Opinion ID: 314281
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: this case should be decided in the context of evolution

Text: 138 OF CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION PREMISED BROADLY ON 139 MAXIMUM USE OF REHABILITATION OF NARCOTIC ADDICTS. 140
141 The Jones-Miller Act and Harrison Act did not prohibit possession of narcotics as such, but under the provisions frequently referred to as possession offenses, proof of possession sufficed to sustain conviction of importation, or of purchase in a non-stamped package. 14 142 These laws were repealed by the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, P.L. 91-513. That act wrought three significant changes. First, it expressly prohibited simple possession of narcotic drugs as controlled substances, see Sec. 404(a), 21 U.S.C. Sec. 844. Second, it made that offense a misdemeanor, sharply reducing penalties that might be applied to persons on mere evidence of possession. Most important, Congress repealed the provision, included in the Price Daniel Act of 1956 (note 18, infra) that had precluded probations or suspended sentences as to most convictions under the Jones-Miller and Harrison Acts, see 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7237(d). Probation is now prohibited only in case of a continuing criminal enterprise. 21 U.S.C. Sec. 848. 143 Appellant's counsel submit that his contentions rest on broad principles which require the same disposition on the merits as to prosecutions under both the earlier laws and the 1970 law. Counsel have urged us, in effect, to consider the conviction as if it were under the 1970 law. They make no argument based on the particular provisions or earlier history of the prior statutes. We think it appropriate to broadly consider applicable principles and Congressional intention in the light of the 1970 law. In short, the validity of appellant's conviction will be appraised as equivalent in all material respect to one entered under the 1970 law for knowing possession. 144 We are aware that this is somewhat unusual, particularly since the Supreme Court has recently held, in Bradley v. United States, 15 that the 1970 law's provision permitting the use of probation henceforth was accompanied by another provision precluding its use for offenses committed prior to the effective date of the 1970 law. However, on focusing on the defense in issue, we have come to the conclusion that while there are occasional legislative and judicial statements that might have been seized on as indications that the earlier laws were not intended to be applicable to persons possessing or purchasing heroin for their own use, these were essentially insubstantial wisps-which would, incidentally, have also excluded mere users who had not lost control. As to the lack-of-control issue, we conclude that even in the 1970 law, with its more moderate approach, Congress did not intend to provide for the kind of drug dependence defense appellants have urged. The developments of the 1970 law round out the picture, assuring us that the injection of a drug dependence defense as to prosecutions under either the prior laws, as they fade from view, or the 1970 law, would be an impermissible judicial interjection. We develop in subsequent parts of this opinion the reasons why we do not believe that the courts should develop such a defense as an extension of the general jurisprudence that provides the setting for criminal prosecutions. As to the issue of Congressional contemplation, the fact that we glean its contours in large measure from an examination of current developments in narcotics legislation broadly considered, is, we think, a sound approach for ascertaining legislative intent. 16 145
146 Understanding of pertinent Congressional intent will be aided by first recalling the Federal narcotics legislation of the 1950's, laws that have been characterized as the turning of the screw. 147 The mandatory minimum, no probation, no-parole provisions of the Federal laws were not in the original Jones-Miller and Harrison Acts. These features were installed by amendment in 1951 and 1956, in reaction to the rising tide of drug abuse. 148 The Boggs Act of 1951, P.L. 82-255, 65 Stat. 767, placed a two-year minimum sentence on convictions under the Jones-Miller and Harrison laws. The Senate Report deemed prevailing sentences unequal to the task of stemming drug abuse. 17 It would appear . . . that the punishment which has been afforded narcotic law violators has not been an effective deterrent. 18 149 The Price Daniel Act of 1956, P.L. 84-728, 70 Stat. 567, raised the minimum penalty for a violation of the Jones-Miller law to five years, and in addition, introduced the no-probation provision codified at 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7237(d). 19 The House Report stated: Drug addiction is not a disease. 20 It evidenced considerable optimism that increasing penalties would cope with the drug problem. It claimed the 1951 penalties had reduced narcotic traffic, 21 that illicit traffic continues in problem areas where leniency with respect to sentencing of convicted traffickers is an established pattern in the courts. 22 It recommended increasing severity in sentences as justified by the factual evidence proving the deterring value of severe penalties for narcotic and marihuana law violations. 23
150 The 1960's witnessed a continuing reassessment of approach, and an increasing realization and acceptance that the Government could not satisfactorily cope with the narcotic drug abuse problem by concentrating on law enforcement activities and a theory of deterrence, that there was need for removal of mandatory terms and reestablishment of probation and parole authority, for recognition of addiction as beset by disease aspects that could respond in some measure to treatment, and for multiple paths of research and experiment in keeping with the diverse aspects of the problems. 151 1. White House Conference on Narcotic and Drug Abuse (1962): The Emergence of Civil Commitment; Probation and Parole 152 The watershed was the first White House Conference on Narcotic and Drug Abuse, convened on September 27, 1962. The working paper of the Conference, the Report of an Ad Hoc Panel on Drug Abuse, identified drug abuse as a indication of an underlying character disorder, manifesting an inadequate personality unable to cope with the stresses of normal life. It recognized that we do not understand the origins of the disorders of the various types of addicts, or how to cure them, but posited that even an individual whose abuse has been terminated must be provided with support and supervision or he could not survive any stress without relapse. 24 153 The Conference was particularly advised of the legislative developments in California and New York. After ten years of increasing prison terms, the California legislature realized this might seem a panacea to the public mind but could not effectively cope with the problem. After study, it passed legislation establishing rehabilitation centers, available on certification by a court after conviction of an addict, with provision for controlled supervision after institutional treatment. 25 154 The New York law, not yet in force, went further, permitting criminal proceedings to be stayed, with provision for committal to a facility subject to medical supervision, release to out-patient probationary supervision, and abatement of the legal proceedings on successful completion of the program. 26 155 A significant voice at the Conference was that of Senator Thomas J. Dodd, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency, who opposed the rigid imprisonment features of the 1956 law, as of illusory value in deterrence and damaging in impact. Without leniency for the professional criminals at the vortex of narcotic racketeering there must be reform of the excessively primitive and inhumane treatment now meted out to those who are essentially the victims of the narcotic racket. He recommended: 156 The problem of drug addiction is essentially a medical problem, a psychiatric problem. It cannot be solved by merciless prison sentences. I believe that the law should be amended to repeal mandatory minimum penalties and to restore the possibility of probation and parole for rehabilitated narcotic offenders. 157 Senator Dodd stated that the responses to his Committee's inquiries showed that these views were supported by a majority of Federal Judges, probation officers, prison wardens and United States attorneys. 27 2. Recommendation of President's Advisory Commission (1963) 158 Executive Order 11076, signed January 15, 1963, 28 Fed.Reg. 477, created the President's Advisory Commission on Narcotic and Drug Abuse, to submit recommendations based on an evaluation of the White House Conference. The Commission, chaired by our distinguished and revered late colleague, Judge E. Barrett Prettyman, rendered its report on November 1, 1963. 28 Basic philosophy 159 The Basic Philosophy section of the Prettyman Commission report was reprinted in full in the 1970 House Committee Report, which stated that the 1970 law, added to previous measures, effectuated in whole or in part virtually all pertinent recommendations made by the Presidential Commissions in 1963 (Prettyman Commission) and in 1967 (so-called Katzenbach Commission). 29 This is how the Prettyman Commission stated its Basic Philosophy: 30 160 The abuse of drugs has aroused two extreme attitudes-the punitive and the permissive. 161 Some people are concerned primarily with the effects of drug abuse on the community.    Because most serious drug abusers return to drugs if left to themselves, these people would shut down the drug abuser away from society for as long as possible. 162 In contrast to this attitude, others hold that serious drug abuse is usually symptomatic of a mental disturbance and that the drug abuser is a sick person. They attribute his crimes to an inner compulsion for which he should not be held responsible under our code of criminal justice. They feel that the drug abuser must be treated for his sickness rather than punished. Some feel his disease is incurable and that he should be maintained on the drug. 163 This Commission does not accept either of these extreme attitudes, but it subscribes to certain aspects of each.    The drug abuser who steals or who sells drugs to finance his habit is guilty of a crime. Like any other citizen, he should face the consequences. Whether he can be held criminally responsible can only be decided in the courts, case by case. The Commission cannot assert a general rule that every confirmed drug abuser is so impelled by his habit that he is not accountable for his acts under criminal law. 164 If the abuser is to be penalized, he should not be penalized in the spirit of retribution. The modern concept of criminology should apply-that penalties fit offenders as well as offenses. 165 Penalties should be designed to permit the offender's rehabilitation wherever possible. Although society must often be protected from the offender for a time, penalties in specific cases should recognize the need for reformation. 166 The deterrent effect of long sentences is vigorously debated. Some evidence indicates that the threat of long sentences may deter non-using traffickers, but it does not necessarily deter the drug abuser. Deterrence is essentially an appeal to a normal sense of reason which the drug abuser has lost. The persistence of narcotic abuse, despite severe penalties for the possession of narcotics, is persuasive evidence that the abuser will risk a long sentence for his drug. 167 The general philosophy of this Commission can be stated in three parts: 168 (1) The illegal traffic in drugs should be attacked with the full power of the federal government.    169 (2) The individual abuser should be rehabilitated.    170 (3) Drug users who violate the law by small purchases or sales should be made to recognize what society demands of them. In these instances, penalties should be applied according to the principles of our present code of justice. When the penalties involve imprisonment, however, the rehabilitation of the individual, rather than retributive punishment, should be the major objective. Specific recommendations 171 Specifically the Prettyman Commission recommendations included the following: 172 (a) As to probation and parole: 173 That mandatory minimum sentences, and prohibition of probation, suspended sentences, and parole, be modified so that the sentencing judge have full discretion in the sentencing of those whose offense is possession of narcotics without intent to sell (and for all marihuana offenses). 31 174 (b) As to civil commitment: 175 After discussion of the New York and California programs, the Commission recommended that a federal civil commitment statute be enacted to provide an alternative method of handling the federally convicted offender who is a narcotic or marijuana user. 32 176 3. Civil Commitment: Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966 (NARA) 177 The Prettyman Commission proposals as to civil commitment emerged, with some modification, in the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966 (NARA). NARA was intended to provide a rehabilitative approach, rather than a purely penal one. 33 NARA was congruent with the 1953 D.C. law's philosophy, 24 D.C.Code Sec. 601 et seq. (1967), that addicts were sick people, who need a helping hand, and which permitted a court order for confinement of a drug user. 34 However, the D.C. Act was made expressly inapplicable to any person . . . charged with a criminal offense, 24 D.C.Code Sec. 603(b). NARA went further and provided for civil commitment even of persons charged with crimes, in the case of crimes deemed related to drug abuse (with certain exceptions). NARA commitment provisions 178 The NARA provisions for civil commitment of narcotic addicts may be summarized as follows: 179 Title I-pretrial commitment for treatment, in lieu of prosecution, of addicts charged with Federal crime. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2901 ff. 180 Title II-commitment for treatment of addicts convicted of Federal crime. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4251 ff. 181 Title III-commitment for treatment of persons not charged with any Federal crime, on a petition by the addict or a related individual. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3411 ff. 182 Eligibility under Titles I and II was subject to statutory exclusions, e.g., any person charged with a crime of violence. 35 A person charged with selling a narcotic drug is excluded from Title I, but not from Title II, if the sale was to enable him to obtain a narcotic drug which he required for his personal use. 183 Civil commitment requires a determination by the court that the narcotic addict is likely to be rehabilitated by treatment. Under Title I he is committed to the custody of the Surgeon General for treatment up to 36 months-in an institution, or on additional release in the community. If he successfully completes the treatment program, the criminal charge is dismissed, otherwise, the prosecution may be resumed. Under Title II, the convicted person is committed to the custody of the Attorney General who provides for his treatment, with provision for conditional release under supervision in the community, after six months commitment in a treatment institution. 184
185 Judge: The Controlled Substances Act of 1970 186 The other pertinent recommendation of the Prettyman Commission (1963) and Katzenbach Commission (1967) for restoration of discretionary authority in the sentencing judge (probation, including suspension of sentence; no mandatory minimum) and parole, was accomplished by the Controlled Substances Act of 1970. This was enacted as Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, P.L. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236. 36 This Prettyman Commission recommendation (text at note 31 supra) was reiterated in 1967 by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 37 which stated: 187 The Commission recommends: State and Federal drug laws should give a large enough measure of discretion to the courts and correctional authorities to enable them to deal flexibly with violators, taking account of the nature and seriousness of the offense, the prior record of the offender and other relevant circumstances. 188 The President's 1969 message, while recommending expansion of rehabilitation and research measures in recognition of an obligation of society to help the genuinely sick people dependent on drugs, stated that their sickness helps to explain, but not to excuse, the crimes they commit. 38 However, the Administration made clear that its concern for such sick people, while not extending to exculpation, did embrace provision for treatment while on probation or parole. 189 Attorney General Mitchell, outlining the Administration's proposal at the hearings, emphasized the need for tailoring of disposition to the requirements of the violation or the narcotics addict, both in length of detention, and in possibility of rehabilitation and treatment while on probation or parole. 39 190 This approach was reflected in the 1969 report submitted by Senator Dodd in behalf of the Senate Judiciary Committee and was in line with Senator Dodd's presentation to the 1962 White House Conference. The Report 40 stated: 191 It had also become apparent that the severity of penalties including the length of sentences does not affect the extent of drug abuse and other drugrelated violations. The basic consideration here was that the increasingly longer sentences that had been legislated in the past had not shown the expected overall reduction in drug law violations. 192