Opinion ID: 2582516
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Appellant's waiver of his right to testify

Text: Gallego claims that the waiver of his right to testify was not valid because he made it under a misconception that his testimony would have been restricted. This claim has no merit. The district court advised Gallego fully of his right to testify or to speak in allocution, explaining that any statements he gave would be limited to matters relevant to the penalty phase, such as mitigating circumstances and expressions of remorse, not issues of guilt. Gallego responded that if he could not tell the whole truth, he had no choice but to forfeit his right to testify. Gallego did speak in allocution. Criminal defendants have the right to testify on their own behalf under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment and the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. [41] The United States Supreme Court has stated that a valid waiver of a fundamental constitutional right ordinarily requires an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. [42] Courts should indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver and should not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights. [43] Gallego contends that his waiver of his right to testify was not knowing because at trial he believed that his testimony would be restricted when he actually could have testified as he wished, subject to cross-examination. He is incorrect. The proper place for the introduction of evidence tending to establish innocence is in the guilt phase of trial. At the penalty phase, the defendant's guilt has already been assessed and is no longer in issue. [44] Evidence presented in mitigation must be relevant to the offense, the defendant, or the victim. [45] At a capital penalty hearing, a court may constitutionally exclude evidence as irrelevant if it does not bear on the defendant's character, his prior record, or the circumstances of his offense. [46] Thus, Gallego's belief at trial that the scope of his testimony could be limited was not a misconception. We conclude that Gallego understood his right to testify and intentionally waived it.