Opinion ID: 657348
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 16 Walker also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on several of the mail fraud counts beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he and not someone else was involved in the scheme. 17 When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his or her conviction, we will affirm if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original). We make this determination by viewing the evidence and the reasonable inferences which can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the government. Id. 18 In order to sustain a mail fraud conviction under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1341, the government must adduce sufficient evidence as to three elements: (1) the defendant's participation in a scheme to defraud; (2) defendant's commission of the act with intent to defraud; and (3) use of the mails in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme. United States v. Cosentino, 869 F.2d 301, 307-308 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 908, 109 S.Ct. 3220, 106 L.Ed.2d 570 (1989). 19 The government presented ample evidence to support the jury's verdict. As to its theory that Walker assumed the identity of Thomas Hamilton, the government introduced exhibits establishing that official transcripts from Oklahoma State University were requested in the name of Thomas Hamilton and that the bill for the transcripts was mailed to Walker's address. A copy of the transcript was found in his car after he was arrested on state charges in 1988. When Walker was arrested again almost two years later, he was carrying a driver's license and Illinois identification card in the name of Thomas Hamilton, both of which contained his own picture. His roommate at the University of Illinois also testified that Walker was known there as Thomas Hamilton. 20 There was also abundant evidence to establish that Walker perpetrated the mail fraud scheme. Several witnesses testified that Walker carried credit cards in the name of Thomas Hamilton in his wallet. In addition, the officer who arrested Walker at the University of Illinois testified that during a search of Walker's dormitory room, he recovered a credit card application filled out in Hamilton's name. Evidence was also introduced linking Walker to the addresses where the credit cards were sent. Therefore, we conclude that Walker's conviction on the conspiracy counts was supported by sufficient evidence. 21 III. Fairness of Trial Due to Judge's Statements 22 Walker claims that he was denied a fair trial because the district court judge pressured him into stipulating to the admissibility of the fraudulent credit card applications, the dates they were mailed, and the amounts charged on certain credit card accounts. According to Walker, the trial court insisted that he enter the stipulations even though it was the government's burden to prove the essential elements of the counts charged. He also claims that the government failed to obtain the stipulations in writing, in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 17.1. 23 Walker failed to object below and, therefore, has waived this argument on appeal. Angulo, 864 F.2d at 507. Since he did not preserve this issue, we can reverse only if the district court committed plain error. United States v. Carroll, 871 F.2d 689, 692 (7th Cir.1989). A plain error is one that results in 'an actual miscarriage of justice' (citation omitted) such that the defendant 'probably would have been acquitted but for the erroneously admitted evidence.'  Id. 24 Even if Walker had properly preserved the issue for appeal, the record shows that the trial court did not pressure him into entering the stipulations. At the pretrial conference, the judge asked defense counsel to consider entering into stipulations as to undisputed questions involving the foundation and authenticity of documentary evidence. 1-24-91 Tr. 4-5. Immediately before the trial began, defense counsel advised the court that her client had instructed her not to stipulate. In response, the judge asked Walker to reconsider his position unless he had a good faith basis for believing that there was something wrong with the documents. Id. at 4-6. In doing so, the district court also acknowledged Walker's right to put the government to its proof. Id. at 5. 25 Given that the government intended to call thirty-two witnesses simply to authenticate documents, the judge's request was eminently reasonable. A judge is responsible not only for ensuring a fair trial, but also for making efficient use of judicial resources. The trial judge did not compromise Walker's right to a fair trial by requesting Walker to reconsider his position. 26 Neither can we reverse on the ground that the stipulation violated Fed.R.Crim.P. 17.1. In pertinent part, Fed.R.Crim.P. 17.1 states: 27 No admissions made by the defendant or the defendant's attorney at the [pretrial] conference shall be used against the defendant unless the admissions are reduced to writing and signed by the defendant and the defendant's attorney. 28 Walker's stipulation did not concern an admission he made at the pretrial conference. Furthermore, the record below reveals that he signed a handwritten stipulation agreeing, among other things, to the admission of certain government exhibits. 29