Opinion ID: 2092308
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Violation of MRPC 8.4(a) and 8.4(d)

Text: Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4 Misconduct. It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through acts of another; (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;.... Judge North concluded that Respondent did not commit any crimes or engage in conduct involving fraud, deceit, dishonesty, or misrepresentation. She did conclude, however, that Respondent's act of filing a motion to remove the Texas action, without any legal basis, was prejudicial to the administration of justice. She also found that Respondent interfered with the administration of justice when he failed to mail the Motion for Removal to opposing counsel until two days before a scheduled hearing in Texas, forcing NATG to incur unnecessary expenses. Respondent excepts to these findings, arguing that he tried to consolidate and remove the Weaver and Impero actions into the U.S. District Court in Maryland in order to litigate with more practicality. Respondent also contends that he was not aware of the hearing in Texas for the temporary injunction, and that because he had procured local counsel in the Texas action, he had no reason to know of any scheduled hearings, assuming there were any.... [18] Id. at 22. Given the clear and convincing evidence upon which Judge North made her conclusions of law, we overrule Respondent's exceptions. First, having affirmed Judge North's conclusions that Respondent violated MRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(a), and 3.1, we conclude that Judge North had clear and convincing evidence upon which to determine that Respondent violated MRPC 8.4(a). Second, we find it particularly troublesome that Respondent believes that, even though he served as lead counsel in the NATG dispute for Weaver and Impero, he nevertheless was absolved of the responsibility of keeping abreast of any recent filings by the opposing party and resultant court hearing dates because he had hired local counsel to, in his words, assist him with the case. In a 26 June 1995 letter, Respondent reassured Weaver and Impero that he, and not the Texas counsel, would be doing the bulk of the work on their case. As we noted in Mooney, [f]ailure to represent a client in an adequate manner violates MRPC 8.4(d). 359 Md. at 83, 753 A.2d at 31. By not fulfilling the duties he owed to his client, Respondent failed to represent Weaver adequately. We also address briefly Respondent's strenuous exceptions here to Judge Chasanow's denial of his Petition for Removal and Consolidation without a hearing, and prior to any opposition to it submitted by opposing counsel. (Respondent's emphasis). Respondent seems to imply that Judge Chasanow's actions were inappropriate. We find this implication that a court cannot, sua sponte, deny a motion to remove a case for lack of jurisdictionto be completely unfounded, without any support, and having no place, as a collateral attack, in this disciplinary proceeding. We therefore reject entirely Respondent's argument on this point.