Opinion ID: 1149150
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Degree of Homicide

Text: The offense of second degree murder is defined in § 6-55, W.S. 1957, as follows: Whoever purposely and maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any human being, is guilty of murder in the second degree, and shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for any term not less than twenty years, or during life. In order to sustain a conviction of second degree murder, it was incumbent on the state not only to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Nunez killed McCullum, but also that he killed him both purposely and maliciously. By definition the word purposely means intentionally or deliberately. We need then to see whether the evidence is sufficient to show beyond reasonable doubt that Nunez intended to kill McCullum, and if so, whether he did it maliciously. In State v. Parmely, 65 Wyo. 215, 199 P.2d 112, 118, where the accused was charged with assault and battery with intent to kill and murder, this court approved an earlier decision holding that the specific intent to kill must be proved as any other fact in a case. Doubt was expressed in the Parmely case as to whether it was shown beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to commit a felony. Likewise we find doubt in the instant case as to whether it was shown beyond a reasonable doubt that Nunez intended to kill McCullum, or that he killed him on purpose. There was no direct evidence that Nunez threatened to kill McCullum or that he purposely did so, and no circumstances were shown from which the jury could infer beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intended to kill his opponent. As stated in State v. Helton, 73 Wyo. 92, 276 P.2d 434, 442, it is incumbent upon the state to prove circumstances from which legal malice might be justly inferred. Of course it is equally incumbent upon the state to prove circumstances from which intention might be justly inferred. Nunez is the only living witness to the actual fight. As we have already indicated, he related how he asked McCullum at one time if he had enough and said let us quit. He also helped him up. After the fight was over, Nunez testified he told the bartender and another man to, Go make sure that man is all right. He claims he also told his wife the same, and she corroborated the part concerning her. None of this testimony was contradicted. If true, it would refute the idea that Nunez deliberately or intentionally tried to kill his opponent. Where an accused is the sole witness of a transaction charged as a crime, as in the case at bar, his testimony cannot be arbitrarily rejected, and if his credibility has not been impeached, and his testimony is not improbable, and is not inconsistent with the facts and circumstances shown, but is reasonably consistent therewith, then his testimony should be accepted. Eagan v. State, 58 Wyo. 167, 128 P.2d 215, 226. Inferences contrary to direct testimony are not ordinarily sufficient to support a finding. [1] Hence, in the absence of concrete evidence on the part of the state to show intent, and in the absence of anything to contradict or impeach the testimony of defendant and his wife, there can be no presumption of law on intent. State v. Parmely, supra. The state therefore failed to prove that the killing of McCullum was purposely done by Nunez. In the same manner in which it was incumbent on the state, for a conviction of second degree murder, to prove the accused purposely killed, it was also incumbent on the state to prove he maliciously killed. In Eagan v. State, supra, the court first considered the matter of malice, and then at 128 P.2d 225, it said the intent to kill was closely connected with the matter of malice and the same rule would probably apply, in that particular case. We think the same is true in the case now before us. As stated in State v. Sorrentino, 31 Wyo. 129, 224 P. 420, 423, 34 A.L.R. 1477, rehearing denied 31 Wyo. 499, 228 P. 283, 34 A.L.R. 1487, what constitutes malice is not easily defined. The term, as used in the law of homicide, has often been defined as the intentional killing of a human being by another, without legal justification or excuse and under circumstances which are insufficient to reduce the crime to manslaughter. 26 Am.Jur., Homicide, § 40, pp. 183-184. See also State v. Ogilvie, 180 Or. 365, 175 P.2d 454, 459; and State v. Myers, 248 Iowa 44, 79 N.W.2d 382, 390. There is such a wide variation in the definitions ascribed to the term malice, and we have said enough about the term purposely, so that we deem it unnecessary to be precise in determining whether the state has sufficiently met its burden of proving a malicious killing. Instead, we rely on what has been said in this jurisdiction before, that if the crime is as consistent with guilt of a lesser crime as it is with the guilt of a higher crime, the conviction should be of the lesser crime. State v. Bruner, 78 Wyo. 111, 319 P.2d 863, 871; Eagan v. State, supra. We, accordingly, hold the conviction should be reduced to manslaughter in keeping with the pattern set in State v. Bruner, 78 Wyo. 111, 319 P.2d 863; State v. Sorrentino, 31 Wyo. 129, 224 P. 420, 34 A.L.R. 1477, rehearing denied 31 Wyo. 499, 228 P. 283, 34 A.L.R. 1487; State v. Flory, 40 Wyo. 184, 276 P. 458; Eagan v. State, 58 Wyo. 167, 128 P.2d 215; State v. Helton, 73 Wyo. 92, 276 P.2d 434. The verdict of the jury is therefore set aside as to murder in the second degree and sustained as to manslaughter; also the judgment and sentence of the district court are set aside, and that court is directed to resentence the defendant for manslaughter.