Opinion ID: 304012
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the requirement of exhaustion of available

Text: 17 ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES WITH RESPECT TO FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT 18 In support of the contention that he is not required to exhaust available administrative remedies before bringing suit in a federal court charging a federal agency with racial discimination in employment, Beale advances two theories: It is first asserted that the district court's jurisdiction is not limited to that established by Title 28, U.S.C., Section 1361 (mandamus), but extends to the jurisdiction provided by Title 28, U.S.C., Sections 1331 and 1343. 7 The second contention is that the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape, 1961, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492; McNeese v. Board of Education, 1963, 373 U.S. 668, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 10 L.Ed.2d 622; and Damico v. California, 1967, 389 U.S. 416, 88 S.Ct. 526, 19 L.Ed.2d 647, dealing with the requirement of exhaustion of state administrative remedies in actions brought pursuant to Title 42, U.S.C., Section 1983, 8 have application here. 19 We find neither theory to be meritorious. Our reasons are simple and uninvolved. 20 Sections 1331 and 1343, Title 28, United States Code, may not be construed to constitute waivers of the federal government's defense of sovereign immunity. Cotter Corporation v. Seaborg, 10 Cir. 1966, 370 F.2d 686, 692. Beale's complaint thus alleges no proper jurisdictional basis for seeking reinstatement. 21 The Supreme Court's decisions regarding the supplementary nature of relief under Title 42, U.S.C., Section 1983, are inapplicable to this case, in which Beale alleges a deprivation of rights protected by Title 42, U.S.C., Section 1981. 9 The Section 1983 cases on which Beale heavily relies dealt with the relationships between the several states and the federal government in the field of deprivations of federally protected rights under the color of state law. The Supreme Court found no rational basis for requiring a claimant to exhaust state administrative remedies before being permitted to institute an action in federal court to redress the deprivation of a federal right. But Beale's situation is totally dissimilar from that of a plaintiff in a Section 1983 action. Beale was formerly an employee of a department of the government of the United States. The federal government is on record by Act of Congress as opposed to discrimination on the basis of race in its own employment practices. Title 5, U.S.C., Section 7151. 10 Pursuant to Section 7151, the President has directed the heads of all federal agencies to put into effect positive programs designed to eliminate racial discrimination in federal employment and to resolve complaints of unequal treatment on the basis of race within the governmental establishment. Executive Order 11246 (1965), as amended by Executive Order 11478 (1969). 22 Beale does not assert that resort to the administrative processes of the postal service designed to deal with complaints of racial discrimination would be a meaningless ritual. He claims simply that he did not need to present his claim of racial discrimination to the postal authorities before bringing suit in district court. We adhere to the time-tested requirement that available administrative remedies be exhausted prior to the institution of a mandamus action. The federal bureaucracy's efforts to police its own practices with respect to discrimination in employment on the basis of race should not be undermined. This would be the predictable effect of sanctioning resort to the federal courts before completion of the administrative review process. We hold that the teachings of Monroe, McNeese and Damico and similar decisions have no application to this case. 11 23