Opinion ID: 2515839
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Claim of involuntary consent to search.

Text: Defendant next urges that Cornwell's consent to search the El Monte house she shared with defendant was involuntary and thus invalid because she was coerced by police threats and intimidation. A warrantless search may, of course, be based on the consent of a person, other than the accused, who has joint dominion or control over the area or thing to be searched. However, the defendant may challenge the validity of the consent insofar as the search infringed his own expectations of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. ( Minnesota v. Carter (1998) 525 U.S. 83, 88, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142 L.Ed.2d 373; United States v. Matlock (1974) 415 U.S. 164, 170-171, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242; People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 971-972, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044 ( Jenkins ).) A consent to search is invalid if not freely and voluntarily given. ( Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 ( Royer ).) The voluntariness of consent is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of circumstances. ( Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 ( Schneckloth ); Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th 900, 973, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) If the validity of a consent is challenged, the prosecution must prove it was freely and voluntarily giveni.e., that it was [not] coerced by threats or force, or granted only in submission to a claim of lawful authority. ( Schneckloth, supra, at p. 233, 93 S.Ct. 2041; see Royer, supra, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229.) In Boyer I, we found, on the record then before us, no evidence or contention that Cornwell was improperly coerced to give her consent. ( Boyer I, supra, 48 Cal.3d 247, 276, 256 Cal.Rptr. 96, 768 P.2d 610.) Specifically, we noted, Cornwell, [t]hough initially hostile, ... became cooperative ( id. at p. 278, 256 Cal.Rptr. 96, 768 P.2d 610) after consulting with defendant, who left the matter entirely up to her, and with an attorney ( id. at pp. 277-278, 256 Cal.Rptr. 96, 768 P.2d 610). Though defendant insists otherwise, it appears any new facts bearing on this issue were fully disclosed during the suppression hearing conducted on retrial. There, in the context of litigating whether Cornwell's testimony was coerced (see text discussion, ante, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 705-706, 133 P.3d at pp. 604-605)  and with the burden of proof on the Peoplethe circumstances surrounding Cornwell's consent to search were thoroughly explored. Detective Lewis testified, as in the prior trial, about the circumstances of defendant's preconsent telephone conversation with Cornwell. Cornwell and Detective Ritter, both present at the El Monte house, described at length the events there that led to Cornwell's consent to search. Ruth Ohanessian, the lawyer with whom Cornwell consulted, also testified about the circumstances and substance of their conversations. In response to a specific question by the trial court, Cornwell conceded she was describing the events crucial to her agreement to allow the El Monte house to be searched. Under these circumstances, we are convinced we may confirm, on the totality of circumstances, our prior conclusion that Cornwell's consent to search was voluntary. The request for consent took place in an environment most familiar and comforting to herher own home. Cornwell was, of course, upset and emotional when the police took defendant to the Fullerton station, and again when officers returned to seek permission to search. Such events are inherently stressful. However, several hours intervened between the officers' original departure and their return. No effort was made to secure the premises during this interlude. Cornwell was alone with her children, giving her time for reflection and calm. Indeed, she took the opportunity to burn the jacket defendant wore on the night of the murder. Once the detectives did return, there is no indication, other than as discussed below, that they behaved discourteously. Though eventually there were six or seven officers on the premises, Cornwell gave no indication her will was overborne by the sheer number of personnel in the house. (Cf., e.g., People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 924, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103 ( Weaver ).) Similarly, Cornwell did not suggest she was affected by the monitoring of her telephone, or by her understanding that defendant was suspected of murder. Significantly, Cornwell acknowledged she was allowed to consult with both defendant and an attorney before giving her permission. Despite her stress, she had the presence of mind to insist on doing both. Though she signed a written consent form only after her arrest, she gave oral permission well before that time. [20] Cornwell did testify at the suppression hearing on retrial that she was threatened with the loss of her children, and that an officer roughly handled her infant daughter, with the purpose, Cornwell believed, of intimidat[ing] her. However, based on the contrary testimony of Detective Ritter, and its observation of both witnesses, the trial court declined to credit Cornwell on these points. We have no basis to disagree. (See Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th 900, 973, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) In our view, the record, now fully developed, amply demonstrates that Cornwell gave voluntary consent to the search of the El Monte house. [21]