Opinion ID: 6078
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Physically Qualified to Return to Work

Text: Finally, Parham claims to have established that he could have returned to work at Carrier. In support of this claim, he points only to his own self-serving testimony that he obtained similar employment at McDonald's after he was fired from Carrier, and that he believed he could do everything physically necessary to work at Carrier. In response, Carrier points to several critical pieces of 16 An additional six months of leave are granted to injured employees with over five (5) years seniority . . . where there is a reasonable expectation that the employee will be able to return to work within this . . . period. Based on Parham's inability to secure a full-duty medical release to return to work at Carrier, however, the additional five months of leave granted Parham must be regarded as a windfall. He got them without having to demonstrate a reasonable expectation that he would be able to return to work, a demonstration that he was unable to make. 17 Parham did not respond to evidence that another employee was allowed to return to work at Carrier because he was able to secure a full-duty medical release within the six-month extension provided by Carrier. 11 evidence))evidence that Parham conveniently fails to address. First, Parham was never able to obtain the requisite physician's full-duty release to return to work, even as of the time of trial.18 Second, while he was on leave, Parham actively sought to be classified as permanently and completely disabled: he probably should be estopped now from claiming to be capable of full-duty employment.19 Third, Parham's own testimony reflects that, although his job at McDonald's is similar to his job at Carrier, it is less strenuous. And, finally, Parham admitted that he still suffered from some disability.20 Parham's bald assertion that he could have returned to work at Carrier thus suffers from a fatal defect: it flies in the face of all objective evidence, and is supported by none. In summary, Parham failed totally to satisfy his burden of establishing a causal nexus, as required under Article 8307c, between his filing a workers' compensation claim and his discharge.21 His evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to 18 The requirement that employees who have been on unpaid leaves of absence secure full-duty medical releases before returning to work at Carrier is contained in both the 1986 and the 1989 CBAs, as well as several earlier CBAs. 19 Alternatively, perhaps his earlier claim of permanent disability was fraudulent. 20 During questioning Parham admitted, I can't lift like I used to lift. 21 Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1090 (5th Cir. 1991); accord Swearingen v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 968 F.2d 559, 562 (5th Cir. 1992). 12 support his claim of retaliatory discharge. To the extent that Parham's evidence tends to show anything, it is that Carrier terminated Parham in accordance with a neutrally-applied absence control policy, an action that we have expressly held not to violate article 8307c.22 We conclude that the facts and inferences favor Carrier to such an overwhelming extent that an impartial and reasonable fact-finder))fully apprised of all relevant information))could not reach a verdict for Parham. We are therefore constrained to reverse the jury's verdict and render a take-nothing judgment against Parham on his retaliatory discharge claim.