Opinion ID: 1131496
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: termination of probation

Text: Smith's first claim of error is that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation. Smith bases this claim on two alternative theories: (1) Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a) (Supp. 1984), which limits the time a court may place a person on probation to eighteen months, was applicable to Smith at the time of his revocation hearing, and (2) under the express terms of his probation order, his probation terminated prior to the time the court obtained jurisdiction.
The trial court's power to grant, modify, or revoke probation is purely statutory, and although a trial court has discretion in these matters, the court's discretion must be exercised within the limits imposed by the legislature. [12] In the past, we have held that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to revoke probation when it acts outside the scope of its legislative authority. [13] At the time Smith was placed on probation, Utah's probation statute, Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1984), did not limit the length of time a person convicted of a felony could be placed on probation. [14] Prior or to Smith's revocation hearing, however, the legislature amended section 77-18-1, limiting the time a person convicted of a felony can be placed on probation to eighteen months. [15] Smith claims that even though he was placed on probation under the 1981 statute, the 1984 statute should apply to his case because it was in effect at the time of his revocation hearing. We disagree with this contention and hold that the 1984 statute does not apply to this case. Initially, it should be noted that under traditional statutory analysis, the 1984 amendments should not apply retroactively. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (Supp. 1984) provides that no part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared. The amendments to section 77-18-1 did not expressly state that they should be applied retroactively. [16] There is, however, an exception to the rule of non-retroactivity, set out in section 68-3-3, for statutes that are procedural or remedial in nature. [17] A statute is considered procedural or remedial, as opposed to substantive, if the statute does not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested rights. [18] The amendment in question, section 77-18-1(10)(a) (Supp. 1984), limits the time a person can be placed on probation, thereby enlarging the rights of an individual who is placed on probation. The amendment is therefore substantive and, pursuant to section 68-3-3, should not apply retroactively. Plaintiff contends, however, that there are additional considerations involved with amendments that lessen the penalty for criminal offenses. He cites a line of cases which hold that when a statute is amended to lessen the penalty for a criminal offense, a person convicted of the offense is entitled to the lesser penalty if the amendment becomes effective prior to the time the person is sentenced. [19] He argues that this rule supports the contention that individuals who are placed on probation are entitled to the benefit of any statutory amendments that become effective prior to their revocation hearings. His reliance on these cases, however, is misplaced. The rule set out in the cases cited by plaintiff is applicable only to situations in which the amendment that lessens the criminal penalty becomes effective prior to the time a criminal defendant is sentenced. [20] We have consistently held that in such situations, the law in force at the time of sentencing govern[s] and ... that an amendment to [a] statute passed after sentence has no effect on the matter. [21] This approach is based on Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-5 (Supp. 1984), which states, [The] repeal of a statute does not revive a statute previously repealed, or affect any right which has accrued, any duty imposed, any penalty incurred, or any action or proceeding commenced under or by virtue of the statute repealed. When a person has been sentenced under a statute, that person has incurred a penalty under the statute; therefore, pursuant to section 68-3-5, any amendment to the statute that becomes effective after a sentence has been imposed has no effect on that sentence. In the instant case, in 1981, plaintiff was convicted and sentenced, and pursuant to section 77-18-1(1) (Supp. 1981), his sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation. The fact that he was placed on probation does not affect the fact that in 1981 he had incurred a punishment within the meaning of section 63-3-5. The term punishment in section 63-3-5 should be interpreted in accord with its usual and accepted meaning. [22] This being the case, it is unnecessary to determine whether a person who has been placed on probation incurs the punishment set out in the sentence prior to the time probation is revoked, because it is clear that simply by being placed on probation, punishment is incurred. The general nature of probation places significant restrictions on the liberty of the person placed on probation. [23] The penal quality of probation is also clear from section 77-18-1(4) (Supp. 1981), which states that as a condition of probation the trial court can impose fines, require restitution, and impose jail sentences. When Smith was placed on probation on terms that were consistent with section 77-18-1 (Supp. 1981), he incurred a punishment; therefore, under the terms of section 63-3-5 and the cases cited by Smith, any subsequent amendment to section 77-18-1 would have no effect on the terms of his probation. Thus, the trial court was correct in refusing to apply section 77-18-1 (Supp. 1984) in the instant case and in holding that Smith's probation had not automatically terminated after he spent eighteen months on probation without a probation violation.
Plaintiff's second argument is that the district court had no authority to revoke his probation because, by the express terms of his probation order, his probation terminated prior to the time revocation proceedings were initiated. We agree with this contention and hold that under the statute applicable to Smith's case, the trial court lacked the authority to revoke Smith's probation because Smith was not given notice of the revocation proceedings prior to the expiration of his probation. Plaintiff's argument is based on our decision in State v. Green , [24] where we held that, pursuant to section 77-18-1 (Supp. 1984), a trial court lacks the authority to revoke probation after the expiration of a statutorily imposed eighteen-month probation period even if the violation occurred during the probation period. [25] A related issue is now before this court: whether probation can be revoked when the revocation proceeding had been arguably initiated but not completed before the expiration of a judicially imposed probation period. Although Green involved a defendant who was placed on probation pursuant to section 77-18-1 (Supp. 1984) and the decision was based in part on the language of the 1984 statute, the holding in Green is applicable to the instant case. In Green, we rejected an interpretation of section 77-18-1 (Supp. 1984) that would allow for a tolling of the probation period after the commission of a probation violation. In doing so, we reasoned that such an interpretation would be improper because it would place individuals who have been placed on probation in a perpetual state of limbo; although their probation would appear to have terminated ... [the] defendants would actually be subject to a continued term of fictional supervision. [26] The court found support for this contention in our case law decided prior to the enactment of section 77-18-1 (Supp. 1984). [27] Nothing in section 77-18-1 (Supp. 1981) is contrary to the position asserted in Green. It is true that section 77-18-1 (Supp. 1981), unlike section 77-18-1 (Supp. 1984), does not include language stating that probation will terminate after a certain period. However, section 77-18-1(4) (Supp. 1981) states that the district courts do not have the authority to extend a period of probation without a hearing conducted pursuant to the procedures set out in section 77-18-1(5) (Supp. 1981). [28] This language is consistent with the assertion that without such a hearing, the trial court does not have the authority to extend the period of supervision beyond the original period of probation. Defendants, however, contend that the instant case is distinguishable from Green in that Smith's revocation proceedings were initiated during his period of probation. In Green, we expressly reserved the question of whether the trial court retains its authority to revoke probation in situations where the revocation proceedings are initiated but not completed within the probation period. [29] There are jurisdictions where it is necessary to complete the revocation process within the probationary period in order for the trial court to retain its authority to revoke an individual's probation. [30] The jurisdictions which follow that rule, however, do so largely as a matter of statutory construction. [31] There is nothing in the Utah statute, section 77-18-1 (Supp. 1981), which compels the conclusion that the revocation proceedings must be completed, as opposed to initiated, within the probation period. [32] Furthermore, as discussed below, the concerns over the extension of the period of supervision which were relied on in Green are not implicated in a situation where the revocation proceedings are properly initiated. Without any statutory or policy considerations to the contrary, we see no reason to limit a trial court's authority to revoke or modify probation. This conclusion leads to a second issue: which stage in the revocation proceedings must be reached within the period of probation for the court to retain its authority over probationers beyond the probation period. A review of the relevant statutes and case law leads us to the conclusion that in order for a court to retain its authority over a probationer who is not actively evading supervision, the probationer must be served with the order to show cause within the period of probation. The jurisdictions that have considered this issue have not followed a uniform approach. [33] Rather, the positions taken by the various states are largely dependent on each state's individual probation statute. [34] The Utah statute, section 77-18-1 (Supp. 1981), does not explicitly deal with this issue. However, section 77-18-1 (Supp. 1981) does place a significant amount of emphasis on the nature and degree of notice to which an individual is entitled prior to a revocation hearing. Section 77-18-1(5)(b) and (c) (Supp. 1981) not only states that a court shall cause to be served on the defendant a copy of the affidavit and order to show cause, but also provides that the order to show cause shall inform the defendant of the nature of the accusations against him, his right to counsel, and his right to present evidence. [35] The emphasis on notice in section 77-18-1 (Supp. 1981) is consistent with the assertion that a court retains the authority to revoke probation if the probationer is served with notice of the revocation proceedings within the probation period. The assertion that a probationer is entitled to notice within the period of probation in order for the court to retain the authority to revoke probation is consistent with the rationale underlying our decision in Green. If probationers are given notice within the probation period, there is no danger of placing them in a state of perpetual limbo[, where] although their probation would appear to have terminated ... defendants would actually be subject to a continued term of fictional supervision. [36] Under such an approach, all parties concerned would be aware of the proceedings and the allegations underlying the proceedings at the time the probation terminates. Probationers could also be assured that no new proceedings or proceedings under different grounds could be brought against them once the probation period has ended. [37] Therefore, probationers would not be in a state of limbo where it would appear that their probation had terminated but where further proceedings could be brought against them. However, if a trial court was able to retain the authority to revoke probation without giving notice to the probationer, there may be situations in which it could appear that the probation had ended when in fact the court may, at some later date, reassert its jurisdiction over the defendant for the purpose of revoking probation. Such an approach is also in accord with the decisions of this court, as well as the United States Supreme Court, holding that the guarantees of the fundamental fairness embodied in the due process clause of the United States Constitution entitle probationers to written notice of the accusations against them prior to their revocation hearings. [38] This approach is also consistent with the general rule that in order for a court to obtain jurisdiction over a civil defendant, the defendant must be properly served in the manner required by law. [39] Moreover, there should be no practical problem with serving probationers because, due to the nature of probation, they are already under the supervision of the state. A different rule may need to be followed in some situations, such as where the probationer is actively avoiding service or is evading the supervision of the probation authorities or when the violation is committed so close to the termination of probation that it would be impractical or impossible for the probationer to receive notice within the period of probation. This question, however, is not presently before the court; therefore, we do not reach this issue. We hold that in situations where the probationer is not actively avoiding supervision, in order for a trial court to retain its authority over the probationer beyond the period of probation, the probationer must be served with an order to show cause within the probationary period. [40] It is undisputed that plaintiff was not given notice of the revocation proceedings within his probation period. Furthermore, it has not been claimed that he was avoiding the supervision of probation authorities. The trial court, therefore, did not have authority to revoke Smith's probation. Since we find for Smith on his first claim, we will not reach his other arguments. This case is remanded to the trial court with the direction to grant plaintiff's petition for habeas corpus. HOWE, Associate C.J., and ORME, Court of Appeals Judge, concur.