Opinion ID: 1701107
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Improper Double Enhancement

Text: This court has not determined whether a criminal penalty may be enhanced under both the third offense DWI statute, SDCL 32-23-4, and the habitual felony offender provision, SDCL 22-7-7. The only similar situation confronted by this court was in State v. Layton, 337 N.W.2d 809 (S.D. 1983). In Layton an inmate defendant was convicted of a felony. He was sentenced as an inmate felon subject to a double penalty under SDCL 22-6-5.1 and, in turn, sentenced as a habitual felony offender under SDCL 22-7-8. We approved the sentence in Layton because each of the two penalty enhancement provisions served a distinct purpose. In reaching our conclusion in Layton we stated: The individual who commits felonies while incarcerated exhibits a callous disregard of our penal system, is dangerous to penitentiary personnel, and wreaks havoc with an institution which can exist only through discipline. SDCL 22-6-5.1, the inmate doubling statute, operates in part to protect the unarmed penitentiary guards who must risk their safety to enforce penitentiary rules. SDCL 22-7-8, our habitual offender statute, operates to protect society from the individual who, through his continued felonious conduct, exhibits that efforts of rehabilitation have failed. These two statutes serve distinct purposes, each being a vital concern to our criminal justice system. Layton, 337 N.W.2d at 816. This case presents a situation unlike that in Layton. The use of both SDCL 32-23-4 and SDCL 22-7-7 to enhance the penalty for petitioner's DWI offense accomplishes the same purpose: it enhances his punishment for the subsequent commission of the same criminal offense. As a result, the dual purpose rationale relied upon in allowing double enhancement of the penalty in Layton is not present in this case. In a case involving a factual situation nearly identical to this one, the Supreme Court of Nebraska ruled that the specificity of the language in that state's DWI repeat offender statute, which was, if such conviction is for a third offense, or subsequent offense thereafter, such person shall be imprisoned ..., (emphasis original) yielded the conclusion that it was a specific DWI habitual criminal statute excluding application of a general habitual felony provision. State v. Chapman, 205 Neb. 368, 287 N.W.2d 697, 699 (1980), citing Neb.Rev.Stat. § 39-669.07(3) (1943). We find the reasoning of the Nebraska Supreme Court persuasive in our review of SDCL 32-23-4, the third offense DWI statute. Like the Nebraska statute, it specifically states, [i]f conviction for a violation of § 32-23-1 is for a third offense, or subsequent offense thereafter, the person is guilty of a Class 6 felony.... (emphasis added). We similarly conclude that SDCL 32-23-4 is a self-contained, specific habitual criminal statute. Rules of statutory construction require that a statute that is specific and express controls over a more general statute, Marshall v. State, 302 N.W.2d 52 (S.D.1981). We find the general felony habitual offender statute inapplicable in sentencing a repeat DWI offender. SDCL 22-7-7 provides, in part: When a defendant has been convicted of one or two prior felonies under the laws of this state or any other state or the United States, in addition to the principal felony, the sentence for the principal felony shall be enhanced by changing the class of the principal felony to the next class which is more severe. The determination of whether a prior offense is a felony for purposes of this chapter shall be determined by whether it is a felony under the laws of this state or under the laws of the United States at the time of conviction of such prior offense.... On its face, this language purports to apply to principal and prior felonies as opposed to misdemeanors enhanced to felony status. [] This conclusion is in keeping with our holding that, [t]he habitual offender act [SDCL ch. 22-7] is a highly penal enactment and, therefore, it should be strictly construed and applied. State v. Grooms, 339 N.W.2d 318 (S.D.1983). This conclusion is also in keeping with State v. Helling, 391 N.W.2d 648, (S.D.1986) where we held that a person charged with a third offense DWI was not entitled to additional (felony) peremptory challenges on the underlying charge. We hold, therefore, that SDCL 32-23-4 provides an exclusive sentencing scheme for repeat DWI offenders and that the sentencing court erred in levying a sentence enhanced under both SDCL 32-23-4 and SDCL 22-7-7. Therefore, we reverse and remand for resentencing. WUEST, C.J., and MORGAN, J., concur. HENDERSON, J., concurs in result. MILLER, J., disqualified.