Opinion ID: 345511
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: An objection to Broadway's Applicability

Text: 61 The government's main argument on appeal is that United States v. Simmons, 503 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1974), precludes the application of Broadway to the case at bar. The government asserts that Simmons held that Broadway did not apply to cases in which the evidence of prior similar acts made out merely a similar occurrence rather than a prior criminal offense. Although we do not embrace that characterization as fully accurate, we think that even assuming the truth of that interpretation, Simmons is inapposite. 62 Simmons holds merely that in adducing evidence of prior similar acts, the prosecution need not demonstrate conclusively that those acts constitute a criminal offense. In this respect our opinion in Simmons merely reasserts the principle that evidence of prior similar acts is not admissible because it indicates the commission of a crime but in spite of that possibility. See 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 305 (3d ed. 1940); see also note 8 supra. 63 In Simmons the defendant was convicted of furnishing false financial statements to a federal land bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014. In order to show that the defendant's statements were knowingly false, the government introduced testimony of the former vice president of a corporation of which the defendant was the largest stockholder. The witness, Judd, testified that some years earlier, at a time when the corporation was seeking a loan from a bank, the defendant had undertaken to teach Judd how to mislead the bank by means of a false financial statement. On appeal the defendant apparently contended that the evidence should have been excluded because the government had failed conclusively to establish the commission of a criminal offense. We properly rejected this argument, observing that Broadway and its progeny did not hold that proof only of acts which amount to a criminal offense are admissible. Id. at 835. We said that because Judd's testimony was plain, clear and conclusive that Simmons possessed the requisite knowledge to falsify a financial statement to be presented to a bank in conjunction with a loan, the testimony was properly admitted to show intent or guilty knowledge. Id. at 835. 64 We must begin the analysis of Simmons's impact on Broadway by observing that Simmons cannot mean that when the proof adduced by the government fails to establish each element of a putative prior criminal offense, that evidence indicates merely a prior similar occurrence that need not meet the Broadway test. On that interpretation the mere failure to satisfy Broadway by proving the congruent physical elements of the prior offense would in many cases itself obviate the need to satisfy Broadway an absurd result obviously not intended by Simmons. Thus the application of Broadway is not precluded merely because the government did not prove that the credit cards were stolen from the mail or seek to prove that Beechum knew they were stolen. 65 Nor is Broadway inapplicable merely because the government did not explicitly characterize Beechum's possession of the cards as a criminal offense. Of course, the trial judge did term Beechum's possession a substantially similar offense, but the trial judge in Simmons so characterized the prior similar acts in that case. In any event the government's label, whether prior occurrence or prior criminal offense, should not be determinative of whether the Broadway test must be satisfied. Insofar as Simmons is based on a belief that prior similar occurrences will be inherently less prejudicial than prior offenses, the prejudicial effect of admitting such evidence rests not on the label but on the inferences the jury is likely to draw, and it is this index of prejudice that ought to determine whether the full force of Broadway applies. 66 In the circumstances of this case we think it clear that the government intended to imply and the jury would naturally tend to infer that Beechum's possession of the credit cards was part of a prior offense. Indeed, absent such an inference the evidence had little probative value. In Simmons, evidence that the defendant instructed Judd in the art of filing false financial statements was sufficient, without more, to show by plain, clear and conclusive (proof) that Simmons possessed the requisite knowledge to falsify a financial statement . . . . Id. at 835. That fact was independently relevant to the inquiry in Simmons. But the crime of which Beechum is charged requires no particular skill that might be shown by the mere possession of the credit cards. Unlike the simple act of instruction in Simmons, Beechum's possession of the cards conclusively demonstrated no independently relevant fact. 67 The shallowness of the government's position is indicated by the contradictory nature of its assertions. On the one hand, it assumes Broadway applies but claims that it satisfied that test. To do this it would have had to show that Beechum possessed stolen credit cards. On the other hand, as part of its argument that Simmons and not Broadway applies, the government protests that it never sought to prove that Beechum had committed a prior offense but merely sought to adduce evidence of a prior occurrence. 19 The government cannot have it both ways of course, since if it had succeeded in its efforts to prove Beechum possessed stolen credit cards then it would have made out the physical elements of a criminal offense. The point is not that the government's alternative legal argument is improper, but rather that in fact the prosecution sought to have the jury believe, and fully expected it to believe, that Beechum had committed a prior criminal offense. Hence the admission of the credit card was still prejudicial even though the prosecution failed to prove that Beechum's possession of the cards was a criminal offense. 68 If the prosecution offers evidence that a defendant was suspected of committing a prior robbery, as in United States v. Vosper, supra, we do not fail to apply Broadway or to find this evidence dangerously prejudicial merely because the government fails to prove that its suspicions are founded. It is precisely the danger that its suspicions are groundless that underlies the clear and convincing standard. Beechum's case comes squarely within the rule established by Broadway.