Opinion ID: 4229402
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Labrum and Stare Decisis

Text: ¶ 53 We’ve already explained why Labrum requires that Mr. Neese receive additional procedural protections—the right to particularized notice, to call witnesses, and to a fuller written explanation of the Parole Board’s decision—before the Parole Board may, in effect, extend Mr. Neese’s term of incarceration based on untested allegations that he committed a sex offense unrelated to the reasons for his incarceration. Supra ¶¶ 25–34. Under Labrum, “original release hearings . . . are analogous to sentencing hearings and require due process to the extent that the analogy holds.” Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 908 (Utah 1993); see also supra ¶¶ 27, 46. Labrum requires that we balance the goals of (1) minimizing errors in the Parole Board’s sentencing process and (2) promoting the perception of fairness with (3) ensuring the effective administration of Utah’s prison and parole systems. Labrum, 870 P.2d at 909–10; see also supra ¶ 28. ¶ 54 In the ordinary case, the Parole Board makes its decision based on considerations such as a review of an inmate’s criminal, 6 In response, the dissent makes much of Mr. Neese not citing to Labrum in his opening brief. See infra ¶ 129. That is a fair criticism, but one that sidesteps the fact that (1) Mr. Neese did make the underlying state due process argument in his initial brief and (2) the State extensively briefed Labrum in response, as did Mr. Neese on reply. 21 NEESE v. PAROLE BOARD Opinion of the Court psychological, social, and carceral history. The Parole Board examines the crimes of which the inmate has already been adjudicated, the inmate’s network of social support, his disciplinary, socialprogrammatic, and work record in prison, and (if pertinent) uncontested therapeutic opinions of the inmate’s psychologist or therapist. When this is the extent of the Parole Board’s review, it need not allow an inmate to call witnesses because witnesses won’t meaningfully reduce the risk of error or promote the perception of fairness. Instead, it’s sufficient to give an inmate the opportunity to review the records on which the Parole Board intends to rely, to afford the inmate an opportunity to speak, and to provide a brief written summary of the factors the Parole Board considered in setting the inmate’s release date. Labrum, 870 P.2d at 904; see also Padilla v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 947 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1997) (reviewing the constitutional adequacy of “rationale sheets used by the [Parole] Board to explain its parole decision”). This is because to correct errors or inaccuracies in the Parole Board’s records, the inmate need only (1) have the opportunity to review those records and (2) be allowed to point them out to the Parole Board. Labrum, 870 P.2d at 909–10 (focusing on the problem of “substantial inaccuracies in inmate files . . . ‘I have seen black men listed as white and Harvard graduates listed with borderline IQ’s’” (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 33 & n.15 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). The written rationale sheet, in turn, gives the inmate the opportunity to make sure the Parole Board has heeded his corrections—and it gives courts the opportunity to review arbitrary and capricious decisions to rely on inaccuracies that the inmate may have already pointed out. ¶ 55 But Labrum requires more when the Parole Board goes beyond its usual role and, instead, bases its decisions on untested allegations that an inmate has committed a sex offense. In such a situation, the Parole Board is sitting not just as a sentencing tribunal, but as a trier of fact. Cf. Labrum, 870 P.2d at 908; see supra ¶ 29. Fairness and the minimization of error thus require more than simply giving the inmate an opportunity to speak and “point out errors” in his file. Labrum, 870 P.2d at 909 (citation omitted). Particularized, advanced written notice of the alleged sex offense is crucial to allowing an inmate a fair opportunity to prepare and be heard; witnesses are crucial to determining whether a person has committed such an offense; and an explanation of the Parole Board’s decision is crucial for our reviewing its criminal fact-finding. See supra ¶¶ 44–47. 22 Cite as: 2017 UT 89 Opinion of the Court ¶ 56 The dissent disagrees. It acknowledges that Labrum “deserves some measure of respect as a matter of stare decisis.” Infra ¶ 125. But the dissent thinks it can square its preferred result with upholding Labrum. The dissent accuses us of beginning with “the broadest conception of our opinion in Labrum” and then extending its “premises . . . to their logical extreme.” Infra ¶ 125. Before we apply Labrum’s theory to Mr. Neese’s case, the dissent contends “we should carefully consider the basis of the court’s analysis in Labrum.” Infra ¶ 125. Because the dissent finds this basis wanting, it tells us to confine Labrum to its precise facts, see infra ¶ 166 (arguing against “extend[ing] [Labrum] further” based on the dissent’s view that Labrum was wrongly decided). ¶ 57 The dissent’s stated approach—confine Labrum to its facts on the grounds that Labrum was wrongly decided—doesn’t respect stare decisis. It’s treating it like a velvet Elvis—hiding the opinion in the attic and exhibiting it only to subject it to derision. Respect for past opinions demands more. Stare decisis is “a cornerstone of Anglo-American jurisprudence that is crucial to the predictability of the law and the fairness of adjudication.” State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted). A fundamental requirement of stare decisis is that we not “overrule our precedents lightly.” State v. Guard, 2015 UT 96, ¶ 33, 371 P.3d 1 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We thus don’t overrule our precedents unless they’ve proven to be unpersuasive and unworkable, create more harm than good, and haven’t created reliance interests. See Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, ¶ 22, 345 P.3d 553; Utah Dep’t of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 2011 UT 62, ¶¶ 16–17, 275 P.3d 208 (“[W]e may overturn our precedent [when] more good than harm will come by departing from precedent” and the precedent “is simply unworkable in practice.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Helf v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 2015 UT 81, ¶ 92, 361 P.3d 63 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting) (“Unless and until our decisions become unworkable . . . they are worthy of respect.”). ¶ 58 And transparency in the decision-making process and respect for our precedent require more than a bare, technical refusal to overrule. “[L]aying just claim to be honoring stare decisis requires more than beating [precedent] to a pulp and then sending it out to the lower courts weakened, denigrated, more incomprehensible than ever, and yet somehow technically alive.” Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 636 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, The Roberts Court, Stare Decisis, and the Future of 23 NEESE v. PAROLE BOARD Opinion of the Court Constitutional Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1533, 1534 (2008). In short, respect for stare decisis requires us to “extend a precedent to the conclusion mandated by its rationale.” Richard L. Hasen, Anticipatory Overrulings, Invitations, Time Bombs, and Inadvertence: How Supreme Court Justices Move the Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 779, 780 (2012) (citation omitted). ¶ 59 The dissent doesn’t even attempt to explain how Labrum’s principles are consistent with denying Mr. Neese the due process protections he seeks. Instead, the dissent simply tells us to confine Labrum to its facts on the grounds that Labrum got it wrong. Infra ¶¶ 125, 166. This is not a faithful application of our precedent; rather, it is “fail[ing] to extend a precedent to the conclusion mandated by its rationale.” Hasen, Anticipatory Overrulings, supra, at 780 (citation omitted). It’s also not how we should do business. We’re an adversarial court that ought not upend our precedents absent argument from the parties that they be overruled. See State v. Steed, 2015 UT 76, ¶ 11 n.9, 357 P.3d 547 (The concurrence argues “that we should overrule McBride. We decline to do so, however, because neither party has asked us to overrule the case nor argued that it applies in the manner that [the concurrence] suggests.” (citation omitted)); see also supra ¶ 39. Absent a persuasive invitation to overrule our precedents, we give them a full and fair application to the facts before us. ¶ 60 Here, Labrum’s full measure commands that we extend additional procedural protections to an inmate, like Mr. Neese, whom the Parole Board seeks to adjudicate a sex offender based solely on previously unadjudicated allegations that he’s committed a sexual offense. Labrum rested on the proposition that “original release hearings”—such as the hearing at issue here—“are analogous to sentencing hearings and require due process to the extent that the analogy holds.” Labrum, 870 P.2d at 908. The corollary of this proposition is that this court must announce “procedural safeguards . . . to ensure the accuracy and fairness of [Parole] Board decisions in original parole grant hearings.” Id. at 912; see id. at 910 (“Accuracy and fairness are essential in proceedings which impinge as directly on personal liberty as original parole grant hearings.”). As we’ve explained, a faithful application of this framework requires providing inmates the opportunity to call witnesses and requires the Parole Board to explain its decision when it decides to consider unadjudicated allegations of sexual misconduct in setting an inmate’s sentence. Supra ¶¶ 25–34. 24 Cite as: 2017 UT 89 Opinion of the Court ¶ 61 The dissent would have us provide only the specific procedural protections that Labrum required—not additional protections based on application of the Labrum framework, which the dissent fairly characterizes as Labrum’s “premises.” Infra ¶ 125. These premises are the rationale of the decision, the engine that drives the Labrum machine. “For all intents and purposes, adoption of [Utah’s] indeterminate sentencing system transformed the [Parole] Board from an agency having the ability to shorten a prisoner’s judge-determined sentence into an agency with power analogous to that of a court to actually impose a sentence. Therefore,” we’ve held, “the [Parole] Board’s decision of whether to grant parole does implicate the offender’s liberty interest because at the time an offender first comes before the [Parole] Board, no term of incarceration has been fixed.” Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah 1994). “[B]y acknowledging . . . that the parole function is a complex, multi-dimensional proceeding which includes sentencing, we have opened the door to a more extensive review of the constitutional adequacy of procedures that the [Parole] Board, and probably the legislature, would prefer to exclude from such review.” Padilla, 947 P.2d at 669 (quoting Labrum, 870 P.2d at 911). ¶ 62 Labrum’s rationale has thus set the terms of analysis that this court has used to analyze the due process protections to which inmates at an original parole grant hearing are entitled. Based on the analogy between original release hearings and sentencing proceedings, we’ve held that an inmate “is entitled to access psychological reports to be considered by the [Parole] Board in hearings at which the inmate’s release date may be fixed or extended.” Neel, 886 P.2d at 1103. In reaching this decision, we drew on the rationale underlying defendants’ rights to information in connection with sentencing proceedings. See id. (“This rationale [drawn from sentencing decisions] guides our decision in the present case.”). We also “grounded” our holding “on concerns about [ensuring] the factual accuracy of the information contained in the [Parole] Board’s files.” Id. at 1102 (citation omitted). And we held—as we do here—that this procedural right was not unlimited: “due process does not require the disclosure of confidential information when that disclosure might lead to harm of a third person.” Id. at 1103 (citation omitted). ¶ 63 Labrum also sets the terms of our analysis when we reject inmates’ arguments for additional procedural protections. In Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1996), for example, while we agreed that inmates were entitled to test the accuracy of a restitution order, we held 25 NEESE v. PAROLE BOARD Opinion of the Court that an inmate was not allowed to call character witnesses because the inmate had not shown that the proffered testimony had “anything to do with substantially furthering the accuracy and reliability of the [Parole] Board’s fact-finding process.” Id. at 1030. We likewise refused the inmate’s request for a lawyer on the grounds that he’d “failed to show how the ‘participation of counsel at the hearing would have affected the accuracy of the information considered by the [Parole] Board.’” Id. (quoting Neel, 886 P.2d at 1103). In each case, we explained that our holding rested on the basic premise that “if an inmate fails to demonstrate how a particular procedural requirement will substantially further the [Parole] Board’s fact-finding process, we have no basis for concluding that a failure to provide that procedure operated to deny the inmate due process.” Id. (citation omitted). ¶ 64 If we were to follow the dissent’s lead, we’d undercut the foundations of this entire line of cases. Their discrete procedural protections would remain, but there would be no coherence to those protections, and the Parole Board, the lower courts, and future litigants would be left without guidance on how to reason about our precedent in this field. Depending on the specific composition of this court, those precedents would either have new life breathed into them or they would come in for repeated, sustained criticism, until, one day, they found themselves overruled. ¶ 65 This can’t be what respect for stare decisis—indeed, respect for the rule of law—allows. “If this Court is to decide cases by rule of law rather than show of hands, we must surrender to logic and choose sides . . . .” Hein, 551 U.S. at 618 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). As nobody has asked us to overrule Labrum and its progeny, much less met the heavy burden of showing that they ought to be overruled, we must apply them fairly, according not just to their specific dispositions, but to the underlying logic they embody. This is what our opinion today does.