Opinion ID: 175021
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Motion To Reopen the Proceeding

Text: In July 2008, represented by new counsel, Vartelas filed a timely motion before the BIA to reopen, citing In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A.1988) (setting standard for motions to reopen based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel), and alleging that the series of attorneys who represented him in the proceedings before the IJ had failed to provide him with effective assistance. In addition to arguing that his first attorney had been ill-prepared and had missed certain hearings, Vartelas argued principally that he had been severely prejudiced by both attorneys' failure to pursue his defenses to removability. Adverting to the defense the Board had refused to consider on his appeal, and citing a predecessor of § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II), Vartelas pointed out that the sentence actually imposed did not exceed a term of imprisonment in excess of six months and stated that he was not relying on 212(c) relief when he entered his plea of guilty; he was relying on the fact that the sentence imposed made his crime a non-removable crime at the time of conviction. (Vartelas Motion To Reopen and Remand at 12-13.) In addition, Vartelas argued that IIRIRA had changed the meaning of entry in § 101(a)(13) with respect to LPRs and that his prior attorneys had provided ineffective assistance by not challenging removability on the ground that the IIRIRA change should not be applied to him retroactively. In an opinion dated January 23, 2009 (BIA 2009 Decision) (reported, without pagination, at 2009 WL 331200), the BIA denied Vartelas's motion to reopen. The Board evaluated Vartelas's ineffective-assistance claim under the standard that had recently been announced by the Attorney General in In re Compean, Bangaly & J-E-C-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 710 (A.G. Jan. 7, 2009) ( Compean I ) (overruling Lozada in part), vacated by In re Compean, Bangaly & J-E-C-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1 (A.G. June 3, 2009) ( Compean II ). Describing the then-controlling Compean I, the Board noted that [t]o prevail on a deficient performance of counsel claim, the respondent must establish that his lawyer's failings were egregious and that his case was prejudiced by counsel's performance. To establish prejudice, the respondent must show that but for the lawyer's failing[s], he likely would have succeeded on the merits of his underlying claim to remain in the United States. BIA 2009 Decision at 1. The Board concluded that Vartelas did not meet this standard. It found no deficiency in the performance of Vartelas's second attorney; and it found that even if there were derelictions on the part of his first attorney, Vartelas failed to show that [the attorney's] performance prejudiced his case. The Immigration Judge gave the respondent additional time to obtain new counsel. [Vartelas] has failed to establish that he is not inadmissible as charged. [Vartelas] is not eligible for the petty offense exception under section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II), because the maximum penalty for the crime of which he was convicted is five years imprisonment.... BIA 2009 Decision at 2. The Board also rejected the contention that the IIRIRA-amended version of INA § 101(a)(13) was impermissibly retroactive as applied to Vartelas, noting that Vartelas cited only Camins v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 872 (9th Cir.2007). It stated that his reliance on that case was misplaced because the instant case arises in the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, not the Ninth Circuit, and the Board historically follows a court's precedent in cases arising in th[e] circuit in which the proceeding is conducted. BIA 2009 Decision at 2. The Board concluded that Vartelas's attorneys' failure to raise the retroactivity argument thus did not prejudice him.