Opinion ID: 2747609
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: “We review de novo the district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Peterson v. Grisham, 594 F.3d 723, 727 (10th Cir. 2010). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Our review of a dismissal under the Eleventh Amendment is also de novo. See Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir. 2013). The district court dismissed Mr. Sweets’s claims against the Wyoming Department of Employment (now known as the Wyoming Department of Workforce Services, see Wyo. Stat. § 9-2-2601(k)) and the Division, because these defendants are agencies of the State of Wyoming and therefore have immunity from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. In his opening brief Mr. Sweets does not challenge the district court’s Eleventh Amendment ruling. He has therefore waived any issue as to that ruling. See City of Colo. Springs v. Solis, 589 F.3d 1121, 1135 n.5 (10th Cir. 2009) (arguments not -4- raised in the opening brief are waived). We affirm the dismissal of the claims against these governmental defendants. The district court likewise dismissed Mr. Sweets’s official-capacity claims against the only individual defendant named in the complaint, Wendy Schuetz,1 on the ground that the claims against her in her official capacity—which sought only damages—were also barred by the Eleventh Amendment. We agree. See Ellis v. Univ. of Kan. Med. Ctr., 163 F.3d 1186, 1196 (10th Cir. 1998) (the Eleventh Amendment bars suit for damages against a state official acting in her official capacity). As for the claims against Ms. Schuetz in her individual capacity, the district court dismissed them on the ground that the complaint contained no factual allegations showing that she personally engaged in any unconstitutional activity. A plaintiff alleging a § 1983 claim for denial of his constitutional rights by a natural person must demonstrate that the defendant was personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation. See Stewart v. Beach, 701 F.3d 1322, 1328 (10th Cir. 2012). Because Mr. Sweets failed to allege facts that showed Ms. Schuetz personally participated in violating his constitutional rights, we affirm the dismissal of Ms. Schuetz in her individual capacity. 1 The caption shows her name as “Wendy Schultz,” but the correct spelling is “Schuetz.” -5- Finally, the district court dismissed the John Doe and Jane Doe defendants. It reasoned that if they were sued in their official capacities, the Eleventh Amendment provided them with immunity from suit. And if sued in their individual capacities, the complaint contained no facts showing that they had personally participated in any constitutionally impermissible conduct. See Henry v. Storey, 658 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir. 2011) (Section 1983 “imposes liability for a defendant’s own actions— personal participation in the specific constitutional violation complained of is essential.”). We agree and accordingly affirm the dismissal of the John Doe and Jane Doe defendants. Thus, each of the defendants named in Mr. Sweets’s complaint was properly dismissed. Mr. Sweets argues, however, that the district court should not have dismissed the action before providing him with an opportunity to conduct discovery. With the documents he asked defendants to produce, he argues, he could have discovered which individuals were responsible for denying his constitutional rights, and could have filed an amended complaint detailing their personal participation in the deprivation of his rights. But there was no whisper of this argument in district court. To be sure, Mr. Sweets now argues that he sought discovery “to obtain the very facts upon which the defendants’ motion to dismiss was predicated.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 26. This argument, however, is made for the first time on appeal. In district court Mr. Sweets never requested discovery to enable him to amend his complaint. Indeed, he filed no -6- response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, or any other pleading asserting that he should be afforded discovery to cure any deficiency in his complaint.2 Mr. Sweets was certainly put on notice of those deficiencies. The motion to dismiss stated the proposition that “a plaintiff must show the defendant personally participated in the alleged violation,” R., Vol. I at 64, and argued that because Mr. Sweets’s complaint did not contain allegations of personal participation, it “[did] not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” id at 65. Thus, the district court was left to rule on a facially meritless complaint undefended by any responsive pleading, accompanied by a discovery request that, to all appearances, sought discovery on the assumption that the case would move forward. It is unsurprising, under these circumstances, that the district court denied the discovery-related motions as moot. Moreover, after the district court granted the motion to dismiss, Mr. Sweets made no further request for discovery or attempt to amend his complaint. Our general rule is that a pro se party should be given leave to amend after a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). See Knight v. Mooring Capital Fund, LLC, 749 F.3d 1180, 1190 (10th Cir. 2014). But we see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s 2 After the defendants’ motion to dismiss but before dismissal and before his discovery request, Mr. Sweets filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint, which did not request discovery to fix deficiencies in the complaint. The district court denied his motion to amend because of various defects unrelated to such deficiencies. He has not appealed this denial. -7- failure to sua sponte grant such leave here. The plaintiff should display at least minimal interest in defending the validity of his claims before the district court is required to prolong the litigation by giving the plaintiff a second chance to state a claim.