Opinion ID: 725563
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 8 Baria invoked the district court's jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1329, 2 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal-question jurisdiction), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (the Declaratory Judgment Act); the district court ruled only that it had jurisdiction under the first of these heads. Baria invokes this court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a). 3 Although neither party in its brief has contested the jurisdiction of either this court or the district court, 4 we have an independent obligation to satisfy ourselves as to the jurisdiction of both courts. Benavidez v. Eu, 34 F.3d 825, 830 (9th Cir.1994). Questions of subject-matter jurisdiction are reviewed de novo. Galt G/S v. Hapag-Lloyd AG, 60 F.3d 1370, 1373 (9th Cir.1995). 9 The posture of this case is somewhat unusual, as courts of appeals most often review rescission proceedings on a petition for review from the Board, not on appeal from the district court. Rescission is usually challenged as part of a petition for review of concurrent or subsequent deportation proceedings and 8 U.S.C. § 1105a provides that the courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction to review final orders of deportation. In Waziri v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 392 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir.1968), this court held that where a petitioner has been ordered deported on the basis of an underlying order rescinding the petitioner's adjustment of status, [t]he interdependency of the two orders requires that the [§ 1105a] power of review extend to the order rescinding an adjustment of status. The court reaffirmed its Waziri holding in Bachelier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 625 F.2d 902, 904 (9th Cir.1980) and discussed it approvingly in Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 634 F.2d 408, 412 (9th Cir.1980), aff'd, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983). 5 See also Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 938, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2777, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) ([T]he term 'final orders' in [§ 1105a] 'includes all matters on which the validity of the final order is contingent, rather than only those determinations actually made at the hearing.' ) (quoting Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 634 F.2d at 412 (discussing Waziri )). 10 While Waziri allows this court to review underlying rescission proceedings upon a petition for review of a deportation order, this court has also held that it has no jurisdiction under § 1105a to consider a petition for review of a rescission order in the absence of a deportation order. Kuh v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 758 F.2d 370, 371 (9th Cir.1985). This is because § 1105a(a) grants the courts of appeals exclusive judicial review only of all final orders of deportation ... made ... pursuant to administrative proceedings under [8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) ]. The Supreme Court has construed this language narrowly, holding that the judicial review provisions of [§ 1105a] embrace only those determinations made during a proceeding conducted under [§ 1252(b) ]. Cheng Fan Kwok v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 392 U.S. 206, 216, 88 S.Ct. 1970, 1976, 20 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1968). The Kuh court pointed out that rescission orders, of course, are not final orders of deportation, and they are made pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1256, not § 1252(b). 758 F.2d at 371. Thus, Baria could not have petitioned directly to this court for review of the order rescinding his permanent-resident status. See also Bachelier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 548 F.2d 1157, 1158 (5th Cir.1977) (Even if rescission proceedings are 'in the nature' of deportation proceedings they are not 'final orders of deportation' as specified by [§ 1105a] for direct review.); Chadha, 634 F.2d at 412 (citing Bachelier and noting in dicta that a rescission decision is not immediately appealable under § 1105a). 11 Some language in Waziri might be read, however, to suggest that a district court does not have jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to a rescission order and that an alien whose status is rescinded cannot challenge that rescission until a deportation order is entered, allowing review in the court of appeals pursuant to § 1105a:Certainly [§ 1105a's] objective of expediti[ng the deportation of undesirable aliens by preventing successive dilatory appeals to various federal courts] would be thwarted if this court approved perfunctorily the deportation order while the district court reviewed the crucial underlying rescission order, and afterward this court reviewed on appeal the determination of the district court. 12 392 F.2d at 57. The holding of Waziri, however, is not that a district court has no jurisdiction to review a rescission order but that a court of appeals does have jurisdiction to review a rescission order underlying a final deportation order that is before the court pursuant to its exclusive § 1105a jurisdiction. Moreover, reading Waziri as divesting the district court of jurisdiction to review rescission orders when no deportation order has been issued would present several problems. 13 First, such a reading is contrary to the grant of jurisdiction to the district courts in § 1329 over all causes ... arising under the immigration provisions of Title 8 and to the limited grant of jurisdiction to the courts of appeals in § 1105a to review final orders of deportation: In situations to which the provisions of [§ 1105a(a) ] are inapplicable, the alien's remedies would, of course, ordinarily lie first in an action brought in an appropriate district court. Cheng Fan Kwok, 392 U.S. at 210, 88 S.Ct. at 1973. See also Jaa v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 779 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir.1986) (district court has jurisdiction to review determinations ancillary to an application for permanent residency); Sadegh-Nobari v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 676 F.2d 1348, 1350 (10th Cir.1982) (denial of application for change of nonimmigrant classification under 8 U.S.C. § 1258, and denial of motion to reopen those proceedings, were not final orders of deportation or proceedings under § 1252(b), so jurisdiction to review the denials was in the district court, not the court of appeals). 14 Second, such a reading of Waziri would leave an alien without a remedy in the admittedly unusual case in which the Board ordered the rescission of the alien's permanent-resident status but the I.N.S. did not pursue deportation against the alien. 15 Finally, holding that a district court has no jurisdiction to hear a challenge to a rescission order would contradict several cases that have considered such challenges (albeit without mentioning the jurisdictional question). In at least three reported cases, this court, with no discussion of jurisdiction, reviewed district court decisions reviewing final Board action in rescission proceedings under § 1256. Kim v. Meese, 810 F.2d 1494, 1495-96 (9th Cir.1987); Dabaghian v. Civiletti, 607 F.2d 868, 869 (9th Cir.1979); Singh v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 456 F.2d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847, 93 S.Ct. 53, 34 L.Ed.2d 89 (1972). The Second and Third Circuits have also decided such appeals. Zaoutis v. Kiley, 558 F.2d 1096, 1099 (2d Cir.1977); Quintana v. Holland, 255 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.1958) (decided under former rescission procedures and before courts of appeals were granted jurisdiction to review final orders of deportation). 16 We conclude that the district court had jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1329 to review the Board's decision and that this court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the district court's decision. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 17 A district court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Jesinger v. Nevada Federal Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir.1994). 18 Not surprisingly, given the unusual posture of this case, little case law discusses the appropriate standards courts should apply in evaluating plaintiff's claims. Given that the courts of appeals regularly review rescission orders in considering petitions for review of final deportation orders under § 1105a, a district court, and a court of appeals on review, should apply the same standard when a rescission order is challenged directly. In considering a petition for review of a final order of deportation, the court of appeals determines whether there is reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence in the record as a whole to support the [administrative] determination that the INS carried its burden. Paointhara v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 708 F.2d 472, 474 (9th Cir.1983), as amended on denial of reh'g, 721 F.2d 651; see also Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 276, 281-82, 87 S.Ct. 483, 485-86, 17 L.Ed.2d 362 (1966); Yaldo v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 424 F.2d 501, 503 (6th Cir.1970) (applying standard in review of rescission order underlying deportation order). 19 In order to rescind Baria's adjustment of status, the I.N.S. had to prove by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence, Waziri, 392 F.2d at 57; see also Woodby, 385 U.S. at 277, 284-86, 87 S.Ct. at 483, 487-88; Kim, 810 F.2d at 1496, that Baria did not intend to establish a life together with Patoc at the time the couple married. Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 511 F.2d 1200, 1201-02 (9th Cir.1975). Therefore, the district court and our court should review the record to determine whether substantial evidence supports the Board's conclusion that the I.N.S. met its burden that required it to adduce clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence. Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it means such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.1995).