Opinion ID: 831214
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: overview of causation

Text: Three of the offenses with which defendant was charged contain an element of causation, so the prosecution was required to prove causation beyond a reasonable doubt for each offense. The Court of Appeals erred to the extent that it held otherwise. The plain language of the statutes that prohibit OWI causing death, MCL 257.625(1) and (4), and the statutes that prohibit operating a motor vehicle with the presence of a schedule 1 controlled substance in one's body, causing death, MCL 257.625(4) and (8), requires that the defendant's operation of a motor vehicle have caused the death of another person. [1] Likewise, the plain language of MCL 257.617(3) contains an element of causation. Specifically, the statute imposes criminal liability if an individual fails to stop following an accident caused by that individual and the accident results in the death of another.... MCL 257.617(3) (emphasis added). [2] Thus, because the statute specifically requires the prosecution to establish that the accident was caused by the accused, the Court of Appeals ignored the plain language of the MCL 257.617(3) and erred by holding that it does not contain a causation element. Having determined that each of the statutes contains a causation element, we now turn to the definition of the term cause. In People v. Schaefer , we stated that, in the criminal law context, the term `cause' has acquired a unique, technical meaning. People v. Schaefer, 473 Mich. 418, 435, 703 N.W.2d 774 (2005). Specifically, the term and concept have two parts: factual causation and proximate causation. Id. at 435-436, 703 N.W.2d 774. Factual causation exists if a finder of fact determines that but for defendant's conduct the result would not have occurred. Id. A finding of factual causation alone, however, is not sufficient to hold an individual criminally responsible. Id. at 436, 703 N.W.2d 774. The prosecution must also establish that the defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of, in this case, the accident or the victim's death. Id. [3] Proximate causation is a legal construct designed to prevent criminal liability from attaching when the result of the defendant's conduct is viewed as too remote or unnatural. Id. If the finder of fact determines that an intervening cause supersedes a defendant's conduct such that the causal link between the defendant's conduct and the victim's injury was broken, proximate cause is lacking and criminal liability cannot be imposed. Id. at 436-437. Whether an intervening cause supersedes a defendant's conduct is a question of reasonable foreseeability. Id. at 437. Ordinary negligence is considered reasonably foreseeable, and it is thus not a superseding cause that would sever proximate causation. Id. at 437-438. In contrast, gross negligence or intentional misconduct on the part of a victim is considered sufficient to break the causal chain between the defendant and the victim because it is not reasonably foreseeable. Id. Gross negligence, however, is more than an enhanced version of ordinary negligence. Id. at 438. It means wantonness and disregard of the consequences which may ensue.... People v. Barnes, 182 Mich. 179, 198, 148 N.W. 400 (1914). [4] Wantonness is defined as [c]onduct indicating that the actor is aware of the risks but indifferent to the results and usually suggests a greater degree of culpability than recklessness.... Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed.). Therefore, while a victim's negligence is not a defense, it is an important factor to be considered by the trier of fact in determining whether proximate cause has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., People v. Campbell, 237 Mich. 424, 430-431, 212 N.W. 97 (1927). [5]