Opinion ID: 2344887
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Majority Improperly Faults WaferTech

Text: ¶ 31 As explained, CR 41(b)(1) does not control this case. However, even if CR 41(b)(1) were applicable, the majority improperly construes the rule. The majority places considerable emphasis on WaferTech's failure to respond to the trial court's order regarding destruction of the trial exhibits and its failure to move for dismissal of the action at an earlier time, since it knew that the case had not been dismissed in its entirety. Majority at 1028-29. The majority concludes that WaferTech had the obligation to move for dismissal if it was concerned that delay would prejudice its case. Majority at 1029. ¶ 32 Under CR 41(b)(1), the defendant has none of these obligations. In applying the rule that want of prosecution mandates dismissal upon motion of the defendant, it makes no difference whether the defendant could have taken steps to forward the prosecution of the case. Arthur v. Wash. Water Power Co., 42 Wash. 431, 433, 85 P. 28 (1906). [T]he failure of the defendant to take any steps to bring the cause to trial or hearing is not a ground for denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss the cause for want of prosecution since the obligation in that respect rests upon plaintiff rather than the defendant. State ex rel. Lyle v. Superior Court, 3 Wash.2d 702, 707, 102 P.2d 246 (1940) (predecessor version of the rule). The burden of going forward to escape operation of the rule providing for dismissal for want of prosecution always belongs to the plaintiff and not to the defendant. McDowell v. Burke, 57 Wash.2d 794, 796, 359 P.2d 1037 (1961) (predecessor rule); State ex rel. Wash. Water Power Co. v. Superior Court, 41 Wash.2d 484, 489, 250 P.2d 536 (1952) (same). The duty of seeing that diligence is exercised in prosecutions of civil actions rests particularly on the plaintiff. State ex rel. Goodnow v. O'Phelan, 6 Wash.2d 146, 153, 106 P.2d 1073 (1940) (quoting Arthur, 42 Wash. at 433, 85 P. 28); see also Callahan v. Caldwell, 30 Wash.2d 430, 437, 191 P.2d 708 (1948) (`a defendant is under no obligation to speed the trial, and cannot be charged with neglect if he maintains his position on the defensive, and simply meets issues of law or of fact as the plaintiff regularly calls them up for hearing' (quoting State ex rel. Philips v. Hall, 6 Wash.2d 531, 537, 108 P.2d 339 (1940))). [2] ¶ 33 Accordingly, in applying CR 41(b)(1) the majority improperly faults WaferTech for doing nothing itself to move the case forward and improperly places the burden on WaferTech to have moved for dismissal. CR 41 does not require that a defendant do so and this court's cases have long been to the contrary. ¶ 34 Under CR 41 `every reasonable opportunity should be afforded to permit the parties to reach the merits.' Thorp Meats, 110 Wash.2d at 168, 750 P.2d 1251 (quoting Yellam v. Woerner, 77 Wash.2d 604, 608, 464 P.2d 947 (1970) (decided under predecessor rule)); see Landberg v. State, 36 Wash.App. 675, 676-77, 676 P.2d 1027 (1984). However, it is not reasonable to allow the plaintiff to sit idle for four years, pay no attention to the order about exhibits, notify the court and the defendant of its own attorney's intent to withdraw on the basis that the action is at an end, and then pick up where it left off and note the case for trial after a motion for dismissal. In the face of this conduct, which as a whole constitutes unacceptable litigation practices, the majority unfortunately applies CR 41(b)(1) so as to afford BSA an unreasonable opportunity to breathe new life into its old case.