Opinion ID: 618950
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Substantive Summary Judgment Analysis

Text: In an action to quiet title under Michigan Law, the claimant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case for title. See Mich. Comp. Laws §600.2932(1); Sumpter, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 719. If the claimant establishes its legal interest, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to prove its superior right or title to the property. Sumpter, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 719 (citations omitted). Similarly, an action for wrongful levy requires the claimant to prove a legally cognizable interest in the property. See McGinness, 90 F.3d at 146. 11 No. 10-1340 In its complaint, Plaintiff originally claimed that it gained its interest in the Property by deed from FRD in May 1998. To this day, Plaintiff has not provided evidence to support this contention. Similarly, Plaintiff has failed to produce viable evidence showing that it took title following Turchan’s repurchase of the Property from FRD in August 1998. Without proof of these transactions, the evidence of Turcar’s interest consists of the April 21, 1998, quitclaim deed, recorded May 14, 1998, transferring the Property from Turchan to Turcar, and the July 17, 1998, deed, recorded July 31, 1998, produced at the Motion for Reconsideration involving the same parties. On appeal, Plaintiff does not challenge the district court’s analysis that the doctrine of after-acquired title defeats Turchan’s first effort to convey a subsequently-obtained interest by quitclaim deed. See Turchan I, 2009 WL 3241968, at –3. Plaintiff has provided no argument that the second transaction would be subject to a different analysis. While the bulk of Plaintiff’s argument on appeal seeks to prove its prioritized status over the government’s lien, Plaintiff’s efforts are misplaced. The district court correctly noted that this argument is inapposite unless and until Turcar can successfully prove the origin of its legal interest. Because Turcar has failed to do so, its claim of title remains fatally flawed and it cannot succeed on either of its claims. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322–23 (summary judgment appropriate against a party who fails to provide a sufficient showing to establish an essential element of its case). Accordingly, we hold that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the government on Plaintiff’s claims to quiet title and for wrongful levy. We hold that the district court did not procedurally err in doing so on the alternative sua sponte basis.