Opinion ID: 2319241
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Commonwealth v. MacPhail

Text: Appellant next contends that his prosecution for the murder of Officer Miller is barred under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110 and this Court's holding in Commonwealth v. McPhail , Pa. 519, 692 A.2d 139 (1997). See Appellant's Brief at 52 (Argument XIII). In McPhail, a plurality of this Court [15] concluded that courts of common pleas enjoy jurisdiction all over the Commonwealth; in other words, the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas is general and not limited to the territory of the county wherein the courts sit. We reasoned that, under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110, charges arising from crimes committed in different counties, but which constituted a single criminal episode, were in the jurisdiction of a single court. In the instant case, the trial court rejected Appellant's claim, finding it was previously considered and rejected by the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 723 A.2d at 195. In Commonwealth v. Lesko, ____ Pa. ____, 15 A.3d 345, 367 n. 13 (2011), [16] Lesko similarly argued that prosecution for the murder of Officer Miller should have been barred under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110 and McPhail as a result of his guilty plea to the murder of William Nichols because the two murders were part of a single criminal episode. This Court explained that, notwithstanding Lesko's attempt to frame an issue under McPhail as a resentencing claim, such a claim is a guilt-phase claim, and, as such, is subject to the time limitations of the PCRA. For the following reasons, Appellant's McPhail claim must likewise be viewed as a guilt-phase claim, and, therefore, is subject to the time limitations of the PCRA. Appellant's judgment of sentence became final in 1984, after his petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court was denied. Appellant's subsequent PCHA petition was denied in 1985; thus, Appellant did not qualify for the one-year tolling provision contained in the 1995 amendments to the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Fahy, 558 Pa. 313, 321, 737 A.2d 214, 218 (1999) (where a judgment of sentence becomes final on or before the effective date of the amendments to the PCRA, a petition will be deemed timely if the petitioner's first petition is filed within one year of the effective date of the amendments). Appellant therefore had until January 16, 1996, the date the 1995 amendments to the PCRA took effect, to file a second or subsequent PCRA petition raising claims from his 1981 guilt trial. Appellant did not raise the instant claim until 1997, when he filed his omnibus pre-trial motion with the trial court. Accordingly, as in Lesko, Appellant's claim is time-barred under the PCRA.