Opinion ID: 204669
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Hernandez's Motion to Suppress his Post-Arrest Statement

Text: Hernandez argues that he gave his post-arrest statement involuntarily and that the district court erred in rejecting his motion to suppress. We review de novo the district court's determination that Hernandez's confession was voluntary, United States v. Montgomery, 555 F.3d 623, 629 (7th Cir.2009), and we review the district court's relevant factual findings for clear error, giving special deference to the district court's credibility determinations, United States v. Villalpando, 588 F.3d 1124, 1127 (7th Cir.2009). Due process requires that a criminal conviction not be based on an involuntary confession. See generally Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223-26, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); United States v. Gillaum, 372 F.3d 848, 856-57 (7th Cir.2004). We have held that [a] confession is voluntary if, in the totality of circumstances, it is the product of a rational intellect and free will and not the result of physical abuse, psychological intimidation, or deceptive interrogation tactics that have overcome the defendant's free will. Gillaum, 372 F.3d at 856 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041. [C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not `voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gillaum, 372 F.3d at 856 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Montgomery, 555 F.3d at 632. [W]e analyze coercion from the perspective of a reasonable person in the position of the suspect. United States v. Huerta, 239 F.3d 865, 871 (7th Cir.2001). We consider the following factors when evaluating coercion: The defendant's age, education, intelligence level, and mental state; the length of the defendant's detention; the nature of the interrogations; the inclusion of advice about constitutional rights; and the use of physical punishment, including deprivation of food or sleep. Narcotics, alcohol, and fatigue also may be considerations in a particular case. Id.; see also Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041. The facts of this case require affirming the district court's judgment. Agents came to Hernandez's home at 6:30 AM on May 26, 2005, and arrested him. Hernandez was in his late fifties at the time of his arrest. He has diabetes, low blood sugar, and a heart condition, which the interviewing agents knew at the time of the arrest. He attended school through the 8th grade, reads and speaks Spanish, and can speak English 80 percent. He also claims to have slow mental ability and a difficulty understanding what people tell him, although he has never been treated for mental disabilities. Agents asked Hernandez for his medications at the time of his arrest, which he provided, and then took him to their office for questioning. Agent Maria Lia Fowler (Agent Fowler), formerly known as Agent Lia Posada, asked if Hernandez had breakfast. Hernandez responded that he had not. He asked for a soda at 7:35 AM. Before the interrogation, Agent Fowler gave Hernandez a soda and his medications and permitted him to use the restroom. The district court found that after Agent Fowler played intercepted calls for Hernandez, she read a Spanish-language version of Miranda warnings aloud and Hernandez signed an advice of rights form. Hernandez testified that he received his Miranda warnings at the end of the interrogation, that he received water but not a soda, and that he did not use the restroom. But the district court concluded otherwise, crediting the agents' testimony. Because Hernandez has not demonstrated that the agents' testimony was exceedingly improbable, we defer to the district court's credibility determinations and accept its findings of fact. United States v. Dillon, 150 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir.1998). The interview proceeded in Spanish and lasted two-and-a-half hours, from approximately 8:30 AM until 11 AM. Hernandez was handcuffed for the duration of the interview. Two agents testified that Hernandez did not complain of chest pains, shortness of breath, or other physical ailments before or during the interview. Hernandez disputes this, but, again, the district court credited the agents' testimony, and Hernandez fails to demonstrate that their testimony was exceedingly improbable. Id. Hernandez also testified that he felt ill during the interrogation, but the district court credited other evidence that contradicted Hernandez's claim that he experienced chest pains and a heart attack during the interrogation. The agents gave Hernandez a snack after the interview, at 11 AM. Later that day, Hernandez was taken to a hospital to assess his suitability for confinement. The district court reviewed medical records indicating that while Hernandez was at the hospital, he said that his chest pains began three hours prior to his arrival at the hospital, which was at approximately 11:30 AM. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we affirm the district court's decision to deny Hernandez's motion to suppress his confession; the facts simply do not suffice to conclude that the agents were coercive or that Hernandez's post-arrest statement was involuntary. Compare Gillaum, 372 F.3d at 857 (finding that the defendant's statements were voluntary when he was thirty-seven at the time of his arrest, he was personally familiar with the criminal justice system, he was read the Miranda warnings and indicated that he understood them, his interviewers, who knew he was diabetic, offered him food and insulin, which he refused, and he was interrogated for less than forty-five minutes, during which he was not handcuffed), and United States v. Jones, 359 F.3d 921, 923-24 (7th Cir.2004) (holding that the defendant's confession was voluntary where the interviewing agents informed Jones about his rights and did not use physical violence[,] Jones was not handcuffed, and, although he never asked, he was not denied beverages, phone calls, or access to a restroom, where he was in a familiar setting because he had attended similar interviews as a union representative, and where Jones professed his innocence with respect to one charge and ultimately ended the interrogation, even though his interrogators yelled at him and displayed a weapon) with United States v. Hull, 441 F.2d 308, 312-13 (7th Cir.1971) (holding that a defendant's confession was involuntary where he was mentally and emotionally handicapped and he endured a continuous series of intensive interrogations for nearly twelve hours, during which he had no sleep or food except for a cup of coffee). We affirm the district court's denial of Hernandez's motion to suppress.