Opinion ID: 4539973
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: City Copy Fee Schedule

Text: Next, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the fees assessed by the city for providing photocopies of public records are commensurate with the actual costs of producing a photocopy, as required by RSA 91-A:4, IV. That provision provides, in part, that: If a computer, photocopying machine, or other device maintained for use by a public body or agency is used by the public body or agency to copy the governmental record requested, the person requesting the copy may be charged the actual cost of providing the copy, which cost may be collected by the public body or agency. The plaintiff contends that, in drawing its conclusion, the trial court either relied on evidence that does not support its conclusion, or misapplied RSA 91-A:4, IV by failing to conduct a formulaic numeric analysis to determine the city’s “actual cost” of providing a photocopy. Based upon the plaintiff’s calculations, he maintains that the trial court could not have properly concluded that a rate higher than approximately four cents per page complies with the requirements of the Right-to-Know Law. When a trial court renders a decision after a trial on the merits, we uphold its factual findings and rulings unless they lack evidentiary support or are legally erroneous. Vention Med. Advanced Components v. Pappas, 171 N.H. 13, 28 (2018). We do not decide whether we would have ruled differently than the trial court, but rather, whether a reasonable person could have reached the same decision as the trial court based upon the same evidence. Marist Bros. of N.H. v. Town of Effingham, 171 N.H. 305, 309 (2018). Thus, we defer to the trial court’s judgment on such issues as resolving conflicts in the testimony, measuring the credibility of witnesses, and determining the weight to be given evidence. Id. Nevertheless, we review the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo. Id. We note that, in RSA 91-A:4, IV, the legislature did not mandate use of a formulaic method for determining “actual cost” and we decline the plaintiff’s invitation to impose a requirement that the legislature did not see fit to include. See Petition of Malisos, 166 N.H. 726, 729 (2014) (“We . . . will not consider 7 what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include.”). Therefore, contrary to the plaintiff’s assertion, to prove that the city’s copy fee schedule complied with RSA 91-A:4, IV, the city was not obligated to proffer either specific numbers in support of its rate, or the city budget. At trial, the court received evidence of copy fee schedules2 from other municipalities. In addition, the city manager testified to the costs of producing a photocopy that are considered when establishing the fee schedule, including the cost of leasing copy machines, maintenance, capital costs on the machines, and the cost of paper. Further, the city manager testified that the fee schedule is based upon the actual cost of copying, and not the labor associated with making the copies. The trial court found that the city’s fee schedule is “commensurate with ‘the actual cost of providing the copy,’ . . . as evidenced by testimony of City officials and by comparison with other fees assessed in comparable municipalities across the state.” On the record before us, we conclude that the evidence presented to the trial court was sufficient such that a reasonable person could draw the same conclusion that the court did.