Opinion ID: 776676
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failed Identifications

Text: 21 Harris also argues that the district court erred by precluding him from eliciting testimony at trial that two witnesses were unable to identify him at the line-up as the robber. The court sustained the government's objection that such evidence constituted inadmissible hearsay, a determination we review for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Green, 258 F.3d 683, 689 (7th Cir.2001). Defense counsel tried to ask Spano whether any other witnesses present at the line-up had failed to identify Harris as the perpetrator. The court correctly concluded that this line of questioning called for inadmissible hearsay, i.e., an out-of-court statement offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(c); United States v. Williams, 272 F.3d 845, 859 (7th Cir.2001). Harris contends that he wanted merely to introduce evidence that only one of the three witnesses had selected him as the robber. This line of questioning, however, represented a backdoor attempt to submit second-hand (and unchallengeable) evidence suggesting that Harris may not have been the person they saw who robbed the bank. The court correctly prohibited the inquiry — Harris could have called both witnesses to testify but chose not to, giving the government no opportunity to cross-examine them as to why they could not identify Harris. And because no exception to the hearsay rule applies, the district court's refusal to allow such testimony was not an abuse of discretion. 22 AFFIRMED.