Opinion ID: 772035
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gang Membership Evidence

Text: 10 Lemon concedes that his membership in the Family Mob gang was relevant to whether his FMOB ring was found on Ms. Hicks's dresser. He argues, however, that the district court erred in admitting this evidence without a limiting instruction because the risk of unfair prejudice -- the jury convicting him because of his association with a criminal gang -- outweighed its limited probative value as cumulative evidence linking him to the apartment and its contents. Evidence of gang membership is admissible if relevant to a disputed issue. See, e.g., United States v. Sills, 120 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 1487, 1497 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1098 (1995). However, such evidence can be unfairly prejudicial, and in United States v. Roark, 924 F.2d 1426, 1434 (8th Cir. 1991), we ordered a new trial because the government's use of prejudicial gang evidence was so pervasive the entire theme of the trial [became] guilt[] by association. The district court has broad discretion when weighing probative value against this type of unfair prejudice. United States v. Sparks, 949 F.2d 1023, 1026 (8th Cir. 1991) (admission of gang affiliation evidence not an abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 927 (1992). 11 Prior to trial, the government filed a motion in limine seeking to admit both expert testimony as to Lemon's admitted gang membership, and evidence that his most recent felony conviction was a violation of MINN. STAT. 609.229, entitled Crime Committed for the Benefit of a Gang. Lemon's violation resulted from his participation in a gang-related drive-by shooting. The district court ruled: 12 it appears that while limited evidence of [Lemon's] gang affiliation is relevant to material issues in this case and not unfairly prejudicial, [the unfair prejudice from] evidence of [Lemon's] prior conviction for Crime for the Benefit of a Gang substantially outweighs its probative value. For these reasons, the Court exercises its discretion under Rules 401 and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and grants the admission of expert testimony linking [Lemon] to the F Mob ring, but denies admission of [Lemon's] Crime for the Benefit of a Gang conviction. 13 By this ruling, the court admitted a limited amount of gang-related evidence that was relevant to Lemon's mere presence defense, while excluding evidence of the drive-by shooting conviction, which might have prejudicially diverted the jury's attention from the constructive possession issues central to the case. As a result, gang evidence did not become a pervasive theme of the trial, as in Roark. In addition, the government's expert carefully used the word gang as it is defined in 609.229, the Minnesota statute Lemon violated, ensuring that the jury would not unfairly equate his Family Mob association with more highly publicized criminal gangs. In these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this gang- related evidence. Lemon further argues this was Rule 404(b) evidence that required a limiting instruction. But no such instruction was requested, and the court's failure to give one sua sponte was not plain error. Moreover, evidence that Lemon was a member of the Family Mob at the time of the search was circumstantial evidence of constructive possession requiring no Rule 404(b) limiting instruction. See United States v. Aranda, 963 F.2d 211, 216 (8th Cir. 1992).