Opinion ID: 197450
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurisdictional Limits in Federal Courts Generally

Text: 60 An inquiry that is in essence jurisdictional is an appropriate early step toward full understanding of the meaning of the constitutional, statutory, and decisional mandates regarding the scope of the authority of federal courts in a case involving judicial review of an out-of-court claims decision. 61 Article III courts and other federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction. See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 2403, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978). Even when some source of subject-matter jurisdiction appears of record (by reason of complete diversity of citizenship, for example, or the dependence of a claim on some federal question), federal courts are not automatically authorized to adjudicate every kind of related claim a party wishes to have decided. Rather, except as to instances of jurisdiction over claims of unconstitutionality of legislation, limits on the scope of jurisdiction of federal courts (other than the Supreme Court of the United States) are partly statutory. E.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1675, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). 62 A central characteristic of federal jurisdiction is that it tends to be claim-based, and thus specific to claims, rather than case-based, and thus general to an entire case if the court has jurisdiction over any claim. See American Law Institute, Federal Judicial Code Revision Project, Tentative Draft No. 1, 33-34 (Apr. 8, 1997) (Commentary). The Reporter for this ALI Project, Professor John B. Oakley, in an introductory Memorandum to the Members of the Institute, identifies as an organizing principle used from an early stage of the history of this ALI Project, the observation that: 63 subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal district court operates on a 'claim-specific' basis that is concealed and confused by the 'action-specific' language of the basic statutory grants of original jurisdiction to the district courts. Id. at xvii. He adds: 64 .... Although the basic statutes purport to confer federal jurisdiction over particular types of 'civil actions,' 'cases,' 'proceedings,' and the like, they have been administered on a claim-specific rather than action-specific basis, with the law of supplemental jurisdiction functioning in the background as the mechanism for determining which claims joined to a particular action that do not directly involve the kinds of issues or parties within the scope of Article III are nonetheless within federal judicial power because of their relationship to other claims involving issues or parties that fall within Article III's criteria. 65 Id. at xviii. We interpret action, as used both in this passage and in a passage of the Firestone opinion, quoted above, as meaning civil action, not cause of action. Professor Oakley adds that these background themes are a part of the complex structure of federal jurisdiction, commonly recognized as involving constitutional, statutory, and decisional tiers of authorization and limitation. Id. at 36-45. 66 We conclude that a theme of claim-specific limitations on the scope of federal judicial power extends also to a distinction between plenary jurisdiction, in a broad sense including authority to decide anew on the merits, and a more confined type of jurisdiction over a specific type of claim within the court's jurisdiction. A district court's subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim may be solely for judicial review of an out-of-court decision on the merits of the claim. This kind of limitation is primarily statutory in origin. It may be implicit, for example, in a statutory authorization for judicial review over out-of-court substantive decisions (of many different types) made by governmental agencies, under provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Also, this kind of limitation may be implicit in statutory provisions for judicial review of special kinds of out-of-court substantive decisions made by private decisionmakers such as those acting under employee benefits plan, making decisions reviewable in this case under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)(B) and 1132(c). 67 In a regime characterized in large part by limited jurisdiction, a statutory authorization for judicial review of out-of-court decisions does not imply authorization for a court to expand its jurisdiction to a plenary authority to decide, itself, all genuinely disputable factual issues decisive of the merits of claims. This point applies both to a court's acting on its own initiative and to a court's acting upon a consensual request by the parties that a court accept an expansion of its jurisdiction. We say more about consensual requests in Part II.E, below. 68 Also, to understand fully a source of authority regarding the scope of a court's jurisdiction when judicially reviewing an out-of-court claims decision, one must take account of the distinctive nature of a court's role in judicial review, in contrast with the role of a court in other civil actions generally. 69 A civil action for judicial review of an out-of-court decision is fundamentally different from a paradigm civil action asserting tort, contract, or property claims, or even alleged rights to equitable or declaratory relief. In cases of judicial review, ordinarily no right to jury trial is involved, and no need or authority exists to make factual findings of the kind regularly made by a jury, or by the trial judge in a nonjury trial. 70 If a need exists for deciding disputable factual issues in the course of judicial review of an out-of-court decision on the merits of a benefits claim, typically that need is associated with a dispute about the record. We turn next to considering disputes of this kind.C. Deciding Disputes About the Record 71 1. The Contrast Between Disputes About the Record and 72 Disputes About the Merits 73 Deciding disputable factual issues about what is or is not properly a part of the record for judicial review is fundamentally different from deciding disputable factual issues going to the merits of a benefits claim. 74 The out-of-court decision under judicial review in this case was, or at least in ordinary circumstances should have been, a decision on the merits. The standard of judicial review of that decision, in whatever way it may be phrased and described, is to some extent deferential in the sense that the reviewing court is not to set aside a factual finding of historical fact for which the record on which the decision was made contained adequate support. 75 Ordinarily the deference to a decision on the merits extends also to deference to an evaluative inference on which the decision on the merits depends, at least unless the inference is a mixed-legal-factual inference. Just as appellate courts tend to give somewhat less deference to a trial court's mixed-legal-factual inference--see, e.g., AIDS Action Comm. of Mass., Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.1994) (appellate court accords significant deference to trial court's factual determinations and most of its resolutions of mixed fact/law issues, letting them stand unless they are clearly erroneous, but engages in de novo review of trial court's application of a First Amendment standard to the facts of the particular case); In re Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1328 (1st Cir.1993) (The standard of review applicable to mixed questions usually depends upon where they fall along the degree-of-deference continuum; the more fact-dominated the question, the more likely it is that the trier's resolution of it will be accepted unless shown to be clearly erroneous.)--so likewise a court engaged in judicial review of an out-of-court decision may tend to give less deference to an inference-based decision that appears possibly to have been influenced by a mistake about the existence or meaning of an applicable legal rule or about how the legal rule applies in the particular instance. In applying such a less deferential standard, however, a reviewing court is not authorized to make, itself, a new decision replacing every factual finding of the out-of-court decisionmaker that goes to the merits and is challenged. The judicial review of the decision on the merits continues to be to some extent deferential. 76 In contrast, the trial judge's decision of a dispute about the record is typically not deferential. 77 A factual dispute about the record of an out-of-court decision of a claim under an employee benefits plan may involve a contention, by either party, that the record as produced by the decisionmaking entity contains documents or descriptions of non-documentary evidence not considered before the challenged decision was made, or documents or descriptions of evidence not properly considered (which one party or the other asks the trial court to strike or otherwise treat as irrelevant to judicial review). Obversely, the dispute may involve a contention that the record for the out-of-court decision should have included, and did not, additional materials (which one party or the other asks the trial court to rule must be taken into account). 78 If, after taking such a supplementation of the record into account, the trial judge determines that, by reason of departures from fair process, the challenged out-of-court decision cannot be affirmed, one obvious possibility is an order of remand for reconsideration by the committee or other entity that made the procedurally flawed out-of-court decision. 79 That form of remedy fits. Concerning a court's obligation generally, in framing relief, to fashion a remedy that fits and does not overburden a party, see, e.g., Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 2558, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979) (injunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs); E.E.O.C. v. Astra U.S.A., Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 746 (1st Cir.1996) (same). 80 First, the remedy for the departure from fair process is easily framed to fit within the authorized scope of judicial review. Second, the nature of the remedy matches the nature of the error. Moreover, if the error was solely an error of the committee or other deciding entity, any other form of order is likely not to fit because it tends to place an undeserved burden or disadvantage on one party or the other. 81 We leave to be considered in Parts III.C and III.D of this opinion a defense contention in this case that if the record failed to contain evidence that would have supported plaintiff's claim, plaintiff failed to use her available opportunities to proffer more evidence. 82 To complete an explanation of the contrast between deciding disputes about the merits and deciding disputes about the record, we must take account of legal authority bearing on who is to decide a dispute about the record and by what procedures. 83 2. Who Decides? 84 As to who is to decide a dispute about the record, we canvass three possibilities (and variations on each) that are apparent in this case: (1) the out-of-court decisionmaker on remand from the district court; (2) the court or courts where judicial review occurs; and (3) a jury (or trial judge as finder of fact in a nonjury proceeding), guided on the law by the trial judge's rulings, those rulings being subject to correction on appeal. 85 The first possibility (remand to the out-of-court decisionmaker) may sometimes be appropriate, but is likely to result in delay, and perhaps very extended delay and expense if the dispute is not resolved to the satisfaction of all interested parties, and promptly. That kind of delay is inconsistent with the objective of providing workers and their dependents an inexpensive and expeditious method of resolving disputes over benefits claimed under an employee benefits plan. This is one of the multiple objectives underlying ERISA. See, e.g., Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 987 F.2d 1017, 1023-1025 (4th Cir.1993) (citing Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d 963, 966 (6th Cir.1990)). 86 The availability of the third possibility--jury trial--in ERISA cases is a matter on which many courts have spoken but in ways that may reasonably be understood as creating some unresolved conflicts. E.g., compare Turner v. Fallon Community Health Plan, Inc., 953 F.Supp. 419 (D.Mass.1997), with Padilla De Higginbotham v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 820 F.Supp. 48 (D.P.R.1993). We do not speak further to this conflict in this opinion, for the reason that in any event the record before us fails to show any disputable issue of fact appropriate for submission to a jury in this case, as we explain below. 87 The use of a jury to resolve disputes about the record for judicial review of out-of-court decisions in this case would be fundamentally inconsistent with the regime of limited jurisdiction of federal courts. Jurisdiction for judicial review cannot be expanded to encompass a jury role inconsistent with limitations on the court's jurisdiction. The jury is an arm of the court, and an arm that performs only a designated court function. In a case before the court solely for judicial review of an out-of-court decision, the jurisdiction of the court as a whole, including the jury, is limited to the function of determining whether the out-of-court decision is to be affirmed, or is to be set aside as arbitrary or capricious, or is to be reconsidered by the committee or other entity designated to decide the merits. 88 A recent decision of the Supreme Court in a very different context helps to explain both the rejection of this third possibility and the distinctive nature of the role of the trial judge in deciding disputes about the record as distinguished from disputes about the merits. That context involved a dispute about who decides an issue of interpretation of a patent claim as to which reasonable persons familiar with both the intricacies of patent law and all the relevant circumstances of the particular case might differ. Justice Souter, in the opinion of the Court, observed that a trial judge is better positioned than a jury to decide this kind of factual issue. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., --- U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 1387, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996) (Since evidence of common law practice at the time of the Framing does not entail application of the Seventh Amendment's jury guarantee to the construction of the [patent] claim document, we must look elsewhere to characterize this determination of meaning in order to allocate it as between court or jury. Existing precedent, the relative interpretive skills of judges and juries, and statutory policy considerations all favor allocating construction issues to the court.). 89 Much of the reasoning of the Court in Westview applies to the role of a trial judge in deciding disputes about the record for judicial review. Compared with judges, jurors typically have less experience and training relevant to competence to review decisions of others with an appropriate degree of deference while at the same time assuring no misunderstanding or misapplication of governing law. And, historically, juries have had no part in judicial review of out-of-court decisions. 90 Concerning factors bearing upon who is better positioned to decide, in determining whether responsibility for deciding a factual dispute of a distinctive kind should be allocated to juries or instead to judges, the Westview opinion cited other Court decisions made in other contexts, including Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114, 106 S.Ct. 445, 451, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985) (when an issue falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact, the fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in question.). Other decisions in the 1980s and 1990s have added more illustrations that, by analogy, reinforce the conclusion we reach in this case about the role of the judge in judicial review. See, e.g., Thompson v. Keohane, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995) (habeas petitioner serving a sentence under a state conviction had confessed, during a two-hour tape-recorded session at the Alaska state trooper headquarters, to killing his former wife; federal district court denied his petition for habeas relief on the ground that the trooper had obtained his confession without giving Miranda warnings; the Ninth Circuit affirmed on the ground that the state court's ruling that the accused was not in custody for Miranda purposes was a fact determination as to which § 2254(d) establishes a presumption of correctness; this Court has classified as 'factual issues' within § 2254(d)'s compass questions extending beyond the determination of 'what happened' ; [t]his category notably includes: competence to stand trial; and juror impartiality; [w]hile these issues encompass more than 'basic, primary, or historical facts,' their resolution depends heavily on the trial court's appraisal of witness credibility and demeanor; [t]his Court has reasoned that a trial court is better positioned to make decisions of this genre, and has therefore accorded the judgment of the jurist-observer 'presumptive weight' ; even so, we independently review the state in-custody determination because [c]lassifying 'in custody' as a determination qualifying for independent review potentially may guide police, unify precedent, and stabilize the law); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501 n. 17, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1960 n. 17, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984) (A finding of fact in some cases is inseparable from the principles through which it was deduced. At some point, the reasoning by which a fact is 'found' crosses the line between application of those ordinary principles of logic and common experience which are ordinarily entrusted to the finder of fact into the realm of a legal rule upon which the reviewing court must exercise its own independent judgment.). See also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 920, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 1875, 131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, J., and Scalia, J.) (citing Bose and declaring: In certain areas, indeed, this Court apparently gives quite little deference to the initial factfinder, but rather 'exercise[s] its own independent judgment' about the factual conclusions that should be drawn from the record.).