Opinion ID: 754566
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Displacement of Courts' Inherent Powers

Text: 26 Certain inherent powers of the courts are said to be rooted in the notion that a federal court, sitting in equity, possesses all of the common law equity tools of a Chancery Court ... to process litigation to a just and equitable conclusion. ITT Community Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 1359 (5th Cir.1978). Included among the courts' traditional inherent powers is the authority to issue injunctive relief, such as the power to stay court orders. This authority derives not only from the power of the Judiciary to manage its affairs, see Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (explaining that the courts' inherent powers are governed by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases (quotation omitted)); cf. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 117 S.Ct. 1636, 1650, 137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997) (underscoring a district court's broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket), but also furthers the pursuit of achieving complete justice by enabling the court to suspend those judgments whose enforcement leads to inequitable results. Cf. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 233-34, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 131 L.Ed.2d 328 (explaining that Rule 60(b) merely reflects and confirms the courts' own inherent and discretionary power, 'firmly established in English practice long before the foundation of our Republic,' to set aside a judgment whose enforcement would work inequity) (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244, 64 S.Ct. 997, 88 L.Ed. 1250 (1944)); Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44, 111 S.Ct. 2123 (stating that the historic power of equity allows a federal court to vacate its own judgment where induced by fraud). Although the exercise of the inherent power of lower federal courts can be limited by statute and rule, for [t]hese courts were created by act of Congress,Chambers, 501 U.S. at 47, 111 S.Ct. 2123 (quotation omitted) (alteration in original), the comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative command. Porter, 328 U.S. at 398, 66 S.Ct. 1086; see also Califano, 442 U.S. at 705, 99 S.Ct. 2545 (Absent the clearest command to the contrary from Congress, federal courts retain their equitable power to issue injunctions in suits over which they have jurisdiction.). We require Congress to make plain its desire to limit the courts' inherent powers because  '[t]he great principles of equity, securing complete justice, should not be yielded to light inferences, or doubtful construction.'  Porter, 328 U.S. at 398, 66 S.Ct. 1086 (quotation omitted). 27 We do not think the language of the PLRA automatic stay provision or the statute's legislative history compels a departure from the courts' inherent power to stay judicial orders in order to achieve equity. As explained previously, the prisoners' and the Justice Department's statutory construction is based on the logical assumption that Congress would not have provided in § 3626(e)(4) for expedited review of orders suspending the automatic stay if the courts did not have the authority to issue such orders. Moreover, the legislative history does not reveal a clear congressional command limiting the courts' inherent powers. Although the Conference Report accompanying the 1997 bill amending the automatic stay provision explains that Congress wished to make clear that mandamus relief is available to compel the court to issue a ruling on a pending motion [to terminate or modify the consent decree] and to provide the courts additional time (60 days) to rule on motions to terminate before the automatic stay takes effect, the report is silent as to the legislative intent behind § 4. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 105-405 (1997). Nor does the report indicate whether Congress sought to eliminate all judicial discretion over the operation of the automatic stay. 11 Accordingly, we must resolve the ambiguities surrounding the automatic stay provision in favor of the interpretation which preserves the courts' ability to consider proceedings brought under the PLRA termination provisions in accordance with traditional equitable practices. Cf. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 330, 64 S.Ct. 587, 88 L.Ed. 754 (1944) (resolving the ambiguities of § 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 50 U.S.C.App. § 925(a) (1944), in favor of that interpretation which affords a full opportunity for equity courts to treat enforcement proceedings under this emergency legislation in accordance with their traditional practices). We therefore accept the statutory construction advanced by the prisoners and the Department of Justice. 28