Opinion ID: 1781968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the trial court erred in refusing to allow the defendant to question the venire about whether they would automatically vote in favor of the death penalty in violation of the sixth, eighth and fourteenth amendments of the united states constitution and article 3 sections 26 and 28 of the mississippi constitution and miss. code ann. section 13-5-69.

Text: The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that individuals accused of crimes shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed ... U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Fourteenth Amendment bars the States from depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Article 3, § 26 of the Mississippi Constitution provides: In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a right to be heard by himself or counsel, or both, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and, in all prosecutions by indictment or information, a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the county where the offense was committed; ... The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 3, § 28 of the Mississippi Constitution contain the Federal and State cruel and unusual punishment prohibitions noted above. To the end of selecting an impartial jury our legislature has promulgated law providing that, [t]he parties or their attorneys in all jury trials shall have the right to question jurors who are being impaneled with reference to challenges for cause, and for peremptory challenges, and it shall not be necessary to propound the question through the presiding judge, but they may be asked by the attorneys or by litigants not represented by attorneys. Miss. Code Ann. § 13-5-69 (1972) (Emphasis supplied.) In the instant case, the following exchange took place during voir dire questioning by defense counsel: DEFENSE COUNSEL: ... How many of you believe that if you find Chris guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of capital murder that he should be sentenced to death automatically? BY THE COURT: That's not the law. I  I'm going to have to interpose my own objection. That is not the law. He will not be  and if you will answer that or ask that question properly I would allow that one also. DEFENSE COUNSEL: May I approach the bench? BY THE COURT: You may. (The attorneys approach the bench, along with the court reporter, and the following occurred out of the hearing of the jurors:) DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I still think I still believe  did you object automatically for him? BY THE COURT: I objected to you asking them whether or not they felt that the death penalty should be automatic if they found him guilty of capital murder. That is not the law of this state, and I will not allow that particular question. DEFENSE COUNSEL: So then if I cut off the automatically part? BY THE COURT: No, I didn't say that. You asked them if they found him guilty of capital murder did they feel that he should automatically get the death penalty. That is not the law of this state, and I will instruct them differently from that so I feel that you are voir diring the jury on matters that  or a matter that is improper. Let's move along. Thank you. You may proceed. DEFENSE COUNSEL (to the veniremen): Do any of you believe that persons convicted of murder should be executed? VENIRE: (NO RESPONSE) DEFENSE COUNSEL: Is there anyone in this section here? VENIREMEN: (Number 90, Jean Whaley, raised her hand) DEFENSE COUNSEL: I have one hand back there. BY JUROR: Number 90. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Is there anyone on this outer parameter? VENIRE: (NO RESPONSE) DEFENSE COUNSEL: Anyone in this section? BY A JUROR: I don't understand what you say murder. BY THE COURT: That's a good point. DEFENSE COUNSEL: The question was, do any of you believe that someone convicted of murder should be executed? BY A JUROR: Do you mean has to be executed? DEFENSE COUNSEL: No. BY A JUROR: If there are extenuating circumstances  DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. If you'd like to stand. BY A JUROR: I'd like to hear the case before I make my decision. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Thank you, ma'am. BY THE COURT REPORTER: Your number, please, ma'am. BY JUROR: 93. BY THE COURT REPORTER: Thank you. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, sir. BY A JUROR: 24. It depends on the evidence presented. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Thank you. Anyone in this section? VENIRE: (NO RESPONSE) The United States Supreme Court recently decided under virtually the exact same set of factual set of circumstances that due process required an Illinois trial judge to allow defense counsel to ask veniremen if they would automatically vote for death if the defendant was found guilty of capital murder. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. ___-___, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 2234-35, 119 L.Ed.2d 492, 509 (1992). The Court noted: A juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do. Indeed, because such a juror has already formed an opinion on the merits, the presence or absence of either aggravating or mitigating circumstances is entirely irrelevant to such a juror. Therefore, based on the requirement of impartiality embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a capital defendant may challenge for cause any prospective juror who maintains such views. If even one such juror is empaneled and the death sentence is imposed, the State is disentitled to execute the sentence. 504 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2229-30, 119 L.Ed.2d at 503. These precepts being so, the Court recognized that a logical corollary has to be that the defendant has the right to voir dire the jury on any such potential knee-jerk reactions to guilt. The Court said of this corollary precept: Were voir dire not available to lay bare the foundation of petitioner's challenge for cause against those prospective jurors who would always impose death following conviction, his right not to be tried by such jurors would be rendered as nugatory and meaningless as the State's right, in the absence of questioning, to strike those who would never do so. 504 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2232, 119 L.Ed.2d at 506. (emphasis in original). In Morgan, the Illinois Death Penalty Statute provided that if a capital defendant was found guilty of the crime, and the jury found at least one of ten enumerated aggravating factors to be present, the jury could sentence the defendant to death if they unanimously agreed that mitigating circumstances did not warrant a lesser penalty. 504 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2225-26, 119 L.Ed.2d at 498. During voir dire, defense counsel requested the trial court to ask the question, If you found Derrick Morgan guilty, would you automatically vote to impose the death penalty no matter what the facts are? 504 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2226-27, 119 L.Ed.2d at 499. The trial court refused to ask the question, stating that it had asked the question in a different vein substantially in that nature. Id. The court had asked some of the potential jurors, Would you follow my instructions on the law, even though you may not agree. Id. The United States Supreme Court held that the general follow the law question was not synonymous with the automatic vote for death question and did not have the same investigatory value. 504 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2232-34, 119 L.Ed.2d at 506-507. The Court observed: Any juror who would impose death regardless of the facts and circumstances of conviction cannot follow the dictates of law. [cite omitted.] It may be that a juror could, in good conscience, swear to uphold the law and yet be unaware that maintaining such dogmatic beliefs about the death penalty would prevent him or her from doing so. A defendant on trial for his life must be permitted on voir dire to ascertain whether his prospective jurors function under such misconception. Id. The case at bar appears virtually identical to Morgan. Foster's attorney attempted to ask the question, How many of you believe that if you find Chris guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of capital murder that he should be sentenced to death automatically? The trial court prevented him from asking the question, because it said it would instruct the jury otherwise. The court apparently assumed that any juror who took the juror's oath would follow the court's instructions. Obviously, that is not necessarily true. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Morgan effectually said that a juror's subjective views about whether he can follow the law cannot substitute for a defendant's probe for objective indicia of whether that juror would in fact be likely to follow the law. Foster's counsel had to settle for asking the question, Do any of you believe that persons convicted of murder should be executed? Clearly, that is not as poignant a question. A venireman may not necessarily be struck for cause, simply because he believed murderers should be put to death, See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851. It is possible he could put those personal views aside and follow the instructions of law given to him. It is the knee-jerk reaction, the precise point embodied in the automatic vote for death question, that gives rise to dismissal. Id. Moreover, Foster was entitled to explore for information useful to his intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges. Miss. Code Ann. § 13-5-69. The majority suggests that the problem is that Foster's counsel did not properly phrase the question. It does not bother to inform us what the proper phraseology is. More importantly, it does not inform us of any rule that the question transgresses as phrased. Surely, voir dire questions are not required to be phrased as instructions. Nor is it a sufficient objection that it does not comport with intended instruction or is an incorrect statement of the law. The question did not purport to be a statement of the law. It was intended to pry into jurors' thought processes, prejudices and biases. That a particular juror might exhibit a preconception at odds with the law is exactly what the lawyer wants and is entitled to know. Id. The trial court interposed its own objection and ruled on it erroneously. It provided absolutely no guidance as to phraseology that it would accept. Under these circumstances, I cannot agree with the majority that either the pronouncements of Morgan or our statutory voir dire procedures were complied with. Under the authority of Morgan and that of Jones v. State, 133 Miss. 684, 98 So. 150 (1923), I would reverse the sentence of death in this case.