Opinion ID: 1498213
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Component-parts doctrine

Text: On appeal, Wagner argues that it is not appropriate to adopt the component-parts doctrine in this particular case. Wagner maintains that not only would the doctrine provide a complete defense to liability as a matter of law, but the doctrine does not apply to the facts of the case. Specifically, Wagner contends that the doctrine does not apply where a manufacturer, such as Pilkington, has a federal statutory and regulatory obligation to certify that the tempered glass designed as a component part in the 2000 Blazer complied with all federal safety standards. Wagner further argues that the component-parts doctrine does not apply to Pilkington. Specifically, Wagner asserts that she provided evidence of material issues of fact with respect to the issues of (1) whether the driver's side window was defective; (2) whether Pilkington substantially participated in the design of the tempered-glass side windows; and (3) whether Pilkington knew that the windows provide no protection against occupant ejection. Pilkington responds, arguing that the component-parts doctrine, if adopted, provides a valid defense in Arkansas, as other states have adopted the doctrine. Pilkington contends that the component-parts doctrine does not conflict with any Arkansas statutory or case law and should be adopted. Pilkington further argues that the component-parts doctrine entitles it to an award of summary judgment because (1) its Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 205 certification does not make the component-parts doctrine inapplicable; (2) the evidence established that the tempered glass was not defective and complied with federal safety standards; (3) Pilkington did not design the glass; and (4) Wagner is incorrect in arguing that its knowledge of the specific use of the component part is a requirement. The component-parts doctrine, which Pilkington asserted as a defense in its motion for summary judgment, provides that suppliers of inherently safe component parts are not responsible for accidents that result when the parts are integrated into a larger system that the component-part supplier did not design or build. In re TMJ Implants Products Liability Litigation v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 97 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 1996). This doctrine applies to claims for negligence and strict liability. Id. If the component-part manufacturer does not participate in the integration of the component into the finished product, it is not liable for defects in the final product if the component itself is not defective. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 334 (5th Cir.1998). The component-parts doctrine is outlined in section 5 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, which provides in pertinent part: One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing product components who sells or distributes a component is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by a product into which the component is integrated if: (a) the component is defective in itself... and the defect causes the harm; or (b)(1) the seller or distributor of the component substantially participates in the integration of the component into the design of the product; and (2) the integration of the component causes the product to be defective ...; and (3) the defect in the product causes the harm. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 5 (1998). In light of the component-parts doctrine, which has not yet been adopted in Arkansas, we review the evidence in support of Pilkington's motion for summary judgment. At the outset, we note that we analyze the issue specifically for its value in reaching a decision on whether factual issues exist with regard to the two bases for recovery, negligence and strict liability, alleged in Wagner's complaint. Here, Pilkington provided the deposition testimony of Trooper Joann Demmitt, who reconstructed the accident, and Robert Carter, the property owner whose property was damaged as a result of the accident. Pilkington also submitted the sworn affidavits of Anthony R. Shaw, Pilkington's vice president of automotive technology, whose testimony reflected that the glass at issue was designed and manufactured according to GM's specifications, and Richard Morrison, the owner of Glass & Glazing Forensics, Inc., who testified about the design and materials of the glass. In meeting proof with proof under Lamar, supra , Wagner submitted the report of Anne Stodola, an engineer who evaluated the accident for the purpose of reconstruct[ing] the subject accident. Wagner also submitted the deposition testimony of Trooper Demmitt, Robert Carter, and Shelley Carter. Wagner further provided an affidavit of Michael Reyes, a mechanical engineer, who testified about occupant ejections, and Stephen A. Batzer, a mechanical engineer, who testified that [t]he driver's side window system of the 2000 Blazer was unreasonably dangerous and defective because the tempered soda-lime glass used in the side windows lacks energy-absorbing property and will not retain occupants during a collision or rollover event. Additionally, Wagner submitted confidential testimony, which was sealed pursuant to a protective order rendered by this court, of David Murbach, a salesperson for GM, who testified that GM produced the blue prints or drawings for the moveable windows including the driver's side glass for the 2000 Blazer. Based upon this evidence presented to the circuit court, there appears to be competing testimony as to whether there was a defect in the glass, whether the defect caused any harm, and whether Pilkington substantially participated in the integration of the component into the design. Thus, Wagner met proof with proof in response to Pilkington's motion for summary judgment. Therefore, we hold that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in Pilkington's favor.