Opinion ID: 1697132
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Vagueness Challenge.

Text: Sturgeon raises a vagueness challenge to our unauthorized practice rules, claiming he is unable to discern the limits on his involvement in bankruptcy matters. It is true that, by its nature, the practice of law has not been precisely defined. We have said the practice of law includes the obvious: representing another before the court. But the practice of law includes out-of-court services as well. For example, one who gives legal advice about a person's rights and obligations under the law is practicing law. Or one who prepares legal instruments affecting the rights of others is practicing law. Or one who approves the use of legal instruments affecting the rights of others is practicing law. Baker, 492 N.W.2d at 701. Sturgeon argues that terms such as before the court, legal instruments, prepares, and approves are so broad he is unable to discern what valid limits on his activities must be honored. The broad definition of the practice of law in EC 3-5 and cases such as Baker would mean that only a lawyer could be a bail bondsman or transact the sale of a motor vehicle, according to him. To pass a vagueness test a statute must be `set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with, without sacrifice to the public interest.' Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 159, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 1647, 40 L.Ed.2d 15, 36 (1974) (quoting United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 578-79, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 2897, 37 L.Ed.2d 796, 816 (1973)). The Florida Court of Appeals applied this test in an unauthorized practice case and concluded: [T]he definition of the practice of law in Florida is not confined to the language in [the unauthorized-practice-of-law statute], but, rather, is shaped by the decisional law and court rules as well as common understanding and practices. In deciding whether the [defendants]... received fair and adequate warning of what activities constitute the practice of law and, thus, are proscribed to unlicensed and unauthorized individuals, we find the decisional law instructive and enlightening.... .... The quoted comment [from Brumbaugh, stating it is somewhat difficult to define was constitutes the practice of law in all instances] was not intended, and should not be construed, to suggest that the practice of law cannot be defined or that an attempt to interpret [the unauthorized-practice-of-law statute] must involve guesswork and chance. Instead, the court acknowledged the reasonable notion that an inflexible, permanent definition is simply impracticable. Were we to adopt the [defendants'] suggestion that the need for flexibility in definition renders a statute void for vagueness, the State would be effectively precluded from establishing minimum qualifications for practice in the regulated and licensed professions and occupations. The law is clearly established that the states have a compelling interest in the regulation of the practice of the professions and, particularly, in the setting of minimum standards for entry into the practice of law. Having considered the provisions of [the unauthorized-practice-of-law statute], in conjunction with the pertinent case law and rules interpreting it, we conclude the law regulating the practice of law is set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with, without sacrifice to the public interest. Arnett, 416 U.S. at 158, 94 S.Ct. at 1646. State v. Foster, 674 So.2d 747, 750-52 (Fla. Dist.Ct.App.1996) (other citations omitted). While the practice of law necessarily defies a precise definition, we do not believe Sturgeon was forced to guess whether he was crossing the line. The record establishes he performed services that any reasonable person in his position would understand to be the practice of law. Furthermore, we have said our rule on the unauthorized practice of law resolves problems of fair notice by authorizing the commission to seek injunctions. The subject of such an injunction would then be on notice of what specific conduct is prohibited before that person is punished. Baker, 492 N.W.2d at 704. If the subject of an injunction believes such an injunction was issued in error, he can always seek appellate review of such an injunction, which is precisely what happened here. Accordingly, we reject Sturgeon's vagueness challenge.