Opinion ID: 601261
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant Greenfield

Text: 9 The situation presented by the remaining defendant Greenfield differs significantly from the one presented by his codefendants. Greenfield did not join his codefendants in objecting to the district court's order refusing to dismiss the pending counts on double jeopardy grounds. See United States v. Bailin, 977 F.2d 270 (7th Cir.1992). Rather, he raised this issue before the district court on remand. In a separate ruling, Judge Hart held that the jury's acquittal verdict on Count Two of the indictment did not bar a retrial on the remaining charges against Greenfield. Greenfield then appealed this order to this court and moved to stay trial pending appeal. 10 As discussed above, an order denying a motion to dismiss a count or an indictment on the grounds that it violates the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. See, e.g., Abney, 431 U.S. at 656-62. Consequently, this court has jurisdiction over Greenfield's appeal. Nevertheless, because Greenfield's arguments are frivolous, the motion for stay should be denied and the order of the district court affirmed. 11 Count Two of the original indictment alleged a mail fraud scheme incorporated by reference into other mail fraud counts in the indictment. In addition, Count Two provided the sections of the Commodities Exchange Act that were allegedly violated. Finally, Count Two charged defendant Sidel with committing mail fraud through a particular transaction. Greenfield argues that the acquittal on Count Two bars the Government from prosecuting him on the remaining mistried counts (Commodities Exchange Act violations and mail and wire fraud violations). He maintains that by rendering an acquittal verdict on Count Two, the jury found that no scheme to defraud existed. Thus, claims Greenfield, he cannot be found guilty of having committed mail or wire fraud (a count which incorporated the scheme to defraud contained in Count Two). 12 The district court, in both its orders of January 22 and January 29, rejected this argument as frivolous. United States v. Bailin, No. 89-CR-668, memorandum opinion and order at 3 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 22, 1993); United States v. Bailin, No. 89-CR-668, memorandum opinion and order at 9 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 29, 1993). Emphasizing that the jury's finding could have been based on a finding that another element of mail fraud was missing for that particular mailing, the district court denied Greenfield's motion. United States v. Bailin, No. 89-CR-669, memorandum opinion and order at 3 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 22, 1993). The district court further noted that a scheme to defraud is not a necessary element of the two pending Commodities Exchange Act violations. Id. These district court findings are not plainly erroneous. It is apparent that an acquittal on Count Two is not a sufficient basis to apply double jeopardy to bar a retrial of Greenfield on the mistried counts. See United States v. Bailin, 977 F.2d 270, 278 (7th Cir.1992) (the acquitted counts do not bar retrial on the mistried counts, they [only] bar relitigation of issues already resolved against the government); see also Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445-46 (1970). In the present case, the government is not seeking to retry Greenfield on issues already resolved against the government. Thus, Greenfield's arguments fail, and a stay is not necessary. Furthermore, an affirmance of the district court is appropriate.