Opinion ID: 800561
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Against the Manifest Weight of Evidence

Text: When considering whether the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, the district court has the power to get a general sense of the weight of the evidence, assessing the credibility of the witnesses and the comparative strength of the facts put forth at trial. Mejia, 650 F.3d at 633. In conducting its own assessment of the evidence presented, the district court cannot remove a piece of evidence from the calculus merely because the court believes it was not credible and then, with that piece excluded, grant a motion for a new trial because the verdict is now against the weight. Id. We have already found that the district court cannot disregard the officers' testimony as physically impossible or inherently incredible, so the district court was bound by the same evidence the jury considered in ruling on the motion for new trial. See id. [A] court will set aside a verdict as contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence only if no rational jury could have rendered the verdict. Marcus & Millichap Inv. Servs. of Chi., Inc. v. Sekulovski, 639 F.3d 301, 313-14 (7th Cir.2011) (quotations omitted); see also Galvan v. Norberg, 678 F.3d 581, 589 (7th Cir.2012). Whitehead relies heavily on Mejia in arguing that the district court applied the wrong standard to her motion for new trial by looking at the case in the light most favorable to the defendants instead of making an independent, neutral decision based on the credibility of the witnesses and evidence. Whitehead's reading of Mejia, which places the judge in the role of a 13th juror, is misguided. In Mejia, the district court determined that the weight of the evidence (not necessarily the manifest weight) was against the defendants, but concluded that it could not set aside the verdict unless the defendants' testimony contradicted indisputable physical facts or laws. 650 F.3d at 633. We held that the indisputable facts analysis comes into play only when considering whether to remove evidence from the court's evaluation. Id. at 634. This analysis, we explained, has no application when the court merely weighs the evidence itself. Id. (emphasis in original). The district court in that case viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendants (rather than neutrally) and concluded that the verdict could not be set aside unless the evidence supporting it was impossible. Id. Because the power to weigh the evidence is not limited by such a standard, we reversed. Id. Mejia stands for the proposition that the district court must properly exercise its discretion in weighing the evidence to determine if it's against the manifest weight of evidence. The district court, however, cannot grant a new trial just because it believes the jury got it wrong. See Latino, 58 F.3d at 315. [S]ince the credibility of witnesses is peculiarly for the jury, it is an invasion of the jury's province to grant a new trial merely because the evidence was sharply in conflict. Id. Even when evidence is contradictory, `[i]t's the jury's jobnot the district court's job or the job of a panel of appellate judgesto figure out who's telling the truth.' United States v. Hassebrock, 663 F.3d 906, 920 (7th Cir.2011) (quoting Lowe v. Consol. Freightways of Del., 177 F.3d 640, 642-43 (7th Cir.1999) (The fact that [the defendant] presented evidence that is inconsistent with the jury's verdict does not mean that the verdict should be reversed.... The jury was there; it weighed the witnesses' credibility, considered the evidence, and reached a supportable conclusion.)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, ___ S.Ct. ___, ___ L.Ed.2d ___, 2012 WL 359467 (2012). We will not supplant the jury's reasonable and factually supported verdict with our own judgment. Wipf v. Kowalski, 519 F.3d 380, 385 (7th Cir.2008). The district court acknowledged that it was required to weigh the facts when addressing Whitehead's motion for new trial and concluded: The jurors ... were presented with two sharply conflicting portrayals of the events on June 20, 2008, and they were entitled to believe either side. Whitehead testified that she was harassed by Bond and Stevens after calmly inquiring about her son, and then was thrown in the back of a [prisoner wagon] despite complying with all of their orders. Bond testified that he never saw Whitehead at the scene, and Stevens and Stack testified that Whitehead acted disruptively and failed to follow the orders they had issued to control the hostile crowd that had gathered. Given this conflicting testimony, none of which contracts indisputable physical facts or laws, ... the jury had a reasonable basis to find that the individual Defendants had probable cause to arrest Whitehead and did not use excessive force in doing so. After weighing all of the evidence presented at trial, the Court finds that this is not a case in which no rational jury could have rendered the verdict. ... Because the verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, the Court declines to grant Whitehead a new trial. (emphasis added). The district judge's discussion of the evidence and comparative strength of the facts wasn't extensive, but we do not fault him because Whitehead's arguments on this issue were brief and merely referred the court back to her arguments on the inherent incredibility of the officers' testimony. The judge nevertheless, citing Mejia, applied the proper standard, understood his role in weighing the evidence, and relying on all the evidence, including the officers' testimony, concluded that the jury had a reasonable basis to find in favor of the defendants. See Aldridge v. Forest River, Inc., 635 F.3d 870, 877 (7th Cir.2011) (This court will not overturn a jury verdict if a reasonable basis exists in the record to support it.). [O]nce the district court applies the correct law, its discretion is wide and our review deferential. Mejia, 650 F.3d at 634; see also Galvan, 678 F.3d at 588 (Our review of a decision denying a new trial is `extremely deferential.'). [T]he district court is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and determine whether the verdict was against the manifest weight; it heard the witnesses testify, saw the evidence presented, and gained a better appreciation of the nuances of the case than could be gleaned from a cold, written record. Mejia, 650 F.3d at 634; see also Aldridge, 635 F.3d at 876-77 (The district court, having seen the presentation of the evidence and observed the witnesses, is in a unique position to rule on a new trial motion. (quotations omitted)). Based on this record, we cannot find that the district court, having observed the witnesses testify to their different versions of events and having assessed their credibility, abused its discretion in concluding that the jury verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.