Opinion ID: 168332
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: “W e [have] jurisdiction to consider the BIA’s denial of petitioner’s motion to reopen the proceedings” because “[i]t is considered a final, separately appealable order.” Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1359, 1361 (10th Cir. 2004). W hile aliens in removal proceedings have no Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel, M ichelson v. INS, 897 F.2d 465, 467 (10th Cir. 1990), they do have a Fifth Amendment right to a fundamentally fair removal proceeding, Osei v. INS, 305 F.3d 1205, 1208 (10th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in civil immigration proceedings may be based on Fifth Amendment due process. M ichelson, 897 F.2d at 468. An alien may prevail on a Fifth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a removal proceeding only by showing that “the proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that [he] was prevented from reasonably presenting his case.” In re Lozada, 19 I& N Dec. 637, 638 (BIA 1988); see also Osei, 305 F.3d at 1208. W e review the denial of a motion to reopen only for abuse of discretion. Infanzon, 386 F.3d at 1362. “The BIA abuses its discretion when its decision provides no rational explanation, inexplicably departs from established policies, is devoid of any reasoning, or contains only summary or conclusory statements.” Id. (quotation omitted). -8- The Supreme Court has explained that at least three grounds exist upon which the BIA may deny reopening: First, it may hold that the movant has not established a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief sought. . . . Second, the BIA may hold that the movant has not introduced previously unavailable, material evidence . . . . Third, in cases in which the ultimate grant of relief is discretionary (asylum, suspension of deportation, and adjustment of status, but not withholding of deportation), the BIA may . . . simply determine that . . . the movant would not be entitled to the discretionary grant of relief. INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1988) (emphasis added). As noted above, the BIA denied the motion to reopen based on its perceived lack of jurisdiction 5 and because petitioner had not established that he would be entitled to the discretionary relief of voluntary departure. In order to merit reopening based on ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must comply with the procedural requirements of In re Lozada, 19 I& N Dec. 637, and further show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s ineffectiveness. Id. at 638. Because the BIA found that petitioner complied with the procedural 5 The BIA provided no support for its holding that it had no jurisdiction to allow petitioner “to seek recourse before the [INS] for his prior counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance.” Admin. R. at 2. However, “[w]hile we may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not given, we will uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas–Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285-86 (1974). Because the matter at hand arose in the course of a removal hearing that charged petitioner solely with being a simple overstay, any claims arising from M r. M arinoff’s alleged ineffective assistance surrounding either the 1996 petition or the 1999 petition were not before the BIA. W e are satisfied that we can reasonably understand this to be the basis for the BIA’s jurisdictional holding, a holding we can affirm on appeal. -9- requirements of In re Lozada, we turn now to the correctness of the BIA’s implicit decision that petitioner w as not prejudiced under the Fifth Amendment’s rubric of due process as applied in civil immigration proceedings. Here, as noted above, the test is whether “his counsel’s ineffective assistance so prejudiced him that the proceeding was fundamentally unfair.” Akinwunmi v. INS, 194 F.3d 1340, 1341 n.2 (10th Cir. 1999). Because removal proceedings are civil in nature, the extensive constitutional safeguards of criminal proceedings do not apply, and the procedural due process attending removal proceedings is limited to an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Schroeck v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 947, 951-52 (10th Cir. 2005). In his discussion of the standard of prejudice aliens in petitioner’s situation must demonstrate, petitioner cites United States v. Aguirre-Tello, 324 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 2003), a criminal deportation case, for the proposition that he need only “demonstrate prejudice which might have affected the outcome of the proceedings.” Pet’r Opening Br. at 30. Under this standard, he asserts that “it’s practically impossible to suggest that the outcome might not have been different.” Id. at 31. Indeed; and that is why we have rejected this as the standard to prove fundamental unfairness, even in criminal proceedings. W hat petitioner overlooks is that our first opinion in Aguirre-Tello was vacated, and that on rehearing en banc, we held that the standard for proving fundamental unfairness in a criminal context, with its -10- heightened constitutional protections, is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome would have been different. United States v. Aguirre-Tello, 353 F.3d 1199, 1209 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc). Against this backdrop, we now examine petitioner’s claims of prejudice. It is important to keep in mind that the proceeding petitioner seeks to reopen is the underlying removal proceeding. His claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, therefore, is confined to counsel’s actions surrounding that proceeding and, despite present counsel’s efforts, cannot be read to include prior counsel’s actions regarding the 1999 petition or the circumstances surrounding the 1996 petition. Petitioner first points to counsel’s concession at the removal hearing that he was not eligible for voluntary departure as an example of the prejudice he has suffered as a result of counsel’s ineffective assistance. 6 In order to establish prejudice under these circumstances, petitioner must demonstrate that he was eligible for relief in the form of voluntary departure. See In re Assaad, 23 I& N Dec. at 562. There are several showings an alien must make before he or she is eligible for the discretionary grant of voluntary departure. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(c). Our review of the record has failed to uncover any evidence that 6 As petitioner explains, “[i]ndividuals who leave the United States under an order of removal are barred from re-entering for a period of ten years. . . . 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A). In contrast, individuals who depart under an order of voluntary departure are free to immediately apply for re-admission if eligible for a visa.” Pet’r Opening Br. at 18 n.8. -11- petitioner made this show ing in the materials before either the IJ or the BIA. 7 Other than conclusory statements going to petitioner’s eligibility for voluntary departure in his motion to reopen, which are insufficient to discharge petitioner’s prima facie burden, petitioner has failed to establish that he meets the requirements relative to residency, character, criminal record, or financial means and intent to depart required before consideration for discretionary voluntary departure is even possible. See id. Because petitioner has failed to show a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome had his counsel treated the voluntary departure issue differently, he has failed to demonstrate the prejudice necessary to establish a due process violation. The BIA therefore did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reopen based on petitioner’s failure “to establish his prim a facie eligibility for voluntary departure in his motion to reopen.” Admin. R. at 3. Petitioner’s second example of prejudicially ineffective assistance of counsel involves counsel’s failure to challenge the INS’s finding of marriage fraud and further failure to diligently prosecute an appeal from the denial of petitioner’s 1999 petition. As the BIA implicitly reasoned, these matters were not before the IJ in the removal hearing. Issues surrounding the alleged marriage fraud should have been resolved in an appeal from the denial of the 1996 petition; an appeal from the denial of the 1999 petition is apparently still pending. 7 As noted earlier, petitioner had retained new counsel, although not his present counsel, for his appeal of the removal order to the BIA. -12- W e agree with petitioner that the presence in his record of evidence of a fraudulent marriage intended to win an immigration benefit probably colored the removal proceedings and may have even created the impression that petitioner was attempting to continue a pattern of fraud. The INS’s attorney referred repeatedly to the evidence of fraud in petitioner’s immigration file. See id. at 181-82, 187. In denying petitioner any relief, the IJ stated, “I think that this thing has been developing where he came to the United States and he was going to stay one w ay or the other. If he had to marry 10 women, he’s going to marry 10. He’s married two already. I’m not going to listen to it anymore.” Id. at 189-90. Again, the problem for petitioner w ith this argument is that his attorney’s actions regarding the prior petitions were not before the IJ in the removal hearing. The only ground for removal indicated in the notice to appear was petitioner’s status as an overstay. Id. at 255. Any issues of previous fraud went unmentioned in the notice. Therefore, the IJ would not have been able to undo the denials of petitioner’s two prior attempts to adjust his status. Given the procedural posture of petitioner’s case at the removal hearing, it was not reasonably likely that representation by other competent counsel would have changed the outcome. The BIA thus did not abuse its discretion in concluding that it “did not have jurisdiction to allow the respondent to seek recourse before the [INS] for his prior counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance.” Id. at 2. -13- Petitioner argues finally that due process requires a hearing on the merit of his voluntary departure request. W e have already affirmed the BIA’s conclusion that petitioner did not establish his prima facie eligibility for discretionary voluntary departure as a basis for his motion to reopen. To the extent this argument is an attempt to have this court reverse the ruling of the IJ on that matter, w e lack jurisdiction to take such action. See Ekasinta v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 2005). In summary, we conclude that the BIA provided rational explanation for its denial of the motion to reopen, it did not depart from established policies, and it provided adequate reasoning to allow judicial review. See Infanzon, 386 F.3d at 1362. The petition for review in No. 05-9573 is therefore denied. H abeas petition Case No. 05-9587 Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus was pending in the district court on M ay 11, 2005, the date of the enactment of the Real ID Act. “[T]he Real ID Act eliminates a district court’s jurisdiction over habeas petitions challenging final orders of removal. However, the Real ID Act did not eliminate a district court’s jurisdiction to review habeas petitions challenging an alien’s detention.” Ferry v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 1117, 1131 (10th Cir. 2006). Here, petitioner filed a mixed petition challenging both the IJ’s removal order and his continued detention. Because the challenge to his detention is grounded in the removal -14- order rather than based on some inherent problem w ith the detention itself, how ever, the district court properly transferred the petition to this court, and w e will treat it as a petition for review of the removal order. 8 W e have jurisdiction to review the latter under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). Id. at 1132.