Opinion ID: 4543683
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denson’s Claim

Text: The parties do not dispute that a statute—the First Step Act—authorized the district court to reduce Denson’s sentence on his drug distribution conviction. The parties do not dispute that Denson’s Count III crack-cocaine offense is a “covered offense” and that Denson is eligible for a reduction under the First Step Act. The only issue is whether Denson had a legal right to be present at a hearing before the district court ruled on his motion. First, to the extent Denson contends that the First Step Act itself gives him a statutory right to attend a hearing, we agree with the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, which have concluded that the plain text of the First Step Act does not give a defendant seeking a sentence reduction such a right. See Jackson, 945 F.3d at 321- 5 The other two circumstances are: (1) under § 3582(c)(1)(A), when either the Bureau of Prisons or the defendant has filed a motion and extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a reduction or the defendant is at least 70 years old and meets certain other criteria; or (2) under § 3582(c)(2), when a defendant has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that the Sentencing Commission has subsequently lowered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(o). See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). 11 Case: 19-11696 Date Filed: 06/24/2020 Page: 12 of 18 22; Williams, 943 F.3d at 843-44. As the Eighth Circuit succinctly observed, the First Step Act “does not mention, let alone mandate, a hearing.” Williams, 943 F.3d at 843. In fact, the First Step Act provides only that the district court “may, on motion of the defendant, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, the attorney for the Government, or the court, impose a reduced sentence.” First Step Act § 404(b) (emphasis added). “Its text imposes no further procedural hoops.” Jackson, 945 F.3d at 321. The First Step Act grants the district court discretion to reduce a sentence but does not require a reduction. First Step Act § 404(c) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant to this section.”); see also Jones, ___ F.3d at ___, 2020 WL 3248113, at  (“District courts have wide latitude to determine whether and how to exercise their discretion in this context.”). That Denson was eligible for resentencing does not mean he was entitled to it. See Jones, ___ F.3d at ___, 2020 WL 3248113, at . The First Step Act leaves the choice of whether to resentence and to what extent to the district court’s sound discretion. Id. Denson suggests that § 404(c) of the First Step Act requires a “complete review on the merits” of the motion and this phrase necessarily means a hearing with him present before the district court. Denson’s argument, however, takes § 404(c) out of context. Section 404(c) provides that “[n]o court shall entertain a motion made under this section to reduce a sentence if . . . a previous motion made 12 Case: 19-11696 Date Filed: 06/24/2020 Page: 13 of 18 under this section to reduce the sentence was, after the date of enactment of this Act, denied after a complete review of the motion on the merits.” First Step Act§ 404(c). As the Fifth Circuit explained in rejecting a § 404(c) argument like Denson’s, “the relevant provision establishes that a defendant can file only one motion for resentencing” and bars a second First Step Act motion if the first was “denied after a complete review of the motion on the merits.” Jackson, 945 F.3d at 321 (quotation marks omitted). The Fifth Circuit correctly concluded that this textual phrase in § 404(c) does not mean a hearing is required. Simply put, the First Step Act itself does not grant Denson a legal right to a hearing. Second, Denson’s motion is governed by Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which expressly provides that Denson’s presence is not required in a § 3582(c) proceeding. Rule 43 specifies when a defendant must be and when he need not be present during his criminal prosecution. Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a)-(b). Under Rule 43, the defendant “must be present at . . . sentencing,” but need not be present at proceedings involving “the correction or reduction of sentence under Rule 35 or 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).” Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a)(3), (b)(4). “A defendant does not have a right to be present whenever a district court takes an action to modify his sentence.” United States v. Thomason, 940 F.3d 1166, 1171 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted). Given Denson was proceeding under § 3582(c)(1)(B), his presence at the hearing was not required by Rule 43(b). All 13 Case: 19-11696 Date Filed: 06/24/2020 Page: 14 of 18 sentence reduction proceedings under § 3582(c) are listed in Rule 43(b) as proceedings for which the defendant’s presence is not required. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(b)(4).6 Third, Denson’s due process claim also fails. In addition to Rule 43, “[t]he Due Process Clause grants criminal defendants a right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.” Thomason, 940 F.3d at 1171 (quotation marks omitted). Although this Court has not defined the precise overlap of Rule 43 and the Due Process Clause, we have concluded that the right to be present under Rule 43 is at least as broad as the right under the Due Process Clause. See United States v. Webb, 565 F.3d 789, 795 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Parrish, 427 F.3d 1345, 1348 (11th Cir. 2005). Thus, where Rule 43 does not require a defendant’s presence, there is no due process concern. See Parrish, 427 F.3d at 1348 (pointing out that “other circuits have noted that the right to be present under the Due Process Clause is narrower than the right to be present under Rule 43”); United States v. Boyd, 131 F.3d 951, 953-54 n.3 (11th Cir. 1997) 6 We also reject Denson’s argument that the Advisory Committee’s notes for the 1998 amendment to Rule 43 suggest otherwise. Had Congress or the Advisory Committee intended a district court to hold a § 3582(c)(1)(B) sentence reduction hearing in the defendant’s presence, it would not have included in Rule 43(b) a “proceeding involv[ing] the correction or reduction of [a] sentence under . . . 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).” Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(b)(4). 14 Case: 19-11696 Date Filed: 06/24/2020 Page: 15 of 18 (explaining that “if [Rule 43] does not require a defendant’s presence at a given proceeding, neither does the Constitution”). In short, because Rule 43 did not require Denson’s presence at a § 3582(c)(1)(B) sentence reduction hearing, Denson had no corresponding due process right to be present at such a hearing. See Parrish, 427 F.3d at 1348; Boyd, 131 F.3d at 953-54 n.3.