Opinion ID: 1657755
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Improper Questioning at Trial

Text: Finally, Smith argues that his counsel was deficient in failing to object to improper questioning at trial relating to Smith's prior criminal convictions. Smith sets forth the following trial excerpt in support of his argument: [State:] Mr. Smith, have you ever been convicted of a crime involving dishonesty? [Smith:] No. Q Theft? A No, no. Q Have you even been convicted of a felony? A Yes, I have. Q And that was in 1993? A Yeah. Q Is that correct? And that was for domestic abuse? A That was for domestic violence. Q In 1987 weren't you also found guilty of felony theft? A Yes. I stole a car. Q Okay. So, that would be a theft or a crime involving theft. A Yes, yes. Q Okay. THE COURT: That's not a crime involving dishonesty. [State:] That is not? THE COURT: No. [State:] Okay. Smith argues that the State's inquiry into his prior convictions was prejudicial and improper under the rules of evidence prohibiting the admission of evidence of convictions greater than 10 years old and of crimes not punishable by death or at least 1 year's imprisonment or involving dishonesty. This court has held that [i]n a case tried to a court without a jury, there is a presumption that the trial court, in reaching its decision, considered only evidence that is competent and relevant. State v. Zaritz, 235 Neb. 599, 607, 456 N.W.2d 479, 485 (1990). In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption is that a judge will disregard evidence that should not have been admitted. State v. Bjorklund, 258 Neb. 432, 604 N.W.2d 169 (2000). In this case, Smith was convicted in a bench trial. Thus, even if the State improperly questioned Smith about his prior convictions, the district court is presumed to have considered only properly admissible evidence in reaching its decision. In fact, at trial, the court stated that the prior theft conviction about which the State inquired did not involve dishonesty, demonstrating that the court was familiar with the pertinent evidentiary rules and their applicability to the testimony set forth above. Such a statement by the court supports an even stronger presumption that the court disregarded the inadmissible evidence in making its decision. Thus, we conclude that Smith was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object to improper questioning by the State at trial because the district court is presumed to have considered only legally admissible evidence in deciding the case.