Opinion ID: 1805514
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the court err in denying the request for additional paternity testing?

Text: ¶ 6. McIntosh argues that additional paternity testing should have been granted based upon Miss.Code Ann. § 93-9-21(1)(c) (Supp.2003). That statute states in pertinent part that [i]f either party challenges the original test results, the department shall order additional testing at the expense of the challenging party. Yet while the statute plainly provides a mechanism for recoupment of costs when additional testing is needed, it does not detail the procedure to challenge the validity of genetic testing. ¶ 7. That process is addressed in Section 93-9-23(3), which describes in pertinent part that [i]f the court, in its discretion, finds cause to order additional testing, then it may do so using the same or another laboratory or expert. (emphasis added). McIntosh never supplied the trial court with any expert testimony that would show good cause why additional paternity testing was warranted. Without such evidence the trial court found that it could not allow additional testing. This was not an abuse of discretion on the part of the chancellor; indeed, it is a logical and wholly correct determination. If parties could simply set aside genetic tests with no evidence tending to disprove their validity, then paternity would never be resolved. ¶ 8. There is another reason why McIntosh's argument fails. Sections 93-9-23(2) & (3) outline in pertinent part that [a] party may challenge the testing procedure within thirty (30) days of the date of mailing the results ... [but] [i]f there is no timely challenge to the original test results or if the court finds no cause to order additional testing, then the [original] certified report shall be admitted as evidence in the proceeding as prima facie proof of its contents. Id. In the case sub judice, the original paternity evaluation was issued on March 28, 1990. McIntosh's request for additional paternity testing was on November 29, 1999, roughly nine years from the issuance of the original paternity evaluation. Any challenge to the paternity test or motion for additional paternity testing grossly exceeded the statutorily-provided thirty days. ¶ 9. For those two reasons, the trial court committed no error in refusing to grant McIntosh's request for additional paternity testing.