Opinion ID: 6498223
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Regulation of Student Speech

Text: Schools may restrict student speech only if it “would substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students.” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509; Thompson v. Ragland, 23 F.4th 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2022). A school can also regulate student speech where it reasonably forecasts such disruption. 7 Appellate Case: 20-1320 Document: 010110706275 Date Filed: 07/06/2022 Page: 8 Thompson, 23 F.4th at 1256. “[S]pecial characteristics call for special leeway when schools regulate speech that occurs under its supervision.” Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2045 (2021). But in considering student speech that occurs off campus and is unconnected to any school activity, a school: (1) can “rarely stand in loco parentis”; (2) “will have a heavy burden to justify intervention” when political or religious speech is involved; and (3) must especially respect “an interest in protecting a student’s unpopular expression.” Id. at 2046. The Mahanoy Court “d[id] not . . . set forth a broad, highly general First Amendment rule stating just what counts as ‘off campus’ speech and whether or how ordinary First Amendment standards must give way off campus to a school’s special need to prevent, e.g., substantial disruption of learning-related activities or the protection of those who make up a school community.” Id. at 2045. Instead, it identified the above “three features of off-campus speech that often, even if not always, distinguish schools’ efforts to regulate that speech from their efforts to regulate on-campus speech.” Id. at 2046. Mahanoy “provide[s] one example” of “where, when, and how these features mean the speaker’s off-campus location will make the critical difference.” Id. In Mahanoy, minor student B.L. posted two photos on her Snapchat. Id. at 2043. The first photo showed B.L. and a friend raising middle fingers and was captioned: “Fuck school fuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything.” Id. The second photo was blank and captioned: “Love how me and [another student] get told we need a year of jv before we make varsity but tha[t] doesn’t matter to anyone else?” Id. Fellow 8 Appellate Case: 20-1320 Document: 010110706275 Date Filed: 07/06/2022 Page: 9 students who were B.L.’s friends on Snapchat could see this post. Id. The images circulated, and B.L. was suspended from the junior varsity cheerleading squad. Id. The Court first analyzed B.L.’s speech and determined that it “did not involve features that would place it outside the First Amendment’s ordinary protection.” Id. at 2046–47. The Court found it important that B.L.: (1) spoke “outside of school hours from a location outside the school”; (2) “did not identify the school in her posts or target any member of the school community with vulgar or abusive language”; and (3) “transmitted her speech through a personal cellphone, to an audience consisting of her private circle of Snapchat friends.” Id. at 2047. The Court explained that these features, “while risking transmission to the school itself, nonetheless . . . diminish the school’s interest in punishing B.L.’s utterance.” Id. (citation omitted). The Court then weighed the school’s possible interests in prohibiting B.L.’s speech. Id. at 2047–48. That B.L.’s speech was, “[g]eographically speaking, offcampus speech” rendered insufficient the validity of her school’s “anti-vulgarity interest” and meant that the school did not stand in loco parentis. Id. at 2047. Also, some students being upset by the post and discussing it during class for a few days “d[id] not meet Tinker’s demanding standard” of “‘substantial disruption’ of a school activity or a threatened harm to the rights of others that might justify the school’s action.” Id. at 2047–48 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514). Mahanoy clarified that risk of transmission to the school does not inherently change the off-campus nature of all speech on social media. Id. at 2047. 9 Appellate Case: 20-1320 Document: 010110706275 Date Filed: 07/06/2022 Page: 10 Mahanoy’s framework for assessing school regulation of off-campus speech on social media controls our analysis here. In many respects and based on the Complaint, this case is materially similar. Like B.L.’s speech, C.G.’s speech would generally receive First Amendment protection because it does not constitute a true threat,4 fighting words, or obscenity. See id. at 2046–47. Defendants argue that C.G.’s post is uniquely regulable because it is “hate speech targeting the Jewish community” and “not just a crude attempt at a joke about the Holocaust.” Aplee. Br. at 20. But offensive, controversial speech can still be protected. See Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2055–56 (Alito, J., concurring). Like B.L., C.G.: (1) spoke “outside of school hours from a location outside the school”; (2) “did not identify the school in [his] post[] or target any member of the school community with vulgar or abusive language”; and (3) “transmitted [his] speech through a personal cellphone, to an audience consisting of [his] private circle 4 True threats are “statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). “[A] reasonable person in the circumstances [must] understand [the statement] as a declaration of intention, purpose, design, goal, or determination to inflict bodily injury on another.” United States v. Dillard, 795 F.3d 1191, 1200 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Heineman, 767 F.3d 970, 972 (10th Cir. 2014)). “[T]he threat must be a serious one, ‘as distinguished from words as mere political argument, idle talk or jest.’” Heineman, 767 F.3d at 972–73 (quoting United States v. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d 392, 395 (10th Cir. 1999)). As Plaintiff pointed out at oral argument and in the Complaint, school officials apparently did not consider C.G. to have authored a threat. On the Monday morning following his post, C.G. drove himself to school, parked in the school parking lot, and walked past security to his first-period class with his backpack (which was not searched) before he was escorted to Dean Thomas’s office. Aplt. App. at 48. 10 Appellate Case: 20-1320 Document: 010110706275 Date Filed: 07/06/2022 Page: 11 of Snapchat friends.” Id. at 2047 (majority opinion). These characteristics of C.G.’s speech, “while risking transmission to the school itself, nonetheless . . . diminish the school’s interest in punishing [his] utterance.” Id. (citation omitted). Further, like the school in Mahanoy, CCHS’s possible interests in prohibiting C.G.’s speech would not defeat his First Amendment protections. See id. at 2047–48. Defendants argue that their disciplinary actions were appropriate because they “must consider the rights of other students to be free from harassment and receive an effective education.” Aplee. Br. at 21–22. But the school cannot stand in loco parentis here. That doctrine applies “where the children’s actual parents cannot protect, guide, and discipline them.” Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2046. Mahanoy is clear that schools may not invoke the doctrine to justify regulating off-campus speech in normal circumstances. See id. Based on the Complaint, there is nothing abnormal in this case to prevent following this rule. Next, CCHS argues that it had a reasonable expectation of substantial disruption (which it claims did in fact occur) and/or interference with other students’ rights to access education5 under Tinker. Aplee. Br. at 16–22; Aplt. App. 77–79. First, Defendants provide the following reasons to support a reasonable forecast of substantial disruption regarding C.G.’s initial suspension: (1) that Principal Ryan Silva received emails about the post; (2) that the post had been widely circulated 5 Defendants do not develop an argument for interference with other students’ rights, so we address only their substantial disruption arguments. See Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007). 11 Appellate Case: 20-1320 Document: 010110706275 Date Filed: 07/06/2022 Page: 12 throughout the area’s Jewish community; and (3) that the post had scared, angered, and saddened a family who said their son was worried about having a class with C.G. Aplt. App. 74–75. After the initial suspension, Defendants stress that: (1) Principal Silva sent a message to CCHS students, parents, and staff; (2) news outlets covered the incident; (3) three more parents contacted CCHS; and (4) CCHS used one advisory period to discuss C.G.’s post and promote conversation about harmful speech. Aplt. App. 51, 75–76. These facts do not support a reasonable forecast of substantial disruption that would warrant dismissal of the Complaint. See Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2047–48. CCHS only provides an email chain with one family. Aplt. App. 88–91. Principal Silva needed more to substantiate his “feel[ing] [that] the learning environment ha[d] been impacted.” Aplt. App. 88; see Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 713 F.3d 25, 37 (10th Cir. 2013). Moreover, “impact[]” does not necessarily equal substantial disruption. Aplt. App. 88. Defendants rely on West v. Derby Unified School District No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir. 2000), to claim that the school has expertise deserving of deference and that the context of previous anti-Semitic incidents at the school6 must be considered. Aplee. Br. at 17–18. But that case involved a student drawing a confederate flag on campus in a school district that had adopted a policy in response 6 The record attests one previous incident: “the suspension of 3 students last December for threatening to use assault rifles to shoot the Jews.” Aplt. App. 91; Aplt. Reply Br. at 9 & n.1. 12 Appellate Case: 20-1320 Document: 010110706275 Date Filed: 07/06/2022 Page: 13 to previous racial incidents, some of which included confederate flags and the student in question. West, 206 F.3d at 1361–63. That case materially differs from this one because C.G. was off campus and Defendants lack documented context facilitating similar disciplinary action or previous, similar behavior by C.G. Moreover, C.G.’s post did not include weapons, specific threats, or speech directed toward the school or its students. Thus, even pre-Mahanoy, this case materially differs from the five cases Defendants cite to prove that other circuits have applied Tinker to off-campus speech. Those cases all addressed specific threats directed at a school, its students, or its officials.7 Defendants cannot claim a reasonable forecast of substantial disruption to regulate C.G.’s off-campus speech by simply invoking the words “harass” and “hate” when C.G.’s speech does not constitute harassment and its hateful nature is not regulable in this context. CCHS’s argument that substantial disruption actually occurred is equally unconvincing. See Aplee. Br. at 17; Aplt. App. 79. We cannot consider CCHS’s choice to discuss C.G.’s post during an advisory period (a schedule block twice a week implemented specifically for dealing with such matters) substantial disruption. See Aplt. App. 51–52. Neither can news reports nor four emails from parents be 7 See Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 384–85, 389–93 (5th Cir. 2015); Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1070–71 (9th Cir. 2013); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011); D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 764–65 (8th Cir. 2011); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2007). Some of these cases may evidence the rare instance where a school could stand in loco parentis. 13 Appellate Case: 20-1320 Document: 010110706275 Date Filed: 07/06/2022 Page: 14 evidence of substantial disruption. These facts fall short of “Tinker’s demanding standard.” Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2048. Because CCHS cannot stand in loco parentis and the Complaint alleges no reasonable forecast of substantial disruption or actual disruption, Plaintiff has properly alleged that Defendants’ discipline of C.G. for his off-campus speech is a First Amendment violation that cannot be dismissed at this stage.