Opinion ID: 1294870
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Escape Statute.

Text: A conviction under section 719.4(1) requires proof that (1) the defendant had been convicted of a felony, and (2) he intentionally escape[d] from an institution to which the person has been committed or from the custody of any public officer, employee, or any other person to whom the person has been entrusted. Iowa Code § 719.4(1); accord State v. Wagner, 596 N.W.2d 83, 86 (Iowa 1999). The district court ruled that Smith violated the statute on two grounds: he escaped after being committed to the State Department of Corrections, and he had escaped from the custody of the Black Hawk County Sheriff and/or the defendant's attorney, who were public officers or employees under the statute. In State v. Breitbach, 488 N.W.2d 444 (Iowa 1992), we construed the custody requirement of section 719.4(1) as it had evolved through the legislative process and our earlier cases, including State v. Burtlow, 299 N.W.2d 665 (Iowa 1980). Breitbach, 488 N.W.2d at 449-50. In Burtlow the defendant was charged with violating section 719.4(1) because he had failed to return from work release. We held that, while this would have been a violation of subsection 3 of section 719.4, it was not a violation of subsection 1. Burtlow, 299 N.W.2d at 669. In reversing Burtlow's conviction, we said: We believe subsection one [the subsection charged in Smith's case] is intended to apply [to] unauthorized departures from physical restraint. In those cases a danger of injury to persons or property exists. When the offense is a mere failure to return from an authorized release, no such danger exists. It is reasonable to conclude the legislature intended to punish breaches of physical restraint more severely. Id. (emphasis added). Smith seizes on the physical restraint language of Burtlow to argue that he was not in custody because he was not physically restrained in the sense he had been handcuffed or otherwise incapacitated or confined. In Breitbach we clarified the physical restraint language of Burtlow, saying: [W]e did not mean in Burtlow that custody for purposes of subsection 1 must involve actual physical contact with the arrestee. Instead, physical restraint, as that term is used in Burtlow, is necessarily involved whenever an individual either is or would be subjected to immediate physical restraint if an attempt to flee from the authorities was made. An arrest is clearly such a situation. In recognition of this fact, the escape statute explicitly characterizes an escape by a felony-arrestee as a subsection 1 violation. Breitbach, 488 N.W.2d at 449. In Breitbach officers went to the home of Breitbach's girlfriend, where they attempted to serve an arrest warrant on him. Id. at 445. The officers waited outside the house while Breitbach went inside to talk to his girlfriend. Breitbach suddenly came out of the house, jumped off the porch, and fled. Id. We held that, under the test set out above, Breitbach was in custody because he was subject to immediate physical restraint by fleeing from the officers. Id. at 449-50. Smith now argues that he was not physically restrained at the time he bolted, and under Breitbach, immediate physical restraint is required. This is a misreading of Breitbach. In that case, we said custody is established if the individual is or would be subjected to immediate physical restraint if an attempt to flee from the authorities was made. Id. at 449. This is consistent with State v. Eads, 234 N.W.2d 108, 111 (Iowa 1975), in which we said [c]ustody begins when an arrest is made and continues until the defendant is lawfully discharged. Under Smith's argument, he could have fled during the sentencing hearing itself without being guilty of escape because he was not physically restrained in the narrow sense he advocates. The court's order, however, ordered Smith to report to the sheriff, a public officer to whom the person has been entrusted. Smith would have been subject to immediate physical restraint at the time he fled, and therefore, for purposes of the escape statute, he was in custody under the Breitbach test.