Opinion ID: 2086616
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sanders

Text: Plaintiff, Louise Sanders, commenced employment with defendant General Motors Corporation in October, 1952. From that date until November, 1960, plaintiff worked in various capacities including packing bumpers, working on a press, working on the production line and inspecting. At the end of plaintiff's shift on November 10, 1960, while working as an inspector, plaintiff tripped and fell over several pieces of wire which had been discarded in an aisle. The fall resulted in injuries to plaintiff's back. Plaintiff first consulted with her own physician, Dr. John Benson, who recommended that she cease work for a 30-day period. The plant physician, Dr. Clark, however, did not agree that the injuries to plaintiff's back necessitated total cessation of work. Rather, Dr. Clark had plaintiff transferred to sedentary work for a 30-day period. Plaintiff returned to her prior duties at the conclusion of the 30-day period and subsequently transferred to several other positions. For approximately a three-year period between plaintiff's November, 1960 fall and April, 1963, plaintiff continued to work while she received treatment for back and leg problems occasioned by her fall. In April, 1963, however, plaintiff's medical problems necessitated cessation of work. [1] From termination of employment through 1966, plaintiff underwent several surgeries and periods of hospitalization and was able to perform only limited activities. Plaintiff testified that in 1966, following her third laminectomy, she was unable to do almost all household chores, be mobile for more than a short time, prepare meals or drive or ride in an automobile. Plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits during much of the period between April, 1963 and October, 1965. On September 27, 1967, plaintiff filed a petition for hearing with the Workers' Compensation Bureau alleging total and permanent disability to her back, legs and nervous system. A hearing was held December 5, 1968, which resulted in a finding that, as of April 15, 1963, plaintiff had sustained an occupational disease disability and was therefore entitled to receive compensation for total disability from her employer for the maximum statutory period of 500 weeks [2] (i.e., until November 11, 1972). The hearing referee simultaneously determined, however, that defendant Second Injury Fund, unlike defendant employer, was not liable because plaintiff had failed to sustain the burden of proof to establish total and permanent disability as defined by the statute (emphasis added). No appeal was taken from this determination. On December 6, 1972, plaintiff again filed a petition for hearing with the Workers' Compensation Bureau alleging total and permanent disability due to loss of industrial use of both legs. Pursuant to this second hearing, the Administrative Law Judge concluded that plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled through the industrial loss of use of both legs. Appeal was taken to the WCAB. The WCAB determined that, because there had been no change in plaintiff's condition since the first hearing, the doctrine of res judicata as set forth by this Court in Hlady v Wolverine Bolt Co, 393 Mich 368; 224 NW2d 856 (1975), precluded a redetermination of the issue of plaintiff's total and permanent disability. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals which found that, despite the doctrine of res judicata, there were two possible approaches under which total and permanent disability could now be found. The first possible approach was explained as follows: [I]t is possible that the referee who entered the first award in 1968 found that the plaintiff was then suffering a total loss of industrial use of her legs but that it was impossible at that time to determine whether or not the loss was permanent. Sanders v General Motors Corp, 80 Mich App 190, 194; 263 NW2d 329 (1977). The second possible approach centered on a change in the legal standard: Whether or not the referee believed that the plaintiff's condition was permanent, he may have found no `total and permanent disability' because he found no `loss of industrial use of both legs'. While the statutory phrase has remained the same, the case law interpretation of that phrase has undergone a considerable evolution beginning shortly after the plaintiff's 1960 injury date. Paulson v Muskegon Heights Tile Co, 371 Mich 312; 123 NW2d 715 (1963), Lockwood v Continental Motors Corp, 27 Mich App 597; 183 NW2d 807 (1970), Burke v Ontonagon County Road Comm, 391 Mich 103; 214 NW2d 797 (1974). Sanders, supra, 195. Based on these alternative possibilities, the Court of Appeals vacated the decision of the WCAB and remanded to that board for further proceedings. Appeal was taken from this decision. On June 1, 1978, this Court granted the applications for leave to appeal of the employer and the Second Injury Fund and the cross-application for leave to appeal of plaintiff. II. ISSUE Because of the differing factual aspects of Gose and Sanders, this Court phrased in different language the issues on which leave to appeal was granted. The issue on which this Court granted leave to appeal in Gose is as follows: [D]oes the doctrine of res judicata bar plaintiff's second total and permanent disability claim based on insanity when, in the prior case, the claim based on insanity was withdrawn before adjudication? 402 Mich 950p. In Sanders the issue is: [D]oes the doctrine of res judicata apply to bar plaintiff's total and permanent disability claim when the issue of total and permanent disability was litigated and decided against the plaintiff at a previous hearing before a referee? [3] 402 Mich 950i. The order in each case indicated the two cases were to be argued and submitted together. III. WORKERS' COMPENSATION RES JUDICATA