Opinion ID: 329474
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: alternative constructions.

Text: 40 One clause of § 905(b) which might potentially insulate Wheeling from liability is the language no such action shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in providing stevedoring services to the vessel. The members of the barge crew who fastened the cables to the hatch covers, and the crane operator who applied tension to the cable which opened the hatch through which Griffith fell, clearly were providing such stevedoring services, and none of their negligence can be the basis for imposing liability on an owner Pro hac vice. But on the present record, there is evidence that Joseph Allfree, Wheeling's crew foreman, observed the defective condition of the hatch covers and departed, apparently without giving any warning of a potentially hazardous condition. There is no conclusive evidence that he made these observations in the capacity of stevedore or as agent of Wheeling as owner pro hac vice. At a trial, testimony might so conclusively establish Allfree's stevedore status that Griffith could not get to the jury, or instead might establish that his conduct was not negligent. But on the present record we could not, especially at the appellate level, grant summary judgment for Wheeling on either ground. 41 The final, and most compelling construction which would insulate Wheeling from liability for negligence, is to concentrate not on § 905(b), but on § 905(a), the exclusive remedy provision, which has been a part of the statute since 1927. The language in § 905(a) could hardly be plainer: 42 The liability of an employer prescribed in section 904 of this title shall be exclusive and in place of All other liability of such employer to the employee . . . . (emphasis supplied). 43 There is no exception in § 905(a) for § 905(b) liability of an employer who is also a vessel. 16 If the claimant is an employee as defined in § 2(a)(3), that is, if he is a person engaged in maritime employment who is not a master or member of a crew of any vessel, 33 U.S.C. § 902(3), then he has no remedy against his employer even when the employer also is the vessel. If Griffith was not a member of the crew of barge No. 2730 he was an employee, and the exclusive remedy provision bars any remedy other than workmen's compensation. 17 44 This construction would leave longshoremen covered by the Act with third party actions against anyone who may be liable, under federal or state law, except an employer who is liable only for compensation. Such a construction would be consistent with the language of 33 U.S.C. § 933(a), the third party section, which provides in part: 45 If . . . the person entitled to such compensation determines that some person Other than the employer . . . is liable in damages, he need not elect whether to receive such compensation or to recover damages against such third person. (emphasis supplied). 46 It would place longshoremen in the same position with respect to seaward third parties as to shoreside third parties. If a truck owned and operated by an outside contractor should injure the longshoreman on the pier he would have a third party action, while if the truck was owned and operated by his employer, he would not. The heart of all workmen's compensation systems is the trade-off between the certainty of benefits and the limitation of employer liability. There is no argument in logic and reason why an employer who owns barges should be treated less favorably than an employer who owns trucks. 47 But while logic and common sense suggest the literal application of § 905(a), the ghost of Sieracki-Ryan stands in the way. The Supreme Court has already construed the exclusive remedy provision as permitting a suit against a Pro hac vice owner who was also an employer. In Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 83 S.Ct. 1349, 10 L.Ed.2d 448 (1963), a longshoreman was injured as a result of an unseaworthy condition on board the vessel The Yaka, which was under bareboat charter to Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation, his employer. Reed brought an in rem action against the vessel. He was not a member of the crew, and thus was covered under LHWCA. Reviewing the way in which Sieracki and Ryan had already made an end-run around the exclusive remedy provision in § 905(a) (then § 905), Justice Black, writing for the Court, concluded: 48 In the light of this whole body of law, statutory and decisional, only blind adherence to the superficial meaning of a statute could prompt us to ignore the fact that Pan-Atlantic was not only an employer of longshoremen but was also a bareboat charterer and operator of a ship and, as such, was charged with the traditional, absolute, and nondelegable obligation of seaworthiness which it should not be permitted to avoid. . . . 373 U.S. at 415, 83 S.Ct. at 1353. 49 Thus § 905, now § 905(a), was held to be no bar to a suit against a vessel chartered to a Pro hac vice owner which was also an employer liable for compensation payments. As the treatise writers have observed: 50 After Reed v. The Yaka the longshoreman's action might just as well have been brought directly against his employer which would have simplified the situation procedurally. However, in the customary employment situation, the parties, out of politeness or inertia, continued to observe the elaborate formalities of the Sieracki-Ryan ritual: longshoreman sued ship or shipowner, who impleaded employer in his third party indemnity action . . . . 51 G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty § 6-55, at 445 (2d ed. 1975) (footnote omitted). 52 Since Congress made no change in the operative language of the exclusive remedy provision, we would appear to be bound by the eviscerating construction of Reed v. The Yaka, supra. Congress was aware of that construction, and deliberately chose to deal with it only to the limited extent of the second sentence in § 905(b). 18 The vessel, even a vessel which is an employer under the Act, is relieved of liability for negligence of persons engaged in providing stevedoring services, but is not relieved of liability for its own owner occasioned negligence. 19 See 1A Benedict on Admiralty § 27, at 2-24; § 115, at 6-16 (7th ed. 1973). 53 Thus, no construction appears open which would shield Wheeling from liability as a Pro hac vice owner for the negligence of employees engaged in services in connection with the barge other than stevedoring. Since on this record, as we indicated earlier, questions of material fact exist concerning the status of employees who observed the condition of the hatch covers, or exist as to their own negligence as barge crewmen, rendering services other than stevedoring services, the district court's granting of summary judgment in Wheeling's favor against Griffith must be reversed. 54