Opinion ID: 759243
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Offer of Proof Regarding Harold Bowens's Testimony

Text: 32 Green argues that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to make an offer of proof after Bowens refused to testify at Green's second trial, thereby precluding Green from appealing this matter. Green argues to this court that Bowens's testimony would have been easily impeachable and certainly not credible, thereby rendering [h]is testimony beneficial to [Green because] the jury would have seen through his false accusation against [Green]. Beyond this, Green does not suggest what type of offer of proof his counsel should have made, nor does he offer any evidence to show how Bowens's testimony would have been favorable or helpful to him. And this is no wonder, because a review of Bowens's testimony for the prosecution at Green's first trial reveals a highly damaging story against Green. 14 Because conclusory assertions of prejudice are insufficient to satisfy the second prong of Strickland, see Kinnamon v. Scott, 40 F.3d 731, 735 (5th Cir.1994), Green's complaint fails.