Opinion ID: 2010496
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Spahn v. Zoning Board of Adjustment (25 and 26 EAP 2008)

Text: R.G. Woodstock Associates (Woodstock) is the owner of two vacant lots on Bainbridge Street in Philadelphia. The lots are in an area zoned R-10 residential district. In June of 2005, Woodstock filed two separate applications with the Philadelphia Department of Licenses and Inspections (L & I) seeking to construct a three-story, single family home on each of the lots. L & I denied the permits because each residence did not have a roofed-over front porch with usable space underneath and failed to meet certain open area requirements of the Code. Woodstock appealed to the Zoning Hearing Board of Philadelphia (Board) seeking a dimensional variance with respect to each lot. The Board conducted a hearing on August 17, 2005. Prior to the hearing, Gary Spahn (one of the appellants herein) submitted a letter in opposition to the request. At the hearing, the parties agreed that the front porch was not at issue but was the result of a clerical/labeling error on the design plans and the matter proceeded solely on the question of the open area requirements. The Code requires a minimum open area of 30% for lots in an area zoned R-10. The plans submitted by Woodstock only provided for an open area of 19% with respect to each lot. Spahn testified in opposition to the granting of the dimensional variance at the hearing. Following the hearing, the Board granted a variance with respect to each lot, concluding that Woodstock had presented sufficient evidence to meet the criteria necessary for a variance. Spahn appealed the grant of both variances and the trial court consolidated the appeals. Before the trial court Woodstock filed a motion to quash the appeals on the basis that Spahn was not an aggrieved person having standing to appeal the Board's decision. Woodstock argued that the General Assembly's addition of Section 17.1 to the Home Rule Act eliminated the general standing granted to any taxpayer under Section 14-1807 of the Code to appeal a decision of the Board. The trial court agreed with Woodstock's interpretation of Section 17.1 and pointed out that Spahn did not present evidence to establish himself as an aggrieved party. Therefore, the trial court granted Woodstock's motion to quash the appeals on the basis that Spahn did not have standing to pursue them. Spahn appealed. On appeal, a panel of the Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court's order. Spahn v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment et al., 922 A.2d 24 (Pa.Commw.2007). As to Spahn's first argument, that Section 17.1 did not eliminate taxpayer standing, the court majority explained that it saw no purpose of the language of Section 17.1 other than to limit the broad grant of general taxpayer standing provided in the Code. Id. at 28. The court further noted that Section 17.1 limited the definition of aggrieved person by specifically excluding taxpayer from its definition. Therefore, under Section 17.1, only a taxpayer with an interest that could be `detrimentally' affected by a decision of an entity such as the Board has standing to appeal. Id. Turning to the issue of whether the standing provision of the Code supersedes Section 17.1, the court acknowledged that the concept of home rule gives municipalities the right to enact such ordinances, but that the home rule municipality cannot exercise powers contrary to, or in limitation or enlargement of, powers granted by acts of the General Assembly. Spahn, 922 A.2d at 29 ( quoting 53 P.S. § 13133(b)). Thus, the General Assembly has the authority to negate ordinances enacted by a home rule municipality if the conflicting statute involves a substantive matter of statewide concern. Section 17.1 met this standard since this issue involves access to the courts, a concern for every citizen [o]f this Commonwealth. Id. at 29. The court then looked at the constitutionality of Section 17.1 under Article III, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution pertaining to the single subject requirement. Relying on this Court's pronouncement in Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund v. Commonwealth, 583 Pa. 275, 877 A.2d 383 (2005) (hereafter PAGE ), the court explained that the rule was not violated so long as the amendments to the bill are germane to the bill's subject. Applying such a test, the court concluded that Spahn confused subject for content since, in this case, the standing language was germane to the subject of the billan amendment to the Home Rule Act, 53 P.S. § 13101 et seq. See Spahn, 922 A.2d at 30-31. Finally, considering whether Spahn was an aggrieved party, the court agreed with the trial court's review of the record evidence that revealed that Spahn lived approximately one and a half blocks from the subject properties, but that he only walked by the properties every day. Thus, the court concluded that Spahn's interest was no different from the interest common to all citizens regarding obedience to the law. Id. at 31. Judge Simpson concurred in the result of the majority, writing separately to note his view that Section 17.1 may have violated the clear expression of title requirement contained in Article III, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, but concluding that such an argument was not preserved. Spahn, 922 A.2d at 31-32 (Simpson, J., concurring). This Court granted allowance of appeal to consider the statutory construction of Section 17.1, the single subject requirement, and aggrieved party standing. Spahn v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 598 Pa. 108, 954 A.2d 567 (2008).