Opinion ID: 790182
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the ability of the opposing party to satisfy an award of attorney's fees;

Text: 26 (3) whether an award of attorney's fees against the opposing party would deter other persons acting under similar circumstances; 27 (4) whether the party requesting attorney's fees sought to benefit all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a significant legal question regarding ERISA itself; and 28 (5) the relative merits of the parties' positions. 29 See Johannssen, 292 F.3d at 179. As we observed in Johannssen, it is essential, in order to ensure an adequate basis for review, for the trial court to have addressed each factor. Id. 30 In making the Attorney's Fee Ruling, the district court addressed three of the five factors specified by Johannssen —the first, second, and fifth. 8 First, the court found that the Sereboffs (and Stein) had not acted in bad faith under the first Johannssen factor. This finding on the first factor was, of course, supportive of the Sereboffs' position in opposition to MAMSI's fee request. Next, the court concluded that, despite the Sereboffs' lack of bad faith, their position on the Reimbursement Award swam against a heavy current of legal precedent, rendering their position under the fifth factor to be meritless. Although the court did not identify or explain the heavy current of precedent that the Sereboffs' position contravened, it was apparently referring to the decisions on which its Reimbursement Award had relied: Knudson, Bombardier, Varco, and our unpublished decision in Primax Recoveries, Inc. v. Young, 83 Fed. Appx. 523 (4th Cir.2003). In assessing the fifth Johannssen factor, however, the court failed to consider that the Ninth Circuit's decision in Westaff had created a circuit split on the question presented by the Reimbursement Award (a question that was not addressed by Knudson 's holding): whether a plan fiduciary asserting a subrogation right to reimbursement from a plan beneficiary who has received payments from a third party, and who possesses that recovery in an identifiable fund, is seeking equitable relief under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA. 31 Finally, the district court addressed the second Johannssen factor and determined that the Sereboffs would have sufficient funds available to satisfy an attorney's fee award to MAMSI. In so ruling, the court presumed that the Sereboffs' lawyer, Mr. Stein, would credit the award [of attorney's fees and costs] against his contingent fee collected in the underlying personal injury suit. It identified no record support, however, for the proposition that Stein would so act. In any event, the court concluded that the Sereboffs would be able to satisfy the Attorney's Fee Ruling from the $750,000 they recovered in the California litigation. 32 In sum, the district court's assessment of the Johannssen factors was incomplete. On one hand, the court's analysis of the second factor favored a fee award to MAMSI. On the other, its analysis of the first factor mitigated against any award at all, and the court did not assess either the third or the fourth factor. Finally, the court's examination of the fifth factor failed to recognize the existing circuit split on the issue raised by the Reimbursement Award. As a result, the court erred in making the Attorney's Fee Ruling, and we are constrained to vacate the Ruling and remand for a further assessment under Johannssen.