Opinion ID: 2832664
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Caretaker

Text: [¶34] Pew and Cooke contend that the AOP does not require that the owners employ a caretaker in general, or the current caretaker in particular. We review the 8 Other courts have recognized that by executing a ROFR, co-tenants may waive their right to partition. See Libeau v. Fox, 892 A.2d 1068, 1071 (Del. 2006); LEG Invs. v. Boxler, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 519, 525 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). 9 A new owner of an undivided interest may wish to join the mutual covenants established in the AOP that the original owners exchanged in order to maintain the island’s exclusive circle of ownership. Concerning the parties to this action, the Superior Court expressly found that “[a]lthough [Torrey] Cooke [as trustee] and the Hinckses acquired their ownership interest after the original owners signed the AOP, they considered themselves to be bound by it. The court therefore treats all of the present owners as parties to the agreement.” Cooke does not challenge this finding on appeal. 19 interpretation of a contract and the question of whether it is ambiguous de novo. Flaherty v. Muther, 2013 ME 39, ¶ 17, 65 A.3d 1209. If the contract is ambiguous, “its interpretation is a question of fact for the factfinder.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). The question of whether a breach of the AOP occurred is also a finding of fact reviewed for clear error. Coastal Ventures v. Alsham Plaza, LLC, 2010 ME 63, ¶ 20, 1 A.3d 416. [¶35] The trial court did not err in concluding that the AOP is ambiguous concerning the question of whether it requires the employment of a full-time caretaker. In the AOP, the owners agreed that their intent was “that the Island be maintained essentially as it is today”; to that end, they agreed that penalties would be imposed on any owner who “fail[ed] to pay his/her appropriate share of expenses.” The AOP does not, however, specify the expenses that are “appropriate.” For that reason the court appropriately looked to extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent, see id. ¶ 27, in this case the August 21, 1978, letter of agreement that it determined was the foundation for the later AOP. [¶36] The letter states, in part: [Nickles, Pew, and Sayler] understand[] that the caretaker is receiving $700 a month plus payment for utilities. [They] agree[] that the caretaker should continue in his position and receive the same monthly payments. .... 20 It is agreed that an association of owners will be created to collect assessments from the owners for payment of the caretaker’s salary, real estate taxes, and general maintenance. These assessments will be divided equally among the three principal houses . . . . Each of the parties understands that in situations where the caretaker must call in outside assistance to work on a project affecting only a particular house, the owner of that house will pay for the outside assistance. Work done by the caretaker on common Island property, such as the sea wall, studio, tennis courts, etc., will be shared by all owners. Further, it is understood that the caretaker’s work on each of the homes on the Island will not change the basi[c] intention of the parties to share equally the caretaker’s salary and benefits. (Emphasis added.) [¶37] The letter makes clear that the cost of a caretaker was an accepted expense to be commonly shared. As further support, the court found that the owners had employed a full-time caretaker for over thirty years, including the current caretaker for more than ten years, and had, by each paying their full share of the cost until 2010, recognized the caretaker position to be a necessary expense. As late as 2009, Pew and Cooke agreed to give the current caretaker a $3,000 raise. For these reasons, the court did not err in finding that “all of the owners are jointly liable for the expenses arising from [the caretaker].” [¶38] Moreover, the court did not err in finding that the AOP prevented Pew and Cooke from unilaterally changing the caretaking arrangement—i.e., by firing the caretaker—by withholding their share of that cost. The court found that any such change would constitute a significant change affecting the island pursuant to 21 the AOP, and thus required a two-thirds vote before it could be implemented. Given the parties’ long-standing agreements and decades-long course of dealing, the court’s conclusion is well supported. [¶39] Pew and Cooke also assert that they have a common law right to discharge an at-will employee, and that the caretaker is employed pursuant to a contract of indefinite duration that is terminable at will. See Burnell v. Town of Kingfield, 686 A.2d 1072, 1073 (Me. 1996) (“It is well settled that a contract of employment for an indefinite length of time is terminable at will by either party.” (quotation marks omitted)). The flaw in their argument lies in the answer to the question of who can exercise that right. Pursuant to the AOP, the owners collectively can, by two-thirds vote, fire the caretaker at will. Pew and Cooke cannot do so as individual owners in a manner inconsistent with the AOP.