Opinion ID: 2293869
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mutual Present Intent to be Husband and Wife

Text: In order to establish a common-law marriage between defendant and herself, plaintiff was first required to provide clear and convincing evidence of each party's mutual present intent to be husband and wife. See Smith, 966 A.2d at 114. See generally Odd Fellows' Beneficial Association of Rhode Island v. Carpenter, 17 R.I. 720, 722, 24 A. 578, 578 (1892) (In order to constitute a marriage per verba de presenti [ sic ], the parties must agree to become husband and wife presently. The consent which is the foundation and essence of the contract must be mutual and given at the same time   .). [6] At the trial in the Family Court, plaintiff testified that defendant had proposed to her in Jamestown in 2000 or 2001. She testified that she replied to that proposal: What's the point? The plaintiff also testified that she believed that their marriage began in either 2000 or 2001, but she was unable to cite a specific date. She further stated that she believed that their marriage began when they began attending each other's family functions and when they started planning their life together. By contrast, defendant testified that he did not recall proposing to plaintiff; he added that, if it had been his intention to become engaged, he would have purchased a ring and would have then made a proposal  steps which he characterized as being the proper procedures. In addition, he consistently described their relationship as being in the category of friends with benefits  and not that of a married couple. The trial justice found defendant's testimony as to his understanding of the nature of his relationship with plaintiff to be credible. Although a formal ceremony or engagement is not required for a common-law marriage to come into existence, the facts before us, coupled with the trial justice's credibility determinations, plainly do not constitute clear and convincing evidence of a mutual present intent to be husband and wife. See Smith, 966 A.2d at 116. Indeed, even plaintiff's testimony as to when she believed the common-law marriage to have come into existence is vague and inconsistent. The plaintiff, however, places emphasis on their joint tax returns and on the deed that refers to plaintiff and defendant as husband and wife as tenants by the entirety in order to demonstrate that she and defendant both had the mutual present intent to be married. In DeMelo, 844 A.2d at 178, we indicated that the following were some of the facts which were indicative of a lack of clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff had considered herself to be married: that she listed herself as single on her tax returns, on a mortgage application, and on insurance applications; that she did not designate defendant as a beneficiary on her 401(k); that their condominium was owned as tenants in common, not as tenants by the entirety, or even as joint tenants; and that the parties did not have any joint bank accounts. See id.; see also Smith, 966 A.2d at 115 (noting that the parties declared themselves single on legal documents and forms, including their tax returns); Lovegrove v. McCutcheon, 712 A.2d 874, 874 (R.I.1998) (mem.) (holding that the parties were not married at common law because the evidence revealed that the plaintiff consistently designated her marital status as single on employment applications, the home was purchased only in the defendant's name, and the parties did not pool their assets). In the instant case, plaintiff and defendant indeed filed tax returns as married filed jointly for four years, and they also owned property as tenants by the entirety. However, defendant testified that they filed the joint returns as a result of a friend's advice that they would save money if they filed in that manner. With respect to the property which they owned as tenants by the entirety, defendant stated that, at the time when he was dealing with the property ownership documents, there was a blizzard of papers and he did not realize the significance of the term tenancy by the entirety; defendant in fact stated that he did not read all of the documents. The trial justice found defendant's explanations concerning the tax returns and the form of property ownership to be credible. In contrast to the just-discussed evidence concerning the form of property ownership and the filing of joint tax returns, the parties neither held joint bank accounts nor discussed with each other the purchase of large items ( e.g., the vehicles that plaintiff purchased). In addition, plaintiff listed herself as divorced on the FAFSA forms, and she listed her daughter and not defendant as the beneficiary of her retirement account. The trial justice also noted that defendant listed a daughter, not plaintiff, as the beneficiary of his 401(k). Despite the joint tax returns and the form of property ownership, the testimony of defendant coupled with the other financial documents demonstrate the conflicting evidence as to whether plaintiff and defendant had a mutual present intent to be married. It is therefore our judgment that the trial justice did not clearly err in finding that there was no clear and convincing evidence of the intent to enter into a husband-wife relationship.