Opinion ID: 1649129
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Termination of Shawna's Parental Rights

Text: The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence to terminate Shawna's parental rights under both § 43-292(6) and (7). The State contends that neither parent contested that Shelby was in out-of-home placement for over 15 of the most recent 22 months when the petition was filed and that Shawna was unable to rehabilitate herself in that time. Although the State does not argue in its brief why it is in Shelby's best interests to terminate Shawna's parental rights, at oral argument, the State asserted that Shawna had continued to place Shelby at risk by seeking unnecessary medical treatment. Shawna, however, contends that the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in Shelby's best interests. She argues that (1) Clark's opinion that she placed Shelby at risk by seeking unnecessary medical treatment was not credible because MacDonald's testimony showed Shawna had not harmed Shelby through medical contacts or treatment and (2) the State admitted that Shawna and Shelby are bonded. [1,2] For a juvenile court to terminate parental rights under § 43-292, it must find that termination is in the child's best interests and that one or more of statutory grounds listed in this section have been satisfied. The State must prove these facts by clear and convincing evidence. See In re Interest of Mainor T. & Estela T., 267 Neb. 232, 674 N.W.2d 442 (2004). Clear and convincing evidence is that amount of evidence which produces in the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction about the existence of a fact to be proved. In re Interest of Aaron D., supra . [3] Here, the State satisfied the statutory ground for termination under subsection (7). See § 43-292(7) (allowing termination if juvenile has been in out-of-home placement for 15 or more of most recent 22 months). The State removed Shelby the second time on March 12, 2002, and she had been in continuous out-of-home placement for 15 months and 12 days when the termination petition was filed on June 24, 2003. If this were the only ground for termination, the only question would be whether termination was in Shelby's best interests. See In re Interest of Aaron D., supra . But the juvenile court also found grounds for termination under subsection (6). In In re Interest of Aaron D., we stated that the evidence adduced to prove termination on any statutory ground other than subsection (7) is highly relevant to the best interests of the juvenile, as it would show abandonment, neglect, unfitness, or abuse. 269 Neb. at 260, 691 N.W.2d at 173. Thus, whether the State proved by clear and convincing evidence grounds for termination under subsection (6) is highly relevant to a determination of Shelby's best interests. [4,5] When a court adjudicates a juvenile under § 43-247(3)(a), a termination under § 43-292(6) requires a finding that reasonable efforts to preserve and unify the family under the direction of the court have failed to correct the conditions leading to the determination. In re Interest of Rebecka P., 266 Neb. 869, 669 N.W.2d 658 (2003). And when a parent is unable or unwilling to rehabilitate himself or herself within a reasonable time, the best interests of the children require termination of the parental rights. In re Interest of Mainor T. & Estela T., supra . At the termination hearing, Clark again contended that Shawna's inaccurate reporting of Shelby's symptoms put Shelby at risk because it was harmful to place a child on unnecessary medications. Implicit in her testimony is the assumption that Shawna had subjected Shelby to unnecessary medical treatment. Thus, we look to the only relevant allegation from the adjudication: Shawna has subjected Shelby to excessive and unnecessary medical treatment to the detriment of the child.