Opinion ID: 2087265
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Stacking of Coverage Afforded Under the Business Auto Policy

Text: Whether stacking associated with the separate premiums paid for the pickup trucks under the business auto policy was proper turns on the operation of the following provision: The most we will pay for all damages resulting from bodily injury to any one person caused by any one accident is the limit of Bodily Injury shown in the declarations for `Each Person.' The trial judge concluded that the provision was unambiguous and precluded stacking. That ruling was based on the decision in Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Miller (1989), 190 Ill.App.3d 240, 137 Ill. Dec. 755, 546 N.E.2d 700, involving a similar provision. The appellate court in this case found Cincinnati Insurance to be distinguishable and the provision above ambiguous. 232 Ill.App.3d 221, 173 Ill.Dec. 251, 596 N.E.2d 875. Cincinnati Insurance is, indeed, distinguishable from the present case. Cincinnati Insurance, like this case, involved an attempt to aggregate coverage associated with two vehicles insured under a single business auto liability policy. (See Cincinnati Insurance, 190 Ill.App.3d at 248, 137 Ill.Dec. 755, 546 N.E.2d 700.) And, like this case, that question turned on the reading of a provision intended to limit the insurer's liability similar to that in Country Mutual's policy. In fact, the provision involved in Cincinnati Insurance was virtually identical, differing in only two words from the provision appearing in the business auto policy at issue here. The provision in Cincinnati Insurance contained the words this endorsement instead of the words the declarations used in Country Mutual's policy. Thus, the provision read: `The most we will pay for all damages resulting from bodily injury to any one person caused by any one accident is the limit [of bodily injury] shown in this endorsement for each person.' Cincinnati Insurance, 190 Ill.App.3d at 249, 137 Ill.Dec. 755, 546 N.E.2d 700. The appellate court in Cincinnati Insurance determined that the provision was unambiguous and limited the uninsured motorist protection to the amount stated on the endorsement. ( Cincinnati Insurance, 190 Ill.App.3d at 248-49, 137 Ill.Dec. 755, 546 N.E.2d 700.) Central to that determination was the fact that the endorsement in which the provision was contained was issued separately from the business auto liability policy. (See Cincinnati Insurance, 190 Ill.App.3d at 243-44, 245, 137 Ill.Dec. 755, 546 N.E.2d 700.) The endorsement was used to add a third vehicle to those listed under the existing policy. ( Cincinnati Insurance, 190 Ill.App.3d at 243-44, 137 Ill.Dec. 755, 546 N.E.2d 700.) Apparently because the endorsement contained one coverage amount associated with that one vehicle, the court concluded the provision in the endorsement limiting liability was unambiguous. The provision's specific limit of liability to the amount shown in the endorsement could mean only that amount of coverage stated for the vehicle listed in the endorsement as separate document for which only one additional premium was paid. That analysis is of little help here. The declarations of Country Mutual's business auto policy include reference to both of the pickup trucks for which the policy was issued and for which separate premiums were paid. The question is whether the meaning of the provision limiting liability is ambiguous in light of that fact. See Menke, 78 Ill.2d at 423-24, 36 Ill.Dec. 698, 401 N.E.2d 539. A reproduction of the declarations page of the Country Mutual policy is appended to this opinion. Most of that page consists of a series of columns. The third column from the left is headed YEAR MAKE, indicating that within that column appear entries identifying the vehicles covered under the policy by the maker and year of production of each. The pickup trucks covered are listed there. The entry 83 CHEVR, corresponding to a 1983 model Chevrolet pickup truck, is listed in the column, as is the entry 80 GMC, corresponding to a 1980 model General Motors Corporation pickup truck. The 83 CHEVR entry is listed in the column above the entry 80 GMC. To the right of the column for the make and year of the covered vehicles are other columns with headings corresponding to the premium amounts associated with the various coverages set out in the policy. Reading from left to right, other column headings include PART IV BODILY INJURY, PART IV PROPERTY DAMAGE, PART V MEDICAL PAYMENTS, PART VI UNINSURED MOTORIST, UNDERINSURED MOTORIST, PART VII COLLISION, PART VII OTHER PHYSICAL DAMAGE, CARGO, and, to the farthest right, TOTAL PREMIUM. The page is structured so that, reading to the right, as one would normally, from the entry for the year and make of each covered vehicle in the column headed YEAR MAKE at the left, the premiums charged and the total for each vehicle appear in a line, like words in a sentence. The sentence-like line of column entries for premium amounts and their total for the 83 CHEVR pickup truck appear above the sentence-like line of column entries for premium amounts and their total for the 80 GMC pickup truck. Understanding the arrangement of entries in the columns is important in determining the effect of what is not there included. Specifically, the limits of liability are not set out within the column arrangement in the same manner as the page lists the premium amounts and totals. That is, there is no column for which the limit of liability for bodily injury is to be listed like a premium amount so that the $100,000 limit for each person would appear in both sentence-like lines for the pickup trucks. It would not be difficult to find an ambiguity created by such a listing of the bodily injury liability limit for each person insured. It could easily be interpreted that an insured should enjoy a total limit $200,000 in coverage because a figure of $100,000 would be shown for each pickup truck. There would be little to suggest in such a listing that the parties intended that coverage was to be limited to that provided for only one of the two pickup trucks. It would be more reasonable to assume that the parties intended that, in return for the two premiums, two $100,000 coverage amounts were afforded. See Squire, 69 Ill.2d at 179-80, 13 Ill.Dec. 17, 370 N.E.2d 1044 (holding that the existence of two declarations pages, both setting $10,000 limits for liability for each person, created an ambiguity permitting the aggregation of those coverage amounts). But that is not the case. The limit of liability of $100,000 for bodily injury for each person is noted only once on the page. The limit is set forth outside and above the column for PART IV BODILY INJURY. Other limits of liability similarly appear above the columns for which the limits are associated. The Bruders insist that the declarations page is subject to no less than three possible constructions, making it necessary to construe the policy against Country Mutual. First, they argue the limit of liability can be read as applying for each vehicle. Because it is stated apart from the column arrangement, the limit must be read twice, once for each vehicle listed. The result would be the aggregation of $200,000 of coverage the Bruders seek. Second, they argue the limit can be read as the total amount available for either or both of the pickup trucks, resulting in $100,000 of coverage. Finally, the Bruders argue that the limit can be read as an amount which is to be proportionally decreased by the number of vehicles covered. Given the two pickup trucks here, the total amount of coverage afforded would be $50,000. The touchstone in determining whether ambiguity exists regarding an insurance policy, however, is whether the relevant portion is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation (see Monsalud v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1991), 210 Ill.App.3d 102, 107, 154 Ill.Dec. 748, 568 N.E.2d 969; Gibson v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. (1990), 193 Ill.App.3d 87, 90, 139 Ill.Dec. 700, 549 N.E.2d 23), not whether creative possibilities can be suggested. Reasonableness is the key. The declarations page here is subject to only one interpretation which is reasonable. Although two entries are found in the column PART IV BODILY INJURY for the premiums paid for each pickup truck, there is only one corresponding amount of liability for bodily injury for each person appearing on the page. That is the $100,000 amount appearing outside and above that column. The only reasonable interpretation is that the policy provides only $100,000 of liability for bodily injury occasioned to each person insured no matter how many vehicles are listed in the column arrangement and no matter how many premiums are paid. The representation of the limit of liability for bodily injury for each person on the declarations page is consistent with the language of the antistacking provision. It is also consistent with the language in the policy that the antistacking provision would apply regardless of the number of covered autos. Because there is no ambiguity in the limitation of liability provision, the provision must be applied as written. Aggregation of coverage associated with the premiums paid for the two pickup trucks under the business auto policy is not available. We therefore reverse the appellate court's determination to permit stacking as for both Ruth and Halie.