Opinion ID: 1265150
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motion for Judgment of Acquittal of Driving Revoked for DUI Charge

Text: Appellant next claims that the trial court erred by not granting his motion for judgment of acquittal following the close of the State's evidence because no proof was submitted showing that Appellant had actual knowledge that his driving privileges were revoked for DUI. Appellant alleges that this error was compounded when the trial court did not instruct the jury that actual knowledge of license revocation is an essential element of the offense of driving revoked for DUI. Embodied in both purported errors is an issue of first impression for this Court: whether knowledge, actual or otherwise, of the revocation of a driver's license is a necessary element of the offense of driving revoked for DUI. Since this issue necessarily involves an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review. Syl. pt. 1, in part, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995). We naturally turn to the language of the statute in question at the inception of our review because [w]hen a statute is clear and unambiguous and the legislative intent is plain, it is the duty of the courts to apply the statute in accordance with the legislative intent therein clearly expressed. Syl. pt. 7, State v. Bragg, 152 W.Va. 372, 163 S.E.2d 685 (1968). West Virginia Code § 17B-4-3(b) (1999) (Repl.Vol.2000) [13] defines the offense of driving revoked for DUI as follows: (b) Any person who drives a motor vehicle on any public highway of this state at a time when his or her privilege to do so has been lawfully revoked for driving under the influence of alcohol, controlled substances or other drugs, or for driving while having an alcoholic concentration in his or her blood of ten hundredths of one percent or more, by weight, or for refusing to take a secondary chemical test of blood alcohol content, is, for the first offense, guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be confined in jail for six months and in addition to the mandatory jail sentence, shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars; for the second offense, the person is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be confined in jail for a period of one year and, in addition to the mandatory jail sentence, shall be fined not less than one thousand dollars nor more than three thousand dollars; for the third or any subsequent offense, the person is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for not less than one year nor more than three years and, in addition to the mandatory prison sentence, shall be fined not less than three thousand dollars nor more than five thousand dollars. As is evident from the statute, which Appellant concedes, knowledge is not expressly stated as an element of the offense. Appellant maintains instead that the element of lawful revocation implies that the licensee have actual knowledge of the revocation in order to commit the offense because West Virginia Code § 17C-5A-1(c), detailing the driver's license revocation procedure, provides that a revocation is not effective until ten days after receipt of the copy of the order of revocation. West Virginia Code § 17C-5A-1, provides in pertinent part that: (a) Any person who is licensed to operate a motor vehicle in this state and who drives a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given his or her consent by the operation thereof, subject to the provisions of this article, [14] to the procedure set forth in this article for the determination of whether his or her license to operate a motor vehicle in this state should be revoked because he or she did drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, controlled substances or drugs, or combined influence of alcohol or controlled substances or drugs, or did drive a motor vehicle while having an alcoholic concentration in his or her blood of ten hundredths of one percent or more, by weight, or did refuse to submit to any designated secondary chemical test .... .... (c) If ...the commissioner shall determine that a person was arrested for an offense described in section two, article five of this chapter ... and that the results of any secondary test or tests indicate that at the time the test or tests were administered the person had, in his or her blood, an alcohol concentration of ten hundredths of one percent or more, by weight, or at the time the person was arrested he or she was under the influence of alcohol, controlled substances or drugs, the commissioner shall make and enter an order revoking the person's license to operate a motor vehicle in this state.... A copy of the order shall be forwarded to the person by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, and shall contain the reasons for the revocation or suspension and describe the applicable revocation or suspension periods provided for in section two [§ 17C-5A-2] of this article. No revocation or suspension shall become effective until ten days after receipt of a copy of the order. Also related to our inquiry is the following portion of the general statute governing notices which the Division of Motor Vehicles is authorized or required to make: The giving of notice by mail is complete upon the expiration of four days after such deposit of said notice. Proof of the giving of notice ... may be made by the certificate of any officer or employee of the department or affidavit of any person over the eighteen years of age, naming the person to whom such notice was given and specifying the time, place, and manner of the giving thereof. W.Va.Code § 17A-2-19 (1951) (Repl.Vol.2000). Although the statute defining the offense of driving revoked for DUI is silent with regard to criminal intent or mens rea, this Court has held that the [t]he legislative purpose to dispense with the element of intent in a statutory crime must be clearly expressed. Syllabus, State v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. of America, 111 W.Va. 148, 161 S.E. 5 (1931). [15] We do not find such a clear and unambiguous expression in the provisions of the statute defining the subject offense. Nonetheless, a reading of the plain language of the statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation which thus requires us to construe the statute. Our general goal in construing a statute is to determine and give effect to legislative intent. Syl. Pt. 1, Smith v. State Workmen's Compensation Com'r., 159 W.Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975). We undertake this task with the understanding that ambiguous criminal statutes must be strictly construed against the State and in favor of the defendant. Syl. Pt. 3, State ex rel. Carson v. Wood, 154 W.Va. 397, 175 S.E.2d 482 (1970). We further note that in cases such as the one before us which involve multiple statutory provisions our task is to read and apply a statute as to make it accord with the spirit, purposes and objects of the general system of law of which it is intended to form a part; it being presumed that the legislators who drafted and passed it were familiar with all existing law, applicable to the subject matter, whether constitutional, statutory or common, and intended the statute to harmonize completely with the same and aid in the effectuation of the general purpose and design thereof, if its terms are consistent therewith. Syl. Pt. 5, in part, State v. Snyder, 64 W.Va. 659, 63 S.E. 385 (1908). Other jurisdictions which have been faced with the similar task of determining whether criminal intent is an element of driving while a license to do so has been revoked or suspended have reached varying results. Although there is not a clear consensus among the other states which have considered similarly worded driving while revoked and notification of revocation statutes, a significant number have held that the element of knowledge of revocation must be read into the statute. Jeffcoat v. State, 639 P.2d 308 (Alaska Ct.App.1982); Jolly v. People, 742 P.2d 891 (Colo.1987); State v. Keihn, 542 N.E.2d 963 (Ind.1989); State v. McCallum, 321 Md. 451, 583 A.2d 250 (1991); Zamarripa v. First Judicial District Court, 103 Nev. 638, 747 P.2d 1386 (1987); State v. Herrera, 111 N.M. 560, 807 P.2d 744 (1991); State v. Atwood, 290 N.C. 266, 225 S.E.2d 543 (1976); Bryant v. State, 643 S.W.2d 241 (Tex.Ct.App.1982); State v. Collova, 79 Wis.2d 473, 255 N.W.2d 581 (Wis.1977). But see State v. Swain, 245 Conn. 442, 718 A.2d 1 (1998); King v. State, 226 Ga.App. 576, 486 S.E.2d 904 (1997); People v. Johnson, 170 Ill.App.3d 828, 121 Ill.Dec. 488, 525 N.E.2d 546 (1988); State v. Sonderleiter, 251 Iowa 106, 99 N.W.2d 393 (Iowa 1959); State v. Pickering, 432 So.2d 1067 (La.Ct.App.1983); State v. Grotzky, 222 Neb. 39, 382 N.W.2d 20 (1986); State v. Buttrey, 293 Or. 575, 651 P.2d 1075 (1982). The Supreme Court of Wisconsin summarized the reasons why it found that some requirement of guilty knowledge or criminal intent was intended by the legislature in establishing the offense by stating: The driving of a motor vehicle by one who has neither knowledge nor reason to know that his operating privilege is or may have been revoked is a wholly routine and innocent act. Absent some unmistakable indication in the words of the statute, we are unwilling to conclude that the legislature intended to subject a defendant who is innocent of any negligent or intentional wrongdoing to the harsh consequences [16] a conviction ... [the offense statute] entails. To inflict substantial punishment on a person who is innocent of any intentional or negligent wrongdoing offends the sense of justice and is ineffective. State v. Collova, 255 N.W.2d at 587-88. Similar concern was expressed by other jurisdictions which concluded that knowledge was an implied element of the offense. [17] We find this reasoning persuasive. Furthermore, the overall statutory scheme, including the means by which a lawful revocation of a license is to occur, supports the conclusion that the Legislature intended that an accused have knowledge of the license revocation in order to be convicted and punished for the offense of driving revoked for DUI. Accordingly, we conclude that knowledge of the revocation of a driver's license is an element of the offense set forth in West Virginia Code § 17B-4-3(b) of driving while one's license is revoked for DUI. Prima facie evidence of knowledge of the revocation of a license to drive a motor vehicle is established by the State offering proof of mailing the notice of revocation to the licensee in compliance with West Virginia Code §§ 17C-5A-1 (1994) and 17A-2-19 (1951), (Repl.Vol.2000). Defendants in such situations may rebut the inference of knowledge of the revocation, although lack of knowledge must be the result of something other than a defendant's wrongful or dilatory conduct. Consequently, failure to notify the Division of Motor Vehicles of a change in address as required by West Virginia Code § 17B-2-13 (1951) (Repl.Vol.2000) or eluding delivery of the notice would not defeat the inference. The State admits that it did not establish proof of notice of revocation in this case because knowledge had not been conclusively established as a necessary element of the charged offense. As a result of our decision requiring such proof and in order to provide the State the opportunity to comply with the conclusions we announce today, we reverse Appellant's conviction for driving revoked for DUI and remand the matter for a new trial. [18]