Opinion ID: 474866
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jury Instruction on Reckless Indifference

Text: 33 Defendant argues that the following jury instruction given by the trial court as to false and fraudulent statements was improper: 34 A statement or representation is false or fraudulent within the meaning of this statute if it relates to a material fact and is known to be untrue or is made with reckless indifference as to its truth or falsity, and is made or caused to be made with intent to defraud. 35 App. at 554-55 (emphasis added). Defendant's attack on this instruction is twofold. 36
37 First, defendant argues that a finding of reckless indifference is not enough to establish a fraudulent representation. Although United States v. Rabinowitz, 327 F.2d 62 (6th Cir.1964), does not directly address the reckless indifference standard, defendant relies heavily on the following language from our opinion in that case: 38 In every mail fraud case, there must be a scheme to defraud, representations known by defendants to be false and some person or persons must have been defrauded.... The scheme to defraud must have included the intent to do so. Even if the statements complained of were false, defendants must have known them to be false and they must have intended to defraud in order to be found guilty. 39 Id. at 76-77 (citation omitted). In United States v. Stull, 743 F.2d 439 (6th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1062, 105 S.Ct. 1779, 84 L.Ed.2d 838 (1985), we expressly held that the following jury instruction defining false or fraudulent statements conformed to the prevailing legal standard: 40 A statement or representation is false or fraudulent if the maker of the statement knows it to be untrue; if the person making it does so without regard to whether it is true or false; if it is put forth without a reasonable basis; or if it is made with reckless indifference as to truth or falsity. 41 Id. at 445-46 & n. 7 (emphasis included in Stull opinion). 42 While superficially these two opinions may appear inconsistent, they are not. By stating in Rabinowitz that defendants must have known [the statements] to be false, we left open the question of what evidence would be required to prove knowledge of falsity. In Stull, we held that proof of reckless indifference was sufficient in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1341 prosecutions, citing, among other cases, Irwin v. United States, 338 F.2d 770, 774 (9th Cir.1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 911, 85 S.Ct. 1530, 14 L.Ed.2d 433 (1965). 743 F.2d at 446. Irwin, in turn, expressed the rationale we implicitly adopted in Stull: One who acts with reckless indifference as to whether a representation is true or false is chargeable as if he had knowledge of its falsity. Irwin, 338 F.2d at 774. Thus, while prosecutions under section 1341 require a showing that defendants knew the statements to be false, one who acts with reckless indifference as to the truth or falsity of their statement is chargeable with this knowledge. 4
43 Defendant's second assignment of error with regard to the above jury instruction is that by permitting the government to go to the jury on a reckless indifference instruction in the actual trial, the Court allowed an improper constructive amendment of the Indictment. Defendant-Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 15. In making this argument, defendant relies on the fact that reckless indifference was not charged in the indictment. Rather, defendant notes that the indictment charged that he well knew that the representations made were false. 44 In response, the government takes the position that the instruction was neither a constructive amendment nor an impermissible variance. Defendant's assignment of error fails for two reasons. 45
46 The distinction between an amendment and a variance was set out by this court in United States v. Beeler, 587 F.2d 340, 342 (6th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860, 102 S.Ct. 315, 70 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981): A variance occurs when the proof introduced at trial differs materially from the facts alleged in the indictment. In contrast, an amendment involves a change, whether literal or in effect, in the terms of the indictment. 47 Included in this definition are three types of variations between a grand jury indictment and evidence presented at trial. The least common is an actual amendment. This occurs when the charging terms of the indictment are altered. United States v. Castro, 776 F.2d 1118, 1121 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 1233, 89 L.Ed.2d 342 (1986). The second, but most common, type of variation encompassed by this definition is a variance. A variance occurs when the charging terms are unchanged, but the evidence at trial proves facts materially different from those alleged in the indictment. Id. The third type of variation, a constructive amendment, falls somewhere in the borderland between an actual amendment and a variance. A constructive amendment occurs when the terms of an indictment are in effect altered by the presentation of evidence and jury instructions which so modify essential elements of the offense charged that there is a substantial likelihood that the defendant may have been convicted of an offense other than that charged in the indictment. See United States v. Davis, 679 F.2d 845, 851 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1207, 103 S.Ct. 1198, 75 L.Ed.2d 441 (1983); Beeler, 587 F.2d at 342; cf. United States v. Ylda, 653 F.2d 912, 914-15 (5th Cir.1981) (per curiam) (trial court's jury instruction altered elements of offense but evidence was consistent with indictment; held, no possibility that defendant was convicted of crime other than that set out in indictment and instruction was thus harmless). 48 Although the distinction between a variance and a constructive amendment is at best shadowy, 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec.-516, at 26 (2d ed. 1982), it has been considered significant. In dicta we have repeatedly stated that amendments are deemed prejudicial per se. United States v. Burkhart, 682 F.2d 589, 591 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 915, 103 S.Ct. 228, 74 L.Ed.2d 181 (1982); see also Beeler, 587 F.2d at 342 (where although prejudice was clearly present, we noted the per se rule). 5 Variances, on the other hand, will not result in reversal unless substantial rights of a defendant have been affected. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52; United States v. Bowers, 739 F.2d 1050, 1053 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 195, 83 L.Ed.2d 128 (1984); Beeler, 587 F.2d at 342. Substantial rights, in turn, are affected only when a defendant shows prejudice to his ability to defend himself at trial, to the general fairness of the trial, or to the indictment's sufficiency to bar subsequent prosecutions. United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 105 S.Ct. 1811, 1816 n. 5, 85 L.Ed.2d 99 (1985). 49 We have held that a variance crosses the constructive amendment line only when the variance create[s] 'a substantial likelihood' that a defendant may have been 'convicted of an offense other than that charged by the grand jury.'  Beeler, 587 F.2d at 342; see also United States v. Gray, 790 F.2d 1290, 1297 (6th Cir.1986) (per curiam). No such danger is present in the instant case, and, thus, the problem, if any, is one of a variance. 50 Since we are dealing with a variance, and not an amendment, the only remaining question is whether prejudice is present. [B]ecause variances between indictments and proof at trial are not regarded as per se error, the burden of proof as to error has been placed on defendants, who must not only show the variance exists but also that the variance is 'fatal.'  Cola v. Reardon, 787 F.2d 681, 700 (1st Cir.1986) (emphasis in original). In the instant case, defendant has not shown any prejudice, and, accordingly, this assignment of error is rejected. 51
52 The facts before the court in the instant case do not present reversible error for a second reason. The rule prohibiting judicial amendment of indictments is inapplicable to matters of form or surplusage. See, e.g., United States v. Nabors, 762 F.2d 642, 647 (8th Cir.1985); United States v. Cusmano, 659 F.2d 714, 717 (6th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252, 104 S.Ct. 3536, 82 L.Ed.2d 841 (1984); cf. United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 1811, 1815, 85 L.Ed.2d 99 (1985) (in context of variance Court noted, A part of the indictment unnecessary to and independent from the allegations of the offense proved may normally be treated as 'a useless averment' that 'may be ignored.' ) (quoting Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 602, 47 S.Ct. 531, 534, 71 L.Ed. 793 (1927)). 53 Presented with the same facts now before this court, the Ninth Circuit has held the well knowing language to be surplusage. United States v. Love, 535 F.2d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 847, 97 S.Ct. 131, 50 L.Ed.2d 119 (1976). The rationale of the Love court, which we find persuasive and now adopt, was as follows. The court began by recognizing that,  '[o]ne who acts with reckless indifference as to whether a representation is true or false is chargeable as if he had knowledge of its falsity.'  535 F.2d at 1158 (quoting Irwin v. United States, 338 F.2d 770, 774 (9th Cir.1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 911, 919, 85 S.Ct. 1548, 14 L.Ed.2d 433, 11 L.Ed.2d 438 (1965)). 6 With that background, the Love court went on to hold that by giving the reckless indifference instruction, although the indictment charged that the defendant well knew that representations made were false, the district court did not commit reversible error: 54 The indictment would have been sufficient without the allegation that [the defendant] well knew the statements he made were misrepresentations. The challenged language does no more than reiterate the knowing state of mind implicit in other language of the indictment. It is thus surplusage. 55 535 F.2d at 1158. 56