Opinion ID: 475767
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The District Court's Denial of Habeas Corpus

Text: 35 The District Court relied upon Preston v. Maggio, 741 F.2d 99, 101-02 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 2334, 85 L.Ed.2d 850 (1985), to require that defendant Atwell demonstrate that Desire residents were selected for service on the grand jury which indicted him, but were not served with a subpoena summoning them for that duty. Federal Record at 75. Because of Atwell's purported failure to meet habeas standards of prima facie proof, the District Court did not reach the retroactivity issue. Id. at 73 n. 3. 36 The District Court's reliance on Preston is flawed, and Preston itself is subject to question in light of Thiel and Hillery. The District Court relied on language in Preston requiring defendant to demonstrate actual prejudice by evidence of exclusion at the level of the venire actually chosen for him. Federal Record at 73-75; see Preston, 741 F.2d at 101; cf. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). Because the harm is the exclusion itself, because harmless error analysis cannot be applied, and because a prima facie case is established by direct evidence of exclusion at the multiple-venire level, Preston had likely met his habeas burden of showing prejudice. 37 Although it is wholly unnecessary to demonstrate prejudice in Atwell's case, prejudice was shown by direct evidence of systematic exclusion at the multiple-venire level. Such prejudice can only be negated by Governmental proof that no discrimination occurred.