Opinion ID: 1216911
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: withholding of exculpatory evidence

Text: Prior to trial, investigative sources and statements of third parties made both the prosecution and the defense aware that Al-Otaiby, a witness for the prosecution, had some involvement with illicit drugs. After the trial was over, Ogden police officers informed both counsel that at some time prior to trial Al-Otaiby had sold cocaine to an undercover officer and that his arrest was imminent. Defendant had filed a pretrial motion for discovery requesting, inter alia, an order requiring the plaintiff to inform the defendant of any and all evidence which would exonerate the defendant or which would demonstrate the defendant's innocence or be of value to the defendant in preparing for trial. [1] The prosecution provided no information about Al-Otaiby pursuant to this request because both parties had the same general knowledge before trial, see State v. Jarrell, Utah, 608 P.2d 218, 225 (1980), and because Al-Otaiby's alleged drug involvement did not bear on and issue in this case. The prosecutor had no knowledge of Al-Otaiby's sale of cocaine until after the trial, although it was known to police officers working on this case. Defendant argues that the prosecution's withholding of this evidence denied him a fair trial. We disagree. At the outset, we stress that we are concerned with more than the prosecutor's state of knowledge regarding the sale of cocaine or other drug activity by the witness. Information known to police officers working on a case is charged to the prosecution since the officers are part of the prosecution team. Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir.1964). Neither the prosecutor nor officers working on a case may withhold exculpatory evidence or evidence valuable to a defendant. State v. Johnson, 223 Kan. 119, 124, 573 P.2d 976, 980 (1977). Cf. State v. Wright, 87 Wash.2d 783, 557 P.2d 1 (1976). The important question here is whether defendant was prejudiced by the prosecution's failure to disclose the witness's imminent arrest. For purposes of this question, the good or bad faith of the prosecutor is irrelevant. If the suppression of evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2401, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). The nature of the request determines the standard to be applied in determining whether the defendant has been denied a fair trial. The request in this case was a general  Brady -type request for all exculpatory evidence or evidence of value to the defense. In this situation, as in the case where the defendant makes no request at all, the reviewing court must make its determination in the context of the entire record. [I]f the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed. This means that the omission must be evaluated in the context of the entire record. If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new trial. On the other hand, if the verdict is already of questionable validity, additional evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt. Codianna v. Morris, Utah, 660 P.2d 1101, 1106 (1983) ( Codianna II ), quoting from United States v. Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at 112-13, 96 S.Ct. at 2401-2402. In the context of the entire record, the omitted evidence adds nothing to defendant's case and would not have raised a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Al-Otaiby's testimony came after and mainly corroborated the testimony of another prosecution witness, Gtata. There was no material variance between the testimony of these two witnesses. Evidence of an independent event of drug trafficking would not have shown that Al-Otaiby used drugs, and even drug use is admissible only if it shows that it impaired the witness's perception of the events to which he testified. Braham v. State, Alaska, 571 P.2d 631, 647 (1977); State v. Belote, 213 Kan. 291, 295-96, 516 P.2d 159, 162-63 (1973). Defendant could not have used the omitted evidence to impeach Al-Otaiby's character or to show his propensity toward untruthfulness. Utah Rules of Evidence 22; Rouse v. State, Okl.Cr.App., 594 P.2d 787, 792-93 (1979); State v. Humphrey, 217 Kan. 352, 364, 537 P.2d 155, 164 (1975). The trial judge correctly applied the law when he limited cross-examination of Al-Otaiby and other witnesses to specific instances of drug use that might have affected the witness's ability to perceive. The omitted evidence would thus have had no bearing on the defendant's case. Defendant argues that the evidence would have been relevant to show that Al-Otaiby had a motive to kill Mansour. Even when coupled with evidence that Al-Otaiby supported the deceased for one and one-half years and that Al-Otaiby had the nickname Crazy Mohammed, this evidence is so speculative that it is impossible to see how it could have affected the outcome of the trial. There is no violation of due process if the evidence demonstrates only a `mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial... .' Codianna II, 660 P.2d at 1106, quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 109-10, 96 S.Ct. at 2400-2401.