Opinion ID: 751836
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Obstruction of Justice Claims

Text: Camelio's final argument is that defendants are liable under RICO because they engaged in a campaign of obstructive conduct in violation of two federal criminal statutes, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1510 and 1512. Violations of these statutes constitute predicate acts of racketeering activity under RICO. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1). Further, Camelio has sufficiently alleged that defendants' obstructive conduct caused his injuries to satisfy RICO's proximate cause requirement. Camelio's final attempt to salvage his RICO claims fails, however, because the conduct of which he complains does not violate either obstruction statute. The two statutes on which Camelio relies are similar in focus and effect. Section 1510(a) makes it a crime for any person to willfully endeavor[ ] by means of bribery to obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication of information relating to a violation of any criminal statute ... to a criminal investigator. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1510(a). Similarly, § 1512(a)(2) punishes any person who intentionally harasses another person and thereby hinders, delays, prevents, or dissuades any person from ... reporting to a law enforcement officer ... the commission ... of a Federal offense. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(c)(2). Both statutes focus on a specific step in the criminal investigatory process, namely the communication or reporting of information to criminal investigators. See, e.g., United States v. Siegel, 717 F.2d 9, 20 (2d Cir.1983) (in order to convict under § 1510(a), prosecution must prove that defendant had a reasonably founded belief that information had or was about to be given to a federal investigator); United States v. San Martin, 515 F.2d 317, 320-21 (5th Cir.1975) (prosecution must prove that [defendant] knew or reasonably believed that [informant] had information which she had given or would give to federal investigators). The conduct on which Camelio bases his claims falls outside the scope of both statutes because he alleges that defendants engaged in their obstructive conduct in an effort to prevent him from uncovering information of wrongdoing rather than to prevent him from reporting information he had already uncovered. Conduct that is aimed only at preventing a private citizen from uncovering evidence of a crime, while undeniably wrong, is not within the purview of either obstruction of justice statute. Accordingly, Camelio cannot save his RICO claims by relying on either statute. 1 This is the fourth time in recent years that we have been called upon to evaluate the sufficiency of a RICO claim arising from an employment dispute. In all four cases, the claim has failed to survive a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Miranda, 948 F.2d at 47; Pujol, 829 F.2d at 1205; Nodine, 819 F.2d at 349. Although we are not prepared today to address the issue in a categorical fashion, we emphasize the court's statement in Miranda: While it may be theoretically possible to allege a wrongful discharge which results directly from the commission of a RICO predicate act ... any such safe harbor would be severely circumscribed. 948 F.2d at 41. Whatever the future may hold for this category of claims, Camelio's RICO claims are well outside any safe harbor that may exist.