Opinion ID: 1762353
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the hearsay nature of marilyn's testimony

Text: KRE 602 states that a witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Nor is hearsay admissible, except as provided by these rules and the rules of the Supreme Court of Kentucky. KRE 802. In this context, hearsay is a statement . . . offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. KRE 801(c). The state of mind exception is inapplicable here, as Anne Hurst's state of mind was not in issue in this proceeding. See KRE 803(3). Where one's state of mind is not an issue, testimony of such is irrelevant and is not allowed into evidence under KRE 803(3). Bray v. Commonwealth, 68 S.W.3d 375, 381-82 (Ky.2002). Moreover, the state of mind exception excludes a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, or revocation, identification, or terms of a declarant's will.  KRE 803(3) (emphasis added). Whether or not conclusions in a disciplinary hearing should ever be based upon evidence of such nature as we find in this record is very troubling. That aside, it highlights the obvious deficiency in this case, namely, that everybody that knew anything from personal presence or experience, other than Craft and Coburn's widow, were deceased or incapacitated by the time of the charges and later proceedings. On the hearsay issue, we do note there was no objection to the hearsay nature of the testimony given in Marilyn's deposition. Of course, the rules of evidence and civil procedure apply to all disciplinary matters, see SCR 3.300, SCR 3.340, and a failure to object (even to hearsay) essentially renders the matter waived on appeal. KRE 103(a)(1). However, the fact that much, if not all, of the testimony on which the Trial Commissioner and Board of Governors based their recommendations is hearsay, originating from a person who had Alzheimer's, should be enough for this Court to pause and consider the sufficiency (aside from the reliability) of the evidence in this case. This is, of course, a permitted function as part of our de novo review. See Franklin, 534 S.W.2d at 463; Berry, 626 S.W.2d at 633. These same concerns also apply to the testimony of Coburn's widow, Levita, other than the testimony regarding the $350.00 retainer check paid to Will Collins, which was produced in evidence.