Opinion ID: 2631813
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: pagan religion

Text: The first issue for determination is whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion when it allowed into evidence the State's cross-examination of Leitner concerning her involvement with Wicca, a pagan religion, sometimes referred to as witchcraft. The admission and exclusion of evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Lumley, 266 Kan. 939, 953, 976 P.2d 486 (1999). `[I]t is clear that our standard of review regarding a trial court's admission of evidence, subject to exclusionary rules, is abuse of discretion.` [Citation omitted] 266 Kan. at 950. Judicial discretion is abused only when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. State v. Williams, 268 Kan. 1, 8, 988 P.2d 722 (1999). On February 17, 1999, Leitner filed a pretrial motion in limine asking the trial court to prohibit counsel and witnesses for the State from, among other things, making reference to, eliciting testimony or offering evidence of ... [t]he alleged practice of `witchcraft' by the accused. The trial court heard oral arguments on pretrial motions on March 3, 1999. The State offered no objection to an order excluding such evidence. The court granted Leitner's motion in limine in its entirety. On the third day of the jury trial, the court heard the arguments of counsel on several issues outside the presence of the jury. The judge stated: [W]ith regard to the issue of witchcraft, that the court has determined ... after reviewing K.S.A. 60-445 the court has discretion to exclude certain evidence, and as far as my knowledge of the case ... I question whether the State's able to show how her involvement with witchcraft or membership in any organization, religious beliefs, are related to the crime charged, and without a showing of that I think it's highly prejudicial for that material to be before the jury, and we did have a motion in limine on that, and I think I'll hold you to that.... I'll forewarn you that I do find this fairly highly prejudicial potentially to the jury and very little probative value as far as showing how even her subsequent acts might relate to the crime.... The State agreed to instruct its witnesses of the court's ruling. The trial court, noting that it was possible that defense witnesses could open the door to this subject, stated if they do we'll deal with it at that time. Later, during a recess in the trial outside the hearing of the jury, the State again raised the topic of questioning witness Pam Hockett regarding Leitner's witchcraft activities following Michael's murder. The State proffered to the court that Pam would testify that defendant was using a black caldron, she cooked flowers in there, seeds, and did chants of some sort, and she slept with some type of tree branch, and I think it was oak, over her bed, and these were all particular to the defendant's beliefs in what I'm going to call witchcraft but I think she calls Wicca.... [T]he defendant did these behaviors as protection spells ... to be protection from the KBI ... discovering what she did to her ex-husband. Again, the court ordered the State not to get into that area because of the high prejudicial value of the testimony. The trial court noted that this evidence might possibly show some evidence of consciousness of guilt but determined that there was other evidence of that nature available. On Friday, August 27, 1999, the defense called Leitner to the stand. She testified about the events that occurred the night of Michael's death, their marital history, and about many specific instances of physical abuse Michael inflicted on her. She testified that after a certain time period, Michael stopped hitting her in the face but would hit her in places where her clothes would cover the injuries. She stated that did not seek medical attention after these instances because Michael was her nurse afterward and twice gave her stitches using fishing line and a mattress needle. Leitner testified that she intentionally shot Michael three times after he hit her in the stomach and choked her. Following the direct examination of Leitner during a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor again broached the topic of her involvement with witchcraft. The prosecutor asserted that [t]he defendant in her testimony has opened the door to several items ... when she testified about the nature of the relationship with the victim, Michael Leitner and stated that witnesses had alleged that the reasons Michael hit her on a couple of occasions was that the defendant was involved in witchcraft and he didn't like it, being the reason for possibly Michael hitting her. The central concern of the prosecutor regarding Leitner's testimony was that she had misled the jury by making direct misstatements about her sexual experience with men prior to and during her marriage to Michael, about reporting to others that he abused her, and about the lack of provocation on her part when Michael hit her. Counsel for Leitner argued that as to the affairs or the witchcraft, nothing Patricia testified to touched on those issues.... It's not relevant. It's highly prejudicial. The prosecutor countered by stating, Well, oh, he wants her to be able to testify, your Honor, that all this abuse occurred, but we're not allowed to get into why it may have occurred and that it may be her fault that she was involved in things that Michael didn't want her to. (Emphasis added.) After a brief discussion of another issue, the court stated: I'm concerned about the witchcraft. Do you have witnesses ... that can testify that beatings were a result of her involvement ... in witchcraft? The State made the proffer that testimony of Leitner's sister, Tammy Warner, would be that Leitner only told her of two occasions of abuse, one of which was when Michael found out Leitner had attended a pagan ritual involving witchcraft and the other when he learned she was dating a man involved in it. Counsel for Leitner argued that the prosecutor seemed to be arguing that the witchcraft and the affair justified the beatings. The trial court acknowledged that I don't know that there's any justification for beatings. The court ruled, however, that despite efforts to keep the issues of witchcraft, prostitution, and fires from the jury, Leitner's testimony appeared to open the door. Therefore, the court decided to allow the State to cross-examine Leitner about her former involvement with prostitution, witchcraft, and extramarital affairs. Leitner's attorney requested a standing objection to any of this evidence coming in. The trial court required the attorney to make specific objection or to just say objection. The State proceeded to cross-examine Leitner concerning her testimony of Michael's past physical abuse. Defense counsel objected on the grounds of relevancy, but the court allowed the questioning to continue. Leitner denied that she had been hit by Michael after he had caught her having sex with another man. Next, the State brought up the subject of witchcraft. Following another objection by Leitner's counsel, the court allowed the State to continue. The State repeated the question, asking Leitner whether she got into an argument with Mike because [she] had entered into witchcraft and [she] had gone to a pagan ritual ceremony.... Leitner denied it, stating that none of the times that I got beat up was it ever or ever had anything to do with pagan religion. Following that exchange, the trial record reads: Q. You're not denying that you were involved in that though? A. No, I am not. Q. You in fact were involved in that? A. Wicca. [Counsel for Leitner]: Judge, this is beyond the scope. I think the State has exceeded the boundaries. THE COURT: Well, I don't know that we need to go further at this point. [The State]: I just want to make sure she wasn't denying she was involved in that. [Leitner]: No. At trial, the prosecutor argued he should be able to question Leitner about witchcraft to clarify for the jury why the physical abuse may have occurred due to her fault because she was involved in things that Michael did not like. On appeal, the State contends that, in an effort to counter Leitner's testimony that Michael indiscriminately physically abused her, it sought to present evidence that he disliked her practice of witchcraft which caused marital strife. The State's asserted purpose was to impeach Leitner and to put into context Michael's alleged action against the defendant on the specific instance testified to by the defendant. Further, the State argues that the trial court used the balancing test provided in K.S.A. 60-445 and properly found that the value of the evidence was not outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Conversely, Leitner argues that [t]he use of the word `witch' to evoke terror in the jury in a contemporary criminal trial echoes the cries of `communist' in the McCarthyist 1950's or `witch' in the days of Salem. Relying on State v. Pham, 27 Kan. App.2d 996, 10 P.3d 780 (2000), Leitner asks for a new trial because there was no probative value to balance against the extreme prejudice from the introduction of the witchcraft material. The State's position is that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Leitner's affiliation with witchcraft. The State contends that, during the trial, the prosecutor not only sought to show the jury that the defendant was not completely truthful in her statements to the jury, thus impeaching her, but also to put into context Michael's alleged action against the defendant on the specific instance testified to by the defendant. Additionally, the State argues that if, arguendo, the trial court did commit error by admitting this evidence, it constituted harmless error.
Except as otherwise provided by statute, constitutional prohibition, or court decision, all relevant evidence is admissible. K.S.A. 60-407(f); State v. Galloway, 268 Kan. 682, 686, 1 P.3d 844 (2000); Divine v. Groshong, 235 Kan. 127, 130, 679 P.2d 700 (1984). K.S.A. 60-401(b) defines relevant evidence as evidence having any tendency in reason to prove any material fact. Leitner urges this court to consider several cases when determining whether the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed into evidence her involvement with Wicca, or witchcraft. The first is Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 117 L. Ed.2d 309, 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992). In that case, after a jury convicted the defendant of first-degree felony murder, a penalty hearing was conducted so that the jury could decide whether he should be sentenced to death. At the hearing, the trial court allowed the introduction of evidence of the defendant's Aryan Brotherhood tattoos during the jury's consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The Dawson Court, extending the protection of the First Amendment to evidence introduced at a sentencing hearing, concluded: [T]he Constitution does not erect a per se barrier to the admission of evidence concerning one's beliefs and associations ... simply because those beliefs and associations are protected by the First Amendment. [W]e nevertheless agree [that]... the receipt into evidence ... regarding his membership in the Aryan Brotherhood was constitutional error. Dawson, 503 U.S. at 165. The Dawson Court reasoned that even if the Aryan Brotherhood espoused racist beliefs, those beliefs had no relevance to the defendant's sentencing. 503 U.S. at 166. The Dawson Court concluded that the defendant's First Amendment rights were violated by the admission of the Aryan Brotherhood evidence in this case, because the evidence proved nothing more than Dawson's abstract beliefs. Cf. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 503 U.S. at 167. Next, Leitner cites the Nevada case of Flanagan v. State, 846 P.2d 1053 (Nev. 1993). In Flanagan, the prosecution presented details of the defendants' belief in the occult and membership in a coven to establish their bad character at a sentencing hearing. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, but the United States Supreme Court vacated the sentences in light of Dawson. On remand, the Flanagan court reviewed the rule set forth in Dawson, stating: The United States Supreme Court stated that evidence of constitutionally protected associations could be admissible to show that a defendant poses a future danger to society. [Citation omitted.] However, the mere fact that a defendant belongs to a group holding racist or other antisocial beliefs is insufficient. To be admissible, the constitutionally suspect evidence must somehow be `tied' to the defendant's crime. [Citation omitted.] .... From Dawson, we derive the following rule: Evidence of a constitutionally protected activity is admissible only if it is used for something more than general character evidence. 846 P.2d at 1055-56. Leitner further cites the case of Unites States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 83 L. Ed.2d 450, 105 S. Ct. 465 (1984). In Abel, the United States Supreme Court held that under the common law of evidence, the admission of evidence relating to a witness' membership in an organization may be relevant to show witness bias, i.e., that his or her testimony was slanted or perhaps fabricated. 469 U.S. at 52-53. Even though this court has not encountered a previous murder trial where evidence of a defendant's association with witchcraft was admitted into evidence, it has considered cases concerning the admission of evidence of gang affiliation. In State v. Sims, 265 Kan. 166, Syl. ¶ 5, 960 P.2d 1271 (1998), this court stated: Evidence of gang affiliation indicating a defendant is a member of a gang or is involved in gang-related activity is admissible to show a motive for an otherwise inexplicable act. Such evidence, however, is only admissible where there is sufficient proof that such membership or activity is related to the crime charged. In another recent Kansas case involving evidence of a person's association with a gang, this court reviewed the Dawson case and stated: `Dawson does not stand for the position that such evidence must always be excluded. In fact, United States v. Abel [citation omitted] held that evidence of gang membership was probative of witness bias, and its probative value outweighed the potential for prejudice. Dawson does not overrule or limit Abel; we read Dawson as applying to the sentencing fact scenario.' State v. Roberts, 261 Kan. 320, 325, 931 P.2d 683 (1997) (quoting State v. Tran, 252 Kan. 494, 503-04, 847 P.2d 680 [1993]). Thus, although there is no per se barrier to the introduction of evidence of a person's membership or participation in a religious group or association, to be admissible such evidence should be related to the commission of the crime charged or should be used to show a person's possible bias or motive. See Dawson, 503 U.S. at 168; Abel, 469 U.S. at 52-53; Sims, 265 Kan. 166, Syl. ¶ 5; Roberts, 261 Kan. 320, Syl. ¶ 1.
`The determination of relevancy is a matter of logic and experience, not a matter of law. [Citations omitted.]' State v. Gardner, 264 Kan. 95, 104, 955 P.2d 1199 (1998). To establish relevancy to the fact of the crimes charged, this court has stated there must be some natural or logical connection between [the witness'] testimony and the inference or result [the witness'] testimoney is designed to establish. State v. Donesay, 265 Kan. 60, 85, 959 P.2d 862 (1998). Here, the evidence showing that Leitner participated in Wicca bears no relevance to the crimes charged against her. The record contains no hint or innuendo that her abstract beliefs had any connection to Leitner killing Michael. Further, the State's assertions that it sought to use this evidence to put Michael's actions into context or to impeach Leitner's testimony about the indiscriminate nature of Michael's abuse are ludicrous. To believe these assertions, one must first believe that a justification exists for beating one's spouse. The State fails to present a valid justification for its argument that Leitner's testimony describing Michael's physical abuse opened the door to collateral evidence of Leitner's association with Wicca.
The State further asserts on appeal that the evidence of Leitner's involvement with witchcraft was more probative than prejudicial. K.S.A. 60-445 states: Except as in this article otherwise provided, the judge may in his or her discretion exclude evidence if he or she finds that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission will unfairly and harmfully surprise a party who has not had reasonable opportunity to anticipate that such evidence would be offered. While K.S.A. 60-445 only refers to the element of surprise, as a rule of necessity the trial judge may exclude any evidence which may unfairly prejudice the jury against the defendant. See State v. Davis, 213 Kan. 54, 57, 515 P.2d 802 (1973). Where the probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, even relevant evidence may be excluded by the judge. See Curry v. Klein, 251 Kan. 670, 675, 840 P.2d 443 (1992). On cross-examination, the prosecutor succeeded in getting Leitner to admit that she was involved in witchcraft and attended at least one pagan ceremony. As noted, however, the evidence failed to show Leitner's bias or motivation for killing Michael and was not relevant to the commission of the crime charged. Thus, it had no probative value. As to the possible prejudice generated, the idea of witchcraft has generated terror and contempt throughout American history. Before this country was formed, the first laws of the Massachusetts Bay Colony listed idolatry and witchcraft among capital offenses. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 335, 33 L. Ed.2d. 346, 92 S. Ct. 2726 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). Even in our culture today, satanic imagery associated with witchcraft continues. For example, in Altman v. Bedford Cent. School Dist., 245 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2001), parents brought suit against a school district alleging that a card game played by extracurricular clubs depicting goblins, zombies, and vampires glorified the worship of Satan and the practice of witchcraft. In another recent case, two young children were taken from their parents by social workers for 2½ months after the mother's sister, who suffered from a severe psychiatric disorder, told tales of Satanic worship and falsely reported that the father might sacrifice his son to Satan at the fall equinox ritual. Wallis by and through Wallis v. Spencer, 193 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 1999). It seems evident that our culture associates witchcraft with Satanic worship and other evil practices. Any mention of a defendant's involvement with witchcraft is highly prejudicial. Therefore, because the evidence of Leitner's practice of witchcraft was more prejudicial than probative, had no direct relevance to the crime charged, and did not serve to impeach Leitner, no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court in admitting evidence of Leitner's participation in witchcraft. The decision to admit this evidence at trial was in error.
An appellate court's review of the trial court's admission of evidence is a twostep process. First, it must determine whether the evidence was admissible or inadmissible. Then, if the evidence was improperly admitted, it must determine whether to apply the harmless error rule of review or the federal constitutional error rule to the erroneous admission of that evidence. State v. Smallwood, 264 Kan. 69, 80-81, 955 P.2d 1209 (1998). Review of the admission or the exclusion of evidence is usually governed by the harmless error rule. K.S.A. 60-261 provides that no error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence by the court is a ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. State v. Morris, 255 Kan. 964, Syl. ¶ 6, 880 P.2d 1244 (1994). Under the federal constitutional error rule, an error of constitutional magnitude is serious and may not be held to be harmless unless the appellate court is willing to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Before we may declare the error harmless, we must be able to declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial. State v. McClanahan, 259 Kan. 86, Syl. ¶ 4, 910 P.2d 193 (1996). State v. Clark, 261 Kan. 460, 469, 931 P.2d 664 (1997). Recently, in the case of Pham, the Kansas Court of Appeals considered the erroneous admission of the defendant's gang affiliation during his trial on nongang-related crimes. In that case, the Court of Appeals found that where inflammatory evidence has no probative value of significant magnitude to counterbalance its prejudicial effect, its introduction becomes grossly and unfairly prejudicial. 27 Kan. App.2d at 1002. There, because the evidence against the defendant was far from overwhelming, the court held that cumulative trial errors merited reversal and a new trial. 27 Kan. App.2d at 1006. We must consider whether the admission of evidence that Leitner was involved in witchcraft constituted reversible error. In this particular case, overwhelming evidence was presented concerning Leitner's steadfast desire to kill Michael. Moreover, ample evidence illustrated Leitner's belief that she and her boys would be better off financially if Michael were dead. At trial, Leitner did not dispute that she intentionally shot Michael. The issue was whether she acted in self-defense or with premeditation. Leitner's intent was a key factor for the jury to decide. Leitner testified that she made two previous attempts to kill Michael by poisoning him. She expressed to her brother, her sister, and her babysitter a continuing desire to be rid of Michael permanently for the sake of her family. Although she owned two guns of her own, she took two guns belonging to others with her the night she shot Michael. She wore gloves to hide her fingerprints. She told her sister-in-law that she asked Michael to come to Toronto with her to work things out. Leitner also told her that she walked up behind Michael and shot him in the head, then twice again in the temple as he laid on the ground to make sure he was dead. The expert opinion of Dr. Mitchell supports Pam's testimony. Leitner had stopped earlier at a rest stop for the purpose of killing Michael by shooting him, which makes premeditation clear. Here, overwhelming evidence contradicts Leitner's story of self-defense on the night of the murder. While in a close case, the admission of evidence of a defendant's participation in Wicca might serve to inflame a jury to wrongfully convict a defendant and result in a reversal on appeal, it is clear in this case that the jury heard ample evidence to show that Leitner murdered her husband with premeditation. Therefore, based on the particular facts of this case alone, we decline to set aside the jury verdict based on the erroneous admission of witchcraft evidence. II. AGENT HALVORSEN'S TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE NONINVOLVEMENT OF GARY HOCKETT On appeal, Leitner asserts that the trial court erred when it allowed KBI agent Bill Halvorsen to testify that Gary Hockett was telling the truth. Halvorsen is a special agent with the KBI, assigned to the general felony investigations unit. Halvorsen assisted in the investigation of Michael's homicide. Leitner states that Halvorsen served as a sort of expert, noting that he was permitted to observe the testimony of other witnesses throughout the trial prior to his testimony. Expert opinion testimony is admissible if it aids the jury with unfamiliar subjects or interpreting technical facts or if it assists the jury in arriving at a reasonable factual conclusion from the evidence. Necessity is the basis for the admission of expert testimony, arising out of the particular circumstances of the case. Expert conclusions or opinions are not necessary if the normal experience and qualifications of jurors permit them to draw proper conclusions from the given facts and circumstances. Smallwood, 264 Kan. at 80. An expert's opinion, pursuant to K.S.A. 60-456, is admissible up to the point where an expression of opinion would require the expert to pass upon the credibility of witnesses or the weight of disputed evidence. An expert witness may not pass on the weight or credibility of evidence. State v. Rice, 261 Kan. 567, Syl. ¶ 10, 932 P.2d 981 (1997). An expert may testify and give his or her opinion concerning the ultimate issue of the case; however, such testimony is admissible only if it actually assists the jury. State v. Gaines, 260 Kan. 752, 757, 926 P.2d 641 (1996). No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence by the court is a ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. Smallwood, 264 Kan. at 80 (citing K.S.A. 60-261; State v. Morris, 255 Kan. 964, Syl. ¶ 6, 880 P.2d 1244 [1994]). In particular, Leitner objects to the following testimony: Q. At some point after Gary Hockett's interview that day to today's date were you ever able to positively confirm that Gary Hockett was not involved prior or during the murder of Michael Leitner? MR. CLARK: I guess I'm going to object, your Honor. That's one of the ultimate issues that the jury's going to have to decide, and I don't think it's proper for this witness to render an opinion as to credibility of witnesses. That's the ultimate issue. THE COURT: Not in this trial. You may repeat the question if you wish. You can answer. Q. Were you ever able after the interview of Gary Hockett on October 22nd, the five or six hour interview, ever able to absolutely positively confirm that Gary Hockett was not involved prior to or during the murder of Michael Leitner? A. Yes, I was. At trial in her opening statement, Leitner's theory of defense was that she intentionally shot Michael in self-defense. Upon direct examination, Leitner first stated that Gary encouraged her to take the guns with her and even loaded them for her while she went to the liquor store. Later, during cross-examination, Leitner testified that Gary did not know what she was going to do with the guns or that she was going to commit a crime on the night of the murder. In closing argument, defense counsel argued that Gary was not telling the truth when he testified that he did not give Leitner the two guns that evening. In addition, counsel for Leitner asserted that Pam and Gary lied in order to keep Gary from being prosecuted for his involvement in Michael's murder. The inference defence counsel asked the jury to draw was that if Pam and Gary lied, Leitner's story of self-defense would be more probable. Leitner's theory that the trial court's admission of Halvorsen's testimony was in error because it touched on the ultimate issue of premeditation fails for two reasons. First, when considering whether Leitner committed the murder with premeditation, it makes no difference whether jurors chose to believe either Gary or Leitner. Even if Gary gave Leitner two guns for her protection that Friday night, as Leitner testified, reasonable jurors could conclude that she formed the requisite premeditation during her 2hour drive to Olathe. `Premeditation under the law does not require any specific time frame.' [Citation omitted.] State v. Moncla, 262 Kan. 58, 72, 936 P.2d 727 (1997). Furthermore, a jury `has a right to infer premeditation from the established circumstances of the case provided the inference is a reasonable one.' State v. Murillo, 269 Kan. 281, 286, 7 P.3d 264 (2000). Thus, the fact that Gary's story varied from Leitner's makes no difference as to the issue of premeditation. Second, the State's inquiry did not concern Gary's credibility during the trial; rather the question was designed to elicit a response from Halvorsen as to whether his investigation confirmed the truth of Gary's story of noninvolvement prior to or during the murder. This information is helpful to a jury, and, thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed Halvorsen to testify. Moreover, Leitner's own testimony confirmed that Gary was not involved prior to or during the murder. Thus, Leitner suffered no prejudice from Halvorsen's testimony, and her claim of error is without merit.