Opinion ID: 1425795
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence Against Morell

Text: Morell mounts a broad challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him. He argues that no rational jury could have found him guilty of any of the crimes of which this jury convicted him. Those crimes were: (1) conspiracy in Count One of the indictment; (2) Hobbs Act extortion of three subcontractors  Feliciano, Carmona, and Laracy  in Counts Two, Three, and Four, respectively; (3) wire fraud in Counts Nine to Eleven; and (4) mail fraud in Count Thirteen. [18] Our central task in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence is to determine whether a rational factfinder could have found each element of the crime in question beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Lizardo, 445 F.3d 73, 81 (1st Cir.2006). Our review is plenary, looking at the record as a whole and resolv[ing] all questions of credibility and reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict. Id.; accord United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 711 (1st Cir.1992) ([I]t is not the appellate court's function to weigh the evidence or make credibility judgments. Rather, it is for the jury to choose between varying interpretations of the evidence.). We need not be convinced that a guilty verdict was the only one available on the evidence, but merely that a plausible rendition of the record supports the verdict. Ortiz, 966 F.2d at 711. Evidence sufficient to support a guilty verdict may be entirely circumstantial, and the factfinder is free to choose among reasonable interpretations of the evidence. United States v. Wight, 968 F.2d 1393, 1395 (1st Cir.1992). Morell was convicted on three counts of Hobbs Act extortion by fear of economic harm or under color of official right; each of these counts pertained to the extortion of each of three subcontractors: Feliciano, Carmona, and Laracy. We begin our analysis by determining whether a rational jury could have found the elements of extortion for these three subcontractors. The Hobbs Act provides that [w]hoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by . . . extortion or attempts or conspires so to do . . . shall be [punished]. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). The Act defines extortion as the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of . . . fear, or under color of official right. Id. § 1951(b)(2). We have clarified that fear encompasses `fear of economic loss, . . . including the possibility of lost business opportunities.' United States v. Rivera Rangel, 396 F.3d 476, 483 (1st Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Bucci, 839 F.2d 825, 827-28 (1st Cir.1988)). Therefore, an individual commits Hobbs Act extortion if he: (1) obtains property from another person; (2) with that person's consent; (3) through fear of economic loss or under color of official right; and (4) the transaction affects interstate commerce. Id. Morell does not dispute the existence of the fourth element, and we find sufficient evidence in the record to establish this element [19] and the first three. The first element is easily satisfied: Cobián testified  and a rational jury could have believed  that the subcontractors made periodic cash payments to him between 1997 and 1999 which he then passed on to Vázquez, Morell, and Granados. Several subcontractors verified that they made such payments to Cobián, and this testimony was supported by documentary evidence  for example, sham checks from Carmona's business to non-existent individuals for unperformed services, so Carmona could generate the cash necessary to pay Cobián. Feliciano also testified that he made one payment to Vázquez in person. The second element is also easily met: Feliciano, Carmona, and Laracy all testified that they agreed voluntarily (though reluctantly) to pay the money demanded, and a rational jury could have believed this testimony. As for the third element  inducement to pay by fear of economic loss or color of official right  it, too, is established on the facts presented. As an initial matter, the two components of this element are disjunctive, and an extortion conviction will stand if there is sufficient evidence to prove either component. Id. To prove the former, the government must show that the victim reasonably feared that noncompliance with the putative extortionist's terms would result in economic loss. United States v. Cruz-Arroyo, 461 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir.2006), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1169, 166 L.Ed.2d 997 (2007). The Government here put forth ample evidence to show that Feliciano, Carmona, and Laracy reasonably feared economic harm if they failed to pay the money demanded of them. Feliciano, for example, testified that he agreed to pay the money because, if he did not, [t]he government could make life very difficult for his construction firm by delaying Superaqueduct project payments and not awarding the firm government contracts in the future. Carmona testified that he felt compelled to pay and keep paying because if he failed to do so, the Thames-Dick consortium could be removed from the Superaqueduct project and his construction firm might also suffer other adverse consequences. Laracy testified in a similar vein that he feared detriment to his business if he did not pay. Feliciano, Carmona, and Laracy testified further that they knew the recipients of the money were people with influence in the NPP government; they knew Granados to be among them; and Feliciano and Carmona also knew Vázquez to be among them. Based on this testimony, a rational jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Feliciano, Carmona, and Laracy paid Cobián out of fear of detrimental consequences for their respective businesses, and that this fear was reasonable because they believed the extortionists to have real power to effect such detriment. The next critical question we must answer is whether a rational jury could have found Morell to be linked to the extortion scheme in a manner that allows criminal liability to be imputed to him. We must therefore examine whether a rational jury could have found a conspiracy to exist, and Morell to be a member of it, as charged in Count One of the indictment. To establish a conspiracy, the Government must prove three elements: (1) an agreement to commit an unlawful act; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the agreement and voluntary participation in it; and (3) an overt act by at least one of the coconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Muñoz-Franco, 487 F.3d 25, 45 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 678, 169 L.Ed.2d 514 (2007). The Government need not prove a formal agreement; instead, [t]he agreement may be shown by a concert of action, all the parties working together understandingly, with a single design for the accomplishment of a common purpose. Id. at 45-46 (quoting Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 93, 107 (6th Cir. 1944)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Morell's conviction may be sustained on sufficient evidence of a conspiracy to commit any of the three charged conspiracy offenses. Id. at 46. For purposes of the present analysis, we focus on conspiracy to commit extortion. Morell does not seriously challenge the Government's evidence on the first and third elements of conspiracy, and we find an abundance of evidence in the record to support their existence. Cobián and Granados testified that Vázquez and Cobián devised a plan to compel the subcontractors to hand over a portion of their Superaqueduct profits. As we have found above, a rational jury could have considered this compelled payment to constitute extortion  the requisite unlawful act that is the object of the conspiracy. And the record reveals many overt acts in furtherance of such a conspiracy including, for example, Cobián's physical transfer of periodic cash payments from Feliciano and Carmona to Vázquez's medical office. What remains, then, is the second element: whether Morell knew of the extortion agreement and voluntary participated in it. The most direct evidence against Morell in this regard is Cobián's testimony about one of his initial meetings with Vázquez. According to this testimony, Vázquez told Cobián that Morell and Granados would be assisting him in his efforts to secure the Superaqueduct contract for Thames-Dick, and that Cobián should approach Morell to work out how Morell wished to receive his share of the payments. Yet even in the absence of this testimony, a rational factfinder could still have inferred that Morell knew of and adhered to the extortion agreement based on a significant quantum of other evidence. For example, Cobián testified that, in 1997, he approached Morell to arrange how the latter wished to receive his share. Cobián stated that Morell was not surprised to see him, but instead seemed to have been expecting him and had already devised a specific plan for concealing the transfer of the subcontractors' money. According to Cobián, Morell proceeded to draw up a sham legal contract and made several other elaborate arrangements to this end. Morell then accepted periodic payments from Cobián under the sham contract and through third-party payments from 1997 to 1999  a period largely overlapping with the period during which Vázquez and Granados were also receiving payments. Morell does not dispute that he received thousands of dollars from Cobián over the course of those two years. As noted above, it is not for us to make credibility determinations on a review of the sufficiency of the evidence, but merely to say whether a rational jury could have believed this testimony. See Ortiz, 966 F.2d at 711. We find that a rational jury could have believed Cobián, and then drawn the reasonable inference that Cobián's payments to Morell were not for legal services and other licit ends, but were instead designed clandestinely to channel him his part of the extortionate proceeds. A rational jury could then have drawn a second inference: that Morell obviously knew of, and voluntarily participated in, the scheme. Accordingly, a rational jury could have found all three elements of conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt, and this jury's conviction of Morell under Count One was therefore supported by sufficient evidence. This brings us to the sufficiency of the evidence as to the counts charging Morell with substantive crimes incident to the conspiracy. Contrary to Morell's assertion at oral argument, the law does not require proof that he personally took any steps to instill economic fear in the subcontractors, to influence the award of the contract or the payment for performance under the contract, or that the subcontractors feared Morell or even knew of his involvement. Instead, under the Pinkerton doctrine, a defendant can be found liable for the substantive crime of a coconspirator provided the crime was reasonably foreseeable and committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Gobbi, 471 F.3d 302, 309 n. 3 (1st Cir.2006) (citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946)). The district court properly instructed the jury on the Pinkerton doctrine. Based on overwhelming evidence in the record, the jury could rationally have found that Vázquez, Cobián, or Granados committed extortion. Through Pinkerton, such a jury could then have found Morell equally liable for the substantive offense, since extortion was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy (and indeed was the conspiracy's object), and was a reasonably foreseeable result of the conspiracy. See Díaz-Díaz, 433 F.3d at 137. [20] For these reasons, Morell's substantive extortion convictions under Counts Two to Four of the indictment were also supported by substantial evidence. The last set of convictions Morell challenges on sufficiency grounds stems from various instances of mail and wire fraud charged in Counts Nine to Eleven and Thirteen. In order to convict an individual of mail or wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343, the Government must prove: (1) the defendant's knowing and willing participation in a scheme or artifice to defraud with the specific intent to defraud, and (2) the use of the mails or interstate wire communications in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 723 (1st Cir.1996). Counts Nine, Ten, and Eleven charged Morell with devising a scheme to defraud the Puerto Rico Treasury Department (Hacienda) by failing to pay income taxes on revenue earned from the extortion. Each count lists a separate wire transaction of thousands of dollars dated April 16, 1999 from Thames-Dick to Feliciano, Carmona, and Laracy, respectively. These were apparently chosen as representative samples of the monthly wire transfers Thames-Dick made to the subcontractors beginning in January 1997, a portion of which the subcontractors then handed over to Cobián, who in turn gave a portion to Morell, Vázquez, and Granados. The indictment charges that Morell failed to account for this 1999 income on his Puerto Rico tax return, and then used the mails to send the return to the Puerto Rico tax agency. This mailing was the basis for the mail-fraud charge in Count Thirteen. Upon review of the record, we find sufficient evidence for a rational jury to have convicted Morell on all of these counts. A rational jury could have believed Cobián's testimony that Morell directed Cobián to funnel him the subcontractors' money through checks for sham legal services purportedly rendered to Cobián's company, and through payments to third parties for Morell's benefit. Such a jury could also have credited the certified copy of Morell's 1999 tax return in evidence, that failed to report payments made to him by Cobián in that year. A rational jury could likewise have believed Morell's tax preparer, who testified that Morell did not tell him about income earned from Cobián's company in 1999, and that he therefore did not include it on the 1999 return. These findings, in turn, would be sufficient to satisfy the first element for both mail and wire fraud: that Morell intentionally, knowingly, and willingly participated in a scheme to defraud Hacienda. See id. Specifically with respect to the wire-fraud counts, a rational jury could then have found the second element fulfilled  that wire communications were used in furtherance of the scheme. [21] Morell need not have had any personal involvement in initiating the wire transfers; instead, the use of the wires need only have been a reasonably foreseeable part of the scheme in which he participated. Id. at 723 n. 6 (quoting United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 585 n. 8 (1st Cir.1996)) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted); accord United States v. Fermín Castillo, 829 F.2d 1194, 1198 (1st Cir.1987) (it must have been reasonably foreseeable that use of the mails or wires would follow in the ordinary course of business (quoting United States v. Benmuhar, 658 F.2d 14, 16-17 (1st Cir.1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. (case law on mail-fraud statute instructive for wire-fraud statute). From the evidence presented, a rational jury could have inferred that it was reasonably foreseeable that interstate wires would be used in the ordinary course of business for Thames-Dick to transfer payments to the subcontractors. These transfers were essential to the success of the extortion scheme and, in turn, the scheme to defraud the Puerto Rico tax agency, because they provided the subcontractors the money they gave to Morell and the others, and which Morell then failed to report. On the basis of such findings, a rational jury could thus have concluded that Morell was guilty of wire fraud on each of the three counts. [22] Turning specifically to the mail-fraud count, a rational jury could also have found the second element fulfilled here  that the mails were used in furtherance of the scheme. The district court admitted into evidence a copy of a meter-marked envelope addressed to Hacienda and bearing a Hacienda receipt stamp, along with Morell's 1999 return. Morell does not dispute that these were his envelope and return, but contends there is no proof that the return was actually placed in the mail. We disagree, and conclude that a rational jury could have credited evidence that Morell mailed the return or reasonably expected that in the regular course of business, it would be mailed to Hacienda on his behalf. Morell's tax preparer, who formerly worked for Hacienda, testified that when tax returns came in the mail, Hacienda kept the envelope and stapled it to the return, but would likely discard an envelope accompanying a hand-delivered return. A rational jury could have believed this testimony, and inferred from it that the 1999 return and the meter-marked envelope were actually mailed. The evidence was therefore sufficient to support a finding of guilt by mail fraud. For these reasons, we reject all of Morell's challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, and proceed to the next ground of appeal.