Opinion ID: 2997126
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Officers’ Questioning of Moore

Text: We first address Moore’s argument that the officers exceeded the permissible scope of the traffic stop when they questioned him regarding matters unrelated to the purpose of the stop (and thus illegally seized him). As a preliminary matter, we note (and Moore does not dispute) that the officers had probable cause to stop the cab Moore was riding in when they observed its driver make two lane changes without signaling, violations of 625 ILCS 5/11- 804. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996) (police may stop a vehicle when they have “probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred”). Once the officers (legally) stopped the cab, Moore, as a passenger in the vehicle, became subject to the officers’ custody and control “until their safety could be assured.”1 United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 949 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997)). And, incident to his status as a passenger of a vehicle involved in a traffic stop, Moore could be questioned by the officers without their questions being deemed a “seizure” for Fourth Amendment purposes (and thus perhaps requiring reasonable suspicion or probable cause to justify the questions being asked at 1 Moore argues that the officers’ stop of the cab was pretextual, in that their only reason for stopping the vehicle was to question him about suspected drug activity. Moore further contends that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion, based on their observations at the train station, to stop him independently of their stop of the cab. Neither of these arguments warrants consideration. As long as the officers had probable cause to stop the taxicab, which they did, their subjective motives are irrelevant. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). And they needed no further justification than the cabdriver’s traffic violation to stop Moore as the vehicle’s passenger. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413-14 (1997). 6 No. 02-2802 all). Childs, 277 F.3d at 951; see also United States v. Thompson, 106 F.3d 794, 798 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275, 1280-81 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Tipton, 3 F.3d 1119, 1122 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Rivera, 906 F.3d 319, 322 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1220-21 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1993). Thus, clearly, Moore was not illegally seized when Welsh approached the passenger’s side door of the cab and asked Moore if he would be willing to answer some questions. There remains, however, the question of whether the officers’ questioning of Moore, reasonable at its inception, nonetheless became unreasonable (and therefore requiring Fourth Amendment scrutiny) because the progressive questioning exceeded the “duration” or “scope” of the stop. Cf. Childs, 277 F.3d at 955-61 (Cudahy, J., concurring) (agreeing with the result on other grounds, but arguing that both “duration” and “scope” of questioning should be considered regardless of impetus for stop). But cf. id. at 95253 (determining that an inquiry into the “duration” and “scope” of questioning not necessary when there was probable cause to arrest passenger for seatbelt violation before questioning started). But we need not address this question (or further parse out the rationale of Childs), for here Moore consented to answer further questions from Welsh,2 and it is well settled that a consensual encounter 2 Moore argues that the district court erred in finding that he voluntarily consented to answer Welsh’s questions. However, the district court did not even pass on this question because Moore failed to make this argument to the magistrate judge. Accordingly, this argument is waived. United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 2000) (arguments not made before the magistrate judge are waived). We note also that Moore admitted at his sup- pression hearing before the magistrate that he did, in fact, willingly agree to answer Welsh’s questions. See Tr. at 59-60, 65-66. (continued...) No. 02-2802 7 between an individual and a law enforcement official does not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny, see United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991); United States v. DeBerry, 76 F.3d 884, 886 (7th Cir. 1996), so that an inquiry into the duration or scope of the officers’ questioning is unnecessary. Thus the officers’ questioning of Moore was not, in any respects, an illegal seizure.