Opinion ID: 1626048
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: the trial court erroneously admitted a tape recorded statement elicited from defendant in the absence of appointed counsel.

Text: Jordan requested an attorney prior to his preliminary hearing or arraignment, but after formal charges had been filed against him. The trial judge agreed that Jordan should have an attorney prior to his preliminary hearing, and sent him out with a bailiff. Shortly thereafter, Jordan was questioned by the police without counsel, the police not knowing that counsel had been appointed. Statements were made which were tape recorded and introduced into evidence at the trial over defense objections. Appellant argues that the statements should have been suppressed by the trial court at the resentencing hearing and at the Federal habeas corpus proceeding. In Jordan v. State, 365 So.2d 1198 (Miss. 1978), the Court, citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977), stated: [T]he United States Supreme Court made it clear that an accused can voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel at an interrogation which occurs after counsel has been appointed, provided the prosecution has adequately carried its heavy burden to show that the waiver was knowingly and intelligently made. 365 So.2d at 1202. The argument under this assignment was raised and the question was addressed in Jordan's petition for writ of habeas corpus. In passing on the question, the United States Court of Appeals in Jordan v. Watkins, 681 F.2d 1067, 1075 (5th Cir.1982) said: Appellant also argues that his right to counsel under the sixth and fourteenth amendments was violated by his interrogation in the absence of counsel after adversary proceedings had commenced. It is undisputed that adversary proceedings had commenced when the authorities elicited the recorded confession. [O]nce adversary proceedings have commenced against an individual, he has the right to legal representation when the government interrogates him. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1240, 51 L.Ed.2d 424, 438 (1977). This does not mean that at that stage an accused cannot waive his rights under the sixth and fourteenth amendments. Id., 430 U.S. at 405-406, 97 S.Ct. at 1243, 51 L.Ed. at 441. Rather, it is encumbent upon the [prosecution] to prove an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege. Id., 430 U.S. at 404, 97 S.Ct. at 1242, 51 L.Ed. at 439. Based on the facts and circumstances previously discussed, we hold that the prosecution met this strict standard with respect to Jordan. We are of the opinion that the State met its burden with respect to Jordan and that question is now res judicata.