Opinion ID: 150603
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Bullet-Proof Vest

Text: Lee next argues that the District Court erred when it allowed the government to introduce evidence that he was wearing a bullet-proof vest at the time of the traffic stop, and, further, when it allowed the government to argue, what goes more with a bullet-proof vest than guns? (App. at 618.) Lee asserts that this is impermissible propensity evidence under Rule 404(b) and that it is substantially more prejudicial than probative under Rule 403. The District Court ruled that the bullet-proof vest was not excludable under Rule 404(b) because it is relevant and strong evidence of [Lee's] alleged possession of firearms. (App. at 4.) As a result of the District Court's ruling, both the government's and Lee's briefs focus on whether the bullet-proof vest was admissible under Rule 404(b). In our view, the admissibility of the bullet-proof vest does not turn on Rule 404(b), because it is not evidence of a separate wrongful act. [12] No one suggested to the District Court or to the jury that Lee's possession of the bullet-proof vest was illegal [13] or otherwise wrongful in and of itself; indeed, there was no suggestion that there was anything inherently bad about possessing or wearing a bullet-proof vest. Lee's wearing of the bullet-proof vest is noteworthy only for what it says about the nature of the object on the back seat of his Jeep. Thus, the bullet-proof vest should, in the first instance, be analyzed under Rules 401 and 402, [14] as circumstantial evidence related to a fact directly in issue, namely, Lee's alleged possession of a firearm. Evidence of the bullet-proof vest supports the inference that the long, slender object beneath the coat on the backseat was a firearm, in the same manner that the presence of a razor and small glassine bags found at a crime scene can support the inference that white powder residue found nearby is cocaine. In both the case of drug paraphernalia and drugs and the case of a bullet-proof vest and a firearm, the relationship between the contraband and the tools sometimes used with contraband allows a logical inference to be drawn. In other words, a jury could, after considering Kraus's description of the object on the backseat and Lee's decision to wear a bullet-proof vest, draw an inference that the object was a firearm. The bullet-proof vest is therefore circumstantial evidence upon which the jury could properly move toward a conclusion about gun possession. [15] Lee next argues that the bullet-proof vest should have been excluded under Rule 403, because  any purported probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. [16] (Appellant's Op. Br. at 44 (original emphasis).) Specifically, Lee argues that the prosecutor's accompanying statementwhat goes more with a bullet-proof vest than guns? Does it corroborate the fact that there was a gun in his lap and that there was a gun in the back seat?makes the introduction of the bullet-proof vest even more prejudicial than it would have been on its own. (App. at 618.) A district court's ruling under Rule 403 may be reversed only if it is arbitrary or irrational. See United States v. Univ. Rehab. Servs. (PA), Inc., 205 F.3d 657, 665, 669 (3d Cir.2000) ( en banc ) ([We] cannot reverse a District Court's conclusion under Federal Rule 403 unless such a conclusion is held to be an abuse of discretion, which we have defined as `arbitrary or irrational.' (citing In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Lit., 113 F.3d 444, 453 (3d Cir.1997))). Here, the Court's ruling was certainly not so infirm. It, in effect, recognized that the prosecutor was only providing the jury with the inferential step that he hoped would be made: that Lee had particular reason to protect himself against gun violence by wearing body armor because he was himself carrying a gun. While prejudicial to Lee, it was not unfairly prejudicial to suggest that bullet-proof vests and guns often accompany one another. In addition, while we do not think it helpful to view the bullet-proof vest as 404(b) evidence, any concern that the jury might have misinterpreted the relevance of the vest is laid to rest by the District Court's instruction that information related to the vest could only be considered for a limited purpose. [17] The Court told the jury, twice, that it should consider the bullet-proof vest only for deciding whether the defendant had the state of mind, knowledge, motive or intent necessary to commit the crime charged, or did not commit the acts for which he is on trial by accident or mistake. (App. at 644-45.) Thus, the Court's limiting instruction encouraged the jury to think of the vest only for what it might imply about whether Lee possessed a firearm when Kraus confronted him. Given the high degree of deference we owe when reviewing a district court's Rule 403 determination, combined with the legitimate probative value of the evidence and the District Court's limiting instruction, we cannot say that the decision to admit the bullet-proof vest evidence was arbitrary or irrational.