Opinion ID: 2587783
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Legislative Power under Article II, Section 1 of the Washington Constitution

Text: ¶ 24 As previously indicated, we generally do not entertain preelection review of initiatives but maintain a prudential exception for subject matter challenges. This exception was first articulated in a case dealing with a county initiative, Ford, 79 Wash.2d 147, 483 P.2d 1247, and later applied to a statewide initiative in Philadelphia II, 128 Wash.2d 707, 911 P.2d 389. As previously noted, Philadelphia II is the only case in this court holding an initiative outside the scope of the state legislative power. ¶ 25 In Philadelphia II, a citizens' group filed an initiative that sought to establish in the United States `direct democracy' by means of a federal, nationwide initiative process to complement the current congressional system, and ultimately to call a world meeting where representatives from participating countries will discuss global issues. Id. at 710, 911 P.2d 389. We were asked to determine whether this initiative exceeded the scope of article II, section 1 of the Washington Constitution. We concluded that while the ambitious goals of the initiative may be laudable, it simply was not within Washington's legislative power to enact federal law. Id. at 720, 911 P.2d 389. ¶ 26 In Philadelphia II, we used a two part test to determine whether the initiative exceeded the legislative power. [I]n order to be a valid initiative, [an initiative] must be legislative in nature and enact a law that is within the state's power to enact. Id. at 719, 911 P.2d 389. See also Ford, 79 Wash.2d at 154-55, 483 P.2d 1247 (It is clear from . . . [Art. II, Sec. 1] that the initiative process, as a means by which the people can exercise directly the legislative authority to enact bills and laws, is limited in scope to subject matter which is legislative in nature.). We looked at the fundamental and overriding purpose of the initiative, rather than mere incidental[s] to the overriding purpose. Philadelphia II, 128 Wash.2d at 719, 911 P.2d 389. We concluded that, although some of the incidentals were legislative in nature, the overriding purpose was to enact federal law. Because enacting federal law was unquestionably beyond the scope of the state legislative power, we dismissed the action. ¶ 27 Notably, petitioners here do not argue that sections 1, 2, and 4(2) of I-330 are not legislative in nature. Petitioners instead argue that these sections are unconstitutional and accordingly exceed the legislative power as a matter of law. However, this argument directly contradicts the narrow exception that we created in Philadelphia II. [W]hile a court may decide whether the initiative is authorized by article II, section 1, of the state constitution, it may not rule on the constitutional validity of a proposed initiative Id. at 717, 911 P.2d 389. ¶ 28 Petitioners rely on several cases to argue that I-330's limits on noneconomic damages and contingency fees are unconstitutional. Specifically, petitioners argue that the limits on noneconomic damages in sections 1 and 2 would violate article I, section 21 of the Washington Constitution by unduly infringing on the right to trial by jury. For this assertion, petitioners rely on Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash.2d 636, 771 P.2d 711, 780 P.2d 260 (1989) and Moody v. United States, 112 Wash.2d 690, 773 P.2d 67 (1989). ¶ 29 Petitioners similarly argue that the restriction on attorney fees in section 4(2) violates separation of powers principles derived from article IV, section 1 of the Washington Constitution. They cite several of our decisions to support their view that section 4's regulation of attorney contingent fees is a matter within the exclusive authority of the judiciary and this court specifically. See Brief of Petitioners at 2 ( citing Wash. State Bar Ass'n v. State, 125 Wash.2d 901, 890 P.2d 1047 (1995); City of Seattle v. Ratliff, 100 Wash.2d 212, 215-16, 667 P.2d 630 (1983); In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Brothers, 149 Wash.2d 575, 582, 70 P.3d 940 (2003); Holmes v. Loveless, 122 Wash.App. 470, 94 P.3d 338 (2004); Kommavongsa v. Haskell, 149 Wash.2d 288, 311-12, 67 P.3d 1068 (2003)). ¶ 30 Petitioners' reliance on this precedent applying other sections of our state's constitution to other laws is misguided. We carefully distinguish between review of initiatives for general constitutionality and review for being beyond the legislative power of article II, section 1 of the Washington Constitution. In adherence to our prior decisions, we therefore restrict analysis of I-330 to determining if its fundamental and overriding purpose is within the state's power to enact. We determine that it is. ¶ 31 I-330 does not purport to effectuate a federal law; amend the U.S. or Washington Constitution; or create any other type of law outside the state's legislative power. I-330 is plainly legislative in nature and concerns a general subject matter within the legislative authority of the people. Neither the people nor the legislature is entirely without authority to enact laws relating to causes of action or the practice of law. The fact that this court has addressed a subject in a prior case does not prevent the people or the legislature from enacting measures to test the bounds or continued applicability of a prior judicial decision. ¶ 32 In making this observation, we do not hold that the provisions of I-330 limiting noneconomic damages would surely withstand a constitutional challenge. Rather, because the state undeniably possesses the power to alter or even eliminate causes of action, such exercise is within the state's legislative power. ¶ 33 I-330's regulation of contingency fees is also within the state's legislative power. In certain instances the state may regulate the practice of law, including fees. See e.g., RCW 4.24.005 (mandating how a judge shall determine the reasonableness of attorneys' fees in tort actions); RCW 51.52.120 (limiting attorneys' fees in representing a worker before the Industrial Insurance Department). No parade of cases exemplifying instances in which such power was held unconstitutionally utilized can usurp the state's underlying power to regulate the practice of law in certain carefully designated domains. Whether I-330 may violate one of the limitations, such as this court's power to regulate the bar, is a constitutional inquiry, and one which we refuse to engage in here. ¶ 34 Accepting petitioners' interpretation of Philadelphia II would eliminate our rule against preelection review and open the floodgates to preelection challenges of nearly any proposed initiative. Not only would this infringe upon the constitutional rights of the people, but it would needlessly inject our courts into a political dispute that is time sensitive. Under petitioners' theory, any proposed legislation that could be potentially unconstitutional would operate as an amendment to the constitution, which is beyond the legislative power. See Ford, 79 Wash.2d at 156, 483 P.2d 1247 (1971) (the initiative power set forth in Const. Art. 2 does not include the power to directly amend or repeal the constitution itself.); accord Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wash.2d at 204, 11 P.3d 762. Br. of Petitioners at 8. Such an argument could undoubtedly be made for some (many) of the hundreds of bills considered by the legislature every session. We do not substantively review the legislature's bills before enactment, and will not do so with the people's right of direct legislation. ¶ 35 Finally, the instant challenge is particularly troublesome because it challenges only three of the twenty sections contained in I-330. In essence, petitioners are requesting that this court edit the initiative. Doing so would raise obvious questions whether the newly-edited initiative remains true to the intent of those who signed the proposed initiative to qualify it for certification to the legislature.