Opinion ID: 1191883
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Alternative View of Paternity by Estoppel Favors a Narrower Test of Prejudice Focusing on Financial, Rather Than Emotional, Harm.

Text: R.L.B. urges us to follow the lead of our prior cases by applying the Clevenger test here. She argues that the record supports the trial court's finding that K.'s strong, voluntarily fostered ties to B.E.B. cannot be severed without considerable emotional trauma. In contrast, B.E.B. cites a substantial body of cases in which courts have expressly declined to apply Clevenger 's broad test of emotional harm. These courts assert that the doctrine of paternity by estoppel should ordinarily be invoked only upon a showing of economic, rather than emotional, prejudice. In K.B. v. D.B., [21] the Massachusetts Appeals Court reviewed the conflicting cases on paternity by estoppel and identified two competing policies that these cases promote. [22] K.B. described Clevenger, on the one hand, as the leading proponent of a policy that focuses on preserving paternal ties after the break-up of a marriage. [23] This policy, recognizing that the bonds between a parent and a young child can seldom be severed without serious emotional harm to the child, strongly discourages non-biological fathers from abandoning parental relationships that they have willingly fostered: The reversal of [the non-biological parent's original representation of parenthood], through the publication of the illegitimacy of the child, inflicts deep injury upon [the child]. To be designated as an illegitimate child in preadolescence is an emotional trauma of lasting consequence. Having placed the cloak of legitimacy upon the child, having induced the child to rely upon its protection, the [adult] by abruptly removing it surely harms the child. [24] Several jurisdictions have followed Clevenger in holding that prejudice in such cases can be based on proof of potential emotional harm. [25] On the other hand, the K.B. court described Knill v. Knill [26] as a leading case favoring a policy that focuses on establishing paternal ties while a marriage is still healthy. [27] This policy strongly encourages a putative parent to assume the role of an actual parent without fear of later repercussions. [28] In Knill, the Maryland Court of Appeals disagreed with the idea that the need to spare a child from the emotional harm caused when a non-biological parent withdraws support justifies the doctrine of paternity by estoppel. [29] The court explained its preference for a policy that strives to foster harmony while the family remains intact: In this case, Charles knew that Stephen was not his son and, nevertheless, treated him as his son and as a member of the Knill family. Such conduct is consistent with this State's public policy of strengthening the family, the basic unit of civilized society. We encourage spouses to undertake, where feasible, the support, guidance, and rearing of their spouses' children.... [30] The court in Knill thus concluded that Charles should not be penalized for his conduct under the circumstances. [31] It opted for a rule limiting estoppel to cases of financial detriment [32] that is, cases in which the non-biological parent's conduct actively interferes with the children's support from their natural parent. [33] In favoring the narrow test of financial prejudice over Clevenger 's broader emotional harm standard, the Knill court relied on the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Miller. [34] The Miller court reasoned that the development of `emotional bonding' ... is not sufficient to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel[,] [35] because to hold otherwise would create enormous policy difficulties. A stepparent who tried to create a warm family atmosphere with his or her stepchildren would be penalized by being forced to pay support for them in the event of a divorce. At the same time, a stepparent who refused to have anything to do with his or her stepchildren beyond supporting them would be rewarded by not having to pay support in the event of a divorce. [36] Many states now follow the narrow approach to paternity by estoppel described in Knill and Miller, requiring prejudicial reliance to be proved by evidence of financial harm. [37]