Opinion ID: 2600380
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Unconstitutional Provisions Can Be Severed.

Text: Having decided that the OEI unconstitutionally infringes upon the speech rights of government officials and employees, and that it limits Alaskans' ability to participate fully in public life, we must next determine if the law can be saved by severing any unconstitutional provisions. After oral argument, and in light of our initial reservations about the constitutionality of the OEI's broad reach, we asked the parties to submit additional briefing on whether any potentially unconstitutional provisions of the OEI could be severed. [150] Our review of the parties' helpful briefing on severance has convinced us that the unconstitutional provision of the initiative  the first sentence of AS 44.12.320  may be severed from the remainder of the initiative and that the remainder should be preserved under the standards established by our precedents. A proper measure of respect for lawmaking by the people through the initiative process requires that only those portions of initiated laws that are unconstitutional should be struck down. We have previously held that striking the whole of an initiative rather than excising the invalid portion would place an unwarranted constriction on the rights of the people to express their will by popular vote. [151] This is especially true where, as in this case, the initiative contains a severability clause requiring that only offending portions be stricken and that the rest of the law be retained. [152] But severance, as distinct from striking down an initiative in its entirety, is only permissible when established standards are satisfied. In answering whether this is an appropriate case for severance, we first consider the various severance tests we have used in past cases and determine the proper standard for a statute that has been enacted through the initiative process. We then determine whether the initiative in this case, as redacted, meets those standards.
We originally established standards for determining whether a statute is severable in Lynden Transport, Inc. v. State. [153] In that case, we considered a statute that had been enacted by the legislature. [154] The Lynden Transport test asks (1) whether legal effect can be given to the severed statute and (2) if the legislature intended the provision to stand in the event other provisions were struck down. [155] But neither party in this case looks to Lynden Transport for the test for severance. ACL urges that we use the test articulated in McAlpine v. University of Alaska [156] and most recently applied in Alaska Action Center v. Municipality of Anchorage [157] in determining severability, and the Alakayak appellees assume its applicability. In those cases, we were faced with initiative proposals that had not yet been voted upon by the electorate. [158] The McAlpine test is substantially similar to the Lynden Transport test except in that it also requires us to look to the spirit of the measure. [159] We have never had the occasion to determine whether the standard applied in McAlpine and Alaska Action Center for the pre-election review of an initiative should also apply to an initiative after it has been approved by the voters. In other words, we have not decided which severability test to apply to enacted initiatives. We conclude that there is no compelling reason to apply a different severability analysis to statutes enacted by the people from those enacted by the legislature. Thus, there is no reason that McAlpine should apply to enacted initiatives. Whether a statute was enacted by vote of the legislature or vote of the people, the risk involved in severing a statute is that an erroneous judicial reading of the intent of those who enacted the statute will result in a statute that no one wanted. While this risk is real, it is not qualitatively different for a statute enacted by the legislature and one enacted by the voters. Thus, there is no need for a different test. [160] Several other states treat statutes the same for the purposes of severability regardless of the manner in which the statute was enacted. For example, the California Supreme Court has stated that, in matters of severability, we can discern no meaningful distinctions between statutes `enacted' by the people and statutes enacted by the Legislature. [161] Likewise the Washington Supreme Court has stated that it interpret[s] initiatives based on the same rules of construction we apply to statutes passed by the legislature. [162] For these reasons, we conclude that the proper test to apply in determining severability of the EOI is that set out in Lynden Transport. We turn now to application of that test.

At the outset it is important to note the consequences of the voters' approval of the severability clause in the initiative, AS 44.12.390. [163] The severability clause places on those challenging the statute the burden of showing that the Lynden Transport test is not satisfied by a redaction. [164] In Lynden Transport we adopted with approval the following language of the United States Supreme Court: In the absence of [a severability clause], the presumption is that the Legislature intends an act to be effective as an entirety  that is to say, the rule is against the mutilation of a statute; and if any provision be unconstitutional, the presumption is that the remaining provisions fall with it. The effect of the [severability clause] is to reverse this presumption in favor of inseparability, and create the opposite one of separability. [In the absence of a severability clause], the burden is upon the supporter of the legislation to show the separability of the provisions involved. [In the presence of a severability clause], the burden is shifted to the assailant to show their inseparability.... [With a severability clause], the presumption must be overcome by considerations which establish the clear probability that the invalid part being eliminated the Legislature would not have been satisfied with what remains. [ [165] ] The emphasis was added by the Lynden court. We applied this rule in Kenai Peninsula Borough School District v. Kenai Peninsula Borough School District Classified Association, [166] where we held that the opponents to a school board collective bargaining ordinance had not shown that the school board would not have enacted the constitutional portions, had it known that two restrictions would be found unconstitutional. [167] One justice disagreed with this conclusion but nonetheless agreed with the placement and expression of the burden under a statutory severability clause, concluding that the record establishes the `clear probability' that the board `would not have been satisfied'. ... [168] Thus, our analysis begins with the understanding that the burden is on the challengers to show that the voters did not intend the remaining provisions to be given effect.
The first part of the Lynden Transport test for severability, determining whether legal effect can be given to the remaining provisions of the statute, [169] requires us to examine whether the severed statute requires action or if it is merely a statement of public policy. [170] This is a relatively low threshold test that merely requires an enforceable command to implement the law. [171] So, for instance, a statute reduced to the statement that English is the official language of the State of Alaska could not be given legal effect because it would be only a statement of public policy. On the other hand, a statute that required the use of English in all official public documents and records could be given legal effect since it would require action by government officials and employees. As noted above the OEI must be redacted by severing the first sentence of AS 44.12.320. [172] Thus limited, it would still require that English be used in the preparation of all official public documents and records, including all documents officially compiled, published or recorded by the government. [173] This mandate is consistent with the OEI's purpose of promoting English as the common unifying language of Alaskans. Moreover, it would require action on the part of the legislative and executive branches of the State of Alaska and all political subdivisions, [174] and it could be enforced through a private right of action. [175] Contrary to the suggestion of the dissent, this court does not hold that severance is justified because the ... second sentence of section .320 ... still serves a useful purpose. [176] Rather, the redacted section imposes a substantial obligation on the part of state and local governments, and it reflects the complete scheme that several states have enacted to accomplish their purposes. [177] The first part of the Lynden Transport test  if, standing alone, legal effect can be given to the provisions that remain after severance of an invalid provision [178]  is clearly met here. [179]
The second part of the Lynden Transport severability test asks whether the voters intended the provision to stand in the event that portions of it were struck down. [180] As we noted in Sonneman v. Hickel , [t]he key question is whether the portion remaining, once the offending portion of the statute is severed, is independent and complete in itself so that it may be presumed that the [voters] would have enacted the valid parts without the invalid part. [181] We answer this question in the affirmative. First, as discussed above, the initiative contains a severability section: The provisions of [the act] are independent and severable, and if any provision ... shall be held to be invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction, the remainder ... shall not be affected and shall be given effect to the fullest extent practicable. [182] In other words, the voters have told us that they did intend the remaining provision to stand in the event that portions of the initiative were struck. [183] We dealt with a similar provision in State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, [184] where in reference to a severability clause built into a campaign financing reform act we stated: The Act contains a severability clause. Its inclusion indicates that the legislature intended the remainder of the Act to stand if part of it were invalidated.  [185] This conclusion is buoyed by our analysis of the overarching purposes of the initiative: unification of our diverse state. In attempting to make English the official language of the state of Alaska, the initiative proceeds on the assumption that a common language is thought to exert a unifying force. As the statement in support noted: Like our flag, the pledge of allegiance, and our national anthem, English as our official language is our symbol. These symbols remind Americans and Alaskans of every race, religion, and background of what we all have in common. The initiative, as redacted, continues to reflect the voters' belief in the unifying force of a common language and their intent that provisions establishing a common language be upheld to the fullest extent practicable. [186] Moreover, the voters had the benefit of the sponsors' statement in the election pamphlet, and it is clear that the sponsors of the initiative  who drafted the severability clause  favored preservation of the constitutional provisions of the initiative. Alaskans for a Common Language has filed a supplemental brief so indicating: To the extent this court may now conclude that certain provisions, such as the first sentence of AS 41[44].12.320, might otherwise give rise to an unintended unconstitutional application of the act, ACL respectfully submits that both the Initiative itself and this Court's precedents require that any such provision should be severed. Such severance, rather than invalidation of the act, would give effect to the meaning of the Initiative as set forth in the Act and its stated purposes as adopted by the voters. The intent and desire of the sponsors is therefore clear. And apart from the voters' indication of intent in the severability clause, we do know that the initiative was well received. It passed with the approval of more than sixty-eight percent of the voters. It is difficult to construct an argument as to why a version of the initiative shorn of the unconstitutional provisions but still establishing English as the official language of the state and requiring that English be used in all official documents and records would be any less favorably received. The opponents of the initiative before this court have not attempted to make a case as to why this might be so. They have thus failed to meet their burden of showing, by a clear probability, that the voters would not have supported the initiative as redacted. We conclude that the initiative is severable, because (1) the remaining provisions can be given legal effect and (2) the voters intended that they be given effect. The requirement that the government use English in official documents can be given legal effect and is enforceable. Indeed, as noted, many official English acts in other states are limited to similar provisions. [187] The initiative's challengers have not met their burden of showing the clear probability that severance was not intended by the voters. [188] The presumption in favor of severability leads us to conclude that the voters intended that, if a court were to strike the first sentence of AS 44.12.320, the second sentence of that section should stand.