Opinion ID: 782174
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was Jenkins' petition pending through May 27, 1997?

Text: 40 The state contends that Jenkins' state post-conviction petition was not pending within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) for a sufficient period to render his federal petition timely under AEDPA. This issue was raised but not reached in the district court. 41 In Nino, the court concluded that AEDPA's statute of limitations must be tolled during all of the time during which a state prisoner is attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust state court remedies with regard to a particular post-conviction application. 183 F.3d at 1006 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The court determined that a sensible construction of AEDPA demanded that a broad construction [be] given the word `pending.' Id. at 1005. Nino made clear that a petition could be considered to have been pending even if the courts ultimately declined to consider its merits. Id.; see also Tillema v. Long, 253 F.3d 494, 502 (9th Cir.2001) (as amended) (holding that AEDPA's period of limitation is tolled during the pendency of a state application challenging the pertinent judgment, even if the particular application does not include a claim later asserted in the federal habeas petition.). Nino's broad interpretation of pending allows the state courts to have the unfettered first opportunity to review the prisoner's claim and to provide any necessary relief.... Tolling AEDPA's statute of limitations until the state has fully completed its review reinforces comity and respect between our respective judicial systems. 183 F.3d at 1007. 42 The Supreme Court recently underscored the importance of permitting states the fullest opportunity to consider a petition for post-conviction relief before requiring that a petitioner take his case to federal court. In Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 122 S.Ct. 2134, 153 L.Ed.2d 260 (2002), the Supreme Court held that a petition is pending during the period between a lower state court's decision and the filing of a notice of appeal in a higher state court. Id. at 217, 122 S.Ct. 2134. The Saffold Court reiterated earlier holdings that a habeas petitioner must  `invok[e] one complete round of the State's established appellate review process' in the interest of promoting  `comity, finality, and federalism.' Id. at 220, 122 S.Ct. 2134 (quoting O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d (1999) and Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 436 (2000)). AEDPA intends that state courts receive the first opportunity to review [the] claim, and to correct any constitutional violation in the first instance. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). Therefore, a petitioner may not file for relief in federal court until he has exhausted his state remedies; according to the Supreme Court, exhaustion has not occurred as long as the petitioner retains the right under the law of the State to raise ... by any available procedure, the question presented. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 43 Saffold therefore requires that we answer a threshold question: Was a procedure available to Jenkins? Here, the Oregon Court of Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court considered Jenkins' motion to file a delayed appeal pursuant to ORS § 138.071(4). 6 As recounted above, Jenkins did not receive notice of the state post-conviction court's September 9, 1996, dismissal of his petition until January 28, 1997, some four and a half months after it was filed. ORS § 138.071(1) requires that a notice of appeal be served within thirty days after judgment is entered. Therefore, Jenkins' notice of appeal would have been due on October 9, 1996. However, ORS § 138.071(4) provides, in relevant part: 44 (4)(a) Upon motion of a defendant, the Court of Appeals shall grant the defendant leave to file a notice of appeal after the time limits described in subsections (1) to (3) of this section if: 45 (A) The defendant, by clear and convincing evidence, shows that the failure to file a timely notice of appeal is not attributable to the defendant personally; and 46 (B) The defendant shows a colorable claim of error in the proceeding from which the appeal is taken. 47 . . . 48 (c) The request for leave to file a notice of appeal after the time limits prescribed in subsections (1) to (3) of this section shall be filed no later than 90 days after entry of the order or judgment being appealed and shall be accompanied by the notice of appeal sought to be filed[.] 49 . . . 50 (e) The denial of a motion under paragraph (a) shall be a bar to post-conviction relief under ORS 138.510 to 138.680 on the same ground, unless the court provides otherwise. 51 Because Jenkins did not receive notice of the state post-conviction court's entry of judgment until more than ninety days after it had occurred, he could not possibly have complied with ORS § 138.071(4)(c), the section upon which the Oregon Court of Appeals based its dismissal. His argument to the Court of Appeals was essentially one for equitable tolling: He argued that equity requires that the statute of limitations not be mechanically applied where the state courts themselves forced a late filing by their own failure to follow mandatory procedures — in this case, sending Jenkins notice that the state court had dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief. 52 The question, then, is whether or not Jenkins' equitable request for permission to file a late notice of appeal invoked a procedure available to him in light of the requirement that we broadly interpret when a petition might be pending for purposes of statutory tolling. See Nino, 183 F.3d at 1005-06 (favoring a permissive reading of pending where [a] contrary construction would be antithetical to the entire theory of state remedy exhaustion and would inevitably lead to the filing of protective federal petitions because construing the tolling statute broadly reinforces the orderly presentation of claims to the appropriate state tribunals and obviates the need for federal action prompted by AEDPA's statute of limitations.). Nino implicitly held that we should defer, when possible, to a state court's own determination of whether a petition is pending. Saffold reinforces this approach. Saffold, 536 U.S. at 226, 122 S.Ct. 2134 (If the California Supreme Court had clearly ruled that Saffold's 4-month delay was `unreasonable,' that would be the end of the matter ...). 53 The record shows that Jenkins — placed in a very difficult position due to the state post-conviction court's failure to timely notify him of the decision in his case — made a reasoned argument to the Oregon Court of Appeals that the statute of limitations imposed in subsection (c) was not mandatory but permissive, and that the court should exercise its discretion to permit his late notice because his delay was entirely out of his control. The fact that the Oregon Court of Appeals ultimately disagreed with Jenkins' argument — whether because it determined that the requirement was, in fact, mandatory or because it rejected his equitable claim on the merits is unclear — does not in and of itself demonstrate that Jenkins was not using available state court procedures properly when he filed his petition. 54 However, the district court never made any findings of fact on the issue of whether the state courts deemed Jenkins' petition untimely. It simply never reached the issue. Although we conclude that Jenkins' petition was properly filed, we remand, as requested by the petitioner, for the district court to determine whether it was pending and whether tolling applies. On remand, Jenkins may advance his claims and develop the record as to whether equitable tolling applies even if statutory tolling may not. See Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a habeas petition is available if extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time) (quoting Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir.1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). From the record before us, it appears that Jenkins pursued his state remedies as expeditiously as practically possible, filing a motion on the very day he learned of the judgment. The failure to notify Jenkins of the judgment in a timely manner was certainly out of his control. Moreover, had he not persisted with his state court appeal, and simply proceeded to file a federal habeas petition, he ran the distinct risk that the federal petition would be dismissed for failure to exhaust his claims in the state courts. 55 Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 56 VACATED AND REMANDED.