Opinion ID: 2977297
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Well-Founded Fear of Persecution or Torture

Text: Antar argues that he is entitled to relief based upon the severity of his past persecution and therefore need not show a likelihood of future persecution. (Pet’r Br. at 31, citing Matter of Chen, 20 I&N Dec. 16 (BIA 1989)). Alternatively, Antar points to the testimony of Dr. Kamoo, who opined that Antar will suffer an extreme exacerbation of his mental health symptoms if he returns to Sierra Leone. (J.A. at 104.) Antar also proffered the affidavit of Dr. Jeremy Presholdt, a professor of African and World History at Northeastern University, who had recently returned from a two-week visit to Sierra Leone where he conducted onsite investigations in the capital city of Freetown and in the Bo, Kono and Kenema Districts. (Id. at 746.) Dr. Presholdt stated that RUF rebels roam the country freely because they were granted amnesty from prosecution by the government and opined that Antar could suffer psychological and economic distress if he returned to Sierra Leone and, if 13 armed conflict were to resume, possibly physical harm. (Id. at 748.) The government argues that, assuming that Antar is credible and even assuming Antar can demonstrate past persecution, Antar must show a well-founded fear of future persecution or a likelihood of torture. The government contends that the IJ and BIA were correct in concluding that fundamentally changed conditions in Sierra Leone noted in the 2004 State Department Country Report, such as the absence of both politically motivated disappearances and the capture of political prisoners, adequately rebut Antar’s fear of future persecution. 1. Statutory Framework of Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and CAT The Attorney General may, in his discretion, grant asylum to an alien who demonstrates that he is a refugee within the meaning of the Immigration Nationality Act. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). An alien qualifies as a refugee if he establishes past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution in his country of origin on account of a protected ground. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R.§ 1208.13(b). If the applicant is able to prove past persecution, a presumption of future persecution arises. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). The government may rebut the presumption of future persecution by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that, since the past persecution occurred, conditions in the applicant’s country have changed to an extent that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of being persecuted upon return. Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d 445, 452 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Mikhailevitch, 146 F.3d at 390). This court has explained the government’s burden of proof with respect to fundamental change in the applicant’s country conditions as follows: The INS must do more than show that circumstances in the country have fundamentally changed; the INS must also show that such change negates the particular applicant's well-founded fear of persecution. Id. See also Krastev v. INS, 14 292 F.3d 1268, 1276-77 (10th Cir. 2002) (BIA must conduct individualized well-founded fear analysis); Chand v. INS, 222 F.3d 1066, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000) (whether or not a particular applicant's fear is rebutted by a general change in country conditions requires an individualized analysis that focuses on the specific harm suffered and the relationship to it of information contained in a country report); Fergiste v. INS, 138 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 1998) (general evidence of changed country conditions is insufficient to show that an applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution); Charles Gordon et al., Immigration Law & Procedure § 34.02[9][d] (Rev. ed. 2002). Id. at 452. Whereas asylum is discretionary, withholding of removal under the INA is mandatory if an alien demonstrates that his life or freedom would be threatened in the proposed country of removal on account of a protected ground. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b). An applicant must establish a clear probability of future persecution by demonstrating that it is “more likely than not” that he will be persecuted on account of a protected ground upon his return to the proposed country of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2). The standard for withholding of removal is more stringent than the standard for asylum. Liti v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 631, 640 (6th Cir. 2005). Likewise, to be eligible for protection under CAT, an applicant must establish that it is “more likely than not” that he would be tortured if returned to the country of removal. See C.F.R. § 1208.16(b); Liti, 411 F.3d at 641. The standard for relief under CAT is more stringent than the standard for asylum. Liti, 411 F.3d at 641. 2. Application As discussed above, there is significant case law supporting the government’s position that any presumption of future persecution can be rebutted in the face of significantly changed country conditions, and that past persecution alone is not sufficient to support entitlement to asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT protection. In Liti, 411 F.3d at 641, this court reversed the BIA’s 15 determination that the applicants were not credible with respect to past persecution for engaging in anti-communist protests in Albania. However, the Liti court affirmed the BIA’s order denying the applicants’ claims for asylum because State Department country reports indicated that conditions in Albania had fundamentally changed to the extent that anti-communist protestors were no longer persecuted, and the applicants failed to rebut the government’s evidence by producing their own evidence that anti-communist protestors were still persecuted in Albania. Since the applicants failed to establish their eligibility for asylum, the Liti court concluded that the applicants could not satisfy the more stringent standard for withholding of removal or relief under the CAT. Id. (citing Koliada v. INS, 259 F.3d 482, 489 (6th Cir. 2001)); Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 955 (6th Cir. 2004); Yu v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 700, 703 n.3 (6th Cir. 2004). Like the court in Liti, the IJ and BIA found that any presumption of future persecution was rebutted by the 2004 State Department Report for Sierra Leone, which stated that there were no reports of politically motivated disappearances or of political prisoners. Significantly, while the IJ and BIA did not explicitly note this fact in analyzing the change in conditions in Sierra Leone, the basis for both Antar’s past persecution and fear of future persecution was the role of RUF rebels in politically motivated disappearances and the capture of political prisoners. Further buttressing the BIA’s holding are the 2004 State Department Report and the 2005 Human Rights Watch Report noting that the Sierra Leonean government provided a forum for publicly airing the grievances of victims and the confessions of perpetrators from the civil war, and over 100,000 citizens had participated in this Truth and Reconciliation process by the time the hearings ended. (J.A. 497-505; 513.) Therefore, the court finds that the BIA made more than a generalized determination that circumstances in the country have fundamentally changed and instead engaged in an “individualized 16 analysis focusing on the specific harm suffered and the relationship to it of information contained in a country report.” Chand v. INS, 222 F.3d 1066, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000). Like the applicants in Liti, Antar also failed to produce evidence of his own to rebut the government’s evidence that, due to changed conditions in Sierra Leone, Antar does not have a wellfounded fear of future persecution at the hands of RUF rebels. Dr. Kamoo’s testimony regarding the possible exacerbation of Antar’s mental health symptoms if he returns to Sierra Leone is not relevant and thus does not serve as corroborative evidence that Antar has a well-founded fear of future persecution by the rebels. Similarly, even if Dr. Presholdt, a professor of African and World History, was qualified to opine about Antar’s mental health symptoms, it is not corroborative for the same reason. Finally, Dr. Presholdt’s speculation that Antar might be subject to physical harm in the event that armed conflict resumes is not compelling corroborative evidence of Antar’s well-founded fear of future persecution at the hands of RUF rebels. For the reasons stated above, the court finds that the government met its burden of rebutting the presumption of future persecution by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that conditions in Sierra Leone have changed to an extent that Antar no longer has a well-founded fear of being persecuted by RUF rebels upon his return. Accordingly, the court affirms the BIA’s determination that Antar failed to establish his eligibility for asylum. Moreover, like the Liti court, this court finds that, since Antar failed to establish his eligibility for asylum, he cannot satisfy the more stringent standard for withholding of removal or relief under the CAT. D. Removal to Sierra Leone or, in the Alternative, to Lebanon Antar objects to being removed to Sierra Leone or, in the alternative, to Lebanon. First, Antar argues that removal to Sierra Leone is improper because “it is apparent from the record and the [IJ’s] 17 decision that the [IJ] did not believe that Antar last resided in Sierra Leone or that he is from Sierra Leone.” (Pet’r Br. at 55.) Secondly, Antar argues that the IJ erred by ordering Antar removed, in the alternative, to Lebanon because Antar presented evidence that he is not a citizen or national of Lebanon. (Id.) When the alien does not designate a country of removal, the Attorney General is required by statute to remove the alien to any country where the alien is a “subject, national, or citizen” unless the government of the country refuses to accept the alien. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(D). When the alien cannot be removed to the country of nationality or citizenship, then the Attorney General is required to designate a country that falls into one of seven categories listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(E). Here, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(E)(iv), the IJ was clearly permitted to designate Sierra Leone as the first country of removal because Antar was born there. Similarly, the Attorney General may properly designate Lebanon as an alternate country of removal if Lebanon would accept him into the country, and if removal to Sierra Leone is “impracticable, inadvisable, or impossible.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(E). Accordingly, this court finds that the BIA did not err when it removed Antar to Sierra Leone or, in the alternative, to Lebanon.