Opinion ID: 901626
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Valuation of Joni's Equine Business

Text: [¶16.] Rick also argues that the trial court erred when it accepted Joni's valuation of the horses she had raised and sold during their relationship. Rick argues that the trial court should have accepted the expert testimony of Joan Harmon because (1) Harmon was a disinterested witness and (2) Joni failed to offer hard evidence of the value of the horses other than her own personal opinion. [¶17.] The fact that Joni was an interested party did not preclude her from offering testimony as to the value of the horses used in her equine business. [A] business or property owner is clearly qualified to testify to the value of his business or property. Behrens v. Wedmore, 2005 SD 79, ¶65, 698 NW2d 555, 580. Joni had been training, raising, breeding, and selling horses for over twenty years and was qualified to offer an opinion as to their value. [¶18.] Rick also argues Joni was required to produce hard evidence of the value of the horses other than her own personal opinion. Schwab v. Schwab, 505 NW2d 752 (SD 1993). Rick emphasizes the following language in Schwab v. Schwab : In the absence of a stipulation as to the value of marital assets, the parties must `produce hard evidence as to those values other than their own personal opinions.' Id. at 755 (quoting Studt v. Studt, 443 NW2d 639, 641 (SD 1989)). Because the parties did not stipulate to the value of the horse business, Rick argues that Joni had to produce hard evidence to establish the value of the horse business other than her personal opinion. [¶19.] The term hard evidence was taken from Hanks v. Hanks , a divorce case where both the husband and wife offered their personal opinions as to the value of the marital home and the husband's law practice. 296 NW2d 523, 526 (SD 1980). In affirming the trial court's valuation of these marital assets, this Court made the following comment: Where the parties come into the trial court without even a stipulation as to the values, then they had better be prepared to produce hard evidence as to those values other than their own personal opinions. Based upon the lack of such evidence in this record, we are not going to say that the trial court was in error in the valuations that it set. Exactitude is not required of the trial court in the valuation of assets in a dissolution proceeding; it is only necessary that the value arrived at lies within a reasonable range of figures. Johnson v. Johnson, 277 NW2d 208, 211 (Minn 1979). Id. (emphasis added). In Martin v. Martin we again considered the trial court's valuation of marital assets and offered the following explanation of the hard evidence language in Hanks : As we held in Hanks v. Hanks, 296 NW2d 523 (SD 1980), it is the obligation of the parties to provide the trial court some competent evidence in addition to their own personal testimony regarding the value of their property. The trial court should not be expected to go on a treasure hunt of its own to try to ferret out evidence that it is the parties' duty to provide. 358 NW2d 793, 798 (SD 1984). Later, in Studt v. Studt , we said  the parties must `produce hard evidence as to those values other than their own personal opinions.' 443 NW2d at 641 (quoting Hanks, 296 NW2d at 526) (emphasis added). The origin of the hard evidence language indicates that Studt and Schwab should not be read to require the trial court to reject proposed valuations of marital assets simply because they are based on a party's personal opinion. This language more accurately serves as a reminder that it is the duty of the parties, not the trial court, to produce competent evidence regarding the value of their property. Martin, 358 NW2d at 798. Therefore, we move to the trial court's valuation of Joni's horse business. [¶20.] While the parties have the task of producing evidence regarding the value of their property, the trial court, as the trier of fact, has the task of placing a valuation on the marital assets. In doing so, the trial court is not required to accept either party's proposed valuation. Christians v. Christians, 2001 SD 142, ¶12, 637 NW2d 377, 380 (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 471 NW2d 156, 162 (SD 1991) (stating that [t]he trier of fact is free to accept all of, part of, or none of the expert's opinion.)) (additional citations omitted). However, the value the trial court places upon the marital assets must be within a reasonable range of values presented to the court. Id. [¶21.] Joni testified at length in regard to her involvement in the horse industry over twenty years of owning, breeding, training, and selling horses. She described in detail the horses purchased, sold, deceased or foaled before and after the marriage. In her opinion, she valued her marital share of the horses including the foaled horses at $11,650.00 and her premarital share at $137,900.00. In contrast, Rick's expert observed the horses once, over a year before trial. The expert valued the horses purchased prior to the marriage at $93,900.00, those purchased after the marriage at $38,850.00 and those foaled during their marriage at $78,250.00. Rejecting Joni's request to exclude all the premarital horses in the marital estate, the trial court included a premarital amount of $57,900.00. The trial court set the value of the horses acquired while married at $28,250.00, which was lower than Rick's value of $38,850.00 but higher than Joni's value of $11,650.00. Likewise, the $55,250.00 value of the horses foaled while married was set lower than Rick's value and higher than Joni's since she had included them in the $11,650.00 figure. Accordingly, the trial court's valuation fell within the range of values presented to the court. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court's valuation was clearly erroneous.