Opinion ID: 2499272
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Representation of Justi

Text: On July 16, 2007, Alaurice Tafoya-Modi, Esq., (Tafoya-Modi) filed a complaint on behalf of Justi in Grand County District Court. After Tafoya-Modi withdrew from the case, Respondent entered his appearance on Justi's behalf on May 23, 2008. Justi ruptured his quadriceps muscle after falling down a stairway in a Winter Park condominium in 2005, and he claimed RHO Condominium Association (RHO) was liable for the stairway's dangerous condition. Stuart Morse (Morse) represented RHO and Condominium Management Company (CMC), which RHO had retained to manage the building where Justi fell and which Respondent named as a second defendant in an amended complaint. RHO filed a motion for summary judgment on May 30, 2008, [32] to which a response was due on June 17, 2008. [33] On June 18, 2008, Respondent successfully sought a ninety-day extension of time to file the response. [34] Although the new deadline was October 11, 2008, Respondent did not file the response until October 27, 2008. [35] The court granted RHO's motion for summary judgment but later reversed that decision upon consideration of a C.R.C.P. 60 motion Respondent filed. [36] On November 4, 2008, CMC filed a motion for summary judgment and dismissal, arguing it had no actual knowledge of any alleged defect in the stairway, as would be required to support Justi's claim under the Colorado premises liability statute. [37] Respondent did not file a response on Justi's behalf, and the court entered summary judgment for CMC on December 3, 2008. [38] During the extensive motions practice leading up to trial in Justi's case, Respondent failed to respond to numerous other motions filed by the defense, including a motion to strike a designated expert, [39] two motions in limine to exclude evidence, [40] and a motion to strike a claim for economic damages. [41] The court granted in full or in part several of those motions. (Respondent's pattern of non-response also continued after trial, when he neglected to respond to a motion for attorney's fees [42] and a bill of costs. [43] ) At the disciplinary hearing, Respondent explained that his strategy in this case was to stay small and that he made calculated decisions not to contest certain motions he adjudged indefensible. Yet he also admitted it was irresponsible not to have confessed those motions. Trial was held in Justi's case before Judge Mary Hoak on January 25 and 26, 2010. [44] On the second day of trial, after Respondent questioned his last witness, Judge Hoak asked Respondent if he wished to rest. He responded he did not intend to rest but he had no further witnesses at the time. After Judge Hoak instructed Respondent that he was obligated to rest if he had no additional evidence to present, Respondent agreed to rest. Morse then moved for a directed verdict, arguing that (1) Respondent had failed to present any evidence of a connection between RHO and the condominium at which Justi fell and (2) Respondent had presented no evidence showing RHO had unreasonably failed to exercise the requisite standard of care. Respondent replied that evidence presented by a defense witness would show RHO owned the condominium in question. But Judge Hoak found that Respondent had the burden to present such evidence in his case-in-chief. Respondent then moved to reopen his case, explaining that he had relied on Morse's prior representation he would call a representative of RHO as a witness, and that Respondent intended to prove ownership by questioning that witness. But Morse denied having promised to call any such witness. Judge Hoak determined there was no legal basis for reopening the evidence, and she granted Morse's motion for directed verdict. The court of appeals affirmed Judge Hoak's decision not to reopen the evidence. [45] The appeals court held that, even had RHO been bound by representations made in its opening argument and answer as to its ownership of the condominium, as Respondent argued for the first time on appeal, a directed verdict still would have been appropriate because Respondent had not shown that RHO failed to exercise reasonable care. [46] In addition, the court of appeals found no error in the lower court's denial of Respondent's C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion, noting that he offered no applicable evidence or authority to support a contention that the circumstances presented here were such that a reasonably prudent person similarly would have neglected to put on a prima facie case before he or she rested. [47] The People allege Respondent violated his duty under Colo. RPC 1.1 to competently represent Justi by failing to respond to defense motions and neglecting to subpoena an essential witness for trial. They further allege that this conductalong with Respondent's failure to take any depositions amounted to a lack of diligent and prompt representation in violation of Colo. RPC 1.3. We agree with the People as regards these claims. Even though staying small may have been a legitimate strategy, it was irresponsible for Respondent to simply ignore multiple motions filed by the defense. As Judge Hoak noted, it is very unusual for a lawyer to overlook numerous motions, and some of the motions Respondent disregarded were significant to the resolution of the case. In addition, Respondent acted without the requisite promptness by requesting an extension of time to respond to RHO's motion for summary judgment after the deadline had passed, then only to file his response sixteen days past the extended deadline. We also find that Respondent's conduct addressed in RHO's motion for a directed verdict did not meet applicable standards of diligence and competence. It is unclear to us, given the limited record available, whether Respondent intended to demonstrate a connection between RHO and the condominium by calling a witness he expected Morse to make available in the course of Respondent's case-in-chief, or rather if he intended to directly examine that witness during the defense. The safest course of action would have been to subpoena the witness, but we do not entirely discount Respondent's argument that it is common practice for counsel to agree to make witnesses available to testify without a subpoena. However, if Respondent needed to question a certain witness to establish a prima facie case and either he or Morse did not wish to issue a subpoena, he should have secured an agreement with Morse ensuring the witness's presence during the relevant portion of the trial. If he meant to directly examine the witness during the defense, he also should have secured Morse's agreement not to move for a directed verdict. Finally, we find the court of appeals' reasoned determination that Respondent failed to establish a required element of his prima facie case to be persuasive evidence of his failure to act with the requisite diligence and competence. Accordingly, we find Respondent violated Colo. RPC 1.1 and 1.3. In addition, the People assert Respondent violated his duty under Colo. RPC 1.4(a)(3) to keep Justi reasonably informed about the case by failing to alert Justi that he was not responding to defense motions, that CMC's motion to dismiss had been granted due to his lack of response, and that he had not planned to subpoena an essential witness. In their hearing brief, the People maintain that Respondent previously admitted he did not uphold his duty to communicate with Justi. But Respondent's answer contains no such admission, nor does his testimony provide any indication of inadequate communication to Justi. And Justi himself did not testify at the disciplinary hearing to corroborate the People's assertion. Given the dearth of evidence that Respondent neglected to keep Justi informed about his case, we find no violation of Colo. RPC 1.4(a)(3) here. The People also allege two claims concerning judgments owed in the Justi matter. Between September 9, 2008, and May 14, 2010, Judge Hoak entered four judgments against Justi in the amounts of $25,086.97, [48] $901.00, [49] $1,001.00, [50] and $918.83, [51] and she also entered a judgment against Respondent for $422.00 in attorney's fees. [52] On December 6, 2010, the People informally interviewed Respondent regarding the Justi matter. Respondent was asked whether the judgments owed in that case had been paid. According to the testimony and notes of Laurie Seab, the People's investigator, Respondent said, I think I paid the judgments, and then he stated, we paid all of them. [53] But the register of actions in the Justi case showed that none of the judgments had been paid. [54] The People claim Respondent violated Colo. RPC 8.1(a), which provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact in connection with a disciplinary matter, by telling the People the judgments in the Justi case had been paid. The People further assert that Respondent violated Colo. RPC 8.4(c) by misrepresenting to the People that the judgments against himself and Justi had been satisfied. According to Respondent, he said during the interview that he thought the judgments had been paid because he truly believed that to be case. In addition, he did not think the People's question encompassed the defense's $25,086.97 bill of costs, since the case was on appeal and the bill of costs was not yet properly considered an unsatisfied judgment. Respondent also noted that at the time of the interview he was taking prescription pain medication to ease his recovery from hip surgery. We cannot find that Respondent possessed the state of mind required to support a violation of Colo. RPC 8.1(a) or 8.4(c). By its terms, Colo. RPC 8.1(a) encompasses situations in which a lawyer knowingly makes a false statement of material fact. And the Colorado Supreme Court has determined that the element of scienter must be proved to give rise to a violation of Colo. RPC 8.4(c). [55] Respondent made the comments at issue without having received prior warning that he would be asked about the judgments and without the benefit of documentation available for his review. And rather than categorically and firmly asserting that the judgments had been paid, Respondent prefaced his comments by saying he thought they had been paid. As such, we do not find clear and convincing evidence of the state of mind necessary to sustain the People's claims under Colo. RPC 8.1(a) and 8.4(c).