Opinion ID: 2266211
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Nature of Contempt Proceeding

Text: [¶ 9] Mr. Stephens argues the contempt proceeding was criminal in nature, and the district court did not have jurisdiction because it was not brought in a separate, independent action. See, e.g., BW v. State, 2010 WY 18, ¶ 5, 226 P.3d 272, 274 (Wyo. 2010); Swain v. State, 2009 WY 142, ¶¶ 13-17, 220 P.3d 504, 507-09 (Wyo.2009). The Lavitts counter that the contempt proceeding was civil and the district court had jurisdiction to hear it as part of the original case. `Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law to be reviewed de novo. ' Hamilton v. Hamilton, 2010 WY 35, ¶ 5, 228 P.3d 51, 52 (Wyo.2010), quoting SEG v. GDK, 2007 WY 203, ¶ 4, 173 P.3d 395, 395 (Wyo.2007). [¶ 10] In Swain, ¶¶ 13-17, 230 P.3d at 507-09, we stated that a criminal contempt proceeding is between the public and the contemnor and is a separate and independent proceeding from, and is not a part of, the original case in which the contempt arose-it is instituted, tried and treated as a distinct criminal action. Id., ¶ 14, 230 P.3d at 508, citing Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 31 S.Ct. 492, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911). A district court does not have jurisdiction over a criminal contempt proceeding unless it is brought as a separate action, in the name of the state. Any criminal contempt order issued in an action not properly commenced is null and void. Swain, ¶ 14, 230 P.3d at 508. In contrast, a civil contempt proceeding is a dispute between the original parties and is instituted, tried and treated as a part of the main case. Id. [¶ 11] In Munoz v. Munoz, 2002 WY 4, ¶ 11, 39 P.3d 390, 393 (Wyo.2002), we identified four factors that may be considered in determining the nature of a contempt proceeding: 1. In what manner did the contempt happen, that is, did the contemnor refuse to do an affirmative act or did the contemnor do that which he was ordered not to do; 2. what was the substance of the proceeding; 3. what kind of punishment was imposed; and 4. for what reasons did the court impose that kind of punishment. [¶ 12] Analyzing the first factor, if the contemnor refuses to do an affirmative act previously ordered by the court, the proceeding is considered to be civil; if the contemnor does something he was ordered not to do, the proceeding is criminal. Id. See also, United Mine Workers of America, Local 1972 v. Decker Coal Co., 774 P.2d 1274, 1280 (Wyo.1989), superseded on other grounds by rule as recognized by CRB v. State, Dept. of Family Services, 974 P.2d 931, 936 (Wyo.1999). The Lavitts' motion to show cause alleged both a failure to perform an affirmative action previously ordered by the district court (lock the gate) and the doing of an act which was prohibited (harassing them). The district court, however, found Mr. Stephens in contempt only for failing to lock the gate. The court held the evidence did not establish that Mr. Stephens had harassed the Lavitts. On the whole, this factor indicates the contempt proceeding was civil. [¶ 13] The substance of a contempt proceeding is determined by analyzing the course of proceedings. Mr. Stephens apparently assumes the contempt proceeding was criminal because the district court proceeded under W.R.Cr.P. 42. The process set out in Rule 42 follows typical criminal law procedure. However, in Munoz, ¶ 13, 39 P.3d at 393, this Court rejected the notion that a proceeding will always be considered criminal if the district court proceeds under Rule 42. We explained that W.R.Cr.P. 42 and 42.1 expressly recognize the possibility of imposing either criminal or civil sanctions for contempt of court. W.R.Cr.P. 42.1(b) states in relevant part: If, after notice and hearing, the court finds that a person has failed or refused to perform an act that is yet within the person's power to perform, the court may find the person in civil contempt of court.... The fact that the district court provided the accused contemnor with the protections and advisements provided by the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure does not automatically render the proceeding criminal in nature. Munoz, ¶ 13, 39 P.3d at 393. [¶ 14] Although the district court referred to the contempt action as criminal and utilized criminal procedure, the course of proceedings in this case demonstrates that the proceeding was civil. The action was brought by a private party, rather than the state, to enforce compliance with the protections provided in the injunction. [¶ 15] The third and fourth factors address the type of punishment imposed and the district court's reasons for imposing the punishment and are often denominated as the principal considerations in determining whether a contempt proceeding is criminal or civil. Horn v. District Court, Ninth Judicial District, 647 P.2d 1368, 1372-73 (Wyo.1982). We expounded on the punishment element in Horn v. Welch, 2002 WY 138, ¶ 12, 54 P.3d 754, 759 (Wyo.2002): A contempt is considered civil when the punishment is wholly remedial, serves only the purposes of the complainant, and is not intended as a deterrent to offenses against the public. Horn, 647 P.2d at 1373. A civil contempt is generally intended to compel a party to comply with a lawful court order while a criminal contempt is punitive in nature and is enforced so the authority of the law and the court will be vindicated. Id. Stated simply, the primary purpose of criminal contempt is to punish while the primary purpose of civil contempt is to coerce. Anderson v. Anderson, 667 P.2d 660, 662 (Wyo.1983); Horn, 647 P.2d at 1373. Appellate courts are obligated to decide whether a contempt is civil or criminal based on the reasons for a particular penalty. Id. [¶ 16] The permanent injunction was focused on compelling Mr. Stephens to act properly on the easement, including keeping the gate locked. The Lavitts' motion to show cause alleged that Mr. Stephens had violated the injunction and prayed that the court would permanently enjoin Mr. Stephens from entering their property. The district court reviewed the history of Mr. Stephens' refusal to comply with its orders and succinctly and clearly explained its rationale for terminating Mr. Stephens' easement: 12. The Court is unable to enter an Order that will permit [Mr.] Stephens to use the Luman Road and accomplish the gate being locked, because [Mr.] Stephens has demonstrated his refusal to comply with such an Order. 13. [Mr.] Stephens' violation of the Court's Order constitutes misuse of his easement on Luman Road sufficient to cause forfeiture of that easement. Unquestionably, the reason the district court imposed the punishment of forfeiture of the easement was to enforce its order that the gate should be locked. The purpose of its order was to remedy the harm done to the Lavitts rather than to protect the public or punish Mr. Stephens. [¶ 17] The punishment factors, like the others, confirm that the action was civil in nature. It was, therefore, properly brought under the original docket number, as a private matter between the original parties. The district court had jurisdiction to entertain the action.