Opinion ID: 1197830
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The instruction given the jury when it appeared deadlocked.

Text: Staude contends that the instruction given to the jury when it appeared deadlocked, often called an Allen charge, was error because it was not the instruction approved by this court in Wilkins v. State, 96 Nev. 367, 372-74 n. 2, 609 P.2d 309, 313 n. 2 (1980). Staude specifically argues that the instruction given was not neutral because it was directed only at jurors having a reasonable doubt. The district court gave the jury an instruction which this court deemed satisfactory in Hudson v. State, 92 Nev. 84, 88-89 n. 3, 545 P.2d 1163, 1166 n. 3 (1976), four years before Wilkins. The instruction stated in part that a dissenting juror should consider whether the doubt in his or her mind is a reasonable one, when it makes no impression on the minds of so many jurors equally honest, equally intelligent, with him or her, who have heard the same evidence with an equal desire to arrive at the truth under the sanction of the same oath. In contrast, the instruction later approved in Wilkins is directed at all jurors, not just those with reasonable doubts. [1] The judicial concern in regard to Allen charges is that they not coerce jurors into reaching a verdict. This court has reluctantly approved the Allen charge if it clearly informs the jury that each member has a duty to adhere conscientiously to his or her own honest opinion, and if it avoids creating the impression that there is anything improper, questionable or contrary to good conscience for a juror to create a mistrial. Wilkins, 96 Nev. at 373, 609 P.2d at 312. In order to ensure that juries are so informed, we expressly approved the American Bar Association version of the Allen charge and set it forth for the future guidance of our district courts. Id., 609 P.2d at 313. The Hudson charge used by the district court improperly focused only on jurors supporting acquittal, and the court erred in not using the instruction approved in Wilkins. We expressly direct the district courts should they find use of an Allen charge absolutely necessaryto employ the version set forth in Wilkins. However, we conclude that the charge given below was not unduly coercive in this case. It still clearly informed the jurors that they were not to give up a conscientious conclusion for the sake of reaching a verdict. Also, after receiving the charge, the jury deliberated for nearly five more hours before reaching the guilty verdict. Although not dispositive of the issue, this fact suggests that the instruction did not coerce the jury into agreeing to a verdict. See Wilkins, 96 Nev. at 373, 609 P.2d at 313.