Opinion ID: 338425
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Permissibility of Any Jury Charge

Text: 62 In Bartkewich v. Billinger, 432 Pa. 351, 247 A.2d 603 (1968), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed a denial of judgment n.o.v. in a strict liability case. The legal issue was whether a glass-cutting machine had a defect during normal use. Apparently as a matter of law, the court indicated that the manufacturer could not be liable for an accident where the worker voluntarily did not use the machine in its usual manner. 432 Pa. at 356, 247 A.2d at 606. While not focusing explicitly on the question whether the jury should decide the question of normal use, this holding implies that normal use is solely a question of law within the bench's bailiwick. However, subsequent Pennsylvania and federal precedent, more to the point, leads us to the opposite conclusion. 63 Berkebile I did not expressly address the issue of the appropriateness of jury determination of normal use. However, it did not quarrel with the trial Judge's charge, which allowed the jury to make at least one factual determination with respect to normal use. 14 64 This reading of Berkebile I is consistent with past interpretations of Pennsylvania law by the federal courts. In affirming a District Court judgment, this Circuit has noted (w)e . . . think that there was ample evidence for the jury to find that the (product) was not abnormally used. Greco v. Bucciconi Engineering Co., 407 F.2d 87, 91 (3d Cir. 1969). In Eshbach, supra, 481 F.2d at 943, the trial Judge's charge was found improper because it reverted to negligence concepts. In noting the correct charge, the Court said, the proper limits of responsibility for the defendant-seller here is whether the 'use' to which the product was put was intended or foreseeable (objectively reasonable) by the defendant. (citation omitted). The nature of this suggested language, as well as the Court's failure to question the appropriateness of any charge on this matter, imply that the jury should be charged on this issue. 65 In LaGorga v. Kroger Co., 275 F.Supp. 373, 379-80 (W.D.Pa.1967), aff'd on other grds., 407 F.2d 671 (3d Cir. 1969), the trial Judge stated: (i)n our opinion the evidence posed . . . important issues of fact for the determination of the jury since they were such that reasonable men could differ. Among these, the jury found . . . (3) that the (product) was not reasonably safe for normal wear by a young child; and (4) that it was foreseeable (by the manufacturer) that such a child might play with or around fire and such was not abnormal wear of the jacket. (citation omitted). 66 Greiner relies on Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F.Supp. 1064, 1070-73 (E.D.Pa.1969) (Fullam, J.). However in that case the trial Judge refused to grant judgment on the pleadings, and find inter alia, abnormal use, as a matter of law. He did not address who should make the abnormal use determination once the case went to trial. 67 On the basis of this precedent, we hold that the trial Judge here properly charged the jury with deciding the normal use question.