Opinion ID: 2369035
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Cumulative Effect of the Alleged Evidentiary Errors

Text: Christie asserts that, even if the alleged errors do not constitute reversible error on their own, when taken together, they created a prejudicial effect that overwhelmed any possibility of a fair consideration of the evidence against him. However, we have noted only one error in the numerous evidentiary rulings that Christie challengesthe District Court's admission of the testimony concerning the toys seized from Christie's homeand we have already concluded that that error was harmless, in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt in this case. We thus readily conclude that, taken together, the purported errors do not entitle Christie to a new trial.
Christie next argues, as he did to the District Court, that, by failing to abide by the CI Guidelines, [t]he government's investigation and prosecution of [the case against him] constituted outrageous government conduct that violated his due process rights. (Appellant's Op. Br. at 45.) He claims there were several violations of the Guidelines, including (1) that MacFarlane knew that Lochmiller was on probation but did not contact probation authorities; (2) that the paperwork required to register a confidential informant had not been completed; and (3) that, although confidential informants are not supposed to engage in criminal activity without authorization and supervision, Lochmiller continued to run the NAMGLA website. See CI GUIDELINES §§ II.A-B, II.D.5, III.C. According to Christie, the government's failure to follow the CI Guidelines meant that MacFarlane and other agents lacked control over Lochmiller, which Christie alleges violated his right to due process because, absent such control, the government simply cannot vouch for the integrity of the data on [the NAMGLA] site, and thus innocent people are exposed to prosecution. (Appellant's Op. Br. at 54.) In assessing Christie's claim of outrageous government conduct, we review the District Court's factual findings for clear error and exercise plenary review over the Court's legal conclusions. United States v. Lakhani, 480 F.3d 171, 181 (3d Cir.2007). [W]e repeatedly have noted that we are `extremely hesitant to find law enforcement conduct so offensive that it violates the Due Process Clause.' United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 154 (3d Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1065 (3d Cir.1996)). The CI Guidelines do not themselves create rights for criminal defendants. See United States v. Henry, 482 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir.2007) (Justice Department guidelines were not compelled by statute, nor intended to create private rights.); cf. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 751-52, 99 S.Ct. 1465, 59 L.Ed.2d 733 (1979) (reversing suppression of evidence obtained in violation of IRS regulations). Accordingly, even if those Guidelines were violated, that would not mean, in itself, that Christie would be entitled to relief. The pertinent question is whether the government's conduct was so outrageous or shocking that it amounted to a due process violation. See Hoffecker, 530 F.3d at 153-54; United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 229 (3d Cir.1998) ([A] criminal defendant may raise a due process challenge to an indictment against her based on a claim that the government employed outrageous law enforcement investigative techniques.). The CI Guidelines are relevant, if at all, only to the extent that they indicate boundaries the FBI views as defining good law enforcement practices in working with CIs. They do not purport to be rules, much less a statement of the limits of constitutional behavior. Assuming that the CI Guidelines apply to the government's interactions with Lochmiller, which is a point in dispute, the alleged failures to abide by the Guidelines did not violate Christie's due process rights. Cases in which we have found due process violations have involved far more egregious government conduct. For example, we have determined that due process was violated when the government itself manufactured the illegal activity and then prosecuted others who engaged in that activity alongside government actors. See United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 379 (3d Cir.1978) (We do not believe the Government may involve itself so directly and continuously over such a long period of time in the creation and maintenance of criminal operations, and yet prosecute its collaborators.). Here, in contrast, the government gained access to ongoing illegal activity through an intermediary, Lochmiller. The government benefitted from the information and site access that Lochmiller provided, but it did nothing to create or encourage criminal acts, and there is no evidence that the information Lochmiller gave was untrustworthy.
Christie contends that the District Court erred in denying his motion to suppress because, as he sees it, the government's acquisition of his IP address, in connection with the administrative access given by Lochmiller, violated his Fourth Amendment rights. We review the denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual determinations and exercise plenary review over the application of the law to those facts. United States v. Veal, 453 F.3d 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2006). Christie's argument hinges on the flawed premise that he possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP address. Federal courts have uniformly held that subscriber information provided to an internet provider is not protected by the Fourth Amendment's privacy expectation because it is voluntarily conveyed to third parties. United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir.2008); see also United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 164 (4th Cir.2010) (holding that a defendant could not point to any evidence that he had a subjective expectation of privacy in his internet ... subscriber information because he voluntarily conveyed that information to the company, and assumed the risk that the company would provide that information to the police (internal citations omitted)); Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cir.2001) (We conclude that plaintiffs ... lack a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in their subscriber information because they communicated it to the systems operators.). Similarly, no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in an IP address, because that information is also conveyed to and, indeed, from third parties, including ISPs. IP addresses are not merely passively conveyed through third party equipment, but rather are voluntarily turned over in order to direct the third party's servers. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir.2008); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (pointing out that the Supreme Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties). Christie therefore had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP address and so cannot establish a Fourth Amendment violation. [4] The District Court properly denied his motion to suppress.
Finally, Christie argues that his sentence is unreasonable. He does not object to the enhancements imposed in his case. Instead, he says that § 2G2.2 is inherently flawed because the enhancements apply in even the most routine cases, thereby producing unnecessarily severe results, and that his sentence is thus per se unreasonable because it was based upon a sentencing range dictated by that Guideline. We review a district court's sentencing order for reasonableness, under an abuse of discretion standard. [5] United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir.2009). Whether or not § 2G2.2 may produce unreasonable sentences in some casesa subject on which we make no comment herethe sentence in this case is not unreasonable. First, Christie's collection of many thousands of images of child pornography powerfully indicates that his is not the routine case. Second, and more importantly, Christie helped to run a network that allowed for the trading of hundreds of thousands of unlawful images. As a moderator of the NAMGLA site, he facilitated the trading and possession of child pornography by other users, showing that he is guilty of far more than mere possession. Third, the District Court noted that Christie expressed no remorse and believed that he was likely to reoffend in the future. All of those facts support the reasonableness of the District Court's sentence, based on Christie's particular history and characteristics and the specific characteristics of his offense. Accordingly, on the facts of this case, we are satisfied that the sentence was within the bounds of reasonableness.