Opinion ID: 3193078
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Officer Carrig’s Testimony

Text: On cross-examination, Officer Carrig was questioned about defendant’s demeanor on the day of the altercation. Officer Carrig testified that defendant was “cooperative” and that she “wasn’t agitated.” When Officer Carrig stated that he “d[id not] recall” any other observations pertaining to defendant’s demeanor, defense counsel attempted to refresh his recollection by having him review a copy of the Domestic Violence & Sexual Assault/Child Molestation (DV/SA) form that was filled out by another officer in connection with the incident. When he was asked if the DV/SA prompted any further recollection as to defendant’s demeanor on the day of the altercation, the state objected. The trial justice then heard the attorneys at sidebar. As -7- grounds for the objection, the state argued that the DV/SA form included the phrase “scared of Butler[,]” which the state posited did not refer to the officer’s observation of defendant’s demeanor, but rather memorialized a statement defendant made to the reporting officer. The trial justice indicated that the statement was a conclusion either based on Officer Carrig’s observations or based on a statement made by defendant, and that, if it were the latter, then the statement was inadmissible hearsay under State v. Harnois, 638 A.2d 532 (R.I. 1994). Nevertheless, the trial justice gave defense counsel the opportunity to lay a foundation for the admissibility of Officer Carrig’s testimony that defendant was “scared of Butler.” Defense counsel then tried to broach the topic of how Officer Carrig came to the conclusion that defendant was scared, and the state lodged another objection. The jury was removed from the courtroom, and a voir dire of the witness commenced. During the voir dire, Officer Carrig confirmed that he did not fill out the DV/SA form; rather, his colleague, Officer Nick St. Lawrence (Officer St. Lawrence), completed the form, and he was not consulted. Officer Carrig also testified that he did not recall seeing Officer St. Lawrence fill out the form. Defense counsel asked Officer Carrig if reviewing the form helped him to recall that defendant “was scared of Mr. Butler,” to which Officer Carrig responded in the affirmative. Officer Carrig testified that he came to this conclusion based in part on defendant’s body language and the way she was acting, but also that he could not recall if his conclusion was based on “physical signs [of fear] or if she verbally stated it.” The state fleshed out its objection to Officer Carrig’s testifying that defendant was “scared of Butler” and argued that, absent an accompanying statement, one’s body language or demeanor alone does not indicate fear of a particular individual or object. The trial justice determined that Officer Carrig’s recollection had not been refreshed by the DV/SA form because -8- he could not remember whether the statement “scared of Butler” was derived from defendant’s demeanor and/or an accompanying verbal statement, and he ultimately disallowed the testimony. The jury returned, and defense counsel continued to ask Officer Carrig about defendant’s demeanor based solely on his observations and not on any statements made by defendant. Officer Carrig stated that defendant “was upset and seemed to be pretty nervous.” When defense counsel pressed and asked if defendant “was nervous because Mr. Butler was still in the house[,]” the state objected, and the trial justice sustained the objection on the basis of lack of personal knowledge. Officer Carrig’s testimony concluded shortly thereafter. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial justice was “misguided” in thinking that Officer Carrig’s testimony that she was “scared of Butler” was inadmissible hearsay and implicated our holding in Harnois. In that case, we held that a defendant who did not testify and was not subject to cross-examination could not then “manipulate[]” the rules of evidence by introducing exculpatory statements he made through the testimony of police officers via the “catchall” exception to the hearsay rule, Rule 803(24) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Harnois, 638 A.2d at 535-36. Here, defendant argues that Officer Carrig’s testimony that she was “scared of Butler” was not based on a statement she made, but rather was based solely on Officer Carrig’s observations of her demeanor following the altercation. However, despite being given ample opportunity to do so, defense counsel failed to lay a foundation to demonstrate that Officer Carrig knew defendant was scared of Butler specifically and that his conclusion was based solely on his observations. To begin, we note that Officer Carrig was permitted to testify as to what he observed following the altercation, which included any observations pertaining to defendant’s demeanor. See State v. Bruskie, 536 A.2d 522, 522, 523 (R.I. 1988) (state troopers permitted to testify as to -9- their observation that a defendant suspected of driving under the influence appeared to be “belligerent” and “dis-arranged”). Indeed, he testified without objection that defendant was “cooperative” and “wasn’t agitated[;]” and, likewise, he was permitted to testify that she appeared “upset” and “nervous.” Officer Carrig’s testimony became problematic, though, when he attempted to identify Butler as the source of defendant’s fear. We have said that “a witness may not give an opinion as to the inner thoughts or feelings of another person   .” State v. Covington, 69 A.3d 855, 866 (R.I. 2013); see State v. Ellis, 619 A.2d 418, 423 (R.I. 1993) (“[I]t can scarcely be contended that in the ordinary course of events a lay witness is able to determine such inner feelings as might arise if a person was threatened. This is a question that a lay witness (and probably most expert witnesses) would be totally unqualified to answer.”). That afternoon, defendant could have exhibited an “upset” or “nervous” demeanor for any number of reasons, not the least of which being that the police were in her mother’s home as a result of a violent altercation she was involved in. Despite being given leeway to do so, defense counsel declined to ask any questions to elicit specific observations made by Officer Carrig that would support his conclusion that the source of defendant’s nervousness or fear was Butler. Additionally, Officer Carrig testified that he could not recall whether his conclusion that defendant was “scared of Butler” was based on physical signs of fear or based on a statement made by defendant. He also testified that he did not author the DV/SA form, nor was he consulted during the process. 6 As such, it is questionable that Officer Carrig knew that defendant was in fact scared of Butler in particular. See Rule 602 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence (“A witness may not testify to a matter 6 To be sure, the fact that Officer Carrig did not author the DV/SA form does not bar the defense from using it to refresh his recollection. See State v. Presler, 731 A.2d 699, 704 (R.I. 1999) (noting that “any writing or object may be used in an effort to refresh a witness's recollection   ” quoting State v. Souza, 708 A.2d 899, 903 (R.I. 1998)). -10- unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.”). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in barring the testimony.