Opinion ID: 2408478
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: We explained our standard of review for directed-verdict motions in Williams v. State, 325 Ark. 432, 436, 930 S.W.2d 297 (1996): This court treats the denial of a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict; substantial evidence must be forceful enough to compel a conclusion one way or the other beyond suspicion and conjecture. On appellate review, it is only necessary for this court to ascertain that evidence which is most favorable to appellee, and it is permissible to consider only that evidence which supports the guilty verdict See also Choate v. State, 325 Ark. 251, 254-55, 925 S.W.2d 409, 411 (1996) (quoting King v. State, 323 Ark. 671, 916 S.W.2d 732 (1996)) (other citations omitted). To sustain a conviction for first-degree murder, the State was required to prove that the appellant purposely caused the death of June Barnes. See Ark.Code § 5-10-102(a)(2). A person acts purposely with respect to his conduct or a result thereof when it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result[.] Ark.Code Ann. § 5-2-202(1) (Repl.1993). A criminal defendant's intent or state of mind is seldom capable of proof by direct evidence and must usually be inferred from the circumstances of the crime. Williams, 325 Ark. at 437, 930 S.W.2d 297. The intent necessary to sustain a conviction for first-degree murder may be inferred from the type of weapon used, from the manner of its use, and the nature, extent, and location of the wounds. Id.; citing Walker v. State, 324 Ark. 106, 918 S.W.2d 172 (1996). Circumstantial evidence of a culpable mental state may constitute substantial evidence to sustain a guilty verdict. Williams, 325 Ark. at 437, 930 S.W.2d 297; Crawford v. State, 309 Ark. 54, 827 S.W.2d 134 (1992). In order for circumstantial evidence alone to constitute substantial evidence, however, it must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. Williams, 325 Ark. at 437, 930 S.W.2d 297; Key v. State, 325 Ark. 73, 923 S.W.2d 865 (1996). Once the evidence is determined to be sufficient to go to the jury, the question of whether the circumstantial evidence excludes any other hypothesis consistent with innocence is for the jury to decide. Id. In the present case, the jury could have easily inferred from the numerous blunt force injuries to the victim's skull, as well as from the autopsy evidence that she was strangled, that appellant acted with the purpose to cause the victim's death. The jury also heard evidence that appellant took the victim's body to a dump site, set it on fire, and then left. As attempts to cover up a crime are properly admissible, see Brenk v. State, 311 Ark. 579, 847 S.W.2d 1 (1993), the jury could have properly considered this evidence as proof of a purposeful mental state. Moreover, it was within the jury's province to believe or disbelieve appellant's testimony. When considering these circumstances, the jury could have reasonably inferred that appellant acted with the purpose of causing the victim's death. See Williams, supra . Thus, we cannot say that the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for directed verdict.