Opinion ID: 1689155
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: ordering excessive monetary sanctions.

Text: ¶ 52. Finally, Illinois Central argues that the final award of damages was excessive. A plain reading of Rule 37 indicates that Illinois Central is correct. Rule 37 states that the court shall require the party to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure. Miss. R. Civ. P. 37(d). The mandate is mandatory, but it only includes those expenses that are a direct result of the failure, not expenses that the aggrieved party would have incurred even without the failure. The only reasonable expenses caused by the failure in this case were those expended on the first scheduled depositions which Illinois Central did not attend. The rescheduled depositions are expenses that the heirs would have incurred anyway. Further, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Illinois Central did not subsequently comply with future orders and directives of the court, so the coercive effect of the sanctions was realized. Thus, the sanctions should have been only for the purpose of compensation in order to make the heirs whole again, and Illinois Central should not have been further penalized. ¶ 53. In Batson v. Neal Spelce Assocs., Inc., 765 F.2d 511, 516 (5th Cir.1985), the Fifth Circuit has held the plain language of Rule 37 limits the imposition of expenses and attorney's fees to those caused directly by the other party's failure to comply with the court's orders. In Batson, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the case because the district court assessed attorney's fees for matters unrelated to Batson's failure to comply with a discovery order. The Batson court also held that an award of attorney's fees in excess of $30,000 over a single discovery violation was unreasonable on its face. Batson, 765 F.2d at 516. See Liew v. Breen, 640 F.2d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir.1981)(holding that award of attorney fees and costs for opposing attorney's failure to obey order was excessive, since part of fees were not incurred because of failure to obey order); Gordon v. New England Tractor Trailer Training Sch., 168 F.R.D. 178, 179 (D.Md.1996)(holding that the party would have had to prepare at least once for the deposition whether or not the other party failed to appear the first time the deposition was scheduled, therefore, the attorney's preparation for the originally scheduled deposition must be subtracted from party's requested attorney fees); Dixon v. Margolis, 765 F.Supp. 454, 456 (N.D.Ill.1991)(holding that only proper sanction was for additional costs incurred because of discovery violation); Lawrence v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 716 F.Supp. 883, (D.Md.1989)(holding that party could not recover cost of depositions allegedly needed because of a discovery violation, because the depositions would have had to been taken anyway); Argo Marine Sys., Inc. v. Camar Corp., 102 F.R.D. 280, 285 (S.D.N.Y.1984)(holding that the Court must make a careful determination of the additional expenses incurred by party as a direct result of discovery violation), aff'd, 755 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir.1985). ¶ 54. In the case sub judice, the circuit court awarded the heirs just over $47,000, the amount the heirs submitted as expenses, including attorneys' fees, for the scheduled and the rescheduled depositions. In doing so, the circuit court went beyond reimbursing the heirs, it gave the heirs a windfall. If the circuit court wished to find Illinois Central guilty of criminal contempt as well, it should have set a fixed amount, payable to the court, not the heirs. See Blake Assocs., Inc. v. Omni Spectra, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 283, 293 (D.Mass.1988)(holding that the only basis on which a punitive fine may be imposed for violation of discovery orders is criminal contempt; civil contempt is only to insure compliance and inures to the benefit of the other party). We would have then reviewed the contempt order ab initio to determine whether on the record Illinois Central had, beyond a reasonable doubt, wilfully, deliberately and contumaciously ignored the court. ¶ 55. We conclude the circuit court abused its discretion in awarding fees and expenses for both sets of depositions. We therefore remand this case so that the trial court may determine, on the record, what is the proper amount of expenses that is directly attributable to Illinois Central's failure to attend the first round of depositions in other words, the expenses incurred because the first scheduled round of depositions did not occur. All expenses that the heirs would reasonably have expected to incur anyway, in the process of deposing the Illinois Central executives, must be excluded.