Opinion ID: 3186961
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Material

Text: Sauter next argues that the plea agreement supplement was not material for Brady purposes, because there is no reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of Dvorin’s first trial would have been different. Dvorin responds that the testimony elicited at trial based on Derrington’s plea agreement did not convey that the government had promised Derrington to forego other charges, had agreed that his testimony and statements could not be used against him, and had agreed to file a motion for sentence reduction in the event it found Derrington’s assistance substantial. Further, Dvorin contends that the testimony elicited at trial did not convey that all of these promises were expressly contingent on Derrington’s testimony. “Evidence is material if there is ‘a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Brown, 650 F.3d at 588 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Spence v. Johnson, 80 F.3d 989, 994 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682). The district court held that the plea agreement supplement was material because although the jurors might have been aware during trial that Derrington cooperated with the government in his own case, they were not aware that Derrington had motivation to testify in Dvorin’s trial. The court concluded: “[b]ecause the undisclosed evidence undermined the credibility of the Government’s most important witness, . . . it was material.” We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s conclusion that this evidence was material. Derrington was a key witness and the only other alleged conspirator with Dvorin. During trial, Derrington testified that he was “cooperating with the . . . Government” and “hope[d] to obtain some leniency” at sentencing, but represented that he did not “get any promises from the 15 Case: 15-10142 Document: 00513429336 Page: 16 Date Filed: 03/18/2016 No. 15-10142 Cons. w/ No. 15-10183 Government in exchange for [his] testimony.” During cross examination, Dvorin’s counsel elicited testimony that Derrington was hoping to get favorable treatment from the court and the government based on his cooperation. But this testimony does not make clear, nor does the plea agreement itself indicate, that the government agreed to “file a motion urging sentencing consideration for Derrington’s cooperation if, in its sole discretion, it determine[d] that he ha[d] provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of others.” It is reasonable to conclude that evidence of such consideration would be more powerful than Derrington’s testimony that he merely hoped he would receive leniency, but had not received any promise from the government that he would. “[G]iv[ing] play to the trial court’s superior understanding of the trial, evidence, and witnesses,” United States v. Sipe, 388 F.3d 471, 480 (5th Cir. 2004), we affirm the district court’s holding that the withheld evidence was material, and thus conclude that Sauter violated Brady and Giglio.