Opinion ID: 2065684
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Pye v. State [12]

Text: As mentioned above, Pye presents two issues for our review. The first is the same one presented in both Teel, supra, and Womack, supra : Should this Court's prior decision in Frazier v. State , that carrying a handgun does not merge into possession of a firearm by a convicted person be inapplicable to the instant case because the General Assembly has greatly increased the penalty for possession of a firearm by a convicted person since the Frazier ruling? We resolve it in the same way that we resolved the issue in the prior cases: for the reasons stated in Teel, supra, we answer the above question in the negative.
The additional issue Pye presents for our consideration is: Did the trial judge err in denying [Pye's] motions to dismiss and to acquit and by sentencing him to a five year no parole sentence for possession of a firearm by a person with a prior conviction under Article 27, § 449(e) where [Pye] previously had been convicted of a felony but not a crime of violence? Its answer depends upon the interpretation of § 449 in an attempt to determine whether §§ 445 and 449(e) require a prior conviction of both a crime of violence and a crime of felony, or whether a conviction of one or the other, but not both, will suffice. The petitioner was charged with possessing a firearm after having previously been convicted of a felony narcotic violation. [13] He moved, prior to trial, to dismiss that charge. He argued that such a conviction required proof of conviction of both a felony and a crime. The trial court reserved its ruling on the issue. At the close of evidence, Pye, making the same argument, moved for judgment of acquittal as to that count. The trial court denied the motion for judgment of acquittal, stating: All right, for the reasons [ ] this Court has stated previously on the record, [ ], there is no need for the State to prove a conviction [ ], for a crime of violence and for that reason, as well as the court's reasons with respect to the reservation of 445(c) instead of 445(d), the Court is denying the motion for [a]cquittal. . . .  The trial court then instructed the jury that the parties have stipulated that the defendant has been convicted previously of an offense which conviction prohibits him from possessing a handgun. [14] Section 449(e), the statute under which Pye was sentenced after being convicted of the first count, provides: (e) Illegal possession of firearm with certain previous convictions.  A person who was previously convicted of a crime of violence as defined in § 441(e) of this article or convicted of a violation of § 286 or § 286A of this article, and who is in illegal possession of a firearm as defined in § 445(d)(1)(i) and (ii) of this article, is guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be imprisoned for not less than 5 years, no part of which may be suspended and the person may not be eligible for parole. Each violation shall be considered a separate offense. Art. 27, § 449(e) (emphasis added). Section 445(d)(1)(i) and (ii), which § 449(e) references, provide, in relevant part: (d) Restrictions on possessionIn general.  A person may not possess a regulated firearm if the person: (1) Has been convicted of: (i) A crime of violence; [or] (ii) Any violation classified as a felony in this State[.] . . .  The State argues that the language of (d)(1)(i) and (ii) controls. We disagree. We recently were confronted with the same issue in Stanley v. State, 390 Md. 175, 887 A.2d 1078 (2005); namely, whether a person must be convicted of both a crime of violence and a felony in order to be subjected to an enhanced sentence. We held that the word and in § 449(e) (emphasized in the quote of that subsection) controls because it requires that convictions for a prior offense or offenses must be both a crime of violence and a felony. As we stated in Stanley: We agree with the petitioner and with Judge Davis, § 449(e) is clear and unambiguous. By its clear and explicit terms, to be subjected to the enhanced penalty it prescribes, a person must be in `illegal possession of a firearm . . .' and been convicted previously of a crime of violence . . . or been convicted of certain enumerated drug related offenses. `Section 449(e), by its plain structure, is divided into two requirements. The first requirement is that the defendant have a previous conviction of a crime that falls within § 441(e). The second requirement is that the defendant have a current conviction under § 445(d)(i) and (ii).' The definition of the illegal possession targeted for purposes of this statute-there are two other proscribed possessions listed in § 445(d)consists of two elements and is stated in the conjunctive. Consequently, both elements must be met; it is not sufficient if only one is present. That means, since the definition includes a crime of violence and `any violation classified as a felony in this State,' that a conviction of both, not just one, must be established. . . .  Stanley, 390 Md. at 183, 887 A.2d at 1082-83 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). In the case sub judice, [t]he State agree[d] that the question in the present case is the same as that presented in Stanley v. State, 157 Md.App. 363, 851 A.2d 612, [ cert. granted ], 383 Md. 256, 858 A.2d 1017, . . . argued on January 11, 2005. Accordingly, our holding in Stanley controls and we answer the question posed by Pye in the affirmative. The trial court should have granted the motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to the first count. Thus, we reverse Pye's conviction for possession of a firearm by a person with a previous conviction and vacate that sentence. [15]