Opinion ID: 2276759
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Admission of Hearsay Testimony (Strong's point 9)

Text: Strong alleges the trial court erred and abused its discretion in the penalty phase by admitting Eva's statements to the police that Strong assaulted her on November 10, 1999, in that the admission of this testimony violated the hearsay rule. During the trial, Strong objected to the admission of the order of protection that Eva received after that incident, but he never objected to the officer's testimony nor did he raise the issue in his motion for a new trial. As a result, this claim will be reviewed solely for plain error. State v. Knese, 985 S.W.2d 759, 769 (Mo. banc 1999); State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831, 842 (Mo. banc 1998). The police officer testified that he responded to a domestic call at Eva's apartment on November 10, 1999, at approximately 11:30 p.m. He arrived within one minute of the 911 call and saw Strong and another man outside the apartment getting into separate cars. The officer testified that when he arrived, Eva was crying, visibly upset, borderline hysterical. He said she had a knot on her forehead and her left eye was bruised. He testified that Eva said, `He hit me, he hit me in the eye, and he hit me in the mouth, and he choked me until I passed out.' The officer testified that while Eva was saying those things, he noticed a large wet spot in the crotch of her pants. Eva told the officer that Strong was the one who had hit her. The state contends the testimony was admissible because it was within the excited utterance exception of the hearsay rule. See State v. Van Orman, 642 S.W.2d 636, 638 (Mo.1982) (also referred to as spontaneous exclamation or spontaneous statement exception). At trial, Strong's counsel essentially conceded this assertion when he asked to approach the bench and said, It was my understanding from in chambers that we were only going into a few of the statements which were made as excited utterances. The essential test for admissibility of a spontaneous statement or excited utterance is neither the time nor place of its utterance but whether it was made under such circumstances as to indicate it is trustworthy. Id. at 639. This exception is premised on the idea that where the statement is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses as a result of the shock produced by the event, the utterance may be taken as expressing the true belief of the declarant. Id. The officer testified that he arrived on the scene within one minute of the 911 call. Strong, who had committed the assault, was just outside the apartment on the parking lot at that time. The officer described Eva as hysterical upon his arrival. Her demeanor and the surrounding circumstances demonstrated her remarks were made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses as a result of the shock produced by her assault. Id. As such, her statements to the officer as to what had occurred were made under such circumstances as to indicate [they were] trustworthy. Id. Strong further argues that his case should be controlled by State v. Bell, 950 S.W.2d 482 (Mo. banc 1997). Bell, however, did not deal with the excited utterance exception and is inapplicable. Id. at 483-84. Strong has failed to demonstrate error, plain or otherwise, in the admission of this testimony.