Opinion ID: 848813
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: May the Legislative History of the srca trump the statutory language?

Text: Notwithstanding that the language of the statute does not require bad faith as a precondition to recovering double damages, defendant asserts that such a construction must be imposed by the courts. Defendant relies upon the legislative history of the statute in support of its position. [5] In 1991, our Legislature passed Senate Bill 36, which was based on model language drafted by the Bureau of Wholesale Representatives. The language of the bill passed was the same as M.C.L. § 600.2961, except that it did not include the word intentionally. Governor John Engler vetoed the bill on July 15, 1991. The veto message stated in part: Second, I oppose the use of exemplary damages in contract actions absent broad public policy considerations and particularly in this case where exemplary damages would be assessed without consideration of the underlying factors resulting in breach of contract. In response to the Governor's veto, the Legislature added the word intentionally. With that addition, the Governor signed the bill into law. 1992 PA 125. It does appear that the Governor vetoed the original bill in part out of a concern for the inappropriateness of awarding extracontractual damages on the basis of a mere breach of contract. The fact remains that the final bill enacted and signed into law did not cure the problem the Governor raised in his veto message. Defendant's argument that the statute should be construed to include a good faith defense must fail because it violates a prime tenet of statutory construction: Michigan courts are bound to apply the unambiguous language actually used in a statute. Danse Corp. v. Madison Hts., 466 Mich. 175, 182, 644 N.W.2d 721 (2002). Because the statute is clear, there is no ambiguity that would permit or justify looking outside the plain words of the statute. `[W]e do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.' Chmielewski v. Xermac, Inc., 457 Mich. 593, 608, 580 N.W.2d 817 (1998), quoting Gilday v. Mecosta Co., 124 F.3d 760, 767 (C.A.6, 1997), quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-148, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994). See also Luttrell v. Dep't of Corrections, 421 Mich. 93, 101, 365 N.W.2d 74 (1984).