Opinion ID: 790214
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Aspects Instruction

Text: 55 Mr. Duran's final challenge is to the instructions on the conspiracy charge in Count 1. These instructions stated in relevant part: 56 A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to accomplish an unlawful purpose. To sustain the charge of conspiracy as charged in Count 1, the government must prove the following propositions beyond a reasonable doubt: 57 First, that the conspiracy as charged in Count 1 existed, and, second, that the defendant knowingly became a member of the conspiracy with an intention to further the conspiracy. 58 If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty of Count 1. 59 If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty of Count 1. 60 A conspiracy may be established even if its purpose was not accomplished. 61 Count 1 sets forth different aspects an [sic] of alleged agreement between the defendant and others. The government need not prove every aspect of the agreement alleged as part of the conspiracy charged in Count 1. 62 To be a member of the conspiracy, the defendant need not join at the beginning or know all members or the means by which its purpose was to be accomplished. 63 The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware of the common purpose and was a willing participant. 64 Tr. at 896-97. 65 Mr. Duran argues that these instructions were likely to mislead the jury, implying a reduction in the standard of proof necessary to convict and, accordingly, violated his due process rights. Appellant's Br. at 45-46 (citing, among other cases, United States ex rel. Fleming v. Huch, 924 F.2d 679 (7th Cir.1991)). As we noted above, [j]ury instructions are viewed as a whole and `[i]f the instructions are adequately supported by the record and are fair and accurate summaries of the law, the instructions will not be disturbed on appeal.' Folks, 236 F.3d at 388-89 (citation omitted). 66 We cannot say that the conspiracy instructions, taken as a whole, constitute reversible error. The jury unambiguously was instructed that it had to find the elements of conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt and that, if any of the elements were not found beyond a reasonable doubt, then the jury was to acquit. The subsequent admonition that Count 1 sets forth different aspects an [sic] of alleged agreement between the defendant and others, and [t]he government need not prove every aspect of the agreement alleged as part of the conspiracy charged in Count 1 does not, in our view, signal to a reasonable jury to ignore the prior reasonable doubt instruction. 67 Count 1 did state nine of what laypersons would reasonably and naturally consider aspects of an agreement. For example, paragraph 2 of Count 1 explained that it was part of the conspiracy that defendants DAVID DURAN, FRANK DURAN, and DANIEL GALICIA, obtained wholesale quantities of cocaine and marijuana for distribution to others. Superseding Indictment at 2. Paragraph 5 explained that [it] was further part of the conspiracy that Vivian Reyes and Beatriz Gamez, David's and Mr. Duran's girlfriends, respectively, would assist in distributing the drugs. Id. None of these aspects needed to be proven in order to convict for conspiracy because [p]roving a conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846 requires that (1) two or more people agreed to commit an unlawful act and (2) the defendant knowingly and intentionally joined in that agreement. No overt act is required. United States v. Thornton, 197 F.3d 241, 254 (7th Cir.1999). Accordingly, it was appropriate for the instructions to make this point, and, in the process of so doing, we do not think the jury would have thought that this aspects instruction, in face of the reasonable doubt instructions, meant that it did not have to find the elements of a conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. To take the view Mr. Duran suggests, we would have to believe that the jury could have thought that the district court was telling it not to do what the district court specifically and explicitly told it to do just sentences earlier.