Opinion ID: 1058852
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: rejected penalty phase instructions

Text: Juniper contends the trial court erred by disallowing Juniper's proposed instructions in the penalty phase regarding depravity of mind, aggravated battery, and mitigating evidence. The three rejected instructions are: (Def.A) In deciding whether the Commonwealth has proven that the defendant's conduct was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved depravity of mind, you are instructed that depravity of mind is not proven by proof of an intentional killing. Rather, depravity of mind means a degree of moral turpitude and psychical debasement surpassing that inherent in the definition of ordinary malic[e] and premeditation. Ordinary malice is that state of mind which results in the intentional doing of a wrongful act to another without legal justification or excuse, at a time when the mind of the actor is under the control of reason. Ordinary premeditation is a specific intent to kill, adopted at some time before the killing, but which need not exist for any particular length of time. (Def.B) In deciding whether the Commonwealth has proven that the defendant's conduct was outrageously vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved an aggravated battery to the victim, you are instructed that an aggravated battery is not proven by proof of an intentional killing. Rather, an aggravated battery is a battery which, qualitatively and quantitatively, is more culpable than the minimum necessary to accomplish an act of murder. A battery is the actual infliction of corporal hurt on another. A battery which causes death is a murder, but that fact, standing alone, does not make the battery an aggravated battery. (Def. C) If you unanimously find that the Commonwealth has proved an aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, you must go on to consider mitigating evidence. Mitigating evidence is any fact or circumstance that, while it does not excuse or justify the offense, nonetheless in fairness and mercy may either extenuate or explain it or reduce the degree of the defendant's moral culpability such that he should not be sentenced to death. Certain factors, if they exist, are made mitigating by law. In this case, they are: 1. That the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity. 2. That the capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 3. At the time of the commission of the capital felony, the capacity of the Defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired. You must consider the evidence bearing on each of these factors. Each of you must then decide, individually, whether you find that the factor exists. If you, individually, find that any of these factors does exist, that factor is mitigating and you must consider it in deciding upon sentence. Other factors, if they exist, may be mitigating. You must consider all of the evidence offered in mitigation. Each of you must then decide, individually, whether the evidence establishes the existence of any other factor and whether that factor is mitigating. If you, individually, find that a factor exists and that it is mitigating, you must consider it in deciding sentence. In refusing the proposed instructions, the trial court stated, I think other instructions that are being given adequately cover the subject instructions. Juniper asserts that because each proposed instruction accurately states the law and substantially tracks either model jury instructions or instructions used in other cases, the trial court should have given his proposed instructions. He also contends that giving a jury instruction regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances without also instructing the jurors that the mitigating circumstances need not be unanimously found is unconstitutional. [22] The Commonwealth responds by asserting that the proposed instructions were cumulative and redundant of instructions given to the jury. Specifically, the Commonwealth notes the substantially similar, and in cases identical, text in the following instructions given by the trial court: (1) Depravity of Mind means a degree of moral turpitude and psychical debasement surpassing that inherent in the definition of ordinary legal malice and premeditation. (2) An aggravated battery is a battery which, qualitatively and quantitatively, is more culpable than the minimum necessary to accomplish an act of murder. (3) If you find that the Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of an aggravating circumstance, in determining the appropriate punishment, you should consider any evidence presented of circumstances which do not justify or excuse the offense but which in fairness or mercy may extenuate or reduce the degree of moral culpability and punishment. To the degree that the proposed instructions differed from those actually given, the Commonwealth argues that the proposed instructions would have impermissibly confused or misled the jury, suggested a particular response from the jury, or provided an incorrect statement of the law. Def. A, the proposed instruction on depravity of mind, for example, included instructions on malice and premeditation, which are not relevant for consideration in the sentencing phase of the trial. Similarly, Def. B, the proposed instruction on aggravated battery, suggest[ed] resolution of the question in [Juniper's] favor. As to proposed instruction Def. C, the Commonwealth argued this would mislead the jury because it suggested the listed mitigating factors had been determined to exist by the trial judge, which was not the case. After comparing the proposed instructions to those actually given, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing Juniper's proposed instructions. The language relevant and appropriate to Juniper's case was fully and fairly covered by the instructions given to the jury. Instruction Def. A regarding malice and premeditation was superfluous and potentially confusing to the jury at the penalty stage because those factors are only at issue during the guilt phase of the trial. The depravity of mind instruction that was given contained sufficient information for the jurors to understand that term. Similarly, the jury was adequately instructed on what constitutes aggravated battery. The additional information contained in the proposed instruction Def. B was unnecessary and suggestive. With regard to Juniper's proposed instruction Def. C, we agree with the Commonwealth that the wording of the instruction would have misled the jury as to the existence of the listed mitigating factors because it implied that such factors had been established. That determination was the responsibility of the jury. Furthermore, we have previously rejected the argument that the jury should have been instructed its finding of mitigating factors need not be unanimous as being unnecessary and confusing. Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201, 212, 257 S.E.2d 784, 791 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1049, 100 S.Ct. 741, 62 L.Ed.2d 736 (1980). Since only by unanimous agreement can the death penalty be inflicted, a disagreement by one or more of the jurors as to the proper sentence would, by statute, result in life imprisonment. Code § 19.2-264.4(E). Id. The differences between aggravating and mitigating factors, and their role in determining a sentence of death versus imprisonment for life, were sufficiently covered by the instructions given to the jurors by the trial court. Our previous decisions reflect that even if jury instructions contain accurate statements of law, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by refusing the instruction if it is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case, Hatcher, 218 Va. at 813-14, 241 S.E.2d at 758, or if it would have created confusion and would have been misleading. Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 1, 15, 413 S.E.2d 875, 883 (1992). Nor does a trial court abuse its discretion by refusing a relevant instruction if the granted instructions fully and fairly cover the same legal principle. Stockton, 227 Va. at 145, 314 S.E.2d at 384. The trial court thus did not err in refusing Juniper's proposed instructions.