Opinion ID: 1967729
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interpreting the Various Maryland Orders

Text: In this case, the trial court was faced with numerous orders from Maryland, and as already noted, the legal effect of each order is critical to our determination of the issues on appeal. We will discuss each in turn. First, the Order of February 11, 1998, adopts the recommendations of Master Yochelson and reduces the child support obligation from $500 to $300 a month. As already noted, Master Yochelson recommended a pendente lite modification of child support. It is unclear on the face of the February 11th Order whether the trial court adopted the recommendation as a pendente lite modification or if the order was meant to be a permanent modification of the child support obligation. This distinction is very important. Under Maryland law, some pendente lite orders, which by definition are temporary, [3] do not create continuing, exclusive jurisdiction in the Maryland court. MD.CODE ANN., FAMILY LAW § 10-308(e) (Temporary Support Order. A temporary support order issued ex parte or pending resolution of a jurisdictional conflict does not create continuing, exclusive jurisdiction in the issuing tribunal.). Thus, if this order was pendente lite, it was error for the trial court to rely upon D.C.Code § 46-302.07(b)(1), which states that: (b) If a proceeding is brought under this chapter, and 2 or more child support orders have been issued by tribunals of the District or another state with regard to the same obligor and child, a tribunal of the District shall apply the following rules in determining which order to recognize for purposes of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction: (1) If only 1 of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under this chapter, the order of that tribunal controls and must be so recognized. For if the order was temporary, it did not give Maryland, continuing, exclusive jurisdiction and § 46-302.07(b)(1) would not apply. The second Maryland order, the Memorandum of October 12, 1988 from the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, was given short shrift by the trial judge because he concluded that he had no real context in which to view the Memorandum. The legal effect of this Memorandum, however, is imperative in determining the outcome of the present case. An Order that is clear on its face dismissing the case completely would be given great weight if all the formalities of an Order had been followed. Although the October 12, 1988 Memorandum was entitled Memorandum, rather than Order, it clearly stated that the case is hereby dismissed. All issues to be determined by the Court of original jurisdiction. It seems to us a leap for the trial court to conclude that there was no real context in which to view this Memorandum it identifies a case number and states that the case is dismissed. If this Memorandum was in fact an order dismissing the case, then it is important to understand what that means. For example, if this order does in fact dismiss the case, as it appears to do, it is unclear whether that dismissal means that the prior order modifying child support is also terminated. Further, there might be a different legal effect of the dismissal if the prior child support order was permanent as opposed to pendente lite. It is also possible that the Memorandum was something else all together and that the prior modification order is still in effect. If that were the case, then the Maryland order controls. See, e.g., Halo v. Halo, 275 A.2d 543 (D.C.1971); see also D.C.Code § 46-302.05(c). Thus, the trial court must determine the legal effect of this Memorandum in order to properly dispose of the case. Finally, the trial court gave great weight to the Consent Withholding Order. While it would have been proper for the trial court to give great weight to a fully executed Consent Withholding Order, the Order in this case was not signed by either Ms. Christopher or an Agency that represented her interests. The legal effect of such an order, if any, must be determined before a court can give it any weight, let alone the great weight that the trial court accorded to the Order in this case. Furthermore, if the Memorandum of October 12, 1988 was in fact a final order dismissing the case, the legal effect of that order may preclude giving the Consent Withholding Order any weight because the Consent Withholding Order cannot serve to overrule the previous final order from another trial judge with concurrent jurisdiction. See, e.g., Warfel v. Brady, 95 Md.App. 1, 619 A.2d 171, 174 (1993) (According to Maryland law, the law of the case doctrine applies to decisions finally disposing of the case.). While this case has a very complicated history, which spans decades and involves various orders from multiple judges from courts of two different jurisdictions, in our mobile society it is not uncommon for multiple jurisdictions to be involved in support proceedings. Therefore, to address such scenarios, the District of Columbia Code has adopted the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (Act). Section 317 of the Act, codified at D.C.Code § 46-303.16 (2001), provides the trial court with a unique tool to assist in deciphering the sometimes unclear judgments, decrees and orders issued by another jurisdiction so the trial court can understand the legal effect of such judgments, decrees and orders and place them in their proper context. Understanding the legal effect of the Maryland Orders is critical in the present case. D.C.Code § 46-303.16 (2001) states: A tribunal of the District may communicate with a tribunal of another state in writing, or by telephone or other means, to obtain information concerning the laws of that state, the legal effect of a judgment, decree, or order of that tribunal, and the status of a proceeding in the other state. A tribunal of the District may furnish similar information by similar means to a tribunal of another state. The purpose of this provision of the Act is to expedite the establishment and enforcement of a support order. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 317, Comment, 9 U.L.A. 235, 330 (1996). Thus, in cases like the one before us, this statute provides a means for the trial court to give proper recognition and context to orders which may not be clear on their face. If the legal effect of an order is not understood, then it is incumbent upon the trial court, when appropriate, to seek guidance from the issuing jurisdiction. Therefore, in order to properly weigh the various Maryland rulings, the trial court should have sought guidance from the Maryland court itself under D.C.Code § 46-303.16; accord MD.CODE ANN., FAMILY LAW § 10-329 (same). We acknowledge, however, that in some cases, where much time has passed, this will not be an easy task. In fact, it is possible that the trial court may not be any better informed after contacting the other tribunal, than it was before. Nevertheless, in the interest of justice and fairness, we conclude that an effort must be made. Because the trial court failed to do so, we must remand the case for further proceedings. [4]