Opinion ID: 2432503
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: automobile accident report privilege

Text: Secondly, appellant asserts his pre-arrest statements to Gibson constituted privileged information which should have been suppressed at trial. Appellant argues these statements were privileged because they were made in discharge of his statutory duty under Ark.Code Ann. § 27-53-202(a) (Repl. 1994) to report his traffic accident to the Arkansas State Police, and, as such, were precluded from use as evidence against him at trial under Ark.Code Ann. § 27-53-208(b)(1) (Repl.1994). Ark.Code Ann. §§ 27-53-201 to -209 (Repl.1994) govern accident reports which are required to be filed by persons other than law enforcement officers. Section 27-53-202(a) requires the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death to any person or apparent property damage in excess of $50.00 to forward a written report of the accident to the Arkansas State Police within forty-eight hours. Section 27-53-208(b)(1) provides that no report shall be used as evidence in any resulting civil or criminal trial. Section 27-53-208(b)(1) is an example of a statute which grants the so-called automobile accident report privilege. See generally John A. Tarantino, Defending Drinking Drivers § 586 (2d ed. 1991). Ark.Code Ann. §§ 27-53-301 to -306 (Repl.1994) govern accident reports which are required to be filed by law enforcement officers. Sections 27-53-303(a) and (b)(2) required Gibson, as the investigating officer, to prepare and file a report of his investigation of appellant's accident. Sections 27-53-301 to -306 contain no automobile accident report privilege provision. It is undisputed that appellant filed no written report of his accident with the state police. The only written report of the accident was prepared and filed by Gibson. Appellant, however, asserts the statutory automobile accident report privilege barred Gibson's testimony as to appellant's pre-arrest statements because those statements were used by Gibson in the preparation of the report which was filed. Appellant's only authority for his argument is Norstrom v. State, 587 So.2d 1148 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1991), in which the Florida District Court of Appeal held the trial court erred in admitting the taped statement of motorist Norstrom, given while in police custody and after he had waived his Miranda rights, during the investigation of a vehicular homicide. The court of appeal ruled the statement inadmissible because it was made during the accident investigation and was privileged under Florida's automobile accident report privilege provision, Fla.Stat. ch. 316.066 (1988). We find appellant's reliance upon Norstrom misplaced. The court of appeal's decision was subsequently quashed in part by the Florida Supreme Court which held that the automobile accident report privilege did not apply on the facts of that case, and remanded the case for consideration of other issues not relevant to this discussion. State v. Norstrom, 613 So.2d 437 (Fla.1993), on remand, 616 So.2d 592 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1993). Appellant argues then, without persuasive authority, that the automobile accident report privilege rendered inadmissible Gibson's testimony as to appellant's pre-arrest statements, and that the trial court's ruling permitting the testimony was reversible error. Although this argument is apparently one of first impression in this state, it has been addressed by other jurisdictions. See John A. Tarantino, Using The Automobile Accident Report Privilege To Bar Police Officer Testimony, 4 DWI Journal 6 (Jan.1989). The reported weight of authority, we have found, is that, in most criminal proceedings, testimony by police officers relating to admissions by drivers for the purpose of preparing automobile accident reports is admissible. See Randy R. Koenders, Annotation, Admissibility of Police Officer's Testimony At State Trial Relating to Motorist's Admissions Made In Or For Automobile Accident Report Required By Law, 46 A.L.R.4th 291, §§ 2[a]; 4[a] & [b] (1986 & Supp.1994). We find appellant's argument is without merit. A plain reading of section 27-53-208(b)(1) shows the automobile accident report privilege is expressly extended only to the report itself [2] . By its express terms, the statute does not shield testimony of the investigating officer as to that officer's observations made in preparing his report, including statements made to the officer by the motorist. Other state courts interpreting identical or similar automobile accident report privilege statutes have likewise concluded the privilege does not bar the testimony of the investigating officer. See, e.g., Creary v. State, 663 P.2d 226 (Alaska Ct.App.1983); Spradling v. State, 628 S.W.2d 123 (Tex.Ct. App.1981). We also note with interest that, since the Norstrom case, the State of Florida has amended its automobile accident report privilege statute to specifically permit testimony of the investigating officer to the extent the motorist's privilege against self-incrimination is not thereby violated. State v. Riley, 617 So.2d 340 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1993). The fundamental concern addressed by those courts which have extended the automobile accident report privilege to bar testimony of the investigating officer is to protect against a violation of the reporting motorist's federal constitutional right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Riley, 617 So.2d 340; People v. Gilbert, 8 Mich.App. 393, 154 N.W.2d 800 (1967). In the instant case, appellant argues his statutory duty to report the accident to the state police was the reason he provided privileged information to Gibson. However, there is no evidence in the record showing appellant was aware of or was attempting to comply with his statutory duty to report the accident. There is no evidence that appellant believed he was compelled to answer Gibson's investigatory pre-arrest questions. There is no evidence that Gibson coerced appellant's statements, or indicated to appellant in any way that appellant was required to answer Gibson's questions. At trial, appellant stated, through his counsel, that his pre-arrest statements to Gibson were not made in the context of a custodial interrogation. In addition, although section 27-53-201 subjects to statutory fine or suspension of license to drive any motorist who fails to render a required automobile accident report, we are aware of no such penalty for a motorist who refuses to answer the questions of the investigating officer. On this record, the evidence does not indicate that appellant's statements were obtained in violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination. Our standard for reviewing the trial court's ruling admitting the challenged testimony is abuse of discretion pursuant to A.R.E. Rule 103. McVay v. State, 312 Ark. 73, 847 S.W.2d 28 (1993). On this record, we find no abuse. Appellant also argues on appeal that admission of Gibson's testimony as to his pre-arrest statements violated his rights under the U.S. Const. amend. 4 and Ark. Const. art. 2, § 15. We do not address this argument which is raised for the first time on appeal. Aaron v. State, 319 Ark. 320, 891 S.W.2d 364 (1995). The trial court's judgment is affirmed.