Opinion ID: 2021311
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory Rights to Subpoena Evidence and to Discovery in a Criminal Proceeding

Text: ś 41 Schaefer contends that the analysis above is inconsistent with the broad subpoena power in the Wisconsin Statutes. We disagree. Schaefer's subpoena duces tecum is 1) not authorized by our subpoena statutes, and 2) inconsistent with our criminal discovery statutes. ś 42 The subpoena power is set out in multiple statutes. For instance: (A) Wisconsin Stat. § 757.01(1) provides that courts of record shall have power [t]o issue process of subpoena, requiring the attendance of any witness, . . . to testify in any matter or cause pending or triable in such courts. (B) Wisconsin Stat. § 885.01(1) authorizes a court to require the attendance of witnesses and their production of lawful instruments of evidence in any action, matter or proceeding pending or to be examined into before any court, magistrate, officer, arbitrator, board, committee or other person authorized to take testimony in the state. This statute provides a court with general power, at the behest of an attorney, to subpoena both witnesses and documents. See Wiseman, et al., 9 Wisconsin Practice: Criminal Practice and Procedure § 24.11 (1996). (C) Wisconsin Stat. § 805.07(1) provides that [a] subpoena may also be issued by any attorney of record in a civil action or special proceeding to compel attendance of witnesses for deposition, hearing or trial in the action or special proceeding. (Emphasis added.) Wisconsin Stat. § 805.07(2)(a) states that [a] subpoena may command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents or tangible things designated therein. ś 43 As a general rule, Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1) makes civil procedure statutes part of the criminal code. The subsection provides that the rules of evidence and practice in civil actions, including Wis. Stat. § 805.07, shall be applicable in all criminal actions unless the context of a section or rule manifestly requires a different construction.  (Emphasis added.) The subsection then adds: Chapter[ ] 885 . . . shall apply in all criminal proceedings. Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1). ś 44 Considered broadly, courts and attorneys of record have the power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence by subpoena in any proceeding. But, unlike present Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45, Wis. Stat. § 805.07 appears to link the production of documentary evidence with the appearance and testimony of a witness. [9] This is significant because Wis. Stat. § 805.07(1) authorizes a subpoena for the attendance of a witness for deposition, hearing or trial. Schaefer is asking this court to establish an additional proceeding, denominated by him as a Return of Records, that will help the defendant prepare for his preliminary examination without requiring any witness to testify. Our criminal procedure statutes do not contemplate a court proceeding to receive evidence preliminary to a preliminary examination, and our civil procedure statutes neither recognize nor compel such a proceeding. ś 45 Wisconsin Stat. § 804.09, entitled Production of documents and things and entry upon land for inspection and other purposes, is the civil procedure statute that most closely approximates what Schaefer is trying to accomplish in this case. However, § 804.09(1) involves a request, not a command, and § 804.09(1) is located in the chapter on Civil Procedure â Depositions and Discovery.  (Emphasis added.) In short, no subpoena statute authorizes Schaefer's action. ś 46 Schaefer's attempt to utilize the general subpoena power for discovery prior to his preliminary examination also conflicts with Wis. Stat. §§ 971.31(5)(b) and 971.23. Wisconsin Stat. § 971.23 is the criminal discovery statute. Wisconsin Stat. § 971.31(5)(b) provides explicitly that in felony actions, motions under s. 971.23 . . . shall not be made at a preliminary examination and not until an information has been filed. (Emphasis added.) ś 47 [G]enerally where a specific statutory provision leads in one direction and a general statutory provision in another, the specific statutory provision controls. Marder v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis., 2005 WI 159, ś 23, 286 Wis.2d 252, 706 N.W.2d 110. This principle of statutory interpretation aligns with the important qualification in Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1) that a civil practice applies to criminal procedure  unless the context of a section or rule manifestly requires a different construction. Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1) (emphasis added). ś 48 Schaefer's statutory argument is that Wis. Stat. § 972.11 allows a criminal defendant access to the civil subpoena duces tecum power embodied in Wis. Stat. § 805.07(2). He asserts that § 972.11 applies the general subpoena power in Wis. Stat. § 885.01 to criminal proceedings. He further contends that the subpoena duces tecum constitutes a judicial process independent of discovery rules. In view of this argument, if we were to conclude that Schaefer was not attempting to pursue discovery with his subpoena duces tecum, we might have difficulty concluding that his subpoena request was inconsistent with the timing limitation in Wis. Stat. § 971.31(5)(b). [10] ś 49 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.23 sets out the state's discovery obligations. Subsection (1) provides in part: (1) What a district attorney must disclose to a defendant. Upon demand, the district attorney shall, within a reasonable time before trial, disclose to the defendant or his or her attorney and permit the defendant or his or her attorney to inspect and copy or photograph all of the following materials and information, if it is within the possession, custody or control of the state[.] Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1). ś 50 Paragraphs (a) through (h) of the statute then outline the specific disclosures the district attorney must make: (a) Any written or recorded statement concerning the alleged crime made by the defendant, including the testimony of the defendant in a secret proceeding under s. 968.26 or before a grand jury, and the names of witnesses to the defendant's written statements. (b) A written summary of all oral statements of the defendant which the district attorney plans to use in the course of the trial and the names of witnesses to the defendant's oral statements. (bm) Evidence obtained in the manner described under s. 968.31(2)(b), if the district attorney intends to use the evidence at trial. (c) A copy of the defendant's criminal record. (d) A list of all witnesses and their addresses whom the district attorney intends to call at the trial. This paragraph does not apply to rebuttal witnesses or those called for impeachment only. (e) Any relevant written or recorded statements of a witness named on a list under par. (d), including any audiovisual recording of an oral statement of a child under s. 908.08, any reports or statements of experts made in connection with the case or, if an expert does not prepare a report or statement, a written summary of the expert's findings or the subject matter of his or her testimony, and the results of any physical or mental examination, scientific test, experiment or comparison that the district attorney intends to offer in evidence at trial. (f) The criminal record of a prosecution witness which is known to the district attorney. (g) Any physical evidence that the district attorney intends to offer in evidence at the trial. (h) Any exculpatory evidence. Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(a)-(h). ś 51 These mandatory disclosures should be compared to Schaefer's subpoena demand: A complete copy of all reports, memorandums, witness interviews and any records related to the investigation and arrest of Ronald Schaefer on suspected criminal offenses or relating to the alleged sexual assault of Kerry M. DOB 4/6/76 in 1990. (Emphasis added.) ś 52 The demands in the defendant's subpoena duces tecum clearly overlap the discovery materials outlined in Wis. Stat. § 971.23. In some respects, the subpoena demands exceed the discovery materials authorized by the statute. Because the mandatory disclosures outlined in § 971.23(1) include information that is customarily found in police investigative reports or similar records, [11] we are hard pressed to distinguish the defendant's subpoena duces tecum from a discovery demand under Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1). ś 53 As noted above, Wis. Stat. § 971.31(5)(b) provides that [i]n felony actions, motions . . . under s. 971.23 . . . shall not be made at a preliminary examination and not until an information has been filed.  (Emphasis added.) ś 54 Schaefer's subpoena duces tecum arguably is governed by the limitation on pretrial discovery found in Wis. Stat. § 971.31(5)(b). Schaefer is seeking discovery materials (police records). His subpoena satisfies some of the criteria of a motion. See Wis. Stat. § 971.30. The police chief's failure to honor the subpoena would likely lead to an application for an order to comply. Wis. Stat. § 971.30(1). Black's Law Dictionary defines motion as A written or oral application requesting a court to make a specified ruling or order. Black's Law Dictionary 1031 (7th ed. 1999). In effect, Schaefer has requested the circuit court to order, pursuant to its subpoena power, the Brookfield Chief of Police or designee to appear in court with the documents requested. We think it makes little sense to disregard the timing limitations on discovery in Wis. Stat. § 971.31(5)(b) simply because Schaefer does not rely on Wis. Stat. § 971.23, has tried to exceed the scope of discovery in § 971.23, and has not labeled his subpoena duces tecum as a motion. To say that Schaefer's subpoena duces tecum is not a motion elevates form over substance. ś 55 This case requires us to interpret several statutes. [T]he purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine what the statute means so that it may be given its full, proper and intended effect. State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ś 44, 271 Wis.2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. [S]tatutory language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results. Id., ś 46. Statutes involving the same subject matter must be construed in a manner that harmonizes them in order to give each full force and effect. Wis. Power & Light Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 2006 WI App 221, ś 15, 296 Wis.2d 705, 725 N.W.2d 423. ś 56 The plain truth is that if we permitted the general subpoena authority to effect discovery in a criminal case before the preliminary examination, there would be nothing left of the limiting conditions in Wis. Stat. §§ 971.23(1) and 971.31(5)(b). This would not be harmonizing the general subpoena statutes with the criminal discovery statutes. ś 57 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.23(1) requires a district attorney to disclose discovery material within a reasonable time before trial. Requiring the state [12] to disclose discovery material before the preliminary examination â before the court has even authorized a trial â is plainly at odds with the statutory scheme. This conclusion about timing is reinforced by the language in Wis. Stat. § 971.31(5)(b) that discovery motions shall not be made at a preliminary examination and not until an information has been filed. ś 58 Equally important, Wis. Stat. § 971.23 does not require the state to turn over all the information in its possession. For instance, Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(d) requires the state to disclose [a] list of all witnesses and their addresses whom the district attorney intends to call at the trial. This paragraph does not apply to rebuttal witnesses or those called for impeachment only. If Schaefer were entitled to obtain by subpoena duces tecum the names of all witnesses who have surfaced in the police reports as well as their statements, his need â and the need of all defendants â for § 971.23 discovery would be substantially reduced. Section 971.23(1) would then be used primarily to make sure that the state discloses any new information that it obtains and reveals its trial strategy, i.e., what witnesses and physical evidence the state plans to present at trial and what evidence it has decided not to present. ś 59 It must be noted that the limitations on the scope of discovery in Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1) may not always prevail against a subpoena duces tecum after an information is filed. We have previously implied that a subpoena duces tecum may have to be honored if the defendant shows a particularized need for information in the possession of the state. See Lynch, 82 Wis.2d at 466-68, 262 N.W.2d 773. That is not the case here. The defendant has no statutory subpoena right to obtain and copy police investigation reports and nonprivileged materials prior to his preliminary examination.