Opinion ID: 1768433
Heading Depth: 1
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Heading: Construction of Statutes

Text: KRS 533.030 provides for restitution when a defendant is given probation or conditional discharge. KRS 533.030(3) provides in pertinent part: When imposing a sentence of probation or conditional discharge in a case where a victim of a crime has suffered monetary damage as a result of the crime due to his property having been converted, stolen or unlawfully obtained, or its value substantially decreased as a result of the crime ... the court shall order the defendant to make restitution ... Restitution shall be ordered in the full amount of the damages.... (Emphasis added.) The statute is silent with respect to interest. Consequently, the construction and application of the statute are matters of law which are reviewed de novo. See Bob Hook Chevrolet Isuzu, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Transportation Cabinet, Ky., 983 S.W.2d 488 (1998). KRS 446.080 provides that all statutes shall be liberally construed with a view to promote their objects and carry out the intent of the legislature. It is the duty of the Court to give effect to the intent of the legislature as contained in the statutory language, considering the evil the law was intended to remedy. See Commonwealth v. Allen, Ky., 980 S.W.2d 278 (1998). The rule of lenity is qualified by the same statute. Commonwealth v. White, Ky., 3 S.W.3d 353 (1999). Cf. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 100 S.Ct. 311, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979), which provides that the rule of lenity applies when courts are uncertain about the statute's meaning and is not to be used in complete disregard of the purpose of the legislature. We recognize, as did the Court of Appeals, that at common law, criminal fines and penalties were not subject to prejudgment interest. Rodgers v. United States, 332 U.S. 371, 68 S.Ct. 5, 92 L.Ed. 3 (1947). At common law, interest was not allowed on judgments either. Powell v. Bd. of Ed. of Harrodsburg, Ky.App., 829 S.W.2d 940 (1991). The issue of prejudgment interest was not the subject of this appeal so we are limiting our opinion to the matter of post-judgment interest only. Here, KRS 533.030(3), clearly states that restitution shall be ordered in the full amount of damages. If restitution is to be considered full, it will need to include post-judgment interest in most cases. In this case, the amount of the restitution judgment and the period allowed for its payment means that the Jefferson County Public Education Foundation will suffer a substantial decrease in the value of its property and loss of the use of the funds unless interest is permitted. The argument that there is no express statutory authority for the imposition of interest is without merit here. The courts of other states may ordain specific statutory language is necessary to require interest, see State v. Akers, 435 N.W.2d 332 (Iowa 1989), but that is not the case in Kentucky. Many federal and state courts have ordered interest on restitution without specific statutory language. As an example, we look to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(a), which is similar to our statute in that it requires restitution of the full amount of the damages. United States v. Patty, 992 F.2d 1045 (10th Cir.1993), and United States v. Smith, 944 F.2d 618 (9th Cir.1991), upheld the payment of prejudgment interest on restitution ordered by a trial court. See also Government of the Virgin Islands v. Davis, 43 F.3d 41 (3d Cir.1994) and United States v. Rochester, 898 F.2d 971 (5th Cir.1990), which upheld both prejudgment and post-judgment interest on restitution orders. A number of state courts have also decided that interest can be properly included in restitution even though the restitution statutes make no specific mention of interest. People v. Law, 459 Mich. 419, 591 N.W.2d 20 (1999), upheld the grant of interest on criminal restitution. Dorris v. State, 656 P.2d 578 (Alaska Ct.App.1982), held that interest on restitution was proper since the purpose of the restitution statute is to make the victim whole. For other cases allowing interest as part of restitution see Ex parte Fletcher, 2001 WL 306916, ___ So.2d ___; Valenzuela v. People, 893 P.2d 97 (Colo.1995); People v. Acosta, 860 P.2d 1376 (Colo.Ct.App.1993); Ebaugh v. State, 623 So.2d 844 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1993); Woods v. State, 418 So.2d 401 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982); State v. Brewer, 296 Mont. 453, 989 P.2d 407 (1999); State v. Meyers, 571 N.W.2d 847 (S.D.1997); Rodriguez v. State, 710 S.W.2d 167 (Tex.App.1986). Commonwealth v. Bailey, Ky., 721 S.W.2d 706 (1986), sets out the purpose of restitution as follows: We also do not feel this is additional punishment exacted by the criminal justice system. It is neither imprisonment as envisioned by KRS Chapter 532, nor fine as set out in KRS Chapter 534. It is merely a system designed to restore property or the value thereof to the victim. It is not punishment to make the criminal give back something which was never his and which was obtained by him only by commission of a crime. Money is property which is capable of being converted. See Commonwealth v. Karnes, Ky., 849 S.W.2d 539 (1993). In order to give the statute full legislative intent, this Court interprets the language of the statute to include interest as monetary damage which, because it resulted from the theft and conversion of the property of the victim, must be included in the full amount of damages provided by the restitution statute. We cannot accept the argument by the Hearns to the effect that the legislature must have intended to exclude interest from other forms of restitution simply because it expressly imposed interest on restitution in the medicaid fraud statute, KRS 205.8467(1)(a). In the case of medicaid fraud, the damages can only be pecuniary. The forms of restitution contemplated by KRS 533.030 are not limited to money damages. Under KRS 533.030(3), a probated defendant can be made to work at a minimum wage and pursuant to subsection C, such a defendant can be made to return any undamaged property. The specific language of the medicaid fraud statute arises because only one type of restitution in that situation is available and it is money. The language of KRS 533.030 is more general in order to cover a variety of restitution situations, including monetary damages such as the cost of the loss of the use of money over a period of time. The conversion here resulted in the loss of the use of money for an indefinite period. The claim by the Hearns that no other Kentucky statutes refer to interest on restitution is misplaced because the statutes on which they rely are procedural in nature and do not relate to the duty of the trial court to determine the amount of restitution to be paid. KRS 532.160, the garnishment statute; KRS 532.162, which allows a lien on earnings; and KRS 532.164, which permits a lien on real property, merely provide mechanisms for enforcing collection and do not involve any determination of the amount or type of restitution. We find the other citations employed by the Hearns, namely, Powell v. Bd. of Ed. of Harrodsburg, Ky.App. 829 S.W.2d 940 (1991); Clayborn v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 701 S.W.2d 413 (1985); and Commonwealth, Dept. of Transp., Bur. of Highways v. Lamb, Ky., 549 S.W.2d 504 (1976), distinguishable and not applicable to this situation. The contention that the legislative intent underlying KRS 533.030 is only to promote rehabilitation and deterrence is unconvincing. The statute clearly authorizes restitution for the full amount of the damages. Such restitution is intended to fully compensate for the loss incurred, serves to emphasize the seriousness of the crime and to deter similar offenses in the future by not only these defendants, but other potential criminals. The imposition of interest in the restitution award serves the legislative purpose of deterrence and rehabilitation as well as making the victim whole. Including interest on the amount taken in a financial crime clearly emphasizes the seriousness of the crime and highlights the full criminal responsibility.