Opinion ID: 1249921
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Driver's License

Text: The trial court admitted, over objection, evidence that Kanta did not have a valid driver's license because he was under suspension due to an accumulation of 22 points on his driving record. The court instructed the jury that [n]o person shall drive a motor vehicle upon a highway in this state unless such person has a valid license as an operator. The plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence that Kanta did not possess a valid driver's license. We agree. In Knoepfle v. Suko, 108 N.W.2d 456 (N.D.1961), the defendant offered to prove that the plaintiff had been convicted of several driving offenses, that his driver's license had been revoked, and that he had failed a driver's examination. We said, at page 465: This offer of proof was properly overruled. At the most it would tend to prove general incompetence only. Evidence of general competency or incompetency is not admissible upon the issue of negligence. [Citations omitted.] See also South v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 290 N.W.2d 819, 839 (N.D.1980), where we said that evidence of one's past driving record is inadmissible to prove that a person acted negligently on the occasion in dispute. Scott and Nemont have urged that we adopt the Massachusetts rule stated in Watson v. Forbes, 307 Mass. 383, 30 N.E.2d 228 (1940), that failure to have a driver's license is evidence of negligence. We decline to do so because, as stated in Hawkins v. United States, 395 A.2d 45, 47 (App.D.C.1978): We view under the circumstances of this case the testimony in dispute as having considerable prejudice and little probative value. Punch v. United States, D.C.App., 377 A.2d 1353 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955, 98 S.Ct. 1586, 55 L.Ed.2d 806 (1978). We are not persuaded that there is any causal connection between the failure of appellant to have a driver's license when he drove his car and the homicide occurring here. State v. Davis, 196 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1972). We are thus unable to agree with the contention of Scott and Nemont that [i]f it is error, it is not prejudicial error.