Opinion ID: 754226
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Denial of Plaintiffs' Request for Attorneys' Fees

Text: 33 In the meantime, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988(b) and 3613(c)(2), plaintiffs had moved for an award of attorneys' fees and costs, eventually requesting approximately $1.5 million. Acknowledging that they had not obtained more than nominal monetary damages, plaintiffs argued that their primary objective was not monetary, but rather, was to eliminate the threat of discriminatory zoning (Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Application for Attorneys' Fees and Costs at 3), and they argued that the court had awarded significant injunctive relief. Plaintiffs contended that since they had succeeded in requiring the [Village] to change its policies, behavior, and zoning code (Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Application for Attorneys' Fees and Costs at 8), they had received most of the injunctive relief which they requested (id. at 10), and were thus entitled to an award of fees. 34 Plaintiffs also submitted affidavits demonstrating that they and the government had closely coordinated their requests for injunctive relief, and they pointed out that their success at trial was the foundation for the grant of the relief requested by the government: 35 The efforts of the plaintiffs and their counsel have been a direct[ ] and traceable 'catalyst' in obtaining the type of relief requested by the Government, and in [sic ] the jury verdict obtained against the Village, and therefore the private Plaintiffs' case became the ultimate fulcrum for success. 36 (Id. at 7 (emphasis omitted).) 37 The Village opposed a fee award on two principal grounds. First, noting testimony by the individual plaintiffs that they had not in fact been prevented by the Village from attending religious services, the Village argued that because plaintiffs' home synagogue had operated without interruption since before the incorporation of the Village, plaintiffs' lawsuit--and the resulting injunctions--had not  'materially' altered the legal relationship between the Village and plaintiffs. (Village Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs['] Application for Attorneys['] Fees and Costs at 15.) Second, the Village argued that because plaintiffs did not obtain an order directing a total dissolution of the Village of Airmont, they failed to obtain the degree of success th[e] ... Plaintiffs themselves defined as a successful Court remedy. (Id. at 18.) The Village contended that the grant of plaintiffs'  'copycat' request for the injunctive relief requested by the government was insufficient to warrant an award of fees. (Id.) 38 In a Memorandum Decision dated October 15, 1996 (Fee Decision), the district court, [i]n the exercise of its discretion, Fee Decision at 11, denied plaintiffs' motion for fees. The district judge found that 39 plaintiffs were not prevailing parties against most of the defendants whom they sued originally and, indeed, were specifically the losing party with respect to five who went to trial individually and as Trustees. They were technically a prevailing party only against the Village by virtue of the decision of the Court of Appeals. 40 Id. at 6. He stated that although plaintiffs were technically a 'prevailing party,'  id. at 9, in awarding legal fees, you must focus on whether the legal relationship between the parties ha[s] been altered, id. Finding that 41 [t]he Village of Airmont ... took no action against any of the private plaintiffs[, and that d]uring deposition and at trial, the private plaintiffs acknowledged that the Village itself had done nothing to interfere with their conducting of religious services, 42 id. at 6, the judge concluded that [t]he institution and prosecution of [plaintiffs'] suit did not effect [sic ] the behavior of the defendant Village in any meaningful way, id. at 8. Although the judge acknowledged that the relief obtained by the government may be helpful to any new religious groups which desire to hold services in a private home in a residential area, he concluded that [t]he judgment entered in th[e present] case did not materially change the legal relationship between the [ ] private plaintiffs and the Village. Id. 43 In addition, noting that [t]he most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained, Fee Decision at 10, the district judge concluded that plaintiffs' success was most limited, id. Citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114-15, 113 S.Ct. 566, 574-75, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992), for the proposition that [a] plaintiff who formally prevails shall not receive attorneys' fees where it is seeking primarily compensatory damages but obtains nothing but nominal damages, Fee Decision at 10 (emphasis added), the district judge concluded that [t]he award of attorneys' fees in this case is governed by Farrar, Fee Decision at 9. The judge found that 44 plaintiffs sought primarily monetary damages of $1,000,000, plus punitive damages in an unspecified amount. The plaintiffs were interested in building a traditional free standing synagogue. However, they lacked the money with which to build one. A substantial monetary award in this case would have financed the building of the synagogue.... The only injunctive relief they sought (prior to the Court of Appeals decision which focused on the Zoning Code) was the abolishment of the Village of Airmont and/or the return of Orthodox Jewish residential areas to the Town of Ramapo. They did not obtain that injunctive relief. The plaintiffs did not prevail on any issue critical or essential to their claims. 45 Id. at 7-8 (footnotes omitted). Since plaintiffs received only nominal damages of one dollar per plaintiff and ... no injunctive relief except to the extent that the government's request was granted, id. at 4, the district judge concluded that plaintiffs had not attained a sufficient degree of success to merit an award of fees, see id. at 10. The judge rejected the argument that plaintiffs were entitled to a fee award on the ground that the jury verdict they won was the linchpin for the government's success, stating that [e]ven if ... they contributed to the success of the government on its appeal, it was, compared to what the plaintiffs had sought, a most limited degree of success for them. Id. 46 The district judge also stated that the number of hours claimed by one of plaintiffs' attorneys was not entirely supported by time records, id. at 9 n. 12; that [t]he number of hours claimed to have been devoted to this action by the various plaintiffs' counsel are excessive and duplicatory, id. at 9; and that [t]he fee sought by plaintiffs results from excessive hours expended, most of which involved defendants as to whom plaintiff[s] did not prevail and claims for damages which were unsuccessful, id. at 10. The judge found it unnecessary to make findings as to how many of the claimed hours he viewed as excessive, duplicative, or unsupported, given his ultimate ruling that no fee was reasonable because of plaintiffs' lack of success, see, e.g., id. at 9 n. 12. 47 This appeal followed.