Opinion ID: 466309
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: severance of the trials

Text: 24 White argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever his trial from that of the other defendants. He asserts that, but for the joinder, he could have called codefendant Jenkins, who would have testified favorably for him. Moreover, White states that he was a minor actor in the scheme and that his conviction resulted from a spillover effect from the evidence against the other defendants. 5 In this court, denial of severance is reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Harris, 738 F.2d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir.1984). 25 When the reason for severance is the need for a codefendant's testimony, defendant must show that he would call the codefendant at a severed trial, that the codefendant would in fact testify, and that the testimony would be favorable to the moving party. United States v. Seifert, 648 F.2d 557, 563 (9th Cir.1980); see also United States v. Mayo, 646 F.2d 369, 374 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1127, 102 S.Ct. 979, 71 L.Ed.2d 115 (1981). 26 White relies on Seifert, but it is distinguishable. In Seifert, counsel had proffered a detailed outline of the codefendant's expected testimony, and the trial court had found that the testimony would be favorable to the moving party. It was only in this context that we reversed the district court's denial of the severance motion. 27 By contrast, White merely makes a bare assertion that Jenkins' testimony would have been favorable. Moreover, his assertion comes despite a statement in his original severance motion that Jenkins' grand jury testimony actually implicated him. White even raised a Bruton claim for severance based on the same fear of inculpatory testimony. This case, then, appears to be more like Mayo, in which we upheld the denial of a severance motion where the codefendant's testimony would not necessarily have been favorable to the moving party. Mayo, 646 F.2d at 374. 28 White's spillover claim must also fail. As we held in United States v. Sears, 663 F.2d 896, 901 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1027, 102 S.Ct. 1731, 72 L.Ed.2d 148 (1982), a party seeking reversal of a denial of severance carries the difficult burden of demonstrating clear, manifest or undue prejudice resulting from a joint trial. It is not enough that a separate trial might offer a defendant a better chance of acquittal, or that the prosecution's case is stronger against a codefendant. White makes no particularized showing of prejudice beyond an assertion, disputed by the government, that he was a minor player in the scheme. Moreover, the trial judge here was careful to give several cautionary and limiting instructions to ensure that the jury could compartmentalize the evidence. Nothing indicates that these admonitions were insufficient. See United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074, 99 S.Ct. 849, 59 L.Ed.2d 41 (1979). 29