Opinion ID: 324875
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Instructions to the Jury

Text: 24 Anaconda asserts that Laugesen's claims of error in the jury instructions should not be considered because they were not preserved for appellate review by timely objection. F.R.Civ.P. 51. In Gradsky v. Sperry Rand Corporation, 489 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1973), we held: 25 (1, 2) Rule 51, construed in light of Rule 46's discouragement of formality in procedures, does not require formal objections, but the Rule is satisfied only if it is clear that the judge was made aware of the possible error in or omission from the instructions. E.g. Sears v. Southern Pacific Co., 313 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1963). The purpose of the Rule is to inform the court of possible errors in the charge 'to afford (the) trial judge opportunity to correct error in his charge before the case is finally submitted to the jury.' Moore v. Stephens, 271 F.2d 119, 120 (6th Cir. 1959). The court, insofar as the instructions were covered by the appellant's proposals and objections to the appellee's proposals, was aware of the appellant's objections to the charge as given. To that extent, the requirements of Rule 51 have been met. However, assignments of error on points not included in the appellant's proposed instructions nor covered in his objections to the appellee's proposals are not properly preserved for appeal. Gradsky v. Sperry Rand Corporation, supra, 489 F.2d at 503. 26 A careful examination of the record satisfies us that Laugesen's objections to the instructions were brought in timely fashion to the attention of the trial judge, and were thus properly preserved for our review. Gradsky, supra. 27 Four specific objections are made to the jury instructions in addition to the issue previously discussed. Only one do we conceive to be meritorious. 28 First, Laugesen claims that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury upon two distinct theories of recovery: the first, a claim of unlawful discharge, and the second, a claim of unlawful failure to rehire. Laugesen's complaint is couched solely in terms of charges of wrongful termination. Only one event was proved, the termination itself. While it is true that the termination report issued by Anaconda indicates that Laugesen was determined to be 'ineligible for rehire,' this simple statement on the report is not enough to warrant an instruction where the claim was never pleaded. Further, there was never any proof that Laugesen, after his discharge, made an effort to be rehired, nor for that matter, any claim or proof that Anaconda engaged in any rehiring practices. The trial judge was under no obligation to instruct as to a theory not pleaded and in support of which there was no evidence. Flentie v. American Community Stores Corporation, 389 F.2d 80 (8th Cir. 1968). 29 Second, Laugesen asserts that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that 'It did not have to find that Anaconda had acted with specific discriminatory intent in order to find for him.' Plaintiff's reliance upon King v. International Union, 443 F.2d 273 (6th Cir. 1971) as support for the charge requested is misplaced. King does not hold that discriminatory intent is unessential, but rather that its presence may be inferred from a totality of the circumstances. King, supra, at 278. Here the trial court did not specifically instruct on intent, but rather used such terms as 'because of his age' and 'reasons' for his discharge. We think this was a permissible employment of language which conveyed the law to the jury in understandable terms. The trial court further instructed the jury that they could properly consider circumstantial evidence in considering their verdict. Thus, the judge's instructions substantially charged the jury in the manner desired by plaintiff without using the specific language requested. Plaintiff cannot complain because of the language difference. Tyree v. New York Central R.R., 382 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1967). 30 Third, Laugesen asserts that the trial judge erred in failing to 'instruct the jury in accordance with the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor.' Counsel for Laugesen did not submit any written request to charge couched specifically in terms of any regulations, but rather sought to assert the right during the colloquy on instructions which preceded final arguments. Counsel requested that the court instruct the jury that all exceptions to the Age Act be construed narrowly and the burden of proving them placed upon the employer. Laugesen relies upon that language in the regulations appearing in 29 CFR § 860.103(e): 31 Further, in accord with a long chain of decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States with respect to other remedial labor legislation, all exceptions such as this must be construed narrowly, and the burden of proof in establishing the applicability of the exception will rest upon the employer, employment agency or labor union which seeks to invoke it. 32 A reading of the complete regulation, 860.103, places the cited subsection in its proper context. The regulation in question is aimed at policies of companies pertaining, for example, to physical fitness, educational requirements or the like, which are differentiations based on factors other than age, but which can in fact have a disparate impact upon older employees, thus imposing upon the employer the duty of showing job-relatedness. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). The regulation is not intended to shift the burden of proving non-discrimination by the employer in a private single plaintiff age discrimination case where the defense is a selection based upon the relative personal performance characteristics of two employees competing for one job. 33 There is also no merit to Laugesen's claim that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that discrimination was also prohibited within the protected age bracket, in accordance with Regulation 860.91. There was no claim here that discrimination did occur within such bracket. Moreover, the trial court nowhere indicated that it was permissible to discriminate within the protected bracket. The fair import of his instructions taken as a whole, Tyree, supra, was quite to the contrary, and thus was not inconsistent with the language of the regulation. 34 Finally, it is claimed that 'in order for plaintiff Laugesen to have recovered under the instructions in the instant case, he would have been required to show that age was the sole reason for his lay-off, by reason of the Court's charge that the Age Discrimination Act makes it unlawful to discharge any individual between the ages of 40 and 65 from his 'employment merely because of his age. In addition to objecting to this specific language, Laugesen objected to the failure of the court to instruct the jury that he could recover if the jury was to find that 'age was a 'factor' or a 'determining factor' or a 'substantial factor' in selecting plaintiff for discharge.' 5 35 We recognize that in evaluating the adequacy of a charge to the jury, it must be taken as a whole. Tyree v. New York Central R.R., supra. If the judge's instructions properly present the issues and the law as applicable, it is no ground for complaint that certain portions, taken by themselves and isolated, may appear to be ambiguous, incomplete or otherwise subject to criticism. Gradsky v. Sperry Rand, supra. Thus, the use of the term 'merely' is of little consequence unless, construed with the instructions as a whole, it misleads the jury to the prejudice of the plaintiff. Accordingly, we are led to an examination of the entire instructions given. 6 36 In formulating his instructions to the jury, the trial judge was without the benefit of any published opinions in this or other circuits which might shed light on proper instructions to a jury in Age Act cases. The record reflects extensive and careful consideration of the problem both by the court and by counsel for the parties. 37 The general need of Anaconda to reduce its personnel at Louisville because of unfavorable economic conditions was largely conceded by Laugesen. It was not the general reduction, but rather the selection of Laugesen for discharge as opposed to someone else which formed the crucial issue in his claim that he was discharged because of his age. Since it was obvious that economic conditions had to play an important part in the decision, it was vital for the jury to know that this alone would not dispose of the case if Laugesen's age induced Anaconda to discharge him instead of someone else. 38 The concept of causal relationship is variously expressed. In the law of torts, it is frequently said that there can be more than one proximate cause. In King v. Laborers International Union, supra, a Title VII case, this court speaking of the right of the jury to award damages in the form of lost compensation, stated: 39 'But where it can be shown that discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin was, in part, a causal factor in a discharge or refusal to hire the aggrieved party, the aggrieved party is statutorily entitled to damages of lost compensation.' King v. International Laborers Union, supra, 443 F.2d at 279. 40 The Secretary of Labor, in the regulations interpreting the Age Act speaks in terms of insuring that age 'is not a determining factor' in a decision to discharge. 29 CFR § 860.103(c). 41 Anaconda claims in its brief that the instructions given properly apprised the jury in this regard: 42 'In essence, if the jury believed that age played any part or had any connection with the decision to terminate Laugesen, it could have found for him under those instructions. On the other hand, under the District Court's instructions, the jury could only find for Anaconda if it determined that his termination was for bona fide business reasons unconnected with age and in which age was not a factor. The fair inference of these instructions is that if the jury believed that age played any part in the decision to terminate Laugesen, it should find for him.' 43 If the instructions given by the trial judge had, in fact, conveyed the ideas attributed to them by Anaconda, there would have been no error. While the instructions make it manifestly clear that the jury should find for the defendant if termination 'is for bona fide business or economic reasons in which age is not a factor,' the converse is not stated. Rather the instructions concerning the right of plaintiff to recover state that it is unlawful to discharge an individual 'merely because of his age,' and that he has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence 'that he was discharged from his job because of his age' without making it clear that it need not have been the sole or exclusive cause. 44 However expressed, we believe it was essential for the jury to understand from the instructions that there could be more than one factor in the decision to discharge him and that he was nevertheless entitled to recover if one such factor was his age and if in fact it made a difference in determining whether he was to be retained or discharged. This is so even though the need to reduce the employee force generally was also a strong, and perhaps even more compelling reason. It is because the instructions did not convey this necessary concept of the law to the jury that we are compelled to reverse and remand for a new trial.