Opinion ID: 810883
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: MTE was using Investors’ funds to meet MTE

Text: and [Wealth Creation Institute’s] obligations to repay prior Investors; and (c) MTE’s ability to repay Investors was dependent on MTE’s continuing to fraudulently raise funds from future Investors. Roy Jr. also acknowledged that “he had the opportunity to consult with an attorney regarding this matter;” the 3 Roy III originally challenged the admission of the consent order he signed but later stipulated that the Government could present a redacted form of his consent order to the jury. Nos. 11-1013, 11-3008 & 11-3082 13 “Stipulation [was] entered into freely and voluntary;” and he was not promised anything with regard to “civil or criminal liability arising from the facts underlying this matter.” Roy Jr. filed a motion in limine to exclude the Consent Order. The parties discussed the motion during a status hearing on June 30, 2009, and the district court stated, “[A]s to the general notion that none of this comes in, that’s not going to happen.” Proceeding in light of the district court’s comment, Roy Jr. entered into a stipulation with the Government that the Consent Order would either be admitted in its entirety or with certain portions redacted. The district court instructed the parties that “there should be an instruction at the end, and there should also be an instruction when this evidence comes in[,] that it’s only to be used for the person who signed the consent and no other defendant.” At trial, the entire Consent Order was admitted without redaction, accompanied by an instruction admonishing the jury to consider the Consent Order only against Roy Jr. The brief and reply brief for Roy Jr. and Roy III are unclear as to who exactly is challenging the admissibility of the Consent Order, Roy Jr. alone or Roy Jr. and Roy III.4 Either way, the limiting instruction, coupled 4 Roy Jr. and Roy III filed a consolidated brief and reply brief. In the sections discussing the admissibility of the Consent Order, the parties are inconsistent, first stating that “Roy (continued...) 14 Nos. 11-1013, 11-3008 & 11-3082 with the fact the Consent Order did not contain any references to Roy III, sufficiently removed any unfair prejudice to Roy III, see United States v. Javell, No. 11-3044, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 18377, at -11 (7th Cir. Aug. 30, 2012) (explaining that the admission of a co-defendant’s confession is permissible at trial if the admission is accompanied by a limiting instruction and does not facially incriminate the defendant), and we, thus, move on to Roy Jr.’s argument. Roy Jr. maintains that the Consent Order he signed should not have been admitted because it was highly prejudicial and unnecessarily confusing to the jury, inserting state civil procedure issues into a federal criminal trial. The Government contends the information was relevant, as it contained factual admissions related to the fraud allegations, and not unfairly prejudicial. We find that Roy Jr. has waived his ability to contest the Consent Order’s admission. “To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party ‘must make a proper objection at trial that alerts the court and opposing party to the specific grounds for the objection.’ ” Naeem v. McKesson Drug Co., 444 F.3d 593, 610 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Wynn, 845 F.2d 1439, 1442 (7th Cir. 1988)). “When a party fails to timely and properly object at trial to the admission of 4 (...continued) Fluker Jr. and Roy Fluker III” were deprived of a fair trial and, later, that “Mr. Roy Fluker Jr.” previously argued that the Consent Order’s admission was improper. Nos. 11-1013, 11-3008 & 11-3082 15 evidence, the party is deemed to have waived the issue on appeal.” Christmas v. City of Chi., 682 F.3d 632, 640 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Jones v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 188 F.3d 709, 727 (7th Cir. 1999)). The Government and Roy Jr. stipulated to the Consent Order’s admission. When the Government asked at trial to publish portions of it to the jury, Roy Jr.’s counsel stated that he had no objection. By entering into a stipulation with the Government and failing to object at trial to the Consent Order’s admission, Roy Jr. made a strategic decision to abandon his challenge of the Consent Order’s admissibility. See United States v. Gaona, No. 12-2039, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 20787, at  (7th Cir. Oct. 5, 2012) (“The touchstone of waiver is a knowing and intentional decision.” (quoting United States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2005))). This decision precludes our review of the issue on appeal.