Opinion ID: 1129288
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Right to Testify

Text: The next issue is whether Lott's trial counsel interfered with his right to testify. To prevail on this claim, Lott must satisfy the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel: first, he must prove deficient performance, and second, he must prove prejudice. See, e.g., Oisorio v. State, 676 So.2d 1363, 1364 (Fla. 1996) (We find that a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's interference with his right to testify must meet both prongs of Strickland . . . in order to obtain postconviction relief.). The circuit court found no deficiency. Although Lott initially wanted to testify, the circuit court determined that he made a voluntary decision, and a joint decision with counsel not to do so. Because there is competent, substantial evidence to support this ruling, we must affirm. The United States Supreme Court has made clear that a criminal defendant has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, one of which is whether to testify in his or her own behalf. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring)). The Court has located this right to testify in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, see Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51-52, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987), and has also called it a necessary corollary to the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against compelled testimony. Id. at 52, 107 S.Ct. 2704. Yet the Court has not specifically addressed what a defendant must do to waive the right. We have addressed the waiver issue many times, beginning in the seminal case of Torres-Arboledo v. State, 524 So.2d 403 (Fla.1988). There, we acknowledged a constitutional right to testify under the due process clause of the United States Constitution, but rejected the view that it fall[s] within the category of fundamental rights which must be waived on the record by the defendant himself. Id. at 410-11. Rather, we held that a trial court does not have an affirmative duty to make a record inquiry concerning a defendant's waiver of the right to testify. Id. at 411 n. 2. In dictum, however, we cautioned that to avoid postconviction disputes it would be advisable for the trial court, immediately prior to the close of the defense's case, to make a record inquiry as to whether the defendant understands he has a right to testify and that it is his personal decision, after consultation with counsel, not to take the stand. Id. Since Torres-Arboledo, this Court has repeatedly refused to require an on-the-record waiver of the right to testify. Brown v. State, 894 So.2d 137, 153 (Fla. 2004); see also Peterka v. State, 890 So.2d 219, 235 (Fla.2004), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2911, 162 L.Ed.2d 301 (2005); Davis v. State, 875 So.2d 359, 368 (Fla.2003); Lawrence v. State, 831 So.2d 121, 132 (Fla.2002); Occhicone v. State, 570 So.2d 902, 905 (Fla.1990); Remeta v. State, 522 So.2d 825, 827 (Fla.1988). At the same time, we have demanded that the record at least support a finding that such a waiver was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made. State v. Lewis, 838 So.2d 1102, 1112 (Fla.2002) (quoting Deaton v. Dugger, 635 So.2d 4, 8 (Fla.1993)). In most cases where we have considered an ineffective assistance claim based on interference with the right to testify, we have found competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily decided not to testify. See, e.g., Monlyn v. State, 894 So.2d 832, 838 (Fla. 2004) (holding that [t]he trial court's finding, based on trial counsel's unswerving testimony, that counsel always advised clients of this right [to testify at the penalty phase] and that he did so in this case, is supported by competent, substantial evidence); Brown, 894 So.2d at 153 (holding that the court's discussion with Brown and his subsequent written waiver are more than sufficient); Peterka, 890 So.2d at 235 (holding that, where defense counsel advised Peterka not to testify because Peterka's version of events were being introduced by his videotaped statement, an ineffective assistance claim was contrary to the evidence); Lawrence, 831 So.2d at 131-32 (rejecting an ineffective assistance claim where counsel testified that he had lengthy discussions with the Defendant concerning whether to testify and that the defendant agreed with his position that the Defendant should not testify in the guilt phase). The case most similar to this one is Shere v. State, 742 So.2d 215 (Fla.1999), where we also rejected an ineffective assistance claim based on interference with the right to testify. In Shere, defense counsel worried that the defendant would not be credible because he kept changing his story. They repeatedly advised him not to testify, and their investigator and the Chief Assistant Public Defender gave similar advice. In the end, however, they allowed the defendant to make the final decision on whether he should testify in the guilt stage. Id. at 222. According to them, [h]e agreed that he would not. Id. Yet a second-chair attorney testified that the defendant did not understand the decision of whether or not to testify. Id. The defendant claimed that counsel pressured him into deciding not to testify. Id. at 221. Nevertheless, we upheld the trial court's conclusion that the lead attorney's advice was a reasonable, tactical decision that was in the realm of counsel's professional judgmentnot ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 222; see also United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1535 (11th Cir.1992) (en banc) (rejecting a claim of interference with the right to testify where defense counsel advised [the defendant] that it would be unwise and unnecessary for him to testify, and ultimately believed that [he] had assented or acceded to her recommendation). We reach the same conclusion here. Notwithstanding Lott's initial desire to testify, both his attorneys stated that he ultimately agreed not to do so. Lott confirmed as much during a colloquy with the trial judge at the end of the guilt phase: COURT: Now that all the jurors are out of the room, Mr. Lott, are you satisfied with the representation of your two lawyers? LOTT: Yes, ma'am. .... COURT: Did the attorneys do everything that you anticipated they would do? LOTT: Yes, ma'am. COURT: And was it a joint choice by all three of you that you would not testify in the trial? LOTT: Yes, ma'am. COURT: Okay. Is there anything that they did that you didn't want them to do? LOTT: No. COURT: So you're satisfied with everything they've done? LOTT: Yes, ma'am. (Emphasis added). [3] In light of this competent, substantial evidence, we must defer to the circuit court's factual finding that Lott voluntarily agreed with counsel's recommendation not to take the stand. A separate question is whether Spector's advice to Lott, even if voluntarily followed, was nevertheless deficient because no reasonable attorney would have discouraged Lott from testifying. As the circuit court explained below, there were many identifiable risks of placing Mr. Lott on the witness stand. Spector identified three in particular: (1) there were no witnesses able to corroborate Lott's alibi, because his wife Tammy did not want to lie for Kenny anymore and because the investigator could not locate any witnesses in north Florida; (2) Lott has a bad temper; and (3) Lott has a significant criminal history, including three armed robbery convictions and one attempted escape conviction. In retrospect, perhaps Lott's testimony would have been worth these risks. But we have explained that [t]o fairly assess counsel's performance, the reviewing court must make every effort to eliminate the `distorting effects of hindsight' and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Elledge v. State, 911 So.2d 57, 67 (Fla.2005) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1173, 163 L.Ed.2d 1141 (2006). At the time of trial, Lott's counsel did consider the possibility of advising Lott to testify, but gave the opposite recommendation due to reasonable, strategic considerations. Thus, his performance cannot be considered deficient. See, e.g., Occhicone v. State, 768 So.2d 1037, 1048 (Fla.2000) (explaining that strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel's decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct).