Opinion ID: 2519351
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Limitations on the Exercise of Inherent Contempt Power

Text: ¶ 19 While inherent contempt authority is a critical component of judicial power, its use is only appropriate in limited situations. We have long held that courts may not exercise their inherent contempt power [u]nless the legislatively prescribed procedures and remedies are specifically found inadequate. Mead Sch. Dist., 85 Wash.2d at 288, 534 P.2d 561 (citing State ex rel. Curtiss v. Erickson, 66 Wash. 639, 642, 120 P. 104 (1912), aff'd on other grounds by Carlson v. Washington, 234 U.S. 103, 34 S.Ct. 717, 58 L.Ed. 1237 (1914); State ex rel. Dye v. Rielly, 40 Wash. 217, 220, 82 P. 287 (1905)); see also State v. Boatman, 104 Wash.2d 44, 48, 700 P.2d 1152 (1985); State v. Browet, Inc., 103 Wash.2d 215, 218, 691 P.2d 571 (1984). Only under the most egregious circumstances should the juvenile court exercise its contempt power to incarcerate a status offender in a secure facility. If such action is necessary, the record should demonstrate that all less restrictive alternatives have failed. State v. Norlund, 31 Wash.App. 725, 729, 644 P.2d 724, review denied, 98 Wash.2d 1013 (1982); see also In re Pers. Restraint of King, 110 Wash.2d 793, 802, 756 P.2d 1303 (1988). ¶ 20 In this case, the juvenile court commissioner did not specifically find that one of the statutory remedies available to him was inadequate: criminal contempt of court, under RCW 7.21.040. Under that statute, a court may impose punitive sanctions of up to $5,000, up to one year imprisonment, or both on adult contemnors, after certain procedures are followed. RCW 7.21.040(5). Juvenile status offenders [5] can also be sanctioned criminally for contempt. State v. A.L.H., 116 Wash.App. 158, 162, 163-64, 64 P.3d 1262 (2003) (citing In re Interest of Rebecca K., 101 Wash.App. 309, 2 P.3d 501 (2000)). When juveniles are found guilty of a nonenumerated offense equivalent to an adult gross misdemeanor, such as contempt, see RCW 9A.20.010(2)(b), .021(2), the conviction is classified as a category D juvenile offense. RCW 13.40.0357. Category D offenses are punishable by confinement in a juvenile detention facility for up to 30 days, up to 12 months' community supervision, up to 150 hours' community restitution and/or a fine up to $500. Id. Under RCW 7.21.040(5), Commissioner Inouye could have sentenced petitioners to 30 days in juvenile detention, without a purge condition, after finding the remedial RCW 7.21.030(2)(e) sanction inadequate and affording proper criminal due process protections. ¶ 21 We recognize that the holding of Division Two of the Court of Appeals in A.L.H. may be inconsistent with our conclusion that criminal contempt sanctions may be imposed on juveniles violating a placement order in a dependency case. In A.L.H., the court held that only civil contempt sanctions may be imposed on a juvenile for violating an at-risk youth (ARY) order. The ARY statutes constitute a separate chapter of Title 13 RCW from the dependency statutes. As amended in 1998, the ARY contempt statute provided, Failure by a party to comply with an order entered under this chapter is a civil contempt of court as provided in RCW 7.21.030(2)(e), subject to the limitations of subsection (3) [which limits sanctions to $100 and/or seven days' confinement] of this section. RCW 13.32A.250(2). The Court of Appeals interpreted this statute as expressly limit[ing] sanctions that may be sought for contempt to the remedial sanctions laid out in RCW 7.21.030(2)(e). A.L.H., 116 Wash.App. at 164, 64 P.3d 1262. If contempt charges are brought against a juvenile in violation of an ARY order, the State must seek civil contempt remedies, the court concluded, but any juvenile offender in contempt of court on some other basis may be subject to criminal, civil, or summary contempt under the general contempt statutes. Id. at 163-64, 64 P.3d 1262. ¶ 22 The wording of the dependency contempt statute  the statute at issue here  underwent the same 1998 amendments and is essentially identical to the ARY contempt statute: Failure by a party to comply with an order entered under this chapter is civil contempt of court as provided in RCW 7.21.030(2)(e). RCW 13.34.165(1). This subsection, like the ARY subsection, is followed by a subsection limiting remedial sanction[s] to seven days' confinement, RCW 13.34.165(2). Thus, when Commissioner Inouye made the orders at issue here, he specifically found that criminal contempt sanctions under RCW 7.21.040 were unavailable, basing that finding on the A.L.H. decision. ¶ 23 We disagree with Commissioner Inouye. First, we note that A.L.H. concerned a different statute than the one we are interpreting: the ARY contempt statute. Although the wording of the two statutes is similar, the purposes behind the statutes are somewhat different. The ARY statutes were designed to provide parents of at-risk youth with tools to assist them in raising their children and keeping their children safe. RCW 13.32A.010. The legislature specifically stated that services were to be offered on a voluntary basis whenever possible . . . and that the courts [should] be used as a last resort. Id. The dependency statutes, on the other hand, were intended to protect the health and safety of children when the rights of basic nurture, physical and mental health, and safety of the child and the legal rights of the parents are in conflict. RCW 13.34.020. These statutes appear to contemplate greater court involvement, while the ARY statutes were partially aimed at providing interventions to keep children out of detention. ¶ 24 In addition, we do not find the A.L.H. decision entirely persuasive. Division Two of the Court of Appeals provided little to no reasoning for its decision limiting sanctions in particular cases to civil contempt remedies. In fact, the other Court of Appeals ARY cases cited in A.L.H.  M.B. and Rebecca K.  can be read as suggesting the opposite conclusion: that criminal sanctions can be imposed for violation of an ARY order, so long as the proper due process is afforded. Both of those cases addressed whether the legislature had, by declaring the RCW 7.21.030(2)(e) sanction to be remedial, constitutionally transformed criminal sanctions into civil sanctions, allowing determinate sentences to be imposed without purge conditions and without criminal due process protections. See M.B., 101 Wash.App. 425, 3 P.3d 780; Rebecca K., 101 Wash.App. 309, 2 P.3d 501. Both opinions concluded that confinement in juvenile detention without a purge condition remained a punitive sanction requiring criminal due process, regardless of what the legislature called it. M.B., 101 Wash.App. at 445-46, 3 P.3d 780; Rebecca K., 101 Wash.App. at 316-17, 2 P.3d 501. Division Three of the Court of Appeals further stated in Rebecca K. that [c]riminal contempt proceedings must be initiated by a criminal information filed by the State in order to comply with due process. Rebecca K., 101 Wash.App. at 317, 2 P.3d 501 (citing A.D.F. v. State, 88 Wash.App. 21, 26, 943 P.2d 689 (1997), superseded by statute on other grounds by State v. A.L.H., 116 Wash. App. 158, 64 P.3d 1262). Concluding that the sanctions in the Rebecca K. case were punitive in nature, the court reversed the orders of contempt, because the requirements of RCW 7.21.040 were not followed. Similarly, Division One emphasize[d] in M.B. that due process prohibits a court from using either statutory or inherent power to justify its actions if the contempt sanctions are themselves punitive, unless the contemnor is afforded criminal due process protections. M.B., 101 Wash.App. at 453, 3 P.3d 780 (emphasis added). We infer from this language that Divisions One and Three of the Court of Appeals consider statutory criminal contempt sanctions to remain available in ARY cases after the 1998 amendments. ¶ 25 Finally, we interpret statutes so as to give effect to legislative intent. Campbell v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 150 Wash.2d 881, 894, 83 P.3d 999 (2004). The chief objective of the legislature's 1998 amendments to the contempt statutes was to make detention available as a coercive tool for juvenile courts. M.B., 101 Wash.App. at 446, 3 P.3d 780; see also Laws of 1998, ch. 296, § 35 ([i]t is the intent of the legislature to authorize a limited sanction of time in juvenile detention independent of chapter 7.21 RCW for failure to comply with court orders in . . . dependency cases for the sole purpose of providing the courts with the tools necessary to enforce orders in these limited types of cases because other statutory contempt remedies are inadequate). The legislature did not expressly designate this new tool the exclusive remedy, instead noting that it may be imposed in addition to, or as an alternative to, any other remedial sanction authorized by this chapter. RCW 7.21.030(2)(e). We have previously stated, [b]ecause civil and criminal contempt sanctions employ different procedures and are applied for fundamentally different purposes, statutes providing for one kind of contempt cannot be read to circumscribe statutes providing for the other. King, 110 Wash.2d at 800, 756 P.2d 1303. We conclude that the legislature did not intend, by amending the dependency contempt statute, to abrogate the availability of criminal contempt sanctions under RCW 7.21.040 in dependency cases. Instead, as the legislature stated, it intended to merely create a new alternative sanction. ¶ 26 The dissent points out that the legislature, when creating the Becca sanctions, intended to discourage the filing of criminal charges against status offenders. Dissent at 24. Our holding in no way undermines this goal. We do not hold that criminal sanctions should be sought before Becca sanctions and other civil statutory sanctions; we do not speak to the order in which statutory remedies should be utilized. Instead, we merely adhere to our previous jurisprudence requiring courts to utilize all the tools the legislature has seen fit to provide before exercising broader inherent powers. The legislature carefully crafted the new tool they intended to provide, limiting it to seven days in detention. We do not infer from this careful limitation an intent to allow courts to disregard other statutes and sentence juveniles to whatever time in detention they felt was reasonable. ¶ 27 Because we conclude that statutory criminal contempt sanctions are available for violation of a dependency order, it follows that a juvenile court must find those sanctions inadequate before exercising its inherent contempt power. [6] In the present case, Commissioner Inouye failed to do this. Consequently, his resort to inherent authority was premature and improper. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals' decision to the contrary. As a result, we need not consider petitioners' other claims for relief.