Opinion ID: 475833
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of Deliberate By-Pass Standard

Text: 26 In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 434, 83 S.Ct. 822, 846, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963), the Supreme Court held that a federal court has the power to grant habeas relief despite a petitioner's failure to appeal in state court. However, the Court also held that as a matter of discretion, a federal court may deny relief to a petitioner who has deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure of the state courts and in so doing has forfeited his state court remedies. Id. at 438, 83 S.Ct. at 848 (emphasis added). Where, on the other hand, a habeas petitioner fails to appeal in state court because of inadvertence or neglect, thereby forfeiting his state remedies, appellate and collateral, ... those consequences should be sufficient to vindicate the State's valid interest in orderly procedures. Id. at 433, 83 S.Ct. at 846. Thus, under Fay, we may refuse to hear Hughes's petition only if he made a considered choice to relinquish intentionally his right to appeal in Idaho state court. Id. at 439, 83 S.Ct. at 849. Hughes clearly has shown that he did not make such a choice. The state has failed to show otherwise. 2 27 The majority finds that the cause and prejudice standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2506, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), applies to Hughes's failure to appeal. The majority relies upon what it perceives as the clear trend toward application of that standard evidenced in the more recent Supreme Court decisions Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982), Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 104 S.Ct. 2901, 82 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984), and Murray v. Carrier, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). 28 I believe, however, that these decisions are inapplicable to a habeas petitioner's failure to take an appeal of a state court judgment, and that the only trend evidenced in the cases is the failure of courts to be precise in stating the law applicable to a particular factual context. At issue in Wainwright was a petitioner's failure to comply with the state's contemporaneous objection rule. In establishing the applicability of the cause and prejudice standard in that context, the Supreme Court stated: 29 We have no occasion today to consider the Fay standard as applied to the facts there confronting the Court. Whether the [cause and prejudice] rule should preclude federal habeas review of claims not made in accordance with state procedure where the criminal defendant has surrendered, other than for reasons of tactical advantage, the right to have all of his claims of trial error considered by a state appellate court, we leave for another day. 30 433 U.S. at 88 n. 12, 97 S.Ct. at 2507 n. 12. Thus, in refusing to paint with a broad brush, id., the Supreme Court explicitly left Fay applicable to a petitioner's failure to appeal. 31 In addition, Chief Justice Burger's Wainwright concurrence explained the basis for applying the Fay standard in some contexts, and the Wainwright standard in others. The determinative question is whether the defaulted procedure involves a decision made solely by the defendant, or one made principally by attorneys in the exercise of their professional expertise. The Fay deliberate by-pass standard applies to a failure to appeal because the defendant himself ha[s] to make the decision whether to appeal or not.... Id. at 92, 97 S.Ct. at 2509 (Burger, C.J., concurring). By contrast, the cause and prejudice standard applies to a failure to object contemporaneously because that decision is necessarily entrusted to the defendant's attorney.... Id. at 93, 97 S.Ct. at 2509. Thus, in Wainwright, the Supreme Court not only refused to overrule Fay, but the Chief Justice, in concurrence, explained the very basis for preserving it. 32 Contrary to the majority's assertion, Engle did nothing to alter the vitality of Fay. In Engle, as in Wainwright, the habeas petitioners had failed to comply with contemporaneous objection rules. 456 U.S. at 110, 124, 102 S.Ct. at 1570. All three petitioners in Engle had appealed their convictions in state court. Thus, despite what the majority characterizes as the Court's broad holding regarding the applicability of the cause and prejudice standard, Engle did nothing more than reaffirm Wainwright 's holding as applied to failures to object contemporaneously even where the alleged constitutional error affects the truthfinding function of the trial. Id. at 129, 102 S.Ct. at 1572. See Murray, 106 S.Ct. at 2644 (like Wainwright, Engle involved claims procedurally defaulted at trial). Indeed, the Court in Engle discussed the Fay deliberate by-pass standard in language which suggests that standard's vitality, not its demise. 456 U.S. at 130 n. 36, 102 S.Ct. at 1573 n. 36. 33 I do not understand the majority's reliance upon Reed because that decision, rather than eroding the Fay standard, actually reinforces the applicability of Fay to a petitioner's failure to appeal. In Reed, the procedural default was a failure by the habeas applicant's attorney to raise the pivotal habeas issue in the direct appeal which was taken in state court. 468 U.S. at 3, 7, 104 S.Ct. at 2903, 2906. In addition to the broad language the majority cites regarding the applicability of the cause and prejudice standard to the facts in Reed, the Supreme Court stated: Where ... a defendant has failed to abide by a State's procedural rule requiring the exercise of legal expertise and judgment, the competing concerns implicated by the exercise of the federal court's habeas corpus power have come to be embodied in the 'cause and prejudice' requirement.... Id. at 11, 104 S.Ct. at 2906 (emphasis added). The significance of this language derives from the Supreme Court's supporting citations, which, other than the Engle citation, the majority appears to disregard. First and foremost, the Court cited Chief Justice Burger's Wainwright concurrence. As previously noted, this concurrence explains why the deliberate by-pass standard applies to a defendant's failure to appeal while the cause and prejudice standard applies to procedural defaults for which a defendant's counsel is responsible. In citing this concurrence, the Court in Reed clearly was recognizing this distinction and finding that the decision regarding which issues to include in an appeal belongs in the latter category which involves the exercise of legal expertise and judgment. 34 Among the Court's other citations were three circuit court opinions relying on the Chief Justice's explanation in Wainwright to preserve Fay in the context of a failure to appeal. Id. at 11 n. 7, 104 S.Ct. at 2908 n. 7. In Crick v. Smith, 650 F.2d 860, 867 (6th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 1281, 71 L.Ed.2d 464 (1982), the Sixth Circuit, relying on the distinction drawn by Chief Justice Burger, stated: Because this is at least a rational distinction, and because Wainwright could have but did not explicitly overrule Fay v. Noia, supra, we conclude that the deliberate by-pass rule is still alive and well, or at least remains applicable to its own facts. Similarly, in Graham v. Mabry, 645 F.2d 603, 606-07 (8th Cir.1981), the Eighth Circuit, citing the Chief Justice's concurrence, reasoned that Fay applies where the alleged waiver is the result of the defendant's own decision, including the decision whether to appeal. Finally, in Boyer v. Patton, 579 F.2d 284, 286 (3d Cir.1978), the Third Circuit noted that the Chief Justice's concurrence suggested that Fay 's deliberate bypass standard would continue to apply to failures to appeal, which involve 'the exercise of volition by the defendant himself,'  and that Wainwright did not offer guidance regarding the standard applicable to such failures. The Supreme Court's citation to these passages of these opinions belies the majority's claim that the broad language in Reed--which is not really so broad when examined closely--erodes the applicability of Fay to failures to appeal. Indeed, taken in context, the language of Reed makes clear that Fay continues to apply in this context. 35 Finally, in Murray, the Supreme Court again addressed the cause and prejudice standard as applied to a petitioner's failure to raise the pivotal habeas issue in the appeal which he did take in state court. In reaffirming Wainwright 's applicability to this context, the Court stated: 36 The real thrust of respondent's arguments appears to be that on appeal it is inappropriate to hold defendants to the errors of their attorneys. Were we to accept that proposition, defaults on appeal would presumably be governed by a rule equivalent to Fay v. Noia 's deliberate bypass standard, under which only personal waiver by the defendant would require enforcement of a procedural default. We express no opinion as to whether counsel's decision not to take an appeal at all might require treatment under such a standard, see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S., at 88, n. 12, [97 S.Ct. 2507 n. 12] but, for the reasons already given, we hold that counsel's failure to raise a particular claim or claims on appeal is to be scrutinized under the cause and prejudice standard when that failure is treated as a procedural default by the state courts. 37 106 S.Ct. at 2648 (former emphasis added; latter emphasis in original). Thus, in Murray, the Supreme Court specifically refused to expand the applicability of the cause and prejudice standard to contexts not already controlled by Wainwright. 38 Given these Supreme Court opinions, I am convinced that the Fay deliberate by-pass standard remains applicable where, as in the present case, the petitioner fails to appeal. The Supreme Court clearly draws a distinction between this decision, made solely by the defendant, and other decisions made primarily by the defendant's attorney. Furthermore, in light of Murray and Reed, I find difficult to understand the majority's assertion that the value of [the Supreme Court's] reservation [of Fay 's applicability] has been diminished by several recent Supreme Court decisions. Murray, which is the Supreme Court's most recent relevant decision, expressly makes this reservation. Reed, the next most recent decision, through its language and supporting citations, reinforces the applicability of Fay to the case now before us. 39 Even were I to agree with the majority that the cause and prejudice standard generally applies to a failure to appeal, I do not agree that the standard applies where the petitioner was acting pro se at the time of the default. None of the Supreme Court cases has addressed the question of what standard applies in this context. Indeed, as the majority notes, the Court stated in Reed that [t]he situation of of a defendant representing himself ... is not presented in this case and we express no view on the applicability of the cause-and-prejudice requirement in that context. 468 U.S. at 11 n. 7, 104 S.Ct. at 2908 n. 7 (citation omitted). 40 Moreover, the Supreme Court's language in Engle and Murray strongly suggests that those decisions are applicable only to defaults involving counsel. In Engle, the Court justified the stringent enforcement of the contemporaneous objection requirement because [t]he defendant's counsel ... has detracted from the trial's significance by neglecting to raise a claim in that forum. 456 U.S. at 128-29, 102 S.Ct. at 1572. See also id. at 129 n. 34, 102 S.Ct. at 1572 n. 34 (counsel's default may stem from simple ignorance, the pressures of trial, or sandbagging). And in Murray, the Court stated the issue as whether cause is shown where competent defense counsel inadvertently failed to raise the substantive claim of error.... 106 S.Ct. at 2642 (emphasis added). The Court described the Wainwright holding itself as [a]t a minimum ... plainly impl[ying] that default ... by counsel ... would ... bind the habeas petitioner even if he had not personally waived that claim. Id. at 2644 (emphasis added). The Court reasoned that [s]o long as a defendant is represented by counsel whose performance is not constitutionally ineffective, he must bear the risk of attorney error that results in procedural default. id. at 2645-46 (emphasis added). It focused on counsel's breach, the costs of attorney error, sandbagging by appellate counsel, counsel's state of mind in failing to raise a claim, and hold[ing] defendants to the errors of their attorneys. Id. at 2647. The Court then reaffirmed Reed 's holding that counsel's failure to raise a particular claim ... on appeal was governed by the cause and prejudice. Id. at 2648 (emphasis added). It thus is clear that the Supreme Court in these cases simply did not consider, let alone decide, what standard applies to a default occurring while the defendant was acting pro se. 41 Furthermore, I agree with the Third Circuit's analysis in Diggs v. United States, 740 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.1984), in which the court, notwithstanding the majority's assertion to the contrary, did decide whether the cause and prejudice standard applies to a pro se petitioner's procedural default. After noting that Wainwright did not overrule Fay 's application to a failure to appeal, the court stated: Moreover, it would appear that application of the 'cause' prong of the cause and prejudice test has little meaning in the context of post-trial proceedings involving indigent litigants because they normally will be without the assistance of those schooled in the technicalities of our appellate procedures. Id. at 244-45 (footnote omitted). The majority ignores this analysis, and in refusing to distinguish between the errors of defendants and those of their counsel, instead relies on what it perceives as the clear trend toward applying [Wainwright ] and the apparent abandonment of Fay 's deliberate bypass standard. I believe that this reliance is misplaced because as I have demonstrated, the trend is not clear, and the abandonment is not apparent. Accordingly, I would hold that regardless of the general rule, the deliberate by-pass standard applies to a pro se petitioner's failure to appeal. 42