Opinion ID: 2543498
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether inflammatory closing argument by the State requires a new trial.

Text: ¶ 15. Long complains that the prosecutor's closing remarks equated to a send-a-message argument, which this Court consistently has held to be improper. Brown v. State, 986 So.2d 270 (Miss. 2008). The language specifically complained of reads as follows: You know, its not a murder case, but the sale of drugs, the illegal sale of drugs is important, ladies and gentlemen. It's important to control it, and you do so by stopping those that get caught selling drugs illegally, which is exactly what this man did. The defendant sold drugs illegally andand he's guilty, and it's time for him to be held accountable. He's selling drugs near a park as you pass through on your way to I don't know where.... I'm just glad we caught him when we did. ¶ 16. Depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, `send-a-message' arguments maystanding aloneconstitute reversible error. Brown, 986 So.2d at 275. In determining whether the argument complained of constituted an improper send-a-message argument, this Court will apply the two-prong test set forth in Spicer v. State, 921 So.2d 292 (Miss.2006). However, the Court must first determine whether defense counsel objected to the statement. Id. at 317. (Spicer further provided that, despite the absence of objection, this Court will not procedurally bar the issue where the send-a-message argument was so `inflammatory' that the trial judge should have objected on his own motion.) Id. Next, this Court must determine whether, in light of the surrounding circumstances, defense counsel invited the statement. Id. at 318. ¶ 17. If the appellant can pass these threshold inquires, Spicer states that this Court must determine (1) whether the remarks were improper, and (2) if so, whether the remarks prejudicially affected the accused's rights. Id. To clarify the Spicer test, Brown provided, to meet the second prong of the test, we hold that it must be clear beyond a reasonable doubt that, absent the prosecutor's inappropriate comments, the jury would have found the defendant guilty. Brown, 986 So.2d at 276 (emphasis original). ¶ 18. To explain the problem with send-a-message arguments, this Court stated: The jurors are representatives of the community in one sense, but they are not to vote in a representative capacity. Each juror is to apply the law to the evidence and vote accordingly. The issue which each juror must resolve is not whether or not he or she wishes to send a message but whether or not he or she believes the defendant to be guilty of the crime charged. The jury is an arm of the State but it is not an arm of the prosecution. The State includes both the prosecution and the accused. The function of the jury is to weigh the evidence and determine the facts. When the prosecution wishes to send a message they should employ Western Union. Mississippi jurors are not messenger boys. Williams v. State, 522 So.2d 201, 209 (Miss.1988). ¶ 19. This Court finds that Long cannot pass the threshold inquiries set forth in Spicer, and therefore, Long's assignment of error is without merit. Admittedly, Long failed to object during the State's closing argument. Also, the statement was not so inflammatory that the trial judge should have objected on his own motion. Spicer, 921 So.2d at 317. In this case, the statement complained of does not rise to the level of those statements which this Court has found to be improper. See, e.g., Payton v. State, 785 So.2d 267, 270 (Miss.1999); Evans v. State, 725 So.2d 613, 675 (Miss.1997); Chase v. State, 699 So.2d 521, 537 (Miss.1997); Wilcher v. State, 697 So.2d 1123, 1139 (Miss.1997); Hunter v. State, 684 So.2d 625, 637 (Miss.1996); Williams v. State, 522 So.2d 201, 209 (Miss.1988). ¶ 20. In this case, the State's remarks were simply reiterating the jury's duty set forth in the jury instructions. The members of the jury were charged with the duty to make a finding of guilt based on the testimony and evidence presented at trial. By stating that the illegal sale of drugs must be controlled, which is exactly what [Long] did, the State was suggesting that the jury find Long guilty if they believed that the evidence and testimony had proved that Long sold drugs illegally. Therefore, the State's closing remarks, taken in context, were not so `inflammatory' that the trial judge should have objected on his own motion. Spicer, 921 So.2d at 317 (quoting Payton, 785 So.2d at 270). Accordingly, we find Long's assignment of error to be without merit.