Opinion ID: 1942975
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Diminution in Value of Property

Text: Sometime around 1997, the parties set up an investment account with Morgan Stanley/Dean Witter for retirement. From 1999 until the account was closed in 2001, it lost approximately one million dollars through a series of risky investments. The court found, and the respondent does not dispute, that the respondent managed the investment account. The court further found that [the respondent's] actions in stock trading caused . . . the loss of over $1,000,000.00 in family assets, and based the unequal asset distribution, at least in part, upon this loss. RSA 458:16-a, II(f) provides that the court may consider, as a special circumstance justifying an unequal division of assets, [t]he actions of either party during the marriage which contributed to the growth or diminution in value of property owned by either or both of the parties. The respondent argues that the term diminution in RSA 458:16-a, II(f) equates to the term dissipation and requires a finding of wrongful intent, at the time when the marriage is coming to an end, to deprive the other spouse of his or her fair share of the marital estate. He argues that the loss occurred five years before either party contemplated divorce, there was no evidence to suggest that he acted with the intent to deprive the petitioner of assets, and the court failed to consider his actions in increasing the value of marital assets as well as the substantial tax credit the parties took for the stock loss. In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiters of the legislative intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. When examining the language of the statute, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning to the words used. We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. In the Matter of Carr & Edmunds, 156 N.H. ___, ___, 938 A.2d 89, 95-96 (2007) (citations omitted). The word dissipation does not appear in the statute and we disagree with the respondent that this term equates with the phrase diminution. Black's Law Dictionary defines diminution as [t]he act or process of decreasing, lessening, or taking away. Black's Law Dictionary 490 (8th ed. 2004). In contrast, dissipation is defined as [t]he use of an asset for an illegal or inequitable purpose, such as a spouse's use of community property for personal benefit when a divorce is imminent. Id. at 506. The plain language of RSA 458:16-a, II(f), therefore, does not require malicious intent. In addition, the statute does not require that the conduct occur in anticipation of divorce as it allows the trial court to consider [t]he actions of either party during the marriage,  RSA 458:16-a, II(f) (emphasis added). See In re Marriage of Coyle, 671 N.E.2d 938, 943 (Ind. Ct.App.1996) (The [Indiana] statute directs the trial court to examine the conduct of the parties `during the marriage,' so that the court is not limited to an examination of any particular time period. (citation omitted)). We decline, therefore, to adopt the law from those jurisdictions that requires either an intent or timing element to justify an unequal division of assets where a spouse's conduct resulted in the loss of marital assets. See, e.g., Kittredge v. Kittredge, 441 Mass. 28, 803 N.E.2d 306, 313 (2004) (citing cases where courts define dissipation as a spouse's expenditures for his or her own personal enjoyment at a time when the marriage is apparently coming to an end, from which it can be inferred that the spouse's expenditures were made in order to deprive the other spouse of his or her fair share of the marital estate). We look, instead, to those jurisdictions which have declined to read an intent or timing element into their asset distribution statutes but have applied other factors relevant in determining whether a spouse's actions justify an unequal property distribution. The Court of Appeals of Washington has instructed its trial courts that they may consider whose negatively productive conduct depleted the couple's assets and . . . apportion a higher debt load or fewer assets to the wasteful marital partner. In re Marriage of Williams, 84 Wash.App. 263, 927 P.2d 679, 683 (1996) (quotation omitted), review denied, 131 Wash.2d 1025, 937 P.2d 1102 (1997). In Williams, the court approved the trial court's consideration of various factors to determine that the wife's gambling losses throughout the marriage did not amount to a dissipation of marital assets. Id. The factors the trial court considered included: the amount of income the wife brought into the marriage; the nature of the conduct (the court equated legalized gambling to an entertainment cost[ ]); and the husband's knowledge of the wife's gambling. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts adopted a similar view in Kittredge: [D]etermination whether a spouse's expenditures constitute dissipation considers them in the light of that spouse's over-all contribution, including whether the expenditures have rendered the spouse unable to support the other spouse from the much-diminished estate at the time of divorce. Kittredge, 803 N.E.2d at 315. We find these cases persuasive and hold that in applying RSA 458:16-a, II(f) to support an unequal distribution of assets due to a spouse's conduct which resulted in a diminution in value of property, a trial court must consider factors such as: conduct which contributed to the growth in value of property; the nature of the conduct; the other spouse's knowledge of the conduct; whether the conduct diminished the total marital assets to such an extent that the other spouse is unable to maintain a similar lifestyle following divorce; and any other factor the court deems relevant. There is evidence in the record before us, and the trial court found, that the respondent contributed the initial start-up funds deposited into the account from the purchase and sale of properties and businesses. The petitioner also testified that she was aware that the respondent had invested money in the stock market and that he managed the account daily. In addition, there is evidence in the record that the parties had other significant marital assets besides the stock account, and that the stock loss allowed the parties to claim a loss on their taxes, contributing to a tax credit of nearly $131,000. The record fails to show that the trial court considered these factors when it found that the actions of [the respondent] . . . caused the diminution in value of property owned by the parties. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's division of the marital assets and remand to determine asset distribution in a manner consistent with this opinion.