Opinion ID: 881894
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Investigative Delay

Text: Even if some prejudice had been proven in this case, that prejudice must outweigh the necessity of allowing a reasonable time to investigate the crime. Goltz, 197 Mont. at 368-69, 642 P.2d at 1083. In United States v. Lovasco , the United States Supreme Court recognized that reasonable investigative delay protects the interests of both the State and the defendant. From the potential defendant's perspective, premature indictment would, increase the likelihood of unwarranted charges being filed, and would add to the time during which the defendants stand accused but untried. These costs are by no means insubstantial since ... a formal accusation may interfere with the defendant's liberty, disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 791, 97 S.Ct. at 2049, 52 L.Ed.2d at 760. (Citations, quotations and footnote deleted.) From the State's perspective, premature indictment could impair investigations by causing sources of information to dry up and by alerting other potential defendants of the possibility of indictment. The threat of dismissal for failure to prosecute would pressure the State into early and potentially ill-considered and unwarranted prosecutions thereby increasing the burden on the judicial system. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 791-94, 97 S.Ct. at 2049-51, 52 L.Ed.2d at 760-62. The record in the present case contains no evidence concerning the prosecution's reasons for the long delay in indictment. We have before us only the State's unsubstantiated assurance that, The investigation covered a period of more than one year and required delving into numerous bank records involving accounts belonging to four different individuals. Against this, the appellant offers nothing to show that the delay was not reasonable and necessary in relation to the complexity of the investigation. In Lovasco, the United States Supreme Court faced a similar situation. In holding for the government, the Court explicitly relied on reasons for the prosecution's delay given in the government's briefs and oral arguments. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 796, 97 S.Ct. at 2052, 52 L.Ed.2d at 763. Like the Supreme Court, Ciucci v. Illinois (1958), 356 U.S. 571, 573, 78 S.Ct. 839, 840, 2 L.Ed.2d 983, 985, we generally will not accept unsubstantiated evidence presented only in the parties' briefs, State v. Tiedemann (1978), 178 Mont. 394, 397, 584 P.2d 1284, 1287. Reasons for investigative delay, however, are not normally trial issues and may not produce an evidentiary record. Furthermore, in this case, the appellant has offered no evidence to counter the State's contention. Therefore, in this case, we follow the Supreme Court in assuming that the prosecution's statements were rendered in good faith. We hold that the complexity of the evidence warranted the length of the investigative period. The requirements of a conscientious investigation outweighed the prejudice, if any, which may have occurred. The pre-indictment delay did not violate the appellant's right to due process.