Opinion ID: 781507
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence of a Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments

Text: 30 Alexander Panek challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of conspiracy to launder monetary instruments in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). A defendant bears a heavy burden in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 89 (2d Cir.1999). Although the sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed de novo, the Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and draws all inferences in favor of the government. Id.; see also United States v. Szur, 289 F.3d 200, 219-220 (2d Cir.2002). The conviction must be affirmed if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime. United States v. Amiel, 95 F.3d 135, 141-42 (2d Cir.1996) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). In order to establish that a defendant conspired to launder monetary instruments in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), the government must show that the defendant agreed to: 1) conduct a financial transaction; 2) involving the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; 3) knowing that the property involved in the transaction represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity; and 4) knowing that the financial transaction was designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the nature, source, location, ownership, or control of those proceeds. See United States v. Maher, 108 F.3d 1513, 1525-27 (2d Cir.1997) (setting out elements of substantive offense); United States v. Wydermyer, 51 F.3d 319, 326-28 (2d Cir.1995). 6 31 The government presented sufficient evidence that Alexander Panek conspired with William Henry to launder the proceeds of marijuana sales. William Henry testified that Alexander Panek arranged the exchange of $50,000 in cash from the sale of marijuana for a cashier's check, made payable to Henry's mother, which was used to purchase a limousine. In addition, Joseph Pfohl, an unindicted co-conspirator, testified that in June 1995, Alexander Panek asked him to assist in the purchase of a limousine. Panek told Pfohl that he and another individual had cash and wished to buy a limousine, but that they could not purchase it with cash. Panek offered to pay Pfohl $50,000 in cash in return for a cashier's check in the amount of $45,000, made out to William Henry's mother. Panek and Henry subsequently visited Pfohl's business to retrieve the check. Henry handed Panek a brown paper bag containing between $45,000 and $50,000 in cash, the proceeds of marijuana sales, and Panek, in turn, handed the bag of cash to Pfohl. Pfohl then gave the pair the cashier's check. Henry gave the check to his mother to deposit into their joint account, and he used the money to purchase a limousine in his mother's name. Henry testified that we obtained the cashier's check from Pfohl because he was a legitimate big businessman and he could show where the money came from [and] we couldn't. Henry also testified that the money for the limousine was the proceeds of narcotics sales. 32 In March 1996, Alexander Panek helped William Henry purchase another limousine in a similar manner. Alexander Panek obtained a cashier's check in the amount of $20,000 from his credit union. Panek then delivered the check, made payable to William Henry's business, to Henry, who used it to purchase another limousine. In exchange for the cashier's check, Henry gave Alexander Panek cash and two or three checks. 33 Based upon this evidence, the jury reasonably could have concluded that Alexander Panek conspired with William Henry to launder the proceeds of marijuana sales by exchanging illicit cash for cashier's checks, which were then used to purchase two limousines. Both the exchange of cash for cashier's checks and the purchase of a vehicle with monetary instruments are financial transactions within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1956. See United States v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 912, 926-27 (7th Cir.1996) (conversion of cash into checks); United States v. Blackman, 904 F.2d 1250, 1257 (8th Cir.1990) (purchase of a truck). 34 There is also sufficient evidence to establish that Alexander Panek knew that the funds at issue were the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1); see also Maher, 108 F.3d at 1525-27 (holding that a defendant need only believe that the money was from some form of unlawful activity and need not know precisely what that activity was). It is undisputed that Alexander Panek knew that Henry was also substantially involved in purchasing and distributing marijuana and willingly participated in the elaborate transactions giving rise to the limousine purchases. Alexander Panek told Pfohl that he and Henry could not use the cash they wished to exchange for a cashier's check. The fact that William Henry handed Alexander Panek a brown paper bag containing such a large sum of cash supports the jury's conclusion that Alexander Panek knew the money came from unlawful activity. Moreover, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Alexander Panek was involved in a conspiracy to distribute marijuana, also suggesting that he knew the source of his co-conspirator's cash. 35 There is also sufficient evidence to establish that Alexander Panek knew that the transactions at issue were intended to disguise the source of the cash. Alexander Panek knew that Henry could not spend the cash without first exchanging it for cashier's checks, evident by his comment to Pfohl. Also, the elaborate nature of the transactions should have suggested to Alexander Panek that they were intended to make it more difficult to trace Henry's cash. 36 Finally, there is sufficient evidence to establish that Alexander Panek and William Henry had an agreement to launder the illicit cash. Alexander Panek told Pfohl that he and Henry wanted to buy a limousine but could not use cash, suggesting that Panek was an equal partner in the conspiracy. A conspiratorial agreement itself may be established by proof of a tacit understanding among the participants, rather than by proof of an explicit agreement. United States v. Desimone, 119 F.3d 217, 223 (2d Cir.1997); see also Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975); United States v. Martino, 759 F.2d 998, 1004 (2d Cir.1985). The mere fact that Panek participated with Henry in the suspicious transactions at issue suggests an agreement. 37 Alexander Panek argues that the government never proved that he had an interest in the transactions or profited from them. However, this Court has held that [i]t is not necessary to charge the jury that each conspirator must be found to have a `stake in the success' of the conspiracy. United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 245 (2d Cir.1990) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Isabel, 945 F.2d 1193, 1203 (1st Cir.1991) (citations omitted) ([E]vidence of a financial stake in the venture is not essential to show that the defendant intended to facilitate the unlawful objective of the conspiracy.). The government need only show purposeful behavior aimed at furthering the goals of the conspiracy. Desimone, 119 F.3d at 223; see also Torres, 901 F.2d at 245 (It is sufficient that the defendant was not indifferent to the outcome of the venture.). Rather, the government may establish this element by showing that the defendant had a financial stake in the outcome of a conspiracy. See Desimone, 119 F.3d at 224 (holding that the defendant's financial stake in the outcome of the negotiations constituted proof of his interest in furthering the goals of the conspiracy). 38 Therefore, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support Alexander Panek's conviction for conspiracy to launder monetary instruments in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).