Opinion ID: 2508322
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excusal of Prospective Juror Elaine Q.

Text: Defendant contends he was denied the right to a guilt phase trial by an impartial jury, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and under article I, section 16 of the California Constitution, because, according to him, the trial court improperly excluded for cause Prospective Juror Elaine Q. based on her attitude toward the death penalty. In Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, the United States Supreme Court held that a prospective juror may be excluded for cause when the jurors views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' ( Id. at p. 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, quoting Adams v. Texas (1980) 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581.) We have adopted that standard in determining whether a defendants state constitutional right to an impartial jury was violated by an excusal for cause. ( People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 767, 239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250; see also People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 962, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214.) The trial courts determination of the jurors state of mind is binding on appeal if the jurors statements are equivocal or conflicting. If the jurors statements are not inconsistent, we will uphold the courts ruling if it is supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1247, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 468, 64 P.3d 762.) We find no error here. Several times during voir dire, Prospective Juror Q. said she could not vote for the death penalty, although she hedged her answer by stating that maybe she could not do so. At the end of voir dire, she stated: I would find it very, very difficult [to vote for the death penalty], but I could probably do it. I mean, that's as good as I can come. After the prosecutor challenged Prospective Juror Q. for cause, the trial court noted that she was quite uncomfortable during questioning and that the record may not reflect the physical manifestations of her anxiety. Under these circumstances, the court's determination of Prospective Juror Q.'s state of mind is binding. (See People v. Jones, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1247, 131 Cal. Rptr.2d 468, 64 P.3d 762.) Defendant maintains Prospective Juror Q. should not have been dismissed simply because she had serious doubts about the propriety of the death penalty. He argues that removing prospective jurors with views comparable to Prospective Juror Q. tilts the jury toward conviction. But the trial court did not dismiss Prospective Juror Q. because of her doubts about the death penalty, but because it found that those doubts would substantially impair her ability to follow the court's instructions. As defendant concedes, we have held that the state and federal Constitutions permit such death qualification. ( People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1199, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254.)