Opinion ID: 2356368
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Crime of Violence Statute

Text: Section 18-1.3-406 is a mandatory sentencing provision. It is not a substantive charge and may only be imposed after the defendant has been found guilty of one of the eligible substantive offenses. See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 277 (Colo. 1996); Brown v. Dist. Court, 194 Colo. 45, 47, 569 P.2d 1390, 1391 (1977). This statute sets an increased penalty range for certain crimes that involve the use of a deadly weapon. People v. Terry, 791 P.2d 374, 378 (Colo. 1990). If the jury makes the specific finding as required in section 18-1.3-406(4), then the defendant must be sentenced to a term of at least the midpoint in, but no more than twice the maximum of, the presumptive range for the offense. § 18-1.3-406(1)(a). In order to impose the crime-of-violence mandatory sentence for attempted first degree murder, the jury shall make a specific finding that the defendant used or possessed and threatened the use of a deadly weapon during its commission. The relevant statute reads: (2)(a)(I) Crime of violence means any of the crimes specified in subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (a) committed, conspired to be committed, or attempted to be committed by a person during which, or in the immediate flight therefrom, the person: (A) Used, or possessed and threatened the use of, a deadly weapon . . . (II) Subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (a) applies to the following crimes . . . (A) Murder . . . (4) The jury . . . shall make a specific finding as to whether the accused did or did not use, or possessed and threatened to use, a deadly weapon during the commission of such crime. . . . If the jury . . . finds that the accused used, or possessed and threatened the use of, such deadly weapon . . . the penalty provisions of this section shall be applicable. § 18-1.3-406 (emphasis added). A deadly weapon may be any weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance which in the manner it is used or intended to be used is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury. § 18-1-901(3)(e) (emphasis added). Whether an object is a deadly weapon is a question of fact for the jury to decide. J.D.C. v. Dist. Court, 910 P.2d 684, 688 (Colo.1996). Our primary goal in construing a sentencing statute is to give effect to the legislative intent. Vensor v. People, 151 P.3d 1274, 1275 (Colo.2007). To determine legislative intent, we first look to the plain language of the statute. See, e.g., Bostelman v. People, 162 P.3d 686, 690 (Colo.2007). The plain language of the crime-of-violence mandatory sentence statute indicates that the requirements set forth in section 18-1.3-406(4) are mandatory. This statute dictates that the jury  shall make a specific finding as to whether the accused did or did not use, or possessed and threatened to use, a deadly weapon. § 18-1.3-406(4) (emphasis added). [6] The inclusion of the word shall means that the jury must make this specific finding in order to impose the crime-of-violence mandatory sentence. See People v. Dist. Court, 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo.1986) (The generally accepted and familiar meanings of both `shall' and `require' indicate that these terms are mandatory.). When interpreting this statute we have previously held that it requires a specific finding of fact, Brown, 194 Colo. at 47, 569 P.2d at 1391, and that the jury must make this determination beyond a reasonable doubt, People v. Russo, 713 P.2d 356, 364 (Colo.1986). The court of appeals has held that the trial court must submit special interrogatories to the jury to elicit the required findings and that failure to do so is reversible error. People v. Grable, 43 Colo. App. 518, 519, 611 P.2d 588, 589 (1979). According to the mandatory language of the crime-of-violence statute, the jury must make the required, specific finding of fact, and once it does, the defendant shall be sentenced within the increased penalty range. By negative implication, the increased sentencing range may not be imposed upon a defendant if the jury does not make the required, specific finding of fact. A jury verdict that fails to track the statutory language, when combined with jury instructions that do track the statutory language, however, is not so egregious as to fall within the narrow category of structural errors, which require automatic reversal. [7] Rather, this situation is more analogous to a trial court's erroneous jury instruction, which we consider trial error. Griego, 19 P.3d at 8. Hence, when the trial court properly instructs the jury regarding the required, specific finding of fact, but the verdict form fails to contain the mandatory language, the jury's resulting finding is inconclusive and inconsistent; therefore, we hold that this incongruity constitutes trial error. This should be reviewed for plain error when the defendant fails to object at trial to determine whether the error warrants reversal.