Opinion ID: 290727
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The timeliness of the Government's Application

Text: 15 Appellant Trefina points out that the application of the Government to intervene came a little over a year after the commencement of this litigation and approximately a year after the date that the Government clearly knew of the suit. Trefina also asserts that the application was filed only five days before trial. This contention misrepresents the circumstances, because the case had been broken into two separate lawsuits, and the United States was not concerned in the one that was set five days after the application. The trial court informed the parties that it would hold a hearing on the intervention before that trial was over, and it did so. At the time of the intervention, there had been no legally significant proceedings in the second of the two lawsuits other than completion of discovery and a pretrial that determined that there were to be two separate suits. There is no showing of any delay in the process of the overall litigation by the Government's filing of its application at the time it did. 16 Under these circumstances, we clearly cannot hold that the application was untimely. In the first place, timeliness is a question addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and we cannot reverse its allowance of the intervention absent an abuse of that discretion. 2 W. Barron & A. Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 594 (Wright ed. 1961); 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice P24.13(1) (1969). There is no abuse of discretion here. Timeliness of intervention is to be judged by two criteria: (1) The length of time during which the proposed intervenor has known about his interest in the suit without acting, and (2) the harm or prejudice that results to the rights of other parties by delay. In the context of this lengthy, complicated litigation, based on a contract signed over a decade ago, we do not think that the Government forfeited its right to intervene solely by the passage of a year after it knew of the suit. Cf. Kozak v. Wells, 8th Cir. 1960, 278 F.2d 104 (application timely even though a year late); Innis, Speiden & Co. v. Food Mach. Corp., D.C.Del.1942, 2 F.R.D. 261 (application timely after four years); Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 2d Cir. 1965, 344 F.2d 571 (application untimely after sixteen months). Furthermore, the more important question is not the mere length of time but the possibility of prejudice to existing parties that the delay may cause. This consideration is to be evaluated against the liberal treatment that is to be accorded applications for intervention of right; such applications 'may well be granted at a time in the suit when it would be wise to deny permissive intervention.' J. Moore, supra at P24.13(1). Since few legally significant events have occurred in the separate part of the case in which the Government is involved, and since many courts have allowed intervention in meritorious cases after trial, after judgment, and even after settlement, see W. Barron & A. Holtzoff, supra at 368 n. 36, J. Moore, supra at 24-526 to 24-528, we cannot find that the time of the application caused prejudice to Trefina's rights of a magnitude sufficient to justify overturning the trial court's decision.