Opinion ID: 3168517
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Excluding Conclusory Allegations

Text: At the second step in our pleading analysis, we identify those allegations that, being merely conclusory, are 15 not entitled to the presumption of truth. Twombly and Iqbal distinguish between legal conclusions, which are discounted in the analysis, and allegations of historical fact, which are assumed to be true even if “unrealistic or nonsensical,” “chimerical,” or “extravagantly fanciful.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. Put another way, Twombly and Iqbal expressly declined to exclude even outlandish allegations from a presumption of truth except to the extent they resembled a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a … claim” or other legal conclusion.7 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Firestone Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 796 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2015) (concluding that allegations that were “neither legal assertions nor conclusory statements reciting the elements of a cause of action” were “entitled to a presumption of truth” under Iqbal). Perhaps “some allegations, while not stating ultimate legal conclusions, are nevertheless so threadbare or speculative that they fail to cross the line between the conclusory and the factual,” but the clearest indication that an allegation is conclusory and unworthy of weight in analyzing the sufficiency of a complaint is that it embodies a legal point. Peñalbert-Rosa v. Fortuño-Burset, 631 F.3d 592, 595 (1st Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 7 The Court in Iqbal clarified that it was only the conclusory nature of certain allegations – that is, their mere recitation of formulaic legal elements – that rendered them excludable: “[W]e do not reject these bald allegations on the ground that they are unrealistic or nonsensical. … It is the conclusory nature of [the] allegations, rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature, that disentitles them to the presumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. 16 Although the District Court considered the Amended Complaint to be “extremely vague and conclusory,” it did not specifically identify any allegations that, being mere legal conclusions, should have been discounted. (App. 10.) In our plenary review of the motion to dismiss, we consider the following allegations in the Amended Complaint to be disentitled to any presumption of truth: (1) that Connelly’s supervisors at Lane “subjected her to disparate treatment based on her gender and retaliation for making complaints about discrimination and sexual harassment” (App. 26); (2) that Lane, “[b]y subjecting Connelly to discrimination based on her gender and retaliation,” violated Title VII and the PHRA (App. 26-27); (3) that Connelly was an “employee” of Lane “within the meaning of Title VII and the PHRA” (App. 27); (4) that “[a]t all times relevant to this case, [Lane] was an ‘employer’ within the meaning of Title VII and the PHRA” (App. 27); and (5) that “Connelly has exhausted her federal and state administrative remedies.” (App. 36). All of these allegations paraphrase in one way or another the pertinent statutory language or elements of the claims in question. To the extent that Connelly’s allegation that she “was sexually harassed” by Manning states a legal conclusion, that is also excluded, although her factual allegations describing Manning’s behavior and her reaction to him, along with her allegation that his threatened physical contact was “unwanted,” are accepted as true. (App. 31.)