Opinion ID: 150901
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Supreme Court's Ruling in Hamilton v. Lanning Supports a Temporal Interpretation of Applicable Commitment Period

Text: The Supreme Court recently ruled in Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2464, ___, ___ L.Ed.2d ___, at 18 (2010), that while the mechanical approach of calculating projected disposable income directly as a derivative of disposable income is the proper starting point, bankruptcy courts may account for changes in the debtor's income or expenses that are known or virtually certain at the time of confirmation. Lanning does not directly comment on the definition of applicable commitment period but what it does indicate is that § 1325(b) is not a strict mechanical formula existing in a vacuum. Lanning opens the door for the possibility that the final projected disposable income accepted by the bankruptcy court may not be the result of a strict § 1325(b)(1)(B) calculation. The applicable commitment period must have an existence independent of the § 1325(b)(1)(B) calculation. If applicable commitment period were left dependent upon projected disposable income, as Tennyson recommends, then it would necessarily be dependent on the multitude of indeterminate factors that Lanning has allowed to be used in the determination of projected disposable income. This in turn would leave applicable commitment period an indeterminate term. In order for applicable commitment period to have any definite meaning, its definition must be that of a temporal term derived from § 1325(b)(4) and independent of § 1325(b)(1).