Opinion ID: 597777
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Cost Data

Text: 12 The first issue raised on this appeal is whether there is a reasonable basis for the NLRB's conclusion that the Company did not violate the NLRA by refusing to provide the Union with the requested cost data. Section 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the Act requires employers to bargain in good faith with the representatives of their employees. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) and (d). This obligation includes the duty to provide information needed by the bargaining representative relevant to the proper performance of its duties. NLRB v. ACME Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36, 87 S.Ct. 565, 567-68, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967). 13 There is no presumption of relevance when a union seeks access to financial information to test an employer's need for concessions on labor costs. The standard for determining whether an employer must provide financial information was explained in NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153-54, 76 S.Ct. 753, 756, 100 L.Ed. 1027 (1956). There the Supreme Court stated that a refusal to attempt to substantiate a claim of inability to pay increased wages may support a finding of a failure to bargain in good faith. Id. at 153, 76 S.Ct. at 756. The Court noted, however, that it did not hold that in every case in which economic inability is raised as an argument against increased wages it automatically follows that the employees are entitled to substantiating evidence. Each case must turn upon its particular facts. Id. The Board determines whether a union is entitled to financial information based on whether the employer has asserted an inability to pay, or simply an unwillingness to pay. See Washington Materials, Inc., 276 N.L.R.B. 839, 840-41 (1985). A company is obliged to provide financial information only when it asserts an inability to pay, because this assertion is legitimately subject to verification. 14 The Union argues that the Company asserted an inability to pay when the Company president said concessions were needed in order to be competitive and survive in today's market. The ALJ accepted the union's argument, holding that Truitt compelled the conclusion that Melfi's statement triggered a duty to disclose economic information. The Board disagreed, finding that [t]he Respondent's assertions pertain only to declining market conditions attributable to competition from other businesses. Concrete Pipe and Prods. Corp.--Syracuse Div., 305 N.L.R.B. ----, 138 L.L.R.M. (BNA) 1185, 1186 (1991). We affirm the Board's decision. 15 The courts accord a very high degree of deference to administrative adjudications by the NLRB. When the NLRB concludes that no violation of the NLRA has occurred, that finding is upheld unless it has no rational basis or is unsupported by substantial evidence. United Mine Workers of America, District 31 v. NLRB, 879 F.2d 939, 942 (D.C.Cir.1989) (internal citations omitted). It is not necessary that we agree that the Board reached the best outcome in order to sustain its decisions. The Board's findings of fact are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). The Supreme Court recently instructed that a decision of an agency such as the Board is to be reversed only when the record is so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find to the contrary. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 812, 817, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992). 16 When the Board disagrees with the ALJ as to legal issues or derivative inferences made from the evidence, this Court's standard of review is not modified in any way. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496, 71 S.Ct. 456, 469, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951). Accord, Sign and Pictorial Union Local 1175 v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 726, 734 (D.C.Cir.1969). 17 The Board at one time accepted the Union's argument that a plea of competitive disadvantage is the functional equivalent of a statement of inability to pay under the Truitt analysis. In rulings enforced by this Court and others, the Board frequently found that companies had committed unfair labor practices by refusing to back up competitive disadvantage claims with statistical data. See, e.g., United Steelworkers Local 5571 v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 434, 436 (D.C.Cir.1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 946, 89 S.Ct. 2020, 23 L.Ed.2d 465 (1969); NLRB v. Western Wirebound Box Co., 356 F.2d 88, 91 (9th Cir.1966); NLRB v. Taylor, 338 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir.1964) (per curiam). 18 Recently, however, the Board has adopted a more restrictive reading of the Truitt disclosure requirements. The Board's change of heart apparently resulted from NLRB v. Harvstone Mfg. Corp., 785 F.2d 570, 575-77 & nn. 4-6 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 821, 107 S.Ct. 88, 93 L.Ed.2d 41 (1986). The Seventh Circuit there refused to enforce a Board order imposing Truitt requirements in response to a claim of competitive disadvantage. In a subsequent case, the Board concluded that it would henceforth treat competitive disadvantage and inability to pay bargaining statements as analytically distinct. See Neilson Lithographing Co., 305 N.L.R.B. No. 90, slip op. at 3-5 (1991), aff'd sub nom. Graphic Communications Int'l Union, Local 508 v. NLRB, 977 F.2d 1168 (7th Cir.1992). In the intervening period, a number of other circuits had sided with the Harvstone court in its interpretation of the NLRA. See Facet Enters., Inc. v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 963, 980 (10th Cir.1990); Washington Materials, Inc. v. NLRB, 803 F.2d 1333, 1338-39 (4th Cir.1986). 19 An agency may alter its interpretation of substantive law so long as its new interpretation does not conflict with the statute, see, e.g., International Bh'd of Elec. Workers v. ICC, 862 F.2d 330, 337 (D.C.Cir.1988), and so long as the agency supplies a reasoned analysis for changing its course. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 2866, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). See also Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C.Cir.1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923, 91 S.Ct. 2229, 2233, 29 L.Ed.2d 701 (1971). We join our sister circuits in concluding that the Board's new disclosure rules are a permissible reading of the broad terms of the NLRA. See, e.g., Facet Enters., 907 F.2d at 980-81; Harvstone, 785 F.2d at 575-77. The question whether the Board supplied a reasoned explanation for the change is stickier. The Board's decision in this case did not discuss or even acknowledge the conflict with its earlier rulings. See Concrete Pipe and Prods. Corp.--Syracuse Div., slip op. at 3-4, 305 N.L.R.B. at ----, 138 L.L.R.M. (BNA) at 1185-88. However, we find that the Board's opinion in Neilson Lithographing, issued just two months after the opinion here under review, supplies the needed reasoned analysis for the policy change. Given the Board's thorough analysis in that case, which the Seventh Circuit recently upheld, it would be a hollow exercise to remand so that the Board may append the same analysis to its opinion in this case. 20 We also reject the Union's suggestion that it was entitled to rely on such precedents as this Court's Local 5571 decision in steadfastly adhering to its bargaining position. The negotiations between the Union and Concrete Pipe took place twelve months after the Seventh Circuit issued its Harvstone decision requiring the Board to rethink its equation of competitive disadvantage and inability to pay statements. Under these circumstances, the Union could not reasonably have believed that its right to Company financial data was clear under settled Board precedent. In sum, we find the Board's conclusion that Concrete Pipe did not commit an unfair labor practice by refusing to disclose its financial data to be supported by substantial evidence.