Opinion ID: 2378023
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Prosecutor's rebuttal remarks

Text: Finally, McCaslin argues that the prosecutor inflamed the emotions and passions of the jury during his rebuttal remarks. The State responds that the arguments were within a prosecutor's latitude. As a fundamental rule in closing arguments, prosecutors must confine their comments to matters in evidence. State v. Richmond, 289 Kan. 419, 440-41, 212 P.3d 165 (2009) (citing State v. Baker, 281 Kan. 997, Syl. ¶ 11, 135 P.3d 1098 [2006]). However, a prosecutor is allowed considerable latitude in discussing the evidence and drawing reasonable inferences from that evidence. Richmond, 289 Kan. at 440-41, 212 P.3d 165; see also King, 288 Kan. at 352, 204 P.3d 585 (`Inherent in this wide latitude is the freedom to craft an argument that includes reasonable inferences based on the evidence.'). We have held that a prosecutor is given wide latitude in the language and manner of presenting argument and may even use picturesque speech as long as he or she does not refer to facts not disclosed by the evidence. State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 643-45, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (discussing cases referring to the smoke and mirrors analogy). McCaslin complains two prosecutorial comments were improper. First, evidence showed that A.D.'s body was set ablaze after she was doused with citronella oil. When explaining why there was no citronella oil on McCaslin, the prosecutor argued to the jury: You've all maybe lit a barbecue. Did you get barbecue lighting fluid on you when you are lighting a barbecue? No, it goes on the charcoal, and Angela Duran was his charcoal and he was through. Second, when explaining to the jury why there was no soot on McCaslin's clothing, the prosecutor remarked: We're not saying he hung around and cooked s'mores. We're saying he lit the fire and left. The fire was burning. You would not have soot, you would not have ash, you wouldn't have smoke at the time. The State responds that the prosecutor was merely discussing the evidence and drawing an analogy to explain it. We acknowledge that the prosecutor's statements served to explain two important factual issues in the case: why the accelerant used to set A.D. on fire was not found on McCaslin and why McCaslin's clothing did not contain ash or soot if he was at the fire. We also recognize that both of these issues were raised in the defense's closing argument, i.e., the materials' absence indicated McCaslin's innocence. This in turn caused the prosecutor to address them in rebuttal. The language chosen created an analogy easily understood by the jury and did not contain facts undisclosed by the evidence. However, comparing a burning murder victim to the lit charcoal for barbecuing meat and for roasting marshmallows to make a cookout' dessert falls short of qualifying the prosecutor as a paragon of professionalism. The reference which can imply roasting marshmallows over A.D.'s flaming body, while picturesque (see Rodriguez, 269 Kan. at 643, 8 P.3d 712), is particularly repugnant. We agree with McCaslin that these remarks not only constituted prosecutorial misconduct but also demonstrated ill will, lack of good faith, and were gross and flagrant. See Elnicki, 279 Kan. at 64, 105 P.3d 1222. Despite our disapproval of this language, we are not prepared to find reversible error, even when coupled with the prosecutor's instances of misconduct during McCaslin's cross-examination. When viewed against other evidence in the case, the prosecutor's conduct did not deny McCaslin a fair trial. See Richmond, 289 Kan. at 444-45, 212 P.3d 165. We hold that the harmlessness standards are satisfied from both K.S.A. 60-261 (not inconsistent with substantial justice) and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, reh. denied 386 U.S. 987, 87 S.Ct. 1283, 18 L.Ed.2d 241 (1967) (conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the results of the trial). See State v. White, 284 Kan. 333, 340, 161 P.3d 208 (2007). For example, although reviewed under a different standard in Issue 2, much of the same evidence applies to the present analysis. After discovering A.D.'s body, McCaslin did not call 911. By his own admission, he instead took numerous steps to conceal his presence at the scene. That same day he also got rid of his pistol, ammunition, and drugs. McCaslin's claim of innocence was additionally harmed by the location of A.D.'s blood on the inside of his jeans' waistband, the condition and position of A.D.'s body, his DNA inside her, and the proximity in time between his now admitted presence at the scene and the house fire. Moreover, key parts of his testimony were irreconcilable with the testimony of both the coroner and the fire investigator after their independent reviews of A.D.'s body.