Opinion ID: 2508188
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Testimony Regarding Effect of Shackling on Verdict

Text: Davis contends the trial court erred by permitting, over his objection, jurors Buchanan, Dasher, and Nelson to testify at the reference hearing that their knowledge of Davis's shackling did not influence or affect their verdict. At the reference hearing the trial court permitted Buchanan to testify that seeing Davis in restraints on two occasions during the guilt phase of the trial had no effect on his verdict in the guilt or penalty phases. [89] The trial court also permitted Dasher to testify that another juror's comment to her that one of the defendants was wearing restraints did not make or have any bearing on whether I thought Mr. Davis was guilty or not. [90] And finally the trial court permitted Nelson to testify that seeing Davis in restraints in the hallway prior to voir dire did not have any effect on his deliberations or verdict. [91] According to Davis, the jurors' testimony about whether they subjectively believed that knowledge of his shackling affected their deliberations was outside the scope of the five questions we asked the trial court to resolve at the reference hearing and is irrelevant under case law. The State counters that to prevail on his claim of shackling, Davis has to show he was actually prejudiced such that the jury's verdict was affected by his shackling. As a result, according to the State, the trial court did not err by allowing jurors to testify that Davis's shackling did not affect their decisions. Davis cites to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Dyas for the proposition that jurors' subjective beliefs regarding the effect of shackling is irrelevant and must be disregarded. [92] However in Dyas, no precautions were taken to conceal the shackles from the jurors; the evidence of guilt was not overwhelming; and the juror's subjective views on shackling were given before trial took place. [93] Dyas is distinguishable from the present case, where the jurors' testimony on the effect of shackling on them was given after trial concluded. Because on collateral relief the inquiry is whether the petitioner (1) was actually prejudiced, and (2) whether the prejudice was substantial, consideration of actual effect might be probative. However, given the remoteness in time of the reference hearing from the actual verdict, we decline to consider such testimony.