Opinion ID: 2336032
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mootness And Collateral Consequences

Text: In Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute we established that commitment-order appeals based on assertions of insufficient evidence are moot if the commitment period has passed, subject to the public interest exception. [8] Because Joan's post-release appeal from the superior court's commitment order is based on an assertion of insufficient evidence and neither Joan nor the State discussed mootness in their original briefs, we ordered supplemental briefing on that issue. In her supplemental briefing, Joan suggests we should overrule Wetherhorn because it mistakenly focused on release from commitment, rather than vacating the commitment order, as the relief sought in a commitment-order appeal. She also argues the public interest exception to mootness applies because [u]nless this court reviews commitment orders for sufficiency of the evidence, the masters and trial court judges hearing these cases will have no standards by which to measure the cases before them. Finally, she argues that we should adopt the collateral consequences exception to mootness in commitment-order appeals. The State responds that Wetherhorn mandates dismissal of Joan's appeal as moot because: (1) the public interest exception to mootness does not apply; and (2) Joan has not established any actual collateral consequences resulting from her commitment order. We ordered oral argument on the mootness question, directing that the parties be prepared to discuss the authority and appropriateness of issuing a vacatur order to remedy possible collateral consequences arising from an otherwise-moot commitment order. [9]

In response to our supplemental briefing order, Joan asserts that in Wetherhorn we erred in focusing on the period of the commitment rather than the relief that Wetherhorn sought when we held that an evidentiary-based challenge to a completed commitment is generally moot. Joan asserts the true relief Wetherhorn sought was vacating the gravely disabled finding; although not expressly stating it, she suggests the true relief she seeks is vacating the finding that she is a danger to herself or others. Our order for supplemental briefing did not anticipate questioning Wetherhorn 's fundamental holding, nor did Joan address the standards we impose for overturning our precedent. [10] We therefore do not consider overturning Wetherhorn 's holding that an evidentiary-based challenge to a completed 30-day commitment generally is moot. Joan also argues her evidentiary-based appeal of her 30-day commitment should be considered under the public interest exception to mootness. She contends that given her bipolar disorder, she is likely to face future commitment proceedings and the issues of this case are likely to be repeated. She also contends we must provide guidance to the trial courts on the evidence necessary to meet the legal standards for: (1) finding someone a danger to self or others; and (2) least restrictive treatment alternatives. In connection with this latter argument, Joan cursorily asserts in her supplemental opening brief that her statutory right to appeal her commitment order is meaningless if we choose not to review the order. [11] Although Joan's interpretation of the statute as overriding the judicial policy of not deciding moot cases appears overbroad, we do not need to address this argument, or her overall public interest exception argument, because we agree with Joan that we should adopt the collateral consequences exception to mootness in this context and consider the merits of her appeal. [12]
Joan notes that several other courts have applied the collateral consequences exception to mootness in the involuntary commitment context. She points to social stigma, [13] adverse employment restrictions, [14] application in future legal proceedings, [15] and restrictions on the right to possess firearms [16] as recognized consequences from involuntary commitment orders. She argues we should adopt the collateral consequences exception to mootness and urges us to do so without adopting case-specific requirements; she contends a commitment proceeding will not focus on future collateral consequences and the record available for appellate review will be inadequate. Joan also argues that when we decline to review the merits of involuntary commitment orders, we should vacate them rather than leaving them in place. The State acknowledges there are collateral consequences from an involuntary commitment order, but argues that: (1) an exception from the general rule of mootness requires a case-specific analysis; and (2) Joan has not established any actual collateral consequences arising from her involuntary commitment order. At oral argument the State also argued that certain collateral consequences from an involuntary commitment order, such as restrictions on the right to possess a firearm, are important, and we therefore should consider an appeal's merits rather than simply vacate the underlying commitment order. We have previously recognized that the collateral consequences doctrine allows courts to decide otherwise-moot cases when a judgment may carry indirect consequences in addition to its direct force, either as a matter of legal rules or as a matter of practical effect. [17] Both Joan and the State have articulated sound reasons to adopt the doctrine, at least to some extent, in the involuntary commitment order context. We conclude that there are sufficient general collateral consequences, without the need for a particularized showing, to apply the doctrine in an otherwise-moot appeal from a person's first involuntary commitment order. But we do note that some number of prior involuntary commitment orders would likely eliminate the possibility of additional collateral consequences, precluding the doctrine's application. [18]
Based on our adoption of the collateral consequences exception to mootness in the involuntary commitment order context, we agree that Joan's commitment order, her first, is reviewable.