Opinion ID: 2610005
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Entrapment.

Text: Froggatt requested the district judge to instruct the jury on the law of entrapment. The State objected, on the ground that there was insufficient evidence, express or implied, upon which the jury could have drawn any inference that Froggatt was entrapped with respect to the sale of the marijuana. [4] We do not agree. The State contends that C.T., who planted the marijuana in the spare-tire compartment of Froggatt's car, was not a police informer when he made the plant and that he did not become so engaged until the following day. There is a conflict in that evidence, as shown by Garner's testimony, and the jury should have had an opportunity to pass on the question. [5] We have reiterated the rule in Barger v. State, 81 Nev. 548, 550, 551, 552, 407 P.2d 584, 585, 586 (1965), that: Citation of authority is no longer necessary for the proposition that a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to have the court instruct the jury about his theory of defense, if there is evidence to support it. The state acknowledges the rule, but suggests that Barger's testimony was a fantasy not worthy of belief and cannot qualify as `some' evidence, `substantial' evidence or, indeed, even as `any' evidence;   . We hold that a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory of the case as disclosed by the evidence, no matter how weak or incredible that evidence may appear to be. People v. Carmen, 36 Cal.2d 768, 228 P.2d 281 (Cal. 1951). The jury by its verdict will decide whether the truth rests with the state or the defense. We approve the ruling of the United States District Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Hamilton v. United States, 221 F.2d 611, 614, 615 (1955): The gist of the defense of entrapment is the conception of the crime by the government's agent for the purpose of prosecuting the defendant, the latter not having any previous intention to commit it. A money consideration or any other adequate motive incited by the agent to induce the crime may constitute entrapment, provided the conception of the criminal design originated with the government's agent, and was planted by him in the mind of the accused, who otherwise would not have committed the offense; but, when it is suspected that a crime is being committed, for instance, in the sale of narcotics, and the question is as to who is the guilty party, traps may be laid by affording the suspect an opportunity to sell the same in order to catch the guilty person. A suspected criminal may be offered an opportunity to transgress in such manner as is usual therein, but extraordinary temptations or inducements may not be employed by officers of the government. The charge requested by the appellant fairly stated the law, and should have been given instead of the oral equivocal instruction that left the jury without any definite applicable guide in considering the evidence on the subject of entrapment. Sorrel[l]s v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 [1932]; Butts v. United States 8 Cir., 273 F. 35, 38, 18 A.L.R. 143 [1921]; United States v. Wray, D.C. [N.D., Ga.], 8 F.2d 429 [1925]; Swallum v. United States, 8 Cir., 39 F.2d 390 [1920]; Morei v. United States, 6 Cir., 127 F.2d 827 [1942]; Demos v. United States, 5 Cir., 205 F.2d 596 [1953]; United States v. Sawyer, 3 Cir., 210 F.2d 169, 170 [1954].    To decline to reverse the judgment appealed from would be tantamount to denying the defendant a jury trial upon the issue of entrapment. Therefore, the judgment must be reversed   . In the case at hand it was possible for the jury to have found that the criminal intent originated with the State, since some of the evidence, if believed, shows not only that a State agent purchased the marijuana, but that, in addition, another State agent placed the marijuana in the defendant's car. This evidence supports the defense of entrapment, and the defendant was entitled to an instruction upon that defense. We conclude that the jury should have had an opportunity to consider Froggatt's defense to the charge, and for that reason we reverse the case and remand it to the district court for a new trial. COLLINS, C.J., and ZENOFF, BATJER and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.