Opinion ID: 2514511
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: S.A. 60-1507 Claim: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Text: Barr's plea was taken by one judge. A different judge presided over his sentencing and the later probation revocation hearing. Yet a third judge heard legal argument on Barr's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. We have a transcript of the argument before the court at that hearing. The judge hearing the motion denied relief based upon that argument and a review of the files and records of the case. Because we are in as good a position as the judge hearing the 60-1507 motion to consider its merits, our review is de novo. Bellamy v. State, 285 Kan. 346, 354, 172 P.3d 10 (2007); Laymon v. State, 280 Kan. 430, 436-37, 122 P.3d 326 (2005). To prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Barr bore the burden of establishing not only that his counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient, but also that he was prejudiced thereby; i.e., that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Bledsoe v. State, 283 Kan. 81, 90, 150 P.3d 868 (2007). In the present context, the different outcome of the proceedings would have been a timely direct appeal of Barr's sentence. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000). Barr claims that his counsel should have filed a direct appeal of his sentence since his counsel moved the court at sentencing to have Barr sentenced for a misdemeanor under the identical offense doctrine set forth in Nunn, and the motion was denied. This identical offense doctrine was later applied in McAdam to the statute under which Barr was convicted. Barr argues that his counsel should have anticipated this court's ruling in McAdam and appealed his sentence. In considering this claim we extend a high level of deference to the decisions of Barr's counsel, who enjoys a strong presumption that his conduct was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. See State v. Gleason, 277 Kan. 624, 88 P.3d 218 (2004). Barr seeks to extend to his case the ruling in Laymon v. State, 280 Kan. 430, 122 P.3d 326. In Laymon, the court considered whether the failure of appellate counsel to anticipate the court's ruling in McAdam constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Laymon involved counsel who practiced in the Appellate Defender Office. Barr's counsel did not. Laymon's counsel was engaged in appellate practice. Barr's counsel was not. This court found Laymon's appellate counsel's failure to preserve the argument that ultimately prevailed in McAdam to be objectively unreasonable, given the involvement of other attorneys in the Appellate Defender Office in the McAdam issue. This inside baseball analysis does not apply to trial counsel from a local public defender office. We consider Barr's counsel's conduct from counsel's perspective at the time of Barr's sentencing, discounting, as best we can, the benefits of hindsight. See Graham v. State, 263 Kan. 742, 754, 952 P.2d 1266 (1998); Baker v. State, 20 Kan.App.2d 807, 894 P.2d 221, rev. denied 257 Kan. 1091 (1995). Here, however, we have the added factor of the motion based on Nunn raised by counsel at the sentencing hearing. The Court of Appeals addressed this factor: Although Barr's attorney foresaw the argument that would be the basis for McAdam, the record does not suggest that Barr's plea counsel had the same level of involvement with the McAdam issue as did the ADO attorney in Laymon. And unlike Laymon, where McAdam was pending at the time the defendant's direct appeal was filed, Barr pled guilty and was sentenced approximately 18 months before McAdam was even filed in the Kansas Supreme Court. [Citation omitted.] Barr II, slip op. at 9. We find this distinction drawn by the Court of Appeals to be a sound one. But of equal if not greater weight is the fact that Barr fails to present a colorable claim of prejudice. One reason for the district court's rejection of Barr's Nunn/McAdam argument was the lack of prejudice because Barr was not entitled to retroactive application of McAdam. This court has since announced in Phinney that McAdam applies retroactively to a defendant who perfects a late direct appeal. Thus, this first basis for finding no prejudice is flawed. The district court's other reason for finding no prejudice is sound. At the time of Barr's original sentencing, the court expressed concern about the disparity between the proposed 142-month prison sentence for Barr and a sentence of 10 to 16 months with presumptive probation for his wife. Accordingly, Barr was given the option of a shorter sentence in prison, or the full 142-month sentence but with the departure of probation. The State opposed a dispositional departure and urged that Barr be sent to prison. Barr received the departure sentence of probation. After failing probation and being sent to prison to serve his sentence, Barr asserted for the first time in his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion that he did not appeal his sentence because at the original sentencing hearing the district court did not advise me of my right to appeal or regarding the time restriction on filing such an appeal. As discussed earlier, this assertion is not an adequate basis for a late direct appeal because Barr was otherwise informed of his appeal rights before his sentence was imposed. Once that argument fails, Barr presents no alternative theory for why he did not appeal. He does not claim he asked his attorney to file an appeal but his attorney failed or refused to do so. He does not claim that his attorney advised against an appeal. In fact, his only averment regarding this claim indicates a lack of communication on the issue: Counsel did not advise defendant of his right to appeal nor did he advise defendant regarding the time restrictions on filing such an appeal. Since, as noted earlier, the issue is the extent of Barr's knowledge, not the source of that knowledge, this claim regarding counsel's conduct also fails. Barr's counsel at the hearing on his 60-1507 motion expressed the obvious: Obviously a direct appeal was not had here, and if I remember correctly, Mr. Barr was placed on probation at first.... [A]nd then at a later time was revoked from his probation, so obviously with the placement on probation he did not directly appeal at first.  (Emphasis added.) The district court observed: `Moreover, the movant does not even allege that he would have appealed his sentence had he known of the time restriction. Again, the court offered the movant the option [of] serving a prison sentence or being placed on probation; the movant elected to take a chance at probation, and the court granted him that opportunity. There is no reason to believe the movant would have appealed his sentence.' Barr II, slip op. at 4-5. Finally, the Court of Appeals noted: Thus, if Barr had appealed, this court may well have had the opportunity to review the departure to determine if the facts justifying the departure were (1) supported by evidence in the record and (2) constituted substantial and compelling reasons for the departure. K.S.A. 21-4721(d). Because an appeal may have jeopardized the defendant's probationary status, Barr cannot suggest that there could be no strategic reason for the failure to file a direct appeal. Barr II, slip op. at 9-10. Barr fails to allege, let alone offer proof of, any prejudice resulting from any ineffective assistance of counsel. In his motion Barr raised two claims which are now before us: (1) the failure of the district court to advise him of his right to appeal and the time restriction for an appeal; and (2) the failure of his counsel at sentencing to advise him of his right to appeal and the time restrictions for an appeal. As discussed above, neither claim has merit. Barr presents no justifiable basis for a late appeal under the first Ortiz exception. He fails to assert a viable claim of deficient lawyering which caused him not to appeal his departure sentence. Accordingly, the district court did not err in refusing to grant relief on Barr's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, and the Court of Appeals properly affirmed that ruling. Affirmed. DAVIS and JOHNSON, JJ., not participating. McANANY, J., and BRAZIL, S.J., assigned.