Opinion ID: 844163
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: First degree murder counts

Text: Defendant contends that the evidence at trial demonstrated that he killed Brens, Davis, Hill, and White as a result of an “unconsidered or rash impulse” rather than with the premeditation and deliberation required for first degree murder. (See §§ 187, subd. (a), 189.) “In the context of first degree murder, „ “premeditated” means “considered beforehand,” and “deliberate” means “formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course of action.” [Citation.]‟ [Citation.] „The process of premeditation and deliberation does not require any extended period of time. “The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly . . . .” [Citations.]‟ [Citation.] „In [People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15], we “identified three categories of evidence relevant to resolving the issue of premeditation and deliberation: planning activity, motive, and manner of killing.” [Citation.] However, these factors are not exclusive, nor are they invariably determinative. [Citation.] “ „Anderson was simply intended to guide an appellate court‟s assessment whether the evidence supports an inference that the killing occurred as the result of preexisting reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse.‟ ” ‟ ” (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 636 (Lee).) The evidence here supports each of the identified factors. The prosecutor presented overwhelming evidence of planning. Defendant reconnoitered the school and created a diagram of the school entitled “Mission Profile.” He studied law enforcement tactics. He wrote a “goodbye” letter to his family telling them they should not blame themselves for his actions. He purchased the necessary supplies before heading to the school. And he brought two different loaded firearms, including the .22-caliber rifle whose stock he had sawed off the night before, and spare 33 ammunition to the school. This evidence indicated that he had considered the possibility of not only a violent encounter but an encounter involving multiple targets. Similarly, the prosecutor presented ample evidence of defendant‟s motive. Defendant told the hostages and law enforcement personnel that Brens had ruined his life by flunking him. Defendant blamed the school system for allowing this to happen and wanted to “make a point” to ensure it did not happen again. Although defendant appeared to have harbored no personal animosity toward Davis, Hill, and White, a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded he believed that killing students would draw attention to himself and his plight, or that they were simply innocent targets of his misdirected anger. The prosecutor‟s evidence also showed that defendant‟s demeanor during the killings appeared to be controlled. For example, Kaze described him, in the midst of the carnage, as having “a slight smile on his face and a spring to his step.” This evidence supports the conclusion that defendant‟s actions were the result of preexisting thought and reflection rather than an unconsidered rash impulse. Defendant nonetheless contends that the evidence showed that he planned only to kill himself at the school but then changed his mind at the last instant and decided instead to shoot off his firearms or perhaps wound people or take hostages in an effort to get attention. While such a scenario might be possible, we presume in support of the verdict the existence of every fact that can be reasonably inferred from the evidence. Given the extensive evidence of defendant‟s preparations for his assault, a reasonable trier of fact could have found defendant guilty of four counts of first degree murder on a premeditation and deliberation theory. To the extent defendant contends that the “the quality and quantum of proof distinguishing deliberate premeditated murder from second degree murder” is “undefined and undecipherable,” we disagree. Killing resulting from preexisting reflection is readily distinguishable from a killing based on an unconsidered or rash impulse (People v. 34 Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 812-813), and the evidence in this case allowed a reasonable trier of fact to find the former beyond a reasonable doubt.