Opinion ID: 587250
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The legislative history clarifies the word return.

Text: 172 The Refugee Act of 1980 did extend the scope of INA § 243(h), but not as broadly as the majority supposes. Briefly stated, the legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended, by means of the word return, to expand the provision to encompass excludable, as well deportable, aliens. Excludable aliens, like deportables, are physically present in the United States. Li v. Greene, 767 F.Supp. 1087, 1088 (1991). Thus, while Congress did broaden the provision's reach it did not expand it to aliens physically outside of United States territory. Section 243(h)(1) as amended does not cover aliens interdicted on the high seas such as the plaintiffs in this case who are neither deportable nor excludable. 173
174 A proper understanding of § 243(h)(1) requires some familiarity with the concepts deportation and exclusion as used in immigration law. The basic distinction is straightforward. An alien who has entered the United States is subject to deportation proceedings. An alien who is physically present in the United States, without making a legal entry, however, is subject to exclusion proceedings. Li v. Greene, 767 F.Supp. 1087, 1088 (1991); see also, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187-88, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 1073-74, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (exclusion proceedings appropriate for alien who has not made legal entry even though the alien is physically within the United States); Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 205 n. 1 (2d Cir.1982) (defining an excludable alien as one who has reached our border but has not been formally permitted to enter the country. Even though physically present in the country, he is 'treated as if stopped at the border.' ) (citation omitted); Ledesma-Valdes v. Sava, 604 F.Supp. 675, 680 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (Excludees, although physically present in the United States, are 'treated as if stopped at the border.' ). An alien who has not yet physically entered United States territory is, of course, subject neither to deportation nor exclusion proceedings. 175 To complicate matters a bit, deportation is sometimes referred to as expulsion and has occasionally been used loosely to encompass both expulsion and exclusion proceedings. Use of the term deportation to encompass exclusion, however, reflects none of the technical gloss accompanying its use as a word of art.... Barber, 357 U.S. at 187, 78 S.Ct. at 1073; see also Bertrand, 684 F.2d at 205 n. 1. For present purposes, we properly distinguish between deportation and exclusion as these different concepts are recognized in immigration law. 176 Entry, the status which renders an alien subject to deportation as opposed to exclusion, involves: 177 (1) a crossing into the territorial limits of the United States, i.e. physical presence; 2(a) an inspection and admission by an immigration officer or (b) actual and intentional evasion of inspection at the nearest inspection point; and (3) freedom from official restraint. 178 Correa v. Thornburgh, 901 F.2d 1166, 1171 (2d Cir.1990) (quoting Matter of Ching and Chen, Interim Decision 2984, at 3 (BIA 1984)). Thus, in practical terms, if the government wishes to remove an alien whom it has inspected and admitted at the border, or who has evaded inspection, and who is in United States territory free[ ] from official restraint, id., it may do so only through deportation proceedings. Where the government has detained the alien at a border crossing, an airport or on a ship, physically within United States territory or territorial waters but without an entry having been effected, it may remove him or her pursuant to an exclusion hearing. This is true even where the Attorney General has paroled a detainee into the country. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (Supp. II 1990). In the eyes of the law, such a person is deemed stopped at the border, Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215, 73 S.Ct. 625, 631, 97 L.Ed. 956 (1953), and is not within the United States, Barber, 357 U.S. at 189, 78 S.Ct. at 1074, even though physically present. The distinction is important because, as we have noted, [d]eportation proceedings are generally more favorable to the alien than exclusion proceedings. Correa, 901 F.2d at 1171 n. 5; see also Maldonado-Sandoval v. INS, 518 F.2d 278, 280 n. 3 (9th Cir.1975). 179
180 Prior to 1980, § 243(h) protected a refugee, in the Attorney General's discretion, only against deportation ... to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be subject to persecution.... 8 U.S.C.A. § 1253(h) (1970). In Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187-89, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 1074-75, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958), the Supreme Court accordingly held that § 243(h) covered only deportable, and not excludable, aliens. See also INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 415, 104 S.Ct. 2489, 2493, 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984). 181 The Refugee Act of 1980 opened up § 243(h) to excludables. The House Report explains quite clearly that section 203(e) [of the Refugee Act] amends section 243(h) of the Act, relating to withholding of deportation, to require (with some exceptions) the Attorney General to withhold deportation of aliens who qualify as refugees and who are in exclusion as well as deportation proceedings. H.R.Rep. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 30 (1979) (emphasis added). This piece of legislative history goes a long way towards answering the interpretive question before us. It demonstrates that Congress intended to broaden § 243(h)(1) to apply to excludables, but did not extend the provision to aliens outside United States territory. 182 In addition, the reference to excludables clarifies the meaning of return. To bring excludables within the terms of § 243(h) Congress had to change the statutory language in two ways. First, it had to delete the words within the United States which, the Supreme Court had held, covered only deportables. See Barber, 357 U.S. at 188, 78 S.Ct. at 1074. Secondly, it had to modify the word deportation since this term, too, limited the scope of § 243(h) to deportables, not excludables. Id. at 187-90, 78 S.Ct. at 1074-75. To signify the intended broader scope Congress therefore added the words: or return. Statutes and case law had previously used return in this manner. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(26) (1970) (discussing return [of excludable alien] to country from which he came); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(d)(6) (1970) ([t]he Attorney General shall prescribe conditions ... to control and regulate the admission and return of excludable aliens....); Barber, 357 U.S. at 187, 78 S.Ct. at 1073 (describing the return of excluded aliens from the country); United States v. Murff, 176 F.Supp. 253, 256 & n. 13 (S.D.N.Y.1959) (The return of aliens who seek and who are denied admission into the United States is governed by the exclusion provisions, whereas the deportation of aliens ... is governed by the expulsion provisions of the act.). Thus, just as deport refers to deportables, Congress intended return to refer to excludables. 183 The legislative history provides additional support for this reading. For example, Congress' decision in the 1980 amendments to continue to address the provision to the Attorney General, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (Supp.1992), indicates that § 243(h)(1) as amended was to be applied to deportables and excludables, aliens over which the Attorney General had operational jurisdiction, and not to other refugees or potential refugees outside United States territory who might be encountered by other United States government personnel, be they Coast Guard, military, or the like. 184 Moreover, the INA grants excludables and deportables the right to seek judicial review but does not provide review for aliens outside United States territory, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1105a, 1157 (1988 & Supp. II 1990), and those outside United States territory will not likely gain review under the APA, see HRC v. Baker II, 953 F.2d at 1505-1507. It is unlikely that Congress would have granted rights under § 243(h)(1) to aliens outside the United States without providing them a clear means to enforce these rights. This further supports a limitation of § 243(h)(1) relief to excludables and deportables to whom judicial review is available. 185 The legislative history also suggests that the territorial reach of § 243(h)(1) is co-extensive with § 208(a), a provision which establishes asylum procedures for alien[s] physically present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry, i.e. deportables and excludables. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (Supp.1992). Under the heading Asylum and Withholding of Deportation, the House Report states that 186 Since 1968, the United States has been a party to the United Nations Refugee Protocol which incorporates the substance of the 1951 Convention of Refugees which seeks to insure fair and humane treatment for refugees within the territory of the contracting states.... The Committee Amendment conforms United States statutory law to our obligations under Article 33 [of the Convention] in two of its provisions: ... section 208 ... [and] section 243(h). 187 H.R. 608 at 17 (emphasis added). Thus, sections 208 and 243(h), respectively, meet the United States' international obligation to provide asylum procedures for, and not to deport or return, refugees within the territory of the contracting states. Id. Case law, and a leading commentator, also read § 243(h)(1) as co-extensive with § 208(a). See HRC v. Baker, 789 F.Supp. at 1575 (citing INA § 208(a) for the proposition that plaintiff's claims under INA § 243(h) must fail because the statutory rights and protections asserted are reserved, by the very terms of the statute, to aliens within the United States); C. Gordon & S. Mailman, 1 Immigration Law and Procedure, § 1.03[a] at 1-33 (1991) ([r]efugee status is available [pursuant to INA § 207] to individuals screened and selected outside the United States, while asylum [pursuant to INA § 208] and withholding of deportation [pursuant to INA § 243(h) ] are remedies available to those who have already reached our shores or borders and wish to secure permission to stay.) 188