Opinion ID: 105305
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: There is yet a second ground for our decision.

Text: Section 192, like the ordinary federal criminal statute, requires a criminal intentin this instance, a deliberate, intentional refusal to answer. [33] This element of the offense, like any other, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Petitioner contends that such proof was not, and cannot be, made in this case. Clearly not every refusal to answer a question propounded by a congressional committee subjects a witness to prosecution under § 192. Thus if he raises an objection to a certain questionfor example, lack of pertinency or the privilege against self-incriminationthe committee may sustain the objection and abandon the question, even though the objection might actually be without merit. In such an instance, the witness' refusal to answer is not contumacious, for there is lacking the requisite criminal intent. Or the committee may disallow the objection and thus give the witness the choice of answering or not. Given such a choice, the witness may recede from his position and answer the question. And if he does not then answer, it may fairly be said that the foundation has been laid for a finding of criminal intent to violate § 192. In short, unless the witness is clearly apprised that the committee demands his answer notwithstanding his objections, there can be no conviction under § 192 for refusal to answer that question. [34] Was petitioner so apprised here? At no time did the committee specifically overrule his objection based on the Fifth Amendment; nor did the committee indicate its overruling of the objection by specifically directing petitioner to answer. In the absence of such committee action, petitioner was never confronted with a clear-cut choice between compliance and noncompliance, between answering the question and risking prosecution for contempt. At best he was left to guess whether or not the committee had accepted his objection. This ambiguity in the committee's position is apparent from the transcript of the hearing. [35] Immediately after petitioner stated that he was adopting Fitzpatrick's objection, the committee chairman asked petitioner: . . . will you now answer the question whether you are now or ever have been a member of the Communist Party, or do you decline to answer? In response to this, petitioner stated for the first time that he would not answer. He said: I decline to discuss with the committee questions of that nature. Committee counsel thereupon stated that further questioning relating to those matters was not necessary and proceeded upon a new line of inquiry. There is nothing in this colloquy from which petitioner could have determined with a reasonable degree of certainty that the committee demanded his answer despite his objection. Rather, the colloquy is wholly consistent with the hypothesis that the committee had in fact acquiesced in his objection. Our view that a clear disposition of the witness' objection is a prerequisite to prosecution for contempt is supported by long-standing tradition here and in other English-speaking nations. [36] In this country the tradition has been uniformly recognized in the procedure of both state and federal courts. [37] It is further reflected in the practice of congressional committees prior to the enactment of § 192 in 1857; a specific direction to answer was the means then used to apprise a witness of the overruling of his objection. [38] Against this background § 192 became law. [39] No relaxation of the safeguards afforded a witness was contemplated by its sponsors. In explaining the bill in the House, Congressman Davis expressly stated that committee powers were not increased, that no added burden was placed upon the witness, and that a mere substitution of a judicial proceeding for punishment at the bar of Congress was intended. [40] The reason for enacting § 192 went to the punishment and not the offense. It was recognized that the power of Congress to deal with a contemnor by its own processes did not extend beyond the life of any session. [41] By making contempt of Congress a crime, a fixed term of imprisonment was substituted for variable periods of congressional custody dependent upon the fortuity of whether the contemnor had been called to testify near the beginning or the end of a session. [42] But there is nothing to indicate that this change in the mode of punishment affected in any way the well-established elements of contempt of Congress. Since the enactment of § 192, the practice of specifically directing a recalcitrant witness to answer has continued to prevail. [43] In fact, the very committee involved here, the House Un-American Activities Committee, originally followed this practice [44] and recently resumed it. [45] Giving a witness a fair apprisal of the committee's ruling on an objection recognizes the legitimate interests of both the witness and the committee. Just as the witness need not use any particular form of words to present his objection, so also the committee is not required to resort to any fixed verbal formula to indicate its disposition of the objection. So long as the witness is not forced to guess the committee's ruling, he has no cause to complain. And adherence to this traditional practice can neither inflict hardship upon the committee nor abridge the proper scope of legislative investigation.