Opinion ID: 2218649
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Judicial misconduct and failure of the Court to disqualify itself at sentencing denied Defendant a fair and impartial sentencing tribunal (Assignments # 16 and # 17).

Text: Rather than an assignment of error, in his assignment No. 16 defendant has stated what he considers a fact determinative of his statement that he has been denied due process, apparently during the guilt-innocence part of the trial. In his assignment No. 17, defendant straightforwardly sets out that the trial judge erred in failing to disqualify [himself] at the penalty phase of the trial and in support of that contention sets out events occurring during the trial. We shall treat assignment No. 16 as if defendant is contending that the trial judge erred in failing to disqualify himself from presiding at the trial. As presented in defendant's brief, the two points are argued together, and we will so consider them. This court, long ago, set out the standards as to conduct during a trial to which a trial judgment must conform in order to provide a defendant a fair trial. In Hansen v. State, 141 Neb. 278, 286-87, 3 N.W.2d 441, 446 (1942), we said: It is the duty of the court to abstain carefully from any expression of opinion or comment on the facts or evidence, not only in its charge to the jury ... but also on the examination of witnesses and otherwise during the course of the trial. The trial judge should not deny the existence of any fact bearing on the innocence of accused, or make any remark or inquiry in the presence of the jury concerning matters of fact at issue which indicates his opinion as to such facts. ... ... It is well known to those who are familiar with jury trials that jurors are usually alert to discover the attitude of the court respecting the merits of the case, and particularly in criminal actions. For this reason, among others, the court should avoid even the appearance of partiality as between the parties.... See, also, Moore v. State, 147 Neb. 390, 23 N.W.2d 552 (1946); State v. Bideaux, 219 Neb. 718, 365 N.W.2d 830 (1985); State v. Larmond, 244 N.W.2d 233 (Iowa 1976). The cases we have cited are concerned primarily with statements made by the trial judge, but it is axiomatic that conduct can speak as loudly as words. The trial judge in this case, by his conduct, has expressed himself to some degree. We must consider whether that conduct has prejudiced defendant's right to a fair trial. The facts set out by defendant on these issues are the following. During the sentencing hearing held on September 15, 1986, the defendant's attorney asked the trial judge to say something about the meeting in chambers when we were here for sentencing on the second degree murder charge. [The defendant pled nolo contendere on July 28, 1986, to the second degree murder of Luke Stice and was sentenced to life imprisonment for this murder on September 11, 1986.] The meeting in chambers, apparently, between the court and to some extent, Mr. Merz [the prosecuting attorney], withโwith persons interested in the Luke Stice matter. THE COURT: Okay. Well, for the record and for your information, Mr. Goos and Mr. Ryan, the Court has, after eachโat the conclusion of each case, asked the family members of the victims if they would like to visit with the Court, and if so, answer certain questions about legal proceedings that might have gone on during the course of the trial. And a number of the family members did want to visit with the Court and, basically, the subject of that visit was to answerโAll right, Mr. Merz, first of all, wasn't there except forโI asked him to explain one thing to them. And, basically, it was just to answer questions about the proceedings that went on pertaining to that case. There was absolutely no discussion about any other cases other than that case .... .... ... The Court didn't have any inquiries it wanted to make of the family. The only thing the Court wanted to do was make itself available to the family to answer any questions about any procedural matters; legallyโlegal procedural matters that might have been confusing to them, `cause we're quite frequently getting criticized thatโthat no one ever shows any consideration of the victims by at least being willing to answer questions. And I asked Mr. Merz to come in and answer a question that they had, and to be right honest with you, IโDo you recall what that was? It had to do with the plea bargain, I believe. MR. MERZ: Well, Your Honor, the substance of the question was, frankly, what was the legal effect of the no contest or the nolo contendere plea. THE COURT: Yeah, that's right. So, that question was raised to, you know, what is the legal consequences of aโor, significance or meaning of a no contest plea.... (Emphasis supplied.) In State v. Barker, 227 Neb. 842, 847, 420 N.W.2d 695, 699 (1988), we held: [A] judge, who initiates or invites and receives an ex parte communication concerning a pending or impending proceeding, must recuse himself or herself from the proceedings when a litigant requests such recusal. See, also, State v. Jenson, 232 Neb. 403, 440 N.W.2d 686 (1989). Initially, we must determine whether the trial judge violated this rule. It is true that the trial judge stated he had invited an ex parte communication with the family members of the victims. The law does not condone such a practice. The record does not show, however, that the trial judge met with the James Thimm family, and the judge affirmatively stated, There was absolutely no discussion about any other cases than that [Luke Stice] case. There is nothing in the record indicating anything to the contrary. The trial judge did meet with the Luke Stice family before defendant was sentenced on his plea of nolo contendere to the second degree murder of Luke Stice, and so stated in the case before us. In that connection, the trial court acted as a witness within the holding set out in State v. Barker, supra . The propriety of the court's actions in the Stice murder case is not before this court in this case. Any communication the judge had with the Stice family cannot be said to have concerned the pending or impending proceeding before the trial court and this court in this case, the murder of James Thimm, in connection with either the sentencing of defendant or the conduct of the trial. Additionally, the sentencing court did not consider the Luke Stice murder as an aggravating circumstance under Neb.Rev. Stat. ง 29-2523(1)(a) (Reissue 1985). This subsection provides: The offender was previously convicted of another murder or a crime involving the use or threat of violence to the person, or has a substantial history of serious assaultive or terrorizing criminal activity. We held in State v. Joubert, 224 Neb. 411, 399 N.W.2d 237 (1986), and State v. Moore, 210 Neb. 457, 316 N.W.2d 33 (1982), that this circumstance exists where the defendant had killed someone prior to the murder for which he was sentenced to death. The rule set forth in Barker, supra, does not apply to the case at bar, given the fact that the ex parte meeting did not concern a pending case, and the murder of Luke Stice was not considered under circumstance (1)(a) by the judge in sentencing the defendant. In his 17th assignment of error the defendant contends that he was prejudiced before the jury when the trial judge turned his back to the defendant during at least half of [the defendant's] testimony. Brief for appellant at 59. During a hearing on a motion for a new trial the trial judge stated to defendant's attorney: Let me get your advice for the next trial, would you rather that when testimony's coming in about a shovel handle going up somebody's rectum and it just, you know, kind of smarts a little bit, would you rather I do that facing the jury, or would you rather I do that with my back to the jury? The trial judge apparently has admitted the conduct alleged by defendant on this point. The fact that the trial judge turned away from the defendant in an attempt to hide his expressions from the jury while the defendant described, in detail, the atrocities of his crime was inappropriate, but does not constitute prejudicial error in this case. There are cases when such conduct by a judge might constitute prejudicial error in a criminal trial, but in this case, where the evidence of defendant's guilt is so overwhelming, we hold that the trial judge's actions did not constitute reversible error. It would have been better had the judge observed all witnesses while they testified about the sickening events, as the jury was required to do, but the judge's conduct does not constitute prejudicial error in this case. If it be considered that defendant is attacking the judge's conduct as affecting the guilt-innocence portion of the trial, there are separate reasons why that conduct does not require reversal of this cause on that issue. With regard to the Luke Stice matter, any communications with the Stice family occurred after the case had been submitted to the jury and the jury had determined defendant guilty of first degree murder. The activities in this regard could not have affected the jury verdict in any way. With regard to the judge's actions during defendant's testimony, we cannot find in the record, nor are we directed to any portion of the record, where defendant objected to the judge's actions. The incident was not mentioned until defendant filed a motion for new trial after the verdict. It is not possible for this court to now judge the effect of the judge's turning his back on defendant while he was testifying, but defendant may not let that occur and then, after the verdict, complain of the conduct. We are not faced with the situation in State v. Larmond, 244 N.W.2d 233 (Iowa 1976), where the Iowa court was faced with the further problem that defendant's counsel was inexperienced. Defendant's counsel in this case was experienced and, as the record shows, was not at all reticent in representing defendant. Insofar as defendant contends the trial judge's activities affected the sentencing procedure, that issue will be discussed later in this opinion. Defendant's 16th and 17th assignments of error are without merit.