Opinion ID: 187362
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: General Injunctions

Text: The district court permanently enjoined Defendants from committing any act of racketeering, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), relating in any way to the manufacturing, marketing, promotion, health consequences or sale of cigarettes in the United States, and from making, or causing to be made in any way, any material false, misleading, or deceptive statement or representation, or engaging in any public relations or marketing endeavor that is disseminated to the United States public and that misrepresents or suppresses information concerning cigarettes. Such material statements include, but are not limited to, any matter that: (a) involves health, safety, or other areas with which a reasonable consumer or potential consumer of cigarettes would be concerned; (b) a reasonable consumer or potential consumer would attach importance to in determining whether to purchase or smoke cigarettes; or (c) the Defendant, Covered Person or Entity making the representation knows or has reason to know that its recipient regards or is likely to regard as important in determining whether to purchase cigarettes or to smoke cigarettes, even if a reasonable person would not so regard it. Philip Morris, 449 F.Supp.2d at 938. Defendants assert that, in the face of more than 1,600 pages of findings, these injunctions do not sufficiently specify the acts restrained, in violation of Rule 65(d), due process, and the First Amendment. Defs. Br. 137. Rule 65(d) requires every order granting an injunction to state its terms specifically [and] describe in reasonable detailand not by referring to the complaint or other documentthe act or acts restrained or required. FED.R.CIV.P. 65(d)(1)(B)-(C). The Rule was designed to prevent uncertainty and confusion on the part of those faced with injunctive orders. Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476, 94 S.Ct. 713, 38 L.Ed.2d 661 (1974). Because an injunction prohibits conduct under threat of judicial punishment, basic fairness requires that those enjoined receive explicit notice of precisely what conduct is outlawed. Id. Under this standard, we have held injunctions to be too vague when they enjoin all violations of a statute in the abstract without any further specification, or when they include, as a necessary descriptor of the forbidden conduct, an undefined term that the circumstances of the case do not clarify. See Wash. Inv. Network, 475 F.3d at 407 (order enjoined all future violations of the applicable statutes, without clarifying the acts restrained); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Brock, 778 F.2d 834, 843 (D.C.Cir.1985) (order enjoined substantially similar conduct without further specification in a case that provided no examples of what is similar); Common Cause v. NRC, 674 F.2d 921, 926-27 (D.C.Cir.1982) (order enjoined conduct similar in nature without further specification in a case that provided no examples of what is similar); SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 665 F.2d 1310, 1318-19 (D.C.Cir.1981) (defendant enjoined not to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person); see also Schmidt, 414 U.S. at 476, 94 S.Ct. 713 (enjoined the present Wisconsin scheme). Even if it tracks statutory language, a general injunction is not too vague if it relates the enjoined violations to the context of the case. See Savoy Indus., Inc., 665 F.2d at 1316-17 (tracking language of the statute in context of defendant's relationship with issuers of securities). Indeed, we must always apply the fair notice requirement in the light of the circumstances surrounding (the injunction's) entry: the relief sought by the moving party, the evidence produced at the hearing on the injunction, and the mischief that the injunction seeks to prevent. Common Cause, 674 F.2d at 927 (quotation marks omitted). The two injunctions at issue here sufficiently specify the activities enjoined as to provide Defendants with fair notice of the prohibited conduct. The district court did not abstractly enjoin Defendants from violating RICO or making false statements, but instead specified the matters about which Defendants are to avoid making false statements or committing racketeering acts: the manufacturing, marketing, promotion, health consequences, and sale of cigarettes, along with related issues that Defendants have reason to know are of concern to cigarette consumers. This is not a generalized injunction to obey the law, especially when read in the context of the district court's legal conclusions and 4,088 findings of fact about fraud in the manufacture, promotion, and sale of cigarettes. These injunctions may be broad, but breadth is warranted to prevent further violations where[, as here,] a proclivity for unlawful conduct has been shown. Savoy Indus. Inc., 665 F.2d at 1317 (quoting McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 192, 69 S.Ct. 497, 93 L.Ed. 599 (1949) (holding that the record of continuing and persistent violations of the [statute] would indicate that that kind of a [general] decree was wholly warranted in this case)). Defendants complain that the volume of findings in this case actually make understanding the injunctions more difficult and chill speech because some of the district court's findings present express prohibitions whereas others, like the use of white filter paper for cigarettes, simply reflect the district court's disapproval of aspects of Defendants' business practices without finding the conduct fraudulent. Defs. Br. 137. This objection answers itself, as the plain terms of the injunctions prohibit only conduct that would constitute a racketeering act or a material false, misleading, or deceptive statement or representation, not all activities the court mentioned in its findings.