Opinion ID: 654569
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the heightened pleading standard

Text: 55 Generally, in civil cases, plaintiffs are entitled to discovery if they set forth in their complaint a  'short and plain statement of [303 U.S.App.D.C. 345] the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2)). In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), however, the Supreme Court concluded that bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery. Id., at 817-18, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. The purpose of the qualified immunity rule in Harlow was to dispose of insubstantial claims prior to discovery and trial. See id., at 815-16, 102 S.Ct. at 2737. Thus, Harlow held that government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Id., at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. Although the Court purported to eliminate inquiry into the subjective intent of Government officials, Harlow did not discuss cases in which unconstitutional motive is an essential element of the claim. 56 Two years after the decision in Harlow, this court considered the question not reached in Harlow. In Hobson v. Wilson, 237 U.S.App.D.C. 219, 737 F.2d 1 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084, 105 S.Ct. 1843, 85 L.Ed.2d 142 (1985), the court held that, in cases in which the motive of Government officials is an essential element of the claim, a plaintiff's pleading must rest on nonconclusory allegations to support a claim of unconstitutional motive. See id., 737 F.2d at 29. Hobson did not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence; however, six years after Hobson, in Siegert v. Gilley, 895 F.2d 797, 802 (D.C.Cir.1990), aff'd on other grounds, 500 U.S. 226, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991), a different panel of the court held that a plaintiff's pleadings must provide direct, as opposed to circumstantial, evidence of unconstitutional motive in order to survive a motion to dismiss. 57 Hobson and Siegert are irreconcilable in their commands, thus it appears that the panel in Siegert ignored the law of the circuit in adopting a direct evidence rule. Nonetheless, the majority in this case ignores Hobson and relies on Siegert, instead, in dismissing Kimberlin's case. Even if Siegert can somehow be read merely as an outgrowth of Hobson--a fanciful claim, I think--it ought to be reconsidered by the court en banc. The simple truth here is that a direct evidence rule finds no support in the Federal Rules, is at odds with Supreme Court precedent, defies the case law of this and other circuits, and is a nonsensical notion. 58 As an initial matter, as noted above, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Leatherman calls into question even the underlying rationale of the heightened pleading standard in Hobson. In Hobson, this court justified the heightened pleading requirement as a firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Hobson, 737 F.2d at 29-30 & n. 86 (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2911, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978)). In Leatherman, however, the Supreme Court held that it was impossible to square  a heightened pleading standard similar to the one in Hobson 4 with the liberal system of 'notice pleading' set up by [FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a) ]. Leatherman, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1163 (emphasis added). Further, the Supreme Court noted that Rule 9(b) contains an exclusive list of actions for which particularized pleading may be required, and that, in the absence of an amendment to the Rules, the courts may not require particularized pleading in causes of action not listed in Rule 9(b). Id.; see FED.R.CIV.P. 9(b) (requiring particularized pleading in cases alleging fraud and mistake). The Court's decision in Leatherman thus employs a strict reading of Rules 8 and 9 that suggests strongly that any heightened pleading standard is impossible to square with the Rules, and is therefore invalid. 5 59 [303 U.S.App.D.C. 346] Even if we assume that some form of a heightened pleading requirement may be imposed in cases involving a qualified immunity defense, today's holding still cannot stand. Nothing in Hobson reasonably can be read to invoke a categorical distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence. Rather, the court in Hobson ruled that, 60 in cases involving a claim that defendants acted with an unconstitutional motive, we will require that nonconclusory allegations [or] evidence of such intent must be present in a complaint for litigants to proceed to discovery on the claim. The allegations on this issue need not be extensive, but they will have to be sufficiently precise to put defendants on notice of the nature of the claim and enable them to prepare a response and, where appropriate, a summary judgment motion on qualified immunity grounds. 61 737 F.2d at 29 (emphasis added). Hobson also stated that Harlow requires that merely conclusory allegations of unconstitutional motive, devoid of factual support, must be found lacking and dismissed. Id., at 31 (emphasis added). Thus, the pleading standard in Hobson was intended to ensure that there was a factual basis for the plaintiff's allegations and that Government officials be put on notice of the specific claims against them; Hobson was not concerned about the plaintiff's use of direct as opposed to circumstantial evidence. 6 62 The court's later decision in Siegert inexplicably characterizes the complaint in Hobson as an example of allegations of direct evidence of improper motivation that will overcome a defense of qualified immunity. Siegert, 895 F.2d at 804. A careful examination of Hobson reveals that the complaint in that case referred to memoranda that provided direct evidence of the unconstitutional intent of only two of the five Hobson defendants; the illegal intent of the other three Hobson defendants was established by strong circumstantial evidence. See Hobson, 737 F.2d at 8-9 (noting that incriminating memoranda were issued by defendants Brennan and Moore, but not by defendants Jones, Grimaldi and Pangburn). 7 If Siegert really [303 U.S.App.D.C. 347] meant to adhere to Hobson as it arose and as it was decided, then the direct evidence requirement enunciated inSiegert cannot be seen to rest on a categorical distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence, and the pleading standard in Siegert can be reconciled with the pleading standard in Hobson. Instead of direct evidence, Siegert can be read to require precise, nonconclusory allegations supported by direct or circumstantial evidence of unconstitutional intent--which is exactly what the complaint in Hobson provided. See Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 774 F.Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C.1991) (reasoning that Siegert does not appear to have turned on the distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as understood in the law of evidence, but on the question whether the plaintiff had proffered something other than mere conclusions, namely tangible allegations of concrete facts corroborative of [the plaintiff's] own subjective version of the events). However, if the Siegert court really meant to require direct as opposed to circumstantial evidence, then the pleading standard adopted by Siegert cannot be reconciled with Hobson. 63 The apparent confusion of the Siegert majority over the meaning of the standard in Hobson can be traced to several decisions rendered in the aftermath of Hobson. In Martin v. D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, 812 F.2d 1425 (D.C.Cir.1987), the panel majority held that a plaintiff must present more than inferential or circumstantial support for his allegation of unconstitutional motive. That is, some direct evidence that the officials' actions were improperly motivated.... Id., at 1435. Martin borrowed the direct evidence language from a trial court in Maryland, which had fashioned a direct evidence pleading requirement out of whole cloth. Harris v. Eichbaum, 642 F.Supp. 1056, 1066 (D.Md.1986), cited in Martin, 812 F.2d at 1435. Although this ill-chosen language appears to be the source of the direct evidence standard, a close examination of the reasoning in Martin reveals that there is no basis (other than the bare, unexplained words) to believe that the Martin majority intended to require plaintiffs to plead direct, as opposed to circumstantial, evidence of unconstitutional motive. Certainly, there is no reason to elevate this language, plucked from a district court opinion, over the binding precedent established by this court in Hobson. 64 First, and most tellingly, the majority opinion in Martin explicitly affirmed an intention to remain faithful to Hobson. In its holding, Martin instructed the trial court to defer its decision on the defendants' motion for summary judgment until after the plaintiff had obtained limited discovery 8 and had presented an amended complaint meeting the standard set out in Hobson, 737 F.2d at 29. Martin, 812 F.2d at 1438 (emphasis added). Thus, Martin purported to be faithful to the heightened pleading standard in Hobson. See also id., at 1434 (quoting Hobson, 737 F.2d at 30, that plaintiffs must 'produce some factual support for their claim [303 U.S.App.D.C. 348] [of unconstitutional motive] to avert dismissal' ); id., at 1438 (Edwards, J., concurring) (noting that the majority opinion is not unfaithful to the teachings of Hobson). The logical conclusion is that Martin simply intended to restate the Hobson pleading requirement. Most certainly, there is nothing in Martin that shows an intent to replace Hobson with a more rigorous pleading standard. 65 Second, Martin was concerned with the overall probative quality of the plaintiff's evidence at the pleading stage, not with its characterization as direct or circumstantial. Martin characterized its heightened pleading standard as a [l]imitation [ ] ... on the range of inferences a trial court may draw, (not as a prohibition on the trial court's reliance on inferences), and illustrated the standard with examples from antitrust cases. Id., at 1435-36 (emphasis added). A review of the cited antitrust cases confirms that not one of them invokes a distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence. See especially Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764, 104 S.Ct. 1464, 1471, 79 L.Ed.2d 775 (1984) (permitting direct or circumstantial  evidence to support an inference of conspiracy) (emphasis added), cited in Martin, 812 F.2d at 1436. Martin also concluded that [the plaintiff's] fact recitations, as they now stand, are insufficiently probative of the alleged unconstitutional motive to warrant denial of the [defendants'] motion for summary judgment. 812 F.2d at 1436 (emphasis added); but see id. (noting that the plaintiff had produced no direct evidence of the defendants' unconstitutional motive). Needless to say, this focus on the probative quality of the evidence is entirely consistent with the pleading requirement in Hobson. 66 The distortion of Hobson can also be traced to Whitacre v. Davey, 890 F.2d 1168 (D.C.Cir.1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1038, 110 S.Ct. 3301, 111 L.Ed.2d 810 (1990), in which the court incorrectly opined that Martin made clear that if a plaintiff failed to allege direct evidence of unconstitutional intent, his claim must be dismissed immediately. Id., at 1171 n. 4. Whitacre has no precedential weight, however, because the court in that case did not rely on the plaintiff's lack of direct evidence when it dismissed the plaintiff's claim. Id., at 1172. 67 The Siegert majority attempted to summarize and clarify the court's holdings in Hobson, Martin and Whitacre, but, in so doing, the majority mistakenly latched onto the direct evidence language in Martin and incorrectly concluded that, 68 under this court's heightened pleading standard, in order to obtain even limited discovery, [unconstitutional] intent must be pleaded with specific, discernible facts or offers of proof that constitute direct as opposed to merely circumstantial evidence of the intent. 69 Siegert, 895 F.2d at 802. Indeed, the Siegert majority insisted that the plaintiff must offer direct evidence of impermissible motive, contrasting direct with circumstantial evidence in at least two places in the opinion, see id., at 802, 803, even though there is no foundation for this pleading standard in either Hobson or Martin--the two cases upon which Siegert principally relied. 70 Regrettably, the Supreme Court did not address the heightened pleading standard when it affirmed the court's judgment in Siegert. 9 However, Justice Kennedy specifically wrote in a separate concurrence that he would reject ... the Court of Appeals' statement that a plaintiff must present direct, as opposed to circumstantial, evidence. Siegert, 500 U.S. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 1795 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Instead, Justice Kennedy wrote that a heightened pleading standard should require a plaintiff to put forward specific, nonconclusory factual allegations which establish malice, or face dismissal. Id. In his dissent, Justice Marshall (joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens) also stated that the court of appeals erred in holding that a plaintiff must proffer direct evidence of the unconstitutional motive. Id., at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 1800 (Marshall, J., dissenting). At least three justices of the [303 U.S.App.D.C. 349] current Supreme Court have therefore made plain that they believe that a direct evidence rule is error. 71 Following the Supreme Court's decision in Siegert, this court's application of the heightened pleading standard has floundered. In Hunter v. District of Columbia, 943 F.2d 69 (D.C.Cir.1991), the panel held that [t]he [heightened] pleading standard requires no more than that the plaintiff tell his story, relating the pertinent information that is already in his possession. Id., at 76 (citing to Justice Marshall's dissent in Siegert for analogous support). Shortly after Hunter was decided, in Crawford-El v. Britton, 951 F.2d 1314 (D.C.Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 62, 121 L.Ed.2d 29 (1992), the court applied the Hobson formulation of the heightened pleading standard without reference to the direct evidence requirement in Siegert. 10 Id., at 1317 (quoting Andrews v. Wilkins, 934 F.2d 1267, 1269-70 (D.C.Cir.1991) (quoting Hobson, 737 F.2d at 30)). Crawford-El also noted that Hunter had clarified the scope of this circuit's heightened pleading standard. Id., at 1322. If nothing else, Hunter and Crawford-El show that there is considerable confusion in this circuit about the correct formulation of the heightened pleading standard. 72 To summarize, the heightened pleading standard, as originally formulated in Hobson, makes no mention of direct evidence and does not provide the basis of a pleading standard that requires direct, as opposed to circumstantial, evidence. The direct evidence language that forms the basis of the majority's holding today arose out of thin air in Martin, borrowed from a district court opinion that likewise conjured the language out of thin air. While the direct evidence language in Martin was reconcilable with the Hobson standard, subsequent cases such as Whitacre and Siegert have poured an unintended significance into the language that is fundamentally irreconcilable with the standard in Hobson. 73 Faced with an irreconcilable difference between two heightened pleading standards, a panel of this court is not free to overrule the original standard with a subsequent distortion of that standard. The pleading requirement in Hobson is binding precedent. See Martin, 812 F.2d at 1440 (Starr, J., dissenting in part) (Even if one has latter-day doubts as to Hobson 's wisdom, the pleading requirement which it so clearly articulates is the law of this circuit. We are bound to follow it.). 74