Opinion ID: 3172172
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Credible Threat Standard

Text: [¶7] “Generally, decisions of the Commission are reviewed only to determine whether the agency’s conclusions are unreasonable, unjust or unlawful in light of the record.” Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 2014 ME 56, ¶ 18, 90 A.3d 451 (alterations omitted) (quotation marks omitted). The Commission must “ensure safe, reasonable and adequate service” pursuant to 35-A M.R.S. § 101 (2015). See also 35-A M.R.S. § 301 (2015). Consistent with 5 this duty, in Friedman I we mandated that the Commission determine whether smart meters and their associated RF constitute a “credible threat” to the health and safety of CMP customers. Friedman I, 2012 ME 90, ¶ 10, 48 A.3d 794. Friedman argues that “ensure” means that any credible evidence of a risk precludes a finding that smart meters are safe, and therefore the Commissioners impermissibly relaxed the standard by allowing some potential for harm “in light of the context and purpose of the service and facility . . . .” [¶8] Contrary to Friedman’s contention, and as the Commission noted, “[i]t is one thing to make a finding that evidence is credible regarding potential harm and quite another to find there is a legally credible threat of harm—that a credible threat of harm is in fact credible: likely and probable to result in harm.” (Emphasis added.) In other words, evidence of a hypothetical future risk is not sufficient to preclude a finding that CMP satisfied its burden; rather, the threat of harm must be probable and convincing. The Commission, therefore, properly rejected Friedman’s approach because it would require an impractically high threshold for ensuring safety, and as a result would render nearly all utilities unsafe. The Commission appropriately applied the credible threat standard such that it evaluated “what threat or hazard constitutes an acceptably safe level of exposure,” balancing the potential for harm against the usefulness and pervasiveness of the technology at issue. 6 [¶9] Friedman also contends that the Commission improperly shifted the burden of proof as a result of its interpretation of the standard. We need not reach this issue because, as discussed infra, we conclude that substantial evidence in the record supports the Commission’s determination that smart meters pose no credible threat to the health and safety of CMP customers. See Pine Tree Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 631 A.2d 57, 62 (Me. 1993) (stating that “[b]ecause we find there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commission’s decision, we need not consider” an assertion regarding the allocation of the burden of proof); Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 414 A.2d 1217, 1236 n.10 (Me. 1980) (“Since we decide that the Commission’s . . . Orders were supported by sufficient evidence affirmatively of record, we have no occasion to be embroiled in the controversy among the parties as to who may have borne either the burden of coming forward with evidence or the ultimate burden of proof.”).