Opinion ID: 748641
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Requirements for Municipal Liability

Text: 35 The district court analyzed the Plumeaus' claims under the various theories of § 1983 municipal liability. Plumeau, 907 F.Supp. at 1435-46. To impose municipal liability under § 1983 for a violation of constitutional rights plaintiff must show: (1) that [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which [s]he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy 'amounts to deliberate indifference' to the plaintiff's constitutional right; and, (4) that the policy is the 'moving force behind the constitutional violation.'  Oviatt By and Through Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir.1992) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1204-05, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989)). 36 Amanda had a constitutional right to be free from state-imposed violations of bodily integrity. P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1303 (9th Cir.1996). This includes freedom from excessive physical abuse by school employees. Id. at 1302-03; Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1413, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977) ([W]here school authorities, acting under color of state law, deliberately decide to punish a child for misconduct by restraining the child and inflicting appreciable physical pain, we hold that Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests are implicated.). Although this court has never explicitly stated that this liberty interest includes the right to be free from sexual abuse by school employees, a student's liberty interest in bodily integrity logically encompasses such freedom. 37 In considering whether substantive due process has been violated, this court has considered the following factors: 38 the need for the governmental action in question, the relationship between the need and the action, the extent of harm inflicted, and whether the action was taken in good faith or for the purpose of causing harm. 39 Koch, 96 F.3d at 1304 (quotation omitted). Each of these factors weighs heavily in favor of the conclusion that public school children have a constitutionally protected right not to be sexually abused by school employees at school. No governmental need could justify such conduct. See Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 727 (3d Cir.1989) (a teacher's sexual molestation of a student could not possibly be deemed an acceptable practice). The extent of harm inflicted by sexual abuse is immeasurable. And, in contrast to corporal punishment, sexual abuse is never inflicted in good faith. Thus, we agree with the other circuits that have considered this issue: the Constitution protects a child's right to be free from sexual abuse by school employees while attending public school. See Doe v. Taylor Independent Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 451 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc) (If the Constitution protects a schoolchild against being tied to a chair or against arbitrary paddlings, then surely the Constitution protects a school child from physical sexual abuse ... by a public schoolteacher.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 815, 115 S.Ct. 70, 130 L.Ed.2d 25 (1995); D.T. By M.T. v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 16, 894 F.2d 1176 (10th Cir.1990); Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 727 (holding that student's right to be free from sexual molestation is clearly established). The Plumeaus provided ample evidence that Amanda was deprived of this right. 40 However, after reviewing the entire record, and viewing the evidence as we must in the light most favorable to the Plumeaus, we agree with the district court that the Plumeaus have failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to § 1983 municipal liability in so far as their claims were based upon: (i) a custom or practice of ignoring complaints; (ii) unconstitutional actions taken by those with policy-making authority; or, (iii) an affirmative duty to protect. 41 The district court also concluded that the Plumeaus did not submit evidence, sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment, to support their claim that the School District was deliberately indifferent to the need to provide training in identifying the signs of child sexual abuse. 4 Because the Plumeaus have not argued failure to train on appeal and, indeed, reject the theory as one upon which they rely, this court cannot address that issue. See Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 738 (9th Cir.1986) (holding that the court of appeals will not consider matters not specifically and distinctively argued in brief).