Opinion ID: 1760726
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The admission of the urinalysis results.

Text: Burton filed a motion in limine requesting exclusion of the urinalysis results as irrelevant and inadmissible because the results failed to establish concentration levels or impairment. At trial, the lab technician that tested Burton's urine testified that it tested positive for THC (marijuana) and cocaine. She could not, however, say what quantities were present or when the substances had been ingested. Dr. Terry Martinez, a toxicologist and pharmacologist, testified that a urinalysis tests for inactive metabolites (by-products of the drug, not the active drug itself), and therefore the test could only establish that Burton had ingested cocaine and marijuana sometime in the past. Dr. Martinez explained that the urine test does not indicate whether Burton was under the influence of, or was impaired by, these substances at the time of the test. The effects of cocaine generally last an hour, but a person's urine could test positive from two to four days after its ingestion. The effects of marijuana could last up to six hours, but a person's urine could test positive seven days after its ingestion. Pointedly, Dr. Martinez testified that the urine test indicated absolutely nothing about whether Mr. Burton was impaired at the time of the accident. According to Dr. Martinez, a blood test is the key indicator for whether or not there is impairment and thus correlates much better to actual impairment. No blood test was performed in this case, nor did the Commonwealth offer any evidence to rebut Dr. Martinez's testimony. On appeal, Burton contends that for the urinalysis results to be relevant and admissible, the Commonwealth had the burden of proving that the amount of cocaine and marijuana found in his system was sufficient to cause impairment. Burton further argues that even if the urinalysis had some relevance, it should have been excluded as unduly prejudicial under Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 403, or as evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts under KRE 404. The Commonwealth concedes preservation on the arguments concerning relevancy and KRE 403, but denies preservation as to Burton's KRE 404 issue, asserting that the issue was not raised before the trial court. See Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439, 446 (Ky. 1999) (A new theory of error cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.) ( citing RCr 9.22; Ruppee v. Commonwealth, 821 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Ky.1991)). Here, however, it appears that both matters were brought to the attention of the trial court. See Lanham v. Commonwealth, 171 S.W.3d 14, 21 (Ky.2005). The motion in limine, dealing with separate items of evidence, argued both KRE 403 and KRE 404. The hearing on the motion dealt with KRE 403 and KRE 404 concerns, albeit as they related to Burton's prior DUI, which gave rise to the driving on a suspended license charge and was vocalized as the KRE 404 problem, rather than the urinalysis results. [3] In reality, the majority of these issues will be resolved under KRE 403. However, it is clear from the hearing that the court recognized from counsel's discussions, and its review of prior precedents dealing with urinalysis results, that the temporal relationship of the use of the substance measured by the urinalysis would be a factor in the criminality of the event and in the determination of admissibility. However, the determination of admissibility was passed to trial, where Burton's subsequent objection was overruled. Thus, in deference to the confusion surrounding the appropriate use of urinalysis results (whether it is a KRE 403 or KRE 404 matter), we believe the issue was fairly preserved. An appellate court ought to be sensitive to the realities, and if it believes there may have been a miscarriage of justice it should use its extraordinary power and reverse a judgment that there may be a fuller development of the facts so that the guilt of the accused, if he is guilty, may be more certainly determined. Stone v. Commonwealth, 456 S.W.2d 43, 44 (Ky.1970) ( quoting Davis v. Commonwealth, 290 Ky. 745, 162 S.W.2d 778, 780 (1942)). And plainly, this merits our reconsideration to remedy the [confusion] in our law. Lanham, 171 S.W.3d at 20. The confusion to which we refer evolves out of the dual nature of urinalysis results. In one instance, it may be part of the crime and thus evidence of, or in support of, the appropriate mental state. On the other hand, it may be so temporally disconnected from the criminal event or criminal mental state at issue as to only constitute proof of other crimes, wrongs or acts pursuant to KRE 404. In these latter instances, the evidence must be first evaluated under KRE 404, and if found admissible, then under KRE 403. In the first instance, it is a KRE 402 and KRE 403 matter. Here, it is a KRE 403 matter. Burton was indicted for multiple offenses involving wanton mental states. One way to prove wantonness is to show that the defendant in a vehicle-homicide [,or injury,] case was driving while intoxicated. Burchett v. Commonwealth, 98 S.W.3d 492, 494 (Ky.2003). Here, however, no witness could say what quantities were present or when the substances had been ingested. Dr. Martinez testified that a urinalysis tests for inactive metabolites (break-down products), not the active drug itself, and therefore the test only established that Burton had ingested cocaine and marijuana sometime in the past. In Billings v. Commonwealth, 843 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Ky.1992), this Court noted that: Against the hoary proposition that we welcome any evidence tending to make a material fact, i.e., an element of the offense, appear more likely or less likely than it would appear absent that evidence, is counterpoised the equally venerable rule that a defendant may not be convicted on the basis of low character or criminal predisposition, even though such character or predisposition makes it appear more likely that the defendant is guilty of the charged offense. The upshot is that evidence of criminal conduct other than that being tried is admissible only if probative of an issue independent of character or criminal predisposition, [i.e., KRE 404] and only if its probative value on that issue outweighs the unfair prejudice with respect to character [i.e., KRE 403]. Id. (emphasis in original); See also Rowe v. Commonwealth, 50 S.W.3d 216, 223 (Ky. Ct.App.2001). This Court has previously considered issues relating to the admissibility of urinalysis results in Berryman v. Commonwealth, 237 S.W.3d 175, 178 (Ky.2007); see also Parson v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 775, 780-81 (Ky.2004); Estep v. Commonwealth, 957 S.W.2d 191, 193-194 (Ky.1997); Bush v. Commonwealth, 839 S.W.2d 550, 555 (Ky.1992). In Bush , the defendant/driver had an established blood alcohol level of 0.13%. The defendant's urinalysis showed traces of marijuana and amphetamines, yet his blood sample was negative for these drugs. The chemist could not say the drugs were present in [a] sufficient amount to impair, and because [the] drugs where not present in the blood but had passed from the blood into the urine, [the] date and time of ingestion could not be calculated. Bush, 839 S.W.2d at 555. Nevertheless, it was the Commonwealth's contention that `the evidence was relevant to show wanton conduct.' Id. The court, recognizing the issue to be whether [the] evidence showed only a predisposition to act wantonly, or whether it is probative to show the appellant was acting wantonly by driving under the influence of drugs as well as the alcohol on this occasion, held the admission of the evidence to have been error, but believed, given other evidence of impairment, that the error was harmless. Id. Justice Leibson, who wrote the majority opinion, but also a separate opinion dissenting in part, framed the issue well in his separate opinion, noting: The evidence failed the test of relevance because there was nothing to infer that the presence of marijuana and amphetamine as found in the urine made the ultimate fact at issue, whether appellant was driving under the influence, any more or less probable. Certainly we have not yet reached the sorry state of affairs where prior use of marijuana and amphetamines, unrelated to the accident, should be considered evidence to prove wanton conduct on the occasion of the accident. Id. at 557-558 (Leibson, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). It is noteworthy that the blood analysis in Bush established that the drugs did not affect the defendant's conduct as they were not in his blood. Estep was next and involved a defendant with no alcohol in her system. Yet, blood tests revealed the existence of five (5) different prescription drugs in her body Xanax, Elavil, Soma, Valium, and Hydrocodone some at therapeutic levels and some not. In addition, the hospital nurse, assessing the defendant after the accident, found fifty-eight (58) Xanax tablets in her purse and a handful of Soma and Xanax tablets in her pants pocket. In addition to the blood tests, her urinalysis results disclosed the presence of marijuana in her system. Estep, herself, admitted that she and a friend would sit around the house and smoke marijuana in order to `try to enjoy a little bit of life.' Estep, 957 S.W.2d at 194. She also discussed her use of the prescription drugs. Dr. Hunsaker, the Commonwealth's medical expert, testified that the presence of the prescription drugs in the quantities found would cause impairment of one's ability to operate a motor vehicle. He reiterated, [s]he appeared to be under the influence of something. Id. at 195. Moreover, the prosecution's theory in Estep was that Estep constantly took drugs in order to feel good. Id. at 194. This Court, in reviewing the urinalysis results evidencing the presence of marijuana, found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the urinalysis results as, in this instancesuch evidence was reasonably related to proof of wantonness. Id. Moreover, given proof of the impairment, the urinalysis evidence assisted in identifying the substances used by the defendant as well as evidencing temporal aspects of the conduct pertinent to the degree of the wanton conduct, i.e., Estep constantly took drugs to feel good. We addressed the issue next in Parson , where the defendant had an extremely high blood alcohol concentration of 0.238 grams per deciliter. In addition, his urinalysis results tested positive for unquantified amounts of cocaine and marijuana. Parson, 144 S.W.3d at 780. The Commonwealth's medical expert, Dr. Rodgers, testified in detail to the impairable effects of the blood alcohol level on the defendant, but could not say when the cocaine and marijuana had been ingested and not know what additional effect would result from a mixture of alcohol and cocaine. Id. at 780. Importantly, however, Dr. Rodgers testified that cocaine left no traces in urine after 24 hours. Thus, when the Court stated, [w]e believe that evidence that a person charged with vehicular homicide had intoxicating drugs in his system when the homicide occurred is relevant to the issue of wantonness even without additional evidence of the degree of impairment caused by its presence, Id. at 781 (emphasis added), it recognized the temporal link under the evidence at hand (cocaine disappears from urine within 24 hours) of such conduct as a quantifier of the degree of wanton conduct at issue. [4] Notably, extreme impairment during the criminal event (which would have taken time to achieve) had already been established by the blood alcohol analysis. Thus, under the evidence presented to it, the Court held the urinalysis results were relevant to the question and degree of wantonness. Parson relied on Bush and Estep , as well as State v. McClain, 525 So.2d 420 (Fla.1988) and State v. Weitz, 500 So.2d 657, 659 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1986) (disapproved of in part by McClain ), for support. In Weitz , the defendant/driver was the cause of the accident. The investigating officer arrested him after he failed a series of field sobriety tests because he smelled of alcohol and because of other indications of intoxication. At jail, he was administered two (2) breathalyzer tests which gave successive readings of a 0.017% blood alcohol level. Because this low reading was inconsistent with the defendant/driver's state of intoxication, the arresting officer suspected the presence of other drugs and took a urine sample. The urine sample disclosed the presence of an unquantified amount of Methaqualone, Cocaine, and Phenobarbital. Based upon toxicology testimony that it was impossible to determine the defendant's degree of impairment at the time of the offense (based upon the mere presence of drugs in the defendant's urine), the trial judge suppressed the urinalysis report. However, given the Officer's testimony of intoxication and the low level of the breathalyzer results, which could not explain the intoxication, the appellate court reversed and held that the urinalysis results did tend to prove that he was `under the influence' of those drugs. Weitz, 500 So.2d at 659. Here again, once intoxication (or impairment) is established, yet without identification of the substances, the use of urinalysis results is highly relevant to the identity of the substances causing the intoxication. In McClain , an analysis of the defendant's blood taken after the accident demonstrated a blood alcohol level of 0.14 and a trace of cocaine. According to the expert chemist who testified at the suppression hearing, the amount of cocaine was so small that the chemist was unable to state whether its presence could have affected the defendant's driving. The trial court then granted the motion to suppress on grounds that the prejudicial impact substantially outweighed its relevance. In upholding the trial court's discretion in suppressing the evidence, the court analyzed the rational of the Weitz decision, noting: It may be that McClain and Weitz can be reconciled when the challenged evidence is viewed in light of its relationship to the other evidence. In both cases, it could be said that the prejudicial impact of permitting the jury to hear that the defendant had taken illegal drugs was equal but that it was the difference in probative value which tipped the scales. In Weitz , the defendant's low blood alcohol test belied the other evidence of his intoxication. Thus, the presence of even a small amount of drugs in the defendant's urine was significant because it provided an explanation for his impaired conduct. In the instant case, McClain's blood alcohol substantially exceeded the figure necessary to raise a presumption of impairment. Therefore, evidence of a trace amount of cocaine in McClain's blood added little to the state's proof of intoxication. Thus, we cannot say that the decision in Weitz was incorrect. However, we disapprove of the opinion ... to the extent indicated above. McClain, 525 So.2d at 423 (emphasis added). [5] Clearly, given the other proof of intoxication, McClain was properly resolved under KRE 403. We have also noted the admissibility of urinalysis results in Berryman, 237 S.W.3d at 178 n. 6, though the evidence was addressed within the context of a motion for directed verdict. Therein we noted, that [a] reasonable reference could be drawn that Berryman was impaired, at least somewhat, by the Xanax in his system. Id. at 179. Yet, in Berryman , the facts were such as to compel a conclusion that the defendant was impaired. Id. The defendant was driving at ninety-eight (98) miles per hour when he hit the back of the vehicle ahead of him on an unobstructed four-lane highway. He made no effort to brake or swerve before overtaking and ramming the back of a clearly visible vehicle. Id. at 176-178. Pointedly, like Weitz , the facts of the accident in Berryman left little question as to impairment. The question was one of identifying the substance. Thus, like Weitz , the use of the urinalysis was permissible to identify the impairing substance. KRE 404(b) . . . protects against the introduction of extrinsic act evidence when the evidence is offered solely to prove character [or propensity]. The text contains no intimation, however, that any preliminary showing is necessary before such evidence may be introduced for a proper purpose. If offered for such a proper purpose, the evidence is subject only to general strictures limiting admissibility such as [KRE] 402 and 403. Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 944-45 (Ky.1999) (quoting Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687-88, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988)). However, it is a well-known fundamental rule that evidence that a defendant on trial had committed other [crimes] is never admissible unless it comes within certain exceptions, which are well-defined in [KRE 404(b)] itself. Clark v. Commonwealth, 223 S.W.3d 90, 96 (Ky.2007) ( quoting Commonwealth v. Buford, 197 S.W.3d 66, 70 (Ky.2006)). Yet, when offered for a proper purposei.e., the taking of illegal drugs during the time frame of, or up to, the criminal event or mental statethe evidence is subject only to the general strictures limiting admissibility such as [KRE] rules 402 and 403. English, 993 S.W.2d at 945. Indeed, the same item of evidence may be admissible in one case and not in another, depending upon the relation of that item to the other evidence. McClain, 525 So.2d at 422 ( citing E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence, § 185 (3d ed.1984)). `Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. KRE 401. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. KRE 403. Obviously, here, there are no considerations of confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Thus, the trial court must determine if the evidence's probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice. This is a task properly reserved for the sound discretion of the trial judge, English, 993 S.W.2d at 945 ( citing Rake v. Commonwealth, 450 S.W.2d 527, 528 (Ky. 1970)), and [t]he standard of review is whether there has been an abuse of that discretion. Id. (citing Partin v. Commonwealth, 918 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Ky. 1996)). The test for abuse of discretion is whether trial judges' decisions were arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair or unsupported by sound legal principals. Id. The Commonwealth argues that consideration of this issue is barred by this Court's decision in Parson , holding that such evidence is relevant to the issue of wantonness even without additional evidence of the degree of impairment caused by its presence. Parson, 144 S.W.3d at 781. Yet, as already alluded to, the Commonwealth's argument overlooks the full text of the quote, including use of the word additional. The full quote was [l]ike the court in McClain , we believe that evidence that a person charged with vehicular homicide had intoxicating drugs in his system when the homicide occurred is relevant to the issue of wantonness even without additional evidence of the degree of impairment caused by its presence. Id. (emphasis added). The Court referred to McClain , which upheld the trial court's suppression of the urinalysis evidence because of its holding, that such evidence is not inadmissible simply because a toxicologist cannot estimate the degree of impairment caused by its presence. Id. at 781 ( citing to McClain, 525 So.2d at 423 (emphasis added)). In Parson , the expert testified: [T]hat traces of marijuana can remain in the body for weeks after ingestion but that traces of cocaine will disappear within twenty-four hours. He could not say when in the twenty-four hour period Appellant had ingested the cocaine but admitted that he also could not say that Appellant had not ingested the cocaine immediately prior to operating his vehicle. And, although he testified in detail to the effects of a blood alcohol concentration of 0.238 grams per deciliter on the motor skills and judgment of a person with that amount of alcohol in his system, he did not know what additional effect would result from a mixture of alcohol and cocaine. Id. at 780. Thus, in Parson , the trial court was confronted not only with an extremely high breathalyzer reading (which reasonably implies a significant time of consumption), but, also with a record that evidentially established that one's use of cocaine will not be revealed on a urinalysis more than twenty-four hours after its intake. Thus, remoteness was not a substantial factor in the evaluation. The requirement that the prior act be `not too remote' is integral to determining the probative value of the evidence. Thus, an independent act too remote in time will fail the balancing test required by KRE 403. Robey v. Commonwealth, 943 S.W.2d 616, 618 (Ky.1997); see also English, 993 S.W.2d at 945 ([T]his is the point at which the issue of temporal remoteness becomes a factor in determining inadmissibility.). Here, neither the lab technicians, nor Dr. Martinez could testify what quantities were present or when the substances had been ingested. In fact, the evidence here showed that the cocaine could have been taken as much as four (4) days prior to the urinalysis test and that the marijuana use may have occurred as much as seven (7) days prior to the urinalysis. Moreover, each witness acknowledged that the urine test indicated absolutely nothing about whether Burton was impaired at the time of the accident. Understandably, given the apparent severity of the head-on-collision, the witnesses' testimony about Burton's conduct while his arm was flopping unnaturally from side to side, his walking back and forth in a confused state and almost being struck by an arriving ambulance and the testimony concerning his impairment or mental state following the accident was equivocal. [6] Indeed, Officer Sims wrote in his report that Burton did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol. He noted, however, that the occupants of the other car (Mr. Bartolo and Mr. Boyd) may have been. Several other witnesses smelled alcohol around the Bartolo vehicle and broken beer bottles were observed in and near the vehicle. Moreover, Officer Sims knew, but could not testify to, the results of Mr. Bartolo's blood alcohol level. [7] More to the point, although the accident reconstructionist's evidence supports the finding of Burton's fault in the accident, neither it, nor any other evidence, compels a conclusion that such fault was attributable to an impairment consistent with Berryman . Given the scientific evidence of remoteness, as well as the absence of evidence reliably supporting a conclusion of impairment, no significant issue of identity or of a temporal connection to the impairment exists that is consistent with Weitz . Absent a proper context within the other evidence, the introduction of urinalysis results only encouraged speculation. As such, the only real affect the urinalysis results could have had was to brand Burton as a user of drugs. This raises the unduly prejudicial value of the evidence too high to be overcome by the minimal relevancy of its potentially remote use as much as two (2) to seven (7) days prior to the accident. Indeed, Chief Justice Minton, in his dissent, acknowledges that the use of the evidence only makes the issue of use slightly more probable. While logic dictates that use of urinalysis results may be accurate to a low or high degree depending upon the conclusions compelled by the supporting evidence, the same logic dictates that its use without such supporting evidence will result in an unreliably higher conviction rate. Thus, once this evidence was introduced to identify Burton as a known drug user, the jury verdict was a foregone conclusion. Thus, we must conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in the admission of this evidence and it was error to do so. Within the context of the other evidence we have reviewed and considering the potential result, we cannot say that the error was harmless. Even so, it appears probable that the effect of this evidence may have been multiplied by the testimony of a drug recognition instructor for the Department of Criminal Justice Training Center, an issue which we will consider next.