Opinion ID: 75882
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Discovery Phase

Text: 3 During the ensuing discovery period, several bitter disputes arose between Munson and counsel for Tenneco (opposing counsel). One point of contention concerned whether opposing counsel was conducting himself appropriately in deposing Thomas and the plaintiff witnesses. For instance, Thomas originally was deposed on 15 April 1999, but Munson cut short the deposition and postponed any future questioning based on her assertion that opposing counsel was abusive towards her client. 2 At the continuation of the deposition on 4 May 1999, Munson again raised the issue of opposing counsel's conduct, and she objected several times to what she considered the insulting and argumentative tone of his questioning. Yet, at no time during the dispute over how opposing counsel deposed Thomas, and at no time during the disputes over opposing counsel's questioning of other deponents, did Munson seek a protective order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). 3 4 Munson and opposing counsel also were embroiled in a discovery dispute over the production of certain Tenneco personnel records and the scheduling of several depositions. Specifically, the two attorneys argued over the production of personnel records of several non-party Tenneco employees who were promoted to supervisory positions in lieu of Thomas. Opposing counsel for Tenneco refused to hand over the records until a confidentiality protective order was in effect. In addition, Munson and opposing counsel fought over the deposition schedule for six witnesses, all of whom were either current or past Tenneco employees. In response to motions filed as a result of these disputes, the district court, among other things, granted Tenneco's motion for a confidentiality protective order concerning the personnel records and instituted a schedule for conducting the depositions of the six witnesses. 5 Munson challenged the district court order by filing a petition for a writ of mandamus with our court. In the petition, Munson referred to opposing counsel's law firm as [t]he white[ ] law firm, R2-59-3, and she described the entire discovery dispute over the production of documents and scheduling of witnesses in racial terms. Concerning the deposition schedule instituted by the district court, Munson alleged that [t]he white[ ] law firm representing the defendant-employer ... was permitted to set defendant's deposition schedules without any interference from the court or plaintiff's African-American counsel (a civil rights attorney). Id. That is, Munson maintained that unusual deposition schedules [were] forced upon the African-American plaintiff while the white law firm set its own schedule and [proceeded] at its own pace. Id. at 6-7. 6 In addition, Munson inserted into the mandamus petition derogatory remarks about the Middle District of Georgia in general, and about the district judge hearing the case in particular, in order to suggest that racial bias permeated the discovery order. For example, in one footnote, Munson stated that civil rights attorneys outside of this jurisdiction have knowledge of the reputation of the Middle District and are not desirous of appearing in that forum. Id. at 2 n. 1. Later she remarked: Although a motion for recusal was considered, such did not appear to be a viable alternative given plaintiff's counsel's prior experiences in the Middle District of Georgia. Id. at 5 n. 2. Munson further contended in the petition that the tone of the district judge towards her was extremely and unusually hostile and combative during one telephone conference. Id. She speculated that [s]uch seeming[ ] resentment could be the result of the court having to rule for the plaintiff [on a separate issue] when it did not want to do so, again insinuating that the district judge was biased against her and her client. Id. Concluding that all of these allegations were without merit, we denied the petition for writ of mandamus. See In re Thomas, No. 99-11656 (June 15, 1999). 7