Opinion ID: 404144
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Original Test of Crew Members' Status

Text: 6 As McDermott points out, the ALJ and the Benefits Review Board held the following test to be appropriate for use in determining crew member status under the Longshoremen's Act: whether (1) there is a vessel in navigation; (2) the worker has a more or less permanent connection with the vessel; and (3) the worker is on board the vessel primarily to aid in navigation. This frequently cited three-prong test apparently was first distilled from earlier caselaw in Wilkes v. Mississippi River Sand & Gravel Co., 202 F.2d 383, 388 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 817, 74 S.Ct. 29, 98 L.Ed. 344 (1953). The Wilkes court fashioned the test as a means of determining whether the decedents of two plaintiffs could qualify as seamen under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688. However, in describing the issue presented as whether these cases are governed by the Longshoremen's and Harborworkers' Act ... or by the Jones Act, the court implicitly recognized that the same test necessarily identifies a seaman covered by the Jones Act and a crew member not covered by the Longshoremen's Act. This court has concluded that the same test is to be applied to ascertaining whether a person is a 'seaman' for purposes of Jones Act jurisdiction, or is 'a member of a crew of a vessel' for the purpose of (denying) Longshoremen's Act jurisdiction.... Hardaway Contracting Co. v. O'Keeffe, 414 F.2d 657, 659-60 (5th Cir. 1968) (citing Boatel, Inc. v. Delamore, 379 F.2d 850, 859 (5th Cir. 1967)). See also Travelers Insurance Co. v. Belair, 412 F.2d 297, 302 (1st Cir. 1969) ( 'Seaman,' as used in the Jones Act and 'members of the crew' as excluded from the Longshoremen's Act, are equivalent terms.) 7 This court first adopted the tripartite standard in McKie v. Diamond Marine Co., 204 F.2d 132, 136 (5th Cir. 1953), and most of the federal circuits who regularly hear maritime actions have used some form of the test. See, e.g., Salgado v. M. J. Rudolph Corp., 514 F.2d 750, 754 (2d Cir. 1975); Griffith v. Wheeling Pittsburg Steel Corp., 521 F.2d 31, 36 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054, 96 S.Ct. 785, 46 L.Ed.2d 643 (1976); Whittington v. Sewer Construction Co., 541 F.2d 427, 436 (4th Cir. 1976); Bullis v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 474 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir. 1973). Not surprisingly, however, each prong of the test has generated its share of interpretative controversy. 8 Courts have held, for example, that the vessel in navigation element does not require the vessel to have been in actual operation at the moment of the injury or death in question. Case law indicates that a vessel is 'in navigation' although moored to a pier, in a repair yard for periodic repairs, or while temporarily attached to some object. Griffith, supra, 521 F.2d at 37 (citing 2 M. Norris, The Law of Seamen § 668, at 301-02 (3d ed. 1970); see also 1 Benedict on Admiralty § 11a, at 2-7 (7th ed. 1981). In Doucet v. Wheless Drilling Co., 467 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1972), this court held that a semisubmersible drilling barge temporarily moored for repairs remained a vessel in navigation. See also Rogers v. United States, 452 F.2d 1149, 1152 (5th Cir. 1971) (missile tracking ship tied to pier for repairs in navigation); Bodden v. Coordinated Caribbean Transport, Inc., 369 F.2d 273, 275 (5th Cir. 1966) (freighter in dry dock for repairs still in navigation). 4 Thus, the facts in the case before us amply justified that ALJ's findings that McDermott's Lay Barge 23, which remained afloat and under its owner's control throughout the repair period, was a vessel in navigation. 9 Similarly, the facts developed at the hearing below support the finding that Boudreaux had a more or less permanent connection with the fleet of barges. The testimony showed that Boudreaux had worked on the repairs aboard Lay Barge 23 from the time he returned from his layoff in March to the time of his death. Moreover, Boudreaux had spent most of his time with McDermott as a welder attached to the company's fleet of pipeline barges and was scheduled to return to sea on Lay Barge 21 when he died. (I)t is well established that one need not be indefinitely and invariably assigned to one vessel in order to achieve the 'permanent' connection required by this prong of the ... analysis. The permanency requirement may be satisfied by assignment to a specific fleet of vessels. Ardoin v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 641 F.2d 277, 281 (5th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted). 10 The controversy in our case, then, centers on the third prong of the McKie standard, which requires that the worker be aboard primarily to aid in navigation. The ALJ who heard the case observed that Boudreaux had spent only three and one-half months of the year prior to his death working offshore; he had spent the remainder of his time (discounting, presumably, the winter layoff) repairing the moored barge. However, assuming, arguendo that decedent spent twelve months as a pipeline welder, the ALJ continued, his primary duties then were to fit and weld pipeline extending from oil wells to oil distribution facilities. The ALJ found that these duties did not primarily aid in navigation and that Boudreaux was not, therefore, a crew member excluded from coverage under the Longshoremen's Act. 11 In affirming this construction of the aid in navigation prong, the Benefits Review Board added that Boudreaux had been engaged in ship repair work for two months prior to his death, had received lower pay for this work than for his usual offshore duties, had been living ashore, and had not been engaged in oil pipeline welding, the special function of the vessel. Thus, the Board concluded that (d)ecedent was clearly a 'shiprepairman' in employer's yard from March 23, 1976, until his death on June 18, 1976. 12 We are forced to conclude that these holdings represent a fundamental misunderstanding of the legal construction that this court has placed upon the phrase aboard primarily to aid in navigation. 5 While agreeing that the test for determining whether an employee is a member of a crew is the same test used for determining whether a worker is a Jones Act seaman, the ALJ based his final judgment on a conviction, approved by the Board, that this court's post-McKie decisions expanding the concept of Jones Act seaman are wholly irrelevant to factual inquiries into crew member's status under the Longshoremen's Act. Relying on the bare language of the familiar three-part test, the ALJ assumed that Boudreaux' responsibilities as a pipeline welder on an offshore barge did not qualify as an aid to navigation. In upholding this conclusion, the Board chose to emphasize that Boudreaux' temporary shift to ship repair work on a barge moored at the McDermott yard was sufficient to remove him from the excluded class of crew members. Both views of the law as applied in this circuit are incorrect, since they ignore our interpretation of the aid to navigation prong in Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959), and subsequent decisions. 13