Opinion ID: 12932
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Constitutionality of the Hobbs Act Under Lopez Part II

Text: 78 Under Part II of Lopez, the Supreme Court recognized that Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. at 1629. As indicated by the cases cited by the Supreme Court in identifying Part II powers, I read the term instrumentalities of interstate commerce to refer to trains, planes, cars, trucks, boats, and other vehicles by which people or commodities move in a channel of commerce; I read the term persons in commerce to mean passengers, travelers, operators, or crew members on the instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and I read the term things in interstate commerce to mean the goods or commodities being transported as cargo in interstate commerce. I note that the Supreme Court used the verb protect as well as the verb regulate in defining Part II. 79 Clearly under Part II of Lopez, the Hobbs Act is facially constitutional as an exercise of congressional power to regulate and protect the instrumentalities, people, and goods actually moving in interstate commerce from robberies. Yet there is no evidence or testimony in this case which could support a conclusion that any instrumentality of commerce, any persons ... in interstate commerce, or any things in interstate commerce were obstruct[ed], delay[ed], or affect[ed] by the subject robberies. 80 In the Hobbs Act, the term robbery is defined as [t]he unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person against his will by force, or violence. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1). How can a robbery delay, obstruct, or affect commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce? Obviously, if the personal property which is taken as part of the robbery is itself a commodity in interstate commerce, then there could be an obstruction of the movement in interstate commerce of that commodity, regardless of the quantity or value of that commodity which was taken. Likewise, if the person who is robbed is, himself, in interstate commerce (either as a passenger or a traveler, or as an operator or crew member of an instrumentality of interstate commerce operating in interstate commerce), then whatever is taken from that person (whether it be cash money, watches, jewelry, or credit cards, regardless of the quantity, number, or value, thereof) could constitute an effect on commerce because Congress intended that such passenger, traveler, operator, or crew member would be protected while in interstate commerce. These are the very circumstances and events which the legislative history shows that Congress clearly had in mind when it passed the Hobbs Act. These are also the circumstances which are compelled by the plain, common-sense reading of the words of the Hobbs Act. 81 Thus, under Part II of Lopez, what was taken in the robbery, and the person from whom such property was taken, determine whether the robbery delay[ed], obstruct[ed], or affect[ed] interstate commerce. In each of the robberies involved in this appeal, what was taken was cash from the cash register or safe of a retail fast food outlet. From where did this cash come? It came from customers as the proceeds from sales conducted on the premises of the fast food outlets after these customers paid cash money over the counter for the food products available. These customers were the final retail consumers of these food products. These sales transactions were exclusively local and intrastate in nature and were taxable by the State of Texas under its general sales tax. Both seller and buyer were in the same place and the transfer of possession took the form of hand-to-hand and person-to-person exchange, both as to the food product being sold and bought and as to the money being given therefor as consideration. I would conclude, then, that as a matter of law, the money taken from the cash register was not a commodity or product moving in interstate commerce. 82 Likewise, the persons from whom this cash was taken do not qualify as persons in interstate commerce. In this case, there is absolutely no evidence that any interstate passenger or traveler was even present on the occasion of any robbery, much less that any such passenger or traveler was actually robbed of any of his personal property. In one instance, there is testimony that the driver of a delivery truck was present during one of the robberies. Yet, as to this occasion, there is no testimony (i) that this driver was making any kind of interstate delivery, nor (ii) that any of the product which he was delivering was taken in the robbery, nor (iii) that any of his personal property was taken. Because the employees of the fast food outlet were obviously present during the robberies, the critical question becomes whether these employees can be considered operators or crew members of any instrumentality of interstate commerce. I think not. An instru-mentality of interstate commerce is something which effectuates the movements of goods, commodities, or information from a place in one state to a place in another state. In the case of goods and commodities, the essential features of an instrumentality are its abilities to move and to transport such commodities. The fast food outlets in this case have neither essential feature. Consequently, because neither the cash which was taken, nor the persons from whom the cash was taken, meet the test of being in interstate commerce, I conclude that the evidence in this case is wholly insufficient to support a finding under Lopez Part II that the robberies at issue delay[ed], obstruct[ed], or affect[ed] interstate commerce. 83