Opinion ID: 1758894
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Wagstaff Act

Text: San Antonio has also brought forward points assigning error to the Court of Civil Appeals' holding that under the various provisions of the Wagstaff Act (Articles 7471-7472d) [3] the Commission is vested with broad discretion to grant or deny San Antonio's application for a permit to appropriate water for municipal purposes. San Antonio contends that when the Commission accepted and filed their presentation under Article 7496, the acceptance was tantamount to a finding by the Commission that the presentation was for an approved purpose under Article 7507 [4] ; that Article 7507 directs the Commission to issue a permit when the subsequent application is for an approved purpose under Articles 7470 and 7471, because Article 7472b provides that [t]he right to take waters necessary for domestic and municipal supply purposes is primary and fundamental, and the right to recover from other uses, waters essential to such purposes shall be paramount and unquestioned in the policy of the State,; and that the provisions of the Wagstaff Act which give a priority to municipal use modified or repealed Article 7589 [5] insofar as cities and towns are concerned. We overrule these contentions. In Southern Canal Co. v. State Board of Water Engineers, supra, we stated that Article 7507, has directed the Board [Water Rights Commission] to issue a permit if the proposed appropriation contemplates use of the water for approved purposes. There can be no doubt that San Antonio's application was for an approved purpose; however, in Southern Canal we gave equal recognition to the remaining requirements of Article 7507 which requires the issuance of a permit only if it does not impair existing water rights or vested riparian rights, and is not detrimental to the public welfare. Furthermore, we have preceded this statement by saying: To make certain that such waters are so conserved and used the Legislature has created the State Board of Water Engineers and has entrusted to it broad discretion, within certain statutory limits, in determining whether an application for a permit to appropriate and divert such waters to a particular use shall be granted or denied. The statutory limits within which the Commission's discretion must be exercised are set out in Article 7507 as not impair existing rights or vested riparian rights, and    not detrimental to the public welfare. Of necessity, the determination of these issues involves the exercise of a sound and reasonable discretion on the part of the Water Rights Commission. San Antonio contends that Article 7472b is an expression of State policy which operates to limit the Commission's discretion in passing on applications for permits and which modifies or repeals Article 7589 insofar as cities and towns are concerned. In our opinion, Article 7472b, supra, relates solely to the exercise of the power of eminent domain for acquisition of water for domestic, municipal and irrigation purposes and was not intended by the Legislature to be a directive to the Water Rights Commission in passing on competing applications for permits. Any other construction would create a direct conflict between Article 7472b and Article 7472c which specifically admonishes the Water Rights Commission that as between applicants for rights to use the waters of the State, preference be given not only in the order of preferential uses declared [by Article 7471], but that preference also be given those applications the purposes for which contemplate and will effectuate the maximum utilization of waters and are designated and calculated to prevent the escape of waters without contribution to a beneficial public service. San Antonio answers this by arguing that if Article 7472c gives the Commission discretion to ignore the priorities established in Article 7471, then Article 7472c is unconstitutional because such purpose is not contained in the caption of the Act. The question of violating the order of priority of uses is not presented in this case. San Antonio and GBRA were before the Commission competing for permits for out-of-basinmunicipal use and in-basin municipal use, respectively. Certainly the preference given to municipal use by Article 7471, which San Antonio says gives them priority for out-of-basin use, is equally applicable to municipal use within the Guadalupe basin by GBRA. We hold that Wagstaff Act does not modify or repeal Article 7589. We come now to consider the appeal insofar as it relates to the order granting GBRA a permit.