Opinion ID: 2604574
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Immunity and Mootness of Injunctive Relief Under Section 1983

Text: As a matter of law, Stjernholm is unable to obtain damages against the members of the Board. Absolute immunity protects officials who engage in judicial or quasi-judicial activities from such liability. Section 1983 provides that: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. (Emphasis added.) This statute must be read against a common-law background of official immunity. Higgs v. District Court, 713 P.2d 840, 850 (Colo.1985). Absolute immunity is afforded to those officials whose special functions or constitutional status requires complete protection from suit. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2732, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); see also Higgs, 713 P.2d at 852. Absolute immunity is typically applied as a complete defense to prosecutors and judges in judicial proceedings in order to preserve their independent decision-making and to prevent undue deflection of attention from public duties. Higgs, 713 P.2d at 850. Administrative officials acting in a quasi-judicial role are entitled to absolute immunity. In Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978), the Supreme Court concluded that federal administrative officials who initiate or participate in quasi-adjudicatory administrative proceedings, function analogously to prosecutors and judges in judicial proceedings and are absolutely immune from a suit for damages arising therefrom. Id. at 512-13, 98 S.Ct. at 2913-14; Accord, e.g., Pfeiffer v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 1484, 1489 (10th Cir.1991) (It is also well established that this absolute prosecutorial immunity extends to state attorneys and agency officials who perform functions analogous to those of a prosecutor in initiating and pursuing civil and administrative enforcement proceedings.). We have held that witnesses who testify at grand jury proceedings are entitled to absolute immunity for such testimony because these proceedings are a part of the judicial phase of the criminal process. See Wagner v. Board of County Comm'rs, 933 P.2d 1311, 1313, 1314 (Colo.1997). We have further held that members of the Parole Board, a Colorado administrative agency, perform a function that is judicial in nature when they consider, grant, deny, or revoke parole. See State v. Mason, 724 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Colo. 1986). Parole Board members, the Parole Board as an entity, and the state are entitled to absolute immunity for their quasi-judicial acts. See id. at 1292 (We recognize that the absolute quasi-judicial immunity of the parole board members ... leaves the plaintiff without remedy even if the parole board's release of [an inmate] was careless and negligent.). Like the Chiropractic Board, the Parole Board performs both quasi-legislative functions through rulemaking, § 17-2-201(3)(a) to (c), 8A C.R.S. (1986 & 1996 Supp.), and quasi-adjudicatory functions through consideration of applications for parole and hearings on parole revocations, § 17-2-201(4)(a) to (c), 8A C.R.S. (1986 & 1996 Supp.). The Chiropractic Board is comprised of five citizens, four of whom have practiced the chiropractic profession in the state of Colorado for five years prior to their appointment to the Board, and one of whom is appointed from the public at large. § 12-33-103(1), 5A C.R.S. (1991). In its quasi-legislative capacity, the Board has authority to promulgate rules and regulations. § 12-33-107(1)(a), 5A C.R.S. (1991). In its quasi-judicial capacity, the Board has the duty to [e]xamine, license, and renew licenses of duly qualified chiropractic applicants ..., § 12-33-107(1)(b), 5A C.R.S. (1991); to conduct hearings upon complaints concerning the disciplining of chiropractors, § 12-33-107(1)(d), 5A C.R.S. (1991); to cause the prosecution of and seek injunctions against all persons violating the Act, § 12-33-107(1)(e); and to [e]mploy investigators, issue subpoenas, compel the attendance of witnesses, compel the production of records, books, papers, and documents, and administer oaths to persons giving testimony at hearings ..., § 12-33-107(1)(f), 5A C.R.S. (1991). We have previously addressed how quasi-judicial actions differ from quasi-legislative actions. Quasi-adjudicatory proceedings involve determinations of the rights, duties, or obligations of specific individuals, see Colorado Ground Water Comm'n v. Eagle Peak Farms, Ltd., 919 P.2d 212, 217 (Colo.1996), based on the application of presently existing legal standards or policy considerations to past or present facts developed at a hearing conducted for the purpose of resolving the particular interests in question. Cherry Hills Resort Dev. Co. v. Cherry Hills Village, 757 P.2d 622, 625 (Colo. 1988). The Board member actions at issue in this section 1983 litigation involved professional discipline and license suspension. In Colorado, such proceedings are quasi-judicial in nature. Discipline under the Chiropractic Act invokes application of the APA. See § 12-33-119(5). APA section 24-4-102(2), 10A C.R.S. (1988), provides that adjudication means the proceeding used by an agency for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of an order and includes licensing. See, e.g., Eagle Peak Farms, Ltd., 919 P.2d at 219; see also Zamarripa v. Q & T Food Stores, Inc., 929 P.2d 1332, 1342 (Colo.1997) (License revocation can occur only as a result of proper quasi-adjudicatory proceeding when a licensee invokes the procedural and substantive protection to which the licensee is entitled under applicable law.). The General Assembly may prohibit the practice of a profession in the absence of a statutorily prescribed license, and there exists a strong public interest in the enforcement of such statutes. See Kourlis v. District Court, 930 P.2d 1329, 1333, 1336-37 (Colo.1997). Doctors of medicine, doctors of osteopathy, chiropodists, dentists, and doctors of chiropractic all practice their professions by grace of the state. Colorado Chiropractic Ass'n v. State, 171 Colo. 395, 402, 467 P.2d 795, 799 (1970). In giving scope to the principle of absolute judicial immunity, the Supreme Court has stated that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. Liability to answer to every one who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge, would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871). We have applied this policy to absolute prosecutorial immunity. See Higgs, 713 P.2d at 850. The rationale for both absolute judicial and prosecutorial immunity is equally pertinent to quasi-judicial functions performed by state boards, members of these state boards, and state attorneys: The importance of impartial decision making, the possibility of unfounded suits and the need for freedom from fear of litigation.... Mason, 724 P.2d at 1291. As public officials engaging in quasi-judicial actions, the state Board, Board members and attorneys enjoy absolute immunity from suit for damages, state or federal. Underscoring and reinforcing this immunity, the Chiropractic Act provides that [t]he members of the board shall not be personally liable for damages for any official act of the board. § 12-33-104, 5A C.R.S. (1991). Of course, a state actor cannot invoke a state immunity provision to avoid liability otherwise existing under section 1983. See Brace, 919 P.2d at 238. But this provision of the Chiropractic Act mirrors federal law which does preclude a suit under section 1983 for damages arising from judicial or quasi-judicial activities. Nevertheless, official immunity from damages does not equate to immunity from injunctive relief under section 1983. [N]either qualified nor absolute immunity precludes prospective injunctive relief.  Lemmons v. Law Firm of Morris & Morris, 39 F.3d 264, 267 (10th Cir.1994); see also White v. Colorado, 82 F.3d 364, 366 (10th Cir.1996). In rare circumstances, a person may seek injunctive relief against continuing or future government misconduct which violates section 1983 even though damages cannot be awarded because of official immunity. See Lemmons, 39 F.3d at 267. Stjernholm seeks injunctive relief against the Board members under section 1983. Since such relief is not barred as a matter of the law of official immunity, we must examine whether the district court correctly determined that such relief could not be awarded in this case. The complaint alleges that [t]his action is brought to enjoin and stop improper and unconstitutional state regulatory agency action, and that court intervention is required to accomplish this. We agree with the district court that Stjernholm has been awarded previously all the relief to which he is entitled and this case is moot. Statutory procedural requirements accompany license and discipline proceedings in recognition of the fact that a professional license is a valuable and indispensable prerequisite to conducting a learned livelihood affecting the public interest. The court of appeals final decision effectively prevents a recurrence of the procedural violation alleged in this section 1983 action: summary suspension of Stjernholm's chiropractic license without a hearing, in the absence of a justifying emergency. Prospective injunctive relief would have no practical effect here. Nearly two years prior to this court of appeals decision, in July of 1991, the Board itself had lifted the order of summary suspension. No facts have been pleaded by Stjernholm in this section 1983 action to demonstrate that the Board is considering repeating, or is likely to repeat, that conduct which the court of appeals held to be illegal. A case is moot when the relief sought, if granted, would have no practical legal effect. See Brown v. Colorado Dep't of Corrections, 915 P.2d 1312, 1313 (Colo.1996); see also Van Schaack Holdings, Ltd. v. L.C. Fulenwider, 798 P.2d 424, 426 (Colo.1990). [W]hen issues presented in litigation become moot because of subsequent events, an appellate court will decline to render an opinion on the merits of an appeal. Van Schaack, 798 P.2d at 427. When the conduct sought to be redressed by either declaratory or injunctive relief is peculiar to a particular event that has already occurred, the finality of the event in a manner incapable of repetition moots the controversy. See Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Romer, 921 P.2d 84, 88 (Colo.App.1996). In Freedom From Religion, a section 1983 case, the court of appeals reasoned that a controversy is moot when neither declaratory nor injunctive relief with regard to past events will have any practical legal effect. [11] Id.; see also Committee for the First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1519 (10th Cir. 1992) (plaintiffs' claims seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under section 1983 were properly dismissed on summary judgment as moot). A section 1983 injunctive claim is moot when prospective relief is unnecessary to remedy an existing controversy or prevent its recurrence. In White v. Colorado, 82 F.3d 364, 366 (10th Cir.1996), plaintiff asserted a claim under section 1983 alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs because they refused to provide him surgery on a leg injury sustained prior to his incarceration. Id. The court concluded that his claims for injunctive relief against the prison officials were moot, in view of his release from that institution on parole. Id. In Aiona v. Judiciary of Hawaii, 17 F.3d 1244, 1248 (9th Cir.1994), the Ninth Circuit dealt with the constitutionality of Hawaii's statutory administrative driver's license revocation process; plaintiffs' section 1983 claims for injunctive relief were held to be moot because their licenses had been restored. Id.; see also Shimabuku v. Britton, 503 F.2d 38, 44 (10th Cir.1974) (In discussing the need for regulations which the agency had proceeded to issue, the court stated that it thus appears that appellants have already received everything for which they asked and which could in any event have been granted.). In F.E.R. v. Valdez, 58 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir. 1995), plaintiffs sought an injunction ordering the return of their patient records to their psychiatrist. Id. at 1533. But their records had been returned at the end of the investigation and there existed no present controversy justifying injunctive relief, and the objective sought by the proposed injunction had been met already. See id. Two exceptions exist to the mootness doctrine: the court may resolve an otherwise moot case if the matter is one that is capable of repetition yet evading review, see People v. Black, 915 P.2d 1257, 1259 n. 1 (Colo.1996) (citing Humphrey v. Southwestern Dev. Co., 734 P.2d 637, 639 (Colo.1987)), and the court may hear a moot case involving issues of great public importance or recurring constitutional violation. See Black, 915 P.2d at 1259 n. 1. Neither exception is applicable here. Stjernholm's license was restored and the final judgment of the court of appeals in Stjernholm II binds the parties. This case does not involve a matter of great public importance or an allegedly recurring constitutional violation. Rather, this case involves an alleged procedural violation by a state agency, which has been adjudicated between the parties and remedied by the final decision of the court of appeals. Sufficient allegations of injury justifying equitable relief are a standing requirement to maintenance of an action for such relief under section 1983. In Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), plaintiff Lyons was stopped by police officers for a traffic code violation. Id. at 97, 103 S.Ct. at 1662-63. Though Lyons offered no resistance or threat, the officers seized him and applied a chokehold, rendering Lyons unconscious and causing damage to his larynx. Id. at 97-98, 103 S.Ct. at 1662-63. Lyons filed a complaint seeking, inter alia, injunctive and declaratory relief, see id. at 97, 103 S.Ct. at 1662, alleging that he and others similarly situated are threatened with irreparable injury in the form of bodily injury and loss of life, and that Lyons `justifiably fears that any contact he has with Los Angeles Police officers may result in his being choked and strangled to death without provocation, justification or other legal excuse.' Id. at 98, 103 S.Ct. at 1663. The Supreme Court stated that [t]he equitable remedy is unavailable absent a showing of irreparable injury, a requirement that cannot be met where there is no showing of any real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will be wronged againa `likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury.' Id. at 111, 103 S.Ct. at 1670 (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502, 94 S.Ct. 669, 679, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974)). The Court thus held that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to entertain Lyons' claim for injunctive relief, see id., 461 U.S. at 101, 103 S.Ct. at 1664, and stated that absent a showing that the plaintiff will be wronged again in a similar way, he or she is not entitled to injunctive relief under section 1983. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111, 103 S.Ct. at 1670. Past exposure to illegal conduct, if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects, does not present a case or controversy regarding injunctive relief. See Valdez, 58 F.3d at 1534; see also Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 1069, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (A still vital claim for prospective injunctive relief must be present at all stages of review.). Although states may choose to use different standards than the federal courts for issuance of injunctions under section 1983, see Lyons, 461 U.S. at 113, 103 S.Ct. at 1671, Colorado has adopted the equivalent of the Lyons standard. We have directed that [c]ourts should not grant the equitable remedy of injunction against other branches of government in the absence of convincing proof of threatened and impending wrongful action. City of Pueblo v. Flanders, 122 Colo. 571, 573, 225 P.2d 832, 833 (1950) (emphasis added). We have determined that standing requirements for injunctive relief against enforcement of a particular regulatory scheme must satisfy the imminent injury standard. In Board of County Commissioners v. Bowen/Edwards Associates, Inc., 830 P.2d 1045, 1054 (Colo.1992), we concluded that imminent injury to a legally protected interest must have been caused or threatened to justify injunctive relief against the enforcing agency. Id. (A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief satisfies the threshold requirement of standing by showing that the action complained of has caused or has threatened to cause imminent injury to an interest protected by law.). Actions of state agencies have a presumption of validity and regularity. See North Colorado Med. Center, Inc. v. Committee of Anticompetitive Conduct, 914 P.2d 902, 906 (Colo.1996); see also Public Utils. Comm'n v. District Court, 163 Colo. 462, 468, 431 P.2d 773, 776 (1967). This presumption of regularity extends to compliance with final decisions of courts of law and operates to render injunctive relief, enforceable by the contempt powers of the court, normally unnecessary to prevent recurrence of the agency action which was disapproved by the court. If, however, this agency attempts to suspend Stjernholm's license contrary to the final decision in Stjernholm II, an equitable remedy would be available. The trial court was correct in its order following remand from Stjernholm II that [t]he relief granted in the earlier adjudications and subsequent appeals comprise the relief sought against the Board. Prospective injunctive relief is not appropriate because the conduct of the agency does not possess recurring potentiality or effect under the state of this record. Cf. Valdez, 58 F.3d at 1533-34. [12] Since no claim for relief is viable in this section 1983 action, Stjernholm's claim for attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994) is untenable; fees can be awarded only to a prevailing party in a section 1983 action. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994).