Opinion ID: 776475
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evans v. Jeff D.

Text: 2 This action must be viewed in the context of Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 106 S.Ct. 1531, 89 L.Ed.2d 747 (1986). In Evans, plaintiffs in a class action suit entered into a settlement that included a waiver of statutory attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which permits an award of fees to a prevailing party in a federal civil rights lawsuit. 1 Plaintiffs argued that the district court should have rejected the fee waiver as inconsistent with § 1988. They contended the fee waiver was a product of coercion because it exploited the ethical obligation of plaintiffs' counsel to recommend any settlement that was in the best interests of the clients. Id. at 729. Concluding that it is not necessary to construe the Fees Act [ i.e., § 1988] as embodying a general rule prohibiting settlements conditioned on the waiver of fees in order to be faithful to the purposes of that Act, the Court rejected plaintiffs' claims. Id. at 737-38. But the Court suggested that § 1988 might prohibit fee waivers in three specific situations. First, § 1988 might bar a governmental unit from implementing a statute, policy, or practice precluding the payment of attorney fees in settlements of civil rights cases. Id. at 739-40, 106 S.Ct. 1531. Second, a district court might be required to disapprove a fee waiver that was part of a vindictive effort to deter attorneys from representing plaintiffs in civil rights suits. Id. at 740, 106 S.Ct. 1531. Finally, an action might lie if it were shown that fee waivers have had the effect, in the aggregate and in the long run, of shrinking the pool of lawyers willing to represent plaintiffs in such cases, thereby constricting the effective access to the judicial process for persons with civil rights grievances which the Fees Act was intended to provide. Id. at 741 n. 34, 106 S.Ct. 1531 (internal quotation marks omitted). Noting that comment on this last issue was premature, the Court added that as a practical matter the likelihood of this circumstance arising is remote. Id. 3 Then, in Willard v. City of Los Angeles, 803 F.2d 526 (9th Cir.1986), the plaintiffs settled a civil rights action in exchange for a lump sum, which included all attorney fees potentially recoverable under § 1988. Id. at 527. They nonetheless moved for an award of attorney fees, arguing that the settlement was unenforceable. Id. The district court denied the motion. We affirmed, but, following Evans, stated that a settlement waiving fees might be unenforceable if the governmental unit had a statute, policy, or practice requiring waiver of fees as a condition of settlement or... it has vindictively sought to deter attorneys from bringing civil rights suits. Id. at 528.