Opinion ID: 6104768
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Consent Finding.

Text: The district court, while noting that [t]here is a difference between giving consent happily and giving it voluntarily, concluded that Reyes twice voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle and that the actual search [conducted] did not exceed the scope of [the] consent that was given. In making these findings, the court relied largely on the testimony of Trooper Lynch, who the court deemed to be credible. Because, as the district court explained, [i]t is well-established that 'a warrantless search may be conducted with the voluntary consent of a person authorized to give it,' (quoting United States v. Stierhoff, 549 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 2008)), the court ruled that both the warrantless search of Reyes's car and the admission at trial of the physical evidence seized therein were permissible. On appeal, Reyes objects to the fact that the district court's finding of consent was based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of Trooper Lynch. 4 Reyes argues that the district court's assessment that Trooper Lynch was credible was belied by the lack of any contemporaneous record of Reyes's consent and assessed inconsistencies in Trooper Lynch's affidavit and oral 4 In this overarching challenge, Reyes contests the finding that he consented to the search at all; he has not lodged alternative challenges to the district court's subsidiary conclusions that such consent: (i) was voluntary and (ii) encompassed a search of the car's trunk. - 13 - testimony. These arguments are unavailing. Typically, consent -- including its voluntariness -- turns on questions of fact that must be assessed based upon the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Fornia-Castillo, 408 F.3d 52, 62 (1st Cir. 2005). For that reason, a finding of voluntary consent . . . is reviewable only for clear error.5 Id. Where a district court's factual findings -- such as a consent finding -- are based on credibility determinations[,] . . . error is seldom considered 'clear' unless the credibility assessments were based on testimony which was inherently implausible, internally inconsistent, or critically impeached. United States v. Merlino, 592 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Awon v. United States, 308 F.3d 133, 141 (1st Cir. 2002)). Reyes has not made the requisite showing. Reyes's initial contention -- that the lack of any contemporaneous record of Reyes's consent belies Trooper Lynch's credibility -- is unpersuasive. The lack of such records is consistent with Trooper Lynch's evidentiary hearing testimony that troopers generally do not create audio recordings of consent or use consent forms at stops. Moreover, we have previously considered and rejected the argument that a lack of contemporaneous 5 Unless the finding of consent is based on an erroneous legal standard. Fornia-Castillo, 408 F.3d at 62. - 14 - records evidencing a defendant's consent undermines the credibility of a government agent. See United States v. MeléndezSantiago, 644 F.3d 54, 61 (1st Cir. 2011) (where the district court afford[ed] total credibility to a government agent's testimony that defendant Meléndez voluntarily confessed to his role in a conspiracy and agreed to cooperate, the Government's fail[ure] to produce a signed waiver, a cooperative agreement, a recording of the interviews, or a signed statement from Meléndez d[id] not establish inherent implausibility or other basis for a finding of clear error (internal citation omitted)). Nor has Reyes succeeded in proving that Trooper Lynch's narrative regarding Reyes's consent was inherently implausible on its own terms. We disagree with Reyes's contention that there was no reason for Trooper Lynch to ask for consent a second time after Reyes had already consented to the search a few minutes prior; after all, this was a pre-planned stop. Given the expectation that the stop would produce evidence, it is logical that Trooper Lynch would seek to protect the search by reconfirming Reyes's consent. Although, as Reyes suggests, it might have made more sense for Trooper Lynch to request consent a second time once other officers -- who could serve as witnesses to the consent -- had arrived on scene, it is not our role to decide whether Trooper Lynch acted optimally in securing Reyes's consent, but rather to assess whether his account is credible. Because Reyes has not - 15 - shown that Trooper Lynch's consent narrative is inherently implausible or inconsistent, we will not overturn the district court's consent finding on such grounds. Reyes's additional attacks on the district court's assessment of Trooper Lynch's credibility are, likewise, unsuccessful. Reyes contends that there were several inconsistencies in Trooper Lynch's written and oral statements on matters unrelated to the consent issue that show that Trooper Lynch is such an incredible witness overall that his testimony on the question of consent should, correspondingly, not be believed. Because the Government offers a persuasive rebuttal to each of Reyes's contentions, Reyes again fails to satisfy his burden of proving that the district court's credibility determination was clearly erroneous. Reyes first points to the fact that the Government asked the district court to disregard in deciding the motion to suppress the statement in Trooper Lynch's affidavit that he learned from fellow officers that Reyes arrived at his home on the day of the traffic stop at approximately 7:00 p.m. and that soon thereafter Reyes placed a box taken from the suspicious parcel into the trunk of his car and drove away. While Reyes suggests that the Government's request itself reveals that Trooper Lynch is not credible, the Government explained in its closing argument on the motion to suppress that its request was motivated by the fact that - 16 - certain predicate observations did not come into evidence at the evidentiary hearing. The Government made clear both that its request did not stem from any conceded inaccuracy or dishonesty on the part of Trooper Lynch, and that it was not asking the district court to ignore Trooper Lynch's testimony at the hearing. The Government was merely moving to withdraw aspects of the affidavit that were not elicited during the evidentiary hearing. Second, Reyes argues that Trooper Lynch's testimony about the traffic violations committed by Reyes was inconsistent and dubious. Specifically, Reyes takes issue with Trooper Lynch's claim on direct examination that he personally observed Reyes tailgating. Reyes claims that on cross-examination, Trooper Lynch changed his testimony about where in the stack of officer vehicles he was in relation to Reyes and admitted that it was in fact Trooper Pantazelos who observed the tailgating, while Trooper Lynch learned of this traffic violation via radio transmission. Contrary to Reyes's contention, there is no ipso facto inconsistency. As the Government explained in oral argument, tailgating is not necessarily an instantaneous phenomenon that only one person can observe. Common sense dictates that if a driver is tailgating over a period of time, two people could see it. Thus, it could be simultaneously true that Trooper Lynch first learned of Reyes's tailgating via the radio transmission of Trooper Pantazelos and also observed the tailgating for himself - 17 - when he eventually moved into position behind Reyes in the State Police cruiser. As such, Trooper Lynch's testimony on the traffic violations is not inherently implausible or inconsistent such that the district court's credibility determination should be disturbed. See Merlino, 592 F.3d at 27. Finally, Reyes contends that because Trooper Lynch's testimony on how long . . . Reyes was in handcuffs before being questioned was different from that in his affidavit and at odds with [Massachusetts State Police] records, he is an incredible witness. Contrary to Reyes's assessment, Trooper Lynch's statement in his affidavit that Reyes was in handcuffs for ten minutes prior to his arrest is consistent with his testimony at the evidentiary hearing that it was approximately ten to fifteen minutes. Ignoring the fact that the district court found that Reyes was handcuffed for around nineteen minutes before his arrest, on appeal, Reyes invokes Trooper Lynch's evidentiary hearing testimony that he stopped Reyes at 7:40 p.m. and an Administrative Journal Extract that reads 20.20 to suggest that Reyes was actually in handcuffs for approximately 35 minutes. For his part, when asked at the evidentiary hearing, Trooper Lynch testified that the entry 20.20 did not mean 8:20 p.m., but rather was just a number assigned to the extract, unrelated to time. Thus, Reyes has not identified any inconsistencies in Trooper Lynch's testimony on the handcuffing, as Trooper Lynch has been entirely - 18 - consistent in his estimates and explanations.6 In short, Reyes's multifaceted attacks on the credibility of Trooper Lynch are insufficient to show that the district court clearly erred in holding that Reyes consented to the search of his vehicle. We, therefore, affirm the factual finding that Reyes twice consented to the search.7