Opinion ID: 183016
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Possession In Furtherance of a Drug-Trafficking Crime

Text: A conviction under § 924(c)(1)(A) requires more than just possession of a firearm; it also requires that such possession be in furtherance of (as relevant here) a drug-trafficking crime. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); accord United States v. Villa, 589 F.3d 1334, 1341 (10th Cir.2009), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 636, 178 L.Ed.2d 476 (2010). Mr. King challenges the sufficiency of the government's evidence as to this in furtherance element, arguing that no evidence was presented linking the rifle to a drug-trafficking offense. In the context of drug-trafficking crimes, firearms are frequently tools of the trade, United States v. Hall, 473 F.3d 1295, 1304 (10th Cir.2007), and we have recognized that it is highly unlikely the presence of [a firearm] in a car containing a large amount of [narcotics] [is] merely coincidental, United States v. McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282, 1293 (10th Cir.2000). Nevertheless, we have cautioned that the mere presence of a firearm in an area where a criminal act occurs is not a sufficient basis for imposing [§ 924(c)(1)(A)'s] mandatory sentence. United States v. Iiland, 254 F.3d 1264, 1271 (10th Cir.2001) (emphasis omitted) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 105-344, at 12 (1997)). Instead, to meet the in furtherance element of § 924(c)(1)(A), we require that the weapon further[], promote[] or advance[] a drug trafficking crime. United States v. Luke-Sanchez, 483 F.3d 703, 706 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 435 F.3d 1244, 1251 (10th Cir.2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Avery, 295 F.3d at 1175 (noting that the presence of the firearm cannot be the result of accident or coincidence). In other words, to support a conviction under § 924(c)(1)(A), the government must establish some nexus between the firearms and the underlying drug trafficking crime. Luke-Sanchez, 483 F.3d at 706. The intent to possess the weapon to further the drug trafficking crime is generally proven through circumstantial evidence. . . . United States v. Rogers, 556 F.3d 1130, 1140 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2783, 174 L.Ed.2d 282 (2009). We have identified a nonexclusive list of factors that are relevant when assessing whether the government has established the requisite nexus between the firearm and the drug-trafficking offense, including: the type of drug activity being conducted, the accessibility of the firearm, the type of firearm, the legal status of the firearm, whether the firearm is loaded, the proximity of the firearm to drugs or drug profits, and the time and circumstances under which the firearm is found. United States v. Trotter, 483 F.3d 694, 701 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Basham, 268 F.3d 1199, 1208 (10th Cir.2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted), judgment vacated on other grounds by 552 U.S. 1090, 128 S.Ct. 864, 169 L.Ed.2d 713 (2008), and 552 U.S. 1091, 128 S.Ct. 870, 169 L.Ed.2d 713 (2008); see also Basham, 268 F.3d at 1208 (addressing these factors for the first time in our circuit, in connection with a jury instruction challenge, and concluding that they would be relevant and helpful to a jury in determining the intent with which the weapon was possessed). Applying these Trotter factors to this case, we have little trouble concluding that sufficient evidence existed to support the jury's finding that Mr. King possessed a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. Mr. King has not appealed his conviction for possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute, and, by his counsel's own admission, ample evidence existed that Mr. King dealt drugs. R., Vol. II, at 15. The firearm was located in the trunk right next to the marijuana, meaning that it was immediately reachable when the drugs were being accessed. The firearm is a rifle, and the jury heard testimony from Officer Leatherman that, due to its size, such a weapon ordinarily would be kept by a drug-trafficker in someplace like a vehicle trunk for some type of protection, intimidation type purpose. Id. at 94. And the gun was loaded, which naturally would make it better suited to serve as protection for the marijuana. Id. at 98. Thus, viewed in the aggregate, the Trotter factors support the conclusion that the rifle was possessed in furtherance of Mr. King's drug trafficking. See United States v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231, 1248 (10th Cir.2002) (We conclude that the placement of a loaded, semi-automatic weapon on the driver's seat of the car in which the instrumentalities of methamphetamine manufacturing were also found is sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that the purpose of the gun was to provide defense or deterrence in furtherance of attempting to manufacture methamphetamine.); see also Trotter, 483 F.3d at 702 (When guns and drugs are found together and a defendant has been convicted of possession with intent to distribute, the gun, whether kept for protection from robbery of drug-sale proceeds, or to enforce payment for drugs, may reasonably be considered to be possessed in furtherance of an ongoing drug-trafficking crime. (quoting United States v. Garner, 338 F.3d 78, 81 (1st Cir.2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Brooks, 438 F.3d 1231, 1238 (10th Cir.2006) (upholding a § 924(c)(1)(A) conviction where a loaded revolver was found within ten feet of the recovered evidence of an active methamphetamine laboratory); United States v. Robinson, 435 F.3d 1244, 1251 (10th Cir.2006) (affirming a § 924(c)(1)(A) conviction where the firearm was a fully loaded and chambered high-powered rifle easily within reach and in close proximity to drug paraphernalia). Mr. King raises three arguments in opposition to this conclusion, none of which gives us pause. First, he reiterates his claim that he did not possess the gun, and argues, therefore, that it could not have been used in furtherance of his drug trafficking. Aplt. Opening Br. at 11-12. For the reasons discussed supra in Part II(A), this argument is without merit. Second, Mr. King contends that Officer Taylor's admission that he did not see him with the gun, much less see him use it in his drug trafficking, must ineluctably lead to the conclusion that the government offered insufficient evidence that the rifle was used to advance or further anything. Aplt. Opening Br. at 12. Mr. King, however, mistakes what is required of the government in this situation: the § 924(c)(1)(A) offense at issue here does not require evidence that the gun was actively used or employed, only evidence that it was possessed in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. See Basham, 268 F.3d at 1208 (recognizing that passive possession is all that is required for the possession-in-furtherance offense under § 924(c)(1); a firearm that is kept available for use if needed during a drug transaction is `possessed in furtherance of' drug trafficking, because such possession does not necessarily require `use' as long as such possession `in furtherance of' is the intent of the drug trafficker); cf. Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74, 76-77, 128 S.Ct. 579, 169 L.Ed.2d 472 (2007) (noting, by way of contrast with respect to § 924(c)(1)(A)'s prohibition on the use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking offense, that mere possession does not amount to `use': `§ 924(c)(1) requires evidence sufficient to show an active employment of the firearm by the defendant, a use that makes the firearm an operative factor in relation to the predicate offense' (quoting Bailey, 516 U.S. at 143, 116 S.Ct. 501)). Because the loaded rifle in this case was located immediately adjacent to the drugs, a reasonable jury could infer that it furthered Mr. King's drug trade by protecting Mr. King and his merchandise. See Lott, 310 F.3d at 1248; see also Avery, 295 F.3d at 1180-81 (collecting cases). Finally, relying upon the Sixth Circuit's decision in United States v. Mackey, 265 F.3d 457 (6th Cir.2001), Mr. King argues that appellate courts have concluded that `for the possession to be in furtherance of a drug crime, the firearm must be strategically located so that it is quickly and easily available for use.' Aplt. Opening Br. at 12 (quoting Mackey, 265 F.3d at 462). Here, reasons Mr. King, the rifle was not `strategically located' such that it was `quickly and easily available for use'. . . [because] [i]t was locked in the trunk of a car, and Mr. King did not have a key to the trunk. Id. Furthermore, Mr. King suggests that he could not have intended the rifle to further any of his drug-trafficking because it could not intimidate anyone while it was concealed in the trunk. Mr. King's arguments, however, are unavailing. There is no requirement that the firearm be accessible for use at all times. The focus is on whether the firearm was kept available for use should it be needed during a drug transaction.  Villa, 589 F.3d at 1341 (emphasis added) (quoting Poe, 556 F.3d at 1127) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord United States v. Garza, 566 F.3d 1194, 1202 (10th Cir.2009); Avery, 295 F.3d at 1180. On these facts, the firearm clearly was available for use during any drug trafficking. The marijuana that Mr. King was convicted of possessing with the intent to distribute was stored in the trunk of a vehicle. In order to distribute that marijuana, Mr. King needed to remove it from the trunk. And, if he did so, Mr. King would have had immediate access to the rifle, which was located right next to the marijuana. Thus, the rifle was available for use at the relevant point in timeduring Mr. King's drug trafficking. The fact that it was under lock and key and concealed at other times is of no moment. Moreover, Mr. King's reliance on the Sixth Circuit's decision in Mackey is misplaced. The Mackey court stated: In order for the possession to be in furtherance of a drug crime, the firearm must be strategically located so that it is quickly and easily available for use. Mackey, 265 F.3d at 462 (emphasis added). Although Mackey recognized that [o]ther factors. . . may be relevant to a determination of whether the weapon was possessed in furtherance of the crime, id., it effectively established the accessibility factor supra as a threshold requirement. See United States v. Wahl, 290 F.3d 370, 376 (D.C.Cir. 2002) (noting that [t]he [ Mackey ] court held it essential that the firearm be `strategically located so that it is quickly and easily available for use' (emphasis added) (quoting Mackey, 265 F.3d at 462)); see also United States v. Charles, 469 F.3d 402, 407 (5th Cir.2006) (noting that Mackey  requires that for a firearm to be possessed in furtherance of a drug crime, it `must be strategically located so that it is quickly and easily available for use' (emphasis added) (quoting Mackey, 265 F.3d at 462)). Although we have referred to Mackey's accessibility requirements, see, e.g., Lott, 310 F.3d at 1247, we have not adopted them. Instead, we have opted for a more flexible approach in which the accessibility of the firearm is just one factoralbeit a significant onein the analysis. Trotter, 483 F.3d at 701; see Avery, 295 F.3d at 1180-81 (collecting cases); see also Villa, 589 F.3d at 1342 (noting that Ms. Villa kept the gun where she had immediate access to it). Furthermore, even if we were bound by the requirements articulated in Mackey, we would conclude that they are satisfied on these facts. The rifle was strategically located right next to the marijuana such that it was quickly and easily available for use by Mr. King when he was engaged in drug trafficking. That Mr. King would need to obtain the key from Ms. Washington to open the trunk would not aversely impact the speed with which he could access the weapon once he was inside the trunk and engaged in distributing the marijuana. Therefore, in light of the preceding analysis, we conclude that there was ample evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the in furtherance requirement of § 924(c)(1)(A) was satisfied.