Opinion ID: 422249
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Government Attorney Comments

Text: 24 During the cross-examination of one of Crosby's witnesses, his close friend Gus Borges, the government counsel asked the witness about a telephone call Crosby had made to Borges' home the morning of the hostage incident. Borges had testified on direct that Crosby had called to ask if he could borrow some money. On cross-examination Borges denied that the purpose of Crosby's call was to borrow a gun. The prosecutor then asked: Do you recall telling Dominick Nuccio [a friend of Crosby's] about three or four months after the incident at your house that Gary had come by your house to get your gun, and he said, 'I am going to blow some people's heads off at the Veterans Administration Hospital?'  Defense counsel interrupted the question with an objection, stating before the jury that the question was an improper question, which counsel well knows. To this assertion the prosecutor replied that the question was not improper because there was a factual basis for the question which the government was prepared to provide the court. 25 Following this exchange, a conversation took place out of the hearing of the jury where the prosecutor explained to the court that he and another attorney for the government had interviewed Nuccio prior to trial, and that it was during this interview that Nuccio had told them of the conversation with Borges. To substantiate this, the government attorney showed the court the notes he had taken during the interview, which indicated that the question asked was a virtual verbatim representation of what Nuccio had said. The prosecutor explained that he believed calling Nuccio to the stand would be improper 9 as it would result in impeaching a witness by extrinsic evidence, but that he can put him [Nuccio] on the stand. At this point, the court overruled the defense motion and allowed the question. Borges denied that the conversation took place or that he even owned a gun. 26 Crosby initially argues that the prosecutor's statement before the jury that there was a factual basis for the question was improper and constituted reversible error. We note, however, that Crosby failed to object to the statement at trial and later refused the court's offer of a curative instruction to the jury. Because there was no objection below, the question is not properly before us on appeal. United States v. Okenfuss, 632 F.2d 483, 485 (5th Cir.1980). 27 Alternatively, Crosby contends that the question itself was improper. A trial court may generally limit the scope and extent of cross-examination, and its decision will not be disturbed on review unless the ruling was an abuse of its discretion. United States v. Hawkins, 661 F.2d 436, 444 (5th Cir.1981). This general rule is limited by the requirement that the prosecution must have some good faith factual basis for its question. Further, the question, of course, must be relevant to the issues involved at trial. Crosby contends that reversible error occurred when the government failed to call Nuccio to the stand to prove a good faith factual basis for the question at issue. 28 Crosby's argument is dependent upon a theory that the trial court's decision allowing the question to be asked was predicated upon the fact that the government had told the court it would call Nuccio. Our reading of the record, however, convinces us that the government's response to the court's question as to whether it was prepared to call Nuccio to the stand was only one of several bases on which the court made its decision that the question was proper. As stated earlier, the prosecutor told the court the specifics of its basis for the question, and even showed notes to the court which substantiated that basis. Further, the record shows that the government's offer to put Nuccio on the stand was merely a demonstration of the good faith of the impeaching question. It was not a promise upon which the court's ruling was conditioned. Cf. United States v. Bright, 588 F.2d 504, 512 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972, 99 S.Ct. 1537, 59 L.Ed.2d 789 (1979) (government's offer to reopen case and call person as witness sufficient to demonstrate the necessary good faith factual basis for cross-examination of defense character witness). Also, Crosby's attorney conceded that Nuccio confirmed to him that the conversation with Borges had taken place and that he had told the government of the conversation, although Nuccio was not sure what had been said. In our view, the above facts were more than adequate to permit the trial court, in its discretion, to determine that there was a good faith basis for the government's question. 29 Even were we to find that the question itself was improper, we fail to see how the question detracted from Crosby's defense that he was suffering from PTSD at the time of the incident. Crosby contends that allowing the jury to hear that he was prepared to blow the head off persons at the Veterans Administration permitted the jury to infer that Crosby was not disoriented and suffering from a PTSD dissociative episode, but rather was able coolly and rationally to premeditate a violent act. This contention is not persuasive. The question concerned a visit or telephone call which preceded the events at the VA Hospital by only a few hours. The defense had presented considerable testimony in support of its theory that Crosby had become extremely depressed and upset at least 24 hours before the incident. Crosby himself testified that he became disoriented and unaware of his actions after reading a story the day before about a Vietnam veteran who had killed himself in Miami after not receiving help for his problems. These feelings intensified later, he continued, when he went to a bar and met another Vietnam veteran with whom he shared combat stories. The two men drank and took drugs. Crosby did not sleep all night nor did he remember how he got back to his home. Crosby's wife testified that Crosby was so upset when he left the house the following morning that she felt it necessary to call Nuccio and ask him not to give her husband his gun. The cumulative effect of this evidence could not have been overborne by a single question advancing a fact which was denied and which could easily have been interpreted by the jury as merely more evidence that Crosby was, in fact, suffering from PTSD at the time of the kidnapping. 30 A question about Crosby blowing heads off appears at first glance to be prejudicial. But when viewed in the context of all the testimony at Crosby's two week trial, we find it not improperly inflammatory. Dr. Richard, one of the persons initially held by Crosby in the nurses station, had earlier testified that, following his attempt to assure Crosby that he was a doctor and would help him, Crosby had responded by wheeling around and placing the shotgun two feet from Richard's chest. At this point, Richard testified, he visualized the gun's going off and he believed it likely that he would be killed. Another hostage, Patricia Porter, testified at length as to her fear that Crosby would harm the hostages. Sharman, the nurse who was held the entire three hours, testified that Crosby told him that he would not harm him. But when in response he told Crosby that he was going to leave and walk out of the room, Crosby's reaction was to advise Sharman not to be a damned fool. Thus, there was considerable evidence offered at the trial that Crosby in his statements, his general actions, and his wielding of the shotgun, placed his hostage victims in immediate and serious fear of losing their lives. In this context, the one question stating his alleged threat, but denied by the witness, could not create any greater degree of a threat of drastic violence than did these sustained narrations of Crosby's threats and actions. 31 In conclusion, therefore, we do not find that the government's failure to call Nuccio to the stand constituted reversible error. The prosecutor's belief that it would have been improper to call the witness to the stand to contradict Borges' answer was reasonable, and the trial court had a good faith factual basis to allow the prosecutor's question. There was no necessity to call Nuccio to the stand for questioning. Moreover, even if the question was improper, it did not result in any substantial prejudice to Crosby's defense.