Opinion ID: 1511494
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Twenty-Day Period

Text: In determining the validity of the finding as to the first period excluded by the court below the following chronology is significant. The case was listed for arraignment on January 7, 1976. At some point prior to arraignment, the trial had been scheduled to begin on January 29, 1976. Appellant failed to appear for the scheduled arraignment; the reason for her absence does not appear in the record before us. On January 27, 1976, the bench warrant which had been issued for her absence on January 7, 1976, was withdrawn and the trial date of January 29, 1976 was left undisturbed. There is no contention that appellant's actions between January 7th and January 27th in any way prevented the commencement of trial on the scheduled date of January 29, 1976. [2] The Commonwealth contends and the court below agreed, that appellant was unavailable between January 7th and January 27th and therefore this period was properly excluded under section (d). Assuming that appellant had been properly notified of her obligation to appear for the January 7th arraignment it would be proper to find that she was unavailable between that date and the time she did appear on January 27, 1976. Commonwealth v. Cohen, 481 Pa. 349, 392 A.2d 1327 (1978) (wherein we held that where a defendant on bail, who has received proper notice of a court proceeding, fails to appear as directed is unavailable from the time of such proceeding until his subsequent apprehension or until he voluntarily surrenders.) However, finding that appellant or her counsel was unavailable provides only one of the prerequisites for an exclusion under section (d)(1). Section (d)(1) requires the exclusion of the period of delay resulting from the unavailability of the defendant or counsel for the defense. [3] A critical fact in this instance is that the unavailability of appellant between January 7th and January 27th did not result in delaying the schedule of the proceedings. The conclusion that section (d)(1) requires that the unavailability cause a delay in the proceedings finds ample support in our prior cases. In Commonwealth v. Millhouse, 470 Pa. 512, 517, 368 A.2d 1273, 1276 (1977), this Court stated: The actual period of delay at any stage of the proceedings attributable to the unavailability of the defendant or his attorney is an automatic exclusion from the time limits . . . . In Millhouse, supra, a majority of this Court found that the delay caused by the defendant's deliberate failure to retain counsel when he was in the financial position to do so was excludable under section (d)(1). In computing the period to be excluded, the Court noted, the preliminary arraignment, however, was held despite the absence of counsel and thus, no actual delay resulted. Id., 470 Pa. at 518, 368 A.2d at 1276. In Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 475 Pa. 227, 380 A.2d 326 (1977), the prosecution argued that a certain period of time should have been excluded from the computation of the 180 day period because the appellant was allegedly unavailable for trial, he being on trial for another offense in another courtroom. To this contention this Court responded: We cannot accept the prosecution's argument that a defendant is unavailable for trial within the meaning of Pa. Rule Crim. Procedure 1100(d)(1) for the entire criminal [term] during which he is tried on separate criminal charges in the same county, without reference to the actual days consumed in the trial of those charges. (emphasis added) Commonwealth v. Vaughn, supra, 475 Pa. at 232-33, 380 A.2d at 329. Another instance where we had occasion to refer to the relationship required by section (d)(1) between the period of unavailability and a delay in the commencement of trial can be found in our decision in Commonwealth v. Lamonna, 473 Pa. 248, 373 A.2d 1355 (1977). In that case we had occasion to state that, the mere fact that counsel was preoccupied with other matters at some point during the 180 day period is irrelevant for purposes of section (d) unless the unavailability causes a delay in the proceedings . . . Id., 473 Pa. at 252, 373 A.2d at 1359. A further explication of this concept may be found in the Superior Court's opinion in Commonwealth v. Mancuso, 247 Pa.Super. 245, 372 A.2d 444 (1977). Judge Hoffman speaking for that court stated: In its brief, the Commonwealth argues that the period of time during which appellants were not represented should be excluded under Rule 1100(d)(1) which provides for an exclusion of time resulting from counsel's unavailability. The Commonwealth misconstrues the rule. The rule does not permit us to search for days when counsel or appellant were unavailable unless delay in the proceedings results from the unavailability. See Commonwealth v. Coleman, 241 Pa.Super. 450, 361 A.2d 870 (1976); Commonwealth v. Wade, 240 Pa.Super. 454, 360 A.2d 752 (1976); Commonwealth v. Adams, 237 Pa.Super. 452, 352 A.2d 97 (1975). The Commonwealth must be able to point to actual frustration of litigation before we can conclude that unavailability of counsel or a defendant caused the delay. In fact, Fayette County scheduled no criminal proceedings during the period in question. Thus, appellants' failure to retain counsel could not have caused delay in the proceedings. (emphasis in original) Id., 247 Pa.Super. at 250-251, n.4, 372 A.2d at 446, n.4. Nor do we accept the argument that the postponement of the arraignment constituted a delay in the proceedings as required by section (d) where as here it in no way affected the commencement of trial. While the delay may occur at any stage in the proceedings it is only a delay cognizable under section (d) where it causes (either directly or indirectly) the commencement of trial to be postponed for some period of time beyond the time it would have been scheduled absent the delay. The thrust of Rule 1100 was to crystallize and clarify the Commonwealth's obligation to afford the defendant a speedy trial. Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa. 297, 297 A.2d 127 (1972). The concern of the Rule is the delay in the commencement of trial and section (d) seeks to prevent the Commonwealth from being accountable for those delays in the commencement of trial where they result from actions properly attributable to the defense. Thus, any occurrences between the filing of the complaint and the commencement of the trial which did not affect the time in which the trial was commenced, is beyond the purview of the Rule and therefore not properly considered as a delay in the proceedings within the terms of section (d) of the Rule. Delay in the proceedings as used in the Rule requires an actual frustration in the commencement of trial. A postponement of an arraignment which does not in any way prolong the time for the commencement of trial is irrelevant to the question of a speedy trial and is therefore not in fact to be considered in determining the application of Rule 1100 in a given case. We therefore hold that the twenty (20) day period between January 7th and January 27, 1976 was improperly excluded from the computation of the time in which trial was required to commence under Rule 1100.