Opinion ID: 3012034
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Expense Letters

Text: Marshall claimed that the expense letters were evidence of additional favors received by McKinnon, and, as such, were Brady material that could have been used to impeach McKinnon’s credibility. The New Jersey Supreme Court considered the merits of the claim, despite noting that the letters were outside the scope of the remand hearing. Marshall I, 586 A.2d at 195. The Court rejected Marshall’s argument that the non-disclosure was material, in part because of the extent of the cross-examination on the terms of the plea agreement, and in part because the Court deemed the evidence merely cumulative. Id. at 195-96. The District Court agreed. See Marshall III, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 762. Under the AEDPA standard, we ask only whether the New Jersey Supreme Court reasonably applied Brady and its progeny in concluding that the non-disclosure was immaterial as a matter of law. We conclude that it did. There is no question that McKinnon was a critical witness to the prosecution, and that the information as to the benefits received by his family was favorable to the defense and could have been used in cross-examination. But there 29 is also no dispute that counsel’s cross-examination did disclose some special favors from the government, and did cause McKinnon to admit to lying on several occasions. In his testimony McKinnon portrayed himself as a man who was stringing Marshall along, intending to get from him as much money as possible to murder Maria Marshall, and then simply to walk away with the money. He testified that he had never intended to allow Maria Marshall to be killed, but that Thompson had confronted him, claiming that there was a contract on McKinnon’s life because of an unfinished job. According to McKinnon’s testimony, he thought Marshall had taken out the contract; it was on the basis of that conversation that McKinnon agreed to let Thompson murder Maria Marshall for him. McKinnon provided many details of the trips to Atlantic City that were independently corroborated by investigators, and that he could not have known had he not met with Marshall. Marshall complains that the information links Marshall to McKinnon, but not Marshall to the crime. We disagree. While Marshall admitted that he had hired McKinnon, he had offered only that he was trying to trace the missing winnings that he had given to Maria. Between McKinnon’s testimony and the corroborating evidence, the State was able to demonstrate that McKinnon had received much more than the value of the purportedly missing funds. Further, McKinnon’s testimony and the corroborating evidence established that McKinnon was in Atlantic City the day of Maria’s death, and that he received money from Marshall on that day. Both of those pieces of information were critical -- albeit circumstantial-- elements in challenging Marshall’s benign explanation for his association with McKinnon, and they provided a basis for inferring that Marshall’s motive for hiring McKinnon, paying him large sums of money, and meeting with him and paying him on the day of Maria’s death was, as McKinnon testified, to arrange for Maria’s murder. Marshall also claims that, since the evidence was not merely repetitive of what was before the jury, the New Jersey Supreme Court erred in concluding that it was cumulative. He cites to Perdomo, where we stated: 30 The district court did not apply the correct standard for measuring materiality at the sentencing hearing. The court reasoned that the undisclosed information was not material because the jury had ample opportunity to evaluate [the witness’s] credibility due to other damaging testimony that had been elicited concerning the government payments to [the witness] and his prior drug usage. Whether or not the jury has had an opportunity to consider other impeachment evidence is not the correct standard for determining materiality of undisclosed information. United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 972 (3d Cir. 1991). In Perdomo, the impeachment evidence of former convictions and a psychiatric examination was so compelling that we concluded, Seldom have appellate judges seen such persuasive evidence that the availability of information on a prior conviction could have made a difference. Id. Here the evidence tends to indicate a motivation for McKinnon to provide testimony, and to provide testimony that the State finds satisfactory. But those precise motivations were brought out graphically at trial; it was clear after cross-examination that McKinnon’s change of plea would not occur until after he had testified and that at his change of plea the State would withdraw the murder charge. Further, the jury was made aware that, pursuant to his plea agreement, McKinnon’s sentence would be no more than five years for this terrible murder; in practical terms this meant that he either would serve no more jail time, or would serve what little post-plea time he did in a women’s institution, a place that counsel implied offered McKinnon very favorable residential conditions. From the face of the plea agreement and the cross- examination, it was also clear that the prosecutor would assist McKinnon’s entry into the federal witness protection program. It could not help but be evident to the jury that McKinnon’s testifying to the satisfaction of the State was critical in determining McKinnon’s future. Indeed, the jury apparently found McKinnon’s testimony about Thompson incredible, since it acquitted him. Unlike in Perdomo, the ongoing support to McKinnon’s family would not provide an alternative or stronger incentive for his testimony. Marshall also cites to two cases that he argues demonstrate that the 31 evidence could not have been cumulative because it was not repetitive. We find those cases to be inapposite, because they were discussing the admissibility of evidence, not its materiality. See Elwood v. Pina, 815 F.2d 173, 178 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Ives, 609 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 1979).