Opinion ID: 150664
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Suicide Theory of Defense

Text: Allen claims that his counsel was ineffective for adopting what Allen describes as the desperate trial strategy of arguing to the jury that Cribbs may have committed suicide. That strategy was objectively unreasonable, Allen says, because the evidence showed that Cribbs had been bound and stabbed: she had superficial stab wounds on her face, her carotid artery was cut, and she had abrasions and ligature marks on her wrists and ankles. The Florida Supreme Court denied this claim based on Strickland 's prejudice element. The court explained: Although trial counsel did question the medical examiner about the possibility of suicide, such questioning was only a small part of an overall defense that Allen did not commit the murder. Consistent with this defense, counsel attempted to establish reasonable doubt by demonstrating that the State conducted a cursory and error-prone investigation. Counsel showed that (1) the crime scene technician did not send the medical examiner the knife found at the scene for comparison with the victim's wounds; (2) the knife was not examined for rag or fiber traces; (3) blood found in the sink was never tested; and (4) the medical examiner initially overlooked the fact that the victim may have been tied. Counsel also exposed that, in a previous case, the medical examiner ruled that a stab-victim had died of drowning. Counsel further established that the medical examiner summarily ruled out suicide as a cause of death even though it would have been medically possible for the victim to have stabbed herself. Counsel used the suicide theory merely to illustrate his argument about the superficial nature of the State's investigation. Although this particular illustration may not have helped Allen's cause, it did not undermine it either. Therefore, there is no reasonable probability that but for counsel's suggestion that the victim committed suicide, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Allen II, 854 So.2d at 1261 (emphasis added). Allen argues that the Florida Supreme Court's decision deserves no deference under AEDPA because it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). He asserts that counsel did not use the suicide theory merely to illustrate his argument about the superficial nature of the State's investigation, Allen II, 854 So.2d at 1261, but instead used it to suggest the cause of Cribbs' death. Allen points out that counsel referred to the suicide theory in his closing argument and emphasized that Cribbs had lost her husband, was lonely, and was never seen in the company of men as reasons why she may have committed suicide. Based on our review of the record, we find that the Florida Supreme Court's fact findings about this issue are reasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) & (e)(1). Although Allen's counsel did mention suicide in his closing argument, the context of his statements about it supports the Florida Supreme Court's finding that he used the suicide theory merely to illustrate his argument about the superficial nature of the State's investigation. Allen II, 854 So.2d at 1261. In fact, Allen's counsel expressly stated to the jury that Cribbs' death isn't a suicide death or that sort of thing, but that Allen should be acquitted because there was no evidence that he was the murderer. Tr. at 551. Counsel argued that in order to accept the state's evidence, the jury would have to go beyond reasonable doubt and really stretch [its] imagination. Id. at 554. One by one he disputed the testimony of the state's witnesses, contending that the investigation was haphazard and the evidence was inconclusive. He argued that the crime scene investigator had a lackadaisical attitude that just rots through the whole investigation. Id. at 561. He also asserted that the serologist's failure to test some of the blood at the murder scene was [i]nexcusable. Id. at 564. Counsel primarily used the theoretical possibility of suicide, and how quickly the medical examiner had dismissed it, to argue that the examiner's work was shoddy and biased toward the prosecution. He accused the medical examiner of blundering by failing to compare the knife to the wound and of rushing through the autopsy. Id. at 566. Counsel then said that the medical examiner was desperate to get in the scenario that fits the prosecution's theory and that he had casually ruled out suicide because he is uncomfortable with the thought. Id. at 566-67. Counsel said that the jury should expect a little more of a scientific response than what the examiner had given. Id. at 567. Counsel also mentioned suicide later in his closing argument. Again, his point was that the investigation was unreliable and had failed to consider all the possibilities. See id. at 571-73 (mentioning as an example of the investigators' mistakes that the State had disregarded the possibility of suicide, but concluding that if the jury did its job, the State would be faced with trying to find a real killer). That argument was consistent with the closing argument's overarching theme that the State conducted a cursory and error-prone investigation. Allen II, 854 So.2d at 1261; see also Allen I, 662 So.2d at 328 n. 3 (Defense counsel essentially argued that Allen was a convenient suspect because he was a drifter without family ties, while the victim had a large family that the police wanted to mollify by arresting someone for the murder.); Tr. at 575 (arguing that the State's investigators had cut corners, and concluding with these words: You all agreed to give Lloyd Chase Allen a fair trial. The corners they want you to cut are off the Constitution of the United States. Don't do it.). To the extent that Allen's counsel said the possibility of suicide was itself grounds for reasonable doubt, he did not advance that argument to the exclusion of other defense theories. See Allen II, 854 So.2d at 1261 (determining that the suicide theory was only a small part of an overall defense that Allen did not commit the murder); see also Tr. at 610 (All I am saying is that we don't know who did it. There are different possibilities. [Allen] is a possibility; the realtor is a possibility; a third party is a possibility; suicide is a possibility. There are all sorts of possibilities.). Counsel's mention of suicide was not antagonistic to his other arguments, cf. Gamble v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 450 F.3d 1245, 1250-51 (11th Cir.2006) (some of defense team's arguments were self-contradictory); it did not concede any material fact, cf. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190-91, 125 S.Ct. 551, 562-63, 160 L.Ed.2d 565 (2004) (finding no deficient performance even where counsel had made strategic decision to concede, at the guilt phase of the trial, the defendant's commission of murder); and it did not open the door to harmful evidence, cf. Gilliam v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 480 F.3d 1027, 1034 (11th Cir.2007) (per curiam) (defense counsel's strategy had opened the door to evidence of defendant's prior rape conviction). Allen argues that we should imagine the visceral response of the jury to a defense closing argument that the victim was responsible for her own death. On these facts, however, the Florida Supreme Court determined that imagined prejudice is no prejudice at all. Based on our review of the record and the context in which the suicide theory was mentioned, that determination was reasonable. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2068 (The assessment of prejudice should proceed on the assumption that the decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the standards that govern the decision.). The suicide theory may not have helped the defense, but the determination that it did not hurt the defense either is a reasonable one. [2]