Opinion ID: 800868
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ownership of All Items in the Apartment

Text: Johnson made his second confession after he was placed under arrest and transported to the West Vliet address. At this point in time, it is undisputed that Johnson was in custody and had not been read his Miranda rights. Thus, the central issue is whether Johnson was subjected to interrogation prior to stating that everything in the apartment was his. At the suppression hearing, Officer Bohlen and Johnson offered different accounts of their interaction at the West Vliet address. Officer Bohlen testified that he read a copy of the search warrant from top to bottom as Johnson sat in the back of the police wagon. After he read the last line, Johnson stated, Everything in the apartment's mine, it's all mine. (Supp. Tr. at 28.) Officer Bohlen also testified that he did not question Johnson in any way about the search warrant prior to Johnson's admission. In contrast, Johnson testified that Officer Bohlen read the search warrant aloud and then asked, Is there anything that you want to talk to me about, that you want to tell me right now? Id. at 87. In addition, Officer Bohlen stated, If we find anything in the apartment I can arrest not only you but who's ever [sic] on the lease. Id. According to Johnson, it was only after this statement from Officer Bohlen that Johnson admitted everything in the apartment belonged to him. Even if a suspect is in custody, his statements are not necessarily the product of interrogation such that Miranda's requirements are triggered. See Ambrose, 668 F.3d at 955 ( quoting United States v. Swanson, 635 F.3d 995, 1002 (7th Cir. 2011)). For instance, voluntary incriminating statements are not subject to Miranda warnings and are admissible as evidence. Swanson, 635 F.3d at 1001-02; Ambrose, 668 F.3d at 955 (Law enforcement officers are not prohibited from merely listening to a person's voluntary statement.). As noted previously, the test for determining whether a suspect was subjected to interrogation is whether a reasonable objective observer would believe that an officer's express questioning, words, or actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Swanson, 635 F.3d at 1002 ( quoting United States v. Abdulla, 294 F.3d 830, 834 (7th Cir.2002)). The focus is on the suspect's perceptions rather than the intent of the police. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682. The district court determined that Officer Bohlen's testimony was more credible, given Johnson's obvious motive to be untruthful. In addition, noting Johnson's willingness to cooperate with authorities and his testimony that he lied to officers about the ownership of the safe in the apartment, the magistrate judge found Johnson's version of the encounter between him and Officer Bohlen to be incredible. Thus, the court held that Johnson's statement was spontaneous and unsolicited. We give special deference to a district court on matters of witness credibility in light of the district court's superior vantage point. United States v. Pillado, 656 F.3d 754, 770 (7th Cir.2011) ( quoting United States v. Whited, 539 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir.2008)). In other words, the district court's decision is entitled to deference because the magistrate judge actually heard the testimony and observed the demeanor of the witnesses in making his credibility determination. See United States v. McCarthur, 6 F.3d 1270, 1275 (7th Cir.1993). In light of this standard and the record before us, we see no reason to upset the district court's credibility determination. But our analysis does not end here. Even acknowledging the magistrate judge's credibility finding, Johnson argues that Officer Bohlen's own testimony provides enough evidence to establish that Johnson was subjected to interrogation. Specifically, Johnson asserts that Officer Bohlen's act of reading the search warrant aloud was designed to elicit an incriminating response. Interrogation need not be express questioning; in fact, [a]n officer can `interrogate' a suspect for Miranda purposes without uttering a question. United States v. Richardson, 657 F.3d 521, 525 (7th Cir.2011) ( citing Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01, 100 S.Ct. 1682). For instance, in Rhode Island v. Innis , a man accused of killing another man with a shotgun was arrested and placed in the back of a police car. 446 U.S. at 294-95, 100 S.Ct. 1682. On the way to the police station, the officers transporting the defendant talked about the missing murder weapon, noting that there were several handicapped children in that area who might happen upon the weapon and hurt themselves. Id. Apparently concerned for these children, the defendant interrupted the conversation to tell the officers where the shotgun was located. Id. at 295, 100 S.Ct. 1682. The Supreme Court held that the defendant was not interrogated by police officers because there was nothing to suggest that the officers' conversation was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Id. at 302-03, 100 S.Ct. 1682 (Given the fact that the entire conversation appears to have consisted of no more than a few off hand remarks, we cannot say that the officers should have known that it was reasonably likely that Innis would so respond.). The fact that the defendant may have been subjected to subtle compulsion was not enough for the Court to find a Miranda violation. Id. at 303, 100 S.Ct. 1682. In this case, Officer Bohlen read the search warrant to Johnson as Johnson sat in the police wagon outside the residence. Officer Bohlen testified that he approached Johnson and stated, Okay, now I'm going to read the warrant to you. (Supp. Tr. at 52.) After he read the warrant aloud, Johnson declared that everything in the apartment was his. In light of these facts, we find that Officer Bohlen's actions do not constitute interrogation for purposes of Miranda. This case is analogous to those cases in which we have held that merely reciting the evidence against a suspect is not the functional equivalent of an interrogation. See, e.g., United States v. Vallar, 635 F.3d 271, 285 (7th Cir.2011) (Merely apprising Vallar of the evidence against him by playing tapes implicating him in the conspiracy did not constitute interrogation.); Easley v. Frey, 433 F.3d 969, 974 (7th Cir.2006) (advising a suspect of witness testimony implicating him in a crime that could subject him to the death penalty was not interrogation); United States v. Sutton, 77 Fed.Appx. 892, 895 (7th Cir.2003) (nonprecedential) (officer's statement to defendant that he found marijuana and a gun on the defendant's property was not an interrogation, and defendant's interjection that the items belonged to him and not his sons was an admissible, volunteered statement). By reading the warrant aloud, Officer Bohlen informed Johnson of the items officers had probable cause to search for in his apartment, essentially advising Johnson of potentially incriminating evidence that could be used against him. Johnson then made a voluntary statement in response. Cases from our sister circuits support this holding. See, e.g., United States v. Genao, 281 F.3d 305, 310-11 (1st Cir.2002) (detective's actions did not constitute interrogation where detective showed suspect items seized from his apartment and stated, we've got a problem here); United States v. Payne, 954 F.2d 199, 202-03 (4th Cir.1992) (officer's statement to defendant that they found a gun in his house was not interrogation); Shedelbower v. Estelle, 885 F.2d 570, 572-73 (9th Cir.1989) (informing suspect that his accomplice was in custody and the victim had identified the suspect was not the functional equivalent of interrogation). We have previously cited with approval the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Payne, noting that providing such information to a suspect may even be helpful to him because `information about the evidence against a suspect may also contribute to the intelligent exercise of his judgment regarding what course of conduct to follow.' Easley, 433 F.3d at 974 ( quoting Payne, 954 F.2d at 202). Like the Fourth Circuit, we do not believe that the provision of information, even if its weight might move a suspect to speak, amounts to an impermissible `psychological ploy.' Id. Here, Officer Bohlen read the search warrant to Johnson, informing him of the items the officers were searching for within his apartment. Like Innis, there was nothing to indicate that reading the search warrant aloud would prompt Johnson to confess to owning everything in the apartment in order to protect his girlfriend. The only indication that Officer Bohlen was trying to play on Johnson's fears that his girlfriend would be in trouble comes from Johnson's own discredited testimony at the suppression hearing. Accordingly, the district court properly denied the motion to suppress Johnson's confession that everything in the apartment belonged to him.