Opinion ID: 2066060
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Theft by Unauthorized Taking or Transfer (Counts II, III, IV, V, VI, and VII)

Text: [¶ 22] Schmidt's convictions for theft in Counts II through VII are based on the State's allegations that Schmidt failed to compensate six individuals who provided products or services for the building's renovation: (1) Gregory L. Pollack of A & E Plumbing, (2) William Barnett of Riverside Electric, (3) Johnson's True Value, (4) Mark Wright of Mark Wright Construction and Disposal, (5) Zaccheriah Gidney, and (6) Steven J. Scott. [¶ 23] There is competent record evidence to establish that Schmidt exercised control over City funds, and to support a reasonable inference that Schmidt intended to deprive the six named victims of the money they were owed for their work on the Main Street building. The evidence is insufficient, however, to support a finding that Schmidt ever exercised unauthorized control, within the meaning of the criminal statutes, over money that was the property of the six named victims based on his failure to pay them according to their agreement. [¶ 24] In State v. Nelson, the defendant was convicted of several counts of theft by unauthorized taking. He had contracted with several landowners who were to supply him with timber in exchange for payment. 1998 ME 183, ¶ 2-3, 714 A.2d 832, 832-33. Nelson paid only one of the timber suppliers a partial amount owed and paid the remaining suppliers none of what he owed them. Id. ¶ 2, 714 A.2d at 832. We vacated Nelson's conviction on the ground that an unpaid money obligation owed to another person gives rise only to a security interest, and that the unpaid debt does not constitute property of another pursuant to the theft statutes, and thus could not support a conviction for theft by unauthorized taking. Id. ¶ 5, 714 A.2d at 833. [¶ 25] Our decision in Nelson is relevant to Schmidt's case. The criminal statute defines [p]roperty of another as property in which any person or government other than the actor has an interest that the actor is not privileged to infringe, regardless of the fact that the actor also has an interest in the property. 17-A M.R.S. § 352(4) (2007). Further, [p]roperty in the possession of the actor may not be deemed property of another who has only a security interest therein, even if legal title is in the creditor pursuant to a conditional sales contract or other security agreement. 17-A M.R.S. § 352(4). In this case, the loan funds, at least at the time, were properly in Schmidt's possession, and did not constitute property belonging to the six unpaid subcontractors and suppliers. Rather, the victims had only a right to payment that could afford them a security interest in the form of a mechanic's lien on the property. We therefore vacate Schmidt's convictions as to Counts II through VII for lack of sufficient supporting evidence.