Opinion ID: 184802
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Federal versus State Law

Text: GM's initial argument is that the EAB erred in followingfederal rather than Michigan law, which arguably permits acollateral attack upon a state-issued permit when the Stateinitiates the enforcement proceeding. See Michigan v. Sperandeo, 112 Mich. App. 337, 342, 315 N.W.2d 863, 865 (1981). Apparently, in GM's view the alternative to state law on the question of collateral attacks is federal common law, whichwould be inappropriate under the Supreme Court's teachingin O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994). See id.at 87 (limiting federal common law to situations in whichthere is a significant conflict between some federal policy orinterest and the use of state law). The pertinent distinction between this case and O'Melveny,however, is that here there is a federal statute to apply. Accordingly, our task is but to construe[ ] the language of[the] federal statute ... [an] enterprise [that] is, and alwayshas been, a matter of federal law. RTC v. Diamond, 45F.3d 665, 671 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Auction Co. of Am. v.FDIC, 132 F.3d 746, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (statute applies byits own terms ... not by virtue of any lawmaking power offederal courts). Therefore, there is no choice of law issue. Nor do the cases GM cites provide any support for theproposition that state law governs which defenses a permitteemay raise in the course of a federal proceeding to enforce theterms of a state-issued permit. See United States v. PuertoRico, 721 F.2d 832 (1st Cir. 1983) (resolving question whetherCWA ousts federal courts of their original jurisdiction, under28 U.S.C. s 1345, of all suits brought by the United States,not whether federal enforcement agency must apply statelaw); District of Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854, 863(D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that CWA does not create impliedright of action for private party to challenge state permittingdecision, not that state law follows state permit into federalforum for enforcement of CWA). Accordingly, we reject GM's claim that the EnvironmentalAppeals Board erred in looking to federal law in order todetermine whether GM could raise a collateral attack uponthe validity of its permit in an administrative penalty proceeding brought pursuant to s 1319(g).