Opinion ID: 2816600
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Exceptions

Text: The Supreme Court has instructed that while the default rule applies to “most” disputes about burdens, Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 57, another “general rule of statutory construction” provides “that the burden of proving justification or exemption under a special exception to the prohibitions of a statute generally rests on one who claims its benefits,” FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1948); see also Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 91 (2008) (repeating “the familiar principle that ‘[w]hen a proviso . . . carves an exception out of the body of a statute or contract those who set up such exception must prove it’”) (quoting Javierre v. Cent. Altagracia, 217 U.S. 502, 508 (1910)); United States v. Taylor, 686 F.3d 182, 190 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2012) (compiling “numerous Supreme Court decisions” for the proposition that “where the statute contains . . . an exception, the defendant bears the burden of proving it”). This “longstanding convention is part of the backdrop against which the Congress writes laws, and we respect it unless we have compelling reasons to think that Congress meant to put the burden of persuasion on the other side.” Meacham, 554 U.S. at 91-92. 12 Here, § 1692c(b) states that “[e]xcept as provided in section 1692b . . . a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, . . . [with third parties].” 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b). Thus, the FDCPA generally prohibits a debt collector from contacting third parties, with the debt collector’s ability to seek location information framed as an exception to this general prohibition. Repeat contacts made pursuant to that exception are even further limited, with telltale language likewise indicative of an affirmative defense: Any debt collector communicating with any person other than the consumer for the purpose of acquiring location information about the consumer shall . . . not communicate with any such person more than once unless requested to do so by such person or unless the debt collector reasonably believes that the earlier response of such person is erroneous or incomplete and that such person now has correct or complete location information[.] 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(3) (emphasis added); see United States v. Franchi-Forlando, 838 F.2d 585, 591 (1st Cir. 1988) (Breyer, J.) (stating that introducing provisions with the words “unless” and “except” may indicate an affirmative defense). Moreover, in assessing which party has the burden of proof under this rule, courts often “focus[] on the relationship between the defense in question and the plaintiff’s primary case,” and “on whether a defense raises factual or legal issues other than those put in play by the plaintiff’s cause of action.” In re Sterten, 546 F.3d 278, 284 (3d Cir. 2008). Put differently, as we recently held in the criminal context, 13 “[w]hether a particular statutory phrase constitutes a defense or an element of the offense . . . turns on whether the statutory definition is such that the crime may not be properly described without reference to the exception.” Taylor, 686 F.3d at 191 (internal quotation marks omitted). If that is the case, “the exception is an element of the crime”; if not, the exception is an affirmative defense. Id. In the case of the FDCPA, no reference to the Act’s exceptions is necessary to discern that calls to third parties in pursuit of collecting a consumer’s debt are prohibited. Instead, what constitutes a violation is apparent from the plain language of § 1692c(b). Thus, we find no compelling reason to reverse the “longstanding convention” that a party seeking shelter in an exception—here, the debt collector—has the burden to prove it. Meacham, 554 U.S. at 91.