Opinion ID: 195970
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Attorney Fees Under PMPA

Text: 33 Lastly, Four Corners challenges the denial of its request for an attorney fee award against Mobil based on the PMPA violation. First, it claims that the district court's factual findings were inadequate under Fed.R.Civ.P. 52. Second, it says that the district court was somehow constrained to allow a fee award because Congress meant to encourage prevailing franchisees to vindicate their rights under PMPA. 34 A denial of an attorney fee award is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. See Catullo v. Metzner, 834 F.2d 1075, 1085 (1st Cir.1987). Under PMPA, see 15 U.S.C. Sec. 2805(d)(1)(C), an attorney fee award is discretionary where the plaintiff recovers neither actual nor exemplary damages. Not only did Four Corners sustain no provable damages, but the record evidence indicates that it generated approximately $44,000 more in aggregate net profits during the projected remaining life span of the Mobil franchise as a consequence of having been freed from the Mobil franchise gallonage caps since 1988. Four Corners likewise failed to win equitable reinstatement of its Mobil franchise. Cf. Chestnut Hill Gulf, Inc. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 749 F.Supp. 331, 333 (D.Mass.1990) (plaintiff which obtains equitable relief under PMPA is entitled to attorney fee award even absent recovery of actual or exemplary damages). 35 Without in any sense diminishing Mobil's clear violation of PMPA, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying an attorney fee award on the present record. Nor do we think that Congress intended to compel attorney fee awards under PMPA as an inducement to franchisees to pursue vindication in these circumstances. 36 The district court judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to cross-appellee in appeal No. 94-1718.