Opinion ID: 2290808
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Janet and Jillisa Hammons Received a Vested Remainder Subject to Divestment.

Text: Rosa argues Janet and Jillisa received a contingent remainder because their ability to take is contingent (1) on there being any property left to take, given Rosa's ability to invade the corpus, and (2) on them either surviving Rosa or predeceasing her but leaving issue of their own. This interpretation of the will employs a colloquial, rather than a legal, definition of the word contingent and reflects a misunderstanding of the distinction between a contingent remainder and a vested remainder. Whether a testator intended a contingent remainder or a vested remainder is a relatively common question and our case law includes many opinions distinguishing these two types of remainders. Conlee, 190 S.W.2d at 47 (The mere fact that an estate is to take effect and be enjoyed after the termination of an intervening estate will not prevent both estates from being vested at the same moment.); Montgomery's Ex'r v. Northcutt, 292 Ky. 622, 167 S.W.2d 317, 320 (1942) (A remainder interest may be a vested one although the right of possession and enjoyment of the property is made to depend on some uncertain future event.); Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Tiffany, 202 Ky. 618, 260 S.W. 357, 359 (1924) (A vested interest is a present right ... which carries with it an existing right of alienation, even though the right to possession or enjoyment may be postponed to some uncertain time in the future.... A contingent estate is one which gives no present right, but the vesting of which depends upon some uncertain event in the future, or the happening of a certain event in the future at an uncertain time....); Williamson v. Williamson, 57 Ky. 329, 18 B. Mon. 329 (1857) (A vested remainder depends upon an event which must happen. A contingent remainder depends on an event which is uncertain and may never happen. A vested remainder is to a person in esse and ascertained. A contingent remainder is to a person not in esse or not ascertained.); see also Phelps v. Sledd, 479 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Ky.1972); Curtis v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 318 S.W.2d 33, 35-36 (Ky.1958); Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Lane, 303 S.W.2d 273, 274-75 (Ky.1957); Hurst v. Russell, 257 Ky. 78, 77 S.W.2d 355, 355-56 (1934); Slote v. Reiss, 153 Ky. 30, 154 S.W. 405, 406 (1913); Roach v. Dance, 26 Ky. L. Rptr. 157, 80 S.W. 1097, 1098 (1904). In Carroll v. Carroll's Ex'r, 248 Ky. 386, 58 S.W.2d 670, 672 (1933), the testator left his personal assets in a fund for the care of his wife, with any remaining at her death to his sons, unless either should die before she does, leaving living children, [in which case] they will get his share. The Court held the sons had a vested remainder in the trust fund, noting the conditional language, if either should die before she does, leaving living children .... did not convert the vested interest into a contingent remainder. Id. In Conlee, the testator gave to her husband, all my estate, personal, real and mixed. To have and to hold during his natural life, to use, occupy and enjoy as he deems proper, and also grant to him a power to sell and dispose of the real estate and invest the proceeds thereof with any remainder after her husband's death to her children. 190 S.W.2d at 44. After discussing the distinctions between contingent and vested remainders, this Court (then known as the Court of Appeals) held the husband took a life estate and the children had a vested remainder because they were capacitated to take possession of the remainder interest devised to them at any moment after the termination of the life estate. Id. at 47. The law makes a further distinction between a contingent remainder and a vested remainder subject to divestment. [1] Unlike a contingent remainder, which does not vest until the happening or non-happening of a condition precedent, a vested remainder subject to divestment vests immediately, though the remaindermen's ability to take possession depends on a condition subsequent. Bailey, 351 S.W.2d at 164-67; Carroll, 58 S.W.2d at 672 (On a condition precedent, a title does not pass or vest until it is performed, while a condition subsequent operates by way of a defeasance of the title that has once vested.); Tiffany, 260 S.W. at 359; Fulton v. Teager, 183 Ky. 381, 209 S.W. 535, 536 (1919). In Zinsmeister's Trustee v. Long, 250 Ky. 50, 61 S.W.2d 887, 890 (1933), the Court noted, The possibility of defeasance does not transform into a contingent remainder what would otherwise be a vested remainder. In Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Lane , this Court determined a beneficiary, Francis Ramey, took a vested remainder subject to divestment under the terms of a trust that provided the grantors retained the right to sell the family home but, if they died without doing so, the home passed to their daughter and, upon her death, to Francis Ramey. 303 S.W.2d at 274. The Court found the fact that Ramey could not immediately possess the home did not affect the vested nature of her interest. Id. Nor was her interest rendered contingent merely because it might be divested by the happening of a condition subsequent. The exercise of the power of disposal by either of the [grantors] would merely divest Frances [sic] Ramey of her vested estate. Id. By comparison, this Court has found contingent remainders in cases where the devisees must reach a certain age before taking or where the devisees are either unnamed or not yet in existence. In Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Tiffany , this Court held the grandchildren of the testator received a contingent remainder because of the condition precedent that a grandchild could not receive any income until he reached the age of twenty-two. 260 S.W. at 359. In other words, no grandchild received any benefit from, nor had any vested interest in, the estate until he reached twenty-two years of age. Id.; see also Curtis v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 318 S.W.2d 33 (Ky.1958). In Hurst v. Russell, 77 S.W.2d at 355-56, the testator gave his daughter a tract of land for her life, then to her lawful heirs and assigns forever. Id. At the time the suit was brought, the daughter had two sons. Id. The Court held they were contingent remaindermen because the word heirs designated a class of takers whose members could not be known until the death of their mother (the testator's daughter). Id. Thus, the grandchildren's interest was contingent because it could not vest until the mother died and all the members of the class could be determined. Id. In the present case, Janet and Jillisa are to receive all the assets remaining in their father's estate after Rosa's life estate terminates. Should either of them predecease Rosa without issue, that daughter's share passes to her sister. Should either of them predecease Rosa with issue, the deceased daughter's share passes either according to her will or to her issue. None of the characteristics of a contingent remainder are present as to Janet and Jillisa's interests under their father's will. The estate is not to be withheld from Janet and Jillisa until they reach a certain age or achieve a certain status, nor is their remainder to be shared with an unspecified heir or with a class with undetermined members. The remainder was left specifically to Janet P. Hammons and Jillisa S. Hammons, the born and ascertained daughters of the testator. The amount Janet and Jillisa, (or their children should either daughter predecease Rosa), receive depends on how much of the corpus of the estate Rosa consumes to provide for her own proper maintenance and medical care. These contingencies in the colloquial sensethat there be something left in the estate and that Janet and Jillisa either survive Rosa or leave a childdo not prevent Janet and Jillisa's interest from vesting immediately upon the death of the testator. They simply create the possibility that Janet and Jillisa may be divested of their interests. In accordance with the copious law on this subject, we hold Janet and Jillisa have a vested remainder subject to divestment. Construing the will thus is also in keeping with the intention of Dr. Hammons, the testator. It is clear from the will as a whole that he intended to care for both his wife and his daughters, to the greatest extent possible. To that end, he provided for his wife during her life and left whatever remains of his estate absolutely and in fee simple to Janet and Jillisa. In the event his wife had predeceased him, he left all of his assets to his daughters. And had his wife been unable or unwilling to serve as executrix, he named his daughters as co-executrices. These provisions make clear Dr. Hammons trusted his daughters and wanted to ensure they would be cared for after his death. Finding he left his daughters a vested remainder is in keeping with this intent and, accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals on this issue.