Opinion ID: 2196613
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ruling without a Hearing

Text: As is the case with the first issue, the Maryland Rule differs, in its wording, from the comparable Federal Rule. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 says nothing about whether a U.S. District Court must hold a hearing on a motion for new trial, and the Federal courts have interpreted that silence as indicating that the court has discretion in the matter. See United States v. Wright, 625 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir.1980); United States v. DiPaolo, 835 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.1987); United States v. Herman, 614 F.2d 369 (3d Cir.1980); United States v. Molovinsky, 688 F.2d 243 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1221, 103 S.Ct. 1228, 75 L.Ed.2d 462 (1983); United States v. Chagra, 735 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. O'Dell, 805 F.2d 637 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1129, 106 S.Ct. 1658, 90 L.Ed.2d 201 (1986); United States v. Hedman, 655 F.2d 813 (7th Cir.1981); United States v. Bednar, 776 F.2d 236 (8th Cir.1985); United States v. Nace, 561 F.2d 763 (9th Cir.1977); United States v. Bradshaw, 787 F.2d 1385 (10th Cir.1986); United States v. Slocum, 708 F.2d 587 (11th Cir.1983). See also Story v. State, 788 P.2d 617 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 836, 111 S.Ct. 106, 112 L.Ed.2d 76 (1990); Clark v. State, 530 N.E.2d 1182 (Ind.1988). We have noted above the requirements of Maryland Rule 4-331. Section (e) of that rule is clear and direct. Unlike the Federal rule, and with the one inapplicable exception stated, it requires that [t]he court shall afford the defendant or counsel and the State's Attorney an opportunity for a hearing on a motion filed under this Rule. In her motion, petitioner expressly requested a hearing, so no issue of waiver is presented. It is not entirely clear to us whether, in affirming the trial court's ruling, the Court of Special Appeals interpreted Rule 4-331(e) as conditioning the right to a hearing on a preliminary determination by the court that the evidence posited by the defendant is, in fact, newly discovered, or whether it recognized the right to a hearing on that issue as well but simply concluded that the denial in this case was harmless, or non-prejudicial. Whichever theory it used, we think it erred. The rule requires the opportunity for a hearing on a motion filed under this Rule. The motion, of course, asserts both that the evidence was newly discovered and that it might well have produced a different result. We can find no basis for a conclusion that the required hearing is only to consider the second allegation and that the court may avoid a hearing by determining, preliminarily and without a hearing, that the evidence was not newly discovered. The only basis for the court to deny a hearing is expressly provided for in the rulea determination that the motion was filed late and did not comply with the requirements of § (d) of the Rule. The alternative prospectthat, without so characterizing it by name, the Court of Special Appeals effectively applied a harmless error approach to the undisputed violation of the rule in this caseis equally unsupportable. Whether the denial of a hearing in contravention of Rule 4-331(e) can ever be harmless erroran issue we need not resolve in this appealit is clear that the violation that occurred in this case was not harmless. In Noble v. State, 293 Md. 549, 559, 446 A.2d 844, 848 (1982), we recognized that the rules of criminal procedure are not exempt from the harmless error principle. We reaffirmed, however, our adherence to the more general principle that the rules of practice and procedure adopted by this Court are to be strictly followed and that [a] violation of one of these rules constitutes error, normally requiring such curative action or sanction as may be appropriate. Id. at 557, 446 A.2d at 848. In essence, that simply paraphrases the provision in Maryland Rule 1-201(a): When a rule, by the word `shall' or otherwise, mandates or prohibits conduct, the consequences of noncompliance are those prescribed by these rules or by statute. If no consequences are prescribed, the court may compel compliance with the rule or may determine the consequences of the noncompliance in light of the totality of the circumstances and the purpose of the rule. There are many rules dealing with hearings on motions of one kind or another, and they seem to fall into three categories. In some instances, the rule focuses on the particular action that may be taken but conditions the taking of that action on first affording the parties an opportunity for hearing or an opportunity to be heard. [4] Other rules are not phrased in sequential or conditional language but expressly require a hearing, not just the opportunity for one. [5] In yet other cases, we have made clear that neither a hearing nor an opportunity for one is required and have left it to the discretion of the court whether to conduct a hearing. [6] Rule 4-331(e) combines features of all three categories. The general requirementthe one relevant hereis that the court shall afford the defendant or counsel and the State's Attorney an opportunity for a hearing on a motion filed under this Rule. That requirement is not cast in sequential or conditional language, as are most of the other rules that speak only of an opportunity for a hearing, but, by requiring only the opportunity for a hearing and not absolutely mandating one, the rule also more clearly allows for a waiver of a hearing. Under either approach, however, in the absence of a waiver by both sides, the court must conduct a hearing before acting on the motion. Even when afforded only by rule, and not as an incident of due process of law, the right to a hearing is of fundamental importance. It represents an assessment by us of the significance of the matter under consideration, at least to the parties, and, given that significance, of their right, if they choose to exercise it, to present directly to the court, viva voce, the reasons why they should prevail. It is a recognition that personal, vocal communication with the judge may not only itself be a more effective means of persuasion than written documents that may be read hurriedly and not fully appreciated or understood, but that a hearing offers at least a limited opportunity for dialogue, allowing for clarification, for greater precision, for addressing concerns harbored and expressed by the judge. It is a right that, ordinarily, may be waived, but when not waived, we are loathe, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, to find its denial harmless. It would often be a matter of pure speculation whether prejudice ensuedwhether, had the party been given the opportunity to make his or her pitch at a hearing, the result may have been differentand that is much more likely the case when the decision may rest upon the resolution of factual disputes or the exercise of discretion and judgment. That is the situation here. This was a non-jury trial. The judge decided the relevant facts. In denying petitioner's first motion for new trial, he found that petitioner personally gagged the victim and thus contributed directly to the victim's death. Although that was certainly a permissible finding by inference, there was no affirmative evidence to that effect; petitioner denied gagging the victim. She said that she put a towel over his head, but, according to the medical examiner, the gag, which he removed from the victim, was a sleeve that had been jammed into the victim's mouth in such a way as to cause the tongue to lift and block the air passage. Petitioner did not have the benefit of Williams's September, 1998 statement when her first motion for new trial was made and decided. In order to prevail on her motion, petitioner had the burden to demonstrate that (1) the statement from Williams was in fact, newly discovered evidenceevidence that could not have been discovered by due diligence in time to have presented it in connection with her first motion for new trial, and (2) that the newly discovered evidence may well have produced a different result, that is, there was a substantial or significant possibility that the verdict of the trier of fact would have been affected. Yorke v. State, 315 Md. 578, 588, 556 A.2d 230, 235 (1989). The first prong is essentially a factual one, and, although the Court of Special Appeals appeared to make its own factual determination that there was nothing `new' in the second motion for new trial that could not have been raised in the first motion, the record by no means compels such a finding. There is no compelling evidence that testimony from Williams that he, not petitioner, gagged the victim was, or in the exercise of due diligence could have been, available to petitioner prior to July, 1998, when her first motion was decided. Although Williams had by then been convicted, his appeal was still pending in the Court of Special Appeals, and, although he ultimately chose to make this admission before his appeal was resolved, it was not the kind of admission he could reasonably be expected to make while his appeal was still pending. The second prong is a judgmental one weighing the effect of the evidence. Petitioner contended throughout that she had no part in the killing of Mr. Bowlinthat the homicide was committed entirely by Williams for reasons of his own and not in furtherance of the scheme to rob Bowlin. See Watkins v. State, 357 Md. 258, 744 A.2d 1 (2000); Mumford v. State, 19 Md. App. 640, 313 A.2d 563 (1974). In rejecting that contention when denying petitioner's first motion for new trial, the judge expressed a finding that petitioner had been the one to gag the victim and, in so doing, personally contributed to his death. Williams's later statement that he inserted the gag, if credited, could possibly have led the judge to reconsider petitioner's contention. Obviously, the judge was not required to credit that statement, but whether he should credit it, and, if he did, whether that evidence may well have produced a different result were matters upon which oral argument may have been helpful to petitioner. However strong the case was against petitionerand it was a strong casethis was not a situation in which, on undisputed facts and inferences, denial of the motion was legally mandated. On this record, we cannot safely declare that the State has met its burden of establishing that petitioner was not prejudiced by the lack of a hearingthat denial of a hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The appropriate remedy in such a situation is to vacate the order and remand the case for a hearing. See EMI Excavation v. Citizens Bank, 91 Md.App. 340, 604 A.2d 518, cert. denied, 327 Md. 523, 610 A.2d 796 (1992); United States v. Mitchell, 602 F.2d 636 (4th Cir.1979); United States v. Disston, 582 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir.1978). JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO VACATE ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND REMAND CASE TO CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY FOR HEARING ON THE MOTION; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY BALTIMORE COUNTY.