Opinion ID: 776312
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: plaintiffs' constitutional challenges

Text: 30 Finally, the Plaintiffs contend that this Court's interpretation of § 82.004 is unconstitutional. First, they argue that our interpretation violates the open court's provision of the Texas Constitution. The open courts provision provides that [a]ll courts shall be open, and every person for a injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13. To establish an open court's violations, the plaintiff must establish that (1) he or she has a well-established, cognizable common law cause of action that is being abrogated or restricted, and (2) that restriction of the claim is unreasonable or arbitrary when balanced against the statute's purpose. Diaz v. Westphal, 941 S.W.2d 96, 100 (Tex.1997). The district court concluded that the Plaintiffs failed to establish the first prong, i.e. that they had a well-established, cognizable common-law claim that § 82.004 abrogated or restricted. We agree. As recently as 1996, this Court labeled a product liability action premised on the addictive nature of cigarettes as a novel and wholly untested theory. Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 737 (5th Cir.1996). And just last year another panel of this Court, whose decision we are bound to follow, concluded that an assault claim premised on personal injuries from smoking was not a well-established common-law claim. 3 Harris, 232 F.3d at 458. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court's rejection of the Plaintiffs' open courts challenge was proper. 31 Lastly, the Plaintiffs argue that § 82.004 violates the Due Process clauses of the United States and Texas Constitutions. Specifically, the Plaintiffs argue that Sanchez 's interpretation of § 82.004 is unreasonable and arbitrary because it, in effect, grants tobacco manufacturers immunity from suit in the state of Texas. 32 Since no fundamental right is implicated here, § 82.004 need only be rationally related to the stated legislative purpose. Texas Workers' Comp. Comm'n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 525 (Tex.1995). Thus, the Texas Legislature's enactment of § 82.004 is unconstitutional only if it is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 93 F.3d 167, 174 (5th Cir.1996) (quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926)). The Texas Legislature's stated purpose is passing § 82.004 was to abrogate frivolous lawsuits it perceived as wasting judicial time and money, and to adopt the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. We agree with the district court that a rational relationship exists between § 82.004 and the Texas Legislature's objective. Accordingly, § 82.004 does not violate the Plaintiffs' Due Process rights. The district court did not err in rejecting the Plaintiffs' constitutional challenges. 33