Opinion ID: 202689
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Collateral Valuation

Text: Eastern also claims that it did not receive adequate notice of an intent to value the collateral. It raises this argument because it failed to object during the valuation hearing, and ordinarily that means that the Debtor's valuation is upheld by default. See Enewally v. Wash. Mut. Bank (In re Enewally), 368 F.3d 1165, 1173 (9th Cir. 2004); In re Brown, 244 B.R. 603, 611 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2000); see also Campos-Orrego, 175 F.3d at 95 (issues raised for the first time on appeal are deemed waived). It justifies its lack of objection by saying that it never had the notice due under Bankruptcy Rule 3012 that an evidentiary hearing on valuation was going to take place. Bankruptcy Rule 3012 states: The court may determine the value of a claim secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest on motion of any party in interest and after a hearing on notice to the holder of the secured claim and any other entity as the court may direct. Eastern cites the case of Piedmont Trust Bank v. Linkous (In re Linkous), 990 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1993), for the proposition that, 15 Eastern also argues that the Debtor should be viewed as holding an easement on so much of the Enfield Lot upon which the Debtor's house sits. It says that this would essentially bring all of the house under the mortgage on the Jasper Lot. Because Eastern raises this argument for the first time on appeal, it is deemed waived. Campos-Orrego v. Rivera, 175 F.3d 89, 95 (1st Cir. 1999). -17- in order to satisfy the rule, the court must provide creditors with specific notice that a § 506 valuation hearing is to be held. Id. at 162-63. However, there is some split of authority, with courts in this circuit and others holding that the filing of a Chapter 13 plan is sufficient notice of an intent to strip down and revalue collateral, and no separate motion or hearing is required. See Curtis v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank (In re Curtis), 322 B.R. 470, 481 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005); McDonough v. Plaistow Coop. Bank (In re McDonough), 166 B.R. 9, 14 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994); Lee Servicing Co. v. Wolf (In re Wolf), 162 B.R. 98, 107-08 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1993). However, even assuming that the specific notice that Linkous calls for is required in this circuit, it was provided. The hearing that was held on November 23, 2004, covered, in part, the Debtor's motion for secured status under 11 U.S.C. § 506, and Eastern had notice that that was to be the subject. The hearing was described as nonevidentiary, but, Eastern argues, the hearing implicitly became evidentiary, without notice, because the court expected Eastern to provide evidence to refute the Debtor's valuation of the Jasper Lot. At the hearing in question, the bankruptcy judge made very clear that, if valuation were in dispute, then an evidentiary hearing would be necessary. He said that the issue would be decided as a matter of law, without a separate evidentiary hearing, -18- so long as the valuation was unopposed by Eastern. Eastern then argued the legal issue of the interpretation of § 1322(b)(2), but did not argue the actual valuation of the Jasper Lot. At the end