Opinion ID: 2721621
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Contact with the Child

Text: [¶19] In addressing rights of parent-child contact, the best interest of the child is the paramount consideration. Grant v. Hamm, 2012 ME 79, ¶ 6, 48 A.3d 789; see also 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1653(1)(C), (2)(D)(1), (3) (2013). We review factual findings for clear error and the ultimate conclusion concerning the child’s best interest and rights of contact for an abuse of discretion. See Grant, 2012 ME 79, ¶¶ 6, 15, 48 A.3d 789. Because Sullivan did not request additional findings of fact pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52, we assume that the trial court made all of the necessary subsidiary findings that can be supported by competent record evidence to support its decision to order no rights of contact “at this time” and no right of access to the child’s records. See Efstathiou v. Efstathiou, 2009 ME 107, ¶ 10, 982 A.2d 339; Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick, 2006 ME 140, ¶ 17, 910 A.2d 396. 8 [¶20] Here, the court very evidently applied the best-interest-of-the-child standard in determining rights of contact.2 The court’s finding that Sullivan poses a significant risk to minors is supported by the evidence, and, contrary to Sullivan’s characterization of the GAL’s opinion, the GAL equivocated on whether Sullivan should be allowed even supervised contact, advising that such a decision would depend on facts yet to be determined. Additionally, though the court did not reference the fact in its decision, criminal charges arising out of Sullivan’s relationship with Doe were, and are, pending against Sullivan. See, e.g., Douglas v. Douglas, 2012 ME 67, ¶¶ 3-4, 17, 43 A.3d 965. [¶21] Although the statute expresses a preference for parent-child contact, this preference does not apply when the court “determines that the best interest of [the] child would not be served.” 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(1)(C). On this record, the court acted within the bounds of its discretion in denying Sullivan rights of contact “at this time,” which invites modification of the judgment in the event of a substantial change in circumstances at a later date. See Grant, 2012 ME 79, ¶ 6, 48 A.3d 789 (stating that the trial court’s judgment is entitled to “very substantial 2 By statute, the court is required to consider a number of factors to determine the best interest of the child. 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3) (2013). We infer from the judgment that the court in this case made an ultimate finding concerning the child’s best interest and that it considered the factors in section 1653(3), particularly in section 1653(3)(A), (K), (M), (N), and (S), in doing so. Although the court did not make explicit findings on the best-interest factors, “a court may enter a judgment without making explicit findings addressing best interest or any other issue, unless findings are requested.” Grant v. Hamm, 2012 ME 79, ¶ 13, 48 A.3d 789; see also Nadeau v. Nadeau, 2008 ME 147, ¶ 35, 957 A.2d 108. Sullivan did not request additional findings. See Grant, 2012 ME 79, ¶¶ 13-14, 48 A.3d 789. 9 deference” given its ability to appraise witness testimony); Douglas, 2012 ME 67, ¶¶ 14, 17, 43 A.3d 965.