Opinion ID: 2540544
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Suppress His Confession

Text: T.C. makes several arguments in support of his assertion that the circuit judge erred by denying his motion to suppress his confession: (1) that the Miranda warnings were not given until forty-five minutes into his first interview, and this failure tainted his later confession; (2) that the waiver of his Miranda rights was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent; (3) that the consent of Jones to T.C.'s interview was invalid because, as a suspect, her interest was adverse to T.C.'s; (4) that the confession was the result of police coercion; (5) that the confession was the result of violation of Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure 2.2 and 2.3; and (6) that the confession was not reliable. We focus initially on whether T.C.'s waiver of Miranda rights was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. That determination involves the consideration of two components, both of which must be satisfied. See Otis v. State, 364 Ark. 151, 217 S.W.3d 839 (2005). The first component involves the voluntariness of the waiver and concerns whether the waiver was the product of free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Id. The second component involves whether the defendant made the waiver knowingly and intelligently and concerns whether the waiver was made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Id. In making these decisions, this court reviews the totality of the circumstances surrounding the waiver, including the age, education, and intelligence of the accused; the lack of advice as to his constitutional rights; the length of the detention; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; the use of mental or physical punishment; and statements made by the interrogating officers and the vulnerability of the defendant. Jordan v. State, 356 Ark. 248, 147 S.W.3d 691 (2004). [4] This court will reverse a circuit judge's ruling on this issue only if it is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Id. Using the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, we conclude that T.C.'s waiver was not knowingly and intelligently made. While a defendant's youth is a factor to be considered in determining whether a juvenile knowingly and intelligently waived his or her Miranda rights, it is generally not enough, standing alone, to prove that he or she is incapable of knowingly and intelligently waiving Miranda rights. For example, in Otis v. State, 364 Ark. 151, 217 S.W.3d 839 (2005), this court held that a fourteen-year-old with a functional age of nine to twelve years old had knowingly and intelligently waived his rights where officers had carefully explained what the words on the waiver form meant, where Otis had asked no questions, and where he had indicated that he understood the form. The court also noted that Otis's mother was present when he signed the form. Similarly, in Sandford v. State, 331 Ark. 334, 962 S.W.2d 335 (1998), this court held that a sixteen-year-old with an Intelligence Quotient of 67 had knowingly waived his Miranda rights under the totality of the circumstances. Testimony regarding those circumstances showed that he understood the statements on the waiver form, that he had not asked any questions about the form, and that his father had been present during the execution of the waiver forms. Likewise, in Oliver v. State, 322 Ark. 8, 907 S.W.2d 706 (1995), we held that a fifteen-year-old with the mental age equivalent of a twelve-year-old had knowingly and intelligently waived his rights where testimony from the suppression hearing showed that the arresting officers had explained the waiver-of-rights form to Oliver and that he appeared to understand it. A common thread running through these cases is that the defendants had their rights carefully explained to them and either asked no questions or otherwise did not express confusion about the meaning of the waiver-of-rights form. In contrast, T.C. was given no explanation of the waiver-of-rights form the first time he signed it and instead was merely asked to read it for himself. The second time he was asked to sign the form, he said that he did not understand what waiver meant. Instead of explaining what waiver meant, the police gave T.C. the definition of voluntariness, saying: what you are saying, you are doing of your own free will . . . [w]e haven't made any promises. We haven't threatened you in any way. You are doing this because you want to do this. And again, it is by your own free will that you do this, that you make this statement. This definition of what waiver means was patently wrong. As a result, we conclude, based on T.C.'s question and the police officer's explanation, that T.C. did not understand the meaning of waiver. Waiver, of course, is routinely defined as the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. See Pratt v. State, 359 Ark. 16, 194 S.W.3d 183 (2004) (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977)). In laymen's terms, it is giving up something, in this case the right to be silent and the right to counsel. The police officer's explanation imparted to T.C. did not make clear that he was giving up his rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel. It necessarily follows then that T.C.'s waiver was not made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. E.g., Otis v. State, 364 Ark. at 161, 217 S.W.3d at 845. And that is the crucial test. We hold that the circuit judge's finding that T.C. knowingly and intelligently waived his rights was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. For this reason, we suppress T.C.'s confession. Because we suppress the confession due to T.C.'s lack of a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights under Miranda, it is unnecessary to address the other grounds presented for suppression.