Opinion ID: 3172549
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the presidio trust act

Text: At the center of the dispute over the lodge proposal is interpretation of Section 104(c) of the Presidio Trust Act. This section requires the Trust to “develop a comprehensive program for management of those lands and facilities within the Presidio which are transferred to the administrative jurisdiction of the Trust. . . . Such program shall consist of— (1) demolition of structures which in the opinion of the Trust, cannot be cost- effectively rehabilitated, and which are identified in the management plan for demolition, ... (3) new construction limited to replacement of existing structures of similar size in existing areas of development . . .” PTA § 104(c). The Trust reads Section 104(c)(3) to permit new construction in any existing area of development so long as the new construction is offset by demolition in any existing area of development throughout the park—i.e., the banking interpretation. In the course of litigation, the Trust also advanced a narrower interpretation of the statute that would permit new construction so long as it is offset by demolition in the same existing area of development—i.e., what the Associations term the “banking lite” interpretation. The PRESIDIO HISTORICAL ASS’N V. PRESIDIO TRUST 15 Associations take the position that Section 104(c)(3) limits new construction to replacement of demolished structures with “buildings of roughly the same size in roughly the same place”—essentially a building-by-building, or one-up, onedown, approach. We reject the Trust’s broader banking theory, but agree that the statute supports a variant of its narrower interpretation. The buildings scheduled for demolition within the same Main Post planning district (94,000 square feet) offset the lodge’s 70,000 square feet of new construction within close proximity to the demolished structures. We therefore hold that the lodge proposal qualifies as a “replacement of existing structures of similar size in [an] existing area[] of development.” PTA § 104(c)(3). Because the lodge is the only new construction at issue in this appeal, we need not concern ourselves with the calculations related to the remaining demolition and new construction contained within the Update. Nor do we explore the outer limits of what is permissible under the statute. Our reasoning rests on the familiar Chevron analysis because the Trust is a government entity with statutory authority to make binding policy regarding Area B of the Presidio. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984); High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630, 648 (9th Cir. 2004) (treating the precedential value of an agency’s statutory authority as determinative of whether Chevron applies). Under Chevron, we look first to the text of the statute to determine whether “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 16 PRESIDIO HISTORICAL ASS’N V. PRESIDIO TRUST intent of Congress.” Id. at 842–43. If the intent of Congress is not clear, then we consider whether the Trust’s interpretation is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843. In reaching their preferred, albeit divergent, readings of “replacement of existing structures of similar size,” both sides start with the proposition that the statute is unambiguous. Yet the seemingly simple statute raises more questions than it answers and we conclude that it is ambiguous with respect to the scope of the Trust’s authority to undertake new construction. A dizzying array of square footage figures offered by the parties hints at deep underlying ambiguity, and nothing in the plain text of the statute—the common denominator for the purposes of our analysis—adds any clarity. See United States v. Ermoian, 752 F.3d 1165, 1168 (9th Cir. 2013) (“We begin, as any effort to interpret a statute must, with the text.”). We first consider the Associations’ position that the statute unambiguously mandates a rough one-up, one-down principle. This argument fails on a plain language reading of the statute. The Associations largely assume that the word size refers to square footage, but we note that size might also refer to a building’s volume, height, footprint, scale, massing, or some combination of factors that are simply not delineated by the statute and thus inevitably require interpretation and judgment calls on the part of both the Trust and this court. Additionally, the term similar, particularly as part of the phrase “similar size,” itself evokes a qualitative judgment, which is anathema to the notion of clarity at Chevron step one. PRESIDIO HISTORICAL ASS’N V. PRESIDIO TRUST 17 The purported plain meaning of the word replacement does not fare any better. To be sure, the contours of its accepted meaning limit the realm of possibilities, requiring that there be a plausible connection between the replacement and its predecessor. See Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2009) (defining replace as “to provide a substitute for” or “put an equivalent in place of”). But whatever inherent limiting effect the word replacement might impart, the narrow meaning is lost when the word is read in context. The statute refers to replacement of “existing structures” rather than an “existing structure.” PTA § 104(c)(3). Thus, this language does not preclude a building or groups of buildings from replacing other groups of buildings, making it increasingly difficult to be sure what must be compared for similarity, let alone how to compare it. The ambiguity of this phrase stands out in contrast with the Golden Gate Act, which employed similar, but far clearer, language limiting new construction. See 16 U.S.C. § 460bb- 2(i) (prohibiting new construction generally but allowing “[a]ny . . . structure which is demolished” to be “replaced with an improvement of similar size” (emphasis added)). Had Congress intended the Trust Act to maintain the same strictures that governed new construction in the Presidio under the Golden Gate Act, it presumably would have kept the singular form, which better supports a one-up, one-down principle. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 n.12 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Where limiting language present in earlier statutes is not included in later legislation, it can be presumed that the omission was intentional.”). The Associations acknowledge that the phrase “replacement of existing structures of similar size” does not bind the Trust to put new construction in exactly the same 18 PRESIDIO HISTORICAL ASS’N V. PRESIDIO TRUST place and make it exactly the same in appearance or even footprint as the prior structures. They assert only that the Trust must put new construction “roughly” in the same location as the demolished building and make it “roughly” the same size. The Associations further acknowledge that it might be possible under their interpretation to remove several buildings and replace them with one new building of similar aggregate size. This common-sense concession certainly embraces one plausible reading of the statute, but one can posit both narrower and more expansive definitions of the provision’s operative terms, which are inherently abstract and imprecise. The specificity that Chevron step one demands is simply lacking here. The statute also states that the new construction may only replace existing structures in “existing areas of development.” PTA § 104(c)(3) (emphasis added). The reference to “existing areas” would be rendered superfluous if the provision required the Trust to proceed on a buildingby-building basis, since the building being replaced would necessarily have been in an existing area of development. See Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1177–78 (2013) (noting that a statutory interpretation that renders other statutory language superfluous is generally disfavored, particularly if there is another interpretation that gives effect to every clause and word of a statute). Reading the phrase “replacement of existing structures of similar size” in light of the phrase “existing areas of development” compounds the ambiguity of PTA § 104(c)(3). In sum, we are unconvinced by the Associations’ reading of the statute. Nor are we persuaded that the Trust’s banking interpretation passes the test at Chevron step one. The claim that the statute unambiguously mandates this interpretation is PRESIDIO HISTORICAL ASS’N V. PRESIDIO TRUST 19 in considerable tension with the plain text of the statute. Put literally, the Trust’s reading would have the statute say that the Trust can undertake new construction to “replicate square footage (in the aggregate) from buildings demolished in any area of the park where there is development.” This expansive formulation essentially reads out plausible, common-sense meanings of the words replacement and similar size. At Chevron step one, we determine whether Congress has spoken to the “precise question at issue.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. The answer here is no. The statute is unclear. Notably, neither side presents a compelling argument for any definitive, unambiguous definition of what is required of the Trust. In the end, the most that can be said of the statute is that it grants some unspecified discretion to the Trust to undertake new construction projects within certain obscure strictures. In the face of an ambiguous statute, under the second step of the Chevron analysis, we defer to the Trust’s interpretation so long as it is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. We hold that the Trust’s expansive banking interpretation is impermissible because it is “manifestly contrary to the statute.” Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 239 (2004) (citation omitted). While the new construction authority granted by the Presidio Trust Act is indeed capacious, there are nevertheless limits to what the Trust can read into the Act’s delegation of authority. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442–43 (2014) (“Even under Chevron’s deferential framework, agencies must operate ‘within the bounds of reasonable interpretation.’” (quoting City of Arlington v. 20 PRESIDIO HISTORICAL ASS’N V. PRESIDIO TRUST F.C.C., 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013)). The key infirmity of the banking interpretation is that it imposes no discernible limits on the Trust’s development authority across the Presidio, and thus would lead to an “enormous and transformative expansion” of the Trust’s “regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization.” Id. at 2444. For example, nothing in the banking approach would prevent the Trust from demolishing all of the buildings in the Main Post district in order to offset the construction of a highrise condominium complex across the Presidio in the heart of the relatively undeveloped South Hills area.6 Although the Trust points to the requirement that the new construction be in “existing areas of development” to disclaim any power to use the banking approach to undertake such a project, the “existing areas of development” language has no limiting effect where it is statutorily undefined and virtually every area of the Presidio (and certainly every planning district) contains at least some development. Even if the banking theory contained discernible limits, efforts to balance the “ledger” over time and space, while the Trust juggles multiple development projects over multiple years, would be a nightmare in practice. Taken at face value, the Trust’s theory would render the entire Area B of the Presidio subject to unspecified development under the Trust Act, so long as square footage from somewhere (or multiple somewheres) was replaced with square footage anywhere else in the Presidio. 6 The Trust argues that in all likelihood it would be prevented from undertaking such construction by other applicable statutes, such as NEPA, the NHPA, and the Golden Gate Act. Yet we are required to construe the Trust Act on its own terms, not in reference to or as part of a constellation of other independent statutory obligations. PRESIDIO HISTORICAL ASS’N V. PRESIDIO TRUST 21 That the banking interpretation would permit unlimited authority puts it at odds with a major purpose of the Trust Act—i.e., to implement “sound principles of land use planning” and “protect[] the Presidio from development and uses which would destroy the scenic beauty and historic and natural character of the area and cultural and recreational resources[.]” PTA § 101(5). That is reason enough to conclude that the banking interpretation is impermissible. See Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. E.P.A., 217 F.3d 861, 867 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding EPA’s interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision unreasonable where it was inconsistent with the Clean Air Act’s purpose). Ultimately, any reasoned interpretation of the statute must account for the diversity of the Presidio’s landscape, the vastly different levels of development in different areas of the park, and the historic nature of the park. For instance, the South Hills planning district is a largely undeveloped natural area, albeit with some small buildings, while the Main Post and Letterman planning districts are relatively urban. The Trust adopted the planning districts in recognition of the reality that these districts had different “historical uses” and features. If nothing else, Section 104(c)(3) was designed to prohibit the wholesale re-purposing of remote corners of the Presidio that currently feature vastly different characteristics and disparate levels of development. Yet the banking interpretation permits just that—the Trust offers no effective limiting interpretation that would account for the Trust’s duty to preserve the existing architectural and natural diversity of the Presidio. The Trust’s banking interpretation cannot pass muster because it “entirely fail[s] to consider an important aspect of the problem” at hand. Michigan v. E.P.A., 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of 22 PRESIDIO HISTORICAL ASS’N V. PRESIDIO TRUST United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). In the face of its unsuccessful efforts to persuade the district court to embrace a broad reading of the statute, on appeal, the Trust advanced a new, narrower interpretation of Section 104(c)(3). The Trust asks us to read the statute to permit construction of new buildings where their aggregate square footage is offset by demolition within the same existing area of development. We understand the Trust’s alternative theory as asserting authority to offset new construction with demolition in some physical proximity of the new construction, regardless of the boundaries of the planning districts. Under this “banking lite” theory, the Trust argues that the lodge proposal—and, indeed, the Update’s new construction plans as a whole—are “more than offset[]” by the demolition in the immediately adjacent areas of development, including the demolition in the Main Post Update plus demolition of the nearby Buildings 605, 606, and 1158 in the Crissy Field and Letterman planning districts. The Trust views the three buildings outside the Main Post planning district as “still within the larger ‘existing area of development’ that includes the Main Post.” The Record of Decision, which adopted the Update, is predicated on the Trust’s banking interpretation. In contrast, the new “banking lite” theory—advanced for the first time on appeal in response to the district court’s rejection of the Trust’s effort to invoke Chevron—is nothing more than a convenient litigating position. “Congress has delegated to the administrative official and not to appellate counsel the responsibility for elaborating and enforcing statutory commands.” Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988) (citation omitted). The “banking lite” PRESIDIO HISTORICAL ASS’N V. PRESIDIO TRUST 23 interpretation is not the product of any considered development, nor has the Trust’s theory been consistent throughout the administrative process. Because of the way it came about and its potentially broad reach, we decline to give the litigating position any special deference under Skidmore. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“The weight of [an agency interpretation] will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all of those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”).7 The ultimate question is whether the lodge proposal falls within the statutory mandate that new construction projects are limited to “replacement of existing structures of similar size in existing areas of development . . . .” PTA § 104(c)(3). See also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). We conclude that it does. The new lodge construction is projected for 70,000 square feet, while the physically proximate planned demolition within the Main Post planning district alone amounts to over 90,000 square feet.8 7 Our approach to Skidmore deference vis-a-vis an agency’s litigating position has varied depending on the factual circumstances. Compare Alaska v. Fed. Subsistence Bd., 544 F.3d 1089, 1095 (9th Cir. 2008) (affording no deference to the government’s litigating position) with Andersen v. DHL Ret. Pension Plan, 766 F.3d 1205, 1212 (9th Cir. 2014) (affording Skidmore deference to the government’s litigating position); Price v. Stevedoring Serv. of Am., Inc., 697 F.3d 820, 829–32 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (affording Skidmore deference to the government’s litigating position). 8 The Trust left open the question of whether it will follow through in demolishing Buildings 40 and 41, which are located in the Main Post planning district and were counted in its 94,000 square feet demolition calculation. Even without these two buildings, which total 16,514 square 24 PRESIDIO HISTORICAL ASS’N V. PRESIDIO TRUST As already explained, the term “replacement” is not confined to a one-for-one demolition/new construction meaning. Instead, replacement can include, collectively, construction of more than one structure offset by demolition of more than one structure, thus giving meaning to the plural language of “existing structures.” PTA § 104(c)(3) (emphasis added). Further, treating the “similar size” restriction as encompassing at least a comparison of the square footage of the relevant demolished buildings, without necessarily cabining its meaning to that unit of analysis, ties the statutory requirements together in a manner consistent with the statute’s language and purpose. Id. Finally, the phrase “existing areas of development” should be limited to development in areas physically proximate to the location of the building being replaced.9 Id. This interpretation harmonizes all of the elements of the statute. See Boise Cascade Corp. v. E.P.A., 942 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Under accepted canons of statutory interpretation, we must interpret statutes as a whole . . . .”). feet, the rest of the planned demolition in the Main Post planning district would still exceed the 70,000 square feet of new lodge construction. 9 Unlike the more sweeping banking theory, this interpretation also imposes some foreseeable limits on the Trust’s new construction authority that are more in keeping with the purposes of the Presidio Trust Act. The Trust could not, for instance, undertake isolated new construction in a remote corner of the park, because it would need to establish physical proximity to an existing area of development in which the purported “replacement” was located. This interpretation further reinforces the purposes of the Presidio Trust Act by allowing the Trust to draw new construction authority from physically proximate parcels that are already likely similar in character. It therefore prevents the Trust from fundamentally re-purposing certain areas of the part in one fell swoop, and generally preserves the architectural, historic and natural diversity of the Presidio as a whole. PRESIDIO HISTORICAL ASS’N V. PRESIDIO TRUST 25 We conclude that the Trust’s Update with respect to the proposed lodge and the offsetting demolition in the Main Post area is consistent with Section 104(c)(3). Without doubt, the proposed lodge is physically proximate to the other Main Post demolition sites. Each of the buildings being “replace[d]” is within several hundred yards of the proposed lodge and falls within a similarly developed area of the Presidio. It does not matter that there may be more structures than before: the new buildings still replace the other buildings within the Main Post planning district. To be sure, there remains some leeway as to how far the statute extends, especially with respect to the requirement of physical proximity. But we need not delineate the outer limits of that extension nor consider whether proximity is defined by the boundaries of the planning districts. Although the Trust reached across district lines to justify proposed construction in addition to the lodge, that expanded construction effort is not before us. Thus, we do not reach the question of whether Buildings 605, 606, and 1158 (encompassing 54,071 square feet), which are within two different, but adjacent, planning districts, legitimately could be counted to offset other planned construction in the Main Post. All we decide here is that the lodge construction and demolition taking place within the Main Post satisfy the replacement, size, and proximity limitations of Section 104(c)(3).