Opinion ID: 2720085
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Right to Access and Copy Records

Text: Appellees, the former MHTE and HHTE trustees, contend that the waiver doctrine precludes Hill from appealing the district court’s denial of his motion to enforce and compel. “The [waiver] doctrine promotes procedural efficiency and ‘prevents the bizarre result that a party who has chosen not to argue a point on a first appeal should stand better as regards the law of the case than one who had argued and lost.’” Lindquist v. City of Pasadena, 669 F.3d 225, 239-40 (5th Cir. 2012). As noted above, Hill requested that complete access to the MHTE’s books and records be added as a term to the settlement agreement. The district court rejected Hill’s proposed amendment and entered final judgment, which we affirmed in Hill’s first appeal. To the extent that Hill’s appeal argues that the right to have access to the documents should have been included in the final judgment, or that it was contemplated in the settlement agreement, his argument is waived. But Hill restyles the current appeal as one challenging the district court’s denial of his motion to enforce and compel the final judgment. While his prior appeal argued that a right to access the documents was wrongfully excluded from the settlement agreement, he now contends that the right to 6 Case: 13-10939 Document: 00512741186 Page: 7 Date Filed: 08/21/2014 No. 13-10939 inspect and have access to the books is part of the agreement, and that he is merely seeking enforcement of the final judgment. As such, the waiver doctrine does not preclude Hill’s current appeal. Nonetheless, Hill’s challenges to the district court’s denial of his motion to enforce and compel are without merit. We hold that Hill cannot now claim that a provision granting him access to the MHTE books and records is part of the agreement because such a provision was not actually contemplated by the parties. “As long as the [settlement and trust] as a whole [are] coherent, ambiguities can be resolved as a matter of law, without looking beyond the four corners of the document.” Carpenters Amended and Restated Health Benefit Fund v. Holleman Constr. Co., 751 F.2d 763, 766 (5th Cir. 1985). The duty of the MHTE trustee to keep books and records was extended to the MHTE successor trustees, as stated in plain language from the MHTE Articles of Agreement. But there is no express language that indicates that the successor trustee must be given the same set of books, records, and archives maintained by the former trustees. Nothing in the record indicates that the parties think that the agreement is ambiguous on this point. Indeed, that Hill tried to add a provision granting him access to MHTE’s books and records is evidence that he knew such a provision was not part of the final judgment and settlement agreement as written. Hill contends that Texas law mandates his ability to access MHTE’s books and records. Texas statutory law does not require such a result. Hill relies on a section of the Texas code that states that “[u]nless otherwise provided in the trust instrument or by order of the court appointing a successor trustee, the successor trustee has the rights, powers, authority, discretion, and title to trust property conferred on the trustee.” Tex. Prop. Code § 113.084. But he does not cite to any authority to support his position that courts interpret this statutory language to compel his access to MHTE documents on 7 Case: 13-10939 Document: 00512741186 Page: 8 Date Filed: 08/21/2014 No. 13-10939 these facts. And even accepting Hill’s interpretation of Texas law, the district court “otherwise provided” that Hill would not be able to access MHTE’s documents by entering final judgment on a settlement agreement that consciously excluded such a right. Finally, Hill cites to Texas Property Code § 112.057, arguing that Texas law permits a trustee to divide a trust only if the terms of the separate trusts are identical to the terms of the original trust. It follows, he claims, that because the former trustees had access to these records, the successor trustees should also have access because the successor trustees step into the role of the former trustees. This argument fails. First, Hill downplays the amount of documents received during discovery, including financial statements from KPMG. Second, the statutory language crucial to Hill’s argument is not found in the applicable 2010 version of § 112.057. The language he relied on, that “the terms of the separate trusts must be identical to the terms of the original trust” is not present in the relevant 2010 version of Texas Property Code § 112.057, but rather was part of the 2005 version. Finally, § 112.054(b) provides that “[t]he court shall exercise its discretion to order a modification or termination . . . in the manner that most conforms as nearly as possible to the probable intention of the settlor.” This section also does not expressly state or infer that the MHTE Articles of Agreement require the former trustees to give the successor trustees access to the permanent records. Because Texas law does not require a different result, we decline to modify the district court’s final judgment enforcing a settlement agreement that consciously excluded Hill’s right to access MHTE’s books and records.