Opinion ID: 3156789
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Appoint Counsel

Text: Maryland Rule 4-707(b) governs appointment of counsel in proceedings under the post-conviction DNA testing statute. That rule provides as follows: Appointment of Counsel. If the court finds that a petitioner who has requested the appointment of counsel is indigent, the court shall appoint counsel within 30 days after the State has filed its answer unless (1) the court denies the petition as a matter of law or (2) counsel has already filed an appearance to represent the petitioner 21 Maryland Rule 4-707(b). Although this rule uses the phrase “shall appoint,” this Court has held that a circuit court’s decision whether to appoint counsel is discretionary. Fuster, 437 Md. at 664-69.16 Mr. Simms argues that this Court’s holding in Fuster is inapplicable to his case because, unlike the petitioner in Fuster, he requested appointment of counsel in his petition. He further argues that because the Circuit Court did not immediately deny his renewed petition as a matter of law, he was entitled to appointment of counsel under Rule 4-707(b). While it is true that the petitioner in Fuster did not request counsel, a circuit court’s exercise of discretion is not controlled by whether a petitioner makes a request. The evident purpose of the provision for appointment of counsel is to provide a petitioner with the means to develop facts and legal arguments to support a petition for testing when the petition clears certain hurdles and the involvement of counsel would be beneficial to the petitioner and the court in resolving issues raised by the petition. In our view, the Circuit Court retained discretion to decline to appoint new counsel for Mr. Simms even though he had made a request. Here, the Circuit Court was faced with a petitioner who had already had the benefit of well-qualified and experienced counsel in pursuing DNA testing of a specific item of evidence – evidence that the State had established, to the satisfaction of that 16 This Court recently amended Rule 4-707(b), effective January 1, 2016, to substitute “may” for “shall” in conformity with the holding in Fuster. See Rules Order (November 19, 2015) relating to the 188th Report of the Standing Committee of Rules of Practice and Procedure. 22 counsel and Mr. Simms (at least for some period of time), no longer existed. Moreover, when Mr. Simms changed course before the Circuit Court to question the legality and timing of the destruction of the evidence, he suggested no basis for contradicting the detailed documentation provided by the State. A circuit court is not required to second-guess counsel or to indulge every speculation a petitioner might wish to pursue. The Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that it should not deploy the limited resources available for petitioners in DNA testing cases to retread ground that had already been covered or to pursue a legally-doomed theory. C. Whether Mr. Simms Was Entitled to Further Relief Under CP §8-201 In its memorandum opinion, the Circuit Court noted that Mr. Simms, through counsel, had conceded in early 2011 that the socks in question had been destroyed and that he had not subsequently suggested any basis for questioning the detailed documentation attached to the Bazzle affidavit. Accordingly, the court concluded that there was no factual basis for finding a possibility, much less a reasonable probability, that further efforts under the post-conviction DNA testing statute would yield exculpatory or mitigating evidence. The Circuit Court also held that Mr. Simms had failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that a further search of the law enforcement database would yield potentially mitigating or exculpatory evidence. This Court reviews a circuit court’s reasonableness determination under the post-conviction DNA testing statute according to a “clearly erroneous” standard. Johnson, 440 Md. at 570; Washington, 424 Md. at 651; Blake v. State, 418 Md. 445, 460, 15 A.3d 787 (2011). Under this standard, “if there is any competent evidence to 23 support the factual findings below, those findings cannot be held to be clearly erroneous.” Washington, 424 Md. at 651 (brackets omitted) (quoting Solomon v. Solomon, 383 Md. 176, 202, 857 A.2d 1109 (2004)). Mr. Simms argues that the Circuit Court should have conducted further proceedings under CP §8-201 to allow him to explore whether the socks had in fact been destroyed or might still be available for testing.17 As the Circuit Court noted, Mr. Simms had already had ample opportunity to question whether they still existed years earlier in the proceeding. This was not a case where a court ruled on the basis of a last minute affidavit to which the petitioner had no opportunity to respond. See Arey, 422 Md. at 335-36. Indeed, in his “Motion for Appropriate Relief” under CP §8- 201, Mr. Simms did not appear to question that the socks had been destroyed, but asked for a hearing to explore the timing of their destruction – presumably in the hope that he could show that the destruction actually occurred after the effective date of the statute requiring the State to preserve scientific identification evidence or that it had otherwise been done in bad faith. It was only in his brief to this Court that Mr. Simms asserted that some evidence may yet exist − a position that contradicted his 17 On appeal, Mr. Simms also complains for the first time that the 2011 Bazzle affidavit did not include the general protocols for the maintenance and disposition of evidence. Although the attachments to the Bazzle affidavit provided detailed documentation of the seizure, chain of custody, and destruction of the various items of clothing found in the trash bag – as well as an affirmation that the destruction occurred pursuant to applicable protocols – the protocols themselves, which would have pre-existed the post-conviction DNA testing statute, were not attached. While it would be the better practice, and more compliant with the rules, to include copies of any such protocols, their absence does not diminish the weight of the documentation that was submitted. Moreover, no objection was ever raised to the absence of those documents in the Circuit Court. 24 attorney’s status letter to the court in March 2011, his pro se petition for habeas corpus relief filed in August 2011, and his own statements at the May 2014 hearing. Mr. Simms alleged no facts to support either of his more recent suspicions. The Circuit Court was not obliged to conduct a fishing expedition to indulge every permutation that Mr. Simms might imagine. Johnson, 440 Md. at 571-72, (speculation is not sufficient to overcome a prima facie showing by the State). Here, he had received the assistance of very qualified counsel who determined that the evidence in question was no longer available for testing. Even had the evidence been located and been available for testing, it would not have conclusively established Mr. Simms’ innocence. Mr. Simms’ theory was that a sophisticated DNA test of the socks would reveal an absence of his skin cells. This would only be significant if he could also show that he had the same skin condition in 1995 as reported in his prison medical form in 2007 and that the skin condition would necessarily result in his DNA on the socks. At best, this might be evidence to question his aunt’s testimony that he had been wearing various items of clothing on the day of the murders. It would hardly be exculpatory – this was not an instance where DNA testing of a rape kit might exonerate the individual convicted of the crime. The Circuit Court concluded that the Bazzle affidavit, the supporting documentation of the chain of custody and destruction of the evidence, and Mr. Simms’ admission that the State destroyed the evidence, all indicated that a further search would not produce relevant evidence with reasonable probability. Given the 25 affirmative and unrebutted evidence that the socks had been destroyed, the Circuit Court’s conclusion was not clearly erroneous.