Opinion ID: 1441495
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Legal Malpractice Action

Text: On October 20, 1995, Mr. Lockhart  represented by new counsel  filed a complaint in the Superior Court against Ms. Cade alleging legal malpractice, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty. The complaint stated that Ms. Cade had been professionally negligent in the following respects: When the Plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies was raised as an issue by the defendants in their motion to dismiss, Cade failed to advise the court that because Plaintiff was not longer employed by the MPD at the time of his job interview with the Department of Commerce, there was no requirement for Plaintiff to exhaust his administrative remedies.       ... Cade failed to advise Plaintiff that there is a one-year statute of limitations [for defamation claims] and that his claims may be barred. The defamatory statements were published on August 27, 1991.... Notwithstanding, Cade waited until October 6, 1992, to file her defamation claim despite the fact that Cade was advised of the defamation claim on or about August 13, 1992.       Cade named the wrong parties as defendants in the complaint. The District of Columbia can be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the intentional torts of its employees (specifically MPD personnel) acting within the scope of their employment. Therefore, Cade should have sued the District of Columbia instead of the Mayor and the Police Chief.       ... In response to Plaintiff's inquiry as to whether an appeal had been filed ... Cade replied that she was, indeed, in the process of filing an appeal. In fact, an appeal was never filed. Subsequent to Cade's failure to appeal the dismissal, she filed a Motion for Reconsideration on December 12, 1994. This Motion was the first time that Cade informed the court that Plaintiff was no longer employed by the MPD at the time of the alleged defamatory statements and, as such, that Plaintiff did not have an obligation to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the court on September 8, 1995. The period within which such requests for further relief from the dismissal order would have had to have been filed expired on August 29, 1994, thus forever barring Plaintiff's cause of action. The complaint sought compensatory damages in the amount of $250,000, along with attorneys' fees and costs. Ms. Cade filed an answer to the complaint on November 16, 1995, but failed to comply thereafter with the court's pre-trial scheduling order. She did not serve her discovery materials by the court-ordered deadline, nor did she even request an enlargement of time for doing so until two days after that deadline had passed. The request was granted, but Ms. Cade subsequently filed a second motion for enlargement of time. Finally, after Ms. Cade's repeated delays in the litigation, Ms. Lockhart filed a motion for default judgment. In light of Ms. Cade's assertion that her delinquency was due to her husband's serious illness, the court denied Mr. Lockhart's motion, but noted in its order, Defendant is cautioned, however, that if her personal problems continue to interfere with her ability to defend this action, she would be well advised to retain counsel to act for her. Ms. Cade apparently ignored the court's warning, continued to disregard the scheduling order, and failed to respond to Mr. Lockhart's discovery requests. On June 4, 1996, Lockhart filed a motion for reconsideration, or in the alternative to compel discovery. The court granted the motion and entered a default against Ms. Cade. See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 55(a). In granting the default, the court ordered that the case be set for an ex parte hearing on damages.