Opinion ID: 780249
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Power of Expropriation

Text: 15 Shreve Town contends that the City does not have the power to expropriate its property. Specifically, Shreve Town argues that the City's power of expropriation is subject to the limitations of art. I, § 4 and art. VI, § 21 of the Louisiana Constitution. Shreve Town further argues that the City does not have the power to expropriate for economic development under the general laws enacted by the Louisiana Legislature and the City Charter. Lastly, Shreve Town asserts that section 19:102 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes is procedural in nature and does not confer a substantive power of expropriation. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. See Matter of Bruner, 55 F.3d 195, 197 (5th Cir.1995). 16 Shreve Town's arguments are almost identical to those presented to the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal in City of Shreveport v. Chanse Gas Corp., 794 So.2d 962, 971 (La.Ct.App.2001). In Chanse Gas, the court held that the City's home rule charter expressly assumes the power of expropriation and that section 19:102 confers a substantive power of expropriation on the City. The court also held that it was not persuaded by the legislative acts cited by the defendants that special legislative authority is needed for the City to expropriate land because each of the acts antedate the Constitution of 1974 and its more expansive concept of home rule charter. 3 17 In this case, Shreve Town asserts that section 19:102 does not provide the City with a substantive power of expropriation. We disagree. Section 19:102 states that where a price cannot be agreed upon with the owner, any municipal corporation of Louisiana may expropriate property whenever such a course is determined necessary for the public interest. Section 19:102, along with the City's expansive home rule charter, clearly confers on the City a broad power of expropriation. Chanse Gas, 794 So.2d at 971 (holding that section 19:102 confers a substantive power of expropriation based on the Louisiana constitutional authority and the City's home rule charter). 18 With respect to art. VI, § 21, the City asserts that it should not be applied in this case because it was raised for the first time on appeal. Shreve Town counters that although it failed to cite art. VI, § 21, it is nonetheless applicable because the overarching issue of whether the City has the authority to expropriate its property was properly raised before the district court. Regardless of whether we apply art. VI, § 21, the City possesses a substantive power of expropriation, including the right to expropriate Shreve Town's property. See LA.REV.STAT.ANN. § 19:102 (Supp.1977). 19 Shreve Town further asserts that the legislature has never delegated the City with the power to expropriate property for economic development purposes. We disagree. Like the court in Chanse Gas, we reject this argument because the legislative acts relied upon by Shreve Town all predate the amended 1974 Louisiana Constitution and the City's adoption of the home rule charter. 20 As a result of the foregoing, we conclude that the City has the authority to expropriate Shreve Town's land as long as it does so for a valid public purpose.