Opinion ID: 3031870
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: facial constitutionality of

Text: 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 960 [11] Appellants argue that 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 960 are unconstitutional on their face because they permit the judge to determine the sentencing factors by a preponderance of the evidence, in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).32 We rejected facial challenges to sections 841 and 960 in United States v. Buckland, 277 F.3d 1173, amended, 289 F.3d 558, 563-68 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Section 841), and United States v. Mendoza-Paz, 286 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th. Cir. 2002) (Section 960). See also United States v. Jimenez, 300 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Carranza, 289 F.3d 634, 643 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Varela-Rivera, 279 F.3d 1174, 1175 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002). [12] Appellants now claim that the Supreme Court’s decision in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 552 (2002), has undermined the method of statutory construction employed in Buckland and followed in Mendoza-Paz. We rejected a similar argument in United States v. Hernandez, 322 F.3d 592, 600-02 (9th Cir. 2003). We adopt our reasoning in Hernandez and reaffirm that 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 960 require material facts to be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, consistent with Apprendi. So construed, Sections 841 and 960 are not facially unconstitutional. 32 We review this challenge to the constitutionality of a statute de novo. United States v. Serang, 156 F.3d 910, 913 (9th Cir. 1998). 5556 UNITED STATES v. NAVARRO-VARGAS