Opinion ID: 186000
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Orders on Appeal

Text: 7 While Cobell VI was pending before us and thereafter, the Department and its officers took a number of steps relevant to this appeal. Beginning in March 2000 and continuing apparently to the present, the Department filed the quarterly reports required by Cobell V. In April 2000 the Department published a notice in the Federal Register proposing a method for performing an historical accounting and seeking public comment thereon; and in December 2000 it chose statistical sampling as the method it would use. 8 In April 2001 the district court appointed Kieffer as Court Monitor. As noted, the Department consented to this appointment, regarding which it expressed the hope that this will in fact be a positive step forward so that resources can be more directed towards trust reform and less directed towards litigation. The order appointing Kieffer stated he would serve for at least 1 year from this date. Upon order of the Court, after comment or objection thereto by the parties, his term of service may be extended for additional terms. In April 2002 the district court propose[d] to extend Mr. Kieffer's term of service for at least an additional year. The Department objected to Kieffer's reappointment unless several conditions were met. The district court accepted some but not all those conditions, and reappointed Kieffer. 9 Four days later (April 19) Kieffer, with authorization from the district court, attended a meeting with Deputy Secretary of the Interior J. Steven Griles, the Special Trustee, and other departmental officials; the plaintiffs were not represented at the meeting. The district court found this was one of many internal DOI meetings Kieffer attended; the meeting was called at Griles's request; it was a heated meeting [that] resolved nothing. The district court also found that at the meeting the Court Monitor discussed with Interior officials his concerns about the way they were doing their jobs — concerns that he was subsequently to report to the district court. The district court characterized Kieffer's actions as an effort to set the stage to convince the parties attending the meeting to find some way to work together. 10 On June 14 the Department moved the district court to revoke Kieffer's appointment as, and to clarify the role of, the Court Monitor. The Department argued that its previous objections presaged the April 19 meeting, at which, the Department claimed, Kieffer demonstrated his intention and his ability to assert powers constitutionally reserved to the Executive Branch of the Government. 11 Meanwhile the Monitor's reports, which were, to say the least, unflattering to the DOI, had prompted the district court to order Secretary Norton and Assistant Secretary McCaleb, both of whom had taken office in 2001, to show cause why they should not be held in civil contempt of court in their official capacities on five specifications, namely: 12 (1) Failing to comply with the Court's Order of December 21, 1999, to initiate a Historical Accounting Project. 13 (2) Committing a fraud on the Court by concealing the Department's true actions regarding the Historical Accounting Project during the period from March 2000, until January 2001. 14 (3) Committing a fraud on the Court by failing to disclose the true status of the TAAMS project between September 1999 and December 21, 1999.[  ] 15 (4) Committing a fraud on the Court by filing false and misleading quarterly status reports starting in March 2000, regarding TAAMS and BIA [Bureau of Indian Affairs] Data Clean-up.[  ] 16 (5) Committing a fraud on the court by making false and misleading representations starting in March, 2000, regarding computer security of IIM trust data. 17 Cobell v. Norton, 226 F.Supp.2d 1, 19-20 (D.D.C.2002) ( Contempt Opinion ). The district court held a 29-day bench trial on the contempt charges. 18 On September 17, 2002 the district court issued the three Orders that are the subject of this appeal. First, the court issued an Order that, among other things, held Secretary Norton and Assistant Secretary McCaleb in civil contempt of court. Cobell v. Norton, 226 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C.) ( Contempt Order ). The Contempt Order was accompanied by and explained in the Contempt Opinion, released simultaneously. Second, the district court issued a Memorandum and Order denying the defendants' motion to revoke Kieffer's appointment as Court Monitor. Cobell v. Norton, 226 F.Supp.2d 163 (D.D.C.) ( Monitor Order ). Finally, the court issued an Order appointing Kieffer to serve as Special Master-Monitor [p]ursuant to Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Cobell v. Norton, 2002 WL 31059909, at , 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17354, at  (D.D.C.) ( Special Master-Monitor Order ). 19 In the Contempt Order, the court addressed each of the five specifications of contempt. With regard to the first count, the court described Norton's and McCaleb's failure to comply with its earlier order as litigation misconduct. In each of the other specifications, the court found Norton and McCaleb to have committ[ed] a fraud on the Court. 226 F.Supp.2d at 161. The district court used some harsh words in the Contempt Opinion, expressing its dissatisfaction with the defendants' conduct. See, e.g., 226 F.Supp.2d at 125 (The Department of Interior is truly an embarrassment to the federal government in general and the executive branch in particular. The 300,000 individual Indian beneficiaries deserve a better trustee-delegate than the Secretary of Interior); id. at 113 (The Court is both saddened and disgusted by the Department's intransigence). Of particular note are the district court's statement that Secretary Norton and Assistant Secretary McCaleb can now rightfully take their place alongside former-Secretary Babbitt and former-Assistant Secretary Gover in the pantheon of unfit trustee-delegates, id. at 161, and the court's invitation to Secretary Norton or any other individual at the Department who feel[s] that as a result of th[e] Court's ruling they are unable or unwilling to perform their duties to the best of their ability to leave the Department forthwith. Id. at 133. 20 Turning to the question of relief, the court refused the plaintiffs' request that it appoint a receiver to take over the IIM trust. The court did, however, determine that the relief it had ordered in Cobell V — remanding the case to the agencies to carry out their duties as instructed — was and is insufficient, id. at 147, and it therefore contemplated granting further injunctive relief. Id. at 148. To that end the court scheduled further proceedings, which it called the Phase 1.5 trial. Id. In order to prepare for the Phase 1.5 trial, the court required Interior to file a plan for conducting a historical accounting of the IIM trust accounts and a plan for bringing themselves into compliance with the fiduciary obligations that they owe to the IIM beneficiaries. Contempt Order, 226 F.Supp.2d at 162. The court also permitted the plaintiffs (and the Department of the Treasury) to file such plans, and permitted each party to respond to any other party's plan. Id. 21 In the Monitor Order, the court denied the Department's June 14 motion to revoke the appointment of Court Monitor Kieffer. The court found that Kieffer's participation in the April 19 meeting was not inappropriate or beyond his authority because it was pursuant to the Secretary of the Interior's own request  and in conformance with the Orders of the Court. 226 F.Supp.2d at 169. Finally, in the Special Master-Monitor Order, the court sua sponte elevated Kieffer to the position of Special Master-Monitor; Kieffer retained his duties as Court Monitor and as Special Master assumed new responsibilities for the management of discovery. 2002 WL 31059909, at -, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17354, at -. 22 Secretary Norton and Assistant Secretary McCaleb appealed all three Orders of the district court. They argue that the district court overstepped the bounds of judicial authority by declaring them unfit and by seizing control of the processes for creating and implementing plans for Indian trust reform. They also argue that the district court erred when it held them in contempt of court, denied their motion to terminate Kieffer's tenure as Court Monitor, and appointed him Special Master-Monitor.