Opinion ID: 2273456
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Negligence and Fraudulent Concealment

Text: Blondell similarly asserts, regarding his negligence and fraudulent concealment counts, that Littlepage owed duties of communication and disclosure to him concerning her advice to the clients that Blondell may have delayed fatally in filing their claim, thereby creating an issue that diminished the settlement value of the case, and in suggesting that the clients pursue a potential malpractice action against Blondell. As a threshold matter, one of the essential elements of causes of action in negligence and fraudulent concealment is the existence of a duty between the parties. As we recently reiterated in Lloyd v. GM, 397 Md. 108, 916 A.2d 257 (2007): A complaint alleging negligence must contain the following elements: (1) that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and (4) that the loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant's breach of the duty. Id. at 131-32, 916 A.2d at 270-71 (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted), quoting Valentine v. On Target, 353 Md. 544, 549, 727 A.2d 947, 949 (1999); BG & E v. Lane, 338 Md. 34, 43, 656 A.2d 307, 311 (1995), citing Rosenblatt v. Exxon, 335 Md. 58, 76, 642 A.2d 180, 188 (1994). Similarly, the essential elements of a claim of fraudulent concealment include: (1) the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff to disclose a material fact; (2) the defendant failed to disclose that fact; (3) the defendant intended to defraud or deceive the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff took action in justifiable reliance on the concealment; and (5) the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the defendant's concealment. Lloyd, 397 Md. at 138, 916 A.2d at 274 (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted), quoting Green v. H & R Block, 355 Md. 488, 525, 735 A.2d 1039, 1059 (1999). With respect to determining whether a duty exists, we often have recourse to the definition in W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts § 53 (5th ed. 1984), which characterizes duty as an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another. Gourdine v. Crews, 405 Md. 722, 745, 955 A.2d 769, 783 (2008), quoting Patton v. USA Rugby, 381 Md. 627, 636-37, 851 A.2d 566, 571 (2004). See also Pendleton v. State, 398 Md. 447, 461, 921 A.2d 196, 204-05 (2007); Doe v. Pharmacia & Upjohn Company, Inc., 388 Md. 407, 415, 879 A.2d 1088, 1092 (2005); Hemmings v. Pelham Wood Ltd. Liab. Ltd. P'ship, 375 Md. 522, 536, 826 A.2d 443, 451 (2003); Todd v. MTA, 373 Md. 149, 155, 816 A.2d 930, 933-34 (2003); Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 627, 510 A.2d 1078, 1083 (1986). In essence, the determination of whether an actionable duty exists represents a policy question of whether the specific plaintiff is entitled to protection from the acts of the defendant. Pendleton, 398 Md. at 461, 921 A.2d at 205, quoting Rosenblatt, 335 Md. at 77, 642 A.2d at 189 (reasoning that ultimately, the determination of whether a duty should be imposed is made by weighing the various policy considerations and reaching a conclusion that the plaintiff's interests are, or are not, entitled to legal protection against the conduct of the defendant.). In Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank, 307 Md. 527, 515 A.2d 756 (1986), we had occasion to consider the nature of a duty and considerations of the relationship of the parties and foreseeability: The duty with which we are here concerned is a duty imposed by law as a matter of sound policy, for the violation of which a person may be held to respond in damages in tort. This duty is conveniently, if not lyrically, referred to as a tort duty. A tort duty does not always coexist with a moral duty. Neither must a duty imposed by statute necessarily create a tort duty. Nor does a duty assumed or implied in contract by that fact alone become a tort duty. The mere negligent breach of a contract, absent a duty or obligation imposed by law independent of that arising out of the contract itself, is not enough to sustain an action sounding in tort. Still, while every contractual duty does not also impose a tort duty, [w]here a contractual relationship exists between the persons and at the same time a duty is imposed by or arises out of the circumstances surrounding or attending the transaction, the breach of such duty is a tort and the injured party many have his remedy by an action on the case, or he may waive the tort and sue for breach of contract. In determining whether a tort duty should be recognized in a particular context, two major considerations are: the nature of the harm likely to result from a failure to exercise due care, and the relationship that exists between the parties. Where the failure to exercise due care creates a risk of economic loss only, courts have generally required an intimate nexus between the parties as a condition to the imposition of tort liability. This intimate nexus is satisfied by contractual privity or its equivalent. By contrast, where the risk created is one of personal injury, no such direct relationship need be shown, and the principle determinant becomes foreseeability. Id. at 533-35, 515 A.2d at 759-60 (citations and footnote omitted) (alteration in original). In Gourdine, 405 Md. at 745-46, 955 A.2d at 783, quoting Patton, 381 Md. at 637, 851 A.2d at 571 (citations omitted), we discussed the interrelationship of duty and foreseeability, of primary importance in instances of personal injury: Where the failure to exercise due care creates risks of personal injury, the principal determinant of duty becomes foreseeability. The foreseeability test is simply intended to reflect current societal standards with respect to an acceptable nexus between the negligent acts and the ensuing harm. In determining whether a duty exists, it is important to consider the policy reasons supporting a cause of action in negligence. The purpose is to discourage or encourage specific types of behavior by one party to the benefit of another party. While foreseeability is often considered among the most important of these factors, its existence alone does not suffice to establish a duty under Maryland law. We continued that [d]uty requires a close or direct effect of the tortfeasor's conduct on the injured party, as acknowledged by Prosser and Keeton: The rule that you are to love your neighbor becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbor; and the lawyer's question, Who is my neighbor? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbor. Who, then, in law is my neighbor? The answer seems to be persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question. Id. at 746-47, 955 A.2d at 784, quoting Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts at Section 53, quoting Donoghue v. Stevenson, 1 Q.B. 491 (1893); see also Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 229 (2000) (Relationship of the parties is so pervasively important in determining existence and measure of duty that it often goes unmentioned.). We concern ourselves here, then, with whether there was that level of intimate nexus between Blondell and Littlepage to support the existence of a duty to warrant any remuneration for economic loss, outside of any allegedly related to his fee, which is not in issue. With respect to any personal injury recovery, we ask whether under the circumstances presented, it was reasonably foreseeable by Littlepage that Blondell would suffer the injuries he is alleged to have incurred. Under the intimate nexus test, as well as in the consideration of the foreseeability question, actionable duties of consultation and communication cannot be derived in the instant case, because any duty owed by Littlepage to Blondell is circumscribed by the fee sharing agreement. The agreement among the parties directly contradicts the existence of those duties, because Littlepage unilaterally was to determine whether to request Blondell's services; Blondell had conceded at the inception any necessity of consultation and its attendant communication between him and Littlepage. [8] We also decline to elevate the LittlepageBlondell fee sharing relationship to a closer association warranting imposition of the duties of consultation and communication based upon Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, not only because the Rules do not support the imposition of civil liability, [9] but also because Rule 1.5 itself does not support the recognition of such a duty. The intended beneficiary of Rule 1.5 is the client, for whom disclosure is mandated, rather than co-counsel. Further, to impose a duty on Littlepage that she should have foreseen that her failure to consult and communicate with Blondell, would affect his ability to ever speak to his client, which in and of itself may not necessarily constitute a basis for recoverable damages, is not warranted. It may be, as Blondell has alleged, that he has suffered injuries apart from a lessened fee; because, however, Littlepage was to determine the level of Blondell's involvement, solely as a matter of her own prerogative, as Blondell had agreed and disclosed to the Corbins, she could not reasonably be expected to have foreseen that the lack of communication and disclosure would injure Blondell in the way specified. As a result, we hold that the duties of consultation and communication that Blondell alleges in his negligence and fraudulent concealment counts are not extant.