Opinion ID: 1852083
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Steve Smith

Text: ¶ 28. Finally, Steve Smith, a friend of Powell's, testified that on one occasion, Ayars became angry while holding the baby and handed her to Powell in a hostile manner. After Powell's attorney asked the witness [h]e shook the baby?, Ayars's attorney objected. The chancellor sustained the objection, stating [y]ou don't have to show us what he did. All you need to do is tell us what happened. Smith then remarked he handed the baby to her like that. That's the best way I can put it. ¶ 29. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 614(b) specifically provides that the court may interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party. However, it is grounds for reversal if the trial judge abuses the authority to call or question a witness by abandoning his impartial position as a judge and assuming an adversarial role. West v. State, 519 So.2d 418, 422-24 (Miss.1988). In order to obtain a review of the question of propriety of remarks or conduct of the judge during a trial, the remarks must be especially called to the attention of the trial judge when made, and a correction requested or a proper objection made at the time. Tippit v. Hunter, 205 So.2d 267, 271 (Miss.1967). A limitation on this rule occurs when the conduct of the trial judge, on the entire record, was so reprehensible and prejudicial as to deny a fair trial or due process of law. Jackson Yellow Cab Co. v. Alexander, 246 Miss. 268, 277, 148 So.2d 674, 678 (1963). ¶ 30. This Court has listed some of the circumstances under which a trial judge may question witnesses, explaining: There is the frightened or excited witness to whom, by a few discreet and sympathetic interrogatories by the court, normal mental processes may be restored; there is the recalcitrant, stubborn, or extremely partisan witness upon whom it may become necessary to place the power of the court itself in order to make the witness disgorge all, instead of only a part, of the material facts actually known to him; there is a witness whose testimony is confused and in a fog, and counsel either fails to clear it up with reasonable promptness or, as often happens, adds to the confusion by a confused course of examination.... Griffin v. State, 171 Miss. 70, 156 So. 652, 653 (1934). The Court further noted that the powers of a chancellor are broader than those of a circuit judge when he sits as both judge and jury. Id. ¶ 31. Powell contends that she did not receive a fair trial as a result of the chancellor's behavior. She complains that the chancellor impeached the Utleys when they attempted to testify in her favor. Powell further argues that the chancellor attempted to rehabilitate Ayars after he admitted he is on call twenty-four hours a day. She notes that the chancellor actually tried Christopher Jennings after he recalled the incident in which Ayars allegedly ran him off the road and engaged in a blistering diatribe and cross-examination.... Lastly, Powell argues that the chancellor prohibited Steve Smith from physically demonstrating the manner in which Ayars angrily handed the baby to Powell when there was no objection to his doing so. ¶ 32. At trial, Powell failed to object to any of the aforementioned questions asked by the chancellor. She may not object to them for the first time on appeal. While it appears that the chancellor tread closely along the line between adversary and impartial factfinder, we hold that this issue is without merit. Though there is an exception to the procedural bar, it is limited to instances in which the chancellor's conduct was so reprehensible so as to deny a party a fair trial. Jackson Yellow Cab Co. v. Alexander, 148 So.2d at 678. That is not found in this case.