Opinion ID: 2515784
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Individual Death-qualification Voir Dire

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to conduct individual death-qualification voir dire, thereby violating his federal constitutional rights to a fair trial by an impartial jury, to due process, and to a reliable judgment under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. In Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 80, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301, we stated that, to minimize the potentially prejudicial effects of voir dire conducted in open court, in future capital cases, the portion of the voir dire of each prospective juror involving death qualification should be done individually and in sequestration. Our holding in Hovey has been abrogated by Code of Civil Procedure section 223, as added in 1990 by Proposition 115. ( People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 288, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.3d 990.) Section 223 provides, in pertinent part: Voir dire of any prospective jurors shall, where practicable, occur in the presence of the other jurors in all criminal cases, including death penalty cases. Because defendant's trial occurred after section 223 of the Code of Civil Procedure was enacted, that section governs here. Notwithstanding Code of Civil Procedure section 223, defendant contends that the trial court's failure to hold individual voir dire as set forth in Hovey violated his federal constitutional rights. We disagree. We adopted the rule in Hovey pursuant to our supervisory authority over California criminal procedure and not under constitutional compulsion. ( People v. Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1135, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306; accord, People v. Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 287, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.3d 990.) Section 223 was intended to overrule Hovey's holding that individual sequestered voir dire is required during death qualification ( People v. Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 288, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.3d 990; People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 713-714, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46), and defendant cites no authority in support of his argument that sequestered voir dire is constitutionally compelled. In the alternative, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in conducting group death-qualification voir dire. We disagree. Although the court denied defense requests to conduct the entire death-qualification voir dire individually, it allowed for some private sequestered voir dire as to some jurors because of some information they have about the case or for some other reason. The court clearly recognized its obligation to comply with section 223 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Defendant fails to convince us that the court's procedure on this matter constituted an abuse of discretion or violated the federal Constitution.