Opinion ID: 200445
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Closing Arguments of the Prosecutor

Text: 45 Newton claims that he deserves a new trial because of prosecutorial misconduct arising from statements made to the jury during closing arguments. Since Newton did not make a contemporaneous objection to these statements, we review for plain error the question of whether the prosecutor impermissibly commented on Newton's failure to testify. United States v. Roberts, 119 F.3d 1006, 1013-14 (1st Cir.1997). Under plain error review, the appellant must show (1) the occurrence of an error; (2) that the error is obvious or clear under current law; and (3) that the error substantially and adversely affects the rights of the appellant. Id. at 1014. Remedial discretion in the face of plain error should be exercised if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (citations omitted). Because the comments of the prosecutor were not improper, we find no error at all in the trial judge's failure to address these comments sua sponte. 46 Newton points to two comments made by the prosecutor during his rebuttal to the defendants' closing arguments. These comments must be evaluated in the context of Newton's defense as advanced in his closing argument. Newton did not present witnesses or his own testimony to deny his use or possession of drugs. 2 Instead, his defense focused on the charge of conspiracy, highlighted the lack of evidence of an agreement between the alleged co-conspirators, and questioned the motives of the co-operating witnesses. Specifically, in her closing, Newton's counsel said to the jury: 47 The U.S. Attorney's office has bought testimony from liars, from thieves, from addicts, from dealers, from desperate, desperate people. From people who but for their ability to come in here and say what the U.S. Attorney wants, would most likely spend a significant amount of time in jail. 48 In his rebuttal to this closing argument, the prosecutor asked: Is there any testimony in this case that points otherwise, that really points to other people who may have been the leaders, organizers of this conspiracy besides these three. I would suggest to you that there was none. 49 In her closing argument, Newton's attorney also asserted: Mike Newton was a working man. He worked and we know that because you'll see his tax records, tax returns in evidence. 3 In response to this argument, the prosecutor stated at the close of his rebuttal: 50 [Defense Counsel] says, well, my client was working and — because that's what the tax records show. If you look at those tax records, you will see I believe on the 1999 tax record, it says auto mechanic. Ask yourself was there any testimony in this case indicating that he was involved in repairing cars or anything of that like. I just want to leave you with that thought. 51 Newton argues that this statement and the prior one by the prosecutor constituted prohibited comment on his exercise of the right to remain silent. 52 It is well-established that the Fifth Amendment ... forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965). A prosecutor's comment does not need to be direct; rather, a prosecutor may run afoul of the rule in Griffin by making such comments inferentially. See, e.g., United States v. Glantz, 810 F.2d 316, 322 (1st Cir.1987). Nevertheless, as we have pointed out repeatedly, the standard is: 53 Whether, in the circumstances of the particular case, the language used was manifestly intended or was of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify. 54 Id. (internal quotations omitted); accord United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 979 (1st Cir.1995). Moreover, when a prosecutor's comments, fairly viewed, are susceptible to two plausible meanings, one of which is unexceptionable and one of which is forbidden, context frequently determines meaning. Taylor, 54 F.3d at 979. In addition, a court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through a lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging interpretations. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974). 55 With these rules as our guide, we conclude readily that the prosecutor's comments did not run afoul of the Fifth Amendment. To support his claim, advanced in closing argument, that the tax records established that he was a working man with a source of income — namely, an auto mechanic — Newton would not have had to rely on his own testimony. United States v. Bey, 188 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.1999). Knowledge of his work would easily have been within the competence of other witnesses who could have testified at the trial. Hence, this is not a situation when contradiction [of the government's case] would have required the defendant to take the stand, United States v. Flannery, 451 F.2d 880, 881 (1st Cir.1971), and hence the prosecutor's question in rebuttal (Ask yourself was there any testimony in this case indicating that he was involved in repairing cars or anything of that like.) did not constitute inappropriate comment on the defendant's failure to testify. See Bey, 188 F.3d at 9; Flannery, 451 F.2d at 882. 56 When the prosecutor asked in rebuttal if there was any testimony in the case that really points to other people who may have been the leaders, organizers of this conspiracy besides these three, he was responding to the theory of the defense, also advanced in closing argument, that the prosecution witnesses who testified about the role of the defendants in the drug conspiracy should not be believed because they were liars ... thieves ... addicts ... desperate, desperate people. Viewed in context, the prosecutor's question is a comment on the plausibility of the defense theory ... [T]he government is entitled, to some extent, to comment on a defendant's failure to produce evidence supporting the defense theory of the case. Glantz, 810 F.2d at 321. Hence the comment at issue did not constitute improper comment on Newton's exercise of his Fifth Amendment rights.