Opinion ID: 2072515
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appointment of Counsel in PCRA Proceedings

Text: Under Pa.R.Crim.P. 1503, as currently in effect, every indigent petitioner is entitled to have counsel appointed to represent them in PCRA proceedings, unless the same issue was finally determined against the petitioner in a previous counselled proceeding. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 1504. The point in time at which a trial court may determine that a PCHA petitioner's claims are frivolous or meritless is after the petitioner has been afforded a full, fair, and counselled opportunity to present those claims. Commonwealth v. Harris, 381 Pa.Super. 206, 214-15, 553 A.2d 428, 433 (1989) (emphasis in original, citing cases). There is no exception to the rule requiring appointment of counsel for situations when the pro se petition fails to state a claim cognizable in PCRA proceedings. This construction of the current rule is supported by the Supreme Court's more plainly expressed intent in the new rules promulgated February 1, 1989, which take effect July 1, 1989. Under the new rules the trial court is required to indicate the nature of any defects in the original pro se petition, and must provide counsel appointed to assist the petitioner with a [reasonable] period of time in which to file a written amended petition curing the defects. Pa.R. Crim.P. 1505(b-d) (adopted 2/1/89, effective 7/1/89). Thus, under the new rules, defects in the original pro se petition would not warrant dismissal without appointment of counsel. Rather, it is only on second and subsequent PCRA petitions that the new rules render the appointment of counsel discretionary with the trial court. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1504(b & c) (adopted 2/1/89, effective 7/1/89). [2] Hence, we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to appoint counsel to represent appellant prior to dismissing appellant's first pro se PCRA petition. However, following the initial erroneous dismissal of the PCRA petition without appointment of counsel, present counsel was appointed. Counsel has filed a petition which asserts that he has reviewed the record and finds no non-frivolous issues which could have been raised in an amended petition. Counsel notes further that the sole issue which appellant seeks to raise is not properly cognizable in a PCRA proceeding. Finally, counsel informed appellant of his conclusions in an  Anders Brief sent to appellant by counsel, and also informed appellant in the accompanying letter that appellant could hire counsel, seek appointment of new counsel, or present argument in support of his contention pro se. [3] Appellant then filed a pro se answer in opposition to appellate counsel's motion to withdraw, which asserted that a cognizable claim had been asserted in his pro se PCRA petition. Thus, despite the trial court's error in failing to appoint counsel to represent appellant prior to summarily denying the petition, counsel appointed to represent appellant on appeal has provided every protection which PCRA counsel at the initial stage could have provided. Cf. Commonwealth v. Turner, supra at n. 3. The United States Supreme Court has declared that there is no federal constitutional right to counsel in collateral post conviction proceedings. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987). The new PCRA contains no statutory grant of a right to counsel. Thus, the right to counsel in PCRA proceedings as set forth in present Pa.R.Crim.P. 1503 and in Pa.R.Crim.P. 1504 (effective 7/1/89), is a creation of our Supreme Court not founded on federal constitutional or state legislative mandate. Rather, the allowance of counsel to petitioners for post-conviction relief is based solely upon procedural rule adopted by our Supreme Court pursuant to Pa. Const. Article V, section 10, as a matter of administrative convenience. See Court Rules, 552 A.2d at XCVI (1989) (IT IS ORDERED pursuant to Article V, Section 10 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania . . .). There was no suggestion in the order promulgating new Pa.R.Crim.P. 1504, or in Commonwealth v. Turner, supra , that there is any state constitutional basis for a right to counsel in collateral post-conviction relief proceedings, i.e. that Pa. Const.Art. 1, sect. 9 provides a greater right to counsel than U.S. Const.Amend. 6, as construed in Pennsylvania v. Finley, supra . Consequently, we see no reason why procedural defects by either a withdrawing attorney or the court granting withdrawal may not be dismissed as not substantial or not prejudicial in appropriate cases. See Commonwealth v. Harris, supra . Under the circumstances of this case, we see no reason to remand for the pointless and formalistic repetition of PCRA proceedings, when the outcome would nonetheless be a foregone conclusion. Cf. Id.