Opinion ID: 1836553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Instructions on Intent to Deceive.

Text: Williams argues that a significant element of the offense of theft by deception is a specific intent on the part of the actor to deceive. He urges that despite his objection the district court did not adequately convey that requirement to the jury in its instructions. The district court's instruction on the elements of theft by deception were as follows: The State must prove all of the following elements ....: 1. On or about the 6th day of June, 2001, the defendant did present statements and documents to Community Motors. 2. The defendant deceived Community Motors in one or more of the following ways: a. Creating or confirming another's belief or impression as to the existence or non-existence of a fact or condition which is false and which the actor does not believe to be true; b. Promising payment, which the actor does not intend to perform or knows the actor will not be able to perform. Failure to perform, standing alone, is not evidence that the actor did not intend to perform. 3. The defendant obtained transfer of possession or control from Community Motors. The statutory definition of deception on which this instruction was based provides: Deception consists of knowingly doing any of the following: 1. Creating or confirming another's belief or impression as to the existence or nonexistence of a fact or condition which is false and which the actor does not believe to be true. . . . . 5. Promising payment, the delivery of goods, or other performance which the actor does not intend to perform or knows the actor will not be able to perform. Failure to perform, standing alone, is not evidence that the actor does not intend to perform. Iowa Code § 702.9 (emphasis added). In affirming Williams' conviction, the court of appeals classified the crime of theft by deception as not involving a specific intent to defraud. We cannot agree with that conclusion. The acts of knowing deception included in the statutory definition are in all material respects the equivalent of a specific intent to deceive. Consequently, we must decide whether the trial court's instruction adequately conveyed that requirement to the jury. Preferably, subparagraphs a and b of paragraph 2 of the instruction should have been preceded by the word knowingly. However, the failure to include that word in the instructions did not constitute reversible error in the present case. In considering subparagraph b of paragraph 2 of the instruction (which mirrors paragraph 5 of section 702.9), it appears impossible for the act of promising payment that the actor does not intend to perform to be accomplished in other than a knowing manner. Hypothetically, the type of deception described in subparagraph a of paragraph 2 of the instruction is conduct that could occur unknowingly. However, we are satisfied that there was no room for the jury to conclude that this was the situation with respect to defendant's conduct in the present case. The acts of forging the letter promising a large cash payment and the representation that he was employed were matters that defendant had to know were false assertions. He also had to know that he was making those false assertions as part of an effort to obtain possession of an automobile. A failure to instruct that a criminal act must be knowingly done was held to be harmless error due to the context of the transaction in State v. Blackford, 335 N.W.2d 173, 178 (Iowa 1983). We conclude that the same is true with regard to the instruction given in the present case. We have considered all issues presented and conclude that the decision of the court of appeals and judgment of the district court should be affirmed. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.