Opinion ID: 3021079
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: CSX’s Negligence

Text: In addition to finding that Samantha was more than 50% negligent, the District Court concluded that CSX was not negligent as a matter of law. As to all but one of Bouchard’s claims, we disagree.
Under Pennsylvania law, a railroad owes a duty to adopt a “reasonably safe and effective mode, commensurate with the danger at the crossing,” of warning travelers of an approaching train. McGlinchey v. Baker, 356 F. Supp. 1134, 1142 (E.D. Pa. 1973). A plaintiff need not demonstrate “unusual, peculiar and extra hazardous conditions,” Bouchard, 2005 WL 2266593, at  (citing Yolton v. Pa. R.R. Co., 84 A.2d 501 (Pa. 1951)), to prove that a railroad should have provided additional warning signals.4 Rather, the issue is 4 The rule that the District Court applied, that plaintiff bears the burden “to show unusual, peculiar and extra hazardous conditions at the crossing for the railroad to be charged with the duty of providing additional warning devices,” Bouchard, 2005 WL 2266593, at , does not fit the facts of this case. That rule applies in cases where the injured party ran into a train that was already in the crossing. See Yolton, 84 A.2d at 503; Wink v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 176 A. 760, 761-62 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1935). It does not apply where, as here, the injured party was struck by an approaching train. 10 whether, under the circumstances described, taking into consideration the physical conditions of the crossing, the extent of its use by the public, the nature of the surroundings, the speed of the train, and other matters tending to show exceptional dangers incident to the particular locality, [the railroad] performed [its] duty toward persons using the highway. Cummings v. Pa. R.R. Co., 151 A. 590, 591 (Pa. 1930). See also Strozyk v. Norfolk So. Corp., 358 F.3d 268, 277 (3d Cir. 2004) (railroad’s duty of care is “heavily factcontingent, with all conditions being relevant”). Although “[t]he general rule is that there is no common-law duty on the part of a railroad company to place . . . safety gates at a crossing,” the fact finder may consider the absence of gates “in determining whether or not under all the circumstances the railroad was negligent at the time the accident happened.” Cummings, 151 A. at 591. The question of whether a railroad has fulfilled this duty “present[s] a classic jury question,” such that a trial court, in most cases, is “unjustified in removing any aspect of the case from the jury’s consideration.” McGlinchey, 356 F. Supp. at 1139. Bouchard has introduced more than enough evidence to reach the jury on this issue. The record before the District Court included an expert report that opined: The Juniper Street crossing fits several specific generally accepted criteria for the installation of gates, including its status as a multiple-track crossing subject to sight obstructions caused by adjacent structures and trains on other tracks, a crossing over which hazardous materials vehicles operate, a bike path crosses, and a crossing with a high number of daily train movements. Bouchard also proffered the testimony of two witnesses that the Juniper Street crossing was guarded by gates at some point, probably in the late 1970s or early 1980s. This evidence, which the District Court improperly disregarded, at least raises a genuine issue 11 of material fact as to whether CSX fulfilled its obligation to provide a “reasonably safe and effective mode” of warning travelers of the danger of approaching trains at the Juniper Street crossing.
The same “standard of ordinary care under the circumstances” that applies to the railroad’s duty to maintain a railroad crossing also applies to its operation of the train. McGlinchey, 356 F. Supp. at 1143. The evidence in this case presents a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Taylor provided adequate warning of the train’s approach before the train struck Samantha. Dodds testified that he did not hear the train’s horn sounding, its bell ringing or its whistle blowing before impact. Pennsylvania case law clearly provides that testimony from a witness who was at the scene to the effect that he did not hear a train’s horn is competent evidence that no horn was blown. See Fallon v. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co., 279 A.2d 164, 167-68 (Pa. 1971). While this evidence may not be as compelling as the conflicting evidence presented by CSX from the train’s data recorder log, the weight of the evidence is for the jury, and not the District Judge, to assess. Moreover, Bouchard supplied the District Court with an expert report that noted that the data from the train’s event recorder log showed that the whistle blasts did not comply with CSX’s internal regulations. The whistle blasts began only 848 feet from the likely point of impact, not at the whistle post (located 1,932 feet away) as required. The crew also failed to initiate the series of short and long blasts that CSX regulations 12 required when it became clear that they would pass the end of an oncoming train in close proximity to a public grade crossing. The expert opined that, if the train personnel had complied with CSX’s internal regulations, “Samantha Bouchard would have definitely heard the oncoming train over the noise made by the passing auto rack train, and would be alive today.” In light of Dodds’s testimony and the expert report, which CSX has not contradicted, we conclude that the District Court erred in removing the issue of CSX’s negligence in operating the train from the jury.
The District Court granted CSX summary judgment on Bouchard’s claim that CSX failed to maintain proper personnel to operate the train because it concluded that Bouchard had not established that CSX’s failure to ensure that the train’s engineer and conductor remained properly certified was a proximate cause of Samantha’s death. Bouchard, 2005 WL 2266593, at . This conclusion ignores evidence in the record, in the form of an expert report submitted by Bouchard, that opines, “the crew’s violation of the CSX operating rules, lack of reasonable care, and their insufficient training and experience was the cause of the accident.” The District Court’s grant of summary judgment on this basis was thus improper
Finally, the District Court granted summary judgment to CSX on Bouchard’s excessive speed claim because it found that the claim was preempted by federal law pursuant to CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993). Bouchard’s attempts 13 to resurrect this claim on appeal by arguing that it falls within Easterwood’s “specific, individual hazard” exception, see id. at 675 n. 15, are unavailing. First, the hazard that Bouchard cites in this case–the obstruction of a traveler’s view by a passing train–is not unique or particularly local and, thus, does not qualify as a “specific, individual hazard.” See, e.g., Shaup v. Frederickson, No. Civ. A. 97-7260, 1998 WL 726650, at  (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 1998) (“[C]onditions which can and do occur at many intersections, such as multiple tracks and rail cars that obstruct view, are not unique, local conditions or specific, individual hazards.”). Second, and equally importantly, the “specific, individual hazard” exception applies only where the plaintiff asserts that the defendant was negligent in failing to slow or stop a train. See Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 675 n. 15. Bouchard’s claim, by contrast, is based on an excessive speed theory. See Pl.’s Compl. 6, ¶ 26(g); (asserting that CSX was negligent in “failing to maintain a safe and reasonable speed of its train, but rather proceeding at an excessive rate of speed under the circumstances”). The Supreme Court’s decision in Easterwood specifically holds that the Federal Railroad Safety Act preempts such claims. See 507 U.S. at 675.