Opinion ID: 2211982
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: equal protection challenge to subsection 9

Text: The next issue we must address is whether subsection 9 is constitutionally valid under the Equal Protection Clauses of US Const, Am XIV and Const 1963, art 1, § 2. This Court, in Manistee Bank & Trust Co v McGowan, 394 Mich 655, 668; 232 NW2d 636 (1975), discussed equal protection challenges to legislation. In pertinent part, the Court stated: If the interest is fundamental or the classification suspect, the court applies a strict scrutiny test requiring the state to show a compelling interest which justifies the classification. Rarely have courts sustained legislation subjected to this standard of review. Other legislation, principally social and economic, is subjected to review under the traditional equal protection test. The burden is on the person challenging the classification to show that it is without reasonable justification. It has been said that [a] statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it. A classification will stand unless it is shown to be essentially arbitrary. Few statutes have been found so wanting in rationality as to fail to satisfy the essentially arbitrary test. In Perlos, the Court of Appeals held that the defendants' fundamental right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated. Therefore, a strict scrutiny analysis was employed, and the Court found that the statute violated equal protection guarantees. The Court also held that the statute would not survive a rational-basis analysis: We find no reasonable or rational basis for denying conscious drivers who are in the hospital the same opportunity to refuse a blood test as is given to conscious drivers who are not in the hospital. [170 Mich App 89-90.] We do not agree. We find that no fundamental Fourth Amendment right was violated by the statute. Furthermore, we are persuaded that treating hospitalized individuals who are not under arrest differently from arrested drivers who are not in the hospital does not raise the level of examination to strict scrutiny. Thus, we conclude that hospitalized persons, not under arrest, do not constitute a suspect class. Subsection 9 can be classified as principally social and economic legislation. Therefore, our inquiry is whether the classification itself is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. United States Dep't of Agriculture v Moreno, 413 US 528, 533; 93 S Ct 2821; 37 L Ed 2d 782 (1973). We agree with the Court of Appeals in England: One possible rational basis is safety. If statutory procedure requires a driver involved in an accident to be arrested before the blood alcohol test were administered, the procedure would lead to delays in treatments for injured drivers while the arresting officers took the steps necessary for a legal arrest. Second, in an attempt to combat the tremendous cost in lives and property damage to our society, the Legislature has chosen to ease the prosecution of drunk drivers [who have been involved in an accident] by making the results of blood alcohol tests performed by hospitals available to prosecutors, without the use of otherwise cumbersome procedures. People v Stoney, 157 Mich App 721, 726; 403 NW2d 212 (1987). [176 Mich App 347-348.] The Court then cited O'Donnell v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 404 Mich 524, 542; 273 NW2d 829 (1979), where this Court stated: If it be said, the law is unnecessarily severe, and may sometimes do injustice, without fault in the sufferer under it, our reply is: these are considerations that may very properly be addressed to the legislature, but not to the judiciary  they go to the expediency of the law, and not to its constitutionality. The responsibility for drawing lines in a society as complex as ours  of identifying priorities, weighing the relevant considerations and choosing between competing alternatives  is the Legislature's, not the judiciary's. Perfection is not required: [T]he drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one. Perfection in making the necessary classifications is neither possible nor necessary. One reasonable basis underlying subsection 9 is safety. By easing the prosecution of drunken drivers, the Legislature has paved the way for safer travel in Michigan. We find that subsection 9 is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Accordingly, we hold that subsection 9 of the implied consent act is constitutional under US Const, Am XIV, § 1 and Const 1963, art 1, § 2.