Opinion ID: 2087646
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application of the Fair and Just Reason Standard to this Case

Text: ¶ 64 We now review the circuit court's decision in this case, bearing in mind the standard of review and use of the record to support the circuit court's decision. ¶ 65 Jenkins had a lengthy criminal history when he appeared before the court at his sentencing hearing and attempted to withdraw his plea. He had been convicted of two prior felonies, had his parole revoked, and had established a record of violence against both family and strangers. From the beginning of this case, Jenkins had been represented by counsel. He had several months to consider a plea agreement offered by the State. On February 24, 2003, he accepted that agreement pleading guilty to selling heroin, a third felonyafter participating in a thorough plea colloquy with the court. After the plea, he was returned to the Dodge Correctional Institution on a prior offense. ¶ 66 Before the sentencing hearing and two months after entering his plea, Jenkins received and examined a presentence investigation (PSI) that described the offense, the defendant's admission of that offense, the defendant's admission of extensive drug dealing, and the defendant's nickname of Streetwise, as well as the PSI writer's recommendation of five to seven years in prison, plus one to two years of extended supervision. Hence, before the sentencing hearing, Jenkins knew that the PSI recommended a prison sentence at least two-and-a-half times what the prosecutor was pledged to recommend. ¶ 67 At the sentencing hearing, Jenkins' counsel asked for another 30 to 60 days of postponement to see whether federal authorities would decide to meet with Jenkins. Jenkins' counsel had already debriefed Jenkins and supplied the Milwaukee County District Attorney's office with a summary of information that Jenkins was prepared to discuss. At the request of one prosecutor, two Milwaukee police detectives met with Jenkins. Another prosecutor encouraged federal authorities to talk with Jenkins, but they never accepted the invitation. Consequently, the court decided not to postpone sentencing again. ¶ 68 Jenkins then moved to withdraw his plea. When the court asked him the basis for his request, he proffered the following reason: Stipulations that I'm not able to fulfill, what I had my projections on. I'm sure the federal agents were meaning to speak to me. In response to the court's question of his understanding of what was going to happen when he entered a plea, Jenkins replied: At least I would benefit, at least, you know, something, at least to, you know, be able to get out of the life I'm already in or I was involved in at the time. And sort of, you know, they bring in at least to assist the state here, you know, from much of the troubles I've caused and the stress we place on Milwaukee, the police department here in this state, and sort of abolish this heroin that's flowing into the states and guns and everything else, so sort of just kind of get myself cleared up and get back on track. It's not too much about the time, you know. It's not much time. I've done, as you can read, I've done time before. My point is just to get some changes, you know, with myself and help. ¶ 69 To that response, the court told Jenkins that it was not going to permit Jenkins to withdraw his plea. The court reasoned that Jenkins had a hope that did not come to fruition. Because there was no breach of the plea agreement, the court did not allow Jenkins to withdraw his plea. ¶ 70 On appeal, Jenkins argues that the circuit court's decision should be reversed because it applied the wrong legal standard by considering Jenkins' request for plea withdrawal in the context of a breach of a plea agreement, rather than in the context of his misunderstanding the consequences of the plea. Jenkins argues that the circuit court focused on whether the opportunity to work with law enforcement was part of the plea agreement instead of whether Jenkins believed that the opportunity to work with law enforcement was part of the plea agreement. We see this argument as without merit. ¶ 71 First, Jenkins did not proffer a fair and just reason at the time of his motion for plea withdrawal. [T]he burden is on the defendant to offer a fair and just reason for withdrawal of the plea. Canedy, 161 Wis.2d at 583-84, 469 N.W.2d 163. Jenkins did not plainly assert that he misunderstood the consequences of the plea. Jenkins asserted that he wanted to withdraw his plea because of stipulations that he could not fulfill and because of his projections. Disappointment and unfulfilled hopes are not the same as a misunderstanding of the consequences of the plea. See Leitner, 247 Wis.2d 195, ¶ 33, 633 N.W.2d 207; Dudrey, 74 Wis.2d at 486, 247 N.W.2d 105. ¶ 72 Even after the court explicitly asked Jenkins at sentencing about his understanding of what was going to happen when he entered a plea, he did not assert that he thought his cooperation with law enforcement would lead to definite sentencing benefits. Nor did he assert that anyone had told him that his plea would guarantee an opportunity to work with law enforcement. Instead, Jenkins discussed how he wanted to help the community through his cooperation and help himself by getting out of the life he was living. Had Jenkins and his attorney actually had an agreement with authorities, they would have found some way to memorialize the agreement off the record. Jenkins' imprisonment for eight months before the plea made his active cooperation with authorities virtually impossible. ¶ 73 Second, even if we assume that Jenkins alleged a misunderstanding of the plea, the circuit court still had to find that this misunderstanding actually existed. See Dudrey, 74 Wis.2d at 485, 247 N.W.2d 105. The circuit court did not explicitly state during the motion for plea withdrawal that it did not believe that Jenkins misunderstood the consequences of his plea, but the court rejected the proffered misunderstanding when it stated that Jenkins simply had a hope that did not come to fruition. The circuit court made this statement right after it heard Jenkins explain what he thought was going to happen. ¶ 74 The circuit court's statement supports the inference that the circuit court found that Jenkins understood the consequences of the plea and simply took his chances on whether he would be able to meet with law enforcement and benefit from that encounter. See Dudrey, 74 Wis.2d at 486, 247 N.W.2d 105. Like the defendant in Dudrey, when Jenkins realized that his chances had passed, he decided to withdraw his plea. See id. As we have stated, [t]he defendant must show some reason more than a mere desire to have a trial. Id. There must be some fair and just reason for a change of heart. In its post-conviction decision, the circuit court explicitly found that Jenkins did not misunderstand the consequences of his plea. ¶ 75 Third, even if we were to accept Jenkins' argument that the circuit court applied the wrong legal standard by not considering his plea withdrawal in the context of a misunderstanding of the plea, we must still independently review the record to determine whether the [circuit] court's decision can be sustained when the facts are applied to the applicable law. Shanks, 152 Wis.2d at 289, 448 N.W.2d 264. ¶ 76 When we review the record, especially the plea colloquy, we find evidence to support a finding that Jenkins did not misunderstand the consequences of his plea. ¶ 77 In the plea colloquy, the State recited the terms of the plea agreement: The State is recommending 24 months initial confinement, 24 months extended supervision, a thousand dollars fine, plus costs. The court asked Jenkins: [H]as [the State] correctly set forth what the State is required to recommend at the time of sentencing? Jenkins replied, Yes. ¶ 78 Jenkins' affirmative response indicates that he understood what the State would recommend in exchange for his plea. The State's recommendation did not include any benefit conditioned on Jenkins' cooperation with law enforcement. Significantly, Attorney Barrett made a revealing statement about the plea agreement at the beginning of the plea hearing, when he said: It wasn't much of a negotiation. Attorney Barrett's statement reinforces the fact that Jenkins' cooperation with law enforcement was not part of the plea agreement. ¶ 79 The circuit court also warned Jenkins that it was not required to follow the State's recommendation: THE COURT: Mr. Jenkins, the State is required at the time of sentencing to make the recommendation that you heard [the State] describe in court. I want you to understand that I am not required to follow that recommendation. I could impose any penalty up to the maximum allowed by law. Do you understand what I am saying? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. Jenkins' affirmative response indicated that he understood that regardless of any plea agreement, the court was not required to follow the State's recommendation at sentencing. Thus, Jenkins understood that even if he had been able to fully cooperate with law enforcement and earn more favorable comment, the court did not have to follow the State's recommendation. ¶ 80 The court also inquired whether anyone had promised Jenkins something to get Jenkins to plead guilty: THE COURT: Other than what the State has agreed to recommend, has anybody promised you anything to get you to plead guilty here today? THE DEFENDANT: No, they haven't. THE COURT: Has anybody threatened you to get you to plead guilty? THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am. THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty because you are guilty? THE DEFENDANT: Totally. Jenkins' responses demonstrate that Jenkins did not believe that the State, his lawyer, or any law enforcement official promised him anything beyond the plea bargain to induce him to plead guilty. ¶ 81 The record of the plea colloquy also indicates that the court followed its other statutory and court-mandated duties. First, the court established Jenkins' understanding of the charge against him by referring to the guilty plea questionnaire and the jury instructions for the crime of Delivery of a Controlled Substance. See Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a); Brown, 293 Wis.2d 594, ¶ 35, 716 N.W.2d 906. The court informed Jenkins of the range of punishment he was facing. See id. ¶ 82 The court also established the factual basis for Jenkins' plea. See Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b); Brown, 293 Wis.2d 594, ¶ 35, 716 N.W.2d 906. When the court asked Jenkins if he agreed with the allegations in the complaint, Jenkins explained that he did not agree that he spoke to the undercover officers during the delivery. After hearing Jenkins' objection to one piece of information, the court found that, based on the criminal complaint and its colloquy with Jenkins, there was a factual basis for Jenkins' plea. ¶ 83 Implicit in the court's acceptance of Jenkins' plea was a determination that the circuit court believed that Jenkins understood the nature of the charge and the effects of his plea. See Id., ¶ 37 (stating, If a defendant does not understand the nature of the charge and the implications of the plea, he should not be entering the plea, and the court should not be accepting the plea.). ¶ 84 Based on the extensive plea colloquy, there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that Jenkins understood the consequences of his plea. We may, however, also look to other evidence in the record to support this conclusion. For instance, we look to the letter that Jenkins' attorney wrote to Jenkins concerning the opportunity to work with law enforcement. [14] ¶ 85 We must accept the circuit court's finding that th[is] letter refers to a multitude of possibilities, none of which a reasonable person would construe as a `guaranteed opportunity[,]' unless the finding is clearly erroneous. It is not. ¶ 86 We also refer to the letters that Jenkins wrote to Judge Lamelas before the plea hearing and before the sentencing hearing. In the first letter, dated December 1, 2002, Jenkins foreshadowed accepting the State's plea offer without any reference to future cooperation with law enforcement. [15] In the second letter, Jenkins complained about a conspiracy against him. He stated that it was his understanding that he would have to plead guilty to the charge in order to receive any type of benefit or relief in terms of an agreement. He also told the court that the plea he entered was not genuine or of his own free will, and that he entered the guilty plea for the purpose of mentally gaining [the court's] approval. He told the court that he was not guilty of these accusations. [16] Jenkins also complained about his counsel's representation and asked the circuit court to dismiss the case against him. ¶ 87 Jenkins' second letter contradicts prior statements and known facts. When the circuit court referenced the letter, after denying Jenkins' motion for plea withdrawal, it addressed only Jenkins' alleged dissatisfaction with his attorney. The court discounted this dissatisfaction by noting that Jenkins' attorney did not get to control the offer from the State. The court's silence as to other allegations supports a finding that the circuit court did not find Jenkins' letter credible. ¶ 88 Even if Jenkins entertained hopes of giving extensive cooperation to law enforcement in order to potentially affect his sentence, his hopes were too unrealistic in view of the serious charge against him, his lengthy incarceration before his plea, and his extensive criminal history, to constitute a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea when his hopes were not realized. Jenkins knew he could not count on that cooperation to materially affect his sentence. [17]