Opinion ID: 46696
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Improper argument by the prosecution

Text: Anderson argues that the prosecutor committed reversible error during his argument at the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. The prosecution made the following remarks: Before I get into that, do you think that in this case that the defendant – the Defense and the attorneys for the defendant would ever have admitted that he was even in the house in the first place if his – the Cobbs’ property had not been found in his trailer? Do you think they would have come in and told you that? Do you think the Defense would have come in here and admitted that the defendant sexually assaulted Bertha Cobb if his semen had not been in her vaginal cavity? There’s no honor in what they did. They did it—“ to which the defense objected, the court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the statement. The defense moved for a mistrial, which the court denied. The prosecutor also stated in regards to whether another person could have committed the crime: “Who is this other person? Does anyone know? We don’t. And the Defense never once—” at which point the defense objected. The court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the last portion of the prosecutor’s statement. The defense then moved for a mistrial, and the court denied the motion. Later in the argument, the prosecutor stated: “But I’ll tell you this: Don’t think for a minute -7- that the State of Texas believes that there is another person.” Again the defense objected, the court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the statement, the defense moved for a mistrial, and the court denied the motion. Anderson argues that these statements by the prosecutor amounted to constitutionallyimpermissible “vouching” that necessitates a new trial. United States v. Murrah, 888 F.2d 24, 26–27 (5th Cir. 1989) (reversing a conviction because of improper statements by the prosecutor). “The test applied to determine whether a trial error makes a trial fundamentally unfair is whether there is a reasonable probability that the verdict might have been different had the trial been properly conducted.” Kirkpatrick v. Blackburn, 777 F.2d 272, 278–79 (5th Cir. 1985). The district court agreed with Anderson that these statements were improper, stating that “the prosecutor’s comment was a bizarre and manifestly improper accusation that the Defendant and his counsel would have chosen to exercise his right to remain silent if they could have, and only waived it because of the evidence presented by the prosecution.” The district court, however, found that in light of the other evidence presented against Anderson, the statements did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determinating the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (internal quotation omitted). We agree. While these statements by the prosecutor were inappropriate, the other evidence against the defendant was overwhelming. In addition, the court gave a curative instruction after each of the sustained objections to the improper statements. Ward v. Dretke, 420 F.3d 479, 499 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that “a timely objection and request for a curative instruction would have mitigated the prejudice generated by the prosecutor's [improper] invocation”); see also Derden v. McNeel, 938 F.2d 605, 622 (5th Cir. 1991) (Jones, J., dissenting) (“[T]he trial judge's curative instructions to the jury with respect to the two instances of alleged -8- prosecutorial misconduct significantly reduced the risk of prejudice to [the defendant].”). We reject this ground for relief. D. Use of undefined and vague terms in the special sentencing issues Anderson argues that the special issues submitted to the jury during the punishment phase contained undefined and vague terms so as to violate the Eighth Amendment. The special issues submitted to the jury are mandated by TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 37.071, § 2(b)(1)–(2) & (e). Anderson points to various words used in this special issues, namely “probability,” “criminal acts of violence,” and “continuing threat to society,” in arguing that these terms are unconstitutionally vague. In Zant v. Stevens, the Supreme Court noted that statutory aggravating factors “circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death penalty.” 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983). In Godfrey v. Georgia, the Supreme Court reversed a death sentence on the basis that the aggravating factor used was unconstitutionally vague. 446 U.S. 420, 428, 433 (1980) (holding that “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman” was too vague of a sentencing factor). Anderson acknowledges “that this Court has rejected similar complaints regarding the vagueness of these terms” and that he “wishes to preserve this error for further review in the event relief is not otherwise granted herein.” A review of Fifth Circuit caselaw confirms that the court has consistently rejected similar complaints regarding the alleged vagueness of the same terms of which Anderson complains, and also of similar terms. See James v. Collins, 987 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the terms “deliberately,” “probability,” “criminal acts of violence,” and “continuing threat to society” “have a common-sense core of meaning that criminal juries should be capable of understanding”) (internal quotation omitted); see also Hughes v. Johnson, 191 F.3d 607, 615 (5th Cir. 1999); Woods v. Johnson, 75 F.3d 1017, 1033–34 (5th Cir. 1996). As these cases -9- foreclose relief, we reject this ground for habeas relief. E. Trial court’s failure to inform the jury of the effect of a non-unanimous verdict as to any of the special sentencing issues Anderson also argues that the trial court’s failure to inform the jury properly about the effect of a non-unanimous verdict on the special sentencing issues constituted a violation of the Eighth Amendment. In other words, Anderson argues it was unconstitutional that the court did not instruct the jury that if they fail to reach a verdict on punishment that the defendant would have received a sentence of life. Anderson relies on Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988), and McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990). This court, however, has previously held that the situation about which Anderson complains is not sufficiently similar to Mills and McKoy to permit relief. Anderson acknowledges this in his brief, stating that “the current expression of this Circuit’s law is that Mills is not applicable to the capital sentencing scheme in Texas. He wishes to preserve this error for further review in the event relief is not otherwise granted herein.” In Hughes, the court stated that “[u]nlike the systems discussed in Mills and McKoy, a single juror in Texas cannot preclude the remainder of the jury from considering mitigating evidence.” 191 F.3d at 629. Previously, in Jacobs v. Scott, the court noted that “the law in Texas is completely different from that in Mills.” 31 F.3d 1319, 1328 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that this claim was procedurally barred but also was “meritless”). We reject this ground for habeas relief. F. Failure to require the statutory aggravating factors to be alleged in the indictment and requiring Anderson to bear the burden of proof on mitigation Anderson alleges that the trial court’s failure to require that the statutory aggravating factors be alleged in the indictment was a violation of due process. Anderson argues that under Apprendi - 10 - v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000), any fact that increases the penalty for a given crime beyond the statutory maximum must be alleged in the indictment and proven at trial beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi does not require that the special sentencing issues for the death penalty be pleaded in the indictment. Anderson points to no law indicating such a requirement, and this court holds that the state habeas court was not unreasonable in rejecting such a requirement. Anderson further argues that he was improperly required to bear the burden of proof on the mitigation special sentencing issue in violation of due process. This argument also does not implicate Apprendi. The absence of mitigating circumstances is not “the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19; see also Rowell v. Dretke, 398 F.3d 370, 379 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[N]o Supreme Court or Fifth Circuit authority requires the State to prove the absence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.”). We reject these grounds for relief. G. Ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal Anderson argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his direct appeal. Specifically, Anderson argues that his direct appeal counsel was ineffective for only raising three issues on direct appeal, namely, legal insufficiency of guilt, factual insufficiency of guilt, and potential error by the court in striking a portion of the cross-examination of an expert for the state. The state habeas court rejected this claim, finding that “Appellate counsel reviewed the record and concluded that while there were some trial errors, in his opinion, other than the one issue raised, that there was no error which would result in a reversal of the judgment and sentence” and that “Appellate counsel’s performance was not deficient and did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.” We may only grant relief if the state court was unreasonable in making this determination. - 11 - As previously stated, to succeed on an ineffective assistance claim, Anderson must demonstrate that his counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that the “deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. Appellate counsel explained at the state court hearing on the writ of habeas corpus that it would have been a waste of time to argue other issues. In addition, it might potentially have aggravated the appellate court to have to read about insignificant issues, thereby making it less likely that Anderson would win on the significant issues. Anderson points out, however, that his counsel should have considered the possibility of waiver in not raising these arguments. The district court agreed with Anderson and found that he had satisfied the first prong of Strickland, namely that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. We assume, without deciding, that this conclusion is correct. To succeed on an ineffective assistance claim, however, Anderson must also have shown that the error caused prejudice. The issues that Anderson argues his counsel should have raised on direct appeal, namely issues B-F above, lack merit. As such, failure to raise these issues did not prejudice Anderson. Anderson further argues, however, that “[i]t was reasonably probable that at least one of the issues raised above, would have been considered by the Supreme Court.” We disagree. The state court did not act unreasonably in denying this ground for habeas relief. We therefore reject this ground for relief. H. The state’s unfettered discretion in deciding whether to seek the death penalty Anderson next argues that the Texas death penalty statute violates due process, equal protection, and due course of law to a constitutionallyimpermissible degree because it gives unbridled discretion to prosecutors in determining whether or not to seek the death penalty. Anderson does not point to any Supreme Court or Fifth Circuit precedent forbidding such discretion, and we have - 12 - found none. Anderson states that he wishes to preserve this point for further review. We reject this ground for habeas relief. I. The trial court’s failure to grant a mistrial after it struck the testimony of the state’s risk assessment expert Anderson argues that the state trial court should have granted a mistrial when it struck the testimony of a risk expert for the state by reading the testimony back to the jury. Anderson raised this claim on direct appeal, but the court refused to consider it on the merits because Anderson failed to preserve the error at trial. See Jackson v. Jackson, 194 F.3d 641, 652 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[The] Texas contemporaneous objection rule constitutes an adequate and independent state ground that procedurally bars federal habeas review of a petitioner's claims.”) (internal quotation omitted). Accordingly, the federal courts will only consider this claim “if the defendant can first demonstrate either ‘cause’ and actual ‘prejudice,’ or that he is ‘actually innocent.’” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998). In its motion for summary judgment, the State argued that procedural default applied to this claim. In his reply to the motion for summary judgment, Anderson did not argue cause and prejudice or actual innocence. He admits as much in his appellate brief, stating that his only suggested ground for cause was “not directly briefed as cause for the default.” As such, the district court properly refused to consider this issue on the merits.1 We reject this ground for relief. J. Cumulative effect of errors Anderson finally argues that, even if none of the individual errors alleged necessitate reversal, the cumulative effect of these errors does. In Kyles v. Whitney, the Supreme Court recognized that 1 It appears from the record that the State could also have properly raised procedural default with respect to other claims, but the State did not do so. This court will not consider these arguments. - 13 - the cumulative effect of errors, none of which individually are significant, could be collectively significant. 514 U.S. 419, 436–37 (1995). The state habeas court rejected this argument, finding that “the cumulation of any mere trial error did not amount to federal constitutional harm” and “that the cumulation of errors did not amount to a deprivation of due process.” We do not hold that this conclusion was an unreasonable determination of the law or an unreasonable application of the facts. We reject this ground for relief.