Opinion ID: 1357701
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Preserve Arguments on Appeal

Text: At the outset, the plaintiffs assert that Van Enterprises failed to properly preserve its arguments with respect to the Zurich Settlement. They contend that the arguments Van Enterprises now raises on appeal were not preserved by Van Enterprises' written objection in the District Court, in which Van Enterprises attempted to merely incorporate by reference into its objection every argument raised in every brief, declaration and exhibit that was submitted in connection with Plaintiffs' motion for class certification, as well as the Defendants' motion to dismiss. In other words, the plaintiffs argue that this conclusory written objection simply cannot serve to preserve for appeal the sprawling arguments it now raises concerning certification of the Settlement Class. The plaintiffs also point out that Van failed to attend the Fairness Hearing, during which it could have elaborated on its cryptic arguments made entirely by reference. Thus, the plaintiffs contend that the only arguments Van Enterprises preserved for appeal pertain to the Plan of Allocation and the purported need for subclasses. Although Van Enterprises frequently cites submissions to the District Court in the Commercial Case litigationinstead of its own written objectionas support for the various arguments it advances on appeal, Van Enterprises asserts that its written objection preserved all of these arguments because the objection incorporated the motions, responses, briefs, declarations and exhibits filed by the Plaintiffs and Defendants concerning class certification of a litigation class. Van Enterprises argues that the District Court erred by not considering these adversarial motions and briefing for a Litigation Class despite emphatic requests from the non-settling Defendants and Van Enterprises. [21] As an initial matter, although Van Enterprises did not appear at the fairness hearing to argue its objections, its absence from the hearing did not cause it to forfeit the objections it had timely submitted to the District Court in written form. Van Enterprises acted in accordance with the notice provided to the potential Settlement Class Members, which stated that attendance at the hearing was not necessary so long as an objection was properly filed with the District Court by the deadline: If you are a Settlement Class Member... and do not exclude yourself from the Settlement Class, you may object to the Zurich Settlement, any term of the Zurich Settlement Agreement, the Plan of Allocation or Plaintiffs' application for attorneys' fees and expenses. Such objection must be in writing and must provide evidence of your membership in the Settlement Class. The written objection also should state the specific reason(s), if any, for the objection, including any legal support you wish to bring to the Court's attention and any evidence you wish to introduce in support of the objection. A written objection (and any support for it) must be received by the Court and the following counsel by no later than January 11, 2007.    If (and only if) you make a written objection to the Zurich Settlement as set out above, you may choose to speak either in person or through an attorney hired at your own expenseat the hearing... the Court has set to consider whether to approve the Zurich Settlement. You are not required to attend the hearing. Lack of attendance at the hearing will not prevent the Court from considering your objection. (Zurich App. 3077-79.) Thus, while it was necessary for Van Enterprises to provide the grounds for its objections in writing in order to preserve its arguments for appeal, it was unnecessary for it to appear at the hearing. However, we are not obligated to entertain all of the arguments that Van Enterprises presently advances. Absent exceptional circumstances, this Court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. Del. Nation v. Pennsylvania, 446 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir.2006) (citing Harris v. City of Phila., 35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d Cir.1994)); see also Salvation Army v. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs of N.J., 919 F.2d 183, 196 (3d Cir.1990) (The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases. (internal quotation marks omitted)). For an issue to be preserved for appeal, a party must unequivocally put its position before the trial court at a point and in a manner that permits the court to consider its merits. Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. United States, 182 F.3d 212, 218 (3d Cir.1999). A fleeting reference or vague allusion to an issue will not suffice to preserve it for appeal, so the crucial question regarding waiver is whether defendants presented the argument with sufficient specificity to alert the district court. Keenan v. City of Phila., 983 F.2d 459, 471 (3d Cir.1992); see also Frank v. Colt Indus., Inc., 910 F.2d 90, 100 (3d Cir.1990) (Particularly where important and complex issues of law are presented, a far more detailed exposition of argument is required to preserve an issue.). Thus, the arguments that were properly preserved for appeal are limited to those which Van Enterprises presented with at least a minimum level of thoroughness to the District Court through its written objection and, without the existence of compelling circumstances, we need not entertain challenges to the approval of the Zurich Settlement which were not before the District Court. [22] Turning to the substance of Van Enterprises' written objection, we are able to discern that Van Enterprises' principal challenges to the approval of the Zurich Settlement are that the Settlement Class is overbroadwhich impacts the Rule 23 requirements of commonality, typicality, and predominance of common issuesand that antagonistic interests among the class members exist such that, in the absence of separate subclasses, the adequacy of representation requirement is not satisfied and the Plan of Allocation is not fair. (Zurich App. 2439.) Van Enterprises did not offer much support in its written objection to substantiate its argument that the Rule 23 requirements are not satisfied, but rather posited that the Settlement Class should not be certified unless the litigation class can properly be certified, and thus Van Enterprises asserted that the District Court needed to consider all of the filings in the class action litigation that have a bearing on whether certification of the litigation class is appropriate. Van Enterprises also did not substantiate its argument that subclasses were needed to ensure a fair allocation of the settlement fund other than to say that the Plan of Allocation treats various types of policyholders differently. Although Van Enterprises detracts from the credibility and persuasiveness of its objections by presenting them in such a conclusory fashion, we nonetheless will credit its explicit mention of the commonality, typicality, and predominance requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b), as well as its brief discussion of the need for subclasseswhich touched on both the adequacy of representation requirement of Rule 23(a) and the fairness of the Plan of Allocation under Rule 23(e)and will consider these specific challenges on appeal. But beyond these objections, Van Enterprises has forfeited the opportunity to challenge other aspects of the District Court's decision to approve the Zurich Settlement by failing to make any mention of those arguments in its written objection. [23] The attorneys general argue that among the issues that Van Enterprises has failed to preserve for appeal is its challenge to the named plaintiffs' standing. The attorneys general assert that the standing issue was not addressed in Van's original objection.... If Van had seriously believed there was an issue of standing, it could have raised it at the District Court level. They also note that [i]n the related `Gallagher' settlement, Van raised the [standing] argument and was denied by the same District Judge as here. We agree that Van Enterprises' objection is devoid of any reference, express or implied, to the named plaintiffs' standing and there is no basis for construing the objection as containing such a challenge. In a somewhat telling statement, Van Enterprises now argues that no standing issues were addressed by the Settling Parties and District Court in connection with [the Zurich] Settlement Class. The likely explanation for the absence of a standing analysis is that no challenge was made to the plaintiffs' standing and the District Court did not otherwise discern a reason to include a discussion of the plaintiffs' standing in its opinion. That said, because [s]tanding is a threshold jurisdictional requirement, and we have an obligation to examine our own jurisdiction and that of the district courts, we will briefly address whether the named plaintiffs have standing. Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 248, 254 (3d Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Turning to the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing, the Supreme Court has articulated three requirements: First, the plaintiff must have suffered an `injury in fact'an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) `actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.' Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained ofthe injury has to be `fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.' Third, it must be `likely,' as opposed to merely `speculative,' that the injury will be `redressed by a favorable decision.' Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (internal citations and select quotation marks omitted). Van Enterprises argues that the named Plaintiffs do not allege and have not shown that any of their policies were subject to the improper use of contingent commission agreements, and thus they have not established an injury in fact. Van Enterprises contends that, at best, Plaintiffs allege that the entire class paid `higher prices that arguably ensued in [the] entire industry' as a result of Defendants' allegedly anticompetitive conduct directed at some subset of Class Members. In response, the attorneys general assert that at least seven of the named plaintiffs purchased Zurich insurance policies, and that this is sufficient to establish standing for class certification purposes because [o]nce a named Plaintiff has been shown to have standing and therefore [is] properly before the Court, the focus shifts to compliance with the provisions of Rule 23. Alternatively, the plaintiffs argue that because the Settlement Class is limited to those policyholders with a `direct and immediate relationship' to a Defendant coconspirator in this Action, and because all Settlement Class Members purchased insurance at prices elevated by Defendants' unlawful scheme, all members of the Settlement Class have been injured by the anticompetitive conduct described in the Complaint and therefore have standing. They add that the payment of contingent commissions drove up the costs of all insurance policies because [t]hrough a process called `premium build-up' the contingent commissions paid by insurers were built into formulas used to derive all rates. Van Enterprises' arguments must be rejected because it is clear that the named plaintiffs alleged a concrete and particularized injury in fact. The plaintiffs alleged that they paid supra-competitive prices for their insurance policies as a result of the contingent commission arrangements and other anticompetitive conduct of the Zurich Defendants. This increase in price constitutes a concrete injury in fact. Moreover, because the named plaintiffs purchased insurance policies from the Zurich Defendants during the relevant class period, their injuries are neither generalized nor speculative. This is not to say that the named plaintiffs have proven that they were injured by the Zurich Defendants, but they are not required to prove their injuries in order to establish that they are a proper party to bring their claims before the court. Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that the economic harm they suffered can be traced to the Zurich Defendants' conduct and these injuries can be redressed by imposing liability on the Zurich Defendants. Therefore, we are satisfied that the case and controversy requirement of Article III is met and that the named plaintiffs had standing to bring this case.