Opinion ID: 1980706
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Award Amount and Interest

Text: Gruss contends that, depending upon whether it believed him, the arbitration panel was restricted to awarding Carlsten either the full amount of his claim for $120,000 or absolutely nothing. It maintains that any other result, in this case an award of $72,000, constituted an improper and irrational compromise. Gruss further avers that the arbitration panel ignored its own code and irrationally awarded interest from the commencement of the action rather than from the date of the award. Consequently, it asserts that the hearing justice should have vacated the award for either of these reasons alone. We disagree. [S]ubject to the terms of the empowering clause, arbitrators possess latitude in crafting remedies as wide as that which they possess in deciding cases. Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 10-11 (1st Cir.1990). `[I]f the parties do not pre-negotiate remedies, the arbitrator can fashion them as part of his [or her] decisional discretion.' Id. at 11. Section 10214 of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure provides that [t]he arbitrator(s) shall be empowered to award any relief that would be available in court under the law. Additionally, Section 10330(h) of that code provides that: [a]n award shall bear interest from the date of the award: (1) if not paid within thirty (30) days of receipt, (2) if the award is the subject of a motion to vacate which is denied, or (3) as specified by the arbitrator(s) in the award. Considering the latitude granted an arbitrator in both fashioning an award, as well as in deciding a remedy and in awarding interest, we cannot say that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law or acted irrationally in its award to Carlsten. Consequently, the hearing justice acted appropriately in confirming both the interest and the award amount.