Opinion ID: 2385250
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plaintiff's Evidence, Even if Admissible, Was Totally Inadequate

Text: To pile Pelion upon Ossa, the majority's decision cannot or should not be sustained for two additional reasons. The majority bases its position on the testimony of C. William Kraft (counsel for Boyd), who testified seven years after the alleged oral agreement (between Boyd and Albright who was the payee in the judgment note) which greatly varied the judgment note, that Albright admitted to him and his client in a heated conversation ten months after the alleged oral agreement, that he had made an oral agreement prior to the execution of the judgment note and that he did not intend to keep it. This is a strange admission for a man to make to his adversary and his adversary's attorney. The Chancellor believed Judge Kraft [] and found that the parties had made the exact agreement which Judge Kraft testified Albright orally admitted. However, plaintiff's other witness, Guerrina, testified to a different oral agreement; the testimony of the architect Jobson, who incidentally wrote a confirming letter one day after the alleged oral agreement, as to his understanding was entirely different; and Albright was not called upon to testify in behalf of the plaintiff when it was his burden to prove by evidence which was clear, precise and convincing a specific oral agreement  if any existed and was admissible  which varied the written agreement. Such testimony, under all the facts and circumstances of this case, certainly does not rise to the test of clear, precise and convincing evidence which is necessary  if admissible at all  to justify the material alteration of the subsequent written agreement. This contrariety of recollection or testimony is an additional illustration of one of the basic reasons for the modern Parol Evidence Rule. How unwise and fallacious the majority's new interpretation of the Parol Evidence Rule is may be illustrated by the following example: If plaintiff and ten witnesses testified, and their testimony was clear, precise and convincing, that prior to or contemporaneously with the written agreement, plaintiff and defendant agreed to an oral agreement which varied or modified the written agreement, or if defendant admitted this oral agreement by demurrer, that testimony is inadmissible and that admission of record is legally insufficient to vary or modify the written agreement: Bardwell v. The Willis Co., 375 Pa., supra, and cases hereinabove cited. However, if plaintiff testifies and his testimony, even though contradicted, is clear, precise and convincing, that the day after or one year after or seven years after the written agreement was signed, defendant admitted the contemporaneous or prior oral agreement  such testimony is not only admissible but is legally sufficient to vary or modify the written agreement. An easier way to circumvent and nullify the modern Parol Evidence Rule and to reopen (as before Gianni v. R. Russell & Co., Inc., 281 Pa. 320, 126 A. 791) the gate to fraud, it would be difficult to imagine. The majority opinion says that the Parol Evidence Rule is aimed at the prevention of, not the protection, of fraud. There is not a scintilla of evidence in this case of fraud. The basic reasons for the establishment of Pennsylvania's modern Parol Evidence Rule were (a) to prevent fraud; (b) to eliminate the tremendous confusion which the old Rule had caused, and (c) to establish the integrity of written agreements. Like the Statute of Frauds, the Dead Man's Rule, the Statute of Limitations, Laches, Estoppel, Adverse Possession and other rules of limitation or repose, cases will arise where a just claim is defeated. While that would not be sufficient to justify the abandonment, emasculation or nullification of the modern Parol Evidence Rule, this is not such a case. It is, we repeat, difficult to imagine an easier way to avoid or circumvent and nullify the modern Parol Evidence Rule than that approved in the majority opinion. Even the appellants never urged this circumvention, nor did Judge HAROLD L. ERVIN (who is now a member of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania) who admitted [] this oral evidence to prove payment (payment or non-payment can always be proved by parol evidence). The majority opinion has cited one modern Supreme Court case in an attempt to support the admission of this testimony which, as we have seen, circumvents and nullifies the modern Parol Evidence Rule, namely, Allinger v. Melvin, 315 Pa. 298, 172 A. 712. The Allinger case was a wise decision but it is clearly distinguishable. The question there was whether parol evidence was admissible to prove a contemporaneous agreement that execution on a bond (and accompanying mortgage) should be limited to the mortgaged premises. Both parties to the bond testified that the aforesaid restriction which was agreed upon had been omitted from the bond by mistake and that the obligee, to avoid delaying settlement, agreed that he would immediately give the obligor a letter or agreement protecting him and restricting the obligation to the mortgaged real estate. The obligee then executed and delivered to the obligor the letter which restricted the bond. The Court correctly held that the testimony by both parties of this oral agreement which was omitted by mistake, was admissible, and said (page 304): . . . In view of the finding of the jury, based on the evidence of both parties to the contract, there can be no question that Whelan made a mistake in omitting from the bond the agreed-upon restrictions, that Melvin detected the mistake, refused to execute the papers, and ultimately did so only on Whelan's promise to correct the mistake, as was in fact done by the letter and supporting oral evidence received. . . . Here both parties to the contract agree that the instrument, as Whelan drew it, did not express their agreement, and that it would not have been executed unless the supplementary [restricting] agreement had been made. Proof of such agreement was proper: . . . I would hold that the judgment note executed by Boyd could not be varied and nullified by this alleged prior parol agreement and I would allow Hoffman's claim thereunder. Mr. Justice MUSMANNO joins in this opinion.