Opinion ID: 1718692
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: The Trial Court Improperly Restricted the Defense's Attempt to Elicit Testimony in Support of Mitigating Evidence.

Text: Next, appellate counsel complains that the trial court cut off defense cross-examination of the victim's daughter, Ann Brinson Joslin, when counsel sought to equate her loss of her mother to the potential pain that defendant's family might experience in losing him to execution, in the following colloquy: Q: Do you think it's conceivable that other people might be hurt by the loss of a loved one also? A: Of course, Mr. Scott, yes. Q: Even if that person is not a pillar of the community and has been a bad person and has done some things wrong? Do you think it's still conceivable that his family ... The prosecutor interrupted with an objection which the trial court promptly sustained, directing counsel to move on with an abrupt, Next question. The present scenario, in which counsel sought to invoke a mercy theme from the victim's daughter, is the reverse of that faced by the Court in State v. Manning, 03-1982 (La.10/19/04), 885 So.2d 1044. There, the trial court sustained the state's objections to defense counsel questioning Manning's mother and sister if they wanted the jury to spare Manning's life. Manning, 03-1982 at 61-62, 885 So.2d at 1098-00. Recalling Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991) (permissible victim-impact evidence does not include the admission of a victim's family members' characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence....), this Court held that the trial court erred in sustaining the state's objection which cut off an attempt at the witnesses' response, but that the error was harmless because the jury would have inferred that the family members would have expressed a preference for life if they had been permitted to answer. Manning, 03-1982 at 61-62, 885 So.2d at 1098-00. The Court reasoned that in this situation: Concerns for an even playing field must yield to the defendant's constitutional right to present any relevant mitigation evidence. While the Eighth Amendment allows the State to present only a limited amount of victim impact evidence, carefully circumscribed in scope, [u]nder the aegis of the Eighth Amendment [the Supreme Court has] given the broadest latitude to the defendant to introduce relevant mitigating circumstances reflecting on his individual personality, and the defendant's attorney may argue that evidence to the jury. Payne, 501 U.S. 826-27, 111 S.Ct. at 2609. Given the breadth of the defendant's Eighth Amendment right to present any and all relevant mitigating evidence, it would be a difficult rule of law to enforce that the defendant's family members may restate in exacting detail the extenuating circumstances in the defendant's background and yet not express their conclusion based on that evidence that the defendant should live despite the severity of his crime. Id. In the present case, the trial judge gave the defense the broadest of free reign to query each of defendant's family members, as well as his friends who testified as mitigation witnesses, as to how they would be affected if defendant received the death penalty. Here, unlike in Manning, the judge permitted defendant's friends and family members to express freely the negative impact it would have on them and their family if defendant were executed. However, the judge drew the line at counsel's attempt to place the victim's daughter into that same category. To the extent that the judge precluded counsel from asking the victim's daughter to speculate on how the defendant's family members would feel were the jury to return a verdict of death, the decision to sustain the state's objection was correct. The error was surely harmless under the standard articulated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). See also Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 1798, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988)(O'Connor, J.)(harmless-error analysis begins with the premise that the evidence admitted at trial is sufficient to support the verdict and asks whether the state can prove `beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.')( quoting Chapman ). In the end, an appellate court must satisfy itself that the jury's verdict in the particular case was surely unattributable to the error. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993); State v. Sanders, 93-0001, p. 25 (La.11/30/94), 648 So.2d 1272, 1291. At any rate, at the close of counsel's very brief cross-examination of Ann Joslin, he asked whether her mother (the victim) was a devout Catholic ... a generous and merciful individual, to which Joslin replied, I believe those would adequately describe her in that respect. So, through the back door, counsel delivered his mercy theme. No relief appears due under this portion of this argument.