Opinion ID: 204254
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: VOIP Traffic

Text: We turn, then, to PRTC's final contention, which is that we should reverse the district court's holding that the Board's decision not to enumerate VOIP separately as a permissible traffic activity was arbitrary and capricious. According to PRTC, VOIP is a kind of technology, not a kind of traffic, and thus at least some of the calls placed through VOIP technology can be covered by enumerated traffic types. Given this distinction, PRTC asserts, the Board's decision not to enumerate VOIP was rational and avoided the possibility of creating new, unforeseen problems. Centennial asserts, however, that the Board committed a clear, irrational error of logic by acknowledging that the parties already exchange VOIP traffic and limiting the meet points to specified classes of traffic, yet refusing to include VOIP among the permissible types of traffic. The Board does not defend its decision at all. [19] Under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, an agency's decision will be upheld unless the agency lacks a rational basis for making the determination or if the decision was not based on consideration of the relevant factors. River St. Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 111, 114 (1st Cir.2009) (quotation marks omitted). If the district court is correct that VOIP is a kind of traffic, then one might conclude from reviewing the record that the Board commit[ted] a clear error of judgment, Town of Winthrop v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 535 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2008), justifying reversal. On the other hand, if VOIP is merely a technology already covered in part by other categories, then that would explain how the Board could say simultaneously that only enumerated traffic types could be exchanged at meet points and that the parties already were exchanging VOIP calls. That decision would, moreover, be based on a consideration of the relevant factors, such as a lack of history of disputes over VOIP calls, uncertainty about future FCC action and the potential that enumerating VOIP traffic separately could create new problems. Unfortunately, whether VOIP already is covered by the parties' interconnection agreement is an unresolved question. PRTC asserts that VOIP is a technology, but that does little to resolve the central question: whether VOIP calls are subsumed by types of traffic enumerated in the agreement. On that point, PRTC equivocates, saying only that VOIP technology may very well be. PRTC Br. 54. Nor does the Board do much to clarify its decision, telling us only that if VOIP is already covered, then there is no issue. We are hesitant to insert ourselves into the classification and regulation of VOIP traffic on such a muddled record. VOIP presents a number of sensitive technical and policy considerations better left to the FCC and state commissions. Some VOIP calls originate on a computer and terminate at a telephone, or vice versa. Other VOIP calls, however, both originate and terminate on an actual telephone; for this type of call, the internet provides the medium of transmission on at least one end of the conversation. There are obvious differences between these types of calls. The FCC may choose to treat each configuration in a different way; conversely, it may choose to treat them in the same way, or not to regulate them at all. In addition, at argument, counsel for the Board explained that a key consideration in refusing to enumerate VOIP separately was its fear that Centennial would use a general VOIP category as a Trojan horse to give it access to the meet points for types of calls for which it would otherwise owe PRTC separate compensation. Given the possibility for abuse, the lack of past disputes and the uncertain regulatory environment, we believe the Board was wise to keep its powder dry and save final resolution of the VOIP question for a later day. Cf. Town of Winthrop, 535 F.3d at 13 (holding that, when an agency is faced with an area of research . . . still developing, it is not arbitrary and capricious to decline to take action while evaluat[ing] the issue more fully). Although we agree with the district court that the Board's language is confusing, we believe that the Board's order meant to convey that some, if not all, VOIP traffic has been and will continue to be exchanged at the meet points under other, specifically enumerated headings. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., ___ U.S. ____, 129 S.Ct. 1800, 1810, 173 L.Ed.2d 738 (2009) (stating that a court should `uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned' (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286, 95 S.Ct. 438, 42 L.Ed.2d 447 (1974))). Nothing in the Act mandates that the Board permit all types of VOIP traffic to be exchanged, so the exclusion of certain types of calls not covered by enumerated traffic categories is permissible. If later disputes create a need for specific intervention, then the Board can tailor a remedy to the specific problems presented before it. Moreover, the Board can certainly take into account PRTC's representations during this litigation in assessing a proper response to any future problems.