Opinion ID: 153245
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Title VII and EPA claims.

Text: 15 To establish a prima facie case of unlawful wage discrimination under Title VII and the EPA, Ryan offered her testimony that she was satisfactorily performing her work, and that Equity paid more for the same (or lesser) work when it was performed by males in similar conditions and circumstances. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n. 13 (1973); see also Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974); Nulf v. International Paper Co., 656 F.2d 553, 560 (10th Cir.1981) (noting that equal pay for equal work concept applies to Title VII in the same way it applies to the EPA). 16 In making its motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50, Equity relied on the testimony of an Equity administrator whom Ryan called as her first witness. Asserting that the raises and salary decisions were based on merit and performance, the administrator also testified regarding the salaries of other comparable female branch managers. In its order, the district court found that Ryan had presented no evidence to dispute the credibility of that justification, and that, moreover, Equity's treatment of other women indicated that there was no pattern ... that salaries or raises were based on ... gender. Appellant's Br., Ex. A at 5. 17 We agree with the district court. Ryan presented no evidence to create a jury question in light of the clearly established fact that the highest paid member of the new group of branch managers was a woman. Nonetheless, Ryan disputes the validity of this fact, arguing as her second claim of error that any consideration of such data impermissibly converts her case into a disparate impact claim, when, in fact, her claim is one of disparate treatment. 5 18 It is well settled that in a Title VII suit, an employer's general practices are relevant even when a plaintiff is asserting an individual claim for disparate treatment. Gomez v. Martin Marietta Corp., 50 F.3d 1511, 1520 (10th Cir.1995). Thus, isolated incidents or random comparisons demonstrating disparities in treatment may be insufficient to draw [an] inference of discrimination without additional evidence that the alleged phenomenon of inequality also exists with respect to the entire relevant group of employees. Houck v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 10 F.3d 204, 206 (4th Cir.1993) (requiring a showing of disparity across the relevant group even at the level of the prima facie case). 19 Although Equity presented a facially nondiscriminatory reason for its actions and thereby dispelled the presumption arising from Ryan's prima facie case, in effect, Ryan seeks to equate her prima facie case with the elements required to create a jury question. However, to go to the jury on her Title VII claim, Ryan was required to produce evidence of pretext from which the fact finder could infer the requisite unlawful motive. Likewise, although proof of intentional gender discrimination is not required under the EPA, see Brownlee v. Gay & Taylor, Inc., 861 F.2d 1222, 1224 (10th Cir.1988), Ryan was still required to present more than a scintilla of contrary evidence in response to Equity's showing that its decisions were not gender based. This she failed to do. Accordingly, all the inferences point one way, and the district court correctly granted judgment on the law in Equity's favor. 20