Opinion ID: 1057415
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Guiding Preemption Principles

Text: The preemption doctrine stems from the Supremacy Clause. It is a “fundamental principle of the Constitution [] that Congress has the power to preempt state law.” Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000). There are “three classes of preemption”: express preemption, field preemption and conflict preemption. United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1281 (11th Cir. 2012). “The first, unconstitutional prosecution for plaintiffs who do not or cannot sue every conceivable state prosecutor who could institute proceedings against them.” Id. 30 VALLE DEL SOL V. WHITING express preemption, arises when the text of a federal statute explicitly manifests Congress’s intent to displace state law.” Id.; see also Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2500–01. Under the second, field preemption, “the States are precluded from regulating conduct in a field that Congress, acting within its proper authority, has determined must be regulated by its exclusive governance.” Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501. Field preemption can be “inferred from a framework of regulation ‘so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it’ or where there is a ‘federal interest . . . so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.’” Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). Third, “even if Congress has not occupied the field, state law is naturally preempted to the extent of any conflict with a federal statute.” Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372. Conflict preemption, in turn, has two forms: impossibility and obstacle preemption. Id. Courts find impossibility preemption “where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal law.” Id. Courts will find obstacle preemption where the challenged state law “stands ‘as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’” Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). Finally, any direct regulation of immigration—“which is essentially a determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain”—is constitutionally proscribed because the “[p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusive federal power.” DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354–55 (1976). VALLE DEL SOL V. WHITING 31 Analysis of a preemption claim “must be guided by two cornerstones of [the Supreme Court’s] jurisprudence. First, ‘the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.’ Second, ‘[i]n all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has legislated . . . in a field which the states have traditionally occupied, . . . we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alterations in original). But see United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000) (“[A]n assumption of nonpre-emption is not triggered when the State regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant federal presence.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).