Opinion ID: 1420062
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Wildlife Management Is Clearly Inapplicable to the Initiative Process Based on the Language and History of Articles XI and XII

Text: To determine whether the subject matter of wildlife management is clearly inapplicable to the initiative process, we look first to the language and history of the constitutional provisions regarding the initiative process. We apply basic rules of statutory construction when interpreting the Alaska Constitution. [13] When construing constitutional provisions, we use our independent judgment, adopting a reasonable practical interpretation in accordance with common sense based upon the plain meaning and purpose of the provision[s] and the intent of the framers. [14] We also look to the meaning that the voters would have placed on [the] provision. [15] Although the restrictions included in Article XI are relatively straightforward and easy to decipher, the meaning of the phrase clearly inapplicable in Article XII is less obvious. We therefore look to the intent of the framers for guidance in interpreting the provision. The debates about the initiative process at the Alaska Constitutional Convention make clear the framers' understanding of the phrase clearly inapplicable in Article XII. During the discussion of what is now Article XII, § 11, Delegate George McLaughlin, chair of the Judiciary Committee and author of the proposed language, explained that use of the phrase the legislature in an article marked the delegates' intent to make the article subject to the initiative process as well: What do I mean here by unless clearly inapplicable? ... Certainly we wouldn't intend, where you read in the article on the judiciary that the supreme court may adopt rules which may be, in substance, disapproved by two-thirds of each house of the legislature, because it was obviously meant from that context that that couldn't be subject to the initiative, and so we are clearly indicating here that where we use the expression by the legislature or the expression the legislature we mean completely, thoroughly, and wholeheartedly know that it is subject not only to the initiative but to the referendum, and where it is clearly inapplicable, even 55 idiots would agree that it was inapplicable. [16] The convention adopted McLaughlin's proposed language shortly after he gave this speech. [17] Delegate Victor Fischer, in response to a motion to make the legislature signify exclusively the legislature, argued that such an interpretation would leave hidden meanings in the constitution that would limit the people's legitimate use of the initiative: I don't think it is right for us as an afterthought to start going through the whole constitution and add additional items that are not subject to the initiative.... If you believe that certain items should be exempted let's put them into Section 5 of Article 3 [later renumbered as art. XI, § 7] and specifically exempt them from the initiative instead of going through each article, section by section, and by hidden meanings prevent the people from exercising the initiative. [18] Shortly after Fischer's speech, the motion to narrow the intended meaning of the term the legislature was defeated by a 2-1 margin. [19] The framers chose to use the phrase the legislature in Article VIII, which concerns natural resource management: GENERAL AUTHORITY. The legislature shall provide for the utilization, development, and conservation of all natural resources belonging to the State, including land and waters, for the maximum benefit of its people. [20] Such language evidences the delegates' intent that natural resource issues would be subject to the initiative. Indeed, unlike the Judiciary Committee, [21] the Resources Committee made no effort to have the subject matter of Article VIII excluded from the initiative process. If we were to grant the legislature an exclusive right to propose wildlife legislation based on the state's role as trustee over wildlife under Article VIII, we would be relying on the very hidden meanings against which Fischer warned and that the delegates at the constitutional convention squarely rejected. Even if Article VIII had not contained the words the legislature, the subject of wildlife management is not so clearly inapplicable to the initiative process as to pass Delegate McLaughlin's 55 idiot test. The convention debates suggest the framers added clearly inapplicable to Article XII so that the initiative would not replace the legislature where the legislature's power serves as a check on other branches of government, such as legislative power to define courts' jurisdiction or override judicial rules. [22] This separation-of-powers concern does not exist with respect to natural resource issues under Article VIII. Hence, the debates do not support an interpretation of Article XII that would grant the legislature exclusive law-making powers over natural resource management on the grounds that such subject matter is clearly inapplicable to the initiative process. Wright argues that natural resources issues are sensitive and sophisticated in Alaska, and therefore should be free from the impulsive enactment of laws by the general public. He points to resolutions passed by the legislature and Game Board endorsing snare trapping as evidence that the initiative is ill-conceived. We agree with Wright that such issues are sensitive and complex; indeed, public policy stakes are usually high in initiative law. [23] But the framers of the constitution chose to include the initiative process as a law-making tool with full knowledge of the risks inherent to direct democracy. [24] And the public's disagreement with legislative and administrative officials can just as easily be taken as evidence of the appropriate use of the initiative process. Additionally, safeguards exist in the process, allowing the legislature to repeal initiated legislation after two years and to amend such legislation at any time. [25] Concerned parties can also bring a post-election substantive challenge to what they may believe is an ill-advised law. As the Alaska Wildlife Alliance (AWA) points out, if any specific initiated law is constitutionally infirm, it can be invalidated on that basis. [26] Finally, the delegates' decision to submit Ordinance 3, which banned commercial salmon traps, for voter ratification along with the rest of the constitution evidences the delegates' and voters' understanding that wildlife management issues would be subject to direct democracy. The wording of the referendum submitted to the people emphasized the public's role in the decision to abolish fish traps: As a matter of immediate public necessity, to relieve economic distress among individual fishermen and those dependent upon them for a livelihood, to conserve the rapidly dwindling supply of salmon in Alaska, to insure fair competition among those engaged in commercial fishing, and to make manifest the will of the people of Alaska, the use of fish traps for the taking of salmon for commercial purposes is hereby prohibited in all the coastal waters of the State. [27] Those delegates opposed to submitting the ordinance to the voters argued that the matter should be resolved by future state legislative action rather than by popular vote. [28] A motion to this effect was defeated by a 42-12 vote. [29] After ratification, we held that Ordinance 3 was a valid modification of the territorial laws. [30] We viewed Ordinance 3, and by implication the process through which it was adopted, as being consistent with the state's management responsibilities for wildlife and other property of the state, held in trust. [31] Thus the language and framers' understanding of Articles XI and XII, along with the chosen wording of Article VIII and the inclusion of Ordinance 3 for ratification, suggest that natural resource management is not, as Wright contends, clearly inapplicable to the initiative process.