Opinion ID: 2612478
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Union Democracy

Text: At the heart of the majority opinion is its conclusion that the preservation of union democracy requires that union leadership have a free hand in discharging employees for reasons of policy. Even assuming that the LMRDA sanctions patronage firing as an adjunct of its purpose to promote union democracy (see Finnegan v. Leu, supra, 456 U.S. 431, 441 [72 L.Ed.2d at p. 247]; Tyra v. Kearney (1984) 153 Cal. App.3d 921, 926 [200 Cal. Rptr. 716]), that purpose does not provide union leadership with an unfettered license to dismiss union employees. In Sheet Metal Workers v. Lynn (1989) 488 U.S. 347 [102 L.Ed.2d 700, 109 S.Ct. 639], for example, a local union in financial crisis was placed under trusteeship by the president of the international union. The plaintiff, an elected business agent, was an outspoken member of a faction in the union which opposed a dues increase as a method of solving the local's financial problems. The trustee discharged the plaintiff from his position as a business agent because of his (successful) opposition to the dues increase. The plaintiff brought suit in federal court under section 412 alleging violation of his free speech rights under section 411(a)(2) of subchapter II. The union alleged that the dismissal was immune from attack under Finnegan v. Leu, supra, 456 U.S. 431, because it was policy based. The Supreme Court disagreed, observing that the discharge penalized plaintiff for the exercise of his free speech rights, and deprived the union membership of an elected business agent. His removal, therefore, hardly was `an integral part of ensuring a union administration's responsiveness to the mandate of the union election.' [Citations.] ( Sheet Metal Workers v. Lynn, supra, 488 U.S. at p. 355 [102 L.Ed.2d at p. 710].) In addition, in light of the plaintiff's removal, other members of the Local may well have concluded that one challenged the union's hierarchy, if at all, at one's peril. This is precisely what the Congress sought to prevent when it passed the LMRDA. ( Ibid. ) The court carefully examined the purposes of the LMRDA, and determined that this discharge did not promote the purpose of union democracy. Accordingly, the court found not only that the plaintiff's discharge was not sanctioned by the LMRDA, but also that the Act provided affirmative redress for the breach of the plaintiff's free speech rights. Justice White's concurring opinion in Sheet Metal Workers v. Lynn underscores the distinction between a union official's exercise of union patronage, and his or her power to hire and fire as an ordinary employer: In this case, unlike Finnegan, respondent was not discharged by an incoming elected president with power to appoint his own staff, but by a trustee whose power to dismiss and appoint officers, for all that is shown here, went no farther than the Local's president to discharge for cause, i.e., for incompetence or other behavior disqualifying them for the tasks they were expected to perform as officers. Respondent's speech opposing the dues increase was the speech of a member about a matter the members were to resolve, and there is no countervailing interest rooted in union democracy that suffices to override that protection. (488 U.S. at p. 360 [102 L.Ed.2d at p. 713] (conc. opn. of White, J.).) In Bloom v. General Truck Drivers, supra, 783 F.2d 1356, a union member alleged he was wrongfully discharged as coordinator of the business agents and business manager of the union because he refused to illegally alter the minutes of a union meeting. The Court of Appeals held the plaintiff could not properly state a federal claim under section 412 of the LMRDA because the discharge affected him as an employee and not as a union member (citing Finnegan v. Leu, supra, 456 U.S. 431, and Cehaich v. International Union, U.A.W. (6th Cir.1983) 710 F.2d 234, 238). The court further held, however, that the plaintiff's state claim was not preempted : The kind of discharge alleged, retaliation for refusal to commit a crime and breach a trust, is not the kind sanctioned by the Act, or by the courts in Finnegan and Tyra. Protecting such a discharge by preempting a state cause of action based on it does nothing to serve union democracy or the rights of union members; it serves only to encourage and conceal such criminal acts and coercion by union leaders. (783 F.2d at p. 1362.) The Bloom court properly analyzed the state claim in terms of its relation to the purposes of the LMRDA. Not only would the state action not inhibit union democracy, it concluded, but preemption would deprive the plaintiff of any viable remedy, and thus frustrate the very purposes of the Act. ( Bloom v. General Truck Drivers, supra, 783 F.2d 1356.) Brown v. Hotel Employees, supra, 468 U.S. 491, is also instructive. New Jersey casino laws regulated unions representing casino employees and disqualified from union office those persons who had ties to organized crime. The union argued that section 7 of the NLRA (codified at 29 U.S.C. ง 157) โ including the right of employees to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing โ preempted the jurisdiction of the state casino commission to disqualify any member from holding office. The Supreme Court held that section 7 of the NLRA (29 U.S.C. ง 157) did not confer an absolute right on employees to choose the officials of their bargaining representatives, notwithstanding the impact on union democracy. Ironically, it was the enactment of the LMRDA itself which led the court to this conclusion. [9] Title V [subchapter VI] of LMRDA imposes various restrictions on labor union officials and defines certain qualifications for them.... [ถ] By enacting ง 504(a) [setting forth disqualifications from office for conviction of crime], Congress has unmistakably indicated that the right of employees to select the officers of their bargaining representatives is not absolute and necessarily admits of some exception. ( Brown v. Hotel Employees, supra, 468 U.S. 491, 505 [82 L.Ed.2d at pp. 385-386].) In addition, the high court noted, another provision of LMRDA, [section 523(a)], is `an express disclaimer of pre-emption of state laws regulating the responsibilities of union officials....' De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 157 (1960).... In affirmatively preserving the operation of state laws, [section 523(a)] indicates that Congress necessarily intended to preserve some room for state action concerning the responsibilities and qualifications of union officials. ( Brown v. Hotel Employees, supra, 468 U.S. at pp. 505-506 [82 L.Ed.2d at p. 386], italics partially added, fns. omitted.) As the foregoing cases demonstrate, the concept of union democracy in the LMRDA was designed to make union leadership accountable to its members, not to put the members at the mercy of its leaders. The Act does not, as the majority suggests, demand a broad rule of state preemption in order to effectuate the federal mandate. Instead, each case must be examined to determine whether the conduct regulated by the state actually conflicts with the conduct intended to be protected by the Act. As explained below, plaintiff's state law claims for wrongful discharge do not impinge upon any federally protected preserve.