Opinion ID: 2599164
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Limitation on Cross-examination of a Witness

Text: Gary Reep testified for the prosecution about defendant's attempts to hide the truck and defendant's role in pawning the victim's tools. On direct examination, he testified that he had discussed the case with the police. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked whether Reep would talk to him. Reep responded, No, sir. But then the court sustained a relevance objection by the prosecutor, who argued, Every witness has a right to not talk to either the prosecution or defense. Defendant contends the court erred in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. We agree the court erred under state law in sustaining the relevancy objection. A witness's refusal to talk to a party is relevant to that witness's credibility because it shows the possibility of bias against that party. ( People v. Hannon (1977) 19 Cal.3d 588, 601-602, 138 Cal. Rptr. 885, 564 P.2d 1203; People v. Shaw (1896) 111 Cal. 171, 174, 43 P. 593.) The court here erred in concluding otherwise. Although the court may have had discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to exclude the question, that was not the basis of its ruling. Nevertheless, we do not agree the error constituted a violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation right. `[A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby, to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.` [Citations.] However, not every restriction on a defendant's desired method of cross-examination is a constitutional violation. Within the confines of the confrontation clause, the trial court retains wide latitude in restricting cross-examination that is repetitive, prejudicial, confusing of the issues, or of marginal relevance. [Citations.] California law is in accord. [Citation.] Thus, unless the defendant can show that the prohibited cross-examination would have produced `a significantly different impression of [the witnesses'] credibility' [citation], the trial court's exercise of its discretion in this regard does not violate the Sixth Amendment. ( People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 946, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) The trial court's sustaining of this single question did not violate the Sixth Amendment under this standard. The court generally allowed the defense full scope to cross-examine Reep. Although the disallowed question was relevant to credibility, refusing to talk to an attorney is not a prototypical form of bias. A witness may choose not to talk to an attorney for many reasons unrelated to bias or favoritism. Reep may have been only a reluctant witness. Having given a statement to the police, which was discoverable by the defense, he simply may not have wanted to give yet another statement to an attorney who would be cross-examining him. Not allowing the jury to consider that refusal did not produce a significantly different impression of his credibility. The error under state law was harmless. Although Reep corroborated some of Lonnie's testimony, he was not a critical witness. Nor was his credibility particularly suspect, even considering that he did not want to talk to defense counsel. It is not reasonably probable the result would have been different had the jury considered Reep's refusal to talk to defense counsel. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243.) Indeed, we would find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.