Opinion ID: 2609813
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Veteran's Preference

Text: Pinther presents three issues involving § 19-6-102, the veteran's preference statute. The statute provides in pertinent part: (a) In every public department and upon all public works in Wyoming, members of the United States military establishment in any war or conflict as defined in section 101, title 38, United States Code, honorably discharged from service, and the widows of members during widowhood, shall be preferred for appointment or employment. Section 19-6-102(a) (emphasis added). Pinther argues that the Legislature intended for a qualified veteran to be given preference any time he makes an application for a state job vacancy. He claims that the preference should be given regardless of whether or not the veteran is a state employee. The personnel administrator interpreted the statute as granting a preference to veterans only when they are initially being considered for state government positions. The parties' divergent interpretations of § 19-6-102(a) are evidence that the statute is ambiguous. State Board of Equalization v. Tenneco Oil Company, 694 P.2d 97, 99 (Wyo.1985). Our rules for statutory construction are well established: [A] statute is ambiguous . . . if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations. [W]hether an ambiguity exists in a statute is a matter of law to be determined by the court. . . . . When the court determines that a statute is ambiguous, the court will resort to general principles of statutory construction in the effort to ascertain legislative intent. We believe that in ascertaining the legislative intent in enacting a statute . . . the court . . . must look to the mischief the act was intended to cure, the historical setting surrounding its enactment, the public policy of the state, the conditions of the law and all other prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances that would enable the court intelligently to determine the intention of the lawmaking body. Knowledge of the settled principles of statutory interpretation must be imputed to the legislature. This court presumes that the legislature enacts statutes with full knowledge of the existing condition of the law and with reference to it. They are therefore to be construed in connection and in harmony with the existing law, and as part of a general and uniform system of jurisprudence. . . . . . . . Another rule of statutory interpretation we have occasionally invoked is that, in construing an ambiguous statute, the administration of which is charged to a particular executive branch agency, we will give deference to that agency's interpretation unless it is clearly erroneous. . . . If an ambiguous statute has been construed by an agency charged with administering it, we will accord deference to, but are not bound by, that construction. After all, the final construction of an ambiguous statute is a question for the court. Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1043-45 (Wyo.1993) (citations omitted). Applying the rules for statutory construction, we read the phrase members of the United States military establishment in any war or conflict . . . honorably discharged in conjunction with the phrase shall be preferred for appointment or employment. Taken together, these phrases evince a legislative intent to encourage qualified veterans to pursue state government employment. Amendments to § 19-6-102(a) since its enactment in 1890 support such an interpretation. The veteran's preference statute as originally enacted read in pertinent part: In and upon each public department and work of the territory and cities and counties thereof, honorably discharged union soldiers and sailors shall be preferred for appointment and employment provided they possess the proper and necessary qualifications to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of the position for which they apply and are equal to or superior to all other applicants for such positions. 1890 WYO.SESS.LAWS ch. 44, § 1. The text of the preference statute remained unchanged until 1945. In 1945, the Legislature amended the statute to include female veterans and widows of male veterans, to limit the preference to veterans of wars, and to include an additional preference for disabled veterans and widows. 1945 WYO.SESS.LAWS ch. 54, § 1. The 1969 Legislature broadened the statute's scope to include qualified veterans of a conflict. 1969 WYO.SESS.LAWS ch. 3, § 1. The Legislature intended for the veteran's preference statute to give qualified veterans the benefit of a competitive advantage in the state hiring process. By giving them an advantage over equally qualified nonveteran job candidates, the statute encourages qualified veterans to seek state employment. The state confers the benefit granted by § 19-6-102(a) and fully satisfies the legislative purpose behind the statute by giving preference only to veterans who are initially seeking state employment. Giving a preference to veterans who are pursuing a transfer or promotion within the state government in no way advances the legislative purpose behind § 19-6-102(a). The Legislature's failure to alter or amend the language of § 19-6-102(a), despite the Department of Administration and Information's practice of giving the preference to veterans only when they are initially applying for state employment, supports our interpretation. Pinther cites no authority indicating that the state has ever given the veteran's preference outside the initial employment application process. The Legislature has not amended the statute to clarify when the state should give the preference. The Legislature's inaction regarding the application of § 19-6-102(a), thus, indicates its acquiescence to the state's practice of restricting the giving of the veteran's preference to initial applications for government employment. Tenneco Oil Company, 694 P.2d at 99. The veteran's preference contained in § 19-6-102(a) does not extend to a qualified veteran who is a state employee seeking a transfer to another state agency. The personnel administrator correctly interpreted the personnel rules and § 19-6-102(a), and he correctly applied them to Pinther's case. His conclusions of law were in accordance with law, and his actions were not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Section 16-3-114(c)(ii)(A). Because the veteran's preference issue is dispositive, we will not address the issues relating to qualifications and scored examinations under § 19-6-102(c). Affirmed.