Opinion ID: 2634202
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Propriety of Dismissal of Counterclaim: A Grantor's Right to Declaratory Judgment Regarding the Validity of an Easement

Text: [¶21] Here, the district court dismissed, sua sponte, Jenkins' counterclaim for declaratory relief. S ua sponte dismissals require adherence to a specific procedure: The leading federal decision on sua sponte dismissals under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) is Tingler v. Marshall, 716 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1983). The Tingler court reviewed the sua sponte dismissal of a complaint on its merits, so federal jurisdiction was not in question. The court found four reasons why a sua sponte dismissal under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) is not favored. First, the action places the court in the role of a proponent rather than an independent observer. Second, plaintiffs are prejudiced because, unlike when a motion to dismiss is filed by a defendant, the plaintiff is given no opportunity to amend the complaint or make legal arguments against dismissal. Pro se plaintiffs, unskilled in legal pleadings, are more likely to suffer acute prejudice. Third, dismissal without service of process and notice is unfair to defendants because the sua sponte action of the court deprives the defendants of the opportunity to participate in the litigation process and places them in the position of having to chose: whether to not participate in an appeal and risk an adverse decision; or, whether to participate in the appeal and make arguments based upon matters not in the factual record. Fourth, the sua sponte dismissal ultimately wastes judicial resources. The dismissal creates an opportunity for appeal based upon an incomplete record of pleadings and orders resulting in an inability to make a factual decision on the merits and limiting the appellate court to decisions on broad legal grounds. Tingler, 716 F.2d at 1111. Using its supervisory power, the Tingler court outlined a five-step procedure for dismissal of complaints, sua sponte: (1) allow service of the complaint upon the defendant; (2) notify all parties of [the court's] intent to dismiss the complaint; (3) give the plaintiff a chance to either amend his complaint or respond to the reasons stated by the district court in its notice of intended sua sponte dismissal; (4) give the defendant a chance to respond or file an answer or motions; and (5) if the claim is dismissed, state [the court's] reasons for the dismissal. Id. at 1112. In an exercise of this court's supervisory powers, Wyo. Const. art. 5, § 2, we adopt the federal approach to sua sponte dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) including the five-step process outlined in Tingler. . This process assures proper notice and opportunity to be heard, see Torrey v. Twiford, 713 P.2d 1160 (Wyo. 1986), and promotes a policy of deciding cases on their merits which is consistent with the general tenor of our procedural rules. See Hill v. Zimmerer, 839 P.2d 977, 981 (Wyo. 1992). Restricting sua sponte dismissals is also consistent with the requirement of the Wyoming Constitution to maintain an open court system: Osborn v. Emporium Videos, 848 P.2d 237, 241-42 (Wyo. 1993) (emphasis added and footnote omitted). [¶22] The district court failed to follow this procedure. As a matter of course, then, this matter must be remanded to the district court with directions to follow the procedural steps outlined in Osborn. Id. ; see also Jackson, 961 P.2d at 395.
[¶23] The decision to remand this case based on the district court's improper grant of summary judgment as to Millers' declaratory judgment action does not address the propriety of the district court also dismissing Jenkins' counterclaim. The district court dismissed Jenkins' counterclaim in reliance on Walton v. Dana, 609 P.2d 461 (Wyo. 1980), and the court's interpretation of that case as precluding Jenkins from seeking a declaratory judgment. Specifically, the court concluded that Defendants' Counterclaim for a declaratory judgment should be dismissed because the right to pursue an easement rests exclusively with the petitioners, and Defendants are precluded from bringing a declaratory judgment action. Because we anticipate that the same substantive issue will arise on remand, it is appropriate to address the district court's conclusions at this time. [¶24] Historically, Wyoming's law concerning private roads and easements has been less than clear. However, this Court has clarified that landlocked property owners cannot be forced to pursue legal remedies, such as a common law way of necessity or an implied easement, prior to seeking a private road pursuant to Wyoming's private road statutes, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-9-101 through 24-9-104. See Miller v. Bradley, 4 P.3d 882, 887 (Wyo. 2000) (Section 24-9-101 contains no requirement that other forms of relief be pursued prior to seeking the relief available under its provisions); Lindt v. Murray, 895 P.2d 459, 462 (Wyo. 1995); Walton, 609 P.2d at 463-64. [¶25] The district court used this rule of law, combined with its conclusion that Millers lacked legally enforceable access to their lands, in holding that Jenkins were without authority to seek a declaratory judgment regarding the easement. We agree with the district court's conclusion that Millers should be allowed to proceed with a private road proceeding where there is no presently existing outlet to or connection with a public road[.] Miller, 4 P.3d at 887 (emphasis in original). [3] But this is not the case with which the court was presented nor can this rule of law logically extend to the conclusion reached by the district court. [¶26] The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (the Act) authorizes Wyoming courts to declare rights, status and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-102 (LexisNexis 2007). Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-103 (LexisNexis 2007) states, Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by the Wyoming constitution or by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument determined and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations. See also Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-107 (LexisNexis 2007). The purpose of the Act is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to legal relations, and is to be liberally construed and administered. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-114 (LexisNexis 2007). [¶27] A declaratory judgment action may be brought to determine the right to an easement, or determine the relative rights of parties affected by an easement, or whether an easement has been created. 22A Am. Jur. 2d Declaratory Judgments § 156 (2003). [4] Nothing in the Act, Wyoming's private road statutes, or Wyoming law dictates that the owner of a servient estate is precluded from seeking declaratory relief as to the validity or establishment of an easement or as to the rights of parties surrounding a disputed easement. This Court has said repeatedly that Wyoming is concerned about making the private road process an economic and convenient one for landlocked property owners and, thus, does not require those individuals to seek an adjudication of other potential means of legally enforceable access prior to proceeding into the private road process where that access is not presently existing. See, e.g., Wagstaff v. Sublette County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2002 WY 123, ¶ 12, 53 P.3d 79, 82-83 (Wyo. 2002); Martens v. Johnson County Bd. of Comm'rs, 954 P.2d 375, 380 (Wyo. 1998) ([W]e have noted that the legislature intended the procedure under the statute to provide in a local forum a readily available, economically affordable, and time efficient method to obtain a means of access to property); McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1288 (Wyo. 1980). However, Wyoming also recognizes the rights of property owners whose lands will be subjected to the imposition of private roads. Such property owners should have the right to determine the status of alleged or potential existing legally enforceable access through their lands even where those rights have not yet been adjudicated and, hence, are not presently existing. [5] To hold that Walton v. Dana precludes the exercise of a right that clearly exists pursuant to the Act simply goes too far. Jenkins were entitled, either as plaintiffs bringing a claim or defendants bringing a counterclaim, to have the district court adjudicate their legal rights relative to the disputed but potential legally enforceable access. The court erred in dismissing their counterclaim.