Opinion ID: 2546413
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Various Evidentiary Rulings

Text: Jude Barrios and Christine Zorns testified over defense objection and recounted incriminating comments they had overheard while defendant, Richard Zorns, and Sergio Ayala discussed the crime in the hours following the swap meet robbery and Teal's murder. Defendant contends the admission of this evidence violated the hearsay rule as well as his constitutional rights to due process of law and to confront the witnesses against him. Regarding the hearsay question, we agree with the trial court that the challenged evidence was admissible because it qualified as an adoptive admission. The law is well settled. Evidence Code section 1221 provides: Evidence of a statement offered against a party is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is one of which the party, with knowledge of the content thereof, has by words or other conduct manifested his adoption or his belief in its truth. Under this provision, `If a person is accused of having committed a crime, under circumstances which fairly afford him an opportunity to hear, understand, and to reply, and which do not lend themselves to an inference that he was relying on the right of silence guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and he fails to speak, or he makes an evasive or equivocal reply, both the accusatory statement and the fact of silence or equivocation may be offered as an implied or adoptive admission of guilt.' [Citations.] `For the adoptive admission exception to apply, ... a direct accusation in so many words is not essential.' ( People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 852 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 831 P.2d 249]....) `When a person makes a statement in the presence of a party to an action under circumstances that would normally call for a response if the statement were untrue, the statement is admissible for the limited purpose of showing the party's reaction to it. [Citations.] His silence, evasion, or equivocation may be considered as a tacit admission of the statements made in his presence.' ( People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1189, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969.) Defendant presented no evidence suggesting he did not hear the comments testified to by Barrios and Christine Zorns. Nor is there any suggestion he failed to speak because he was relying on his Fifth Amendment rights. Although, as defendant emphasizes, the witnesses did not specifically attribute each comment to a particular speaker, that is irrelevant on the facts of this case, where defendant heard the comments, had the opportunity to reply, and the comments were made under circumstances that normally would call for a response. Although he claims there was no evidence of his reaction to the comments, his silence may be taken as an adoption of them. We conclude the trial court properly admitted the statements as adoptive admissions excepted from the hearsay rule. Defendant also contends the admission of this same evidence violated his federal constitutional rights. He did not, however, make a specific objection on constitutional grounds at trial. Assuming without deciding the issue was properly preserved for appellate review ( People v. Champion, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 908, fn. 6, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93), we conclude defendant fails to persuade us the admission of his adoptive admissions rendered his trial so fundamentally unfair that it violated his due process rights. (See Estelle v. McGuire, supra, 502 U.S. at p. 75, 112 S.Ct. 475.) In short, we find no constitutional error. [25]
The prosecutor proposed to have Jude Barrios testify she perjured herself when, in defendant's earlier trial for the Sun Valley swap meet robbery, she provided him with an alibi. Defendant objected, claiming lack of relevance. The court overruled the objection, noting that [a] witness's credibility is always in issue. Barrios thereafter testified that she had provided defendant with an alibi, that she had lied when she did so, and that she and defendant had discussed her testimony in the prior case before she testified. She had committed perjury because she loved him and thought she could help him. Defendant admits evidence of a witness's credibility is generally admissible, but contends the real purpose for the prosecutor's eliciting this evidence was to prejudice the defendant by showing his involvement in another crime โ aiding and abetting perjury โ and attack his character. (See Evid.Code, ง 1101.) He did not object on this ground and therefore forfeited the issue for appeal. Even had he preserved the claim, it lacks merit. As noted, ante, the trial court admitted evidence of defendant's role in the earlier Sun Valley swap meet robbery. Barrios's testimony, especially that she had discussed with defendant what she should say when testifying to provide him a false alibi, was relevant to show defendant's consciousness of guilt for that crime. This evidence was clearly relevant for that purpose and therefore properly admitted.
The jury was not allowed to view postmortem photographs of victim Roland Teal while the witnesses were testifying, but near the end of the prosecution's presentation of guilt phase evidence, the trial court considered whether to admit four photographs. The first shows the nude body of the victim lying on the coroner's table, covered by a towel. The other three photographs portrayed close-up views of the wounds the victim suffered. Defendant objected to their admission; the trial court took the basis of the objection to be that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative. (Evid.Code, ง 352.) As to the latter three, the court ruled they were basically clinical photos. They are not gruesome. They are not bloody. Moreover, [t]hey are relevant to show the nature of the wounds, the position of the ... victim in receiving the wounds, and helps illustrate the coroner's testimony. The court concluded these photographs were not more prejudicial than probative and admitted them. The trial court initially made a different ruling as to the first photograph, which showed the victim on the coroner's table. The trial court stated it saw no relevance to the photo and thus excluded it. The prosecutor argued that the photograph was relevant to an issue raised by the coroner's testimony. Specifically, it was the prosecutor's theory that the victim was shot while his arms were raised (as if to give himself up), although defendant, in his cross-examination of the coroner, raised the possibility the victim was engaging in certain body gyrations when shot, thereby explaining the particular type of wounds. The prosecutor argued the photo, showing that the victim was an overweight elderly man, was relevant to whether the victim was capable of engaging in such gyrations. The trial court agreed, reconsidered its ruling, and admitted the photograph. Defendant contends the trial court erred when it overruled his objections to the admission of these photographs. The admission of allegedly gruesome photographs is basically a question of relevance over which the trial court has broad discretion. ( People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 13-14, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 939 P.2d 748.) A trial court's decision to admit photographs under Evidence Code section 352 will be upheld on appeal unless the prejudicial effect of such photographs clearly outweighs their probative value. ( People v. Gurule, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 624, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224.) We have examined the photographs in question and conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion. They are not unduly bloody or gruesome and are relevant to the manner in which the victim was killed. As we have previously noted, `murder is seldom pretty, and pictures, testimony and physical evidence in such a case are always unpleasant.' ( People v. Pierce (1979) 24 Cal.3d 199, 211, 155 Cal.Rptr. 657, 595 P.2d 91.) Although defendant argues the photographs were cumulative to the coroner's detailed testimony, this fact, even if true, does not demonstrate the trial court abused its broad discretion. [P]rosecutors, it must be remembered, are not obliged to prove their case with evidence solely from live witnesses; the jury is entitled to see details of the victims' bodies to determine if the evidence supports the prosecution's theory of the case. ( People v. Gurule, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 624, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224.)
The prosecutor asked Barney Pipkin, the manager of the San Fernando swap meet, whether he had ever been robbed before while loading his car with the proceeds from the swap meet. He answered in the negative, whereupon defendant objected on the ground of relevance. The trial court overruled the objection, merely saying: The answer is in. Defendant contends the information was irrelevant and encouraged the jurors to feel sympathy for Pipkin. Respondent argues defendant waived the issue by failing to request the witness's answer be stricken. We need not resolve either of these contentions, for the issue is too trivial. Even assuming the answer was irrelevant, no conceivable prejudice could have resulted.
Judy Adams called the police when she realized a robbery was occurring. While she was on the phone, she did not see what was happening but relayed to the police a description of the events provided to her by her son, Rod Adams, and Leticia Calderon, both of whom were percipient witnesses. Police taped this call, and the prosecutor proposed to play the tape for the jury. Defendant objected on the ground the tape contained hearsay, but the trial court overruled the objection. The tape was then played for the jury. Defendant contends the trial court erred by permitting the prosecution to play the tape for the jury, arguing that Judy Adams was not a percipient witness and her comments therefore did not qualify as a spontaneous utterance that could fall under an exception to the hearsay rule. Evidence Code section 1240 provides: Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [ถ] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [ถ] (b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception. In a multiple, nested hearsay situation as here, the multiple hearsay is admissible only if each hearsay layer separately meets the requirements of a hearsay exception. ( People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 149, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) A trial court's decision to admit evidence under the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule will not be reversed unless the court abused its discretion. ( People v. Phillips (2000) 22 Cal.4th 226, 236, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 58, 991 P.2d 145.) That all three people involved โ Judy Adams, her son Rod Adams, and Leticia Calderon โ were operating under the stress and excitement of the robbery when the tape was made is not questioned. The crime had just occurred and was ongoing; the robbers were fleeing with the loot, and Roland Teal, Barney Pipkin, and others were in hot pursuit. Although defendant is correct that Judy Adams was not a percipient witness to the events she related to police on the telephone, she was a witness to what the others (Rod Adams and Leticia Calderon) were saying. ( People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 150, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980 [the act or event described can be another's statement].) Rod Adams and Leticia Calderon, in turn, were percipient witnesses to the unfolding events of the robbery and the flight therefrom. Because both levels of hearsay qualified under the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the tape. [26]