Opinion ID: 150718
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Communications Act Claim.

Text: OneLink has another shot in its sling. It asserts that PRTC violated two FCC orders and that it (OneLink) may enforce these orders. It premises its assertion of standing on the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-615b. Specifically, it relies on section 401(b), which provides in pertinent part that [i]f any person fails or neglects to obey any order of the [FCC]... any party injured thereby ... may apply to the appropriate district court of the United States for the enforcement of such order. 47 U.S.C. § 401(b). OneLink's assertion of standing runs headlong into circuit precedent. We have held that section 401(b) may be used by aggrieved parties to enforce FCC orders that emanate from the Commission's adjudicatory process. See New Engl. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. PUC of Me., 742 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.1984) (Breyer, J.). We also have held, however, that section 401(b) may not be used by an aggrieved party to enforce FCC orders promulgated through the Commission's rulemaking process. [3] See id. OneLink does not dispute that both the 2007 Order and the 1991 Order are rulemaking orders rather than adjudicatory orders. Thus, under the dichotomy established in New England Telephone, OneLink lacks standing to enforce those orders. In an effort to parry this thrust, OneLink counters that New England Telephone was wrongly decided and invites us to overrule it. We decline the invitation. The law of the circuit rule is a subset of stare decisis. It is one of the building blocks on which the federal judicial system rests. Under the rule, newly constituted panels in a multi-panel circuit court are bound by prior panel decisions that are closely on point. See, e.g., United States v. Rodríguez-Vélez, 597 F.3d 32, 46 (1st Cir.2010); United States v. Wogan, 938 F.2d 1446, 1449 (1st Cir.1991). Although this rule is not immutable, Carpenters Local Union No. 26 v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 215 F.3d 136, 142 (1st Cir.2000), the exceptions are extremely narrow and their incidence is hen's-teeth-rare. Such exceptions come into play only when the holding of the prior panel is contradicted by controlling authority, subsequently announced (say, a decision of the authoring court en banc, a Supreme Court opinion directly on point, or a legislative overruling), United States v. Rodríguez, 527 F.3d 221, 225 (1st Cir. 2008), or in the rare instances in which authority that postdates the original decision, although not directly controlling, nevertheless offers a sound reason for believing that the former panel, in light of fresh developments, would change its collective mind, Williams v. Ashland Eng'g Co., 45 F.3d 588, 592 (1st Cir.1995). OneLink proffers a trilogy of Supreme Court decisions to support its plaint that New England Telephone should be relegated to the scrap heap. None of these decisions affords a principled basis for overruling New England Telephone. We can discard two of the decisions without ceremony; they predate New England Telephone, see Ambassador, Inc. v. United States, 325 U.S. 317, 321-22, 326, 65 S.Ct. 1151, 89 L.Ed. 1637 (1945), CBS v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 416-19, 62 S.Ct. 1194, 86 L.Ed. 1563 (1942), and thus give no traction to OneLink's plaint. [4] A previously decided caseat least a previously decided case not overlooked by the original panelcannot trigger an exception to the law of the circuit rule. The third Supreme Court opinion embraced by OneLink is more recent. In that case, however, the Court did not discuss what sort of orders are enforceable by a private party under section 401(b). Rather, the decision deals with the scope of a private right of action carved out of a different section of the Communications Act. See Global Crossing Telecomms., Inc. v. Metrophones Telecomms., Inc., 550 U.S. 45, 52-54, 127 S.Ct. 1513, 167 L.Ed.2d 422 (2007) (discussing 47 U.S.C. § 207). [5] Global Crossing is simply not on point. OneLink's argument against the stare decisis effect of New England Telephone has another dimension. It commends to our attention some lower court decisions that decline to follow New England Telephone. See, e.g., Alltel Tenn., Inc. v. Tenn. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 913 F.2d 305, 308 (6th Cir.1990); Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. PUC of Haw., 827 F.2d 1264, 1270-72 (9th Cir.1987). Under the law of the circuit rule, however, mere disagreement by a coequal court with a panel decision will not divest that opinion of its customary stare decisis effect within the circuit. See Williams, 45 F.3d at 592. That principle has especial force when the reasoning that underpins the conflicting decision or decisions was considered and expressly rejected in the challenged panel decision. That is the situation here. See New Engl. Tel. & Tel., 742 F.2d at 4-7. The law of the circuit rule promotes important virtues, including humility, stability, and predictability of outcomes within a judicial circuit. There is no sufficient reason to disregard it here. Consequently, we are bound by our earlier decision in New England Telephone. We therefore hold that OneLink lacks standing to enforce either of the two FCC rulemaking orders at issue here.