Opinion ID: 2716182
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Spencer’s claim of a hostile work environment

Text: A hostile work environment claim requires proof of: (1) membership in a protected group; (2) harassment (3) based on a factor rendered impermissible by Title VII; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the 5 Case: 13-20282 Document: 00512722328 Page: 6 Date Filed: 08/05/2014 No. 13-20282 employer knew or should have known of the harassment yet failed to address it promptly. Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 654 (5th Cir. 2012). If the harasser is plaintiff’s supervisor, though, and not a co-worker, liability depends on certain other factors: If the supervisor’s harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, the employer is strictly liable. But if no tangible employment action is taken, the employer may escape liability by establishing, as an affirmative defense, that (1) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any harassing behavior and (2) that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of the preventive or corrective opportunities that the employer provided. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013). At issue here is the district court’s determination that the foremen who harassed Spencer were his supervisors, but that Schmidt was not liable for the harassment because it was entitled to the affirmative defense established by the Supreme Court in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). The district court held that the foremen were not a part of management and did not have hiring or firing power, but concluded they were supervisors based on the evidence that they were tasked with leading the work of other employees. See Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella, 266 F.3d 343, 353-54 (5th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the court held that Spencer did not have to prove that Schmidt was aware of the harassment and had failed to address it. Even so, Spencer had failed to take advantage of the company’s available corrective procedures. While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued a decision that clarified how to determine whether a person is a supervisor in a Title VII claim for workplace harassment. See Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2439. “Because this court 6 Case: 13-20282 Document: 00512722328 Page: 7 Date Filed: 08/05/2014 No. 13-20282 must apply the law current at the time of its decision, the [Vance] decision binds this court.” Nations v. Sun Oil Co. (Delaware), 695 F.2d 933, 936 (5th Cir. 1983). “It is well established that an appellate court is obligated to take notice of changes in fact or law occurring during the pendency of a case on appeal . . . .” Concerned Citizens of Vicksburg v. Sills, 567 F.2d 646, 649-50 (5th Cir. 1978) (quotation marks omitted). In Vance, the Court held “that an employee is a ‘supervisor’ for purposes of vicarious liability under Title VII if he or she is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim.” Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2439. A tangible employment action is defined as “a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Id. at 2442 (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761). The court expressly rejected “the nebulous definition of a ‘supervisor’ advocated in the EEOC guidance and substantially adopted by several courts of appeals.” Id. at 2443 (citation omitted). The rejected EEOC standard would categorize someone as a supervisor if the person was either “authorized ‘to undertake or recommend tangible employment decisions affecting the employee,’ . . . or (2) [was] an individual authorized ‘to direct the employee’s daily work activities.’” Id. at 2455 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting EEOC, Guidance on Vicarious Employer Liability For Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, 8 BNA FEP Manual 405:7654 (Feb. 2003)). Schmidt argued to the district court that the foremen were not supervisors and, accordingly, Spencer should be required to prove Schmidt’s knowledge of the hostile work environment and had failed to address it. The district court never reached that argument because of its reliance on caselaw, now invalidated by Vance, that individuals were supervisors if they had 7 Case: 13-20282 Document: 00512722328 Page: 8 Date Filed: 08/05/2014 No. 13-20282 “immediate (or successively higher) authority over the harassment victim.” Celestine, 266 F.3d at 353. The Vance decision was handed down after the district court’s decision but prior to the briefing in this court. While Spencer did not discuss the consequences of Vance, Schmidt argued Vance mandated the conclusion that the foreman were not supervisors and that Spencer’s claim would fail due to his inability to demonstrate Schmidt’s knowledge of the harassment and failure to act. We will consider the issue. In making its pre-Vance determination on supervisors, the district court concluded the foremen were not a part of management and did not have hiring and firing power. We agree, and find that the foremen here did not have power to take tangible employment actions against Spencer. Frank testified that while foremen may give employees direction on how to do jobs, he does not consider them to be supervisors because they do not hire and fire. Brown testified that foremen did not have the ability to hire. Though they had some authority to fire, it was an indirect right that required going through the general foreman who in most cases had also to go up the ranks for permission to fire an employee. Spencer testified he was “under the impression” the foremen could fire him, but based that opinion on foreman he worked with in the past for other contractors. He further stated he believed they could fire by “pick[ing] up the phone, call the office,” and ask to get a person laid off. His testimony does not create a fact issue as to whether the foreman could fire, but supports Frank and Brown’s testimony that foreman had to go up the ranks for permission to fire an employee. There is no evidence that the foremen were empowered to take tangible employment actions against Spencer that would cause a significant change in his employment. The evidence supports that a foreman was “authorized to direct the employee’s daily work activities,” which 8 Case: 13-20282 Document: 00512722328 Page: 9 Date Filed: 08/05/2014 No. 13-20282 is the definition of supervisor expressly rejected by the Supreme Court. See Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2455 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quotation marks omitted). In summary, there is no evidence that the foreman were empowered by Schmidt to take tangible employment actions; the foremen do not qualify as supervisors for the purposes of Schmidt’s vicarious liability under Title VII under the rule set out in Vance. Because supervisors were not the harassers, we search for evidence that Schmidt knew or should have known of the harassment yet failed to address it promptly. Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 654. Schmidt argued that Spencer failed to prove knowledge and a failure to act, and Spencer did not present any alternative argument to the district court or on appeal. Spencer has relied solely on the argument that Schmidt was liable because the foremen were supervisors. Spencer presented no evidence on whether Schmidt management was aware of what the foremen were doing. Thus, Spencer failed to show a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Schmidt knew or should have known of the harassing conduct yet failed to take prompt remedial action. Because the foremen were co-workers, Schmidt cannot be liable for their actions without proof Schmidt knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt action, a fact Spencer has failed to establish. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment for Schmidt on Spencer’s claim of hostile work environment.