Opinion ID: 2622018
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Act Violates Due Process

Text: ś 104 All regulations and laws enacted pursuant to the State's police power are subject to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 14 S.Ct. 499, 38 L.Ed. 385 (1894); see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (stating due process is intended to protect the individual against the exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective). ś 105 To satisfy due process, the law or regulation must (1) be aimed at achieving a legitimate public purpose, (2) use means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose, and (3) not be unduly oppressive on individuals. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95, 82 S.Ct. 987, 8 L.Ed.2d 130 (1962) (citing Lawton, 152 U.S at 137, 14 S.Ct. 499). The classic statement of the rule in Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137, 14 S.Ct. 499, 38 L.Ed. 385 (1894), is still valid today. Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594, 82 S.Ct. 987; see also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 541-42, 125 S.Ct. 2074, 161 L.Ed.2d 876 (2005) (observing the Lawton due process inquiry asks whether a regulation of private property is effective in achieving some legitimate public purpose[ ] . . ., for a regulation that fails to serve any legitimate governmental objective may be so arbitrary or irrational that it runs afoul of the Due Process Clause.). ś 106 Undoubtedly the smoking ban regulates private property. See majority at 320. But more fundamentally the smoking ban prohibits private conduct. It is this regulation of private conduct I find most disturbing. ś 107 It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter. We have vindicated this principle before. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992) (plurality opinion). ś 108 In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 396-97, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923), a teacher was tried and convicted of teaching a 10-year-old the German language, contravening a statute that made it verboten to teach German. Reversing the conviction the United States Supreme Court held, [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Id. at 399, 43 S.Ct. 625 (citing cases). ś 109 Similarly in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35, 45 S.Ct. 571, 573, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925), an Oregon statute required students attend public school only. The Court held Oregon had a legitimate interest to regulate schools, teachers, and curriculum and to require all children of a certain age attend school; however, to compel attendance at public school, the State unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control. Id. at 534-35, 45 S.Ct. 571. ś 110 These cases should not be dismissed as judicial aggression toward governmental overreaching into the familial sphere under the guise of police power. As recently as 2003 the United States Supreme Court recognized the promise that [l]iberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self. . . . Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003) (emphasis added); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) (banning abortion violates substantive due process). I seriously doubt the State's health interest to protect against sexually transmitted disease, a real and verifiable concern, could constitutionally justify invading the privacy of consenting adults. ś 111 This self-autonomy includes what time you go to bed at night, how much to exercise, how much fat to eat, a choice to smoke, a choice to be around smokers as well as every other myriad private decision we make to pursue happiness in our lives (even when some choices are probably not as healthy as others). Yet these choices are the very essence of personal liberty and self-autonomy. [18] Most of us would pause if the State compelled our bedtime based on a perception that many Washingtonians are sleepless in Seattle. Hopefully in our free society the coercive power of the State is restricted from this realm. If . . . a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the constitution Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661, 8 S.Ct. 273, 31 L.Ed. 205 (1887); see also Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 162 Wash.2d 683, 694, 169 P.3d 14 (2007). ś 112 The State imposes its coercive power on the members of the Post Home, not because there are people at the Post Home who do not want to be around smokers, but quite the contrary. Every member of the Post Home would prefer smoking be permitted at the Post Home, including the seven members who are also employees. Rather, the State imposes its coercive power on the Post Home notwithstanding the desire of those locked behind its private doors to prevent outside intrusion. ś 113 According to the majority, the Act is premised on the claim that banning smoking in the Post Home is necessary to ensure the health and safety of the Post Home's seven member-employees. However, it is inherently a factual question whether the legitimate end of ensuring employees are safe from workplace dangers is advanced by banning workplace smoking. But the State submits no such facts in its affidavit to support such a proposition; it merely cites a widely discredited federal report to support its claim. See Thomas A. Lambert, The Case Against Smoking Bans, 13 Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 94, 109-111 (2006). ś 114 The focus on secondhand smoke as an alleged workplace danger began in 1993 with the classification by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of secondhand smoke as a Class A carcinogen, supposedly causing an approximate 3,000 deaths of nonsmoking adults per year. [19] Shortly after the EPA released its report, a congressional inquiry found the Agency has deliberately abused and manipulated the scientific data in order to reach a predetermined, politically motivated result. . . . [The] EPA was able to reach that conclusion only by ignoring or discounting major studies and by deviating from generally accepted scientific standards. [20] ś 115 Courts have also questioned the EPA's conclusion secondhand smoke presents a danger in the workplace. The court is faced with the ugly possibility that EPA adopted a methodology for each chapter, without explanation, based on the outcome sought in that chapter. Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 4 F.Supp.2d 435, 456 (M.D.N.C.1998), vacated on other grounds, 313 F.3d 852 (4th Cir.2002). That court, unlike our own, was more concerned with finding the Truth than merely identifying and upholding government policy. The court concluded: EPA publicly committed to a conclusion before research had begun; . . . adjusted established procedure and scientific norms to validate the Agency's public conclusion, and aggressively utilized the Act's authority to disseminate findings to establish a de facto regulatory scheme intended to restrict [tobacco] products and to influence public opinion. . . . EPA disregarded information and made findings on selective information; did not disseminate significant epidemiologic information; deviated from its Risk Assessment Guidelines; failed to disclose important findings and reasoning; and left significant questions without answers.. . . While so doing, EPA produced limited evidence, then claimed the weight of the Agency's research evidence demonstrated ETS [environmental tobacco smoke] causes cancer. Id. at 465-66 (footnote omitted). ś 116 Subsequent studies confirm these criticisms to question the supposed connection between cancer and secondhand smoke. [21] A respected study, primarily funded by the American Cancer Society, of more than 35,000 nonsmoking Californians married to smokers concluded, [t]he results do not support a causal relation between environmental tobacco smoke and tobacco related mortality, although they do not rule out a small effect. The association between exposure to environmental tobacco smoke and coronary heart disease and lung cancer may be considerably weaker than generally believed. [22] ś 117 These criticisms of the dangers of secondhand smoke have not gone unnoticed. Smoking ban proponents often answer these criticisms not with contradictory scientific data but with ad hominem attacks on the scientists themselves. [23] ś 118 As a famous lawyer once asked, What is to be done? [24] ś 119 Recall the three-prong test that must be satisfied before the State may regulate private property or prohibit private lawful conduct. Under the first prong we ask if there is a legitimate public purpose for the action. The stated purpose of the smoking ban is workplace safety: The people of the state of Washington recognize that exposure to second-hand smoke is known to cause cancer in humans. Secondhand smoke is a known cause of other diseases including pneumonia, asthma, bronchitis, and heart disease. Citizens are often exposed to second-hand smoke in the workplace, and are likely to develop chronic, potentially fatal diseases as a result of such exposure. In order to protect the health and welfare of all citizens, including workers in their places of employment, it is necessary to prohibit smoking in public places and workplaces. RCW 70.160.011 (emphasis added); see also CP at 227 (State's memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment stating, challenged laws cannot reasonably be characterized as anything other than police power legislation rationally related to protecting employees from the known health risks of secondhand smoke (emphasis added)). ś 120 I agree modern jurisprudence recognizes workplace safety as a legitimate public purpose. See, e.g., Parrish v. W. Coast Hotel Co., 185 Wash. 581, 55 P.2d 1083 (1936) (upholding a statute governing wages and working conditions of female and child laborers), aff'd, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703 (1937). However, `[w]hen our rulers worry about our health, we should worry about our liberty.' Joseph Sobran, The Wanderer 5 (June 26, 1997), quoted in Seeley v. State, 132 Wash.2d 776, 814, 940 P.2d 604 (1997) (Sanders, J., dissenting). ś 121 Under the second prong of the test, we look to the necessity of the action to achieve that legitimate public purpose. Absent a substantial relation to the achievement of the legitimate public purpose, the State may not regulate or prohibit the free conduct of its citizens. See Biggers, 162 Wash.2d at 694, 169 P.3d 14; see also Petstel, Inc. v. King County, 77 Wash.2d 144, 154, 459 P.2d 937 (1969) (stating, even though the activity in question be subject to police power regulation, the legislation must be substantially related to the evil sought to be cured). ś 122 As shown above whether secondhand smoke is the known cause of disease is far from self-evident for summary judgment purposes. Dr. Elizabeth Whelan, President of the American Council on Science and Health (and an antismoking advocate) observed, the role of ETS [environmental tobacco smoke] in the development of chronic diseases like cancer and heart disease is uncertain and controversial. [25] ś 123 If there is no proven causal relation between secondhand smoke and workplace dangers, the prohibition of smoking is arbitrary; arbitrary regulations violate due process. [26] See Lawton, 152 U.S. at 137, 14 S.Ct. 499 (stating a legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations.). A mere possibility of harm is insufficient. See State ex rel. Wenatchee Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Wenatchee, 50 Wash.2d 378, 384, 312 P.2d 195 (1957). Even slight harm is equally insufficient. See Lambert, supra, at 111 ([P]aternalistic regulations aimed solely at reducing risks . . . are justifiable only when the risk is relatively serious and the liberty intrusion occasioned by the regulation is relatively minor.). As succinctly stated by Dr. Michael Siegel, professor in the Social and Behavioral Sciences Department, Boston University School of Public Health and noted antismoking advocate, The ends do not justify the means, especially when those means are violating principles of autonomy and self-determination that form the essential bases for free societies. These are values which cannot and should not be trodden upon by public health organizations simply to promote a favored policy. [27] ś 124 I would hold the Act violates substantive due process absent proof, persuasive to the fact finder, that the stated reason for the Act is actually and substantially advanced by the implementation of the prohibition. [28] This is not to require undisputed or absolute scientific proof, as the majority interprets, but instead merely to require the declared reason for the Act be actually and substantially advanced. Majority at 324 n. 28. Absent this minimal requirement, individuals hold their liberty in trust for the State to extinguish at its leisure.