Opinion ID: 326183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the surviving widow requirement

Text: 3 The Act provides that compensation known as a death benefit shall be payable to A surviving wife or dependent husband ... (or) surviving child. 33 U.S.C. § 909 (1970), as amended (Supp. II 1972). 2 The term 'widow' includes only the decedent's wife living with or dependent for support upon him at the time of his death; or living apart for justifiable cause or by reason of his desertion at such time. 33 U.S.C. § 902(16) (1970), as amended (Supp. II 1972). In interpreting this section the Supreme Court found that the essential requirement is a conjugal nexus between the claimant and the decedent subsisting at the time of the latter's death. Thompson v. Lawson, 347 U.S. 334, 336-37, 74 S.Ct. 555, 557, 98 L.Ed. 733 (1954). Here claimant contended that she was living apart from the decedent for justifiable cause at the time of his death. Petitioner challenges this contention and further urges that claimant does not meet the test set forth in Thompson because she had embarked upon a permanent relationship with another man. We shall examine each of these claims in turn.
4 Claimant, the only witness before the Deputy Commissioner, stated that she and the decedent agreed to separate in 1954 because his excessive drinking was a bad influence on their two minor children. (JA 20-24, 30). 3 The Valentines maintained separate abodes from the time of the separation until Mr. Valentine's death in 1970. The Deputy Commissioner concluded that the credible evidence sustains that at the time of the employee's injury and death the claimant widow was living apart from the employee for justifiable cause. (JA 79). 5 Petitioners contend that the decedent's drinking and its adverse potential impact on his minor children do not constitute the sort of conduct which may serve as justifiable cause for the claimant's living apart from her husband. This contention rests solely on our decision in Weeks v. Behrend, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 341, 135 F.2d 258 (1943). That decision affirmed a district court holding that the Deputy Commissioner's finding of living apart for justifiable cause was not supported by substantial evidence where the couple separated by mutual consent in order to enable the husband to obtain employment from the Public Relief Bureau. Id. at 342, 135 F.2d at 259. This court opined that Congress had looked to the law of divorce and separation in fashioning the justifiable cause requirement and intended the phrase as substantially equivalent to a 'matrimonial offense.'  Id. Subsequent to Weeks the Fifth Circuit gave justifiable cause a broader and more straightforward interpretation, finding a mother-in-law's violent objection to the claimant and her cutting up of claimant's clothes sufficient as a justifiable cause for living apart. 4 We read Thompson as undermining the narrow construction of justifiable cause offered in Weeks. The Court stated in Thompson that it would not assess the marital conduct of the parties. That is an inquiry which may be relevant to legal issues arising under State domestic relations law. Our concern is with the proper interpretation of the Federal Longshoremen's Act. 347 U.S. at 336, 74 S.Ct. at 556. We conclude that the Deputy Commissioner and the Board properly found that the decedent's drinking and its effect on claimant's minor children constituted justifiable cause for their separation. 6 In their brief, petitioners claimed that even if a justifiable cause existed at the time of the separation it did not persist until the date of the employee's death, 5 the time fixed by the statute for ascertaining the existence of justifiable cause. 6 The justifiable cause requirement is met where, as here, it continued over a period (at least 11 years) sufficient to shape the claimant's way of life. Counsel for petitioners conceded as much, at least where there was no subsequent misconduct undercutting conjugal nexus. This comports with human realities and avoids working undue hardships upon individuals by forcing either the forfeiture of benefits or the abandonment of a life style to which they had become accustomed following the justified separation. In essence, we believe that at least in cases like the present one the effect of the original justification persists and inheres in the relationship of the parties despite the change in circumstances since the initial separation. 7
7 Thompson teaches that recovery of benefits as a surviving widow is dependent on the existence of a conjugal nexus between the claimant and the decedent at the time of the employee's death. As this court found in Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Donovan, 95 U.S.App.D.C 49, 51, 218 F.2d 860, 862 (1955), the conjugal nexus test focuses on the real status of the claimant in respect to the deceased, not the existing legal formalities of the relationship. Pointing to language in Thompson, petitioners contend that the claimant is barred from obtaining death benefits because she embarked on a permanent relationship with another man, a Mr. Mosely, prior to decedent's death. 8 Certainly, the existence of a continuing-or permanent-relationship with another man, is a factor to be weighed in ascertaining the real status of the claimant and the decedent, and it may well be that in other cases, and perhaps even in most cases, that it would negative the requisite conjugal nexus. However, we do not read Thompson as establishing the absence of a permanent relationship as a separate and indispensable requirement. 9 8 The relevant facts relating to the real status of the Valentines at the time of Mr. Valentine's death in 1970 can be briefly summarized. The couple married in 1939, had two children (Donna in 1940 and Gary in 1947), and separated in 1954. 10 About 1957, Mrs. Valentine began having sexual relations with Cleveland Mosely that resulted in the birth of a child, Leslie, in 1958. Claimant continued to have relations with Mosely up to and after the death of Mr. Valentine. Following the 1954 separation, claimant never lived in the same abode with Mosely or any other man. Decedent visited the claimant during the entire 16 year span of their separation, continued to have sexual intercourse with her, and occasionally spent two or three nights a week with her. He contributed to his wife's support for a period of about three years after the separation and gave money for support of the children (including Leslie) thereafter. He knew Mosely was Leslie's father and accepted her and his wife's relationship with Mosely. Claimant visited the decedent at the time of his illness in 1969 and helped care for him at that time. She consistently held herself out as Mrs. Valentine and was known to her friends and the community as Mrs. Valentine. Claimant never divorced the decedent or attempted to marry Mr. Mosely. 9 We believe these facts provide substantial evidence to support the Board's finding of a conjugal nexus between the Valentines at the time of the decedent's death. In Thompson the Court found that claimant's embarking upon another permanent relationship was a conscious choice to terminate her prior conjugal relationship with the decedent and to sever the bond which was the basis of her right to claim a death benefit. 11 Here, by contrast, the continuing relationship with Mosely as a boy friend did not displace claimant's relationship with the decedent so as to destroy their continued real status as husband and wife. Claimant's continued sexual relations with decedent, her consistent holding out as decedent's wife, her solicitude to decedent during his 1969 illness, his contribution of funds from his meager income, 12 his knowing acceptance of claimant's relationship with Mosely, the absence of an attempt by either party to remarry, and the fact that claimant never lived in the same abode with Mosely, all constitute a complex of circumstances that are substantial evidence to support a finding of a conjugal nexus at the time of Mr. Valentine's death.