Opinion ID: 2789212
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence as to Materiality

Text: A statement is material under § 1621(1) if it is 'capable of influencing the tribunal on the issue before it.' Scivola, 766 F.2d at 44 (quoting United States v. Giarratano, 622 F.2d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1980)) (discussing materiality under 18 U.S.C. § 1623); see also Moreno Morales, 815 F.2d at 747 (applying Scivola to 18 U.S.C. § 1621). This test is a broad one. Scivola, 766 F.2d at 44. The statement need not be material to any particular issue in the case, but rather may be material to any proper matter of the -15- [decisionmaker]'s inquiry . . . . Id. (suggesting that this includ[es] the issue of credibility). Nor must the statement be dispositive; it is enough that the false statement has the ability to influence the decision or function of the trier of fact, even if it is unsuccessful in doing so. See Birrell, 470 F.2d at 115 n.1. The scope of what is material varies with context. That scope is particularly broad where the decisionmaker can direct or pursue specific lines of inquiry in response to the defendant's statements. See United States v. Guariglia, 962 F.2d 160, 163-64 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing the difference in the materiality standard between investigative setting[s] and the trial context).11 This follows from the definition of materiality: the body of statements that are capable of influencing a decisionmaker in the exercise of her function will depend, in part, on what that function is. Cf. United States v. Newell, 658 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2011) (discussing materiality in terms of its ability to affect or influence a government function). The scope of what a jury could find material to these removal proceedings is broad. This is in part because an 11 Compare, e.g., United States v. Nazzaro, 889 F.2d 1158, 1165 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that, in light of the wide-ranging investigative function reserved to grand juries, courts must indulge comparable breadth in construing . . . materiality (citing Moreno Morales, 815 F.2d at 747)), with Guariglia, 962 F.2d at 16364 (holding that the materiality of false trial testimony before a petit jury depends on its impact on the factfinder's ultimate verdict, not on whether the false testimony hinders further inquiry). -16- immigration judge has discretion as to relief. Even where an applicant otherwise satisfies the requirements for asylum, an immigration judge may deny relief based on a balancing of various adverse factors, including fraudulently obtaining immigration benefits. See Matter of Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467, 472-75 (B.I.A. 1987) (holding that an immigration judge must consider the seriousness of adverse factors in exercising discretion), superseded in part by statute on other grounds as stated in Andriasian v. I.N.S., 180 F.3d 1033, 1043-44 & n.17 (9th Cir. 1999). The scope of materiality is also broad for removal proceedings because the immigration judge has a relatively active role in seeking the information she needs to make her decision. In particular, the immigration judge may elicit testimony that guides the proceedings, and base her decisions about what lines the parties may pursue on the answers to questions. Cf. United States v. Nazzaro, 889 F.2d 1158, 1165 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting the grand jury's ability to appropriately elicit testimony). That is, the function of the immigration judge is not limited to deciding the ultimate issue (even where she has no discretion as to relief), but includes subsidiary decisions governing the scope of the proceedings. Cf. United States v. Doulin, 538 F.2d 466, 470 (2d Cir. 1976) (A conviction under § 1623 [criminalizing '[f]alse declarations before [a] grand jury or court'] may . . . be -17- sustained upon a showing that a truthful answer to the grand jury's question could conceivably have furthered its inquiry by providing 'an evidentiary stone in the larger edifice.' (quoting United States v. Mancuso, 485 F.2d 275, 283 (2d Cir. 1973))). In light of the standards governing Kantengwa's removal proceedings, the false statements at issue could have been material in at least five different ways: to deciding the ultimate issue of whether discretionary relief is warranted; to determining whether Kantengwa was barred from relief for the persecution of others; to considering whether her use of fraud to enter the country warrants a discretionary denial; to making the threshold determination of credibility; and to guiding the relevant lines of inquiry. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (governing asylum relief); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) (Persecutor's Bar) (stating that asylum relief shall not apply to those who participated in the persecution of others); Matter of Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 472-75. The jury is responsible for deciding whether her false statements were material to any of these issues. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 523. The government need not show that the immigration judge actually found them material, see United States v. Edgar, 82 F.3d 499, 510 (1st Cir. 1996), or that the immigration judge's decision would have differed had truthful answers been given, see United States v. Silveira, 426 F.3d 514, 518 (1st Cir. 2005). For example, the government did not need to show that the persecutor -18- bar would have applied had Kantengwa not lied about the roadblock, only that those lies were material to the determination of whether it did. See Birrell, 470 F.2d at 115 n.1 (noting that a material statement need not be dispositive). Finally, it is enough that the government present sufficient evidence for the jury to find a statement material to any one of these issues; the government need not pursue them all or present evidence for the jury to understand all of these issues. See Scivola, 766 F.2d at 44 (The statement need not be material to any particular issue . . . , [but] may be material to any proper matter of the [decisionmaker]'s inquiry . . . . (emphasis added)); see also Silveira, 426 F.3d at 518.