Opinion ID: 1040865
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dual Juries Claims

Text: McKinney raises a number of claims based on the trial court’s use of dual juries. However, McKinney exhausted3 only one of them in the state courts, as AEDPA requires—his claim that the use of dual juries led to a prejudicial courtroom layout where McKinney sat facing the jurors throughout trial. McKinney’s “courtroom layout” claim fails, because he has failed to identify clearly established federal law that would provide the basis for relief under § 2254(d)(1). McKinney failed to exhaust any of the other potential dual juries claims and would now be barred from raising these claims in state court. See Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987 (citing Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)). Accordingly, McKinney’s “other” dual juries 3 The exhaustion doctrine requires a petitioner to provide the state courts with the opportunity to rule on his federal constitutional claims before presenting these claims to a federal habeas court. See King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2009); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (proving that a writ of habeas corpus shall not be granted unless “the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State”). 10 MCKINNEY V. RYAN claims are procedurally defaulted,4 and he has not shown cause or prejudice to excuse the default. See id.
Before trial, Hedlund moved to sever his case from McKinney’s, and the State did not oppose the motion. The trial court initially granted the motion to sever. The trial court later asked the parties for briefing on the idea of using dual juries. Thereafter, the trial court held a hearing on the use of dual juries. The State opposed the practice based on a perceived state procedural obstacle set forth in State v. Lambright, 673 P.2d 1 (Ariz. 1983) (en banc), overruled by Hedlund v. Sheldon, 840 P.2d 1008 (Ariz. 1992) (en banc). McKinney shared the State’s Lambright concern and argued that it would be improper for the court to employ an untested dual jury procedure. McKinney also argued that severance was required to avoid the introduction of impermissible, incriminating testimony under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). The trial court concluded that the use of the dual juries would not impede Defendants’ right to fair trial, and found no inherent prejudice in the use of dual juries. At trial, both 4 A state prisoner procedurally defaults federal claims if he fails to raise them as federal claims in state court or if, in raising the claims, he fails to comply with applicable state procedural rules. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730–31 (1991). The state can successfully assert a procedural default defense to federal habeas review unless the prisoner can show both “cause” for the procedural default and actual prejudice, or the prisoner demonstrates that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Id. at 750. MCKINNEY V. RYAN 11 Defendants’ juries were present in the courtroom, except during “the reading of charges, opening statements, closing arguments, and testimony related to a particular defendant’s inculpatory statements.” Both before and during trial, the trial court reminded counsel to preserve the integrity of the dual jury procedure and to avoid eliciting testimony nonadmissible against the other codefendant under Bruton. Before trial, McKinney challenged the use of dual juries in a special action to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Hedlund, 840 P.2d at 1009. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court exceeded its authority under the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in Lambright. Id. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court’s decision to use dual juries. Id. at 1011. On direct appeal of his conviction and sentence, McKinney claimed that the dual juries caused the courtroom layout “with Defendants facing the jurors, [to be] intimidating and resulted in fundamental error requiring reversal.” McKinney, 917 P.2d at 1232. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected this argument, concluding that McKinney could not demonstrate prejudice and provided no authority for “a constitutional right to a standard American courtroom arrangement.” Id. McKinney raised the “courtroom layout” issue again in his PCR Petition. The State PCR Court rejected McKinney’s argument that the courtroom layout “tainted” the proceedings. McKinney also argued in the PCR Petition that the use of the dual juries violated his “right to a fundamentally fair trial” for a number of other reasons. However, McKinney did not 12 MCKINNEY V. RYAN invoke the U.S. Constitution, nor did he cite to any state or federal cases. McKinney raised the same “courtroom layout” claim in his federal habeas petition. McKinney also made a number of other arguments that the use of the dual juries prejudiced his right to a fair trial. The federal district court addressed each sub-part of McKinney’s dual juries claim. Of those, the district court concluded that only McKinney’s “courtroom layout” claim was even “arguably exhausted in state court.” Despite this conclusion, however, the district court rejected all of McKinney’s arguments on the merits.
McKinney exhausted his “courtroom layout” claim. “To exhaust his Arizona remedies, [a petitioner must] give the Arizona courts a fair opportunity to act on his federal due process claim before presenting it to the federal courts.” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). In so doing, a petitioner must apprise the state court that he is “making a claim under the U.S. Constitution, and describe both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which [the] claim is based . . . .” Id. at 999 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This can be accomplished by citing “specific provisions of the federal constitution or . . . federal or state cases involving the legal standard for a federal constitutional violation.” Id. “Mere ‘general appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial,’ do not establish exhaustion.” Id. (quoting Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)); see also Fields v. Waddington, 401 F.3d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding MCKINNEY V. RYAN 13 that a petitioner failed to exhaust a federal due process claim where petitioner’s briefing to the state court mentioned the federal constitution only twice and due process only once). In short, a petitioner must “alert the state courts to the fact that he [is] asserting a claim under the United States Constitution.” Hiivala, 195 F.3d at 1106. McKinney set forth the “federal legal theory” underlying his prejudicial courtroom layout claim in his opening brief to the Arizona Supreme Court. McKinney claimed: “The bizarre and prejudicial seating arrangement deprived the appellant of due process under the Arizona and Federal Constitutions.” The brief’s table of contents also cites the page containing that sentence under its entry for the “Fifth Amendment.” Taken together, the argument and the table of contents allude to a specific provision of the U.S. Constitution. McKinney’s brief also invokes the U.S. Constitution numerous times in reference to other claims. Accordingly, McKinney’s brief was sufficient to alert the Arizona Supreme Court that McKinney raised a federal claim. See Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1103 (9th Cir. 2010) (“This is not a case where the petitioner failed to make clear that he was invoking a federal right, or where the petitioner’s general appeal to a constitutional guarantee was too vague to put the state court on notice of the federal claim.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)); Hiivala, 195 F.3d at 1106. Thus, we conclude that McKinney exhausted his “courtroom layout” claim. Turning to the merits of McKinney’s “courtroom layout” claim, we must determine whether the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision rejecting this claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. We conclude that it was not. McKinney cites no Supreme 14 MCKINNEY V. RYAN Court case, and our search reveals no case, that would provide the basis for relief under § 2254(d)(1). Accordingly, we echo the Arizona Supreme Court’s McKinney opinion, which held: “McKinney has not demonstrated any prejudice and provides no authority for his argument that there is a constitutional right to a standard American courtroom arrangement, and we decline to invent such a right.” 917 P.2d at 1232. McKinney is not entitled to relief on his prejudicial courtroom layout claim.
In addition to the “courtroom layout” claim, McKinney makes several arguments in federal court that the use of the dual juries denied him his right to a fair trial. McKinney claims the dual juries prejudiced him, because: (1) Defendants presented antagonistic defenses, which led to prejudicial leading questions, limited cross-examination, and Bruton violations; and (2) the procedure necessitated increased security and the use of a leg brace during trial. The State argues that McKinney procedurally defaulted these claims by failing to fairly present them to the state court. We agree. 1. McKinney failed to exhaust his “other” courtroom layout claims. McKinney’s Arizona Supreme Court briefing did not set forth the operative facts or federal legal theory for any dual juries claim apart from the “courtroom layout” claim. The same is true of the PCR Petition. While the PCR Petition makes a general appeal to McKinney’s right to “due process” and a “fair trial,” this is insufficient to exhaust. See Castillo, 399 F.3d at 998; Hiivala, 195 F.3d at 1106. Accordingly, MCKINNEY V. RYAN 15 McKinney failed to exhaust any potential claim arising out of the trial court’s use of dual juries, except the “courtroom layout” claim. McKinney argues that his claims were exhausted, because Hedlund raised the claims to the Arizona Supreme Court. However, “[t]he questions raised by [McKinney] involve constitutional privileges which are personal to him, and therefore an appeal by his co-defendant can not exhaust [his] remedies in the state courts.” Williams v. Nelson, 431 F.2d 932, 932–33 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).5 Accordingly, McKinney failed to exhaust these claims because he failed to raise them personally to the state court. 2. McKinney’s unexhausted dual juries claims are procedurally defaulted. “A claim is procedurally defaulted ‘if the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.’” Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991)). McKinney’s dual jury claims are procedurally defaulted, because he is barred “under Arizona law from going back to state court.” Id.; see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a), 32.4(a).6 5 Contrary to McKinney’s argument, the subsequent case, Harris v. Superior Court of the St. of Cal., Los Angeles Cnty., 500 F.2d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc), did not affect this portion of Williams. 6 Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a) and 32.4(a) provide alternate bases for our conclusion that McKinney’s claims would now be barred. Rule 32.2(a)(3) precludes “any claim that could have been brought on direct appeal or in a prior PCR petition.” Henry v. Ryan, ___ 16 MCKINNEY V. RYAN “Nonetheless, we will review the merits if [McKinney] can show cause and prejudice or, alternatively, a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987. While McKinney mentioned these exceptions in his briefing, he made no argument that they apply to excuse the procedural default of his dual juries claims. At oral argument, when asked whether he could show cause, McKinney argued that he could establish cause under Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). McKinney’s invocation of Martinez suggests that McKinney argues that the ineffective assistance of his PCR counsel constitutes cause to overcome the procedural default of his other dual juries claims. However, it is wellsettled that ineffective assistance of PCR counsel does not establish cause. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753–57. While Martinez created a “narrow exception” to this rule, 132 S. Ct. at 1315, the Martinez exception does not apply to McKinney’s dual juries claims. The Supreme Court made clear that the exception applies only when the underlying constitutional claim is ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Id. Thus, McKinney cannot show cause and his dual juries claims are procedurally defaulted.