Opinion ID: 1973387
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Merits: The Cross-Appeal

Text: McElroy raises a number of issues on cross-appeal, but we choose to address only one because it alone will undoubtedly reoccur on remand and involves an issue of substantial public importance. Cf. McElroy I, 637 N.W.2d at 501-02 (considering evidentiary issues). McElroy urges us to overrule Smith v. ADM Feed Corp., 456 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa 1990), and hold plaintiffs under the ICRA are entitled to have their claims tried to a jury of their peers.
In Smith, a sharply divided court held there was no right to a jury trial under the ICRA. The case at bar apparently presents the first opportunity to reexamine Smith. Two plaintiffs have asked the court of appeals to overrule Smith, but understandably that court has declined to tinker with our precedents. Reiss v. ICI Seeds, Inc., 548 N.W.2d 170, 175 (Iowa Ct.App.1996); Ramirez v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 546 N.W.2d 629, 632 (Iowa Ct.App.1996). In its statutory analysis, the majority in Smith concluded the district court in an ICRA action sits as the [ICRC] and is empowered only to grant that relief authorized by the ICRA. 456 N.W.2d at 381. The majority stressed the administrative nature of the ICRA framework and concluded that affording a jury trial in district court would substantially interfere with a statutory scheme which delegates to the court only that limited power held by the commission. Id. Concerned that ruling to the contrary would result in a time consuming process which would place a greater emphasis ... on a money recovery over other available relief, the majority concluded the statute should not be interpreted to afford litigants a jury trial. Id. The majority also noted that the statute itself did not say whether a jury trial was afforded, and considered this silence as evidence the legislature did not intend a jury trial. Id. at 380-81.
On further examination, we conclude the majority's statutory analysis in Smith was fundamentally flawed and must be overruled. As four members of this court pointed out in Smith, the majority erred when it concluded the ICRA framework was administrative in nature: The district court does not sit as a civil rights commission; it does not screen cases as does the commission; it does not investigate cases like the commission; nor does a court hear cases under the commission's rules. When the legislature sought to provide a partial answer to the backlog of undisposed claims before the civil rights commission, it did so by providing an alternative to the administrative proceeding in the form of an ordinary civil action. Id. at 387-88 (Carter, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). While it is true the ICRA generally requires plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies, there is nothing extraordinary about the nature of a district court proceeding brought once those remedies are so exhausted. The ICRA is no different than any other statute providing a cause of action. The ICRA has always permitted a plaintiff to sue for monetary damages in the district court. For this reason, it is not surprising the legislature did not expressly indicate claimants were entitled to a jury trial under the ICRAit was assumed. Far from substantially interfere[ing] with [the] statutory scheme, interpreting the ICRA framework as written would alleviate the problems that have arisen since Smith was decided. In Smith, the dissent pointed out that denying the right to a jury trial on ICRA claims would not only run contrary to legislative intent, but would also prove infelicitous because plaintiffs bringing several different causes of action would have some of them tried by a jury, with others tried to the court. Id. at 388. Fifteen years later, the dissent's prophesy has come true. Further problems have arisen. Shortly after Smith was decided, Congress passed legislation that granted litigants the right to a jury trial under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981. [6] Subsequently, the Eighth Circuit ruled it was not bound to our pronouncement in Smith. See Pickens v. Soo Line R.R., 264 F.3d 773, 779 (8th Cir.2001). Federal district courts in Iowa have ruled litigants have a right to a jury trial on their ICRA claims in federal court. See, e.g., Bales v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 972 F.Supp. 483, 490 (S.D.Iowa 1997) (concluding [t]he ICRA authorizes actual damages, as well as equitable remedies and granting jury trial on ICRA claim). As McElroy points out, this has resulted in the odd situation that plaintiffs bringing ICRA claims in federal court may receive a jury trial, but those in state court will not. [7] This has only further compounded the problems the dissent foretold. In truth, there is only one reason to uphold Smith today stare decisis. From the very beginnings of this court, we have guarded the venerable doctrine of stare decisis and required the highest possible showing that a precedent should be overruled before taking such a step. Kiesau v. Bantz, 686 N.W.2d 164, 180 n. 1 (Iowa 2004) (Cady, J., dissenting) (citing, in part, Hildreth v. Tomlinson, 2 Greene 360, 361 (Iowa 1849)). We do not overturn our precedents lightly and will not do so absent a showing the prior decision was clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Kersten Co. v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 207 N.W.2d 117, 121 (Iowa 1973); Doolittle v. Shelton, 1 Greene 272, 273 (Iowa 1848); accord Miller v. Westfield Ins. Co., 606 N.W.2d 301, 306 (Iowa 2000) (when error is manifest); Cover v. Craemer, 258 Iowa 29, 35, 137 N.W.2d 595, 599 (1965) (palpably wrong); Stuart v. Pilgrim, 247 Iowa 709, 714, 74 N.W.2d 212, 216 (1956) (only for the most cogent reasons); Lammars v. Chi. Great W. R.R., 162 Iowa 211, 215, 143 N.W. 1097, 1098 (1913) (weighty and sufficient reasons). This is especially true in this case because we often infer legislative assent to our precedents from prolonged legislative silence. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 517 N.W.2d 208, 215 (Iowa 1994); Gen. Mortgage Corp. v. Campbell, 258 Iowa 143, 152, 138 N.W.2d 416, 421 (1965). These principles are not absolute, however. [S]tare decisis does not prevent the court from reconsidering, repairing, correcting or abandoning past judicial announcements when error is manifest, including error in the interpretation of statutory enactments. Miller, 606 N.W.2d at 306. Stare decisis should not be invoked to maintain a clearly erroneous result. Id. (quoting Kersten, 207 N.W.2d at 121). [W]hen a rule, after it has been duly tested by experience, has been found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social welfare, there should be less hesitation in frank avowal and full abandonment. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 150 (1921); see, e.g., State v. Liddell, 672 N.W.2d 805, 813 (Iowa 2003). As for the legislative-assent-from-silence argument, it should be noted that the majority in Smith ignored this very principle. The dissent in Smith correctly noted that in several cases before that case was decided claimants were afforded a jury trial under the ICRA. Indeed, historically Iowans were afforded the right to a jury trial under previous civil rights statutes. Smith, 456 N.W.2d at 388 (Carter, J., dissenting) (citing Ayala v. Center Line, Inc., 415 N.W.2d 603 (Iowa 1987); Annear v. State, 454 N.W.2d 869 (Iowa 1990)). Rather than attempt to divine legislative intent in this fashion, we must remember that legislation sometimes persists on account of inattention and default rather than by any conscious and collective decision. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 319 (1986). For all the foregoing reasons, we overrule Smith and hold a plaintiff seeking money damages under the ICRA is entitled to a jury trial.