Opinion ID: 2070942
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The elements of the offense.

Text: In the District of Columbia, the offense of accessoryship after the fact is the subject of a statute which was enacted in 1901, and which provides as follows: Whoever shall be convicted of being [an] accessory after the fact to any crime punishable by imprisonment shall be punished by a fine or imprisonment, or both, as the case may be, not more than [one-half] the maximum fine or imprisonment, or both, to which the principal offender may be subjected. D.C.Code § 22-106 (1996). Section 22-106 does not contain a definition of an accessory after the fact. Accordingly, in conformity with Section 1 of the 1901 Code, D.C.Code § 49-301 (1997), [6] we look to the common law for an understanding of the substantive definition of the offense. Heard v. United States, 686 A.2d 1026, 1029 (D.C.1996); see also Outlaw v. United States, 632 A.2d 408, 411 (D.C.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1205, 114 S.Ct. 1326, 127 L.Ed.2d 674 (1994) (citing cases). Section 49-301 leaves the common law to fill in where statutes are silent. Day v. United States, 682 A.2d 1125, 1129 (D.C.1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 1435, 137 L.Ed.2d 542 (1997). The common law of the District of Columbia encompasses all common law in force in Maryland in 1801, unless expressly repealed or modified. United States v. Jackson, 528 A.2d 1211, 1215 (D.C.1987) (citing, inter alia, D.C.Code § 49-301). Maryland authorities expounding the common law of that state constitute powerful precedent in this jurisdiction, [7] and this court has followed Maryland case law in identifying the four substantive elements of AAF: (1) A completed felony must have been completed by another prior to the accessoryship; (2) The accessory must not be a principal in the commission of the felony; (3) The accessory must have knowledge of the felony; and (4) The accessory must act personally to aid or assist the felon to avoid detection or apprehension for the crime or crimes. Outlaw, supra, 632 A.2d at 411 (quoting Howell v. State, 62 Md.App. 278, 489 A.2d 55, 58 (1983)). Little contends that the prosecution did not prove the first of these elements, because the murder of the decedents had not been completed at the time Little is alleged to have engaged in the accessorial conduct by transporting Bailey from the scene and by thus attempting to help Bailey to escape. Little also claims that the trial judge incorrectly instructed the jury that Little could properly be convicted as an accessory after the fact to murder even if the underlying murder was incompletethat is, even if the victim was dying but not dead. Little relies heavily on early common law commentaries cited in Outlaw, supra, 632 A.2d at 411 n. 8, which we discuss at pp. 712-713, infra. The government argues, on the other hand, that the older common law rule has been superseded by more recent authorities, including, in particular, McCoy, supra, 721 F.2d at 474-75.