Opinion ID: 1057944
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Unadjudicated Acts Arising from the

Text: Murder of Veronica Jefferson 26 Prieto further alleges that, even if it did not constitute victim impact testimony, the circuit court erred in admitting testimony of unadjudicated acts arising from Veronica Jefferson's murder. Specifically, Prieto argues (1) that if unadjudicated acts are to be admitted, they require a high threshold of reliability which is absent here, and (2) that due to the decades of time elapsed since the commission of the unadjudicated act, it is not indicative of future dangerousness as required by Virginia law. This Court has previously held evidence of unadjudicated acts to be admissible in sentencing as probative of future dangerousness. Stockton, 241 Va. at 209, 402 S.E.2d at 206. We have rejected Prieto's argument that evidence of an unadjudicated crime is not reliable. Beaver v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 521, 529, 352 S.E.2d 342, 347, cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1033 (1987). Indeed, we have said that  'a trier of fact called upon to decide whether . . . to impose the death penalty is entitled to know as much relevant information about the defendant as possible.'  Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364, 379, 402 S.E.2d 218, 227 (omission in original) (quoting Beaver, 232 Va. at 529, 352 S.E.2d at 347), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 834 (1991). We have also rejected the argument that such testimony is inherently prejudicial. Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 27 Va. 313, 346-47 & n.8, 356 S.E.2d 157, 175-76 & n.8, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 873 (1987). The Supreme Court of the United States has rejected the argument that specific prior unadjudicated acts must be established beyond a reasonable doubt to be admissible. See generally Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 n.7 (1988) ([T]he trial court neither weighs credibility nor makes a finding that the Government has proved the conditional fact by [even] a preponderance of the evidence. The court simply examines all the evidence in the case and decides whether the jury could reasonably find [that the prior act took place].). See also Pavlick v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 219, 227, 497 S.E.2d 920, 924 (1998) (holding that the Huddleston standard for proof that a prior bad act took place is in accord with Virginia law). With respect to the sentence phase of a capital murder trial, this Court has specifically rejected the argument that individual unadjudicated acts require an elevated degree of reliability, requiring only that the evidence on the whole must be sufficient to permit a jury to make the ultimate finding of future dangerousness or vileness beyond a reasonable doubt in order to impose the death penalty. Walker v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 64-66, 515 S.E.2d 565, 571-72 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1125 (2000). 28 Prieto argues that his due process rights were violated because the evidence of unadjudicated acts was not accompanied by evidence suggesting its predictive reliability. The Commonwealth did not provide expert testimony discussing the predictive nature of events occurring decades prior to trial. It does not appear that this Court has ever specifically addressed whether the Commonwealth bears a burden, in proving future dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt, to present expert witnesses to draw a nexus between past and future behavior. It is true that, in some previous capital cases, the Commonwealth provided this sort of nexus. In Beaver, for example, the prosecution presented an expert witness who testified that the defendant's psychological profile was a highly consistent profile reflecting personality traits of long duration. It is not likely to change much with time . . . . Treatment or rehabilitation programs tend not to be very successful for individuals with this profile type. 232 Va. at 532, 352 S.E.2d at 348-49 (emphasis omitted). On the other hand, neither this Court nor the Supreme Court of the United States has ever specifically required expert testimony providing this nexus, stating instead that the jury was entitled to as much information as possible in the sentencing phase so as to make an informed decision based on the 29 individual in question. Payne, 501 U.S. at 821. Thus, there is no support for the argument that the law places such a burden on the prosecution. Certainly, the defense had the opportunity to refute both the accuracy and the predictive nature of this 20year-old allegation. Prieto failed to do so at trial.