Opinion ID: 765614
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sanzi's Questioning of Jones

Text: 21 After directing Jones to step out of the car, Sanzi asked him a series of approximately six questions, beginning with inquiries about Jones's travels and culminating in Sanzi asking to see the money Jones had flashed from his pocket in response to the previous question. When Sanzi examined these bills and determined that they were counterfeit, he arrested Jones and read him the Miranda warnings. Jones argues that Sanzi's questioning was a custodial interrogation that produced inculpatory responses from Jones in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; he contends that the law required Sanzi to give Jones Miranda warnings before questioning him. According to the government, however, the pre-Miranda questions were proper because Jones was not in custody until Sanzi formally arrested him. 22 Jones concedes that Miranda applies only to custodial interrogations; our analysis, therefore, focuses upon whether Jones was in custody at any point during this initial questioning. The decisive issue in the custody inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associatedwith a formal arrest. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1529, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1994) (internal punctuation and quotation omitted). In making this determination, we engage in a fact-specific inquiry, evaluating all of the circumstances surrounding the incident. Although no single element dictates the outcome of this analysis, factors that we consider in deciding whether a defendant was in custody at the time of questioning include: whether the suspect was questioned in familiar or at least neutral surroundings, the number of law enforcement officers present at the scene, the degree of physical restraint placed upon the suspect, and the duration and character of the interrogation. United States v. Masse, 816 F.2d 805, 809 (1st Cir. 1987) (quotation omitted). 23 In the present case, the totality of the circumstances indicates that Sanzi's questions of Jones did not constitute a custodial interrogation. Although the location apparently was not familiar to Jones and the area was not well-lit, a public highway is a neutral setting that police officers are not in a position to dominate as they are, for example, an interrogation room at a jailhouse. Cf. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 438-39, 104 S. Ct. at 3149-50 (in refusing to require Miranda warnings prior to formal arrest of suspect questioned pursuant to traffic stop, observing that public nature of traffic stop reduces the ability of an unscrupulous policeman to use illegitimate means to elicit self-incriminating statements and offsets aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer that may intimidate a motorist). In addition, Jones was with a companion, and only one trooper questioned each of the suspects. Sanzi did not subject Jones to any physical restraint; his only requirement of Jones with respect to his physical position was that Jones exit the car, a direction that Jones does not challenge on this appeal. Sanzi furthermore testified that he used a normal tone of voice when questioning Jones. Finally, Sanzi stated that the duration of the stop and questioning was brief -- two to three minutes from the initiation of the stop to the formal arrest -- a time frame that seems reasonable given the events that occurred during that period. Cf. United States v. Quinn, 815 F.2d 153, 157-58 (1st Cir. 1987) (concluding that Miranda warnings were not required at any time during 20-25 minute period in which officers continued to interrogate suspects). 24 We further observe that Sanzi implemented the purpose of a Terry stop by using the short period of questioning to confirm or allay his suspicions about Jones's connection to the reported counterfeiting incident. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439, 104 S. Ct. at 3150 (The stop and inquiry must be reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation. Typically, this means that the officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions.) (internal punctuation, quotation, and citation omitted); see also Sowers, 136 F.3d at 27 (noting that Terry sanctions a brief detention of an individual to confirm or allay a police officer's reasonable suspicions and approving officer's separate questioning of driver and passenger of car during 30 minute stop that eventually led to discovery of contraband). In this case, Sanzi asked Jones only a few questions, all of which related directly to his justification for initiating the stop: his reasonable suspicion that the vehicle's occupants might have been involved in the counterfeit bill-passing incident. 25 Jones incorrectly argues that whether the stop complied with Terry is irrelevant to the Miranda analysis because Terry involved a Fourth Amendment challenge, whereas Miranda concerns the Fifth Amendment. Although the Terry case itself did not explicitly address the effect of an investigative stop and inquiry upon an individual's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, the Supreme Court since has recognized that a valid Terrystop, including brief questioning relevant to the reasonable suspicions that prompted the officer to detain the individual, does not run afoul of the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Berkemer, 468 U.S. 420 at 440, 104 S. Ct. at 3150 (The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda.). Examining the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Jones was not in custody until Sanzi formally placed him under arrest. The short series of questions that Sanzi posed to him, therefore, were not part of a custodial interrogation and did not violate the requirements of Miranda.