Opinion ID: 2081667
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Detective Conner's Statement

Text: Starling next argues that the admission of Detective Conner's statement at trial violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent by creating in the jury's mind a negative inference from Starling's decision to exercise that right. Starling claims that the trial judge committed reversible error by failing to order a mistrial after Conner revealed on the witness stand that he had attempted to interview Starling. We review a trial judge's denial of a motion for a mistrial for abuse of discretion. [17] At trial, the State asked Conner if he was present while Michael gave his statement. Answering no, Conner stated that he was instead interviewing Starling at the time. Starling objected to Conner's testimony, claiming that the statement violated his right to remain silent and therefore warranted a mistrial. The trial judge denied Starling's motion, but sua sponte instructed the jurors to disregard Conner's reference to Starling. After Starling renewed this claim in a postverdict motion for a mistrial, the trial judge again denied Starling's motion, holding that Conner's testimony did not reasonably imply to the jury that Starling had invoked his Fifth Amendment rights. A mistrial is warranted where a defendant suffers egregious prejudice that cannot be remedied by a curative instruction. [18] Thus, a mistrial is mandated where there are no meaningful and practical alternatives to that remedy. [19] In conducting our review, we recognize that trial judges are in the best position to assess whether a mistrial should be granted. [20] The trial judge applied the Hughes v. State three-part harmless error analysis to determine if the statement incurably prejudiced the jury. [21] Finding that Conner's testimony failed to satisfy any of the three-part Hughes test, the trial judge determined that the statement's introduction constituted harmless error. [22] We agree. If Conner's testimony created prejudice that rendered all curative measures inadequate, a mistrial would be the appropriate remedy. But Starling's right-to-remain-silent claim, while addressing potential negative implications in the abstract, fails to address the remedial effects of the trial judge's curative instruction. Although Conner referred to Starling by name, he did not reveal any details about Starling's conduct or anything said during the attempted interrogation that could give rise to an uncontestable negative inference. In the absence of any indication that Conner's testimony irrevocably unfairly prejudiced Starling before the jury, we find that the trial judge's curative instruction effectively neutralized any potential prejudice to Starling that the jury may have inferred. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.