Opinion ID: 497896
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Literal infringement of claims 1, 3, and 5.

Text: 7 We cannot agree with appellant's contention that the District Court erred in interpreting claim 1 of the '387 patent by adopting a generic statement of the invention limiting it to its preferred embodiment as found in the specification, rather than applying the specific language of claim 1. 2 We also are not persuaded by appellant's assertion that the District Court incorporated the limitations regarding porosity embodied in claims 3 and 5 into the broader claim 1. On the contrary, we conclude that the District Court merely employed a consistent meaning for the term 'porous' as used in claims 1, 3, and 5. While it is well-settled that 'patent law allows the inventor to be his own lexicographer,' Autogiro v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397, 155 USPQ 697, 703 (Ct. Cl. 1967); see also Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d at 1565, 219 USPQ at 1140, there is nothing in the claims at issue to indicate that 'porous' refers to anything other than its ordinary, dictionary meaning. As the District Court recognized, '[t]he words in a claim 'will be given their ordinary and accustomed meaning, unless it appears that the inventor used them differently. Propper Mfg. Co. v. Surgicot, Inc., No. CV-85-1363, slip op. at 13 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 1986) (quoting Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 137 F.2d 3, 58 USPQ 504 (7th Cir. 1943), aff'd, 322 U.S. 471, 61 USPQ 382 (1944)); see also Envirotech Corp. v. A1 George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753, 759, 221 USPQ 473, 477 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Furthermore, the word 'porous' is found in all three claims at issue. Appellant cannot ask that the court interpret the term 'porous' in one manner in claim 1 but differently in claims 3 and 5. 8 After determining that the literal language of each of the claims at issue requires a porous outer region or shell, but that claims 1, 3, and 5 differ in the manner which the porous outer shell is limited, the District Court compared the claims of the '387 patent with the accused device and held that appellee's STAR Pack did not literally infringe claims 1, 3, or 5 of the '387 patent. The District Court concluded that the claims of the patent did not read on the 'non-porous, gas impermeable, unitary, plastic laminated sheet' on the bottom and top of the accused STAR Pack. That is, the District Court held, correctly, that the porous sheets described in the claims of the '387 patent did not include non-porous sheets. See SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 227 USPQ 577 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 9 Nor did the District Court reach its conclusion in a vacuum. Rather, the court conducted a thorough investigation (in interpreting the claims) by looking not only to the actual language embodied in the claims, but also to the prosecution history and the specification. See Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 226 USPQ 5 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In reviewing the prosecution history, the District Court noted that the patent examiner required Augurt to amend the claims to more particularly point out the difference between the porosity of the porous outer sheets and the porous inner core sheets, both to define the invention and to distinguish it over the prior art (e.g., the Bowie and Dick test pack). Appellant simply cannot have it both ways. Propper cannot define the terms in the invention in one manner during prosecution to seek allowance by the PTO, and then redefine them before the court in another manner to seek infringement. General Elec. Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 745, 753, 198 USPQ 65, 72 (Ct. Cl. 1978). 10