Opinion ID: 1892409
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: nebraska case law

Text: The majority holds that Nebraska's manslaughter statute follows the common law in that it divides manslaughter into two types: voluntary and involuntary. Section 28-305(1) states: A person commits manslaughter if he kills another without malice, either upon a sudden quarrel, or causes the death of another unintentionally while in the commission of an unlawful act. (Emphasis supplied.) In support of its voluntary/involuntary conclusion, the majority relies upon Boche v. State, 84 Neb. 845, 122 N.W. 72 (1909), in which it was stated that the manslaughter statute did not change the common law. At that time, Nebraska's manslaughter statute was substantially similar to the one quoted above: If any person shall unlawfully kill another without malice, either upon a sudden quarrel, or unintentionally, while the slayer is in the commission of some unlawful act, every such person shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter.... Comp.Stat. Pt. III § 5 (1909). Boche further held that when the homicide is upon a sudden quarrel, the killing must have been intentional, but in sudden passion or heat of blood caused by a reasonable provocation.... Boche at 854, 122 N.W. at 75. After citing this language, the majority states: Consequently, we hold that, to sustain a conviction for voluntary manslaughter under § 28-305(1), that is, a conviction for killing another, without malice, `upon a sudden quarrel,' the State, by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, must prove that the defendant intended to kill, and did kill, another. (Emphasis supplied.) Prior to Boche, in Bohanan v. The State, 15 Neb. 209, 18 N.W. 129 (1883), although the case was decided upon other grounds, this court considered a refused jury instruction defining manslaughter as  `the unlawful killing of another without malice, either express or implied, which may be either involuntary, upon a sudden heat of passion, or inadvertently, upon the commission of some unlawful act.' (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 215, 18 N.W. at 131. The court affirmed the trial court's refusal to give this instruction, saying: As a general definition of manslaughter under our statute this was correct. But it was faulty in this, that the last clause had no application to the evidence. There was no pretense that the act was done inadvertently upon the commission of some unlawful act. This instruction was, therefore, rightly refused. (Emphasis supplied.) Id. The Bohanan court also wrote, A malicious killing, although done upon a sudden quarrel and in the heat of passion, is murder in the second degree at least. (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 214, 18 N.W. at 131. In 1883, at least, this court recognized that Nebraska's homicide definitions changed the common law. A decision of this court after Boche, State v. Worley, 178 Neb. 232, 132 N.W.2d 764 (1965), supports the rationale of Bohanan. In Worley, the court found that the facts of the case would support a conclusion that the killing occurred either upon a sudden quarrel or in the commission of an unlawful act. After making this finding, the court stated, To come within the provisions of the manslaughter statute, the killing must not have been intentional or with a design to effect death. (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 236, 132 N.W.2d at 767. In State v. Drew, 216 Neb. 685, 344 N.W.2d 923 (1984), the defendant was charged with second degree murder. Drew was convicted of the lesser crime of manslaughter. The defendant claimed that she was acting in self-defense when the decedent was shot and died as a result of a bullet's striking the victim. The transcript reveals that the trial court, when it came to manslaughter, instructed the jury both upon the sudden quarrel and upon the unlawful act theories. No intent instruction was given in regard to manslaughter. Drew claimed the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the burden was upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not accidental. In upholding Drew's manslaughter conviction, this court declared: The threatening use of a firearm is an unlawful assault sufficient to convict one of manslaughter, when defined as causing the death of another unintentionally while in the commission of an unlawful act.... Similarly, the accidental discharge of a gun, the use of which was not justified under the circumstances, is not a defense to manslaughter when the killing occurred upon a sudden quarrel. (Emphasis supplied). Id. at 687-88, 344 N.W.2d at 925. In State v. Rincker, 228 Neb. 522, 423 N.W.2d 434 (1988), this court affirmed the manslaughter conviction of the defendant. Rincker assigned as error the trial court's giving a manslaughter instruction, because he did not request such an instruction. We said: The jury could well have concluded from the evidence that Rincker's wife was lying on the bed between the victim and Siegrist and that Rincker reacted to that scene without any prior intention to kill the victim. That alone required the trial court to instruct the jury concerning manslaughter. (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 534, 423 N.W.2d at 442. In Rincker, this court also pointed out that the fact remains that he [Rincker], albeit unintentionally, took a life, id. at 535, 423 N.W.2d at 442, and [t]he manslaughter was an unintentional act; bringing the knife to the scene was an intentional act, id. at 535, 423 N.W.2d at 443. Nowhere does the opinion hold that it was illegal for Rincker to carry the knife to the scene. These cases indicate that manslaughter in Nebraska does not require an intent to kill, whether the killing be upon a sudden quarrel or in the commission of an illegal act. I contend that Boche, sub silentio, has been overruled and that Nebraska no longer recognizes common-law voluntary and involuntary manslaughter or that intent to kill is an element of voluntary manslaughter. The majority cites cases from California, Wyoming, New Mexico, and Idaho. Each out-of-state case is distinguishable in that the statutes considered all specifically denote and define voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. As shown above, the Nebraska statutes have not recognized these two types of manslaughter since 1873. Even though the words voluntary and involuntary have not been a part of Nebraska's manslaughter statute since 1873, the majority insists upon reading them into our manslaughter statute. Prior to adoption of the current criminal code in 1977, the second degree murder statute required that the killing be done purposely and maliciously. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-402 (Reissue 1975). The new code defined second degree murder as a killing done intentionally, but without premeditation. § 28-304. However, malice continues to be judicially required as an element of second degree murder. See State v. Rowe, 214 Neb. 685, 335 N.W.2d 309 (1983). This construction comports with legislative history which states that the new section is comparable to the former section. Summary of Contents L.B. 38, Judiciary Committee, 85th Leg., 1st Sess. 3 (1977). It is my contention that malice is a judicially supplied essential element in second degree murder to distinguish second degree murder from an intentional killing that is permitted by law under certain circumstances, i.e., a person's or law enforcement officer's killing someone where legally permissible under Nebraska's justification for use of force statutes, §§ 28-1406 to 28-1416. This court's first attempt at defining malice after adoption of the 1873 criminal code appears to have been in Milton v. The State, 6 Neb. 136 (1877). That case held that malice is  `[t]he doing a wrongful act intentionally without just cause or excuse.' 2 Bouv.Law Dict., 91. 6 Neb. at 143. This rule was expanded in Carr v. State, 23 Neb. 749, 756, 37 N.W. 630, 633 (1888), which defined malice as a wicked and mischievous purpose which characterizes the perpetration of a wrongful or injurious act intentionally committed without lawful excuse. It is a mental condition on the part of the actor supposed to exist at the time of the commission of the offense, and is imputed to doing of an unlawful act intentionally, without just cause or excuse. The court in Carr cited Milton, but felt the rule was incomplete. Carr also cites the following definition: Malice, in the definition of murder, is imputed to an act done willfully, malo animo, an act wrong in itself, and injurious to another, and for which there is no apparent justification or excuse.... The natural or necessary conclusion and inference from such an act, willfully done without apparent excuse, are, that it was done malo animo in furtherance of the wrongful, injurious purpose, previously, though perhaps suddenly, formed, and is, therefore, `a homicide with malice of forethought,' which is the true definition of murder. Carr at 755-56, 37 N.W. at 633. Carr was discussed in Housh v. State, 43 Neb. 163, 61 N.W. 571 (1895). This court stated that  ` [m]alice, in its legal sense, denotes that condition of mind which is manifested by the intentionally doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse. It means any willful or corrupt intention of the mind.'  Id. at 167-68, 61 N.W. at 572. The court further stated that the above definition was substantially within the definition approved in Carr. The definition of malice announced in Housh is nearly the same as the definition stated in State v. Batiste, 231 Neb. 481, 488, 437 N.W.2d 125, 130 (1989):  `Malice,' in a legal sense, denotes that condition of mind which is manifested by the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse. Obviously, the definition of malice has changed very little since 1877 and not at all since 1895. The difference between second degree murder and manslaughter is significant. Second degree murder is committed when the killing is done intentionally without just cause or excuse, i.e., with malice; manslaughter is committed when the killing is without malice. Regardless of what the common-law definition may have been, malice, in Nebraska, is the intentional doing of an unlawful act without just cause or excuse. If a person is killed intentionally, whether done upon a sudden quarrel or not, the act is obviously done with malice, because killing another is an unlawful act unless the killing is exempt under §§ 28-1406 to 28-1416. It is logically impossible to distinguish between a killing done intentionally and one done with malice. A killing committed without malice is one committed unintentionally. WHITE, J., joins in this dissent.