Opinion ID: 2094772
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: Failure to Seek Removal of Judge Cieslik for Cause

Text: Defendant asserts that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to seek removal of Judge Cieslik for cause and that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on appeal. Defendant's action was originally assigned to Judge Bailey. Defendant's attorney, Thomas Bomba, sought a substitution as a matter of right (see 725 ILCS 5/114-5(a) (West 1998)). When that motion was granted, Judge Bailey, rather than sending the case to the office of the chief judge for random reassignment, assigned the case to Judge Cieslik. Bomba moved to vacate the case assignment, and Judge Cieslik denied that motion. Subsequently, defendant sought leave to file a petition for writ of mandamus or a supervisory order with this court. This court denied defendant's motion. Defendant could have raised this issue on direct appeal. Because he failed to do so, the issue is waived. Hobley, 182 Ill.2d at 428, 231 Ill.Dec. 321, 696 N.E.2d 313. Defendant argues, however, that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal. Consequently, we will review the underlying claim. See West, 187 Ill.2d at 435, 241 Ill.Dec. 535, 719 N.E.2d 664. A defendant who seeks a substitution of judge for cause (see 725 ILCS 5/114-5(d) (West 1998)) bears the burden of establishing actual prejudice. People v. Vance, 76 Ill.2d 171, 178, 28 Ill.Dec. 508, 390 N.E.2d 867 (1979). To meet this burden, the defendant must establish animosity, hostility, ill will, or distrust towards this defendant. Vance, 76 Ill.2d at 181, 28 Ill.Dec. 508, 390 N.E.2d 867. Defendant contends that Judge Cieslik demonstrated his prejudice when he (1) ruled against the motion to vacate the case assignment to Judge Cieslik filed by Bomba; (2) criticized defendant's attitude; (3) criticized defendant's objections to Neil Spector, who had been appointed to represent defendant; (4) referred to Hicks, in a different case, as Smiley and to another assistant public defender as Laughing Boy; (5) had a reputation for racial and sexual intolerance and had previously been censured for offensive comments to a female attorney; (6) made derogatory comments to both defendant and Hicks during the motion to suppress; and (7) stated, during defendant's testimony during the motion to suppress, that he was not getting the facts from defendant. The facts that Judge Cieslik ruled against defendant's motion to vacate the case assignment and that he told Bomba that the motion was baseless are not reasons to grant a motion for substitution for cause. See Vance, 76 Ill.2d at 178, 28 Ill.Dec. 508, 390 N.E.2d 867 (holding that the fact that a judge had ruled against the defendant is not a basis for finding the judge prejudiced); see also Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1157, 127 L.Ed.2d 474, 490 (1994) (explaining that judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion). The comments criticizing defendant's attitude and defendant's objections to Spector similarly do not demonstrate an animosity, hostility, ill will, or distrust toward defendant. The first complained-of criticism occurred during the following colloquy. THE COURT: Any other matters that can be handled at this particular time? A DEFENDANT: [3] Did they catch the guy who did the double murder yet? THE COURT: I don't know anything about it sir. I really have no idea who they caught or anything. I have enough problems with the people that are before me, and I don't want to get involved with some other people's problems. I not only have problems with the individuals, but certain other situations that you need not concern yourself. The only problem I have, gentlemen, is that you all get a fair trial and you get fair consideration by this court, do you understand that? A DEFENDANT: I understand, I'm just wondering is anybody earning their money around here besides sitting on your duffs. THE COURT: How do you mean that? A DEFENDANT: You got me up here for a double murder I didn't even do. THE COURT: Look, I know nothing about what's happening in here. An attitude like that will do nothing for you. Defendant also complains of Judge Cieslik's comments during a later proceeding in which defendant said, with respect to Spector, He's not representing me, your Honor, I don't want him. The trial judge responded, When did you think that you could tell mejust a minute. You listen to me. I listened to what you had to say. You are not going to tell me who's going to represent you. Do you understand that? I am not running a courtroom where the defendants are telling me what they are going to do. There is no law that requires me to listen to you to tell me what I have to do. Do you understand that? I don't tell you what you have to do. You are required to do certain things as required by rules of court and rules of statute or the Supreme Court. But there is [ sic ] no rules that I know of where a defendant can come out there and tell me that a particular individual is not representing him. You can indicate that you are not satisfied with him, and it is for me to make that decision. After reviewing the statements in their context, we are unable to conclude that they demonstrate animosity, hostility, ill will, or distrust toward defendant. Instead, they demonstrate nothing more than judicial expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction and annoyance that are within the bounds of what judges, as imperfect people, sometimes display, and such statements do not provide a basis for finding that Judge Cieslik was prejudiced against defendant. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555-56, 114 S.Ct. at 1157, 127 L.Ed.2d at 491; see also People v. Blanck, 263 Ill. App.3d 224, 232-33, 200 Ill.Dec. 773, 635 N.E.2d 1356 (1994) (holding that an isolated comment made during a momentary lapse of judicial composure does not demonstrate the prejudice necessary to obtain a motion for substitution for cause). Although we recognize the concern raised by Judge Cieslik's statements in another case involving Hicks and another African-American assistant public defender, we do not believe that these statements are sufficient to demonstrate a prejudice against defendant. To begin with, the comments at issue were not directed at defendant. Granted, they were directed toward one of defendant's attorneys, but our test looks to whether the trial court is prejudiced against the defendant. See Vance, 76 Ill.2d at 181, 28 Ill. Dec. 508, 390 N.E.2d 867. Although situations may arise in which comments directed toward a defendant's attorney can demonstrate animosity, hostility, ill will, or distrust toward the defendant, we do not believe that this single comment in another proceeding is sufficient to meet this standard. Moreover, the mere fact that Judge Cieslik allegedly had a reputation for racial and sexual intolerance is an insufficient basis upon which to grant a motion for substitution for cause. To conclude that a judge is disqualified because of prejudice is not, of course, a judgment to be lightly made. Vance, 76 Ill.2d at 179, 28 Ill.Dec. 508, 390 N.E.2d 867. Because of this, a defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice, not just the possibility of prejudice. People v. Hooper, 133 Ill.2d 469, 513, 142 Ill.Dec. 93, 552 N.E.2d 684 (1989). Finally, the comments directed toward defendant and his attorney during the motion to suppress do not demonstrate animosity, hostility, ill will, or distrust toward defendant. Defendant alleges that Judge Cieslik admonished him 11 times during defendant's testimony to answer yes or no. Although the judge did, at times, instruct defendant to answer yes or no, he did so only where there was confusion over the question asked or when an objection had been raised. With respect to the statement in which Judge Cieslik stated, I know what the facts are. But that is not the facts [ sic ] I am getting from this witness, it appears that the judge's comment arose, not as a criticism of defendant, but rather from confusion over the contents of defendant's testimony. After reviewing the portions of the record cited by defendant, we are unable to conclude that, had a motion for substitution for cause been filed, a reasonable probability exists that it would have been granted.