Opinion ID: 202176
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Protective Sweep of the Basement

Text: 10 The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990). Generally, the search of an individual's house without a search warrant is unreasonable and violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. Exceptions to this general rule arise when the benefits to the public interest outweigh the individual's privacy right. Id. One such exception is a protective sweep conducted in conjunction with the arrest of an individual in his home. Id. at 327. 11 A `protective sweep' is a quick and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others. Id. To prevent law enforcement from abusing the protective sweep by using it as a pretext for searching an individual's home, the Supreme Court has limited its use. First, law enforcement officers conducting the sweep must have a reasonable suspicion of danger: there must be articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene. Id. at 334, 110 S.Ct. 1093 & n. 2. The reasonable suspicion standard is considerably less demanding than the level of proof required to support a finding of probable cause, United States v. Martins, 413 F.3d 139, 149 (1st Cir.2005), but must be based on more than an unfounded speculation, United States v. Cook, 277 F.3d 82, 85 (1st Cir.2002). Second, the scope of a protective sweep must be limited to its purpose. The sweep may extend only to a cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be found. Buie, 494 U.S. at 335, 110 S.Ct. 1093. Additionally, the duration of the sweep must be no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises. Id. at 335-36, 110 S.Ct. 1093. 12 The district court in this case held that the protective sweep violated the Fourth Amendment. We review the district court's factual findings for clear error. United States v. Palmer, 203 F.3d 55, 60 (1st. Cir.2000). We review de novo the constitutional question of whether the protective sweep violated the Fourth Amendment. Id.
13 The district court found that the agents did not have a reasonable suspicion to believe that a dangerous person could be in the basement. The government contests this finding and puts forth a number of facts to support a finding of reasonable suspicion. First, the agents had information to believe that Winston was armed and dangerous and possibly with armed and dangerous cohorts. Winston was indicted, along with twenty-five others, for distribution of cocaine as part of an investigation of a large-scale cocaine trafficking organization. One of the other defendants informed agents that he had sold Winston two handguns and a bullet-proof vest. One of the agents present had also previously arrested Winston after a traffic stop for possession of a handgun. Second, the government finds significant that Winston's girlfriend initially denied having knowledge of Winston's car. From this deception, the government argues that a reasonable agent could believe that the purpose of the deception was to gain time to allow Winston and/or his cohorts to hide, exit the house through another door or window, or prepare an ambush. Third, the government notes that when agents called out Winston's name, Winston responded up here from the second floor. The government found it unusual that Winston responded so casually from the second floor when agents forcibly entered his house and argues that a reasonable agent could believe that Winston's unusual response was part of a scheme to escape or to allow others in the drug organization to escape or ambush the agents. 14 In response, Winston argues that the circumstances would lead agents to believe that no others were present in the house. First, Winston notes that agents surveilled the house for an hour and a half and, during this time, saw no indication of anyone's presence in Winston's house. However, since Winston, his girlfriend, and their child were in the building but unobserved, others could easily have been in the home. Next, Winston finds significant that an agent testifying at the suppression hearing could not recall if there were other cars parked in Winston's driveway or near Winston's home, implying that there were no other cars and thus no sign of other people being present in Winston's house. Winston argues that if cars were present the agent would have noticed them and would have been able to recall this fact. We refuse to ascribe such meaning to the agent's failure to recall whether cars were present, especially given the lack of other relevant information. Finally, Winston points out that when the agents entered the house, they did not see or hear any evidence of another person. We do not find this highly relevant since the purpose of a protective sweep is to protect agents from concealed threats. 15 We find that, based on the information presented above, the agents had a reasonable suspicion to believe that a dangerous person could be in the basement. Underlying a protective sweep is the `risk of danger in the context of an arrest in the home' due primarily to the reality that there may be `unseen third parties in the house.' United States v. Lawlor, 406 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir.2005) (quoting Buie, 494 U.S. at 333, 336, 110 S.Ct. 1093). Winston was a potentially dangerous drug dealer who had recently purchased a bullet-proof vest and firearms and had numerous, potentially armed and dangerous cohorts. This risk was compounded by the deceptive actions of Winston's girlfriend, which gave any potential occupants inside the house five minutes to conceal themselves or prepare an ambush. Further, given that Winston knew that agents had forcibly entered his house, his casual response inviting them upstairs was unusual. One would expect Winston either to evade the agents or to surrender to them by coming downstairs or responding that he was on his way down. His casual, inviting response could lead a reasonable agent to believe that it was part of a scheme to lead the agents away from the basement because others were hiding there waiting to escape or launch a surprise attack on the agents. The fact that the sweep revealed that there was no person [in the basement] has no bearing on whether [agents were] justified in conducting the sweep in the first place. Id. at 42 n. 5. We think that a reasonably prudent agent could believe that there was a distinct possibility that a man was hiding in the [basement]. Martins, 413 F.3d at 150. When agents arrest an armed criminal with known cohorts in his home, they put themselves in a dangerous situation and must be able to protect themselves. In these situations, the experienced perceptions of law enforcement agents deserve deference and constitute a factor in our reasonable suspicion analysis. Id. at 150 & n. 4.
16 Additionally, the district court found that the scope of the sweep was excessive because agents immediately arrested Winston, and agents could have protected themselves by guarding the top of the stairs. This finding, however, begs the point. Obviously, the agents had the right to protect themselves not only from Winston but from all other circumstances reasonably within the scope of the dangers they were facing, i.e., an arrest involving a member of a drug organization with multiple constituents, not all of whom had been accounted for, who were likely to be armed, as Winston was, in a setting which presented an opportunity for ambush or similar violent conduct against the arresting officers. 17 The scope of the protective sweep in this case, in both location and duration, was within the bounds set forth by the Court in Buie. Officers may make only a cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be found. Buie, 494 U.S. at 335, 110 S.Ct. 1093. Here, agents walked immediately through the first floor and basement and moved a blanket covering a space large enough for a person to hide. We find that their actions constituted a limited and cursory inspection. 18 Winston argues that the agents could have protected themselves by guarding the top of the basement stairs. As judges trained in the law, and not in apprehending suspects, we cannot determine in this situation how the agents could have gone about protecting themselves, but it does not seem logical or reasonable that given the circumstances previously explained, the agents would leave such an obvious hiding place, from which harm could be dispensed, unsecured. Even if Winston were correct, the validity of a protective sweep does not turn on the availability of less intrusive investigatory techniques. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). 19 Winston also notes that the agent did not descend cautiously into the basement and that agents did not conduct a protective sweep of the second floor, suggesting that the agents did not actually fear for their safety and that the protective sweep was merely a pretext to search Winston's house. We do not agree with Winston that these particular choices by the agents necessarily indicate that the sweep was pretextual. An agent could determine that it would be safer to move silently and swiftly into the basement instead of announcing his presence. Further, agents need not coordinate their intentions to conduct a protective sweep. The validity of a protective sweep conducted by the agent on the first floor is not negated by the separate decision of agents on the second floor that a protective sweep is not there necessary. Regardless, the agents' subjective intentions are not relevant as long as the protective sweep was objectively reasonable. Lawlor, 406 F.3d at 43 n. 8 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996)). Furthermore, we are not here to second guess the agents as to how to conduct a protective sweep, for as stated, we are not qualified to do so nor is that within the scope of our judicial duties. We are able, however, to pass upon whether their actions were objectively reasonable given the circumstances and constraints within which they operated. We believe they were. 20 The duration of the sweep must be no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises. Buie, 494 U.S. at 335-36, 110 S.Ct. 1093. The facts show that Winston's house was small and that Trooper Martin moved quickly into the basement. After arresting Winston, Agent Burns went into the basement to inform Trooper Martin of the arrest, and all agents departed. There was no evidence that the agents lingered longer than necessary to arrest Winston.
21 The district court also suppressed Winston's statement admitting his ownership of the safe, because it arose from the illegal observation of the safe. Given our validation of the safe's discovery and Winston's failure to otherwise contest this statement on appeal, we conclude that this admission was also improperly suppressed.