Opinion ID: 2277556
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Contemporary Construction, Statutes Permitting the House to Perform a Role in the Confirmation Process, and the Ballot Question Prepared by the Secretary of State.

Text: As noted in our discussion of Kraus, there are several recent statutes that clearly afford the House a role equal to the Senate in the confirmation process. The Governor relies heavily upon those statutes to buttress his argument that § 93 was intended toand actually doesafford the House a role in the confirmation process. KRS 11.160, which provides the general framework for the confirmation of gubernatorial appointments, was first enacted in 1990. As originally enacted, it did not mention confirmation by the House. [68] In 1992, however, the General Assembly amended KRS 11.160 to specify the manner of confirmation of appointees who were statutorily required to be confirmed by both the House and the Senate. [69] The addition in 1992 of language pertaining to the House having a defined role in the confirmation of appointees was done in the same legislative session in which the General Assembly passed, and thereby presented to the electorate, SB 226 and the amendments to § 93 at hand. The Governor argues that this contemporaneous recognition of bicameral confirmation requirements in KRS 11.160 is entitled to great weight in interpreting the 1992 amendments to § 93. We agree, of course, that contemporaneous legislative explanation or clarification of a constitutional provision should ordinarily be given deference by a reviewing court. [70] But we disagree with the Governor's ultimate assertion that the enactment of statutes purporting to specify the manner of bicameral confirmation of appointees nullifies clear constitutional language to the contrary. Obviously, because the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it[,] [71] no statute can validly direct or authorize the performance of an unconstitutional act. [72] It appears that there were at least two statutes requiring bicameral confirmation of gubernatorial nominees existing before the 1992 amendments to § 93. In 1990, for example, the General Assembly created the State Board for Elementary and Secondary Education. [73] The act creating that Board, currently codified at KRS 156.029, requires the eleven Board members to be appointed by the Governor and confirmed by both the Senate and the House. [74] Also, in 1990, as part of the same act that created this State Board for Elementary and Educational Education, the General Assembly also created the Council for Education Technology. [75] The nine members of that Board were also required to be appointed by the Governor and confirmed by both the Senate and the House. [76] But in 1992, the General Assembly repealed the section of the KRS covering the Council for Education Technology. [77] In its place, the General Assembly created a new Council for Education Technology. [78] But that new Technology Council consisted of several ex officio members and eight members appointed by the Governor. [79] Notably, however, that bill did not require those eight appointed members to be confirmed by either the House or the Senate. It is important to note that when those statutes providing for bicameral confirmation were enacted in 1990, the Constitution had not been amended to preclude the House from having a role in the confirmation process. Nor had the amendment to § 93 specifically giving the Senate alone the right to confirm nominees been ratified by the people when, in 1992, the General Assembly amended KRS 11.160(2) to specify the bicameral confirmation procedures. [80] It is apparent that the General Assembly, the body that originally drafted the amendments to § 93 at issue, had already shown its ability and willingness to put specific language in legislation requiring appointees to be confirmed by both the Senate and the House. Tellingly, however, the General Assembly chose not to put specific language in the relevant amendments to § 93 that would have required, or at least authorized, the House to confirm appointees. We are unwilling to assume that the General Assembly omitted reference to the House in § 93 by oversight. Instead, we agree with Fox that the absence of language mentioning the House in § 93 should rationally be interpreted as a conscious decision by the General Assembly not to include the House in confirming nominees. Although not memorialized in a statute, there are, in fact, some indicators that the contemporaneous construction of the 1992 amendments to § 93 envisioned only senatorial confirmation. First, the May 4, 1992, Legislative Record, a newspaper-style summary of Kentucky legislative activities edited and published by the Legislative Research Commission (LRC) (an entity charged with assisting the General Assembly), contains the steps that SB 226 took along the path to being enacted by both legislative chambers. That Legislative Record also contains a summary of SB 226. That summary states that one aspect of SB 226 was to authorize appointment of members of boards and commissions with the consent of the Senate.... [81] The bill log for the House Committee on Elections and Constitutional Amendments likewise summarizes SB 226, in pertinent part, as a proposal to amend Section 93 to... authorize appointment of members of boards and commissions with consent of the Senate.... [82] These are, therefore, at least two contemporaneous indications that the General Assembly contemplated only the Senate having the ability to confirm (or reject) appointments such as Fox's. [83] Of course, the General Assembly has the ability to propose amendments to our Constitution; but those amendments must be ratified by the electorate. As our predecessor-Court memorably held, [i]n the ultimate sense, the legislature does nothing unless and until the people ratify and choose to give the revised constitution life by their own direct action. [84] Indeed, § 256 of our Kentucky Constitution provides that after appropriate passage of a proposed amendment by the General Assembly, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be submitted to the voters of the State for their ratification or rejection.... Obviously, therefore, the will of the people regarding constitutional amendments is paramount. Because the electorate has an inviolable right to be informed of all proposed constitutional amendments upon which it will pass judgment, § 257 of our Kentucky Constitution provides, in relevant part, that [b]efore an amendment shall be submitted to a vote, the Secretary of State shall cause such proposed amendment, and the time that the same is to be voted upon, to be published at least ninety days before the vote is to be taken thereon.... Of great assistance to our determination of this matter is the actual question the Secretary of State directed the county clerks to place on the ballot in 1992. Since proposals to our Kentucky Constitution are nothing until a majority of the electorate gives the amendment force and effect[,] [85] what could be more critical to our decision than reading the actual question presented to the voters of Kentucky? So we granted Fox's request to supplement the record with a copy of the Secretary of State's official certification of the ballot question at hand. In pertinent part, the ballot question presented to the voters [86] asked them whether they were in favor of permitting the General Assembly to require the Senate's consent to the selection of inferior state officers and members of boards and commissions.... (Emphasis added.) Unlike previous proposed amendments that have spawned lawsuits challenging the form of the ballot question, [87] we have been cited to no actions, nor are we independently aware of any, that were filed to contest the sufficiency or accuracy of the ballot question in this case. The question proposed to the voters plainly asked them whether they favored giving the Senate the express authority to consent to appointments. No reasonable voter could have construed that ballot question to mean that the House had any right whatsoever to confirm nominees. And, of course, since any constitutional provision does not derive its force from the convention which framed it, but from the people who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the people, and it is not to be supposed that they have looked for any ... abstruse meaning in the words employed.... [88] Instead, we must accept that the people, who, after all, were responsible for giving life to the constitutional provision, accepted ... [its terms] in the sense most obvious to the common understanding, and ratified the instrument in the belief that was the sense designed to be conveyed. Accordingly, in construing a constitution, it is presumed that the language has been employed with sufficient precision to convey the intention.... [89] Yet the Governor's construction of § 93 would logically authorize the House to have a role, either alone or in conjunction with the Senate, to confirm appointments such as Fox's even though there is no mention of any role for the House in either § 93 itself or in the ballot question prepared by the Secretary of State. No voter reading the ballot question for the 1992 amendments to § 93 reasonably could have foreseen such a result. We are aware that mainly since the 1992 amendments to § 93 were ratified, the General Assembly has enacted new statutes, or has amended existing statutes, to require certain nominees to be confirmed by both the House and the Senate. [90] But, as stated before, the intent of the people who ratified the constitutional provision must be considered the paramount consideration in constitutional interpretation. [91] And it has been conclusively shown that no reasonable voter would have believed that voter was authorizing bicameral confirmation (or confirmation by the House alone) by voting to approve the 1992 amendments to § 93. So the General Assembly's later attempts to require bicameral confirmation of certain appointees contravenes the will of the people, as unmistakably expressed by their approval of the amendments to § 93.