Opinion ID: 1249738
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Inform Defense of Acker's Cooperation Record.

Text: (43a) Defendant contends the prosecutor's failure to disclose to the defense Acker's record of having informed on others 12 times, including on his own wife, amounted to a violation of defendant's federal constitutional rights to due process, to confront adverse witnesses, and to be present at all stages of the proceedings. We conclude that no constitutional violation occurred. Defendant testified he did not stab Acker, even though he candidly admitted having stabbed inmates Lynch and Fuzzell. If admissible, it is conceivable that Acker's record might have caused the jurors to wonder whether Acker had a grudge against inmates in general and would lie to harm defendant, or had a grudge against defendant in particular and saw an opportunity to use a stabbing committed by another inmate against defendant. The mere fact of his having informed on 12 different people might have caused the jury to wonder whether one person could reliably compile so much information on other inmates. Nevertheless, such hypotheses do not rise to the level of constitutional cognizability. (44) United States v. Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. 667, sets forth the standard of review applicable to defendant's claims of constitutional violations for failure to disclose favorable impeachment information. The holding in Brady v. Maryland [(1963) 373 U.S. 83, 87] requires disclosure only of evidence that is both favorable to the accused and `material either to guilt or to punishment.' ( Id. at p. 674 [87 L.Ed.2d at p. 489].) The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A `reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. ( Id. at p. 682 [87 L.Ed.2d at p. 494] (lead opn. of Blackmun, J.); accord, id. at p. 685 [87 L.Ed.2d at p. 496] (conc. opn. of White, J.).) (43b) Under the foregoing standard, there was no constitutional violation. [13] Other aggravating factors that weighed against defendant lead almost inescapably to our conclusion that the prosecution's shortcoming on this issue was not of sufficient magnitude to undermine confidence in the outcome of the case. In aggravation, the jury had found that defendant was the actual killer of Gardner and had been previously convicted of first degree murder. And defendant conceded he had attacked another inmate with intent to kill, though he argued he had desisted in the end and that the attack was in response to an attempt on his life. For the revelation of Acker's record to have made a material difference the jury would have had to conclude that as a result of that record (1) Acker was fabricating his testimony, and (2) the balance of other aggravating and mitigating factors was so close that absent proof of an assault on Acker defendant should be given a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. We believe such a concatenation of conclusions was unlikely in the extreme.