Opinion ID: 44235
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Transmission of Citizenship

Text: Valdes-Rego first argues that case law indicates that an exception to the INA’s physical presence requirement should be applied when a United States official prevents an applicant from meeting those requirements. Valdes-Rego argues that the “statute’s spirit” would be frustrated if his mother’s citizenship was not transferred to him, because his mother repeatedly but unsuccessfully attempted to register him as a foreign-born United States citizen. 1 Because Valdes-Rego’s immigration proceedings commenced after April 1, 1997, the permanent rules of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (“IIRIRA”), govern his petition for review. 2 The statute detailing judicial review of immigration decisions states that if the court of appeals “finds from the pleadings and affidavits that no genuine issue of material fact about the petitioner’s nationality is presented, the court shall decide the nationality claim.” INA § 242(b)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(A). To determine Valdes-Rego’s citizenship, we look to the applicable law in effect at the time of his birth. Tullius v. Albright, 240 F.3d 1317, 1320 (11th Cir. 2001). In 1970, when Valdes-Rego was born, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) provided that: [A] person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than ten years, at least five of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years . . . was a national and citizen of the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (1970).2 In addition, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) explicitly sets forth two physical presence requirement exceptions: (1) for a period of honorable service in the armed forces, or (2) for employment with the United States government. Id. In Tullius, we considered a situation where an appellant sought declaratory judgment of United States citizenship. 240 F.3d at 1318. In that case, the 2 This provision, as amended, is now codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g). 3 appellant contended that his father had transmitted United States citizenship to him, even though both parties agreed that the appellant’s father had not satisfied the physical presence requirements set forth in the statute. Id. at 1319-20. The appellant argued that a constructive physical presence doctrine should apply in transmission cases when a citizen is prevented from satisfying the physical presence requirement because of circumstances beyond his control. Id. at 1320. We held, however, that “the plain meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) prevents this interpretation.” Id. We reasoned that “the existence of . . . two articulated exceptions to the physical presence requirements undermine[d] [the] appellant’s argument that this Court should add a third ‘circumstances beyond control’ exception.” Id. at 1321. In the instant case, the record indicates that Valdes-Rego’s mother relocated to Cuba in 1955, at the age of seven, and returned to the United States in 1980. Accordingly, when Valdes-Rego was born in 1970, his mother had not satisfied the physical presence requirement set forth in § 1401(a)(7). In drafting 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7), Congress clearly intended to include two exceptions to the physical presence requirement, to be applied when: (1) an individual serves in the armed forces, and (2) an individual is employed by the United States government. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7)(1970). The record contains no evidence suggesting that 4 Valdes-Rego’s mother fell within either of these exceptions. Despite Valdes-Rego’s allegations, the record contains no objective evidence suggesting that United States officials prevented his mother from returning to the United States and fulfilling the physical presence requirement. Moreover, even if he had submitted such evidence, the applicable version of the statute does not explicitly provide for an exception for individuals who were prevented from returning to the United States because of misconduct by a United States official. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7)(1970). Finally, we held that “the doctrine of constructive physical presence does not apply to the physical presence requirement for transmission of United States citizenship under 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7).” See Tullius, 240 F.3d at 1321. Accordingly, we deny ValdesRego’s petition as to this issue.