Opinion ID: 1155448
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Guilt Phase Jury Instructions on Willfulness, Deliberateness and Premeditation

Text: Powell contends that the jury was not provided with an instruction defining willful or deliberate and that in the absence of such definitions, the jury was misled to believe that the State was only required to prove that Powell acted with premeditation. Powell asserts that Jury Instruction No. 9 was incomplete because it merely defined premeditation. Jury Instruction No. 9 provided: Premeditation is a design, a determination to kill, distinctly formed in the mind at any moment before or at the time of the killing. Premeditation need not be for a day, an hour or even a minute. It may be as instantaneous as successive thoughts of the mind. For if the jury believes from the evidence that the act constituting the killing has been preceded by and has been the result of premeditation, no matter how rapidly the premeditation is followed by the act constituting the killing, it is willful, deliberate and premeditated murder. Powell contends that this instruction directed the jury that if it found premeditation, it was to automatically find willfulness and deliberation as well. In Briano v. State, 94 Nev. 422, 581 P.2d 5 (1978), this court referred to deliberate and premeditated as a single term and not separate elements requiring separate thought processes. We recently considered deliberateness in DePasquale v. State, 106 Nev. 843, 803 P.2d 218 (1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 99, 116 L.Ed.2d 70 (1991). There, we stated: Premeditation and deliberation can be inferred from the nature and extent of the injuries, coupled with repeated blows. Given the brutal and extensive nature of Mr. Cane's injuries (including injuries to the head, torso, ribs and back), an inference of premeditation and deliberation can be reasonably drawn. This is particularly true when considering the metal rod which was inserted deeply into the victim's ear. It is difficult to imagine such a process occurring without deliberate thought. Id. at 848, 803 P.2d at 221. In DePasquale, as in Briano, we used the terms premeditated and deliberate as a single term. Other jurisdictions have held that the terms deliberate, premeditated and willful are a single phrase, meaning simply that the actor intended to commit the act and intended death to result. See Sanders v. State, 392 So.2d 1280, 1282 (Ala.Crim.App.1981) (the terms premeditation and deliberation may be grouped together under the phrase formed design); People v. Fusselman, 46 Cal.App.3d 289, 299, 120 Cal.Rptr. 282 (1975) (distinguishing malice aforethought from the phrase willful, deliberate and premeditated; the latter phrase indicates a frame of mind in which the actor weighs the course of action and chooses to kill); Fuller v. State, 45 Md. App. 414, 413 A.2d 277, 280 (1980) (the trilogy of terms willful, deliberate and premeditated connote the same general idea of the intention to kill); Commonwealth v. Nelson, 514 Pa. 262, 523 A.2d 728, 732 (1987) (a willful, deliberate and premeditated killing is one where the actor has specific intent to bring about the death of the victim). In Fuller, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals queried whether the three adjectives described three different aspects of the mental state of intent to kill or whether the terms were simply a rhetorical expression used for emphasis. Fuller, 413 A.2d at 280. The court went on to ask if the act could be willful (a specific design and purpose to kill) without simultaneously being deliberate (conscious knowledge of the purpose to kill). Id. We agree with the Maryland court when it stated: The trilogy of terms connotes the same general idea  the intention to kill. The use of all three words would seem to us to serve no purpose other than to shroud the intention in an aura of redundancy so as to convey the seriousness of the matter. Id. at 380 (quoting Brown v. State, 44 Md.App. 71, 410 A.2d 17, 22 (1979)). We have set forth the requirement for premeditation in Briano v. State, 94 Nev. 422, 581 P.2d 5 (1978), where we stated [T]he state must prove that a design to kill was distinctly and rationally formed in the mind of the perpetrator, at or before the time the fatal blows were struck... . [I]t [does not] matter how short a time existed between the formation of the design to kill and the killing itself. Id. at 425, 581 P.2d at 7. As long as the instruction on premeditation which is given to the jury comports with Briano, it is not necessary to separately define deliberateness or willfulness. The instruction on premeditation which was given to the jury in the case at hand was an accurate definition. We therefore conclude that Powell's argument has no merit.