Opinion ID: 2143014
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Hospital Records and X rays.

Text: On direct examination, Dr. Marshall expressed a medical opinion highly favorable to plaintiff. Upon cross-examination he conceded that one of the bases for this opinion was his clinical knowledge of plaintiff. He also admitted that this clinical knowledge was partly gained from the hospital records covering plaintiff's various hospitalizations from 1953 through 1961 and also from various X rays taken of plaintiff's leg from 1953 through the accident of March 16, 1959. By stipulation and testimony it was established that these were the hospital records and X rays of plaintiff but, except for notations on these records signed by Dr. Marshall and corroborated by him, none of the other persons who had made entries in the records, or had actually taken the X rays, were called as authenticating witnesses. After the conclusion of the cross-examination of Dr. Marshall, defendants offered the hospital records and X rays in evidence. Plaintiff objected on the ground that they had not been properly authenticated. The trial court admitted them for the limited purpose of the cross-examination of Dr. Marshall and for the use of defendants' medical experts in giving their testimony but ruled that such hospital records and X rays would not be permitted to go to the jury. Defendants' medical experts, Drs. Kaufman and Nellen, did rely on these hospital records and X rays in giving opinion testimony adverse to plaintiff. Therefore, if the trial court  erred in permitting this use of them, such error was prejudicial. However, we find no error. Plaintiff relies upon our decision in Rupp v. Travelers Indemnity Co. (1962), 17 Wis. (2d) 16, 115 N. W. (2d) 612, which is succinctly summarized in headnote 1 as follows: The supreme court cannot interpret sec. 327.25, Stats., relating to the admissibility in evidence of entries made in the usual course of business, no matter how liberally, so as to excise from the statute the express requirement therein that entries must be identified by the testimony of the entrants if it is not shown that they are beyond the jurisdiction of the court or are insane. Nevertheless, the Rupp decision did not repudiate the rule of Sundquist v. Madison Railways Co. (1928), 197 Wis. 83, 221 N. W. 392, but instead expressly distinguished it. In the Sundquist Case, objection was made to the testimony of plaintiff's medical expert, in giving a diagnosis which was partially based upon a report of the results of examinations made by hospital technicians, because these technicians were not called as witnesses and their reports were not received in evidence. This court upheld the trial court's overruling the objection and stated (p. 87): In making a diagnosis for treatment physicians must of necessity consider many things that do not appear in sworn proof on the trial of a lawsuit,things that mean much to the trained eye and touch of a skilled medical practitioner. This court has held that it will not close the doors of the courts to the light which is given by a diagnosis which all the rest of the world accepts and acts upon, even if the diagnosis is in part based upon facts which are not established by the sworn testimony in the case to be true. Leora v. M., St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co. 156 Wis. 386, 395, 146 N. W. 520. In Rupp we commented upon the holding in the Sundquist Case as follows (p. 20):  Underlying this decision is the concept [that] the hospital records, although hearsay, were trustworthy as a basis for a medical conclusion because one in a position to know accepted and relied upon them in the important daily affairs of mankind. Thus there is no question concerning the propriety of Dr. Marshall's basing his medical opinion upon his clinical knowledge obtained in part from the hospital records and X rays in question even though they were hearsay in the absence of the authenticating testimony required by sec. 327.25, Stats. 1961. It is also obvious that defendants' counsel could properly use them for the purpose of cross-examining Dr. Marshall. The closer question is whether it was proper to admit them for the further limited purpose of permitting defendants' medical experts to base their opinion testimony on them. None of the briefs submitted cite any authority on this precise point. Surprisingly, independent research on our part has also failed to unearth a single case passing on this question. The preservation of the spirit of fair play inherent in our adversary system of trying lawsuits seems to us to lead to but one conclusion: If plaintiff's medical expert has relied on hospital-record entries and X rays not in evidence in testifying to a diagnosis or medical opinion, then defendants' medical experts should be accorded the same privilege. Therefore, we approve the challenged ruling of the trial court.