Opinion ID: 1660492
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the actions of MDOC were arbitrary and capricious when it refused to:

Text: ¶ 11. The State argues that this is basically a due process argument, and since no liberty interest was involved with Edwards's removal from ISP he was not entitled to due process protections. This does not change simply by terming the actions arbitrary and capricious. The State cites Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) for the proposition that no due process violation was found where Sandin was not allowed to call witnesses at a disciplinary hearing. ¶ 12. What the State fails to recognize is that MDOC procedures require a hearing before a disciplinary committee where the accused can be heard and present evidence. MDOC Standard Operating Procedure 18.02.01, Disciplinary Procedures, Formal Resolutions at 4. The procedures specifically provide that inmates may call witnesses and present documentary evidence in their defense unless to do so would be: 1) unduly hazardous to safety and security, or, 2) the witness was not present when the violation occurred or has no personal knowledge of the incident, 3) the witness does not want to appear, or, 4) if testimony would be cumulative, the accused may only present two witnesses, 5) if the witness is unavailable, a statement obtained by the investigator or transcribed telephone statement may be used instead of live testimony, or, 6) revealing the identity of the witness may subject him to personal danger. Id. at 4-5. Any witnesses called by the accused offender or by the disciplinary committee will be given the opportunity to make a statement concerning the charge. Id. at 6. ¶ 13. If the disciplinary committee refuses to follow its own administrative review procedures, then its decision is by definition arbitrary and capricious. The disciplinary committee acted arbitrarily in refusing to allow Edwards to present witnesses and evidence in violation of its own administrative review procedures.
¶ 14. It is true that Edwards did not have a constitutional right to state-appointed counsel at the disciplinary hearing of the classification committee. However, Edwards retained counsel specifically for the purpose of representing him at the classification committee hearing. MDOC's own regulations provide him the right to examine witnesses and present evidence, though not specifically granting nor denying the right to representation by retained counsel. ¶ 15. The cases cited by Edwards, Riely v. State, 562 So.2d 1206 (Miss.1990); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973); and Ex parte Laird, 305 So.2d 357 (Miss.1974), all involve the right to counsel at Probation and Parole Board hearings. These cases stand for the proposition that an accused has a right to counsel at such hearings in cases which are complex or difficult to develop, and when, after being informed of his right to request counsel, the accused makes such a request, based on a timely and colorable claim. ¶ 16. Riely and Gagnon involve the right to court-appointed counsel, and are therefore distinguishable from the case at bar. In Laird, we held that the hearing officer violated the rules of the Probation and Parole Board by refusing to allow her counsel to participate in the proceedings where the Board's own rules provide an absolute right to retain counsel for a preliminary hearing. Id. at 357. ¶ 17. MDOC Standard Operating Procedure 18.02.01 does not provide for such a right, nor does it deny it. However, common sense and the interest of justice dictate that, where one takes the initiative and goes to the expense of hiring an attorney to speak for him, the attorney should be allowed to represent his client. Neither in the State's brief nor in the record was a reason given for refusing to allow Edwards's attorney to participate in the proceedings. The committee therefore acted arbitrarily or capriciously in refusing to allow Edwards's attorney to participate in the hearing in any way.