Opinion ID: 1145228
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Implied and Express Warranties

Text: Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on theories of defendant Tri-O's liability under implied and express warranties of fitness pertaining to the rope. A warranty is an assurance by one party to a contract of the existence of a fact upon which the other party may rely. It is intended to relieve the promisee of any duty to ascertain the fact for himself, and it amounts to a promise to answer in damages for any injury proximately caused if the fact warranted proves untrue. Quagliana v. Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., Utah, 538 P.2d 301, 309 (1975); Welchman v. Wood, 10 Utah 2d 325, 328, 353 P.2d 165, 167 (1960); Hoover v. Nielson, 20 Ariz. App. 130, 510 P.2d 760 (1973), aff'd, 110 Ariz. 329, 518 P.2d 990 (1974); Steadman v. Turner, 84 N.M. 738, 507 P.2d 799 (N.M.Ct.App. 1973); Metropolitan Coal Co. v. Howard, 155 F.2d 780, 784 (2d Cir.1946). A cause of action in warranty is separate from a cause of action in negligence, although this separateness does not mean that a plaintiff could recover damages on both theories. See Cook Associates, Inc. v. Warnick, Utah, 664 P.2d 1161 (1983). Unlike liability for negligence, which is based on fault, breach of warranty sounds in strict liability. Breach of warranty does not require that the person making the representation or promise be aware that it is false, Welchman v. Wood, 10 Utah 2d at 328, 353 P.2d at 167; Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal.2d 481, 486, 275 P.2d 15, 19 (1954), and a person may be liable for breach of warranty despite his exercise of all reasonable or even all possible care. Moore v. James, 5 Utah 2d 91, 94-95, 297 P.2d 221, 222-23 (1956); Chandler v. Bunick, 279 Or. 353, 356, 569 P.2d 1037, 1039 (1977). For the foregoing reasons, the jury's finding that defendant Tri-O was not negligent in this case does not establish that plaintiffs have no action for breach of an implied or express warranty. Moore v. James, supra . Defendant contends that absent a sale or lease of goods, no warranty can arise except as an express contract term, which is absent here. It is true as a matter of history that warranties developed in the context of the commercial sale of goods. [3] However, warranties have now been recognized in circumstances other than the sale of goods. A warranty of fitness is generally implied in the lease or bailment for hire of chattels. [4] Some jurisdictions hold that one who furnishes plans and specifications for the construction of a building impliedly warrants that they are reasonably fit for that purpose. [5] Many states imply a warranty of habitability in the sale of a new home. [6] Similarly, many courts have found a warranty of workmanlike performance implicit in a contract for services. [7] Plaintiffs urge us to extend our law of implied warranty and hold on the facts of this case that a general contractor who supplies equipment to a subcontractor for its use in performing the contracted work impliedly warrants that the equipment is reasonably fit for the purpose for which it is supplied. However, our law does not yet reach so far, and we are not persuaded to extend it. There is substantial evidence of an express warranty of fitness in this circumstance. The record is replete with defendant's representations that the rope used by Groen was strong enough for its intended purpose. On the first morning that Groen flew, he met with Clinger, Tri-O's superintendent, at the show-up yard to discuss the equipment they would be using. Groen testified that Clinger handed him the 1/2-inch polypropylene rope and stated that it was the kind of rope Groen would be using to pull wire. Groen had never used or seen this type of rope before. He told Clinger he had used only Sampson rope, which was of larger diameter and of different construction. Clinger responded, Well, that's  we have used that rope; we have been using that rope. It's a good rope. Groen repeated his misgivings: I asked Ken [Clinger] if this rope would be strong enough because the rope that I had been using was larger in diameter and a different rope  a Sampson rope, and he said, Oh, yes. This rope  don't worry about that rope, it's nylon or polypropylene rope and it's every bit as strong as that Sampson rope. And I thought, well, I don't know. It's not as big  you know. [Clinger responded:] Well, new fabric kind of thing. And it is strong enough. It will be plenty strong. This rope is every bit as strong as Sampson rope. And I, still not knowing anything about ropes and not using this kind of rope before, I had nothing of my own to go on, so I was still kind of querying rather whether this would work and be strong enough. And he insisted and said [pointing to a D-9 Caterpillar bulldozer], That rope will lower that Cat over a cliff. It's strong enough. Don't worry about it. Groen further testified that he knew nothing about the construction and tensile strengths of ropes generally, but that he knew only that he had always used 3/4-inch Sampson rope. He asked Clinger if he could have Sampson rope anyway. Groen testified that Clinger responded: No. No, this rope is strong enough, you don't need Sampson rope. Besides, that Sampson rope costs a lot of money. I don't know how much Sampson rope costs per foot and we don't have it. We are going to have to send for it if we get any. We would have to send for it, which means being shut down for two or three days at least to get it. And you don't need it anyway. This rope is as strong as Sampson rope. When Groen asked to see the actual rope he would be using to pull the line, Clinger told him that it was already set up at the job site and Groen would see it when he went there to begin work. At the job site, Groen again saw the 1/2-inch polypropylene rope, which was already attached to the cable on the pullers. He and Clinger inspected the rope hand over hand, looking for signs of wear. Groen again asked Clinger if he was sure the rope was going to be strong enough. Groen testified: And Ken [Clinger] said, Yes. Don't worry about the rope. That rope is as strong as Sampson rope. ... . ... He ... again pointed to a piece of equipment, one of the Cats, and said, That rope will lower that Cat over a cliff. And to me that's pretty strong. And I figured that Cat was certainly heavier than a helicopter and if it would do that, it would certainly hold up for the wear and stress and so I accepted. Joe Candlish, the pilot Groen was to train, was present at both the meeting in the show-up yard and at the job site, and he corroborated Groen's testimony on this subject in every detail. [8] Where, as here, there is conflicting evidence, the issues of whether Tri-O's representatives actually made the above statements and, if so, whether those statements constituted an oral express warranty are questions of fact that are properly submitted to the jury. Park v. Moorman Manufacturing Co., 121 Utah 339, 347-48, 241 P.2d 914, 918 (1952); Nielson v. Hermansen, 109 Utah 180, 184, 166 P.2d 536, 538 (1946); see generally Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 619, 625-26 (1959). Compare Morris v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., Utah, 658 P.2d 1199 (1983), in which we held that the interpretation of an unambiguous written contract was a question of law to be decided by the judge. An express warranty does not require any particular words. Welchman v. Wood, 10 Utah 2d at 328, 353 P.2d at 168; Nielson v. Hermansen, 109 Utah at 183, 166 P.2d at 537; Rockhill v. Creer, 56 Utah at 126, 189 P. at 671. Any direct and positive affirmation of fact, as distinguished from mere opinion or judgment, made by one party to the contract that induces the other party to act in reliance thereon constitutes an express warranty. There was ample evidence that Groen understood Clinger's assurances of the rope's strength as an affirmation of fact, that Clinger consciously intended to induce Groen's reliance, and that Groen did in fact rely. The record is also clear that Groen did, in fact, fly with the polypropylene rope in reliance on Clinger's assurances of its strength, rather than waiting for the Sampson rope which he preferred. [9] Groen testified that he knew nothing about the breaking strengths and working loads of ropes generally, but that Clinger had represented to him that he was knowledgeable about ropes, that he had been a journeyman lineman, and that he understood and read the manufacturer's literature concerning most of the ropes used to fly wire. Groen testified that he flew with the polypropylene rope that was hooked up at the job site [b]ecause Ken Clinger said it was okay... . I was satisfied it was strong enough. Ken Clinger told me it was strong enough and that's why I used it. [10] We conclude that there was sufficient evidence of an express warranty of fitness to entitle the plaintiffs to have that theory of liability presented to the jury. The district court erred in refusing the requested instructions on this subject. The judgment for the defendant is affirmed in part (as to the causes of action for negligence and implied warranty) and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for partial new trial. At that trial, the special verdicts of the jury in the first trial that neither defendant Tri-O nor plaintiff Groen was negligent, having been sustained or not challenged on this appeal, will be res judicata between the parties. The second trial will therefore be limited to those matters pertaining to the plaintiffs' cause of action for breach of an express warranty and the damages attendant thereon. [11] So ordered. No costs awarded. HALL, C.J., and STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concur.