Opinion ID: 2735154
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Doe’s Claims under Title VI and Title IX

Text: Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 makes the same guarantee but substitutes “on the basis of sex” for “on the ground of race, color, or national origin.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Title VI and Title IX are so similar that a decision interpreting one generally applies to the other. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, 555 U.S. 246, 258–59 (2009); Doe v. Smith, 470 F.3d 331, 338 (7th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court has set a high bar for plaintiffs seeking to hold schools and school officials liable for student-onstudent harassment. School officials are given broad latitude to resolve peer harassment and are liable only in “certain limited circumstances.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 643 . A peerharassment plaintiff must demonstrate that the harassment was discriminatory, the school officials had “actual knowledge” of the harassment, the harassment was “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it … deprive[s] the victims of access to educational opportunities,” and officials were “deliberately indifferent” to the harassment. Id. at 650. The Court made clear that “courts should refrain from second-guessing the disciplinary decisions made by school administrators.” Id. at 648. 10 No. 13-2551
Title VI protects students from discrimination only if it is based on race, color, or national origin, and Title IX only if based on sex. As noted above, there were some explicit references to Doe’s Russian origin. Regarding sex, in the context of adult employment, we have held that gendered words like bitch and whore, even if used to describe both women and men, can be strong evidence that the harassment at issue is on the basis of sex. See Passananti v. Cook County, 689 F.3d 655, 665–67 (7th Cir. 2012) (reversing summary judgment for employer because supervisor’s repeated use of “bitch” to refer to plaintiff could support finding of sexually hostile environment). The issue is more subtle in the school context because “at least early on, students are still learning how to interact appropriately with their peers.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 651. Children are often less aware of the import of their words and actions. The district court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that any of the bullying Doe suffered was based on her national origin or gender. We are not as convinced, but we need not resolve the issue because, as explained below, Doe’s claims fail for other reasons.
School administrators learned of some of the more minor incidents between Doe and other students contemporaneously, but it is undisputed that they did not witness and were not told about the violent incidents until the evening of the last day of her seventh grade year at the earliest. Doe argues, however, that counselor Lakatos and other school offiNo. 13-2551 11 cials knew enough about the situation to trigger further investigation long before Doe’s last day of seventh grade. School administrators certainly cannot escape liability by putting their heads in the sand, but there is no evidence that any school official willfully avoided learning of serious threats to Doe’s safety or ability to obtain an education. The standard set out in Davis is not satisfied by knowledge that something might be happening and could be uncovered by further investigation. The standard is “actual knowledge.” School administrators have actual knowledge only of the incidents that they witness or that have been reported to them. Gabrielle M., 315 F.3d at 823–24. In this case, administrators knew about the name-calling and a number of other disputes between Doe, T.M., and others. There is no evidence, however, that they knew before the last day of school about the much more severe events that they did not witness: T.M. punching Doe in the face, the attacks at the track meet, or that day’s attacks with sticks.
Federal law does not protect students from commonplace schoolyard altercations, including name-calling, teasing, and minor physical scuffles. As the Supreme Court stressed in Davis, “children may regularly interact in a manner that would be unacceptable among adults.” 526 U.S. at 651. At school they “often engage in insults, banter, teasing, shoving, pushing, and gender-specific conduct that is upsetting to the students subjected to it,” but “[d]amages are not available for simple acts of teasing and name-calling among school children.” Id. at 651-52. This is true “even where these comments target differences in gender.” Id. at 652. Instead, to be actionable, the harassment must be serious enough to 12 No. 13-2551 “den[y] its victims the equal access to education that Title IX is designed to protect.” Id. The incidents that the school district actually knew about before the last day of school did not amount to severe harassment that denied Doe equal access to educational benefits or opportunities. The name-calling and the various scuffles, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Doe, would have appeared to school administrators as the “simple acts of teasing and name-calling among school children” contemplated by the Supreme Court in Davis. 526 U.S. at 652. We assume that relatively minor incidents could be so numerous or incessant as to qualify as severe harassment under Title VI or Title IX, but a reasonable jury could not find that the incidents school officials knew about before the last day of school rose to that level. On the other hand, a reasonable jury could find that the violent physical attacks toward the end of seventh grade added up to severe or pervasive harassment that denied Doe equal access to educational benefits or opportunities. These attacks could qualify as “objectively offensive.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 650. In one, T.M. pushed Doe and punched her in the face in the hallway after class. In another, T.M. and M.C. repeatedly hit Doe with metal track spikes at a track meet, making her limp and bleed. In yet another, all three of the boys hit Doe with sticks on the playground on the last day of school—leaving a foot-long welt on her back and other injuries. The attacks eventually drove Doe out of the school district. A reasonable jury could find that the cumulative effects of this abuse were comparable to harassment found in rare cases to be sufficiently severe under Title VI and Title IX. In No. 13-2551 13 Zeno v. Pine Plains Central School District, the Second Circuit affirmed a jury verdict for plaintiff, finding that the severity requirement was satisfied where the victim endured blatant racial slurs and physical attacks that warranted police attention, including instances in which the victim was punched and choked. 702 F.3d 655, 659–62, 667 (2d Cir. 2012). Because of this abuse, the victim opted to graduate early with a limited diploma rather than stay and complete the work needed for a full high school diploma. Id. at 663. Similarly, in Vance v. Spencer County Public School District, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a verdict for the plaintiff, finding sufficiently severe harassment where the victim’s harassers sexually propositioned her, yanked off her shirt, and stabbed her in the hand. 231 F.3d 253, 259 (6th Cir. 2000). Because of this harassment, the victim began completing her studies at home. Id. And in Murrell v. School District No. 1, the Tenth Circuit found that a complaint sufficiently alleged severe harassment where the victim was sexually assaulted for a month and was eventually hospitalized and then rendered homebound by the abuse. 186 F.3d 1238, 1248 (10th Cir. 1999). Doe, too, was subjected to multiple incidents of physical violence that merited police attention. Although Doe was not hospitalized like the victim in Murrell or forced to begin home-schooling like the victim in Vance, her family understandably decided to change school districts because of the prospect that one or two of the three boys might return to Pilgrim Park with Doe for eighth grade. The Does’ reasonable decision to move to another school district is analogous to the victim’s decision in Zeno to opt for an early graduation and a lesser diploma rather than face more harassment. In short, a reasonable jury could find that the violent attacks Doe suffered—which ultimately resulted in her leaving the 14 No. 13-2551 school district—constituted severe harassment that caused a negative and “systemic effect” on Doe’s education. Davis, 526 U.S. at 653.
The standard of deliberate indifference sets a high bar for plaintiffs under Title VI and Title IX. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 643. School administrators must “continue to enjoy the flexibility they require” in disciplinary decisions unless their response to harassment is “clearly unreasonable.” Id. at 648– 49. The Court stressed in Davis that Title IX does not require administrators to “engage in particular disciplinary action.” Id. at 648. We echoed this concern in Gabrielle M. We said that a “school may take into consideration administrative burdens or the disruption of other students’ or their teachers’ schedules in determining an appropriate response [to peer harassment].” 315 F.3d at 825. As the Fifth Circuit has observed, “Judges make poor vice principals … .” Estate of Lance v. Lewisville Indep. School Dist., 743 F.3d 982, 996 (5th Cir. 2014). Doe argues that the school officials knew about a pattern of non-severe harassment by T.M. and his friends during sixth grade and early in seventh grade, and that based on that pattern, the school should have done more to investigate and to prevent the violent acts that were committed against Doe at the end of the seventh grade. If we accepted that argument, however, we would be substituting a negligence standard for both the severity and deliberate indifference standards that control this case under Davis. We agree instead with the district court that no reasonable jury could find that the defendants responded with deNo. 13-2551 15 liberate indifference to any of the bullying or harassment that Doe suffered, including both the severe and non-severe incidents. In Gabrielle M., we affirmed the grant of summary judgment in a Title IX case partly on the ground that the school district’s response to the peer harassment at issue was not clearly unreasonable. 315 F.3d at 825. We emphasized: “After each reported or observed instance involving Jason [the harasser] and other students, Jason was disciplined and steps were taken to prevent future inappropriate conduct.” Id. at 824. Similarly in this case, after every reported or observed incident of bullying involving Doe, school officials promptly intervened. As the incidents persisted and escalated, so did the school’s responses. The first incidents between Doe and T.M. occurred in the sixth grade. School officials responded adequately to each incident they knew about. When T.M. erased some of Doe’s work in English class and Doe told the teacher, the teacher spoke with T.M. and explained that what he did was wrong. When the gym teacher saw T.M. throw a ball at Doe in gym class, the gym teacher involved counselor Lakatos, who also spoke with Doe about the name-calling between her and T.M. The involvement of guidance counselors and school psychologists is evidence that a school district was responding appropriately. Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, 488 F.3d 67, 76 (1st Cir. 2007); Gabrielle M., 315 F.3d at 824. When the problems between Doe and T.M. resurfaced in the second half of the seventh grade, the undisputed facts show that school officials again responded swiftly and reasonably to incidents they knew about. When a teacher saw T.M. dump Doe’s papers on the floor, he ordered T.M. to help her pick them up. When M.C. knocked papers off her 16 No. 13-2551 desk, a teacher intervened. When the band director noticed Doe and T.M. pushing in band class, he gave both of them detention. In addition, counselor Lakatos continued to meet with Doe about once or twice a week. School officials also took measures to reduce contact between Doe and T.M. by moving their lockers, assigning them to different study groups, and asking them to agree to stay away from each other. We found similar efforts showed that a school’s response to harassment was not clearly unreasonable in Gabrielle M., where school administrators assigned the victim and harasser to different lunch and recess periods. 315 F.3d at 824–25. Similarly, in Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, the First Circuit overturned a jury verdict and found that the school district was not deliberately indifferent because officials had taken measures to separate the victims from their harassers. 488 F.3d at 76. The serious violence of the last day of school sparked a further escalation in the school’s response to the bullying. On that day, school officials responded promptly to two observed incidents. When a teacher saw T.M. and his friends chasing Doe with sticks, the teacher had the boys put the sticks down. And later, when another teacher saw Doe throw ice cream at T.M. and T.M. push Doe down into a mud puddle, she sent them both to Hinz’s office, and Hinz telephoned the students’ parents. Courts applying the deliberate indifference standard from Davis have regarded the involvement of parents as evidence that a school district is responding to harassment in a reasonable manner. See, e.g., Estate of Lance, 743 F.3d at 1000–01 (applying Davis standard to affirm summary judgment for school district; finding no deliberate indifference where district engaged in a “pattern No. 13-2551 17 of active responses” that included communicating with parents). Doe’s and her father’s visit to Principal Galster later that day prompted his investigation into what exactly T.M. and his friends had been up to. In his investigation, Galster learned the full extent of what the boys had been doing to Doe on the last day of school—hitting her violently with sticks. He also learned about the track-meet incident and the incident in which T.M. punched Doe’s face. Galster completed a thorough investigation, including interviewing witnesses, within twelve days of learning of the severe harassment. Cf. Zeno, 702 F.3d at 661, 671 (affirming a jury verdict for plaintiff for peer harassment where school district’s Title VI and Title IX compliance officer knew of reports of racial harassment but “elected not to investigate”). Not long after the investigation, Galster met with the Does and informed them of his decision to recommend the three boys for expulsion. Doe points out, however, that over the summer, the school district did not give her a formal safety plan even though her parents requested one. Nor did the school district grant her request to transfer to a different school. The school district also did not inform the Does that the three boys would not be returning to Pilgrim Park before the family decided to move to another school district at the end of August 2008. These facts still would not allow a reasonable jury to find that the defendants’ actions were clearly unreasonable. First, Davis does not entitle plaintiffs to any specific remedial measure. E.g., Zeno, 702 F.3d at 666 (disclaiming a victim’s right to specific remedies and according deference to school officials). The school was not required by federal law 18 No. 13-2551 to give Doe a formal safety plan. We also do not see how failing to adopt a formal safety plan could be clearly unreasonable in light of the fact that the harassing students were in the process of being expelled, making a safety plan less necessary. Second, it is true that in Gabrielle M., we regarded the fact that a school district granted the student-victim’s request to transfer to a different school as evidence that the school district’s response to her harassment was not clearly unreasonable. 315 F.3d at 825. But that does not make the denial of Doe’s request to transfer to a different school clearly unreasonable, at least when Doe’s harassers were in the process of being expelled and likely would not return to her school for eighth grade and in fact did not return. Finally, we do not think it clearly unreasonable that the school district failed to tell the Does by a specific date that summer that the boys would not be returning. As Superintendent Gibson correctly explained, although Doe’s family understandably would have liked to know what was happening in the boys’ expulsion hearings, school officials also had to respect the privacy rights of the disciplined students. See generally Wis. Stat. § 118.125 (confidentiality of pupil records). Given this tension between the legal rights of all the students involved, a reasonable jury could not find that it was clearly unreasonable for school officials not to inform the Does about the status of all three boys by the end of August. Nor is this a case where the school district responded with half-hearted remedial measures. See, e.g., Zeno, 702 F.3d at 668–71 (finding deliberate indifference where school district repeatedly gave the same ineffective warnings in reNo. 13-2551 19 sponse to known racial harassment). There was nothing halfhearted about the expulsion of the three boys. We do not mean to suggest here that expulsion of the harassers was the only reasonable disciplinary route. School-age bullies also have legal rights. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). Federal law gives school officials wide discretion in making disciplinary decisions, especially as they have to balance the interests of all concerned. In this case, however, the forcefulness of expulsion certainly demonstrates how seriously the defendants took the boys’ bullying of Doe once they learned its full extent. The undisputed facts thus show that defendants’ responses to the known acts of severe peer harassment suffered by Doe in this case were not deliberately indifferent. We affirm the grant of summary judgment for the defendants on Doe’s Title VI and Title IX claims.