Opinion ID: 2302783
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The False Imprisonment and Malicious Prosecution Claims

Text: The gist of any complaint for. . . false imprisonment is an unlawful detention. . . . Clarke v. District of Columbia, 311 A.2d 508, 511 (D.C.1973). [I]t is a familiar principle that probable cause for an arrest and detention constitutes a valid defense to a claim of false . . . imprisonment. Magwood v. Giddings, 672 A.2d 1083, 1086 (D.C.1996). For probable cause to exist, it is sufficient that the arresting officer have a good faith, reasonable belief in the validity of the arrest and detention. Gabrou v. May Dep't Stores Co., 462 A.2d 1102, 1104 (D.C.1983); see also Weisman v. Middleton, 390 A.2d 996, 1002 (D.C. 1978) (noting that probable cause may flow from a belief that turns out to be unfounded as long as it is not unreasonable) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Johnson v. United States, 349 A.2d 458, 460-61 (D.C.1975) (explaining that the test of probable cause is whether at the moment the arrest was made, . . . the facts and circumstances within [the officer's] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed . . . an offense) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Probable cause must be supported by more than mere suspicion but need not be based on [the same quantum of] evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction. Perkins v. United States, 936 A.2d 303, 306 (D.C.2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The existence of probable cause will likewise defeat a claim for malicious prosecution. . . . Gabrou, 462 A.2d at 1104; see also Prieto v. May Dep't Stores Co., 216 A.2d 577, 578 (D.C.1966) (There is no material distinction between reasonable grounds for detention in false imprisonment and probable cause in malicious prosecution.). [T]o establish a case of malicious prosecution[,] there must be (a) a criminal proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant against the plaintiff, (b) termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused, (c) absence of probable cause for the proceeding, and (d) `Malice,' or a primary purpose in instituting the proceeding other than that of bringing an offender to justice. Jarett v. Walker, 201 A.2d 523, 526 (D.C.1964) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As one court has observed, [i]n an action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff bears a heavy burden of proof to show lack of probable cause. Schlueter v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 252 Fed.Appx. 7, 9 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The District defendants argue that summary judgment on DeWitt's false imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims was warranted because [p]robable cause to arrest and imprison DeWitt until trial and to prosecute him is established by DeWitt's conviction, even though the conviction was later set aside. The applicable principle, however, is that a prior conviction, although set aside or reversed and followed by an acquittal, is conclusive evidence of the existence of probable cause, unless the conviction was procured by fraud, perjury or other corrupt means.  Bumphus v. Smith, 189 A.2d 130, 131-32 (D.C.1963) (italics added, citations omitted). DeWitt alleged in his complaint that the defendants erroneously testified to the grand jury and at trial about eyewitness descriptions and photo identifications, manipulated a line-up identification and witness statements, beat and intimidated a witness (Christopher Hines) into implicating DeWitt in the murder, lost or withheld exculpatory information, and caused criminal proceedings to be instituted and continued against DeWitt, even after [they] knew or reasonably should have known that no probable cause existed to support the prosecution against him and his continuing detention. In his ruling after the IPA hearing, Judge Burgess made no findings confirmatory of those specific claims. [7] Nevertheless, because DeWitt's allegations amount to claims of fraud or corruption, [8] we decline to treat the fact of DeWitt's conviction as mandating a conclusion that there was probable cause for his imprisonment and prosecution. Rather, we go on to consider whether, leaving aside the evidence that DeWitt alleges was tainted by police misconduct and considering the evidence that was withheld, there was enough reasonably trustworthy information . . . to warrant a prudent man in believing that [DeWitt] had committed . . . [the] offense. Beck, 379 U.S. at 91, 85 S.Ct. 223; cf. Sanders v. United States, 550 A.2d 343, 345 (D.C.1988) (holding that false testimony supporting indictment was not material because other incriminating evidence presented to the grand jury also supported probable cause to indict). Having reviewed the record, we agree with Judge Richter's conclusion, in his Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, that the defendants unquestionably had probable cause to arrest and detain DeWitt and that no reasonable finder of fact could find that [they] lacked either probable cause or a reasonable belief in probable cause. As Judge Burgess's lengthy evidentiary summary recounted, two days after the shooting, when Detective Alexander Shepard showed eyewitness Rufus Pace a photo array. Pace selected DeWitt's photograph and one other in the photo array as resembling the shooter. [9] On May 23, 1991, Pace selected DeWitt from a line-up. [10] On May 15, 1991, eyewitness Mildred Greene, the cashier at the gas station where Ridley was shot (who testified at trial that she looked right into [the] face of the shooter), picked DeWitt's photo from a photo array. Greene also made an in-court identification of DeWitt as the shooter. And, when officers arrived at the scene of the shooting, they were informed by witnesses that the shooter was a black male who drove a red, two-door Acura bearing temporary tags. DeWitt fit that description and owned a red Acura with temporary tags, facts that Judge Burgess aptly characterized as important corroborating evidence of [DeWitt's] guilt. Judge Burgess found that in light of all the foregoing evidence (and additional evidence that we need not discuss), [t]here exist[ed] too much evidence indicating DeWitt's guilt for him to find by clear and convincing evidence that DeWitt is innocent. That same too much evidence provided probable cause for DeWitt's detention and prosecution. [11] Moreover, we see no evidence in the record (and DeWitt points to none) that his conviction was maliciously sought or that defendants had a primary purpose in instituting the proceeding other than that of bringing an offender to justice. Jarett, 201 A.2d at 526. As Judge Richter noted, [a]lmost all of the evidence implicating Carson as the killermost importantly, the testimonies of John Smith, James Montgomery, and Douglas Eatmon that they either saw Carson shoot Ridley, heard Carson admit to the shooting, or heard an associate of Carson say that Carson did the shootingemerged well after trial. DeWitt points to no evidence, and we see none, that any of the defendants doubted DeWitt's guilt or believed he was innocent, but nevertheless lent support to his detention and prosecution. For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Judge Richter did not err in granting summary judgment to the District defendants on DeWitt's false imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims.