Opinion ID: 3063257
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effect of the Joint Stipulation

Text: Parker first argues that the district court abused its discretion by amending Parker’s sentence to 236 months instead of 210 months, given that, in the Joint Stipulation filed by the parties, the Government did not object to Parker’s request that his sentenced be reduced to 210 months. We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in reducing Parker’s sentence to 236 months instead of 210 months as requested by Parker in the Joint Stipulation. The district court, in its order directing a response concerning retroactive application of the crack cocaine amendment as to Jerry Parker, encouraged the 2 parties to confer regarding Parker’s eligibility for a sentence reduction. The court, however, did not direct the parties to stipulate to a specific reduced sentence, and in fact the Government did not stipulate that Parker’s sentence should be reduced to the low end of the sentencing range. The Government merely did not oppose Parker’s request for a low-end sentence. Nothing in the statute or caselaw suggests that a post-sentencing stipulation of this nature could limit a district court’s exercise of its discretion under § 3582(c)(2). See United States v. Vautier, 144 F.3d 756, 760 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Both the language of § 3582(c)(2) and this circuit's precedent indicate that the sentencing court's power to reduce a sentence is discretionary.”). Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in failing to reduce Parker’s sentence to 210 months, as requested by Parker in the Joint Stipulation.