Opinion ID: 417693
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Factual Inferences

Text: 58 Our first step in applying the law to the facts of this case is to review the district court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). This standard applies to the inferences drawn from findings of fact as well as to the findings themselves. 16 The test places considerable limits on our discretion. 59 The basic facts in the case are undisputed and, as set out in Part I of the opinion, grounded almost entirely in Hamilton's testimony. It is the inferences the trial judge drew from those facts that are in contention on appeal. And it is the district court's inferences that are essential to establishing the elements of civil conspiracy and aiding-abetting in this case. First, the district court found that Hamilton knew full well the purpose of [Welch's] evening forays and the means he used to acquire their wealth. See District Court Opinion at 5, 6. Second, the district court inferred an agreement--that [she] was a willing partner in his criminal activities. See id. Third, the district court pointed to various acts by Hamilton (e.g., typing transmittal letters for the ingot sales, handling the payments and accounts, maintaining all financial transactions solely in her name), see id. at 4, and concluded that they were performed knowingly to assist Welch in his illicit trade: Disposing of the loot was the principal business in which Welch and Hamilton engaged while at home. Hamilton worked as secretary and recordkeeper of their transactions ... Id. at 5. See also id. at 6 (in its conclusions of law, the court noted Hamilton knowingly and willingly assisted in Welch's burglary enterprise). 60 Based upon the record before us, we do not find these inferences to be impermissible. The facts lend them substantial support. The district court also emphasized that its conclusions were based in part on the demeanor and behavior of Hamilton under oath. Id. at 5. 61 As to the inference of Hamilton's knowledge of Welch's criminal doings, it defies credulity that Hamilton did not know that something illegal was afoot. Welch's pattern of unaccompanied evening jaunts over five years, his boxes of booty, the smelting of gold and silver, the sudden influx of great wealth, the filtering of all transactions through Hamilton except payouts for goods, Hamilton's collusive and unsubstantiated treatment of income and deductions on her tax forms, even her protestations at trial that she knew absolutely nothing about Welch's wrongdoing--combine to make the district court's inference that she knew he was engaged in illegal activities acceptable, to say the least. 62 Similarly, the district court's finding of an agreement between Welch and Hamilton to execute a criminal enterprise involving stolen goods was not clearly erroneous. As we discussed above, courts have to infer an agreement from indirect evidence in most civil conspiracy cases. The circumstances of the wrongdoing generally dictate what evidence is relevant or available in deciding whether an agreement exists. Factors like the relationship between the parties' acts, the time and place of their execution, and the duration of the joint activity influence the determination. In this case, Hamilton and Welch did not commit burglaries together but their activities were symbiotic. They were pursuing the same object by different but related means. Their home became the storage and processing base for Welch's criminal activities; they thus performed some of their different parts of the illegal operation together at the same location. The long-running nature of the scheme is also crucial to the inference of agreement--Hamilton's knowledge and aid over five years makes some kind of accord extremely likely--perhaps only a tacit accord, but that is enough. Furthermore, while Hamilton's extensive participation in the profits of the illegal venture might not by itself prove an agreement, her unquestioning accession of wealth during this period is certainly consistent with such an agreement. Totaling all this evidence up, the district court's conclusion that Hamilton and Welch reached an understanding about their illegal enterprise withstands attack. 63 Finally, the district court's inference of knowing assistance also stands under the clearly erroneous test. Hamilton's invaluable service to the enterprise as banker, bookkeeper, recordkeeper, and secretary is substantiated by her own testimony. She performed these services in an unusual way under unusual circumstances for a long period of time and thereby helped launder the loot and divert attention from Welch. Given all this, we will not upset the court's inference that she knew she was assisting Welch's wrongful acts. As the Supreme Court noted, [a] finding is 'clearly erroneous' [only] when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 541, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948).