Opinion ID: 2600788
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: admission of prior offense

Text: According to Terry, on August 29, 1997, Thang announced that he wanted to take a bike ride, borrowed Terry's black leather gloves, and left the apartment for about five hours. Terry further testified that Thang said he had broken into a woman's house through a side window, and kicked and killed an old lady, boasting [t]he bitch is dead, this bitch is dead. Report of Proceedings (RP) at 195. Thang had with him a purse, from which he took approximately $60 in cash before throwing it onto a neighboring roof, where it was later found. He threw his bloodstained socks into the living room garbage can and washed his tennis shoes. Dietzen and Lambert's testimony tended to corroborate Terry's account. Thang countered that it was Terry who committed the murder and that Terry's friends were attempting to help Terry by shifting the blame to Thang. Initially, Terry denied any knowledge of the Klaus murder but later he offered to testify against Thang in exchange for a promise that he would be charged only with possession of stolen property. In order to test Terry's claim that he did not commit the homicide, police had Terry submit to a polygraph test. [3] The examiner concluded that he was 99 percent certain that Terry was being deceptive about his knowledge of the Klaus killing. [4] Despite these test results, the State entered into a plea bargain with Terry and Terry was permitted to testify against Thang. Dietzen and Lambert also changed their positions to substantiate Terry's postplea bargain version of events. Initially, both denied any knowledge of a murder. At Thang's trial, Dietzen testified that he too saw Thang leave the apartment and return with a backpack and purse. Lambert also corroborated Terry's version. It was Terry who testified that the bloody sock in the garbage belonged to Thang. Some physical evidence corroborated their testimony; the spot of blood on Thang's shoe, which matched that of Mildred Klaus and which was not explained by Thang's version of events. On a defense motion in limine, the judge excluded testimony regarding a February 1996 conviction for robbery and burglary of Mrs. Morgan, an elderly woman, in Aberdeen. Thang, wearing a black bandana over his face, kicked in her back door while an accomplice knocked on the front door and pointed a gun at the victim. Thang kicked the woman three times and stole various items. During that crime, Thang allegedly said, Where is your money, you bitch, and later I think the bitch is dead. Clerk's Papers at 106-07. He fled in the woman's car. In ruling to exclude the evidence, the court specifically left open the possibility of introducing the evidence in rebuttal. In the same ruling, the defense was precluded from arguing that other suspects might have committed the crime without first showing outside the presence of the jury that the evidence was reliable. After unsuccessfully challenging DNA evidence that put Thang at the scene of the crime, the defense focused almost exclusively on the identity of the killer. Defense counsel portrayed Thang as an outsider, and suggested in his opening statement that the State's key witnesses were closing ranks to protect Terry. The defense later introduced testimony from Lawrence Dusek, who had served time with Thang and Terry at Maple Lane. Dusek testified that he had visited Terry and Thang at the Spokane apartment and Terry had confessed to killing Klaus. According to Dusek, Terry had stated that Thang kept watch outside while Terry killed the victim. After the killing, Terry called Thang inside and Thang rolled the victim over with his foot to look at her and yelled at Terry, cursing at him for being so dumb as to kill her. Dusek was a surprise witness who said he decided to come forward after reading an account of the trial in the newspaper. After the defense rested, the judge ruled that because the defense had produced evidence that Terry was the killer, the State could introduce the prior offense for the purpose of showing identity. In anticipation of Morgan's testimony, the defense moved and was allowed to reopen. Thang first corroborated Dusek's testimony and contended that the blood on his shoes came from turning over Klaus's body with his foot. Thang then testified regarding the Aberdeen case, admitting that he had pushed Morgan to the ground and kicked her repeatedly. Thang said he thought he had killed Morgan, but denied saying, where's the money, bitch or the bitch is dead. When the State called Morgan, she testified that two men broke into her house, threw her across the room, and kicked her three times in the ribs. However, having agreed only after extensive prompting that the statements were made, she was unable to identify Thang as the person who made them, so her testimony abruptly ended. After Thang testified, the court ruled that the State could also use Morgan's testimony regarding the Aberdeen incident to rebut the allegation that the blood on Thang's shoes came from turning over the body rather than kicking the victim. Because Morgan could not remember who said what during the Aberdeen assault, the court excluded any testimony on this point, and instructed the jury to disregard the bitch question. The court then gave an instruction limiting the purpose to identity: With respect to the testimony of Ms. Morgan who was the last witness, evidence has been introduced in this case on the subject of a prior act of the defendant's identity for the limited purpose of indicating identity. You must not consider this evidence for any other purpose. RP at 950. Thang argues that the trial court erred in permitting evidence of the Aberdeen attack to establish the identity of the Spokane killer. Washington ER 404(b) provides: Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. This Court reviews decisions to admit evidence under ER 404(b) for abuse of discretion. State v. Dennison, 115 Wash.2d 609, 627-28, 801 P.2d 193 (1990). Discretion is abused if it is exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wash.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971). Alternatively, the Court considers whether any reasonable judge would rule as the trial judge did. State v. Nelson, 108 Wash.2d 491, 504-05, 740 P.2d 835 (1987). To admit evidence of other wrongs, the trial court must (1) find by a preponderance of the evidence that the misconduct occurred, (2) identify the purpose for which the evidence is sought to be introduced, (3) determine whether the evidence is relevant to prove an element of the crime charges, and (4) weigh the probative value against the prejudicial effect. State v. Lough, 125 Wash.2d 847, 853, 889 P.2d 487 (1995). In doubtful cases, the evidence should be excluded. State v. Smith, 106 Wash.2d 772, 776, 725 P.2d 951 (1986). In this case, the trial court found that the misconduct occurred and clearly identified the purpose of introducing the evidence (to establish identity). Thang challenges the third prong of the test, claiming that because the crimes did not feature unique characteristics, the prior crime had no relevance to the crime for which he was being charged. When evidence of other bad acts is introduced to show identity by establishing a unique modus operandi, the evidence is relevant to the current charge only if the method employed in the commission of both crimes is `so unique' that proof that an accused committed one of the crimes creates a high probability that he also committed the other crimes with which he is charged. State v. Russell, 125 Wash.2d 24, 66-67, 882 P.2d 747 (1994) (citing State v. Hernandez, 58 Wash.App. 793, 798-99, 794 P.2d 1327 (1990)), disapproved on other grounds by State v. Kjorsvik, 117 Wash.2d 93, 99 & n. 2, 101-02, 812 P.2d 86 (1991). This Court has held that `[t]he device used must be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.' State v. Coe, 101 Wash.2d 772, 777, 684 P.2d 668 (1984) (quoting Edward W. Cleary, McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 190, at 449 (2d ed.1972)). The greater the distinctiveness, the higher the probability that the defendant committed the crime, and thus the greater the relevance. Coe, 101 Wash.2d at 777-78, 684 P.2d 668. Moreover, to establish signature-like similarity, the distinctive features must be shared between the two crimes. Smith, 106 Wash.2d at 778-79, 725 P.2d 951. In Smith, the State sought to admit three burglaries when trying the defendant for three rapes, but this Court held that there were insufficient similarities between the burglaries and the rapes. See also Coe, 101 Wash.2d at 779, 684 P.2d 668 (excluding testimony of a previous incident involving a replica of a penis where the rapes Coe was accused of did not involve any such replica). Factors relevant to similarity include geographical proximity and commission of the crimes within a short time frame. See, e.g., Russell, 125 Wash.2d at 68, 882 P.2d 747 (allowing joinder of two signature-like murders occurring a few weeks apart in the Bellevue/Kirkland area); See also, Smith, 106 Wash.2d at 779, 725 P.2d 951 (excluding evidence where the crimes were not committed on the same day or in close proximity). Another factor can be wearing similar clothing. See, e.g., State v. Laureano, 101 Wash.2d 745, 682 P.2d 889 (1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 111 Wash.2d 124, 128, 761 P.2d 588 (1988) (army fatigues), aff'd on subsequent review, 113 Wash.2d 520, 527, 782 P.2d 1013 (1989), 787 P.2d 906 (1990); State v. Lynch, 58 Wash.App. 83, 792 P.2d 167 (1990) (a brown wig). In Thang's case, there was neither geographic nor temporal proximity. The two crimes were committed at least 18 months apart, and were committed on opposite sides of the state. Neither was there evidence of similar clothing. The next question is whether the similarities between the two crimes are unusual or distinctive. Thus, in a case where a robber entered the store, pulled a knife, asked for money and fled upon receiving it, the Court of Appeals held that although the crimes were similar, the shared features were not sufficiently unusual or unique to amount to a signature. State v. Hernandez, 58 Wash.App. at 799, 794 P.2d 1327. In contrast, signature-like similarity was found between crimes involving victims approached by a man with the offer to sell salvaged televisions and video equipment at greatly reduced prices, where in each case the thief directed the victim to drive him to a certain location, took cash for the purchase, did not return to that location, and contacted the victim later. Brown, 111 Wash.2d at 128, 761 P.2d 588. Even when features are not individually unique, appearance of several features in the cases to be compared, especially when combined with a lack of dissimilarities, can create sufficient inference that they are not coincidental, thereby justifying the trial court's finding of relevancy. State v. Jenkins, 53 Wash.App. 228, 237, 766 P.2d 499 (1989) (holding that while pipe wrench burglaries, brown Camaros and ground floor entries are not individually unique, they create striking similarities when taken together, sufficient for a signature-like crime). Another close decision involved three people breaking into a dwelling after dark, use of a 20-gauge shotgun, and the presence of marijuana packaged the same way, in crimes occurring only three weeks apart. This Court, while acknowledging that reasonable minds could differ on the degree of similarity, upheld the trial court's action. Laureano, 101 Wash.2d at 764-65, 682 P.2d 889. The shared features as represented to the court in this case are: (1) both cases involved theft of a purse and jewelry; (2) both victims were elderly; (3) in both cases, the perpetrator allegedly remarked that the bitch is dead and (4) both victims were kicked, Morgan three times and Klaus repeatedly. However, there are also several dissimilarities between the two crimes: (1) they occurred 18 months apart; (2) they took place in different parts of the state; (3) one victim was kicked three times and the other until she died; (4) In one case, entry occurred through a door, and in the other, through a window; (5) in one case, the perpetrators fled in the victim's car, and in the other case, on foot. The question for the court to answer is whether all of these shared features, when combined, are so unusual and distinctive to be signature-like. The trial court answered this question in the negative, observing, the two incidents do not reflect as indicated earlier an over-arching design or plan nor specifically a signature type crime. RP at 876. Having concluded that the prior offense was not signature-like and that it was not admissible for any purpose other than to show identity, the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the Aberdeen crime. Moreover, the unique character of the statements relied upon was not established. The limiting instruction, although not objected to, did not cure the error because it limited consideration to identity, which would require a finding of signature-like similarity between the crimes. A curative instruction was required. Evidence of the prior offense should have been stricken. In this case, potential prejudice outweighed probative value. The error was exacerbated by the prosecutor, who argued during closing argument: [t]his is from a man that committed the same type of crime three years earlier. RP at 969. Then, after describing the similarities of attacking, throwing to the ground, and kicking a defenseless elderly woman, the prosecutor added, [h]e was caught in 1996. He was sent to prison. He escaped. And what is the first thing he does? He breaks into an elderly woman's home and in cold blood he kills her. [5] RP at 998. The Court of Appeals concluded that Thang could not complain about the introduction of Mrs. Morgan's testimony about the 1996 offense because Thang, in anticipatory rebuttal, introduced the evidence first. The Court of Appeals concluded that the Morgan testimony was merely cumulative. We disagree. It has been a long-standing practice for a defendant to mitigate the damaging effect of testimony regarding prior crimes by introducing the conviction during direct evidence, to take the sting out of the evidence. See, e.g., Irving Goldstein & Fred Lane, Goldstein Trial Technique § 11.30 at 29 (2d ed.1985); F. Lee Bailey & Henry B. Rothblatt, Successful Techniques for Criminal Trials § 253, at 222 (1971). The three main reasons for preemptive disclosure are: (1) the triers of fact are more likely to trust the side that discloses the information, (2) it avoids the appearance of hiding information, and (3) the advocate can couch the information in sympathetic terms. L. Timothy Perrin, Pricking Boils, Preserving Error: On the Horns of a Dilemma After Ohler v. United States, 34 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 615, 617 (2001). Practitioners and commentators alike continue to advocate the practice. Id. at 626, 682 P.2d 889. In a five-to-four decision, the United States Supreme Court recently made preemptive disclosure extremely risky in federal courts, holding that under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a defendant who elects to introduce the evidence herself waives the right to object because the harm from a court's ruling permitting impeachment by a prior conviction is wholly speculative. Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 759, 120 S.Ct. 1851, 146 L.Ed.2d 826 (2000).