Opinion ID: 171021
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Bomb Book

Text: Mr. Caraway's friend Mark Hight testified at trial that he used to manufacture methamphetamine in the Caraways' garagea large, multiroom outbuilding also referred to as the shop or the shed. Hight recalled that approximately six months to a year before the search of the property, he found a paperback book, an ATF book (although no connection was shown to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms). It was in the middle of the shop, near some dressers and some stuff somebody was storing there. R. Vol. 6 at 520. The book, Hight said, contained instructions and illustrations for making explosive devices, including how to make bombs in barrels for single-shot 20-and 12-gauge shotguns. Id. at 522. Hight said that he took the book home with him and then loaned it to a friend, who did not return it. He never saw Mr. Caraway with the book, or any other book. On cross-examination, he said that the stuff near where the book was found belonged to a Calvin Mounkes. Mr. Caraway argues that the district court erred in admitting Hight's testimony about the bomb book because (1) it was irrelevant, and (2) its minimal probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. He raised this objection in a motion in limine and renewed it at trial. We review challenges to admissibility of evidence solely for abuse of discretion. United States v. Chisum, 502 F.3d 1237, 1241 (10th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. Fed. R.Evid. 402. A matter of consequence in this case was whether Mr. Caraway had the knowledge to construct the explosive device. Evidence that there was at one time a book in Mr. Caraway's workshop that explained how to make an explosive device similar to the one sent to Owens makes his possession of that knowledge more probable. Mr. Caraway argues, however, (1) that the evidence was too remote in time from the alleged construction of the device to be relevant, in that the book had been removed from his place before the motive for revenge even arose, Aplt. Br. at 26, and (2) that the book was not adequately connected to Mr. Caraway (after all, it was found near someone else's belongings). We are not persuaded. First, we do not agree with this characterization of the timing. Denise testified that she left her husband in June 2003, which is approximately seven months before the device was mailed. Hight, although uncertain of the exact time frame, estimated that he saw the book 6 to 12 months before the mailing. Second, even if the book was removed from the shop before Denise left, and even though it may not have been among Mr. Caraway's belongings, his access to the book (it was on his property) sometime that year still supports an inference that he read the book before its removal and used the information he took from it when constructing the device. The striking similarity between the bomb and the portion of the book described by Hight could persuade a rational fact finder that the book's presence on the Caraway's property was no mere coincidence. The district court could properly determine that the evidence was relevant under Rule 401. To be sure, relevant evidence is not necessarily admissible. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, which Mr. Caraway argues is the case here. Mr. Caraway characterizes the bomb-book testimony as strong evidence, Aplt. Br. at 25, and aligns it with the evidence of his threats to Owens and his wife, his mechanical skills, his prior construction of bombs, and the items found on his property that matched bomb components. But probative evidence, even very probative evidence, is not to be confused with prejudicial evidence. Evidence is not unfairly prejudicial simply because it is damaging to an opponent's case. United States v. Curtis, 344 F.3d 1057, 1067 (10th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). To be unfairly prejudicial, the evidence must have an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one. Fed.R.Evid. 403 advisory committee's note. Mr. Caraway points to no such tendency. If the jury inferred that Mr. Caraway had read the book, that inference was properly inculpatory. If the jury did not believe that he had read it, the jury was highly unlikely to hold against him that such a book was found on his property. Because Mr. Caraway has shown no danger of unfair prejudice, such danger could not have substantially outweighed the evidence's probative value, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it.