Opinion ID: 2649557
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: James Morris

Text: Morris, who was convicted for his role in supplying drugs to the Coles organization, raises four arguments on appeal: (1) that he did not receive timely notice of the Government’s intention to seek an enhanced sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 851(a) and that the District Court thus erroneously enhanced his sentence pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A); (2) that the District Court erred when it did not strike certain testimony of the Government’s drug expert; (3) that the District Court should have suppressed the evidence seized from a house where he stayed but did not reside and the car parked in the driveway there; and (4) that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for conspiracy.
Morris contends that the District Court erred when it applied the enhanced penalty in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) because the Government failed to serve timely notice of the prior convictions on which the enhancement is based, as required by 21 U.S.C. § 851. Section 851 provides: No person who stands convicted of an offense under this part shall be sentenced to increased punishment by reason of one or more prior 8 We review this purely legal issue de novo. United States v. Brown, 595 F.3d 498, 526 (3d Cir. 2010). 9 Moreover, “Apprendi requires the jury to find only the drug type and quantity element as to the conspiracy as a whole, and not the drug type and quantity attributable to each co-conspirator.” United States v. Phillips, 349 F.3d 138, 143 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom Barbour v. United States, 543 U.S. 1102 (2005). Thus, Phillips also forecloses Baukman’s argument. 13 convictions, unless before trial, or before entry of a plea of guilty, the United States attorney files an information with the court (and serves a copy of such information on the person or counsel for the person) stating in writing the previous convictions to be relied upon. . . . 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) (emphasis added). Morris argues that the notice was untimely because, while it was filed electronically one hour prior to jury selection,10 it was not served on Morris or his counsel at that time, and Morris’s counsel did not receive a copy of the notice on the day it was filed. We review the sufficiency of the Government’s notice de novo. United States v. Weaver, 267 F.3d 231, 246 (3d Cir. 2001). We first address Morris’s argument that his counsel was not served because the notice was filed electronically. Under the federal rules,11 “a party may use the court’s transmission facilities” to make electronic service, if permitted by the local rules. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(3). The Eastern District of Pennsylvania has adopted local rules permitting such service by the Electronic Case Filing (“ECF”) system, and under the rules, registration as an ECF user constitutes consent to receive service of all documents through that system. E.D. Pa. R. Civ. P. 5.1.2(8)(a), (d). Morris’s counsel had registered as an ECF user, and had filed and served numerous pleadings through the ECF system. Because “§ 851 incorporates the normal rules governing service,” United States v. Rivas, 493 F.3d 131, 143 (3d Cir. 2007), and Morris’s counsel had consented to service by 10 The record indicates that the Government filed the notice electronically at 9:08 a.m. on December 18, 2007, approximately one hour before the beginning of jury selection at 10:11 a.m. that same morning. Jury selection continued until December 20, 2007, at which point the District Court recessed until January 16, 2008, when the jury was sworn in and the trial began. 11 Service of papers in a criminal action “must be made in the manner provided for a civil action.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 49(b). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (and related local rules) govern service. 14 electronic filing, the Government’s filing of the information on the ECF system effected service. We next turn to whether that electronic service, made one hour before jury selection, was timely. Because the statute requires that service of the information occur “before trial,” service before the jury was selected satisfies the statute. See, e.g., United States v. McAllister, 29 F.3d 1180, 1183 (7th Cir. 1994) (timely service of the information minutes before jury selection began); United States v. White, 980 F.2d 836, 842 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[T]he phrase ‘before trial’ in § 851(a)(1) means before the commencement of jury selection.”).12 Thus, we will affirm Morris’s enhanced sentence under § 841.
Morris raises two arguments concerning the testimony of the Government’s drug expert. He contends that the expert: (1) impermissibly testified to the “ultimate issue” when he discussed evidence of possession with intent to distribute;13 and (2) strayed from the bounds of proper drug expert testimony when he described a call between Coles and Morris as a “drug conversation,” instead of interpreting particular code words.14 12 Some courts have affirmed sentences where the notice was filed after jury selection. See, e.g., United States v. Beasley, 495 F.3d 142, 149 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that the statutory command that the government file an information “before trial” is “surely ambiguous,” and that a district court’s finding that it meant “before [the jury] was sworn” was not error). We need not decide whether service after jury selection complies with § 851. 13 The “ultimate issue” refers to the rule that, “[i]n a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone.” Fed. R. Evid. 704(b). 14 In the heading of this section of the brief, Morris also asserts that the expert improperly testified to his opinion that the money found in Morris’s girlfriend’s house was the proceeds of drug activity. He does not address that argument in the text of the brief or his reply brief. Accordingly, we view it as abandoned and need not address it. 15 Although Morris contends that both objections were preserved because his counsel objected during each line of questioning, there was no objection to the testimony about intent.15 Rather, his counsel’s objections concerned the accuracy of a date that the prosecutor used in the hypothetical situation he presented to the expert. Those objections came after, and were entirely unrelated to, the testimony about intent that Morris now challenges under Rule 704(b). See United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 257 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that a defendant had failed to preserve a hearsay error by making an incorrect specific objection on another ground). Accordingly, he did not preserve his present objection and thus we review the admission of that statement for plain error. Id. We have upheld the admission of expert testimony if “it merely supports an inference or conclusion that the defendant did or did not have the requisite mens rea, so long as the expert does not draw the ultimate inference or conclusion for the jury and the ultimate inference or conclusion does not necessarily follow from the testimony.” United States v. Watson, 260 F.3d 301, 309 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal citation, alterations and quotation marks omitted). The expert’s testimony did not cross that line. Our opinion affirming the conviction in United States v. Davis, 397 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2005), is instructive. In Davis, the Government asked the witness to assume the key facts concerning the discovery of the drugs, including the quantity and the paraphernalia. Id. at 177. Here, the Government asked the expert to assume the key facts concerning drugs and drug paraphernalia that were recovered from a car that Morris had been seen driving. In response to the Government’s question as to whether the type and quantity of drugs 15 Counsel for a different defendant objected to an earlier statement as cumulative. 16 and drug paraphernalia were “consistent with drug trafficking or . . . simple possession,” the expert responded, “It would be my opinion that would be possession with intent to deliver the narcotics.” Id. This testimony did not violate Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) because it responded to a hypothetical question and did not involve the government’s “repeated[ ] refer[ence] to the individual defendant’s state of mind when questioning the government expert.” Id. at 179 (quotation marks and citation omitted); Watson, 260 F.3d at 305-06. It is true, as Morris contends, that unlike in Davis, the expert also testified as a fact witness. 16 That testimony, however, concerned a different defendant and property search, and there is no indication that the expert relied on his personal knowledge of the facts of the case when providing his expert opinion about the items found that were associated with Morris. Accordingly, the admission of the expert’s testimony concerning intent did not constitute plain error. Counsel for one of Morris’s co-defendants did object to the expert’s characterization of a recorded conversation as a “drug conversation.” Morris App. 592. Morris now contends that this testimony improperly exceeded the scope of expert knowledge. Assuming that the objection did put the District Court on notice of Morris’s complaint,17 we review the District Court’s ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony for abuse of discretion. Watson, 260 F.3d at 306. We conclude that the 16 See Davis, 297 F.3d at 179 (“[N]o evidence was presented that [the expert] had any direct relationship with the investigation or the defendants and, therefore, there was no potential for the jury to conclude that [the expert] had any special insight into the thoughts or intent of the defendants.”). 17 In his objection, counsel for the co-defendant contended that the witness’s response was “an opinion on the ultimate issue.” Morris App. 592. That objection—governed by Rule 704—is different from the claim that the statement exceeded the bounds of expert testimony under Rule 702. Moreover, the objection came after the expert had earlier made the same statement without drawing an objection. 17 District Court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to exclude the “drug conversation” testimony. Here, the expert’s testimony was merely shorthand to explain that, based on the context of the sentence he was asked to explain and the use of code words he had previously identified, the defendants’ use of the word “dogs” at the beginning of the recorded conversation referred to drugs, while a later reference to “dogs” in the same conversation referred to canines. Morris App. 592-93. The expert did not offer a sweeping conclusion about Morris’s activities but rather only provided his understanding of parts of a particular intercepted conversation. See United States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587, 591 (3d Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Price, 76 F.3d 526, 528 (3d Cir. 1996). Accordingly, we conclude that the testimony was properly admitted.
Morris next contends that the District Court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence seized from the house at 5 North Burden Hill Road in Quinton, New Jersey, and from the car in the driveway.18 We review a district court’s order denying a motion to suppress for clear error as to its factual findings and exercise plenary review of its application of the law to those facts. United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002). Where, as here, the defendant challenges the probable cause determination underlying a warrant, we must “give great deference to the magistrate judge’s probable cause determination.” United States v. Hodge, 246 F.3d 301, 305 (3d 18 The home was owned by the mother of Thais Thompson. Thompson is one of Morris’s co-defendants and the mother of his children. 18 Cir. 2001). A magistrate judge properly finds probable cause when, considering the totality of the circumstances, “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). We “need not determine whether probable cause actually existed, but only whether there was a substantial basis for finding probable cause.” Hodge, 246 F.3d at 305 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Our inquiry is confined “to the facts that were before the magistrate judge, i.e., the affidavit,” and we do not “consider information from other portions of the record.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Morris argues that the affidavit did not establish that he had a connection to the house, which he contends was not his residence, or that there was drug activity there. Morris is incorrect. The affidavit incorporated another lengthy affidavit, which in turn averred numerous facts concerning Coles’s drug conspiracy. The affidavit stated that a phone number associated with Coles had called Morris over 300 times, and that some of those conversations were recorded and revealed Morris’s role in acquiring, delivering, and receiving payment for cocaine, connecting Morris to the conspiracy. Furthermore, the affidavit set forth evidence connecting Morris to the residence. In a recorded conversation between Coles and the landline of 5 North Burden Hill, an individual believed to be Morris referred to being in his “crib,” Morris App. 726, which was understood to be a reference to the 5 North Burden Hill residence. During a recorded conversation on Morris’s wireless phone, Morris told Coles he would be traveling to Mexico. When Coles called the 5 North Burden Hill landline a few days later, the female who answered told Coles that Morris was not in, meaning at the 5 North Burden Hill 19 residence, because he was still on a plane returning home. In addition, the affidavit disclosed that certain law enforcement officers saw Morris operating the gold Chevrolet Suburban that other officers saw parked in the driveway at 5 North Burden Hill. Finally, the affidavit noted that a police report concerning a child custody matter indicated Morris had been in the North Burden Hill home when the police officer visited, further tying Morris to the location.19 In short, the Magistrate Judge had a substantial basis for finding probable cause, and the District Court correctly denied the motion to suppress.20
Morris contends that the Government failed to prove the existence of a conspiracy, or that he was a member of it. He preserved this argument through a Rule 29 motion. The elements of a conspiracy are: (1) a unity of purpose between the alleged conspirators; (2) an intent to achieve a common goal; and (3) an agreement to work together toward that goal. United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). The Government can prove these three elements “entirely by circumstantial evidence.” Id. We have held that “a simple buyer-seller relationship,” which Morris contends existed in this case, “without any prior or contemporaneous understanding beyond the sales 19 Morris contends that the probable cause finding could not have relied on the police report because it was undated, and the affidavit must set forth “facts so closely related to the time of the issue of the warrant as to justify a finding of probable cause at that time.” Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210 (1932). The police report merely provided additional evidence tying Morris to the home. The wiretapped phone conversations, some of which occurred less than two weeks before the search, provided recent facts to justify a finding of probable cause that there would be evidence of drug activity at the home at the time of the search. 20 United States v. Helton, 314 F.3d 812 (6th Cir. 2003), on which Morris relies, is distinguishable because the only evidence in that case was that a drug dealer called the residence around three times per month. Id. at 821. In this case, the evidence tying Morris to the drug conspiracy was substantial, including the recorded calls in which Morris and Coles discussed procuring drugs. 20 agreement itself, is insufficient to establish that the buyer was a member of the seller’s conspiracy.” Id. Where the evidence of a defendant’s participation in the conspiracy is solely or primarily drug purchases or sales, we look to the surrounding circumstances to “determine whether the defendant is a mere buyer who had such limited dealings with the conspiracy that he cannot be held to be a conspirator, or whether he has knowledge of the conspiracy to the extent that his drug purchases are circumstantial evidence of his intent to join that conspiracy.” Id. at 199. Factors that courts consider in this analysis include how long the defendant was affiliated with the conspiracy, whether there was an established method of payment, the extent to which transactions were standardized, whether the actions of the defendant and members of the conspiracy demonstrated a level of mutual trust, whether the transactions involved a large amount of drugs, and whether the buyer purchased the drugs on credit. Id. Here, the Government introduced extensive evidence from which a reasonable juror could infer that Morris agreed to work with Coles’s organization with the intent to distribute large amounts of cocaine. For example, the Government introduced an intercepted phone conversation between Coles and Morris that indicated that Coles asked Morris to get a lower price from Morris’s supplier.21 Morris agreed that he would try to help his “peoples,” referring to the Coles organization. Morris App. 371. Morris also noted that the supplier had “seen what [Coles] move[s],” which the jury could infer was a reference to the amount of cocaine Coles sold. Morris App. 371. Later, Morris asked 21 Coles said, “Get that better number for me . . . for us.” Morris App. 371. 21 Coles, “[Y]ou trying to get rich ain’t you?” Morris App. 371. When Coles responded that he was “trying hard,” Morris said “I’m a try to do my best to get you there.” Morris App. 371. From this conversation alone, the jury could infer a unity of purpose to successfully sell drugs, as well as Morris’s awareness of Coles’s group and the volume of drugs that they sold. Other recorded conversations between Coles and Morris further support this inference. In another conversation, Coles asked, “when we gonna be husky?,” Morris App. 381, which the Government’s expert testified was a code word referring to having “an ample amount of cocaine.” Morris App. 498. Morris told Coles he would go to Cancun to meet with “the old man,” and would let Coles know the following week. Morris App. 381. Morris also promised Coles, “I’ll see what I can do for you . . . . I’m a try my damndest . . . .” Morris App. 382. Coles responded, “That’s why I love you. I know you’re gonna do it for me.” Morris App. 382. The jury could infer that this exchange reflected Morris’s intention to meet with his source in Mexico to secure drugs for Coles’s distribution network. In another conversation, Morris told Coles he was concerned about “jawns” that Morris gave Coles. Morris App. 388. The Government’s expert testified that a “jawn” in this context was a kilogram of cocaine. Morris App. 495. Coles responded that he had Morris “covered” concerning the “seven [Morris was] talking about.” Morris App. 388. A juror could thus infer from this conversation that Morris and Coles trusted each other and that Morris had provided seven kilograms of cocaine to Coles on credit. See United States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 150, 156 (3d Cir. 22 2008) (holding that evidence of a credit arrangement was sufficient evidence of an agreement to cooperate). Based on these facts, and drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the Government, Dent, 149 F.3d at 187, the jury could find that Morris regularly supplied Coles kilogram quantities of cocaine and thereby conspired with him to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine. Accordingly, we will affirm his conspiracy conviction.