Opinion ID: 2139707
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Specific Intent to Kill is Required to Convict for Attempted Murder

Text: Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1, the general attempt statute, was enacted in 1976 and provides, in part, as follows: A person attempts to commit a crime when, acting with the culpability required for commission of the crime, he engages in conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime. The interpretation of this statute with regard to the crime of attempted murder was first undertaken by this Court in the case of Zickefoose v. State (1979), 270 Ind. 618, 388 N.E.2d 507. In Zickefoose, Justice Hunter offered an excellent analysis of the then new attempt statute. Citing extensive authority from other jurisdictions, Justice Hunter, speaking for the unanimous Court, said: Although there are somewhat varying definitions of what conduct actually constitutes an attempt, there is fundamental agreement on the two necessary elements of the crime. First, the defendant must have been acting with a specific intent to commit the crime, and second, he must have engaged in an overt act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of the crime. (Emphasis supplied) 388 N.E.2d at 510. Five years later, this Court again analyzed the crime of attempted murder. In Smith v. State (1984), Ind., 459 N.E.2d 355, this Court, by a three to two vote, reversed the defendant's conviction for attempted murder because the trial court erroneously failed to instruct the jury that it must find that the defendant had the specific intent to commit murder in order to be found guilty of attempted murder. The specific instruction that was reversed in that case is as follows: STATE'S INSTRUCTION NO. 3 You are instructed that the essential elements of the crime of Attempted Murder which the State of Indiana must prove beyond a reasonable doubt are the following: 1. That the Defendant [sic] knowingly 2. Engaged in conduct that constituted a substantial step toward the commission of Murder. The Court specifically held that such instruction, which purports to state the essential elements of the crime of attempted murder, fails to include an essential element of the offense, namely that the Defendant must have had the specific intent to commit murder in order to be found guilty of attempted murder. 459 N.E.2d at 357. After examining the other instructions that were given and finding that none of the instructions contained any statement to the effect that, if the defendant is to be found guilty of attempted murder, there must first be a finding that when he engaged in the conduct proscribed, he intended to kill the victim. The Court stated: Thus we are left with instructions which would lead the jury to believe that the Defendant could be convicted of attempted murder if he knowingly engaged in conduct which constituted a substantial step toward the commission of murder. Although one may be guilty of murder, under our statute, without entertaining a specific intent to kill the victim, he cannot be guilty of attempted murder without entertaining such intent. 459 N.E.2d at 358. From that time to the present, the Court has been faced with a variety of attempted murder instructions. See Santana v. State (1986), Ind., 486 N.E.2d 1010; Worley v. State (1986), Ind., 501 N.E.2d 406, (the court held that the instruction much more clearly apprised the jury of the element of specific intent), King v. State (1988), Ind., 517 N.E.2d 383, (the court approved the challenged instruction as being more similar to the instruction in Worley than the one in Smith and, additionally, stated that [i]t would have been preferable for the trial court to give explicit instructions on specific intent to murder, but implicit within the instruction is the element that King intended to kill Patterson); Abdul-Wadood v. State (1988), Ind., 521 N.E.2d 1299, (the court reversed the trial court for committing fundamental error by failing to instruct the jury that specific intent to kill is a requisite element of the crime of attempted murder); Jackson v. State (1989); Ind., 544 N.E.2d 853, (this Court reversed the trial court for failing to inform the jury of the elements of attempted murder, namely that defendant with intent to kill (the victim) took a substantial step to accomplish that end); and most recently, Hurt a/k/a Miller v. State (1991), Ind., 570 N.E.2d 16 (this Court did not reverse the trial court for giving instructions substantially similar to those condemned in this case and in earlier cases because the trial court did, in another instruction, inform the jury that attempted murder is a crime of specific intent). Henceforth, we hold that an instruction which purports to set forth the elements which must be proven in order to convict of the crime of attempted murder must inform the jury that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, with intent to kill the victim, engaged in conduct which was a substantial step toward such killing. In the present case the trial court, after reading the statutory definition of attempt, Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1, and the statutory definition of murder, Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1), instructed the jury as follows: INSTRUCTION NO. 6 To convict the defendants, the State must have proved each of the following elements: The defendants 1. knowingly or intentionally 2. strike, stab and cut the body of Robert Grubbs 3. that the conduct was a substantial step toward the commission of the crime of murder. If the State failed to prove each of these elements, you should find the defendants not guilty. If the State did prove each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendants guilty of the crime of Attempted Murder, a Class A felony. The appellate court analyzed these instructions and found that, when read together, the instructions were basically the same as those in Worley and King. Citing King, the appellate court further found that there can be no doubt that the instructions here are sufficient to inform the jury of the necessity of finding the defendants intended to kill Grubbs. In a nutshell, we disagree. Nowhere in the instructions is there a requirement that the State prove that the Spradlins, at the time that they struck, stabbed and cut the victims, intended to kill such victims. We hold that, by definition, there can be no attempt to perform an act unless there is a simultaneous intent to accomplish such act. Simply stated, in order to attempt to commit a crime, one must intend to commit that crime while taking a substantial step toward the commission of the crime. Here the jury was not instructed that such proof was required. For that reason, we reverse.