Opinion ID: 2085977
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Merits of Hicks' 404(b) Claims

Text: Hicks contends error under Rule 404(b) in admitting: (1) testimony by two witnesses about an incident in January 1991 when Hicks severely beat Koontz with his fists; (2) testimony that in the summer of 1993 Hicks suffered knife wounds on his legs and arms and Koontz suffered a black eye after the two had an argument; (3) testimony that Hicks beat [Koontz] up in the kitchen in January 1994; and (4) admissions Hicks made about his violent relationship with Koontz in his statement to police the day after the murder. Hicks also contends that it was error to admit various statements Hicks made to witnesses that reflected his hostility toward Koontz. [11] All of the above were objected to on 404(b) grounds at trial. Specifically, Hicks makes two contentions. First, he cites Pirnat, 612 N.E.2d at 153, which applied the Seventh Circuit's four part 404(b) test, and contends that the incidents were too remote in time to be relevant and that they were not similar enough to the murder because they did not involve a gun. Similarly, he says the admissions he made about the couple's violent relationship were not sufficiently similar to the act of murder to be relevant. Second, he contends that the evidence of domestic violence was propensity evidence. The State responds that evidence of Hicks' violent relationship with Koontz is admissible evidence of motive. As detailed supra, remoteness in time or dissimilarity do not render 404(b) evidence per se inadmissible. Rather, the timing and similarity of the incidents are factors in the larger inquiry into whether the incidents were relevant to a matter in issue. In particular, similarity between the prior act and the charged conduct is not a major consideration when the prior act is offered to show motive, even if it may be critical if offered to prove identity by a signature technique. ROBERT L. MILLER, JR., COURTROOM HANDBOOK ON INDIANA EVIDENCE 68 (1998 ed). Taylor, 659 N.E.2d at 543 (informations detailing defendant's past charged sexual abuse of the victim were admissible to show motive for murder); Kimble v. State, 659 N.E.2d 182, 185 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (evidence of membership in a racist organization admissible to show motive for felony murder). [12] Here, the evidence of domestic violence was neither too remote nor too dissimilar to be relevant. Under the first part of the 404(b) test, if the evidence of prior acts of domestic violence was offered only to show that Hicks was of bad character and acted in conformity therewith by murdering Koontz, then the evidence would be inadmissible. The State cites Guenthensperger v. State, 566 N.E.2d 61, 62 (Ind.1991) for the proposition that evidence of a defendant's prior assaults, batteries, or threats against a homicide victim is admissible to prove motive. Guenthensperger, though directly on point, was decided prior to the adoption of Rule 404(b) and does not control the admissibility of evidence under this Rule. The substance of the holding in Guenthensperger has, however, been repeated in Rule 404(b) cases. As we recently held in Ross v. State, 676 N.E.2d 339, 346 (Ind.1996), [a] defendant's prior bad acts are... usually admissible to show the relationship between the defendant and the victim. See also Elliott v. State, 630 N.E.2d 202, 204 (Ind.1994) (prior threats of violence to ex-wife and victim admissible to show the relationship between the parties and defendant's motive); Price v. State, 619 N.E.2d 582, 584 (Ind.1993) (prior bad acts against the victim are admissible to show the relationship between the parties and appellant's motive). Federal courts agree. More precisely, as the Fourth Circuit put it in United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d at 1106-07, [h]ostility is a paradigmatic motive for committing a crime. In Hicks' case, the hostility between him and Nicole existed from the relationship's inception, as shown by the incident of abuse of the victim in 1991, and continued up to the time of the murder. See generally United States v. Hinton, 31 F.3d 817, 822-23 (9th Cir.1994) (testimony about accused's four previous assaults on his wife was admissible to show motive in a prosecution for assault with intent to murder); Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 F.2d 1185, 1197-98 (10th Cir.1989) (evidence of intense disputes between defendant and victim admissible to show motive for murder) (applying Wyoming law). Although the evidence was relevant to show motive, it may still be inadmissible under the second prong of the 404(b) test if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Evid.R. 403. We review this balancing act by the trial court under an abuse of discretion standard. Mayberry v. State, 670 N.E.2d 1262, 1268 (Ind.1996). As discussed above, the evidence of domestic violence was probative of the hostility between the parties. But in a case like this, at some point testimony about every incident of violence between the two becomes more prejudicial than probative. The 1992 and 1994 incidents and Hicks' statements to the police illustrated the hostile relationship that could have been a motive for murder. However, testimony about the January 1991 incident was graphic, prejudicial, and of low probative value. Shane and his wife at the time testified that Hicks, who was living next door with Koontz, broke into their home at about 3:00 a.m., covered in blood, and yelled Call 911.... I think I killed her this time. Shane and his wife called 911, went next door, and found Koontz lying semi-conscious in a pool of blood. Shane said that her head was busted open. This testimony, though relevant to show the hostility of the relationship, was of fairly low probative value in view of its remoteness in time. Its probative value was further reduced because the State had ample evidence of hostility, including the other two more recent incidents and Hicks' own statements, upon which it could rely. The prejudicial impact of the testimony, however, was sure to be high and substantially outweighed its probative value. Accordingly, the trial court erred in admitting it. However, considered in light of all the other evidence about the relationship, testimony about this one incident of domestic violence was cumulative and is not grounds for reversal. Chappel v. State, 591 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (Ind. 1992).