Opinion ID: 2683906
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Decision to Testify

Text: ¶24 A defendant has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, including whether to testify on his or her own behalf. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). He or she retains this right no matter how unwise such a decision. Ortega v. O'Leary, 843 F.2d 258, 261 (7th Cir. 1988).6 This means that a circuit court cannot refuse to allow a defendant to testify solely because the court wishes to protect the defendant from himself or herself. Quarels v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 73, 79 (Ky. 2004); State v. Rivera, 741 S.E.2d 694, 703 (S.C. 2013). It also means that a circuit court must refrain from unduly influencing a defendant's decision. 6 See also Boyd v. United States, 586 A.2d 670, 673-74 (D.C. 1991) (quoting People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504, 513 (Colo. 1984)) (further citation omitted). (The wisdom or unwisdom of the defendant's choice does not diminish his right to make it.). 8 No. 2012AP2140-CR ¶25 We have addressed this latter concern in the context of deciding whether to require circuit courts to engage in a colloquy to determine if a defendant is validly waiving the right to testify, or to refrain from doing so. First, in Weed, we noted valid concerns about influencing a decision that rests with the defendant. Weed, 263 Wis. 2d 434, ¶41. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit succinctly summarized those concerns as follows: To require the trial court to follow a special procedure, explicitly telling defendant about, and securing an explicit waiver of, a privilege to testify . . . could inappropriately influence the defendant to waive his constitutional right not to testify, thus threatening the exercise of this other, converse, constitutionally explicit, and more fragile right. Siciliano v. Vose, 834 F.2d 29, 30 (1st Cir. 1987). Notwithstanding these concerns, we decided to require a colloquy, as a simple and straightforward exchange would not sway a defendant. Weed, 263 Wis. 2d 434, ¶41. In a later decision, however, we declined to require circuit courts to engage in a similar colloquy for a defendant's decision not to testify because inquiry into whether the defendant is aware of his or her corollary right not to testify runs a real risk of interfering with defense strategy and inadvertently suggesting to the defendant that the court disapproves of his or her decision to testify. State v. Denson, 2011 WI 70, ¶65, 335 Wis. 2d 681, 799 N.W.2d 831. ¶26 Our decision in Weed strikes a balance between ensuring that a defendant makes a knowing, intelligent, and 9 No. 2012AP2140-CR voluntary decision about whether to testify and avoiding inappropriately influencing that decision. Our later decision in Denson illustrates that improperly influencing a decision that belongs to the defendant remains a source of concern. Therefore, we note that by going beyond the limited colloquy in Weed, for instance by inquiring into the advisability and the risk of taking the stand, a circuit court risks going too far. Arthur v. United States, 986 A.2d 398, 407 (D.C. 2009). ¶27 We do not decide, however, whether the circuit court erred in this case. The State does not dispute that the circuit court erred.7 Therefore, we assume, without deciding, that error occurred, and analyze only whether that assumed error should result in a new trial.