Opinion ID: 3012576
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Heading: introduction

Text: It has been well established, as the Supreme Court enunciated thirty-five years ago, that a defendant company who possesses monopoly power in the relevant market will be found in violation of S 2 of the Sherman Act if the defendant wilfully acquired or maintained that power. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). In many S 2 cases, the parties spend much time and effort in seeking to define the market and to determine 36 whether the defendant has monopoly power. Fortunately, in this case we need devote no effort to these issues. It is agreed that the relevant product market is transparent tape, and the relevant geographic market is the United States.1 Moreover, as to the issue of monopoly power, 3M concedes it possesses monopoly power in the United States transparent tape market, with a ninety percent market share. In fact, the evidence showed that the household penetration of 3M's Scotch-brand tape is virtually one hundred percent. The sole remaining issue and our focus on this appeal is whether 3M took steps to maintain that power in a manner that violated S 2 of the Sherman Act. A monopolist wilfully acquires or maintains monopoly power when it competes on some basis other than the merits. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 482-83 (1992); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 n.32 (1985). The District Court, in instructing the jury on Count I, LePage's claim of unlawful maintenance of monopoly power under S 2, explained: Count I in this case is unlawful maintenance of monopoly power. LePage's alleges that it was injured by 3M's unlawful monopolization in the United States market for invisible and transparent tape for home and office use. To win on their claim of monopolization, LePage's must prove each of the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence. First, that 3M had monopoly power in the relevant market. Secondly, that 3M willfully maintained that power through predatory or exclusionary conduct. . . . _________________________________________________________________ 1. Although 3M originally challenged LePage's selection of the United States as the relevant geographic market, App. at 7, the District Court held that LePage's had introduced sufficient evidence from which the jury could properly find that the relevant geographic market is the United States and 3M does not challenge that market definition on appeal. 37 And thirdly, that LePage's was injured in its business or property because of 3M's restrictive or exclusionary conduct. App. at 5663-64. The jury was given the following questions on Count I. (1) Do you find that LePage's has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the relevant market is invisible and transparent tape for home and office use in the United States? (2) Do you find that LePage's has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 3M unlawfully maintained monopoly power as defined under the instructions for Count I?; [and] [(3)] Do you find that LePage's has proven, as a matter of fact and with a fair degree of certainty, that 3M's unlawful maintenance of monopoly power injured LePage's business or property as defined in these instructions? App. at 6523. The jury answered yes to each of the three questions. It awarded LePage's more than $22 million before trebling. Our review of a jury's verdict is limited to determining whether some evidence in the record supports the jury's verdict. Swineford v. Snyder County, 15 F.3d 1258, 1265 (3d Cir. 1994) (A jury verdict will not be overturned unless the record is critically deficient of that quantum of evidence from which a jury could have rationally reached its verdict.). This is essentially the same inquiry that the District Court made. In considering whether to overturn the jury's verdict, this court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, here LePage's. Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993). We must accord LePage's the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference. Id. LePage's alleges that 3M wilfully maintained its monopoly in the transparent tape market primarily by bundling its rebates and by exclusionary conduct, such as by contracts that expressly or effectively required dealing virtually 38 exclusively with 3M. 3M does not argue that it did not engage in this conduct. It agrees that it offered bundled rebates and entered into some exclusive dealing contracts. Instead, 3M argues that its conduct was legal as a matter of law because it never priced its transparent tape above its cost. For this argument, it relies on the Supreme Court's decision in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). The majority in essence agrees. But Brooke Group did not deal with a monopolist and the antitrust claim in that case was predatory pricing, which is not one that LePage's raised here. The majority discusses bundled rebates and exclusive dealing separately. I view that as a serious error. That is because in determining whether a monopolist competes on some basis other than the merits, which as noted is the definition of monopolistic behavior, almost all courts, including this one, have looked to the monopolist's conduct taken as a whole rather than considering each aspect in isolation. See, e.g., Cont'l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699 (1962) (statingin a case like the one before us [alleging S 1 andS 2 violations], the duty of the jury was to look at the whole picture and not merely at the individual figures in it) (citation and quotation omitted); SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056, 1061 n.3 (3d Cir. 1978) (determining that although defendant's anticompetitive scheme lack[ed] the element of coercion necessary for liability under the theory of tie-ins [under S 1], the evidence of tying was sufficient to establish the offense of monopolization underS 2 of the Sherman Act); City of Anaheim v. So. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1376 (9th Cir. 1992) ([I]t would not be proper to focus on specific individual acts of an accused monopolist while refusing to consider their overall combined effect. . . . We are dealing with what has been called the `synergistic effect' of the mixture of the elements.); Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1522 n.18 (10th Cir. 1984) (Each of the six [aspects of defendant's exclusionary conduct2] _________________________________________________________________ 2. The six aspects referred to by the court were(1) forcing plaintiff out of the four-area ticket by requiring that revenues be divided below 39 viewed in isolation need not be supported by sufficient evidence to amount to a S 2 violation. It is enough that taken together they are sufficient to prove the monopolization claim.), aff 'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 585 (1985); City of Groton v. Conn. Light & Power Co., 662 F.2d 921, 928 (2d Cir. 1981) ( `It is the mix of the various ingredients of utility behavior in a monopoly broth that produces its unsavory flavor.' ) (quoting City of Mishawaka v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 616 F.2d 976, 986 (7th Cir. 1980)); Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T, 651 F.2d 76, 95 n.28 (2d Cir. 1981) (following Continental Ore to consider defendants' various activities as a whole, although concluding proof of violation utterly lacking); cf. United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 78 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (avoiding issue because district court did not point to any series of acts, each of which harms competition only slightly but the cumulative effect of which is significant enough to form an independent basis for liability); 2 Philip E. Areeda, Roger D. Blair & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law P 310, at 147 (2d ed. 2000) (In a monopolization case, conduct must always be analyzed `as a whole.' A monopolist bent on preserving its dominant position is likely to engage in repeated and varied exclusionary practices. Each one viewed in isolation might be viewed as de minimis . . . , but the pattern gives increased plausibility to the claim.). In concluding that there was an insufficient basis to support the jury's verdict, the majority fails to consider whether the synergistic effect of the conduct considered as a whole is anticompetitive. As will be seen, even considered individually the evidence underlying each of LePage's claims supports the jury's verdict. When 3M's conduct is considered as a whole, the conclusion is inescapable that the synergistic effect of 3M's conduct was anticompetitive. _________________________________________________________________ plaintiff 's market share; (2) substituting defendant's three area ticket for a four area ticket; (3) marketing and advertising its three mountains in a manner designed to convince consumers that Aspen had only three mountains, not mentioning Aspen Highlands; (4) making an agreement with a tour operator to sell defendant's tickets to the exclusion of plaintiffs; (5) refusing to accept plaintiff 's coupons during the 1978-79 season; and (6) raising ticket prices for a single-day lift ticket thus eliminating plaintiff 's ability to offer a multi-area ticket. Id. at 1517. 40 II.