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Text: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” §703(a), 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S. C. §2000e–2(a). The statute entrusts the enforcement of that prohibition to the EEOC. See §2000e–5(a); EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 61–62 (1984). The EEOC’s responsibilities “are triggered by the filing of a specific sworn charge of discrimination,” University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 190 (1990), which can be filed either by the person alleging discrimination or by the EEOC itself, see §2000e–5(b). When it receives a charge, the EEOC must first notify the employer, ibid., and must then investigate “to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true,” University of Pa., 493 U.S., at 190 (internal quotation marks omitted).

This case is about one of the tools the EEOC has at its disposal in conducting its investigation: a subpoena. In order “[t]o enable the [EEOC] to make informed decisions at each stage of the enforcement process,” Title VII “confers a broad right of access to relevant evidence.” Id., at 191. It provides that the EEOC “shall . . . have access to, for the purposes of examination, . . . any evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded against that relates to unlawful employment practices covered by” Title VII and “is relevant to the charge under investigation.” 42 U.S. C. §2000e–8(a). And the statute enables the EEOC to obtain that evidence by “authoriz[ing] [it] to issue a subpoena and to seek an order enforcing [the subpoena].” University of Pa., 493 U.S., at 191; see §2000e–9.1 Under that authority, the EEOC may issue “subp[o]enas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of any evidence.” 29 U.S. C. §161(1). An employer may petition the EEOC to revoke the subpoena, see ibid., but if the EEOC rejects the petition and the employer still “refuse[s] to obey [the] subp[o]ena,” the EEOC may ask a district court to issue an order enforcing it, see §161(2).

A district court’s role in an EEOC subpoena enforcement proceeding, we have twice explained, is a straightforward one. See University of Pa., 493 U.S., at 191; Shell Oil, 466 U.S., at 72, n. 26. A district court is not to use an enforcement proceeding as an opportunity to test the strength of the underlying complaint. Ibid. Rather, a district court should “ ‘satisfy itself that the charge is valid and that the material requested is “relevant” to the charge.’ ” University of Pa., 493 U.S., at 191. It should do so cognizant of the “generou[s]” construction that courts have given the term “relevant.” Shell Oil, 466 U.S., at 68–69 (“virtually any material that might cast light on the allegations against the employer”). If the charge is proper and the material requested is relevant, the district court should enforce the subpoena unless the employer establishes that the subpoena is “too indefinite,” has been issued for an “illegitimate purpose,” or is unduly burdensome. Id., at 72, n. 26. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652–653 (1950) (“The gist of the protection is in the requirement . . . that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable” (internal quotation marks omitted)).