Opinion ID: 781994
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of a First Amendment Defense

Text: 140 In Rogers, the Second Circuit held that movie titles are protected from right of publicity actions unless the title is wholly unrelated to the content of the work or was simply a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services. 875 F.2d at 1004. This test is supported in the context of other expressive works by comment c of § 47 of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition. It states that [u]se of another's identity in a novel, play, or motion picture is ... not ordinarily an infringement [of the right of publicity, unless] the name or likeness is used solely to attract attention to a work that is not related to the identified person. The Rogers formulation is also supported by the decision in dePasse. In dePasse, the court cited Seale, 949 F.Supp. at 337, for the proposition that the relationship between a plaintiff's identity and the content of the work is an element of a defense to a right of publicity action. See dePasse, 82 F.Supp.2d at 731. Seale, in turn, relied upon Rogers. See 949 F.Supp. at 337; see also Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004-05. We thus apply Rogers to the instant case. 141 For the same reasons we have stated earlier and need not repeat, we believe that Parks' right of publicity claim presents a genuine issue of material fact regarding the question of whether the title to the song is or is not wholly unrelated to the content of the song. A reasonable finder of fact, in our opinion, upon consideration of all the evidence, could find the title to be a disguised commercial advertisement or adopted solely to attract attention to the work. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004-05.