Opinion ID: 764970
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The HRUS

Text: 37 The HRUS clearly falls within the charge or fee category of recreational use statutes. As stated previously, the HRUS extends immunity to landowners who allow others to use their land without charge. See Haw. Rev. Stat. 520-4, 520-5(2). The HRUS defines charge as the admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or permission to enter or go upon the land. Haw. Rev. Stat. 520-2(4). This is the same definition that is used by several other states in their charge statutes. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-557f(1) ('Charge' means the admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or permission to enter or go upon the land.); Del. Code. Ann. tit. 7, 5902(4) (same); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, 477-2(4) (same); see also Colo. Rev. Stat. 33-41-102(1) ('Charge' means a consideration paid for entry upon or use of the land or any facilities thereon or adjacent thereto.). 38 Howard's reliance on cases interpreting consideration statutes in support of her argument that she was charged a fee is misplaced. As we have previously recognized, the consideration exception is much broader than the charge or fee exception: 39 The language of the consideration exception itself suggests a broad reading. . . . The exception is worded not in narrow terms of fee or charge, but rather in the far more encompassing terms, for a consideration. Consideration is a term of art, a word with a well-understood meaning in the law, embracing any right, interest, profit or benefit. Used in a statute, it should be accorded that meaning. The statutory exception, then, is itself literally applicable to situations well beyond those involving a strict charging of a fee for permission to recreate. 40 Ducey, 713 F.2d at 510 (citations and footnote omitted). 41 The interpretation of the various recreational use statutes is controlled by the precise language of each statute. Wilson, 989 F.2d at 956. Thus, the only cases that will be applicable in analyzing the charge exception to the HRUS are cases interpreting statutes with the same language, i.e., the charge statutes. We therefore look only to those cases interpreting charge statutes in determining whether the Government is entitled to immunity under the HRUS and reject Howard's arguments that rely on cases interpreting consideration statutes. 42 In summary, we agree with the district court: 43 It is not enough [under the HRUS] for a landowner to have received a benefit in return for a third-party's privilege to charge people. 44 [ ] Here, MWR did not charge the Plaintiff or US Sailing for entry onto the land. Although MWR did receive a reduced fee for two of its employees, Plaintiff was paying for a service provided by US Sailing, similar to the services provided by the surf board concessionaires in Viess, or the inner tube renters in Jones. 45 [ ] The statute's purpose prevents a private landowner who allows the public onto its land from actually running a business or other venture for commercial profit, injuring someone and then disclaiming liability. It is clear that even on the day in question, the Government itself did not charge anyone for the use of its facility, and in fact, could have made money if it had charged US Sailing. 46 Because the Government did not impose a charge or fee for Howard to enter upon and use Hickam Harbor, Howard's use of the Government's property was without charge under the HRUS. 47