Opinion ID: 2520615
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedure upon Remand

Text: In the present case, the trial court, relying on prior case law, did not resolve the issue of Finnie's compliance with section 24-10-109(3) as a motion to dismiss pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), but rather granted a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5). Because we only now specify the procedure that courts must follow when resolving all issues of compliance with section 24-10-109, we remand this case to the court of appeals with directions to return it to the trial court to afford the defendant the opportunity to file a Trinity motion to resolve the issue of compliance. In the subsequent proceedings, Finnie bears the burden of demonstrating that notice was properly filed so that the suit may proceed; however, we have described this burden as relatively lenient. See Tidwell, 83 P.3d at 86, 2003 WL 22533402, at . Although Finnie must carry this burden, our narrow construction of statutes granting governmental immunity requires that Finnie be afforded the reasonable inferences of [her] evidence in proving compliance with section 24-10-109(3). Id. at 85-86, at . The evidence Finnie presented in the current proceeding may yield several reasonable inferences. We again emphasize that trial courts have discretion to conduct Trinity hearings to accept and weigh evidence to determine whether a plaintiff fulfilled the GIA's notice requirements. See Trinity, 848 P.2d at 925. We also note that in such hearings, we have directed trial courts to allow the parties latitude in discovering or introducing evidence that tends to prove or disprove a plaintiff's compliance with the notice provisions. See Tidwell, 83 P.3d at 85-86, 2003 WL 22533402, at  (citing Trinity, 848 P.2d at 924). In this proceeding, Finnie offered evidence from which one can draw multiple reasonable inferences, specifically the alleged statements by the Risk Management Department employee and the letter sent to Finnie by the Risk Management Department acknowledging receipt of her notice of claim. Additionally, it may be necessary to develop some of the other relevant facts, such as the relationship between the School Board and the Risk Management Department, to determine factually whether an agency relationship existed or whether Finnie's notice fulfilled the purposes of the notice requirement. Although courts have discretion to conduct Trinity hearings, this procedure serves as a sometimes necessary tool for courts to resolve cases in which the facts presented raise multiple questions that require development before the court can determine whether the case should proceed. Furthermore, our prior case law holds that a court should conduct a Trinity hearing when alleged facts are in dispute. Tidwell, 83 P.3d at 85-86, 2003 WL 22533402, at ; see Trinity, 848 P.2d at 924-27. In proceedings after remand, a denial by the School District that Finnie complied with section 24-10-109(3) may put some of Finnie's alleged facts at issue, even though the School District did not previously dispute facts that were irrelevant to the strict standard of compliance incorrectly applied by the trial court. In this case, we are unable to resolve whether Finnie substantially complied with the notice provision in section 24-10-109(3). Instead, we can only conclude that the case arrived before us through procedures that we have now determined to have been incorrect and that the trial court applied the wrong standard. Therefore, a remand of this case is necessary to allow the parties to submit pleadings in accordance with the procedures outlined above and to properly explore and develop the facts necessary to determine whether the filing of notice was sufficient.