Opinion ID: 187459
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wolff's Appellate Standing

Text: Next, Wolff appeals the district court's decision to strike him as an appellant. The court concluded that Wolff lacked prudential standing under the Bankruptcy Code to appeal the bankruptcy court's Settlement Approval Order because Wolff was not a person aggrieved by the order. In McGuirl v. White, 86 F.3d 1232 (D.C.Cir.1996), this court recognized the rule that limits standing to appeal bankruptcy court orders to a `person aggrieved,' 86 F.3d at 1234, that is, to one `whose rights or interests are directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by the order or decree of the bankruptcy court,' id. (quoting In re El San Juan Hotel, 809 F.2d 151, 154 (1st Cir.1987) (quoting In re Fondiller, 707 F.2d 441, 442 (9th Cir.1983))). [6] Without such a limit, we explained, the bankruptcy courts might be overwhelm[ed] ... with claims by the many parties indirectly affected by bankruptcy court orders. Id. at 1235 (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 45 F.3d 737, 741 (3d Cir.1995); Fondiller, 707 F.2d at 443). On appeal, however, Wolff does not assert he is a person aggrieved, as he did in district court, 391 B.R. at 340-41, but argues instead that he has standing as a party in interest. We disagree. Wolff contends that the Bankruptcy Code expressly authorizes an appeal by one who is a party in interest in the bankruptcy proceeding, relying on 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b), which provides: (b) A party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity security holders' committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee, may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this chapter. On its face, however, this language applies only to a case under this chapter, that is, under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, and Chapter 11 governs only proceedings in the bankruptcy court, not appeals therefrom. See In re Am. Ready Mix, Inc., 14 F.3d 1497, 1502 (10th Cir.1994) (Section 1109(b) says nothing about a party's standing to appeal.); In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 248-49 (3d Cir.2000) (§ 1109(b) confers broad standing at the trial level but courts do not extend that provision to appellate standing). Consequently, Wolff's standing in district court is governed by the rule we recognized in McGuirl limiting bankruptcy appeals to persons aggrievedand Wolff does not challenge the district court's conclusion that he was not a person aggrieved because his rights or interests were not directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by the order. McGuirl, 86 F.3d at 1234 (internal quotation omitted). Accordingly, Wolff lacked prudential standing to appeal the Settlement Approval Order. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. So ordered.