Opinion ID: 1698429
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: arguments #4 & 5

Text: Opponents of the Casino Act contend that the statute unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority to the executive branch of government. [State government is divided into three separate branches, legislative, executive, and judicial. La. Const. art. II, § 1. Furthermore, art. II, § 2 provides that one branch shall not exercise power granted to either of the others.] The power and duty to define gambling was granted to the legislature in La. Const. art. XII, § 6(B). In defining gambling, the legislature excluded games conducted on board commercial cruiseships, upon riverboats as defined and authorized, and at the official gaming establishment as defined and authorized. Plaintiffs contend that this power to define gambling has been relinquished by the Legislature in the Casino Act, as well as in the Cruiseship Gaming Act and the Riverboat Gaming Act. With regard to the Casino Act, they reason that the Casino Corporation, whose members are appointed by the governor and whose president is selected by the members of the Board, subject to the approval of the governor, is part of the executive branch of government. Since La.Rev. Stat.Ann. § 4:620(B) (West Supp.1993) permits the Board of the Casino Corporation to determine the types of games to be operated, plaintiffs suggest that the power to define gambling has thereby been relinquished to the executive branch. They claim that a similar analysis is applicable to the Cruiseship Gaming Act and to the Riverboat Gaming Act. In State v. Morgan, 238 La. 829, 116 So.2d 682 (1959), defendant urged that a statute, which made it unlawful to introduce certain articles declared to be contraband onto the grounds of a penal institution except through regular channels, was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to an administrative officer. This provision was challenged on the grounds that it left to the officer in charge the determination of when an action was a crime. Although it was argued that the prison officials could make certain conduct criminal within their jurisdiction by simply banning certain procedures for bringing items into prison, this Court had no difficulty in holding ... that the provision under attack is constitutional. Id., 116 So.2d at 687. In this case, opponents complain that the legislature has relinquished its power to define certain conduct as gambling, and thus has relinquished its power to define criminal activity. We disagree. Having defined gambling in La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 14:90 as the intentional conducting, or directly assisting in the conducting, as a business, of any game, contest, lottery, or contrivance whereby a person risks the loss of anything of value in order to realize a profit, the legislature specifically excluded from its definition gaming activities or operations on board a commercial cruiseship, upon a riverboat, and at the official gaming establishment. No gaming activities which the Casino Board, or boat operators, or licensees may choose to conduct at these locations constitute gambling, according to the legislature. The Board, operators and licensees can add nothing to the legislature's definition of gambling. By designation, they can create no criminal activity regarding gambling at these locations, and they have no authority beyond the limits of the cruiseship, riverboat, or the official gaming establishment.