Opinion ID: 2633286
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Admission of Defendant's Statements to the Bailiff

Text: At the prosecutor's request, the trial court conducted an Evidence Code section 402 hearing near the end of the prosecution's case-in-chief to determine the admissibility of a statement defendant had made to Deputy Sheriff Richard Breton, a courtroom bailiff, during a pretrial hearing. At the hearing, Breton testified that on June 14, 1993, he had a conversation with defendant as he escorted him from the courtroom to the lockup. Breton told defendant he had visited several cities in Guatemala and enjoyed the country. Defendant acknowledged the cities were very nice and then said, In my country, I do this, no problem, I go home tonight. A few seconds later, he said something in Spanish that Breton did not understand. Trial counsel objected to admission of Breton's testimony on the ground that defendant's statement to Breton was ambiguous. [12] The prosecution argued the statement was admissible as an implied admission of guilt. The trial court acknowledged defendant's statement was ambiguous but ruled the testimony was nonetheless admissible because what defendant was referring to when he said I do this is for the trier of fact to determine. At trial, Breton's testimony was consistent with his testimony at the hearing. On appeal, defendant maintains the statement should have been excluded because the meaning of I do this was ambiguous. His claim fails, however, because it concerns only the weight of this evidence, not its admissibility, which does not require complete unambiguity. ( People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 438, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78.) Defendant additionally argues the statement was hearsay and not admissible as an implied admission under Evidence Code section 1220. Because defendant did not object on this ground at trial, he may not raise this issue on appeal. ( People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1049, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 988 P.2d 531.) Moreover, the argument is without merit. Evidence Code section 1220 provides that Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered against the declarant in an action to which he is a party. . . . In this case, the evidence was of a statement made by and offered against defendant, the declarant as well as a party to this prosecution. Regardless of whether the statement can be described as an admission, the hearsay rule does not require its exclusion when it is offered against a party declarant. ( People v. Carpenter, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1049, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 988 P.2d 531.) Finally, relying on People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673, and People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1, defendant argues the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury that the bailiff's testimony was not entitled to any special weight simply because it came from a bailiff. In Hill, the courtroom bailiff overheard the defendant make incriminating statements and at trial, testified for the prosecution regarding those statements. ( Hill, at p. 842, 72 Cal. Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) The bailiff thereafter resumed his courtroom duties. ( Ibid. ) On appeal, the defendant argued that, among other things, the trial court, on its own motion, should have instructed the jury to not give the bailiff's testimony any additional weight merely because he was a bailiff. ( Id. at pp. 842-843, 72 Cal. Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) We agreed such an instruction should have been given, and further concluded the bailiff should have been reassigned to another courtroom after he testified because the jurors would likely have accorded the bailiff's testimony additional weight simply because he was a uniformed officer in charge of their protection. ( Id. at pp. 842-843, 846, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) In People v. Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1289, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1, the courtroom bailiff similarly overheard the defendant make incriminating statements and subsequently testified at trial for the prosecution regarding those statements. The defendant objected to admission of the bailiff's testimony on the grounds its admission would deny him due process and a fair and impartial trial because the bailiff was a trusted court officer, had been involved in seating and escorting the jurors, and had relayed juror messages to the court. ( Ibid. ) On appeal, we agreed with the trial court's findings that the probative value of the testimony outweighed any prejudice to the defendant from his status as a trusted officer and concluded the testimony was properly admitted. ( Id. at p. 1290, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1.) The bailiff had little direct contact with jurors, had not been identified as a potential witness, was not a key prosecution witness, and was relieved of his courtroom duties upon testifying. ( Ibid. ) In addition, the trial court admonished the jury not to accord the bailiff's testimony greater weight because he had been a bailiff in the courtroom. ( Id. at p. 1291, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1.) In this case, Breton served as bailiff in pretrial proceedings but was reassigned from the courtroom in which defendant's case was tried prior to commencement of jury selection. Hence, there was no official interaction between Breton, acting as the courtroom bailiff, and the jury. Unlike Hill and Cummings, the danger that the jury would accord Breton's testimony additional weight because of his direct interaction with them was therefore nonexistent. Breton, moreover, was not the key prosecution witness, and his presence as a uniformed officer was no different than that of any other uniformed officer testifying in court. Accordingly, on these facts, we conclude the trial court was not required to admonish the jury that no greater weight should be accorded Breton's testimony because he was a courtroom bailiff.