Opinion ID: 1545753
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Trial court's reference to an objection being preserved for appeal

Text: Appellant's next contention is that his judgment of sentence should be reversed because during trial, the court mentioned to counsel, with the jury present, that one of his prior objections was preserved for appeal. N.T. Feb. 5, 2007, at 93. Counsel spoke to the court at sidebar concerning the remark and requested a mistrial. The court denied the request, assured counsel that it would not use that phraseology again, and offered to give the jury a curative instruction. Counsel declined the offer because he felt that such an instruction might do more harm than good by highlighting the remark. See id. at 138-41. Appellant claims that the denial of the mistrial motion was prejudicial error. A mistrial is an extreme remedy that is only required where the challenged event deprived the accused of a fair and impartial trial. Commonwealth v. Boczkowski, 577 Pa. 421, 454, 846 A.2d 75, 94 (2004). The denial of a mistrial motion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 542 Pa. 464, 488-89, 668 A.2d 491, 502-03 (1995). Remarks that lead the jury to believe that it is not the final arbiter of the death penalty are impermissible, as they tend to minimize the jury's sense of responsibility for the verdict, and thereby undermine the Eighth Amendment's heightened need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 2636-37, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, a death sentence may not rest on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere. Id. at 328-29, 105 S.Ct. at 2639. In Commonwealth v. Baker, 511 Pa. 1, 511 A.2d 777 (1986), this Court applied the Caldwell rule in a situation where the prosecutor argued at length to the jury that, in view of the protracted appeals process, any death sentence would only be carried out, if at all, at a much later date, and only after the appellate courts had made sure that the defendant received a fair trial. See id. at 24, 511 A.2d at 789. Likewise, the Court in Commonwealth v. Jasper, 558 Pa. 281, 737 A.2d 196 (1999), vacated a death sentence because the trial court had informed the jury that, [s]omewhere down the line, if you do impose the death penalty, the case will be reviewed thoroughly. And after thorough review the death penalty may be carried out. Id. at 282, 737 A.2d at 196 (emphasis added). This Court reasoned that the trial court's remark amounted to telling the jurors that, while they may nominally impose a death sentence, the responsibility to decide whether it should be carried out rested elsewhere. See id. at 283, 737 A.2d at 197. See generally Commonwealth v. Chambers, ___ Pa. ___, ___, 980 A.2d 35, 55-58 (2009) (discussing cases). The Court in Commonwealth v. Uderra, 580 Pa. 492, 862 A.2d 74 (2004), on the other hand, affirmed a death sentence although the prosecutor told the jurors that you do not by your verdict give [the defendant] the death penalty, and urged them to find that the defendant had earned that punishment according to the scheme set down by the Legislature. While Uderra disapproved the district attorney's language, it noted that, in context, she was developing the statutory requirements for a death penalty and, furthermore, that the common pleas court repeatedly admonished the jury concerning its fundamental responsibility for the verdict. See id. at 527, 862 A.2d at 95. Presently, the trial court made a brief, one-time reference to a defense objection being preserved for appeal. Upon sidebar discussion with counsel, the court recognized that it should avoid such references in the future, but declined to award a mistrial. In the context of Appellant's lengthy retrial, this single reference was not so egregious as to have denied Appellant his Eighth Amendment rights. Although the remark may have alerted the jury to the fact that there would be an appeal, it was so brief and generic that it did not tend to undermine the jury's responsibility to determine the appropriate punishment. See Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 210, 555 A.2d 846, 856 (1989) (finding no Caldwell violation where the prosecutor made a reference to the appeals process that this Court deemed to be a generic one). See generally Chambers, ___ Pa. at ___, 980 A.2d at 59 (recognizing that there is no per se rule requiring reversal at any mention of the appeals process). The trial court's comment, moreover, was unlike the prosecutorial argument in Caldwell, in which the district attorney told the jury directly that its decision was not the final one. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 325, 105 S.Ct. at 2637. Finally, the fact that the court's remark was made during the guilt phase further distances this situation from that in Caldwell, where the offending comments were spoken just before the jury retired to deliberate on the sentence, and the Supreme Court's holding was accordingly predicated on its concern that a capital sentencing jury should proceed[] with an appropriate awareness of its truly awesome responsibility and of the gravity of its task. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 341, 105 S.Ct. at 2646. See generally Abu-Jamal v. Horn, 520 F.3d 272, 295-96 (3rd Cir.2008) (declining to extend the Caldwell rule to references to the appeals process made during the guilt phase of a bifurcated capital trial). In light of the above, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying Appellant's motion for a mistrial. [19]