Opinion ID: 488727
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Statements About Other Drug Transactions

Text: 26 Munson's next argument concerns testimony by Pierce, Christiansen, and Lynwood Jackson about drug transactions other than those for which Munson was being tried. Pierce said that on an unspecified date, but at some time other than November 19-20, she was present when Grenier and Munson were weighing up some cocaine and packaging it. Christiansen testified about a meeting at his house on October 18, 1984, at which Munson was present when another individual gave Grenier money in exchange for cocaine. According to Munson, the court allowed these statements in under the coconspirator exception of Rule 801(d)(2)(E). No objection was made to Pierce's and Christiansen's statements, however, and the court made no rulings regarding them. 27 Even if an objection had been made, this testimony would have been admissible under the hearsay exception in Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) as evidence of other wrongful acts. Under that rule, 28 [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 29 And, as we have said, should the evidence prove relevant in any other way it is admissible, subject only to the rarely invoked limitations of Rule 403. United States v. Zeuli, 725 F.2d 813, 816 (1st Cir.1984). This testimony by Christiansen and Pierce was relevant to the intent of Grenier and Munson to conspire. As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has said, 30 In every conspiracy case, ... a not guilty plea renders the defendant's intent a material issue and imposes a difficult burden on the government. Evidence of such extrinsic offenses as may be probative of a defendant's state of mind is admissible unless he affirmatively take[s] the issue of intent out of the case. 31 United States v. Roberts, 619 F.2d 379, 383 (5th Cir.1980) (citation omitted); see United States v. Zeuli, 725 F.2d at 816. 32 A third bit of evidence to which Munson points was testimony by Lynwood Jackson, who said he bought cocaine from Christiansen on or about July 8, 1983, at which time Christiansen identified Munson as his supplier. Munson's counsel did object to this testimony. The court allowed it in as a coconspirator statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) according to the procedure we set forth in United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d at 23, and further elucidated in United States v. Ciampaglia, 628 F.2d 632, 638 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956, 101 S.Ct. 365, 66 L.Ed.2d 221 (1980). After all the testimony had been given the court found that it was a statement made while Christiansen and the defendant were members of a conspiracy not charged in the indictment, but related to substantive offenses charged in Counts I through III. The court ruled correctly. 33 It is well established that the applicability of the 'co-conspirator' exception to the hearsay rule is not conditioned on the presence of a conspiracy count in the indictment. Ottomano v. United States, 468 F.2d 269, 273 (1st Cir.1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1128, 93 S.Ct. 948, 35 L.Ed.2d 260 (1973); see also, e.g., United States v. Stratton, 779 F.2d 820, 829 (2d Cir.1985) ([I]t is not necessary that the Government charge a conspiracy to take advantage of Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). The Government merely needs to demonstrate that the declarant and the defendants against whom the statements are offered are members of a conspiracy in furtherance of which the statements are made....), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 2285, 90 L.Ed.2d 726 (1986); United States v. Williams, 435 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir.1970) (same), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995, 91 S.Ct. 1241, 28 L.Ed.2d 533 (1971); 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence p 801(d)(2)(E), at 801-229 (1985) (same). Although the only conspiracy charged in the indictment allegedly took place on November 18-20, 1984, the evidence supports the court's finding that Munson and Christiansen were conspiring with respect to the July 1983 transactions charged in the indictment. Christiansen testified that during July 6-8 he was purchasing cocaine from Munson and distributing it to others, including Jackson. Jackson testified that he bought cocaine on or about July 8, and that Munson was present at Christiansen's residence when the transaction took place. Christiansen's statement identifying his source advanced the sale of the cocaine and thus was in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Lambros, 564 F.2d at 30. Jackson's testimony, therefore, was properly admitted. 34