Opinion ID: 2228677
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Policy-Based Analysis of Immunity

Text: The ministerial/discretionary test does not advance the public policy of government immunity because it does not consider the type of decision protected by immunity. Rather, it considers only the resulting conduct and attempts to label that conduct. The ministerial/discretionary test defines discretionary in the negative: anything which is non-ministerial is discretionary. The test does not require an affirmative finding that the governmental action arose from the type of policy-making decision protected by governmental immunity. It operates by process of elimination, removing ministerial acts from the more general category of discretionary, immune acts. The discretionary function exception of the ITCA removes discretionary acts from the broader spectrum of liability. This requires an affirmative finding that the governmental act is of the type intended to be protected by immunity. The planning/operational test provides a better framework for such an analysis. This test advances the policy underlying governmental immunity and allows consideration of the nature of the challenged decision. In defining discretionary acts immune under the ITCA, we reject the ministerial/discretionary test in favor of the planning/operational test, to be applied in light of the policy and rational supporting governmental immunity. The issue of whether an act is discretionary and therefore immune is a question of law for the court's determination. The question may require an extended factual development [1] , but the essential inquiry is whether the challenged act is the type of function which the legislature intended to protect with immunity. This determination should be made by the court. Discretionary immunity must be narrowly construed because it is an exception to the general rule of liability. Larson v. Ind. School Dist. No. 314, 289 N.W.2d 112 at 121 (Minn. 1979). The governmental entity seeking to establish immunity bears the burden of proving that the challenged act or omission was a policy decision made by consciously balancing risks and benefits. See Little v. Wimmer, 303 Or. 580, 739 P.2d 564 (1987); Johnson v. State, 69 Cal.2d 782, 794 n. 8, 447 P.2d 352, 361 n. 8, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 249 n. 8 (1968). In deciding whether the function is the type intended to benefit from immunity, the court should look to the purposes of immunity to determine whether those purposes would be furthered by extending immunity to the act in question. Factors which would, under most circumstances, point toward immunity, include: 1. The nature of the conduct  a) Whether the conduct has a regulatory objective; b) Whether the conduct involved the balancing of factors without reliance on a readily ascertainable rule or standard; c) Whether the conduct requires a judgment based on policy decisions; d) Whether the decision involved adopting general principles or only applying them; e) Whether the conduct involved establishment of plans, specifications and schedule; and f) Whether the decision involved assessing priorities, weighing of budgetary considerations or allocation of resources. 2. The effect on governmental operations  a) Whether the decision affects the feasibility or practicability of a government program; and b) Whether liability will affect the effective administration of the function in question. 3. The capacity of the court to evaluate the propriety of the government's action  Whether tort standards offer an insufficient evaluation of the plaintiff's claim. Immunity assumes negligence but denies liability. Thus, the issues of duty, breach and causation are not before the court in deciding whether the government entity is immune. If the court finds the government is not immune, the case may yet be decided on the basis of failure of any element of negligence. This should not be confused with the threshold determination of immunity. See Prosser and Keeton, The Law on Torts, supra § 131 at 1043.