Opinion ID: 787077
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Participation in the Examination of Goodman

Text: 23 In United States v. Mostella, 802 F.2d 358, 361 (9th Cir.1986), we recognized that a trial judge's discretion to participate in the examination of a witness, although broad, is not unlimited: 24 It is entirely proper for [a judge] to participate in the examination of witnesses for the purpose of clarifying the evidence, confining counsel to evidentiary rulings, controlling the orderly presentation of the evidence, and preventing undue repetition of testimony. 25 A trial judge's participation may, however, overstep the bounds of propriety and deprive the parties of a fair trial. This court will order a new trial, however, only if the record discloses actual bias on the part of the trial judge or leaves the reviewing court with an abiding impression that the judge's remarks and questioning of witnesses projected to the jury an appearance of advocacy or partiality. 26 (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.) 27 Here, the trial judge's examination of Goodman went beyond clarifying the evidence. Although the trial judge's participation in the examination of Goodman was, in our view, inappropriately extensive and suggestive of the court's own conclusion about Goodman's credibility, it does not warrant reversal for plain error. Mostella held that the judge's participation in the examination of a witness did not warrant reversal particularly in light of the judge's specific instruction that the jury disregard testimony elicited by the judge's examination of a witness. Id. at 362. Similarly, in United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 553 (9th Cir.1989), when reviewing a trial judge's remarks for plain error, we stated that any possible adverse impact was obviated by the [curative] instruction given by the court. Even in cases where a judge's participation in a trial is extreme, that participation generally does not warrant reversal if a later curative instruction is given. United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir.2001). 5 28 Here, before either party presented any evidence, the district court read to the jury a detailed instruction regarding questions and comments from the bench: 29 During the course of the trial I may occasionally ask questions of a witness in order to bring out facts which may not be fully covered by the testimony. You are not to consider my questioning of a witness, even if it may become lengthy, as an indication of what I feel about the case in general or the testimony of that witness in particular. 30 After closing arguments, the district court again stressed that no question of mine, no admonition of mine to any counsel, no ruling that I have made on any evidence is to suggest in any way what verdict I think you should find. In the light of the emphasis that cases like Mostella and Sanchez-Lopez place on curative instructions, the court's instructions to the jury — both before and after the questioning — lead us to conclude that the judge's participation did not prejudice Goodman. 31 Our conclusion is reinforced by the context in which the court's questions occurred. Before the judge questioned Goodman about Bowler's understanding of her involvement with Elite Investments, Bowler herself testified that she had no idea that Defendants had obtained or used a business line of credit in her name. Every other individual victim of Defendants' fraudulent scheme testified similarly that he or she was unaware of involvement with the fictitious companies, and each denied authorizing Defendants to forge documents, secure credit, or make charges against those lines of credit. 32 In view of that testimony, as well as the court's curative instructions, it is highly unlikely that, here, a substantial right of a defendant [was] affected. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d at 551. Thus, we hold that the trial judge's participation in the examination of Goodman did not constitute plain error requiring reversal. 33