Opinion ID: 2357354
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Limitations of Victims' Rights

Text: Palmer argues that, were our judgment to direct reversal of the Circuit Court, the effect would be to deny her any possible remedy for a clear violation of her right to be notified of, and be heard at, the sentencing proceeding. She largely is correct. Many victims' rights seem effective only when exercised prior to sentencing and entering of a final judgment against or in favor of the defendant. Such a limitation is implied in Article 47's express prohibition on a court permitting a victim to stay a criminal justice proceeding. See also § 11-103(c). If a victim is not authorized to take an action to stay the entering of a judgment in a criminal case, the victim similarly is powerless to have that judgment reopened or vacated. It would be somewhat anomalous if the victim had the power to have a judgment vacated (essentially, undone) where the victim did not have the power to stay the entering of that same judgment. In Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 747, 490 A.2d 1228, 1256-57 (1985), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 1078, 106 S.Ct. 1452, 89 L.Ed.2d 711 (1986), and again in Cianos, 338 Md. at 411-12, 659 A.2d at 294, we briefly discussed the legislative history of a proposal to permit a victim to seek invalidation of a defendant's sentence based on a violation of the victim's rights. Provisions invalidating the sentence clearly worried the legislators. A memorandum, evidently prepared by staff of the House Judiciary Committee, stated, `[t]he major practical problem of both bills . . . is the possibility of placing the defendant in jeopardy a second time during the sentencing hearing.' . . . The memorandum concluded that, `House Bill 70 would be acceptable, however, if [the] lines [invalidating the sentence] were deleted. The statute would have no teeth after such a deletion but it would provide the personal input toward which the statute is aimed.' Cianos, 338 Md. at 411-12, 659 A.2d at 294 (quoting Lodowski, 302 Md. at 747, 490 A.2d at 1256-57). The Legislature has addressed some of the limitations on victims' rights, such as expanding a victim's right to apply to appeal, following Lopez-Sanchez. The Legislature, however, in the 23 years since Lodowski and 13 years since Cianos, has not given much substance to the illusory nature of the enforcement of victims' rights. The General Assembly is presumed to be aware of this Court's interpretation of its enactments and, if such interpretation is not legislatively overturned, to have acquiesced in that interpretation. Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 210, 438 A.2d 1301, 1305 (1981). Although a victim now has more opportunity to participate in an appeal, there remains no effective tangible remedy for a victim to seek to un-do what already has been done in a criminal case. The rights, to seek invalidation of an otherwise legal sentence. The victims' rights provisions in Maryland law still lack adult teeth. Thus, the victim is left largely with extra-judicial remedies. Although the Legislature responded to the specific issue decided in Lopez-Sanchez, Judge Wilner's description of the lack of remedies afforded victims of crime who have been denied their statutory rights remains largely apt: Although disciplinary proceedings conceivably may be brought against a judge who wilfully violates clear statutory rights, there seems to be no efficient remedy for a victim . . . if a judge, whether in good or bad faith, denies the victim the rights the Legislature has conferred. Lopez-Sanchez v. State, 388 Md. 214, 231, 879 A.2d 695, 704 (2005) (Wilner, J., concurring). In the present case, there is absolutely no indication that the Circuit Court acted in bad faith. The Circuit Court, on hearing Palmer's motion to vacate, admitted the apparent oversight regarding notice and attempted to remedy the mistake, although the remedy selected was beyond the Circuit Court's reach. [28] Because Palmer's rights as a victim of crime were violated, we again shall fashion the only remedy of which we are legally capable. Palmer shall not be burdened with costs in this appeal, where her rights were violated through no fault of her own. [29] JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO VACATE THE SENTENCE OF THE REMAINDER OF FIFTEEN YEARS IMPOSED BY THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY AND REMAND TO THE CIRCUIT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REINSTATE THE SENTENCE OF PROBATION IMPOSED ON 8 APRIL 2005 AND TO CONDUCT ANY FURTHER PROCEEDINGS DEEMED NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE THAT ARE NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION; COSTS TO BE PAID BY PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND.