Opinion ID: 4576766
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The acquiescence standard

Text: A CAT applicant must show that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured upon removal. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c). Torture is defined as “severe pain or suffering” that is “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” Id. § 208.18(a)(1). Because the definition of “torture” encompasses government “acquiescence,” it is the applicant’s burden to show a likelihood—a greater than 50% chance—that public officials will acquiesce to torture. See Hamoui v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 2004). Acquiescence occurs when a public official has prior awareness of torturous activity and “thereafter breach[es] his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.” Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003) 1 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(7)). Stated another way, acquiescence is when “public officials demonstrate ‘willful blindness’ to the torture of their citizens by third parties.” Id. at 1195. The BIA rejected the IJ’s finding that Hernandez had established “acquiescence” because the Honduran government had been “unable to stop gang violence.” The BIA explained “it is well-settled that unlawful violence committed by individuals over whom the government has no reasonable control does not mean that an applicant has carried his burden of proof for protection where the government is actively trying to combat gang activity.” This was not error. We have held that acquiescence is not established where a government is aware of torturous activity by private parties and “actively, albeit not entirely successfully, combats the illegal activities.” Del Cid Marroquin v. Lynch, 823 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014). Acquiescence requires something more—evidence that officials are failing to intervene due to “corruption or other inability or unwillingness to oppose criminal organizations.” Garcia-Milian, 755 F.3d at 1034; see also Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2016) (“We have reversed agency determinations that future torture is not likely only when the agency failed to take into account significant evidence establishing government complicity 2 in the criminal activity.”) (emphasis added). Thus, the BIA identified the correct legal standard in this case.