Opinion ID: 2011334
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: equal protection: are homosexuals a suspect or quasi-suspect class?

Text: I write, once again, only for myself, and thus, in the balance of this opinion, respectfully dissent from the judgment to affirm. Appellants also maintain that the statute limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples unconstitutionally discriminates against them as a gay couple, in violation of their Fifth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws. [29] The trial court rejected this contention in a Supplemental Memorandum Opinion and Order of June 2, 1992. The court concluded that homosexuals comprise neither a suspect class mandating strict scrutiny of the statutory bar against same-sex marriage, nor a quasi-suspect class requiring intermediate scrutiny of the marriage barrier. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 216 & n. 14, 217-18, 102 S.Ct. at 2394-95 & n. 14, 2395. The court accordingly held that the rational basis test applied and that the statute limiting marriage to heterosexuals is rationally related to three legitimate state interest[s]: [1] fostering at a socially-approved point in time (i.e., during marriage), that which is essential to the very survival of the human race, namely, procreation.... [2] [prohibiting] ... the sexual conduct, to wit, sodomy, commonly associated with homosexual statusconduct deemed by society to be so morally reprehensible as to be a criminal offense in the District of Columbia and many other jurisdictions.[ [30] ] [3] Finally, the legislature could also rationally conclude that such authorization would constitute unprecedented and unwarranted social tinkering with one of the most sacred institutions known to mankind, namely, marriage.... [Footnotes omitted.] The court then asserted in a footnote: Indeed, the result would not be different even if plaintiffs were members of a suspect or quasi-suspect class. As previously noted, the state's interests and concerns are not only legitimate but compelling. And realistically there is no less restrictive means of adequately addressing them than by simply prohibiting the proposed union.
The fact that same-sex marriage is not a fundamental right, entitled to due process protection, see supra Part V., does not end the constitutional inquiry; equal protection analysis is available to determine whether the classification at issue, unrelated adult homosexual couples, [31] can serve as a legitimate basis for excluding persons from a state benefitin this case the right to marry which is available virtually without limitation to unrelated adult heterosexual couples. The Supreme Court has explained that certain state-imposed limitations or exclusions can violate the equal protection guarantee either (1) by restricting the exercise of a fundamental right, see Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541, 62 S.Ct. at 1113not the case here [32] or (2) by discriminating, without sufficient justification, against members of a constitutionally protected class. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-18, 102 S.Ct. at 2394-95; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312, 96 S.Ct. at 2566. This case concerns the latter, discrimination category. It is important to say at the outset of this discussion what will become clearer as I proceed: the question I am addressingwhether homosexuals, see supra note 31, comprise a constitutionally protected classmust be answered for equal protection purposes generally, not just for a marriage case. That is to say, the answer to this classification question will be the same whether the issue in a particular case is alleged discrimination against homosexuals in employment, or in housing, or under the marriage statute; homosexuals either will, or will not, comprise a class entitled to special constitutional scrutiny of alleged discrimination against them. What will not be the same from case to case, however, is the ultimate outcome resulting from that classification. Suppose, for example, this court were to conclude here, or in another case, that homosexuals comprise a constitutionally protected class. This would do no more than shift to the government in a particular case the burden of proving that the alleged discrimination against homosexuals served a compelling, or at least an important, governmental interest. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-18, 102 S.Ct. at 2394-95. Thus, classification of homosexuals as a constitutionally protected class would not grant them the right to marry one another. It is theoretically possible that the government would fail to carry its burden in a housing or employment, discrimination case but might succeed, nonetheless, in demonstrating why, in the public interest, only heterosexuals should be allowed to marry. The point is: in the ensuing discussion of whether homosexuals comprise a constitutionally protected classjust as racial minorities and women are specially protected classesI shall be dealing with a threshold inquiry that does not necessarily dictate the result of the case. Basically, I shall be dealing with the question (1) whether the plaintiffs-appellants should have the burden of showing why there is no rational basis for disallowing homosexuals to marry one another, or (2) whether instead the District should have the burden of showing a compelling, or at least substantial, governmental interest in preventing homosexuals from marrying one another. It also is important to be clear from the beginning that, even though the state does not withhold a right deemed fundamental for constitutional purposes, a legislative classification that withholds other significant rights and benefits from a protected class of persons, while making those benefits available to others, can just as surely violate the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-18, 102 S.Ct. at 2394-95 (Texas statute withholding from local school districts state funds for educating children who were not legally admitted violates equal protection clause). Thus, even though only heterosexual couples have a fundamental right to marry, the aspect of marriage that elevates it to a fundamental right under the due process clausethe capacity to have children togetherdoes not gainsay the fact that marriage has other important attributes which, as the Supreme Court itself has recognized, can be significant enough on occasion to outweigh various interests the state may have in withholding the right to marry from one group or another.
In Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), the Court held that a state law withholding from prisoners the right to marry violated due process because four important attributes of marriage, id. at 95, 107 S.Ct. at 2265, outweighed any penological concern the state could articulate to support the marriage ban. In particular, the Court said: The right to marry, like many other rights, is subject to substantial restrictions as a result of incarceration. Many important attributes of marriage remain, however, after taking into account the limitations imposed by prison life. [1] First, inmate marriages, like others, are expressions of emotional support and public commitment. These elements are an important and significant aspect of the marital relationship. [2] In addition, many religions recognize marriage as having spiritual significance; for some inmates and their spouses, therefore, the commitment of marriage may be an exercise of religious faith as well as an expression of personal dedication. [3] Third, most inmates eventually will be released by parole or commutation, and therefore most inmate marriages are formed in the expectation that they ultimately will be fully consummated. [4] Finally, marital status often is a precondition to the receipt of government benefits ( e.g., Social Security benefits), property rights ( e.g., tenancy by the entirety, inheritance rights), and other, less tangible benefits ( e.g., legitimation of children born out of wedlock). These incidents of marriage, like the religious and personal aspects of the marriage commitment, are unaffected by the fact of confinement or the pursuit of legitimate corrections goals. Id. at 95-96, 107 S.Ct. at 2265. If these attributes of marriage are relevant to the needs and aspirations of gays and lesbiansas public education (not a fundamental right) was relevant to alien children (a quasi-suspect class) in Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217-18 & n. 16, 223-24, 230, 102 S.Ct. at 2395 & n. 16, 2397-98, 2401-02we have the basis for inquiring whether a marriage statute that excludes homosexuals from the right to marry one another meets equal protection requirements. Appellants proffer that, given the nature of homosexuality, Turner 's attributes of marriageemotional support, religious or spiritual significance, physical consummation, and government and other benefitsare as relevant and important to same-sex couples as to heterosexual couples. I perceive no basis for doubting that appellants can make such a showing. [33] Moreover, appellants buttress their argument by noting that many heterosexual couples are not able to have children, or may choose not to do so, whereas homosexual couples, absent state law or policy impediments, [34] can and do elect parenthood through adoption, surrogacy, or artificial inseminationthe result being that parenthood, and even the benefits of procreation, are not necessarily limited to formally united heterosexual couples. After considering pertinent legislative facts and applying relevant case law, I must concludeas elaborated laterthat the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that homosexuals do not comprise a suspect or quasi-suspect class, and thus the court erred in concluding as a matter of law that the rational basis test applies to this case under the equal protection clause. On the other hand, I am unable to ascertain to the required degree of certainty from the record, supplemented by my own study, the legislative facts necessary for deciding as a matter of law whether homosexuals are entitled under the equal protection clause to special scrutiny of their claimed right to marry. Thus, as explained below, I believe a trial will be required to decide the classification issue: whether the rational basis test, or a higher form of scrutiny, applies.
I do not believe this court can resolve the matter in appellants' favor by assuming, for the sake of argument, that the rational basis test applies. Although I do not subscribe to the trial court's reasoning, see supra Part VI.A., I also cannot say as a matter of law that the limitation of marriage to heterosexual couples would not survive the traditional rational basis test under the equal protection clause. Under that test, the government's action in this case, the marriage statute limitation to heterosexual couples must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. A State, moreover, has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification. [A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data. Haller v. Doe, ___ U.S. ___, ___ _ ___, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2642-43, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993) (citations omitted); see Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3255-56, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 1851-52, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971); Backman v. United States, 516 A.2d 923, 927 (D.C.1986). Although this case raises serious questions about the legitimacy, under the equal protection clause, of limiting marriage to apposite-sex couples, it appears that the Supreme Court has seen marriage as having a traditional principal purpose: to regulate and legitimize the procreation of children. See Zoblocki, 434 U.S. at 385-86, 98 S.Ct. at 680-81; Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541, 62 S.Ct. at 1113. Although the Court has also made clear that marriage embraces much more, see Turner, 482 U.S. at 95-96, 107 S.Ct. at 2265, I believe that this central purpose of the marriage statutethis emphasis on childbearing provides the kind of rational basis defined in Heller, ___ U.S. at ___ _ ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2642-43, permitting limitation of marriage to heterosexual couples. I therefore cannot conclude that appellants are entitled to prevail even if the rational basis standard applies.
I also conclude that this court cannot resolve the matter in the District's favor by assuming, for the sake of argument, that discrimination against homosexuals is subject to strict scrutiny; for In cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that the District has a compelling or even a substantial interest in reserving marriage for heterosexual couples. The trial court did not explicate the reasons why it so concluded, other than referring to previously noted' reasons. See supra Part VI.A. As I read the court's opinion, those reasons are the same as those cited under the court's rational basis' analysis. They are simply too conclusory for equal protection analysis; summary judgment is inappropriate on this issues. The question then remains; whether (1) the rational basis test under equal protection analysis applies, or whether instead (2) a more rigorous scrutiny of the District's policy excluding same-sex marriage is required because homosexuals comprise a scenically protected class. In either event, absent any basis for summary judgment, I conclude the judgment for the District should be reversed and the case remanded for trial.
An historical approach will be useful to the classification analysis. The idea that the legislative treatment of particular classes of persons requires greater scrutiny under the equal protection clause than other persons receive is traceable to dictum in a footnote to the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778, 783-84 n. 4, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938) (upholding federal statute prohibiting interstates shipment of filled milk under rational basis test). In that footnote, Justice Stone indicated that prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition ... curtail[ing] the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and [so] may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. Id. (emphasis added). Racial discrimination presents the paradigm case under Carolene Products. A particular racial minority, such as Africa-Americans, is discrete in the sense intended; they are visible in a way that makes them relatively easy for other s to identify. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV.L.REV. 713, 729 (1985). African-Americans also are insular, meaning they tend to interact with each other with great frequency in a variety of social contexts, such as neighborhoods, churches, clubs. See id. at 726. African-Americans, moreover, are nationally, if not always locally, in the minority. Finally, the history of civil rights litigation and legislation reflects prejudice which has resulted in invidious discrimination against African-Americans, requiring various court-ordered remedies. The premise underlying Carolene Products' call for more searching judicial inquiry into allegedly prejudicial treatment of discrete and insular minorities is that such minorities lack sufficient political power to fend for themselves in a democratic process that should, but fails, to generate[] outcomes systematically more favorable to minority interests. Ackerman, supra, 98 HARV.L.REV. at 716. There are problems with the Carolene Products formulation, however. It is underinclusive, as later Supreme Court decisions have made clear. Women, for example, are subject to prejudicial discrimination while comprising a diffuse, not insular group. And, of course, women are not a minority. Furthermore, discrete and insular minorities are not necessarily less able to effectuate their interests through the legislative process than other groups or even disorganized majorities. Racial minorities, in any event, appear to have greater political muscle in most instances than other disadvantaged groups, such as illegitimate children or homosexuals or the poor, all of which tend on the whole to be less identifiable and more diffuse than African-Americans, for example. See id. at 728-31. Finally, the kind of prejudice reflected in the Carolene Products footnote is also under-inclusive. There are at least two kinds of prejudice the Supreme Court has recognized: (1) lack of effective participation in the political process, as emphasized in Carolene Products, and (2) stigma, i.e., a mark of shame that invites demeaning treatment regardless of one's strength at the polls. See, e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223, 102 S.Ct. at 2398 (stigma of illiteracy affecting undocumented school-age children); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 1769, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973) (plurality opinion) (gross, stereotypical distinctions between the sexes). As explained below, equal protection analysis has evolved beyond Carolene Products to the point where courts intervene to remedy both kinds of prejudice. This discussion of Carolene Products is intended as background for discussion of how the Supreme Court has developed and applied the idea of intensified scrutiny to a variety of groups not limited to discrete and insular minorities, and how the Court has expanded protectable prejudice from lack of effective participation in the political process to prejudice from stigmatizing and stereotypingfrom devaluingparticular groups of human beings.
In the years since Carolene Products, the Supreme Court has identified two kinds of legislative classifications that require intensive equal protection analysis. These commonly have been called, respectively, suspect and quasi-suspect classes (meaning the legislative classifications, not the people in them, are suspect). The first, suspect classificationwhich the Supreme Court has used to resolve complaints alleging discrimination based on race, [35] alienage, [36] and national origin [37] must receive strict scrutiny from the courts; i.e., for legislative use of the classification to survive, the state must demonstrate that its classification has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217 & n. 15, 102 S.Ct. at 2395 & n. 15; see Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. at 3254 (classifications based on race, alienage, or natural origin . . . will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest). The second, quasi-suspect classificationwhich the Court has used to decide cases alleging discrimination based on gender [38] and illegitimacy [39] requires intermediate or heightened scrutiny; i.e., the state must show that legislative use of the classification reflects a reasoned judgment consistent with the ideal of equal protection that further[s] a substantial interest of the State. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217-18 & n. 16, 102 S.Ct. at 2395 & n. 16; see Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441, 105 S.Ct. at 3255 (gender classification fails unless it is substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest; classification based on illegitimacy will survive if substantially related to a legitimate state interest). The Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether homosexuals, let alone homosexual couples, constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class. See Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014, 105 S.Ct. 1373, 1376-77, 84 L.Ed.2d 392 (1985) (Brennan, J. dissenting from denial of certiorari ). Nor has the Court clearly defined the differences between these two classifications requiring, respectively, strict and intermediate (or heightened) scrutiny. [40] The Court, however, has focused from case to case on several factors to guide the analysis applied to either classification, although the Court has not addressed every factor in every case. As we shall see, these factors have one thing in common: they reflect various ways of evaluating whether intensive court scrutiny and, perhaps, intervention will be necessary, under the equal protection clause, to help substantially powerless classes of people maintain their dignity and receive important rights in the face of harmful, indeed invidious, discrimination by the state (meaning the popular majority). [41] Specifically, the Court will ask: (1) Has the group suffered a history of purposeful discrimination? [42] (2) Is the class the object of such deep-seated prejudice that it is often subjected to disabilities based on inaccurate stereotypes that do not truly reflect the members' abilities? [43] (3) Is the class defined by the presence of an immutable trait that is beyond a class member's control and yet bears no relation to the individual's ability to contribute to society? [44] (4) Is the group a politically powerless minority? [45] Interestingly, the first two of these factors reflect a concern for stigmafor unfair stereotyping. The latter two focus on the ability of the group to avoid the claimed disadvantage through self-helpthe classic Carolene Products concern.
Before considering whether any combination of factors, if satisfied, would require intensive judicial scrutiny of the prohibition against homosexual marriage, it is necessary to note that four federal courts of appeals have ruledprimarily by reference to the Supreme Court's due process decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, supra that homosexuals do not comprise a suspect or quasi-suspect class. See High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 570-73 (9th Cir.1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 564-66 (7th Cir. 1989); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed.Cir.1989); Padula v. Webster, 261 U.S.App.D.C. 365, 370-72, 822 F.2d 97, 102-04 (1987). In Padula, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the government in appellant's suit claiming the FBI had violated the equal protection clause by refusing to hire appellant because she was a homosexual. The court concluded that homosexuals did not comprise a class deserving intensive scrutiny because the Supreme Court, in Hardwick, had approved state laws criminalizing homosexual conduct, and thereby implicitly had precluded any special protection of homosexuals. If the Court [in Hardwick ] was unwilling to object to state laws that criminalize the behavior that defines the class, it is hardly open to a lower court to conclude that state sponsored discrimination against the class is invidious. Id. at 371, 822 F.2d at 103 (emphasis added); see Dronenburg v. Zech, 239 U.S.App.D.C. 229, 238-39, 741 F.2d 1388, 1397-98 (1984) (private, consensual, homosexual conduct is not constitutionally protected). Padula 's premisethat homosexual behavior... defines the class, id. appears facially overboard; homosexuals as a class are defined by reference to sexual orientation, which does not necessarily imply particular conduct, even in marriage. See supra note 33; see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U.CHI.L.REV. 1161, 1178 n. 85 (1988). As the D.C. Circuit itself had noted earlier, [ Hardwick ] did not reach the difficult issue of whether an agency of the federal government can discriminate against individuals merely because of sexual orientation.  Doe v. Casey, 254 U.S.App. D.C. 282, 296, 796 F.2d 1508, 1522 (1986) (CIA employee alleged he was dismissed because of homosexual orientation, and court concluded that if, indeed, CIA action reflected policy of terminating employment of all homosexuals, CIA would have to justify why this policy was necessary in interests of United States). [46] It is important to note, however, that in Padula itself, plaintiff-appellant herself rejected the conduct/orientation distinction, premising her constitutional argument on a definition of homosexuals as persons who engage in homosexual conduct. 261 U.S.App.D.C. at 370, 822 F.2d at 102. The court accordingly balked at finding invidious discrimination against a class of persons who, by definition, engaged in conduct that, consistent with the Constitution, could be criminalized. Three other federal circuits followed suit. In Woodward v. United States , the court sustained dismissal of a naval reserve officer from active duty on the ground that he was an admitted homosexual. In rejecting the claims that the Navy's action violated Woodward's constitutional right to privacy, as well as his right to equal protection of the laws, the court relied on Hardwick. In holding that homosexuals were not members of a suspect or quasi-suspect class, the court merely asserted the legislative factwithout citing any authoritythat [m]embers of recognized suspect or quasi-suspect classes, e.g., blacks or women, exhibit immutable characteristics whereas homosexuality is primarily behavioral in nature. Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076. Similarly, in Ben-Shalom v. Marsh , the court of appeals, reversing the district court, upheld the Army's refusal to reenlist an admitted lesbian. Relying on Hardwick, the court concluded that, [if] homosexual conduct may constitutionally be criminalized, then homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis scrutiny for equal protection purposes. Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464 (footnote omitted). The court also appeared to be influenced by the fact that it had been asked to overturn an Army regulation, which the court believed would be an unjustified intrusion into military affairs. See id. at 465. The court added that homosexuals are proving that they are not without growing political power. Id. at 466. Finally, in High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office , a class action brought by homosexual applicants for employment by the Defense Department, the court of appeals, reversing the district court, rejected plaintiffs' arguments that the Department's refusal to grant security clearances to known or suspected gay or lesbian applicants violated the equal protection clause. The court relied on Hardwick, Ben-Shalom, and Padula and, in particular, asserted as legislative factwithout citing any authoritythat [h]omosexuality is not an immutable characteristic; it is behavioral and hence is fundamentally different from traits such as race, gender, or alienage, which define already existing suspect and quasi-suspect classes. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573. The court also noted that homosexuals are not without political power. Id. at 574. It is critical to understanding the equal protection issue for us to recognize, very frankly, that even if homosexuals as a class could be defined, at least in part, by reference to homosexual conduct, the federal courts in Padula, Woodward, Ben-Shalom, and High Tech Gays as elaborated below all misapplied Hardwick, a due process case in which the Supreme Court expressly noted it was not addressing equal protection issues. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196 n. 8, 106 S.Ct. at 2847 n. 8 (Respondent does not defend the judgment below based on the Ninth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clauses or the Eighth Amendment.). Furthermore, two of these courts, in Woodward and High Tech Gays apparently recognizing that Hardwick was not dispositiveapplied equal protection analysis by merely asserting that homosexuality is not immutable, entirely ignoring a substantial body of scientific research to the contrary. See infra note 49. I have considerable respect for the federal courts that issued these decisions, but this court owes them no deference, and we would abandon our judicial review responsibility if we accepted what, in my view, is critically flawed reasoning. The discussion above in Part V., concluding that same-sex marriage is not a fundamental right under the due process clause, made clear that, to the extent the due process clause protects substantive rights, it characteristically upholds tradition. As Professor Cass R. Sunstein has noted: From its inception, the Due Process Clause has been interpreted largely (though not exclusively) to protect traditional practices against short-run departures. The clause has therefore been associated with a particular conception of judicial review, one that sees the courts as safeguards against novel developments brought about by temporary majorities who are insufficiently sensitive to the claims of history. Sunstein, supra, 55 U.CHI.L.REV. at 1163. Professor Sunstein then stressed that, whereas the due process clause reinforces tradition, the equal protection clause is forward-looking; it is intended to invalidate traditions, however longstanding, that become invidiously discriminatory as times change and disadvantaged groups call attention to their treatment. The Equal Protection Clause ... has been understood as an attempt to protect disadvantaged groups from discriminatory practices, however deeply engrained and longstanding. The Due Process Clause often looks backward; it is highly relevant to the Due Process issue whether an existing or time-honored convention, described at the appropriate level of generality, is violated by the practice under attack. By contrast, the Equal Protection Clause looks forward, serving to invalidate practices that were widespread at the time of its ratification and that were expected to endure. The two clauses therefore operate along different tracks. Id. Professor Sunstein accordingly concluded that, although Hardwick sustained, against due process clause attack, a statute criminalizing consensual sodomy as applied to homosexuals, that ruling does not necessarily foreclose a discrimination claim by homosexuals who contend that the equal protection clause entitles them to the same treatment that heterosexuals receive. See id. at 1163-64; Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 711, 716-20 (9th Cir.1989) (en banc) (Norris, J., concurring). As applied in this case, Sunstein's analysis suggests that, even though Hardwick says the state can outlaw consensual sodomy between homosexuals without violating the due process clause, this does not necessarily mean the state can deny homosexual couples the right to marry, while allowing heterosexual couples to do so, without violating the equal protection clause. [47] In concluding that homosexuals did not have a privacy right to engage in sodomy protected by the due process clause, Hardwick did not decide whether the state constitutionally could deny consenting heterosexuals the same right, see id., 478 U.S. at 188 n. 2, 106 S.Ct. at 2842 n. 2, although it is hard to imagine that the Court would find heterosexual sodomy deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, Moore, 431 U.S. at 503, 97 S.Ct. at 1938, and thus constitutionally protected by the due process clause. See Watkins, 875 F.2d at 717-718 (Norris, J., concurring). If the state can deny that right to heterosexuals and homosexuals alike by criminalizing consensual sodomy by everyone, consistent with due process, based on a tradition of criminal sodomy statutes that have drawn no distinction between homosexual and heterosexual sodomy, see Watkins, 875 F.2d at 718 (Norris, J., concurring), then such conduct provides no basis by itself for denying marriage to homosexual couples without also denying, if not revoking, that right for all heterosexual couples who intend, or are found, to practice consensual sodomy. If, on the other hand, the state cannot ban sodomy for consenting heterosexual couples, consistent with their constitutional right to privacy, then it is not readily apparent why the state could lawfully discriminate against homosexual couples, presumed to be engaging in unlawful consensual sodomy, by denying them a formal status, marriage, that heterosexual couples use to legitimize their own consensual sodomy (among other needs). See id.; C.R. Sunstein, supra, 55 U.CHI. L.REV. at 1169-70. Lurking in this analysis is a subissue: the assumption that the state, despite Hardwick, cannot constitutionally prohibit consensual heterosexual sodomy by a married couple, consistent with the constitutional right to privacy, does not necessarily mean the state cannot constitutionally prohibit sodomy by a consenting unmarried heterosexual couple, just as the state criminalizes fornication. See, e.g., D.C.Code § 22-1002 (1989 Repl.) (fornication). On that assumption, the question then becomes: whether same-sex couples (presumed for this purpose to be a constitutionally protected class) can use the equal protection clause to claim a constitutional right to marryabsent a compelling or substantially state interest to the contrary when they admittedly engage in conduct, consensual sodomy, which the state can lawfully proscribe for a large measure of the heterosexual population, namely all unmarried opposite-sex couples. The answer, I believe, is yes; equal protection is available. In the first place, Hardwick, in dealing only with consensual homosexual sodomy, 478 U.S. at 188 n. 2, 106 S.Ct. at 2842 n. 2, arguably drew the line between homosexual and heterosexual sodomy, not between unmarried and married conduct. But, even if Hardwick left room for constitutionally protecting consensual sodomy in marriage while permitting criminal penalties for consensual sodomy outside marriage, that would only reenforce appellants' equal protection argument here. Heterosexual couples could validate their conduct and escape criminal prosecution, while attending to their other physical, emotional, and spiritual needs, by entering a marriage; homosexual couples engaging in the same conduct, and having the same other needs, could not. This difference arguably amounts to invidious discrimination because the state would be withholding from homosexual couples a status that heterosexual couples could elect to legitimize for themselves the very same conductto the point of curing otherwise criminal conductthat homosexual couples would be helpless to legitimize. If marriage can make behavior acceptableand constitutionally protectablethat would otherwise be unacceptable and unprotectable, this means that marriage can legitimize behavior that may be contextually, but not inherently, unacceptable. If, therefore, marriage (under the assumptions considered here) is the only variable that distinguishes between acceptable and unacceptable consensual sodomy, then a law permitting marriage only between opposite-sex couples would appear to discriminate invidiously against members of the only class of unmarried, unrelated, adult coupleshomosexual coupleswho are disqualified from legitimizing behavior, and from attending to other important needs, that similarly situated heterosexual couples can lawfully arrange to undertake and satisfy.