Opinion ID: 1355684
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: use of deposition at trial

Text: In his second issue, appellant asserts that the district court acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner and abused its discretion by admitting into evidence the discovery deposition of Dr. Curnow, one of appellant's treating physicians. We agree that the admission of this deposition testimony was error, but we determine that appellant was not prejudiced thereby, and the error was thus harmless. We have consistently held that the admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and that evidentiary rulings will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Mintle v. Mintle, 764 P.2d 255, 257 (Wyo. 1988); Lawrence v. Farm Credit System Capital Corporation, 761 P.2d 640 (Wyo. 1988). We have defined an abuse of discretion as an error of law committed by the court under the circumstances. Id. at 653; Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831, 838 (Wyo. 1980). We look, therefore, to the circumstances under which this deposition testimony was admitted to determine if an error of law has occurred. In March of 1987, General Motors took Dr. Curnow's deposition for discovery purposes. All parties were represented by counsel during the deposition. Appellant unsuccessfully attempted to serve a subpoena on Dr. Curnow on May 29, 1987, two days before trial. On the final day of trial, both appellees moved for admission of the discovery deposition. [4] Counsel for Burman Motors indicated to the district court that Burman Motors had been relying to some extent upon appellant's subpoena and that, pursuant to contacts with the doctor's office, Burman Motors was under the impression that the doctor would be available for trial testimony. Apparently realizing that a problem existed, counsel for Burman Motors attempted to subpoena Dr. Curnow on the second day of the trial for an appearance on the following final trial day. The sheriff's office was unable to serve the doctor, and counsel for Burman Motors informed the district court during the motion conference that the doctor was in surgery on that final day of trial. The district court, over the objection of appellant, granted appellees' motion for admission of the deposition under the authority of W.R.C.P. 32 but limited the deposition testimony to those parts of the direct examination which the court felt were adequately tested by cross-examination at the taking of the deposition. Thereafter, excerpts from Dr. Curnow's deposition were read to the jury and into the record. W.R.C.P. 32 provides in relevant part: (a) Use of depositions.  At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present and testifying, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had reasonable notice thereof, in accordance with any of the following provisions:       (3) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds:    (D) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (E) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used [.] (Emphasis added). The rule is premised on the principle that oral testimony is preferable to a deposition. 8 C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2146 (1970). See also Napier v. Bossard, 102 F.2d 467 (2d Cir.1939) (per Learned Hand, deposition is treated as a substitute  second best, not to be used when original is available). A showing that due diligence was exercised in attempting to secure the presence of the witness is required from the party seeking to introduce the deposition testimony of the witness. Sutton v. Shufelberger, 31 Wash. App. 579, 643 P.2d 920, 924-25 (1982); Palfy v. Rice, 473 P.2d 606 (Alaska 1970). We are not convinced that appellees made a sufficient showing to warrant the admission of this deposition testimony. The failure of appellees to attempt to subpoena Dr. Curnow until the day prior to the need for his testimony and their misplaced reliance on the attempted subpoena by appellant and on informal contacts with the doctor's office do not demonstrate diligence. These circumstances, in our opinion, do not fall within the exceptions contemplated by W.R.C.P. 32(a)(3)(D) and (E) for use of depositions in lieu of oral testimony. The admission of Dr. Curnow's deposition testimony was an abuse of discretion under the circumstances of this case. Although we determine the admission of this testimony was error, we conclude that it does not warrant a reversal in this instance. W.R.C.P. 61 provides: No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence    is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. W.R.C.P. 61 applies to cases on appeal. Hall v. Hall, 708 P.2d 416, 422 (Wyo. 1985). The deposition testimony of Dr. Curnow admitted at trial went to questions regarding appellant's injuries, medical treatment, and prognosis; i.e., damages. The jury, by its verdict, found that neither appellee was negligent and that the negligence of Elizabeth Fiedler, a nonparty, was the entire proximate cause of the accident and any damages allegedly sustained by appellant. The jury, in responding to a question on the verdict form submitted to it, found as follows: 21. Considering all fault to be 100% fill in below the percentage by which the fault of each was a direct cause, of the accident and of the injuries and damages allegedly sustained as a result thereof: James Waggoner 0 % General Motors 0 % Burman Motors 0 % Western Rentals 0 % Elizabeth Fiedler 100 % Clearly, the jury found that the negligence of Elizabeth Fiedler was the entire proximate cause of the accident. Thus, given the verdict, any error in admitting testimony regarding damages was harmless.