Opinion ID: 853629
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Inconsistent and Unreliable Verdicts

Text: The defendant contends that the jury's verdicts, finding the defendant guilty of murder and neglect of a dependent, are internally inconsistent and therefore unreliable. The defendant argues that, in finding the defendant guilty of neglect, the jury found the failure to seek medical treatment caused Emporia's death and [the defendant's] negligence led to the need for medical treatment. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 19. The defendant also argues that, in finding the defendant guilty of murder, the jury found she knowingly killed Emporia and the beating, not the failure to seek medical treatment, caused her death. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 19. The defendant frames her argument as follows: Both of these propositions cannot be true. If [the defendant's] state of mind was merely one of negligence, she cannot be also guilty of Murder. If her state of mind was knowing, she was not negligent. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 19. Thus, the defendant argues that the defendant could not have knowingly caused Emporia's death under the murder charge and negligently caused her death under the neglect charge. When this Court reviews a claim of inconsistent jury verdicts, we will take corrective action only when the verdicts are extremely contradictory and irreconcilable. Jones v. State, 689 N.E.2d 722, 724 (Ind.1997). See also Hodge v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1246, 1248 (Ind.1997) (`Verdicts may be so extremely contradictory and irreconcilable as to require corrective action.') (quoting Jackson v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1232, 1234 (Ind.1989)); Butler v. State, 647 N.E.2d 631, 636 (Ind. 1995) ([T]his court will `review findings and verdicts to determine whether they are consistent; however, perfect logical consistency is not demanded and only extremely contradictory and irreconcilable verdicts warrant corrective action by this Court.') (quoting Hoskins v. State, 563 N.E.2d 571, 577 (Ind.1990)) (emphasis omitted). Furthermore, we will not attempt to interpret the thought process of the jury in arriving at its verdict, and perfect logical consistency is not required. Jones, 689 N.E.2d at 724; Butler, 647 N.E.2d at 636. See also Hodge, 688 N.E.2d at 1249 (`In resolving such a claim, the Court will not engage in speculation about the jury's thought processes or motivation.') (quoting Jackson, 540 N.E.2d at 1234). In this case, the State charged the defendant with knowingly killing Emporia Pirtle, by striking her with a wooden stick, thereby inflicting mortal injuries and causing her to die. To convict the defendant of murder, the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly killed Emporia. IND.CODE § 35-42-1-1. To prove that the defendant acted knowingly, the State had to prove that the defendant was aware of a high probability that the conduct would result in death. [6] IND.CODE § 35-41-2-2(b) (A person engages in conduct `knowingly' if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.); Powers v. State, 696 N.E.2d 865, 870 (Ind. 1998). See also Brown v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1010, 1021(Ind.1998) (The trial court could reasonably determine that by inflicting over twenty wounds Brown acted `knowing' that his actions could produce death.); Horne v. State, 445 N.E.2d 976, 979 (Ind.1983) ([A]n act is done `knowingly' or `purposely' if it is willed, is the product of a conscious design, intent or plan that it be done, and is done with an awareness of the probable consequences.). In determining whether a defendant was aware of the high probability that her actions would result in the death of the victim, the duration, severity, and brutality of a defendant's actions, and the relative strengths and sizes of a defendant and a victim, may be considered. Anderson v. State, 681 N.E.2d 703, 708 (Ind.1997); Gibson v. State, 515 N.E.2d 492, 496-97 (Ind. 1987). The State also charged the defendant with knowingly placing Emporia Pirtle in a situation that might endanger her life or health by failing to seek medical attention for her, which resulted in serious bodily injury and death. To convict the defendant of neglect of a dependent, the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, having the care of Emporia Pirtle, a dependent, by failing to seek medical attention, knowingly or intentionally [7] placed Emporia in a situation endangering her life or health. IND.CODE § 35-46-1-4(a). To convict the defendant of neglect as a class B felony, the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the neglect resulted in serious bodily injury. [8] Id. Under the dependent neglect statute, the level of culpability required for knowing behavior is that level where the accused must have been subjectively aware of a high probability that he placed the dependent in a dangerous situation. Armour v. State, 479 N.E.2d 1294, 1297 (Ind.1985) (applying IND.CODE § 35-41-2-2). Proof of this subjective awareness requires resort to inferential reasoning to ascertain the defendant's mental state. Barrett v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1112, 1116 (Ind.Ct.App.1996); Kellogg v. State, 636 N.E.2d 1262, 1265 (Ind.Ct.App.1994); Hill v. State, 535 N.E.2d 153, 154 (Ind.Ct.App. 1989). When there are symptoms from which the average layperson would have detected a serious problem necessitating medical attention, it is reasonable for the jury to infer that the defendant knowingly neglected the dependent. [9] Hill, 535 N.E.2d at 155. Also, in the context of care of a dependent, we have said that `[n]eglect is the want of reasonable carethat is, the omission of such steps as a reasonable parent would take, such as are usually taken in the ordinary experience of mankind....' White v. State, 547 N.E.2d 831, 836 (Ind.1989) (quoting Eaglen v. State, 249 Ind. 144, 150, 231 N.E.2d 147, 150 (1967)). The evidence adduced at trial demonstrated the following. On November 11, 1996, with a two-foot-long wooden rod, the defendant, a fifty-one-year-old woman, struck Emporia, a six-year-old girl, at least five times on the head and approximately fifty times on the shoulders, back, buttocks, arms, and legs. The defendant told the child to die. Record at 658. With both of her hands, the defendant choked Emporia, causing the girl to gasp. Immediately after the beating, Emporia had visible bruises all over her body, and she acted differently. Her mouth was swollen, and her lips were purple. She could no longer walk after the beating. Her older sister had to help her take a bath, and then she had to help Emporia walk from the bathtub to where she would sleep that night. The next morning Emporia was not breathing. The defendant wrapped Emporia in a sheet and bedspread and put her in the storage shed located outside the apartment, beside the patio. The defendant told Emporia's sister, Auinia, not to tell anyone or she would have to go to a foster home. For one month, neither the defendant nor Auinia mentioned Emporia's death to anyone. Finally, Auinia told their mother that Emporia was dead. On December 11, 1996, one month after the beating, paramedics responded to an emergency call and discovered Emporia's body in the shed. In finding the defendant guilty of murder and neglect of a dependent, the jury could logically conclude that the defendant knowingly killed Emporia (i.e., that she was aware of the high probability that her repeated striking of Emporia on the head and body with the rod would result in death), and that the defendant knowingly placed Emporia in a situation that might endanger her life or health (i.e., that she was subjectively aware of a high probability that she placed Emporia in a dangerous situation by failing to seek medical attention when the average layperson would have recognized the danger and sought help). The jury was not required to find, and in fact did not find, that the defendant knowingly caused Emporia's death under the murder charge and negligently caused her death under the neglect charge. Instead, with both of the charged offenses, the jury was required to find that the defendant acted knowingly. We hold, therefore, that the verdicts are not inconsistent.