Opinion ID: 2084981
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Child Custody and Relocation

Text: On review, this Court will not disturb the findings of fact made by the Family Court with respect to the issue of custody and the best interests of the child unless the trial justice abused his [or her] discretion in making a particular custody award. Berard v. Berard, 749 A.2d 577, 579 (R.I.2000); see also McDonough v. McDonough, 962 A.2d 47, 52 (R.I.2009). This Court will affirm an award unless the trial justice's factual findings overlooked or misconceived material evidence or were clearly wrong. McDonough, 962 A.2d at 52; see also Berard, 749 A.2d at 580. The plaintiff first argues that the trial justice erred in that he failed to evaluate defendant's motion to relocate in light of the factors set forth in Pettinato v. Pettinato, 582 A.2d 909 (R.I.1990), as is required by this Court's decision in Dupre v. Dupre, 857 A.2d 242 (R.I.2004). In Pettinato, this Court set forth several factors that are to be considered by a trial justice in evaluating the best interests of a child whose custody is in dispute. Those factors are: 1. The wishes of the child's parent or parents regarding the child's custody. 2. The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience to express a preference. 3. The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parent or parents, the child's siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest. 4. The child's adjustment to the child's home, school, and community. 5. The mental and physical health of all individuals involved. 6. The stability of the child's home environment. 7. The moral fitness of the child's parents. 8. The willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate a close and continuous parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent. Pettinato, 582 A.2d at 913-14. The Court in that case further held that the best interests of the child should not be determined with reference to any one factor, but rather the trial justice must consider a combination of and an interaction among all the relevant factors that affect the child's best interests. Id. at 914. In the instant case, the trial justice discussed each of the Pettinato factors in his decision. He found that both parties were seeking sole custody of the children and that the children were too young to express a preference. The trial justice then considered the evidence presented by the parties concerning the relationship each has with the children and the children's relationships with other relatives. He noted that Ms. Frizzle had been more involved in the children's day-today life, although he also noted that plaintiff enjoys spending time with his children. The trial justice also made note of the testimony of Ms. Frizzle's aunt (Pamela Calderone), who testified at trial that she had observed that Mr. Valkoun sometimes gave little attention to Sarah when he would come home for lunch while she was baby-sitting the child. The trial justice next considered the children's adjustment to home, school, and community, and he found that Sarah was doing well in the local public school kindergarten. He noted that Ethan was too young to have a showing of adjustment outside the home. The trial justice also noted, with respect to the children's mental and physical health, that Ethan did have some medical issues but that neither Sarah nor the parents had other problems. The trial justice paid considerable attention to the stability of the children's home environment. He noted that Ms. Frizzle has had custody of the children throughout the parties' separation and that they have been with her for virtually their entire lives. The trial justice took into consideration a contempt order that had been entered against Ms. Frizzle with respect to her having failed to permit Mr. Valkoun to exercise his visitation rights; he also took note of the fact that plaintiff did not seek visits with his children when the couple first separated. He also discussed the incident that occurred at Sarah's birthday party, stating that Mr. Valkoun acted unwisely    immaturely and not in the best interests of his daughter on that day. In addressing the moral fitness of the parties, the trial justice declined to find either party's past actions to be either moral or immoral. He concluded that plaintiff and defendant were both morally fit parents. The trial justice also noted that there was no evidence with respect to either party's religious beliefs. The trial justice also considered the willingness of the parties to facilitate a relationship with the non-custodial parent. He reviewed several incidents that were testified to by the various witnesses, including Ms. Frizzle's aunt and sister. He found the testimony of defendant's witnesses to be credible, and he concluded that Mr. Valkoun's behavior does not show a person who would want to cooperate and facilitate visits with a non-custodial parent. He also found that the behavior that Mr. Valkoun exhibited during several of the incidents that were testified to demonstrated that he had acted immaturely. After evaluating all these factors, the trial justice concluded that physical placement of the children should be awarded to Ms. Frizzle. The trial justice then turned to the question of relocation and discussed this Court's opinion in Dupre. This Court in Dupre ruled that a parent's ability to relocate for legitimate reasons should not be burdened by having to demonstrate that such reasons are also `compelling,' provided that the relocation is in the child's best interests. Dupre, 857 A.2d at 254. The Court also identified the following nonexclusive factors as being of particular significance with respect to the issue of relocation: (1) The nature, quality, extent of involvement, and duration of the child's relationship with the parent proposing to relocate and with the non-relocating parent.    (2) The reasonable likelihood that the relocation will enhance the general quality of life for both the child and the parent seeking relocation, including, but not limited to, economic and emotional benefits, and educational opportunities.    (3) The probable impact that the relocation will have on the child's physical, educational, and emotional development.    (4) The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the non-relocating parent and child through suitable visitation arrangements, considering the logistics and financial circumstances of the parties.    (5) The existence of extended family or other support systems available to the child in both locations.    (6) Each parent's reasons for seeking or opposing the relocation.    (7) In cases of international relocation, the question of whether the country to which the child is to be relocated is a signatory to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction   . (8) To the extent that they may be relevant to a relocation inquiry, the Pettinato factors also will be significant. Dupre, 857 A.2d at 257-59. No single factor is dispositive and [e]ach case will present its own unique circumstances that a trial justice must balance and weigh as he or she deems appropriate. Id. at 259. Further, in both the instant case and in Dupre, the trial justice was charged with making an initial determination concerning custody; in such cases, the Court has emphasized that the focus is squarely on the best interests of the child, and the parents come before the court on an equal footing   . Id. at 260; see also McDonough, 962 A.2d at 53 n.10 (Both parents share an equal burden of demonstrating with which parent the child's interests will be best served.). In discussing the first Dupre factor, the trial justice noted that Ms. Frizzle has been the children's primary caregiver. In addressing the second Dupre factor, the trial justice noted the evidence that was presented by Ms. Frizzle, which evidence tended to show (1) that her quality of life would be improved by moving to North Carolina; (2) that she would be able to further her education in that state; and (3) that she would have access to free day-care. The trial justice found that Ms. Frizzle's mother, Cathy Frizzle, was a credible witness when she testified with respect to the nature of her neighborhood in North Carolina, the quality of the local elementary school that the children would attend, and the activities available to the children in her area. In addition, the trial justice noted that Cathy Frizzle, in view of her regular trips to Rhode Island from North Carolina, would be available to help facilitate visitation between the children and Mr. Valkoun. In discussing the third Dupre factor, ( viz., the probable impact that relocation would have on the physical, educational, and emotional development of the children), the trial justice found that the school system in North Carolina was at least as good as the current public school attended by Sarah in Rhode Island. The trial justice further found that, although Ethan did have some medical issues, these medical issues were not so extreme or so difficult to treat that they would make it unlikely that a pediatrician could be found to attend to these needs in North Carolina. In turning to the emotional development of the children, the trial justice recognized that the children would suffer some loss due to the fact that they would no longer have weekly visits with their father if relocation was allowed. However, he also noted that in North Carolina they would have a home to live in and daily contact with their grandmother; he also mentioned the advantages for the children that would result from their mother's opportunity to further her education and improve her employment status. Next, the trial justice discussed the fourth Dupre factor viz., the feasibility of preserving the relationship between the non-relocating parent and the children through suitable visitation. The trial justice reiterated that the maternal grandmother, Cathy Frizzle, is available to assist in facilitating visitation with Mr. Valkoun. He further noted that, as established by the trial testimony and exhibits, Mr. Valkoun would have sufficient money available to allow him to travel to North Carolina to visit with the children there or to pay for the children to visit him in Rhode Island. The trial justice recognized that Ms. Frizzle had a very limited amount of money at the time, but he again found Cathy Frizzle's testimony with respect to her willingness to facilitate visitation to be credible and compelling. The trial justice next turned to the fifth Dupre factor and addressed the availability of extended family in both North Carolina and Rhode Island. He found that both locations provided the opportunity for contact with extended family. He again noted that Cathy Frizzle's offer to facilitate visitation would enable the children to have contact with their extended family in Rhode Island in addition to their contacts with other extended family members in North Carolina. Turning to the sixth Dupre factor, the trial justice then considered each parent's reason for seeking or opposing relocation. He found that Ms. Frizzle's reasons for moving appeared to be sincere. He further found that North Carolina offers more for Defendant than she can currently achieve in Rhode Island based upon her current circumstances. The trial justice compared the type of home that Ms. Frizzle would be able to provide for her children in Rhode Island with that which was available to her in North Carolina ( viz., her parents home). He found that Ms. Frizzle simply cannot provide as well for herself and her children in Rhode Island at this time. The final Dupre relocation factor calls for taking into account the Pettinato factors [t]o the extent that they may be relevant   . Dupre, 857 A.2d at 259. In discussing this factor, the trial justice stated that he had already applied those factors to the question of custody and that he found that placement of the children with Ms. Frizzle was in the best interests of the children. After awarding Mr. Valkoun possession of the couple's home, the judge reasoned that the children would be required to move from the only home they have ever known to either an apartment in Rhode Island or to North Carolina. The plaintiff contends that the trial justice erred when he failed to re-consider the Pettinato factors with respect to the issue of relocation and discussed the factors only as they applied to the determination of custody. We do not agree. The trial justice thoroughly reviewed the testimony and exhibits presented by each party and discussed the applicable law. As detailed above, the trial justice analyzed each of the Pettinato factors in light of the evidence presented in the just-decided motions for custody. He then turned to defendant's motion to relocate and discussed the Dupre factors, carefully examining the evidence with respect to each of those factors. The trial justice recognized that the Pettinato factors represent specific concerns to be considered in deciding the best interests of the child in a particular relocation case. He stated that he was required to determine if relocation is in the best interests of Ethan and Sarah. The trial justice had already engaged in an exhaustive evaluation of the evidence with respect to each of the Pettinato factors when he decided the parties' motions for custody. The trial justice had already found that the children were too young to express a preference for custody; it is unlikely that a dissimilar result would have been reached with respect to their preference regarding a move to North Carolina. Likewise, the parents' preferences were unlikely to change with respect to the relocation issue. The trial justice had already evaluated the mental and physical health of the parties, the moral fitness of the parents, and the willingness of each party to facilitate a relationship with the non-custodial parent. To reiterate each Pettinato factor again in discussing the motion to relocate would have been needlessly repetitious. It is clear from the record that the trial justice took into consideration the pertinent Pettinato factors The plaintiff next argues that the trial justice erred in finding that defendant's reasons for relocating were valid. He contends that defendant failed to present competent evidence that she was pursuing a real career in North Carolina; he argues that she wishes to move only in order to take advantage of her parents' offer of free child-care. Mr. Valkoun also contends that there was no evidence that the children's quality of life would be improved by the move to North Carolina. In Dupre, 857 A.2d at 258, the Court stated as follows: A parent's desire to relocate with his or her children ought not be predicated upon a whim. On the other hand, as we previously have noted, a relocating parent need not establish a compelling reason for the move. The motivation for the relocation, however, will be a significant consideration. Clearly, a vindictive desire to interfere in the other parent's relationship with the child would weigh heavily against the parent seeking to relocate. This Court in Dupre also identified several reasons for relocation that would be considered valid, such as the desire to be close to family or other sources of support, the pursuit of employment or educational opportunity, and the prospect of improving the family's quality of life. Id. at 258-59. When considering what factors may be relevant in deciding a motion for relocation, that determination is confided to the discretion of the trial justice and that discretion should not be unduly restricted. Id. at 257; see also McDonough, 962 A.2d at 54. We perceive no error in the trial justice's decision to grant defendant's motion to relocate. We now turn to the last issue raised by plaintiffnamely, that the trial justice overlooked evidence with respect to Ms. Frizzle's relationship with her son Joseph in determining her fitness as a parent and her ability to provide a stable home for the children. In his decision, the trial justice discussed the evidence presented by plaintiff indicating that Ms. Frizzle and Joseph's father had exchanged custody of Joseph several times. The trial justice referred to the several exhibits that had been received during the trial showing Ms. Frizzle's involvement with her children, including her involvement with Joseph. He further noted that Sarah and Ethan had lived with Ms. Frizzle all of their lives and that, at one point during the couple's separation, Mr. Valkoun did not seek visitation with his children and refused overnight visits with Ethan. The trial justice also discussed the incident involving Sarah's birthday party, finding that Mr. Valkoun's testimony regarding his understanding of the visitation order related to that day was evasive and simply not credible. The trial justice cited this incident as an example of Mr. Valkoun's immature and unreasonable behavior. The trial justice also discussed the testimony presented by Ms. Frizzle, her mother, and her aunt concerning defendant's abilities as a mother and her involvement with the children's lives. We perceive no error in the trial justice's determination that Ms. Frizzle was a fit parent who would provide a stable home for the children.