Opinion ID: 2188938
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the assertion of privilege of peter trepanier

Text: The defendant asserts that the trial justice committed error when he declined to compel Trepanier to testify in spite of his assertion of his privilege against self-incrimination. We respectfully disagree with this argument. It should be noted at the outset that at the time that Ducharme sought to compel Trepanier to testify as a witness, he had been found guilty of twenty-seven counts of a sixty-count indictment that had been filed against both Ducharme and Trepanier. However, it should also be noted that Trepanier at that point had not argued his motion for new trial and, of course, had not tested his conviction on appeal before this court. Although defendant argues that he wished to interrogate Trepanier about events relating to his interrogation by the police, it cannot be overlooked that events relating to the interrogation might well if expanded by cross-examination establish points which might serve as a link in a chain of events that could have incriminated Trepanier. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964). The trial justice did not err when he refused to compel Trepanier to testify in the presence of the jury. The trial justice made his determination based on the voir dire examination of Trepanier where, on advice of counsel, Trepanier invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, thereby refusing to respond to any of the defense counsel's substantive questions. After the voir dire examination, the trial justice asked Trepanier if, before the jury, he would again invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege. Based upon Trepanier's response that he would reassert the privilege if called to testify, the trial justice precluded the defense from calling Trepanier at trial. The defense urges us to find that the trial justice erred by precluding Trepanier's testimony because Trepanier had waived his privilege against self-incrimination when he testified at the suppression hearing. We do not agree. It is well settled that a defendant who testifies in a suppression hearing does not waive his privilege or right to object to use of illegally obtained evidence in any other context. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). The Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination as applied to the states in Malloy v. Hogan, supra , is not lost until a conviction is final. As the Supreme Court stated in Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 94 S.Ct. 316, 322, 38 L.Ed.2d 274, 281 (1973), the Fifth Amendment not only protects the individual against being involuntarily called as a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution but also [accords him the] privilege not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings. For this very reason the privilege cannot be said to be extinguished until a defendant has exhausted all available routes of appeal. See, e.g., Taylor v. Best, 746 F.2d 220, 223 (4th Cir.1984) (citing Lefkowitz in dicta); State v. Johnson, 77 Idaho 1, 287 P.2d 425 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1007, 76 S.Ct. 649, 100 L.Ed. 869 (1956). Therefore, since Trepanier's conviction was not final when he exercised his right to invoke the Fifth Amendment, the trial justice did not err when he precluded Trepanier from being called to testify before the jury.