Opinion ID: 3169692
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rizo Is Subject to a Final Order of Removal

Text: Our precedent dictates that Rizo petitioned for review from a final order of removal. The IJ’s decision was an order of removal: after denying Rizo’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT, the IJ granted a period of voluntary departure with an alternate order of removal to Nicaragua. This order of removal then became final when the BIA affirmed the IJ’s disposition of Rizo’s claims. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B). The BIA’s remand to the IJ did not affect the finality of the order of removal, as the IJ’s only role on remand was to provide certain necessary advisals regarding voluntary departure, and grant Rizo a new voluntary departure period. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 explicitly deprives us of jurisdiction to review an agency’s disposition of a petitioner’s request for voluntary departure. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(f). “Accordingly, the BIA’s decision denying asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection but remanding to the IJ for voluntary departure proceedings is a final order of removal . . . .” Pinto v. Holder, 648 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2011). The government, however, submits that this case is controlled by our recent decision in Abdisalan v. Holder, RIZO V. LYNCH 7 774 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 2014). In that case, we held that a decision by the BIA cannot be a final order of removal until all administrative proceedings have concluded, even if the BIA decision finalizes certain claims while remanding others to the IJ for further proceedings. Id. at 526. Abdisalan resolved a tension between two decisions of this circuit, Go v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2011) and Li v. Holder, 656 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2011). In Go, we held that there was no final order of removal — and we therefore lacked jurisdiction — until all administrative proceedings before the IJ had concluded. 640 F.3d at 1051–52. In Li, we held that there was a final order of removal as to an asylum claim when the BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of said claim, even when other issues were remanded to the IJ for further proceedings. 656 F.3d at 904. Abdisalan closed this split in our circuit’s law in favor of Go, holding that “when the [BIA] issues a decision that denies some claims but remands any other claims for relief to an [IJ] for further proceedings . . . the BIA decision is not a final order of removal with regard to any of the claims.” 774 F.3d at 520. Today, this court clarifies our holding in Abdisalan — and holds that Pinto remains the law of the Circuit.2 As we have recognized elsewhere, “[o]ur [] en banc decision in Abdisalan v. Holder does not disrupt our line of cases holding that a remand by the BIA to an IJ solely to consider voluntary departure does not affect the finality of the BIA’s decision for purposes of our review.” Solano-Rivera v. Holder, 599 Fed. App’x 271, 271 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). In this 2 Under the facts of the Abdisalan case, we specifically declined to “revisit our rule [set forth in Pinto] that the BIA’s decision is a final order of removal when it remands for consideration of voluntary departure but denies all other forms of relief.” Abdisalan, 774 F.3d at 526 n.8. 8 RIZO V. LYNCH case, as in Pinto, the court is presented with a petition where all substantive matters judicially reviewable by this court have been finalized. The only pending matter concerns voluntary departure — itself a form of removal, the granting or denial of which we are powerless to review by congressional mandate. See 8 U.S.C. § 1299c(f). The concerns we expressed in Adbisalan are therefore completely absent: there is no “mixed BIA decision” finalizing the negative disposition of certain claims for relief while remanding other claims that could yet lead to relief from deportation. 774 F.3d at 524. There is no threat that the order of removal could become final at multiple points in time. See id. When the BIA remanded Rizo’s claim to the IJ, Rizo was subject to the single, final order of removal contemplated by Congress and confirmed by this court in Abdisalan. See id. at 526 (“These agency interpretations shed further light on what the text of the statute already implies: in a case like Abdisalan’s, there is only one final order of removal, and when the BIA remands to the IJ, that order is not ‘final’ until administrative proceedings have concluded.”). Any concerns regarding the efficient utilization of this court’s limited resources are also ameliorated. The complete portfolio of issues capable of being reviewed by this court is finalized, even if non-reviewable administrative matters regarding voluntary departure remain pending. Abdisalan did not overturn Pinto, and does not disturb Pinto’s holding that a BIA remand for further proceedings as to voluntary departure does not affect the finality of an otherwise-final order of removal. We have jurisdiction over Rizo’s petition for review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we may review the merits of his petition. RIZO V. LYNCH 9