Opinion ID: 1007229
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedural Background & Issues on Appeal

Text: On March 23, 1999, Wootton filed its original complaint in the district court. The next day, Wootton filed a First Amended Complaint. On August 16, 1999, the district court granted in part and denied in part Subaru’s motion to dismiss and ordered Wootton to file a second amended complaint. In its order, the district court ruled that any claims based on facts in existence before the effective date of the 1998 Franchise Agreement were barred because of the valid and enforceable release provision contained in prior agreements. Consequently, Wootton could pursue only those claims arising from Subaru’s acts and omissions occurring after the March 1, 1998 effective date of the 1998 Franchise Agreement. This order is not challenged in this appeal. 4 According to Section 2.10 of the Standard Provisions, the term Planning Volume means the proportionate number of vehicles which, if sold by Wootton within its Area of Responsibility in a twelve-month period, would equal a market penetration level selected by Subaru as appropriate for the area. Planning Volume, however, is not intended to be a measure of a dealer’s sales performance. Standard Provisions, § 2.10. 6 WOOTTON ENTERPRISES v. SUBARU OF AMERICA On September 10, 1999, Wootton filed a Second Amended Complaint (SAC),5 including the following allegations: (1) breach of contract, including fifteen sub-counts; (2) fraud; (3) violation of the Automobile Dealers’ Day in Court Act (ADDCA), 15 U.S.C. § 1221 et seq.;6 (4) violation of Section 15-207(c) of the Maryland Transportation Code; (5) violation of Section 15-207(d) of the Maryland Transportation Code; (6) violation of Section 15-207(e)(2) of the Maryland Transportation Code; (7) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; (8) violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(b); and (9) violation of the Maryland Antitrust Act, Md. Code § 11-204(a)(4). On September 27, 1999, Subaru filed a motion to dismiss Wootton’s SAC for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On March 17, 2000, the district court granted in part and denied in part Subaru’s 12(b)(6) motion. After the district court’s March 17, 2000 ruling, the following claims remained: (1) seven of the fifteen material breaches of contract allegations; (2) fraud; and (3) violations of the ADDCA and its Maryland counterpart, but only with respect to the alleged demands by Subaru that Wootton meet unattainable sales objectives when read in conjunction with Subaru’s alleged threats to terminate Wootton’s franchise or take Wootton to court. On June 28, 2000, Wootton filed a motion to compel the production of documents. The district court denied this motion, without prejudice, on July 18, 2000. On August 28, 2000, Subaru filed a motion for summary judgment. On February 28, 2001, following a motion hearing and supplemental briefing from both parties, the district court granted summary judgment for Subaru on all of Wootton’s remaining counts. See Wootton, 134 F. Supp. 2d 698. On appeal, Wootton contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on its claims alleging: (1) breach of contract, 5 Wootton’s SAC spans some 52 pages, including 149 paragraphs, and nine separately stated counts, most with sub-counts and sub-subcounts. 6 The fifteen sub-counts of Wootton’s breach of contract claim serve as the basis for Wootton’s ADDCA claim. WOOTTON ENTERPRISES v. SUBARU OF AMERICA 7 including claims alleging (i) the delayed shipment of vehicles, SAC, ¶¶ 101(c) and (d), (ii) the setting of unattainable sales objectives and withholding of inventory, SAC, ¶ 101(h), (iii) the failure to provide information, SAC, ¶ 101(j), and (iv) the making of repeated threats of termination, SAC, ¶¶ 101(k), (l), and (m); (2) fraud in the inducement and in the administration of the contract; and (3) violations of the ADDCA and Maryland Transportation Act. Wootton also challenges the district court’s dismissal of a significant number of its claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Specifically, Wootton appeals the dismissal of eight of its fifteen breach of contract claims, the dismissal of its claims alleging violations of the ADDCA and Maryland Transportation Code, and the dismissal of its claims alleging violations of the Robinson-Patman Act and Maryland Antitrust Act. Lastly, Wootton appeals the district court’s July 18, 2000 denial of its motion to compel Subaru to produce documents pertaining to the allocation of inventory and sales of Wootton’s rival dealerships.