Opinion ID: 1456707
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Text: For more than thirty years, Norma Owens (Norma) and Phillip R. Owens, Sr. (Phillip) maintained a quasi-marital relationship in the state of Washington. In 2004, Norma and Phillip separated. On August 19, 2005, the Superior Court of King County, Washington, issued a state court order (Order) awarding Norma a fifty-percent interest in the pension benefits being paid to Phillip by Automotive Machinist Pension Trust (Automotive Trust or Trust). Automotive Trust declined to implement the Order on the ground that it was not a valid Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) under § 1056 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1). Specifically, the Trust argued (1) that the Order did not relate to marital property rights pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(I); and (2) that Norma was not an Alternate Payee under 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(K) because she did not qualify as an other dependent. [1] We agree with the Washington Federal District Court that, because Norma and Phillip lived together in a quasi-marital relationship for more than thirty years, the Superior Court's Order does in fact relate to marital property rights, that Norma is an Alternate Payee under 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I), and that the Superior Court's Order therefore qualifies as a valid Qualified Domestic Relations Order. We therefore AFFIRM the Federal District Court's denial of Automotive Trust's Motion for Reconsideration.
The important facts are not in dispute. For more than thirty years, Norma Owens and Phillip Owens lived together as husband and wife in a quasi-marital relationship [2] in King County, Washington. Although Norma and Phillip were never legally married, they had and raised two boys together, purchased a home together, and held themselves out to their friends and to the public as a married couple. During their thirty-year relationship, Norma and Phillip also acquired numerous joint assets including real property, furniture, furnishings, and vehicles. The Owens' jointly acquired funds were held in various financial institutions, and some of these funds were held in joint bank accounts. Additionally, during their relationship, Phillip, because of his employment, acquired interest in various retirement accounts. Norma's formal education ended after the ninth grade. Financially, Norma contributed little or nothing to the household. Instead, Phillip provided the main financial support for the family. Except for brief periods during which she worked for minimum wages, Norma, a homemaker, devoted her time to caring for her husband and raising their two sons. Phillip and Norma filed joint tax returns. The tax returns for 2003, 2002, and 2001 list Norma as Phillip's wife. Norma was also named as Phillip's wife and beneficiary in Phillip's life insurance application. Though they were not legally married, Norma and Phillip lived together for more than thirty years in a quasi-marital relationship as husband and wife. In March 2004, Norma and Phillip separated. Only two major assets of theirs remained: the house in Seattle that they had purchased together and Phillip's ERISA pension plan with Automotive Trust. Proceeds from the sale of the house were used to pay off the Owens' delinquent mortgage payments and other debts. The only significant remaining asset was Phillip's ERISA pension plan with Automotive Trust. That ERISA pension plan is the subject of this litigation. In January 2005, Phillip submitted his claim for early retirement benefits to Automotive Trust. Phillip's claim became effective on February 1, 2005 and resulted in Phillip's retirement benefit being paid to him as a single life annuity. [3] Phillip currently receives gross monthly pension benefit payments from Automotive Trust in the amount of $1905.79; the payments will continue for his lifetime. On August 10, 2004, shortly after the Owens' separated, Norma filed a Petition for Equitable Distribution of Property Acquired During a Meretricious Relationship in the Superior Court for King County, Washington. In the Petition, Norma claimed that she was entitled to fifty percent of each of Phillip's monthly pension benefit payments. On May 11, 2005, the parties participated in an arbitration hearing. Automotive Trust was not a party to that action. On June 7, 2005, an arbitration award was issued in favor of Norma. Pursuant to the arbitration award, on August 19, 2005, the Superior Court issued an Order assigning Norma Fifty Percent (50.0%) of each of [Phillip's] monthly benefit payments from [Automotive Trust's] Plan based on Norma's quasi-marital relationship to Phillip. The Superior Court considered the pension benefits that Phillip accrued under the Trust as part of the overall equitable distribution of property acquired during the couple's thirty-year quasi-marital relationship. Because the Order related to marital property rights, and because it named Norma as an Alternate Payee, the Superior Court titled the Order a Qualified Domestic Relations Order. On October 14, 2005, Automotive Trust notified Norma's attorney that the Superior Court's Order did not, in fact, qualify as a Qualified Domestic Relations Order under § 206(d)(3) of ERISA. Despite the Superior Court's findings, Automotive Trust refused to pay Norma her share of the pension benefits. In a letter to Norma's attorney, Harry Reichenberg, Automotive Trust stated: It is [Automotive Trust's] understanding that [Norma] and [Phillip] were never married. Therefore, it would not appear that the [Superior Court's] August 19, 2005 order relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital property rights, and it would not be qualified [as required by ERISA § 206(d)(3) and Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 152(d)(2)(H)]. In a response letter dated February 6, 2006, Norma's attorney asked Automotive Trust to re-evaluate its position on the ground that the Superior Court's Order was a valid QDRO. Specifically, Norma asserted that: (1) the Order related to marital property rights because Norma and Phillip lived together for more than thirty years in a quasi-marital relationship; (2) Washington state law permitted such an equitable distribution of property following the termination of a quasi-marital relationship; and (3) Norma satisfied the Alternate Payee requirement because she qualified as an other dependent under I.R.C. § 152(d)(2)(H). On March 6, 2006, Automotive Trust replied to Norma's attorney and reaffirmed its original position that the Order did not constitute a valid QDRO because it did not meet the relevant ERISA requirements. Norma filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington (U.S. District Court). On October 27, 2006, Automotive Trust filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. On November 10, 2006, Norma filed a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. On January 19, 2007, the U.S. District Court, Honorable Thomas A. Zilly, presiding, denied the Trust's motion and granted Norma's crossmotion for summary judgment. The U.S. District Court held that the Superior Court's Order (1) was a valid domestic relations order because it related to marital property rights; and (2) was a valid QDRO because it recognized the existence of an Alternate Payee. On January 30, 2007, Automotive Trust filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of Judgment, which the U.S. District Court denied on March 1, 2007. On March 27, 2007, Automotive Trust timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The question before us is this: Did the U.S. District Court correctly hold that the state Superior Court's Order qualified as a QDRO pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1)? That is, (1) did the Order relate to marital property rights pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(I); and (2) did Norma qualify as an Alternate Payee pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(K)?