Opinion ID: 807161
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Numerical or Surrogate Take in the ITS

Text: As discussed above, Section 101(a)(5)(A) of the MMPA does not require that the Service quantify in absolute terms the number of marine mammals that would be taken pursuant to incidental take regulations, so long as the agency reasonably determines through some other means that the specified activity would result in take of only “small numbers” of mammals. Legislative history of the MMPA reveals that Congress recognized that the “small numbers” concept “is not capable of being expressed in absolute numerical limits.” H.R. Rep. No. 97-228, reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1469. By contrast, the legislative history of the ESA reveals that Congress “clearly declared a preference for expressing take in numerical form” with respect to ITSs under Section 7. Or. Natural CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY v. SALAZAR 9549 Res. Council v. Allen, 476 F.3d 1031, 1037 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 97-567, at 27 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2827). Section 7(b)(4) of the ESA requires that an ITS specify the “impact” of the incidental take on the listed species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)(C)(i). ESA implementing regulations clarify that “impact” in this context means the “amount or extent” of incidental take. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i)(1)(i). The House Report accompanying Section 7(b)(4) states, “Where possible, the impact should be specified in terms of a numerical limitation . . . .” H.R. Rep. No. 97-567, at 27, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2827. “Accordingly, we have recognized that the permissible level of take [in an ITS] ideally should be expressed as a specific number.” Allen, 476 F.3d at 1037 (citing Ariz. Cattle Growers, 273 F.3d at 1249); accord Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 566 F.3d 1257, 1274-75 (11th Cir. 2009). However, “while Congress indicated its preference for a numerical value, it anticipated situations in which [the amount of take] could not be contemplated in terms of a precise number.” Ariz. Cattle Growers, 273 F.3d at 1250; see also H.R. Rep. No. 97-567, at 27, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2827 (“The Committee does not intend that the Secretary will, in every instance, interpret the word ‘impact’ to be a precise number. . . . [I]t may not be possible for the Secretary to specify a number in every instance.”). As a result, we have held that the Service need not specify numerical take in an ITS if it establishes “that no such numerical value could be practically obtained.” Ariz. Cattle Growers, 273 F.3d at 1250. In such circumstances, an ITS may “utilize[ ] a surrogate instead of a numerical cap on take,” so long as it “explain[s] why it was impracticable to express a numerical measure of take.” Allen, 476 F.3d at 1037. The chosen surrogate “must be able to perform the functions of a numerical limitation” by “set[ting] forth a ‘trigger’ that, when reached, results in an unacceptable level of incidental take . . . and requir[es] the parties to re-initiate consultation.” Id. at 1038 (internal quotation marks omitted). The ITS also “must 9550 CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY v. SALAZAR articulate a rational connection between the surrogate and the taking of the species.” Wild Fish Conservancy v. Salazar, 628 F.3d 513, 531 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Ariz. Cattle Growers, 273 F.3d at 1250-51). In Arizona Cattle Growers, we rejected a surrogate as too vague because it did not contain measurable guidelines and thus failed to “provide a clear standard for determining when the authorized level of take has been exceeded.” 273 F.3d at 1250-51. In Allen, we struck down an ITS that “offer[ed] no explanation of why the [Service] was unable numerically to quantify the level of take.” 476 F.3d at 1038. In that case, the BiOp for timber sales in suitable habitat for the threatened northern spotted owl noted that owl survey data was out of date, and that surveys had been discontinued or reduced. Id. We noted that the Service “never states that it is not possible to update the survey data in order to estimate the number of takings, only that it has not actually done the surveys. This does not establish the numerical measure’s impracticality.” Id. We also rejected the ITS for using an improper surrogate that authorized the take of all spotted owls associated with the project and thus did not set forth an adequate trigger for reinitiating consultation. Id. at 1038-39. We explained that “[e]ven if the actual number of takings of spotted owls that occurred during the project was considerably higher than anticipated [in the BiOp], the Incidental Take Statement would not permit the [Service] to halt the project and reinitiate consultation.” Id. at 1039. Here, the ITS does not specify a numerical measure of the “amount or extent” of anticipated incidental take. The ITS states: In the accompanying [BiOp], the Service determined that total take anticipated as a result of the issuance of the Regulations under section 101(a)(5)(A) of the MMPA is not likely to result in jeopardy to the polar bear. No lethal take is anticipated. While the Service CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY v. SALAZAR 9551 cannot anticipate the specific amount or extent of other types of take that may result from activities that may be authorized under the Regulations until they are proposed and the specific activities and location is known, the negligible effects finding and the small numbers determination articulates the anticipated amount of take with respect to effect on the population. Borrowing from a draft of the Chukchi Sea final rule, the Service explains elsewhere in the BiOp that The dynamic nature of sea ice habitats and its influence on the seasonal and annual distribution and abundance of polar bears and walruses in the specified geographical region (eastern Chukchi Sea), limits the Service’s ability to provide a priori numerical estimates of the number of Pacific walruses and polar bears that might potentially be impacted in any given year. The final rule elaborates on this explanation in its response to comments. See 73 Fed. Reg. at 33,243-44. [9] The ITS is not very illuminating regarding the feasibility of providing a specific numerical estimate of take under the ESA. The Service at oral argument contended that the explanation, while short, adequately summarizes the reasons, described in greater detail in the final rule, why a numerical measure was impracticable. Although it is a close question, we conclude that the ITS, as supplemented by the explanation elsewhere in the BiOp, sufficiently “explain[s] why it was impracticable to express a numerical measure of take.” Allen, 476 F.3d at 1037. This is not a case, as in Allen, where “the BiOp offers no explanation of why the [Service] was unable numerically to quantify the level of take.” Id. at 1038. A surrogate measure of take in an ITS “must be able to perform the functions of a numerical limitation” by setting forth 9552 CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY v. SALAZAR “a clear standard for determining when the authorized level of take ha[s] been exceeded.” Id. at 1038-39 (an adequate surrogate must contain “measurable guidelines to determine when incidental take would be exceeded” and “not be so general that the applicant or the action agency cannot gauge its level of compliance”). Here, the ITS states that the “negligible effects finding and the small numbers determination [in the 2008 Chukchi Sea rule] articulates the anticipated amount of take with respect to effect on the population.” In most circumstances, such a statement in an ITS would not serve as an adequate surrogate because it does not specify a clear standard for determining when the anticipated level of take would be exceeded. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1138-39 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (“To the extent this sentence is meant to act as a surrogate for a numerical estimate of take, it is too vague and confusing to act as any meaningful standard upon which compliance with the ITS can be measured.”). However, given the interplay between the ESA and MMPA in this case, we conclude that the ITS, incorporating by reference the 2008 Chukchi Sea rule, satisfies the requirement that it specify “the impact, i.e., the amount or extent,” of the incidental take. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i)(1)(i). We base this conclusion on several factors. First, as discussed above, a primary purpose of the ITS and its measure of permissible take is to provide a trigger for reinitiating consultation under Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA. See Allen, 476 F.3d at 1040; Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1182 (“[T]he ITS serves as a check on the agency’s original decision that the incidental take of listed species resulting from the proposed action will not violate section 7(a)(2) of the ESA.”). However, the relevant MMPA standard at issue here is more conservative than the ESA standard. The Service, when promulgating incidental take regulations under Section 101(a)(5) of the MMPA, must determine that the specified activity will have no more than a “negligible impact” on the relevant stock of polar bears, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(5)(A)(i)(I), whereas the stanCENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY v. SALAZAR 9553 dard under Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA is whether the agency action would “jeopardize the continued existence” of the species as a whole, id. § 1536(a)(2). As the BiOp explains [I]f an action meets the MMPA standard of negligi- ble impact . . . , there should be little potential for the action to jeopardize the species. . . . It is reasonable to expect that a proposed action being independently evaluated under the MMPA and the ESA would be determined to have more than a negligible impact before, and in some cases well before, a jeopardy determination would be made. Thus, so long as the amount and extent of take remains consistent with the Service’s “small numbers” and “negligible impact” findings in the MMPA incidental take regulations, there should be no need for reinitiating consultation under the ESA. Second, Section 101(a)(5)(B) of the MMPA provides that the Service “shall withdraw, or suspend[,]” its incidental take authorization if the agency finds that take from the specified activity “is having, or may have, more than a negligible impact on the species or stock concerned.” Id. § 1371(a)(5)(B). The Service highlighted this provision in its response to comments in the final rule. See 73 Fed. Reg. at 33,240. The “may have[ ] more than a negligible impact” standard would necessarily operate as a trigger to reinitiate consultation under the ESA. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.16(b) (“Reinitiation of formal consultation is required . . . [i]f new information reveals effects of the action that may affect listed species or critical habitat in a manner or to an extent not previously considered.”). Accordingly, this is not a case, as in Allen, where “[e]ven if the actual number of takings . . . was considerably higher than anticipated [in the BiOp], the Incidental Take Statement would not permit the [Service] to halt the project and reinitiate consultation.” 476 F.3d at 1039. 9554 CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY v. SALAZAR The Service will not always be able to rely on findings under Section 101(a)(5)(A) of the MMPA to specify the “amount or extent” of take permitted under the ESA. Such reliance is permissible only where, as here, the Service first establishes that it is impracticable to quantify a numerical measure of take. If the Service fails to establish that a numerical measure is impracticable, then the ESA requires that the agency provide a numerical limit in the ITS, even though Section 101(a)(5)(A) of the MMPA does not require it in the incidental take regulations themselves. Such reliance is also permissible only where, as with the polar bear here, the listed species at issue is also a marine mammal subject to the incidental take regulations under the MMPA. If the specified activity pursuant to the incidental take regulations could affect other listed species, like threatened or endangered fish, as in Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1180-81, a “small numbers” and “negligible impact” finding as to marine mammals under the MMPA would be irrelevant to the Service’s obligations to protect those other species under the ESA. In such an instance, the Service could not rely on findings in the MMPA incidental take regulations to provide a surrogate for the “amount or extent” of take under the ESA. Third, Plaintiffs have failed to articulate a feasible, alternative surrogate measure of take. Given the nature of the species, the geographic region, and the proposed activities at issue here, we recognize that it may be impossible for the Service to develop an adequate surrogate based on other potential measures, such as habitat or ecological conditions. Here, the Service is dealing with about 3,500 widely distributed polar bears that travel thousands of miles per year, a dynamically changing geographic area of about 90,000 square miles, proposed oil and gas activities without specific locations, and a type of anticipated take that results in only short-term, minimal changes in behavior. We do not hold that it is generally a plaintiff’s burden to propose alternative, surrogate measures of take. But Plaintiffs’ inability to propose such measures here — even when specifically questioned about it at oral arguCENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY v. SALAZAR 9555 ment — influences our view of the adequacy of the Service’s proffered surrogate in the ITS. [10] In sum, although it is a close question, we agree with the Service that “[t]he ITS in this case reasonably relies on the negligible impact and small numbers findings of the MMPA incidental take regulation to articulate the anticipated amount of take and the effect on the polar bear population.”