Opinion ID: 1060398
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application to the Case Under Submission

Text: The standard I propose, which restores custody to a parent where the parent demonstrates that the child would not be substantially harmed as a result, may best be illustrated by application to the facts before the Court. In the case under submission, custody was initially placed with Badenhope pursuant to an agreed order, and it does not appear that the North Carolina court made any finding that Joy would face substantial harm if custody were awarded to Blair. Indeed, Tennessee trial courts have twice expressly found Blair to be a fit parent. Blair had discovered he was the father of a motherless childa child with whom he had no relationship at the time and though he originally agreed to allow custody to remain with the grandmother who had cared for her, he persistently and relentlessly pursued a relationship with the child from that time forward. His efforts included moving to the state and city where the grandmother resided, for the sole purpose of being closer to the child. The testimony reveals that because of these efforts, a loving bond has been created between parent and child. Notably, the trial court did find that Joy would face substantial harm if custody were awarded to Blair. Careful review of the record, however, indicates that the evidence in this regard is not persuasive. There exists in the record absolutely no evidence that Joy would face substantial harm if placed in her father's custody. Under the circumstances, the prior voluntary surrender of custody notwithstanding, there exists no sound policy justification why the law of this state should stand as an obstacle to the uniting of this parent and his child. Far to the contrary, the majority's decision today gives the non-parent a weapon with which to sever forever the natural bonds. Before a finding of substantial harm is justified, I would hold that a genuine danger of injury to the physical, emotional, or mental well-being of the child must exist. Other states applying similar parental rights analyses have concluded that parents may be deprived of the custody of their children only if shown to be unfit to perform the duties that custody imposes. 2 Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States § 20.6 at 529 (2d ed. 1987). These states generally require[] proof of such serious parental inadequacy as child neglect, child abuse, parental inability to care for the child, or conditions such that the child will suffer severe physical or emotional harm if left in the care of the parent. Id. at 530 (footnotes omitted). A similar analysis is applicable to Tennessee custody disputes between a parent and non-parent. While the variability of human behavior renders it unwise to specify the evidence which would support a finding of substantial harm, it is clear, in my view, that the requirement cannot be satisfied by proof of harm which is trivial, insignificant, or transitory in its duration or impact. Moreover, the mere notion that harm might occur should be insufficient. The evidence must demonstrate clearly that a danger exists before a finding of substantial harm may be justified. Most important, the residual problems which are inherent in many transitions of custody should not, in ordinary circumstances, constitute a danger of substantial harm. Otherwise, it often would be impossible for a parent to regain custody from a non-parent, for a child inevitably will face some problems in almost every case involving a change of custody. In the case under submission, the trial court essentially designated four reasons supporting its finding of substantial harm: (1) a past relationship of some sort between Blair's wife and another man; (2) the stability of Badenhope's home environment; (3) Badenhope's emotional bond with Joy; and (4) Badenhope's willingness to foster a relationship between Joy and Blair. Addressing the trial court's reasons seriatim, as to the relationship between Blair's wife and another man, the evidence was, at best, vague and inconclusive. Even were we to assume that the relationship had been inappropriate, it terminated in 1996, and the man has since left Tennessee. No evidence was presented which suggested that Joy had been affected by the relationship when it was on-going. Nor was any evidence introduced that Joy would be harmed in the future by what appears now to be a matter of history. Although the trial court opined that Badenhope's home would provide a more stable environment than Blair's home, the stability of Badenhope's home does not directly bear on the substantial harm analysis. The stability of Blair's home is relevant only as it may tend to prove that Joy would face the danger of substantial harm if placed in that environment. No such proof appears in the record. The trial court used Badenhope's emotional bond with Joy as one of the supports for its finding of substantial harm. The fact that Joy and Badenhope have developed a strong emotional bond is commendable. It does not suggest, however, that Joy will experience substantial mental, emotional, or physical harm from the change of custody. Finally, Badenhope's willingness to foster a relationship between Joy and Blair is immaterial. Although cited by the trial court as one of the bases for finding substantial harm, this factor would, seemingly, relate to Badenhope's fitness. Such a consideration bears no relevance to the substantial harm analysis. Having considered the facts in the record, I would conclude that the preponderance of evidence demonstrates clearly that Joy will not face any danger of substantial harm if placed in Blair's custody. Accordingly, I would order Joy to be placed in Blair's custody forthwith. Moreover, even if I were to accept the standard adopted by the majority, I would continue to disagree with its ultimate conclusion. The majority concludes that Blair has failed to demonstrate a material change in circumstances sufficient to justify a modification of the original custody decree, and consequently it dismisses his petition. I disagree with this conclusion that there has been no material change of circumstances in this case. When Blair originally agreed to surrender custody of Joy to Badenhope, his relationship with his daughter was uncertain and had only begun. Indeed, he apparently did not even see Joy until after her mother's death. But in the many years that have passed since that time, Blair has expended great effort to create a strong, loving bond with his daughter. That bond has flourished to such a degree that Joy now has expressed an interest in living with Blair. Additionally, Blair has moved to Tennessee to be nearer to Joy, [5] and he has purchased a new home in a neighborhood where Joy has many friends. Blair's relationship with his daughter, his daughter's interest in living with him, and even his place of residence have changed entirely. The majority, however, holds these dramatic changes for naught. Essentially, the majority holds that a parent's efforts to assume parental responsibilities in an exemplary fashion and improve the relationship with his or her child can never constitute a changed circumstance sufficient to warrant reconsideration of a custody award. To a layperson, it would be evident that the circumstances of Blair's relationship with his daughter are completely different than they were when the initial custody decree was entered. Our adoption of a legal standard which embraces results so contrary to the expectation of average citizens invites criticism, perhaps well-deserved, that we who apply the law have become estranged from the everyday lives of the people of Tennessee. To embrace such a standard in this case is to lend credence to that charge. Having concluded that there has been a sufficient material change of circumstances in this case, I next would submit that the best interest analysis embraced by the majority should result in Joy being transferred to Blair's custody. A multitude of factors must be weighed in considering a child's best interests, including, inter alia, the stability of a family, the emotional ties between parent and child, the disposition of the parent to provide care for the child, the character and behavior of any person who may be living with the parent, the parent's potential for future performance of parenting responsibilities, and the reasonable preference of the child if twelve years of age or older. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-6-106 (2001). Blair offers a loving, stable home, and the bonds between him and his daughter have increased substantially in the years since Joy's birth. He has demonstrated a commitment to providing for Joy's care, both in the past and in the future. The emotional and psychological benefits of living in such an environment with a biological parent should not be disregarded. Likewise, his wife has displayed a willingness and ability to serve as a worthy caregiver for Joy. Finally, the testimony at trial reflected that Joy has expressed a desire to live with Blair and his wife. I find this choice reasonable and give it significant weight. [6] Overall, I find that the bulk of the statutory factors indicate that it would be in Joy's best interests to be placed in Blair's custody. Consequently, even under the analysis proposed by the majority, I would submit that father and daughter should be united.