Opinion ID: 2806120
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Crime of Violence Framework

Text: Section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) mandates a sixteen-level increase to a defendant’s base offense level when the defendant previously has been deported following “a conviction for a felony that is . . . a crime of violence.” The commentary to the Guidelines, in turn, defines “crime of violence” as (1) any offense in a list of enumerated offenses, including “aggravated assault,” or (2) “any other offense under federal, state, or local law that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii). 3 “This court uses different tests when analyzing whether a particular offense amounts to a [crime of violence], and the test used depends on whether the offense is an enumerated one or has physical force as an element.” United States v. Moreno–Florean, 542 F.3d 445, 449 (5th Cir. 2008). We apply a categorical approach derived from Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), to determine whether the offense of conviction contains as an element the use of force. 4 Moreno–Florean, 542 F.3d at 449. To this end, we “examine the elements of the offense, rather than the facts underlying the 3 The Guidelines commentary “is binding and is equivalent in force to the Guidelines language itself as long as the language and the commentary are not inconsistent.” United States v. Esparza–Perez, 681 F.3d 228, 229 n.3 (5th Cir. 2012). 4 We refer to this as the “force offense” or “use of force” prong. 3 Case: 14-40321 Document: 00513069071 Page: 4 Date Filed: 06/05/2015 No. 14-40321 conviction or the defendant’s actual conduct.” United States v. Carrasco– Tercero, 745 F.3d 192, 195 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). In comparison, we apply a “common sense” approach that looks to the “generic, contemporary meaning” of an offense listed in § 2L1.2 to assess whether the offense of conviction amounts to that enumerated offense. 5 United States v. Esparza–Perez, 681 F.3d 228, 229 (5th Cir. 2012). To discern this “plain, ordinary meaning,” we rely on sources including the Model Penal Code, Professor LaFave’s Substantive Criminal Law treatise, modern state statutes, and dictionaries. Mungia–Portillo, 484 F.3d at 816; see also Esparza–Perez, 681 F.3d at 229. “State-law labels do not control this inquiry because the [crime of violence] adjustment incorporates crimes with certain elements, not crimes that happen to have the same label under state law.” Esparza–Perez, 681 F.3d at 230 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the defendant was convicted under a statute that is “narrower than the generic crime” or that mirrors the generic definition with only “minor variations,” the enhancement may stand. United States v. Herrera, 647 F.3d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 2011). But if the statute of conviction “encompasses prohibited behavior that is not within the plain, ordinary meaning of the enumerated offense, the conviction is not a crime of violence as a matter of law.” Esparza–Perez, 681 F.3d at 230 (internal quotation marks omitted). 6 Under both the categorical and common sense approaches, “if the statute of conviction contains a series of disjunctive elements, this court may look beyond the statute to certain records made or used in adjudicating guilt to determine which subpart of the statute formed the basis of the conviction.” 5 We refer to this as the “enumerated offense” prong. 6 As is evident from this explanation, the “common sense” approach is also “categorical” in nature because it requires us to compare the statutory definition of the crime—and not the defendant’s conduct—to the generic, contemporary meaning of the enumerated offense. See Esparza–Perez, 681 F.3d at 230. 4 Case: 14-40321 Document: 00513069071 Page: 5 Date Filed: 06/05/2015 No. 14-40321 Moreno–Florean, 542 F.3d at 449. Qualifying records “are ‘generally limited to . . . the charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented.’” Herrera–Alvarez, 753 F.3d at 138 (quoting Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005)). If the statute of conviction cannot be narrowed using such Shepard-compliant documents, we must determine whether the “least culpable act constituting a violation of that statute” necessarily entails the use of force or constitutes the enumerated offense. United States v. Gonzalez–Ramirez, 477 F.3d 310, 315–16 (5th Cir. 2007).