Opinion ID: 70447
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of section 1B1.3 in drug conspiracies

Text: 20 U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1 sets the base offense level for conspiring to distribute controlled substances. See United States v. Butler, 41 F.3d 1435, 1442 (11th Cir.1995). Calculating the base offense level under section 2D1.1 requires a determination of the quantity of illegal drugs properly attributable to a defendant. This, in turn, requires an assessment of the conduct of others for which a defendant is accountable under section 1B1.3. Butler, 41 F.3d at 1442. 21 Before November 1, 1992, section 1B1.3(a) held defendants accountable for 22 all acts and omissions committed or aided and abetted by the defendant, or for which the defendant would be otherwise accountable, that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense, or that are otherwise in furtherance of that offense.... 23 U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3(a)(1) (1991) (emphasis added). The commentary to section 1B1.3 clarified the emphasized language: In the case of criminal activity undertaken in concert with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy, the conduct for which the defendant 'would be otherwise accountable' also includes conduct of others in furtherance of the execution of the jointly-undertaken criminal activity that was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant. U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3 comment. (n. 1) (1991). On the other hand, the commentary explained that a defendant was not accountable for the conduct of others [w]here it is established that the conduct was neither within the scope of the defendant's agreement, nor was reasonably foreseeable in connection with the criminal activity the defendant agreed to jointly undertake.... U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3 comment. (n. 1) (1991). This language seemed to indicate that a conspirator was accountable for all reasonably foreseeable conduct, regardless of the extent of the conspirator's agreement to participate in the conspiracy. See United States v. Studley, 47 F.3d 569, 574 (2d Cir.1995). Indeed, the commentary provided an example that supported this interpretation: 24 Defendants H and I engaged in an ongoing marihuana importation conspiracy in which Defendant J was hired only to help off-load a single shipment. Defendants H, I, and J are included in a single count charging conspiracy to import marihuana. For the purposes of determining the offense level under the guideline, Defendant J is accountable for the entire single shipment of marihuana he conspired to help import and any acts or omissions in furtherance of the importation that were reasonably foreseeable. He is not accountable for prior or subsequent shipments of marihuana imported by Defendants H or I if those acts were beyond the scope of, and not reasonably foreseeable in connection with, the criminal activity he agreed to jointly undertake with Defendants H and I (i.e., the importation of the single shipment of marihuana). 25 U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3 comment. (n. 1) (1991). In other words, section 1B1.3 instructed that a conspirator was held accountable for the acts of his coconspirators if: (1) the acts were reasonably foreseeable; or (2) the acts were within the scope of the criminal activity he agreed to jointly undertake. 26 Thus, before November 1, 1992, the law in this circuit governing the application of section 1B1.3 in the context of drug conspiracies was clear. A conspirator was held responsible for all reasonably foreseeable quantities of drugs involved in the conspiracy, regardless of the scope of the defendant's agreement to participate. See United States v. Andrews, 953 F.2d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1210, 112 S.Ct. 3007, 120 L.Ed.2d 882 (1992). For example, in Andrews, this court made clear that street-level dealers in a conspiracy are not simply responsible for the quantities of cocaine that they agree to sell; rather, they are also responsible for all other reasonably foreseeable quantities distributed in the conspiracy. Andrews, 953 F.2d at 1319-23. Moreover, since a finding of reasonable foreseeability meant that the defendant was accountable under section 1B1.3, courts often did not need to address the scope of the defendant's agreement to participate in the drug conspiracy. See Studley, 47 F.3d at 573 (Our opinions on this portion of section 1B1.3 have primarily focused on the issue of whether conduct was foreseeable to the defendant, and have not directly addressed whether conduct was 'jointly undertaken.' ). 27 On November 1, 1992, a clarifying amendment to section 1B1.3 became effective. See Butler, 41 F.3d at 1443 n. 7. Section 1B1.3(a), as amended, provides that a defendant is responsible for: 28 (1) (A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; and 29 (B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity[.] 30 U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3(a). The amendment also included commentary that explains how section 1B1.3 should be applied in cases of jointly undertaken criminal activity, such as drug conspiracies. Application note 2 of the commentary provides: 31 In order to determine the defendant's accountability for the conduct of others under subsection (a)(1)(B), the court must first determine the scope of the criminal activity the particular defendant agreed to jointly undertake (i.e., the scope of the specific conduct and objectives embraced by the defendant's agreement). The conduct of others that was both in furtherance of, and reasonably foreseeable in connection with, the criminal activity jointly undertaken by the defendant is relevant conduct under this provision. The conduct of others that was not in furtherance of the criminal activity jointly undertaken by the defendant, or was not reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity, is not relevant conduct under this provision. 32 .... 33 With respect to offenses involving contraband (including controlled substances), the defendant is accountable for all quantities of contraband with which he was directly involved and, in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity, all reasonably foreseeable quantities of contraband that were within the scope of the criminal activity that he jointly undertook. 34 U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3 comment. (n. 2). Under this commentary, reasonable foreseeability alone is no longer sufficient to establish accountability. Instead, defendants are only accountable for other conduct that was reasonably foreseeable and within the scope of the criminal activity that the defendant agreed to undertake. In fact, to illustrate this change, the commentary amended the example that it had previously provided regarding the marijuana importation conspiracy. The example now reads: 35 (3) Defendants H and I engaged in an ongoing marihuana conspiracy in which Defendant J was hired only to help off-load a single shipment. Defendants H, I, and J are included in a single count charging conspiracy to import marihuana. Defendant J is accountable for the entire single shipment of marihuana he helped import under subsection (a)(1)(A) and any acts and omissions in furtherance of the importation of that shipment that were reasonably foreseeable. (See the discussion in example A(1) above). He is not accountable for prior or subsequent shipments of marihuana imported by Defendants H or I because those acts were not in furtherance of his jointly undertaken criminal activity (the importation of the single shipment of marihuana). 36 U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3 comment. (n. 2) (emphasis added). Thus, even though the conspirator in the example may have reasonably foreseen other shipments of marijuana, he is not accountable for those other shipments because they were not part of the scope of the criminal activity that he agreed to undertake. Application note 2 of the amended commentary also includes five new examples that emphasize this change: 37 (4) Defendant K is a wholesale distributor of child pornography. Defendant L is a retail-level dealer who purchases child pornography from Defendant K and resells it, but otherwise operates independently of Defendant K. Similarly, Defendant M is a retail-level dealer who purchases child pornography from Defendant K and resells it, but otherwise operates independently of Defendant K. Defendants L and M are aware of each other's criminal activity but operate independently. Defendant N is Defendant K's assistant who recruits customers for Defendant K and frequently supervises the deliveries to Defendant K's customers. Each defendant is convicted of a count charging conspiracy to distribute child pornography. Defendant K is accountable under subsection (a)(1)(A) for the entire quantity of child pornography sold to Defendants L and M. Defendant N also is accountable for the entire quantity sold to those defendants under subsection (a)(1)(B) because the entire quantity was within the scope of his jointly undertaken criminal activity and reasonably foreseeable. Defendant L is accountable under subsection (a)(1)(A) only for the quantity of child pornography that he purchased from Defendant K because the scope of his jointly undertaken criminal activity is limited to that amount. For the same reason, Defendant M is accountable under subsection (a)(1)(A) only for the quantity of child pornography that he purchased from Defendant K. 38 (5) Defendant O knows about her boyfriend's ongoing drug-trafficking activity, but agrees to participate on only one occasion by making a delivery for him at his request when he was ill. Defendant O is accountable under subsection (a)(1)(A) for the drug quantity involved on that one occasion. Defendant O is not accountable for the other drug sales made by her boyfriend because those sales were not in furtherance of her jointly undertaken criminal activity (i.e., the one delivery). 39 (6) Defendant P is a street-level drug dealer who knows of other street-level drug dealers in the same geographic area who sell the same type of drug as he sells. Defendant P and the other dealers share a common source of supply, but otherwise operate independently. Defendant P is not accountable for the quantities of drugs sold by the other street-level drug dealers because he is not engaged in a jointly undertaken criminal activity with them. In contrast, Defendant Q, another street-level drug dealer, pools his resources and profits with four other street-level drug dealers. Defendant Q is engaged in a jointly undertaken criminal activity and, therefore, he is accountable under subsection (a)(1)(B) for the quantities of drugs sold by the four other dealers during the course of his joint undertaking with them because those sales were in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity and reasonably foreseeable in connection with their criminal activity. 40 (7) Defendant R recruits Defendant S to distribute 500 grams of cocaine. Defendant S knows that Defendant R is the prime figure in a conspiracy involved in importing much larger quantities of cocaine. As long as Defendant S's agreement and conduct is limited to the distribution of the 500 grams, Defendant S is accountable only for the 500 gram amount (under subsection (a)(1)(A)), rather than the much larger quantity imported by Defendant R. 41 (8) Defendants T, U, V, and W are hired by a supplier to backpack a quantity of marihuana across the border from Mexico into the United States. Defendants T, U, V, and W receive their individual shipments from the supplier at the same time and coordinate their importation efforts by walking across the border together for mutual assistance and protection. Each defendant is accountable for the aggregate quantity of marihuana transported by the four defendants. The four defendants engaged in a jointly undertaken criminal activity, the object of which was the importation of the four backpacks containing marihuana (subsection (a)(1)(B)), and aided and abetted each other's actions (subsection (a)(1)(A)) in carrying out the jointly undertaken criminal activity. In contrast, if Defendants T, U, V, and W were hired individually, transported their individual shipments at different times, and otherwise operated independently, each defendant would be accountable only for the quantity of marihuana he personally transported (subsection (a)(1)(A)). As this example illustrates, in cases involving contraband (including controlled substances), the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity (and thus the accountability of the defendant for the contraband that was the object of that jointly undertaken activity) may depend upon whether, in the particular circumstances, the nature of the offense is more appropriately viewed as one jointly undertaken criminal activity or as a number of separate criminal activities. 42 U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3 comment. (n. 2). 43 The commentary of section 1B1.3, and its examples, are binding on this court. See Stinson v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993). Although United States v. Bush, 28 F.3d 1084 (11th Cir.1994), did not fully and explicitly discuss this change in the law, it has recently followed the new version of section 1B1.3. In Bush, the defendant, who had been convicted of conspiring to distribute cocaine, challenged the quantity of cocaine that the district court attributed to her under the guidelines. This court vacated the defendant's sentence because the district court found that [the defendant] could foresee the quantity of drugs distributed by her [coconspirators] without making the critical inquiry as to the scope of criminal activity undertaken by the defendant. Bush, 28 F.3d at 1087. Bush provides the correct post-amendment interpretation of section 1B1.3 in the context of a drug conspiracy. 44