Opinion ID: 1439815
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Subsequent confession

Text: Given our conclusions that the showing of the video was the functional equivalent of interrogation, and that the failure to advise Green of his rights violated Miranda, we are thus left with the on-the-record statement by DEA Special Agent Hughes that this omission was the result of a deliberate and calculated plan. Although Defendant fails to raise this issue, we are unable to ignore the implication that this stark admission on the part of a federal law enforcement official has on the admissibility of Defendant's subsequent, post- Miranda statements. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004). This is precisely the type of error contemplated by the plain error standard of review. Warren, 338 F.3d at 260 (unpreserved error which affected the outcome of trial proceedings may be corrected on appeal where it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings); see also United States v. Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079, 1091 (7th Cir.2004) (remanding to district court for Seibert determination but stating if Seibert rendered confession inadmissible, earlier admission of confession was plain error affecting defendant's substantial rights). In Seibert, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the question first, Mirandize later interrogation strategy. There, the Court held that where police make a conscious decision to withhold Miranda until after interrogating and obtaining a confession, all subsequent incriminating statements, even those made after the mid-interrogation provision of Miranda warnings are rendered inadmissible. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616-17, 124 S.Ct. 2601; cf. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 311-14, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (although defendant made unsolicited confession at scene, police's later Miranda warnings given when defendant was formally in custody made subsequent, repeated confession admissible under objective inquiry of voluntariness). We have previously discussed the Seibert decision at length in United States v. Naranjo, 426 F.3d 221 (3d Cir.2005). In Naranjo, federal customs agents suspected that the defendant was involved in narcotics trafficking, and a few days into their investigation, a number of agents converged on the suspect as he was leaving his residence. Id. at 224. Naranjo was handcuffed, but the agents told him that although he was not under arrest and did not have to answer any questions, they wanted to know if he would be willing to speak with them in any event. Id. at 224-25. Defendant agreed to talk and incriminated himself. Id. at 255. After a break in the questioning, however, notwithstanding the defendant's desire to continue speaking, the agents stopped him and advised him of his Miranda rights; Naranjo subsequently waived his rights and offered additional details of his criminal involvement. Id. We held in Naranjo that the threshold inquiry, when confronted with a statement challenged on question first, Mirandize later grounds, is whether the timing of the Miranda warning was the product of a deliberate law enforcement tactic to withhold the requisite warnings at the commencement of questioning. Id. at 231-32 (citing Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622, 124 S.Ct. 2601 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)). [13] Where Miranda is consciously withheld, postwarning statements that are related to the substance of prewarning statements must be excluded unless curative measures are taken before the postwarning statement is made. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622, 124 S.Ct. 2601 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Such curative measures may include an inquiry into whether or not the defendant was informed that his/her prior unwarned statement can not be used as evidence, although it's not necessary to inform the suspect of that in every instance. Naranjo, 426 F.3d at 232. Further, a substantial break in time and circumstances between the prewarning statement and the Miranda warning may suffice in most circumstances, as it allows the accused to distinguish the two contexts and appreciate that the interrogation has taken a new turn. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622, 124 S.Ct. 2601 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In determining the efficacy of the midstream warnings ( i.e., whether the belated advisement sufficiently cured the taint of the initial Miranda violation), courts may also consider the degree of overlap between the substance of pre-warning and post-warning statements and questions, whether the same interrogators were involved, the level of detail of the pre-warning statements, and the extent to which interrogators treated the post-warning questioning as a continuation of the pre-warning session. Id. at 615, 124 S.Ct. 2601 (plurality opinion); see Stewart, 388 F.3d at 1090 (if two-step interrogation strategy is intentionally undertaken, the central voluntariness inquiry of Elstad has been replaced by a presumptive rule of exclusion, subject to a multifactor test for change in time, place, and circumstances from the first statement to the second). Because it was unclear based on the record available to the Naranjo court whether the Miranda warnings there were omitted as a result of a rookie mistake or a deliberate interrogation strategy, we remanded the case to the district court to make the requisite Seibert findings. Naranjo, 426 F.3d at 232. No such ambiguity exists in this case. Here, DEA Special Agent Eric Hughes and Task Force Officer Lawrence Collins arrested Defendant on the street pursuant to a federal drug indictment but told him initially that it was for a state warrant. This was done, at least in part, to prevent Green from invoking his rights at the outset. App. at 59A (And, quite frankly, had I said [ ] I was DEA ... and had him out on the scene, it's quite possible he would have said, I want to speak to my lawyer right away.). After arriving at DEA offices, Defendant was taken to an interrogation room by Hughes and Collins and only then was informed of the true nature of his arrest. Hughes told Green not to say anything further, at which point the video was played. After seeing the video, Green made a number of verbal and non-verbal statements which acknowledged his guilt. Hughes then immediately administered the Miranda warnings, and Green allegedly waived his rights, although no waiver form was signed. Hughes asked Green if he recognized anyone on the video. After a long pause, Defendant shook his head and said that he was smoking a lot of weed back then and just didn't remember. Hughes reminded Green of the evidence they had against him, the severity of the charges, and repeated the question. Defendant again gave the same response that he did not recall. Hughes and Collins thus suspended the questioning, moved Defendant back to a holding cell, and sought the assistance of the AUSA assigned to the case. After the prosecutor arrived at DEA offices approximately an hour and 20 minutes later, Green was again taken to an interview room and Hughes and Collins, this time accompanied by the AUSA, resumed questioning. After all three government officials emphasized the potential criminal penalties he was facing, Defendant responded: What do you want to know? Collins then asked Green if he had ever sold crack cocaine; Green responded that he had done so only once, and gestured toward the video. Defendant then told the agents the identity of his drug source for the particular transaction. Because Hughes openly stated at the suppression hearing that he intentionally refrained from advising Green of his Miranda rights prior to showing the video, Seibert dictates that Green's post- Miranda statements which relate to his pre- Miranda admissions are presumptively inadmissible unless we determine that the second interrogation session was carried out under sufficiently different circumstances so as to have cured the initial taint. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622, 124 S.Ct. 2601 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In this instance, however, there was no intervening lapse of time between the warned and unwarned interrogations. [14] Cf. id. (a break between prewarning statements and advisement of rights may suggest to a reasonable person that the two stages of interrogation are distinct). All of the relevant questioning here occurred in the same location, and with essentially the same interrogators. The focus of the two consecutive interrogation sessions was identical, as were the questions asked. And although neither agent engaged in express questioning pre- Miranda, for purposes of our constitutional analysis, there is no difference between showing Defendant a video of him engaging in a criminal act and informing him of the existence of such evidence against him. None of these undisputed facts indicate that any sort of curative measures were undertaken in Defendant's case. On the other hand, we acknowledge that Green's initial pre- Miranda statements after seeing the video were not expressly inculpatory or particularly detailed, and that the prewarning interrogation session lasted only a few minutes. However, Defendant's prewarned statements, although not express, were nevertheless implicit admissions of guilt. See discussion supra Section II.B.1. Furthermore, in light of the fact that the entire interrogation session at issue here was relatively brief  not surprising given that the particular charged crime in this case consisted solely of a single hand-to-hand drug sale  we believe the factor of the exhaustive nature of the prewarning questioning and of the admissions is not particularly helpful to the sufficiency of the curative measures inquiry in this instance. Under the unique circumstances before us, where everything occurred in one continuous span in the same place and with the same people, we think it unlikely that a reasonable person in Defendant's position would have viewed the pre- and post- Miranda questioning as distinct episodes, nor would he have thought that he had a meaningful choice in whether to continue to make incriminating statements. See United States v. Aguilar, 384 F.3d 520, 525 (8th Cir.2004) (excluding confession under Seibert ). Unlike those of the vast majority of the cases that courts have encountered in the wake of Seibert, the record in this case is unambiguous that the initial violation of Miranda was not merely hapless or inadvertent, but rather was an intentional withholding that was part of a larger, nefarious plot to prevent Defendant from invoking his rights so as to gain his confession. Cf. Reinert v. Larkins, 379 F.3d 76, 91 (3d Cir.2004) (no Seibert violation where police appear to have unintentionally neglected to administer Miranda warnings at the outset of questioning); United States v. Yamba, 407 F.Supp.2d 703, 718 (W.D.Pa.2006) (Hardiman, J.) (single unintentional unwarned question did not taint subsequent, warned interrogation and confession). This dangerous practice is precisely the type of systematic circumvention of Miranda that the Supreme Court sought to root out in Seibert, and we must thus decline to countenance these highly irregular procedures here. Because we find that insufficient curative measures were undertaken in Defendant's case, Seibert requires the exclusion of Green's post- Miranda statements as well.