Opinion ID: 1927701
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the challenged delegation of legislative power in this case is constitutional

Text: We now address the issues before us. The first and threshold issue is whether the Legislature, in conferring authority upon the DNR and the Natural Resources Commission to promulgate rules and regulations pursuant to §§ 3 and 3a of 1921 PA 17; MCLA 299.3, 299.3a; MSA 13.3, 13.4, unconstitutionally delegated its legislative power. As we ruled supra, a delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency is constitutionally valid when: (1) for purposes of satisfying the constitutional principle of the separation of powers, the legislation in which power is delegated to an administrative agency expressly or by reference includes standards    as reasonably precise as the subject matter of the legislation requires or permits; and (2) for purposes of satisfying the Due Process Clause of our Constitution, safeguards, including standards, exist, thereby assuring that the public will be protected against potential abuse of discretion at the hands of administrative officials; and, if the standards afforded provide little or no actual due process protection, a court should, in balance, determine whether a sufficient totality of safeguards exists. Accordingly, in terms of this case, we first ask, for purposes of satisfying the constitutional principle of the separation of powers, whether the challenged delegation, as contained in §§ 3 and 3a of the act, expressly or by reference, includes standards as reasonably precise as the subject matter of the legislation, agency protection and conservation of natural resources, requires or permits. Our answer to this question is yes. Section 3 of the act provides: The department of conservation shall protect and conserve the natural resources of the state of Michigan; provide and develop facilities for outdoor recreation; prevent the destruction of timber and other forest growth by fire or otherwise; promote the reforesting of forest lands belonging to the state; prevent and guard against the pollution of lakes and streams within the state, and enforce all laws provided for that purpose with all authority granted by law, and foster and encourage the protecting and propagation of game and fish. MCLA 299.3; MSA 13.3. Section 3a provides: The commission of conservation shall make such rules for protection of the lands and property under its control against wrongful use or occupancy as will insure the carrying out of the intent of this act to protect the same from depredations and to preserve such lands and property from molestation, spoilation [sic], destruction or any other improper use or occupancy. MCLA 299.3a; MSA 13.4. As is apparent, § 3 defines the authority of the DNR in its most general sense: The Department of Conservation (now the DNR) shall protect and conserve the natural resources of the State of Michigan. The Legislature then specifies those natural resources it desires the agency to protect and conserve: [P]rovide and develop facilities for outdoor recreation; prevent the destruction of timber and other forest growth by fire or otherwise; promote the reforesting of forest lands belonging to the state; prevent and guard against the pollution of lakes and streams within the state, and enforce all laws provided for that purpose with all authority granted by law, and foster and encourage the protecting and propagation of game and fish. MCLA 299.3; MSA 13.3. Do these sections, read together, provide standards as reasonably precise as the subject matter of the legislation, the protection and conservation of our natural resources, requires or permits? We believe they do. In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful of the fact that 1921 PA 17, as amended, is an act which deals with the preservation and regulation of the quality of our natural resources. As we declared in DNR v Seaman, supra: The preciseness of the standard will vary with the complexity and/or the degree to which subject regulated will require constantly changing regulation. The `various' and `varying' detail associated with managing the natural resources has led to recognition by the courts that it is impractical for the Legislature to provide specific regulations and that this function must be performed by the designated administrative officials. People v Soule, 238 Mich 130, 140; 213 NW 195 (1927). See United States v Grimaud, 220 US 506; 31 S Ct 480; 55 L Ed 563 (1910). (Footnote omitted, emphasis added.) 396 Mich 299, 309. And, although in the words of this Court in Ray v Mason County Drain Commissioner, supra , the language of the statute paints the standard for environmental quality with a rather broad stroke of the brush, the language used is neither illusive nor vague. 393 Mich 294, 307, fn 10. As with the language in our Environmental Protection Act, pollution, impairment, and destruction, [22] the language in 1921 PA 17, as amended, §§ 3 and 3a, prevent and guard against the pollution of lakes and streams and molestation, spoilation, destruction, and improper use or occupancy acquires its meaning from our state's developing and evolving common law of environmental quality, 393 Mich 294, fn 10, 307. For these reasons, §§ 3 and 3a of the act, read together, satisfy the constitutional principle of the separation of powers in providing standards as reasonably precise as the subject matter of the legislation requires or permits. Next, in accord with our rule enunciated supra, we ask, in terms of this case, whether safeguards, including standards, exist, thereby assuring that the public will be protected against potential abuse of discretion at the hands of administrative officials. Additionally, we must consider whether the standards afforded provide actual due process protection in themselves. If not, we must determine, in balance, whether a sufficient totality of safeguards exists. As we have discussed, the standards afforded by the challenged legislation, contained in §§ 3 and 3a of the act, are, necessarily and properly, painted with a rather broad stroke of the brush. However, the clear result of this is that these standards provide, in themselves, insufficient due process protection. Therefore, we must ask whether, in balance, a sufficient totality of safeguards exists. Our answer to this question is yes. First, we note the fact that the Administrative Procedures Act (the APA) is, by legislative fiat, in full effect with respect to any rule-making in which the DNR engages. [23] The APA requires that an agency adhere to detailed, extensive procedural requirements when engaged in rule-making pursuant to statutory delegation. [24] Without doubt, these procedural requirements provide extensive due process safeguards to those persons affected by the agency's rule-making. Second, we note that 1921 PA 17 includes language reflecting the agency's high degree of statutorily-based political accountability. 1921 PA 17, MCLA 299.1; MSA 13.1, as amended, provides in pertinent part: The general administration of said powers and duties shall be vested in a commission of conservation which shall be composed of 7 members appointed by the governor, subject to confirmation by the senate. The members of said commission shall be selected with special reference to their training and experience along the line of 1 or more of the principal lines of activities vested in the department of conservation and their ability and fitness to deal therewith: Provided, That 2 of these members shall reside in the upper peninsula. The term of office of each member of the commission shall be six years: Provided, That of those first appointed 3 shall be appointed for 2 years, 2 for 4 years and 2 for 6 years. The agency's high degree of proximity to the elective process (appointment by the Governor and confirmation by the Senate) is, in our opinion, an additional, substantial factor assuring that the public is not left unprotected from uncontrolled, arbitrary power in the hands of remote administrative officials. We believe this factor, plus the safeguards inherent in the APA, provide constitutionally sufficient protection to the people as required by due process. Therefore, §§ 3 and 3a of 1921 PA 17, MCLA 299.3, 299.3a; MSA 13.3, 13.4, satisfy both constitutional requisites essential to a delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency. Accordingly, we hold that the delegation of rule-making power to the DNR and the Natural Resources Commission pursuant to this statute is a constitutionally valid delegation of legislative power.