Opinion ID: 1058326
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Promissory Estoppel and Quantum Meruit

Text: Where it is available, the cause of action based on promissory estoppel consists of four elements, recently defined as: (1) a promise, (2) which the promisor should reasonably expect to cause action by the promisee, (3) which does cause such action, and (4) which should be enforced to prevent injustice to the promisee. Barnhill v. Veneman, 524 F.3d 458, 475-76 (4th Cir.2008). The Executors are correct in asserting that promissory estoppel is not a cognizable cause of action in Virginia. In a trio of cases decided on the same day in 1997, we observed that such a cause of action had never been held to exist in the Commonwealth and we expressly declined to create such a cause of action. W.J. Schafer Associates v. Cordant, Inc., 254 Va. 514, 521, 493 S.E.2d 512, 516 (1997). See Virginia School of the Arts v. Eichelbaum, 254 Va. 373, 377, 493 S.E.2d 510, 512 (1997); Ward's Equipment, Inc. v. New Holland North America, Inc., 254 Va. 379, 385, 493 S.E.2d 516, 520 (1997). We have not altered that position. Promissory estoppel and quantum meruit are conceptually distinct. They require entirely different proof and result in entirely different remedies. Where promissory estoppel is available, the promisee must prove, by the standard of evidence required in the jurisdiction, the four elements quoted above from Barnhill. If successful, the promisee is entitled to judicial enforcement of the promisor's promise. If that remedy were to be applied to the present case, it would have required a conveyance of all the Dove property, less the mountain land, to Woods, if he had carried his burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. Quantum meruit recovery, by contrast, is based upon an implied contract to pay the reasonable value of services rendered. Hendrickson v. Meredith, 161 Va. 193, 198, 170 S.E. 602, 604 (1933). See also Marine Development Corp. v. Rodak, 225 Va. 137, 140-41, 300 S.E.2d 763, 765 (1983). This cause of action has been available in Virginia for many years. In Rea v. Trotter, 67 Va. (26 Gratt.) 585, 592 (1875), this Court referred to it as an undeniable principle of law. There, we said, Where service is performed by one, at the instance and request of another, and ... nothing is said between the parties as to compensation for such service, the law implies a contract, that the party who performs the service shall be paid a reasonable compensation therefor. ( Id. ) The remedy available to the plaintiff is an award of damages amounting to the reasonable value of the work performed, less the compensation actually received for that work. Hendrickson, 161 Va. at 201, 170 S.E. at 605. A party may state in a pleading as many claims as he has, regardless of consistency and whether based on legal or equitable grounds. Rule 1:4(k). The fact that Woods' first count alleged facts that might have framed a cause of action for promissory estoppel, if such had been available, is immaterial to the claim made in his second count for damages based on quantum meruit. Therefore, we find no merit in the Executors' first assignment of error.