Opinion ID: 218483
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Record on State Court Collateral Review

Text: Our examination of the record reveals that Mr. Medicine Blanket did not pursue his due process claims through one complete round of the state’s appellate process. Although he raised his due process claims in his Rule 35(c) motion to the state district court, his brief to the CCA abandoned them in favor of three Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Mr. Medicine Blanket -5- suggests the first of these ineffectiveness claims adequately raised the due process issues. We disagree. That claim was presented to the CCA as a straight-forward ineffective assistance of counsel issue: “The District Court Erred in Holding that Trial Defense Counsel was not Ineffective for Failing to Raise the Issue of the District Court’s Jurisdiction Over the Defendant.” R. Vol. 1 at 139. After setting forth the applicable Sixth Amendment standard established by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), Mr. Medicine Blanket explicitly argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to contest the trial court’s jurisdiction. Mr. Medicine Blanket’s state appellate court brief focused on his Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance claim and did not raise his due process claims. Although his arrest and extradition serve as the basis for both claims, ineffective assistance and due process are analytically distinct. Cf. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374-75 (1986) (explaining that Fourth and Sixth Amendment claims are “distinct, both in nature and in the requisite elements of proof”). Mr. Medicine Blanket recognized the distinct nature of his claims when he raised them as separate constitutional violations in his Rule 35(c) motion. We cannot overlook the abandonment of Mr. Medicine Blanket’s due process claims even if they share a similar factual predicate with his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366 (stating that “mere similarity of claims is insufficient to exhaust”). -6- Moreover, it is not “enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state courts.” Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (per curiam). The CCA was not obligated to infer a due process claim from Mr. Medicine Blanket’s brief when the brief did not raise the issue. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 32 (“[O]rdinarily a state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must read beyond a petition or brief.”). Mr. Medicine Blanket asserts his due process claims were exhausted when the CCA addressed his extradition and arrest. See Aplt. Br. at 14. Again, we disagree. The CCA discussed the arrest and extradition solely to determine whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction. Indeed, after detailing the controlling Sixth Amendment standards, the CCA stated it was evaluating whether “trial counsel’s failure to challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction” constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Aplt. App. at 209. The CCA concluded that “trial counsel’s decision not to challenge the [trial] court’s jurisdiction [based on the extradition process] . . . was not below an objective standard of professional conduct.” Id. at 211. The court reasoned that Colorado law rendered “such a challenge [to the trial court’s jurisdiction] unlikely to succeed, despite [Mr. Medicine Blanket’s] allegations that his arrest and extradition were defective.” Id. (emphasis added). The CCA’s Sixth Amendment analysis of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim did not address or resolve the merits of any alleged due process issue. We conclude that Mr. Medicine -7- Blanket did not advance his due process claims through one complete round of Colorado’s appellate process. B. Mr. Medicine Blanket’s Missing Transcript Argument Mr. Medicine Blanket suggests another reason his due process claims were exhausted. By way of two pro se motions recently filed in this court, Mr. Medicine Blanket requests, among other things, to supplement the record with a missing portion of the transcript from his July 26, 2005, Rule 35(c) hearing. 2 He posits that this portion of the transcript will demonstrate he did exhaust his due process claims. If nothing else, Mr. Medicine Blanket claims, he was entitled to a hearing in the federal district court on the matter. We reject this theory for three reasons. First, there is no missing portion of the transcript. Mr. Medicine Blanket previously requested and received the complete Rule 35(c) transcript and admitted he erred in his recollection of the verbal exchange he believed to be missing. Indeed, although he had been granted a hearing by the CCA to reconstruct the record of the July 26, 2005, hearing, Mr. Medicine Blanket successfully moved to 2 The first motion, dated March 26, 2011, is entitled: “Motion for Leave to Supplement the Record on Appeal Pending Review and to Raise Claim of Justifiable Excuse.” The second motion is dated April 13, 2011, and is captioned, “Motion for Leave to Fire Counsel and For Permission to Proceed Pro Se and to Supplement the Record on Appeal Pending Review and to Raise Claim of Justifiable Excuse.” -8- vacate the new hearing, acknowledging that “nobody remember[ed] the sequence of events on [July 26] the way he remember[ed] it, and . . . even if he remembered it correctly, any correction to the transcript . . . would have little, if any, impact on his appeal.” R. Vol. 2, Disc 1 (State Trial R. at 785-86). Second, we also reject this argument because the issue was already resolved in the state courts; consequently, a federal hearing is unnecessary. See Dever, 36 F.3d at 1535-36. And third, even if there were a missing portion of the transcript, and even if that portion showed that Mr. Medicine Blanket raised his due process claims in the state post-conviction district court, that would not add anything to the showing he has already made. The issue now is whether he pursued the due process claims through the state’s remaining appellate process, which, we conclude, he has not. C. Procedural Default The Supreme Court has held that habeas claims are procedurally defaulted if the state court to which an applicant would be required to present his unexhausted claims would conclude the claims are procedurally barred. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1. Colorado law precludes Mr. Medicine Blanket from raising his due process claims again in state court. See Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII) (“The court shall deny any claim that could have been presented in an appeal previously brought or postconviction proceeding previously brought. . . .”). Accordingly, these claims are procedurally defaulted. -9- Mr. Medicine Blanket can overcome procedural default by showing cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Smith v. Workman, 550 F.3d 1258, 1274 (10th Cir. 2008). To show cause, he must demonstrate that “some objective factor external to the defense impeded [his] efforts to comply” with state law. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). To show prejudice, Mr. Medicine Blanket must demonstrate that he suffered “actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. A fundamental miscarriage of justice provides only “a narrow exception to the cause requirement where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent of the substantive offense.” Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393 (2004) (quotations omitted). Because Mr. Medicine Blanket makes no attempt to show cause or prejudice, and does not assert his innocence, the district court was correct to dismiss his claims with prejudice.