Opinion ID: 1712936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Arbitrariness of Classification

Text: Analogizing this case to Manuel, we conclude that the age classification in Section 98.1 provides for an even closer classificatory fit [7] than the statutes in Manuel. The governmental purpose of improving highway safety bears a closer correlation with Section 98.1, which addresses the dual activities of underaged drinking and driving, than with the statutes at issue in Manuel, which addressed only underaged drinking. Moreover, we repeatedly stated in Manuel that the real problem targeted by the statute was youthful drinking and driving.  Consequently, our reasoning in Manuel applies as well to the issue of the arbitrariness of the classification in the present case. Defendant argues, however, that the statistical evidence relied upon in Manuel and in this case is fatally flawed in at least one significant respect, namely, the national alcohol-related fatal crash statistics are based in large part not on actual BAC testing, but rather on imputation. As explained by Compton, imputation is a complex statistical procedure used to impute the BAC for crashes in which a BAC is unavailable. In those cases, a variety of factors are considered to arrive at the imputed BAC value, including the time of day, day of week, type of road, age and gender of driver, and type of vehicle being driven. Nationwide crash data, collected over many years, are analyzed to produce this imputation procedure. The procedure has been tested by comparing the imputed values to actual statistics from states in which the BAC was tested in a high percentage of crashes, and the margin of error has been slim. We thus find no merit to defendant's argument that the use of this well-accepted, statistically sound procedure renders improper the expert's reliance on this national statistical data. Defendant further contends that the trial court correctly concluded the Evangeline Parish DWI data was entitled to more weight than the national statistics submitted by the State. Noteworthy, the very same type of DWI data was presented by the plaintiffs in Manuel. In rejecting the relevance of that local DWI data and criticizing the trial court's apparent reliance on such DWI data from Evangeline Parish, we reasoned that [n]ot only did the statistics not show the percentage of drivers in the disadvantaged group in the parish, but also there was no consideration that young drinking drivers are frequently not arrested for the first incident. Manuel, 95-2189 at p. 11, 692 So.2d at 342 n. 8 (on reh'g). Moreover, statistics are relevant primarily to provide corroborative support for broad sociological propositions that are widely accepted by experts. In this case, the proposition is that lowering the BAC limit for drivers under twenty-one to a zero tolerance level of 0.02 percent is substantially related to improving overall highway safety by reducing alcohol-related accidents. For the reasons recited herein as well as the reasons recited in Manuel, we conclude that the State has met its burden of establishing that the classification in La.Rev.Stat. 14:98.1 substantially, and not just incidentally, furthers the admittedly appropriate governmental purpose. Finally, defendant contends that even if it was appropriate for the Legislature to classify eighteen-to-twenty-year olds for separate civil treatment based on promoting highway safety, it was inappropriate to criminalize conduct by members of this age group when identical conduct by persons twenty-one and over is not punishable as a crime. Significantly, the statutes declared constitutional in Manuel, which prohibited the purchase and public possession of alcohol by persons under twenty-one years of age, provided a criminal penalty for violations thereof. Moreover, the defining of conduct as criminal is properly a legislative function, subject to constitutional restrictions. We discern no constitutional violation in the Legislature's providing a criminal penalty for operating a motor vehicle by a person who is drinking in small amounts and cannot drink legally at all. The Legislature provided significantly lesser penalties for violation of Section 98.1 than for violation of Section 98. Defendant, of course, does not take issue with the lesser penalties imposed by Section 98.1, but takes issue with a provision that permits a violation of Section 98.1 to remain on a person's record and thus, according to defendant, potentially to serve as an enhancement of a subsequent DWI conviction. The Legislature purposefully carved the zero tolerance law here at issue out of the driving while intoxicated statute, creating an entirely separate statute. In that separate statute, the Legislature did not include any provision for retaining a violation of Section 98.1 on the defendant's records. Indeed, a record retention provision was placed only in La.Rev.Stat. 32:853, which addresses motor vehicle operating records. [8] More significantly, the DWI statute expressly limits those criminal offenses which can be used to enhance a subsequent DWI offense to the following: For purposes of determining whether a defendant has a prior conviction for violation of this Section, a conviction under either R.S. 14:32.1, vehicular homicide, R.S. 14:39.1, vehicular negligent injuring, or R.S. 14:39.2, first degree vehicular negligent injuring, or a conviction under the laws of any state or an ordinance of a municipality, town, or similar political subdivision of another state, which prohibits the operation of any motor vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, vessel, or other means of conveyance while intoxicated, while impaired, or while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or any controlled dangerous substance shall constitute a prior conviction. This determination shall be made by the court as a matter of law. La.Rev.Stat. 14:98 F(1). Because there is no express reference to Section 98.1 in the enumeration of Louisiana criminal offenses that can be utilized to enhance a subsequent DWI conviction, we conclude that a violation of Section 98.1 may not be used to enhance a subsequent DWI conviction, regardless of how long it is retained in a person's records. [9] This conclusion is buttressed by the Legislature's carving out of Section 98.1 the conduct that would otherwise be a violation of La.Rev.Stat. 14:98 A(1)(b) and providing that such conduct shall be charged under its provisions rather than under this Section. La.Rev. Stat. 14:98.1 B.