Opinion ID: 64501
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Significantly Facilitate

Text: Under the Reccko two-step inquiry, our analysis should end once we conclude that Ollison did not occupy a position of trust. In this case, we will proceed to the second step in order to fully address the arguments raised by the dissent. Even assuming arguendo that Ollison occupied a position of trust, the Government did not provide sufficient evidence that Ollison used her secretary position in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the theft. [12] In this case, the delay in detection is properly attributable to lax oversight of the P-Card program by DISD, not concealment by Ollison. It was simply blind luck that she was not discovered sooner. See United States v. Ragland, 72 F.3d 500, 503 (6th Cir.1996). Although Ollison did alter some receipts before submitting them to DISD, her amateurish effort at concealment was not furthered by or related to her secretary position. The dissent correctly observes that Ollison was responsible for maintaining receipts for all purchases that she made, [13] but DISD never requested those receipts until the P-Card program was terminated in July 2006. Ollison did not evade detection through the abuse of substantial discretionary judgment that was associated with her secretary position. Ollison's position as a secretary gave her the opportunity to commit the crime, but the discretionary authority associated with that position was not instrumental in accomplishing the fraud. [14] Because Ollison's legitimate spending authority was severely limited, it did not assist her in achieving her illegitimate objective. See Tiojanco, 286 F.3d at 1021; see also Ragland, 72 F.3d at 503 ([T]here is no indication that what little autonomy defendant did possess in any way facilitated her scheme....). This case is distinguishable from United States v. Smith , where we held that a bank teller was subject to the enhancement because her position gave her knowledge of the inner workings of the bank and its security measures[, which] significantly facilitated the commission of the offense. 203 F.3d 884, 893 (5th Cir. 2000). Ollison's secretary position did not give her insider knowledge or access to private records that facilitated the commission of the theft. [15] Ollison's misuse of her P-Card, without more, does not subject her to the § 3B1.3 enhancement. See United States v. Hemmingson, 157 F.3d 347, 359-60 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming the district court's refusal to apply the enhancement to an attorney who never performed legal services to facilitate or conceal the crime).