Opinion ID: 186000
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Contempt Specifications

Text: 60 The district court held Secretary Norton and Assistant Secretary McCaleb in civil contempt of court (1) for having engaged in litigation misconduct, to wit, failing to comply with the Court's Order of December 21, 1999, and (2-5) for having, in each of four ways, committ[ed] a fraud on the Court. Contempt Order, 226 F.Supp.2d at 161. The Department claims the district court erred in two respects: by holding Norton and McCaleb in contempt (1) based upon conduct of their predecessors in office, and (2) without finding either officer had disobeyed a clear order of the court. The Department also argues the district court's factual findings do not support its conclusion that there was a fraud on the court. In response the plaintiffs argue the district court correctly applied the law to the facts. We agree with the Department, although our analysis is somewhat different.
61 A contempt proceeding is either civil or criminal by virtue of its character and purpose, not by reason of the trial judge so denominating the proceeding. Int'l Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 2557, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441, 31 S.Ct. 492, 498, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911). Civil contempt is ordinarily used to compel compliance with an order of the court, Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828, 114 S.Ct. at 2557, although in some circumstances a civil contempt sanction may be designed to compensate[ ] the complainant for losses sustained. Id. at 829, 114 S.Ct. at 2558. By contrast, criminal contempt is used to punish, that is, to vindicate the authority of the court following a transgression rather than to compel future compliance or to aid the plaintiff. Id. at 828, 114 S.Ct. at 2557. 62 In this case the nature of the contempt is obscured by the lack of any clear sanction. Although it did, under the heading Further Relief, expand the scope of the plaintiffs' discovery, Contempt Opinion, 226 F.Supp.2d at 159, the district court itself noted that 63 much of the relief granted is not dependent on the Court's conclusion that the defendants committed several frauds on the Court. Rather, the Court has fashioned much of the relief granted today (such as future proceedings and the appointment of a special master) simply because of the current status of trust reform. 64 Id. at 135. In fact, other than an award of expenses the plaintiffs incurred in the contempt trial, 226 F.Supp.2d at 162 — which cannot be considered relief for the underlying contempt — the only relief granted that could conceivably be based upon the findings of contempt are the initiation of the Phase 1.5 proceeding and the appointment of the Special Master. On its face, that is, the Contempt Order appears to find the defendants in contempt, and then to impose no sanction. 65 Clearly, however, the district court did not intend its decision to be without effect. The exceedingly strong words it used in finding the defendants in contempt — in particular its statement that Secretary Norton was unfit — suggest the court intended the adjudication and accompanying opinion to serve as a reprimand to Secretary Norton and Assistant Secretary McCaleb. Indeed, the defendants reasonably characterize the decision as having impose[d] opprobrium upon them. Norton and McCaleb in particular believed the district court's adjudication to be so injurious to their reputations that they engaged private counsel and sought to intervene as appellants and to present arguments in their respective personal capacities. We see no reason a district court may not impose a reprimand as the sole sanction for an adjudication of contempt, particularly when the contemnor is a public official acting in her official capacity. 66 Examining this sanction in light of the principles set forth in Gompers and Bagwell, therefore, it is clear the proceeding was, and should have been treated as being, for criminal contempt. In specifications two through five, the district court cites completed conduct of the defendants (or of their predecessors in office), making the proceeding criminal in nature. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 829, 114 S.Ct. at 2558 (When a contempt involves the prior conduct of an isolated, prohibited act, the resulting sanction has no coercive effect and is therefore punitive in nature); id. at 828, 114 S.Ct. at 2558 (describing a sanction as criminal if it is imposed retrospectively for a `completed act of disobedience' (quoting Gompers, 221 U.S. at 443, 31 S.Ct. at 498-99)). Moreover, in each of those four specifications the district court held the defendants in contempt for [c]ommitting a fraud on the Court, Contempt Opinion, 226 F.Supp.2d at 20, citing as authority a Supreme Court opinion assimilating fraud on the court to criminal rather than to civil contempt. Id. at 26 (citing Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412, 63 S.Ct. 268, 87 L.Ed. 368 (1943)). We have been unable to find any authority for, let alone any reason to believe, the proposition that fraud on the court constitutes a civil contempt. We therefore treat the district court's contempt citations on specifications two through five as criminal in nature. 67 We also note that, although the district court said in the Contempt Opinion it was not issu[ing] a contempt citation at this time with respect to Specification 1, id. at 118, the accompanying Contempt Order is ambiguous on this score and the court later interpreted it otherwise. The statement that the defendants had engaged in litigation misconduct appeared under the heading Contempt Specifications. 226 F.Supp.2d at 161. In a later opinion addressing a motion to disqualify the District Judge, Special Master-Monitor Kieffer, and another special master from participation in contempt proceedings against certain non-parties, the district court further muddied the waters, stating that on September 17 it indeed had held the defendants in contempt for, among other things, engaging in litigation misconduct by failing to comply with the Court's Order as described in specification one. Memorandum and Order, at 5-6 (Jan. 17, 2003). We therefore treat specification one as a finding of contempt, also criminal in nature. 68 Although one may be held in civil contempt for refusing to comply with a court order, a sanction for one's past failure to comply with an order is criminal in nature. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828-29, 114 S.Ct. at 2557-58; Gompers, 221 U.S. at 443-44, 31 S.Ct. at 498-99. The district court clearly intended to punish the defendants for failing to comply with the Court's Order of December 21, 1999, to initiate a Historical Accounting Project, Contempt Order, 226 F.Supp.2d at 161, which is no doubt why its opinion lacks any suggestion that the defendants could yet comply and thereby purge themselves of the contempt. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828, 114 S.Ct. at 2558 (contempt is civil if the contemnor is able to purge the contempt and obtain his release by committing an affirmative act, and thus carries the keys of his prison in his own pocket). 69 The contempt proceeding being criminal rather than civil in nature, and the allegedly contumacious behavior occurring outside the presence of the court, the defendants were entitled to the usual protections of the criminal law, such as trial by jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 826-27, 114 S.Ct. at 2556-57. Because the Department has not objected upon any such procedural ground, however, and explicitly disavowed any such objection at oral argument, we treat the same as waived. 70 In addressing the merits of the contempt specifications, we start with the elementary principle that, subject to certain exceptions clearly not relevant here, and absent respondeat superior liability, one person cannot be held criminally liable for the conduct of another. We further note that a finding of criminal contempt requires both a contemptuous act and a wrongful state of mind. In re Farquhar, 492 F.2d 561, 564 (D.C.Cir.1973).  71 With these principles in mind, we can dispose quite readily of some of the district court's findings of contempt. Secretary Norton took office in January, Assistant Secretary McCaleb in July, 2001. Because specifications two and three concern conduct that took place prior to their taking office, the district court erred as a matter of law in holding either official in criminal contempt on those counts. The district court also erred in holding Assistant Secretary McCaleb in contempt on all five counts without having identified in the Contempt Opinion any specific act or omission whatsoever on his part. We address the other specifications of contempt, therefore, with reference to Secretary Norton alone.
72 Specification one charged Secretary Norton with [f]ailing to comply with the Court's Order of December 21, 1999, to initiate a Historical Accounting Project. Contempt Opinion, 226 F.Supp.2d at 20. The district court said with regard to this specification that Secretary Norton had committed litigation misconduct, referring principally to its finding that [b]etween December 21, 1999 and July 10, 2001 the Department had failed to take any steps toward completing an accounting. Id. at 113. The court characterized the Department's actions taken since that time as too little, too late, and stated that Interior cannot rely on efforts undertaken at the late date of June, 2001 to avoid a contempt citation. Id. at 115. In fact, the district court described its holding as being that the defendants unreasonably delayed initiating the historical accounting project. Id. at 118. 73 Because Secretary Norton cannot be held criminally liable for contempt based upon the conduct of her predecessor in office, her contempt conviction cannot stand; she simply cannot be held criminally to account for any delay that occurred prior to her assuming office. Of the one and one-half year delay about which the district court was concerned, more than a year was on someone else's watch. 74 Moreover, the district court's findings clearly indicate that in her first six months in office Secretary Norton took significant steps toward completing an accounting. By June 2001 the Secretary had contracted with EDS, a national consulting firm, to evaluate the status of the TAAMS project, id. at 86, and by November 2001 the Department had proposed a reorganization plan aimed at eliminating the problems EDS had identified. Id. at 45. In July 2001 Secretary Norton created the Office of Historical Trust Accounting, which has since made significant progress toward completing an accounting. Id. at 44-45. Hence, the Court Monitor stated in his Fifth Report, [t]here is no doubt the OHTA has made more progress ... in six months [July through December, 2001] than the past administration did in six years. 75 These uncontested facts are inconsistent with a finding that Secretary Norton failed to comply with the district court's order of December 21, 1999. Therefore, we hold the district court erred as a matter of law in holding Secretary Norton in criminal contempt on specification one.
76 In specification four the Secretary was held in contempt for committing a fraud on the court. We note initially that fraud on the court is a narrow concept, limited to the most egregious conduct involving a corruption of the judicial process itself. 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2870, at 418 (2d ed.1995). 77 The district court held Secretary Norton in contempt for filing false and misleading quarterly status reports starting in March 2000, regarding TAAMS and BIA Data Cleanup. Contempt Opinion, 226 F.Supp.2d at 124. Of those eight reports, however, the first four were filed prior to Secretary Norton's taking office, and she therefore cannot be held criminally liable for anything in them. The remaining reports do not rise to the level of fraud on the court. 78 The court complained that the fifth report provided a positive assessment of the status of TAAMS based on nothing more than speculation and wishful thinking. Id. at 80. Of the sixth report, the district court said the Department was misleading the court when it represented it was moving ever closer to being able to implement fully the title and realty portions of TAAMS, and that it had conducted specific tests that indicated that it was almost ready to deploy TAAMS. Id. at 82. Regarding the seventh report, the court noted the Department's concession that it had not met certain goals and complained that the Department presented a positive picture of TAAMS despite the fact that the agency was not ready to deploy or implement the land management system as scheduled, and ... clearly was not going to be able to deploy or implement it anytime soon. Id. at 83. The court also objected that Interior did not provide the Court with anything close to what can be construed as a complete picture of the system's status. Id. 79 Finally, with regard to the eighth report — which was the first to be filed after Interior had received EDS's assessment of the project — the court noted both Secretary Norton's concession that previous reports had been inadequate, and the Secretary's attempts to improve the quality of the reports. Id. at 84-85. The district court appeared to have no quarrel with the content of the eighth report. Instead, the court inferred from admissions in the eighth report that the inadequacies of the previous reports were intentional and contumacious. See id. at 80 (completion dates in fifth report, in light of the later filed quarterly status reports, [were] based on nothing more than speculation and wishful thinking); id. at 82 (sixth report particularly misleading (and troubling) in light of the Department's Eighth Report); see also id. at 84 (quoting Secretary Norton's testimony that seventh report gave an insufficient picture and was not a particularly good document). 80 We find the reasoning of the district court mystifying. The court is surely correct in stating that the eighth report does not absolve[ ] the defendants of responsibility for any past wrongdoing. Id. at 126. But neither does the Secretary's candid critique of prior reports, made in the light shed by EDS's evaluation, lead to the conclusion that those reports were intentionally false and misleading; the district court's findings of fact simply do not support its conclusion that Secretary Norton committed a fraud on the court. To be sure, the earlier reports painted an overly sunny picture of the status of the TAAMS project and were misleading about the progress being made in ways painstakingly identified by the district court. The district court made no finding, however, that Secretary Norton had any personal knowledge that the fifth, sixth, or seventh reports were false or misleading. 81 In light of the above, we conclude that the district court erred as a matter of law in holding Secretary Norton in criminal contempt on specification four.
82 In specification five, the district court found the Secretary committed a fraud on the court by making false and misleading representations regarding computer security of IIM trust data. Id. at 100. The Department made representations on that subject under Secretary Norton in April and May 2001. The district court's findings as to those statements do not support its conclusion that Secretary Norton committed a fraud on the court. 83 The April representations appeared in the Department's Opposition to the Plaintiffs' Motion for Special Master Investigation; in particular, the court identified the statement that the Department had made security a top priority and ha[d] taken numerous steps to improve the security of the Reston facility since the Special Master's visit, id. at 106, and the Department's outline of its completed and planned security improvements. Id. at 106-07. The district court also took issue with the Department's May 2001 Opposition to the Plaintiffs' Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, insofar as the defendants argued the plaintiffs' position [was] wholly without merit. Id. at 107. 84 The district court apparently found these statements to be false based upon the Report on IT Security prepared by a special master (not Kieffer), and upon the Department's failure to dispute any of the underlying facts set out in that report. See id. at 108. In the report, the special master had concluded the Department has known about pervasive IT security deficiencies for more than a decade, id., and found the Department has not taken necessary actions to correct its numerous and longstanding IT security deficiencies, id. at 109, which the special master chronicled at length. 85 We see no finding of fact in the Report on IT Security, or in any opinion of the district court, that directly contradicts the statements in the Department's April Opposition, which the court identified as part of a fraud on the court. Absent a direct contradiction, the facts of this case do not support the implicit inference that Secretary Norton has acted with an intent to deceive or defraud the court. United States v. Buck, 281 F.3d 1336, 1342 (10th Cir.2002). With respect to the statement in the Department's May Opposition, we think it inconceivable that a departmental secretary may be held to have committed a fraud on the court because an attorney representing her Department argued in an adversarial proceeding that an adversary's motion critical of the Department was without merit. 86 We therefore conclude the district court erred as a matter of law in holding Secretary Norton in criminal contempt on specification five.