Opinion ID: 77967
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of the birth certificate

Text: Deverso argues that the district court erred in admitting a copy of Beverly's birth certificate into evidence to establish that Beverly was under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged sexual encounter. First, he claims that the birth certificate is a business record, and the Government did not lay a proper foundation for its admission. See 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (governing admission of business records into evidence). Second, Deverso contends that the Government did not authenticate the birth certificate, and the document did not bear the required indicia of reliability. He claims that while the birth certificate may have been attested to by an appropriate individual listed in Federal Rule of Evidence 902(3), the document itself does not contain the minimum information to appear valid on its face. Deverso questions the authenticity of the document because the certificate states that it certifies that Beverly Regidor Datanagan who was allegedly born on November 10, 1986 . . . appears in the National Indices for birth. (R. Exhibit No. 5.) Thus, Deverso argues that the document is not what the Government claims it to be  a birth certificate  but is, instead, a document containing an alleged date of birth. A review of the record indicates that Deverso objected to the admission of the document on the grounds that what purports to be a copy of the original or certified copy of the original does not have a signature under the heading Certificate of Attendant at Birth. Specifically, he claimed that it was an incomplete document. (R. Vol.6, p. 322.) This trial objection is different than the objections Deverso proffers on appeal. Consequently, to obtain relief, Deverso must demonstrate plain error warranting relief. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631-32, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 1785, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) ([B]efore an appellate court can correct an error not raised at trial, there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affect[s] substantial rights . . . [and] (4) . . . seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1549, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). The Government admitted the document as a foreign public document pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 902(3). This rule provides, in part, that Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not required with respect to . . . (3) Foreign public documents. A document purporting to be executed or attested in an official capacity by a person authorized by the laws of a foreign country to make the execution or attestation, and accompanied by a final certification as to the genuineness of the signature and official position (A) of the executing or attesting person, or (B) of any foreign official whose certificate of genuineness of signature and official position relates to the execution or attestation or is in a chain of certificates of genuineness of signature and official position relating to the execution or attestation. A final certification may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent of the United States, or a diplomatic or consular official of the foreign country assigned or accredited to the United States. If reasonable opportunity has been given to all parties to investigate the authenticity and accuracy of official documents, the court may, for good cause shown, order that they be treated as presumptively authentic without final certification or permit them to be evidenced by an attested summary with or without final certification. FED. R. EVID. 902(3). There is no requirement in Rule 902(3) that the document itself be signed. See United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 562 (4th Cir.2000). The rules are written in the alternative  foreign documents may be authenticated by a certification from the official executing the document or by an official attesting to the document. Id. There are two requirements for the authentication of a foreign document. First, there must be some indication that the document is what is purports to be. Thus, the proffered document must be executed by a proper official in his official capacity, or the genuineness of the document must be attested to by a proper official in his official capacity. Id. ; see also United States v. Doyle, 130 F.3d 523, 545 (2d Cir.1997) (noting that the rule is not concerned with establishing the truth of information contained in the proffered document but, instead, is concerned only with assuring that evidence is what it purports to be). Second, there must be some indication that the official vouching for the document is who he purports to be. Squillacote, 221 F.3d at 562. Accordingly, the rules require that one of a specified group of foreign officials must issue a final certification attesting to the genuineness of signature and title of the person executing or attesting to the document, or of another official who has certified the signature and position of the person executing or attesting to the document. Id. The Government met these requirements here. The Government established that Agent Orate requested and obtained a copy of Beverly's birth certificate from the Philippine National Census and Statistics Office and that he had the copy authenticated and certified at the United States Embassy in Manila. The copy of Beverly's birth certificate was accompanied by a certificate from Richard Ambrad, Embassy Coordinator with the Government of the Philippines, attesting that the copy of Beverly's birth certificate was a true copy of an official record authorized by the law of the Philippines to be reported and recorded in the National Census and Statistics Office. That certification was accompanied by a final certification by Kimberly A. Russell, Vice Consul of the United States in the Philippines. Additionally, the copy of the birth certificate was stamped as a certified copy and affixed with the seal of Luzviminda N. Cruz, whom Vice Consul Russell certified was Clerk II, National Statistics Office, Quezon City, Republic of the Philippines. Because the Government met the requirements for self-authentication of the foreign document, it did not have to lay a foundation for admission of the document as a business record. See FED.R.EVID. 902, advisory committee note to para. (3) (stating that this paragraph provides a method for extending the presumption of authenticity to foreign official documents by a procedure of certification). Furthermore, to the extent that Deverso challenges the reliability of the information contained in the birth certificate, such as Beverly's date of birth and the lack of signature of the attendant at birth, that challenge goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility on grounds of authenticity. See, e.g., Doyle, 130 F.3d at 545 ([T]he official does not need to attest to the truth or trustworthiness of the facts contained in the document; accuracy of its contents is the concern of other Federal Rules.). Deverso fails to establish that Beverly's birth certificate is not what it purports to be, especially in light of Agent Orate's testimony that the certified copy of the birth certificate was identical to the birth certificate that Beverly showed him upon request. Consequently, Deverso cannot show error, let alone plain error, warranting a new trial due to the district court's admission of the birth certificate into evidence.