Opinion ID: 1434270
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Inadmissibility of New Evidence on Appeal

Text: Concerning the admissibility of new evidence not presented to the Commission, the general rule is that upon an appeal from an order of the Commission, additional evidence may not be considered, and the court is without authority to try the case anew upon the record. City of Albuquerque v. New Mexico State Corp. Commission, 93 N.M. 719, 723, 605 P.2d 227, 231 (1979); Transcontinental Bus System v. State Corp. Commission, 56 N.M. 158, 241 P.2d 829 (1952). The district court is limited to the record before the Commission when reviewing a Commission order. State ex rel. State Corp. Commission v. McCulloh, 63 N.M. 436, 321 P.2d 207 (1957). This rule is followed unless an exception is brought to the attention of the court, such as those indicated in NMSA 1978, Section 12-8-20 or Section 12-8-21 of the New Mexico Administrative Procedures Act (NMAPA). No exception under the NMAPA or the Motor Carrier Act was presented to the district court. Groendyke did not use either Section 12-8-20, which allows the appeals court to be petitioned before the hearing date for leave to present additional evidence, or Section 12-8-21, which permits procedural irregularities during the Commission hearing to be a basis for admitting new evidence on appeal. The role of the district court in the administrative appeal procedure is to review the record made before the Commission and determine if there was sufficient evidence to uphold the administrative agency's decision. Ferguson-Steere Motor Co. v. State Corp. Commission, 63 N.M. 137, 314 P.2d 894 (1957). During the appellate review, the district court refused to admit new evidence offered by Groendyke. The evidence concerned Commission orders granting or denying certificates in similar cases. Groendyke claims the Commission used a different standard for Groendyke than that utilized in granting other similar certificates under similar circumstances. Groendyke asserts this variation in the application of standards established discriminatory treatment of Groendyke when compared with other similarly situated applicants whose applications were granted. Evidence of this asserted discriminatory action was not presented to the Commission at the administrative hearing. Traditionally, cases have uniformly held the hearing of an administrative appeal at the district court level is an appellate procedure, not a trial de novo. Garrett Freight Lines v. State Corp. Commission, 63 N.M. 48, 312 P.2d 1061 (1957). State ex rel. Transcontinental Bus Service v. Carmody, 53 N.M. 367, 208 P.2d 1073 (1949). The pertinent wording of Subsections 65-2-120(A) to (D), regarding actions to set aside orders of the Commission has remained essentially unchanged over forty years. See NMSA 1978, § 65-2-120(A) to (D) (Repl.Pamp. 1981); NMSA 1978, § 65-2-66 (Orig.Pamp.); NMSA 1953, § 64-27-68 (Repl.Vol. 9, 1960); NMSA 1941, § 68-13-63. It is not the function of the trial court to retry the case, Ferguson-Steere Motor Co.; admit new evidence unless under an exception stated in Sections 12-8-20 or 12-8-21 of the NMAPA; or substitute its judgment for that of the Commission. Gas Co. of New Mexico v. New Mexico Public Service Commission, 100 N.M. 740, 676 P.2d 817 (1984); Lloyd McKee Motors, Inc. v. New Mexico State Corp. Commission, 93 N.M. 539, 602 P.2d 1026 (1979); Llano, Inc. v. Southern Union Gas Co., 75 N.M. 7, 399 P.2d 646 (1964). Additional evidence not presented at the administrative hearing, nor offered under a recognized exception, may not later be heard by the district court sitting in the posture of an appellate court. Here the district court was limited to reviewing that evidence presented to the Commission. We uphold the district court's decision not to accept new evidence on appeal that was neither offered at the Commission hearing nor under exceptions stated in Sections 12-8-20 and 12-8-21.