Opinion ID: 534832
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: enforcement of discovery orders

Text: 10 Without disputing that he missed two deadlines for designating expert witnesses, 5 as recited above, Geiserman complains that the district court improperly prevented him from presenting expert testimony to support his claims of legal malpractice against Attorney. 11 The court's order striking the late expert witness designation and precluding any expert witness testimony involves both the enforcement of a scheduling order and the enforcement of local rules. We review either type of order under the abuse of discretion standard. See Bradley v. United States, 866 F.2d 120, 124 (5th Cir.1989) (amendment of pretrial order); Sturgeon v. Airborne Freight Corp., 778 F.2d 1154, 1157-58 (5th Cir.1985) (refusal to allow expert testimony because of late designation). 12 Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the district court to control and expedite pretrial discovery through a scheduling order. Consistent with the authority vested in the trial court by rule 16, our court gives the trial court broad discretion to preserve the integrity and purpose of the pretrial order. Hodges v. United States, 597 F.2d 1014, 1018 (5th Cir.1979) (affirmed refusal to modify pre-trial order); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b), Advisory Committee Note (trial court may modify scheduling order for good cause). Moreover, a trial court's decision to exclude evidence as a means of enforcing a pretrial order must not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. See Davis v. Duplantis, 448 F.2d 918, 921 (5th Cir.1971); Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(f) (court may sanction party's failure to comply with scheduling order by excluding evidence). 13 We review the court's exercise of discretion to exclude evidence that was not properly designated by considering the following four factors: (1) the explanation for the failure to identify the witness; (2) the importance of the testimony; (3) potential prejudice in allowing the testimony; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice. Bradley, 866 F.2d at 125 (citing Murphy v. Magnolia Electric Power Ass'n, 639 F.2d 232, 235 (5th Cir.1981)). Preliminarily, we note that in excluding the evidence, the court was merely enforcing the deadlines plainly set out in the court order and local rule for designating witnesses. 14 The reasons offered by Geiserman for his failure to timely designate are weak, at best. He asserts that the pretrial order did not specify a deadline date for designation. This is incredible, because the scheduling order and local rule 8.1(c) plainly impose a deadline to designate his expert witnesses at least 90 days before trial. One does not require a legal degree to count back 90 days from the scheduled trial date of December 5, which the pretrial order contained. The second excuse, that the omission resulted from a scheduling mistake in counsel's office, is not the type of satisfactory explanation for which relief may be granted. See Sturgeon v. Airborne Freight Corp., 778 F.2d 1154, 1158 (5th Cir.1985) (plaintiff should have been aware of need for expert testimony and claim of last minute need is meritless). 15 The next factor for our consideration involves the relative importance of the excluded testimony. In his response to Attorney's motion to exclude expert testimony, Geiserman stated that expert testimony would be useful to assist the jury in determining complex issues, but he also stated that some of his claims of malpractice could be proven without expert testimony. Subsequently, however, he stated that expert testimony was essential for complete proof of the majority of the malpractice claims against the [Attorney Defendants. While expert testimony is necessary to establish the standard of care and possible breach in most legal malpractice cases, such testimony is not critical if the allegation of negligence is apparent to a lay person or established as a matter of law. 6 We shall assume arguendo that expert testimony was significant to Geiserman's case--so much the more reason to be sure its introduction was properly grounded. 16 Geiserman argues that a delay of a couple weeks in designating the expert witness would not have caused any prejudice to Attorney. Such delay, however, would have disrupted the court's discovery schedule and the opponent's preparation. Attorney stated that his own trial strategy was affected by Geiserman's extensive delay in answering interrogatories and similar delay in designating any expert witness. Attorney explained that he chose and designated his own expert witness in reliance on Plaintiff's apparent decision to forgo expert testimony. 7 Attorney also argued that he would be unable to prepare for and take the depositions of Geiserman's proposed experts before the discovery deadline of October 3. Turner also mentioned the expense that would result from an extended discovery schedule for Geiserman's failure to adhere to deadlines. Although Attorney might not suffer the degree of unfair surprise associated with the last-second designation of an unscheduled witness, see Bradley, 866 F.2d at 125, the trial court has latitude to control discovery abuses and cure prejudice by excluding improperly designated evidence. 17 The final factor we should consider is the possibility of a continuance. Although Geiserman mentioned to the lower court that he was contemplating a requested continuance in order to prepare his proposed expert witness, counsel never formally requested a continuance from the court. In fact, in a brief to the court Geiserman stated: the Plaintiff is anxious for the trial of this case to proceed and does not want any delay of his day in court. While Attorney could have conducted new discovery and redeposed witnesses under a continuance in response to the untimely designation, this would have resulted in additional delay and increased the expense of defending the lawsuit. Moreover, a continuance would not deter future dilatory behavior, nor serve to enforce local rules or court imposed scheduling orders. See Bradley, 866 F.2d at 126. 18 Consequently, the court's refusal to modify the scheduling order and its enforcement of the time deadlines did not abuse its discretion. See Sexton v. Gulf Oil Corp., 809 F.2d 167, 170 (1st Cir.1987) (court affirmed preclusion of testimony due to untimely designation of expert witness). Geiserman has not provided a valid reason that would justify excusing him from the deadlines imposed by the lower court. The claimed importance of expert testimony underscores the need for Geiserman to have timely designated his expert witness so that Attorney could prepare for trial. 8 The inportance of such proposed testimony cannot singularly override the enforcement of local rules and scheduling orders. Cf. Hull v. Eaton Corp., 825 F.2d 448, 452 (D.C.Cir.1987) (court may sanction unexcused failure to designate witness by precluding testimony without first determining how badly the party needs the witness). 19 Regardless of Geiserman's intentions, or inattention, which led to the flouting of discovery deadlines, such delays are a particularly abhorrent feature of today's trial practice. They increase the cost of litigation, to the detriment of the parties enmeshed in it; they are one factor causing disrespect for lawyers and the judicial process; and they fuel the increasing resort to means of non-judicial dispute resolution. Adherence to reasonable deadlines is critical to restoring integrity in court proceedings. We will not lightly disturb a court's enforcement of those deadlines and find no reason for doing so here. The court did not abuse its discretion in striking Geiserman's untimely witness designation and precluding Geiserman's expert testimony. 9