Opinion ID: 169726
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence

Text: Beckstead argues that the Government deprived him of due process because officers immediately seized and destroyed the methamphetamine lab components and related chemicals found at Morris' apartment and in Beckstead's car. [3] Beckstead contends that by destroying this potentially exculpatory evidence, officers deprived him of any opportunity to test the lab for fingerprints which might have eliminated him as the lab's operator, and deprived him of the ability to challenge the amounts of chemicals seized. To establish that the Government deprived him of due process by destroying potentially exculpatory evidence, Beckstead must show both that 1) the evidence destroyed was potentially exculpatory and 2) the government acted in bad faith in destroying it. [4] See United States v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904, 910-11 (10th Cir.1994). For purposes of this appeal, we will assume that the destroyed evidence was potentially exculpatory and will consider here only whether the Government acted in bad faith when officers destroyed it. [5] [U]nless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988); see also Snow v. Sirmons, 474 F.3d 693, 716 (10th Cir.2007). [W]henever potentially excuplatory evidence is permanently lost, courts face the treacherous task of divining the import of materials whose contents are unknown and, very often, disputed. Part of it stems from our unwillingness to read the fundamental fairness requirement of the Due Process Clause as imposing on the police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution. We think that requiring a defendant to show bad faith on the part of the police both limits the extent of the police's obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable bounds and confines it to that class of cases where the interests of justice most clearly require it, i.e., those cases in which the police themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57-58, 109 S.Ct. 333 (quotations, citations omitted); see also Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 547-48, 124 S.Ct. 1200, 157 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2004) (per curiam); Snow, 474 F.3d at 716. We review the district court's determination that the Government did not act in bad faith for clear error. See Gomez, 191 F.3d at 1219. Beckstead bears the burden of establishing that the Government acted in bad faith. See Bohl, 25 F.3d at 913. The presence or absence of bad faith necessarily turns on the Government's knowledge of the evidence's potentially exculpatory value. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56 n. , 109 S.Ct. 333. Generally, however, destroying the evidence according to an established procedure, as the Government did here, precludes a finding of bad faith absent other compelling evidence. Gomez, 191 F.3d at 1219 (quotation omitted). This court considers several factors in determining whether the Government acted in bad faith, see Bohl, 25 F.3d at 911-13: 1) Did the Government have explicit notice that Beckstead believed the methamphetamine lab and its chemicals were exculpatory? See id. at 911. In this case, the Government appears to have destroyed this evidence before Beckstead had an attorney or any opportunity to notify government officials that the lab and its chemicals were potentially exculpatory. Cf. id. (noting Government was explicitly placed on notice that [the defendants] believed the evidence was potentially exculpatory where defendants sent the government numerous letters to that effect); United States v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir.1993) (determining Government was on notice that lab equipment was potentially exculpatory where, during pre-seizure investigation, defendant's parole officer and the lab's landlord reported that the business operating the lab claimed it was for legitimate scientific purposes; and after seizure, but before the Government destroyed the evidence, Government agents were again told lab equipment was set up for legitimate purposes and was structurally incapable of producing methamphetamine). In this case, while Beckstead admittedly did not have much of an opportunity to notify the Government that this evidence was potentially exculpatory, neither did the Government destroy it in the face of a contrary request from Beckstead to preserve it, see Bohl, 25 F.3d at 911. 2) Is Beckstead's claim that this evidence is potentially exculpatory conclusory, or is it instead . . . backed up with objective, independent evidence giving the government reason to believe that further tests on the [destroyed evidence] might lead to exculpatory evidence? Id. In this case, Beckstead's arguments are conclusory. He does not point to any other, independent evidence that would have suggested to the Government, at the time it destroyed this evidence, that further testing of the methamphetamine lab might produce exculpatory evidence. Cf. Cooper, 983 F.2d at 931 (holding destruction of lab equipment, in the face of evidence corroborating the potentially exculpatory nature of that equipment, obtained from sources other than the defendants, was in bad faith). In fact, the evidence the Government had at the time it destroyed this evidence was just to the contrary. The samples officers took of the chemicals found with the lab indicated they were precursors to methamphetamine production. Officers also found some methamphetamine with the lab. When discovered, officers recognized the equipment as a methamphetamine lab. Officers photographed the lab pieces before and after they were disassembled, and documented the pieces of lab equipment they found. From those photographs, a Government expert testified that the lab, as constructed, was capable of producing methamphetamine. Further, the Government did try, apparently unsuccessfully, to obtain fingerprints from the lab equipment before it was destroyed. Moreover, even if, as he argues, Beckstead's fingerprints were not on the lab components found in the apartment, that fact alone would not necessarily exculpate him. See Torres v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1145, 1161 (10th Cir.2003) (addressing whether destroyed fingerprints were potentially exculpatory). Given what officers knew at the time they destroyed the methamphetamine lab, they would not have had objective reason to believe that further tests on the [destroyed evidence] might lead to exculpatory evidence. Bohl, 25 F.3d at 911. 3) Did the Government still have the ability to control the disposition of the evidence at the time Beckstead indicated that the methamphetamine lab and its chemicals might be exculpatory? See id. at 912. Beckstead has not asserted any evidence indicating that this was the case here. Rather, it appears that the Government destroyed the evidence before Beckstead raised the possibility that it was exculpatory. 4) Was the evidence disposed of central to the case? See id. The answer to this inquiry is clearly yes. The lab found in Morris' apartment and the lab equipment found in Beckstead's car were central to Beckstead's conviction for attempting to manufacture methamphetamine; and the red phosphorus seized at Morris' apartment presumably would have supported the jury's finding that Beckstead attempted to manufacture over fifty grams of methamphetamine, as well as providing the basis for Beckstead's conviction for possessing red phosphorus. See generally United States v. Donaldson, 915 F.2d 612, 614 (10th Cir.1990) (noting Youngblood 's analysis also applies to sentencing proceedings). 5) Does the Government offer any innocent explanation for its failure to preserve the evidence? See Bohl, 25 F.3d at 912. Clearly it does. Officers and Envirosolve technicians testified that they removed and destroyed the lab and its chemicals in this case pursuant to the police department's standard policy. This policy is based upon the significant dangers that such a lab and the chemicals associated with it present. For example, Officer Wersland testified at a pretrial evidentiary hearing that the fumes in a trash bag used as a vent for a methamphetamine lab could kill a person, should the bag rupture. And many of the chemicals associated with the production of methamphetamine are combustible, toxic or corrosive, and very dangerous. Beckstead does not dispute this evidence. Instead, he asserts that the Government could, nevertheless, have carefully preserved the evidence. The fact that the Government could preserve the evidence, however, is not dispositive. The same was true in Trombetta, where officers destroyed breath samples used to support drunk driving charges, even though it was technically feasible for police to preserve those samples. See 467 U.S. at 481-83, 104 S.Ct. 2528. The Supreme Court, nevertheless, concluded that officers' destruction of this potentially exculpatory evidence in accord with their normal practice did not amount to bad faith, and therefore did not deprive the defendant of due process. See id. at 486-89, 104 S.Ct. 2528. Considering Bohl 's factors, we conclude that the officers in this case did not act in bad faith when they destroyed the components of the methamphetamine lab and the chemicals found with it. Officers were acting pursuant to the department's standard policy, and there is no evidence suggesting that they were otherwise acting in bad faith. Our conclusion mirrors decisions by other courts in similar cases. In United States v. Heffington, 952 F.2d 275 (9th Cir.1991), for example, the Ninth Circuit rejected a similar Youngblood claim because the police had destroyed a methamphetamine lab in compliance with `departmental procedures.' This routine disposal of the evidence was apparently not the product of any realization that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant. Significantly, [the defendant] does not claim that the government knew that any test would exonerate him. Id. at 281 (quotations, alterations omitted). And in other circumstances, the Supreme Court, as well as this court, has similarly rejected Youngblood claims where the Government destroyed potentially exculpatory evidence pursuant to standard policy. See Fisher, 540 U.S. at 545, 547-49, 124 S.Ct. 1200 (rejecting due process claim where Government, acting in good faith and pursuant to normal police procedures, destroyed cocaine seized during traffic stop ten years earlier); United States v. LaVallee, 439 F.3d 670, 697, 699 (10th Cir.2006) (rejecting due process claim where Bureau of Prisons destroyed videotape two years after it was created, pursuant to the Bureau's policy, and there was no indication that the Bureau was acting in bad faith when it did so); Gomez, 191 F.3d at 1217, 1219 (rejecting due process claim where Government destroyed most of the marijuana it had charged Gomez with possessing, pursuant to the Government's ordinary statutory procedures). See generally Bohl, 25 F.3d at 912-13 (noting that courts have held that the government does not necessarily engage in bad faith conduct when the destruction of evidence results from a standard procedure employed by the governmental department or agency regarding the disposal of like evidence, at least when there is adequate documentation of the destroyed evidence). In this case, undisputed evidence indicates that the Government destroyed the methamphetamine lab pursuant to an established and routinely followed department policy. Beckstead fails to present any evidence that suggests that the Government, in this particular case, was nevertheless acting in bad faith when it destroyed the lab and its related chemicals. The district court, therefore, did not err in rejecting Beckstead's due process argument. See United States v. Ward, 182 Fed.Appx. 779, 783-86 (10th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (reaching same conclusion in similar case), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 422, 166 L.Ed.2d 298 (2006).