Opinion ID: 218015
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dr. Vincent's Opinion

Text: Next, we consider McKinzey's argument that the ALJ failed to explain the weight she gave to the state agency physician's opinion that McKinzey could only occasionally use her hands for handling, fingering, or feeling. Generally speaking, an ALJ's adequate discussion of the issues need not contain a complete written evaluation of every piece of evidence. Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir.2005). But when the evidence comes in the form of a medical opinion from a state agency physician, the agency's own regulations and rules require that the ALJ not ignore these opinions and must explain the weight given to the opinions in their decisions. S.S.R. 96-6p; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f). McKinzey argues that the ALJ did fail to explain her treatment of these opinions, and that this failure alone requires us to remand the matter to the agency for further consideration. We agree with the former claim but not the latter. Dr. Vincent concluded, based solely on a review of the medical records to date, that McKinzey had the following exertional limitations: she could lift 20 pounds not more than occasionally and 10 pounds not more than frequently, could stand or sit no more than 6 hours in the course of an 8-hour day, and could not handle excessively repetitive activity. In addition, Dr. Vincent found that McKinzey could only occasionally use her hands to handle, finger, or feel. [3] While the ALJ was not required to follow Dr. Vincent's opinion, there is no indication in the record that she was even aware that a state agency physiciantwo, actuallyhad opined that McKinzey had significant limitations with her hands, much less that she gave this opinion proper consideration. The ALJ thus violated S.S.R. 96-6p, which is binding on ALJs, see Lauer v. Apfel, 169 F.3d 489, 492 (7th Cir.1999), and leaves no room for doubt that the ALJ was required to consider Dr. Vincent's opinion. This was error. But administrative error may be harmless: we will not remand a case to the ALJ for further specification where we are convinced that the ALJ will reach the same result. Spiva v. Astrue, 628 F.3d 346, 353 (7th Cir.2010). That would be a waste of time and resources for both the Commissioner and the claimant. Thus, we look at the evidence in the record to see if we can predict with great confidence what the result on remand will be. We note (yet again, see Spiva, 628 F.3d at 353 and the critical discussion therein) that the harmless error standard is not, as the Commissioner and district court seem to believe, an exercise in rationalizing the ALJ's decision and substituting our own hypothetical explanations for the ALJ's inadequate articulation. We have already concluded that the ALJ erred. The question before us is now prospectivecan we say with great confidence what the ALJ would do on remandrather than retrospective. Here, a review of the records convinces us that no reasonable ALJ would reach a contrary decision on remand regarding McKinzey's manipulative limitations. While Dr. Vincent's opinion is entitled to consideration as a non-examining source, it does not carry significant weight in comparison to the opinion of a treating specialist like Dr. Pardubsky. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Dr. Vincent reviewed only medical records, and notably could not have taken into account Dr. Pardubsky's opinion, based on his personal observation just a few months after Dr. Vincent's opinion, that McKinzey had no significant limitations in the use of her hands. Dr. Pardubsky's history of treating McKinzey, both before and after his August 2005 opinion, give his opinion singular weight and importance. Had the opinions been reversedwith Dr. Pardubsky opining that McKinzey was significantly limited in the use of her handswe have no doubt that the ALJ would not have been free to prefer a contrary opinion from a state agency physician. See Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 415 (7th Cir.2008) (outlining treating physician rule). In short, we find the ALJ's oversight harmless because although she failed to articulate her reasons for rejecting a portion of Dr. Vincent's opinion (or failed to notice that portion, whatever the case may be) the proper place of that opinion in the context of the other evidence is clear. It would serve no purpose to remand this case to the ALJ for a statement of the obvious.