Opinion ID: 490093
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: PAB Review of the Presiding Member's Decision.

Text: 15 Although the PAB nowhere in its decision explicitly states that it is undertaking de novo review of the Presiding Member's decision, it is obvious that is what the board did. The PAB noted that Chen's case offered the board its first opportunity pursuant to new regulations, to review a Presiding Member's decision with regard to whether the record, viewed as a whole, supports the decision. PAB Dec. at 14, J.A. 20. The PAB asserted that its regulations entitled it to correct any decision which was contrary to the overall weight of the record evidence. Id. PAB counsel have acknowledged in their brief that the PAB interpreted its new review provisions as permitting it to engage in de novo review of the presiding member's opinion. Respondent's Brief at 13. Because we conclude that the PAB lacked such de novo review authority, we vacate the PAB's decision and remand the record for further consideration of the initial decision under the correct standard of review. 16
17 The PAB is a five-member board appointed by the Comptroller General for three-year terms; its members are removable by a majority of the board only for cause. The PAB's duties include consider[ing] and order[ing] corrective or disciplinary action in a variety of personnel matters and prescribing regulations on officer and employee appeals as well as its own operating procedures. 31 U.S.C. Sec. 753 (a), (d). The PAB may delegate its Sec. 753(a) authority to a panel or even to a single member, and the decisions of individual members or panels are deemed final decisions of the PAB unless the Board reconsiders the decision under subsection (c) of this section. Sec. 753(b). Section 753(c) states that reconsideration may take place on motion of a party or the PAB within 30 days of the individual member's decision. 18 Although PAB regulations say nothing about what standard of review should govern reconsideration by the PAB of an individual member's decision, 4 C.F.R. Sec. 27.1, section 28.25(c) spells out the conditions under which the full board may reopen, and ultimately reverse, decisions of individual PAB members. That section, until March 1986, stated in relevant part: 19 The Board may grant a motion to reopen and reconsider when it is established that: 20 (1) New and material evidence is available that, despite due diligence, was not available when the record was closed; or 21 (2) The decision of the Hearing Officer is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation. 22 4 C.F.R. Sec. 28.25(c). In March 1986 the PAB revised the regulation by adding three additional subsections: 23 (3) The decision is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not consistent with law; 24 (4) The decision is not made consistent with required procedures; or 25 (5) The decision is unsupported by substantial evidence. 26 4 C.F.R. Sec. 28.25(c), published at 51 Fed. Reg. 7739 (March 6, 1986). Chen's was the first case to which the PAB applied these new regulations. PAB Dec. at 14; J.A. 20. 27 We conclude that the PAB regulations, as amended, preclude the board from exercising de novo review powers over individual board members' decisions. 28
29 Although the PAB majority stated that the new regulations allow the PAB the first opportunity to correct any decision which was contrary to the overall weight of the record evidence, PAB Dec. at 14; J.A. 20, the plain language of the regulations imposes a considerably narrower scope of review. The new additions to the old regulation mirror familiar language in the APA and the PAB's own organic statute, see 31 U.S.C. Sec. 755, limiting judicial review of agency actions to a substantial evidence standard. Moreover, when the PAB promulgated its new regulations, it noted: 30 Section 28.25 was amended by adding paragraphs (c)(3) through (c)(5). These subsections include the statutory bases upon which the courts review the decisions of the Board as bases for reconsideration by the full Board of a Hearing Officer's decision. 31 51 Fed.Reg. at 7735 (emphasis added). It seems clear that the PAB's new regulations give it only appellate review powers and not de novo review authority to reopen and review individual member's decisions. 32
33 PAB counsel argue that Sec. 28.25(c) generally allows the PAB to review a single member's adjudications de novo even if the specific bases listed in (c) (1) through (c)(5) do not; they suggest we ignore the omission of de novo review authority from Sec. 28.25, asserting that the language of the regulation is permissive and does not limit the PAB's reconsideration to those bases listed (i.e., the regulation says the PAB may reconsider a case when certain conditions apply, rather than only when those conditions apply). PAB counsel rely heavily on this court's decision in Dunning v. NASA, 718 F.2d 1170, finding that somewhat analogous regulations of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) afford authority to reopen cases in situations not specifically listed. In that case, the court confronted a regulation stating that the MSPB may grant a petition for review when it is established that ..., reciting a set of conditions almost identical to the old PAB regulations. 5 C.F.R. Sec. 1201.115 (1983). Then Judge, now Justice, Scalia concluded that 34 any negative implication that might ordinarily arise [from the language of the regulation] is eliminated by the second following section which provides that [t]he Board may reopen and reconsider a decision of a presiding official on its own motion at any time, notwithstanding any other provision of this part. 5 C.F.R. Sec. 1201.117.... That provision makes it clear beyond doubt that Sec. 1201.115 is not a categorical restriction upon the Board's review authority, but only sets forth the most common situations in which review will ordinarily be entertained. Or to put the point another way: If, in entertaining this appeal, the Board was acting beyond the specified limits of Sec. 1201.115, it was clearly acting within its reserved discretion under Sec. 1201.117. 35 Dunning, 718 F.2d at 1173 (emphasis added). As the quoted language makes clear, the court did not find comprehensive review power implicit in the permissive language of the regulations, but rather in the explicit language in Sec. 1201.117, which clearly reserved authority to reconsider at any time, notwithstanding any prior, more specific delineation of the circumstances under which that power could be exercised. 36 PAB counsel assert repeatedly that we should refer to MSPB regulations to fill any gaps in the PAB regulations because the PAB modelled its regulations largely after those of the MSPB. But even if true, 4 it is irrelevant. The PAB cannot copy some of the MSPB regulations, omit the critical residual authority provision, and then ask us to read the excluded provision back into its own regulations. PAB had the opportunity to adopt a residual authority provision like Sec. 1201.117, but it did not do so. As late as March 1986, when amending the regulations, the PAB could have included authority for de novo review, but it did not. Instead the PAB specifically limited its authority to reconsider an individual member's decisions to the substantial evidence standard used by appellate courts to review the PAB itself. 51 Fed.Reg. 7735. Moreover, the PAB decision in this case explicitly relied on the new regulations, not on any implicitly reserved powers, for authority to reconsider the Presiding Member's decision. PAB Dec. at 14, J.A. 20. Thus, any authority for de novo review must be found in subsections (c)(3) to (c)(5) of the regulations, not in the use of the permissive word may. 5 Counsel's post-hoc rationalizations are especially unavailing when the agency has so clearly indicated reliance on a different rationale. See Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-69, 83 S.Ct. 239, 245-46, 9 L.Ed.2d 207 (1962). 37
38 PAB counsel argue that an agency has inherent power to reconsider the decisions of its individual members, unless it explicitly limits that authority, and that the PAB has not done so in Sec. 28.25. We agree that absent regulations to the contrary, the PAB could reconsider on a de novo basis decisions of its Presiding Member. See 31 U.S.C. Sec. 753(b) (authorizing PAB to delegate decisionmaking authority to individual members, but permitting full board to reconsider). But the PAB could also under the same statute clearly limit the scope of its review on reconsideration. 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 90-93 (2d ed. 1980) (noting that agencies may, but rarely do, limit their authority to reconsider decisions of individual members). 6 39 Some agency regulations explicitly grant de novo review authority to the full board, see, e.g., 16 C.F.R. Sec. 3.54(a) (Federal Trade Commission); 17 C.F.R. Sec. 10.104 (Commodities Futures Trading Commission); 43 C.F.R. Sec. 4.320 (Board of Indian Appeals), while others explicitly deny it, see, e.g., 20 C.F.R. Sec. 802.301 (Department of Labor Benefits Review Board). The PAB has followed neither model. Accordingly, on the basis of the language of the reconsideration regulations and of the PAB's own contemporaneous explanation of those regulations as incorporating an appellate review approach, 51 Fed.Reg. at 7735, we are constrained to adopt the negative implication we warned might ordinarily arise from the identical language in the MSPB regulations, Dunning v. NASA, 718 F.2d at 1173. 7 40 We conclude, then, that the PAB's reconsideration regulations do not permit the full board simply to reopen the decisions of individual members at any time to correct any errors. The PAB has limited its rehearing authority to reversing initial decisions only for lack of substantial evidence. Unless and until the PAB properly revises its regulations, it must restrict the scope of its review accordingly. 41
42 We remand the record to the PAB and retain jurisdiction over the case pursuant to our rules. See D.C. Cir.R.13(d). On remand, the PAB may either decide that reconsideration was inappropriate and adopt the Presiding Member's decision as the board's final decision, 4 C.F.R. Sec. 28.25(b), or it may proceed to reconsider the Presiding Member's decision under the substantial evidence standard specified in its regulations, 4 C.F.R. Sec. 28.25(c)(5). The term substantial evidence has already been defined by the Supreme Court as more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. at 477, 71 S.Ct. at 459 (citations omitted). 43 Under a substantial evidence test, the PAB may not simply substitute its judgment for that of the Presiding Member. The PAB must carefully consider the Presiding Member's findings and conclusions, and, if applicable, elucidate its reasons for taking a different course. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. F.C.C., 444 F.2d at 853. In the case before us, where credibility issues may determine the adoption or rejection of critical allegations made by both sides, the Presiding Member's findings are entitled to great deference. National Ass'n of Recycling Indus., Inc. v. F.M.C., 658 F.2d at 824-25; Jackson v. Veterans Admin., 768 F.2d at 1331.