Opinion ID: 2570071
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: NRCP 6(b)(2)'s enlargement of time provision is applicable to NRCP 25 when excusable neglect exists

Text: Dr. Moseley contends that NRCP 25's mandatory language required the district court to dismiss Richard's loss of consortium claim because no substitution or enlargement of time to substitute was made within the rule's 90-day limitation period. The Sinickis argue that under NRCP 6(b)(2), the district court may enlarge the time to move for substitution, after the 90-day limitation period has expired, upon a showing that excusable neglect, inadvertence, or mistake existed. Thus, the Sinickis maintain that the district court properly granted their NRCP 6(b)(2) motion for an extension of time to substitute a party after NRCP 25's 90-day limitation period expired. This court has strictly interpreted NRCP 25(a)( l )'s language even though a trial on the merits is favored over a mechanical application of a ninety-day rule. [17] Nonetheless, NRCP 6(b)(2) provides that the district court may exercise its discretion to grant an enlargement of time to take an action that is otherwise required to be done within a specified time when excusable neglect is shown. [18] In other words, despite NRCP 25(a)( l )'s 90-day limitation period, under NRCP 6(b)(2), when a party establishes excusable neglect, the party may be granted an enlargement of time after the 90-day limitation period has expired. NRCP 6(b)(2) applies to most acts required by the rules of civil procedure unless they are specifically excluded. [19] Because NRCP 25 is not specifically excluded under NRCP 6(b)(2), there appears to be a conflict between NRCP 25's mandatory language requiring dismissal if a motion for substitution is not filed within 90 days after the suggestion of a party's death is made on the record and NRCP 6's language that allows for an extension of time to perform acts required by the rules of civil procedure so long as the rule is not specifically excluded from NRCP 6's scope. The interplay and interpretation of NRCP 25 and NRCP 6 are issues of law that we review de novo. [20] To resolve the apparent inconsistency in our rules and because Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 25 and 6 are similar to our procedural rules, [21] we consider the federal courts' interpretations of the corresponding federal rules. [22] Originally, federal Rule 25(a) provided plaintiffs with two years in which to substitute a representative for the deceased party. [23] Under that version of Rule 25(a), the United States Supreme Court interpreted the rule's language as mandating dismissal if the substitution was not effectuated within two years. [24] The Supreme Court also held that under the original version of federal Rule 6(b), a party could not use that rule to override the express provisions of Rule 25. [25] The Supreme Court reasoned that strict compliance with Rule 25(a) was required because to allow substitution of a deceased party's estate after the two-year limitation period in the rule would be unfair and disruptive of orderly and expeditious administration of estates because the settlement and distribution of the estate might be so far advanced. [26] The Supreme Court also noted that the word shall in Rule 25(a)(1) indicated that dismissal was mandatory, rather than permissive. [27] In 1963, Congress amended federal Rule 25 and changed the two-year period to a 90-day limitation to avoid the harsh results and inflexibility of the rule. [28] Congress also deleted the phrase shall be dismissed and substituted the phrase must be dismissed. [29] That same year, Congress amended Rule 6(b) so that a court may have discretion to enlarge the 90-day period under Rule 25. [30] Specifically, the 1963 Rule 6(b) amendment deleted [t]he prohibition against extending the time for taking action under Rule 25. [31] Thus, relief under Rule 6(b) could be obtained if excusable neglect was shown and the opponent failed to show that undue prejudice would result if the relief was granted. [32] Federal courts interpreting the 1963 amendment to federal Rule 25 have concluded that the `90 day period was not intended to act as a bar to otherwise meritorious actions.' [33] In particular, in Rende v. Kay, [34] the federal district court stated that Rule 25 should be interpreted liberally because the underlying purpose of the amended rule is to allow flexibility in substitution. [35] Similarly, in George v. United States. [36] the federal district court in Connecticut stated that Rules 6(b)(2) and 25(a)(1) work together to provide flexibility in enlarging the time for substitution. [37] Likewise, in Zeidman v. General Accident Insurance Co., [38] a federal district court in New York recognized that the 1963 amendments to Rules 25 and 6, along with the rules' history, demonstrates that the 90-day limitation period was intended to allow for flexibility in substitution. This court has consistently declined to liberally interpret NRCP 25(a)(1). [39] Yet, as noted, NRCP 25 is not an enumerated rule that is specifically excluded from NRCP 6(b)'s provision for an extension of time. And this court has also recognized that whenever possible, a court will interpret a rule or statute in harmony with other rules or statutes. [40] Further, this court has stated that use of shall is mandatory unless a rule's construction demands a different interpretation to carry out the rule's purpose. [41] As noted, federal cases have held that Rules 6(b)(2) and 25(a)(1) work together to provide flexibility in enlarging the time for substitution. [42] Because NRCP 6(b)(2) does not specifically state that the district court cannot extend the time for taking any action under NRCP 25, the two rules, when read together, provide that NRCP 6(b)(2) may be used to obtain an extension of time to move for substitution upon a proper showing of excusable neglect. Thus, we conclude that NRCP 6(b)(2) may permit an enlargement of the time to substitute a representative or successor after the 90-day limitation in NRCP 25 has expired when excusable neglect is established.