Opinion ID: 1830890
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 25

Heading: the prosecutor's misconduct during the course of closing argument violated manning's right to a fair trial and warrants reversal.

Text: ¶ 44. Manning contends that the prosecutor made improper closing argument by vouching for the credibility of witnesses and misrepresenting the evidence. The record reflects that Manning failed to offer a contemporaneous objection to any of the complained-of comments at trial, so he is procedurally barred from raising this issue on appeal. Wells, 698 So.2d at 514. Furthermore, Manning's claims are not supported by the record. ¶ 45. [A]n advocate does not vouch for the evidence submitted in a cause; the tribunal is responsible for assessing its probative value. Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3, cmt. We have previously condemned personal vouching of witnesses by the prosecution. See Bell v. State, 725 So.2d 836, 852, 1998 WL 334709,  (Miss.1998). We have also warned prosecutors of the danger of reversal when they go outside the scope of the record during closing argument. Wideman v. State, 339 So.2d 1378, 1382 (Miss.1976). ¶ 46. Manning asserts that Mr. Allgood misrepresented Barbara Duck's testimony when he argued that Ms. Duck saw Manning around the crime scene at 6:20 p.m. In fact, Ms. Duck stated that the last time she saw Manning on the evening of the murders was around 4:00 p.m. when she left for Rock Hill. Manning argues that this misstatement of the facts was important, because Ms. Duck's testimony was used to impeach Manning's statement that he had not been at Brooksville Gardens on the evening of the murders. This argument fails on a common sense analysis. In Manning's statement to police, he claimed that he was not at Brooksville Gardens on the day or night of the murders. Ms. Duck's testimony impeaches Manning's statement whether she saw him at 4:00 p.m. or at 6:20 p.m.-either way she disputes Manning's contention that he was not there. Although Manning does not make the argument in his brief, the prosecutor's misstatement of Ms. Duck's testimony could be prejudicial to Manning's case if his intent was to place Manning at the crime scene closer to the approximate time of the murders. However, even if this were true, the State provided several other witnesses who saw Manning at Brooksville Gardens at different times on the day of the murders, between 3:00 p.m. and 7:20 p.m. Any resulting prejudice therefore fades in light of the tremendous amount of testimony placing Manning at the murder scene. ¶ 47. Manning also takes issue with the prosecutor's statement that Kevin Lucious would never be rewarded for his testimony. He maintains that this was a misstatement of the testimony, because Lucious only stated that he had not yet received any leniency in exchange for his participation. Manning's position simply is not supported by the record. Lucious attested that he had not made any deals with law enforcement or the prosecution to testify at Manning's trial. The prosecutor's comments on his lack of incentive for testifying, therefore, were within the wide range of acceptable argument. ¶ 48. Manning also asserts that the prosecutor misstated the evidence when he spoke of an eyewitness to the murders. The prosecutor never specifically argued that Lucious witnessed Manning murder the two women. The prosecutor called him an eyewitness, and Lucious was an eyewitness to Manning's forced entry into the victims' apartment. Again, the portions of closing argument of which Manning complains are not outside the scope of allowable argument. ¶ 49. Finally, Manning contends that the prosecutor improperly argued that Manning was an evil person bent on criminality. The prosecutor's exact language was, And Willie Manning has got brothers. One that he is trying to school in the fine art of killing people. This comment was related to Manning's conversation with his brother Marshon and Kevin Lucious at Club Essex, during which Manning stated that it ain't nothing to kill somebody and you know, sometimes you have to kill people in order to get your respect that you deserve. In Lucious's statement to police, he depicted the conversation as in general about Fly saying you had to kill people to get respect. Fly was trying to convince Marshon to be able to kill somebody. The prosecutor's comment that Manning was teaching Marshon about killing people was therefore based in the evidence. ¶ 50. Trial counsel is granted wide latitude during closing argument. Johnson v. State, 416 So.2d 383, 391-92 (Miss.1982). [T]he court cannot control the substance and phraseology of counsel's argument; there is nothing to authorize the court to interfere until there is either abuse, unjustified denunciation, or a statement of fact not shown in evidence. Id. at 391 ( quoting Gray v. State, 351 So.2d 1342, 1346 (Miss.1977) ( quoting Nelms & Blum Co. v. Fink, 159 Miss. 372, 131 So. 817, 820 (1930))). To constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct must be `of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial.' Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987) ( quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) ( quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976))). The prosecutor's closing argument in this case does not require reversal.