Opinion ID: 1098089
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Relation of the Claims to Section 315(b)

Text: The first question this Court must address is whether the candidates' claims are dependent on, or arise from, a duty imposed by § 315(b), and thus lie within the ambit of the 1991 FCC Declaratory Ruling. If the candidates' five counts are standard contract and tort claims and are not dependent on, or do not arise from, a duty imposed by § 315(b), then the FCC does not have jurisdiction over the matter. See The Law of Political Broadcasting and Cablecasting: A Political Primer, 100 F.C.C.2d 1476 (1984) (The FCC has always taken the position that it cannot settle disputes over contracts between the more than 9,500 broadcasting stations and their advertisers. Such disputes can best be settled by negotiations between the two parties or in civil actions in the local courts.). If the candidates' claims are not preempted by federal law, then the State of Alabama has an interest in vindicating the rights of its citizens and providing a forum for adjudication of their claims. The candidates have crafted their complaint to avoid any mention of § 315(b), apparently trying to avoid FCC preemption of their claims. However, an analysis of the separate claims reveals that each one, at its core, is integrally related to § 315(b) and cannot exist independently of that statutory provision. It would be folly to allow the candidates to shape the language of their complaint in a manner that converts what are essentially federal-law claims into state-law claims. See the 1991 FCC Declaratory Ruling, 6 F.C.C.R. 7511 ¶ 5 n. 9 (quoting Zell Miller for Governor v. Pacific & Southern Co., No. 1:91-CV-RLV, slip op. at 11-12 (N.D.Ga. June 4, 1991) (not published in F.Supp.)). Initially, the candidates allege breach of contract. The basis of this claim is that the contracts between the candidates and the television stations contained a clause in which the stations agreed to charge the candidates the lowest unit charge for political advertisements, and that the stations overcharged them by charging a rate higher than the contract price. `Breach' consists of the failure without legal excuse to perform any promise forming the whole or part of the contract. McGinney v. Jackson, 575 So.2d 1070, 1071-72 (Ala.1991) (citing 17 Am. Jur.2d Contracts § 441 at 897 (1964)). The candidates cannot prove performance or nonperformance under the contract without resorting to a determination of the lowest unit charge. Therefore, the breach-of-contract claim is facially and explicitly dependent [4] on a determination of the lowest unit charge. Without the statutory language incorporated into the contract, the term lowest unit charge has no meaning. Thus, this claim is preempted by federal law. Next, the candidates assert a claim of negligence, wantonness, or willfulness. The candidates' complaint states that because [e]ach defendant operates its respective television station under a broadcast license issued by the Federal Communications Commission, the stations have an affirmative duty to provide political candidates with reasonable access to the lowest unit charge for advertising. See the second amendment to the complaint, at ¶ 68. The candidates then state that the stations violated what the candidates describe as an affirmative duty; that the stations violated it intentionally, negligently, wantonly, or willfully; and that the candidates were damaged as a result. The 1991 FCC Declaratory Ruling details two causes of action that are specifically preempted by federal law and that are subject to exclusive FCC jurisdiction. The first is a dispute dependent on § 315(b), and the second is a dispute arising from a duty imposed by § 315(b). This second count is entirely premised upon an asserted affirmative duty owed to the candidates by the stations to provide the lowest unit charge. It is disingenuous for the candidates to assert that this could be an independent state-law tort claim when it is inextricably linked to the stations statutory and contractual obligation to provide candidates the lowest unit charge for advertising rates. The candidates' third claim is for money had and received. This is essentially a derivative claim of fraud. The candidates assert that the defendant stations overcharged them and are therefore in possession of money that is not rightfully theirs. The essence of the theories of unjust enrichment or money had and received is that a plaintiff can prove facts showing that defendant holds money which, in equity and good conscience, belongs to plaintiff or holds money which was improperly paid to defendant because of mistake or fraud. Hancock-Hazlett Gen. Constr. Co. v. Trane Co., 499 So.2d 1385, 1387 (Ala.1986) (citing Foshee v. General Tel. Co. of the Southeast, 295 Ala. 70, 322 So.2d 715 (1975); Wash v. Hunt, 281 Ala. 368, 202 So.2d 730 (1967)). A complete defense to this claim is that the stations did not improperly overcharge the candidates, and consequently are not in possession of money not rightfully theirs. The only means of resolving this claim is to determine the lowest unit charge. The claim is completely derivative of the fraud claims, and thus cannot stand as a separate state-law claim. The candidates' fourth claim alleges that the stations knowingly misrepresented to them that they would be charged the lowest-unit-charge rate. Again, we note that it is impossible to divorce the two concepts of lowest unit charge as prescribed by § 315(b) and the candidates' claim of misrepresentation. The only method by which the television stations can establish the proper legal performance of their contractual obligations is by looking to a determination of § 315(b) charges. This is precisely the area of law preempted by the FCC in its 1991 Declaratory Ruling. The final claim alleged by the candidates is fraudulent suppression. The candidates assert that the stations were in a position of superior knowledge of the advertising-rate structures and were therefore under a duty to disclose the proper amount to be billed to the campaigns, and that they failed to do so. Because the basis of this claim is that the stations had a duty arising under § 315(b), even the most talented wordsmith cannot avoid the obvious conclusion that the 1991 FCC Declaratory Ruling, asserting primary original jurisdiction over any cause of action dependent on a duty arising under that subsection [315(b)], clearly manifests the FCC's intent to cover this kind of claim. Merely avoiding any reference to § 315(b) and couching the claim in terms of fraudulent suppression cannot alter the fact that any duty the stations may have had to supply true facts to the candidates would have arisen from the contract containing the language of § 315(b) and the language of the statute operating independently of the contract. Because the candidates' claim of fraudulent suppression cannot persist without integral reference to § 315(b), the claim is within the realm of FCC preemption. Each of the five claims the candidates asserted against the stations is premised, at base, on a determination of each station's lowest unit charge or upon a duty imposed by § 315(b). Because the claims are so intimately intertwined with a determination of the lowest-unit-charge formula, the claims cannot exist as distinct state-law tort and contract claims, but instead are subsumed by the 1991 FCC Declaratory Ruling. Proper original jurisdiction thus lies with the FCC.