Opinion ID: 2383520
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Principles Limiting Discretion in Assigning Parental Rights

Text: When properly exercised, a trial court's historic equitable discretion to assign parental rights and responsibilities is entitled to substantial deference. Ziehm v. Ziehm, 433 A.2d 725, 730 (Me.1981) (citing Cooley v. St. Andre's Child Placing Agency, 415 A.2d 1084, 1086 (Me.1980)). The court, however, may not do as it pleases. In discharging its responsibility to exercise its original equity jurisdiction over the custody of infants, the trial court must apply the substantive principles of equity. Roussel v. State , 274 at 925. A judge in discharging his sobering responsibility of deciding the care and custody of a minor child acts not at all as a mere arbiter between two adult adversaries, simply reacting to the evidence they may see fit to adduce in support of their respective positions. Rather, his function is that described in the oft-quoted words used by Judge Cardozo in Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925): He acts as parens patriae to do what is best for the interest of the child. He is to put himself in the position of a wise, affectionate and careful parent and make provision for the child accordingly.... He is not adjudicating a controversy between adversary parties, to compose their private differences. He is not determining rights as between a parent and a child or between one parent and another. He interferes for the protection of infants, qua infants, by virtue of the prerogative which belongs to the [state] as parens patriae. Ziehm v. Ziehm, 433 A.2d at 728. In Ziehm we not only identified the best interest of the child as the fundamental principle limiting the court's discretion in assigning parental rights, we adopted Justice Cardozo's explication of that principle. The trial court's guiding equitable principle in determining parental rights and responsibilities is not to effect an even-handed division between the parents. Its guiding principle is to act in the best interest of the child. Our legislature has mandated that historic equitable principle, to act in the best interest of the child, as the standard for custody determinations at divorce. 19 M.R.S.A. § 752 (1981 & Supp.1994). [2] Although we have said repeatedly that the delicate balancing of the factors set forth in 19 M.R.S.A. § 752 is left to the sound discretion of that judge who has the single opportunity to observe the individuals involved and therefore is in the best position to act on behalf of the State as a wise, affectionate, and careful parent, as the reviewing court here we must measure the trial court's balancing against a principled standard decreed not only by the historic traditions of equity but by our statute. We have said that as long as there is rational support for the trial court's determination of parental rights we will not overturn it. Sheldon v. Sheldon, 423 A.2d 943, 946 (Me.1980). But that rational support, the reason for the court's determination, must fall within the principle established by equity, articulated by Cardozo, and adopted by this Court. Just any reason will not do. Mere evidence on the record will not do. Discretionary justification is not a question of clear error of fact. A court is not free to disregard professional witnesses' advice without articulating a principled rationale, grounded in the best interest of the child, for having done so. A court is not free to seek to assign parental rights and responsibilities by balancing them equally between one parent and another. It is not enough for the court to simply declare its determination to be in the best interest of the child. The record in the instant case provides no rational support for the court's determination that it is in the best interest of this child to be divided equally between two warring parents.