Opinion ID: 2627651
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Application of Declaratory Judgment Law to Plaintiffs' Complaint

Text: [¶ 22] As explained in more detail below, we conclude West`s and Turner`s claims and requests for relief are simply too amorphous to be justiciable. The first two Brimmer elements for a justiciable controversy require the plaintiffs to allege that they have a tangible interest which has been harmed and that a judicial decision in their favor will effectively remedy the harm. In the context of this case, West and Turner needed to allege: the State has a constitutional or statutory duty to undertake some function in administering CBM water; it failed or will fail to do so on CBM facilities affecting their property; that particular failure by the State has damaged or will damage their property in an actual, as opposed to theoretical, way; and a declaration that the State has the responsibility to undertake that specific function will effectively remedy their harm. [¶ 23] While West and Turner do allege the State has generally failed to comply with certain statutory and constitutional duties in administering CBM water and that they have a genuine interest in that they own property that has been harmed by CBM water, they do not allege facts that connect the asserted general deficiencies in the State`s administration of CBM water to direct harm they have suffered or will suffer in the future. Nor, do they allege facts that would indicate a declaratory judgment in accordance with their particular requests for relief will have an actual effect on their properties. [¶ 24] It is very important to focus on what West and Turner allege and what they do not allege in terms of a tangible interest and the utility of a judicial ruling. Many of their allegations are very broad. For example, they state: Plaintiffs bring this action to have the Court resolve constitutional questions regarding management of Wyoming`s most valuable and finite resource: water. This is a matter of great public importance, impacting the social and economic realities of the present-day organization of Wyoming`s society; and The future of Wyoming`s water supply, its lands, and the fabric of its society are threatened by the waste of Wyoming`s ground water, and by the actual and potential damage and injury to soil, crops, vegetation, existing water wells, and ground water and surface water rights that is the result of Defendants` failure to administer water pursuant to the Wyoming Constitution and laws. [¶ 25] With regard to their specific interests, the plaintiffs state in the Parties section of their amended complaint: [9] 8. Plaintiff [West] . . . owns and operates West Ranch. For over fifty years Bill and Marge West have produced crops and raised cattle on the 13,000 acre property. The normal irrigation of the Wests` ranch is prevented by the saline and sodic CBM water that has mixed with the water supply from Spotted Horse Creek. Flooding from CBM water has also killed vegetation and damaged the soil of the ranch`s valuable bottom lands. CBM water stored in reservoirs has flooded bottom lands on the ranch and otherwise leaked out, damaging the soil and killing vegetation. 9. Plaintiffs [Turner] own the Turner Ranch on Bates Creek in the Cheyenne River Drainage. The three permitted wells they use for domestic and stock watering purposes are either dried up or threaten to dry up as a result of CBM ground water pumping in the area. [¶ 26] The plaintiffs` allegation that they own property affected by CBM water indicates they have a tangible interest and satisfies the first Brimmer element. To meet the second element of the Brimmer test and demonstrate that the controversy is one upon which a judgment of the court may effectively operate, they must allege that the State`s failures have affected their property. In other words, the court`s decision must have some practical effect upon the litigants. Reiman, 838 P.2d at 1187. See also , Holly Sugar Corp. v. Fritzler, 42 Wyo. 446, 463, 296 P. 206, 210 (Wyo. 1931); Heilig, ¶ 10, 64 P.3d at 738. Thus, West and Turner must allege facts to link the State`s failures to follow its constitutional and statutory duties and the remedy they seek to impacts on their property. [¶ 27] When we examine the relief requested by West and Turner, we find no allegation as to how that relief will redress or prevent the damage they claim their property has incurred or will certainly incur in the future. They ask that the court enter a judgment declaring that the State`s practice of permitting CBM groundwater wells and reservoirs unconstitutional and in violation of the applicable statutes and rules. They also ask for specific declarations, which we summarize as: 1. The current permitting of CBM ground water and reservoirs violates Wyoming`s statutes because it fails to quantify the amount of water put to beneficial use for CBM production. 2. The [State Engineer`s] practice of permitting CBM ground water without notice and an opportunity for a hearing violates the constitutional right to due process of law under the United States and Wyoming constitutions. 3. The State cannot issue permits for CBM groundwater wells and reservoirs without adopting rules pursuant to WAPA specifically addressing CBM water and defining the public interest. 4. Placement of CBM water in reservoirs and pits for the purpose of achieving disposal of that water through evaporation, infiltration and/or flushing is not a beneficial use of water. 5. The State must evaluate and weigh the public and various interests as part of its duty to supervise Wyoming`s water. 6. The State must inspect and adjudicate all CBM groundwater wells and reservoirs used to store CBM water. [¶ 28] The plaintiffs attack the State`s process for issuing CBM water permits throughout Wyoming and within the Powder River Basin. [10] For example, West and Turner allege that the State has failed to fulfill its duty to consider the public interest in making CBM water permitting decisions. They suggest that, if the State had properly considered the public interest, it would have denied the permits or at least incorporated a condition that the applicants have a disposal plan to reduce the impacts on downstream landowners. The plaintiffs do not, however, allege that the State issued a particular permit affecting their property without considering the public interest, ask that any permit affecting their property be revoked or denied for failure to consider the public interest, or assert with any certainty that permits will be issued in the future that will actually injure their interests. They also do not explain how the relief they request, i.e., that the State be required to consider the public interest before approving applications for well and reservoir permits, will address any past or future harm to them. Instead, they simply assert that future unspecified CBM water production will cause long term damage to the state. [¶ 29] Even if we were to declare that the State is required to consider the public interest, a result that seems to be required by the applicable statutory and constitutional provisions, we cannot be assured that such a declaration would have a practical effect on the plaintiffs. This situation is similar to White, Mountain West and Anderson where this Court ruled that the courts do not have the power to determine anticipated or theoretical disputes and is distinguishable from Rocky Mountain where there was a specific allegation that the plaintiffs were required to immediately apply for permits under the disputed regulatory scheme. [¶ 30] As we explained in Cranston v. Thomson, 530 P.2d 726, 729 (Wyo. 1975), the difference between an abstract question that is nonjusticiable and a controversy contemplated by the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is one of degree. Basically, the problem in each case is whether the facts alleged under all the circumstances show that there is a substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal interests of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the declaratory judgment. Id., citing Golden v. Zwickler , 394 U.S. 103, 89 S.Ct. 956, 959-960, 22 L.Ed.2d 113 (1969). Persons seeking a declaratory judgment, therefore, have the duty to allege sufficient specific facts showing that a judgment in their favor will have an immediate and real effect on them. This is true even under the concept of notice pleading. To find that West and Turner have a justiciable controversy in this case, we would have to make a number of assumptions about facts that are material and necessary to their claims. For instance, we would have to assume that, because their properties have been damaged by CBM water, an order requiring the State to consider the public interest in its permitting decisions would mitigate that damage or prevent it in the future. West and Turner have not made those allegations, and it is not the court`s function or duty to make such assumptions. In the absence of allegations of material and necessary facts, the State is entitled to an order of dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Martinez, 891 P.2d at 790. [¶ 31] It should also be noted that determining whether an agency has properly considered the public interest requires review of the facts of a particular action. See, e.g ., Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441 (Idaho 1985) and Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Washoe County, 918 P.2d 697 (Nev. 1996) (considering whether the involved state agencies had properly considered the public interest when granting specific water appropriation permits). By failing to challenge a particular permit, the plaintiffs have not provided a context in which a court could determine whether the public interest had been considered. [¶ 32] The declarations requested by West and Turner address the harm they claim the permitting process is causing the citizenry of the state and the public interest. However, they are not entitled to a declaratory judgment that the State`s actions violated the rights of other persons, Budd, 543 P.2d at 372. [11] It is not the function of the judicial branch to pass judgment on the general performance of other branches of government. Instead, it is our function to resolve specific controversies between adverse parties and determine whether those parties, in the context of that controversy, have complied with the law. By failing to challenge a specific permitting action, West and Turner have not satisfied the second Brimmer requirement. [¶ 33] The same problem exists with regard to their due process claim. West and Turner do not allege that they were deprived of notice and an opportunity to be heard on any particular permit that affects their property. Instead, they are apparently seeking a declaration that the State`s procedures violate the due process rights of neighboring landowners in general. This assertion presents an abstract legal question rather than the requisite substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal interests of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the declaratory judgment. Cranston, 530 P.2d at 729. [¶ 34] West`s and Turner`s complaints regarding the lack of adjudication and inspection of CBM wells and reservoirs suffer from similar deficiencies. Adjudication of water rights serves the purposes of establishing the relative priorities of water users and quantifying those rights, in accordance with the constitutional and statutory concept of beneficial use. See, e.g ., In re Big Horn River System, 2004 WY 21, 85 P.3d 981 (Wyo. 2004); Nichols v. Hufford, 21 Wyo. 477 , 133 P. 1084 (Wyo. 1913). Inspection serves the obvious purpose of determining whether permitted reservoirs and wells meet the legal requirements. [¶ 35] The plaintiffs claim the statutes require the State to adjudicate CBM wells and reservoirs and the State has failed to do so for a majority of the CBM wells and reservoirs. By alleging that a majority of the CBM wells and reservoirs have not been adjudicated, they are implying that some of them have been. In order to present a justiciable controversy, the plaintiffs are required to assert that the wells and reservoirs affecting their lands (i.e., their tangible interests) have not been adjudicated and that failure by the State has harmed their properties. They do not make that specific allegation. In addition, the plaintiffs do not allege that a judicial order requiring the State to undertake its adjudication function on a state-wide basis will remedy the damages they have suffered or will certainly suffer in the future. [¶ 36] Turner does allege domestic and stock wells on their property have dried up or threaten to dry up because of CBM water pumping in the area. They do not, however, allege that their wells or the relevant CBM wells have not been adjudicated; they have requested an adjudication and the State has refused; particular CBM wells are interfering with their wells; any particular user is taking more water than necessary for beneficial use; or an order requiring the State to undertake state-wide adjudication of CBM wells will remedy their alleged harm. Thus, the plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to show that they are entitled to the relief they requestan order directing the State to undertake adjudication of all CBM wells and reservoirsunder the Declaratory Judgment Act. [¶ 37] West and Turner also assert that the statutes require the State to inspect completed works and assert that water stored in CBM reservoirs has flooded their bottom lands and is otherwise leaking out and damaging their property. They do not, however, identify the CBM reservoirs that are damaging their properties or how a judicial declaration that the State is generally required to inspect reservoirs would effectively redress their particular grievances. Thus, the plaintiffs have not successfully alleged their interest would be protected by an order of the court. [12] In Budd, the plaintiff did not allege how the Surplus Water Law affected his water rights and, therefore, he did not present a justiciable claim. Similarly, the plaintiffs here do not connect the State`s alleged failures to follow its statutory duties for adjudication and inspection to their particular circumstances. By requesting some type of general ruling that the State is improperly administering CBM water without challenging a specific action or requesting individualized relief, the plaintiffs` complaint is a perfect example of a nonjusticiable controversy and a failure to meet the minimal requirements for notice pleading under W.R.C.P. 8. [¶ 38] Moreover, as we explained in Rocky Mountain and Bonnie M. Quinn, when the matter at issue is one that has been delegated to an administrative agency, such as whether to grant a permit, the challenger must utilize available administrative processes rather than bring a declaratory judgment action. By refusing to consider a declaratory action in matters requiring agency expertise, we avoid usurping the agency`s fact finding and discretionary functions. Such a situation is distinguishable from when a party challenges the agency`s statutory authority to act, like the producers` challenge to the EQC`s authority to adopt rules in Rocky Mountain, which is an appropriate declaratory judgment action. [¶ 39] There are administrative remedies available to West and Turner for many of their complaints, and they apparently have not availed themselves of those procedures. First, Turner could file a well interference action pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-911 (LexisNexis 2007) [13] to remedy the alleged interference with their wells by CBM wells. A well interference action would provide a specific factual scenario for the agencies and, on judicial review, the courts to consider. [¶ 40] To the extent the plaintiffs are asserting that CBM producers are using more water than necessary for production of methane gas, i.e., exceeding the amount necessary for beneficial use and/or wasting water, they have other remedies available to them to protect their water rights in the affected streams and/or wells. In Zezas Ranch, Inc. v. Board of Control, 714 P.2d 759 (Wyo. 1986), we stated that, under the proper circumstances, the Board of Control has jurisdiction to consider a petition from a surface water user to adjudicate another user`s right. Id. at 761. Presumably, the State has similar powers with respect to groundwater wells. Thus, if the appropriate circumstances were presented, the plaintiffs could petition the Board of Control for a determination of the quantity of water another water right holder is entitled to use. [¶ 41] The plaintiffs could also petition the district court, pursuant to § 16-3-114, for review of a particular administrative action, such as the granting of a well permit or an adjudication order, so long as they could show that they were aggrieved or adversely affected by the agency action or inaction. Under such circumstances, the plaintiffs could challenge the processes used by the State in making its decision and/or the legal and factual basis for the decision. There is no showing in this case that the plaintiffs have challenged the permits affecting their properties through the available administrative channels. [¶ 42] Likewise, West`s and Turner`s request for an order directing the State to adopt new or revised rules and regulations is not appropriate for declaratory judgment. Wyoming statutes specifically give the State authority to adopt rules and regulations for the administration of water, see, e.g ., Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-4-211, 41-3-909 and 41-33-08 (LexisNexis 2007). The State has adopted rules pertaining to groundwater and reservoirs, although they are not specific to CBM water. See , Rules of State Engineer`s Office, Chap. 1 (Introduction to Wyoming Water Administration); Chap. 4 § 2 (Adjudication of Proofs, Groundwater Proofs) (2005); Rules of State Engineer`s Office, Surface Water, Chap. 5 (Reservoirs) (1980); Rules of State Engineer`s Office, Ground Water Rules (1974). [¶ 43] Any interested person may petition an agency for promulgation, amendment or repeal of a rule under § 16-3-106. We recognized the importance of the petition process in Goedert v. State ex rel., Wyo. Worker's Safety and Comp. Div., 991 P.2d 1225, 1228 (Wyo. 1999). West and Turner should have requested rule making before seeking a declaratory judgment ordering the State to undertake that function. [14] This is especially true because, under the procedure set forth in § 16-3-106, a petitioner may accompany his petition with relevant data, views and arguments to help the agency determine if the petitioned action is appropriate. We conclude, therefore, that West`s and Turner`s fourth cause of action does not present a justiciable controversy. [¶ 44] The plaintiffs stress that this case presents a matter of great public importance and, consequently, the elements of a justiciable controversy should be ignored or relaxed. As conceded by the State, the administration of water is unquestionably a matter of great importance in Wyoming`s arid environment. Over a century ago, this Court stated: It is doubtful if any questions of graver importance than those affecting water rights are presented for judicial consideration. Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpenter, 9 Wyo. 110, 61 P. 258, 259 (Wyo. 1900). [¶ 45] Jolley v. State Loan and Inv. Bd., 2002 WY 7, ¶ 9, 38 P.3d 1073, 1077 (Wyo. 2002) involved a petition for review of agency action under § 16-3-114(a); nevertheless, we examined the public interest element of our justiciable controversy jurisprudence. See also , Riedel v. Anderson, 2003 WY 70, ¶ 22, 70 P.3d 223, 230 (Wyo. 2003). We have recognized a more expansive or relaxed definition of standing when a matter of great public interest or importance is at stake. Washakie County School District Number One , 606 P.2d 310, 317 [(Wyo. 1980)]. . . . Historically, we have applied the great public interest and importance doctrine to find standing where we ordinarily would not in the following instances: Washakie County School District Number One , 606 P.2d 310 (constitutionality of school financing); Memorial Hospital of Laramie County , 770 P.2d 223 [(Wyo. 1989)] (tax exempt status of hospital); State ex rel. Wyoming Association of Consulting Engineers and Land Surveyors v. Sullivan , 798 P.2d 826 (Wyo. 1990) (constitutionality of the Wyoming Professional Review Panel Act); Board of County Commissioners of the County of Laramie v. Laramie County School District Number One , 884 P.2d 946 (Wyo. 1994) (entitlement of school district to interest on school district funds held by county treasurer); and Management Council of the Wyoming Legislature , 953 P.2d 839 [(Wyo. 1998)] (constitutional scope of governor's veto power). . . . . [W]e have historically applied the doctrine when a constitutional question is presentedas in Washakie School District Number One ; Wyoming Association of Consulting Engineers and Land Surveyors; and Management Council  or where the issue concerns the apportionment of state revenues among governmental entitiesas in Memorial Hospital and Board of County Commissioners of the County of Laramie . . . . The doctrine of great public interest or importance should be applied cautiously: The question of great public importance rests with this court, Kellner v. District Court In and For City and County of Denver , 127 Colo. 320, 256 P.2d 887, 888 [(Colo. 1953)]. This exception must be applied with caution and its exercise must be a matter where strict standards are applied to avoid the temptation to apply the judge's own beliefs and philosophies to a determination of what questions are of great public importance. Brimmer v. Thomson , 521 P.2d 574, 578 (Wyo. 1974). Jolley, ¶ 9, 38 P.3d at 1077-78 (some citations omitted). [¶ 46] Although we have said that the requirements for a justiciable controversy may be relaxed or avoided in matters of great public interest or importance, we have also stated that wanting any of [the Brimmer ] requisites, a great public interest alone is insufficient to warrant the action of the court under any situation which we might at present foresee. Cranston, 530 P.2d at 729. A close reading of the cases applying the public interest exception indicates that we have not detoured from Cranston . The plaintiffs in cases involving a matter of great public importance have also alleged a tangible interest that would receive some practical benefit from a judicial decision. For example, in Brimmer, incumbent state senators stated that they planned to file as gubernatorial candidates in the upcoming election. Consequently, a decision about the legality of running for the governor`s office while still holding the office of state senator would have a practical effect on them. In Washakie County , the plaintiffs included parents, children, and school board members whose interests were directly affected by inequality in public school funding, and, in Memorial Hospital, the public hospital`s finances would be directly affected by a decision on whether it owed sales tax on construction purchases. In Director of State Lands & Investments v. Merbanco, Inc., 2003 WY 73, 70 P.3d 241 (Wyo. 2003), school children, their parents and the Wyoming Education Association were found to have standing to challenge the constitutionality of exchanges of school trust lands without competitive bid, a matter of great public importance; however, a corporation that was only a prospective bidder did not. While this Court has recognized a more lenient definition of justiciablity in matters of great public importance, the facts alleged in these cases demonstrate that public importance alone is not sufficient to establish justiciability. [¶ 47] The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act envisions a true justiciable controversy before the court may decide a matter, even if the case presents a matter of great public importance. The act does not extend the jurisdiction of the court and § 1-37-103 specifically requires that an interested person present an appropriate right for declaration before the court can assume jurisdiction. If we were to rule that any matter of great public importance could be litigated under the Declaratory Judgments Act, we would be impermissibly extending our jurisdiction beyond that allowed under the act and the concept of justiciability firmly established in our jurisprudence. [¶ 48] By ruling that the Court does not have jurisdiction over this case, we do not want to leave the impression that we approve of the State`s administration of CBM water. West and Turner raise serious allegations of damages to their property from CBM water and failures on the part of the State to properly regulate CBM water statewide. The plaintiffs` failure to connect any particular state action to their harm prevents them from establishing justiciablity here. Nevertheless, in the event we are presented with a true justiciable controversy in another case, we will not hesitate to determine whether the State`s processes meet the constitutional and statutory directives.