Opinion ID: 2428738
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony regarding possible blood

Text: At trial, the State presented evidence showing that after appellant shot the victim, William Hall, appellant got into Hall's vehicle and drove over Hall. It is important to note that appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the State's evidence on appeal. During the State's direct examination of Annette Tracy, a crime-scene specialist with the Little Rock Police Department, the deputy prosecutor asked Tracy to identify State's Exhibit 25. Tracy described the exhibit as a photograph of the underside of Hall's vehicle with what appears to be possible blood on the oil pan. The State then moved to admit the photograph. Appellant objected to the admission of the exhibit, claiming that it was not relevant and was unduly prejudicial because Tracy had described only possible blood. The deputy prosecutor stated that subsequent evidence would show that samples collected from the underside of the car were identified as human blood of the victim's blood type. On that basis, the trial court admitted the photograph. Subsequently at trial, Scott Sherill, a forensic serologist with the State Crime Lab, testified that the substance shown in State's Exhibit 25 was human blood but that he was not able to determine the blood type. Appellant then moved for a mistrial on the basis that the State had presented no evidence connecting the blood found underneath the car to the victim. The judge denied that motion, and appellant then moved to have the evidence unadmitted. The judge also denied that request, along with a request to admonish the jury to ignore the evidence. Appellant relies on Brenk v. State, 311 Ark. 579, 847 S.W.2d 1 (1993), to support his contention that the reference to possible blood requires reversal because the blood found underneath Hall's car was not conclusively proven to be Hall's own blood. Appellant mischaracterizes this Court's ruling in Brenk . The Brenk case confronted the issue of whether evidence of luminol testing should be allowed in light of the fact that luminol does not distinguish between certain metals, vegetable matter, human blood, or animal blood. This Court held that evidence about the use of luminol would not be admissible unless additional tests showed that the substance tested was human blood related to the alleged crime. Brenk clearly does not apply to the facts of the instant case because luminol was not used and because serological testing showed that the substance found underneath Hall's car was, in fact, human blood. Appellant also relies on the case of Palmer v. State, 315 Ark. 696, 870 S.W.2d 385 (1994). Similarly, appellant's reliance on Palmer is misplaced because it also refers to the use of luminol evidence at trial. Furthermore, there was no evidence in that case to show that the victim had ever even been in the bedroom of a house where the substance was detected by the use of luminol. Still, as in the present case, Sherill was able to identify human blood, but not blood type. The fatal flaw in Palmer was not the inability to establish the blood type but rather the lack of proof that the victim had even been at the location where the blood was found. Again, in the instant case, the State presented evidence that appellant drove over Hall in Hall's vehicle after shooting him; this is evidence which appellant does not challenge on appeal. Therefore, unlike Palmer , the State proved that Hall had, in fact, been underneath the car, where the blood was found, at a time when he was bleeding profusely from newly inflicted gunshot wounds. In short, the State presented very convincing circumstantial evidence connecting the blood found underneath the victim's vehicle with this crime. A trial court's evidentiary ruling will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Webb v. State, 327 Ark. 51, 938 S.W.2d 806 (1997). Relevant evidence means any evidence having the tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Id. at 62, 938 S.W.2d 806. The evidence at issue was relevant to establish that appellant had driven over a wounded, bleeding man whom he had just shot. Appellant further relies on the case of Whitson v. State, 314 Ark. 458, 863 S.W.2d 794 (1993), which discusses the use of novel scientific evidence. Appellant never claimed in the court below that the tests performed by Sherill were novel. In fact, the tests appellant now complains of have been in existence for many years. They are a routine part of criminal investigations and are frequently admitted by our courts. See Lee v. State, 327 Ark. 692, 942 S.W.2d 231 (1997); Johnson v. State, 308 Ark. 7, 823 S.W.2d 800 (1992); McDonald v. State, 37 Ark.App. 61, 824 S.W.2d 396 (1992); Linder v. State, 273 Ark. 470, 620 S.W.2d 944 (1981). In each of these cases, the evidence of blood identity, i.e. animal or human and blood typing, was introduced without question concerning its novelty or reliability. Further, Sherill's testimony that the substance was human blood rendered moot any problem that may have existed with Tracy's reference to possible blood being depicted in State's Exhibit 25. Indeed, the substance was proven to be human blood; therefore, any prejudice was negated when Sherill identified the substance as human blood.