Opinion ID: 1984181
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: illegal electronic surveillance.

Text: Before the first and second trials there were extensive evidentiary hearings on defendant's claim of illegal electronic surveillance by the state. At the first such hearing witness Jim Pellitteri testified that on advice of his attorney he taped his telephone conversations with the defendant which he later turned over to the state and on three occasions wore a microphone given him by the state to monitor conversations with employees of the defendant. On this and other evidence adduced at the hearing Judge JACKMAN concluded that the tapes were lawful one-party consent tapes made by Pellitteri and that no other electronic surveillance was conducted by the state. Before the second trial a second evidentiary hearing was held. Jim Pellitteri also took a polygraph test to determine whether his version of the making of tapes was true. On the basis of the two hearings and the polygraph test, Judge MALONEY found that the tapes were lawful one-party consent tapes and that the defendant proved no other electronic surveillance by the state. The tapes which Pellitteri made and turned over to the state were not introduced as evidence before the grand jury or at the trial. [9] On this appeal defendant claims that both trial courts erred in finding no proof that the state engaged in illegal electronic surveillance. As in the granting or denying of a motion to suppress evidence, the findings of fact of the trial courts here will be sustained unless they are against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. [13] This court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court in matters of credibility. [14] [10-12] The general rule is that evidence obtained by the state by means of an illegal electronic surveillance violates the Fourth Amendment and must be suppressed. [15] In the case before us, two trial courts found that the challenged tapes were made by Pellitteri. This finding of fact is not challenged on appeal. They are, as both trial judges found, one-party consent tapes which are not searches within the compass of the Fourth Amendment. [16] As to the existence of further illegal electronic surveillance by the state, both trial judges found that this did not occur. While there is contradictory evidence in the records of the two evidentiary hearings, we cannot conclude the trial courts' findings of no electronic surveillance by the state to be against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. [13] The defendant also sees error in the trial court's finding that witness Pellitteri did not tape his conversations with employees of the defendant to injure defendant within the meaning of sec. 968.31(2)(c), Stats. Under that statute one-party consent tapes are lawful unless the communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act ... or for the purpose of committing any other injurious act. The trial court's finding of fact was that the witness' purpose in making the tapes was to protect himself from prosecution. That finding is not against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. A federal court has stated that in taping one's own telephone conversations or permitting another to do so, [A]ll parties have a right to proceed under the law and to protect their own rights. [17] We will not disturb the trial court's finding that this witness was doing just that. Our holding that the witness was entitled to tape his telephone conversations with the defendant's employees to protect himself from prosecution leaves the defendant little room to argue that the witness was not entitled to turn those tapes over to law enforcement authorities, as he did, in exchange for a grant of immunity. But defendant contends that this turnover is prohibited by sec. 968.29, Stats. Subsections (1), (2) and (5) of that statute authorize the disclosure of the contents of authorized interceptions by law enforcement authorities for enumerated investigatory purposes. Subsection (3) of the statute permits the use of authorized interceptions by [a]ny person ... only while giving testimony under oath or affirmation in any proceeding in any court or before any magistrate or grand jury ... [Emphasis supplied.] The defendant contends that since Pellitteri was not himself a law enforcement officer he can use or disclose the tapes only as permitted under sec. 968.29 (3), Stats., while giving testimony under oath in a court proceeding. It claims that turning the tapes over to the state does not satisfy this rule. [14, 15] In holding that one-party consent tapes are lawful in Wisconsin, a holding we here reaffirm, our court stated: Interception is one thing; disclosure as evidence in court is another. In declaring interceptions with consent of one party `not unlawful' the act recognizes the need of this investigative tool to detect crime, but in denying its use as evidence the statute recognizes in the balance the right of privacy of free people. [18] Therefore, in Arnold our court held that the admissibility of the contents of electronic surveillance was governed exclusively by sec. 968.29(3), Stats. Although one-party consent tapes are lawful, they are not authorized by ss. 968.28 to 968.33 and therefore the contents cannot be admitted as evidence in chief. [19] But it is to the use of the contents as evidence that the limitation upon disclosure in sec. 968.29(3), Stats., applies. It is to the use of the contents as evidence that the only under oath requirement applies. As was held in the Arnold Case, it is the admissibility into evidence of the contents of eavesdropping interceptions that is governed solely by sec. 968.29(3), Stats. [20] Our court has refused to apply the Arnold holding so as to prohibit an undercover agent who monitored his conversation with a prostitute to testify about that conversation because, although the fruits of the surveillance were not admissible, the surveillance was not prohibited. [21] The Pellitteri tapes were not authorized under sec. 968.29 (3). They were turned over to a law enforcement agent and were not admitted as evidence. Sec. 968.29(3) does not prohibit this use. [16] The prosecutor in his opening statements to the grand jury referred to the fact that the witness Pellitteri made tapes that he turned over to the state. The defendant claims that this reference also violated sec. 968.29(3), Stats. However, this reference to the existence of the tapes was not a disclosure of the contents of tapes, and for the same reasons that the transfer of the tapes to the state did not violate sec. 968.29(3), Stats., the prosecutor's reference to the tapes did not violate that statute. [17] Nonetheless, the reference was improper. Because under Arnold the tapes themselves could not be used in evidence, it was unfair for the prosecutor to refer to them. [22] However, the judge instructed the jury to disregard all comments of the attorneys, and the indictment the jury handed down is supported by testimony sufficient to establish probable cause. [23] Under these circumstances the prosecutor's reference to the tapes does not warrant, much less require, quashing the indictment.