Opinion ID: 2633504
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Champion's After-Acquired Evidence Defense

Text: In Brogdon v. City of Klawock, we recognized that after-acquired evidence of an employee's wrongdoing may be introduced in employment cases. [23] But our discussion of the after-acquired evidence doctrine was brief. [24] We did not, for example, decide what limits the trial court should place on the introduction of post-termination justifications, or whether a new cause for termination merely serves to limit damages or eliminates entirely the right to damages. [25] In its answer to Domke's complaint, Champion asserted that [t]he doctrine of after-acquired evidence bars plaintiff's recovery in whole or in part. The gist of Champion's defense was that it would have terminated Domke once it discovered that he kept and cashed the consultant overpayments. The trial court declined to dismiss this defense at summary judgment, finding that issues of fact exist as to who knew about the checks, what was known about these checks. Further, issues of fact exist as to whether Domke would have been terminated if Champion had known about the alleged improper retention of these checks. An instruction on Champion's defense was submitted to the jury. [26] The jury found that Domke's wrongful retention of the consultant overpayments did not bar him from recovery for Champion's breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Domke nonetheless argues on appeal that the court erred when it refused to grant summary judgment on Champion's defense. Domke asserts that he demonstrated in his summary judgment motion that Champion was aware of the overpayments  and that Domke had cashed the checks  during the course of his employment. According to Domke, this means that the evidence relating to the consultant overpayments was not after-acquired and that Champion's defense should have been dismissed at summary judgment. But Domke fails to show that he was prejudiced by the trial court's decision. The jury ultimately found in Domke's favor on Champion's defense. The only potential source of prejudice lies in the evidence of Domke's misconduct with regard to the overpayments that was introduced to support Champion's theory. Domke insists that the overpayments were known to Champion during his employment, and he suggests that, since Champion did not terminate him after gaining this knowledge, the fact of the overpayments is completely irrelevant to the issues raised by his claims. Yet even if Champion had learned of the overpayments while Domke was still working, and even if it knew that he intended to keep them, this evidence still would have been admissible to rebut Domke's evidence of his own good character and reasonable expectation of long-term employment. At most, then, allowing the jury to hear Champion's after-acquired-evidence defense amounted to harmless error.