Opinion ID: 42566
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: If an individual or organization is required

Text: We review questions of law de novo. See to file a report and fails to do so, the CFDA Kona Tech. Corp. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 225 authorizes civil penalties. See id. § 18:1505.4. F.3d 595, 601 (5th Cir. 2000). Because a fa- If the failure to file is knowing, wilful, or cial challenge to the constitutionality of a stat- fraudulent, the person required to file (either ute presents a pure question of law, we employ as an individual or representative of an organithat standard here as we examine the merits. zation) may be fined up to $500 dollars and sentenced to up to six months in prison. See In general, to mount a successful facial at- id. § 18:1505.6(A)(2). tack, “the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act At the heart of the Center’s challenge is the would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, statutory definition of “expenditure.” Section 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). The requirement is 18:1483(9)(a) states that an expenditure is “a different in the First Amendment context, purchase, payment, advance, deposit, or gift, where we recognize the overbreadth doctrine. of money or anything of value made for the With regard to facial First Amendment chal- purpose of supporting, opposing, or otherwise lenges, the challenger need only show that a influencing the nomination or election of a perstatute or regulation “might operate unconsti- son to public office.” The Center contends tutionally under some conceivable set of cir- that this definition is vague and overbroad becumstances.” Id. cause it could be interpreted to reach both express advocacy and issue advocacy. Because The provisions of the CFDA relevant to the disclosure requirements burden protected polCenter’s claim are as follows: Louisiana Re- itical speech and subject those who do not vised Statute section 18:1501.1(A) states that comply to civil and criminal penalties, and because the disclosure requirements are trig- [a]ny person, other than a candidate or a gered, inter alia, by “expenditures” in excess political committee, who makes any expen- of $500, the Center contends that the definiditure or who accepts a contribution, other tion is vague and overbroad and therefore viothan to or from a candidate or to or from a lates the First Amendment. political committee, shall file reports if ei- ther said expenditures or said contributions The Board counters that because the releexceed five hundred dollars in the aggre- vant provisions of the CFDA are equivalent to gate during the aggregating period defined the disclosure provisions in the Federal Elecfor committees. tion Campaign Act (“FECA”) that were upheld in Buckley, the CFDA provisions are not The reports must “contain the same informa- facially unconstitutional. We agree, but only 6 by imposing the same limiting construction on sufficiently important to outweigh the possithe CFDA that the Court employed in Buckley. bility of infringement [of First Amendment rights], particularly when the free functioning
The challenged provisions are similar to The governmental interests sought to be vindiwhat the Court confronted and upheld in cated by the disclosure requirements are of this Buckley. Section 434(e) of FECA required magnitude.” Id. at 66. In reaching that conthat clusion, the Court focused on voters’ need for information about candidates and their sup- [e]very person (other than a political com- porters to evaluate the candidates and expose mittee or candidate) who makes contribu- corruption. Id. at 66-68. tions or expenditures, other than by contri- bution to a political committee or candi- Nevertheless, with regard to § 434(e), the date, in an aggregate amount in excess of Court stated that “the provision raises serious $100 within a calendar year . . . file with problems of vagueness, particularly treacherthe [Federal Election] Commission a state- ous where, as here, the violation of its terms ment containing the information required by carries criminal penalties and fear of incurring this section. these sanctions may deter those who seek to exercise protected First Amendment rights.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 160. In relevant part, Id. at 76-77. The source of vagueness was FECA defined “expenditure” as “a purchase, the “for the purpose of influencing” language payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, within the definition of expenditure, which or gift of money or anything of value, made for gave the provision “potential for encompassing the purpose of influencing the nomination for both issue discussion and advocacy of a politielection, or the election, of any person to cal result.” Id. at 76, 79. Due process “reFederal office, or to the office of presidential quires that a criminal statute provide adequate and vice presidential election.” Id. at 147. notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that his contemplated conduct is illegal.” Id. at 77. The challengers in Buckley “attack[ed] Without knowing whether the reporting re- § 434(e) as a direct intrusion on privacy of be- quirements of § 434(e) were triggered by lief . . . and as imposing very real, practical political advocacy, issue discussion, or both, burdens . . . certain to deter individuals from an individual (or organization) wishing to making expenditures for their independent po- speak out could not know whether his contemlitical speech . . . .” Id. at 75. In discussing a plated conduct would subject him to criminal similar requirement within the FECA, the sanction if he did not disclose the information Court agreed that disclosure requirements “can required by FECA. seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment” In addition, the Court held that § 434(e) and that such requirements must therefore was rendered potentially overbroad by the fact “survive exacting scrutiny.” Id. at 64. that it could be interpreted to require disclosure when an independent individual or group The Court held, however, that in general, engages only in issue advocacy. The Court disclosure requirements survive exacting scru- reasoned that if § 434(e) did cover that situatiny because “there are governmental interests tion, the connection between the information 7 sought and the governmental interest in pro- cacy and issue advocacy. “Speakers,” the moting clean and well-informed elections “may Court stated, do not “possess an inviolable be too remote.” Id. at 80. First Amendment right to engage in the latter category of speech.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at Rather than striking § 434(e) down as un- 190. The Court further asserted that constitutional, however, the Court imposed a limiting construction on the statute, bringing it a plain reading of Buckley makes clear that within constitutional bounds by drawing a line the express advocacy limitation, in both the between express advocacyand issue advocacy. expenditure and the disclosure contexts, The Court stated that “we construe ‘expendi- was the product of statutory interpretation ture’ for purposes of [§ 434(e)] . . . to reach rather than a constitutional command. In only funds used for communications that narrowly reading the FECA provisions in expressly advocate the election or defeat of a Buckley to avoid problems of vagueness clearly identified candidate.” Id. Words of and overbreadth, we nowhere suggested express advocacy include terms “such as ‘vote that a statute that was neither vague nor for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ overbroad would be required to toe the ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ same express advocacy line. ‘reject.’” Id. at 44 n.52. These are the well- known “magic words.” Id. at 192. Given that the CFDA links the disclosure The Board contends that McConnell elimirequirements for expenditures made by inde- nates completely the express advocacy/issue pendent individuals and groups to the same advocacy delineation and in its place provides “for the purpose of influencing” language that a more holistic, “practical” approach to deterthe Court confronted and upheld in Buckley, mining whether expenditures have been made we can likewise construe the CFDA in a way for the purpose of influencing an election and that saves it from constitutional infirmity. On therefore, consistent with the First Amendthat basis, the Center fails in its facial challenge ment, can be subject to regulation. That readto the constitutionality of the disclosure provi- ing of McConnell is incorrect. McConnell sions of the CFDA. states only that a campaign finance regulation can cover issue advocacy and nevertheless be
The more difficult question, in light of Mc- “closelydrawn” to match a “sufficientlyimporConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. tant” government interest, id. at 135, and is 93 (2003), is whether we must, in circum- not vague. The Court has not provided a stances such as this, continue to adhere to the broader approach to determining when expenexpress advocacy/issue advocacy dichotomy ditures have been made for the purpose of inthat the Court set up in Buckley and that we fluencing an election. employed in Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Moore, 288 F.3d 187, 194-95 Instead, the Court has stated that legisla- (5th Cir. 2002). In McConnell the Court held tures may employ standards other than a that for purposes of regulating election-related bright-line distinction between express and isspeech, there is no constitutionally-mandated sue advocacy as long as they are precise in reline that must be drawn between express advo- gard to the types of activities that will subject 8 an individual or group to regulation. With re- nition for what qualifies as such advocacy.7 As gard to the particular provision at issue in so limited, the challenged provisions of the McConnell, for example, the Court held that CFDA are facially constitutional. new FECA § 304(f)(3)’s definition of “elec- tioneering communication” “raises none of the The judgment of dismissal is AFFIRMED. vagueness concerns that drove our analysis in Buckley,” because the term applies only (1) to a broadcast (2) clearly identifying a candidate for federal office, (3) aired within a specific time period, and (4) targeted to an identified audience of at least 50,000 viewers or listeners. These components are both easily understood and objectively determinable. Thus, the consti- tutional objection that persuaded the Court in Buckley to limit FECA’s reach to express advocacy is simply inapposite here. Id. at 194. McConnell does not obviate the applicabil- 7 ity of Buckley’s line-drawing exercise where, We are aware of the McConnell Court’s asas in this case, we are confronted with a vague sertions, 540 U.S. at 193-94, that “the presence or statute. See Anderson v. Spear, 356 F.3d 651, absence of magic words cannot meaningfully dis664-65 (6th Cir. 2004). The flaw in the CFDA tinguish electioneering speech from a true issue is that it might be read to cover issue advo- ad,” that “Buckley’s magic-words requirement is functionally meaningless,” and that “Buckley’s excacy. Following McConnell, that uncertainty press advocacy line . . . has not aided the legislative presents a problem not because regulating effort to combat real or apparent corruption.” such communications is per se unconstitu- Those statements, however, were made in the contional, but because it renders the scope of the text of the Court’s determination that a distinction statute uncertain. between express advocacy and issue advocacy is not constitutionally mandated. The Court said To cure that vagueness, and receiving no nothing about the continuing relevance of the magic instruction from McConnell to do otherwise, words requirement as a tool of statutory construcwe apply Buckley’s limiting principle to the tion where a court is dealing with a vague camCFDA and conclude that the statute reaches paign finance regulation. only communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified In light of that silence, we must assume that candidate. In limiting the scope of the CFDA Buckley remains good law in such circumstances. If the State of Louisiana agrees with the Court that to express advocacy, we adopt Buckley’s defi- the magic words requirement is “functionally meaningless,” then pursuant to McConnell it is free to amend the CFDA in the same way that Con- gress altered the FECA. 9