Opinion ID: 1722019
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was Officer Douglass a De Facto Peace Officer Under Section 321J.1(7)(e)?

Text: The State concedes officer Douglass did not have the training required by section 321J.1(7)(e). It claims, however, that officer Douglass is a de facto peace officer because (1) he had the authority to arrest Lindeman for operating while intoxicated, and (2) he had all the indicia of the authority of a peace officer, such as a police car, a badge, a police uniform and a gun belt. We recently considered an identical issue in the Palmer case which, coincidentally, involved the same police officer. In that case, we held officer Douglass was not a de facto peace officer under chapter 321J because his inability to qualify under chapter 321J's definition of peace officer rested on more than a mere technicality. Id. at 866. Officer Douglass was not a peace officer under section 321J.1(7)(e) because he lacked training in OWI procedures. Id. at 867. We observed that the training requirement is the essence of this statute and protects the citizens of Iowa from `indiscriminate testing and harassment.' Id. at 865 (quoting State v. Hopkins, 465 N.W.2d 894, 896 (1991)). Therefore, we refused to undermine the legislature's policy decision by recognizing one without such training as a de facto peace officer. Id. We see no reason to deviate from Palmer here.