Opinion ID: 422085
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Is Knights' Claim Barred from Habeas Corpus Review?

Text: 12 Knights argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right, through the Fourteenth Amendment, to be confronted by witnesses against him by the trial judge's refusal to recuse himself from presiding over Knights' motion for a new trial. The basis of the motion was a conversation in chambers during the course of the trial between the trial judge and a witness for the prosecution, Jake Davis. The motion for a substitution of judges was not made, however, until after the court had heard and denied the motion for a new trial. 13 As the Illinois Appellate Court noted in People v. Veal, supra, Knights and his co-defendant filed a lengthy motion for a new trial, followed by extended hearings. At trial the prosecution had presented the testimony of minor twins Jake and Jerry Davis, who testified to alleged incriminatory statements made by Knights. At the hearings on the motion for a new trial the Davis twins and another witness recanted their trial testimony implicating the defendants. They testified further that the State had used force and threats to make them testify against the defendants and that the assistant State's attorneys and some of the police officers knew that their testimony at trial and before the grand jury was false. 16 Ill.Dec. at 205, 374 N.E.2d at 980. At the conclusion of the post trial hearings, the trial court made lengthy findings of fact, finding that the recantations were not credible and that their testimony at trial had been corroborated by other evidence and other witnesses. Id. 16 Ill.Dec. at 206, 374 N.E.2d at 981. 1 14 After Jake had testified at trial he requested to speak with the judge. The judge took him into chambers with a court reporter and deputy sheriff. Counsel were excluded. No objection was made by counsel. Jake indicated to the judge that he wanted to go home with his mother. The judge sent the bailiff to find Mrs. Davis. He then told the reporter to go off the record. When Mrs. Davis arrived, the reporter was instructed to go on the record again. As the court noted in People v. Veal, supra, Jake testified at the post trial hearing that during the time designated as off the record he told the judge that the prosecutor had made him lie about defendants Knights and Veal being the killers: 15 'The Judge wouldn't let the court reporter take the part down when I was telling him how the State's Attorney and police had made me get on the stand and say this, that it was lying.' 16 Jake further testified that he told the judge that the assistant State's attorneys and the police had threatened him and his mother if he didn't testify, but he did not explain what the threats were. 16 Ill.Dec. at 213, 374 N.E.2d at 988. The court made a finding that the alleged off the record comments did not occur. Id. 16 Ill.Dec. at 214, 374 N.E.2d at 989. 17 The court in People v. Veal noted further that defense counsel knew that the question of what occurred off the record would be an issue from as early as the cross-examination of Davis during the recantation hearing, but not until weeks later, and after the court had denied the motion for a new trial .... did the defense move for substitution of judges. Accordingly the court held the motions were not timely made, saying in part: 18 [I]t is a well-settled rule that a petition for change of venue after the court has ruled on any matter going to the merits of the case comes too late. (People v. Myers (1966), 35 Ill.2d 311, 326, 220 N.E.2d 297, 307....) This rule is followed even where the petition alleges actual prejudice and that the prejudice was not known until after the ruling on an issue. (People v. Norcutt (1970), 44 Ill.2d 256, 255 N.E.2d 442.) Here, where the motion was made only after the court had ruled on the very issue the motion attacked, it came too late. 19 16 Ill.Dec. at 214, 374 N.E.2d at 989. 20 In Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), the defendant had failed to make a timely objection under the Florida contemporary objection rule to the admission of his inculpatory statements and had thereby waived his right to challenge their admissibility in State court in post conviction motions. The Court held that absent a showing of cause for noncompliance and actual prejudice he was also barred from federal habeas corpus review of his Miranda claim. The recent case of Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1572, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982) reaffirmed the holding that any prisoner bringing a constitutional claim to the federal courthouse after a state procedural default must demonstrate cause and actual prejudice before obtaining relief. See also United States ex rel. Veal v. De Robertis, 693 F.2d 642 (7 Cir.1982) and United States ex rel. Spurlark v. Wolff, 699 F.2d 354 (7 Cir.1983, on rehearing en banc). 21 The Illinois Court has clearly held that Knights' claim of error in the trial judge's declining to recuse himself was waived and barred because it came too late. His petition for habeas corpus review is likewise barred in the absence of cause and actual prejudice. There is no showing of cause. Knights and his counsel knew that the off the record conversation would be an issue when Jake Davis was cross-examined at the hearing on the motion for new trial, but did not file the motion for substitution of judges until several weeks later after the issue had been decided. Nor do we find any evidence of actual prejudice. The district court noted that this issue was analyzed in depth by the state appellate court, which concluded that no constitutional right has been violated. The district court adopted the state court's finding that the error, if any, of relying on information obtained during an in chambers discussion with a witness following his testimony is harmless, particularly since the defense counsel knew of the off-the-record inquiry but did not object until after denial of a new trial. People v. Veal, 58 Ill.App.3d 938, 972-975, 16 Ill.Dec. 188, 213-215, 374 N.E.2d 963, 988-990 (1978). We agree. 22