Opinion ID: 1239233
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cross-Examination of C.H.

Text: During C.H.'s cross-examination, defense counsel asked, You told [Sergeant] Adams that you had seen these guys before, is that correct, when he asked you? The question was based on statements attributed to C.H. in a written interview summary prepared by Sergeant Adams. The State objected to the use of Adams' interview summary because C.H. had been subject to a lengthy interview which had been recorded. Defense counsel agreed to use a transcript of the interview in questioning, which transcript had been created by defense counsel. After a bench conference, the State made the following statement within earshot of the jury, [y]ou haven't provided [the transcript] to me. The State then objected to the use of the transcript because a copy had not been provided to the State for verification of its accuracy. The district court ruled that defense counsel could ask questions based on the content of the transcript for the remainder of the afternoon but prohibited counsel from using the transcript as extrinsic evidence. When defense counsel later asked C.H., you spoke to ... Sergeant Knight, is that correct? You recall that? The State objected because defense counsel was referring to a summary of the same interview and the summary isn't necessarily accurate.... [A]nd she has an accurate [transcript] that I wasn't provided. That evening a copy of the transcript of the C.H. interview was provided to the State. The next morning the State argued that use of the transcript should be precluded because the late delivery of the transcript was a discovery violation. In addition, the State asserted prejudice as a result of the late delivery, arguing that had the transcript been timely produced, the State's direct examination of C.H. would have changed. The district court ruled that the transcript of C.H.'s interview with Adams and Knight was excluded under the best evidence rule and not admissible unless both parties stipulated to it in advance. The court also restricted the use of the transcript because it was neither a sworn statement nor an accurate transcription. After C.H.'s testimony, defense counsel made a motion to use the tape recording of C.H.'s interview during its cross-examination of Sergeant Adams. Defense counsel sought to use the tape to impeach C.H.'s trial testimony. The State objected on the ground that the tape was an hour long and would not be proper impeachment of the few specific statements Graham thought were material. The district court told defense counsel to first allow the officer to recall the relevant events based on his notes, and then we'll see where we go. During cross-examination, Adams could not recall a statement from the interview and said that reviewing the tape might help his memory. Defense counsel attempted to introduce the tape, and the State objected. The court upheld the State's objection and excluded use of the tape. Turning first to the question of whether defense counsel should have been permitted to ask questions based on the content of the summaries prepared by the officers, we conclude that the district court erred in sustaining the State's objection. It does not appear from the record that defense counsel was attempting to introduce the statement as extrinsic evidence. Accordingly, defense counsel's examination was proper. See Stofflet, 281 N.W.2d at 497; Hyde, 134 Minn. at 168-69, 158 N.W. at 921; see also Saget, 991 F.2d at 710. But the district court's error in excluding the testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Examination of the record reveals that the summaries defense counsel was precluded from using contain few or none of the impeachment points Graham characterizes as essential to his defense. We next consider the district court's decision to exclude the use of the transcript and tape of C.H.'s interview with Sergeants Adams and Knight. C.H. was an eyewitness to the crime. Defense counsel identified several statements from C.H.'s taped interview that counsel was not able to elicit without access to the tape or transcript. These statements included C.H.'s (1) inconsistency on whether he had seen the assailants around the neighborhood; (2) inconsistency on the skin tone of the taller assailant; (3) denial that during his police interview he stated that the shooter was not in the line-up shown to him by Adams and Knight; and (4) statement during the same interview that Roderick M. was not in the house during the robbery. Because C.H. was an eyewitness to the robbery and shooting, his testimony was central to the State's case. Therefore, defense counsel should have been able to introduce inconsistent statements made during his police interview with Sergeants Adams and Knight. Ideally, a transcript of C.H.'s interview should have been prepared by the State, or, alternatively, the transcript made by defense counsel should have been provided to the State for verification, or the district court should have either ordered the State to verify the relevant parts of the transcript or permitted introduction of the tape. But, even if the district court's erroneous exclusion of defense evidence rose to the level of a constitutional violation, we conclude that any error by the district court in precluding both the tape and the transcript was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because there was no reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been different if the evidence had been admitted. Post, 512 N.W.2d at 102. The State presented several other witnesses who identified Graham as the assailant who shot Furcron, and the State produced physical and forensic evidence tying Graham to the area of the crime. Further, defense counsel was able to ask about most of the impeachment facts raised in this appeal, and was limited only in producing extrinsic evidence of the interview. Given the strength of the State's case and the significant corroborating testimony, we hold that there is no reasonable possibility the jury's verdict would have been different had the evidence been admitted.