Opinion ID: 2973317
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Leonard Mellberg

Text: Defendant Leonard Mellberg, a classification officer during Griffin’s detention, knew of Griffin’s suicide attempts prior to November 15 and of his threats to kill himself in the future. J.A. 322, 332. He also understood that according to jail policy, inmates normally stayed in the medical unit for several days after coming off suicide precautions so that officials could monitor their behavior. J.A. 1106. Nevertheless, when on the evening of November 15 Edward Postal reported a potential altercation between Griffin and another inmate in the medical unit, Mellberg made the decision to transfer Griffin to maximum security, where he committed suicide later that evening. J.A. 311, 313, 655, 1012. To validate this decision, Mellberg insists that he had an appointment earlier that day with 21 Kelly Norman, during which Norman “indicated that if inmate Griffin started acting out that it would be appropriate to place Griffin in the max area.” J.A. 313; see J.A. 323, 332, 334. Norman flatly denies this conversation occurred, and the circumstances surrounding the alleged conversation suggest that indeed it did not. J.A. 326. Mellberg claims that without prompting or prior knowledge of Griffin’s looming altercation with his cell mate, he visited Norman to inquire about moving Griffin to maximum security for “[f]uture planning.” J.A. 323; see J.A. 337-38, 530. Reenforcing the odd nature of this episode, Mellberg attests that this conversation with Norman involved only Griffin and no other inmates. J.A. 324. Mellberg also disingenuously attempts to deny knowledge of Griffin’s previous suicide attempts and suicidal history. Although he admits reading the report on Griffin’s placement in the restraint chair, he claims not to recall reading about Griffin’s repeated pleas to have the chair hooked up to electricity so he could die. J.A. 330. As this vivid, memorable episode certainly marks one of the most striking portions of the report on Griffin’s restraint chair confinement, it seems odd that Mellberg would forget such a detail. He likewise feigns ignorance with respect to Griffin’s November 12 suicide attempt, insisting that he “d[id]n’t know that [Griffin] attempted suicide. It [the report] just said he had something wrapped around his neck.” J.A. 331. Again, another document, composed by Officer Settles in maximum security on November 15, warned Mellberg to “[k]eep an eye on him [Griffin]. Has been suicidal in the past[.]” J.A. 333. Mellberg claims, “I can’t speculate as to what Officer Settles meant by this.” J.A. 333. Despite these repeated pledges 22 of ignorance, Mellberg “cannot escape a finding of his subjective knowledge of risk just because he ‘declined to confirm the inferences of risk.’” Comstock, 273 F.3d at 706 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 n.8). Though the evidence produced to date appears inconclusive, the Supreme Court has noted that in deliberate indifference cases involving prison officials, “[w]hether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence.” Brooks v. Celeste, 39 F.3d 125, 128-29 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842) (emphasis & brackets in original). Given the numerous inconsistent and improbable elements within Mellberg’s testimony and his intimate involvement with the events culminating in Griffin’s suicide, this Court AFFIRMS the district court’s finding that a jury could find that he acted with deliberate indifference to Griffin’s serious medical needs.
As this Court has affirmed, “the record supports a finding of a constitutional violation [of deliberate indifference to Griffin’s serious medical needs] on the part of Mellberg.” Linden, slip op. at 24. Mellberg therefore satisfies the first prong of the qualified immunity test. For the second prong, the Court must determine if the constitutional right violated was so clearly established that preexisting law would alert a reasonable person to its existence. As stated earlier, this Circuit has recognized that suicidal tendencies constitute a serious medical need in the Eighth Amendment context since Danese v. Asman and has established an extensive line of cases reiterating this holding. 875 F.2d at 1244 (“The ‘right’ that is truly at issue here is . . . the right to have steps taken that would 23 have prevented suicide.”); see, e.g., Crocker, 285 F. Supp. 2d at 975; Barber v. City of Salem, 953 F.2d 232, 239-40 (6th Cir. 1992); Molton v. City of Cleveland, 839 F.2d 240, 243 (6th Cir. 1988). By erroneously honing in on the specific act of Mellberg’s moving Griffin to an isolation cell, the district court elided the function of this prong of the test: determining whether a right is clearly established. The “very action” Mellberg undertook is not pertinent to this inquiry. Danese, 875 F.2d at 1242. Thus, because ample case law teaches that deliberate indifference toward a detainee’s suicidal tendencies is a violation of Constitutional rights, Mellberg satisfies the test’s second prong. The final component of the test requires an examination of the evidence to determine whether Mellberg’s actions – specifically, moving Griffin from the medical unit into an isolated cell in maximum security – were reasonable under prevailing law. During his deposition, Mellberg conceded that before transferring Griffin, he knew Griffin had attempted suicide during both of his detentions and had been placed on suicide precautions. J.A. 325, 330, 332, 335. Further, when Kelly Norman placed Griffin in the medical unit on November 14, 2000, intending that he remain there for up to a week as a step-down from suicide precautions – a standard procedure, Mellberg admits, see J.A. 325 – she informed Mellberg of the transfer and the reasons for it. J.A. 965. Specifically, she told him that “he [Griffin] doesn’t do very well when he’s isolated . . . . [and] it would be good for him to have other roommates . . ., so if he didn’t press a panic button they could press a panic button if it was needed.” J.A. 965. This evidence demonstrates that Mellberg had knowledge of Griffin’s suicidal tendencies and understood that placing him in isolation aggravated them. Nevertheless, he ignored Griffin’s condition and placed him in an isolated cell, fully aware 24 that this act would endanger Griffin’s life. 10 A reasonable person with 10 To justify transferring Griffin from the medical unit to maximum security, Mellberg contends that Norman told him “it would be appropriate to house him [Griffin] in another area of the facility,” J.A. 323; see J.A. 324, 325, 334, 337-38, in a conversation that Norman insists did not occur. J.A. 326; see also J.A. 965. While at first glance the factual dispute seems legitimately contentious, Mellberg’s explanation of the alleged conversation suggests it never occurred: Q [to Mellberg]: And why did you go to Ms. Norman to talk about Mr. Griffin? A [from Mellberg]: To see if there was [sic] any problems with him while he was in the medical area, if there was [sic] any altercations or anything like that, to see if housing in another area would be appropriate. Q: What prompted your going to her office about Mr. Griffin? A: I don’t know if anything prompted me. It was just something that I would do. .... Q: All right. So you went to her [Norman] again. Tell me the purpose you went to see Ms. Norman about Luke Griffin? [sic] A: I went to talk to her to see if it was – if there was a problem with him [sic] getting along with others, if it would be appropriate to house him in another area of the facility. Future planning. .... Q: Okay.... Did you go to talk with Ms. Norman about any other inmate at that point in time other than wanting to discuss Luke Griffin? A: No. .... Q: What made you – does every inmate that’s in medical have fights with inmates in medical? A: Not necessarily, no. Q: Right. So what was there about Luke Griffin that said, hum, I think it’s now time for me to walk down to Kelly Norman to see if this gentleman might get into a fight in medical or have an altercation in medical such that I might have to move him? Why did that enter your head? A: Well, Mr. Griffin had problems while he was in the holding area with other individuals and had to be placed in another holding cell so he wasn’t around them. J.A. 323-24; see J.A. 325. Though Mellberg claims he visited Norman to discuss moving Griffin because of Griffin’s past behavioral problems, his further testimony renders this excuse – and the entire conversation with Norman – implausible: Q [to Mellberg]: If there’s a security issue that should generate an incident report? A [from Mellberg]: Yes. Q: If there’s a safety issue that should generate an incident report? A: Yes. .... 25 Mellberg’s knowledge of Griffin’s history would not have transferred Griffin into a solitary cell, and thus Mellberg’s actions satisfy the third prong of the test; he does not receive qualified immunity. b2. Disputed Material Facts & Mellberg’s Credibility In addition to the argument outlined above, substantial inconsistencies in Mellberg’s testimony erode his credibility and leave open numerous factual disputes that also prohibit the Court from granting him qualified immunity. To begin with, Mellberg variously denies Q: Would you agree that you have not seen any incident reports relating to Luke Griffin that were authored on November 12, 2000? .... A: None that were authored on November 12th, no. .... Q: And there are no incident reports for Luke Griffin relating to anything on November 13th? .... A: No. Q: You’ve not seen any relating to November 14th? A: No. Q: And you’ve not seen any that related to November 15 except for yours and Officer Postal’s, correct? A: Right. Q: And if, in fact, there are no incident reports [for the dates above], that would be evidence that there were no significant incidents on those days, correct? A: Involving this individual, probably not. .... Q: And in the absence of incident reports for those four days and in the absence of any concerns being raised on the 15th, you decided for your future planning, is that what you are telling us, that you would talk to Kelly Norman? A: Yes. .... Q: So as I understand it then, there was nothing that you had learned in particular about Luke Griffin that had occurred between November 12 and November 15 that prompted you to have the discussion you claim you had with Kelly Norman, correct? A: Yes. J.A. 336-38 (emphasis added). 26 and admits to having knowledge of Griffin’s attempted suicide during his second detention. Compare J.A. 330, 332, with J.A. 331, 322. Q [to Mellberg]: So you were aware as of the time that you spoke with Ms. Norman that during the course of that [second] incarceration, four days before, Mr. Griffin had attempted suicide . . . ? A [by Mellberg]: Yes. .... Q: Okay. So we have now your knowledge, don’t we, that he had, in fact, attempted suicide during that second incarceration, right? We know that, don’t we? A: I don’t know that he attempted suicide. It just said he had something wrapped around his neck. J.A. 330, 331. Similarly, he disingenuously insisted he did not understand officer Settles’ meaning when Settles wrote in a logbook, “Keep an eye on him [Griffin]. Has been suicidal in the past.” J.A. 333 (quotations omitted). When asked what Settles meant, Mellberg responded, “I can’t speculate as to what Officer Settles meant by this.” J.A. 333. This attempt to deny knowledge of Griffin’s psychological problems underscores the unreliability of Mellberg’s testimony and the need to pursue further the facts underlying his role in Griffin’s suicide. Finally, Mellberg cannot account for the presence of two different reports detailing Griffin’s transfer, even though writing the report was his responsibility. J.A. 327-29. These two texts differed in one crucial manner: The first – which Mellberg admits writing – reads, “CMH worker Norman indicated that if Inmate Griffin started acting out that it would be appropriate to place Griffin in the max area as it was the belief of CMH that Griffin was very manipulative.” J.A. 328 (quotations omitted). The second, later report, which Mellberg denies authoring, states that “CMH worker 27 Norman indicates that if Inmate Griffin started acting out that it would be appropriate to place Griffin in the max area as the SP precautions had been removed and that Griffin was very manipulative.” J.A. 328 (quotations omitted) (emphasis added). Though the origins of this second report remain unclear, it smacks of a cover-up. The presence in the record of these half-truths, evasive responses, and unanswered factual questions necessitates that this Court REVERSE the district court and strip Leonard Mellberg of qualified immunity.