Opinion ID: 1662051
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: federal constitutional and statutory claims

Text: Even assuming either the nonexistence or the unconstitutionality of the competitive bid law, still Ordinance 77-257 must itself pass constitutional muster before its provisions can stand. We believe that the affirmative action program proposed by the ordinance does not comport with the constitutional requirements announced in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 100 S.Ct. 2758, 65 L.Ed.2d 902 (1980), and Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978). Specifically, we hold that the ordinance violates Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment because (1) the Birmingham City Council is not a competent body to identify and address past constitutional or statutory violations; (2) even if the council were a competent body to identify and address past constitutional or statutory violations, the council has not compiled the necessary record to demonstrate the need for the affirmative action program; and (3) even if the council were a competent body which had compiled the necessary record to demonstrate the need for an affirmative action program, the remedy imposed is not carefully tailored to rectify the continuing effects of past illegal discrimination. Neither Fullilove nor Bakke gives this Court an absolute statement as to the equal protection analysis which should be applied in cases which question the constitutionality of affirmative action programs. Nevertheless, we believe that the approach of Justice Powell is fairly representative of a more rigorous standard of review, and for purposes of this opinion we will employ the analytical framework proposed by him. We are reluctant to belabor the reader by quoting Justice Powell at length; however, we recognize that he most succinctly states his own reasoning and approach in cases involving equal protection challenges to governmentally imposed race preferences. For example, in the Fullilove case, Justice Powell wrote: The question in this case is whether Congress may enact the requirement in § 103(f)(2) of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 (PWEA), that 10% of federal grants for local public work projects funded by the Act be set aside for minority business enterprises. Section 103(f)(2) employs a racial classification that is constitutionally prohibited unless it is a necessary means of advancing a compelling governmental interest .... For the reasons stated in my Bakke opinion, I consider adherence to this standard as important and consistent with precedent. . . . . Racial preference never can constitute a compelling state interest. `Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry' [are] `odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.' Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. [1], at 11, [87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010] quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100, [63 S.Ct. 1375, 1385, 87 L.Ed. 1774]. Thus, if the set-aside merely expresses a congressional desire to prefer one racial or ethnic group over another, § 103(f)(2) violates the equal protection component in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. ... The Government does have a legitimate interest in ameliorating the disabling effects of identified discrimination. ... The existence of illegal discrimination justifies the imposition of a remedy that will make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful ... discrimination. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 [95 S.Ct. 2362, 2372, 45 L.Ed.2d 280] (1975). A critical inquiry therefore, is whether § 103(f)(2) was enacted as a means of redressing such discrimination. But this Court has never approved race-conscious remedies absent judicial, administrative, or legislative findings of constitutional or statutory violations.... Because the distinction between permissible remedial action and impermissible racial preference rests on the existence of a constitutional or statutory violation, the legitimate interest in creating a race-conscious remedy is not compelling unless an appropriate governmental authority has found that such a violation has occurred. In other words, two requirements must be met. First, the governmental body that attempts to impose a race-conscious remedy must have the authority to act in response to identified discrimination. ... Second, the governmental body must make findings that demonstrate the existence of illegal discrimination.... Our past cases also establish that even if the government proffers a compelling interest to support reliance upon a suspect classification, the means selected must be narrowly drawn to fulfill the governmental purpose.... Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 496-498, 100 S.Ct. at 2784-2785 (Powell, J., concurring) (citations and footnotes omitted). See also, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287-320, 98 S.Ct. at 2746-2763. Thus, when affirmative action programs are challenged, the questions are whether: (1) The governmental body imposing the plan has the authority and capability to remedy past constitutional or statutory violations; (2) The body compiled the record necessary to support the conclusion that past illegal conduct existed and that adverse residual effects of the conduct continue to exist; and (3) The plan imposed is narrowly tailored to address the residual effects of the identified past violations. Undoubtedly the Ordinance 77-257 set-aside is a racial classification resulting in a discriminatory preference for the named minority groups. Although the ordinance states that the racial preference is a goal, rather than a mandatory quota, nevertheless, a contractor is required to submit, along with his bid, either a specific plan for ten percent MBE participation in the contract, or a request for administrative waiver of the ten percent requirement. The result is that ten percent of city construction work, by dollar amount, is reserved for minority businesses. The City's stated purpose for imposing the racial classification was to encourage, facilitate and effect greater participation by minority business enterprises in construction contracts let by the city. While the City's purpose is meritorious, it is indeed a grave measure to accomplish that purpose through discrimination against nonminorities. For this reason, the reallocation of burdens and benefits by the ordinance classification is constitutionally permissible only as the remedial response to specific illegal action against those to be benefited by the classification. Necessarily, the Birmingham City Council must be invested with some remedial power before it can properly identify and redress past illegal conduct. Defendant Birmingham contends that the City Council, having limited police powers, is an entirely appropriate and competent body to find and address constitutional and statutory violations. In this case, we disagree. Here, we are dealing neither with the broad remedial powers of Congress conferred by the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments, cf. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 483, 100 S.Ct. at 2777; 448 U.S. at 500, 100 S.Ct. at 2786 (Powell, J., concurring), nor with the limited powers of a court. Cf., Franks v. Bowman Transport Co., 424 U.S. 747, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976). As Justice Powell said, [I]solated segments of our vast governmental structures are not competent to make ... decisions [as to the propriety of race-conscious remedial action], at least in the absence of legislative mandates and legislatively determined criteria. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309, 98 S.Ct. at 2757 (footnote omitted). The governmental entity involved here, a municipality, derives all of its power from the state, and no municipality can legislate beyond what the state has either expressly or impliedly authorized. Colvin v. Ward, 189 Ala. 198, 66 So. 98 (1914). We see nothing in the limited police power granted municipalities by the state to warrant the conclusion that municipalities possess the broad remedial power to vindicate constitutional or statutory violations by employing racially discriminatory preferences, but we are not now called upon to answer that question. Certainly the state has not granted cities the power to initiate legislation in direct contravention of state law and policy favoring open competitive bidding on city contracts. Even assuming the Birmingham City Council were competent to act, we believe the council failed to compile the necessary record to justify the ordinance. Although the ordinance commences with a declaration that historical practices of racial discrimination have resulted in minorities' receiving an inequitable share of city construction contracts, we interpret the pertinent case law to require more than a conclusory legislative preamble to justify the council's imposition of discriminatory racial classifications. [2] To hold that race-conscious remedies may be imposed without competent and particularized findings of record would be to convert a remedy heretofore reserved for violations of legal rights into a privilege that all institutions throughout the Nation could grant at their pleasure to whatever groups are perceived as victims of societal discrimination. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310, 98 S.Ct. at 2758. If all that is required is some statement of justification, unsupported by studies or hearings of record, then there is no substance to the requirement that the race-conscious remedy be justified by findings of past discrimination. [3] Defendant Birmingham presented no evidence that the ordinance was the considered response to hearings, reports, debates, or empirical studies. In fact, those persons primarily responsible for implementation and enforcement of the ordinancethe former city engineer, the acting city engineer, and the purchasing agentall testified that they knew of no studies conducted to determine the need or justification for the ordinance. The record reflects that the ordinance was passed shortly after the circuit court's injunction against enforcement of the mayor's regulation requiring ten percent MBE participation. The council appears to have simply adopted the voided regulation, with some minor substantive changes and post hoc findings of past discrimination. As far as the record shows, Birmingham failed to establish that the findings were anything other than an unsubstantiated conclusion by the council. Our opinion is not changed by the argument that the council was, by its findings, simply admitting its own past wrongs. The council members cannot speak for past city administrations and officials. Furthermore, even if it were appropriate for the City to admit its own misdeeds, absent sufficient findings, it was inappropriate and unnecessary for the City to acknowledge that discrimination has existed in Birmingham; however, past societal discrimination alone is insufficient justification to support the specific remedy dictated by the ordinance set-aside. See, 438 U.S. at 310, 98 S.Ct. at 2758. We also conclude that Ordinance 77-257 is not narrowly drawn to advance the purported objective of ameliorating the effects of past discrimination. A glance at the ordinance suffices to establish that it was not drafted to address identified past discrimination. Included as beneficiaries of the ordinance are individuals who are Blacks, Spanish speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts. Assuming that the city council had sufficient evidence before it to justify a race-conscious preference for Blacks, nothing in the record supports the conclusion that the other named minority groups were entitled to remedial relief. Cf., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 537-9, 100 S.Ct. at 2805-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The United States Supreme Court and other courts have considered various factors when deciding whether a race-conscious plan is sufficiently narrow to comport with equal protection guarantees. Factors considered are (i) the efficacy of alternative remedies ... (ii) the planned duration of the remedy ... (iii) the relationship between the percentage of minority workers to be employed and the percentage of minority group members in the relevant population or workforce ... and (iv) the availability of waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be met. 448 U.S. at 510-11, 100 S.Ct. at 2791 (Powell, J., concurring). We believe that, viewed in light of these factors, the ordinance must fall. We do not rule on the efficacy of non-discriminatory alternatives. At trial the issue was contested, but the trial judge did not rule on the question. Additionally, we do not address the issue of the availability of a waiver of ordinance requirements. The ordinance provisions include a waiver, although the plaintiffs contend the waiver is not applied as set down in the ordinance. However, using factors considered by other courts, we note several infirmities in the ordinance set-aside plan. The ordinance has no time limit, and presumably the ten percent set-aside will remain in force until repealed. Additionally, there is no evidence of written regulations or guidelines. Implementation and enforcement of the ordinance are left to the discretion of administering officials. Finally, there is no indication in the record that the ten percent MBE set-aside has any relationship to the number of minority contractors available and equipped to do city construction work. Certainly, the ordinance is demonstrably broader than necessary. Defendant Birmingham argues that Fullilove is dispositive of every issue in this case and is absolute authority that the ordinance set-aside is constitutional. In Fullilove, the Court upheld the ten percent set-aside proposed by the Public Works Employment Act of 1977. Since the Birmingham ordinance is modeled on the federal law, defendant continues, the ordinance is undoubtedly constitutional. Although Fullilove is guidance for our resolution of the issues in this case, the result in Fullilove does not dictate our result here. In short, Fullilove turned on the Congressional authority to legislate race-conscious remedial measures. The Congressional authority is rooted in the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments, and without doubt the City of Birmingham has no coextensive power. Furthermore, the PWEA was limited in duration, and its provisions were implemented through extensive regulations. Although the factual differences between the instant case and Fullilove seem few, they are material. In conclusion, we note that our decision does not and cannot foreclose the City's enforcement of federal statutes or constitutionally imposed administrative regulations. Nor do we conclude that no municipality or state governmental entity may initiate a constitutionally sound affirmative action program. We only decide the case before us. AFFIRMED. TORBERT, C. J., and MADDOX, FAULKNER, ALMON and EMBRY, JJ., concur. JONES, SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., dissent. ADAMS, J., not sitting.