Opinion ID: 160150
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Voluntary Proceeding or Program

Text: 35 Defendants also claim that the adverse consequences imposed in this case are not compulsory because Plaintiff could choose not to participate in the SATP. In other words, Defendants assert that Plaintiff's participation in the SATP is voluntary. 36 The record offers differing evidence concerning whether participation in the SATP is officially required by Department regulations. It appears that the program was required when Plaintiff was first recommended for it in 1994. The policy has since been amended such that, officially, inmates may volunteer to enter the SATP. However, even if participation in the SATP is not officially required of every sex offender, the policy of imposing certain administrative consequences upon an inmate in the event that he refuses to participate lends an element of compulsion. In light of the fact that the Department would impose sanctions solely because Plaintiff wishes to remain silent and invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, we cannot see how his participation in the SATP is truly voluntary. 37 In addition, we think this case is distinguishable from the Supreme Court's recent decision in Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272. In Woodard, the Court characterized the inquiry as whether giving inmates the option of voluntarily participating in an interview as part of the clemency process violates an inmate's Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at 276. Mr. Woodard, a death row inmate, argued that because there was only one guaranteed clemency review and because his answers could have been used against him the interview was not truly voluntary and therefore it violated the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 285. The Court rejected this claim, concluding that the interview was voluntary and, as a result, Mr. Woodard was not compelled to speak. See id. at 286. Because Mr. Woodard retained the choice whether to provid[e] information to the [Parole] Authority at the risk of damaging his case for clemency or for postconviction relief or . . . [to] remain[] silent[,] . . . [t]he pressure to speak in the hope of improving his chance of being granted clemency does not make the interview compelled. Id. at 287-88. 38 This case is distinguishable from Woodard for the simple reason that Mr. Woodard was not punished for invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege. Rather, the clemency interview was voluntary and Mr. Woodard's eligibility for clemency did not depend on his participation in the interview. Though his participation in the clemency interview may have affected his chances for clemency, no separate and distinct substantial or potent consequences were imposed for his refusal to participate in the interview. Plaintiff in this case, however, is punished for refusing to participate in the SATP and invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege. Unlike the situation in Woodard, Plaintiff is not even eligible for the SATP without disclosing the requisite information about his sexual history, and his refusal to disclose is met with very specific, potent, and substantial consequences. 10 39 This case also differs from the Supreme Court's decision in Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420. In that case, the Supreme Court addressed the Fifth Amendment privilege in a probation setting. Mr. Murphy was charged with criminal sexual conduct, pleaded guilty to a reduced charge, was placed on probation, and was required to participate in a sexual offender treatment program. In the course of the program, Mr. Murphy, without claiming his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, admitted to an earlier rape and murder for which he was subsequently prosecuted. Bringing a § 1983 action, he argued that the confession was inadmissible because he was compelled to admit the crimes or face revocation of probation. See id. at 434. 40 Relying on Cunningham, Turley, and other precedent, the Court observed that there was a substantial basis for concluding that an express or implied threat to revoke a convicted defendant's probation because he legitimately invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege would create the classic penalty situation . . . and the probationer's answers would be deemed compelled. Id. at 435. Despite these pronouncements, the Court held that, although the state conditioned probation on the giving of truthful answers in the therapy program, it did not violate the Fifth Amendment because it had not attempt[ed] to take the extra, impermissible step of compelling the answers. Id. at 436; see also id. at 437. Thus, because Mr. Murphy was not required to disclose specific incriminating statements but merely was required to be truthful to his probation officer, and because he was not threatened with a penalty for invoking the privilege, the Court held that the state did not violate the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 437, 440. 41 It is significant that Mr. Murphy was not required to disclose any specific information, nor was he penalized or punished for invoking his constitutional right. In short, other than the normal consequences flowing from his confession, Mr. Murphy was not punished or penalized solely for choosing to remain silent. However, that is exactly what would happen to Plaintiff here. Defendants' policy would respond to his refusal to admit responsibility and disclose his sexual history by transferring him to a higher level of security and substantially restricting the privileges that he had earned in the lower level of security. 42