Opinion ID: 68475
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to object when “cut off”

Text: As to Simon’s first claim, he suggests that his counsel should have persisted in questioning potential jurors about their views on the death penalty or objected to the trial judge’s “cutting off” his opportunity to rehabilitate jurors with beliefs against the death penalty. Simon notes that five jurors whom the State later challenged due to their refusal to impose the death penalty had indicated that they could follow the court’s instructions and determine guilt without regard to their views on the death penalty: Ethridge, Craigen, Dickerson, Tinnell, and Williams. Simon suggests that these jurors were partially rehabilitated and that his trial counsel should have continued attempting to rehabilitate them. He contends that counsel’s failure to do so resulted in five jurors being needlessly struck for cause. The Supreme Court of Mississippi rejected this claim, noting that the issue Simon suggests his counsel should have continued to pursue—whether those prospective jurors could ever impose the death penalty—“had indeed been 22 No. 08-70011 covered several times by the trial Court, the State, and Simon’s trial counsel before” counsel was cut off. See Simon II (State Habeas), 857 So. 2d at 693. Moreover, the jurors who Simon argues his counsel should have questioned were all “straightforward and unwavering in their opposition to imposing the death penalty.” Id. Thus, according to the court, “the [trial] judge did not err in cutting off Simon’s trial counsel’s last attempt to rehabilitate them, nor was counsel’s assistance deficient for failing to object to this preemption.” Id. The district court agreed with the Supreme Court of Mississippi, stating that the record did not support Simon’s contentions. See Simon II (Federal Habeas), 2007 WL 4292498, at . Indeed, the district court found Simon to be “tak[ing] liberties with the facts of the case by characterizing the trial court’s statements as impeding his opportunity to rehabilitate potential jurors.” Id. The district court thus found it reasonable for Simon’s trial counsel to cease this line of questioning. We do not find the district court’s resolution of this issue debatable. The pertinent issue—whether particular jurors would refuse to impose the death penalty—had twice been covered before Simon’s trial counsel began his voir dire. First, during the court’s voir dire, the trial judge asked the venirepersons whether they would be able to impose a sentence of death. Several unequivocally indicated that they were not. Later, during the State’s voir dire, counsel for the State twice asked the jurors whether they had changed their mind about their stated inability to return a sentence of death with no response. The State also asked whether anyone (besides those who had indicated earlier) could not impose a sentence of death, and one juror responded that she could not. When Simon’s trial counsel began discussing the issue, he first asked who on the venire did not believe in the death penalty. After roughly a dozen affirmative responses, counsel then asked whether those who did not believe in 23 No. 08-70011 the death penalty could follow the judge’s instructions and decide guilt or innocence regardless of their feelings about the death penalty. Counsel received varying answers, some yes, some no, some not knowing. Counsel then asked the jurors whether they understood that a cross section of the community includes people who do not believe in the death penalty. The State objected to this question, and the trial judge sustained the objection. Simon’s trial counsel then attempted to restate the question to one particular juror: Now, those people that I just asked about the death penalty, the ones who do not believe in the death penalty, if you’re selected on the jury, even though you do not believe in the death penalty—Ms. Ethridge, could you follow the law and consider whether or not it’s appropriate or not, even though you don’t believe in it. The State objected to this question, noting that “the word ‘consider’ is not a part of it.” The court then sustained the objection in detail: JUDGE PEARSON: The question has been asked about three different ways. MR. WALLS [Simon’s trial counsel]: Your Honor, that’s the question I wanted to pose to all those other jurors. Has the Court ruled I shouldn’t ask that question? JUDGE PEARSON: The Court has asked this question, Mr. Walls, and this is the third different way that you’ve asked the same question. I’m sustaining the objection. MR. WALLS: All right. I have one other area, two quickly that I want to go into. . . . Simon’s trial counsel then went on to ask the venirepersons about what they had heard regarding the case. Under these circumstances, it was not unreasonable for Simon’s trial counsel to cease his efforts at rehabilitation. The substance of the pertinent question—whether jurors would refuse to return a sentence of death—had 24 No. 08-70011 already been covered. It was reasonable for counsel to move on to a different issue. Had Simon’s trial counsel persisted in the above-quoted line of questioning, he likely would have drawn additional objections that the trial judge would have sustained. Instead of antagonizing the trial judge in front of potential jurors, counsel reasonably decided to move on. Further, even if Simon’s trial counsel could have tried to rehabilitate several of the jurors, his failure to do so was not deficient performance. A potential juror can be excused for cause if his or her views on the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his or her duties. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985); Williams v. Collins, 16 F.3d 626, 633 (5th Cir. 1994). A juror whose views on the death penalty prevent him or her from returning a sentence of death is therefore excusable for cause. See Williams, 16 F.3d at 633. And where attempts to rehabilitate a juror who has refused to impose the death penalty would be futile, refusal to engage in such useless efforts rarely constitutes deficient performance under Strickland. See id. Our review of the record reveals that four of the five jurors in question—Ethridge, Craigen, Dickerson, and Tinnell—squarely indicated that they could not return a sentence of death. Efforts to rehabilitate them would have been fruitless, and the performance of Simon’s trial counsel was therefore not deficient. The fifth potential juror, Williams, is a bit less clear. We could only find evidence that Williams did not “believe” in the death penalty. But we need not address whether counsel was deficient regarding Williams; even if we assume deficient performance, Simon cannot show that the exclusion of Williams prejudiced his trial. The jury in Simon’s trial was selected from the first fortyfour members of the venire, with three alternates selected from the first fifty-six. Williams was juror number seventy-two. Thus, even if Simon’s trial counsel had 25 No. 08-70011 fully rehabilitated her, she would not have been on the jury that heard his case. Any failure to rehabilitate Williams, then, could not have prejudiced Simon. 2. Failure to object to State’s for-cause challenges The State later challenged the five above-mentioned jurors for cause, and the trial judge excused all five due to their refusal to impose the death penalty. Simon contends that his counsel should have pointed out to the trial judge that his efforts to rehabilitate these jurors were cut off, and the failure to do so amounted to ineffective assistance. The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that it was not deficient performance for Simon’s counsel not to object when the trial judge stated that jurors struck for cause were only partially rehabilitated. See Simon II (State Habeas), 857 So. 2d at 693. As “these jurors did not falter in their stated opposition to imposing the death penalty,” they could be stricken for cause and any cutting short of trial counsel’s questioning “had little, if any, effect upon the adequacy of their voir dire.” Id. Thus, according to the court, Simon’s trial “counsel did not render deficient performance in failing to remind the judge that he had been cut off in his futile attempts to rehabilitate these jurors.” Id. The district court agreed, stating that each of the jurors in question were unequivocal in their inability to impose the death penalty. See Simon II (Federal Habeas), 2007 WL 4292498, at . The district court also noted that, in addition to Williams, potential jurors Craigen, Dickerson, and Tinnell also were not among the first forty-four venire members and therefore “would not have been reached even if they had remained on the panel.” Id. We do not find the district court’s resolution of this issue debatable. Again, four of the five potential jurors in question had squarely stated that they would refuse to impose the death penalty. Any further efforts to rehabilitate them would have been fruitless, and Simon’s trial counsel was therefore not 26 No. 08-70011 deficient in failing to point out that his efforts at rehabilitating them had been cut short. And as to Williams, any failure to rehabilitate her did not prejudice Simon. 3. Failure to object to disparate opportunities for rehabilitation Simon’s trial counsel challenged several jurors for cause on the ground that they had said they would automatically impose the death penalty. The trial judge gave the State the opportunity to rehabilitate some of these jurors. Simon again contends that his trial counsel should have pointed out that the trial judge had cut short his efforts at rehabilitating jurors, and that his failure to do so constituted ineffective assistance. The Supreme Court of Mississippi found no deficiency in Simon’s trial counsel’s performance on this matter. In the court’s words, The record reflects that during the time jurors were being stricken “for cause,” where the judge’s notes were inadequate, incomplete, or where he considered them untrustworthy, he would permit an individual voir dire of that juror to clear things up. No objections were made to this procedure by either party. It benefitted both sides. That Simon’s trial counsel did not object to the judge’s allowing individual voir dire of jurors—where the State was successful in clarifying the judge’s perception of those jurors in a way that possibly could be characterized as favorable to the State—was not the provision of deficient assistance. See Simon II (State Habeas), 857 So. 2d at 693. The district court similarly found no merit to Simon’s allegations of deficient performance when the State was allowed to rehabilitate potential jurors, as both the State and defense were allowed to conduct individual voir dire. See Simon II (Federal Habeas), 2007 WL 4292498, at . Again, we do not find the district court’s resolution of this issue debatable. The record shows that counsel for the State and Simon’s trial counsel were both given the opportunity to question jurors when there was some confusion as to 27 No. 08-70011 what the juror had said. Further, as to four of the five jurors in question, any effort at rehabilitation would have been fruitless. And any failure to rehabilitate Williams was harmless. In sum, the district court held that the Supreme Court of Mississippi’s resolution of Simon’s ineffective assistance claims regarding rehabilitation was proper. The district court’s resolution of this issue is not debatable, and we therefore deny a COA on this claim.