Opinion ID: 723198
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kelly Rambur

Text: USSG § 3C1.1 provides as follows: 15 If the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels. 16 This enhancement applies to several types of conduct, including committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury. USSG § 3C1.1, comment. (n. 3). The provision is not to be used punitively against a defendant who merely denies his or her guilt. Id. (n. 1). 17 A trial court's decision that a defendant has obstructed justice is reviewable only for abuse of discretion. United States v. Smart, 41 F.3d 263 (6th Cir.1994). This circuit has defined an abuse of discretion as a definite and firm conviction that the trial court committed a clear error of judgment. Logan v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 865 F.2d 789, 790 (6th Cir.1989). 18 While a trial court may not automatically assess the increase against every defendant who testifies in his or her own behalf and is convicted, the enhancement is proper where the court reviews the evidence and makes an independent finding that the defendant committed perjury. United States v. Dunnigan, 113 S.Ct. 1111 (1993). The finding of perjury should encompass all of the factual predicates for a finding of perjury. Dunnigan, 113 S.Ct. at 1117. The Supreme Court defined the predicates for finding perjury as follows: 19 A witness testifying under oath or affirmation violates this statute if she gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory. 20 Dunnigan, 113 S.Ct. at 1116. Accordingly, the district court must find false testimony that is material and made willfully. 21 The district court expressly found that Rambur's testimony went beyond a bare denial of guilt. Rambur's testimony was specifically refuted by other credible evidence. Credibility determinations are uniquely the province of the trial court. See United States v. Brown, 946 F.2d 1191 (6th Cir.1991) and Sewell v. Jefferson Co. Fiscal Court, 863 F.2d 461 (6th Cir.1988). The trial judge is in the best position to view the witnesses and to make the appropriate determinations about the witnesses' demeanor and veracity. 22 Rambur argues that the factual predicates of perjury are not met because the witnesses who testified against Rambur were not credible witnesses who could refute her testimony. The basis for this argument is that the witnesses testified under plea agreements which contained cooperation clauses requiring them, if called upon do so, to give complete and truthful testimony at trial on behalf of the Government. 1 This argument is meritless. While certainly that factor may have weighed in the calculus by which the trial judge measured credibility, this court cannot assume that every witness who testifies pursuant to an agreement with the Government is unbelievable. See United States v. Blandford, 33 F.3d 685, 708-09 (6th Cir.1994) and United States v. Frost, 914 F.2d 756, 766 (6th Cir.1990). Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the element of false testimony is met. 23 The element of willfulness can be demonstrated by repeated instances of false testimony. Dunnigan, 113 S.Ct. at 1117. Given the numerous witnesses who contradicted Rambur on many facts about which she could not innocently have been mistaken, there is ample support for the district court's finding. Id. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the factual predicate of willfulness is met. 24 The district court did not specifically find that Rambur's false testimony was material. However, we have held that if a district court's findings pursuant to USSG § 3C1.1 encompass all elements of perjury except materiality, Dunnigan does not require remand, because materiality is a question of law. United States v. Seymour, 38 F.3d 261 (6th Cir.1994). In Seymour, a sex abuse case, the court held that the defendant's false denial of a sexual relationship with the victim was material to the charges for sexual abuse of a minor because it was the very essence of the offense. Seymour, 38 F.3d at 264. Rambur's false denial of knowledge of the counterfeit credit card scheme is similarly material because it goes to the heart of the charged conspiracy to use counterfeit credit cards. Accordingly, the factual predicate for materiality is met as a matter of law. 25 The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in deciding that the factual predicate for perjury is met. Pursuant to USSG § 3C1.1, the trial judge was entitled to apply a two-level enhancement to Rambur's offense level for obstruction of justice. Shahan Chakmakchian 26 Chakmakchian does not dispute the district court's addition of two levels for obstruction of justice based on the finding that he committed perjury when he testified on Rambur's behalf at her trial. Rather, Chakmakchian claims this is an extraordinary case where the trial court should have credited him with acceptance of responsibility despite the obstruction-of-justice enhancement. 27 A district court's determination regarding a defendant's acceptance of responsibility may be overturned only if it is clearly erroneous. United States v. Hopper, 27 F.3d 378, 381-82 (9th Cir.1995). USSG § 3E1.1 provides in pertinent part: 28 (a) If the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense level by 2 levels. 29