Opinion ID: 2550126
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Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The natural and probable consequences doctrine under Nevada law

Text: Nevada case law addressing the principles of conspiracy is limited to the following concepts. [36] As we noted above, a conspiracy is generally defined as an agreement between two or more persons for an unlawful purpose. [37] A person who knowingly does any act to further the object of a conspiracy, or otherwise participates therein, is criminally liable as a conspirator .... [38] Evidence of a coordinated series of acts furthering the underlying offense is sufficient to infer the existence of an agreement and support a conspiracy conviction. [39] However, absent an agreement to cooperate in achieving the purpose of a conspiracy, mere knowledge of, acquiescence in, or approval of that purpose does not make one a party to conspiracy. [40] We have never expressly adopted the Pinkerton rule and our discussion of coconspirator liability has been limited. In State v. Cushing, a pre- Pinkerton decision, the defendants were charged with performing illegal abortions. [41] The State did not contend that the defendants themselves performed the abortions, but that they were accessories before the fact and chargeable as principals because they entered into a common plan or scheme to perform the abortions. [42] This court recognized in Cushing that where a person enters into a common plan or scheme he may be held criminally liable as an accessory for unintended acts if in the ordinary course of things [they were] the natural or probable consequence of such [a] common plan or scheme. [43] In McKinney v. Sheriff, McKinney challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an indictment for murder, which was committed during the course of a robbery. [44] McKinney argued that he was unaware of and did not participate in the murder and thus there was no probable cause to support the murder charge. [45] In rejecting his claim, this court stated that the fact that McKinney's cohorts deviated from their agreed-upon plan by committing the murder did not absolve McKinney of liability. [46] Where the purpose of the conspiracy is to commit a dangerous felony, each member runs the risk of having the venture end in homicide .... Hence each is guilty of murder if one of them commits homicide in perpetration ... of an agreed-upon robbery.... [47] Like the New York court in McGee, our overarching concern in Sharma centered on the fact that the natural and probable consequences doctrine regarding accomplice liability permits a defendant to be convicted of a specific intent crime where he or she did not possess the statutory intent required for the offense. [48] We are of the view that vicarious coconspirator liability for the specific intent crimes of another, based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, presents the same problem addressed in Sharma, and we conclude that Sharma's rationale applies with equal force under the circumstances of the instant case. To convict Bolden of burglary and kidnapping, the State was required to prove under Nevada law that he had the specific intent to commit those offenses. Holding otherwise would allow the State to sidestep the statutory specific intent required to prove those offenses. The overriding factor in our decision to reject the natural and probable consequences doctrine for coconspirator liability respecting specific intent crimes is the absence of a statutory basis for it. Our statutes lack a comprehensive statutory definition or explanation of coconspirator liability. Nevada distinguishes parties as principals or accessories and by statute outlines the criminal liability of both. NRS 195.010 classifies parties as principals and accessories. NRS 195.020 defines criminal liability as a principal: Every person concerned in the commission of a felony, gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor, whether he directly commits the act constituting the offense, or aids or abets in its commission, and whether present or absent; and every person who, directly or indirectly, counsels, encourages, hires, commands, induces or otherwise procures another to commit a felony, gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor is a principal, and shall be proceeded against and punished as such. The fact that the person aided, abetted, counseled, encouraged, hired, commanded, induced or procured, could not or did not entertain a criminal intent shall not be a defense to any person aiding, abetting, counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing or procuring him. Additionally, NRS 199.480 sets forth the penalties for conspiracy offenses. These statutes are silent respecting the parameters of coconspirator vicarious liability. [49] NRS 195.020 was codified in 1912 and 1929. Given the age of the statute, and a lack of legislative history, we cannot say that the Legislature intended the statute to extend principal liability for a specific intent crime based on the natural and probable consequences theory permitted by Pinkerton. The power to define crimes and penalties lies exclusively within the power and authority of the Legislature. [50] No statutory underpinning for the Pinkerton rule exists in Nevada. In the absence of statutory authority providing otherwise, we conclude that a defendant may not be held criminally liable for the specific intent crime committed by a coconspirator simply because that crime was a natural and probable consequence of the object of the conspiracy. To prove a specific intent crime, the State must show that the defendant actually possessed the requisite statutory intent. Although we refuse to adopt the natural and probable consequences doctrine in general, our decision is limited to vicarious coconspirator liability based on that doctrine for specific intent crimes only. The mental state required to commit a general intent crime does not raise the same concern as that necessary to commit a specific intent crime. General intent is the intent to do that which the law prohibits. It is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the defendant intended the precise harm or the precise result which eventuated. [51] On the other hand, specific intent is the intent to accomplish the precise act which the law prohibits. [52] To hold a defendant criminally liable for a specific intent crime, Nevada requires proof that he possessed the state of mind required by the statutory definition of the crime. [53] Although we affirm Bolden's conviction for the general intent crimes of home invasion and robbery, we conclude that in future prosecutions, vicarious coconspirator liability may be properly imposed for general intent crimes only when the crime in question was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the object of the conspiracy. We caution the State that this court will not hesitate to revisit the doctrine's applicability to general intent crimes if it appears that the theory of liability is alleged for crimes too far removed and attenuated from the object of the conspiracy. We conclude that the district court understandably but erroneously instructed the jury that Bolden could be found guilty of the specific intent crimes of burglary and first- and second-degree kidnapping as long as the commission of those offenses was a natural and probable consequence of the conspiracy, and even if Bolden never intended the commission of those crimes. We further conclude, however, that the error is applicable only with respect to Bolden's conviction of the specific intent crimes of burglary and kidnapping and does not require reversal of his conviction of the general intent crimes of home invasion and robbery.