Opinion ID: 161004
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard of Review and Certificate of Appealability

Text: 16 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) applies to Gonzales's case because he filed his 2254 petition after April 24, 1996. See Hooks v. Ward, 184 F.3d 1206, 1213 (10th Cir. 1999). Under AEDPA, Gonzales must obtain a Certificate of Appealability (COA) before he can appeal the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court. 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(1)(A). He is not entitled to a COA unless he can make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2). Because the district court rejected his 2254 petition on the merits, to satisfy 2253(c) Gonzales must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). We construe Gonzales's notice of appeal, filed on December 30, 1999, to be a request for a COA, and because he has met the standard set forth in Slack, his request for a COA is granted. 1 17 The standard of review under AEDPA is set forth in 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), which provides: 18 An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim 19 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 20 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 21 Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel involve mixed questions of law and fact for purposes of review under 2254. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402-403 (2000) (reviewing question of prejudice in ineffective assistance of counsel claim under 2254(d)(1)); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1227 (10th Cir. 2001); Hale v. Gibson, 227 F.3d 1298, 1314 (10th Cir. 2000); Wallace v. Ward, 191 F.3d 1235, 1247 (10th Cir. 1999). Likewise, a determination of whether exculpatory evidence suppressed by a prosecutor is material presents a mixed question of law and fact which we review under the standard set forth in 2254(d). See Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152, 1165 (10th Cir. 1999). If a state court did not hear the petitioner's claims on the merits, however, we review the district court's legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact, if any, for clear error. See, e.g., Hale, 227 F.3d at 1309.