Opinion ID: 1925657
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Power to control the servant's conduct.

Text: Although the facts of record are largely undisputed, the parties are in emphatic disagreement as to whether the evidence supports Mrs. Schecter's position that MHD retained the authority to control the conduct of Mr. Young and that of Young's assistant, Jason Brown. We conclude that, notwithstanding the use of the independent contractor label, a jury could find significant evidence that MHD had (and indeed exercised) such authority. The record reveals that, however the relationship was denominated, MHD effectively determined where Mr. Young and Mr. Brown would travel each day. It did so by deciding which route and which deliveries it would offer to Mr. Young. While MHD accommodated the delivery drivers' preferences as to routes and deliveries, it did not relinquish control over the routes. Delivery drivers were not offered a choice or selection of routes, nor were they given the opportunity to bid on a particular route, so that they had no control over the location of their deliveries. MHD asserts that the delivery drivers had the right to decline any of the routes offered to them. Although this is a legitimate factor in determining whether an employer-employee relationship existed  an employee ordinarily cannot decline a task given to him by his employer  it is not conclusive. MHD's contract with Mr. Young states that, [w]hen requested by [MHD], [Mr. Young] in a good and workmanlike manner will deliver consumer items for [MHD's] customers. (Emphasis added.) In other words, MHD retained the ultimate authority to specify which deliveries Young and Brown would make and where they would make them. The determinative factor is the right to control an employee in the performance of a task and in its result, and not the actual exercise of control or supervision. Safeway Stores, 448 A.2d at 860. MHD also controlled the time at which the delivery drivers began work each day. When offering a route to the driver, MHD informed him of the time when the merchandise had to leave the loading dock. Based on direction from Circuit City, MHD specified at what time the drivers had to make each delivery. The delivery drivers were required to deliver the merchandise within a specified delivery window. Moreover, as we have previously noted, each driver was required to report his location to MHD every half-hour. Drivers were also required to call in at the beginning and end of each delivery stop. MHD kept track of each driver's location throughout the day, and measured his performance on the basis of the driver's ability to make deliveries on time. The corollary of this tracking was that MHD terminated drivers who failed to make timely deliveries. MHD also controlled in some detail the manner in which a driver made each delivery. The contract between Circuit City and MHD specified exactly what was to be done upon delivery of each type of appliance. See, e.g., note 7, supra (setting forth in detail the procedure to be used in delivering washing machines). Further, as we have seen, see pp. 9-10, supra, there is evidence on the basis of which a trier of fact could reasonably find that MHD's procedures were geared to insure that the delivery drivers worked for MHD on a daily basis. Finally, MHD exercised control over the clothing that the delivery drivers wore. At Circuit City's direction, the drivers were required to wear MHD uniforms. An impartial juror could reasonably find that this requirement reflects a substantial limitation upon the independence of those who wished to make deliveries for MHD, and that it is consistent with their being servants or employees, rather than independent contractors. By requiring the drivers to wear MHD uniforms, MHD held the drivers out to be a part of MHD's operations. Accordingly, the requirement that delivery drivers wear MHD uniforms, analyzed under the appropriate standard, moves the calculus in Mrs. Schecter's favor. In light of the foregoing analysis, we conclude that, viewed in the light most favorable to Mrs. Schecter, the record would support a jury finding that Mr. Young was an employee of MHD. Because it is undisputed that Mr. Brown was an employee of Mr. Young, a reasonable jury could likewise find that he too was effectively under the control of, and employed by, MHD. This conclusion is consistent with, and finds strong support in, the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, issued almost forty years ago, in Dovell, 124 U.S.App. D.C. at 90-91, 361 F.2d at 544-45. In that case, a pedestrian who was struck by a truck sued Arundel Supply Corporation, the employer of the driver, John Skouzes, relying on a theory of respondeat superior. The principal issue that divided the parties was whether Skouzes was an employee of Arundel or an independent contractor. Skouzes owned two dump trucks, and he was responsible for their maintenance and upkeep. Skouzes drove one truck himself, and he hired a second man to drive the other truck. Skouzes' job for Arundel was to haul gravel from Arundel's work site and to deliver it to customers designated by Arundel. While Arundel told Skouzes where to deliver the gravel, Skouzes was free to select the route by which he traveled to the customer's place of business. Skouzes worked for Arundel on a regular basis, five or six days a week, but he was free to drive for other employers as well at times when Arundel did not need him; each day Arundel had a right of first refusal as to Skouzes' services. Prior to Skouzes' departure to make a delivery, Arundel loaded the truck and measured the load. Arundel paid Skouzes on the basis of receipts which Skouzes received upon completing the delivery. Skouzes' was paid weekly, and his compensation was based on the tonnage he hauled and the distance he hauled it. The agreement between the parties was oral, and it could be terminated at any time by either party without notice. Based on all of these facts, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's award of summary judgment in favor of Arundel. The court emphasized that Skouzes was not brought in as a plumber, for example, to perform a function unrelated to Arundel's supply business as such. His function was directly related to and essential to the supplying of gravel by Arundel to Arundel's customers. 124 U.S.App. D.C. at 91, 361 F.2d at 545. The court concluded that a jury determination is required here, since this is a doubtful case even though a close one. 124 U.S.App. D.C. at 92, 361 F.2d at 546. There are obvious differences between Dovell and the present case. On the one hand, there was no agreement in Dovell identifying Skouzes as an independent contractor rather than an employee. On the other hand, there was no indication that Skouzes had to wear an Arundel uniform, that he had to report in every half-hour, or that the mechanics of delivery were subject to precise instructions from Arundel. No two cases are alike, but we are satisfied that in this case, as in Dovell, it is for the jury to decide whether Young and Brown were employees of MHD.
In granting a directed verdict in MHD's favor, the trial judge ruled as a matter of law that Alan Young was an independent contractor, but that even if he was not, MHD could not be held vicariously liable because the thefts were not within the scope of the delivery men's employment. The judge based his ruling on his view that the thefts were not committed in furtherance of MHD's business. We agree with the judge's conclusion with respect to the scope of employment issue.  Respondeat superior is a doctrine of vicarious liability and allows the employer to be held liable for the acts of his employees committed within the scope of their employment. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. Reddick, 398 A.2d 27, 29 (D.C.1979) (citations omitted) (hereinafter Reddick ). The boundaries of the term scope of employment were well articulated almost a century ago in Axman v. Washington Gaslight Co., 38 App. D.C. 150 (1912), as follows: [W]e conceive the true test in measuring the principal's responsibility, to be whether the act of the agent was done in the prosecution of the business either impliedly or expressly intrusted to the agent by the principal. If it was, the principal is responsible for the manner in which the agent executed his commission, even if he acted wantonly, recklessly, or against orders. He represented his principal, and what he did was for the benefit of his principal. If his recklessness or lack of judgment caused loss or damage, it is only just that the one who selected and commissioned him should be held accountable therefor. Of course, the moment the agent turns aside from the business of the principal and commits an independent trespass, the principal is not liable. The agent is not then acting within the scope of his authority in the business of the principal, but in the furtherance of his own ends. Id. at 158 (emphasis added). More recently, in Brown v. Argenbright Sec., Inc., 782 A.2d 752, 758 n. 8 (D.C. 2001), we quoted with approval Section 228 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1958), which reads as follows: (1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master; and (d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the master. (2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master. (Emphasis added in Brown. ) The Restatement goes on to provide that [a]n act of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is done with no intention to perform it as a part of or incident to a service on account of which he is employed. Id. § 235. Further, [i]t is the state of the servant's mind which is material. Its external manifestations are important only as evidence. Conduct is within the scope of employment only if the servant is actuated to some extent by an intent to serve his master. Id. § 235 cmt. a. In conformity with these principles, we have stated that [t]he employer will not be held liable for those willful acts, intended by the agent only to further his own interest, not done for the employer at all. Reddick, 398 A.2d at 31 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); accord, Hechinger Co. v. Johnson, 761 A.2d 15, 24 (D.C.2000). Further, when all reasonable triers of fact must conclude that the servant's act was independent of the master's business, and solely for the servant's personal benefit, then the issue becomes a question of law, Reddick, 398 A.2d at 32 (emphasis added), and the master is entitled to judgment. In the present case, it cannot reasonably be disputed that the theft of Mrs. Schecter's valuables was effected solely for the benefit of Young and Brown (each of whom subsequently possessed some of the proceeds), and not at all for the benefit of MHD. The fact that the thieves were authorized to take away Mrs. Schecter's old washing machine, and even to search for her saw, has no rational relationship to their conduct in stealing her jewelry. The theft by Mr. Young and Mr. Brown was not actuated at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master. RESTATEMENT § 228(1)(c). Indeed, it was not merely too little activated by a purpose to serve the master, id. § 228(2), it was not so actuated at all. In our view, no impartial jury could rationally find otherwise. [T]he courts have consistently held that employers were not liable where employees... participated in the theft of property from a customer's home or business premises, because the employees did not act within the scope of their employment or in furtherance of their employer's business. Phoebe Carter, J.D., Annotation: Employer's Liability for Assault, Theft, or Similar Intentional Wrong Committed at Home or Business of Customer, 13 A.L.R. 5th 217 (1993 & Supp.2004). See, e.g., Int'l Distrib. Corp. v. Hines, 186 U.S.App. D.C. 305, 308, 569 F.2d 136, 139 (1977) (It is clear that the thefts in this case were simply a personal adventure which did not spring from any purpose to serve the employer. Hence the District Court correctly refused to impose vicarious liability upon [the employer]) (internal quotation marks omitted); Bremen State Bank v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 427 F.2d 425, 428 (7th Cir.1970) (employee of moving company stole money while bank was being moved); the employer is liable for the negligent, wilful, malicious or criminal acts of its employees when such acts are committed during the course of employment and in furtherance of the business of the employer; but when the act is committed solely for the benefit of the employee, the employer is not liable to the injured third party  (emphasis added; citations omitted); Effort Enters., Inc. v. Crosta, 194 Ga.App. 666, 391 S.E.2d 477, 479-80 (1990) (defendant moving company's employer allegedly stole homeowners' jewelry; moving company entitled to summary judgment, because [a]s the only business of the [moving company] was to move the customer's belongings, any action by its employee in stealing jewelry would be personal and outside the scope of employment) (citation, brackets, and ellipsis omitted); Searle v. Parke, 68 N.H. 311, 34 A. 744 (1895) (defendants who were decorating state building, hired B and S to assist then; B or S stole a ring, [t]heft was not the business for which B and S were engaged, nor was it within the scope of their employment. The mere fact that the wrongdoers were their servants is not sufficient to make the defendants answerable for the wrong.); Island Assoc. Coop., Inc. v. Hartmann, 118 A.D.2d 830, 500 N.Y.S.2d 315, 316 (1986) (employee removed inventory from customer's warehouse; employer held not liable because employee's actions were in no way incidental to furtherance of the employer's interest, and torts committed for personal motives, unrelated to furtherance of the employer's business, cannot be within the scope of his employment, especially if the tortious act is serious in nature) (citations omitted); Liggett v. Glen Oaks Club, Inc., 28 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1941) (per curiam) (Even if the defendant's employee could be held to have taken the articles, an employer not personally at fault is not liable for an employee's theft.). The parties have cited us to no decision, and we know of none, holding that a theft by an employee, made to enrich himself, was committed within the scope of his employment. Mrs. Schecter relies on Presley v. Commercial Credit Corp., 177 A.2d 916 (D.C.1962), but Presley does not provide significant support for her position. In that case, the plaintiff claimed that Robinette, an employee of the defendant creditor, drove away with the plaintiff's automobile, apparently mistaking it for a vehicle belonging to the plaintiff's brother, who was delinquent in his car payments to the defendant. The vehicle was found on the next day, stripped of various accessories and other personal property. Reversing a directed verdict in favor of the employer, the court held that a corporation may be held liable for the tortious acts of its employee when such acts are done within the scope of the employee's employment. Id. at 918. The court continued: Applying the above legal principles to the testimony in the present case, it seems reasonable that a jury might find that appellee's servant who was seen at the place and drove appellant's car away had some authority to protect the only security for the debt that the master had and to take away any automobile whose owner was delinquent in his payments. The jury could find that in doing so the servant Robinette was acting within the scope of his employment at the time and place and in furtherance of his master's business, even though in performing his duties he made a mistake and took the wrong automobile. In any event, although the evidence as to scope of employment was circumstantial, nevertheless, with reasonable inferences therefrom, the testimony made out a prima facie case requiring the defendant to present any evidence on its behalf and submission of the issues of fact to the jury. Id. Counsel for Mrs. Schecter claims that this decision stands for the proposition that Robinette's alleged theft of the accessories and personal property in the vehicle, even if it was done solely for his own benefit, could reasonably be found to be within the scope of his employment. Fairly read, however, the opinion holds only that the employee's alleged repossession of the wrong automobile did not necessarily take his conduct outside the scope of his employment. In its opinion, the court did not address at all the legal consequences of the theft of the car's contents; it simply mentioned that the contents were stolen. Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents. Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511, 45 S.Ct. 148, 69 L.Ed. 411 (1925); see also District of Columbia v. Sierra Club, 670 A.2d 354, 360 (D.C. 1996) (quoting Webster ). In the absence of some more explicit discussion of the issue in the court's opinion in Presley, we are not prepared to treat that decision as holding by implication, without analysis, that a deliberate theft in a thief's own interest can be within the scope of his employment. Moreover, the Presley case is distinguishable from the situation before us, for Robinette, if he took the contents of the car, may have believed that he should do so on behalf of his employer so that the employer would have additional security to satisfy the car owner's supposed debt. In other words, if Robinette stole the car and its contents, an impartial jury might reasonably find that he did so, at least in part, for his employer's benefit. In the present case, on the other hand, it would be absurd to suggest that Mrs. Schecter's valuables were stolen by Mr. Young and Mr. Brown in order to enrich MHD. Here, the theft was incontestably for the thieves' own benefit, and Mrs. Schecter has not argued to the contrary Mrs. Schecter relies on several decisions in which an employee, having become involved, within the scope of his employment, in an argument or altercation with a plaintiff, used patently excessive force against that plaintiff. These decisions are not easy to reconcile with one another. Compare Johnson v. Weinberg, 434 A.2d 404, 408-09 (D.C.1981) (laundromat employee shot and wounded plaintiff who had complained that his shirts were missing; summary judgment in favor of laundromat owner reversed); Weinberg v. Johnson, 518 A.2d 985 (D.C.1986) (judgment for $2,000,000 in favor of plaintiff in Johnson v. Weinberg affirmed); and Lyon v. Carey, 174 U.S.App. D.C. 422, 424, 533 F.2d 649, 651 (1976) (reversing judgment for employer notwithstanding the verdict where employee, who was delivering a mattress to a customer's home, raped the customer following an argument about whether the mattress should be brought upstairs and whether payment should be by check or cash; [a]lthough the assault was perhaps at the outer bounds of respondeat superior, the case was properly one for the jury); with Boykin v. District of Columbia, 484 A.2d 560, 562-64 (D.C.1984) (affirming summary judgment in favor of District where blind coordinator of an educational program sexually assaulted blind and deaf student while training her not to walk into obstacles; the court stated that Johnson v. Weinberg approaches the outer limits of liability that may be imposed under respondeat superior,  id. at 563); Grimes v. B.F. Saul Co., 60 App. D.C. 47, 48, 47 F.2d 409, 410 (1931) (holding that the owner of an apartment building was not liable for the attempted rape of a tenant by an employee who was inspecting the building for needed repairs; although the employee obtained access to the tenant's unit by professing to need to inspect it, the wrongful act was not done in the furtherance of the employee's business, but was an independent trespass on the part of the employee). Without attempting a reconciliation of these authorities, we note that each case in which the plaintiff prevailed originated in a job-related quarrel between the employee and the plaintiff, and the employer was held liable, although that quarrel did not justify the criminal conduct of the employee thereafter. In the present case, there was no confrontation of any kind between Mrs. Schecter and the thieves. We are not prepared to extend the holdings of Johnson and Lyon to impose vicarious liability on the employer of a thief, where the thief has committed a theft solely for his own benefit. In Boykin, the plaintiff argued that a deaf, blind and mute child can be taught only through the sense of touch, that physical touching was therefore a part of the teacher-student relationship, and that this made it possible for the sexual assaults to occur. We rejected this connection as too attenuated. 484 A.2d at 562. For essentially the same reason, we consider too attenuated the connection proposed by counsel for Mrs. Schecter between the plaintiff's authorization to Young and Brown to remove the old washing machine and to search for a saw, and the wholly unrelated and criminal theft of Mrs. Schecter's valuables. For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude, as a matter of law, that the thieves were not acting within the scope of their employment when they committed the crime for which Mrs. Schecter asks us to impose liability upon MHD.
In Fleming v. Bronfin, 80 A.2d 915, 917 (D.C.1951), the court stated: One dealing with the public is bound to use reasonable care to select employees competent and fit for the work assigned to them and to refrain from retaining the services of an unfit employee. When an employer neglects this duty and as a result injury is occasioned to a third person, the employer may be liable even though the injury was brought about by the willful act of the employee beyond the scope of his employment. This principle has been applied in a variety of cases dealing with innkeepers, carriers, stores, apartment houses, and other businesses. Accord, Murphy v. Army Distaff Found., Inc., 458 A.2d 61, 64 (D.C.1983); RESTATEMENT, (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 & cmt. g (1957). Potential recovery in tort for negligent hiring or retention of an employee is not based on respondeat superior, but rather on proof of negligence on the part of the employer himself. Fleming, 80 A.2d at 917. Especially where, as in this case, the employer knows that the employee will have free and independent access into the homes of its customers, the employer has an obligation to make reasonable efforts to inquire into such employee's past employment and past record. See, e.g., Abbott v. Payne, 457 So.2d 1156, 1157 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984). In the present case, the plaintiff attempted to introduce evidence at trial to the effect that prior to being hired to work for MHD and Mr. Young, Jason Brown entered a plea of guilty to fourth degree burglary with the intention to commit theft from a dwelling. Therefore, Mrs. Schecter argued, there was a danger that Brown would steal if he were admitted to customers' homes in the performance of his duties on MHD's behalf. The judge was of the opinion, however, that proof of the crime (or of Jason Brown's criminal tendency) would be relevant to the issues of the case [only] if there is a finding that he is either an employee or agent of Merchants Home Delivery in a master/servant relationship. (Emphasis added.) Because the judge subsequently ruled as a matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Mr. Brown was an employee of MHD, the condition for the admission of the evidence was not satisfied. We have ruled, however, in Part II.A. of this opinion, that an impartial jury could reasonably find that Mr. Young and Mr. Brown were MHD employees. The condition suggested by the judge for the admissibility of Brown's criminal record has thus now been satisfied. [12] Moreover, Mr. Fritz testified as follows: Q. Okay. Now, is it not correct that most of these delivery drivers work with assistants? A. Yes, have helpers on their truck. Q. And Merchants Home Delivery knew that the drivers had assistants with them on the trucks. A. Yes. Q. Now you didn't interview the helpers before they were hired to work with the delivery drivers, did you? A. No, because they didn't work for us. Q. And Merchants Home Delivery did not do background checks on the helpers before they were hired as they did with delivery drivers, did they? A. No. Counsel for Mrs. Schecter claim on appeal, based on the foregoing evidence, that Merchants Home Delivery utterly failed in its duty to supervise, train and maintain Allen Young and Jason Brown as its delivery personnel. Merchants Home Delivery had a duty to anticipate and guard against its employees' human traits that could cause harm to others. It breached that duty when it employed Mr. Brown, an individual with a record for burglary and theft, to remove personal property from customers' homes when it had no knowledge of his background and provided no training or supervision of his activities. It also breached that duty when it provided no supervision or training to Mr. Young with respect to his supervision of Mr. Brown. As such, Merchants Home Delivery is directly liable for Messrs. Young's and Brown's wrongdoing towards Mrs. Schecter. Although the foregoing assertion may be premature before the case is retried under the correct legal standard, we agree with Mrs. Schecter that there is sufficient evidence of negligent hiring, training, and supervision to require submission of the issue to the jury. Since Mr. Brown was one of the thieves, there is also sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the question whether any negligence in his hiring or retention proximately caused the loss of which Mrs. Schecter complains.