Opinion ID: 3187215
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: involuntary intoxication defense

Text: As to his conviction, Ledford argues that trial counsel’s primary defense— that Ledford was involuntarily intoxicated due to his early onset alcoholism—was foreclosed by Georgia law. Ledford contends that trial counsel’s presenting a 23 Because the Georgia Supreme Court summarily affirmed the lower state court’s denial of Ledford’s habeas petition, this case touches upon the issue currently before our en banc court in Wilson v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 774 F.3d 671 (11th Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (July 30, 2015), which concerns whether we look through a summary affirmance to a lower state court opinion when considering a habeas petition. However, the outcome in Wilson will not affect this decision. Regardless of whether we look through the Georgia Supreme Court’s summary affirmance, Ledford’s claims fail. 85 Case: 14-15650 Date Filed: 03/21/2016 Page: 86 of 103 legally precluded defense was deficient performance in the guilt phase. He claims that trial counsel should have argued instead that Ledford’s voluntary intoxication negated his intent to commit murder because it was the only legally cognizable defense available to Ledford. We discuss Georgia law and trial counsel’s performance.
Under Georgia law, “[a] person shall not be found guilty of a crime when, at the time of the act, omission, or negligence constituting the crime, the person, because of involuntary intoxication, did not have sufficient mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to such act.” Ga. Code Ann. § 16-3-4(a). “Involuntary intoxication means intoxication caused by: (1) [c]onsumption of a substance through excusable ignorance; or (2) [t]he coercion, fraud, artifice, or contrivance of another person.” Id. § 16-3-4(b). In Georgia, chronic alcoholism does not amount to involuntary intoxication. See, e.g., Sanford v. State, 671 S.E.2d 820, 823 (Ga. 2009) (approving charge stating that alcoholism is not involuntary and is no defense to a criminal act); McEver v. State, 373 S.E.2d 624, 625 (Ga. 1988); McLaughlin v. State, 224 S.E.2d 412, 414 (Ga. 1976). Additionally, “[v]oluntary intoxication shall not be an excuse for any criminal act or omission.” Ga. Code Ann. § 16-3-4(c). Still, “Georgia juries may 86 Case: 14-15650 Date Filed: 03/21/2016 Page: 87 of 103 be instructed as to whether evidence of intoxication negated intent to commit murder.” Lobosco v. Thomas, 928 F.2d 1054, 1058 (11th Cir. 1991).
The overwhelming evidence of Ledford’s guilt made defending Ledford a difficult and daunting task. See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 191, 125 S. Ct. 551, 562 (2004) (“Attorneys representing capital defendants face daunting challenges in developing trial strategies, not least because the defendant’s guilt is often clear.”). Understandably, trial counsel could not rely on a theory of factual innocence or other typical defense theories. Rather, with the help of a capital trial expert, trial counsel developed a novel defense—that Ledford’s early-onset alcoholism at age eight, which developed well prior to the age of majority, amounted to “involuntary intoxication” under Georgia law. While ordinary alcoholism does not constitute involuntary intoxication under Georgia law, trial counsel was not arguing that Ledford was an ordinary alcoholic. Instead, trial counsel argued that Ledford suffered from a peculiar type of alcoholism—one that developed due to forced exposure to alcohol and drugs at such a young age—that rendered his addiction and intoxication involuntary. While this defense is novel and a difficult one, the state argues that it by no means was necessarily doomed to fail. The state also argues that trial counsel’s involuntary intoxication defense was quite strategic because it allowed trial counsel to 87 Case: 14-15650 Date Filed: 03/21/2016 Page: 88 of 103 introduce significant mitigating evidence early on in the guilt phase. See Nixon, 543 U.S. at 192, 125 S. Ct. at 563 (“[I]n a capital case, counsel must consider in conjunction both the guilt and penalty phases in determining how best to proceed.”). Rather than just introducing evidence of intoxication on the day of the murder, trial counsel in the guilt phase was able to introduce evidence of Ledford’s difficult and horrific childhood and his forced exposure to alcohol at age eight. Trial counsel still argued to the jury that Ledford’s intoxication, regardless of its voluntariness, negated the mens rea required for malice murder. Ledford concedes that was a viable defense strategy. Thus, at best, Ledford argues that trial counsel’s strategy focused too much on the novel involuntary intoxication theory and too little on the negation of mens rea. The state argues that this is precisely the type strategic consideration that we do not second guess. See Hunt, 666 F.3d at 726 (“There is a strong presumption that counsel’s attention to certain issues to the exclusion of others reflects trial tactics rather than sheer neglect.”) (quotation marks and alterations omitted). We need not decide this performance prong issue because Ledford has not carried his burden on the prejudice prong in any event.
The state court’s decision finding no prejudice was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. In closing, trial 88 Case: 14-15650 Date Filed: 03/21/2016 Page: 89 of 103 counsel did argue, albeit briefly, that Ledford’s intoxicated state negated his intent to murder Dr. Johnston. And even if trial counsel exclusively relied on its novel involuntary intoxication defense, which they did not, the state trial court unambiguously instructed the jury that intent is an “essential element” of the crime, and that a defendant is not criminally responsible if “alcohol, drugs or narcotics impairs a person’s mind to the extent that the person is not able to form an intent to do the act charged.” Evidence of Ledford’s consumption of drugs and alcohol on the day of the murder and his long history of substance abuse supported the claim that he was intoxicated at the time he killed Dr. Johnston. The court’s charge to the jury regarding intent cured any prejudice resulting from trial counsel’s alleged failure to present a more fulsome mens rea argument. In other words, because the jury was presented with and instructed on the very defense that Ledford contends trial counsel neglected, there is little chance, let alone a “substantial” chance, that the trial outcome would have been any different had trial counsel more fervently supported a mens rea defense. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 112, 131 S. Ct. at 792. On this prejudice prong, we also consider that the state presented overwhelming evidence of Ledford’s factual guilt at trial, including his written confession, his assistance in recovering the murder weapon, Mrs. Johnston’s account of seeing him in her husband’s truck, her account of the robbery and being tied up by him, the pawn shop employees’ testimony as to the guns, and the 89 Case: 14-15650 Date Filed: 03/21/2016 Page: 90 of 103 forensic serologist’s testimony. Despite consuming a large amount of drugs and alcohol, Ledford was able to inflict wounds that required a significant amount of force, hide Dr. Johnston’s body (albeit crudely), force his way into the Johnston residence, cut the phone line, tie up Mrs. Johnston, drive away, and discard the murder weapon. All of this is ample evidence demonstrating that, despite his consumption of drugs and alcohol, Ledford maintained some cognitive faculties during and after Dr. Johnston’s murder. Even if Ledford’s trial counsel had exclusively focused on attempting to convince the jury that Ledford did not have the requisite intent to kill Dr. Johnston because he was intoxicated, it is fair to conclude that Ledford still would have been found guilty of murder based on the state’s overwhelming evidence presented at trial. Thus, Ledford failed to demonstrate a “reasonable probability” that but for trial counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome at trial would have been different. Hunt, 666 F.3d at 721. Because the state court’s decision finding no prejudice was not unreasonable, the district court properly denied relief on this ineffective counsel claim. 24 24 In reaching our conclusion, we do not rely on the state habeas court’s alternative finding that a jury could have reasonably inferred that Ledford was not actually intoxicated at the time of the murder. 90 Case: 14-15650 Date Filed: 03/21/2016 Page: 91 of 103