Opinion ID: 889317
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Issue Four: Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it refused Peterson's reasonable and prudent speed instruction and an instruction regarding the inadmissibility of the lack of traffic citations in the underlying negligence suit?

Text: ¶ 56 Peterson also asserts that the District Court abused its discretion when it refused to give the following proposed jury instructions: PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 62 Subject to any maximum speed limits, a person shall operate a vehicle in a careful and prudent manner and at a reduced speed no greater than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances existing at the point of operation, taking into account the amount and character of traffic, visibility, weather and roadway conditions. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 59 In considering any evidence that no traffic citations were issued to either Mr. Peterson or Mr. Lindberg as a result of the underlying automobile accident, you are instructed that the lack of any traffic citations does not equate to the lack of civil negligence. A traffic violation involves a criminal proceeding requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. You are instructed that any evidence of the lack of traffic citations would not have been admissible to the jury in the underlying case. ¶ 57 Proposed instruction No. 62 was based on § 61-8-303, MCA. Proposed instruction No. 59 was offered to cure the perceived prejudice occasioned by the District Court's admission of evidence regarding the lack of traffic citations. The District Court rejected proposed instruction No. 59, stating that it was allowing the lack of citations as one piece of evidence as to what St. Paul knew at the time it was making its analysis of liability. The District Court rejected proposed instruction No. 62, stating it was concerned about creating the dangerous situation of the jury retrying the first case instead of considering the ultimate issue in the second casei.e., the reasonableness of St. Paul's conduct. ¶ 58 The decision to deny these proposed instructions did not involve a legal determination by the District Court, but was instead based on its concerns that these instructions would confuse the jury and potentially prejudice St. Paul. Thus, unlike our analysis under Issue One, this decision is to be afforded much greater discretion. Given the latitude afforded the District Court in instructing the jury in light of such concerns, we conclude that the rejection of these instructions was not an abuse of the District Court's discretion. However, the court on remand should reassess the propriety of such instructions in light of our analysis under Issue One and the objective standard to be utilized by the jury in evaluating the reasonableness of St. Paul's conduct. Although the District Court's concerns about the jury litigating the negligence suit in the UTPA case were understandable, such concerns will be ameliorated by an objective, reasonable person instruction on the issue of reasonably clear liability. Instructions and evidence that address the facts and law taken into consideration by the insurer will allow the jury to make a fully informed determination of this question.