Opinion ID: 1853745
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Age, Low IQ, and Good Jail Behavior Mitigators

Text: Pooler asserts that the postconviction trial court erred in summarily denying his claim that his trial counsel failed to investigate and present, and the trial court failed to find, the age, low IQ, and good jail behavior mitigators. The postconviction trial court summarily denied this claim as procedurally barred because it was raised and rejected by this Court on direct appeal. We affirm the trial court's summary denial of this claim. See Pooler, 704 So.2d at 1379-80 (holding that the sentencing court's failure to find these mitigators was either not an abuse of discretion or harmless error); see also Spencer v. State, 842 So.2d 52, 60-61 (Fla.2003) (quoting Smith v. State, 445 So.2d 323, 325 (Fla.1983) (Issues which either were or could have been litigated at trial and upon direct appeal are not cognizable through collateral attack.)). 1. Misleading Comments and Jury Instructions Pooler next argues that the postconviction trial court erred in summarily denying his claim that the jury was misled by (1) the trial court's repeated instructions that the jury's sentencing role was merely advisory; (2) the trial court's instructions and the State's argument which, Pooler claims, shifted the burden to Pooler to prove that death was an inappropriate sentence; and (3) the trial court's instructions that Pooler claims were unconstitutionally vague and allowed the jury to consider the murder in the course of a felony aggravator as an automatic aggravator. Pooler also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to these comments and instructions. The postconviction trial court summarily denied these claims as both procedurally barred and legally insufficient. We affirm the trial court's decision. Pooler's claims of prosecutorial misconduct and trial court error should have been raised on direct appeal. See Rodriguez v. State, 919 So.2d 1252, 1262 n. 7, 1280 (Fla.2006); Occhicone, 768 So.2d at 1040 n. 3. ([C]laims challenging the validity of jury instructions should be raised on direct appeal, not on motions for postconviction relief.). Similarly, Pooler's claims regarding the adequacy of jury instructions are procedurally barred because they should have been raised on direct appeal. See Thompson v. State, 759 So.2d 650, 665 (Fla.2000). We will not consider such procedurally barred claims under the guise of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Freeman, 761 So.2d at 1067 (holding that claims that could have been raised on direct appeal cannot be relitigated under the guise of ineffective assistance of counsel). Moreover, Pooler's ineffectiveness claim for failure to object to these jury instructions is legally insufficient. The instructions were proper and were consistent with the standard jury instruction. See Rodriguez, 919 So.2d at 1280-81 (rejecting claims that jury instructions diluted the jury's responsibility for its sentencing role, shifted the burden to the defendant to prove that death was inappropriate, and allowed the jury to consider the murder in the course of a felony aggravator as an automatic aggravator); Griffin v. State, 866 So.2d 1, 14 (Fla.2003) (rejecting claim that the murder in the course of a felony aggravating circumstance allows the jury to consider an automatic aggravator in recommending whether to impose a death sentence); Sweet v. Moore, 822 So.2d 1269, 1274 (Fla.2002) (rejecting claim that the standard jury instruction impermissibly shifted the burden to the defense to prove that death was not the appropriate sentence); see also Cherry v. State, 781 So.2d 1040, 1054 (Fla.2000) ([C]ounsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to object to proper jury instructions.).