Opinion ID: 6352826
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cost of care liability

Text: ¶24 Likewise, a person's mandatory liability for the cost of the care received during a recommitment is a collateral consequence that renders recommitment appeals not moot. Under Wis. Stat. § 46.10(2), a committed person like S.A.M. shall be liable for the cost of the care, maintenance, services and 14 No. 2019AP001033 supplies related to each commitment period. If the underlying commitment order is vacated, however, the liability tied to that particular commitment period no longer exists. See Jankowski v. Milwaukee County, 104 Wis. 2d 431, 438-40, 312 N.W.2d 45 (1981); Ethelyn I.C. v. Waukesha County, 221 Wis. 2d 109, 120-21, 584 N.W.2d 211 (Ct. App. 1998). For that reason, a direct causal relationship exists between vacating an expired recommitment order and removing the liability it creates, sufficient to render recommitment appeals not moot. ¶25 The court of appeals' contrary position, again adopted by the County, is that S.A.M. failed to show actual monetary liability because he presented no evidence of collection efforts against his debt by the time of the appeal. See S.A.M., No. 2019AP1033, at ¶14. This position misses the mark for two related reasons. First, it is irrelevant whether collection efforts have begun because, regardless, S.A.M. remains liable solely by virtue of § 46.10(2)'s mandatory language (shall be liable). And second, it is enough to overcome mootness when there is the potential for collection actions because of the liability. See State v. McDonald, 144 Wis. 2d 531, 537, 424 N.W.2d 411 (1988) (holding that a deceased defendant's appeal was not moot because his conviction may lead to potential collateral consequences for his estate); see also D.K., 390 Wis. 2d 50, ¶24 (applying to ch. 51 commitment orders the same collateral-consequences rationale used in criminal cases). The threat of potential collection actions to recoup the costs associated with S.A.M.'s recommitment care may follow S.A.M. 15 No. 2019AP001033 unless and until his recommitment order is vacated or the liability is satisfied. See Jankowski, 104 Wis. 2d at 438. ¶26 We are also not persuaded by the County's argument that a committed person's liability is contingent on a person's ability to pay. That is simply not the law. A liable person['s] ability to pay only informs to whom collection efforts should be directed, see § 46.10(3), and what, if any, settlement or agreement might be appropriate to satisfy the debt, see § 46.10(7). Neither of those considerations, however, extinguish the liability. And in fact, this liability permits the government to continually probe S.A.M.'s financial condition to reevaluate his ability to pay. See § 46.10(8)(c). Thus, vacating a recommitment order will have the practical effect of removing the order's attached liability, regardless of the person's ability to pay. ¶27 Accordingly, we conclude an appeal of an expired recommitment order is not moot because vacating the order would still have practical effects on two of the order's collateral consequences——the ability to restore a constitutional right and the liability for the cost of care received while subject to the 16 No. 2019AP001033 recommitment order.5 Because S.A.M.'s appeal is not moot, we turn to the merits of his appeal.