Opinion ID: 1009824
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Coercive Interrogations

Text: While questioning employees about union sentiments is not per se unlawful activity, an employer may not interrogate its employees in a coercive fashion. NLRB v. Nueva Eng’g, Inc., 761 F.2d 961, 965 (4th Cir. 1985). Several factors go into the Board’s evaluation of coercion: the history of employer hostility to the union, the nature of the information sought, the identity of the questioner, and the place and method of the questioning. Id. at 966. In determining whether there was intimidation, the Board must also ‘take into account the economic dependence of the employees on their employers, and the necessary tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to pick up intended implications of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear.’ Id. at 965 (quoting NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969)). Here, the conditions of Antley’s individual interrogations of maintenance employees made such employer hostility to the Union plain. He took the workers late 12 SARA LEE BAKERY GROUP v. NLRB at night and one by one to his office for what were clearly coercive conversations or lectures.6 2. Gag Rule and Prohibition of Union Paraphernalia Soliciting support for a union and distributing union literature are two essential activities protected by the NLRA. Consol. Diesel Co. v. NLRB, 263 F.3d 345, 352 (4th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, the workplace is ‘uniquely appropriate’ for such activities, so long as the activities are conducted in nonwork areas during nonwork time and in a non-abusive manner. Id. at 352 (quoting Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 801 n.6 (1945) (internal citations omitted)). Thus, no-solicitation and no-distribution rules can be valid in the workplace, provided that they are not selectively applied against prounion activity and do not spring up only when union activities begin. Opryland Hotel, 323 N.L.R.B. 723, 728-29 (1997). In this case, while the existing Earthgrains policy regarding nosolicitation and no-distribution was lawful, Antley went beyond that policy by imposing a gag rule and prohibiting Union literature.7 Rather than simply stopping solicitation attempts or requesting the employees not to pass out Union fliers, Antley ordered the maintenance employees not to speak about the Union at all while at work. Antley also told Crider that it was illegal even to possess Union literature on the job. There is no evidence that Earthgrains previously restricted its employees’ conversation topics in such a fashion. Accordingly, we find sufficient evidence to support the Board’s finding on this section 8(a)(1) violation. 6 The Board has declared a supervisor’s office a locus of authority, and the fact that questioning occurs there enhances the coercive effect of an interrogation. Double D Constr. Group, Inc., No. 12-CA-21951, 2002 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 414, at  (Sept. 10, 2002). 7 The fact that Antley misstated Earthgrains’ lawful policy is of no consequence. We find no merit in Earthgrains’ contention that Antley was merely a low-level manager with little authority. Accordingly, Earthgrains cannot be excused by Antley’s incorrect interpretation of the policy. SARA LEE BAKERY GROUP v. NLRB 13 The Board also found a violation of section 8(a)(1) in Rodoski’s statement to Dukes that he could not wear a hat with a Union insignia on it. A rule restricting any personal display of union insignia on the job is presumptively unlawful. Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 803. The rule, however, is not absolute. Rather, the right to wear union insignia can be abridged when the employer demonstrates that special circumstances exist which justifies [sic] the banning of union insignia. E. Omni Constructors, Inc. v. NLRB, 170 F.3d 418, 424 (4th Cir. 1999). [S]ubstantial evidence of special circumstances, such as interference with production or safety, is required before an employer may prohibit the wearing of union insignia, and the burden of establishing those circumstances rest [sic] upon the employer. Gov’t Employees, 278 N.L.R.B. 378, 385 (1986) (internal citations omitted). The Board found that Earthgrains did not prove any special circumstances that would overcome the presumption that prohibiting union insignia is unlawful. Earthgrains argues that Rodoski’s statement was innocuous because Dukes continued to wear his hat after the encounter. However, a showing of actual coercion is not required. If the conduct in question had a reasonable tendency in the totality of the circumstances to intimidate, this is sufficient. Corrie Corp. of Charleston v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 149, 153 (4th Cir. 1967). Rodoski’s statement implied that Dukes would suffer adverse consequences if he did not remove the Union insignia. Morever, the record reflects that Earthgrains consistently allowed bakery members to wear paraphernalia advertising vendors, and no manager had previously told Dukes that he could not wear a hat with advertising. These facts are sufficient to support the Board’s finding of a violation in this instance. 3. Threats of Loss of Benefits and Unfavorable Working Conditions It is a general rule that employers violate the NLRA if they threaten their employees with reprisal because of the employees’ union activity. Equitable Gas Co. v. NLRB, 966 F.2d 861, 866 (4th Cir. 1992). An employer also violates the NLRA if it promises its employees benefits if they reject a union. NLRB v. Gen. Wood Preserving Co., 905 F.2d 803, 808 (4th Cir. 1990). The Board found that Antley threatened employees Free, Crider, Jennings, Nettles, and Dukes in the course of discussing Earthgrains’ talking points. In addition, the 14 SARA LEE BAKERY GROUP v. NLRB Board found that Plant Manager Maxwell threatened employees with the loss of the April pay raise and a loss of benefits if the Union was voted in, and promised a pay increase if the Union was voted out. Finally, the Board found Vice President Miles made unlawful threats of a loss of benefits. There is substantial evidence to support the Board’s findings as to Antley in his words alone. Antley told Free that the employees probably would lose everything that [they] already had with [Earthgrains] as far as 401(k) or benefit packages (J.A at 358) and told Dukes that if the Union was voted out, then the raise would be given. (J.A. at 123). To Nettles, Antley stated that Earthgrains didn’t want a Union in the bakery, and anybody involved with the Union in part or whole would have no further advancement or increase in pay if they were in any way connected with the Union. (J.A. at 55-56). We affirm the Board’s findings as to Antley. The statements of Maxwell that the Board found objectionable were all related to the postponement of the April raise. While an employer is allowed to state that it will withhold a wage increase pending an election, the employer must also concurrently state that (1) the benefit will be granted after the election, regardless of the results, (2) that the sole purpose of the postponement is to avoid the appearance of influencing the outcome, and (3) that the burden for the postponement is not on the union. Atl. Forest Prods., 282 N.L.R.B. 855, 858 (1987). Maxwell’s statements on March 22 and 23 fail this test. Rather than assuring the maintenance employees that their pay raise would be granted regardless of the election’s result, Maxwell stated that [i]f the Union is defeated we can give you a pay increase just like our other employees here. If the Union is voted in . . . your pay is something that would have to be negotiated. (J.A. at 864). The additional statement that the Union could accuse [Earthgrains] of trying to buy votes and could file charges against [Earthgrains] does nothing more than place the blame for the postponement on the Union. We find sufficient evidence that those statements were threats in violation of the NLRA. The Board’s findings as to Vice President Miles’ statements are also supported by substantial evidence. An employer’s statement that it will bargain from scratch constitutes an impermissible threat if, SARA LEE BAKERY GROUP v. NLRB 15 in the totality of the circumstances, the statement is likely to be understood by employees as an indication of the employer’s hostile bargaining stance toward a union. See, e.g., NLRB v. Aerovox Corp., 435 F.2d 1208, 1211-12 (4th Cir. 1970) (finding that, taken in context, the phrase bargaining starts from scratch was coercive). Under the circumstances of this case, Miles’ statements that there were no promises period and that everything is negotiable from that point were coercive. We find substantial evidence to support the Board’s finding that Miles’ statements were also unlawful threats. Accordingly, Earthgrains’ petition for review is denied, and the Board’s cross-application for enforcement is granted. PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED; CROSS- APPLICATION FOR ENFORCEMENT GRANTED