Opinion ID: 529326
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Law enforcement officer's duty.

Text: 10 The government contends that the FTCA, in abrogating sovereign immunity where a private individual would be liable under like circumstances, precludes us from considering whether Texas recognizes some duty on the part of law enforcement officers. By contrast in Louie v. United States, 776 F.2d 819, 825 (9th Cir.1985), a case closely analogous to this one, the government prevailed in its assertion that 11 Reference to Washington law, setting forth the liability of state and municipal entities to establish the government's standard of liability under the FTCA, is both necessary and proper. Id. 12 Under the special circumstances involved, we think the government got it right in Louie. We are not looking to state law insofar as it immunizes a public entity from liability; rather, we are seeking like circumstances which best articulate a state's negligence law. 13 Mr. Louie's widow filed suit under the FTCA because her husband died in a collision with a drunken off-duty soldier. She alleged that the military police, who fetched the soldier back to Fort Lewis after his off-post citation for driving while intoxicated, should have kept him in custody until he became sober. They did not do so, and the fatal accident occurred a few hours later. 14 The Ninth Circuit first addressed whether Washington's law of municipal corporations or of a private special relationship was the proper vehicle for assessing FTCA liability. The court conducted its analysis under both lines of authority, but it concluded that municipal liability principles were controlling. The court reasoned: 15 The circumstances here involve government employees in a law enforcement function. Questions as to the power and authority to arrest, to maintain custody, and to lawfully restrict a person's liberty are unique to the law enforcement function. Because private persons do not wield such police powers, the inquiry into the government's liability in this situation must include an examination of the liability of state and municipal entities under like circumstances. 16 Louie v. United States, 776 F.2d 819, 825 (9th Cir.1985). This interpretation of like circumstances seems compelling. We must disregard state rules of sovereign or official immunity in analyzing the scope of FTCA liability, because these conflict with Congress's analogy to private person liability under Sec. 2674. See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 164, 83 S.Ct. 1850, 1859, 10 L.Ed.2d 805, 816 (1963); Wright v. United States, 719 F.2d 1032, 1034-35 (9th Cir.1983). Similarly, the performance of a uniquely governmental function has repeatedly been rejected as a defense to FTCA liability. Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319, 77 S.Ct. 374, 376, 1 L.Ed.2d 354, 358 (1957); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64, 76 S.Ct. 122, 124, 100 L.Ed. 48, 53 (1955); B & F Trawlers, Inc. v. United States, 841 F.2d 626, 630-31 (5th Cir.1988). These rules should not, however, require us to ignore a state's law enunciating negligence principles based on like circumstances without regard to local sovereign immunity. In Louie, Washington State had waived sovereign immunity, and the court went on to find that employees of political subdivisions there owe no duty to a given member of the public such as Mr. Louie. 17 Texas courts have twice considered on the merits, irrespective of official or sovereign immunity claims, whether a police officer has any tort duty to protect the public from acts of a criminal suspect. 2 Each time, the court declined to impose any such duty. Dent v. City of Dallas, 729 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Munoz v. Cameron County, 725 S.W.2d 319, 321-22 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1986, no writ). 18 In Dent, the statutory beneficiaries of an innocent motorist killed in a collision with a suspect trying to evade police sought to recover from the officer who had failed to arrest the suspect promptly and from the officer's employer, the City of Dallas. The court observed that [w]hether a police officer owes a special duty to one injured or killed by a person whom the officer had probable cause to arrest, but either elected not to do so or made an inadequate attempt to arrest, is a question of first impression in this state. Dent, 729 S.W.2d at 116. Other states, however, have uniformly held that the officer's duty is a duty to the public at large to enforce the criminal law and that the officer owes no special duty to the individual injured. Id. Following this public duty rationale, the court concluded that the officer had breached no actionable duty to the deceased. The court's decision rejected a finding of duty in broad terms: 19 Appellants are seeking to hold the City of Dallas and one of its police officers liable for the officer's discretionary decisions as to if, how, and when to arrest a person suspected of attempting to pass a forged prescription. If we were to uphold the finding of liability on the part of Officer Reed for his actions, then, to avoid liability, police officers would have to arrest all persons stopped by them for whatever reason (be it jaywalking, expired license tags, etc.) lest these persons attempt escape and cause injury to somebody during their flight from justice. Sound jurisprudence as well as the public interest could not tolerate such a holding. 20 Dent, 729 S.W.2d at 116. 21 Similarly, in Munoz, the plaintiffs sought to recover for the alleged negligence of a county sheriff in failing to promptly execute an arrest warrant on the plaintiffs' father, who subsequently shot and killed their mother. In concluding that the sheriff owed the plaintiffs no actionable duty, the court followed the public duty rationale, holding that while a sheriff does owe a duty to execute arrest warrants, that duty is owed to the public at large, not to any individual plaintiff. Munoz, 725 S.W.2d at 321-22. 22 Absent a strong indication that the Texas Supreme Court would decide the case differently, decisions of the Texas courts of appeals are controlling on questions of state law in this court. Mott v. Mitsubishi International Corp., 636 F.2d 1073, 1074 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981). Thus, under existing Texas law a police officer owes no duty to a specific plaintiff to arrest a suspect. 3 23