Opinion ID: 1920303
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: judicial interpretation

Text: This Court has consistently held that support payments may be required only until a child attains the age of majority. This principle was recognized over 120 years ago in Chaffee v Chaffee, 15 Mich 184, 190 (1867), when Justice CHRISTIANCY wrote: The daughter is above the age of majority, and however desirable it might be that she should be provided for with the mother, I can discover no recognized principle upon which it can be done by a decree in this proceeding.[ [24] ] The exceptional circumstances clause was addressed when continued support was sought beyond the statutory age limit of seventeen years to allow a child to achieve a high school diploma. In interpreting 1940 CL 12739-1, [25] the precursor of today's  17a, this Court held that extended support for educational purposes did constitute an exceptional circumstance. However, it extended the support payments for only eighteen months beyond the child's seventeenth birthday, well before he reached the age of majority, twenty-one years. Barry v Barry, 291 Mich 666; 289 NW 397 (1939). Similarly, the Court held that educational pursuit constituted an exceptional circumstance in Titus, supra . Again, the support was specifically limited by the age of majority: [T]he allowance must thereupon cease, and shall cease in any case upon [the child's] arrival at majority .... In Rybinski v Rybinski, 333 Mich 592; 53 NW2d 386 (1952), the Court once more held that support could not be ordered after the child had reached her majority. Barry, Titus, and Rybinski all provided the framework for the Johnson decision, which prohibited required support beyond a child's majority age even though exceptional circumstances existed. [26] After the Age of Majority Act became effective, this Court and the Court of Appeals continued to follow the same line of reasoning, which effectively negated the legal authority of the exceptional-circumstances clause of  17a. This issue was addressed in Price v Price, 51 Mich App 656; 215 NW2d 756 (1974), rev'd on other grounds 395 Mich 6; 232 NW2d 630 (1975), when the Court of Appeals held: The clear intent of the Legislature, as expressed in this enactment and as authoritatively interpreted by decisions of the Michigan Supreme Court, indicates that there is no right to receive support payments after the age of majority is reached. The statute explicitly provides that the above jurisdiction is relative to the minor children of the parties. (Emphasis supplied.) The succeeding clauses allowing support for children attaining the age of 18 must be read, then, in the context of minor children. When the statute was enacted, it was possible for a minor child to be over the age of 18, since the age of majority was 21. [51 Mich App 658.] Additionally, the Price Court said: Since the Legislature has made an 18-year-old an adult for all purposes whatsoever, notwithstanding any law to the contrary, support cannot properly be awarded to a child who has reached the age of 18. [51 Mich App 660. Emphasis in original.] In reviewing the Price decision, the Court chose not to invalidate the lower court's reasoning, but rather to reverse on the basis of the saving clause of the Age of Majority Act. [27] In Price, the rights of the child accrued prior to the effective date of MCL 722.52; MSA 25.244(52). Therefore, the eighteen-year age of majority was not applicable, and the twenty-one-year age of majority did apply. Accordingly, this Court granted support payments until the child attained the applicable majority age, twenty-one years. Though the courts have never dissented from the rule that the age of majority limits the duration of child-support payments, this saving clause has been used, when applicable, to provide for support up to a child's twenty-first birthday. See Charlton v Charlton, 397 Mich 84; 243 NW2d 261 (1976); Milbrand v Milbrand, 66 Mich App 730; 239 NW2d 730 (1976); Barbier v Barbier, 45 Mich App 402; 206 NW2d 464 (1973). The Johnson and Price decisions provided the foundation for a series of cases which, absent an express agreement to the contrary, negate the obligation of a parent to provide child support payments beyond the age of majority, eighteen years. See Arndt v Kasem, 135 Mich App 252; 353 NW2d 497 (1984), Boyd v Boyd, 116 Mich App 774; 323 NW2d 553 (1982), Sumerix v Sumerix, 106 Mich App 7; 307 NW2d 727 (1981), McNames v McNames, supra , and Allen v Allen, 63 Mich App 475; 235 NW2d 22 (1975). [28] The only indication that appears contrary to this significant body of case law is in footnote 5 of Price. [29] However, this footnote has no value as a legal precedent and was identified as merely dicta by the Court of Appeals. Parrish v Parrish, 138 Mich App 546, 551; 361 NW2d 366 (1984) (parents have no obligation to support their adult children). While this footnote does provide that [t]he Age of Majority Act does not purport to deprive persons between the ages of 18 and 21 of any rights theretofore enjoyed by them ..., the saving clause of the Age of Majority Act [30] specifically provides that rights incurred before the effective date of this act may be continued or instituted under and in accordance with the law in force at the time of the... right accruing, accrued or acquired.... MCL 722.54; MSA 25.244(54). Although the Age of Majority Act did not purport to deprive anyone of existing rights, these rights were nonetheless restricted by law existing prior to January 1, 1972. The law prior to January 1, 1972, authorized support payments only until a child attained the age of majority. Johnson, supra . Therefore, the inference of the footnote is frustrated by the same legal authority from which it appears to have been borne. [31] Again, we note that since the release of the Price decision by this Court fourteen years ago, the rationale behind this footnote, and the inference implicit therein, has never been persuasive in any proceeding before a Michigan appellate court save in the matter before us today and its progeny. The dissent asserts that our decision is based [p]rimarily in reliance on this Court's decision in Johnson.... Post, pp 643-644. The dissent goes on to claim that we have employed a dubious analysis of legislative intent ... that is clearly contrary to express statutory language.... Post, p 658. Finally, it argues that we are attempting to reduce [our] responsibility for this result by stating that the result reflects the will of the Legislature and that to hold otherwise would be a usurpation of legislative power. Id. Not so. What we have done by our decision today is recognize that the overriding responsibility of this Court is to act within the limits of its authority as expressed in the constitution of this state. [32] The authority to determine the duration of child support payments is vested in the Legislature, not this Court. See Kaimowitz, ante, p 617. The dissent fails to acknowledge, or even to address, the fact that the amendments of  15-17a of the child support laws enacted by the Legislature after the reduction of the age of majority have resulted in an increased use of the limiting word minor. See ante, pp 611-619. Furthermore, the dissent, in mischaracterizing our opinion as being based primarily in reliance on Johnson, totally disregards Michigan's history of judicial interpretation regarding the duration of child support payments. Our decision is based on the express actions of the Legislature and on an analysis of how legislative action has been interpreted by our appellate courts. While persuasive, Johnson is but one instance in a forty-five-year survey of Michigan case law. See ante, pp 621-626.