Opinion ID: 2326611
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Hearsay Statements of the Detective

Text: In 1995, when she was sixteen years old, Mary reported an incident in which she alleged that John, then fourteen years old, had sexually assaulted her. The defendant argues that the trial justice committed reversible error by permitting a Warwick police officer to testify that in March 1995 John stated to her, in the presence of his father, that he in fact did have consensual sexual contact with Mary. The trial justice admitted the hearsay statement under Rule 804(b)(3) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence as a statement against the declarant's penal interest. On appeal, defendant faults the trial justice's ruling for several reasons which, he asserts, militate against the trustworthiness of the hearsay statements. Also, in a citation of supplemental authorities submitted after oral argument pursuant to Article I, Rule 16(e) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure, and supporting memorandum, he asserts that the admission of the statement violated his right to confront the witnesses against him as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The exclusion or admission of any evidence relating to sexual contact between Mary and John was also a subject of the parties' motions in limine. The trial justice and counsel for both parties engaged in a fairly extensive discussion concerning the rape shield statute, and primarily the applicability of Oliveira, to Mary's allegations of assault by John. After much discussion concerning whether the sexual contact was consensual or the result of a forcible assault, the trial justice concluded the hearing on the motion by ruling as follows: So the ruling then is that I'll hold a hearing out of the hearing of the jury on the [John] incident to, first of all, see whether or not there is any allegation of sexual assault. If there is no allegation of sexual assault and it becomes consensual, then I won't permit it. If, however, I'm satisfied that the allegations were of sexual assault, then I will hear whatever the State wants to show that they were true, that they were, in other words, true. If there's anything that would tend to show that they're not true, I'll consider that. The incident with John was indeed raised by defendant during his cross-examination of Mary. Outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor represented that he was prepared to prove that Mary's allegations against John were true. Then in a voir dire examination, Mary testified that John touched her against her will, and penetrated her with his penis vaginally, orally, and attempted to penetrate her anally. Without permitting any additional witnesses or further argument from the state, the trial justice ruled that defendant would be permitted to question Mary about John in front of the jury. Following Mary's testimony, the next witness called by the state was Sgt. Kerri Holsten of the Warwick Police Department. In the absence of the jury, the prosecutor said that the witness was being offered to show when Mary said he did these things to her, there was proof that it happened. He further explained that Sgt. Holsten would testify that John admitted to having sex with Mary. John's statements were admissible, the prosecutor argued, as statements against his penal interest. Because there had been no showing that John was unavailable as a witness, as is required by Rule 804(b)(3), however, Sgt. Holsten was excused, subject to recall. The parties later stipulated to John's unavailability, and Sgt. Holsten was recalled as a witness. Over defendant's hearsay objection, she testified that John initially denied that he even knew Mary. He later acknowledged that he did know her, and finally admitted to having sexual intercourse with her. He said he fondled her, penetrated her vaginally and tried to penetrate her anally, but was unsuccessful. The incident occurred, he said, on a large rock in a wooded area near a school. On cross-examination, Sgt. Holsten testified that after making an oral statement, John started to make a written statement, but was interrupted by his father, and never completed it. The statement that John wrote admitted that he had been smoking pot and fondled Mary, but ended with the following sentence: We were on the rock and we were kissing and nothing happened. Notwithstanding, the state's strenuous objection that this written statement was not against the declarant's penal interest, the trial justice admitted the statement as a full exhibit because it was being offered as direct contradiction of [Sgt. Holsten's] testimony. Rule 804(b)(3) provides in pertinent part:  Statement Against Interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless the declarant believed it to be true. In his brief, defendant argues that in light of John's written denial that sexual intercourse occurred at all and his assertion that the sexual contact that did occur was consensual, the oral statement he gave to Sgt. Holsten was not `so far contrary to [his]    criminal liability' that it could [be] said that he believed his oral statement to the detective. He further suggests that there is not a substantial likelihood that a reasonable person in John's position would believe the oral statements attributed to him by Sgt. Holsten. Further, he asserts that the trial justice failed to consider properly John's age, the lack of corroborating evidence, the small likelihood that he would be sent to the Training School, and the fact that the true penal authority present when he made the statements was not the police, but his father. He also contends that the trial justice erroneously found that John had been given his Miranda rights. We first note that the probability that a fourteen-year-old juvenile would be subject to criminal liability is, indeed, remote, although, given the possible allegations of force or coercion and the mental disability of the victim, not entirely out of the realm of possibility in the event that the Family Court were to waive jurisdiction. A delinquency proceeding, however, is one of civil, as opposed to one of criminal, nature. In the Matter of a Child under Eighteen (18) Years of Age, 730 A.2d 28, 29 (R.I.1999) (mem.) (quoting In re John D., 479 A.2d 1173, 1176 (R.I.1984)). Also, as the trial justice perceptively observed, the statements may also be against an economic interest because the declarant doesn't know whether his subject is pregnant or not. The admission of a statement under an exception to the hearsay rule is within the sound discretion of the trial justice and shall not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. See State v. Torres, 787 A.2d 1214, 1222 (R.I.2002) (admissibility of an excited utterance clearly within the trial justice's discretion and will not be overturned unless there is an abuse of that discretion); Estate of Sweeney v. Charpentier, 675 A.2d 824, 827 (R.I.1996) (admissibility of the residual exception to the hearsay rule clearly within the discretion of the trial justice and will not be overturned unless there was an abuse of that discretion resulting in prejudice). The focus of our inquiry must be on whether the statements so far tended to subject John to civil or criminal liability that a reasonable person in his position would not have made them unless he believed them to be true. The rationale for this exception is that people are not likely to make statements that are damaging to themselves unless they believe them to be true. Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 804(b)(3). Here, there are factors that weigh on both sides of the issue. The conversation took place at the Warwick police station in the presence of his father pursuant to an investigation of an alleged sexual assault. Although there was no direct evidence that he had been given the Miranda warnings, the prosecutor made such a representation to the Court. Further, the sexual activities to which he admitted in the hearsay statements, even if consensual, would arguably subject him to liability for sexual penetration with a mentally-disabled individual under G.L.1956 § 11-37-2, as well as for sodomy, under the then-existing version of G.L.1956 § 11-10-1. [5] Finally, as the trial justice noted, the statements were contrary to his pecuniary interest in the event that Mary became pregnant as a result of their sexual encounter. On the other hand, it is not clear from the record that a reasonable fourteen-year-old, under investigation for an alleged sexual assault, would be mindful of the possibility that Mary might have had a mental disability sufficient to transform an act of consensual sex into a sexual assault. It is perhaps more likely that John's motive in admitting to having consensual sexual relations with Mary was to avoid penal liability, or at least to obtain more favorable treatment from the authorities. Such self-serving statements generally lack the trustworthiness that underlies the rule. The test is not whether a declarant's statement could have subjected him to civil or criminal liability; rather it is whether the statement was sufficiently against the declarant's interest that a reasonable person in declarant's position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 603-04, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994). Rule 804(b)(3) is founded on the commonsense motion that reasonable people, even reasonable people who are not especially honest, tend not to make self-inculpatory statements unless they believe them to be true. Id. at 599, 114 S.Ct. 2431. In light of the circumstances of this case, we are not satisfied that a reasonable fourteen-year-old would be aware that his statements acknowledging consensual sexual contact with Mary could also subject him to penal liability, or that he might incur any financial responsibility as a result thereof. Accordingly, we are unable to conclude that John's oral statements to Sgt. Holsten were so far contrary to his interest as to be admissible under Rule 804(b)(3). We are satisfied, however, that their admission was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant does not identify any prejudice from the admission of these statements. In fact, it was defendant who first introduced to the jury, over the state's objection, evidence of Mary's sexual encounter with John during his cross-examination of Mary. He advanced three reasons to support his contention that evidence of the previous encounter between Mary and John was relevant. First, he argued, it established the fact that Mary spoke to the police during the same period when she alleged that defendant was abusing her, and yet she failed to make a complaint against him. Secondly, he asserted that it demonstrated her prior knowledge of the same exact [sexual] acts that took place in this case. And, thirdly, he maintained that it was admissible to challenge effectively her credibility. Rather than undermining these assertions, however, the admission of John's hearsay statements arguably buttressed them. Sergeant Holsten's testimony clearly demonstrated that there was a continuing police investigation supporting defendant's claim that Mary had an opportunity to file a complaint against her father. John's admission of sexual relations with Mary supported defendant's contention that she had other sources of sexual knowledge. Further, by asserting that the relations were consensual, his statements contradicted Mary's allegations that they were forcible. After reviewing the record, we are satisfied that the admission of John's statements to Sgt. Holsten was harmless error. We next turn to defendant's argument that the admission of John's hearsay statements violated the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides that, `[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right    to be confronted with the witnesses against him.' Crawford v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1359, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) (quoting U.S. Const. Amend. VI). This issue was not raised at trial, and indeed was first raised in defendant's post-oral argument citation to supplemental authorities. The defendant cites the recent Supreme Court opinion of Crawford for the proposition that testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial are admissible only when the declarant is unavailable, and only when the defendant has had a previous opportunity to cross-examine. The express effect of Crawford is to overrule the rationale of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) that an unavailable witness's statement against a criminal defendant is admissible if the statement bears adequate `indicia of reliability.' Crawford, ___ U.S. at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 1355 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531). Such a test is satisfied if the statement falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or bears particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Id. Generally, this Court will not consider questions that are not properly presented in the court below. See State v. Burke, 522 A.2d 725, 731 (R.I.1987). Under certain circumstances, however, this Court will review issues implicating basic constitutional rights. These circumstances are: First, the error complained of must consist of more than harmless error. Second, the record must be sufficient to permit a determination of the issue.    Third, counsel's failure to raise the issue at trial must be due to the fact that the issue is based upon a novel rule of law of which counsel could not reasonably have known at the time of trial. State v. Ramsey, 844 A.2d 715, 719 (R.I.2004) (quoting State v. Smith, 766 A.2d 913, 919 (R.I.2001)). Because we conclude that the error was harmless, however, we need not address the Crawford issue within the context of this case.