Opinion ID: 1302292
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: in camera examination

Text: Lyons failed to make a contemporaneous objection to the in camera questioning of the witness at the trial level. Under K.S.A. 60-404: A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the judgment or decision based thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous admission of evidence unless there appears of record objection to the evidence timely interposed and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of objection. Kelley was testifying when the following discussion transpired: Q. (by Mr. Rues) Okay. Do you remember who you told who you thought appeared to be shooting someone? A. (by Kelley) Yes. Q. And who was that? A. Antawin Lyons. Q. Okay. And, today, you're saying you don't think it was Antawin Lyons? A. That's not what I said. Q. Well, what did you say, Miss Kelley? A. I said thatwell, that may have been what I said, but that'scan I explain? Mr. Ambrosio: I move that we appoint counsel to her, Judge. Mr. Rues: No. A. No, just let me Mr. Ambrosio: I can do that Tony [Rues]. A. Just let me explain what my thought is. The Court: Well, counsel, do you mind if the Court conducts an in-camera questioning of the witness? Mr. Ambrosio: Not at all, Judge. The Court: Just for the purpose of making a determination of whether counsel needs to be appointed. Mr. Ambrosio: I agree, Judge. And we can seal that record so in case there is a problem. The Court: Okay. Mr. Cuevas [the court reporter] and I and the witness will go in the conference room. Thus, the question becomes whether the issue should be decided on the merits, despite the lack of a contemporaneous object at trial. An issue not presented to the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal. State v. Gardner, 264 Kan. 95, Syl. ¶ 4, 955 P.2d 1199 (1998). Also, in State v. Boyd, 257 Kan. 82, 89, 891 P.2d 358 (1995), the court stated that a timely objection is necessary to give the trial court the opportunity to correct any alleged trial errors. [Citation omitted]. Lyons not only failed to object, but counsel for Lyons acquiesced in the in camera hearing; thus, the issue for appeal has not been preserved for appeal. However, we believe that the matter deserves at least some comment. The trial court should be conscious at all times that an accused in a criminal trial has certain constitutional rights that counsel for a defendant cannot waive, although a defendant can waive a constitutional right, and the trial judge must make a record of the waiver. This was not done in this case. However, we hold that even if Lyons had preserved the issue and it fell within a protected right, the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial. We have previously held: Error ... in violation of a constitutional ... right of a party is governed by the federal constitutional error rule. An error of constitutional magnitude is serious and may not be held to be harmless unless the appellate court is willing to declare a belief that the error is harmless. Before an appellate court may declare such an error harmless, the court must be able to declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial. Where the evidence of guilt is of such direct and overwhelming nature that it can be said that evidence erroneously admitted or excluded in violation of a constitutional or statutory right could not have affected the result of the trial, such admission or exclusion is harmless. [Citation omitted.] State v. Sanders, 258 Kan. 409, 418-19, 904 P.2d 951 (1995), aff'd on appeal after new trial 263 Kan. 317, 949 P.2d 1084 (1997). In the present case, we need not again recite the testimony of each witness. Any inconsistency in the testimony of the witnesses pales in comparison to the witnesses' consistent testimony that it was Lyons who shot Dexter. The evidence against Lyons is of the direct and overwhelming nature necessary to hold that the challenged error could not have affected the result of the trial. Even if Kelley's testimony is considered strictly in terms of the testimony that she gave at trial before the in camera questioning (that she believed or it appeared that it was Lyons who shot Dexter), such testimony by one witness would not have affected the result of the trial, given that three other witnesses positively identified Lyons as the individual who shot Dexter and there is no evidence that anyone else fired the fatal shots. In conclusion, Lyons has not preserved the issue for appeal and, in any event, Lyons' due process rights were not violated by the challenged error because such error was harmless, based on the record before us. The judge did not elicit new information from Kelley during the in camera questioning that was not explored by the prosecution or Lyons on cross-examination. Kelley essentially repeated what she had told the judge in camera when she returned to the witness stand. Thus, the jury was able to fully evaluate Kelley's demeanor and her recollection of events during direct and cross-examination. Lyons had ample opportunity to cross-examine Kelley about her motives, her version of the events, and her change in testimony. The jury had substantial testimony from which it could weigh Kelley's credibility. The judge's questioning did not deny the jury a significant basis upon which it could resolve whether Kelley's testimony was sound, plausible, flimsy, or fraudulent. Thus, Lyons' arguments that the in camera questioning violated his right to confrontation and effective cross-examination and the right to be present all fall within the harmless error rule set forth above.