Opinion ID: 2207646
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Partition Proceedings Severance of Successive Ownerships

Text: The Court of Chancery held that, although he only owned a life estate, Peters was entitled to compel a partition of the Houston Farm because he held that life estate concurrently in an undivided one-third interest as a tenant in common with Thomas, Sr. and Robert. See 25 Del.C. § 721(c). Peters argues that after the Court of Chancery partitioned the Houston Farm in kind into three parts, it erred by not further partitioning or ordering a sale of the parcel to which his life interest had been assigned. Thus, the dispositive issue in the case sub judice is whether Peters' right to compel partition extends to the remainder interest held by Thomas, Jr. Peters' argument raises a question of apparent first impression in Delaware. However, the answer is well-established by the common law. It has already been noted that at common law the historical purpose of a partition proceeding was to permit co-tenants to sever concurrent ownership interests. See Simes & Smith, The Law of Future Interests § 1769 (2d ed. 1956). Conversely, in the absence of concurrent ownership, partition could not be had at common law between owners in severalty of successive estates. Id. See also 2 American Law of Property § 6.23, at 101. Successive owners, such as those holding a life estate and the remainder interest, are not co-tenants and [t]here is no possibility of them ever being entitled concurrently to possession of the same piece of land. Barden v. Pappas, Fla.App., 532 So.2d 707, 709-10 (1988). [2] Consequently, the general rule at common law was that a life tenant could not maintain a partition proceeding against persons who owned the remainder interest. 4 Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law of Real Property §§ 1822, 1824. Therefore, as a matter of common law, life tenants were not entitled to seek partition against holders of remainder interests. Simes & Smith, The Law of Future Interests §§ 1764, 1769. See, e.g., Dixon v. Dixon, 189 Neb. 212, 202 N.W.2d 180, 181-82 (1972). The common law rule has been summarized as follows: Partition involves primarily the idea of a severance of concurrent ownership, not the severance of successive ownerships. Certainly the common-law notion is that the parties are to be permitted to enjoy the possession in severalty; but it does not include a mere severance of title, where joint possession of enjoyment is not involved. And, if the applicable partition statute gives the power to partition only to possessory owners, it seems clear that the statutory provision for partition still, in the main, proceeds upon this common-law doctrine. Thus, if Blackacre is given to A for life, with reversion or remainder to B in fee, A cannot succeed in an action for partition as against B. Dixon v. Dixon, 202 N.W.2d at 181-82 (quoting Simes & Smith, The Law of Future Interests § 1769). Similar statements of the rule are found in the American Law of Property: As partition can be had only between cotenants, it goes without saying that partition cannot be had between owners in severalty of successive estates such as a life tenant and a reversioner or remainderman in fee. Id. (quoting 2 American Law of Property § 6.23, at 101). An example provided in Section 126 of the Restatement of the Law of Property illustrates that the partition decree entered by the Court of Chancery, pursuant to Peters' petition, was completely in accordance with the general common law rule: A, owning Blackacre in fee simple absolute, transfers Blackacre as an undivided one-half interest therein to B and his heirs and as to the other undivided one-half interest therein to C for life, remainder to D and his heirs. C has the power to compel the partitioning of Blackacre and in a case where Blackacre is physically divisible, this partition operates so that B acquires an estate in fee simple absolute in the specific land allotted to him, and C and D acquire, respectively, an estate for life and a remainder estate in fee simple absolute in the balance of Blackacre. Restatement of the Law of Property § 126 illus. 1 (1936).