Opinion ID: 1659386
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: effect of stipulation and dismissal order on affirmative defenses

Text: ¶ 46. Next, VanCleve argues that the City's failure to object to the Stipulation and Order of Dismissal, thereby dismissing its cross-claims, waived its assertion that it was not primarily liable under this action. [13] ¶ 47. We disagree. The failure to object to the Stipulation and Order of Dismissal is not a waiver of affirmative defenses, since it does not resolve any of the claims between VanCleve and the City. This is supported by the fact that the Stipulation and Order failed to mention any affirmative defense. Additionally, VanCleve neglects to cite authority, and we have uncovered none, that supports the contention that in dismissing the cross-claim against Keller, the City waived its affirmative defense under Wis. Stat. § 81.17. (Def.-Appellant Br. at 16). ¶ 48. The City's cross-claim for contribution and its affirmative defenses are two distinct parts of the pleadings according to Wis. Stat. § 802.01(1). We have previously held that a writing must contain an express statement waiving a statutory affirmative defense before a court should find waiver. Gonzalez v. City of Franklin, 137 Wis. 2d 109, 132-133, 403 N.W.2d 747, 756 (1987). Here, the City simply acquiesced in the dismissal, consistent with our decisions in Johnson and Pierringer, which stated that no objection could be raised, and that dismissal of the released defendant was required. Additionally, the City's cross-claim against Keller was a standard cross-claim for indemnification and contribution. Therefore, because the failure to object to the Stipulation and Order of Dismissal did not resolve any of the claims between VanCleve and the City, there was no waiver of an affirmative defense. ¶ 49. Ultimately, the City's ability to object to Keller's dismissal was eliminated when a Pierringer release had been signed by VanCleve releasing Keller. Johnson, 73 Wis. 2d at 296-297; Pierringer, 21 Wis. 2d 182. As a result, we hold that the City did not waive its assertion that it was not primarily liable, when it failed to object to the Stipulation and Order of Dismissal.