Opinion ID: 2234021
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Police Cruiser

Text: The first officer testified that Bormann was placed in the back seat of the police cruiser and asked to provide his name and address. On two occasions, Bormann said he would like to talk. He was told to sit back and relax and not to ask any questions. Bormann appeared calm. He had watery eyes that were slightly bloodshot, and there was an odor of alcohol on his person. Bormann then volunteered that after becoming frustrated about the officiating of the football game he was watching, he got out his deer rifle and drove around. He said he had not shot anyone. The second officer, who was standing outside the cruiser, testified that Bormann said he had been at home watching a football game, drinking, and getting upset with the referee because of some of the officiating calls he made. Bormann said that as the game progressed, he became more and more upset. He got dressed, grabbed his rifle, and started driving around. He finished his statement by saying, I didn't shoot anybody tonight. Bormann argues his statement was inadmissible because he had not been given the Miranda warnings. The safeguards provided by Miranda come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. State v. McKinney, 273 Neb. 346, 364, 730 N.W.2d 74, 90 (2007). Miranda warnings are required only when there has been such a restriction on one's freedom as to render one `in custody.' State v. McKinney, 273 Neb. at 364, 730 N.W.2d at 90-91, quoting State v. Mata, 266 Neb. 668, 668 N.W.2d 448 (2003). A person is in custody for purposes of Miranda when there is a formal arrest or a restraint on one's freedom of movement to the degree associated with such an arrest. State v. McKinney, 273 Neb. at 364, 730 N.W.2d at 91. Bormann was handcuffed and placed in the back seat of a police cruiser. His freedom of movement was restrained. It is not disputed that he was in custody at the time he made the statements to the officers in and near the cruiser. We then consider whether Bormann was interrogated while in the police cruiser. `Interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. State v. Rogers, 277 Neb. 37, 54, 760 N.W.2d 35, 52 (2009). In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301-02, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) (emphasis in original), the U.S. Supreme Court stated: A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation. But, since the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. We have held that [s]tatements made in a conversation initiated by the accused or spontaneously volunteered by the accused are not the result of interrogation and are admissible. State v. Rodriguez, 272 Neb. 930, 944, 726 N.W.2d 157, 171 (2007). In addition, the definition of interrogation excludes a course of inquiry related and responsive to a volunteered remark. Id. In interpreting Rhode Island v. Innis, supra , this court has stated that an objective standard is applied to determine whether there is interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. See State v. Gibson, 228 Neb. 455, 422 N.W.2d 570 (1988). The question to be answered is as follows: Would a reasonable and disinterested person conclude that police conduct, directed to a suspect or defendant in custody, would likely elicit an incriminating response from that suspect or defendant?... If the answer is yes, there is interrogation requiring the Miranda warning before a defendant's incriminating response is constitutionally admissible as evidence against the defendant. Id. at 463, 422 N.W.2d at 575. Both officers in and near the cruiser testified that Bormann's statements while he was in the cruiser were volunteered. Neither of the officers elicited a response by beginning a conversation with Bormann. He was asked for his name and address in order for the officers to conduct a background check on him. This information was collected for arrest and did not require Miranda warnings. Neither officer took any action that elicited an incriminating response from Bormann. The officers cannot be held accountable for Bormann's response. They asked no questions beyond obtaining information for identification purposes. [I]nterrogation occurs when a person is placed under a compulsion to speak. State v. Rodriguez, 272 Neb. at 943, 726 N.W.2d at 171. Bormann was not compelled to talk to the officers by their actions or statements. He voluntarily asked to talk to the officers, who discouraged him from doing so. Bormann continued to talk even when he was told not to speak. There was no interrogation in the police cruiser. We conclude that Bormann was not subjected to interrogation while sitting in the police cruiser at the scene or while being transported to police headquarters. The statements made by Bormann were voluntary and were not the result of interrogation. Therefore, they were admissible. The trial court did not err in allowing such statements to be admitted into evidence.