Opinion ID: 814125
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony Regarding Assault

Text: Dawson also contends that his appellate counsel rendered a deficient performance by failing to appeal the district court’s admission of evidence regarding Dawson’s attack upon his former girlfriend and her son. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, however, Dawson must meet the familiar standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Specifically, Dawson must establish not only that his attorney’s performance was deficient, but also that he was prejudiced as a result of the deficient performance. Id. at 687. Because Dawson was not prejudiced by No. 11-5021 Dawson v. United States Page 5 his appellate attorney’s failure to contest the admission of the assault-related testimony, he cannot establish that counsel’s assistance was constitutionally ineffective. “Under [Federal] Rule [of Evidence] 403, a district court is granted ‘very broad discretion in determining whether the danger of undue prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence.’” United States v. Fisher, 648 F.3d 442, 449 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Vance, 871 F.2d 572, 576 (6th Cir. 1989)). We review a district court’s rulings under Rule 403 for abuse of discretion. See Nolan v. Memphis City Sch., 589 F.3d 257, 264 (6th Cir. 2009). Evidence of uncharged misconduct may be admissible when it “arises from the same events as the charged offense, forms an integral part of a witness’s testimony, or completes the story of the charged offense.” United States v. Hardy, 228 F.3d 745, 748 (6th Cir. 2000). Dawson has not presented any compelling support for the notion that the admission of the testimony was unduly prejudicial to him or that it was material to the outcome of his trial. Excluding the testimony at issue, there was ample evidence from which a jury could have found Dawson guilty. Further, this evidence was not the type that would “engender vindictive passions within the jury or . . . confuse the issues.” United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261, 1268 (6th Cir. 1977). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony and, as a result, no prejudice resulted from Dawson’s appellate lawyer’s failure to raise the issue on appeal. C. Dawson’s Attempted Rape Conviction Under the ACCA Dawson also challenges his fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence. The ACCA imposes a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence when a defendant convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) has three or more prior convictions for “violent felonies” or “serious drug offenses.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(e)(1). Dawson concedes that his 2001 conviction for aggravated burglary qualifies as a violent felony but argues that his 1993 conviction for attempted rape does not. Further, he contends that his two 1988 convictions cannot be counted separately, because the crimes involved were not committed on separate occasions, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The government contends that, because Dawson failed to raise these issues in his initial § 2255 petition, No. 11-5021 Dawson v. United States Page 6 he is foreclosed from raising them here. But because Dawson’s initial petition was filed pro se and no further factual development is needed, we will consider the merits of this portion of Dawson’s petition. Because we hold that Dawson’s attempted rape conviction is categorically a violent felony, however, Dawson’s arguments fail. The Tennessee rape statute under which Dawson was convicted reads as follows: (a) Rape is unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by the defendant or of the defendant by a victim accompanied by any of the following circumstances: (1) Force or coercion is used to accomplish the act; (2) The sexual penetration is accomplished without the consent of the victim and the defendant knows or has reason to know at the time of the penetration that the victim did not consent; (3) The defendant knows or has reason to know that the victim is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless; or (4) The sexual penetration is accomplished by fraud. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-503. Further, a criminal attempt requires not only that the defendant have the requisite culpability for the underlying offense, but also that a substantial step toward completion of the offense be committed. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12-101. Based on his conviction for attempted rape, Dawson was sentenced to three years in jail. A “violent felony” under the ACCA is an offense that is punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year and either “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another,” or “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). Dawson’s attempted rape conviction was punishable by more than one year, thus satisfying the threshold requirement of the Act. Dawson argues that the crime, however, is not categorically violent for purposes of the Act, however, because rape can be achieved through fraud and does not necessarily involve the use of physical force against another person. Despite the fact that the crime can be achieved through fraud, the offense clearly falls within the ACCA’s residual clause as a crime that presents a serious No. 11-5021 Dawson v. United States Page 7 potential risk of physical injury to another. Accordingly, Dawson was not prejudiced by his appellate counsel’s failure to challenge the ACCA sentence upon appeal. An offense falls within the ACCA’s residual clause if it poses a serious potential risk of injury to others and involves the same kind of purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct as the enumerated offenses of burglary, arson, extortion, or criminal acts involving the use of explosives. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 145 (2008). In conducting this inquiry, we employ the “categorical approach,” examining only “whether the elements of the offense are of the type that would justify its inclusion within the residual provision.” James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 202 (2007). Further, we consider the behavior underlying the offense as it is ordinarily committed, “not in terms of how an individual offender might have committed [the offense] on a particular occasion.” Begay, 553 U.S. at 141. Under the categorical approach to evaluating offenses under the ACCA’s residual clause, Dawson’s conviction for attempted rape qualifies as a violent felony under the Act. Under Tennessee law, attempted rape requires that “the defendant acted with intent to rape and that his conduct constituted a substantial step toward the commission of a rape.” State v. Bowles, 52 S.W.3d 69, 78 (Tenn. 2001). In arguing that attempted rape is not categorically violent, Dawson relies on United States v. Arnold, 58 F.3d 1117 (6th Cir. 1995), where we held that assault with intent to commit sexual battery was not categorically violent for purposes of the ACCA. Assault with the intent to commit sexual battery, however, involves intent to commit “unlawful sexual contact” as opposed to unlawful sexual penetration, as in attempted rape. It bears noting that the crime at issue in Arnold was assault which, under Tennessee law, includes merely putting another person in fear of imminent bodily harm. See id. at 1122 n.4. Further, sexual battery poses less of a risk of physical injury than attempted rape. “Short of homicide, [rape] is the ultimate violation of self. . . . Rape is very often accompanied by physical injury . . . and can also inflict mental and psychological damage.” Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597–98 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted). The purposeful and aggressive nature of the crime, even when perpetrated by No. 11-5021 Dawson v. United States Page 8 fraud, creates an inherently high degree of risk of physical injury. See Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2276 (2011). Thus, attempted rape falls squarely within the class of crimes that present a serious risk of physical injury to another, as contemplated by the ACCA. See id.; see also United States v. Terrell, 593 F.3d 1084,1090 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[E]ven in those cases where the rape is achieved by trickery or deception, that fact does not erase the ever-present possibility that the victim may figure out what’s really going on and decide to resist, in turn requiring the perpetrator to resort to actual physical restraint that could then easily escalate into a violent confrontation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Rooks, 556 F.3d 1145, 1150-51 (10th Cir. 2009). Dawson’s 1993 attempted rape conviction, his 2001 aggravated burglary conviction, and either of his 1988 convictions constitute three previous crimes of violence for purposes of the ACCA. Accordingly, we need not consider whether Dawson’s two 1988 convictions arose from acts committed on separate occasions. AFFIRMED.