Opinion ID: 74899
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: wrongful denial of leave

Text: In Count 2 of her complaint, Brungart claimed that BellSouth violated the FMLA with respect to the FMLA leave request she submitted on December 2, 1996 for her mother’s emergency heart surgery. Congress enacted the FMLA “to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families, to promote the stability and economic security of families, and to promote national interests in preserving family integrity.” 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1). The FMLA entitles eligible employees to take up to 12 weeks of leave during any 12-month period for medical reasons, for the birth or adoption of a child, and for the care of a spouse, child, or parent who has a serious health condition. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). Not all employees are eligible for leave under the FMLA. The statute defines those who are as follows: The term “eligible employee” means an employee who has been employed – 7 (i) for at least 12 months by the employer with respect to whom leave is requested . . . ; and (ii) for at least 1,250 hours of service with such employer during the previous 12-month period. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A). It is undisputed that at the time of her leave request in December of 1996 Brungart had not worked 1,250 hours for BellSouth during the previous 12-month period. Brungart’s theory behind Count 2 is that BellSouth’s failure to inform her of her eligibility for FMLA leave within the time required by 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d) made her eligible for the leave, or at least should have prevented BellSouth from denying that she was eligible, and as a result its denial of leave was wrongful. Brungart did not give notice of her need for leave more than two business days prior to the date she wanted to commence the leave, but instead applied for leave to begin effective immediately. In those circumstances, the relevant portion of § 825.110(d) is the following: Where the employee does not give notice of the need for leave more than two business days prior to commencing leave, the employee will be deemed to be eligible if the employer fails to advise the employee that the employee is not eligible within two business days of receiving the employee’s notice. Id. 2 2 Section 825.110(d) provides in full: The determinations of whether an employee has worked for the employer 8 The validity of § 825.110(d) is squarely presented in this case. It is undisputed that in December 1996 when Brungart applied for medical leave to begin immediately she was statutorily ineligible for FMLA leave, because she had not worked for BellSouth the requisite 1,250 hours within the previous 12-month period. Likewise, it is undisputed that BellSouth failed to advise her of her ineligibility for FMLA leave until more than a month after it received her application for it. If the § 825.110(d) regulation is valid, by virtue of it Brungart is to be deemed eligible for FMLA leave in December 1996, but if the regulation is for at least 1,250 hours in the past 12 months and has been employed by the employer for a total of at least 12 months must be made as of the date leave commences. If an employee notifies the employer of the need for FMLA leave before the employee meets these eligibility criteria, the employer must either confirm the employee’s eligibility based upon a projection that the employee will be eligible on the date leave would commence or must advise the employee when the eligibility requirement is met. If the employer confirms eligibility at the time the notice for leave is received, the employer may not subsequently challenge the employee’s eligibility. In the latter case, if the employer does not advise the employee whether the employee is eligible as soon as practicable (i.e., two business days absent extenuating circumstances) after the date employee eligibility is determined, the employee will have satisfied the notice requirements and the notice of leave is considered current and outstanding until the employer does advise. If the employer fails to advise the employee whether the employee is eligible prior to the date the requested leave is to commence, the employee will be deemed eligible. The employer may not, then, deny the leave. Where the employee does not give notice of the need for leave more than two business days prior to commencing leave, the employee will be deemed to be eligible if the employer fails to advise the employee that the employee is not eligible within two business days of receiving the employee’s notice. 9 invalid there is no basis for her eligibility at that time. The district court held that BellSouth was entitled to summary judgment on this count because § 825.110(d) was “unconstitutional to the extent that it converts ineligible employees into eligible employees, contrary to the express language of the FMLA.” The only circuit to have addressed the issue so far is the Seventh, which held that this part of the § 825.110(d) regulation is invalid. See Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Illinois, 223 F.3d 579, 582 (7th Cir. 2000).3 We could not agree more. As the Seventh Circuit explained: “The statutory text is perfectly clear and covers the issue. The right of family leave is conferred only on employees who have worked at least 1,250 hours in the previous 12 months.” Id. To put it in Chevron terms, “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” which is eligibility for the medical leave rights created in the statute, and because “the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron 3 In addition to the district court in this case, four other district courts have addressed this issue, and all but one of them have reached the same conclusion. See McQuain v. Ebner Furnaces, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 763 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (holding § 825.110(d) to be invalid); Seaman v. Downtown Partnership of Baltimore, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 751 (D. Md. 1998) (same); Wolke v. Dreadnought Marine, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1133 (E.D. Va. 1997) (same); but see Miller v. Defiance Metal Products, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (holding § 825.110(d) to be valid). 10 U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 - 43, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2781- 82 (1984). Congress could have, but did not, confer the right to family medical leave on any employee who did not receive a prompt response from the employer to her leave request. There is no ambiguity in the statute concerning eligibility for family medical leave, no gap to be filled. Instead, the Department of Labor in this regulation has attempted to pry apart the clear words of the act in order to create a gap into which it can wedge its policy preference. We understand the Department’s motive, which is to further the goals of the act by forcing employers to respond to leave requests within a reasonable period of time. But when an administrative agency seeks to improve legislation by altering the basic coverage provisions that Congress has written into the law, it has gone too far. The rule of law in general, and separation of powers principles in particular, require that such administrative hubris be reigned in, and that the task of improving the basic provisions of statutes be left to the same body that wrote them in the first place. We note that our conclusion here is strongly supported by our decision last year in McGregor v. Autozone, Inc., 180 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 1999). In that case this Court invalidated another Department of Labor regulation, one which provided that if an employer failed to give prospective notice that an absence was being 11 counted as FMLA leave, the leave taken could not be counted against the employee’s 12- week entitlement under the FMLA, with the result that the employer would be required to give a total of more than 12 weeks of leave. See id. at 1307-08 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c); 29 C.F.R. § 825.700(a)). We explained that the regulation “converts the statute’s minimum of federally-mandated unpaid leave into an entitlement to an additional 12 weeks of leave unless the employer specifically and prospectively notifies the employee that she is using her FMLA leave.” Id. at 1308. Because the FMLA itself “does not suggest that the 12 week entitlement may be extended,” we held that the regulation was contrary to the statute and therefore invalid and unenforceable. Id. That reasoning fits here. For all of these reasons, we hold that 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d) is invalid insofar as it purports to extend the eligibility provisions of the FMLA to an otherwise ineligible employee who is not promptly notified after requesting leave that she is ineligible for it under the statute.4 Because Brungart’s sole theory of 4 In dicta the Seventh Circuit has speculated about the possibility of an employer being estopped from denying an employee’s eligibility for FMLA leave if the employee reasonably relied to her detriment on the employer’s failure to notify her promptly of her ineligibility. See Dormeyer, 223 F.3d at 582. We do not have those facts before us, because Brungart did not reasonably rely to her detriment upon BellSouth’s failure to respond more promptly to her leave request. It is true that Brungart was written up for taking unauthorized leave, but she left work immediately and there is no evidence she would not have taken any leave to be with her mother if she had been informed right away by BellSouth that she was not entitled to it. While the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to Brungart indicates that she might not have been gone as long had she been informed earlier that she was not eligible for FMLA leave, she conceded in deposition that she would have taken some leave anyway. And there is no evidence 12 eligibility for FMLA leave involved in Count 2 (the December 1996 request) fails, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment against her on that count.