Opinion ID: 6110141
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Reams's Batson Claim

Text: I also disagree with the majority's handling of Reams's Batson claim. Like Reams's Duren claim, the Batson claim is structural in nature, and therefore can be addressed for the first time in post-conviction proceedings. Furthermore, the fact that this court addressed a version of Reams's Batson argument (as developed and presented by the same attorney who represented Reams at trial) over two decades ago in his direct appeal does not prevent Reams from raising the claim in these Rule 37 proceedings. Although Rule 37.2(b) ordinarily precludes the consideration of claims adjudicated at trial or on direct appeal, that principle is inapplicable when, as here, the petitioner presents substantial new evidence that fundamentally changes the nature of the claim. See Cullen v. Pinholster , 563 U.S. 170 , 186 n.10, 131 S.Ct. 1388 , 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011) (recognizing that substantial new evidence  in support of a previously adjudicated claim may in fact present a new claim). At the Rule 37 hearing, Gene McKissic, who worked in the Jefferson County Prosecuting Attorney's Office and then had a private criminal practice in Jefferson County for nearly three decades, testified that the office's custom and practice was to save strikes to exclude African-Americans. Mr. McKissic also explained that he observed significant discrimination against African Americans in the jury selection process by his fellow Jefferson County prosecutors. Mr. McKissic's testimony-along with statements from his law partner, Jesse Kearney, who is a former Circuit Court Judge in the Eleventh Judicial District, which includes Jefferson County-would have supported the averment from Reams that there existed a custom and practice of racial discrimination in jury selection by Jefferson County prosecutors at the time of his trial. All of this evidence is in addition to the facts presented in support of Reams's Duren claim, which have only been raised for the first time by Reams's postconviction counsel and which surely would have colored any consideration of his Batson claim. Due process requires effective corrective procedures to protect Mr. Reams's liberty and life interests, which means that state postconviction procedures must comport with principles of fundamental fairness. See, e.g. , Ford v. Wainwright , 477 U.S. 399 , 417-18, 106 S.Ct. 2595 , 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) (finding Florida's postconviction procedures for determining sanity of death row prisoner was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing on a critical issue in the case). Accordingly, I would not limit this court's remand to the substance of Reams's Duren claim, but would direct the circuit court to consider the merits of Reams's Batson claim as well, in light of the newly presented evidence. The majority misconstrues multiple cases in overturning Wainwright v. State , 307 Ark. 569 , 823 S.W.2d 449 (1992) (per curiam). 1 The majority concedes that Reams failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that he was prejudiced [g]iven Reams's testimony regarding his involvement in the planning and commission of the robbery and shooting death of the victim at an ATM. Majority opinion, supra , at 450-51. I would affirm on that basis. The majority's decision has created an entirely new avenue for Rule 37 relief. Under this decision, we apparently no longer require that fair cross-section-of-the-jury claims be raised and preserved on direct appeal under Duren v. Missouri , 439 U.S. 357 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), or be subject to a finding of prejudice under Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The majority's analysis is flawed. It erroneously equates this case to other cases and constrains these cases to reach the conclusion that prejudice now is presumed. A thorough and honest comparison of these cases to Reams is therefore required. First, the majority erroneously relies on Collins v. State to extend the exception to our requirement that constitutional errors be raised at trial and on direct appeal for errors so fundamental as to render the judgment of conviction void.  324 Ark. 322 , 326, 920 S.W.2d 846 , 848 (1996) (emphasis added). Collins is distinguishable from this case because Collins was convicted by an eleven-member jury, instead of twelve. Id. Court rules at that time required the defendant  to waive his right to trial by a jury of twelve in writing or personally in open court, which undisputedly did not occur. Id. Consequently, being tried by an eleven-member jury was a serious error for which the trial court should intervene and is an exception to the contemporaneous exception rule. Id. at 327 , 920 S.W.2d at 849 . We have repeatedly failed to extend Collins . See, e.g. , Swain v. State , 2017 Ark. 117 , at 5-6, 515 S.W.3d 580 , 585 ; Springs v. State , 2012 Ark. 87 , at 15, 387 S.W.3d 143 , 154 ; Howard v. State , 367 Ark. 18 , 27, 238 S.W.3d 24 , 32 (2006) (declining to extend for allegations of prosecutorial misconduct). Second, the majority cites to Rowbottom v. State as a reason for overruling our precedent. 341 Ark. 33 , 13 S.W.3d 904 (2000). Again, the facts here are distinguishable. In Rowbottom , the issue was whether the defendant could raise double jeopardy in a Rule 37 proceeding without having previously raised it. Id. A double jeopardy violation is one that voids the judgment, which is completely different from the issue here. A ground sufficient to void a judgment of conviction must be one so basic that it renders the judgment a complete nullity, for example, a judgment obtained in a court lacking jurisdiction to try the accused, or a conviction obtained in violation of an accused's rights against double jeopardy. Jeffers v. State , 301 Ark. 590 , 591, 786 S.W.2d 114 , 114 (1990). There is no allegation that Reams's judgment is void. Finally, the majority defends its decision to overturn precedent with the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez , 548 U.S. 140 , 126 S.Ct. 2557 , 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006). The majority uses Gonzalez-Lopez to advance its proposition that some errors are so fundamental as to be considered structural. Yet, an analysis of Gonzalez-Lopez suggests the opposite result from that which the majority reaches in this case. In Gonzalez-Lopez , the defendant was denied the counsel of his choice. The federal district court then sanctioned the defendant's desired counsel for communicating with the defendant following its denial. The defendant was found guilty and appealed. Although the majority is correct that the Supreme Court held that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice was structural in nature, it misapplied the Supreme Court's reasoning. In Gonzalez-Lopez , the government argued that such a denial was subject to review on direct appeal for harmless error. The Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that a right to counsel of choice impacts every stage of the proceedings and thus qualified as a structural error. Different attorneys will pursue different strategies with regard to investigation and discovery, development of the theory of defense, selection of the jury, presentation of the witnesses, and style of witness examination and jury argument. And the choice of an attorney will affect whether and on what terms the defendant cooperates with the prosecution, plea bargains, or decides instead to go to trial. In light of these myriad aspects of representation, the erroneous denial of counsel bears directly on the framework within which the trial proceeds, or indeed on whether it proceeds at all. Harmless-error analysis in such a context would be a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in an alternate universe. Id. at 150 , 126 S.Ct. 2557 (cleaned up). Clearly, Gonzalez-Lopez is different from the present case. Every case the majority cites to reach its conclusion fails to support it. The majority is straining to provide analysis to overturn precedent.  Here, Reams testified at trial that he participated in the ATM robbery that resulted in a death. He admitted at trial that the gun used to commit the murder came from him. The majority even affirms the circuit court's decision that there was no prejudice because there was no reasonable probability that, despite any alleged errors his counsel might have made, a jury would have reached a different outcome. This is not Gonzalez-Lopez . The majority's decision that we will presume prejudice in this case necessarily presumes that a jury consisting of a different racial composition would have reached a different decision. Regardless of juror race, the jury would not have reached a different decision when they heard the defendant's own incriminating testimony. The circuit court's decision was correct. For these reasons, I dissent. I believe that the majority's decision to declare that a Duren violation is a structural error, and that we will presume prejudice when it occurs, is premature. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent. When ruling on a Rule 37 petition, the circuit court shall determine the issues and make written findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.3(c) (2017). In this case, the circuit court made virtually no written findings on Reams's Duren claim and instead made a single-sentence conclusion that his claim fails in the absence of a showing of prejudice. The circuit court's conclusory findings are not adequate for us to properly review this issue on appeal. See Pigg v. State , 2016 Ark. 108 , at 2, 486 S.W.3d 751 , 753 (per curiam). The appropriate response is for this court to remand the case to the circuit court to properly consider and analyze Reams's Duren claims before we take further action. I therefore dissent. Jin Hee Lee , NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. (New York), pro hac vice ; Christopher Kemmitt and Ajmel Quereshi , NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. (Washington DC), pro hac vice ; Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP , by: George H. Kendell and Corrine Irish , pro hac vice ; and John W. Walker, P.A. , by: John W. Walker , for appellant.