Opinion ID: 2363213
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the Error Plain?

Text: Having found error, we turn to whether the error should be considered plain. [T]he word `plain' is synonymous with `clear' or, equivalently, `obvious.' Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467, 117 S.Ct. 1544 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770) (internal quotation marks omitted). Usually, the issue is whether the error was plain at the time of trial, i.e., whether the error was so egregious and obvious as to make the trial judge and prosecutor derelict in permitting it, despite the defendant's failure to object. United States v. Gore, 154 F.3d 34, 43 (2d Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If that were the issue here, we could not possibly find such dereliction, for Crawford had not yet been decided at the time of appellant's trial. In Johnson, however, the Court held that in a case such as this  where the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal  it is enough that an error be `plain' at the time of appellate consideration. 520 U.S. at 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544. The present case differs from Johnson in one respect that might be thought significant. The error in Johnson arose in a prosecution for knowingly making a false material declaration under oath before a grand jury. In accordance with then-prevailing Circuit precedent, and without objection from defendant Johnson, the trial court decided the issue of materiality instead of submitting it to the jury. Thereafter, before Johnson's appeal was decided, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995), that the materiality of a false statement is for the jury to decide. The trial court's error thus was clear by the time Johnson's case was considered on appeal; the governing law had changed after trial but before the time of appellate consideration in Johnson itself. In contrast, in the present case we are asked to find plain error based on a change in the governing law that we have not declared before now. It is true, of course, that we are applying the principles set out in Crawford, which was decided in 2004. However, while Crawford undeniably created uncertainty as to the continuing viability of Howard's constitutional holding and the constitutionality of D.C.Code § 48-905.06, we have not heretofore resolved that uncertainty. Although none of the parties before us has raised the question, it fairly can be asked whether an appellate court properly may find an error to be plain in the same case in which it first declares the change in the law that enables it to find error at all. We think a finding that the error is plain, or obvious, is as mandatory in these circumstances as it was in Johnson. The rationale of Johnson  that a defendant should not be required to raise useless objections at trial in order to benefit on appeal from a post-trial reversal of settled law, see 520 U.S. at 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544  is equally applicable whether the reversal occurs in the defendant's own appeal or in someone else's appeal, so long as it occurs before the decision in the defendant's appeal is rendered. If the appellate court's opinion determines the law and finds error, the error by definition is plain  at the time of appellate consideration, id., and clear under current law. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770. (Emphases added.) It would be anomalous and arbitrary to hold otherwise, for as soon as the opinion were to issue, it would be precedent that would establish both error and plainness in all other pending direct appeals by similarly situated appellants raising the same plain error claim. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (holding that a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases . . . pending on direct review . . ., with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a `clear break' with the past). We conclude that the Crawford error in this case is plain at this time, and that the second prong of the plain error test therefore is satisfied. [26]