Opinion ID: 1135208
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in denying CMG's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim based on CMG's own conduct.

Text: ¶ 6. According to Robert's complaint, CMG committed the common law tort of alienation of affections by kn[owing] of and negligently and recklessly allow[ing] the illicit relationship between the Defendant, Erwyn E. Freeman, Jr., and its employee, Julie Rawson Phillips, to be carried on while employed with said Defendant at its office and elsewhere. In order to reverse the trial court's denial of CMG's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we must be able to say, with certainty, that Robert cannot prove any set of facts to support his claim. See Little v. Miss. Dep't of Human Servs., 835 So.2d 9, 11 (Miss.2002); M.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) cmt. ¶ 7. There is a vast difference between the pleading burden necessary to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and the evidentiary requirements necessary to survive a motion for summary judgment under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), as opposed to other devices in civil law, contemplates a high degree of speculation by the reviewing court. In Stuckey, we explained the differences between Rule 12 and Rule 56: While the two rules provide for dismissal of actions, their bases are completely different. Accordingly, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests legal sufficiency, and in applying this rule `a motion to dismiss should not be granted unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff will be unable to prove any set of facts in support of the claim.' Missala Marine Services, Inc. v. Odom, 861 So.2d 290, 294 (Miss.2003). Quite differently, Rule 56 tests the notion of well-pled facts and requires a party to present probative evidence demonstrating triable issues of fact. Stuckey, 912 So.2d at 865-66. Our inquiry on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is not limited to the specific allegations in Robert's complaint, which we must accept as true. Poindexter v. S. United Fire Ins. Co., 838 So.2d 964, 966 (Miss.2003). We are charged to consider only whether any set of facts could support Robert's action for alienation of affections against CMG. Cook v. Brown, 909 So.2d 1075, 1078 (Miss. 2005). ¶ 8. According to this Court's opinion in Walter v. Wilson, 228 So.2d 597, 598 (Miss.1969), overruled in part on other grounds by Saunders v. Alford, 607 So.2d 1214, 1219 (Miss.1992), [u]nder the common law a husband is entitled to the services and companionship and consortium of his wife. When he is wrongfully deprived of these rights, he is entitled to a cause of action against one who has interfered with his domestic relations. The required elements of an alienation of affections lawsuit include (1) wrongful conduct of the defendant, (2) loss of affection or consortium, and (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the loss. Bland v. Hill, 735 So.2d 414, 417 (Miss.1999). ¶ 9. The wrongful conduct necessary to maintain an action for alienation of affections is the direct and intentional interference with the marriage relationship by the defendant. In Stanton v. Cox, 162 Miss. 438, 450, 139 So. 458, 460 (1932), the Court held that: it must appear . . . that there had been a direct interference on the defendant's part, sufficient to satisfy the jury that the alienation was caused by the defendant, and the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show such interference. . . . But to maintain this action it must be established that the husband was induced to abandon the wife by some active interference on the part of the defendant. (internal citations omitted; emphasis added). See also Kirk v. Koch, 607 So.2d 1220, 1223 (Miss.1992) (defendant directly and intentionally interfered with plaintiff's marriage, inducing the alienation of affections); Martin v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 246 Miss. 102, 110-11, 149 So.2d 344, 348 (1963) (same). ¶ 10. It is true that Robert fails to specify CMG's conduct that directly and intentionally interfered with his marriage. However, under our rules, Robert is not required to plead the specific wrongful conduct. At the pleading stage, he is required only to place CMG on reasonable notice of the claims against it and to demonstrate that he has alleged a recognized cause of action upon which, under some set of facts, he might prevail. Consequently, in order to succeed in having this case dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), CMG must demonstrate that Robert cannot prevail under any set of facts. This is the analysis we must apply. See Ralph Walker, Inc., 926 So.2d at 893; Cook, 909 So.2d at 1078; Poindexter, 838 So.2d at 966; Little, 835 So.2d at 11. ¶ 11. We are unable to say, as a matter of law, that there are no possible facts which could result in CMG's liability for alienation of affections. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of CMG's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim insofar as Robert alleges CMG committed the tort of alienation of affections based on its own actions.