Opinion ID: 888658
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the jury instructions and verdict form at trial render Schmidt's conviction for mitigated deliberate homicide a legal impossibility under Demontiney?

Text: ¶ 30 A person commits the offense of mitigated deliberate homicide when they satisfy all of the elements necessary for deliberate homicide but [do] so under the influence of extreme mental or emotional stress for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. Section 45-5-103(1), MCA. Schmidt argues that the jury's acquittal on the charge of deliberate homicide and conviction of mitigated deliberate homicide created a legal impossibility that requires his immediate release from custody. ¶ 31 This Court determined a similar result to be truly legally inconsistent in Demontiney v. Mont. Twelfth Judicial Dist. Court, 2002 MT 161, 310 Mont. 406, 51 P.3d 476. The State charged Demontiney with deliberate homicide. The district court instructed the jury on mitigated deliberate homicide over Demontiney's objection. Demontiney, ¶ 5. The district court instructed the jury first to consider the charge of deliberate homicide. Jurors were to consider the lesser charge of mitigated deliberate homicide only if they reached a verdict of not guilty, or were unable to agree, on the greater charge. Demontiney, ¶ 7. The jury entered a verdict of not guilty to deliberate homicide and guilty to mitigated deliberate homicide. Demontiney argued that the jury's verdict was truly legally inconsistent. Demontiney, ¶ 8. ¶ 32 This Court reasoned that a finding of guilty on mitigated deliberate homicide requires a finding of every element of deliberate homicide plus an additional finding of extreme mental or emotional stress. Demontiney, ¶ 20. Both the jury instructions and the verdict form directed the jury to consider the lesser charge only if the jury found the defendant not guilty of the greater charge. Demontiney, ¶ 7. This Court assumed that the jury first acquitted Demontiney on the deliberate homicide charge and concluded that there was no logical way the jury could acquit on deliberate homicide and then consider mitigated deliberate homicide. Demontiney, ¶ 16 (emphasis in original). The jury's acquittal on the charge of deliberate homicide precluded a conviction on mitigated deliberate homicide. Demontiney, ¶ 24. ¶ 33 Justice Leaphart agreed that the district court's instruction incorrectly applied the law. Demontiney, ¶ 32 (Leaphart, J. dissenting). He argued, however, that Demontiney had not been prejudiced by this error. Demontiney, ¶ 33 (Leaphart, J. dissenting). Justice Leaphart pointed out that the jury's not guilty verdict to the offense of deliberate homicide did not necessarily mean that Demontiney had not committed all of the elements of deliberate homicide. Demontiney, ¶ 35 (Leaphart, J. dissenting). The jury likely simply determined that Demontiney had committed all of the elements of deliberate homicide while acting under extreme mental or emotional stress. Demontiney, ¶ 35 (Leaphart, J. dissenting). The Court could not discern from the verdict form whether the jury first had acquitted Demontiney of deliberate homicide, or whether the jury first had convicted Demontiney of mitigated deliberate homicide. Demontiney, ¶ 35 (Leaphart, J. dissenting). The Court rejected this argument on the basis that the jury instructions incorrectly directed the jury to consider first the more serious deliberate homicide charge. Demontiney, ¶ 19. ¶ 34 The District Court did not commit the same error in this case. The court's jury instruction on mitigated deliberate homicide directed the jury to consider whether Schmidt had committed all of the elements of deliberate homicide while acting under the influence of extreme mental or emotional stress. If the jury found that Schmidt had committed all of the elements of deliberate homicide without the mitigating circumstance of extreme mental or emotional stress, it was to find Schmidt guilty of deliberate homicide. The court's instruction differed functionally from Schmidt's in that it omitted the concluding direction first to consider the verdict on the greater offense, and to consider mitigated deliberate homicide only if it were unable to reach a verdict on deliberate homicide. Schmidt's proposed instruction erroneously would have directed the jury first to consider the deliberate homicide charge. Schmidt's proposed instruction further would have directed the jury to consider mitigated deliberate homicide only if the jury were unable to reach a verdict on deliberate homicide. Schmidt's proposed instruction thus created precisely the type of issue that this Court addressed in Demontiney. The District Court avoided this potential pitfall by formulating its own instruction. ¶ 35 The District Court's correct instruction must be distinguished from the verdict form proposed by Schmidt and adopted by the court. Unlike the District Court's jury instruction, the verdict form directed the jury to enter a verdict for mitigated deliberate homicide only if it first found Schmidt not guilty of deliberate homicide. Schmidt's challenge thus arises solely from the form on which the jury entered its verdict. The verdict form instructed the jury to skip the charge of mitigated deliberate homicide if the jury entered a verdict of guilty to the charge of deliberate homicide. If the jury entered a verdict of not guilty to deliberate homicide, however, the verdict form directed the jury to enter a verdict for the charge of mitigated deliberate homicide. The verdict form was functionally the same as the form offered by Schmidt. ¶ 36 Schmidt failed to object to the verdict form. Indeed, Schmidt argued at sentencing that the jury's verdict provided credibility to the evidence of mitigation. Schmidt first objected to the alleged inconsistency in the verdict form when he filed his petition for a writ of supervisory control four months after he had filed his notice of appeal. Schmidt cannot create error for his own benefit on appeal. Cline v. Durden, 246 Mont. 154, 162, 803 P.2d 1077, 1082 (1990). ¶ 37 This Court in Demontiney stated that [w]e cannot imagine a much more prejudicial result to a defendant than a guilty verdict that is not logically possible. Demontiney, ¶ 21. The same does not hold true here. The court correctly instructed the jury on mitigated deliberate homicide in spite of Schmidt's proposed erroneous instruction. We must presume that the jury followed the court's instruction. Malcolm v. Evenflo Co., 2009 MT 285, ¶ 103, 352 Mont. 325, 217 P.3d 514. ¶ 38 Schmidt now attempts to create a Demontiney issue from the verdict form that he proposed. As noted by Justice Leaphart in Demontiney, we cannot discern definitively whether the jury first acquitted Schmidt of deliberate homicide, or first convicted Schmidt of mitigated deliberate homicide. Demontiney, ¶ 35 (Leaphart, J. dissenting). The Dissent, in rejecting this conclusion, conflates the District Court's jury instruction with the directions on the verdict form. In Demontiney, both the verdict form and the jury instructions directed the jury to consider mitigated deliberate homicide only if it first acquitted the defendant, or was unable to reach a verdict of deliberate homicide. The Dissent ignores the functional difference here by focusing on the erroneous verdict form rather than the fact that, unlike in Demontiney, the District Court correctly instructed the jury. This Court in Demontiney was concerned primarily with the District Court's erroneous instructions, not with the jury's efforts to grapple with those erroneous instructions. Demontiney, ¶ 19. The District Court in this case correctly instructed the jury to consider mitigating circumstances concurrently with the elements of deliberate homicide. We must assume that the jury followed those instructions. Evenflo, ¶ 103. This assumption holds true here, where Schmidt provided the erroneous verdict form, but the court actually instructed the jury correctly. We have no basis from which to determine that the jury followed the directions on the verdict form to the exclusion of the instruction provided by the District Court. ¶ 39 The Dissent further contends that the legislature has confused the state of the law with regard to the crime of mitigated deliberate homicide. The Dissent raises valid concerns, but it is not this Court's job to write the lawrather we must apply it as written. We note nonetheless that the verdict form suggested by the Dissent would obviate Demontiney -type problems pending a legislative fix. ¶ 40 We further recognize that Schmidt proposed a verdict form that contained functionally the same wording as the one he now claims resulted in a legal impossibility. Schmidt may not now claim prejudice from that form that he proposed. Cline, 246 Mont. at 162, 803 P.2d at 1082. The Court in Demontiney presumed prejudice from the ambiguous verdict form due to the erroneous jury instructions. Demontiney, ¶ 19. We decline to presume prejudice from this verdict form in light of the fact that the District Court correctly instructed the jury. We cannot determine under these circumstances that the verdict form presented by Schmidt, and adopted by the court, substantially prejudiced Schmidt. State v. Scarborough, 2000 MT 301, ¶ 85, 302 Mont. 350, 14 P.3d 1202.