Opinion ID: 1975121
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Principal Liability

Text: D.C.Code § 22-2401 (1989), the District's first degree murder statute, applies the common law definition of felony-murder in specific, enumerated instances and classifies such homicides as first degree murder. See United States v. Heinlein, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 157, 168, 490 F.2d 725, 736 (1973) (citing Hamilton v. United States, 26 App.D.C. 382 (1905)); see also United States v. Branic, 162 U.S.App.D.C. 10, 13, 495 F.2d 1066, 1069 (1974). Under the statute, the government need not prove intent to kill or a purposeful killing; rather, it must prove that the defendant inflicted a fatal injury on the deceased while the defendant was perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate an enumerated felony: arson, rape, mayhem, robbery, kidnapping, or armed housebreaking. West v. United States, 499 A.2d 860, 865-66 (D.C.1985); Waller v. United States, 389 A.2d 801, 807 (D.C.1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 901, 100 S.Ct. 1824, 64 L.Ed.2d 253 (1980); CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, No. 4.22(A) (3d ed. 1978). What, however, does perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate the underlying felony mean in the context of principal liability for felony-murder? To hold a principal liable under a theory of felony-murder, the government must prove more than the commission of a felony followed by an unlawful killing. The government must show a sufficient causal nexus between the felony and the murder to prove that the killing took place as part of the perpetration of the felony. As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has said: Something more than a mere coincidence of time and place between the wrongful act and the death is necessary. It must appear that there was such actual legal relation between the killing and the crime committed or attempted that the killing can be said to have occurred as a part of the perpetration of the crime, or in furtherance of an attempt or purpose to commit it. Heinlein, 160 U.S.App.D.C. at 168, 490 F.2d at 736 (quoting State v. Schwensen, 237 Or. 506, 392 P.2d 328, 334 (1964)); see United States v. Bolden, 169 U.S.App.D.C. 60, 66, 514 F.2d 1301, 1307 (1975); Head v. United States, 451 A.2d 615, 625 (D.C. 1982); cf. Green v. United States, 95 U.S.App.D.C. 45, 46, 218 F.2d 856, 857 (1955) (when evidence at trial shows defendant committed felony and felony was sole cause of victim's death, evidence sufficient to find defendant guilty of felony-murder). The requirement under § 22-2401 that the underlying felony be inherently dangerous ( i.e., arson, rape, mayhem, robbery, kidnapping, or armed housebreaking), must be distinguished from the additional requirement of proximate or legal cause. A given category of felony may be inherently dangerous, but it may still be that the death which actually occurred has come about in such an extraordinary way that as a matter of causation the defendant should not be held accountable for the death.... In a given case ... the victim's [death] may be so abnormal and unforeseeable that it cannot be said that his [or her] death was legally caused by the defendant's felonious conduct. LAFAVE & SCOTT, 2 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 7.5(d), at 213. [2] Thus, the government must first prove that the principal committed an inherently dangerous felony and that somebody died; then it must prove that the death was legally caused by the principal's acts committed in furtherance of the felony. In short, whether there is a sufficient causal connection between the felony and the homicide depends on whether the [principal's] felony dictated his [or her] conduct which led to the homicide. LAFAVE & SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 71, at 557. [T]he chain of circumstances between the felony and the killing must be unbroken. CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra, No. 4.22 (comment at 174) (citing Coleman v. United States, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 210, 295 F.2d 555 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 813, 82 S.Ct. 689, 7 L.Ed.2d 613 (1962)). In Coleman, one of the two primary cases the majority relies on, see ante at 557-558, the issue was whether a police officer's attempted seizure of a fleeing robber broke the essential link between the robbery and the killing. 111 U.S.App.D.C. at 216, 295 F.2d at 561. During the seizure attempt, the defendant and two officers had struggled, resulting in the shooting death of one of the officers. The court upheld the trial judge's instruction to the jury that, to hold the defendant liable for felony-murder, the jury had to first find that the officers had not placed the defendant under arrest before the shooting occurred. Id. at 219, 295 F.2d at 563-64. In upholding the instruction, the court concluded: The jury could not have failed to understand that the Government was bound to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there has been an unbroken continuity between the robbery and the killing. Id. This basic principle is firmly established in our caselaw. See, e.g., Head, 451 A.2d at 625 (for purposes of felony-murder, crime of robbery is continuing offense as long as asportation of goods continues); Carter v. United States, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 40, 42, 223 F.2d 332, 334 (1955) (during continuous police pursuit and while defendant is still sporting stolen goods, defendant guilty of felony-murder if defendant kills pursuer), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 949, 76 S.Ct. 324, 100 L.Ed. 827 (1956); see also C. TORCIA, 2 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 148, at 214-20 (14th ed. 1979) (for purposes of felony-murder, felony is deemed to be still in progress if defendant has not left scene or if defendant is fleeing scene). Thus, if the principal commits the underlying felony and his or her felonious conductincluding flight from the scenecontinues unbroken, a killing during the course of the unbroken chain of criminal activity is a killing in the course of the [felony]. Blango v. United States, 373 A.2d 885, 888 (D.C.1977). In Blango, the other authority chiefly relied upon by the majority, appellant and his codefendant entered the victim's home while armed with guns for the shared purpose of assaulting the victim, who earlier that evening had pistol-whipped the codefendant's brother. 373 A.2d at 886. Upon finding the victim upstairs along with several other persons, the codefendant almost immediately shot the victim with his .45 caliber gun. Before running for cover, two of the witnesses saw Blango reach for his belt. Two .25 caliber shots were fired at the victim; the government established by circumstantial evidence that Blango had fired the last two shots. Id. at 886-87. On these facts this court concluded that Blango killed [the victim] on the premises in the course of the burglary [and] the requirements of the felony-murder statute were satisfied. Id. at 888. In contrast to the above cases, if a principal abandons the felonious plan before the fatal shooting occurs, then the killing does not take place while the principal is perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate the felony. See Mumforde v. United States, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 107, 109, 130 F.2d 411, 413 (upholding trial court's instruction), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 656, 63 S.Ct. 53, 87 L.Ed. 527 (1942). There must be, however, some appreciable interval between the alleged abandonment and the act which caused the killing. Id. (quotation omitted); see also Harris v. United States, 377 A.2d 34, 38 (D.C.1977) (in felony-murder case, withdrawal from underlying criminal enterprise requires affirmative action to disavow underlying purpose or definite and decisive steps indicating disassociation); cf. People v. Mason, 54 Cal.2d 164, 4 Cal.Rptr. 841, 351 P.2d 1025 (1960) (although killing in victim's home took place 20 hours after defendant committed burglary by entering home, evidenceincluding defendant's past assaults on victimsufficient to sustain felony-murder instruction). In short, a principal is liable for felonymurder only when the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that, while committing or attempting to commitor fleeing from committingone of the inherently dangerous felonies enumerated in the statute, the principal legally caused a death through some action in furtherance of the felony.