Opinion ID: 883726
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Occupational Disease Claim

Text: As a result of his back injuries, Wunderlich developed a degenerative disk problem. On July 31, 1992, Wunderlich filed a claim for occupational disease benefits with Lumbermens, Buttreys' insurer for Occupational Disease Act claims, presenting three opinions from medical doctors stating that he suffered from an occupational disease. Lumbermens denied his claim three times during the following year. In August 1993, following a determination by the Department of Labor and Industry that Wunderlich was entitled to occupational disease benefits, Lumbermens accepted liability. Wunderlich then demanded a twenty percent penalty based on Lumbermens' allegedly unreasonable delay in accepting his claim; Lumbermens refused to pay the penalty. Wunderlich petitioned the Workers' Compensation Court seeking both a twenty percent penalty and attorney's fees. He asserted that the Workers' Compensation Court's broad jurisdiction over workers' compensation and occupational disease issues authorized it to award a penalty pursuant to § 39-71-2907(1)(b), MCA, for an insurer's unreasonable delay in making occupational disease benefit payments due a claimant. The Workers' Compensation Court found that Lumbermens' denial of Wunderlich's underlying occupational disease claim was unreasonable, but concluded as a matter of law that it lacked jurisdiction to award the requested penalty. We review the Workers' Compensation Court's legal conclusions to determine whether they are correct. Bohmer v. Uninsured Employers' Fund (1994), 266 Mont. 289, 291, 880 P.2d 816, 817. Our resolution of this issue depends on whether the Workers' Compensation Court correctly interpreted several statutes. The function of courts in interpreting statutes is to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted. Section 1-2-101, MCA. If the intention of the legislature can be determined from the plain meaning of the words used, we may not go further and apply other means of construction. Murer v. State Compensation Mut. Ins. (1994), [267 Mont. 516], 885 P.2d 428, 430. Montana's Workers' Compensation Act specifically authorizes the Workers' Compensation Court to increase by twenty percent the full amount of benefits due a claimant if an insurer unreasonably delays or refuses to pay benefits. Section 39-71-2907, MCA. Montana's Occupational Disease Act, found at Title 39, chapter 72, MCA, contains no penalty provision. The legislature's inclusion of the straightforward penalty provision in the Workers' Compensation Act clearly reflects its intent to permit the Workers' Compensation Court to assess a penalty against an insurer in disputes under Title 39, chapter 71, MCA; the legislature's failure to include a corresponding provision in Title 39, chapter 72, MCA, just as clearly reflects the legislature's intent not to authorize assessment of such a penalty under the Occupational Disease Act. For that reason, we decline to insert a penalty provision into the Occupational Disease Act where one does not exist. Wunderlich asserts that the Workers' Compensation Court possesses broad jurisdiction over the determination of issues under both the Workers' Compensation Act and the Occupational Disease Act. On that basis, he argues that the plain language of § 39-71-2907, MCA, does not limit the award of a penalty to workers' compensation disputes, but encompasses and authorizes the award of a penalty in disputes arising under chapter 72. His argument is without merit. It is true that § 39-71-2905, MCA, gives the Workers' Compensation Court broad jurisdiction regarding the adjudication of benefits and other disputes under the Workers' Compensation Act contained in Title 39, chapter 71, MCA. See also, State, Etc. v. Hunt (1981), 191 Mont. 514, 519, 625 P.2d 539, 542. The court also is specifically authorized to award assessments and penalties expressly provided in chapter 71 for disputes arising under that chapter. Section 39-71-2905, MCA. Section 39-71-2907, MCA, contains such a penalty. In contrast, the Workers' Compensation Court's jurisdiction under the Occupational Disease Act is much more limited. There, the court reviews on appeal final determinations by the Department regarding occupational disease claims. Section 39-72-612, MCA. The review is statutorily circumscribed and, unlike the jurisdiction statute in the Workers' Compensation Act, does not provide express authorization to award assessments and penalties. Section 39-72-612(2), MCA. Pursuant to legislative enactment, the Workers' Compensation Court's jurisdiction under the Workers' Compensation Act differs substantially from its jurisdiction under the Occupational Disease Act. Broad jurisdiction pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act simply cannot be superimposed upon, and override, limited jurisdiction under the Occupational Disease Act. We conclude, therefore, that the court does not have jurisdiction to assess a § 39-71-2907, MCA, penalty in a dispute arising under the Occupational Disease Act. Thus, we hold that the Workers' Compensation Court did not err in denying Wunderlich's petition for a penalty based on Lumbermens' unreasonable delay in accepting liability for the occupational disease claim. Wunderlich's final argument relates to the Workers' Compensation Court's denial of his motion for attorney's fees pursuant to § 39-71-612, MCA. He argues that he is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to § 39-71-612(1), MCA, if this Court concludes that he is entitled to a penalty pursuant to § 39-71-2907, MCA. Because we have concluded that Wunderlich is not entitled to a penalty under § 39-71-2907, MCA, we need not address his attorney's fees argument. We also need not address the issue, encompassed in that argument, relating to the interpretation of attorney's fees as compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act. Affirmed. CHIEF JUSTICE TURNAGE, JUSTICES TRIEWEILER, HUNT and NELSON concur.