Opinion ID: 1996165
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Approval

Text: [¶ 12] Respecting our constitutional separation of powers, Me. Const. art. III, and statutes governing administrative appeals, our review of state agency decision-making is deferential and limited. We review decisions made by an administrative agency for errors of law, abuse of discretion, or findings of fact not supported by the record. Save Our Sebasticook, Inc. v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 2007 ME 102, ¶ 13, 928 A.2d 736, 740 (quotation marks omitted). In this review, [t]he [C]ourt shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency on questions of fact. 5 M.R.S. § 11007(3) (2009). [¶ 13] Upon review of an agency's findings of fact we must examine the entire record to determine whether, on the basis of all the testimony and exhibits before it, the agency could fairly and reasonably find the facts as it did. Int'l Paper Co. v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 1999 ME 135, ¶ 29, 737 A.2d 1047, 1054. We must affirm findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record, even if the record contains inconsistent evidence or evidence contrary to the result reached by the agency. [6] S.D. Warren Co. v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 2005 ME 27, ¶ 22 n. 10, 868 A.2d 210, 218; Int'l Paper Co., 1999 ME 135, ¶ 29, 737 A.2d at 1054; Aviation Oil Co. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 584 A.2d 611, 614 (Me.1990). [¶ 14] The substantial evidence standard does not involve any weighing of the merits of evidence. Instead it requires us to determine whether there is any competent evidence in the record to support a finding. Administrative agency findings of fact will be vacated only if there is no competent evidence in the record to support a decision. Lakeside at Pleasant Mountain Condo. Ass'n v. Town of Bridgton, 2009 ME 64, ¶ 11, 974 A.2d 893, 896; Fitanides v. City of Saco, 2004 ME 32, ¶ 23, 843 A.2d 8, 15; see also Green v. Comm'r of Dep't of Mental Health, 2001 ME 86, ¶ 9, 776 A.2d 612, 615 (noting that review is based on clearly erroneous standards); 5 M.R.S. § 11007(3). Any Court review that would redecide the weight and significance given the evidence by the administrative agency would lead to ad hoc judicial decision-making, without giving due regard to the agency's expertise, and would exceed our statutory authority. [¶ 15] Accordingly, we proceed to review the findings of the Board to determine their sufficiency. See Save Our Sebasticook, 2007 ME 102, ¶ 15, 928 A.2d at 741; FPL Energy Me. Hydro LLC v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 2007 ME 97, ¶ 14, 926 A.2d 1197, 1201. In this review, FOLL, the party seeking to vacate the agency decision, bears the burden of persuasion on appeal. Anderson v. Me. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., 2009 ME 134, ¶ 3, 985 A.2d 501, 503; Zegel v. Bd. of Soc. Worker Licensure, 2004 ME 31, ¶ 14, 843 A.2d 18, 22.
[¶ 16] FOLL essentially conceded at oral argument that the Board's findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. The nature of FOLL's sufficiency of the evidence argument appears to be that findings resulting in a denial of the application could have been supported by evidence in the record questioning the propriety of the sound assessment model, suggesting significant impact of wind turbine sounds and vibrations on public health, and warning of the project's impact on wildlife. Given the standard of review that we are bound to apply, however, whether alternative findings could be supported by the record is not determinative. See S.D. Warren Co., 2005 ME 27, ¶ 22 n. 10, 868 A.2d at 218. [¶ 17] Reviewing the record as a whole, and notwithstanding the fact that evidence or information exists in the record that could support alternative findings, the Board's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record, based on the final reports of the Department's independent consultant, the sound assessment study, and the opinions of the MDIFW and MCDC. We briefly address each of FOLL's main points.
[¶ 18] Title 38 M.R.S. § 484(3)(B) provides that [i]n determining whether a developer has made adequate provision for the control of noise generated by a commercial or industrial development, the department shall consider board rules relating to noise. . . . Pursuant to regulations, as relevant to the Rollins Project, the hourly sound levels resulting from the routine operation of the development may not exceed fifty-five dBA during the day and forty-five dBA at night. 2 C.M.R. 06 096 375-7 § 10(C)(1)(a)(v) (2001). Five dBA must be added to observed levels of short duration repetitive sounds that result from routine operation of the development for purposes of determining compliance with the above sound level limit. 2 C.M.R. 06 096 375-8 § 10(C)(1)(e) (2001). [¶ 19] As FOLL argues, the sound prediction model, CADNA/A (operating in ISO 9613-2) may not be designed specifically for wind turbine projects. The Department consultant ultimately concluded, however, that the sound assessment was essentially reasonable and technically correct, except for its failure to consider the potential for SDR sounds. The consultant's recommendation that the project be monitored post-construction for SDR sounds and compliance with sound level limits was adopted. See 2 C.M.R. 06 096 375-10 § 10(E) (2001). [7] FOLL did not offer an alternative sound prediction model, and the Board could conclude that FOLL failed to demonstrate that the use of the CADNA/A model was unreasonable or inappropriate. [8]
[¶ 20] Department rules state that [t]he Board recognizes that the construction, operation and maintenance of developments may cause excessive noise that could degrade the health and welfare of nearby neighbors, and that it is the Board's intent to require adequate provision for the control of excessive environmental noise from developments. 2 C.M.R. 06 096 375-6 § 10(A) (2001). The Board's inferred determination concerning the impact of wind energy sound and vibrations on public health is supported by the opinion of the MCDC included in the record, upon which the Board could reasonably rely. We cannot reject the Board's finding on the grounds that other evidence in the record supports a different factual finding. See Aviation Oil Co., 584 A.2d at 614.
[¶ 21] The NRPA provides that a person must obtain a permit from the Department before beginning construction if the activity is located in, on or over any protected natural resource, which includes a significant wildlife habitat. 38 M.R.S. §§ 480-B(8), 480-C(1). A significant wildlife habitat includes habitats of species appearing on the State list of threatened species. [9] 38 M.R.S. § 480-B(10). Before being granted a permit, the applicant must show that the activity proposed will not unreasonably harm any significant wildlife habitat . . . [or] travel corridor. 38 M.R.S. § 480-D(3). [¶ 22] Agency rules provide that [e]ven if the activity has no practicable alternative, and the applicant has minimized the proposed alteration as much as possible, the application will be denied if the activity will have an unreasonable impact on . . . subject wildlife. 2 C.M.R. 06 096 335-2 § 3(C) (2010). An unreasonable impact means that one or more of the standards of the NRPA at 38 M.R.S.[] § 480-D will not be met. Id. In making this determination, the Department considers the area of the significant wildlife habitat affected by the activity, including areas beyond the physical boundaries of the project and the cumulative effects of frequent minor alterations of significant wildlife habitats. Id. [¶ 23] Contrary to FOLL's contention, the Board did consider the impact of the project on area wildlife for purposes of the NRPA, finding that the project as proposed will not have an unreasonable impact on significant wildlife habitats under its rules and the NRPA and requiring that post-construction monitoring be performed to determine, avoid, and minimize negative impact. See 38 M.R.S. § 480-D(3); 2 C.M.R. 06 096 335-2 § 3(C) (2010). The Board reasonably relied on the opinion of the MDIFW included in the record which, though acknowledging that certain wildlife, particularly nesting eagles outside the project area, could be negatively impacted by the project, ultimately advised only that the project be monitored post-construction. FOLL has not demonstrated that there is no competent evidence to support the Board's findings. See Kelley v. Me. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., 2009 ME 27, ¶ 27, 967 A.2d 676, 685. [¶ 24] Having reviewed the entire record to determine whether, on the basis of all the testimony and exhibits before it, the agency could fairly and reasonably find the facts as it did, Int'l Paper Co., 1999 ME 135, ¶ 29, 737 A.2d at 1054, we affirm the Board's factual findings as supported by competent record evidence.