Opinion ID: 456170
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Negligence and Unseaworthiness

Text: 37 As discussed above, the first step in determining a shipowner's entitlement to limitation of liability is to establish what acts of negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness caused the accident. In this case, negligence involves evidence of careless or improper operation of the ship by the crew. Because the shipowner has a non-delegable duty to provide a competent master and crew, unseaworthiness can be caused by insufficient manning of the vessel or an incompetent crew. Tug Ocean Prince, Inc. v. United States, 584 F.2d 1151, 1155 (2d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959, 99 S.Ct. 1499, 59 L.Ed.2d 772 (1979). Unseaworthiness may also result from improper maintenance of equipment or other related failures which make the vessel ill-suited for its duties at sea. As noted by the district court the two concepts are related because negligent operation of a vessel often results from improper training of the crew. The district court in its factual findings sets forth many instances of negligence and unseaworthiness that combined to cause the accident. In reviewing the findings of negligence and conditions of unseaworthiness by the district court, we bear in mind that fault in the abstract is not sufficient. To produce liability, the acts of negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness must be a contributory and proximate cause of the accident. See Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans v. M/V Farmsum, 574 F.2d 289, 297 (5th Cir.1978). 38
39 The district court held that Captain Liu was negligent in allowing his ship to be directed up the channel by the pilot at speeds ranging from half-speed ahead to full ahead. The district court's findings of fact with regard to speed were as follows: (1) At 0650, in the vicinity of buoy 6, the speed of the vessel was increased to full ahead or 13 knots over the water; (2) One-half mile after passing buoy 12, near buoy 14, and still proceeding full speed ahead, the weather had deteriorated so the bow of the ship could not be seen, indicating visibility was less than 500 feet; (3) Maintaining a speed of 13 knots, the SUMMIT VENTURE traveled from buoys 14 to 16, a distance of 1.25 nautical miles, in approximately five minutes. Just prior to reaching buoy 16 at 0721, the vessel's speed was reduced to half ahead or 9 1/2 to 11 knots. When the lookout, Boatswain Sit, arrived on the bow about 0723, he immediately sighted buoy 16 off the port bow as it passed down the port side of the vessel. The boatswain could not clearly see the color or shape of the sighted buoy because of the heavy fog and poor visibility. At that time the rain and wind increased, and visibility was approximately 300 to 500 feet--less than the ship's length. According to the posted maneuvering characteristics, emergency stopping distance of the vessel was in excess of 3,500 feet; (4) The vessel continued to proceed up Tampa Bay at one-half ahead, even though Pilot Lerro could not visually sight the next set of buoys; 1A and 2A. By the time the vessel was two tenths of a mile from buoys 1A and 2A, Atkins advised that the radar scope had been totally obliterated by heavy rainfall and that radar contact was lost. Although radar contact was momentarily regained for one or two sweeps of the port radar, buoys 1A and 2A were never visually sighted or seen again on radar. The vessel proceeded forward at one-half ahead at approximately 10 knots, toward the critical turning buoy and the bridge, which was less than one mile away; (5) Notwithstanding radar occlusion and virtually zero visibility, the vessel continued to proceed at 9 1/2 to 11 knots through the turn at buoy 2A, just seven-tenths of a mile away from the bridge. Under these conditions, the vessel required approximately 2500 feet to stop its forward motion. Pilots Lerro, Evans 5 and Atkins, all testified that the vessel was in violation of the speed and visibility rules at this point. At no time did Captain Liu or Chief Mate Chan communicate with the pilot or suggest that the ship be slowed or anchored; (6) At 0731, approximately seven-tenths of a mile from the Skyway Bridge and approximately three and one-half minutes prior to the collision, Pilot Lerro ordered the engine speed to slow ahead, but that reduction had no appreciable effect on the speed of the SUMMIT VENTURE; and (7) At 0732.5, Lerro ordered double full astern, hard aport, and let go both anchors, however only one anchor dropped. Before any of these emergency measures could take effect, the starboard bow of the SUMMIT VENTURE struck the Skyway Bridge, approximately 800 feet from the center line of the channel. 6 At the time of the allision, the vessel was proceeding at a speed of approximately eight knots. The allision with the bridge occurred at 0734. 40 It is clear from the evidence adduced at trial that the excessive speed of the SUMMIT VENTURE was the principal overt act of negligence causing the allision with the bridge. Hercules attempts to circumvent the fact of the SUMMIT VENTURE's excessive speed by citing to the testimony of four witnesses who stated that it would have been imprudent to attempt to stop the SUMMIT VENTURE in the circumstances existing on the morning of May 9, 1980, after the storm broke. The fallacy of this argument is two-fold. First, Hercules claims that the storm broke at buoy 2A when the facts clearly show that the SUMMIT VENTURE had been in a heavy rain storm for approximately two and one-half miles after passing buoy 14. Second, the evidence clearly establishes that the SUMMIT VENTURE's speed far exceeded minimum visibility requirements prior to buoy 2A and that attempts to reduce the vessel's excessive speed after passing buoy 2A had no appreciable effect. It is true that some circumstances would make low speed inappropriate, and Hercules in its appeal suggests that reducing speed below half ahead would have been imprudent because a greater speed was necessary to maintain control of the ship. However, the expert witnesses at trial stated only that an attempt to stop the ship during the heaviest rain after passing buoy 2A would have been imprudent. Significantly, they did not question the propriety of slowing at some point before buoy 2A, when the severity of the rain storm was evident and visibility virtually non-existent. Moreover, had the SUMMIT VENTURE been traveling at a more moderate speed prior to buoy 2A, attempts to slow the vessel after passing buoy 2A would have been more successful. Clearly the success of any attempt to stop the vessel by either backing the engine or dropping the anchors was directly correlated to the vessel's speed at the time these maneuvers were attempted, and certainly appellants cannot argue that stopping a vessel is imprudent when a bridge has been sighted and allision is imminent. 41 Article 16 of the Inland Rules, subtitled Speed in Fog provides: Every vessel shall, in a fog, mist, falling snow, or heavy rainstorms, go at a moderate speed, having careful regard to the existing circumstances and conditions. 33 U.S.C. Sec. 192. 7 The Pennsylvania Rule provides that a statutory violation raises a rebuttable presumption that the ship caused the collision. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall) 125, 22 L.Ed. 148 (1874). If a statutory violation is proven, Hercules must demonstrate that the violation could not have been one of the causes of the allision. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. at 136. With regard to the moderate speed required in heavy weather under 33 U.S.C. Sec. 192, the half distance rule is a gloss that has been recognized by the courts. The Supreme Court in Union Oil Company of California v. The San Jacinto, 409 U.S. 140, 93 S.Ct. 368, 34 L.Ed.2d 365 (1972), defined the half-distance rule as follows: If two vessels, upon sighting each other, are proceeding at rates of speed such that each can stop before it reaches the point at which the courses of the two intersect, collision is impossible. 409 U.S. at 144-145, 93 S.Ct. at 371. 42 Though this rule is not directly applicable here because a stationary object, the bridge, was involved, we find that the circumstances of this case clearly demonstrate a violation of the moderate speed rule. The facts show that from buoy 14 to the bridge, a distance of over three miles, Pilot Lerro allowed the vessel to proceed up the channel with visibility of 500 feet or less. With a ship length over 600 feet and visibility less than 500 feet, good seamanship plus the pilot's statutory duty under the moderate speed rule dictated that the ship be stopped by buoy 14 or 16. 43 Instead, Pilot Lerro chose to push ahead blindly at a grossly excessive speed when he could not even see the bow of the ship. Between buoys 14 and 16 the ship maintained a speed of 13 knots; at this speed the ship had an emergency stopping distance of 3,500 feet, or approximately seven times Pilot Lerro's actual visibility. Just prior to reaching buoy 16, the ship's speed was reduced to half ahead and upon reaching buoy 2A (which was never sighted), 1.3 miles away, the ship was traveling at 9 1/2 to 11 knots. At this point, the bridge was .7 miles away, visibility was zero and the ship's emergency stopping distance was 2,500 feet. Given the ship's speed, even if Pilot Lerro had been able to see the bridge at this point, full emergency stopping measures would have still brought the ship perilously close to the bridge. Pilot Lerro chose to push forward resulting in the tragic allision. 44 We can think of no greater case of misfeasance or gross negligence than as exemplified by the facts of this case. This strong language not only applies to Pilot Lerro, but also to Captain Liu and Chief Mate Chan who stood by mutely as these events unfolded in their full view. Likewise, we find absurd appellant's suggestion that the storm suddenly broke at buoy 2A and caught the crew of the SUMMIT VENTURE by surprise. As established by the facts recited above, the severity of the storm was clearly evident for over three miles prior to reaching the bridge, rendering any defense of surprise ludicrous. 45 Accordingly, we affirm the district court's finding, as a matter of law, that Captain Liu, as master of the SUMMIT VENTURE was negligent in allowing his vessel to proceed at the speeds ordered by Pilot Lerro under conditions of visibility of less than 500 feet. 46
47 The evidence showed that the two radars on the SUMMIT VENTURE when operated together at short range tended to interfere with one another. The district court found that the interference between the two radars, while not a statutory violation was a well-known fact, and consequently established negligence on the part of Hercules for allowing the ship to proceed to sea without correcting the known problem. Moreover, the district court found that Captain Liu had little knowledge and inadequate training in the use of the two radars aboard the SUMMIT VENTURE. The district court further found that contrary to company policy, none of the crew members aboard the SUMMIT VENTURE had a radar observer certificate, and that on the morning of the allision, Captain Liu failed to use the radar effectively by using one to track or monitor the approaching weather and the other to aid in navigation. 48 We find that while negligence existed because the two radars tended to interfere with one another and the owners of Hercules failed to have a crew member with a radar observer certificate aboard the SUMMIT VENTURE, this negligence was not a contributory and proximate cause of the allision. Though none of the crew members of the SUMMIT VENTURE had a radar observer certificate, both Pilot Lerro and Pilot Trainee Atkins had radar observer certificates and the evidence showed that Atkins was monitoring the radar. The evidence also showed that while the radar could detect rain it could not indicate the intensity of a storm. Furthermore, the severity of the storm was visually evident by buoy 14 when the bow could no longer be seen. Soon thereafter, approximately two tenths of a mile from buoys 1A and 2A, the radar scope became completely obliterated. It was at buoy 14 and beyond that the decision of whether to stop or slow the vessel was critical and proximately related to the ultimate allision with the bridge. There is no evidence that the lack of radar observer certificates among the crew members, Captain Liu's inexperience with the radars aboard the SUMMIT VENTURE, or the potential interference between the two radars at short range, had anything to do with the failure of the crew members aboard the SUMMIT VENTURE to properly slow or stop the vessel between buoy 14 and the bridge. That is, there is no evidence to suggest that the negligence with respect to the radar contributed to the series of events occurring between buoy 14 and the bridge. Accordingly, we hold that the district court's findings relating to radar interference and the lack of radar observer certificates as a contributory cause of the allision between the SUMMIT VENTURE and the Sunshine Skyway Bridge to be clearly erroneous. 49
50 The district court found that it was negligent of Captain Liu not to send a lookout forward when the weather began deteriorating. The district court also found that when the lookout was sent forward he failed to perform his functions properly in that although he reported the sighting of a buoy, he did not report the color or whether or not he heard any sounds. 8 Furthermore, there was conflicting testimony as to which side of the ship the buoy passed and this not only suggested the inadequacy of the lookout's performance but also the likely relation between the improper performance of the lookout's duties and the vessel veering off course. Furthermore, the lookouts, Sit and Lok, received no instructions from the watch officer prior to going on watch regarding what to look for or what to expect during the voyage, a clear violation of the IMCO regulations. Moreover, Bo'sun Sit, whose primary duty was to serve as a lookout, found himself performing double duty as an anchor watch because only two men had been sent forward and a complement of three men was required to drop both anchors simultaneously. Thus, the negligence in the assignment of this particular lookout was further demonstrated by the fact that the lookout had divided duties. See St. Phillip Offshore Towing Co. v. Wisconsin Barge Lines, Inc., 466 F.Supp. 403, 409-10 (E.D.La.1979) (duty to post proper lookout cannot be fulfilled by person who has other duties); Harbor Towing Corp. v. Tug Reliance, 211 F.Supp. 896, 902 (E.D.Va.1963) (the lookout under adverse conditions serves as the eyes of the ship and should have no other duties). The appellant argues that despite the assignment of divided duties to the lookout, that on the morning of the allision he was at his assigned post as only a lookout and was well forward of the anchor engine at impact and narrowly escaped injury when a portion of the bridge fell onto the ship's forecastle. Thus, the appellant argues that the fact that the lookout might be ordered to assist another seaman in letting go anchors did not interfere with his primary duty as a lookout, and cites Farrell Lines, supra, 530 F.2d at 12 as supportive of this proposition. We find Farrell Lines not to be on point as that case did not involve a lookout but a second minor duty (bellbook entries) of a watch officer which did not detract from his primary duty of supervising the helmsman. Furthermore, the district court's ruling that posting a lookout with two assigned duties was negligent is supported by evidence of the poor performance of the lookout assigned; and therefore we cannot find the district court's holding as to this negligent act to be clearly erroneous. 51
52 The district court found that as a matter of practice for the past 15 years, upon entering and leaving port, Captain Liu failed to insure that the anchors were ready for use so that both anchors could be let go if necessary. The court found this practice violated company regulations and was contrary to sound navigational practice and good seamanship. The district court further found that although Pilot Lerro requested that both anchors on the SUMMIT VENTURE be readied and that three men were required to drop both anchors simultaneously, only two men were on the bow and thus when the order was given only one anchor was dropped. The court found this to be evidence of unseaworthiness. 53 While the facts found by the district court constitute negligence and unseaworthiness, we find that these facts had no causative relation to the SUMMIT VENTURE's allision with the Sunshine Skyway Bridge. Because of the speed of the vessel and the late dropping of the anchor, it still had not caught hold at the point of allision. The testimony further indicated that given the speed of the ship, the dropping of both anchors would have had no appreciable effect because had they caught hold, the chains would have been ripped from the vessel because of its speed. (TL 571-572) 9 Consequently, we find the district court's holding that the negligence surrounding the anchor watch and anchors was a contributory cause to the accident to be clearly erroneous. 54
55 The district court found that Captain Liu acted negligently in failing to follow the prescribed procedures when he relieved Chief Mate Chan as Officer of the Watch. The district court also found that: 56 Liu did not know the position or course of the SUMMIT VENTURE or the position of the other vessels in the vicinity and Liu failed to ask Chan for clarification in this regard. Furthermore, when Chan left the bridge at 0727, no relief officer was present and, thus, Liu had to act in a dual capacity, as master and duty officer on the watch, for seven to eight critical minutes prior to the collision, rendering Liu too busy to monitor the ship's course or ascertain its position. 57 566 F.Supp. at 974. Appellant argues that prior to relieving Chan, Liu had been on the bridge observing and monitoring and knew the situation without needing the chief officer to brief him. Appellant further argues that Captain Liu was available to perform any function that may have been required of the chief officer and that there were two other pilots on the bridge with the statutory duty of navigating the SUMMIT VENTURE through the channel, plus a helmsman, and that therefore, there were more than enough personnel on the bridge to navigate the SUMMIT VENTURE. 58 The deposition of Captain Liu indicates that he did not ask any questions of the pilot because he did not want to interfere or disturb the two pilots. Moreover, his testimony indicates that because he was acting as captain and master of the ship and also duty officer on watch when the chief mate went forward to stand by the anchor, that he did not have time to check and follow so many things. Furthermore, Captain Liu felt that with one pilot on the radar and one on the conn, the best thing he could do was to keep quiet and let the two pilots handle the ship. In sum, the evidence shows that Captain Liu was too busy with his dual responsibilities to perform his duty to oversee the pilots and to exercise authority over them when he believed the ship to be in danger. Likewise, with Chief Mate Chan gone from the bridge of the ship, there was no longer a crew member of the SUMMIT VENTURE present who could effectively monitor the course and speed of the ship and exercise his authority to question or override the pilots aboard who were tending to these matters. 59 The significance of the failure to utilize proper turnover procedures is evidenced by the testimony of Captain Liu and Chief Mate Chan regarding their concern over the handling of the ship by Pilot Lerro. Captain Liu stated that he was concerned about the safety of the ship for ten minutes prior to the allision. Chief Mate Chan testified that he thought the SUMMIT VENTURE should have been anchored at buoy 16. However, both failed to convey their concerns to Pilot Lerro or to each other. 60 Had the two officers gone through the appropriate turnover procedures, a discussion of the ship's speed and course along with the presence of other vessels and the location of the bridge would obviously have occurred. Moreover, it seems inevitable that during the ensuing discussion their mutual concerns over the piloting of the ship would have surfaced and been brought to the attention of Pilot Lerro. While the content of this non-existent conversation is speculative, the hypothetical exchange illustrated above, when compared with the absolute failure of Captain Liu and Chief Mate Chan to adequately communicate, demonstrates the total abdication by the two officers of their duties on board the ship. The failure to follow established procedures for turnover on the bridge resulted in critical communications never being exchanged--communications that very well may have averted the accident. 61 We affirm the district court's finding that Captain Liu acted negligently in allowing Chief Mate Chan to leave the bridge without briefing Captain Liu on the matters that Chief Mate Chan had been monitoring, and further failing to make provision for replacement of Chief Mate Chan before his departure. 62
63 The district court found that Captain Liu was negligent in relying on the pilots and failing to remonstrate with them. The IMCO rules 10 and recommendations which were binding on the crew of the SUMMIT VENTURE provided: Navigation with Pilot Embarked 64 Despite the duties and obligations of a pilot, his presence on board does not relieve the master or officer in charge of the watch from their duties or obligations for the safety of the ship. The master and pilot shall exchange information regarding navigation procedures, local conditions and the ship's characteristics. 65 Furthermore, the Supreme Court in The China, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 53, 67-68, 19 L.Ed. 67 (1869) noted: 66 It is the duty of the master to interfere in cases of the pilot's intoxication or manifest incapacity, in cases of danger which he does not foresee, and in all cases of great necessity. The master has the same power to displace the pilot that he has to remove any subordinate officer of the vessel. He may exercise it, or not, according to his discretion. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 67 The district court found unequivocably that the circumstances surrounding the approach to the bridge made out such a case of great necessity that it was blatant negligence on the part of Captain Liu to allow the ship to proceed under the control of Pilot Lerro after Captain Liu became aware or should have become aware of the inevitable risk of accident. Indeed, Captain Liu testified that he had been concerned about the safety of the vessel for approximately ten minutes before the allision. Moreover, while on paper, the shipowner followed the IMCO rules and recommendations, the evidence showed that the actual practice of the company was to permit all navigational decisions to be made by a pilot when on board and that the master could only relieve the pilot if he was acting in a drunken or crazy manner. According to Port Captain Chaing the shipowner's policy was that the pilot is in command and in charge. Accordingly, the district court found that Captain Liu's adherence to the company's policy constituted negligence when he relinquished to Pilot Lerro his responsibility for the safety of the ship. 68 Chief Mate Chan, who later went forward to monitor the anchor watch, testified that he believed the SUMMIT VENTURE should have anchored at buoy 16. However, he said nothing to Pilot Lerro about his concerns. The district court found that because of the company's unwritten policy against interfering with compulsory pilots that neither Chief Mate Chan nor Captain Liu realized that when a vessel is being piloted by a compulsory pilot that the master and officers of the vessel are not relieved of their ultimate responsibility to insure the safety of the vessel. 11 This misunderstanding as to ultimate responsibility is most obvious in the case of Chief Mate Chan who thought the vessel should have been anchored at buoy 16 but did not think he had the authority to either discuss anchoring with the pilot or in fact anchor over the objections of the pilot if he concluded that the ship was in a dangerous situation. 69 The appellant's principal defense is based upon testimony of Captain Liu that as captain of the ship he had authority to give an order to the pilot and that no one from the company had ever told him that the pilot was in command of the ship when he was aboard. Captain Liu further testified that he would principally rely on the pilot but that in the final analysis the captain had the final responsibility and that if the pilot was doing something wrong, he should overrule him. 70 However, there was conflicting testimony by Captain Liu at deposition and at trial concerning his understanding of his authority to question or overrule Pilot Lerro. At deposition, Captain Liu stated that he was concerned about the ship's position for ten minutes prior to the allision but that he gave no consideration whatsoever to stopping his vessel because he thought it was a one-man show, referring to the fact that the pilot had total control of the ship. (TB 147-148). At trial Captain Liu stated he did not think he had the authority to say I want to stop and anchor the vessel to the pilot or to anyone else. (TL at 104). Furthermore, Port Captain Chaing, the company officer in charge of insuring that the IMCO regulations were followed, testified on numerous occasions in his deposition that the pilot was in command of the ship. While this interpretation is completely contrary to the IMCO rules and the company's written regulations, the evidence showed that Port Captain Chaing's interpretation was, in actual practice, the rule suggested and followed by the company's officers. 71 Hercules insists that the district court made inconsistent findings regarding Captain Liu's comprehension of the company policy toward compulsory pilots, and that given Captain Liu's admitted comprehension of official company policy, the court was precluded from finding the owners were in privity with the negligence resulting from Captain Liu's failure to remonstrate with the pilots. 72 The passages from the district court opinion cited by Hercules read: 73 The testimony of Captain Liu shows clearly that he understood that both the law and the company policy allowed him to discuss areas of concern with the pilots, and that he had the power to overrule or relieve pilots. 74 Hercules, 566 F.Supp. at 974. 75 Further, the evidence shows, and I so find, that petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the company's policy whereby the pilot, rather than the master, was in ultimate command of the vessel was without its privity and knowledge. 76 Hercules, 566 F.Supp. at 979. 77 These two passages when read within the entire context of the opinion do not reflect inconsistent findings by the district court. They demonstrate the basis for the district court's ruling that Captain Liu ignored the written company policy in favor of the inconsistent, unwritten company policy to defer to a pilot who is navigating. The evidence adduced at trial and through deposition clearly demonstrated that Captain Liu had adopted the unwritten company policy as his own official operating policy. 78 Having reviewed the entire testimony on this subject and given the blatant negligence of Captain Liu and Chief Mate Chan in failing to intervene when both had serious concerns over the safety of the vessel, we find that the trial court was correct in concluding that the failure of Captain Liu and Chief Mate Chan to intervene was proximately related to the allision and that their failure to intervene resulted from the unwritten policy of the company to defer completely to the pilot on board. 79
80 The district court found that Captain Liu was negligent in failing to instruct or train the crew of the SUMMIT VENTURE and failed to disseminate to them critical company and navigational information. Captain Liu admitted that he had never shown the company regulations or the IMCO rules to his deck officers before the allision, nor had he inquired whether any of his mates had read or periodically reviewed these regulations. The district court found that this particularly affected Chief Mate Chan who had never had the company policies and binding regulations outlined for him. The district court found that the failure to properly instruct Chief Mate Chan was a proximate cause in his failure to exercise his authority over the pilot when he perceived that the ship was in obvious danger. In other words, had Chief Mate Chan been instructed on the IMCO rules and the shipowner's manual, he would have realized his responsibility to take action when he believed the vessel was in danger. The district court was correct in holding that the failure of Captain Liu to properly instruct his crew was an act of negligence and was proximately related to the allision. 81
82 The district court found that Chief Mate Chan and Second Mate Kong 12 did not have valid Liberian licenses on the date of the allision because the Chinese licenses which had been presented in order to obtain their Liberian licenses could not be validated. A company official testified that the company took the Chinese licenses at face value. The district court found this position to be totally unreasonable and inexcusable for a company which operates ocean going vessels, regardless of the alleged competency of the unlicensed senior officers. 83 The appellant argues that there was no evidence that the underlying Chinese licenses were obtained by fraud and that the only evidence of invalidity was that the Liberian authorities were unable to validate the underlying Chinese licenses upon the strength of which the reciprocal Liberian licenses were granted. Appellant's principal contention is that there was no indication of any causal connection between the invalid Chinese licenses and the allision. Appellant also contends that the company had received from the Liberian government a list of suspect license numbers and the names of suspected licensees. The Chief Mate and Second Officer were not on this list and therefore appellant argues that it had no reason to suspect that these licenses were invalid. 84 However, the evidence shows that the shipowner had the capability of checking on the validity of the underlying Chinese licenses but failed to check with respect to the licenses of Chief Mate Chan or Second Mate Kong before or after hiring them. Moreover, prior to the allision on May 9, 1980, Hercules was aware of a continuing problem in its fleet with the use of counterfeit and fraudulent licenses. However, the company policy was that if a man had been employed by Wah Kwong for several years, the company accepted the license at face value. (TL 392-395). 85 The courts have noted that it is possible to estimate the competency of a vessel's crew by examining their licenses. See In re Ta Chi Navigation (Panama) Corporation, S.A., 513 F.Supp. 148, 159 (E.D.La.1981), aff'd, 728 F.2d 699 (5th Cir.1984). Licensing requirements are promulgated to insure that seamen are properly trained and will know their duties and responsibilities when aboard a vessel at sea. The district court in finding that Wah Kwong Company was negligent in not validating its officers' licenses did not relate this particular negligence to any specific fact contributing toward the accident. However, we find that the invalid license of Chief Mate Chan is further evidence that he was ill-equipped to perform the duties necessary for the safe navigation of the vessel. The incompetency of this unlicensed crew member was manifested by his failure to (1) inform the lookout as to his duties, (2) maintain his position on the bridge until a relief officer was present, (3) insure the navigation of the vessel by requiring compliance with the rules of the road in restricted visibility, and (4) seek clarification from or countermand Pilot Lerro when Chan thought the vessel should have been anchored at buoy 16 or before. 86 It is clear from the facts enumerated above that the district court was correct in finding that the crew on board the SUMMIT VENTURE was negligent and unseaworthy on the date of the allision with the Sunshine Skyway Bridge and that their negligence and unseaworthiness was a proximate cause of that allision.