Opinion ID: 1965145
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Entitlement to Scientific Testing in Proceedings to Set Aside Paternity Declarations

Text: Section 5-1029 of the Family Law Article states in relevant part: § 5-1029. Blood or genetic tests. .... (b) In general. On the motion of the Administration, a party to the proceeding, or on its own motion, the court shall order the mother, child, and alleged father to submit to blood or genetic tests to determine whether the alleged father can be excluded as being the father of the child. .... (f) Laboratory report as evidence. (1) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (3) of this subsection, the laboratory report of the blood or genetic test shall be received in evidence if: (i) definite exclusion is established; or (ii) the testing is sufficiently extensive to exclude 97.3% of alleged fathers who are not biological fathers, and the statistical probability of the alleged father's paternity is at least 97.3%. The issue debated by the parties is whether the mandatory blood or genetic test requirement in section 5-1029 also applies, upon motion, in a proceeding whereby an adjudicated father is attempting to set aside the paternity declaration entered against him. The putative fathers in this appeal claim it does apply, while the State, on behalf of the mothers, and amicus curiae, claim the trial court must first consider the best interests of the child. An examination of section 5-1038 and its legislative history makes clear that the best interests of the child standard generally has no place in a proceeding to reconsider a paternity declaration. [14] First, a plain reading of subsection (a)(2)(i)2 reveals that it cross-references to a blood or genetic test done in accordance with § 5-1029. A reading of section 5-1029(b) then states that [o]n the motion of... a party to the proceeding, ... the court shall order the mother, child, and alleged father to submit to blood or genetic tests to determine whether the alleged father can be excluded as being the father of the child. (Emphasis added.) The word shall makes it clear that, at least in a proceeding to determine paternity, or a challenge to a prior paternity declaration under section 5-1038, a blood or genetic test is to be triggered automatically when any party, including the putative father, moves to have testing conducted. In addition, the plain language of section 5-1038(b) states that [ e]xcept for a declaration of paternity, the court may modify or set aside any order or part of an order under this subtitle as the court considers just and proper in light of the circumstances and in the best interests of the child.  (Emphasis added.) In other words, the best interests standard is only to be considered by the trial court in matters corollary to the paternity declaration, such as custody, visitation, giving bond, or any other matter that is related to the general welfare and best interests of the child. See § 5-1035(a) of the Family Law Article (enumerating additional provisions to which a circuit court may grant an order in conjunction with a paternity declaration). The legislative process leading to the passage of Chapter 248 emphasizes this point further. As noted, supra, section 5-1038 originally was to be modified by the General Assembly to require the best interests analysis in any attempt to review a prior paternity or paternity-related court order. Both H.B. 337 and S.B. 114, at their first reading, would have repealed and re-enacted section 5-1038 to read that a trial court may modify or set aside any order or part of an order under this subtitle as the court considers just and proper in light of the circumstances and in the best interests of the child. Ultimately, that language was amended so that only orders coming out of a paternity proceeding, other than paternity declarations themselves, could be amended when just and proper in light of the circumstances and in the best interests of the child. Materials in the bill files evidence the unsuccessful opposition to this modification in the statute. In a March 30, 1995 letter to Senator Walter M. Baker, Acting Executive Director of the Child Support Enforcement Administration Joan M. Knight stated, at 1: [W]e are concerned that `the best interests of the child' is not provided for in Section (2) and request that the bill be amended to include the best interests of the child in any decision to dissolve a declaration of paternity. Despite Ms. Knight's plea, that amendment never occurred and the best interests of the child standard was excluded from the determination of whether to set aside a prior paternity declaration. The lack of a best interest standard also did not go unnoticed by Patricia C. Jessamy, the State's Attorney for Baltimore City. In her letter, supra, at 2, she noted: Another additional factor to be considered is that to avoid redetermination of paternity, it is possible for courts or plaintiffs, to order or request mandatory blood testing in all paternity cases. This would resolve the most frequent request in redetermining paternity, i.e. blood testing, but would also involve a substantial expenditure of public funds to cover the additional blood tests requested. [Emphasis added.] Although she was discussing testing in the context of an original paternity proceeding, Ms. Jessamy recognized the mandatory effect of section 5-1029. We agree that, without considering cost, it might be preferable for the trial courts to require testing in the original paternity proceedings; a declaration backed by a conclusive test confirming paternity would provide greater finality, and thus stability, to Maryland's system of determining paternity. [15] The putative fathers in this case, however, did not have such testing conducted in their original hearings. To not allow testing now would violate the mandatory tenets of section 5-1029 and the Legislature's intent, in enacting Chapter 248, to provide relief to putative fathers seeking review of potentially false paternity declarations entered against them. We hold, given the legislative history behind Chapter 248, that the Legislature intended for blood or genetic tests to be made available, upon a motion, to any putative father seeking to challenge a paternity declaration previously entered against him in which such blood or genetic test evidence was not introduced. Moreover, an examination of the best interests of the child has no place in that determination. We note that, when faced with similar legislative history, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota, in Spaeth v. Warren, 478 N.W.2d 319 (Minn.Ct.App.1991), reached the same conclusion that we do in the case sub judice. Spaeth addressed the issue of whether the best interests analysis should be applied in a pre-trial determination of whether to allow a paternity case to proceed under Minnesota's version of the Uniform Paternity Act. The court noted that Minnesota ... excised the portion of the UPA referencing [the] `best interest of the child.' Id. at 323. The court held that the best interest analysis was not to be considered in adjudicating paternity. Id. at 322. Our holding is also bolstered by the history of the testing statute, section 5-1029. We discussed that history in Eagan v. Ayd, 313 Md. 265, 545 A.2d 55 (1988). Eagan first noted that the original paternity laws, then called bastardy laws, were criminal in nature because their purpose was, not only to reduce the government's cost in supporting the illegitimate child, but to punish the fornicating parents. Eagan then discussed the history of the testing statute: [T]he criminal bastardy laws still were in effect in 1941 when Article 12, § 17 of the code (the predecessor to § 5-1029) came into being.... The new section was enacted in order to give the court the benefit of a relatively new scientific toolthe use of blood tests to prove nonpaternity. Bowen, Blood Tests and Disputed Parentage, 18 Md. L.Rev. 111, 115 (1958) (hereinafter Bowen). It provided: Whenever the defendant in bastardy proceedings denies that he is the father of the child, upon the petition of the defendant, the court shall order that the complainant, her child and the defendant submit to such blood tests as may be deemed necessary to determine whether or not the defendant can be excluded as being the father of the child. The result of the test shall be received in evidence, but only in case definite exclusion is established .... [emphasis supplied] This new addition was patently for the benefit of the defendant. Shanks v. State, 185 Md. 437, 449, 45 A.2d 85, 90 (1945); Bowen, 18 Md. L.Rev. at 116-117. Id. at 269-70, 545 A.2d at 56-57 (alteration in original). Many changes have been made in the paternity laws since then. First, in 1966, the criminal bastardy laws were replaced with the current civil paternity provisions (which, at that time, were codified in Article 16). The blood test statute was transferred in the process, and the provision allowing the court to order testing on its own motion was added. In 1982, changes were made in the law that allowed the mother to request testing, and made tests that conclusively proved the putative father's paternity admissible in evidence. A 1984 amendment excluded the trial court's discretion to exclude a test that confirmed paternity. See id. at 271-73, 545 A.2d at 57-58. We note that what has never changed in the paternity testing law is the requirement that the court provide the defendant-father with testing when he requests it, and the requirement that the tests be admitted when they conclusively prove that he is not the biological father. In fact, as Eagan notes, that was the original intent behind what is now section 5-1029 of the Family Law Article. To now require a trial court to conduct a best interests analysis prior to granting a blood or genetic test would counter the original and long-standing legislative intent of this statute. Petitioner Danielle, appellees Riffe and Locklear, and amicus curiae, argue that a number of previous Court of Appeals decisions impliedly inject the best interests analysis into a paternity declaration. All of these cases are distinguishable, however. In Turner v. Whisted, 327 Md. 106, 607 A.2d 935 (1992), the mother, Kelly Whisted, had been involved with another man, William Turner, prior to her marriage and there was evidence that he might be the father. Her husband, Danny Whisted, was listed as the child's father on the birth certificate. The married parties separately briefly, during which time the mother lived with Turner. Eventually, the Whisteds reconciled and Kelly returned to the marital home. Mr. Turner, who had developed a relationship with the child, sought visitation rights. During the litigation that ensued, he moved the court to order blood tests to prove the paternity of the child. We held that the trial court could grant such relief, on a showing of good cause, which we equated to a showing that the test would be in the best interests of the child. See id. at 116, 607 A.2d at 940. This Court, however, reasoned that the blood test was not to be conducted under the edicts of section 5-1029, but under the illegitimacy provisions of section 1-208(b) of the Estates & Trusts Article. See id. at 113, 607 A.2d at 938. The Court recognized that utilizing Estates & Trusts section 1-208(b) was meant to be a `less traumatic' means of establishing paternity than utilizing the Family Law Article paternity provisions. Id. (citing Thomas v. Solis, 263 Md. 536, 544, 283 A.2d 777, 781 (1971); Dawson v. Eversberg, 257 Md. 308, 314, 262 A.2d 729, 732 (1970)). Thus, paternity testing performed under the authority of section 1-208(b), which does not specifically mention testing, was to be ordered by a court pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-423. That rule is discretionary and is where the Turner decision found the good cause standard, which it equated to a best interests analysis, in the context of blood or genetic testing. See id. at 113-14, 607 A.2d at 939. Proceedings under section 5-1038(a)(2)(i)2, however, specifically require testing to be conducted pursuant to section 5-1029 of the Family Law Article. As we noted, supra, section 5-1029 is mandatory; it does not contain any good cause or other standard of review. There is also a more obvious distinction. Turner involved a dispute between two different men over visitation rights. The issue of paternity was collateral to the issue disputedvisitation. Visitation is not the same as paternity, and it makes more sense for the best interests of the child to be considered in a visitation proceeding. In fact, if a challenge to a paternity declaration under either prong of section 5-1038(a)(2)(i) is successful, it is conceivable that situations might arise in which the trial court will have to address a prior order of visitation granted along with the original paternity declaration. As we have indicated, except for [the] declaration of paternity, the best interests of the child may be considered: pursuant to section 5-1038(b), a paternity-related visitation order may be modified or vacated when it is just and proper in light of the circumstances and in the best interests of the child to do so. Monroe v. Monroe, 329 Md. 758, 621 A.2d 898 (1993), is also cited and is easily distinguishable. Rather than being sought in an action to establish paternity,... the blood tests in [ Monroe ] [we]re being requested in the context of a child custody dispute between the mother of a child born out of wedlock and the man who ha[d], both before and after their marriage, acknowledged that child as his own and maintained a fatherly relationship with her. Id. at 766, 621 A.2d at 902. The mother sought the blood test in the hopes that it would prove that her husband was not the biological father and, thus, support her case to deny him custody of the child. As Chief Judge Bell recognized in Monroe, 329 Md. at 767, 621 A.2d at 902, establishing paternity is not a necessary factor to be considered when addressing the issue of custody. Monroe held that the trial court had to consider the best interests analysis prior to ordering the test because [w]hen a court is called upon to resolve the issue of which of the parties to a child custody action should be awarded custody of a child, the critical and overriding consideration is `what is in the best interest of the child?' It is not simply one of several factors; rather, it is `the objective to which virtually all other factors speak.' See id. at 769, 621 A.2d at 903 (citations omitted). The same analysis does not apply to the fact of paternity. As with visitation, any order of custody that accompanied an original declaration of paternity must be reviewed, if at all, pursuant to section 5-1038(b), which requires the best interests analysis. That standard of analysis is notably absent from section 5-1038(a) and the provisions relating to an original paternity proceeding. As the Court pointed out in Monroe, the best interests weighing process must be conducted where there is neither a putative father nor a presumptive father vying for the child's paternity, but only a man, who has treated the child as his own, locked in combat with the child's mother on the issue [of custody]. Id. at 772, 621 A.2d at 905. This is a situation far different from the paternity disputes in the appeal before us now. Finally, Sider v. Sider, 334 Md. 512, 639 A.2d 1076 (1994), involved bizarre circumstances in which the mother, during her marriage to Mr. Sider, had an extramarital affair, during which she conceived a child. After a subsequent affair of the wife, the couple initiated divorce proceedings, in which they fought over custody of the child conceived with the first paramour in the prior affair. During these proceedings, the biological father, the first paramour, was informed (by the wife's second paramour) of the impending divorce and that he might be the father of the child. The first paramour then had a blood test, which confirmed his paternity. He subsequently initiated paternity proceedings, which were stayed by the trial court pending the outcome of the custody proceedings. The trial court ultimately granted custody to the marital father. The paternity proceedings were subsequently dismissed. We recognized that [a]lthough we said in Monroe v. Monroe, 329 Md. 758, 767, 621 A.2d 898 (1993), that `establishing paternity is not a necessary factor to be considered when addressing the issue of custody,' this case presents a unique situation. Therefore, ... we believe that the paternity issue in the instant case must be resolved before we can address the difficult custody issue. Sider, 334 Md. at 525-26, 639 A.2d at 1083 (first emphasis added). The Court held that, in the case before it, the best interests of the child should be considered in determining whether to allow the biological father to initiate paternity proceedings. Id. at 527, 639 A.2d at 1083. Given the unique circumstances of Sider, as well as Turner and Monroe, we chose not to apply or extend their holdings further than the unique facts of those cases. [16] This is especially true, given the legislative history we have noted, supra, in which the Legislature initially intended to add, but ultimately extracted the best interests standard from any later challenge to the original paternity declaration. Interestingly, we note that the bill files contain a May 15, 1995 letter from Attorney General J. Joseph Curran to Governor Parris N. Glendening concerning the constitutionality and legal sufficiency of S.B. 114 and H.B. 337, in which the Attorney General's office recognized the distinction we have made between these prior decisions and the type of paternity challenge advanced in the cases sub judice: The Legislature could rationally believe that proceedings for child support, which result in an ongoing responsibility, are substantively different from cases involving inheritance, which end when the estate has been distributed. This is especially true since, in the most typical case, the putative father will not be present to raise the issue or to give a blood sample. The other types of cases that arise under [Estates & Trusts Article] § 1-208, while of many different types, also can be differentiated as they are generally adversarial and most likely will involve blood testing in the first place. Moreover, where two men claim paternity, or where a man seeks to establish paternity against the wishes of the child's mother, there is significantly less support for the argument that a man who actively sought a declaration of paternity should subsequently be able to reverse the judgment. [Footnotes omitted.] The types of proceedings in Turner, Monroe, and Sider are substantially different from cases in which declarations of paternity are sought. [17] In the great majority of these cases, it is the State, on behalf of the mother, who initiates the proceeding against the putative father. As in the present cases, the State, through its various agencies, litigates the matter to conclusion in the name of the mother. And, as the letter points out, fathers often may not be present to challenge the proceeding or to provide a blood or genetic sample. Chapter 248 was intended to provide relief to such fathers by allowing them to seek paternity testing even after the paternity declaration against them has been rendered. We further note that it would be illogical to deny a putative father the chance to receive a blood or genetic test under section 5-1029, based on a best interests analysis or otherwise, when the type of proceeding envisioned by the Legislature in adopting section 5-1038(a)(2)(i)2 requires that such testing, if requested, must be conducted in order to consider whether to exclude the complainant as the biological father. Without testing, the putative father could never succeed in his challenge to the declaration. The Court of Special Appeals pointed this out below in well-reasoned analysis: [T]he provision of present F.L. § 5-1038(a)(2)(i)(2) permitting a court to modify or set aside an enrolled declaration of paternity if blood or genetic testing done in accordance with § 5-1029 of this subtitle establishes the exclusion of the adjudged father would be meaningless if the exclusionary testing pursuant to F.L. § 5-1029 that may serve as the basis for the court's exercise of its revisory power must have been requested and obtained prior to the declaration of paternity. Obviously, if blood or genetic testing excluding the alleged father had been obtained prior to the declaration of paternity, there would not have been a declaration of paternity at all and the adjudged father (who would not have become adjudged) would not be invoking the revisory power of the court under F.L. § 5-1038(a). We reject as illogical appellees' position to the contrary. Tyrone W., 129 Md.App. at 297, 741 A.2d at 573. We hold that the provisions of section 5-1029 are mandatory once a party to any paternity proceeding moves for a blood or genetic test. This includes a post-declaration proceeding, subsequent to the initial declaration of paternity, conducted under section 5-1038(a)(2)(i)2, challenging the declaration because the putative father is not, or may not be, the biological father. Given the mandatory statutory language of section 5-1029, and the history of that section, the best interests analysis generally may not be conducted in determining whether to grant a motion for testing.