Opinion ID: 72176
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.

Text: 42 Defendants rely on the Supreme Court's decision in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994), to argue that the preliminary injunction unconstitutionally abridges their First Amendment rights. Because the Court in Madsen set forth a new standard by which to judge First Amendment challenges to injunctions, and because Madsen arose in a similar factual context, we pause to examine that case in some detail. 43 Madsen arose out of abortion protest activities in Florida. A Florida state court permanently enjoined the defendant protesters from blocking or interfering with public access to the clinic and from physically abusing people entering or leaving the clinic. Six months later, plaintiffs sought to broaden the injunction when the protesters continued their unlawful conduct. The Florida trial court found that the protesters had impeded access to the clinic by congregating on the street leading up to the clinic and by marching up to the clinic's driveways. It found that as vehicles heading toward the clinic slowed to allow the protesters to move out of the way, sidewalk counselors would approach and attempt to disburse anti-abortion literature. The number of people outside the clinic varied from a handful to 400, and their volume varied from singing and chanting to the use of loudspeakers and bullhorns. The court found that these protests took a physical toll on the clinic's patients. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 757-58, 114 S.Ct. at 2521. Doctors and clinic workers were also picketed at their residences and generally harassed. Id. 16 44 In Madsen, the abortion protesters first argued that because the injunction only restricted the speech of anti-abortion protesters, it necessarily was content- or viewpoint-based. Id. at 761-63, 114 S.Ct. at 2523. The Court explicitly rejected this argument on the ground that an injunction, by its very nature, applies only to a particular group or to individuals. Id. The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech 'without reference to the content of the regulated speech.'  Id. (citations omitted). In Madsen, the trial court had not enjoined actors on the basis of their speech, but rather on the basis of their conduct. Id. at 763-65, 114 S.Ct. at 2524. Thus, because the injunction was not content-based, it was not subject to heightened scrutiny. 17 Id. 45 Turning to the injunction, the Court in Madsen developed a new standard for evaluating content-neutral injunctions. The Court noted that the constitutionality of content-neutral, generally applicable statutes is typically assessed under the standards set forth in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791-92, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2753-54, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989), and similar cases. Because the areas surrounding clinics are typically traditional public fora, these cases require that time, place, and manner regulations be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764, 114 S.Ct. at 2524. However, injunctions carry a greater risk of restricting speech than generally applicable statutes because injunctions apply only to the person whose prior unlawful conduct prompted the injunction. Accordingly, the Court determined that the standard time, place, and manner analysis was not sufficiently rigorous. Id. at 763-67, 114 S.Ct. at 2524-25. Instead, the Court adopted a new, purposefully stricter standard: whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest. Id. at 765, 114 S.Ct. at 2525. 46 The Court in Madsen readily found that numerous significant government interests were protected by the injunction in that case. These included the State's interest in: (1) protecting a woman's freedom to seek lawful medical or counseling services in connection with her pregnancy; (2) ensuring public safety and order, promoting the free flow of traffic on public streets and sidewalks, and protecting the property rights of all citizens; (3) ensuring residential privacy; and (4) analogously, protecting captive patients from targeted picketing. Id. at 767-69, 114 S.Ct. at 2526. Accordingly, the Court examined each contested provision of the injunction to determine whether it burdened more speech than necessary to serve these significant government interests. 47 First, the trial court had enjoined the protesters from congregating, picketing, patrolling, demonstrating or entering any portion of the public right-of-way or private property within 36 feet of the property line of the clinic. Id. The Court held that the buffer zone on public property was no more broad than necessary to protect unfettered passage to and from the clinic and to ensure that the protesters did not block traffic on the adjoining road. 18 Id. at 769-71, 114 S.Ct. at 2527. As to the private property, the Court noted that patients and staff attempting to reach the clinic did not have to traverse private property abutting the clinic and that nothing in the record indicated that the protesters' activity on the private property obstructed access to the clinic. Id. at 771-73, 114 S.Ct. at 2528. Absent such evidence, the Court held that this portion of the buffer zone burdened more speech than necessary to protect access to the clinic. Id. 48 Second, the injunction restrained the protesters from singing, chanting, whistling, shouting, yelling, use of bullhorns, auto horns, sound amplification equipment, or other sounds or images observable to or within earshot of the patients inside the [c]linic during the hours of 7:30 a.m. through noon on Mondays through Saturdays. Id. The Court held that the noise restrictions burdened no more speech than necessary to ensure the health and well-being of patients at the clinic. Id. In so holding, the Court noted that it had taken into account the place to which the restriction applied in determining whether the restriction burdened more speech than necessary; to-wit: The First Amendment does not demand that patients in a medical facility undertake Herculean efforts to escape the cacophony of political protests. Id. 49 Third, as noted, the injunction also restrained the protesters from projecting images observable (i.e., signs) outside the clinic. The Court held that this prohibition burdened more speech than necessary to achieve the purpose of limiting threats to clinic patients or their families. Id. at 773-75, 114 S.Ct. at 2529. It so held on the grounds that patients inside the clinic could easily avoid these images by pulling the curtains on the clinic's windows. Id. 50 Fourth, the injunction ordered that the protesters refrain from physically approaching people seeking the clinic's services unless such person indicates a desire to communicate in an area within 300 feet of the clinic. Id. The Court held that this provision burdened more speech than necessary to prevent intimidation and to ensure access to the clinic because it prohibited all uninvited approaches of patients regardless of how peaceful the contact may be. Id. Before such approaches could be restrained, the Court required evidence that the protesters' speech was independently proscribable (e.g., fighting words or threats) or was otherwise indistinguishable from a threat of physical harm. Id. 51 Finally, the Court examined the injunction's restraint of picketing, demonstrating, or using sound amplification equipment within 300 feet of the residences of clinic staff. The injunction also enjoined demonstrators from impeding access to streets which provided the sole access to streets on which those residences were located. Id. As to noise, the Court upheld the restriction on the same grounds it used to uphold noise outside the clinics. Id. As to the picketing, the Court found that the 300-foot zone was broader than necessary to protect particular residences given the evidence in that case. Id. at 775-77, 114 S.Ct. at 2530. It found that a smaller zone could have accomplished this result. Id. at 775-77, 114 S.Ct. at 2530. 19 52