Opinion ID: 1187773
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Court Adoption of Ademption by Extinction at This Time

Text: We will not apply this principle of construction, at this late time and when the legislature has otherwise determined, to create by judicial rule ademption by extinction, and thus defeat testator intent. This is the first case coming before this court to promulgate the principle as a rule of the law, and it would do so in a fashion that could only apply to wills predating passage of the current law. Since the legislature has determined that the principle is inappropriate, we will not embrace this outmoded principle for application in this case, and more particularly as only applicable to wills written and not later revoked predating April 1, 1980. This can properly be done by utilization of the determinative question of actual intent without the artificiality of implied construction derived from Roman law, to be followed by Lord Thurlow's Ghost of Ashbruner v. MacGuire, 29 Eng.Rep. 62 (Ch. 1786). [3] Many caustic critiques are available, but the subject is well summarized: The present mechanical rule of ademption has little relation to the factors relevant in determining whether the testator would wish that the legatee take an economic equivalent. Note, Ademption and the Testator's Intent, 74 Harvard L.Rev. 741, 750 (1960-1961). The author, with pessimism, then observed that there would be more than a little judicial hesitancy in overruling the doctrine, and concluded:    In view, however, of the traditional judicial reluctance to act in this manner, legislative action may be necessary to bring about the desired change. 74 Harvard L.Rev. at 751. The Wyoming legislature acted before the doctrine was inculcated into the state law, and we have no present interest in retrospectively creating a doctrine for a period of time predating the action of the legislature obviously undertaken to avoid the rule. The exhaustively considered and carefully reasoned Iowa case of Newbury v. McCammant, Iowa, 182 N.W.2d 147, 45 A.L.R.3d 1 (1970) is clearly more persuasive than the contradicting case of In re Krotzsch's Estate, 60 Ill.2d 342, 326 N.E.2d 758 (1975), upon which appellee relied so extensively. The factual status of Newbury is very similar to this case, and the conclusion well derived in philosophy and legal reason:    [I]t has long been held the primary consideration in will construction is intent of the testator. [Citations.] And we resort to technical rules or canons of construction only if the language of a will is clearly ambiguous, conflicting, or testator's intent is for any reason uncertain. [Citations.] 182 N.W.2d at 150. Considering the testatrix' sale of the specifically devised realty, the court said as to the contracted balance of purchase price: Briefly stated, the remaining unpaid contractual proceeds are, (1) identifiable, (2) found in the estate, and (3) constitute identical property which testatrix intended should pass to appellants. As to such proceeds there is no ademption. 182 N.W.2d at 151. The dissent also had something of value to say in the case: If we were starting anew here, perhaps the majority opinion would represent the best choice. 182 N.W.2d at 153. See an excellent discussion of the case in Comment, Ademption in Iowa  A Closer Look at the Testator's Intent, 57 Iowa L.Rev. 1211, 1213 (1972). Wyoming is starting anew and need not now adopt a discredited and legislatively repealed rule. Directly and specifically stated, the ademption rule of Lord Thurlow more frequently than not serves to frustrate intent, and this will be such a case. Note, Wills, Ademption and Legacies in Oklahoma, 14 Okla.L.Rev. 108, 113 (1961); Mechem, Why Not a Modern Wills Act, 33 Iowa L.Rev. 501, 515 (1958). See also other law journal articles which speak to the subject in detail, supra n. 3, including the conclusion of Paulus, Ademption by Extinction: Smiting Lord Thurlow's Ghost, 2 Texas Tech L.Rev. 195, 227 (1970-1971): The current status of the law of ademption by extinction framed in medical terms is, `condition serious, prognosis poor.' The depressing nature of this report is due to the fact that the courts and legislatures have been treating the symptoms rather than the cause of the ailment. The cause, of course, is the 185-year-old identity doctrine. Current deficiencies are compounded by the fact that the medication prescribed to relieve the symptoms is often ineffective. The major ground of criticism of the ademption doctrine, and probably also the reason for the proliferation of exceptions to it, is that the results produced, whether favorable to the legatee or not, are often contrary to the testator's probable intention. 74 Harvard L.Rev. at 745-746. To a like result see In re Estate of Atkinson, 19 Wis.2d 272, 120 N.W.2d 109 (1963); Comment, Wills  Ademption  Inapplicable Where Contract of Sale Follows Specific Devise of Land, 49 Iowa L.Rev. 623 (1964).