Opinion ID: 1356054
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Edwards's Testimony

Text: Defendant contends the court should not have allowed Edwards to testify. He did not object to his testimony at trial, so the issue is not cognizable on appeal. ( People v. Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 488, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249; People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1216, 283 Cal.Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163.) Defendant argues defense counsel were ineffective in failing to object. However, he has shown no basis on which to exclude Edwards's testimony. Defendant's primary argument is that, as a result of his plea agreement, Edwards believed he was required to testify against defendant in a certain way. As we observed in People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1251-1252, 232 Cal.Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115: `[A] defendant is denied a fair trial if the prosecution's case depends substantially on accomplice testimony and the accomplice witness is placed either by the prosecution or by the court, under a strong compulsion to testify in a particular fashion. ... Thus, when the accomplice is granted immunity subject to the condition that his testimony substantially conform to an earlier statement given to police ... or that his testimony result in defendant's conviction ... the accomplice's testimony is tainted beyond redemption and its admission denies defendant a fair trial. On the other hand, although there is a certain degree of compulsion inherent in any plea agreement or grant of immunity, it is clear that an agreement requiring only that the witness testify fully and truthfully is valid.' (Italics added.) ( People v. Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1216-1217, 283 Cal.Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163.) The agreement in this case was permissible. Without contradiction, Edwards testified that he had entered into an agreement in which he would plead guilty to first degree murder and testify truthfully in this trial. In return, he would be sentenced to prison for 25 years to life, and the other charges, including the special circumstance allegations that made him death eligible, would be dismissed. He was obligated to tell the truth, not to conform his testimony to any prior statement given the police or anyone else, or otherwise to testify in any particular fashion. Indeed, defendant concedes that Edwards's trial testimony did not entirely conform to any of his pretrial statements. Defendant argues that Edwards did not actually plead guilty pursuant to the agreement and was not sentenced until after he testified. This circumstance did not invalidate the agreement. [T]hough the bargain obviously contained `a ... degree of compulsion [of the type] inherent in any plea agreement or grant of immunity' [citation], from [the witness's] perspective the degree of compulsion was not overwhelming, and more important, the only demand [the witness] understood the agreement made of him was to tell the truth. Such a bargain did not make the trial fundamentally unfair, and hence did not offend defendant's due process rights. ( People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1219-1220, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 831 P.2d 1210.) Citing one portion of the lengthy cross-examination, defendant claims Edwards in fact believed the agreement required him to testify in a particular fashion. Defense counsel was questioning Edwards about whether he had told someone before the crime, We don't need a gun, we [or I] have a knife. At that point of the cross-examination, Edwards testified he did not remember making that statement but, because he had earlier testified he did say it, I'm just up here saying I did because I'm tired of having all kinds of flack. Defense counsel exploited this testimony in some detail, and finally Edwards explained, You think I like sitting up here and taking this. I didn't actually kill that man. I have to go up and cop to first degree murder when I didn't kill that man. Sure, I was in for the robbery and that, but I'm not going to sit up here and lie for nobody. I may be lying about what I supposedly said because I'm tired of getting all kinds of flack. So I just finally gave up and said fine, I'll go ahead and say that `We don't need a gun, I got a knife.' Defense counsel succeeded in getting Edwards to contradict himself, thus casting doubt on his credibility, but this testimony presents no basis on which to disqualify him as a witness. Edwards did not suggest that his plea agreement required him to give this testimony. It is not clear what Edwards meant by flack, but most likely he was referring to the lengthy and hostile cross-examination. (Because the defense did not object to Edwards's testifying, no one had much reason to investigate this point further.) The testimony that Edwards gave to avoid flackthat he told someone before the murder the men did not need a gun because he (or they) had a knifewas not something he felt compelled to say to please the prosecution. The statement tended to increase his involvement in the crime, not defendant's. Edwards repeatedly said his understanding of the agreement was that he was to tell the truth. Whether, and to what extent, he did so, was for the jury to determine, but the record does not support defendant's claim that the agreement compelled him to testify in a particular way. Defendant's next argument is similar to one we rejected in People v. DeSantis . [Defendant contends his due process rights were violated even if the agreement required only that [the witness's] testimony conform with the truth, because [the witness] in fact believed he was required to testify according to a predetermined formula. The record belies this contention. Questioned again and again about his understanding of the nature of the testimony he was to give, [the witness] continued to emphasize his understanding that he was to tell only the truth, [¶] We also find of paramount significance the fact that the jury was aware of the bargain: [the witness] was extensively and effectively examined by defendant's counsel on his expectations of a reduced sentence following his testimony. The jury had every opportunity to discount or entirely disbelieve [the witness's] testimonyan opportunity enhanced by the court's instructions that [the witness] was an accomplice as a matter of law and that an accomplice's testimony is to be distrusted. ( People v. DeSantis, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1220, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 831 P.2d 1210.) [6] Defendant also argues the record supplies many reasons for the jury to question Edwards's testimony. Edwards's credibility was indeed suspect. Defense counsel cross-examined him effectively. Edwards made many prior inconsistent statements and had an obvious motive to blame defendant and minimize his own participation in the crime. He admitted he lied numerous times in the past about this crime. But these circumstancesknown to the jury do not provide a basis to exclude his testimony. Edwards, Osborne, and defendant were the ones who best knew exactly what happened during the crime. Osborne was unavailable to testify. Edwards and defendant did testify, even though both had reason to lie. Defendant had no right to have the jury hear only his version of the events and not the contrary testimony of another participant. It was for the jury to evaluate the testimony of both and the remaining evidence and determine where the truth lay. Defendant also claims that Edwards was so incredible that the prosecution presented false testimony in using him as a witness. We disagree. The prosecution simply presented its evidence and allowed a fully informed jury to evaluate it. We rejected a similar contention in People v. Gordon (1973) 10 Cal.3d 460, 110 Cal.Rptr. 906, 516 P.2d 298. In that case, the prosecutor told the jury in his opening statement he did not think that Carolyn, his `star witness,' would tell the whole truth because he believed, contrary to her testimony, that both the defendant and she committed the charged murder together. ( Id. at p. 472, 110 Cal.Rptr. 906, 516 P.2d 298.) The defendant argued that he was denied a fair trial because of knowing use of perjured testimony by the state. ( Id. at p. 473, 110 Cal.Rptr. 906, 516 P.2d 298.) We disagreed: In effect, [the prosecutor] was presenting [Carolyn's] testimony with a full admonition of its doubtful veracity, so that the jury could decide for itself which of the conflicting versions of the incidents in question was true. The prosecutor, despite his suspicions, did not know Carolyn's testimony was perjured.... Moreover, defendant makes no showing that any of Carolyn's testimony was in fact perjured.... Finally, it is significant that Carolyn was the only person other than defendant who knew what actually occurred. The parties to litigation generally cannot choose all their witnesses; some are forced upon them by circumstance. We conclude, therefore, the prosecution's presentation of Carolyn's testimony did not constitute a denial of due process. ( Id. at p. 474, 110 Cal.Rptr. 906, 516 P.2d 298, original italics, fn. omitted.) Similarly, the prosecutor here was not present at the murder scene. He did not know whether or to what extent Edwards might be lying at trial. Only defendant, Edwards, and Osborne were present at the crime. Only they knew for sure what happened. Allowing both Edwards and defendant to testify subject to cross-examination and impeachment by available evidence, as was done here, afforded defendant a fair trial and comported with due process. Based largely on his previous arguments, defendant also contends that the heightened reliability required in a capital case prohibits a conviction based on Edwards's testimony. We disagree. The jury was instructed on the reasonable doubt standard; no higher standard applies even in a capital trial. There is no requirement, under the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution, to instruct on a higher standard of proof of guilt at the penalty phase of a capital trial. (See Franklin v. Lynaugh (1988) 487 U.S. 164, 172-175 [108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155].) ( People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 706, 276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278.) Both available eyewitnesses to the events testified subject to thorough cross-examination and impeachment. Moreover, Edwards's testimony was not all that incriminated defendant. Indeed, the jury did not have to believe all of that testimony to find defendant guilty of the charges or even to return a verdict of death. The jury may well have been skeptical, or may have entirely disbelieved, parts of that testimony. Defendant blamed Edwards and Osborne for the murder. Edwards primarily blamed defendant. Contrary to defendant's claim, the jury did not have to choose between these versions. The jury may well have believed the truth lay somewhere in betweenthat the most reasonable interpretation of the evidence as a whole was that all three were guilty. The three were generally together and apparently mutually cooperating before the crime, during the crime, and after the crime. Defendant had incriminating blood on his boots when arrested. The jury may have had some unanswered questions about exactly who did what, but no reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of a heinous murder. Whatever skepticism the jury might have had about parts of Edwards's testimony, it could reasonably have rejected defendant's claim that he slept through the murder, awoke to help dispose of the body, then went back to sleep. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that [Edwards's] testimony rendered either the capital conviction or the death sentence unreliable. ( People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 432, 75 Cal. Rptr.2d 684, 956 P.2d 1137.) Defendant also argues that allowing Edwards to testify violated his rights to effective cross-examination and to present a defense. These arguments are primarily based on his claim, which the record does not support, that the plea agreement compelled Edwards to testify in a particular way. Defendant was permitted to cross-examine Edwards at length and effectively. Indeed, many of the reasons defendant now argues to doubt Edwards's credibility were elicited on cross-examination. The court also fully permitted defendant to present a defense. Finally, defendant contends the appellate record is inadequate to determine this issue. The alleged missing record relates not to his case but to the severed prosecution against Edwards. On February 10, 1988, the judge in Edwards's case (not the one who presided over this trial) received a handwritten letter from Edwards requesting a new attorney. In response, the court held an in camera hearing with Edwards and his attorney. At that hearing, Edwards's attorney stated that the problem involved deciding whether Edwards should accept the plea agreement. The court continued the matter for a further hearing on the morning of February 24, 1988. No hearing was held on that date, however. The court's minutes state, Defense counsel reporting that defendant Edwards will be testifying against the co-defendant [i.e., defendant here], that there is no attorney-client conflict, and that there is no need for a Marsden hearing ( People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 [84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44]), the matter is dropped from the calendar. No reporter's transcript exists for that proceeding. Edwards began testifying in this trial the same day. Defendant asserts there must have been some hearing on February 24,1988, involving Edwards, for which the reporter's transcript is missing, and that the missing transcript would have been relevant to this issue. We disagree. The record indicates Edwards was not present in that courtroom that day, and the court held no hearing. It presents no reason to suspect anything happened other than that Edwards's attorney informed the courtno doubt informallythat no hearing was needed, and the matter was dropped. It presents no basis to suspect anything occurred relevant to the nature of the agreement between Edwards and the prosecution that was not otherwise on the record.