Opinion ID: 2521561
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Washington's General Survival StatuteRCW 4.20.046(1)

Text: Before 1993, RCW 4.20.046(1) provided that: All causes of action by a person or persons against another person or persons shall survive to [his or her] personal representatives... Provided, however, That no personal representative shall be entitled to recover damages for pain and suffering, anxiety, emotional distress, or humiliation personal to and suffered by a deceased. Laws of 1961, ch. 137, § 1. The statute expressly provided that no recovery was allowed for damages suffered by a decedent after tortious conduct but before death occurred. In other words, if a person survived a tortious act for a period of time but later died, any recovery for pain and suffering actually experienced by the decedent was not permitted. Before the 1993 revisions, we considered the issue of whether damages for LOEL were recoverable under RCW 4.20.046(1) in Wooldridge v. Woolett, 96 Wash.2d 659, 666, 638 P.2d 566 (1981), and we held that they were not. In Wooldridge, the administrator of a decedent's estate brought a survival action under the pre-1993 general survival statute, claiming shortened life expectancy as a recoverable item of damages. Wooldridge, 96 Wash.2d at 660-62, 638 P.2d 566. We equated the term shortened life expectancy with the impaired ability to enjoy the pleasures of life which a person otherwise would have enjoyed, Wooldridge, 96 Wash.2d at 664, 638 P.2d 566, but held that damages in a survival action do not include LOEL. We reasoned that [t]he loss of life's amenities should be recoverable only by plaintiffs who survive compensable injuries, since such lost pleasures are personal to that individual and essentially represent pain and suffering. Wooldridge, 96 Wash.2d at 666, 638 P.2d 566. We further reasoned that shortened life expectancy is relevant only to the extent it affects the loss of value of a decedent's future earning capacity. Wooldridge, 96 Wash.2d at 667, 638 P.2d 566. The issue then becomes whether the 1993 revisions changed this rule. The revisions rewrote a proviso of the statute to allow the recovery of damages for pain and suffering, anxiety, emotional distress, or humiliation personal to and suffered by a deceased  if certain specified statutory beneficiaries existed. (emphasis added). The estate argues that the 1993 amendment to Washington's general survival statute expanded the availability of damages and now permits recovery for LOEL. The estate claims that Ms. Otani's shortened life expectancy caused her to lose the qualitative enjoyment and satisfaction of life for which she is entitled to recover damages under RCW 4.20.046(1). Essentially, the estate contends that the bars to recovering damages for a decedent's shortened life expectancy no longer exist under RCW 4.20.046 because the statutory limitation for pain and suffering was removed in 1993. We disagree. Prior to the 1993 amendment, RCW 4.20.046(1) provided that a personal representative shall not recover damages for predeath pain and suffering actually experienced by a decedent. Since the 1993 amendment, however, the statute now allows recovery of damages for pain and suffering and other noneconomic damages suffered by a decedent prior to death so long as specified statutory beneficiaries exist. The statute states that [a] personal representative shall only be entitled to recover damages for pain and suffering, anxiety, emotional distress, or humiliation personal to and suffered by a deceased on behalf of those beneficiaries enumerated in RCW 4.20.020.... (Emphasis added.) Before the amendment, no statutory claim could be brought by an estate for any pain and suffering experienced by a decedent. After the revisions, a claim for pain and suffering personal to and suffered by a decedent became recoverable by an estate. Under these revisions, however, a decedent still has to experience suffering before a claim is allowed. In analyzing the 1993 amendment to the general survival statute, the Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion in Tait v. Wahl, 97 Wash.App. 765, 773, 987 P.2d 127 (1999), review denied, 140 Wash.2d 1015, 5 P.3d 9 (2000). In Tait, a decedent's niece sued the owner and driver of a delivery truck that struck and killed the decedent, on behalf of herself, her children, the decedent's nondependent brother, and the decedent's estate. The niece sought damages for the decedents pain and suffering, medical expenses, impairment of income and earning capacity, loss of enjoyment of life, and loss of consortium. The Court of Appeals held, among other things, that an estate could recover damages for lost net accumulations of a decedent under the amended general survival statute but could not recover damages for LOEL under RCW 4.20.046(1) because LOEL is not an asset that can accrue for the benefit of an estate. The court explained that the 1993 amendment was intended to close the gap between [the statutes], so that even if a decedent's pain and suffering were caused by an injury unrelated to the decedent's death, it would be a recoverable item of damages under the general survival statute for the benefit of the statutory beneficiaries. Tait, 97 Wash.App. at 773 n. 3, 987 P.2d 127. The estate also argues that we recognized LOEL as a separate element of damages in Kirk v. Washington State University, 109 Wash.2d 448, 746 P.2d 285 (1987), and that this cause of action should survive. In Kirk, we held that damages for LOEL were recoverable in the context of a personal injury claim. In that case, a cheerleader brought a personal injury action for injuries she suffered during cheerleading practice. The trial court had instructed the jury to consider LOEL as distinct from damages for pain and suffering, as well as from disability and disfigurement. Kirk, 109 Wash.2d at 459-60, 746 P.2d 285. The defendants in that case relied on Wooldridge for the assertion that this loss was already included in pain and suffering, creating an improper double recovery. The plaintiff recovered an award for LOEL. In affirming that award, we held that LOEL was not the same as pain and suffering and that a LOEL award in a personal injury action is allowed as a separate element of damages. Kirk, 109 Wash.2d at 461, 746 P.2d 285. We reasoned that damages for pain and suffering and disability compensate only for the discomfort caused by an injury and the inability to lead a normal life but do not include the noneconomic rewards of specific skills as a separate element of damages. Kirk, 109 Wash.2d at 460-61, 746 P.2d 285. Contrary to the estate's assertion, Kirk did not overrule our holding or reasoning in Wooldridge. Rather, Kirk specifically distinguished Wooldridge as a survival action instead of a personal injury action. Relying on prior court rulings, we stated that  Wooldridge does not support a conclusion that an instruction regarding enjoyment of life would be barred in a personal injury action not governed by the [general] survival statute. Kirk, 109 Wash.2d at 461, 746 P.2d 285. Kirk further held that pain and suffering is a separate element of damages from LOEL. Thus, even a generous reading of Kirk does not support the conclusion that the outcome in Wooldridge was erroneous or that a decedent's estate should be allowed to recover postdeath damages for LOEL under Washington's general survival statute. Kirk noted the distinction that recovery for pain and suffering compensates a victim for only physical and mental discomfort caused by an injury, whereas recovery for LOEL compensates a victim for the inability to lead a normal life. Kirk, 109 Wash.2d at 461, 746 P.2d 285. In Kirk, the plaintiff was allowed to recover damages for LOEL because she consciously experienced discomfort from her injury and was unable to lead a normal life. Unlike Kirk, however, the estate in this case is not seeking damages for any conscious loss Ms. Otani may have experienced from her injury prior to death, nor does the evidence illustrate that Ms. Otani consciously experienced discomfort from her injury. Furthermore, Ms. Otani was not deprived of leading a normal life, but deprived of life itself. Accordingly, the statute does not permit a decedent's estate to recover damages for a decedent's loss of life' but for the decedent's LOEL which must be experienced prior to death. As mentioned, the statute preserves causes of action that a decedent could have maintained had he or she survived. Loss of enjoyment of life is not a claim Ms. Otani could have brought had she survived because it is not a loss she experienced during life. Thus, the cause of action was not preserved for her estate. See, e.g., Federated Servs.Ins. Co. v. Pers. Representative of Estate of Norberg, 101 Wash.App. 119, 125-27, 4 P.3d 844 (2000), review denied, 142 Wash.2d 1025, 21 P.3d 1150 (2001) (concluding that an estate could not recover for a decedent's loss of future inheritance because it was not a claim for which the decedent could have recovered if he survived). Additionally, the legislative history behind the 1993 amendment does not support the argument that the legislature intended to expand causes of action under the general survival statute to include postdeath damages for LOEL, nor does the legislative history indicate that damages for LOEL are available to a decedent who never experiences a conscious awareness of his or her loss. The legislature revised the language of the statute to allow recovery for the pain and suffering experienced by a decedent prior to death, whereas such damages were specifically excluded under the provisions of the prior statute. The amended statute still requires that a plaintiff consciously experience suffering in order to permit recovery. The estate argues that whether she was conscious of her loss or not, Ms. Otani still suffered the loss of enjoying 7.9 years of her life, and that to hold otherwise would be analogous to saying that a person who lies comatose for six months ... has suffered no compensable noneconomic loss because that person is not cognizant of any loss. Resp't's Brief at 3. However, as the Court of Appeals correctly noted, the estate is not seeking an award for any loss experienced by Ms. Otani in the few hours between her injury and her death. The estate is seeking damages for Ms. Otani's LOEL arising out of her death. The express language of the statute permits an estate to recover damages only for a decedent's conscious suffering prior to death and not for the decedent's death itself.