Opinion ID: 3011960
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Plaintiffs’ S 1983 Complaint

Text: On August 6, 1998, Concepcion and Ways filed their complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983, alleging that they were the victims of excessive force in violation of their constitutional rights on August 18, 1997. They named seven NJSP corrections officers and officials as defendants. On August 22, 2000, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust available administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(a), which mandates that[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . by a prisoner . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted. More specifically, the defendants argued that, before seeking redress in a federal court, the plaintiffs were required under S 1997e(a) to follow the administrative grievance procedure set forth in the Department of Corrections Inmate Handbook (Handbook). The District Court described that procedure as follows: The process begins by the inmate submitting an Administrative Remedy Form to the Administrator’s Office. Upon receipt, the Department Head writes a response on the form; this response is signed by the Primary Level Supervisor and the Department Head; and the response is finally reviewed and signed by the Intermediate Level Supervisor as the Administrator’s designee. The inmate complaint form with the administrative response is then placed in the inmate’s Classification folder and the prisoner is given a copy. No administrative appeal is permitted. Concepcion v. Morton, 125 F. Supp. 2d 111, 116 (D.N.J. 2000) (citations omitted). The Handbook states that the grievance procedure is set up to give the inmate population a way to bring complaints, problems, suggestions, etc. to the attention of the Administration of New Jersey State Prison to solve or possibly put into use. App. at A5. Finding that the grievance procedure described in the Handbook does not constitute an administrative remedy for purposes of S 1997e(a), the District Court held that there were no available administrative remedies for the 6 plaintiffs to exhaust and therefore denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to address available administrative remedies on December 21, 2000.1 Concepcion, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 121. After conducting an analysis of the language, structure, and legislative history of S 1997e(a), the court concluded that, in using the phrase administrative remedies, Congress meantadministrative schemes promulgated by an agency. Id. at 120. Because the prison warden and his staff, rather than the Department of Corrections, promulgated the grievance procedure in the Handbook, the District Court held that the remedy was not administrative in nature and thus outside the scope of S 1997e(a). See id. Subsequent to the District Court’s decision denying summary judgment, the United States Supreme Court decided Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001), in which the Court held that S 1997e(a) requires exhaustion of an administrative remedy even if that remedy cannot grant the type of relief sought by an inmate. See id. at 734. Thus, the prisoner in that case, who sought only money damages under S 1983, was required to complete a prison administrative process, even though that process could not provide him with any monetary relief. See id. On June 11, 2001, in light of the Court’s holding in Booth , the defendants moved for reconsideration of the District Court’s decision. The District Court, however, denied defendants’ motion for reconsideration, explaining: The clear implication of Booth is that courts should not read futility exceptions into [S 1997e(a)’s] exhaustion requirement where there is an existing administrative procedure. Here, this Court found that there was no existing administrative procedure; therefore; the _________________________________________________________________ 1. The District Court did, however, grant summary judgment on Count Seven of plaintiffs’ amended complaint, which alleged that defendants Willis Morton and John Smith 1-13 failed to provide adequate training and supervision to their corrections officers in violation of plaintiffs’ Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Concepcion, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 127. The court held that these claims for supervisory liability had to be dismissed because there was noaffirmative link between the alleged constitutional violations and the officials sued. Id. at 128. 7 teaching of Booth does not alter the Court’s original Opinion and Order. App. at A28. The defendants subsequently moved for reconsideration of the District Court’s order denying their previous motion for reconsideration, noting that several District Judges in the District of New Jersey had recently issued decisions at odds with the District Court’s holding in Concepcion. See, e.g. In re Bayside Prison Litigation, 190 F. Supp. 2d 755, 771 (D.N.J. 2002) (I cannot accept Concepcion’s conclusion that an inmate handbook can never constitute an administrative remedy . . . .). In the alternative, the defendants sought a stay of the proceedings and moved to certify the question of what constitutes an administrative remedy under S 1997e(a). On October 5, 2001, the District Court denied defendants’ second motion for reconsideration but granted their motion for certification and for a stay of the proceedings. The defendants then petitioned this Court, pursuant to Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, for permission to appeal the question whether the exhaustion requirement of S 1997e(a) is applicable only in those instances in which an administrative remedy scheme is adopted through regulations rather than through publication and distribution of an inmate handbook. We granted the petition on November 8, 2001.