Opinion ID: 621257
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lack of Interference

Text: It is also clear on these facts that there is no real risk of interference with the three ongoing private civil actions in the state courts. Younger abstention is based, in large measure, on the seriousness of federal judicial interference with ongoing state-court proceedings. Huffman, 420 U.S. at 603, 95 S.Ct. 1200; accord Maymó-Meléndez v. Álvarez-Ramírez, 364 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir.2004) ( Younger is ... built around the principle that ... federal courts should refrain from issuing injunctions that interfere with ongoing state-court litigation....). As a result, where neither declaratory nor injunctive relief can directly interfere with the ongoing state proceedings, there is no basis for Younger abstention. Doran, 422 U.S. at 931, 95 S.Ct. 2561; accord Rio Grande, 397 F.3d at 70 ( Younger applies only when the relief asked of the federal court `interfere[s]' with the state proceedings. (alteration in original) (quoting Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 716, 116 S.Ct. 1712)); Green, 255 F.3d at 1096 (The Supreme Court has ... confirmed that `interference' with ongoing state judicial proceedings is a necessary condition for Younger abstention.). Interference is usually expressed as a proceeding that either enjoins the state proceeding or has the `practical effect' of doing so. Rio Grande, 397 F.3d at 70. Nothing in the MDA's requested relief would interfere with the three state-court proceedings involving its members. The prospective injunctive relief sought pertains solely to the Attorney General, and would only preclude the Commonwealth, not private parties, from bringing suit under § 148B(a)(2) with respect to motor carriers engaged in interstate commerce. [11] The declaratory relief sought would also not cause any interference with the state-court proceedings. It is true that the MDA seeks a general declaration that subsection (a)(2) is pre-empted with respect to motor carriers engaged in interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has made clear that is not a basis to invoke Younger. In Steffel and in Doran, the outcomes of the federal suits would create judicial precedent which might or might not coincide with the determinations made by the state courts as to other parties under the same state statutes. That did not warrant Younger abstention. Indeed, the Court in NOPSI made clear that even though the federal court's disposition of such a case may well affect, or for practical purposes pre-empt, a future or, as in the present circumstances, even a pendingstate-court action, such an effect was insufficient to give rise to Younger abstention. 491 U.S. at 373, 109 S.Ct. 2506; see also Rio Grande, 397 F.3d at 71 ([T]he mere possibility of inconsistent results in the future is insufficient to justify Younger abstention.); Green, 255 F.3d at 1097 (explaining that the `mere potential for conflict in the results of adjudications,' is not the kind of `interference' that merits federal court abstention (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976))). Beyond that, there is another reason there is no interference here. As a practical matter, the [s]tate courts are not bound by the dictates of the lower federal courts, although they are free to rely on the opinions of such courts when adjudicating federal claims. Evans v. Thompson, 518 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2008) (citing Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring)); accord Steffel, 415 U.S. at 482 n. 3, 94 S.Ct. 1209 (Rhenquist, J., concurring) (explaining that a federal declaratory judgment would not be accorded the stare decisis effect in state court that it would have in a subsequent proceeding within the same federal jurisdiction. Although the state court would not be compelled to follow the federal holding, the opinion might, of course, be viewed as highly persuasive.); Magouirk v. Phillips, 144 F.3d 348, 361 (5th Cir.1998) ([T]he Louisiana state courts are not bound by Fifth Circuit precedent when making a determination of federal law.); Bromley v. Crisp, 561 F.2d 1351, 1354 (10th Cir.1977) (en banc) (holding that state courts may express their differing views on the retroactivity problem or similar federal questions until we are all guided by a binding decision of the Supreme Court); United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1076 (7th Cir.1970) ([B]ecause lower federal courts exercise no appellate jurisdiction over state tribunals, decisions of lower federal courts are not conclusive on state courts.); Owsley v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 804, 805 (4th Cir.1965) (Though state courts may for policy reasons follow the decisions of the Court of Appeals whose circuit includes their state, they are not obliged to do so. (citation omitted)). [12] As a matter of state law, Massachusetts state courts do not regard the pronouncements of lower federal courts as binding. ACE Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 437 Mass. 241, 770 N.E.2d 980, 986 n. 8 (2002) (Although we are not bound by decisions of Federal courts (other than the United States Supreme Court) on matters of federal law, `we give respectful consideration to such lower Federal court decisions as seem persuasive.' (citation omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hill, 377 Mass. 59, 385 N.E.2d 253, 255 (1979))); Commonwealth v. Montanez, 388 Mass. 603, 447 N.E.2d 660, 661 (1983) (Though we always treat their decisions with deference, we are not bound by decisions of Federal courts except the decisions of the United States Supreme Court on questions of Federal law.). Thus, should the district court issue a declaratory judgment on remand finding the state statute pre-empted, that judgment would not be binding on Massachusetts state courts and litigation by private parties may proceed. That said, a defendant may seek to enforce the declaratory judgment in federal court should the Attorney General continue to bring actions under the statute in state court despite the declaratory judgment. The Attorney General does not argue that a federal decision could result in collateral estoppel effects that would amount to interference with the state proceedings. Even if such collateral estoppel effects were present, they would not suffice to justify Younger abstention. Rio Grande, 397 F.3d at 71 (Normal res judicata effects of federal actions on state actions ... are of course not enough to trigger Younger. ). Given this lack of any interference with the state-court proceedings, Younger abstention is inapplicable. [13]