Opinion ID: 1351576
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Constitutionality of the 1978 Death Penalty Law: Treatment of Evidence of Unadjudicated Offenses

Text: (38) Defendant contends in substance that the 1978 death penalty law is unconstitutional insofar as it allows individual jurors to consider evidence of unadjudicated offenses in aggravation without first requiring at least a substantial majority of a 12-member panel to agree that the People have proved such crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, he claims that in this regard the law violates certain rights assertedly guaranteed criminal defendants under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution  viz., due process of law (U.S. Const., Amends. V, XIV), trial by impartial jury ( id., Amends. VI, XIV), and a reliable penalty determination ( id., Amends. VIII, XIV). The point must be rejected. As stated in part IV.I, ante, in a quotation from People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at page 774, we see nothing improper in permitting each juror individually to decide whether uncharged criminal activity has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt and, if so, what weight that activity should be given in deciding the penalty. We do not believe that in this regard the 1978 death penalty law implicates the guaranties of due process, jury trial, and reliable sentencing contained in the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. In our view, the statutory scheme does not significantly affect, to the defendant's detriment, either the fairness of the penalty trial or the correctness of its outcome, nor does it impair whatever federal constitutional right he might have to a determination by a jury. [16]
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the witness-killing special-circumstance findings must be set aside but that otherwise the judgment must be affirmed. It is so ordered.