Opinion ID: 187075
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: appellant's facial challenge to the nps permit requirement

Text: Appellant was convicted of violating 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(2), which states that [d]emonstrations and special events may be held only pursuant to a permit issued in accordance with the provisions of this section. Permits are not required for some demonstrations involving fewer than 25 people, nor are they required for demonstrations taking place in certain park areas that are not at issue in this case. 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(2)(i) and (ii). Under the regulations, the term demonstrations includes demonstrations, picketing, speechmaking, marching, holding vigils or religious services and all other like forms of conduct which involve the communication or expression of views or grievances, engaged in by one or more persons, the conduct of which has the effect, intent or propensity to draw a crowd or onlookers. This term does not include casual park use by visitors or tourists which does not have an intent or propensity to attract a crowd or onlookers. 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(1)(i). And the penalty provision applicable to appellant's alleged violation states that [a] person convicted of violating a provision of the regulations contained in [Part 7] of this chapter . . . shall be punished by a fine as provided by law, or by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, or both, and shall be adjudged to pay all costs of the proceedings. 36 C.F.R. § 1.3(a). Appellant argues that because none of the applicable provisions in the regulations contains a mens rea element, a person may be found guilty even when he has no knowledge as to the lack of a permit and, indeed, even where he holds a reasonable, good faithbut mistakenbelief that a permit in fact exists. Br. for Appellant at 18. According to appellant, these provisions establish a strict liability regime that imposes an unconstitutional burden on free expression. Id. Appellant thus contends that the District Court erred in holding to the contrary. In addressing this claim, we apply a de novo standard of review. See United States v. West, 393 F.3d 1302, 1310 (D.C.Cir.2005) (appellate court reviews de novo the trial court's construction of a criminal statute); United States v. Braxtonbrown-Smith, 278 F.3d 1348, 1352 (D.C.Cir.2002) (As an issue of statutory construction, our review is de novo.). Strict liability is generally disfavored in criminal law, particularly with respect to cases that implicate the First Amendment. See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150-54, 80 S.Ct. 215, 4 L.Ed.2d 205 (1959). It is well understood, however, that the mere omission . . . of any mention of intent will not be construed as eliminating that element from the crimes denounced. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952); see also United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978). This point was reiterated in Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994), where the Supreme Court held that a statute's silence on the mens rea element does not necessarily suggest that Congress intended to dispense with a conventional mens rea element. 511 U.S. at 605, 114 S.Ct. 1793. The Staples Court importantly added that some indication of congressional intent, express or implied, is required to dispense with mens rea as an element of a crime. Id. at 606, 114 S.Ct. 1793. We agree with the District Court that we must presum[e] that criminal statutes and regulations contain a mens rea element unless otherwise clearly intimated in the language or legislative history. Sheehan, 2006 WL 3756349 at . In this case, nothing significant in the language or legislative history of the NPS regulations indicates a congressional intent to adopt a strict liability regime. The language of the regulations is at worst ambiguous, and the legislative history is silent. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court has implied a mental state requirement where the legislative history of a disputed statute has provided much more evidence of congressional intent to create a strict liability regime than is evident in this case. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 73-78, 115 S.Ct. 464, 130 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994); see also id. at 80-85, 115 S.Ct. 464 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It is also significant that, unlike the situation in American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v. City of Dearborn, 418 F.3d 600 (6th Cir.2005), the Government here ostensibly concedes that the NPS regulations would be unconstitutional if they imposed strict liability. Br. for Appellee at 31-40; see also Sheehan, 2006 WL 3756349 at . In light of the well-established precedent covering this matter, we hold that 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(2) survives appellant's facial constitutional challenge. We therefore affirm the decision of the District Court on this point: Although the National Park Service regulation contains no express language indicating that demonstrators must know that there is no permit before being subjected to criminal sanctions, there likewise is no language clearly evincing an intent to dispense with such a mental state, and the appellant proffered no evidence of such an intent by citing to the history of the regulation, or to any other source for that matter. Thus, following the reasoning applied in Morissette and its progeny, it is clear that the presumption in favor of a [mens rea] requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct. Id. at  (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted). In short, the disputed NPS regulations must be read to contain a mens rea element. This means that individuals cannot be convicted of demonstrating without a permit unless the Government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that they had the requisite knowledge and intent to do so.