Opinion ID: 2495239
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Officer Watkins and Officer Rosser

Text: The only claim against Watkins and Rosser that survives our analysis of the availability of the doctrine of collateral estoppel is Walker's claim of negligence relating to their failure to recognize her symptoms at the time of her arrest and their failure to obtain medical treatment for her. It is undisputed that Watkins and Rosser are State agents. Watkins and Rosser argue that their actions fall within the fourth (as modified by Hollis ) and fifth categories identified by Cranman : exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State, including, but not limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or attempting to arrest persons, or serving as peace officers under circumstances entitling such officers to immunity pursuant to § 6-5-338(a) and exercising judgment in the discharge of duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing persons of unsound mind, or educating students. See Cranman and Hollis, supra. Chief Owens testified that, in making DUI arrests, the Department's police officers like Watkins and Rosser based the decision to arrest on their observations and experience. A written directive of the Department stated: Any prisoner who is injured prior to or during an arrest will not be transported to the City detention facility until he/she has been transported to and offered treatment at an approved medical facility. The directive defined the term injury as a broken bone, a cut requiring stitches, or any other injury or condition a supervisor or detention facility officer determines must be treated. Chief Owens testified that the decision to transport an individual to the hospital instead of to jail lies with the arresting officer. He also testified that there was no directive or guideline, other than that stated above, detailing when an officer should transport an individual to the hospital instead of the jail. [5] Based on this evidence, it is apparent that, in determining whether Walker needed medical attention, Watkins and Rosser were not discharging duties pursuant to detailed rules, regulations, or checklists. See Yancey, supra. They were, instead, exercising judgment with respect to Walker's arrest and performing a discretionary function in the line and scope of their law-enforcement duties within the meaning of § 6-5-338. Watkins and Rosser, therefore, have shown that they are entitled to State-agent immunity under the fourth area identified in Cranman. The burden then, shifts to Walker to present evidence indicating that Watkins and Rosser acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond their authority. No evidence in the record shows that they did so. Accordingly, Walker has not met her burden, and Watkins and Rosser are immune from liability on Walker's negligence claim relating to their failure to recognize her symptoms at the time of her arrest and their failure to obtain medical treatment for her.