Opinion ID: 2338449
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Stevens v. State

Text: Alaska's emergency aid doctrine originated with Stevens v. State , which relied on United States v. Barone for the general rule that [t]he right of the police to enter and investigate in an emergency without the accompanying intent to either search or arrest is inherent in the very nature of their duties as police officers, and derives from the common law. [20] In Stevens, [21] Stevens shot and killed a friend during early morning drinking at Stevens' house in Hoonah. Stevens' children fled the house and told a neighbor about the shooting. The neighbor phoned the Hoonah chief of police, who went to Stevens' house and knocked on the door. Stevens' wife opened the door, and the chief entered without any comment by either. When Stevens sobbingly confessed he had shot his `buddy' and threatened suicide, the chief arrested and jailed Stevens for his own safety. The chief returned shortly thereafter with the Hoonah mayor. The chief and mayor briefly inspected the house, viewed the victim's body, and then left, padlocking the house. The mayor contacted state troopers in Juneau for assistance, and a trooper ordered the premises be kept locked and advised the chief to also confine Stevens' wife. The troopers arrived seven hours later, ten hours after the chief's original entry, and entered the house without a search warrant to conduct a homicide investigation. Stevens and his wife were still incarcerated and were unaware of the troopers' warrantless entry into their house. At trial Stevens sought to prevent presentation of the evidence gathered during the troopers' warrantless search of his house, but the trial court allowed it. Stevens ultimately was convicted of manslaughter. On appeal Stevens conceded the chief's original entry was lawful. [22] The court stated the general rule that the right to enter and investigate in an emergency, without an accompanying intent to search or arrest, derives from the common law and is an inherent police duty. [23] The court further observed that [t]he criterion is the reasonableness of the belief . . . as to the existence of an emergency, not the existence of an emergency in fact. [24] The court concluded that given the phone call from Stevens' neighbor, which was based on knowledge gained from Stevens' children, the chief had reason to believe that an emergency existed when he knocked at the door of [Stevens'] home, and even though he entered uninvited, his entry was made under the same reasonable belief. [25] The court built on that conclusion, explaining that after legally entering Stevens' home and learning of the homicide, the chief's duty to investigate included the right to inspect the premises; [26] had the chief conducted his investigation immediately, he could have taken pictures, made measurements, and retrieved evidence in plain view without violating Stevens' constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. [27] The court concluded the ten-hour delay between the chief's original entry and the troopers' later entry did not convert what otherwise would have been a legal investigation into a violation of constitutional privacy rights. [28] Justice Rabinowitz concurred in the decision, agreeing with the court's recognition of the Barone emergency aid doctrine and its conclusion that the chief's initial entry into the home was lawful, but viewing the totality of the circumstances as supporting a lawful search of Stevens' house incident to Stevens' arrest. [29] Justice Rabinowitz made two key points guiding the assessment of potential emergencies. [30] First, he noted [t]he reasonableness of an entry by the police upon private property is measured by the circumstances then existing. [31] Second: The preservation of human life is paramount to the right of privacy protected by search and seizure laws and constitutional guaranties; it is an overriding justification for what otherwise may be an illegal entry. It follows that a search warrant is not required to legalize an entry by police for the purpose of bringing emergency aid to an injured person. Frequently, the report of a death proves inaccurate and a spark of life remains, sufficient to respond to emergency police aid. As a general rule . . . an emergency may be said to exist, within the meaning of the `exigency' rule, whenever the police have credible information that an unnatural death has, or may have, occurred. And the criterion is the reasonableness of the belief of the police as to the existence of an emergency, not the existence of an emergency in fact.[ [32] ]