Opinion ID: 163795
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the City's Denials of SP-149 and SP-150 Were Supported by Substantial Evidence.

Text: 66 Under 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii), [a]ny decision by a State or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities shall be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record. Section 332(c)(7)(B)(iii)'s substantial-evidence requirement does not `affect or encroach upon the substantive standards to be applied under established principles of state and local law.' Cellular Telephone Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 494 (2d Cir.1999) (citation omitted). `Substantial evidence' review under the [Telecommunications Act] does not create a substantive federal limitation upon local land use regulatory power, but is instead `centrally directed to those rulings that the Board is expected to make under state law and local ordinance in deciding on variances, special exceptions and the like.' Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc. v. Todd, 244 F.3d 51, 58 (1st Cir.2001) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we look to the requirements set forth in the local zoning ordinance to ascertain the substantive criteria to be applied. See Town of Amherst, N.H. v. Omnipoint Communications Enterprises, Inc., 173 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir.1999). In sum, [t]he reviewing court's task is to determine whether the [local authority's] decision, as guided by local law, is supported by substantial evidence. Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus, 197 F.3d at 72. 67 We begin by noting that judicial review under the substantial-evidence standard is quite narrow. Ready Mixed Concrete Co. v. N.L.R.B., 81 F.3d 1546, 1551 (10th Cir.1996); American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. I.C.C., 703 F.2d 459, 462 (10th Cir.1983) (It is axiomatic that the scope of review by an appellate court of a Commission decision is a narrow one.). That said, [our] review, though highly deferential, `is not a rubber stamp.' Todd, 244 F.3d at 58-59 (quoting Penobscot Air Servs., Ltd. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 164 F.3d 713, 718 (1st Cir.1999)). Substantial evidence is such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion reached by the [decisionmaker]. Substantial evidence requires more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. Sandoval v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 377, 382 (10th Cir.1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's findings from being supported by substantial evidence. Curtis, Inc. v. I.C.C., 662 F.2d 680, 685 (10th Cir.1981). 68
69 Prior to conducting our substantial-evidence review, we must address the parties' dispute with respect to the reasons undergirding the City Council's two denials. Limiting its consideration to the transcripts of the City Council's voice votes, U.S. Cellular argues that the City Council denied SP-149 solely on the basis of two findings: (1) SP-149's failure to comply with the Zoning Ordinance's 120-percent setback requirement; and (2) the availability of alternative sites. Similarly, with respect to SP-150, U.S. Cellular argues that City Council premised its denial on (1) the availability of alternative sites, and (2) the existence of towers suitable for co-location. 70 The City, on the other hand, argues that we should look to its written denials of SP-149 and SP-150, sent to U.S. Cellular on July 17, 2001, and July 20, 2001, respectively, both of which set forth numerous reasons not contained in the voice-vote portions of the City Council meeting transcripts. 71 In advancing its argument, U.S. Cellular notes that City Council members, during the voice votes on SP-149 and SP-150, mentioned only the pairs of reasons noted above. According to U.S. Cellular, these reasons alone constitute the City Council's true bases for the denials. We reject this argument for several reasons. 72 First, all of the reasons set forth in the City's letters of July 17, 2001, 21 and July 20, 2001, were aired during the extensive proceedings the City conducted on SP-149 and SP-150, which included consideration by the Planning Director, the Planning Commission, and the City Council. 22 In other words, the City did not create the reasons set forth in its denial letters post hoc. In fact, the reasons set forth in the City's letters were the same, or substantially similar to, the reasons set forth in the Agenda Packets, which Planning Director Daroga created at the very beginning of the process, prior to the Planning Commission's initial consideration of SP-149 and SP-150. All City Council members received copies of the respective Agenda Packets prior to the hearings on SP-149 and SP-150. 23 Further, the City noted in its July 20, 2001, letter that its denial was based, in part, on the Planning Commission's recommendation, which in turn was based on Planning Director Daroga's findings set forth in the Agenda Packet. 73 Second, the Zoning Ordinance specifically provides that [a]ny decision[] to deny an application for the placement, construction, modification of towers for cellular or personal communication service, or specialized radio mobile service shall be conveyed to the applicant in writing. Broken Arrow Zoning Ord. art. VIII, § 18.16. Thus, local law identifies the written decision as the proper source for the reasons supporting the denial, see Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus, 197 F.3d at 72, and this court will not assume that the City acted in contravention of section 18.16's self-imposed procedural requirement. 74 Similarly, given the writing requirement contained in the Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii), logic dictates that we look to the required writing to determine the basis for the City Council's decision. As the First Circuit suggested in Todd, the purpose of section 332(c)(7)(B)(iii)'s writing requirement is to facilitate meaningful judicial review. 244 F.3d at 60 ([The] written denial must contain a sufficient explanation of the reasons for the permit denial to allow a reviewing court to evaluate the evidence in the record supporting those reasons.). 75 Third, according to U.S. Cellular, [i]t would be patently unfair to speculate that the members of the City Council who voted upon the specific motion, as seconded, would agree to that which was not expressly voted upon. We agree. But it would be similarly unfair to assume, as U.S. Cellular invites us to, that each City Council member who voted to deny U.S. Cellular's application necessarily adopted only those reasons stated by the Council member who initiated the motion at the end of lengthy written and oral consideration. Fortunately, the City's denial letters, which set forth in writing the City's reasons for denial, remove the need for such speculation. 76 Based on the above, we reject U.S. Cellular's argument that we should remove from the scope of our substantial-evidence review the reasons set forth in the City's denial letters of July 17, 2001, and July 20, 2001 and record evidence supporting those reasons.
77 U.S. Cellular raises two principal points in contending that the City Council's denial of SP-149 cannot withstand substantial-evidence review. First, U.S. Cellular argues that the City Council failed to apply the standards and criteria set forth in the Zoning Ordinance. Second, U.S. Cellular contends that the reasons 24 set forth in the City Council's July 17, 2001, letter were not supported by substantial evidence. We consider each contention in turn. 78 First, the transcripts of the City Council's June 18, 2001, hearing belie U.S. Cellular's assertion that the City Council did not review the Section 18.12 factors in denying SP-149. In accordance with section 18.12's mandate, City Council members considered the following: (1) the proximity of the tower to residential structures and adjacent residential lot boundaries and the nature of uses on adjacent and nearby properties, 25 Broken Arrow Zoning Ord. art. VIII, § 18.12(b)(c); (2) the height and design of the proposed tower, with particular reference to those design characteristics which have the effect of reducing or eliminating visual obtrusiveness, 26 id. § 18.12(a), (f); and (3) whether ... there are suitable, existing towers or other supporting structures capable of meeting the technological needs of the applicant, 27 id. § 18.12(i). Further, both the Planning Director and the Planning Commission considered SP-149 under the factors contained in section 18.12. 79 Second, we must consider whether substantial evidence supported the reasons set forth in the City Council's July 17, 2001, letter. The City Council based its denial, in part, on the fact that U.S. Cellular's proposed site was zoned AR-1, a transitional-zoning category, and applicable law provided that [n]o new use may be commenced on land, which is assigned transitional zoning ... without obtaining appropriate conventional zoning. Id., art. VIII, § 15.5. 80 With respect to this aspect of the City Council's decision, U.S. Cellular notes that [it] expressly agreed to pursue the platting and zoning change as a condition to the granting of the special use permit. U.S. Cellular argues that nothing in the [Zoning Ordinance] prohibit[ed] [the City Council from] granting the special use permit subject to acquiring the proper zoning and platting. We disagree. 81 Under the plain language of article VIII, section 15.5, [n]o new use may be commenced on land which is assigned transitional zoning ... without obtaining appropriate conventional zoning. Although U.S. Cellular argues that section 15.5 only prohibits use, rather than the grant of a conditional permit, the City Council had, on at least one previous occasion, interpreted section 15.5 in a manner consistent with the construction employed in its denial of SP-149. Further, even if we agreed with U.S. Cellular's construction of section 15.5, we may not overturn the City Council's interpretation of its own Zoning Ordinance. Rather, our task is a limited one; our sole inquiry under 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) is whether the [local authority's] decision, as guided by local law, is supported by substantial evidence. Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus, 197 F.3d at 72 (emphasis added). As to the City Council's decision here, the answer is plainly yes. 82 U.S. Cellular does not dispute the fact that the East Avenue property was zoned AR-1, a transitional zoning category under the Zoning Ordinance; nor does it contend that it had obtain[ed] conventional zoning. See Broken Arrow Zoning Ord. art. VIII, § 15.5. Thus, SP-149 clearly falls within section 15.5's prohibition. Nothing in the Telecommunications Act forbids local authorities from applying general and nondiscriminatory standards derived from their zoning codes. Aegerter v. City of Delafield, 174 F.3d 886, 891 (7th Cir.1999). Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence supported the City Council's denial based on section 15.5. 83 In an attempt to avoid this result, U.S. Cellular argues that [i]t makes no sense to require U.S. Cellular to expend the time and resources to obtain the platting and rezoning of the Subject Property before it knows whether it can obtain a special use permit to place the tower on the property. Even if we agreed with U.S. Cellular, this would not alter our conclusion; so long as the municipality's decision is grounded in local law and supported by substantial evidence, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) is satisfied. On this point, the Seventh Circuit's observation is instructive: 84 Some may disagree with Congress's decision to leave so much authority in the hands of state and local governments to affect the placement of the physical infrastructure of an important part of the nation's evolving telecommunications network. But that is what it did when it passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and it is not our job to second-guess that political decision. 85 City of Delafield, 174 F.3d at 892. 86 The City Council also based its denial on section 18.13, which provides that [t]he applicant [must] demonstrate[] to the City Council's reasonable satisfaction that no existing tower or other structure can accommodate the applicant's proposed antenna. Broken Arrow Zoning Ord. art. VIII, § 18.13. In the Planning Commission's April 26, 2001, Agenda Packet, a copy of which was provided to U.S. Cellular, Planning Director Daroga noted that there was an alternative site for U.S. Cellular's proposed 120-foot monopole, located slightly more than one-half mile from SP-149's proposed site on the east side of County Line Road. 87 U.S. Cellular offered no substantive evidence concerning the feasibility of co-locating on the County Line Road tower. 28 The only evidence in the record concerning the feasibility of this site consists of the following: (1) statements before the Planning Commission from Doyle Groat, a U.S. Cellular engineer; 29 and (2) statements before both the Planning Commission and the City Council from Kevin Coutant, U.S. Cellular's attorney, suggesting the inadequacy of the site. 30 U.S. Cellular offered no evidence to substantiate Mr. Groat's or Mr. Coutant's statements. Thus, substantial evidence supported the City Council's denial based on section 18.13. Cf. Todd, 244 F.3d at 63 (For a telecommunications provider to argue that a permit denial is impermissible because there are no alternative sites, it must develop a record demonstrating that it has made a full effort to evaluate the other available alternatives and that the alternatives are not feasible to serve its customers.). 88 To the extent U.S. Cellular suggests that it was the City's burden to come forward with evidence concerning the feasibility of co-locating on this site, we disagree. The Zoning Ordinance explicitly places this burden on the applicant. Broken Arrow Zoning Ord. art. VIII, § 18.13. 89 Further, although denials may not be based on conjecture or speculation, Petersburg Cellular Partnership v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Nottoway County, 205 F.3d 688, 695 (4th Cir.2000), [w]e doubt that Congress intended local zoning boards to pay for experts to prove that there are alternative sites for a proposed tower, National Tower, LLC v. Plainville Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 297 F.3d 14, 24 (1st Cir.2002). Accordingly, we firmly reject the district court's statement that [t]he opinions expressed by the City officials about the existence of other adequate existing locations amount to nothing more than `generalized' concerns' which are not adequate to fill the record with substantial evidence. U.S. Cellular I, at 12. In AT & T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of City of Virginia Beach, the Fourth Circuit dismissed a similar argument: 90 In all cases of this sort, those seeking to build will come armed with exhibits, experts, and evaluations. [The telecommunications provider], by urging us to hold that such a predictable barrage mandates that local governments approve applications, effectively demand that we interpret the Act so as always to thwart average, nonexpert citizens; that is, to thwart democracy. The district court dismissed citizen opposition as `generalized concerns.' Congress, in refusing to abolish local authority over zoning of personal wireless services, categorically rejected this scornful approach. 91 155 F.3d 423, 431 (4th Cir.1998). 92 Based on the foregoing, 31 we conclude that substantial evidence contained in [the] written record supported the City Council's denial of SP-149. 32 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii).
93 U.S. Cellular advances similar arguments in challenging the City Council's denial of SP-150. At the outset, we note that U.S. Cellular's contention that the City Council did not apply the standards and criteria set forth in the Zoning Ordinance is wholly without merit. 33 94 Similarly, we reject U.S. Cellular's argument that the City Council's denial of SP-150 was not supported by substantial evidence. U.S. Cellular's proposed site, the South Oneta Road property, was zoned AA-1, a transitional-zoning category. Under the Zoning Ordinance, no new use may be commenced on land, which is assigned transitional zoning ... without obtaining appropriate conventional zoning. Broken Arrow Zoning Ord. art. VIII, § 15.5. Although the City Council had conditionally approved the South Oneta Road property for conventional zoning on February 21, 2001, U.S. Cellular does not contend that conventional zoning had in fact been obtain[ed]. 34 See id. 95 Further, the City Council had earmarked the South Oneta Road property for A-1 zoning. Under section 18.11(G), towers are normally discouraged in A-1... zoning districts. Id., art. VIII, § 18.11(G). Where an applicant seeks a permit to construct in such disfavored areas, section 18.11 requires that the applicant establish the elements of the application by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Despite section 18.11(G)'s requirement of clear and convincing evidence in support of the application, U.S. Cellular ignored the City Council's request that the company provide information on the feasibility of 100-foot, camouflaged tower for the SP-150 site. Thus, substantial evidence supported the City Council's denial under section 18.13, which provides: No new tower should be permitted by the City Council, unless the applicant demonstrates to the City Council's reasonable satisfaction that no existing tower or other structure can accommodate the applicant's proposed antennae. Id., art. VIII, § 18.13.