Opinion ID: 702495
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legal Significance of the Letters

Text: 25 The district court credited testimony that the oral agreements provided for unalterable territories. Thomas insists the testimony established only that distributor status was guaranteed, absent cause for termination, but that no specific stores or territories were assigned to a distributor on a permanent, unalterable basis. Defendant avers that its view of the testimony is supported by the plain language of the letters, and that the contrary finding of the district court was clearly erroneous because it was contradicted by the letters' plain language. It asserts that it is improper to rely on testimony about oral agreements that contradicts the terms of written contracts because such reliance violates the parol evidence rule. 26 The district court treated the confirmation letters merely as evidence of the content of the oral agreements between Thomas and plaintiffs, rather than as written contracts. In doing so it noted that no single document has articulated the understanding of the parties. 853 F.Supp. at 60. What the district court failed to recognize was that even if the letters were only partial articulations of the parties' agreements, the parol evidence rule would still operate to exclude oral testimony of contract terms inconsistent with those contained in the writings. 27 It is a cornerstone of contract law that written agreements hold a special place in the eyes of the law. Under the parol evidence rule,  'if a written contract is found to be the final repository of agreements made between the parties, evidence of a prior unwritten agreement would not be allowed to have any effect on the agreement as integrated in the writing.'  Damora v. Christ-Janer, 184 Conn. 109, 441 A.2d 61, 64 (1981) (quoting Shelton Yacht & Cabana Club, Inc. v. Suto, 150 Conn. 251, 188 A.2d 493, 496 (1963)). This is a rule of substantive contract law, not a rule of evidence. See TIE Communications, Inc. v. Kopp, 218 Conn. 281, 589 A.2d 329, 332 (1991) (citing 2 Restatement (Second), Contracts Sec. 213, comment (a)); see also Vezina v. Nautilus Pools, Inc., 27 Conn.App. 810, 610 A.2d 1312, 1314 (1992). 28 The parol evidence rule is premised upon the idea that 'when the parties have deliberately put their engagements into writing ... it is conclusively presumed, that the whole engagement of the parties, and the extent and manner of their understanding, was reduced to writing. After this, to permit oral testimony, or prior or contemporaneous conversations, or circumstances, or usages [etc.], in order to ... contradict what is written, would be dangerous and unjust in the extreme.'  TIE Communications, Inc., 589 A.2d at 333 (quoting Glendale Woolen Co. v. The Protection Ins. Co., 21 Conn. 19, 37 (1851)) (alteration in original). The logical outcome of the rule is that when there is an oral agreement that one party reduces to a writing, the other party's assent to the writing, by words or conduct, even though a term of the writing differs from the oral understanding, is an acceptance of the substituted term, and the writing is the final embodiment of the agreement. See 2 Restatement (Second), Contracts Sec. 209 cmt. b, illus. 2 (1981). 29 Preliminary to the application of the parol evidence rule is the inquiry as to whether there is an integrated agreement. See Suburban Sanitation Serv. v. Millstein, 19 Conn.App. 283, 562 A.2d 551, 553 (1989) (quoting 2 Restatement (Second), Contracts Secs. 209(a), 210(3)). A written agreement is 'integrated' and operates to exclude evidences of the alleged extrinsic negotiation if the subject matter of the latter is mentioned, covered or dealt with in the writing.... Associated Catalog Merchandisers, Inc. v. Chagnon, 210 Conn. 734, 557 A.2d 525, 528 (1989) (citing 2 Restatement (Second), Contracts Sec. 215) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, it is the intent of the parties that determines whether the written contract was the final repository of the oral agreements and, if so, the oral agreement is not considered when determining the obligations of the parties. See id. 557 A.2d at 528 (quoting Damora, 441 A.2d at 64-65); see also Giorgio v. Nukem, Inc., 31 Conn.App. 169, 624 A.2d 896, 899 (1993). 30 Whether the parties intended a writing to be an integration of their oral agreement presents a question of fact. See Associated Catalog Merchandisers, Inc., 557 A.2d at 529; Giorgio, 624 A.2d at 899. As noted above, the district court treated the confirmation letters as evidence of the terms of the oral agreements, rather than as contracts in their own right. Hence, the district court made no findings as to whether Thomas and the distributors intended the confirmation letters to be integrated agreements. Normally, at this juncture we would remand this issue to the district court for it to make such a finding. But the record before us leaves us with the firm conviction that a reasonable trier of fact could come to but one conclusion. We view the evidence as establishing, as a matter of law, that the confirmation letters were assented to as integrated writings of the Thomas-distributor relationship. Our reasons follow. 31 It is clear that defendant's normal policy was to have its representatives send confirmation letters to new distributors. These relatively identical letters span a nearly 20-year period from 1966 to 1984, at which time defendant began its practice of having new distributors execute Independent Contractor Agreements. The language of the letters, confirming the meeting, discussing in detail the important aspects of the Thomas-distributor relationship, and asking the recipient to make inquiry if any questions remained, expresses Thomas' intention that the writing be an integrated agreement. 32 To the extent the writing differed from any oral understanding of the parties, it was a substitution of new terms. Because the new terms and the writing are one and the same, the acceptance of these new terms is the assent to the letter as an integration of the parties' understanding. Such acceptance can be shown by acts or conduct or by the offeree's silence and inaction. See John J. Brennan Constr. Corp. v. City of Shelton, 187 Conn. 695, 448 A.2d 180, 187-88 (1982); Pleines v. Franklin Constr. Co., 30 Conn.App. 612, 621 A.2d 759, 762 (1993). It is axiomatic that, regardless of a party's actual intent, if he conducts himself so as to lead the other party reasonably to conclude that he is accepting an offer to contract, acceptance has taken place as a matter of law. John J. Brennan Constr. Corp., 448 A.2d at 187; see also Pleines, 621 A.2d at 762. 33 Plaintiffs did not question the terms set forth in the confirmation letters. This acquiescence, coupled with performance under the contract for a period ranging from nine years (in the case of Adkins) to 27 years (in the case of Nardello), entitled defendant justifiably to conclude that the letters' terms had been accepted. As a matter of law, plaintiffs accepted the terms of the confirmatory letters and assented to the writings as integrated agreements with Thomas. Were we to hold otherwise, the recipient of a writing confirming the terms of a contemporaneous oral agreement could escape an unfavorable written provision that the recipient believes differs from the oral understanding simply by silence. The recipient could perform under the agreement and years later renounce the written terms of the contract to the surprise of the offeror. Such a rule would nullify the benefits of reducing an agreement to written form, and is one we decline to make.