Opinion ID: 2357535
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Timeliness of Opposition to Summary Judgment

Text: [¶ 15] Peterson argues that the court ( Mullen, J. ) erred as a matter of law by granting the bank's late-filed motion to enlarge time to oppose his cross-motion for summary judgment without requiring an express showing of excusable neglect. Because of this error, Peterson argues, the bank's opposition to his cross-motion for summary judgment was untimely, and he was entitled to summary judgment based on the bank's failure to provide notice. [¶ 16] When a party moves for enlargement of time after the time for filing a pleading has expired, Rule 6(b) of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure requires a showing of excusable neglect for that party to obtain the enlargement of time. Determinations of excusable neglect are reviewed for errors of law or an abuse of discretion. Dyer Goodall & Federle, LLC v. Proctor, 2007 ME 145, ¶ 18, 935 A.2d 1123, 1127. [¶ 17] The bank filed its motion for enlargement of time twenty-eight days after Peterson filed his cross-motion for summary judgment. By rule, a response was due within twenty-one days after the filing of the motion. M.R. Civ. P. 7(c)(2). Because the motion for enlargement was filed outside the time during which the responsive pleading was required, the motion could only be granted upon a showing of excusable neglect. See M.R. Civ. P. 6(b). [¶ 18] The determination of excusable neglect is within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Sevigny v. City of Biddeford, 344 A.2d 34, 38 (Me. 1975). Here, neither the reasons for the bank's delay nor the court's findings related to excusable neglect are available on the record before us, and Peterson did not ask the court to articulate its findings. What we can determine from the record is that there was only a seven-day delay in filing the motion for enlargement, and this brief delay followed several other delays occasioned by Peterson's motions for enlargement of time, which the bank did not oppose, and which the court liberally granted. [¶ 19] We decline to create a hard and fast rule as to the necessary written contents of a motion to extend and thus reject Peterson's argument that the court erred as a matter of law. In the absence of a record demonstrating any other facts that formed the basis of the court's ruling, we assume that the court acted within its discretion in granting the motion to enlarge.