Opinion ID: 3134275
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: constitutionality of death penalty claims

Text: Defendant's final allegations of error challenge the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Illinois death penalty statute, section 9--1 of the Criminal Code of 1961. Defendant first claims that his death sentence must be vacated and remanded for a new hearing because it was based in part on an unconstitutional provision of our Criminal Code, section 9--1(b)(7) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 9--1(b)(7)). Defendant contends that the terms used in the statute to define the conduct that will sustain a finding of eligibility, exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 9--1(b)(7)), are facially vague and therefore unconstitutional. Relying on the Supreme Court's decisions in Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 100 L. Ed. 2d 372, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988), and Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1, 111 S. Ct. 313 (1990), defendant alleges section 9--1(b)(7) fails to provide principled guidance for the sentencer's discretion in imposing the death penalty. However, this court has previously considered the constitutionality of section 9--1(b)(7) in light of Maynard and has held that section 9--1(b)(7) does not suffer from the same constitutional infirmity as the statue in Maynard. People v. Odle, 128 Ill. 2d 111, 138-41 (1988). We also find defendant's reliance on Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1, 111 S. Ct. 313 (1990), unpersuasive. In Shell, the Supreme Court found the trial court's limiting instruction, defining an aggravating factor identical to that in Maynard, to be constitutionally insufficient. Shell, 498 U.S. at 4, 112 L. Ed. 2d at 5, 111 S. Ct. at 314. This court's decision in Odle, holding that section 9--1(b)(7) was not unconstitutionally vague, rested on the distinction between the language of the aggravating factor in the Oklahoma statute at issue in Maynard and the more specific description which qualifies an accused for the death penalty in Illinois. Odle, 128 Ill. 2d at 140. The language of the aggravating factor in the Mississippi statute at issue in Shell is identical to the statutory language challenged in Maynard, and therefore section 9--1(b)(7) is distinguishable on the same basis. This court has repeatedly affirmed its holding in Odle that the statutory language of section 9--1(b)(7) sufficiently channels the discretion of the sentencer. People v. Banks, 161 Ill. 2d 119, 146-47 (1994); People v. Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d 399, 443-46 (1989); People v. Kidd, 129 Ill. 2d 432, 454- 56 (1989). Defendant offers no persuasive ground to support his request that we reconsider the holding in Odle, and we decline to do so. In a related argument, defendant claims the jury instructions in the eligibility phase of the sentencing hearing did not adequately define the language of section 9--1(b)(7). At sentencing, over defendant's objections the judge instructed the jury on the definition of the words brutal and heinous as contained in section 9--1(b)(7). IPI Criminal 3d Nos. 7B.07A, 7B.07B. Defendant objected to the instruction because he did not believe the jury needed to be educated as to what is [sic] an aggravating factor. Defendant's argument on appeal, that the instructions were too vague to offer principled guidance to the jury, is inconsistent with his objection at trial. Defendant also failed to submit an alternative instruction. Therefore, we find defendant has waived his argument. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d at 406. We also believe that plain error analysis will not defeat the waiver. In compliance with this court's holding in People v. Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d 399, 448-49 (1989), the judge in this case instructed the jury on the definitions of the statutory terms at the sentencing hearing. Brutal was defined as grossly ruthless, devoid of mercy or compassion, cruel, and cold-blooded. IPI Criminal 3d No. 7B.07A. Heinous was defined as hatefully or shockingly evil, grossly bad, enormously, and flagrantly criminal. IPI Criminal 3d No. 7B.07B. The instructions gave a sufficient explanation and an adequate limiting construction and we believe no error occurred. Defendant next argues that the Illinois death penalty statute violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments because it places a burden of proof on the defendant and precludes meaningful consideration of mitigation. We have previously rejected this claim (Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d at 408; People v. Page, 155 Ill. 2d 232, 283 (1993); People v. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d 274, 345-46 (1992)) and do so again here. We have also held that the death sentencing procedure is not unconstitutional where the prosecution is allowed to have both initial and rebuttal arguments at the sentencing hearing. Page, 155 Ill. 2d at 282-83. Finally, defendant claims that various aspects of the Illinois death penalty statute, in combination, invite the risk of arbitrary or capricious imposition of death sentences. Defendant admits that this court has previously examined and rejected the constitutional challenges defendant raises. See People v. Whitehead, 116 Ill. 2d 425 (1987); People v. Albanese, 102 Ill. 2d 54 (1984); see also People v. Tenner, 157 Ill. 2d 341, 390 (1993); Page, 155 Ill. 2d at 284-85. Defendant suggests the previously rejected grounds for finding the statute unconstitutional, when considered cumulatively, render the statute unconstitutional. However, this court has held that if the individual aspects of the statute are constitutional, then it follows that the whole is constitutional. People v. Phillips, 127 Ill. 2d 499, 542-43 (1989).