Opinion ID: 2639278
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecutor's Opinion on Finley's Credibility

Text: The defendant argues the prosecutor improperly expressed her opinion regarding the veracity of the defendant and his witnesses. The defendant complains of the following: Tom and Denise Sklar both testified pretty consistently with each other, but their stories are incredible and they're virtually impossible to believe. What are the odds that they would pull up to the house at exactly the same time that the fire is breaking out, at exactly the same time that George LaMae was running down the stairs and coming out of the house? What are the odds of that? Isn't that just coincidental? That's a pretty big coincidence if it is. .... And don't forget all the inconsistencies that I pointed out in Tom's prior sworn testimony. He's said various things at various times, and the reason why people do that is because they can't keep all the lies straight. .... Again, there was no objection lodged by the defendant to any of the above comments. This court in State v. Pabst, 268 Kan. 501, 507, 996 P.2d 321 (2000), noted the following with respect to comments on witness credibility: Pabst's credibility was crucial to the case. The prosecutor placed before the jury unsworn testimony which it should not have considered: his personal opinion on Pabst's credibility and the credibility of the State's evidence. Stating facts not in evidence is clearly improper. [Citation omitted.] Accusing Pabst of lying goes far beyond the traditional wide latitude afforded to prosecutors in closing argument. [Citation omitted.] Inherent in this wide latitude is the freedom to craft an argument that includes reasonable inferences based on the evidence. When a case develops that turns on which of two conflicting stories is true, it may be reasonable to argue, based on evidence, that certain testimony is not believable. However, the ultimate conclusion as to any witness' veracity rests solely with the jury. The Pabst court reversed the conviction based on the prosecutor's having injected his personal opinion about the credibility of the defendant. 268 Kan. at 510-12. The prosecutor's argument in the present case was not improper. The prosecutor based her argument on an inference drawn from the nature of the defendant's conflicting stories, not on the prosecutor's knowledge of the defendant's veracity. Furthermore, the phrase they can't keep all the lies straight does not come close to the egregious manner in which the prosecutor in Pabst called the defendant a liar. See 268 Kan. at 505-06. As the comment purported to be based on evidence, not on the prosecutor's personal knowledge of the defendant's veracity, it cannot be said the prosecutor's comment denied the defendant a fair trial. The defendant further argues that the following comment by the prosecutor was improper: And Tom and Denise are the only ones that really have a motive to fabricate any lies in this case. He's not going tohe might admit to you that he uses drugs, that he used them, that he hangs out with people, but he's not going to admit that he made meth on this day because that would be admitting to felony murder. And Tom and Denise had plenty of time to get their stories straight, to conjure up what they were going to tell you all. The above comments constitute fair comment on the evidence concerning the defendant's motives. While Pabst informs us the use of the word lie or its derivative should be avoided by prosecutors, the above argument concerning motive is a fair comment based on reasonable inferences from the evidence. Furthermore, the fact that the defendant and Sklar had time to coordinate their stories is a fair observation. The defendant and Sklar first went to the defendant's mother's house after the fire, and then went to a hotel. During this time, they certainly had time to agree on their version of the morning's events. Last, the defendant complains of the following: And I'm sorry, but I just can't buy this story that Tom and Denise come up with that Tom was somewhat of a hero risking his life to go in and save these people in the house. It seems to me there was no remorse for LaDonna's injuries or her death. Only emotion that we saw from him or Denise came when they were testifying about his own injuries. Doesn't seem like a martyr to me. The defendant did not object to the above comment. While the prosecutor's comments are based on her belief that the defendant's story is incredible, to the extent she expresses her belief as to credibility she commits error. It is for the jury to resolve questions of credibility and it is improper for a prosecutor to express his or her personal belief about the credibility of witnesses testifying at trial. 268 Kan. at 507, 510. A prosecutor may, however, discuss the credibility of witnesses as revealed in the evidence presented at trial. Given our standard of review and the overwhelming evidence of guilt, we conclude that the above error had little likelihood of changing the result of the trial. We are able to conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.