Opinion ID: 2600221
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prongs Two and Three: State's Reasons and Balancing Test

Text: We need consider the State's reasons for delay only if Salavea proves prosecutorial delay prejudiced his defense. See Norby, 122 Wash.2d at 264, 858 P.2d 210 (stating that a defendant must show that he was prejudiced by the delay in order to prevail); Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790, 97 S.Ct. 2044 (explaining that generally proof of prejudice is a necessary element of a due process claim). Salavea bases his prejudice argument on loss of juvenile court jurisdiction. In light of our interpretation of RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v), Salavea had to be less than 16 years old at the time of proceedings to be entitled to juvenile court jurisdiction. Therefore, although we find that Salavea did not prove he was prejudiced, we discuss the State's reasons for delay to the extent that these reasons show the earliest charging and trial date was after Salavea turned 16 years old. Absent extraordinary circumstances, a juvenile's case is managed in the same manner as all other cases and does not receive special treatment even if the juvenile is about to turn 18. Calderon, 102 Wash.2d at 354, 684 P.2d 1293. The State has broad discretion to decide when to prosecute and may delay prosecution until it feels it can establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Lidge, 111 Wash.2d 845, 850, 765 P.2d 1292 (1989); see also Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 795, 97 S.Ct. 2044. Broad discretion is allowed because the court does not want the State to mistakenly charge an innocent person or bring cases that are insubstantial and result in a waste of judicial resources. Lidge, 111 Wash.2d at 850, 765 P.2d 1292. Encompassed in prosecutorial discretion is the need for the prosecution to undertake an investigation. An investigation may not occur until the charges are reported, but once reported a court should evaluate the investigation for deliberate or negligent delay. See Warner, 125 Wash.2d at 890-91, 889 P.2d 479 (noting that a reason for delay may be a delay in reporting). However, if an investigation follows standard practices, the delay caused is considered a justified investigatory delay and rebuts accusations of deliberate or negligent inaction. Calderon, 102 Wash.2d at 354, 684 P.2d 1293; Dixon, 114 Wash.2d at 865-66, 792 P.2d 137; Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 795-96, 97 S.Ct. 2044. Here, the charges were not reported to the police until August 1998. The juvenile court's prosecutor's office received the investigative file on September 29, 1998, child interviews were conducted the following month, and a detective tried to contact Salavea through the end of November. Therefore, the delay between the time the acts were committed and December 1998 may be justified by a delay in reporting, an investigatory delay, and the right of the prosecution to exercise discretion in filing charges. Salavea turned 16 on October 9, 1998. The earliest the State could have charged and tried Salavea is after the justified investigatory delay at the end of November 1998. This means that Salavea would have been 16 at the time of the proceedings, the automatic decline statute would have applied to him, and he would have been automatically declined to adult court jurisdiction. Therefore, any argument that Salavea was prejudiced by a loss of juvenile court jurisdiction fails because he was never entitled to juvenile court jurisdiction. In light of this conclusion, we need not consider the rest of Salavea's delay arguments or prong three of the prosecutorial delay test.