Opinion ID: 1195187
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A Physician's Duty to Disclose

Text: Dr. McCurdy argues that the ICA erred by vacating the fraud count and remanding for a new trial on the fraud claim. He contends that the ICA should have reversed the fraud verdict because the majority's creation of a legal duty by physicians in Hawaii to inform patients of medical board certifications they do not have before providing treatment[] is a policy mistake. In essence, Dr. McCurdy's argument presumes that, as a matter of law, a physician does not have an affirmative duty to disclose his or her qualifications to a patient prior to providing treatment. We agree.
The type and extent of information a physician is required to disclose as a matter of law is governed by the doctrine of informed consent. It is well established that the doctrine of informed consent imposes an affirmative duty upon physicians or surgeons to fully disclose to a patient the types of risks and alternatives to a proposed treatment or surgery. Keomaka v. Zakaib, 8 Haw.App. 518, 523, 811 P.2d 478, 482 (quoting Linda S. Martell, Note, Leyson v. Steuermann: Is there Plain Error in Hawaii's Doctrine of Informed Consent?, 8 U. Haw. L.Rev. 569, 580 (1986)), cert. denied, 72 Haw. 618, 841 P.2d 1075 (1991). See Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 671-3 (1993). [3] Whether informed consent requires disclosures beyond those relating to the nature, anticipated results, risks, and alternatives of a contemplated treatment or procedure is an issue of first impression in Hawai`i. No state has ever held that the doctrine of informed consent requires disclosure of information concerning the personal characteristics of the physician. In fact, informed consent has been held not to require disclosure of: (1) the physician's lack of experience in performing the disputed procedure, Foard v. Jarman, 326 N.C. 24, 387 S.E.2d 162 (1990); (2) the physician's incompetence, Wachter v. United States, 689 F.Supp. 1420 (D.Md.1988), aff'd, 877 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.1989) (applying Maryland and federal law); nor (3) the qualifications of persons providing treatment, Abram v. Children's Hosp. of Buffalo, 151 A.D.2d 972, 542 N.Y.S.2d 418 (N.Y.App.Div. 1989), appeal dismissed by, 75 N.Y.2d 865, 552 N.Y.S.2d 930, 552 N.E.2d 178 (1990). See generally David W. Louisell & Harold Williams, 3 Medical Malpractice ¶ 22.04[e] (1997) (discussing the doctrine of informed consent). Under the circumstances of the present case, we decline to hold that a physician has a duty to affirmatively disclose his or her qualifications or the lack thereof to a patient. First, Dr. McCurdy was certified as, and held himself out to be, an otolaryngologist, facial surgeon, and cosmetic surgeon. He made no active representations to the contrary, nor did he conceal his qualifications from Ditto. Ditto concedes as much, given that her entire basis for fraud was based on the fact that Dr. McCurdy failed to tell her that he was not certified as a plastic surgeon. Second, this is a matter best left to the legislature, and, more specifically, the board of medical examiners. Hawaii's statute on informed consent expressly mandates that the board of medical examiners establish standards for physicians or surgeons to follow in disclosing information to a patient to ensure that the patient's consent to treatment is an informed consent. HRS § 671-3(a). We conclude, therefore, that, under the circumstances of this case, Dr. McCurdy did not have an affirmative duty to inform Ditto of his qualifications or the lack thereof specifically that he was not a plastic surgeon and that he did not have hospital privileges. Consequently, Ditto's claim of fraud cannot stand. We therefore (1) reverse the jury's finding of fraud and award attributed thereto, and (2) remand this case to the trial court with instructions to dismiss the fraud count.