Opinion ID: 70446
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Municipal Liability under Section 1983

Text: Cities are not liable for constitutional violations committed by city employees unless those violations result directly from a municipal custom or policy. See, e.g., City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989); Conner v. Travis County, 209 F.3d 794, 796 (5th Cir.2000). Liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior is not cognizable in § 1983 actions. Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council-President Gov't, 279 F.3d 273, 286 (5th Cir.2002). It is, however, clear that a municipality's policy of failure to train its police officers can rise to § 1983 liability. Brown v. Bryan County, 219 F.3d 450, 456 (5th Cir. 2000). For the purposes of § 1983, an official policy is a policy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by the municipality's lawmaking officers or by an official to whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-making authority. Alternatively, official policy is a persistent, widespread practice of city officials or employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy. Finally, a final decisionmaker's adoption of a course of action tailored to a particular situation and not intended to control decisions in later situations' [ sic ] may, in some circumstances, give rise to municipal liability under § 1983. Id. at 457 (internal citations and quotations omitted). For Sanders-Burns to succeed on her failure to train claim against Plano, she must demonstrate that: (1) Plano's training policy procedures were inadequate, (2) Plano was deliberately indifferent in adopting its training policy, and (3) the inadequate training policy directly caused Sanders's death. See Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 200 (5th Cir.1996); see also Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 332 (5th Cir.2002). The Supreme Court has explained that a municipality can be liable for failure to train its employees when the municipality's failure shows `a deliberate indifference to the rights of its inhabitants.' Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 840, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (citing City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197). Deliberate indifference is more than mere negligence. Conner, 209 F.3d at 796 (citation omitted). Sanders-Burns must show that in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees, the need for more or different training is obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in violations of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonable be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390, 109 S.Ct. 1197. Finally, a showing of deliberate indifference is difficult, although not impossible, to base on a single incident. Gabriel v. City of Plano, 202 F.3d 741, 745 (5th Cir.2000); Conner, 209 F.3d at 797. Claims of inadequate training generally require that the plaintiff demonstrate a pattern. Davis v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 383 n. 34 (5th Cir.2005) (citation omitted). Notice of a pattern of similar violations is required. Id. at 383. The prior acts must be fairly similar to what ultimately transpired and, in the case of excessive use of force, that the prior act must have involved injury to a third party. Id. The single incident exception is narrow and to rely on the exception a plaintiff must prove that the highly predictable consequence of a failure to train would result in the specific injury suffered, and that the failure to train represented the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Id. at 386 (quoting Brown, 219 F.3d at 462) (internal quotation marks omitted).