Opinion ID: 492687
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: 13 The prevailing party in a federal civil rights case is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988. Here the district court found, and the state does not seriously contest, that the plaintiffs prevailed. 4 We need only review then whether the fee award is reasonable. 14 Our review of the fee award is very limited. Given the district court's superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding appellate review of what are essentially factual matters, Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1941, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), the determination of a fee award is left to the sound discretion of the district court. Id.; Spanish Action Committee of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 811 F.2d 1129, 1134 (7th Cir.1987). Accordingly, [i]f reasonable persons could differ over the trial court's view, then the appellate court will not be able to find an abuse of discretion. Munson v. Friske, 754 F.2d 683, 696 (7th Cir.1985). 15 As the Supreme Court has stated, [w]here a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S.Ct. at 1940. Congress intended for plaintiffs [to] receive a reasonable fee that is 'adequate to attract competent counsel,' and that 'counsel for prevailing parties be paid, as is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client, for all time reasonably expended '. Gekas v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission, 793 F.2d 846, 853 (7th Cir.1986). Such a fee award is thus arrived at by first calculating a lodestar figure--the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. The court, where warranted, may then adjust the lodestar figure upwards or downwards through the use of a multiplier.