Opinion ID: 2549094
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Quash Levy

Text: McCurdy asserts that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to quash levy inasmuch as the levy was made after the expiration of the return day stated in the execution. HRS § 651-34 (1993) provides that: Time within which execution shall be returnable. All executions and alias executions issued by or from any court shall be made returnable within sixty days from the date thereof. (Emphasis added.) The writ of execution in this case directed the authorized officer to make return of this writ of execution within sixty (60) days[.] The execution was issued on November 22, 1999 and was therefore returnable prior to January 21, 2000. As noted previously, Sheriff Kling levied the execution on February 9, 2000. Ditto claims that Hawaii law does not require that the writ of execution be carried out within sixty days of its issuance and any delay in this case was caused by [McCurdy]'s lack of cooperation and absence from the State. [HRS § ] 651-34 ... does not provide that writ of execution shall be returned within sixty days of its issuance, only that it is returnable within sixty days. Webster's New World Dictionary (Second Edition) defines returnable as that can or may be returned. (Emphasis added.) Under [HRS § ] 651-34, the writ of execution could have or may have been returned within sixty days of its issuance. (Emphases in original.) Ditto's reasoning is flawed inasmuch as it fails to make a critical distinction between a levy of execution and a return of execution. A levy of a writ of execution consists of the acts by which an officer sets apart and appropriates, for the purpose of satisfying the command of the writ of execution, a part or the whole of the judgment debtor's property. Lincoln Lumber Co. v. Elston, 1 Neb.App. 741, 511 N.W.2d 162, 167 (1993) (citation omitted); cf. HRS § 651-42 (1993) (Every levy by an officer, in pursuance of a writ of execution issued by a court or judge, shall be made by taking the property levied upon into the officer's possession, care, and guardianship.); Everett v. Bolles, 6 Haw. 153, 154 (1875) (an essential ingredient of a levy [is] that the property levied upon be taken in the possession, care or guardianship of the officer). A return of a writ of execution, however, is the short official statement of the officer, indorsed thereon or attached thereto, of what the officer has done in obedience to the mandate of the writ or of the reason why the officer has done nothing. See Union v. Barnes, 29 Tenn. 244, 245 (1849); Rowe's Adm'r v. Hardy's Adm'r, 97 Va. 674, 34 S.E. 625 (1899). The purpose of the return is to establish of record that the officer has performed the official acts essential to an effective levy. See Watt v. Wright, 66 Cal. 202, 5 P. 91 (1884). Thus, although we agree with Ditto that the writ of execution could or may have been returned within sixty days of its issuance, the act of the return of execution is clearly separate and distinct from the levy of execution. Moreover, it is a fundamental principle of the law on executions that, although an execution may be levied at any time before the return day of the writ, see, e.g., Vitale v. Hotel California, Inc., 184 N.J.Super. 512, 446 A.2d 880, 885 (1982), and, indeed, on the day on which it is returnable, see, e.g., Southern California Lumber Co. v. Ocean Beach Hotel Co., 94 Cal. 217, 29 P. 627, 628 (1892), a writ of execution cannot properly be levied after the return day. See Chasnoff v. Porto, 140 Conn. 267, 99 A.2d 189, 192 (1953) (When the return day of an execution has past, it is of no force[] and the officer has no power to execute it.); Willoughby v. Dewey, 63 Ill. 246, 248 (1872) (After the time when an execution is to be returned, it can not be executed by taking the property of the debtor.); Hicks v. Bailey, 272 S.W.2d 32, 32 (Ky.1954) (a sheriff has no power to make the levy after the return date on the execution); Galaxy Steel & Tube, Inc. v. Douglass Coal & Wrecking, Inc., 928 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Mo.Ct.App.1996) (once the return date of the original execution passed, [it] became functus officio); Fredd v. Darnell, 107 N.J. Eq. 249, 152 A. 236, 251 (1930) (a valid levy cannot be made after the return day); Ansonia Brass & Copper Co. v. Conner, 103 N.Y. 502, 9 N.E. 238, 239 (1886) (a sheriff cannot levy upon property except during the life of the execution); Faull v. Cooke, 19 Or. 455, 26 P. 662, 662 (1890) (after the return day, a writ is functus officio and confers no authority). A levy accomplished after the return day is invalid, and a sale founded thereon is void. See Waldrup v. Friedman, 90 Ala. 157, 7 So. 510, 511-12 (1890) (a levy made after the return day held to be absolutely void); Osborn v. Cloud, 23 Iowa 104, 107 (1867) (sale founded upon a levy made after the return day of a writ held to be a nullity); Preissman v. Crockett, 194 Md. 51, 69 A.2d 797, 802 (1949) (The law demands that a levy under a fieri facias be made before the return day, and[,] if it is not so made[,] a sale thereafter is void.); State ex Rel. Duggan v. District Court of Second Judicial Dist., 65 Mont. 197, 210 P. 1062, 1064 (1922) (a levy made after the return day specified in the execution is unauthorized, and general held to be absolutely void); Faull, 26 P. at 664 (any attempted levy and sale by virtue of a writ whose return day has passed are nullities). Ditto urges that a writ of execution has a continuous life as long as the sheriff is actively working on carrying it out. However, Ditto fails to cite to, nor are we aware of, any authority to support this proposition. Therefore, in view of the great weight of authority, we expressly adopt the rule that a writ of execution cannot properly be levied after the return day. Once the return day of an execution passes, it becomes functus officio and confers no authority on the officer to whom it is directed. Correlatively, a levy accomplished after the return day is invalid and a sale based thereon is void. Based on the foregoing, we hold that the levy in this case was invalid and reverse the circuit court's June 19, 2000 order denying McCurdy's motion to quash levy of execution.