Opinion ID: 1723194
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Heading: The Proof Required.

Text: Until today our court has consistently upheld the use of the clear and satisfactory evidence standard for proof of contempt. See, e.g., Callenius v. Blair, 309 N.W.2d 415, 419 (Iowa 1981); Lutz v. Darbyshire, 297 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Iowa 1980); Brown v. District Court, 158 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Iowa 1968); Huston v. Huston, 255 Iowa 543, 549, 122 N.W.2d 892, 896 (1963). When a finding of contempt has been challenged on appeal, we have examined the evidence to ensure that proof of contempt was clear and satisfactory. Callenius, 309 N.W.2d at 419. We noted in a recent case, however, that many other courts require proof beyond a reasonable doubt before a person can be found in contempt and punished for nonpayment of child support. Skinner v. Ruigh, 351 N.W.2d 182, 185 n. 1 (Iowa 1984) (referencing cases from other jurisdictions). Here we are presented with the question alluded to but not addressed in Skinner whether due process requires that contempt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before the court may impose sanctions which punish the contemnor, even though the contempt arises from the alleged violation of a decree in a civil proceeding. Marsha argues that due process under the Iowa Constitution and the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution requires that there be proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of contempt when the proceeding may lead to a jail sentence or other punishment of a criminal nature. Marsha's constitutional argument has solid underpinnings. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 (1970), squarely held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal proceeding is a requirement of constitutional magnitude: Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. Winship was a juvenile delinquency proceeding, not a contempt action, but Marsha points out that the same potential for deprivation of liberty that is present in criminal cases was also present in this contempt proceeding. Marsha was punished for past behavior, disobedience of the dissolution decree, by being sent to jail and having her rights under the dissolution decree modified. The jail sentence had all the earmarks of punishment imposed following conviction of a crime. Many appellate courts have attempted to draw a meaningful line of distinction between civil and criminal contempt proceedings, in an attempt to provide guidance for trial courts which must determine the extent to which substantive and procedural safeguards must be furnished to the alleged contemnor. Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating the Confusion Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 50 Cin.L.Rev. 677, 681 (1981). The United States Supreme Court has explained: When the petitioners carry the keys of their prison in their own pockets, the action is essentially a civil remedy designed for the benefit of other parties and has quite properly been exercised for centuries to secure compliance with judicial decrees. In short if the petitioners had chosen to obey the order they would not have faced jail.... . . . . ... Courts often speak in terms of criminal contempt and punishment for remedial purposes. It is not the fact of punishment but rather its character and purpose that often serve to distinguish civil from criminal contempt.... While any imprisonment, of course, has punitive and deterrent effects, it must be viewed as remedial if the court conditions release upon the contemnor's willingness to testify. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368-70, 86 S.Ct. 1531, 1534-35, 16 L.Ed.2d 622, 626-27 (1966) (citations omitted). The principal effect of the distinction those courts make is that certain constitutional safeguards, such as the requirement that guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, are required in criminal contempt proceedings, but not proceedings involving only civil contempt. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444, 31 S.Ct. 492, 499, 55 L.Ed. 797, 807 (1911); Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 Cornell L.Rev. 183, 238, 243 (1971); Martineau, supra, at 681 n. 28. Recent Iowa cases, however, have cut through this blurred and often nebulous distinction by treating all contempts as quasi-criminal. See, e.g., McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, 11-14 (Iowa 1982) (upholding indigent's constitutional right to appointment of counsel when predictive evaluation suggests that contempt citation may result in jail term); Lutz v. Darbyshire, 297 N.W.2d at 353-54 (Contempt proceedings are commonly treated as criminal in nature even when they generate from civil cases.); Knox v. Municipal Court, 185 N.W.2d 705, 707 (Iowa 1971) (As we treat all contempts as quasi-criminal in Iowa, this sometimes nebulous distinction [between civil and criminal contempts] is no longer of significance.). In Wilson v. Fenton, 312 N.W.2d 524 (Iowa 1981), we explained that our governing statutes, Iowa Code chapter 665 and such other statutes as apply specific punishments for contempt, have constructively repealed the common law of contempt and treat all contempts as criminal in nature even when they arise from civil cases. Consequently the sanctions are not compensatory as they might be in a civil contempt proceeding. See Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 Cornell L.Rev. 183, 267 (1971). The punishment in section 665.4 is punitive and the fine is for the benefit of the State. Id. Imprisonment under section 665.5 is a coercive remedial sanction. Id. Thus the statute provides for two types of punishment, punitive for acts which, being done, are themselves completed contempts, and imprisonment to coerce the performance of affirmative acts ordered by the court. Note, Civil and Criminal Contempt in Iowa, 20 Iowa L.Rev. 121, 127 (1934). Because no other sanctions are provided, no other sanctions are authorized. Wilson, 312 N.W.2d at 528-29. This Wilson analysis is equally applicable to contempt proceedings involving violation of a dissolution decree, for which the specific punishments are provided in Iowa Code section 598.23. See Greene v. District Court, 342 N.W.2d 818, 821 (1983) (We have recognized that the jail sentence imposed for willful nonpayment of child support under Iowa Code section 598.23 makes this contempt procedure criminal in nature.). We agree with Marsha's contention that this contempt proceeding was by its very nature and effect the equivalent of a criminal proceeding exacting punishment. In re Winship teaches that due process may only be satisfied in a proceeding that is criminal in nature if the conduct which results in punishment is established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The reasonable doubt standard was as necessary here as it would be to establish the elements of a crime warranting imposition of a fine or incarceration in a criminal case. The district court, understandably relying on our long-established but now rejected rule governing burden of proof, required that Marsha's contumacious behavior be proved only by clear and convincing evidence rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. On this record we cannot determine whether the district court, applying a reasonable doubt standard, would have found Marsha in contempt. We therefore must reverse the finding of contempt and resulting punishment. We hold that no person may be punished for contempt unless the allegedly contumacious actions have been established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Prior decisions holding to the contrary are thus no longer controlling.