Opinion ID: 1878960
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court erred in allowing the state to impeach defense witness terry dora with his conviction for the sale of cocaine.

Text: ¶ 57. Baldwin asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence that defense witness Terry Dora had been convicted for the sale of cocaine. Baldwin further argues that the trial court did not make an adequate finding on the record regarding the admissibility of this evidence. The State responds that the evidence was properly admitted to show Dora's bias and prejudice against the office of the district attorney who had prosecuted him for the sale of cocaine. ¶ 58. Terry Dora was Baldwin's cellmate while Baldwin awaited trial. The defense called Dora to testify that Baldwin had never discussed the charges against him and to refute the testimony of another cell-mate, State's witness, Michael Ball. Ball had testified that Baldwin discussed Liz Dill's murder with him. Dora testified that he never saw Baldwin speak alone with Michael Ball. ¶ 59. Before cross-examining Dora, the assistant district attorney approached the bench to inform the judge of his intentions to impeach Dora with the conviction for the sale of cocaine. He explained that he was the prosecutor involved in Dora's conviction and that he wished to introduce the conviction to show bias and prejudice. The court allowed the testimony. ¶ 60. Rule 609 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence provides as follows: For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect on a party or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment. This Court addressed Rule 609 in Peterson v. State, 518 So.2d 632, 636 (Miss.1987), and stated: We hold today that Rule 609(a)(1) requires the trial judge to make an on-therecord determination that the probative value of the prior conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect before admitting any evidence of a prior conviction.    What factors should the trial judge consider when weighing the probative value of the convictions against the prejudicial effect of their admission? Although the relevant considerations will vary according to the particular facts of each case, there are some general factors which should be considered when a trial judge is making this determination. In [U.S. v.] Preston, supra [608 F.2d 626], the [Fifth Circuit] court listed the following: (1) the kind of crime involved; (2) when the conviction occurred; (3) importance of the witness' testimony to the case; (4) the importance of the credibility of the defendant. (Citation omitted). A more specific list of factors to be considered by the trial judge was outlined in Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C.Cir.1967) (Burger, J.); and is set forth in Weinstein's Evidence: (1) The impeachment value of the prior crime. (2) The point in time of the conviction and the witness' subsequent history. (3) The similarity between the past crime and the charged crime. (4) The importance of the defendant's testimony. (5) The centrality of the credibility issue. ¶ 61. In Johnson v. State, 655 So.2d 37, 41 (Miss.1995), we stated, [T]here are several ways to impeach a witness' credibility including the showing of bias or prejudice of the witness ... as long as the impeaching material is relevant to the issue at hand. We have held that the scope of cross-examination, though ordinarily broad, is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court possesses inherent power to limit cross-examination to relevant matters. Smith v. State, 733 So.2d 793, 801 (Miss.1999). ¶ 62. Applying the guidelines established by this Court to the facts of the case at bar, we conclude that the trial court appropriately admitted the testimony of Terry Dora regarding his conviction for the sale of cocaine. Our holding in Johnson clearly allows such evidence showing bias or prejudice of the witness. Baldwin argues, however, that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to make an adequate finding on the record pursuant to Peterson. While the judge may have failed to enunciate succinctly the Peterson criteria, it is nonetheless clear that the court's decision was based on a thorough contemplation of the intended testimony, the arguments both for and against the testimony, and the judge's knowledge of the applicable evidentiary rules. If the court erred by not enunciating Peterson findings, the error was harmless, especially in light of our holdings in Johnson and Smith. Further, it should be noted that during Dora's direct examination Baldwin elicited testimony that the two of them had been incarcerated together in the Lowndes County jail. Obviously, Dora had been prosecuted for some crime, or he would not have been in jail with Baldwin. Baldwin should not be allowed to claim unfair prejudicial effect as he was the first to present the subject of Dora's criminal history. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to admit the testimony of Dora's prior conviction. Therefore, we find this assignment of error to be without merit.