Opinion ID: 1953766
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: termination of father's parental rights to daughter was the least restrictive alternative based upon all the facts and circumstances of this case.

Text: Termination of parental rights is a final step that should be exercised with great caution. Matter of S.H., 337 N.W.2d 179, 181 (S.D.1983). The state must show there is no narrower means of providing for the best interests of the child. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). This least restrictive alternative to termination of parental rights is examined from the child's point of view. A.H., 421 N.W.2d at 75. The best interest of the child is the controlling factor. Id. Matter of C.M., 417 N.W.2d at 889. Therefore, we must determine whether the trial court was clearly erroneous in finding the evidence supporting termination was clear and convincing. A.H., 421 N.W.2d at 75. Father argues the trial court's findings of fact were inadequate to support the termination of his parental rights. Incarceration itself is not sufficient reason to terminate parental rights; however, the court may consider a parent's past conduct and present incarceration in the decision. In re A.D., 416 N.W.2d 264, 268 (S.D.1987). We have noted the nature of the crime committed, as well as the person against whom the criminal act was perpetrated are all relevant to the issue of parental fitness. Matter of B.A.M., 290 N.W.2d 498, 501 (S.D.1980) (quoting In re Sego, 82 Wash.2d 736, 513 P.2d 831, 833 (1973). The court found Father had sexually abused Daughter from the time she was seven or eight years of age. He is currently serving a fifteen year prison sentence for that crime. The Father's criminal conduct toward his own child weighs heavily in favor of terminating his rights to that child. Expert testimony indicated Father will need treatment for seven to eight years for his abnormal sexual behavior. Even Father admits he is not certain he will ever be cured. [3] The best interests of a child require that some certitude and stability enter a child's life.... A child ... is entitled to a stable, healthy environment now[.] A.D., 416 N.W.2d at 268 (citing T.H., 396 N.W.2d at 149-51; Matter of A.M.L., 371 N.W.2d 358, 360 (S.D.1985) (Henderson, J., specially concurring)). While in prison, Father is unable to provide for his children or perform normal parental duties. See Matter of B.A.M., 290 N.W.2d at 503. Daughter is now fifteen years old, she will be an adult in three years, long before Father's treatment is resolved. She deserves a safe, secure home life with responsible caregivers now. A psychologist testified that Daughter needs to be in control of any relationship with her Father and be protected from any inappropriate communication. Daughter indicated in an in camera interview with the judge that she does not want to visit her Father in prison, does not want any contact with him now and does not know whether she ever will. With the termination of her Father's parental rights, if Daughter wishes to communicate with her Father, she can; the decision and control belong to her, not her Father. Under these circumstances, the least restrictive alternative in the Daughter's best interest was to terminate Father's parental rights. The fact the court did not terminate Father's rights as to Younger Son, where there was no evidence of abuse or mistreatment, shows the trial court applied the least restrictive alternative as to each child. The evidence provided a clear and convincing basis on which to terminate Father's parental rights to Daughter. The decision and order of the trial court is affirmed. MILLER, C.J., and SABERS, J., concur. HENDERSON and AMUNDSON, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.