Opinion ID: 2600593
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Instruction concerning the circumstances in which a sentence of death may be imposed

Text: Defendant contends that the instruction given pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.88 fails to convey that the jury must return a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole if it finds that death is not an appropriate punishment, and that a life sentence is mandatory if the aggravating factors do not outweigh the mitigating factors. CALJIC No. 8.88 explains that [t]o return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole. Defendant acknowledges that we repeatedly have rejected the contention that substantially identical language in former CALJIC No. 8.84.2 (1986 rev.) failed to explain the circumstances in which a verdict of death may be returned ( People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th, 826, 900 [48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135] ( Rogers ); People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 381; [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169]; Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th 694, 781-782; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978 [281 Cal.Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131]( Duncan )), but asks that we reconsider our holdings. In particular, defendant challenges Duncan 's conclusion that substantially identical language clearly stated that the death penalty could be imposed only if the jury found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating. There was no need to additionally advise the jury of the converse (i.e., that if mitigating circumstances outweighed aggravating, then life without parole was the appropriate penalty). ( Duncan, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 978.) Defendant complains that the instruction does not explicitly state that aggravating circumstances must outweigh mitigating circumstances, but he is unpersuasive in urging that the phrase so substantial in comparison does not convey this requirement. Defendant also challenges Duncan 's conclusion that it is unnecessary to advise the jury of the converseif mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating, then life imprisonment without parole is the appropriate penalty. Asserting that Duncan cites no authority for this conclusion, he argues that the absence of the converse instruction causes CALJIC No. 8.88 to emphasize the prosecution's theory of the case. Contrary to defendant's characterization of the instruction, CALJIC 8.88 highlights the significant burden that must be satisfied before a verdict of death may be returned, and thereby conveys that life in prison without the possibility of parole is the appropriate punishment if this burden is not met.