Opinion ID: 864456
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: whether moody was properly indicted for the

Text: CAPITAL MURDER OF WILLIAM HATCHER WITH THE SEXUAL BATTERY OF ROBBIE BOND AS THE UNDERLYING FELONY. ¶65. Moody argues that Count Two of the indictment against him is fundamentally flawed because the victim of the underlying felony of sexual battery (Bond) is distinct from the 41 second person who was murdered (Hatcher). Therefore, Moody argues, there should not be an attempt to link the death of Hatcher to the sexual battery of Bond. ¶66. Count Two of the indictment states that on May 14, 1995, in Perry County, Mississippi, Kenneth Moody: Did unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously, with malice aforethought, kill and murder a human being, to wit: WILLIAM HATCHER, while engaged in the commission of the crime of Sexual Battery on the person of ROBBIE BOND, to wit: did then and there unlawfully, wilfully, and feloniously engage in sexual penetration with her and without her consent, the said ROBBIE BOND, in violation of Section 97-3-95 (1)(a) of the Mississippi Code of 1972, as amended, all in violation of Section 97-3-19(2)(e) of the Mississippi Code of 1972, as amended, against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi. ¶67. Miss. Code Ann. §97-3-19(2)(e) states, in pertinent part: (2) The killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means or in any manner shall be capital murder in the following cases: (e) When done with or without any design to effect death, by any person engaged in the commission of the crime of rape, burglary, kidnapping, arson, robbery, sexual battery, unnatural intercourse with any child under the age of twelve (12), or nonconsensual unnatural intercourse with mankind, or in any attempt to commit such felonies. ¶68. Moody argues that the language in the commission of renders the indictment flawed because Hatcher was not killed while in the commission of the sexual battery of Bond. We disagree. Certainly, Moody could not have carried out the sexual battery of Bond had 42 he not first murdered Hatcher so that he would then be unimpeded in committing these acts upon Bond. The language of the statute is not ambiguous: ...any person engaged in the commission of the crime of...sexual battery, or in any attempt to commit such felonies. (emphasis added). ¶69. In West v. State, 553 So.2d 8, 13 (Miss. 1989), the defendant was convicted of capital murder, with the underlying felony, as here, being sexual battery. In West, we stated: An indictment charging a killing occurring ‘while engaged in the commission of’ one of the enumerated felonies includes the actions of the defendant leading up to the felony, the attempted felony, and flight from the scene of the felony. E.g., Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 757-58 (Miss. 1984); Pruett v. State, 431 So.2d 1101, 1104-05 (Miss. 1983). The fact that the actual moment of the victim's death preceded consummation of the underlying felony does not vitiate the capital charge. 553 So.2d at 13. We also held in West: Mississippi law accepts a ‘one continuous transaction’ rationale in capital cases. In Pickle v. State, 345 So.2d 623 (Miss. 1977), we construed our capital murder statute and held that ‘the underlying crime begins where an indictable attempt is reached....’ 345 So.2d at 626; see also Layne v. State, 542 So.2d 237, 243 (Miss. 1989); Fisher v. State, 481 So.2d 203, 212 (Miss. 1985); and Culberson v. State, 379 So.2d 499, 503-04 (Miss. 1979). 553 So.2d at 13. ¶70. Moody cites Pickle, as well, in an attempt to argue that when he made the decision to sexually batter Bond, that action did not cause the already completed murder of Hatcher 43 to rise to the level of capital murder. We see no way Moody could construe Pickle in his favor: The res gestae of the underlying crime begins where an indictable attempt is reached and ends where the chain of events between the attempted crime or completed felony is broken. Application of the felony-murder doctrine does not require that the underlying crime shall have been technically completed at the time of the homicide, nor does it matter at what point during the commission of the underlying felony the homicide occurs. When, however, there is a break in the chain of events leading from the initial felony, as by the felon's abandonment of the original criminal activity, a subsequent homicide committed by him is not within the felony-murder statute, and it is a question of fact for the jury whether the original criminal activity did in fact terminate prior to the homicide. In this connection, escape or attempted escape is generally held to be so immediately connected with the initial crime as to be a part of it. Pickle v. State, 345 So.2d 623, 626 (Miss. 1977) (quoting from 40 Am.Jur.2d Homicide § 73, at 366-367 (1968) (emphasis added). ¶71. In this case, there is never a break in the chain of events. The record reveals that Moody first killed Hatcher, then immediately thereafter sexually assaulted and killed Bond. Moody’s actions fall within the purview of the capital statute. ¶72. This issue is without merit.