Opinion ID: 2581010
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Asserted constant disparagement of defense counsel and defendant

Text: Defendant asserts that on numerous occasions throughout the trial the prosecutor  by his language, facial expressions, tone of voice, and accusatory speaking objections  disparaged the character and integrity of defendant and defense counsel in front of the jury. For example, defendant cites (i) defense counsel's closing argument to the jury, in which counsel told the jury that the prosecutor had glared and pointed at his client during trial; (ii) the prosecutor's comment, Don't direct your questions to me, Counselor, in response to defense counsel's question during the cross-examination of Shane Powell; (iii) the prosecutor's assertion that defense counsel's questions of Powell were obviously calculated to prejudice this jury; (iv) the prosecutor's assertedly sarcastic tone, as exemplified in his statement made in response to a court order to show defense counsel all items to be handled by any witness: Here. Let me comply with defense counsel's request; and (v) the prosecutor's assertions, during closing argument, that the defense tactic would be one of character assassination. Many of defendant's cited examples, by his own admission, appear innocuous if viewed in isolation. Indeed, we find most of the cited passages to be innocuous, even viewed in combination, when considered in the context of the surrounding testimony and circumstances. In any event, defendant failed to object at trial to any of these challenged comments. Because timely admonitions would have cured any harm, claims based upon these comments may not now be asserted on appeal. ( Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 34, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468.) Defense counsel, however, did object at trial to two additional matters, which he now asserts as error. During an in limine hearing prior to the introduction of any evidence, defense counsel complained to the court that the prosecutor had been glaring at defendant hatefully, with a lot of tension, and asked the trial court to order the prosecutor to cease such conduct. The prosecutor acknowledged looking at defendant but denied any improper conduct. The trial court concluded that it could not rule on the request because it had not noticed any such conduct. We conclude that even if the prosecutor did on occasion glare at defendant in the manner complained of, the record does not establish or support a pattern of conduct so egregious as to infect the trial with anything approaching the level of fundamental unfairness that would constitute a denial of due process under the federal Constitution. (See People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 820, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 838 P.2d 204 ( Espinoza ); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo (1974) 416 U.S. 637, 642-643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 ( DeChristoforo ).) Defense counsel also voiced exception after the prosecutor at one point made a speaking objection in which he asserted that a question posed by defense counsel to Terry Guillory  asking whether Guillory recalled telling the prosecutor of talk on the street that Maurice Solvang and Donna Guthrie were involved in this  was the most outrageous question I have ever heard and that [defense counsel] is in contempt of court because of that question. As defendant observes, the trial court eventually overruled the prosecutor's objection. But again, even assuming that in this and other instances the prosecutor at times was intemperate, the record does not establish a pattern of conduct so egregious as to reflect the level of fundamental unfairness that would constitute a denial of due process under the federal Constitution. Although it is apparent from the record that the relations between defense counsel and the prosecutor at trial often were acrimonious, we find apt our observation in Espinoza, supra, 3 Cal.4th 806, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 838 P.2d 204: None of the instances that defendant characterizes as prosecutorial misconduct appears to have been either intended or likely to deceive the jury on any material issue. Moreover, it is not reasonably likely that the jury would have understood the prosecutors bickering with defense counsel, or his use of facial expressions or gestures to express dismay or disbelief, to be a personal attack on defense counsels integrity. In all likelihood, the jury viewed such behavior as expressing merely a clash of personalities. Thus, it is not reasonably probable that the prosecutors occasional intemperate behavior affected the jury's evaluation of the evidence or the rendering of its verdict. ( Id., at pp. 820-821, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 838 P.2d 204.)