Opinion ID: 509231
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Instruction on Self Defense

Text: 8 We begin our analysis by noting that a petitioner who seeks habeas relief from a state court conviction alleging improper jury instructions has a heavy burden to bear in federal court. It is not sufficient for the petitioner to show simply that the instructions were undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned. Wood v. Marshall, 790 F.2d 548, 551 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied sub nom. Wood v. McMackin, 107 S.Ct. 889 (1987). Rather, the petitioner must show that the allegedly improper instructions have infected the accused's trial to such a degree as to constitute a clear violation of due process. Id. Accordingly, the trial court's failure to give requested jury instructions generally does not amount to constitutional error. Eberhardt v. Bordenkircher, 605 F.2d 275, 277 n.  (6th Cir.1979). In Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154-55 (1977), the Supreme Court stated: 9 The burden of demonstrating that an erroneous instruction was so prejudicial that it will support a collateral attack on the constitutional validity of a state court's judgment is even greater than the showing required to establish plain error on direct appeal.... [The] burden is especially heavy [when] ... [the] claim of prejudice is based on the failure to instruct.... An omission, or incomplete instruction, is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law. The Supreme Court has also stated: 10 [T]he failure to give a requested instruction ... must be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances--including all the instructions to the jury, arguments of counsel, whether the weight of the evidence was overwhelming and other relevant factors--to determine whether the defendant received a constitutionally fair trial. 11 Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789 (1979). 12 In support of their argument that their due process rights were violated by the court's failure to instruct on the self-defense issue, petitioners cite to a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in the case of United States ex rel. Means v. Solem, 646 F.2d 322 (8th Cir.1980). In that case, the defendant was convicted of starting a riot to obstruct justice stemming from a protest demonstration at the trial of several American Indians. The charge resulted from an altercation with members of the police tactical squad who attempted to remove the protestors from the Minnehaha County Courthouse in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. The defendant claims that he had acted in self-defense and in the defense of other protestors against the unexpected and excessive force used by the tactical squad during their assault on the courthouse. The trial court, however, refused to instruct the jury on the issue of self-defense because the court found that the defendant and the other protestors had provoked the attack by their refusal to leave the courtroom when ordered to do so by the judge. After exhausting his state remedies, defendant Means filed a petition for habeas corpus with the federal district court in South Dakota. The petition was granted, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the trial court's failure to give instructions on self-defense and the defense of others was a denial of the petitioner's right to due process. 646 F.2d at 331-32. 13 In the instant case, the federal district court found that the Tennessee trial judge adequately charged the jury on the issue of self-defense in the petitioners' criminal case. The district court distinguished the decision by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Solem, where the trial court had made it clear that all instructions on self-defense would be disallowed. 14 The instructions given to the jury at petitioners' trial provided in part: 15 Every person has a right to resist an unlawful arrest, and that in preventing such illegal restraint of his liberty, he may use such force as may be necessary. But that is not an unlimited right. Necessary is a relative term, depending on the circumstances of each case. Force may not be resorted to or means of resistance adopted which are disproportionate to the effort made to take him into custody. The question as to whether unnecessary and excessive force was employed by the officer making the unlawful arrest, or by the person sought to be arrested illegally, is for you, the jury, as the triers of the facts, to decide under all of the circumstances. 16 Even if you find that a police officer had probable cause to arrest another, an arresting law enforcement officer may use only such force as is reasonably necessary in affecting that arrest under the circumstances. That is to say, an officer who uses more force than is reasonably necessary under the circumstances to affect a lawful arrest commits a battery upon the person arrested and would justify the person being arrested to resist and defend himself. 17 A police officer, merely because of his status as a law enforcement officer, is given no more or less rights to use force in affectuating [sic] an arrest than a private person. 18 If you find in this case that a law enforcement officer used more force than was reasonably necessary under the circumstances to affect the arrest of one or more of the defendants, then the defendants, or either of them, would be justified in acting in defense of such excessive force. 19 (App. 84-85). The district court found that these instructions were sufficient to advise the jury that a person has a right to resist an unlawful arrest or defend himself against excessive force used by an officer to affect a lawful arrest. Accordingly, the district court found that the failure to give the petitioners' requested instruction did not violate their constitutional right to due process. 1 20 The outcome of the petitioners' criminal prosecution essentially turned on the question of credibility. The officers testified that petitioners had attacked them while they were attempting to effectuate a lawful arrest. On the other hand, the petitioners claim that they had surrendered freely to the officers and were only attempting to defend themselves from the violent unprovoked attack. We find that the instructions set forth above were sufficient to allow the jury to return a verdict of not guilty in the event that they believed the petitioners' version of the fracas. The failure to give that instruction did not infect the entire trial to such a degree that the resulting convictions violated due process. Petitioners clearly set forth their theory of self-defense during the course of their testimony presented at trial and during the closing arguments made by their attorneys. Accordingly, we find that the instructions given to the jury did not violate the petitioners' right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.