Opinion ID: 109990
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: a narcotic drug

Text: 6 Section 220.39 specifies criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree as a class A-III felony. See n. 1, supra . 7 Fowler's criminal record is set out in full in the District Court's opinion, 436 F.Supp. 1153, 1159 n. 13 (S.D.N.Y.1977). 8 Chapter 20, renumbered Chapter 14, of the Magna Carta states: A free man shall not be amerced for a trivial offence; except in accordance with the degree of the offence, and for a serious offence he shall be amerced according to its gravity, saving his livelihood . . . . J. Holt, Magna Carta 323 (1965). For a discussion of the evolution of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in the English Bill of Rights, see Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The Original Meaning, 57 Calif.L.Rev. 839, 855-860 (1969). 9 The Court of Appeals suggested that petitioners were not aided by the fact that their convictions were based on cocaine and not heroin. Cocaine is a dangerous drug that causes damaging psychological and physiological effects in its users. 576 F.2d 405, 412 n. 11 (CA2 1978). In support of that proposition, the court cited no findings by the District Court. Rather, the Court of Appeals relied on a law review article which notes that cocaine use does not produce tolerance or physical dependence, McLaughlin, Cocaine: The History and Regulation of a Dangerous Drug, 58 Cornell L.Rev. 537, 553 (1973), and on an opinion of the Alaska Supreme Court which acknowledges that, [w]hile cocaine has been anecdotally related to aggressive or criminal conduct, adequate evidence to assess its possible impact in these areas is absent. State v. Erickson , 574 P.2d 1, 9 (1978). 10 Here there was no evidence causally linking petitioners' drug offenses to any violent collateral crimes. And it is questionable whether such linkage can be presumed. Even if the Court of Appeals could appropriately rely on a New Yorker Magazine article to establish that a substantial percentage of New York's prison inmates use drugs and that many of them turn to robbery or burglary to support their habits, see 576 F.2d, at 412 n. 12, it cannot be presumed either that: (1) but for drugs, those defendants would not have committed crimes; or (2) cocaine sales have a significant causal relationship to robbery or burglary. See n. 9 supra . Indeed, one of the Court of Appeal's own sources noted that there is no reliable scientific evidence linking cocaine usage to criminal conduct . . .. State v. Erickson, supra , at 9. 11 N.Y. Penal Law §§ 160.15, 70.00(2)(b) (McKinney 1975); §§ 140.30, 70.00(2)(b); § 230.00 (McKinney Supp.1978), New York Penal Law § 70.15(2) (McKinney 1975). 12 In In re Lynch , the California Supreme Court held that an indeterminate sentence must be evaluated as a maximum sentence of life imprisonment and that, as such, it was cruel and unusual punishment for a second offense of indecent exposure. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adopted a contrary approach in Rummel v. Estelle , 587 F.2d 651 (1978) (en banc). At issue there was the constitutionality of a sentence imposed under the Texas Habitual Criminal Statute, which mandates life imprisonment upon a third felony conviction. Relying in part on the analysis of the Court of Appeals in this case, the en banc majority upheld the sentence, after taking into consideration the possibility of parole. Id. , at 662. The dissent, in which six judges joined, refused to discount the defendant's sentence by a statistical possibility of clemency, an unenforceable hope that he may someday benefit from the grace of a parole board. Id. , at 668. (Clark, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). That another Circuit has narrowly divided over a question of critical significance for this case is, in my judgment, further reason for granting review. 13 N.Y. Penal Law §§ 125.27, 125.25, 150.20, 135.25 (McKinney 1975). 14 The crimes are defined in N.Y. Penal Law §§ 130.35, 125.20, 135.20, 150.15, 160.15, 140.30, 120.10 (McKinney 1975). The penalties are set forth in §§ 70.02(3)(a), (b) (McKinney Supp.1978). 15 If convicted of possession as a second offender, Carmona would have been subject to no more than two years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). Had she been convicted of possession with intent to sell, the maximum penalty for a first offense would have been 15 years' imprisonment, a $25,000 fine, and a special parole term of at least 3 years; for a second offense, it would have been 30 years, $50,000, and at least 6 years' special parole. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Only if she were found guilty of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise in concert with at least five others could she have received a life sentence. 21 U.S.C. § 848. 16 The report's latest annual figures, those for 1975, reflect that San Francisco, Los Angeles, Phoenix, Detroit, Chicago, San Diego, and San Antonio have a higher heroin addict per capita ranking than New York City. Person, Retka, & Woodward, at 8. 17 See U. S. Dept. of Justice, FBI Uniform Crime Reports, Crime in the United States 1977, Table 4 (1978).