Opinion ID: 2182951
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Motions for immunity by the defense.

Text: At the postconviction hearing Robert Gage, the friend to whom the defendant had allegedly given the keys to the car involved in the burglary, again took the stand. When questioned about a statement he had given to defendant's trial counsel, in which he admitted that he was one of the burglars but stated that defendant was not the other, he invoked his fifth amendment privilege. He also refused to answer questions about his activities on the night of the burglary, except to claim that Peters did not accompany him on any of these activities. Counsel for defendant then tried unsuccessfully to move the court for a grant of immunity to Gage. On this review, counsel for defendant argues that criminal defendants should have the right to move the court to grant immunity to witnesses. Under sec. 972.08, Stats., only the district attorney may now make such a motion. Defendant argues that his fundamental constitutional right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor [23] should include a right to move for immunity of witnesses. This court has faced this issue in three previous cases, and has rejected the notion of a defendant's right to cause the granting of immunity to witnesses. In Elam v. State , [24] just as in this case, a witness at a postconviction hearing had allegedly exculpatory evidence in a burglary case, and the defendant attempted to get the trial court to grant this unwilling witness immunity. This court found that the trial court had no authority to grant immunity without a motion by the district attorney. In Hebel v. State , [25] the constitutional dimensions of this situation were thoroughly considered, and the court concluded that the lack of opportunity for the defendant to immunize did not constitute a denial of due process. The same result was reached in the recent case of Sanders v. State. [26] Wardius v. Oregon , [27] relied upon by the defendant, does not require a different result. In that case the United States Supreme Court held that a state could not, consistent with the dictates of due process, require that a defendant disclose the details of his alibi defense, and at the same time deny him reciprocal discovery rights. Defendant contends that this rationale should extend to a reciprocal right to move for immunity. In support of this contention he also cites cases which hold that the prosecution may be compelled to give up previously exclusive rights to the identity of informers, [28] and to the substance of grand jury testimony. [29] However, in Wardius and the cases involving informers and grand jury testimony, all that was involved was disclosure and exchange of evidentiary information. This is quite different from the immunity situation where, in addition to whatever evidence may be obtained from the immunized witness, the criminal laws of the state are suspended in relation to that witness. The state, through the district attorney, has a vital concern in controlling the use of this extraordinary device. Unlike the Wardius situation of pretrial discovery, there are in the immunity situation significant governmental interests which . . . support the lack of reciprocity. [30] Lack of reciprocity in moving for immunity is supported by other considerations. The district attorney, as the representative of the state, is charged with the enforcement of the criminal laws of the state. Any suspension of the criminal laws by grant of immunity where the state, through the district attorney, has not waived its right to prosecute by making the motion for immunity would be of questionable validity. Secondly, the potential for disruptive, collusive or frivolous use of such motions by the defense would be present because the defense has nothing to lose and much to gain by such motions. The state, on the other hand, is kept in check by the fact that it has to weigh the question of whether it should forego prosecution of one party in order to gain sufficient evidence for the conviction of other parties. Finally, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly examined nonreciprocal immunity statutes, without any indication of their constitutional infirmity from this point of view. [31] Such statutes have been said to have historical roots deep in Anglo-American jurisprudence [32] and have become part of our constitutional fabric. [33] Although previous cases have emphasized that the immunity statute is primarily intended for the benefit of the prosecution, [34] it must not be forgotten that the duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict. [35] When the prosecutor is considering whether or not to make a motion for immunity, he should bear in mind this predominant objective of impartial justice, and not merely whether the evidence will be favorable to the prosecution. He should not hesitate to move for immunity solely on the ground that the testimony thus elicited might exonerate the defendant. By the Court. Order reversed insofar as convictions for obstructing an officer and burglary are concerned; cause remanded for a new trial on these two charges.