Opinion ID: 1452791
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Frustration of Vasquez's Attempts To Impeach Demond Brown's Hearsay Testimony

Text: Vasquez also argues that the state trial court violated his Confrontation Clause rights by frustrating his attempts to impeach Demond Brown's hearsay testimony.
Over the course of this litigation, Vasquez has complained of his inability to impeach Demond Brown's hearsay testimony with (1) Brown's prior criminal record, which bears on his character for truthfulness; and (2) statements from a post-preliminary-examination interview between Brown and defense counsel in which Brown recanted his preliminary examination testimony and disclosed that the prosecution promised him leniency on an embezzlement charge in exchange for his testimony against Vasquez. Vasquez has consistently raised the issue of Brown's criminal record, but as explained below, he did not properly raise the recantation and quid pro quo issues in state court. The only impeachment claim properly before the court concerns Brown's prior criminal history. Vasquez's direct appeal omitted the recantation and quid pro quo issues. In his motion for a new trial, he argued that he could not have discovered the basis for these claims in time for trial because Brown absconded. But according to the Michigan trial court's order denying his new-trial motion, this evidence was not newly discovered. The Michigan Court of Appeals and Supreme Court both denied an application for leave to appeal without explanation, so this court looks through these decisions to the last reasoned state-court decision, see Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991), and it is clear that Vasquez's failure to bring the claims in compliance with Michigan procedural rules was at least a `substantial basis' for that court's decision denying relief. See McBee v. Grant, 763 F.2d 811, 813 (6th Cir.1985) (citing Hockenbury v. Sowders, 620 F.2d 111, 115 (6th Cir.1980)). We thus decline to address these procedurally defaulted claims. [2]
When a prisoner who filed his habeas petition after AEDPA's effective date properly raised a claim in state court, yet that court did not review the claim's merits, AEDPA deference does not apply, and the federal habeas court reviews legal issues de novo. See, e.g., Williams v. Coyle, 260 F.3d 684, 706 (6th Cir.2001). But complexity arises here because although the state court adjudicated Vasquez's Confrontation Clause claim, it never addressed the constitutional issue  instead, it simply held that any alleged error was harmless. See People v. Vasquez, No. 195915, 1998 WL 1991270, at  (Mich.Ct.App. June 26, 1998) (per curiam). Although Wiggins v. Smith could be read to suggest that AEDPA deference applies only to issues that the state court actually considers on the merits, [3] this circuit applies modified AEDPA deference in circumstances like this where the state court adjudicated the claim but with little analysis on the substantive constitutional issue. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Wilson, 416 F.3d 470, 476 (6th Cir.2005); Howard v. Bouchard, 405 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir.2005). Under this standard, the court conducts a careful and independent review of the record and applicable law, but cannot reverse unless the state court's decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. Maldonado, 416 F.3d at 476; see also Howard, 405 F.3d at 467. We conclude that the state court's rejection of Vasquez's impeachment claim was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, most notably Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974).
In Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), the Supreme Court held that the state trial court violated the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights by barring him from impeaching a prosecution witness with the witness's prior criminal record. In Vasquez's case, the state courts found no constitutional infirmity in barring Vasquez from impeaching Brown's hearsay testimony with evidence of Brown's prior criminal record. That determination represented an unreasonable application of Davis. In Davis, the state charged the defendant with stealing a safe. To insulate the credibility of its star witness, the prosecution sought a protective order barring the defense from referring to the witness's juvenile record. See id. at 310-11, 94 S.Ct. 1105. The defense protested that because the witness feared his probation would be revoked, he was subject to undue police pressure and therefore possibly biased against the defendant. Id. at 311, 94 S.Ct. 1105. The trial court granted the protective order, relying in part on an Alaska law giving it discretion to admit a juvenile record in these circumstances, id. at 311 & n. 1, 94 S.Ct. 1105, and the defendant was convicted. In the passage relevant to Vasquez's case, the Supreme Court explained: Subject always to the broad discretion of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation, the cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve into the witness' story to test the witness' perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness. One way of discrediting the witness is to introduce evidence of a prior criminal conviction of that witness. By so doing the cross-examiner intends to afford the jury a basis to infer that the witness' character is such that he would be less likely than the average trustworthy citizen to be truthful in his testimony. The introduction of evidence of a prior crime is thus a general attack on the credibility of the witness. A more particular attack on the witness' credibility is effected by means of cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand. Id. at 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105. The Court reversed the defendant's conviction because the state courts had prohibited him from probing the witness's possible bias. Id. at 317-18, 94 S.Ct. 1105. In Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986), the Supreme Court refined the meaning of Davis. Although Davis had recognized the importance of cross-examining a witness regarding bias, id. at 678-79, 106 S.Ct. 1431, Van Arsdall stressed that [i]t does not follow . . . that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment prevents a trial judge from imposing any limits on defense counsel's inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness. Id. at 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431. For example, the judge may impose reasonable limits to avoid harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Id. The Confrontation Clause `guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.' Id. (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) (per curiam)). Applying these principles, Van Arsdall acknowledged a Confrontation Clause violation because the trial court had prohibited all inquiry into the possibility that [the witness] would be biased as a result of the State's dismissal of his pending public drunkenness charge. Id. The Court then restated its rationale: [A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias. . . . Id. at 680, 106 S.Ct. 1431 (citing Davis, 415 U.S. at 318, 94 S.Ct. 1105). These cases demonstrate that the Confrontation Clause affords the right to impeach a witness with his criminal record, subject to the trial court's discretion to impose reasonable limitations to prevent harassment and annoyance of the witness. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431. Impeachment with prior crimes is precisely the otherwise appropriate cross-examination permitted under Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680, 106 S.Ct. 1431. It is a prototypical form of cross-examination, even if it goes only to the witness's credibility. See Davis, 415 U.S. at 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105; see also, e.g., Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 757, 120 S.Ct. 1851, 146 L.Ed.2d 826 (2000) ([O]nce the defendant testifies, she is subject to cross-examination, including impeachment by prior convictions. . . .); Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 420, 77 S.Ct. 963, 1 L.Ed.2d 931 (1957) ([W]hen a criminal defendant takes the stand, he . . . becomes subject to cross-examination impeaching his credibility just like any other witness. . . .). Therefore, the state courts' failure to recognize that the trial court's exclusion of Vasquez's impeachment evidence amounted to a Confrontation Clause violation represents an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, most notably Davis.
The state attempts to debunk Vasquez's impeachment claim by arguing that [t]he Supreme Court has never held that cross-examination with regard to credibility, as opposed to bias, is constitutionally protected. The state points to Davis and Van Arsdall, but the passage from Davis we block-quote above draws no meaningful distinction between the constitutional status of cross-examination as to bias and that of cross-examination as to credibility or character for truthfulness. It simply says that impeachment based on past crimes is [o]ne way of discrediting the witness  and a traditional one at that  while probing bias is [a] more particular attack on the witness' credibility. Davis, 415 U.S. at 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105. That these concepts are separately identifiable says nothing about their relative importance in our constitutional system. And we give little weight to Justice Stewart's caution in concurrence that the Davis majority neither h[eld] nor suggest[ed] that the Constitution confers a right in every case to impeach the general credibility of a witness through cross examination about his past delinquency adjudications or criminal convictions. 415 U.S. at 321, 94 S.Ct. 1105 (Stewart, J., concurring). No other Justice joined this concurrence, and as stated above, the six in the majority drew no meaningful distinction between bias and credibility. Though the particular facts of Davis and Van Arsdall implicated only bias, [4] the holdings of those cases clearly apply to both bias and credibility. [5] The state also points to this circuit's decision in Boggs v. Collins, 226 F.3d 728 (6th Cir.2000). In that rape prosecution, the state trial court limited the scope of defense counsel's cross-examination to the victim's past drug use, history of mental illness, and recollection of the attack, id. at 732, while barring inquiry into her previous false accusations of rape (questioning designed to impugn her character for truthfulness). Id. at 733. Following his conviction, the defendant brought a habeas corpus action, arguing the exclusion of evidence of past false rape accusations violated the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 735. The Boggs panel found that Davis compelled the conclusion that the defendant suffered no Confrontation Clause violation, reasoning that Davis had distinguished between a `general attack' on the credibility of a witness . . . and a more particular attack on credibility `directed toward revealing possible biases. . . .' See id. at 736 (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105). It opined that Justice Stewart's concurrence underscored that the Confrontation Clause was implicated only because Davis was seeking to show bias or prejudice. Id. at 737 (emphasis added). The panel then opined that Van Arsdall and subsequent Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit cases have adhered to the distinction . . . drawn by Justice Stewart. . . . Id. Finally, the panel discussed cases from other circuits that supposedly take the same position. Id. at 738 (collecting cases). Boggs is not dispositive for several reasons. First, and most obviously, it unquestioningly accepts Justice Stewart's attempt to commandeer the majority opinion in Davis. Second, Boggs, like most of the cases it marshals, was a rape-shield case where the Confrontation Clause arguably provides defendants less protection than in other cases. That is, the right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). Rape-shield laws vindicate a legitimate state interest in encourag[ing] victims of sexual misconduct to institute and to participate in legal proceedings against alleged offenders. Cf., e.g., Fed.R.Evid. 412 advisory committee's note. But such a legitimate interest must be very substantial to trump the defendant's right to confront witnesses by traditional means: in Davis, the Court rejected as insufficient the state's asserted interest in the rehabilitative goals of juvenile correctional procedures. 415 U.S. at 319-20, 94 S.Ct. 1105. In Vasquez's case, there is no state interest asserted in preventing impeachment of hearsay testimony by means that would have been permitted had the declarant testified at trial. On the contrary, the rules of evidence generally allow this practice. [6] Third, Boggs is materially distinguishable on its facts. The Boggs state trial court actually permitted the defense to cross-examine the witness on numerous subjects at trial  just not past false rape allegations. 226 F.3d at 732-33. Therefore, Boggs is better seen as a case about the court's broad discretion to limit the scope of cross-examination to prevent undue harassment and the like. See, e.g., Davis, 415 U.S. at 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105; Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431. The trial ruling here, however, prevented Vasquez's counsel from doing anything to challenge Demond Brown's hearsay testimony at trial. For these reasons, we reject the state's argument and conclude that the state courts' failure to recognize that the exclusion of Vasquez's past-crimes impeachment evidence violated his Confrontation Clause rights represents an unreasonable application of Supreme Court jurisprudence, most notably Davis v. Alaska .
Confrontation Clause errors are subject to harmless-error analysis. See, e.g., Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431; Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-22, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). We filed the opinion in this case before the Supreme Court decided Fry v. Pliler, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2321, 168 L.Ed.2d 16 (2007). Following the standard then prevailing in this circuit, we held that because the state court actually had applied harmless-error review, [7] we, as a federal habeas court reviewing a petition subject to AEDPA, would inquire whether the state court's conclusion as to harmless error was itself unreasonable. Eddleman v. McKee, 471 F.3d 576, 583 (6th Cir.2006) (citing Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 124 S.Ct. 7, 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003) (per curiam)). In other words, we applied the standard of  Chapman plus AEDPA deference. Id. To determine whether the Confrontation Clause error in this case was harmless under Chapman, we looked to Van Arsdall and its five-factor test, [8] concluded that none of the Van Arsdall factors supported a finding of harmlessness, and thus followed those courts that have rejected a state court's harmless-error determination despite AEDPA deference when few or none of the Van Arsdall factors pointed to harmlessness. See, e.g., Eddleman, 471 F.3d at 587-88 (none); Stapleton, 288 F.3d at 867-68(one); Fowler v. Sacramento County Sheriff's Dep't, 421 F.3d 1027, 1042-43 (9th Cir.2005) (one); cf. Benn v. Greiner, 402 F.3d 100, 106-07 (2d Cir.2005) (accepting the state court's harmless-error determination where three factors pointed to harmlessness). While a petition for panel rehearing pended, the Supreme Court issued Fry. We granted panel rehearing to consider its effect, if any, on this case. We conclude that while Fry changes the standard we must apply, it does not change the result here. In Fry, the Supreme Court held that a federal habeas court must assess the prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial under the `substantial and injurious effect' standard set forth in Brecht [v. Abrahamson], 507 U.S. 619, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 . . . [(1993)], whether or not the state appellate court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness under the `harmless beyond a reasonable doubt' standard set forth in Chapman . . . . 127 S.Ct. at 2328. Fry, 127 S.Ct. at 2326-27, therefore overruled Eddleman, 471 F.3d at 583, where we concluded that AEDPA replaced the Brecht standard with the standard of Chapman plus AEDPA deference when, as here, a state court made a harmless-error determination. To resolve the harmless error issue, we now must ask whether the constitutional violation `had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623, 113 S.Ct. 1710 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). If `the matter is so evenly balanced' that this Court has `grave doubt' as to the harmlessness of the error, it `should treat the error, not as if it were harmless, but as if it affected the verdict' ( i.e., as if it had a `substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict'). Stapleton v. Wolfe, 288 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir.2002) (quoting O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435, 115 S.Ct. 992, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995)). This court has repeatedly referred to the Van Arsdall factors in determining whether a Confrontation Clause error was harmless under Brecht. [9] See, e.g., Stallings v. Bobby, 464 F.3d 576, 582 (6th Cir. 2006); Fulcher v. Motley, 444 F.3d 791, 809-10 (6th Cir.2006); Madrigal v. Bagley, 413 F.3d 548, 551-52 (6th Cir.2005); Stapleton, 288 F.3d at 867-68; Tucker v. Warden, Ohio State Penitentiary, 64 Fed. Appx. 467, 472 (6th Cir.2003) (unpublished); Crane v. Sparkman, No. 97-5321, 1998 WL 598725, at  (6th Cir. Aug.27, 1998) (unpublished) (per curiam). We therefore have taken a fresh look at our prior analysis of the Van Arsdall factors, and we conclude that the Confrontation Clause error in this case had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623, 113 S.Ct. 1710. First, Demond Brown's testimony was important to the prosecution's case. As the prosecutor said at trial, Brown's testimony [was] of some importance as he [did] put a gun in both both [sic], in each Defendant's hands at the time of the shooting. And as the trial court recognized, it was Mr. Brown's testimony that was the basis for bind over. Detective Richard Stern testified that Demond Brown was an [e]xtremely important witness in the case. The jurors too seemingly thought Brown's testimony significant because they asked to review the transcript during deliberations. Cf. United States v. Tarricone, 996 F.2d 1414, 1420 (2d Cir.1993) ([T]he jury's requests for a read-back of [argument and testimony on a certain subject] suggest that the subject was important to their considerations. (internal quotations omitted)). Moreover, no physical evidence linked Vasquez to the murder weapon, [10] so witness testimony was crucial. Witness Brandi Gibbs testified that she did not see Vasquez at the party, that she had never seen him before the preliminary examination, and that she only had heard Vasquez was involved. The prosecution impeached her credibility on this point with her prior inconsistent statements (earlier statements to investigators implicating Vasquez that she testified at trial were only rumors she had repeated). The other witness, Reginald Whitlow II testified that he thought he saw Vasquez shoot a handgun when the melee began. The defense impeached Whitlow's credibility with his admission to drinking and smoking marijuana that night, but Whitlow stuck to his story. The only other relevant testimony came from Demond Brown, who said he saw Vasquez shooting a handgun during the shootout. In our view, Brown was a tiebreaker witness whose credibility  unlike that of the other two witnesses  had not been impeached. Therefore, the jury might well have seen Demond Brown's testimony as the true account, making his testimony important to the prosecution's case. Considering next whether the record demonstrates that Brown's testimony was cumulative, we determine it does not. The mere fact that one other witness (here Whitlow) has testified to a particular fact (here that Vasquez was holding a handgun) does not render other testimony on that point cumulative. See, e.g., Stapleton v. Wolfe, 288 F.3d 863, 865-66, 868 (6th Cir.2002). Moreover, Brown's testimony may even have bolstered Whitlow's because whereas Whitlow only testified that Vasquez was holding a handgun, Brown testified both that Vasquez was holding a handgun and that someone else (co-defendant Joe Olive) was holding a rifle  this partially undermines Vasquez's testimony that he fired a rifle in self-defense. This potential bolstering weighs against finding harmless error. Cf. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 299, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (deeming one confession not cumulative of another, despite some overlapping details, where the jury might have believed that the two confessions reinforced and corroborated each other and concluding that the error in admitting the confession was not harmless); Stapleton, 288 F.3d at 865-66, 868 (relying on Fulminante to reverse a state court's harmless-error determination despite AEDPA deference by concluding that one co-defendant's confession inculpating the defendant was not cumulative of another co-defendant's confession also implicating the defendant). Third, no physical evidence corroborated Brown's story that Vasquez was shooting a handgun. And the other testimonial evidence does not corroborate Brown's account any more than it contradicts it: Whitlow's account corroborates Brown's, but Gibbs contradicted the entire story by testifying that she did not even see Vasquez at the party. Fourth, the trial court otherwise permitted little effective cross-examination of Demond Brown's preliminary examination testimony. As a preliminary matter, we doubt that the opportunity to question a witness at a preliminary examination hearing satisfies the pre- Crawford understanding of the Confrontation Clause's guarantee of an opportunity for effective cross-examination, Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 20, 106 S.Ct. 292 (emphasis removed), when the witness does not appear at trial. [11] In any event, we agree with the trial court that in light of the voluminous discovery in this case, it would have been unrealistic to expect defense counsel to be prepared to question Demond Brown about his criminal record at this early stage. Given this material restriction on the questioning permitted at the preliminary examination, we conclude that the fourth factor points toward a finding that the error was not harmless. Fifth, the prosecution's case was not terribly strong without Demond Brown's testimony. No physical evidence linked Vasquez to the murder weapon. Ignoring Brown, the testimony was balanced, and each witness had been impeached. [12] For these reasons, we conclude that the Confrontation Clause error in Vasquez's case had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict, Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623, 113 S.Ct. 1710, and therefore was not harmless.