Opinion ID: 4519077
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Information-Reporting and Coordination

Text: Provisions. The information-reporting provision of section 10153(a) mandates that a Byrne JAG application include [a]n assurance that, for each fiscal year covered by an application, the applicant shall maintain and report such data, records, and information (programmatic and financial) as the Attorney General - 17 - may reasonably require. Id. § 10153(a)(4). The coordination provision requires an applicant to certify that there has been appropriate coordination with affected agencies. Id. § 10153(a)(5)(C). The DOJ contends that these provisions authorized the imposition of the challenged conditions because those conditions request the sharing of programmatic information about a grant recipient's law enforcement and correctional activities and call for coordination with federal immigration authorities. The DOJ's contentions stretch the statutory language beyond hope of recognition. Under the DOJ's interpretation, the term programmatic in the information-reporting provision apparently would refer to any activity that a grant recipient undertakes within the eight categories of programs that the Byrne JAG statute allows grants to fund, without regard to whether the recipient's grant in fact funds that particular activity. Throughout the Byrne JAG statute, though, Congress used the term program in only two ways: to refer to Byrne JAG itself, see, e.g., id. § 10151(a) (The grant program established under this part shall be known as the 'Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program'.), or to refer to the specific criminaljustice-related activity that a Byrne JAG grant supports, see, e.g., id. § 10152(a)(1) (explaining that Byrne JAG provides funding for criminal justice, including for any one or more of - 18 - the following [eight] programs); id. § 10153(a)(5)(A) (requiring applicant to certify that the programs to be funded by the grant meet all the requirements of this part). In statutes that authorize other federal grant programs, Congress commonly uses the term programmatic in this same manner, that is, to denote the grant program and the activities that it funds. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1232f(a); 29 U.S.C. § 3245(c)(2); 34 U.S.C. § 20305(a)(2)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-14(h)(3)(A). The DOJ's contrary interpretation is little more than an ipse dixit; the DOJ advances no principled reason why we should interpret the term in so unorthodox a manner when construing the information-reporting provision.3 See City of Los Angeles, 941 F.3d at 944-45; City of Philadelphia, 916 F.3d at 285; see also Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1812 (2019) (explaining that courts should 3 The DOJ mentions that each challenged condition is prefaced with some variant of the following language: [w]ith respect to the 'program or activity' funded in whole or part under this award. The challenged conditions define program or activity by importing the broad meaning that the same phrase carries under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d4a (defining program or activity as all of the operations of various public and private entities that receive federal funding). If the DOJ seeks to argue that its own definition of the term program is entitled to deference, that argument is incorrect. This definition contradicts the plain meaning of the term as used in the statute and is, therefore, unreasonable. See City of Los Angeles, 941 F.3d at 945 n.17; see also Quinn v. City of Boston, 325 F.3d 18, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2003) (explaining that courts should not defer to agency interpretations of statutes that are unreasonable or contradict clearly ascertainable legislative intent). - 19 - not lightly assume that Congress silently attaches different meanings to the same term in the same or related statutes). The DOJ's definition of programmatic is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute in another way. The information-reporting provision requires that a grant applicant assure that it will maintain and report programmatic information for each fiscal year covered by an application. 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(4). The fact that the statute ties the reporting obligation to the years covered by an application supports interpreting the term programmatic to refer to Byrne JAG itself and the specific activities that a grant funds. Treating programmatic as referring to law-enforcement-related activities that are not funded by a grant would gratuitously expand the scope of the term in a manner that contradicts the fiscal year language. Turning to the coordination provision, we find once again that the DOJ's broad interpretation conflicts with the plain meaning of the statutory text. The DOJ reads the phrase coordination with affected agencies to refer to coordination with all law enforcement agencies affected by any activity of the grant applicant. It attempts to justify this interpretation by invoking a goal of the Byrne JAG program, which is also an objective of the OJP's work more generally: the promotion of law enforcement cooperation. See, e.g., 34 U.S.C. § 10102(a)(4) - 20 - (directing Assistant AG for OJP to maintain liaison with . . . State and local governments . . . relating to criminal justice); Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 197 (listing purposes of predecessor grant program as including increasing coordination of law enforcement and criminal justice systems at all levels of government). The text of the provision itself belies this jerry-built justification. The statute requires an applicant to certify only that there has been coordination, 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(5)(C), and we must give effect to the verb tense that Congress has chosen to employ, see Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438, 448 (2010); Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 100-01 (1st Cir. 2001). That tense makes pellucid that the coordination to which the statute alludes must take place before a state or local government submits its application. Given this temporal limitation, we think it manifest that the required coordination concerns the preparation of an application and involves the agencies affected by the programs for which the applicant seeks funding.4 See City of Los Angeles, 941 F.3d at 945; City of Philadelphia, 916 F.3d at 285. 4 Contrary to the DOJ's intimation, the Byrne JAG statute does not address this type of coordination elsewhere in the list of certifications and assurances required in an application. See 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(3) (pre-submission opportunity for consultation with the public); id. § 10153(a)(6) (submission of statewide plan - 21 - If more were needed — and we doubt that it is — both the statutory context and the formulaic nature of the Byrne JAG program undermine the DOJ's expansive construction of the informationreporting and coordination provisions. To begin, the canon of noscitur a sociis teaches that statutory words are often known by the company they keep. Lagos v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1684, 1688-89 (2018); see Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co. v. Keach (In re Montreal, Me. & Atl. Ry., Ltd.), 799 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2015). Under this canon, a string of statutory terms raises the implication that the 'words grouped in a list should be given related meaning.' S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 378 (2006) (quoting Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 36 (1990)). The information-reporting and coordination provisions appear in a list of assurances and conditions that a Byrne JAG applicant must make with respect to the application and programs to be funded. See 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a) (requiring certification, inter alia, that grant will not supplant applicant's own funding and that applicant's governing body and the public had opportunity to review application). We presume that Congress intended these provisions to relate unreservedly to the application, grant, and programs to be funded. The broad authorization that the DOJ on use of Byrne JAG grants developed in consultation with public and private entities). - 22 - purports to find in these provisions — the power to condition a Byrne JAG grant on the recipient's reporting of information and coordination on matters relating to any of the far-flung law enforcement operations that it conducts — is implausible in this context. See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2368 (2016) (recognizing that canon of noscitur a sociis helps avoid expansive definitions that Congress did not intend). In addition, it is nose-on-the-face plain that Congress intended Byrne JAG to operate as a formula grant program. See 34 U.S.C. § 10201(b)(2) (referring to Byrne JAG grants as formula grants). To carry out this intent, the DOJ must allocate funding in accordance with a detailed formula that takes into account population and violent crime statistics. See id. §§ 10152(a)(1), 10156. Congress was quick to specify those relatively few instances where it thought a deviation from this formula would be permissible. For example, the DOJ may reserve up to five percent of Congress's total appropriation for special grants to address precipitous or extraordinary increases in crime, id. § 10157(b)(1), and it must withhold ten percent of a grant from a state that does not maintain a sex offender registry that meets federal standards, see id. § 20927(a). Congress did not make an allowance for any deviation that would justify the actions undertaken by the DOJ in this case. And reading the information-reporting and coordination provisions - 23 - as broadly as does the DOJ would destabilize the statutory formula. In the DOJ's view, it can condition Byrne JAG grants on state and local governments assisting with unrelated federal law enforcement priorities through mandatory disclosure of information and coordination. But the statutory formula is not so elastic: it simply does not allow the DOJ to impose by brute force conditions on Byrne JAG grants to further its own unrelated law enforcement priorities. In fact, the express authorization for specific deviations from the formula strongly implies that Congress did not intend to give the DOJ the power to advance its own priorities by means of grant conditions. See City of Philadelphia, 916 F.3d at 286; see also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 262 (2006) (declining to find broad and unrestrained authority for agency in statute that specifically describes agency's limited authority to act). To sum up, we hold that the information-reporting provision authorizes the DOJ to require a Byrne JAG applicant only to assure that it will maintain and report information about its grant and the programs that the grant funds. See City of Los Angeles, 941 F.3d at 944-45; City of Philadelphia, 916 F.3d at 285. We further hold that the coordination provision authorizes the DOJ only to require a certification that the applicant has coordinated in the preparation of its application with agencies affected by the programs for which the applicant seeks funding. - 24 - See City of Los Angeles, 941 F.3d at 945; City of Philadelphia, 916 F.3d at 285. None of the challenged conditions falls within the compass of this authority. With respect to the informationreporting provision, only the notice condition requires the disclosure of information to the federal government. That condition, however, calls for the Cities to report the release dates of noncitizens in their custody — information that does not pertain either to the Cities' Byrne JAG grants or to the policerelated programs for which the Cities sought funding. The release dates of noncitizens do not, therefore, qualify as programmatic information. So, too, the purported reach of the challenged conditions exceeds the authority conferred upon the DOJ by the coordination provision: they mandate that the Cities cooperate with federal immigration authorities in manifold ways that are, without exception, unrelated either to their Byrne JAG grants or to the programs for which the Cities sought funding. The challenged conditions also require coordination on an ongoing basis during the term of the Cities' grants, not merely past coordination relative to the preparation of their applications. We add a coda. Although the Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion about the meaning of the information-reporting and coordination provisions, it held that those provisions authorize the imposition of the notice and access conditions on - 25 - any grant that funds a program relate[d] in any way to the criminal prosecution, incarceration, or release of persons. New York, 951 F.3d at 116-22. The court explained that such programs include those for police task forces, prosecutors' and defenders' offices, and incarceration facilities. See id. at 117-18. The DOJ advances a similarly expansive notion of the scope of a funded program. For example, it suggests that even if the term programmatic refers only to a Byrne JAG grant and the programs that the grant supports, the challenged conditions seek programmatic information from any grant recipient that uses its funding for a law enforcement or corrections program. We reject this capacious view of the types of funded programs that would permit the imposition of the challenged conditions — a view that covers most (if not all) criminal justice activities that a state or local government may undertake. For the reasons previously discussed, we think it would be wrong to hold that Congress gave the DOJ free rein to insist that Byrne JAG applicants furnish information and engage in coordination with respect to all of their law enforcement operations. And while we do not foreclose the possibility that the challenged conditions may be sufficiently related to programs for which a different grant applicant seeks funding, the activities financed by the Cities' FY2017 Byrne JAG grants have no direct connection either to the removal of noncitizens or to the Cities' relationships with federal - 26 - immigration authorities. It follows inexorably, as night follows day, that the DOJ lacked statutory authority to impose the challenged conditions pursuant to the information-reporting and coordination provisions of the Byrne JAG statute. 2. The Applicable Federal Laws Provision. We turn next to the DOJ's asseveration that the certification condition is authorized by section 10153(a)(5)(D) of the Byrne JAG statute. That provision requires Byrne JAG applicants to certify that they will comply with all provisions of this part [the Byrne JAG statute] and all other applicable Federal laws.5 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(5)(D). The DOJ would have us interpret the phrase applicable Federal laws to cover all laws that apply to Byrne JAG applicants and are germane to the grant. Section 1373 qualifies as such a law, the DOJ claims, because it applies to state and local governments and mandates cooperation between federal and state officials, which . . . is central to the Byrne JAG program. The Cities rejoin that the phrase refers more narrowly to laws that apply to state and local governments qua 5 Although the statute speaks only of certifying compliance with applicable Federal laws, the conditions in the Cities' FY2017 grant award letters specify that the Cities both certify compliance with section 1373 and ensure ongoing compliance with the same statute throughout the period of the grants. The DOJ's arguments do not meaningfully distinguish between these two requirements. Because we conclude that section 1373 is not an applicable Federal law, see text infra, we take no view on whether the DOJ may condition a Byrne JAG grant on ongoing compliance with such a law. - 27 - Byrne JAG grant recipients. They hasten to add that section 1373 does not fit within this narrower taxonomy. The statutory text, on its face, fails to resolve this dispute: it neither defines the term applicable nor explicitly indicates the scope of federal laws that fall within the ambit of this provision. The dictionary defines applicable to mean capable of being applied or fit, suitable, or right to be applied. Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 105 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 2002). Relying heavily on this generic definition, the Second Circuit interpreted the phrase applicable Federal laws to encompass all federal laws pertaining either to the State or locality seeking a Byrne grant or to the grant being sought. New York, 951 F.3d at 106. The court reasoned that a statute can or may be capable of being applied or fit to be applied both to persons (such as the grant applicant) and to circumstances (such as the grant itself). Id. Courts must be wary of simplistic solutions and, unlike the Second Circuit, we do not believe that the dictionary definition clarifies the meaning of the term applicable as used in this context. After all, words are like chameleons; they frequently have different shades of meaning depending upon the circumstances. Doe v. Leavitt, 552 F.3d 75, 83 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Romain, 393 F.3d 63, 74 (1st Cir. 2004)). A federal law may be capable of being applied or fit to be - 28 - applied in an infinite number of ways, and the range of interpretations advanced by the Second Circuit, the DOJ, and the Cities are all consistent with this definition. Instead of assuming (as the Second Circuit did) that Congress meant to imbue applicable Federal laws with its broadest possible meaning, we think that sound principles of statutory construction demand that we venture beyond the dictionary definition to ascertain the intended scope of the phrase in this specific context. At the outset, a close reading of the statutory text casts grave doubt on the Second Circuit's extravagant interpretation. The canon against surplusage teaches that [w]e must read statutes, whenever possible, to give effect to every word and phrase. Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 449 F.3d 16, 26 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc). Courts generally ought not to interpret statutes in a way that renders words or phrases either meaningless or superfluous. See United States v. Walker, 665 F.3d 212, 225 (1st Cir. 2011). The Second Circuit's interpretation of the phrase applicable Federal laws — which encompasses all federal laws that apply to state and local governments in any capacity — flouts this principle by effectively reading the term applicable out of the statute. For instance, a local government hardly can certify that it will comply with a law that does not apply to local governments in the first place. Congress obviously could have written this provision to require Byrne JAG applicants - 29 - to certify compliance with all other Federal laws, but it did not. In our view, the fact that Congress included the word applicable strongly implies that the provision must refer to a subset of all federal laws that apply to state and local governments. See City of Philadelphia, 916 F.3d at 289. To its credit, the DOJ does not ask us to adopt the expansive interpretation of the applicable Federal laws phraseology proposed by the Second Circuit. The DOJ argues instead that its somewhat narrower construction of the phrase does not render the word applicable meaningless because that word limits the relevant category of federal laws to those that are germane to the Byrne JAG program (and, thus, may constitutionally serve as conditions on Byrne JAG grants). See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 171-72 (1992). Such a limitation gets the DOJ where it wants to go since it deems all laws that govern cooperation between the federal government and states and localities on any law enforcement issue to be germane to the Byrne JAG program. This argument has a patina of plausibility. The words applicable and germane both can mean relevant. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, supra, at 105, 951. But as with the Second Circuit's blind allegiance to the dictionary definition of the word applicable, the DOJ's use of a handy synonym for the same word does not answer the critical question: in what sense must a - 30 - federal law be relevant in order to qualify as an applicable Federal law under section 10153(a)(5)(D)? Once again, we find useful guidance in the canons of statutory construction. The canon of noscitur a sociis points us to the correct answer. It suggests that the applicable Federal laws provision must carry a meaning similar to the neighboring assurances and certifications in section 10153(a). As we previously have explained, see supra Part II(A)(1), those assurances and certifications all concern the Byrne JAG application and the programs supported by the grants. In this statutory setting, the phrase applicable Federal laws logically denotes laws that apply to states and localities in their capacities as Byrne JAG grant recipients. It strains credulity to think that Congress would bury among those certifications and assurances an authorization for the DOJ to condition grants on certification of compliance with federal laws that require some law-enforcement-related cooperation but lack any nexus to the Byrne JAG program. See City of Philadelphia, 916 F.3d at 289-90. There is more. Under the DOJ's interpretation of the applicable Federal laws provision, it would have substantial discretion to deviate from the statutory formula in order to enforce its own priorities. After all, it would be able to withhold a grant in its entirety based on the recipient's failure to certify compliance with any of the wide array of federal laws - 31 - that touch upon law enforcement cooperation.6 See id. at 290. Given the formulaic nature of the Byrne JAG program, we doubt that Congress intended to give the DOJ so universal a trump card. The DOJ strives to persuade us that this reasoning is faulty. It serves up a list of other statutes that it contends more clearly limit the phrase applicable Federal laws to laws that apply in the context of federal funding. See 42 U.S.C. § 16154(g)(1) (requiring Secretary of Energy to carry out hydrogen energy and fuel cell program in a manner consistent with the generally applicable Federal laws and regulations governing awards of financial assistance, contracts, or other agreements); Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-121, § 1043(a)(3)(C)(ii)(II), 128 Stat. 1193, 1246 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2201) (requiring Secretary of the Army to ensure that certain recipients of federal funds for water resources projects comply with all applicable Federal laws (including regulations) 6 The DOJ implicitly assumes that the Byrne JAG statute allows it to pick and choose the applicable Federal laws with which a grant applicant must certify compliance. See New York, 951 F.3d at 104 ([T]he Attorney General identifies the laws requiring § 10153(a)(5)(D) compliance certification.). This assumption contradicts the language of the statute, which states that a Byrne JAG application shall include a certification that the grant applicant will comply with . . . all other applicable Federal laws. 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(5)(D) (emphasis supplied). Given the clarity of the requirement set forth in the statute, we do not think that the DOJ's discretion to determine the form of a Byrne JAG application, id. § 10153(a), is sufficiently elastic to allow it to mandate certification of compliance with only those applicable Federal laws that further its own policy priorities. - 32 - relating to the use of those funds). Relatedly, it complains that the Cities' crabbed interpretation means that it cannot condition Byrne JAG grants on recipients' certification of compliance with certain significant public safety laws that do not apply to states and localities in their capacities as grant recipients. See New York, 951 F.3d at 107-08 (expressing concern at the idea of States and localities seeking federal funds to enforce their own laws while themselves hampering the enforcement of federal laws, or worse, violating those laws). Specifically, the DOJ points to federal statutory requirements anent the transfer and registration of firearms. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 5812, 5841. We are not convinced. As the DOJ's examples demonstrate, Congress could have used clearer language to indicate its desire to limit applicable Federal laws to those that apply to state and local governments in their capacities as Byrne JAG grant recipients. But the perfect is often the enemy of the good, and Congress cannot always be expected to speak in the clearest possible terms. In this instance, what counts is that the language that Congress did use, coupled with the neighboring statutory provisions and the formulaic nature of the grant program, leaves little doubt that Congress meant for the phrase applicable Federal law to have this circumscribed scope. We add — without taking a position as to whether any laws not at issue here are applicable Federal laws — that we - 33 - think Congress intended not to condition Byrne JAG grants on certification of compliance with every law that mandates some form of cooperation with the federal government on criminal justice matters. Congress made this intent manifest by stating expressly in other statutes that noncompliance with those statutes' requirements could trigger the withholding of a set percentage of a Byrne JAG grant. See, e.g., 34 U.S.C. § 60105(c)(2). We find equally unconvincing the Second Circuit's asserted justification for interpreting the phrase applicable Federal laws to include laws beyond those that apply to state and local governments in their capacities as Byrne JAG grant recipients. See New York, 951 F.3d at 105-11. In addition to the generic dictionary definition of the term applicable, the Second Circuit mentioned what it considered the DOJ's broad statutory authority to determine whether a state or local government qualifies for Byrne JAG funding in the first place. See id. at 103-04, 107 & n.22. We do not read the Byrne JAG statute to grant the DOJ such sweeping authority. We recognize, of course, that Congress said that a state or local government may not qualify for its share of Byrne JAG funding in some circumstances. See 34 U.S.C. § 10154 (permitting Attorney General to finally disapprove [an] application after allowing applicant to correct deficiencies); id. § 10156(f) (directing Attorney General to reallocate funding - 34 - to localities if he determines . . . that a State will be unable to qualify or receive funds under this part). Still, nothing in the Byrne JAG statute indicates that Congress intended to permit the DOJ to create qualification requirements unrelated to the grant program simply to advance its own policy priorities. And as the Second Circuit acknowledged, section 10153(a) delineates precisely what an applicant must do to qualify for a grant, that is, proffer the necessary assurances and certifications and submit the required statewide plan. See New York, 951 F.3d at 104 ([T]he Attorney General's authority in identifying qualified Byrne applicants is not limitless but, rather, a function of the particular requirements prescribed by Congress.). The DOJ may determine the form of the application and certain certifications, 34 U.S.C. §§ 10153(a), 10153(a)(5), but that power does not allow it to arrogate unto itself the authority to alter the qualification requirements. Seen in this light, the limited delegation of discretion to the DOJ in the Byrne JAG statute does not support a broad interpretation of the applicable Federal laws provision. That ends this aspect of the matter. We hold that applicable Federal laws under section 10153(a)(5)(D) are federal laws that apply to state and local governments in their capacities as Byrne JAG grant recipients. Section 1373 is not such a law because it applies to any state or local government, regardless of - 35 - whether that government accepts Byrne JAG funding. The applicable Federal laws provision did not, therefore, authorize the imposition of the certification condition. B. The Duties and Functions of the Assistant Attorney General. We now reach what may be the DOJ's strongest argument: its assertion that it possessed statutory authority to impose the challenged conditions under 34 U.S.C. § 10102. This statute lays out the duties and functions of the Assistant AG for the OJP. These duties and functions include overseeing the various components within the OJP and performing certain informationsharing and liaison-related tasks pertaining to criminal justice issues. See id. § 10102(a)(1)-(5). In addition, section 10102(a)(6) states that the Assistant AG shall exercise such other powers and functions as may be vested in the Assistant Attorney General pursuant to this chapter or by delegation of the Attorney General, including placing special conditions on all grants, and determining priority purposes for formula grants. Id. § 10102(a)(6). Seizing on this language, the DOJ submits that section 10102(a)(6) authorizes the Assistant AG to place special conditions on all grants that the OJP administers, including Byrne JAG grants.7 The DOJ defines a special condition as any grant- 7 Although the DOJ's 2017 announcement of the notice and access conditions called compliance with those conditions an - 36 - wide condition that the Assistant AG deems warranted based on the circumstances of a particular grant program (or, as the DOJ put it at oral argument, any condition germane to the grant program). The challenged conditions are reasonable requirements for the receipt of Byrne JAG funds, the DOJ says, because they ensure that state and local governments cooperate with federal immigration authorities and, thus, enhance public safety. As we have explained, see supra Part II(A), the DOJ has not pointed to any provision in the Byrne JAG statute that allows either the Assistant AG or the Attorney General to impose the challenged conditions on Byrne JAG grants. Nor has the DOJ identified any other statute or regulation that gives such authority to either official. It necessarily follows that the DOJ's thesis rests on the notion that section 10102(a)(6) itself confers statutory authority to impose special conditions. In a nutshell, the DOJ reads the phrase placing special conditions on all grants as an independent endowment of authority above and beyond such other powers and functions as may be vested in the authorized and priority purpose of the Byrne JAG grants, the DOJ has not taken the matter any further. Before us, it has neither defined the term priority purpose nor explained why compliance with the challenged conditions constitutes a priority purpose. Any argument to the effect that the determining priority purposes for formula grants language in section 10102(a)(6) authorized the imposition of the challenged conditions is, therefore, waived. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) ([I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.). - 37 - Assistant Attorney General pursuant to this chapter or by delegation of the Attorney General. The Cities reject this premise, arguing that placing special conditions is simply an illustrative example of the powers that the Assistant AG may exercise if vested in him elsewhere in the statute or by delegation from the Attorney General. Our analysis of this provision starts, as it must, with the statutory text. See In re Hill, 562 F.3d at 32. Congress prefaced the phrase placing special conditions on all grants with the word including. In both lay and legal usage, include generally signifies that what follows is a subset of what comes before. See Include, Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) (defining include as [t]o contain as a part of something); Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, supra, at 1143 (defining include as to place, list, or rate as a part or component of a whole or of a larger group, class, or aggregate). In the same vein, the word including most commonly connotes . . . an illustrative application of the general principle. Reich v. Cambridgeport Air Sys., Inc., 26 F.3d 1187, 1191 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 100 (1941)). This plain meaning indicates, as the Cities posit, that placing special conditions on all grants is an example of a power or function that the Assistant AG may exercise if vested in him - 38 - pursuant to this chapter or by delegation of the Attorney General. See New York, 951 F.3d at 101-02; City of Philadelphia, 916 F.3d at 287; City of Chicago, 888 F.3d at 284-85; see also City of Los Angeles, 941 F.3d at 947-48 (Wardlaw, J., concurring in the judgment). Under the DOJ's alternative interpretation, the word including would mean and or as well as — a radical departure from the word's plain and ordinary meaning. See P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 77 n.7 (1979). What is more, each subsection of section 10102(a) begins with one or two verbs that define the authority imbued in the Assistant AG. See, e.g., 34 U.S.C. § 10102(a)(1) (directing Assistant AG to publish and disseminate certain information); id. § 10102(a)(5) (directing Assistant AG to coordinate and provide staff support to OJP components). Section 10102(a)(6) starts with the verb exercise. Id. § 10102(a)(6). Accordingly, the most natural reading of this provision is one conferring on the Assistant AG only the limited authority to exercise such other powers and functions as may be vested in the Assistant Attorney General pursuant to this chapter or by delegation of the Attorney General. The DOJ's more ambitious reading of section 10102(a)(6) conflicts with the provision's plain meaning by interpreting placing as a second verb that gives the Assistant AG additional power. Unlike play-doh, the text of a statute cannot be molded into an infinite number of shapes and sizes to suit the needs of - 39 - particular moments. Here, the statutory language simply does not say that the Assistant AG may place special conditions on all grants. The statutory context surrounding section 10102(a)(6) likewise counsels in favor of the Cities' interpretation. See City of Philadelphia, 916 F.3d at 288; City of Chicago, 888 F.3d at 285; see also City of Los Angeles, 941 F.3d at 949 (Wardlaw, J., concurring in the judgment). Section 10102(a) assigns six sets of duties and functions to the Assistant AG. The first five encompass purely ministerial responsibilities, such as providing information to various recipients, liaising with certain private and public entities, and coordinating the operations of the OJP. See 34 U.S.C. § 10102(a)(1)-(5). Given the canon of noscitur a sociis, we are hesitant to interpret the sixth and final subsection to grant wide-ranging substantive authority to the Assistant AG to impose special conditions on Byrne JAG grants at his discretion when the neighboring provisions confer only ministerial responsibilities upon him. If Congress meant to give the Assistant AG the wide-ranging discretionary authority envisioned by the DOJ, we think it would have done so in clearer terms and in a more prominent place in the statute. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions — it does not, one might say, hide elephants - 40 - in mouseholes.). Examples of more explicit language that Congress could have employed to give the Assistant AG the power to impose conditions abound in statutes that authorize other grant programs. See, e.g., 34 U.S.C. § 10142(2) (tasking DOJ official with awarding and allocating funds . . . on terms and conditions determined . . . to be consistent with the statute); id. § 10446(e)(3) (In disbursing grants under this subchapter, the Attorney General may impose reasonable conditions on grant awards to ensure that the States meet statutory, regulatory, and other program requirements.). An additional point is worth mentioning. The DOJ's proposed construction of section 10102(a)(6) is — like its interpretation of the Byrne JAG statute, see supra Part II(A) — inconsistent with the formulaic nature of the grant program. See City of Chicago, 888 F.3d at 286; see also City of Los Angeles, 941 F.3d at 949-50 (Wardlaw, J., concurring in the judgment). This inconsistency is especially hard to ignore here; even the wideranging authority that the DOJ purports to find in the Byrne JAG statute covers only a few limited categories of potential grant conditions (for instance, information-reporting requirements under section 10153(a)(4) or certification of compliance with other federal laws under section 10153(a)(5)(D)). By contrast, the DOJ claims that section 10102(a)(6) authorizes it to impose any and all conditions that it deems relevant to a grant program and to - 41 - withhold entire grants for noncompliance. Were such discretion vested in the DOJ, Byrne JAG would no longer function as a formula grant program. To cinch the matter, Congress added the including language to section 10102(a)(6) in 2006 in the same bill that established the current Byrne JAG formula. Yet the bill contained no cross-reference between the two sections. See Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act §§ 1111, 1152(b); see also City of Chicago, 888 F.3d at 286. Had Congress wanted to authorize the DOJ to deviate from the statutory formula so drastically, we would expect to see a more direct statement to that effect. The DOJ's arguments for reading section 10102(a)(6) as an independent grant of statutory authority to impose special conditions are unavailing. Invoking the canon against surplusage, the DOJ contends that accepting the Cities' construction would render the including language meaningless because no other statute gives the Assistant AG (or any other DOJ functionary) the power to impose special conditions on any Byrne JAG grant. The presumption against treating the including language as surplusage has particular force here, the DOJ suggests, because a court should presume that Congress intended its 2006 amendment to have real and substantial effect. Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995). - 42 - A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit relied on this reasoning to hold that section 10102(a)(6) confirm[s] the authority of DOJ to place 'special conditions on all grants.'8 City of Los Angeles, 941 F.3d at 939. We do not agree. The plain meaning of a statute is the best evidence of Congress's intent. See Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 2000). As we already have explained, the statutory language that Congress chose to employ simply does not demonstrate an intent to give the Assistant AG independent statutory authority to impose special conditions. In all events, there is less to the DOJ's argument that the canon against surplusage supports its position than meets the eye. Although we aspire to give statutory language more than an illustrative function when the plain meaning of the text admits, we recognize that sometimes Congress may consider a specific point important or uncertain enough to justify a modicum of redundancy. Mass. Ass'n of HMOs v. Ruthardt, 194 F.3d 176, 181 (1st Cir. 1999). The canon against surplusage is not a straitjacket. It should not, therefore, be employed inflexibly to rule out every 8 Even so, the panel went on to invalidate the notice and access conditions on the ground that they did not constitute special conditions. See City of Los Angeles, 941 F.3d at 944.