Opinion ID: 2159212
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prosecutorial Misconduct: Penalty Phase Summation

Text: Defendant claims that prosecutorial misconduct occurred during the penalty phase summation. In defendant's view, the prosecutor's remarks in summation infected the deliberations with inappropriate considerations regarding the victim and with the prosecutor's personal beliefs about the case. Defendant argues that by telling the jury that this part of the trial ... is when we think of the victim and that [t]his is how I want to know Amie Hoffman, a cheerleader, someone who had a life, who had a future, the prosecutor improperly shifted the focus of deliberations from the background and record of the accused and the particular circumstances of the crime to the character of the victim. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed. 2d 440 (1987) (Maryland statute that provided that Victim Impact Statement be introduced at sentencing phase of capital cases held violative of eighth amendment because it focused on personal characteristics of victim and effect of murder on victim's family, rather than on defendant). Defendant also claims that when the prosecutor remarked to the jury that if this isn't the right [circumstance in which to vote for death], I don't know if there is one, he impermissibly injected his personal beliefs into the deliberations. This was particularly improper, defendant argues, because there was nothing in the record that would allow jurors to compare this crime and this defendant with other crimes committed by other defendants. According to defendant, the jury was left to rely on the prosecutor's expertise or to believe the prosecutor was either exaggerating or fabricating. The Court cannot presume, defendant maintains, that any juror would believe the prosecutor was exaggerating or fabricating, and thus must find that these comments were prejudicial. See State v. Farrell, supra, 61 N.J. at 106; see also Darden v. Wainwright, supra, 477 U.S. 168, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed. 2d 144 (condemning summation in which prosecutor called defendant an animal and otherwise injected personal views); Tucker v. Zant, 724 F. 2d 882, 889 (11th Cir.1984). The State argues in response that the prosecutor's statements were reasonably inferrable from the evidence and were made in order to establish the requisite aggravating factors. However, the State argues that even if this Court finds some prosecutorial misconduct, reversal is not required. This is so, the State argues, because defendant's failure to object during the State's summation imposes on him the burden of proving plain error. In other words, the State would have defendant prove that the prosecutor's summation was clearly capable of producing an unjust result. State v. Hock, 54 N.J. 526, 528 (1969), cert. den., 399 U.S. 930, 90 S.Ct. 2254, 26 L.Ed. 2d 797 (1970). The dissent, on the other hand, argues that the alleged prosecutorial misconduct must be examined under the enhanced standard of review it has proposed. Post at 344. Application of this new standard to the current allegations of misconduct, the dissent contends, requires reversal of the death penalty. We do not agree. In the recent case of Darden v. Wainwright, supra, 477 U.S. 168, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed. 2d 144, the United States Supreme Court articulated a test for prosecutorial misconduct similar to the test that we articulated in State v. Bucanis, supra, 26 N.J. 45, namely, whether the prosecutor's comments `so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.' 477 U.S. at 169, 106 S.Ct. at 2466, 91 L.Ed. 2d at 157 (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed. 2d 431 (1974)). To warrant reversal under our own standard a prosecutor's statements in summation must substantially prejudice the defendant's fundamental right to have a jury fairly evaluate the merits of his defense. State v. Bucanis, supra, 26 N.J. at 56; accord State v. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 40; State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 322; see also State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 218 (1984) (While not condoning all aspects of the prosecutor's conduct, we conclude that, in the context of the entire trial, it did not cause defendant to be denied a fair trial); State v. Tirone, supra, 64 N.J. at 229 (In the context of the summation as a whole, we cannot say that the prosecutor's comments were so inflammatory as to deny defendant a fair trial). We do not find that the prosecutor's remarks in this case necessitate reversal under this standard.