Opinion ID: 183251
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pirelli's Unjust Enrichment Claim

Text: One loose end remains. Pirelli argues that it has a claim for unjust enrichment even if its fraud claim is not viable. The district court dismissed the claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, concluding that the dismissal of the fraud claim took the unjust enrichment claim with it. We agree. Under Illinois law, unjust enrichment is not a separate cause of action. Rather, it is a condition that may be brought about by unlawful or improper conduct as defined by law, such as fraud, duress, or undue influence, and may be redressed by a cause of action based upon that improper conduct. Alliance Acceptance Co. v. Yale Ins. Agency, Inc., 271 Ill.App.3d 483, 208 Ill.Dec. 49, 648 N.E.2d 971, 977 (1995) (quoting Charles Hester Enters., Inc. v. Ill. Founders Ins. Co., 137 Ill.App.3d 84, 91 Ill.Dec. 790, 484 N.E.2d 349, 354 (1985)). For example, a breach of a contract, or of a fiduciary duty, might create a situation in which someone has retained a benefit that ought to be disgorged based on principles of equity. See also, e.g., HPI Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Mt. Vernon Hosp., Inc., 131 Ill.2d 145, 137 Ill.Dec. 19, 545 N.E.2d 672, 679 (1989) (citing 1 G. Palmer, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1.1, at 2-4 (1978), and discussing one set of circumstances in which retaining a benefit has been deemed unjust). Pirelli argues that the conduct of which it has accused Walgreens violates state law and therefore it should be able to maintain its unjust enrichment claim. See Ass'n Benefit Servs., Inc. v. Caremark RX, Inc., 493 F.3d 841, 855 (7th Cir.2007) (Illinois courts have held that conduct rises to the level of wrongful, in the context of an unjust enrichment claim, when it violates the law.). But again, it is allegations of fraud, not claims of fraud, to which Rule 9(b) applies. Pirelli's complaint does not contend merely that Walgreens erred in filling prescriptions, violated the Illinois Pharmacy Act by doing so, and should therefore be disgorged of erroneously obtained benefits. Nor did Pirelli set out its unjust enrichment claim in the alternative, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(d)(2). See Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 407 (7th Cir.2000) (While [plaintiffs] need not use particular words to plead in the alternative, they must use a formulation from which it can be reasonably inferred that this is what they were doing.). Rather, the complaint maintains that Walgreens was engaged in a massive, perhaps fully-automated, system of filling prescriptions for the more expensive forms of Ranitidine and Fluoxetine. A system in which other industry actors were deceived. We have found those averments, bolstered by reimbursements to a single member in Illinois for just one of the drugs at issue and by a smattering of untethered nationwide data, insufficient to satisfy Pirelli's information-and-belief plausibility-burden. In Caremark RX, we reaffirmed that when the plaintiff's particular theory of unjust enrichment is based on alleged fraudulent dealings and we reject the plaintiff's claims that those dealings, indeed, were fraudulent, the theory of unjust enrichment that the plaintiff has pursued is no longer viable. 493 F.3d at 855. Pirelli's response brief elides the complaint's omission of alternative pleading, subtly reorienting its response brief toward a more straightforward unjust enrichment claim of a type that it might have pled in the alternative. The effort founders, however, because of the axiomatic rule that a plaintiff may not amend his complaint in his response brief. Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 201-02 (3d Cir.2007) (citing Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 1984)). Therefore, the district court did not err by dismissing Pirelli's unjust enrichment claim.