Opinion ID: 1631067
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Jury Instructions P-21 and P-29

Text: ś 97. Carla argues that the trial court erred by refusing jury instructions P-21 and P-29, which concerned an unusual condition or emergency. Jury instruction P-21 stated in part that generally when two vehicles are traveling in the same direction the driver of the second vehicle is not negligent for striking the rear of the first vehicle when the collision is a result of an unusual condition or emergency created by the first vehicle. Jury instruction P-29 stated in part that [g]enerally, when two cars are traveling in the same direction, the primary duty of avoiding collision rests with the second driver in the absence of an emergency or unusual condition. The trial court refused both instructions based on insufficient evidence. In its post-trial order, the trial court also stated that the lack of reflective tape, as noted in P-21, or failure to comply with the FMCSRs, as noted in P-29, bordered on a theory of strict liability, and the lack of reflective tape was not the type of unusual condition or emergency contemplated in the statute. The trial court also found that the instructions were superfluous. ś 98. The trial court did not err by refusing P-21 and P-29. The jury was instructed that R & R and Hunter were negligent for violating the FMCSRs in jury instruction C-13. After hearing all the evidence, including that the trailer had no reflective tape, the jury found in favor of R & R and Hunter, indicating that the lack of reflective tape and the violations of the FMCSRs were not the proximate cause or proximate contributing cause of the collision. No other facts inferred an unusual condition or emergency. The trial court has considerable discretion when instructing the jury. Bickham, 861 So.2d at 301. A trial judge may refuse a proposed jury instruction that has no proper foundation in the evidence before the court. Cato, 15 So.3d at 423; Young, 7 So.3d at 259. This issue is without merit.