Opinion ID: 1747978
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory Compliance Claims

Text: Appellant also argues that the Board violated section 494.410.1 because the master jury list contained only 750 names at any given time, far fewer than the statutorily required 5% of the county population. [2] The record does not support this claim. Instead, it shows that the Board compiled a master jury list of about 42,000 names, greatly exceeding the required minimum 5% of the county population. This master jury list was compiled from, and consisted of, a combined cross-referenced list of the eligible voters and licensed drivers within Cape Girardeau County. Once every three months the Board would load the names from the master jury list into a computer, which would then randomly select a qualified juror list of 750 names, consistent with section 494.415. Separate jury panels would then be chosen from the qualified jury list as needed. Appellant's argument on this issue is based in part on a matter of semantics contained in the testimony of the Cape Girardeau County circuit clerk, who at times used the term source lists rather than master jury list to refer to the combined and cross-referenced registered voters/licensed drivers list. It is clear from the overall context of the clerk's testimony, however, that he was using these two terms interchangeably. See also the 1993 Committee Note to Standard 2, Supreme Court of Missouri Standards Relating to Juror Use and Management (advisory standards adopted by this Court for guidance and use by all Missouri courts, which may be obtained from the Office of State Courts Administrator). The Committee Note states that, in compiling the master jury list: Using two source lists, such as the drivers license and voter registration lists, is recommended. Appellant is incorrect in arguing that simply because section 494.410 requires the Board to consult one or more public records (such as the voter registration and drivers license lists) in order to compile the master jury list, that the master jury list therefore cannot consist of those records. See State v. Albrecht, 817 S.W.2d 619, 623 (Mo.App. 1991).
Appellant also complains that the circuit clerk and presiding judge would routinely remove names from the 750-person qualified juror lists for improper or inadequate reasons. He argues that the circuit clerk would improperly remove people known to be ill, or who had a doctor's appointment, or who were believed to be out of town or working on the Mississippi River for extended periods of time, or who for any number of reasons cannot serve during that term. Review of the record shows little support for this claim. Instead, it shows that the clerk typically removed only the names of people who were statutorily ineligible for service under section 494.425 due to factors such as age, nonresidency, felony convictions, or being a licensed attorney. Each potential juror received a summons, a questionnaire and a letter from the court. If the questionnaire was returned with reasons why a person should be excused from service due to a hardship listed in section 494.430, the presiding judge then made a determination as to whether the individual should be excused. [3] The trial court only excused people eligible to be excused. Appellant nonetheless contends the evidence shows that, in some instances, the clerk not only removed people who were statutorily ineligible, but also some who were not, such as individuals known to be gone on an extended vacation or working for extended periods of time on the river. To the extent that the record may arguably support this contention, no substantial failure to comply with the underlying statutory policy and provisions embodied by Chapter 494 occurred in Appellant's case. Only a substantial failure to comply with the statutory jury selection requirements would entitle Appellant to relief. Section 494.465.1. In this context, we hold that a substantial failure to comply is one that either rises to the level of a constitutional violation, and/or that actually prejudices a defendant. [4] For reasons already discussed, the jury selection procedures employed in Appellant's case did not violate his constitutional rights. As to prejudice, Appellant has not shown that any individual was actually improperly excused in his case. By the same token, Appellant also has not shown that he was in any way prejudiced by some isolated and minor technical violations that might possibly have occurred if the clerk, for example, removed some venirepersons who were thought to be away on vacation. The exclusion of a prospective juror for reasons not listed in the statute is not grounds for reversal absent a showing that a defendant was actually prejudiced by failure to strictly observe the statutory provisions for excuse. State v. Gilmore, 661 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Mo. banc 1983); see also State v. Cross, 887 S.W.2d 789, 791-92 (Mo.App. 1994).