Opinion ID: 585560
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutional Right to a Blood Test

Text: 12 Reichelt's primary argument is that the defendants deprived him of his due process rights by adopting an unconstitutional unwritten policy which precluded the taking of blood to test for the presence of cocaine. A municipality or individual municipal officers may be liable for adopting a policy or custom which violates a federal statute or constitutional provision. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). 13 The City of Los Angeles negotiated with the Police Protective League to determine appropriate procedures to follow when investigating police officers for substance abuse. According to Article 37 of the Memorandum of Understanding: 14 An employee shall not be required to submit a sample of blood, breath, or urine for the purposes of determining the presence of a narcotic, drug, or alcohol, nor shall an employee be required to submit to a field sobriety examination unless: 15 A. The employee exhibits objective symptoms of being under the influence of alcohol and/or narcotic or drug; OR 16 B. There is substantial evidence to indicate the officer has ingested or absorbed by the body in any other manner an alcoholic beverage, narcotic, or drug. 17 If the employee is ordered to submit to these tests involuntarily, the evidence obtained shall be used for administrative purposes only. 18 Reichelt argues that the LAPD adopted an unwritten policy contrary to Article 37 requiring that only urine (and not blood) samples be used to test for the presence of cocaine. 19 Even assuming that the LAPD adopted this policy, it does not contradict Article 37. Article 37 does not give an employee under investigation his choice of blood, alcohol, or breath tests; instead, it allows investigators to use any of the three tests if an employee under investigation meets the criteria set out in parts A or B. 4 20 Moreover, a plaintiff cannot base a due process claim on an administrative agency's improper adoption of a rule of general applicability. See United States v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 244-46 (1973) (contrasting due process rights in individual administrative adjudication with the absence of such rights in administrative rulemaking). Thus, it is irrelevant to our constitutional inquiry whether the LAPD adopted a urine test-only policy without adequate notice and comment. It follows from this conclusion that we need not consider the parol evidence indicating the intent of the parties in drafting Article 37, nor the relative efficacy of urine over blood tests in detecting cocaine use. 21 Reichelt also argues that the IAD officers' refusal to take a blood sample in lieu of a urine sample violated the California Constitution and California case law. Violation of state law does not create a federal due process violation. Reichelt's argument must be addressed, if at all, in the context of his pendent state claims.