Opinion ID: 2046959
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Development of Depraved Indifference Murder in the Aftermath of People v Register

Text: After deciding Register, this Court considered several depraved indifference murder cases. None has gone so far as to justify a conviction for depraved indifference murder in a shooting of the type before us. In People v Gomez (65 NY2d 9 [1985]), the defendant deliberately drove his automobile at 40 miles per hour down a busy sidewalk, striking several people and killing two. We affirmed the conviction for depraved indifference murder, concluding that [t]he risks posed by defendant's conduct in this case and his callous indifference to them entitled the jury to conclude that his conduct placed the crime on the same level as intentional murder ( id. at 12). In People v Roe (74 NY2d 20 [1989]), the Court affirmed a conviction for depraved indifference murder where the defendant, a 15-year-old high school student, deliberately loaded a mix of live and dummy shells into the magazine of a 12-gauge shotgun and fired the weapon at the victim, who was standing only 10 feet away. Over a vigorous dissent, the Court concluded that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the conviction ( id. at 28). [9] We have also affirmed depraved indifference murder convictions in cases where the defendant fired several shots at a number of people ( see People v Fenner, 61 NY2d 971 [1984]), where the defendant brutally beat a child ( see People v Bryce, 88 NY2d 124 [1996]; People v Cole, 85 NY2d 990 [1995]; People v Best, 85 NY2d 826 [1995]), and where the defendant killed six patients by injecting them with a neuromuscular blocking agent ( see People v Angelo, 88 NY2d 217 [1996]). Finally, in People v Russell (91 NY2d 280 [1998]), we affirmed a conviction for depraved indifference murder where the defendant, along with other participants, engaged in a gun battle that resulted in the death of an innocent bystander who was struck by a stray bullet. [10] Even though we have allowed more and more cases to fall within the definition of depraved indifference murder, our language in Russell remains cogent and relevant. To constitute depraved indifference, conduct must be so wanton, so deficient in a moral sense of concern, so devoid of regard of the life or lives of others, and so blameworthy as to warrant the same criminal liability as that which the law imposes upon a person who intentionally causes the death of another ( id. at 287-288 [internal quotation marks omitted] [emphasis added]). This formulation, which is consistent with the criteria codified in 1829 and articulated in Darry, focuses on the defendant's depravitya mental state so appalling that we ascribe to it a moral deficiency tantamount to barbarity. Thus, in centering the analysis on the defendant's moral deficiency, Russell correctly deals with the mens rea, and not the objective circumstances. Russell articulates a mens rea requirement far more culpable than mere recklessness, which simply requires a conscious disregard of a substantial risk. The Russell Court's formulation of depraved indifference murder requires a state of mind so wanton, so morally deficient and so blameworthy as to place that crime on a par with intentional murder. This obviously goes beyond mere recklessness, which, in the homicide classifications, is two grades lower. [11] Indeed, Russell cites People v Fenner (61 NY2d 971), which held that depraved indifference murder is characterized by conduct, beyond being reckless    [which is] so wanton, so deficient in a moral sense of concern, so devoid of regard of the life or lives of others, and so blameworthy as to warrant the same criminal liability as that which the law imposes upon a person who intentionally causes the death of another ( id. at 973 [emphasis added]). Reckless conduct (the Register standard) is obviously not the same as conduct that goes beyond recklessness (the Russell standard). In making that critical distinction, the Court in Russell and Fenner improved on Register by properly identifying the heightened mens rea requirement that characterizes depraved indifference murder. Until Register was decided, this heightened standard, which forcefully articulates the essence of depravity, had always been the unquestioned law of this state. Interestingly, the New York Criminal Jury Instructions recognize the heightened mens rea standard by providing that [c]onduct evincing a depraved indifference to human life creates a much more serious threat to human life than conduct which is merely reckless.    Under our law, a defendant acts with depraved indifference to human life when, in the judgment of the jury, his conduct, beyond being reckless, is so brutal, callous, dangerous and inhuman, so devoid of regard for human life, as to constitute conduct equivalent in law to intentionally causing death (2 CJI[NY] PL 125.25 [2], at 316-323 [emphasis added and in original] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Notwithstanding this stringent standard, we have seen a proliferation of depraved indifference murder prosecutions at the trial level and a seemingly growing tolerance for them at the Appellate Division level. [12]