Opinion ID: 513999
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of a Prior Felony.

Text: 3 Title 18, section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person convicted ... of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a period exceeding one year from possessing a firearm. Whether prior criminal proceedings resulted in a conviction depends on the law of the jurisdiction that conducted them. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 921(a)(20). Here, in related arguments, Dancy contends that (1) the Government offered no evidence to explain the meaning of conviction under California law; and (2) the district court erred in admitting his California pen packet to evidence a prior conviction. The latter argument is addressed first. 4 The Government offered Dancy's California pen (penitentiary) packet, a file prepared by the California Department of Corrections (CDC) that includes copies of a criminal judgment and Dancy's CDC fingerprint card. A CDC official certified the documents to be copies of originals in her legal custody; a judge certified that the official had legal custody of the documents. On appeal Dancy raises authentication and hearsay objections to the pen packet documents. 5 Under Rule 902(4), Fed.R.Evid., a copy of an official record or report ... or of a document authorized by law to be recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed in a public office is self-authenticating if certified by the legal custodian of the record. Fed.R.Evid. 902(4) (emphasis added). Dancy apparently does not dispute that the pen packet documents are copies of CDC official records; rather, he argues that there is no showing ... that the records were actually recorded or filed in a public office. This argument is meritless; Rule 902(4) does not contemplate that official records must be filed or recorded in a public office to be self-authenticating. See United States v. Darveaux, 830 F.2d 124, 126 (8th Cir.1987) (Texas Department of Corrections records self-authenticating under Rule 902(4)); United States v. Stone, 604 F.2d 922, 924-25 (5th Cir.1979) (Treasury Department disbursement record self-authenticating under Rule 902(4)). The pen packet documents, therefore, were properly authenticated. 6 Dancy additionally argues, however, that both the judgment and fingerprint card were inadmissible because neither fit within the public records exception to the hearsay rule. See Fed.R.Evid. 802, 803(8). As to the judgment, Dancy's argument is irrelevant; evidence of a criminal judgment is independently admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 803(22). As to the fingerprint card, Dancy's reliance on United States v. Cain, 615 F.2d 380, 381-82 (5th Cir.1980), is misplaced. Cain does not hold, as Dancy implies, that Rule 803(8)(B) bars admission of all law enforcement agency records. See United States v. Quezada, 754 F.2d 1190, 1193-94 and n. 9 (5th Cir.1985). Rather, the rule excludes records that report the observation or investigation of crimes, not records that merely document routine, unambiguous factual matters. Id. at 1194. In this case, the fingerprint card, which contains Dancy's prints, physical description, sentence, and CDC reporting date, is unrelated to a criminal investigation and admissible under Rule 803(8). 1 7 Dancy also contends that the record is silent as to what constitutes a conviction under California law. This argument is based on his belief that the judgment introduced as part of the pen packet (1) is not final; and (2) fails to evidence that Dancy's sentence could exceed one year. 8 The March 15, 1977, judgment recites that in Case A555608 Dancy pleaded guilty to first degree robbery in violation of Section 211, Penal Code, a felony. It recites further that Dancy was to be punished by imprisonment in the State Prison for Men for the term prescribed by law pursuant to Section 1168 P.C. Dancy assumes that the judgment is not final because it fixes no determinate sentence but instead orders [t]he Director of Department of Corrections ... to file a report within 120 days. This assumption is incorrect. Under then-applicable law, a trial court could order a defendant to prison, but it could not fix a definite term. Cal.Penal Code Sec. 1168 (Deering 1977). A judgment was valid if it, like Dancy's, ordered imprisonment for the term prescribed by law. See People v. Bruce, 141 Cal.App.2d 854, 857, 297 P.2d 437 (1956). Section 1168 did permit the trial court, on the recommendation of the CDC Director, to recall its judgment sua sponte within 120 days and resentence the defendant. Cal.Penal Code Sec. 1168; see also Cal.Penal Code Sec. 5079 (Deering 1977). This latter provision of Sec. 1168 explains the report referred to in the Dancy judgment. 9 Dancy's additional assertion that the judgment does not demonstrate that his prior conviction was punishable by more than a year in jail, although correct, is irrelevant. Dancy's CDC fingerprint card recites that he entered prison seven days after the date of judgment to begin serving a 5-Life sentence for Robb 1st (211 PC) in Case # A-555608. The jury therefore had sufficient evidence that the offense carried a potential term in excess of one year. 2 10