Opinion ID: 185410
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of the Gun

Text: 11 Stevenson's second claim involves the district court's ruling on the admissibility of a Cobray MAC 11 semiautomatic weapon taken from Wallace when he was arrested. In a motion in limine Stevenson argued the gun was irrelevant because the police officers did not know before the shooting that Wallace was armed and therefore the reasonableness vel non of their actions was not dependent on the gun's existence. Moreover, Stevenson argued that admitting the gun would be unfairly prejudicial because it would inflame the jury against him. The District countered that the MAC 11 was relevant to show plaintiff's motivations and intent to escape at all costs, JA 57, and to contradict his assertion that he tried to flee only because he panicked when he saw the police. JA 63. The district court concluded Wallace's possession of the gun was more probative than prejudicial as evidence of the plaintiff's desperation, as a convicted felon on parole ... in the presence of a firearm, to avoid arrest and his intention to use his vehicle as a weapon. JA 114. 12 Stevenson presses before us the same arguments he advanced before the district court. Reviewing the district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, United States v. Clarke, 24 F.3d 257, 267 (D.C. Cir. 1994), we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion. 13 The Federal Rules of Evidence define relevant evidence as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 401. Under this definition, the gun is relevant because, as the District argued below, it tends to support the proposition that Stevenson was intent on escaping at all costs and in so doing placed the officers at risk. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that the district court gravely abused its discretion in declining to exclude the gun under Rule 403. See Clarke, 24 F.3d at 265 (We review the district court's Rule 403 determinations 'with great deference, reversing only for grave abuse of discretion.'  (quoting United States v. Johnson, 970 F.2d 907, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Payne, 805 F.2d 1062, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1986)))). Although admission of the gun no doubt worked against Stevenson's interest, the risk of undue prejudice to Stevenson, we conclude, did not substantially outweigh the evidence's probative value. Finally, Stevenson's reliance on Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116 (D.C. Cir. 1986), is misplaced. There the court held that the district court abused its discretion in allowing counsel to read lengthy and detailed allegations of police misconduct contained in administrative complaints, pleadings in lawsuits and newspaper articles when the sole purpose of the exercise was to test whether the witnesses were familiar with the allegations. The same result, the court noted, could have been achieved in a less prejudicial manner. The facts here are far different. The allegedly prejudicial evidence introduced was not extensive, as it was in Carter. See id. at 126-28. Moreover, unlike the challenged evidence in Carter, the gun was probative of an important issue in the case, namely which version of events-Stevenson's or the officers'-was true. Accordingly, Carter does not win the day for Stevenson.