Opinion ID: 202431
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the evidence supporting the aggravated felony finding

Text: 32 Berhe argues that, even applying the hypothetical federal felony approach, his 2003 state drug possession conviction is not a felony under federal law because the 1996 conviction was neither charged nor proven during the 2003 proceeding. He notes that under federal and Massachusetts law, a defendant must be charged with a prior conviction before the government can seek a recidivism-based sentencing enhancement. See 21 U.S.C. § 851; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, § 11A; see also Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 42, 44 (1st Cir.1999) (holding that federal courts lack[ ] authority to impose the statutory enhancement where the government has not complied with the strictly enforced § 851 charging procedures). Berhe acknowledges that both the state and the federal government (had it brought charges against him) could have sought a recidivism-based sentence enhancement which, if successful, would have resulted in a felony conviction under federal law. But, because he was not so charged, and instead pleaded guilty only to simple possession of a controlled substance (which is only a misdemeanor under federal law because it is punishable by no more than one year in prison, see 21 U.S.C. § 844(a)), the government failed to establish that he was convicted of a hypothetical federal felony. 33 We agree. Because Berhe's 1996 conviction is not a part of the record of the 2003 conviction, the government did not establish that Berhe was convicted of a hypothetical federal felony. As recently articulated, this circuit applies a modified categorical approach for determining whether an alien has been convicted of an aggravated felony. Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45, 55-56 (1st Cir.2006). Under this approach, the government bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence derived solely from the record of the prior proceeding, that (i) the alien was convicted of a crime and (ii) that crime involved every element of one of the offenses enumerated in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). Id. at 56. When the statute on which the underlying conviction rests necessarily involves all of the elements enumerated in one of the INA's definitions of aggravated felony, proof of the fact of conviction suffices to discharge the government's burden. Id. Where, however, the underlying statute sweeps more broadly (i.e., encompasses crimes that are not necessarily aggravated felonies under the INA), the government ... must demonstrate, by reference only to facts that can be mined from the record of conviction, that the putative predicate offense constitutes a crime designated as an aggravated felony in the INA. Id. (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990); In re Pichardo-Sufren, 21 I & N Dec. 330, 335-36, 1996 WL 230227 (BIA 1996)). 6 34 As noted above, the underlying state statute here encompasses crimes that ordinarily would not constitute felonies under either state or federal law. Compare Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, § 34, with 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (both setting a maximum term of imprisonment of one year for knowingly or intentionally ... possess[ing] a controlled substance). Therefore, we must look to the record of conviction of the alleged aggravated felony to determine whether the government met its burden of proving that Berhe had a prior conviction for a drug offense. See 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (noting that if an offense for simple possession is committed after a prior conviction for a drug offense has become final, the maximum penalty increases to two years' imprisonment). The record of Berhe's 2003 conviction in state district court—the criminal complaint alleging misdemeanor possession of crack cocaine and the official criminal docket indicating Berhe's plea of guilty to that charge—contains no reference to Berhe's 1996 conviction. Both the criminal complaint and the docket clearly indicate that Berhe was charged and convicted of the misdemeanor crime (under both Massachusetts and federal law) of simple possession of a controlled substance punishable by no more than one year in prison. 7 35 Because the record of conviction here contains no reference to Berhe's prior conviction, or to any other factor that would hypothetically convert his 2003 state misdemeanor conviction into a felony under federal law, the Board erred by concluding that his 2003 conviction was an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). The Board therefore also erred in concluding that Berhe is ineligible for asylum and cancellation of removal. Hence, we must remand so that it may consider the merits of those claims. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (noting that a court of appeals should ordinarily remand a case to an agency for decision of a matter that statutes place primarily in agency hands).