Opinion ID: 2604678
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: An Analysis of the Housing Preservation Ordinance under Dolan

Text: We have already declined to analyze Sintra's regulatory takings claim under Nollan Sintra I, 119 Wash.2d at 16 n. 7, 829 P.2d 765. Were we to analyze the Seattle Housing Preservation Ordinance (HPO) in light of Dolan, we would almost certainly hold that the HPO effected a regulatory taking of Sintra's property. A Dolan analysis of the HPO restrictions on Sintra's proposed land use would require a threshold determination that an outright denial of that proposed use, based on the same negative impacts which are submitted as justification for the HPO conditions, would not effect a regulatory taking of Sintra's property. The critical consideration would be whether Sintra was singled out to bear a burden which should have been borne by the public as a whole. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835 n. 4, 107 S.Ct. at 3148 n. 4. We have already held that the HPO went far beyond the prevention of the anticipated harm of Sintra's proposed use of its property, and imposed a burden to provide an affirmative public benefit, a burden which should have been borne by the public as a whole. [5] Based on this effect of the HPO, it has already been determined that the denial of Sintra's proposed land use under the HPO amounted to a regulatory taking. Thus, under a correct analysis of the threshold issue, we would never reach Justice Talmadge's proposed inquiry into whether the HPO demolition fee was `roughly proportional' to the public benefit. Concurrence/Dissent at 582. IV. Justice Talmadge's Proposed New Analysis of Dolan Justice Talmadge not only stretches the Dolan analysis beyond its proper context in development permit exactions, the proposed framework omits the necessary threshold inquiry into whether a denial of proposed land use would be justified in the first instance. The resulting test provides very little protection from excessive regulation of private property. Under Justice Talmadge's proposed analysis, a restriction on the use of property is not a regulatory taking as long as (1) the challenged regulation advances a legitimate state interest; (2) there is an `essential nexus' between the interest advanced and the requirement exacted; (3) there is a roughly proportional relationship between the benefit to the public and the cost to the landowner. Concurrence/Dissent at 582 (citations omitted). [6] This test effectively eliminates most of our existing substantive protections against the excessive regulation of private property. The first element of Justice Talmadge's new framework does not accurately state the test for whether a given restriction on the use of property amounts to a regulatory taking. While a land use regulation that does not advance a legitimate state interest is a taking, the reverse is not necessarily true. Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash.2d 586, 595, 854 P.2d 1 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1176, 114 S.Ct. 1216, 127 L.Ed.2d 563 (1994) (citing Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash.2d 320, 330, 787 P.2d 907, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 911, 111 S.Ct. 284, 112 L.Ed.2d 238 (1990)). Even regulations that advance a legitimate state interest may constitute a regulatory taking if they require the property owner to provide an affirmative public benefit, destroy a fundamental attribute of ownership, or deny the owner all economically viable use of the property. Guimont, 121 Wash.2d at 595, 854 P.2d 1. The second and third elements of Justice Talmadge's proposed test would require a nexus and rough proportionality between the burden of the restriction on the use of property and the resulting benefit to the public. Concurrence/Dissent at 582. This formulation overstates the range of legitimate state interests which may justify a development permit exaction under Dolan. The rough proportionality test measures the relationship between the conditions placed on the use of property and the negative impacts of that use that would justify the denial of the proposed use in the first instance. Sparks, 127 Wash.2d at 914-16, 904 P.2d 738. Only those negative impacts may be weighed against the burden of exactions or other conditions on the proposed land use. Sparks, 127 Wash.2d at 914-16, 904 P.2d 738; see also Presbytery, 114 Wash.2d at 336 n. 30, 787 P.2d 907. A restriction or condition on the use of property which goes beyond the prevention of harm to provide an affirmative benefit to the public may constitute a regulatory taking. Guimont, 121 Wash.2d at 595, 854 P.2d 1. The combined effect of Justice Talmadge's new test would be to eliminate meaningful as applied challenges under our existing regulatory takings framework. In an as applied challenge, our regulatory takings analysis considers: (1) the regulation's economic impact on the property; (2) the extent of the regulation's interference with investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of the government action. Guimont, 121 Wash.2d at 596, 854 P.2d 1 (citing Presbytery, 114 Wash.2d at 335-36, 787 P.2d 907; Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash.2d 34, 51, 830 P.2d 318, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1028, 113 S.Ct. 676, 121 L.Ed.2d 598 (1992)). Under Justice Talmadge's proposed new test, these factors are never considered.