Opinion ID: 2633651
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Asserted erroneous admission of evidence

Text: Over defendant's objection that the evidence was irrelevant and collateral, and impermissibly demonstrated propensity under section 1101 of the Evidence Code, the trial court admitted rebuttal evidence regarding defendant's brief termination from the sheriff's department in 1983 as a result of a complaint made by a prostitute. The prosecutor argued the evidence showed defendant had a motive to kill Clark  to keep her from reporting him, an act that could result in his termination  and thus rebutted defense testimony suggesting defendant killed Clark in an emotional state brought on by her taunts. Lieutenant Paul Kent testified that in February 1983, while serving as a sergeant in the internal affairs division of the Kern County Sheriff's Department, he investigated a complaint against defendant made by a prostitute named Ellen Martinez. As a result of the investigation, defendant was terminated from the department, but he appealed and was reinstated. Investigator Hodgson read into the record a portion of the transcript of the police interview of defendant conducted after his arrest for the Clark homicide. In response to a question concerning the Martinez incident, defendant stated: There for awhile I was real pissed at her, but you know, I got to a point where I  I just  I never believed a whore . . . [¶] . . . That hearing just  it just changed my outlook, I guess. Defendant felt done wrong by Martinez. Clark did not remind him of Martinez, except that she's a whore. Defendant contends the evidence of his firing and reinstatement and of the comments he made about those events was inadmissible under subdivision (a) of section 1101 of the Evidence Code, because its sole purpose was to show his propensity to abuse prostitutes, and that in any event it should have been excluded as more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352. He asserts the admission of the evidence violated both state law and his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, warranting reversal of his convictions for the murders of Clark and Benintende. The trial court found the evidence admissible under section 1101 of the Evidence Code. We find no error in the trial court's ruling. Section 1101 declares that evidence of a person's character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion. (Evid.Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) But [n]othing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident . . .) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b); see also People v. Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 145-146, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357.) We review for abuse of discretion a trial court's ruling under section 1101. ( People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 705, 27 Cal. Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289.) Here, the trial court admitted the evidence of defendant's firing and reinstatement and his comments about those events on the theory that it was relevant to defendant's motive in killing Clark. We agree. The evidence tended to show defendant had a reason to fear the consequences of any report Clark might make. It thus was relevant to motive, and therefore inferentially relevant to the disputed issues of intent, premeditation, and deliberation. (See People v. Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 707, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289 [evidence of motive makes the crime understandable and renders the inferences regarding intent more reasonable]; see also People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 167-171, 246 Cal.Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629.) Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in ruling that the evidence was admissible under Evidence Code section 352 because it was not more prejudicial than probative. The evidence was probative of motive, and had no prejudicial effect. At the guilt phase, the jury heard only that defendant had been briefly terminated, and then rehired, as a result of Martinez's complaint. The jury did not hear the details of the complaint until the penalty phase. Because defendant was reinstated, the jury heard no evidence suggesting that Martinez's charges were true. Defendant contends his own statements during police interrogation  for example, that after the Martinez ordeal he never believed a whore and that the incident changed [his] outlook  implied he was hostile to prostitutes and therefore the admission of these statements was highly prejudicial. We disagree. Evidence is prejudicial within the meaning of Evidence Code section 352 if it encourages the jury to prejudge defendant's case based upon extraneous or irrelevant considerations. (See People v. Zapien, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 958, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704.) The evidence here did not do so. Rather, defendant's comments suggesting he believed all prostitutes were liars and were not to be trusted raised a permissible inference that he feared a report by Clark would be overblown. Relying on People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 205 Cal.Rptr. 775, 685 P.2d 1126, defendant argues the evidence was inadmissible because his motive for killing Clark  to prevent her from turning him in  was obvious, and because the evidence was cumulative of much more direct evidence of motive: defendant's statements to the authorities that he killed Clark because he feared she would report him. In Alcala, the defendant was convicted of kidnapping and killing a young girl. We held evidence of prior crimes against young girls inadmissible to prove the defendant's motive. We noted: Common sense indicates that one who commits a felony upon another wishes to avoid its detection. That may lead to the calculated murder of his victim. ( People v. Alcala, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 634, 205 Cal.Rptr. 775, 685 P.2d 1126.) We then rejected the prosecution's proffered theory that the prior-crimes evidence was admissible to establish a motive to eliminate the victim as a witness because those crimes might result in more severe punishment for the current offense. We concluded that if evidence of past offenses were admissible on that basis, one's criminal past could always be introduced against him when he was accused of premeditated murder in the course of a subsequent offense. The accused's mere status as an ex-criminal would place him under an evidentiary disability not shared by first offenders. The prejudicial effect of the prior-crimes revelations would vastly outweigh their slight and speculative probative value. ( Id. at p. 635, 205 Cal.Rptr. 775, 685 P.2d 1126.) We thus concluded that because the issue of witness elimination was before the jury in any event[,] speculation that defendant was also worried about the implications of his past criminal record is remote and cumulative. ( Ibid. ) Alcala does not govern here. As the discussion above makes clear, in Alcala we were concerned with the implications of allowing admission of evidence of past crimes for the sole purpose of showing the defendant feared punishment as a repeat offender. We reasoned such a policy would be unfair to repeat offenders because the highly prejudicial nature of prior-crimes evidence would make it difficult for such offenders to receive a fair trial, whereas the probative value of the evidence was slight. Here, the evidence of defendant's firing and reinstatement did not suggest defendant was involved in any criminal activity; thus Alcala's concerns about the highly prejudicial nature of prior-crimes evidence are not implicated. Nor was the evidence offered here for the impermissible and speculative purpose of suggesting defendant was worried about the implications of his past criminal record. Rather, it was offered for the specific purpose of showing defendant feared what would happen to him if Clark were allowed to report him (even if, as he claimed in his statement to the authorities, he initially shot her accidentally). As such, the evidence was highly probative. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of defendant's firing and reinstatement, as well as his taped comments. Defendant finally contends he was prejudiced because the trial court gave no instruction limiting, to proper purposes, the jury's use of the evidence of his firing and reinstatement and his taped comments. [14] A trial court generally is not obligated to provide such an instruction on its own motion. ( People v. Collie, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 64, 177 Cal.Rptr. 458, 634 P.2d 534; People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 411, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442.) As noted above, we have recognized a narrow exception to this rule in the occasional extraordinary case in which unprotested evidence of past offenses is a dominant part of the evidence against the accused, and is both highly prejudicial and minimally relevant to any legitimate purpose. ( People v. Collie, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 64, 177 Cal.Rptr. 458, 634 P.2d 534; see also People v. Milner, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 251-252, 246 Cal.Rptr. 713, 753 P.2d 669.) This exception was inapplicable here. As explained, the evidence did not establish any past offense and was not prejudicial. The trial court was not required to instruct sua sporte on the limited admissibility of the evidence.