Opinion ID: 864646
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial Court's Comments

Text: ¶13. Easter argues that he was denied a fair trial based on comments made by the trial court during voir dire; Agent Grogan's testimony; and Thompson's testimony. ¶14. In Thompson v. State, 468 So.2d 852, 853-54 (Miss. 1985), quoting Green v. State, 97 Miss. 834, 53 So.2d 415 (1910), this Court stated: 'It is a matter of common knowledge that jurors, as well as officers in attendance upon court, are very susceptible to the influence of the judge. The sheriff and his deputies, as a rule, are anxious to do his bidding; and jurors 5 watch closely his conduct, and give attention to his language, that they may, if possible ascertain his leaning to one side or the other, which, if known, often largely influences their verdict. He cannot be too careful and guarded in language and conduct in the presence of the jury, to avoid prejudice to either party.' The Court further stated: The great danger, particularly in a criminal case, is that the weight and dignity of the court accompanies each question or comment, although not so intended by the judge, and are very likely to be interpreted by the jury as the court's approval of the witness and her testimony, thereby lending unity to it and thus diverting the jurors' attention from their responsibility of deciding the case from the evidence, untainted, as heard by them from the witness stand. Thompson, 468 So.2d at 854.
¶15. Easter contends that the trial court denied him a fair trial and unduly prejudiced his case by commenting during voir dire of the prospective jury panel as to presumption of innocence. Easter alleges that this comment corroborated the description stated on close by the State, enhancing the State's position with the jury. In order to examine the alleged reversible error, it is necessary to see the trial court's remarks. The record reflects the following statement by the trial court: Now, this is a criminal case. It's not a civil case. There are certain general concepts that apply in all criminal cases in our judicial system. The first concept deals with a term that you will hear used throughout the trial. You will also see it used in the written instructions on the law that will be given to you at the conclusion of the trial by -- that will be given by the Court, and that term is called the presumption of innocence. That is, every defendant is presumed to be innocent until they are convicted by a jury. And I make this statement to you because a lot of times, attorneys during voir dire before you've heard any evidence or received any testimony will ask you, how many of you think my client is or could be guilty because they're here on trial? And my answer to that is every defendant at this stage of the proceedings are presumed to be innocent until they're convicted by a jury. Obviously, you 6 haven't heard any testimony, so technically if the trial was to stop now, you would be required to find every defendant not guilty. ¶16. This Court finds that the trial court's opening remarks on voir dire did not constitute reversible error. Easter's argument is without merit. Moreover, the record reflects that the defense never offered a contemporaneous objection at trial nor raised the issue with the trial court in his motion for a new trial. In Johnson v. Gray, 859 So.2d 1006, 1015 (Miss. 2003), this Court stated: There is a general requirement that objections must be raised at the trial level. In re S.A.M., 826 So.2d 1266, 1277 (Miss. 2002); In re V.R., 725 So.2d 241, 245 (Miss. 1998). See Riley v. Doemer, 677 So.2d at 743 n. 3; Smith v. State, 572 So.2d 847, 848 (Miss. 1990); Burney v. State, 515 So.2d 1154, 1156-57 (Miss. 1987). This Court has stated that [i]f no contemporaneous objection is made, the error, if any, is waived. Dorrough v. Wilkes, 817 So.2d 567, 577 (Miss. 2002) (quoting Walker v. State, 671 So.2d 581, 597 (Miss. 1995); Hill v. State, 432 So.2d 427, 439 (Miss. 1983)). Therefore, we find that this issue is without merit.
¶17. Easter argues that the trial court erred in allowing Agent Grogan to testify as to whether it was standard operating procedure for people involved in a drug transaction to disguise what they were discussing. Easter claims that the trial court allowed Agent Grogan to supply an expert opinion without being qualified as an expert. The record reflects the following exchange: Mr. Davis [State]: Agent Grogan, were you present when the confidential informant placed a phone call to the defendant on this date? Agent Grogan: Yes, sir. State: Were you able to listen to the conversation that ensued between them? Agent Grogan: Yes, sir. 7 State: Now, when these, how many of these types of conversations have you witnessed in law enforcement would you say? Agent Grogan: Probably hundreds I imagine. State: All right. Is it normal or is it kind of standard operating procedure for people involved in that to kind of disguise what they're talking about, or do they come out and say, I will sell you two ounces of cocaine? Mr. Parrish [Defense]: Your, Honor, at this time, we're going to object. This is calling for an expert opinion, and he hasn't been tendered as an expert at all. State: Judge, he can give his personal opinion based on his experience as a law enforcement officer. The Court: All right. Well, I'll let you voir dire him on his qualifications if you'd like to do that now. Defense: Your, Honor, we'd object. He has not been disclosed to the defendants as an expert witness. He's been disclosed to us as a fact witness. If he's going to start testifying as to his opinion about how drug deals -- based upon his training and experience, then he's getting into the expert range, and that's what we're objecting on because we're not able to prepare to rebut that. State: Your Honor, if I may, a lay witness can -- a fact witness can give their opinion. The Court: I think this officer can give an opinion based upon his experience. He's worked for -- been an agent for MBN for over four years. Defense: It's two and a half, Judge, but -- The Court: Two and a half years. Defense: We would object to him being able to give opinion testimony other than to -- observations that he -- as he observed whatever facts he's going to testify about. The Court: All right. Well, your objection's noted. It will be overruled. He'll be subject to cross-examination. State: Thank you, Judge. State: During these types of conversations between somebody wanted to purchase and somebody wanting to see narcotics, it is standard -- the normal course of business, I guess, code words or synonyms to be used rather than people to say, I 8 want one ounce of cocaine, and the seller to say, I will sell you one ounce of cocaine? Agent Grogan: Yes, sir. (emphasis added). ¶18. In overruling the defense's objection, the trial court determined that Agent Grogan was able to render his opinion based on his experience as a MBN agent. The Mississippi Court of Appeals was faced with a factually similar situation. In Jones v. State, 754 So.2d 476, 484 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999), the defense asserted that Detective Steve Renfroe presented expert testimony without being qualified as an expert. Detective Renfroe's testimony explained how he determined what evidence was relevant and what should be recovered from a crime scene. Id. Detective Renfroe also provided testimony explaining why the scales, the walkie-talkies and the metal detector all had evidentiary value in a narcotics arrest. Id. The court found that Detective Renfroe did not give an opinion as contemplated in Mississippi Rule of Evidence 702. Instead, he answered questions based on his experiences as a narcotics officer. Id. ¶19. This Court finds that the trial court did not commit reversible error in allowing Agent Grogan to testify, based on his experience as a narcotics agent for the MBN transactions, that it was not uncommon for there to be use of code to disguise the drug transaction. This issue is without merit.
¶20. Easter contends that the trial court committed reversible error by stating to Thompson during his direct examination by the State, Let's just get on to this transaction, please. It 9 is necessary to examine the comment in the proper context. The record reflects the following exchange: State: Chris, if we can back up a little bit. But how did all this come about? How did you know you were supposed to meet him? Thompson: I had talked to him on the phone. State: Okay. When did you talk to him? Thompson: Around lunch. State: Okay. And who was present when you made that phone call? Thompson: Neil Grogan and Alan Ward. State: And do you remember where you were? Thompson: At the MBN office. State: And during that conversation around noon, tell us a little be about what happened, what the conversation was about. Thompson: He said he couldn't -- wasn't able to get in touch with me and my phone had been messed up. He asked about some other transactions that we – Defense: Objection. We need to be heard outside the presence of the jury. The Court: All right. Sustained. Let's just get on to this transaction, please. State: Chris, just dealing with this particular transaction, did you and Mr. Easter agree to meet somewhere? Thompson: Yes. State: And where was that? Thompson: At the Apple store on Highway 19 South. State: And did you -- what did you talk about doing at the Apple store? Thompson: Trading some money for cocaine. (emphasis added). ¶21. Clearly, Thompson was already testifying as to the transaction in question that involved Thompson working with MBN as a confidential informant to arrange an exchange with Easter. The trial court's comment was an immediate response to the defense's objection to Thompson discussing other transactions he had with Easter. The trial court's comment was made to instruct Thompson to testify only as to the transaction in question. Obviously, 10 the jury was aware that the State had alleged that a transaction of cocaine for money had occurred. The trial court only acted to limit testimony to one transaction in question. The trial court did not offer a finding that a drug deal had definitely occurred. We find that this issue is without merit. ¶22. Next, Easter contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it commented on the quality of the tape recording of the telephone conversation. The trial court, outside the presence of the jury, played the tape recording of the two telephone conversations before allowing the tape to be played to the jury. The record reflects that the defense's objection to the tape of the telephone conversation was to exclude the introductory part of the recording as the first part of the tape is going to get into 404 (b) activity.1 ¶23. The trial court ordered the deletion of the introduction part of the conversation before the tapes could be played to the jury. The trial court also commented on the poor quality of the tape outside the presence of the jury. The trial court found that the tape was offered to show motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident, and under M.R.E. 403, the tape was certainly relevant and more probative than prejudicial. 1 M.R.E. 404 (b) provides: (b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 11 ¶24. It is after the conference outside the presence of the jury that the alleged error occurred when the jury was brought back into the courtroom and Thompson resumed his testimony. The record reflects the following transpired: The Court: Mr. White, you want to bring the jury in, please. (THE JURY RETURNED TO THE COURTROOM AT 10:05 A.M., AND THE PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AS FOLLOWS, TO-WIT:) The Court: Ms. Heidelberg [State], you may proceed. State: Yes, sir. Judge, at this time, we'd like to play the tape for the jury, please.... The Court: Yes, sir. (AUDIOTAPE BEING PLAYED FOR THE JURY.) State: Okay. Chris, let me ask you just a few questions about that. What exactly was that that the jury just heard? Thompson: It's a conversation between me and Baron. State: Okay. And I notice that you didn't call him Baron. What did you call him when you placed the phone call? Thompson: B. State: Okay. And you didn't identify yourself -- well, how did you identify yourself? Thompson: As C. State: Okay. So what does B stand for? Thompson: Baron. State: And C stands for? Thompson: Chris. State: Okay. You didn't hold a conversation with him -- a drug-related conversation with him during that particular phone call, and why not? What happened? Thompson: He wanted to call me back. For whatever reason I don't know. State: Okay. And did he call you back? Thompson: Yes... State: Judge, if we may proceed with the telephone call that was placed back to Chris. The Court: Okay. (AUDIOTAPE BEING PLAYED FOR THE JURY.) State: And, Chris, during that conversation when Mr. Easter called you back, did you all discuss -- well, what did you discuss at that particular time? Defense: Objection, your Honor. Under the Best Evidence Rule, the tape speaks for itself. For this witness to then interpret his 12 understanding of the tape is improper bolstering. They've entered this into evidence, and the jury's free to examine it at their leisure and give it whatever weight and credibility they determine, but this is improper. The Court: All right. Your objection's going to be overruled. The quality is not that great. This witness will be subject to crossexamination. He was part of the conversation, so I'll allow you to ask him questions about the contents of that tape.... The Court: You may answer the question. (emphasis added). ¶25. In Stromas v. State, 618 So.2d 116, 119 (Miss. 1993), this Court stated: Certainly a tape recording of the alleged drug transaction is relevant. See Miss. R. Evid. 401. The tape's admission makes the drug transaction more likely to have taken place. See Butler, 592 So.2d at 984. ¶26. Tape recordings may be received into evidence as long as the proper predicate has been established. Middlebrook v. State, 555 So.2d 1009, 1012 (Miss. 1990). The mere fact that portions of a recording are unintelligible does not by itself render the recording inadmissible. Middlebrook, 555 So.2d at 1012; Frank v. State, 749 So.2d 1241, 1243 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). See also Oatis v. State, 726 So.2d 1230, 1235 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998). Transcripts provided to the jury to follow along with the tape recording have also been allowed. See Frank, 749 So.2d at 1243 (transcripts can be used to assist the jury in determining who is speaking and discerning what is being said). ¶27. This Court finds that the trial court's comment did not indicate its leaning toward the State's witness nor was it likely to influence the jury's verdict. This issue is without merit.