Opinion ID: 2580978
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Multiple Penetrations as Multiple Incidents per Victim

Text: Multiple incidents of offense per victim can justify an exceptional sentence. Former RCW 9.94A.390(2)(d)(i) (1998). Although the statute discusses multiple incidents in the context of major economic offenses, this subfactor may be relied upon as a basis for an exceptional sentence for both noneconomic and economic offenses. See State v. Dunaway, 109 Wash.2d 207, 219, 743 P.2d 1237, 749 P.2d 160 (1987). See also State v. Armstrong, 106 Wash.2d 547, 550, 723 P.2d 1111 (1986) (using former RCW 9.94A.390(2)(d)(i) (1998) to justify an exceptional sentence for the infliction of multiple injuries in the course of a second degree assault). Multiple acts in themselves establish a greater level of culpability than that contemplated by the legislature in establishing the punishment for a crime committed by a single act. State v. Vaughn, 83 Wash.App. 669, 677-78, 924 P.2d 27 (1996), review denied, 131 Wash.2d 1018, 936 P.2d 417 (1997). The aggravating circumstance of major economic offense remains a valid reason for imposing an exceptional sentence if even one of the statutory subfactors is satisfied. State v. Branch, 129 Wash.2d 635, 651, 919 P.2d 1228 (1996). The State raised this aggravating factor at the resentencing for the first time, and the trial court recognized it as an additional justification for the exceptional sentence. Tili challenges the use of the multiple penetrations in this way because he claims his conduct was not exceedingly more egregious than what is `typical' [for] rape in the first degree. Pet. for Review at 16. The State counters that while this court concluded the rapes constituted same criminal conduct, it did not disallow the use of the multiple penetrations as an aggravating factor. A straightforward analysis of the parties' contentions is difficult because the record is unclear as to how the trial court ultimately used the multiple penetrations in justifying the exceptional sentence. The stated bases for the exceptional sentence under conclusions of law I are: (a) deliberate cruelty; (b) victim vulnerability; and (c) multiple incidents of offense per victim as provided in former RCW 9.94A.390(2)(d)(i) (1998). Yet, findings of fact II, sections (kk), (oo), (pp), and (qq), [4] indicate that the court used the multiple rape incidents to support the operation of the multiple offense policy as an aggravating circumstance as provided in former RCW 9.94A.390(2)(i) (1998). See also former RCW 9.94A.400 (1998). The findings of fact do not mention the use of multiple incidents per victim as an aggravating circumstance in and of itself. There is necessarily some overlap between these two aggravating circumstances. However, because the trial court's findings focus on the operation of the multiple offense policy, rather than multiple incidents per victim, we will confine our analysis of the multiple incidents only to the multiple offense policy.