Opinion ID: 162347
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Limitation on Cross-Examination of Sh-Pone Harris

Text: 19 Toles next contends that limitations on his cross-examination of Harris violated his Confrontation Clause rights under the Sixth Amendment. Harris testified at trial after the government granted him use immunity. During the trial, Toles attempted to cross-examine Harris about the details of a plea agreement Harris had entered into in the Kansas criminal case. The government, however, argued that the plea agreement was made in another jurisdiction, was not binding on Harris in this case, and was therefore irrelevant. Under cross-examination by co-defendant Morris, Harris stated that he was not testifying because of the plea agreement in Kansas. Based on that testimony, the district court did not allow Toles to cross-examine Harris about the contents of the plea agreement. The district court stated that the contents of the plea agreement were irrelevant because Harris had already stated that his testimony was not pursuant to the plea agreement and because the Kansas plea agreement has no relationship to this case. 20 This court reviews de novo whether cross-examination restrictions violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. United States v. McGuire, 200 F.3d 668, 677 (10th Cir. 1999). [T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (quotation omitted). Although the trial court has wide discretion to impose reasonable limits on the scope of cross-examination, the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination. Id. at 678-79, 106 S.Ct. 1431 (quotation omitted). A defendant's Confrontation Clause rights are violated when he is prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to elicit the witness' bias and a reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of the witness' credibility. See id. at 680, 106 S.Ct. 1431. 21 The parties dispute whether Harris' plea agreement in a federal Kansas court is binding on him in a federal court in Oklahoma. This court has not previously addressed the issue of whether a plea agreement made in one jurisdiction is binding on a defendant in another jurisdiction, and need not resolve it in this case. 22 Even if the Kansas plea agreement was binding on Harris in Oklahoma and the limitation on the cross-examination of Harris violated Toles' Confrontation Clause rights, the limitation is subject to harmless error review. See United States v. DeSoto, 950 F.2d 626, 630 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)); see also Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431. In conducting a harmless error review, this court determines whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431. Among the factors to consider are the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, the cumulative nature of the testimony, the presence or absence of corroborating or contradictory testimony, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the overall strength of the prosecution's case. Id. 23 In this case, the record contains ample evidence of Toles' guilt. Detective Nevil testified that Toles confessed to each of the four robberies charged in this case and provided details about the location of certain robberies, the amounts taken, and his role as a getaway driver. These details were consistent with the details provided in DeMarques Morris' confession to Detective Nevil on July 2 at the SCADF. Toles also indicated that a note and a fake beard and mustache were used in one of the bank robberies, which is corroborated by Morris' confession and the testimony of Dekisha Verner, a bank teller at the American State Bank robbery. 24 Furthermore, Toles' cross-examination of Harris was circumscribed only as to the Kansas plea agreement. Although the jury did not hear testimony about the contents of the agreement, it heard Toles elicit testimony from Harris about its existence. Toles conducted extensive cross-examination of Harris about the statements Harris gave to law enforcement and the conversations he had with Toles and Morris about the robberies. The jury was able to witness Harris' demeanor and assess his credibility. 25 In addition, the possibility that Harris was biased in favor of the government is mitigated by the fact that he was granted use immunity for his trial testimony. Harris testified that he understood he could be held in criminal contempt if he refused to testify or gave false testimony. Thus, even if the jury had heard testimony that the government gave Harris favorable treatment under the Kansas plea agreement, the potential bias from such treatment is mitigated by the specter of criminal contempt charges against Harris. 26 Finally, the government's case against Toles was strong even without the testimony of Harris, who was the only witness who testified about Toles' direct involvement in certain robberies. Given Toles' and Morris' confessions, as well as the corroborating evidence of the other testifying witnesses, this court is satisfied that the limitation on the cross-examination of Harris was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.