Opinion ID: 204313
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Origin of the Identical or Nearly Identical Standard

Text: The identical or nearly identical requirement traces its roots in this circuit to Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir.2002). In that case, a former Playmate of the Year, Terri Welles, had used this descriptive on a website devoted to the sale of her pictures and to the promotion of her services as a spokeswoman. Playboy sued Welles on various theories, including a federal trademark dilution claim under the prior statute. [2] We determined that most of Welles's use of Playmate of the Year were nominative uses and, therefore, excepted from coverage. However, Welles's use of the abbreviation PMOY on the wallpaper of her site was not nominative, and, therefore was not excepted from the anti-dilution provisions. Playboy Enters., 279 F.3d at 806. As a result, we reversed the judgment in favor of Welles on the dilution issue and gave the following instructions to the district court: We note that if the district court determines that PMOY is not entitled to trademark protection, PEI's claim for dilution must fail. The trademarked term, Playmate of the Year is not identical or nearly identical to the term PMOY. Therefore, use of the term PMOY cannot, as a matter of law, dilute the trademark Playmate of the Year.  Id. (emphasis added; footnote omitted). Our authority for the identical or nearly identical language employed in Playboy Enterprises was Luigino's, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 170 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir.1999), and J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 24:90.2 (4th ed.2001). See Playboy Enters., 279 F.3d at 806 n. 41. In Luigino's, the Eighth Circuit held that, [t]o support an action for dilution by blurring, `the marks must at least be similar enough that a significant segment of the two target groups of customers sees the two marks as essentially the same.' 170 F.3d at 832 (quoting J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 24:90.1, at 24-145 (4th ed.1998)). In support of this proposition, the Eighth Circuit not only relied on McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, but also Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1029 (2d Cir.1989). Tracing the ancestry of the standard a step further, Mead Data Central involved a trademark dilution claim brought under a New York state statute. According to the Second Circuit, the legislative history of that act stated the purpose of the statute as preventing `the whittling away of an established trade-mark's selling power and value through its unauthorized use by others upon dissimilar products.' Mead Data Cent., 875 F.2d at 1028 (quoting 1954 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 49; emphasis added by the Second Circuit). The court continued: If we were to interpret literally the italicized word its, we would limit statutory violations to the unauthorized use of the identical established mark. . . . However, since the use of obvious simulations or markedly similar marks might have the same diluting effect as would an appropriation of the original mark, the concept of exact identity has been broadened to that of substantial similarity. Nevertheless, in keeping with the original intent of the statute, the similarity must be substantial before the doctrine of dilution may be applied. Id. at 1028-29 (internal citations omitted). The court stopped short of requiring that the marks in question . . . be sufficiently similar that confusion may be created as between the marks themselves. Id. at 1029. Instead, it held that the marks must be `very' or `substantially' similar and that, absent such similarity, there can be no viable claim of dilution. Id. [3] Thus, the requirement of identity, or substantial similarity, pre-dates the adoption of the FTDA in 1996 and has its origins in state dilution law, specifically that of the State of New York.