Opinion ID: 794369
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the seizure of Brown based on reasonable suspicion?

Text: 37 Having determined when the seizure of Brown occurred, was it based on reasonable, articulable suspicion that Brown and his companion might be the robbery suspects? Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (determining reasonableness after establishing moment of seizure). Reasonable suspicion is an elusive concept, but it unequivocally demands that the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). An officer's objective basis for suspicion must be particularized because the demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 n. 18, 88 S.Ct. 1868. At the same time, we must allow officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Nelson, 284 F.3d 472, 476 (3d Cir.2002). The ultimate question is whether a reasonable, trained officer standing in [Santiago's] shoes could articulate specific reasons justifying [Brown's] detention. Johnson, 332 F.3d at 206. 38 In evaluating whether there was an objective basis for reasonable suspicion, we consider the totality of the circumstances — the whole picture. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417, 101 S.Ct. 690; Robertson, 305 F.3d at 167. As our Court has observed, 39 [t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that a reasonable suspicion may be the result of any combination of one or several factors: specialized knowledge and investigative inferences ( United States v. Cortez ), personal observation of suspicious behavior ( Terry v. Ohio ), information from sources that have proven to be reliable, and information from sources that — while unknown to the police — prove by the accuracy and intimacy of the information provided to be reliable at least as to the details contained within that tip ( Alabama v. White ). 40 Nelson, 284 F.3d at 478. 41 The factors that informed Officer Santiago's decision to stop and frisk Brown were (a) the police radio broadcast of a description of the robbery suspects and the extent to which Brown and Smith matched that description, (b) the radio call from Officer Pacheco conveying the location tip provided by Firth, and (c) Santiago's personal observation of Brown and Smith at 22nd and Lombard Streets. Although Santiago conceded that Brown and Smith being the only two black males at that location . . . was the only reason why those two males were stopped by me and they were investigated by me, we must consider only whether a reasonable, trained officer standing in [Santiago's] shoes could articulate specific reasons justifying the investigative stop of Brown. Johnson, 332 F.3d at 206. Thus, even if the initial radio broadcast and the conduct of Brown and Smith did not factor into Santiago's reasonable suspicion analysis, they must be included in ours. Although we examine each of the three factors in turn, our ultimate determination of reasonable suspicion requires us to consider these items not in isolation from each other, but (as noted) as part of the totality of the circumstances. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274, 122 S.Ct. 744.
42 The first factor contributing to the totality of the circumstances was the initial radio broadcast describing the attempted robbery suspects and the extent to which Brown and Smith matched that description. The fact that every detail provided [in a description] matched the details observed by the officers can contribute to a finding of reasonable suspicion. Nelson, 284 F.3d at 483. The broadcast description in this case, however, fails to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's demand for specificity. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 n. 18, 88 S.Ct. 1868. 43 The broadcast, as described in the District Court's findings of fact, identified the suspects as African-American males between 15 and 20 years of age, wearing dark, hooded sweatshirts and running south on 22nd Street, where one male was 5'8 and the other was 6'. 8 In the more stringent context of probable cause, we have concluded that, armed with information that two black males driving a black sports car were believed to have committed three robberies in the area some relatively short time earlier, [the officer] could not justifiably arrest any African-American man who happened to drive by in any type of black sports car. United States v. Kithcart, 134 F.3d 529, 532 (3d Cir.1998) (though offering no opinion on whether there was sufficient reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop). Similarly, even the less stringent standard of reasonable suspicion cannot be met by a description that paints with this broad of a brush. 44 By way of contrast, consider the facts of United States v. Harple, 202 F.3d 194, 196-97 (3d Cir.1999), where reasonable suspicion was supported, along with other factors, when the suspects' car substantially matched the description, including the two-toned color of the car, the presence of a third brake light in the rear window, and five or more young, white, male passengers. See also Nelson, 284 F.3d at 481 n. 5 (finding support for reasonable suspicion when there was an exact match of the unique description — car, plates, occupants and direction of travel). 45 To make matters worse, the match of Brown and Smith to even this most general of descriptions was hardly close. Among other things, the robbery suspects were described as between 15 and 20 years of age, but on the date of the stop Brown was 28 years old and Smith was 31 years old. Moreover, both Brown and Smith had full beards and the description of the suspects included no mention of any facial hair. Indeed, about the only thing Brown and Smith had in common with the suspects was that they were black. What we have is a description that, while general, is wildly wide of target. By no logic does it, by itself, support reasonable suspicion.
46 When, as here, one officer (Santiago) conducts a stop and frisk based on information provided by another officer (Pacheco), a finding of reasonable suspicion to justify the stop require[s] the presentation of evidence by the government that the officer who issued the radio bulletin [Pacheco] had reasonable suspicion, not simply that it was reasonable for the arresting officer [Santiago] to have relied on the bulletin. Coward, 296 F.3d at 180; see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 233, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985) (when the police make a Terry stop in objective reliance on a flyer or [radio] bulletin, we hold that the evidence uncovered in the course of the stop is admissible if the police who issued the flyer or [radio] bulletin possessed a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop.) (emphasis in original); Nelson, 284 F.3d at 481 (when officers' stop was based on match of defendants with broadcast information, the reasonableness of the stop . . . depends on the reliability of the tip itself); Rogers v. Powell, 120 F.3d 446, 453 (3d Cir.1997) (The legality of a seizure based solely on statements issued by fellow officers depends on whether the officers who issued the statements possessed the requisite basis to seize the suspect.) (emphasis in original). Our focus is thus the first source — Officer Pacheco. Would the location tip give a reasonable, trained officer standing in [her] shoes reasonable suspicion to order the stop? Johnson, 332 F.3d at 206. 47 Pacheco's information regarding the location of the suspects was based on comments by the victim, Radenkovic, relaying observations by Radenkovic's friend, William Firth. It is well settled that reasonable suspicion can be based on information gathered from another person. Robertson, 305 F.3d at 168; see also Johnson, 332 F.3d at 206 (noting that officers may rely on a trustworthy second hand report, if that report includes facts that give rise to particularized suspicion). Both our Court and the Supreme Court have considered the reliability of tips from citizens in several Terry stop cases, but almost always in the context of anonymous informants. In the typical case, an unidentified person calls the police and reports a man with a gun standing at a particular location wearing specified clothing. See, e.g., J.L., 529 U.S. at 268, 120 S.Ct. 1375 (anonymous caller reported that a young black male wearing a plaid shirt and standing at a particular bus stop was carrying a gun). 48 The record before us does not fit neatly into the typical anonymous tip framework, as Firth made no effort to hide his identity and was known to Radenkovic. Despite this distinction, we may still borrow underlying principles from the anonymous tip context to evaluate the reliability of Firth's tip. Cf. Robertson, 305 F.3d at 169 (distinguishing anonymous informant case from hot pursuit case, aided by a bystander's informative tip, but still applying standards of reliability from anonymous tip cases). 49 In the context of anonymous tips, the Supreme Court has made clear that an informant's `veracity,' `reliability,' and `basis of knowledge' . . . [are] `highly relevant in determining the value of his report.' Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). When considering fully all the facts about a tip, the honesty of the caller, the reliability of his information and the basis of his knowledge are closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the commonsense, practical question whether there is reasonable suspicion to support a Terry stop. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230, 103 S.Ct. 2317; see also White, 496 U.S. at 328-29, 110 S.Ct. 2412 (holding Gates analysis applicable to reasonable suspicion context); 50 Valentine, 232 F.3d at 354 (Supreme Court uses a flexible standard that assesses the relative value and reliability of an informant's tip in light of the totality of the circumstances). 51 The following specific aspects of tips indicate reliability: 52 (1) The tip information was relayed from the informant to the officer in a face-to-face interaction such that the officer had an opportunity to appraise the witness's credibility through observation. Nelson, 284 F.3d at 480; see also Valentine, 232 F.3d at 354. 53 (2) The person providing the tip can be held responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated. Valentine, 232 F.3d at 354 (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also J.L., 529 U.S. at 270, 120 S.Ct. 1375; Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); Nelson, 284 F.3d at 482. 54 (3) The content of the tip is not information that would be available to any observer. Nelson, 284 F.3d at 483 (citing White, 496 U.S. at 332, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990)). A not truly anonymous tip is accorded greater weight when the specific details of language, type of activity and location matched a pattern of criminal activity known to the police, but not to the general public, and the tip could not have been generated by the general public, nor based solely on observation. Id. at 482, 484; see also United States v. Roberson, 90 F.3d 75, 79 (3d Cir. 1996) (affording tip less weight when information could have been gained by caller . . . looking out of his window . . . at the time of his 911 call). 55 (4) The person providing the information has recently witnessed the alleged criminal activity. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 234, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (informant's statement that the event was witnessed first-hand entitles tip to greater weight); Adams, 407 U.S. at 147, 92 S.Ct. 1921 (citing situation when the victim of a street crime seeks immediate police aid and gives a description of his assailant as example of tip that could support reasonable suspicion); Nelson, 284 F.3d at 482 (tip was more reliable when posture of the caller allowed the officer to infer that the caller was himself a victim of the criminal activity). 56 (5) The tip predicts what will follow, as this provides police the means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility. J.L., 529 U.S. at 271, 120 S.Ct. 1375; see also White, 496 U.S. at 332, 110 S.Ct. 2412 (When significant aspects of the caller's predictions were verified, there was reason to believe not only that the caller was honest but also that he was well informed, at least well enough to justify the stop.); Gates, 462 U.S. at 245, 103 S.Ct. 2317. Predictive information is also useful in that it can reflect particularized knowledge. Nelson, 284 F.3d at 484. 57 With these indicators, we assess whether the communication[] [J.L. originating from Firth] to the police possessed sufficient indicia of reliability, when considering the totality of the circumstances, for us to conclude that the officers possessed an objectively reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a Terry stop. Nelson, 284 F.3d at 481. We conclude that this factor does not support reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Brown. 58 It is true Firth did not make an anonymous call; the police would certainly have been able to find him and hold him accountable had his tip proved to be inaccurate. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that Firth was dishonest. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125, 120 S.Ct. 673 (the determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior). Reasonable suspicion, however, requires that there must be some reason to believe not only that the caller was honest but also that he was well informed. White, 496 U.S. at 332, 110 S.Ct. 2412. With little information to go on, Firth made inferences not based in fact. For example, he stated that Smith and Brown looked like the robbery suspects, but he had never seen the suspects and heard only a general description from Radenkovic. 59 Bad information in leads to bad information out. But how is a professional like Officer Pacheco to know this? First, a reasonable, trained officer would assume, from the context of the call, that Firth did not witness the attempted robbery; he had never seen the people he was attempting to identify. Second, a reasonable, trained officer would recognize that Firth's tip provided no information that would reflect any particularized knowledge or that he was well-informed. Third, and most important, a reasonable, trained officer would realize Firth was merely providing information that could be observed by anyone. Nelson, 284 F.3d at 483. Specifically, Firth was providing Officer Pacheco with nothing more than his observation that there were two black males at 22nd and Lombard Streets. 60 A tip is not reliable merely because its description of the suspect's visible attributes prove accurate. J.L., 529 U.S. at 271, 120 S.Ct. 1375. [R]easonable suspicion . . . requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person. Id. at 272, 120 S.Ct. 1375; see also White, 496 U.S. at 332, 110 S.Ct. 2412. Firth was undoubtedly sincere, but his tip was nothing more than Brown's readily observable location and appearance, and was thus insufficient on its own to support reasonable suspicion. J.L., 529 U.S. at 272, 120 S.Ct. 1375. [O]ne citizen's subjective feelings are not enough to justify the seizure of another where the objective facts do not point to any articulable basis for suspicion. Johnson, 332 F.3d at 210. The tip in the record, sincere as Firth was, does not provide objective facts justifying the seizure of Brown and would not have established reasonable suspicion in the mind of a reasonable, trained officer.
61 With Firth's call imparting information a reasonably trained officer would suspect, was there anything observed personally by the police that would justify a stop of Brown? Put another way, if a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more reliable. White, 496 U.S. at 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412; see also Nelson, 284 F.3d at 480 (If, for example, a tip on its own carries few indicia of reliability, much corroborating information is necessary to demonstrate reasonable suspicion.); Roberson, 90 F.3d at 80 (omissions [in tip] probably would not have invalidated the stop, if, after corroborating readily observable facts, the police officers had noticed unusual or suspicious conduct on [the suspect's] part). 62 The following factors have been identified by the Supreme Court and our Court as suggesting suspicious behavior; alone they may be insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, but if observed by police they can serve to corroborate an otherwise insufficient tip. 63 (1) Presence of a suspect in a high crime area. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S.Ct. 673; Adams, 407 U.S. at 147-48, 92 S.Ct. 1921; Johnson, 332 F.3d at 206; Nelson, 284 F.3d at 483; United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir.2000); Valentine, 232 F.3d at 356; Brown, 159 F.3d at 149. 64 (2) A suspect's presence on a street at a late hour. Adams, 407 U.S. at 147-48, 92 S.Ct. 1921; Nelson, 284 F.3d at 483; Valentine, 232 F.3d at 356; Brown, 159 F.3d at 148, 150. 65 (3) A suspect's nervous, evasive behavior, or flight from police. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S.Ct. 673; see also United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir.2004); Ubiles, 224 F.3d at 217; Valentine, 232 F.3d at 357; Brown, 159 F.3d at 150. 66 (4) A suspect behaves in a way that conforms to police officers' specialized knowledge of criminal activity. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 276, 122 S.Ct. 744; Nelson, 284 F.3d at 482. 67 Notably, none of these factors was observed by Officer Santiago. It was not alleged that Brown and Smith were in a high crime area. Neither were they on the street late at night. Nothing about their behavior was evasive or suspicious. Brown and Smith were walking normally; Santiago testified that they were not running nor were they out of breath. See Roberson, 90 F.3d at 80 (stating that walk[ing] casually is behavior that does not indicate criminal activity). The two men were hailing a cab. While Officer Santiago thought this was more to try to flee the area, he also agreed that the men were flagging it down like an ordinary person would. Moreover, Brown and Smith were cooperative when approached by Santiago, who testified that he had a nice, brief conversation with the two men and that they were cooperative and complied with all [his] demands. 9 In sum, as Officer Santiago testified, Brown and Smith weren't doing anything suspicious other than hailing a taxicab. 68 Although legal, innocent behavior at times corroborates other information to raise reasonable suspicion, the suspects' act of hailing a cab in this case hardly corroborates the unreliable tip of Firth. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (in making a determination of reasonable suspicion, `the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is innocent or guilty, but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts') (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 245 n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 2317). In light of the unreliability of the tip from Firth, some unquantifiable but significant amount of corroborating information is required to establish reasonable suspicion to stop Brown, and the record is devoid of that evidence. 69