Opinion ID: 1974288
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: feigons' counterclaim

Text: The Feigons contend that, because of evidentiary errors made by the court, and because there is insufficient evidence to support it, the verdict against them on their counterclaim for a breach of contract should be overturned. The first evidentiary ruling challenged by the Feigons is the exclusion of the testimony of Lionel Tardif. Tardif testified concerning his experience with Haworth as the contractor on home renovations that took place prior to the Feigon job. Tardif's testimony that Haworth had used marijuana on the job was objected to by Haworth, and the court instructed the jury to disregard the testimony. [9] The Feigons argue that Tardif's testimony was relevant to the issue of Haworth's credibility and diligence on the job. The court ruled that the evidence was irrelevant because it related to conduct on a different job and involved a different substance from that referred to in the statements that form the basis of this action. We discern no error in that determination. The Feigons also contend that the court erroneously permitted witnesses Timothy Roddy, a painter, and Jeffrey Sugden, an electrician, to testify in rebuttal to the Feigons' counterclaim. We accord considerable deference to the trial court's determination of what constitutes proper rebuttal evidence. Payson v. Bombardier, Ltd., 435 A.2d 411, 413 (Me.1981). The record reveals that the testimony of both Roddy and Sugden was properly admitted to rebut evidence presented by the Feigons to support their counterclaim.
Finally, the Feigons contend that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Haworth had not breached the contract by not completing the work on time. In order to successfully challenge the jury's verdict on appeal, the Feigons, because they had the burden of proof, must demonstrate, viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to Haworth, together with any justifiable inferences therefrom that the jury was compelled to conclude in their favor. Luce Co. v. Hoefler, 464 A.2d 213, 215 (Me.1983). In this case, there was no dispute as to the quality of Haworth's work. In addition, there was sufficient evidence of Haworth's performance of much of the contracted-for work to allow the jury to conclude that Haworth had substantially completed the work required by the contract. See F.A. Gray, Inc. v. Weiss, 519 A.2d 716, 717 (Me.1986). Moreover, the evidence would allow the jury to conclude that any failure by Haworth to complete the work in a timely manner was the result of the Feigons' failure as the general contractor to properly coordinate the various subcontractors. [10] See Morin Bldg. Prod. Co., Inc. v. Atlantic Design & Constr. Co., Inc., 615 A.2d 239, 241 (Me.1992). In contending that the jury ignored the evidence and based its decision on their counterclaim on passion and prejudice, the Feigons rely on the jury's failure to award damages to the Feigons on their essentially uncontroverted separate claim that Haworth damaged their garage door and did not pay for those damages (alleged to be $225), and for unreimbursed telephone calls made by Haworth on the Feigons, telephone at the job site (alleged to be $15). There was credible evidence, however, that, at the request of the Feigons, Haworth performed substantial extra work on the Feigon home, over and above the work contracted for, for which he was never paid, and that the value of that extra work exceeded the $240 claimed to be owed to the Feigons for the damaged door and the telephone bills. The Feigons had the burden to prove the elements of their counterclaim. We cannot say that the jury was compelled to find that the Feigons were owed $240. See Luce Co., 464 A.2d at 215. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. All concurring.