Opinion ID: 1518773
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: was the voir dire improperly restricted?

Text: Appellant first argues that he was denied due process by the trial court's conduct of the examination of the prospective jurors and refusal to propound a question submitted by the defense. Specifically, the defense sought voir dire on whether each juror could vote for each of the possible penalties for intentional murder, including the minimum penalty of twenty (20) years in the penitentiary, in a case where a jury had found a defendant guilty of more than one intentional murder. Prior to trial, the judge advised counsel that he would question the jury about the death penalty himself, but would allow the attorneys to question the jurors about pretrial publicity. The questions at issue were propounded to each juror and were substantially as follows: Our legislature in Kentucky has recognized every case is different and in recognizing that, they've determined there are four different types of penalties that can be imposed in a murder case. One would be for a term of years in prison of not less than 20 years; or two would be for a term of life in prison; three would be for a term of life in prison without possibility of parole for at least 25 years; and the fourth would be the death penalty. The jury would not even be considering the death penalty unless the jury determined that not only was there an intentional murder, but there was [sic] some aggravating circumstances in the case. In addition to the aggravating circumstances, the jury would be considering mitigating circumstances or anything that it felt dealt with the issue of punishment. Bearing that in mind, if you were chosen as a juror in a case of that nature, would you be able to give a fair and equal consideration of all four of those different penalty options? Upon receiving an affirmative response to this question, the court would then ask: Would you be able then to impose whichever one you felt was fair and appropriate under the facts as you heard them in that particular case? Depending on the jurors' responses, some were also asked if there was a penalty that the juror could not fairly consider and whether that juror could consider a penalty of twenty years as well as the death penalty. The defense sought to ask each juror specifically whether he or she could consider imposition of each specific sentence in a case of multiple murders. The trial judge denied the defense request on the ground that the more specific question would compel the prospective jurors to prejudge this case. The judge also refused to define or explain for the jurors what aggravating and mitigating circumstances were. It is Appellant's contention that merely asking whether a juror can consider the entire range of punishments and do what is right is insufficient to advise counsel whether a juror would actually vote for any particular penalty. Thus, Appellant argues, he could not make meaningful and valid challenges for cause or intelligent use of his peremptory strikes. In particular, Appellant argues that he was unable to determine whether any prospective juror was biased in favor of the death penalty to the extent that he or she would not, no matter what the circumstances might have been, consider imposing a lesser penalty. Such bias would serve as grounds for a challenge for cause. Grooms v. Commonwealth, Ky., 756 S.W.2d 131, 137-38 (1988). RCr 9.38 grants to the circuit court the authority to conduct the examination of the prospective jurors. If the court chooses to personally conduct the examination, it shall permit the attorney for the Commonwealth and the defendant or the defendant's attorney to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper. The further examination may be conducted by either counsel or the court. RCr 9.38. This rule was complied with in its entirety. The trial court's voir dire was clearly sufficient and explicit enough to elicit the information sought by Appellant's counsel. The specific potential punishments that he sought to question the jurors about were disclosed and the jurors were asked if fair and equal consideration could be given to each, with no emphasis on a particular penalty. The question propounded to the jurors is in accord with and seems to simply be a more detailed version of that approved by this Court in Morris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 766 S.W.2d 58 (1989). Therein, this Court directed that: The jury should be asked the simple question `If you determine under the instructions of the court beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of intentional murder, could you consider the entire range of penalties provided by statutes of this Commonwealth as outlined to you?' Id. at 60. The trial court did not err in the conduct of the voir dire in this case and we find no ground for reversal.