Opinion ID: 1682002
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: indefiniteness of the agreement

Text: Even if mutuality could be inferred from the separate events of March 16 and March 30, 1986, the resulting contract would not be enforceable. It is undisputed that the union membership committed itself to take care of the discharged employees and that it did so for almost two years at considerable expense to the individual members. However, not every statement of intent of the kind made by the union in this case will rise to the level of an enforceable agreement. See, e.g., Soar v. National Football League Players' Ass'n, 550 F.2d 1287 (1st Cir.1977), in which the court declined to enforce an oral promise by the NFL Commissioner that retroactive benefits would be provided to retired NFL players who were not covered under a recently approved pension plan. As the court noted in Soar : It is fundamental that for a contract to be enforceable, it must be of sufficient explicitness so that a court can perceive what are the respective obligations of the parties. Applying this principle to the present case, we are convinced that ... the alleged oral contract was too indefinite to be enforced even it if fulfilled the other conditions of a valid contract... . [A]ny agreement which leaves unanswered such critical questions [as this one does] cannot by any reasonable stretch of the imagination be said to represent a real meeting of the minds. 550 F.2d at 1290 (citations omitted). Likewise, in Laseter v. Pet Dairy Products Co., 246 F.2d 747, 748 (4th Cir.1957), the court declined to enforce an employer's assurance to an injured employee that the company was going to take care of him. The plant manager for the defendant company told the worker that he would be given light work once he was physically able to do it, but no specific job was mentioned and there was no discussion of pay, hours, or duration of employment. The court concluded that the claimed contract of employment was too indefinite to be enforced and ordered dismissal of the action. Id. at 750. See also Cotton v. Roberts' Estate, 47 Tenn. App. 277, 337 S.W.2d 776 (1960) (oral statement by decedent that she would see that plaintiff was taken care of in her will held too ambiguous, vague, and indefinite to be enforceable); Scott v. Grinnell, 102 N.H. 490, 161 A.2d 179 (1960) (promise to leave plaintiff sufficient money to support her in style to which plaintiff was accustomed held too vague); Saunder v. Baryshnikov, 110 A.D.2d 511, 487 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1 Dept. 1985) (private secretary's claim against her employer on alleged oral promise to take care of the secretary and her financial needs for life too vague to be enforced). Hence, even if the parties in this case thought they had an understanding, their agreement would not be legally enforceable unless the court could discern what the agreement was. As provided in the Restatement 2d of Contracts § 33(1), [e]ven though a manifestation of intention is intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably certain. Moreover, those terms cannot be deemed reasonably certain unless they provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy. Id. at § 33(2). In this case, the record shows that the parties intended that the plaintiffs would be taken care of through payments funded by a union check-off. But assuming the existence of a valid consideration for this benefit, there is no way for us to determine the essential details of that commitment. How long, for example, were the payments to continue? Were they to increase as the wages of the regular workers increased? When and under what circumstances might they be terminated? Certainly, the law does not favor perpetual contracts. In re Miller, 90 N.J. 210, 218, 447 A.2d 549, 553-54 (1982) (perpetual contract performance to be avoided unless there is a clear manifestation that the parties intended it, citing 1 Williston § 38 (3d ed 1957); 3 Corbin on Contracts § 553 (1960)). At the same time, the modern view is that indefiniteness in non-essential terms ought not to defeat the reasonable expectations of the parties. 1 Corbin on Contracts § 95 Supp. p. 223 (1963, Supp. 1990). Thus, faced with a contractual deficiency as to length of performance, some courts would impose a reasonable period of duration. See, e.g., Stark v. Shaw, 155 Cal. App.2d 171, 317 P.2d 182 (1957). Others would nevertheless hold to the traditional view that in the absence of an explicit agreement as to date of termination, the contract is terminable at will by either party. See, e.g., First Flight Assoc., Inc., v. Professional Golf Co., Inc., 527 F.2d 931 (6th Cir.1975). Still others would say that it is terminable upon reasonable notice. See, e.g., McGinnis Piano & Organ Co. v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 480 F.2d 474 (8th Cir.1973). But even if we were to find the existence of a valid contract and impose our notion of reasonable duration on the union's obligation to perform, rather than strike down the agreement as too indefinite to be enforced, we could not uphold the decision of the Court of Appeals. Obligating the union membership to make payments until the last plaintiff reaches age 62, a period that might stretch over decades, is clearly not reasonable under the circumstances.