Opinion ID: 197384
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Psychiatric Testimony of Dr. Jose Fumero

Text: 20 Appellants argue that the district court erred in excluding the testimony of Dr. Fumero, the psychiatrist who had, at the court's direction, initially examined Robles for competency. This claim includes two distinct arguments. First, appellants claim that the court erred in excluding Dr. Fumero's testimony after defense counsel had relied on an earlier ruling that the testimony would be allowed. Second, appellants assert that the court's decision to exclude Fumero's testimony was based on the mistaken belief that the testimony was offered only to address the issue of Robles' competency as a witness. Appellants contend that the testimony was actually offered to: 21 provide information concerning Robles' medical history and his diagnosed schizophrenia, and the possible ramifications of Robles' illness for evaluation of the evidence to be introduced at trial--to provide information relevant to whether, as a result of his mental disease or defect Robles was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his acts in May-June, 1994; or whether aspects of his illness were relevant to assessing the reliability and meaning of Robles' statements. 22 Brief of Appellant Montalvo, at 17. We deal with each claim in turn.
23 Prior to trial, defense counsel met with Dr. Fumero, who had conducted the competency examination of Robles. Fumero opined that Robles was suffering from a mental illness at the time of the offenses and that his mental illness resulted in a tendency to exaggerate. Defense counsel informed the court that he intended to have Fumero testify at trial, arguing that Fumero's testimony should be admitted so that the jury could determine the weight to be given to the taped conversations. Tr. 1 at 7. The court stated that it would let Dr. Fumero testify and then let that go to the jury. 1 Tr. 1 at 21. 24 During opening statements, counsel for both defendants made reference to Robles' mental state. Counsel for Gonzalez-Maldonado promised the jury that he would produce a psychiatrist who would testify that a person in Robles' condition exaggerates, and that everything that he talks about is greater. Tr. 1 at 163. Counsel for Montalvo, in his opening statement, stated: 25 The expert selected by this Court, Dr. Fumero, selected by this Court, will come here, will sit there and will testify that during this conspiracy ... Mr. Julio Robles-Torres was mentally insane. Therefore, you cannot trust him. You cannot put much attention to what he's saying because he exaggerates. 26 Tr. 1 at 169. 27 During the presentation of defendants' case, the court reconsidered its earlier decision and decided that Dr. Fumero would not be allowed to testify because the testimony would only go to the issue of Robles' competency as a witness, which is a question for the court, and that evidence of a mental defect does not render testimony inadmissible. See Tr. 8 at 1506. 28 Appellants argue that even if Fumero's testimony was properly excluded, the court committed reversible error by first ruling that it would permit Fumero to testify and then, after the close of the government's case, ruling that his testimony would be excluded. 29 In Anderson v. Butler, 858 F.2d 16 (1st Cir.1988), defense counsel, in his opening, told the jury that he would call a psychiatrist and a psychologist to show that the defendant had no appreciation of what he had done. Counsel subsequently rested his case without calling the promised doctors, although they were available. On appeal, this court held that the failure to call these witnesses amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel, stating that little is more damaging than to fail to produce important evidence that had been promised in an opening. Id. at 17. The first thing the ultimately disappointed jurors would believe, in the absence of some other explanation, would be that the doctors were unwilling, viz., unable, to live up to their billing. This they would not forget. Id. [T]he jurors' conclusion would remain that impartial experts--the most qualified witnesses--would not testify as counsel had said they would; in effect a contradiction of the favorable lay witnesses, much worse than if he had not mentioned the doctors initially. Id. Furthermore, to promise even a condensed recital of such powerful evidence, and then not produce it, could not be disregarded as harmless. We find it prejudicial as a matter of law. Id. at 19. 30 The case at bar raises similar concerns. The opening statements for the defense included a promise to the jury that a psychiatrist would testify to the effect that Robles exaggerates as a result of his mental illness. Unlike in Anderson, it was the district court that prevented the defense from fulfilling its promise to the jury. Having obtained the assurance of the court that Dr. Fumero would be allowed to testify, defense counsel stated as much to the jury. When the court later changed its mind and ruled that the expert would not be permitted to testify, defendants were unable to produce the promised testimony. 31 Like the jury in Anderson, the jury in this case was likely to infer from defense counsel's failure to call Dr. Fumero that he was unwilling to testify for the defense. Nor was the jury informed of the fact that it was the court's ruling, rather than the defendants' decision, that kept Dr. Fumero off the stand. Although Anderson concerned an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the principle behind Anderson applies in this case. A defendant's opening statement prepares the jury to hear his case. If the defense fails to produce promised expert testimony that is critical to the defense strategy, a danger arises that the jury will presume that the expert is unwilling to testify and the defense is flawed. That the defendant should suffer this presumption because he relied on a prior ruling of the trial court that the same court later reversed, rather than because of poor judgment on the part of his own counsel, in no way changes the fact that the presumption formed in the minds of the jury is prejudicial. As we did in Anderson, we find that promising to admit this important evidence and then failing to produce it is prejudicial as a matter of law in the circumstances of this case. Following Anderson, therefore, we find that denying defendants the opportunity to have Dr. Fumero testify, in light of the fact that the court's decision on the matter led defense counsel, in their opening remarks, to promise the expert's testimony to the jury, was reversible error. 32
33 Appellants also challenge the district court's ruling that Dr. Fumero's testimony is inadmissible. On appellate review, [a] district court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony is entitled to great deference. United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126, 132 (1st Cir.1995). We will reverse the trial court's decision on this question only if (1) the district court based the decision on an incorrect legal standard, or (2) we have a 'definite and firm conviction that the court made a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached based on a weighing of the relevant factors.'  Id. (citations omitted). 34 Defendants' argument proceeds as follows. Dr. Fumero was a qualified witness within the meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as the court agreed. Tr. 8 at 1483. He proffered to the court that the symptoms of Robles' mental condition include verbosity; grandeza ([h]e has to feel important and the center of attention as part of his ... fragmented ego needs), Tr. 8 at 1497; and exaggeration. Because defendants faced criminal charges based largely on recorded conversations involving Robles, and because the government claimed that these conversations demonstrated the existence of a drug conspiracy, the weight placed on the taped conversations by the jury was of paramount importance. Indeed, the defendants' case was founded on the view that the recorded conversations were discussions of legitimate business dealings. If the jury could be convinced that Robles' testimony was unreliable because he had a medical condition that led him to exaggerate, it would be more likely to believe the defense theory that they were involved in legal business activity. 35 The district court ruled that Dr. Fumero would not be allowed to testify on the ground that the fact that a person may suffer a mental defect or problem does not render his testimony inadmissible. Tr. 8 at 1459. The court stated further that [y]ou cannot bring a witness and say, well, this man is not telling the truth or he can't tell the truth. Tr. 8 at 1465. The court appears to have understood Dr. Fumero's testimony to be related to the competency of Robles: What I suggest to you is that we give to the jury a stipulation that Julio Robles had been held not competent to stand trial at this time but that he is being evaluated further. Tr. 8 at 1466. 36 It is well established that a witness' mental state can be relevant to the issue of the witness' credibility. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 82 (1st Cir.1992). The competency of a witness to testify is a determination to be made by the trial judge, but issues of credibility are for the trier of fact. See United States v. Carroll, 105 F.3d 740, 743 (1st Cir.1997); United States v. Hyson, 721 F.2d 856, 864 (1st Cir.1983). 37 The ability of parties to offer expert testimony on the question of credibility is not, however, unlimited. [A]n expert's opinion that another witness is lying or telling the truth is ordinarily inadmissible pursuant to Rule 702 because the opinion exceeds the scope of the expert's specialized knowledge and therefore merely informs the jury that it should reach a particular conclusion. Shay, 57 F.3d at 131. On the other hand, no constitutional provision, law, or rule requires the exclusion of expert testimony simply because it concerns a credibility question. Id. To be admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, a proposed expert witness must: (1) be qualified to testify as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, Fed.R.Evid. 702; (2) the testimony must concern scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge, Fed.R.Evid. 702; and (3) the testimony must assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Fed.R.Evid. 702. Shay, 57 F.3d at 132. 38 In Shay, the defendant, Shay Jr., was convicted of conspiracy and aiding and abetting an attempt to blow up his father's car. Shay, 57 F.3d at 128. Shortly after the bombing, he told a police officer that he was sorry about it and wished he could turn back the hands of time. Id. The government argued that this statement was evidence of Shay Jr.'s guilt. As part of his defense, Shay Jr. sought to call Dr. Phillips, a psychiatrist, to testify that Shay Jr. suffered from a mental disorder known as pseudologa fantastica. The expert witness was to testify that this illness caused Shay Jr. to fabricate self-aggrandizing lies that would place him at the center of attention. Id. at 129-30. The district court excluded this testimony on the ground that the jury was capable of determining the reliability of Shay Jr.'s statements. 39 The Shay panel held that expert psychiatric testimony can be admitted in appropriate circumstances to establish a witness' character for truthfulness. Id. at 131. 40 The instant case is governed by Shay, and our analysis follows the one adopted there. 41 Neither party challenges Dr. Fumero's qualifications as an expert. The proffered testimony concerned the mental illness of Robles and its impact on his behavior--implying that it concerned scientific, technical or specialized knowledge. The remaining question is whether it would have assisted the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. The question that a court must answer in determining whether a proposed expert's testimony will assist the trier of fact is whether the untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best degree, the particular issue without enlightenment from those having a special understanding of the subject matter involved. Id. at 132 (internal quotation marks omitted). Dr. Fumero's testimony would have discussed Robles' mental illness. Dr. Fumero would have testified that Robles, as a result of his illness, was prone to exaggeration. 42 Moreover, this case has a unique dimension. Because Robles was incompetent to testify, the jury did not have the usual chance to evaluate his demeanor. Yet, the tapes containing his statements were introduced, and they were damaging to the defense. In light of the fact that the government's case was heavily dependent on Robles' taped conversations, we believe that, in these unusual circumstance, the testimony that he had a mental illness that led to verbosity, grandeza, and exaggeration was highly relevant and that an untrained layman would not be qualified to determine intelligently, and to the best degree the weight to place on Robles's recorded statements without enlightenment from Dr. Fumero. 43 The government argues that Dr. Fumero's testimony should be disallowed because the taped conversations featured current actions which were largely corroborated. To the extent that Robles did suffer from the mental illness at issue, however, Dr. Fumero's testimony could be relevant to the credibility of current statements. The defense theory is that Robles exaggerated his situation in statements that he made--a claim for which Dr. Fumero's testimony is clearly relevant. That the statements were, in the view of the government, accurate, is something for the jury to consider in its deliberations. It goes to the weight to be given to the evidence and is not a reason to exclude Dr. Fumero's testimony. 44 We conclude, therefore, that the district court erred in refusing to allow Dr. Fumero to testify. 2