Opinion ID: 1855709
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Unconstitutional religious discrimination

Text: Finally, defendant asserts in a footnote of his brief that certain jurors were successfully challenged for cause in violation of their federal and state constitutional rights to freedom of religious beliefs. As we held in State v. Sanders, 93-0001 (La.11/30/94), 648 So.2d 1272, this argument fails for two reasons: First, [defendant] has not even argued (much less shown) that the alleged discrimination the two jurors suffered actually constitutes religious discrimination. The record shows the inquiry was restricted to the question of whether the veniremen could vote for the death penalty. As this court has held, the single attitude of opposition to the death penalty does not represent the kind of... religious ... characteristic that underlies those groups that have been recognized as being distinctive. State v. Lowenfield, 495 So.2d 1245, 1254 (La. 1985). Second, even if reluctance to impose the death penalty were religious in nature, this court has adopted the Witherspoon and Witt standards. This court has on numerous occasions reviewed the disqualification of jurors who stated a religious basis for their inability to impose the death penalty, and has in no instance found a constitutional violation. See, e.g. State v. Sullivan, 596 So.2d 177 (La. 1992); State v. Copeland, 530 So.2d 526 (La.1988); State v. Ward, 483 So.2d 578 (La.1986); Lowenfield, 495 So.2d at 1254. This assignment of error thus lacks merit as to those prospective jurors who allegedly were struck because their religious beliefs precluded them from imposing the death penalty.