Opinion ID: 2604678
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ownership of Property at Time of Taking

Text: If the Housing Preservation Ordinance effected a constitutional taking by the imposition of the demolition fee, only the owner of the property when the ordinance was enacted, and not any subsequent owner, could recover for the taking. Sintra bought the Larned Hotel knowing the HPO was in place. The enactment of the HPO predated Sintra's acquisition of the Larned Hotel. Sintra's challenge to the ordinance is not that the City's particular application of it to Sintra's particular circumstances was a taking, but that the mere existence of the ordinance effected a taking. The taking Sintra alleges occurred once: In the takings context, the basis of a facial challenge is that the very enactment of the statute has reduced the value of the property or has effected a transfer of a property interest. This is a single harm, measurable and compensable when the statute is passed. Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 688 (9th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1093, 114 S.Ct. 924, 127 L.Ed.2d 217 (1994). See also 2 JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.01[4], at 5-29  5-30 (Rev.3d ed. 1995); 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 383, at 757 (1992). Sintra incurred no injury entitling it to assert a facial challenge to the ordinance. A landowner who purchased land after an alleged taking cannot avail himself of the Just Compensation Clause because he has suffered no injury. The price paid for the property presumably reflected the market value of the property minus the interests taken. Carson Harbor Village Ltd. v. City of Carson, 37 F.3d 468, 476 (9th Cir.1994). Accord, Garneau v. City of Seattle, 897 F.Supp. 1318, 1324-25 (W.D.Wash.1995). See also Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 283, 60 S.Ct. 231, 235-36, 84 L.Ed. 240 (1939). Washington law is the same. Kakeldy v. Columbia & P.S.R. Co., 37 Wash. 675, 680, 80 P. 205 (1905); Hoover v. Pierce County, 79 Wash.App. 427, 433-34, 903 P.2d 464 (1995), review denied, 129 Wash.2d 1007, 917 P.2d 129 (1996); State v. Sherrill, 13 Wash.App. 250, 258 n. 1, 534 P.2d 598, review denied, 86 Wash.2d 1002 (1975). If any compensable taking of the Larned property occurred, it occurred on the day the HPO was enacted. At that point, the demolition fee requirement went into effect, diminishing the value of the property. Anyone wishing to buy and develop the Larned property by demolishing the buildingthereby lessening the number of housing units in the citywould have had to pay a demolition fee. The requirement for payment of the demolition fee would presumably reduce the value of the land by the amount of the fee the purchasing developer would have to pay. If the Schoning group could have shown the HPO went too far, the enactment of the HPO would be a taking, and the Schoning group would have had a cause of action for just compensation. Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 94 Wash.2d 479, 485, 618 P.2d 67 (1980). In the present case, Sintra not only knew about the HPO before it purchased the Larned, it negotiated with the seller to make the sellers' notice to Sintra of the HPO a private agreement not set forth in the purchase and sale agreement. Sintra also knew the City had turned down the sellers' request for a variance from the HPO requirements. Moreover, Sintra called the HPO enforcement office before the purchase to ascertain the HPO would place no requirements on Sintra's plan for a bed and breakfast. In summary, Sintra purchased the Larned with full knowledge of the HPO. If the HPO effected a taking of the Larned property, the taking occurred before Sintra purchased the property. The right to damages does not run with the property. Sintra, therefore, did not have a regulatory taking claim.