Opinion ID: 1997525
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Household Member

Text: Count 3 of the indictment charged Wright with having violated Maryland Code, Article 27, § 35C which, in relevant part, makes it a felony for [a] parent or other person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for the supervision of a child or a household or family member to cause abuse to the child. A household member is defined as a person who lives with or is a regular presence in a home of a child at the time of the alleged abuse. As worded, the statute subjects to liability for child abuse (1) the child's parent, (2) an other person who has permanent or temporary care or custody of the child, (3) an other person who has responsibility for the supervision of the child, (4) a household member, and (5) a family member. The State's position was that, under the circumstances, Wright was either a person having responsibility for Queen's care, custody, or supervision, or that he was a household member. At the conclusion of the State's case, the court, responding to a motion for judgment, found insufficient evidence of the former but, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, concluded that it sufficed to permit the jury to determine that Wright was a household member in Queen's temporary home. Wright acknowledges that he was a household member of Shirley's home but presses the point that Shirley's home was not Queen's homethat Queen lived with her mother in Indian Head and was only a temporary occupant in Shirley's abode. The statute, he urges, requires that the defendant be a household member in the child's home. The issue is one of statutory construction, and we are thus required to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent. As noted, the relevant statutory provision § 35C(a)(5)defines household member as a person who lives with or is a regular presence in a home of a child at the time of the alleged abuse. (Emphasis added.) Use of the indefinite article a, as opposed to the definite article the, itself indicates a legislative recognition that, for purposes of the child abuse statute, a child may have more than one home. Given the context, that is not an unreasonable recognition. Words like home, resident, and household are not capable of singular, absolute, generic definition in the law, because they are used in so many different ways and for so many different purposes. They may mean one thing to the census taker, another to an automobile insurer, one thing for voting purposes or for establishing venue in litigation, another for determining where to mail a letter. When the law uses such a word as a substitute for domicile, it may encompass only one, permanent, fixed abode, without regard to where the individual may be actually residing at a given moment. In other contexts, it may instead mean where the person is staying at the moment. The flexibility in these terms is especially important with respect to children, who are more frequently part of several homes and households. If their parents are separated or divorced, they likely will spend time and have clothes and belongings in the homes of both parents; they may visit grandparents or other relatives for varying periods of time; they may be off to camp during the summer. Where their home is at any given time may well depend on what is at stake in ascertaining where their home is. The term household member, and with it the term home, was added to § 35C in 1991. The clear purpose of the addition was to extend the reach of the statute for the greater protection of children, to declare as criminal violations acts of abuse committed against children by a class of persons not then subject to the law. The Legislature obviously recognized that there were people other than parents, custodians, and persons directly charged with the care and supervision of a child who were in a position to commit abuse within the child's home setting, where, because of the status of both the abuser and the child in that setting, the child might be helpless against the predation. We cannot subscribe to Wright's view that the Legislature intended to restrict that protection to only one residential setting, and thus to ignore the reality actually faced by children. Queen's permanent homeher domicilewas with her mother. Through consensual arrangements among Queen, Shirley, and their mother, however, Queen was living with Shirley when the criminal activity occurred. Given that Queen, according to her testimony and that of her mother, had been at Shirley's house for about two weeks and was intending to stay another two weeks, it is a fair inference that at least some part of her clothes and other personal belongings were also at Shirley's house; that is where she slept, bathed, and ate; that is where her friend, Tomika, was staying with her. That was the place where, at the time, she formed part of Shirley's household, a household of which Wright was a member. JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REVERSE JUDGMENT OF CIRCUIT COURT FOR CHARLES COUNTY AND REMAND FOR NEW TRIAL; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY CHARLES COUNTY. Concurring and Dissenting opinion by CHASANOW, J., in which RODOWSKY and KARWACKI, JJ., join. CHASANOW, Judge, concurring and dissenting. I concur with the portion of the majority opinion titled Household Member and the determination that the defendant, Rodney Wright, was a household member within the meaning of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, § 35C. I dissent from the reversal of Wright's conviction because the trial judge admitted Wright's prior inconsistent statement to his one-time cellmate Louis Hurt. In reversing Wright's rape and child abuse convictions, the majority reaches three illogical and unsupported conclusions. First, the rules for impeaching witnesses and parties by extrinsic evidence of their prior inconsistent statements do not apply to defendants. Second, impeaching evidence of a defendant's partial admission is admissible in rebuttal, but impeaching evidence of a defendant's full and complete confession is not. Third, a defendant's illegally obtained confession is admissible to impeach the defendant on rebuttal, but a defendant's valid confession is not.