Opinion ID: 765540
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Severability of sec. 192.25

Text: 64 We have held that nearly all of sec. 192.25 is preempted by federal regulations and orders. The only part remaining is the two-person crew requirement for operations that are neither hostling nor helper service. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the statute's provisions are not severable, and so in preempting part we should invalidate the whole. This issue seems not to have been raised in the district court, but neither Wisconsin nor the UTU argue that this issue was waived so we will address it. 65 Whether invalid provisions in a state law can be severed from the whole to preserve the rest is a question of state law. Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 116 S. Ct. 2068, 2069 (1996); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 506 (1985). Both Leavitt and Brockett involved statutes that were partially invalid because some of their provisions were unconstitutional. We have found no case addressing the severability of a state statute that was partially preempted. We assume for purposes of deciding this case that state law would also govern this issue. Wisconsin's severability law was created by statute: 66 The provisions of the statutes are severable. . . . If any provision of the statutes or of a session law is invalid, or if the application of either to any person or circumstance is invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 67 Wis. Stat. sec. 990.001(11). The factors to consider in deciding whether a statute should be severed from an invalid provision are the intent of the legislature and the validity of the severed portion standing alone. In re Hezzie R. (State v. Hezzie R.), 580 N.W.2d 660, 665 (Wis. 1998) (quotation omitted). Section 192.25(3) provides that subsection (2) of the statute, which contains the two-person crew requirement, shall not apply to the extent it is contrary to federal regulations. This provision of course has no practical effect because the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution makes the statute apply only to the extent it does not conflict with federal law. But it does evidence a legislative intent to keep whatever part of subsection (2) was not preempted. It does not, of course, expressly show an intent to keep a part of subsection (2) when subsection (1) had also been preempted. But we think the intent is clear enough and the purpose of sec. 192.25 is not thwarted by federal preemption of subsection (1). Although the state requirements for crew qualifications are ineffective this does not mean that any miscellaneous person could operate a train in Wisconsin. Subsection (1) is preempted precisely because the FRA has covered the subject matter of crew qualifications with its extensive regulations. Indeed, the Wisconsin legislature merely adopted the federal standards for engineers and its standards for trainmen are compatible with the federal requirements and certainly less extensive. Thus, we conclude that the remaining parts of sec. 192.25 can be given effect without the preempted parts, and that the legislature so intended. We therefore decline to strike down the statute in its entirety.