Opinion ID: 2982082
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disclosure under Rovario

Text: Bost next challenges the district court’s refusal to order the disclosure of the informant or to require an in camera hearing be held concerning the informant. As to the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for disclosure of an informant, we review such decisions under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Jenkins, 4 F.3d 1338, 1341 (6th Cir. 1993). “A district court abuses its discretion when it applies the incorrect legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard, or relies upon clearly erroneous findings of fact.” United States v. Pugh, 405 F.3d 390, 397 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Schenck v. City of Hudson, 114 F.3d 590, 593 (6th Cir.1997)). Therefore, we will reverse the district court’s decision only if firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. Id. (citing United States v. Kingsley, 241 F.3d 828, 835 n.12 (6th Cir. 2001)). In Roviaro v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the government has a limited privilege to withhold the identity of confidential informants. 353 U.S. 53, 59-60 (1957). The defendant can overcome this privilege where “the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause.” Id. at 60-61. It is the defendant’s burden “to show how disclosure of the informant would substantively assist his defense.” United States v. Moore, 954 F.2d 379, 381 (6th Cir. 1992). In determining whether disclosure of an informant is proper, a court must “balanc[e] the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense.” Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 62. The result ultimately “depend[s] on the particular 9 No. 12-1780 United States of America v. Bost circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other relevant factors.” Id. Bost first argues that the need for producing the informant in presenting an entrapment defense is self-evident. He states that the informant was the only witness to the recruitment process and that it was imperative that Bost be able to examine the informant about the inducements he offered. Bost himself, however, testified regarding the inducements offered. He stated that the informant told him that if Bost sold Agent Hogan drugs, Agent Hogan would provide Bost with a snow removal job. Further, Agent Hogan testified concerning the creation of the job application that the informant provided to Bost. Other than the snow removal position, Bost never alleged there were any further inducements offered by the informant, and the government did not contest the issue of whether Bost was offered a job in return for selling Agent Hogan drugs. Ultimately, we find that Bost did not establish how the informant testifying to the same facts would have assisted him in establishing an entrapment defense. We also note that Bost knew the identity of the informant, at least by his “street name.” District Ct. ECF No. 37 ; District Ct. ECF No. 32 -32. In fact, it appears that the informant was Bost’s next-door neighbor. District Ct. ECF No. 37 . Thus, if Bost had wished to interview the informant prior to trial or subpoena the informant to testify, it seems that Bost would have known how to contact the informant without the assistance of the government.2 Based on this 2 At oral argument, appellant’s counsel indicated that the defense did attempt to locate the informant but the attempt was unsuccessful. No other evidence exists in the record to support this claim. 10 No. 12-1780 United States of America v. Bost information, together with Bost’s failure to establish how the informant would assist him in establishing his entrapment defense, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bost’s motion for disclosure of the informant. Bost next argues that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to conduct an in camera interview with the informant before denying Bost’s motion for disclosure. Generally, a district court’s denial of a request to hold an in camera hearing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Hudson, 325 F. App’x 423, 426 (6th Cir. 2009). In this case, however, the defendant never made such a request nor did he object when the district court did not hold such hearing. Therefore, we review the district court’s actions in this instance only for plain error. See United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 672 (6th Cir. 2004) (“When an appellant fails to object to an error in the district court, this Court reviews for plain error.”). District courts “have traditionally utilized in camera interviews in order to assess the relevance and possible helpfulness of the informant’s identity to the defense.” United States v. Sharp, 778 F.2d 1182, 1187 (6th Cir. 1985). However, “it is ordinarily not even appropriate for the trial court to compel the production of the suspected informant for an in camera interview unless the defendant has first borne his burden of producing some evidence supportive of his entrapment defense, and not merely unsworn assertions of his counsel.” Id. Here, Bost argues that his own testimony provided some evidence of entrapment beyond the assertions of his counsel. Specifically, he states that his testimony concerning the informant’s continuing requests for guns and drugs from Bost provided evidence of entrapment. After Bost’s testimony, Bost’s counsel renewed his motion for disclosure of the informant. Bost’s counsel argued 11 No. 12-1780 United States of America v. Bost that based on Bost’s testimony, there seemed to be a dispute between the government’s and the defendant’s version of the events. Therefore, he once again requested that the informant be disclosed. The district court, however, found that there was no dispute about what role the informant played. While there may have been some evidence of entrapment based on Bost’s testimony, such evidence was not enough to require that the district court hold an in camera hearing regarding the informant’s disclosure. Further, we note that during a pretrial hearing when Bost’s counsel made the first motion for disclosure of the informant, the district court listened to a recording of the first uncharged transaction, in which the informant took part. After hearing the recording, the district court found that nothing in it indicated that Bost’s “will had to be overborn” by the informant before Bost agreed to take part in the offense. District Ct. ECF No 41 . After hearing this recording and the testimony from all witnesses involved in the case, the district court made the informed choice, without holding an in camera hearing, not to require disclosure of the informant. We find that based on the record, the district court did not commit plain error by not conducting an in camera hearing regarding the production of the informant, as nothing in the record indicates how the disclosure of the informant could substantively assist in establishing Bost’s entrapment defense. As the district court stated, it is clear what role the informant played regarding Bost’s inducement and the record does not indicate how the informant would have substantively assisted further in Bost’s entrapment defense. 12 No. 12-1780 United States of America v. Bost