Opinion ID: 2355139
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Multiple Counts of Kidnapping

Text: In his last point, Sanchez maintains his right to be free from double jeopardy was violated by his conviction on two separate counts of kidnapping with respect to the same victim. The jury found Sanchez guilty on one count that the victim was confined for the purpose of inflicting physical injury or terrorizing her and on a second count that the victim and another victim were confined for the purpose of using them as a shield or hostage. Sanchez argues that kidnapping is a continuing course of conduct and, therefore, he only committed one crime. In State v. French, 79 S.W.3d 896, 898-99 (Mo. banc 2002), this Court reviewed the analysis to be used. The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense. Where multiple punishments are imposed following a single trial, double jeopardy analysis is limited to determining whether multiple punishments were intended by the legislature. In other words, multiple punishments are permissible if the defendant has in law and in fact committed separate crimes. To determine whether the legislature intended multiple punishments, a court looks first to the unit of prosecution allowed by the statutes under which the defendant was charged. Only where the charging statute is silent as to the unit of prosecution must recourse be made to Missouri's general cumulative punishment statute. [4] Sanchez was charged under section 565.110.1, which states in pertinent part that: A person commits the crime of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another without his consent from the place where he is found or unlawfully confines another without his consent for a substantial period, for the purpose of    (2) Using the person as a shield or hostage; or    (5) Inflicting physical injury on or terrorizing the victim or another. The jury convicted him of confining the woman with whom he was living for the purpose of inflicting physical injury on her or terrorizing her. The jury separately convicted him of confining the woman and her child for the purpose of using them as shields or hostages. Since the crime is defined with reference to confining another and there is more than one victim, section 565.110.1 allows for more than one allowable unit of prosecution. See State v. Thompson, 147 S.W.3d 150, 160 (Mo.App. 2004). That the same victim is contained in both instructions does not change the analysis. That victim's inclusion in the shields and hostages instruction did not prejudice Sanchez. The jury was required to find that the child also was used as a shield or hostage. The instructions required two separate persons to be victimized in different ways. The duplication was mere surplusage as the name of the victim is not an element of the crime. See State v. Bradshaw, 81 S.W.3d 14, 23 (Mo. App.2002).