Opinion ID: 304354
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Dearborn's Other Contentions

Text: 33 Appellant Dearborn also raised as additional contentions: (1) that having sentenced Dearborn's wife and read her presentence report, Judge Hunter should have recused himself upon Dearborn's motion; (2) that since the conceded ringleader of the conspiracy, Richardson, received a 20-year sentence upon his guilty plea, Dearborn's total sentence of 25 years contravenes the Eighth Amendment by punishing his insistence on a jury trial; (3) that the search warrant which yielded the heroin in his possession was invalid as being based on information from an informer that was insufficient in light of Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); and (4) that the fruits of the search are tainted by the allegedly illegal manner in which the warrant was enforced. 26 34 We find none of these contentions availing to Dearborn. First, when Judge Hunter sentenced this appellant's wife he merely read in her presentence report an account of appellant's alleged activities which he could have read in a newspaper. This is hardly the personal bias requisite for recusal. Second, the alleged ringleader, Richardson, was sentenced to twenty years upon his guilty plea to Count I, the precise term given Dearborn on Count I. The concurrent twenty years and consecutive five years stem from convictions on two other counts, not from Dearborn's refusal to plead guilty. Third, the affidavit on which the warrant rested did not rely solely upon the informer's testimony. The affidavit also presented the substance of a wiretapped conversation in which Dearborn said the heroin was on a shelf in his house, precisely where it was found. Since, as we previously explained, the wiretap was permissible, this message clearly is sufficient to corroborate the informer. 35 Finally, we reject the contention the search was illegally conducted. Dearborn contends that since the warrant was directed To U.S. Marshal or other authorized officer, it was illegal for it to have been enforced by two Bureau of Narcotics Agents assisted by two city policemen. That contention, however, is fully answered by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3105: 36 A search warrant may in all cases be served by any of the officers mentioned in its direction by an officer authorized by law to serve such warrant [as are Narcotics Agents, 21 U.S. C. Sec. 878(2)], but by no other person, except in aid of the officer on his requiring it, he being present and acting in its execution. 37 Appellant also contends the two officers at the rear of the door without the warrant illegally entered before the two at the front door with the warrant, but Judge Hunter expressly found the facts to be to the contrary. Similarly, Dearborn contends the officers were not justified in their forcible entry after twice announcing their purpose and hearing indecipherable conversation inside. We think, however, that the ease with which narcotics are destroyed justified the entry when it was clear persons were present inside and aware of the officer's presence, but refusing to acknowledge the request for entry. Cf., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37-41, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963).