Opinion ID: 2622179
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the history of utah's tolling statute

Text: ¶16 Utah Code section 78-12-35 does not differ materially from its original version enacted in 1872. [4] The current tolling statute reads as follows: Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out of the state, the action may be commenced within the term as limited by this chapter after his return to the state. If after a cause of action accrues he departs from the state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. [5] ¶17 In his briefs, Larson aptly describes the circumstances surrounding the creation and operation of Utah's tolling statute. When Utah's tolling statute was created, the ability to obtain personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state resident (or nonresident) was severely limited by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [6] Given this restraint, the tolling statute served the important purpose of preventing the statute of limitations from expiring on valid claims when the defendant was out of state and obtaining personal jurisdiction was not possible. ¶18 In the early 1900s, the jurisdictional reach of the states' courts began to expand, and by 1945, the United States Supreme Court, in International Shoe, adopted a more flexible standard for asserting personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants. [7] This new standard required only that a defendant have minimum contacts with the forum state such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction did not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. [8] As a result of International Shoe, states began enacting long-arm statutes, which were comprehensive jurisdictional statutes based upon a defendant's conduct in or contact with the forum state. These long-arm statutes expanded the jurisdictional reach of state courts, allowing such courts to exert personal jurisdiction to the outer limits of the Due Process Clause. ¶19 Utah's long-arm statute was enacted in 1969. [9] It allows Utah's courts to exert personal jurisdiction over any person, whether or not a resident of Utah, if that person committed any of the acts enumerated in the statute. [10] The long-arm provisions apply so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the fullest extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [11] The provisions allow service of process pursuant to rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on any party outside the state. [12] ¶20 Larson argues that Utah's tolling statute must be interpreted in light of this history and purpose and in relation to other statutes. He argues that when the purpose of the tolling statute conflicts with its literal meaning, the purpose must be given effect. He explains that the purpose of the tolling statute is to prevent valid claims from expiring because personal jurisdiction over a defendant cannot be obtained due to the defendant's absence from the state. He argues that, in light of this purpose, the language in the tolling statute referring to a defendant who is out of the state should describe a defendant who is beyond the personal jurisdiction and process of Utah courts and not merely a defendant who is physically absent from the state. Larson contends that this interpretation harmonizes the tolling statute with the purposes of Utah's long-arm statute, the substitute service of process provisions of rule 4, and the applicable statute of limitations, which are all designed to allow parties to expeditiously adjudicate their claims. Ultimately, Larson maintains that the purpose of such a tolling statute is served where the long-arm statute or rule 4 brings a defendant within the personal jurisdiction of the court. Under these circumstances, the tolling statute should no longer apply because the need to delay the running of the statute of limitations ceases to exist. ¶21 The position advocated by Larson, although favored by many states, would effectively write the tolling statute out of the Utah Code. We are disinclined to ignore the statute in light of its clear, plain-language meaning. Moreover, our own precedent has adhered to the statute's plain-language meaning. It is the Legislature's prerogative to set statutes of limitation. It is also the Legislature's prerogative to set the terms by which a statute will be tolled. Whether or not this tolling is necessary, given the changes in our long-arm jurisdiction, the statute is clear, and it is solely up to the Legislature to change it. Thus we conclude that the plain language of the tolling statute, our well-settled precedent, and appropriate deference to the Legislature make the answer to the certified question relatively straightforward.