Opinion ID: 2323462
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Harrison's Remarks as Proof of Motive

Text: It can be easy to confuse evidence of propensity with evidence of motive, and courts must be on guard to prevent the motive label from being used to smuggle forbidden evidence of propensity to the jury. [22] When, as here, the accused denies having committed the charged offense, his motive to commit it may be shown, but not via evidence that is merely evidence of propensity. Accordingly, we must determine what motive meant in this case and whether the probative value of Harrison's statements to T.D., J.M., and A.G. depended wholly or primarily on the jury inferring that he was predisposed or had a propensity to commit the charged crimes against T.G. [23] A motive is simply an emotion or state of mind that prompts a person to act in a particular way; an incentive for certain volitional activity. [24] In determining whether particular prior bad acts evidence is admissible to prove motive, the specificity of the motive is of critical importance, because [t]he more common or generalized the motive evidence, the more it verges upon inadmissibility as mere propensity evidence. [25] If, for instance, in a sexual assault prosecution, evidence of prior bad acts against other victims is introduced to show the defendant's desire to engage in heterosexual sex, the motive is indistinguishable from predispositionfor such evidence to be relevant, the jurors must infer the defendant's general sexual desire from the prior bad acts, and then infer that he acted in conformity with that desire and committed the charged sexual offense. As a rule, it is improper to offer prior instances of the same offense [against persons other than the victim in the instant case] to show motive, since such acts are relevant only by relying on the improper inference that the defendant has a propensity to engage in that conduct. [26] In this case, the only specific motive the government ever articulated during trial suffered from exactly this defect. According to the prosecutor's opening statement, the motive revealed by Harrison's remarks to T.D., J.M., and A.G. was that he was attracted to teenage girls. The opening statement was the only time during the trial that the prosecutor attempted to specify the motive revealed by Harrison's comments to the three students. In closing argument, the prosecutor reiterated that those comments were evidence of Harrison's motive to commit the charged offenses against T.G., but the prosecutor never gave a name to that motive. For its part, while the trial court instructed the jury that it could consider whether Harrison's statements showed he was motivated to engage T.G. in a sexual relationship, the instructions did not furnish sufficient guidance as to how the jury properly might draw that inference. Such guidance was not supplied by the mere admonition against using the statements to conclude that the defendant has a bad character or that the defendant has a criminal personality. [27] This was not enough to ensure that the jury did not rely on Harrison's comments to the students other than T.G. to find that his attraction to teenage girls meant he had a motive to commit the offenses against her. It is hard to see how else the jury could have utilized the evidence. In its brief on appeal, the government argues that Harrison's comments revealed a motive that was narrower than an attraction to teenage girls in general. According to the government, his motive was his attraction to the girls in T.G.'s group in particular. [28] Emphasizing that Harrison started hitting on T.G., J.M., and T.D. after becoming privy to their love triangle in the Peaceoholics mediation, the government asserts that Harrison's sexually suggestive comments to the three girls demonstrated the motive to involve himself voyeuristically in their relationships and attempt to change their sexuality. [29] The government admits that A.G. was not a member of the love triangle, but, it says, she was friendly with those who were. [30] Based on the record, this strikes us as a somewhat strained theory of motivation, at least to the extent that it posits Harrison was motivated by a desire to change the sexuality of the girls he approached. (A.G.'s sexuality was not in evidence, it should be noted.) And whatever we may think of this appellate theory, it was not what the government suggested at trial. Contrary to the argument crafted on appeal that Harrison's motive was focused narrowly on his attraction to T.G.'s group (whatever that means), the prosecutor argued to the jury that T.G. was just unlucky; that her sexual abuse by Harrison was a crime of opportunity that [c]ould have happened to any girl at Spingarn because Harrison was on the prowl (sought out the opportunity, as shown especially by his sexual remarks to A.G.); in short, that Harrison's interactions with the other female students showed his motive to be that he simply was attracted to teenage girls in generalnot just to T.G. and her group. The line between proper motive evidence and improper propensity evidence therefore was crossed in this case: The jury was invited to infer from Harrison's remarks to T.D., J.M., and A.G. that he had a sexual interest in teenage girls, and (the forbidden inference) that he acted in conformity with that bad character trait by committing the charged offenses against T.G. We do not perceive how else the jury could have used the evidence.