Opinion ID: 2599854
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Insufficient Evidence

Text: Defendant contends his felony convictions for murder, robbery, sodomy, burglary and grand theft, as well as all the special circumstance allegations, are not supported by sufficient evidence. The law is clear and well settled. On appeal we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence  that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value  from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738; see also Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 317-320, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560.) The standard of review is the same in cases in which the People rely mainly on circumstantial evidence. ( People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 932, 251 Cal.Rptr. 467, 760 P.2d 996.) `Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests `guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the jury, not the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. `If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.' [Citations.]' ( Id. at pp. 932-933, 251 Cal.Rptr. 467, 760 P.2d 996.) `Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to connect a defendant with the crime and to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' ( People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 792-793, 42 Cal. Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481.)
Defendant contends his convictions for murder and forcible sodomy and the sodomy-murder special-circumstance finding must be reversed for insufficient evidence because they are based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of codefendant Vieyra, an accomplice. Section 1111 provides: A conviction can not be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof, [¶] An accomplice is hereby defined as one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of the accomplice is given. Accordingly, the jury was instructed: You cannot find a defendant guilty based upon the testimony of an accomplice unless that testimony is corroborated by other evidence that tends to connect such defendant with the commission of the offense. The jury was further instructed: To corroborate the testimony of an accomplice as to the guilt of a codefendant, there must be evidence of some act or fact related to the crime which, if believed, by itself and without any aid, interpretation or direction from the testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime charged. [¶] However, it is not necessary that the evidence of corroboration be sufficient in itself to establish every element of the crime charged or that it corroborate every fact to which the accomplice testifies. The instructions accurately reflect the applicable law. The corroborating evidence may be circumstantial or slight and entitled to little consideration when standing alone, and it must tend to implicate the defendant by relating to an act that is an element of the crime. The corroborating evidence need not by itself establish every element of the crime, but it must, without aid from the accomplice's testimony, tend to connect the defendant with the crime. ( People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1128, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1.) The trier of fact's determination on the issue of corroboration is binding on the reviewing court unless the corroborating evidence should not have been admitted or does not reasonably tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime. ( People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 986, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 51 P.3d 874; People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 628, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224.) Thus, to the extent defendant argues that evidence corroborating Vieyra's testimony must be substantial, he is mistaken. There is no doubt the victim was sodomized and killed. Vieyra testified he was with defendant when defendant fought with the victim. He claimed he opened the door and saw defendant straddling his mother on the floor and saw a white cloth around her neck. A few minutes later, defendant emerged from the bedroom and told Vieyra estuvo (it is done). The two of them then took several items from the victim's room, loaded them into her car and went to sell them. Vieyra claimed that, prior to the crime, he heard defendant express his desire to kill his mother because she had given him up to be raised by someone else when he was a child. Although defendant concedes the victim was sodomized and killed, he contends that apart from Vieyra's uncorroborated testimony, there was no evidence identifying him as the assailant. We disagree. All the critical aspects of Vieyra's testimony were corroborated. Police found the victim with a white sock wrapped tightly around her neck. Chachi, one of victim Loza's children who lived with her, testified that on the evening of March 15, 1996, defendant and Vieyra came to see Loza. Chachi heard defendant and Loza arguing and heard Loza scream. Later, he heard someone start Loza's car and drive off. Both Candina Bravo and Gabriel Arce testified that, in the days before the murder, they heard defendant state he wished to kill the victim. This evidence corroborates Vieyra's testimony on the issue of the killer's identity. The authorities defendant cites in support are distinguishable. In People v. Martinez (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 119, 133, 183 Cal.Rptr. 256, the purported corroborating evidence did nothing more than show `the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.' Similarly, in both People v. Valardi (1966) 240 Cal. App.2d 98, 49 Cal.Rptr. 339 and People v. Lloyd (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 236, 61 Cal. Rptr. 138, the only evidence tending to corroborate an accomplice's testimony was proof the defendants were present at the scene. By contrast, evidence aside from Vieyra's testimony established more than defendant's mere presence at the scene of the crime. The evidence showed he fought and argued with the victim, the manner of killing (the sock), and his preexisting desire to kill the victim. This evidence  all obtained from sources other than Vieyra  tends to prove, directly or circumstantially, that defendant was the person who sodomized and killed the victim. Contrary to defendant's suggestion, the corroborating evidence need not independently establish the identity of the victim's assailant. ( People v. McDermott, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 986, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 51 P.3d 874 [corroborating evidence need not by itself establish every element of the crime].) There being ample evidence corroborating Vieyra's testimony, we find his testimony was properly admitted and provided substantial evidence identifying defendant as the person who committed the murder and sodomy. We thus reject the claim there was insufficient evidence of murder, sodomy or the sodomy-murder special circumstance.
Defendant contends his conviction for robbery and the robbery-murder special-circumstance finding must be reversed for insufficient evidence, relying on several theories. First, he argues the evidence was insufficient that he formed the intent to steal before or during the application of force to the victim. ( People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 129, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166.) We disagree. Candina Bravo testified that, just hours before the murder, defendant asked her for money. According to Gabriel Arce, defendant's practice when the victim refused his requests for money was just to take it from her purse. That defendant, immediately after killing the victim, stole several items from her home and then offered them for sale to Leonard Mercado, is also relevant circumstantial evidence of his intent at the time of the murder. Although the evidence is circumstantial, the intent required for robbery ... is seldom established with direct evidence but instead is usually inferred from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the crime. ( People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 643, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392.) We conclude substantial evidence supports the jury's implied finding that defendant harbored the intent to steal before or during the murder. Second, defendant argues the evidence was insufficient he stole the victim's property by means of force or fear. The crime of robbery, of course, is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or, immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear. (§ 211, italics added.) Because the victim was already dead when he took her property, defendant argues, he cannot be found to have stolen from her by means of force or fear. The point is meritless. [I]t is settled that a victim of robbery may be unconscious or even dead when the property is taken, so long as the defendant used force against the victim to take the property. ( People v. Jackson (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1326,1330, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 793, citing People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 956, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) There is no requirement a victim be aware that someone was taking his or her property. ( Jackson, at p. 1330, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 793.) It was defendant who applied the force to this victim, and substantial evidence was presented to show that he did so with the intent to steal. We thus reject his arguments. Third, defendant argues there was insufficient evidence he removed the victim's property from [her] person or immediate presence. (§ 211.) The generally accepted definition of immediate presence ... is that `[a] thing is in the [immediate] presence of a person, in respect to robbery, which is so within his reach, inspection, observation or control, that he could, if not overcome by violence or prevented by fear, retain his possession of it.' ( People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 626-627, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376.) This element was satisfied by evidence defendant took electronic equipment from the victim's bedroom, the same location in which she was killed. Moreover, even taking her car or items from another bedroom would qualify: The zone of immediate presence [for purposes of robbery] includes the area `within which the victim could reasonably be expected to exercise some physical control over his property.' ( People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 440, 285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273; see People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 675, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213 [although victim was killed in the bedroom, items in her kitchen were in her immediate presence for robbery purposes].) We also reject as unsupported defendant's further argument that the items he took were not in the victim's immediate presence because [a] deceased individual is no longer a person and therefore cannot have actual or constructive possession of property. To the contrary, [w]hile it may be true that one cannot rob a person who is already dead when one first arrives on the scene, one can certainly rob a living person by killing that person and then taking his or her property. ( People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 499, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d 1182.) In sum, we find sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for robbery and the robbery-murder special circumstance.
Defendant contends his two convictions for burglary and the burglary-murder special-circumstance finding must be reversed for insufficient evidence. He relies on two theories. First, he argues the evidence was insufficient that he formed the intent to steal before he entered either the victim's home, her bedroom or Carlon's bedroom. We disagree. Intent to steal is often proved by circumstantial evidence ( People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 36, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673, overruled on another ground in People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 879, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135), and this case is no different. Here, substantial evidence showed defendant intended to commit a theft-related offense at the time he entered his mother's home. Candina Bravo testified defendant asked her for money shortly before the crimes and that defendant had, in the past, clashed with his mother over money. Defendant's possession and subsequent sale of goods stolen from the victim's home shortly after the crimes is strong circumstantial evidence that he harbored the intent to commit larceny when he entered her home. ( People v. Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 131, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166.) Moreover, [t]here is no better proof that [defendant] entered the [victim's house] with intent to commit robbery than a showing he did in fact commit robbery after his entry. ( People v. Du Bose (1970) 10 Cal. App.3d 544, 551, 89 Cal.Rptr. 134.) Second, defendant contends that because he lived with the victim, there was insufficient evidence of burglary because one cannot be guilty of burglarizing his own residence. He is correct as a general matter ( People v. Davis (1998) 18 Cal.4th 712, 721, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 958 P.2d 1083; People v. Gauze (1975) 15 Cal.3d 709, 125 Cal.Rptr. 773, 542 P.2d 1365), but even assuming he lived with the victim, the charge was not limited to entry into the victim's home. The second amended information charged defendant in count 4 with entering an inhabited dwelling house ... and inhabited portion of a building occupied by BEATRICE LOZA. (Italics added.) It similarly charged him in count 5 with entering an inhabited dwelling house ... and inhabited portion of a building occupied by SUZIE [ sic ] CARLON. (Italics added.) The wording of the information is consistent with section 459, which provides in pertinent part: Every person who enters any house, room, apartment, ... or other building ... with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary. (Italics added.) With regard to count 4, we conclude there was sufficient evidence defendant burglarized his mother's bedroom. Although the victim may have permitted defendant to be in her home, a point we need not resolve, [7] defendant fought with the victim in her bedroom causing her to scream. When Chachi came to see what was happening, defendant told him to return to his room. Defendant then reentered the victim's bedroom. The jury could have concluded that, under the circumstances, defendant at that time lacked the victim's consent to enter her bedroom; that he may have had a possessory right to enter the home does not preclude a conviction for burglary on these facts. (See People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 954, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) With regard to count 5, Carlon testified that on returning to the house, the lock on her bedroom door had been broken and her electronic equipment had been stolen. Consistent with her testimony, the prosecutor argued that the minute someone went into Susie Carlon's bedroom with the intent to steal from her, they are guilty of burglary. As defendant broke into Carlon's locked bedroom and stole her electronic equipment, that he may have lived in the house is immaterial. ( People v. Wilson (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 611, 256 Cal. Rptr. 422 [invited guest who, without permission, breaks into a locked bedroom commits burglary], cited with approval in People v. Sparks (2002) 28 Cal.4th 71, 81, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 508, 47 P.3d 289.) We thus conclude the evidence was sufficient to support both counts of burglary. That being so, we also reject defendant's claim there was insufficient evidence to sustain the burglary-murder special circumstance. To the extent he claims our interpretation of the law of burglary renders the special circumstance unconstitutionally broad, such that it fails to perform the constitutionally required narrowing function, we reject that as well. (See People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1095, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 46 P.3d 335 [§ 190.2 not unconstitutional because of the breadth of the felony-murder special circumstance].)
Defendant contends his conviction for grand theft of a vehicle must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence to show that he intended to steal the car, i.e., that he intended permanently to deprive the victim of it. We disagree. Defendant was convicted of violating former section 487h, subdivision (a), which in 1996 provided in pertinent part: Every person who feloniously steals or takes any motor vehicle ... is guilty of grand theft. (Stats.1993, ch. 1125, § 6, p. 6292; see now § 487, subd. (d).) The crime requires the specific intent to permanently deprive a person of property. ( People v. Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 693, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 489, 968 P.2d 48, overruled on another point in People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 45 Cal.Rptr. 3d 353, 137 P.3d 184.) Contrary to defendant's argument, the evidence of his intent, though circumstantial, was strong. He killed the owner of the car and then used it to ferry his stolen goods to sell. As in People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 27, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591, [t]he evidence defendant intended to deprive [the victim] of her car permanently was overwhelming, and the evidence he merely intended to drive it temporarily and then return it to her was virtually nonexistent. At the threshold, we note that defendant killed [the car's owner], indicating he did not intend to return the car to her. Defendant asserts evidence the victim allowed him to drive the car and had, in fact, loaned it to him the very day of her murder, demonstrates that he had permission to drive the car. The evidence, coming from defendant himself, was not adduced until the penalty phase of the trial, however, and thus was not before the jury at the guilt phase. In any event, even by defendant's own account, he did not have permission to still be driving the victim's car when he was arrested after midnight. Coupled with evidence he killed the car's owner, we conclude there was sufficient evidence defendant did not intend to return the car to her.
In his final argument addressing the alleged insufficiency of the evidence, defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to prove he killed the victim while ... engaged in the three target felonies of robbery, sodomy and burglary. Section 190.2, subdivision (a) provides the penalty for first degree murder is either life imprisonment without possibility of parole, or death, if one or more of the following special circumstances has been found ... to be true: [¶] ... [¶] (17) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in, or was an accomplice in, the commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate flight after committing, or attempting to commit, the following felonies: [robbery, sodomy, burglary]. (Italics added.) The information charged defendant in this language, the jury was so instructed and the verdict reflects this language. [A] felony that is merely incidental to the murder cannot serve as the basis for a felony-murder special circumstance ( People v. Gurule, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 628, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224), for the Legislature's goal in implementing the death penalty law by enacting the special circumstance scheme would not be achieved if a criminal defendant could be made eligible for the death penalty where his intent is not to commit an enumerated felony but is instead simply to kill, and the associated felony was merely incidental to the murder. ( People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 61, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468.) [8] For example, a killer who takes the victim's clothes so as to forestall later identification of the victim and thus avoid responsibility for the murder ( Green, at p. 61, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468) or a rapist-killer who takes a letter from his victim as a remembrance of his rape ( People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 41, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262) have not committed murder while engaged in their felonies. For those who kill, however, we need not discern their various mental states in too fine a fashion; a concurrent intent to kill and to commit an independent felony will support a felony-murder special circumstance. ( People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1158, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384.) We conclude sufficient evidence exists to show defendant killed the victim while ... engaged in the commission of robbery and burglary. Evidence demonstrated that, on the day of the murder, defendant was in need of money, having asked Candina Bravo for some. The victim had asked defendant to leave her home because he had stolen money from her. Immediately after the victim was killed, defendant and Vieyra took electronic equipment from her bedroom and loaded it into her car. They then broke the lock on Carlon's bedroom, entered and removed more electronic equipment. They took the victim's car without permission and proceeded to sell the stolen goods. This behavior was not incidental or ancillary to the murder, but amply demonstrates an independent felonious purpose in support of the robbery- and burglary-murder special circumstances. We also conclude sufficient evidence exists to show defendant killed the victim while ... engaged in the commission of sodomy. Defendant expressed to several witnesses his anger at, and hatred of, the victim, his biological mother, for abandoning him and then denigrating the woman who raised him. The jury could reasonably have inferred from this evidence that defendant wished to injure and humiliate the victim before killing her in retaliation for those perceived injustices. There is no suggestion defendant's commission of this forced sex act against his own mother was merely incidental to her murder. Finally, defendant contends the three special circumstance findings must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence of the underlying felonies themselves. As we explained, ante, sufficient evidence supports defendant's convictions for robbery, burglary and sodomy. Accordingly, we reject this claim as well.