Opinion ID: 1420768
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Use of Expert Witnesses Identified by Settling Defendants

Text: The second issue concerns the use by the remaining defendants of expert witnesses identified by the settling defendant, in violation of the settlement agreement between the plaintiffs and the settling defendant. Our standard of review of evidentiary matters is the well-settled rule stated in Syllabus Point 10 of Board of Ed. of McDowell County v. Zando, Martin & Milstead, Inc., 182 W.Va. 597, 390 S.E.2d 796 (1990): `Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are largely within a trial court's sound discretion and should not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of discretion.' State v. Louk, 171 W.Va. 639, 301 S.E.2d 596, 599 (1983)[, overruled on other grounds, State v. Bradshaw, 193 W.Va. 519, 457 S.E.2d 456 (1995) ]. Syllabus Point 2, State v. Peyatt, [173] W.Va. [317] 315 S.E.2d 574 (1983). Syllabus Point 7, State v. Miller, [175] W.Va. [616] 336 S.E.2d 910 (1985). See West Virginia Dept. of Highways v. Mountain, Inc., 167 W.Va. 202, 279 S.E.2d 192 (1981); Casto v. Martin, 159 W.Va. 761, 230 S.E.2d 722 (1976). The issue of use by the remaining defendants of the settling defendant's expert witnesses presents two important competing policies. One policy is based on the principle that `the public ... has a right to every man's evidence.' U.S. v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331, 70 S.Ct. 724, 730, 94 L.Ed. 884, 891 (1950), quoting, John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 2192 (3rd ed.). [E]xceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for the truth. (footnote omitted). U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3108, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039, 1065 (1974). The other policy is the encouragement of settlement rather than litigation to resolve controversies by upholding contracts fairly made that do not contravene public policy. Indeed, [t]he law favors and encourages the resolution of controversies by contracts of compromise and settlement rather than by litigation; and it is the policy of the law to uphold and enforce such contracts if they are fairly made and are not in contravention of some law or public policy. Syllabus Point 1, Sanders v. Roselawn Memorial Gardens, Inc., 152 W.Va. 91, 159 S.E.2d 784 (1968). In accord Syllabus Point 1, Riggle v. Allied Chemical Corp., 180 W.Va. 561, 378 S.E.2d 282 (1989); Syllabus Point 2, State ex rel. Vapor Corp. v. Narick, 173 W.Va. 770, 320 S.E.2d 345 (1984). However, the dilemma between these competing policies was created by the remaining defendants who then sought rescue from the circuit court claiming a right to all available evidence. At this stage of discovery in a medical malpractice case, the policies are in conflict. But, the dilemma could have been avoided by the remaining defendants. The remaining defendants had the same opportunity as the settling defendant to select their own expert witnesses and to identify those experts to the plaintiffs, or the defendants could have agreed to a formal arrangement to share expert witnesses. Neither was done in this case. We have addressed the issue of use of the settling defendant's expert witnesses by the remaining defendant on two occasions. In Riggle v. Allied Chemical Corp., supra , we upheld the denial of a continuance for the remaining defendant to obtain its own experts. The request for the continuance occurred after Allied, a co-defendant, settled after the first day of trial by a Mary Carter settlement agreement. [3] Because of the Mary Carter settlement, Allied, who remained as a defendant, did not present the extensive defense it had originally planned. 180 W.Va. at 564, 378 S.E.2d at 285. In upholding the denial of the continuance we point[ed] out that appellant had years to prepare its case, and had no right to rely on expert evidence developed by Allied to fight the plaintiffs' claims. 180 W.Va. at 569, 378 S.E.2d at 290. After noting that settlement was a possibility, we said, if appellant wanted to fight plaintiffs' claim, it could have prepared its own case rather than relying on Allied's experts. Id. We found the appellant had only itself to blame for the result. Id. A similar approach was taken in Board of Ed. of McDowell County v. Zando, Martin & Milstead, Inc., supra , when Zando, Martin & Milstead (ZMM), the remaining defendant, attempted to call the expert witnesses of the settling defendant in violation of the settlement agreement. In Zando, although the settlement prohibiting the use of the settling defendant's expert witnesses was reached several weeks before trial, ZMM attempted to use these experts at trial. The circuit court granted ZMM a recess to attempt to obtain an expert of its own, but when trial resumed five days later, ZMM asserted that it had been unable to locate any witnesses who could offer the same testimony. (footnote omitted). Zando, 182 W.Va. at 613, 390 S.E.2d at 812. In Zando, we upheld the circuit court's refusal to allow the remaining defendant, ZMM, to use the settling defendant's expert witnesses. In Zando, id., we concluded: It is obvious to any sophisticated trial lawyer that in litigation involving multiple defendants there is the likelihood that settlements will occur before trial. To rely on another party defendant's witnesses without some formal agreement as to shared use is to invite the consequences that arose in Riggle and in the present case. The end result is that no error can be claimed. Based on reasoning underlying Riggle and Zando, we hold that, absent a formal agreement among defendants in a litigation proceeding involving multiple defendants, the circuit court should not generally permit a settling defendant's expert witnesses to testify for the remaining defendants. When a settlement agreement between the settling defendant and the plaintiffs prohibits the continued use of the settling defendant's expert witnesses by the remaining defendants, the circuit court, subject to Rule 26(b)(4)(B) [1988] of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, should honor that agreement by not permitting the remaining defendants to use or present such information in the preparation for or conduct of the trial. [4] Two other courts have addressed the question of public policy and an expert witness limitation. The Texas Supreme Court in Tom L. Scott, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 556, 559 (Tex.1990) rejected the settlement agreement's redesignation of expert witnesses to preclude the witnesses from testifying based on [t]he primary policy behind discovery is to seek truth so that disputes may be decided by facts that are revealed rather than concealed. However, this approach was rejected in Wolt v. Sherwood, a Div. Of Harsco Corp., 828 F.Supp. 1562, 1567 (D.Utah 1993), which after comparing the Texas Supreme Court's reasoning to our reasoning in Zando, said that the court is persuaded that West Virginia more accurately states the rule that should be followed by this court. The Wolt court found that the purposes of discovery were not frustrated by allowing a plaintiff to purchase the expertise of a settling defendant because of the availability of the `exceptional circumstances' [exception] under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B). (footnote omitted). 828 F.Supp. at 1568. [5] The determination of upholding a settlement agreement that precludes the testimony of a settling defendant's expert witnesses is designed to promote fairness by precluding unreasonable access to an opposing party's diligent trial preparation. Wolt, 828 F.Supp. at 1568, quoting, Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir.1984) (discussing Fed. R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B)). In this case, the remaining defendants claim that the reservations contained in their identification of expert witnesses supposedly give them the right to use any experts named by any other defendant or party. These declarations are not a formal agreement about sharing expert witnesses; they provide no notice to the plaintiffs, and therefore, they should not be considered adequate preparation in a litigation involving multiple defendants. Such self-serving statements should not deprive the plaintiffs of the settlement bargain which included the removal of the settling defendant's expert witnesses. [6] We note that in this case the remaining defendants may still have the time and the opportunity to develop their own defense. The effect of our holding in this case is simply to prevent the remaining defendants from using the trial preparation of the settling defendant, who agreed not to allow such use in the settlement agreement. We find that the circuit court abused its discretion in allowing the remaining defendants to use the settling defendant's expert witnesses in violation of the settlement agreement. The plaintiffs should not be deprived of the settlement bargain they gained by their strategy of divide et impera. [7] For the above stated reasons, the petition for a writ of prohibition is granted. The underlying case shall proceed below in accordance with the principles set forth in this opinion. Writ granted.