Opinion ID: 1482159
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Yates's Appeal

Text: [¶ 10] Yates contends that the Superior Court improperly concluded that the premarital agreement the parties signed does not cover spousal support. The determination of whether a contract is ambiguous is a matter of law and is reviewed de novo. Am. Prot. Ins. Co. v. Acadia Ins. Co., 2003 ME 6, ¶ 11, 814 A.2d 989, 993. If the contract is unambiguous, the interpretation of the contract is also a question of law. Id. We look at the entire instrument when construing the contract and attempt to give effect to all of its provisions; an interpretation that renders a provision meaningless is avoided. Id. ¶ 12, 814 A.2d at 993. Finally, language in the contract is given its plain meaning. Id. ¶ 13, 814 A.2d at 993. [¶ 11] The operative provisions of the premarital agreement are as follows: Recitals . . . . 2. In anticipation of such marriage, Edward and Frances desire by an Ante  Nuptial Agreement to fix and determine the rights of each of them in and to certain real and personal property and other matters hereinafter described, now owned by them or either of them or to which they or either of them may become entitled. . . . . Covenants . . . . 3. Except as otherwise set forth herein, Edward shall not have any claim or rights to a share of the personal property or estate of Frances which she now owns or may hereafter acquire, specifically waiving any and all claims that may accrue to him by reason of the marriage which Edward and Frances anticipate will be solemnized. . . . . Paragraph four is reciprocal to paragraph three. Ackerman relies on Foster v. Foster, 609 A.2d 1171 (Me.1992) for the proposition that because the premarital agreement does not mention alimony, spousal support, or maintenance, it should not be interpreted as covering that issue. In Foster, we concluded that the premarital agreement under consideration addressed the disposition of marital property only in the event of death. Id. at 1171. Important to this conclusion was that all of the numbered paragraphs dealt with the exwife's rights as a widow of the ex-husband and used the terms dower, distributive share, and descent. Id. at 1172. Additionally, the paragraph establishing the exwife's entitlement to $50,000 was conditioned on her surviving her ex-husband. Id. We concluded that the broad language in the introductory provisions did not expand the settlement provisions of the agreement. Id. [¶ 12] The second recital in the Ackerman  Yates premarital agreement could be construed as covering spousal support because of the following broad language: fix and determine the rights of each of them in and to certain real and personal property and other matters hereinafter described.  (Emphasis added.) Nonetheless, the coverage of covenant three is limited to property and does not address spousal support. Covenant three abolishes any claim or right Ackerman may have to a share of the personal property or estate of Frances which she now owns or may hereafter acquire, specifically waiving any and all claims that may accrue to him by reason of the marriage. Contrary to Yates's contention, the language in the clause following specifically operates to explain, not expand, the first clause, and explains that Ackerman is waiving rights he may have to a share of Yates's personal property or estate that have accrued by reason of the marriage. Because broad language contained in an introductory paragraph does not expand the actual settlement provisions of an agreement, Foster, 609 A.2d at 1172, the language in the second recital does not expand the scope of covenant three, the actual settlement provision, which governs property only. [1] Accordingly, because the premarital agreement is unambiguous, the Superior Court did not err when it concluded that the agreement did not govern the issue of spousal support. [2]
[¶ 13] Yates further contends that the Superior Court erred when it concluded that the record was silent with regard to the 1999 state income tax refund. Because Yates did not offer any testimony regarding the state refund, and did not take any steps to raise the issue in the Superior Court until she filed her motion to amend the judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(b), the Superior Court could have properly concluded that she failed to present evidence on the issue. See Sanders v. Sanders, 1998 ME 100, ¶ 11, 711 A.2d 124, 127. Accordingly, the Superior Court did not err when it denied Yates's motion to amend pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(b). See Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Woodman, 1997 ME 164, ¶¶ 2-3, 697 A.2d 1295, 1297 (affirming the denial of a motion to amend when the defendants raised an issue for the first time in the motion).