Opinion ID: 2543536
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: roadway standards exemptions

Text: ¶ 47 Although Hermes believed that under Ordinance 1275, the closed portion of North Union Avenue and 1070 East were not public streets subject to county roadway standards for such streets, out of an abundance of caution Hermes requested the County to grant it exceptions from those standards. The County, based on recommendations of various county officials and their staff, granted the exceptions in June 1995. We review this decision under the standard set forth in section 17-27-1001 of the Utah Code. Subsection 3 provides that courts shall presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and ... determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001(3) (1999). ¶ 48 Plaintiffs contend this grant of exception was erroneous because the County did not follow its own rule for granting exceptions. Chapter 14.12.150 of the Salt Lake County Ordinances provides that the county commission may grant exceptions to the roadway standards where unusual topographical, aesthetic or other exceptional conditions or circumstances exist ... after receiving recommendations from the planning commission and the public works engineer, provided that the variations or exceptions are not detrimental to the public safety or welfare. While the County received the required recommendations, nothing suggests any unusual topographical, aesthetic or other exceptional conditions or circumstances, other than the conditions or circumstances the County created when it improperly attempted to transform North Union Avenue from a public street to a closed street and when it erroneously took the position that 1070 East was a private way. The County does not contend that there were any topographical or aesthetic conditions which justified the exceptions. Under the principle of ejusdem generis where an enumeration of particular or specific terms is followed by a general term, the general term must be restricted to include things of the same kind, or character, as those specifically enumerated, unless there is something to show a contrary intent. See Parrish v. Richards, 8 Utah 2d 419, 421-22, 336 P.2d 122, 123 (1959). Therefore, under that principle, exceptional conditions or circumstances which are mentioned in the ordinance as justifying an exception cannot be stretched to include conditions self-imposed by the County when it unlawfully attempted to close a public street. ¶ 49 Defendants seek to justify the exceptions on the ground that the access provided to plaintiffs was, as Ken Jones stated, pretty standard and typical. He added with two houses back there a 20-foot wide access would have been a typical access that we would have provided anywhere else. That response, of course, simply begs the question and is not persuasive. The County correctly points out that it widened 7240 South and improved it with curb, gutter, and sidewalk. However, that street does not run to the frontage of the Croxford property where the two houses are located. That street runs only to the southwest (rear) corner of the property from where a vehicle must then travel north on 1070 East and then east on the closed segment of North Union Avenue to the property. Large garbage and fire trucks would at that point have to use the property and its driveways to turn around since the closed portion of North Union Avenue is not more than twenty-five-feet wide and no cul-de-sac is provided at the end of the segment of the street. We conclude that the exceptions were erroneously granted.