Opinion ID: 2508217
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Definition Adopted by Court of Appeals

Text: The terms gross misconduct and conduct grossly unbecoming a state officer or employee have not been defined by the legislature in this context, nor were they defined by KSU, the PRC, the Board, or the district court, all of which simply concluded that Jones' actions constituted gross misconduct or conduct grossly unbecoming a state officer or employee. The Board made this determination by examining the totality of the circumstances. The Court of Appeals majority opinion was the first to adopt a specific definition for these terms. In reviewing the history of the statute, the majority noted: K.S.A. 75-2949f was added after this court's decision in Swezey v. State Department of Social & Rehabilitation Services, 1 Kan. App. 2d 94, 562 P.2d 117 (1977). In Swezey, this court held: `Legal cause for dismissal exists if the facts disclose the employee's conduct is of a substantial nature and directly impairs the efficiency of the public service, but there must be a real and substantial relation between the employee's conduct and the efficient operation of the public service; otherwise, legal cause is not present.' 1 Kan. App. 2d at 100. By thereafter enacting K.S.A. 75-2949f, this court subsequently concluded the legislature intended to establish a category of conduct that is per se cause for discipline, obviating the need for the Board to make a case-by-case determination whether there was direct impairment of the public service. Sanstra v. Kansas Highway Patrol, 15 Kan. App. 2d 148, 151, 804 P.2d 1009, rev. denied 248 Kan. 996 (1991). At no time thereafter has the legislature specifically defined `gross misconduct' or `conduct grossly unbecoming' within the CSA; in fact, the terms `gross' and `grossly' now appear throughout the statute without specific definitions. 32 Kan. App. 2d at 322. The majority ultimately adopted the definition of gross misconduct provided now in K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 44-706(d)(1) relating to disqualification from unemployment benefits: We conclude that, for purposes of K.S.A. 75-2949f(a), ordinary misconduct is to be distinguished from gross misconduct, and conduct unbecoming an officer is to be distinguished from conduct `grossly' unbecoming an officer. Particularly since the legislature concluded that the addition of `grossly' was worthy of a specific amendment in 1985, we must conclude that insertion of such terms in qualifying the conduct justifying dismissal was not meaningless and should not be disregarded. See Todd v. Kelly, 251 Kan. 512, 515, 837 P.2d 381 (1992). Although we decline to establish a general rule that would serve to define `gross misconduct' in every case, we believe that the legislature intended that `gross' and `grossly' in the language of K.S.A. 75-2949f(a) mean something significantly more than ordinary misconduct. Notwithstanding our refusal to provide a missing statutory definition for all purposes, we are convinced that in order for misconduct to be `gross,' it must be aggravated, extreme, or wanton in nature, evincing a knowing and reckless disregard for the rules, policies, or other standards of appropriate behavior. 32 Kan. App. 2d at 325. While the majority opinion specifically declined to establish a general rule, it essentially did just that by defining the term gross misconduct. However, the Court of Appeals correctly points out that the legislature intended to establish per se causes for discipline and defining the terms merely provides the Board with guidance in differentiating between ordinary misconduct and gross misconduct in the realm of the Kansas Civil Service statutes. However, as discussed below, we decline to adopt a single definition but rather employ several methods to aid in our interpretation of the statute. The Court of Appeals reliance solely upon K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 44-706(b)(1) (now K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 44-706[d][1]) as providing a definition is misplaced. K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 44-706(d)(1) provides in relevant part: (d) If the individual has been discharged for misconduct connected with the individual's work . . . [and] is discharged for gross misconduct . . . such individual shall be disqualified for benefits . . . [and] all wage credits attributable to the employment from which the individual is discharged for gross misconduct. . . shall be canceled. (1) For the purposes of this subsection (d), `misconduct is defined as a violation of a duty or obligation reasonably owed the employer as a condition of employment. The term `gross misconduct' as used in this subsection (d) shall be construed to mean conduct evincing extreme, willful or wanton misconduct as defined by this subsection (d). Significant differences exist between the CSA and the Employment Security Law, K.S.A. 44-701 et seq. The two statutory schemes are enforced by different agencies, and the policies behind the two acts differ significantly. While the CSA is designed to balance the rights of state employees to employment decisions based on merit against the need for the State to maintain an efficient workforce to carry out government functions, the Employment Security Law was designed to protect individuals and the public good from the impact of involuntary unemployment. See K.S.A. 44-702; K.S.A. 75-2925. If the legislature had intended this definition to apply under K.S.A. 75-2949f, it could have used the definition or, at the very least, referenced the definition now set forth in K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 44-706(d)(1). Moreover, this definition overlooks the definition of conduct grossly unbecoming a state officer or employee. We conclude that the Court of Appeals improperly interpreted K.S.A. 25-2949f by applying this definition of gross misconduct from the Employment Security Law. The terms gross misconduct and conduct grossly unbecoming a state officer or employee were not specifically defined because their meanings within the context of legislation involving state employees are not unfamiliar. For a number of years, these terms have provided guidance to state employers and employees. Their meanings are perhaps similar to the conduct suggested by the definition set forth in K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 44-706(d)(1) but not as rigid or narrow as suggested by the Court of Appeals. The meanings of these terms are best defined in the dictionary and within the context of K.S.A. 75-2949(f) under the totality of the circumstances. First, the dictionary defines gross as glaringly noticeable usually because of inexcusable badness or objectionableness. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 507 (1973). Black's Law Dictionary 702 (6th ed. 1990), defines gross as [o]ut of all measure; beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; as a gross dereliction of duty, a gross injustice, gross carelessness or negligence.. . . Such conduct as is not to be excused. Misconduct is defined as [a] transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior. Black's Law Dictionary 999 (6th ed. 1990). Second, the statutory construction doctrine of noscitur a sociis, which literally means it is known from its associates, is an ancient and well known maxim that is a common sense aid to the construction of doubtful language. This doctrine may be applied when the meaning of a word or phrase might be obscure or doubtful when considered in isolation to clarify or ascertain by reference to those words or phrases with which it is associated. When taken in context, a word may have a broader or narrower meaning than it might have if used alone. State v. Zabrinas, 271 Kan. 422, 432, 24 P.3d 77 (2001). Other grounds for discipline listed under K.S.A. 75-2949f include a criminal conviction; immoral conduct; willful abuse or misappropriation of state funds, materials, property, or equipment; making a false statement of material fact in the employee's application for employment or position description; participation in any action that would in any way seriously disrupt or disturb the normal operation of the agency, institution, department, or any other segment of state government; trespassing on the property of any state official or employee for the purpose of harassing or forcing dialogue or discussion from the occupants or owners of such property; willful damage to or destruction of state property; willful endangerment of the lives or property of others, or both; possession of unauthorized firearms or other lethal weapons while on the job; performing duties in a brutal manner, or mistreating, neglecting, or abusing a patient or resident or other person in the employee's care; refusal to accept a reasonable and proper assignment from an authorized supervisor (insubordination); being under the influence of alcohol or drugs while on the job; knowingly releasing confidential information from official records; use of the employee's state position, use of the employee's time on the state job or use of state property or facilities by the employee in connection with a political campaign; exhibiting other personal conduct detrimental to state service which could cause undue disruption of work or endanger the safety of persons or property of others, as may be determined by the appointing authority; gross carelessness or gross negligence; grossly improper use of state property; and sexual harassment arising out of or in connection with employment. K.S.A. 75-2949f(b)-(s). Finally, review of what other actions have constituted gross misconduct is helpful to this analysis. We note that while the Court of Appeals cited several cases from other jurisdictions where officers committed much more egregious acts which warranted dismissal, only one of those cases involved the term gross misconduct. See City of Minneapolis v. Moe, 450 N.W.2d 367, 370-71 (Minn. App. 1990). As such, the persuasiveness of those cases is minimal. The following cases provide some guidance as to what other courts have considered to constitute gross misconduct. See Department of Employment v. Owens, 75 Md. App. 472, 479, 541 A.2d 1324 (1988) (gross misconduct for employee to threaten to kill his supervisor); Stafne v. City of Center City, unpublished opinion, 1998 WL 778931 (Minn. App. 1998), rev. denied January 21, 1999 (gross misconduct for city maintenance worker to operate a city vehicle without a valid driver's license); In re Claim of Barresi, 232 App. Div. 2d 714, 648 N.Y.S.2d 179 (1996) (officer who misplaced his personally owned revolver and could not locate it for over a year constituted gross misconduct); Bomar v. Tenn. Department of Mental Health, unpublished opinion, 2000 WL 146369 (Tenn. App. 2000) (gross misconduct or conduct unbecoming a state officer for restraining a 7-year-old patient in an abusive manner); Roach v. Regional Jail Authority, 198 W. Va. 694, 482 S.E.2d 679 (1996) (gross misconduct for correctional officer to watch a female inmate use the toilet in her cell and fail to secure a door to the central control room). After examining the definitions and grounds for discipline set forth above, it is clear that the legislature's use of the words gross and grossly in the statute signified that it required something significantly more than ordinary misconduct. All of the grounds for discipline are of a serious or extreme nature, and the actions are generally intentional or willful. When reviewing the cases involving gross misconduct, it appears that the actions giving rise to termination were more egregious than those committed by Jones in this case. However, the analysis does not end there. The next issue we must consider is whether his conduct should be viewed in isolation or under the totality of the circumstances including the effect that his actions had on his ability to perform his job. The Court of Appeals refused to consider how the misconduct reflected upon Jones' credibility as a state officer or employee.