Opinion ID: 1829652
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: may title be tried only in chancery court?

Text: Chancery courts are given jurisdiction to try title by the Mississippi Constitution. Miss. Const. Art. 6, § 160 (1890). However, jurisdiction to try title is not limited to chancery court. `[U]nder our system of courts, the jurisdiction to make a conclusive and final adjudication of title to land rests alone with the circuit and chancery courts, and now to a limited extent with the county courts'. McCoy v. McRae, 204 Miss. 309, 320, 37 So.2d 353, 356 (1948) [quoting Vansant v. Dodds, 164 Miss. 787, 144 So. 688 (1932)]. When an action for replevin which is brought to determine who has the right to immediate possession of a particular piece of property is tried in circuit court and when the right to possession is dependent upon title or ownership, and title or ownership is the issue upon which the decision as to the right of possession actually turns, then a judgment in replevin is as fully conclusive upon the said issue of title or ownership as would be the same determination in any other form or action or in any other court of competent jurisdiction. Fair v. Dickerson, 164 Miss. 432, 441, 144 So. 238, 239 (1932). In an action for ejectment, a court of law may determine the question of title if the parties are already in a court of law, and can fairly present their respective titles in that court, which are of such character as will there be recognized, and no special reason is presented for equitable interference... . Huntington v. Allen, 44 Miss. 654, 663 (1870). In Bell v. City of West Point, 51 Miss. 262 (1875), this Court presented a lengthy discussion of the jurisdiction of the various courts. The Court said, The 64th section of the 6th article is: `The circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction in all matters, civil and criminal, in this state.' Dwelling a moment on the language, it is broad enough to embrace suits at common law as well as in equity  `all matters civil.' But we know that the purpose was to create a court of common law cognizance, and we, therefore, give that import only to the words. That is plain, from the history of the past as well as from the subsequent sections of the same article. The 16th section provides `for the establishment of chancery courts, with full jurisdiction in all matters of equity,' etc. Reading the two sections together in the light of history, and we have a superior court of original common law jurisdiction, and a court of chancery with full jurisdiction in all matters of equity.       In determining whether the circuit court has cognizance of a particular suit we must bear in mind that it is a superior court of original jurisdiction over all civil matters, and the inquiry is, has the particular subject been excluded and cognizance been bestowed on some other court?       To hold at this day, in the light of legislative and judicial history, since 1817, that the constitution organizing the judicial power must have a literal interpretation, would bring into grave doubt the validity of several important statutes, and would deny to the legislature the right to confer new jurisdiction on the several courts, as it might judge convenient. The constitution does not confine the several courts in a straight jacket. When it established a chancery court `with full jurisdiction in all matters of equity,' it meant that system of equity jurisprudence, unwritten and positive, which existed in this state in 1869, with all its capabilities of improvement and expansion. It left the court free to take its share in a wider development of its peculiar jurisprudence, and to new applications of its principles, to the shifting transactions of men, and the changing condition of society, assisted from time to time by legislative enactments... . It would be unfortunate if the boundaries of the court had been so adjusted in the constitution as that the court of chancery could proceed so far in adjudicating the rights of a legatee or distributee, and then come to a final pause, and turn him over to some other court to obtain full redress. That evil may be obviated by holding that where the constitution gives jurisdiction of the principal subject matter, the legislature may allow it cognizance over cognate and incidental matters, so that by one litigation the whole subject may be terminated. Bell, 51 Miss. at 270-274 (emphasis added). We have allowed a chancery court to consider actions at law if those questions are pendent to the claim by which the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Johnson v. Hinds County, 524 So.2d 947 (Miss. 1988). Where there appears from the face of the well-pleaded complaint an independent basis for equity jurisdiction, our chancery courts may hear and adjudge law claims. Tillotson v. Anders, 551 So.2d 212, 213 (Miss. 1989). A claim is pendent if it arise[s] out of the same transaction or occurrence as the principal claim or, as others put it, out of a common nucleus of operative fact. Hall v. Corbin, 478 So.2d 253, 255 (Miss. 1985). A circuit court has also been allowed to hear equity claims via pendent jurisdiction. Gibson v. Manuel, 534 So.2d 199 (Miss. 1988) (circuit court could consider a motion for preliminary injunction); American Electric, A Division of FL Industries v. Singarayar, 530 So.2d 1319 (Miss. 1988) (circuit court could consider claims for equitable relief); Canton Farm Equipment, Inc. v. Richardson, 501 So.2d 1098 (Miss. 1987) (circuit court could consider claims for equitable relief). In fact, in Hall, supra, we indicated that it is more appropriate for a circuit court to hear equity claims than it is for a chancery court to hear actions at law since circuit courts have general jurisdiction but chancery courts enjoy only limited jurisdiction. We have allowed a chancery court to hear issues that are within the jurisdiction of the eminent domain court. The case of Johnson v. Hinds County, supra , involved what the appellant alleged was an attempt to take a public road by the county. The appellant said that the action could only be heard by an eminent domain court. We said that the chancery court had subject matter jurisdiction of the action since not only did the claim involve a question of title but also equitable relief was being sought. Since the court had subject matter jurisdiction, it could also hear any non-chancery claims especially where the so-called eminent domain proceeding is at best one for inverse condemnation. Johnson, 524 So.2d at 953. In H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. Board of Supervisors of Jackson County, 324 So.2d 746 (Miss. 1975), Porter brought an action in chancery court to confirm its title to 204 acres of land which had been conveyed to it by Jackson County. Jackson County responded by asking the court to confirm that the land belonged to the State of Mississippi to be used for public purposes. The chancellor held that Jackson County could reacquire the land by eminent domain. Porter appealed the chancellor's decision contending that the chancery court did not have jurisdiction to make that determination. We said that while ordinarily that question might only be decided by an eminent domain court, where as here, one of the issues raised relative to the confirmation was the question of whether the county ... could reacquire the land since it was no longer being used for industrial purposes, the court had jurisdiction to decide the question. H.K. Porter Co., Inc., 324 So.2d at 751. Clearly, trying title is not limited to the chancery court if another court has subject matter jurisdiction of the action and the issue of title is pendent to that claim. Historically, this Court has allowed courts other than chancery to try title where that issue is incidental to the main action. Where the eminent domain court has subject matter jurisdiction of a condemnation action based upon the pleadings presented by the parties, the court should be allowed to adjudicate title where that issue arises out of the same occurrence. Moreover, application of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure to eminent domain proceedings ensures that all necessary parties to the title dispute will be joined. Like a motion filed under § 11-27-15, trying title is a function of the judge and shall be heard and decided by the judge as a preference proceeding, without a jury, prior to the hearing on the petition.