Opinion ID: 3149319
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Advice from the ICE Agent

Text: Cordova also contends that the ICE agent misinformed her with respect to her eligibility for relief from removal and that the misinformation induced her to sign the waiver. As previously mentioned, because Cordova did not raise this argument before the district court, we review it for plain error. See United States v. Chavez–Hernandez, 671 F.3d 494, 497 (5th Cir. 2012). To succeed on plain error review, an appellant must show (1) a forfeited error, (2) that is clear or obvious, and (3) that affects her substantial rights. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If an appellant makes such a showing, we may exercise our discretion “to remedy the error . . . only if the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 8 7 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit has held that an IJ could not have found that the alien’s waiver was voluntary and knowing based only on the signed stipulated form of removal. United States v. Gomez, 757 F.3d 885, 898 (9th Cir. 2014). The court found that it constituted an invalid waiver of the right to appeal and that it was a violation of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b). 8 The government argues that Cordova’s plea agreement waived this claim. The plea agreement waived any appeal except for “issues relating to the district court’s ruling on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment.” Because this issue is related to the court’s ruling 12 Case: 14-50053 Document: 00513245181 Page: 13 Date Filed: 10/23/2015 No. 14-50053 Cordova contends that the ICE agent incorrectly advised her that her prior drug conviction was an aggravated felony, which rendered her ineligible for relief from removal, and that the misinformation induced her to sign the waiver. Having an aggravated felony makes an alien ineligible for cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3), and Cordova was charged with having an aggravated felony, the methamphetamine conviction. The agent’s advice regarding the availability of relief was correct with respect to the applicable BIA precedent at the time. In re Ismael Yanez-Garcia, 23 I & N Dec. 390, 398 (BIA 2002). However, a few months after Cordova’s removal proceedings, the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court determined that an offense such as Cordova’s drug conviction does not qualify as an aggravated felony. GonzalesGomez v. Achim, 441 F.3d 532, 533 (7th Cir. 2006); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 60 (2006). Cordova contends that the misinformation about the possibility of obtaining relief rendered her waiver unknowing and involuntary. Relying on Mendoza-Lopez, Cordova asserts that the invalid waiver rendered her removal proceedings fundamentally unfair. However, in Mendoza-Lopez, the Supreme Court accepted the government’s invitation to assume (and not decide) that the “respondents’ rights to due process were violated by the failure of the Immigration Judge to explain adequately their right to suspension of deportation or their right to appeal.” 481 U.S. at 839–40. Thus, Cordova’s reliance on Mendoza-Lopez is misplaced. Our precedent precludes Cordova from demonstrating plain error. We have held that relief that is “available within the broad discretion of the on the motion to dismiss the indictment, we reject the government’s argument that this claim is waived by the plea agreement. 13 Case: 14-50053 Document: 00513245181 Page: 14 Date Filed: 10/23/2015 No. 14-50053 Attorney General is not a right protected by due process.” Lopez-Ortiz, 313 F.3d at 231. More specifically, we held that because an alien’s eligibility for discretionary relief from removal is not a liberty or property interest deserving of due process protection, an IJ’s failure to explain the eligibility for such relief “does not rise to the level of fundamental unfairness.” Id. It is undisputed that the cancellation of removal at issue in the instant case constitutes discretionary relief. Accordingly, it follows that the ICE agent’s failure to explain to Cordova that there was a possibility that she could become eligible for discretionary relief does not demonstrate fundamental unfairness. Cordova recognizes our precedent and attempts to distinguish her case. She asserts that Lopez-Ortiz does not control her case because she did not receive a hearing, and it was undisputed that Lopez-Ortiz was afforded a hearing and a fair opportunity to be heard. 313 F.3d at 230–31. Cordova argues that the misinformation regarding her eligibility to avoid removal resulted in the deprivation of her right to a removal hearing, a right that LopezOrtiz emphasized is guaranteed by principles of due process. Thus, she contends that her case is not governed by Lopez-Ortiz’s holding on fundamental fairness. 9 We are not persuaded that Lopez-Ortiz does not control. Although the right to a hearing is guaranteed by due process, as previously explained, such a right can be waived. A majority of circuits agree with our holding in LopezOrtiz that there is no constitutional right to be informed of eligibility for—or to be considered for—discretionary relief. United States v. Soto-Mateo, 799 F.3d 117, 123 (1st Cir. 2015); United States v. Santiago-Ochoa, 447 F.3d 1015, 9 Alternatively, Cordova seeks to preserve the argument that the holding in Lopez-Ortiz is incorrect and should be overturned by this court en banc or by the Supreme Court. 14 Case: 14-50053 Document: 00513245181 Page: 15 Date Filed: 10/23/2015 No. 14-50053 1020 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Torres, 383 F.3d 92, 104–06 (3rd Cir. 2004); United States v. Aguirre-Tello, 353 F.3d 1199, 1204–05 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc); Smith v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 425, 430 (4th Cir. 2002); Oguejiofor v. Attorney General of U.S., 277 F.3d 1305, 1309 (11th Cir. 2002); EscuderoCorona v. INS, 244 F.3d 608, 615 (8th Cir. 2001); Ashki v. INS, 233 F.3d 913, 921 (6th Cir. 2000). But see United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 70–73 (2d Cir. 2004) (opining that a “failure to advise a potential deportee of a right to seek Section 212(c) relief can, if prejudicial, be fundamentally unfair”); United States v. Arrieta, 224 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the IJ’s failure to inform the alien of eligibility for relief from removal violated due process). Moreover, in the above-cited First and Seventh Circuit cases, the aliens waived their right to a hearing and did not appear before an IJ. Soto-Mateo, 799 F.3d at 119; Santiago-Ochoa, 447 F.3d at 1019. Although the aliens had waived their right to a hearing, those two circuits held that the aliens had no constitutional right to be informed of their eligibility for discretionary relief. Those two cases are indistinguishable from Cordova’s case. Agreeing with our sister circuits’ reasoning, Cordova is precluded from showing that any error was clear or obvious. Additionally, Cordova has not shown that the ICE agent’s advice affected her substantial rights. In other words, she has failed to show that the agent’s advice prejudiced her. If Cordova had gone before the IJ, there is no reason to believe that the IJ would have given her different advice with respect to her eligibility for cancellation of removal. As she points out, the alien in LopezOrtiz was afforded a hearing before an IJ. 313 F.3d at 227. However, in LopezOrtiz, once the IJ found the alien removable, the alien declined to remain in detention and did not appeal the ruling. Id. Cordova has failed to show that 15 Case: 14-50053 Document: 00513245181 Page: 16 Date Filed: 10/23/2015 No. 14-50053 she would have changed her mind about her willingness to remain detained had the same advice been given to her by an IJ instead of the agent. Cf. SotoMateo, 799 F.3d at 123–24 (explaining that the “appellant’s unsolicited request to speed up the removal process is some indication that he had no stomach for deportation proceedings (during which he was likely to have been detained)”). Cordova has failed to show prejudice and thus cannot show her substantial rights were affected. At least in the context of plain error, Cordova has not carried her burden of showing that the agent’s advice rendered her proceedings fundamentally unfair.