Opinion ID: 202810
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bartnicki v. Vopper

Text: We agree with the district court that this case is controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 121 S.Ct. 1753, 149 L.Ed.2d 787 (2001). Therefore, we must examine that decision closely before applying it to the facts of this case.
In Bartnicki, the Supreme Court considered what degree of protection, if any, the First Amendment provides to speech that discloses the contents of an illegally intercepted communication. Id. at 517, 121 S.Ct. 1753. The dispute in Bartnicki arose during contentious collective bargaining negotiations between a Pennsylvania school board and a union representing teachers at the local high school. An unidentified person intercepted and recorded a cellular phone call between the union's chief negotiator and the president of the local union, during which the president stated: If they're not gonna move for three percent, we're gonna have to go to their, their homes. . . . To blow off their front porches. . . . Id. at 518-19, 121 S.Ct. 1753 (first omission in original)(internal quotation marks omitted). Jack Yocum, the head of a local taxpayer's organization, subsequently found a recording of the intercepted conversation in his mailbox. He played the tape for members of the school board and later delivered the tape to Frederick Vopper, a radio commentator, who played the tape on his public affairs talk show. The union officials brought an action for damages under federal and state wiretap statutes against Yocum and Vopper, who invoked their First Amendment right to speak on issues of public importance. The relevant provision of the federal wiretap statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c), provides that any person who intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral or electronic communication in violation of this subsection may be sued. The Pennsylvania state wiretap statute contains a similar provision. 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 5703. Both statutory schemes also provide for recovery of damages for violations. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(2); 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 5725(a). Following discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment before the district court. The court denied both motions and granted a motion for an interlocutory appeal to the Third Circuit. That court concluded that the statutes were invalid as applied because they deterred significantly more speech than was necessary to protect the privacy interests at stake, and remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for defendants. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 521-22, 121 S.Ct. 1753 (citing Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 121 (3d Cir.1999)). The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to determine whether the First Amendment shielded defendants from suits for damages for violation of § 2511(1)(c) and its Pennsylvania analog. Since the grant of certiorari followed a remand with instructions to enter summary judgment for defendants, the majority opinion (authored by Justice Stevens and joined by five other Justices) viewed the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 525, 121 S.Ct. 1753. It assumed that the interception was intentional, and therefore unlawful, and that, at a minimum, [defendants] `had reason to know' that it was unlawful. Id. at 525, 121 S.Ct. 1753. The plaintiffs were thus entitled to recover damages under the statutes unless application of the statutes in such circumstances would violate the First Amendment. Id. The Court also accepted three other factual propositions that serve to distinguish most of the cases that have arisen under § 2511. First, the defendants played no part in the illegal interception. Rather, they found out about the interception only after it occurred, and in fact never learned the identity of the person or persons who made the interception. Second, defendants' access to the information on the tapes was obtained lawfully, even though the information itself was intercepted unlawfully by someone else. Third, the subject matter of the conversation was a matter of public concern. Id.
The Court first held that § 2511(1)(c) was content neutral, explaining that the statute does not distinguish based on the content of the intercepted conversations, nor is it justified by reference to the content of those conversations. Rather, the communications at issue are singled out by virtue of the fact that they were illegally intercepted. . . . Id. at 526, 121 S.Ct. 1753. The Court also explained that the statute, as applied to the facts of the case, is fairly characterized as a regulation of pure speech. Id. It noted that the delivery of a tape recording is like the delivery of a handbill or pamphlet, and as such, it is the kind of `speech' that the First Amendment protects. Id. at 527, 121 S.Ct. 1753. Having established these principles, the Court then balanced the state interests served by the statute against the public interest in the disclosure of information. The Court identified two interests served by the statute: (1) removing an incentive for parties to intercept private conversations; and (2) minimizing the harm to persons whose conversations have been illegally intercepted. Id. at 529, 121 S.Ct. 1753. The Court accorded little weight to the first interest, id. at 532, 121 S.Ct. 1753, noting that it would be quite remarkable to hold that speech by a law-abiding possessor of information can be suppressed in order to deter conduct by a non-law-abiding third party, id. at 529-30, 121 S.Ct. 1753, and explaining that there is no empirical evidence to support the assumption that the prohibition against disclosures reduces the number of illegal interceptions, id. at 530-31, 121 S.Ct. 1753. It found the second interest in the situation before it more immediately relevant, noting that disclosure of the contents of a private conversation can be an even greater intrusion on privacy than the interception itself. Id. at 533, 121 S.Ct. 1753. Given this concern, it found a valid independent justification for prohibiting disclosures by persons who lawfully obtained access to the contents of an illegally intercepted message, even if such prohibition does not deter the initial interception. Id. In particular, the fear of public disclosure of private conversations might well have a chilling effect on private speech. Id. With respect to the public interest in disclosure, the Court emphasized that `if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need . . . of the highest order.' Id. at 528, 121 S.Ct. 1753 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103, 99 S.Ct. 2667, 61 L.Ed.2d 399 (1979)(omission in original)). Given the presumption in favor of protecting publication of truthful information, the issue presented in Bartnicki was narrow: `Where the punished publisher of information has obtained the information in question in a manner lawful in itself but from a source who has obtained it unlawfully, may the government punish the ensuing publication of that information based on the defect in a chain?' Id. (quoting Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463, 484-85 (D.C.Cir.1999)(Sentelle, J., dissenting)). Although the Court thus noted that there are important interests to be considered on both sides of the constitutional calculus, id. at 533, 121 S.Ct. 1753, it ultimately concluded that privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance, id. at 534, 121 S.Ct. 1753. Surveying the many cases in which it had protected speech on matters of public concern, id. at 534-35, 121 S.Ct. 1753, the Court explained that [o]ne of the costs associated with participation in public affairs is an attendant loss of privacy, id. at 534, 121 S.Ct. 1753. Consequently, the Court concluded that a stranger's illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern. Id. at 535, 121 S.Ct. 1753. Because the collective bargaining negotiations in Bartnicki were unquestionably a matter of public concern, and respondents were clearly engaged in debate about that concern, the First Amendment prohibited recovery of damages against defendants. Id.