Opinion ID: 2634745
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: a petition to nullify may include additional claims

Text: ¶14 It is not clear from the language in Utah Code section 38-9-7 (2001) whether the legislature intended a petition to nullify to act as a motion for an expedited proceeding addressing one issue within the context of a larger civil action, like a motion for partial summary judgment on the wrongful lien issue, or as a separate and independent action designed to resolve the wrongful lien claim. [3] However, the former interpretation is more consistent with the structure of the statute, which does not explicitly prohibit the petition from containing additional claims and, in fact, anticipates that the petition may include claims in addition to those subject to expedition. The statute provides that [i]f the petition contains a claim for damages, the damage proceedings may not be expedited under this section. Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-7(7). The statute further provides that, at the summary proceeding, the court shall not determine any other property or legal rights of the parties nor restrict other legal remedies of any party. Id. § 38-9-7(4). It is clear that the legislature recognized that a party may have claims beyond a request to nullify a wrongful lien. Nothing in the statute prohibits those claims from being initially pled in a petition to nullify. This suggests that the outcome of the summary lien proceeding does not necessarily end the controversy between the parties. ¶15 This interpretation is supported by the absence of any language in section 38-9-7 that indicates, explicitly or implicitly, that the summary lien proceeding is intended to be a separate, immediately appealable, proceeding. See id. § 38-9-7. For certain other expedited proceedings, the legislature has explicitly set forth the method for appealing the decisions made therein. See, e.g., id. § 78-36-11 (2002) (providing that, in a forcible entry and detainer action, either party may, within ten days, appeal from a judgment rendered); id. § 31A-27-302(3) (2003) (providing that, in an action to rehabilitate an insurer, [t]he judgment of the court granting or denying the petition may be appealed under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. . . . The Supreme Court shall give expeditious review of appeals made under this Subsection); id. § 20A-4-406 (providing that, in an election contest, [e]ither party may appeal the district court's judgment to the Supreme Court as in other cases of appeal from the district court). We have been referred to no language in section 38-9-7, and we can find none, that suggests the legislature intended that a summary lien proceeding be treated as a separate and independent proceeding that is immediately appealable despite the existence of additional pending claims. If the legislature had intended such a departure from the normal rules of appellate procedure, it would have evidenced its intent explicitly. ¶16 We also note, that an interpretation that requires parties to litigate all of their claims before they can appeal serves important policy considerations. See Kennedy v. New Era Indus., Inc., 600 P.2d 534, 535 (Utah 1979). Limiting a party to one trial of all of the party's claims that arise from the same transaction or occurrence not only promotes judicial economy by preventing piecemeal appeals, but also reduces expense to the litigants and judiciary and prevents the interminable protraction of lawsuits. Id. ¶17 Consequently, in this case, even though at the summary proceeding the district court could only determine whether Wilshire's lien was wrongful as defined by the Wrongful Lien Act, all of the issues raised in the Andersons' Petition were before the court and remain pending until the court disposes of those issues.