Opinion ID: 2546070
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was There a Genuine Dispute About Whether the Loss Was Beyond Piekarski's Control?

Text: In a bailment case, the bailor (here Coster) bears an initial burden of establishing (1) the existence of a bailment, and (2) the damage, destruction, or loss of the chattel involved. [5] Those issues are undisputed here for the purposes of summary judgment. The burden therefore shifts to the bailee (here Piekarski) to prove: 1. that the cause of the damage or destruction was beyond his control, and 2. that there is evidence in explanation of the damage which would indicate care on his part in the protection of the property. [6] Only after Piekarski has proved these facts does the burden of proving specific negligence shift back to Coster. [7] As this case is presented to us, Piekarski is entitled to summary judgment only if there is no genuine dispute that the loss was beyond his control and if he offers evidence permitting an inference that he exercised appropriate care. The record establishes that there is a fact dispute about whether the jewelry's disappearance was beyond [Piekarski's] control. On the one hand, Piekarski signed two letters in the summer of 1995 claiming that Coster had lost jewelry in the burglary. On the other hand, Piekarski supported his motion for summary judgment with his 1998 affidavit in which he denied any knowledge that Coster had brought jewelry to his house. Moreover, the police interviewed Piekarski when they investigated the burglary, but the police report does not list the jewelry as missing. Adding to the contradictions is Coster's testimony that Piekarski waited several days after the burglary before telephoning her in Valdez and inform[ing her] of the robbery ... and [her] missing property and jewelry. The record does not explain how Piekarski could inform Coster of a theft of property he did not know was in the home, or why he did not report loss of the jewelry to the police when he reported the burglary. The circumstances surrounding the burglary and the seemingly contemporaneous jewelry disappearance remain murky. We acknowledge that Piekarski only concedes the fact of a bailment for the purpose of summary judgment and that he asserts that he would contest the fact of bailment at trial. The burden of proof per State v. Stanley [8] does not prevent Piekarski from litigating the question of bailment at trial. But it is nonetheless insufficient proof of a cause beyond his control for him to state simply that a burglary occurred during the term of the bailment. Something more is required, particularly some evidence that tends to prove that the burglary caused the loss of Coster's jewelry. Piekarski has not stated, for example, that the burglars exposed his secret-hiding spot under his bedroom dresser, where Coster claims to have hidden her jewelry at his suggestion, or even whether the burglars entered or took anything from his bedroom. [9] He has not stated that he noticed the jewelry missing when he inventoried stolen items for the police. He did not report to the police that the jewelry had been stolen. In short, he has provided no evidence tying any loss of the jewelry to the burglary. Piekarski's inconsistent statements about whether the jewelry was even in his house could reasonably cause a jury to question whether the loss was beyond his control. [10] These inconsistencies put Piekarski's credibility in genuine dispute. Questions about witness credibility will not necessarily preclude summary judgment, unless supported by specific facts. [11] But the inconsistencies noted above themselves constitute specific facts that require sending the beyond control issue to a fact finder. Only a fact finder can resolve the fundamental disputes about whether the jewelry was ever in the home, and whether it was lost in a burglary. We also note that Piekarski cannot simultaneously concede the existence of a bailment for summary judgment purposes while also relying on his testimony that the jewelry was not in his home.