Opinion ID: 4216904
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Anderson’s ineffective assistance claim

Text: Anderson’s claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel fails to establish that any deficiency in his counsel’s performance caused him prejudice. Even perfect performance by appellate counsel would not likely have 3 Case: 14-11202 Document: 00514219503 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/01/2017 No. 14-11202 rendered the error Anderson perceives “clear or obvious” in the eyes of the direct appeal panel. “We judge counsel’s appellate performance under the same two-prong test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), applicable to trial performance.” Williamson, 183 F.3d at 462. “To prevail, [Anderson] must establish, first, that his attorney’s representation was deficient and, second, that the deficient performance caused him prejudice.” Id.
“To prove deficient performance, [Anderson] must show that counsel’s failure to raise [an] argument ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’” Id. (quoting Jones v. Jones, 163 F.3d 285, 301 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688)). “Our review is deferential,” Williamson, 183 F.3d at 462, and Anderson “must overcome [a] ‘strong presumption that counsel’s conduct [fell] within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’” Jones, 163 F.3d at 301 (quoting Williams v. Cain, 125 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 1997)). Counsel does, however, have “an obligation to research relevant facts and law, or make an informed decision that certain avenues will not prove fruitful.” Williamson, 183 F.3d at 462. “Solid, meritorious arguments based on directly controlling precedent should be discovered and brought to the court’s attention.” Id. at 463. During the direct appeal, Anderson’s appellate counsel did argue the district court erred through its severe restriction of the time permitted for closing argument. Counsel framed his argument under the abuse of discretion standard of review. The direct appeal panel, however, reviewed only for plain error due to trial counsel’s failure to object or request additional time at the end of his closing argument, see Holt, 493 F. App’x at 522. 4 Case: 14-11202 Document: 00514219503 Page: 5 Date Filed: 11/01/2017 No. 14-11202 Anderson submits that appellate counsel performed deficiently by failing to frame his argument in terms of plain error review. The district court concluded that appellate counsel’s decision to argue under the abuse of discretion framework “cannot be said to stem from professional judgment.” As discussed below, we conclude that Anderson’s claim fails on the second prong of the Strickland analysis. Therefore, with respect to Strickland’s first prong, we assume without deciding that Anderson’s counsel on direct appeal rendered a deficient performance.
“To prove prejudice from [counsel’s] deficient performance, [Anderson] must demonstrate that ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Williamson, 183 F.3d at 463 (quoting Jones, 163 F.3d at 302 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694)) (alteration in Williamson omitted). “A reasonable probability is that which renders the proceeding unfair or unreliable, i.e., undermines confidence in its outcome.” Williamson, 183 F.3d at 463; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”). To determine whether appellate counsel’s performance “undermine[d] the result on direct appeal, making the sentence unfair or unreliable,” we must “counter-factually determine the probable outcome on appeal had counsel” properly framed his argument. Williamson, 183 F.3d at 463. Trial counsel’s failure to object to the limited time permitted for oral argument constrained us, on direct appeal, to review the issue for plain error. See Holt, 493 F. App’x at 522. We must determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the direct appeal would have reached a different result if appellate counsel had 5 Case: 14-11202 Document: 00514219503 Page: 6 Date Filed: 11/01/2017 No. 14-11202 recognized that plain error review applied and offered proof regarding other closing arguments Anderson would have made if given additional time. “To demonstrate plain error, ‘an appellant must show (1) a forfeited error, (2) that is clear or obvious, and (3) that affects [the appellant’s] substantial rights.’” United States v. Moreno, 857 F.3d 723, 727 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Cordova-Soto, 804 F.3d 714, 722 (5th Cir. 2015)). “Even if those prongs of the test are satisfied, reversal is warranted ‘only if the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings’ and this court chooses to exercise its discretion to correct the error.” Moreno, 857 F.3d at 727 (quoting Cordova-Soto, 804 F.3d at 722). We conclude that the direct appeal panel would not have deemed the trial court’s error “clear or obvious” even under the counter-factual scenario. The direct appeal panel stated that the district court’s limitation on closing argument “arguably” amounted to an abuse of discretion. See Holt, 493 F. App’x at 521. An error is not “clear or obvious” if it is “subject to reasonable dispute.” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). To succeed in this appeal, Anderson would need to establish that appellate counsel’s proper argument would have moved the question of whether the trial court erred from “arguable” to “clear or obvious,” i.e., beyond reasonable dispute. Appellate counsel’s argument could not have changed the fact that trial counsel received the extra minute he requested, and failed to make any further objection. Anderson has offered no authorities establishing that the district court’s limitations were, beyond any reasonable dispute, an abuse of discretion even where trial counsel received precisely what counsel requested. 3 3 We decline Anderson’s invitation to “expand” the certificate of appealability to include trial counsel’s performance. Cf. United States v. Reed, 719 F.3d 369, 372 n.1 (5th Cir. 2013) (confining review to the claims upon which a certificate of appealability was granted). 6 Case: 14-11202 Document: 00514219503 Page: 7 Date Filed: 11/01/2017 No. 14-11202