Opinion ID: 2744103
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Transmission as a “Disclosure”

Text: The Board also found that on the merits the Agency had proven Charge 2 because Mr. Wrocklage’s transmission of the TECS report constituted an unauthorized disclosure. It found that Mr. Wrocklage’s transmission of the TECS report to Ms. Berglund constituted a “disclosure” in violation of the Privacy Act despite the fact that Ms. Berglund did not view the TECS report and deleted it from her possession. J.A. 4. The Board defined disclosure as the act of sending, “[T]he disclosure, or violation, occurred when the appellant sent the e-mail message to Bergland [sic].” J.A. 4. The government argues that the Board correctly found Mr. Wrocklage’s transmission of the TECS report to Ms. Berglund constitutes a “disclosure.” It argues that a “transfer” of a record containing protected information constitutes a prohibited “disclosure,” and that the act of emailing the TECS report is therefore a “disclosure.” Resp. Br. 11–12 (citing Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-108, Privacy Act Implementation: Guidelines and Responsibilities, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,948, 28,953 (July 9, 1975) (“A disclosure may be either the transfer of a record or the granting of access to a record.”)). It also relies upon 5 C.F.R. § 297.102 defining “disclosure” to mean “providing personal review of a record, or a copy thereof, to someone other than the data subject or the data subject’s authorized representative” and argues that the term “providing” means “to make [something] available: to supply.” Resp. Br. 12. The government further asserts that concluding that a “disclosure” did not occur in this case would cause a “host of problems.” Id. at 14. Specifically, it asserts that such a holding would effectively allow transmission of documents containing protected information so long as the recipient only views those portions free of protected information, and would encourage more widespread transmission of documents containing protected information. Id. 8 WROCKLAGE v. DHS We do not agree. Mr. Wrocklage’s transmission of the TECS report to Ms. Berglund does not constitute a “disclosure” because the undisputed facts of this case are that Ms. Berglund never viewed the TECS report. The Privacy Act does not define the term “disclosure.” See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a). However, other courts have interpreted this language in a persuasive manner. In Luster v. Vilsack, the Tenth Circuit adopted the definition of disclosure requiring “personal review” by an unauthorized recipient as set forth in 5 C.F.R. § 297.102 to reject a Privacy Act violation claim. 667 F.3d 1089, 1098 (10th Cir. 2011). There, the court concluded that no “disclosure” occurred where a document containing protected information was transmitted to a fax machine but there was no evidence that any unauthorized person actually viewed it. Id. Similarly, in Schmidt v. United States Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, the court defined the term “disclose” as “the placing into the view of another information which was previously unknown” and concluded that there was no Privacy Act violation where there was no evidence that anyone actually viewed the protected information. 218 F.R.D. 619, 630–31 (E.D. Wis. 2003). Most recently, in In re Science Applications International Corp. Backup Tape Data Theft Litigation, the court adopted from Privacy Act authorities what is a “common-sense intuition: If no one has viewed your private information (or is about to view it imminently), then your privacy has not been violated.” -- F. Supp. 2d --, 2014 WL 1858458, at  (D.D.C. May 9, 2014). On that basis, the court denied standing to most of the plaintiffs where a thief had acquired tapes containing protected data but there was no allegation, and it was entirely speculative, that the thief had actually viewed their information. Id. We are persuaded that these cases articulate the correct interpretation of disclose or disclosure as requiring not just transmission, but actual viewWROCKLAGE v. DHS 9 ing or imminent viewing by another. 1 Of course the fact that the record was viewed, like other facts, only needs to be established by a preponderance of the evidence. This would not seem to require identifying a specific viewer. It would be enough to show that someone more likely than not viewed the material. The undisputed facts of this case, however, are that the record went to one person and was not viewed. It is undisputed that the recipient deleted the email and it is therefore not imminently viewable. While it is true that Mr. Wrocklage transmitted the TECS report to Ms. Berglund and she received it, it is undisputed that she never viewed it. There was therefore no “disclosure.” 2 We conclude that Charge 2 is not supported by substantial evidence.