Opinion ID: 1096608
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Admission of Testimony Regarding Flight at the Time of Arrest

Text: The third of the three subparts to Conde's fifth claim involves Conde's alleged attempt to flee at the time of his arrest. In opening statements, the prosecution stated that upon entering Conde's grandmother's home in June 1995, detectives saw the defendant crouching down in an apparent attempt to get under a bed. The defense objected on the basis that any consciousness of guilt suggested by this act was just as easily associated with the G.M. incident, which had occurred within that week, as with the murders, which had occurred over six months before. The court overruled Conde's objection. During the evidentiary portion of the trial, when the prosecution began to ask a detective about the arrest, Conde renew[ed his] previous motion and objection reference to that line of questioning. This objection was overruled without discussion, and the detective eventually testified that he saw Conde on the right side of a large sized bed and he was kneeling, making his way, it appeared to me that he was going to conceal himself under the bed. In closing argument, the prosecutor argued that this was the behavior of someone who knew he was caught for his crimes. On appeal, Conde asserts that the trial court's admission of this testimony was error, as his arrest came six months after the last murder and was probative, at most, of consciousness of guilt concerning the then recently-committed, uncharged crime against G.M. The State erroneously argues that this issue was unpreserved and, thus, is subject to fundamental error analysis. However, as noted above, Conde objected twice to the testimony. We agree with Conde that insufficient evidence existed to establish a nexus between his conduct and the charged crime, given the length of time since Dunn's murder, the recent crime against G.M., and the absence of evidence that Conde even was aware that he was the subject of a murder investigation. See Escobar v. State, 699 So.2d 988, 996 (Fla. 1997) (insufficient evidentiary nexus for admission of flight evidence where defendant attempted to avoid arrest after traffic violation in another state, twenty-seven days after commission of charged offense). However, although we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence without the necessary nexus, we also find that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the standard set forth in State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986).