Opinion ID: 1846260
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT WAS IN VIOLATION OF THIS COURT'S FINDINGS IN FOSTER v. STATE, IN ALLOWING EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES ON THE ISSUE OF WHAT COULD HAVE HAPPENED.

Text: ¶ 119. Kolberg next tells us that the State was permitted to ask witnesses about what could have happened. Kolberg tells us that could have testimony violates our decision in Foster v. State, 508 So.2d 1111 (Miss.1987), overruled on other grounds, Powell v. State, 806 So.2d 1069 (Miss.2001). In Foster, the defendant was convicted of capital murder. The victim's body was found in a vacant lot. Lab tests were conducted on paint chips found on the victim's clothing in an attempt to establish a connection with paint chips found on the front seat of Foster's car. At trial, a chemist testified that the paint chips were indistinguishable in color, texture, and inorganic chemical composition; and that they therefore could have a common origin. Id. at 1117. The State also provided expert testimony that the stab wound to the victim's chest was caused by this knife [i.e., the knife found in Foster's car] or another one very similar. Id. Foster argued before this Court that the could have testimony was too speculative to be admissible. We agreed. ¶ 120. We began our analysis by determining that the testimony of the two experts was relevant. Id. at 1117-8. A majority of the Court, excluding the author, believed that under a Rule 403 balancing, use of could have minimized the evidence's probative value and maximized its tendency to mislead the jury. Id. at 1118. Thus, the majority concluded by stating that on remand, use of the terms `possible' and `could have' should be avoided. Id. The Court suggested using the term consistent instead. Id. ¶ 121. We feel that it is important to note that Foster was not reversed on this issue. Foster was reversed because the trial court improperly limited Foster's cross-examination of the State's key witness. Id. at 1112. We addressed Foster's remaining issues in anticipation that they might arise again on remand. Id. at 1115. ¶ 122. Kolberg quotes three questions which he says violated Foster. All three arise with questions the prosecution asked Dr. Meador. They are as follows: Q. And could you say if those bruises were put there that day? Could they have been put there that day? A. They could have been, but I could not date them precisely for you. . . . . Q. But it could be consistent with someone beating her with their fist, hands or a blunt object? A. Yes, it could be. . . . . Q. So that could have been a separate blow to her face that day? A. I would think so. As an initial matter, the second quotation may be dispensed with as it used the term consistent which was the term suggested by the Foster Court. As to the first quotation, Kolberg made no objection. Kolberg did, however, object to the third instance and his objection was sustained. The trial judge instructed the prosecutor to rephrase the question, and the prosecutor then used the magic term consistent. ¶ 123. The point which troubled the majority in Foster was the tendency the term could have would have to mislead the jury. Foster, 508 So.2d at 1118. For this reason, the Foster court thought the probative value of the experts' testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger of misleading the jury. Id. at 1117-18 (citing Miss. R. Evid. 403). However, this Court today does not have the troublesome issue before it as did the Foster Court. Kolberg did not object to the first instance of which he now complains, and when he did object, his objection was sustained. The State then rephrased the question. The one instance which passed without objection, in light of Dr. Meador's testimony in its entirety, simply cannot be said to render the probative value of the testimony as substantially outweighed by the danger of misleading the jury. Consequently, this assignment of error is without merit.