Opinion ID: 155821
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: right to impartial jury

Text: 32 Petitioner first contends the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury when it denied his motion to conduct individual, sequestered voir dire or to dismiss the jury venire panel on the ground that members of the venire were irreparably tainted by their association with one of the panel members who was the brother of one of the victims. 5 33 During jury voir dire, the first question asked by the prosecutor was whether any members of the panel had read or heard anything concerning the charges. The prosecutor further asked members of the venire the source of the information. One of the panel members, Dale Shaw, responded that he had heard about the charges and that the source of his information was his sister. The prosecutor then asked him whether Dena Shaw, one of the victims, was his sister. Mr. Shaw answered, Yes. 34 The trial court then called a bench conference, and no further questions were directed at Dale Shaw. At the bench conference, it was discovered that Mr. Shaw had associated with the members of the current jury panel a few weeks earlier during jury qualification for an unrelated case and as a juror in the eight-hour trial of that case. Petitioner's counsel objected to the venire on the ground that its members' prior association with Shaw and their awareness of his relationship as brother to one of the victims tainted the entire panel. Defense counsel requested that a new panel be drawn or that each panel member be sequestered and questioned individually concerning the effects of Shaw's presence on the panel. The trial court denied defense counsel's motion, although taking it under advisement depending on what developed in group voir dire, and ordered that voir dire continue after removing Shaw from the panel. 35 In the jury voir dire that followed, the prosecutor questioned the panel as to whether any of the members had discussed the facts of the case with Mr. Shaw. Receiving no affirmative response, the prosecutor then asked whether any of the members had any contacts or relationships with Shaw apart from jury duty. Those contacts were minimal. 36 The prosecutor further questioned the members who had previously served with Mr. Shaw on another jury. He asked them whether, as a result of that service and their knowledge that he was the brother of one of the victims of the charged crimes, their ability to decide petitioner's case solely on the evidence presented at trial and in light of the court's instructions was impaired. There were no affirmative responses to that question. Following the prosecutor's questioning, petitioner's counsel also questioned the members as to the effect their association with Shaw on a previous jury and their knowledge that he was the brother of one of the victims might have on them in this case. Satisfied with the panel members' responses that they could decide the case fairly, the trial court proceeded with jury selection and trial. 37 On a habeas petition, this court's review of the state trial court's rulings on juror impartiality is 'limited to enforcing the commands of the United States Constitution.'  Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1350 (10th Cir.1994) (quoting Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 1903, 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991)). A federal habeas court may reverse a state trial court's findings of juror impartiality only upon a showing of  'manifest error.'  Id. (quoting Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 428, 111 S.Ct. at 1906-07). This limited review of the state trial court's rulings is based in part on the broad deference traditionally accorded to trial courts in determining jury selection procedures and conducting voir dire. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 423, 111 S.Ct. at 1904. Limited review also acknowledges that  '[t]he state trial judge had the benefit of observing the general demeanor of the jurors as the basis for his general finding'  of impartiality. Brecheen, 41 F.3d at 1350 (alteration in original) (quoting Church v. Sullivan, 942 F.2d 1501, 1519 (10th Cir.1991)); see also Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594-95, 96 S.Ct. 1017, 1020-21, 47 L.Ed.2d 258 (1976). Therefore, to establish a constitutional violation based on the trial court's refusal to allow individual, sequestered voir dire or to dismiss the venire panel, petitioner must demonstrate either that the trial resulted in actual prejudice or that it gave rise to a presumption of prejudice because it involved 'such a probability that prejudice will result that it is deemed inherently lacking in due process.'  Brecheen, 41 F.3d at 1350 (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-43, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1632-33, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965)). 38 Petitioner has not identified any actual prejudice on the part of any juror. Instead, petitioner suggests that prejudice should be presumed because the panel members were aware that one of their group was closely related to a victim of one of the charged offenses, and because certain panel members had previously served with Dale Shaw on a jury in an unrelated case. Petitioner also suggests that, rather than remedying the problem and resolving any concerns about possible prejudice, the group questioning of the panel concerning any prejudice resulting from their association with Dale Shaw only served to emphasize the situation. 39 We conclude that petitioner has failed to establish a presumption of prejudice under the facts of this case. Dale Shaw was immediately removed from the panel when the trial court and attorneys learned that he was related to one of the victims. Although the trial court denied petitioner's motion to conduct individual, sequestered voir dire or to dismiss the panel, the trial court indicated that this ruling was subject to change depending on the outcome of group voir dire. Both the prosecutor and petitioner's counsel had the opportunity to specifically question the members of the panel about their prior association with Shaw and about their ability to remain fair and impartial in this case. None of the prospective jurors indicated that they had discussed petitioner's case with Shaw. Those that had served with Shaw on the prior jury indicated that they could remain fair and impartial despite their prior association with Shaw and despite their knowledge that he was the brother of one of the alleged victims. 40 Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that jurors remain true to their oath and conscientiously observe the instructions and admonitions of the court. United States v. Easter, 981 F.2d 1549, 1553 (10th Cir.1992). As noted by the federal district court, [p]etitioner seeks to establish a presumption of prejudice from what was, at most, a few days contact in a fairly structured and formal setting. That circumstance is insufficient to establish such a presumption. We conclude petitioner's constitutional right to an impartial jury was not violated.