Opinion ID: 418064
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: appointment of a special master

Text: 22 Defendants seek to have the district court's appointment of a special master set aside as an abuse of discretion. Their argument that the present case fails to show the requisite exceptional condition under F.R.Civ.P. 53(b) is wholly lacking in merit. The monitoring of a Consent Judgment that mandates individualized care for thousands of class members and that entails balancing of the interests of parties with third-party employees, 8 school authorities, 9 and community groups 10 is just the sort of polycentric problem that cannot easily be resolved through a traditional courtroom-bound adjudicative process for which Judge Weinstein found a Special Master appropriate in Hart v. Community School Bd. of Brooklyn, 383 F.Supp. 699, 766 (E.D.N.Y.1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 37 (2 Cir.1975). See also Gary W. v. Louisiana, 601 F.2d 240, 244-45 (5 Cir.1979); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital, 612 F.2d 84, 111 (3 Cir.1979) 11 and cases cited in these opinions. 23 Underlying defendants' objection to the appointment is the apprehension that the Special Master would become Willowbrook's de facto administrator, intervening at every decision-making stage and rewarding the exposure of deficiencies in ways that would be disastrous to staff morale. An order appointing a special master to oversee a city's compliance with the Fair Housing Act, a remedy opposed by defendants and plaintiffs, was reversed in United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562, 579 (6 Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926, 102 S.Ct. 1972, 73 L.Ed.2d 1309 (1982), on the ground of intrusiveness. The limited powers of this Special Master, as set forth in Judge Bartels' Order of July 13, 1982, assure that this spectre of usurpation is unlikely to materialize. 24 Provisions of the July 13, 1982, Order allowing the Master access to Willowbrook records and buildings, permitting him to interview class members and defendants' employees, requiring his staff to compile periodic reports on compliance, and permitting inspection and copying of such reports by all parties, Order at 3-4, are taken practically word-for-word from the powers and duties of the Review Panel set forth in the 1975 Consent Judgment at 7, as is the provision punishing as contempt of court any interference with the Special Master or his staff by any person with notice of the Order. The Order also reproduces the mechanism by which the Review Panel made recommendations regarding compliance with or interpretation of the Consent Judgment, which became binding on all parties unless written objections are filed seeking resolution by the court. Order at 4-5; Consent Judgment at 9. As this court stated in an earlier opinion dealing with Willowbrook, the parties knowingly and intentionally delegated to a panel of chosen experts the power to make the initial determination on important matters involving the meaning and interpretation of the Consent Judgment, 596 F.2d at 32-33. [T]hey created continually evolving enforcement and supervisory mechanisms thought necessary to meet evolving conditions and to resolve differences, id. at 37. The powers of the Special Master to inspect, to interview, and to make recommendations go no further than those agreed to in the Consent Judgment. 25 Other powers and duties of the Special Master are more narrowly circumscribed than those previously possessed by the Review Panel. The Special Master is directed to review, integrate, and harmonize the audits conducted by the many existing monitoring groups, Order at 3, and may require the defendants to submit any reports necessary to assist the Master in performing his duties, Order at 4, but he and his staff do not have the Review Panel's blanket power to conduct any additional inquiries they deem necessary or appropriate. Consent Judgment at 8. The Order contemplates a role for the Special Master at once less formal and more facilitative than that of the former Review Panel. While the Consent Judgment placed little emphasis on the Review Panel's power to make informal suggestions, Consent Judgment at 8, the Order in several of its provisions directs the Special Master to provide assistance and advice to the parties, report to the parties, consult with the parties informally, and conduct informal working sessions. Order at 4-5, 7. Correspondingly, [d]efendants and all of their agents, as well as public agencies of the State of New York, are directed to cooperate fully with the Master in order to accomplish the purposes of this order. Id. at 8. The following provision of the Order had no counterpart in the Consent Judgment: 26 The Master shall have no authority to exercise any control or management over the operation of any facility operated or licensed by the State of New York, but he shall have authority to monitor the location and acquisition of community placement facilities in order to meet the placement goals of the Consent Judgment, and to make a report to the parties with respect thereto. 27 The powers granted to the Special Master here comport with those granted in similar cases by other courts. See Gary W., supra, 601 F.2d at 245 and cases cited therein. As limited by the letter and spirit of Judge Bartels' Order of July 13, 1982, the Special Master's role does not threaten usurpation of state functions. 12 28 What we have said largely answers the appellants' arguments on this aspect of the case based on Youngberg v. Romeo, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28, decided by the Supreme Court on June 18, 1982, nearly two months after the decision here. That case, as it reached the Supreme Court on certiorari to the Third Circuit, 644 F.2d 147, was a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against Pennsylvania state officials by a retarded man who, at his mother's request, had been committed to the Pennhurst State School and Hospital. The damages sought were for injuries received as a result of Romeo's own violence and the reactions of other residents to him, for unduly prolonged physical restraints, and for failure to provide Romeo with appropriate treatment for his mental retardation. The Court upheld Romeo's claims to safe conditions and to freedom from unnecessary bodily restraints. It found his claim to a constitutional right to minimally adequate habilitation to be more troubling, --- U.S. at ----, 102 S.Ct. at 2458, 73 L.Ed.2d at 37. Because of what it thought to be a disavowal of broader claims, at ---- - ---- & n. 23, 102 S.Ct. at 2459-2460, 73 L.Ed.2d at 38-39 & n. 23, the Court considered that Romeo was asserting only a constitutional right to minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint. At ----, 102 S.Ct. at 2460, 73 L.Ed.2d at 39. It sustained this claim and, because of the disavowal, found it unnecessary to consider the difficult question whether a mentally retarded person, involuntarily committed to a state institution, has some general constitutional right to training per se, even when no type or amount of training would lead to freedom. Id. However, in what for us is the most important passage in the opinion, the Court endorsed the standard articulated by Chief Judge Seitz of the Third Circuit as that to be applied in reviewing state action for the protection of the involuntarily committed. This was that, 644 F.2d at 178: 29 the Constitution only requires that the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of several professionally acceptable choices should have been made. 30 Justice Powell went on to say, at ----, 102 S.Ct. at 2461-2462, 73 L.Ed.2d at 41-42: 31 In determining what is reasonable--in this and in any case presenting a claim for training by a state--we emphasize that courts must show deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified professional. By so limiting judicial review of challenges to conditions in state institutions, interference by the federal judiciary with the internal operations of these institutions should be minimized. Moreover, there certainly is no reason to think judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals in making such decisions.... For these reasons, the decision, if made by a professional, is presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment. 32 We are unable to agree with appellants that Youngberg automatically leads to reversal of what would otherwise have been an appropriate exercise of the judge's discretion to appoint a Special Master. What it does do is supply a standard that will be relevant to any further attempts that might be made to modify the terms of the consent decree, as we hold it to be with respect to this one. To the extent that the decree leaves room for interpretation, that standard will also have relevance for the Special Master in making recommendations and for the district court in ruling upon them. Time may show that because of Youngberg's restrictive effect upon the scope of the review, the Special Master is unnecessary. In that event the defendants are free to move that the appointment be terminated.