Opinion ID: 1059198
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Immunity of the Prosecutor

Text: Bolt, the Commonwealth's Attorney of Grayson County, maintains that, upon the record of these cases, he is entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The absolute immunity of prosecutors from civil liability for acts within the scope of their duties and intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process is derivative of judicial immunity. As we have previously held, Lilt is clear that judges enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability, even when they act maliciously or corruptly or in excess of their jurisdiction. Judges can be held liable only when they act in `clear absence of all jurisdiction.' Harlow v. Clatterbuck, 230 Va. 490, 493, 339 S.E.2d 181, 184 (1986) (quoting Johnston v. Moorman, 80 Va. 131, 142 (1885)). The common-law immunity of a prosecutor is based upon the same considerations that underlie the common-law immunities of judges and grand jurors acting within the scope of their duties. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-23, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). In Imbler, the Supreme Court noted that the prosecutor's actions were intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, and thus were functions to which the reasons for absolute immunity apply with full force. Id. at 430, 96 S.Ct. 984. But the Court specifically reserved the question whether like or similar reasons require immunity for those aspects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative officer rather than that of advocate. Id. at 430-431, 96 S.Ct. 984. Later, in Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991) the Court held that absolute prosecutorial immunity from suit recognized in Imbler did not extend to giving advice to police officers. The Court observed that: Absolute immunity is designed to free the judicial process from the harassment and intimidation associated with litigation . . .. That concern therefore justifies absolute prosecutorial immunity only for actions that are connected with the prosecutor's role in judicial proceedings, not for every litigation-inducing conduct. Burns at 494, 111 S.Ct. 1934. In the case before us, Andrews and Cox argue that Bolt gave advice to Ring, and that pursuant to Burns, Bolt is not entitled to absolute immunity. We disagree with Andrews and Cox because this Court is not compelled to follow Burns. The determination whether absolute prosecutorial immunity is extended to the prosecutor in this case is a matter of state common law not federal law. The principle is well-established in the seminal case of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), where the Court stated: Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. And whether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or general, be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts. This fundamental principle of federalism was expressed by the Supreme Court of North Carolina when it noted: The views of the Supreme Court of the United States ... are not binding upon this Court with regard to questions of North Carolina common lawquestions as to which this Court's holding... is the final and controlling authority. Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assoc., P.A., 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85, 92 (N.C. 1990). See also, Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 342 (4th Cir.1996)(Our holdings on questions of state law do not bind state courts, nor do state court determinations on questions of federal law control us.). The process by which an accused may be charged with a criminal offense in Virginia includes indictment, presentment, information, arrest warrant, or summons. When a prosecutor is involved in the initiation of the criminal process, it may take the form of preparation of an indictment for consideration by a Grand Jury, direction to a law enforcement officer to obtain a warrant or summons, or advice to a law enforcement officer that sufficient probable cause exists for the obtaining of a warrant or a summons. For the purposes of determining a prosecutor's absolute immunity from suit, these are distinctions without a material difference. In each case where a prosecutor is involved in the charging process, under Virginia law, that action is intimately connected with the prosecutor's role in judicial proceedings and the prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity from suit for such actions. Consequently, Bolt is entitled to absolute immunity from suit on the counts in each motion for judgment alleging malicious prosecution. We do not decide in this case whether actions of a prosecutor in the role of investigator or administrator are entitled to absolute immunity.