Opinion ID: 2612440
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: equal protection doctrine

Text: Appellant Ford asserts that RCW 19.118.100(3) violates the equal protection guaranties of the United States and Washington State Constitutions by singling out a class of litigants and subjecting them to onerous penalties as a condition of seeking redress within the court system. Appellant contends that [t]he lemon law ostensibly permits both consumers and manufacturers to appeal to the superior court for de novo review of [the arbitration board's] decisions. Yet, only consumers appeal without risk. A manufacturer who appeals faces the threat of a [$25 per day] fine and payment of the consumer's attorneys' fees. [1] Where neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental right is at issue, a rational basis test is the appropriate one for determining whether a violation of equal protection of the law has occurred. [3] Appellant Ford asserts that strict scrutiny is the only appropriate level of judicial review because this case involves both a suspect classification and a fundamental right. [2] Appellant Ford contends that RCW 19.118.100(3) restricts a manufacturer's right to appeal, thus burdening its fundamental right of access to the courts. Appellant cites Carter v. University of Wash., [4] to support its argument that the right of access to courts is necessary to preserve numerous other rights and is, therefore, a fundamental right entitled to constitutional protection. This court in Housing Auth. v. Saylors, [5] ruled that access to the courts is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the Washington Constitution. Access to the courts is not recognized, of itself, as a fundamental right. [6] RCW 19.118.100 gives a manufacturer the right to appeal an adverse ruling by the new motor vehicle arbitration board to the superior court for a trial de novo. Both the manufacturer and the consumer have access to the superior court. The appellant manufacturer is liable for the consumer's attorney's fees and the $25 per day damages only in the event its appeal is denied. [3] Appellant Ford's contention that RCW 19.118.100(3) infringes on its right to a jury trial is moot. CR 38(b) requires that a demand for jury trial be made at or prior to the time a case is set for trial. Failure to file a demand pursuant to the rule constitutes a waiver. At a hearing on February 13, 1989, the Superior Court set a trial date of July 6, 1989. Ford did not file a jury demand or pay the jury fee on or prior to that date. Ford thus waived its right to jury trial. [4] A statute enacted by the Washington State Legislature is presumed constitutional. [7] The party challenging it has the burden of proving it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. [8] The presumption of constitutionality is especially strong when a statute regulating business activity is challenged on equal protection or due process grounds. As this court noted in American Network, Inc. v. Utilities & Transp. Comm'n : [9] [J]udicial deference is particularly necessary when the legislation in question relates to purely business and economic activity. In equal protection cases, a particularly heavy presumption of constitutionality applies when the statute concerns economic matters. (Citations omitted.) [5] There are three essential questions which must be answered when evaluating the constitutionality of a legislative classification with minimum scrutiny: First, does the classification apply alike to all members within the designated class? Second, do reasonable grounds exist to support the classification's distinction between those within and those without the class? And third, does the challenged classification have some rational relation to the purposes of the challenged statute? [10] The first inquiry is whether the classification applies alike to all members in the designated class. RCW 19.118.100(3) applies to all manufacturers as a class, as defined by RCW 19.118.021(7). [11] Those manufacturers who choose to appeal a decision of the new motor vehicle arbitration board and fail to improve their position are subject to continuing damages and attorney's fees. As defined by RCW 19.118.021(4), consumers are not within the same class with manufacturers. [12] Appellant Ford does not dispute this assertion. We answer, then, the first question in the affirmative. The next inquiry is whether reasonable grounds exist for the classification. Appellant Ford maintains that the distinction between appeals by manufacturers and appeals by consumers from arbitration decisions under RCW 19.118.100(3) is unreasonable and unconstitutional. Appellant asserts that the Legislature may have treated manufacturer appellants differently because manufacturers have more resources to devote to warranty litigation. Appellant then contends that such differentiation constitutes irrational discrimination based upon the impermissible consideration of wealth. This argument is without merit. [13] [6, 7] The Legislature has broad discretion in establishing classifications in social and economic legislation. [14] A classification will be upheld if any state of facts may reasonably be conceived to substantiate it. [15] Such a rational basis for a legislative decision need not have actually motivated the Legislature's decision. [16] The Legislature clearly articulated its purpose in enacting the motor vehicle warranties law, the lemon law, in RCW 19.118.005, which states: The legislature recognizes that a new motor vehicle is a major consumer purchase and that a defective motor vehicle is likely to create hardship for, or may cause injury to, the consumer. The legislature further recognizes that good cooperation and communication between a manufacturer and a new motor vehicle dealer will considerably increase the likelihood that a new motor vehicle will be repaired within a reasonable number of attempts. It is the intent of the legislature to ensure that the consumer is made aware of his or her rights under this chapter and is not refused information, documents, or service that would otherwise obstruct the exercise of his or her rights. In enacting these comprehensive measures, it is the intent of the legislature to create the proper blend of private and public remedies necessary to enforce this chapter, such that a manufacturer will be sufficiently induced to take necessary steps to improve quality control at the time of production or provide better warranty service for the new motor vehicles that it sells in this state. The legislative considerations in establishing the classification under the motor vehicle warranties law may be generally summarized as: (1) manufacturers are in a position to improve the quality of new motor vehicles they produce and are better able to provide service for them; (2) in the purchase of new motor vehicles, consumers are at risk of injury and must bear the hardship caused by defective motor vehicles; and (3) manufacturers are better informed of their legal rights and are better prepared to enforce them. Respondent Barrett and Respondent-Intervenor State of Washington both assert that the classification of consumers and manufacturers is rational and justified. The Legislature in determining its classification in RCW 19.118 sought a proper balance in the relationship between manufacturers and consumers, considering consumers' general lack of economic resources, manufacturers' access to skillful legal counsel, and manufacturers' experience with warranty disputes. Such a legislative effort need not be perfect. It must only be rational on the basis of any conceivable set of facts. [17] Reasonable grounds must exist to support the classification's distinction between those within and those without the class. [18] The third inquiry is whether the challenged classification has a rational relation to the purposes of the challenged statute. This inquiry focuses upon RCW 19.118.100(3), which allows costs and continuing damages to a consumer who prevails on appeal. Appellant Ford asserts that the provisions of RCW 19.118.100(3) cannot be upheld as rationally related to the purpose of the statute or as furthering a legitimate purpose. Appellant contends that the award of attorney's fees and continuing damages is an overt penalty which discourages not only frivolous appeals, but even meritorious appeals, by manufacturers. Appellant further contends that the statute cannot be justified as encouraging consumers to appeal since the continuing damages and attorney's fees provision does not apply unless the manufacturer seeks de novo review. Respondent Barrett and Respondent-Intervenor State of Washington assert that the purpose of this provision is to protect the consumer and promote compliance with the arbitration decision by discouraging manufacturers from bringing meritless appeals. Additionally, the respondents state that the Legislature recognized that the purchase of a new car is a major purchase which might create hardship or injury to the consumer. [19] By giving a manufacturer incentive to comply with the arbitration decision or provide free use of a replacement loaner car, respondents assert, the consumer's investment is protected during appeal. [8] Appellant Ford's contention that the statute may discourage all appeals does not effectively demonstrate that the statute is not rationally related to its purpose. Equal protection does not require that legislative efforts be perfect. [20] RCW 19.118.100(3) is reasonably designed to deter manufacturers from appealing cases which have little or no merit. A manufacturer is only required to pay attorney's fees if the consumer prevails on appeal. A manufacturer is required to pay continuing damages when (1) the new motor vehicle arbitration board awards replacement or repurchase to the consumer, (2) the consumer prevails on appeal, and (3) the manufacturer chooses not to comply with the arbitration decision nor to supply the consumer with free use of a replacement loaner car while the appeal is pending. [21] This statutory scheme allows the manufacturer to determine its choice upon the relative merits of each case. [9] Appellant Ford has not successfully demonstrated that RCW 19.118.100(3) is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Its contention that the statute violates the equal protection clause of the United States and Washington State Constitutions is therefore without merit.