Opinion ID: 1974115
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: legal analysis of respondent's conviction

Text: In light of the controlling precedents discussed supra, we turn to a legal analysis of the statutory provisions defining the elements of the crime of which Respondent was convicted. The focus of this analysis is to determine whether such elements necessarily required proof of an intent to defraud.
Respondent's conviction was entered in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on a plea of guilty to an information charging him with aiding and abetting another person in the commission of passport fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1028(a)(4). The pertinent statutory provisions are as follows: § 2 Principals (a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.       § 1028 Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Identification Documents (a) Whoever . . . (4) knowingly possesses an identification document (other than one issued lawfully for the use of the possessor) or a false identification document, with the intent such document be used to defraud the United States ... shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section. Subsection (b)(3) provides that the offense defined in § 1028(a)(4) is punishable by a fine of not more than $5000 or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. It is therefore a misdemeanor offense, whereas the punishment for violations of certain other subsections of § 1028(a) cause them to be felonies. It is acknowledged that respondent's conviction was under 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) for aiding and abetting a pro bono client, Ms. Patricia Shahid, in committing passport fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(4). The elements of such conviction requires a legal analysis of the interplay between the aider/abetter provisions of § 2(a) of the Criminal Code and the substantive offense defined in § 1028(a)(4). The controlling precedent is Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 100 S.Ct. 1999, 64 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980). As the Court observed, the Common Law dealt with parties to a crime in terms of principals and accessories, and over the years, the Common Law became riddled with `intricate' distinctions. Id. at 15, 100 S.Ct. at 2003. As part of a turn-of-the-century reform movement, Congress in 1909 enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2 to eliminate such intricate Common Law distinctions and to provide instead that all persons participating in the commission of a crime, either directly or as one who aids and abets its commission, should be tried and punished as principals. Thus, as originally enacted, 18 U.S.C. § 2 expressly provided that anyone who aids or abets the commission of a crime is a principal. 447 U.S. at 18, 100 S.Ct. at 2005. In 1951, Congress changed the words is a principal to the words is punishable as a principal. As the Supreme Court observed, this change was designed to eliminate all doubt that in the case of offenses whose prohibition is directed at members of specified classes ( e.g., federal employees), a person who is not himself a member of that class may nonetheless be punished as a principal if he induces a person in that class to violate the prohibition. Id. As the Standefer Court held, a criminal trial under 18 U.S.C. § 2 imposes upon the government the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that [the other person committed the alleged underlying crime]... and that petitioner aided and abetted him in that venture. Id. at 26, 100 S.Ct. at 2009. However, it is clear that 18 U.S.C. § 2 does not create a wholly independent crime, and indeed there is no penalty applicable to § 2. It simply abolishes the old Common Law intricacies of principal and accessory, and if the requirements of § 2 are satisfied, the aider and abetter is a principal subject to the same punishment as the other person committing the alleged underlying crime. United States v. Kegler, 724 F.2d 190 (D.C.Cir.1984). A leading opinion in this jurisdiction is United States v. Raper, 676 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir.1982). As the court observed, there must be a guilty principal before a second party can be found to be an aider and abetter, but the party who aids or abets the offense is guilty under the statute as a principal. Id. at 849. According to the Raper court, the elements of an aiding and abetting offense are the following: (1) the specific intent [of the alleged aider or abetter] to facilitate the commission of a crime by another; (2) guilty knowledge on the part of the accused; (3) that an offense was being committed by someone; and (4) that the accused assisted or participated in the commission of the offense. Id. at 849 (citations omitted). With respect to the third element listed by the Raper court, the law is clear that proof in the aiding and abetting case must establish every element of the criminal offense allegedly committed by another person. As stated by the Ninth Circuit, the jury in the aiding and abetting case must find every essential element of the crime allegedly committed by the other person as a prerequisite to conviction of the alleged aider and abetter. United States v. Short, 493 F.2d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir.1974). It is not necessary to conviction of an aider and abetter that the other person be tried and convicted, or even that such person be identified. United States v. Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 947, 85 S.Ct. 440, 13 L.Ed.2d 544 (1964). Indeed, the aider and abetter can be convicted even though the other person is acquitted, because the fate of other participants [in their trials] is irrelevant. United States v. Sandefer, 447 U.S. 10, 20, 100 S.Ct. 1999, 64 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980). However, all elements of the criminal offense allegedly committed by the other person must be established in the case against the alleged aider and abetter. The first and second elements identified by the Raper court (specific intent and guilty knowledge) are closely related. These two elements require proof that the alleged aider and abetter had actual knowledge of the other person's conduct and intent with respect to every material element of the crime allegedly committed by such other person. For example, in a case where the alleged underlying crime was armed bank robbery, the trial court instructed the jury that the alleged aider and abetter could be found guilty without proof of his knowledge that the other person inside the bank had a gun. Since use of a gun was an essential element of the alleged underlying crime of armed robbery, this instruction was erroneous because it is the aider and abetter's state of mind, rather than the state of mind of the principal, that determines the former's liability. United States v. Short, 493 F.2d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir.1974). The fourth element of aiding or abetting requires proof that the accused assisted or participated in the commission of the underlying offense. The legal standard was initially formulated by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2nd Cir.1938). The alleged aider and abetter must . . . associate himself with the [criminal] venture . . . participate in it as something that he wishes to bring about and ... seek by his action to make it succeed. Id. at 402. This standard for establishing the required participation of the alleged aider and abetter has been adopted by the Supreme Court and numerous lower federal courts. E.g., Nye and Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619, 69 S.Ct. 766, 769, 93 L.Ed. 919 (1949); United States v. Staten, 581 F.2d 878, 887 (D.C.Cir.1978); United States v. Holder, 566 F.2d 617, 619 (8th Cir.1977). As refined by the Raper court: All that is necessary is to show some affirmative participation which at least encourages the principal offender to commit the offense, with all its elements, as proscribed by the statute. 676 F.2d at 850. We turn next to the essential elements of the alleged underlying criminal offense by the other person who, in this case, was Respondent's client, Ms. Shahid. She allegedly violated 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(4), the language of which breaks down into the following elements: (1) Ms. Shahid knowingly possess[ed] an identification document (other than one issued lawfully for the use of the possessor); or (2) Ms. Shahid knowingly possess[ed]... a false identification document; and (3) Ms. Shahid had the intent [that] such document be used to defraud the United States. Elements (1) and (2) above are alternative requirements, i.e., Ms. Shahid knowingly possessed either a counterfeit or a false identification document. For purposes of determining whether the Respondent's aiding and abetting offense involved moral turpitude, the Board perceives no legal significance in the possibility that Ms. Shahid's alleged crime could have been predicated on either a counterfeit document or a false document. Ms. Shahid's alleged offense required proof of her possession of either a counterfeit or false identification document. Of course, proof of possession by Ms. Shahid does not establish possession by Respondent, the alleged aider and abetter. This distinction, however, is of no avail because the courts have held that an aiding and abetting offense, when predicated on another party's underlying crime which requires as an essential element the possession of something, there is no need to prove that the aider and abetteor possessed the thing in question. This was the principal holding in the Raper case. 676 F.2d at 850. On the other hand, the government's proof must establish that the aider and abetter had guilty knowledge of the other person's possession of the thing in question. As to the intent element in Ms. Shahid's alleged criminal offense, the statute required proof of her intent [that] such document be used to defraud the United States, which the information identified as passport fraud. Accordingly, Respondent's conviction established that he had the specific intent to facilitate Ms. Shahid's commission of her alleged crime requiring such intent to defraud and that Respondent further had guilty knowledge of the criminal venture. Raper, 676 F.2d at 849; see discussion supra. To sum up, based on the essential elements of the crime involved in Respondent's conviction, the following must be accepted as true for purposes of the moral turpitude issue: 1. Ms. Shahid had possession of either a counterfeit or false identification document; 2. Ms. Shahid had the intent to use such identification document to defraud the United States by means of passport fraud; 3. Ms. Shahid therefore committed a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(4); 4. Respondent had the specific intent to facilitate commission of the crime by Ms. Shahid; 5. Respondent had contemporaneous guilty knowledge of the criminal offense, including all of its elements, as the crime was being committed by Ms. Shahid; and 6. Respondent knowingly assisted or participated in the commission of Ms. Shahid's criminal offense. The Board concludes that the above elements establish that the crime of which Respondent was convicted was one involving a knowing intent to defraud. Under the controlling rule of Willcher discussed supra, Respondent's conviction was of a crime that involves moral turpitude per se.
Respondent's brief advances various arguments to support the contention that the criminal offense here in question did not involve moral turpitude per se. None of these arguments is persuasive. 1. The Misdemeanor and Aider and Abetter Arguments. Respondent's brief urges that the Board should consider both that the violation is a misdemeanor and that Mr. McBride was charged only as an aider and abetter, not a principal. Respondent's Brief to Board at 17. As part of this same line of argument, Respondent also urges that his criminal conviction does not involve moral turpitude per se inasmuch as other criminal offenses not involving moral turpitude per se require conduct far more harmful [than] Respondent's crime. The Board is not persuaded by any of these arguments. It is legally irrelevant whether the criminal conviction involves a misdemeanor or a felony. Indeed, the court's seminal decision, which established that crimes requiring proof of intentional fraud involve moral turpitude per se, was handed down in a case involving a misdemeanor. In re Willcher, 447 A.2d 1198, 1199 (D.C.1982). Closely related to Respondent's misdemeanor argument is the contention that a comparison of the maximum punishment applicable to the various offenses in 18 U.S.C. § 1028 shows that Respondent's offense under subsection (a)(4) calls for the least punishment and is therefore the least culpable offense in § 1028. This argument is predicated on the further assertion that the more culpable offenses in 18 U.S.C. § 1028 do not involve moral turpitude per se and that therefore the least culpable offense in subsection (a)(4) must also be free of moral turpitude per se. This argument is a non sequitur because it assumes, without any valid basis, that Congress always proportionalizes criminal punishment based on degrees of moral turpitude involved in the criminal conduct. The further contention that a distinction should be made between an aider and abetter as compared to a principal is also unavailing. It is contrary to the overwhelming authority that an aider and abetter is a principal under federal criminal law, and is therefore subject to the same punishment as the other person who was aided and abetted. Respondent further argues that his plea bargain agreement was based on an alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(4) because government prosecutors wanted him to receive the least amount of criminal punishment provided by this statute. Respondent also notes that the sentencing judge placed him on probation with the hope that Respondent could fulfill his community service obligations by practicing law. Once again, these are facts which, if true, might be considered in mitigation or explanation of the circumstances underlying Respondent's conviction, but all such facts are legally irrelevant in the Board's initial determination of the moral turpitude issue. Nor does it advance Respondent's cause to point to cases where no moral turpitude per se was found for criminal offenses involving conduct allegedly far more harmful than Respondent's conduct in this case. As noted, the Board is not concerned with an examination of all of the facts and circumstances of Respondent's conduct underlying the criminal offense. Rather, we are concerned only with the essential elements of Respondent's criminal offense as determined by a legal analysis. Respondent's cause would be advanced if one could point to a post- Willcher decision of the court holding that a particular crime did not involve moral turpitude per se even though it did involve a knowing intent to defraud. Unfortunately, from Respondent's point of view, there is no such post- Willcher decision. 2. Respondent's Legislative History Argument. Respondent argues that the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(4) shows that the crucial statutory language requiring proof of intent to defraud the United States has such a broad meaning that it encompasses criminal conduct under hundreds of such [federal] statutes, only a tiny fraction of which will involved moral turpitude. Respondent's Brief at 15. Once again, the Board is not persuaded. Respondent's crime is based on an information charging passport fraud, and nothing in the legislative history indicates that this type of crime does not involve moral turpitude per se under Willcher. Respondent relies on a passage in House Report No. 97-802 (Sept. 10, 1982), which accompanied H.R. 6946, the Bill that was enacted as 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(4) on December 31, 1982. The full pertinent text of this portion of the House Report is set forth below: The fourth offense [18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(4)] ... is knowing possession of ... a false identification document, with the intent such document be used to defraud the United States.... The Committee intends that possession with the intent to commit any offense that would be subsumed under the term defraud the United States would be covered. It is the view of the Committee that the intent to defraud the United States in this context is an intent to use the identification document to commit an offense against the United States, for example, an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. The term defraud the United States is not simply a misrepresentation ... but would include use of false identification to obstruct functions of the government. U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, 3519, at 3529 (Dec.1982). The above passage makes crystal clear that the term defraud the United States requires something more than a misrepresentation. The two specific examples cited in the Committee's Report are illuminating. One such example is the use of false identification to obstruct functions of the Government. The Board can perceive no meaningful distinction that would preclude a finding of moral turpitude per se where a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(4) is based on a knowing intent to use false identification in obstructing the functioning of the federal government by means of passport fraud. The other example of intent to defraud, as set forth in the House Report, is use of a false identification document to commit an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. This section of the Criminal Code defines a criminal offense with respect to any material fact which the defendant knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme or device in a matter before a department or agency of the federal government. If an intent to defraud the United States through a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 is illustrative of the intent to defraud required by § 1028(a)(2), as suggested by the House Report, such legislative history provides scant support for Respondent's argument that the intent to defraud element in his passport fraud conviction could have been supplied by means of a violation of hundreds of other federal statutes, only a tiny fraction of which involve moral turpitude. The House Report cited by Respondent also stated that the Committee intends that the term `with the intent' have the same culpable state of mind as the term `purpose' as used in the Model Penal Code (§ 2.02). U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 3528 (Dec.1982). The Committee's Report then quoted with approval a recent Supreme Court opinion defining the word purpose or purposefully as requiring proof that the person consciously desires a particular result. As applied to the instant case, this would require that Respondent consciously desired the success of Ms. Shahid's efforts to engage in passport fraud. Moreover, Respondent's reliance on In re Meisnere, 471 A.2d 269 (D.C.1984) is misplaced. In Meisnere, the Board concluded, and the court agreed, that the attorney's conviction on a guilty plea to an alleged violation of the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, involved a crime of moral turpitude per se. This conclusion was proper because the information ... specifically charged conspiracy knowingly to defraud the United States by obstructing the Treasury Department in its attempt to ascertain the assets of and the taxes due from another person ... which ... necessarily required proof of intent to defraud. Id. at 270. The Board's report in Meisnere simply noted, by way of dictum, that an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 371 does not necessarily constitute moral turpitude per se  because § 371 encompasses not only a conspiracy to defraud the United States but also an agreement or conspiracy to commit  any offense against the United States. In this case, Respondent's conviction was based on an information charging passport fraud under a statute which explicitly requires proof of an intent to use a counterfeit or false identification document to defraud the United States. When 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(4) is read together with the information charging passport fraud, the Board can find no legal basis for the position that Respondent's conviction did not constitute a crime involving a knowing intent to defraud.