Opinion ID: 885077
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence on Counts VI, VII and VIII

Text: ¶ 91 Southern contends that there was not sufficient evidence to support his convictions for the count of burglary, the count of sexual intercourse without consent, and the count of theft (Counts VI, VII and VIII, respectively), which occurred on May 18, 1996. Southern maintains that the only evidence that connects him to these crimes is circumstantial, and that, although the circumstantial evidence places him at the crime scene, it does not establish that he committed the crimes. The State counters that the evidence not only placed Southern at the crime scene, but placed him there when the only two people present were the assailant and the victim. ¶ 92 Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to obtain a conviction. Johnson, ¶ 43 (citing State v. Lancione, 1998 MT 84, ¶ 37, ___ Mont. ___, ¶ 37, 956 P.2d 1358, ¶ 37, 55 St.Rep. 344, ¶ 37). Circumstantial evidence must only be of such a quality and quantity as to legally justify a jury in determining guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and all facts and circumstances must be considered collectively. Johnson, ¶ 43 (quoting Lancione, ¶ 37 and State v. Weaver (1981), 195 Mont. 481, 495, 637 P.2d 23, 31). ¶ 93 The evidence against Southern included Hewitt's testimony regarding a pair of sunglass which the victim knocked off her assailant's face during the attack and which were subsequently found on the floor of the victim's bedroom. Hewitt found a footprint left on the lens of the sunglasses which she compared to the sole of a pair of Southern's shoes. Hewitt determined that the footprint was made by the left sole of Southern's shoe to the exclusion of all other shoes. In addition, Ammen testified that pubic hairs found on the bed where the rape occurred were consistent with Southern's pubic hair sample but inconsistent with the victim's pubic hair sample. ¶ 94 Notwithstanding, Southern asserts that this evidence only establishes that he was at the crime scene. As we stated above, presence at a crime scene is insufficient, by itself, to prove criminal liability. Johnston, 267 Mont. at 481, 885 P.2d at 406 (citation omitted). However, as the State correctly points out, this evidence not only placed Southern at the scene but also placed him at the crime scene when the only people there were the victim and her attacker. Consequently, we conclude that even though the evidence on Counts VI, VII and VIII was circumstantial, it was of sufficient quality and quantity that a reasonable jury could find Southern guilty of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, having reviewed the record, we hold that there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Southern committed the offenses of burglary, sexual intercourse without consent, and theft as charged in Counts VI, VII and VIII.