Opinion ID: 437194
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Analysis of Section 2412(b)

Text: 38 The district court correctly pointed to the testimony of Armand Derfner as the key to understanding the House subcommittee's amendment of section 2412(b). As the majority notes, the original version of Senate Bill 265 limited the United States' liability under section 2412(b) to the extent that a private party would be liable. Award of Attorney's Fees Against the Federal Government: Hearings on S.265 Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary Committee, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 3, 9 (1980) (hereinafter Hearings on S.265). Derfner was the only witness to comment on the term private party. He expressly brought to the committee's attention the discrepancy between a state's liability for attorney's fees under sections 1983 and 1988, 1 and the federal government's liability in similar circumstances under the proposed wording of section 2412(b): 39 Mr. Kastenmeier, if I could just direct myself to one portion of this bill? 40 There is an area in which a slight drafting modification could carry out what I believe might be the intention of the committee; and that is to put the United States completely on a par as far as the enforcement of important constitutional and statutory rights. 41 In the Civil Rights Act of 1976 you provided that when someone, whether it be an individual or business, or whatever, sues a State or local government under 42 United States Code, section 1983, to vindicate a constitutional or Federal statutory right, that fees would be available under the Newman v. Peggy [Piggie] Park standard. These bills say that the United States should pay fees--in the amendment to 28 United States Code 2412--in those circumstances where the court may award such fees in suits involving private parties. 42 That doesn't say State or local government, but if the language were amended to read, in those circumstances where the court may award such fees in suits involving other litigants; it would achieve that purpose. And I think it would go even further toward putting the United States on a par with other governmental bodies. 43 Hearings on S.265 at 100. 44 Derfner was not quite accurate in stating that a party sues a State under section 1983. The eleventh amendment bars such a suit against a state qua state absent the state's consent. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 339-41, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1144-45, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782, 98 S.Ct. 3057, 3057, 57 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1978) (per curiam); Peters v. Lieuallen, 693 F.2d 966, 970 (9th Cir.1982). Instead, section 1983 actions are brought against state officials in their official capacity, see Peters, 693 F.2d at 970, or against local governmental units, see Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035-36, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Nevertheless, Derfner was correct that the state itself is liable under section 1988 for the attorney's fees assessed in section 1983 actions against state officials, at least where the plaintiff obtains prospective relief in the underlying section 1983 action. In Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978), the Supreme Court held that such fees did not offend the eleventh amendment, id. at 694-97, 98 S.Ct. at 2575-77, and could be awarded even though the state itself was not a party to the underlying section 1983 action. Id. at 699-700, 98 S.Ct. at 2578. As the Court noted: 45 Although the Eleventh Amendment prevented respondents from suing the State by name, their injunctive suit against prison officials was, for all practical purposes, brought against the State. 46 Id. See also Spain v. Mountanos, 690 F.2d 742, 744 (9th Cir.1982) (state Controller and Treasurer ordered to pay from state treasury attorney's fees assessed in section 1983 action against state officials); Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d 1268, 1271 (5th Cir.1980) (same). 2 47 The thrust of Derfner's suggestion, therefore, was that the United States should be liable for attorney's fees if federal officials deprived a party of constitutional rights, just as a state would be liable for such fees under section 1988 if state officials violated section 1983. Without further discussion of the bill's wording, the House subcommittee amended the bill to replace private party with the current terms any other party, essentially a verbatim adoption of Derfner's suggestion. 48 Testimony before a congressional committee sometimes is of dispositive weight in interpreting congressional intent where the testifying witness is closely identified with the legislation. See, e.g., United States v. Henning, 344 U.S. 66, 72 n. 14, 73 S.Ct. 114, 118 n. 14, 97 L.Ed. 101 (1952) (citing congressional testimony of the Assistant Administrator for Insurance, Veterans Administration, to interpret statute); United States v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 547-48, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 1066, 84 L.Ed. 1345 (1940) (testimony of Chairman of Legislative Committee of the Interstate Commerce Commission); 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, Sec. 48.11 (4th ed. 1973) (statements of individual witnesses considered where they sponsored or led legislation through Congress). Those cases impliedly held that Congress evidenced agreement with the witness' views by enacting the legislation that the witness sponsored. 49 In the instant case, it is the sequence of events, rather than the witness' sponsorship of the legislation, that provides a nexus between the intent of Congress and that of the witness. Congress, without stating any other reason for the change, amended S.265 in precisely the fashion Derfner suggested. Far from being a bit or scrap of legislative history as the majority implies, Derfner's testimony is the only reason in the legislative record for the amendment. The majority fails to explain the remarkable coincidence in the timing of Derfner's suggestion and the amendment. The only plausible explanation is that Congress adopted the amendment for the reason Derfner suggested. See Premachandra v. Mitts, 727 F.2d 717, 728-29 (8th Cir.1984),rehearing granted, 727 F.2d 717 (8th Cir.1984). 50 If further confirmation of congressional purpose were necessary, it is apparent that the amendment replacing private party with any other party was aimed at section 1983. The House report on the amended bill expressly states that section 2412(b) clarifies the liability of the United States under such statutes as the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 [section 1988] ... H.R.Rep. No. 96-1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 4984, 4996 (hereinafter House Report). Of all the statutes mentioned in section 1988, however, only section 1983 differentiates between states and private parties, because only section 1983 requires parties to act under color of state law before liability may attach. 51 Federal officials who deprive persons of constitutional rights under color of federal law are not liable for damages under section 1983. See, e.g., Ellis v. Blum, 643 F.2d 68, 83 and n. 17 (2d Cir.1981); Hubbert v. United States Parole Commission, 585 F.2d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir.1978). Relief is available against federal officials in such situations, however, either in a suit arising directly from the constitution against the official in his individual capacity, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), or in a suit against him in his official capacity, see Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 796-97 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905, 101 S.Ct. 3030, 69 L.Ed.2d 405 (1981). The only conceivable purpose for the amendment to S.265 was to place the federal government in the same position regarding attorney's fees in these actions as state governments under section 1983 (through the provisions of section 1988). 52 In order to avoid the logical conclusion that S.265 was amended to impose fees in these actions, however, the majority construes the amendment in an unrealistic manner. The majority concludes the amendment merely removes sovereign immunity as a bar to fees awards where the government is found liable under a substantive provision that would authorize a fee award against a state. Majority Op. at 9; see also Majority Op. at n. 4. The majority, however, cites no substantive provision other than section 1983 that distinguishes between states and individuals. The original version of S.265, therefore, removed the sovereignty bar to fee awards in all cases except those arising under section 1983, because private parties could be liable under all of the other statutes named in section 1988. The majority apparently means that Congress adopted the amendment only to remove sovereign immunity as a bar to fees awards against the federal government in the extremely rare case where such fees would be available under section 1983. In other words, in the majority's view Congress intended that attorney's fees could be assessed against the federal government under section 2412(b) if a federal official deprived a party of constitutional rights under color of state law, but not if the official acted under color of federal law. 53 The legislative record does not support this strained construction of congressional intent. Federal officials usually act under color of federal law and seldom act to deprive a party of constitutional rights under color of state law. See Premachandra, 727 F.2d at 729; cf. Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 623 (7th Cir.1979), rev'd in part on other grounds, 446 U.S. 754, 100 S.Ct. 1987, 64 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980) (per curiam) (imposing liability on federal officials under section 1983 only where state officials played a significant role in the underlying constitutional violation). The majority apparently recognizes that Congress did not intend to focus on these uncommon situations, because the majority adopts its construction even though it assumes that Congress amended section 2412(b) in response to the comments of Mr. Derfner. Majority Op. at 9. I would not read the amendment so as to frustrate Congress' intent. Cf. Barnes v. Donovan, 720 F.2d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir.1983) (parties may not resort to an unduly literal interpretation of a statute that eviscerates the clear intent of Congress). 54