Opinion ID: 174624
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Branham Can Prove a Serious Health Condition

Text: As noted, Branham cannot prevail on her interference or retaliation claims unless she sought leave for an FMLA-qualifying reason, namely, that she had a serious health condition that prevented her from doing her job. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). The FMLA defines serious health condition as an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves (A) inpatient care ... or (B) continuing treatment by a health care provider. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11). Branham does not contend that she ever required inpatient care, so her claim turns on her need for continuing treatment. Department of Labor regulations define continuing treatment as [a] period of incapacity (i.e., inability to work ...) of more than three consecutive calendar days, and any subsequent treatment or period of incapacity relating to the same condition, that also involves: (A) [t]reatment two or more times by a health care provider ... or (B) [t]reatment by a health care provider on at least one occasion which results in a regimen of continuing treatment under the supervision of the health care provider. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(i) (2006) (amended 2009) (emphasis omitted). [1] Gannett argues that Branham cannot prove that her condition involved continuing treatment because she cannot establish that she was incapacitated for a period of more than three days. This argument is unavailing. To be sure, Branham admitted in her deposition that she was not sick on Tuesday, November 7, or Wednesday, November 8, days on which she missed work in order to care for her son. She further admitted that she either performed some work or did not work but was not incapacitated on every day on which her office was open between Tuesday, November 14, and Tuesday, November 28. Dist. Ct. Document (Doc.) 35-1 (Branham Dep. at 148-51). This testimony cannot be construed as a legal admission, however. Branham agreed that she was not incapacitated only after the following exchange with defense counsel: Q: And then on the 15th you say you worked from home, true? A: True. Q: But you were not incapacitated, true? A. I still wasn't feeling well. Q: I understand, but you weren't incapacitated. You obviously were able to do some work, true? A: True. Doc. 35-1 (Branham Dep. at 149) (emphases added). Plainly, Branham understood defense counsel's use of the word incapacitated to refer to the inability to do any work. [2] In fact, incapacity refers to the inability to perform the functions of the position of such employee, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D), which in turn is defined as being unable to work at all or ... unable to perform any one of the essential functions of the employee's position, 29 C.F.R. § 825.115 (2006) (amended 2009). That is, a person can be incapacitated despite being able to do some of her regular work. Here, the very basis of Branham's suit is that she was not able to perform the essential functions of her job throughout the period of her absences in November 2006. She submits her testimony, her medical records, and Nurse Practitioner Seefeldt's certification as evidence of that incapacity. [3] Even if Branham's deposition testimony were viewed as preventing her from arguing incapacity from November 14 through 28which, to reiterate, it does notBranham consistently has maintained that she was incapacitated between Thursday, November 9, and Monday, November 13. That Thursday, she left Buhler a voicemail message indicating that she was sick; that Friday, she left Buhler another voicemail message indicating that her migraines were keeping her home; then, her migraine was so bad [that she] had been in bed for the entire weekend and could not tolerate any light or sound, Doc. 35-1 (Branham Dep. at 79); and the following Monday, Branham's husband informed Gannett that he was taking her to the doctor. These facts indicate that Branham was incapacitated for five consecutive calendar days. Gannett points to different evidence: a document from Branham's medical records in which Dr. Singer listed the duration of Branham's illness as 2 days. Doc. 35-6 at 78 (Medical Records). But Branham does not accept Dr. Singer's evaluation and provides her own testimony and a conflicting medical opinion in support of her position. This is the essence of a factual dispute that precludes summary judgment. In short, Branham has advanced sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact on the incapacity element of the continuing treatment requirement. Gannett next argues that Branham cannot establish continuing treatment because she cannot show that she was treated by a health care provider twice within her period of incapacity or that a regimen of continuing treatment resulted from the single doctor's visit she did have. Again, Gannett is wrong on both counts. First, there is evidence that Branham was treated by two health care providers during her period of incapacity: Dr. Singer on November 13, and Nurse Practitioner Seefeldt on November 28. The issue is whether the Seefeldt visit qualifies as a treatment ... by a health care provider under 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(i) (2006). The regulations' definition of treatment states that the term includes (but is not limited to) examinations to determine if a serious health condition exists and evaluations of the condition. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(b) (2006). Seefeldt's certification includes several diagnoses, reflecting that some sort of examination took place, and Gannett appears to acknowledge as much. See Appellee's Br. at 14 n. 6 (stating that Branham was seen by Seefeldt). The regulations also define a health care provider to include nurse practitioners such as Seefeldt. 29 C.F.R. § 825.118(b)(2) (2006). It is irrelevant that Branham saw Seefeldt after Gannett received Dr. Singer's negative certification and after Gannett terminated her. At this stage of the analysis, the question is not whether Gannett was entitled to terminate Branham when it did based on the FMLA's certification requirementsan issue we discuss belowbut rather whether Branham can prove that she suffered from a serious health condition. That is, the question is whether Branham can prove to a jury that she received continuing treatment by showing that she received [t]reatment two or more times by a health care provider. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(i)(A) (2006). The only timing requirement relevant to this inquiry is that the second treatment must occur during the same period of incapacity as the first, defined to include the original period of more than three consecutive calendar days of incapacity and any subsequent period of incapacity relating to the same condition. See id.; Jones v. Denver Pub. Schs., 427 F.3d 1315, 1321-23 (10th Cir.2005). Branham saw Nurse Practitioner Seefeldt about the same medical issues for which she saw Dr. Singer: migraines, anxiety, depression, and insomnia. Thus, taken in the light most favorable to Branham, the evidence indicates that she was treated by Dr. Singer and Nurse Practitioner Seefeldt, both qualified health care providers, during the same period of incapacity, which exceeded three days. This is enough to show a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Branham suffered from a serious health condition involving continuing treatment, 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2) (2006), rendering summary judgment inappropriate. Second, Branham may also be able to use her examination by Seefeldt to show a serious health condition based on [t]reatment by a health care provider on at least one occasion which result[ed] in a regimen of continuing treatment under the supervision of the health care provider. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(i)(B) (2006). Seefeldt's certification indicates under the heading Regimen of Treatment that Branham required greater than 5 physician visits, including several appointments with orthopedist, ob/gyn, and [primary care physician] over the next month and a half for surgery, medication adjustments, injections. Doc. 28-2 at 3 (Seefeldt Cert.). Seefeldt also wrote that she anticipated referring Branham to additional health care providers, that Branham would need to work less than her normal schedule, and that she could return to full duty on January 1, 2007. Branham testified in her deposition that she did see other physicians after this visit, including an obstetrician/gynecologist to investigate whether her migraines were hormonal and to treat fibroids, an orthopedist for a cyst on her wrist and her trigger-finger condition, and her primary-care physician, Dr. Peters, for her migraines and insomnia. Thus, this evidence of a regimen of continuing treatment following the Seefeldt visit also precludes summary judgment.