Opinion ID: 1116828
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Arguments in trial court

Text: Defense counsel commenced his argument on the merits of the case with the statement, It appears to me, your Honor, that the first question that should be resolved in the Court's mind is whether or not [Charles] is an accomplice as a matter of law in the alleged act about which he testified. He, of course, argued in the affirmative and then urged that Vann was also an accomplice as a matter of law, as a result of which his testimony could not constitute corroboration of Charles' testimony, and that there was virtually no other evidence which could constitute corroboration. [4] In conclusion, he stated, On that basis I would ask for an acquittal. The prosecuting attorney argued, among other things, that Charles, a young, inexperienced 18-year-old boy, who had just finished high school, engaged in his first taste of real life experience hitchhiking around the country, been arrested and put in jail for the first time in his life, and, with his long hair, had a somewhat effeminate appearance, had submitted under duress and out of fear and was not an accomplice. The prosecuting attorney argued that when Charles found himself locked in the cell with five other people, he was, in effect, like the proverbial lamb in the den of wolves. By finding defendant guilty, the trial court found by implication that Charles was not an accomplice or, in the alternative, that Charles was an accomplice but that Vann was not an accomplice and hence his testimony corroborated Charles' testimony. (1a) Questions: First. Is there sufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings? Yes. By the terms of section 1111 of the Penal Code, the testimony of an accomplice must be corroborated. [5] Under the circumstances here present, however, the trier of fact could reasonably have inferred that Charles was not an accomplice and that his testimony therefore constituted a sufficient basis for finding defendant guilty. Under section 26, subdivision 8, of the Penal Code, the defense of duress is available only to those who committed the act or made the omission charged under threats or menaces sufficient to show that they had reasonable cause to and did believe their lives would be endangered if they refused. (Italics added.) Although a number of cases in this state have held that the fear must literally be of death, People v. Otis, 174 Cal. App.2d 119, 124 [344 P.2d 342], suggests that the fine distinction between fear of danger to life and fear of great bodily harm is unrealistic. According to Otis (quoted approvingly in People v. Lo Cicero, 71 Cal.2d 1186, 1191 [80 Cal. Rptr. 913, 459 P.2d 241]), however, the threat must be of present, immediate harm, not future violence. Here, by Charles' own testimony, when he submitted to defendant there had been no threats of immediate violence from the inmates of Cell 2; Charles feared that he would be subjected to violence and might even be killed, but defendant's only threats had been that Charles' protection from future attacks by other inmates would be removed and that if he told anyone of the offense, defendant would beat him. However, in People v. Anderson, 264 Cal. App.2d 271 [70 Cal. Rptr. 231], involving sodomy committed upon a 16-year-old boy, it is pointed out at page 274: The cases in this state have greatly broadened the situation under which a person participating in the forbidden acts under threats of great bodily harm should not be considered an accomplice. And at pages 276-277 it is stated: Furthermore, a principle has been developed, not by statute but by case law, which makes the factors involved lead to a conclusion that the boy was dominated by the older person, and that he assented rather than consented to the various improper acts involved in the charge against the defendant. People v. Westek, 31 Cal.2d 469 [190 P.2d 9], suggests that a boy is not an accomplice if he is simply afraid of the older person and dominated by him. The fear referred to in the opinion is not closely defined, but it apparently does not mean necessarily fear of death or even of great bodily harm. In that case, the defendant was prosecuted for violation of Penal Code sections 288 and 286; all of the boys involved were under the age of 14 years, and it was held that they could not be accomplices under section 288 of the Penal Code, but that they could be under section 286 if they participated knowingly in the forbidden acts; there was evidence in the case that the boys knew that the acts were wrongful, and the court, therefore, treated them as potential accomplices in spite of their ages. The Supreme Court held, however, that where the boys participated in the acts because they were afraid of the defendant and were dominated by him, they merely assented instead of consenting to them and, therefore, they could not be considered accomplices. (2) It is further said in Anderson at pages 275-276: In People v. Olds, 154 Cal. App.2d 78, 81-82 [315 P.2d 881], the applicable rule is thus discussed: `To be an accomplice one must knowingly, voluntarily, and with common intent unite with the principal offender in the commission of the crime. ( People v. Lamb, 134 Cal. App.2d 582, 585 [285 P.2d 941]; People v. Shaw, 17 Cal.2d 778, 799 [112 P.2d 241].) This requires consent, which is defined in People v. Dong Pok Yip, 164 Cal. 143, at page 147 [127 P. 1031] as follows: Consent, in law, means a voluntary agreement by a person in the possession and exercise of sufficient mentality to make an intelligent choice, to do something proposed by another. `Consent' differs very materially from `assent.' The former implies positive action and always involves submission. The latter means mere passivity or submission, which does not include consent. In People v. Westek, 31 Cal.2d 469 [190 P.2d 9], which concerned a violation of the same section of the Penal Code here involved, the court pointed out (p. 475) that The jury apparently accorded full credit to the boys' testimony that they did not `willingly' join in the criminal acts, and so concluded that their part therein constituted an `assent' rather than a `consent.' Consequently, the boys, by virtue of the evidence accepted by the jury as true, were not accomplices and corroboration of their testimony was not necessary. In People v. Featherstone, 67 Cal. App.2d 793 [155 P.2d 685], which also involved a violation of this same code section, the court observed (p. 796) that If he (a fifteen-year-old boy) was not an accomplice, corroboration of his testimony was not necessary. `It was for the arbiter of the facts to determine whether Ronald consented to and wilfully joined in the criminal act defendant committed. Of course on appeal we must accept as established every fact in harmony with the judgment that finds adequate support in the evidence.'  People v. Washington, 203 Cal. App.2d 609, 610 [21 Cal. Rptr. 788], similarly discusses the principles involved as follows: `One of the victims testified that after robbing her, defendant forced her at the point of a knife and while she was in great fear of bodily harm therefrom to engage in an act in violation of section 288a, Penal Code, and then, while still in such fear, forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. Consent induced by fear is no consent at all. ( People v. Hinton, 166 Cal. App.2d 743, 749 [333 P.2d 822].) Also, one who participates in an act of sex perversion because of threats and is in fear of great bodily harm is not an accomplice and such victim's testimony need not be corroborated. [Citation.] Whether one is an accomplice is a question of fact.' Likewise, in People v. Brown, 6 Cal. App.3d 619, 624 (6) [86 Cal. Rptr. 149], which also involved the crime of sodomy, it was said: Participation induced by threats and fear of bodily harm removes one from an accomplice category. (1b) In the present case, the trial court recognized that when a young man has been subjected to acts of sexual perversion, his age and background, his sophistication, his maturity or immaturity, things of that sort are significant in determining the degree of threat he felt; and, under the circumstances here shown, the trial court could reasonably have inferred that Charles did not consent to participate in the act, but assented through fear of great bodily harm, and hence was not an accomplice. As hereinabove pointed out in the quotation from Anderson, we must accept as established every fact in harmony with the judgment that finds adequate support in the evidence; and there is adequate evidence here to support findings in harmony with the judgment. (3) Second. Did the trial court apply the proper test of sanity? Yes. Defendant contends that the court erroneously construed the word wrong in the right-and-wrong test for sanity, in that the court indicated it referred to legal wrong and not to both legal and moral wrong. It is wrong in the legal sense, however, that is contemplated in the sanity test. ( People v. Nash, 52 Cal.2d 36, 50 [338 P.2d 416]; see also People v. Wolff, 61 Cal.2d 795, 801 [40 Cal. Rptr. 271, 394 P.2d 959].) [6] (4a) Third. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for funds to investigate the possibility of jury misconduct? No. One of the jurors composed a poem, which happened to fall into the hands of defense counsel after the jury had returned its verdict. Defendant contends that the poem is concrete evidence that misconduct was present and that the trial court therefore abused its discretion in refusing to grant funds to investigate such a possibility. (5) With respect to alleged jury misconduct, where questions of fact are presented for the trial court (as by affidavit) its findings will be upheld in the absence of a showing that its discretion was clearly abused. ( Bardessono v. Michels, 3 Cal.3d 780, 795 (12b) [91 Cal. Rptr. 760, 478 P.2d 480, 45 A.L.R.3d 717].) (4b) No showing of abuse has been made here. To begin with, there is no evidence that any of the other jurors even saw the poem. In any event, this court has read the poem and has concluded that it was not such as to warrant an investigation of jury misconduct. Moreover, the alleged misconduct was entirely speculative in nature, and it is settled that the denial of a constitutional right resulting in essential unfairness must be established as a demonstrable reality, not as a matter of speculation. ( Darcy v. Handy, 351 U.S. 454, 462 [100 L.Ed. 1331, 1337-1338, 76 S.Ct. 965].) The judgment is affirmed.