Opinion ID: 1745728
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: res judicata and the jefferson district court dismissal

Text: Stephenson argues that this Court should affirm the Court of Appeals because the Jefferson District Court's dismissal of the felony DUI charge acts as a bar to the Commonwealth's further prosecution. Stephenson observes that [t]he Order from the Court of Appeals partially granting the Writ of Prohibition did not indicate on what grounds the Court was partially granting the writ, and submits that the Court of Appeals granted him partial relief because it found that the Jefferson District Court's dismissal of the charges against Stephenson had preclusive effect. We find Stephenson's effort to cloak himself in the ambiguity created by the failure of the Court of Appeals to set forth the grounds for its order disingenuous. We cannot imagine any rational basis upon which the Court of Appeals could have concluded that the Jefferson District Court's dismissal barred the subsequent felony DUI prosecution, but not subsequent prosecutions for the other charges dismissed by the Jefferson District Court. However, we address Stephenson's argument nevertheless and find it unpersuasive. KRS 505.030 outlines statutory double jeopardy protections in the narrowest sense, i.e., when a defendant is faced with two prosecutions involving only one criminal statute and one set of facts. [27] In addition to outlining the fundamental double jeopardy principlese.g. that a subsequent prosecution is prohibited when a former prosecution for the same conduct and offense resulted in a conviction or acquittal or an on the merits determination that the evidence was insufficient to support a convictionKRS 505.030 provides: When a prosecution is for a violation of the same statutory provision and is based upon the same facts as a former prosecution, it is barred by the former prosecution under the following circumstances: ... (3) The former prosecution was terminated by a final order or judgment, which has not subsequently been set aside, and which required a determination inconsistent with any fact or legal proposition necessary to a conviction in the subsequent prosecution.... [28] The Commentary to KRS 505.030 explains that the or legal proposition language in subsection (3) includes a situation where a court dismisses a charge after finding that the prosecution was barred by former jeopardy: Subsection (3) prohibits a subsequent prosecution for the same offense on the basis of the same facts if: the first prosecution terminated with a final order or judgment; that order or judgment, at the time of the second prosecution, has not been set aside; and the order or judgment required a determination of fact or law inconsistent with a subsequent conviction for the same offense. At the outset, it should be mentioned that this claim of former jeopardy ... does not require a presentation of evidence in the former prosecution... [and] is not dependent upon an attachment of jeopardy. The source of this subsection is the case of United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 37 S.Ct. 68, 61 L.Ed. 161 (1916). In that case, an initial indictment against the defendant had been dismissed because of the statute of limitations. He was subsequently reindicted for the same offense. His defense was former jeopardy. The government urged that his defense was nothing more than a claim of res judicata which did not apply to criminal cases. The Supreme Court rejected this position, ruled that the doctrine of res judicata does apply to criminal cases, and held the former prosecution a bar to the subsequent one. The matters intended for coverage by this subsection were indicated in the Model Penal Code: Illustrative of the pre-trial determinations which will bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense are: a determination that the statute of limitations has run; a determination that the defendant has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense; a determination that the defendant has been pardoned for the offense; and a determination that the defendant has been granted immunity by law from prosecution for the offense. Model Penal Code § 1.09, Comment at 50 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956) (citations omitted). [29] This Court has held that a final order dismissing a criminal charge or indictment may bar subsequent prosecutions. In Commonwealth v. Hicks , [30] the Kenton District Court dismissed a misdemeanor DUI charge in an order that read, [t]he Commonwealth's motion to continue is overruled and the defense motion to dismiss is sustained. The Commonwealth re-filed the charges, and the defendant unsuccessfully argued to the trial court that its former ruling barred the subsequent prosecution. Hicks sought a writ of prohibition from the Kenton Circuit Court, and this Court considered the matter on discretionary review. We held that a judgment or order of dismissal, except on the grounds noted in the Rule [CR 41.02(3)], must be construed as being with prejudice unless it says otherwise [31] and thus results in an adjudication on the merits. [32] Because the Commonwealth had not sought amendment of or appealed from the order of dismissal, we held that the dismissal barred subsequent prosecution: The order of dismissal contained no indication that it was intended to be without prejudice. Forthrightly, it denied a continuance and sustained the motion to dismiss. It said no more. As such, the order of dismissal was with prejudice and if the Commonwealth was to have relief, a timely amendment of the order of dismissal or an appeal from that order was required. Upon its failure to take steps to obtain such relief, the order of dismissal became final and subsequent litigation was thereby barred. [33] In Commonwealth v. Taber , [34] we applied our holding in Hicks and found that the Scott Circuit Court's previous order dismissing Taber's nine-count indictment barred Taber's subsequent conviction under a new indictment for the same offenses. [35] Here, the Jefferson District Court's notation on the docket sheet and case jacket read: DM/SPC Duplicate Charges Prosecuted in New Albany. [36] The parties inform us that, in the shorthand employed in the Jefferson District Court, DM indicates dismissedas distinguished from DWOP, which represents dismissed without prejudiceand SPC signifies stipulation of probable cause. Although the Office of the Jefferson County Attorney, after speaking with the police officer involved in the case, did bring a timely motion to reinstate the charges, the Commonwealth eventually withdrew this motion, and thereafter the Jefferson District Court's disposition became final. Stephenson thus argues that, in accordance with Hicks , his subsequent indictment and prosecution in Jefferson Circuit Court were improper. We disagree and find KRS 505.030 inapplicable. KRS 505.060 provides: A prosecution is not barred, as provided in KRS 505.030, 505.040 and 505.050 if the former prosecution: ... (2) Was before a court which lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense. [37] The distinguishing factor between Hicks and Taber and the case at bar is that, while the Kenton District Court had the jurisdiction to dismiss finally a misdemeanor DUI charge and the Scott Circuit Court had the jurisdiction to dismiss finally a felony indictment, the Jefferson District Court did not have the jurisdiction to make a final adjudication as to Stephenson's felony [38] charges. The Judicial Article of the Kentucky Constitution states that [t]he district court shall be a court of limited jurisdiction and shall exercise original jurisdiction as may be provided by the General Assembly. [39] Although the General Assembly has granted the district courts limited jurisdiction in criminal matters, [40] district courts cannot make final dispositions as to felony offenses. [41] Instead, jurisdiction for final adjudications in felony cases is reserved for the circuit courts, which, under the Kentucky Constitution shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciable causes not vested in some other court. [42] This Court has recognized that, when misdemeanor offenses are combined with felony offenses, the circuit and district court's respective jurisdictions as to the misdemeanor offenses are not set out with crystal clarity. [43] However, no such ambiguity exists concerning district courts' jurisdiction as to felony offenses because [f]inal disposition of felony cases is expressly excepted from district court jurisdiction. [44] While a district court that finds good cause to amend a charge to a misdemeanor offense may exercise jurisdiction to make a final adjudication as to that amended, misdemeanor offense, [45] the Jefferson District Court in this case made no such finding or disposition, and instead merely dismissed the felony offenses. Instead, as to each of Stephenson's felony offenses, the district court could act only as an examining court [46] by conducting a preliminary hearing to determine whether probable cause existed to detain the defendantand even if the district court found probable cause lacking, the Commonwealth could still proceed with the prosecution by direct indictment. [47] We find that the Jefferson District Court lacked the jurisdiction to finally adjudicate Stephenson's felony DUI offense, and the Jefferson District Court's dismissal of that offense thus provides no basis for the issuance of a writ prohibiting Stephenson's prosecution for felony DUI.