Opinion ID: 3152259
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Rawls v. Commonwealth

Text: In Rawls, we were presented with the question whether a defendant who has been sentenced in excess of the statutorily prescribed range of punishment is entitled to a new sentencing hearing. Prior to Rawls, our jurisprudence had not been uniform in determining whether a defendant who received an improper sentence was entitled to a new sentencing hearing. See 278 Va. at 218-21, 683 S.E.2d at 547-49. Additionally, “[i]n many instances, our jurisprudence require[d] a court to speculate regarding how a jury would have fixed a defendant’s punishment had the jury been properly instructed or had the jury properly applied the correct instruction.” Id. at 218, 683 S.E.2d at 547. Thus, in Rawls we adopted a bright-line rule that: a sentence imposed in violation of a prescribed statutory range of punishment is void ab initio because the character of the judgment was not such as the Court had the power to render. Thus, a criminal defendant in that situation is entitled to a new sentencing hearing. This common law rule of jurisprudence will eliminate the need for courts to resort to speculation when determining how a jury would have sentenced a criminal defendant had the jury been properly instructed or had the jury properly followed correct instructions. Id. at 221, 683 S.E.2d at 549 (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted). The common law rule adopted in Rawls was “designed to ensure that all criminal defendants whose punishments have been fixed in violation of the statutorily prescribed ranges are treated uniformly without any speculation.” Id. Despite the clarity of our holding in Rawls, we are now invited to create an exception. The Commonwealth, noting that each case discussed in Rawls involved a jury sentence, argues 4 that our holding in that case should be limited to sentences exceeding the statutory maximums that were imposed by juries. The Commonwealth contends that the dispositive point made in Rawls is that “in addressing an incorrect sentence, a court may not speculate about the sentence that might have been imposed.” In this case, the Commonwealth maintains, there is no risk of speculation: the same judge who sentenced Grafmuller in 2009 corrected his sentence in 2014. Grafmuller argues that our rule in Rawls applies to “all criminal defendants whose punishments have been fixed in violation of the statutorily proscribed ranges” and that there should be no “exceptions for defendants improperly sentenced by judges rather than juries.” We agree. Our holding in Rawls was purposefully broad. We intended to end both the lack of uniformity in our jurisprudence and the speculation about what sentence would have been imposed had the sentencer not been mistaken about the maximum punishment provided by law. Id. at 221, 683 S.E.2d at 549. Although the cases we discussed in Rawls each involved a jury sentence, our holding was not limited to cases in which the jury imposed a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum. The requirement was announced “to ensure that all criminal defendants whose punishments have been fixed in violation of the statutorily prescribed ranges are treated uniformly.” Id. (emphasis added). We decline the invitation presented by this case to create an exception to this doctrine for defendants who were sentenced by a judge rather than a jury. Such an exception would re-introduce to this area of the law both a lack of uniformity and a need for speculation as to what the sentence would have been if the sentencer had not misapprehended the statutory maximum. For example, if the original sentencing judge is no longer available to 5 correct the sentence, the resentencing judge would be required to speculate about what sentence the original judge would have imposed had he or she been aware of the proper sentencing range. 4 Furthermore, a defendant charged with a felony has a constitutional right and a statutory right to be personally present during the trial. U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Va. Const., art. I, §§ 8, 11; Code § 19.2-259. The statutory phrase, “during the trial,” means “every stage of the trial from his arraignment to his sentence, when anything is to be done which can affect his interest.” Remington v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 333, 360, 551 S.E.2d 620, 636 (2001) (quoting Palmer v. Commonwealth, 143 Va. 592, 605, 130 S.E. 398, 402 (1925)). The constitutional imperative is the same: “[A] defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.” Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987). We conclude that a resentencing hearing for a convicted felon who has been sentenced to more than the maximum sentence allowed by law is critical to the outcome of the criminal proceeding. The presence of the defendant would contribute to the fairness of the process of correcting his sentence. Id. Accordingly, we hold that a defendant convicted of a felony has a right to be present personally at a new sentencing hearing at which his or her sentence is modified so as not to exceed the maximum sentence provided by law. This requirement applies equally to sentences imposed by a jury and sentences imposed by a judge. 4 As the facts of both Rawls and this case demonstrate, years may pass before an argument is made to the courts that the sentence as originally imposed exceeded the statutory maximum. Rawls moved to vacate his sentence 12 years after it was imposed. 278 Va. at 21516, 683 S.E.2d at 546. The errors in Grafmuller’s sentences were raised after five years. 6