Opinion ID: 550707
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ground E--Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Text: 7 Ground E of Byrd's petition alleges that his trial counsel erroneously and unreasonably called Oscar Ford to testify on Byrd's behalf. Shortly after the murder, Ford stated that he had seen three black men, one of whom resembled a Mr. Kirksey, leave the location of the murders (a shopping center) in a yellow car. Before the trial, Ford recanted his earlier statements and stated that he had in fact seen Byrd at the shopping center. At trial, Ford again testified that he had seen Byrd at the time and place of the murders. 8 In our review of Byrd's first petition, we held that counsel had a reasonable basis for the decision to call Oscar Ford. Byrd v. Armontrout, 880 F.2d 1 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1326, 108 L.Ed.2d 501 (1990). We held that counsel sought to introduce Byrd's original statement to the police implicating Kirksey in order to corroborate the testimony of Faraby Lombardo, who had testified: 9 that she had seen three black men in a yellow car in the neighborhood around 8:10 that morning. Such testimony would clearly be exculpatory, since the state's own case had included the testimony of a woman with whom Byrd worked that Byrd was already at work around 7:50 that morning. 10 Id. at 5. Thus, we concluded, it seemed reasonable that counsel would decide to use Ford's testimony to establish the 'yellow car' defense. Id. 11 In the instant petition, Byrd argues that an intervening change in the law requires reconsideration of Ground E. In Harris v. Reed, 894 F.2d 871 (7th Cir.1990) (Harris ), the district court found that the failure of the petitioner's trial attorney to put on any evidence in his client's defense did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, because of the weakness of the petitioner's evidence. The Seventh Circuit found that trial counsel did not offer the strategic justifications provided by the district court, id. at 878, and accordingly reversed because [j]ust as a reviewing court should not second guess the strategic decisions of counsel with the benefit of hindsight, it should also not construct strategic defenses which counsel does not offer. Id. In sum, Harris stands for the proposition that courts may not deny claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on justifications created by the court rather than by counsel. 12 Byrd argues that Harris requires reconsideration of his claim because this court manufactured a yellow car defense which counsel did not offer or intend to offer. We disagree. The record shows that trial counsel said in his opening statement that we'll introduce testimony from Mr. Ford about what his original description was. That he saw these individuals [none of whom was Byrd] leave in a yellow car. (Trial Transcript at 713.) In addition, trial counsel asked Ford about the yellow car theory at trial (Trial Transcript at 738) and discussed the yellow car in his closing statement (Trial Transcript at 941-42). 13 Furthermore, counsel's testimony at the state post-conviction relief hearing (the 27.26 hearing) 3 also addresses the yellow car defense. Counsel testified that he called Ford to the stand to corroborate Lombardo's testimony that on the morning of the murders: 14 she saw an automobile fitting the description of the car Mr. Ford saw pull up on her street and a black man exited the car and there were two other individuals in the car, and that the black man placed a large bag in the trunk of a large car and re-entered the car and left again. 15 Brief of Appellant at 32. Counsel added that I was assuming Mr. Ford would say that he picked out Mr. Kirksey, and felt Faraby Anysia Lombardo would say that was the same individual she saw on her street. Id. Although counsel did not mention a yellow car in this portion of his testimony, the passages cited clearly restate the yellow car theory. 16 On the other hand, Byrd relies on the following exchange from the Rule 27.26 hearing: 17 Q: But at the point in time Oscar Ford was on the stand, the State had already suggested to the Court that, in fact, the yellow Ford had nothing to do with the crime, is that correct, another car was possibly used? 18 A: I don't recall, but I don't think anything really pointed to the yellow Ford. 19 Q: Yet, as far as his testimony, he saw three men near a yellow Ford? 20 A: I think another car, a green Plymouth, another vehicle. 21 Brief of Appellant at 33 (emphasis in original). Byrd interprets this passage to mean that counsel never sought to establish the yellow car theory. In light of the testimony cited above, other interpretations are equally plausible. For instance, Aylward might have questioned the truth of the yellow car theory after the trial, or might have merely been describing the prosecution's theory. Neither possibility, however, forecloses a finding that the yellow car theory was used at the time of trial. 22 In sum, we reiterate our view that counsel sought to use the yellow car defense at trial and sought to use Ford's initial identification to corroborate Lombardo's testimony. Thus, we did not improperly construct strategic defenses which counsel does not offer, Harris, 894 F.2d at 878, and Byrd cannot point to any new legal developments supporting reconsideration of Ground E. 4