Opinion ID: 4536379
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lead Poisoning and Legionnaires’ Disease

Text: “On April 25, 2014, Flint officially began using the Flint River as its primary water source, despite the fact that the proper preparations had not been made and Glasgow had warned that the FWTP was not ready.” Id. at 57, ¶ 164 (Page ID #17860). Flint River water had high chloride levels that, left untreated, would corrode the water pipes and cause lead to “leach into drinking water.” Id. at 55, ¶ 161 (Page ID #17858). The MDEQ purportedly believed that it needed to collect data on the water for an entire year, in two consecutive six-month tests, before Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533 Waid et al. v. Snyder et al. Page 9 it could treat the water for corrosion. Id. at 95–96, ¶ 290 (Page ID #17898–99). Prior to the switch, City and MDEQ officials “discussed optimization for lead,” but “decided that having more data was advisable before implementing an optimization method.” Id. at 55, ¶ 159 (Page ID #17858). Rather than delay the switch to the Flint River, the City began delivering untreated water to its residents. Within weeks of the switch, residents reported to Shekter-Smith that there was something wrong with the smell, taste, and color of the water, and that it was causing rashes. Id. at 57, ¶¶ 165–66 (Page ID #17860). By June 2014, residents were reporting that “the water was making them ill.” Id. at 57, ¶ 167 (Page ID #17860). The City and State did nothing. Id. “On August 14, 2014, Flint’s water tested above legal limits for total coliform and E. coli bacteria.” Id. at 57, ¶ 168 (Page ID #17860). In response, the City issued boil water advisories and treated the water with additional chlorine. Id. at 57–58, ¶¶ 168–69 (Page ID #17860–61). Chlorine, however, “as has been well known for decades,” “preferentially reacts with the bare metal [in corroded pipes] instead of attacking solely bacteria.” Id. at 57–58, ¶ 169 (Page ID #17860–61). Unsurprisingly, then, the bacterial problem did not abate—so the City added still more chlorine. Id. The water then tested high in total trihalomethanes (“TTHM”), a byproduct of chlorine interacting with metal, and a “red flag that the steel in the pipes had been laid bare,” and that lead was leaching into the water. Id. at 58, ¶¶ 170–71 (Page ID #17861). Back in May 2014, MDEQ officials—including Busch, Prysby, and Rosenthal—knew that TTHM levels were above the EPA’s maximum contaminant level but did nothing, even as residents raised concerns about the water. Id. at 58, ¶ 172 (Page ID #17861). From May 2014 to August 2015, the City sampled the water six times to test for corrosivity, and “[t]he sampling results all showed that the drinking water was very corrosive.” Id. at 62, ¶ 187 (Page ID #17865). In the summer of 2014, just “[a]s officials were beginning to assess the extent of Flint’s TTHM problems, . . . the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) reported an outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease—another red flag.” Id. at 58–59, ¶ 173 (Page ID #17861–62). Legionnaires’ disease “is a severe form of pneumonia.” Id. at 59, ¶ 174 (Page ID #17862). It infects people who inhale or consume water contaminated with legionella bacteria. Id. “Extensive studies of legionella have established that the pathogen enters the water supply Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533 Waid et al. v. Snyder et al. Page 10 when the ‘bio-film’ protecting pipes is stripped away—which is exactly what happened when the River’s corrosive water entered the City’s pipes.” Id. When a City officer informed Earley and his then-advisor Gerald Ambrose of the outbreak, Earley responded by “disclaiming any connection between the outbreak and Flint’s water.” Id. at 59, ¶ 175 (Page ID #17862). Earley stated that “the City’s ‘message’ should be that the outbreak was ‘an internal issue at McLaren [Hospital] that they are working on with our assistance, not a Flint water problem that we are trying to resolve.’” Id. In September 2014, MDHHS reported that “lead poisoning rates ‘were higher than usual for children under age 16 living in the City of Flint during the months of July, August and September, 2014.’” Id. at 59–60, ¶ 176 (Page ID #17862–63). And in early October 2014, officials realized that the bacterial contamination partly stemmed from the use of over-75-yearold cast iron pipes that comprised most of the City’s water distribution system. Id. at 60, ¶ 177 (Page ID #17863). Still no action. On October 13, 2014, General Motors stopped using Flint River water at its engine plant out of fear that the high levels of chloride would corrode its machinery. Id. at 60, ¶ 179 (Page ID #17863). The next day, a member of Governor Snyder’s executive staff wrote to the team: Now we are getting comments about being lab rats in the media, which are going to be exacerbated when it comes out that after the boil water order, there were chemicals in the water that exceeded health-based water quality standards. I think we should ask the [Emergency Manager] to consider coming back to the Detroit system in full or in part as an interim solution to both the quality, and now the financial, problems that the current solution is causing. Id. at 60–61, ¶ 180 (Page ID #17863–64). Snyder’s legal counsel similarly stated that the Flint River water issues are “downright scary” and “advised that, ‘[t]hey should try to get back on the Detroit system as a stopgap ASAP before this thing gets too far out of control.’” Id. at 61, ¶ 182 (Page ID #17864). The executive staff directed MDEQ officials to brief Earley on the water quality issues, id. at 60–61, ¶ 180 (Page ID #17863–64), but Earley refused to reconnect to the DWSD, id. at 61, ¶ 181 (Page ID #17864). Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533 Waid et al. v. Snyder et al. Page 11 With their awareness of the dangers of Flint River water only increasing, officials nonetheless failed to disclose the risks to Flint Residents. Id. at 80, ¶ 235 (Page ID #17883). “On December 31, 2014, the first round of lead monitoring showed results exceeding the Lead and Copper Rule’s action levels for lead, 15 parts per billion.” Id. at 61–62, ¶ 183 (Page ID #17864–65). And the samples had not even been drawn from the highest risk homes. Id. In January 2015, State officials met to discuss the legionella problem. Id. at 80, ¶ 233 (Page ID #17883). Around that time, MDEQ Director of Communications Bradley Wurfel wrote in an email, “I don’t want my director to say publicly that the water in Flint is safe until we get back the results of some county health department of epidemiological trace-back work on [the] 41 cases of Legionnaires’ disease” diagnosed since the switch to the Flint River. Id. at 62, ¶ 184 (Page ID #17865). On January 9, 2015, the University of Michigan turned off certain water fountains on its Flint campus because tests it conducted revealed high levels of lead. Id. at 62, ¶ 185 (Page ID #17865). “That same day, Earley,” again, “refused to return to DWSD water.” Id. at 62, ¶ 186 (Page ID #17865). A few days later, Earley resigned as Emergency Manager, and Governor Snyder appointed Gerald Ambrose in his stead. Id. at 80, ¶ 234 (Page ID #17883). On January 21, 2015, State officials had water coolers discreetly installed in State buildings located in Flint, careful not to make their actions known to the public. Id. at 80, ¶ 235 (Page ID #17883). On January 27, 2015, the Genesee County Health Department (“GCHD”) reported a likely “association between the spike in Legionnaires’ disease reports and the onset of the use of Flint River water.” Id. at 81, ¶ 237 (Page ID #17884). The City and State did nothing. Id. On January 29, 2015, the DWSD offered Emergency Manager Ambrose “an opportunity to purchase DWSD water at attractive rates . . . includ[ing] waiving the re-connection fee.” Id. at 81, ¶ 239 (Page ID #17884). Ambrose refused. Id. “On February 17, 2015, Flint water users staged public demonstrations demanding that Flint reconnect with DWSD.” Id. at 82, ¶ 243 (Page ID #17885). Ambrose again refused. Id. Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533 Waid et al. v. Snyder et al. Page 12