Opinion ID: 1304835
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: issue of contradictory testimony

Text: The evidence offered by Hemphill at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment consisted of portions of the depositions of Mancuso and Fernandez. Neill offered the remainder of the depositions, as well as a subsequent affidavit from Mancuso which purported to clarify his deposition testimony. Although it is not entirely clear from the district court's order, it appears that the district court may not have considered the affidavit because the court determined that there was a conflict between the affidavit and deposition. Neill assigns this as error. Neill argues that the district court relied upon Momsen v. Nebraska Methodist Hospital, 210 Neb. 45, 53, 313 N.W.2d 208, 213 (1981), in which this court stated that `[w]here a party without reasonable explanation testifies to facts materially different concerning a vital issue, the change clearly being made to meet the exigencies of pending litigation, such evidence is discredited as a matter of law and should be disregarded.' This court noted that [t]he important considerations are that the testimony pertains to a vital point, that it is clearly apparent the party has made the change to meet the exigencies of the pending case, and that there is no rational or sufficient explanation for the change in testimony. Id. at 55, 313 N.W.2d at 213. As noted above, it is not clear from the district court's order whether the court relied upon Momsen v. Nebraska Methodist Hospital, supra , or otherwise determined that Mancuso's affidavit was discredited as a matter of law. To the extent that the district court may have relied upon Momsen v. Nebraska Methodist Hospital , however, this reliance was in error. Even if it is assumed, but not decided, that Mancuso's deposition and subsequent affidavit are contradictory, the question of what the facts are is for the jury. See Hawkes v. Lewis, 252 Neb. 178, 560 N.W.2d 844 (1997). In Hawkes v. Lewis , the plaintiff sued Dr. Kirk Lewis, her surgeon, and Dr. Jeffrey Itkin, the assistant surgeon, for alleged negligence in packing her bowel during an abdominal hysterectomy. Itkin moved for and was granted a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's case based upon his testimony that he had not been involved with the packing of plaintiff's bowel. Id. This court reversed the directed verdict, finding that a jury question had been presented regarding Itkin's involvement in packing the plaintiff's bowel. Id. In pretrial deposition testimony, offered into evidence by the plaintiff, Itkin had denied that he performed any of the packing. Id. Lewis stated at one point, however, that he and Itkin had both packed the bowel and then at another point that he, Lewis, could not remember how many of the packs he had inserted. Id. We thus determined that directed verdict was error, holding that the good faith self-contradiction of an expert witness presents a question for the trier of fact. Id. In the instant case, Mancuso testified in his deposition and affidavit that Fernandez was negligent in failing to perform a battery of tests that Mancuso believes could have diagnosed Neill's coronary artery condition prior to Neill's myocardial infarction. Mancuso's deposition includes the following colloquy with defense counsel: Q. Just a couple minutes here, Doctor, and I'll  Doctor, can blood pressure rise because of a stressful situation, in your experience? A. Certainly. Q. Such as a committment [sic] to a psychiatric ward? A. I believe so, yes. Q. Could that certainly be a reason that, in your opinion, that Mr. Neill's blood pressure spiked as it did for a period of time? A. It could well be, yes. Q. Could actually have had absolutely nothing to do with a cardiac problem, more of a stress-related problem? A. Certainly. Q. And whether that's indeed what the situation was when he was at Mercy Hospital between 3-11 of 1993 to 3-18-1993, can you say one way or the other? A. No, I cannot. Q. Okay. So that, in fact  And I want to make sure I understand your opinion the way that you mean it, and I think I do, but I want to make sure I get it fleshed out here a little bit. Your criticism of Dr. Fernandez was that there was some tests that he could have indeed performed that were not done; is that correct? A. That's correct. Q. All right. And whether those tests would have shown that  or whether they would have been perfectly normal or not, we don't know that because they were not performed, correct? A. That's correct. Q. All right. And indeed it may well have been that those tests could have been normal, correct? A. Could have been, yes. Q. They could have been abnormal, correct? A. Correct. In his affidavit, Mancuso explained: On page 31 of your Affiant's deposition, he was asked whether or not Mr. Neill's blood pressure could have spiked because of a stressful situation, whether or not Mr. Neill's spiked blood pressure could have had nothing to do with his cardiac problem, and whether any tests performed by Dr. Fernandez could have been normal. Certainly these could questions are things that could possibly happen, but it is your Affiant's opinion that Mr. Neill's high blood pressure was because of his coronary artery disease and that had the appropriate tests been performed, his coronary artery disease should have been diagnosed which he would have been treated for, and, in all likelihood, he would not have suffered a myocardial infarction and permanent damage to his heart. (Emphasis in original.) We conclude that the contradictions, if any, between Mancuso's deposition and his affidavit go to the weight or credibility of this testimony and are matters for the trier of fact. Therefore, the trial court erred if, in fact, the trial court discredited Mancuso's testimony in deciding to sustain Hemphill's motion for summary judgment.