Opinion ID: 1226361
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Kuehne contends that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to proceed to the merits of his pro se motion for judgment of acquittal or a new trial. We disagree. On March 7, 2005, over five months after the verdict was rendered in his case, Kuehne filed a pro se motion seeking judgment of acquittal or a new trial pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 29 and 33. The government objected to the district court's consideration of the motion, asserting that it was filed more than seven days after the verdict in violation of Rule 33. Kuehne contended that he was unable to comply with the time limits established by the Rule because he was receiving ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court later appointed Kuehne new counsel and conducted a hearing regarding his motion for acquittal. During the hearing, the district court heard testimony from Kuehne's previous attorney and arguments regarding whether consideration of the motion for acquittal was proper in light of the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. After the hearing, the parties submitted memoranda in support of their respective positions. On April 24, 2006, the district court denied Kuehne's motion for acquittal without discussing the merits. The district court did not abuse its discretion in reaching this conclusion. A district court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires. Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(a). However, any motion filed on grounds other than newly discovered evidence must be filed within 7 days after the verdict or finding of guilty. Fed. R.Crim.P. 33(b)(1)-(2). On appeal, Kuehne does not allege that newly discovered evidence excuses his failure to file a timely motion for acquittal. Rather, he asserts that the district court should have reached the merits of his motion for acquittal, notwithstanding its untimely filing, because of the ineffective assistance of his counsel. While Kuehne's argument makes intuitive sense, i.e., that a court should reach the merits of a motion for acquittal where a defendant can demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, Rule 33 itself speaks of no such exception. [9] See, e.g., United States v. Vincent, 20 F.3d 229, 237 (6th Cir.1994). Instead, the Rule allows for motions to be filed outside of the seven day window only upon a showing of newly discovered evidence. Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(b)(1). Kuehne has made no such showing and therefore the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for acquittal. See United States v. Ford, 187 Fed.Appx. 496, 501 (6th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (finding that, notwithstanding the defendant's allegation that he was unable to file a timely motion for acquittal under Rule 33 because of ineffective assistance of counsel, the denial of the motion was proper because the motion for a new trial was late. This fact alone justifies its denial).