Opinion ID: 1652198
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Inherently-Dangerous Exception

Text: Finally, Stoltze argues that the inherently-dangerous exception should apply to protect employees of the independent contractor. In Williams, supra , we stated: When an owner or general contractor has hired an independent contractor to perform work, as in this case, the rule is that the general contractor or owner has a duty to exercise ordinary care and to warn in the event there are any unusually hazardous conditions existing which might affect the welfare of the employees. The recognized exception occurs if the prime contractor [or owner] has undertaken to perform certain duties or activities and negligently fails to perform them thereafter or performs them in a negligent manner. Aluminum Ore. Co. v. George, 208 Ark. 419, 186 S.W.2d 656 (1945). Williams, 318 Ark. at 454-55, 886 S.W.2d 586 (citing Gordon v. Matson, 246 Ark. 533, 439 S.W.2d 627 (1969)). However, [t]he duty of an employer of an independent contractor to use ordinary care or to warn of latent dangers does not contemplate a duty to warn of obvious hazards which are an integral part of the work the contractor was hired to perform. Jackson, 270 Ark. at 509, 606 S.W.2d 66. In Jackson, supra, the court explained: Although the general rule is that an employer is not responsible for the negligence of his independent contractor,... a well-recognized exception... extends liability when the work which the employer delegates to an independent contractor is inherently dangerous. This exception is grounded in a recognition that the possibility of harm to others is so great when the work activity is inherently dangerous that the law tolerates it only on terms of insuring the public against injury. We impose vicarious liability under these circumstances to insure that the public has legal access to a financially responsible party. The exception was obviously intended to protect those who have no direct involvement with the hazardous activity, are only incidentally exposed to its risks and have no direct means of insuring themselves against loss. Since employees of an independent contractor are directly involved in the hazardous activity, have knowledge of the risks and are insured against injury by worker's compensation, we perceive no sound justification for expanding the exception to include persons it was surely not designed to protect. Jackson, 270 Ark. at 510, 606 S.W.2d 66 (citations omitted). Stoltze states: Admittedly, Arkansas Courts have decided that this exception should not apply so as to protect employees of the independent contractor. However, he argues that policy reasons and the facts in the present case support rejection of our holding in Jackson that the inherently-dangerous exception does not apply to employees of an independent contractor. Stoltze states that the Jackson court was incorrect in stating that the employees of the independent contractor are directly involved in the hazardous activities. Stoltze states that he was classified as a groundman, and that he was not qualified to work on energized lines. Stoltze also argues that the Jackson court was incorrect in stating that the employees of independent contractors have knowledge of the risks. He maintains that no one ever told him that his activities of that morning were dangerous. Finally, Stoltze argues that the availability of workers' compensation should not bar recovery against the principal because workers' compensation, as it operates today, does not adequately reimburse victims of catastrophic incidents like the one in this case. In Jackson, supra, a case which is factually similar to the present case, the court stated that it cannot be seriously contended that [the primary contractor] should isolate lines from the employees of an electrical contractor whose compensation and contractual obligations expressly contemplate working around energized lines. Jackson, 270 Ark. at 509, 606 S.W.2d 66. In the present case, the contract provided that AECI shall ... employ, in connection with construction of the Project, capable, experienced and reliable foremen and such skilled workmen as may be required for the various classes of work to be performed. The contract also provides that AECI was to provide a competent superintendent... who shall be present at all times during work hours where construction is being carried on. Even if we assume that Stoltze was a groundman and not qualified to work on energized lines, by the plain language of the contract, it was AECI's responsibility, not AVECC's responsibility to ensure that qualified workers performed the job. In addition, the contract provides that it was AECI's responsibility to employ a superintendent, as well as competent foremen, to oversee the job. It follows that it was AECI's responsibility to warn Stoltze of dangers inherent in working with energized wires. As to Stoltze's third argument, that he is not adequately compensated by workers' compensation laws, we find Olson v. Kilstofte and Vosejpka, 327 F.Supp. 583, 587 (D.Minn. 1971), to be instructive: Since the statutory remedy afforded employees under Workman's Compensation is exclusive as against the employer, under the formulation adopted by the state legislature an employee forfeits any common law cause of action that may have arisen out of the negligence of his employer which results in injury occurring within the scope of his employment. The doctrine of non-delegable duty if literally applied destroys the liability barrier between an owner and an independent contractor, and for practical purposes treats the two separate entities as one before the law. Olson, 327 F.Supp. at 587. In upholding a verdict against the employee of an independent contractor, the Olson court stated: To hold as plaintiff requests would negate almost entirely the doctrine of independent contractor. There is scarcely anything that a person himself might negligently do that an independent contractor might not also do. In light of the facts of this case, to remove the time hallowed insulation of the doctrine of independent contractor is not something this court feels it should do.... Olson, 327 F.Supp. at 589. Like the Olson court, we are not inclined to overrule longstanding precedent on the law concerning independent contractors. Accordingly, we will not overrule the longstanding rule in Arkansas that the inherently-dangerous exception does not extend to the employees of independent contractors. Affirmed.