Opinion ID: 874428
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The district court properly dismissed the action against Estay.

Text: The district court's decision to dismiss this action requires a preliminary consideration of the constitutional dimensions of the rules governing service of process and the form of that process. We then consider the district court's determination that the action should be dismissed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2). Service of process is the due process mechanism that vests a court with jurisdiction over a person, with the power to require such person to comply with the court's orders. McGloon v. Gwynn, 140 Idaho 727, 730, 100 P.3d 621, 624 (2004). Process constructively served by way of publication in a local newspaper is not, by itself, a reliable method of advising interested parties that their rights are before the courts. In McGloon, id., we took note of constructive comments from the United States Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.: Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his home outside the area of the newspaper's normal circulation the odds that the information will never reach him are large indeed. 339 U.S. 306, 315, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865, 873 (1950). Thus, in the context of service of process, due process requires: notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information ..., and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance. McGloon, 140 Idaho at 730, 100 P.3d at 624 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, 70 S.Ct. at 657, 94 L.Ed. at 873 (citations omitted)). The constitutional validity of service of process hinges on whether the process is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected, or, where conditions do not reasonably permit such notice, that the form chosen is not substantially less likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary substitutes. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315, 70 S.Ct. at 657, 94 L.Ed. at 873 (citations omitted). This Court's previous decisions involving constructive service though local newspapers and the due process requirements of notice require that a plaintiff mail a copy of the summons and complaint to the last known address most likely to give notice to an interested party. McGloon, 140 Idaho at 731, 100 P.3d at 625; Evans v. Galloway, 108 Idaho 711, 701 P.2d 659 (1985); I.R.C.P. 4(e)(1). The instant case asks this Court to decide what information the due process requirements of notice require a plaintiff to include when initiating constructive service though a local newspaper. In order to provide a method of constructive service by publication that meets the due process requirements of notice, this Court has adopted I.R.C.P. 4(e)(1), McGloon, 140 Idaho at 731, 100 P.3d at 625, which provides in relevant part: Whenever the summons, notice or order is served by publication it shall contain in general terms a statement of the nature of the grounds of the claim, and copies of the summons and complaint shall be mailed to the last known address most likely to give notice to the party. I.R.C.P. 4(e)(1) (emphasis added). In order to apprise an interested party of the pendency of an action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections, at a minimum, the notice must convey the nature of the grounds of the claim. A summons format that complies with the due process requirements of notice for constructive service by publication is found in I.R.C.P. 4(b)(3), which provides in relevant part: Where service is to be made by publication, the Summons to be published shall be substantially as follows: SUMMONS To: [Defendant's Name] You have been sued by [Plaintiff's Name], the Plaintiff, in the District Court in and for [Name of County] County, Idaho, Case No. [Case No.]. The nature of the claim against you is [nature of claim]. Any time after 20 days following the last publication of this summons, the court may enter a judgment against you without further notice, unless prior to that time you have filed a written response in the proper form, including the Case No., and paid any required filing fee to the Clerk of the Court at [address and telephone number of the clerk] and served a copy of your response on the Plaintiff's attorney at [name, address, and phone number of Plaintiff's attorney]. A copy of the Summons and Complaint can be obtained by contacting either the Clerk of the Court or the attorney for Plaintiff. If you wish legal assistance, you should immediately retain an attorney to advise you in this matter. Dated: ____________ [Name of County] County District Court By _____, Deputy Clerk Herrera did not use the summons in the form provided by I.R.C.P. 4(b)(3) when he published notice in the Teton Valley News. Instead, Herrera used the summons in the form provided by I.R.C.P. 4(b)(2). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b)(2) contains the form of a summons for use in civil proceedings other than eviction proceedings. [5] Therefore, we must examine what information was included in the summons used by Herrera and determine whether that information apprised Estay of the pendency of the action and afforded him an opportunity to present his objections. Herrera's summons published in the Teton Valley News provided the following: IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON Case No. CV04-453 SUMMONS JESUS HERRERA Plaintiff VS. PEDRO ESTAY, ROCK CREEK DEVELOPMENT, LLC Defendant. NOTICE: YOU HAVE BEEN SUED BY THE ABOVE-NAMED PLAINTIFF(S). THE COURT MAY ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST YOU WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE UNLESS YOU RESPOND WITHIN 20 DAYS. READ THE INFORMATION BELOW. TO: PEDRO ESTAY You are hereby notified that in order to defend this lawsuit, an appropriate written response must be filed with the above designated court within 20 days after service of this Summons on you. If you fail to so respond the court may enter judgment against you as demanded by the plaintiff(s) in the Complaint. A copy of the Complaint is served with this Summons. If you wish to seek the advice of or representation by an attorney in this matter, you should do so promptly so that your written response, if any, may be filed in time and other legal rights protected. An appropriate written response requires compliance with Rule 10(a)(1) and other Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and shall also include: I. The title and number of this case. II. If your response is an Answer to the Complaint, it must contain admissions or denials of the separate allegations of the Complaint and other defenses you may claim. III. Your signature, mailing address and telephone number, OR the signature, mailing address and telephone number of your attorney. IV. Proof of mailing or delivery of a copy of your response to plaintiff's attorney, as designated above. To determine whether you must pay a filing fee with your response, contact the Clerk of the above-named court. DATED this 13th day of OCTOBER, 2004 CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT Deputy Clerk Published in the Teton Valley News May 19, 26, June 2, 9, 2005. # 1415 Although the summons indicated that a copy of the complaint was served with the summons, the complaint was not published in the Teton Valley News. The district court identified a number of deficiencies in Herrera's summons when compared to I.R.C.P. 4(b)(3). The district court found that Herrera's summons did not: (1) contain any information regarding the nature of the claim filed against Estay; (2) specify when the twenty day default period began to run; (3) advise Estay where a copy of the underlying complaint may be obtained; and did not (4) include the address and telephone number of the clerk of the court. Most significant, for purposes of the due process requirements of notice, is the fact that Herrera's summons did not contain in general terms a statement of the nature of the grounds of the claim, in compliance with I.R.C.P. 4(e)(1), and therefore, the due process requirements of notice. Without knowing the nature of the grounds of the claim against him, Estay was neither apprised of the pendency of the action nor afforded an opportunity to present his objections. This deficiency alone fails to meet the due process requirement of notice. Consequently, Herrera's attempt to constructively serve Estay by publication was deficient and the district court correctly determined that Estay was not subject to its personal jurisdiction. Thus, the district court properly concluded that Herrera failed to timely serve Estay. A party who fails to effect timely service bears the burden of demonstrating good cause. Harrison v. Bd. of Prof'l Discipline of Idaho State Bd. of Med., 145 Idaho 179, 183, 177 P.3d 393, 397 (2008) (citing Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 346, 941 P.2d 314, 318 (1997)). Whether or not good cause exists is a factual determination. Rudd v. Merritt, 138 Idaho 526, 532, 66 P.3d 230, 236 (2003) (citing Regjovich, 134 Idaho at 157, 997 P.2d at 618). When reviewing the district court's decision, we must liberally construe the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Harrison, 145 Idaho at 182-83, 177 P.3d at 396-97. The district court concluded that Herrera's failure to follow the applicable Rules cannot be used as a `bootstrap' to support an argument of `good cause' for failure to timely serve. Despite the liberal standard of review, we are constrained to agree with the district court that Herrera's failure to comply with the rules governing service of process does not rise to the level of good cause. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the action against Estay.