Opinion ID: 1488269
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Arbitrariness in seeking the death penalty

Text: At one point in the proceedings Huffington proffered a guilty plea in exchange for a life sentence. Huffington asserts that defense counsel was under the impression that the State had conditionally accepted the offer, but then rejected it when the parents of Becker found it unacceptable. Huffington moved to strike the notice of intention to seek the death penalty, contending consideration of the wishes of the family made this an arbitrary factor. He relies upon Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), and Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). The State responds that it had already made [the] decision [to seek the death penalty], given notice to [Huffington], and proceeded to trial prior to the alleged `arbitrary' action. It contends that the feelings of victims' families are legitimate considerations and that in any case it is not bound to accept a proposed plea agreement. It further asserts: In this case the Court at sentencing invoked a novel procedure when it allowed the defense to place plea negotiations before the sentencing jury and argue that the State's consideration thereof should be a mitigating factor. In other words, the jury was allowed to determine whether the State's response to the defense's offer was some indication that the death penalty was not appropriate in this case. The State protested such action below and it is the State's position here on appeal that this procedure gave Appellant more than he was entitled to. In Calhoun v. State, 297 Md. 563, 468 A.2d 45 (1983), the accused mounted an attack upon our death sentence statute based upon what he called the prosecutor's unbridled exercise of discretion under Art. 27, § 412(b). We considered Gregg and Furman and concluded: Absent any specific evidence of indiscretion by prosecutors resulting in an irrational, inconsistent, or discriminatory application of the death penalty statute, Calhoun's claim cannot stand. To the extent that there is a difference in the practice of the various State's attorneys around the State, our proportionality review would be intended to assure that the death penalty is not imposed in a disproportionate manner. 297 Md. at 605, 468 A.2d at 64. We do not regard consultation with the family of the victim here, after the State had already made a decision to seek the death penalty and after trial had begun, as any evidence of indiscretion by a prosecutor. We hold this contention to be without merit.