Opinion ID: 1745101
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: authority to order restitution

Text: Wolff first argues that there is no statutory authority for sentencing courts to order restitution when a defendant is sentenced to the penitentiary and receives neither a suspended sentence, suspended imposition of sentence, probation, nor a sentence to be served in county jail, pursuant to SDCL 23A-28-3. [1] We disagree. A statute must be construed according to its intent, which must be determined from the statute as a whole, as well as enactments relating to the same subject. In re Appeal of AT & T Information Systems, 405 N.W. 2d 24, 27 (S.D.1987). Read together, the statutes concerning restitution in criminal cases establish a restitutional scheme which is broader than that envisioned in Wolff's argument. Statutes on restitution in criminal cases appear in SDCL chs. 22-6, 23A-27, and 23A-28, which are respectively titled: Authorized Punishments, Sentence and Judgment, and Restitution to Victims of Crime. SDCL 22-6-1 authorizes courts, in addition to sentence imposed, to order a defendant found guilty of a felony to make restitution to any victim in accordance with the provisions of chapter 23A-28. [2] SDCL 23A-27-1 also provides that courts, in imposing sentence, shall enter an order of restitution in accordance with chapter 23A-28. Turning to SDCL ch. 23A-28, we find that [i]t is the policy of this state that restitution may be made by each violator of the criminal laws to the victims of his criminal activities to the extent that the violator is reasonably able to do so. . . . SDCL 23A-28-1. SDCL §§ 23A-28-5 and -6 detail procedures regarding plans of restitution for defendants serving in the penitentiary. We hold these statutes to be indicative of legislative intent to authorize courts to order restitution regardless of the form a particular sentence may take, and generally agree with the following analysis: Some judges had viewed restitution and incarceration as mutually exclusive alternatives. Responding to the hesitancy of the judiciary to order restitution in conjunction with incarceration, the South Dakota Legislature passed SDCL sections 22-6-1 and 22-6-2. According to those laws, the court could order that the defendant make restitution in addition to the sentence that was imposed, including imprisonment. This freed restitution from the historical province of probation under section 23A-28-3. It also heightened restitution to a status commensurate to or above that held by the conventional punitive sanctions of imprisonment and fines. Crime and Punishment: The Propriety and Effect of South Dakota's Victim Restitution Legislation, 31 S.D.L.Rev. 783, 785 (1986) (footnotes omitted). This is consistent with other jurisdictions which allow restitution in conjunction with imprisonment. See Commonwealth v. Reed, 374 Pa.Super. 510, 543 A.2d 587 (1988); Eatherton v. State, 761 P.2d 91 (Wyo.1988). We reject Wolff's argument that 1987 amendments to SDCL ch. 23A-28 (see 1987 S.D.Sess.L. ch. 179) deprived courts of authority to order defendants imprisoned in the penitentiary to make restitution. The amendments referred to by Wolff concern allocation of responsibility for preparation of plans of restitution, not authority to order restitution in the first place. For those persons serving time in the State Penitentiary, the Board of Pardons and Paroles has the responsibility of preparing and administering plans of restitution. SDCL 23A-28-5.