Opinion ID: 3038099
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Refusal of Romm’s Proffered Instruction

Text: on “Visual Depiction” Next, Romm claims the district court deprived him of the right to present his theory of the case by refusing his proffered jury instruction on the statutory definition of “visual depiction.” If the defense theory has a basis in fact and law, the failure to give a proffered jury instruction on that theory is per se reversible error. See United States v. Escobar de Bright, 742 F.2d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 1984). However, “it is not reversible error to reject a defendant’s proposed instruction on 15 We express no opinion on the possible multiplicity of the charges brought against Romm. Romm made a pretrial motion for the prosecution to elect between multiplicitous counts, but does not appeal its denial. Therefore, we need not reach this issue here. 8282 UNITED STATES v. ROMM his theory of the case if other instructions, in their entirety, adequately cover that defense theory.” United States v. Mason, 902 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir. 1990). We review de novo whether the jury instructions adequately cover the defense’s theory of the case. See United States v. Duran, 59 F.3d 938, 941 (9th Cir. 1995). During the jury instructions conference, Romm proposed that the court instruct the jury on the legal definition of “visual depiction” and require the jury to find whether Romm knowingly received “visual depictions” onto the hard drive of his laptop computer. This instruction was necessary, Romm argued, to cover the “storage” element of the offense. The court refused Romm’s proffered instruction because “storage is not an element” of the offense and because Romm had, in any event, conceded that the cached files were “visual depictions” by stipulating that the cached files were “child pornography.” We need not address Romm’s stipulation, however, because we hold that the instructions given adequately covered Romm’s theory of the case. [12] The jury was instructed that “a person has received something if they [sic] have knowingly come into possession of it.” The instructions defined “possession” as “know[ing] of [an object’s] presence and ha[ving] the power and intention to control it.” The court’s definition of “receiving,” as knowingly taking possession, thus required the jury to find whether Romm had possession and control over the images in the cache. Romm’s “visual depictions” defense was premised on the notion that files in the cache are too inaccessible to be the object of “possession” or “receipt” under § 2252A. In essence, he challenged whether he had access to and control over the images in the cache. The instructions on receiving, by incorporating a finding of control, encompassed Romm’s theory of the case. B. Instructions on the Mens Rea of Knowing Possession Next, Romm claims the jury instructions on the elements of knowing possession are plainly erroneous under our decision UNITED STATES v. ROMM 8283 in Lacy, 119 F.3d at 747-50. He also challenges the district court’s refusal to supplement those instructions in response to a note from the jury expressing confusion over whether Romm had to know the images were located on his disk. Since Romm failed to object on either ground, we review for plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Recio, 371 F.3d 1093, 1099-1102 (9th Cir. 2004). Under this standard, we have discretion to reverse only if there is (1) error, (2) that is “plain”—i.e., obvious—under current law, and (3) that “affec- t[s] [Romm’s] substantial rights.” See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993). If these three elements of plain error are established, we will exercise our discretion to reverse only if (4) leaving the error uncorrected would “ ‘seriously affect[ ] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ” Id. at 736 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)). In Lacy, 119 F.3d at 747-50, the defendant appealed his conviction on one count of knowingly possessing “3 or more matters” that contained visual depictions of child pornography. The defendant there had downloaded several pictures of child pornography. He claimed, however, not to know the images were present on his disk because he had tried to delete the files, yet failed to do so. Id. at 745. The jury was instructed to find whether “[1] . . . Lacy knowingly possessed ‘the matters charged’ and [2] . . . those ‘matters contained a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.’ ” Id. at 747 (quoting jury instructions); see also id. at 748 n.9 (full text of jury instructions). But the instructions failed to “require a finding that Lacy knew the matters contained the visual depictions.” Id. at 747 (emphasis in original). Applying United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72-73 (1994),16 we held that the instructions, by failing to 16 In X-Citement Video, the Supreme Court held 18 U.S.C. § 2252 requires the government to prove the defendant’s knowledge that the performer depicted is a minor because this is “the crucial element separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct.” Id., 513 U.S. at 72-73. 8284 UNITED STATES v. ROMM require a finding that Lacy knew the files were on his disks, omitted an element of the offense. See Lacy, 119 F.3d at 747 (“[A] defendant may be convicted under § 2252(a)(4)(B) only upon a showing that he knew that the matter in question contained an unlawful visual depiction.”). Without addressing whether this error was “plain” or prejudicial, we affirmed at step four of Olano because of the overwhelming evidence of Lacy’s knowledge. See Lacy, 119 F.3d at 749-50. [13] Here, the jury instructions on knowing possession of child pornography omitted the same element of knowledge we addressed in Lacy. The entire instructions on knowing possession read as follows: Defendant Stuart Romm is charged in Count 2 of the Indictment with Knowing Possession of Child Por- nography, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2252A(a)(5)(B). In order for Defendant Romm to be found guilty of that charge, the Government must prove each of the following ele- ments beyond a reasonable doubt: First, That Defendant Stuart Romm knowingly pos- sessed a laptop computer with a hard drive that contained three or more images of child pornography; Second, That the images of child pornography knowingly possessed by Defendant Stuart Romm, had been mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by com- puter. A person has possession of something if the person knows of its presence and has physical control of it, or knows of its presence and has the power and intention to control it. UNITED STATES v. ROMM 8285 (Third emphasis added.) Just as in Lacy, the instructions failed explicitly to require the jury to find whether Romm knew images of child pornography were present on his disk. Furthermore, the jury sent out a note after six hours of deliberations expressing confusion over the Lacy standard. The note read: We need clarification on the [Possession] Charge. Are we trying to determine if Mr. Romm knew that he possessed three or more images could [sic] be found on his hard drive. Or is simply viewing pic- tures considered knowing of its [sic] presence and being in control of it. The court, with the affirmative agreement of both counsel,17 referred the jury back to the original, flawed instructions and told the jury that no further guidance could be given. The government contends that the instructions are distinguishable from the instructions given in Lacy because of the second instruction’s reference to “images . . . knowingly possessed by Romm.” But this phrase is in fact a peremptory instruction that Romm knowingly possessed the unlawful images; not that the jury should determine whether he know17 The government argues that Romm’s affirmative agreement to this response waives any right to challenge the jury instructions under the doctrine of “invited error.” While the Seventh Circuit has applied waiver in similar circumstances, see United States v. Askew, 403 F.3d 496, 505-06 & n.3 (7th Cir. 2005), we have limited the doctrine of invited error to cases where “the record reflects that the defendant was aware of the omitted element [in the jury instructions] and yet relinquished his right to have it submitted to the jury.” United States v. Perez, 116 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); see also United States v. Alferahin, 433 F.3d 1148, 1154 n.2 (9th Cir. 2005) (refusing to apply invited error where it appeared that “both defense counsel and the district court were operating under a misapprehension of the applicable law”). Here, since nothing in the record suggests that Romm or his trial counsel were aware of the element omitted from the jury instructions, invited error does not apply. 8286 UNITED STATES v. ROMM ingly possessed them. The jury was told that they only needed to find whether the images that Romm “knowingly possessed” had a nexus to interstate commerce. Rather than requiring a finding that Romm knowingly possessed the images, the instructions dictated this finding. [14] Given that we squarely addressed the same issue in Lacy, we conclude that the instructions were in error and that the error was “plain.”18 We assume, without deciding, that the omission of the knowledge element affected Romm’s substantial rights. We also assume, without deciding, that the district court’s failure to supplement the flawed instructions was plainly an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Southwell, 432 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Failure to provide the jury with a clarifying instruction when it has identified a legitimate ambiguity in the original instructions is an abuse of discretion.”). Even so, we nonetheless may affirm if the record contains “strong and convincing evidence” that the missing element of the crime was adequately proved by the prosecution, such that it is “extremely unlikely” that a properly instructed jury would not have convicted. See United States v. Perez, 116 F.3d 840, 848 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Here, while Romm disputed whether he knew the images were being stored to the cache, the evidence of his knowledge of the presence of the visual depictions in his cache and their content was overwhelming. When stopped and interviewed by ICE, Romm was in a hurry to continue his travels and asserted that the laptop con18 We note that the Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instructions incorporate Lacy’s requirement that the defendant know the images are on his disk. See Model Criminal Jury Instruction 8.154 (2003) (instructing the jury to determine, “[f]irst, that the defendant knowingly possessed [books] [magazines] [periodicals] [films] [video tapes] [matters] which the defendant knew contained [a] visual depiction[s] of [a] minor[s] engaged in sexually explicit conduct.”) (emphasis added). While these instructions are for possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252 rather than 18 U.S.C. § 2252A, both versions of the statute are materially the same. UNITED STATES v. ROMM 8287 tained his company’s proprietary software. He also acknowledged Canadian authorities knew about his prior conviction. It was against this background that Romm acknowledged having “lapses” from his “therapy,” and viewing images of child pornography. He also acknowledged to Agent Swenson that he had “saved” and viewed the images, for up to five minutes, but claimed to have deleted them. Importantly, he said he had “saved” or “downloaded” the images to his computer in Las Vegas. After Agent Macho confronted Romm with Swenson’s relation that ten images of child pornography had been found19 and questioned Romm as to why he had lied to Macho, Romm did not look surprised, or state he was surprised; rather, he let his shoulders slump and looked down at the ground rather than maintain eye contact with Agent Macho, in a demeanor that Agent Macho described as “confessional.” Then, Romm stated that “he knew [they] were gonna find something on the computer.” In addition to his statements, the forensic analysis of Romm’s computer showed that he had erased his internet history at 2:25 p.m. on February 2, 2004, the same afternoon he was placed on a flight back to Seattle. Romm’s internet cache was completely empty, and the government’s expert opined through his experience and training that Romm had manually deleted the files or instructed his browser to empty it. Therefore, the forensic evidence strongly corroborated Romm’s direct admission that he knew the images were on his disk. [15] In sum, because of the overwhelming evidence of Romm’s knowledge, we decline to exercise our discretion to correct the plain error in the jury instructions on knowing possession. 19 This evidence came in without an objection to its being hearsay. 8288 UNITED STATES v. ROMM