Opinion ID: 2902093
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Arabalo’s Motion to Amend Her Complaint

Text: Arabalo filed a motion to amend her complaint, seeking to add state-law tort claims against Captain Gutierrez. The district court referred this issue to the magistrate judge, who later recommended that the district court grant Arabalo’s motion to amend her complaint. Four weeks after the district court allowed Arabalo to amend her complaint, Captain Gutierrez moved to dismiss the claims against him. The district court again referred the issue to the magistrate judge, who later recommended that the district court grant Captain Gutierrez’s motion to dismiss. The district court adopted the recommendation and dismissed all of Arabalo’s claims against Captain Gutierrez, including the state-law tort claims. On appeal, Arabalo does not challenge the district court’s order granting Gutierrez’s motion to dismiss.11 Instead, she argues that the district court erred in granting her motion to amend “when it was clear [the district court] would subsequently deny her ability to conduct discovery and simply dismiss the claims upon motion from Defendants.” Appellant’s Br. at 39. She argues that “[g]iven the legal authority . . . Arabalo should not have been permitted to add the [state law] claims in the first instance.” Id. at 41. True, the magistrate judge later recommended that the district court dismiss the state-law tort claims against Gutierrez, and the district court did dismiss those 11 Even so, she did list this order in her notice of appeal. But because she makes no attempt to argue the merits, any appeal from this order is waived. 35 claims with prejudice. But adding additional claims in an amended complaint is hardly an ironclad guarantee that they will not be dismissed with prejudice. We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s ruling on a motion to amend a complaint. Stubblefield v. Windsor Capital Grp., 74 F.3d 990, 994 (10th Cir. 1996). Under that standard, we reject this issue out of hand. Arabalo did not object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation that she be allowed to amend her complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) requires such an objection: When a pretrial matter not dispositive of a party’s claim or defense is referred to a magistrate judge to hear and decide, the magistrate judge must promptly conduct the required proceedings and, when appropriate, issue a written order stating the decision. A party may serve and file objections to the order within 14 days after being served with a copy. A party may not assign as error a defect in the order not timely objected to. Parties that fail to make timely objections to a magistrate’s order waive appellate review. Boyd Motors, Inc. v. Emp’rs. Ins. of Wausau, 880 F.2d 270, 270 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). This is known as the “firm waiver rule.” Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991). There are two exceptions to the firm waiver rule: (1) when a pro se litigant has not been informed of the time period for objecting; or (2) when the interests of justice require review. Id. The first exception does not apply here because an attorney represented Arabalo. For the second, we generally require a “miscarriage of justice.” Morales-Fernandez v. I.N.S., 418 F.3d 1116, 1120 (10th Cir. 2005). Because Arabalo is appealing the magistrate’s decision to grant her own motion, this simply does not qualify as a miscarriage of justice. Even further, under the “invited error doctrine,” a party cannot 36 request that a court do something and then appeal when that request is granted. See ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc. v. Bowers, 643 F.3d 735, 771 (10th Cir. 2011). We affirm the district court. E. Captain Gutierrez’s Motion to Dismiss and Defendants’ Attorney’s Fees The district court granted Gutierrez’s motion to dismiss, and while Arabalo listed that order in her notice of appeal, she failed to argue against—or even mention—the merits of that order once in her briefing to this court. Further, after the district court dismissed the state-law tort claims against Gutierrez, it also awarded him attorney’s fees and costs. Arabalo also included the district court’s orders awarding attorney’s fees and costs in her notice of appeal. But she failed to discuss them whatsoever. Therefore, she has waived any appeal that she intended from these orders. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 679 (10th Cir. 1998); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994). We affirm any ruling relating to Captain Gutierrez’s motion to dismiss or the award of attorney’s fees and costs.