Opinion ID: 2209028
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Police Sound Recordings

Text: One of the undercover officers was wearing a microphone during the three transactions with Wallace and some conversations with Wallace were recorded. Defense counsel attempted to introduce those tapes during the State's case-in-chief. The State objected, contending a proper foundation had not been established to indicate that the tapes were audible and enlightening. The judge suggested that he would have to listen to the tapes to make that determination, and defense counsel stated that the tapes did not need to be played at that time. The judge said he would reserve his ruling until the tapes were played. After the State had presented its rebuttal evidence, defense counsel sought to introduce the tape recordings. The State again objected, contending that the proper time for introduction was during the defense's case-in-chief and that the tapes were irrelevant in light of the testimony from the officers and the defendant. The trial judge sustained the objection without further comment. Wallace now claims the trial court's refusal to admit the tapes was prejudicial error requiring reversal. The admission of sound recordings is within the discretion of the trial court, and we reverse only upon an abuse of that discretion. Lamar v. State (1972), 258 Ind. 504, 282 N.E.2d 795. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the tapes. First, Wallace failed to establish the requisite foundation. The admission of sound recordings must be preceded by a foundation which shows that: 1. They are authentic and correct; 2. The testimony elicited was freely and voluntarily made, without any kind of duress; 3. All required warnings were given and all necessary acknowledgments and waivers were knowingly and intelligently given; 4. They do not contain matter otherwise not admissible into evidence; 5. They are of such clarity as to be intelligible and enlightening to the jury. Id. An officer identified the tapes but testified that their audio quality was pretty poor. There was no other testimony during trial to provide a further foundation. Even if the trial court did erroneously refuse admission of the tapes, no prejudicial error could be shown. Wallace claims one tape would have shown his innocence in the August 23rd transaction. However, Wallace admitted he told police that he knew someone who could get some trees for them at $3 or $3.50 each. He admitted subsequently introducing the officers to Mak and accompanying them to the purchase site. Wallace also testified that he received two trees from Mak for his role in the drug purchase. Inasmuch as Wallace's conduct by his own account was illegal, no tape substantiating his testimony would exonerate him. Defense counsel suggested the absence of certain conversations on the other tape would corroborate Wallace's claim that his involvement in the drug transactions was induced by police offers of money, drugs, and beer. The officers denied making any inducements and testified that only the drug dealings were recorded. Under these circumstances, the mere absence of the alleged conversations from the tape does not heighten the inference that they in fact occurred. The second tape simply does not lend any more credence to Wallace's claim. Therefore, he has failed to establish prejudicial error from the trial court's refusal to admit the tapes. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to admit the recordings. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. GIVAN, C.J., and DeBRULER, PIVARNIK and DICKSON, JJ., concur.