Opinion ID: 63149
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to vacate prior orders

Text: A motion to alter or amend a judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) “must clearly establish either a manifest error of law or fact or must present newly discovered evidence” and “cannot be used to raise arguments which could, and should, have been made before the judgment issued.” Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 863 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs offer no facts or arguments in support of their motion to vacate the court’s prior orders. Therefore, the district court’s denial of this motion was proper. C. Dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction The district court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based solely on Plaintiffs’ failure to file a response or appear at a pretrial conference to respond to the motion. In doing so, the district court relied on its Local Rule 7.4, which permits it to construe a party’s failure to respond as a representation of no opposition. It did not consider the substance of the motion. We have previously recognized “the power of district courts to ‘adopt local rules requiring parties who oppose motions to file statements of opposition.’” Johnson v. Pettiford, 442 F.3d 917, 918 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting John v. Louisiana, 757 F.2d 698, 708 (5th Cir. 1985)). However, “we have not ‘approved the automatic grant, upon failure to comply with such rules, of motions that are dispositive of the litigation.’” Id. (quoting John, 767 F.2d at 709). Rather, “[b]efore a trial judge dismisses a complaint with prejudice, there should be a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct, and a finding that lesser sanctions would not serve the system of justice.” Luna v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers Local #36, 614 F.2d 529, 531 (5th Cir. 1980). The mere failure to respond to a motion is not sufficient to justify a dismissal 4 No. 07-41178 with prejudice. See Johnson, 442 F.3d at 919 (vacating a dismissal of a habeas petition based on the petitioner’s failure to respond to a government motion, because a two-month period with no response did not constitute a clear record of delay and because the district court did not consider lesser sanctions); Ramsey v. Signal Delivery Serv., Inc., 631 F.2d 1210, 1214 (5th Cir. 1980) (vacating a district court’s dismissal with prejudice because the plaintiff’s failure to respond to a motion to dismiss within three months was not the sort of extreme delay that warranted dismissal). Here, only a month and a half elapsed between Defendant’s motion to dismiss and the district court’s dismissal. This is a shorter delay than was present in either Luna or Ramsey, in which we found insufficient evidence of delay, and Defendant cites no cases in which we have found a clear record of delay on facts similar to those here. Plaintiffs’ modest delay in responding to the motion, even in combination with their failure to appear at a hearing to respond to the motion, does not constitute sufficient delay or contumacious conduct that would justify dismissal with prejudice. Moreover, there is no evidence that the district court attempted to use lesser sanctions or found that lesser sanctions would not have served the system of justice. Therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the case with prejudice based on Plaintiffs’ failure to respond to Defendant’s motion. D. Dismissal for failure to prosecute As an alternative to its dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the district court dismissed the case for failure to prosecute because Plaintiffs failed to appear before the court at an initial pretrial conference. We review the dismissal of a case based on failure to prosecute for abuse of discretion. Stearman v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 436 F.3d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 2006). “Dismissals with prejudice for failure to prosecute are proper only where (1) there is a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff and (2) 5 No. 07-41178 the district court has expressly determined that lesser sanctions would not prompt diligent prosecution, or the record shows that the district court employed lesser sanctions that proved to be futile.” Id. As discussed above, we see no evidence that the district court employed lesser sanctions or expressly determined that lesser sanctions would be inadequate, nor do we find a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by Plaintiffs. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute.