Opinion ID: 3038354
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: MacDonald’s Charges Under the Washington Law

Text: Against Discrimination Apart from her constitutional claims, which we do not consider, MacDonald does not contend that her sexual harassment charge survives under Wash. Rev. Code § 40.60.180, which exempts nonprofit religious organizations from discrimination by “employers” on the basis of sex. See also Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.040(3). However, MacDonald contends that other provisions of the Washington Law Against Discrimination, namely Wash. Rev. Code §§ 49.60.010,9 49.60.030,10 and 49.60.210(1),11 prohibit sex discrimination 9 Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.010 provides: This chapter shall be known as the “law against discrimination”. It is an exercise of the police power of the state for the protection of the public welfare, health, and peace of the people of this state, and in fulfillment of the provisions of the Constitution of this state concerning civil rights. The legislature hereby finds and declares that practices of discrimination against any of its inhabitants because of race, creed, color, national origin, families with children, sex, marital status, age, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability . . . are a matter of state concern, that such discrimination threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of its inhabitants but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free democratic state. A state agency is herein created with powers with respect to elimination and prevention of discrimination in employment, in credit and insurance transactions, in places of public resort, accommodation, or amusement, and in real property transactions because of race, creed, color, national origin, families with children, sex, marital status, age, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability . . . ; and the commission established hereunder is hereby given general jurisdiction and power for such purposes. 10 Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.030 provides in relevant part: MACDONALD v. GRACE CHURCH SEATTLE 9437 and retaliation by parties other than “employers” and therefore apply to the defendants. [12] MacDonald’s arguments fail because the Washington Supreme Court broadly held in Farnam v. CRISTA Ministries, 807 P.2d 830, 837 (Wash. 1991), that nonprofit religious employers are exempt from all provisions of the Washington Law Against Discrimination. See also City of Tacoma v. Franciscan Found., 972 Pd. 566, 569 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that the Washington Law Against Discrimination authorizes the exemption of nonprofit religious employers from “the law’s reach”). This view is also supported by the Washington Supreme Court’s decision in Griffin v. Eller, 922 P.2d 788, 789-90 (Wash. 1996). In Griffin, the Washington Supreme Court relied on Farnam to hold that small employers are statutorily exempt from all provisions of the Washington (1) The right to be free from discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, sex, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a disabled person is recognized as and declared to be a civil right. This right shall include, but not be limited to: (a) The right to obtain and hold employment without discrimination; ... (2) Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of this chapter shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained by the person, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys’ fees or any other appropriate remedy authorized by this chapter or the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . . 11 Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.210(1) provides that “[i]t is an unfair practice for any employer . . . or other person to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden by this chapter . . . .” See also Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.040(1) (expansively defining “person” as including “corporations”). 9438 MACDONALD v. GRACE CHURCH SEATTLE Law Against Discrimination.12 See id. at 790 (“Having previously determined in Farnam that [the Washington Law Against Discrimination] does not support a private cause of action against an exempt employer, we are controlled by that precedent.”). In Griffin, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff employee’s sexual harassment and retaliation claims under the Washington Law Against Discrimination.13 See id. at 789. [13] Based on the Washington Supreme Court’s decisions in Farnam and Griffin, we read Washington State case law as exempting nonprofit religious employers, such as the defendants, from sexual harassment and retaliation charges under the Washington Law Against Discrimination.14 Thus, the Washington Commission did not have subject matter jurisdiction over MacDonald’s charges. Accordingly, the 180-day time limit applies. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(2); see also 12 The Washington Law Against Discrimination exempts employers with fewer than eight employees, in addition to nonprofit religious organizations, from the definition of “employer.” See Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.40(3). 13 For her argument that provisions of the Washington Law Against Discrimination other than Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180 cover her charges, MacDonald relies primarily on Marquis v. City of Spokane, 922 P.2d 43, 51 (Wash. 1996), in which the Washington Supreme Court held that an independent contractor could bring a sex discrimination claim under Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.030, even though she was not protected by Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180. However, in Griffin, the Washington Supreme Court distinguished between the expanded protections found in Marquis and the statutory employer exemptions of Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.40(3). See 922 P.2d at 789-90. The Washington Supreme Court stated that “[u]nlike Marquis . . . we are here addressing the issue of a statutory exemption for small employers rather than statutory silence as to independent contractors.” Id. at 790. Accordingly, Marquis does not alter our reading of the Washington Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Washington Law Against Discrimination as exempting nonprofit religious employers. 14 When interpreting state law, a federal court is bound by decisions of the state’s highest court. See Nelson v. City of Irvine, 143 F.3d 1196, 1206 (9th Cir. 1998). MACDONALD v. GRACE CHURCH SEATTLE 9439 Dezaio, 205 F.3d at 65-66 (holding that because the New York State Division on Human Rights lacked subject matter jurisdiction over discrimination claim against Port Authority, plaintiff was subject to 180-day, not 300-day, time limit for filing EEOC charge); Vitug, 860 F.Supp. at 550-51 (holding that because the Illinois Department of Human Rights lacked subject matter jurisdiction over discrimination claim against employer with less than fifteen employees, plaintiff was subject to 180-day, not 300-day, time limit for filing EEOC charge).