Opinion ID: 844220
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prospective Juror Mary G.

Text: Immediately after overruling the defense Batson/Wheeler objection to the prosecution‟s peremptory challenge of Prospective Juror P.J., the trial court made this comment to the prosecutor: “I would, while we‟re here, sound a note of caution. I was a little alarmed that you exercised the first several peremptories on Hispanics. And it seemed to me there was a pattern developing there that you might have to explain somewhere along the line. [¶] But the same thing. The defense hasn‟t raised it. I just sound it as a note of caution. And I think that we should watch that.” Thus alerted, the defense raised another Batson/Wheeler objection when, shortly thereafter, the prosecutor used her 14th peremptory challenge against a Hispanic woman, Prospective Juror Mary G. Defense counsel noted that Mary G. 34 was the fifth Hispanic woman that the prosecutor had removed by peremptory challenge. Without stating whether it had found a prima facie case, the trial court asked the prosecutor why she had excused Mary G. The prosecutor replied: “Your Honor, [Mary G.], as I recall, from when she was on the stand yesterday, came very close to being a challenge for cause. [¶] She was sitting here — in fact I tried to challenge her for cause. She was sitting next to [F.R.], as I recall. And she — I thought I had her originally down for my questionnaire as a challenge for cause. If she had stuck to the answers when she was talked to, it would have gotten her kicked. But she changed her tune as soon as [F.R.] changed hers. So unless I got my people mixed up . . . .” Without disputing the accuracy of the prosecutor‟s description of Prospective Juror Mary G.‟s questionnaire answers and voir dire responses, defense counsel asked for an explanation of the prosecutor‟s previous challenges to Hispanic women. The trial court denied that request and overruled the objection. The trial court explained: “I think that counsel at this time has a very logical explanation. I remember the colloquy well with [Mary G.]. She was — waffled back and forth. And we had to go into great detail with her. And finally she qualified — I mean she passed cause by changing her position back again. [¶] And I‟m sure you remember the same thing. We had to go back and forth with her. And I finally had to get into it. So I can‟t fault [the prosecutor] for having — since she said that she is exercising her challenges for people that she perceives to be weak on death, certainly this is a person that would be a loose cannon in the jury room as far as the prosecution is concerned.” In this instance, as with Prospective Juror P.J., the issue of whether defendant made a prima facie showing is moot because the prosecutor explained her reason for the peremptory challenge of Prospective Juror Mary G., and the trial court ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination. (Hernandez v. 35 New York, supra, 500 U.S. 352, 359; People v. Booker, supra, 51 Cal.4th 141, 165; People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th 415, 471.) We therefore proceed to step three of the Batson/Wheeler analysis. We acknowledge that, as defendant asserts, both the prosecutor and the trial court made statements that the record does not support. The prosecutor was mistaken in stating that during voir dire Prospective Juror Mary G. “was sitting next to” Prospective Juror F.R., while the court was mistaken in stating that it “finally had to get into” the voir dire questioning of Mary G. The record shows, instead, that Mary G. and F.R. underwent voir dire on the same day but at different times, and that the trial court did not participate in the voir dire of Mary G. But factual mistakes of this sort are usually the result of faulty memory and “are not necessarily associated with impermissible reliance on presumed group bias.” (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 189; accord, People v. Jones, supra, 51 Cal.4th 346, 366.) Moreover, as the record shows, the prosecutor was correct that Mary G. had “changed her tune” regarding her willingness to vote for death, and the trial court was correct that Mary G. had “passed cause by changing her position.” During voir dire, when defense counsel asked whether there was “anyone sitting here that would never vote for death,” Prospective Juror Mary G. raised her hand. Before asking Mary G. to explain her position, defense counsel questioned other prospective jurors who had also raised their hands. One of those jurors, when asked whether she could vote for death for “the worst criminal you could ever think about,” said she “couldn‟t do it.” At this point, defense counsel invited Mary G. to comment. Mary G. said: “I would say no, but it would be according to what the case is.” Asked by defense counsel whether she “could think of an instance or a situation and — where you would vote for the death penalty,” Mary G. answered, “Yes.” 36 Later, when the prosecutor‟s turn for questioning arrived, the prosecutor asked: “I am not quite sure what your position is — why don‟t you tell me a little bit about it — with regards to the death penalty.” Prospective Juror Mary G. replied: “I am for it. Of course, depending on the case and the circumstances.” Asked how she “would feel about having to judge somebody,” Mary G. replied, “I would be judgmental.” The prosecutor continued: “When you filled out your form, you left blank what your feelings were on the death penalty; but under the life without possibility of parole, you felt it was the most severe punishment due to the fact no one knows how long you will live. Do you still believe life without the possibility of parole is the more severe punishment of the two?” Mary G. replied: “I would say it would depend on each individual.” The prosecutor said that “the law, it would appear, views death as a more severe sort of thing.” Asked whether she understood that, Mary G. said, “Yes.” Asked how she felt “about being told to do that,” Mary G. replied, “I would say death.” These responses support the trial court‟s observation that Prospective Juror Mary G. was “a person that would be a loose cannon in the jury room as far as the prosecution is concerned.” On her questionnaire, Mary G. had given no response at all when asked for her opinion about the death penalty. During voir dire, she raised her hand when defense counsel asked if any juror would never vote for death. That action alone would cause any reasonable prosecutor to question a prospective juror‟s willingness to vote for death in a case such as this one. Although Mary G. later said she could think of a situation in which she would vote for death, she did not say what that situation was. Mary G.‟s responses were sufficient to avoid a challenge for cause, but the prosecutor had valid grounds for concern that Mary G. would not be a favorable juror for the prosecution on the penalty issue. The inconsistency and ambiguity of her responses also suggested she might have difficulty performing her duties as a juror. (See People v. Taylor 37 (2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, 893.) Substantial evidence supports the trial court‟s finding that the prosecutor‟s peremptory challenge of Mary G. was not racially motivated.