Opinion ID: 464799
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Third-Party Claims and Complaints

Text: 45 Fed.R.Evid. 403 grants the trial judge broad discretion to determine whether to allow the introduction of relevant, but prejudicial, matters into evidence. When the trial judge has assessed both the probative value and the likely prejudicial effect of the evidence, the reviewing court wil not disturb his decision to admit or exclude evidence unless it finds an abuse of discretion. E.g., United States v. Martinez, 775 F.2d 31, 37 (2d Cir.1985); United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 514-15 (2d Cir.1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905, 98 S.Ct. 1451, 55 L.Ed.2d 496 (1978). We find no abuse of discretion here. 46 We have no doubt that, in the context of a theory that the City negligently supervised its officers in their use of force, the evidence that a number of claims of police brutality had been made by other persons against the City, together with evidence as to the City's treatment of these claims, was relevant. Whether or not the claims had validity, the very assertion of a number of such claims put the City on notice that there was a possibility that its police officers had used excessive force. The City's knowledge of these allegations and the nature and extent of its efforts to investigate and record the claims were pertinent to Fiacco's contention that the City had a policy of nonsupervision of its policemen that reflected a deliberate indifference to their use of excessive force. The fact that none of the claims had yet been adjudicated in favor of the claimant was not material; if the City's efforts to evaluate the claims were so superficial as to suggest that its official attitude was one of indifference to the truth of the claim, such an attitude would bespeak an indifference to the rights asserted in those claims. 47 Further, the value of such evidence to a plaintiff in a Sec. 1983 action is clear. Since the existence of a policy of nonsupervision amounting to deliberate indifference to constitutional rights cannot be established by inference solely from evidence of the occurrence of the incident in question, see City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle; Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 196, 202-04 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016, 101 S.Ct. 577, 66 L.Ed.2d 475 (1980), a plaintiff cannot prevail on a Sec. 1983 claim against a municipality without introducing other evidence. Proof that other claims were met with indifference for their truth may be one way of satisfying the plaintiffs' burden. 48 Given that the evidence of third-party claims was both relevant and valuable to Fiacco's case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that its probative value outweighed its possible prejudicial effect. The court properly attempted to minimize any such effect by repeatedly instructing the jury as to the limited purpose for which the evidence was admitted. The jury was instructed that there had never been any authoritative finding as to whether or not any claimant's charge was valid and that the jury was neither to assume that the claims were true nor to try to assess their truth; rather, the jury was merely to focus [its] attention on [whether] the chief of police and/or the city [took] sufficient steps in their supervisory capacity in handling those claims. 49 In all the circumstances, we conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to admit into evidence against the City defendants proof as to the assertion of other claims of police brutality. 50