Opinion ID: 2996577
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Superceding Indictment

Text: Defendants first argue they were tried under a second superceding indictment that, because it was returned outside the statute of limitations period and did not relate back to the original indictment, was time-barred. We review the district court’s ruling regarding the statute of limitations de novo. United States v. Anderson, 188 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir. 1999). The original indictment against defendants, which included a wire-fraud count for the wiring of money on January 31, 1996, was filed January 19, 2001, within the five-year statute of limitations. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282. Subsequently, a first superceding indictment was returned on March 22, 2001, and a second superceding indictment was returned July 19, 2001. Although only the original indictment was filed within the five-year limit, “a superceding indictment that supplants a still-pending original indictment relates back to the original indictment’s filing date so long as it neither materially broadens nor substantially amends the charges initially brought against the defendant.” United States v. Ross, 77 F.3d 1525, 1537 (7th Cir. 1996). Defendants have two statute of limitations complaints about the indictments: the original indictment was filed under seal and the later indictments do not relate back to the original indictment. We first address defendants’ concern that the original indictment was sealed. Defendants argue that despite the fact that filing an indictment within the statute of limitations period tolls the running of the statute of limitations, it should not have been tolled in this case because the original indictment was filed under seal. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(4) provides that a court “may direct that the indictment be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or has been released pending trial.” Rule 6 does not require the statute of limitations analysis to be altered when an indictment is sealed, and we see no reason why, in a case such as this where an open indictment was filed only 6 Nos. 02-4356, 03-1005 & 03-1232 two months later, the statute of limitations should continue to run after a sealed indictment has been returned. See United States v. Thompson, 287 F.3d 1244, 1251 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v. Edwards, 777 F.2d 644, 647 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1154 (2d Cir. 1979). Hawkins also complains that because the original indictment has remained under seal, his counsel has never been able to determine whether the first superceding indictment relates back to the original indictment. The district court conducted an in camera comparison of the original indictment to the first superceding indictment and determined that the only difference between the two was the removal in the latter of the identity of an unindicted coconspirator. Our review confirms this minor change, which, since it does not alter or amend the charges against the defendants in any way, does not offend the statute of limitations. This is not to say, however, that it was proper for the indictment to indefinitely remain under seal in the district court. Pearson and the government acknowledge that the identity of the coconspirator named in the original indictment has been publicly revealed. This court has repeatedly recognized the paramount importance of providing public access to court proceedings, especially in criminal matters. See, e.g., In re Associated Press v. Ladd, 162 F.3d 503, 50910 (7th Cir. 1998); Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 1994). At the very least, once the identity of the unindicted coconspirator became known, the indictment should have been unsealed, and it is, as of this date, unsealed.2 2 We remind litigants that under Seventh Circuit Operating Procedure 10, “[e]xcept to the extent portions of the record are required to be sealed by statute . . . every document filed in or by (continued...) Nos. 02-4356, 03-1005 & 03-1232 7 Defendants’ second statute of limitations argument is that changes made to the conspiracy count in the second superceding indictment materially broadened the charge, preventing it from “relating back” to the original indictment, and leaving it time-barred. The second superceding indictment modified the end date of the conspiracy from February 1996 to September 2000 and added three overt acts which occurred during that time. Defendants argue that the three acts—Hawkins’s preparation of Marks’s false affidavit, his preparation of a phony consulting agreement, and his false testimony about the consulting agreement— were not part of the wire fraud conspiracy and thus expanded the alleged crime. However, “the fact that the ‘central objective’ of the conspiracy has been nominally attained does not preclude the continuance of the conspiracy.” United States v. Hickey, 360 F.2d 127, 141 (7th Cir. 1966). Here, the uninterrupted success of the conspiracy turned on defendants’ ability to continuously conceal the truth about the defective batteries from consumers and Exide shareholders. Hawkins’s acts to prop up the scheme were an integral part of the continuing actions of deceit. We find that defendants were on notice of the charges pending against them because “the initial indictment informed appellant[s] in no uncertain terms that [they] would have to account for essentially the same conduct with which [they were] ultimately charged in the superceding indictment,” United States v. O’Bryant, 998 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 1993), and therefore the second superceding indictment did not violate the statute of limitations. 2 (...continued) this court (whether or not the document was sealed in the district court) is in the public record unless a judge of this court orders it to be sealed. Documents sealed in the district court will be maintained under seal in this court for 14 days, to afford time to request the approval required by . . . this procedure.” 8 Nos. 02-4356, 03-1005 & 03-1232