Opinion ID: 2119163
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: authority to make the award.

Text: Appellant contends that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in awarding that Officer Stabbe be given first consideration for transfer to District One. [5-8] This court has repeatedly held that it has a hands off attitude toward arbitrators' decisions. WERC v. Teamsters Local No. 563, 75 Wis.2d 602, 611, 250 N.W.2d 696 (1977); Milw. Pro. Firefighters, Local 215 v. Milwaukee, 78 Wis.2d 1, 21, 22, 253 N.W.2d 481 (1977); Jt. School District No. 10 v. Jefferson Ed. Asso., supra, at 117. `Judicial review of arbitration awards is very limited. The strong policy favoring arbitration as a method for settling disputes under collective bargaining agreements requires a reluctance on the part of the courts to interfere with the arbitrator's award upon issues properly submitted . . . Thus the function of the court upon review of an arbitration award is a supervisory one, the goal being to insure that the parties receive the arbitration they bargained for.' Milwaukee Professional Firefighters v. Milwaukee, supra. The decision of an arbitrator cannot be interfered with for mere errors of judgment as to law or fact. Courts will overturn an arbitrator's award if there is perverse misconstruction or if there is positive misconduct plainly established, or if there is manifest disregard of the law, or if the award itself is illegal or violates strong public policy. Jt. School District No. 10 v. Jefferson Ed. Asso., supra, at 117, 118. Before the arbitrator, appellant contended that subsection 6 of Part II, C, MANAGEMENT RIGHTS, of the collective bargaining agreement gave the chief of police the sole right to decide when and where transfers are to be made. Appellant also argued that the Milwaukee City Charter gives the police chief so broad a mandate in regard to matters relating to refusal to transfer that such refusals do not constitute a grievance. Sec. 1, Chapter 586, Laws of 1911, (formerly section 959-46d. 23 of the statutes, and presently 62.50(23), Stats.) provides: The chief engineer of the fire department and the chief of police of said cities, shall be the head of their respective departments and shall have power to regulate said departments and prescribe rules for the government of its members. The chief of police shall cause the public peace to be prescribed and see that all laws and ordinances of the city are enforced. He shall be responsible for the efficiency and general good conduct of the department under his control. Each of said chiefs shall have the custody and control of all public property pertaining to said departments and everything connected therewith and belonging thereto. They shall have the custody and control of all books, records, machines, tools, implements, and apparatus of every kind whatsoever necessary for use in each of said departments. Various provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, in addition to subsections 6 and 7 of Part II, C, MANAGEMENT RIGHTS, and the arbitration clause in section I. A. 1. of Part III, GRIEVANCE AND ARBITRATION PROCEDURE, recognize the power of the chief of police to manage and direct the operation of the police department and give deference to his authority conferred by Chapter 586, Laws of 1911 and the amendments thereto. These provisions are: WHEREAS, it is intended that the following Agreement shall be an implementation of the provisions of Section 111.70, Wisconsin Statutes, consistent with the legislative authority which devolves upon the Common Council of the City of Milwaukee, the Special Laws of the State of Wisconsin, Chapter 586 of the Laws of 1911 and amendments thereto, relating to the Chief of Police and the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, the municipal budget law, Chapter 65, Wisconsin Statutes, 1971, and other statutes and laws applicable to the City of Milwaukee; and WHEREAS, it is intended by the provisions of this Agreement that there be no abrogation of the duties, obligations, or responsibilities of any agency or department of City government which is now expressly provided for respectively either by: state statutes, charter ordinances and ordinances of the City of Milwaukee except as expressly limited herein; . . . . . . . PART I . . . . H. SUBJECT TO CHARTER In the event that the provisions of this Agreement or application of this Agreement conflicts with the legislative authority which devolves upon the Common Council of the City of Milwaukee as more fully set forth in the provisions of the Milwaukee City Charter, the Special Laws of the State of Wisconsin, Chapter 586 of the Laws of 1911 and amendments thereto pertaining to the powers, functions, duties and responsibilities of the Chief of Police and the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners or the municipal budget law, Chapter 65, Wisconsin Statutes, 1971, or other applicable laws or statutes, this Agreement shall be subject to such provisions. PART II . . . . C. MANAGEMENT RIGHTS 1. The Association recognizes the right of the City and the Chief of Police to operate and manage their affairs in all respects in accordance with the laws of Wisconsin, ordinances of the City, Constitution of the United States and Section 111.70 of the Wisconsin Statutes. The Association recognizes the exclusive right of the Chief of Police to establish and maintain departmental rules and procedures for the administration of Police Department during the term of this Agreement provided that such rules and procedures do not violate any of the provisions of this Agreement. . . . . 11. The Association pledges cooperation to the increasing of departmental efficiency and effectiveness. Any and all rights concerning the management and direction of the Police Department and the police force shall be exclusively the right of the City and the Chief of Police unless otherwise provided by the terms of this Agreement as permitted by law. . . . . PART III II. GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION . . . . F. In reviewing any difference over application of a departmental rule or regulation under this grievance and arbitration procedure the arbitrator shall take into account the special statutory responsibilities granted to the Chief of Police under the 1911 Special Laws of the State of Wisconsin, Chapter 586, and amendments thereto. The arbitrator shall not impair the ability of the Chief of Police to operate the department in accordance with the statutory responsibilities under the Special Laws of the State of Wisconsin, Chapter 586 of the Laws of 1911 and amendments thereto nor shall he impair the authority of the Chief of Police to maintain, establish and modify rules and regulations for the operation of the Police Department, provided such rules and regulations are not in violation of the specific provisions of this Agreement. In addition the arbitrator shall not prohibit the Chief of Police from executing departmental rules and regulations in a fair and equitable manner. . . . . PART V A. AID TO CONSTRUCTION OF PROVISIONS OF AGREEMENT . . . . 2. The Association recognizes the powers, duties, and responsibilities of the Chief of Police as set forth in Chapter 586, Session Laws of 1911 and that pursuant thereto the Chief of Police and not the Common Council of the City of Milwaukee has the authority to establish rules and regulations applicable to the operation of the Police Department and to the conduct of the police officers employed therein. The arbitrator acknowledged that the chief's right to transfer employees in a manner most advantageous to the city would seem to place the subject of transfers in a non-grievable category. He further recognized that Chapter 586 of the Laws of 1911 was incorporated in the collective bargaining agreement and gives the chief powers not normally enjoyed by other governmental department heads. The arbitrator even declared that both the explicit terms of the contract and the state law incorporated therein seem to give the chief unbridled transfer power. However, the arbitrator discussed Confederation of Police v. City of Chicago, 529 F.2d 89 (7th Cir. 1976), [1] The arbitrator stated that in his opinion the City of Chicago Case ruled that matters concerning adverse transfers are grievable, therefore, in order to be consistent, matters concerning requested transfers should be grievable. Thus, he found that the union's prayer for relief was reasonable. He declared: In view of the unanimous feeling of the parties, and in view of the recent Federal Court decision in our Circuit which seems to eliminate possible constraints of the Contract, I can, freely rule that the request of the Grievant is not unreasonable. Finally, the arbitrator directed that when and if an opening for a police officer develops in District Number One, Stabbe be given the first consideration for transfer to that district; and if the city does not transfer him, that he be given the right to a hearing to establish why the transfer is not advantageous to the city. [9-11] We believe that the arbitrator had no authority to direct that Stabbe be given the next assignment in District One, since both the statutes and the collective bargaining agreement vest authority in the chief of police to make decisions concerning transfers. An arbitrator obtains his authority from the contract of the parties. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board v. Teamsters Local No. 563, 75 Wis.2d 602, 611, 250 N.W.2d 696 (1977). The function of the arbitrator in disputes under a collective bargaining agreement is to interpret and apply the agreement. Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration Works 296 (1976). '[A]n arbitrator is confined to the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to his obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.' United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). Milw. Pro. Firefighters, Local 215 v. Milwaukee, supra, at 21. The direction that Stabbe be given first consideration for transfer to District Number One or be afforded the right to a hearing if he is not transferred, does not draw its essence from the contract. The arbitrator was authorized to resolve only questions of contractual rights, and thus, the question before him was whether the contract required that Stabbe be given first consideration for transfer. Although he did direct that Stabbe be given first consideration, it is very clear from his decision that he did not do so because the agreement, as he interpreted it, required such a remedy. Rather, this direction by the arbitrator was based upon his understanding of the feeling of the parties and upon a federal circuit case which had been vacated at the time of his decision and which he interpreted to eliminate possible constraints of the Contract. The arbitrator ignored numerous provisions in the agreement giving deference to the authority and responsibilities placed upon the chief of police by Chapter 586, Laws of 1911, and, in particular, subsection F of Part III, section II, GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION, which provides in part: . . . The arbitrator shall not impair the ability of the Chief of Police to operate the department in accordance with the statutory responsibilities under the Special Laws of the State of Wisconsin, Chapter 586, of the Laws of 1911 and amendments thereto. . . . Furthermore, by directing that Stabbe be given first consideration for transfer, at the same time that he failed to find that the agreement required that Stabbe be given first consideration, the arbitrator has added to the labor agreement a provision compelling employee transfers. This is contrary to subsection D of Part III, section II providing that The arbitrator shall neither add to, detract from, nor modify the language of the Agreement. . . . This case is similar to Milw. Pro. Firefighters, Local 215, v. Milwaukee, supra , in which the union challenged certain orders issued by the fire chief calling for implementation of new rules regarding the scheduling of overtime work, vacation days and off days for the firefighters for the upcoming two years. The arbitrator found in favor of the union and his award, among other things, required that scheduling be conducted in the same manner that it had been prior to the issuance of the orders. On appeal, the city contended that the arbitrator exceeded his powers by disregarding the collective bargaining agreement. This court stated that the arbitrator was authorized to resolve only questions of contractual rights and so the question before him was whether the contract required that past practice be maintained. This court held that the circuit court erred in confirming the part of the award which directed the maintenance of past practice, since it was clear from the arbitrator's decision that he did not give such a direction because the agreement, as he interpreted it, required maintenance of past practice. Instead, his decision showed that his direction was based upon his understanding of the wishes of the parties. This court stated at page 25 of its decision: . . . Although arbitrators are to be afforded flexibility and latitude in formulating remedies, the arbitrator here has not confined himself to the agreement, as he is required, and thus has denied the appellants the arbitration they bargained for. Since this aspect of the award has not drawn its essence from the collective bargaining agreement, the arbitrator exceeded his power in respect thereto. In the case before us we conclude the arbitrator exceeded his power and contract authority. Therefore the circuit court erred in confirming the award.