Opinion ID: 2567176
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: minimum procedural due process requirements

Text: ¶ 11 To find a basis for allocution at a revocation we must look beyond RCW 9.94A.500. We find federal analysis of the rights associated with parole revocation hearings persuasive. The United States Supreme Court addressed the rights to which one is entitled at a parole revocation hearing in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). In Morrissey, the Court observed: Revocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions. Id. at 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593. ¶ 12 The Morrissey court held that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees only minimal due process requirements including: (a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a neutral and detached hearing body ...; and (f) a written statement by the fact finders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593. ¶ 13 In Dahl, we held that the Morrissey due process requirements applied at revocation hearings. State v. Dahl, 139 Wash.2d 678, 683, 990 P.2d 396 (1999). A revocation hearing, however, should not be equated to a full-blown criminal prosecution because society had already been put to the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of the crime. State v. Johnson, 9 Wash.App. 766, 772, 514 P.2d 1073 (1973). ¶ 14 In the cases before us, the only implicated Morrissey requirement is the opportunity to be heard in person. In each case, the defendants were afforded the opportunity to testify on their own behalf. This does not necessarily mean that these defendants were afforded their opportunity to be heard. While there is no separate constitutional right to allocution, it cannot reasonably be said that allocution is never part of a defendant's right to be heard in person. Accordingly, we hold that in the context of a revocation hearing, the defendant must be allowed to allocute if he so chooses.