Opinion ID: 104229
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Opportunity to Prepare Defense.

Text: Petitioner surrendered September 3, 1945, and was interned as a prisoner of war in conformity with Article 9 of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929. [22] He was served with the charge on September 25 and put in confinement as an accused war criminal. On October 8 he was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. On October 29 the trial began and it continued until December 7, when sentence was pronounced, exactly four years almost to the hour from the attack on Pearl Harbor. On the day of arraignment, October 8, three weeks before the trial began, petitioner was served with a bill of particulars specifying 64 items setting forth a vast number of atrocities and crimes allegedly committed by troops under his command. [23] The six officers appointed as defense counsel thus had three weeks, it is true at the prosecution's suggestion a week longer than they sought at first, to investigate and prepare to meet all these items and the large number of incidents they embodied, many of which had occurred in distant islands of the archipelago. There is some question whether they then anticipated the full scope and character of the charge or the evidence they would have to meet. But, as will appear, they worked night and day at the task. Even so it would have been impossible to do thoroughly, had nothing more occurred. But there was more. On the first day of the trial, October 29, the prosecution filed a supplemental bill of particulars, containing 59 more specifications of the same general character, involving perhaps as many incidents occurring over an equally wide area. [24] A copy had been given the defense three days earlier. One item, No. 89, charged that American soldiers, prisoners of war, had been tried and executed without notice having been given to the protecting power of the United States in accordance with the requirements of the Geneva Convention, which it is now argued, strangely, the United States was not required to observe as to petitioner's trial. [25] But what is more important is that defense counsel, as they felt was their duty, at once moved for a continuance. [26] The application was denied. However the commission indicated that if, at the end of the prosecution's presentation concerning the original bill, counsel should believe they require additional time . . ., the Commission will consider such a motion at that time, before taking up the items of the supplemental bill. Counsel again indicated, without other result, that time was desired at once as much, if not more to prepare for cross-examination as the Prosecution's case goes in as to prepare affirmative defense. On the next day, October 30, the commission interrupted the prosecutor to say it would not then listen to testimony or discussion upon the supplemental bill. After colloquy it adhered to its prior ruling and, in response to inquiry from the prosecution, the defense indicated it would require two weeks before it could proceed on the supplemental bill. On November 1 the commission ruled it would not receive affidavits without corroboration by witnesses on any specification, a ruling reversed four days later. On November 2, after the commission had received an affirmative answer to its inquiry whether the defense was prepared to proceed with an item in the supplemental bill which the prosecution proposed to prove, it announced: Hereafter, then, unless there is no [sic] objection by the Defense, the Commission will assume that you are prepared to proceed with any items in the Supplemental Bill. On November 8, the question arose again upon the prosecution's inquiry as to when the defense would be ready to proceed on the supplemental bill, the prosecutor adding: Frankly, sir, it took the War Crimes Commission some three months to investigate these matters and I cannot conceive of the Defense undertaking a similar investigation with any less period of time. Stating it realized the tremendous task which we placed upon the Defense and its determination to give them the time they require, the commission again adhered to its ruling of October 29. Four days later the commission announced it would grant a continuance only for the most urgent and unavoidable reasons. [27] On November 20, when the prosecution rested, senior defense counsel moved for a reasonable continuance, recalling the commission's indication that it would then consider such a motion and stating that since October 29 the defense had been working day and night, with no time whatsoever to prepare any affirmative defense, since counsel had been fully occupied trying to keep up with that new Bill of Particulars. The commission thereupon retired for deliberation and, on resuming its sessions shortly, denied the motion. Counsel then asked for a short recess of a day. The commission suggested a recess until 1:30 in the afternoon. Counsel responded this would not suffice. The commission stated it felt that the Defense should be prepared at least on its opening statement, to which senior counsel answered: We haven't had time to do that, sir. The commission then recessed until 8:30 the following morning. Further comment is hardly required. Obviously the burden placed upon the defense, in the short time allowed for preparation on the original bill, was not only tremendous. In view of all the facts, it was an impossible one, even though the time allowed was a week longer than asked. But the grosser vice was later when the burden was more than doubled by service of the supplemental bill on the eve of trial, a procedure which, taken in connection with the consistent denials of continuance and the commission's later reversal of its rulings favorable to the defense, was wholly arbitrary, cutting off the last vestige of adequate chance to prepare defense and imposing a burden the most able counsel could not bear. This sort of thing has no place in our system of justice, civil or military. Without more, this wide departure from the most elementary principles of fairness vitiated the proceeding. When added to the other denials of fundamental right sketched above, it deprived the proceeding of any semblance of trial as we know that institution.