Opinion ID: 1696930
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Whether the Trial Court Committed Error by Denying the Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict and by Allowing an In-Court Identification of the Defendant

Text: ¶ 23. Jordan asserts that he was never identified as the shooter of the victim, and therefore could not have been convicted of murder beyond a reasonable doubt or to a moral certainty as required by law. Since Mississippi law does not require a finding of guilt to a moral certainty, this Court will determine whether or not Jordan was wrongly convicted of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 980 So.2d 927, 929 (Miss.2008) (noting that the burden of proof for criminal cases is proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
¶ 24. Jordan asserts that he was never positively identified as the shooter, and further contends that no evidence linked him to the crime. In support of his argument, Jordan cites Edwards v. State, 736 So.2d 475 (Miss.Ct.App.1999), where the Court of Appeals found that the identification of the shooter was against the weight of the evidence and warranted a new trial. In this case, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove that Jordan was the shooter. The trial court denied the motion. Jordan asserts that this constituted error and that the trial court should have at least reduced the charge to manslaughter, directed a verdict on the murder charge, and allowed the jury to determine guilt or innocence on the manslaughter charge. ¶ 25. This Court's standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence is as follows: Should the facts and inferences considered in a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence point in favor of the defendant on any element of the offense with sufficient force that reasonable men could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty, the proper remedy is for the appellate court to reverse and render. However, if a review of the evidence reveals that it is of such quality and weight that, having in mind the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof standard, reasonable fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions on every element of the offense, the evidence will be deemed to have been sufficient. Boyd v. State, 977 So.2d 329, 336 (Miss. 2008) (internal citations omitted). In determining whether evidence is sufficient to support a jury verdict in a criminal case, this Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Id. (citation omitted). This means that [a]ll credible evidence consistent with the defendant's guilt must be accepted as true, and the state is given the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence. Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, since witness credibility and relative weight of testimony are left to the factfinder, the Court should reverse only where, `with respect to one or more elements of the offense charged, the evidence so considered is such that reasonable and fair-minded jurors could only find the accused not guilty.' Id. at 337 (citing Fox v. State, 724 So.2d 968, 970 (Miss.Ct.App. 1998)). ¶ 26. Simpson and Netherland testified that they heard two gunshots and saw a flash from the second gunshot. Simpson testified that the shooter wore a white t-shirt and jeans, which matched the clothing Jordan's father gave the police. Simpson also testified that the shooter got into a car that she recognized as belonging to Jordan. She testified that she had previously observed a gun in Jordan's Suburban and knew that he kept a second gun in the Suburban. Netherland testified the shooter's vehicle was a light brown Suburban. Netherland testified that he had stepped in front of the Suburban, in an attempt to prevent the shooter from fleeing the scene. However, he said that the Suburban drove around him, and that the shooter grinned at him as he fled the scene. Later, Netherland and Brown identified Jordan in a photographic lineup. ¶ 27. The record reveals that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict.
¶ 28. Jordan asserts that the trial court erred in allowing six witnesses to make in-court identifications of Jordan. Jordan argues that these in-court identifications fail the totality of the circumstances test as set forth in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). The test requires that the following factors be considered: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Bogan v. State, 754 So.2d 1289, 1292 (Miss. Ct.App.2000) (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200, 93 S.Ct. 375). The record reveals that Jordan did not object to the in-court identification by any witness. Thus, this issue is not preserved for appeal. See, e.g., Fleming v. State, 604 So.2d 280, 302 (Miss.1992); Smith v. State, 530 So.2d 155, 161-62 (Miss.1988).