Opinion ID: 2810874
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Omission of an Essential Element of Wire Fraud

Text: In any prosecution for wire fraud, the government must establish three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: “(1) a scheme to defraud; (2) an interstate wire communication; and (3) a purpose to use the wire communication to execute the scheme.” United States v. Wittig, 575 F.3d 1085, 1093 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We review de novo whether the jury instructions, as a whole, accurately informed the jury of the governing law. United States v. Sharp, 749 F.3d 1267, 1280 (10th Cir. 2014). An instruction that erroneously omits an element of the offense is subject to review for harmless error. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1999). The defendants argue that by removing the phrase “defraud or” from the instruction, the district court effectively removed the first element, “a scheme to defraud,” from the jury’s consideration. They suggest this error is understandable in light of this court’s precedent, but that the error nevertheless requires reversal. In urging the government to elect whether to instruct the jury to find either (1) a scheme to defraud or (2) a scheme to obtain money by false pretenses, the district 21 court acted consistently with our precedent interpreting § 1343. See United States v. Cronic, 900 F.2d 1511, 1513 (10th Cir. 1990) (interpreting mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, as prohibiting two “overlapping” but separate offenses); see also United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081, 1104 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting first two elements of wire fraud and mail fraud are identical). But Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 25-26 (2000), effectively overruled Cronic. In Cleveland, the Supreme Court rejected the government’s contention that the mail fraud statute, § 1341, “defines two independent offenses: (1) ‘any scheme or artifice to defraud’ and (2) ‘any scheme or artifice . . . for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.’” 531 U.S. at 25 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1341, alteration in original). In doing so, the Court clarified that the disjunctive phrases in § 1341 proscribe a single offense and that the second phrase merely describes one type of fraudulent scheme. Id. at 26. And, as noted earlier, this court has recognized that the first two elements of the mail fraud statute and the wire fraud statute, §§ 1341 and 1343, are identical. Welch, 327 F.3d at 1104. Consequently, Cleveland, rather than Cronic, informs our analysis of the alleged instruction error. The parties acknowledge Cleveland’s impact but disagree on its application. The government argues the instruction did not omit an essential element because under Cleveland, the scheme to obtain money or property by fraudulent pretenses is simply a specific type of scheme to defraud. The defendants’ argument lacks clarity but implicitly recognizes that after Cleveland, the wire fraud statute’s two-clause 22 disjunctive structure creates a single offense. Yet the defendants seemingly argue that because the statute defines only one offense, the district court omitted an essential element of that offense—the scheme to defraud—by instructing the jury only on the specific means of committing a scheme to defraud described in the second part of the clause. We disagree. Since the first element of wire fraud is a scheme to defraud and that element includes a scheme to obtain property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, omitting the phrase “defraud or” did not render the instruction constitutionally deficient. If anything, the government’s “election” worked to the defendants’ favor by requiring the government to prove a particular type of scheme to defraud. Consequently, we conclude Instruction No. 17 did not omit an essential element of wire fraud.