Opinion ID: 1435285
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Negligent Entrustment of a Firearm

Text: There are no cases in this jurisdiction allowing recovery for negligent entrustment of a firearm. [13] Some other jurisdictions, including Maryland, the situs of the entrustment here, have recognized this cause of action. See, e.g., Neale v. Wright, 322 Md. 8, 585 A.2d 196, 199 (1991) (negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle); Bonsignore v. City of New York, 683 F.2d 635, 637-38 (2d Cir.1982) (negligent entrustment of a revolver); Johnson v. Patterson, 570 N.E.2d 93, 96 (Ind.Ct.App. 1991) (negligent entrustment of a shotgun). [14] The elements of this cause of action are: (1) [t]he making available to another a chattel which the supplier (2) knows or should have known the user is likely to use in a manner involving risk of physical harm to others (3) the supplier should expect to be endangered by its use. Mackey v. Dorsey, 104 Md.App. 250, 655 A.2d 1333, 1337 (1995). If the supplier knows or should know of the entrustee's propensities to use the chattel in an improper or dangerous manner, the entrustor owes a duty to foreseeable parties to withhold the chattel from the entrustee. Herbert v. Whittle, 69 Md.App. 273, 517 A.2d 358, 361 (1986). But where the entrustor neither knows nor has any reason to know that there is an inordinate risk of harm in supplying the person with the dangerous weapon, there can be no recovery on this theory even if injury occurs. Id. at 361-63. Generally, one has no duty to prevent the criminal acts of a third party who is not under the defendant's supervision or control unless the criminal conduct was the foreseeable result of the defendant's negligence. Prather, supra, 981 S.W.2d at 806 (citations omitted). In other words, [a] defendant has a duty to protect others from the criminal acts of a third party only if it reasonably appears or should appear to him that the criminal act would be the foreseeable result of his negligence. Id. (citations omitted); see generally District of Columbia v. Cassidy, 465 A.2d 395, 398 (D.C.1983) (liability may be imposed for reasonably foreseeable results of acts or omissions, including intervening acts of a third party when foreseeable). Thus, our inquiry is whether appellant proffered evidence in the trial court which establishes that the City of Mount Rainier knew or should have known that it was likely that Thompson, if entrusted with a service revolver, would use it in a dangerous manner. See Prather, 981 S.W.2d at 806. Appellant contends that the City was on notice that Officer Thompson was an accident waiting to happen. In support of this claim, appellant cites evidence in Thompson's personnel files indicating various problems. Specifically, there is evidence that the Deputy Chief of Police recommended Thompson's demotion, pointing out that Thompson had displayed uncontrollable outbursts of rage and lack of control or discipline, disrespect for rank and superior officers. The Deputy Chief of Police also listed two internal investigations of Thompson for filing a false report and destruction of government property, disrespect of superior officers, causing dissension between employees and civilian complaints. Daily observation reports noted Thompson's overbearing nature, and faulted him for the level of force he used during a detention. He received a below average performance evaluation at the end of 1991 for judgment, ability to work without direct supervision and ability to deal with the public and department employees. Thompson also admitted throwing a traffic cone across the office against the door of the Police Chief. [15] Appellant argues that this evidence was sufficient for a jury to conclude that injury to a third party was foreseeable if the City allowed Officer Thompson to continue carrying a weapon. Unquestionably, there is substantial evidence that Thompson had many disciplinary problems as a police officer prior to the shooting. The question is whether knowledge of all of these incidents appellant cites supports a claim that the City should have known that Thompson was likely to use his service revolver in a dangerous manner. For only [i]f the supplier knows or should know of the entrustee's propensities to use the chattel in an improper or dangerous manner, [does] the entrustor owe[] a duty to foreseeable parties to withhold the chattel from the entrustee. Herbert, supra, 517 A.2d at 361. We are not persuaded that the incidents identified by appellant, even when taken together, can be deemed to have alerted the police that Officer Thompson might recklessly or deliberately use his weapon in a private dispute. There was no evidence of conduct by Officer Thompson prior to the fatal shooting in this case which should have alerted the police that Thompson was likely to misuse his gun. There was no evidence that any of his misconduct to that point involved his service revolver, and only a single documented instance of his having used inordinate force during a detention. Nor is there is any contention that Thompson was not proficient in the use of firearms. Even assuming the facts outlined by appellant to be true, they are insufficient as a matter of law to show that the City knew or should have known that Thompson was likely to use his weapon in a manner involving risk of physical harm to others. Mackey, supra, 655 A.2d at 1337. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for appellant on this claim.