Opinion ID: 2613142
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the social worker's testimony.

Text: The trial court also determined that State v. Wright required the social worker to follow a formula when the social worker conducted interviews with the child. In Idaho v. Wright , however, the Supreme Court rejected the apparently dispositive weight placed by [the Idaho Supreme Court] on the lack of procedural safeguards at the interview. 497 U.S. at 818, 110 S.Ct. at 3148, 111 L.Ed.2d at 654. It was not appropriate for the trial court to address the application of the Confrontation Clause to the testimony of the social worker until it determined that the social worker's testimony was admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. The only indication that the trial court may have determined that the social worker's testimony fit within I.R.E. 803(24) is its statement on the morning trial was scheduled to begin: Now, the problem is probably twofold. First, there's the possibility of the young witness's memory being tainted, if greatly enhanced, because of the lack of reviewability of the interviews. Secondly, the Confrontation Clause is violated  would be violatedin the event the [social worker's] inculpatory hearsay testimony were to be allowed, which did not fall within the traditional exceptions and which was brought into evidence as a result of an interview lacking procedural safeguards. In determining whether the social worker's testimony fits within I.R.E. 803(24), the trial court should have employed the analysis set forth in State v. Giles, 115 Idaho 984, 772 P.2d 191 (1989): To be admissible under I.R.E. 803(24), the court must determine that (A) the statement has circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those in Rules 803(1) to 803(23), (B) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact, (C) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts, and (D) the general purposes of the rules of evidence, and the interests of justice, will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. Further, (E) a statement may not be admitted under I.R.E. 803(24) unless its proponent gives the adverse party adequate notice and information regarding use of the statement. Once these elements are met, the I.R.E. 803(24) exception is equally as valid as any other hearsay exception. Id. at 986-87, 772 P.2d at 193-94 (quoting State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 697, 760 P.2d 27, 36 (1988)). We conclude that the trial court should not have dismissed the case on the grounds of the Confrontation Clause. There was no basis to exclude the child's testimony under the Confrontation Clause, although there may be an issue of the child's competency to testify. Before addressing the application of the Confrontation Clause to the testimony of the social worker, the trial court should have considered the admissibility of the social worker's testimony under any applicable exception to the hearsay rule. Poole asserts that even if the trial court was incorrect in dismissing the case under the Confrontation Clause, the trial court should have dismissed pursuant to I.C.R. 16, because of the failure of the state properly and timely to provide discovery. The trial court did not rule on this question. Because our disposition of the primary issue presented requires a remand to the trial court for further proceedings, we decline Poole's invitation to address this alternative grounds for dismissal.