Opinion ID: 793418
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Seizure of Rick Cortez

Text: 21 Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff Rick Cortez, we have no difficulty in finding that he has presented facts or allegations showing the Defendants violated a constitutional right, namely the Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable seizure. Olsen, 312 F.3d at 1312. It appears that the officers: (1) grabbed Rick Cortez and pulled him from the doorway of his home; (2) handcuffed him; (3) advised him of his Miranda rights; (4) placed him in the back seat of the locked squad car; and (5) questioned him while he was in the back seat of the locked squad car. We also note that the encounter took place after midnight. 6 Based on the facts above, a jury could find that Rick Cortez was arrested without probable cause. 7 22 Under the second sequential question 8 , we also find the right was clearly established when the alleged violation occurred. The law was and is unambiguous: a government official must have probable cause to arrest an individual. Furthermore, it was established law that the probable cause standard of the Fourth Amendment requires officers to reasonably interview witnesses readily available at the scene, investigate basic evidence, or otherwise inquire if a crime has been committed at all before invoking the power of warrantless arrest and detention. Romero, 45 F.3d at 1476-77 (footnote omitted). In the present case, witnesses were readily available for interviews, physical evidence was available, and a medical diagnosis was forthcoming. Defendants, however, did not: (1)interview the mother, the nurse, or the doctor; (2) inspect the youngster's clothing for possible signs of sexual assault; or (3) wait for a preliminary report from the doctor. In other words, Defendants conducted no investigation. Instead, the Defendants relied on the flimsiest of information. 23 Defendants rely upon the statement of the two-year-old child which was relayed to them by a nurse, who heard it from the girl's mother. The fact that hearsay evidence would not be admissible at trial to prove guilt does not make it unusable as a source of probable cause for a warrantless arrest. See United States v. Swingler, 758 F.2d 477, 487 (10th Cir. 1985). Defendants have cited the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule contained in Rule 803(2) F.R.Evid. Arguably, the statement might also fall within the medical diagnosis exception of Rule 803(4) F.R.Evid., but the Court sees no need to engage in such analysis. The statement is not being presented for the truth of the matter asserted therein; the issue is whether the officers were justified in relying upon it. 24 In Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441 (10th Cir.1985), we declined to discount the testimony of a three-year-old and a five-year-old regarding child abuse based solely on their age. Id. at 1449. We specifically found, however, that the five-year-old's statement had corroborated all the facts given by [the three-year-old]. . . with respect to the assault [the five-year-old] witnessed. Id. at 1443. Here, no such corroboration was present. Additionally in Easton, we found that details in both children's statements regarding the plaintiff's residence and the site of the assault were independently corroborated by police investigation. Id. at 1450. Again, no such corroboration was present. Therefore, we find that the Plaintiff has demonstrated a claim that his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures has been violated. 25 This conclusion does not, however, end our analysis. Even law enforcement officials who reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present are entitled to immunity. Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1476 (10th Cir.1995) 9 . Therefore, when a warrantless arrest or a seizure is the subject of a § 1983 action, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest or detain the plaintiff. 26 This principle may appear to be in some tension with the equally established principle that it is a jury question in a civil rights suit whether an officer had probable cause to arrest. DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 622 (10th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 814, 112 S.Ct. 65, 116 L.Ed.2d 41 (1991). The tension is resolved in this case by the essential lack of dispute over the historical, predicate facts. The parties agree on the what happened questions. 10 In such a circumstance, for qualified immunity purposes there is no such thing as a genuine issue of fact as to whether an officer should have known that his conduct violated constitutional rights. See Pace v. City of Des Moines, 201 F.3d 1050, 1056 (8th Cir.2000). 11 We find the officers did not have arguable probable cause to arrest Rick Cortez because, as mentioned above, the information relied on to conduct the seizure was not reasonably trustworthy information sufficient on its own to justify the seizure.