Opinion ID: 6318412
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Attempt to Withdraw Guilty Plea

Text: We first consider Seys’s argument that the district court should have granted his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, applying an abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. Trevino, 829 F.3d 668, 671 (8th Cir. 2016). 2 The district court recognized it did not need to consider the remaining factors related to a motion to withdraw a guilty plea because of its fair and just reason determination. But it believed such an analysis was warranted. The district court found Seys did not make a meaningful assertion of factual or legal innocence. The district court also found that too much time had passed between Seys’s guilty plea and his motion to withdraw it and thus “the timeliness factor . . . [did] not support granting [Seys’s] motion.” Finally, the district court found the government would not be significantly prejudiced by permitting Seys to withdraw his guilty plea but concluded this factor did not outweigh Seys’s failure to prevail on the other factors. -4- The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permit a defendant to withdraw a court-accepted guilty plea before sentencing if “the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). “Even if such a fair and just reason exists, before granting the motion a court must consider ‘whether the defendant asserts his innocence of the charge, the length of time between the guilty plea and the motion to withdraw it, and whether the government will be prejudiced if the court grants the motion.’” United States v. RamirezHernandez, 449 F.3d 824, 826 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Nichols, 986 F.2d 1199, 1201 (8th Cir. 1993)). The district court need not weigh these other considerations, however, where the defendant shows no fair and just reason for the withdrawal. Nichols, 986 F.2d at 1201. The threshold issue here is whether the district court abused its discretion in deciding Seys did not show a fair and just reason to withdraw his guilty plea. It did not. The district court found “unpersuasive” Seys’s contention that DDTF’s handling of the surveillance video amounted to a due process violation, thus warranting a withdrawal of the guilty plea. “Due process is violated when the government ‘suppresses or fails to disclose material exculpatory evidence.’” United States v. Houston, 548 F.3d 1151, 1155 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 547 (2004)). “If, however, the evidence in question is only potentially useful, as opposed to clearly exculpatory, then a criminal defendant must prove bad faith on the part of the police to make out a due process violation.” Id. Seys admits the missing surveillance video is only potentially useful and thus he needed to show Kearney acted in bad faith to prevail on his due process claim. After two hearings where Kearney and other law enforcement officials testified about their handling of the surveillance video, the district court concluded the law enforcement agents’ actions fell “far short of the type of behavior which could plausibly be considered to be bad faith.” The district court explained there was no evidence Kearney intentionally destroyed files, consciously suppressed exculpatory -5- evidence, or otherwise tried to circumvent disclosure requirements. And the district court rejected Seys’s position that Kearney acted in bad faith, reasoning this speculation was based on “unreasonable” inferences and “an overly literal parsing of . . . Kearney’s testimony and assumptions about what law enforcement agents from different but related agencies should know throughout the course of a prolonged investigation.” Our review of the record convinces us there is no basis to disturb the district court’s determination. Without a potentially meritorious due process claim, the only other allegedly fair and just reason Seys advanced for withdrawing his guilty plea was his desire to use Kearney’s purportedly inconsistent explanations regarding the video to impeach him at trial. Applying our precedent, the district court decided this was not a fair and just reason for Seys to withdraw his guilty plea. See Nichols, 986 F.2d at 1201– 02 (holding new evidence that “at best” was “only a source of impeachment material” did “not constitute a sufficient reason” to permit the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea); United States v. Morrison, 967 F.2d 264, 269–70 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming the district court’s decision to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea when the “purported new evidence was . . . only weak impeachment evidence”). Under these facts, we agree with the district court’s assessment. Because Seys did not establish a fair and just reason to withdraw his guilty plea, we hold the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion.