Opinion ID: 151577
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Brunn’s and Terragna’s Motions to Suppress

Text: Terragna and Brunn argue that the district court should have suppressed certain statements that each made while the FBI was conducting a search of their home. As all parties agree, they had not been given warnings in accordance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). We review de novo the denial of a motion to suppress statements that may have been obtained in violation of Miranda and review any underlying factual determinations for clear error. See United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 393 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2005). We give special deference to a district court’s credibility determinations where, as in this case, a suppression hearing was held. See United States v. Craighead, 539 F.3d 1073, 1082 (9th Cir. 2008). 3 Neither Brunn nor Terragna were in custody when they made the statements at issue. While the number of law enforcement personnel that were present weighs in favor of determining that they were in custody, the remainder of the Craighead factors do not. See id. at 1084. Brunn and Terragna were repeatedly told that they were not under arrest and would not be placed under arrest at the conclusion of the search. Brunn, himself a police officer, was allowed to spend time freely at the scene with someone he knew. Neither Terragna nor Brunn was physically restrained. And Terragna freely walked in and out of the house during the search and was able to feed her child. These circumstances are far different from those in Craighead, where Craighead was “escorted to a back room and the door was closed behind him,” an armed and armored detective appeared to be blocking Craighead’s exit from the room, and Craighead’s “emotional support” was excluded from the room. See id. at 1084–89.