Opinion ID: 2708559
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jose Guzman

Text: Next we address the appeal of Regional Enforcer Jose Guzman. Evidence at the trial showed that Guzman extracted fines from gang members and oversaw at least one violation. FBI Agent Weismantel, who arrested Guzman, identified the latter’s tattoos as being associated with the Latin Kings. Shanna testified that Guzman worked as a first-level distributor of cocaine for the Latin Kings’ drug operations. Guzman was convicted after a jury trial and sentenced to 240 months on the RICO count and 180 months on the drug conspiracy count, to run consecutively (thus 420 months in all). He too raises quite a few issues on appeal, but we focus here on three of them: his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence linking him to the RICO enterprise; his motion for a mistrial based on the jury’s alleged view of him and several co-defendants being moved from the holding cell to the 26 Nos. 11-3179 et al. courtroom; and his contention that the jury instructions on the RICO predicate acts were faulty. Rule 29 Motion: RICO count. At trial, Guzman moved for a judgment of acquittal on the RICO conspiracy count under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. We review the denial of a Rule 29 motion de novo; when the motion is based on insufficiency of the evidence, the only question before us is whether the district court erred in its determination that there was enough evidence to reach the jury. See United States v. Johns, 686 F.3d 438, 446 (7th Cir. 2012). That determination, as we noted in connection with Zambrano’s appeal, is governed by the rigorous Jackson v. Virginia standard. There are several ways in which the government may prove participation in a RICO conspiracy, but the one pertinent to Guzman comes from 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). That part of the statute forbids a person to “conduct or participate, directly or indirectly,” in the enterprise’s pattern of racketeering activities. The government thus had to prove that Guzman conspired to participate (in the way defined by § 1962(c)) in the Latin Kings’ racketeering operations. Guzman’s first argument—that the government failed to introduce sufficient evidence that he was personally involved in two predicate acts—requires little comment. This was a conspiracy charge, not a substantive § 1962(c) charge. All the government had to show was that another member of the enterprise committed the two predicate acts and that Guzman “knew about and agreed to facilitate the scheme.” Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 66 (1997). Guzman can prevail only if no rational juror could have found that he was part of, or agreed to facilitate, the activities of the Latin Kings. But the record contains ample evidence supporting Nos. 11-3179 et al. 27 the jury’s verdict. Shanna, for instance, testified that Guzman was a Regional Enforcer for the Latin Kings in December 2007 and that he oversaw violations in that capacity. The jury also heard testimony that Guzman distributed drugs for the gang. And these are just two examples of many we could cite. The district court properly denied Guzman’s Rule 29 motion. Mistrial. We alluded to this argument in our discussion of Vicente Garcia’s appeal, but we now discuss more fully the incident that prompted motions for a mistrial from several defendants. Guzman’s counsel moved for a mistrial after he learned that the jurors allegedly saw Guzman and his codefendants being escorted from the holding cell to their seats in the courtroom. Relying on Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976), Guzman contends that the presumption of innocence to which he was entitled was undermined when the jurors spotted him, as he put it, being “paraded into the courtroom with U.S. marshals as guards.” In Williams, the Supreme Court held that it violates the Fourteenth Amendment to force a defendant to wear prison garb during his jury trial. Id. at 504–05. We have held that Williams extends to the right not to appear before the jury in shackles, unless they are necessary to control contumacious conduct. Harrell v. Israel, 672 F.2d 632, 635 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970)). But Williams and Harrell deal with a continuing, outward sign to the jury that might undermine the presumption of innocence. The Court did not hold that everything that might remind the jury of the accusation is impermissible; indeed, that would be impossible, since the jury is obviously aware of who the defendants are and the nature of the charges. 28 Nos. 11-3179 et al. Here we have only an isolated glimpse, assuming for the sake of argument that the jurors actually saw what happened. (That is unclear, but we do not need to resolve the question.) The district court decided that any prejudice was de minimis, maybe nonexistent, because the jurors could not have known that the defendants were coming from the “tank” and they might not have seen anything at all. We share the district judge’s impression that this alleged inci- dent was too minor to have made any difference, and we would not be inclined in any event to second-guess the trial judge’s assessment of the situation. Jury Instructions: Predicate Acts. Guzman argues that the court erred by refusing to instruct the jury that it had to agree on which predicate acts the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt before it could convict on the RICO count. In our view, he forfeited this objection at the trial. Guzman did object to Instruction 27, which said, “An offense may be committed by more than one person. A defendant’s guilt may be established without proof that the defendant personally performed every act constituting the crime charged.” Guzman’s counsel had this to say about the instruction: I don’t specifically object to the instruction being given, but I’d ask that the language be put in there of some sort that says that guilt still has to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. … [W]hat this says, Judge, is the defense may be submitted [sic] by more than one person. The defendant’s guilt may be established with- out proof that the defendant personally per- Nos. 11-3179 et al. 29 formed every act. And in the elements instruc- tion now they are saying someone else may have performed the acts and still be found guilty. Nothing in that objection alerted the district court to the fact that the defendant believed that there must be an instruction telling the jury that it had to agree unanimously on the predicate acts supporting the RICO conspiracy. Proceeding under plain error review, we see no reversible error. Both sides refer us to United States v. Campione, 942 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1991), which held that even if defendants agree to different predicate acts, it is enough if each defendant agrees to two predicate acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. at 436. In other words, the government need not prove which two predicate acts occurred; it must show only that each defendant agreed to two predicate acts (not necessarily the same) in furtherance of the conspiracy. Campione, however, does not answer the question whether a jury needs to agree unanimously on which two predicate acts a single defendant committed in furtherance of the RICO conspiracy. Cf. Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 816 (1999) (jury in a continuing criminal enterprise case, 21 U.S.C. § 848, must agree unanimously on the specific violations that make up that continuing series). Had Guzman properly raised the point, we would ex- plore it further. But he did not. The instruction to which he objected did not invite the jurors to find Guzman guilty without a unanimous finding on the particular predicate acts he committed; it said nothing about that point. Particularly in light of the remainder of the jury’s verdict (under which Guzman was found guilty of conspiring to distribute co30 Nos. 11-3179 et al. caine) and the evidence showing his deep involvement with the Latin Kings, this is not a situation in which we are prepared to find plain error. Other Arguments. Guzman raises a mélange of additional arguments, but we find no reversible error on any of these grounds: • Lack of a buyer-seller instruction on the drug dis- tribution count (see Chavez’s appeal, infra at 32). • Use of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for facts found at the sentencing phase (see King’s appeal, infra at 36). • Use of the preponderance standard for setting the baseline offense level for the RICO conspiracy (see King’s appeal, infra at 37). • Insufficient evidence to prove conspiracy to commit murder (see Chavez’s appeal, infra at 35). • Violation of Double Jeopardy to count drug con- spiracy separately from RICO conspiracy (see Zambrano’s appeal, supra at 20). • Sentence for the drug conspiracy violates the Eighth Amendment because it is disproportion- ately long. See generally Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (upholding sentence of life with- out parole for drug-distribution offense). In summary, we find no grounds for reversing either Guzman’s conviction or his sentence.