Opinion ID: 1281505
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Prosecutor's Argument Regarding Multiple-murder Special Circumstances, Dual Use of Underlying Crimes

Text: Some error arose from the prosecutor's argument with respect to multiple-murder special circumstances and factors (a) and (b). (See CALJIC No. 8.84.1.1; ง 190.3, factors (a), (b).) [30] Prompt objection and proper admonition could have cured any harm, but such objection was not made. (See Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 27, 34.) In any event, reversal is not required. The jury in this case found true as to each victim a multiple-murder special circumstance, a rape special circumstance, and a sodomy special circumstance. Further, in his argument at the penalty phase, the prosecutor said: Consider not only the facts of the case, but the circumstances that were found to be true, the special circumstances, not just the other circumstances.... [ถ] A person who commits a murder, for example, during the course of a robbery, could be subject to the death penalty, and a variety of other conditions of taking a life under certain conditions subjects a person to the death penalty. Those are called special circumstances.... [ถ] In here, we have, as to each murder, three โ you have multiple murders, you have rape and you have sodomy. Those were found by the jury to be true. You may have others, but those are three definite ones as to each.... [ถ] You consider acts of violence or implied violence, you consider the various events or acts of events of violence. They are demonstrated by his convictions for these felony charges. There are six of them.
(29) It was error on the facts of this case to find true more than one multiple-murder special circumstance. ( People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 950 [245 Cal. Rptr. 336, 751 P.2d 395]; People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1273 [232 Cal. Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115]; People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 787 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].) The question is whether defendant suffered any prejudice from the reference to two multiple-murder special circumstances instead of one. (See Williams, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 951; Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 787-788; Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 1281-1283.) We conclude he clearly did not. The jury was not told to mechanically count up aggravating factors. It was not confused as to the number of victims. It is inconceivable that finding true one more multiple-murder special circumstance than was strictly correct had any influence on the outcome of the deliberations at the penalty phase.
(30) A second issue arises from the fact that the jury found true special circumstances of rape-murder and sodomy-murder as to each victim. Additionally those special circumstances were, under factor (a), considered as aggravating factors. Based on section 190.3, factor (a), the jury was instructed to consider: The circumstances of the crime with which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true. The prosecutor's remarks invited the jury to consider not only the facts of the case which included rape and sodomy, but also the fact that those offenses were special circumstances. The issue is whether this situation improperly permitted excessive counting of special circumstances, either by the number of felony-murder special circumstances alleged as to each victim or their consideration under factor (a). We recently discussed and resolved these issues in People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713 [244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741]. We rejected the position, which had been supported by the plurality opinion in Harris, supra, 36 Cal.3d 36, that there was any statutory or constitutional impediment to the jury considering as special circumstances the various felonies which were part of the indivisible course of conduct involving the murder. ( Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 763-768; and see Harris, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 64-66.) [31] We also noted that while there might in theory be a problem with considering such felonies both as circumstances of the murder and as special circumstances, the possibility of real prejudice was remote. ( Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 768-769.) We conclude the potential for prejudice was not realized here. The jury was fully aware of the facts and, again, was not instructed to weigh aggravating factors in some mechanical way.
(31) Finally, a related but slightly more troublesome problem is the fact that the prosecutor suggested the jury could consider the crimes of which defendant had been convicted in this case not only under factor (a) but also as acts of violence under factor (b). (See ง 190.3, factor (b).) The jury had been instructed that they might consider: The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the expressed or implied threat to use force or violence. Defendant asserts that the prosecutor's argument not only proposed additional, improper aggravating factors, it deprived him of a mitigating factor, namely the absence of other violent criminal activity. Factor (b) only pertains to criminal activity other than the crimes for which defendant is convicted in the present proceeding. ( Kimble, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 505; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 106 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127].) It was therefore error for the prosecutor to suggest that the two murders, two rapes, and two sodomies should be considered not only in analyzing the circumstances of the crime but also as violent criminal activity under factor (b). We conclude nevertheless that this error was harmless not only in light of the brevity of the reference and the other arguments of both counsel, but also in light of the fact that the prosecutor himself, in his final remarks to the jury, chose to emphasize that aggravating factors are not counted up and compared to the score for mitigating factors. He stressed that the jury must consider instead the quality of the various factors and determine whether defendant is the type of person that should be given life without parole or the death penalty. Defendant argues that the prosecutor's remarks deprived him of a mitigating factor, namely, the absence of other criminal activity involving violence. We said in Lucero, supra, 44 Cal.3d 1006, that where a defendant had no prior criminal record, improper overlap of factors (a) and (b) could have the effect of eliminating a legitimate mitigating factor. ( Id. at p. 1031, fn. 15.) Here, however, defendant himself, as part of the description of his disturbed childhood, presented his tendency to resort to violence. It is thus highly unlikely that the prosecutor's comments foreclosed the defense from any argument based on the lack of violent crimes in defendant's record. We find no reasonable possibility that the prosecutor's brief remarks could have prejudiced the defense.