Opinion ID: 46
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony of the Prosecutors and Lieutenant Peterson

Text: We review a district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, and will reverse only for manifest error. Manley v. AmBase Corp., 337 F.3d 237, 247 (2d Cir.2003) (citations omitted). We afford district courts wide latitude ... in determining whether evidence is admissible, and in controlling the mode and order of its presentation to promote the effective ascertainment of the truth. SR Int'l Bus. Ins. Co. v. World Trade Ctr. Props., LLC, 467 F.3d 107, 119 (2d Cir.2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Even if we do find that evidentiary rulings were manifestly erroneous, we will not grant a new trial if we find that the improperly admitted evidence was harmlessi.e., [that] the evidence was unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question. United States v. Germosen, 139 F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir.1998). An error is harmless if we can conclude with fair assurance that the evidence did not substantially influence the jury. United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1220 (2d Cir.1992). We consider several factors in determining whether evidentiary error warrants a new trial: In assessing the wrongly admitted testimony's importance, we consider such factors as whether the testimony bore on an issue that is plainly critical to the jury's decision, whether that testimony was material to the establishment of the critical fact or whether it was instead corroborated and cumulative, and whether the wrongly admitted evidence was emphasized in arguments to the jury. Wray v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 515, 526 (2d Cir.2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We also consider the overall strength of the [appellees'] case. United States v. Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d 139, 164 (2d Cir.2008) (quotation marks omitted); see also Wray, 202 F.3d at 526 ([T]he principal factors to be considered are the importance of the witness's wrongly admitted testimony, and the overall strength of the [appellees'] case.).
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, relevant evidencethat is, evidence that has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable is generally admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 401, 402. This presumption of admissibility is subject to many exceptions, several of which are implicated in this case. First, [a]s a matter of law, the credibility of witnesses is exclusively for the determination by the jury, and witnesses may not opine as to the credibility of the testimony of other witnesses at the trial. United States v. Forrester, 60 F.3d 52, 63 (2d Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also United States v. Johnson, 529 F.3d 493, 499 (2d Cir.2008) (It is ... impermissible for a government agent to vouch for a government witness or generally to opine on the credibility of witnesses. (citations omitted)). For example, it is typically improper for an investigating agent to communicat[e] that he had skeptically and scrupulously checked out all the information furnished by the witnesses before accepting it. Johnson, 529 F.3d at 498. Similarly, we have found error where an expert witness stated that he `rejected' the possibility that [witnesses] had lied. Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 398 (2d Cir.2005). Second, witnesses may not present testimony in the form of legal conclusions. United States v. Articles of Banned Hazardous Substances Consisting of an Undetermined Number of Cans of Rainbow Foam Paint, 34 F.3d 91, 96 (2d Cir.1994); accord Densberger v. United Techs. Corp., 297 F.3d 66, 74 (2d Cir. 2002). [5] Such testimony undertakes to tell the jury what result to reach, and thus attempts to substitute the [witness's] judgment for the jury's. Nimely, 414 F.3d at 397 (internal quotation marks omitted). Hence, the issue of whether or not probable cause to arrest exists is a legal determination that is not properly the subject of expert opinion testimony. Rizzo v. Edison Inc., 419 F.Supp.2d 338, 348 (W.D.N.Y.2005), aff'd 172 Fed.Appx. 391 (2d Cir.2006) (summary order). On the other hand, if a witness's own belief as to probable cause is relevant to the outcome of a case (for example, where a police officer is sued for false arrest, and claims that she believed she possessed probable cause to arrest), that witness's testimony about her own subjective belief may be admissible. Third, a lay witness may testify in the form of an opinion, even one that goes to an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact, but may do so only so long as that testimony is helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. Fed. R.Evid. 701(b), 704(a). This helpfulness requirement is designed to provide assurance[] against the admission of opinions which would merely tell the jury what result to reach or would constitute an attempt to introduce meaningless assertions which amount to little more than choosing up sides. Rea, 958 F.2d at 1215-16 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fed.R.Evid. 701 Advisory Committee's Note (1972). For example, when jurors can see with their own eyes both a defendant and a photograph that allegedly depicts that defendant, there is usually no need for a witness to testify to a resemblance between the two; but if a party alleges that a photograph depicts a person the jury has not seen, that testimony may be helpful in establishing the similarity. See United States v. Robinson, 544 F.2d 110, 113 (2d Cir.1976). Finally, all such testimony is subject to the general balancing rule of Rule 403, which provides that evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 403; see generally, e.g., United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 110 (2d Cir.1998) (per curiam).
Under these well-settled rules of evidence, much of the challenged testimony would quite obviously be inadmissible in the ordinary case. Appellees argue, however, that this case is different, because the elements of malicious prosecution claims render the challenged testimony admissible. In particular, Appellees claim that Pangilinan's and Brandon's testimony showed that prosecutors made independent decisions based on additional, corroborating evidence, and that Ramos and Rivera might therefore not be considered to have `caused' or `procured' the prosecution, thus defeating grounds for liability. Appellees' Br. 38 (quoting White v. Frank, 855 F.2d 956, 962 (2d Cir.1988)). [6] This argument misunderstands the nature of the tort of malicious prosecution. Malicious prosecution occurs when (1) the defendant initiated a prosecution against plaintiff, (2) without probable cause to believe the proceeding can succeed, (3) the proceeding was begun with malice and, (4) the matter terminated in plaintiff's favor. Ricciuti v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir.1997). Under New York law, police officers can initiate prosecution by filing charges or other accusatory instruments. Id.; see also, e.g., Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 944 (2d Cir.1997) (Under New York law, if there has been no indictment, a criminal action is commenced by the filing of an accusatory instrument, to wit, a `felony complaint' for a felony charge, or a `misdemeanor complaint' or an `information' for a misdemeanor charge. (citations omitted)); Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563, 568, 571 (2d Cir.1996) (finding no dispute as to the first ... element[ ] where the plaintiff was immediately taken to the police station and was charged by the defendant officer). As the District Court correctly instructed the jury, there was no dispute in this case as to the existence of the first and fourth prongs of Cameron's malicious prosecution claim. As a matter of law, Ramos and Rivera's filing of the Criminal Court Complaint initiated the prosecution against Cameron. See Ricciuti, 124 F.3d at 130. And, of course, Cameron's acquittal in the criminal prosecution constituted a termination in her favor. Hence, the only questions that the jury had to decide with respect to the malicious prosecution claim were (a) whether Ramos and Rivera had probable cause to initiate the prosecution; (b) whether Ramos and Rivera initiated the proceeding with malice; and (c) what damages, if any, Cameron was entitled to. Appellees suggest that the jury had another question to answer, on which the challenged testimony was relevant: whether the prosecutors' opinions and actions attenuated the officers' causal responsibility for the prosecution. But generally in malicious prosecution actions alleging that a police officer provided false information to a prosecutor, what prosecutors do subsequently has no effect whatsoever on the police officer's initial, potentially tortious behavior. See Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 177 (2d Cir.2007) ([T]he chain of causation need not be considered broken if [a defendant government agent] deceived the subsequent decision maker or could reasonably foresee that his misconduct [would] contribute to an independent decision that results in a deprivation of liberty. (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 352 (2d Cir. 2000) (Even if the intervening decision-maker (such as a prosecutor, grand jury, or judge) is not misled or coerced, it is not readily apparent why the chain of causation should be considered broken where the initial wrongdoer can reasonably foresee that his misconduct will contribute to an `independent' decision that results in a deprivation of liberty.). Appellees rely on dicta suggesting that the independent judgment of a grand jury or public prosecutor might, in some circumstances, attenuate a complaining witness's role in causing or procuring a prosecution. See White, 855 F.2d at 962. This dicta merely acknowledges that a complaining layperson might not be responsible for a prosecution if prosecutors go forward based on independent, untainted evidence. As a result, it would not appear that it has any application where a police officer is alleged to have maliciously misled a prosecutor. See Higazy, 505 F.3d at 177; Zahrey, 221 F.3d at 354 n. 10 ([A] police officer who fabricated evidence and forwarded that evidence to a prosecutor (who used it against a defendant) would [be] liable for the consequences of his misconduct....); Llerando-Phipps v. City of New York, 390 F.Supp.2d 372, 383 (S.D.N.Y.2005) ([A]pplying the layperson standard to the police would mean that law enforcement officers would never be liable for malicious prosecution.... Although there is a presumption that a prosecutor exercises independent judgment in deciding whether to initiate and continue a criminal proceeding, an arresting officer may be held liable for malicious prosecution when a police officer creates false information likely to influence a jury's decision and forwards that information to prosecutors. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, the dicta has no application here, where the independent judgment consisted of no more than verifying some of the allegedly false information provided by the officers. The evidence about which Pangilinan testifiedthe security camera footage, the 911 calls, and the booking photoscould not on its own justify a prosecution, absent the information provided by Ramos and Rivera. Accordingly, the prosecutors' belief that the officers were credible, and that the photographs and 911 calls were consistent with the officers' version of events, could not have relieved the officers of causal responsibility. It follows that testimony as to that belief was not relevant to any element that Appellants needed to prove. Additionally, to the extent that a prosecutor's decision to continue a prosecution does represent an acceptance of a police officer's version of events, the character of that implicit vouching is far different from that of the testimony admitted in this case. It is one thing for a jury to infer that a prosecutor took a case to trial because she thought there was a basis for the case. It is another thing entirely for a prosecutor to state that she believed that photographs in evidence corroborated the events ... recounted by the police officers, and ... actually strengthened [the] prosecution, J.A. 504, a belief, significantly, that the prosecutor would not be permitted to state at the underlying criminal trial. And it is another thing again for a prosecutor to state that she had no reason to believe that anything [the complaining officers told her] was not accurate. J.A. 505. Such a statement goes well beyond the details of the officers' account and necessarily represents support for their general character for honesty. Furthermore, Appellees' theory misunderstands the function of a screening prosecutor in relation to a malicious prosecution claim. The prosecutor's actions do not supersede the complaining officer's actions; they only determine whether the officer's actions come to fruitionthat is, whether the officer committed the tort of malicious prosecution, or merely attempted to prosecute maliciously. Notably, in this case, Brandon decided not to prosecute Higgenbottom; that decision is not relevant to the question of whether the complaining officers were telling the truth regarding Higgenbottom's conduct. Similarly, a prosecutor's decision to pursue a prosecution has no more relevance to the complaining officer's credibility than the implicit relevance shared by all decisions to prosecute. Importantly, the rule that Appellees urge us to adopt would place inappropriate pressures on both prosecutors and plaintiffs. If all cases of malicious prosecution were taken to trial, and prosecutors were called to testify about why they had originally pursued certain charges, then prosecutors might be subjected to great, though perhaps tacit, pressure from cities and police officers to maintain even a weak prosecution in order to undercut any subsequent malicious prosecution claim. Similarly, plaintiffs who have legitimate claims of both malicious prosecution and other torts, such as false arrest (which almost always travels in malicious prosecution's sidecar), effectively would be forced to forgo their malicious prosecution claims. Otherwise, such plaintiffs would risk exposing all of their claims to highly prejudicial testimony from seemingly reputable sourcestestimony a district judge would not consider admitting in the absence of the malicious prosecution claim. For all these reasons, we hold that prosecutors' opinions as to probable cause and complaining officers' credibility are irrelevant in virtually all cases involving claims of malicious prosecution. In such cases, district courts remain bound by the rules of evidence that normally govern opinion testimony, and accordingly the District Court erred in allowing Peterson and the prosecutors to testify to the officers' credibility and to the existence of probable cause.
In this case, every factor that the Court considers in determining whether an evidentiary ruling was harmless counsels in favor of a new trial. First, the testimony bore on the two most important issues in the case: whether or not Ramos and Rivera were credible, and whether or not they had probable cause (a) to arrest Cameron and Higgenbottom and (b) to prosecute Cameron. Indeed, according to the jury charge, the only contested element of the false arrest claims was whether Officer Rivera and Officer Ramos had probable cause, while the only issues in the malicious prosecution claim were (a) whether Ramos and Rivera had probable cause and (b) whether they acted with malice (which, the charge stated, could be inferred if the officers acted without probable cause). J.A. 658, 664. Similarly, Pangilinan's and Peterson's testimony that the security camera photos were consistent with the officers' accounts unmistakably bore on the same set of crucial questions. Second, the improper testimony was not simply cumulative or corroborative. Rather, it provided strong external validation for propositions that otherwise would have come in only from the Appellees' mouths. Indeed, it told the jury what conclusions two prosecutors and a police lieutenant had drawn on the primary issues of the case, testimony that could hardly be considered duplicative of the other testimony the jury heard. The testimony is particularly significant because it came from ostensibly neutral government actors, whose opinions, understandably, will often greatly influence jurors. See United States v. Grinage, 390 F.3d 746, 752 (2d Cir.2004). Third, Appellees made use of the testimony in their opening statement and in summation. To be sure, as Appellees argue, these were only brief references. Appellees' Br. 40. Nevertheless, counsel's arguments did drive home the incorrect idea that Brandon, rather than Ramos and Rivera, had initiated the proceeding, and emphasized Pangilinan's inadmissible and irrelevant belief that it was appropriate to continue the prosecution against Ms. Cameron. J.A. 144. Fourth, Appellees' case was not particularly strong. It essentially boiled down to a credibility contest between the officers and the Appellants. Appellees' statements had changed over time, and disagreed with each other in some material respects. [7] In such a case, testimony from three impartial law enforcement agents that the officers were to be believed is surely highly prejudicial. For all these reasons, we cannot say with confidence that the erroneously admitted testimony was harmless. Accordingly, we must vacate the verdict and remand to the District Court for a new trial.
While much of the challenged testimony was inadmissible, not everything that these witnesses said should be prohibited upon retrial. It is therefore worth noting, in the interest of judicial economy, which particular pieces of testimony are inadmissible, and which the District Court has discretion to admit. Most obviously, testimony that a third party (such as a prosecutor or a police supervisor) found the defendants to be credible should be excluded. Similarly, there is no justification for testimony that anybody but the defendants themselves believed that probable cause existed to arrest or prosecute Cameron and Higgenbottom. As to Lieutenant Peterson, he testified about his personal observations when he arrived at the scene of the incident; such testimony seems entirely appropriate. [8] He also testified that, during the seven months preceding the incident, in which he supervised Officers Ramos and Rivera, he did not see [Ramos] engage in any type of inappropriate behavior. J.A. 351. This seems relevant to Appellants' Monell claim, as it goes to the question of whether Ramos's supervisors were faced with a pattern of misconduct and [did] nothing. Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 192 (2d Cir.2007). Peterson's testimony that he thought that [the police] had probable cause to effect the arrest and that he had no reason to doubt the officers' account of the facts that day, J.A. 353, on the other hand, should not be permitted upon retrial. The first comment bears on neither the Monell issue nor the false arrest and malicious prosecution claims. The second comment, while it does in some ways relate to the Monell issue, extends far beyond Peterson's personal observations of Ramos's behavior and discusses directly Peterson's opinion of her credibility. [9] Nor can we see any reason for allowing Peterson to testify regarding the security camera photos, which he saw [a] long time after this incident happened. J.A. 359. His opinion of how the pictures should be interpreted is entirely irrelevant, and his testimony on the subject added nothing that the jury could not see for itself by looking at the photos. As to ADA Brandon, her testimony regarding the substance of her interactions with Officer Rivera seems entirely proper. Her comments as to whether she had any reason not to believe Officer Rivera's account, and whether she believed that probable cause existed to arrest or charge Appellants, however, should be avoided on retrial. Regarding Brandon's testimony that it was her decision to prosecute Cameron, and that Rivera had no say in whether or not a criminal prosecution was initiated and that Rivera did not urge [her], encourage [her], or press [her] to proceed with the criminal prosecution, J.A. 271-72, we do not think that this testimony needs to be precludedif, that is, it is accompanied by the District Court's clear and correct instruction that Ramos's and Rivera's conduct sufficed as a matter of law to initiate prosecution. Whether the police officers aggressively sought prosecution, or only allowed the District Attorney's handling of the case to run its own course, seems probative on the important question of whether the officers acted with malice, and so the District Court would be within its discretion to permit the same testimony on retrial. Finally, as to ADA Pangilinan, she should not be permitted to testify to her legal conclusions about the case, or to her opinions of the officers' credibility. As with ADA Brandon, we see nothing improper in her testifying about her interactions with Ramos and Rivera insofar as they allow the jury to draw appropriate inferences one way or another as to the officers' malice. It also would appear to be permissible for Pangilinan to testify as to the content of the 911 calls and the booking photoCameron's demeanor and statements in the former, and her appearance in the latteras the photo and the tapes of the calls are no longer in existence and Pangilinan personally observed them. See Fed.R.Evid. 1004; Glew v. Cigna Group Ins., 590 F.Supp.2d 395, 413 (E.D.N.Y.2008) (Oral testimony has been admitted as secondary evidence, if the original is lost or destroyed.). [10] But she should not be allowed to state conclusions such as her opinions that the 911 calls corroborated the officers' version of events, that the security camera photos actually strengthened [the] prosecution, and that the booking photo supported to some extent continued prosecution of the case. J.A. 504-05.