Opinion ID: 2759931
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Valverde v. Spottswood

Text: ¶35. Trinity argued, and the trial court agreed, that the ruling of Valverde held that a lien could not be created against the vessel or the owner by an independent contractor. After a thorough review of the Valverde record, it is clear that Valverde is so markedly distinguishable from the present case that it provides no support to Trinity’s argument that Mike & Jerry’s should not be allowed to pursue its claim for the marine finishes demanded by the purchasers/owners and builder/owner, which were supplied to and applied to the yachts at Trinity’s behest. Valverde does not require a separate contract or privity with the owner to perfect a lien. The word “privity” is not found in the text of the Valverde opinion. 18 The trial court’s use of the term “security” is misplaced. Mike & Jerry’s agreed with Trinity’s substitution of the money in the stead of the liens on the vessels and gave up its right to pursue “any, claim, right, action, or lien” against the vessels in exchange for the right to proceed on its claims against the substituted property, i.e., the money. 19 The trial court did properly grant Mike & Jerry’s motion to amend its complaint to add West Coast as a defendant. 23 ¶36. In Valverde, the owner of the vessel (Spottswood) contracted with George Smith (contractor) to repair his steamer. Valverde, 28 So. at 721. Smith, in turn, hired several laborers to perform repair work on the vessel and asked Valverde to supply groceries to the vessel during the time the workers repaired the steamer. Spottswood (owner) and Smith (contractor) agreed upon a price for such repairs. Spottswood already had paid Smith the agreed-upon price in full, absent knowledge of the disputed claims. Id. Smith, however, did not pay Valverde the entire amounts owed for the victuals or the laborers. At the time of Spottswood’s payment to Smith, Spottswood was wholly unaware of Valverde’s claim for supplies and the laborers’ claim for work performed, as those claims were made subsequent to Spottswood’s payment to Smith. Id. ¶37. Valverde filed a declaration on March 17, 1898, asserting that, from March 23, 1897, until May 1, 1897, he had sold Smith various and sundry groceries, for which he had not received full payment.20 Valverde also asserted in his declaration that he had been assigned seven separate claims by laborers who had performed work on the vessel but were not paid in full for their labor. The total amount unpaid was approximately $210.21 On the same day, 20 The case did not address that Valverde’s declaration was untimely filed, as it was more than six months after the payment was due. See Miss. Code Ann. § 85-7-7. 21 There is a discrepancy in the record as to whether the amount owed was $209.50 or $210.15. 24 a writ of seizure was filed against the vessel, authorizing the sheriff to seize the vessel.22 The vessel was returned after Spottswood paid a bond in the amount of $419.50. ¶38. On April 25, 1898, Spottswood filed a “Special Plea,” stating that (1) he had contracted with Smith to repair his vessel, (2) the agreed-upon sum of $1,051 was paid in full (unlike today’s case), (3) Smith had no interest in his vessel (unlike builder/owner Trinity), and (4) the contract price was paid long before he knew Smith was incurring debts without his knowledge or approval (unlike today’s case). On April 28, 1898, Valverde demurred Spottswood’s Special Plea, stating that Spottswood presented no defense and Spottswood’s payment to Smith did not operate to discharge the lien. The court overruled the demurrer, and, after Valverde declined to reply or plead further, dismissed the case. Valverde timely appealed. ¶39. On appeal, the Court held that Smith was not the agent or owner of the steamer (as was builder owner Trinity) and Smith’s contracts could not bind the owner. Valverde, 28 So. at 721. Valverde and “his assignors knew, or ought to have known, that they were not dealing with the owner of the steamer, or with his agent, and they had no reason to believe that Smith carried with him authority to contract for the owner; (neither of which applies to today’s case, for Mike & Jerry’s and DuPont knew Trinity was the owner, and that either Trinity or its paint contractor had authority to procure paint to fulfill Trinity’s contractual obligation, see FSC Sec. Corp. v. McCormack, 630 So. 2d 979, 988 (Miss. 1994) (holding that an agent is one 22 Although the record is unclear about certain dates, it is clear that the vessel was seized only after (1) all the work had been performed, (2) groceries had been delivered by Valverde, and (3) the ship had left and later returned to Mississippi. In the present case, the lien was filed while the yachts were still under construction at the builder/owner’s (Trinity’s) yard. 25 who acts under either the express or apparent authority of a principal) and the consequences of their negligence must be borne by them (no issue of negligence was alleged in today’s case)).” Id. The Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. Id. The Valverde Court held that, as the facts were presented in that particular case and in the absence of other relevant factors, no lien could be had by the grocer on that particular vessel. The facts of the present case are so dissimilar as to make Valverde inapplicable. ¶40. Spottswood exercised no control over the labor or materials used in the ship’s repair. Trinity did as builder/owner. The Valverde Court noted that the owner did not order the specific material that was used to repair his steamer. Valverde, 28 So. at 721. Conversely, in the present case, both the builder/owner (Trinity) and the purchasers/owners specifically required that DuPont marine finishes be acquired from Mike & Jerry’s and used on the yachts. Trinity was contractually obligated to paint the yachts using DuPont paint distributed by Mike & Jerry’s. Spottswood already had paid Smith the full amount owed for the repairs, without the knowledge that his contractor, Smith, had not yet paid his grocer for supplies or laborers for their work. There was no other “debt due and owing from the owner” to perfect a lien against the vessel. See Miss. Code Ann. § 85-7-7. In today’s case, there was money “due and owing from the owner [Trinity],” as Trinity had not paid, and still has not paid, West Coast or Mike & Jerry’s the amount owed and withheld by Trinity for the marine finishes. Trinity was aware of Mike & Jerry’s claim while West Coast was still applying the finishes to the yachts and withheld money it owed to West Coast equal to the claimed amount. In the present case, Mike & Jerry’s timely asserted a claim against the vessels, pursuant to Section 85-7-7. 26 ¶41. Trinity argues that Valverde is the only case addressing the application of Section 85- 7-7. However, the case of Kornosky v. Hoyle, 97 Miss. 562, 52 So. 481, 481 (1910), is instructive, as it also involves the owner of the vessel, as does the present case. In Kornosky, Hoyle filed a replevin suit against Kornosky (owner) for the balance owing Hoyle for repairs made to Kornosky’s boat. Id. After Kornosky refused to pay Hoyle the amount owed, Hoyle sued out a writ of replevin for the boat. Id. That Court stated that [t]he court below held that chapter 85, Code of 1906, [now 85-7-7] which gives a lien, and a remedy therefor, on watercraft for work done or materials supplied in building, repairing, and furnishing the same, was appellant’s only remedy for the collection of the amount due him by appellee. In so holding the court erred. At common law the appellant had a possessory lien for work done and materials furnished in repairing the boat, carrying with it the right to hold the same against the owner until his charges were paid. Id. That Court held that there is “a lien at common law for the building of a ship, if the shipwright has not parted with the possession thereof, . . . without paying all that is due for her construction.” Id. (quoting 19 A. & E. Encyc. Law 1090 (2d ed.)). Chapter 85 of the 1906 Code, like its counterpart Section 85-7-7, “does not abrogate the common-law right. On the other hand, its purpose is to enlarge the same, and give a better remedy, though not exclusive.” The Court held that Hoyle was entitled to one of two remedies: (1) he was entitled to judgment against the owner (Kornosky) for the return of the boat (this is not sought in this case), or (2) he was entitled to the amount of his indebtedness (which is exactly what Mike & Jerry’s presently seeks). Applying the Kornosky reasoning, which is more akin to this case than Valverde, this Court should find that Mike & Jerry’s is entitled to pursue its claim with notice to all interested parties.