Opinion ID: 29675
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: district court funding of dna tests

Text: In his final point of error Hines argues the district court wrongly denied him funds to conduct a new DNA test on the blood evidence to aid his federal habeas application as allowed under 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(9). That section states: Upon a finding that investigative, expert, or other services are reasonably necessary for the representation of the defendant, whether in connection with issues relating to guilt or the sentence, the court may authorize the defendant's attorneys to obtain such services on behalf of the defendant and, if so authorized, shall order the payment of fees and expenses ... 14 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(9) (emphasis added). In denying Hines funds under this section, the district court concluded that Hines had not shown that the requested assistance would aid him in the development of a viable habeas claim. It rejected his argument that testing would aid in developing the trial continuance claim above, concluding that claim lacked merit. We review the district court’s determination to deny expert funds under 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(9) for an abuse of discretion. See Clark, 202 F.3d at 765-66 (noting that district court’s determination whether to take additional evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion). Hines argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying the funds because a DNA test was reasonably necessary for him to prove that the DNA test results were “subject to varying expert opinion,” as required by Yohey, 985 F.2d at 227. Assuming arguendo that Hines is correct that the tests were reasonably necessary to establish that a second DNA test at trial would have produced different results, we still cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion. We explained in Fuller, 114 F.3d at 502 (5th Cir. 1997), that for a request for funds to be “reasonably necessary” for a claim, a petitioner must demonstrate how those results can show that any aspect of his trial was constitutionally flawed. Hines argues that the requested test could show that he was constitutionally entitled to a trial 15 continuance under Yohey. But to make a valid Yohey claim, not only does Hines have to show that additional DNA testing might have produced different results, but also that the results would have been critical evidence at trial. As we noted above, Hines cannot do so. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Hines’ funding request.