Opinion ID: 779815
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the government's use of informants

Text: 9 Manning claims that the government's use of Sylvia Herrera as an informant violated his constitutional right to counsel. Criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to counsel at all critical stages of criminal proceedings. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964). [T]he prosecutor and police have an affirmative obligation not to act in a manner that circumvents and thereby dilutes the protection afforded by the right to counsel. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 171, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). Consequently, the government may not, either directly or through its agents, deliberately elicit incriminating information from suspects without counsel present. Id. at 173-74, 106 S.Ct. 477. 10 It is undisputed that Herrera was acting as a government agent here, pursuant to her agreement with the FBI. However, the government suggests that no right to counsel attached because Manning was only charged by complaint, rather than indictment, when he spoke with Herrera. Our cases make no such distinction. See Chewning v. Rogerson, 29 F.3d 418, 420 (8th Cir.1994) (holding filing of charges is a critical stage for sixth amendment purposes); Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314, 1318 (8th Cir.1991) (listing criminal stages at which right to counsel attaches, including filing of complaint). The right to counsel attaches to interrogations conducted after the initiation of adversarial criminal proceedings against the defendant; it is of no import whether the proceedings were initiated by complaint or indictment. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); see also Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1070 (8th Cir.1988) (recognizing sixth amendment applies to interrogation activities conducted `at or after the initiation of adversary criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment') (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972)). The right to counsel attaches not only to direct confrontations by known government officers, but also indirect and surreptitious interrogations by covert government agents and informants. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 272-73, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980) (quoting Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206, 84 S.Ct. 1199). 11 The district court recognized that the government is not involved in interrogation where a government agent merely acts as a listening post. 4 Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 458-59, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986). However, that is not the case here. Rather, similar to Moulton, the government here deliberately created a circumstance ripe for its agents to elicit incriminating statements from Manning. 12 In Moulton, one codefendant agreed to work as a government informant against the other codefendant. The informant wore a recording device in a meeting with the defendant. The police claimed that the recording device was worn not to elicit incriminating information, but instead for the informant's own safety. The Supreme Court found this argument unpersuasive: knowing exploitation by the State of an opportunity to confront the accused without counsel being present is as much a breach of the State's obligation ... as is the intentional creation of such an opportunity. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176, 106 S.Ct. 477. 13 In Manning's case, the government employed two informants to elicit incriminating information from Manning after he was charged. First, the government planted an informant in Manning's cell. Although the FBI told the informant to limit conversation to the Illinois investigation, rather than the charged Missouri crimes, he did not follow suit. The FBI sanctioned this activity through its continued use of the informant, and eventually encouraged him to get more information on the Missouri crimes. The informant then involved his girlfriend, Sylvia Herrera, by suggesting that Manning use her to create an alibi. Herrera then entered into an agreement with the FBI herself, whereby she began recording her conversations with Manning. These conversations took place by telephone and in person. Because Manning was in jail, Herrera initiated the personal visits by traveling to Cook County Jail. By using Herrera and her boyfriend as informants, the government exploited its opportunity to interrogate Manning in the absence of counsel. Any statements from these informants related to Manning's charged crimes should not have been admitted at trial. 14 The government contends that even if it was error to admit Herrera's statements at trial, Manning did not properly preserve this claim. The record indicates that Manning's trial counsel attempted to exclude Herrera's testimony by way of a motion in limine, but failed to renew the objection when Herrera's testimony was admitted at trial. 15 A motion in limine standing alone does not normally preserve an issue for appellate review. United States v. Lee, 274 F.3d 485, 493 (8th Cir.2001). However, when an issue has been defaulted by trial counsel, the defendant may overcome this procedural bar by showing cause for the default and resulting prejudice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). Cause, in this respect, can include a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 753-54, 111 S.Ct. 2546. Accordingly, we apply the familiar test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), in order to determine if the performance of Manning's trial attorney was inadequate, and whether Manning was prejudiced by counsel's shortcomings. 16 Here, there can be no doubt that the performance of Manning's counsel was deficient. Counsel attempted to attack the admission of Herrera's testimony only through a motion in limine. 5 The lack of a contemporaneous objection at trial allowed the government to proffer Herrera's testimony unfettered, despite being constitutionally inadmissible. 17 The record in this case also establishes that Manning was prejudiced by his trial attorney's performance. As a result of counsel's failure to object to Herrera's testimony, the government adduced evidence that Manning had attempted to create a false alibi defense. The prosecutor recognized the importance of this point in his closing, where he emphasized [i]nnocent people don't need to fabricate alibis. (Trial tr. at 657.) 18 Manning has established cause for his procedural default because his trial counsel was ineffective. As for resulting prejudice, as discussed above, counsel here allowed the jury to hear damaging, inadmissible testimony from Herrera that Manning wanted to fabricate an alibi. Because there is a substantial likelihood that absent this testimony the trial result would have been different, Manning has shown prejudice resulting from the procedural default. 19 The government's use of informants here violated Manning's constitutional right to counsel. As a result, Herrera's trial testimony should have been suppressed. Manning is not procedurally barred from raising this claim because he has shown sufficient cause for the default and resulting prejudice. Accordingly, the district court erred in not granting Manning relief on this ground. 20