Opinion ID: 1057570
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Tolling of the One-Year Limitations Period

Text: Although we have determined that the trial court correctly held that, under our discovery rule, the limitations period began on December 18, 2002, our inquiry does not end there. Ms. Pigg argues in her brief that Dr. Applegate's instructions regarding the connection between the Reglan and the tardive dyskinesia at the December 2002 appointment either were not clear or misunderstood by Ms. Sherrill, or she simply forgot them. The Defendants respond that there are no facts in the record to support this contention. The trial court apparently agreed with this assertion, determining as a matter of law that Ms. Sherrill was not suffering from any disability at the time the cause of action accrued which would justify a tolling of the statute of limitations.
The tolling statute for all civil actions, including medical malpractice actions, states as follows: If the person entitled to commence an action is, at the time the cause of action accrued, either under the age of eighteen (18) years, or of unsound mind, such person, or such person's representatives and privies, as the case may be, may commence the action, after the removal of such disability, within the time of limitation for the particular cause of action, unless it exceeds three (3) years, and in that case within three (3) years from the removal of such disability. Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-1-106 (2000) (emphasis added). In the medical malpractice context, this means that if the person who received treatment was of unsound mind at the time the cause of action accrued, the limitations period is tolled until the disability is removed. From the date of the removal of the disability, the person who received treatment (or the representative) has one yearthe period of limitations for medical malpractice actionsin which to bring the suit. [11] Whether an individual was of unsound mind on the date the cause of action accrued, thus tolling the statute of limitations, is a question to be resolved by the trier of fact. Burk v. RHA/Sullivan, Inc., 220 S.W.3d 896, 904 (Tenn.Ct. App.2006); see also Foster v. Allbright, 631 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Tenn.Ct.App.1982); Smith v. Grumman-Olsen Corp., 913 F.Supp. 1077, 1086 (E.D.Tenn.1995). If there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Ms. Sherrill was of unsound mind on December 18, 2002, the date her cause of action accrued, the one-year limitations period is tolled, and her suit was timely filed. Although the term unsound mind, as it appears in section 28-1-106, has been left undefined by the General Assembly, our courts have considered the meaning of the term on several occasions. For example, in a case concerning the application of the unsound mind provision of the tolling statute to individuals allegedly suffering from post-traumatic stress from childhood sexual abuse, the Court of Appeals cited as authority an early case of this Court that interpreted the tolling statute's predecessor. Doe v. Coffee Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 852 S.W.2d 899, 905 (Tenn.Ct.App.1992) (quoting Porter v. Porter, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 586, 589 (1842)). The Court held in Porter that the statute of limitations on adverse possession of personal property had been tolled by the exception for persons non compos mentis [12] because Elizabeth Duffill, a ninety-year-old slave owner, was, due to her extreme old age and mental imbecility,... incapable of attending to any business, or of taking care of herself, and had to break up keeping house and remove to the house of a relative to be taken care of by her friends. 22 Tenn. at 589 (emphasis added). The language from Porter and Doe has been cited repeatedly in medical malpractice cases by courts considering the term unsound mind as it appears in section 28-1-106. See Range v. Sowell, No. M2006-02009-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 3518176, at  (Tenn.Ct.App. Oct. 29, 2009); Burk, 220 S.W.3d at 904; Crawford v. Beatty, 108 S.W.3d 877, 880 (Tenn.Ct. App.2003). Setting aside Porter's archaic and obviously distinguishable facts, the Porter standard is still relevant to determining whether the limitations period for a cause of action is subject to tolling. This Court held in Porter that because of her age and infirmity, Ms. Duffill fell within the constructs of the tolling statute, a predecessor to Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-1-106. Our interpretation of the holding is that Ms. Duffill, because of her inability to attend to her business or take care of herself, was among those entitled to the benefit of the tolling statute. The Court did not, however, as some subsequent cases have suggested, [13] establish a baseline requirement for all individuals seeking the protections of the statute. The physical infirmity component, which the Porter language ostensibly requires, has little bearing on whether an individual understands his or her legal rights and responsibilities at the time a cause of action accrues. Cf. In re Conservatorship of Groves, 109 S.W.3d 317, 334-36 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003) (differentiating between functional capacity and decision-making capacity with regard to the standard for granting a conservatorship petition). While the language from Porter still serves as a guide in the determination of whether an individual is of unsound mind, [14] the modern test for determining whether an individual is of unsound mind for purposes of section 28-1-106 is whether that individual was unable to manage his or her day-to-day affairs at the time the cause of action accrued. This standard comports more fully with the test used in other jurisdictions at this time. 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 172 (2010) (The general test that is applied in determining whether a mental condition is of the type that will toll a statute of limitations, is whether a person could know or understand his or her legal rights sufficiently well to manage his or her personal affairs....); see, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 191 Ariz. 313, 955 P.2d 951, 964 (1998); Sheats v. Tri-Cities Hosp. Auth., 167 Ga.App. 122, 306 S.E.2d 75, 76 (1983); Roe v. Gelineau, 794 A.2d 476, 486 (R.I.2002). In our efforts to clarify the meaning of unsound mind, we are persuaded by the extensive analysis of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, which traced the history of its tolling statute and ultimately concluded as follows: [T]he legal history of the term unsound mind makes clear that the designation is intended to apply to the incapacity to carry out legal functions.... In our opinion, the inability to manage one's day-to-day affairs provides a practical, operational definition of unsound mind. This definition accords with the historical attributes of legal disability and comports with the traditional use of the term as a form of legal incapacity.... At the same time, this definition of unsound mind can be applied readily by trial justices and fact-finders and refines the term by requiring objectively ascertainable actions or inaction.... We believe that defining unsoundness of mind in terms of the concrete, objective standard of inability to manage one's day-to-day affairs complies with the statutory intent of the term.... Roe, 794 A.2d at 486-87 (citations omitted). The focus of the inquiry under section 28-1-106 should be on a plaintiff's mental capacity to understand his or her legal rights and responsibilities, including the cause of action that has accrued.
The determinative question, as stated, is whether there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding Ms. Sherrill's ability to manage her day-to-day affairs on December 18, 2002, when otherwise her cause of action accrued. Because we must assess Ms. Sherrill's competence without the benefit of her testimony, our task is more difficult. Moreover, because Ms. Pigg claims that she was not present at Ms. Sherrill's initial neurologist appointment on December 18, 2002, her testimony with regard to her mother's ability to understand her legal rights and liabilities on that date is not particularly helpful. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, however, we conclude that the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants was erroneous. The Defendants argue that on December 18, 2002, Ms. Sherrill did not suffer from a disability that would toll the statute of limitations. As support for the argument, the Defendants point to Dr. Applegate's description of Ms. Sherrill as a pretty sharp individual [with] a good sense of humor. Further, according to Dr. Applegate, Ms. Sherrill took her own notes at the December 18 appointment and had clear speech and full comprehension at the January 16, 2003 appointment. Ms. Pigg acknowledged that she had not really noticed changes in her mother's mental status by January 16, 2003. Other evidence supports the Defendants' claims that Ms. Sherrill lived alone both prior to and for an extended period after the December 18 appointment and took her own medications. Although her in-home care increased during 2003 and 2004, Ms. Pigg described her mother's mental status as fair as late as June of 2004. In contrast, Dr. Applegate diagnosed Ms. Sherrill with early senile dementia of Alzheimer's type on December 18, 2002. Further, Dr. Applegate testified that she had the impression that Ms. Sherrill was suffering from Alzheimer's disease and that she was having problems with her memory [which] was starting to fail. Dr. Applegate described Ms. Sherrill as demented, an observation corroborated by P.A. Lenihan's statement to Ms. Pigg that her mother had a form of dementia. The physician's notes of the January 16 appointment indicate that a test administered to determine Ms. Sherrill's mental status resulted in a total score of 21/30, which is moderate to severe Alzheimer's. Moreover, although Ms. Sherrill was informed on December 18, 2002 that her tardive dyskinesia condition was caused by Reglan, a medication she had been taking for several months, she did not stop taking the drug after the December 18 appointment. That she continued to ingest Reglan until the follow-up appointment on January 16, 2003 is of significance. Ms. Sherrill's continued use of Reglan despite clear warnings that the drug was the cause of her neurological condition suggests an inability to manage her day-to-day affairs during this period. [15] During the summary judgment stage of a proceeding, all reasonable inferences must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. In our view, a trier of fact could legitimately resolve the question of competence in favor of Ms. Sherrill. Because disputed issues of material fact exist regarding whether Ms. Sherrill was of unsound mind on the date the cause of action accrued, the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants was error. [16] Whether the one-year limitations period for medical malpractice actions should be tolled due to a lack of mental competence is a question of fact. Because Ms. Sherrill has sought the application of the tolling statute to a suit otherwise untimely filed, she, or her representative, bears the burden of proving at trial that she was of unsound mind at the time the cause of action accrued. See Jacobs, 957 F.Supp. at 1010.