Opinion ID: 1841264
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the nature of objects of a possessory action

Text: Under French law, [c]orporeal immovables can be the object of a possessory action bearing on the possession of the land itself only if they are in commerce and, as such, susceptible of being acquired by adverse possession (footnote omitted). Aubry & Rau, 2 Civil Law TranslationsProperty § 185, 129 (7th ed. 1966). The key to the possession of corporeal immovables in France seems to lie in the land's being in commerce. Under the French scheme, if the corporeal immovables were in commerce, and as such, (i.e. because of their commercial availability) susceptible of being acquired by adverse possession, the land was equally amenable to being the object of a possessory action bearing on the possession of the land. Thus it is not the ability to acquire by adverse possession that sets the stage for the availability of a possessory action; rather, by implication from French theory, it is the state of being in commerce which triggers the availability of the possessory action. The ability to acquire by adverse possession is only incidental to the requirement that the corporeal immovables be in commerce. Aubry & Rau supra illustrates those corporeal immovables which, at least under French law, are incapable of being possessed because they are not in commerce. The following can not, for this reason, be protected by possessory actions: lands occupied by war fortifications, sea coast, national or departmental highways, local roads, public streets and squares, rights of way of navigation canals and artifical dikes of navigable rivers, cemeteries and churches. (Footnotes omitted) [10] On the other hand according to the French commentators Aubry & Rau, corporeal immovables in the private domain, even those in the private domain of the state, [11] may be object[s] of a possessory action bearing on the possession of the land itself, and [t]his applies especially to sea relictions ( lais et relais ), and even river beds from which water has permanently receded were held to be relictions.  (Footnotes omitted) (Emphasis provided) Aubry & Rau, supra at 130. Accord Planiol, I Civil Law Treatise, Part 2 §§ 3068A, 3082, at 816, 824 (1959). The availability of a possessory action against corporeal immovables of the state, according to the French commentators, turns then on the classification of the corporeal immovable as either a public or private thing. [12] Under our jurisprudence, a possessory action has not been allowed in regard to public property. Bruning v. City of New Orleans, 165 La. 511, 115 So. 733 (1926); Martin et al v. City of Lafayette, 162 La. 262, 110 So. 415 (1926). [13] In Bruning, 115 So. at 737 (on first rehearing), we framed the question concerning possession of private and public things as follows: Suffice it to say that, if the property in controversy be of a nature subject to private ownership and exclusive private possession, then our former decree [enjoining the city from entering the land in dispute] is correct, and should be reinstated. On the other hand, if the property in controversy be of that class of public things, the property of which is vested in a whole nation, and the use of which is allowed to all (R.C.C. art. 453), such as the seashore, being that space of land, over which the waters of the sea spread in the highest water, during the winter season (R.C.C. art. 451), or such as the streets and public squares of a city (R.C.C. art. 454), then mere physical possession thereof by a private individual is not such a possession as entitles the possessor to maintain himself against the public until ousted by a petitory action; that the public is entitled to enter thereon at once. Martin v. City of Lafayette, 162 La. 262, 110 So. 415, and authorities there cited. The same is also true of land actually covered by the waters of the sea ( Milne v. Girodeau, 12 La. 324); nor does it make any difference that such land be uncovered even for whole seasons at a time, if in fact it be subject to periodical inundation by the regular rise or flow of the water at the appropriate season ( Sapp v. Frazier, 51 La.Ann. 1718, 26 So. 378, 72 Am.St.Rep. 493). On second rehearing in Bruning, we upheld the municipality's right to enter the lakefront property (rejecting the Brunings' possessory action) finding that [n]o complaint, apparently, was ever made by plaintiff, by her husband, or by her sons, of the action of the authorities in consistently claiming and treating the property in dispute as a locus publicus. We reversed the earlier decision, however, insofar as it purport[ed] to determine finally the ownership of the property. 115 So. at 738. On the other hand when property is private, a possessory action has been permitted. Moran v. City of New Orleans, 170 La. 499, 128 So. 290 (1930). In Moran, when the city sought to remove the plaintiff's wire fence and replace it with a board fence to exercise control over what the city alleged was locus publicus, the plaintiff filed a possessory action to enjoin the city from interfering with her possession and control of the property. In upholding the plaintiff's right to be quieted in her possession of the property, this Court found: The record shows that the property involved in this suit was subject to private ownership; that plaintiff was in the actual possession of it at the instant when the disturbance alleged in the petition occurred; that she had possessed the property quietly and without interruption, under a claim of ownership, for many years prior to the disturbance, and that defendant had never, theretofore, asserted claim to any part of it, or attempted to exercise any dominion over it. The record does not show that the property involved was ever dedicated, by any of its former owners, to public uses. A map and certain sales with reference thereto are relied upon as impliedly dedicating the property as a locus publicus, but no connection between the confection of the map and the owner of the property is shown. Hence, if the title to the property could be inquired into in this proceeding, we seriously question whether the offerings referred to could be given the effect contended for by defendant. 128 So. at 291. Therefore while public things may not be objects of possession by private individuals, our jurisprudence, consistent with Louisiana's Civil Code and French theories, allows private things (the ownership of which is in dispute as between a private litigant and a sovereign) to be the objects of a possessory action. And our courts have awarded judgment favorable to the private litigant when the private nature of the property has been established and the plaintiff suing the sovereign has satisfied the other requirements for success in a possessory action. Moran, 128 So. 290. Thus, the success or failure of a possessory action against the state will depend in part on the judicial determination concerning the nature of the object of that possessory action, that is whether the property is public or private in nature.