Opinion ID: 2326676
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: [¶ 29] The jeopardy order found that, among other things, jeopardy to Thomas arose from what the Department believes is substance abuse. At the termination hearing, the court received evidence of the extent of William's alcohol use in January 2002, as demonstrated by the existence of numerous empty beer cans in the home and his consumption of as many as five to six beers per day. A letter to William from the Department's caseworker in July 2002 stated, among other things, that he was expected to participate in a substance abuse evaluation, but the letter did not mention that he was expected to abstain from alcohol or participate in substance abuse counseling. William was subsequently evaluated for substance abuse by Carolyn Parker, and she concluded that William did not need further in-depth assessment because of his low score on the Michigan Alcohol Screening Test (MAST), noting his acknowledgement that he drank two beers, two days weekly, but that he should continue couples counseling with Angela. William and Angela subsequently engaged in couples counseling as recommended by Parker. The court concluded in its termination order that the Parker evaluation should be given no probative value, as it was entirely based on [William]'s self-reporting to Ms. Parker, which the court believes was not truthful. [¶ 30] The court's termination findings also cite the fact that Angela minimized the extent of physical and emotional abuse in the household and of [William]'s drinking after they resumed cohabitation. Angela testified in July 2003 that since their resumption of cohabitation, William had significantly cut down on his drinking and that the last time I saw him drink was  I think it was the Superbowl weekend. [¶ 31] The court ultimately found that there is no convincing evidence that [William] is even beginning to meet or address the preexisting issues by abstaining from drinking [or] engaging in substance abuse counseling and concluded that he is clearly both unable to prevent Tommy from being in jeopardy pursuant to 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055(1)(D)(2)(b)(i) and is unwilling to take responsibility for Tommy within a time which is reasonably calculated to meet his needs pursuant to sub-§ (2)(B)(ii). [¶ 32] The court was fully justified in considering evidence of William's alcohol use as of January 2002. Evidence of past jeopardy is relevant to the future, and in the case of a custodial parent it is highly probative, but the question before the court is necessarily whether there is prospective jeopardy. In re Tabitha R., 2003 ME 76, ¶ 7, 827 A.2d 830, 832 (emphasis added). The jeopardy order found that the children had been subject to emotional abuse by exposure to domestic discord and what the Department believes is substance abuse  (emphasis added). William's subsequent substance abuse evaluation and the evidence of his reduced consumption of alcohol during the seventeen-month period following the jeopardy order do not confirm the Department's belief. Accordingly, in the absence of (1) a rehabilitation and reunification plan memorializing William and the Department's agreement that William's abstention from alcohol and his completion of substance abuse counseling were needed to eliminate the conditions of jeopardy, or (2) a court order establishing such a plan, the record regarding William's use of alcohol does not establish William's parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence.
[¶ 33] The jeopardy order also contained the finding that the children have been ... subject to emotional abuse by exposure to domestic discord. [6] In her July 2002 letter to William, the Department's caseworker stated that she expected William to attend and complete Violence No More. At the termination hearing, the court received evidence that at the time the children went into the Department's custody, the parents frequently argued and that the father had, on one occasion, pulled the phone cord out of the wall during an argument. The court also found that during the months following the jeopardy determination, the mother had, for a time, discontinued her relationship with [William], and admitted to [the DHS Caseworker] ... that her relationship with [William] had been `at least emotionally abusive.' In its termination decision, the court concluded that William was unable to prevent Thomas from being in jeopardy and take responsibility for him within a period that is reasonably calculated to meet his needs, in part, because he had not commenced or completed a certified batterers intervention program such as Violence No More. [¶ 34] Because there was no rehabilitation and reunification plan requiring William to complete a certified batterers intervention program, his failure to complete such a program is not, taken alone, clear and convincing evidence supporting the court's conclusion regarding prospective jeopardy. The evidence regarding the parties' arguments and Angela's realization, expressed to her counselor, that William was controlling and that the relationship had been emotionally abusive relates almost entirely to the status of the parties' relationship as of January 2002. Subsequent to the jeopardy finding and following their resumption of cohabitation, Angela and William engaged in individual and joint counseling, completed parent education programs, and improved the condition of their shared residence. [¶ 35] The jeopardy order did not find that William committed domestic violence or domestic abuse; rather, it found that the children were subjected to emotional abuse by exposure to domestic discord. Certified batterers intervention programs are, however, reserved for perpetrators of domestic abuse. [7] 1A C.M.R. 03 201 015-5 § 4.1(B)(3) (2003). In the absence of a plan establishing as a benchmark that William must complete a certified batterers intervention program, the record does not otherwise support a conclusion by clear and convincing evidence that William was an appropriate candidate for a batterers intervention program and that his failure to complete such a program results in prospective jeopardy to the child.
[¶ 36] The termination order acknowledges that the termination of Angela's parental rights poses a more difficult question. The court found that although Angela is willing to take responsibility for Tommy within a time which is reasonably calculated to meet his needs, she is unable to do so. The court concluded that Angela's resumption of cohabitation with William showed an inability to protect Thomas from jeopardy. The court also based its determination of Angela's parental unfitness on its finding that her skill deficiencies rendered her unable to functionally cope with Tommy's developmental disabilities while he was in her care. Even if Angela's resumption of cohabitation with William did not in and of itself justify findings that termination is warranted at this time, Angela's inability to adequately respond to Tommy's needs supports termination. Our conclusion that the court erred in finding ongoing jeopardy with respect to William undermines one of the two reasons set forth by the court in concluding that Angela is unable to assume responsibility for Thomas and protect him from jeopardy. The court found, however, that separate and apart from the issue of cohabitation, Angela's inability to cope with Tommy's special needs was itself sufficient to establish parental unfitness. [¶ 37] Competent evidence in the record fully supports the court's conclusion that Angela will not be able to functionally cope with Thomas's disabilities and be able to follow through on a consistent basis if he is in her care. For example, Angela did not utilize recommendations from Thomas's speech therapist regarding Thomas's speech difficulties, did not demonstrate that she retained parenting skills obtained from her occupational therapist, her ability to regulate Thomas decreased as time passed according to a psychology clinician, and, according to a visitation supervisor, Angela failed to show sufficient interest in working on speech and development strategies for Thomas. [¶ 38] Proof of only one definition of parental unfitness may justify termination if it is accompanied by a finding that termination is in the best interest of the child. In re Annie A., 2001 ME 105, ¶ 20, 774 A.2d 378, 384. Here, the court properly determined that its findings regarding Angela's inability to provide the high level of care required because of Thomas's special needs support at least one definition of parental unfitness. Nonetheless, because we conclude that the termination of William's parental rights must be vacated, the termination of Angela's parental rights must also be vacated because the denial of the petition as to William's rights has a direct bearing on the best interest analysis as it pertains to Angela's parental rights. The court's assessment of the threat posed by Angela's continued cohabitation with William was an important component of its conclusion that the termination of Angela's parental rights was in Thomas's best interest. [¶ 39] In addition, because the court concluded that the termination of William's parental rights was justified, it did not have reason to consider whether Angela's inability to provide for Thomas's special needs on her own would be ameliorated if she shared parenting responsibilities with William. Accordingly, on remand, the court must also reconsider whether Angela's inability to care for Thomas's special needs remains a basis for termination in view of William's possible availability to co-parent the child with her if, in the future, reunification was deemed warranted. [¶ 40] We find the remaining issues raised by William and Angela to be without merit and do not address them separately.