Opinion ID: 1431348
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: impropriety of the hearing procedure.

Text: One of the obvious improprieties of the hearing procedure was the failure to address the omission of a proper description in the complaint. The trial court should have so ruled and either allowed the appellant sufficient time in which to file an amended complaint with the necessary description or the complaint should have been dismissed without prejudice. If necessary, it should have issued the order, previously referred to, for entry by appellant on appellees' land for necessary surveys. With the parties before the court, appellees' consent to entry for such purpose was a probability. Amendments of complaints are authorized by subsection (f) of Rule 71.1, W.R.C.P., [w]ith the leave of court    as many times as desired. It sets forth the necessity and method for service and notice of the amendment. Dismissal of the complaint for good cause shown is authorized by subsection (k)(3) of Rule 71.1, W.R.C.P., and the fact that such can be without prejudice is recited in subsection (k)(4) of that rule. The trial court indicated its recognition of the defect in description in the summary judgment, but this defect should have been rectified, or at least the opportunity to rectify it should have been offered, before an appealable order or judgment was entered. It should be here noted that the inadequacy of the description in the complaint was not rectified by the evidence produced at the hearing. Entirely aside from the specific requirement of the rule for adequate description in the complaint and from the impossible position in which it placed the appellees with respect to preparation of their case, the only effort at the hearing to supply a specific description was the introduction into evidence of an aerial photographic map with some of the roads on it highlighted. Some of the highlighted roads were represented to be the property to be taken. Perhaps a surveyor could establish a line by reference to the map. But there is no evidence at all as to the width of the proposed right-of-way  whether 25 feet or 500 feet if the taking be under §§ 1-26-301, et seq., W.S. 1977, or whether 25 feet or 100 feet if the taking be under §§ 1-26-401, et seq., W.S. 1977. [7] Without that factor, the amount of land to be taken cannot be determined. A usual description of a right-of-way is x feet on each side of a center line running as follows. Then is set forth the starting point, the course and direction of the center line, and the terminus. But, beyond the description issue, the hearing was defective in other ways. Its purpose was to resolve the first phase of the eminent domain action  to determine the regularity of the proceedings. It got off the track on this purpose and ended up with an improper summary judgment. In addition to the treatment of the description matter, it would serve little purpose here to detail the incidents in this case relative to the five other determinations to be made concerning the regularity of the proceedings. But in summary: 1. Arguments were made relative to the power or authority or right to make the appropriation. The trial court ruled that appellant lacked the same. The majority opinion finds otherwise. I believe we do not have sufficient facts [8] before us to resolve the issue, and a resolution of it would be piecemeal in any event. I will address the piecemeal aspect later. 2. The trial court ruled that the purpose was improper since a mine haul road was not pertinent to appellant's oil and gas activities. Again the majority opinion is otherwise. I believe the factual inquiry must go further and that evidence is necessary to establish the actual use to be made of the road. Although the determination of public use is for the legislature, the application of the facts in the case before the courts to the public use as defined and intended by the legislature is a judicial function. The final determination of whether a use or purpose is within the limits of legislative discretion is a judicial function; thus it is for the courts to decide whether a given use is a public use.   Reel v. City of Freeport, 61 Ill. App.2d 448, 209 N.E.2d 675, 678 (1965); Kessler v. City of Indianapolis, 199 Ind. 420, 157 N.E. 547 (1927); Colorado Central Power Co. v. City of Englewood, 10th Cir.1937, 89 F.2d 233. The scrutiny should be more intense in making the determination of a public purpose when the eminent domain power is delegated to private entities than when used by governmental bodies. [9] As said in Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Development Authority, Fla., 315 So.2d 451, 455 (1975): The power of eminent domain is one of the most harsh proceedings known to the law. Consequently, when the sovereign delegates this power to a political unity or agency, a strict construction must be given against the agency asserting the power. The burden is on the condemning authority to establish a public purpose and reasonable necessity for the taking. [Footnotes omitted.] 3. The subjectivity or availability of the property for appropriation is not pertinent to this case since the appropriation does not involve property of the United States, or property in which there is a conflict between more than one entity with eminent domain powers, or property already devoted to public use. 4. While not addressed at the hearing, the interest to be condemned seems to be a right-of-way easement and not a fee interest. The quantum to be taken is related in this instance to the description which, as previously noted, is not sufficient to designate the quantum. 5. The necessity of the taking as well as the quantum is largely within the discretion of the condemnor. But the taking must not be for more than that required for the purpose or public use. To do so would be a denial of due process of law. ( City of Carlsbad v. Ballard, 71 N.M. 397, 378 P.2d 814 (1963); Knappen v. Division of Administration, State Department of Transportation, Fla.App., 352 So.2d 885 (1977).) Arguments were made to the trial court concerning the necessity for the taking, but the evidence thereto was not specific and was very limited. The trial court did not rule thereon  nor could it without an adequate description. In this connection, it is noted that eminent domain power may not be exercised to obtain a right-of-way to a piece of property if the condemnor has a reasonably adequate way otherwise than over the lands of the condemnee. McGowin Investment Company v. Johnstone, 54 Ala.App. 194, 306 So.2d 286 (1974); and see McIlquham v. Anthony Wilkinson Live Stock Co., 18 Wyo. 53, 104 P. 20 (1909), wherein the court said at page 22:    It is at least well settled that where a party has one way by which he can reach a public highway, and which affords him reasonable facilities for possessing, using and enjoying his own premises, he is not entitled to another way as a way of necessity.    Section 1-26-401(d), W.S. 1977, part of the statutory procedure which the majority of the court holds to be applicable in this case, is specific in this requirement. [10] As already noted, the trial court should have first addressed the adequacy of the complaint (including the presence of a description), authorizing an amendment thereof or dismissing it without prejudice until it complied with the requirements of Rule 71.1(c), W.R.C.P. Such action is authorized and implied by subsection (e) of Rule 71.1, W.R.C.P., wherein it is stated that the court shall hear proofs and allegations of all parties interested touching the regularity of the proceeding. Thereafter, the court should have held the hearing required by subsection (e) of Rule 71.1, W.R.C.P., and considered the five itemized incidents relative to the regularity of the proceedings. In condemnation proceedings, rulings should be made on three of such incidents in every instance: Proper purpose, quantum and interest, and availability or subjectivity of the property. The other two incidents, (1) power, authority or right to take, and (2) the necessity therefor are considered as established and contest thereon waived unless the issues are raised in an answer. Subsection (d)(3) of Rule 71.1, W.R.C.P. The answers in this case raised both of these issues. The findings and conclusions with respect thereto should have been set forth in the order or judgment issued on this phase of the action. One reason for determination of all issues in the one order is to prevent multiple appeals  such as can occur in this case should the trial court find against appellant on another of the first phase incidents when the matter is next before it. For example, the trial court could find that there is not a necessity for a right-of-way, and the case could again be on appeal for resolution of the propriety of that finding. In this case, we end up without a description from which the necessity, the availability and the quantum of taking can be determined. We end up with a summary judgment, which is an anachronism since Rule 71.1, W.R.C.P., sets forth a procedure wherein the resulting order or judgment on the first phase of the action is not of a summary nature. Additionally, although subsection (a) of Rule 71.1, W.R.C.P., provides that the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern the procedure for condemnation except as otherwise provided in this rule, and although Rule 56, W.R.C.P., authorizes summary judgments under proper conditions, Rule 56 also provides that the motion for a summary judgment shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The motion was not made in this instance until during the hearing itself. [11] The occurrences, and the sequence thereof, at the hearing in this case were unusual. The complaint listed the authority for the taking to be that provided by §§ 1-26-401 through 1-26-404, W.S. 1977. At the outset of the hearing, appellant's motion was considered whereby it sought to amend the complaint by adding §§ 1-26-301 through 1-26-303, W.S. 1977, as authority for the taking. Appellees opposed the motion and contended that they should be allowed time to amend their answers if it were granted. The question as to whether or not § 1-26-401, W.S. 1977, gave authority to appellant for the action was discussed, and the trial court ruled that it did not and that he would dismiss the complaint for this reason. The trial court then granted appellant's motion to amend its complaint to include §§ 1-26-301 through 1-26-303, W.S. 1977, as authority for the taking. Appellees then moved for a summary judgment with reference to such. The trial court received evidence on the motion and heard argument on it. The trial court then granted the motion for a summary judgment on the lack of authority to take in §§ 1-26-301 through 1-26-303, W.S. 1977. Appellant then moved to have the evidence submitted with reference to the summary judgment be made part of the order relative to 1-26-401. The motion was opposed by appellees Graham and Reislands. The trial court then reconsidered its ruling on the motion to dismiss and granted the motion. It stated that [t]he court's ruling will remain the same on that motion. And the court will grant the summary judgment as stated. The judgment itself reads: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants' motion for summary judgment against plaintiff be, and it hereby is, granted, and that summary judgment be entered in favor of defendants and against plaintiff, and that plaintiff's Amended Complaint be dismissed. If this was a dismissal of the complaint, it was not a dismissal of the cause  and therefore not appealable (see supra), and it does not otherwise provide and was therefore without prejudice  pursuant to Rule 71.1(k)(4), W.R.C.P., which provides that [e]xcept as otherwise provided in the notice, or stipulation of dismissal or order of the court, any dismissal is without prejudice,  (emphasis supplied). If it was a summary judgment, it was on a motion made without timely notice. Nor was it a motion to dismiss turned into a motion for summary judgment on receipt of evidence since the complaint was already dismissed.