Opinion ID: 2588178
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Citizen-taxpayer standing

Text: To establish citizen-taxpayer standing, plaintiffs must show that the case is of public significance and that they are appropriate plaintiffs. [13] We have held that a plaintiff was not appropriate when the plaintiff was a sham plaintiff with no true adversity of interest; when the plaintiff was incapable of competently advocating his or her position; and when there was another potential plaintiff more directly affected by the challenged conduct who had sued or was likely to sue. [14] We agree with the Keller plaintiffs that they were not sham plaintiffs and that they were capable of competently advocating their positions. And we assume, without deciding, that an alleged violation of the fair and just treatment clause is a matter of public significance. But there is nonetheless a substantial question here as to whether other persons who are more directly affected have sued or are likely to sue. The Keller plaintiffs argue that no other potential plaintiffs who are more directly affected have sued or are likely to sue. At a minimum, this argument ignores the Kiesel plaintiffs, who were more directly affected by the investigation and who actually sued some of the French defendants. As the subpoenaed witnesses, the Kiesel plaintiffs were among the classes of persons in this investigation most obviously protected by the fair and just treatment clause. They did not allege any violation of the fair and just treatment clause in the superior court. But had they thought they were being mistreated, they would have been far more appropriate plaintiffs to make that claim than the Keller plaintiffs, none of whom self-identified as either a witness or a target of the investigation. We have held that an appellant did not have citizen-taxpayer standing when a more directly affected plaintiff had already filed suit based on closely related claims, even though the claims were not identical. [15] We likewise reject the Keller plaintiffs' argument that no other plaintiffs more directly affected by the challenged conduct have sued. In addition to the subpoenaed plaintiffs, as of October 9 when we issued our dispositive order there was at least one other potential plaintiff who was directly affected by the investigation and who was fully capable of suing. The Keller plaintiffs concede that Governor Palin was arguably more directly concerned, but argue that she is unlikely to sue. They argue that the governor stated that she would cooperate with the investigation, and that this, along with the fact that she was in the middle of a national election campaign, indicated that she was not going to bring suit. [16] Their interpretation of the citizen-taxpayer standing test is too literal. Even if the governor did not intend to sue, there is no indication that, if she thought her rights were being violated, she would be unable to do so. The Keller plaintiffs do not contend that the governor or any other potential plaintiffs were somehow limited in their ability to sue. That individuals who are more directly affected have chosen not to sue despite their ability to do so does not confer citizen-taxpayer standing on an inappropriate plaintiff. We have denied citizen-taxpayer standing on similar grounds before. In Kleven v. Yukon-Koyukuk School District a former employee who filed a grievance but resigned before it was resolved sued to challenge his former employer's grievance process. [17] We held that the employee lacked citizen-taxpayer standing because the remaining employees were in a better position to raise the complaints and because we had no reason to believe that current . . . employees would be indisposed to press legitimate grievances. [18] That decision did not hinge on the likelihood that the current employees would sue. Here there is no reason to believe that any potentially implicated executive branch officials, including the governor, would be unwilling to sue if they thought their rights were being violated during the investigation. We therefore reject the Keller plaintiffs' argument that no other plaintiff more directly affected by the challenged conduct is likely to sue. Comparing other potential parties' claims with those of the Keller plaintiffs reveals how indirectly, if at all, the investigation affected the Keller plaintiffs. The fair and just treatment clause was written to avoid the excesses which [the delegates] felt were characterized by the conduct of Senator Joseph McCarthy, including vilification, character assassination, and an intimation of guilt by association. [19] Witnesses in the investigation, targets of the investigation, or any executive branch employee potentially implicated in Monegan's dismissal could have been appropriate plaintiffs in an action to enforce the constitution's protection. [20] Such persons would be in a position to be vilified, have their characters assassinated, or be found guilty by association during an investigation that was not fair and just. But there is no indication the Keller plaintiffs might personally be exposed to any such abuses of legislative power; they do not claim that they were potential witnesses or investigative targets, or that the investigation would somehow implicate them in Monegan's dismissal. As the French defendants argue, it appears the Keller plaintiffs are attempting to assert the individual rights of potential or imaginary third parties. We have never before allowed citizen-taxpayer standing to be used in this way. The Keller plaintiffs assert that we did so in State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska. [21] But we did not discuss citizen-taxpayer standing in that case. Instead, we held that the plaintiffs had interest-injury standing and third-party standing, both of which are distinct from citizen-taxpayer standing. [22] As we have noted before, [g]enerally, a litigant lacks standing to assert the constitutional rights of another. [23] We have recognized third-party standing, but not citizen-taxpayer standing, as an exception to this rule. [24] The Keller plaintiffs do not rely on third-party standing, but invoke citizen-taxpayer standing in attempting to achieve the same result. We decline to allow the use of citizen-taxpayer standing as a substitute for third-party standing here.