Opinion ID: 1950784
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Right to an Attorney

Text: The Court of Appeals concluded that Mr. Cohen was not an attorney during the time he was suspended. We reject its reasoning and conclude that the defendant was not deprived of his right to counsel by virtue of the fact that Mr. Cohen had been temporarily suspended from the practice of law during some parts of his representation of the defendant. The defendant's argument is mainly syllogistic: the defendant has the right to an attorney; a suspended attorney is not an attorney; therefore, the right was violated. However, the syllogism fails because its second premise is inaccurate. A suspended attorney is an attorney who has been suspended from the practice of law, but is still an attorney. [1] A person who becomes an attorney remains an attorney until formally disbarred or otherwise permanently separated from the bar. A suspension does not alter the formal status as an attorney. This is not a case in which a lay person has masqueraded as an attorney. Although we do not address the question here, it is possible that we would reach a different result if the defendant's counsel had never been admitted to the bar. A rule of reversal per se has been adopted by other jurisdictions that have considered that question. Those courts have declined to reach the question whether the person pretending to be an attorney actually provided adequate representation. The reversal is based on the fact that the person technically was not an attorney at all. [2] However, the conclusion that a person was not an attorney for right-to-counsel purposes is based on the fact that the person never became an attorney, not on the basis of a suspension. Thus, the reasoning of these cases does not support the adoption of a rule of reversal per se on the grounds that a suspended attorney is not an attorney. A suspension is irrelevant to that inquiry.