Opinion ID: 1769906
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The identification procedure used by the Commonwealth to identify Appellant was appropriate.

Text: Prior to trial, Appellant moved the trial court to suppress the identification of Appellant made by confidential informant Haley and any of the fruits of that identification. The identification in question is where Haley identified Appellant at the county courthouse as the man who sold him drugs on May 10, 2005. Haley initially knew the person who sold him drugs only by the nickname Black and thought the dealer's name was Michael Mann. At the courthouse Haley identified Appellant as Black. Evidence introduced indicated that at the time the identification was made about 25 to 30 people were present in the courtroom. Appellant moved to exclude the identification on the grounds that the identification was an improper show-up identification. Appellant argued that there was no exigent circumstance warranting the police to have Haley pick Appellant out at the courthouse. Further, Appellant argued that a proper photo lineup could have been easily performed and would be more reliable. Appellant also argued that since there is no evidence of how many African-Americans were present in the courtroom Haley's identification may not be reliable. The trial judge ruled that Haley's identification was not a show-up procedure. The trial judge believed that a show-up procedure is where an officer presents a suspect to a victim one-on-one soon after a crime occurs. In this situation, Haley was not specifically introduced to Appellant. Further, the trial judge believed that even if Haley's identification constituted a show-up procedure, it was reliable according to the guidelines set out in Merriweather v. Commonwealth, 99 S.W.3d 448, 451 (Ky. 2003). The trial judge therefore denied Appellant's motion to suppress. When reviewing the trial court's findings of fact after a suppression hearing, the conclusion shall be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. RCr 9.78; Adcock v. Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky.1998). If the findings are supported by substantial evidence, then the trial judge's application of the applicable law to the facts is reviewed de novo. Id.; see Commonwealth v. Neal, 84 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Ky.App.2002). In this matter, the trial judge's factual findings are supported by adequate evidence. The procedure used to identify Appellant was not a single suspect show-up as alleged because Haley was shown at least twenty-five people and asked to choose one. Further, while Haley may have been initially mistaken as to the actual name of the dealer, he confidently picked out Appellant from a room of nearly thirty people. Even if the method used to identify Appellant was a show-up, it was reliable under the standard articulated in Merriweather. Merriweather requires the trial court to: assess the probability that the witness would make an irreparable misidentification based upon the totality of the circumstances and in light of the five factors enumerated in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401. 382, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972), which include (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; and (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification. Merriweather, 99 S.W.3d at 451. In the present matter, there is no evidence that these five factors were not met. While Haley was inevitably under stress while completing the drug deal, this alone does not lead to a conclusion that he was unable to properly identify who dealt him the cocaine. Moreover, the short period of time between the purchase of the drugs and the identification leads to a conclusion that the identification procedure was reliable. Thus, there is no error.