Opinion ID: 785958
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Lack of prejudice to the respondent

Text: 48 Allen finally argues that equitable tolling is appropriate because the state has not been prejudiced by the delay. As noted above, however, this court has held that the [a]bsence of prejudice is a factor to be considered only after a factor that might justify tolling is identified. Vroman v. Brigano, 346 F.3d at 605. Because Allen has failed to demonstrate the existence of a factor that justifies tolling, we may not consider the alleged lack of prejudice. 49 D. Does Allen's claim of actual innocence allow her to circumvent AEDPA's statute of limitations? 50 Allen finally contends that, even if her habeas petition was untimely, her claims should still be considered because she is actually innocent of the assault-with-the-intent-to-commit-murder charge. Although one district court within this circuit has held that the United States Constitution requires an actual-innocence exception to AEDPA's statute of limitations, see Holloway v. Jones, 166 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1190 (E.D.Mich.2001), this court has never endorsed that view. One case that provides useful guidance, however, is Whalen v. Randle, 37 Fed.Appx. 113 (6th Cir.2002) (unpublished opinion), where this court declined to decide whether an actual-innocence exception exists because the petitioner in that case was unable to demonstrate that he was actually innocent of the charges for which he was convicted. Id. at 121. 51 Although the Whalen court declined to adopt an actual-innocence exception, the court suggested the likely requirements of such a claim: 52 Other circuits that have considered such an exception have set a very high bar for actual innocence claims, since a substantial claim that constitutional error has caused the conviction of an innocent person should be extremely rare. The exception requires petitioner to show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of all the evidence. The petitioner must produce evidence of innocence so strong that the court can not have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error. 53 Id. at 121 (citations omitted). 54 In the present case, Allen first contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to demonstrate that she aided and abetted the gunman, Ronald Light, in committing the crime of assault with the intent to commit murder. But this evidence was actually presented to a jury, which found Allen guilty. Allen therefore cannot credibly contend that no hypothetical reasonable juror, after hearing the trial evidence, would have found Allen guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; an entire jury did exactly that. 55 Beyond the trial evidence, Allen also claims that affidavits by her codefendants, Anastasia Allen and Light, demonstrate her innocence. Her sister Anastasia's affidavit states: 56 1. That I, Anastasia Allen, did not hear Charmel Allen ask, nor encourage, instigate, express nor imply to Ronald Light that she desired him to assault Brian Carson, and; 57 2. That I, Anastasia Allen and Charmel Allen never discussed, planned nor intended for Ronald Light to assault Brian Carson before, during, after nor in the presence [sic]. 58 In a similar vein, Light's affidavit reads: 59 1. That I, Ronald Light, did not receive any assistance, encouragement, nor counseling from Charmel C. Allen, and; 60 2. That there was not a common design or purpose between Charmel Allen and I, and; 61 3. That Charmel Allen and I did not share any criminal intent on the assault against Brian Carson, and; 62 4. That no advice or advisement was given to me by Charmel Allen during, before, in between nor after the assault on Brian Carson. 63 Anastasia's affidavit in essence states that (1) Allen did not, in the presence of Anastasia, encourage Light to shoot Carson, and (2) Allen and Anastasia did not jointly encourage Light to shoot Carson. But the affidavit does not eliminate the possibility that Allen, outside of the presence of Anastasia, encouraged Light to shoot Carson. Anastasia's affidavit is therefore insufficient to demonstrate actual innocence. 64 Light's affidavit, on the other hand, has the potential to exculpate Allen. As the district court noted, however, postconviction statements by codefendants are inherently suspect because codefendants may try to assume full responsibility for the crime without any adverse consequences. But Allen contends that the district court's analysis was incorrect because Mr. Light has effectively deprived himself of any opportunity to seek legal recourse for his release by signing the affidavit and disclosing the truth. The flaw in Allen's argument, however, is that Light's affidavit exculpates Allen, but does not actually inculpate Light in any way. Thus, the district court correctly concluded that Light's affidavit was inherently suspect because Light could have signed the affidavit in order to help his codefendant Allen without endangering his own interests. 65 Aside from its lack of reliability, Light's affidavit is insufficient to demonstrate that Allen is innocent because Light's assertions are inconsistent with the evidence presented at trial. According to the Michigan Court of Appeals, the evidence introduced at trial demonstrated the following: 66 &#x2022; On the date of the incident, Allen could not account for $1,200 of her ex-boyfriend's money; 67 &#x2022; Allen orchestrated the plan to bring Anastasia and Light to Wallace's and Carson's apartment; 68 &#x2022; After arriving at the apartment, Allen coaxed Carson into unlocking his door; 69 &#x2022; Allen, Anastasia, and Light then forcibly entered the apartment; 70 &#x2022; [W]hile Light pointed the gun at Carson and Wallace, [Allen] demanded money. 71 We must presume that these factual findings by the Michigan Court of Appeals are correct unless Allen rebuts that presumption with clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 72 Light's affidavit essentially asserts that Allen never encouraged him to participate in either the attempt to get money from Carson and Wallace or the shooting. This assertion is inconsistent with the evidence presented at trial demonstrating that Allen, not Light, had the motive to obtain money from Carson and Wallace. Light's affidavit is also contrary to the Michigan Court of Appeal's finding that Allen orchestrated the plan to bring Anastasia and Light to Wallace's and Carson's apartment. 73 This court noted in Whalen that the actual-innocence exception requires petitioner to `show that it is more likely than not' that no reasonable juror would have found [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of all the evidence. 37 Fed.Appx. at 121 (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995)). In the present case, Allen's evidence of her alleged innocence consists of two postconviction affidavits from her codefendants. One affidavit is facially insufficient to establish that Allen is innocent; the other is inherently unreliable and contradicted by the evidence presented at trial. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that a reasonable juror could easily find beyond a reasonable doubt that Allen is guilty of assault with the intent to commit murder. 74 Because the affidavits are legally insufficient to establish that Allen is actually innocent of the assault charge, we will follow the lead of the Whalen court and decline to reach the question of whether the Constitution requires an actual-innocence exception to [28 U.S.C.] § 2244(d)(1). Id. at 121.