Opinion ID: 1165369
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: splitting cause of action.

Text: In the nineteenth century, a very narrow definition of cause of action was used. The definition varied in terms of same remedial right, identical substantive or primary right or suits having the same evidence. See J. Pomeroy, Code Remedies §§ 346-56 (5th ed. 1929); Schopflocher, What is a Single Cause of Action for the Purpose of the Doctrine of Res Judicata?, 21 Or.L.Rev. 319 (1942); Vestal, Res Judicata/Claim Preclusion: Judgment for the Claimant, 62 Nw.U.L.Rev. 357 (1967). The problem with these tests is that they are perfunctory and fail to account for particular situations. Whether causes of action are identical for res judicata purposes    cannot be determined precisely by mechanistic application of a simple test. Abramson v. University of Hawaii, 594 F.2d 202, 206 (9th Cir.1979) (citation omitted). Our Court has never decided what constitutes a cause of action for res judicata purposes. Reliance on the nineteenth century interpretations offers little guidance and probably adds to the already existing confusion. We, accordingly, reject those views. Our courts need guidelines, and we adopt the rules contained in Restatement, supra §§ 24 and 25. We reproduce them for the convenience of the Bar. § 24. Dimensions of Claim for Purposes of Merger or Bar  General Rule Concerning Splitting (1) When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the plaintiff's claim pursuant to the rules of merger or bar   , the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose. (2) What factual grouping constitutes a transaction, and what groupings constitute a series, are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage. § 25. Exemplifications of General Rule Concerning Splitting The rule of § 24 applies to extinguish a claim by the plaintiff against the defendant even though the plaintiff is prepared in the second action. (1) To present evidence or grounds or theories of the case not presented in the first action, or (2) To seek remedies or forms of relief not demanded in the first action. We recognize that [g]eneral adoption of the [Restatement] approach will neither change resolution of the easy problems nor ease resolution of the difficult problems. It will remain as clear as ever that a mere change in a legal theory does not create a new cause of action. Many common problems will continue to be answered by well-established rules, as they should be. But in approaching difficult or novel questions, it will be found that the [Restatement approach] defines a process rather than an absolute concept. 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4407 (1981) (footnote omitted). The essence of the Restatement approach is to see claim in factual terms and to make it coterminous with the transaction regardless of the number of substantive theories, or variant forms of relief flowing from those theories, that may be available to the plaintiff. Restatement, supra § 24 comment a. Thus, where one act causes a number of harms to, or invades a number of different interests of the same person, there is still but one transaction. Id. § 24 comment c. Different legal theories arising out of a given episode do not create multiple transactions and hence multiple claims. Id. While it was true that a successful suit in equity would not preclude an action at law, this is not so today. [A] judgment granting or denying specific performance of a contract should preclude an action for money damages. Id. § 25 comment (i)(2). Both cases arise out of the same transaction, a land contract. The only difference is the remedy sought. We therefore find that the cause of action requirement of res judicata is met. We further recognize that there are exceptions to the doctrine of res judicata. Id. § 26. Three Rivers states that imposing res judicata would be unjust because the trial court would not allow them to amend their complaint to include a claim for damages based on the trial court's belief that mixing questions of law and equity would be confusing. The Restatement does contain an exception similar to the one Three Rivers requests: The court in the first action has expressly reserved the plaintiff's right to maintain the second action. Id. § 26(1)(b). The comment to this provision makes it clear that the trial court's refusal to grant leave to amend the complaint is not a reservation by the court.    The plaintiff's    recourse against an incorrect refusal of an amendment is direct attack by means of appeal from an adverse judgment. Id. § 26 comment b. We find that this exception does not apply. The trial court should have found that res judicata barred Case II, and we therefore reverse. IT IS SO ORDERED. SOSA, Senior Justice, and PAYNE, J., concur.