Opinion ID: 4510492
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether a Certificate Was Required

Text: The government and the district court appeared to understand Colorado law as requiring a certificate of review in every professional negligence action and that dismissal is required whenever a plaintiff fails to file one. See ROA at 74 (government’s motion to dismiss); id. at 83 (district court holding that “because Plaintiff has failed to file a certificate of review, his Amended Complaint must be dismissed”). But Colorado courts have long held that Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-602 requires a plaintiff to file a certificate of review only “for any claim based on allegations of professional negligence that requires expert testimony to establish a prima facie case.” Martinez v. Badis, 842 P.2d 245, 250 (Colo. 1992) (emphasis added); accord Shelton, 984 P.2d at 626; Giron v. Koktavy, 4 We deny Mr. Coleman’s request that we direct reassignment to a different judge on remand. He has not presented evidence of “personal bias” or “extreme circumstances” to justify this action. See Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1448 (10th Cir. 1996). A judge’s adverse ruling, standing alone, does not establish bias. See id. at 1449. 5 124 P.3d 821, 825 (Colo. App. 2005).5 Thus, “[i]f a plaintiff determines that expert testimony is not required, no certificate need be filed.” Martinez, 842 P.2d at 250-51; see Shelton, 984 P.2d at 626. If a certificate is not filed within the 60-day statutory period and the defendant believes expert testimony will be required to establish the plaintiff’s professional negligence claim, it may move to require the plaintiff to file a certificate or to dismiss. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-20-602(2), 13-20-602(4); Martinez, 842 P.2d at 251; Shelton, 984 P.2d at 626. The court determines whether expert testimony and therefore a certificate of review are required. See Shelton, 984 P.2d at 626; Giron, 124 P.3d at 825. Dismissal for failure to file a certificate of review is proper only when the court has determined that a certificate is required under these standards. See Shelton, 984 P.2d at 626 n.4 (holding dismissal under § 13-20-602(4) applies only “to situations in which the court decides that the plaintiff should have submitted a certificate and the plaintiff has not demonstrated good cause for late filing”); Giron, 124 P.3d at 825 (“[F]ailure to file 5 In Hill, 393 F.3d at 1118, and Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp., 90 F.3d 1523, 1537-38 & n.9 (10th Cir. 1996), we upheld dismissal for failure to file a certificate under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-602. Both opinions suggested the plaintiff’s need for expert evidence. See Hill, 393 F.3d at 1115 (noting plaintiff’s “need for expert testimony”); Trierweiler, 90 F.3d at 1542 (discussing plaintiff’s expert reports). Although not precedential, our unpublished decisions have recognized this standard. See, e.g., Sherman v. Klenke, 653 F. App’x 580, 594-95 (10th Cir. 2016); Falcon v. Saint-Veltri, 23 F. App’x 908, 910 (10th Cir. 2001). So has the United States District Court in Colorado, see, e.g., Morales v. Rattan, No. 17cv-03009-PAB-KLM, 2019 WL 588192, at  (D. Colo. Feb. 13, 2019), recommendation accepted (Mar. 5, 2019); Kellar v. U.S. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, No. 08-cv-00761-WYD-KLM, 2008 WL 5330644, at  (D. Colo. Dec. 19, 2008). See 10th Cir. R. 32.1 (“Unpublished decisions are not precedential, but may be cited for their persuasive value.”); see also Fed. R. App. P. 32.1. 6 a certificate of review, where required, must result in dismissal of the claim.” (emphasis added)); Morales v. Rattan, No. 17-cv-03009-PAB-KLM, 2019 WL 588192, at  (D. Colo. Feb. 13, 2019) (noting that dismissal is required for failure to comply with Colorado’s certificate statute “if a certificate is deemed necessary”), recommendation accepted (Mar. 5, 2019). Although expert testimony may be necessary in most medical malpractice claims, it is not always required to establish a prima facie case. In Shelton, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the state district court’s decision not to require a certificate in a medical malpractice action. It explained that expert testimony is usually required “to establish the proper standard of care against which the professional’s conduct is to be measured,” but some claims do not require expert testimony. 984 P.2d at 627; see Martinez, 842 P.2d at 249 (“Some claims of professional negligence do not require expert testimony.”); Teiken v. Reynolds, 904 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Colo. App. 1995) (noting that expert testimony is not required when “the subject matter of a medical malpractice action lies within the ambit of common knowledge or experience of ordinary persons”). In this case, the government did not argue in district court that expert testimony was required for Mr. Coleman to establish a prima facie case of medical negligence, and the court did not decide this issue. Without determining that a certificate of review was required due to the need for an expert, the district court lacked a proper basis to dismiss the claim for failure to file a certificate. On remand, the district court should consider this issue under the proper standard. 7 2. Whether Dismissal, if Required, Should Be with or without Prejudice The district court did not explain why it dismissed Mr. Coleman’s complaint with prejudice. As the government noted in its answer brief, courts that have dismissed FTCA claims for failure to comply with a state certificate requirement usually have done so without prejudice. See, e.g., Aplee. Br. at 11-12 (citing cases).6 The government suggests the district court should have considered whether dismissal should be with or without prejudice under the Ehrenhaus factors. See Aplee. Br. at 12 (citing Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1162 (10th Cir. 2007)); see also Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916, 921 (10th Cir. 1992). These are the factors a district court must consider in deciding whether to dismiss a case with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) as a sanction for a plaintiff’s violation of a court rule or order. See Nasious, 492 F.3d at 1161-62 & n.4.7 The Colorado federal district court has considered these factors in dismissing claims for failure to comply with Colorado’s certificate statute. It has held such 6 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-602 does not specify whether dismissal should be with or without prejudice when a plaintiff is required to file a certificate of review but does not do so. See id. § 13-20-602(4). 7 These factors are: “(1) the degree of actual prejudice to the defendant [as a result of the plaintiff’s rule violation]; (2) the amount of interference with the judicial process; (3) the culpability of the litigant; (4) whether the court warned the party in advance that dismissal of the action would be a likely sanction for noncompliance; and (5) the efficacy of lesser sanctions.” Nasious, 492 F.3d at 1162 (internal quotation marks omitted). 8 dismissals should be without prejudice unless (1) the failure to file a required certificate of review was the result of willful misconduct or gross negligence or (2) caused substantial prejudice. See Alpine Bank v. Hubbell, No. 05-cv-00026EWN-PAC, 2007 WL 218906, at -6 (D. Colo. Jan. 26, 2007) (holding that dismissal for failure to comply with Colorado’s certificate statute should be without prejudice absent these circumstances); Carson v. United States, No. 13-cv-02962CMA-KLM, 2014 WL 3563021, at  (D. Colo. July 18, 2014) (dismissing without prejudice under this standard); Morales, 2019 WL 588192, at  (same). If the district court determines on remand that expert testimony is necessary to establish Mr. Coleman’s professional negligence claim and that dismissal is required under the statute due to his failure to file the required certificate, it should consider whether dismissal should be with or without prejudice. 3. Whether Dismissal, if Required, Should Be under the Colorado Statute or Rule 12(b)(6) The government moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The district court said it dismissed Mr. Coleman’s complaint under this rule. But rather than analyze the sufficiency of Mr. Coleman’s allegations,8 the court relied on Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-602 to dismiss. See ROA at 82-83; id. at 90 (explaining “the basis for dismissal . . . was Plaintiff’s failure to file a certificate of 8 “[T]he purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) motions . . . is to test the sufficiency of the allegations within the four corners of the complaint after taking those allegations as true.” Issa v. Comp USA, 354 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 9 review pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-602(1)(a)”). The Colorado Court of Appeals has held that “Section 13-20-602 sets forth a special statutory ground for dismissal, separate from that of C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) ([dismissal for failure to state a claim]).” Barton v. Law Offices of John W. McKendree, 126 P.3d 313, 314-15 (Colo. App. 2005). Thus, dismissal under the certificate statute does not constitute dismissal for failure to state a claim. See id. The federal district court in Colorado has recognized and followed this holding. See Alpine Bank, 2007 WL 219121, at  & n.4 (holding dismissal for failure to file a certificate of review under Colorado law is not “akin to dismissal under [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 12(b)(6)”); Alpine Bank, 2007 WL 218906, at  (same). The distinction between dismissal under the Colorado certificate statute and dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) matters because Mr. Coleman can be assigned a strike under the Prison Litigation Reform Act if the district court dismisses his action for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).9 If the district court determines on remand that Mr. Coleman’s professional negligence claim should be dismissed under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-602, it should reconsider whether dismissal would be for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 9 Three strikes under the PLRA bars persons from bringing a civil action ifp unless they are “under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 10