Opinion ID: 2582433
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: formality of the interrogation

Text: ¶ 55 The formality of the interrogation is another factor considered by the Davis Court. Comparing the interrogation in Crawford to McCottry's 911 phone call, the Court observed: the difference in the level of formality between the two interviews is striking. Crawford was responding calmly, at the station house, to a series of questions, with the officer-interrogator taping and making notes of her answers; McCottry's frantic answers were provided over the phone, in an environment that was not tranquil, or even . . . safe. Id. at 2276-77. In contrast to the chaos surrounding McCottry's interrogation, the situation in Hammon allowed for a more organized or formal [2] interrogation to take place. Hammon told arriving officers that things were fine and there was no immediate threat to her person. Id. at 2278. Her interview was conducted in a separate room away from the perpetrator and her statements deliberately recounted, in response to police questioning, how potentially criminal past events began and progressed. Id. at 2278. The Court concluded, [s]uch statements under official interrogation are an obvious substitute for live testimony because they do precisely what a witness does on direct examination. Id. (emphasis in original). III ¶ 56 With these factors in mind, I turn to the present case. James Ohlson, the alleged perpetrator, had left the scene by the time Officer Gray arrived. Although shaken, the declarant, D.L., was in no immediate danger when he made his statements to Officer Gray. He was, in fact, protected by the presence of law enforcement and separated from the perpetrator at all times throughout the interrogation. Officer Gray's testimony indicates D.L. used the past tense to describe what had occurred prior to the officer's arrival. See I Verbatim Report of Proceedings at 91 (I spoke with both of them, and they told me what happened.  (emphasis added)). ¶ 57 The temporal factor is the single most important factor here. D.L. was describing events in the past tense, not describing events which were presently happening. Because Ohlson had left the scene and the police were present to protect D.L., there was sufficient separation between the perpetrator and the declarant to suggest that the emergency had abated and D.L. was providing information to the police to assist in apprehending and prosecuting the perpetrator. ¶ 58 The interrogation before us is not particularly formal; however, police often conduct investigations in the field with the understanding between the interrogator and the declarant that the purpose of the questioning is to assist the apprehension and prosecution of the wrongdoer rather than resolve the ongoing emergency. I conclude that the statements made by D.L. to the police at the scene were testimonial. IV ¶ 59 The majority concludes the emergency was ongoing because Ohlson was still at large and pose[d] a threat of harm. Majority at 1279. Thus, the majority concludes the emergency is still in progress when police arrive at the scene. But whether a perpetrator is at large was not a factor considered by the Davis Court, and the majority's emphasis on such a factor is problematic as many perpetrators will indeed be at large while police are questioning witnesses during an investigation. ¶ 60 The majority also concludes that an emergency was ongoing because, upon arrival, the police needed more information to determine whether the danger was ongoing. Again, I fear that this will nearly always be the case. Therefore, I would not conclude that statements to the police are nontestimonial merely because more crime or violence could possibly occur. ¶ 61 Most critically, I respectfully submit that the majority does not adequately distinguish Hammon from the case before us. In Hammon, the Supreme Court determined that by time the police arrived on the scene the emergency had ended even though Hammon appeared somewhat frightened and there was evidence in the home of a very recent and violent physical altercation between Hammon and her husband. 126 S.Ct. at 2272 (internal quotation marks omitted). Hammond's husband was present in the house, but she was protected by the police at the time. These facts are analogous to those in Hammon and distinguishable from those in Davis where McCottry was alone, unprotected by law enforcement, and in immediate danger from her husband. Id. at 2279. Here, Ohlson had left the scene by the time police arrived, D.L. was in no immediate danger, and the record indicates he used the past tense to describe what had occurred prior to the arrival of law enforcement. See id. at 2279 (McCottry's present-tense statements showed immediacy; [Hammond]'s narrative of past events was delivered at some remove in time from the danger she described.); id. at 2276 (statement is likely nontestimonial when it is necessary . . . to resolve the present emergency, rather than simply to learn . . . what had happened in the past (second emphasis added)). As such, D.L.'s recitation of recent, yet past events cannot rightly be construed as a call for help, as there was no present emergency in need of resolution. Id. at 2276. ¶ 62 The fact that D.L. described past events, the fact that the perpetrator had left the scene and the police were present to protect D.L., and the formality of the police officer's securing information for the purpose of apprehending and prosecuting the perpetrator all suggest D.L.'s statements were testimonial. As such, admittance of the statements violated Ohlson's right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. I concur in the result of the majority, however, because the admittance was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of Ohlson's guilt at trial. See State v. Guloy, 104 Wash.2d 412, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985). I CONCUR: Justice BARBARA A. MADSEN.