Opinion ID: 711739
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: LIMITATION OF CROSS-EXAMINATION (Campoy)

Text: 22 A trial court has considerable discretion to limit cross-examination. Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir.1992) (en banc) (internal quotation omitted), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1600 (1993). As the Government points out, Campoy only generalizes about the district court's refusal to permit additional cross-examination and does not point to any specific prejudice to his case. 23 Generally, once cross-examination reveals sufficient information with which to appraise a witness's possible bias and motives, confrontation demands are satisfied. United States v. Bonnano, 852 F.2d 434, 439 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1016 (1989). Confrontation demands were satisfied in this case. Gutierrez was cross-examined by six defense counsel in this case. Campoy sheds no light on what specific questions he should have been able to ask Gutierrez. The trial court does not abuse its discretion as long as the jury receives sufficient information to appraise the biases and motivations of the witness. United States v. Guthrie, 931 F.2d 564, 568 (9th Cir.1991) (quotations omitted); see also United States v. Manning, 56 F.3d 1188, 1197 (9th Cir.1995). The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reopen additional cross-examination of Gutierrez for presumably cumulative evidence.