Opinion ID: 2633881
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Asserted Denial of Right to Counsel Due to Conflict of Interest

Text: The Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution, made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. Similarly, article I, section 15 of our state Constitution provides that [t]he defendant in a criminal case has the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for the defendant's defense.... It has long been held that under both Constitutions, a defendant is deprived of his or her constitutional right to the assistance of counsel in certain circumstances when, despite the physical presence of a defense attorney at trial, that attorney labored under a conflict of interest that compromised his or her loyalty to the defendant. (See Glasser v. United States (1942) 315 U.S. 60, 70, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 ( Glasser); People v. Lanigan (1943) 22 Cal.2d 569, 575-576, 140 P.2d 24 [discussing former art. I, § 13 of Cal. Const., which guaranteed the defendant's right to appear and defend, in person and with counsel]; People v. Chacon (1968) 69 Cal.2d 765, 776-777, fn. 3, 73 Cal.Rptr. 10, 447 P.2d 106 ( Chacon); People v. Mroczko (1983) 35 Cal.3d 86, 104, 197 Cal.Rptr. 52, 672 P.2d 835 ( Mroczko ).) Defendant contends a conflict of interest existed in the present case and denied him his federal and state constitutional rights to counsel.
A recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, Mickens v. Taylor (2002) 535 U.S. 162, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 ( Mickens ), clarified several aspects of the applicable law concerning the determination whether a conflict of interest acted to deny a defendant the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In its central holding, the high court decided that in cases in which the trial court should have inquired into the possibility of a conflict of interest on the part of defense counsel but failed to do so, before reversal is warranted the defendant nonetheless must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest affected counsel's performance. ( Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at pp. 173-174, 122 S.Ct. 1237.) As relevant to the present case, the high court also confirmed that conflict-of-interest claims are a category of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, which, pursuant to the court's decision in Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ( Strickland ), generally require the defendant to demonstrate (1) deficient performance by counsel, and (2) `a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' ( Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 166, 122 S.Ct. 1237, quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052.) In the context of a claim of conflict of interest, however, the deficient-performance prong of the Strickland test is satisfied by a showing that defense counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest, that is, a conflict that affected counsel's performance as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties. ( Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 171, 122 S.Ct. 1237.) As to the second prongthat a defendant demonstrate prejudice in the outcome the court recognized an exception to this requirement, applicable when there exist `circumstances of [the] magnitude' of the denial of counsel entirely or during a critical stage of the proceeding. ( Id., at p. 166, 122 S.Ct. 1237.) The court acknowledged that several of its cases held that circumstances of that magnitude existed when the defendant's attorney had actively represented conflicting interests, and thus no showing of prejudice was required in such circumstances. ( Ibid.; see also United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 659, fn. 26, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657.) Those earlier cases established what has become known as a presumption of prejudice that would relieve the defendant of the otherwise applicable burden of demonstrating a reasonable probability that the conflict affected the outcome of the trial. (See Glasser, supra, 315 U.S. 60, 76, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680; Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980) 446 U.S. 335, 349-350, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 ( Sullivan ).) In determining whether a defendant has demonstrated the existence of an actual conflict of interest satisfying the first prong of the analysis, we consider whether the record shows that counsel `pulled his punches,' i.e., failed to represent defendant as vigorously as he might have had there been no conflict. ( People v. Easley (1988) 46 Cal.3d 712, 725, 250 Cal. Rptr. 855, 759 P.2d 490 ( Easley ).) And yet we must bear in mind, as we observed in People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 674, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289 ( Roldan), that when `a conflict of interest causes an attorney not to do something, the record may not reflect such an omission. We must therefore examine the record to determine (i) whether arguments or actions omitted would likely have been made by counsel who did not have a conflict of interest, and (ii) whether there may have been a tactical reason (other than the asserted conflict of interest) that might have caused any such omission.' Defendant contends that his attorneys labored under an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected their performance in two general respects: first, their decision to agree to delay investigation into the alleged statement until the end of the trial, and second, their handling of the inquiry when the witnesses and jurors ultimately were questioned. We find it unnecessary to determine whether the decision to delay the inquiry was a reasonable tactical choice by counsel or a result of divided loyalties, because we agree with defendant that counsel pulled their punches during the questioning of the witnesses. Although Smith's report was multiplelevel hearsay, some pieces of known informationthat Juror T.W., the jury foreman, was a medical doctor and possibly undertook the Hippocratic Oath at some point in his careerfit with the specifics of the statement as recounted by Smith, affording some indication of reliability. Moreover, despite the trial court's view that the statement, taken literally, did not make a lot of sense, it is reasonably possible to discern a meaning behind the words: for example, that the juror felt an obligation to society to protect it from a confessed killer such as defendant, quite apart from the juror's view of the evidence presented at the trial. [46] Indeed, the trial court repeatedly mentioned the possibility that confirmation of the report might lead it to declare a mistrial as to both the guilt and penalty phases. In light of the foregoing, there appears to be no reasonable explanation for defense counsel's ultimate failure to ask news reporter Thomson specifically whether he told Smith's wife about the alleged statement by Juror T.W., other than the desire to protect Smith's personal interest in not publicly exposing his wife as the source of the report. It seems unlikely that if Smith had learned of the alleged statement from an acquaintance who had a casual conversation with Thomson on the streetinstead of from Smith's own wife, who allegedly had a confidential conversation with Thomson in connection with her employmentThomson would not have been pointedly questioned about the conversation, even in light of the denials offered at the hearing by the other percipient witnesses. We doubt that unconflicted counsel would have ended the investigation of this potentially serious allegation of juror misconduct without asking more direct and probing questions of the witness who supposedly had heard the alleged statement. The Attorney General observes that defendant at all times was represented by two attorneys, and contends the record on appeal does not establish that defendant's other counsel, Humphreys, labored under a conflict of interest. We disagree. Even assuming we could consider separately the actions of Humphreys from those of Smith such that Smith's conflict would not automatically taint the entire defense team's handling of the juror misconduct issue, we believe Humphreys's sense of loyalty to his cocounsel was sufficient to create an actual division of loyalties on his part when viewed in light of the unreasonable failure of either counsel adequately to explore with Thomson the statement attributed to Juror T.W. Attorneys Humphreys and Smith at that time had worked together on defendant's case for more than one and a half years. Smith spoke repeatedly of the serious personal difficulties he perceived he would face if the source of his information were publicly exposed, and he and the trial court mentioned that he even might be required to withdraw from the case, depending upon how the matter was handled. (See Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 726-727, 27 Cal. Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289.) Under these circumstances, we believe the record demonstrates that Humphreys also labored under an actual conflict of interest. In sum, we conclude defense counsel's questioning of Thomson was inadequate compared to what reasonable and unconflicted counsel would have done, was a result of Smith's predicament and both attorneys' desire not to exacerbate it, and could not have been based upon a strategic choice regarding how best to protect defendant's rights. Defendant therefore has demonstrated that an actual conflict of interest affected counsels' performance. Turning to the second prong of the analysisthe question of prejudice arising from this actual conflict of interestwe conclude no presumption of prejudice should be applied in this case, and, further, the appellate record does not demonstrate a reasonable probability that, absent the conflict of interest, the result of the trial would have been different. As the Attorney General observes, dictum in Mickens expressed some uncertainty concerning the circumstances in which a presumption of prejudice should be applied. The court observed that its previous conflict of interest cases ( Glasser, supra, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680; Holloway v. Arkansas (1978) 435 U.S. 475, 489-490, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426; Sullivan, supra, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333), in which a showing of prejudice to the outcome was not required, all involved situations in which a single defense attorney represented jointly charged defendants. The court further observed that despite this common factual underpinning, lower courts had applied the presumption of prejudice `unblinkingly' to `all kinds of alleged attorney ethical conflicts,' even though the language of Sullivan itself does not clearly establish, or indeed even support, such expansive application. ( Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at pp. 174, 175, 122 S.Ct. 1237.) The court stated that whether the presumption properly would be applied to other conflicts remains, as far as the jurisprudence of this Court is concerned, an open question. ( Id. at p. 175, 122 S.Ct. 1237.) In evaluating claims of Sixth Amendment violation based upon conflicts of interest, we in the past have stated that the presumption of prejudice would be applicable in a variety of factual circumstances, including matters in which, as in the present case, it was alleged that the personal interests of the attorney conflicted with those of the defendant. (See, e.g., People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 914, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23, 116 P.3d 494 ( Dunkle ) [conflict based upon possibility that the attorney might be a defense witness]; Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 674, 27 Cal. Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289 [conflict based upon defense attorney having been threatened by the defendant]; Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 998, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183 [conflict based upon defense attorney's upcoming suspension from the practice of law]; May field, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 206, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 852 P.2d 331 [conflict based upon defense attorney's financial and reputational interests].) The only cases in which we have had occasion to actually apply the presumption, however, have involved, like the high court's cases, joint representation of codefendants by a single attorney. (See Easley, supra, 46 Cal.3d 712, 250 Cal.Rptr. 855, 759 P.2d 490; Mroczko, supra, 35 Cal.3d 86, 197 Cal.Rptr. 52, 672 P.2d 835; see also Chacon, supra, 69 Cal.2d at 767, 73 Cal.Rptr. 10, 447 P.2d 106.) In all other cases in which we mentioned the presumption of prejudice in the recitation of the applicable law, we concluded that the defendant failed to establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected counsel's performance; that is, we determined `the constitutional predicate for [the] claim of ineffective assistance' was lacking. ( Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 175, 122 S.Ct. 1237, quoting Sullivan, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 350, 100 S.Ct. 1708.) Our past decisions, therefore, do not constitute controlling authority concerning the question whether the presumption of prejudice applies to all or only some conflict of interest situations, and we are especially reluctant to interpret those holdings broadly here, in light of the skepticism expressed by the high court in Mickens concerning an expansive application of the presumption. As the high court pointed out in Mickens, the presumption of prejudice is a prophylactic measure established to address situations where Strickland itself is evidently inadequate to assure vindication of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. ( Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 176, 122 S.Ct. 1237.) Only when the court concludes that the possibility of prejudice and the corresponding difficulty in demonstrating such prejudice are sufficiently great compared to other more customary assessments of the detrimental effects of deficient performance by defense counsel, must the presumption be applied in order to safeguard the defendant's fundamental right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. ( Mickens, at p. 175, 122 S.Ct. 1237.) We conclude that the Strickland standard is not inadequate in this case, and, accordingly, no presumption of prejudice is called for. Defendant does not contend that the conflict affected his counsel's performance related to their conduct of the trial itself, apart from counsel's reaction to the juror misconduct issue in question. As a result, the complained-of shortcomings of counsel in this case are fundamentally different from those found in typical conflict-of-interest situations. In most conflict cases, in which a conflict of interest affected the presentation of the defense case to the jury, the problem in assessing prejudice to the outcome of the proceeding has arisen from the reviewing court's difficulty in evaluating how extensively the conflict affected counsel's choices and, ultimately, in predicting how the presence or absence of certain evidence or arguments at trial would have affected the jury's deliberations and verdict. In the present case, we must examine how counsel's conflict affected the resolution of the allegation of juror misconduct and the possibility of defendant's moving for and receiving a mistrial on that basis. [47] This determination does not pose the same level of difficulty as attempting to gauge the effect of a conflict upon how counsel conducted the defense case at trial, and further to predict how a jury would have reacted if counsel had put forth a different defense. Rather, it essentially involves a factual determination of whether any misconduct occurred and, if so, a legal determination of whether such misconduct would have provided grounds for moving for and granting a mistrial. Accordingly, we cannot say that any difficulty in assessing the prejudice resulting from the type of conflict of interest at issue in this case is so great that the Strickland standard is inadequate. We therefore conclude we should not apply the prophylactic presumption of prejudice under these circumstances. We further conclude, based upon the appellate record, that defendant has not carried his burden of demonstrating a reasonable probability he would have received a more favorable outcome were it not for his counsel's conflict of interest that is, of demonstrating that more extensive questioning of the witnesses would have uncovered sufficient grounds to support the making and granting of a motion for a mistrial. Smith revealed to the court the reported statement and his concerns surrounding it. Other than Smith's unsworn statements and possibly Juror T.W.'s half-statement that he had spoken of the Hippocratic Oath at some point, the evidence in the appellate record, including a logical reading of Thomson's testimony, strongly contradicts the allegation that Juror T.W. made the statement in question. We also cannot determine at this time whether, even if Juror T.W. did make the statement as reported, such action constituted misconduct, or if it did, that it would warrant a mistrial. Similarly, even were we to assume that counsel's decisions to delay investigation of Smith's report and not to call Smith's wife as a witness at the hearing also were products of a conflict of interest, there is nothing in the record before us establishing that a different course of action would have exposed any more convincing evidence of misconduct. Therefore, based upon this record, we conclude there is no reasonable probability that, absent the conflict, defendant would have received a more favorable outcome specifically, a ruling by the trial court granting a mistrial based upon juror misconduct. [48]
As noted, the California Constitution provides that a defendant is guaranteed the right to have the assistance of counsel for the defendant's defense. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) We long have recognized that under state law, [t]he right to counsel is a fundamental constitutional right, which has been carefully guarded by the courts of this state. ( In re James (1952) 38 Cal.2d 302, 310, 240 P.2d 596.) We also have characterized our state provision as calling for a somewhat more rigorous standard of review of conflict-of-interest claims compared with the analysis employed in the Sixth Amendment context. ( Mroczko, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 104, 197 Cal.Rptr. 52, 672 P.2d 835.) Although the federal Constitutionregardless of whether a presumption of prejudice appliesrequires proof of an actual conflict of interest, that is, proof that counsel's conflict adversely affected his or her performance during the proceedings ( Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 172, fn. 5, 122 S.Ct. 1237), under the state Constitution we have required only that the record support an informed speculation that a potential conflict of interest impaired the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. ( Mroczko, supra, 35 Cal.3d 86, 105, 197 Cal.Rptr. 52, 672 P.2d 835; see Chacon, supra, 69 Cal.2d at 767, 776-777, fn. 3, 73 Cal.Rptr. 10, 447 P.2d 106, citing Lollar v. United States (D.C.Cir.1967) 376 F.2d 243, 247 ( Lollar ).) [49] Because a conflict of interest may retard counsel's development of evidence or arguments in support of the defense and possibly even evidence of the conflict itselfwe have retained this stricter standard in order to closely guard the fundamental right to the assistance of counsel. The very failure to produce or emphasize such information ... produces a void and results in a record which shields the fact of any possible conflict and makes it difficult to demonstrate on appeal that a conflict did in fact exist. [Citation.] Accordingly, a [defendant] ... need not establish that there was an actual conflict of interest, but rather it is sufficient if the record provides an adequate basis for an `informed speculation' that there was a potential conflict of interest which prejudicially affected the defendant's right to effective counsel. [Citations.] [¶] Permissible speculation giving rise to a conflict of interest may be deemed an informed speculation but only when such is grounded on a factual basis which can be found in the record. ( People v. Cook (1975) 13 Cal.3d 663, 670-671, 119 Cal.Rptr. 500, 532 P.2d 148.) We apply a standard stricter than that applied under the federal Constitution for determining the existence of a conflict of interest, but our ultimate resolution of defendant's state constitutional claim is no different from the resolution of his federal claim. As already discussed with regard to the determination whether an actual conflict of interest exists under the federal test, the record supports an informed speculation that a potential conflict of interest impaired defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel. Smith's desire to avoid the public disclosure of his wife as the source of the report, as well as Humphreys's desire not to cause serious personal difficulties for Smith and to avoid Smith's possible withdrawal, created the potential for divided loyalties. As also discussed above, the record additionally supports an informed speculation that counsel pulled punches because of these conflicts, as reflected in the manner in which counsel pursued the issue with news reporter Thomson during the hearing conducted at the conclusion of the trial. We conclude, however, that, as under Sixth Amendment standards, no presumption of prejudice is appropriate under state law under the circumstances of this case. We further conclude, based upon the appellate record, that defendant has not carried his burden of demonstrating he was prejudiced by the perceived conflict, including, if we assume them to be conflicted actions, counsel's decisions to delay the investigation and not to question Smith's wife. Counsel's conflicts did not affect the presentation of the defense case to the jury. Moreover, defendant has not established that Juror T.W. made the statement attributed to him by Attorney Smith, or that even if he did make some statement pertaining to the Hippocratic Oath, this constituted misconduct that would have warranted moving for, and being granted, a mistrial. [50]