Opinion ID: 1114554
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the court erred in limiting the amount of the award of attorney's fees.

Text: The determination of whether to award attorney's fees is, as with alimony, largely within the discretion of the chancellor. Smith v. Smith, 614 So.2d 394 (Miss. 1993) (citing Martin v. Martin, 566 So.2d 704 (Miss. 1990); Devereaux v. Devereaux, 493 So.2d 1310 (Miss. 1986); Kergosien v. Kergosien, 471 So.2d 1206 (Miss. 1985)). As such, we are hesitant to disturb a chancellor's decision to award or deny payment of attorney's fees to a party, as well as the amount of an award, if any. Smith, 614 So.2d at 398 (citing Geiger v. Geiger, 530 So.2d 185, 187 (Miss. 1988)). Unless an abuse of discretion is found, the chancellor's decision concerning an award of attorney's fees will generally be upheld. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So.2d 1278, 1282 (Miss. 1993); Martin v. Martin, 566 So.2d 704, 707 (Miss. 1990); Kergosien v. Kergosien, 471 So.2d 1206, 1212 (Miss. 1985); Ladner v. Ladner, 436 So.2d 1366, 1375 (Miss. 1983). The discretion of the chancellor in awarding attorney's fees is limited by reasonableness, based upon the factors announced in McKee v. McKee, 418 So.2d 764 (Miss. 1982), which include: 1) the relative financial condition of the parties, 2) the skill and standing of the attorney, 3) the nature of the case, 4) the novelty and difficulty of the issues raised, 5) the time and labor involved, 6) the usual and customary charges for such services prevailing in the community, and 7) the extent that the attorney's representation of the litigant has precluded acceptance of other cases by that attorney. McKee, 418 So.2d at 767. See also, Holleman v. Holleman, 527 So.2d 90 (Miss. 1988); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 519 So.2d 891 (Miss. 1988). We have further commented on the award of attorney's fees, stating that, [t]he fee should be fair and should only compensate for services actually rendered after it has been determined that the legal work charged was reasonably required and necessary. Dunn v. Dunn, 609 So.2d 1277, 1286 (Miss. 1992) (emphasis added). Teresa's attorney's fees were approximately $7,571.50. Additionally, she was charged $822.25 for expense reimbursement, yielding a grand total of $8,393.75. In awarding Teresa $2,500.00, but denying her the full $8,393.75, the chancellor stated the following in his OPINION: This Court, based upon almost 25 years of litigation practice and a little over 12 years on the Bench, believes that this case could have been concluded satisfactorily in much less than 79.70 hours. It's the judgment of this Court that $8,393.75 is grossly excessive, even though some of the time was caused by Mr. Gibson [Eddie's Attorney]. It's the judgment of this Court that an equal portion of excessive time was caused by Mrs. Wegener [Teresa's Attorney]. Based upon the record, the chancellor correctly awarded a sufficient amount to Teresa to compensate her for attorney's fees. In addition, regardless of the relative financial condition of the parties, the losing litigant should not be saddled with the unreasonable charges made by the other party's attorney. Testimony in the record reveals that the hourly rate charged by Teresa's attorney was $95.00 per hour  higher than any other rate charged by other competent attorneys who performed similar legal services in the community (maximum $70-75 per hour). Additionally, the chancellor determined that all the legal services charged to Teresa were not reasonably required and necessary.