Opinion ID: 3170129
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trespassing Claim

Text: 5 Article IV of the Constitution states: The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States . . . . U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. That power is subject to no limitations. United States v. West, 232 F.2d 694, 698 (9th Cir. 1956) (quoting Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 92, 99 (1871)); see also McFarland v. Kempthorne, 545 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008) (The Property Clause gives Congress plenary power to regulate the use of federal land.). The United States can prohibit absolutely or fix the terms on which its property may be used. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536 (1911). It is also beyond question that ‘the government has, with respect to its own lands, the rights of an ordinary proprietor, to maintain its possession and to prosecute trespassers.’ West, 232 F.2d at 698 (quoting Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897)). Before the enactment of the Taylor Grazing Act in 1934, longstanding custom allowed persons to use open, unreserved federal lands for the purpose of grazing stock. Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326 (1890); West, 232 F.2d at 697. But the Supreme Court consistently referred to that custom as an implied license, Buford, 133 U.S. at 326, and the Court explained in 1918 that Congress has not conferred upon citizens the right to graze stock upon the public lands. The 6 government has merely suffered the lands to be so used. Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 352 (1918); see also Light, 220 U.S. at 535 (There thus grew up a sort of implied license that these lands, thus left open, might be used so long as the government did not cancel its tacit consent. Its failure to object, however, did not confer any vested right on the complainant, nor did it deprive the United States of the power of recalling any implied license under which the land had been used for private purposes. (citation omitted)). With [the enactment of] the Taylor Grazing Act, Congress revoked this indiscriminate ‘implied license’ in favor of an express statutory permit . . . . West, 232 F.2d at 697. The Taylor Grazing Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to issue or cause to be issued permits to graze livestock pursuant to his rules and regulations. 43 U.S.C. § 315b. In 1950, Congress granted the same authority to the Secretary of Agriculture with respect to national forests. Act of Apr. 24, 1950, ch. 97, § 19, 64 Stat. 82, 88, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 580l. In 1976, Congress enacted the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), which provides specific guidance to the Secretaries in implementing the federal grazing permit systems. Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 402, 90 Stat. 2743, 2773, codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1752; see also 43 U.S.C. § 1740 (authorizing the 7 Secretaries to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the purposes of this Act). All three Acts clearly state that the issuance of a permit does not create any property rights. See 43 U.S.C. § 315b ([T]he issuance of a permit pursuant to the provisions of this subchapter shall not create any right, title, interest, or estate in or to the lands.); 16 U.S.C. § 580l ([N]othing herein shall be construed as limiting or restricting any right, title, or interest of the United States in any land or resources.); 43 U.S.C. § 1752(j) (Nothing in this Act shall be construed as modifying in any way law existing on October 21, 1976, with respect to the creation of right, title, interest or estate in or to public lands or lands in National Forests by issuance of grazing permits . . . .). Accordingly, we long have held that a grazing permit has always been a revocable privilege and is not a property right[]. Swim v. Bergland, 696 F.2d 712, 719 (9th Cir. 1983); accord West, 232 F.2d at 697–98; Osborne v. United States, 145 F.2d 892, 896 (9th Cir. 1944). The ownership of water rights provides a substantial benefit to an applicant for a grazing permit. By statute, the federal agencies generally must give preference to owners of water rights. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 315b (Preference shall be given in the issuance of grazing permits to . . . owners of water or water rights . . . .). Additionally, the federal agency granting a grazing permit to those 8 who own water rights often need not include the requirement—common to other grazing permits, such as those in the record here—that the recipient haul water to the site. But the ownership of water rights has no effect on the requirement that a rancher obtain a grazing permit (or other grazing authorization) before allowing cattle to graze on federal lands. In Hunter v. United States, 388 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1967), we held that, pursuant to the Mining Act of 1866 and another Act, an owner of water rights possessed a right of way over federal lands for the purpose of diverting the water by the construction of ditches and canals.1 Id. at 154 (quoting Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 251, 253, codified at 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1866); 30 U.S.C. § 51 (1866)). But we made clear that an owner of water rights possessed a right of way only for those diversionary purposes. Id. We expressly rejected the rancher’s argument that water rights entitled him to an appurtenant right to graze or to any additional or other easements. Id. Accordingly, we held 1 The FLPMA repealed the portion of the Mining Act of 1866 that guaranteed a right of way for the purpose of constructing ditches and canals. 43 U.S.C. § 661 note. But the FLPMA expressly provided that the Act did not affect any existing rights of way. See 43 U.S.C. § 1769(a) (Nothing in this subchapter shall have the effect of terminating any right-of-way or right-of-use heretofore issued, granted, or permitted.). Because Defendants’ predecessors-in-interest obtained their water rights well before 1976 (the enactment date of the FLPMA), that repeal does not affect this case. 9 that the rancher is not entitled to an easement to graze livestock on the lands within the boundaries of the [federal lands] but that he should be allowed a right of way over those lands to divert the water by one of the methods contemplated by the [Mining Act of 1866]. Id. Both the Tenth and Federal Circuits have agreed. See Diamond Bar Cattle Co. v. United States, 168 F.3d 1209, 1214–15 (10th Cir. 1999) (following Hunter and rejecting ranchers’ argument that they have an appurtenant right to graze); Estate of Hage v. United States (Hage VIII), 687 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that water rights do not include an attendant right to graze but that the government may not prevent all access to such water rights); see also Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 568 (2005) (following Hunter and Diamond Bar and concluding that water rights contain no appurtenant right to graze and contain only a right of access for diversion); Gardner v. Stager, 892 F. Supp. 1301, 1303–04 (D. Nev. 1995) (holding that the argument that the ranchers’ predecessors acquired vested water rights and that grazing rights are ‘appurtenant’ to such water rights . . . was expressly rejected long ago (citing Hunter, 388 F.2d at 153–55)).2 2 Although Hunter did not rely on this reasoning, the Taylor Grazing Act’s granting of preference in the permitting process to owners of water rights strongly suggests that Congress did not intend grazing rights to follow from water rights without a permit. 43 U.S.C. § 315b. If owners of water rights did not need to (continued...) 10 In sum, an owner of water rights has special privileges when applying for a grazing permit and has a right to access federal lands for the sole purpose of diverting the water. But an owner of water rights—like all other persons—may graze cattle on federal lands only if he or she has obtained a grazing permit or other grazing authorization. Water rights are irrelevant to that basic requirement. Between 2004 and 2008, Defendants’ cattle grazed frequently on lands owned by the United States. Neither Hage Senior nor Hage held a grazing permit or other grazing authorization during that time. Accordingly, Defendants violated applicable federal statutes and regulations, as well as the state law of trespass. See 43 U.S.C. § 1733(g) (The use, occupancy, or development of any portion of the public lands contrary to any regulation of the Secretary or other responsible authority . . . is unlawful and prohibited.); 43 C.F.R. § 4140.1(b)(1) (prohibiting persons from [a]llowing livestock . . . to graze on or be driven across [federal] lands: (i) Without a permit or lease or other grazing use authorization). See generally 43 C.F.R. subpart 4150 (governing Unauthorized Grazing Use). See 2 (...continued) obtain permits at all, the provision would be a nullity. See, e.g., Ciolino v. Frank (In re HP Inkjet Printer Litig.), 716 F.3d 1173, 1184 (9th Cir. 2013) (Under accepted canons of statutory interpretation, we must make every effort not to interpret a provision in a manner that renders other provisions of the same statute inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). 11 also West, 232 F.2d at 699 ([T]he Government is vested with legal title. It must be conceded as well that any license appellees may have had to occupy the lands at the sufferance of the Government has been terminated. Hence, as between the Government and appellees, the latter are now clearly trespassers.). The district court nevertheless concluded that, because of their water rights, Defendants have an easement by necessity to access the water sources. That conclusion squarely contravenes Hunter. As discussed above, Hunter held that an owner of water rights has an easement for diversionary purposes only, and it rejected the argument that water rights entitle the owner to any additional or other easements. 388 F.2d at 154. The district court’s theory also fails for several additional, independent reasons. We briefly mention two. First, the easement by necessity test fails on its own terms. For example, the requirement that the unity of title was severed by a conveyance of one of the parcels, McFarland, 545 F.3d at 1111 (internal quotation marks omitted), is not met because there has never been a severance of title. Under Nevada law, the owner of water rights owns neither the land nor the water; the right is usufructuary only. Desert Irrigation, Ltd. v. State, 944 P.2d 835, 842 (Nev. 1997) (per curiam). Second, even if Defendants had an easement by necessity, the government retains the right to issue reasonable regulations—and it 12 has done so by requiring a grazing permit. See McFarland, 545 F.3d at 1112 (Even where a statutory right of access exists, the [federal agency] has broad discretion to regulate its use.); see also Diamond Bar, 168 F.3d at 1217 (Plaintiffs contend their water right is of little utility if their cattle have no place to graze. If true, the fault lies with plaintiffs, who were fully apprized of the consequences of failing to renew their permits.). See generally Adams v. United States, 3 F.3d 1254, 1259 (9th Cir. 1993). In sum, the district court’s easement by necessity theory plainly contravenes the law. Defendants offer several alternative theories on appeal in support of affirmance. None is persuasive. Collateral estoppel does not apply here against the government. In 1991, Hage Senior and his wife sued the government in the Federal Court of Claims. Hage v. United States (Hage I), 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 153–56 (1996). Although they initially prevailed on some claims, the Federal Circuit reversed on all such claims and remanded for further proceedings. Hage VIII, 687 F.3d 1281. On remand, the trial court held that no further claims had merit and entered judgment for the government. Estate of Hage v. United States (Hage IX), 113 Fed. Cl. 277 (2013). Because that judgment is in favor of the government, we need not decide whether any subsidiary determinations in that case were adverse to the government. Any 13 determinations adverse to the government would not have any preclusive effect here. See, e.g., United States v. Weems, 49 F.3d 528, 532 (9th Cir. 1995) ([A] determination adverse to the prevailing party is not given preclusive effect.). Defendants’ water rights do not include, as a matter of state law, an implicit, appurtenant grazing right on federal lands. As recognized by federal and Nevada courts alike (including the district court here), the Taylor Grazing Act preempted any such right. Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803, 807–08 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Ansolabehere v. Laborde, 310 P.2d 842, 849–50 (Nev. 1957). Defendants have not established a right of way pursuant to Revised Statute (R.S.) 2477, which is the title given to section 8 of the Mining Act of 1866: the right of way for the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted. 14 Stat. at 253.3 Defendants have not shown that any roads exist, let alone that Nevada established the alleged roads as public highways under Nevada law. See Lyon v. Gila River Indian Cmty., 626 F.3d 1059, 1077 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the party asserting an R.S. 2477 right of way has the burden to establish [its] existence and that the first question is whether [the State] at some point established these roads as public highways under 3 The FLPMA repealed this section at the same time that it repealed the ditches and canals right of way. As noted above, in footnote 1, that 1976 repeal did not affect existing rights of way. 43 U.S.C. § 1769(a). 14 [state] law); see also S. Utah Wilderness All. v. BLM, 425 F.3d 735, 773–74 (10th Cir. 2005) (At the opposite extreme [from a recognized ‘highway’], in Cassity v. Castagno, 347 P.2d 834, 835 (Utah 1959), the Utah Supreme Court declined to recognize an R.S. 2477 right of way where one cattleman had a practice of herding his cattle across the lands of another to get to and from winter grazing land.). Finally, the district court correctly rejected the argument—for legal and factual reasons that Defendants have not challenged on appeal—that certain treaties between the United States and the original owners of the land are relevant. In sum, Defendants’ unauthorized grazing of cattle on federal lands was unlawful, and their water rights have no effect on the analysis.