Opinion ID: 2367244
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Facts Taken in Their Entirety and in a Light Most Favorable to the Defendants, Mr. Howe Failed to Prove Sgt. Bryant Acted Without Probable Cause

Text: ¶ 23 Given that the justice court's decision is not conclusive evidence of a lack of probable cause, we turn to Mr. Howe's alternative argument that no probable cause existed under the totality of the circumstances as a matter of law. Probable cause is often the critical issue in litigation involving false arrest and malicious prosecution. See Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314, 320 (Utah 1979) (stating probable cause is a defense to a claim of false arrest or imprisonment) overruled on other grounds by McFarland v. Skaggs, 678 P.2d 298, 304-05 (Utah 1984); Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co. 745 P.2d 838, 843 (Utah Ct.App.1987) (holding a plaintiff must demonstrate a want of probable cause to prevail on a claim of malicious prosecution). The probable cause standard is constant regardless of the point at which it is required by the law. See State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ¶ 18, 137 P.3d 787 (stating probable cause means probable cause and specifically holding that probable cause mandated at a preliminary hearing is the same as that required for an arrest warrant). ¶ 24 Given this consistency, our description of probable cause justifying an arrest and prosecution mirrors the standard derived from the Fourth Amendment. See Trane, 2002 UT 97, ¶¶ 26-27, 57 P.3d 1052 (holding that both the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution require probable cause to support a warrantless arrest and defining probable cause with reference to federal jurisprudence). Thus, probable cause to effectuate an arrest requires that we objectively review the actions by police by asking `whether from the facts known to the officer, and the inferences [that can] fairly ... be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in [the officer's] position would be justified in believing that the suspect had committed the offense.' Id. ¶ 27 (quoting State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 125 (Utah 1983) (alteration and omission in original)). Therefore, we must determine whether the facts known to Sgt. Bryant and Ms. Werner, along with any fair inferences that may be derived from them, would lead a `reasonable and prudent person in the officer's position' to be `justified in believing that the suspect had committed the offense.' Id. (quoting Cole, 674 P.2d at 125 (internal brackets omitted)). Stated differently, to prevail on his motion Mr. Howe must demonstrate that it was unreasonable for Sgt. Bryant and Ms. Werner to conclude he violated state law by making a false alarm. ¶ 25 Utah's false alarm statute renders a person criminally liable for making a false alarm by reporting a crime or catastrophe while knowing that the report or warning is false or baseless. Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-105(1). When Mr. Howe called police on June 27, 2003, he falsely reported that a private security guard was at the school and had verified a burglary. Mr. Howe, however, argues that this false statement is not equivalent to a false alarm contemplated in section 76-9-105; he points out that he did not report a false alarm, as a burglary had in fact occurred. Mr. Howe merely reportedalbeit falselywho had verified the crime. This argument is not without merit. The false alarm statute does not stand for the proposition that a person is subject to criminal prosecution by making any factual misstatements when they call for police assistance. Rather, section 76-9-105 clearly criminalizes the act of reporting a crime with the knowledge that no crime existed. ¶ 26 Nonetheless, other facts in this case raise questions with regard to probable cause. Mr. Howe told police dispatch that a security guard had verified the burglary. He knew that police would not otherwise respond. From his lobbying activities, Mr. Howe knew the content of the Salt Lake City ordinance. And Mr. Howe's own employee had been told by a police dispatcher, minutes earlier, that police would not respond to unverified burglar alarms by an alarm company. Additionally, Mr. Howe's own whatever-it-takes statement could be interpreted by a prudent officer as meaning that Mr. Howe would say anything necessary to persuade police to respond to a mere burglary alarm regardless of whether he believed an actual burglary had occurred. Finally, there are inconsistencies in Mr. Howe's initial statements. Mr. Howe told police dispatch that there was a burglary in progress. By the time Mr. Howe was interviewed by police, he claimed he was reporting a panic alarm based on a theory that someone's life could potentially be in danger. Given these facts, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that a prudent officer would not have been justified in concluding Mr. Howe reported a crime while knowing it was false. ¶ 27 This does not mean there are no facts suggesting Sgt. Bryant and Ms. Werner acted without probable cause. Indeed, in Part III we discuss these facts thoroughly. But, given that we must view the facts in a light most favorable to Salt Lake Citythe nonmoving party on this motionwe conclude the district court did not err in rejecting Mr. Howe's motion for partial summary judgment.