Opinion ID: 1388055
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Acquisition of adverse interest.

Text: (2) The undisputed evidence shows that petitioner violated rule 4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct which proscribes the acquisition by an attorney of an interest adverse to a client. In Ames v. State Bar (1973) 8 Cal.3d 910, 917-919 [106 Cal. Rptr. 489, 506 P.2d 625], we held that a purchase by two attorneys of a note secured by a first deed of trust on a piece of property was the acquisition of an adverse interest within the meaning of rule 4 since their clients held the second deed of trust on the same property. We noted that the interest was adverse for two reasons. First, the attorneys were in the position to proceed with a sale under the senior lien which would extinguish the client's junior lien. ( Id., at pp. 918-919.) Second, the attorneys had obtained an interest in the subject matter of the litigation for which they had been retained, contrary to their duty of undivided loyalty to their client.... ( Id., at p. 919.) Petitioner levied on the property of Mr. Robles, recorded the writ of execution as a lien, and eventually purchased the duplex at a marshal's sale. The property had been community property before Mrs. Robles' divorce; she had retained petitioner's father to appeal the judgment which awarded Mr. Robles ownership of the property; thus the property was the subject of the litigation for which petitioner bore the responsibility. (See McArthur v. Goodwin (1916) 173 Cal. 499, 503 [160 P. 679]; Valentine v. Stewart (1860) 15 Cal. 387.) The duplex, moreover, constituted the only property which Mr. Robles owned which could be used to satisfy Mrs. Robles' $1,500 judgment [2] since the family residence, also awarded to Mr. Robles by the trial court, had been sold at a trustee's sale. ( Marlowe v. State Bar (1965) 63 Cal.2d 304, 309 [46 Cal. Rptr. 326, 405 P.2d 150].) Petitioner boldly asserts that he had the right to execute on Mr. Robles' property irrespective as to whether the client also had a right to obtain a writ of execution in her favor against the same judgment creditor. Even if the judgment in favor of petitioner had been obtained independently of his representation of Mrs. Robles, we doubt that he could have acquired the property without violation of rule 4. The order compelling Mr. Robles to pay attorney's fees and costs on appeal directly to petitioner, however, was not such an independent judgment because the court renders an award for attorney's fees and costs for the benefit of a party to the action, the attorney's right thereto being derived from that of his client. (Civ. Code, § 4371; Marshank v. Superior Court (1960) 180 Cal. App.2d 602, 606-607 [4 Cal. Rptr. 593]; Telander v. Telander (1943) 60 Cal. App.2d 207, 210 [140 P.2d 204]; 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1974) Husband and Wife, § 144, pp. 5011-5012.) Petitioner further argues that Mrs. Robles expressly consented to his levy on the property and to his subsequent purchase of the property at the execution sale. Even if the consent were an informed consent, which it does not appear to have been, and even if petitioner were acting in complete good faith, petitioner could still be properly disciplined for violation of rule 4. ( Ames v. State Bar, supra, 8 Cal.3d 910, 917.)