Opinion ID: 836245
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: MCL 600.5856(c) AND TOLLING

Text: The first issue this Court is asked to address is whether the defects identified in plaintiff's NOI act to bar tolling of the statute of limitations under MCL 600.5856(c) as amended by 2004 PA 87, effective April 22, 2004. Our analysis necessarily begins with a review of the language of § 5856 before and after the 2004 amendments. The relevant language of § 5856(d), the predecessor to § 5856(c), [8] provided that tolling is operative if the notice is given in compliance with section 2912b.  (Emphasis added.) The relevant language of § 5856(c) currently provides that tolling is operative [a]t the time notice is given in compliance with the applicable notice period under section 2912b .... (Emphasis added.) The question arises whether the amendment mandates compliance with the entirety of § 2912b, such that a defective NOI does not get the benefit of tolling, or whether the new language focuses on compliance with only the applicable notice period in § 2912b, such that a defective NOI tolls the statute of limitations as long as it is compliant with the notice period. This question was seemingly answered in Roberts v. Mecosta Co. Gen. Hosp. (Roberts I) [9] and Boodt v. Borgess Med Ctr, [10] both of which held that a defect in an NOI precludes tolling of the statute of limitations during the 182-day waiting period. Roberts I opined that MCL 600.5856(d) and MCL 600.2912b were inextricably tied. The Court held that the statute of limitations cannot be tolled under MCL 600.5856(d) unless notice is given in compliance with all the provisions of MCL 600.2912b. [11] However, this holding was foundationally premised on the pre-amendment language. The Court explained: Section 5856(d) clearly provides that notice must be compliant with § 2912b, not just § 2912b(2) as plaintiff contrarily contends. Had the Legislature intended only the delivery provisions of § 2912b to be applicable, we presume that the Legislature would have expressly limited compliance only to § 2912b(2). However, the Legislature did not do so. Rather, it referred to all of § 2912b. Since the statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court is required to enforce § 5856(d) as written. As a result, the tolling of the statute of limitations is available to a plaintiff only if all the requirements included in § 2912b are met.[ [12] ] Significantly, Roberts I interpreted the former MCL 600.5856(d), as the amendment was not enacted until after Roberts I was decided. Boodt, while decided in 2008, made no reference to the 2004 amendment. Rather, it relied on the Roberts I interpretation of the former § 5856(d), presumably because the complaint in Boodt was filed prior to the 2004 amendment. Neither Roberts I nor Boodt addressed the question at issue here, namely, whether the current language of § 5856(c) mandates that defects in an NOI act as a bar to tolling of the statute of limitations. Since Roberts I and Boodt relied on language of a statute that is no longer in existence, examining the correct interpretation of § 5856(c) and its interrelationship with § 2912b is an issue of first impression. The question this Court addresses is one of statutory construction. Assuming that the Legislature has acted within its constitutional authority, the purpose of statutory construction is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. [13] In determining the intent of the Legislature, this Court must first look to the language of the statute. [14] The Court must, first and foremost, interpret the language of a statute in a manner that is consistent with the intent of the Legislature. [15] `As far as possible, effect should be given to every phrase, clause, and word in the statute. The statutory language must be read and understood in its grammatical context, unless it is clear that something different was intended.' [16] Moreover, when considering the correct interpretation, the statute must be read as a whole. [17] Individual words and phrases, while important, should be read in the context of the entire legislative scheme. [18] While defining particular words in statutes, we must consider both the plain meaning of the critical word or phrase and its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme. [19] A statute must be read in conjunction with other relevant statutes to ensure that the legislative intent is correctly ascertained. [20] The statute must be interpreted in a manner that ensures that it works in harmony with the entire statutory scheme. [21] Moreover, courts must pay particular attention to statutory amendments, because a change in statutory language is presumed to reflect either a legislative change in the meaning of the statute itself or a desire to clarify the correct interpretation of the original statute. [22] Finally, an analysis of a statute's legislative history is an important tool in ascertaining legislative intent. [23] To determine the intent of MCL 600.5856(c), we first look at its plain language. The pre-amendment version of § 5856 stated: The statutes of limitations or repose are tolled: (a) At the time the complaint is filed and a copy of the summons and complaint are served on the defendant. (b) At the time jurisdiction over the defendant is otherwise acquired. (c) At the time the complaint is filed and a copy of the summons and complaint in good faith are placed in the hands of an officer for immediate service, but in this case the statute is not tolled longer than 90 days after the copy of the summons and complaint is received by the officer. (d) If, during the applicable notice period under section 2912b, a claim would be barred by the statute of limitations or repose, for not longer than a number of days equal to the number of days in the applicable notice period after the date notice is given in compliance with section 2912b. [Emphasis added.] MCL 600.5856, as amended by the Legislature in 2004, states: The statutes of limitations or repose are tolled in any of the following circumstances: (a) At the time the complaint is filed, if a copy of the summons and complaint are served on the defendant within the time set forth in the supreme court rules. (b) At the time jurisdiction over the defendant is otherwise acquired. (c) At the time notice is given in compliance with the applicable notice period under section 2912b, if during that period a claim would be barred by the statute of limitations or repose; but in this case, the statute is tolled not longer than the number of days equal to the number of days remaining in the applicable notice period after the date notice is given. [Emphasis added.] In comparing the pre- and post-amendment language, it is clear that the focus of the operative language has been clarified. Roberts I opined that the focus of § 5856(d) was on compliance with § 2912b in its entirety. In contrast, the focus of the new § 5856(c) is unquestionably limited to compliance with the applicable notice period. As Roberts I pointed out, if the Legislature had intended to limit the applicability of § 2912b, it would have expressly limited compliance in the statute. The 2004 amendment of § 5856 does precisely that. It limits compliance to the notice period under § 2912b. Thus, pursuant to the clear language of § 2912b and the new § 5856(c), if a plaintiff complies with the applicable notice period before commencing a medical malpractice action, the statute of limitations is tolled. Defendants ask us to disregard the change to the language of § 5856 and assume that the change was merely inadvertent. They urge us to interpret the amended statute in the same manner that Roberts I and Boodt interpreted the pre-amended statute. We cannot do so. This Court cannot assume that language chosen by the Legislature is inadvertent. [24] To the contrary, this Court must assume that an express legislative change denotes either a change in the meaning of the statute itself or a clarification of the original legislative intent of the statute. [25] We cannot assume that the change means nothing at all. The language of the new § 5856(c), compliance with the applicable notice period under section 2912b, clearly and unequivocally sets forth that a plaintiff's NOI must comply only with the applicable notice period. In sum, neither the Roberts I nor the Boodt analysis applies in the matter before us because both analyses were based on a former version of § 5856 that is no longer in existence. The Legislature, in exercising its authority, has changed the language of the statute and we must abide by that action. Thus, we hold that, pursuant to the clear language of § 2912b and § 5856(c), if a plaintiff files a timely NOI before commencing a medical malpractice action, the statute of limitations is tolled despite the presence of defects in the NOI.