Opinion ID: 2585199
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: injury or personal injury

Text: ¶ 7 Our inquiry begins with the interpretation of 85 O.S.Supp.2000, § 3 (10)(a), (b) and (c), defining injury or personal injury for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act. [2] It is important to note the legislature amended § 3 in November, 1997. [3] The definitions of injury or personal injury were reconfigured and moved from subsection (7) to subsection (10). When construing a statute which has been amended, we are mindful that the legislature may have intended either (a) to clarify that which previously appeared doubtful or (b) to effect a change in the existing law. Arrow Tool & Gauge v. Mead, 2000 OK 86, ¶ 15, 16 P.3d 1120, 1126. ¶ 8 The Workers' Compensation Court trial tribunal concluded Johnson suffered from angina induced by preexisting coronary artery disease. Order Denying Compensability at p. 2, Finding 4. It also found Johnson was in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the angina attack and the evidence supported a finding that the physical stress at the time the angina pain initiated was in excess of that experienced by a person in the conduct of everyday living. Order Denying Compensability at p. 2, Findings 5 and 6, respectively. In Finding 7, page 2, the trial tribunal apparently applied § 3(10)(c) to the instant set of facts, stating: [Johnson] failed to establish by a preponderance of the medical evidence that a physical injury to the heart has occurred, as angina pain alone is insufficient to establish a compens[a]ble injury. Claimant's claim is therefore denied. On page one of its order, Finding 2, the trial tribunal concludes: However, angina pain alone is insufficient without actual physical injury to the heart to constitute an accidental injury Haynes v. Pryor High School, 1977 OK 1, 566 P.2d 852, 854. ( Emphasis original. ) ¶ 9 These findings establish the trial tribunal denied Johnson's claims for medical expenses and temporary total disability benefits because it concluded he did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that physical injury to his heart occurred during the May 6, 1999, incident. In the current version of § 3(10)(b), (amended effective November 1, 1997), injury or personal injury includes heart-related or vascular injury or illness if it results from (1) stress in excess of that experienced by a person in the conduct of everyday living and (2) which stress arises out of and in the course of a claimant's employment. ( numbering added ). We decided the Haynes case on November 30, 1976, and denied rehearing July 12, 1977, prior to the legislature's amendments to both statutes. At the time, compensation awards for heart-related injuries were limited to injuries attributable to coronary occlusion, thrombosis or myocardial infarction. Haynes, 1977 OK 1, ¶ 17, 566 P.2d 852, 855. This limitation on compensable injuries was lifted by the legislative amendments of November 1, 1977, that resulted in the current § 3(10)(a) and (b). Today, under Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Act, coronary artery disease such as that suffered by Johnson is, indeed, a heart-related illness. [4] ¶ 10 Based upon the medical record in this case, coronary artery disease undermines and weakens a person's constitution and is not a temporary condition. The record allows that this illness affects the general soundness of the heart and its health. As such, coronary artery disease constitutes a heart-related illness within the confines of (10)(b). The trial tribunal held Johnson's stress met the criteria set forth in (10)(a) and (b) and stated: THAT the treating physicians who were cardiac specialists, diagnosed claimant's condition as Angina induced by pre-existing Coronary Artery Disease. (See records contained within claimant's Exhibit 5). Finding 4, Page 2, Order Denying Compensability. Nonetheless, it concluded no physical heart injury occurred and therefore denied benefits. Such a conclusion could be reached only if the trial tribunal mistakenly applied subsection (c). The application of subsection (c) to the instant facts is inappropriate because that subsection deals exclusively with mental injury that is unaccompanied by physical injury, except in the case of rape. . . . ¶ 11 We addressed the appropriate application of subsection (c) in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reinholtz, 1998 OK 11, 955 P.2d 223, even though the facts occurred in 1995, prior to the 1998 amendments. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reinholtz involved a claimant who was raped by her supervisor while at work. As a result of the rape, the claimant suffered a back injury, a skin rash and psychological overlay for which there was no apparent physical cause. The trial tribunal found the claimant's back injury compensable and ordered benefits based upon her psychological overlay claim. We held: Claimant's rape was an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of her employment and sustain the trial court's award with regard to the psychological overlay benefits and treatment for Claimant's skin rash. 1998 OK 11, ¶ 6, 955 P.2d 223, 224. ¶ 12 In our assessment of the psychological or mental injury to the claimant therein, we considered 85 O.S.Supp.1992, § 3 (7)(c) and observed that although the 1992 version of the statute applied to the facts of the case, the statutory section including subsection (c) had been amended in 1998. See, 1998 OK 11, ¶ 12, n. 1, 955 P.2d 223 at 225, n. 1. We stated subsection (c), as amended, applied to psychological or mental injury and established an exception to the required accompaniment of physical injury, in cases of rape, arising out of and in the course of employment. ¶ 13 The Act requires any psychological or mental injury be accompanied by physical injury in order to receive disability benefits for a debilitating psychological condition: `injury' or `personal injury' shall not include mental injury that is unaccompanied by physical injury. 1998 OK 11, ¶ 12, n. 1, 955 P.2d 223, 225, n. 1.