Opinion ID: 2390579
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's Taped Confession was Voluntary and Properly Admitted into Evidence

Text: Additionally, defendant contends that his confession should also have been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of his rights under the fifth amendment. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed. 2d 378, reh'g denied, 452 U.S. 973, 101 S.Ct. 3128, 69 L.Ed. 2d 984 (1981), prevents police-initiated custodial questioning of a suspect once that person has expressed a desire to deal with police only through counsel. Defendant's assertion that Edwards provided grounds for the suppression of all his statements is meritless. Hence, counsel's decision not to move to suppress cannot constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The initial conversations between defendant and police were neither custodial nor police-initiated. On both March 2nd and 3rd, Perry spoke with police but was free to leave at any time. He did in fact leave each day before completing the planned interviews. He was also repeatedly told he need not cooperate, yet freely returned to do so. One could not conclude that he was deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694, 706 (1966), or that he was subject to formal arrest or the restraint of freedom of movement normally associated with formal arrest. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed. 2d 1275 (1983). Neither the timing, atmosphere, police conduct, or defendant's response to that conduct at that time resembled the conduct criticized in the Supreme Court's latest application of the Edwards rule. Minnick v. Mississippi, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed. 2d 489 (1990) (where a defendant subject to custodial interrogation repeatedly made unequivocal requests to proceed only through counsel and was told that he could not refuse to talk to federal and state interrogators, his statements should be suppressed for violation of his fifth-amendment rights as protected by Edwards ). Nor was his questioning on March 4th police-initiated. Despite the fact that Perry's March 4th statements were doubtless made in a custodial context (due to his arrest on drug charges), they are still admissible. He `evince[d] a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation.' State v. Fuller, 118 N.J. 75, 82, 570 A. 2d 429 (1990) (quoting Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed. 2d 405 (1983)). He repeatedly expressed both his desire to assist with the murder investigation and his understanding that he did not have to cooperate. He never stated that he wished to deal only through counsel; in fact, he explicitly stated on March 3rd that he would proceed without counsel. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 101 n. 7, 96 S.Ct. 321, 325 n. 7, 46 L.Ed. 2d 313, 320 n. 7 (1975) (stating that suspect's decision to cut off questioning, unlike a request for counsel, does not raise presumption that the suspect is unable to proceed without lawyer's advice). Defendant returned to the police on the successive days expressing his desire to take the polygraph to clear himself of the murder and waived his rights before doing so on each day including March 4th. As he initiated the conversation himself, he does not fit within the Edwards rule. Nor does the record show that defendant's waiver of his right to counsel was involuntary or unintelligent. The prosecution has shown that Perry's waiver of the right to counsel and to remain silent was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. See State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 134, 548 A. 2d 887 (1988) ( Bey II ). He repeatedly expressed his eagerness to take the test to prove himself innocent. He repeated his desire to proceed without an attorney. The State met its burden under State v. Wright, 97 N.J. 113, 123, 477 A. 2d 1265 (1984), and Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 134, 548 A. 2d 887, by showing that his March 4th confession was not tainted by any drug use that day, by any prolonged questioning or abuse, or by any confusion over his right to remain silent. Likewise, the State did not violate any of the rules springing from Edwards. It cannot be said that Perry requested or chose to proceed only through counsel. In fact, he admits that he was very well treated and voluntarily spoke with police. This differs radically from Minnick, who claimed both mistreatment and persistent pressure. These facts assure that the coercive pressures of custody were not the inducing cause of his confession. Minnick, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 492, 112 L.Ed. 2d at 499. Counsel's refusal to contest the admissibility of a statement under such conditions was neither unreasonable nor prejudicial. Under the Strickland/Fritz standards, defendant's right to counsel was not violated by his attorney's failure to move to suppress evidence under the fourth and fifth amendments. Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth [or Fifth] Amendment claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also prove that his Fourth [or Fifth] Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice. [ Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2583, 91 L.Ed. 2d 305, 319 (1986)]. Since Perry cannot establish that his fourth or fifth amendment claim is meritorious, he has not cleared the first hurdle in establishing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.