Opinion ID: 1926022
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Sentencing

Text: Appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to take remedial action when Appellant elected to be sentenced by the jury despite his counsel's strong recommendation that he be sentenced by the court. Just before the sentencing hearing began, defense counsel told the court that counsel and Appellant disagreed as to the choice of the sentencing authority. Appellant argues that, under the circumstances, the court was obliged, sua sponte, to make an adequate inquiry of Appellant to ascertain that he was competent to make the decision to be sentenced by a jury, one that was against his counsel's recommendation. He also argues that, because he elected to be sentenced by a jury, against the advice of his counsel, and because he disagreed with his counsel about the advisability of being sentenced by the jury, the court should have conducted a hearing to determine whether counsel could continue to represent him. At a minimum, Appellant argues, the court should have granted him a postponement to allow his counsel to prepare for a jury sentencing. It is the State's position that the record demonstrates clearly Ware's competency, despite the strategic dispute with his attorneys, and that there was no need for the court to take any further action with respect to Ware's competency to elect the mode of sentencing. On the day the sentencing proceeding began, Appellant was questioned by his counsel regarding his election to be sentenced by the jury: [DEF. ATT'Y:] Mr. Ware, we have had an opportunity to discuss this matter at length on many occasions. We are now at the stage of these proceedings where the sentence orthere is going to bea sentencing determination is going to have to be made. You have been found guilty of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, and as a result the State is seeking to have a death sentence imposed. Basically whatever sentencing authoritywhatever authority sentences you, will have three options available to them. They will have the option of life, life without the possibility of parole and death. You have to make the decision as to which authority you want to sentence you. In other words, you can be sentenced by the same jury that has found you guilty at the guilt/innocence stage, or you can elect to waive your right to a jury sentencing and present your mitigation and agree to have Judge Thieme basically be the sentencing authority. Do you understand that? DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. [DEF. ATT'Y:] Now, we have had an opportunity to discuss this issue of how to proceed on sentencing on many occasions. Is that correct? DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. [DEF. ATT'Y:] We have discussed it well, I have been in the case since last October, October of last year. But before I got in the case, you also discussed the issue of how you wanted to proceed at the time of sentencing with Mr. Wachs, who was your prior attorney, and Mr. Gunning. Is that correct? DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. [DEF. ATT'Y:] And during all of those previous discussions, the discussions you had with Mr. Wachs and the discussions you had with Mr. Gunning and the discussions that you had with me, up until yesterday you had indicated that you believed that it would be in your best interest to proceed by way of court sentencing. Is that correct? DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. [DEF. ATT'Y:] And we discussed the pros and cons and the advantages and disadvantages to proceeding by way of a jury sentencing versus a Court sentencing. Is that correct? DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. [DEF. ATT'Y:] Now, yesterday you well, before I get to yesterday, we had been preparing on the basis of your representations and our conversations. We have been preparingif we got to this phase, we had been preparing to proceed by way of a Court sentencing up until yesterday. Is that correct? DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. [DEF. ATT'Y:] And that was based on our discussions and your indications to us as to how you wanted to proceed. Is that correct? DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. [DEF. ATT'Y:] Yesterday, you expressed your decision or your feeling that you wanted to proceed by way of a jury sentencing. Is that correct? DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. [DEF. ATT'Y:] And we discussed that for a long time yesterday, didn't we? DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. [DEF. ATT'Y:] Over two hours? DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. [DEF. ATT'Y:] And we strongly urged you to waive your right to jury sentencing and proceed by way of a Court sentencing. Isn't that correct? DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. [DEF. ATT'Y:] And in spite of our lengthy conversations and our virtual prayers to you to proceed by way of a Court sentencing, you indicated that you wanted to proceed by way of a jury sentencing. Is that correct? DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. [DEF. ATT'Y:] Once again, just to make it clear, and that was against our advice? DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. [DEF. ATT'Y:] Okay. The decision is yours. We can't tell you what to do. The final decision is yours. So, we can't sit here and tell you you have to have Court or you have to have jury sentencing. But I have to let you know, after consulting with colleagues in the office, it is our belief that we should, under these circumstances, really disregard your election and decide to proceed by way of a Court sentencing anyway. Do you understand that? DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. [DEF. ATT'Y:] The final decision is going to be up to Judge Thieme as to who wins out in this, because basically we are at the point now where we are not on the same page. Up until yesterday we were on the same page, that we were going to do the court sentencing. Correct? DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. [DEF. ATT'Y:] Okay. I am going to have to ask you to keep your voice up so your answers can be heard. Okay? And yesterday, we realized that our paths were no longerthat our paths had separated. Is that correct? DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. [DEF. ATT'Y:] So now, we are in the position of you stand before Judge Thieme and you say, Judge, I want a jury sentencing. Is that what you are saying? DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. [DEF. ATT'Y:] Against the pleas of my counsel? DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. [DEF. ATT'Y:] We are standing in front of Judge Thieme saying, Judge he doesn't know what he is doing. He can't be in his right mind. If he wants a jury sentencing, disregard what he wants to do, accept our election to allow this matter to be heard before the Court and allow us to waive the jury sentencing portion. Do you understand that we are differing on that? DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. [DEF. ATT'Y:] Do you understand that His Honor is going to make the final decision about that, in terms of who wins in this battle? DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. [DEF. ATT'Y:] Okay. Once again, Mr. Ware, we have gone over your age and the fact that you have never been in a mental institution or the care of a psychiatrist. We did that yesterday with your election not to testify. Are you under the influence of any drugs, alcohol or any other substance that would prevent you from understanding what is going on here today? DEFENDANT: No sir. [DEF. ATT'Y:] Has anyone forced you to do this? Well, strike that. This is where we are, Your Honor. An impasse. The judge then addressed Appellant, and the following colloquy ensued: THE COURT: Mr. Ware, let me tell you what the law of this State is, and I am quoting from Gilliam v. State, 331 Md. 651 [629 A.2d 685], and I am quoting directly. Election of a court or jury trial and/or sentencing is a decision for the defendant. Regardless of what your attorneys think they are going to do, the decision is yours, and I will abide by your decision. What do you want? DEFENDANT: Jury. THE COURT: That ends it. [DEF. ATT'Y:] Yes. When the attorney for the State began to take issue with the suggestion that Ware must not be in his right mind, defense counsel retracted this assertion: [STATE'S ATT'Y:] Your Honor, if I may? If you could, just based on some of the things that [defense counsel] said regarding it is their position that Mr. Ware must not be in his right mind, that he doesn't understand what's going on, if the Court would inquire as to any condition he may have, which would indicate that he is not in his right mind or THE COURT: Did you understand what was happening this morning, Mr. Ware? DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. [DEF. ATT'Y:] And also, I understand [State's Attorney's] concern. I took some license with the language that I was using. I don't mean to imply any THE COURT: I understood from the standpoint of trial strategy. [DEF. ATT'Y:] Exactly. I am not implying that THE COURT: But let's make [DEF. ATT'Y:]  he is not capable or competent to make the decision. The court made further inquiry, as follows: THE COURT: Do you understand what was said this morning? DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Do you have any questions about what your counsel has asked you? DEFENDANT: No, sir. THE COURT: You obviously had a jury the first time this case went to trial. So I assume you know about your rights for a jury or non-jury regarding the sentencing phase. DEFENDANT: Yes, sir THE COURT: And did Judge Sweeney go through it before you in Howard County in the prior trial? DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: All right. Is there anything that you want to ask me about what counsel has asked you? DEFENDANT: No, sir. THE COURT: Do you want to consider it further? DEFENDANT: No, sir. THE COURT: Does the State have any further inquiries you want me to make? [STATE'S ATT'Y:] Your Honor, just for the record. I know it was on there yesterday. THE COURT: Go ahead. [STATE'S ATT'Y:] Has Mr. Warehave you now or have you ever been a patient in a mental institution or under the care of a psychologist or a psychiatrist? DEFENDANT: Never. Subsequently, Appellant's counsel requested a postponement of the sentencing proceeding until mid-September, partly on the basis of Appellant's last-minute decision to be sentenced by the jury. The court denied the request for postponement. Criminal defendants have a Fourteenth Amendment due process right not to be tried when they are incompetent. See Thanos v. State, 330 Md. 77, 84, 622 A.2d 727, 730 (1993). In Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975), Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, explained: It has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial. Implementing the Supreme Court standard, Maryland Code (1982, 1994 Repl. Vol., 1999 Supp.) § 12-103(a) of the Health-General Article specifies: If, before or during a trial, the defendant in a criminal case appears to the court to be incompetent to stand trial or the defendant alleges incompetence to stand trial, the court shall determine, on evidence presented on the record, whether the defendant is incompetent to stand trial. The Code defines incompetent to stand trial as not able: (1) [t]o understand the nature or object of the proceeding; or (2) [t]o assist in one's defense. Id., § 12-101(e). As we noted in Thanos, [a] defendant must, in other words, have `present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understandingand... a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' Thanos, 330 Md. at 85, 622 A.2d at 730 (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960)). A defendant is presumed to be competent to stand trial. See e.g. Colbert v. State, 18 Md.App. 632, 641, 308 A.2d 726, 731 (1973). However, § 12-103(a) of the Health-General Article places a duty on the trial court if, during trial, a defendant appears to the court to be incompetent or the defendant alleges incompetency to determine whether the defendant is in fact competent to stand trial. The court's duty is triggered in one of three ways: (1) upon motion of the accused; (2) upon motion of the defense counsel; or (3) upon a sua sponte determination by the court that the defendant may not be competent to stand trial. See Johnson v. State, 67 Md. App. 347, 358-59, 507 A.2d 1134, 1140 (1986). In addition, we have held that a finding of competency to stand trial does not automatically result in a conclusion that an accused is also competent to waive substantial rights, such as the right to plead not guilty, the right to a jury trial, and the right to assistance of counsel. Mann v. State's Attorney for Montgomery County, 298 Md. 160, 169, 468 A.2d 124, 129 (1983). Under § 413(b), sentencing shall be by jury and, if waived, before the court alone. [14] See Bruce v. State, 328 Md. 594, 602, 616 A.2d 392, 396 (1992). Whether a defendant is to be sentenced by the court or the jury is a decision for the defendant. See Maryland Rule 4-246; Gilliam v. State, 331 Md. 651, 670, 629 A.2d 685, 694 (1993); Bruce, 328 Md. at 602-07, 616 A.2d at 396-98. Ware argues that the absence of a record demonstrating a competent basis for his eleventh hour decision to elect a jury sentencing despite his attorneys advice to the contrary obligated the court to conduct, sua sponte, a competency examination. Ware's entire argument appears to be that the court must inquire, sua sponte, into the competency of a defendant, based solely on a defendant's election to be sentenced by a jury, when the choice is contrary to the recommendation of his counsel. His argument is meritless. Where there is no independent reason to question or doubt defendant's competency, no hearing or inquiry is required. Cf. State v. Cowans, 87 Ohio St.3d 68, 717 N.E.2d 298, 311 (1999). We had occasion to discuss the trial court's obligation to inquire, sua sponte, into a defendant's competency in Thanos. Thanos was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Over the objection of his counsel, he waived a jury on the guilt/innocence stage and the sentencing. See Thanos, 330 Md. at 84, 622 A.2d at 730. On appeal, as to his competency to waive a jury, he argued that he was not competent to make the decision to waive a jury trial and that the court should have deferred to his attorney's preference for a jury trial. His back up argument was that, even if the choice to waive a jury trial and jury sentencing were his to make, he did not do so knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently. Thanos also argued that the trial court failed to recognize its sua sponte obligation to inquire into his competency given his strange behavior at trial and sentencing. Id. at 85, 622 A.2d at 730. We found no error on the trial court's failure to conduct a competency hearing. Id. at 87, 622 A.2d at 731. The record disclosed that Thanos had the present ability to consult with his counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding as well as a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him. We also rejected his claims related to jury trial and sentencing waiver, stating: We find no merit in these contentions. Thanos has made no claim that the trial court erred in explaining his right to be tried and sentenced by a jury. In both cases, the trial judge patiently spelled out to Thanos the alternatives and consequences involved in proceeding before a judge rather than a jury. As we noted in Treece, a decision need not be wise to be legally intelligent. All that matters is that Thanos was made aware of available alternatives and of the advantages and disadvantages of one choice as compared to another. Because Thanos was so informed, his arguments that he did not knowingly waive trial and sentencing by jury, and that the court should have deferred to his counsel's position on the issue of jury trial waiver, are merely extensions of his claims that he was incompetent to stand trial, which is devoid of merit for the reasons discussed in part II, supra. Id. at 94, 622 A.2d at 735 (citations omitted). As in Thanos, Ware's competency to be sentenced by a jury was never raised before the trial court or even during the trial. It is noteworthy that, when questioned by the court, defense counsel explicitly stated that he was not suggesting that Appellant was incompetent. The record shows that defense counsel and the trial judge engaged Appellant in a colloquy concerning his election of a jury sentencing, the nature of the decision, Appellant's mental treatment/medical history, his knowledge of the procedure based on Ware I, and the absence of any influence of alcohol or drugs. Appellant's mere preference for a jury sentencing is hardly an indication that he was incompetent. We hold that the trial court did not err in failing to conduct, sua sponte, a competency examination. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Appellant lacked the present ability to consult with his attorneys with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or factual understanding of the proceedings. Appellant's decision to proceed with jury sentencing in light of defense counsel's recommendation to the contrary is insufficient in and of itself to trigger a competency examination. Appellant next argues that, when the trial court learned of Ware's sudden shift in sentencing strategy and defense counsel's self-professed unpreparedness, the trial court was required to conduct a hearing to determine whether counsel could effectively represent Appellant during the sentencing phase and whether this so-called conflict necessitated the withdrawal of counsel. Appellant concludes that it was highly doubtful that Appellant could receive effective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase. Again, we point out that at no time before the trial court did defense counsel ask to withdraw from representing Appellant. If Appellant is raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, it is more properly raised in post-conviction proceedings. See Perry v. State, 344 Md. 204, 227-28, 686 A.2d 274, 285 (1996). Regarding Appellant's claim that the trial court should have inquired into Ware's relationship with his counsel, based on the record before us, we believe that it would have been highly inappropriate for the trial court to have interfered with that relationship at that stage of the proceedings. Appellant argues that the trial judge's refusal to postpone the sentencing to allow counsel additional time to prepare was an abuse of discretion requiring reversal. It is settled that the decision whether to grant a postponement is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 345 Md. 437, 451, 693 A.2d 344, 351 (1997); Evans v. State, 304 Md. 487, 514, 499 A.2d 1261, 1275 (1985). Defense counsel had at least eighteen months to prepare for sentencing; he told the court as much. Appellant never specified, at trial or on appeal, how his sentencing case might have been presented differently if he had had more time. We find no abuse of discretion in denying the postponement.