past birth. Id. Finally, Cotton asserted that it was fundamentally unfair and against public policy to permit a [murder] conviction ... for inflicting prenatal injuries if the child survives, but to allow a conviction only for fetal manslaughter if the child dies before birth. Id., at 590, 5 P.3d 918. Cotton maintained that such an interpretation would discourage a perpetrator from attempting to save the life of an injured fetus. Id., at 590-91, 5 P.3d 918. Although the court acknowledged the irony inherent in the existing statutory scheme, it expressed doubt that persons who have engaged in homicidal conduct will render aid to their victims, fetal or otherwise. Rarer still would be the killer who would refrain from attempting to save the life of the fetus solely based [on] the knowledge that allowing the child to die might reduce the perpetrator's culpability from murder to manslaughter. Id., at 591, 5 P.3d 918. The court concluded that, [e]ven [if its interpretation of Arizona's] homicide statutes [as applying] when the injured fetus dies after birth would have the effect Cotton claims, a contrary interpretation would result in even greater injustice. One who recklessly kills a fetus before birth under circumstances that would constitute murder of the mother could be convicted of fetal manslaughter.... However, under Cotton's interpretation, one who premeditatedly injures a child in utero could not be prosecuted for the later death, [as] long as the child lived long enough to be born: the fetal manslaughter statute would not apply once the child was born and the murder statute would not apply because no injury was inflicted on a `person.' Thus, Cotton's interpretation would spawn the irony that the more serious criminal act of intentionally harming the fetus would carry no sanction if the child died after birth, while recklessly engaging in the same conduct would carry the possible sentence of ten and one-half years [imprisonment] if the fetus died before birth.... It is inconceivable that [the Arizona] legislature would have intended that the perpetrator escape responsibility for the child's death in the former scenario, but not the latter. To the extent that Cotton is correct in arguing that the interplay between the fetal manslaughter statute and the murder statutes has created a perverse incentive not to render aid to a dying fetus, his policy arguments are best addressed to the legislature, which is the appropriate forum for determining what, if any, reform is appropriate. (Citations omitted.) Id. We agree with the reasoning of the court in Cotton . If we were to determine, consistent with the defendant's contention in the present case, that the definition of person under our murder and capital felony statutes does not include an infant who is born alive and later dies from injuries inflicted in utero, we also would be required to conclude that the legislature, through its enactment of P.A. 03-21, intended to punish an assault on a pregnant woman that causes the termination of her pregnancy that does not result in a live birth, on the one hand, but intended no punishment for the same conduct if the fetus happens to be born alive but dies shortly thereafter from its injuries, on the other hand. We will not assume that the legislature intended such an irrational and bizarre result, especially because the legislative history surrounding P.A. 03-21 definitively establishes a contrary legislative intent. [85] Moreover, it is not fundamentally unfair for the legislature to treat the killing of a fetus in one manner and the killing of an infant who is born alive and subsequently dies of prenatal injuries in another manner. We are aware, of course, that the legislature's decision to treat a fetus that dies in utero differently than an infant who is born alive produces a particularly unfortunate result for the defendant in the present case because, under the applicable statutory scheme, if he were not criminally liable for the murder of Antonia, he would not be eligible to receive the death penalty. To adopt the contention of the defendant, however, that an infant who is born alive but later dies of injuries sustained in utero is not a person would usurp the legislature's role and require this court to vitiate what is an inherently legislative determination.... The categorization of offenses is a legislative judgment, and, generally speaking, it is not the prerogative of courts in this area lightly to launch an inquiry to resolve a debate [that] has already been settled in the legislative forum.... We defer to the broad authority that legislatures possess in determining the types and limits of punishment for crimes. Indeed, [i]n examining the rationality of a legislative classification, we are bound to defer to the judgment of the legislature unless the classification is clearly irrational and unreasonable. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Heinemann, 282 Conn. 281, 310-11, 920 A.2d 278 (2007). Because it is not irrational for the legislature to treat a fetus that is injured and dies in utero differently from an infant who is born alive but who subsequently dies from injuries sustained in utero, and in view of the fact that the competing policy concerns were raised and fully debated at the legislative hearings on the bill that would have redefined the term person in the Penal Code to include a viable fetus, it would be improper for us to modify our statutory scheme in the manner that the defendant advocates. [86]