Opinion ID: 425171
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to Record Conversations

Text: 137 One of the many noteworthy aspects of the Abscam investigation was the FBI's extensive use of audio and video recording equipment to create a record of conversations between the Abscam operatives and individuals under investigation. Weinberg was instructed to record all of his Abscam-related telephone conversations and, insofar as was possible, meetings were arranged to be held in locations where the FBI could video tape the proceedings. 133 On a few occasions, however, Weinberg and the FBI did not record significant conversations with targets of the Abscam investigation. 134 138 Weisz now contends that the FBI's failure to record or otherwise memorialize all conversations during the Abscam investigation deprived him of a fair trial and violated principles of due process. Weisz notes that no recording was made of his December 21, 1979 telephone conversation with Weinberg 135 or of his February 2, 1980 questioning by the FBI. 136 Furthermore, no FBI Form 302 was prepared memorializing the substance of his conversation with Weinberg. 137 Relying on our seminal decision in United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C.Cir.1971), Weisz asserts that the FBI's failure to preserve these allegedly exculpatory conversations requires reversal of his conviction. We find this argument to be wholly without merit. 139 Weisz' reliance on Bryant and subsequent cases requiring government preservation and production at trial of notes, tapes, and other evidence created during an investigation is inapposite. 138 In Bryant, an FBI agent tape recorded a critical meeting between undercover agents and the defendant, but made no effort to preserve the tape because he had never intended the tape to be used as evidence at trial. Id. at 645-47. Thus we were required to consider 140 the legal consequences of intentional non-preservation by investigative officials of highly relevant evidence.... 141 Id. at 647 (emphasis added). Concerned that decisions made by investigative personnel to dispose of evidence could, if uncontrolled, subvert the integrity of the criminal process, we held that the constitutional and statutory 142 duty of disclosure attaches in some form once the Government has first gathered and taken possession of the evidence in question. Otherwise, disclosure might be avoided by destroying vital evidence before prosecution begins or before defendants hear of its existence.... [B]efore a request for discovery has been made, the duty of disclosure is operative as a duty of preservation. 143 Id. at 644, 651 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Accordingly, we required the government to implement and 144 follow rigorous and systematic procedures designed to preserve all discoverable evidence gathered in the course of a criminal investigation. 145 Id. at 652 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 146 Nothing in Bryant suggests that the FBI was obligated to create documentary evidence of its conversations with Weisz. The clear thrust of that decision is to require the government to preserve discoverable evidence once such evidence is created or uncovered by its investigative activities. But a conversation is not discoverable, at least in the sense that that term is generally used in the adversary process; it is only such notes, memoranda, and recordings of the conversation as may be prepared by the government that are discoverable. 139 Since the Bryant duty of preservation does not attach unless and until such discoverable materials come into existence, id. at 651-52, the FBI was under no duty to preserve its conversations with Weisz by recording or otherwise memorializing them. 140 147 This interpretation of Bryant is supported by our subsequent decision in United States v. Butler, 499 F.2d 1006 (D.C.Cir.1974). In that case the defendant sought to discover the results of a blood alcohol test allegedly performed on a sample of his urine taken by the police. Although the government acknowledged that the urine sample had been taken, it was unable to find any record indicating that the blood alcohol test had, in fact, been performed. Id. at 1007. Although we concluded that under Bryant the government was required to preserve the results of such a test, if performed, we held that if 148 a sample of [the defendant's] urine was taken ... [but] no test was made, that would end the matter, and the judgment of conviction would remain undisturbed. 149 Id. at 1007-08 (emphasis added). Clearly, we concluded in Butler that Bryant imposed no obligation on the government to perform the blood alcohol test and create the evidence sought by the defendant; rather, we found that Bryant only required the government to preserve the test results if it chose to perform the test. Likewise, we conclude that Bryant did not require the FBI to record its conversations with Weisz and thereby create the documentary evidence sought by Weisz. 150 Weisz also suggests that we must require the FBI to record all conversations with individuals under investigation because otherwise the 151 temptation for the government to record only conversations that are favorable to it becomes overwhelming. 141 152 Initially, we are at a loss to understand how the FBI could successfully succumb to the temptation described by Weisz. Prior to the start of a conversation, when the decision to record would have to be made, the FBI could only speculate whether the content of the conversation would be favorable. 142 If the FBI were to record all conversations and then retain only favorable conversations, its conduct would fall squarely within the prohibition of Bryant. 153 In any event, we do not believe that judicial intervention is necessary to encourage the FBI to record, whenever possible, its conversations with persons under investigation. We think it obvious that the FBI, in its efforts to discover and develop evidence for use at criminal trials, has every incentive to gather that evidence in the most reliable and persuasive form. That this is, in fact, the case is amply demonstrated by the Abscam investigation, where the FBI, under no compulsion from the judiciary, recorded virtually all of its hundreds of telephone calls and meetings with individuals under investigation. 143 Under these circumstances there is simply no need for a judicial requirement that the FBI record all conversations with the targets of its investigations. Accordingly, we decline Weisz' invitation to fashion a constitutionally based obligation on the part of law enforcement officials to record or otherwise memorialize all conversations with persons suspected of criminal activity.