Opinion ID: 168528
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Analysis of ineffective assistance at sentencing claim

Text: 143 Mr. Short contends that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing stage because counsel did not object to the victim impact statement. In a brief paragraph disposing of this claim, after noting the victim impact statement was properly admitted, the OCCA concluded that counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to it. Short, 980 P.2d at 1107. The federal district court agreed that [b]ecause the testimony of Mrs. Yamamoto was properly admitted, counsel cannot be considered to have rendered ineffective assistance for failing to object to its admission. Rec. vol. I, doc. 53, at 20. 144 We read the OCCA's opinion to have held that certain limited parts of Mrs. Yamamoto's statements (i.e., Mrs. Yamamoto's statements concerning her fifteen year illness, her son's wish to be buried in Oklahoma City, and her son's death bed thoughts upon seeing his mother) were not relevant victim impact evidence, and as such, the evidence could not be properly admitted. Short, 980 P.2d at 1101, 1107. In fact, the OCCA noted that the evidence came very close to weighting the scales too far on the side of the prosecution. Id. at 1101. However, the OCCA concluded that the victim impact statement's focus on emotion did not have such a prejudicial effect or so skew the presentation as to divert the jury from its duty to reach a moral reasoned decision on whether to impose the death penalty. Id. 145 Counsel had received a copy of the statement six months before trial and agreed that it substantially complied with the law. Counsel later argued that he did not anticipate how emotional the evidence would be prior to it being presented at trial. Id. We note that counsel did object and ask for a mistrial after the victim impact testimony was read into the record, and the trial court denied this request. 146 Even if we assume that trial counsel's performance was deficient for his failure to object earlier, Mr. Short cannot establish prejudice. We are unable to conclude that a reasonable probability exists that, had counsel timely and successfully objected to this testimony and commentary, the jury would have imposed a sentence other than the death penalty. The irrelevant portions of Mrs. Yamamoto's statement were only a small part of a statement that was, for the most part, admissible under Payne. 147 Under our de novo review, and considering the significant and emotional mitigating evidence Mr. Short presented, we conclude that Mr. Short has not satisfied the prejudice prong of Strickland, and thus he is not entitled to habeas relief.