Opinion ID: 4657163
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Recorded Statements

Text: The Government seeks admission of Hamzeh’s statements planning an attack in the Middle East 5 and a domestic attack on a Masonic center. It also challenges exclusion of Hamzeh’s recorded statements to law enforcement after his arrest. 6 The 4 In a single paragraph, the Government states the fact Hamzeh’s recorded statements about attacks in the Middle East are relevant makes Dr. Levitt’s expert testimony on conflicts in the Middle East admissible. The Government fails to cite authority, to cite the record, or to present a meaningful argument. Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8). We deem the issue forfeited. 5 The court noted the statements about killing people overseas were made after Hamzeh met Mike and after Steve started working with the Government. The timing goes to the weight and credibility of the evidence, not its admissibility. 6It appears Hamzeh was issued Miranda warnings, and the Fourth Amendment is not at issue. 6 No. 19-3072 court excluded the evidence on relevance grounds and, in many instances, implied the evidence violated Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The Government ﬁrst argues the district court improperly found evidence bearing on Hamzeh’s predisposition to obtain a machinegun was “not probative” or “irrelevant.” We agree. Whether evidence is relevant is a low threshold. United States v. Driggers, 913 F.3d 655, 658 (7th Cir. 2019). Relevant evidence is that which “has any tendency to make a fact … of consequence” any “more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. A fact of consequence includes one that is “ultimate, intermediate, or evidentiary.” Fed. R. Evid. 401 advisory committee’s notes. Consequently, what must be proven at trial in this case is germane to the relevance inquiry. Hamzeh is charged with violating 26 U.S.C. § 5861, which states in relevant part, “It shall be unlawful for any person … to receive or possess a ﬁrearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record.” § 5861(d). The Government must show (1) Hamzeh consciously possessed a ﬁrearm; (2) he knew the features which brought the ﬁrearm “within the realm of regulation” (speciﬁcally, the automatic nature of the machineguns and the silencing eﬀect of the silencer); and (3) the ﬁrearm was not registered. United States v. Jamison, 635 F.3d 962, 967–68 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Edwards, 90 F.3d 199, 205 (7th Cir. 1996)). Regarding the third element, there is no requirement the Government show Hamzeh knew the weapons were unregistered, knew they were required to be registered, or intended not to register them. Id. at 968; see also United No. 19-3072 7 States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607 (1971) (holding no scienter is required for the registration element). Further, the district court allowed Hamzeh to raise the entrapment defense. 7 Once raised, the Government must show either (1) law enforcement and government agents did not induce Hamzeh to commit the crime or (2) Hamzeh was predisposed to commit the crime. See United States v. Blitch, 773 F.3d 837, 843 (7th Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Hilliard, 851 F.3d 768, 783 (7th Cir. 2017). Governmental inducement occurs when the government solicits the crime “plus some other government conduct that creates a risk that a person who would not commit the crime if left to his own devices will do so in response to the government’s eﬀorts.” United States v. Mayﬁeld, 771 F.3d 417, 434–35 (7th Cir. 2014). For example, “repeated attempts at persuasion, fraudulent representations, threats, coercive tactics, harassment, promises of reward beyond that inherent in the customary execution of the crime, pleas based on need, sympathy, or friendship” may each constitute such “other conduct.” Id. at 435. Predisposition to commit a crime occurs when a defendant was “‘ready and willing’ to commit the charged crime and ‘likely would have committed it without the government’s intervention, or actively wanted to but hadn’t yet found the means.’” Blitch, 773 F.3d at 845 (quoting id. at 438). This Circuit examines several factors in deciding whether a defendant is predisposed. See Mayﬁeld, 771 F.3d at 435. These include: 7Whether allowing the entrapment defense was proper is not before this Court. 8 No. 19-3072 (1) the defendant’s character or reputation; (2) whether the government initially suggested the criminal activity; (3) whether the defendant engaged in the criminal activity for proﬁt; (4) whether the defendant evidenced a reluctance to commit the oﬀense that was overcome by government persuasion; and (5) the nature of the inducement or persuasion by the government. Id. (quoting United States v. Pillado, 656 F.3d 754, 766 (7th Cir. 2011)). While no single factor is dispositive, the most important factor is “whether the defendant was reluctant to commit the oﬀense.” Id. (quoting Pillado, 656 F.3d at 766). Against this background, we examine the court’s relevance rulings. 8 First, in examining the recorded statements between Hamzeh and the informants, the court repeatedly excluded evidence as irrelevant or “not probative.” For example, the court excluded a conversation in which Hamzeh stated it was his “intention a long time ago” to martyr himself. It found the statement irrelevant concerning predisposition. 8 In ruling on the admissibility of Hamzeh’s recorded statements with the informants, the court used “probative” and “relevant” synonymously. See Dkt. 342 at 14 (“When the court opines below that a particular statement is probative of the defendant’s predisposition, it means that the statement is relevant for the jury to consider in determining whether the statement shows predisposition or was the result of inducement.”); c.f. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 184 (1997) (explaining “probative value” is determined by “comparing evidentiary alternatives” while relevance is determined in a vacuum); see generally Fed. R. Evid. 401 advisory committee’s notes (explaining relevance is determined “as a relation between an item of evidence and a matter properly provable in the case,” not in relation to other evidence (emphasis added)). Thus, when it found evidence “not probative,” it found that evidence irrelevant. See generally Fed. R. Evid. 402 (“Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.”). No. 19-3072 9 Under Mayﬁeld and its progeny, a defendant’s statement about when his intent to use a weapon was formed is certainly relevant. Hamzeh’s mental state and predisposition to obtain a machinegun will be central issues at trial. The fact Hamzeh stated he intended to commit an attack a long time ago, if believed by the jury, makes it more likely he was predisposed to obtain two machineguns and a silencer. The court expressed concern about conﬂating predisposition to commit a mass attack with predisposition to commit the charged oﬀenses of possession. These two concepts are not mutually exclusive under the law of relevance. If believed by the jury, the fact Hamzeh wanted to commit a mass attack is evidence he was predisposed to obtain the weapons necessary to do so. The court also erred in excluding Hamzeh’s statement, “But I am absolutely sure that the police won’t hear about the incident; they won’t hear about it.” The Government can introduce this evidence to show Hamzeh’s predisposition to obtain a silencer and as evidence bearing on the second element of the oﬀense. Concerning the latter, the Government must show Hamzeh knew of the silencing eﬀect of the silencer he possessed. While the jury is free to believe or disbelieve the Government’s interpretation of the statement, it is relevant for these purposes. The court also excluded a passage in which Hamzeh discussed what type of weapons he sought to acquire. On January 23, 2016, two days before he was arrested for unlawfully purchasing the weapons, he stated, “Listen, what we need from those people, two machineguns, and three silencers and three magazines.” Again, this evidence relates to the 10 No. 19-3072 reluctance factor of predisposition and shows Hamzeh’s mental state close to the date of the oﬀense, which is highly relevant. Most strikingly, the court excluded a recording of informant Steve telling Hamzeh he should not simply postpone his plans but should “[g]et the whole idea out of [his] head.” Before this statement, Hamzeh spoke about the fact his father tried to convince him not to travel abroad for an attack. Steve responded, “Well why don’t you give up the whole idea and stop this thing?” The court found the passage irrelevant. These statements clearly bear on the governmental inducement prong of the entrapment defense, in which repeated attempts at persuasion is a factor. The Government can introduce this evidence to show Steve attempted to dissuade Hamzeh from carrying out an attack, and necessarily from acquiring the weapons to do so. Next, the court found motive irrelevant because it is not an element of the crime. 9 We have held motive to possess a 9 Citing United States v. Khatib and United States v. Brown, the court came to this conclusion, but we interpret these cases differently. See generally Khatib, 706 F.2d 213, 216–17 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding the fact a government agent’s possession of firearms was exempt from the registration requirement did not provide a defense in a prosecution under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d)); Brown, 548 F.2d 204, 209 (7th Cir. 1977) (finding criminal liability attaches “regardless of the motives of either party to the transaction” and good intentions could not provide a defense to the crime of possession). However, the relevant language in those cases merely establishes that a defendant’s motive for not registering a firearm is irrelevant. In those instances, introduction of evidence of motive to excuse the registration element of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) is irrelevant since the registration element is a strict liability element of the overall crime. See Freed, 401 U.S. at 607; Jamison, 635 F.3d at 967–68. On the other hand, in this case, the No. 19-3072 11 ﬁrearm is relevant, despite not being an element of the crime, because it makes the element of possession more probable. U.S. v. Lloyd, 71 F.3d 1256, 1264 (7th Cir. 1995). As Hamzeh points out, physical possession is not disputed since he will concede that fact at trial. He argues his concession makes evidence of motive to possess the ﬁrearms irrelevant since the possession element would therefore not be “in issue.” This argument is misguided. Under Rule 401, the evidence need only aﬀect a fact “of consequence,” which includes any ultimate fact. See Fed. R. Evid. 401. As stated above, possession is one of the ultimate facts the Government must show, whether disputed or not. Relevant evidence remains relevant even if directed to an undisputed fact. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 179; see Fed. R. Evid. 401 advisory committee’s notes (“The fact to which the evidence is directed need not be in dispute. While situations will arise which call for the exclusion of evidence oﬀered to prove a point conceded by the opponent, the ruling should be made on the basis of such considerations as waste of time and undue prejudice (see Rule 403) … .”). Although the court committed legal error in ﬁnding motive irrelevant, as Hamzeh correctly points out, the error is academic because the Government sought to introduce evidence of motive to show predisposition, and the court considered its evidence as it relates to predisposition. So, the errors aﬀecting the Government’s case were the court’s relevance rulings ﬁnding the evidence not probative or relevant to entrapment. The speciﬁc statements in this section are merely some of the many instances in which the court excluded evidence that Government offers evidence of motive regarding the possession element, not the registration element. 12 No. 19-3072 is indeed relevant to the entrapment issue. By our count, the court ruled at least sixty times that evidence was not probative or relevant to entrapment. While we ﬁnd the excluded evidence relevant, it is not automatically admissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. It is still subject to other rules of evidence.
Second, the Government argues the court abused its discretion under Rule 403. See generally Fed. R. Evid. 403. After the district court ruled the Government’s evidence irrelevant, it used language similar to that found in Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, stating the evidence failed scrutiny under that rule, as well. 10 Rule 403 gives judges discretion to 10 Without explicitly ruling on these grounds, the court also expressed concern that admission of evidence about using machineguns to commit attacks abroad may violate Rule 404(a)(1) and Rule 404(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Government does not seek to introduce this evidence to prove character, a character trait, or conduct in conformity on a particular occasion. See generally Fed. R. Evid. 404; see also United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 856 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (explaining other-act evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) “only when its admission is supported by some propensity-free chain of reasoning”); see also United States v. Rogers, 587 F.3d 816, 822 (7th Cir. 2009) (clarifying 404(b) only “bars one particular inference from prior-act evidence”). Instead, it seeks to introduce the evidence as it relates to the entrapment defense, discussed above. Further, one of the factors in determining whether a defendant is predisposed is character or reputation, putting character “in issue.” See generally, Fed. R. Evid. 404 advisory committee’s notes (explaining “character in issue” occurs when character is “an element of a crime, claim, or defense.” (emphasis added)); see also Gomez, 763 F.3d at 858 (explaining other-act evidence is inadmissible to show intent in a case involving a general-intent crime “unless the defendant puts intent ‘at issue’ beyond a general denial of guilt”). No. 19-3072 13 exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of … unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Since the court erroneously found the Government’s evidence irrelevant, it necessarily was not properly able to weigh probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice to determine whether the latter substantially outweighed the former. While we would normally review exclusions of evidence under Rule 403 for abuse of discretion, 11 the better approach in this case is to remand for reweighing under Rule 403, since the errors made under the court’s Rule 401 determination necessarily aﬀected its Rule 403 determination. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 292 (1982) (“[W]here ﬁndings are inﬁrm because of an erroneous view of the law, a remand is the proper course unless the record permits only one resolution of the factual issue.”). We remind the court only exclusions of that evidence which violates Rule 403 should be made, and prejudice should be unfair to justify exclusion. See United States v. Buckner, 91 F.3d 34, 36 (7th Cir. 1996) (clarifying exclusion of evidence must be based on unfair prejudice, not mere prejudice); see generally Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee’s notes (deﬁning unfair prejudice as having “an undue tendency to 11 The Government argues we should rule all its evidence admissible due to the court’s legal errors. But, such a remedy ignores any rulings within the court’s discretion—for example, the court was well within its discretion to exclude Hamzeh’s racist comments about African Americans and the fact he expected to be considered a terrorist if caught—and fails to allow the court the opportunity to correct legal errors affecting its Rule 403 analysis. 14 No. 19-3072 suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one”). The district court should reweigh the evidence with the correct evidentiary standards, and with recognition the evidence is relevant and probative of whether Hamzeh was entrapped. See Gomez, 763 F.3d at 857 (noting an important issue in Rule 403 analysis is “the extent to which the non-propensity factual proposition actually is contested in the case”). When evidence is relevant and otherwise admissible, exclusions should be narrowly tailored to only the phrases or statements violative of Rule 403. We leave the Rule 403 determination, consistent with this opinion, in the district court’s sound discretion. See Rogers, 587 F.3d at 823 (“Rule 403 balancing depends on the context and individual circumstances of each case, and we prefer not to ‘cabin artiﬁcially the discretion of the district courts.’”(quoting United States v. Hawpetoss, 478 F.3d 820, 825 (7th Cir. 2007))).
The Government also asks this Court to review an order entered October 21, 2019, regarding Hamzeh’s post-arrest statements. Most of the order deals with admission of Hamzeh’s evidence based on the rule of completeness, not exclusion of the Government’s evidence. To the extent the Government seeks review of the admission of Hamzeh’s evidence, this Court is without jurisdiction to review those rulings. See 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (allowing appeal by the Government “from a decision or order of a district court suppressing or excluding evidence”). We conﬁne our review to the two decisions within that order excluding the Government’s evidence. First, the court excluded the Government’s proposed excerpt about Hamzeh’s passports and history of traveling abroad. It did so based on prior exclusions in the order dated No. 19-3072 15 October 16, 2019, which found inadmissible similar conversations about traveling abroad to commit an attack. In so doing, it stated its prior rulings made the post-arrest statement “no longer relevant.” Second, the court excluded statements Hamzeh made to a federal agent after his arrest about his conversations with a Muslim religious leader about whether to attack the Masonic center. Law enforcement asked Hamzeh whether he would have committed the attack had the religious leader said it was okay. The court found the exchange too speculative and “irrelevant” to the entrapment defense and the oﬀense with which he is charged. These rulings fall victim to the same evidentiary errors as the rulings regarding recorded conversations with the informants (found in the order entered October 16, 2019). The evidence is not oﬀered to prove Hamzeh actually would carry out the attacks abroad or domestically. Instead, it was oﬀered to show Hamzeh’s predisposition to obtain the ﬁrearms. The evidence is relevant to predisposition and should be reweighed under Rule 403.