Opinion ID: 170443
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Initial Justification for the Stop

Text: In order to conduct a lawful investigatory stop of a vehicle, the detaining officers must have, based on all the circumstances, `a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.' Leos-Quijada, 107 F.3d at 792 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). The district court concluded the officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on the woman's tip, the pointing neighbors, and the apparent urgency exhibited by the departing vehicles. [3] Sanchez contends the officers lacked reasonable suspicion because the anonymous nature of the witnesses made their tips unreliable. We first consider the woman's tip. In Johnson, we identified two reasons why anonymous tips trouble the courts and sometimes lead to the suppression of otherwise reliable evidence. 364 F.3d at 1190. The first concern relates to the motives of the tipster. . . . This is why the Supreme Court . . . has required that anonymous tips be accompanied by corroboration and other indicia of reliability. Id. at 1190-91 (quotations and citation omitted). A second concern relates not to a tip's anonymity but to its level of specificity. Overly generic tips, even if made in good faith, could give police excessive discretion to stop and search large numbers of citizens. Id. at 1191. Here, these concerns are mitigated by the circumstances surrounding the tip. The woman's motive was less suspect than the typical anonymous tipster because she was seeking help for a victim. In United States v. Brown, we consider[ed] it important that the caller's primary motive in contacting 911 . . . was not to implicate the armed man but to obtain aid and protection for his friend. 496 F.3d 1070, 1077 (10th Cir.2007). We noted the call is more analogous to a plea for help from a victim than to an informant's tip. Id.; see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (recognizing the greater weight carried by a witness's recent report, such as when the victim of a street crime seeks immediate police aid and gives a description of the assailant). Moreover, the woman reported the assault to the police in a face-to-face encounter, thus putting her anonymity at risk, at least to a limited degree, and allowing the police an opportunity to evaluate her credibility and demeanor. We stated in Brown that a[n] unnamed individual who divulges enough distinguishing characteristics to limit his possible identity to only a handful of people may be nameless, but he is capable of being identified and thus is not anonymous. 496 F.3d at 1075. So it is with this woman tipster; she and/or her vehicle could have been identified by the police at the time she made her statement, as would have been obvious to her. Thus, her tip bears an indicium of reliability because she would have known she could be held liable for providing the police with false information. See United States v. Jenkins, 313 F.3d 549, 554 (10th Cir.2002) (A reasonable person . . . would realize that in all likelihood the police could, if they so chose, determine the person's identity, and could hold him responsible if his allegations turned out to be fabricated.). That the police understandably did not take the time to obtain her personal information does not mean she was anonymous. Many cases have recognized the difference between in-person informants and anonymous calls. See, e.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 276, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (An instance where a tip might be considered anonymous but nevertheless sufficiently reliable to justify a proportionate police response may be when an unnamed person driving a car the police officer later describes stops for a moment and, face to face, informs the police that criminal activity is occurring.); Davis v. United States, 759 A.2d 665 (D.C.App. 2000) (police officer had probable cause for a search after citizen informant who declined to give his name flagged down the officer and told him a man nearby in a wheelchair was selling crack out of his right shoe); United States v. Salazar, 945 F.2d 47, 50-51 (2d Cir.1991) ([A] face-to-face informant must, as a general matter, be thought more reliable than an anonymous telephone tipster.); United States v. Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d 760, 763 (9th Cir.1978) ([A]lthough the informant did not identify himself by name, he would have been available for further questioning if the agent had judged the procedure appropriate. Unlike a person who makes an anonymous telephone call, this informant confronted the agent directly.); United States v. Gorin, 564 F.2d 159, 161 (4th Cir.1977) ([S]tandards of reliability should not prevent appropriate action when a victim of a crime immediately has contacted the police. That same analysis applies [when a witness informs the police in person about a crime].) (citation omitted). As to the second concernspecificitythe woman's tip was not overly general. The woman described an aspect of the assailant's clothing (gray shirt). Though she did not provide the age, race or any other physical characteristics of the victim or assailant, her tip was spatially specific. The officers knew they were looking for someone in a residential neighborhood only a block away. The tip did not provide the officers with excessive discretion to stop and search a large number of citizensthis was not a dragnet. The officers also knew the alleged assault occurred shortly before they were flagged down and could be continuing. [4] Moreover, the woman's tip was not all the officers had to go on. After driving to the area described by the woman, the officers observed two vehicles departing quickly from a single-family home. [5] While quickly departing vehicles do not, in and of themselves, suggest criminal activity, it is a suspicious circumstance to be considered as part of the universe of facts. Here it becomes more significant when coupled with a number of people pointing at the vehicles as if to say that's them. We reject Sanchez's contention that the pointing neighbors were anonymous. Like the woman tipster, the neighbors divulged enough information about themselves to be capable of identification. They stood outside their houses throughout the duration of the stop and allowed themselves to be questioned by the officers. In addition to being readily identifiable by the police, they were known to the occupants of the two vehicles and exposed themselves to a risk of retaliation by their conduct. The neighbors were not anonymous and the concerns relating to anonymous tipsmotive and specificityare not present. While each individual factor might not have been sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, we don't parse the elements but consider the totality of the circumstances. See Johnson, 364 F.3d at 1189. In doing so, we defer to the `ability of a trained law enforcement officer to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions.' United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120, 1124 (10th Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528, 1534 (10th Cir.1996)). A determination that reasonable suspicion exists. . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). Indeed, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard. Id. at 274, 122 S.Ct. 744; see also Johnson, 364 F.3d at 1194 ([A]s long as [the officer] has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting an individual may be involved in criminal activity, he may initiate an investigatory detention even if it is more likely than not that the individual is not involved in any illegality.). This case is easily distinguishable from Florida v. J.L ., where the Court concluded the police did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct a search based on an anonymous tip lacking sufficient indicia of reliability. 529 U.S. at 273-74, 120 S.Ct. 1375. The Court noted [a]ll the police had to go on . . . was the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about J.L. Id. at 271, 120 S.Ct. 1375. Here, by contrast, we have much more. An identifiable woman reported an assault to the police in a face-to-face encounter. The officers knew the basis for her knowledge (direct observation) and were able to evaluate her credibility and demeanor. Moreover, her report was corroborated by identifiable (and later identified) neighbors pointing at two quickly departing vehicles. These factors distinguish this case from J.L. and, considered together, provide sufficient justification for the initial stop.