Opinion ID: 1309215
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Cellmate Testimony

Text: Next, defendant contends that cellmate Donald Lee was a police agent/informant who obtained inculpatory statements from defendant in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. (Defendant has not challenged the admission of cellmate Hughes's similar testimony.) As will appear, the point lacks merit. 1. Facts. Defendant was incarcerated on unrelated criminal charges, and was represented by counsel on those charges. He was also deemed a prime suspect in the Salazar murder case, but he had not been charged with that offense. After his arrest, defendant had invoked his right to remain silent and had refused to talk with interrogating officers. Sergeant Dean Hess, in an unsuccessful attempt to obtain more incriminating information from defendant, monitored defendant's jail conversations, but learned nothing helpful. (The monitoring preceded our decision in De Lancie v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 865 [183 Cal. Rptr. 866, 647 P.2d 142], invalidating such practices.) Hess also attempted to find a suitable inmate to become defendant's cellmate and to report incriminating conversations. Hess eventually met with inmate Lee, who coincidentally was then sharing a cell with defendant. (Hess had met with Lee on a prior occasion when Lee had discussed an earlier assault upon him by other inmates and had requested protective custody, resulting in sharing a cell with defendant in a maximum security area.) Sergeant Hess and Lee each testified regarding this conversation. According to Hess, he explained to Lee that he hoped Lee would pass on information regarding defendant's statements, but he [Lee] was not instructed to do so. Hess advised Lee not to tell defendant that Lee had talked to Hess, who realized that legally he could not directly interrogate defendant nor could he use a police agent to initiate such conversations. Lee elaborated on the conversation with Hess. Lee was not directed to attempt to obtain information from defendant, but if I heard anything, that I might want to say later on, Lee was asked to inform Hess about it. Hess explained to Lee that he could not lawfully direct Lee to return to the cell and attempt to obtain any details, because that directive would be illegal. But Hess told Lee that if something important came up, Lee should decide whether or not to report it to Hess. Lee testified that he was never promised any reward or consideration for relating such information. He acknowledged, however, that informants frequently receive protection from assaults by other inmates. Lee himself, upon pleading guilty to an escape charge, received a two-year prison term with protective custody. But no evidence was introduced to show that such custody was granted in consideration of his cooperation with Hess. Lee eventually informed Sergeant Hess of several conversations with defendant regarding the Salazar killing. Lee explained that his sole motive for relating such information was to relieve my mind [of] what I heard. Lee testified at defendant's preliminary hearing that, among other things, defendant had admitted killing Tina Salazar with a knife because she had seen his face; defendant also admitted to Lee that he had molested other young girls. At the preliminary hearing, the magistrate denied defendant's motion to suppress Lee's testimony, finding that Lee was not a paid informant, that Lee was placed in defendant's cell accidentally, that Lee asked no questions of defendant nor forced any information from him, and that Lee's cooperation was given for his own conscious [conscience] sake and was not induced for any reason of police action. The magistrate further found that Lee was unsophisticated, direct, and honest in his answers. Lee disappeared following the preliminary hearing and was unavailable at trial. Accordingly, the prosecution was permitted to read Lee's preliminary examination testimony into the record. 2. No Sixth Amendment violation. (3a) A fair reading of the record indicates that, although Lee was not directed to initiate possible incriminating conversations with defendant, Lee was asked to listen to defendant's words and report to Hess any incriminating statements volunteered by defendant. Defendant contends that, accordingly, Lee was a police agent whose activities violated defendant's right to counsel and his privilege against self-incrimination. We disagree. The leading case regarding cellmate testimony is United States v. Henry (1980) 447 U.S. 264 [65 L.Ed.2d 115, 100 S.Ct. 2183], wherein a paid inmate-informant (Nichols) provided the government with information regarding defendant Henry's incriminating statements. As in the present case, the informant was told not to question defendant, but if defendant initiated any conversations, the informant was asked to pay attention to them. (P. 268 [65 L.Ed.2d at pp. 120-121].) Unlike the present case, however, the informant in Henry was not a mere passive listener or listening post, but instead made efforts to stimulate conversations with defendant, his cellmate. (See pp. 271 & fn. 9, 273 [65 L.Ed.2d at pp. 122-124].) Nichols's motive in eliciting incriminating responses from defendant Henry was heightened by a contingent-fee arrangement whereby the informant would be paid only if he produced useful information. (P. 270 [65 L.Ed.2d at p. 122].) The Henry court stated the Sixth Amendment issue was whether under the facts of this case a Government agent `deliberately elicited' incriminating statements from Henry within the meaning of Massiah [v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201 (12 L.Ed.2d 246, 84 S.Ct. 1199), proscribing postindictment monitoring of defendant's statements]. Three factors are important. First, Nichols was acting under instructions as a paid informant for the government; second, Nichols was ostensibly no more than a fellow inmate of Henry; and third, Henry was in custody and under indictment at the time he was engaged in conversation by Nichols. (P. 270 [65 L.Ed.2d at p. 122].) The court concluded that By intentionally creating a situation likely to induce Henry to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, the Government violated Henry's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. (P. 274, fn. omitted [65 L.Ed.2d at p. 125].) After Henry was decided, the high court reiterated its principles in Maine v. Moulton (1985) 474 U.S. 159 [88 L.Ed.2d 481, 106 S.Ct. 477], additionally holding that incriminating evidence concerning an existing, charged offense, obtained by a secret police informant while investigating an uncharged offense, was inadmissible at the trial of the charged offense. In the present case, as discussed below, the evidence at issue pertained to, and was admitted as proof of, the Salazar murder of which defendant had not been charged when the evidence was obtained. Moulton is thus distinguishable. Following Moulton, the court decided Kuhlmann v. Wilson (1986) 477 U.S. 436 [91 L.Ed.2d 364 [106 S.Ct. 2616], holding that Henry's principles did not apply where the police informant/cellmate merely listened to and reported the accused's incriminating statements, without engaging in questioning or other activity designed deliberately to elicit incriminating statements. In Kuhlmann, the prisoner previously had agreed with police to act as an informant, and had thereafter reported the accused's spontaneous and unsolicited incriminating statements to the police. The high court concluded that in order to make out a Sixth Amendment violation under Henry or Moulton, the defendant must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks. (Id., at p. 436 [91 L.Ed.2d at pp. 384-385, 106 S.Ct. at p. 2630].) Our court recently considered the scope of the Henry decision in People v. Whitt (1984) 36 Cal.3d 724 [205 Cal. Rptr. 810, 685 P.2d 1161], a case which preceded Kuhlmann. There, we stressed the importance of determining whether the state has created a situation likely to produce incriminating statements; in that regard we indicated that the state cannot avoid Henry's proscriptions merely by advising the informant to listen but don't ask. ( Id., at pp. 741-742.) On the other hand, we also observed that Henry is inapplicable to an informant who truly acts on his own initiative rather than on orders by the state. (Pp. 742-743.) Since in Whitt the investigating officer had no prior dealings with deLoach, the informant, who initially volunteered to relate the incriminating statements made by Whitt, Henry was deemed inapplicable even though the officer continued to accept deLoach's information after promising to talk to the prosecutor about deLoach's own sentence. (P. 744.) We observed that the foregoing promise was not conditioned upon the informant's continued assistance in providing such information, and that indeed no promise of leniency was obtained from the prosecutor. Thus, on these close facts it cannot be found that the police gave deLoach the incentive to obtain information from Whitt after July 8th, to such an extent that deLoach's conduct is attributable to the state. ( Ibid. ) Applying the principles of the foregoing cases, we conclude that the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress cellmate Lee's testimony. First, the information procured by Lee related to an offense other than the offense with which defendant had been charged. Defendant was originally arrested and confined in jail on an unrelated matter; no formal charges had yet been filed against him regarding the Salazar murder. (4), (3b) Although he was indeed a suspect in that murder, the prophylactic rules set forth in Massiah and Henry apply only to the attempt to gather incriminating information regarding the formal charges, because the defendant has a present right to counsel only as to those charges. As stated in Maine v. Moulton, supra , Incriminating statements pertaining to other crimes, as to which the Sixth Amendment right has not yet attached, are, of course, admissible at a trial of those offenses. (474 U.S. at p. 180, fn. 16 [88 L.Ed.2d at p. 499].) In the present case, defendant was evidently represented by counsel with respect to the charged offense for which he had been incarcerated. Cellmate Lee's conversations, however, did not involve that offense, and defendant cites no case suggesting that once an accused has obtained counsel with respect to one offense, all further interrogation must cease regarding other possible offenses. Second, even were we to hold that defendant's Sixth Amendment right had attached as to both offenses, we would still conclude that no violation of that right occurred here. The magistrate expressly found that Lee asked no questions of defendant nor forced any information from him. That being so, Kuhlmann v. Wilson, supra , applies and defendant's volunteered statements to cellmate Lee were admissible because they were not deliberately elicited by a police agent. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that defendant's Sixth Amendment claim under Henry must be rejected. 3. No Fifth Amendment violation. (5) For similar reasons, we reject defendant's Fifth Amendment claim under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974]. In light of the principles expressed in Moulton and Kuhlmann, supra, cellmate Lee had no obligation to advise defendant of his constitutional rights prior to engaging in conversations with him. (See People v. Whitt, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 745.) 4. The prosecution exercised due diligence. (6a) Defendant also objected to the use of Lee's preliminary hearing testimony on the ground that the People failed to demonstrate due diligence in locating Lee and securing his testimony at trial. A witness's prior testimony may be introduced if, among other things, he is unavailable as a witness at trial. (Evid. Code, § 1291.) Unavailability may be established by showing that the declarant is `Absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has exercised reasonable diligence but has been unable to procure his attendance by the court's process.' ([Evid. Code] at § 240, subd. (a)(5).) ( People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 311-312 [168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149].) The prosecution must make a good faith effort and exercise reasonable diligence to procure the witness's appearance. ( Id., at p. 312; see also Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 62-77 [65 L.Ed.2d 597, 605-615, 100 S.Ct. 2531] [good faith efforts involve taking reasonable steps to locate an absent witness, but do not include pursuing futile acts not likely to produce the witness for trial].) In the present case, Lee testified at the preliminary hearing in March and April 1979. Trial, however, did not commence until September 1981, a delay in part attributable to pretrial proceedings culminating in Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1 [168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301]. By that time, Lee had become unavailable and, accordingly, the People moved to use his preliminary hearing testimony. The trial court conducted an extensive hearing aimed at determining whether the People exercised due diligence in attempting to procure Lee as a trial witness. The court concluded that due diligence was shown, a finding supported by substantial evidence. Thus, the record discloses that, at some point during the two-and-one-half-year interval between the preliminary hearing and the trial, Lee's whereabouts became unknown. More than one month before Lee's trial testimony was needed, investigators from the district attorney's office attempted to locate him. Learning that Lee had been released on interstate parole to Oklahoma authorities, the investigators made further inquiries and learned that Lee's Oklahoma parole had terminated and that Oklahoma authorities were unaware of Lee's present location. Attempts to locate or call Lee's parents and in-laws were unsuccessful. Records from the Oklahoma police and Federal Bureau of Investigation were consulted to no avail. The Oklahoma officers cooperated in attempting to find Lee by following numerous leads, making various telephone calls and checking arrest and drivers' license records. The People's investigators made, by defendant's own count, approximately 17 telephone calls to various sources in a vain attempt to uncover Lee's whereabouts. This number does not include additional calls by local authorities in Oklahoma. On hearing the foregoing evidence regarding the prosecution's efforts to locate Lee, the trial court indicated that it would allow Lee's preliminary hearing testimony unless the defense could convince the court to disallow it. (I'm inclined to think the burden kind of is with you, Mr. Trudell, to show me why I shouldn't allow the testimony.) [3] Defense counsel then testified that at one point the district attorney had informed him that the People had located Lee, a remark which assertedly induced defense counsel to terminate his efforts to find Lee. The district attorney, however, testified in response that he simply told counsel he was hopeful of locating Lee. Following additional argument by counsel, the trial court granted the People's motion to read Lee's preliminary hearing testimony into the record, expressly finding that the People had exercised due diligence in attempting to locate Lee. The court, learning that defense counsel likewise had not been in contact with Lee at any time during the period in question, also denied defendant's motion for a continuance for the purpose of attempting to find Lee. Defendant now argues that the People's efforts failed to reflect due diligence. He contends that the People should have either attempted to subpoena Lee while he was still in this state, or pursued other investigative leads, including Lee's employers or state agencies that might be his means of support, and state mental hospitals where Lee, previously hospitalized for treatment, might be confined. (Defendant does not assert that pursuing those inquiries would have been successful.) Defendant argues that at least the People should have kept in periodic contact with Lee as soon as he was released from prison in California. (7) We have held that the question of due diligence is a factual one depending on the circumstances in each case, and that the trial court's determination of the issue will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing of an abuse of discretion. ( People v. Enriquez (1977) 19 Cal.3d 221, 235 [137 Cal. Rptr. 171, 561 P.2d 261, 3 A.L.R.4th 73]; see People v. Jackson, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 311-312.) In People v. Louis (1986) 42 Cal.3d 969, 984-989 [232 Cal. Rptr. 110, 728 P.2d 180], we suggested (but did not decide) that an appellate court should independently review the record on the due diligence issue. (6b) In any event, in the present case, whether the abuse of discretion or the independent review test is used, the trial court's finding of due diligence should be upheld. First, we could not properly impose upon the People an obligation to keep periodic tabs on every material witness in a criminal case, for the administrative burdens of doing so would be prohibitive. Moreover, it is unclear what effective and reasonable controls the People could impose upon a witness who plans to leave the state, or simply disappear, long before a trial date is set. Certainly, resort to the subpoena or material witness processes would have been premature in this case. In Louis, supra, we held that if a particular witness's testimony is deemed critical or vital to the prosecution's case, the People must take reasonable precautions to prevent the witness from disappearing. (42 Cal.3d at pp. 989-991.) There, the People honored witness Tolbert's own request for an own recognizance release on theft charges, knowing of a substantial risk that this important witness would flee. Because the People failed to take adequate preventative measures, such as holding Tolbert as a material witness pending defendant Louis's trial, no due diligence was shown. ( Id., at pp. 992-993, fn. 8.) In the present case, unlike Louis, witness Lee's probable trial testimony would not have been so vital to the prosecution's case, because it was largely cumulative of cellmate Hughes's testimony. More important, due process principles obviously would not have permitted holding Lee as a material witness during the two-and-one-half-year period that elapsed following his preliminary examination testimony. (The material witness provisions of the Penal Code are limited to requiring a bond to secure the witness's appearance, and a maximum 10 days in custody for failure to post such a bond. See also Cal. Const., art. I, § 10, forbidding the unreasonable detention of witnesses.) We conclude that the trial court's ruling should be sustained. (8) We similarly reject defendant's related argument that even if due diligence were shown, the admission of preliminary examination testimony of inherently unreliable cellmate testimony violates constitutional confrontation rights where the cellmate declarant becomes unavailable to testify at trial. Our prior cases make clear that (1) cellmate testimony is not inherently unreliable (see People v. Alcala, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 623-624), and (2) a criminal defendant's constitutional confrontation right is not absolute, and is not infringed by use of his prior testimony where the declarant is unavailable at trial and his prior testimony was subject to cross-examination by the defendant ( People v. Enriquez, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 235).