Opinion ID: 432032
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A Significant Risk Standard?

Text: 16 Kelly's argument regarding the third element of the Secretary's burden--the hazard caused or was likely to cause death or serious physical harm--raises an important and undecided issue of law. Citing Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 100 S.Ct. 2844, 65 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1980), (the Benzene Case) and Pratt and Whitney Aircraft v. Secretary of Labor, 649 F.2d 96 (2nd Cir.1981) (Pratt and Whitney I), the company contends that the Commission's determination of a violation should be reversed because the evidence does not demonstrate that Kelly's practices posed a significant risk of harm. In the Benzene Case, the Supreme Court reviewed a standard promulgated by the Secretary of Labor to regulate occupational exposure to benzene, a carcinogenic substance. Remanding the review petition to the Secretary for further proceedings, a four justice plurality held, inter alia, before he can promulgate any permanent health or safety standard, the Secretary is required to make a threshold finding that a place of employment is unsafe--in the sense that significant risks are present and can be eliminated or lessened by a change in practices. (Emphasis in original.) 448 U.S. at 643-44, 100 S.Ct. at 2864-65. 8 In Pratt and Whitney I, supra, the Second Circuit extended the significant risk standard to Commission enforcement of a particular safety standard. The Secretary had cited a company for violating 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1910.94(d)(7)(iii) which prohibits the use of common exhaust systems where a combination of the vented substances may constitute a fire, explosion, or chemical reaction hazard. Considering the Benzene Case and Pratt and Whitney I, we must decide whether the significant risk standard should be further extended and displace existing law with respect to enforcement of the general duty clause. 17 In previous cases concerning the general duty clause's likely to cause death ... provision, courts have focused primarily on the seriousness of the accident should it occur. The likelihood of the accident itself has received only low level scrutiny, leaving the Commission's expertise predominant in the area. The D.C. Circuit, in discussing a citation issued to a company for certain practices involving construction equipment, noted 18 Presumably, any given instance of equipment riding carries a less than 50% probability of serious mishap, but no such mathematical test would be proper in construing this element of the general duty clause [citing Morey, supra, n. 5]. If evidence is presented that a practice could eventuate in serious physical harm upon other than a freakish or utterly implausible concurrence of circumstances, the Commission's expert determination of likelihood should be accorded considerable deference by the courts. 19 National Realty, supra, 489 F.2d at 1265, n. 33. In view of the Act's general goal of reducing industrial carnage, other courts have also found this limited deference to Commission expertise to be proper. See Donovan v. Royal Logging Co., 645 F.2d 822, 829 (9th Cir.1981); Illinois Power Co. v. OSHRC, 632 F.2d 25, 28 (7th Cir.1980). Extension of the significant risk standard to enforcements of the general duty clause would constitute an abandonment of the National Realty standard. The significant risk standard, as enunciated in the Benzene case, looks equally to the likelihood of an accident and the seriousness of the potential harm. Pratt and Whitney Aircraft v. Donovan, 715 F.2d 57, 64 (2nd Cir.1983), (Pratt and Whitney II) citing W. Prosser, Law of Torts Sec. 31, at 147 (4th ed. 1971). 20 Neither the Benzene Case nor Pratt and Whitney I justify such a change in enforcement of the general duty clause. In the Benzene case, the relevant holding was very narrow. 9 The Supreme Court specifically declared that the significant risk standard applies to OSHA's functions in promulgating permanent health or safety standard[s]. (emphasis supplied) 448 U.S. at 643, 100 S.Ct. at 2864. Moreover, the Court's holding depended, to a significant degree, on provisions of the Act relating only to issuance of standards. The section of the Benzene opinion establishing the significant risk standard begins:Our resolution of the issues in these cases turns, to a large extent, on the meaning of and the relationship between Sec. 3(8), which defines a health and safety standard ... and Sec. 6(b)(5) which directs the Secretary in promulgating a health and safety standard for toxic materials.... 21 448 U.S. at 639, 100 S.Ct. at 2863. The fact that the instant controversy does not involve OSHA standards or their promulgation significantly limits the relevance of the Benzene case here. See Modern Drop Forge Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 683 F.2d 1105, 1115 (7th Cir.1982) (the Benzene Case chiefly examined the scope of the Secretary's rule making authority under section 6(b)(5).). 22 Another factor limiting the significant risk holding in the Benzene Case derives from the Supreme Court's emphasis on unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. That emphasis clearly surfaces in the plurality opinion, Justice Stevens reasoning that if the significant risk standard wasn't applicable, the statute would make such a 'sweeping delegation' of power that it might be unconstitutional. 448 U.S. at 647, 100 S.Ct. at 2866. In fact, Justice Rehnquist's concurrence is based primarily on this constitutional argument. Id. at 672-689, 100 S.Ct. at 2879-2887. Because nondelegation doctrine has no relevance to enforcement of the general duty clause, we cannot choose our course based on guidance from the Benzene Case. See Modern Drop Forge Co., supra, 683 F.2d at 1115; Super Excavators, Inc. v. OSHRC, 674 F.2d 592, 595 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1133, 102 S.Ct. 2958, 73 L.Ed.2d 1350 (1982). 23 Similarly, the Second Circuit's extension of the significant risk standard in Pratt and Whitney I does not convince us to make a further extension in today's case. Pratt and Whitney I reversed the enforcement of a particular regulation issued by the Secretary. The regulation in question, 29 CFR Sec. 1910.94(d)(7)(iii), required that an employer take measures for situations that may constitute a fire explosion or chemical reaction hazard. 10 The regulation at issue in Pratt and Whitney I obviously presumes no hazard. This absence of a presumed hazard lay at the heart of the holding in Pratt and Whitney I. Modern Drop Forge Co., supra, 683 F.2d at 1115. Presumption of a hazard, as defined and refined by years of both administrative and judicial determinations, prevents the problems of vagueness which concerned the court in Pratt and Whitney I. Modern Drop Forge, supra, 683 F.2d at 1115; see Georgia Electric v. Marshall, supra, 595 F.2d at 322 n. 32. Ensign-Bickford Co. v. OSHRC, 717 F.2d 1419, 1421 (D.C.Cir.1983). Thus, presumption of a hazard, as under the general duty clause 11 , makes unnecessary the imposition of a significant risk standard. See, id. 24 Congress' purpose in passing the Act was to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions. American Textile Mfrs. Institute Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2478, 69 L.Ed.2d 185 (1981). The existing three-pronged burden for proving a general duty clause violation imposes substantial limits on the Secretary's discretion in enforcing that Congressional mandate. In calculating the proper judicial standard of review, we perceive no reason to impose any additional burden on the Secretary. Given Congress' goals, current law provides the proper standard for reviewing citations under the general duty clause. Courts should defer to the Commission's expert determination of likelihood if evidence is presented that a practice could eventuate in serious physical harm upon other than a freakish or utterly implausible concurrence of circumstances. 12