Opinion ID: 887710
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Foreseeability in the Context of Causation

Text: ¶ 44 The County has not properly presented to this Court the issue of whether it is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of causation. Nevertheless, because the County moved the District Court for summary judgment on this basis, it is appropriate that we comment briefly on the issue for the benefit of the District Court and for the sake of judicial economy. Although foreseeability is generally properly confined to the duty element of negligence under Montana law, where a dispute presents the issue of an intervening act of a third party, as here, we address foreseeability in the proximate cause context as well. Lopez, ¶ 32. In the proximate cause context, we consider whether the unforeseeability of an intervening cause (i.e., Russell's intentional criminal act of stabbing Prindel) severs the chain of causation. Samson v. State, 2003 MT 133, ¶ 25, 316 Mont. 90, ¶ 25, 69 P.3d 1154, ¶ 25. In order to establish proximate causation, however, the specific injury to a plaintiff need not have been foreseen. Samson, ¶ 26 (quoting Lacock v. 4B's Restaurants, Inc. (1996), 277 Mont. 17, 22, 919 P.2d 373, 375-76), overruling, in part, Lopez, ¶ 32, and LaTray, ¶ 28 (to the extent that those decisions suggested that the specific injury suffered by the plaintiff must be foreseeable). ¶ 45 The causal issue of intervening criminal or noncriminal acts normally involves questions of fact which are more properly left to the finder of fact for resolution. Lopez, ¶ 34 (quotations and citation omitted). Thus, it is only when reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion that the question of foreseeability may be determined as a matter of law for purposes of summary judgment. Lopez, ¶ 35 (quotations and citation omitted). ¶ 46 In light of our foregoing analysis of the foreseeability of risk posed by Russell, we conclude that reasonable minds could differ as to whether Russell's intentional act of stabbing Prindel was so unforeseeable as to sever the chain of causation. Consequently, this issue of causation should not be decided on summary judgment, but should be resolved by the trier of fact.