Opinion ID: 2211159
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Special Legislation/Equal Protection

Text: Porter asserts that the trial court erred in holding that section 18-1.1 violates the special legislation clause and the equal protection clause of the Illinois Constitution. The special legislation clause of our state constitution provides: The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or can be made applicable shall be a matter for judicial determination. Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 13. The equal protection clause provides: No person shall    be denied the equal protection of the laws. Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 2. In defense of the trial court's holding, Cheryl initially contends that section 18-1.1 is special legislation because a general law, section 18-1(a) of the Probate Act, already allows anyone to bring nursing care claims against a disabled person's estate. Section 18-1(a) provides for the filing of claims against an estate. See 755 ILCS 5/18-1(a) (West 2000) (A claim against the estate of a decedent or ward, whether based on contract, tort, statutory custodial claim or otherwise, may be filed with the representative or the court or both). Section 18-1(a), however, is not a general law as we have used that term. See County of Bureau v. Thompson, 139 Ill.2d 323, 345, 151 Ill.Dec. 508, 564 N.E.2d 1170 (1990) (A general law is a law that by its terms applies to all who are in a like position, who are `similarly situated'); Bridgewater v. Hotz, 51 Ill.2d 103, 111, 281 N.E.2d 317 (1972). Section 18-1(a) describes which claims may be filed against an estate and with whom to file them; unlike section 18-1.1, section 18-1(a) does not create a new claim. The General Assembly understood this when it amended section 18-1(a) to include section 18-1.1 statutory custodial claims among the types of claims which may be filed with the estate representative or the trial court. Additionally, as we have noted, section 18-1.1 concerns something apart from nursing or other care. The General Assembly knew that section 18-1(a) already was an available avenue to recoup such expenses. The legislature enacted section 18-1.1 to allow immediate family members to recover the additional opportunity and emotional costs of committing their lives to disabled relatives. Section 18-1(a) is not a general law in relation to section 18-1.1. This conclusion, however, does not end our constitutional inquiry. Cheryl further contends that section 18-1.1 violates the special legislation and equal protection clauses because it makes an irrational classification. According to Cheryl, section 18-1.1 includes only members of a disabled person's immediate family within the class that may make statutory custodial claims, while it excludes persons outside a disabled person's immediate familygrandparents or grandchildren, nieces, nephews, aunts, uncles, cousins, and even friends who have provided identical care to a disabled person. The special legislation clause expresslyprohibits the General Assembly from conferring a benefit or privilege upon one group while excluding other similarly situated groups. Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill.2d 367, 391, 228 Ill.Dec. 636, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (1997). The legislature enjoys broad discretion in making statutory classifications, and the special legislation clause does not prohibit all classifications, only arbitrary ones. In re Petition of the Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill.2d 117, 122, 212 Ill.Dec. 883, 658 N.E.2d 365 (1995); Illinois Polygraph Society v. Pellicano, 83 Ill.2d 130, 138, 46 Ill.Dec. 574, 414 N.E.2d 458 (1980) (special legislation preferentially and arbitrarily applies to a class while it excludes all others). That is, the purpose of this clause is to prevent legislative classifications which discriminate in favor of a select group without a sound and reasonable basis. Best, 179 Ill.2d at 391, 228 Ill.Dec. 636, 689 N.E.2d 1057; Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson, 108 Ill.2d 357, 367, 91 Ill.Dec. 610, 483 N.E.2d 1245 (1985). Accordingly, the special legislation clause supplements the equal protection clause, which prohibits arbitrary discrimination against a person or class. Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Authority, 125 Ill.2d 230, 236, 125 Ill.Dec. 822, 531 N.E.2d 1 (1988); Ill. Ann.Stat., 1970 Const., art. IV, § 13, Constitutional Commentary, at 217 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (In many cases, the protection provided by [the special legislation clause] is also provided by the equal protection clause). Our inquiry here is two-fold. We first must determine whether the statute discriminates in favor of a select group. If so, we must determine whether the classification created by the statute is arbitrary. See Phillips v. Browne, 270 Ill. 450, 453, 110 N.E. 601 (1915) (That the statute operates uniformly upon all members of a class created as the beneficiaries of the act is not the sole test to be applied, but in order to avoid the constitutional inhibition    it must also appear that there is a sound basis, in reason and principle, for regarding the class of individuals as a distinct and separate class for the purpose of the particular legislation). In this regard, special legislation and equal protection challenges are judged by the same standard. See Cutinello v. Whitley, 161 Ill.2d 409, 417, 204 Ill.Dec. 136, 641 N.E.2d 360 (1994); Illinois Housing Development Authority v. Van Meter, 82 Ill.2d 116, 124, 45 Ill.Dec. 18, 412 N.E.2d 151 (1980); Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill.2d 295, 315, 37 Ill.Dec. 558, 402 N.E.2d 560 (1979). Because section 18-1.1 does not affect fundamental rights or make a suspect classification, the appropriate measure of its constitutionality is the deferential rational basis test, which asks whether the statutory classification is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. See Best, 179 Ill.2d at 394, 228 Ill.Dec. 636, 689 N.E.2d 1057; Bilyk, 125 Ill.2d at 236, 125 Ill.Dec. 822, 531 N.E.2d 1; see also Thompson, 139 Ill.2d at 337, 151 Ill. Dec. 508, 564 N.E.2d 1170. The legislature has great flexibility in making statutory classifications as dictated by common experience, and our constitution does not mandate `abstract symmetry.' See People ex rel. Carey v. Chrastka, 83 Ill.2d 67, 81, 46 Ill.Dec. 156, 413 N.E.2d 1269 (1980), quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 539-40, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 1112, 86 L.Ed. 1655, 1659 (1942), quoting Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 144, 34 S.Ct. 281, 282, 58 L.Ed. 539, 543 (1914). Accordingly, if a court can reasonably conceive of circumstances which justify distinguishing the class benefitted by the statute from the class outside its scope, the classification is constitutional. Vernon Hills, 168 Ill.2d at 122, 212 Ill.Dec. 883, 658 N.E.2d 365; see Cutinello, 161 Ill.2d at 420, 204 Ill.Dec. 136, 641 N.E.2d 360 (the rational basis test requires only a reasonable relationship between the challenged legislation and a conceivable, even though unarticulated, governmental interest). Here, section 18-1.1 discriminates in favor of a select group. It provides that only certain classes of caregivers spouse, parent, sibling, and childare entitled to make statutory custodial claims. Gebis, 186 Ill.2d at 195, 237 Ill.Dec. 755, 710 N.E.2d 385. Other classes of caregivers are excluded. Thus, in order to pass constitutional muster, the classification in section 18-1.1 must share a rational relation with the problem targeted by the General Assembly. In 1988, after the Illinois House of Representatives had approved House Bill 4116, the Senate judiciary committee proposed several amendments. Both houses appointed conference committees, and both houses adopted the joint conference committee report, which included section 4 containing the statutory custodial claim provision of section 18-1.1. See 1988 Ill. S.J. 3833-36; 1988 Ill. H.J. 5413-16. Governor Thompson disapproved. In an amendatory veto message, he wrote: Section 4 of this legislation attempts to address the difficulty a family member faces in seeking fair compensation for personal custodial care services rendered to a disabled person. While I understand monetary, as well as emotional hardships endured by the family of disabled person are often extreme, Section 4 of this bill is inequitable and unworkable, and will lead to complex probate litigation. Section 4 of this bill contains serious inconsistencies and ambiguities. `Disabled person' is a crucial category, as well as `degrees of disability'; however, no definition is given for either in the text of the bill. Moreover, the category of persons who are entitled to conditional gifts is unfairly restricted, and the custodial claimant is given 1st class creditor statussuperior to those of all beneficiaries under the disabled person's will. Further, it denies the State reimbursement for care given the disabled person until after all the statutory custodial care claims have been paid. Finally, the quality of care given is never addressed, nor is there any distinction, or increased claim provisions made, between a person who provides 3 years of care and one who provides 30 years of care. I believe Section 4 of this bill is inequitable, unworkable, and will no doubt cause havoc with the handling of probate estates. Moreover, I cannot in good faith support and approve legislation which might put disabled persons in the role of `pawn' being tossed to and fro in a battle between persons eager to grant and claim a `conditional gift' upon the disabled person's death. 1988 Ill. S.J. 5896-97 (Governor Thompson's amendatory veto message); 1988 Ill. H.J. 7524-25 (same). Both houses of the General Assembly voted overwhelmingly to pass House Bill 4116 with section 4, notwithstanding the Governor's suggestions. 85th Ill. Gen. Assem., 1988 Sess., Final Legislative Synopsis & Digest 1934. The legislature was mindful of the class of persons who usually live with and personally care for disabled persons. See 85th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, December 1, 1988, at 54-56, 58 (statements of Senator Poshard); 85th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, December 1, 1988, at 58 (statements of Senator Geo-Karis); 85th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, November 16, 1988, at 19 (statements of Representative Tate). The legislature also undoubtedly was mindful of other provisions of the Probate Act. State v. Mikusch, 138 Ill.2d 242, 247-48, 149 Ill.Dec. 704, 562 N.E.2d 168 (1990) (It is presumed that the legislature, in enacting various statutes, acts rationally and with full knowledge of all previous enactments). Section 2-1 of the Probate Act provides rules of intestate descent and distribution. Under section 2-1, an intestate decedent's estate is distributed first to the decedent's surviving spouse and the decedent's descendants. 755 ILCS 5/2-1(a) through (c) (West 2000). If the decedent has no surviving spouse or descendants, then the estate is distributed to the decedent's parents, siblings, and siblings' descendants. See 755 ILCS 5/2-1(d) (West 2000). Section 18-1.1 refers to these same family members: spouse, parent, sibling, and child. Those with the highest intestate priority are those who are entitled to make statutory custodial claims. Cheryl contends that the classification in section 18-1.1 is based upon the claimant's status as an immediate family member, not the claimant's activity in caring for the disabled person. We have previously acknowledged a particularly strong presumption that legislation which classifies on the basis of activities does so on the basis of legitimate differences as to the problem involved or the degree of harm applicable to the activity in question. People ex rel. Skinner v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc., 114 Ill.2d 252, 262, 102 Ill.Dec. 412, 500 N.E.2d 34 (1986); see Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill.2d 455, 460, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967); Harvey v. Clyde Park District, 32 Ill.2d 60, 67, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1964) (classifications based on function are constitutionally permissible). This strong presumption in favor of activity-based classifications, however, does not mean that status-based classifications are never constitutionally permissible. A status-based classification which is rationally related to the purpose of the statute does not violate the special legislation or equal protection clauses. Here, the classification bears a rational relationship to the purpose of the statute. Section 18-1.1 allows only immediate family members to make statutory custodial claims; this restriction clearly serves the legislative goal of encouraging immediate family members to commit themselves to disabled relatives. As Porter aptly notes in her reply brief, the unique and abiding nature of these family ties will best insure the provision of quality home care on a sustained and continuing basis. Expanding the group who may make statutory custodial claims actually would exacerbate one of the problems identified by Governor Thompson. A wider pool of potential claimants would mean more jockeying to receive the statutory distribution. The class of persons most likely to provide dedicated residential and personal care with a loving and altruistic motive is the class identified in the statute. Section 18-1.1 does not violate the special legislation clause or the equal protection clause of the Illinois Constitution.