Opinion ID: 2232891
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Remand for Consideration of Indiana's 1972 Eligibility Requirements

Text: Although the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court had erred in failing to defer to FSSA's interpretation of the then current statutes and regulations, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment on a basis not raised by the parties below or on appeal. The Court of Appeals held that FSSA's interpretation of Indiana's Medicaid eligibility requirement (and by implication, the recent statutory amendment) is invalid under Section 209(b) of the Social Security Act because it is more restrictive than the eligibility requirement in effect on January 1, 1972. We now vacate this part of the Court of Appeals' opinion and remand for further proceedings with respect to this issue. The current statutory definition of disability was present in nearly identical form in 1972, save for the recent statutory amendment precluding consideration of an individual's ability to pay for treatment. While a non-code section of the amending legislation provided that the amendment was intended to be a clarification of the law and not a substantive change, 1995 Ind. Acts 152 § 24, we do not find this statement dispositive of what a different legislature intended more than 20 years ago. The object of statutory construction is to determine, give effect to, and implement the intent of the legislature. Superior Construction Co. v. Carr, 564 N.E.2d 281, 284 (Ind.1990). If a statute is susceptible to reasonable and intelligible construction, it is the duty of the court to construe it to give effect and validity to each provision thereof. Tinder v. Music Operating, Inc., 237 Ind. 33, 52, 142 N.E.2d 610, 620 (1957). The statute is examined as a whole, and while the language itself is analyzed, this Court will refrain from overemphasizing a strict literal or selective reading of individual words. See Clifft v. Indiana Department of State Revenue, 660 N.E.2d 310, 316 (Ind.1995). The Court of Appeals set forth in detail the statutory provisions in effect on January 1, 1972, focusing on a particular phrase in one section of the statutory schemei.e. that assistance could be denied or discontinued to any disabled person who refused treatment. See Ind.Code § 12-1-7-44 (1971). The court then, sua sponte and without the benefit of any briefing by the parties or any record on the issue, concluded on the basis of this phrase that applicants whose disabilities were treatable from the outset, as well as recipients whose disabilities became treatable at some later point, must have been eligible for Indiana's version of APTD, and thus for Medicaid in 1972. Sullivan, 661 N.E.2d at 854-60. While this conclusion logically flows from the inferences drawn from the use of the words denied and discontinued, we cannot say that the statutory scheme as a whole compels this as the only conclusion. The parties had no opportunity to submit evidence to the trial court as to the rules and regulations in effect in 1972 or the actual practice of FSSA's predecessor agency in 1972 in assessing the permanence of a disability. [1] The parties have had only a limited opportunity to brief the issue after FSSA's petition for rehearing before the Court of Appeals. This Court therefore remands this case to the trial court for further consideration of Indiana's 1972 statutory and regulatory scheme and FSSA's predecessor agency's interpretation and application of the 1972 statutes and regulations.