Opinion ID: 172566
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Renewed Severance Motion

Text: Mr. Pursley and Mr. Wardell filed a renewed motion to sever one working day before trial. The renewed motion provided declarations from Mr. Templeman and Mr. Shields stating that: (1) they would testify if Mr. Pursley's trial was severed from their trial but would not testify in a joint trial; (2) they did not conspire with Mr. Wardell or Mr. Pursley; and (3) they were never instruct[ed] by Mr. Wardell or Mr. Pursley to physically assault Jess [i]e Cluff. R., Vol. II, Doc. 316, at 5, 6 (Pursley and Wardell's Renewed Mot. to Sever, filed Dec. 2, 2005). We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Pursley's renewed motion to sever, despite the presence of his coconspirators' declarations. Again, we believe that the district court properly applied the McConnell factors. The district court aptly determined that the proposed testimony lacked the requisite substance to generate prejudice. R., Vol. II, Doc. 322, at 2 (Order Den. Pursley's and Wardell's Renewed Mot. to Sever, dated Dec. 5, 2005). The testimony consisted, in its entirety, of two statements. [7] We address the exculpatory substance vel non of each statement. The first statement simply memorialized a legal conclusion disavowing culpabilitythat neither coconspirator conspire[d] with Mr. Wardell or Mr. Pursley. R., Vol. II, Doc. 316, at 5, 6. Under our precedent, this conclusory assertion of innocence lacks the requisite exculpatory value to require severance. See United States v. Rogers, 925 F.2d 1285, 1287-88 (10th Cir.1991) (holding that codefendant's purported testimony that defendant did not sell cocaine or handle weapons at codefendant's apartment lacked substance because it amounted to little more than his assertion that [defendant] had no involvement in the charged crimes); McConnell, 749 F.2d at 1445-46 (noting that testimony akin to bald assertion of defendant's innocence lacks exculpatory value). The second statement offered little more. It provided a naked factual assertionthat neither Mr. Wardell nor Mr. Pursley verbally instruct[ed] Mr. Shields or Mr. Templeman to physically assault Mr. Cluff. R., Vol. II, Doc. No. 316, at 5, 6. This assertion is insufficient on its face to undercut the criminal liability of Mr. Pursley for either count of the indictment. It would not have contradicted the array of circumstantial evidence proving a conspiracy, i.e., (1) the existence of an implied agreement, and (2) that Mr. Pursley knowingly took other overt acts to further this agreement. [8] See United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1159 (10th Cir.2005) ([T]he jury may infer conspiracy from the defendants' conduct and other circumstantial evidence indicating coordination and concert of action.). And regardless of whether Mr. Pursley instructed the attack, Mr. Shields's undisputed assault of Mr. Cluff the conspiracy's most dramatic overt act made Mr. Pursley legally responsible both for the conspiracy and for the underlying § 1513(b)(1) offense. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 64, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997) (If conspirators have a plan which calls for some conspirators to perpetrate the crime and others to provide support, the supporters are as guilty as the perpetrators.); Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946) (noting that one conspirator's commission of substantive offense in furtherance of the conspiracy makes all coconspirators responsible for both crimes). Additionally, the district court acted within its discretion in concluding that the proposed statements would lack credibility at trial. Both Mr. Shields and Mr. Templeman were impeachable through their extensive criminal history. Indeed, both fell into the highest criminal-history category under the sentencing guidelines. See Hall, 473 F.3d at 1302 (affirming denial in part because exculpatory value would be effectively nullified by declarant's long list of prior convictions); McConnell, 749 F.2d at 1446 (same). Mr. Pursley does not deny the impeachability of Mr. Shields and Mr. Templeman. Instead, Mr. Pursley proclaims that they were no more impeachable than the only first-hand witnesses to the Government's case, Mr. Cluff and Mr. Hoskins, who also possessed extensive criminal histories. Aplt. Opening Br. at 23. Mr. Pursley's argument, however, is a red herring. While perhaps not per se irrelevant to the severance inquiry, the impeachability of the government's first-hand witnesses is of little moment on these facts. Initially, we note that the jury seemingly credited their testimony in convicting Mr. Pursley of the charged crimes and Mr. Pursley does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of his guilt. More significantly, the impeachability of these witnesses does not diminish the credibility problems with Mr. Shields's and Mr. Templeman's projected testimony. And the existence of those credibility problems is an important factor in the severance inquiry. The district court certainly was entitled to find that their testimony lacked credibility. Our seminal case, McConnell, makes clear that at least in most instances if a codefendant's proposed testimony lacks sufficient exculpatory content or would suffer from serious credibility problems at trial, severance is not required. There, the defendant filed a motion to sever his trial on various counts of fraud from that of his codefendant. McConnell, 749 F.2d at 1444. The defendant's motion was accompanied by an affidavit from his codefendant. Id. This affidavit expressed the codefendant's willingness to testify upon severance, denied that the defendant made misrepresentations to the allegedly defrauded investors, and asserted that the defendant gave consideration for money paid out of the investors' funds. Id. at 1444-46. The district court denied the motion to sever. Id. at 1446. We affirmed, concluding that the affidavit lacked substance. Id. We explained that it was little more illuminating than a simple assertion that McConnell was innocent. Id. We further reasoned that it failed to rebut other governmental allegations of criminal liability and that the value of the proposed testimony was undermined by the declarant's prior fraud convictions. Id. We have repeatedly ratified the lesson of McConnell. See, e.g., Hall, 473 F.3d at 1302 (affirming denial of severance motion in part because the government would impeach declarant with an extensive list of prior convictions); United States v. Powell, 982 F.2d 1422, 1433 (10th Cir.1992), (affirming denial of severance motion in part because codefendant's proposed testimony stating that neither he nor [defendant] had agreed to commit any crime would have been impeached by virtue of overwhelming evidence of defendant's involvement in marijuana distribution); Rogers, 925 F.2d at 1287-88 (affirming denial of severance motion in part because codefendant's proposed testimony concerning defendant's noninvolvement was contradicted by several witnesses and amounted to little more than a conclusory assertion of defendant's innocence). We perceive no meaningful distinction between Mr. Pursley's showing in support of severance and that found insufficient in McConnell. Similar to the affidavit at issue in McConnell, the declarations of Mr. Shields and Mr. Templeman lacked exculpatory content. Furthermore, as in McConnell, the district court was entitled to find that Mr. Shields's and Mr. Templeman's impeachability belied the credibility of their proposed testimony. Furthermore, administrative factors support the district court's decision. Mr. Pursley's severance motion was filed one business day prior to trial, and relied upon declarations that should have been submitted with Mr. Pursley's original motion, nearly two months earlier. Granting severance also would have thwarted principles of judicial economy. The district court would have been required, at a minimum, to conduct two four-day trials, rather than just one. Our jurisprudence would confirm the propriety of the district court's decision to deny severance based at least in part on these circumstances. See McConnell, 749 F.2d at 1446 (noting that any prejudice to the defendant from not being able to present this testimony in a severed trial was very small and greatly outweighed by the expense and administrative inconvenience of conducting two lengthy trials involving numerous witnesses rather than one consolidated trial). Accordingly, we discern no error in the district court's denial of Mr. Pursley's renewed severance motion.