Opinion ID: 1842580
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: testimony of investigating officer

Text: The testimony of Officer Novak that Number Six [a photograph] shows the safe that the defendant entered was characterized by the trial judge as a prejudicial statement at the time the judge ordered it stricken from the record. Defendant, however, made no motion for a mistrial on the basis of the effect of the witness' statement on the jury. In State v. Albers, 211 N.W.2d 524 (N. D.1973), we held in paragraph 3 of the syllabus: As a general rule, an assignment of error in the admission of evidence will not be reviewed by this court unless proper and timely objection is made to the admissibility thereof, and the admissibility of such evidence cannot be challenged for the first time upon appeal. In State v. Julson, 202 N.W.2d 145, 153 (N.D.1972), we said: The proper time to object to the introduction of evidence is when it becomes apparent that error will be committed by receiving evidence which is not admissible, as when the evidence is offered, or when a question is asked which is in itself improper or calls for an improper answer. An objection to a question comes too late after the question has been answered. The remedy in such case is a motion to strike the question and answer from the record. In the instant case, where the trial judge ordered the answer of the witness stricken from the record after an off-the-record consultation with both attorneys, it was incumbent upon the defendant to move for a mistrial in order to preserve the issue for appellate review as to whether the witness' statement was prejudicial despite the order striking it. In State v. Haakenson, 213 N.W.2d 394 (N.D.1973), we affirmed the general rule that one of the touchstones for an effective appeal on any issue should be that the matter has been appropriately raised in the trial court so that the trial court can intelligently rule on it. The reasons for this rule are obvious for, if it were otherwise, it would behoove a defendant to sit by and invite error in the hope that if he did not prevail the first time, he would prevail upon appellate review of invited error. Such a situation would be untenable since it would require a trial judge to be the advocate of the defendant in the prevention of error. Further, the duty cast upon the defendant to make the appropriate objections during criminal proceedings in order to preserve the issue for appellate review allows the trial judge to take the necessary actions as an impartial arbiter to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial. Since the defendant failed to move for a mistrial or make other appropriate objection, he has not preserved for appellate review the issue of whether the statement of opinion of the witness was prejudicial or whether the striking of that statement was a sufficient palliative. Defendant raises for our review the issue as to whether it was error for the trial judge to admit the testimony of Officer Novak that the defendant had been advised of his rights (including the right to remain silent) and that, thereafter, in response to a question about the burglary,  the defendant had stated to the officer that it was none of the officer's business. Defendant holds out to us that this testimony constituted a comment on the defendant's right to remain silent and was therefore prejudicial error. However, no objection was made to this testimony and, therefore, under the general rule, we are constrained to say that this issue was not properly preserved for our review. However, although it is unnecessary for us to review this issue, we feel that it is appropriate for us to comment thereon in light of the recent adoption of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure, and in light of the fact that an explication would be helpful to the trial court in the event there is a further trial in this matter. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court, in a footnote, commented upon the aspersions which might be cast through any comment upon the defendant's invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege of remaining silent, when it said, at page 468, note 37, 86 S.Ct. at page 1624: Lord Devlin has commented: `It is probable that even today, when there is much less ignorance about these matters than formerly, there is still a general belief that you must answer all questions put to you by a policeman.. . .' Devlin, The Criminal Prosecution in England 32 (1958). The court then went on, in the same footnote, to limit such comment when it said: In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation. [Citations omitted.] [Emphasis supplied.] We believe that defendant's statement to the effect that his knowledge of any burglary which had occurred was none of the investigating officer's business was an invocation by the defendant of his Fifth Amendment privilege of remaining silent as to the particular interrogatory posed. The prosecutor argues that, although the Miranda warnings were given to the defendant, there was no showing by the defendant that the particular interview referred to was a custodial interrogation. The defendant in the instant case had the right to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege and his response to the interrogatory posed appears to fall within the ambit of responses which are sufficiently evocative of the invocation of the privilege so as to be protected from disclosure at trial, since such disclosure amounts to a comment on the invocation of the privilege, which disclosure is forbidden by Miranda v. Arizona, supra . In People v. Bobo, 390 Mich. 355, 212 N.W.2d 190, 192 (1973), the Michigan Supreme Court said: We will not condone conduct which directly or indirectly restricts the exercise of the constitutional right to remain silent in the face of accusation. `Nonutterances' are not statements. The fact that a witness did not make a statement may be shown only to contradict his assertion that he did. In People v. Severance, 43 Mich.App. 394, 204 N.W.2d 357, 358 (1972), a Michigan Court of Appeals posed the question as follows: Was it reversible error to allow a police officer to testify that after defendant had been warned of his constitutional rights, he remained silent, despite the absence of objection thereto? In determining that such testimony was reversible error, the Michigan Appeals Court said in Severance, supra, 204 N.W.2d at 359: The rule is now firmly established that the prosecution may not use at trial  the fact that a defendant exercised his privilege of silence in face of accusation, for such would penalize the defendant for exercising the privilege. People v. Jablonski, 38 Mich.App. 33, 195 N.W.2d 777 (1972). . . . . . . . . . Admission of such testimony is reversible error unless we can say that it is harmless error under the ruling in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), reh. den. 386 U.S. 987, 87 S.Ct. 1283, 18 L. Ed.2d 241 (1967). In People v. Jablonski, 38 Mich.App. 33, 38-39, 195 N.W.2d 777, 780 (1972), our Court stated: `The admission of such testimony obviously was error. . . . It would appear that the better rule is that there is absolutely no probative value in eliciting that the defendants were informed of their rights unless the prosecutor intends to offer a confession or statement made by the defendants. Since there is a potential prejudicial effect even from the mere mention of the rights statement, even in the absence of testimony that the defendant wished to exercise those rights, such statements should be excluded.' We adhere to the strictures promulgated by the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, supra , as we have stated them above. We further believe that the implementation of those strictures on the prosecutorial function as demonstrated by the Michigan cases discussed should be followed by the trial court in any further proceedings following our remand. In regard to the defendant's argument that error not brought to the attention of the trial court is yet reviewable, we note that a series of Michigan cases including People v. Bobo, supra ; People v. Severance, supra ; and People v. Thomas, 44 Mich.App. 649, 205 N.W.2d 604 (1973), have held that error not objected to, but which nevertheless infringes on a constitutional right, is reviewable. It is unnecessary for us to adopt any standard, regarding the reviewability of issues not raised at trial, at this time; nor to discuss any inherent power of this court to correct a substantial injustice. Rather, we take cognizance of Rule 52(b) of our North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides: RULE 52. Harmless Error and Obvious Error . . . . . .  (b) Obvious error. Obvious errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.