Opinion ID: 2329136
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Providence Police Report of August 2, 1999

Text: Before defendant's criminal trial began, defense counsel filed a Notice to Introduce Statement under Rule 803(24) of [the] Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. [20] The statement referred to in that Rule 803(24) notice was reflected in a Providence police report dated August 2, 1999 and had been made by the complainant, Mary Brown. According to the police report, Ms. Brown told the police that she had received numerous threatening and harassing telephone calls from a subject that she knows as Lavaughn [ sic ] Anderson   . [21] The prosecution reacted to defense counsel's Rule 803(24) notice by filing a motion in limine seeking to preclude the defense from introducing the August 2 police report into evidence. The prosecution's motion in limine further sought to preclude cross-examination of Mr. Anderson about the police report. The motion also requested that the investigating officers who were named in the report be prohibited from testifying to same. In support of its motion in limine, the prosecution maintained (1) that Ms. Brown's statement constituted irrelevant and impermissible hearsay and (2) that its introduction would confuse the jurors by causing them to speculate on collateral matters. After hearing and considering the arguments of counsel, the trial justice granted the prosecution's motion in limine which sought to exclude both the August 2 police report and any other evidence relating to that report. In so ruling, the trial justice found that Ms. Brown's statement in the police report constituted inadmissible hearsay. He further found that the length of time between the date that Ms. Brown filed her complaint against Mr. Anderson (August 2) and the date that the murder took place (August 26-27) was of a sufficient duration to justify exclusion of the police report. In his brief to this Court, defendant alleges that the statement of Ms. Brown was crucial to his defense because it supported what he characterized as his third party perpetrator defense. Specifically, defendant asserts that, by completely excluding all of the evidence that was critical to his third-party perpetrator defense, the trial justice violated his constitutional right to present a full and fair defense, his right to due process of law, and his right to a fundamentally fair trial. [22] The defendant further asserts that the statement was necessary to illustrate the bias the police may have harbored toward [defendant] in pursuing him so singlemindedly. [23] It has often been recognized that a motion in limine can sometimes be a beneficial mechanism that can be used to prevent unfairly prejudicial evidence from having an impact on the jury and to avoid wasting unnecessary time during the trial. State v. Martinez, 824 A.2d 443, 448 (R.I.2003) (recognizing that the in limine motion has become widely recognized as a salutary device to avoid the impact of unfairly prejudicial evidence upon the jury and to save a significant amount of time at the trial) (quoting State v. Torres, 787 A.2d 1214, 1219-20 (R.I.2002)); see also Ferguson v. Marshall Contractors, Inc., 745 A.2d 147, 150 (R.I.2000). The rationale behind such a motion is to prevent prejudicial evidence from being presented to a jury before the trial court has had the opportunity to rule upon its admissibility in the context of a particular trial. Martinez, 824 A.2d at 448 (Its purpose `is to prevent the proponent of potentially prejudicial matter from displaying it to the jury    in any manner until the trial court has ruled upon its admissibility in the context of the trial itself.') (quoting Torres, 787 A.2d at 1220 and State v. Fernandes, 526 A.2d 495, 500 (R.I.1987)). When reviewing the grant or denial of a motion in limine, this Court will consider only whether the challenged evidence was proper and admissible and, if not, whether there was sufficient prejudice to constitute reversible error. Fernandes, 526 A.2d at 500 (The only consideration on appeal is `whether the evidence and cross-examination was proper and admissible, and if not, whether the error was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal.') (quoting Gilliam v. State, 270 Ind. 71, 383 N.E.2d 297, 301 (1978)); see also Martinez, 824 A.2d at 448; Torres, 787 A.2d at 1220. In view of these principles, we must determine whether Mary Brown's statement in the August 2 police report and also the circumstances surrounding the giving of that statement were properly admissible at defendant's criminal trial. If the evidence was properly admissible, then a determination must be made as to whether the trial court's granting of the prosecution's motion in limine (which resulted in the exclusion of that evidence) constituted a sufficiently prejudicial error requiring reversal of the case. There is no question that a defendant is entitled to present a defense that implicates another person. See State v. Wright, 817 A.2d 600, 609 (R.I.2003) (It goes without saying that an appropriate defense to a charge of criminal misconduct is that another person was the true perpetrator of the crime.). To preserve such a defense, however, a defendant must make an offer of proof. See State v. Gazerro, 420 A.2d 816, 824-25 (R.I.1980). Moreover, we require that such an offer of proof be reasonably specific. We made the following clear statement in Gazerro about what is required in this regard: To be admissible, evidence of another person's motive to commit the crime with which a defendant is charged must be introduced in conjunction with other evidence tending to show the third person's opportunity to commit the crime and a proximate connection between that person and the actual commission of the crime. Id. at 825. In making his offer of proof at the hearing on the prosecution's motion in limine in this case, defense counsel pointed to the fact that there were no witnesses to Ms. Brown's murder. He then asserted that, despite the fact that the police knew about the August 2 complaint that Ms. Brown had filed against Mr. Anderson (her former boyfriend), the police had focused exclusively on defendant as their only suspect in the investigation of Ms. Brown's murder. Defense counsel then maintained that the lack of witnesses, combined with the existence of the August 2 police report, should have prompted the investigating police officers to focus on Mr. Anderson as the primary suspect, and he contends that he was entitled to present evidence to the jury concerning what he alleges was the bias of the police against defendant. The record reveals that defense counsel offered absolutely no evidence tending to show, or even to suggest, that Mr. Anderson had murdered Ms. Brown or that he was ever in the vicinity of the murder scene on August 26 or 27. See Wright, 817 A.2d at 610 (holding that the defendant had failed to make an offer of proof and failed to introduce any evidence tending to show that    [the alleged third-party perpetrator] could have committed the murder); State v. Brennan, 526 A.2d 483, 488 (R.I.1987) (holding that the defendant failed to make an offer of proof or to introduce any evidence tending to show that    [the alleged third-party perpetrator] could have committed the murder); Gazerro, 420 A.2d at 825 ([T]he offer of proof shows that defendants would have introduced absolutely no evidence placing    [the alleged third-party perpetrator] on February 3 in the vicinity of the spot where    [the victim] was found.). It is our judgment that defense counsel's offer of proof was inadequate and that the admission of the August 2 police report and any evidence related to that report would have constituted an impermissible invitation to the jury to speculate on a collateral matter. Gazerro, 420 A.2d at 825; see also Wright, 817 A.2d at 610 ([E]vidence of a third person's potential motive or opportunity to commit the crime must not lead to jury speculation nor improperly open up collateral matters.). Accordingly, it is our view that the trial justice did not err in granting the prosecution's motion in limine to preclude the admission of the contested evidence.