Opinion ID: 721306
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Confinement Claims

Text: 41 Four of the thirteen federal claims for relief in Kulak's complaint relate to his involuntary confinement at Kings County and Kingsboro. In three of these (the first, third, and fourth claims for relief), Kulak asserts that the confinement violated his rights because he was not homicidal, suicidal, a danger to himself or others, or mentally ill to an extent justifying involuntary hospitalization. The district court found these three claims barred by issue preclusion because of the state habeas corpus proceeding. In the fourth confinement claim (the fifth claim for relief), Kulak asserts that Kingsboro violated his rights by failing to place him in a less restrictive setting. The district court found this claim deficient because Kulak did not have a liberty interest in a less restrictive setting and, in any event, Kingsboro transferred him to Gracie Square Hospital approximately three weeks after the conclusion of the habeas corpus hearing. For the reasons given below, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Appellees on all four confinement claims. 42 A. Issue Preclusion: Once a matter has been litigated and decided, a party may be foreclosed from litigating the same issue again. This is known as issue preclusion, or, more traditionally, collateral estoppel. See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n. 1, 104 S.Ct. 892, 894 n. 1, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984). Issue preclusion is based upon a policy that it is not fair to permit a party to relitigate an issue that has already been decided against it. Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co. 65 N.Y.2d 449, 455, 482 N.E.2d 63, 67, 492 N.Y.S.2d 584, 588 (1985). 43 A federal court examining the preclusive effect of a state court judgment must look to the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994): 44 Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings ... shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States ... as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken. 45 The Supreme Court has made clear that § 1738 applies in a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal court. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103-04, 101 S.Ct. 411, 419-20, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). In such a suit, a state court judgment must be given the same preclusive effect as it would have under the law of the state in which it is rendered. Id.; Migra, 465 U.S. at 81, 104 S.Ct. at 896; see Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 792-93 (2d Cir.1994) (state habeas corpus proceeding may have preclusive effect in a later federal § 1983 lawsuit). Thus, in order to determine whether the New York court's denial of Kulak's habeas corpus petition precludes any of the § 1983 claims now before us, we must analyze the habeas corpus proceeding in light of New York issue preclusion law. 46 In New York, issue preclusion applies only to those matters actually litigated and determined in a prior action. Kaufman, 65 N.Y.2d at 455, 482 N.E.2d at 67, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 588 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27). In the frequently cited case of Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 246 N.E.2d 725, 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 960 (1969), the New York Court of Appeals stated:[T]here are but two necessary requirements for the invocation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. There must be an identity of issue which has necessarily been decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action, and, second, there must have been a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling. 47 See also Owens v. Treder, 873 F.2d 604, 607 (2d Cir.1989). The burden of showing that the issues are identical and were necessarily decided in the prior action rests with the party seeking to apply issue preclusion, here the Appellees. In contrast, the burden of showing that the prior action did not afford a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues rests with Kulak, the party opposing the application of issue preclusion. Schwartz, 24 N.Y.2d at 73, 246 N.E.2d at 730, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 962. 48 Applying the law to this case, we find that Kulak's first, third, and fourth claims for relief are barred. In the habeas corpus proceeding, the court considered whether Kulak's confinement was wrongful because he was not mentally ill or in need of further retention as required by New York Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39. In denying the writ, the court necessarily found that Kulak met the statutory conditions: he suffered a mental illness to an extent requiring further retention. As made clear in the case law, a person is in need of further retention if he poses a substantial risk of harm to himself or others. See Matter of Harry M., 96 A.D.2d 201, 206, 468 N.Y.S.2d 359, 363-64 (2d Dept.1983); Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 971 (2d Cir.1983). Thus, the matters actually litigated and determined in the state habeas corpus proceeding included (1) whether Kulak suffered a mental illness; and (2) whether, due to the illness, Kulak posed a substantial risk of harm to himself or others so that he was in need of further retention. The testimony of the psychiatrists at the hearing, elicited by both Kulak and the State, confirms that these issues were presented. The court necessarily determined these issues by denying the writ. 49 These matters presented and decided in the state habeas corpus proceeding are identical to the issues in three of the confinement claims now before us. In these claims, Kulak argues that his rights were violated by his confinement because (1) he was not homicidal or suicidal as required by New York Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39; (2) he did not pose a danger to himself or others; and (3) he did not suffer a mental illness justifying involuntary hospitalization. These claims therefore involve the same questions posed in the state court proceeding: Was Kulak mentally ill and a danger to himself or others? 50 Even though there is an identity of issues in this case, issue preclusion would not block Kulak's claims if he could show that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the prior proceeding. To determine whether Kulak met this burden, we may look to several factors including: 51 the size of the claim, the forum of the prior litigation, the use of initiative, the extent of the litigation, the competence and experience of counsel, the availability of new evidence, indications of a compromise verdict, differences in the applicable law and foreseeability of future litigation. 52 Schwartz, 24 N.Y.2d at 72, 246 N.E.2d at 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 961. 53 Kulak claims that because the state court issued a compromise verdict by denying the writ on the one hand but suggesting that Kingsboro place Kulak in a less restrictive setting on the other, he did not have initiative to litigate fully his case. We reject this reasoning because there is no basis for characterizing the court's verdict as a compromise. The hearing transcript is replete with evidence that Kulak opposed the psychiatrists' suggestions regarding placement in a supervised residential care setting and the court specifically noted his opposition in denying the writ. 54 Weighing the other factors listed in Schwartz, we find that Kulak has failed to meet his burden of proving that he lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues of his mental illness and risk of harm in the lengthy and hard-fought state habeas corpus proceeding. Therefore, we find that issue preclusion bars Kulak from relitigating these claims, and we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Appellees on Kulak's first, third, and fourth claims for relief. 55 B. The Right to a Less Restrictive Setting: We turn to Kulak's remaining confinement claim and address it briefly. In his fifth claim for relief, Kulak contends that the state court created a protected liberty interest in a less restrictive setting when it denied the habeas corpus petition but direct[ed] the hospital to arrange for a suitable facility as a less restrictive alternative. Kulak claims that Appellee Patricia Roach, a Kingsboro administrator, violated this protected liberty interest when she failed to transfer Kulak promptly. We disagree with Kulak's contention, and therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Appellees on this claim. 56 We have held that there is no general federal constitutional right to community placement or a least restrictive environment. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1247-49 (2d Cir.1984). However, a state may create such a liberty interest protected under the Fourteenth Amendment by regulations, statutes, or court orders mandatory in character. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1036, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990). Kulak asserts that the state court decision in the habeas corpus proceeding created such a right because it was mandatory and required Kingsboro to transfer Kulak to a less restrictive setting. 57 A review of the court's decision, however, makes clear that the language cited by Kulak as creating a mandatory right was at most an indication that, in the court's opinion, Kingsboro was not the optimal setting for Kulak, and that the court might reconsider its decision to deny the writ if Kulak remained at Kingsboro for too long a period of time. The court urged both Kulak and Kingsboro to use best efforts in finding a suitable alternative environment for Kulak. The court did not direct that such placement be made in any specific amount of time, nor did it attempt to define a suitable facility, though it recommend[ed] that the Kingsboro staff consider a home setting. These statements by the court during the hearing did not appear in the court's final order denying the writ. This is consistent with the view under New York law that the State defendants have discretion regarding patient transfer. See Savastano v. Prevost, 66 N.Y.2d 47, 50, 485 N.E.2d 213, 215, 495 N.Y.S.2d 6, 8 (1985) (per curiam). 58 In advancing his claim, Kulak relies primarily on Walters v. Grossheim, 990 F.2d 381 (8th Cir.1993). In Walters, prison officials of the State of Iowa were under a direct court order to move an inmate from a Level III environment to a less restrictive, lower-security Level IV setting. Once the court order was entered, the officials had no lawful authority to retain the inmate in a high security setting. Walters, 990 F.2d at 384-85. By contrast, the court in Kulak's case entered an order denying Kulak's habeas corpus petition, thereby giving Kingsboro lawful authority to confine Kulak. The order did not mandate Kulak's transfer. Thus, Kulak's reliance on Walters is misplaced. 59 Moreover, Kingsboro did not simply ignore the court's suggestion that Kulak be evaluated for placement in an alternative setting. Rather, workers from an open ward and from residential housing observed or met with Kulak and determined him unsuitable for transfer. These actions on the part of Kingsboro evidence a willingness to follow the court's suggestions regarding alternative placement. We find that the state court order denying Kulak's habeas corpus petition did not give Kulak a protected liberty interest in a less restrictive environment. Therefore, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Appellees on Kulak's fifth claim for relief.