Opinion ID: 662244
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Judicial Conduct

Text: 26 McCord argues that he was deprived of a fair trial because the judge made anti-defendant remarks and had an anti-defendant attitude. 27 Allegations of judicial misconduct are reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Laurins, 857 F.2d 529, 537 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906 (1989). When the defendant fails to object to judicial comments or conduct, allegations are reviewed for plain error. United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 551 (9th Cir.1989). The standard for reversal is whether the trial was unfair. Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282, 1289 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1190 (1985). 28 A federal judge has broad discretion in supervising trials. Laurins, 857 F.2d at 537. An appellate court should reverse only if the record  'disclose[s] actual bias on the part of the trial judge, [or] leave[s] the reviewing court with an abiding impression that the judge's remarks and questioning of witnesses projected to the jury an appearance of advocacy or partiality.'  Shad, 799 F.2d at 531 (quoting Warner v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 739 F.2d 1347, 1351 (8th Cir.1984)). This case creates no such impression. 29 McCord cites three instances of judicial conduct to support his claim that his trial was unfair. Neither as individual events nor cumulatively do these events show an abuse of discretion. First, the trial judge warned McCord's counsel that he did not want to hear too many nonserious motions for mistrial. McCord claims that this warning deprived him of a neutral arbiter and showed open hostility toward McCord. McCord did not object to this warning, and therefore we review for plain error. The remark was made out of the presence of the jury, thus the jury was unaffected by it. Moreover, the court's warning does not display bias or partiality, only a desire to have a trial free of frivolous motions. There was no plain error here. 30 Second, McCord claims that the trial judge displayed an anti-defendant attitude when he referred to defense counsel's questioning technique as a charade. Defense counsel objected to this statement as inappropriate shortly after it was made. 3 Although the court did refer to the manner in which defense counsel was questioning his witness as a charade, the court gave a lengthy curative instruction to the jury. The court also explained to McCord that he was calling the manner in which defense counsel was attempting to refresh McCord's recollection the charade, not the testimony itself. Viewing the record in its entirety, we cannot say that this exchange was anti-defendant or even prejudicial to defendant. We will not reverse the trial court on the basis of this remark. 31 Finally, McCord claims that when the trial court stated in the presence of the jury that a witness knew all about tricky lawyers, it failed to maintain a calm, dispassionate and impartial demeanor, because it had an unjustified, antagonistic tone. McCord did not object to the remark. McCord claims that the trial court was belittling his counsel and therefore he was deprived of a fair trial. The comment does not demonstrate a loss of impartiality by the trial judge constituting plain error, but was instead intended as a joke. The judge twice stated that the comment was made for fun. It did not reflect hostility toward the defense. 32 McCord further suggests that these three situations discussed were just a few of many examples of the court's partial demeanor, creating a cumulative effect of advocacy for the government's case. McCord did not make an objection concerning the general conduct of the trial judge during the course of the trial. None of the incidents, standing alone, is enough to constitute an abuse of discretion. Moreover, we do not find evidence of an overall anti-defendant tone in the record. Instead, the trial court appears to have been quite careful in its management of the trial, and McCord was given considerable leeway in the presentation of his case. The trial judge did not plainly err in his conduct of the trial. 33 AFFIRMED.