Opinion ID: 1110277
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Adversarial Probable Cause Hearing

Text: While the Legislature intended that the commitment trial should take place well in advance of the respondent's date of release from prison, it also apparently recognized that in some cases there could be situations where the alleged offender was set to be released before the commitment trial had taken place. Thus, the Legislature created a separate, secondary adversarial probable cause determination. See § 394.915(2); see also Reese, 773 So.2d at 657 (noting that the Ryce Act contemplates two different probable cause determinations: an ex parte determination in accordance with 394.915(1) and an adversarial probable cause hearing described in 394.915(2)). [9] The adversarial probable cause hearing described in section 394.915(2) can be held [u]pon the expiration of the incarcerative sentence and before the release from custody. Thus, this secondary probable cause determination was apparently intended by the Legislature to be a fallback procedure for persons who were entitled to release from prison but still had not been brought to trial under the commitment petition. The adversarial probable cause hearing also provides the person with more rights than the initial ex parte probable cause determination (i.e., the right to counsel and to present evidence). See § 394.915, Fla. Stat. (1999). The only additional guidance given by the Legislature for when to hold such a hearing was that the trial court may conduct an adversarial probable cause hearing if it determines such hearing is necessary and that the court should hold the hearing only in cases where the failure to begin trial is not the result of any delay caused by the respondent. § 394.915(2), Fla. Stat. (1999). Furthermore, section 394.916(1) does not distinguish between the ex parte or adversarial probable cause determinations for purposes of calculating the thirty-day time limit for trial. In the instant case, the due process problems we have discussed above may well have been alleviated if the court had held an adversarial probable cause hearing early in the proceedings and nearer the time the appellee's criminal sentence expired. [10] As noted above, the provision for an adversarial probable cause determination appears to have been intended for such circumstances. However, we are not presented with that issue here since no adversarial probable cause hearing was ever conducted during the appellee's continued detention after the expiration of his sentence.