Opinion ID: 1752313
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tract Two.

Text: As to Tract Two, there can be no resulting trust because Tract Two was not acquired by respondent with assets or money of the corporation. It is clear that the purchase money for Tract Two was not paid by the corporation at the time it was conveyed to respondent. Title to this tract passed to respondent at the time it was conveyed to her by Franklin. The purchase price was paid by Hewett and respondent with money borrowed from the Oneonta bank. Neither Franklin, the corporation, nor the bank had any claim on Tract Two at that time. A resulting trust has its origin solely in the facts that the purchase money is paid, or advanced by one person at the time of purchase, and the title is taken in the name of another. Long, Adm'r v. King, 117 Ala. 423, 23 So. 534; Talley v. Talley, 248 Ala. 84, 26 So.2d 586. If no money was so invested at the time of the purchase, when title was taken, a subsequent contribution as part payment does not create a resulting trust. Miles v. Rhodes, 222 Ala. 208, 131 So. 633. To constitute a resulting trust it is necessary to show payment by complainant, or an absolute obligation to pay, incurred by him, as a part of the original transaction of purchase, at or before the time of the conveyance. Hooks v. Hooks, 264 Ala. 66, 84 So.2d 354. The corporation paid nothing at the time Tract Two was conveyed to respondent. There is no showing of fraud against the corporation on the part of respondent or anyone else at the time she acquired title to Tract Two. It is not shown that the corporation had any property, right, or interest in Tract Two at that time. It is not shown that the conveyance of Tract Two to respondent in any way impaired any right of the corporation. Good faith to the corporation does not require of its officers that they steer from their own to the corporation's benefit enterprises or investments which, though capable of profit to the corporation, have in no way become subjects of their trust or duty. Lagarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co., 126 Ala. 496, 28 So. 199. The conveyance of Tract Two to respondent did not impress that property with a constructive trust because there was no fraud at the time of purchase. A constructive trust arises when one person, occupying a fiduciary position, or having placed himself in such position in relation to another that good faith requires him to act for the other and not himself, acquires the title to the property in himself in place of the cestui que trust. These cases involve fraud, or a breach of trust in acquiring the title to the property in himself. The fraud must be implicit in the original transaction, not later. Talley v. Talley, supra. There is no fraud shown here in the original transaction, and, consequently, there is no constructive trust. There remains to be considered the question as to whether or not the proof is sufficient to enforce a right of the corporation in the property on the theory of a parol, executory agreement by respondent to convey, and by the corporation to purchase, Tract Two. Such a theory was applied in Talley v. Talley, supra. We are of opinion that the evidence does not support such a conclusion. Title was taken in respondent's name and the consideration was furnished by respondent and her husband. Later, when the part of the tract was sold, only the part sold was conveyed and title to the remainder was left in respondent. Respondent's statements that the lots belonged to the corporation and that she planned deeding the lots back to the company, taken most favorably to complainant, show nothing more than acknowledgment of a parol trust in lands. The statute prohibits creation of a trust concerning lands, except such as results by implication or construction of law, unless by writing. § 149, Title 47, Code 1940. The evidence is against the conclusion that the corporation paid anything for Tract Two. Respondent and her husband furnished the purchase price at the time the land was bought in the respondent's name. The money used to pay the mortgage debt to the bank came, not from assets of the corporation, but from the proceeds of the sale of a part of the tract to which respondent held title and in which at that time the corporation had no right, legal or equitable. We are at the conclusion that the evidence does not support a finding that respondent had agreed to sell the Franklin lot, or Tract Two thereof, to the corporation, and further, that the corporation has not shown an oral contract to purchase Tract Two in which the grantee has paid the consideration. We are of opinion that the court erred in granting relief to complainant as to Tract Two. For the reasons set out, the decree is reversed and the cause is remanded. Reversed and remanded. LIVINGSTON, C. J., and SIMPSON and GOODWYN, JJ., concur.