Opinion ID: 490522
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the procedural flaw in schreiber's petition

Text: 48 Although Schreiber's petition lacked merit for the reasons discussed in Part III below, we are constrained to note at the outset that the district court should have dismissed it on grounds of procedural default. We find error in the district court's suggestion that Schreiber's procedural default was excused by the state court, in its conclusion that there was cause for the default, and in its failure to require a showing of prejudice. 49 It is well established that when a state prisoner has failed to raise his federal constitutional claim in the state courts in accordance with state procedural rules, including those requiring that claims of constitutional defects in the trial be raised on direct appeal from a conviction, there has been a procedural default that bars federal habeas review unless the petitioner shows both cause for the noncompliance and prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 2665-66, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2644, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986); Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. at 10-11, 104 S.Ct. at 2907; Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1572, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 86-87, 97 S.Ct. at 2506. This principle is relaxed when the state courts themselves have disregarded the default and decided the constitutional claim on its merits. See County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 148-54, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2220-23, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979). 50 When the constitutional argument has been presented to a state court after a procedural default and that court has denied relief without comment, the question becomes whether that court has chosen to forgive the default and to reject the argument on its merits or has refused, because of the default, even to consider the argument. When the default occurred at the trial level, this Court has construed the silent denial of relief by a state appellate court to be on the procedural ground when the state had opposed the petitioner's argument on the ground of procedural default. See, e.g., Stepney v. Lopes, 760 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir.1985); Barber v. Scully, 731 F.2d 1073, 1074-75 (2d Cir.1984); Martinez v. Harris, 675 F.2d 51, 54-55 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 849, 103 S.Ct. 109, 74 L.Ed.2d 97 (1982). 51 This construction is equally applicable when the default occurred at the appellate level, the state has opposed collateral relief on the basis of a provision such as N.Y.Crim.Proc.Law Sec. 440.10, and the state court has silently denied collateral relief. Cf. Jackson v. Scully, 781 F.2d 291, 295 n. 2 (2d Cir.1986) (dictum). Section 440.10(1)(h) authorizes the court in which a judgment of conviction was entered to grant a motion to vacate the judgment on the ground that it was obtained in violation of a defendant's constitutional right. Section 440.10(2)(c), however, requires the court to deny such a motion when there has been no appellate review of the argument because of the defendant's unjustifiable failure to raise it on appeal. The purpose of this section is to prevent [Sec.] 440.10 from being employed as a substitute for direct appeal when defendant was in a position to raise an issue on appeal ... but failed to do so. People v. Cooks, 67 N.Y.2d 100, 103, 500 N.Y.S.2d 503, 505, 491 N.E.2d 676, 678 (1986) (citations omitted). In light of this purpose, we think it unlikely that a state court would find the defendant's default justifiable without giving any indication of the basis for such a finding or even that such a finding had been made. Thus, when the state court has been presented with a Sec. 440.10(1)(h) motion asserting a constitutional claim that could have been argued on direct appeal but was not, and the state has, in opposition to the motion, argued procedural default, we conclude that the state court's denial of such a motion without comment should be construed by a federal habeas court as a denial on the ground of procedural default. 52 In the present case, it is undisputed that Schreiber failed to make his Sixth Amendment argument to the New York courts on direct appeal from his conviction, that the State opposed his Sec. 440.10 motion on the ground of procedural default, and that the state court denied the Sec. 440.10 motion without comment. The district court therefore should have concluded that there was an unexcused procedural default and should not have addressed the merits of the federal habeas petition unless Schreiber established cause for the default and prejudice from the alleged Sixth Amendment violation. We cannot agree that either cause or prejudice was established. 53 The district court found that there was cause for Schreiber's failure to present his Sixth Amendment argument on direct appeal because it concluded that the claim was novel and, in light of existing law in the circuit, its assertion would have been pointless. Neither conclusion warranted a finding of cause. As to the notion of futility, the facts that the challenged practice is one of long standing and that the state court may well reject a particular argument do not constitute cause for failing to make the argument. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. at 130, 102 S.Ct. at 1573 (state's adherence to allegedly objectionable practice for more than a century was not cause for failing to object). 54 As to the court's view that the Sixth Amendment  'claim [was] so novel that its legal basis was not reasonably available to counsel,'  619 F.Supp. at 1436 (quoting Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. at 16, 104 S.Ct. at 2910), this could hardly be so. Citing only the most obvious reasons, we note first, that the claim was hardly novel to Schreiber: his counsel had in fact raised it in the trial court. Nor was it novel to others. For example, at least one intermediate appellate court of another state, though it would later be reversed, had recently upheld a similar Sixth Amendment argument when Schreiber filed his March 1983 brief in the Appellate Division, see People v. Payne, 106 Ill.App.3d 1034, 62 Ill.Dec. 744, 436 N.E.2d 1046 (1982), rev'd, 99 Ill.2d 135, 75 Ill.Dec. 643, 457 N.E.2d 1202 (Dec. 1, 1983), and the highest courts of two other states had relied on federal constitutional cases in ruling that the prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptories violated state constitutional provisions aiming at jury composition that as nearly approximated the ideal cross-section of the community as the process of a random draw permits. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748, 762 (1978); see also Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, 509-13, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881, 100 S.Ct. 170, 62 L.Ed.2d 110 (1979). Closer to home, the Sixth Amendment argument had recently been made to New York's highest court, and though that court had rejected it, see People v. McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 545-46, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441, 443, 443 N.E.2d 915 (1982), three of its judges had voted to accept the argument, see id. at 551-59, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 446-51, 443 N.E.2d at 920-25, a petition for certiorari had been filed in the United States Supreme Court pursuing the argument, and the State of New York, noting that the question was significant and recurring, urged the Supreme Court to grant the petition and review the case, see McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 970 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 2438, 2443 n. 9, 77 L.Ed.2d 1322 (1983) (opinion of Marshall, J., dissenting). 55 The fact that the issue had been perceived by other defendants and that it was a live one in the courts at the time, Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. at 133 n. 41, 102 S.Ct. at 1574 n. 41, means that the argument was not so novel that counsel could not assert it. Thus, even if Schreiber's own counsel had not already raised the Sixth Amendment argument at Schreiber's trial, the fact that it was very much a live issue before a number of courts, including the United States Supreme Court, meant that it was hardly beyond counsel's imagination to raise the argument on appeal. 56 Finally, even had there been cause for Schreiber's failure to renew on appeal the Sixth Amendment arguments he had made in the trial court, the district court could not properly entertain his habeas petition without considering whether he had shown actual prejudice, see United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 168-70, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1594-95, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 84, 97 S.Ct. at 2505, as a result of the alleged constitutional violation. Schreiber made no effort to do so, and, in light of our conclusions in Part III.E. below, we doubt that he could have done so. 57 In light of the procedural default, for which Schreiber showed neither cause nor prejudice, the district court should have dismissed his petition without reaching its merits.