Opinion ID: 769911
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Expungement of First Time Simple Drug Possession Offenses

Text: 16 Although the BIA had ruled, in Matter of A-F-, prior to the enactment of the First Offender Act, that it would not recognize expungements of any drug convictions, that broad a rule could not survive the passage of the Act. The First Offender Act allows persons who have never previously violated the narcotics laws and are found guilty of first time simple drug possession to have the charges dismissed without entry of a conviction, provided that the judge deems them suitable for such treatment. The law applies to citizens and aliens alike, and allows those who benefit from it to avoid having their offenses used against them for any purpose. The statute provides that a case disposed of under its provisions shall not be considered a conviction for the purpose of a disqualification or a disability imposed by law upon conviction of a crime, or for any other purpose. 18 U.S.C. S 3607(b) (emphasis added); Garberding, 30 F.3d at 1189. 16 In short, the statute constitutes a broad Congressional effort to afford protection to first time drug possessors against the harsh consequences that follow from a drug conviction. 17 Following the Act's passage, the BIA held that, consistent with the Act, a first time drug possession offense expunged under its provisions could not be used as a predicate for deportation. Matter of Werk, 16 I&N Dec. 234 (BIA 1977). At that time, some states had counterparts to the federal government's Act -parallel laws which provided for the expungement of a first offense for simple possession of narcotics under state law. The BIA held that aliens receiving relief under such statutes also would not be subject to deportation. Id. 18 However, under the BIA's initial rule, not all aliens whose first-time drug possession offenses were expunged under state expungement laws could receive relief. Some of the states did not have exact counterparts to the First Offender Act, but instead utilized general rehabilitation statutes. General rehabilitation laws were not necessarily limited to expungement of drug possession offenses or expungementof first offenses. The BIA initially held that if a state's rehabilitation statute was broader than the federal Act, a defendant who received the benefit of an expungement under that state's statute remained subject to deportation, even if the crime involved was only a first offense of simple drug possession (i.e., even if the offense could have been expunged under the Act had the crime been prosecuted under federal law). Matter of Deris, 20 I&N Dec. 5 (BIA 1989). 19 In Garberding v. INS, 30 F.3d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1994), we rejected the rule that only expungements under exact state counterparts to the Act could be given effect in deportation proceedings, because the rule was inconsistent with the equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. Id. at 1190 (citing Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 364 n.4 (1974)). We held that there was no rational basis for treating two persons found guilty of the identical conduct differently based on the breadth of the rehabilitation statutes in their respective states, when both persons were eligible for relief under their own state's law and both would have been eligible had the state law been an exact counterpart of the federal Act. Had[Garberding] possessed her marijuana in Michigan, Virginia or Wisconsin, she would not have been subject to deportation. . . . distinguishing Garberding for deportation because of the breadth of Montana's expungement statute, not because of what she did, has no logical relation to the fair administration of the immigration laws or the so-called `war on drugs.'  Garberding, 30 F.3d at 1191. Thus, under Garberding, persons who received the benefit of a state expungement law were not subject to deportation as long as they could have received the benefit of the federal Act if they had been prosecuted under federal law. 20 Subsequently, in Paredes-Urrestarazu v. INS, 36 F.3d 801, 811 (9th Cir. 1994) (hereinafter Paredes), a case involving a California pre-trial diversion program, we set forth the corollary of the Garberding rule, and held that persons found guilty of a drug offense who could not have received the benefit of the federal Act were not entitled to receive favorable immigration treatment, even if they qualified for such treatment under state law. Id. at 812. 17 We emphasized, however, that the petitioner in Paredes would be entitled to relief if he met the requirements of the federal law, id. at 811, because it would be anomalous to give effect to the federal expungement statute while not giving effect to its state counterparts; we found no rational reason to reach different results based on the mere fortuity that the state, and not the federal government, prosecutes an alien for a particular offense.  Id. at 812. Nevertheless, because the petitioner was not eligible for relief under the federal Act, we concluded that he could not receive the benefit of the state's rehabilitation law. 21 The rule we declared to be constitutionally required was formally adopted by the BIA in Matter of Manrique, Int. Dec. 3250, 1995 BIA Lexis at . In its decision, the BIA cited both Garberding and Paredes, and held that in simple drug possession cases any alien who has been accorded rehabilitative treatment under a state statute will not be deported if he establishes that he would have been eligible for federal first offender treatment under the provisions of [the Federal First Offender Act] had he been prosecuted under federal law. Id., 1995 BIA Lexis at . Under the law as it stood after Garberding, Paredes, and Manrique, the petitioners here would not have been subject to removal 18 . 22