Opinion ID: 1117896
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether Jones's counsel was ineffective.

Text: ¶ 38. On appeal, Jones's appellate counsel raised two assignments of error, that trial counsel was ineffective: (1) for not requesting a circumstantial jury instruction, and (2) for not requesting a limiting instruction on the prior bad acts. ¶ 39. As discussed in Issue IV, the jury was instructed that Jones was presumed innocent and every reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt must be excluded in order to find Jones guilty. As this Court found no error in Issue IV, trial counsel was not ineffective. This assignment of error is without merit. ¶ 40. Jones also argues on appeal that trial counsel should have requested a limiting instruction as to Jones's prior bad acts. The alleged prior bad acts were discussed in Issue I in the context of the motion in limine. This Court has acknowledged that in many instances, defense counsel may elect to request or not request a limiting instruction. Brown v. State, 890 So.2d 901, 913 (Miss.2004). In Brown, the Court held: In many instances a limiting instruction from the bench can actually focus a jury's attention on the sensitive testimony. Because a defendant might be prejudiced by such an instruction, we allowed trial counsel to actually object to the sua sponte instruction. See Robinson v. State, 735 So.2d 208, 210 (Miss.1999). However, it is not per se prejudicial to a defendant if a jury simply hears an isolated instance of a crime or bad act in the course of a trial. The burden should properly be upon the trial counsel to request a limiting instruction. Brown, 890 So.2d at 913. (Emphasis added). ¶ 41. This Court has stated the standard for review on ineffective assistance of counsel, following the standard provided in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) and Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d 468 (Miss. 1984). Puckett v. State, 879 So.2d 920, 935-936 (Miss.2004). The Court held: The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness [of counsel] must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). A defendant must demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense of the case. Id. at 687, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d 468, 477 (Miss.1984) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674). The focus of the inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances. Id. Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. (citation omitted) . . . A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. Stringer, 454 So.2d at 477 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Defense counsel is presumed competent. Id. Then, to determine the second prong of prejudice to the defense, the standard is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Mohr v. State, 584 So.2d 426, 430 (Miss.1991). This means a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome. Id. The question here is: [W]hether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencerincluding an appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidencewould have concluded that the balance of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. There is no constitutional right then to errorless counsel. Cabello v. State, 524 So.2d 313, 315 (Miss.1988); Mohr v. State, 584 So.2d 426, 430 (Miss. 1991) (right to effective counsel does not entitle defendant to have an attorney who makes no mistakes at trial; defendant just has right to have competent counsel). If the post-conviction application fails on either of the Strickland prongs, the proceedings end. Neal v. State, 525 So.2d 1279, 1281 (Miss.1987); Mohr v. State, 584 So.2d 426 (Miss.1991). Davis v. State, 743 So.2d 326, 333-34 (Miss.1999) (citing Foster v. State, 687 So.2d 1124, 1130 (Miss.1996)). Brown v. State, 798 So.2d 481, 493-94 (Miss.2001). Puckett, 879 So.2d at 935-36. ¶ 42. When claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel because of jury instructions, `it is the duty of the appellant to demonstrate both error in failing to receive the instruction and the prejudice to the defense.' Havard v. State, 928 So.2d 771, 789 (Miss.2006) (quoting Burnside v. State, 882 So.2d 212, 216 (Miss.2004)). The Court went on to state that trial counsel is given broad discretion to plan a trial strategy and to carry it out. Havard, 928 So.2d at 790. The Court further held: When evaluating the overall performance of counsel, counsel must make strategic discretionary decisions including whether or not to file certain motions, call certain witnesses, ask certain questions or make certain objections. Branch, 882 So.2d at 52 (citation omitted). Such decisions do not necessarily equate to ineffective assistance simply because counsel was not successful at trial. These trial decisions by counsel did not decidedly result in performance deficient under Strickland, but even if they did, the inquiry does not end there. Once a deficient performance is shown, a `defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' Woodward, 635 So.2d at 808 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Havard, 928 So.2d at 790. ¶ 43. Here, the defense filed a motion in limine to exclude the alleged prior bad acts from the jury. However, the defense did not seek an instruction stating that the testimony regarding the charges in justice court was to be considered by the jury solely to establish Jones's motive for murdering Knight. Arguably, trial counsel chose not to place this sensitive evidence, which was allowed by the trial court to establish motive for the murder, before the jury in an instruction to be focused on in the jury deliberations. While the defense could have sought an instruction and would have been entitled to one if sought, the case law examined above is clear that the decision rests with counsel, and trial counsel is provided broad discretion in decisions related to trial strategy. ¶ 44. We find that this assignment of error does not merit reversal.