Opinion ID: 518933
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Wrongful Discharge for Union Activity

Text: 8 Appellants allege federal claim for wrongful discharge--that they were wrongfully terminated for their union activities during the strike. This claim encompasses both a breach of the CBA and an unfair labor practice. Both allegations fail but for different reasons: (1) the CBA breach cannot be brought against the employer because appellants have failed to show the Union breached its duty of fair representation; and (2) the unfair labor practice charge is preempted by NLRA Secs. 7 and 8. 9
10 Appellants' federal wrongful discharge claim is effectively a suit for breach of the CBA, and as such states a claim under LMRA Sec. 301, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185(a). Federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the NLRB if an activity claimed to be an unfair labor practice also allegedly violates a collective bargaining agreement. Lumber Production Industrial Workers v. West Coast Industrial Relations Association, Inc., 775 F.2d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir.1985). However, an employee subject to a CBA who makes his or her union the exclusive bargaining agent must prove that the union breached its duty of fair representation before proceeding with a Sec. 301 suit against the employer. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186, 87 S.Ct. 903, 914, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 572, 96 S.Ct. 1048, 1060, 47 L.Ed.2d 231 (1976). Appellants have failed to make a case that the Union breached its duty of fair representation. 11 Appellants' two most likely grounds for showing a breach are first, the Union's acceptance of a settlement rather than proceeding to arbitration; and second, appellants' contention that the Union discriminates against maintenance workers, and in favor of drivers, in its handling of grievances. 12 The first ground fails because of the great deference we accord unions' handling of grievances. For a union to breach its duty of fair representation, its conduct in handling the grievance must be arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 190, 87 S.Ct. at 916; Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1253-54 (9th Cir.1985) (We have never held that a union has acted in an arbitrary manner where the challenged conduct involved the union's judgment as to how best to handle a grievance.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122, 106 S.Ct. 1642, 90 L.Ed.2d 187 (1986). A union's representation need not be error free. Castelli v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 752 F.2d 1480, 1482 (9th Cir.1985). 13 Here, the Union's pursuit of appellants' grievances through to setting arbitration hearings was not a perfunctory handling that would constitute arbitrary treatment, Peterson, 771 F.2d at 1254, nor was its decision to accept a settlement which gave the employees reinstatement, back pay (less one month), and a return to seniority an arbitrary or bad faith exercise of judgment. Scott v. Machinists Automotive Trades Dist. Lodge No. 190, 827 F.2d 589, 593 (9th Cir.1987). Appellants' contemporaneous objections to the settlement do not render the Union's acceptance of it a bad faith act. When employees make their union the sole bargaining representative with the employer, they relinquish the right to control the settlement of their grievances. Unions are free to negotiate and accept settlements even without the grievants' approval. Scott v. Machinists, 827 F.2d at 593; Otero v. International Union of Elec., Radio and Machine Workers, 474 F.2d 3, 4 (9th Cir.1973); Borg v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 116 L.R.R.M. 3315 (N.D.Cal.1984). 14 Furthermore, the settlement agreement as it was accepted by the Union did not prejudice appellants' other claims. While not expressly reserving the appellants' rights, the settlement did not affirmatively assert that the appellants had waived all rights to other claims against Greyhound. In addition, the provision appellants wanted to include in the settlement--an explicit right to go against Greyhound for additional damages--would have been toothless, since the additional damage claims they believed they could bring were not available, under federal law, to employees bound by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. 15 Appellants second ground--discriminatory treatment of maintenance workers--is based solely on the affidavit of Steven Thornell. Because the affidavit contains only conclusory allegations, not backed up by statements of fact, it cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment. Angel v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 653 F.2d 1293, 1299 (9th Cir.1981). We further note that appellants' attorney had over a year in which to conduct discovery to support this claim, thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of the Grant of Summary Judgment when the motion sought additional time for discovery. 16
17 Appellants assert a federal wrongful discharge claim that they were terminated for their active participation in the strike. 2 While federal courts share concurrent jurisdiction with the Board over an activity constituting an unfair labor practice and allegedly violating section 301, here, the employees cannot sustain a section 301 action. Aside from section 301 claims, any federal or state claim for wrongful discharge based on union activity is preempted by NLRA Secs. 7 and 8. 29 U.S.C. Secs. 157, 158; San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959). Garmon preemption is intended to protect the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practice charges. 18 Here, appellants first appropriately brought their wrongful discharge claims before the NLRB, which dismissed them. Instead of appealing that dismissal, appellants have restated the claim and included it in this action. Assuming for the sake of argument that appellants' failure to appeal the NLRB dismissal does not estop them from filing the parallel claim, their claim is preempted under Garmon, as the district court found in its order. 19