Opinion ID: 1851895
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Analysis

Text: ¶ 22. The chancery court, even though apparently determining that Mississippi's long-arm statute gave it jurisdiction over the City and the Board, erroneously concluded that the application of the long-arm statute would violate the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. In the chancellor's decision on the motions to dismiss, he found that: Taken at best plaintiffs' evidence reflects that the Board or the City, or both, own and maintain a reservoir and dam situated wholly in Mobile County, Alabama some 12 miles from Mississippi. One or both of these defendants, at a time of natural flooding released water into an Alabama creek which traversed some 12 miles across Alabama and eventually flowed into the Escatawpa River in Mississippi and added to the flooding caused by Hurricane Georges. By no stretch of the imagination can it be said that these nonresident defendants purposefully directed their activities at the forum state and this litigation results from the alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities. ¶ 23. The due process clause provides: No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.... U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The United States Supreme Court has held: [D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). A defendant has minimum contacts with a state if the defendant has `purposefully directed' his activities at residents of the forum and the litigation results from alleged injuries that `arise out of or relate to' those activities. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). ¶ 24. Applying this rule, the City and the Board purposefully directed their activities toward Mississippi property owners, by opening the spillway to its maximum capacity, as shown by the following deposition testimony of Benny White, a water treatment operator for Mobile Water: Q. So you had them  you had them wide open? A. That's correct. Q. Couldn't have got any more out of them? A. No, sir, not to my knowledge. Q. Had you ever opened them like that before, all seven ten [sic] feet? A. No. Q. Have you ever opened them like that since? A. No. ¶ 25. There is no question that the City and Board knew the water would flow into Mississippi based on deposition testimony of Les Brown, a licensed professional engineer for the water board who had direct supervisory responsibility for operations and maintenance of the Converse Reservoir and Dam: Q. So I assume, unlike the board members I've talked to today, you know and you knew in 1987 that if you opened the gates at the spillway at the Big Creek Reservoir, the water runs down Big Creek and into Mississippi. A. Yes. They knew that the water would flood Mississippi based on White's deposition testimony: A. [W]hen you opened one gate four feet and above or over four feet, you called [Moss Point, Mississippi and Jackson County, Mississippi]. Q. And why would you call them? ...    A. Well, they say we havea  it'sa  we possibly are attributing to flood or something or other in Moss Point. Further, this action resulted from the alleged injuries that arose out of the activities. According to the complaint: This release of water, in either the manner, volume, or at the time released, caused damage and/or destruction to the real and personal property of the Plaintiffs in Jackson County, Mississippi. Therefore, the City and the Board had sufficient minimum contacts with Mississippi to warrant application of our long-arm statute. ¶ 26. In Medical Assurance Company of Mississippi v. Jackson, 864 F.Supp. 576, 577 (S.D.Miss.1994), a Mississippi insurance company sued an Alabama attorney and his Alabama client for breach of a settlement agreement. The attorney and the client moved to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 577. The district court denied the motion. Id. at 579-80. After noting that [a] single act by the defendant directed at the forum state ... can be enough to confer personal jurisdiction if that act gives rise to the claim being asserted, the federal district court reasoned: [D]efendants ... had sufficient contacts with Mississippi... for the court to exercise `specific jurisdiction.' ... Jackson, on Moore's behalf and presumably with his authority, initially wrote a letter to MACM in Mississippi to settle a medical malpractice claim ... .... Jackson rejected that offer by telephone and made a counter-offer ... .... Jackson telephoned Dunn in Mississippi to accept the offer and thereafter, wrote a letter to Dunn in Mississippi confirming the settlement.... Id. at 579. ¶ 27. As was true of the comparison of the present case with City of Milwaukee, so is there a striking similarity between Jackson and the present case. Both Jackson and the present case involve Alabamians; Jackson involved an Alabama attorney and his Alabama client and this case involves an Alabama municipality and its Alabama subsidiary. Also, both Jackson and the present case involve defendants who never set foot in Mississippi; Jackson involved an attorney and his client negotiating from their out-of-state office and the present case involves a municipality and its subsidiary releasing water from their out-of-state dam. Significantly, however, in Jackson, the defendants' contacts with Mississippi were much less extensive than the City and Board's contacts with Mississippi  that is, Jackson involved making two telephone calls and writing two letters while this case involves releasing 18 billion gallons of water. If Jackson had minimum contacts, then surely the present case has minimum contacts. Stated another way, if writing two letters and making two telephone calls is minimum contact, then releasing 18 billion gallons of water is surely a minimum contact. Therefore, the City and the Board had minimum contacts with Mississippi. ¶ 28. Whether maintenance of a suit offends traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice depends on: (1) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (2) the plaintiff's interests in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (3) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and (4) the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental social policies. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477, 105 S.Ct. 2174. ¶ 29. Applying this rule, Mississippi has a strong interest in adjudicating the dispute because Mississippi residents were injured, Mississippi property was destroyed, and the City and the Board continue to release water. Also, the interest of Horne and the hundreds of other Mississippi property owners in obtaining convenient and effective relief is furthered by keeping the suit in Mississippi because their property is located in the county where the suit was filed. Further, the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies is not harmed by keeping the suit in Mississippi since the City and the Board are only 12 miles from Mississippi. Thus, maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, and application of the long-arm statute in this case does not violate the United States Constitution.