Opinion ID: 3012371
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Texts of S 925(c) and the Appropriations Ban

Text: The texts of S 925(c) and the appropriations ban demonstrate that district courts currently lack jurisdiction to consider felons’ petitions for restoration of their firearms privileges. Section 925(c)’s jurisdictional grant provides: Any person whose application for relief from disabilities is denied by the Secretary may file a petition with the United States district court for the district in which he resides for a judicial review of such denial. 18 U.S.C. S 925(c) (emphases added). This language unambiguously makes a denial a jurisdictional prerequisite. McHugh, 220 F.3d at 59; Saccacio, 211 F.3d at 104; Burtch , 120 F.3d at 1090. Because the Secretary of the Treasury has delegated his authority to ATF, see supra note 2, a district court may review a felon’s application for restoration of his firearms privileges only if ATF first denies it. Mullis , 230 F.3d at 219; McHugh, 220 F.3d at 59; Saccacio, 211 F.3d at 104; Owen, 122 F.3d at 1354; Burtch, 120 F.3d at 1090. The structure of S 925(c) supports this reading. The statute grants only the Secretary the authority to grant relief in the first instance. McHugh, 220 F.3d at 59; Owen, 122 F.3d at 1354. Further, he may grant relief if it is established to his satisfaction that . . . the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest. 18 U.S.C. S 925(c) (emphases added). That Congress gave the Secretary broad discretion to apply such an amorphous standard suggests that it wanted an administrative agency, not district courts, to decide whether to restore felons’ firearms privileges. McHugh , 220 F.3d at 59. 14 In addition, immediately after stating that a district court can review a denial, S 925(c) provides that a court may admit additional evidence where failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice. While Rice claimed that this provision decisively supports its conclusion as to exhaustion of administrative remedies,17 closer examination shows otherwise. To begin with, the additional evidence provision permits district courts only to supplement the record; it gives them no authority to create the record in the first place. As ATF points out, that the district court may supplement the record does not change the fact that the court is expressly limited to conducting a ‘judicial review’ of ATF ’s ‘denial’  to determine whether it was arbitrary and capricious. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 18. Moreover, Congress would not have limited the admission of additional evidence to situations in which amiscarriage of justice would result if it intended for district courts to evaluate felons’ applications de novo.18 McHugh, 220 F.3d at 59. Because S 925(c) unequivocally makes a denial by ATF a jurisdictional prerequisite, we must consider whether ATF ’s inability to act because of the appropriations ban constitutes a denial.19 We hold that it does not. [T]he _________________________________________________________________ 17. Were it not for the express authority section 925(c) gives district courts to receive independent evidence when necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice, we would be hesitant to excuse exhaustion where, as here, Congress has entrusted a decision to an agency under standards including one so broad as ensuring the public interest. Rice, 68 F.3d at 709. 18. For this reason, Rice was wrong to view the additional evidence provision as supporting its conclusion with respect to exhaustion of administrative remedies. Rice, 68 F.3d at 708. 19. Rice did not consider whether plenary judicial review of a felon’s application is consistent with S 925(c)’s text. Instead, it treated the statute’s denial provision as a judicially waivable exhaustion requirement, rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite. Saccacio, 211 F.3d at 105 n.2. In addition to erroneously viewing the issue in terms of exhaustion rather than jurisdiction, Rice misapplied the exhaustion doctrine. Rice relied upon Coit Independence, 489 U.S. at 586-87, for the proposition that an agency’s undue delay excuses exhaustion. Rice, 68 F.3d at 708-09. However, Coit Independence involved a situation where 15 word ‘denial’ means an adverse determination on the merits. Burtch, 120 F.3d at 1090; see also Saccacio, 211 F.3d at 104 (same). In contrast, an inability to grant a request is not commonly understood to constitute a denial. See, e.g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 602 (3d ed. 1993) (defining a denial as a refusal to grant, assent to, or sanction or a rejection of something requested, claimed, or felt to be due) (emphases added). Through the appropriations ban, Congress has rendered ATF unable to consider felons’S 925(c) applications. ATF ’s inability to grant the relief that felons seek does not constitute a denial.20 Nor does the text of the appropriations ban create new jurisdiction for district courts to evaluate felons’S 925(c) applications absent a denial. The appropriations ban provides: [N]one of the funds appropriated herein shall be available to investigate or act upon applications for relief from Federal firearms disabilities under 18 U.S.C.S 925(c). Pub. L. No. 107-67, 115 Stat. at 519. Nothing in the ban’s text suggests that Congress intended to confer new jurisdiction on district courts to restore felons’ firearms privileges. McHugh, 220 F.3d at 60. Moreover, in 1993 Congress inserted a sentence immediately following the appropriations ban that restored funding for ATF to investigate corporations’ applications. Pub. L. No. 103-123, 107 Stat. at 1228 ([S]uch funds shall be available to investigate and act upon applications filed by corporations _________________________________________________________________ neither Congress nor the agency itself had imposed a reasonable deadline for agency action. 489 U.S. at 586-87. In contrast, when Congress passed the appropriations ban it expressly barred ATF from acting upon applications. ATF has no duty to act because Congress has prohibited it from acting; hence [t]his is not [a] situation where an agency’s proceedings have been tainted by unreasonable delay. Wiggins, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 516. 20. Although the appropriations ban expressly prohibits ATF from reviewing applications, some courts have imprecisely described ATF ’s inability to act as a refusal to do so. See, e.g., McHugh, 220 F.3d at 60; Burtch, 120 F.3d at 1090. The word refusal implies that a choice was made, and thus inaccurately suggests that ATF could have reviewed applications despite the appropriations ban. 16 for relief from Federal firearms disabilities under 18 U.S.C. S 925(c).). This sentence (and its inclusion in each subsequent ATF appropriations act) would be superfluous if Congress believed that the appropriations ban permitted district courts to grant relief despite ATF ’s inability to review applications. McGill, 74 F.3d at 67-68. The texts of S 925(c) and the appropriations ban demonstrate convincingly that Congress did not intend for district courts to review individual felons’ S 925(c) applications in the first instance.21 Ordinarily we do not examine legislative history when the relevant statutory texts are clear. Ross v. Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Intern. Union, 266 F.3d 236, 245 (3d Cir. 2001). However, because we viewed the pertinent texts differently in Rice, and because the Bean panel made selective use of the legislative history of the appropriations ban, it is appropriate to examine that history.22 B. The Legislative History of the Appropriations Ban The legislative history of the appropriations ban confirms that Congress did not intend for the appropriations ban to allow individual felons to go straight to district court to seek the restoration of their firearms privileges. As mentioned above, Congress first imposed the appropriations ban in 1992. In the reports to their respective chambers, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees explained why they were preventing ATF from _________________________________________________________________ 21. Even if a district court had jurisdiction, it could reverse ATF ’s refusal to restore felons’ firearms privileges only if ATF ’s decision not to act was arbitrary and capricious, McHugh, 220 F.3d at 61; McGill, 74 F.3d at 66; Bagdonas v. Dep’t of Treasury, 93 F.3d 422, 425 (7th Cir. 1996); Bradley v. ATF, 736 F.2d 1238, 1240 (8th Cir. 1984), which following Congress’s mandate is not. 22. Our concurring colleague agrees that the appropriations ban is irreconcilable with S 925(c)’s jurisdictional grant, but criticizes, inter alia, our reliance on legislative history. We would reach the same result even if no Member of Congress uttered a word about his intent. That said, the legislative history confirms Congress’s intent to suspend S 925(c)’s jurisdictional grant and undermines whatever slight persuasive value Bean has. 17 acting on felons’ S 925(c) applications. These reports indicate that Congress wanted to suspend S 925(c)’s relief procedure because it was concerned that dangerous felons were regaining their firearms privileges and because it believed that the resources allocated to investigating felons’ applications would be better used to fight crime. The House Appropriations Committee noted: Under the relief procedure, ATF officials are required to guess whether a convicted felon . . . can be entrusted with a firearm. After ATF agents spend many hours investigating a particular applicant for relief, there is no way to know with any certainty whether the applicant is still a danger to public safety. Needless to say, it is a very difficult task. Thus, officials are now forced to make these decisions knowing that a mistake could have devastating consequences for innocent citizens. Thus, the Committee believes that the $3.75 million and the 40 man-years annually spent investigating and acting upon these applications for relief would be better utilized by ATF in fighting violent crime. Therefore, the Committee has included language which states that no appropriated funds be used to investigate or act upon applications for relief from Federal firearms disabilities. H.R. Rep. 102-618, at 14 (1992). Similarly, the Senate Appropriations Committee stated: Under the relief procedure, ATF officials are required to determine whether a convicted felon, including persons convicted of violent felonies or serious drug offenses, can be entrusted with a firearm. After ATF agents spend many hours investigating a particular applicant they must determine whether or not that applicant is still a danger to public safety. This is a very difficult and subjective task which could have devastating consequences for innocent citizens if the wrong decision is made. The Committee believes that the approximately 40 man-years spent annually to investigate and act upon these investigations and applications would be better utilized to crack down on 18 violent crime. Therefore, the Committee has included language in the bill which prohibits the use of funds for ATF to investigate and act upon applications for relief from Federal firearms disabilities. Under current policy, States have authority to make these determinations and the Committee believes this is properly where the responsibility ought to rest. The Committee expects ATF to redeploy the positions and funding presently supporting firearms disability relief to the Armed Career Criminal program. S. Rep. 102-353, at 19-20 (1992). At the same time, not a single Member of Congress suggested that the appropriations ban would give courts the authority to evaluate S 925(c) applications in the first instance. McHugh, 220 F.3d at 60. Instead, individual Members echoed the Appropriations Committees’ concern about restoring felons’ firearms privileges. For instance, Senator Chafee said: Dozens of convicted felons who have had their gun rights reinstated have been rearrested on new charges, including attempted murder, robbery, and child molestation. This program [S 925(c)’s relief provision] just does not make any sense. At a time when gun violence is exacting terrible costs upon our society, it seems absolutely crystal clear to me that the government’s time and money would be far better spent trying to keep guns out of the hands of convicted felons, not helping them regain access to firearms. I am pleased to note that the Appropriations Subcommittee23 has come to this same conclusion, and has stipulated in the bill that no appropriated funds may be used to investigate or act upon applications for relief from Federal firearms disabilities. _________________________________________________________________ 23. Though Senator Chafee referred to the Appropriations Subcommittee, he probably meant the Committee because he made his remarks about one-and-a-half months after the Senate Appropriations Committee issued its report. 19 138 Cong. Rec. S13238 (1992). Likewise, Senator Lautenberg applauded the decision to suspend ATF from acting on S 925(c) applications: Criminals granted relief have later been rearrested for crimes ranging from attempted murder to rape and kidnaping. . . . ATF agents have better things to do than conduct in-depth investigations on behalf of convicted felons. They should be out on the streets, pursuing criminals. Id. at S13241. Nonetheless, the Bean panel claimed that Congress wanted courts to be able to restore felons’ firearms privileges because it did not pass the SAFE bill, Bean, 253 F.3d at 237-39, which Senators Lautenberg and Simon introduced a few months before Congress decided to suspend ATF from acting on S 925(c) applications. 138 Cong. Rec. S2675 (1992). The SAFE bill would have eliminated S 925(c)’s relief provision for individuals and provided that corporations could not seek judicial review if ATF refused to restore their firearms privileges. Id. at S2676. In addition, it would have amended 18 U.S.C. S 921(a)(20) to provide that persons convicted of violent felonies cannot possess firearms even if the state in which they were convicted restores their civil rights. 24 For several reasons, the SAFE bill’s demise does not support the result in Bean. To begin with, the Supreme Court has consistently said that the legislative history of a proposal that does not become law is a particularly dangerous ground upon which to base an interpretation of an enacted law. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990). The reason is that [c]ongressional inaction lacks ‘persuasive significance’ because ‘several equally tenable inferences’ may be drawn from such inaction, ‘including the inference that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered change .’  Id. (quoting United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962)) (emphasis added). _________________________________________________________________ 24. Section 921(a)(20) provides that a convictionwhich has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored does not prevent a person from exercising firearms privileges unless the expungement, pardon, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides otherwise. 18 U.S.C.S 921(a)(20). 20 Moreover, the sponsors of the failed SAFE bill successfully pushed for the appropriations ban and viewed the ban’s suspension of S 925(c)’s relief provision as a step toward the repeal that they sought. For instance, Senator Lautenberg said of the appropriations ban: I am very pleased that the bill before us includes a provision based on legislation that I introduced with Senator Simon . . . . I’m hopeful that, before long, we can take the next step, and make the change permanent. 138 Cong. Rec. S13241 (1992).25 Indeed, the reasons that the House and Senate Appropriations Committees gave for imposing the appropriations ban mirror those offered by Senators Lautenberg and Simon in support of the SAFE bill. Compare 138 Cong. Rec. S2675 (1992) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg) (Surely, someone who has demonstrated his or her willingness to commit a crime of violence should not be entrusted with highly dangerous, deadly weapons.), and id. at S2679 (statement of Sen. Simon) ([T]axpayers are paying millions of dollars each year so that convicted felons may obtain firearms. In an age of increasing violent gun crimes, not to mention an ever widening budget deficit, that just doesn’t make sense.), with S. Rep. No. 102-353 at 19 (1992) ([Deciding which felons can safely carry firearms] is a very difficult and subjective task which could have devastating consequences for innocent citizens if the wrong decision is made.), and H.R. Rep. No. 102-618, at 14 (1992) ([T]he Committee believes that the $3.75 million and the 40 man-years annually spent investigating and _________________________________________________________________ 25. Senators Lautenberg and Simon made similar statements when they unsuccessfully reintroduced the SAFE bill in subsequent years. 141 Cong. Rec. S10570 (1995) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg) (Senator Simon and I have been successful over the past three years in securing language in the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Bill that prohibits the use of appropriated funds to implement the ATF relief procedure with respect to firearms. However, a funding ban is merely a stop-gap measure for one fiscal year. This bill would eliminate the relief procedure permanently.); 139 Cong. Rec. S10850 (1993) (statement of Sen. Simon) (Last year, Senator Lautenberg and I successfully included language in the Treasury, Postal and General Government appropriations bill to ensure that no money was spent by the Bureau in 1993 to rearm felons. However, a permanent ban is clearly needed.). 21 acting upon these applications for relief would be better utilized by ATF in fighting violent crime.). In addition, Bean overlooked the fact that the appropriations ban is a temporary, compromise version of the portion of the SAFE bill that would have permanently prevented individual felons from regaining their firearms privileges. That Congress chose not to repeal S 925(c)’s relief provision does not mean that it did not intend to suspend it. Further, Bean neglected to mention that the SAFE bill raised federalism concerns that the appropriations ban did not, as it would have eliminated the states’ ability to restore felons’ firearms privileges. The Senate Appropriations Committee’s report indicates that the SAFE bill failed to pass at least partially for this reason. See S. Rep. No. 102353, at 20 (1992) (Under current policy, States have authority to make these determinations and the Committee believes this is properly where the responsibility ought to rest.). Moreover, the notion that Congress’s failure to pass the SAFE bill illustrates that it wanted felons to be able to regain their firearms privileges is inconsistent with the legislative history of subsequent appropriations acts. In 1993, the Senate Appropriations Committee explained why it was continuing the appropriations ban in language virtually identical to that in its 1992 report; the only difference was that it noted that the appropriations ban would no longer apply to corporations. S. Rep. No. 103-106, at 20 (1993). The House Appropriations Committee reiterated the reasons for the ban in 1995: [T]hose who commit serious crimes forfeit many rights and those who commit felonies should not be allowed to have their right to own a firearm restored. We have learned sadly that too many of these felons whose gun ownership rights were restored went on to commit violent crimes with firearms. There is no reason to spend the Government’s time or taxpayer’s [sic] money to restore a convicted felon’s right to own a firearm. H.R. Rep. No. 104-183, at 15 (1995). Shortly after we decided Rice, Senator Simon strongly criticized our decision. He emphasized that Congress 22 wanted to suspend felons’ ability to regain their firearms privileges, not to transfer to the courts the responsibility for reviewing S 925(c) applications: This misguided decision [referring to Rice] could flood the courts with felons seeking the restoration of their gun rights, effectively shifting from ATF to the courts the burden of considering these applications. Instead of wasting taxpayer money and the time of ATF agents[,] which could be much better spent on important law enforcement efforts . . . we would now be wasting court resources and distracting the courts from consideration of serious criminal cases. Fortunately, [McGill] found that congressional intent to prohibit any Federal relief--either through ATF or the courts--is clear. . . . Given this conflict in the circuit courts, we should clarify our original and sustaining intention. The goal of this provision has always been to prohibit convicted felons from getting their guns back--whether through ATF or the courts. It was never our intention to shift the burden to the courts. . . . . . . . . It made no sense for ATF to take agents away from their important law enforcement work, and it makes even less sense for the courts, which have no experience or expertise in this area, to be burdened with this unnecessary job. Let me make this point perfectly clear: It was never our intent, nor is it now, for the courts to review a convicted felon’s application for firearm privilege restoration. 142 Cong. Rec. S10320-21 (1996) (emphases added). In addition, Congress rejected some Members’ efforts to undermine the appropriations ban. In 1995, the House Appropriations Committee reinstated the appropriations ban after one of its subcommittees voted to lift it. 141 Cong. Rec. S10572 (1995). The following year, Congress rejected a provision in the House version of the appropriations bill that would have supplemented district 23 courts’ jurisdiction so that they could review someS 925(c) applications de novo.26 Since 1996, Congress has not indicated why it retained the appropriations ban. However, there has been no adverse congressional reaction to the holdings in McGill, Burtch, Owen, Saccacio, McHugh, and Mullis that the appropriations ban does not allow district courts to review S 925(c) applications. If Congress wanted district courts to be able to restore felons’ firearms privileges, these decisions should have prompted it to give them jurisdiction to do so. In sum, the legislative history of the appropriations ban demonstrates that Congress wanted to suspend felons’ ability to regain their firearms privileges underS 925(c). This history refutes the claim that Congress intended to give district courts jurisdiction to review ATF ’s congressionally mandated inability to restore felons’ firearms privileges. Mullis, 230 F.3d at 220-21. C. Policy Considerations District courts’ institutional limitations suggest that Congress could not have intended for the appropriations ban to transfer to them the primary responsibility for determining whether to restore felons’ firearm privileges. Evaluating a S 925(c) application requires a detailed _________________________________________________________________ 26. The House version included an amendment offered by Representative Obey--who opposed denying nonviolent felons the opportunity to regain their firearms privileges--that implicitly gave district courts jurisdiction to review some felons’ applications. Representative Obey’s amendment provided that the inability of [ATF] to process or act upon [S 925(c)] applications for felons convicted of a violent crime, firearms violations, or drug-related crimes shall not be subject to judicial review, 142 Cong. Rec. H7635 (1996), which suggested that ATF ’s inability to act upon other criminals’ applications was subject to judicial review. The Senate deleted this language, 142 Cong. Rec. S10141 (1996), and the final bill likewise did not give district courts new authority to review S 925(c) applications. H.R. Conf. Rept. No. 104-863, 142 Cong. Rec. H12007 (1996). Senators Lautenberg and Simon praised the Conference Committee for eliminating Representative Obey’s amendment, which they said was inconsistent with the intent behind the appropriations ban. 142 Cong. Rec. S12164 (1996). 24 investigation of the felon’s background and recent conduct. Id. at 219. An effective investigation entails interviewing a wide array of people, including the felon, his family, his friends, the persons whom he lists as character references, members of the community where he lives, his current and former employers, his coworkers, and his former parole officers. Id.; Bagdonas v. ATF, 884 F. Supp. 1194, 1199 (N.D. Ill. 1995). Unlike ATF, courts possess neither the resources to conduct the requisite investigations nor the expertise to predict accurately which felons may carry guns without threatening the public’s safety. Mullis , 230 F.3d at 220; Owen, 122 F.3d at 1354; McGill, 74 F.3d at 67. Because courts are without the tools necessary to conduct a systematic inquiry into an applicant’s background, if they reviewed applications de novo they would be forced to rely primarily--if not exclusively--on information provided by the felon. Mullis, 230 F.3d at 219. As few felons would volunteer adverse information, the inquiry would be dangerously one-sided.27 Id. at 219-20. Instead of being approved by ATF after a detailed investigation, felons’ firearms privileges would be restored based on less, and less accurate, information. It is inconceivable that Congress--concerned that felons who regained their firearms privileges would commit violent crimes--would want to make the review process less reliable. McGill, 74 F.3d at 67.