Opinion ID: 196070
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the summation

Text: 39 Having wended our way across flat, easily negotiated territory, we now reach more problematic turf. Here, the topography features a tripartite claim of error addressed to the government's summation. 40 We start with certain fundamental verities. A prosecutor is permitted vigorous advocacy, so long as he does not stray into forbidden terrain. Palmariello v. Superintendent of M.C.I.-Norfolk, 873 F.2d 491, 494 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 865, 110 S.Ct. 185, 107 L.Ed.2d 140 (1989). Thus, prosecutors need not pull their punches; they may--indeed, they should--present their cases to criminal juries zealously. Forcefulness in the pursuit of justice is to be admired rather than condemned. Yet, while a prosecutor may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). This maxim is particularly relevant to closing arguments, for such arguments come at an especially delicate point in the trial process and represent the parties' last, best chance to marshal the evidence and persuade the jurors of its import. See, e.g., United States v. Manning, 23 F.3d 570, 575 (1st Cir.1994). 41 Of course, a prosecutor's obligation to stay within the pale does not exist in a vacuum. A defendant has a corresponding obligation to protect his own interests. When a defendant defaults on this obligation by failing to make a contemporaneous objection to questionable comments in the prosecution's closing argument, the raise-or-waive rule applies. Afterthought claims of improprieties allegedly occurring during the summation are reviewed under the notably ungenerous plain error standard. Consequently, reversal is justified only if the illegitimate portion of the closing argument so poisoned the well that the trial's outcome was likely affected. Mejia-Lozano, 829 F.2d at 274. 42 In determining whether a prosecutor's miscues in final argument require reversal under this hard-to-satisfy standard, this court considers all the attendant circumstances, paying special heed to factors such as (1) the extent to which the prosecutor's conduct is recurrent and/or deliberate; (2) the extent to which the trial judge's instructions insulated the jury against, or palliated, the possibility of unfair prejudice; and (3) the overall strength of the prosecution's case, with particular regard to the likelihood that any prejudice might have affected the jury's judgment. See id.; see also United States v. Giry, 818 F.2d 120, 133 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 855, 108 S.Ct. 162, 98 L.Ed.2d 116 (1987). Using these criteria, we conclude that none of appellant's claimed errors requires reversal. 43
44 Appellant maintains that, during the summation, the prosecutor referred to matters not in evidence. Specifically, the prosecutor gave a less than completely accurate account of the prefatory conversation between appellant and Lynch on January 29. Appellant greeted Lynch, so the prosecutor said, by imploring: Maestro, show me how it's done. The prosecutor added: We know that Maestro is Mr. Lynch's nickname. Why? Because he plays the organ in his father's church. Warming to this theme, the prosecutor reiterated the point. He told the jury that, as the two men walked into the UST branch, appellant again said: Maestro ... show me the ropes. 45 There was, in fact, no evidence of Lynch's nickname and no evidence that appellant made a request to be shown the ropes as the robbers entered the bank. Withal, there was no contemporaneous objection, and these canards scarcely justify reversal under the plain error doctrine. Given that Lynch admitted to his vocation as a bank robber, his nickname was wholly irrelevant to the case. Moreover, the prosecutor gave an innocent explanation of the moniker and appellant's own lawyer twice referred to Lynch in front of the jury as Maestro. As to the second misstatement, there was evidence that appellant made the request (show me the ropes) previously on the day of the robbery and on at least one earlier occasion. In other words, the substance of the prosecutor's statement was true (although the timing was awry). 46 On whole-record review, we conclude without serious question that the allusions to matters dehors the record were benign. Reversal is totally unwarranted. 47
48 Next, appellant assails the prosecutor's rebuttal, which, he says, contained a minimum of three peccadilloes, namely, (1) an implication that appellant had alerted the four people who mugged Lynch and stole his booty, (2) a suggestion that Lynch should be believed because he suffered from sickle-cell anemia and had tested positive for HIV, and (3) an intimation that Clavin, during her testimony, lowered her voice out of fear. 49 These accusations do not withstand scrutiny. The prosecutor made the first of the cited comments without objection and in direct response to defense counsel's argument that Lynch had turned against Taylor because the latter did not come to his aid during the mugging. We have previously expressed our reluctance to find plain error when a prosecutor's remarks are made to rebut specific statements by defense counsel, and are proportionate to that end. See Whiting, 28 F.3d at 1302; Mejia-Lozano, 829 F.2d at 274. Here, our reluctance ripens into outright unwillingness. Similarly, the prosecutor's remarks about Lynch's health drew no contemporaneous objection. Those remarks were obviously designed to rebut the defense argument that Lynch was hoping to earn a reduced sentence by testifying against Taylor. The statement recounted facts in evidence, and did not constitute either vouching or an improper appeal to the jury's sympathies. Finally, the remark about Clavin's demeanor was not out of line. The jury saw and heard her testimony, and could determine for itself her state of mind. 10 See, e.g., United States v. Mount, 896 F.2d 612, 625 (1st Cir.1990) (Although it is the jury's job to draw inferences, there is nothing improper in the Government's suggesting which inferences should be drawn.). 50
51 The capstone of appellant's asseverational array is his anguished assertion that the prosecutor's summation contained comments on appellant's election not to testify, in derogation of rights secured to appellant under the Fifth Amendment. We quote the disputed portion of the prosecutor's summation: 52 Is there any evidence that Mr. Taylor said, Oh, my God, I've been misled. This is not going to be money from his father. I've got to get out of here. I've got to warn my friend, Lucille Aulmond. She gave me rides in the past, but this is something different. He stayed true in his anchor position. 53 Mr. Lynch went up to the window, demanded money. He was very unafraid. Mr. Lynch demanded money that wasn't his. Did Mr. Taylor say: Oh, my God, I'm going to leave this place and warn my friend, Lucille Aulmond? No. He stayed true to that anchor position. And, in fact, he yelled, Come on, let's go. 54 Lynch points to the door. Mr. Taylor waits there and does he say: Look, just because I'm here, I'm sorry what happened. I didn't know it was going to happen. Is everybody all right? I know who was responsible. 55 He left with the money.... When he got back to the car, you heard Lucille Aulmond, and she said, What happened? Does he say: Lucille, he robbed a bank; I didn't know it was going to happen; I'm sorry. I hit a man in the face was what you got, instead. Not the truth, just another part of the lie.... 56 And they drive two blocks away. Mr. Lynch gets out of the car. Does Terrence Taylor stay with his friend? Lucille, I'm involved in this. You shouldn't have been involved. I didn't even know about it. Let's go to the police and clear this whole thing up. He went with the money. Her job was done. 57 He took the money.... Did he take his share of the money and say, Look, this is not my money; there it is, police, look for bait bills; I'm turning back money; I have nothing to do with this. 58 It is a bedrock principle that a prosecutor may not comment on a defendant's exercise of the right to remain silent. See United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 30, 108 S.Ct. 864, 867, 99 L.Ed.2d 23 (1988); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 1233, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965); United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1186 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2714, 129 L.Ed.2d 840 (1994). Even an indirect or inferential comment on a defendant's silence can transgress the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Hardy, 37 F.3d 753, 757 (1st Cir.1994); United States v. Lavoie, 721 F.2d 407, 408 (1st Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1069, 104 S.Ct. 1424, 79 L.Ed.2d 749 (1984). 59 Because [t]here is no bright line marking the precipice between a legitimate assessment of defense witnesses and an impermissible encroachment upon the accused's silence, Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1186, prosecutors must tread carefully on this terrain. A prosecutor who attempts to define exactly the edge of the precipice approaches at his peril. Rodriguez-Sandoval v. United States, 409 F.2d 529, 531 (1st Cir.1969). In evaluating whether a prosecutor has gone too far, we must ask whether, in the particular circumstances of a given case, the language used by the prosecutor appears to have been designed to yield the improper inference, or, if not so designed, whether it was such that jurors would probably interpret it as a commentary on the accused's failure to take the witness stand. See United States v. Glantz, 810 F.2d 316, 322 (1st Cir.1987), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 929, 107 S.Ct. 3214, 96 L.Ed.2d 701 (1987); United States v. Monaghan, 741 F.2d 1434, 1437 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1085, 105 S.Ct. 1847, 85 L.Ed.2d 146 (1985). 60 Notwithstanding these constraints, no Fifth Amendment violation inheres in comments on a defendant's decision to remain silent in a context outside the legal process. For example, in Lema v. United States, 987 F.2d 48 (1st Cir.1993), we found nothing amiss in a prosecutor's observation that the defendant remained silent during two drug transactions. The comment did not transgress the Fifth Amendment because it referred to defendant's silence at the scene of the crime rather than at trial. See id. at 56; see also United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 714 (1st Cir.1992) (holding that defendant's silent presence at site of drug transaction patently implied participation), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1005, 122 L.Ed.2d 154 (1993). 61 In this case, the government insists that the challenged statements referred to appellant's silence before, during, and after the UST robbery, not to his silence at trial. When a prosecutor's comments, fairly viewed, are susceptible to two plausible meanings, one of which is unexceptionable and one of which is forbidden, context frequently determines meaning. See Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1187; United States v. Lilly, 983 F.2d 300, 307 (1st Cir.1992). Where feasible, a reviewing court should construe ambiguity in favor of a proper meaning: 62 [A] court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through a lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging interpretations. 63 Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 1873, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974); accord Lilly, 983 F.2d at 307. This rule of construction has heightened desirability in the absence of a contemporaneous objection for, when the target of the comments does not interrupt and register a timely objection, it seems especially appropriate to give the arguer the benefit of every plausible interpretation of her words. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1187. We are especially reluctant to fish in the pool of ambiguity when, as now, the complaining party failed to bring a dubious comment, easily corrected on proper notice, to the immediate attention of the trial court. Id. at 1188. 64 Evaluated against this benchmark, we do not believe that the quoted remarks trespassed on appellant's Fifth Amendment rights. While a suspicious mind could construe what was said as a comment on appellant's decision not to testify, the prosecutor's words are more plausibly interpreted as a comment on appellant's silence during the commission of the crime. After all, Taylor had labored to develop a defense based on his lack of foreknowledge concerning Lynch's felonious intent. Appellant's silence throughout the commission of the crime tends to undermine this defense, and the prosecutor's comments were most likely a clumsy effort to seize upon this weakness. 65 We will not paint the lily. Given the absence of a contemporaneous objection, we must cede to the government the benefit of a legitimate, plausible interpretation of the prosecutor's words. On this basis, we hold that the remarks in question did not amount to a constitutionally prohibited comment on appellant's declination to testify at trial. 66 We add that, even if the prosecutor's comments crossed the line, our traditional three-part analysis suggests that reversal would be unwarranted. First, although the comments were repeated several times, there is no reason to conclude that the prosecutor intentionally drew attention to appellant's silence at trial. Second, despite the lack of an objection, the district judge instructed the jury with painstaking care regarding the government's burden of proof, appellant's presumed innocence, and his constitutional right to refrain from testifying. Among other things, the judge admonished that no adverse inference is to be drawn from his exercise of his election not to take the stand. We are confident that this explicit instruction was sufficient to combat any impermissible inference that might have been drawn from the prosecutor's statements. 67 Last--but far from least, see Mejia-Lozano, 829 F.2d at 274 (explaining that the strength of the government's case is an important factor in considering the likely effect of borderline rhetoric)--the possibility that the comments, even if misconstrued, affected appellant's substantial rights is diminished by the potency of the government's proof. Lynch's testimony was unequivocal and corroborated on many points. Moreover, several witnesses to the UST robbery noted appellant's presence and described his behavior in a way that strongly suggested his complicity in the crime. In view of the substantial evidence against appellant, we find it highly unlikely that the jury could have been swayed by the prosecutor's amphibolous remarks. 11