Opinion ID: 1658853
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the lower court err in admitting into evidence a statement made by the appellant to the sheriff and allowing testimony from the sheriff as to the statement subsequent to a suppression hearing?

Text: The appellant argues that his statement was neither voluntary nor given under the provisions of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The appellant also challenges the propriety of the questions and answer exchanged in open court as to the appellant's statement subsequent to a suppression hearing on the matter. First, as to the voluntariness of the statement, the rules are set out in Jones v. State, 461 So.2d 686, 696-697 (Miss. 1984): The mere giving of the Miranda warnings, no matter how meticulous, no matter how often repeated, does not render admissible any inculpatory statement thereafter given by the accused. The giving of the warnings is only the first step. To render the statement admissible the State must take the second step and prove that the rights of which the accused has been Miranda -warned were thereafter waived  intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily. Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 753 (Miss. 1984). Applying the Jones case to the case sub judice, we find that the evidence shows that the statement made was properly admitted. The State proved with testimony by the sheriff that the Miranda warnings were given, that they were understood, and that the statement was voluntary. All three elements were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court determined the statement was admissible, and the jury obviously gave it weight. The trial court was correct in allowing the introduction of the statement and the testimony of the sheriff.