Opinion ID: 2975810
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Employment Conditions

Text: The dispute in this case primarily concerns the third element of the prima facie case, namely, whether Mazur “was discriminated against in one of the ways described in the statute.”2 Michalski, 625 N.W.2d at 759. Mazur claims that Wal-Mart took discriminatory adverse employment actions 2 Although Wal-Mart expressly refuses to concede that Mazur has established the first two elements, the district court found in favor of Mazur as to those elements, and Wal-Mart makes no challenge to those findings in its brief. -5- against him when (a) he was not allowed to use the scrubber or buffer and (b) he was assigned to clean the bathrooms each time that he worked. The Michigan Court of Appeals has explained that [a]lthough there is no exhaustive list of adverse employment actions, typically [they] take[] the form of an ultimate employment decision, such as “a termination in employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation. Pena v. Ingham County Rd. Comm’n, 660 N.W.2d 351, 358-59 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted) (quoting White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Co., 310 F.3d 443, 450 (6th Cir. 2002)). Here, Mazur’s responsibility to clean the bathrooms and the fact that he was not permitted to use the scrubber or buffer did not affect his income, benefits, or title. While the fact that Mazur was consistently required to clean the bathrooms might understandably displease him, it did not result in a material adverse change in the terms of his employment. Moreover, that some of Mazur’s coworkers dubbed him “Tidy Bowl man” is the sort of social ostracism that does not constitute an adverse employment action. See Heckmann v. Detroit Chief of Police, 705 N.W.2d 689, 697 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that “being socially isolated in the office” did not constitute an adverse employment action as a matter of law), overruled in part on other grounds, Brown v. Mayor of Detroit, Nos. 132-016, 132-017, 2007 Mich. LEXIS 1571, at  n.2 (Mich. July 11, 2007). Accordingly, Mazur has not adduced facts sufficient to establish that he suffered from adverse employment actions as a result of his work conditions. See Christian v. Mich. Dep’t of Corrections, No. 268-856, 2007 Mich. App. LEXIS 431,  (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2007) (holding that the -6- plaintiff “has not established a tangible employment action because occasional rotation to less desirable assignments within her job category is not ‘an ultimate employment decision’”). Even if Wal-Mart’s assignment of Mazur to clean the bathrooms and not to use the scrubber and buffer machines were deemed adverse employment actions, and Mazur provided facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case, Mazur has not rebutted Wal-Mart’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions. Mazur does not dispute that even before Hamacher became supervisor, two members of the crew, both of whom were former supervisors, always operated the scrubber and buffer, while Mazur always cleaned the bathrooms. Hamacher testified in his deposition that when he became supervisor of the night maintenance crew, he assigned the scrubber and the buffer to the crew members who “had more experience with the equipment.” J.A. at 197. Hamacher explained that he “used people at their strengths,” and Mazur’s strength “was making sure that the carpets were cleaned and restroom maintenance.” J.A. at 198. As the district court pointed out, Mazur himself stated that even a former supervisor could not “do seven bathrooms and clean all the carpets and do the [recyclable] cans in one day, but I did it.” J.A. at 73. When Mazur asked to operate the scrubber and buffer, Hamacher directed him to take his complaint to Eldridge, who told him that he could not operate that equipment “at this time.” J.A. at 54, 197. Mazur argues that Eldridge’s answer is pretextual. Eldridge testified in her deposition that the reason she told Mazur that he could not operate the scrubber and buffer was that she “did not feel that with his carelessness, his lack of following the direction [sic] that he should operate the equipment.” J.A. at 119. By alluding to Mazur’s carelessness, Eldridge was referring to several problems with Mazur’s performance, i.e., that a vacuum cleaner was found badly damaged after he -7- had used it on one shift; that Mazur moved too fast pulling pallets and would cause collisions; that Mazur damaged toilet paper dispensers by prying them open rather than using a key, despite having been told not to; that Mazur hurt his back while lifting an item; and that he also injured himself on a separate occasion, bruising his lip and cracking his dentures. Accordingly, Mazur has not rebutted Wal-Mart’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for assigning the other two crew members to the scrubber and buffer and him to clean the bathrooms: namely, that those two employees were more proficient at operating that equipment while he was more proficient at cleaning the bathrooms, and that they had been doing so since before Hamacher became supervisor. Nor has he shown that Wal-Mart’s stated reason was not the real reason for his assignment. The district court therefore properly granted summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart on plaintiff’s claim that his job responsibilities were discriminatorily assigned.