Opinion ID: 1608663
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Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Does the City's Zoning Ordinance Violate Section 414.28A?

Text: Section 414.28A, first enacted in 1997, currently provides in pertinent part: A city shall not adopt or enforce zoning or subdivision regulations or other ordinances which disallow or make infeasible the plans and specifications of land-leased communities because the housing within the land-leased community will be manufactured housing. Iowa Code § 414.28A; see 1997 Iowa Acts ch. 86, § 4. This statute is very similar to a related statute adopted by the Iowa legislature nearly twenty years ago. In 1984, the General Assembly passed a bill that added the following provision to chapter 414: A city shall not adopt or enforce zoning regulations or other ordinances which disallow the plans and specifications of a proposed residential structure solely because the proposed structure is a manufactured home.... 1984 Iowa Acts ch. 1238, § 2 (codified at Iowa Code § 414.28 (1985)). [2] There appears to be very little difference between section 414.28 and section 414.28A with respect to the operative language. The primary distinction of course is that section 414.28 applies to residential structure[s] whereas section 414.28A governs land-leased communities. Section 414.28A is also broader in scope, prohibiting subdivision regulations, as well as general zoning regulations. Originally section 414.28A, like section 414.28, only prohibited ordinances that disallowed manufactured housing developments solely because the homes were manufactured homes. 1997 Iowa Acts ch. 86, § 4 (codified at Iowa Code § 414.28A (1998)). Section 414.28A was soon amended, however, to enlarge the prohibition by barring regulations or ordinances that make infeasible manufactured housing developments, as well as those that outright disallow such developments. 1998 Iowa Acts ch. 1107, § 16 (codified at Iowa Code § 414.28A (Supp.1998)). In addition to this change, section 414.28A was also amended to strike the word solely, see id., again broadening the reach of the statute so as to eliminate the requirement that the disallowance or infeasibility occur only because manufactured housing is involved. While the prohibitions of section 414.28A are even broader and stronger than those contained in section 414.28, the basic structure of the prohibitions are, nonetheless, identical, indicating similar legislative intent and, accordingly, calling for similar interpretation. See State v. Dann, 591 N.W.2d 635, 638 (Iowa 1999) (stating court should seek to harmonize later-enacted statute with existing statutes on the same subject matter); 2B Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 51.02, at 197-98 (6th ed.2000 revision) (Unless the context indicates otherwise, words or phrases in a provision that were used in a prior act pertaining to the same subject matter will be construed in the same sense.). Therefore, it is instructive in our search for the meaning of section 414.28A to consider what the legislature intended when it enacted section 414.28. Although there is no legislative history explaining the legislature's objective in adopting section 414.28, it appears this statute was enacted in response to a perceived crisis in the supply of affordable housing. See generally Brady v. City of Dubuque, 495 N.W.2d 701, 705 (Iowa 1993) (noting that contemporary circumstances may be considered as an aid to interpretation of a statute); Iowa Code § 4.6(2) (stating that the court, in determining the intention of the legislature, may consider... [t]he circumstances under which the statute was enacted). In 1981, then-president Reagan established the President's Commission on Housing to study the housing industry and make recommendations for national policy to address the housing recession caused by inflation and high interest rates. See Exec. Order No. 12,310, 46 Fed.Reg. 31,869 (June 16, 1981) (directing Commission to develop housing ... options which strengthen the ability of the private sector to maximize opportunities for homeownership); see also Proclamation No. 4988, 47 Fed.Reg. 46,837 (Oct. 19, 1982) (referencing the adverse impact on housing from the twin afflictions of inflation and high interest rates and the establishment of the Commission to study national housing policy). One of the Commission's fundamental concerns was the housing problems of low-income Americans, specifically the affordability of housing. Report of the President's Commission on Housing 3, 10-12 (1982). The Commission concluded that [m]anufactured housing [was] a significant source of affordable housing for American families, particularly first-time homebuyers, the elderly, and low- and moderate-income families. Id. at 85. Nonetheless, it recognized that local action often impeded the ability of homebuyers from choosing this type of housing. Id. at 86. Therefore, the Commission recommended removing zoning provisions that discriminate against manufactured housing. Id.; see id. at 203 (States and localities should remove from their zoning laws all forms of discrimination against manufactured housing....); see also Proclamation No. 4988, 47 Fed.Reg. 46,837 (Oct. 19, 1982) (noting Commission's report reaffirmed our national commitment to equal housing choice). The following explanation was given in support of this recommendation: Because of sharply rising housing costs, manufactured housing today offers many households their only option for homeownership. Indeed, in 1980, manufactured (mobile) homes amounted to 29 percent of all single-family homes sold. The marketplace demand for mobile homes has come from improvements in the product as well as from a competitive price. Despite the increasing attractiveness of manufactured housing, local zoning laws continued to discriminate against mobile homes. In many localities, mobile homes are segregated into special areas, often in disadvantageous locations set aside as trailer parks. There is an increasing recognition that the quality of manufactured housing has improved. Since 1976, manufactured housing has been built under a national code, supervised by HUD, setting health and safety requirements. Vermont, California, and Indiana have enacted laws precluding discrimination against manufactured homes. The Michigan Supreme Court last year struck down a zoning law because it violated the State constitution: The per se exclusion of mobile homes from all areas not designated as mobile home parks has no reasonable basis under the police power, and is therefore unconstitutional. Manufactured housing can be as safe and healthy as comparable site-built housing. Housing systems or components satisfying a nationally recognized model code similarly should not be excluded from use in a locality. Exclusionary zoning provisions based on type of manufacture are arbitrary and unrelated to legitimate zoning concerns. Report of the President's Commission on Housing 203-04 (emphasis added). It was within this historical context that the Iowa legislature in 1984 adopted section 414.28. Although this court has never interpreted section 414.28, Iowa's statute was discussed in a 1988 article appearing in Urban Lawyer. See Molly A. Sellman, Equal Treatment of Housing: A Proposed Model State Code for Manufactured Housing, 20 Urb. Law. 73, 84 (1988). Noting that one solution to the affordable housing problem is state enabling legislation demanding comparable or equal treatment of all forms of housing, id. at 81, the author observes, Three statesIowa, Minnesota, and Vermonthave enacted progressive codes encouraging the utilization of manufactured housing by mandating equal treatment of all forms of housing, id. at 82 (emphasis added). The author makes a similar statement later in discussing Iowa's specific statutory provisions, noting again that they mandate equal treatment of manufactured housing with site-built housing. Id. at 84 (emphasis added) (citing Iowa Code Ann. §§ 358A.30, 414.28 (West 1976 & Supp.1986)). The same interpretation of Iowa's statute was made by another author in 1996, in a discussion of state legislation prohibiting or restraining discrimination against manufactured housing. S. Mark White, State and Federal Planning Legislation and Manufactured Housing: New Opportunities for Affordable, Single-Family Shelter, 28 Urb. Law. 263, 269 (1996). This writer also describes Iowa's statute as equal treatment legislation. Id. at 270 & n. 35. He explains such statutes prohibit discriminatory treatment between manufactured and site-built homes, but preserve for local governments the right to impose zoning standards and procedural requirements... on the same terms as site-built housing. Id. at 270. We think the commentators are correct. The historical context in which section 414.28 was enacted indicates that the statute was intended to prevent local zoning authorities from discriminating against manufactured housing. The same purpose logically must be ascribed to section 414.28A. See 2B Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 51.02, at 176-78 (6th ed.2000 revision) (stating that when a new provision is enacted that relates to the same subject matter as previous statutes, the new provision is presumed in accord with the legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes). More importantly, this interpretation of the statute is most consistent with the language of section 414.28 as well as the language of section 414.28A. Section 414.28 prohibits discrimination by providing that plans for a residential structure cannot be disallowed solely because the proposed structure is a manufactured home. Similarly, section 414.28A mandates equal treatment for manufactured housing developments by stating that plans for a land-leased community cannot be disallowed (or even made infeasible) because the proposed community contains manufactured homes. Nothing in the language of the statute supports the City's contention that section 414.28A simply prohibits a municipality from totally excluding manufactured housing developments from the community. The Vermont Supreme Court reached the same conclusion that we reach here when it interpreted similar legislation enacted in that state. See In re Appeal of Lunde, 166 Vt. 167, 688 A.2d 1312 (1997). In Lunde, the city's zoning regulations restricted mobile homes to certain locations, a restriction that was not placed on site-built homes. 688 A.2d at 1313. A mobile home owner claimed the city ordinance violated a Vermont statute providing that no zoning regulation shall have the effect of excluding mobile homes ... from the municipality, except upon the same terms and conditions as conventional housing is excluded. Id. (quoting Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, § 4406(4)(A)). The Vermont Supreme Court rejected an argument that the statute was intended to prevent municipalities from excluding mobile homes `from the municipality,' but to allow restricting mobile homes to mobile home parks or to a particular zone. Id. at 1314. Rather, the court concluded, the legislature intended municipalities to treat mobile homes in the same manner as conventional housing. Id. Although the Vermont statute is not worded precisely the same as Iowa's statute, it too is equal treatment legislation. See Sellman, Equal Treatment of Housing: A Proposed Model State Code for Manufactured Housing, 20 Urb. Law. at 82. The Lunde case is persuasive authority that equal treatment statutes prohibit ordinances that treat manufactured housing developments differently from conventional housing developments, even though manufactured housing developments are not entirely excluded from the municipality. In summary, the plain language of section 414.28A, particularly when considered in the statute's historical context, reveals a legislative intent to require equal treatment of land-leased communities that are composed of manufactured homes with similar communities composed of site-built housing. Our interpretation of section 414.28A does not mean the City must allow mobile home parks in all zoning districts. Nor does it mean the City cannot regulate manufactured housing developments. The statute merely mandates that land-leased communities of manufactured housing be allowed in any district in which similar communities of site-built housing are allowed, under the same terms and conditions imposed on such developments containing traditional housing. Turning to the facts of the case before us, we conclude the Asbury zoning ordinance contravenes section 414.28A by relegating mobile home parks, not all condominium-type communities, to R-4 zoning districts. Without a doubt, this restrictive ordinance has made the Bahls' land-leased community infeasible because it contains manufactured housing, a clear violation of the statute. The facts of the present case present a classic example of exclusionary and discriminatory zoning regulations and decisions of the very type the President's Commission called on states to prevent. Moreover, the City's zoning ordinance is exactly the type of discriminatory treatment of manufactured housing projects our legislature intended to thwart when it enacted section 414.28A.