Opinion ID: 2133639
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Involuntary Manslaughter Jury Instructions

Text: We initially note that defendant's argument on this issue is less than clear. What is consistent throughout defendant's arguments before the trial court, appellate court, and before this court is a general argument that the jury was entitled to determine if the defendant acted recklessly, in the form of an involuntary manslaughter instruction. Therefore, defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing that instruction. This court reviews a court's decision to decline to give an instruction under the abuse of discretion standard. People v. DiVincenzo, 183 Ill.2d 239, 249, 233 Ill.Dec. 273, 700 N.E.2d 981 (1998). We have adopted and applied the charging instrument approach to determine if one offense is a lesser-included offense of a charged offense so that jury instructions can be given for the lesser-included offense. People v. Novak, 163 Ill.2d 93, 106-14, 205 Ill.Dec. 471, 643 N.E.2d 762 (1994); People v. Hamilton, 179 Ill.2d 319, 324, 228 Ill.Dec. 189, 688 N.E.2d 1166 (1997). Under this approach, we analyze whether: (1) the charging instrument includes `a broad foundation or main outline' of the lesser-included offense so that it can be considered a lesser-included offense; and (2) the evidence at trial rationally could support a conviction for the lesser-included offense. People v. Ceja, 204 Ill.2d 332, 360-61, 273 Ill.Dec. 796, 789 N.E.2d 1228 (2003), quoting People v. Baldwin, 199 Ill.2d 1, 11, 262 Ill.Dec. 9, 764 N.E.2d 1126 (2002). Under the first step, we have traditionally looked to the indictment or information when conducting this analysis. People v. Ceja, 204 Ill.2d 332, 361, 273 Ill.Dec. 796, 789 N.E.2d 1228 (2003); People v. Hamilton, 179 Ill.2d 319, 324-25, 228 Ill.Dec. 189, 688 N.E.2d 1166 (1997); People v. Jones, 175 Ill.2d 126, 135, 221 Ill.Dec. 843, 676 N.E.2d 646 (1997); People v. Landwer, 166 Ill.2d 475, 491-92, 211 Ill.Dec. 465, 655 N.E.2d 848 (1995); People v. Novak, 163 Ill.2d 93, 115-16, 205 Ill.Dec. 471, 643 N.E.2d 762 (1994). The trial court allowed the State's motion to dismiss count I of the indictment, leaving only count II, the felony-murder count. Count II of the amended indictment in this case provided: FIRST DEGREE (FELONY) MURDER  in that said defendant, without lawful justification, while committing Mob Action, a felony which involved the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/25-1(a)(1), beat and kicked Richard L. Skelton, and thereby caused the death of Richard L. Skelton, all in violation of 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3), and against the peace and dignity of the People of the State of Illinois. Count II does not specify any mental state as to the killing. As discussed above, the statutory definition of felony murder does not indicate a mental state for the killing (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2002)), and we have confirmed that the offense of felony murder does not include an intent to kill ( Viser, 62 Ill.2d at 581, 343 N.E.2d 903). The Criminal Code describes involuntary manslaughter as follows: A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly   . 720 ILCS 5/9-3(a) (West 1998). Accordingly, this statutory definition clearly specifies that a perpetrator must have a reckless mental state to be guilty of involuntary manslaughter. A lesser-included offense is an offense proven by lesser facts or a lesser mental state, or both, than the charged offense. Hamilton, 179 Ill.2d at 324, 228 Ill.Dec. 189, 688 N.E.2d 1166; 720 ILCS 5/2-9 (West 2002). Therefore, for involuntary manslaughter to be a lesser-included offense of felony murder, the felony-murder count must include a more culpable or equally culpable mental state as involuntary manslaughter. Felony murder as described in defendant's indictment does not include a culpable mental state as to the killing while the offense of involuntary manslaughter requires a reckless mental state. Thus, the charging instrument does not include a broad outline of involuntary manslaughter. Involuntary manslaughter is not a lesser-included offense of felony murder in this case. See People v. McCarroll, 168 Ill.App.3d 1020, 1023, 119 Ill.Dec. 682, 523 N.E.2d 150 (1988); People v. Ellis, 93 Ill.App.3d 981, 984, 49 Ill.Dec. 444, 418 N.E.2d 88 (1981); People v. Weathers, 18 Ill.App.3d 338, 345-46, 309 N.E.2d 795 (1974); but see People v. Golden, 29 Ill.App.3d 502, 507, 331 N.E.2d 134 (1975). In light of this conclusion, we need not reach the second step of the charging instrument approach, the evaluation of whether the evidence at trial could rationally support a conviction for involuntary manslaughter. Ceja, 204 Ill.2d at 361, 273 Ill.Dec. 796, 789 N.E.2d 1228. In the alternative, defendant argues that even if involuntary manslaughter is not a lesser-included offense of felony murder in this case, evidence at trial supports the defense theory that defendant acted recklessly so that defendant could have been found guilty of the less serious, though not included, offense of involuntary manslaughter. As a result, the involuntary manslaughter instructions should have been given. A defendant is entitled to have the jury be instructed on defense theories about which there is at least slight evidence. People v. Everette, 141 Ill.2d 147, 156, 152 Ill.Dec. 377, 565 N.E.2d 1295 (1990). It is permissible for such instructions to address alternative theories that are inconsistent so long as each has support in the trial record. Everette, 141 Ill.2d at 156, 152 Ill.Dec. 377, 565 N.E.2d 1295. Defense theories typically provide affirmative defenses to or mitigation of the charged offenses. See, e.g., People v. Spears, 112 Ill.2d 396, 402, 98 Ill.Dec. 9, 493 N.E.2d 1030 (1986) (the defendant asserted theory that shootings were unintentional, so he tendered jury instructions on reckless conduct as a lesser-included offense of armed violence); Everette, 141 Ill.2d at 150, 152 Ill.Dec. 377, 565 N.E.2d 1295 (the defendant tendered self-defense instructions on homicide case). As we recently explained, [t]he controlling principles are quite settled. A defendant generally may not be convicted of an offense for which the defendant has not been charged. However, in an appropriate case, the defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on less serious offenses that are included in the charged offense. Ceja, 204 Ill.2d at 359, 273 Ill.Dec. 796, 789 N.E.2d 1228. In other words, while a defendant may assert theories to try to mitigate or rebut responsibility for charged offenses, the defendant cannot argue responsibility for less serious, but unrelated, offenses which were not charged. Defendant objects that this case demonstrates how the prosecutor can use this principle to preclude the giving of an involuntary manslaughter instruction by dismissing a knowing or intentional first-degree murder charge and proceeding on only a felony-murder charge. We have already explained why this objection is unpersuasive: [T]he State's Attorney is vested with exclusive discretion in the initiation and management of a criminal prosecution. That discretion includes the choice of which charges shall be brought. A criminal does not have the right to choose his or her prosecution or punishment. Ceja, 204 Ill.2d at 362, 273 Ill.Dec. 796, 789 N.E.2d 1228; see also People v. Novak, 163 Ill.2d 93, 113, 205 Ill.Dec. 471, 643 N.E.2d 762 (1994). The United States Supreme Court has taken the same position. In Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88, 118 S.Ct. 1895, 141 L.Ed.2d 76 (1998), a defendant, indicted on two counts of first degree felony murder, requested jury instructions on second degree murder and manslaughter. The trial court refused to give the instructions because they are not lesser-included offenses of felony murder under Nebraska law. The Nebraska Court of Appeals held that the instruction should have been given. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, explaining: Almost all States    provide instructions only on those offenses that have been deemed to constitute lesser included offenses of the charged crime. [Citation.] We have never suggested that the Constitution requires anything more. The Court of Appeals in this case, however, required    that an instruction be given on some other offense    when no lesser included offense exists. Such a requirement is not only unprecedented, but also unworkable. Under such a scheme, there would be no basis for determining the offenses for which instructions are warranted. The Court of Appeals apparently would recognize a constitutional right to an instruction on any offense that bears a resemblance to the charged crime and is supported by the evidence. Such an affirmative obligation is unquestionably a great [ ]limitation on a State's prerogative to structure its criminal law   . (Emphasis in original.) Hopkins, 524 U.S. at 96-97, 118 S.Ct. at 1901, 141 L.Ed.2d at 85. In light of Ceja and Hopkins, we hold that a trial court need not allow a defendant's request to have the jury instructed on offenses that are less serious, but not included, offenses to those offenses for which he or she was charged regardless of whether the evidence at trial could support the less serious offense. We note defendant makes no argument that the trial court erred in dismissing count I of the indictment. Therefore, the trial court properly refused to give defendant's tendered involuntary manslaughter instructions on the remaining count of the indictment.