Opinion ID: 166715
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Disability Findings

Text: Smith’s remaining arguments are related. She contends that, without any analysis, the ALJ determined E.S.D. did not meet listing 112.05(E), and that the evidence he ignored, discussed in the preceding section, shows that E.S.D. meets or functionally equals the listing. Therefore, she concludes, substantial evidence does not support his conclusion that E.S.D. is not disabled. In his decision, the ALJ discussed some of the evidence and then stated: The claimant does not have an impairment that meets or medically equals the criteria of any of the listed impairments of Appendix 1. The undersigned has considered the listings in general and specifically listing 112.05. The claimant alleged a learning disability since January 1, 1995. Testing in January 2002 revealed a verbal IQ of 60, which indicates a verbal learning disability may be present. Her full-scale performance is in the borderline range (Exhibit 4F). There is no evidence to indicate the claimant has an impairment of listing level severity. Aplt. App. Vol. II, at 16. -15- It is evident that the ALJ concluded E.S.D.’s verbal IQ score of 60 met the first prong of listing 112.05(E), but failed to address the second prong, whether E.S.D. is markedly limited in one of the three functional areas relevant to the listings: social functioning, personal functioning, or concentration, persistence, or pace, see 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Part B, § 112.02(B)(2)(b)-(d). The last sentence of the foregoing quote does not fulfill the ALJ’s requirement to “make a specific finding as to the degree of limitation in each of the functional areas” used to determine whether a mental impairment meets a listing, 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(e), and is “a bare conclusion [that] is beyond meaningful judicial review,” Clifton, 79 F.3d at 1009. Furthermore, the discussion of the functional equivalence domains does not serve as a substitute for the requisite analysis of the three functional areas. As the Commissioner explained in publishing revised final rules for determining childhood disability claims, the “domains are specifically designed for determining functional equivalence and are completely delinked from the mental disorders and other listings.” 65 Fed. Reg. 54747, 54755 (Sept. 11, 2000) (emphasis added). In any event, the ALJ’s functional equivalency findings themselves are flawed because, as discussed above, he did not address some of the significantly probative evidence properly. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s determination because he failed to address the second prong of -16- listing 112.05(E), and he overlooked evidence that “fairly detracts” from the weight to be accorded to the evidence he relied on in making his functional equivalency findings, see Hamlin , 365 F.3d at 1214. However, we do not weigh the evidence ourselves to determine whether E.S.D.’s impairment meets or functionally equals a listed impairment. That is for the ALJ to determine on remand.