Opinion ID: 4534282
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reopening Removal Proceedings

Text: In 1940, Congress created the Board as a decision-making body for immigration disputes. See Regulations Governing Departmental Organization and Authority, 5 Fed. Reg. 3502, 3503 (Sept. 4, 1940). Soon after, “the Attorney General authorized [the Board] to reopen concluded immigration proceedings at its discretion. 8 C.F.R. § 90.9 (1941) (authorization to hear motions); 8 C.F.R. § 150.8 (1941) (discretion to reopen).” Contreras-Bocanegra v. Holder, 678 F.3d 811, 814 (10th Cir. 2012) (en banc). In 1952, Congress passed the INA, directing the Attorney General to “establish such regulations . . . [as] necessary” to administer and enforce the act. Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 103(a), 66 Stat. 163, 173 (1952). Under this directive, the Attorney General updated the Board’s regulations, see 8 C.F.R. § 6.2 (1952) (“Reconsideration or reopening of any case in which a decision has been made by the Board, whether requested by the [government], or by the party affected by the decision, shall be only 11 upon written motion to the Board.”), and established a post-departure bar, 8 id. (“A motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not be made by or in behalf of a person who is the subject of deportation proceedings subsequent to his departure from the United States.”). In 1954, the Board interpreted the post-departure bar as depriving it of jurisdiction to consider motions to reopen filed by aliens located outside the United States. See In re G–y B–, 6 I. & N. Dec. 159, 160 (B.I.A. 1954). And in 1958, the Attorney General formalized the Board’s sua sponte authority: “The Board may on its own motion reopen or reconsider any case in which it has rendered a decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1964 Cum. Supp.) (emphasis added); Miscellaneous Amendments to Chapter, 23 Fed. Reg. 9115, 9118 (Nov. 26, 1958). For thirty-eight years, the statutory and regulatory regime remained largely intact. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1995) (containing the same language as the 1958 regulation). But in 1990, Congress directed that “the Attorney General . . . issue regulations with respect to . . . the period of time in which motions to reopen . . . may be offered in deportation proceedings” and ordered that the “regulations include a limitation on the number of such motions that may be filed and a maximum time period for the filing of such motions.” See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101649, § 545(d)(1), 104 Stat. 4978, 5066. “Congress issued this directive in order to ‘reduce or eliminate . . . abuses’ of regulations that, at that time, permitted aliens to 8 In 1961, Congress enacted a judicial post-departure bar, preventing courts from reviewing a deportation order “if the alien . . . has departed from the United States after the issuance of the order.” 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1964); see also Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 656 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing the judicial post-departure bar). 12 file an unlimited number of motions to reopen without any limitations period.” Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 657 (2d Cir. 2010) (omission in original) (quoting Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 400 (1995)). In response, the Attorney General revised these regulations in three important ways: (1) by limiting a party to “file only one motion to reopen proceedings (whether before the Board or the [IJ]) and that motion must be filed not later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened,” 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c)(2) (1997) (emphasis added); (2) by expanding the Board’s sua sponte authority to “at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision,” id. § 3.2(a) (1997) (emphasis added) (adding the “at any time” language); and (3) by enabling an IJ “upon his or her own motion at any time . . . [to] reopen or reconsider any case in which he or she has made a decision,” 8 C.F.R. § 3.23(b)(1) (1998) (emphasis added). 9 The regulation’s IJ provision also limited an alien to one motion to reopen and included a time bar (ninety days) and a post-departure bar. See id. Congress codified some of these regulatory changes. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 9 We cite the 1998 version because the 1997 version appears to have inadvertently omitted the “at any time” language. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.23(b)(1) (1997) (“The Immigration Judge may upon his or her own motion . . . reopen or reconsider any case . . . .”). 13 3009-546 (“IIRIRA” or “1996 Act”). 10 First, Congress provided aliens a right to file one motion to reopen—if done within ninety days of the final removal order. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A) (2000); id. § 1229a(c)(6)(C)(i); see also Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 14 (2008) (“[The IIRIRA] transform[ed] the motion to reopen from a regulatory procedure to a statutory form of relief available to the alien.”). Second, Congress required deportation of aliens within ninety days of final removal orders. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (2000). And third, Congress repealed the statutory judicialpost-departure bar and declined to “codify the regulatory post-departure bar.” Contreras-Bocanegra, 678 F.3d at 814–15. In early 1997, responding to Congress’s direction in the 1996 Act, the Attorney General promulgated new regulations. See Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312 (Mar. 6, 1997). Though Congress chose not to codify either sua sponte review or a post-departure bar, the new regulations included both. See id. at 10,330–31 (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(a), (d) (1997)). These regulations remain in place. 11
10 We cite the 1997 version of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), which includes amendments made in 1996, before Congress enacted the 1996 Act. See About the Code of Federal Regulations, Nat’l Archives, https://www.archives .gov/federal-register/cfr/about.html (last updated Aug. 8, 2018). 11 The regulations’ location in the CFR was moved after DHS was created in 2002. Zhang, 617 F.3d at 658 n.6 (discussing Aliens and Nationality; Homeland Security; Reorganization of Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. 9824 (Feb. 28, 2003)). 14 The outcome of this appeal turns on the text of one of the regulations first adopted in 1997: (b) Before the Immigration Court— (1) In general. An Immigration Judge may upon his or her own motion at any time, or upon motion of the Service or the alien, reopen or reconsider any case in which he or she has made a decision, unless jurisdiction is vested with the Board of Immigration Appeals. . . . [A] party may file only . . . one motion to reopen proceedings . . . within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal, deportation, or exclusion . . . . A motion to reopen . . . shall not be made by or on behalf of a person who is the subject of removal, deportation, or exclusion proceedings subsequent to his or her departure from the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (2019). 12 In this appeal, the government argues that this regulation is genuinely ambiguous and that we must defer if the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. Brief for Respondent at 14 (mistakenly asking for Chevron deference, not Auer deference). It pins the regulation’s asserted ambiguity on what the agency perceives is a conflict between the specific post-departure-bar provision and the provision giving IJs general sua sponte authority to reopen removal proceedings “at any time.” 13 Id. at 15. But as explained below, we rule that these two provisions do not conflict but instead 12 The corresponding provisions governing the Board, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), (d), are not at issue in this appeal. Section 1003.2(a) grants the Board sua sponte authority in “any case in which it has rendered a decision,” something the Board had not done in Reyes-Vargas’s case. 13 In In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. 646, 660 (B.I.A. 2008), a published, precedential Board decision, the Board held that the post-departure bar limits the IJ and Board’s authority to sua sponte reopen. 15 apply within their own realms. And without a conflict, we find no ambiguity and cannot defer to the Board’s interpretation.
The regulation (and the statute later codifying key pieces of it as applied to “motions to reopen”) gives aliens, such as Reyes-Vargas, two avenues to reopening. First, an alien, or the Immigration Service, may file a “motion to reopen.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2018) (providing aliens the statutory right to file “one motion to reopen”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1). 14 But the regulation limits the alien’s right to file this kind of motion in two ways important to this appeal: 15 (1) a time bar (“A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal, deportation, or exclusion . . . .”) and (2) a postdeparture bar (“A motion to reopen . . . shall not be made by or on behalf of a person . . . subsequent to his or her departure from the United States.”). 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1). Thus, for an alien’s motion to reopen to be legally operative under the regulation, it must be filed within ninety days of a removal order and while the alien is still in the United States—an alien must avoid both bars. 16 14 As discussed supra Section III.A, the statute incorporated the regulation’s requirements. 15 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (“Subject to the exceptions in this paragraph . . . a party may file only . . . one motion to reopen proceedings.”). 16 Consider the following two situations: First, if a party files a motion to reopen outside of ninety days, the regulation bars any consideration of the motion, even if the alien remains in the United States. Or second, if a party files a motion to 16 But this appeal does not concern this first avenue. After all, Reyes-Vargas’s petition to the IJ admitted that he was too late (more than ninety days past his removal order) to file a “motion to reopen.” R. at 99. Instead, both parties agree that this appeal concerns the second avenue, 17 which allows a case to be reopened “upon [the IJ’s] own motion at any time.” 18 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1). With this second avenue, the regulation provides a much broader, though less certain, avenue than the “motion to reopen.” For two reasons, we conclude this regulation unambiguously grants the IJ jurisdiction to reopen “at any time” under this avenue, even when the alien has departed the United States. Thus, we do not defer to the Board’s interpretation. reopen within ninety days, but after the alien has left the country, the regulation bars any consideration there too. This court struck down the post-departure bar in this second situation. Contreras-Bocanegra, 678 F.3d at 813 (invalidating the postdeparture bar as an improper limit on the statutory right to file one motion to reopen). 17 In its decision, the Board noted that Reyes-Vargas’s case turned on the IJ’s sua sponte authority. R. at 3 (“[Reyes-Vargas] admits that his motion to reopen is untimely, as it was filed more than 90 days after the entry of a final administrative order of removal. He does not allege that any . . . exception exists. He therefore relies on the Immigration Judge’s authority to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte.” (citations omitted)). 18 Nothing in the regulation prevents an alien from furnishing the IJ with bases on which the IJ might choose to sua sponte reopen removal proceedings. In fact, we note that in Mata the Supreme Court recognized the difference between an alien’s motion to reopen and an alien’s invitation (request) that the IJ exercise its sua sponte authority. See 135 S. Ct. at 2155 (“That decision . . . hinged on ‘constru[ing]’ Mata’s motion as something it was not: ‘an invitation for the [Board] to exercise’ its sua sponte authority.” (first alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 17 First, § 1003.23(b)(1) limits the post-departure bar to a party’s “motion to reopen,” which, as noted, differs from the IJ’s sua sponte motion to reopen removal proceedings. 19 Addressing the IJ’s sua sponte power, § 1003.23(b)(1) reads as follows: “An Immigration Judge may upon his or her own motion at any time . . . reopen or reconsider any case in which he or she has made a decision, unless jurisdiction is vested with the Board of Immigration Appeals.” The rest of § 1003.23(b)(1) concerns something else—“motions to reopen” filed by “the Service or the alien.” Included in this remainder language are the time and post-departure bars. Importantly, they apply only to a “motion to reopen.” Id. (“A motion to reopen . . . shall not be made by or on behalf of a person who is the subject of removal, deportation, or exclusion proceedings subsequent to his or her departure from the United States.” (emphasis added)); id. (“[A] party may file only . . . one motion to reopen proceedings . . . within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal, deportation, or exclusion . . . .” (emphasis added)). Thus, the IJ may move sua sponte to reopen removal proceedings even when either or both the ninety-day time bar or the post-departure bar would defeat an alien’s “motion to reopen.” 19 When an IJ on her own sua sponte “motion” reopens removal proceedings, the IJ acts solely on her own behalf. In contrast, a party’s “motion to reopen” is filed “by or on behalf of a person.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1). Treating the IJ’s sua sponte motion as one made on behalf of someone apart from the IJ would cast the IJ as an advocate, not a neutral decisionmaker. 18 Second, the regulation’s plain language leads to a sensible result. Oftentimes, the alien’s good reason for reopening removal proceedings takes time to manifest itself. Reyes-Vargas’s situation offers a good example. Vacating a state felony conviction for constitutional error, Padilla error or otherwise, likely takes more time than an alien has in which to stave off removal. Had the agency written its regulations to attach a post-departure bar to the IJ’s and Board’s sua sponte authority to reopen removal proceedings, the resulting sua sponte authority would be next to worthless. By its language, § 1003.23(b)(1) sensibly gives the IJ unlimited time to consider an alien’s exceptional circumstances—whether by learning of them by its own efforts or, more likely, from the alien’s needed prompt, as here. Without this, the IJ’s sua sponte power would be unavailable when most needed. Thus, we conclude that the IJ’s sua sponte power to reopen removal proceedings is independent of, so not subject to, the post-departure bar because § 1003.23(b)(1)’s plain language limits only “motions to reopen” to the ninety-day and post-departure bars, while for sua sponte, the IJ may reopen “at any time.” Id. In no way is this regulation “genuinely ambiguous.” So as Kisor instructs, in this circumstance, we “ha[ve] no business deferring to” the agency’s interpretation. See 139 S. Ct. at 2415. For the reasons given above, § 1003.23(b)(1)’s post-departure bar does not apply to the IJ’s sua sponte motion to reopen removal proceedings. Thus, we hold that the Board erred by concluding that the IJ lacked jurisdiction to consider ReyesVargas’s invitation for sua sponte relief. And for that reason, we grant Reyes19 Vargas’s petition for review, reverse the Board’s decision, and remand for it to consider whether the IJ properly rejected Reyes-Vargas’s sua sponte request on the merits.
Despite this, we still must address whether our decision in Rosillo-Puga v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2009), overruled on other grounds by ContrerasBocanegra, 678 F.3d at 819, binds us to affirm. Though neither party argues that Rosillo-Puga binds us, Reyes-Vargas’s issue runs right through that case. Accordingly, we address Rosillo-Puga in some detail. In Rosillo-Puga, the government began removal proceedings against RosilloPuga by filing a notice to appear in the immigration court after he was convicted for domestic battery in Indiana. Id. at 1149. Under Seventh Circuit law, this domesticbattery conviction qualified as an aggravated felony and a crime of domestic violence, rendering him removable. 20 Id. After a hearing, the IJ ordered him removed from the United States. Id. He chose not to appeal. Id. Several months after his removal, the Seventh Circuit ruled, in a different case, that an Indiana domesticbattery conviction did not qualify as a crime of domestic violence or an aggravated felony. Id. So about three years after this decision, he moved to have the IJ reopen his 20 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (making aliens removable for being “convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed”); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E) (making aliens removable for committing a “crime of domestic violence,” which is a “crime of violence” against a spouse); 18 U.S.C. § 16 (defining a “crime of violence” under federal law). 20 immigration proceedings, relying both on the statutory “motion to reopen” (as mirrored in the regulations) and on the IJ’s sua sponte authority to reopen at any time. Id. The IJ rejected both of Rosillo-Puga’s requested avenues, ruling that the post-departure bar prevented its exercise of discretion in the case, and the Board affirmed. Id. at 1150–51. Rosillo-Puga appealed the Board’s decision to our court, and we also affirmed. Id. at 1160. On appeal, all agreed that Rosillo-Puga’s statutory “motion to reopen” was untimely—he had filed it more than ninety days after his order of removal. That provided a full basis to deny the statutory “motion to reopen.” Id. at 1158. But