Opinion ID: 2426456
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: TapesPrivacy

Text: He first contends that the tape recordings of conversations between Fontenot and himself were obtained in violation of his rights to be free from unexpected, unauthorized intrusions into his privacy protected by the 4th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution. This is not a criminal proceeding, [8] nor does this case involve illegal wiretapping; and thus, the cases cited to us by Judge Bates are distinguishable. The police did not tap Judge Bates' telephone. Nukie Fontenot, independent of police assistance, made the tapes of his own conversations with Judge Bates. Fontenot testified as to the content of these conversations, and the tapes were played to bolster the credibility of the testimony. Judge Bates willingly had these conversations with Fontenot who then later revealed the contents. He expected Fontenot to hear and know the contents. Judge Bates cannot complain when Fontenot later revealed the contents. Judge Bates relies on Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). In Katz, the Court held that information obtained by electronic surveillance is inadmissible under the Fourth Amendment where government agents obtain such information by intrusion into an area where a person justifiably expects his privacy. The United States Supreme Court has written on this subject since Katz. In United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 28 L.Ed.2d 453 (1971), the Court held that there was no unlawful intrusion when a party to a conversation then or later reveals the conversation to the police. However strongly a defendant trusts an apparent colleague, his expectations in this regard are not protected by the Fourth Amendment. 401 U.S. at 749, 91 S.Ct. 1122. The Court in White, supra, quoted from Hoffa v. United States, as follows: In these circumstances, `no interest legitimately protected by the Fourth Amendment is involved,' for that Amendment affords no protection to `a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.' 385 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S.Ct. 408, 413, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966).