Opinion ID: 1351466
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Duty to Instruct on Diminished Capacity

Text: (29a) Defendant contends that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on the lesser included offenses of second degree murder and involuntary manslaughter. Although maintaining his innocence, he contends alternatively that there was evidence in the record that he suffered from voluntary intoxication at the time of the murder and, as a result, lacked the specific intent to commit the felony underlying the murder conviction. The record reveals that defendant consumed an unspecified quantity of alcohol, and possibly marijuana and cocaine, at a party he attended shortly before the murder was committed. Two witnesses present at that party, Gary Eisenhauer and Laurie Snow, testified that defendant did not appear intoxicated: he was capable of holding a normal conversation, and did not walk irregularly when he left the party. [D]ue process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given only when the evidence warrants such an instruction. ( Hopper v. Evans (1982) 456 U.S. 605, 611 [72 L.Ed.2d 367, 373, 102 S.Ct. 2049]; accord, People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 325 [185 Cal. Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311].) (30) Evidence of intoxication sufficient to warrant a diminished capacity instruction can be established in several interrelated ways: (1) eyewitness testimony about a defendant's behavior; (2) expert testimony on the predictable pharmacological effects of the ingested substance; (3) evidence of the defendant's consumption of inordinate quantities of the intoxicating substance; and (4) the common knowledge of jurors of the effect of the intoxicants. ( People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1312 [248 Cal. Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221]; People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 156 [158 Cal. Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587]; People v. Carr (1972) 8 Cal.3d 287, 294 [104 Cal. Rptr. 705, 502 P.2d 513].) Our reasoning in People v. Carr, supra, 8 Cal.3d at page 295, with regard to marijuana intoxication, applies as well to other forms of inebriation: we are satisfied that, in the absence of evidence indicating the quantity of marijuana consumed or additional evidence reflecting the state of defendant's mind, a jury could not reasonably have concluded, in the light of the evidence in this case, that defendant by reason of intoxication did not premeditate or adequately deliberate. (29b) In the present case, the record contains no evidence either that defendant consumed an inordinate quantity of drugs or alcohol, or that his behavior actually demonstrated diminished capacity. Accordingly, the court committed no error in failing to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses based on defendant's failure to form a specific intent to commit the underlying felony.
(31) Defendant contends the court erred in failing to instruct the jurors sua sponte on the use of their notes during deliberations. The court has no such sua sponte obligation. ( People v. Guzman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 915, 948 [248 Cal. Rptr. 467, 755 P.2d 917].)

(32) Defendant contends that People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1147 [240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306], in which we overruled our holding in People v. Carlos (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131 [197 Cal. Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862] that a finding of special circumstances must include a finding of intent to kill, should not be applied retroactively. We rejected this argument in People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 326-327 [246 Cal. Rptr. 886, 753 P.2d 1082]. As in that case, the present case was tried before Carlos was decided. Given that Carlos concluded that the 1978 death penalty statute was ambiguous with respect to intent to kill, defendant's special circumstance culpability under the rule of Anderson was reasonably foreseeable, and its application to the present case therefore poses no ex post facto or due process problems.
(33) Defendant contends the jury's findings of special circumstances were inadequate: the jury should have made a special finding as to each element of the crime that forms the basis of the special circumstance finding, according to defendant's construction of section 190.4, subdivision (a). We have rejected the claim that a special circumstance finding must include specific factual findings, or explicit juror assent to each element of the crime. ( People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 273-275 [221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861].) It is sufficient that the jury return a finding, as it did in the present case, `on the truth of each alleged special circumstance.' ( Id. at p. 274, italics in original.)

(34) Defendant claims that several jurors were improperly excused because, while they were generally opposed to the death penalty, they did not make clear their categorical opposition to it as required by Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770]. The United States Supreme Court's position on death penalty exclusion was substantially modified in Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844], however, to allow exclusion when a prospective juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instruction and his oath.' ( Id. at p. 424 [83 L.Ed.2d at pp. 851-852, fn. omitted].) We adopted the Witt standard in People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 767 [239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250]. In this case, the veniremen in question were properly excused under either standard. Prospective juror Beasley repeatedly expressed his inability to vote for the death penalty under any circumstance. Under questioning by defense counsel the following exchange occurred: Defense Counsel: Say you learned during the evidence that the defendant was the worst conceivable type of person, that he did the worst conceivable type of act, and that he had no redeeming qualities at all, just a totally horrible person. Could you vote death under those conditions? Mr. Beasley: No. Defense Counsel: So you could never vote death for anybody? Mr. Beasley: No. Defense Counsel: Is that  under any type of situation? Mr. Beasley: No. Prospective juror Travis also expressed his unalterable opposition to the death penalty, under extensive questioning, as evinced by this exchange between him and the prosecutor: Mr. Kelberg: Mr. Travis, you said to the judge and in answer to all but the last question that you simply could not vote for the penalty of death in any case. Is that your state of mind? Mr. Travis: Yes. Defendant contends that, nonetheless, certain answers by prospective jurors Beasley and Travis were ambiguous, qualifying their death penalty opposition, and that their testimony, taken as a whole, does not disqualify them under the exacting Witherspoon standard. The record does not support the contention. Both veniremen agreed in the abstract, it is true, that they would endeavor to follow the judge's instructions and to fulfill their oath. But both, when confronted concretely with the prospect of voting for a death sentence, repeatedly stated their inability and unwillingness to do so. Moreover, if the record of a juror's death qualification is ambiguous, the trial court's determination on substantial evidence of the juror's fitness is binding on appellate courts. ( People v. Fields, supra, 35 Cal.3d 329, 356.) We therefore conclude that the court committed no error in excusing prospective jurors Beasley and Travis. In the case of prospective juror Stallworth, defendant concedes that Stallworth expressed unqualified opposition to the death penalty. Defendant objects rather to the court's disallowance of the following question that defense counsel directed at him: Do you think you could put your personal feelings aside and follow the judge's instruction on what the law is and what you're to do in the jury room? The prosecution objected on the ground that the prospective juror, having made abundantly clear his categorical opposition to the death penalty, had already disqualified himself from serving on the jury. He further contended that a question regarding whether the venireman could put his personal feelings aside was an improper one, because jurors are permitted to follow their personal feelings under California's death penalty law, within the prescribed statutory framework. The court sustained the objection. The prosecution's argument is only partially correct. Neither Witherspoon nor Witt, nor any of our cases, requires that jurors be automatically excused if they merely express personal opposition to the death penalty. The real question is whether the juror's attitude will `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' ( Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424 [83 L.Ed.2d at pp. 851-852], fn. omitted.) A prospective juror personally opposed to the death penalty may nonetheless be capable of following his oath and the law. A juror whose personal opposition toward the death penalty may predispose him to assign greater than average weight to the mitigating factors presented at the penalty phase may not be excluded, unless that predilection would actually preclude him from engaging in the weighing process and returning a capital verdict. Defense counsel's question was designed to identify such a juror. In this case, however, exclusion of that question was not error. Prospective juror Stallworth had made it repeatedly clear that he would never vote for the death penalty, never. His responses went beyond expressing simply his attitude toward the death penalty; they reflected rather his incapacity to vote for death. As such, the prospective juror had already disqualified himself, and to disallow further questioning in this regard was not improper.

Defendant was convicted in Florida of three felonies of breaking and entering with the intent to commit a misdemeanor, and one felony escape. The four prior felony convictions were among those introduced by the prosecution as aggravating factors under section 190.3, factor (c). Defendant objects to their admission on several grounds.
(35) Defendant contends the least adjudicated elements test of People v. Crowson (1983) 33 Cal.3d 623, 632-634 [190 Cal. Rptr. 165, 660 P.2d 389], devised to construe the meaning of prior foreign convictions under section 667.5, subdivision (f), applies as well to the meaning of the term prior felony conviction in section 190.3, factor (c). He then argues on various grounds that the crimes of which he was convicted in Florida would not have been felonies in California at the time, and hence those convictions should have been excluded from his penalty phase under the least-adjudicated-elements test. However, we rejected the application of the least-adjudicated-elements test to section 190.3, factor (c), in People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1038-1039 [264 Cal. Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627]. We concluded in that case, In the absence of limitation, a reference to `prior felony convictions' is deemed to include any prior conviction which was a felony under the laws of the convicting jurisdiction. ( Ibid. ) Defendant's claim is therefore meritless. [6]
(36) Defendant contends that our holding in People v. Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pages 1038-1039, i.e., that a prior conviction that was a felony under the law of the convicting jurisdiction is ipso facto admissible under section 190.3, factor (c), makes the use of such convictions unconstitutional. Although his argument is unclear, he appears to advance two separate theories. He first asserts that the use of such convictions violates equal protection of the laws because they would not have been admissible under section 190.3, factor (c), if they had arisen in California. To that extent, however, a defendant against whom they are admitted is not situated similarly to a defendant with prior California felony convictions. To use defendant's own example, such a defendant has no greater cause for complaint than a defendant against whom is admitted a prior felony conviction arising from conduct that might have been charged as  or bargained down to  a lesser offense in a different county of this state. Nor is any resulting discrimination invidious when, as in the case at bar, the defendant's conduct in the convicting state would in any event have been criminal to some degree in California. Defendant next claims the use of such convictions violates the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution because it results in arbitrary and unreliable sentencing. He appears to argue, without citation of authority, that a California jury does not have enough information to make a rational sentencing decision when it does not know the facts underlying an out-of-state conviction but merely the artificial label of the conviction itself. The argument is unpersuasive. A California jury does not know much more, if anything, about a conviction suffered in California. In any event, the fact that certain conduct is characterized as felonious by another state of this Union is more than a mere label; it represents the considered judgment of the people of that state that the conduct is so far below the norms of civilized behavior and morality that it deserves strong condemnation and significant punishment. For a California jury to give weight to such a felony conviction does not make its sentencing decision capricious and arbitrary within the meaning of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
Defendant was pardoned for his first breaking and entering offense by the State of Florida. (37) Defendant now argues that under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution, California must give full effect to this pardon, which would preclude use of the prior conviction in any manner in a new criminal proceeding (citing People v. Terry (1964) 61 Cal.2d 137, 147-148 [37 Cal. Rptr. 605, 390 P.2d 381]). Defense counsel did not raise this issue below, however, and it is deemed waived on appeal. Moreover, even if we found deficient performance by trial counsel for failure to raise this issue, there is no reasonable probability that excluding one of the three breaking and entering convictions would have affected the verdict. Therefore, defendant cannot make out a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on this basis.
(38) Defendant claims it was error to admit evidence of his conviction of escape from a California prison, an offense of which he was convicted in 1982 after the present murder had been committed. He is correct. As we held in People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 201-203 [222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480], prior conviction in this context means that the conviction, not merely the act for which the defendant was convicted, occurred prior to the commission of the capital offense. Because defense counsel did not object below to admission of the escape conviction, however, the issue is deemed waived on appeal. (Evid. Code, § 353.)
During opening argument the prosecutor alluded to the fact that defendant had been placed on probation after his first Florida breaking and entering offense, and that as a result of his violation of the terms of that probation he was committed to a Florida state prison. The prosecutor also introduced into evidence a document showing the probation revocation. (39) Defendant argues that his violation of the terms of probation was erroneously introduced, because the violation was neither the result of violent criminal activity nor a prior felony conviction. He claims that because the probation violation was not part of a class of activity defined by statute as aggravating, introduction of this evidence was erroneous. The claim has merit. Section 190.3 statutorily defines what kinds of evidence may be considered in aggravating a defendant's culpability, and evidence of bad conduct by the defendant that does not fit any statutory category is inadmissible. (See People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 772-776 [215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782].) Defense counsel did not object however, to either of the prosecutorial comments. Even if defendant had preserved his right to raise the issue on appeal, we can perceive no possibility of a different result absent this error. The jury's knowledge that defendant violated his probation in some unspecified manner approximately 20 years prior to his trial could hardly have figured significantly in its decision, given the circumstances of the crime and defendant's criminal record.
(40) Defendant argues that documents were introduced into evidence showing that he was charged, for each of the Florida breaking and entering offenses, with breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony, whereas he pleaded guilty only to breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor. He contends the introduction of the original charges against him, over his counsel's objection, was irrelevant to establishing his prior convictions and was therefore erroneous. The point is well taken. Because the Florida burglaries were nonviolent crimes, only evidence authenticating defendant's conviction for these crimes was relevant and admissible under section 190.3, factor (c). Unlike violent criminal activity admissible under factor (b), the charges leading to a conviction of a nonviolent crime are inadmissible. State-law error at the penalty phase of a capital trial is prejudicial if there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict. ( People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 448 [250 Cal. Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) Here, there was no possibility of prejudice from the erroneous admission of these documents. The charging papers included the names of the victims and a list of personal objects, which in each case appeared to add up to several hundred dollars. In each case, defendant pleaded guilty to breaking and entering with intent to commit petit larceny, that is, of taking less than $100 in property. We cannot conceive, given the small discrepancy between the amount of the theft charged and the amount of the theft of which defendant was convicted, that excluding the charging documents would have influenced the jury to choose a different penalty.
In his opening argument at the penalty phase the prosecutor referred to the fact that defendant's conviction of armed robbery was the result of a plea bargain in which he pleaded guilty to one count of armed robbery and had two counts of attempted armed robbery (against liquor store patrons) dismissed. The prosecutor defined the meaning of the term plea bargain as what I think the public refers to as a deal. (41) Defendant now contends that the prosecutor improperly raised the matter of the plea bargain, and that his comments on the bargain constituted prejudicial error. These claims are meritless. First, it is proper under section 190.3, factor (b), to introduce evidence of violent criminal activity, including alleged violent acts of which the defendant was not convicted because of a plea bargain. ( People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 755.) Only alleged violent criminal activity of which the defendant was acquitted is barred from admission under section 190.3. It was therefore proper to bring to the jury's attention all the circumstances of the liquor store robbery, including acts for which he was charged but was neither convicted nor acquitted. Second, the prosecutor did not comment adversely on the plea bargain. Although the term deal, in the context of the criminal justice system, may have a somewhat pejorative connotation, the prosecutor otherwise used fairly neutral descriptive language in discussing the bargain. (Cf. People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 755, fn. 16 [prosecutor referred to plea bargain as a break which [the defendant] did not deserve].) We therefore conclude that the prosecutor's reference to defendant's plea bargain in the Lee's Liquor Store robbery was not improper.
At the outset of the penalty phase, defendant made a motion to permit the playing of his entire tape-recorded interrogation by police detectives. (See pt. II.D, ante. ) He sought admission of the tapes because they recorded him making exculpatory statements, and reacting with apparent surprise to news of his stepdaughter's murder. The court denied the motion on the ground that the tapes were hearsay. (42) Defendant now contends the tapes were admissible for nonhearsay purposes and, even if hearsay, were sufficiently reliable to permit their admission in a capital trial. Defendant did not raise the issue of admissibility of the tape recordings for nonhearsay purposes at trial. He therefore may not do so on appeal. (See People v. Rogers, supra, 21 Cal.3d 542, 547-548.) As for his contention that the tapes should have been admitted under an exception to the hearsay rule, defendant relies on Green v. Georgia (1979) 442 U.S. 95 [60 L.Ed.2d 738, 99 S.Ct. 2150]. Green held that a defendant's due process rights are violated when hearsay testimony at the penalty phase of a capital trial is excluded, if both of the following conditions are present: (1) the excluded testimony is highly relevant to a critical issue in the punishment phase of the trial, and (2) there are substantial reasons to assume the reliability of the evidence. ( Id. at p. 97 [60 L.Ed.2d at p. 741]; see also People v. Harris (1984) 36 Cal.3d 36, 70 [201 Cal. Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433].) In Green v. Georgia, supra , the defendant attempted to prove, during the penalty phase of his trial, that he had not been present when the actual murder occurred. He sought to introduce statements by a cellmate of his codefendant, a prosecution witness (at the codefendant's separate trial), who was prepared to testify that the codefendant had said he was the sole murderer. The court found substantial indications of the reliability of the cellmate's testimony: there was significant corroborating evidence, the statement was against his penal interest, [7] and the prosecution itself had relied on the cellmate's testimony during its case. ( Green v. Georgia, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 97 [60 L.Ed.2d at p. 741].) In the present case there is no indication that defendant's exculpatory statements to detectives, made shortly after his arrest, were anything but self-serving. On the contrary, given the discredited alibi that appeared on the tapes, introduced during the guilt phase of the trial, there are affirmative reasons to believe the taped statements to be unreliable. As such, we find that the statements do not fall within the Green v. Georgia exception to the hearsay rule, or within any other exception.

(43) Defendant contends the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury explicitly that it may consider sympathy for the defendant as a mitigating factor. The court did instruct the jury on the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors, including the modified section 190.3, factor (k) instruction: under modified factor (k), the jury could consider any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, and any other aspect of the defendant's character or record that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. Such an instruction complies with the federal constitutional requirement that in the penalty phase of a capital case the jury not be precluded from considering any evidence in mitigation. (See People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 878, fn. 10 [196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813]; Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 110 [71 L.Ed.2d 1, 8, 102 S.Ct. 869].) There is no additional constitutional or statutory duty to explicitly instruct the jury sua sponte that sympathy for the defendant is a permissible basis for sentencing him to less than death.
The court instructed the jury that it could consider lingering doubt of defendant's guilt to be a factor in mitigation. [8] (44) The court refused the following lingering-doubt instruction offered by defendant: You have concluded that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. You may still demand a greater degree of certainty of guilt for the imposition of the death penalty. There is no requirement, under the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution, to instruct on a higher standard of proof of guilt at the penalty phase of a capital trial. (See Franklin v. Lynaugh (1988) 487 U.S. 164, 172-175 [101 L.Ed.2d 155, 164-167, 108 S.Ct. 2320].) Nor does California law require an instruction such as defendant proposed. As we held in People v. Terry, supra, 61 Cal.2d 137, 147, jurors may consider their doubts concerning defendant's guilt at the penalty phase of the trial. The lingering-doubt instruction given here by the court permitted the jury to consider such doubt as a mitigating factor, and no further instruction was necessary.
Defendant contends the jurors should not have been instructed on the factors listed in section 190.3 that were not applicable to the present case. We have rejected this contention. ( People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 104-105 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127].) (45) Defendant also maintains that in his closing argument the prosecutor improperly encouraged jurors to consider the absence of mitigating factors, thereby committing the error identified in People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d 247, 289-290. The record is otherwise: the prosecutor merely argued that various statutory mitigating factors were not applicable to defendant. This form of argument is not misconduct. ( People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 864 [258 Cal. Rptr. 184, 771 P.2d 1270].) Since the crux of the jury's decision is the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors, a prosecutor may properly comment on the absence of mitigating factors so long as the prosecutor refrains from suggesting that absence of mitigation is to be equated with aggravation. Here the prosecutor did not cross this line.
(46) Defendant claims it was error for the court to refuse the following instruction: You are instructed that the death penalty should be reserved for only the most aggravating of circumstances, circumstances that are so shocking or repugnant that the murder stands out above the norm or the background sets him apart from the usual murderer. Defendant asserts this or a similar instruction is required by Godfrey v. Georgia (1980) 446 U.S. 420 [64 L.Ed.2d 398, 100 S.Ct. 1759], in which the United States Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional a Georgia statute that permitted a person convicted of murder to receive the death penalty if his offense was found beyond a reasonable doubt to be `outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery of the victim.' ( Id. at p. 422 [64 L.Ed.2d at p. 403].) The court found that the Georgia statute did not adequately guide the discretion of jurors, since almost any murder could be characterized as `outrageous or wantonly vile.' ( Id. at pp. 428-429 [64 L.Ed.2d at p. 406].) From this, defendant in the present case, following language in State v. Watson (1981) 129 Ariz. 60 [628 P.2d 943, 946], extracts the asserted rule that courts are required by the Eighth Amendment to instruct that the death penalty should be reserved for those first degree murders possessing the most aggravating of circumstances. The contention is unmeritorious. The defect that the United States Supreme Court addressed in Godfrey v. Georgia ( supra, 446 U.S. 420) was the inability of the challenged Georgia law to guide juror discretion. California's statutory scheme represents a constitutionally adequate means of channeling jury discretion. (See Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 53 [79 L.Ed.2d 29, 42, 104 S.Ct. 871]; California v. Ramos (1983) 463 U.S. 992, 1002, fn. 19 [77 L.Ed.2d 1171, 1181-1183, 103 S.Ct. 3446].) It was not error to reject the instruction requested by defendant.
The jury was instructed that it was necessary to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had suffered the prior felony convictions introduced by the prosecutor in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (c), including therefore his conviction of the liquor store robbery in 1977. (47) The court failed to instruct, however, that violent criminal activity that did not result in conviction, introduced under section 190.3, factor (b), must also be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant contends the jury may have been inclined to believe the circumstances of the liquor store robbery, such as his choking of the store's proprietor, and to use these against him without having concluded that the acts occurred beyond a reasonable doubt. The failure to give a reasonable doubt instruction on violent criminal activity introduced under section 190.3, factor (b), was indeed error. (See People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1202 [240 Cal. Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301].) On this record, however, the error was harmless. Given the likelihood that the jurors believed beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had been convicted of the armed robbery in question, there was little additional effect in their hearing, without an additional reasonable doubt instruction, the rather mundane details of the robbery. Moreover, the details of the robbery, including the choking incident, were based on uncontradicted eyewitness testimony of one of the robbery victims, and were corroborated by defendant's own confession. There was no reasonable possibility that, had they received the proper instruction, the jury would have given less weight to the armed robbery conviction as an aggravating factor, less still a possibility that such a proposed additional instruction would have influenced the outcome of the penalty phase.
Defendant argues that because of the foregoing instructional deficiency the liquor store robbery evidence may have been counted twice as an aggravating factor, i.e., once as evidence of violent criminal activity and once as evidence of a prior felony conviction. Such dual counting, he maintains, is prejudicial error. We have rejected this argument. ( People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 764.)
During the penalty phase deliberations a juror was hospitalized and was replaced by an alternate. The jury was instructed to disregard earlier deliberations and begin deliberating anew. (48) Defendant contends, however, that the court erred in failing to instruct the replacement juror that the instruction to begin anew meant she was not bound by the other jurors' earlier determination of guilt, but could vote against the death penalty if she doubted defendant's guilt. The alternate juror was instructed, however, together with the other jurors, on the appropriateness of considering lingering doubt as a mitigating factor. Such an instruction made it clear that she could vote against the death penalty if she disagreed with the guilt phase verdict, and no further instruction was necessary.
During voir dire one prospective juror, in the presence of other venire members, told the prosecutor that her uncle had been convicted of murder for killing his wife, was sentenced to death, but served only seven years in prison and was then released. The prospective juror said these events occurred approximately 40 years ago. (49) Defendant contends this remark raised the possibility of commutation of the death sentence in the minds of the jurors, thereby triggering the court's sua sponte duty to instruct the jury not to consider the possibility of such commutation in reaching their verdict at the penalty phase. He bases his claim on our holding in People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 153-159 [207 Cal. Rptr. 800, 689 P.2d 430], in which we held that the so-called Briggs Instruction, informing the jury of the Governor's power to commute a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole, violates the due process clause of the California Constitution. Defendant argues that the prospective juror's remark here operated in substance like a Briggs Instruction, inducing the jury to speculate improperly on the possibility of commutation. We considered a similar claim of Ramos error in People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 769-770. In that case, during voir dire, the prosecutor raised the possibility of commuting a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. We concluded that unlike the Briggs Instruction, which is given at a time when the jury is narrowly focused on the penalty phase, an offhand remark made during voir dire was not likely to prejudice the jury. ( Id. at p. 770.) We believe Ghent 's conclusion is sound, particularly in light of the detriment as well as the benefit that such an instruction may cause the defendant. Because an instruction on disregarding commutation may have precisely the opposite effect, it is prudent to withhold the instruction unless there is good reason to believe that jurors will actively consider commutation during their penalty phase deliberations. In the present case, the voir dire remark was even less likely to be prejudicial than the statement objected to in Ghent ( supra, 43 Cal.3d 739). Here the remark was made not by a prosecutor assumed to know the law, but by a fellow prospective juror. The prospective juror did not raise the possibility of commutation of the present defendant's sentence, but simply related an anecdote open to several interpretations and which, having occurred 40 years ago, would be considered of dubious relevance from any other juror's standpoint. We conclude that this anecdotal remark, made so early in the proceeding, did not trigger a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury to ignore the possibility of commutation.
(50a) Defendant contends the prosecutor erroneously introduced evidence on the possibility of his escape from state prison, and then proceeded to argue the point to the jury. The contention lacks merit. During the penalty phase the prosecutor called as a witness a correctional officer from the Pilot Rock facility from which defendant had escaped in 1979. During direct examination, the prosecutor elicited an admission from the witness that both murderers and persons convicted of violent crimes were sent to that facility. Reading these remarks in context, we agree with defendant that a fair inference to be drawn from this line of inquiry was that defendant might be sent to a similar facility and might again escape. Defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's admittedly improper questions. On cross-examination, the correctional officer conceded that persons sentenced to life imprisonment without parole were not sent to the Pilot Rock facility but to more secure prisons  Folsom and San Quentin. Probably to further counter the correction officer's testimony, defendant called Gary Ducat, Chief of Classification Services for the California Department of Corrections. Defense counsel asked Ducat about the level of security that would be imposed on defendant, eliciting answers that underscored the near impossibility of escape. On cross-examination, over objection, the prosecution was able to elicit from Ducat that (1) those placed in the highest security classification, level 4, had in fact succeeded in escaping; (2) those convicted of life imprisonment without parole might have their security classification downgraded to less than maximum; and (3) correctional authorities have sometimes made mistakes in their security classifications. Objections to some of the prosecutor's questions, such as a question concerning a particular escaped prisoner, were sustained by the court. We have cautioned against the use of expert testimony to establish future dangerousness at the penalty phase of a capital trial. ( People v. Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 767-775 [175 Cal. Rptr. 738, 631 P.2d 446].) Because of the unreliable yet potentially persuasive nature of the testimony, we found that the probative value of [such] testimony is far outweighed by its prejudicial impact. ( Id. at p. 773.) The same principle applies to testimony concerning the possibility of escape from prison. Such testimony is inherently speculative, and may be highly prejudicial in undermining juror confidence in the sentence of life imprisonment without parole as an alternative to death. Here, however, we have a quite different situation. Defense counsel attempted to suggest to the jury that it should consider impossibility of escape as a mitigating factor, and the prosecutor was merely disputing the factual basis of that argument. It is true that it was the prosecutor who initially raised the specter of escape. But defense counsel could have stopped this line of inquiry by a timely objection, yet failed to do so. Had the prosecutor gone further and suggested that ease of escape was an additional reason for sentencing defendant to death, such a claim would have been misconduct. But so long as he confined himself to challenging defendant's argument, no misconduct occurred. In his closing argument the prosecutor referred to Ducat's testimony and the entire issue of prison escape only to suggest that it be given little weight in determining defendant's culpability: he stated, You're to assume, as you should assume, that the Department of Corrections will fulfill its responsibilities. But what I ask you is what is the mitigation? Where is there any in bringing in Mr. Ducat to say what is available in every case, that this is the security facility for people who are sentenced to life without possibility of parole and certainly the same or more applies to a person sentenced to death? How does that in any way, shape or form mitigate this defendant's background, character, the way he committed these crimes, what he did to Monique ... ? (51) Although defendant is given wide latitude to introduce all types of mitigating evidence, the prosecutor is not precluded from urging that some of that evidence should be given little weight. Had he argued that the jury was not permitted to consider such evidence in mitigation, the argument would have been erroneous. But here he merely asserted there was little moral significance, and therefore little relevance at the penalty phase, to the fact that defendant would probably not escape. Finally, the court instructed the jury, as requested by defense counsel, that, You are not to consider or speculate that in the future prison officials might be ineffective in the discharge of their duties and permit the defendant to escape. (50b) Thus, whatever improper suggestions were raised by the prosecutor concerning the possibility of defendant's escape from prison were neutralized by defendant's own evidence, by subsequent prosecutorial comment, and by a proper jury instruction.
(52) Defendant asserts that the prosecutor's closing argument, combined with an erroneous jury instruction, misled the jury as to its sentencing responsibility. Specifically, he contends that the jury was led to believe that its sole task was to determine whether the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and, if so, to vote for death. Defendant also urges the related point that the jurors, so instructed, were erroneously made to feel they did not bear ultimate responsibility for sentencing, but that the sentence was determined by the law. While there is superficial support for defendant's position, a reading of the entire record leads us to reject these arguments. In People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d 512, 538-544, reversed on other grounds sub nom. California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 107 S.Ct. 837] (hereafter Brown ), we recognized that to instruct in terms of the mandatory language of section 190.3, as embodied in former CALJIC No. 8.84.2, [9] could lead the jurors to mistakenly believe that their obligation was to mechanically weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors and arrive at a penalty verdict accordingly. As we explained in People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1276-1280 [232 Cal. Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115], Brown recognized that the instruction could lead the jury into two types of error: (1) misleading the jury to believe that the weighing process is a mechanical counting of factors; and (2) misleading the jury to believe that the result of the weighing of factors determines the verdict, without regard to the jurors' personal assessment that the penalty is appropriate ... under all circumstances. ( Id. at p. 1277.) As we further explained in Brown ( supra, 40 Cal.3d 512), the reason for construing section 190.3 to require jury determination of appropriateness stems from the unique nature of the capital sentencing process. A jury that is asked merely to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances may believe it is being asked to balance what is good and bad about a defendant. But, It would be rare indeed to find mitigating evidence which could redeem ... an offender [convicted of first degree murder with special circumstances] or excuse his conduct in the abstract. ( People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 542, fn. 13.) The jury must be made to understand, rather, that it is not determining whether there is more good than bad in the defendant, but whether the `bad' evidence is so substantial in comparison with the `good' that it warrants death instead of life without parole.  ( Ibid., italics in original.) Instructing the jury that it must determine the appropriateness of the death sentence in all the circumstances clarifies the true nature of the jury's decision as a choice between the law's ultimate and penultimate penalties. In People v. Milner, supra, 45 Cal.3d 227, 253-258, we recognized the interaction between Brown error and the constitutional error identified in Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320 [86 L.Ed.2d 231, 105 S.Ct. 2633] (hereafter Caldwell ). Caldwell held it was constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of defendant's death rests elsewhere. ( Id. at pp. 328-329 [80 L.Ed.2d at p. 239].) In Milner the court recognized that under a certain variant of Brown error prosecutors might not only mislead jurors into believing they do not need to determine the appropriateness of death, but might further lead them to believe it is not they but the law that bears the ultimate responsibility for determining the sentence. Thus, in Milner we found Caldwell error when the prosecutor assured the jurors again and again that they did not have to `shoulder the burden of personal responsibility,' told them again and again that the law `protects' them from deciding what is `just and right,' and even encouraged them to `hide' behind the law. ( People v. Milner, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 257.) In determining whether Brown or Caldwell error has occurred, We do not reach our conclusion based on any single statement uttered by the prosecutor. Rather, we consider the instructions of the court and the arguments of both prosecutor and defense counsel. ( People v. Milner, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 257.) We look especially to the structure of the prosecution's argument, i.e., the extent to which the prosecutor emphasized the mandatory and automatic nature of the sentencing function, versus the prosecutor's emphasis on the discretionary nature of the jury's task. (See, e.g., People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 924-933 [254 Cal. Rptr. 508, 765 P.2d 940] (lead opn. and separate conc. opn. of Eagleson, J.; People v. Hendricks (1989) 44 Cal.3d 635, 650 [244 Cal. Rptr. 181, 749 P.2d 836].) Thus, in some cases we have found that prosecutorial emphasis on each juror's discretion in assigning weights to the aggravating and mitigating factors was itself sufficient to offset contrary prosecutorial arguments that stressed confinement of jury discretion or lack of jury responsibility. (See, e.g., People v. Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d 991, 1033-1035; People v. Hendricks, supra, 44 Cal.3d 635, 652-653.) In other cases we have held that even when prosecutorial argument concedes that jurors have discretion in the weighing process, the argument's emphasis on the compulsory nature of section 190.3 or the lack of jury responsibility may be so strong as to overwhelm such ameliorative language. (See, e.g., People v. Farmer, supra, 47 Cal.3d 888, 924-933 (lead opn. and separate conc. opn. of Eagleson, J.); People v. Milner, supra, 45 Cal.3d 227, 254-256.) In the present case defendant points to several statements made by the prosecutor that he contends support a finding of both Brown and Caldwell error. One such statement came after the prosecutor had read the first part of the former CALJIC No. 8.84.2  i.e., If you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of death  emphasizing the words shall impose a sentence of death. The prosecutor then stated: You do not have the discretion. Once you have made the weighing process and formed in your own mind the weight to be given to these aggravating and mitigating factors, under this law you have taken an oath to uphold it is your duty to return a verdict of death. Then, reading the second part of CALJIC No. 8.84.2, pertaining to mitigating circumstances that equal or outweigh aggravating circumstances, the prosecutor stated: In other words, the law says you shall, once you have done this weighing process  finding the mitigating circumstances equal or outweigh the aggravating circumstances  even if you feel `I'd like to vote for the death penalty,' you cannot and you must not, because the law says you shall impose life without possibility of parole. The prosecutor next read an instruction emphasizing each juror's discretion in assigning the weight to be given to each of the aggravating and mitigating factors, and concluded: But once you have assigned the weight to these factors and then decide which outweighs the other or if they're equally balanced, the law tells you what the verdict is. In contrast to these statements, however, the prosecutor also stressed juror discretion at several points. First, as mentioned, he emphasized each juror's discretion to assign weights to the aggravating and mitigating factors: You are instructed that you may return a verdict of life without possibility of parole even though you should find the presence of one or more aggravating circumstances. Any mitigating circumstance standing alone may be sufficient for you to return a verdict of life without possibility of parole, provided that the mitigating circumstance or circumstances equals or outweighs the aggravating circumstances. You assign the weight to these factors. That is your decision. Moreover, at the close of his argument, instead of returning to the theme of section 190.3's mandatory nature, the prosecutor emphasized and expanded on the overall discretionary aspect of the jury's sentencing decision. In the context of a discussion of the role of lingering doubt, the prosecutor made the following statement: But I'll tell you. If you don't feel that confident in your own mind that you could live with yourself with a verdict of death, then vote for life without parole. I want you to be confident and comfortable, not in the sense that you get any pleasure out of voting for death  who could?  but comfortable in the sense that it is the right verdict. This statement, with its sweeping language, could well be understood to transcend its particular context. Although the prosecutor was arguing at that point that the jurors should choose the death penalty only if they were confident that defendant was the actual murderer, they could also understand the statement to mean they should not return a verdict of death unless they were comfortable with it  in other words, unless they judged the death verdict to be appropriate in all the circumstances. Thus, the prosecutor, rather than closing his argument with a neat syllogistic conclusion that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating and therefore the jury must choose death, instead told the jurors to consult their personal sense of the penalty's propriety. Moreover, taken as a whole, the prosecutor's statements concerning a mandatory aspect of section 190.3 were a relatively minor part of his total closing argument; most of the argument was spent in discussing the applicability of the various aggravating and mitigating factors enumerated in section 190.3. On the other hand, the prosecutor made a number of statements that reasonably led the jurors to believe they had a good deal of discretion, both in terms of assigning weight to the aggravating and mitigating factors and in terms of feeling comfortable with the verdict. Nor does the prosecutor's argument as a whole convey to the jurors that sentencing responsibility lies anywhere but with them. In these circumstances we conclude that the prosecutor's argument in its totality acknowledged jury discretion and responsibility sufficiently to escape Brown or Caldwell error. [10]
In his closing argument the prosecutor made several references to the jury as the conscience of the community, and asked for the death penalty on the ground, inter alia, that it would show that society has the courage to impose a just punishment in this case. (53) Defendant now contends such remarks constituted an impermissible appeal to the emotions of the jury. He failed to object to the remarks when they were made, however, and a timely admonition would have cured any prejudice they might have caused. He therefore cannot complain of the remarks on appeal. ( People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 34.) In any event, we recently held that a similar argument was not improper. ( People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1268-1269.)
Defendant advances several challenges to the death penalty statute as such: i.e., that the law is unconstitutional because it does not require the jury (1) to find beyond a reasonable doubt each aggravating factor it relied on, or (2) to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, or (3) to find beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate penalty. We have rejected these contentions (see, e.g., People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 777-779 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113]), and defendant advances no reason for reassessing our position.
(54) Defendant requests that we review his sentence to determine whether it is disproportionate to those of others convicted of similar crimes. Such review is not required by the federal Constitution ( Pulley v. Harris, supra, 465 U.S. 37) or under California law ( People v. Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d 306, 348). (55) Imposition of a sentence grossly disproportionate to the offense for which it is imposed is a violation of the prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment under article I, section 17, of the California Constitution. ( People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 478 [194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697].) In this case, the sentence of death is not disproportionate to the crimes of sexual molestation and murder of a 12-year-old girl.