Opinion ID: 1375029
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Selection Claims

Text: At voir dire the court asked Elva Cazares, a member of the venire, whether she would refuse to vote to return a verdict of first degree murder so that you wouldn't even have to get to the death penalty? She replied, Yes, I think I would. It then asked her if she would vote to find the special circumstance allegation false in order to stop a capital penalty phase. She replied, Well, it's kind of confusing in that term. But just to sum it all up, I don't believe in the death penalty. The court asked Julietta Lopez, also a member of the venire, If the prosecution proves that the defendant's guilty of first degree murder, ... would you refuse to vote for that because you know by voting for something other than first degree murder there wouldn't be a death penalty? She replied, I would. (1a) Defendant contends that the court erred in failing to inquire more fully about the basis for the two potential jurors' opposition to the death penalty. The result, in his view, was a violation of a right he asserts to an impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. (2) Potential jurors must be excused if their views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties in accordance with the instructions and their oath. ( People v. Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 169 [19 Cal. Rptr.2d 836, 852 P.2d 331].) The court's determination resolves what is essentially a question of fact or, perhaps more accurately, a mixed question that is essentially factual. ( People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1262 [270 Cal. Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251].) Accordingly, our review is deferential: we determine whether substantial evidence supported the rulings. ( Ibid. ) (1b) The court implicitly ruled that the ability of the two potential jurors in question to follow their oaths was substantially impaired. These determinations were supported by substantial evidence. First, we note that the court excluded the potential jurors on its own motion after eliciting their views on the death penalty, and that counsel failed to object. It continues to be the rule that the failure to object does not waive the right to raise the issue on appeal [citation].... ( People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 648, fn. 4 [280 Cal. Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351].) But the failure to object to the rulings does suggest defense counsel's concurrence in the court's assessment of each venireperson's firm and sincere expression of his or her inability to impose the death penalty. ( Ibid. ) Substantial evidence supported the court's implicit determination that the ability of the potential jurors to follow the law at the guilt phase was, at a minimum, substantially impaired. Defendant does not persuade us that any constitutional right was violated.
(3a) Defendant contends that counsel were ineffective for failing to question sufficiently or at all nine potential jurors, including Cazares and Lopez, who were excused for cause  specifically, for what he terms a general opposition to the death penalty. (4) It is fundamental that a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show both deficient performance under an objective standard of professional reasonableness and prejudice under a test of reasonable probability of a different outcome. ( People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 529 [41 Cal. Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119], citing Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693-694, 697-698, 104 S.Ct. 2052]; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215-218 [233 Cal. Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839].) (3b) Counsel were not ineffective. To be sure, part of the guarantee of a defendant's right to an impartial jury is an adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors. [Citations.] ( Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719, 729 [119 L.Ed.2d 492, 503, 112 S.Ct. 2222].) But each venireperson to whom defendant refers us either made clear that he or she would never vote for death, or gave slightly more ambiguous answers from which the court and counsel could reasonably conclude that his or her ability to follow the law was, at a minimum, substantially impaired. We have already described the testimony of Cazares and Lopez. (See ante, p. 817.) To provide other examples, Josefina Docuyanan flatly testified, I will never vote for a verdict of death, and in answer to the question, Would you automatically vote for a verdict other than first degree [murder] in order to avoid having to worry about the death penalty? Pamela Elofson testified, Yes. Yes, I would. Hence, [n]othing in the record indicates that counsel lacked a plausible, tactical reason for asking these individuals few or no follow-up questions. [Citation.] Indeed, counsel might have determined from the demeanor of these prospective jurors that additional questioning would be futile. Counsel might also have reasonably concluded that any ambiguity in the answers they had already given would be beneficial and would promote retention of pro-life jurors. No constitutional deficiency in counsel's performance on voir dire has been shown. ( People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 587 [15 Cal. Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142], fns. omitted, affd. sub nom. Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. ___ [129 L.Ed.2d 750, 114 S.Ct. 2630].) In the case of many of the venirepersons to whose examination defendant alludes, questioning by counsel for either party would have been superfluous, for the court effectively elicited the venireperson's opinion. At other times, it was defense counsel who confirmed what was already apparent: the potential juror was opposed to the death penalty and could not vote for it. Thus, even if counsel were deficient for not questioning each potential juror  an unlikely prospect  we cannot conclude that defendant was prejudiced. There is no reasonable probability that the court's rulings would have differed, and hence that the result might have differed, if counsel had questioned the potential jurors at length. Defendant also asserts that the potential jurors were excused solely because they opposed the death penalty. He contends that the exclusion from the guilt phase of jurors categorically opposed to the death penalty deprived him of a jury composed of a representative cross-section of the community, in violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. We have rejected such claims [citation], as has the United States Supreme Court.... ( People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 674 [276 Cal. Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278].)