Opinion ID: 669601
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appealability of Underlying Judgment and Order

Text: 8 The first issue is whether the appellant can appeal the Judgment and Order, including the previous injunctions and orders which it incorporated. Defendant asserts that the April 5, 1993, contempt order was an extension, modification, and clarification of the Judgment and Order, and therefore appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(a)(1). He urges this court to consider the underlying Judgment and Order now for reasons of judicial economy. 9 In Szabo v. U.S. Marine Corp., 819 F.2d 714 (7th Cir.1987), this court held that a contemnor cannot attack the underlying injunction on Rule 65 grounds if the contemnor did not appeal from the original decision to grant the injunction. The appellant argues that Szabo is inapplicable to his case because the injunctions issued here were not permanent. The appellant fails to explain why this would make a difference. Moreover, the injunction in Szabo was less a permanent injunction than the one in this case, since the Szabo defendant was enjoined from acting in a certain manner pending a hearing and determination on the merits. Here, a judgment had already been issued and the injunctions were merely held over until the payments were complete. 10 Furthermore, the appellant wishes to appeal the underlying Judgment and Order as violative of Rule 65 even though it was issued by stipulation of both parties. Appellant stated that the Judgment and Order fails to set forth appropriate reasons for its issuance, is vague in numerous ways, and incorporates by reference other documents and law rather than spelling them out within the body of the injunction. 11 Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d) provides in relevant part that: 12 Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained.... 13 Rule 65 is controlling and mandatory except by complete agreement of counsel. Brumby Metals, Inc. v. Bargen, 264 F.2d 46, 49 (7th Cir.1960). Appellees assert that since Szego agreed to both the form and the content of the August 4 Judgment and Order, he cannot now raise a Rule 65 objection. See id. 14 Appellant argues that the district court has the duty of refusing to enter a defective injunction even if neither party objects. Chicago & North Western v. Railway Labor Exec., 908 F.2d 144, 149 (7th Cir.1990). However, in Chicago & North Western, the permanent injunction in question was found to be valid even though it incorporated other documents because it was understood by all concerned that the terms, except as to duration, were the same as those of the preliminary injunction ... [so that] the spirit of Rule 65(d) was honored after all. Id. at 150. Similarly, here, the Judgment and Order incorporated the previous injunctions, which clearly spelled out the acts enjoined and the reasons for doing so. No appeal for lack of specificity was made upon issuance of those previous injunctions. The further acts enjoined or ordered on August 4 were specified, upon agreement by the parties. The acid test of whether a purported injunction is appealable is whether it is in sufficient though not exact compliance with Rule 65(d) that a violation could be punished by contempt or some other sanction. Orig. Gr. Am. Choc. Chip Cookie v. River Valley, 970 F.2d 273, 276 (7th Cir.1992). Since the appellant clearly stipulated to the content and form of the Judgment and Order and made no timely attempt to challenge its alleged vagueness and unenforceability, we see no reason why he should be permitted to appeal it here. 15