Opinion ID: 781540
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Finding of Proximate Cause

Text: 13 We are persuaded that the trial court made sufficient findings to give this Court a clear understanding of the factual basis for the decision. Burma Navigation Corp. v. Reliant Seahorse MV, 99 F.3d 652, 657 (5th Cir.1996). The trial court defined the duties of each vessel, specifically explained where each party breached those duties, made findings of negligence, and apportioned liability. Although the trial court made no separate finding of proximate cause, it is implicit in the trial court's negligence findings and apportioning of liability. See McLennan v. American Eurocopter Corp., Inc., 245 F.3d 403, 433 n. 28 (5th Cir.2001) (noting that although the district court entered no actual finding of proximate cause concerning a negligence claim, such a finding was implicit in the court's decision); see also, Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 737 (5th Cir.1985) (explaining that a district court's finding of facts in a bench trial must be specific enough to give appellate courts a clear understanding of the basis for the decision and to ensure that the district court has taken care in ascertaining the facts). In addition, Luhr conceded during oral arguments that it may be a fair inference from the trial court's findings that the VICKIE bore part of the responsibility for the vessels meeting in front of the R&R at the same time. The trial court did not clearly err in its view of the evidence and we deduce proximate cause. 14 The failure of proper communication formed the basis of the negligence finding against the VICKIE. The trial court concluded that both Selinidis and White were aware of the shortcomings in the channel, but it assigned most of the responsibility for the accident to Selinidis, captain of the EAGLE. In apportioning fault, the trial court made the following findings of mixed law and fact. The channel narrows in the vicinity of R&R because of significant shoaling over the years. Selinidis had actual knowledge of the shoaling and other immediate hazards in the vicinity. As a result, Selinidis kept the EAGLE on the centerline. The trial court determined that although the EAGLE was loaded with the most restrictive draft, Crystal cannot claim a superior position in the channel by assuming the risk of loading the vessel to that level. The EAGLE had no greater right to traverse the channel than any other vessel. The trial court explained that had the EAGLE been loaded to a more shallow draft, it would have had greater mobility in the channel. 15 When the EAGLE and the VICKIE first made radio contact, the VICKIE was past the coke dock. When the EAGLE told the VICKIE, it was traveling slow it was actually traveling at 9.1 knots (more than half speed). At that time, the VICKIE was traveling slower, at approximately 4 knots. The EAGLE and the VICKIE agreed on a port-to-port pass. The trial court concluded that the EAGLE proceeded upchannel at full speed without tugs and did not reduce its speed until it passed beacon 54. The EAGLE was to be met by the tugs, HERMES and SPARTAN before reaching beacon 54 but the tugs were delayed with problems in docking the DUVAL. Given these conditions, the trial court found that the EAGLE should have reduced speed before beacon 54. 16 Even though the EAGLE inaccurately described its speed, other vessels are required to rely on independent observations of facts. Independent of the miscommunication between White and Selinidis, White testified that around North 40, before he reached the coke dock, he could see the BERYL. White further stated that way down the canal I could see him [the EAGLE]. Way down the ship channel, is in that area I could see what appeared to be a ship down there. And I was trying to call the second [the EAGLE] — I knew they was there. The first pilot [of the BERYL] told me they was there. White further testified that as he was approaching Vessel Repair, he slowed down to approximately five miles per hour to accommodate some barges but still was unable to make contact with Selinidis. At this point, White could see the second ship in the channel. White explained that it was not until he spoke with Selinidis that he decided to hook it up. 17 The trial court implicitly found that the VICKIE's failure to maintain proper communication and to observe relative speeds was the negligent conduct that in part caused the allision. The trial court found that both Selinidis and White knew they had a duty, discussed infra, to rely on independent observations even if the information relayed to each other was accurate. The trial court found that independent of the communication between them, both Selinidis and White knew that they would encounter traffic and docking facilities in the channel. Rather than rely on their independent observations, the trial court found that Selinidis and White both relied on their communication. The trial court further found that the accident would not have occurred had the two vessels not met where they did. Luhr contends that it was the EAGLE's misinformation that caused the VICKIE to hook it up, otherwise, the two vessels would not have met at the R&R. The trial court explained the duty of each captain to rely on their independent observations regardless of their communication. In its oral argument, Luhr confirmed that at the time the EAGLE described its speed, the VICKIE could see the EAGLE. The trial court explained the VICKIE's duty, found that the VICKIE failed to adhere to that duty, and then apportioned liability. From these findings, this Court can deduce a finding of proximate cause. 18 The trial court further noted that the east side of the channel was not obstructed by the DUVAL, the two tugboats, R&R, or any other structure. The trial court speculated that had the EAGLE and VICKIE chosen a starboard to starboard pass, there would have been ample room for all vessels, even at the narrowest point near the R&R facility. Moreover, if the EAGLE had actually been proceeding at 5.2 knots (i.e., slow) when it passed beacon 56, and if the VICKIE did not speed up, the two vessels would not have met abeam of the R&R facility. Finally, if the EAGLE had an actual ground speed of 3.9 knots (i.e., dead slow) before reaching the R&R, the allision might have been avoided entirely. Thus, the trial court concluded that it was the failure of all vessels to establish prompt communication that foreclosed this opportunity. 19 Luhr argues that the trial court failed to make a specific finding that any negligence assigned to the VICKIE was a proximate cause of the allision, i.e. that the VICKIE's actions caused the EAGLE to lose its steering. Specifically, Luhr contends that the trial court's findings that the bank suction would have been reduced and the allision probably would have been avoided if the EAGLE were going slower, and that the EAGLE began corrective maneuvers merely imply that a shear occurred rather than account for proximate cause. Moreover, Luhr asserts that the trial court's finding that the EAGLE traveled near the centerline at all times with sixty to seventy feet of the vessel across the centerline negates any relationship with the EAGLE's meeting with the VICKIE. We disagree with Luhr's theory of the incident. 20 The trial court did not specifically mention the cause of the sheer, but from Selinidis's testimony the trial court noted that the EAGLE's hard starboard move and the resulting sheer most likely occurred as a result of the EAGLE's maneuver to avoid the approaching VICKIE. Selinidis testified that he took evasive action to avoid a collision with the VICKIE and to allow it to pass on his port side. A fair reading of the trial court's decision is that the failures of both the VICKIE and the EAGLE constituted negligence and that together, their conduct was the proximate cause of the two vessels meeting at the R&R, resulting in the damage to the drydock. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). The trial court's view of the incident is not clearly erroneous.