Opinion ID: 220504
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Scope and Duration

Text: Our constitutional inquiry does not end there. When dealing with limited seizures not subject to the probable-cause requirement, a seizure that is reasonable at its inception may quickly become unreasonable if it extends beyond its unique justification. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion) ([A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.). Croom thus argues that, even if her detention was constitutional at the outset, it ceased to be so once law enforcement concluded she posed no threat and was not involved in the crime. We disagree. Summers itself was less than explicit regarding the outer bounds of police authority to detain occupants of a premises during a warranted search, including the permissible length of Summers detentions. A fair reading of that opinion, however, implies that law enforcement officers are entitled to detain occupants of a premises for the whole length of most warranted searches. See Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 n. 21, 101 S.Ct. 2587 (acknowledging possible exceptions to the Summers rule for special circumstances and prolonged detention[s], implying that the general rule of routine detention of residents of a house while it was being searched for contraband pursuant to a valid warrant confers the power to detain occupants for the length of such routine searches); id. at 701 n. 14, 101 S.Ct. 2587 (acknowledging Professor LaFave's view that police diligence is important to evaluating a seizure's reasonableness). Moreover, in Mena, the Court clearly assumed as much, rejecting the Ninth Circuit's holding (and Croom's argument here) that an innocent detainee must be released once officers cease suspecting him or her of wrongdoing. Mena, 544 U.S. at 98, 125 S.Ct. 1465 (Mena's detention for the duration of the search was reasonable under Summers because a warrant existed to search [the premises] and she was an occupant of that address at the time of the search. (emphasis added)). As a result, we must conclude thatat the very least Summers permits the continued detention of lawfully detained occupants of a premises during the length of a routine and diligently pursued warranted search thereof. On the facts of this case, we hold the scope and duration of Croom's detention was constitutional. After being fully restrained for up to ten minutes while the house was being secured, Croom was transferred to the couch (and then the dining room table), where she remainedunrestrainedfor up to two hours. In light of the three-hour detention of an innocent bystander deemed plainly permissible by the Supreme Court in Mena, id., we cannot conclude that Croom's seizure here became unconstitutional over time. [15]