Opinion ID: 759576
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substitution of Alternate Jurors

Text: 15 Beard contends that the court's decision to substitute the two alternates after deliberations had begun was prejudicial error. Under Rule 24(c), a criminal defendant has the statutory right not to have jurors substituted without his or her consent, once deliberations have commenced. McFarland, 34 F.3d at 1511. The district court, therefore, erred in making those substitutions. The government argues, however, that Beard did not make a timely objection to the Rule 24(c) violation, citing United States v. Gomez-Norena, 908 F.2d 497 (9th Cir.1990). Gomez-Norena is inapposite because that case dealt with whether an objection to the admission of evidence was timely and specific pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(1). Id. at 500. 16 When the district court decided to excuse the two jurors and to substitute the alternates, it acknowledged that this will be over the defense objection. It is unclear whether this refers only to the court's conclusion that there was good cause to excuse the jurors, as the government contends, or to the entire process of dismissing the jurors and calling the alternates. Later, however, the defendant's counsel stated that she wanted to supplement the previous record and move once again for a mistrial, citing the violation of Rule 24(c)'s requirement that alternate jurors be discharged after the jury retires to consider the verdict. The court asked whether counsel wanted to proceed with ten or eleven jurors, but the only remedy that she (defense counsel) sought was a mistrial, based on the probability that the entire jury had been contaminated and on the disqualification of the two jurors despite their indication that they were able to serve. The court then denied the motion for a mistrial, reasoning that it had discretion to proceed with a jury of fewer than twelve and that, under McFarland, it was harmless error to substitute the alternates, absent a demonstration of inherent prejudice. Thus, although the basis for the court's earlier acknowledgment of Beard's objection may have been unclear, we conclude that Beard did object to the Rule 24(c) violation in a timely manner. 17 When a defendant timely objects to an error, the error generally is reviewed for harmlessness, and the government bears the burden of proving lack of prejudice. 4 Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a); Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770. Rule 52(a) provides that [a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Because the burden is on the government, Rule 52(a) precludes error correction only if the error 'does not affect substantial rights.'  Olano, 507 U.S. at 735, 113 S.Ct. 1770. 18 Whether an error is subject to harmless error analysis depends on whether the reviewing court determines that the error is a classic 'trial error.'  United States v. Annigoni, 96 F.3d 1132, 1143 (9th Cir.1996) (en banc) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)). A trial error is one which occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08, 111 S.Ct. 1246. By contrast, structural errors are structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by 'harmless-error' standards, because they affect[ ] the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than [being] simply an error in the trial process itself. Without these basic protections, a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair. Id. at 309-10, 111 S.Ct. 1246 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Structural errors require automatic reversal, because the impact of the error on the jury's performance of its duties cannot be reviewed. United States v. Noushfar, 78 F.3d 1442, 1445 (9th Cir.1996) (quotations and citation omitted), amended by 140 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir.1998). 19 In Annigoni, we noted that the divergence between trial and structural errors was a spectrum, rather than a rigid dichotomy. Annigoni, 96 F.3d at 1144. In this case, however, we need not decide where along that spectrum the district court's unconsented-to substitution of jurors after deliberations had begun falls. For, whether we apply the harmless error rule or conclude that, because of the type of error involved, it cannot be applied, the result is the same. It has not been shown that the error was harmless. Accordingly, in No. 97-10353, we reverse defendant's conviction and remand for a new trial, 5 and dismiss the appeal in No. 97-10410. 6 20 REVERSED and REMANDED; cross-appeal DISMISSED.