Opinion ID: 76910
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Padilla Violated Clearly Established Law

Text: 30 Even though Padilla violated Mercado's constitutional rights, he could still be afforded qualified immunity provided that Mercado's rights were not clearly established at the time of the incident. Mercado can demonstrate that his right was clearly established in a number of ways. First, he can show that a materially similar case has already been decided, giving notice to the police. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). He could also show that a broader, clearly established principle should control the novel facts in this situation. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). Finally, he could show that this case fits within the exception of conduct which so obviously violates that constitution that prior case law is unnecessary. Ferraro, 284 F.3d at 1199. To make this showing, Mercado must point to law as interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the Supreme Court of Florida. See Willingham v. Loughnan, 321 F.3d 1299, 1304 (11th Cir.2003). 31 Any case law that is materially similar to the facts in the case at hand must pre-date the officer's alleged improper conduct and truly compel the conclusion that the plaintiff had a right under federal law. Ensley v. Soper, 142 F.3d 1402, 1406 (11th Cir.1998) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Mercado, however, can point to no controlling case law from the Supreme Court or this Circuit dealing with the Sage Launcher. Although there are some cases dealing with less lethal weapons, such as pepper spray, none of them is materially similar to the facts in this case or truly compels the conclusion that Mercado had a right established under federal law. See, e.g., Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1349 (11th Cir.2002) (denying qualified immunity to an officer who sprayed pepper in the eyes of an arrestee who was already handcuffed). 5 32 If there is no case law directly on point, [g]eneral statements of the law contained within the Constitution, statute, or caselaw may sometimes provide `fair warning' of unlawful conduct. Willingham, 321 F.3d at 1301. These principles may give notice to officers, provided that the decisions clearly apply to the situation at hand. The reasoning, though not the holding of prior cases can also send the same message to reasonable officers in novel factual situations. Hope, 536 U.S. at 743, 122 S.Ct. 2508. 33 The general principle of law must be specific enough to give the officers notice of the clearly established right. Indeed, the principle that officers may not use excessive force to apprehend a suspect is too broad a concept to give officers notice of unacceptable conduct. See Jones v. City of Dothan, 121 F.3d 1456, 1460 (11th Cir.1997) (noting that although the unconstitutionality of using excessive force is an established principle, the concept is far too broad). 34 Mercado, however, relies on the principle that deadly force cannot be employed in a situation that requires less-than-lethal force. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11-12, 105 S.Ct. 1694 (holding that a police officer cannot seize an unarmed nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead). Because the Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable seizures, the use of deadly force must be reasonable under the circumstances. Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323, 1329 (11th Cir.2003). Using deadly force in a situation that clearly would not justify its use is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 35 Under Florida law, deadly force means any force that is likely to cause death or great bodily harm, but does not include the discharge of a firearm by a law enforcement officer or correctional officer during and within the scope of his or her official duties which is loaded with a `less lethal munition.' Fla. Stat. § 776.06. Less-lethal munition is, in turn, defined as a projectile that is designed to stun, temporarily incapacitate, or cause temporary discomfort to a person without penetrating the person's body. Id. According to Orlando policies, the Sage Launcher is defined as a less lethal munition; however, they also recognize that some uses of the weapon should only be employed in deadly force situations. Shooting a suspect in the head is specifically forbidden unless the situation requires deadly force. 36 As noted above, for the purposes of summary judgment, we must assume that Padilla intended to shoot Mercado in the head based on Mercado's injuries and the proven accuracy of Padilla's weapon. Because shooting a subject in the head with a Sage Launcher employs force likely to cause death or great bodily harm, this action can be considered deadly force. Both Padilla and Rouse were aware that police policy forbade them from utilizing this magnitude of force under the facts at bar. Because this situation was clearly not a deadly force situation, and because the officers utilized deadly force to subdue Mercado, they violated the clearly established principle that deadly force cannot be used in non-deadly situations. 37 Furthermore, this is one of the cases that lie so obviously at the very core of what the Fourth Amendment prohibits that the unlawfulness of the conduct was readily apparent to the official, notwithstanding the lack of case law. Ferraro, 284 F.3d at 1199 (internal quotation and citation omitted). The facts in this case are also so far beyond the hazy border between excessive and acceptable force that [the official] had to know he was violating the Constitution even without caselaw on point. Willingham, 321 F.3d at 1303. 38 We have repeatedly held that police officers cannot use force that is wholly unnecessary to any legitimate law enforcement purpose. Ferraro, 284 F.3d at 1199 (holding that slamming a handcuffed arrestee's head against a vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment); see Slicker v. Jackson, 215 F.3d 1225, 1227 (11th Cir.2002) (denying qualified immunity for an officer who kicked an arrestee already in handcuffs); Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 926-27 (11th Cir.2000) (denying qualified immunity to officers who allowed a police dog to attack an arrestee who was already on the ground). 39 Officer Padilla should not have needed case law to know that by intentionally shooting Mercado in the head, he was violating Mercado's Fourth Amendment rights. When the officers entered the apartment, they found Mercado crying on the floor of his kitchen with a loose cord around his neck and a kitchen knife placed up to, but not poking into, his chest. From a distance of about six feet away, Padilla twice shouted for Mercado to drop his knife, and then discharged the Sage Launcher, hitting Mercado in the head from short range. Assuming that Padilla was aiming at Mercado's head intentionally, his use of force was clearly excessive. 40 There is sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that Padilla intentionally aimed for Mercado's head. First Padilla had been trained in the use of the Sage Launcher. Second, the defendants' witness testified that the Sage Launcher fired accurately from a distance of up to five yards. Third, Padilla fired from a distance of six feet. Finally, the only shot that made contact with Mercado hit him in the head. Since such circumstantial evidence could lead a reasonable jury to find that Padilla intended to hit Mercado in the head, we REVERSE the district court's ruling as to Padilla and find that he should not be afforded the protection of qualified immunity. 41