Opinion ID: 2631630
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Permanent Involuntary Guardianship

Text: [¶41] In her second issue, Mother claims that the district court's order establishing the permanent guardianship of MEO violated her fundamental parental rights. She claims that guardianship of a minor should only be awarded to a non-parent over the objection of the parent if it is proven that the parent is unfit. Mother claims that because she was found to be a fit parent, no guardianship was necessary. In response, Grandparents state that the pertinent statutory language is plain and unambiguous in requiring only a best interests analysis. [¶42] Under Wyoming's guardianship statutes, the district court may appoint a guardian for a proposed minor ward when it finds that the ward's status as a minor and the necessity for the appointment of a guardian have been prove[n] by a preponderance of the evidence. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-104(a). When making an appointment, the district court must articulate its findings regarding the necessity of the guardianship. In re McNeel, ¶ 24, 109 P.3d at 518. [¶43] The parties disagree whether a minor's best interests, in the absence of a finding of parental unfitness, may create a necessity for a guardianship. Mother claims that unless a parent is unfit, a guardianship is not authorized. According to Grandparents, a minor's interests trump the interests of the parent. Grandparents contend that Mother's rights have not been infringed to a substantial degree because the guardianship is a temporary, court-monitored custody arrangement that did not sever Mother's parental rights. Additionally, they argue that Mother's statutory interpretation is faulty because it injects language into the statute that is not there. Grandparents assert that the plain language of the statute does not require that the district court make any finding concerning parental unfitness. Grandparents insist that the only standard in a guardianship proceeding is the minor's best interests. Thus, they conclude that necessity for a guardianship arises solely from an analysis of a minor's best interests. [¶44] The district court identified two possible standards for finding the necessity for a guardianship: 1) a finding of parental unfitness; or 2) a finding that it would be in the best interests of MEO. The district court found that either standard seemed to be supported by Wyoming case law. In its decision letter, the district court determined: It is apparent from [ In re Kosmicki, 468 P.2d 818, 823-824 (Wyo. 1970)] that Wyoming, first, recognizes a presumption that the best interests of the child are served by establishing a parent as the guardian. Second, courts are to consider the evidence regarding whether that parent is unfit or if the best interests of the child are better served by placement with an alternate guardian. Essentially, the parent enters the proceedings with the presumption in her favor; the guardians then must demonstrate, pursuant to the statutory standard, that the parent is not fit or that it is not in the child's best interests to return to the parent. . . . Wyoming has determined the Court should continue with a best interests analysis in light of the concept that the interests of the parent are secondary to the interests of the child[.] (Emphasis in original and footnote omitted.) The district court quoted language from Morris v. Jackson, 212 P.2d 78, 82 (Wyo. 1949), stating ... the child's welfare is the supreme consideration, irrespective of the rights and wrongs of its contending parents, although the natural rights of the parents are entitled to due consideration. Additionally, the district court opined that a fifteen-year-old child could request appointment of her own guardian by filing a voluntary petition under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-105 (LexisNexis 2003), requiring a determination of the child's best interests. [¶45] The district court concluded that it was required to apply both standards. First, it would determine if Mother had been proven to be an unfit parent. If Mother was not unfit, the district court would next consider, whether it would be in [MEO]'s best interests that she remain with her grandparents in any event. Following that analysis, the district court found that Mother was not unfit but concluded that a guardianship was in MEO's best interests. Mother claims that this two-part analysis was flawed. She argues that once the issue of her fitness was resolved in her favor, the district court should not have proceeded to analyze MEO's best interests. Mother contends that if a parent is fit, there can be no finding that a guardianship for the child is necessary under § 3-2-104. [¶46] The necessity for appointment of a guardian is not further defined in the guardianship statutes. The term necessity means the condition or quality of being necessary or the state . . . of being in need. American Heritage College Dictionary 929 (4th ed. 2004). Necessary generally means essential or required. [13] When appointing a guardian, the district court must state its findings concerning the reasons why the ward is in need of a guardian. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-104(b)(i). [¶47] A parent is the natural guardian of her child. State ex rel. Klopotek, 621 P.2d at 227. For a minor, a court appointed guardian assumes the role of a parent. That relationship is described in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-201(e), which provides: The guardian of a minor has the powers and responsibilities of a parent who has not been deprived of custody of his unemancipated minor child. A determination by a district court that a minor is in need of a plenary guardian is, therefore, akin to a finding that the minor needs a parent. [¶48] Here, the district court found that MEO was in need of a guardian. However, this finding was accompanied by a finding that Mother was not unfit. The district court concluded: Simply stated, the Court does not believe that the record in this matter would support a finding that [KO] is an unfit mother. ... The Court concludes, therefore, that [KO] is not an unfit parent and that grounds for continuation of this guardianship do not exist on this basis. Despite Mother's apparent ability and willingness to parent MEO, the district court determined that Grandparents should have that role. The district court justified that decision by concluding that it would be in MEO's best interests. [¶49] Throughout their argument, Grandparents emphasize the district court's findings that Mother did not serve MEO's best interests to the same extent they have. In essence, they contend their ability to provide more for MEO supported the necessity for a different custodial arrangement for MEO. They urge us to defer to the district court's discretionary appointment and affirm the guardianship. However, Grandparents fail to recognize the constitutional implications of reading the statute in this way. [¶50] The constitutional protections afforded to parents are not reserved for those who are perfect. The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents . . . . Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753-54, 102 S.Ct. at 1394-95. Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. Id. [S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason . . . to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2061, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). [14] [¶51] The district court's determination that a guardianship was warranted was based solely upon an analysis of MEO's best interests. However, courts have denounced use of the best interests standard as the sole justification for altering a family unit, finding it at odds with a parent's rights. We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended [if] a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best interest. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 554, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978) (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-863 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment)). Our case law does not permit destruction of a natural parent's fundamental right to the custody of his or her child based simply on the subjective determination of that child's best interest. Were we to allow such a result, the implications are obvious. Is it in a child's best interest that he or she be raised in an affluent family as opposed to an impoverished family? Would it be better that a child be raised by extremely intelligent parents rather than people of average intelligence? Is a child better off if that child is raised in a conventional life style rather than an unconventional life style? All of these factors could arguably be considered in determining the child's best interests. However, none even remotely justify denying a parent's constitutional and fundamental right to the custody of his or her child. In re Parenting of J.N.P. v. Knopp, 27 P.3d 953, 958 (Mont. 2001). Indeed, ... the best interests standard, taken to its logical conclusion, would place the minor children of all but the `worthiest' members of society in jeopardy of a custody challenge. Carla R. v. Tim H. (In re D.J.), 682 N.W.2d 238, 245 (Neb. 2004). [¶52] Grandparents attempt to avoid constitutional implications by characterizing the guardianship as a minor infringement upon Mother's parental rights. They deem it significant that Mother's rights have not been terminated and that she retained residual rights over MEO. Although we agree that Mother's rights have not been terminated, we disagree that the infringement upon her rights is minimal. Pursuant to § 3-2-201(e), Grandparents essentially replaced Mother in MEO's daily life. Losing custody of a child to a non-parent alters the parent-child relationship: Under ordinary circumstances, a custody action by a third party against a natural parent is more like a termination action than a custody action between biological parents. Although visitation may be preserved, such an award destroys any pretense of a normal parent-child relationship and eliminates nearly all of the natural incidents of parenthood including the everyday care and nurturing which are part and parcel of the bond between a parent and child. Zack v. Fiebert, 563 A.2d 58, 63 (N.J.Super.A.D. 1989). Custody may imply a temporary arrangement that theoretically could be changed as future circumstances might warrant. But a change of custody may result in . . . a severance of child-parent ties . . . . The day to day contact between the child and one having custody can create a relationship that may leave the birth parent almost an intruder. All of the day to day interactions between a parent and child are bound to be diminished if not eliminated where the parent comes on the scene as a court permitted visitor. Barstad v. Frazier, 348 N.W.2d 479, 483 (Wis. 1984). Contrary to Grandparents' assertions, the guardianship drastically changed Mother's relationship with MEO and impacted her fundamental parental rights. [¶53] The district court relied on several Wyoming decisions that predate significant parental rights cases such as Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), and Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). It is not surprising, then, that the decisional framework in those older cases is not cast in terms of a parent's fundamental rights. This Court did not condone removal of a child from a fit parent in any of the cases relied upon by the district court. Although we have sometimes described the child's best interests as having constitutional preeminence, we have done so in light of an adjudication of neglect or abuse, elevating the child's interests above the individual claims of the parent. E.g., In Interest of MKM, 792 P.2d 1369, 1375 (Wyo. 1990) (minor was adjudicated a neglected child). [¶54] The district court also suggested that the best interests standard was appropriate because of pending voluntary guardianship proceedings that would be determined by the best interests standard pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-105. [15] However, MEO's petition for appointment of her own guardian cannot, by itself, defeat her Mother's legal right to custody and control. State ex rel. Klopotek, 621 P.2d at 226-228. [¶55] We must determine the standard for appointment pursuant to § 3-2-104 with an understanding of the nature of a guardianship of a minor and in a manner that does not offend rights protected by the constitutions of our state and nation. With due regard for these considerations, we conclude that, in the context of an involuntary guardianship proceeding where the proposed ward is a minor, a best interests inquiry is not triggered until the district court determines that the minor needs a guardian. A child with a parent has a natural guardian and is not in need of a court-appointed guardian, unless the court determines that the child's natural guardian is not fit. Thus, [o]nce the natural parent is deemed fit, the issue of custody is decided. Kay v. Rowland, 331 S.E.2d 781, 782 (S.C. 1985). [¶56] In this case, the district court did not find that Mother was an unfit parent. At that point, Grandparents' petition should have been denied. In the absence of a finding of parental unfitness, the district court's finding that a guardianship was necessary for MEO was clearly erroneous. The district court erred by establishing the permanent plenary guardianship. [16]