Opinion ID: 2736701
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Leon Robinson’s Claims

Text: Leon Robinson‟s main claim on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his mid-trial motion for severance because he and Shanika were presenting irreconcilable defenses. We have said that to demonstrate an abuse of discretion in such a denial of severance, an appellant “must show not simply prejudice, but that [he or she] suffered manifest prejudice from the joinder.”53 As a general matter, “„a trial court should grant a severance under [Criminal] Rule 14[54] only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would 53 Coleman, 948 A.2d at 544 (quoting Hammond v. United States, 880 A.2d 1066, 1089 (D.C. 2005)). 54 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 14. 44 compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.‟”55 It is true that the defenses presented by Leon and Shanika were incompatible: Leon denied being present at the scene of the robbery and murder, while Shanika put him there and implicated him as one of the two assailants (though she did not actually testify that he committed the murder). However, “[i]t is well-settled that mutually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial per se, and the mere fact that co-defendants‟ defenses are separate, distinct and antagonistic and that each may have a better chance at acquittal if tried separately is not sufficient for a grant of severance.”56 In numerous cases similar to this one, we accordingly have found no abuse of discretion in the denial of severance.57 55 Hargraves v. United States, 62 A.3d 107, 115-16 (D.C. 2013) (alterations omitted) (quoting Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993)). 56 Id. at 115 (internal quotation marks, ellipses, and footnotes omitted); see also Ingram v. United States, 592 A.2d 992, 996 (D.C. 1991) (“Unfair prejudice does not arise merely because defendants are mutually hostile and attempt to blame each other.”). 57 See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 601 A.2d 1060, 1063 (D.C. 1991) (holding that conflict between the defense asserted by defendant, that he was not 45 Leon has failed to make the strong showing of prejudice necessary to entitle him to a reversal of his convictions. He has neither indicated that a specific trial right was compromised nor adduced any reason to believe the jury was disabled from fairly adjudicating his guilt. The admission of Shanika‟s damaging testimony was not unfairly prejudicial, for she “testified under oath and was subject to crossexamination like every other witness.”58 And even apart from that testimony, the present at scene of robbery, and defense asserted by codefendant, that he was at scene innocently while defendant robbed victim, did not require severance); Lemon v. United States, 564 A.2d 1368, 1371 (D.C. 1989) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance when one defendant testified that she participated in robbery under duress and identified co-defendant as perpetrator and codefendant testified that he was not on the scene, when co-defendant was able to impeach credibility of defendant on cross-examination); Ready v. United States, 445 A.2d 982, 987 (D.C. 1982) (no abuse of discretion in denying severance when one defendant indicated that he “would testify that he shot into the air while appellant shot the victim[, while] Appellant, in sharp contrast, would present evidence that he had not been at the scene of the crime.”); Sweet v. United States, 438 A.2d 447, 450 (D.C. 1981) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance when defendant testified that he participated in criminal offenses due to coercion by co-defendant and co-defendant did not testify, though he presented alibi witnesses who testified that he was out of state at the time of the crime). 58 Hargraves, 62 A.3d at 116. As the Supreme Court has explained, [A] fair trial does not include the right to exclude relevant and competent evidence. A defendant normally would not be entitled to exclude the testimony of a former codefendant if the [trial] court did sever their 46 evidence of Leon‟s guilt was quite strong and well “beyond that required for the government to survive a motion for judgment of acquittal.”59 Accordingly, we reject Leon‟s severance claim.60 trials, and we see no reason why relevant and competent testimony would be prejudicial merely because the witness is also a codefendant. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540. 59 Hargraves, 62 A.3d at 116 n.29 (quoting Ingram, 592 A.2d at 997). 60 Leon presents two other claims on appeal that we may dispose of summarily. First, he asserts that the government violated his Sixth Amendment rights by conditioning its offer of a plea deal on its acceptance by both defendants. We have, of course, condoned the government‟s discretion to offer such “wired” pleas. See e.g., Benitez v. United States, 60 A.3d 1230, 1237 (D.C. 2013). Moreover, in this case, Leon was not prejudiced by the wiring, because his codefendant was willing to accept the plea offer; it was Leon himself who rejected it. Thus, he was not prevented from taking the deal by the condition that Shanika had to accept it too. Second, Leon contends the jury‟s finding that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, must be vacated because the jury was not instructed that it had to find that statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. However, recognizing that error, the trial court did not rely on the finding to enhance Leon‟s punishment, but instead sentenced him on the first-degree murder count to a term of imprisonment of 45 years, which is below the statutory maximum for that offense without a finding of aggravating circumstances. See D.C. Code § § 22-2104; 24-403.01(b-2)(1)(B) (2012 Repl.) (authorizing maximum sentence of 60 years‟ incarceration for murder in the first degree absent a finding of aggravating circumstances). Thus, Leon was not prejudiced by the error. On 47