Opinion ID: 2427524
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sabir's Evidentiary Challenges Are Uniformly Without Merit

Text: Sabir asserts that his conviction is infected by a host of evidentiary errors pertaining to (1) the receipt of expert testimony, see Fed.R.Evid. 702; (2) the receipt of hearsay statements by Shah, see U.S. Const. amend. VI; Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E); (3) the exclusion of a prior inconsistent statement by a prosecution witness, see Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(A); (4) the exclusion of evidence of defendant's state of mind, see Fed.R.Evid. 803(3); and (5) the receipt of myriad evidence that was more prejudicial than probative, see Fed. R.Evid. 403.
Sabir challenges the district court's decision, supported by a detailed written opinion, to allow Evan Kohlmann to testify as an expert witness about al Qaeda and Azzam Publications, the publisher of a jihadist videotape offered in the prosecution's direct case. See United States v. Sabir, No. 05 Cr. 673(LAP), 2007 WL 1373184 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2007). The admission of expert testimony is governed by Fed.R.Evid. 702, which states as follows: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. The law assigns district courts a gatekeeping role in ensuring that expert testimony satisfies the requirements of Rule 702. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999); see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) (articulating non-exhaustive list of criteria court may apply in performing gatekeeping function). The inquiry is a flexible one, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. at 594, 113 S.Ct. 2786, and district courts enjoy considerable discretion in deciding on the admissibility of expert testimony, see Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. at 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167. We will not disturb a ruling respecting expert testimony absent a showing of manifest error, see Zerega Ave. Realty Corp. v. Hornbeck Offshore Transp., LLC, 571 F.3d 206, 213 (2d Cir.2009), which is not present here.
Sabir contends that Kohlmann's testimony satisfied none of the three enumerated requirements of Rule 702. We disagree. Kohlmann's proposed expert testimony had a considerable factual basis: (1) his graduate studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and Center for Contemporary Arab Studies and at the University of Pennsylvania Law School; (2) his full time employment at two organizations focusing on terrorism and al Qaeda, Globalterroralert.com and the Investigative Project; (3) his authorship of various academic papers and a book on al Qaeda; (4) his provision of consulting services on terrorism and al Qaeda to various federal agencies; and (5) his ongoing efforts to collect, analyze, and catalogue written, audio, and visual materials relevant to terrorism generally and al Qaeda in particular, including the records of guilty pleas and confessions from admitted al Qaeda operatives. Before admitting Kohlmann's testimony, the district court also consideredwithout objection from the partiesthe record of a Daubert hearing in another case in which Kohlmann was proffered as a terrorism expert. The evidence adduced at that hearing permitted the trial judge to conclude that Kohlmann's work had undergone `various forms of peer review,' that his opinions were `generally accepted within the relevant community,' and that his methodology was `similar to that employed by experts that have been permitted to testify in other federal cases involving terrorist organizations.' United States v. Sabir, 2007 WL 1373184, at  (quoting United States v. Paracha, No. 03 Cr. 1197(SHS), 2006 WL 12768, at  (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2006)). [32] On this record, we conclude that the district court acted well within its discretion in concluding that Kohlmann's testimony satisfied the enumerated requirements of Rule 702. [33]
Sabir submits that, even if Kohlmann properly qualified as an expert, his testimony about al Qaeda's history and structure was not helpful because jurors' familiarity with al Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden, could be presumed. The argument requires little discussion. We have approved the use of expert testimony to provide juries with background on criminal organizations, notably organized crime families. See, e.g., United States v. Matera, 489 F.3d 115, 121-22 (2d Cir.2007). As we explained in United States v. Amuso, 21 F.3d 1251 (2d Cir.1994): [d]espite the prevalence of organized crime stories in the news and popular media, these topics remain proper subjects for expert testimony. Aside from the probability that the depiction of organized crime in movies and television is misleading, the fact remains that the operational methods of organized crime families are still beyond the knowledge of the average citizen. Id. at 1264. The rationale applies with equal force to terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda.
Sabir's relevancy challenge to certain aspects of Kohlmann's testimony is equally unavailing. See Fed.R.Evid. 401, 403. To the extent Sabir submits that Kohlmann's testimony about terrorist activities in Saudi Arabiaderived in part from Internet sourceswas too speculative to be probative, he misses the point of that testimony. The issue for jury consideration was not whether the government could prove that al Qaeda was, in fact, responsible, for particular terrorist acts in Saudi Arabia, but whether it could reasonably be inferred that a person such as Sabir, who had lived in Saudi Arabia for a year, and who proposed to support al Qaeda's efforts there by serving as the organization's on-call doctor, would know that he was providing support to an organization that engaged in terrorism. Kohlmann's testimony as to generally available information about al Qaeda's terrorist activities in Saudi Arabia was more probative than prejudicial on this knowledge element of § 2339B. The prosecution's failure to adduce specific evidence of Sabir's familiarity with the information went to the weight of Kohlmann's testimony rather than to its admissibility. We similarly reject Sabir's relevance challenge to Kohlmann's testimony about al Qaeda training camps. Such testimony was plainly relevant to mens rea as Sabir was charged both with conspiring with Shah to provide martial arts training to mujahideen and with agreeing to be on call to treat wounded mujahideen who sustained injuries either in training or in actual al Qaeda operation[s]. GX 906T at 48.
Sabir faults the district court for allowing Kohlmann to testify beyond the scope of the government's proffer. See Fed. R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(G). The claim is patently meritless. The testimony about which Sabir complains, relating to Islam, fatwa, and the 9/11 attacks, Appellant's Br. at 72, easily fell within the government's broad proffer, outlined in a February 23, 2007 letter, to present evidence about al Qaeda's origins, history, structure, leadership, instructional methods, operational logistics, and acts of terrorism, United States v. Sabir, 2007 WL 1373184, at  & n. 5 (quoting government proffer letter). Similarly meritless is Sabir's challenge to Kohlmann's expertise to discuss Islam, fatwa, and the 9/11 attacks, to the limited extent of providing background on al Qaeda. Even if Kohlmann had testified beyond the government's Rule 16 profferwhich he did notSabir fails to show the violation of a substantial right, the standard necessary to secure reversal for such an evidentiary error. United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 122 (2d Cir.2006).
Sabir contends that the admission of tape recorded conversations between co-defendant Shah and confidential informant Saeed or undercover Agent Soufan violated both Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) and the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause as construed by the Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) [34] Neither argument is persuasive.