Opinion ID: 867235
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Constitutionality of (F)(6) Jury Instruction

Text: ¶ 48 Prince argues that the jury instruction on especial cruelty, A.R.S. § 13-751(F)(6), was unconstitutionally vague and failed to properly channel the jury's sentencing discretion. Because he did not argue that below, Prince must show fundamental error. State v. Gomez, 211 Ariz. 494, 499 ¶ 20, 123 P.3d 1131, 1136 (2005). ¶ 49 Although the (F)(6) aggravator is facially vague, it may be remedied with appropriate narrowing instructions. Tucker, 215 Ariz. at 310 ¶ 28, 160 P.3d at 189; accord State v. Hargrave, 225 Ariz. 1, 13 ¶ 43, 234 P.3d 569, 581 (2010). The instructions must sufficiently narrow[ ] the statutory terms, Tucker, 215 Ariz. at 310 ¶ 28, 160 P.3d at 189, such that the sentencer has sufficient guidance. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 655, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Ring II, 536 U.S. at 589, 122 S.Ct. 2428. ¶ 50 The trial judge instructed the jury on especial cruelty as follows: Concerning this aggravating circumstance, all first-degree murders are to some extent. . . cruel . . . . However, this aggravating circumstance cannot be found to exist unless the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was especially cruel . . . . Especially means unusually great or significant. In other words, the murder must have been committed in such a way as to set the Defendant's acts apart from the norm of first-degree murder. . . . . The term cruel focuses on the victim's mental anguish. To find that the murder was committed in an especially cruel manner you must find that the victim consciously suffered extreme mental distress or anguish prior to death. A murder is especially cruel when there has been the infliction of mental suffering in an especially wanton and insensitive or vindictive manner. The Defendant must know or should have known that the victim would suffer anguish. A finding of cruelty requires conclusive evidence that the victim was conscious during the infliction of the violence and experienced significant uncertainty as to his or her ultimate fate. The passage of time is not determinative. ¶ 51 Prince claims that the reference to the norm of first-degree murder is vague because juries have no experience with murder and therefore no context in which to understand the norm of first degree murder. Although the instruction's norm of first-degree murder language is often urged by defendants, who can certainly make that point in closing arguments, it is neither necessary nor particularly helpful in a jury instruction. See State v. Bocharski, 218 Ariz. 476, 487-88 ¶¶ 47-50, 189 P.3d 403, 414-15 (2008). But we have repeatedly upheld jury instructions using that phrase, and its inclusion in the (F)(6) instruction here was not fundamental error. State v. McCray, 218 Ariz. 252, 258-59 ¶ 26 n. 3, 183 P.3d 503, 509-10 (2008); State v. Andriano, 215 Ariz. 497, 506 ¶¶ 42-43, 161 P.3d 540, 549 (2007); Tucker, 215 Ariz. at 310-11 ¶¶ 30, 33, 160 P.3d at 189-90. Prince also argues that the phrase especially wanton and insensitive is vague, but we have approved jury instructions using that language as well. State v. Chappell, 225 Ariz. 229, 237-38 ¶ 27 & n. 6, 236 P.3d 1176, 1184-85 & n. 6 (2010); Anderson, 210 Ariz. at 352-53 ¶ 111 & n. 19, 111 P.3d at 394-95 & n. 19. Viewed as a whole, the instruction sufficiently narrowed the (F)(6) aggravator and, therefore, Prince has not established fundamental error. ¶ 52 Prince next argues that the trial court erred by denying his request to give the following instruction: The passage of time is not determinative, but the length of time during which the victim contemplated her fate affects whether the mental anguish is sufficient to bring the first degree murder of the victim within that group of first degree murders that is especially cruel. Because most murders involve some period during which the victim experiences fear, Prince claims, his requested instruction was necessary to channel the jury's discretion when, as here, the events occurred within a short time. ¶ 53 The judge did not err by denying Prince's requested instruction. We have repeatedly approved (F)(6) instructions that do not contain the language Prince requested. E.g., Tucker, 215 Ariz. at 310-11 ¶¶ 30-31, 160 P.3d at 189-90; State v. Cromwell, 211 Ariz. 181, 189 ¶ 42, 119 P.3d 448, 456 (2005); Anderson, 210 Ariz. at 352-53 ¶¶ 111, 113 & n. 19, 111 P.3d at 394-95 & n. 19. The instruction in Anderson contained only the sentence The passage of time is not determinative, the same instruction given here. 210 Ariz. at 352 ¶ 111 n. 19, 111 P.3d at 394 n. 19. Although the passage of time is a relevant factor for evaluating the victim's uncertainty about her fate, see State v. Snelling, 225 Ariz. 182, 188 ¶ 27, 236 P.3d 409, 415 (2010), we have never required an instruction to this effect. More importantly, although proof that a victim experienced uncertainty about her fate may be sufficient, it is not a necessary element to establish that the victim consciously experienced mental pain. See Tucker, 215 Ariz. at 311 ¶ 33, 160 P.3d at 190; Ellison, 213 Ariz. at 142 ¶ 120, 140 P.3d at 925. ¶ 54 Notably, the instruction required the jury to find extreme mental distress, a phrasing that was more favorable to Prince than our case law otherwise requires. See Chappell, 225 Ariz. at 237-38 ¶ 27, 236 P.3d at 1184-85 (stating the mental or physical pain used to establish the (F)(6) aggravator need not be extreme). The jury instructions adequately narrowed the (F)(6) aggravator and properly channeled the jury's sentencing discretion.