Opinion ID: 588143
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Summary Judgment Was Appropriate on the Title VII Claims.

Text: 6 This court reviews de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment. Hayes v. Otis Elevator Co., 946 F.2d 1272, 1277 (7th Cir.1991). When reviewing the decision, we must view the record and all inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Karazanos v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 948 F.2d 332, 335 (7th Cir.1991). We grant summary judgment if, when viewed in this light, the record presents, no genuine issue as to any material fact [such] that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). To determine whether a genuine issue exists in a Title VII case, we must consider both the substantive law of employment discrimination and the burden of proof under the applicable law. Mechnig v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 864 F.2d 1359, 1363-64 (7th Cir.1988). Applying this standard to Reed's case, we find that summary judgment is appropriate although we affirm on grounds other than those relied on by the district court. 7
8 The district court entered summary judgment on Reed's Title VII claims after finding that he had lied on his employment application. The court based its decision on Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir.1988), a case holding that an employer need not reinstate an employee if, absent the discriminatory firing, the employee would have been fired for violating company rules. We find Summers distinguishable from Reed's case. 9 In 1976, Reed was convicted of armed robbery. Two years after the conviction, Reed denied being convicted of a felony on a job application submitted to AMAX. The job application specifically stated that such falsifications were grounds for dismissal. 10 AMAX first discovered the falsified application during Reed's hearing before the IHRC. Because it discovered the misrepresentations after Reed's termination, AMAX could not use them as a justification for firing him; instead, it moved for summary judgment on the theory that the falsifications barred any potential relief under Title VII. The court agreed and granted summary judgment. 11 A court may grant summary judgment if it determines that the plaintiff is not entitled to his requested relief. See id. In Summers, for example, the plaintiff claimed that his former employer terminated him because of his age and religion. Id. at 702. After the suit was filed, the employer learned that the employee had forged one-hundred and fifty company documents. Id. at 704. The employer presented evidence showing that it could have fired the employee for the falsifications alone and that it would have done so. Id. at 708. Based on this evidence, the appellate court affirmed summary judgment, finding that the plaintiff was not entitled to a remedy because he would have been fired for the falsifications, if not for his age. Id. at 709. 12 The Summers case is not as broad as AMAX would have us believe. Summers and analogous cases require proof that the employer would have fired the employee, not simply that it could have fired him. See Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977) (requires proof that an employer would have fired an employee for constitutional reasons where an employee also fired for unconstitutional reasons); Summers, 864 F.2d at 705; see also Smith v. General Scanning, Inc., 876 F.2d 1315, 1319 (7th Cir.1989) (applicant not entitled to back pay and reinstatement where he never met the minimum educational requirements for his job). We must require similar proof to prevent employers from avoiding Title VII liability by pointing to minor rule violations which may technically subject the employee to dismissal but would not, in fact, result in discharge. 13 Unlike the employer in Summers, AMAX never proved that it would have fired Reed for lying on his application; it only proved that it could have done so. AMAX did not, for instance, provide proof that other employees were fired in similar circumstances. (Document No. 79 and attachments). We, therefore, may not affirm for the reasons given by the district court. 2 14
15 Although we cannot affirm the district court's decision based on Summers, this court may affirm on any ground that finds support in the record. See Box v. A. & P. Tea Co., 772 F.2d 1372, 1376 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 3311, 92 L.Ed.2d 724 (1986). Ironically, Reed's motion for summary judgment provides a basis for granting summary judgment in AMAX's favor. 16 In his motion, Reed claimed that he could prove race discrimination under the burden shifting test of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). McDonnell Douglas first requires the employee claiming discrimination to establish a prima facie case. Id. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the employee's treatment. Id. After this, the employee must show pretext. Id. 17 In an attempt to meet the requirements of McDonnell Douglas, Reed submitted affidavits and other evidentiary material. Because this evidence, along with the rest of the evidence in the record, reflects no genuine issue of material fact in Reed's favor, we find that AMAX is entitled to summary judgment. See McCarty v. United States, 929 F.2d 1085, 1088 (5th Cir.1991) (a court may allow summary judgment sua sponte against a nonmovant who has had the opportunity to prove the facts in dispute); Dayton Electric Mfg. Co. v. Apcom, Inc., 782 F.Supp. 389, 395 (N.D.Ill.1992) (same); see also Box, 772 F.2d at 1376 (this court may affirm summary judgment on grounds other than the district court's grounds if the losing party had an opportunity to submit evidence). 18
19 Reed failed to prove a prima facie case of race discrimination. To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show that (1) he was a member of a protected class (2) who was qualified for his job (3) but was discharged while those in other classes were not. Andre v. Bendix Corp., 841 F.2d 172, 175 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 855, 109 S.Ct. 144, 102 L.Ed.2d 116 (1988). If the plaintiff cannot meet one of the prongs of this test, summary judgment is properly entered in favor of the defendant. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Common v. Williams, 859 F.2d 467, 469 (7th Cir.1988). 20 To survive summary judgment, a party may not rest on the allegations in the pleadings; a bare contention that an issue of fact exists is insufficient to raise a factual issue. Billups v. Methodist Hosp. of Chicago, 922 F.2d 1300, 1302 (7th Cir.1991). A plaintiff raises adequate issues of fact when he presents evidentiary material which, if reduced to admissible evidence, may allow him to carry his burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2554-55. 21 The materials attached to Reed's motion for summary judgment fail to address a critical element of the prima facie case, whether AMAX treated its white employees differently than Reed. Even an independent review of the voluminous record 3 produced only weak evidence on the issue. A few documents, including Reed's own affidavit (Document 88) and an Illinois Human Rights Notice of Substantial Evidence, suggest a discrepancy but do not assert personal knowledge of the facts. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Others, including Reed's amended complaint (Document 85) and the IHRC complaint, contain unsupported allegations without any documentation. See Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 708 (3d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1023, 110 S.Ct. 725, 107 L.Ed.2d 745 (1990). To survive summary judgment, Reed should have provided the district court certified transcripts or affidavits from individuals with personal knowledge of the discrepancies. 22
23 Even if Reed had proven a prima facie case, he did not prove pretext. See Billups, 922 F.2d at 1302. An employer's proffered reasons for unequal treatment are pretextual if they are a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805, 93 S.Ct. at 1826. An honest explanation of the unequal treatment is not pretextual simply because it is poorly founded or unfair. Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 557, 559 (7th Cir.1987). 24 In Reed's case, the employer's proffered reason for the discrepancies was its planned-inadvertent sleep policy. Under this policy, employees who intentionally sleep on the job are treated more harshly than employees who mistakenly fall asleep. Reed claimed that the policy was a pretext because the defendant failed to notify the plaintiff and other employees of its alleged planned-inadvertent sleep policy. 25 Reed's claims about the sleep policy may establish unfairness, but not pretext. Reed presented absolutely no evidence proving that AMAX fabricated the policy to hide discrimination. See United Ass'n of Black Landscapers v. Milwaukee, 916 F.2d 1261, 1267 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1317, 113 L.Ed.2d 250 (1991). Thus, although we cannot allow summary judgment for the reasons given by the district court, we nonetheless affirm because Reed's claims do not establish race discrimination. 26