Opinion ID: 2647804
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Negligence (Count IX)

Text: In Count IX, the MacKenzies claim that Flagstar owed [them] a duty . . . as third-party beneficiaries of the [SPA] between a loan servicer and the federal government, and that Flagstar breached their obligations under the HAMP and other related government programs which the SPA incorporates. To state a claim for negligence under Massachusetts law, a plaintiff must -15- allege: (1) a legal duty owed by defendant to plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) proximate or legal cause; and (4) actual damage or injury. Primus v. Galgano, 329 F.3d 236, 241 (1st Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court correctly concluded that the MacKenzies' allegations fall short because as a matter of law Flagstar does not owe the MacKenzies any legal duty under the circumstances of this case. As we have said above, the MacKenzies are not third-party beneficiaries of the SPA between Flagstar and the government. Therefore, they cannot base their negligence claim on that argument. The MacKenzies appear to argue in the alternative that violations of HAMP give rise to a claim for negligence per se. That argument fails as well. Generally, a duty of care arises from the relationship of parties to one another: landlord and tenant, doctor and patient, driver and passenger, etc. Brown v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 10-cv11085, 2011 WL 1311278, at  (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2011). The relationship between a borrower and lender does not give rise to a duty of care under Massachusetts law. See Corcoran v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc., No. 09-cv-11468, 2010 WL 2106179, at  (D. Mass. May 24, 2010) ([A] lender owes no general duty of care to a borrower.); Murray v. Am.'s Servicing Co., No. 200701716, 2009 WL 323375, at  (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 12, 2009). [T]he existence of a positive regulation imposing a duty on one actor does not by -16- itself create a similar duty as a matter of state tort common law. Brown, 2011 WL 1311278, at . The MacKenzies correctly point out that violations of a statute may constitute evidence of negligence, and that [a] claim for negligence based on a statutory or regulatory violation can survive even where there is no private cause of action under that statute or regulation. Both of those propositions are true, but neither directly addresses the dispositive issue here: statutory or regulatory violations cannot give rise to a negligence claim when there is no independent duty of care between the parties. See Seidel v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 12-cv-10766, 2012 WL 2571200, at  (D. Mass. July 3, 2012) (HAMP . . . does not create an independent duty for mortgag[ee]s where no other basis for that duty exists. Thus, plaintiff's claim for negligence fails . . . .) (internal citations omitted); Brown, 2011 WL 1311278, at  ([W]hile violation of a regulation such as HAMP may provide evidence of a breach of a duty otherwise owed, it does not create such a duty in the first place.); Markle, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 185. Where an independent duty of care exists, the violation of a statute or regulation can provide evidence of a breach of that duty, even if the statute or regulation itself does not create a private right of action. But in the absence of an independent duty, a plaintiff cannot proceed with a negligence claim based -17- solely on a statutory or regulatory violation. Thus, the district court properly dismissed Count IX.