Opinion ID: 3012319
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statutory Fraud Claims

Text: Appellants next argue that the district court erred in applying the economic loss doctrine to their fraud claims under the UTPCPL. Ford responds that the district court was correct when it ruled that there does not seem to be an[y] reason for treating a common law fraudulent concealment claim differently from a statutory claim under a consumer protection statute. Werwinski, 2000 WL 1201576, at  (citing Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 1998 WL 469913, at  (W.D. Wis. June 11, 1998)). Appellants attack the district court’s conclusion by attempting to distinguish the case on which the district court relied. Appellants explain that the plaintiff in Weather Shield was a business that would be barred from bringing a claim under the Pennsylvania UTPCPL, which only applies to products purchased for personal, family or household purposes. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73,S 202-9.2(a). Appellants do not explain how this fact materially diminishes the persuasiveness of Weather Shield on the issue of whether statutory fraud claims should be treated the same way as common law fraud claims under the economic loss doctrine. Notwithstanding appellants’ attempt to distinguish the case, Weather Shield provides persuasive authority for applying the economic loss doctrine to statutory misrepresentation claims. As the district court in Weather Shield explicates, exempting [statutory fraud] claims from the effects of the economic loss doctrine would virtually nullify the doctrine since [the statute] is broad enough to encompass nearly every misrepresentation claim in the commercial sales context, and claims arising from product failure can readily be recast as misrepresentation claims. Weather Shield, 1998 WL 469913, at . Ford also offers in support of its position Flagg Energy Development Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 709 A.2d 1075, 1088 (Conn. 1998), in which the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the economic loss rule barred plaintiffs’ claims under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act because the claims depend[ed] upon the allegations of fact that are identical to those asserted in their [contract] claims. 32 In light of the persuasive authority treating common law and statutory fraud claims similarly under the economic loss doctrine, and appellants’ inability to proffer contrary authority, we do not believe that the district court erred in applying the doctrine to appellants’ UTPCPL claims. Inasmuch as the same policy justifications for applying the doctrine to appellants’ common law intentional fraud claims support the doctrine’s application to appellants’ UTPCPL claims, we will affirm the district court’s order with respect to these statutory claims.9