Opinion ID: 6109998
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Theft-of-Property Conviction

Text: For his second point on appeal, Rogers asserts that the circuit court erred in not allowing Rogers to impeach L.W. with a prior theft conviction. The State asserts that Rogers did not preserve this issue for appeal and any error was harmless. Our standard of review regarding evidentiary rulings is that the admission or rejection of evidence is left to the sound discretion of the circuit court, and we will not reverse the court's ruling absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Eubanks v. State , 2009 Ark. 170 , at 3, 303 S.W.3d 450 , 452. At issue is the circuit court's not allowing Rogers to impeach L.W. with her prior misdemeanor conviction for theft of property. Rule 609(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence provides: For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted but only if the crime.... involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment. During cross-examination of L.W., the following colloquy occurred: DEFENSE ATTORNEY : At the time it was oh, this only happened in the ninth grade, but since that time you've remembered it happened through the 10th, 11th, and 12th? L.W.: The more I talk about it, the more I remember. DEFENSE ATTORNEY : And you said a minute ago the reason you didn't tell anybody because he told you that he would hurt your momma. L.W.: Correct. DEFENSE ATTORNEY : You didn't tell them that at all in 2014. Correct? L.W.: Correct. DEFENSE ATTORNEY : Did you ever tell Comel Hackett that nothing happened to you, that the rape didn't occur? L.W.: No. DEFENSE ATTORNEY : You sure? L.W.: I'm positive. DEFENSE ATTORNEY : Okay and you worked with Comel at Target? L.W.: Yes. DEFENSE ATTORNEY : Judge, may we approach for a second?  THE COURT : You may. (Thereupon out of the hearing of the jury, the following conversation took place between counsel and the court): DEFENSE ATTORNEY : She has a misdemeanor conviction out of 2014 for theft of property. Before I impeach her for that, I want to make sure y'all are objecting on that? THE STATE : Yes. It's a misdemeanor, and it's over - - I mean, it's over a year old. DEFENSE ATTORNEY : It's a misdemeanor, but it's in the matter that deals with truthfulness. THE STATE : Actually that does not. It involved filing a false police report, something like that. THE COURT : I agree. Rogers contends that this ruling was an abuse of discretion because theft of property is a crime involving dishonesty and is therefore always admissible under Rule 609(a). The State responds that this argument is not preserved for appeal because Rogers failed to proffer the underlying facts behind the theft conviction and to establish that the crime did, in fact, involve dishonesty or false statement. With regard to preservation, the admission of evidence of prior convictions involving dishonesty and false statements is not a matter within the discretion of the circuit court; such evidence is always admissible for impeachment purposes and its exclusion is an abuse of discretion. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Regions Bank Tr. Dep't , 347 Ark. 826 , 839, 69 S.W.3d 20 , 28-29 (2002). We have consistently interpreted Ark. R. Evid. 609(a) to include theft of property as a crime involving dishonesty. Floyd , 278 Ark. 86 , 643 S.W.2d 555 (holding that, because Floyd's convictions for burglary and theft were crimes involving dishonesty pursuant to Rule 609, they were admissible without the weighing test); State v. Cassell , 2013 Ark. 221 , 427 S.W.3d 663 (stating that the crime involved in that case was a theft offense, which involves dishonesty); Edwards v. Campbell , 2010 Ark. 398 , 370 S.W.3d 250 (holding that misdemeanor theft of property, as defined in Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-103 (a), is a crime of dishonesty); Webster v. State , 284 Ark. 206 , 680 S.W.2d 906 (1984) (stating that grand larceny involves dishonesty); James v. State , 274 Ark. 162 , 622 S.W.2d 669 (1981) (stating that prior convictions for theft, grand larceny, and forgery all involved dishonesty). Further, as discussed above, we have held that crimes involving dishonesty, including theft of property, are automatically admissible under Rule 609(a) and that it is not within the discretion of the circuit court to exclude this evidence. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 347 Ark. 826 , 69 S.W.3d 20 (citing congressional commentary to Fed. R. Evid. 609(a), which is identical to our rule). We have also explained that such convictions are particularly probative of a witness's credibility. Id. In short, a person exhibits dishonesty when he or she knowingly takes unauthorized control of someone else's property or obtains that property through deception or threat with the purpose of depriving the owner of the property.... See Edwards , 2010 Ark. 398 , at 9-10, 370 S.W.3d 250 , 255 ; Floyd v. State , 278 Ark. 86 , 643 S.W.2d 555 (1982) ; James , 274 Ark. 162 , 622 S.W.2d 669 . In other words, the offense at issue here, theft of property, by definition involves dishonesty and is automatically admissible pursuant to Rule 609(a), and Rogers was not required to proffer the conviction. See Edwards , supra. Accordingly, the circuit court abused its discretion by refusing to admit the evidence. Next, Rogers contends that based on the circuit court's error, we must reverse and remand all three convictions because L.W.'s credibility was critical and  material to his defense, there was no physical evidence of the alleged rapes, and his convictions were based solely on the victims' testimony. The State responds that Rogers was not prejudiced by the court's evidentiary ruling and any error was harmless. Here, the State's case in this matter hinged on one thing-the credibility of the victims, including L.W. There is no other evidence in this case. Simply put, it was a he said she said battle between Rogers, his family and neighbors on one side and the victims and their mother on the other. During cross-examination, Rogers questioned L.W. regarding her testimony regarding the alleged rape and L.W.'s conversations with Comel Hackett about the rape. Rogers sought to impeach L.W. because he wanted to convince the jury that L.W. was not credible and to cast doubt on her testimony. The impeachment evidence Rogers sought to introduce concerning L.W. directly relates to her credibility, and her credibility was critical to the question before the jury. Additionally, Rogers's defense was based on the premise that the four girls, along with Bryant, had conspired to concoct their rape allegations against him. Rogers claimed that they had made up the charges to get even with him for moving out of the home and ending the relationship with Bryant. In the State's closing argument, the State acknowledged the alleged collusion when the prosecutor stated: The Defendant wants you to believe the victims colluded and planned their stories in order to frame him because [Bryant] was mad. Because all of the victims' allegations were intertwined, we cannot say that the erroneous exclusion of evidence that would have adversely affected L.W.'s credibility would not have also affected the jury's decisions with regard to Mi.B. and Ma.B. It is unknown whether the jury would have concluded that the evidence successfully impeached her credibility or that Rogers's alternative theory was a reasonable one, but the evidence Rogers sought to introduce to impeach L.W.'s credibility satisfied the requirements of Rule 609, and the evidence should have been allowed. Finally, because the only evidence to support Rogers's conviction was the victims' testimony, the victims' credibility was presumably a major consideration for the jury. See Scamardo v. State , 2013 Ark. 163 , 426 S.W.3d 900 . In other cases in which the witnesses' credibility is a significant issue, such as in rape or sexual-abuse cases, we have declined to hold that the error was harmless. See, e.g. , Scamardo , supra ; Winfrey v. State , 293 Ark. 342 , 738 S.W.2d 391 (1987). In sum, because all of the girls' allegations were intertwined, the circuit court's error in excluding the evidence cannot be considered slight. The case against Rogers rested solely on the victims' credibility, and the jury had to choose between whether to believe the victims and their mother or Rogers and his friends and family. We cannot say that L.W.'s testimony had no bearing on whether the jury believed Mi.B. and Ma.B., and we reverse Rogers's three rape convictions and remand for a new trial or further proceedings. Reversed and remanded; court of appeals opinion vacated. Goodson, Wood, and Womack, JJ., dissent. A Pulaski County jury convicted Edward Rogers of three counts of rape. Rogers appealed to the court of appeals, which reversed. We granted the State's petition for review and affirmed the circuit court in a 4-3 decision. Rogers v. State , 2018 Ark. 242 , 550 S.W.3d 387 . Rogers petitioned for  rehearing, which the majority, in a break from long-standing precedent, grants. The majority now reverses Rogers's three rape convictions and remands for a new trial. As an initial matter, I would deny Rogers's petition for rehearing. On rehearing, I would affirm his rape convictions. Petition for Rehearing Rogers's petition for rehearing fails to comport with or rules for rehearing and thus, should be denied. Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 2-3 prescribes the process for a petition for rehearing. (g) Entire case not to be reargued. The petition for rehearing should be used to call attention to specific errors of law or fact which the opinion is thought to contain. Counsel are expected to argue the case fully in their original briefs, and the brief on rehearing is not intended to afford an opportunity for a mere repetition on the argument already considered by the Court. The petitioner must allege a specific error of law or fact within the original opinion, and he is expressly barred from merely repeating arguments already considered by the court. Until now, this court has firmly held to these limits. Indeed, we have repeatedly stated that we will not consider portions of a petition for rehearing that are nothing more than repetitions of arguments already considered and dismissed by the court. MacKool v. State , 2012 Ark. 341 , at 2, 2012 WL 4321303 (per curiam). In MacKool , we refused to reconsider the same legal error the petitioner had originally raised and that the court had already considered on appeal. In denying the petition, we stated, Petitioner is simply trying to rehash this argument a second time through his petition for rehearing. Id. at 4. Similarly, an appellant cannot attempt to readdress arguments raised on appeal by citing cases it neglected to cite in its original briefing. See S. Paper Box Co. v. Houston , 15 Ark. App. 176 , 183-B, 697 S.W.2d 124 , 124 (1985) (applying then Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 20(g) ). When an appellant simply renews his argument by citing cases not referenced in his original brief, the appellate court cannot reconsider his arguments and should deny the petition for rehearing. Id. Rogers's petition for rehearing fails to comply with the requirements of the rule. He does not allege that our July opinion contains any error of law or fact. In fact, he fails to cite a single legal error. Instead, Rogers challenges the majority's harmless-error application to the facts. Such a challenge is inappropriate in a petition for rehearing. Indeed, I cannot find a single case in which this court has granted rehearing to reconsider the application of the law absent a corresponding challenge to the law itself. Because our rules prohibit a rehearing in this context, not surprisingly, Rogers's petition is also devoid of any such case. Rogers's ten-page petition for rehearing arguing that harmless error should not apply advances the same argument this court has already considered. On appeal, the State argued that even if the victim's conviction was admissible under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 609, the circuit court's error was harmless because Rogers was not prejudiced. In attempting to reargue this issue, Rogers's petition cites, analyzes, and applies cases that he had ample opportunity to argue previously. Issues that are repetitive of their original argument on appeal are an inappropriate subject for a petition for rehearing . Fuller v. Johnson , 301 Ark. 14 , 19-D, 784 S.W.2d 165 , 166 (1990) (emphasis added); Butler Mfg. Co. v. Hughes , 292 Ark. 198 , 206-A, 731 S.W.2d 214 , 215 (1987) (explaining that a mere repeat of the original argument is an inappropriate subject for a petition for  rehearing); Barnett v. Ark. Transport Co., Inc. , 303 Ark, 491 , 800 S.W.2d 429 (1990) (stating, arguments that are merely repetitious of those already considered by the court are inappropriate subjects for a petition for rehearing). Finality matters. Appellate courts should be cautious when exercising their authority to rehear a settled case. To best understand the intention of Rule 2-3, one only needs to look at the rare occasions when the court has exercised its authority to rehear because of an error of law or fact. In Bailey v. Commerce Union Bank , this court granted rehearing to consider an error of law due to an unanticipated change in the law. See 223 Ark. 686 , 692, 269 S.W. 2d 314 , 318 (1954). After issuing its original majority opinion in Bailey , this court, in a separate case, overruled precedent. That case was the primary precedent relied on for the decision in Bailey . Id. Thus, in light of the unanticipated overruling of precedent, the court granted rehearing to determine whether the result in Bailey would change now that the law had changed. The court also allowed the parties to brief, for the first time, the issue of which state law applied. Id. The court also granted rehearing in Wilkinson v. James , 164 Ark. 475 , 479, 262 S.W. 319 , 321 (1924). There, the court had overlooked a stipulation in the record and in briefing that affected the judgment. It granted rehearing to modify the judgment given the stipulation. Neither Bailey nor Wilkinson supports rehearing here. Until now, this court has not granted petitions for rehearing to reapply facts to settled law. Rogers's petition does not fit into the narrow class of cases that are appropriate for rehearing. For over one hundred years this court has refused to broaden its rules for petitions for rehearing. For these reasons, I would deny Rogers's petition for rehearing. Harmless Error On rehearing, I would affirm Rogers's rape convictions for the same reasons the majority of the court explained in Rogers v. State , 2018 Ark. 242 , 550 S.W.3d 387 . There has been no change in the law nor the facts since we issued this opinion over 3 months ago. It remains the law that when this court determines that a defendant was denied the opportunity to impeach a witness's credibility, it then considers whether that error was harmless. Winfrey v. State , 293 Ark. 342 , 738 S.W.2d 391 (1987). This court has previously found harmless error in rape-conviction appeals. Pigg v. State , 2014 Ark. 433 , at 5, 444 S.W.3d 863 , 866 (holding on appeal that the court need not determine whether it was error to deny defendant the opportunity to question the victim's credibility when the alleged error would be harmless); Johnston v. State , 2014 Ark. 110 , at 8, 431 S.W.3d 895 , 899 (holding that erroneous admission of incestuous and pornographic pictures was harmless error in a rape conviction); Kelley v. State , 2009 Ark. 389 , at 21, 327 S.W.3d 373 , 384 (determining error was harmless in admitting two prior convictions involving indecency with a minor in a rape conviction); Buford v. State , 368 Ark. 87 , 91, 243 S.W.3d 300 , 303-04 (2006) (finding harmless error when the court erroneously allowed a child-abuse expert to testify as to the victim's credibility in a rape trial). But see Scamardo v. State , 2013 Ark. 163 , at 9, 426 S.W.3d 900 , 905 (denying a harmless-error argument when the circuit court refused to allow questioning regarding the victim's inconsistent statement as to whether the rape occurred). Here, the circuit court's error fits the harmless-error mold. An error is harmless when the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, and the error is slight.  Scamardo , 2013 Ark. 163 , at 9, 426 S.W.3d at 905 . In Buford , the court found evidence of guilt overwhelming when the trial testimony included graphic detail of the rape, the victim testified to the rape, and another witness testified to witnessing the rape. Buford , 368 Ark. at 91 , 243 S.W.3d at 303 . Here, the evidence that Rogers raped LW is overwhelming. LW testified in specific detail to multiple occurrences of rape. TB testified that she observed a video of Rogers engaged in sex with LW. Moreover, all four victims described what this court emphasized in Kelley when affirming for harmless error as remarkably similar conduct on the part of [the defendant]. Kelley , 2009 Ark. 389 , at 20, 327 S.W.3d at 383 . The girls similarly described their sexual encounters with Rogers, including the color of the condom, the dead-end road where he took two of them, and Rogers's suicide threats. Finally, if Rogers experienced any prejudice, it was slight. Whether an error is slight hinges on the degree to which the defendant was prejudiced. Id. The proposed impeachment testimony of LW, unlike the victim's testimony in Scamardo , did not directly relate to the allegation at hand. Thus, any error was harmless. For these reasons, I would affirm. Goodson and Womack, JJ., join in this dissent. I join Justice Wood's dissent regarding the majority's deeply improvident decision to grant rehearing in this case. I write separately to address Rogers's argument that the circuit court erred by refusing to allow impeachment of L.W. through her prior theft conviction. While the majority faithfully applies this court's established precedent that theft of property is a crime necessarily involv[ing] dishonesty or false statement for the purposes of Arkansas Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2), I believe that this precedent-longstanding though it may be-rests on thin reasoning and merits reexamination. This court's current classification of theft of property goes back nearly four decades to Gustafson v. State , 267 Ark. 278 , 590 S.W.2d 853 (1979). There, the court acknowledged that elements of Arkansas Rules of Evidence 608 and 609 are concerned with the distinction between crimes that involve dishonesty per se (e.g., forgery, perjury, bribery, false pretense and embezzlement) and crimes that do not involve dishonesty per se (e.g., murder, manslaughter or assault). Id. at 288-89 , 590 S.W.2d at 859 . So far, so good. Without analysis, however, the court then reached the abrupt conclusion that theft, as it is defined in the Arkansas Criminal Code, involves dishonesty. Id. Then, just as now, the theft statute did not obviously support such a blanket conclusion. The current theft statute has remained substantively identical to the version cited in Gustafson . It identifies two methods of committing theft of property: (1) tak[ing] or exercis[ing] unauthorized control over or mak[ing] an unauthorized transfer of an interest in the property of another person with the purpose of depriving the owner of the property; or (2) obtain[ing] the property of another person by deception or by threat with the purpose of depriving the owner of the property. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-103 (a) (Repl. 2013). While the second method clearly concerns conduct that is dishonest per se, it is not at all clear that the first does. Consistently treating the first as the second, as we seem to do with theft, would require allowing the exception contained in 609(a)(2) to swallow the rule. The General Assembly's inclusion of deception as an element of the crime in section (2) while excluding it from section (1) should not be ignored. Furthermore, common sense tells us that there are many ways to commit theft that do not  involve dishonesty in any direct way. For instance, the ne'er-do-well who snatches grandma's purse has behaved dishonorably , but not necessarily dishonestly. Reviewing the typical application of Rule 609(a)(2), it becomes apparent that our treatment of theft is the outlier. West v. State , 27 Ark. App. 49 , 766 S.W.2d 22 (1989), provides a useful example. The court of appeals noted that the offense at issue in that case-hindering apprehension-may be committed in six different ways of which [o]nly one involves giving false information. Id. at 52 , 766 S.W.2d at 24 . Because only some instances of hindering apprehension would fall into the Rule 609(a)(2) exception, the party seeking to use the conviction for impeachment purposes was required to make an offer of proof as to the factual circumstances involved in the offense. Id. at 53 , 766 S.W.2d at 24 . We should consider whether attempts to impeach witnesses with testimony about their theft convictions should require this same minimal factual development. Rule 609(a)(2) is a cabined exception. It does away with both the severity requirements and the balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect typically required to admit convictions for impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a)(1). If a conviction falls under Rule 609(a)(2), it is automatically admissible to impeach credibility; this more permissive standard can be justified only if those convictions genuinely concern the witness's honesty. Finally, I note that this court has accounted for the concerns I highlight above in its jurisprudence on Arkansas Rule of Evidence 608(b), creating a puzzling tension between two consecutive rules. Rule 608(b) concerns the introduction of instances of conduct other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609 to demonstrate a witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. In Rhodes v. State , 276 Ark. 203 , 634 S.W.2d 107 (1982), and subsequent cases, we have expressly limited Gustafson 's reach in the Rule 608(b) context. In Rhodes , we prohibited the introduction of past instances of shoplifting that did not result in convictions, reasoning that while an absence of respect for the property rights of others is an undesirable trait, it does not directly indicate an impairment of the trait of truthfulness. Id. at 210 , 634 S.W.2d at 111 . This results in an uneasy status quo. Theft resulting in a conviction is treated as per se dishonest, and it is therefore admissible under Rule 609(a). Acts of theft not resulting in conviction are not considered probative of truthfulness, and they are therefore not admissible under Rule 608(b). Clever lawyering might construct a compelling difference between truthfulness and honesty, but the apparent strain is more than a plain reading of the rules can comfortably bear. As outlined above, I believe that this court's precedents holding theft of property to be a crime of dishonesty per se were incorrectly decided. If that is the case, it follows necessarily that evidence of L.W.'s conviction was not automatically admissible under Rule 609(a), that Rogers was required to proffer the conviction to demonstrate that the underlying facts demonstrated dishonesty or false statement, and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion on this evidentiary question. I respectfully dissent.