Opinion ID: 1660892
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: conclusion

Text: Based on the above analysis, we remand the ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised by Thompson here, other than those rejected herein, for an evidentiary hearing. As to the remaining claims, we affirm the trial court's summary denial. Finally, we deny Thompson's petition for habeas relief. It is so ordered. SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., concur. WELLS, C.J., dissents with an opinion. QUINCE, J., recused. WELLS, C.J., dissenting. I dissent because I believe that the trial judge in her thirty-seven page order adequately and correctly addressed the issues which form the basis of the majority's reversal. I conclude the majority's reversal extends Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), beyond the intended analysis of the United States Supreme Court. In respect to the voir dire issue, the same judge presided over the trial and the postconviction hearing. Though I agree that the sufficiency of the evidence to convict relied on in the order denying relief was not in and of itself the basis upon which relief should be denied, the entire record of the voir dire and the trial also have to be considered. The jurors, including juror Wolcott, agreed to base their decision only on the evidence. They were instructed that the defendant had a right to remain silent and that the defendant's failure to testify should not influence the verdict in any way. I believe the trial judge was correct in finding that the defendant did not demonstrate in his motion a basis upon which relief could be granted. In respect to the male caucasian hair, it seems to me that this entire claim is so speculative that it forms no basis for relief. However, I would favor DNA testing on any material from the crime scene which can be so tested. But that is a separate issue not raised in this motion. In respect to the claimed failure to request a Richardson hearing, this issue is so ill defined in appellant's papers that I do not find a basis for reversal of the trial judge's postconviction order.