Opinion ID: 1880670
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: issue 10. control of presentation of mitigation

Text: Next, Boyd argues that the defendant's waiver of mitigation was invalid because it is the attorney's obligation to decide what evidence is to be presented in the penalty phase of trial. We review decisions of the trial court in its handling of mitigation issues for abuse of discretion. Spann v. State, 857 So.2d 845, 854 (Fla. 2003). Boyd attempts to distinguish a long line of cases holding that a pro se defendant may waive the presentation of mitigating evidence because Boyd was represented by counsel and his counsel should have controlled the presentation of mitigating evidence. This argument is without merit. As stated above, we have long recognized that a competent defendant may waive the right to present all mitigating evidence. Hamblen v. State, 527 So.2d 800 (Fla.1988). This right is not altered when the defendant has counsel. Again, Boyd did not waive his right to present mitigating evidence. Instead, he limited the presentation of such evidence to his testimony and that of his pastor. Boyd argues that the trial court erred in failing to comply with Koon (discussed above under Issue 8) and Mora v. State, 814 So.2d 322 (Fla. 2002), in accepting Boyd's presentation of mitigating evidence. In Mora, the defendant objected to penalty phase counsel contacting his relatives that lived overseas as part of counsel's investigation of mitigating evidence. The trial court relied on Koon in refusing to allow the defendant to waive any mitigating evidence before counsel had investigated all such evidence. Id. at 331. The defendant refused to allow counsel to contact his family and proceeded pro se during the penalty phase, where he presented no mitigating evidence. Id. at 332. We reversed the death sentence because the trial court misapplied Koon in holding that it barred a defendant from waiving mitigation before counsel first investigates all possible mitigation. Id. Instead, Koon simply developed a procedure so that the record clearly reflects a defendant's knowing waiver of his or her right to present mitigating evidence. Id. at 332-33. The defendant received a new penalty phase, because the record reflected that he had only wished to waive a portion of the mitigating evidence and had done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Thus, a defendant possesses great control over the objectives and content of his mitigation. See Farr v. State, 656 So.2d 448, 449 (Fla.1995) (no error when defendant takes stand to refute and disclaim any possible mitigation because defendant is entitled to control overall objectives of counsel's argument). Whether a defendant is represented by counsel or is proceeding pro se, the defendant has the right to choose what evidence, if any, the defense will present during the penalty phase. See Grim v. State, 841 So.2d 455, 461 (Fla.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 892, 124 S.Ct. 230, 157 L.Ed.2d 166 (2003). The record provides extensive support to substantiate that Boyd understood his rights and understood the consequences of his choice to present only the testimony of his pastor and himself. Boyd was exercising his right to be the captain of the ship in determining what would be presented during the penalty phase. See Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So.2d 618, 625 (Fla.2000). Therefore, we hold that the trial court correctly allowed Boyd to make a knowing and voluntary decision as to what testimony was to be presented in mitigation. Boyd attempts to analogize the instant case to that of Klokoc v. State, 589 So.2d 219 (Fla.1991), where this Court held that a defendant cannot prevent his counsel from challenging a sentence on appeal. However, this analogy confuses the distinction between a defendant's rights during a trial versus his rights on appeal. The differences between the trial and appellate levels were succinctly defined in Ocha v. State, 826 So.2d 956, 964 (Fla. 2002): Thus, Klokoc reiterates this Court's interest in ensuring that every death sentence is tested and has a proper basis in Florida law. This proposition is not ... inconsistent with our Hamblen opinion. Hamblen and its progeny operate under the premise that a competent defendant may direct his own defense at trial. See Farr v. State, 656 So.2d 448, 449 (Fla. 1995). However, on appeal, this Court must examine [a defendants] death sentence to ensure the uniform application of law, evidentiary support, and proportionality. See Alston, 723 So.2d at 160. To facilitate the Court's duty, Klokoc requires that the defendant have appellate counsel. Therefore, it is not inconsistent for [a defendant] to waive his right to present mitigating evidence at the trial level, yet have appellate counsel appointed against his wishes. Therefore, a lawyer is fully within the confines of his professional duties in honoring a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver to present mitigation during the penalty phase.