Opinion ID: 2519742
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Two-week suspension of penalty phase deliberations

Text: The jury was sworn to hear this case on June 18, 1990, and opening statements commenced that same day. The record reflects that on that date the trial judge advised counsel and the jury that he would be unavailable for trial during the last week in August 1990. Trial lasted through the summer. In addition to the court's scheduling a one-week vacation for the last week of summer, the record reflects that four of the 12 seated jurors, and two of the four alternates, had prearranged to take their vacations during that same last week of summer. The jury commenced penalty deliberations on Monday, August 20, 1990. The jury requested a readback of certain testimony on Wednesday, August 22, 1990. Late in the afternoon of the following day, Thursday, August 23 1990, with deliberations yet to produce a penalty verdict, the court adjourned the trial proceedings for a 13-day period, with the jurors ordered to return Wednesday, September 5, 1990. Critically, defendant and his counsel expressly agreed to the arrangement. Moreover, the trial judge indicated he had arranged for deliberations to continue in his absence without recess before another judge of the superior court bench who had agreed to fill in. Defendant and his counsel declined that option, preferring instead to adjourn the proceedings until the first week of September. Thereafter, on Friday, August 31, 1990, San Bernardino County Superior Court Judge Robert Krug extended the recess one day, to Thursday, September 6, 1990, because one juror would be unavailable until that date due to a death in the family. On Tuesday, September 4, 1990, at a specially called hearing before the trial judge, the Honorable Ben T. Kayashima, who had returned, defendant and counsel expressly agreed to the one-day extension and declined an invitation to have an alternate juror seated to replace the juror who had to attend a funeral. All in all, the recess spanned 13 calendar days (eight court days), given the two intervening weekends and the Labor Day holiday on Monday, September 3, 1990. Defendant urges us to find error in the eight-court-day (13-calendar-day) recess. Defendant, however, is precluded from claiming error as he and his counsel expressly agreed to the recess arrangement, and further expressly declined the court's invitation to continue deliberations uninterrupted before a substitute trial judge. (See, e.g., People v. Johnson (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 778, 791-794, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 703 [defendant's failure to object to 17-day recess of jury deliberations for Christmas holiday break waived any claim of error]; People v. Harris (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 76, 86, 140 Cal.Rptr. 697 [failure to object to five-day recess of jury deliberations waived assignment of error on appeal].) Nor has defendant demonstrated prejudice from the mutually agreed upon adjournment of proceedings. His claim that the jury's penalty verdict, returned on the same date court proceedings were reconvened, was the direct and prejudicial result of the recess, is none other than speculation.