Opinion ID: 1130417
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the Chancellor's Alimony Award Excessive?

Text: Gregory argues that the chancellor erred in awarding Judy lump sum alimony of $40,000. This Court has addressed large lump sum alimony awards and has considered several factors: 1) Substantial contribution to accumulation of total wealth of the payor either by quitting a job to become a housewife, or by assisting in the spouse's business. Tutor v. Tutor, 494 So.2d 362 (Miss. 1986); Schilling v. Schilling, 452 So.2d 834 (Miss. 1984); 2) A long marriage. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 278 So.2d 446, 449 (Miss. 1973); Tutor and Schilling, supra ; 3) Where recipient spouse has no separate income or the separate estate is meager by comparison. Jenkins, Tutor and Schilling, supra ; 4) Without the lump sum award the receiving spouse would lack any financial security. Abshire v. Abshire, 459 So.2d 802, 804 (Miss. 1984). A closer analysis of these cases, however, reveal that the single most important factor undoubtedly is the disparity of the separate estates. In Tutor, Mrs. Tutor apparently had no substantial assets other than Mr. Tutor's coin collection and a $20,000 insurance policy. Mr. Tutor, on the other hand, had total assets of between $900,000 and $1.4 million. The Court in Tutor increased the lump sum alimony award on appeal to $150,000. In Schilling, Mr. Schilling had an estate with a net worth of not less than $750,000, compared with Mrs. Schilling who had no real assets of her own and whose income did not meet her expenses. A lump sum award of $240,000 was affirmed in this Court. In Jenkins, the Court reversed and remanded an inadequate award of lump sum alimony in light of the husband's admitted $800,000 net worth acquired during the marriage and the wife's lack of any appreciable assets other than a one-half interest in the marital residence. In Reeves v. Reeves, 410 So.2d 1300 (Miss. 1982), this Court held that an award of 10% of the husband's net worth would not be inappropriate where the husband's net worth was over $1 million and the wife had no apparent assets other than a one-half interest in the marital residence and some certificates of deposits totalling about $10,000. At the time of trial Mrs. Reeves had no job, though she had professional training and could find adequate employment. Mrs. Reeves worked solely for her husband only for short periods during the marriage, but contributed capital to Mr. Reeves' real estate ventures. In Clark v. Clark, 293 So.2d 447 (Miss. 1974), Mrs. Clark worked solely for her husband for approximately eleven of the couple's twelve years of marriage. The wife had no apparent assets and the Court reversed for a determination of a fair amount of lump sum alimony to allow her to share in the jointly-accumulated assets which apparently totalled somewhere around $164,000. More recently, in Skinner v. Skinner, 509 So.2d 867, 869 (Miss. 1987), this Court affirmed a lump sum alimony award of $75,000 where the husband's net worth was well over $700,000 and the wife's net worth was approximately $40,000, that being her one-half interest in the family residence. The couple had been married 27 years. None of these cases suggest what, if any, lump sum amount might be proper where there is little difference between the separate estates of the husband and wife. The proof in the case at bar suggests that even taking the most liberal evidence of the Mini Mart's net worth, $88,000 (the insured value), less the remaining loan debt of $32,000, for a total of $56,000, Gregory's net worth would only be one-half, or $28,000. Even assuming Judy has no appreciable assets, this amount is a much smaller disparity than this Court has dealt with previously. However, this case is more similar to Tutor in that Mrs. Tutor remained employed throughout the couple's married life. The Court noted, It is uncontroverted that throughout their married life Emogene Tutor worked and provided income for herself and her family and contributed to the financial status of Forrest Tutor and the family. Tutor, 494 So.2d at 363. Though she had no assets, it does not appear that Mrs. Tutor directly contributed in any substantial way to her husband's accumulation of assets. Tutor, then, supports the proposition that a spouse that contributes something to the marriage is entitled to a share of the accumulated wealth. The facts of this case support the chancellor's finding that lump sum alimony is appropriate. The appropriate amount of the lump sum alimony, however, is a totally separate issue, and one which requires reversal of the $40,000 award. Even taking the most liberal evidence of net worth, $88,000, Gregory's interest in the Mini Mart would be no more than $28,000. There is nothing in the record which establishes the $88,000 value as unduly conservative; in fact, just the opposite is true. How the chancellor could award the receiving spouse more than that owned by the contributing spouse is a mystery. The chancellor's decision could be supported only if the Court accepts the Mini Mart's value as $88,000 and disregards any store liabilities and Gregory's mother's one-half interest. The record is clear, however, that the store had liabilities and Roma Cheatham did own a one-half interest. This award, therefore, is not supported by the evidence. Neither does Gregory's income substantiate the amount of lump sum alimony awarded. Gregory's income seems far from steady, since his income from the store declined from nearly $30,000 in 1984 to at most $18,000 in 1985. The only other proof of Gregory's income comes from 1978 when he earned $13,000 from the store. The proof only shows an average income of roughly $20,000 for these three years. This is only $2,000 more than Judy was earning at the time of trial. Nothing concrete supports an inference that Gregory was hiding assets in order to make his financial picture appear bleak. In fact, Gregory gave a plausible, uncontradicted explanation that his store's profits were down because of increased competition. Taking Gregory's average income for 1984 and 1985, he still only made $24,000. An $8,000 alimony payment would decrease his earnings to $16,000, while increasing Judy's earnings for those five years to $26,000. Nothing in the record outlines Judy's reasonable and necessary expenses which might support the chancellor's award. The proof supports the inference that Judy could again reside in her mother's house. Judy kept most of the couple's furniture. She would have food and gasoline expenses that previously Gregory met from the Mini Mart; however, these seem to be her only real expenses. In summary, the proof does not support the amount of lump sum alimony awarded by the chancellor. In this he was manifestly wrong. McNally v. McNally, 516 So.2d 499, 501 (Miss. 1987); Jordan v. Jordan, 510 So.2d 131, 133 (Miss. 1987) (chancellor's decision on alimony will not be disturbed unless manifestly wrong and an abuse of discretion). Since some lump sum alimony would seem warranted under Tutor, supra, the case is remanded for a complete hearing on an appropriate amount. Gregory finally argues that no lump sum alimony could be awarded since it was not specifically pleaded. Judy did seek periodic alimony and equitable division of property but did not seek lump sum alimony. Gregory argues this is insufficient. While no doubt the better pleading practice is to include a request for lump sum alimony, see Holleman v. Holleman, 527 So.2d 90, 93, there was no surprise or prejudice to Gregory since the record makes clear that the parties litigated the question of alimony and they also litigated to what extent Judy contributed to Gregory's accumulated assets. Therefore, this argument is without merit.