Opinion ID: 864380
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court erred in granting ssd's

Text: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITHOUT ALLOWING AN ORAL HEARING. ¶7. For a summary judgment motion to be granted, there must exist no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party must be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The standard of review of a trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment is de novo. Hancock v. Mid Am. Servs. Inc., 836 So. 2d 762, 764 (Miss. 2003) (citing Short v. Columbus Rubber & Gasket Co., 535 So. 2d 61, 63 (Miss. 1988)). The burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact falls upon the party requesting the summary judgment. This Court will reverse if any triable issue of material fact exists; if not, we will affirm. Id. 1 The original amount of damages awarded to SSD was $45,141.20. This amount represented what SSD would have been owed for March 1999 through April 2001 based on the actual number and types of units rented by Croke during that time period. The original damage amount was remitted by forty percent to $27,084.72 because forty percent of the fees collected by SSD were allocated to maintenance and service. 4 ¶8. SSD filed its motion for summary judgment on June 30, 2000. Croke filed his response to SSD’s motion for summary judgment on September 19, 2000. Four months after the initial motion, the trial court entered summary judgment on November 2, 2000. In a footnote, the chancellor explained the reason for not holding an oral hearing: “[SSD] requested oral argument on its Summary Judgment Motion. The Court hereby denies that request as unnecessarily repetitious, as the issues were thoroughly briefed by the parties.” Croke asserts that the trial court deprived him of a valuable right afforded under Rule 56(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure by granting SSD’s motion for summary judgment without conducting an oral hearing. ¶9. Summary judgment may be entered “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(c). ¶10. Croke argues that the trial court's failure to grant an oral hearing was “a procedural error which affected Appellant's substantial rights as a litigant.” He submits that Rule 56(c) itself clearly contemplates that the trial court will conduct a hearing prior to entering a summary judgment. Rule 56(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part the following: (c) Motions and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shall be served at least ten days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of the hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(c). This Court has recognized that there is not an explicit or implicit right to a hearing under Rule 56(c), but that there appears to be in other rules. See Adams v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 831 So.2d 1156 (Miss. 2002). Rule 78 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 5 Each court shall establish procedures for prompt dispatch of business, at which motions requiring notice and hearing may be heard and disposed of; but the judge at any time or place and on such notice, if any, as he considers reasonable may make orders for the advancement, conduct, and hearing of such actions. To expedite business, the court may make provision by rule or order for the submission and determination of motions not seeking final judgment without oral hearing upon brief written statements of reasons in support and opposition. In Adams, we found that, due to the finality of summary judgments, the trial court committed error by failing to grant a hearing upon a motion for summary judgment. However, finding no unresolved issues of material fact, we concluded that the error was harmless. Adams, 831 So. 2d at 1163-64. This case differs from Adams in that the summary judgment granted here was not final. Several days later, SSD filed a motion for a damages hearing and Croke filed a motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment. Subsequently, the court held a hearing on damages and then issued a final order on October 3, 2001. The court refused to reconsider the summary judgment granted. ¶11. In Adams, we also discussed the federal courts’ definition of “hearing,” which “within the meaning of Rule 56 has been held to refer to the final submission of summary judgment motion papers, rather than implying a requirement that a full-fledged hearing with receipt of oral evidence take place with every motion.” Adams, 831 So. 2d at 1164-65 (citing 11 James Wm. Moore’s Federal Practice 56.15[1][a] at 56-200.1 (3d ed. 2002)). Thus, the pleadings and other papers submitted to the court in consideration of the motion could be sufficient to satisfy the Rule 56 hearing requirement in federal court. Furthermore, federal courts have ruled that the decision to grant a summary judgment hearing lies with the trial judge: Courts generally recognize the advisability of allowing oral argument on summary judgment motions, but even the Fifth Circuit now agrees that the court has the power to order summary judgment without a hearing if it feels that sufficient information is available in the pleadings and the papers in support of and opposition to the motion so that a hearing would be of no utility.” 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2720.1, at 357 (3d ed. 1998) (footnotes omitted). 6 Adams, 831 So. 2d at 1164-65. ¶12. Given our holding in Adams, we find no reversible error here by the chancellor in granting summary judgment without an oral hearing when the issues have been thoroughly presented in the briefs. II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SSD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. ¶13. The law governing summary judgment has been adequately stated by this Court in prior opinions. The burden of demonstrating there is no genuine issue of material fact falls upon the movant. The court must carefully review all evidentiary matters before it; admissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, affidavits, etc., in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made. Hancock, 836 So. 2d at 764. ¶14. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in Rule 56, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, his response must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. Id. A fact is “material” if it tends to resolve any of the issues properly raised by the parties in an outcome determinative sense. Wallace v. Town of Raleigh, 815 So.2d 1203, 1208 (Miss. 2002); Armistead v. Minor, 815 So.2d 1189, 1192 (Miss. 2002); Hudson v. Courtesy Motors, Inc., 794 So.2d 999, 1002 (Miss. 2001); Robinson v. Cobb, 763 So.2d 883, 886 (Miss. 2000); Powell v. City of Pascagoula, 752 So.2d 999, 1003 (Miss. 1999); Prescott v. Leaf River Prods., Inc., 740 So.2d 301, 309 (Miss. 1999). ¶15. Croke argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist. Croke asserts the contention that genuine issues of material fact arise because: 7 1. The trial court overlooked the issue that forcing Croke to connect to the sewer system was a taking of property without just compensation, 2. The trial court overlooked the fact that Croke's equal protection rights were violated when he is being forced to pay to install the needed hardware to connect to the sewer system when others were not, 3. The trial court overlooked Croke’s defense of unclean hands to the injunction and money damages, and 4. The trial court overlooked the fact that SSD violated the Real Property Acquisition Policies law. ¶16. Croke contends that if the trial court had taken all this into consideration then it would not have been so quick to grant summary judgment. ¶17. Croke has only revived the same facts that had been argued in Croke v. Lowndes County Bd. of Sup'rs, 733 So.2d 837 (Miss. 1999), putting a different twist on them. ¶18. The first fact that Croke argues is a material issue, that being forced to connect to the sewer system is a taking without just compensation, was resolved in Lepre v. D'Iberville Water & Sewer Dist., 376 So.2d 191 (Miss. 1979), a case concerning a water system rather than a sewer system. In Lepre, we held, The goals to be achieved by enactments such as the statutes and ordinance involved, which compel property owners to connect, are to protect the health of persons residing within congested areas and in order to assure the payment of bonds issued for such purposes. These are legitimate goals, worthy to be protected by and promoted under the police power of a state or any of its duly authorized or legislatively enacted subdivisions. 376 So. 2d at 193. Likewise, the Virginia Supreme Court in Commonwealth ex rel. State Water Control Bd. v. County Utilities Corp., 290 S.E.2d 867 (Va. 1982), offered the most common reason that citizens who have been forced to abandon their own private facilities to attach to public facilities cannot claim an unlawful appropriation: “All citizens hold property subject to the proper exercise of the police power for the common good.... Even where such an exercise results in substantial diminution of property 8 values, an owner has no right to compensation therefor.” Id. at 872. See also Kingmill Valley Pub. Serv. Dist. v. Riverview Estates Mobile Home Park, Inc., 182 W.Va. 116, 119, 386 S.E.2d 483, 486 (1989). ¶19. The laws requiring Croke to connect to the sewer system in this case were declared constitutional in Croke v. Lowndes County Bd. of Sup'rs, 733 So.2d 837 (Miss. 1999). Forcing Croke to connect to the system does not constitute a taking. SSD has already stressed that it in no way cares to even step foot onto Croke’s land. SSD has further stated that it does not care how Croke connects to the sewer system that runs along his property line, so long as Croke complies with the law and connects. ¶20. Second, Croke contends that his equal protection rights will be violated if he is forced to pay the installation costs of the connection because other citizens were not forced to pay. We disagree. From the inception of the plan until August 25, 1995, Croke could have benefitted from SSD connecting his property without cost. Croke misunderstands that SSD never needed an easement to connect him to the system, rather it needed an easement to come onto his land in order to provide him with a free service, a gift of cost-free connection. Croke was notified that after a certain period of time, he would be responsible for the connection costs because the unused money, the money not used to connect a resident allotted by the State for the project, would be returned to the State. ¶21. A similar situation existed in State, Northern Tp. v. Waughtral, 1993 WL 328750 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). In that case, an ordinance made it unlawful to “construct or maintain” a private well for human consumption in certain areas. The ordinance also required people in certain areas to hook up to the township water system and to use that system for all of their human consumption of water. Initially, to encourage people to connect to the system, all work was done free of charge. The township later required 9 any property owner who did not connect at the initial time of installation to pay the entire cost of connection to the system. The Court of Appeals in Minnesota affirmed the trial court's decision that this action was valid. Here, Croke was treated no differently than any other person who refused to allow SSD to connect him for free. Those people, too, would now have to pay to be connected. ¶22. Croke’s third contention is that the trial court overlooked Croke’s defense of unclean hands to the injunction and money damages. Croke asserts that SSD fraudulently secured funding for this project by representing to the State that it had acquired all easements to complete the sewer project according to the plans and specifications. This argument revolves around the two issues decided above. Never were any easements required to complete the project. The only use of easements to secure monies from the government was to secure money to provide connection for those people who would grant an easement to SSD. For those easements that might have been represented to the State as secured, though not secured, the money afforded for them was returned. This explains why SSD will no longer provide costfree connection to Croke. ¶23. Finally, Croke’s last argument to support his position that genuine issues of material fact are present is that the trial court overlooked SSD’s violation of the Real Property Acquisition Policies law, Miss. Code Ann. §§ 43-37-1 to 43-37-13. This argument is without merit because no property was actually acquired from Croke for the project. ¶24. We find that there were no genuine issues of material fact. House Bill 1577, creating the sewer project, and the ordinance passed by the Board of Supervisors of Lowndes County which requires by law connection to the sewer system were both found valid by this Court. The trial court’s grant of summary judgment for SSD was a correct finding. Croke should connect to the system. 10