Opinion ID: 571279
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 7 The three-step process for evaluating Batson claims requires that the complaining party first make a prima facie showing that opposing counsel has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-1723. Once this showing has been made the burden shifts to the striking party to articulate a race-neutral explanation for the strike. Id. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-1724. Thereafter the trial court must determine whether the Batson claimant has proven purposeful discrimination. Id. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724. The district court has the discretion to fashion the procedure necessary to evaluate counsel's race-neutral explanation. United States v. Clemons, 941 F.2d 321 (5th Cir.1991). The trial court's decision on the ultimate question of discriminatory intent is a finding of fact usually accorded great deference on appeal because of the inherent credibility assessment. Hernandez v. New York, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality) (citing Batson ); United States v. Valley, 928 F.2d 130 (5th Cir.1991) (citing United States v. Moreno, 878 F.2d 817 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 979, 110 S.Ct. 508, 107 L.Ed.2d 510 (1989)). 8 Once counsel has offered a race-neutral explanation and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination, we need consider only the sufficiency of the race-neutral reasons articulated by Keller's counsel. Hernandez v. New York, 111 S.Ct. at 1866. 9 A neutral explanation is one based upon something other than the race of the juror. Clemons, 941 F.2d at 324-25 (citing Hernandez ). The reasons offered in this case include age, familial relationships, appearance during questioning, responsiveness to questions, and background knowledge that raised the possibility of bias. We previously have found age and appearance to be legitimate reasons and have allowed trial counsel to rely upon intuitive assumptions. An explanation need not be quantifiable provided that the intent is not race-based. Clemons, 941 F.2d at 325. We also have found disinterested demeanor and inattentiveness to be valid, race-neutral reasons for peremptory strikes. United States v. Roberts, 913 F.2d 211 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2264, 114 L.Ed.2d 716 (1991); United States v. Melton, 883 F.2d 336 (5th Cir.1989); United States v. Lance, 853 F.2d 1177 (5th Cir.1988). See also United States v. De La Rosa, 911 F.2d 985, 991 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2275, 114 L.Ed.2d 726 (1991) (belief that a juror employed by a church-affiliated agency basically wants to forgive people was accepted); United States v. Moreno, 878 F.2d at 820-21 (gut reaction that commercial artist would be lenient toward narcotics offenders not a pretext). 10 The Moores maintain that Keller's explanations are pretextual. Notwithstanding counsel's assigned reasons, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the [classification] bears more heavily on one race than another. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2049, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976) (quoted in Hernandez ). The disproportionate exclusion of members of a certain race, while not prohibited in and of itself, may nonetheless serve as evidence that counsel's stated reason constitutes a pretext for racial discrimination. Hernandez. 11 The Moores argue that Keller's reasons were pretextual because white jurors similarly situated to Rackley and Bonner were not challenged. As to Rackley, the Moores argue that other jurors appeared elderly, that five jurors had deceased parents, and that the nonresponsive explanation is ambiguous and meaningless. Although Bonner also had a deceased parent, the Moores again complain that only two of the three available strikes were used on jurors with deceased parents. Regarding Bonner's medical knowledge, the Moores argue that one other juror was a nurse and another a dietician. 12 Keller responds that the nurse had once worked for one of its medical witnesses, and was thus more prone to be biased for Keller. Keller's counsel also minimized the overlap of the dietician's experience with the medical issues in the case. As to the auto accident that caused Keller's counsel concern, the Moores assert that Bonner's son was a defendant in that accident, a predicate for bias in favor of Keller. Defense counsel indicated confusion regarding this point, however, and had suggested at trial that the son's role was unclear. 13 The Moores had the burden of proving pretext and therefore racial intent. United States v. Guerra-Marez, 928 F.2d 665, 673 n. 9 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 322, 116 L.Ed.2d 263 (1991). We accord great deference to the district court finding that that burden was not carried. Id. The fact that Keller did not use its third peremptory challenge against a black substantially supports the finding of no discrimination. United States v. Terrazas-Carrasco, 861 F.2d 93, 95 (5th Cir.1988). Further, because multiple reasons led Keller's counsel to strike both Rackley and Bonner the existence of other jurors with some of their individual characteristics does not demonstrate that the reasons assigned were pretextual. 14 We reinstate our rulings on the issues decided on the appeal, reported in full at 937 F.2d 127 (5th Cir.1990). 15 For these reasons the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.