Opinion ID: 2678675
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Juror's Improper Use of Social Media

Text: Defendants have the right to a trial by an impartial jury. U.S. Const. amend. VI. That right is not violated, however, merely because a juror places himself in a potentially compromising situation. United States v. Aiello, 771 F.2d 621, 629 (2d Cir. 1985), abrogated on other grounds by Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292 (1996); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982) ([I]t is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence that might theoretically affect their vote.). A new trial will be granted only if the juror's ability to perform her duty impartially has been adversely affected, Aiello, 771 F.2d at 629, and the defendant has been substantially prejudiced as a result, United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 305 (3d Cir. 2011). Although courts are understandably reluctant to invade the sanctity of the jury's deliberations, the trial judge should inquire into a juror's partiality where there are reasonable grounds to believe the defendant may have been prejudiced. United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76, 97 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1234 (2d Cir. 1983). That inquiry should end, however, as soon as it becomes apparent that those reasonable grounds no longer exist. See Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d at 1234. -14-