Opinion ID: 1240501
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The principles we apply in these proceedings were reviewed recently in Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Shuminsky, 359 N.W.2d 442, 444-45 (Iowa 1984):

Text: We review the record made before the commission de novo. We give respectful consideration to the commission's findings and recommendations although they are not binding on us. If we find the complainant has established the charges by a convincing preponderance of the evidence, we impose an appropriate sanction, considering not only the respondent's fitness to practice law, but the need to deter others from similar conduct and assure the public that courts will uphold the ethics of the legal profession. Complainant need not prove respondent was acting as a lawyer at the time of the alleged misconduct; lawyers do not shed their professional responsibility in their personal lives. (Citations omitted.) Iowa Code section 602.10122(3) provides that the license of an attorney may be suspended or revoked upon the ground he or she has committed [a] willful violation of any of the duties of an attorney ... as hereinbefore prescribed. One of those duties is [n]ot to encourage either the commencement or continuance of an action or proceeding from any motive of passion or interest. Iowa Code § 602.10112(6). We are not required here to determine whether this attorney who assaulted his dissolution action client because she went to dinner with her husband encouraged the continuance of the action from a motive of passion. Adequate ground for the discipline we impose exists within the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers. In Iowa the ethical considerations do more than illuminate the disciplinary rules; in this jurisdiction a violation of an ethical consideration alone is sufficient to support discipline. Shuminsky, 359 N.W.2d at 445; Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Millen, 357 N.W.2d 313, 314-15 (Iowa 1984). EC 1-5 provides: A lawyer ... should refrain from all illegal and morally reprehensible conduct. Because of his position in society, even minor violations of law by a lawyer may tend to lessen public confidence in the legal profession. Obedience to law exemplifies respect for law. To lawyers especially, respect for the law should be more than a platitude. A portion of the above concept finds a place in EC 9-6: Every lawyer owes a solemn duty ... to encourage respect for the law.... Paraphrasing what we wrote in Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Bromwell, 221 N.W.2d 777, 779 (Iowa 1974), when those licensed to operate the law's machinery knowingly violate essential criminal statutes, there inexorably follows an intensified loss of lay persons' respect for the law. II. We find respondent's two-hour assault on an unresisting female constitutes a violation of EC 1-5 and EC 9-6. Based on the duration of the beating, respondent's intermittent discussions with Debra, coupled with his demands she divert her interceding son, we are convinced that respondent was fully conscious of what he was doing. There is little beyond his own contentions, and no professional opinion, to support respondent's claim that he lost his reason and has no recollection of the event. He stands convicted of a serious misdemeanor. In our view, respondent's conduct is fully as morally reprehensible as accepting gifts in violation of a federal statute limiting attorney fees, Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Christoffers, 348 N.W.2d 227, 229-30 (Iowa 1984); having possession of marijuana and amphetamines, Shuminsky, 359 N.W.2d at 445; or making obscene telephone calls, Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Floy, 334 N.W.2d 739, 740 (Iowa 1983). See Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Wilson, 270 N.W.2d 613, 615 (Iowa 1978). Nor, in the circumstances of this case, can we agree with the commission's finding that respondent's conduct did not involve moral turpitude. The term moral turpitude has been used in the law for centuries. It has been the subject of many decisions by the courts but has never been clearly defined because of the nature of the term. Perhaps the best general definition of the term moral turpitude is that it imports an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the duties which one person owes to another or to society in general, which is contrary to the usual, accepted and customary rule of right and duty which a person should follow. Committee on Legal Ethics v. Scherr, 149 W.Va. 721, 726-27, 143 S.E.2d 141, 145 (1965). Respondent's conduct, under the facts disclosed by this record and modern day social mores, clearly met the above definition. It is ordered that respondent's license to practice law should be suspended indefinitely with no possibility of reinstatement for three months. This suspension shall apply to all facets of the practice of law. See Iowa Sup.Ct.R. 118.12. Upon application for reinstatement, respondent shall have the burden to prove that he has not practiced law during the period of suspension and that he meets the requirements of supreme court rule 118.13. LICENSE SUSPENDED.