Opinion ID: 1441974
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: A Defendant May Plead Guilty to a Capital Offense In Order to Seek the Death Penalty.

Text: Chapman contends that a defendant who seeks to receive the death penalty is inherently incompetent. Chapman argues that we should adopt the Arkansas position that a defendant may not waive a jury trial on the issue of sentencing or guilt in a capital case [55] because a defendant who seeks to waive those constitutional protections and seeks his own execution simply has not voluntarily and intelligently [56] waived his rights. [57] We disagree. As noted earlier, in Kentucky, the death penalty is a constitutionally permissible punishment for certain capital offenses. And there is certainly nothing inherently unconstitutional about a person deciding to take responsibility for his or her criminal misconduct without having first undergone a full-blown trial. [58] Adhering to a defendant's choice to seek the death penalty honors the last vestiges of personal dignity available to such a defendant. [59] Therefore, we hold that a competent criminal defendant is entitled to seek to plead guilty to a capital offense and, furthermore, to seek to receive the death penalty. [60] Thus, we reject Chapman's argument that the state's overriding interest in assuring that the death penalty is meted out in a constitutionally permissible manner invariably overrides a defendant's right to accept criminal responsibility for his past misconduct. The safeguards contained in this opinion for a defendant who pleads guilty to a capital offense in order to seek the death penalty  such as ensuring that the defendant is competent, that a factual basis exists to support the imposition of the death penalty, and our proportionality review  amply protect the state's interests. Indeed, the rights of citizens of a free society to make these types of choices concerning their own future are essential to the proper functioning of society as a whole, [61] as well as our system of criminal justice. [62] Furthermore, we decline to declare that a defendant may not waive his right to have a jury fix his sentence. Such a holding would appear to be in conflict with RCr 9.26, [63] as well as our previous recognition that a defendant has the concomitant right to waive a trial by jury. [64] We have not been cited to any authority that moves us to find that a defendant loses the right to waive jury sentencing simply because that defendant has pleaded guilty to a capital offense. So we decline Chapman's invitation to join the minority viewpoint found in Arkansas's ban on a defendant's right to waive jury sentencing in a case involving the death penalty.