Opinion ID: 1399120
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Denial of Motion to Limit Cross-examination of Defendant

Text: (40a) Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to limit cross-examination of himself, at the penalty phase, to his reasons for his rejection of the plea bargain. Of course, since we have determined that evidence of the plea offer was properly excluded, this claim is largely moot. However, since defendant contends this ruling denied him his right to testify, we make the following observations. Defendant wished to testify regarding his refusal of the offer only if he could be shielded from cross-examination. In response to the trial court's ruling that he would have to explain why he rejected the offer, defendant offered to testify that the offer was made, that he rejected it, and that there were three reasons for rejecting it: (1) that he did not want to stipulate to spending the rest of his life in prison without possibility of parole; (2) that he did not want to testify against people he considered to be his friends; and (3) that he would be extremely concerned about spending the rest of his life in state prison labelled an informant. The trial court ruled that if defendant so testified, then the prosecutor would be entitled to cross-examine defendant on his character traits of loyalty and helpfulness to his friends, including Jack Dowdy, Jr. Defendant did not testify, and now contends the trial court's ruling denied him his right to testify in his own defense. (41) It is true, of course, that when a defendant chooses to testify on his own behalf, the privilege against self-incrimination serves `to prevent the prosecution from questioning [him] upon the case generally, and in effect making him its own witness.' ( People v. Schader (1969) 71 Cal.2d 761, 770 [80 Cal. Rptr. 1, 457 P.2d 841], quoting People v. Gallagher (1893) 100 Cal. 466, 475 [35 P. 80]; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; U.S. Const., Amends. V, XIV; see also Evid. Code, § 773, subd. (a).) Such general compelled cross-examination would not only pose the same `cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt' recognized in Murphy v. Waterfront Com., [(1964)], 378 U.S. 52, 55 [12 L.Ed.2d 678, 681, 84 S.Ct. 1594]; it would also penalize and thereby deter a defendant's assertion of his right to take the witness stand to explain or contradict a particular aspect of the case against him. ( People v. Schader, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 770, fn. omitted.) As defendant asserts, the breadth of the waiver of his privilege is determined by the scope of the testimony he presents. (40b) Had he testified, as he proposed, regarding his reluctance to testify against his friends, the prosecution would have been entitled to introduce evidence through cross-examination that explained or refuted his statements or the inferences necessarily to be drawn from them, or that tended to overcome or qualify the effect of the testimony given on direct examination. ( Id. at pp. 770-771.) An inference naturally and necessarily to be drawn from the fact of defendant's reluctance to testify against his friends is that he possessed traits of loyalty, helpfulness, or concern toward them. Given the testimony that defendant and Jack Dowdy were longtime friends, the trial court properly ruled that the defendant could be cross-examined regarding matters bearing on his loyalty, helpfulness, or concern toward Dowdy, although he could not be cross-examined regarding the Urell or Church killings.