Opinion ID: 1293474
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Cho Analysis.

Text: In State v. Cho, supra , this court correctly began its analysis with ORS 161.105(2): [12] Because these statutes were enacted after January 1, 1972, and are outside the Oregon Criminal Code, ORS 161.105(2) must be applied to determine whether the offense    is a violation or a crime. That subsection is clear. The offense is a violation unless the legislature has otherwise provided. That is exactly what the legislature has done. It has provided that this offense is a Class A misdemeanor. That does not answer the question, however, as to whether a culpable mental state is an element to be pleaded and proved to establish a breach of these    laws. 297 Or. at 199, 681 P.2d 1152. To determine whether a culpable mental state is required, the court then looked to ORS 161.105(1)(b). In concluding that the wildlife law involved in that case required proof of a culpable mental state, the Cho court embraced the following approach:    There is only one way in Oregon to establish a crime outside the criminal code which does not require a culpable mental state. That is for the legislature to enact a statute, after January 1, 1972, which provides that an offense is not a violation, and for the offense to clearly indicate a legislative intent to dispense with the culpable mental state requirement. 297 Or. at 200, 681 P.2d 1152. (Emphasis in original.) Thus, in Cho, this court determined that for a post-1971 statute outside the criminal code, both ORS 161.105(2) and 161.105(1)(b) must be applied to determine whether it requires a culpable mental state. Under Cho, then, the question boils down (as it does under the majority's analysis) to whether the statute clearly indicates a legislative intent to dispense with a culpable mental state requirement. For the reasons stated above, I submit that the majority has reached the wrong conclusion under Cho. Because Cho states the current law in Oregon, I have set forth below what I believe to be the proper Cho analysis. ORS 813.010 does not clearly indicate a legislative intent to dispense with a culpable mental state requirement, because [t]he mere enactment of a crime without an expressly required culpable mental state is insufficient to establish such a clear indication. State v. Cho, supra, 297 Or. at 201, 681 P.2d 1152. The DUII offense is a misdemeanor, not a violation, ORS 813.010(3), and thus, even though the statute defining an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, culpability is nonetheless required. ORS 161.115(2). DUII has two material elements: [13] (1) driving a vehicle (2)(a) while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and/or a controlled substance, or (b) with a BAC of .08 percent or more. See UCrJI No. 2704; cf. State v. Buttrey, supra, 293 Or. at 582, 651 P.2d 1075 (two elements to the crime of DWS). To be guilty of DUII, a person must act with a culpable mental state with respect to each material element of the offense that necessarily requires a culpable mental state. [14] ORS 161.095(2). At a minimum, the state must prove that a defendant acted with criminal negligence in respect of both elements of DUII. ORS 161.115(2). In respect of the circumstance of being intoxicated or having a BAC of .08 percent or more, proof of criminal negligence will suffice. [15] Because the concept of a criminally negligent conduct element is undefined, the state must prove at least a knowing mental state regarding the element of driving. [16] This court's decision in Cho, together with the strong policy of stare decisis, compels me to dissent in this case. Under Cho, there is no way to conclude that DUII is a strict liability crime. Defendant in this case wanted to argue that he was not criminally negligent in respect of the element of being under the influence (while he drove). Whether defendant had a culpable mental state was at issue and his defense of lack of culpability should have been heard. The trial court erred in not allowing that defense.