Opinion ID: 2830797
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Montana v. United States

Text: [¶25] In Montana, the Court held that the Crow Indian Tribe’s sovereign power did not include authority to regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting on lands located within the boundaries of the reservation but owned in fee by non-Indians. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566, 101 S.Ct. at 1259. In so ruling, the Court held that “the inherent sovereign powers 10 of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.” Id., 450 U.S. at 565, 101 S.Ct. at 1258. The Court then announced two exceptions to that principle, outlining the circumstances under which a tribe may exercise jurisdiction over a non-Indian on the tribe’s reservation: To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. Williams v. Lee, supra, at 223, 79 S.Ct., at 272; Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384, 24 S.Ct. 712, 48 L.Ed. 1030; Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (CA8); see Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152-154, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 2080-2082, 65 L.Ed.2d 10. A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386, 96 S.Ct. 943, 946, 47 L.Ed.2d 106; Williams v. Lee, supra, at 220, 79 S.Ct., at 270; Montana Catholic Missions v. Missoula County, 200 U.S. 118, 128-129, 26 S.Ct. 197, 200-201, 50 L.Ed. 398; Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 273, 18 S.Ct. 340, 343, 42 L.Ed. 740. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66, 101 S.Ct. at 1258 (footnote omitted). [¶26] Following its decision in Montana, the Supreme Court continued to apply the principles announced in that case to determine tribal regulatory authority over non-Indian conduct on non-Indian land within a reservation. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 423-24, 109 S.Ct. 2994, 3004-05, 106 L.Ed.2d 343 (1989) (tribe lacked authority to zone fee lands owned by non-Indians on portion of reservation open to general public); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 689, 113 S.Ct. 2309, 2316-17, 124 L.Ed.2d 606 (1993) (tribe lacked authority to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on land and water located within reservation but acquired by the United States for operation of a dam and reservoir). In 1997, the Court extended the Montana test beyond tribal regulatory jurisdiction and applied it to determine tribal adjudicative jurisdiction. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 117 S.Ct. 1404, 137 L.Ed.2d 661 (1997). 11 [¶27] In Strate, the Supreme Court addressed tribal court jurisdiction over a personal injury action arising from an automobile accident that occurred on a state highway within reservation boundaries. Strate, 520 U.S. at 442-43, 117 S.Ct. at 1407-08. Both parties to the action were non-Indian. Id. In considering whether the tribal court had jurisdiction over the matter, the Court first confronted the question whether the Montana analysis even applied in the context of adjudicative jurisdiction, given that Montana announced a rule governing tribal regulatory jurisdiction. Id. at 447-53, 117 S.Ct. at 1410-13. In holding that the Montana analysis was controlling, the Court reasoned: While Montana immediately involved regulatory authority, the Court broadly addressed the concept of “inherent sovereignty.” Id., at 563, 101 S.Ct., at 1257. Regarding activity on non-Indian fee land within a reservation, Montana delineated—in a main rule and exceptions—the bounds of the power tribes retain to exercise “forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians.” Id., at 565, 101 S.Ct., at 1258. As to nonmembers, we hold, a tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction. Absent congressional direction enlarging tribal-court jurisdiction, we adhere to that understanding. Subject to controlling provisions in treaties and statutes, and the two exceptions identified in Montana, the civil authority of Indian tribes and their courts with respect to non-Indian fee lands generally “do[es] not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.” Ibid. Strate, 520 U.S. at 453, 117 S.Ct. at 1413 (emphasis added). [¶28] The next question the Supreme Court addressed in Strate concerned the status of the land on which the accident occurred. Strate, 520 U.S. at 454, 117 S.Ct. at 1413. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that the Montana analysis applied only in cases involving non-Indian activity on non-Indian fee land, and the state highway at issue in Strate was not non-Indian fee land but was instead located on lands held in trust for the tribe. Id. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument and held: Forming part of the State’s highway, the right-of-way is open to the public, and traffic on it is subject to the State’s control. The Tribes have consented to, and received payment for, the State’s use of the 6.59–mile stretch for a public highway. They have retained no gatekeeping right. So long as the stretch is maintained as part of the State’s highway, the Tribes cannot assert a landowner’s right to occupy and exclude. Cf. Bourland, 508 U.S., at 689, 113 S.Ct., at 2316–2317 12 (regarding reservation land acquired by the United States for operation of a dam and a reservoir, Tribe’s loss of “right of absolute and exclusive use and occupation ... implies the loss of regulatory jurisdiction over the use of the land by others”). We therefore align the right-of-way, for the purpose at hand, with land alienated to non-Indians. Our decision in Montana, accordingly, governs this case. Strate, 520 U.S. at 455-56, 117 S.Ct. at 1414 (footnote omitted).2 [¶29] Having determined that the accident occurred on the equivalent of non-Indian land, the Supreme Court concluded that what it had before it was a case concerning the conduct of non-Indians on non-Indian land, making Montana applicable to the determination of tribal court jurisdiction. Strate, 520 U.S. at 456, 117 S.Ct. at 1414. In applying the Montana test, the Court framed it as follows: Montana thus described a general rule that, absent a different congressional direction, Indian tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of nonmembers on non-Indian land within a reservation, subject to two exceptions: The first exception relates to nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members; the second concerns activity that directly affects the tribe’s political integrity, economic security, health, or welfare. Strate, 520 U.S. at 446, 117 S.Ct. at 1409-10. 2 In so holding, the Court acknowledged that it was deviating from at least one statutory definition of “Indian country” that included “rights-of-way running through [a] reservation.” Strate, 520 U.S. at 454, 117 S.Ct. at 1413, n.9 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1151). Additionally, while the Court concluded that the tribes had a diminished regulatory role on the state highway for purposes of civil jurisdiction, it acknowledged the tribes do retain criminal enforcement authority on the highway. The Court noted: We do not here question the authority of tribal police to patrol roads within a reservation, including rights-of-way made part of a state highway, and to detain and turn over to state officers nonmembers stopped on the highway for conduct violating state law. Cf. State v. Schmuck, 121 Wash.2d 373, 390, 850 P.2d 1332, 1341 (en banc) (recognizing that a limited tribal power “to stop and detain alleged offenders in no way confers an unlimited authority to regulate the right of the public to travel on the Reservation’s roads”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 931, 114 S.Ct. 343, 126 L.Ed.2d 308 (1993). Strate, 520 U.S. at 456, 117 S.Ct. at 1414, n.11. 13 [¶30] The Court held the first Montana exception was not applicable, explaining: The first exception to the Montana rule covers “activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.” 450 U.S., at 565, 101 S.Ct., at 1258. The tortious conduct alleged in [Plaintiff's] complaint does not fit that description. The dispute, as the Court of Appeals said, is “distinctly non-tribal in nature.” 76 F.3d, at 940. It “arose between two non-Indians involved in [a] runof-the-mill [highway] accident.” Ibid. Although [Defendant] was engaged in subcontract work on the Fort Berthold Reservation, and therefore had a “consensual relationship” with the Tribes, “[Plaintiff] was not a party to the subcontract, and the [T]ribes were strangers to the accident.” Ibid. Strate, 520 U.S. at 456-57, 117 S.Ct. at 1415. [¶31] The Court found the second Montana exception equally unavailing. The Court reasoned: The second exception to Montana’s general rule concerns conduct that “threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.” 450 U.S., at 566, 101 S.Ct., at 1258. Undoubtedly, those who drive carelessly on a public highway running through a reservation endanger all in the vicinity, and surely jeopardize the safety of tribal members. But if Montana's second exception requires no more, the exception would severely shrink the rule.