Opinion ID: 1872281
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Defense Dialogue with Circuit Court

Text: ¶ 64. At the motion hearing, the circuit court and Shomberg's attorney then had the following exchange regarding the offer of proof: MR. COHEN [defense counsel]: . . . When you look at six people in a lineup, you think to yourself which is the person that most looks like the person I'm looking for, and you use relative judgment, and that's what makes a simultaneous lineup very unreliable. . . . . Mr. Carroll can tell you . . . that by using a sequential lineup, you tend to eliminate all the false positives without eliminating the correct positives . . . . Why that's important, when we bring somebody in for a lineup, they tend to think, hey, I'm here for a lineup, they must have caught the guy, now I got to figure out which of these six people did it, and that is relative judgment. . . . . I think the most important thing this expert can tell you is why the process we're using leads to mistakes. . . . . THE COURT: . . . I'll make a preliminary ruling. First of all, as it relates to the opinions that the defense is seeking to elicit from Mr. Carroll, I'm not going to allow that for the following reasons: The bottom line is, the defense seeks to ask Mr. Carroll, in his capacity as an expert, or perception as an expert, as to the reliability of identification by the complaining witness and by the security guard. I think that does invade the province of the jury and, yet, I don't see how it assists the jury. [14] . . . . This holding would be consistent with the Hampton case, as well as Blair and Wilson. Specifically, the judge in the Hampton case ruled that the defendant's expert witness would be limited in his testimony to simply listing the different factors affecting human perception, but would not be allowed to give an opinion as to the reliability of the specific identification of the defendant by Mrs. Schlieve. . . . . . . . Now Mr. Cohen's motion . . . indicates that the expert would testify that there are factors that may influence a witness's ability to identify a stranger. . . . . Mr. Cohen, how is this going to, if I allow this, is this going to assist the trier of fact? . . . . . . . I cannot in any way envision allowing the trier of fact to hear the fact that New Jersey mandates sequential lineups as opposed to simultaneous lineups. I don't see what bearing that has. MR. COHEN: Mandates is not that important, but what is important, the reasons why it's become the preferred method of doing it. . . . . THE COURT: So what we're back to is, you want to call this individual who will opine that sequential lineups are better than simultaneous lineups? MR. COHEN: And the reason why, not just that they're better, but here's why. Here's [sic] the problems with simultaneous ones. THE COURT: Because, in part, it's a process of elimination as opposed to positive identification. MR. COHEN: The fact that exactly, at least part of what the victim said, when she put down her answer, Well, I knew it wasn't one and three because they were too big. I knew it wasn't two and four because they were too old. THE COURT: But isn't that something that you would also ask the witness on cross-examination? MR. COHEN: I sure could. I sure could, but it's a process that, I think it's important. What I was impressed with was the experiments that they have done. That really sort of, you know, sewed it up for me. This was really a much better way of doing it. . . . . THE COURT: So what we're back to is his opinion that sequential is better than simultaneous. MR. COHEN: And why. THE COURT: Because simultaneous means the person, the witness, in essence, has the burden of making a positive identification as opposed to simply eliminating people that the witness does not feel were the perpetrator with the, I guess implicit within the witness's belief, that one of these people must be the perpetrator. MR. COHEN: Yes. Relative judgment. . . . . For instance, I didn't know the term relative judgment, in terms of how it affects someone selecting somebody in a six-person lineup. That's not a term I was familiar with. I don't know if the Court was. THE COURT: No. But as it relates to these areas, I'm having a problem seeing why this could not be adequately explored by cross-examination of any witness who testifies, as to identification and, again, what we're back to is, how much light was available, how much did someone have to drink, did you take any drugs, were you under any type of stress, how close was the person, was their fact in any way obstructing [sic], what was the period of time between which this occurred and you were first shown this lineup. I don't see so far how any of those factors would require the assistance of an expert witness. . . . . I don't think the areas we're talking about require the assistance of an expert because it gets down to the same factors that the trier of fact would consider . . . . . . . . I say that having reviewed . . . Mr. Carroll's report, as well as his CV, and when I look at page three of that report, taking up those opinions one by one . . . I realize they're offered as the basis for his opinion, that ultimately the reliability is suspect, of the eyewitness identification, number one, several minor inconsistencies found in police reports, that's something that can be brought out on cross-examination. Number two, again, that's his opinion when he states, Neither the victim or the witness identify the suspect. The trier of fact will hear the exact testimony in that regard. I don't think anybody under the auspices of being an expert witness would be allowed to testify, If we are to convict suspects on this type identification, then at least 10 percent of those convicted would be innocent. . . . . Number three, again, Victim B[.] isn't identifying the person that she remembers from the incident, but is instead identifying those persons who couldn't have committed the crime, that's a matter that the trier of fact can consider unassisted by Mr. Carroll. Four, Eyewitness identification remains as one of the most influential types of evidence. Studies indicate that jurors believe eyewitness evidence more than fingerprint evidence. I don't see how that's relevant or should be considered by the trier of fact. And then, five, again, relates to his opinion about when eyewitness testimony is more reliable, but it would consider the same types of factors that the trier of fact would as it relates to those studies. As it relates to those studies, I don't believe that would assist the trier of fact, it would simply invade their province, so for all of those reasons, I'm going to deny the motion to admit expert eyewitness testimony.