Opinion ID: 6335605
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Obstruction of Justice Finding

Text: Second, Major challenges the district court’s finding that he obstructed justice by attempting to influence Lobb’s testimony. 2 An offense-level enhancement for obstruction of justice is appropriate if:
peded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the 2 Although obstruction of justice typically increases a defendant’s offense level under the Guidelines by two points, U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, which would have brought Major’s offense level up to a 28, Major’s qualification as a “career offender” independently established a higher offense level of 32, making this finding irrelevant for the purpose of increasing his offense level, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b)(3). This would ordinarily moot his challenge to the obstruction-of-justice finding. See United States v. Collins, 352 F. App’x 96, 98 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that where the defendant was sentenced based on the higher offense level associated with a career offender designation, any challenge to a separate offense level adjustment would be moot). The district court, however, also considered Major’s acts of obstruction when it determined that he did not adequately accept responsibility for his conduct, and an acceptance-of-responsibility finding would have decreased Major’s offense level after accounting for the career offender designation. Thus, his challenge to this factual finding is not moot. 16 No. 20-2829 investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and (2) the ob- structive conduct related to (A) the defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related offense …. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The commentary accompanying U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 gives several examples of “the types of conduct to which this adjustment applies,” including “threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully influencing a co-defendant, … or attempting to do so[.]” Id. cmt. 4(A). The intimidation of a co-defendant can be separate from “committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury.” Id. cmt. 4(B). Major protests that there was no “evidence that [he] had ever threatened Lobb or … attempted to have her commit perjury.” He contends that he was simply trying to encourage Lobb to tell the truth. Although he made some statements to that effect during some of his phone calls, Major also knew that those calls were being recorded—which he admitted during his allocution, when he told the district court, “I know the phones are recorded in jail.” Given this knowledge, it is unsurprising and less than persuasive that—in court—Major described his motive as merely encouraging Lobb to “tell the truth.” Additionally, this assertion is undermined by the fact that Major did not even object to the drug quantity set forth in the PSR—the very issue on which he hoped Lobb would contradict Menchaca. Moreover, even if Major did simply want Lobb to “tell the truth,” this does not mean the district court clearly erred when it held that Major’s attempts to pressure Lobb to “undermine the credibility of Menchaca” were a “clear example[] of trying to influence the testimony of a witness,” which No. 20-2829 17 constituted obstruction. We considered such a scenario in United States v. Cheek, 740 F.3d 440 (7th Cir. 2014). In that case, the defendant wrote a letter to the daughter of a witness against him. Id. at 453–54. In the letter, the defendant told the daughter that her mother (the witness) was lying to the government, and he implied that the daughter should influence her mother to “tell the truth.” Id. at 453. The defendant wrote: To prove [the charge] why would they need your Mom to lie on me if they had something?… She couldn’t get more than 5 if she would’ve just plead guilty without lying on me.… The most she can get is 5 and me LIFE if she doesn’t tell the truth.… So I am praying that she don’t let them keep scaring her.… If God is willing you know who won’t tell that lie and I will be there to see yall in the near future. Id. at 444 (errors in original). We held that the “district court reasonably interpreted this effort as a willful attempt to persuade [the witness’s] daughter to try to sway her mother’s testimony.” Id. at 454. “And an effort to influence a witness’s testimony—albeit vicariously—is a prototypical example of obstruction of justice.” Id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. 4(A)). Following the reasoning in Cheek, even if Major was trying to urge Lobb to “tell the truth” from his point of view, such conduct may still constitute obstruction of justice if its purpose is to persuade a witness or co-defendant to alter her testimony. Here, the evidence clearly showed that Major made a frenzy of phone calls to various associates and family members in an attempt to affect Lobb’s testimony about the quantity of drugs at issue. The context around these calls—in particular, the fact that Major asked his enforcer Ray Ray to get 18 No. 20-2829 involved, the fact that Major was intentionally vague on the recorded phone line about what he wanted his associates to do, and the fact that Major and Ray Ray laughed about how Lobb was “scared as hell”—was sufficient for the court to conclude that this attempt to influence Lobb’s testimony was unlawful. Thus, the district court did not err in finding that Major attempted to influence his co-defendant’s testimony, and this factual finding supported its determination—discussed further below—that Major obstructed justice in a way that was incompatible with accepting responsibility for his conduct.