Opinion ID: 653220
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: evidence of bribes

Text: Havasu makes no allegation that a bribe was solicited or paid with regard to the requirement that Alme be made a partner and marketer of the project. The only issue remaining to be tried at trial was SPFC's possible liability for its role in the selection of Alme as the marketer. The alleged bribes had no relevance to this sole remaining issue. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence for lack of relevance. IV. SPFC'S MOTION TO RE-TAX COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEESThe loan agreement in this case contained a broad clause allowing for the recovery of attorneys' fees: In the event litigation or any other type of proceeding is commenced to enforce or interpret this Agreement, to recover damages for breach of this Agreement, to obtain declaratory relief in connection with this Agreement, or otherwise to obtain judicial relief in connection with the transactions which are the subject of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees ... and all costs of that litigation or proceeding, as the case may be, including, but not limited to, taxable and non-taxable costs.... State law governed the great bulk of claims brought by Havasu against SPFC and controlled all of those claims which survived to trial. State law therefore dictates the recoverability of attorneys' fees. In re Ashley, 903 F.2d 599, 605 n. 7 (9th Cir.1990). California law recognizes the enforceability of contractual attorneys' fees provisions in two separate statutes, Cal.Civ.Code Sec. 1717 and Cal.Civ.Proc.Code Sec. 1021. The district court denied SPFC's motion for costs and attorneys' fees on the basis that Havasu's suit sounded primarily in tort. Section 1021 states that [e]xcept as attorneys' fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties. The courts have interpreted this provision to encompass the right of the parties to agree to the allocation of costs and fees even where the suit is not based on contract. Lerner v. Ward, 13 Cal.App.4th 155, 160 (1993); see also 3250 Wilshire Blvd. Bldg. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 990 F.2d 487, 489 (9th Cir.1993). While section 1717 permits recovery of costs and fees only on claims for breach of contract, section 1717 does not limit the right of a party to recover costs and fees under Sec. 1021. Xuereb v. Marcos & Millichap, 3 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1341-42 (1992). In Lerner the appellate court held that the defendants should have been awarded attorneys' fees under their contract and Sec. 1021 though the only contract claims contained in the complaint were dropped prior to trial. Id. The attorneys' fees provision in the Lender contract allowed for the recovery of costs and fees [i]n any action or proceeding arising out of the agreement. Id. at 155. The attorneys' fees clause in the contract between Havasu and SPFC is as broad as that in Lerner. The district court abused its discretion in refusing to award SPFC attorneys' fees and additional costs pursuant to Cal.Civ.Proc.Code Sec. 1021. See Bussey v. Affleck, 225 Cal.App.3d 1162, 1166 (1990). SPFC requested $214,828.92 in attorneys' fees and $31,500.71 in nonstatutory costs. This issue is returned to the district court to determine the reasonableness of the request as well as to determine SPFC's reasonable fees and costs on this appeal. The district court's judgment as to the merits of the claims brought by Havasu against SPFC is AFFIRMED. The district court's denial of SPFC's motion for assessment of costs and attorneys' fees is REVERSED and REMANDED.