Opinion ID: 71650
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Railway Labor Act Preemption

Text: The district court held that all of the plaintiffs' state-law claims were preempted by the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., because resolution of the claims necessarily relied upon interpretation of the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) between United and ALPA. We agree. Most of the provisions of the RLA apply to labor relations in the airline industry. Pyles v. United Air Lines, Inc., 79 F.3d 1046, 1049 (11th Cir.1996). The RLA has established a framework for the resolution of disputes between air carriers and their employees that grow[ ] out of grievances, or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. Id., citing 45 U.S.C. § 184. The distinguishing feature of such a dispute, termed a minor dispute, is that the dispute may be conclusively resolved by interpreting the existing [collective bargaining] agreement. Id. (citations omitted). Congress intended that these minor disputes be resolved through the grievance procedures of the RLA rather than in federal court. Id. at 1050. Therefore, it has long been the rule that when the resolution of a state-law claim ... requires an interpretation of the CBA, the claim is preempted and must be submitted to arbitration before a system board of adjustment. Id. The Supreme Court has adopted the preemption standard applied in cases under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 263, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 2249, 129 L.Ed.2d 203 (1994); see Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988). The LMRA standard narrows the otherwise broad preemptive scope of the RLA by precluding preemption of state-law claims that enforce rights independent of the CBA. Pyles, 79 F.3d at 1050, citing Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 256-62, 114 S.Ct. at 2246-48. The fact that reference to a CBA may be required, particularly where factual issues are involved, is insufficient of itself to preempt an independent state-law claim; only where interpretation of a CBA is required will the claim be preempted. Pyles, 79 F.3d at 1050 (citations omitted). In Pyles, we found that the breach of contract claim—involving the breach of a letter of agreement similar to the one entered into here between United and ALPA—between United and ALPA in that case was preempted by the RLA. See id. at 1050. We found that the letter agreement was by its terms, a modification of the CBA between United and its employees. Id. Thus, to interpret the letter was to interpret a portion of the CBA. See id. Because the CBA was the only potential source of any rights [the plaintiff] may have to employment with United, one must interpret the CBA to determine what those rights are. Id. Likewise, in Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 486 U.S. 399, 407, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1881, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988), the Court stated if the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a collective bargaining agreement, the application of state law (which might lead to inconsistent results since there could be as many state-law principles as there are States) is pre-empted and federal labor-law principles—necessarily uniform throughout the Nation—must be employed to resolve the dispute. In Farmer v. United Brotherhood of C. & J. of America, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 300, 97 S.Ct. 1056, 1063, 51 L.Ed.2d 338 (1977), the Court established a balancing test, requiring the courts to make a balanced inquiry into such factors as the nature of the federal and state interests in regulation and the potential for interference with federal regulation. In Farmer, the Court held that federal labor law did not preempt a union member's suit against the union for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Such a claim, however, is not present in the case sub judice.
Plaintiffs' claims against United are for breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation. Plaintiffs allege that by way of the letters of employment sent to them from United, United promised to protect the plaintiffs from the harassment they received after the strike in 1985. Additionally, plaintiffs attach to their original complaint the Back-to-Work agreement and Letter of Agreement between United and ALPA as evidence of United's promise to protect its employees. In plaintiffs' original complaint at paragraph 50, they allege that the ALPA owes the plaintiffs, who are all part of the bargaining unit at United, a duty of fair representation. 4 Thus, the plaintiffs, in effect, allege that they are, or were, members of ALPA. Further evidence of the plaintiffs' union membership includes the fact that the plaintiffs are all United pilots and that ALPA is the bargaining unit for all pilots employed by United. Resolution of whether United breached a promise made to plaintiffs and the ALPA to protect the plaintiffs from harassment necessarily depends on the interpretation of the CBAs for the following reasons. United's duty to confront the post-strike harassment on the plaintiffs' behalf comes from the language of both the 4 In the plaintiffs' original complaint, they stated a claim for violation of a duty of fair representation under the RLA. Subsequently, plaintiffs dropped this claim in their amended complaint filed on March 23, 1994. Back-to-Work agreement and Letter of Agreement which are both part of the CBA. The Back-to-Work agreement was collectively bargained between ALPA and United. The agreement also states that it is subject to the 1985 collective bargaining agreement already in place at the time the Back-to-Work agreement was completed. The Letter of Agreement was also collectively bargained and in its first paragraph makes reference to the fact that it is entered into in accordance with the provisions of the RLA. See Pyles, 79 F.3d at 1050 (where the identical language contained in a letter of agreement was one of the factors used by the court in determining that a claim for breach of contract was preempted by the RLA). Thus, these agreements are part of the CBA, and any claims against United for breaches of the duties or representations contained therein necessarily require interpretation of the CBAs and are, therefore, preempted by the RLA. Moreover, the ability of United to confront and discipline the harassment by ALPA members, or install preventative measures against the harassment, depends on the authority granted to United through the CBAs. United's ability to affect the employment situation of ALPA members is governed exclusively through the CBAs. Thus, any alleged breach of contract or fraudulent misrepresentation claim made against United is preempted by the RLA on the basis that resolution of such claims requires the interpretation of the CBA of 1985, the Back-to-Work agreement and the Letter of Agreement entered into by United and ALPA on behalf of United employees.
Plaintiffs' claims against ALPA include tortious interference with a contract and tortious interference with a business relationship. To prevail on a claim of tortious interference with a business relationship under Florida law, a plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) the existence of a business relationship, not necessarily evidenced by an enforceable contract; (2) knowledge of the relationship on the part of the defendant; (3) an intentional and unjustified interference with the relationship by the defendant; and (4) damage to the plaintiff as a result of the breach of the relationship. T. Harris Young & Assoc. v. Marquette Electronics, 931 F.2d 816, 825-26 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1013, 112 S.Ct. 658, 116 L.Ed.2d 749 (1991). Tortious interference with a contract and tortious interference with a business relationship are basically the same cause of action. Smith v. Ocean State Bank, 335 So.2d 641, 642 (Fla. 1st Dist.Ct.App.1976). The only material difference appears to be that in one there is a contract and in the other there is only a business relationship. Id. The plaintiffs contend that ALPA's actions in collectively bargaining with United and United's interest in appeasing the union caused United to forsake the plaintiffs by violating the agreement alleged to have been entered into between the plaintiffs and United. The court also reads the amended complaint to include an allegation by the plaintiffs that the harassment caused interference with the relationship formed between the plaintiffs and United. In its CBAs with United, ALPA agreed not to engage in, and in fact to deter, the harassment that allegedly caused the breach of United's contract with plaintiffs and injured United's relationship with plaintiffs. The allegations made against ALPA are also very tightly intertwined with the alleged duty that United had to protect the plaintiffs. Indeed, assessment of ALPA's actions and the duty of United to protect against these actions can only be done by interpreting the CBAs. It may be found that some of the conduct engaged in by the ALPA is allowed under the CBAs. This will not be known, however, until the arbitration steps provided in the CBAs are undertaken. Application of the Farmer factors also impels RLA preemption. First, we assess the federal interests involved in this case. The present suit involves three parties, all of whom are governed in their employment relationships by the aforementioned CBAs. Additionally, this is a suit by union members against their union and their employer. Thus, the federal concerns regarding the stability of labor relations and the uniformity of handling labor disputes are strong. On the other hand, the state does have an interest in protecting its citizens against conduct that is found to be outrageous. The Court in Farmer found that the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress—encompassing a certain type of outrageous conduct—avoided federal preemption. The claim pursued in Farmer, however, is not the nature of the claims pursued in this case. Lastly, we must consider to what extent avoiding preemption will interfere with the federal regulatory scheme designed to control labor relations. The determinative fact is that the CBAs control the relationships and employment activities of this employment triangle. All parties—either by their membership in the ALPA, their status as employees of United or as the employer—are controlled by the CBAs regarding the issues of labor relations. Entertaining state-law remedies in federal court under these circumstances would be to by-pass the CBAs agreed to by all parties to this litigation. Persuasive on this issue, and supportive of this court's ruling, is Fry v. Airline Pilots Assoc., International, 88 F.3d 831 (10th Cir.1996). The suit brought by Fry and other plaintiffs, also fleet qualified pilots, was similar, if not identical in many ways, to the case before this court. In Fry, the plaintiffs' state-law claims against United were (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (2) conspiracy to inflict emotional distress; (3) breach of contract; and (4) false representation (this cause of action voluntarily dismissed). Id. at 834 n. 3 (emphasis added). The claim against the ALPA was tortious interference with a contract. Id. (emphasis added). At issue in Fry was whether the RLA preempted these state-law claims. The court noted that plaintiffs often [attempt] to avoid federal jurisdiction under § 301 by framing their complaints in terms of such diverse state law theories as wrongful discharge, intentional infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy, and misrepresentation. Id. at 836 (citations omitted). The court held that [a]fter careful review of the record, we conclude that the district court properly determined that plaintiffs' state law claims, based on the theory that United reneged on its responsibility to protect the plaintiffs, cannot be understood without reference to the various CBAs. Id. at 836. The court further stated [i]n this case ... the alleged outrageous conduct is inextricably bound up with agreements and promises made to protect, and then actions allegedly forsaking, the plaintiffs. Id. With respect to the claim for tortious interference with a contract against ALPA, the court determined [w]hether ALPA caused United to breach its contract to protect the plaintiffs cannot be determined without examining and comparing the promised protections afforded by United and the alleged withdrawal of those protections as decided in subsequent negotiating sessions. Id. at 838-39. The court did not, however, find the plaintiffs' emotional distress claims preempted. See id. at 841. The decision by the Tenth Circuit is not binding authority for this court. It is, however, persuasive authority that provides valuable insight. The background and basic facts of Fry are the same as in this case. Fry covers the same strike by ALPA against United, the same CBAs, the same post-strike harassment, and the same post-strike actions taken by United and ALPA. The two material differences between Fry and this case are that the plaintiffs in Fry were different pilots than in this case and some of the claims alleged in the Fry complaint were different than those alleged here. However, all of the state-law causes of action alleged in the case sub judice are covered in Fry. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit's ruling on RLA preemption under virtually the same set of facts as the present case is very instructive. The plaintiffs argue that their claims should fall under the Farmer exception to the preemption doctrine. Farmer held that an otherwise preempted claim could be prosecuted in state or federal court if the conduct alleged was sufficiently outrageous. In Farmer, the cause of action alleged was intentional infliction of emotional distress. No such claim is alleged in the present case. All of plaintiffs' claims in this case sound in contract or quasi-contract. Merely because the plaintiffs allege outrageous conduct as the means by which their contracts were breached does not bring this case under the Farmer exception. Additionally, as discussed above, application of the Farmer balancing test calls for RLA preemption in this case. Lastly, plaintiffs contend that Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 3172, 77 L.Ed.2d 798 (1983), applies in this case to avoid federal preemption. In Belknap, the Court held that non-union employees' breach of contract claims should not be preempted. Id. at 500, 103 S.Ct. at 3178. The Court reached this holding because it determined that innocent third parties, that is, employees of the employer but not members of the union and not implicated in any CBAs, should not be deprived of their normal state-law remedies. See id. It is one thing to hold that the federal law intended to leave the employer and the union free to use their economic weapons against one another, but it is quite another to hold that either the employer or the union is free to injure innocent third parties without regard to the normal rules of law governing those relationships. Id. Thus, Belknap is applicable in a situation where a non-union employee does not have at his disposal the protections of the union and the CBAs, but rather has only his normal state-law remedies against the union or his employer. As mentioned above, the plaintiffs are or were ALPA members, as alleged in paragraph 50 of the original complaint. They are pilots for United, and ALPA is the sole bargaining unit for the United pilots. Additionally, we agree with the district court in its ruling that once the striking workers returned to work under the newly negotiated CBA, the rights and duties of all parties involved, including the plaintiffs as United employees, were governed by the newly formed CBAs. Therefore, Belknap is inapposite. Likewise, the Tenth Circuit in Fry reached the same holding regarding the applicability of Belknap. See Fry, 88 F.3d at 838 & n. 9.