Opinion ID: 1938954
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The basic question presented is whether a life tenant with attendant authority to sell may invade the corpus of the estate.

Text: More specifically, does a life tenant's unrestricted power to sell and convey include authority to encumber the fee? On that issue it is ordinarily understood, a life tenant's power to intrench upon or consume the principal of an estate does not exist under a will unless specifically conferred, or can be reasonably inferred from testamentary language used. In this case the will does not expressly grant the widow power to encumber the fee. As a result, that right, if it exists, must be implied from the intent and meaning of the testamentary instrument. This, however, is not an insurmountable task and we will read such meaning into the will if, by a construction of the entire instrument, it is reasonably evident the testator so intended. In support of the foregoing see Hamilton v. Hamilton, 149 Iowa 321, 330, 128 N.W. 380; Jorge v. da Silva, 100 R.I. 654, 218 A.2d 661, 662-663; 5 Page on Wills, Bowe-Parker Revision, section 45.2-45.3; 33 Am.Jur., Life Estates, Remainders, Etc., section 235, page 722; and 31 A.L.R.3d 6, 22. So decedent's implied intent, if any, must be determined. V. This court has not previously been called upon to evaluate the specific problem now before us. That is understandable for as repeatedly stated few if any cases of this nature stand squarely as precedent. Some guidance is to be found, however, in the case of In re Estate of Cooksey, supra, where we held a will giving the life tenant power to dispose of and pass clear title to property included sale or gift, without exchange or substitution. Also in Volz v. Kaemmerle, 211 Iowa 995, 234 N.W. 805, the will accorded a life tenant absolute use and control of all property, especially to use and dispose of it in such manner as she shall see fit. Our interpretation there was, loc. cit., 211 Iowa 998, loc. cit., 234 N.W. 806: The testator surely had a purpose in the progressive and emphasized enlargements of the benefit and authority or power given by him to his widow. If he had had in mind limiting or restricting her in the execution of the power conferred, he surely would have used other language to indicate such intention. See also Lovrien v. Fitzgerald, 242 Iowa 1258, 1263-1265, 49 N.W.2d 845, distinguishing Cooksey and Volz, both supra, from those cases involving a life tenant's limited power of disposal, not here present.