Opinion ID: 2735768
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fennell’s Ineffective Assistance Claim

Text: Considering the record as a whole, we cannot say that the state 3.850 court’s determination that Fennell’s trial counsel was not ineffective was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Strickland or that the state 3.850 court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented during the evidentiary hearing. Defense counsel Cunningham testified that juror sympathy for the victim was a critical issue to her trial strategy because it was important to the success of 10 Case: 13-10254 Date Filed: 09/22/2014 Page: 11 of 15 Fennell’s self-defense argument. To that end, Cunningham and her co-counsel planned to strike for cause potential jurors who would allow their sympathy for the victim to affect their deliberations. And, indeed, a substantial portion of voir dire was devoted to questioning each prospective juror about the effect sympathy might have on his or her impartiality. The problem for Fennell here is that Cunningham’s exchange with Abdool during voir dire about sympathy was ambiguous and did not show actual bias. To be sure, Abdool indicated he had sympathy as a parent. Cunningham then asked a follow-up, compound question, which asked first whether he would have sympathy, “[n]ot as a parent, but as a juror,” and Abdool responded, “No.” We recognize the second part of the question asked whether Abdool would “be able to set aside sympathy” and the “No” applied to that, too. The problem is the “No” to the first part of the question makes the second part unnecessary. In any event, the question and answer are ambiguous, and, thus, this is not a case in which the prospective juror made a clear declaration that he could not be impartial. Moreover, at the evidentiary hearing, both Cunningham and the prosecutor testified that they believed Abdool’s “No” response indicated he did not have sympathy as a juror and was capable of being impartial. Cunningham further testified that she did not believe she had a basis to strike Abdool for cause. 11 Case: 13-10254 Date Filed: 09/22/2014 Page: 12 of 15 Notably, Cunningham’s and the prosecutor’s interpretation of Abdool’s answer is supported by the other evidence in the record. Neither Cunningham nor the prosecutor, each with over twenty years of trial experience, noted any “sympathy” issues with Abdool on their jury selection charts, although they did make such notes for other prospective jurors. Indeed, in their testimony at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, both Cunningham and the prosecutor testified that they had indicated no concerns on their jury selection charts about potential sympathy during voir dire of Abdool. Further, Cunningham previously had asked the entire panel whether anyone felt he or she could not be an impartial juror because of feelings of sympathy, and only one panel member, Reeder, responded. Cunningham testified that, based on Abdool’s failure to respond to this question to the entire panel, she did not believe Abdool had sympathy for the victim. In addition, the prosecutor asked the venire if they could be fair and impartial and no member replied that they could not. The prosecutor asked: As judges of the facts in this case, I wanted to ask you if anyone here would have any, either religious or moral beliefs that you feel would prevent you from being able to be a fair and impartial juror and decide if a person is either guilty or not guilty of committing a crime; does anyone, who has not already said anything to respond to such a question? Does anyone have anything that comes up in their mind that you feel would prevent you from sitting as a fair and impartial juror[?] 12 Case: 13-10254 Date Filed: 09/22/2014 Page: 13 of 15 No one in the venire, including Abdool, responded to the question. Finally, the trial judge, who was active throughout voir dire, never expressed any concern about Abdool. As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, the question of whether a prospective juror is biased is “largely one of demeanor,” and a prospective juror’s demeanor during voir dire may make clear what seems ambiguous on the face of a cold transcript: Demeanor plays a fundamental role not only in determining juror credibility, but also in simply understanding what a potential juror is saying. Any complicated voir dire calls upon lay persons to think and express themselves in unfamiliar terms, as a reading of any transcript of such a proceeding will reveal. Demeanor, inflection, the flow of the questions and answers can make confused and conflicting utterances comprehensible. Patton, 467 U.S. at 1038 & n.14, 104 S. Ct. at 2892 & n.14. Here, none of the people in the best position to evaluate Abdool’s response appear to have understood him to mean that he could not be impartial. In contrast, Fennell did not present any evidence, other than the voir dire transcript, to show that Abdool was actually biased against him. Instead, Fennell points to the state 3.850 court’s order granting him an evidentiary hearing and claims that the state 3.850 court found in that order that Abdool was biased and should have been removed from the panel. The language Fennell points to, however, was part of the state 3.850 court’s threshold analysis to determine 13 Case: 13-10254 Date Filed: 09/22/2014 Page: 14 of 15 whether the Fennell’s factual allegations were “conclusively rebutted by the record” or did not “demonstrate a deficiency on the part of counsel which [was] detrimental to” Fennell and thus showed that Fennell was not entitled to relief. LeCroy v. Dugger, 727 So. 2d 236, 239 (Fla. 1998) (quoting Kennedy v. State, 547 So. 2d 912, 913 (Fla. 1989) (explaining the standard Florida courts use to determine whether to grant a post-conviction petitioner an evidentiary hearing on an ineffective assistance claim). Furthermore, Fennell made this argument at the outset of the 3.850 hearing, and the state 3.850 court made it clear that it had not yet made any factual findings on the merits of Fennell’s claims. Thus, the state 3.850 court’s order granting Fennell an evidentiary hearing did not establish that Abdool was actually biased. Given that a prospective juror’s ambiguous statements about his ability to be impartial do not give rise to a presumption of actual bias, the state 3.850 court’s determination that Fennell failed to show actual bias was reasonable. Furthermore, Abdool’s ambiguous response, alone, cannot rebut the presumption that his defense counsel acted competently. See Williams, 598 F.3d at 794. Under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable attorney in Cunningham’s shoes could have concluded that there was no need to move to strike Abdool for cause. Furthermore, for the same reason that Cunningham’s failure to object to Abdool was not deficient performance, Fennell cannot show that Abdool’s 14 Case: 13-10254 Date Filed: 09/22/2014 Page: 15 of 15 presence on the jury prejudiced him. Fennell did not show that Abdool was actually biased against him. Both during voir dire and immediately prior to deliberations the state trial court instructed the jury that its verdict should be based on the evidence and not on feelings of sympathy. In addition, Abdool, along with the other empaneled jurors, took an oath to be fair and impartial. Jurors are presumed to follow the law as instructed by the trial court and to comply with their oaths. Hallford v. Culliver, 459 F.3d 1193, 1204 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Khoury, 901 F.2d 948, 955 (11th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 910 F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1990). Without any evidence that Abdool was actually biased, we must presume that he followed the trial judge’s instructions, set aside his feelings of sympathy, and was fair and impartial during deliberations. In sum, Fennell has not shown that the state 3.850 court’s decision rejecting his ineffective assistance claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Strickland or other clearly established federal law or that the decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Fennell’s § 2254 petition. AFFIRMED. 15