Opinion ID: 2011334
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Attributes of Marriage Justifying an Equal Protection Inquiry

Text: In Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), the Court held that a state law withholding from prisoners the right to marry violated due process because four important attributes of marriage, id. at 95, 107 S.Ct. at 2265, outweighed any penological concern the state could articulate to support the marriage ban. In particular, the Court said: The right to marry, like many other rights, is subject to substantial restrictions as a result of incarceration. Many important attributes of marriage remain, however, after taking into account the limitations imposed by prison life. [1] First, inmate marriages, like others, are expressions of emotional support and public commitment. These elements are an important and significant aspect of the marital relationship. [2] In addition, many religions recognize marriage as having spiritual significance; for some inmates and their spouses, therefore, the commitment of marriage may be an exercise of religious faith as well as an expression of personal dedication. [3] Third, most inmates eventually will be released by parole or commutation, and therefore most inmate marriages are formed in the expectation that they ultimately will be fully consummated. [4] Finally, marital status often is a precondition to the receipt of government benefits ( e.g., Social Security benefits), property rights ( e.g., tenancy by the entirety, inheritance rights), and other, less tangible benefits ( e.g., legitimation of children born out of wedlock). These incidents of marriage, like the religious and personal aspects of the marriage commitment, are unaffected by the fact of confinement or the pursuit of legitimate corrections goals. Id. at 95-96, 107 S.Ct. at 2265. If these attributes of marriage are relevant to the needs and aspirations of gays and lesbiansas public education (not a fundamental right) was relevant to alien children (a quasi-suspect class) in Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217-18 & n. 16, 223-24, 230, 102 S.Ct. at 2395 & n. 16, 2397-98, 2401-02we have the basis for inquiring whether a marriage statute that excludes homosexuals from the right to marry one another meets equal protection requirements. Appellants proffer that, given the nature of homosexuality, Turner 's attributes of marriageemotional support, religious or spiritual significance, physical consummation, and government and other benefitsare as relevant and important to same-sex couples as to heterosexual couples. I perceive no basis for doubting that appellants can make such a showing. [33] Moreover, appellants buttress their argument by noting that many heterosexual couples are not able to have children, or may choose not to do so, whereas homosexual couples, absent state law or policy impediments, [34] can and do elect parenthood through adoption, surrogacy, or artificial inseminationthe result being that parenthood, and even the benefits of procreation, are not necessarily limited to formally united heterosexual couples. After considering pertinent legislative facts and applying relevant case law, I must concludeas elaborated laterthat the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that homosexuals do not comprise a suspect or quasi-suspect class, and thus the court erred in concluding as a matter of law that the rational basis test applies to this case under the equal protection clause. On the other hand, I am unable to ascertain to the required degree of certainty from the record, supplemented by my own study, the legislative facts necessary for deciding as a matter of law whether homosexuals are entitled under the equal protection clause to special scrutiny of their claimed right to marry. Thus, as explained below, I believe a trial will be required to decide the classification issue: whether the rational basis test, or a higher form of scrutiny, applies.