Opinion ID: 566791
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Rowley Standard

Text: 47 In reviewing the district court's findings, we agree with other circuit courts that the question whether an IEP provided a free appropriate public education that educationally benefitted the handicapped child is a mixed question of fact and law subject to de novo review. See, e.g., Lachman v. Illinois State Board of Educ., 852 F.2d 290, 293 (7th Cir.1988); Gregory K. v. Longview School Dist., 811 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir.1987). The district court, in addressing the material grievance of J.S.K.'s parents, held that the 1986 IEP met the Supreme Court's Rowley standard. We agree. In Rowley, the Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine the appropriateness of an IEP: 48 First, has the State complied with the procedures set forth in the Act? And second, is the individualized educational program developed through that Act's procedure reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits? 49 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07, 102 S.Ct. at 3051. Because the Board has satisfied the procedural and educational-benefit requirements of EAHCA, the 1986 IEP meets the Rowley standard. Procedural Requirement 50 Despite an attempt at trial to argue that Peggy Tucker's (J.S.K.'s 1986-87 teacher) day-to-day activities that were not expressly included in the 1986 IEP violated EAHCA procedural guidelines, J.S.K.'s parents admitted through their attorney that this was a makeweight argument and not a linchpin of their case. J.S.K.'s parents also recognize on appeal that the essential dispute in this case is whether J.S.K.'s IEP was appropriate. We agree and conclude that Tucker's classroom activities violated no EAHCA procedural requirements. 51 Our inquiry does not stop here, however. The Supreme Court has stated that the procedural inquiry must also determine whether the State has created an IEP for the child ... which conforms with the requirements of § 1401(a)( . Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206 n. 27, 102 S.Ct. at 3051 n. 27. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the 1986 IEP satisfies section 1401(a)(20) requirements. 3 52 Section 1401(a)(20) says that the IEP shall include a statement of present educational levels, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20)(A); a statement of annual goals, id. § 1401(a)(20)(B); a statement of educational services to be provided and the extent to which the child will participate in regular educational programs, id. § 1401(a)(20)(C); the initiation date and duration of these services, id. § 1401(a)(20)(E); and appropriate objective criteria for determining whether instructional objectives are being met, id. § 1401(a)(20)(F). In summarizing the alleged insufficiencies in the 1986 IEP, J.S.K.'s expert witness, Amy Wetherby, testified that the goals and objectives were too vague, that communication and social-interaction goals were insufficient and that there was no adequate plan for integration with nonhandicapped children or for a behavioral program. Because these criticisms do not expressly or impliedly allege that the 1986 IEP procedurally violated section 1401(a)(20) and because nowhere else on appeal do J.S.K.'s parents argue that the 1986 IEP procedurally violated section 1401(a)(20), we conclude after reviewing the record that the 1986 IEP satisfies EAHCA procedural requirements. Educational-Benefit Requirement 53 J.S.K.'s parents argue that, to satisfy the second part of Rowley, the Board must have provided J.S.K. with what his parents call meaningful educational benefits. We are not sure what meaningful is intended to signify; but as we understand J.S.K.'s parents, we disagree with this characterization. 54 J.S.K.'s parents note on appeal that in Rowley the Court stated that, in seeking to provide such access to public education, Congress did not impose upon the States any greater substantive educational standard than would be necessary to make such access meaningful. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192, 102 S.Ct. at 3043 (emphasis added). Meaningful only modified access. More important, the Court further stated that the intent of the [EAHCA] was more to open the door of public education to handicapped children on appropriate terms than to guarantee any particular level of education once inside. Id. 55 The Court, however, recognized that EAHCA would be worthless if handicapped children received no benefit from the free appropriate public education. As the Court stated: Implicit in the congressional purpose of providing access to a 'free appropriate public education' is the requirement that the education to which access is provided be sufficient to confer some educational benefit upon the handicapped child. Id. at 200, 102 S.Ct. at 3048 (emphasis added). Perhaps realizing that there could be no universal measure of some educational benefit, the Court confined itself to a case-specific analysis of the handicapped child and did not attempt ... to establish any one test for determining the adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all children by the [EAHCA]. Id. at 202, 102 S.Ct. at 3049. The Court, in holding that the child's education was adequate, though, found that the educational benefit need not achieve the handicapped child's maximum potential, id. at 198, 204 n. 26, 102 S.Ct. at 3046, 3049 n. 26, or that the educational benefit be more than adequate. As long as the handicapped child received personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally, id. at 203, 102 S.Ct. at 3049, EAHCA educational-benefit requirements would be satisfied. 56 J.S.K.'s parents and the Board acknowledge that in Drew P. v. Clarke County School Dist., 877 F.2d 927 (11th Cir.1989), we addressed the issue of the level of educational benefit required under EAHCA. J.S.K.'s parents contend that Drew P. stands for the proposition that a child must receive a meaningful educational benefit. We disagree to the extent that meaningful means anything more than some or adequate educational benefit. In Drew P. we held that [t]he state must provide a child only with a 'basic floor of opportunity.'  Id. at 930 (quoting Rowley, 102 S.Ct. at 3048). Our decision in Drew P. was not based on whether Drew P. was receiving meaningful educational benefits, but was based on whether he was receiving any educational benefits. Id. at 931 (stating that residential placement was necessary ... to receive any educational benefit). 57 Following Rowley, we hold today that the state must provide to the handicapped child personalized instruction and services that meet state educational standards and that comport with the child's IEP, which must be formulated according to EAHCA requirements. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203, 102 S.Ct. at 3049. We also stress that, when measuring whether a handicapped child has received educational benefits from an IEP and related instructions and services, courts must only determine whether the child has received the basic floor of opportunity. Todd D. v. Andrews, 933 F.2d 1576, 1580 (11th Cir.1991). This opportunity provides significant value to the handicapped child who, before EAHCA, might otherwise have been excluded from any educational opportunity. The IEP and the IEP's educational outcome need not maximize the child's education. Id.; Doe v. Alabama State Dep't of Educ., 915 F.2d at 665. If the educational benefits are adequate based on surrounding and supporting facts, EAHCA requirements have been satisfied. While a trifle might not represent adequate benefits, see, e.g., Doe v. Alabama State Dep't of Educ., 915 F.2d at 665, maximum improvement is never required. Adequacy must be determined on a case-by-case basis in the light of the child's individual needs. 4 58 In applying this standard to J.S.K.'s education, we conclude that he received adequate educational benefit. We acknowledge at the outset that courts lack the 'specialized knowledge and experience' necessary to resolve 'persistent and difficult questions of educational policy.'  Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208, 102 S.Ct. at 3052. Courts must be careful to avoid imposing their view of preferable educational methods on the States. Id. at 207, 102 S.Ct. at 3051 (footnote omitted). We stress that it seems highly unlikely that Congress intended courts to overturn a State's choice of appropriate educational theories in a proceeding conducted pursuant to § 1415(e)(2). Todd D., 933 F.2d at 1581 (citing Rowley, 102 S.Ct. at 3051), and that great deference must be paid to the educators who developed the IEP. Id. Guided by these principles, we conclude that the 1986 IEP provided J.S.K. with adequate educational benefits. 59 The Board presented evidence at trial demonstrating that J.S.K. received adequate educational benefits during the 1986-87 school year. Also, J.S.K.'s parents' key expert/consultant, Amy Wetherby, suggested that J.S.K. received adequate educational benefits. For example, on page four of Wetherby's May 21, 1987 Consultant Report she wrote: 60 [J.S.K.] has made substantial progress in preacademics and behavior management during the school year 1986/87.... The progress that [J.S.K.] has made during 1986/87 indicates that [J.S.K.] can learn new skills given an adequate educational program. 61 Later, on page six, when discussing her general impressions of J.S.K.'s educational programs, she wrote that, during the 1986-87 school year, J.S.K.'s teacher had clearly demonstrated that [J.S.K.] can progress on a large number of goals and manage his behavior when provided with a good educational and behavioral program. Aside from testifying that J.S.K. did not need residential placement to benefit educationally during the 1986-87 school year, Wetherby testified: 62 If you define [appropriate education] as that the child is making measurable gains within the classroom, then I would say that '86-'87 was meeting that standard, but if you define it as the child is making meaningful gains and that the child is able to demonstrate those across settings, which is particularly critical for autistic children, then I would say no. 63 We in fact do define appropriate education as making measurable and adequate gains in the classroom. If meaningful gains across settings means more than making measurable and adequate gains in the classroom, they are not required by EAHCA or Rowley. 64 We do not suggest that Wetherby never attacked the level of J.S.K.'s educational benefits--as the earlier quotation indicates, she felt that his gains were inadequate because they were not generalized or demonstrate[d] ... across settings. Her criticism, however, indicated that she felt J.S.K.'s educational benefits under EAHCA should be maximized. We disagree. The Supreme Court has stated: Whatever Congress meant by an 'appropriate' education, it is clear that it did not mean a potential-maximizing education. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 197 n. 21, 102 S.Ct. at 3046 n. 21. Because J.S.K. received adequate educational benefits from the 1986 IEP during the 1986-87 school year, the Board has satisfied the second part of Rowley. 65