Opinion ID: 2015196
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Provisions For Maintenance

Text: Sharon argues that paragraph 20 unambiguously precludes modification of the settlement agreement unless she and Ronald formally execute an amendment to it. She asks us to follow Bowman and hold that where a maintenance agreement expressly precludes judicial modification, courts have no authority to order a modification. Ronald, on the other hand, continues to argue that paragraph 20 is ambiguous and that applying Bowman would effectively overrule Pfenninger and its progeny. We agree with the Court of Appeals that paragraph 20 probably is not clear enough to support the conclusion Sharon asks us to draw from it. It provides that a modification shall be effective only if made in writing and executed with the same formality as this Agreement. (R. 37.) This language obviously could be read to preclude any modifications not formally executed by the parties themselves. However, Ronald's readingthat the paragraph regulates only the form of any consensual modification that the parties might choose to undertakeis not an unreasonable interpretation of this language. The provision is certainly not as clear as the language in Bowman. See 567 N.E.2d at 829 (`[T]his obligation shall not in any way be modified.'). Nevertheless, Ronald's insightful counsel has correctly identified an underlying tension between Pfenninger and Bowman. See also Roberts v. Roberts, 644 N.E.2d 173 (Ind.Ct. App.1994) (taking a new look at Pfenninger in light of Bowman but deciding to adhere to Pfenninger ). In holding that a court could modify a maintenance obligation originating in a settlement agreement, the Pfenninger court relied largely on our decision in Meehan v. Meehan, 425 N.E.2d 157 (Ind.1981). [5] There, we held that a court could modify a child support order even if its terms originated in a settlement agreement that purported to be `full, complete and absolute' and `forever ... [to] determine the rights between [the] parties.' Id. at 158. In Bowman, the Court of Appeals persuasively rejected the analogy between spousal maintenance and child support upon which Pfenninger depended: The Meehan decision involving a child support order and the present case involving a spousal support order are governed by entirely different principles of public policy.... [T]he parent having custody of a child is merely the trustee of the child support payments and has no right to contract away the benefits of the trust in favor of that child.... An entirely different principle of public policy is at work in the present case, namely, the freedom to contract. 567 N.E.2d at 830-31 (citations omitted). Put simply, the parties to a maintenance agreement are both grown-ups, free to bargain with their own legal rights. The Bowman court also correctly observed that courts had no express statutory authority to modify approved maintenance agreements. Id. at 830; see also Roberts, 644 N.E.2d at 176. In the present case, the Court of Appeals made a laudable effort at harmonizing Pfenninger and Bowman. It held that Pfenninger represented a general rule that maintenance awards originating in settlement agreements are subject to judicial modification. It then read Bowman as establishing a kind of clear statement exception, barring judicial modification where a maintenance agreement unambiguously states that it cannot be modified. Voigt, 645 N.E.2d at 630. This textbook example of common law reasoning resolves the conflict. On the other hand, it fails to address the underlying inconsistency between the rationales of Pfenninger and Bowman. We share Judge Sharpnack's inclination to take a new look at Pfenninger, see Roberts, 644 N.E.2d at 176. [6] We shall consider whether a court may modify an approved maintenance agreement without the consent of both parties. Only if we find that courts possess that power must we decide whether paragraph 20 satisfies the requirements of any exception to that general power.