Opinion ID: 163305
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Were Defendants' Actions Mandatory?

Text: 16 Count I of Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the EPA had a non-discretionary duty under CWA § 309(a)(3) to take enforcement action ... regarding the illegal discharges of pollutants from Molycorp's waste rock dumps, and thus should be ordered to issue a compliance order or file a civil action against Molycorp. Aplt.App. at 80. Count II alleged that the EPA had a nondiscretionary duty under a combination of §§ 301(a), 301(e), and 402(a)(1) to either issue a permit for the known illegal discharges or prohibit them, and asked the court to order the EPA to take one of these actions. We now address whether EPA's issuance of a permit to Molycorp was mandated under the theory of either claim.
17 Section 309(a)(3) reads: Whenever on the basis of any information available to him the Administrator finds that any person is in violation of [effluent limitations]..., he shall issue an order requiring such person to comply with such section or requirement, or he shall bring a civil action.... 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3). 18 Despite the he shall language, the weight of authority is that § 309(a)(3) does not impose a mandatory duty on the Administrator. See Sierra Club v. Whitman, 268 F.3d 898, 900, 902-03 (9th Cir.2001) (EPA does not have a mandatory duty to investigate and make findings, nor does it have a mandatory duty to take enforcement action once a finding is made.); Dubois v. Thomas, 820 F.2d 943, 947, 951 (8th Cir.1987) (same); Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485, 488-91 (5th Cir.1977); City of Olmstead Falls v. EPA, 233 F.Supp.2d 890, 901-04 (N.D.Ohio 2002); 2 Envtl. Law Inst., Law of Environmental Protection § 9:4 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 2002). But see South Carolina Wildlife Fed'n v. Alexander, 457 F.Supp. 118, 134 (D.S.C. 1978) (309(a)(3) imposes a nondiscretionary duty on the Administrator to issue compliance orders once he `finds' a violation of the [CWA]); Illinois v. Hoffman, 425 F.Supp. 71, 77 (S.D.Ill.1977) (Administrator's duty to act is triggered [w]henever a violation is directed to the attention of the Administrator.); cf. Save the Valley, Inc. v. U.S.E.P.A, 99 F.Supp.2d 981 (S.D.Ind.2000) (holding that under CWA § 309(a)(2) the Administrator has a duty to make a finding when she becomes aware of violations, but specifically distinguishing that section from § 309(a)(3)). 19 The view that § 309(a)(3) does not restrict the Administrator's discretion is in keeping with the Supreme Court's pronouncement of the general unsuitability for judicial review of agency decisions to refuse enforcement. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985). The Heckler Court's explanation included the following passage pertinent to the present case: 20 [A]n agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise. Thus, the agency must not only assess whether a violation has occurred, but whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits the agency's overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has enough resources to undertake the action at all. An agency generally cannot act against each technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing. The agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities. 21 Id. at 831-32, 105 S.Ct. 1649. (We should add that these reasons for taking no action at all may also justify taking partial enforcement action rather than engaging in full enforcement.) The Court concluded that an agency's decision not to take enforcement action should be presumed immune from judicial review under [the Administrative Procedure Act]. Id. at 832, 105 S.Ct. 1649. 22 Plaintiffs acknowledge this authority to some extent. They explicitly concede that under section 309(a)(3), there is no duty to make a finding.... Aplt. Reply Br. at 19. They assert, however, that (1) the Administrator made the requisite finding here; and (2) once such a finding is made, § 309(a)(3) mandates enforcement action. We need not address Plaintiffs' second assertion. Even were we to create a circuit split by agreeing that a finding mandates enforcement action, we would still reject Plaintiffs' argument for two reasons. 23 First, the Administrator did not make the required finding that there had been a violation of the CWA. The person identified by Plaintiffs as having made the finding was an EPA geologist, Mr. Abshire. But EPA geologists have not been delegated the authority to make § 309(a)(3) findings. The EPA Delegations Manual delegates the Administrator's authority to make § 309(a) findings to the Regional Administrators and the Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance Assurance. 1 The delegations manual for Region VI in turn states that (1) this authority has been redelegated to the Director of the Compliance Assurance and Enforcement Division and the Director of the Water Quality Protection Division, and (2) the authority may not be redelegated further. Aple. Br. Addendum at vii. 2 24 Plaintiffs have neither alleged nor offered evidence that anyone with authority to make findings made the necessary finding here. Perhaps Plaintiffs could prove that someone with such authority knew that there was a statutory violation at the Molycorp mine. But knowing is not finding. The statutory word finds would be a most peculiar way of expressing knows. Indeed, Plaintiffs' proper acknowledgment that there is no duty to make a finding — i.e., that making a finding is discretionary — would make it impossible to equate making a finding with knowing, which is not a matter of discretion. 25 The second flaw in Plaintiffs' argument is that even if § 309(a)(3) mandates certain action, it certainly did not mandate what the EPA ended up doing in this case. Plaintiffs have failed to connect the relief obtained with the relief that allegedly would have been mandated. What the EPA did to moot Plaintiffs' suit was issue a permit to Molycorp. But issuance of a permit is not an act mandated by § 309(a)(3). What that section says the Administrator shall do if she finds a violation is issue a compliance order or bring a civil action. It says nothing about issuance of a permit. 26 In apparent recognition of this fact, Count I of Plaintiffs' complaint did not seek issuance of a permit, even as an alternative. The relief sought in that count was a court order that the EPA either issue a compliance order to Molycorp or bring a civil action against Molycorp. Even if that relief was mandatory, that relief was never obtained. (The fact that issuance of a permit could moot a claim that the Administrator failed to comply with § 309(a)(3) in itself strongly suggests that § 309(a)(3) is not a mandatory provision; but we need not resolve that matter on this appeal.) 27 For the above reasons, we hold that the EPA's action — issuance of a permit — was not mandated by § 309(a)(3). 28
29 Plaintiffs assert that a nondiscretionary duty to enforce can also be derived from a combination of §§ 301(a), 301(e), and 402(a)(1) of the CWA. Section 301(a) states the general rule that the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). Section 301(e) provides, Effluent limitations ... shall be applied to all point sources of discharge of pollutants.... 33 U.S.C. § 1311(e). And § 402(a)(1) reads, [T]he Administrator may, after opportunity for public hearing, issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant, or combination of pollutants, notwithstanding section [301(a)]. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1). 30 Plaintiffs' argument is that because all point sources shall be subject to effluent limitations, and all discharges shall be unlawful (in the absence of a § 402 permit), the EPA must  either permit [meaning `issue a permit for'] or prohibit an illegal discharge. Aplt. Br. at 37. Relying on Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1375 (D.C.Cir. 1977), Plaintiffs contend that despite the appearance of the word may in § 402(a)(1), the EPA does not have the discretion to exempt a known discharge from the mandates of the CWA. Aplt. Br. at 38. That proposition, however, does not take Plaintiffs as far as they need to go. Costle merely stated that the EPA must either issue a permit for the offending discharge or leave the discharger subject to the total prohibition expressed in § 301. Costle, 568 F.2d at 1375. The court did not address whether the EPA must take action against a violator. And nothing in §§ 301(a), 301(e), or 402(a)(1) compels such action. 31 We conclude that the statutory language, particularly when read in light of Heckler, indicates that the EPA is not required by §§ 301(a), 301(e), and 402(a)(1) of the CWA to take enforcement action against all illegal discharges. Accordingly, EPA's issuance of the permit to Molycorp was not mandated by the statutory provisions relied upon in Plaintiffs' Count II. 32