Opinion ID: 1309702
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cross-examination of Dr. Carson

Text: (2) Defendant next contends the court erred in ruling that Dr. Carson, the defense psychologist, would be subject to cross-examination on the Carter, Burchell, and Hernandez homicides if she testified. We disagree. After the prosecution rested its case in the guilt phase, defense counsel informed the court that he would call Dr. Carson to give testimony on defendant's state of mind at the time of the killings. The prosecutor announced that if defendant tendered a mental defense, he would cross-examine the psychologist on the three uncharged homicides. Defense counsel objected. The court then conducted a hearing in camera to receive and evaluate counsel's offer of proof. Counsel established that Dr. Carson would testify in substance that defendant acted out of homosexual rage in the Parmer and Haynes homicides. The court ruled that if defendant tendered a mental defense through Dr. Carson's testimony, the prosecution would be entitled to cross-examine her on the uncharged homicides for impeachment purposes. Thereupon the defense rested without putting on any evidence. Other-crimes evidence may be used to impeach the testimony of an expert witness. (See People v. Nye (1969) 71 Cal.2d 356, 373-376 [78 Cal. Rptr. 467, 455 P.2d 395]; People v. Jones (1964) 225 Cal. App.2d 598, 610-613 [37 Cal. Rptr. 454].) Because an expert witness may be cross-examined more extensively and searchingly than a lay witness, the court has broad discretion to admit such evidence for impeachment. (See People v. Nye, supra, at pp. 374-375; People v. Jones, supra, at pp. 610-613.) No abuse of discretion appears here. Because Dr. Carson's opinion ... was at odds with the evidence introduced by the prosecution, the prosecutor was entitled to attempt to discredit it. ( People v. Nye, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 376.) Defendant seeks to avoid this conclusion by arguing on the basis of People v. Coleman (1985) 38 Cal.3d 69 [211 Cal. Rptr. 102, 695 P.2d 189], that use of the uncharged homicides should have been barred as unduly prejudicial. But the evidence here appears to be both more probative and less prejudicial than the mentally ill woman's [a]ccusatory statements `from the grave,' which were at issue in Coleman. ( Id. at p. 93.)