Opinion ID: 2538584
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prevention of Oppressive Pretrial Incarceration

Text: With respect to the first interestpreventing oppressive pretrial incarceration Barker notes that an accused is hindered in his ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense. Id. (footnote omitted). Imposing these consequences on someone who is presumed innocent until proven guilty is serious. Id. The accused in Barker was held to. have suffered some prejudice by spending ten months in jail and approximately four years on bond. Id. We consider Appellant's positiontwenty months in jail and eight months on bondto be sufficiently analogous. However, Appellant must bear the burden of any prejudice that he may have suffered due to his incarceration. Appellant was in jail for a total of twenty months. He was originally arrested on September 28, 2008, but he was released on October 17, 2008 less than three weeks after he was originally incarcerated. Appellant only went back to jail on January 8, 2009 because he returned to K.D.'s in December 2008 and taunted the clerk who had been robbed. Appellant's bond was revoked and reset at $100,000, and he remained in jail until he again posted bond on November 12, 2009. [11] On May 3, 2010, after waiving extradition from Ohio, he was back in a Kentucky jail where he remained until his January 2011 trial. Thus, Appellant has only himself to blame for all but three weeks of his twenty months in jail. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 865, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982) (interpreting Barker as standing for the proposition that interests protected by the Sixth Amendment look to the degree of prejudice incurred by a defendant as a result of governmental action or inaction) (emphasis added). Any prejudice he may have suffered must be outweighed by the reason for his incarcerationthe violations of his bond.