Opinion ID: 859592
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: cyphus mohead’s testimony

Text: Moss claims that the trial court erred in excluding the entire testimony of Cyphus Mohead (Mohead) after he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege of self-incrimination. The defense called Mohead as a witness. Mohead fled the scene with Moss after the incident. They were both arrested, and a handgun was found in Mohead’s pants when he was searched. Mohead was charged as a habitual offender with a felony possession of a firearm. His attorney advised him that if he was charged and convicted based on the testimony he intended to give, he could face a sentence of twenty years for each count of aggravated assault without the possibility of parole. Based on the facts of this case, he was warned that he may face fifteen to twenty counts of aggravated assault for firing into the crowd that night. Despite warnings and an advisement of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination from both the court and his court-appointed attorney, Mohead insisted on testifying. On direct examination, Mohead testified that he was shooting into the crowd that night in front of the Knoxville Country Club. He stated that he was aiming at Robert Salley and Patrick Hubbard because they were holding down Felicia Moss. He further stated that he was testifying because he did not want, no man going down for something he didn’t do. Later, on cross-examination, the State asked Mohead where he had obtained the gun that was found on him. At that point, Mohead chose to invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The court excused him from the stand and upon motion from the State, instructed the jury to disregard Mohead’s entire testimony. In Fountain v. United States, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that if a witness testifies on direct examination to incriminating matters, he is considered to have waived the privilege as to those matters and may not, on cross, decline to answer questions as to details of the matters already revealed. Fountain v. United States, 384 F.2d 624, 627 (5th Cir.). However, if the testimony sought to be elicited on cross is not merely a more detailed inquiry into matters as to which the witness already has waived his right, the witness may invoke the privilege. Fountain, 384 F.2d at 628. Where the privilege is legitimately invoked by a witness during cross-examination, all or part of that witness’s direct testimony may be subject to a motion to strike. Id. In the Fountain case, the inquiry focused on the rights of the defendant when a State’s witness invoked the privilege. The court stated that the ultimate inquiry was whether the defendant has been substantially prejudiced by depriving him of his right to test the truth of the direct testimony. Id. In the present case, Mohead, a witness for the defense, asserted his privilege when the State asked him about the gun he used. The direct examination of Mohead only covered the actual shooting and subsequent arrest. The only mention of the gun on direct was when Mohead stated that the police found the gun in his pants subsequent to his arrest. There were no questions asked about how or from where Mohead got the gun. Since this topic was not covered on direct examination, there was no waiver of the privilege, therefore it was properly invoked. The question asked on crossexamination was probing into the issue of from whom Mohead obtained the gun. Mohead had not waived his rights on that issue. Even if we were to hold that the topic was covered on direct, and thus subject to cross-examination, we must still focus on the inquiry of whether or not Moss was substantially prejudiced by the court depriving him of his right to test the truth of the direct testimony. Although the case at bar is different from the Fountain case because it is the defendant’s witness that is invoking the privilege on cross-examination, we do not think that Moss was substantially prejudiced because Mohead’s entire testimony was struck. The defense was still able to introduce into evidence the testimony of several other witnesses who stated that they saw Mohead with the gun, and not Moss. Hence, we hold that Mohead properly invoked his privilege against selfincrimination; it was not reversible error to strike his entire testimony.