Opinion ID: 2519742
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Corpus delicti of rape (count V); admission of defendant's juvenile court testimony regarding the rape; sufficiency of evidence of rape

Text: Defendant was charged in count V with aiding and abetting his son in the forcible rape of Rose V. (§ 261, subd. (a)(2).) Defendant contends the only evidence of his aiding and abetting the rape came from his testimony on behalf of his son at the latter's juvenile hearing, and that the corpus delicti of the crime of rape was not independently established as the necessary predicate for introduction of such extrajudicial statements. Respondent in turn argues that since defendant's admissions were made during a judicial proceeding (his son's juvenile hearing), they were not extrajudicial admissions within the meaning of the corpus delicti rule such as would require corroboration under that rule. Respondent also urges that although defendant, in his first pretrial motion to dismiss (§ 995), asserted there was insufficient evidence to establish the corpus delicti of rape, he did not thereafter specifically object at trial to admission of his juvenile court testimony on corpus delicti grounds, and has therefore waived the claim on appeal. (See People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 186, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365.) In every criminal trial, the prosecution must prove the corpus delicti, or the body of the crime itselfi.e., the fact of injury, loss, or harm, and the existence of a criminal agency as its cause. In California, it has traditionally been held, the prosecution cannot satisfy this burden by relying exclusively upon the extrajudicial statements, confessions, or admissions of the defendant. (E.g., People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 404 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442] ...; People v. Jones [(1998)] 17 Cal.4th 279, 301 [70 Cal. Rptr.2d 793, 949 P.2d 890]; People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 364 [279 Cal. Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009] ...; People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 403 [276 Cal. Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221] ...; People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 455 [99 Cal. Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1] ...; People v. Cobb (1955) 45 Cal.2d 158, 161 [287 P.2d 752]; People v. Amaya (1952) 40 Cal.2d 70, 75-76 [251 P.2d 324]; People v. Simonsen (1895) 107 Cal. 345, 347 [40 P. 440]; 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal.Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Elements, § 45, p. 250.) Though mandated by no statute, and never deemed a constitutional guaranty, the rule requiring some independent proof of the corpus delicti has roots in the common law. (Crisera, Reevaluation of the California Corpus Delicti Rule: A Response to the Invitation of Proposition 8 (1990) 78 Cal. L.Rev. 1571, 1572-1573....) ( People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1168-1169, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 46 P.3d 372 ( Alvarez ).) Recently, in Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1161, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 46 P.3d 372, we held that article I, section 28, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution, the Truth in Evidence provision adopted by Proposition 8 in 1982, abrogated any corpus delicti basis for excluding a defendant's extrajudicial statements from evidence. ( Alvarez, at p. 1165, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 46 P.3d 372.) Accordingly, we need not decide whether defendant adequately preserved a corpus delicti objection to the admissibility of his juvenile court testimony, nor whether any admissions made during that testimony, themselves having been made in another judicial proceeding, were nonetheless extrajudicial admissions for purposes of the corpus delicti rule. We further held in Alvarez that California Constitution article I, section 28, subdivision (d) did not abrogate the corpus delicti rule insofar as it provides that every conviction must be supported by some proof of the corpus delicti aside from or in addition to such statements, and that the jury must be so instructed. ( Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1165, 119 Cal. Rptr.2d 903, 46 P.3d 372.) To the extent defendant is renewing his claim that the corpus delicti of the crime of rape was not established below, his contention must fail. In People v. Wright, supra, 52 Cal.3d 367, 276 Cal. Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221, we explained: The elements of the corpus delicti are (1) the injury, loss or harm, and (2) the criminal agency that has caused the injury, loss or harm. ( Jones v. Superior Court (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 390, 393 [157 Cal.Rptr. 809].) `The independent proof may be by circumstantial evidence [citation], and it need not be beyond a reasonable doubt. A slight or prima facie showing, permitting the reasonable inference that a crime was committed, is sufficient. [Citations.]' ( People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 624-625 [205 Cal.Rptr. 775, 685 P.2d 1126].) It is not necessary for the independent evidence to establish that the defendant was the perpetrator. ( People v. Cullen (1951) 37 Cal.2d 614, 624 [234 P.2d 1]; Jones, supra, at p. 393 [157 Cal.Rptr. 809].) ( People v. Wright, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 404, 276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221; see also People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d 334, 368, 279 Cal.Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009 [We reemphasize that the quantum of evidence the People must produce in order to satisfy the corpus delicti rule is quite modest; case law describes it as a `slight or prima facie' showing. [Citations.]].) At trial, Rose V. testified that after defendant killed Stopher, defendant and Joseph dragged her out of the house and forced her into Jones's van. Defendant twice hit her on the back of the head with the rifle or shotgun. She was also hit behind her right ear with a hard object she could not identify. As they drove off and entered the freeway, defendant and Joseph kept telling Rose V. to shut up. Defendant told Joseph to gag her and tie her up. Defendant warned Rose V. that if she did not cooperate, Joseph would cut her. Joseph tied her hands behind her back with rope, tied her ankles, blindfolded and gagged her. Rose V. testified that the man wearing the mask (later identified as Joseph) then raped her. He cut off her bra with a knife and sliced a half-inch cut in her ankle when he could not remove her pants and had to cut the rope that bound her feet. When Joseph finished raping Rose V., defendant told him to make sure she could breathe and to cover her with a sheet. Rose V.'s testimony regarding her rape, together with the corroborating circumstantial evidence, plainly established the corpus delicti of the crime independent of defendant's admissions made at Joseph's juvenile court hearing. But defendant argues further that even if the corpus delicti of forcible rape was established generally, since he was charged only as an aider and abettor of Joseph who was the direct perpetrator of the rape, no evidence independent of defendant's admissions at the juvenile hearing established his role as an aider and abettor of the crime. Defendant misconstrues the corpus delicti rule. It is not necessary for independent evidence to establish defendant as the perpetrator in order to satisfy the rule. ( People v. Cullen, supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 624, 234 P.2d 1; Jones v. Superior Court, supra, 96 Cal.App.3d at p. 393, 157 Cal.Rptr. 809.) More specifically, it has been held that in a case tried on an aiding and abetting theory, the requisite knowledge and intent required for aiderabettor liability are not elements of the corpus delicti that must be proved independently of any extrajudicial admissions for purposes of establishing the corpus delicti. ( People v. Ott (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 118, 131, 148 Cal.Rptr. 479 [the corpus delicti must be established with respect to the underlying criminal offense, rather than the theory of aiding and abetting which, in the absence of the commission of the main crime, would not be punishable at all], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 556-559,199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318.) Last, defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of aiding and abetting his son's forcible rape of Rose V. The claim was raised and rejected in a Penal Code section 1118.1 motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the People's case-in-chief. It is without merit. We have explained that defendant cannot assert a violation of the corpus delicti rule as a ground for excluding any incriminating admissions made during his testimony at the juvenile hearing, and that in any event, the corpus delicti of the crime of forcible rape was independently established exclusive of such admissions. In denying defendant's second pretrial motion to dismiss the forcible rape charge, the trial court found that any incriminating statements made at the juvenile hearing were admissions within the meaning of Evidence Code section 1220. At trial, when defendant again objected to the reading of redacted portions of his testimony from Joseph's juvenile court hearing, the trial court held a hearing pursuant to Evidence Code section 402, subdivision (b), and made findings that defendant was represented by counsel at the juvenile proceeding, had waived his right against self-incrimination, and that his testimony was not coerced and was freely and voluntarily given. The credibility of defendant's testimony at the juvenile proceeding was an issue for the jury's determination. The trial court's rulings were correct and supported by the evidence. At the juvenile hearing, defendant had testified that at some point he stopped the van, got into the back, told Joseph to go to the front of the van, and then had intercourse with Rose V. He testified he then ordered Joseph to fuck her, and forced his son to rape Rose V. Defendant specifically testified at the juvenile hearing that he loved his son but was not lying to protect him. In contrast, at his own trial defendant testified he was driving the van and was unaware of the rape when it occurred, that he did not tell Joseph to rape Rose V., and that he lied at Joseph's juvenile court hearing in order to protect his son. It fell to the jury to sort out the credibility of defendant's testimony. To the extent defendant claimed at the juvenile hearing that he had also raped Rose V., such testimony conflicted with Rose V.'s account of the crime in both her preliminary hearing and trial testimonyshe testified defendant did not rape her. Contrary to defendant's criticism that the prosecution presented conflicting theories of the rape in the two proceedings and sought to have it both ways, the prosecution did not charge defendant as a direct perpetrator of the forcible rape of Rose V., but instead specifically charged him as an aider and abettor of Joseph's crime. The jury remained free to credit defendant's juvenile hearing testimony that he aided and abetted Joseph's act of forcible rape. We need determine only `whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' ( Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319 [99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560], italics omitted; see also People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053 [99 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68].) ( People v. Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 139, 109 Cal. Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357.) Applying that standard, we find the evidence presented at trial, including Rose V.'s testimony of the circumstances surrounding her rape and defendant's admissible testimony from his son's juvenile court hearing on his own role in the crime, was sufficient to support his conviction of aiding and abetting the forcible rape of Rose V.