Opinion ID: 2310847
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Historical Background of the Pardon Clause

Text: Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States states in part: The President ... shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. Historical accounts of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 reveal that the Founders engaged in very little discussion about the meaning or scope to be given to the President's pardoning authority. [1] Instead, it seems to have been accepted that the presidential power would be virtually identical to that exercised by the King of England, except that the President's authority to grant pardons would not extend to cases of impeachment. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 112-113, 45 S.Ct. 332, 334, 69 L.Ed. 527 (1925); see also Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 311, 15 L.Ed. 421 (1855) (In the convention which framed the constitution, no effort was made to define or change [the meaning of the word `pardon'], although it was limited in cases of impeachment). [2] As Chief Justice Marshall explained in an early case: As this power had been exercised from time immemorial by the executive of that nation whose language is our language, and to whose judicial institutions ours bear a close resemblance, we adopt their principles respecting the operation and effect of a pardon, and look into their books for the rules prescribing the manner in which it is to be used by the person who would avail himself of it. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160, 8 L.Ed. 640 (1833). [3] Later, in the Wells case, in defining the term pardon as it was used in England at the time of the Constitutional Convention, the Supreme Court declared: A pardon is said by Lord Coke to be a work of mercy, whereby the king, either before attainder, sentence, or conviction, or after, forgiveth any crime, offence, punishment, execution, right, title, debt, or duty, temporal or ecclesiastical.... Ex parte Wells, supra, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 311 (citation omitted). But even under the English monarchy, the power to pardon was not absolute. For instance, the King's pardoning authority extended only to the matters of public interest; it had no effect, for example, on the right of a third party to obtain a private judgment against the recipient of the pardon. Ex parte Grossman, supra, 267 U.S. at 111, 45 S.Ct. at 333-334. [4] The Supreme Court established from the outset that the Pardon Clause, like its English model, was to be broadly construed. For example, in United States v. Wilson, supra , the Court described a pardon as an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 160. [5] Moreover, in Ex parte Wells, supra , the Court held that the President had authority to condition the issuance of a pardon on the recipient's assent to a wide array of terms. 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 314. [6] In so ruling, the Court first recognized that conditional pardons were an accepted part of the English crown's clemency power. Id. at 313. Turning then to the actual language of the Constitution, the Court concluded that Article II, Section 2 extended the power to pardon to all kinds of pardons known in the law as such, whatever may be their denomination. We have shown that a conditional pardon is one of them. Id. at 314. Thus, from the first judicial interpretations of the Pardon Clause, it was apparent that the President's pardoning authority was expansive and closely aligned with that of the English King.