Opinion ID: 170256
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Barry Adamson's ADEA Claim.

Text: In termination cases, a prima facie case of age discrimination ordinarily requires the plaintiff to show that he or she was: (1) within the protected class of individuals 40 or older; (2) performing satisfactory work; (3) terminated from employment; and (4) replaced by a younger person, although not necessarily one less than 40 years of age. Greene v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 554, 557-60 (10th Cir.1996)(citing cases). While the elements of a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework are neither rigid nor mechanistic, their purpose is the establishment of an initial inference of unlawful discrimination warranting a presumption of liability in plaintiffs favor. See id. at 558 (citing O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996)). In the absence of facts tending to establish this initial inference, plaintiff is not entitled to the presumption of discrimination and a defendant is not required to defend against the charge. Id. In the instant case, the district court granted MCDS summary judgment on Barry Adamson's age discrimination claim based on his failure to establish the fourth element of his prima facie case. Age 56 at the time of his termination, Adamson was replaced as CEO by MCDS's then-CFO, Sherry Plenert, who was 63. While replacement by an older or insignificantly younger worker does not per se doom a prima facie case if both are within the protected age group, the evidence must nevertheless be adequate to create an inference that the adverse employment decision was, in fact, motivated by plaintiffs age. O'Connor at 312, 116 S.Ct. 1307 (fact one person in protected class has lost out to another person in protected class irrelevant, so long as he has lost out because of his age )(emphasis added). We agree that in this case, in the absence of any other direct or circumstantial evidence establishing the requisite inference, replacement by an undisputedly qualified individual seven years older than plaintiff fails, a fortiori, to satisfy the fourth element of a prima facie case. Adamson relies on Greene to argue his case presents the extraordinary situation in which the failure to establish the fourth element of a prima facie case is not fatal to his claim, Specifically, Adamson contends comments he made to a board member regarding plans to retire some time in the future give rise to an inference that the board's subsequent decision to terminate his employment was discriminatorily motivated independent of any inference established or not established by meeting the fourth prong of the prima facie case. Adamson conflates the analytical schemes applicable when a plaintiff sets out to prove discriminatory intent via direct, as opposed to indirect, evidence and misapplies Greene. See Timmerman, v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 483 F.3d 1106, 1118 (10th Cir.2007)(where plaintiff relied exclusively on the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, not on direct evidence of discrimination, .any value Greene had to her case was strictly through analogy). Greene involved a situation in which plaintiff, a 52 year-old Safeway store manager who had worked for the company for 33 years, was replaced in his management position by a 57 year-old co-worker. At trial on his age discrimination claim, plaintiff adduced evidence establishing that, given his long tenure with the company, he had been grandfathered into the company's pension plan and was 28 months away from vesting in the plan at the time he was replaced. Through the direct testimony of company managers and others, Greene established that his replacement, by contrast, was not eligible for a pension and that this was a factor in Safeway's decision to replace him. On Safeway's Rule 50(a) motion at the close of the evidence, however, the district judge agreed plaintiffs replacement by an older, not younger, worker was `problematic' for purposes of the prima facie case and entered judgment as a matter of law in Safeway's favor. Id. at 556. We reversed, finding that based on the evidence submitted at trial, Greene had presented a submissible case of discrimination independent of the McDonnell Douglas framework and the fourth prong of the prima facie case based on other direct and circumstantial evidence of age discrimination, i.e., that Safeway replaced Greene, on the basis of age, in order to avoid having to pay him grandfathered pension benefits. Greene, 98 F.3d at 560. The fact that his replacement was older than he was not relevant to this independent evidence of age-based discrimination, and hence Greene's failure to comport with the fourth prong of his prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas was not fatal to his claim and could not be used to take the case from the jury. See id. In the instant case, Adamson does not offer his statements regarding plans to retire as affirmative evidence of discrimination independent of the McDonnell Douglas analysis or his prima facie case. More importantly, he does not link his statements regarding retirement either to Plenert or to the board's motivation in replacing him. Instead, Adamson leaps from the fact of his statements to the holding in Greene, saying the board's knowledge of his plans to retire some time in the future creates the inference of age discrimination irrespective of the prima facie case. The argument, if accepted, would vitiate the ADEA itself: the contemplation of retirement some time in the future is common throughout the protected class by definition. Facts demonstrating Adamson had disclosed to board members some months before his termination an unspecified plan to retire have no nexus to, and fall short of any independent evidence of, the discriminatory animus evidenced in Greene. They do not, without additional facts tending to distinguish Plenert on that basis and linking the distinction to the board's replacement decision, provide a basis for allowing Adamson to proceed independently of the McDonnell Douglas framework or otherwise excuse him from having to make his prima facie case. See Timmerman at 1118 (failure to come forth with evidence that might arguably show nexus between employer's alleged bias against older employees and plaintiffs termination fatal to age discrimination claim). We affirm the entry of summary judgment in Defendants' favor on Mr. Adamson's ADEA claim.