Opinion ID: 1651891
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Commission's Decision is Arbitrary and Contrary to Law

Text: For their first point on appeal, Appellants argue that the Commission's decision to affirm the issuance of the air and hazardous-waste permits was arbitrary and contrary to law. They contend that ADEQ erred in issuing the permits without adequately addressing the issues of risks resulting from emissions of dioxin, mercury, and products of incomplete combustion (PICs). They contend that these emissions will cause air pollution, as defined in Ark.Code Ann. § 8-4-303(5) (Repl.2000), which provides: Air pollution means the presence in the outdoor atmosphere of one (1) or more air contaminants in quantities, of characteristics, and of a duration which are materially injurious, or can be reasonably expected to become materially injurious to human, plant, or animal life or to property, or which unreasonably interfere with enjoyment of life or use of property throughout the state or throughout the area of the state as shall be affected thereby[.] [Emphasis added.] We discuss each type of emission separately
Appellants start with the proposition that dioxin is highly toxic to humans and animals, and that Appellees have admitted as much. They then contend that the level of dioxin that will be emitted from the Pine Bluff Facility, in addition to amounts already existing in the area, is reasonably expected to cause adverse health effects. They argue that the health risks are especially high for breast-feeding infants, minorities, and low-income persons. To a large degree, Appellants rely on a document from the EPA, which proposed a reference dose for dioxin of one picogram per kilogram of weight per day, or 1 pg/kg/day. Appellants' reliance on this standard is misplaced, because the record demonstrates that the EPA never adopted this reference dose, which was found in a document known as the 1994 Draft Dioxin Reassessment. The Draft's cover page specifically cautions: DraftDo not Quote or Cite. The draft proposal was never adopted by the EPA and was, in fact, criticized by the EPA's independent Scientific Advisory Board (SAB). Specifically, the SAB concluded that the EPA had not presented adequate scientific findings that would support its conclusion that adverse effects in humans may be occurring at or near current dioxin-exposure levels. The SAB's conclusion was supported by the expert testimony in this case. Dr. Phillip Guzelian, an expert in the field of toxicology, testified that during the 1970s, there was concern among medical scientists that dioxin might cause cancer and other adverse effects in humans. He stated that those old fears have been replaced by the new facts, showing that even persons exposed to dioxin at high doses are not developing adverse health effects. He explained that the only adverse effect clearly shown to be caused by dioxin is chloracne, a very disfiguring and persistent form of acne. He stated that to cause that adverse effect, a person would have to have a blood level of dioxin of one thousand parts per trillion. Dr. Guzelian testified that the level of dioxin expected to be emitted from the Pine Bluff Facility is far less than that amount. To illustrate this point, he considered the study done by Dr. Morris Cranmer on the dioxin levels in the blood of persons living near the Vertac hazardous-waste incinerator in Jacksonville, Arkansas. Dr. Cranmer's study measured the blood levels in 1991, before the incinerator began to burn, and found an average of 3.8 parts per trillion. During the incineration, in 1994, the average blood level was determined to be 3.9 parts per trillion. Finally, after the incineration was completed, in 1995, the average blood level was found to have decreased to 3.5 parts per trillion. Dr. Guzelian used this study in calculating the assessed risks of dioxin exposure from the Pine Bluff Facility. He concluded that the emissions from the Vertac incinerator were quite a bit higher than the expected emissions from the Facility and that, accordingly, there would be no observable change in the blood levels due to emissions from the Facility. He concluded further that the dioxin emissions from the Facility would not pose an unacceptable threat to human health to the exposed population. Despite Dr. Guzelian's testimony that there will be no adverse health effects from the Facility's dioxin emissions, Appellants contend that the exposure to nursing infants caused by emissions from the Pine Bluff Facility, when added to those already in the atmosphere, is virtually certain to cause an increase in the frequency and severity of adverse health effects. They assert that ADEQ's standard of 2.4 pg/ kg/day is too high because it exceeds the standard of 1 pg/kg/day taken from the EPA's 1994 draft. As explained above, this standard was never adopted by the EPA and was, in fact, criticized by its independent advisory board. Other than this, Appellants have offered no evidence showing that ADEQ's standard will result in adverse health effects. The AHO found that the standard was developed in conjunction with the Arkansas Department of Health, after consultation with the EPA, the Center for Disease Control (CDC), and the federal Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, and that the standard adopted for use in the risk assessment was provided to the health department from Dr. Cranmer, who conducted the study of the Vertac incinerator. The AHO found significant the fact that ADEQ received no adverse comments about the standard from any of the agencies it had consulted. The AHO also relied on the testimony of Dr. Gary Liberson, who stated that the health-risk assessment followed, and in some aspects exceeded, the EPA's guidance on the subject. Dr. Liberson testified that ADEQ had used a margin of error approach in arriving at the figure of 2.4 pg/kg/day. Under this approach, emissions from a source are set at a level that will not exceed a certain percentage of the existing exposure level. Dr. Liberson stated that the dioxin emissions from the Pine Bluff Facility would increase the daily dose to the population by no more than ten percent above the daily dose (0.8 pg/kg/day) received by five percent of the state's population that has the lowest levels of dioxin. He explained that this meant that the remaining ninety-five percent of the state's population would get an increase of less than ten percent. Dr. Liberson testified that there is a thirty-fold magnification for infant exposure from the mother's milk. Thus, using the margin of error approach, if the mother's marginal dose is 0.8 pg/kg/day, then the infant criteria is 2.4 pg/kg/day. He stated that this approach was conservative for a number of reasons. First, the approach assumed that the mother and the nursing infant lived on site. Second, it assumed that the mother was exposed to the additional dioxin emissions for seven to fifteen years, even though the Facility is only scheduled to operate for three and one-third years. Third, the expert testimony showed that as the mother nurses, she depletes her reservoir of dioxin, such that at the end of the nursing period, there is about an eighty percent reduction of the dose. Thus, the daily level of dioxin exposure to the nursing infant actually decreases. Finally, because it takes the mother seven to fifteen years to build up this reservoir, any succeeding children would intake a smaller dose than the first child. The AHO concluded that Appellants had failed to demonstrate that the risks from exposure to dioxin emitted from the Facility were not properly considered by ADEQ before it issued the permits. The AHO's order reflects: The risk assessment adequately considered the health effects of dioxin due to predicted emissions from the [Pine Bluff Facility] and existing sources. The AHO concludes that the [ADEQ] evaluation of dioxin through the risk assessment process was protective of the public health and the environment. In addition, the AHO finds no evidence that [ADEQ] acted arbitrarily, capriciously or in violation of any statute or rule. Appellants have failed to show that this ruling is not supported by substantial evidence, especially considering the expert testimony given by Drs. Guzelian and Liberson. As stated above, expert testimony qualifies as substantial evidence unless it is shown that the expert opinion is without reasonable basis. See Bullock, 345 Ark. 373, 48 S.W.3d 516. No such showing was made by Appellants.
Appellants next contend that the levels of mercury to be emitted from the Pine Bluff Facility will constitute air pollution in that they will be harmful to wildlife and the environment. They do not contend that the mercury levels will be harmful to humans. They base their argument on what they claim is ADEQ's abandonment of Arkansas' Water Quality Standards in favor of the standard established by the federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which is one part mercury per one million parts water. Appellees assert that ADEQ never abandoned its standard. The record reflects that the Army was first required to perform a health-risk assessment to consider risks for cancer and long-term and short-term noncancer risks. The assessment demonstrated that the expected mercury emissions from the Facility will not cause either cancer or noncancer risks. The Army then had to perform an evaluation of the potential effect of mercury emissions as part of an ecological assessment. The ecological assessment demonstrated that the predicted mercury emissions would not exceed the ecological risk-screening thresholds. Thereafter, ADEQ required the Army to perform a third assessment to determine the potential effects of mercury emissions on water bodies in the vicinity of the Facility. Because some of the local bodies already exceeded the standard for mercury under the Arkansas Water Quality Standards, ADEQ asked the Army specifically to collect fish tissue samples from those local bodies and evaluate the potential health impacts. Those levels were then added to the expected levels from the Facility. ADEQ then compared that aggregate number to the FDA's standard of one part per million. Based on this standard, ADEQ concluded that the mercury emissions would not cause harmful effects to persons who might eat fish from the water bodies. Appellants contend that the use of the FDA's standard is too lax and that ADEQ used it only because the state's own standards were too stringent. There is no merit to this point. The AHO found that the evidence showed that the expected mercury contributions from the Facility to the existing local water bodies is so small that it is insignificant. By way of example, Appellees point out that then-existing mercury levels in the Arkansas River were 0.15 parts per billion. The expected contribution from the Facility's emissions was only an additional 0.00000052 parts per billion. Appellants have presented no evidence showing that such an additional amount is harmful to wildlife. Nor have they presented any evidence to rebut the presumption that the Commission's decision is reasonable and valid and complies with all legal requirements.
Appellants next argue that the permits will cause air pollution in that the Pine Bluff Facility will emit products of incomplete combustion (PICs). They complain that the Army has not identified the PICs emitted from the facilities at Johnston Island and Tooele, Utah, and that the Army has no procedure in place to identify them. Absent a determination of their identity and toxicity, if any, Appellants assert that it cannot be determined whether these emissions will cause air pollution. The AHO found that every combustion source will have PICs and that, generally, the same PICs are found in any combustion system. Phil Murphy, an engineer with ADEQ, testified that the emissions that come out of the stack are primarily made up of water, nitrogen, carbon dioxide, oxygen, and PICs. He stated that only one percent of the constituents coming out of the stack are PICs. He stated further that he would expect to find the same types of PICs as those found at the Johnston Island facility. The AHO found that ADEQ deals with PICs by writing permits that minimize their formation through good combustion. For example, one of the conditions to the permits issued for the Pine Bluff Facility requires the permittees to perform a total organic carbon test during the trial burn of the Facility. This method separates a sample into three different portions and analyzes the organic carbon in each, allowing ADEQ to quantify some PICs such as chlorinated dioxins and furans. Based on this evidence, the AHO concluded that the risk assessment considered the risk posed by PICs, and that ADEQ employed this information in drafting the permit conditions addressing PICs. We must affirm this conclusion because Appellants have presented no evidence to the contrary, beyond their bare allegations that the unidentified PICs will cause pollution. In sum, Appellants have failed to meet their burden of showing that the Commission's decision affirming the issuance of the air and hazardous-waste permits is erroneous. Moreover, they have failed to demonstrate that the issuance of the permits for the Facility will cause air pollution, as defined in section 8-4-303(5). To the contrary, the evidence clearly demonstrates that the expected emissions will not be materially injurious to human, plant, or animal life or to property and will not unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment of life or the use of property in the area. Thus, we conclude that the Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence. As such, we need not decide whether it is arbitrary, because it automatically follows that where substantial evidence is found, a decision cannot be classified as unreasonable or arbitrary. See Enviroclean, 314 Ark. 98, 858 S.W.2d 116; Wright, 311 Ark. 125, 842 S.W.2d 42.