Opinion ID: 2487056
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Heading: Florida LawThe Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine

Text: The dangerous instrumentality doctrine has been a part of Florida common law for almost one hundred years. In 1920, the Florida Supreme Court considered whether a corporation could be held responsible for the negligence of an operator who injured another while driving an automobile owned by the corporation. See Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629, 631 (1920). In its analysis, the Court articulated what is now known as the dangerous instrumentality doctrine and concluded that the doctrine is applicable to motor vehicles: The principles of the common law do not permit the owner of an instrumentality that is not dangerous per se, but is peculiarly dangerous in its operation, to authorize another to use such instrumentality on the public highways without imposing upon such owner liability for negligent use. The liability grows out of the obligation of the owner to have the vehicle ... properly operated when it is by his authority on the public highway. .... An automobile being a dangerous machine, its owner should be responsible for the manner in which it is used; and his liability should extend to its use by any one with his consent. He may not deliver it over to any one he pleases and not be responsible for the consequences. Id. at 632, 635 (quoting Anderson v. So. Cotton Oil Co., 73 Fla. 432, 74 So. 975, 978 (1917); Ingraham v. Stockamore, 63 Misc. 114, 118 N.Y.S. 399, 401 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1909)). In a subsequent decision, this Court held that an individual who rented vehicles as part of a business was responsible for the negligence of the driver who rented the vehicle. See Lynch v. Walker, 159 Fla. 188, 31 So.2d 268, 271 (1947). In Susco Car Rental System of Florida v. Leonard, 112 So.2d 832 (Fla.1959), this Court determined that a car rental agency was responsible under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine for the operation of a motor vehicle where the vehicle was driven by a person not named in the rental contract, even though the individual who rented the car had agreed in the contract to be the sole driver. See id. at 835 (The fact that the owner had a private contract ... with the renter cannot make such restrictions a bar to the rights of the public. The restrictions agreed upon do not change the fact that the automobile was being used with the owner's consent.). Recently, the Fifth District Court of Appeal reiterated the concept and framework of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine and the purpose behind it: The doctrine imposes strict liability upon the owner of a motor vehicle by requiring that an owner who gives authority to another to operate the owner's vehicle, by either express or implied consent, has a nondelegable obligation to ensure that the vehicle is operated safely. Aurbach v. Gallina, 753 So.2d 60, 62 (Fla.2000). The doctrine is intended to foster greater financial responsibility to pay for injuries caused by motor vehicles because the owner is in the best position to ensure that there are adequate resources to pay for damages caused by its misuse. Id. at 62. The doctrine also serves to deter vehicle owners from entrusting their vehicles to drivers who are not responsible by making the owners strictly liable for any resulting loss. ... Liability of the owner is said to be strict because a plaintiff need not prove that an owner negligently entrusted the vehicle to its operator for liability to attach. However, the doctrine is distinguished from strict liability for ultra-hazardous activity, because the plaintiff must prove some fault, albeit on the part of the operator, which is then imputed to the owner under vicarious liability principles. Id. Burch v. Sun State Ford, Inc., 864 So.2d 466, 470 (Fla. 5th DCA) (footnote omitted), review dismissed, 889 So.2d 778 (Fla.2004). It was a federal court in 1951 that first applied Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine to aircraft. Specifically, in Grain Dealers National Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Harrison, 190 F.2d 726 (5th Cir.1951), an airplane passenger filed an action against the company that owned the aircraft for injuries suffered due to the negligence of the pilot. See id. at 727. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that there was no state decisional law that applied the doctrine to aircraft. See id. at 729. [2] However, the federal appellate court reviewed state judicial decisions that applied the dangerous instrumentality doctrine to motor vehicles and ultimately concluded: Our examination of these authorities and the reasoning underlying their pronouncements leave no room for doubt that, under Florida law, by which we are here governed, the airplane should be similarly classified with the automobile as a dangerous agency when in operation. We can perceive no logical basis for any difference of classification which would authorize a holding that the rule of dangerous agency or dangerous machine, which the Florida law applies to automobiles in operation, should be relaxed in the case of an airplane. This rule imposes liability upon the defendant for the acts and omissions of the pilot of its airplane which the jury was authorized to, and did, find constituted negligence. Id. at 729-30 (emphasis supplied). Subsequently, this Court in Orefice v. Albert held that an airplane, like an automobile, is a dangerous instrumentality when in operation. 237 So.2d at 145. This Court concluded that the owner of an airplane who was not in control of the aircraft at the time of a crash that caused the death of a passenger could be held vicariously liable for the negligent conduct of the co-owner pilot. See id. at 146. It is clear that the dangerous instrumentality doctrine applies to aircraft in Florida.