Opinion ID: 3184519
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Every person who, having taken an oath

Text: that he or she will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly before any competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any of the cases in which the oath may by law of the State of California be administered, willfully and contrary to the oath, states as true any material matter which he or she knows to be false, and every person who testifies, declares, deposes, or certifies under penalty of perjury in any of the cases in 10 ROSALES RIVERA V. LYNCH which the testimony, declarations, depositions, or certification is permitted by law of the State of California under penalty of perjury and willfully states as true any material matter which he or she knows to be false, is guilty of perjury. As discussed below, infra Part V, section 118 criminalizes both written and oral perjury. In the case of a defendant who committed oral perjury, we have articulated the elements of this offense as “a willful statement, under oath, of any material matter which the witness knows to be false.” Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Cabe v. Super. Ct., 63 Cal. App. 4th 732 (1998)). The model jury instructions for section 118 explain that written perjury, by contrast, requires only that the false statement be in writing under penalty of perjury. See People v. Hedgecock, 51 Cal. 3d 395, 403–04 (Cal. 1990) (explaining that California Jury Instruction—Criminal (“CALJIC”) No. 7.21 (1982) sets forth the elements of written perjury). The requirements of willfulness and materiality are common to both perjury offenses. Cal. Penal Code § 118. The word “willful” “simply means that the witness made the allegedly perjurious statement with the consciousness that it was false; with the consciousness that he did not know that it was true and with the intent that it should be received as a statement of what was true in fact.” People v. Tolmachoff, 58 Cal. App. 2d 815, 821 (1943); see also People v. Hagen, 19 Cal. 4th 652, 663–64 (1998); People v. Viniegra, 130 Cal. App. 3d 577, 584 (1982). That the accused was not ROSALES RIVERA V. LYNCH 11 competent4 to give a false statement is not a defense to a charge of perjury under section 118. Cal. Penal Code § 122. A statement is “material” if “the statement or testimony ‘might have been used to affect the [proceeding in or for which it was made],’” or if “the statement could probably have influenced the outcome of the proceedings.”5 People v. Feinberg, 51 Cal. App. 4th 1566, 1575 (1997) (quoting People v. Kobrin, 11 Cal. 4th 416, 420 (1995) (internal brackets in original), and People v. Pierce, 66 Cal. 2d 53, 61 (1967)). For example, testimony may be material if it has a tendency to impeach the credibility of a witness who testified on a material issue, even if the testimony is unrelated to the case itself. See People v. Gamble, 8 Cal. App. 3d 142, 146 (1970). It is not a defense to perjury that “the accused did not know the materiality of the false statement made . . . . It is sufficient that it was material.” Cal. Penal Code § 123. People v. Darcy illustrates the breadth of the materiality element. 59 Cal. App. 2d 342 (1943), disapproved of on other grounds by Murgia v. Mun. Ct., 15 Cal. 3d 286 (1975). There, the defendant stated under oath before a deputy registrar of voters that his name was Sam Darcy and that he 4 A trial witness may be disqualified if he or she is “[i]ncapable of expressing himself or herself concerning the matter so as to be understood,” or “[i]ncapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth.” Cal. Evid. Code § 701(a). 5 California courts have recognized that this definition of materiality does not apply to all section 118 offenses. Hedgecock, 51 Cal. 3d at 405 (setting forth an alternate definition of materiality in “a perjury prosecution based on the filing of a false [statements of economic interest] or [campaign disclosure statement]” because “there is no ‘proceeding’ the outcome of which could be influenced by the false verification”). 12 ROSALES RIVERA V. LYNCH was born in New York, even though his true name was Samuel Dardeck and he was born in the Ukraine. Id. at 345. Darcy argued that it was immaterial whether he made false statements about his name and place of birth, as he could have registered to vote had he used his real name and given his correct place of birth. Id. at 348–49. The court, however, reasoned that the false statements were material because the voting authorities were “prevented from examining the father’s naturalization papers for the purpose of verifying [Darcy’s] citizenship.” Id. at 349. Indeed, one’s name and birthplace may serve “as a basis for an investigation of qualifications of a person who registers,” including citizenship. Id. In sum, even though Darcy would have been allowed to vote had he given his true name and true birthplace, his false statements under oath were material.