Opinion ID: 1934477
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: constitutional and statutory review

Text: It is alleged that the imposition of the death sentence violated both the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and 11 Del.C. § 4209(g), which requires that the sentence imposed be proportional to sentences received in similar crimes under that section.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that the imposition of the death penalty be based upon the personal culpability of a defendant. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 3377, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) ([T]he focus ha[s] to be on [the defendant's] culpability, not on that of those who committed the robbery and shot the victims, for we insist on individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 1687, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987) (A critical facet of the individualized determination of culpability required in capital cases is the mental state with which the defendant commits the crime); see also Lawrie v. State, Del.Supr., 643 A.2d 1336, 1347 (1994) ([T]he principal purposes of capital punishment  deterrence and retribution  are not served by executing a defendant who neither participated in the killing nor intended to kill) (citing Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798-800, 102 S.Ct. at 3377-78). The death penalty may be constitutionally imposed, even in the absence of an intent to kill, if the defendant played a major role in the felony and acted with reckless disregard for human life. Lawrie, 643 A.2d at 1347. The United States Supreme Court noted: [A] number of state courts have interpreted Enmund to permit the imposition of the death penalty in such aggravated felony murders. We do not approve or disapprove the judgments as to proportionality reached on particular facts of these cases, but we note the apparent consensus that substantial participation in a violent felony under circumstances likely to result in the loss of innocent human life may justify the death penalty even absent an intent to kill.       [T]he reckless disregard for human life implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death represents a highly culpable mental state, a mental state that may be taken into account in making a capital sentencing judgment when that conduct causes its natural, though also not inevitable, lethal result. Tison, 481 U.S. at 154, 157-58, 107 S.Ct. at 1686, 1688. Counsel claims that under Enmund and its progeny, the trial judge's instructions to the jury were flawed. Counsel maintains that the jury instructions could have led a reasonable juror to conclude that Nelson Shelton could be found guilty of both intentional murder as an accomplice and felony murder as an accomplice without ever finding that Nelson Shelton specifically intended to kill. Counsel relies on both Delaware law and the United States Supreme Court cases of Enmund, Cabana [9] and Tison for the proposition that the jury is required to find that Nelson Shelton either actually killed Mannon, or intended to kill Mannon. In Cabana, the United States Supreme Court stated that: [T]o the extent that Enmund recognizes that a defendant has a right not to face the death penalty, absent a particular factual predicate, it also implies that the State's judicial process leading to the imposition of the death penalty must at some point provide for a finding of that factual predicate. Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 390-91, 106 S.Ct. 689, 699, 88 L.Ed.2d 704 (1986). Although counsel recognizes that neither Enmund nor Cabana interprets the Eighth Amendment as specifically requiring a jury to find that Nelson intended to kill Mannon, counsel nonetheless maintains that under Delaware state law, Nelson has a liberty interest in having a jury make the necessary factual findings regarding intent. Counsel cites Claudio v. State, Del.Supr., 585 A.2d 1278, 1296 (1991): The framers of the [Delaware] Constitution of 1776 ... declared (1 Del.Laws, Appendix 81) it to be a fundamental rule `that trial by jury of facts where they arise is one of the greatest securities of the lives, liberties and estates of the people.' (quoting Wilson v. Oldfield, 1 Del.Cas. 622, 624-27 (1818)). Counsel's assertions are without merit. With regard to counsel's claim that the jury might have found Nelson guilty as an accomplice, this Court's decision in Deputy v. State, Del.Supr., 500 A.2d 581 (1985), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940, 107 S.Ct. 1589, 94 L.Ed.2d 778 (1987), negates that argument. In Deputy, the defendant had been convicted of killing two individuals during a robbery and sentenced to death. He appealed his sentence claiming that it violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He alleged, like counsel in this case, that the jury may have relied solely on accomplice liability to find him guilty, and thus, under Enmund, his sentence to death was unconstitutional. The Court found, however, that Enmund did not prohibit the imposition of the death penalty. The Court reasoned: Unlike Enmund, [who waited in the getaway car while the killing took place], Deputy was admittedly present at the killings, and, at the very least, did nothing to stop them. There were 145 wounds inflicted upon the two victims, two weapons were used in the murders, and Deputy had one of the victims' watch and wallet the morning after the killings. These factors indicate that Deputy was not solely a participant in the underlying felony, but was instead present during, and involved in, the actual murders. Id. at 599; see also Deputy v. Taylor, 3d Cir., 19 F.3d 1485, 1497-98, cert. denied, sub nom., Stanley v. Taylor, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 2730, 129 L.Ed.2d 853 (1994). In this case, the trial judge found that not only was Nelson present at the scene of Mannon's murder, but he also wielded the hammer and struck Mannon in the back of the head. This finding is supported by the evidence [10] and we defer to the trial court's determination. Additionally, Nelson was wearing Mannon's gold rings when apprehended later that day. He was not merely a participant in the underlying robbery, but was instead present during, and involved in, the actual murders. Deputy, 500 A.2d at 599. Counsel's second contention is equally unavailing. Under 11 Del.C. § 4209(d), the judge determines the sentence in a capital case. The jury deliberates on and recommends to the court answers to: (1) whether the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance, and (2) whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances found to exist. 11 Del.C. § 4209(c)(3)(a). Even as to these matters, the jury makes a recommendation only  the ultimate decision is made by the trial court. State v. Cohen, Del.Supr., 604 A.2d 846, 851-52 (1992). Although the jury plays an important role in the sentencing process, neither the Delaware State Constitution, nor case law provides that it is to assume the dominant role in sentencing, i.e., the accused is not entitled to a jury trial with regard to sentencing. Id. [T]hat principle[, of a jury not passing sentence,] is so deeply rooted in precedent as to be immutable, since this Court has consistently held that, absent express statutory authorization, the jury should not even consider the sentencing consequences which flow from a guilty verdict. Id. (citing Boatson v. State, Del.Supr., 457 A.2d 738, 741 (1983); Smith v. State, Del.Supr., 317 A.2d 20, 25-26 (1974)); see also Claudio, 585 A.2d at 1290-98 (right to trial by jury preserved only as it existed when common law was imported from England in 1776). [11] Here, the jury found that four aggravating circumstances were present, [12] and that these factors outweighed any mitigating factors. They recommended that Nelson be sentenced to death. As part of its sentencing decision, the trial court relied on the jury's recommendation, and the evidence that showed that Nelson actually killed Mannon. Accordingly, Nelson's sentence was imposed fairly and did not violate his rights under either the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or any state law.
Finally, this Court must ensure that the imposition of the death sentence with regard to Nelson is proportionate in relation to similar cases. [13] The analysis here is substantially similar to that performed in Outten v. State and Shelton v. State. Title 11 Del.C. § 4209(g)(2)(a) requires that there be some proportionality between the crime committed and the blameworthiness of the defendant, [14] and mandates that the Supreme Court determine: Whether, considering the totality of evidence in aggravation and mitigation which bears upon the particular circumstances or details of the offense and the character and propensities of the offender, the death penalty was either arbitrarily or capriciously imposed or recommended, or disproportionate to the penalty recommended or imposed in similar cases arising under this section. In making this determination, this Court will scrutinize those first degree murder cases governed by the 1991 amendment to the death penalty statute which have continued to a penalty hearing and where the sentence has become final. In addition, the Court may consider those cases decided under the law in effect from 1985 to 1991 which the Court deems pertinent to the case before it. Wright v. State, Del.Supr., 633 A.2d 329, 342 (1993). In view of this Court's decision in Lawrie, 643 A.2d at 1350, it is essential to distinguish between those cases governed by 11 Del.C. § 4209 as it existed before the 1991 amendment which became effective on November 4, 1991 in 68 Del.Laws Ch. 189 (the pre-1991 cases), and those cases governed by the current provisions of Section 4209 after November 4, 1991 (the post-1991 cases). In Lawrie, we held that the changes in the statutory scheme in 1991 created such a significant dissimilarity between the pre-1991 cases and the post-1991 cases that the former are merely pertinent but are clearly distinguishable because of the statutory change. 643 A.2d at 1350. The pre-1991 cases required a unanimous jury verdict to impose the death penalty. In the post-1991 cases, it is the trial judge who has the final responsibility for sentencing, and the jury's recommendation need not be unanimous. As a result, we held that the pre-1991 cases are not `similar cases arising under this section' [4209]. Thus, while pertinent, they are not dispositive.... Id. Further, we held in Lawrie that the particular pre-1991 cases being offered there as pertinent were not significantly persuasive on the proportionality issue. Id. Thus, the teaching of Lawrie is that this Court must scrutinize the post-1991 cases as the precise universe which is directly applicable to the statutorily-mandated proportionality analysis. While in a given situation a pre-1991 case may be pertinent, and thus may be considered, in the usual case it would not likely be significantly persuasive. In the instant case, there is no pre-1991 case or post-1991 case which is persuasive in showing that the death penalties here are disproportionate. [15] Although a definitive comparison of the universe of cases is almost impossible, this Court has relied upon the factual background of relevant cases to determine the proportionality of a sentence. Pennell v. State, Del.Supr., 604 A.2d 1368, 1376-77 (1992). Most of the persons who have been sentenced to death in Delaware have committed `an unprovoked, cold-blooded murder of a helpless person (or persons) ... [who lacked] the ability to defend themselves and solely for the purposes of pecuniary gain.' Lawrie, 643 A.2d at 1349 (quoting Riley v. State, Del.Supr., 496 A.2d 997, 1027 (1985)); see also Wright v. State, Del.Supr., 633 A.2d 329, 343 (1993). Usually, deliberation has preceded the murder, though this finding is not necessary where there is intent to harm and the crime committed is heinous. See Whalen v. State, Del.Supr., 492 A.2d 552, 564 (1985) (although death penalty not imposed, death penalty is appropriate where defendant broke into home and brutally attacked, raped and strangled occupant). Here, the murder was gruesome, unprovoked, vicious, brutal, unjustified and heinous. An analysis of [defendant's] `intentions, expectations, and actions' is appropriate to determine whether [defendant's] level of culpability is sufficient to justify the death penalty under the proportionality analysis. Lawrie, 643 A.2d at 1349. Based on Gibbons' testimony, scientific evidence and circumstantial evidence, the jury found that Nelson had swung a hammer and hit 64-year old Mannon in the head, for a few inexpensive items. In our view this case is substantially similar, for proportionality review purposes, to other post-1991 death penalty cases where there were killings committed during the commission of a felony, and the pre-1991 death penalty cases are not inconsistent with this view. See Lawrie, 643 A.2d at 1350-51. The death sentence is warranted and is not disproportional.