Opinion ID: 2103224
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Impeachment of Patricia Byers

Text: Appellant raises similar arguments concerning the government's impeachment of its witness, Patricia Byers, appellant's sister. Again, appellant contends that the necessary foundation for the impeachment, surprise and affirmative damage to the government's case, was not shown and that the limiting instruction was given untimely. At trial, Ms. Byers testified that she could not identify the people who were beating Williams that night. At one point she claimed that appellant had been in the apartment at the time of the shooting. Later, she testified that she did not see appellant, her brother, in the alley. Yet, in her grand jury testimony, Ms. Byers identified appellant and others by name as the persons who were beating Williams in the alley. The trial court found that the requirements of surprise and affirmative damage to the government's case were met because the witness, contrary to her grand jury testimony, essentially provided appellant with an alibi. Appellant argues that the government knew that Ms. Byers had made statements subsequently at variance with her grand jury testimony concerning appellant's role in the assault. This fact alone would not preclude a claim of surprise. Parker, supra, 363 A.2d at 977. In Parker, we upheld the trial court's ruling allowing impeachment by the government of its witness where defense counsel informed the prosecutor that the witness would testify inconsistently with testimony he had given before the grand jury. Id. We concluded that the prosecutor could expect that one is cognizant of the significance of the oath and has testified truthfully before the grand jury, even though he might give a different version under circumstances which might engender fear ( i.e., where the accused was present). Id. Finding a rational basis for the trial court's ruling, we upheld it. Id. Similarly, we find here a rational basis for the trial court's finding of surprise where the prosecutor expected that the sworn trial testimony would be consistent with prior sworn grand jury testimony, rather than with informal discussions with defense representatives. Therefore, we cannot say there is no rational basis for the trial court's finding that the government was surprised that the witness testified inconsistently with the testimony she had given under oath. See id. The trial court's findings of affirmative damage with respect to Ms. Byers' testimony also has a rational basis in the record, and accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in its ruling in that regard. Stewart, supra, 490 A.2d at 624. The witness disclaimed that she had seen appellant among those in the alley. In fact, she ultimately testified that he was in the house at the critical time. This unexpected alibi, presented through a government witness, was clearly damaging to its case. [4] Particularly damaging was testimony that the witness did not see appellant in the alley, even though she observed who was there. It is likely that she would have recognized her own brother if he had been there. Thus, there was a rational basis to find affirmative damage to the government's case from the witness' change of her story.