Opinion ID: 438856
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Muhammad v. Carlson

Text: 7 In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979), the Supreme Court set forth the criteria for bringing a Bivens action. A person seeking to recover damages from a federal agent under Bivens first must assert that a constitutionally protected right has been violated. 442 U.S. at 234, 99 S.Ct. at 2271. The litigant is then required to state a cause of action sufficient to invoke the general federal question jurisdiction of the district court. Id. at 239-44, 99 S.Ct. at 2273-76. Furthermore, the complaining party, after establishing his cause of action, has the burden of demonstrating why money damages are the appropriate form of relief. Id. at 244-48, 99 S.Ct. at 2276-79. 8 The district court, in Muhammad v. Carlson, dismissed the case before determining the validity of Muhammad's claim on the ground that federal prisoners, as a prerequisite to a Bivens action, must first exhaust administrative remedies. 9 Ordinarily a party is required to exhaust prescribed administrative remedies before seeking relief in the federal courts unless Congress has indicated to the contrary or the available administrative remedies are inherently inadequate. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51, 58 S.Ct. 459, 463-464, 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938); Babcock and Wilcox Co. v. Marshall, 610 F.2d 1128, 1135 (3d Cir.1979). When Congress has provided an administrative procedure which is capable of resolving a controversy, that procedure must be utilized. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Resor, 442 F.2d 993, 994 (3d Cir.1971). 10 The principles of exhaustion have a constitutional dimension. For courts to act prematurely, prior to the final decision of the appropriate administrative agency, would raise a serious question implicating the doctrine of separation of powers. Babcock and Wilcox, supra at 1136, n. 21. When the federal courts allow for preliminary adjudication by an executive agency, the doctrine of separation of powers involves judicial recognition of the autonomy of the executive branch so that the agency may function efficiently and so that it may have an opportunity to correct its own errors. Id. at p. 1137, n. 28 (quoting Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2467, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (dictum)). The exhaustion requirement does not preclude judicial relief, it simply postpones the timing of the judicial adjudication. See Barnes v. Chatterton, 515 F.2d 916, 921 (3d Cir.1975). Because Congress is vested with the power to prescribe the basic procedural scheme under which most claims may be heard in federal courts, the initial question whether exhaustion is required must be answered, where possible, by reference to congressional intent. Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 2560, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982). 11 In an analogous situation, Congress requires that state prisoners, who sue state officials in federal court for alleged violations of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1976 ed. Supp. IV), exhaust available state administrative remedies, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e (1976 ed. Supp. IV). Although exhaustion of state administrative remedies usually is not a prerequisite to an action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1976 ed. Supp. IV), the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997 et seq. (1976 ed. Supp. IV), created a specific, limited exception to the prohibition against exhaustion for suits brought by state prisoners. Patsy, supra, 457 U.S. at 507, 102 S.Ct. at 2563. In promulgating the Act, Congress established a detailed procedure whereby states might voluntarily ensure the adequacy of their administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(b)(2) (1976 ed. Supp. IV). The legislative history of Sec. 1997 reflects Congress' hope that by carving out this narrow exception it would stimulate the development of successful grievance mechanisms for the numerous Sec. 1983 actions in which a prisoner's allegations stem from the conditions of his or her confinement. See Patsy, supra at 511 and n. 12, 102 S.Ct. at 2565 and n. 12. If a state prisoner who has not exhausted administrative remedies brings suit under Sec. 1983 and the available state remedies conform to the standards of Sec. 1997e(b)(2), the district court is instructed to continue such case for a period not to exceed ninety days in order to require exhaustion. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(a)(1) (1976 ed. Supp. IV). 12 Bivens actions, however, are a creation of the judiciary, and are premised on the theory that victims of a constitutional violation by a federal agent have an implied right of action to recover damages against the official absent any statute conferring such a right. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1471, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980). Were Congress to enact some statutory scheme authorizing the Federal Bureau of Prisons or its equivalent to provide an effective alternative remedy for prisoners asserting constitutional violations, the implied remedies that Bivens recognized indeed might be unnecessary. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 2278, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979). We note that although Congress has authorized the Bureau of Prisons to review, investigate and respond to prisoner complaints in a timely fashion, it did not empower the agency to provide damages or other relief. See 18 U.S.C. Secs. 4001, 4042 (1982); 28 C.F.R. Sec. 542.11. The narrow exception is the Bureau's authority to award up to $2500 for meritorious claims asserted under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 C.F.R. Sec. 543.30 et seq. Because a prisoner asserting only a claim for damages under Bivens apparently can obtain no relief from the Bureau of Prisons, it would serve little purpose to require him to exhaust administrative remedies before coming into the courts. Accord, Goar v. Civiletti, 688 F.2d 27, 29 (6th Cir.1982). 1 13 In view of the limited authority of the Bureau of Prisons in providing relief and the unique nature of Bivens-type claims we may not take it upon ourselves to impose a judicially-created exhaustion requirement directed at federal prisoners. Although we commend the district court's attempt to reduce the intrusion of federal courts into the administration of federal prisons and to encourage prison officials, in the first instance, to attempt to resolve prisoner grievances, we are impelled, under the circumstances, to vacate the judgment of the district court. 14 Accordingly, the judgment in Muhammad v. Carlson will be vacated and the case remanded, with directions to have service completed on the defendants.