Opinion ID: 729705
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Obstruction of Justice and Upward Departure

Text: 66 The district court increased Ismoila's total offense level by four levels--two for obstruction of Justice under 3C1.1 and two by upward departure under 5K2.0--because Ismoila and his wife hid a co-defendant, Grace Eyikogbe, during trial and because Ismoila advised Eyikogbe to flee. Ismoila asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the two-level obstruction of Justice enhancement, and departing upward by two additional levels was error, because his conduct was not substantially in excess of that which is ordinarily involved in the offense and because the Guidelines already take such conduct into account. We disagree.
67 We review for clear error. United States v. Storm, 36 F.3d 1289, 1295 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 131 L. Ed. 2d 725, 115 S. Ct. 1798 (1995). 68 The Government presented evidence that Ismoila and his wife, Tayo Ismail, hid Grace Eyikogbe at their home while Ismoila was in jail during the trial. After the trial, FBI agents found Eyikogbe and Ismail hiding in the attic of Ismoila's house, and Ismail was subsequently charged with harboring a fugitive. As part of Tayo Ismail's plea agreement, the Government questioned her under oath and presented this testimony at Ismoila's sentencing hearing. Ismail testified that when Ismoila called her at home from jail, she told him that Eyikogbe was present at Ismoila's home. Ismail further stated that Ismoila told her to place Eyikogbe into a motel because he could be criminally charged for having Eyikogbe at his house. Ismail's testimony was bolstered by telephone records produced by the Government confirming that Ismoila had indeed called home while he was in jail. Ismoila contends that it is hardly unusual for a person who is jailed to call home and that his wife's testimony does not establish that he obstructed Justice, only that he knew that Eyikogbe was present at his home. 69 The district court properly enhanced Ismoila's sentence. The PSR concluded, and the evidence at the sentencing hearing shows, that Ismoila knew that his co-defendant, a fugitive, was present in his home during the trial. This evidence is certainly enough to support a two-level enhancement for obstruction of Justice.
70 In addition to the two-level enhancement pursuant to 3C1.1, the sentencing court departed upward an additional two levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. 5K2.0 and 5K2.2. We employ an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing the process used by the trial court in sentencing. United States v. Wylie, 919 F.2d 969, 980 (5th Cir. 1990). We review a district court's decision to depart from the guidelines for abuse of discretion, and such a departure will be upheld if the district court provided acceptable reasons for the departure and if the extent of the departure was reasonable. United States v. Rosogie, 21 F.3d 632, 634 (5th Cir. 1994). The reasons given by the trial court are findings of fact, which we review for clear error. Id. 71 A court may depart even if the factor is taken into consideration by the guidelines, only if the factor is present to a degree substantially in excess of that which ordinarily is involved in the offense. U.S.S.G. 5K2.0. This Court has developed a two-pronged test to determine whether a departure is justified: (1) whether the circumstances were considered by the guidelines, and (2) whether the circumstances are of a sufficient magnitude and have a basis in fact. Wylie, 919 F.2d at 980. 72 The Government argues that the obstruction of Justice enhancements in the guidelines do not take into account the seriousness of Ismoila's offense because Ismoila actually obstructed Justice in two ways: (1) harboring a fugitive co-conspirator, and (2) urging her to flee the Houston area. The Government also contends that hiding Eyikogbe was such a serious infraction as to warrant departure because it allowed Ismoila to present a defense at trial that blamed Eyikogbe, all the while he was concealing her in his house. Ismoila, on the contrary, asserts that the 3C1.1 of the guidelines adequately punish him for obstruction of Justice. 73 The facts discussed above are adequate to support a two-level upward enhancement. See Rosogie, 21 F.3d at 634 (departing upward because the guidelines did not adequately account for defendant's criminal history and use of aliases); United States v. Barakett, 994 F.2d 1107, 1112-13 (5th Cir. 1993) (departing upward on bank fraud convictions because of the extended time period over which the fraud occurred, the large number of victims, and the substantial amount of planning), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1049, 114 S. Ct. 701, 126 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1994). Reliance on these facts was not clearly erroneous, and the district court did not abuse its discretion. 11