Opinion ID: 2483089
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Jury Instructions Regarding Consideration of Mitigation Evidence

Text: Defendant's eighth point for review is that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that the defendant should be sentenced to death if no mitigating factor was sufficient to preclude a death sentence, because that prevented the jury from performing its constitutionally required task of measuring the totality of the mitigation against the aggravation. Defendant contends that the instructions informed the jury that it had to consider each mitigating factor singly rather than aggregating the mitigation factors in determining whether defendant should be sentenced to death. Therefore he argues that the jurors were prevented from reaching the decision that death was inappropriate because they had to weigh each mitigating factor against all of the aggravation. Finally, he contends that a juror who believed that all of the mitigation outweighed the aggravation could not conclude death was inappropriate unless that juror also believed that there was one single mitigating factor that outweighed all of the aggravation. Defendant elected to be sentenced under the death penalty statute in effect at the time of the crime on March 24, 2001, rather than the statute in effect at the time of his trial in 2006. The instructions given by the court, which defendant now argues are objectionable, are Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, Nos. 7C.05 and 7C.06 (4th ed. 2000) (IPI Criminal 4th), which instructions were promulgated for use under the death penalty statute in effect at the time of the crime. Those instructions were as follows: Under the law, the defendant shall be sentenced to death if you unanimously find that there is no mitigating factor sufficient to preclude imposition of a death sentence. If you are unable to find unanimously that there is no mitigating factor sufficient to preclude imposition of a death sentence, the court will impose a sentence of natural life imprisonment, and no person serving a sentence of natural life imprisonment can be paroled or released, except through an order by the Governor for executive clemency. See IPI Criminal 4th No. 7C.05. In deciding whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, you should consider all the aggravating factors supported by the evidence and all the mitigating factors supported by the evidence. Aggravating factors are reasons why the defendant should be sentenced to death. Mitigating factors are reasons why the defendant should not be sentenced to death. Aggravating factors include: First: The defendant has been convicted of murdering two or more persons so long as the deaths were the result of an intent to kill more than one person; or the murdered person, Rose Newborn, was killed in the course of another felony if the murdered person was actually killed by the defendant; and, in performing the acts which caused the death of the murdered person, the defendant acted with the intent to kill the murdered person or with the knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered person; and, the other felony was one or more of the following: armed robbery, aggravated kidnaping, or aggravated vehicular hijacking. Second: Any other reason supported by the evidence why the defendant should be sentenced to death. Where there is evidence of an aggravating factor, the fact that such aggravating factor is not a factor specifically listed in these instructions does not preclude your consideration of the evidence. Mitigating factors include: First: Any or all of the following if supported by the evidence: The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, although not such as to constitute a defense to the prosecution. The defendant has expressed remorse for the crime. The defendant has plead guilty on previous cases. The defendant's background includes a history of extreme emotional or physical abuse. Second: Any other reason supported by the evidence why the defendant should not be sentenced to death. Where there is evidence of a mitigating factor, the fact that such mitigating factor is not a factor specifically listed in these instructions does not preclude your consideration of the evidence. If you unanimously find from your consideration of all the evidence that there is no mitigating factor sufficient to preclude imposition of a death sentence, then you should sign the verdict requiring the court to sentence the defendant to death. If you do not unanimously find from your consideration of all the evidence that there is no mitigating factor sufficient to preclude imposition of a death sentence, then you should sign the verdict requiring the court to impose a sentence other than death. See IPI Criminal 4th No. 7C.06. Defendant argues that the jury should have been instructed that it could sentence defendant to death only if there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of a death sentence. In support of this argument he cites Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988). He states that in Mills the verdict form could be interpreted to require jurors to disregard any mitigating factor that all 12 jurors could not unanimously agree existed. This was unconstitutional because [i]f eleven jurors agree that there are six mitigating circumstances, the result is that no mitigating circumstance is found. Consequently, there is nothing to weigh against any aggravating circumstance found and the judgment is death even though eleven jurors think the death penalty wholly inappropriate. Mills, 486 U.S. at 373-74, 108 S.Ct. at 1865, 100 L.Ed.2d at 393. In such a case, the result is that the jury may not give mitigating evidence any effect whatsoever, and must impose the sentence of death. Mills, 486 U.S. at 375, 108 S.Ct. at 1865, 100 L.Ed.2d at 394. Defendant then goes on to analogize his case with the Mills case. He asserts: His jurors were instructed that they were to vote for death if no `mitigating factor' was sufficient to preclude death. If all his jurors believed that death was inappropriate because the entirety of his mitigation precluded a death sentence, but none of them believed that any single mitigating factor precluded a death sentence, they were required to sentence him to death. The jury could not give [defendant's] mitigation `any effect whatsoever' in those circumstances. In People v. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41, 178 Ill.Dec. 19, 604 N.E.2d 275 (1992), defendant raised basically the same contention as defendant in this case and cited the Mills case in support of his argument. In rejecting this argument we said: In Illinois, unlike Maryland, the belief by one juror that any one mitigating factor sufficient to preclude the death penalty exists is sufficient to do so. As such, Illinois' death penalty procedure clearly provides for meaningful consideration of any and all mitigating factors. People v. Ramey, 152 Ill.2d at 77, 178 Ill.Dec. 19, 604 N.E.2d 275. In examining a challenge to jury instructions, a reviewing court must determine whether the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly, fully and comprehensively apprised the jury of the relevant legal principles. People v. Parker, 223 Ill.2d 494, 501, 308 Ill.Dec. 371, 861 N.E.2d 936 (2006). Here the jury was instructed under IPI Criminal 4th No. 7C.06 to consider all mitigating factors supported by the evidence, that [m]itigating factors are reasons why the defendant should not be sentenced to death and that [m]itigating factors include    [a]ny other reason supported by the evidence why the defendant should not be sentenced to death, even if such reason or mitigating factor is not one of the specifically listed factors. It is clear from these instructions that defendant's conclusion in his hypothetical is not correctthe jury was not required to sentence him to death. On the contrary, the instructions clearly state that if any one of the jurors believed that death was inappropriate, based on all of the mitigating evidence, that is, in itself, a reason supported by the evidence why the defendant should not be sentenced to death. Accordingly, IPI Criminal 4th No. 7C.06 then directs the jury to sign the verdict requiring the court to impose a sentence other than death. Furthermore, this court has upheld substantially the same the language of IPI Criminal 4th Nos. 7C.05 and 7C.06. See, e.g., People v. Simms, 192 Ill.2d 348, 411-15, 249 Ill.Dec. 654, 736 N.E.2d 1092 (2000); People v. Emerson, 189 Ill.2d 436, 503-05, 245 Ill.Dec. 49, 727 N.E.2d 302 (2000); Bannister, 232 Ill.2d at 81-82, 327 Ill.Dec. 450, 902 N.E.2d 571. In Boyde v California, 494 U.S. 370, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990), the Supreme Court held that the proper legal standard for reviewing a claim that an instruction was ambiguous and therefore subject to erroneous interpretation was whether there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. at 380, 110 S.Ct. at 1198, 108 L.Ed.2d 316. The Supreme Court further said, Jurors do not sit in solitary isolation booths parsing instructions for subtle shades of meaning in the same way that lawyers might. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. at 380-81, 110 S.Ct. at 1198, 108 L.Ed.2d at 329. Accord People v. Bannister, 232 Ill.2d at 81, 327 Ill.Dec. 450, 902 N.E.2d 571 (correctness of instructions depends not on whether defense counsel can imagine a problematic meaning, but whether ordinary persons acting as jurors would fail to understand them). The Supreme Court noted in Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S, 433, 124 S.Ct. 1830, 158 L.Ed.2d 701, that [n]othing in Boyde precludes a state court from assuming that counsel's arguments clarified an ambiguous jury charge. Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. at 438, 124 S.Ct. at 1833, 158 L.Ed.2d at 708. Here, in closing argument, defense counsel apprised the jury, without objection: [The prosecutor] talked about mitigation and aggravation. This is not a balancing test in the sense that you put things on a scale. We don't have to prove mitigation outweighs aggravation. You'll get the instructions. All we have to do is show you there is a mitigating factor or factors which are sufficient to preclude death. Defense counsel later reiterated: Remember this is not a balancing test. We don't have to prove mitigating factors outweigh aggravating factors; just that there is a single mitigating factor or factors, just one sufficient to preclude that. The instructions directed the jurors to examine all the mitigating evidence offered by defendant during the hearing in deciding whether there was sufficient mitigation to preclude the imposition of a death sentence. Defense counsel properly argued that the mitigating factors did not have to outweigh the aggravating factors just that there is a single mitigating factor  just one to preclude death. Construing the instructions as a whole, and the record before us, we find that the trial court properly instructed the jury regarding consideration of the mitigation evidence. We further find that there is not a reasonable likelihood that the jurors understood the challenged instructions to preclude proper consideration of all the relevant mitigating evidence and we conclude that the jury understood and properly followed the applicable law in reaching its verdict. Defendant also tendered a verdict form to the court stating that he could be sentenced to death only if no mitigating factor or factors precluded a death sentence and it was rejected by the court. The decision to give a non-IPI rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Caffey, 205 Ill.2d at 127, 275 Ill.Dec. 390, 792 N.E.2d 1163. Here, the court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to give defendant's proposed verdict form and instead give the verdict forms from IPI Criminal 4th Nos. 7C.08 and 7C.09A, which properly stated the law.