Opinion ID: 883963
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was Tweedy's right to a speedy trial violated?

Text: An analysis of whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated requires a balancing of the following four factors: 1) length of the delay; 2) reason for the delay; 3) assertion of the right by the defendant; and 4) prejudice to the defendant. Matthews, 894 P.2d at 287. No single factor is indispensable or dispositive. State v. Britton (1984), 213 Mont. 155, 158, 689 P.2d 1256, 1258. The first factor, the length of the delay, acts as a triggering mechanism; the length of the delay must be presumptively prejudicial before the remaining three factors will be analyzed. Matthews, 894 P.2d at 287 (citation omitted). The State concedes that the delay in this case, a period of approximately six years, is presumptively prejudicial. When the delay is presumptively prejudicial, the burden shifts to the State to rebut the presumption by showing a reasonable explanation for the delay and demonstrating that the defendant was not prejudiced by the delay. Matthews, 894 P.2d at 287. The State argues that the reason for the delay after the original July 21, 1989, trial date had been vacated was Tweedy's failure to prosecute his appeal; on that basis, it contends that the entire period must be allocated to Tweedy. We concluded above, however, that it was the State's duty to diligently prosecute the case. Thus, except for the relatively brief period before and after Tweedy's motion to continue the original trial date, which is attributable to Tweedy, we charge the delay in excess of five years to the State. We also must weigh the time chargeable to the State. Matthews, 894 P.2d at 287. Speedy trial issues often involve delay caused by crowded court dockets and corresponding difficulties in setting trial dates, which is commonly referred to as institutional delay; we weigh that type of institutional delay less heavily against the State than intentional delay. See State v. Weeks (1995), 270 Mont. 63, 72, 891 P.2d 477, 482. The delay in this case was not of that type. Nor was the delay intentional. Rather, it was caused by the State's erroneous conclusion that it did not have the burden to diligently prosecute Tweedy's trial de novo and its total failure to pursue the case from July of 1989 until its motion to dismiss the appeal in January of 1995. We noted above that we have not heretofore specifically addressed the precise issue of which party has the burden of diligently pursuing a criminal appeal from a justice court to a district court for a trial de novo; we also indicated, however, that Tiedemann, Sunford, and Bullock clearly mandated our conclusion here that the burden remained on the State to timely prosecute. Thus, Montana case law did not provide a reasonable basis for the State's position on the burden issue. As a result, we weigh the delay of more than five years in this case heavily against the State. The third Barker factor requires that a defendant assert the right to a speedy trial. Our rule is that if a defendant has moved to dismiss before trial, he has fulfilled the requirement of asserting his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Britton, 689 P.2d at 1260. Here, Tweedy moved to dismiss for lack of speedy trial before his trial was ever rescheduled after the first continuance. Thus, he fulfilled the requirement that he assert his constitutional right. The State argues, in this regard, that even if it and the District Court had some responsibility to reset Tweedy's case for trial, that responsibility should be weighed against Tweedy's lack of assertion of the right to speedy trial; in that event, according to the State, this Court must decide whether the cause of the delay was completely attributable to the State or to a waiver of the right of speedy trial by the Defendant. With regard to the alleged lack of assertion of the right, that contention is factually incorrect; indeed, the State recognizes at another portion of its brief that Tweedy asserted his right on January 17, 1995. With regard to the waiver theory, the State cites to no authority under which a defendant's right to a speedy trial is waived  in the legal sense  where asserted prior to trial. As presented here, these arguments by the State are merely a different, and unsupported, twist on its earlier efforts to place the burden of diligently prosecuting this trial de novo on the defendant. The final factor of the speedy trial analysis is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the delay. Three interests are considered in assessing prejudice resulting from delay: 1) prevention of oppressive pretrial incarceration; 2) minimization of the defendant's anxiety and concern; and 3) avoidance of impairment of the defense. Matthews, 894 P.2d at 288. The avoidance of impairment of the defense is the most critical of these three interests. Matthews, 894 P.2d at 288. The primary prejudice-related thrust of Tweedy's motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial was that witnesses' memories had been impaired by the delay. The State argues that, under Weeks, general claims of impairment are not persuasive, and that none of the witnesses have passed away and there has been no destruction of the records regarding the charged incident. It is true that mere self-serving assertions that the defendant suffered prejudice generally are not sufficient to demonstrate impairment of, or prejudice to, the defense. Weeks, 891 P.2d at 484. In Weeks, however, the defendant stated only that `[t]he defense was impaired by the passage of time.' Weeks, 891 P.2d at 484. Here, Tweedy's statement that witnesses' memories were impaired by the lengthy delay is at least minimally more specific than the statement in Weeks upon which we based our conclusion. Moreover, given the presumptively prejudicial delay, the burden shifted to the State in this case to rebut the presumed prejudice. Matthews, 894 P.2d at 287. The State did not respond to Tweedy's motion via either a brief or argument at the hearing. It did not present any evidence, as required by Matthews, to prove that Tweedy was not prejudiced. See Matthews, 894 P.2d at 289. Nor is the State's assertion on appeal that none of the witnesses have passed away material here. First, Tweedy did not assert that witnesses had died; he asserted that witnesses' memories have been impaired due to the long delay. Thus, the State's assertion is not responsive to Tweedy's assertion and, even if true, it would be insufficient to rebut Tweedy's claim. More importantly, the appropriate place to respond to Tweedy's claim of prejudice was in the District Court, not in this Court. The State could, and should, have done so by responding to Tweedy's motion and requesting an evidentiary hearing to rebut his claims. It did not. We recognize that, in the usual case, a defendant claiming a speedy trial violation would be required to at least submit an affidavit in support of claims of prejudice. Matthews, 894 P.2d at 289. Moreover, even an affidavit containing a general the defense was impaired assertion is not sufficient to demonstrate impairment or prejudice to the defense. Weeks, 891 P.2d at 484. Once the burden has shifted to the State to rebut presumed prejudice, however, it is the State's duty to respond to a speedy trial motion and to properly raise, for resolution by the district court, the issues related thereto. Under the well-established principle that we will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal, the State acts at its own peril if it fails to do so. See Weeks, 891 P.2d at 491. In this case, the State failed to raise either its fact-based responses or its legal authority regarding the sufficiency of Tweedy's assertions in the District Court. Thus, on this record, we conclude that the State failed to meet its burden of rebutting the presumed prejudice to the defense as a matter of law. Consequently, we weigh the prejudice factor in Tweedy's favor. In this case, we conclude that a proper balancing of the four Barker factors pursuant to Matthews requires that we accord the extraordinary length of the delay substantially more weight than any of the other Barker factors and that we weigh it in Tweedy's favor and against the State. The assertion of the right and prejudice factors also weigh in Tweedy's favor, although less heavily. As a result, we hold that Tweedy's constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. We reverse the District Court's order dismissing Tweedy's appeal and remand for entry of an order dismissing the misdemeanor assault charge against him. TURNAGE, C.J., and TRIEWEILER, LEAPHART and ERDMANN, JJ., concur.