Opinion ID: 2546413
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Confidential Statements to Dr. Maloney: Attorney-client Privilege

Text: Prior to the penalty phase of trial, the parties held a hearing to discuss the admissibility as aggravating evidence of defendant's threats to kill the prosecutor. Dr. Maloney testified at this hearing that he had warned the prosecutor because defendant said several things. One, that he wasn't going to trial. Number 2, that he'd do anything he could to keep from going to trial. Number 3, he made multiple negative comments regarding [the prosecutor]; he apparently knew him from another case. He said he fantasized about hurting him and mentioned gouging or scratching his eyes out. Dr. Maloney considered defendant sufficiently dangerous, and the threat sufficiently serious, that he was required under Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, supra, 17 Cal.3d 425, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334, to warn the prosecutor. The prosecutor argued this evidence was not privileged under either the psychotherapist-patient privilege or the attorney-client privilege. In addition, he argued the evidence revealed a violation of section 422, which prohibits criminal threats, and was thus admissible as aggravating evidence of criminal activity under section 190.3, factor (b). Defense counsel argued the information was privileged and thus inadmissible, but did not otherwise address whether it was proper aggravating evidence. The trial court ruled the evidence was admissible as aggravating evidence. Dr. Maloney later testified that defendant had said he wanted to hurt the prosecutor; specifically, he mentioned gouging the prosecutor's eyes out. Defendant contends the trial court erred by permitting Dr. Maloney to testify and describe for the jury defendant's threat because that information was inadmissible due to the attorney-client privilege, a ground on which defendant specifically objected. As noted, ante, the trial court appointed Dr. Maloney to assist the defense when defendant became extremely depressed and uncommunicative following the prosecution's decision not to accept any plea short of the death penalty. Defendant's comments to Dr. Maloney, a defense expert, were thus privileged under the attorney-client privilege. [33] The attorney-client privilege is `a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between client and lawyer.' (Evid.Code, ง 954.) That privilege encompasses confidential communications between a client and experts retained by the defense.  ( People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 605, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 528, 2 P.3d 1081, italics added, overruled on another point in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 409, 25 P.3d 618; see Evid.Code, ง 952 [defining confidential communication between client and lawyer as including information disclosed to third persons ... who are present to further the interest of the client in the consultation or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer is consulted].) At the time of defendant's trial, [n]o express exception to the attorney-client privilege exist[ed] for threats of future criminal conduct. ( People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 621, 268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127.) [34] Accordingly, it was error to admit this evidence over defendant's objection. Although we find error, we also conclude the error was harmless. To be sure, the prosecutor returned to the evidence of the threat again and again, in questioning Dr. Maloney, in cross-examining defendant, and in closing argument. But such repetition was offset by Dr. Maloney's repeated testimony that defendant's comments indicated it was a fantasy and that he merely had dreams of hurting people. That defendant made his comments while extremely angry and depressed over his predicament was clear, and that he lacked well-developed skills to cope with life's disappointments could not have escaped the jury's notice. Defendant did not deny he made the threatening statements to Dr. Maloney, but repeatedly denied actually intending to harm the prosecutor, never wavering from his assertion that he was simply desperate to delay his trial. The jury knew defendant was being held in isolation in jail due to his assault on inmate Price, and no evidence was adduced indicating how defendant could have come close to making good on his threat. In sum, the evidence of the threat was likely seen by the jury as foolish talk from a boastful yet desperate young man. In addition, the jury was presented with other, significant aggravating evidence. Defendant was on bail and awaiting a jury's decision for committing a very similar crime when he robbed Pipkin and killed Teal. Though only 19 years old, he had already led a life of crime and, while in jail awaiting this trial, seriously assaulted another inmate. He had a serious drug and alcohol problem, going so far as to use money Barrios received for their children from county general assistance in order to buy drugs. He even threatened Barrios's family. Finally, the evidence describing his victim's life and the impact of his murder on the victim's surviving family was powerful. Under the circumstances, it is not reasonably possible defendant would have obtained a more favorable penalty phase result had the trial court excluded the evidence of defendant's threat to harm the prosecutor. ( People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 538, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032.) Defendant also contends that, threats to the prosecutor aside, it was also improper to have allowed Dr. Maloney to testify and describe other information learned in confidence, including defendant's drug use, his statements showing callousness and disregard for others, and a statement that [he] dreamed of hurting other people. This information also was protected by the attorney-client privilege and thus should have been excluded. Evidence of defendant's drug use and his casual disregard for the safety and feelings of others, however, was amply demonstrated by other evidence. The cumulative nature of this evidence compared to the strong evidence in aggravation persuades us that Dr. Maloney's recounting of defendant's nonthreatening statements was harmless.