Opinion ID: 413331
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: additional issues in leach case

Text: 14 In the postal case, Leach v. United States Postal Service, the plaintiff presents additional arguments that the Ohio limitations statute on arbitration awards should not apply. We now consider those arguments. 15
16 Leach asserts that Mitchell is inapplicable because his claim against the United States Postal Service is not of the 'hybrid type' claim pursuant to Sec. 301(a), LMRA, but is predicated upon an independent jurisdictional statute, 39 U.S.C. Sec. 409(b), which is in fact subject to an existing limitation period contained in 28 U.S.C. (Appellant's Brief at 16). The time limitation which Leach suggests should be applied pursuant to 39 U.S.C. Sec. 409(b), a provision of the Postal Reorganization Act adopted in 1970, is the general six year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2401(a) governing civil actions brought against the United States. Leach bases this argument on the fact that his claim is a contract claim asserted independently against the federal government. (Appellant's Brief at 18). 17 This argument is incorrect. Section 2401(a) is not the applicable limitations statute. The grievance-arbitration process in the Postal Service came into the law in the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970. In passing the Act, Congress created an independent establishment of the executive branch of the government of the United States, 39 U.S.C. Sec. 201, whose labor relations are patterned after the private sector and to which the National Labor Relations Act applies, 39 U.S.C. Sec. 1209. The national labor policy in favor of arbitration expressed in section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 173(d), is included in the Postal Reorganization Act. It authorized the collective bargaining parties to include procedures culminating in binding third-party arbitration, 39 U.S.C. Sec. 1206(b). To enforce the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, Congress enacted 39 U.S.C. Sec. 1208(b). 18 This Circuit and our sister circuits have uniformly held that 39 U.S.C. Sec. 1208(b) is an analogue of Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1957 3 and have consistently applied Sec. 301 law to suits brought pursuant to 39 U.S.C. Sec. 1208(b). Malone v. United States Postal Service, 526 F.2d 1099, 1103-1104 (6th Cir.1975) (legislative intent of Postal Reorganization Act was to bring postal labor relations within the same structure that exists for nationwide enterprise in the private sector). Accord, National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. United States Postal Service, 590 F.2d 1171 (D.C.Cir.1978); Melendy v. United States Postal Service, 589 F.2d 256 (7th Cir.1978); Winston v. United States Postal Service, 585 F.2d 198 (7th Cir.1978); National Association of Letter Carriers v. Sombrotto, 449 F.2d 915, 919 (2nd Cir.1971). 19 Thus, since the courts have applied Sec. 301 case law to Postal Service labor relations cases arising under 39 U.S.C. Sec. 1208(b) and since it is from the Sec. 301 case law that Mitchell, supra, arose, Mitchell is clearly applicable to Leach's action against the Postal Service. 20
21 Allegations Remove His Case From The Application 22 of UPS Is Without Merit. 23 Leach throws in the argument that since the alleged reason for his discharge from the Postal Service involved an instance of speech (mainly obscenities) and since speech is protected under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, his case should be removed from the restrictive application of the Mitchell principle (Appellant's Brief 18-19). The Postal Service's answer to this argument is well-taken: While he makes these contentions, Leach refuses to recognize, as he did in his arbitration proceeding, that it was his alcoholism which caused the misconduct which led to his discharge. (Appellee's Brief 17): 24 Moreover, even assuming arguendo, that Leach's speech was protected by the First Amendment, he cites no case to support a conclusion that the statute of limitations in challenging his discharge is therefore extended. Carried to its logical conclusion, Leach's argument is that anyone who is discharged will be afforded a longer period within which to file suit if he exercises his right of free speech and shouts an obscenity as he leaves his workplace. Such an argument not only lacks support in the law, it defies common sense. (Appellee's Brief 18.) 25
26 The District Court did not err when it permitted defendants to amend their answers to assert the Mitchell statute of limitations defense. The scope of this Court's review of the District Court's decision to permit the Postal Service to amend its Answer is narrow. Review is limited to the question of whether the District Court abused its discretion in allowing the amendment. Hayden v. Ford Motor Company, 497 F.2d 1292 (6th Cir.1974). 27 Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the amendment of pleadings. The Rule provides, in pertinent part, that: 28 [A] party may amend his pleadings only by leave of court or by written consent of an adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. (emphasis added). 29 This Court, as well as others, has freely allowed the amendment of pleadings in the absence of substantial prejudice to the opposing party. Estes v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 636 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir.1980); Hageman v. Signal L.P. Gas, Inc., 486 F.2d 479 (6th Cir.1973); Head v. Timken Roller Bearing, 486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir.1973). Our review of the record indicates that defendants asserted the Mitchell statute of limitations defense shortly after Mitchell was decided. We do not find present here the kind of prejudice that prevents amendment, and therefore we do not find that the District Court erred in permitting the amendment raising the limitations defense.