Opinion ID: 1613711
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The Elements of Comparative Negligence.

Text: Under South Dakota's comparative negligence statute, SDCL 20-9-2 [10] , a plaintiff may recover if his negligence was slight in comparison with the negligence of the defendant. Lovell, supra, at 399. The question of a plaintiff's contributory negligence is a two-step inquiry. Nugent, supra . The first step of the Nugent analysis is a determination of whether the plaintiff and the defendant were negligent. If either is found to be not guilty of negligence, there can be no application of the comparative negligence law. Nugent, supra, at 377. In making such a determination, the expected standard of conduct, that being a reasonable [11] and prudent person, is the basis to determine if either or both the plaintiff and defendant fell below that required level of behavior. Lovell, supra, at 399 citing Nugent at 377; Musilek, supra . The greater the danger, the greater the care required so that a very high degree of danger calls for a very high degree of care which, however, amounts to ordinary care in view of the situation and circumstances. Nugent, supra, at 378 citing Bucholz v. City of Sioux Falls, 77 S.D. 322, 91 N.W.2d 606, 612 (S.D.1958). See also Lovell, supra, at 398. If both are found to be negligent, the second step of the process requires that the negligence of the plaintiff must be compared to the negligence of the defendant. If it is determined that a plaintiff has committed negligence more than slight, the plaintiff cannot recover. Nugent, supra . In making such a determination there is a direct comparison between the conduct of the plaintiff and the defendant rather than to the standard of the reasonable person. Nugent, supra ; Musilek, supra . In application of the facts of this case to the first factor, the plaintiff must concede that he was negligent in making his visual inspection of the substation to see if the disconnect switches were open. He visually saw an open switch but he failed to make an exacting enough inspection to determine that he was viewing the by-pass switches rather than the disconnect switches. Plaintiff testified at trial that he was aware of the difference. Likewise, plaintiff's expert witness testified candidly on this point that plaintiff made a mistake. A plaintiff cannot claim a version of facts more favorable to his position than he gave in his own testimony. Lalley v. Safway Steel Scaffolds, Inc., 364 N.W.2d 139, 141 (S.D.1985). The standard of conduct to which East River is held is well settled by this court: The distribution of electrical energy is a highly dangerous activity and anyone doing so is under a duty to exercise ordinary and reasonable care under all the circumstances to prevent injury to persons and property. This requires care commensurate with the danger involved consistent with the practical operation of the business. Ward v. LaCreek Electric Association, 83 S.D. 584, 163 N.W.2d 344, 347 (S.D.1968). The negligence of East River was established by the jury. As East River has not appealed this determination, it is not properly before us for review and is accepted as fact. The second part of the Nugent test then calls for a comparison to measure the negligence of this plaintiff against the negligence of this defendant to determine if the plaintiff's negligence is more than slight. In discussing the scope of the term slight, we have stated: It is now a relative and variable term which defies precise definition and prohibits an arbitrary mathematical ratio limitation. Broadly speaking, our comparative negligence act now applies whenever a plaintiff's contributory negligence is determined to be small in comparison with defendant's negligence. What constitutes slight or small contributory negligence naturally varies with the facts and circumstances in each case. The same conduct constituting slight or small contributory negligence in one case may be great in others when compared with the negligent acts of different defendants under different facts and circumstances. Crabb v. Wade, 84 S.D. 93, 167 N.W.2d 546, 549 (S.D.1969). See also Corey v. Kocer, 86 S.D. 221, 193 N.W.2d 589, 596 (S.D.1972); Urban v. Wait's Supermarket, Inc., 294 N.W.2d 793, 796 (S.D.1980).