Opinion ID: 2229271
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: if the lower court's order dismissing the complaint also effectively suppressed evidence, was it error to suppress evidence which was to be introduced for the limited purpose of showing motive, intent, identity, scheme or plan, or the absence of mistake or accident?

Text: In its brief the State has expressed some confusion as to the effectiveness of the lower court's order to suppress transactions of the defendant occurring prior to July 1, 1975, the effective date of the law. The order is entitled, Order Granting Motion of Defendant to Suppress Evidence and Order Granting Amended Motion of Defendant to Dismiss the Above Entitled Action and Dismissal of the Complaint. While the body of the three-page order dismisses the complaint, it contains no language discussing the specific evidence to be suppressed, and no order actually suppressing evidence. In spite of its confusion, the State has elected to brief the issue of the admissibility of evidence of prior acts in a criminal proceeding, and asks this Court to decide that issue here and reverse the lower court if, in fact, it has suppressed evidence. We decline to do so. While we might be inclined to discuss and decide the question of the effect of an order suppressing evidence when the body of the order does not contain any language to that effect, we would still be unable to ascertain the relevant evidence to which the order applies. This uncertainty is increased by the general nature of Jelliff's motion to suppress, which asked the Court for an order to suppress all transactions of the Defendant except those occurring after July 1, 1975. We are not informed of the nature or extent of these transactions or their possible relevance to this criminal action. We can indicate general acceptance of the State's argument as to the rules of evidence in this State with respect to the admissibility of prior acts or occurrences in criminal proceedings. The general rule that evidence of acts or offenses committed by the accused prior to the offense charged is not admissible, 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 682, is subject to the well-established exception in this State that such prior acts or offenses are admissible for the limited purpose of showing motive, intent, identity, scheme, plan, or absence of mistake or accident. Rule 404(b), NDREv (1977); State v. Stevens, 238 N.W.2d 251 (N.D.1975). That decision demonstrated our reluctance to mechanically apply rules of evidence, however, and our approval of a balancing test in which the need for and relevancy of evidence is balanced against the possible prejudicial effects attendant upon its admission at trial. In any event, admission of such evidence requires a proper cautionary instruction by the court as to its admissibility for limited purposes. While this is the general rule of evidence in this State, it cannot serve as a basis for resolving the evidentiary question now before us. It is impossible for this Court to affirm or reverse a lower court's order which may or may not effectively suppress evidence, the nature and extent of which remain unknown. The element of knowledge or culpability occurring after July 1, 1975, may be evidenced by acts which occurred prior thereto. For the foregoing reasons, we believe that the criminal complaint alleges sufficient facts, which, if proved, constitute a violation of § 12.1-23-07, NDCC. The decision of the lower court is reversed and the criminal complaint is reinstated. ERICKSTAD, C. J., and PAULSON, SAND and VOGEL, JJ., concur.