Opinion ID: 3003338
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sentencing Entrapment and Manipulation

Text: Sentencing entrapment occurs “when a defendant who lacks a predisposition to engage in more serious crimes nevertheless does so ‘as a result of unrelenting government persistence.’ ” United States v. White, 519 F.3d 342, 347 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Veazey, 491 F.3d 700, 710 (7th Cir. 2007)). The government may disprove sentencing entrapment by simply showing that the defendant was in fact predisposed to violate the law without “extraordinary inducements.” Id. Sentencing manipulation is distinct from entrapment and occurs when the government procures evidence “through outrageous conduct solely for the purpose of increasing the defendant’s sentence under the Sentencing 20 Nos. 06-4101, 06-4376 & 07-1813 Guidelines.” United States v. Wagner, 467 F.3d 1085, 1090 (7th Cir. 2006). Because “this circuit clearly and consistently has refused to recognize any defense based on either ‘sentencing manipulation’ or on asserting ‘outrageous government conduct,’ ” White, 519 F.3d at 346, Davis’ manipulation argument would seem to be a nonstarter. However, Davis raises both sentencing entrapment and manipulation not as defenses to criminal conduct, but as mitigating factors that the district court may consider in choosing a reasonable sentence. See United States v. Lakhani, 480 F.3d 171, 186 (3d Cir. 2007) (acknowledging that the district court at sentencing “would have been entitled to consider the Government’s pervasive role in this case,” even though the jury had rejected the defendant’s entrapment defense); cf. United States v. Hale, 448 F.3d 971, 989 (7th Cir. 2006) (rejecting a sentencing entrapment argument under § 3553(a) on the ground that the defendant had not shown “extraordinary inducements”). Assuming that evidence of sentencing entrapment and manipulation could be relevant to a district court’s application of the § 3553(a) factors, the evidence in this case was not so strong that the district court abused its discretion in rejecting Davis’ entrapment and manipulation arguments. Davis argues that, by changing the payment term of the guns purchase from $2000 cash to 2 1/4 ounces cocaine, the ATF agent entrapped Davis into a drug offense that he would not otherwise have committed. That change also amounts to sentencing manipulation, says Davis, because the drug offense triggered a harsher sentencing range under the career offender guideline, which would not Nos. 06-4101, 06-4376 & 07-1813 21 apply to a cash purchase of guns. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a)(2) (indicating that the career offender guideline applies only where “the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense”). We find these arguments to be without merit. As to sentencing entrapment, Davis had sold crack to the agent on three prior occasions, indicating that he did not lack the predisposition to commit another crack deal. True, the prior sales involved quantities below the 50-gram threshold that triggered a higher statutory maximum for Davis’ instant conviction. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(a)(iii). But Davis was at all times agreeable to paying for the guns with 2 1/4 ounces of crack, telling his co-defendants that he could easily supply that quantity. The agent did not have to use “extraordinary inducements” to convince Davis to engage in this relatively high-volume crack deal. White, 519 F.3d at 347. And while the 2 1/4 ounces solicited by the agent may have had a slightly lesser value than the originally proposed $2000 cash, such “bargain basement pricing” does not amount to sentencing entrapment. United States v. Estrada, 256 F.3d 466, 473-74 (7th Cir. 2001). As to sentencing manipulation, it is not enough that the agent’s provision of handguns and solicitation of larger crack quantities may have been “motivated in part by the desire to increase [Davis’] sentence.” Wagner, 467 F.3d at 1090. Although the agent’s tactics had the effect of increasing Davis’ guidelines sentencing range, it also served the legitimate purpose of investigating the full 22 Nos. 06-4101, 06-4376 & 07-1813 extent of Davis’ criminal activity, including his ability to deal in large quantities of crack. See id. The government’s conduct in this case was not so outrageous as to require leniency under § 3553(a).