Opinion ID: 766199
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Absolute Immunity for Growth Management Hearings Board Members

Text: 9 The first issue is whether members of the Growth Management Hearings Board are protected by absolute immunity from a suit for damages arising out of the Board's ruling on the Buckles' petition. 6 The district court held that the Board members were entitled to absolute immunity. Determination of immunity is a question of law reviewed de novo. Bennettv. Williams, 892 F.2d 822, 823 (9th Cir. 1989). 10 The Growth Management Act created three Growth Management Hearings Boards for the State of Washington: an Eastern Washington board, a Western Washington Board, and a Central Puget Sound board. The latter board has jurisdiction over matters pertaining to King County, and thus is the board at issue in this case. RCW 36.70A.250. Each regional board consists of three members qualified by experience or training in matters pertaining to land use planning. RCW 36.70A.260. Referred to in the Washington Administrative Code as a quasi-judicial body, WAC 242-04-020, the Board presides over and rules on petitions challenging compliance with the requirements of the Growth Management Act. RCW 36.70A.280(1)(a). If the Board determines that a local government entity (the state, a county, or a city) is not in compliance with the Growth Management Act, the Board remands the matter to the affected entity. RCW 36.70A.300(3)(b). Although comprehensive plans and development regulations are presumed valid upon adoption, RCW 36.70A.320(1), the Board has the authority to determine that part or all of a comprehensive plan or development regulation is invalid if the Board specifies the reasons for the invalidity and concludes that the continued validity of part or parts of the plan or regulation would substantially interfere with the fulfillment of the goals of [the Growth Management Act].  RCW 36.70A.302(1). 11 Our analysis of the Board's immunity begins with a central tenet of American jurisprudence--no one is above the law: 12 No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it. 13 United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882). This principle, in turn, requires that a public official seeking absolute exemption from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an exemption of that scope. Butz v. Economou , 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978). Acknowledging that some officials perform special functions [requiring] a full exemption from liability, the Supreme Court has long recognized the need for absolute immunity to protect judges from lawsuits claiming that their decisions had been tainted by improper motives. Id. at 508; see also Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 335 (1871). This same absolute immunity, often dubbed quasi-judicial immunity, has been extended to agency officials when they perform functions analogous to those performed by judges. Butz, 438 U.S. at 511; see also Romano v. Bible, 169 F.3d 1182, 118788 (9th Cir. 1999) (Nevada Gaming Commission members entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken in conducting disciplinary proceedings involving gaming licensees), petition for cert. filed, (May 27, 1999) (No. 98-1906); Bermudez v. Duenas, 936 F.2d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1991) (parole board officials entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken in deciding to grant, deny or revoke parole). 14 In determining whether judicial immunity should attend to officials other than judges, like the Board members, the Supreme Court reminds us that 15 [t]he doctrine of judicial immunity is supported by a long-settled understanding that the independent and impartial exercise of judgment vital to the judiciary might be impaired by exposure to potential damages liability. Accordingly, the touchstone for the doctrine's applicability has been performance of the function of resolving disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating private rights. When judicial immunity is extended to officials other than judges, it is because their judgments are functional[ly] comparab[le] to those of judges-that is, because they,too, exercise a discretionary judgment as part of their function. 16 Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1993) (internal citations omitted). 17 The principle underlying immunity for government officials performing judicial functions is the same as that for judges: adjudications invariably produce[ ] at least one losing party, Butz, 438 U.S. at 509, and if the losing party in one forum were allowed to maintain a civil action against the decision-maker in another forum, it would threaten the decision-maker's independence. In evaluating the defense of absolute immunity, the court considers whether the adjudication within a[n] . . . administrative agency shares enough of the characteristics of the judicial process that those who participate in such adjudication should also be immune from suit for damages. Id. at 513. 18 In Butz, the Supreme Court identified the following characteristics of the judicial process as sufficient to render the role of the administrative law judge functionally comparable to that of a judge: an adversarial proceeding, a decision-maker insulated from political influence, a decision based on evidence submitted by the parties, and a decision provided to the parties on all of the issues of fact and law. Id. The Court noted other safeguards built into the judicial process, such as the importance of precedent and the right to appeal, but did not identify these safeguards as dispositive. What mattered was that federal administrative law requires that agency adjudications contain many of the same safeguards as are available in the judicial process. Id. at 513 (emphasis added). 19 The Board adjudicates land use disputes and functions as a quasi-judicial body; its proceedings reflect the same characteristics of the judicial process identified as sufficient in Butz. The Buckles claim that the proceedings were not adversarial because they were not given the opportunity to become a party. This argument confuses the nature of the Board's proceedings with the Buckles' role. That the Buckles were not parties did not render the proceedings non-adversarial. The issue decided by the Board was whether King County's zoning decision on the Buckles' property violated the public participation requirements of the Growth Management Act. On that issue, the petitioners, who were members of a neighborhood community club, and King County took dramatically polar positions. We have little doubt that the proceeding was an adversarial one. 20 As to the second factor identified in Butz--insulation from political influence--Board members are protected in numerous ways. Board members are appointed by the governor for staggered terms of six years and no more than two (of the three) members may be from the same political party or reside in the same county. RCW 36.70A.260. A Board member is prohibited from engaging in any work inconsistent with the duties as a Board member. RCW 36.70A.270. Nor may a Board member run for or hold any other public office. Id. Ex parte communication with Board members is prohibited, WAC 242-02-130, and the procedures provide for disqualification of the Board members for bias and prejudice, WAC 242-02-530. These safeguards guarantee the impartiality and independence of Board members. 21 Further safeguards ensure that the Board base its decision on reliable information. Discovery is not permitted except upon the Board's order, WAC 242-02-410; instead the government is required to disclose to the parties an index of all material used in taking the action which is the subject of the petition for review, WAC 242-02-520, and any documentary evidence to be offered at the hearing must be submitted in advance to the other parties and the Board. WAC 242-02-52002. 22 Other procedures that parallel the judicial process are also present: sworn testimony, WAC 242-02-610; use of subpoenas,WAC 242-02-420; the Washington rules of evidence as a non-binding guide, WAC 242-02-650; a decision based on evidence in the record, RCW 36.70A.290; issuance of a written decision, RCW 36.70A.270; and the right to judicial review of a final decision by the Board in superior court. RCW 36.70A.300(5). 7 23 The nature and number of safeguards present in proceedings before the Board easily distinguish this case from Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985), which is cited by the Buckles. In Cleavinger, the Supreme Court held that prison discipline committee members were not entitled to absolute immunity because of the lack of procedural safeguards in the disciplinary hearings. The Court noted that the discipline committee members were not independent, but direct subordinates of the warden who reviews their decision and co-workers of the prison official who lodges the charge against the inmate upon whom they sit in judgment. Id. at 204. Further, the information relied upon by the disciplinary committee was suspect because there was no right to compel the presence of witnesses, cross-examine witnesses, or engage in discovery. Id. at 503. And, a prisoner was not entitled to a lawyer or independent representative. Id. 24 The Buckles point to the absence of three procedural safeguards: notice of proceedings before the Board, the indispensable parties doctrine, and the right to appeal. The first and last of these procedural safeguards are built into the Board's proceedings but do not apply here because the Buckles were not a party to the proceedings. See WAC 242-02-510 (requiring notice to all parties of a hearing date before the Board); see also RCW 36.70A.295 (providing any aggrieved party with the right to judicial review of the Board's decision). The Buckles' remaining argument, therefore, is that the absence of the indispensable parties doctrine renders the Board members' functions sufficiently dissimilar from that of judges to make quasi-judicial immunity inappropriate. We find this argument unpersuasive. 25 In essence, the Buckles' claim is that because they were not parties to the first proceeding before the Board, the Board should be stripped of immunity. This argument ignores the Board's adjudicative function and obscures the true nature of the Board's proceedings here. The Board did not zone or change the zoning of the Buckles' property. Rather, the Board held that King County violated the public participation requirements of the Growth Management Act, invalidated King County Council Ordinance 101, and remanded the matter to King County for further proceedings, including the zoning of the Buckles' property. 26 Nor can the Buckles be saved by their argument that the Board has no indispensable party rule. Even in proceedings before a court, the doctrine of indispensable parties is not absolute, but is subject to the public rights exception, where, in a proceeding restricted to the protection and enforcement of public rights, there is little scope or need for the traditional rules governing joinder . . . .'  Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1458-59 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 363 (1940)). Because so many procedural safeguards are built into the Board's proceedings, we conclude that the absence of the doctrine of indispensableparties is not grounds to deny immunity. 27 The Buckles also argue that the Board members are not entitled to absolute immunity because they perform administrative and executive functions similar to those performed by the Land Conservation and Development Commission commissioners in Zamsky v. Hansell, 933 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (holding that commissioners were not entitled to absolute immunity and remanding for consideration of qualified immunity). Unlike the commissioners in Zamsky, who acted as both lawmaker[s] and monitor[s] of compliance, id. at 679, by promulgating the planning standards for local land use plans and then reviewing the comprehensive plans for compliance, the Board members here did not play such a dual role. 28 The Buckles' policy arguments against immunity are at odds with well-established principles of immunity. The Buckles suggest that absolute immunity is unnecessary because the state pays for the Board members' defense and indemnifies them against any judgment. The policy underlying judicial immunity, however, is not protection of judges from monetary loss, but protection from harassment and intimidation, Butz, 438 U.S. at 512, and discourag[ement of] collateral attacks[,] thereby helping to establish appellate procedures as the standard system for correcting judicial error. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988). If Board members were not protected by absolute immunity, we predict that many losing parties would turn around and sue the Board members in a damages action instead of appealing the Board's substantive decision to Superior Court. The decision maker rather than the decision would become the target. Land use decisions are often contentious and involve conflicting interests and policies. Permitting suits against the quasi-judicial decision makers would discourage knowledgeable individuals from serving as Board members and thwart the orderly process of judicial review. Absolute immunity for the Board members serves the broader public interest in having people perform these functions without fear of having to personally defend their actions in civil damages lawsuits. Romano, 169 F.3d at 1188. 29 In the end, the Buckles' argument on immunity is that it unfairly leaves them without a remedy against the Board. On this point, the Buckles attempt to sidestep their guaranteed right to appeal the Board's decision. The Buckles had a right to direct judicial review of the Board's decision that, after remand, King County complied with the Growth Management Act in designating the Buckles' property Rural Residential. But the Buckles did not appeal this decision. Instead, they filed this suit and therefore waived their right to a remedy for the Board's decision on the merits. We hold that the Board members are entitled to absolute immunity and, therefore, we do not address the Buckles' arguments regarding qualified immunity and their procedural due process claim against the Board.