Opinion ID: 1443915
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Testimony of Delores Delacruz Was Erroneously Excluded.

Text: The Wassermans' first point on appeal claims that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the testimony of Delores Delacruz, whom the Wassermans describe as the non-party witness with the closest view of the Safeway incident. The Wassermans characterize the court's exclusion of her testimony as a Civil Rule 37 sanction for her refusal to testify at a deposition. The court stated an additional reason for excluding Delacruz's testimony: that it would be cumulative under Evidence Rule 403. We conclude that neither of these reasons was sufficient to bar the testimony, and that the court erred in excluding Delacruz's testimony.
The court's first rationale for excluding Delacruz's testimony was as a sanction for her non-responsiveness at discovery. Although the court did not explicitly cite Civil Rule 37 in its ruling, the principal source of sanctions for inadequate discovery responses is Civil Rule 37. [11] We conclude, however, that Civil Rule 37 cannot be the basis for excluding the testimony. First, exclusion of testimony is not an appropriate or effective sanction under Civil Rule 37 where the recalcitrant witness is not a party. [12] (The appropriate sanction in these circumstances is an award of reasonable expenses under Civil Rule 37(a)(4)(A).) Second, there is no indication that the appellants, allegedly harmed by the exclusion, encouraged or caused the refusal of the non-party to answer questions at the deposition. In these circumstances, it would not be just to impose a sanction against a party that had done nothing wrong. Because Delacruz was not a party, and because the defendants did not seek an order to compel her deposition testimony, [13] we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in prohibiting her testimony as a Civil Rule 37 sanction for her refusal to cooperate at the deposition. We do not mean to suggest that the trial court was without power to address the situation confronting it on the fourth day of trial when counsel for the plaintiffs announced his intent to call the previously recalcitrant witness. [14] Trial courts have the power to regulate the manner in which evidence is discovered and disclosed at trial. In extreme circumstances, a trial court may properly conclude that only exclusion of a non-party witness's testimony can redress the unfairness of the situation. [15] In the instant case, however, there is no showing that exclusion is justifiable on these grounds. It was not established that the witness's initial non-cooperation was secured at the plaintiffs' urging. It appeared clear from the record that a mid-trial deposition was entirely feasible. In these circumstances, exclusion of Delacruz's testimony on the ground that it was necessary to avoid prejudice was error.
The court's reasons for excluding Delacruz's testimony included these statements: [I]t's potentially cumulative, [w]e've got many, many fact witnesses, and there are so many witnesses on the subject. These statements suggest exclusion under Evidence Rule 403 for undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. The court made its ruling without knowledge of the contents of Delacruz's sealed statement. Our knowledge of that statement is the most important basis for the following analysis and our consequent determination that Delacruz's testimony should have been admitted. Although the trial court stated that Delacruz was not the key witness, her statement reveals that she could be the most important non-party witness. Seven non-party fact witnesses who were in or near the Safeway testified: Martha Roth, Arlene Abalahin, Renee Dewberry, Joy Morrison, Tammy Pruitt, Vincent James Valenza and Roger Hanson. Most of the non-party witnesses were quite distant from the scuffle and stated that their perceptions of it were limited. [17] In comparison, Delacruz states that she was 10-15 feet away. With the possible exception of Roger Hanson, this would make her the closest non-party witness and would lend significance to what she observed. While the trial court said that there was not that large of a diversity between the parties' accounts of the facts, several important facts are disputed: whether the police officers were identifiable as peace officers, whether an officer held Keith Wasserman in a choke hold, and what the officers told Wasserman before they seized him. On each of these points, Delacruz had testimony to offer that was highly favorable to plaintiffs. Delacruz stated that the officers were not identifiable as peace officers, [18] that one of them held Wasserman in what was apparently a choke hold, [19] and that none of them asked Wasserman for identification [20] or told him why they were detaining him. [21] Her testimony, if believed, would strongly have supported the plaintiffs' theory of the case. Evidence properly excludable as cumulative falls into two categories. One is evidence supporting an uncontested or established fact. United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1350 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000, 98 S.Ct. 1656, 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978); Sloan v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 541 P.2d 717, 722 n. 7 (Alaska 1975), modified on other grounds, 552 P.2d 157 (Alaska 1976). The second is evidence repeating a point made by previous evidence. [22] United States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 708, 736 (2d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824, 99 S.Ct. 93, 58 L.Ed.2d 116 (1978); Williams v. Utility Equip., Inc., 837 P.2d 1112, 1115-16 (Alaska 1992); Schneider v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 150 Ariz. 153, 722 P.2d 321, 331 (App. 1985). Delacruz's testimony is clearly not cumulative evidence of the first sort; the Safeway events are disputed. It is not the second, repetitious, sort of cumulative evidence; Delacruz is the only non-party witness who states that the police were not identifiable as police officers, and did not disclose the reason they stopped Keith Wasserman. Moreover, her status as perhaps the closest non-party witness makes exclusion of her testimony questionable. See Zaken v. Boerer, 964 F.2d 1319, 1323 (2d Cir.1992) (rejecting exclusion of testimony as cumulative where all other comparable witnesses were parties or had also sued defendant), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 975, 113 S.Ct. 467, 121 L.Ed.2d 375 (1992); see also Kobos By and Through Kobos v. Everts, 768 P.2d 534, 545-46 (Wyo. 1989). While the defense could identify reasons to discredit Delacruz's testimony, [23] her credibility should not affect whether her testimony is inadmissible as cumulative. The Wassermans' counsel came close to inviting this ruling, by calling on Delacruz after several fact witnesses who provided little or no support for their account and by describing her testimony at one point as more of the same, perhaps. However, a witness's account of disputed facts cannot be considered cumulative on the basis that the court has heard several versions of the facts that differ substantially from the excluded witness's version. The court's opinion could be read to suggest other Rule 403 rationales: undue delay and waste of time. They do not apply. These rationales generally serve to contain a peripheral but potentially time-consuming issue. See Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. Kandik Const., 795 P.2d 793, 801 (Alaska 1990) (It was not necessary for the court to suffer a trial within a trial on this minor issue.); Alaska Northern Dev., Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 666 P.2d 33, 42 (Alaska 1983) (to prevent the `sideshow [from] swallow[ing] up the circus') (alterations in original), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1041, 104 S.Ct. 706, 79 L.Ed.2d 170 (1984). Exclusion on these grounds of evidence pertaining to the central issue at trial is rarely within the trial court's discretion. See Shad v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 799 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir.1986) (rejecting exclusion of expert testimony essential to plaintiffs' case); Denison v. Anchorage, 630 P.2d 1001, 1003 (Alaska App. 1981) (rejecting exclusion as undue delay or waste of time of circumstantial evidence of defendant's sobriety in drunk driving trial); 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 353 at 386 (1994) ([E]vidence should not be excluded on the ground of delay or waste of time when the proffered evidence is of central importance to the case.). Because Delacruz's testimony goes to the central issue of the case, it is not excludable for reasons of undue delay or waste of time. As the rationales of cumulative evidence, undue delay, or waste of time are all inapplicable, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Delacruz's evidence under Evidence Rule 403.
Although it was error to exclude the testimony of Delores Delacruz on grounds of either Civil Rule 37 or Evidence Rule 403, it does not necessarily follow that a new trial must be granted. The determination of the context in which the improperly excluded evidence should be heard will be left, in the first instance, to the trial court. After giving the parties the opportunity to be heard, the trial court should decide whether to reopen the evidence solely to entertain the testimony of Delores Delacruz, to reopen to entertain her testimony and any other evidence within the ambit of her testimony, (allowing, for example, impeachment and rebuttal evidence), or to hold a new trial. [24]