Opinion ID: 4522755
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: To prove a violation of § 922(g), the government had to show that (1) the defendant was a convicted felon, (2) the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm, and (3) the firearm was in or affected interstate commerce. United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2003). Grimsley stipulated to the convicted felon and interstate commerce, leaving whether he knowingly possessed the firearm as the only question. The government may prove possession on a theory of constructive possession with direct or circumstantial evidence. United States v. Howard, 742 F.3d 1334, 1341 (11th Cir. 2014). “[E]vidence proves constructive possession if it shows that the defendant exercised ownership, dominion, or control over the firearm, or that he had the power and intent to exercise dominion or control over it.” Id. (finding constructive possession of a firearm found in the glovebox where defendant had been in the driver’s seat just before search of vehicle). Similarly, we have held that the location of two pistols under the driver’s seat established that the passenger “had sufficient access to the 11 Case: 18-13681 Date Filed: 04/06/2020 Page: 12 of 13 firearms to establish possession.” United States v. Gates, 967 F.2d 497, 499 (11th Cir. 1992). There was sufficient evidence that Grimsley constructively possessed the firearms in both transactions when “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government,” as we must. Campo, 840 F.3d at 1258. Both transactions were recorded. Regarding the first transaction, Detective Bonilla testified that Gavin indicated he got the firearm from Grimsley. Grimsley also told the detective that he could “get more.” Grimsley’s statements evidenced his “power and intent to exercise control over” the firearm by demonstrating his ownership. Howard, 742 F.3d at 1341. Further, Grimsley was driving the vehicle that he and Gavin arrived in, which on its own could have supported a conviction for the first transaction. See id. As to the second transaction, Grimsley stated that the firearm was his. He accepted the money for the weapon from Detective Bonilla. These facts show that Grimsley asserted dominion and control over the firearm and ammunition by claiming ownership of the firearm and actively engaging in the close of the sale. We also note that Bonilla testified that Grimsley and Gavin walked together from motel to Bonilla’s car where the transaction took place. That circumstantial evidence suggests Grimsley was in a hotel room with all the firearms and ammunition. We have previously held that such evidence supports a theory of constructive possession. See, e.g., United States v. Riggins, 12 Case: 18-13681 Date Filed: 04/06/2020 Page: 13 of 13 563 F.2d 1264, 1266 (5th Cir. 1977) (constructive possession found for defendant in a hotel room when drug deal was conducted between two others in the adjoining bathroom). Grimsley argues that the evidence only shows that he was present to fill out a job application. It is true that a reasonable interpretation of the evidence could have been that he was present to fill out a job application and was only a bystander to Gavin’s criminal conduct. But the government is not required to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. See Campo, 840 F.3d at 1258. Moreover, there was no evidence presented that Grimsley knew about the job prospect prior to arriving to the scene of the first transaction. Grimsley also argues that, because there was insufficient evidence to prove he aided and abetted Gavin, his conviction should be set aside. But, as addressed above, this argument is foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent. Griffin, 502 U.S. at 59 Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence was sufficient to convict Grimsley on both counts. Accordingly, we affirm. AFFIRMED. 13