Opinion ID: 2042260
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Whether Defendant Is Immune From Liability

Text: Defendant argues that notwithstanding any duty that might be imposed upon veterinarians under state law, he is immune from liability because he is completely and utterly exempt from the provisions of the Practice Act. Specifically, he points to section 4 of the Practice Act, which states that Nothing in this Act shall apply to    (3) Veterinarians employed by colleges or universities or by state agencies, while engaged in the performance of their official duties. 225 ILCS 115/4(3) (West 2000). This provision, according to defendant, evinces a legislative intent to exempt professors of veterinary medicine not only from the license requirement (225 ILCS 115/3(b) (West 2000)), and the continuing education requirement (225 ILCS 115/16 (West 2000)), but from even forming a veterinarian client-patient relationship as that term is defined in the statute (225 ILCS 115/3(a)(G) (West 2000)). Plaintiffs respond that the Practice Act is a licensing statute, not a tort immunity act. The exemption in section 4(3) is, in plaintiffs' view, intended to allow Illinois universities to attract and employ learned professionals in veterinary science, without imposing the additional burden of acquiring an Illinois license, or being subject to a regulatory agency. We agree. Defendant's argument is, in effect, that the only source of duty for a member of a licensed and regulated profession or occupation is the governing statute and that, therefore, one who is exempt from the statute cannot be held to a standard of care in the practice of his profession or occupation. The Practice Act is codified in chapter 225 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes, which is titled Professions and Occupations. This chapter codifies the licensing and regulation of a multitude of occupations including acupuncture (225 ILCS 2/1 (West 2004)), funeral directors and embalmers (225 ILCS 41/1-1 (West 2004)), professional boxers and wrestlers (225 ILCS 105/1 (West 2004)), as well as physicians (225 ILCS 60/1-1 (West 2004)), and dentists (225 ILCS 25/1 (West 2004)). If we were to accept defendant's reading of the Practice Act, we would also have to conclude that the only duty that may apply to any member of any of the regulated occupations and professions arises through the statute. For example, section 17 of the Illinois Dental Practice Act lists 10 separate acts that constitute the practice of dentistry. 225 ILCS 25/17 (West 2004). Section 17 further provides that the practice of dentistry by a clinical instructor in the course of his or her teaching duties in an approved dental school or college is exempt from the operation of this Act if either of two conditions is met. 225 ILCS 25/17(d) (West 2004). Under defendant's reasoning, a clinical instructor of dentistry who is exempt from the licensing provision of the Dental Practice Act would owe no duty to his dental patients to exercise the same degree of skill and knowledge as licensed members of the profession. Such a result would be absurd. Defendant asks this court to infer a legislative intent to grant tort immunity to a certain class of people in the absence of express statutory language granting such immunity. Our research reveals no authority for making such an inference and defendant cites none. Our constitution, however, contains a guarantee that [e]very person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely, and promptly. Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 12. When the legislature intends to confer immunity from tort liability, it is likely to do so expressly. See, e.g., 225 ILCS 25/36 (West 2004) (granting immunity from civil or criminal liability for good-faith reporting of any violation of the Dental Practice Act); 225 ILCS 60/30 (West 2004) (granting immunity from civil liability to physician who provides emergency care under the Good Samaritan Act); 620 ILCS 20/3 (West 2004) (extending immunity under Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act to airport employees). Because of the constitutional guarantee of a certain remedy for every legal wrong, we will not imply tort immunity in the absence of such express language. We, therefore, conclude that section 4(3) of the Practice Act is intended to exempt certain veterinarians from the license requirement and other requirements of the act, but not to provide immunity from liability in tort for those exempted. Defendant is not immune from liability.