Opinion ID: 1188815
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Counts Two through Nine were sufficiently charged.

Text: An indictment must state all the elements of the crime charged. United States v. Moore, 563 F.3d 583, 585 (7th Cir.2009). In his next attack on the indictment, Pansier argues that Counts Two through Nine, which alleged that he willfully made and subscribed false statements on the Form 8300's in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1), were defectively charged. Section 7206(1) is violated when a person [w]illfully makes and subscribes any return, statement, or other document, which contains or is verified by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and which he does not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter. 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). Pansier argues that the government failed to allege in the indictment or prove at trial what he contends is an element of the crime: that IRS code or regulation requires the Form 8300's to be filed. Without this element, Pansier argues, the government cannot show that the information contained in the Form 8300 was false as to a material matter. In support of this contention, he relies on United States v. Levy, 533 F.2d 969, 975 (5th Cir.1976), for the proposition that a form not required by statute or regulation cannot be the basis of an offense under § 7206(1). We are not persuaded by this argument. Section 7206(1) is a perjury statute, United States v. Scholl, 166 F.3d 964, 980 (9th Cir.1999), and therefore requires only that the taxpayer file a return `which he does not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter,' United States v. Peters, 153 F.3d 445, 461 (7th Cir.1998) (quoting § 7206(1)); see United States v. Presbitero, 569 F.3d 691, 700 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Murphy, 469 F.3d 1130, 1137-38 (7th Cir.2006) (distinguishing between 26 U.S.C. § 7206, which prohibits the willful filing of false documents, and 26 U.S.C. § 7203, which prohibits the willful refusal to file a tax return if required to do so). Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has more recently considered and rejected this same argument in a similar case. See United States v. Anderson, 353 F.3d 490, 498-500 (6th Cir.2003) (superceded by statute on other grounds as recognized in United States v. McBride, 362 F.3d 360, 374 (6th Cir.2004)). In Anderson the defendants filed numerous false Form 8300's reporting nonexistent transactions with judicial officers, police, and attorneys, and as a result, were convicted of violating § 7206(1). Id. at 497-98. In challenging their convictions, the defendants argued that the government could not establish that the false information was material because the reported transactions never occurred, and, therefore, the defendants contended, they had no duty to file the forms. Id. at 499. The court rejected this argument, explaining that criminal penalties for perjury under § 7206 may apply to any document filed with the IRS. Id. (citing United States v. Tarwater, 308 F.3d 494, 504 (6th Cir.2002)). The court further noted that the general definition of a materially false statement is a statement that has `a natural tendency to influence, or [is] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed.' Id. (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999)). Consequently, the court concluded, proof of a duty to file a return is not required to establish a violation of § 7206(1) or (2) for filing reports of nonexistent transactions. Id.; see also United States v. Shortt Accountancy Corp., 785 F.2d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir.1986) (Nothing in the statute or case law indicates that a charge under section 7206(1) for making and subscribing a false return is based on the taxpayer's duty to file or `make' an income tax return.). Although Pansier relies on our statement in United States v. Peters , defining a material statement as one that has the potential for hindering the IRS's efforts to monitor and verify the tax liability of the taxpayer, 153 F.3d at 461 (internal quotations omitted), that definition specifically pertains to a false statement made within the context of a tax return, see, e.g., Presbitero, 569 F.3d at 700-01. Section 7206(1), however, encompasses any return, statement, or other document. We therefore agree with the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit and conclude that a statutory or regulatory duty to file the form is not required to show materiality, nor is it a necessary element of an offense under § 7206(1). The indictment here charged that Pansier willfully made and subscribed false Forms 8300, `Report of Cash Payments over $10,000 Received in a Trade or Business,' each of which contained a written declaration that it was signed under the penalties of perjury and none of which the defendant believed to be true and correct as to every material matter. The indictment, then, stated all the necessary elements of a charge under § 7206(1). See Anderson, 353 F.3d at 499; Scholl, 166 F.3d at 979. And the evidence presented at trial established that Pansier signed and filed, under penalty of perjury, the Form 8300's, reporting transactions that he knew to be false, and that false information led the IRS to initiate investigations into the reported transactions. This was sufficient evidence of materiality, see Neder, 527 U.S. at 16, 119 S.Ct. 1827; Anderson, 353 F.3d at 499, and sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions.