Opinion ID: 489887
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Municipal Liability for Unconstitutional Conduct

Text: 69 Although the law was once to the contrary, 217 Monell firmly established that a municipality can be held directly liable in damages for constitutional violations. 218 That liability attaches under Section 1983 when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the [constitutional] injury.... 219 Although Section 1983 is unavailable in this case, 220 this form of responsibility seems clearly imposable in a constitutionally-implied action as well. 221 70 The municipal liability of which we now speak is direct, not vicarious. It is premised, not on the mere fact that the wrongdoing officer is municipally employed, but on the existence of some policy fairly attributable to the municipal government itself. The primary justification for this type of liability is the recognition that a municipality can act only through those who enable it to function. 222 When an officer or employee has been delegated power or responsiblity to act for the municipality in a given area, he may be acting as a unit of the municipal government, thus rendering the municipal entity liable for his constitutional wrongdoings. 223 The critical issue, then, is whether the municipal representative, when engaging in the activity challenged, can properly be said to have acted as the alter ego of the municipality. This inquiry poses a question of fact rather than law, 224 and in order to survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must set forth a plausible nexus between the action assailed and the authority conferred by the municipality. 225 71 The question whether policymaking by a municipal officer should be deemed a municipal act for liability purposes turns on the scope and nature of the officer's authority. 226 If the official possesses final authority to promulgate policy in the relevant sphere, his decisions constitute the municipality's final decisions and hence provide a basis for municipal accountability. 227 The clearest case is presented when final say over the challenged edict reposes in the decisionmaker by law or official pronouncement. 228 But an individual further down the municipal chain of command may as a practical matter possess final authority to exercise judgment in a particular area, and in such cases it may be feasible to attribute his actions to the municipality for liability purposes. 229 Possession by a lower-level official of de facto final authority may be evidenced by the failure of supervisory personnel to oversee his decisions, 230 or by a tendency of subordinate employees to acquiesce in his directives. 231 These directives may be embodied in formal rules established through official lawmaking procedures, but they may also be promulgated through more informal channels. 232 72