Opinion ID: 1128377
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: the testimony of julie ann cooper concerning the likelihood of the dna match was error.[4]

Text: ¶ 60. Crawford argues that the trial judge erred in permitting the jury to hear expert testimony regarding the likelihood of a DNA match as calculated by the product rule method on the grounds that a product rule calculation was not applicable. The defendant does not now question the general admissibility of DNA evidence. Therefore, Crawford argues that the depositing of the samples of Kristy's blood and Crawford's semen were not independent events and the odds of Kristy's DNA matching blood on the briefs and the odds of Crawford's semen matching semen on the briefs should not have been subject to the product rule. The State responds that Crawford's current argument is procedurally barred because it was not the basis of Crawford's objection to Forman's testimony at trial. Alternatively, the State argues that Forman's testimony was wholly proper. ¶ 61. Crawford relies solely on People v. Collins, 68 Cal.2d 319, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497, 438 P.2d 33 (1968), for the proposition that the application of the product rule to this case was erroneous, since the occurrence of Kristy Ray's DNA on an item and the occurrence of the perpetrator's DNA being on an item are not traits independent of each other. In his motion in limine to prevent introduction of DNA evidence, Crawford criticized the use of the product rule and the statistics used to explain the meaning of a match produced by Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP) testing. Indeed, two population geneticists, among others, have asserted that the product rule is flawed because it rests on the assumption that major population groups, such as Caucasians and Blacks, mate randomly across groups. They contended that, in fact, members of subgroups tend to mate within their own subgroup, resulting in population substructuring, which, in turn, alters the gene frequencies and renders estimates obtained through the product rule invalid. R.C. Lewontin and Daniel L. Hartl, Population Genetics in Forensic DNA Typing, Science, vol. 254, Dec. 20, 1991, at 1745-50. [5] ¶ 62. As part of its presentation of DNA evidence, the prosecution called Lisa Forman, a population geneticist, to testify about the likelihood of Crawford's DNA matching the DNA found on the clothing of the victim. Forman: A status tissue or population geneticist would say the likelihood that a random person who was not those two people but a random person would match would be approximately one in five hundred thousand per set of samples. So each situation is unique. The fact that Kristy Ray matches this set of samples over here that is one in five hundred thousand of and by itself. And the fact that Charles Crawford matches this set of samples over here, that's one in five hundred thousand of and by itself using the modified ceiling method. The fact that they both match a set of crime scene samples in which both people were for whatever other reasons appear to have been involved is now something that you might wish to consider statistically together. Robinson: Is there an accepted method of doing that, combining the items and comparing those numbers together? Forman: Well if they are truly independent you could multiply by five hundred thousand by five hundred thousand and come up with some extraordinary number but you would have to determine whether or not they were both truly independent events first. When asked whether the odds of Kristy Ray's and Crawford's DNA matching off the same exhibit would be greater than one in five hundred thousand if the long johns and briefs were added together, Forman responded, If again those are independent events you would be multiplying those frequencies and the more you multiply small numbers together the smaller those numbers become and the more rare an event is likely to happen by chance alone. ¶ 63. It is well settled that the determination of the admissibility of expert witness testimony rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge. In Polk v. State, 612 So.2d 381, 393 (Miss. 1992), this Court held that evidence of a DNA match using RFLP analysis was admissible. In Polk, the trial court refused to admit population statistics, and this Court did not discuss on appeal the admissibility of those statistics because of that ruling. Id. at 390. However, this Court did mention that an expert's testimony as to those statistics went to the credibility of the testimony. Id. at 393. ¶ 64. Recently, this Court had another opportunity to pass upon the propriety of DNA evidence. In Hull v. State, 687 So.2d 708, 727 (Miss. 1996), the defendant argued that evidence of a DNA match should not have been admitted unless reasonable probability estimates were also admitted. This Court held that where the trial court finds that evidence of a DNA match is admissible as relevant, the court should also allow scientific statistical evidence which shows the frequency with which the match might occur in the given population. Id. at 728. ¶ 65. In the instant case, the trial court denied Crawford's motion in limine regarding presentation of DNA evidence. This constituted a finding that the DNA testimony from Forman was admissible as relevant, pursuant to Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.1923) [6] . As such, it was proper for Forman to give statistics to show the frequency with which a match might occur in the general population. Further, contrary to Crawford's allegation, the jury was not instructed to apply the product rule to the DNA match statistics. As Forman's testimony shows, before the product rule could be applied, a determination would have to be made that the events (the occurrence of Ray's DNA and Crawford's DNA together on two different items) were independent of each other. No evidence was elicited to show that such a determination had been made, so the jury could not have made such a leap. More importantly, Forman testified regarding the modified ceiling method of working through the population genetics models, as recommended by the National Research Council, unlike the professor of mathematics in People v. Collins , who showed no evidence to sustain his individual probability factors. This Court has concluded that the DNA methodology employed by population geneticists, if conducted properly, satisfies the Frye standard. The trial court here considered the DNA analysis in light of Frye and found the evidence of DNA matching admissible. In light of that finding, it cannot be said that the trial court manifestly erred.