Opinion ID: 3040438
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: m. as the City posits.

Text: a. Use of Force [13] Under Hodari D., the first method of effectuating a seizure is through the application of physical force. The force need not be significant and can count as effectuating an arrest even if inadequate to gain control of the suspect. “[M]ere grasping” or “la[ying] . . . hands upon” a suspect is, for example, sufficient even if inefficacious. Id. at 624-25. 11 As we discuss later, Hodari D. also announced that seizure — including arrest — through application of physical force can occur even though the force is ineffective in restraining an individual’s liberty. 499 U.S. at 624. Some cases have asserted that a show of force such as occurred here, when the officers surrounded Fisher’s apartment and placed a police car on the apartment complex lawn, is tantamount to an application of physical force under Hodari D. See Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 506 (6th Cir. 2002); Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 819 (3d Cir. 1997). We assume that is so. See note 13, infra. As a result, we do not contradict Ewolski or create the circuit split that the dissent envisions. Dissent at 510 n.5. 490 FISHER v. CITY OF SAN JOSE [14] Also, the force used need not involve a direct physical connection between the officer and the suspect. Rather, a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs “when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied,” even if indirectly. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989). So, as in Brower, if the police intentionally set up a situation which will cause force to be applied to a suspect, such as establishing a roadblock or firing a gun, they have used force on the suspect. See id. at 598-99 (holding that a seizure occurs when a person is “stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion or put in place in order to achieve that result”); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (“[A]pprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure. . . .”). Applying these standards, we conclude that whether or not the show of official force that occurred before 6:30 a.m. can be considered equivalent to the application of physical force for purposes of effectuating a seizure, there was no basis in the evidence for the jury to conclude that any such seizure was the only one that occurred. Rather, Fisher continued to go about his business in his apartment.12 His doing so was equivalent to the escape envisioned by Hodari D.: Like a fugitive who flees after application of physical force sufficient to constitute a seizure, as long as he remained in his apartment, Fisher was not under complete police control, despite attempts to bring him into such control. For that reason, Fisher remained subject to seizure or arrest — and related entries into his home — after the arrival of the MERGE team 12 Fisher’s location is critical to our conclusion. As Bostick recognized, “escape” or “freedom,” which may generally require an explicit showing of physical flight, takes on a different meaning in a confined location, such as one’s home, in which there are compelling reasons — unrelated to police action — for an individual to remain. 501 U.S. at 435-36. Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, however, we do not hold that merely disappearing from view constitutes an escape of the sort discussed in Hodari D. See Dissent at 511-12. FISHER v. CITY OF SAN JOSE 491 even if he had been seized earlier, just as would an individual shot by the police who continued to flee thereafter. [15] After the MERGE team arrived, the officers threw several volleys of CS gas canisters into Fisher’s house. The gas was intended to reach Fisher’s orifices and interfere with his ability to function and did so. Intentionally exposing Fisher to toxic substances is an application of physical force for Fourth Amendment purposes. See Headwaters Forest Def. v. County of Humboldt, 240 F.3d 1185, 1198-1200 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 534 U.S. 801 (2001), aff’d on remand, 276 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2002); LaLonde, 204 F.3d at 960-61. Thus, after the MERGE team arrived and Boler and Ryan left at 7 a.m., the officers applied physical force to Fisher on more than one occasion, which, under Hodari D., constituted seizing him on each such occasion.