Opinion ID: 109949
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Political Subdivision

Text: Section 5 requires federal preclearance only of those voting changes that are adopted either by a State covered under § 4 or by a political subdivision of such a State. Although § 14 (c) (2) of the Act restricts the term political subdivision to state institutions that conduc[t] registration for voting, last Term the Court ruled that the preclearance requirement of § 5 applied to the city of Sheffield, Ala., which is without authority to register voters. See United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, 435 U. S. 110 (1978). Sheffield had been given authority, however, to undertake a substantial restructuring of the method by which its government officials would be selected. [8] Thus, pursuant to a voter referendum, Sheffield had changed from a commission to a mayor-council form of government. Councilmen were to be elected at large, but would run for numbered seats corresponding to the two council seats given each of the city's four wards. The Court held that Sheffield was a political subdivision, in spite of its lack of authority to register voters. Today the Court states that appellants' contention is squarely foreclosed by our decision last Term in Sheffield. Ante, at 44. The contention that this local school board is not a political subdivision under the Act is foreclosed only because the Court now declares it to be so, as neither the holding nor the rationale of Sheffield applies to this case. The Sheffield decision was based on two grounds, neither of which is present here. First, the Sheffield Court relied upon congressional intent as derived from the Act's structure, the language of the Act, the legislative history of . . . enactment and re-enactments, and the Attorney General's consistent interpretations of § 5. 435 U. S., at 117-118. Second, the Court based its decision on the frustration of the Act's basic policy that would result if a State could circumvent the Act's provisions by simply withdrawing the power to register voters from all or selected cities, counties, parishes, or other political subdivisions. [9] There is nothing in the language, structure, or legislative history of the Act that suggests it was Congress' intent that local entities such as the Board were to fall within the reach of § 5; nor has the Court cited any consistent interpretation of § 5 by the Attorney General that supports the Court's holding. [10] Looking to the structure of the Act, the Court argues that whether a subdivision has electoral responsibilities is of no consequence in determining whether § 5 is applicable. Ante, at 45-46. Rather, it is said that this provision directs attention to the impact of a change on the electoral process, not to the duties of the political subdivision that adopted it. Ibid. Neither Sheffield nor any other decision of the Court suggests that § 5 applies to the actions of every local entity however remote its powers may be with respect to elections and voting. Indeed, the Court indicated the importance of direct power over elections in Sheffield when it repeatedly emphasized Sheffield's power over the electoral process. [11] See, e. g., 435 U. S., at 118, 120, 122, 127. A rational application of Sheffield would require consideration of whether the entity enacting a change had a substantial measure of authority over the way in which elections were held or over the right to vote. The city of Sheffield had such authority; the Dougherty County School Board does not. Although professing to find support in the legislative history of the Act, the Court cites no committee report or statement by any supporter of the Act that suggests a congressional intention to require federal preclearance of actions by local entities that are powerless to exercise any control over elections or voting. The Court does try to connect § 5 to school boards by references to legislative history that are entirely irrelevant. The Court neglects to make clear that each of these references pertained to a school board enacting changes in the way its members were elected, something the Dougherty County School Board is without authority to do. [12] See 121 Cong. Rec. 23744 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Stennis) (Any changes, so far as election officials were concerned, which were made in precincts, county districts, school districts, municipalities, or State legislatures . . . had to be submitted); Hearings on S. 407 et al. before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 467-470 (1975) (school board enacting changes from ward to at-large elections for its members); S. Rep. No. 94-295, p. 27 (1975) (school boards in Texas adopting [e]lection law changes to avoid election of minority groups to school boards). Furthermore, the Sheffield Court's concern over the possible circumvention of the Act is inapposite here, as the Board (unlike the city of Sheffield) has no authority to regulate the electoral process. There can be no danger, therefore, that substantial restructuring of the electoral system will take place in Dougherty County without the scrutiny of either the Attorney General or the District Court for the District of Columbia. Thus, none of the factors relied upon in Sheffield is present in this case: There is no relevant language of the Act, nothing in the Act's structure, nothing in its legislative history, and no consistent interpretation of § 5 by the Attorney General to support the extension of § 5 to the Board's enactments. Nor is it possible that a local school board that is without authority over the electoral process will be used to circumvent the Act's basic policy. There simply is no parallel in fact or governmental theory between a city like Sheffield and the Dougherty County School Board. Finding no support for its decision in the rationale of Sheffield, the Court falls back upon language in that opinion that all entities having power over any aspect of the electoral process are subject to § 5language merely expressing a conclusion drawn from a consideration of the factors present in Sheffield, but absent here. [13] The Board has no power over any aspect of the electoral process in the normal sense of these words. It did not purport by Rule 58 to regulate the appellee's election to the Georgia House of Representatives; it has been given no authority under Georgia law to do so. Rather, the Board merely has said to its employees that, if they choose to run for any elective office, the Board will not affirmatively support their campaign by paying their wages despite the neglect of their duties that inevitably will occur. Such neutral action designed to protect the public fisc hardly rises to the level of power over . . . the election process. In sum, I would reverse the judgment below on either or both of two grounds. The Dougherty County School Board is not a political subdivision within the meaning of the Act. Even if it were deemed to be such, the personnel rule at issue is not a standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting. As respectful as I am of my Brothers' opinions, I view the Court's decision as simply a judicial revision of the Act, unsupported by its purpose, statutory language, structure, or history.