Opinion ID: 475859
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State Court Finding: Fitzpatrick Understood Indigency

Text: 85 In order to satisfy the Sixth Amendment, a defendant's waiver of his right to counsel must be an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1983); Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 940, 947 (11th Cir.1983). Fitzpatrick argues on appeal that because he did not understand the legal significance of the term indigency, he did not know that he might have been entitled to court-appointed counsel. Therefore, he claims, since he was not aware of his potential right to appointed counsel, he could not have intelligently waived that right. The district court found that Fitzpatrick was told he must be indigent to be entitled to a court-appointed lawyer, but that the meaning of indigency was not explained to Fitzpatrick until a post-trial hearing on October 7, 1982. The district court concluded, therefore, that Fitzpatrick did not understand the legal meaning of that term when he waived his right to counsel at trial. Record on Appeal at 212. 86 Although the question of whether a waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a mixed question of law and fact, Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1242, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977), the question of whether Fitzpatrick understood the meaning of the term indigency is purely factual. On October 7, 1982, at a hearing on Fitzpatrick's motion for a new trial and Fitzpatrick's attorney's motion to withdraw, the following exchange between the trial judge and Fitzpatrick took place: 87 THE COURT: Now, if you are going to come right up--let me know if you think you are entitled to representation at the cost of the State. I want you to come back in here, make a--if you file a letter saying that, we will bring you back over here. If you are unable to make some arrangement with Mr. Hackney, I will hear you again on that, on the question of whether or not you are indigent at that point where you cannot afford to hire a lawyer. I will hear you again on the appeal side of it. 88 THE DEFENDANT: I understand that, Your Honor. 89 I wish you would have done that before. 90 THE COURT: Well, don't say that. We talked about it. Every time you said: Oh, no, I am not indigent; I can hire a lawyer. 91 Trial Record at 746. We conclude that the trial judge's statement is an implicit finding of fact that Fitzpatrick indeed understood the meaning of the term indigency. This implicit finding is entitled to a presumption of correctness in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. See Paxton v. Jarvis, 735 F.2d 1306, 1309 (11th Cir.1984); see also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47, 101 S.Ct. 764, 768-69, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981). The district court erred in not presuming this state finding of fact to be correct. 92 The record contains ample evidence supporting the state court's implicit finding that Fitzpatrick understood the meaning of the term indigency. The waiver of counsel form that Fitzpatrick signed on May 28, 1982, stated, in part, If I am financially unable to obtain counsel, I have the RIGHT to Court-appointed counsel.... Record on Appeal at 41. Moreover, immediately prior to Fitzpatrick's signing the form, the trial judge specifically advised Fitzpatrick: Of course, if you cannot afford an attorney, we would appoint one for you; do you understand that? Fitzpatrick responded, I understand. Trial Record at 45-46. The record demonstrates that Fitzpatrick was clearly advised that an attorney would be appointed for him if he could not afford one. This record evidence amply supports the state court's finding that Fitzpatrick did understand the term indigency. 2 Consequently, Fitzpatrick was able to knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel and decide to proceed pro se.