Opinion ID: 2514279
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Does suspicionless substance abuse testing bear a close and substantial relationship to the Municipality's proper governmental interest?

Text: Having found that the Municipality's interest in deterring alcohol and drug usage, sale, and possession in the workplace in order to ensure a safe, healthful, and productive workplace outweighs Fire and Police Department employees' privacy interest, the court must next consider whether the means chosen by the Municipality bear a close and substantial relationship to that interest. Plaintiffs contend that the means, suspicionless drug and alcohol testing, do not bear a sufficiently close and substantial relationship. They argue first, that urinalysis is not the least restrictive means of achieving the Municipality's goals and second, that urinalysis is an unproved method of combatting drug and alcohol abuse. Plaintiffs suggest that screening for substance abuse could be done at least as well and probably more effectively one of two ways. (1) It would be better if supervisors were trained to recognize signs of substance abuse, and to test only upon reasonable suspicion. (2) Standard sobriety tests (such as the HGN used by police) could be used to establish reasonable suspicion for testing. The Municipality responds that neither of these methods would necessarily be less intrusive noting that the greater the discretion vested in a supervisor, the greater the potential for selective and discriminatory use of the testing procedures. The Municipality also argues that these alternatives would primarily aid in detecting drug or alcohol use, but would not be a significant aid to the Municipality's other goal of deterring substance abuse. Courts have not required that the method chosen be the least restrictive one. For example, in Harrison v. State, 687 P.2d 332 (Alaska App.1984), the Alaska Supreme Court upheld a local option law permitting communities to prohibit the importation of alcohol into the community. In challenging the law as violative of the right to privacy, Harrison pointed to evidence suggesting that moderate consumption of alcohol may be medically beneficial and contended that moderate users would be improperly punished by the law. The supreme court found that, whatever the medical benefits might be, the harmful effects of alcohol were undisputed, and that increased access to alcohol would undoubtedly increase the number of alcohol abusers. The court then upheld the local option law finding that it bore a close and substantial relationship to the legitimate legislative goal of protecting the public health and welfare by curbing the level of alcohol abuse in the state. The Court did not accept the argument that the prohibition against alcohol in certain communities spread too broadly, encompassing people who were not problem drinkers. [18] In Skinner, the United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that the government's actions have to be the least restrictive: Respondents offer a list of less drastic and equally effective means of addressing the Government's concerns, including reliance on the private proscriptions already in force, and training supervisory personnel to effectively detect employees who are impaired by drug or alcohol use without resort to such intrusive procedures as blood and urine tests. We have repeatedly stated, however, that [t]he reasonableness of any particular government activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of alternative `less intrusive means.' It is obvious that [t]he logic of such elaborate less-restrictive-alternatives could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all search-and-seizure powers, because judges engaged in post hoc evaluations of government conduct `can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of the [Government] might have been accomplished.' 489 U.S. 602, 629 n. 9, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989). See Vernonia School District v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 2396, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995) (We have repeatedly refused to declare that only the `least intrusive' search practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.). In the instance case, the court concludes that the method chosen need not be the least restrictive in order to have a close and substantial relationship to the government goals. The Plaintiffs' second contention is that urinalysis is an unproved method of combatting drug abuse. None of the cases cited by the parties have struck down a program on this basis. IAFF offers the affidavit of Dr. Kurt Dubrowski, a board-certified clinical and forensic toxicologist who, among other qualifications, has served for the last thirty years as State Director of Tests for Alcohol and Drug Influence in Oklahoma. In his affidavit, Dr. Dubrowski points to studies which he contends establish that random drug testing seldom, if ever, reveals illicit drug use in work populations which have been subject to [mandated drug testing]. Dubrowski Affidavit at 7. He specifically refers to data reported in the November 20, 1996, issue of Drug Detection Report: The Newsletter on Drug Testing in the Workplace, in which motor carrier industry employers who tested their employees pursuant to the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of 1991 reported very small positive rates on drug tests. Dubrowski Affidavit at 7 8. In contrast, the Municipality offers the affidavit of Peter Bensinger, former Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Agency, who runs a private company providing consultation and services related to promoting a drug-free workplace and employee health and safety. Bensinger reaches a different conclusion from the data showing low positive rate for employees tested in the transportation industry. He concludes that the low positive rate results from the deterrent effect of the random drug testing program. Bensinger Affidavit 12/27/96 at 11, ¶ 24. He also points to the 1995 Department of Defense survey of Health Related Behaviors Among Military Personnel in which the Department of Defense reported a dramatic drop in the use of illicit drugs by member of the armed forces since the institution of a mandatory drug testing program. Bensinger Affidavits: 8/26/96 at 5 6, ¶ 10 and Exhibits 1 & 2; 12/27/96 at 11, ¶ 23; 1/27/97 at 5 6, ¶ 12 13. Having concluded that the requirement of a close and substantial relationship is not synonymous with a requirement that the means employed be the least restrictive, this court need not determine as a factual matter that the Municipality has chosen the very best means of preventing substance abuse in the workplace. The Municipality has offered sufficient evidence to establish a close and substantial relationship between its proper governmental interest in deterring alcohol and drug usage, sale, and possession in the Fire Department and Police Department in order to ensure a safe, healthful, and productive workplace and the Municipality's means of suspicionless drug and alcohol testing. C. Does the Testing Policy Violate Employees' Constitutional Right to be Free from Unreasonable Search and Seizure Under Article I, Section 14, of the Alaska Constitution? Article I, Section 14, of the Alaska Constitution provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses and other property, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. No warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. The protection against unreasonable search and seizure under the Alaska Constitution is broader than the protection of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Labor, 565 P.2d 138 (Alaska 1977). Plaintiffs contend that suspicionless drug and alcohol tests violate both the Alaska and U.S. Constitutions because the tests are not pursuant to a warrant issued upon probable cause; and even if a warrant is not required, such testing constitutes an unreasonable search. The preliminary question is whether drug and alcohol testing constitutes a search. If it is, should suspicionless drug and alcohol testing be an exception to the warrant requirement, and if so, is such a search unreasonable? 1. Do the procedures for collecting urine samples and the urinalysis constitute a search? The United States Supreme Court has concluded that the collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable, and therefore, must be deemed searches under the Fourth Amendment. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, 489 U.S. at 617, 109 S.Ct. 1402. This conclusion is equally applicable to the search provision of Article I, Section 14 of the Alaska Constitution. 2. Should suspicionless substance abuse testing be an exception to the warrant requirement? Plaintiffs contend that a warrant issued upon a determination of probable cause by a judicial officer is necessary before suspicionless drug testing can be done because such testing does not fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Usually, a warrantless search will be considered per se unreasonable unless it falls within a previously recognized exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Myers, 601 P.2d 239, 241 (Alaska 1979). However, the court can, if required by the unique facts of a case, look, albeit with great caution, beyond the four corners of previously recognized exceptions to the principles that gave rise to them. Id. at 242. Plaintiffs rely on Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Labor, 565 P.2d 138 (Alaska 1977), in which the court struck down warrantless OSHA searches as violative of the warrant requirement of Article I, Section 14. However, the decision was based on factors not present in this case. In that case, the court observed that OSHA violations can result in significant fines and imprisonment and for this reason, found that the rights extended to a citizen in a criminal prosecution should also be extended to the owner of a business premise subject to an OSHA search. Id. at 151. It also found that without judicial review, far too much discretion was lodged with the official in the field. Id. It concluded that the burden of obtaining a warrant was not likely to frustrate the purpose of the OSHA inspections. Id. The court also noted that the OSHA regulations extended to all employers thereby reaching many commercial undertakings with no history of intensive regulation. Id. at 152. The Municipality relies on the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989) and Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989). In Von Raab, the Court explains that neither a warrant, nor probable cause, nor, indeed any measure of individualized suspicion, is an indispensable component of reasonableness in every circumstance. 489 U.S. at 665, 109 S.Ct. 1384. The Court held that where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations against the Government's interest to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context. Id. at 665-66. It found the drug-testing program was not designed to serve the ordinary needs of law enforcement: Test results may not be used in a criminal prosecution of the employee without the employee's consent. Id. at 666. The Court further found that the purposes of the program were to deter drug use and prevent the promotion of drug users to sensitive positions and that these purposes qualified as special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement. Id. at 665-66. In Skinner, the Court observed that requiring a warrant in the post-accident context would delay testing which would result in the destruction of evidence, and thereby frustrate the purposes of the search. The Court explained: An essential purpose of a warrant requirement is to protect privacy interests by assuring citizens subject to a search or seizure that such intrusions are not the random or arbitrary acts of government agents. A warrant assures the citizen that the intrusion is authorized by law, and that is narrowly limited in objectives and scope. A warrant also provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, and thus ensures an objective determination whether an intrusion is justified in any given case. In the present context, however, a warrant would do little to further these aims. Both the circumstances justifying toxicological testing and the permissible limits of such intrusions are defined narrowly and specifically in the regulations that authorize them, and doubtless are well known to covered employees. Indeed, in light of the standardized nature of the tests and the minimal discretion vested in those charged with administering the program, there are virtually no facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate. 489 U.S. at 621-22, 109 S.Ct. 1402. The reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court is persuasive. The Municipality's drug and alcohol testing policy spells out in great detail the procedures to be followed and vests almost no discretion in an individual. Moreover, the test results may not be used in a criminal prosecution and there is no sanction such as a fine or imprisonment. These circumstances readily distinguish the drug-testing case from the OSHA inspections in Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State, 565 P.2d 138 (Alaska 1977). 3. Is suspicionless substance abuse testing an unreasonable search and seizure? The remaining question is whether the search occasioned by suspicionless drug and alcohol testing is unreasonable. Alaska law does not provide a definition of what is reasonable. Each case [is] to be decided on its own facts and circumstances. Davis v. State, 525 P.2d 541, 543 (Alaska 1974). In Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989), the U.S. Supreme Court observed that the traditional probable cause standard is peculiarly related to criminal investigations and unhelpful in analyzing the reasonableness of routine administrative functions. 489 U.S. at 668, 109 S.Ct. 1384 (citations omitted). In Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989), the U.S. Supreme Court made it clear that a showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional floor below which a search will be deemed unreasonable. It set forth the following framework: In limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion. 489 U.S. at 624, 109 S.Ct. 1402. Thus, in determining the reasonableness of a warrantless search and seizure, a court must determine the nature and extent of the privacy interest, whether there is an important governmental interest at stake, and whether the governmental interest outweighs the privacy interest. This analysis is similar to the one applied to the right to privacy issues. Pursuant to that analysis, this court has determined that suspicionless substance abuse testing does not violate the Fire and Police Department employees' right to privacy. Similarly, the court finds that the Municipality's suspicionless substance abuse testing program does not violate the Fire and Police Department employees' right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. Likewise, the court finds that the Municipality's drug and alcohol testing program does not violate Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment or privacy rights under the United States Constitution. [19] IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment are DENIED. DATED at Anchorage, Alaska, this 14th day of March, 1997. /s/ Karen L. Hunt Karen L. Hunt Superior Court Judge