Opinion ID: 2329809
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Were the Magistrate Court's Findings of Fact Supported by Substantial and Competent Evidence?

Text: A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 856, 55 P.3d 304, 310 (2002); I.R.C.P. 52(a). When deciding whether findings of fact are clearly erroneous, this Court does not substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court. Camp, 137 Idaho at 856, 55 P.3d at 310. It is the province of the trial court to weigh conflicting evidence and to judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. On appeal, this Court examines the record to see if challenged findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Id. Evidence is regarded as substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proven. Id. In challenging the findings, Appellant focuses upon the magistrate court's findings that she had failed to obtain and maintain safe and stable housing and had failed to secure and maintain legitimate employment sufficient to meet the needs of herself and her children. With respect to the safe and stable housing, Appellant contends that she lived in one apartment for approximately the first year of this case and that her son resided with her for seven consecutive months of that period. Mother testified that she lived in a house in Middleton with her boyfriend, her father and mother, and her sister when the Child Protective Act proceedings commenced in March 2009. She moved out of that house in July 2009 and moved into a low-income housing with the assistance of the Department. She was evicted from that housing in March 2010 for repeated violations of the lease agreement. She testified that she cannot remember where she lived from then until June 16, 2010, when she moved into a shelter. She moved out of the shelter at the end of November 2010 and moved into the trailer in which she was living at the time of trial in December 2010. She stipulated that the trailer was unsafe for children, and the magistrate court found it unfit for habitation, which finding is not contested. The trailer appeared to be located in the midst of a junk yard, had no running water, and had exposed wiring inside. With respect to securing and maintaining employment, Appellant contends that she collected scrap metal in an attempt to financially provide for herself and her children, applied for low wage work, and ran a business delivering wooden pallets and recycling glass. Appellant testified at trial that she owned a business repairing and making wooden pallets, that she established the business about four to six weeks before trial, and that she has three to four employees. She said the business was profitable, earning her a monthly income of [p]robably between $300 and $600, $700. The magistrate court found, The evidence presented at trial that was intended to demonstrate that [Appellant] had a positive source of income was not believable. The court also found that she could not fully and clearly explain her claimed employment and that it appeared at best to be only partially legitimate. It is the province of the trial court to weigh conflicting evidence and to judge the credibility of witnesses. Camp, 137 Idaho at 856, 55 P.3d at 310. The court's findings, that Appellant failed to obtain and maintain safe and stable housing and to secure and maintain legitimate employment as required by the case plan, are supported by substantial and competent evidence. The court also found that Appellant had failed to demonstrate adequate parenting and protective skills with her children as required by her case plan, and Appellant does not challenge that finding on appeal. The court did not err in concluding that Appellant had neglected her children by failing to comply with her case plan so that they could be reunited with her. In order to terminate a parent-child relationship, the court must also find that termination is in the best interests of the child. I.C. § 16-2005(1). The magistrate court found that the children were in need of guidance, care, and support that Appellant had not provided and that it was in the children's best interests for Appellant's parental rights to be terminated. Appellant contends that this finding is not supported by substantial and competent evidence because she has not neglected her children, has substantially completed her case plan, and is able to discharge her parental duties. As stated above, the findings that she had neglected her children by failing to complete her case plan were supported by substantial and competent evidence. A psychological evaluation admitted into evidence stated that Appellant is operating at a limited level of cognitive function and that she has a lack of reasoning for the needs of children. The report concluded that [s]he has little prospect or motivation for finding and maintaining gainful employment and a means for caring for her children. The court found that Appellant is generally unwilling to make the changes in her behavior and her decision-making processes that would be necessary for her to complete her case plan. It also found that Appellant's defiant and incredulous attitude toward these failures [regarding completing her case plan] also supports the conclusion that she is unable to discharge her parental duties and that such inability will continue for a prolonged and indeterminate period and will be injurious to the health, morals or well-being of her children. Appellant does not challenge these findings on appeal. There is substantial and competent evidence supporting the finding that termination of Appellant's parental rights is in the best interests of her children. The statutory grounds for terminating parental rights listed in subsections (a) through (e) of Idaho Code section 16-2005(1) are independent. Roe v. Doe, 142 Idaho 174, 179, 125 P.3d 530, 535 (2005). Having affirmed the finding of neglect under Idaho Code section 16-2005(1)(b) and 16-2002(3)(b), we need not address the other grounds found by the magistrate court. Id.