Opinion ID: 197264
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Intent to impede, intimidate, interfere with, or retaliate

Text: 26 The jury was entitled to infer Fulmer's intent from the circumstances surrounding the statement. See United States v. DiMarzo, 80 F.3d 656, 661 (1st Cir.) (The jury was entitled to rely upon circumstantial evidence ... to infer essential elements of the crime ....), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 259, 136 L.Ed.2d 185 (1996); United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 975 (1st Cir.1995) (noting that a showing of criminal intent may be made wholly on the basis of circumstantial evidence). Drawing all inferences and credibility determinations in favor of the government's case, we find that a rational jury could have found that Fulmer knowingly made the statement alleged to be a threat, and that he did so with the intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with Egan in the performance of his duties, or to retaliate against him, within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B). 27 Although we find that the evidence was not insufficient as a matter of law, we come to this conclusion by viewing the properly admitted evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and by drawing all credibility determinations in favor of the verdict. As we discuss in section III, we believe that the improperly admitted evidence was so inflammatory that it may have prompted the jury at the outset to weigh the properly admitted evidence in the government's favor. This sort of taint we cannot condone, and justifies a reversal even where Fulmer's argument as to the sufficiency of the evidence fails.