Opinion ID: 1473637
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Miscellaneous Questions

Text: The plaintiff makes several arguments which it thinks militate against the interpretations which we have adopted. The first is that the cause went to trial upon a stipulation which contained the following passages. The delivery of cream shipped to such plant was not a receipt or purchase by a handler. This language was used of the plaintiff's Newark plant in Claim Two. The other passage is: the operator with respect to such a plant is not a handler, and cream shipped to such a plant would be in the first instance delivered to a purchaser in an unapproved county who was not a handler with respect to such plant. This language was used of the plaintiff Borden's Newark plant, in Part A of Claims Three and Four. If the plaintiff had been misled in presenting any evidence in reliance upon this stipulation, we might feel obliged either to send the case back for further hearing, or perhaps even hold the defendant to the stipulations; but it does not ask leave to prove any other facts than those on which the cause was heard; nor could it have been misled in the conduct of its business, because the stipulation was signed long after all the transactions here in question. Apparently, the conclusiveness of this agreed definition of the word, handler, was first questioned by the judicial officer at a hearing on July 20, 1945. He at that time warned both parties that he might not feel bound by legal conclusions as to whether a person is a handler. A discussion followed, but all that we can find is a request by the plaintiff to be allowed to submit briefs on that point, if the judicial officer decided not to accept the stipulation. Although the plaintiff complains that no leave was ever given to file such a brief, we cannot see, in view of the opportunity for argument afforded both in the district court and here, that this is a grievance to be considered. The judicial officer was entirely right in not accepting the stipulation as final. It attempted to put a gloss upon the Regulation and the Regulation had the force of law. The duty of courts is to administer rights and obligations as they exist, not as the parties may choose to substitute others. [7] Provided fair opportunity be given to meet any change of front which arises out of the repudiation of the agreed interpretation, the party who suffers from it has no ground for complaint; and the doctrine is especially reasonable when, as here, the repudiation is by a succeeding official who differs with his predecessor. The plaintiff goes further, however, and asserts that there had been earlier interpretations in its favor, judicial and administrative, which we ought to follow. In Vogt's Dairies, Inc. v. Wickard [8] Judge Mandelbaum held that, for the purpose of obtaining a credit in the producer-settlement fund, a handler should not be considered such as to transactions in an unapproved plant. Whether this decision was meant to extend to classification under III-D might be debated; but, if it was, we cannot assent for the reasons we have given. As an administrative interpretation, the plaintiff invokes another memorandum which Harmon issued in December, 1938, in which he ruled that when a plant is not approved for the marketing area the dealer is not considered a handler at that plant. This was issued only a few months after the Regulation itself was promulgated, and at a time when, in the nature of things, interpretation was tentative, or, if it was not, ought to have been. We are indeed aware how great an advantage familiarity with the multifarious ramifications of such a subject as milk regulation gives to administrators, and how much less favored are we who must plunge into it unequipped. Nevertheless, we should have to endow them with almost supernatural powers, if they were not, like ourselves, at the outset stunned and confounded by the fantastic proliferation which emerges, when one attempts to find a path through such verbal mazes. We are satisfied that the second thought of the Administrator was better than his first; and we do not feel bound to accept the early ruling. The plaintiff asserts in its brief that it relied upon the memorandum of December, 1938, which defined not a handler, and that, because of it, it conducted its business as it would not otherwise have done. This it calls an estoppel. It is true that in cases of doubtful interpretation, long usage in reliance upon an administrative interpretation often counts for much. [9] We need not say how far we should feel bound by the interpretation if the plaintiff had proved that it did conduct its business in reliance upon the memorandum during the period in question. Be that as it may, there is not a syllable of such evidence in the record, although, as we have said, the judicial officer gave ample warning of what might be his eventual ruling. Nor did the plaintiff ask to be allowed to put in such proof, even after the report was filed. We cannot accept as an equivalent the bare assertion in the brief; nor would it be just now to send the cause back to try out an issue which would presumably lead far afield. Next the plaintiff complains of the exclusion of an exhibit which was designed to show, and which, we may assume, did show, the facts necessary to determine the Class II-A (unpriced) cream price and    comparable prices between such prices in the New Jersey markets after the Regulation went into effect. The object of this was, and could only be, to prove that the Regulation did not operate as it was designed to do, and that, as construed, it was unreasonable. It is, of course true that when alternative interpretations are possible, the more reasonable of the two is to be chosen; but the test of what is reasonable must be based upon what was before the draughtsmen of the Regulation, for their intent is a past fact, not determined or determinable by future events. Such evidence could not possibly have any bearing upon its meaning; it would only show that the purpose sought to be realized was not in fact realized; and purpose and realization are totally different things. The plaintiff does indeed suggest, but only in an indirect way, that, if construed as we are construing it, the Regulation is invalid. Plainly, we are in no position to decide that question. The Regulation was the result of long investigation and deliberation; and the evidence on which it was based is not before us. As upon the issue that it acted upon the faith of the Harmon memorandum, the plaintiff had its opportunity to challenge the validity of the Regulation. It preferred not to try out that question, when that course was open. It would be to the last degree unjust, now that it has failed, to reopen the proceeding and go through a long consideration of issues, many of which have in any event been superseded by the amendment of 1940. The regulation of an industry such as this  indeed of any modern industry  is an undertaking of monstrous difficulty; it yet remains to be seen whether success is within the compass of human abilities. Those charged with such duties must proceed as best they can, correcting their initial blunders, as experience teaches; some ineptitudes and some injustices are inevitable at the start; they are the price of the undertaking as a whole. Finally, the plaintiff complains that the administration of the Regulation has been unequal and inconsistent; not, as we understand, because it was deliberately partial, but because it has been wayward and vacillating. The plaintiff cannot, however, become the vicarious champion in its own interest of imperfections in the discharge of the Secretary's duties. If he has correctly interpreted his powers in dealing with it, and imposed upon it no greater obligations than were lawful, it is no answer that others have fared better; any more than when burdens have been unequally imposed by the mistakes of courts of law. Judgment affirmed.