Opinion ID: 184866
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consideration of Cost in Revising Standards

Text: As this court long ago made clear, in setting NAAQS unders 109(b) of the Clean Air Act, the EPA is not permitted toconsider the cost of implementing those standards. See LeadIndustries, 647 F.2d at 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also NRDC,902 F.2d at 973 (following Lead Industries in reviewingparticulate matter NAAQS); American Petroleum Inst., 665F.2d at 1185 (same, in reviewing ozone NAAQS). The petitioners make four unsuccessful attempts to distinguish LeadIndustries and its progeny. First, the petitioners claim that in Lead Industries we heldonly that the Clean Air Act does not compel the EPA toconsider the costs of implementation in setting a NAAQS; onthe contrary, we held that the Act precludes the EPA fromdoing so. See Lead Industries, 647 F.2d at 1148 (the statute___________________ tion), then a response to air pollution that reduces the asthmatics'well-being to 70 could be counted as an effect of magnitude 30 (thedifference from full health), rather than 10 (the difference from thelevel without the pollution). That approach would ensure thateffects on persons with disabilities were not underestimated, even inthe broad sense of that term apparently adopted by HHS. and its legislative history make clear that economic considerations play no part in the promulgation of [NAAQS]). Second, that we decided Lead Industries prior to theSupreme Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC,467 U.S. 837 (1984) does not, as the petitioners suggest,require us to revisit the earlier case. The Lead Industriesdecision was made in Chevron step one terms, see id., as thepost-Chevron progeny of Lead Industries have made clear. See NRDC, 902 F.2d at 973 (Consideration of costs ...would be flatly inconsistent with the statute, legislative history and case law on this point); NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d1146, 1158C59 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (in banc) (Vinyl Chloride)([S]tatute on its face does not allow consideration of technological or economic feasibility.... Congress considered thealternatives and chose to close down sources or even industries rather than to allow risks to health). Third, though the petitioners are correct that in LeadIndustries we interpreted s 109(b), which governs the settingof NAAQS, and not s 109(d), which governs the revising ofNAAQS, we can discern no legally relevant difference in thetwo sections that would make Lead Industries inapplicable tos 109(d). Section 109(d)(1) directs the EPA to: complete a thorough review of the criteria published under section 7408 of this title and the [NAAQS] promulgated under this section and [to] make such revisions in such criteria and standards and promulgate such new standards as may be appropriate in accordance with section 7408 of this title and subsection (b) of this section. 42 U.S.C. s 7409(d)(1). The petitioners contend that consideration of costs is one pertinent factor in determining whether revision of a NAAQS is appropriate, but this argumentignores the clause immediately following appropriate, whichincorporates s 109(b) and thereby affirmatively precludesconsideration of costs in revising NAAQS. Section 108(b), 42U.S.C. s 7408(b), does require the EPA to provide the Stateswith information on the cost of implementing NAAQS, but thereference to s 108 does not permit consideration of costs insetting NAAQS because it clearly relates back to the require- ment that the EPA make ... revisions in [the criteriapublished under section 7408] ... as may be appropriate. And insofar as the air quality criteria do apply to the settingof NAAQS, they do so through s 109(b), which (again) precludes the consideration of costs and which is explicitlyincorporated into s 109(d)(1). See id. s 7409(b)(1) (primaryNAAQS to be based on [the air quality] criteria issuedunder s 108). Fourth, the petitioners point to s 109(d)(2), which createsthe CASAC and requires it to advise the EPA about, amongother things, any adverse public health, welfare, social, economic, or energy effects which may result from variousstrategies for attainment and maintenance of such [NAAQS].Id. s 7409(d)(2)(C)(iv). Why, ask the petitioners, would theCASAC be required to advise the EPA about these matters ifthe EPA were not then supposed to consider its advice in thecourse of revising the NAAQS? As above, however, thepetitioners overlook that s 109(d)(1) directs the EPA to review and to revise, as appropriate, the air quality standardsissued under s 108 as well as the NAAQS promulgated unders 109(b). The advice required in s 109(d)(2)(C)(iv) is pertinent only to the EPA's duty under s 108 to provide theStates with control strategy information. B.Environmental Consequences of Implementing NAAQS The State Petitioners argue that the EPA erred in failingto consider the environmental consequences resulting fromthe financial impact of the [revised PM2.5 and ozone NAAQS]on the federal Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund Act. This argument is squarely foreclosed by our decision inNRDC. In reviewing the EPA's previous revision of the PMNAAQS, we rejected the argument that the EPA erred inrefusing to consider the health consequences of unemployment in determining the primary [NAAQS] for particulatematter and held that [i]t is only health effects relating topollutants in the air that EPA may consider. 902 F.2d at972-73 (emphasis in original). Unlike the positive healthbenefits of ozone that we hold (in Part III.B, below) the EPA must consider, any detrimental health effects resulting fromthe financial impact upon the mine fund, like the healthconsequences of unemployment, are traceable to the cost ofcomplying with the revised PM2.5 and ozone NAAQS and notto the presence of those pollutants in the air. C.The National Environmental Policy Act In challenging both the revised PM2.5 and ozone NAAQS,the State Petitioners also argue that the EPA failed tocomply with certain requirements of the NEPA. The petitioners recognize that the Congress has exempted all actionsunder the Clean Air Act, including the setting of NAAQS,from the central requirement of the NEPA, namely, thepreparation of an Environmental Impact Statement. Compare 42 U.S.C. s 4332(2)(C)-(D) (agency must prepare EISin all major Federal actions significantly affecting the qualityof the human environment), with 15 U.S.C. s 793(c)(1) (Noaction taken under the Clean Air Act shall be deemed a majorFederal action significantly affecting the quality of the humanenvironment within the meaning of the [NEPA]). Nonetheless, they suggest that the EPA is required to complete thefunctional equivalent of an EIS and also to comply with otherrequirements in the NEPA, see 42 U.S.C. s 4332(2)(B), (E),(G). State Petitioners' PM Brief at 20; State Petitioners'Ozone Brief at 19. We reject each of these suggestions. First, the State Petitioners contend that this court hasrecognized that the '[CAA], properly construed, requires thefunctional equivalent of a NEPA impact statement,'  id.(quoting Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d375, 384 (1973)). Our decision in Portland Cement, however,actually construed only section 111 of the Clean Air Act. By replacing these words with [CAA] in their briefs, thepetitioners misrepresent our interpretation of a single sectionof the Clean Air Act, dealing with emission standards forstationary sources, as an interpretation of the entire Act. Even if the petitioners were correct, however, Portland Ce- ment predated, and is now superseded by, the statutoryexemption in 15 U.S.C. s 793(c)(1), which the Congress addedin 1974. Second, the State Petitioners contend that a provision ofthe NEPA requires that EPA weigh 'economic considerations.'  The section to which the petitioners refer reads asfollows: all agencies of the Federal Government shall ...identify and develop methods and procedures ... which willinsure that presently unquantified environmental amenitiesand values may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations. 42 U.S.C. s 4332(2)(B). Even if this section isproperly read generally to require an agency to considerimplementation costs, s 109(d)(1) specifically prohibits theEPA from doing so. And the NEPA provides that it shall notin any way affect the specific statutory obligations of anyFederal agency ... to comply with criteria or standards ofenvironmental quality. 42 U.S.C. s 4334(1). Therefore,s 4332(2)(B) cannot require the EPA to disregard the prohibition in s 109(d)(1) upon the consideration of costs in settingNAAQS. The State Petitioners' remaining arguments--that the EPAfailed to comply with two other sections of the NEPA--farelittle better. Section 4332(2)(E) requires federal agencies tostudy, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action in any proposal which involvesunresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of availableresources. As with s 4332(2)(B), insofar as s 4332(2)(E) canbe read to require the EPA to consider the costs of implementing NAAQS when revising those standards, contrary tothe prohibition in s 109(d)(1), s 4334(1) prevents it fromhaving any effect. If, on the other hand, s 4332(2)(E) is understood in thecontext of the Clean Air Act to require the EPA merely todiscuss implementation alternatives, then it, like the similars 4332(2)(G) with which the petitioners also claim the EPAfailed to comply, is the functional equivalent of s 108(b)(1). That section requires the EPA to provide the States with,among other things, such data as are available on available technology and alternative methods of prevention and controlof air pollution. As we recognize with regard to the requirement that the agency prepare an EIS, [c]ompliance withNEPA's ... requirement[s] has not been considered necessary when the agency's organic legislation mandates procedures for considering the environment that are 'functionalequivalents' of the [NEPA's] process. Izaak Walton Leagueof Am. v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 367 n.51 (1981). The rationalefor the functional equivalence doctrine is the well-establishedprinciple that a general statutory rule usually does notgovern unless there is no more specific rule. Green v. BockLaundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 524 (1989); see alsoAlabama ex rel. Siegelman v. EPA, 911 F.2d 499, 504-05(11th Cir. 1990) (citing cases). The NEPA is the generalstatute requiring agencies to consider environmental harms,whereas the Clean Air Act is the more specific and itsequivalent provisions apply in place of those in the NEPA. See Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 386 (finding functionalequivalence when more specific statute strikes workablebalance between some of the advantages and disadvantages offull application of NEPA). Our analysis of the petitioners' contentions leads us toconclude that nothing in the NEPA requires the EPA insetting NAAQS to consider or to discuss matters that theClean Air Act does not already permit or require. D. The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act The State Petitioners in the particulate matter case andCongressman Bliley in the ozone case both contend that theEPA is required by the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 2U.S.C. s 1501 et seq., to prepare a Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS) when setting a NAAQS, see id. s 1532, and tochoose the least burdensome from a range of alternativepermissible NAAQS, see id. s 1535. Even if the petitionersand the amicus are correct regarding the interaction of theUMRA and the CAA--a point the EPA strongly contests-- we can provide them with no relief. See id. s 1571(a)(3)([T]he inadequacy or failure to prepare [a RIS] ... shall notbe used as a basis for staying, enjoining, invalidating or otherwise affecting [an] agency rule); id. s 1571(b) (Exceptas provided in [s 1571(a), which does not mention s 1535,]... any compliance or noncompliance with the provisions ofthis chapter ... shall not be subject to judicial review; andno provision of this chapter shall be construed to [be] ...enforceable by any person in any ... judicial action). The State Petitioners, recognizing the limitations uponjudicial review in s 1571, contend that the EPA's failure toprepare a RIS can nonetheless render the NAAQS arbitraryand capricious, see 42 U.S.C. s 7607(d)(9), relying uponThompson v. Clark, 741 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In thatcase, we interpreted a statute that, like the UMRA, bothspecified that the RIS be included in the record for judicialreview and precluded judicial review of an agency's compliance with the RIS requirement. We held that a reviewingcourt will consider the contents of the [RIS], along with therest of the record, in assessing not the agency's compliancewith the [requirement to prepare the RIS], but the validity ofthe rule under other provisions of law. Id. at 405. Noinformation in a RIS, however, could lead us to conclude thatthe EPA improperly set the PM and ozone NAAQS; the onlyinformation such a statement would add to the rulemakingrecord for a NAAQS would pertain to the costs of implementation, see 2 U.S.C. s 1532(a), and the EPA is precluded fromconsidering those costs in setting a NAAQS. Accordingly,the failure to prepare a RIS does not render the NAAQSarbitrary and capricious. E.The Regulatory Flexibility Act In both the ozone and particulate matter cases, the SmallBusiness Petitioners argue that the EPA improperly certifiedthat the revised NAAQS would not have a significant impactupon a substantial number of small entities. The RegulatoryFlexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. s 601 et seq., as amended in 1996 bythe Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act,Pub. L. No. 104-121, tit. II, 110 Stat. 857-74 (SBREFA),requires an agency, when engaging in notice and commentrulemaking, to prepare and make available for public comment an initial regulatory flexibility analysis.... [that] de- scribe[s] the impact of the proposed rule on small entities, 5U.S.C. s 603(a), including small businesses, small organizations, and small governmental jurisdictions, see id. s 601(6). When promulgating a final rule, an agency must describe thesteps ... taken to minimize the significant economic impacton small entities. Id. s 604(a)(5). According to the petitioners, if the EPA had complied with the RFA, it would likelyhave promulgated less stringent PM and ozone NAAQS thanthose actually chosen, which would have reduced the burdenupon small entities. A regulatory flexibility analysis is not required, however, ifthe agency certifies that the rule will not, if promulgated,have a significant economic impact on a substantial number ofsmall entities. Id. s 605(b). Further, the SBREFA madeno change in the requirement that a regulatory flexibilityanalysis conducted pursuant to the RFA include estimates ofthe number of small entities to which the proposed rule willapply and of the classes of small entities which will besubject to the requirement. 5 U.S.C. s 603(b)(3)-(4). Wehave consistently interpreted the RFA, based upon thesesections, to impose no obligation upon an agency to conducta small entity impact analysis of effects on entities which itdoes not regulate. Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Nichols,142 F.3d 449, 467 & n.18 (1998). The EPA certified that its revised NAAQS will not have asignificant economic impact on small entities within the meaning of the RFA. PM Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,702/2; Ozone Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,887/2-3. According tothe EPA, the NAAQS themselves impose no regulations uponsmall entities. Instead, the several States regulate smallentities through the state implementation plans (SIPs) thatthey are required by the Clean Air Act to develop. See 42U.S.C. s 7410. Because the NAAQS therefore regulate smallentities only indirectly--that is, insofar as they affect theplanning decisions of the States--the EPA concluded thatsmall entities are not subject to the proposed regulation.See Mid-Tex Elec. Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 773 F.2d 327, 342(D.C. Cir. 1985); see also id. at 343 (Congress did not intendto require that every agency consider every indirect effect that any regulation might have on small businesses in anystratum of the national economy.). The EPA's description of the relationship between NAAQS,SIPs, and small entities strikes us as incontestable. TheStates have broad discretion in determining the manner inwhich they will achieve compliance with the NAAQS. TheEPA is required to approve a state plan which provides forthe timely attainment and subsequent maintenance of ambient air standards and cannot reject a SIP based upon itsview of the wisdom of a State's choices of emission limitations, Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975) (emphasis inoriginal), or of the technological infeasibility of the plan. SeeUnion Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 265 (1976). Therefore,a State may, if it chooses, avoid imposing upon small entitiesany of the burdens of complying with a revised NAAQS. Only if a State does not submit a SIP that complies withs 110, 42 U.S.C. s 7410, must the EPA adopt an implementation plan of its own, which would require the EPA to decidewhat burdens small entities should bear. The agency hasstated, however, that it will do a regulatory flexibility analysisbefore adopting an implementation plan of its own, as it did in1994 when proposing such a plan for Los Angeles. SeeOzone Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,891/1; PM Final Rule,62 Fed. Reg. at 38,705/3. The responses of the Small Business Petitioners do notpersuade us to reject the EPA's argument or to deviate fromour holdings in Mid-Tex and its progeny. First, the SmallBusiness Petitioners contend that we must defer to the SmallBusiness Administration's interpretation of the Act, as expressed in a letter to the EPA from the SBA's Chief Counselfor Advocacy, that the NAAQS do impose requirements uponsmall entities. The SBA, however, neither administers norhas any policymaking role under the RFA; at most its role isadvisory. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. ss 601(3), 602(b), 603(a), 605(b),609(b)(1), 612. Therefore, we do not defer to the SBA'sinterpretation of the RFA. See Scheduled Airlines TrafficOffices, Inc. v. Department of Defense, 87 F.3d 1356, 1361(D.C. Cir. 1996) (no Chevron deference owed to agencyinterpretation of statute it does not administer). Nor do we defer to the EPA's interpretation of the RFA, for it does notadminister the Act either. We do, however, find the EPA'sinterpretation of the statute persuasive. Second, the Small Business Petitioners argue that the EPAcannot claim both that the NAAQS will have no effect uponsmall entities and that it will have positive health effects. Clearly, however, the EPA can maintain that the NAAQS willhave health effects because the Clean Air Act empowers theagency to ensure that such benefits accrue; and it canmaintain that the NAAQS will not directly affect small entities because it has no authority (short of imposing its ownimplementation plan upon a non-complying state) to imposeany burdens upon such entities. Third, the Small Business Petitioners attempt to distinguish the possible effects upon small entities in this case fromthe indirect effects that, as we found in Mid-Tex, are notwithin the contemplation of the RFA. But Mid-Tex is not soeasily distinguished. The petitioners in that case argued thatthe RFA required the FERC to consider economic effects notonly upon regulated industries but also upon the small entities that are their wholesale customers, even though thecustomers were not directly regulated by the FERC. Werejected that argument, finding a clear indication in thelanguage of s 603 that the RFA is limited to small entitiessubject to the proposed regulation. Mid-Tex, 773 F.2d at342; see also Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n, 142 F.3d at 467n.18 (The RFA itself distinguishes between small entitiessubject to an agency rule, to which its requirements apply,and those not subject to the rule, to which the requirementsdo not apply.); United Distribution Cos. v. FERC, 88 F.3d1105, 1170 (1996) (regulatory flexibility analysis provisionapplies only to small entities that are subject to the requirements of the rule) (emphasis in original). That the CleanAir Act requires the States to submit SIPs that will achievecompliance with the NAAQS does not, in view of the States'nearly complete discretion to determine which entities willbear the burdens of a revised NAAQS, make such smallentities as the SIPs may regulate any more subject to the EPA's regulation than were the wholesalers in Mid-Texsubject to regulation by the FERC. Finally, the Small Business Petitioners suggest that theCongress in enacting the SBREFA overruled our prior interpretation of the RFA in Mid-Tex and its progeny. TheSBREFA made a number of changes in the RFA, but it didnot change anything in s 603 upon which we relied in MidTex. And although the Congress made a slight modificationin s 605(b), we do not understand it to alter our analysis inMid-Tex. Prior to 1996, s 605(b) required an agency toprovide a succinct statement explaining the reasons for itscertification that the promulgated rule would not have asignificant economic impact upon small entities. That sectionnow requires a statement providing the factual basis for suchcertification. Our decision in Mid-Tex contemplates that anagency may justify its certification under the RFA upon thefactual basis that the rule does not directly regulate anysmall entities. Nothing in the change to s 605(b) suggeststhat basis for certification is no longer permissible. (Indeed,the section of the statute amending s 605(b) is labeled Technical and Conforming Amendments, see SBREFA s 243, 110Stat. at 866.) We therefore conclude that the EPA properlycertified that its NAAQS would not have a significant impactupon a substantial number of small entities. III. Ozone A.Subpart 2 and the Revised Ozone Standard In 1990 the Congress substantially revised the Clean AirAct by, among other things, adding specific enforcementprovisions for carbon monoxide, particulate matter, sulfuroxides, nitrogen dioxide, lead, and as pertinent here, ozone. Previously, the Act required that all areas of the country notattaining the primary ozone standard, no matter how far fromattainment, come into compliance as expeditiously as practicable but not later than December 31, 1987. 42 U.S.C.s 7502 (1988). Many areas had not attained the primaryozone NAAQS by that date; some were still a long way from doing so. The Congress responded to the continued ozoneproblem by enacting a new enforcement scheme, which itcodified as Subpart 2 of Part D of the Clean Air Act, 42U.S.C. ss 7511-7511f, redesignating the original provisions asSubpart 1. Subpart 2 requires the EPA to classify nonattainmentareas based upon their design value, which is a rough measure of whether an area complies with the 0.12 ppm, 1-hourprimary ozone standard.6 A table in Subpart 2, set out here inthe margin,7 establishes classifications ranging from marginal________ 6More specifically, the design value is the fourth-highest dailymaximum ozone concentration in an area over three consecutiveyears for which there are sufficient data. If that value is less thanor equal to 0.12 ppm, then an area will have only three expectedvalues above that level and it will be in attainment with the ozoneNAAQS. See EPA, The Clean Air Act Ozone Design Value Study: Final Report 1-1 to 1-22 (1994) (filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.s 7511b(g), which required the EPA to conduct a study of whetherthe [existing design value] methodology ... provides a reasonableindicator of the ozone air quality of ozone nonattainment areas; the EPA concluded it did). 7This table appears in Clean Air Act s 181(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.s 7511(a)(1): TABLE 1 Area Class Design value [ppm] Primary standard attainment date Marginal 0.121 up to 0.138 3 years after November 15, 1990 Moderate 0.138 up to 0.160 6 years after November 15, 1990 Serious 0.160 up to 0.180 9 years after November 15, 1990 Severe 0.180 up to 0.280 15 years after November 15, 1990 Extreme 0.280 and above 20 years after November 15, 1990 The Severe Area category is later subdivided, creating a sixthclassification for ozone nonattainment areas. See id. s 7511(a)(2) to extreme, and provides an attainment date for each class. See id. s 7511(a)(1)-(2). Subpart 2 also specifies, for eachclass of nonattainment areas, both measures that the Statesmust take to reduce emissions of the chemicals that areprecursors of ozone and information that the States mustreport to the EPA. See id. s 7511a. In short, Subpart 2 isthe Congress's comprehensive plan for reducing ozone levelsthroughout the country. The State and Non-State Petitioners, along with Congressman Bliley appearing as an amicus curiae, argue that Subpart2 precludes the EPA from revising the primary and secondary ozone NAAQS. We reject this argument (in Part III.A.1)insofar as it pertains to the EPA's continued ability topromulgate a revised ozone NAAQS or to designate areas asnot in attainment with a revised NAAQS. We agree (in PartIII.A.2) with those petitioners, however, insofar as they maintain, based upon the text and structure of Subparts 1 and 2,that the EPA is precluded from enforcing a revised primaryozone NAAQS other than in accordance with the classifications, attainment dates, and control measures set out inSubpart 2. Further, we conclude (in Part III.A.3) that theEPA may not require a State to comply with a revisedsecondary ozone NAAQS in any area that has yet to attainthe 0.12 ppm primary standard. 1. The EPA's Power to Revise the Ozone NAAQS and Designate Areas as Nonattainment The 1990 amendments did not alter the section of the CleanAir Act that provides for setting and revising primary andsecondary NAAQS. See 42 U.S.C. s 7409. The Administrator, therefore, still must at five-year intervals [from December 31, 1980] ... complete a thorough review of ... the[NAAQS] promulgated under this section and ... make suchrevisions in such ... standards ... as may be appropriate. Id. s 7409(d)(1). The Second Circuit held that this sectioncontinues to set[ ] forth a bright-line rule for agency action, _____________________ (Notwithstanding table 1, [for] a severe area with a 1988 ozonedesign value between 0.190 and 0.280 ppm, the attainment date shall be 17 years ... after November 15, 1990). American Lung Ass'n v. Reilly, 962 F.2d 258, 263 (1992), andwe agree. Nothing in the Act modifies this bright-line ruleor otherwise makes it inapplicable to revision of the ozoneNAAQS. To the extent that the 1990 amendments shed any lightupon this question, they suggest that the EPA retains itsauthority to revise the ozone NAAQS. For example, if theEPA relaxes a NAAQS after enactment of the 1990 amendments, then the Administrator shall ... promulgate requirements applicable to all areas which have not attained that[relaxed] standard as of the date of such relaxation.... [which] shall provide for controls ... not less stringent thanthe controls applicable to areas designated nonattainmentbefore such relaxation. 42 U.S.C. s 7502(e). Although twoother subsections of s 172 are expressly made inapplicable tothe ozone regulations in Subpart 2, see id. s 7502(a)(1)(C),(a)(2)(D), this so-called anti-backsliding provision contains nosuch exemption. Accordingly, as the EPA notes, this sectionspecifically contemplates that the agency may relax its ozoneNAAQS and, therefore, necessarily implies that it retains theauthority to revise that NAAQS. Tellingly, neither the petitioners nor the amicus reply to this point. The petitioners and amicus raise two other arguments tosupport their position that the EPA cannot alter the ozoneNAAQS without the approval of the Congress. We rejectboth in short order. First, the Non-State Petitioners contend that Subpart 2renders revision of the ozone NAAQS inappropriate withinthe meaning of s 109(d)(1), which provides the EPA shallmake such revisions in such ... standards ... as may beappropriate. 42 U.S.C. s 7409(d)(1). This argument, however, pointedly ignores the text immediately following theword appropriate, which specifies that appropriateness is tobe determined in accordance with section 7408 ... and[s 7409(b)] (and which, as we read it, means exclusively inaccord with those sections). See, e.g., American MethylCorp. v. EPA, 749 F.2d 826, 835-36 (D.C. Cir. 1984). BecauseSubpart 2 is neither listed in s 109(d)(1) nor incorporated by reference in either s 108, id. s 7408, or s 109(b), it cannotrender revision of the ozone NAAQS inappropriate. Second, the State Petitioners and Congressman Bliley argue, based upon the classification table in s 181(a)(1), id.s 7511(a)(1), that Subpart 2 codified the 0.12 ppm ozoneNAAQS and, therefore, only the Congress can promulgate arevised NAAQS. Yet not all areas designated nonattainmentfor ozone will have design values of 0.121 ppm or higher. Infact, this was true of areas designated nonattainment forozone as a result of the 1990 amendments, see Ozone FinalRule, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,884/3, at least in part because of thestringent criteria in the Clean Air Act for changing thedesignation of an area to attainment from nonattainment. See 42 U.S.C. 7407(d)(3)(E)(iii) (redesignation permissibleonly if area's attainment of NAAQS is due to permanent andenforceable reductions in emissions). In short, although thenumbers in the classification table are based upon the 0.12ppm ozone NAAQS, they are neither equivalent to nor acodification of the NAAQS. Not only does the EPA, as we conclude above, retainauthority to promulgate a revised ozone NAAQS; the agencyis still required, in no case later than 2 years from the dateof promulgation of a revised NAAQS, to designate areas asattainment, nonattainment, or unclassifiable under thatNAAQS. Id. s 7407(d)(1)(B). Although the 1990 amendments extended by roughly 18 months the maximum timebetween promulgation of a revised NAAQS and designation ofnonattainment areas under that NAAQS, see 42 U.S.C.s 7407(d)(1)-(2) (1988), they made no substantive change inthe EPA's authority to designate areas as nonattainmentunder a revised NAAQS. Therefore, we hold that the EPAretains the power to designate areas as nonattainment undera revised ozone NAAQS. 2. The EPA's Power to Enforce the Revised Ozone Standard That the enactment of Subpart 2 does not alter the EPA'sauthority to revise the ozone NAAQS or to designate areas asnonattainment for ozone does not, however, compel the con- clusion that Subpart 2 has no effect upon the EPA's authorityto enforce a revised primary ozone NAAQS. (We considerthe enforcement of secondary ozone NAAQS in Part III.A.3,below.) In fact, the text and structure of Subparts 1 and 2suggest precisely the opposite conclusion. After designatingan area as nonattainment under a NAAQS, the EPA normallylooks to Subpart 1 for authority to classify the area for thepurpose of applying an attainment date. 42 U.S.C.s 7502(a)(1)-(2). The cited provisions, however, do not applywith respect to nonattainment areas for which classifications[and attainment dates] are specifically provided under otherprovisions of [Part D of Subchapter 1 of the Clean Air Act].Id. s 7502(a)(1)(C), (a)(2)(D). The EPA argues that Subpart 2 specifically provides classifications and attainment dates only for nonattainment designations under the 0.12 ppm ozone NAAQS. The State andNon-State Petitioners counter that Subpart 2 specificallyprovides classifications and dates for all areas designatednonattainment under any ozone NAAQS. We agree with thepetitioners. The pertinent provision of Subpart 2 reads as follows: (a) Classification and attainment dates for 1989 nonattainment areas. -- (1) Each area designated non- attainment for ozone pursuant to section 7407(d) of this title shall be classified at the time of such designation, under table 1, by operation of law, as a Marginal Area, a Moderate Area, a Serious Area, a Severe Area, or an Extreme Area.... Id. s 7511(a)(1). As the petitioners note, s 107(d), 42 U.S.C.s 7407(d), specifies three different times at which an area canbe designated nonattainment for ozone: immediately following enactment of the 1990 amendments, id. s 7407(d)(4); after the EPA revises the ozone NAAQS, id. s 7407(d)(1); and when an area that was in attainment, either when theCongress enacted the 1990 amendments or when the EPApromulgated a revised ozone NAAQS, later ceases to comply,id. s 7407(d)(3). The petitioners conclude from the generalreference to s 107(d) that the classifications and attainment dates in Subpart 2 apply to areas designated underss 107(d)(1), (3), and (4). The EPA gamely responds that thereference to s 107(d) includes only subsection (4), but we donot defer to the agency's interpretation because we find thatthe Congress has spoken on the precise question at issueand we must give effect to the unambiguously expressedintent of Congress. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 84243 & n.9 (1984). We canvass the two reasons that lead us tothis conclusion before returning to the EPA's argument. First, the reference to s 107(d) in s 181(a)(1) appears tohave been purposeful and not the drafting error that theEPA's interpretation implies. The Congress considered butdid not adopt bills that clearly would have limited the reach ofSubpart 2 to nonattainment designations made immediatelyfollowing enactment of the 1990 amendments. The Senatebill contained a version of Subpart 2 that classified only thoseareas designated nonattainment for ozone under its equivalent of s 107(d)(4). See S. 1630, 101st Cong. ss 101, 107,reprinted in III Legislative History of the Clean Air ActAmendments of 1990, at 4124-25, 4195 [hereinafter 1990Legislative History]. The version of Subpart 2 in the Housebill, as originally introduced, similarly referred only to designations made under its equivalent of s 107(d)(4). See H.R.3030, 101st Cong. ss 101(a), 103, reprinted in II 1990 Legislative History, at 3748-49, 3795-96. The House committee,however, replaced the specific reference to what is nows 107(d)(4) with a general reference to s 107(d). See H.R.Rep. No. 101-490, at 3-6, 17 (1990), reprinted in II 1990Legislative History, at 3027-30, 3041. The Conference committee then reported the text of the House bill rather thanthat of the Senate. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-952, at 335 (1990),reprinted in I 1990 Legislative History, at 1785. Second, our conclusion that the Congress intentionally referred to s 107(d) as a whole is supported by a comparison ofSubparts 1 and 2. The Congress enacted Subpart 2 becauseof the failure of the controls in Subpart 1 to bring areas intoattainment with the 0.12 ppm standard in the allotted time. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-490, at 145-50, reprinted in II 1990Legislative History, at 3169-74. Rather than continue treat- ing all ozone nonattainment areas alike, the Congress allowedthe various areas between 3 and 20 years to attain the ozoneNAAQS, depending upon the extent of the area's ozoneproblem. See id. at 146-47 (In 1977, Congress tried towaive [sic] a 'magic wand' and command that all nonattainment areas [for ozone] will meet the applicable [NAAQS].... by December 31, 1987. ... [That] date[ ] ha[s] come andgone and it is clear that ... we had no 'magic' solutions.),reprinted in II 1990 Legislative History, at 3170-71. As thepetitioners argue, because the 1990 amendments extended thetime for nonattainment areas to comply with the 0.12 ppmozone NAAQS, they must preclude the EPA from requiringareas to comply either more quickly or with a more stringentozone NAAQS. Subpart 1 requires compliance with a primary NAAQS asexpeditiously as practicable, but no later than 5 years fromthe date such area was designated nonattainment. 42U.S.C. s 7502(a)(2)(A). All nonattainment areas would haveuntil 2012 to comply with the revised ozone NAAQS if theEPA and the States were to take the full time authorized inSubpart 1 for making attainment designations and the EPAwere to approve every possible extension for each area. Seeid. ss 7407(d)(1)(A)-(B), 7502(a)(2)(A), (C). Such wide discretion is inconsistent, however, with Subpart 2, in which theCongress stripped the EPA of discretion to decide whichozone nonattainment areas should receive more time to reachattainment (with two limited exceptions not relevant here, seeid. s 7511(a)(4), (5)). Moreover, under s 181(a) of Subpart 2,Los Angeles, the nation's only Extreme Area, has until 2010to attain the 0.12 ppm ozone NAAQS, and the possibility ofextending that deadline until 2012. That Los Angeles shouldalso have to attain a more stringent ozone standard by thatsame year, if not earlier, clearly runs counter to the comprehensive enforcement scheme enacted in Subpart 2. The EPA offers two arguments against this interpretationof Subparts 1 and 2. First, the EPA contends that a recentstatute confirms its power to designate nonattainment areasunder the revised ozone standard. See Pub. L. No. 105-178,s 6103(a), 112 Stat. 465 (1998) (extending time to two years from one year for governor to submit proposed designationunder 0.08 ppm ozone NAAQS). That statute also specificallystates, however, that [n]othing in section[ ] ... 6103 shall beconstrued by the Administrator of Environmental ProtectionAgency or any court ... to affect any pending litigation or tobe a ratification of the ozone ... standard[ ]. Id. s 6104. Further, even if the EPA were correct that s 6103 confirmsthe agency's power to designate areas under a revised ozoneNAAQS, that power was never in doubt, as we concludedabove. Indeed, s 6104 simply does not bear upon the question we address here: whether Subpart 1 or Subpart 2provides the applicable enforcement mechanisms for an areadesignated nonattainment under a revised ozone NAAQS. Second, the EPA argues that read in context the referenceto s 107(d) in s 181(a)(1) relates only to designations madeunder s 107(d)(4). Because the table in s 181(a)(1) classifiesareas based upon a design value that roughly measuresattainment of the 0.12 ppm ozone NAAQS, the EPA contendsthat the nonattainment designations referenced in s 181(a)(1)are only those designations made under the 0.12 ppm ozoneNAAQS. This explanation, however, does not square witheither the Congress's decision not to refer to s 107(d)(4)specifically or the long-term nature of the attainment schemeenacted in Subpart 2; on the EPA's interpretation, thatscheme would have been stillborn had the EPA revised theozone NAAQS immediately after the Congress enacted the1990 amendments. The EPA points next to s 181(b)(1), which specifies theattainment dates for areas that met the 0.12 ppm standardwhen the Congress enacted the 1990 amendments but thatlater cease to comply. That section, however, applies only toareas designated under s 107(d)(3) that previously were designated attainment or unclassifiable for ozone under section[107(d)(4)]. That s 181(b)(1) provides special rules for suchareas, but not for areas designated under s 107(d)(3) that hadpreviously been designated attainment for ozone or unclassifiable under s 107(d)(1), does not support the EPA's argumentthat the phrase in s 181(a)(1) designated nonattainment forozone pursuant to section 107(d) denotes only those designa- tions made under s 107(d)(4). If anything, the specificationof s 107(d)(4) in s 181(b)(1) makes its absence froms 181(a)(1) all the more striking. The final bit of context to which the EPA points is the titleof s 181(a): Classification and attainment dates for 1989nonattainment areas. Because the title specifies 1989 nonattainment areas, we are told, s 181(a) must refer only tononattainment designations made immediately after enactment of the 1990 amendments, that is, designations madeunder s 107(d)(4). Although the title of a statute or sectioncan aid in resolving an ambiguity in the legislation's text,INS v. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 502 U.S.183, 189 (1991), a title cannot be allowed to create an ambiguity in the first place. See Maguire v. Commissioner ofInternal Revenue, 313 U.S. 1, 9 (1941) ([T]he title of an actwill not limit the plain meaning of the text.). The text ofs 181(a) clearly encompasses nonattainment designationsmade under all subsections of s 107(d). There simply is noambiguity in need of resolution by reference to the title of thesection. In sum, s 181(a) specifically provide[s] for classificationsand attainment dates for areas designated nonattainment forozone pursuant to s 107(d)(1). Accordingly, Subpart 2, notSubpart 1, provides the classifications and attainment datesfor any areas designated nonattainment under a revisedprimary ozone NAAQS, see 42 U.S.C. s 7502(a)(1)(C),(a)(2)(D), and the EPA must enforce any revised primaryozone NAAQS under Subpart 2. 3. The Secondary Ozone NAAQS The Non-State Petitioners briefly contend that our conclusion that Subpart 2 provides the classifications and attainment dates for areas designated nonattainment under a revised primary ozone NAAQS is equally applicable to theenforcement of a revised secondary ozone NAAQS. We findit impossible to conclude, however, that Subpart 2 specifically provide[s] for classifications and attainment dates forareas designated nonattainment with a revised secondaryozone NAAQS; s 181(a)(1) expressly refers only to primary NAAQS and Subpart 2 not once mentions secondary NAAQS. Further, attainment dates in Subpart 1 for secondary standards are less stringent than for primary standards, makingcomparison with the more lenient dates in Subpart 2 lesstroubling. Compare id. s 7502(a)(2)(B) (attainment of secondary NAAQS shall be ... achieved as expeditiously aspracticable after the date such area was designated nonattainment), with id. s 7502(a)(2)(A) (attainment of primaryNAAQS shall be ... achieved as expeditiously as practicable, but no later than 5 years from the date such area wasdesignated nonattainment). Nonetheless, we understandSubpart 2 to codify the Congress's judgment as to what is asexpeditiously as practicable in reducing an area's level ofozone. Consequently, the EPA is precluded from requiringany steps toward compliance with a revised secondary ozoneNAAQS prior to an area's attainment of the 0.12 ppm standard. In areas that meet the 0.12 ppm standard, however,Subpart 2 erects no bar to the EPA's requiring compliancewith a revised secondary ozone NAAQS as expeditiously aspracticable.