Opinion ID: 614341
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Epps's Involvement in Porter's Third-Step Appeal

Text: Porter also argues that Epps was personally involved in Porter's unlawful detention because his signature is on the form denying Porter's third-step appeal. Epps denies that he was personally involved in Epps's unlawful detention, and the lower court did not address whether Epps was entitled to qualified immunity for this claim. As an initial matter, the evidence is undisputed that Epps had for many years delegated responsibility for evaluating third-step appeals to Deputy Commissioner Emmett Sparkman. Sparkman not Eppssigned Epps's name to the order denying Porter's appeal. Porter offered no further evidence that Epps was personally involved in denying his third-step appeal. Thus, Epps's own, direct actions with regard to Porter cannot be a basis of liability. Moreover, Epps contends that the records department's interpretation of Porter's sentencing order was reasonable, and this same argument extends to the reasonableness of Epps's alleged denial of Porter's third-step appeal. Porter was sentenced to serve a term of FIVE (5) YEARS in an institution under the supervision and control of the [MDOC]. The sentencing order stated, the Court hereby suspends the execution of the above sentence for a period of FOUR (4) YEARS, the suspension of this sentence to commence after the Defendant has served ONE (1) YEAR in the INTENSIVE SUPERVISION PROGRAM (HOUSE ARREST) under the supervision and control of the Department of Corrections, until the Court in term time, or the Judge in vacation, shall alter, extend, terminate or direct the enforcement of the above sentence, and the suspension of said sentence is based upon the following conditions. . . . While the list of conditions included the condition that Defendant shall hereafter commit no offense against the laws of this or any State of the United States or of the United States, the list did not include completion of ISP. Epps contends that it was objectively reasonable to interpret the sentencing order to require completion of ISP prior to the suspension of Porter's sentence. Porter does not address this argument. In light of the language of the sentencing order, the records department's interpretation of that order was objectively reasonable, even if the Mississippi court concluded that such an interpretation was incorrect. Thus, Epps is entitled to qualified immunity to the extent that Porter's claim is based on Epps's personal participation in the unlawful detention.