Opinion ID: 52875
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Applying kidnapping caselaw to the Colorado offense

Text: To restate, the provision of the Colorado code under which Cervantes was convicted, Colorado Revised Statutes § 18-3-302(1), reads as follows: Any person who knowingly seizes and carries any person from one place to another, without his consent and without lawful justification, commits second degree kidnapping. The Colorado code does not define the key terms in this provision, but Colorado caselaw sheds light on their meaning. The plain language of the provision and the Colorado cases interpreting it make clear that § 18-3-302(1) satisfies at most two of the four elements discussed in Gonzalez-Ramirez and Iniguez-Barba. It is apparent from the language of § 18-3-302(1) that this provision satisfies the first element identified in Gonzalez-Ramirez and Iniguez-Barba: knowing removal or confinement. Indeed, § 18-3-302(1) requires removal, not just confinement. It is possible that § 18-3-302(1) also satisfies the third element identified in Gonzalez-Ramirez and Iniguez-Barba: (a) force, threat, or fraud, or (b) if the victim is incompetent or under age thirteen, lack of consent from the person responsible for the general supervision of the victim's welfare. Gonzalez-Ramirez, 477 F.3d at 318-19; see also Iniguez-Barba, 485 F.3d at 791-92 (using the same language as Gonzalez-Ramirez ). In the Tennessee statute at issue in Gonzalez-Ramirez, this element appears explicitly in the definition of the word unlawfully, which appears in the statute in question. See TENN.CODE ANN. § 39-13-301(2). In the New York statute at issue in Iniguez-Barba, this element appears explicitly in the definition of without consent, which is incorporated into the definition of restrain, see NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 135.00(1), which is incorporated into the definition of abduct, see NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 135.00(2), a term that appears in the statute in question. See NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 135.20. Section 18-3-302(1) uses the language without [] consent and without lawful justification. Neither of these terms is defined by the Colorado code. The Colorado Supreme Court has stated that [i]n the context of the crime of second degree kidnapping . . . the term `without lawful justification' simply means an act not authorized or permitted by law-in other words, an act performed without lawful authority. Colorado v. Schuett, 833 P.2d 44, 47 (Colo.1992). The Colorado courts have not offered a more detailed definition of without lawful justification. With respect to the without consent language, the Colorado Court of Appeals has stated that a person who is seized by the use of force or express threats by definition has not given consent. Maass, 981 P.2d at 186. The court has also stated that an adult who consents without deceit to travel with another has not been `seized.' Id. These statements do not indicate whether other methods of seizure also qualify as without consent. It is possible that the phrase without [] consent and without lawful justification has the same meaning as the third element in Gonzalez-Ramirez and Iniguez-Barba; that is, it signifies a taking by (a) force, threat, or fraud, or (b) if the victim is incompetent or under age thirteen, lack of consent from the person responsible for the general supervision of the victim's welfare. Gonzalez-Ramirez, 477 F.3d at 318-19; see also Iniguez-Barba, 485 F.3d at 791-92 (using the same language as Gonzalez-Ramirez ). However, because the Colorado code and Colorado courts have not defined the terms without consent and without lawful justification in this precise manner, it is also possible that these terms have some broader meaning. It does not appear that § 18-3-302(1) includes the second element identified in Gonzalez-Ramirez and Iniguez-Barba: substantial interference with the victim's liberty. Gonzalez-Ramirez, 477 F.3d at 318; see also Iniguez-Barba, 485 F.3d at 792 (using the same language as Gonzalez-Ramirez ). For both the Tennessee statute addressed in Gonzalez-Ramirez and the New York statute at issue in Iniguez-Barba, the substantial interference language appears explicitly in the definitions of terms used in the statutes. See id. By contrast, section 18-3-302(1) of the Colorado Revised Statutes does not include any such substantial interference language, and, as explained above, its key terms are left undefined by the Colorado code. We have not found any Colorado decision that imparts a substantial interference element to § 18-3-302(1). The government's argument that a substantial increase in risk of harm is a factor that can help establish the seiz[ing] and carr[ying] element of the statute is not persuasive. In Colorado v. Harlan , the Colorado Supreme Court stated, That the defendant's conduct substantially increased a risk of harm to the victim is not a material element of second degree kidnapping. 8 P.3d at 476. Nor does § 18-3-302(1) incorporate the fourth element from Gonzalez-Ramirez: (a) circumstances exposing the victim to substantial risk of bodily injury, or (b) confinement as a condition of involuntary servitude. See 477 F.3d at 318-19. This requirement does not appear in the plain language of § 18-3-302(1). While some defendants have argued that a substantial risk of bodily injury element is embedded in § 18-3-302(1)'s requirement that the victim be carrie[d] . . . from one place to another, also known as the statute's asportation requirement, this interpretation has been rejected by the Colorado Supreme Court. The court stated as follows: We do not accept the defendant's proposition that substantially increasing a risk of harm to the victim is part of the asportation element of second degree kidnapping. The asportation element of this offense is simply that a person seized and carried another person from one place to another. That the defendant's conduct substantially increased a risk of harm to the victim is not a material element of second degree kidnapping. It is instead a factual circumstance reviewing courts consider in some cases to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant moved the victim from one place to another. Colorado v. Harlan, 8 P.3d 448, 476 (Colo. 2000). The question therefore becomes whether a statute that contains only the Gonzalez-Ramirez first element, knowing removal or confinement, and possibly the Gonzalez-Ramirez third element, (a) force, threat, or fraud, or (b) if the victim is incompetent or under age thirteen, lack of consent from the person responsible for the general supervision of the victim's welfare, and lacks any additional aggravating elements, such as the specified purpose requirements of the MPC definition, qualifies as the enumerated offense of kidnapping. We conclude that it does not. While Gonzalez-Ramirez did not hold that any particular elements are essential, the court did emphasize that where the specified purposes of the MPC kidnapping definition are lacking, some aggravating elements are necessary to bring a statute closer to the MPC definition of kidnapping. 477 F.3d at 317-20. Moreover, the court stated that we would not conclude that the term `kidnapping' encompasses any unlawful confinement, based on the broadest and most basically written state kidnapping statute. Id. at 318. The court then included a footnote citing South Carolina Code § 16-3-910, thus implying that this South Carolina statute was an example of the broadest and most basically written state kidnapping statute. The South Carolina statute reads as follows: Kidnapping. Whoever shall unlawfully seize, confine, inveigle, decoy, kidnap, abduct or carry away any other person by any means whatsoever without authority of law, except when a minor is seized or taken by his parent, is guilty of a felony. . . . S.C.CODE ANN. § 16-3-910 (2003). This provision is quite similar to the Colorado provision at issue in the instant case. In support of its position, the government relies on Black's Law Dictionary, which is cited in Iniguez-Barba and our unpublished decision in Garcia-Gonzalez. Black's Law Dictionary defines kidnapping as [t]he crime of seizing and taking away a person by force or fraud. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 886 (8th ed.2004). While this definition is somewhat similar to the Colorado provision at issue in this case, § 18-3-302(1) does not explicitly require force or fraud. Thus, the elements of § 18-3-302(1) are not completely congruent with the Black's Law Dictionary definition of kidnapping. In sum, in accordance with this circuit's precedent, a kidnapping statute such as § 18-3-302(1), which lacks the specified purposes of the MPC definition and other aggravating elements identified in Gonzalez-Ramirez and Iniguez-Barba, and also lacks an explicit force or fraud requirement, does not qualify as the enumerated offense of kidnapping. We therefore conclude that the district court erred by enhancing Cervantes's sentence by sixteen levels as a crime of violence conviction under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. B. Cervantes's sentence did not violate due process because it exceeded the maximum sentence for the offense charged in the indictment Cervantes raised his Apprendi objection in his original appeal to this court. This court rejected Cervantes's argument as foreclosed by Supreme Court and circuit precedent. Accordingly, under the law of the case doctrine, this court will not reconsider this argument. See Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. v. Int'l Paper Co., 889 F.2d 536, 539 (5th Cir.1989) (Under the `law of the case' doctrine, an issue of law or fact decided on appeal may not be reexamined either by the district court on remand or by the appellate court on a subsequent appeal.). Even if we were to reconsider Cervantes's objection, there has been no change in Supreme Court or circuit law that would permit us to reverse the district court on this ground.