Opinion ID: 165156
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application for a COA and Motion to Proceed IFP

Text: In order to appeal the district court’s denial of his § 2254 petition, Mr. Bolton must obtain a COA by making “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Mr. Bolton may make this showing by demonstrating that “‘reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.’” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). “[A] claim can be debatable even though every jurist of reason might agree, after the COA has been granted and the case has received full -4- consideration, that [the] petitioner will not prevail.” Id. Moreover, because he seeks to proceed IFP in this appeal, Mr. Bolton must also demonstrate a financial inability to pay the required fees and “a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised.” McIntosh v. United States Parole Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 812 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). For substantially the same reasons set forth by the magistrate judge, we conclude that Mr. Bolton is not entitled to a COA and is not entitled to proceed IFP. The magistrate judge’s recommendation reflects a careful analysis of the record and is supported by the applicable law. Mr. Bolton’s appellate brief argues the merits of his claims but does not present a colorable argument undermining the magistrate judge’s conclusion that the majority of his claims were unexhausted and procedurally barred and that his claim for ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is not cognizable in a § 2254 proceeding. Although Mr. Bolton again alleges that many of his claims were not exhausted because of his post-conviction counsel’s deficiencies, the ineffective assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings does not constitute cause by which a § 2254 petitioner may avoid procedural bar. See Demarest v. Price, 130 F.3d 922, 941 (10th Cir. 1997). -5- B. Arguments in Mr. Bolton’s Petition for Rehearing In his petition for rehearing, Mr. Bolton argues that pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531, (2004), the sentencing judge violated his Sixth Amendment rights by increasing his sentence based upon aggravating circumstances not found by the jury. However, this circuit has held that “Blakely does not apply retroactively to convictions that were already final at the time the Court decided Blakely, June 24, 2004.” United States v. Price, No 04-7058, 2005 WL 535361 (10th Cir. Mar 8, 2005). Mr. Bolton’s convictions were final by that date, and thus he cannot succeed on his Blakely claim. Mr. Bolton also observes that the same Colorado Assistant Attorney General represented the government in the state and federal proceedings, and he argues that this continued representation was “not only highly improper, but prejudicial.” Petition for Rehearing, at 12. We disagree. It is not improper for the same attorney to represent the state on direct appeal and in post-conviction proceedings. Finally, as noted above, the other argument raised by Mr. Bolton in support of his petition for rehearing were properly rejected by the district court for the reasons stated in the magistrate’s well-reasoned recommendation. -6- C. Motion to Appoint Counsel Mr. Bolton has also renewed his motion to appoint counsel. Mr. Bolton’s claims are clearly lacking in merit, and there is thus no reason to appoint counsel.