Opinion ID: 2362113
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Respondent's Evidentiary Exceptions

Text: Respondent argues that Judge Harrington erred when she determined that Mrs. Bantug was an unavailable witness under Rule 5-804(a)(5) [11] and admitted into evidence, under Rule 5 804(b)(1), [12] testimony that Mrs. Bantug gave to the Inquiry Panel over the telephone on 11 February 1999. Respondent makes several assertions in pursuing this argument. First, Respondent asserts that Bar Counsel did not avail itself of all reasonable means to insure Mrs. Bantug's ability to testify before Judge Harrington, for the burden rested upon Bar Counsel to prove that there was no process, no act, no statute, no comity, literally nothing that would produce her presence with regard to `other reasonable means' employed to get her to trial. [13] Respondent argued further that, because it is the cost of [his] doing business, Bar Counsel should have paid for Mrs. Bantug to fly from the Phillippines if the reason she could not attend the hearing was due to economic hardship. [14] Second, Respondent argued that Mrs. Bantug's oral statement should not have been admitted because there was no oath administered in the Phillippines. Third, Respondent asserted that he was given no advance notice that Mrs. Bantug would not be present before Judge Harrington. [15] Fourth and lastly, Respondent asserted that declaring Mrs. Bantug an unavailable witness and admitting her testimony given before the Inquiry Panel was unfair and violates [his] due process. Maryland Rule 5-804(a)(5) requires that Bar Counsel be unable to secure Mrs. Bantug's availability at the hearing either by process or other reasonable means. The rule does not, as Respondent incorrectly contends, require that Bar Counsel go to any lengthsto exhaust every conceivable meansto procure Mrs. Bantug's attendance. As we stated in an analogous context in State v. Breeden, 333 Md. 212, 222, 634 A.2d 464, 468-69 (1993): Other reasonable means require efforts in good faith and due diligence to procure attendance. If the declarant is so unavailable as a witness, former testimony bearing the indicia of reliability, given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, may be admissible if the party against whom the testimony is now offered had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. In such circumstances, the receipt in evidence of the prior testimony does not offend either the confrontation requirement or the hearsay rule. In Breeden, we held that the State's attempts at service of process were not sufficient to meet its burden to prove that an expert witness was unavailable, thus making the admission of the expert's prior testimony a violation of the defendant's right to confrontation. 333 Md. at 227, 634 A.2d at 471. The witness in Breeden was located in Puerto Rico, a territory of the United States, which placed that Breeden witness within the scope of the court's subpoena power. 333 Md. at 222-25, 634 A.2d at 469-70. [16] In the present case, Mrs. Bantug is a citizen of the Phillippines. [17] Because she is a not a citizen of the United States or one of its territories, she could not be compelled, as Bar Counsel properly maintains, to attend Respondent's hearing by virtue of a Maryland judicial subpoena. [O]ther reasonable means requires a good faith effort on Bar Counsel's part to procure Mrs. Bantug's attendance, and, via email communications, Bar Counsel apparently made such an effort, [18] we conclude that the trial court did not err by declaring Mrs. Bantug an unavailable witness. Moreover, we also conclude that, where Respondent had and exercised a full opportunity and similar motive to cross-examine Mrs. Bantug when she testified by telephone at the Inquiry Panel hearing conducted on 11 February 1999, Judge Harrington did not err by admitting that testimony in evidence. Additionally, we find no merit in Respondent's contention that Mrs. Bantug's testimony was inadmissible because she was not sworn properly and because the admission of her testimony violated his right to due process. The former contention becomes frivolous and transparent in light of the following discourse on the record before the Inquiry Panel. [COURT REPORTER]: May I swear in the witness? [MR. RYDER [19] ]: Absolutely. Thank you. [RAYMOND HEIN]: Mrs. Bantug, I'm just, one minute, this is Raymond Hein [assistant bar counsel]. A court reporter is here in the room and he is now going to swear you in. [COURT REPORTER]: If you would, raise your right hand. [MRS. BANTUG]: Yes. WHEREUPON, REBECCA BANTUG, HAVING BEEN DULY SWORN ACCORDING TO LAW, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: Mrs. Bantug properly was sworn. Respondent did not raise an objection before the Inquiry Panel as to the manner or venue in which she was sworn nor how her testimony was taken. We also reiterate that Respondent, who was present at the hearing, had an opportunity and similar motive to conduct cross-examination of Mrs. Bantug at that time. Respondent exercised this opportunity fully, which undermines his argument that he was denied due process because he was unable to cross-examine Mrs. Bantug again in front of Judge Harrington. We reject, therefore, Respondent's evidentiary exceptions. [20]