Opinion ID: 1919526
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Interpretation of La.Rev.Stat. 23:1225 C(1)(c)

Text: The wage-loss coordination provision of Section 1225 C(1) was designed to add all the benefits not funded by the employee; and, if the combined benefits exceeded 66 2/3 percent of the employee's average weekly wage, the employer would be given an offset of the excess against the obligation to pay workers' compensation benefits. Dennis P. Juge, Louisiana Workers' Compensation § 12:5 (1995). Section 1225 C(1) thus provides Louisiana employers with an offset against their worker's compensation obligation of benefits provided by different employer-based sources and establishes a sort of state ceiling of benefits to which an employee is entitled. H. Alston Johnson, Bound in Shallows and Miseries: The 1983 Amendments to the Workers' Compensation Statute, 44 La.L.Rev. 669, 705 (1984); Wex S. Malone & H. Alston Johnson III, 13 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise-Workers Compensation Law and Practice § 289 (3d ed. 1994). Plaintiff contends that the court of appeal erred in construing Section 1225 C(1)(c) broadly to include Social Security disability benefits within the generic term disability benefit plans. According to plaintiff, this broad construction violated the mandate in Cousins v. City of New Orleans, 608 So.2d 978 (La.1992), that Section 1225 C is a restriction on an injured employee's right to workers' compensation benefits and must be strictly construed. We disagree. The rule of strict construction might be applicable if broad construction infringed upon the injured worker's right to workers' compensation benefits. However, broad construction in this case merely prevents the claimant from collecting duplicate wage-loss benefits provided by the employer, which is one of the very purposes of wage-loss benefit coordination laws. Moreover, the jurisprudential mandate of strict construction is tempered by the statutory mandate that [w]hen the language of the law is susceptible of different meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law. La.Civ.Code art. 10. A jurisprudential mandate of strict construction cannot be read as precluding courts in the face of unclear statutory language from considering clear legislative intent. Strict construction cannot be used to defeat the clear intent of the statute. 3 Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 58.01 (5th ed. 1992). Indeed, the paramount consideration in interpreting a statute is ascertaining the Legislature's intent and the reasons that prompted the Legislature to enact the law. Touchard v. Williams, 617 So.2d 885, 888 (La.1993). The Legislature easily could have specified its intention to limit the offset provided by Section 1225 C(1)(c) to benefits from private disability benefit plans. Likewise, the Legislature easily could have specified its intention to exclude disability benefits under the Social Security Act from the term disability benefit plans. Because the Legislature did not do either, we conclude that the Legislature's choice of language is ambiguous. This ambiguity is further evidenced by Section 1225 C(1)(b), which expressly allows such an offset when the employee is collecting old-age benefits under the Social Security Act, but contains no mention of disability benefits under the Social Security Act, although the Legislature easily could have expressly included these. Nonetheless, Section 1225 C(1)(b)'s express reference to Social Security old-age benefits is not inconsistent with a reading of Section 1225 C(1)(c)'s general reference to disability benefit plans as including Social Security disability benefits. A workers' compensation offset for Social Security old-age benefits is rare, given the dissimilarity of these benefits. John D. Copeland, The New Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act: Did the Pendulum Swing Too Far?, 47 Ark.L.Rev. 1, 64 (1994); see also Town of Berwick v. Justilian, 93-854 (La.3/2/94); 634 So.2d 1365 (discussing dissimilarity). In contrast, a workers' compensation offset for Social Security disability benefits is common, given the similarity of these benefits. Arthur Abraham & Irwin Wolkstein, Workmen's Compensation and the Social Security Disability Program: A Contrast, 16 Vand.L.Rev. 1055 (1063). We conclude that the Legislature, by not using any qualifying language such as private and by not specifying any exceptions or exclusions from the term disability benefit plans, meant to provide an offset for benefits received under any disability benefit plan, at least to the extent funded by the employer. Disability benefits under the Social Security Act are benefits under a disability benefit plan. That such disability benefits are referred to interchangeably as Social Security disability insurance benefits and that the source of such benefit payments is an insurance fund does not alter the character of such compensation. Indeed, disability compensation is defined as [p]ayments from public or private funds to one during period of disability and incapacity from work; e.g., social security or workers' compensation disability benefits. Black's Law Dictionary 415 (5th ed. 1979). Moreover, many types of private benefit plans are funded by insurance. Our construction of Section 1225 C(1)(c) as including Social Security disability benefits is bolstered by the clear legislative intent behind the 1983 amendments which engrafted Section 1225 C(1) onto the previous wage-loss benefit coordination provision now contained in Section 1225 A. Those 1983 amendments were part of a substantial revision of the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act, the overall purpose of which was to reduce the cost of workers' compensation for Louisiana employers. H. Alston Johnson, Bound in Shallows and Miseries: The 1983 Amendments to the Workers' Compensation Statute, 44 La.L.Rev. 669, 705 (1984). Construction of Section 1225 C(1)(c) as excluding Social Security disability benefits would thus be contrary to the overall legislative purpose of the 1983 amendments to reduce employers' compensation liability. Further, such a construction would be contrary to Section 1225 C(1)'s apparent legislative purpose of broadening the scope of benefits which may be used to reduce the employer's workers' compensation obligation. Still further, such a construction would permit the exact duplication of benefits that benefit coordination provisions like Section 1225 are designed to preclude. Plaintiff argues, and the trial court apparently agreed, that to construe Section 1225 C(1)(c) as including Social Security disability benefits would create a conflict or contradiction between Section 1225 A and Section 1225 C(1). We disagree. Because of the 1981 federal cutoff for reverse offsets, the Legislature could not expand Section 1225 A beyond permanent total benefits. Moreover, these two sections provide different types of offsets and benefit ceilings. Section 1225 A coordinates some Louisiana workers' compensation benefits by means of the federal Social Security offset provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 424a(a) and (d), and imposes the federal ceiling of eighty percent of average current earnings. Section 1225 C(1) coordinates Louisiana workers' compensation benefits with other employer-based benefits, including Social Security benefits, and imposes a separate state ceiling of sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the average weekly wages of the employee at the time of the injury. Hence, our construction of Section 1225 C(1)(c) as including Social Security disability benefits does not create a conflict with Section 1225 A. Plaintiff further argues that there is a conflict in the differing wording of Section 1225 C(1)(b) and Section 1225 C(1)(c) regarding the amount of the credit. Section 1225 C(1)(c) limits the credit for disability benefit plans to benefits in the proportion funded by an employer. On the other hand, Section 1225 C(1)(b) limits the credit for old-age Social Security benefits to those not funded by the employee. [8] We find these sections, albeit differently worded, convey the same meaning from two different perspectives: Section 1225 C(1)(b) expresses the limit from the employee's perspective, while Section 1225 C(1)(c) expresses the limit from the employer's perspective. Finally, plaintiff contends that the Legislature intended a reduction only for disability benefits voluntarily provided by the employer, pointing out that employer contributions to Social Security are mandated by law. Section 1225 C(1) contains no indication of such legislative intent. Indeed, Sections 1225 A, B and C(1)(b) contain benefits mandated by law, and workers' compensation benefits themselves are not voluntary. We conclude, as did the court of appeal, that plaintiff's employer is entitled under Section 1225 C(1)(c) to an offset of Social Security disability benefits against its workers' compensation obligation.