Opinion ID: 2272236
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pre-Trial Confrontation

Text: Appellant next argues that his right to confrontation was violated when Kustes failed to show up at a pre-trial suppression hearing concerning the admissibility of her identification of him. This Court does not agree. First and foremost, the U.S. Supreme Court has never held that the right to confront witnesses applies to pre-trial hearings. In fact, to the contrary, it has repeatedly described the right as a trial right. E.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (The opinions of this Court show that the right to confrontation is a trial right ....) (plurality opinion); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) ([I]t is this literal right to `confront' the witness at the time of the trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause.); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968) (The right to confrontation is basically a trial right.). The Court's recent decisions, such as Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), do not indicate a change to this long-lived understanding. For that reason, every other state ruling on this issue rejects claims that the Confrontation Clause applies to pre-trial hearings. E.g., State v. Sherry, 233 Kan. 920, 667 P.2d 367, 376 (1983) (There is no constitutional right to allow the accused to confront witnesses against him at a preliminary hearing.); State v. Timmerman, 218 P.3d 590, 594 (Utah 2009) ([T]he federal Confrontation Clause does not apply to preliminary hearings.) Every other state also agrees that the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decisions do not indicate otherwise. E.g., State v. Woinarowicz, 720 N.W.2d 635, 641 (N.D.2006) (In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court did not indicate it intended to change the law and apply the Confrontation Clause to pretrial hearings.); People v. Brink, 31 A.D.3d 1139, 1140, 818 N.Y.S.2d 374 (N.Y.App. 2006) (We reject the contention of defendant that Crawford v. Washington applies to his pretrial suppression hearing and that reversal is required because his right of confrontation was violated at that hearing.). Notably, Appellant does not cite any authority to the contrary. In fact, in his reply brief, Appellant admits that no court has held that the right to confront witnesses attaches at a pre-trial hearing. Given the abundance of courts that have ruled on this issue, Appellant's inability to find any authority to support his position speaks volumes. And based on our independent research, this Court also cannot find any authority to support his position. There is good reason to apply a different standard to pre-trial hearings. A trial focuses on the ultimate issue of an accused's guilt or innocence, whereas in a pretrial hearing the focus is generally on the admissibility of evidence. State v. Rivera, 144 N.M. 836, 192 P.3d 1213, 1216 (2008). Consequently, the interests at stake in a suppression hearing are of lesser magnitude than those in the criminal trial itself. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 679, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980) (citations omitted). For that reason, out-of-court statements are admissible at pre-trial suppression hearings for whatever they might be worth in resolving, one way or another, the issues raised. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 176, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974); accord KRE 104(a) (prohibition against hearsay does not apply to [preliminary questions concerning ... the admissibility of evidence). This is true even when the issue is one of reliability of the declarant. Thompkins v. Commonwealth, 54 S.W.3d 147, 152 (Ky.2001) (allowing hearsay to determine reliability of confidential informant at pre-trial hearing); see also McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311-13, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967). It appears that the issue of whether Crawford applies to pre-trial hearings is an issue of first impression for Kentucky. Ultimately, this Court rejects Appellant's argument because we are persuaded by the above authorities. Neither the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution nor Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution applies to pretrial hearings. There was no violation of Appellant's right to confront his accuser in this case. That being said, just because the use of hearsay in pre-trial hearings does not violate the right of a defendant to confront his accuser does not mean that over-reliance on hearsay cannot be problematic for other reasons. In-court statements are better than hearsay, and should therefore be generally favored; thus, over-reliance on hearsay could conceivably call into question whether the trial court had sufficient grounds on which to base its findings. However, that is not a concern in this case. It was reasonable to rely on the testimony of Detective McGaha at the hearing rather than Kustes, given that the principal concern was that the police, upon McGaha's request, constructed an unduly suggestive photo-array lineup.