Opinion ID: 6496730
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Leiss

Text: ¶102 As discussed, at trial Smith offered the opinion testimony of Peter Leiss—an accident reconstruction expert and mechanical engineer with twenty years of experience in the automotive engineering industry, including in quality control for diesel fuel systems. Leiss was called to testify as to whether the diesel fuel spill could have generated carbon monoxide, and if so, whether there was a passageway for the carbon monoxide to travel from the engine compartment into the passenger compartment of Smith‘s car. The district court held that the latter issue was ―well within [Leiss‘s] bailiwick as an automotive engineer,‖ rendering its resolution a ―factual determination for the jury.‖ But the court found fault with Leiss‘s reliance on the test conducted by the lab technician at Robson Forensics, see supra ¶ 18, which the court referred to as the ―fish tank test.‖ ¶103 The district court concluded that it had erred in admitting Leiss‘s testimony ―as it relates to the alleged production of [carbon monoxide] based on the fish tank test . . . because it was unreliable and prejudicial‖ to SouthTowne. In reaching its ruling, the court took particular umbrage at Leiss‘s reliance on an ―unidentified ‗lab technician‘ . . . working at [Leiss‘s] place of employment‖ who performed the test. The court also deemed the test inadmissible because Leiss was not a chemist and therefore was not qualified to assess the reliability of the test himself. The court also noted that during his trial testimony, Leiss was unable to answer a number of questions about the testing methods used. ¶104 The court essentially determined that Leiss‘s reliance on the test did not meet the standards of Utah Rule of Evidence 703, which permits experts to ―base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed.‖ Under this rule, an expert‘s opinion may be based on otherwise inadmissible ―facts or data‖ that the expert has been made aware of, provided that ―experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject.‖ UTAH R. EVID. 703. If the proponent of the opinion intends to disclose the underlying ―facts or data‖ to the jury, and the facts or data are otherwise inadmissible (for 31 SMITH v. VOLKSWAGEN SOUTHTOWNE, INC. Opinion of the Court example, because they are hearsay), the proponent may do so ―only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.‖ Id. ¶105 The district court then concluded that because Leiss‘s opinion was based on an unreliable test for which he had provided insufficient foundation, his opinion that carbon monoxide could have been produced under Smith‘s hood was inadmissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 702(b). This rule mandates that any ―[s]cientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge‖ serving as the basis for expert testimony must meet ―a threshold showing that the principles or methods . . . underlying . . . the testimony (1) are reliable, (2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (3) have been reliably applied to the facts.‖ UTAH R. EVID. 702(b). ¶106 Smith first argues that SouthTowne waived this argument because it did not object to the test for the reasons relied upon by the district court either before or during trial or in its post-trial motions, and that, therefore, the district court‘s order should be reversed on this basis. ¶107 SouthTowne does not respond to Smith‘s waiver argument in its appellee brief. And it does not dispute Smith‘s assertion that it did not raise the particular objections relied upon by the district court. ¶108 Our independent review of the record confirms that SouthTowne did not raise these specific objections to Leiss‘s testimony. To be clear, in its pre-trial motion in limine, SouthTowne did object to Leiss testifying that the leaking diesel fuel created carbon monoxide in Smith‘s car. But it objected for a different reason. SouthTowne argued not that the laboratory test was unreliable, that the qualifications or identity of the lab technician were unknown, or that, as a non-chemist, Leiss was unqualified to judge whether the test was reliable or whether the technician was qualified. Rather, SouthTowne argued that Leiss should not be allowed to opine about carbon monoxide production in Smith‘s engine compartment because the test did not replicate the conditions inside the engine compartment of a moving vehicle. In this regard, SouthTowne and its experts took particular issue with the fact that the aquarium test was done in an enclosure and therefore did not account for air flow. In its reply brief in support of its motion in limine in the district court, SouthTowne explained: 32 Cite as: 2022 UT 29 Opinion of the Court The reliability issue with respect to Mr. Leiss concerns the manner in which he proposes to apply his aquarium test to the facts of this case . . . . There are problems with this detection method . . . . Defendants concede, however, that this particular problem with the test goes to weight and will counter it with [expert] testimony . . . . The Rule 702 problem arises from the way in which Mr. Leiss proposes to extrapolate from his aquarium results to conditions under the hood, and inside the passenger compartment, of the Smith vehicle. ¶109 So, in its motion in limine, SouthTowne did not challenge the admissibility of the test itself, the qualifications of the lab technician, or Leiss‘s reliance on the test. In fact, in criticizing one of the methods the lab technician used, SouthTowne recognized this went only to the weight to be given the evidence rather than the admissibility of the test itself. ¶110 SouthTowne also did not object to the admission of the test results during trial. During Leiss‘s direct examination, Smith offered the laboratory test results as an exhibit. The court asked SouthTowne if it had any objection to the exhibit, to which SouthTowne answered, ―No.‖18 ¶111 So Smith is correct that SouthTowne did not challenge Leiss‘s testimony for the reasons relied upon by the district court either before or during trial. And SouthTowne also did not make an argument on this basis in its motion for a new trial. ¶112 Usually, this would be dispositive. See UTAH R. EVID. 103(a)(1) (requiring a party to ―timely object[] or move[] to strike‖ evidence it claims was erroneously admitted, and to ―state[] the specific ground‖ upon which the objection was lodged). But here, it is not the end of the analysis. Under civil rule 59(d), a court may grant a motion for a new trial ―for a reason not stated‖ in a party‘s motion ―[a]fter giving the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard.‖ UTAH R. CIV. P. 59(d). ¶113 In scrutinizing Leiss‘s testimony as it did, the district court was properly observing its role as gatekeeper with respect __________________________________________________________ 18 This may have been because SouthTowne‘s experts relied on similar tests, with variations to account for air flow. See supra ¶¶ 25–27. 33 SMITH v. VOLKSWAGEN SOUTHTOWNE, INC. Opinion of the Court to the admissibility of expert testimony.19 The court raised concerns with Leiss‘s reliance on the aquarium test based on its front-row seat at the trial. And rule 59(d) permitted the court to grant a new trial for a reason not raised by SouthTowne in its new trial motion. So SouthTowne‘s failure to preserve this issue is not dispositive. However, as we will discuss, when a court proceeds under rule 59(d), it must give the non-moving party notice of its concerns and an opportunity to be heard. __________________________________________________________ 19 In its amicus brief, UDLA requests clarification of the proper application of admissibility determinations under rule 702, noting confusion over advisory language in the 2007 amendment. Specifically, UDLA argues that our advisory language ―incorrectly downplays the district court‘s important gatekeeping function,‖ thereby encouraging trial judges to include expert testimony ―so long as it can be said that any basic indication of reliability exists, no matter how far-fetched.‖ UDLA asks us to ―reject any reading of the advisory language that would discourage judges from asserting [their gatekeeping] role.‖ UDLA accurately notes that our advisory language departs from the federal rule by broadening the scope of ―[s]cientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge‖ on which an expert may rely. See UTAH R. EVID. 702 & original advisory committee notes. But this does not suggest that trial judges should abdicate their gatekeeping role. Instead, rule 702 permits judges, as gatekeepers, to err on the side of admission within the confines of rule 702. ―[T]he rigor of [the rule‘s application] ‗will vary depending on the complexity of the particular case.‘‖ State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ¶ 54, 345 P.3d 1226 (quoting Eskelson ex rel. Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 2010 UT 59, ¶ 15, 242 P.3d 762). Judges are compelled to exclude expert testimony where it is unhelpful, unreliable, unduly prejudicial, or has improperly invaded the province of the jury. See State v. Martin, 2017 UT 63, ¶¶ 30–31, 423 P.3d 1254. But judges may not ―displace the province of the factfinder to weigh . . . evidence.‖ State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19, ¶ 26, 345 P.3d 1195. And although ―the line between assessing reliability and weighing evidence can be elusive‖ under rule 702, ―the factfinder [and not arbiter] bears the ultimate responsibility for evaluating the accuracy, reliability, and weight of the testimony.‖ Id. (quoting Gunn Hill Dairy Props., LLC v. L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power, 2012 UT App 20, ¶ 47, 269 P.3d 980). 34 Cite as: 2022 UT 29 Opinion of the Court ¶114 Smith next argues that the district court was wrong on the merits. She contends that Leiss did know who performed the lab test and it was reasonable for Leiss to rely on the results of the test. First, Smith proffers Leiss‘s deposition testimony, in which he identifies the technician conducting the lab test as the ―test lab manager, Brett Johnson,‖ and she highlights a portion of Leiss‘s trial testimony in which he states that the technician does this kind of testing ―very often,‖ he is ―knowledgeable‖ and ―well versed‖ in this kind of testing, and experts at Robson Forensics typically rely on the technician. And she argues that she never had the opportunity to offer this response to the district court‘s concerns. ¶115 We ultimately do not resolve whether the district court‘s conclusion that it should have excluded this portion of Leiss‘s testimony was correct. This is because we find Smith‘s related argument—that she was not given the opportunity to respond to the court‘s concerns—to be dispositive. ¶116 While rule 59(d) permits a district court to grant a motion for a new trial for a reason not advanced by the moving party, a court may do this only ―[a]fter giving the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard.‖20 UTAH R. CIV. P. 59(d). See also Salt Lake Legal Def. Ass’n v. Atherton, 2011 UT 58, ¶ 12, 267 P.3d 227 (explaining that due process mandates a party ―be given notice and an opportunity to be heard‖ before a judge ―adjudicate[s] its interests‖). This means that the non-moving party must be given ―timely and adequate notice‖ and an ―opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way.‖ Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah 1983). We have described this as ―the very heart of procedural fairness.‖ Id. ¶117 Here, Smith was not on notice of the substance of the court‘s concerns prior to the hearing on SouthTowne‘s post-trial motions because SouthTowne had not raised these issues in its new trial motion. We recognize that an issue may become apparent to a court during argument on a post-trial motion, and thus make prior notice impossible. In such a situation, a court can __________________________________________________________ 20 We do not explicate upon the issues a court may properly raise sua sponte when granting a motion for a new trial, except to emphasize that it may do so only after giving the parties fair notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. 35 SMITH v. VOLKSWAGEN SOUTHTOWNE, INC. Opinion of the Court ensure procedural fairness by giving the non-moving party additional time to address the new issue raised by the court. ¶118 In addition to lack of notice, Smith did not have a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the court‘s objections to the lab test. After the hearing, Smith attempted to submit an affidavit from Leiss to respond to the district court‘s concerns, but the court rejected the affidavit as an inappropriate attempt to add substantive evidence to the trial record. However, deposition testimony, affidavits, or other pertinent evidence may be admitted as information relevant to the court‘s legal determination regarding the admissibility of evidence. See UTAH R. EVID. 104(a) (―The court must decide any preliminary question about whether a witness is qualified . . . or evidence is admissible. In so deciding, the court is not bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege.‖); see also State v. Sheehan, 2012 UT App 62, ¶ 28, 273 P.3d 417 (―[T]here are two separate reliability determinations: admissibility, which is a legal determination the court makes, and the weight assigned to the evidence admitted at trial, which is a factual determination made by the fact finder.‖); Goebel v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 215 F.3d 1083, 1087 (10th Cir. 2000) (―It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine how to perform its gatekeeping function under Daubert. The most common method for fulfilling this function is a Daubert hearing, although such a process is not specifically mandated. The district court may also satisfy its gatekeeper role when asked to rule on a motion in limine, on an objection during trial, or on a post-trial motion so long as the court has sufficient evidence to perform ‗the task of ensuring that an expert‘s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.‘‖ (second emphasis added) (citations omitted)). ¶119 Where a court is considering granting a new trial based on concerns outside those raised by the moving party, rule 59(d) requires the court to ensure that the non-moving party has adequate notice of the new issues and a meaningful opportunity to address them before granting the motion. Because this did not happen here, we reverse the court‘s new trial ruling excluding the portion of Leiss‘s testimony that relied on the aquarium test.21 __________________________________________________________ 21 However, we note that even if this portion of Leiss‘s testimony were excluded, it would not necessarily render the evidence at trial insufficient to justify the verdict under rule (continued . . .) 36 Cite as: 2022 UT 29 Opinion of the Court