Opinion ID: 500164
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Strict Products Liability Claims

Text: 29 While we do not accord defendants the protection of the Ohio statute of repose, we nevertheless uphold the grant of summary judgment as to the strict products liability claims. Our review of the record convinces us that defendants cannot be held liable under this theory as a matter of law. 30 Ohio has adopted the formulation of Sec. 402(A) of the Restatement of Torts 2d as to the elements required to establish strict liability. Temple v. Wean United Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1967). In Temple, the court summarized these elements as follows: 31 (1) there was, in fact, a defect in the product manufactured and sold by the defendant; (2) such defect existed at the time the product left the hands of the defendant; and (3) the defect was the direct and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries or loss. 32 Id. at 321, 364 N.E.2d at 270 (quoting State Auto Mutual Ins. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 36 Ohio St.2d 151, 156, 304 N.E.2d 891, 893 (1973)). Appellants here allege two theories of product defect: first, that the gauge of steel used rendered the culvert far too flexible for its reasonably forseeable intended use in the Zuber Creek project; and, second, failure to adequately stress the critical importance of the use of proper backfilling material as well as proper compaction of the fill in the product instructions. 33 As the United States Supreme Court has explained: 34 [T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial .... The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case .... 35 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986). The Court further emphasized that Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), should not be construed to mean that the burden is on the party moving for summary judgment to produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, even with respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof. Id. at 2554 (emphasis added). We conclude, after a thorough review of the record, that appellants have failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact under Ohio strict products liability law. 36 The sectional plate arch supplied by U.S.S. through American Culvert, the product, was clearly only one component of the entire bridge structure. The bridge proper was comprised of the aggregate of the concrete footings, the culvert, the headwalls, the backfill, and the road surface. It is undisputed that the sectional plate arch conformed in all respects to the county's specifications when delivered. Despite conflicting expert testimony to the effect that the flexibility factor produced by the use of three gauge steel was too high, all of the experts agreed that the flexibility factor actually relates only to the handling of the structure and maintaining its shape during erection, and that if the shape of the arch is maintained during construction and the structure is properly backfilled, the thickness or strength of the metal arch itself is not pertinent to the strength or integrity of the completed bridge. All of the expert deposition testimony of record indicates that if the arch had been installed utilizing a proper backfill component--ideally gravel as opposed to the clay which was actually used--the subsequent performance of the arch would not have been affected by the so-called flexibility factor. Finally, the expert testimony reveals a consensus that, while a thicker gauge or lower flexibility factor might have prolonged the period before collapse, it would not have prevented it. 37 In Grover Hill Grain Co. v. Baughman-Oster, Inc., 728 F.2d 784 (6th Cir.1984), the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of an unassembled grain bin for damages resulting from the bin's collapse. The cause of the collapse was determined to have been attributable to over-torquing of the bolts during construction. After reviewing the relevant state law, we concluded that under Ohio law, a manufacturer who markets a product in an unassembled state, knowing that a third-party will complete the assembly process, cannot be strictly liable for a defect introduced by that third-party, and we thus affirmed the trial judge's verdict in favor of the manufacturer. Id. at 789. In the case at bar, the evidence cannot, as a matter of law, support a finding that the arch contained any manufacturing defect in existence at the time it left defendant's hands. 38 With respect to appellant's argument regarding inadequacy of warnings or failure to properly instruct, we observe that under Ohio law such allegations do not give rise to a strict liability cause of action. See Knitz v. Minster Machine Co., 69 Ohio St.2d 460, 432 N.E.2d 814 (1982); Temple v. Wean United, Inc., supra. In Temple, the Ohio Supreme Court stated: 39 It is ... apparent that the rule imposing an obligation on the manufacturer or seller to give suitable warning of a dangerous propensity of a product is a rule fixing a standard of care, and any tort resulting from the failure to meet this duty is, in essence, a negligent act. 40 50 Ohio St.2d at 325, 364 N.E.2d at 272. See, e.g., Rimer v. Rockwell International Corp., 739 F.2d 1125 (6th Cir.1984) (upholding, inter alia, verdict for manufacturer on issue of strict liability for failure to warn under Ohio law); Overbee v. Van Waters & Rogers, 706 F.2d 768 (6th Cir.1983) (affirming directed verdict for defendant on question of strict liability for failure to warn under Ohio law). Thus, it is clear that appellant's claims in this regard are cognizable, if at all, under a negligence standard only. 41