Opinion ID: 1981393
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: SDCL 15-6-60(b)(5).

Text: As relevant herein, SDCL 15-6-60(b)(5) provides that on timely motion and upon such terms as are just, the circuit court may relieve a party from a final judgment or order if it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application. A motion for relief via SDCL 15-6-60(b) is addressed to the sound discretion of the circuit court, and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Overvaag v. City of Dell Rapids, 319 N.W.2d 171, 173 (S.D. 1982). On appeal, Olson contends the circuit court erred in vacating its previous decree, because a change in decisional law is not a sufficient basis for relief. With this contention, we disagree. Olson's grandparent visitation rights grew out of Iowa Code § 598.35 and the Iowa District Court decree granting same. The South Dakota circuit court first became involved in this matter when Richard petitioned it to terminate Olson's visitation rights. At that time, South Dakota's grandparent visitation statute, SDCL 25-4-53, was not in effect, and the circuit court modified and reduced Olson's right to visitation arising from the Iowa decree. Thereafter, in Olds v. Olds, 356 N.W.2d 571, the Iowa Supreme Court determined that Iowa Code § 598.35 did not permit grandparent visitation when the grandparent's child objected thereto. Based on this change in the decisional law and the children's best interests, Richard motioned the circuit court via the third provision of SDCL 15-6-60(b)(5), to vacate its previous decree and terminate Olson's visitation rights. This the circuit court did, and under the facts and circumstances of this case, we find no abuse of discretion. The federal counterpart of SDCL 15-6-60(b)(5) is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), and several cases and authorities have concluded that a change in the applicable or decisional law may provide a sufficient basis for prospective relief from a judgment or order under the third provision of Rule 60(b)(5). See, e.g., System Fed'n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647, 81 S.Ct. 368, 371, 5 L.Ed.2d 349, 353 (1961); Fortin v. Comm'r of Mass. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 692 F.2d 790, 799 (1st Cir.1982); Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 667 F.2d 754, 756 (8th Cir.1982), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3102, 77 L.Ed.2d 1358 (1983); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 634 F.2d 929, 934 (5th Cir.1981), vacated, 456 U.S. 952, 102 S.Ct. 2026, 72 L.Ed.2d 477 (1982); Jordan v. Sch. Dist. of City of Erie, Pa., 548 F.2d 117, 122 (3rd Cir.1977); Theriault v. Smith, 523 F.2d 601, 601 (1st Cir.1975); Class v. Norton, 507 F.2d 1058, 1062 (2nd Cir.1974); Yuclan Enterprises, Inc. v. Nakagawa, 583 F.Supp. 1574, 1576-77 (D.Hawaii 1984); Loney v. Scurr, 474 F.Supp. 1186, 1191-92 (S.D.Iowa 1979); Inmates of Boys' Training Sch. v. Southworth, 76 F.R.D. 115, 124 (D.R.I.1977); 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2863, at 208-10 (1973); and 7 J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 60.26[4], at 60-260 (2d ed. 1985). In order to be entitled to such relief under the third provision of Rule 60(b)(5), however, three elements must be present. First, there must be a change in the regulatory, statutory, or decisional law which is specially applicable to that case. Second, the judgment, order, or decree from which relief is sought must have prospective effect or continuing operation as opposed to being a judgment, order, or decree which offers a present remedy for a past wrong, Cook v. Birmingham News, 618 F.2d 1149, 1152 (5th Cir.1980), like a judgment for money damages. Ryan v. United States Lines Co., 303 F.2d 430, 434 (2d Cir.1962). And third, the change in the law must make it inequitable for the judgment, order, or decree to have further prospective application. We find the above-cited federal authority particularly persuasive in interpreting the third provision of SDCL 15-6-60(b)(5), and under the facts and circumstances of this case, we conclude the circuit court did not abuse its discretion. First, the Iowa statute upon which Olson's visitation rights were founded, was subsequently determined by the Iowa Supreme Court not to permit grandparent visitation when the grandparent's child objected thereto. Thus, a change in the applicable law occurred. Second, the decree which granted Olson four visitations per yearthe decree from which Richard sought reliefwas a judgment, SDCL 2-14-2(9), which regulated future actions and activities. Thus, it was a judgment-decree of a continuing nature with prospective effect. Third, the law upon which Olson's visitation rights were premised, was subsequently interpreted not to permit court-induced grandparent visitation when the grandparent's child objected thereto, because this would interfere with the parents' right to raise their child or children. Olds, 356 N.W.2d at 574. Richard objected to Olson's visitations, and this made it inequitable for the judgment-decree to have further prospective application. Richard timely filed his Motion to Vacatewithin four months after the rendition of the Olds decisionand his motion did not constitute a substitute for appeal, which is not a permissible use for such a motion. Flett v. W.A. Alexander & Co., 302 F.2d 321, 324 (7th Cir.1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 841, 83 S.Ct. 71, 9 L.Ed.2d 77 (1962). Additionally, the fact that Richard executed a Stipulation which was the basis for the Iowa decree is not fatal. A decree entered on the basis of the parties' consent or agreement does not negate the power to modify because of subsequent events and/or changes in the law. System Federation, 364 U.S. at 650-51, 81 S.Ct. at 373, 5 L.Ed.2d at 355; Yuclan Enterprises, 583 F.Supp. at 1577.