Opinion ID: 409640
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Concerted activity for mutual aid or protection

Text: 14 In support of its contention that Walsh did not engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection, the hospital argues that: (1) Walsh did not intend mutual aid or protection in coming to McCarthy's aid but acted only out of fear of McCarthy; and (2) Walsh intended to aid McCarthy only at an unemployment compensation hearing, and such aid is not protected by the Act; and (3) McCarthy was properly discharged and therefore Walsh did not act in concert with a statutory employee. 15 The hospital's first argument assumes that if an employee is motivated solely by personal concern when he comes to the aid of another employee his action is not protected by the Act. We are not at all sure that intent rather than effect should control in evaluating what activity is protected by the Act. Even assuming that intent is critical, the ALJ had ample evidence in the record upon which to base his conclusion that Walsh did not act primarily out of fear but because he wanted to tell the truth. 1 16 The hospital argues similarly that Walsh gave the statement to McCarthy only for use at an unemployment compensation hearing not for use in grievance proceedings, and that we therefore must decide whether aid given for that purpose is protected by the Act. Because the circumstances of another employee's discharge were at issue in the unemployment compensation hearing, we would have no trouble finding that Walsh's aid for purposes of the hearing bore a sufficiently close nexus to the terms and conditions of employment to be 'protected concerted activity' , Supreme Optical Co. v. NLRB, 628 F.2d 1262, 1263 (1980), were the question presented. The circumstances of the termination of a particular employee potentially affects the relationship between all employees and their employer. It is reasonable for employees to be concerned about the consequences of their possible termination. Id. But we think that what controls here is the employer's motivation. If, as we conclude within, there was substantial evidence that the hospital acted to thwart mutual aid in a grievance proceeding, we think that the protected status of such aid is what is at issue. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Walsh objected to the use of his statement for grievance purposes, a use he was aware of soon after giving the statement. 17 The hospital's third argument, if accepted, would severely cripple employee participation in the grievance-arbitration process, a process integral to the collective bargaining process that the Act was designed to encourage, see Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960). It would mean that any employee who aided a discharged ex-employee in an unsuccessful grievance of that discharge could himself be discharged. We find this outcome difficult to reconcile with the purposes of the Act. Nor is such an interpretation supported by the language of the Act. The term 'employee' shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute .... 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (emphasis added). The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, ... regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. 29 U.S.C. § 152(9). 18 We conclude that Walsh's proffering to McCarthy of a statement regarding circumstances relevant to McCarthy's discharge and to the grieving of that discharge was concerted employee activity for mutual aid and protection.