Opinion ID: 420749
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prejudice Demonstrated by the Defendants.

Text: 59 The prejudice asserted by the defendants is that their admissions standards have changed significantly since Cannon was first rejected. The 1977 revision of the MCAT is largely responsible for the different standards because the new test emphasizes scientific knowledge and problem-solving skills to a greater degree than did the version of the test taken by Cannon. The defendants argue that, as a result, Cannon's position vis a vis other applicants and the defendants has changed. Requiring the defendants to consider Cannon on the basis of her 1974 application would, in their view, impinge upon the defendants' right to select their own students and would operate to the prejudice of other candidates. The defendants also argue that Cannon's admission on the basis of her 1974 application would be detrimental to their policy of requiring annual reapplication by candidates who are not admitted pursuant to their first application to the medical school. The district court held that this uncontroverted showing fulfilled the prejudice prong of the laches defense. We must determine whether the district judge abused his discretion in so holding. 60 The interest of a medical school in selecting its student body is well established. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 2759, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978), Justice Powell stated: 61 Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment. The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body. 62 On this appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we must assume that, absent enforcement of discriminatory policies by the defendants, Cannon would have been admitted to the defendant medical schools pursuant to the 1974 applications. This does not establish, however, that Cannon would be similarly competitive--or that she would receive an offer of admission--if she took the revised MCAT, reapplied to the medical schools, and was evaluated in comparison with other persons applying in the same year. 11 If Cannon were granted the relief she seeks, she would be admitted to medical school without regard to whether she is qualified in comparison with those students entering medical school at the same time as she. For a court to order such action in an area which so vitally concerns the health and well being of every human being could well be an abuse of the court's equitable power. Because medical school facilities are limited, the result might also be a denial of admission to another candidate more qualified than Cannon. These consequences impinge upon the defendants' right to select student bodies of their own choosing and are particularly serious when the purpose of the selection process is to provide training to those persons best qualified to serve society through the practice of medicine. 63 Cannon's assertion that such prejudice in insufficient in light of the remedy granted in Bakke is misplaced. Cannon relies upon the fact that the Supreme Court ordered the Medical School of the University of California at Davis to admit Bakke despite the intervening revision of the MCAT. Cannon's argument overlooks the fact that laches was not asserted in Bakke and therefore any prejudice resulting from revision of the MCAT or other changes in the admission process at Davis was not at issue. 64 The district judge did not abuse his discretion in holding that the defendant medical schools would be prejudiced if they were required to admit Cannon on the basis of her 1974 applications.