Opinion ID: 796549
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law

Text: 51 We typically review a district court's denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo. K & T Enters., Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 97 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir.1996); Shanklin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 369 F.3d 978, 993 (6th Cir.2004). However, when faced with a motion for judgment as a matter of law based on a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, as here, we apply the standard of review employed by the courts of the state whose substantive law controls the action. Shanklin, 369 F.3d at 993 (citing Morales, 151 F.3d at 506). Under Tennessee law, we do not weigh the evidence; rather, we take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the plaintiff, indulging in all reasonable inferences in his favor, and disregarding any evidence to the contrary. Id. (citing Williams v. Brown, 860 S.W.2d 854, 857 (Tenn.1993)). A grant of judgment as a matter of law is appropriate if reasonable minds could not differ as to the conclusion to be drawn from the evidence. Id. (citing Eaton v. McLain, 891 S.W.2d 587, 590 (Tenn.1994)).
52 We affirm the district court's denial of Defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law. Defendant argues that Plaintiff's only evidence on foreseeability is, first, inadmissible and, second, insufficient to support the conclusion that Defendant should have foreseen the October 3, 2001 attack. (Def.'s Br. at 38) Additionally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's only evidence of `preventability' — offered by its two challenged expert witnesses — should also have been excluded by the district court. 53 Applying Tennessee's standard to review the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court must take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the plaintiff, indulging in all reasonable inferences in his favor, and disregarding any evidence to the contrary. Shanklin, 369 F.3d at 993 (citing Williams, 860 S.W.2d at 857). To succeed on her negligence action, Plaintiff had to prove both cause in fact and proximate cause. McClenahan v. Cooley, 806 S.W.2d 767, 774 (Tenn.1991). Proximate cause requires that 54 (1) the tortfeasor's conduct must have been a `substantial factor' in bringing about the harm . . .; (2) there is no rule or policy that should relieve the wrongdoer from liability because of the manner in which negligence has resulted in the harm; and (3) the harm giving rise to the action could have reasonably been foreseen or anticipated by a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence. 55 Id. at 775 (citations omitted). Accordingly, a plaintiff must show that some action within [the defendant's] power more probably than not would have prevented the injury. Tedder v. Raskin, 728 S.W.2d 343, 348-49 (Tenn.Ct.App.1987). As the Tennessee courts have observed, [n]egligence is ordinarily an issue to be decided by a jury, and can be withdrawn from the jury only in those cases where the facts are established by evidence free from conflict and the inference from the facts is so certain that all reasonable minds must agree. Williams, 860 S.W.2d at 857. 56 The district court properly denied Defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law. As previously discussed, we disagree with Defendant's claim that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the expert witness testimony and prior incident reports. Those incident reports could be taken, in the minds of reasonable people, to establish that Defendant had notice that passengers could potentially interfere with the safe passage of its buses by attacking its drivers or by grabbing the wheel of its buses. Such notice could be taken by these reasonable-minded individuals to establish foreseeability. Additionally, Plaintiff's experts testified that, had Defendant installed entry-resistant barriers to shield its drivers, accidents like the one at issue here could have been prevented. Although, as Defendant contends, these barriers may not have been an effective deterrent to Igric's violent attack, they could have alerted Defendant's driver to the attack in time for him to pull the bus to the side of the road or call for assistance. Further, expert testimony called into question the adequacy of emergency training provided to Defendant's drivers. This is simply not a case where reasonable minds could draw but one conclusion, Williams, 860 S.W.2d at 857, and accordingly, we find the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law.