Opinion ID: 2640086
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Provocation and Lesser Included Offense Instructions

Text: The trial court instructed on two theories of first degree murder: murder by means of lying in wait, and willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder. (CALJIC Nos. 8.10, 8.11, 8.20, 8.25.) The court also instructed on unpremeditated second degree murder (CALJIC No. 8.30), and informed the jury of its duty to fix the degree of murder (CALJIC No. 8.70), and to give defendant the benefit of any reasonable doubt on that issue. (CALJIC No. 8.71.) However, the court denied defendant's request for instructions on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, including an instruction explaining that provocation in the form of a sudden quarrel or heat of passion may reduce murder to manslaughter. [21] The court denied a related request for CALJIC No. 8.73, that evidence of provocation could be considered in determining the degree of murder. [22] On appeal, defendant repeats his claim that the requested instructions were warranted because the jury could conclude that the killings, even if intentional, occurred in a rage, such that defendant was not guilty of first degree murder and was guilty, at most, only of a lesser offense (i.e., voluntary manslaughter or unpremeditated second degree murder). The evidence cited in support of this argument comes from prosecution witnesses, and includes (1) expert testimony describing the victims' injuries as consistent with a crime of passion, (2) the victims' alleged hostility and conspiracy to separate defendant from his son Michael in the months and weeks before the killing, and (3) the asserted lack of any plan by defendant to kill the victims. Defendant contends the instructional error violated his right to due process and a fair trial under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. (13) Where an intentional and unlawful killing occurs upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion (§ 192, subd. (a)), the malice aforethought required for murder is negated, and the offense is reduced to voluntary manslaughtera lesser included offense of murder. ( People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 153-154 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].) Such heat of passion exists only where the killer's reason was actually obscured as the result of a strong passion aroused by a `provocation' sufficient to cause an `ordinary [person] of average disposition . . . to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, and from this passion rather than from judgment.' ( Id. at p. 163.) To satisfy this test, the victim must taunt the defendant or otherwise initiate the provocation. ( People v. Spurlin (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 119, 125-126 [202 Cal.Rptr. 663]; e.g., People v. Berry (1976) 18 Cal.3d 509, 512-515 [134 Cal.Rptr. 415, 556 P.2d 777] [young wife repeatedly subjected older husband to sexual insults, rejection, and admissions of infidelity, causing him to strangle her in jealous rage]; cf. People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 585-586 [36 Cal.Rptr.3d 340, 123 P.3d 614] [provocation lacking where defendant calmly shot bar patron who insulted and goaded him into firing]; see also People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1144 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572] [revenge does not reduce murder to manslaughter].) In a related vein, the `existence of provocation which is not adequate to reduce the class of the offense [from murder to manslaughter] may nevertheless raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant formed the intent to kill upon, and carried it out after, deliberation and premeditation'an inquiry relevant to determining whether the offense is premeditated murder in the first degree, or unpremeditated murder in the second degree. ( People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 329 [185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311], quoting People v. Valentine (1946) 28 Cal.2d 121, 132 [169 P.2d 1].) First degree willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder involves a cold, calculated judgment, including one arrived at quickly ( Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1080), and is evidenced by planning activity, a motive to kill, or an exacting manner of death. ( People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27 [73 Cal.Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942].) Such state of mind is manifestly inconsistent with having acted under the heat of passioneven if that state of mind was achieved after a considerable period of provocatory conduct. ( People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 572 [280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290].) We see no substantial evidence that the killings were provoked and that defendant was guilty only of the lesser offenses on which instruction was sought. No conspiracy by the victims against defendant appears on this record. In December 1994, after defendant and Sonia ended their relationship and stopped living together, Sonia obtained child custody and support orderssomething she was legally entitled to do. She also took the laudable step of maintaining a relationship with defendant's mother, Doristhe grandmother of their son, Michael. Thus, over Easter weekend in April 1995, Sonia helped Doris recuperate after a brief hospital stay. Then, on May 5, 1995, about two weeks before the capital crime, Sonia stayed in Doris's apartment for one week. While there was some evidence that Sonia and Doris might thereafter relocate with Michael in another city, it is not clear defendant knew of this possibility. In any event, none of these events were sufficient to arouse feelings of homicidal rage or passion in an ordinarily reasonable person. ( People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 250 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643].) Far from being the source of any rage or passion ( People v. Spurlin, supra, 156 Cal.App.3d 119, 126), Sonia was arguably taunted by defendant. In late 1994, he began dating codefendant Lee, a mutual colleague of theirs. Before long, coworkers and bosses learned of defendant's new relationship. On April 16, 1995, Easter Sunday, defendant invited Sonia on a drive and admitted that his relationship with Lee was sexual, causing Sonia to reflexively slap him. It appears Sonia did nothing to provoke sexual jealously in defendant. Moreover, contrary to what defendant claims, all the available evidence suggests that, having desired Sonia's death for a considerable period of time, he actively planned the murders with codefendant Lee for at least one week. Prosecution witnesses testified defendant repeatedly said he wished Sonia was dead. The guilty look the pair displayed when spied by their managers at Universal on May 6, 1995, implied they were scouting the crime scene at the time. The planning process included defendant inviting the victims to a late-night Mother's Day meal before the murdersan invitation timed so that their guard would likely be down. He parked in the corner against the garage wall on the top floor with few cars nearby, creating what the prosecutor called a killing zone. It appears codefendant Lee carefully timed her arrival on the scene, with defendant first calling her from the restaurant a few minutes beforehand. Through this arrangement, defendant had the benefit of a second person, Lee, in restraining and killing the victims, and in removing property from the scene in order to stage a robbery. Defendant also brought an extra knife that was found, unused, in the stairwell of the garage. Lee carried washcloths and Ziploc bags that could have been used to clean up and dispose of evidenceitems that were found bloodstained in or near her car along Highway 170. Finally, there was no evidence that heated words were exchanged or a physical struggle took place between the victim[s] and the accused before the fatal[ ] attack. ( People v. Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d 307, 329.) As noted, part of the lethal planning involved the victims' last meal. According to the waitress, the only testy behavior she saw during the Mother's Day dinner came from defendant, not his two female guests. Indeed, defendant told the paramedic at the crime scene that he leaned into the car to kiss Sonia shortly before being attacked from behind by unknown assailants. He reported no quarrel with the victims. (14) In sum, all the evidence indicated either that defendant was not the killer of Sonia and Doris (based on his robbery story at the crime scene) or that the killings were the product of his long-simmering resentment towards them over family issues, and that he exacted the ultimate revenge when he slashed them to death. There was no evidence sufficient to support either voluntary manslaughter instructions or unpremeditated second degree murder instructions based on heat of passion. The defense request for such instructions was thus properly denied.