Opinion ID: 2534434
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Requirement of causal nexus for mitigation

Text: ¶ 93 Anderson argues that [i]nstructing the jury to disregard mitigating evidence where it is not shown to cause the defendant's conduct at the time of the crime violated the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court has emphasized that a State cannot preclude the sentencer from considering any relevant mitigating evidence that the defendant proffers in support of a sentence less than death, Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 822, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted), and that virtually no limits are placed on the relevant mitigating evidence a capital defendant may introduce. Id. The Court also recently held that a jury cannot be prevented from giving effect to mitigating evidence solely because the evidence has no causal nexus to a defendant's crimes. Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, ___ - ___, 124 S.Ct. 2562, 2569-72, 159 L.Ed.2d 384 (2004). ¶ 94 The instruction to which Anderson objects, however, was never given in this case. The jury was not told that it had to find a nexus between the proffered mitigation evidence and Anderson's crime. Rather, the superior court simply instructed the jurors that they should consider any mitigation they found relevant in determining whether to impose a sentence less than death. Anderson did not object to this instruction, which was in any event entirely proper. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113-14, 102 S.Ct. 869 (holding that sentencer should consider any relevant mitigating evidence). ¶ 95 Anderson also objects to various questions and comments made by the prosecution about his proffered mitigation evidence. Because Anderson did not object to any of these comments or questions, we review only for fundamental error. State v. Gendron, 168 Ariz. 153, 154, 812 P.2d 626, 627 (1991). ¶ 96 First, Anderson complains that during cross-examination of Anderson's mitigation expert the prosecution questioned the expert's lack of formal education to make any connection between upbringing and adult conduct. The prosecutor then emphasized that the expert's testimony was merely her personal opinion as to what happened in childhood, that affects adult behavior. Anderson also objects to the State's closing argument, during which the prosecutor emphasized that a psychologist called by the defense to offer mitigation evidence didn't testify about any links, any connections between the defendant's upbringing and him murdering people. Nothing in his childhood caused that. Finally, Anderson points out that the prosecution, during its penalty phase opening statement, told the jury that it would have to decide whether any mitigation evidence was relevant. ¶ 97 None of these statements was improper. While Eddings and various other Supreme Court decisions dictate a liberal rule of admissibility for mitigating evidence, they still leave it to the sentencer to determine the weight to be given to relevant mitigating evidence. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114-15, 102 S.Ct. 869. Once the jury has heard all of the defendant's mitigation evidence, there is no constitutional prohibition against the State arguing that the evidence is not particularly relevant or that it is entitled to little weight. The prosecutor's various comments and questions here simply went to the weight of Anderson's mitigation evidence and were not improper.