Opinion ID: 183631
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Deferral of Removal Pursuant to the Convention Against Torture Determination

Text: The final issues on appeal pertain to Denis's claim of entitlement to deferral of removal pursuant to the Convention Against Torture (CAT), 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note and 8 C.F.R. § 208.16. Denis contends that the BIA and the IJ failed to provide a full and fair rehearing of his CAT claim after the IJ determined that Denis was denied due process as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel. The IJ afforded Denis an opportunity to augment the record with further evidence, but limited the subsequent merits hearing to evidence of Denis's present medical condition. Denis also avers that he demonstrated eligibility for CAT relief because he will be singled out for torture due to his status as a former Duvalier regime officer and also due to his dependence upon hyperthyroid and hypertension medication, the absence of which may render him mentally ill and seemingly noncompliant with the prison guards. We will address these arguments in reverse order. Our resolution of Denis's claims regarding the likelihood of torture is informed by our discussion in Pierre v. Attorney General, 528 F.3d 180 (3d Cir.2008). Pierre addressed the petition of a Haitian alien for deferral of removal pursuant to the CAT on the basis that the alien would experience torture, extreme pain, and suffering if deported to a Haitian prison. Id. at 183-84. There we discussed the origins and policy underlying the CAT, namely a commitment not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture. Id. at 186 (quoting § 1231 note). Consequently, deferral of removal is mandatory if a petitioner is able to show that he is more likely than not to be tortured. Id. at 186 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.17(a)). Pursuant to the Attorney General's promulgated regulations setting forth the procedures by which individuals could seek relief under the CAT, an act constitutes torture solely if it is: intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or her or a third person information or a confession, punishing him or her for an act he or she or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or her on a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. Id. at 189 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1)). In light of this definition, we concluded in Pierre that a petitioner cannot obtain relief under the CAT unless he can show that his prospective torturer will have the goal or purpose of inflicting severe pain or suffering. Id. at 190. On the facts, we determined that Pierre would be imprisoned because the Haitian government has a blanket policy of imprisoning ex-convicts who are deported to Haiti in order to reduce crime. Id. at 189; see also Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 152 (3d Cir.2005) (discussing indefinite detention of ex-convicts returned to Haiti). We further observed that the lack of medical care and likely pain that Pierre will experience is an unfortunate but unintended consequence of the poor conditions in the Haitian prisons, which exist because of Haiti's extreme poverty. Pierre, 528 F.3d at 189; see also Auguste, 395 F.3d at 153 (same). Because Pierre failed to show that Haitian officials will have the purpose of inflicting severe pain or suffering by placing him in detention upon his removal from the United States, this unintended consequence is not the type of proscribed purpose contemplated by the CAT. Id. at 189, 190; see also Gourdet v. Holder, 587 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir.2009) ([T]he substandard prison conditions in Haiti did not constitute torture under the CAT.). Similarly here, Denis failed to demonstrate that the Haitian prison officials will more likely than not specifically target him or intend to inflict pain on him because of potential symptoms resulting from his hyperthyroid and hypertension medical conditions. His unsupported speculation as to how he may appear or act, how the prison officials may potentially react, and the purported state of mind of the prison officials that may hypothetically inflict pain upon him, does not rise to the level of proof necessary to demonstrate that he will more likely than not be singled out for torture. Furthermore, Denis failed to substantiate his assertion that he would be singled out for torture by Haitian prison officials because of his unspecified role as a bodyguard for the Duvalier regime in the previous century. Indeed, Denis's assertions are based on a chain of assumptions and a fear of what might happen, rather than evidence that meets [his] burden of demonstrating that it is more likely than not that [he] will be subjected to torture by, or with the acquiescence of, a public official. . . . In re M-B-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 474, 479-80 (BIA 2002) (en banc) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the BIA properly applied the standard for CAT and denied Denis's request for deferral of removal. Our conclusion that Denis is ineligible for CAT relief informs our resolution of his due process claim. Although the IJ found that Denis's counsel provided ineffective assistance, we previously stated that an alien claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in removal proceedings must, in addition to showing that his lawyer committed unprofessional errors, show that there was a `reasonable likelihood that the result would have been different if the error[s] . . . had not occurred.' Fadiga v. Att'y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 159 (3d Cir.2007) ( quoting United States v. Charleswell, 456 F.3d 347, 362 (2006)). In this vein, to prevail on a procedural due process challenge to a decision by the BIA, an alien must make an initial showing of substantial prejudice. Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 448 (3d Cir.2005) ( citing De Zavala v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 879, 883 (5th Cir.2004)). Mindful of our focus on substantial prejudice, we reasoned that where an alien cannot demonstrate that he was eligible for relief . . . under the CAT, no procedural due process claim can lie. Id. Dennis cannot satisfy this standard. As we already decided, he failed to adduce evidence establishing that he would more likely than not be singled out for torture. His ineligibility for CAT relief wholly undermines Denis's assertion that the ineffective assistance of counsel caused substantial prejudice to his otherwise compelling claim. On this ground alone, his due process claim must fail. Moreover, the BIA correctly rejected Denis's assertion that deficient performance of the prior representative prevented him from introducing evidence that competent counsel would have otherwise discovered and marshaled in support of the respondent's claim. (J.A. 23.) Denis did not identify any specific evidence . . . that his prior representative failed to submit in support of the claim that would have `likely changed the outcome of his initial removal proceedings.' (J.A. 23.) Indeed, the only evidence particular to [Denis that he] sought to submit in support . . . was evidence relevant to his medical conditions, and the [IJ] imposed no unreasonable limitation on [Denis's] opportunity to submit and develop such evidence. ( Id. ) Even in the absence of an entirely new hearing, Denis was given ample opportunity to supplement the record with additional allegations pertaining to his claims. Considering Denis's failure to adduce persuasive particularized evidence and to make an initial showing of substantial prejudice from the IJ's decision, the BIA's reasoning and decision are proper. As a result, Denis's claim for relief under the CAT and his procedural due process claim for a new hearing fail.