Opinion ID: 433473
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 22 Chua argues that the United States lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to prosecute him because all the unlawful acts he committed were done in Malaysia. We disagree. There is no constitutional bar to the extraterritorial application of penal laws. United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 850 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966, 97 S.Ct. 1646, 52 L.Ed.2d 357 (1977). Although courts have been reluctant to give extraterritorial effect to penal statutes, they have done so when congressional intent to give extraterritorial effect is clear. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98, 43 S.Ct. 39, 41, 67 L.Ed. 149 (1922). Section 959 specifically states that it is intended to reach prohibited acts committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Sections 846 and 963, the statutory basis for the conspiracy count in this case, do not specifically provide for extraterritorial application. This court, however, has regularly inferred extraterritorial reach of conspiracy statutes on the basis of a finding that the underlying substantive statutes reach extraterritorial offenses. E.g., United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744, 750 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936, 93 S.Ct. 1913, 36 L.Ed.2d 396 (1973); Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 350 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 986, 88 S.Ct. 469, 19 L.Ed.2d 478 (1967). See also United States v. Layton, 509 F.Supp. 212, 225 (N.D.Cal.), appeal dismissed, 645 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.1981). Thus, the inference that Congress intended sections 846 and 963 to have extraterritorial application is readily made. 23 Before giving extraterritorial effect to penal statutes, courts have considered whether international law permits the exercise of jurisdiction. E.g., United States v. Schmucker-Bula, 609 F.2d 399, 402-403 (7th Cir.1980); King, 552 F.2d at 851; Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir.1967). 24 International law recognizes five general principles whereby a sovereign may exercise this prescriptive jurisdiction: (1) territorial, wherein jurisdiction is based on the place where the offense is committed; (2) national, wherein jurisdiction is based on the nationality or national character of the offender; (3) protective, wherein jurisdiction is based on whether the national interest is injured; (4) universal, which amounts to physical custody of the offender; and (5) passive personal, wherein jurisdiction is based on the nationality or national character of the victim. 25 United States v. Smith, 680 F.2d 255, 257 (1st Cir.1982) (footnote omitted). Many cases involve the prosecution of United States citizens for acts committed abroad, but extraterritorial authority is not limited to cases involving the nationality principle. Extraterritorial application of penal laws may be justified under any one of the five principles of extraterritorial authority. King, 552 F.2d at 851. 26 In King, this court upheld the authority of the United States to prosecute United States citizens for distribution of heroin in violation of section 959, the same statute involved in the present case. The distribution occurred in Japan, but the heroin was intended for importation into the United States. The court noted that the nationality principle applied because the appellants were United States citizens. However, the court stated that appellants' prosecution for violating Sec. 959 could also be justified under the territorial principle, since American courts have treated that as an 'objective' territorial principle. Id. at 851. Under the objective territorial principle, 27 Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the State should succeed in getting him within its power. 28 Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285, 31 S.Ct. 558, 560, 55 L.Ed. 735 (1911). This rule applies to nations as well as states. Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545, 549 (9th Cir.1961). In the present case, Chua intended to create a detrimental effect in the United States and committed acts which resulted in such an effect when the heroin unlawfully entered the country. Chua's section 959 prosecution is therefore justified under the objective territorial principle. See Rivard, 375 F.2d at 887. 29 Other courts have relied on the protective principle to justify jurisdiction over extraterritorial crimes involving the unlawful importation of controlled substances. See United States v. Newball, 524 F.Supp. 715, 720 (E.D.N.Y.1981); United States v. Egan, 501 F.Supp. 1252, 1258 (S.D.N.Y.1980). Noting that drug smuggling compromises a sovereign's control of its own borders, the Seventh Circuit has suggested that it might uphold extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over alien drug smugglers even if the territorial principle did not apply. Schmucker-Bula, 609 F.2d at 403. We are persuaded that the protective principle also justifies Chua's section 959 prosecution. 30 The objective territorial principle and the protective principle are equally applicable to the conspiracy count. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that extraterritorial jurisdiction over aliens exists when a conspiracy had for its object crime in the United States and overt acts were committed in the United States by co-conspirators. Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 624, 47 S.Ct. 531, 541, 71 L.Ed. 793 (1927). See also United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 982 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825, 96 S.Ct. 39, 46 L.Ed.2d 41 (1975). In the present case, Chua's co-conspirators committed acts in furtherance of the conspiracy inside the United States. Co-conspirator Tang was arrested at the San Francisco Airport as he attempted to retrieve suitcases containing heroin. Therefore, the United States does have jurisdiction to prosecute Chua.
31 Chua argues that the 1970 Drug Act under which he was convicted and sentenced incorporates the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, which limits the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States. Chua points to Article 36(a)(2)(iv) of the Single Convention which states: 32 (iv) Serious offenses heretofore referred to committed either by nationals or by foreigners shall be prosecuted by the Party in whose territory the offense was committed, or by the Party in whose territory the offender is found if extradition is not acceptable in conformity with the law of the Party to which application is made, and if such offender has not already been prosecuted and judgment given. 33 18 U.S.T. 1407, 1425 (emphasis added). 34 Chua cites no authority supporting the proposition that the Single Convention limits the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States. The plain language of the cited provision does not limit the jurisdiction of the United States. The only effect of the provision is that Malaysia would have been required to prosecute Chua if extradition had not been acceptable to Malaysia. The provision is not applicable in this case because extradition was acceptable to Malaysia. V DOUBLE JEOPARDY 35 Chua argues that he was convicted in Malaysia for the same offense as in the instant case and that the fifth amendment bar against double jeopardy was thereby violated. Chua also argues that the Single Convention proscribes a second prosecution in the United States. These arguments are frivolous. 36 This court rejected an identical double jeopardy argument in United States v. Richardson, 580 F.2d 946 (9th Cir.1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1068, 99 S.Ct. 835, 59 L.Ed.2d 33 (1979). This court clearly held that prosecution by a foreign sovereign does not preclude the United States from bringing criminal charges. Id. at 947. The court also held that the Convention neither affects the sovereignty of member nations nor embodies an agreement to refrain from prosecuting a defendant who has previously been tried by another signatory nation. Id. Chua's attempts to distinguish Richardson are unpersuasive. VI CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED 37 Chua claims that the Bureau of Prisons has improperly denied him credit for the time served in Malaysia from August 4, 1975 to October 1, 1977. The Bureau based its decision on a telegram from the State Department which stated Chua's initial arrest was in no way related to the offense for which Chua was arrested and deported. The Government contends this issue is not properly before this court because Chua has not exhausted his administrative remedies. 38 Under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3568, [t]he Attorney General shall give any such person credit toward service of his sentence for any days spent in custody in connection with the offense or acts for which sentence was imposed. This court has held that [i]t is the administrative responsibility of the Attorney General, the Department of Justice, and the Bureau of Prisons to compute sentences and apply credit where it is due. It is not the province of the sentencing court. United States v. Clayton, 588 F.2d 1288, 1292 (9th Cir.1979). It is only when a prisoner has exhausted his administrative remedies that he becomes entitled to litigate the matter in the district court. United States v. Mathis, 689 F.2d 1364, 1365 (11th Cir.1982). 39 This court recently explained why a petitioner must exhaust his administrative remedies before filing for collateral relief: 40 The requirement of exhaustion of remedies will aid judicial review by allowing the appropriate development of a factual record in an expert forum; conserve the court's time because of the possibility that the relief applied for may be granted at the administrative level; and allow the administrative agency an opportunity to correct errors occurring in the course of administrative proceedings. 41