Opinion ID: 901906
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Theory of the Defense Instruction

Text: [¶ 33.] Defendant next asserts that the court erred when it refused to instruct the jury that [a]ny person who committed the act charged without being conscious thereof is incapable of committing such a crime. Defendant makes no claim that he acted unconsciously. Rather, he contends that his daughter killed Tami in what he portrays as a catatonic state. As defense counsel told the court during the settlement of jury instructions, the jury may be thinking that [defendant] is simply trying to get his daughter in trouble to save himself. Defendant argues that if the jury knew Haylee could not be found guilty, he could have lessened the negative impact of his claim that his daughter murdered her mother. [¶ 34.] Undoubtedly, [a]n accused must `be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.' State v. Packed, 2007 SD 75, ¶ 27, 736 N.W.2d 851, 860 (quoting State v. Iron Necklace, 430 N.W.2d 66, 75 (S.D.1988)). When a defendant's theory `is supported by law and ... has some foundation in the evidence, however, tenuous[,]' the defendant has a right to present it. Id. ¶ 25 (quoting United States v. Grimes, 413 F.2d 1376, 1378 (7th Cir.1969) (citing Tatum v. United States, 190 F.2d 612, 617 (D.C.Cir. 1951); United States v. Phillips, 217 F.2d 435, 442-43 (7th Cir.1955)) (additional citations omitted)). We review the refusal of proposed jury instructions under the abuse of discretion standard. State v. Jensen, 2007 SD 76, ¶ 7, 737 N.W.2d 285, 288 (citation omitted). [¶ 35.] In this case, defendant was not denied a right to present a complete defense. His contention was that he did not kill Tami, but his daughter did. In support of his position, he was in no way restricted in offering evidence and argument of third-party culpability. See Packed, 2007 SD 75, ¶¶ 22, 23, 736 N.W.2d at 858-59. The jury was properly instructed that the prosecution must prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, the subject of defendant's motive was also properly instructed with the pattern instruction. [¶ 36.] Defendant insists, however, that because his proposed instruction is a correct statement of law and he testified, in effect, that Haylee acted involuntarily, the instruction should have been allowed. In State v. Moss, the defendant argued that the court should have given the jury an instruction on the offense of public indecency. 2008 SD 64, ¶ 25, 754 N.W.2d 626, 634. That instruction, Moss claimed, would have allowed him to argue that the State could have charged him under a lesser criminal statute. In considering this argument, we recognized that defendants are entitled to an instruction for every issue of fact raised material to their defense. Nevertheless, because the lesser-crime instruction was not a lesser-included offense of the crime charged against Moss, we held that there was no error in excluding it. Id. ¶ 26. The uncharged crime was not material to his defense of the charged crime. Id. ¶ 27. [¶ 37.] Here, the requested instruction was not germane to the question the jury had to decide: whether defendant killed Tami. Indeed, such an instruction would not have been exculpatory for defendant. His proposed instruction related not to his defense, but to a defense his daughter might have had if she were charged. But, as the trial court found, instructing the jury on whether Haylee might have been mentally culpable had she been charged with murder would have been speculative and confusing. Even if Haylee had been the killer, the jury did not need to decide the legal effect of her consciousness to find defendant not guilty. Defendant cites no authority where such an instruction was given in similar circumstances. Because the proposed instruction was extraneous to his defense that he did not kill Tami, the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing defendant's requested instruction.