Opinion ID: 4524928
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Takings Without Compensation

Text: Petitioners claim that because the Executive Order prohibits them from using their property12 “at all,” it resulted in a taking of private property for public use without the payment of just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution13 and Article I, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.14 According to Petitioners, a taking need not involve a physical taking of the property to implicate the constitutional protections requiring just compensation. Petitioners’ Brief at 41. Instead, 12 Blueberry Hill is the owner of the property upon which the business is conducted. Emergency Application, ¶ 83. While Blueberry Hill claims that it is deprived of the use of its property in total, we note that it continues to operate on a take-out basis, the restaurant located on the property. Petitioners’ Brief at 49. The record here does not establish what property interests, if any, that Petitioners DeVito Committee and/or Gregory purport to hold. Accordingly, as one petitioner (Blueberry Hill) has standing to assert a takings claim, we will proceed to consider the issue on its merits. 13 The Fifth Amendment provides: No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 14 Article 1, Section 10 provides: [N]o person shall, for any indictable offense, be proceeded against criminally by information, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service, in time of war or public danger, or by leave of the court for oppression or misdemeanor in office. Each of the several courts of common pleas may, with the approval of the Supreme Court, provide for the initiation of criminal proceedings therein by information filed in the manner provided by law. No person shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall private property be taken or applied to public use, without authority of law and without just compensation being first made or secured. [68 MM 2020] - 32 referring to the Executive Order as a government regulation, Petitioners argue that it is sufficient if a governmental regulation “deprive[s] an owner of all economically beneficial or productive use of land…” Id. (citing Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 799 A.2d 751, 754 (Pa. 2002)). Respondents point out that there is a critical distinction between the exercise of the police power, as here, and takings pursuant to eminent domain. They cite to a long line of Pennsylvania cases holding that the payment of just compensation is not required where the regulation of property involves the exercise of the Commonwealth’s police power. Beginning with Appeal of White, 134 A. 409 (Pa. 1926), this Court made the distinction: Under eminent domain, compensation is given for property taken, injured, or destroyed, while under the police power no payment is made for a diminution in use, even though it amounts to an actual taking or destruction of property. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, property cannot be taken except by due process of law. Regulation under a proper exercise of the police power is due process, even though a property in whole or in part is taken or destroyed. The conditions on which its legitimate exercise is predicated should actually exist or their happening be so likely that restraint is necessary, similar to a court issuing a restraining order for injuries done or threatened to persons or property. Likewise, there should be a reasonable and substantial relation between the thing acted on and the end to be attained[.] Id. at 411 (emphasis added). Following White, this Court in Balent v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 669 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1995), again indicated that where governmental regulation restricting activity on private property is implemented pursuant to an exercise of police power, rather than through the government’s power of eminent domain, no just compensation is due: [68 MM 2020] - 33 Eminent domain is the power to take property for public use. The City must provide just compensation for any property taken pursuant to this power. The police power, on the other hand, involves the regulation of property to promote the health, safety and general welfare of the people. White's Appeal, 287 Pa. 259, 134 A. 409 (1926). It does not require that the City provide compensation to the property owner, even if the property is damaged or destroyed. Id. Id. at 314 (emphasis added); see also Estate of Blose ex rel. Blose v. Borough of Punxsutawney, 889 A.2d 653, 657–58 (Pa. Commw. 2005); Commonwealth v. Hinds, 775 A.2d 859, 864 (Pa. Super. 2001). The Balent case, however, differed in one important respect from the allegations made by Petitioners here. In Balent, the city of Wilkes-Barre demolished a structure that had been partially destroyed by fire. Balent, 669 A.2d at 311-12. While the structure was lost, the owners retained ownership of the property. Thus, unlike Petitioners’ claim here, in Balent, there was no claim that the governmental action resulted in a loss of “all economically beneficial or productive use of land.” Petitioners’ Brief at 45 (“The Governor’s Order … is a restriction or interruption of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of property as it deprives Petitioners from using or operating their businesses at their physical location[.]”) (citing Andress v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 188 A.2d 77, 85 (Pa. 1963) (“[A]ny destruction, restriction or interruption of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of property in a lawful manner may constitute a taking for which compensation must be made to the owner of the property[.]”)). Based upon this distinction, Petitioners insist that the principle governing their claims is found in the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Counsil, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). In Lucas, petitioner Lucas bought two residential lots on a South Carolina barrier island, intending to build single-family homes such as those on [68 MM 2020] - 34 the immediately adjacent parcels. Before construction, however, the state legislature enacted a new law barring the erection of any permanent habitable structures on the parcels he had purchased. Lucas filed suit, arguing that even if the new legislation constituted a lawful exercise of the State's police power, the ban on construction deprived him of all “economically viable use” of his property and therefore effected a “taking” requiring the payment of just compensation. Noting Justice Holmes' prior opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), that “if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking,” id. at 415, the Court in Lucas held that generally when a regulation deprives an owner of “all economically beneficial uses” of the land, it constitutes a regulatory taking requiring the payment of just compensation. Id. at 1016. We do not find that either Balent or Lucas is controlling. Instead, we rely on a subsequent Supreme Court decision, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002), for our disposition. In that case, respondent Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (“TRPA”) imposed two moratoria, totaling thirty-two months, on development in the Lake Tahoe Basin while formulating a comprehensive land-use plan for the area. Petitioners, real estate owners affected by the moratoria and an association representing such owners, filed parallel suits, later consolidated, claiming that TRPA's actions had taken all viable economic uses of their property without compensation. Rather than apply its prior decision in Lucas, however, the Court recognized that while the regulation in Lucas stated that the ban on development “was unconditional and permanent,” the regulations at issue in the case before it were merely temporary measures, which specifically stated that they would terminate. Id. at 329. As a result, the High Court affirmed the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s [68 MM 2020] - 35 decision that because the regulations had only a temporary impact on petitioners' fee interest, no categorical taking had occurred. Id. at 342 (noting that “the duration of the restriction is one of the important factors that a court must consider in the appraisal of a regulatory takings claim”). In so holding, the Court stated that “the extreme categorical rule that any deprivation of all economic use, no matter how brief, constitutes a compensable taking surely cannot be sustained,” as it would apply to numerous “normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like, as well as to orders temporarily prohibiting access to crime scenes, businesses that violate health codes, fire-damaged buildings, or other areas that we cannot now foresee … which have long been considered permissible exercises of the police power, which do not entitle the individuals affected to compensation.” Id. at 334-35. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit relied upon Tahoe-Sierra in a case involving an emergency situation bearing similarities to the present disaster crisis. In Nat'l Amusements Inc. v. Borough of Palmyra, 716 F.3d 57 (3d Cir. 2013), the Borough of Palmyra ordered closed for five months an open-air flea market, owned and operated by National Amusements, Inc. (“NAI”), due to safety concerns posed by unexploded munitions left behind when the site had been used as a weapons-testing facility for the United States Army. Relying on the holding in Tahoe-Sierra, the court of appeals categorically denied that a regulatory taking had occurred requiring the payment of just compensation: It is difficult to imagine an act closer to the heartland of a state's traditional police power than abating the danger posed by unexploded artillery shells. Palmyra's emergency action to temporarily close the Market therefore constituted an exercise of its police power that did not require just compensation. Id. at 63. [68 MM 2020] - 36 Applying Tahoe-Sierra and Nat'l Amusements Inc. to the present facts, we conclude that Petitioners have not established that a regulatory taking has occurred. The Executive Order results in only a temporary loss of the use of the Petitioners’ business premises, and the Governor’s reason for imposing said restrictions on the use of their property, namely to protect the lives and health of millions of Pennsylvania citizens, undoubtedly constitutes a classic example of the use of the police power to “protect the lives, health, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the people[.]” Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905). We note that the Emergency Code temporarily limits the Executive Order to ninety days unless renewed and provides the General Assembly with the ability to terminate the order at any time. 35 Pa.C.S. § 7301(c). Moreover, the public health rationale for imposing the restrictions in the Executive Order, to suppress the spread of the virus throughout the Commonwealth, is a stop-gap measure and, by definition, temporary. While the duration of COVID-19 as a natural disaster is currently unknown, the development of a vaccine to prevent future outbreaks, the development of an immunity in individuals previously infected and the availability of widespread testing and contact tracing are all viewed as the basis for ending the COVID-19 disaster.15 15 See remarks by Dr. Anthony Fauci, Director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases: National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, “NIH Clinical Trial of Investigational Vaccine for COVID-19 Begins,” NIH (Mar. 16, 2020) https://www.niaid.nih.gov/newsevents/nih-clinical-trial-investigational-vaccine-covid-19-begins; Peter Sullivan, “Fauci: Improved testing and tracing can help reopen country,” The Hill (Apr. 1, 2020) https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/490713-fauci-improved-testing-and-tracingcan-help-reopen-country; Hayden Bird, “5 important points from Dr. Anthony Fauci’s interview on ‘The Daily,’” Boston.com (Apr. 2, 2020) https://www.boston.com/news/health/2020/04/02/5-important-points-from-dr-faucisinterview-on-the-daily. 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