Opinion ID: 778967
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ayala v. united states

Text: 35 Selective Employment relies on Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196, 1199-1200 (9th Cir.1977), where we held that federal courts were without power to exercise pendent party jurisdiction under the Federal Tort Claims Act. At that time, neither of the key Supreme Court cases, Moor and Aldinger, had resolved the question, nor did we have the benefit of the explicit language of Finley, which came ten years later. Selective Employment, however, points to language that implied that, in addition to not being authorized under any statute, pendent party jurisdiction posed constitutional difficulties. Id. at 1199, 1200 n. 8. These statements, however, are best read as flagging the necessity for caution due to potential constitutional problems that might arise with an unduly broad exercise of pendent jurisdiction. 36 Significantly, Ayala also came before intervening decisions that clarified that Ayala 's restrictive interpretation does not survive the 1990 passage of § 1367. We explained in Galt G/S v. Hapag-Lloyd AG, 60 F.3d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir.1995), that Finley imposed two requirements for supplemental jurisdiction: (1) the claims must be part of the same constitutional `case'; and (2) the jurisdiction must be expressly authorized by statute. We further observed that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 supercedes this second Finley requirement.... Id. at 1374 n. 3; see also Yanez v. United States, 989 F.2d 323, 327 n. 3 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that court lacked jurisdiction in pre-1990 suit, but noting that Congress has now explicitly authorized pendent party jurisdiction (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367)). 37