Opinion ID: 3011287
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Legislative Findings Are Inadequate

Text: Unlike Lopez, but like Morrison, FACE's legislative history contains congressional findings. As a result of hearings, Congress alleged in Committee reports and in floor debates that patients and doctors travel interstate for abortions; that local authorities were sometimes unable to control violence at abortion clinics; and that obstructionist tactics had caused losses in the millions of dollars, caused clinics to close, and had intimidated physicians as well as patients. Based on anecdotal evidence, Congress decided that federal intervention authorized by the Commerce Clause and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment was appropriate. On several occasions, we have said that congressional findings are entitled to judicial deference and that it is not our role to  `second-guess the legislative judgment of Congress.'  United States v. Parker, 108 F.3d 28, 30 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Bishop, 66 F.3d at 577). Accordingly, all that was required of a reviewing court was to ensure that Congress had a rational basis for its legislation. Id. However correct that approach may be in other settings, it can no longer be said that such substantial deference is due in cases assessing the limits of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. In Morrison, the Court stated that the existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1752. Whether the effect upon interstate commerce is substantial enough to make Congress' exercise of power under the 33 Commerce Clause appropriate is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question. Id. As the basis for concluding that blockades have a substantial effect upon interstate commerce, Congress reasoned that obstructions that deter patients from going to a clinic caused diminished business for the enterprise. In some cases, when clinics closed, women were required to travel, perhaps interstate, to obtain the services of another establishment. This is the very same but-for causal chain of logic that the Court explicitly rejected in Morrison. Id. at 1752-53. If every attenuated effect upon interstate commerce stemming from an occurrence of violent crime satisfied the substantial effects test, then Congress could regulate any crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption. Id. The opinions of the Courts of Appeals that have upheld FACE all rely heavily on the legislative history for concluding that a substantial effect on interstate commerce existed. See United States v. Weslin, 156 F.3d 292, 296 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 666, 678 (5th Cir. 1997); Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1415-16 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 920-21 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 681 (7th Cir. 1995); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520-21 (11th Cir. 1995); American Life League v. Reno , 47 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1994). But these decisions are undercut by Morrison. With the asserted justifications constitutionally infirm, the legislative history does little to demonstrate a reasonable congressional judgment that the prohibited activity substantially affects interstate commerce.