Opinion ID: 781977
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Improper Demands for Additional Testimonial Specificity

Text: 43 It is and must be the case that, as the BIA's decision supposes, the petitioner whose testimony is vague can only qualify for asylum if he produces evidence that adds a certain amount of detail to his story. Our decision in Guan Shan Liao illustrates the point: 44 Liao testified he left his home because his neighbor informed him that two persons from the community were looking for him. Yet, he did not indicate who these persons were or what they would have done had they found him and his family. Thus, [Liao's claim (that he was forced to leave his village and deprived of valuable government services because he harbored a cousin who was wanted for sterilization)] is conjectural. 45 Petitioner also declares in his brief that after his family left the house, it was destroyed. But ... even assuming Liao's house was damaged, we do not know that this loss was attributable to the government because he only vaguely identified the two persons he believes were looking for him and whom he blames for having to vacate his home. 46 Guan Shan Liao, 293 F.3d at 70 (internal citations removed). 47 Implicit in this passage is a logical interpretation of what can make credible testimony nonetheless too vague to establish refugee status, absent gap-filling evidence. Thus, testimony is too vague if it doesn't identify facts corresponding to each of the elements of one of the refugee categories of the immigration statutes, as interpreted by the BIA and the federal courts. The IIRIRA's special statutory presumption of persecution on account of political opinion applies only to person[s] who [have] been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntarily sterilization, or who [have] been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population control program. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). Because Liao did not identify as government officials (or other agents of China's population control program) the persons who allegedly damaged his home, his testimony, even taken as true in all its particulars, does not support an inference that he was persecuted for resistance to that program. 48 By contrast, Qiu testified that his wife was apprehended for sterilization by birth control officers, committee members, and brigade cadres. Asked whether his wife wanted to be sterilized, Qiu replied, No. She was taken away by force. This is not detailed testimony, but neither is it vague. It is specific as to the following essential facts: (a) that his wife was forced to be sterilized against her will, and (b) that the agents of coercion were government birth control officials, from which it follows, absent contrary evidence, that they were acting to advance China's population control policy. This is enough specificity to bring Qiu's wife within the ambit of the IIRIRA's regulatory presumption of persecution on account of political opinion, and, under In re C-Y-Z-, it suffices for Qiu as well. 49 The BIA's decision below and the government's brief on appeal blur the distinction between testimony that adverts (albeit not in great detail) to facts corresponding to the definitional elements of refugee, and testimony, as in Guan Shan Liao, that fails to make out these elements. Thus, the government's brief faults Qiu for not describ[ing] the details of the [sterilization] incident, such as how and when his wife was arrested, how many officials were involved, where she was taken, how long she was detained, or what type of sterilization procedure she underwent. Br. of Respondent-Appellee, at 22-23. But, none of these details affects whether the sterilization entitles Qiu to refugee status. 50 A forced sterilization, undertaken to advance a program of population control, can be effected by one arresting official or ten; with an arrest in the morning or in the evening, in the rain or in the sunshine; with a detention for no longer than the time it takes to perform the surgery, or a detention for a term of years; with a tubal litigation operation or a hysterectomy. And since the list of circumstantial details can be expanded indefinitely, a legal standard that empowers an IJ or the BIA to rule against a petitioner who fails to anticipate the particular set of details that the fact-finder desires (but does not request, through questions directed to the applicant) is no standard at all. It would enable the administrative decisionmaker to reject whichever applicants that fact-finder happens to disfavor. 5 51 This is not to say that incidental detail has no role in asylum proceedings. Where an applicant gives very spare testimony, as here, the IJ or the INS may fairly wonder whether the testimony is fabricated. Cf. Diallo, 232 F.3d at 284 n. 3 (remarking that testimony which is credible, in the sense of being internally consistent, may nonetheless appear implausible). If so, the IJ and counsel for the INS may wish to probe for incidental details, seeking to draw out inconsistencies that would support a finding of lack of credibility. But that is not what happened during Qiu's hearing. 6 Neither the IJ nor counsel for the INS questioned Qiu about the details of the sterilization incident. 7 And, indeed, the BIA expressly found no reason to deem Qiu incredible. 52 We conclude that the BIA erred in denying asylum on the basis of insufficient testimonial specificity. And, because the BIA misapprehended what it means for testimony to be too vague to support refugee status, the Board's decision must be vacated and remanded 8 — provided, of course, that there are not independent grounds for denying asylum. We consider next whether such grounds exist in this case.