Opinion ID: 889494
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the District Court properly dismiss Neighbors' public nuisance claim?

Text: ¶ 17 Neighbors rely on Martin v. Vincent, 181 Mont. 247, 593 P.2d 45 (1979), and Wheeler v. Moe, 163 Mont. 154, 515 P.2d 679 (1973), in arguing that the District Court improperly dismissed their public nuisance claim by looking beyond the face of the complaint. The Court in Martin determined that a court may not rely on matters outside the allegations of the complaint in granting a motion to dismiss. Martin, 181 Mont. at 251, 593 P.2d at 48. The district court in Martin had relied upon factual matters outside the complaint. For example, the district court determined that the brokers had failed to disclose their dual capacity as both broker and buyer based upon the brokers' signatures on both the listing agreement and the sales contract. Martin, 181 Mont. at 248, 593 P.2d at 46. This Court determined that nothing on the face of the complaint allowed the district court to conclude that the brokers had failed to disclose their dual capacity. Martin, 181 Mont. at 250, 593 P.2d at 47. ¶ 18 Nothing in Martin, however, barred the district court from considering the applicable law when reviewing a motion to dismiss. Nothing in the District Court's order indicates that it looked at factual matters outside the allegations contained in the complaint. The court expressly stated in its order, even taking all of the allegations as true and the claim as well pled, §§ 27-30-101(2) and 76-9-101, MCA, barred Neighbors' relief. ¶ 19 The plaintiffs in Wheeler filed an action against the Missoula County Sheriff, the Missoula County Attorney, and other public officials. Wheeler, 163 Mont. at 155, 515 P.2d at 680. This Court in Wheeler upheld a district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint based upon the public officials' immunity from civil prosecution in the performance of their official duties. Wheeler, 163 Mont. at 163, 515 P.2d at 684. The Court noted that the plaintiff's complaint contained no allegations that the public officers had been acting in any capacity other than as public officials. Wheeler, 163 Mont. at 163, 515 P.2d at 684. This Court dismissed the complaint as insufficient to support a claim. Wheeler, 163 Mont. at 161, 515 P.2d at 683. ¶ 20 Neighbors go astray with their argument that nothing in their complaint expressly refers to § 76-9-101, MCA. The plaintiffs complaint in Wheeler did not expressly refer to the fact that public officials enjoyed immunity from civil prosecution in the performance of their official acts. The complaint in Wheeler referred solely to the fact that the defendants had been performing official acts. Wheeler, 163 Mont. at 160, 515 P.2d at 682. Here, as in Wheeler, the District Court must apply the controlling law to the factual allegations raised in the complaint. ¶ 21 Neighbors allege that the Ranch's shooting range constitutes a public nuisance. Sections 27-30-101(2) and 76-9-101, MCA, apply regardless of whether Neighbors refer to them explicitly in their complaint. To presume that a district court can grant a motion to dismiss only if the plaintiff expressly raised all potential affirmative defenses or controlling statutes would undermine the district court's responsibility in reviewing a motion to dismiss. The district court considered no facts beyond the face of Neighbors' complaint. The court merely applied law directly applicable to Neighbors' complaint. ¶ 22 We now must review whether the District Court properly applied §§ 27-30-101(2) and 76-9-101, MCA. Section 27-30-101(2), MCA, provides that nothing which is done or maintained under the express authority of a statute can be deemed a nuisance. Section 76-9-101, MCA, provides protection for the locations of and investment in shooting ranges for shotgun, archery, rifle, and pistol shooting. Neighbors argue that § 76-9-101, MCA, represents a general policy statement that does not expressly authorize all shooting ranges. ¶ 23 This Court addressed the effect of § 27-30-101(2), MCA, in Barnes v. City of Thompson Falls, 1999 MT 77, 294 Mont. 76, 979 P.2d 1275. We determined in Barnes that a court must inquire whether the activity is authorized either by the express terms of the authorizing statute or by necessary implication therefrom as a threshold matter under § 27-30-101(2), MCA. Barnes, ¶ 27. The test of statutory authorization thus requires a particularized assessment of each authorizing statute in relation to the act which constitutes the nuisance. Barnes, ¶ 21. Only in this manner can a court ensure an unequivocal legislative intent to sanction a nuisance while avoiding the uncertainty that would result were every generally worded statute allowed to immunize nuisance liability. Barnes, ¶ 21. ¶ 24 Nothing in § 76-9-101, MCA, expressly immunizes shooting ranges from civil nuisance liability. A review of the legislative history of § 76-9-101, MCA, proves instructive in interpreting the generally worded policy statement contained in the statute. The Montana Legislature adopted House Bill 487, An Act Protecting Shooting Range Locations, with the purpose to protect pre-existing shooting ranges from community encroachment and from neighbors complaining of noise or safety hazards from the ranges. Mont. H. Local Gov. Comm., An Act Protecting Shooting Range Locations: Hearing on HB 487, 52nd Leg., Reg. Sess. 8-9 (Feb. 19, 1991), Mont. Sen. Fish & Game Comm. An Act Protecting Shooting Range Locations: Hearing on HB 487, 52nd Leg., Reg. Sess. 6-7 (Mar. 14, 1991). ¶ 25 House Bill 487 added an entirely new Chapter to Title 76 to protect shooting ranges. House Bill 487 also included four amendments to other code provisions. The Legislature expressly exempted shooting ranges from §§ 7-5-2109, 7-5-2110, 45-8-101, and 45-8-111, MCA. These exemptions protect shooting ranges from the definition of community decay, litter, disorderly conduct, and the criminal provision for public nuisances. Mont. HB 487, 52nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mar. 14, 1991). The Legislature combed through the Montana Code to exempt shooting ranges from four specific areas, including criminal public nuisance under Title 45 of the criminal code. ¶ 26 The Legislature chose not to exempt shooting ranges from the specific civil provisions regarding civil public nuisance in Title 27, Chapter 30. The Dissent posits that we should infer statutory authorization of new shooting ranges by necessary implication because §§ 76-9-101, 103, and 104, MCA, authorize the act in questionoperation of the shooting ranges. Dissent, ¶¶ 59, 60. The Dissent argues further that the statutory authorization test from Barnes asks only whether the questioned activity falls wholly outside its statutory authority. Dissent, ¶ 63. ¶ 27 The test enunciated in Barnes ultimately considers whether the defendant's activity falls outside its statutory authority. Barnes, ¶ 25. Before considering whether the defendant's activity falls outside its statutory authority, however, a court must undertake a particularized assessment of the authorizing statute to determine whether the questioned activity even warrants protection in the first place. Barnes, ¶ 25. By requiring such a particularized assessment, the reviewing court ensures an unequivocal legislative intent expressly to or necessarily to imply authorization. Barnes, ¶ 21. The parties in Barnes did not dispute that the statute authorized the alleged nuisancethe city's sewage and storm drain system. Barnes, ¶ 27. The Neighbors sharply dispute, however, whether § 76-9-101, MCA, authorizes shooting ranges. Thus, this Court must undertake a particularized assessment of the statute to determine the Legislature's intent. ¶ 28 The statute certainly evinces the requisite unequivocal legislative intent to protect shooting ranges from adverse local planning and zoning efforts under §§ 76-9-103, 104, MCA. We cannot discern a similar unequivocal intent, however, to exempt shooting ranges from civil nuisance liability. Barnes, ¶ 21. In fact, we must assume the opposite. The Legislature protected shooting ranges explicitly from planning, zoning, community decay, litter, disorderly conduct, and criminal nuisance, but made no mention of civil nuisance liability. ¶ 29 This Court may not insert what has been omitted, or omit what has been inserted. Section 1-2-101, MCA. We cannot insert an inference in § 76-9-101, MCA, by the Legislature to shield shooting ranges from civil nuisance liability. The Legislature carefully crafted House Bill 487 and elected to exempt shooting ranges from specific provisions of the Montana Code. We decline to interpret these specific provisions of the statute to encompass an omitted provision. We reverse and remand to the District Court to allow Neighbors to further develop their civil public nuisance claim.