Opinion ID: 779413
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lopez' Declaration

Text: 36 Lopez' declaration, which was filed with Luna's habeas corpus petition and which admitted that he was guilty of the crime for which Luna was charged, was not considered at the evidentiary hearing. A statement confessing one's guilt to a serious crime is, on its face, against one's penal interest. See Cudjo, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d at 648-49. 37 Lopez' declaration averred that he and his friend assaulted and robbed a man in Mountain View Park in the early morning hours of May 13, 1988. The declaration stated that Lopez participated in the crime and had asked [Leal] to give me his money, [then] a fight started. In the end we took this mans [sic] money and left him lying on the ground. It further stated that Lopez was willing to testify under oath about this crime in court as I was when I first heard that William Luna and Carlos Arcinega were being charged with a crime I personally participated in. There can be no doubt that these statements were specifically disserving to Lopez' penal interest because they unequivocally confessed his guilt to a serious crime. Duarte, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 12 P.3d at 1116. 38 Moreover, the confession in Lopez' declaration carries indicia of trustworthiness because he memorialized it on paper, under oath, and presented it as truth to a court of law. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that Lopez made the statement in an attempt to shift blame or curry favor. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 603, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994). Nor is there evidence that Lopez filed the declaration just to aid his friend. People v. Frierson, 53 Cal.3d 730, 280 Cal.Rptr. 440, 808 P.2d 1197, 1205 (1991). Finally, no record evidence suggests that Lopez made the statement unwittingly or without understanding the ramifications of his statement. To the contrary, Lopez had been involved in the criminal justice system and knew or should have known that his sworn declaration could be used against him in a subsequent criminal trial. Nevertheless, he confessed to the crime in a court document under the threat of perjury. 39 The District Court held that the declaration was unreliable because Lopez invoked his privilege against self incrimination instead of testifying about his participation in the crime. The credibility of Lopez' confession should not have been decided based on statements made in Lopez' declaration that he would actually testify as to the fact of his guilt. Rather, it should have been analyzed separately whether Lopez' inculpatory statement regarding his guilt was admissible as a declaration against penal interest. See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599-600, 114 S.Ct. 2431 (explaining that each statement within a confession should be analyzed separately to determine whether it was sufficiently inculpatory to be admitted into evidence). If, considering all the facts and circumstances, that inculpatory statement was so far against Lopez' penal interests that a reasonable person would not have made it if it were not true, this portion of the declaration was admissible. Id. at 603-04, 114 S.Ct. 2431; Duarte, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 12 P.3d at 1119. 40 A reasonable person in Lopez' position would not have made a sworn declaration admitting his guilt to a serious crime if he did not believe it to be true. See Cudjo, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d at 648-49. The fact that Lopez later refused to testify is not surprising, nor does it render the underlying confession untrustworthy. Thus, we conclude that the District Court erred in ruling that Lopez' declaration confessing to the crime would not be admissible at trial. 41 If Lopez' declaration had been considered below, it would have provided substantial evidence that trial counsel's failure to interview Lopez was prejudicial. In Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1457 (9th Cir.1994), we found prejudice from counsel's failure to attempt to obtain a statement from the defendant's brother, who had confessed to the crime because, had counsel done so, he might very well have obtained a confession similar to the written declaration that accompanied the habeas petition. Even though the defendant's brother ultimately might have invoked the Fifth Amendment and refused to testify at trial, a written confession would have provided powerful evidence of [petitioner's] innocence, and could have been introduced as a declaration against penal interest. Id. 42 Here, too, the fact that trial counsel did not attempt to obtain such a statement from Lopez was prejudicial because he could have introduced an out-of-court confession into evidence as a declaration against penal interest. Id. Thus, the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to consider whether Lopez' declaration provided evidence of prejudice in this case.