Opinion ID: 772800
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Standard for Heat of Passion

Text: 35 Judge Mishler's finding that the assailants acted in the heat of passion appears to be based on the fact that, as he noted, they acted in response to Pizzuto's refusal to obey their commands and the abusive epithets directed to them. These circumstances do not suffice to support a heat of passion finding. At common law, heat of passion could not be shown by words alone, no matter how provocative. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 7.10(b)(6), at 260 & 260 n.55 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter LaFave & Scott]. At least one circuit has followed this approach with federal offenses. See United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700, 705 (5th Cir. 1979). Although in some jurisdictions, insulting words have been deemed sufficient provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter, see People v. Morales, 684 N.Y.S.2d 853 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cty. 1999), the prevailing view has been that words can engender heat of passion only if the words impart information of a highly provocative nature. See LaFave & Scott, § 7.10(b)(6), at 260. The classic example is one spouse informing the other spouse of the former's infidelity, which provokes the recipient of the information to kill the adulterer. See id. Pizzuto's cursing at Velazquez imparted no information, and his isolated use of the same expletive Velazquez had directed at him will not suffice for a heat of passion finding. See State v. Hale, 453 N.W.2d 704, 707 (Minn. 1990) (victim's insults insufficient to provoke ordinary person to kill). 36 Nor, in the circumstances of this case, can Pizzuto's momentary refusal to obey Velazquez's command to reenter his cell constitute sufficient provocation for a heat of passion defense. Although appropriate force sometimes may have to be used to secure compliance with legitimate commands within a prison, Pizzuto was already in his cell when the fatal beating was administered. Force was not used to obtain compliance with a disregarded command; it was summary punishment for previous (and momentary) disobedience. 37 Furthermore, Judge Mishler's finding is vulnerable to the extent that it rested on his view that Pizzuto's conduct was sufficient to arouse the passion of a reasonable man. Just as law enforcement officers are entitled to have their conduct insulated from liability by assessing the circumstances confronting them through the eyes of a reasonable officer, see Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987), they must expect to have their actions assessed by the standards of a reasonable officer when liability is sought to be imposed. It is doubtful that Pizzuto's conduct sufficed to arouse the heat of passion of a reasonable corrections officer confronting a prison inmate. Cf. United States v. Cobb, 905 F.2d 784, 789 (4th Cir. 1990) ([M]ere words by a pretrial detainee [cannot] justify the use of physical force by a police officer.). 38 Finally, we note that the heat of passion defense is normally unavailable after some interval of time has elapsed between the provocation and the response. See LaFave & Scott, § 7.10(d), at 265. In the pending case, that interval included sufficient time for the assailants to inform their supervisor about Pizzuto's conduct and to don rubber gloves (as a precaution against HIV infection) before entering his cell to beat him. 39 Although one member of the panel believes that as a matter of law the evidence is insufficient for a heat of passion finding, we will leave the matter for further consideration on remand because the possibility exists, however remote, that more precise findings, possibly made on an amplified record, could support such a finding.