Opinion ID: 2625590
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Mental Slowness May Be Offered to Negate Mental Culpability Without Entry of an Insanity Plea

Text: We address the second question on certiorari first, beginning with an examination of the impaired mental condition affirmative defense contained in Colorado's insanity statute. Impaired mental condition is defined as a condition of mind caused by mental disease or defect that prevented the person from forming a culpable mental state that is an essential element of the crime charged... § 16-8-101.5(1)(b), C.R.S. (2005) (emphasis added). Mental disease or defect is defined as including only those severely abnormal mental conditions that grossly and demonstrably impair a person's perception or understanding of reality that are not caused by drug or alcohol use or manifested only through repeated criminal conduct. § 16-8-101.5(2)(b), C.R.S. (2005). A defendant seeking to introduce evidence raising the affirmative defense of impaired mental condition must comply with the statutory pleading requirements of the affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of insanity. § 16-8-103(1.5), C.R.S. (2005). This defense must be raised at the time of arraignment, or at any time before trial when the court permits it for good cause shown. § 16-8-103(1.5)(a), C.R.S. (2005). Once raised, a court-ordered mental health examination is automatically triggered by the entry of an insanity plea. § 16-8-105.5, C.R.S. (2005). Thereafter, the burden of proof is on the People to prove the defendant not mentally impaired beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Although insanity pleas, including those based upon an impaired mental condition theory, must comply with these statutory pleading requirements, there is nothing within Colorado's statutory insanity framework indicating that our General Assembly intended to create an all or nothing insanity defense that applies in all cases where the defendant presents evidence challenging the culpable mental state element of the crime charged. Compare People v. Carpenter, 464 Mich. 223, 627 N.W.2d 276, 283 (2001) (noting that the Michigan legislature created an all or nothing insanity defense). Rather, Colorado's insanity statute created a unitary process for hearing the issues raised by the combined affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of insanity (insanity and impaired mental condition), and a not guilty plea on the merits. See § 16-8-101.3, C.R.S. (2005); see also 16-8-104.5, C.R.S. (2005). This statute envisions three possible jury findings in a unitary trial: (1) a jury could find a defendant insane pursuant to the insanity statute; (2) a jury could find that the defendant suffered from an impaired mental condition pursuant to the insanity statute [8] ; (3) if the defendant is neither insane nor mentally impaired, then the jury must decide the defendant's guilt on the merits, i.e., whether the prosecution has met its burden to prove that the defendant in fact committed the crime charged, which, of course, includes the required culpable mental state. See Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385, 390 (1982). One version of the third scenario (where he is neither insane nor mentally impaired) occurs if the defendant suffers from a mental health problem that he does not claim rises to the statutory level of an abnormal mental condition[] that grossly and demonstrably impair[s] [his] perception or understanding of reality. Our court of appeals addressed just such a situation when it held that the defendant could introduce evidence that he was a slow thinker to show that he did not in fact possess the required culpable mental state without complying with the pleading requirements of the insanity statute. People v. Requejo, 919 P.2d 874 (Colo.App.1996), cert. denied (Oct. 15, 1996). In that case, rather than presenting evidence of a severely abnormal mental condition, the defendant offered proof that he was mildly mentally retarded, though competent, sane, and not mentally ill. Id. at 876. The court distinguished impaired mental condition from mental slowness and held that if a defendant's condition of mind is so abnormal as to render him incapable of accurately comprehending his surrounding circumstances, he or she is required to plead the statutory [insanity-impaired mental condition] defense in order to present evidence to that effect. Id. Because the defendant did not claim that he was unable to form the required mens rea, mental condition evidence was properly admitted. Id. We find the court of appeals reasoning in Requejo instructive and apply it here. Vanrees testified that he had taken special education classes throughout the course of his schooling and admitted that he was kind of slow. However, as in Requejo, the defense did not introduce evidence to support a claim that Vanrees's mental slowness constituted a mental disease or defect, consistent with this term's statutory definition. Like the evidence of Requejo's mild mental retardation, defense counsel here did not claim that Vanrees's mental slowness was severely abnormal or that it grossly and demonstrably impair[ed] [his] perception or understanding of reality. As in Requejo, evidence of Vanrees's mental slowness is not encompassed within the statutory definition of impaired mental condition. Hence, we hold that evidence of Vanrees's mental slowness did not satisfy the threshold requirements of the affirmative defense of impaired mental condition and Vanrees did not have to comply with the pleading requirements of that statute. Returning to discuss the third scenario of Colorado's unitary trial process, (where the defendant is neither insane nor mentally impaired), the defendant always possesses the constitutional right to present relevant evidence to contest whether he factually formed the culpable mental state of the crime charged. It is axiomatic that an accused is presumed innocent of ... every element of the crime including the requisite [culpable mental state], Hendershott, 653 P.2d at 390; see also People v. Cornelison, 192 Colo. 337, 341, 559 P.2d 1102, 1105 (1977). Prohibiting a defendant from contesting or disproving the required culpable mental state would create an impermissible presumption of culpability which would violate a defendant's due process rights and unconstitutionally render the prosecution's evidence on that issue uncontestable as a matter of law. Hendershott, 653 P.2d at 391. Thus, based upon a criminal defendant's constitutional right to due process, the defendant's mental slowness may be considered as factual evidence to support the argument that he lacked the required culpable mental state. An accused may contest or counter factually the required mental state even though he may possess the capacity to form it. To summarize, mental slowness is not a mental disease or defect as these terms are defined by the legislature. We conclude that evidence of mental slowness in this case does not meet the threshold requirements of the affirmative defense of impaired mental condition and that the defendant may introduce relevant evidence of mental slowness to counter or to contest factually whether he formed the culpable mental state of the crimes charged.