Opinion ID: 2620296
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ADA and PHRA Claims

Text: We analyze ADA and PHRA disability claims under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Shaner v. Synthes, 204 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 2000). This framework requires that a plaintiff first establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination. See Shaner, 204 F.3d at 500. To do so, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he has a “disability” within the meaning of the ADA, that he is a “qualified individual,” and that he “has suffered an adverse 1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1367, and this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 3 employment action because of that disability.” Turner v. Hershey Chocolate U.S., 440 F.3d 604, 611 (3d Cir. 2006). If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse employment action. Shaner, 204 F.3d at 500. If the defendant meets this requirement, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the legitimate non-discriminatory reason is a pretext for discrimination. Id. Unless the plaintiff can point “to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder” could find that the articulated legitimate reasons were pretextual, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment. See Jones v. School Dist of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 413 (3d Cir. 1999). Although the District Court held that Ostrowski failed to meet his burden to rebut Con-way’s articulated, nondiscriminatory reason, Con-way invites us to affirm on the alternative ground that Ostrowski did not produce sufficient evidence to establish that he suffered from a “disability” as that term is defined by the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Con-way’s argument relies almost exclusively on cases that apply a definition of “disability” that was amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008. See Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4, 122 Stat. 3553, 3555–56 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102). With these amendments, Congress directed courts to interpret the term “disability” broadly “to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A). Drawing all reasonable inferences in Ostrowski’s favor as we are required to do for purposes of summary judgment, Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution LLC, 716 4 F.3d 764, 772 (3d Cir. 2013), we agree with the District Court that Ostrowski’s deposition testimony and record of treatment for alcoholism is sufficient to create a factual dispute precluding summary judgment. We therefore decline to affirm on this basis. We instead affirm for much the same reason articulated by the District Court: that Ostrowski failed to submit any evidence to show that Con-way used his violation of the RWA as a pretext for disability discrimination. Ostrowski argues that the District Court erred in determining that the RWA could serve as a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Con-way to terminate Ostrowski’s employment because the RWA was itself violative of the ADA’s prohibition of “qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6). This argument fails for several reasons. As numerous courts have recognized, employers do not violate the ADA merely by entering into return-to-work agreements that impose employment conditions different from those of other employees. See, e.g., Longen v. Waterous Co., 347 F.3d 685, 689 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing cases). Indeed, several of our sister circuits have explicitly endorsed agreements that bar an employee from consuming alcohol—whether at the workplace or otherwise—in circumstances highly similar to this case. See id.; Mararri v. WCI Steel, Inc., 130 F.3d 1180 (6th Cir. 1997). We find the reasoning of these cases convincing. Although Ostrowski was subject to different standards than other Con-way employees who did not sign an RWA, this difference results from the terms of his 5 agreement rather than disability discrimination. Mararri, 130 F.3d at 1182; see also Longen, 347 F.3d at 689. In addition, Ostrowski does not explain how the RWA, to which he voluntarily agreed, tends to discriminate against him because of his alleged disability (alcoholism) as opposed to regulating his conduct (drinking alcohol). To the contrary, the RWA does not restrict the ability of individuals who suffer from alcoholism to work at Con-way. Rather, it simply prohibits employees subject to its terms from consuming alcohol. Because the RWA was not invalid under the ADA, Ostrowski’s violation of its terms was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Con-way to terminate Ostrowski’s employment. As the District Court noted, Ostrowski has submitted no evidence that the breach of the RWA was a mere pretext for disability discrimination. As a result, the District Court was correct in granting summary judgment on these claims.