Opinion ID: 1834101
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The 1989 conviction.

Text: Two Eagle claims his 1989 attorney was deficient in failing to search the record of his prior conviction for errors. He asserts he asked the attorney if there was any way to make it [the 1987 conviction] go away. He asserts counsel's allegedly deficient investigation negated the voluntary and knowing nature of his plea of guilty. Two Eagle claims that searching records for prior convictions for statutory deficiencies is a routine and ministerial act. We agree that an attorney must make reasonable investigations or make reasonable decisions to forgo particular investigations. Application of Deserly, 507 N.W.2d 905, 907 (S.D.1993) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695). The reasonableness of counsel's actions, however must be examined in light of the presumption of regularity that attaches to final judgments which are attacked in collateral proceedings. Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. ___, ___, 113 S.Ct. 517, 523, 121 L.Ed.2d 391, 404 (1992). Further, a court must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695. Therefore, we must determine whether counsel's decision not to investigate Two Eagle's prior conviction was reasonable considering all the circumstances. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694. There is no clear standard to determine how deeply counsel is required to investigate into a defendant's criminal background and prior convictions. Petrilli, 491 N.W.2d at 85 (finding no prejudice resulted from counsel's failure to order the record of eight-year-old California conviction); cf. State v. Pitsch, 124 Wis.2d 628, 369 N.W.2d 711 (1985) (finding failure to obtain record listing defendant's prior convictions was error). Here, routine investigation would have revealed that Two Eagle had been represented by counsel in the prior proceeding, had plea bargained several charges down to one count of assault and a DWI, that there had been no direct appeal, and that Two Eagle had served out his sentence. In short, there was nothing to signal counsel there might be some infirmity in the prior conviction. Under the circumstances, counsel's lack of deeper investigation was not error so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. Additionally, Two Eagle has demonstrated no prejudice from any allegedly deficient performance. First, his prior conviction was never used to enhance his 1989 sentence. Second, counsel plea bargained a possible life sentence down to twelve years, half the possible sentence for the single robbery count Two Eagle pleaded guilty to. Further, even if the former conviction had been overturned, under South Dakota law the trial court would have examined Two Eagle's behavior and criminal history in determining his sentence. When determining a fitting sentence, the sentencing court should `acquire a thorough acquaintance with the character and history of the man before it.' State v. Pack, 516 N.W.2d 665, 667-68 (S.D.1994) (quoting State v. Carsten, 264 N.W.2d 707, 709 (S.D.1978)). In other words, a conviction `counts' unless reversed or otherwise held invalid prior to the sentencing  but even if a judgment does not count as a conviction, the sentencing court is free to consider the conduct that led to the conviction. Cuppett v. Duckworth, 8 F.3d 1132, 1146 (7th Cir.1993) (emphasis in original) citing United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 92 S.Ct. 589, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1226, 127 L.Ed.2d 571 (1994). Two Eagle did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel in his 1989 conviction. The trial court's order quashing the writ of habeas corpus is affirmed. WUEST, SABERS and AMUNDSON, JJ., and HENDERSON, Retired Justice, concur. KONENKAMP, J., not having been a member of the Court at the time this matter was submitted to the Court did not participate.