Opinion ID: 1456313
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the VBIA Clarified or Altered Existing Law

Text: To avoid this result, Middleton argues that the VBIA merely clarified, rather than altered, existing law. Such legislation is not typically subject to a presumption against retroactivity and is applied to all cases pending on the date of enactment. See, e.g., ABKCO Music, Inc. v. LaVere, 217 F.3d 684, 689 (9th Cir. 2000) (Normally, when an amendment is deemed clarifying rather than substantive, it is applied retroactively. (quotations omitted)); Piamba Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999) ([C]oncerns about retroactive application are not implicated when an amendment... is deemed to clarify relevant law rather than effect a substantive change in the law.); cf. Clay v. Johnson, 264 F.3d 744, 749 (7th Cir.2001) (noting that an agency rule clarifying an unsettled area of law may be applied to case at hand). A number of factors may indicate whether an amendment is clarifying rather than substantive: whether the enacting body declared that it was clarifying a prior enactment; whether a conflict or ambiguity existed prior to the amendment; and whether the amendment is consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the prior enactment and its legislative history. Piamba Cortes, 177 F.3d at 1283-84; see also Liquilux Gas Corp. v. Martin Gas Sales, 979 F.2d 887, 890 (1st Cir.1992). We disagree with Middleton that the VBIA was clarifying legislation. As we explained in the first portion of our opinion, § 1658 applied to USERRA, and the text of the two statutes was not ambiguous, leaving nothing for Congress to clarify. Nor is the VBIA's amendment a reasonable interpretation of USERRA, which was silent on whether § 1658 should apply, or its legislative history, which contained nothing to contradict the clear language of § 1658. Rather than clarifying that no statute of limitations applied to USERRA, the 2008 Congress substantively changed the law so that § 1658 would not apply. We find the text of § 4327(b) to be unambiguous. It does not mention clarification or retroactivity, and we need not turn to the legislative history of the provision. Even if, however, we peeked at that history to determine whether a literal interpretation of the language would contravene Congress's intent, see Bowlds, 411 F.3d at 811, we find nothing to convince us that the VBIA applies to Middleton's claim. First, reliance on a legislature's observations regarding a prior legislature's intent is of marginal utility at best. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980) (noting the oft-repeated warning that the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one. (quotations omitted)); see also Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Blanchette, 628 F.2d 1011, 1014 (7th Cir.1980) ([T]he views of a later Congress cannot be accorded the weight of contemporary legislative history in a consideration of the intent of an earlier one. (quotations omitted)). Second, the only indication that perhaps Congress intended to clarify USERRA or that the VBIA should have retroactive effect came in a Senate report: Subsection 302(f) of the Committee bill would clarify that the original intent of Congress was that USERRA would not be subject to a federal or state statute of limitations period and specifically states that there is no time limit for a person to file a complaint.... The application of a federal statute of limitation period under USERRA is inconsistent with the intent of Congress.... S. Rep. 110-449, at 26 (2008), as reprinted in 2008 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1722, 1748-49. Although Congress used the word clarify, its act must also comport with other attributes of clarifying legislation to avoid being a substantive change in the law. We are hesitant in this case to afford that single word more weight than it deserves. The VBIA's legislative history says nothing regarding retroactivity. That the 2008 Congress believed USERRA to be unconstrained by a statute of limitations from birth is clear, but the 2008 Congress did not state that its amendment should apply to all claims. Furthermore, Congress did not express any intent to clarify USERRA in the statute itself. We proceed with caution when Congress declares its intent to clarify a law in the legislative history rather than the amendment's text. See Piamba Cortes, 177 F.3d at 1284 (As a general rule, `[a] mere statement in a conference report of [subsequent] legislation as to what the Committee believes an earlier statute meant is obviously less weighty' than a statement in the amendment itself. (alterations in original) (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 447 U.S. at 118 n. 13, 100 S.Ct. 2051)). In Brown v. Thompson, the Fourth Circuit held that certain amendments were clarifying, noting that [m]ost significant to our determination here, Congress formally declared in the titles of the relevant subsections of [the amending act] that the amendments of [the original act] were `clarifying' and `technical,' and that Congress expressly provided in [the amending act] that these technical and clarifying amendments be made effective `as if included in the enactment' of the [original act]. 374 F.3d 253, 259 (4th Cir.2004). The VBIA contains no such language. Indeed, as the City points out, Congress has considered similar amendments that would have expressly provided for retroactive application of the VBIA. See, e.g., S. 3432, 110th Cong. § 7 (as introduced by Sens. Casey, Kennedy, and Obama, Aug. 1, 2008) (specifically entitled Clarification that USERRA Has No Statute of Limitations, and stating that the amendment shall apply to all actions or complaints filed under [USERRA] that are pending on or after the date of the enactment of this Act). Congress knew how to make the VBIA retroactive, and it chose not to do so. Without guidance from Congress regarding the effect of the VBIA on pending claims, there is nothing to overcome both the natural meaning of § 4327(b)'s text and our general presumption that an amendment to a statute of limitations should not apply retroactively. The VBIA does not apply to Middleton's claim.