Opinion ID: 1992257
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: due process/date of the offense

Text: Appellant next contends that he was denied constitutional due process based upon the failure of the Commonwealth to state the date of the offense with reasonable specificity in the information filed against him, and in failing to establish the date of the offense at trial. We find no merit in this contention. The relevant caselaw has been fully set forth and analyzed in two recent opinions of this Court. See Commonwealth v. Appenzeller (No. 2601 Philadelphia 1987, filed 11/2/88); Commonwealth v. Fanelli, 377 Pa.Super. 555, 558-565, 547 A.2d 1201, 1203-1207 (1988) ( en banc ). Applying the balancing test explained in those opinions, we find no due process violation in the instant case. The original complaint, filed December 13, 1984, informed appellant that the offenses were alleged to have been committed on or about November 21, 1984. The second complaint filed on January 22, 1985, repeated the allegation that the offenses were committed on or about November 21, 1984. Thus, the complaint filed on December 14, 1984, alleged that the sexual abuse had occurred less than one month earlier. Appellant's initial notice as to the date of the offense was reasonably specific. Subsequently, however, appellant received notice that the Commonwealth's initial precision as to the date of the offenses might be subject to some variance in the proof to be offered at trial. On direct examination, at the second preliminary hearing on April 8, 1985, the child victim testified that the incident occurred around Thanksgiving. (N.T. 4/8/85 at 12-13). On cross-examination she indicated that it occurred on a day after Thanksgiving, after lunch, and during gym class. (N.T. 4/8/85 at 22, 25-26). At trial, the child victim indicated on direct examination that the incident occurred after gym and during the lunch period on a school day sometime around Thanksgiving. On cross-examination, her confusion and limited sense of time became apparent, as the following excerpts indicate: Q. . . . again, the second time that you testified when Mr. Delaney asked you the question  page 22, Your Honor  I am asking you a question, `Was this before lunch or after lunch or don't remember? ANSWER: After lunch.' Do you remember being asked that question and giving that answer? A. I don't know the difference between before and after. Q. Well, before would be a time period occurring  MR. GOLDMAN: See, this is very difficult, Your Honor. May we approach you at side-bar. (OFF THE RECORD DISCUSSION IS HELD AT SIDE-BAR) Q. When you go to gym class or last November when you were going to gym class, did you eat lunch before you got to gym or after gym class was over? A. After gym class was over. Q. Then I am going to ask you my question again. The last time you testified I asked you, `Was this before lunch or after lunch?' And you said, `After lunch.' Do you remember giving that answer? MR. HYMAN: Do you remember saying that when you were in court last time? THE WITNESS: Yes. Q. Which answer is true, this one that you gave here, saying that this happened after lunch? A. After gym and then lunch. Q. When did this occur, after lunch or before lunch? MR. HYMAN: Your Honor, I'd object  THE COURT: Overruled, overruled. When did this occur, [name deleted]? Was it before lunch, after lunch or during lunch. THE WITNESS: During lunch.       Q. All right. You remember last year the date Thanksgiving was on, right? A. Yes. Q. Was this the Friday after Thanksgiving? MR. HYMAN: Objection; asked and answered about three times. THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection. Was this the day after Thanksgiving? Did this happen the day after Thanksgiving? Do you remember? THE WITNESS: No. (N.T. 11/1/85 at 50-51, 75-76). (Emphasis added). The uncertainty regarding the date of the offense, caused by the child victim's confusion and limited sense of time, was significantly reduced, however, by other evidence presented. The child victim clearly and consistently testified at trial that on the day of the incident lunch followed gym on her schedule. ( See N.T. 11/1/85 at 25-26, 40-41, 48, 50-52, 54-55). The school principal testified that school was not in session on the Friday after Thanksgiving, and that the child victim had gym before lunch only on Wednesdays from 11:00 a.m. to 11:45 a.m., with lunch following from 11:45 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. (N.T. 11/1/85 at 84, 87). The child victim also testified that on the date of the incident she told her grandmother that her gym teacher liked her. (N.T. 11/1/85 at 53). The victim's grandmother remembered the victim telling her that her gym teacher liked her. Though the victim's grandmother thought that the victim had told her that the week before Thanksgiving ( i.e. the week of November 21, 1984), she acknowledged that she was not certain of the date. (N.T. 11/1/85 at 94-5). Officer Gwen Thomas testified that she interviewed the victim on December 11, 1984 and that the child victim indicated then that the incident had occurred in the gym office before she went home for Thanksgiving. (N.T. 11/1/85 at 98). The victim's classroom teacher during that time period testified that she remembered the child victim telling her sometime around Thanksgiving that her gym teacher liked her. (N.T. 11/1/85 at 88). While it would be reasonable to infer from the above evidence that the incident probably occurred on Wednesday, November 21, 1984 between 11:45 a.m. and 12:30 p.m., it is possible that the incident occurred on one of the Wednesdays immediately prior or subsequent to November 21, 1984. We do not find this uncertainty or the possible variance from the date alleged in the complaints, to be fatal to the convictions under the due process standards set forth in Fanelli and Appenzeller. The time periods during which the incident could have occurred were determined with reasonable specificity under the circumstances.