Opinion ID: 6335457
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Removal Statute

Text: Title 42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(3) provides that the Commissioner of Social Security “may be removed from office only pursuant to a finding by the President of neglect of duty or malfeasance in office.” Claimant argues that this provision unconstitutionally limits the ability of the President to remove the Commissioner. She asserts further that, because the agency was operating under an unconstitutional removal provision when it decided her claim, she is entitled to a new proceeding before the agency. Claimant forfeited this constitutional argument by failing to raise it to the district court. See Bolker v. Comm’r, 760 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 1985) (“As a general rule, we will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal[.]”); see also United States v. Depue, 912 F.3d 1227, 1232–34 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (explaining the difference between waiver and forfeiture). But we exercise our discretion to reach the issue, which presents a question of law that the parties have fully briefed and argued on appeal. See Bolker, 760 F.2d at 1042 (describing circumstances in which we have reached an issue raised for the first time on appeal); see also Phillips v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. (In re Hanford Nuclear Rsrv. Litig.), 534 F.3d 986, 1007 (9th 8 KAUFMANN V. KIJAKAZI Cir. 2008) (“We have discretion, however, to overlook any [forfeiture].”). Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution vests the President with “[t]he executive Power,” Art. II, § 1, cl. 1, and with the duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” id. § 3. “The entire ‘executive Power’ belongs to the President alone.” Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197 (2020). Practically, however, the President must depend on an array of executive agencies for assistance in exercising that power. Id. To ensure that the President retains full executive power, the Supreme Court has “adhered to the general rule that the President possesses ‘the authority to remove those who assist him in carrying out his duties.’” Id. at 2198 (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 513–14 (2010)). The Court has recognized only “two exceptions to the President’s unrestricted removal power,” id., “one for multimember expert agencies that do not wield substantial executive power, and one for inferior officers with limited duties and no policymaking or administrative authority,” id. at 2199–2200. In Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. 2183, the Court considered the statutory removal provision for the single-member head of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”). The statute allowed the President to remove the Director of the CFPB only “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3). The Court held that the Director fell into neither of the two previously recognized exceptions to the President’s unrestricted removal authority. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2200–01. The Court then declined to recognize a new exception for the structure of the CFPB, “namely an independent agency led by a single Director and vested with significant executive power.” Id. at 2201. “Such KAUFMANN V. KIJAKAZI 9 an agency has no basis in history and no place in our constitutional structure.” Id.; see id. at 2201–07 (analyzing in detail historical, structural, and other arguments). Finally, the Court held that the removal provision was severable from the statute. Id. at 2211 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Alito and Kavanaugh, JJ.); id. at 2245 (Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment with respect to severability and dissenting in part, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, JJ.). In Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761 (2021), the Supreme Court considered the similar structure of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”). Congress installed a single Director as the head of the FHFA, and Congress provided that the President may remove the Director only “for cause.” 12 U.S.C. § 4512(a), (b)(2). The Court held that this removal provision, too, was unconstitutional: A straightforward application of our reasoning in Seila Law dictates the result here. The FHFA (like the CFPB) is an agency led by a single Director, and the Recovery Act (like the Dodd-Frank Act) restricts the President’s removal power. Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1784. The Court rejected, as unpersuasive, several proffered distinctions between the agencies; “the Constitution prohibits even ‘modest restrictions’ on the President’s power to remove the head of an agency with a single top officer.” Id. at 1787 (quoting Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2205). With that background in mind, we turn to Claimant’s constitutional challenge. Congress installed as the head of the Social Security Administration a single Commissioner of Social Security, who serves a term of six years. 42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(3). As noted at the outset, Congress provided that 10 KAUFMANN V. KIJAKAZI the President may remove the Commissioner during the sixyear term only for “neglect of duty or malfeasance in office.” Id. Claimant argues, and the Commissioner concedes, that the removal provision is unconstitutional. Moreover, shortly after the Supreme Court decided Collins, the Office of Legal Counsel fully and persuasively analyzed this issue and concluded that, in light of Collins and Seila Law, the removal provision is both unconstitutional and severable from the statute. Constitutionality of the Commissioner of Social Security’s Tenure Protection, 45 Op. O.L.C. __, 2021 WL 2981542, at –11 (O.L.C. July 8, 2021). We agree that the removal provision is both unconstitutional and severable. The removal provision violates separation of powers principles. For the purpose of the constitutional analysis, the Commissioner of Social Security is indistinguishable from the Director of the FHFA discussed in Collins and the Director of the CFPB discussed in Seila Law. As the Office of Legal Counsel emphasized, several features of the Social Security Administration—“a single Commissioner whose term extends longer than the President’s, the immense scope of the agency’s programs, the Commissioner’s broad power to affect beneficiaries and the public fisc, and the [agency’s] largely unparalleled structure”—compel the conclusion that the removal provision is unconstitutional. Id. at . But the removal provision is severable from the remainder of the statute. “[O]ne provision of a [statute] may be invalid by reason of its not conforming to the Constitution, while all the other provisions may be subject to no constitutional infirmity.” Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2208 (quoting Loeb v. Trs. of Columbia Twp., 179 U.S. 472, 490 (1900)). We “must sustain [the Act’s] remaining provisions ‘unless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions independently of that which is KAUFMANN V. KIJAKAZI 11 invalid.’” Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 509 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 186 (1992)) (ellipsis and brackets omitted). The remaining provisions of the Act are capable of fully independent function, and nothing in the text, structure, or history of the statute makes it “evident” that Congress would have preferred, as an alternative to a Commissioner who is removable at will, no Social Security Administration at all. See id. (holding that the severability of a removability provision was “clear” because “[t]he remaining provisions are not incapable of functioning independently, and nothing in the statute’s text or historical context makes it evident that Congress, faced with the limitations imposed by the Constitution, would have preferred no Board at all to a Board whose members are removable at will.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). In sum, we sever the removal provision and hold that the President possesses the authority to remove the Commissioner of Social Security at will. The final question, then, is the appropriate remedy for Claimant, whose appeal to the Appeals Council was denied while Commissioner Saul served under an unconstitutional removal provision. The Supreme Court held in Collins that an unconstitutional removal provision does not affect the authority of the underlying agency officials to act. 141 S. Ct. at 1787–88 & n.23. Here, Claimant does not dispute that the ALJ, the members of the Appeals Council, Acting Commissioner Berryhill, and Commissioner Saul all served, at all relevant times, under valid appointments. “As a result, there is no reason to regard any of the actions taken by the [agency] as void.” Id. at 1787. A party challenging an agency’s past actions must instead show how the unconstitutional removal provision actually harmed the party—for example, if the President 12 KAUFMANN V. KIJAKAZI would have removed the agency’s head but for the provision or, alternatively, if the agency’s head “might have altered his behavior in a way that would have benefited” the party. Id. at 1789. Claimant therefore must “demonstrat[e] that the unconstitutional provision actually caused [her] harm.” Decker Coal Co. v. Pehringer, 8 F.4th 1123, 1137 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1788–89). “Absent a showing of harm, we refuse to unwind the decision[] below.” Id. Claimant has presented neither evidence nor a plausible theory to show that the removal provision caused her any harm. Claimant does not assert, for example, that the President took an interest in her claim or that the Commissioner directed the Appeals Council to decide her case in a particular way because of the statutory limits on the President’s removal authority. Nothing in the record suggests any link whatsoever between the removal provision and Claimant’s case. See, e.g., Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1802 (Kagan, J., concurring in part) (opining that “I doubt the mass of [Social Security Administration] decisions—which would not concern the President at all—would need to be undone” because “[w]hen an agency decision would not capture a President’s attention, his removal authority could not make a difference”); Ramos v. Comm’r, No. 1:20-cv01606-EPG, 2022 WL 105108, at –4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2022) (collecting cases and concluding that the claimant “has not shown any connection between the denial of benefits and the unconstitutional removal provision”). During oral argument, Claimant asserted that the unconstitutional removal provision affected the “expected value” of Claimant’s claim because the Commissioner theoretically could act in more ways than he could have without the removal restriction. That argument is not KAUFMANN V. KIJAKAZI 13 particularized to Claimant; if we agreed, then it would require us to undo all disability decisions made by the Social Security Administration while the removal provision was operative. We reject the argument. As an initial matter, the reasoning is illogical. Even accepting the questionable premise that the Commissioner might act differently with respect to an individual claimant, the Commissioner just as readily might act in a claimant’s favor as in a claimant’s disfavor. So, without some evidence of how the Commissioner was inclined to exercise expanded authority with respect to the particular claimant, we fail to see how even the theoretical “expected value” of Claimant’s case would change. In any event, the argument rests solely on speculation that the Commissioner theoretically might have acted differently. Claimant cannot meet her burden of showing actual harm with speculation alone. Cf. Munns v. Kerry, 782 F.3d 402, 411 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that speculation cannot satisfy Article III standing requirements). In sum, we hold that the removal provision in 42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(3) violates separation of powers; that the provision is severable; and that, unless a claimant demonstrates actual harm, the unconstitutional provision has no effect on the claimant’s case. Because Claimant has not shown actual harm, we uphold the Commissioner’s decision.