Opinion ID: 559903
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Owner or Operator under CERCLA.

Text: 9 Under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9601(20)(A), CERCLA defines owner or operator as any person owning or operating a facility, and it specifically excludes any person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility. Prescott's position as majority shareholder of IBP did not make him an owner of the asbestos manufacturing plant. The plant was purchased by the IBP corporate entity and not by Prescott. The property of the corporation is its property, and not that of the stockholders, as owners. 1 C. Keating & G. O'Gradney, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations Sec. 31 at 555 (1990). 10 We now turn to the question whether Prescott could have been considered an operator of the asbestos plant during the time that the plant was owned by IBP. Because CERCLA was a hastily drafted Act and passed through a lame-duck Congressional session, 3 it is not surprising that the statute does not explicitly describe the defining character of an operator as used within the statute. While we can conceive of situations where an individual director, officer or employee of a corporation may be considered an operator of a manufacturing facility as defined by CERCLA, this suit does not present such a situation. 11 Under traditional concepts of corporate law, the principle of limited liability would protect officers or employees like Prescott from being held responsible for the acts of a valid corporation. However, CERCLA prevents individuals from hiding behind the corporate shield when, as operators, they themselves actually participate in the wrongful conduct prohibited by the Act. See 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 9607(a) (West Supp.1990) (any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of ... shall be liable for [cleanup costs].); see also S.Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1980) (noting that society should not bear the costs of protecting the public from hazardous wastes generated by an owner or operator who ... now wishes to be insulated from any continuing responsibilities.). In such cases, a defendant can be held individually liable for his wrongful conduct. [T]his personal liability is distinct from the derivative liability that results from 'piercing the corporate veil'  where we would hold the owners of a less than bona fide corporation responsible for corporate acts. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726, 744 (8th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848, 108 S.Ct. 146, 98 L.Ed.2d 102 (1987); cf. 3A S. Flanagan & C. Keating, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations Sec. 1135 (1986) (Corporate officers are liable for their torts, although committed when acting officially.). In determining liability in cases like the one now before us, we must look to the extent of the defendant's personal participation in the alleged wrongful conduct. 12 The plaintiffs in this case have failed to come forward with any evidence showing that Prescott personally participated in any conduct that violated CERCLA. The record clearly indicates that Prescott spent very little time at the asbestos plant, and no evidence has been presented to indicate that such visits would have provided Prescott with the opportunity to direct or personally participate in the improper disposal of asbestos or asbestos by-products. Prescott lived in New York and only visited New Orleans two to four times a year; and his participation in plant operations were limited to reviewing financial statements and attending meetings of the officers where he consulted with von Dohlen and others. On such sparse evidence we find that the district court committed no error in granting summary judgment in favor of Prescott. 13 AFFIRMED.