Opinion ID: 2065144
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: effect of constitutional invalidity

Text: Having found defendant's R-1-C single family zoning ordinance void, the following issues require our attention: (1) what effect is to be accorded our de novo finding of unconstitutionality?; and (2) through what procedure is this effect to be determined? More specifically, the first question to be resolved is whether, considering both plaintiffs' asserted interest in constructing multiple-family dwellings on their parcel  a permitted R-3 use  and the trial court's order generally enjoining defendant from interfering with plaintiffs' use of the property in accordance with defendant's R-3 zoning classification, plaintiffs may construct any structure deemed permissible within the R-3 classification or only that specific use prescribed at trial. For example, may plaintiffs construct: multiple-family units (as indicated in their pleadings); garden apartments; a two-and-one-half story apartment house; a storage building; a church, etc.? The second question requiring resolution is whether this determination is to be made by the trial court alone, an appropriate administrative entity as has been suggested by Justice LEVIN, the trial court supplemented by public testimony, or this Court alone? In resolving these questions, after careful consideration we reject the approach suggested by both Justice LEVIN and the Court of Appeals below urging remand exclusively to an appropriate administrative body for a full trial-type administrative, quasi-judicial determination of the use to be made by an aggrieved landowner subsequent to a judicial declaration of unconstitutionality. In contrast, we rule that subsequent to a judicial declaration of invalidity the matter should be remanded to the appropriate municipal zoning authority to present, for the chancellor's consideration within 60 days of this Court's or the appropriate reviewing court's order of unconstitutionality, an adopted amendatory ordinance comporting with the dictates of equity as well as the requirements of constitutional reasonableness as applied to plaintiffs' parcel; upon the presentation of such amendatory ordinance, the chancellor shall proceed as detailed infra, Part V.
While in the instant case a unanimous Court of Appeals felt bound by existing precedent, 61 Mich App 435, 438, to uphold the chancellor's finding of invalidity and order of general injunctive relief, that Court expatiated on Justice LEVIN'S administrative approach to the review of zoning determinations set forth in Kropf, supra, 164 et seq. In obiter dictum, the Court of Appeals remarked: We would prefer to reverse without prejudice to an application to the legislative body of defendant seeking an administrative hearing with regard to the reasonableness of plaintiffs' proposed use. 61 Mich App 435, 440. We note that the position urged by the Court of Appeals in the instant case has twice been rejected by a majority of this Court: in Kirk, supra, and Kropf, supra . Although similar, Justice LEVIN'S opinion in this case adopts a somewhat modified version of the administrative approach urged by the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, having found defendant's R-1-C ordinance unconstitutionally confiscatory, Justice LEVIN is not disposed to affirm the trial court's order permitting construction in accordance with defendant's R-3 zoning classification. Rather, the Justice would direct that the matter be remanded exclusively to the appropriate administrative body to conduct a full trial-type administrative hearing and to render a decision supported by substantial evidence on the record developed at that hearing; such decisional authority, absent subsequent appeal, is wholly ceded to the administrative body without the necessity of the chancellor's review and approval. Contrary to the dictates of the traditional legislative approach, the LEVIN opinion offers plaintiffs the option of either (1) first seeking a court ruling on unconstitutionality followed by remand for an administrative hearing and determination unaided by impartial judicial scrutiny and equitable consideration with respect to a plaintiff's proposed use, or (2) first challenging a zoning classification in an administrative proceeding  whether the subject ordinance has been judicially determined constitutional or not  in the hope that such body will in effect grant a variance. In either case, the opinion continues, the administrative hearing is subject to judicial review, albeit not de novo as is presently the established law in this state. We disagree with both options. The first option impermissibly invades this Court's powers of de novo review and places a successful litigant in the precarious position of seeking to establish its proposed use before an adversely interested litigant (in this case the city) without the benefit of subsequent judicial consideration unless an appeal is effected on the ground that such decision is not supported by substantial evidence on the record. The second option impermissibly encroaches upon the presumption of legislative validity as well as time-honored notions of separation of powers. My Brother LEVIN firmly believes that such a system of administrative ad hoc zoning ordinance amendment procedures will promote the public welfare as well as relieve the burden on the courts. His opinion indicates that he is not alone in that laudable belief. We are of the opinion, however, that such a system as proposed by Justice LEVIN which permits every constitutionally valid zoning ordinance to be challenged by an affected property owner can only invite countless challenges, many of which must proceed to the courts for a dispositive adjudication. The net result of such a quasi-judicial scheme would most assuredly increase rather than relieve the burden on the courts; the burden on zoning bodies would likewise be unquestionably magnified. Further, and perhaps more significant, the authority of a zoning body's legislative action would likely be debased concomitantly to the extent that every affected property owner could challenge that authority, not on the basis of the value of the constitutionally valid zoning classification to the general public, but on the basis of that zoning determination's value to the individual property owner regardless of the general welfare. Such consequence would undoubtedly destroy both the necessity and desirability of representative legislative action as well as reduce land use determination to a type of what's-in-it-for-me or spot zoning scheme generally eschewed as not in the public interest. For the above reasons, we reject both options of Justice LEVIN'S administrative approach to the review and challenge of zoning determinations. At the same time, however, we find certain components of that approach instructive insofar as they could be applied on remand to defendant city council aided by the chancellor to determine the reasonableness of a landowner's proposed use in accordance with the dictates of equity. We generally accept the following statement of Justice LEVIN in Part IV D of his opinion as apposite in this regard: The judicial determination that the ordinance as applied to the Turkish parcel is unconstitutional should not mean that the Turkishes are necessarily entitled to use the property for multiple-family residences. The surrounding owners have an interest in how the Turkish property is developed, as does the city in providing for orderly development, consistent with its master plan, with adequate services and protection of aesthetic and environmental values. Accordingly, although the Turkishes' proposed use may appear to a court to be `reasonable', there may be other feasible means of developing single-family homes on the parcel if the city permits variances regarding street width and lot size or under other circumstances. The parcel might also be used, consistent with the present zoning, for schools, religious institutions, or some other use. Although uses consistent with present zoning may not be feasible, it may be that some use other than multiple residences is feasible and more compatible with competing interests.
While we are not persuaded to adopt Justice LEVIN'S administrative approach to the review of zoning determinations, questions remain regarding the effect to be accorded an ordinance's judicially declared invalidity as well as the appropriate judicial procedure to be undertaken in determining and ordering such effect. In resolving these questions, the line of cases discussed infra provides this Court with five alternative methods of judicial action subsequent to a judicial finding of constitutional invalidity: (1) leave the subject parcel unzoned until either a use is instituted by plaintiff or the parcel is rezoned, Daraban v Redford Twp, 383 Mich 497; 176 NW2d 598 (1970) (dissenting opinion); (2) enjoin defendant from enforcing a zoning classification other than that classification urged by plaintiff and determined appropriate by the court, Long v Highland Park, 329 Mich 146; 45 NW2d 10 (1950) and its progeny, infra; (3) enjoin defendant from such interference and affirmatively order the institution of plaintiff's proposed specific use on the parcel, Daraban (majority), infra; (4) enjoin defendant from enforcing the unconstitutional classification but remand the matter to the appropriate municipal zoning authority to present for the chancellor's consideration within 60 days of this Court's or the appropriate reviewing court's order of unconstitutionality, an adopted amendatory ordinance comporting with the dictates of equity as well as the requirements of constitutional reasonableness as applied to an aggrieved landowner's parcel, see Dequindre Development Co v Warren Charter Twp, 359 Mich 634; 103 NW2d 600 (1960) (separate opinion of Justice BLACK), infra; or, (5) remand, per the LEVIN opinion, exclusively for an administrative hearing to determine an appropriate use of plaintiff's parcel, discussed supra. We find alternative (1) unacceptable for the reason that merely rendering the parcel unzoned leaves it potentially vulnerable to any uses including those neither urged by plaintiff nor compatible with the orderly development of the community. Alternative (2) may be too expansive in scope insofar as it permits a landowner to develop its property within the general zoning classification approved by the court whether or not such use would be equitable. Alternative (3) is unacceptable for the reason that it may be too restrictive in its implicit rejection of other uses to which plaintiffs' land might more equitably be put. Finally, Justice LEVIN'S recommended position, (5), is not adopted for reasons heretofore discussed. We adopt alternative (4) and hold that, subsequent to a judicial finding of zoning classification invalidity, enforcement of the disputed ordinance should be enjoined and the matter remanded to defendant city council to present, for the chancellor's consideration within 60 days of this Court's or the appropriate reviewing court's order of unconstitutionality, an adopted amendatory ordinance comporting with the dictates of equity as well as the requirements of constitutional reasonableness as applied to an aggrieved landowner's parcel. Specifically, upon the expiration of or within this 60-day period, the chancellor shall enter one of the following orders: (i) If, after remand to defendant city council, plaintiff and defendant find defendant's submitted amendatory ordinance mutually acceptable, the chancellor shall order the implementation of such midsatisfactory amendatory ordinance. (ii) If, after remand to defendant city council, defendant submits an amendatory ordinance unacceptable to plaintiff but embodying Justice BLACK'S midsatisfactory use as determined by the chancellor through a balancing of equitable considerations, the chancellor shall order the implementation of such midsatisfactory amendatory ordinance. (iii) If, after remand to defendant city council, defendant submits an amendatory ordinance unacceptable to plaintiff and plaintiff submits a proposed use embodying Justice BLACK'S midsatisfactory use as determined by the chancellor through a balancing of equitable considerations, the chancellor shall order the implementation of plaintiff's proposed midsatisfactory use. (iv) If, after remand to defendant city council, neither plaintiff nor defendant can agree upon the other's amendatory ordinance or proposed use and the chancellor determines that neither party's proposal embodies Justice BLACK'S midsatisfactory use, the chancellor shall order the implementation of a midsatisfactory use after both plaintiff and defendant as well as other affected parties have had the benefit of a hearing and the submission of proofs to determine the most equitable or midsatisfactory use to be made of plaintiff's parcel. (v) If, after remand to defendant city council, defendant does not submit an adopted amendatory ordinance to the chancellor for consideration within 60 days of this Court's or the appropriate reviewing court's order of unconstitutionality, we direct the chancellor to conduct a hearing supplemented by the submission of proofs by all affected parties to determine and implement the most equitable or midsatisfactory use to be made of plaintiff's parcel. Of course, if either party is dissatisfied with the chancellor's order, an appeal is permitted from that order under normal procedures of de novo review. This ruling is to be accorded limited retroactive effect as to all actions hereinafter commenced as well as all actions heretofore commenced and now pending in either the trial or appellate courts. The alternatives set forth above are discussed below. Alternative 1: Declaration of Invalidity Under Both the Brae Burn Rule as Well as the Daraban Dissent Rendering the Parcel Unzoned The dissenting opinion in Daraban v Redford Twp, 383 Mich 497, 501; 176 NW2d 598 (1970), argued that this Court was without the requisite constitutional power to affirmatively do more than declare a disputed land use classification invalid. The trial court having declared the Daraban zoning restriction void, the dissent reasoned, this Court was incompetent either: (i) to enjoin a defendant municipality from zoning the subject parcel in a manner different from that sought by plaintiff; or, (ii) to order the institution of plaintiff's proposed use as either prayed in plaintiff's complaint or argued before the lower judicial tribunal as to that now unzoned parcel. In effect, the dissent in Daraban would have rendered the subject parcel unzoned, an interim determination awaiting either a legislative rezoning or the institution of some use of the parcel by the previously aggrieved landowner. Although a technically logical position, we are of the opinion that restricting the Court's declaratory powers in such an absolute manner may operate to produce a result neither generally prayed nor argued for by an aggrieved landowner and potentially incompatible with the orderly development of the general community or abutting parcels of property. [6] We therefore reject this alternative form of judicial action rendering the property unzoned as impractical and inequitable. Alternative 2: Issuance of General Injunctive Relief Sensitive to the potential dangers posed by leaving land unzoned, the judiciary of this state has, at minimum, uniformly granted aggrieved landowners injunctive relief generally restraining a defendant municipality from rezoning the subject parcel in a manner different from that classification sought by plaintiff. Three cases decided by this Court are particularly illustrative of this proposition. In each of these cases, this Court sustained the chancellor's decree to the extent that the decree: (i) found the disputed classification unconstitutional; (ii) enjoined defendant from enforcing the invalid restriction; (iii) permitted plaintiff to proceed under the classification urged by plaintiff; but, (iv) did not consider or order the propriety of the aggrieved landowner's proposed specific use. In Long v Highland Park, 329 Mich 146; 45 NW2d 10 (1950), plaintiffs sought to institute an unspecified business use within the general B-2 business classification on a tract of land designated R-1 and, therefore, zoned for nonbusiness uses. The trial court declared defendant's disputed R-1 zoning ordinance (nonbusiness purposes) invalid as applied to plaintiff's land and issued an injunction restraining defendant from attempting to enforce the restrictions. The trial court further ordered that plaintiffs be permitted to use the subject parcel for any of the purposes allowed by the ordinance under classification B-2, for business purposes. This Court unanimously affirmed. Neither the trial court nor this Court, however, ordered or passed on the reasonableness of plaintiff's proposed particular use. Second, in the case of Industrial Land Co v Birmingham, 346 Mich 667; 78 NW2d 656 (1956), a unanimous Supreme Court upheld a circuit court ruling of zoning classification unconstitutionality as well as the chancellor's order that the use of this property for business purposes, as provided in section 1001 of ordinance No 221, as amended, is a reasonable use.    [P]laintiffs are also entitled to an injunction restraining the original defendants from prohibiting plaintiffs' use of the premises for those [business] uses permitted by section 1001 of the ordinance, and from interfering with such uses. 346 Mich 667, 672. Attacking the trial judge's injunctive order finding defendant's single-family zoning ordinance unconstitutional, defendant claimed that the court cannot, by injunctive relief, proceed to rezone plaintiffs' property, as that is a legislative act and a function of the city commission of Birmingham, and that by doing so, would be zoning by judicial determination. 346 Mich 667, 671. This claim was summarily rejected by the Supreme Court on the basis of Long, supra . As in Long, this Court did not specify the precise use to which plaintiff could put its lands beyond permitting those general uses allowed under the zoning classification adjudged valid. [7] Lastly, in Roll v City of Troy, 370 Mich 94; 120 NW2d 804 (1963), plaintiffs sought to develop their parcel into 15,000-square-foot lots; that parcel was zoned to permit lots no smaller than 30,000 square feet in area. This Court upheld the chancellor's order declaring defendant's 30,000-square-foot minimum lot size restriction unconstitutionally confiscatory as applied to plaintiffs' property, restraining defendant from enforcing that restriction on plaintiffs' land, and permitting plaintiffs to develop their land in accordance with the general single-family zoning classification. This Court, however, vitiated the lower court's order to the extent that the chancellor had authorized plaintiffs to use the said property for a residential subdivision in accordance with the proposed plat attached to plaintiffs' bill of complaint [establishing the minimum lot size at 15,000 square feet]. 370 Mich 94, 96, 99. Thus, while upholding the lower court's decree that defendant could not constitutionally restrict plaintiffs' residential lot size to the disputed number of minimum square feet, the Court affirmed its earlier posture that the trial court could not affirmatively sanction a specific proposed use. Said a majority of six Justices: This Court agreed with the trial judge in Christine, 515, 516, that he had no legal duty, right, or obligation to undertake to pass upon the reasonableness of proposed zoning that is not yet the subject of an ordinance. Recognizing that zoning is a legislative function we affirm the principle that courts cannot write zoning laws. The trial court's decree is modified by striking therefrom that portion authorizing and empowering plaintiffs to use the property as proposed in the plat. In all other respects the decree is affirmed. 370 Mich 94, 99. The state of the law in 1963, therefore, appeared clearly settled that neither this Court nor the lower courts of this state could affirmatively order the institution of a specifically proposed use as reasonable subsequent to a finding of classification invalidity. [8] Rather, this Court felt itself constrained to merely enjoin defendant from imposing a zoning classification other than that generally decreed permissible by the lower tribunal. [9] We are of the opinion that this alternative form of relief may be too expansive in scope insofar as it sanctions an aggrieved landowner's development of its parcel in any manner enumerated under the general zoning classification whether or not such potential uses would be inequitable or deleterious to the surrounding community or abutting landowners. Since overall equitable considerations are ignored, we reject this alternative. Alternative 3: Issuance of Injunctive Relief as Well as Order Affirmatively Sanctioning Plaintiff's Specifically Proposed Use: The Daraban Rule In 1970, however, this Court expressly expanded the declaratory powers of the judiciary in reviewing zoning determinations beyond the options of either rendering the land unrestricted or merely enjoining the enforcement of a zoning classification as applied to a plaintiff's subject parcel different from that decreed by the court. Indeed, the majority in Daraban, supra, sanctioned an order not only enjoining defendant's interference with plaintiff's requested general use but also affirmatively permitting the specific use proposed by plaintiff. In Daraban the trial judge decreed: It is further ordered and adjudged that the defendants,    be further permanently enjoined from interfering with plaintiff's erection of apartment dwellings on the property in question in accordance with plaintiff's exhibit number 4, referred to in the court's opinion on page 9, and in accordance with the R-3 zoning classification of the township of Redford. 383 Mich 497, 500. (Emphasis added.) On appeal, 15 Mich App 132; 166 NW2d 295 (1968), defendant alleged that the chancellor's use-specific injunction constituted a judicial invasion of the legislative power. Judge PRATT, writing for Presiding Judge HOLBROOK and then-Judge, now-Justice LEVIN, affirmed the trial court's definitive decree of injunctive relief as supportable by 15 years of precedent. On subsequent appeal this Court affirmed the trial court's order permitting the institution of plaintiff's proposed specific use. It is clear from the majority's 1970 opinion in Daraban that a court may order that definitive relief requested by plaintiff in its pleadings or argued before the Court. Contrary to the position urged by the Daraban dissent, a court may order the institution of not only the general land use classification urged by the landowner but also a specific use prayed for. [10] Compared to alternatives (1) and (2), we find that this alternative may be too restrictive in scope. The Daraban approach is rejected for the reason that it expressly dismisses consideration of any other uses to which the parcel may equitably be put beyond that specific use urged by plaintiff. Alternative 4: The Position Urged by Justice BLACK in Dequindre: Balancing the Equities on Remand Midway between the positions espoused by the Daraban dissent, rendering the parcel unzoned, and the Daraban majority, ordering a particular use proposed by an aggrieved landowner, lies the balancing of the competing equities position promulgated by Justice BLACK in his separate opinion for affirmance on condition found in Dequindre Development Co v Warren Charter Twp, 359 Mich 634; 103 NW2d 600 (1960). In Dequindre, plaintiff sought to construct a trailer coach park on a parcel of land zoned for single-family residential uses. The chancellor declared defendant's disputed ordinance confiscatory and ordered defendant to permit the plaintiff to build and develop said property as a trailer park. 359 Mich 634, 637. On appeal, four Justices directed summary affirmance of the chancellor's order, three Justices urged reversal on the ground that plaintiff had merely presented a debatable question which the Court was not empowered to disturb, and Justice BLACK urged affirmance on condition. The trial court's decree affirmatively permitting the use of the subject parcel for trailer park purposes was summarily upheld. In his separate opinion for affirmance on condition, Justice BLACK reacted to what he perceived to be the harsh result sanctioned by the majority of either invalidating defendants' too-restrictive ordinance, thereby implicitly rendering the subject parcel unzoned, or granting plaintiff's prayer for specific relief as was done in the lower court's order permitting plaintiff's proposed specific use as a trailer park. Rejecting the appropriateness of forcing the Court into the inexorable choice of granting either one land use extreme or the other, the Justice opined that a more equitable midsatisfactory use of the subject parcel could perhaps be better arrived at by remanding the matter to the chancellor via the appropriate municipal zoning body for further proceedings. We quote at length Justice BLACK'S remarks in this regard: An over-concentration of trailer coach living undoubtedly creates problems of municipal concern such as the superintendent has described. The appealing need for solutional aid stares at us from the appendix, yet the usual extremes of affirmance or reversal appear as marking all limits of the judicial function. But do they? Looking upward and outward at the great horizons of equity, and recalling that the shape of decretal relief should as a rule be formed by the chancellor according to germane conditions and equities as same may be shown to exist at the time of final decree ( Herpolsheimer v A B Herpolsheimer Realty Co, 344 Mich 657 [75 NW2d 333 (1956)]; Carlson v Williams, 348 Mich 165 [82 NW2d 483 (1957)]), it would seem that there need be no inexorable choice, now at least, between plaintiff's prayer for specific relief and defendants' too-restrictive ordinance. Why cannot plaintiff and the defendant city consider, together, some possibly midsatisfactory use such as light manufacturing, or retailing, or neighborhood-acceptable commercial endeavor? Why must the permitted use be a this-or-that showdown between temporary life in mobile coaches  or nothing? Does not equity have a duty here, the public interest being at prominent stake? Why not give the parties a chance to answer these questions, in the court below, prior to entry of final decree? I would remand by special order (see Court Rule No 72, § 1 [1945]) authorizing the city to present, for judicial consideration below if it will, an amendatory ordinance which in so many words relieves plaintiff's tract from the present R-1 designation and provides some less restrictive designation conforming  as the city may be advised  with the requirements of constitutional reasonableness; such amendatory ordinance to be adopted and submitted to the successor chancellor within 60 days from the date of such order. The order should provide that, if the city elects not to amend and submit as authorized, due report of that fact shall thereupon be made to this Court by the successor chancellor, whereupon our decree of affirmance will enter. It should also provide, for the event of amendment and submission so authorized, that further disagreement of the parties, if any, should be reported by the chancellor to this Court with accompanying certified record of such additional proceedings as may be ordered and supervised by him. 359 Mich 634, 642-643. [11] We find most instructive Justice BLACK'S championship of the need to balance competing equitable considerations upon remand to the appropriate municipal zoning body for timely presentation of an adopted amendatory ordinance to the chancellor for a determination of the midsatisfactory use to be accorded the subject parcel. It is manifest to this Court that the inevitable tension between landowners and municipal zoning authorities subsequent to a judicial finding of classification invalidity can perhaps best be resolved only through a consideration and balancing of the competing equities revolving about the particular use to be made of a plaintiff's parcel at both the legislative and judicial levels.