Opinion ID: 657239
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Untimely Brady Disclosures and Prosecutorial Misconduct

Text: 13 Woodley argues that prosecutorial misconduct and untimely disclosure of exculpatory evidence prejudiced his defense, requiring reversal. Alternatively, he contends that the court should have used its supervisory powers to dismiss the indictment. 14
15 Woodley asserts that the late disclosures prejudiced his defense in two ways: (1) he was unable to refer to some documents in his opening statement and (2) he could not prepare adequately his experts before trial. 16 Contrary to the government's assertion, we find that these prejudice claims were timely raised. No bright line rule exists to determine whether a matter has been properly raised at trial. Rather, the argument must be raised sufficiently for the trial court to rule on it. In re E.R. Fegert, Inc., 887 F.2d 955, 957 (9th Cir.1989). Woodley moved for judgment of acquittal or for a new trial based partly on the government's actions. The court had an opportunity to review the validity of its prior orders. 17 We review de novo challenges to a conviction based on alleged Brady violations. United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir.1991). Evidence is material under the Brady rule only if there is a reasonable probability that, had [it] been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1984). Although disclosure must be made when it is still of substantial value to the accused, the prosecution need not produce Brady material before trial. Aichele, 941 F.2d at 764. 18 Woodley was not materially prejudiced. He used all of the disputed evidence effectively at trial. See United States v. Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir.1988). The court also took the unusual step of allowing him to depose witnesses linked to the Fay letter. The court's action cured any potential for resulting prejudice. 19
20 Woodley argues that the court erred in failing to dismiss his indictment under its supervisory powers. We are divided as to whether the denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment is reviewed de novo or for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Lunstedt, 997 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir.1993). We need not decide which standard applies here because we affirm the ruling under either standard. Id. 21 A court may use its supervisory powers to dismiss an indictment for three reasons:  to remedy the violation of recognized rights, to deter illegal conduct and 'to preserve judicial integrity by ensuring that a conviction rests on appropriate considerations validly before the jury.'  United States v. Garza-Juarez, 992 F.2d 896, 905 (9th Cir.1993). 22 The Court's power to dismiss an indictment [for] prosecutorial misconduct is ... rarely invoked. United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 881 (9th Cir.1979). Dismissing an indictment is so intrusive on a prosecutor's charging authority that it is justified only when the government's conduct substantially prejudiced the defendant and the government flagrantly disregarded the limits of professional conduct. United States v. Lopez, 989 F.2d 1032, 1041 (9th Cir.1993), amended and superseded, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir.1993). 23 Judge Zilly clearly was irritated and concerned by the government's untimely disclosure of Brady material, its misrepresentation to the court and its inadequate investigation of the Health Care Financing Administration files. But he found that the government's conduct was not widespread or flagrant. He also did not believe that such actions demonstrated a long-standing pattern of misconduct or that they prejudiced Woodley. He concluded correctly that these actions did not affect the trial's outcome substantially.II. Void for Vagueness 24 Woodley's mail fraud convictions were based on a violation of the related-party regulation. 1 42 C.F.R. Sec. 413.17 (1992). This regulation limits reimbursement to providers from related suppliers. Woodley argues that the convictions should be dismissed because the related party regulation as applied is void for vagueness and violates due process. His argument is meritless. 25 Whether a statute or regulation is unconstitutionally vague is a question of law, which we review de novo. United States v. Helmy, 951 F.2d 988, 993 (9th Cir.1991) (inner quotations omitted), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2287, 119 L.Ed.2d 211 (1992). 26 a. Regulatory Reimbursement Scheme 27 As White Pine's operator, Imperial was a provider of services under the Medicare Act. Its rent payments were reimbursable. 42 C.F.R. Sec. 413.130(b). 28 If a provider receives services from a related organization, its repayment is limited to the supplier's cost, not the provider's expended amount. 42 C.F.R. Sec. 413.17(a). The regulation limits a related party's rental reimbursement to the related supplier's actual costs, such as depreciation, mortgage interest and taxes. Organizations are related by common ownership or control. 42 C.F.R. Sec. 413.17(b)(1)-(3). 29 b. Analysis 30 Woodley argues that 42 C.F.R. Sec. 413.17 as applied violated due process because (1) its application to these facts is unsettled, (2) it gives no warning of what is permitted, and (3) it permits arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 31 He relies on United States v. Dahlstrom, 713 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 980, 104 S.Ct. 2363, 80 L.Ed.2d 835 (1984). We have limited Dahlstrom as a case barring the [p]rosecution for advocacy of a tax shelter program in the absence of any evidence of a specific intent to violate the law because such prosecution is offensive to the first and fifth amendments. United States v. Schulman, 817 F.2d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir.1987) (alteration in original) (inner quotations omitted), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 813, 111 S.Ct. 51, 112 L.Ed.2d 27 (1990). 32 The critical question is whether the related party regulation is unconstitutionally vague [because] it fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence with notice of its meaning and the conduct it prohibits. Helmy, 951 F.2d at 993. 33 The Health Care Financing Administration concedes that the related party regulation is difficult to apply and may be susceptible to misinterpretation and to subjective decisions. 44 Fed.Reg. 5479 (Jan. 26, 1979). It proposed revisions to eliminate the regulation's subjective application, but withdrew them to retain flexibility. 46 Fed.Reg. 5006 (Jan. 19, 1981). 34 Notwithstanding these comments, we have on occasion clarified significant ownership as used in the related party regulation. See e.g., American Hosp. Management Corp. v. Harris, 638 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir.1981) (hospital, as lessee, not entitled to full rent reimbursement where 16 partners in lessor limited partnership owned 50% of hospital); Goleta Valley Community Hosp. v. Schweiker, 647 F.2d 894 (9th Cir.1981) (parties related because seven hospital trustees had 70% interest in provider subsidiary). 35 Shaw and Woodley controlled 66% of the trust as co-trustees and 100% of Imperial. A person of ordinary intelligence would know this amounted to significant ownership and control under the regulations, the case law and the Provider Reimbursement Manual. Attorney Woodley had fair warning that his actions were prohibited. 36 The regulations do not allow arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. A good-faith claim for reimbursement, made without intent to defraud the government, would not support a conviction. United States v. Alemany Rivera, 781 F.2d 229, 233 (1st Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1086, 106 S.Ct. 1469, 89 L.Ed.2d 725 (1986). The challenged regulation provides minimal guidelines to govern its enforcement. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983). Any uncertainty over the relatedness of the parties bears on the issue of requisite intent. Without the requisite intent, Woodley would not have been convicted. 37 Because some experts may have reached conflicting opinions at trial does not render the regulation void for vagueness. [M]arginal cases in which it is difficult to determine the side of the line on which a particular fact situation falls is no sufficient reason to hold the language too ambiguous to define a criminal offense. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7, 67 S.Ct. 1538, 1542, 91 L.Ed. 1877 (1947). 38