Opinion ID: 203593
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Production or Trafficking of Counterfeit Access Device

Text: The sentencing court adopted the Presentence Report recommendation to increase the base offense level by two levels, under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(B), which provides, If the offense involved ... production or trafficking of any (i) unauthorized access device or counterfeit access device, or (ii) authentication feature; ... increase by 2 levels. Jones objected to this increase below, arguing that she was merely an end user of the counterfeit identifications, and had no role in producing or trafficking the items. She renews this argument on appeal. Because Jones is raising the legal question of whether the evidence was sufficient to support this two-level increase, we review the challenge de novo. United States v. Ramos-Paulino, 488 F.3d 459, 463 (1st Cir.2007). We review any factual conclusions reached by the district court for clear error. Id. As a preliminary matter, the sentencing guideline in question provides a two-level increase for production or trafficking. However, it seems clear that the increase could not have been applied to Jones for trafficking, but only for production. This is because Jones also pled guilty to Count Four (Aiding and Abetting Aggravated Identity Theft), which carried a statutorily required two-year consecutive sentence, under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. The guideline commentary associated with that offense, found at U.S.S.G. § 2B1.6, states that if a sentence under this guideline is imposed in conjunction with a sentence for an underlying offense, do not apply any specific offense characteristic for the transfer, possession, or use of a means of identification when determining the sentence for the underlying offense. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.6, cmt. n. 2 (emphasis added). In other words, if a defendant receives the two-year consecutive sentence on the identity theft count, her sentence for any underlying offense is not eligible for a 2-level increase for transfer, possession, or use of false identification. Considering the plain meaning of the words, we conclude that Jones' trafficking of a means of identification involved a transfer (though the reverse is not necessarily true). Therefore, because of Jones' guilty plea on Count Four, her base offense level can only be increased by two levels under § 2B1.1(b)(10)(B) for production, but not for trafficking. The only question before us, then, is whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion that Jones played a role in the production of the counterfeit identifications. The meaning of production in this context is a question of first impression for this circuit; indeed, we believe it is a question that no circuit has had occasion to address directly. The pertinent guideline offers a useful start by defining production to include manufacture, design, alteration, authentication, duplication, or assembly. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, cmt. n. 9. Given the facts of this case, the term alteration is the only one that may apply to Jones' conduct. The Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1986) defines alter as: to cause to become different in some particular characteristic (as measure, dimension, course, arrangement, or inclination) without changing into something else. The government points to two pieces of evidence that it argues support the conclusion that Jones engaged in production of the identifications. First, the transcript from the planning session shows that Jones took note of the air bubbles on the face of the fraudulent driver's license and told Green and Lamos that the bubbles should be poked out with a pin. Later, she told Lamos where to look for a straight pin. Finally, though it is not clear from the transcript who actually popped the bubbles, it is evident that Jones identified the need and the means, and instructed Lamos as to how to remove the bubbles. The second piece of evidence highlighted by the government is Jones' statement that she could change the address. It is not clear from the transcript whether she meant that she could send the license back to the New York co-conspirators to have it changed to correspond to the targeted account holder's new address; change the address on the face of the license herself; or change the address on file with the Bank so that it corresponded to the address on the face of the license. What is clear, however, is that she did not take any of those actions; instead, she devised a cover story for Lamos to use to account for the address discrepancy. Keeping in mind the definition of alter  to cause to become different in some particular characteristic, without changing into something else  we believe that the second piece of evidence (Jones' statement that she could change the address) does not constitute alteration. This is for the simple reason that the guideline refers to alteration and not to the mere capacity to alter. Here, Jones simply proposed that she could change the address in some way. Therefore, her statement is not evidence that she produced the license by alteration. In contrast, we believe that Jones did alter the license by popping, or instructing Lamos to pop, the bubbles on the face of the laminate. Jones recognized that the bubbles could undermine the group's effort to pass the identification off as legitimate; she decided to remove the bubbles in order to bolster the authenticity of the license and the likelihood of success of the conspiracy. Therefore, there is sufficient evidence that, by altering the license, Jones engaged in production of a counterfeit access device. The district court was thus correct to increase her base offense level by two levels, as per § 2B1.1(b)(10)(B). We also note that this two-level increase, which increased Jones' guideline sentence range by about ten months, is not simply a rote or technical application of the guidelines. While the physical act of popping small air bubbles with a straight pin might not seem particularly monumental, it was this act of alteration that transformed the flawed driver's license into a usable counterfeit access device. Such an act is precisely the type of behavior that the guideline attempts to capture under the rubric of production.