Opinion ID: 6336322
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: First Issue

Text: Turner first claims that “the petition should be read as a challenge to his present sentence to the extent that it has been enhanced by the allegedly invalid prior convictions.” Aplt. Br. at 6. He claims that his petition was not construed liberally and, if it had been read properly, “Petitioner would satisfy the ‘in custody’ requirement” as to grounds two and four of his petition, which pertain to the denial by the BOP of a nunc pro tunc designation as to Turner I. Id. Turner’s argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, a habeas petitioner does not remain “in custody” after a sentence expires, even if that sentence is used to enhance a subsequent sentence. See Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492. Turner was not “in custody” as to Turner I when the district court dismissed grounds two and four for 4 We also note that Turner makes novel arguments in his reply, such as an assertion that equitable tolling applies to his petition and arguments regarding the Administrative Procedures Act. Even assuming these arguments were properly before us, they are unpersuasive, and it is unclear how or why they are relevant to the issues on appeal. 5 Appellate Case: 21-6151 Document: 010110677612 Date Filed: 04/29/2022 Page: 6 lack of jurisdiction. Second, even construing this argument liberally, Turner has not explained how his prior sentences unlawfully extended his sentence in Turner II. We assume he believes that a nunc pro tunc designation in Turner I would somehow undermine the judgment in Turner II, but in Turner II, he received the applicable mandatory minimum for offenders with only one prior conviction for a serious drug conviction. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (amended 2010). Moreover, he explicitly acknowledged that he was facing such a mandatory minimum in Turner II, and it was “due to the government’s willingness to file only one of the defendant’s prior convictions.” Turner II, Doc. No. 1349 (Nov. 19, 2015). Accordingly, everyone including Turner agreed that his mandatory minimum sentence would be triggered by one, and only one, prior conviction. Whether his prior sentence on that conviction ran concurrently or consecutively with another conviction would not have affected his sentencing in Turner II.