Opinion ID: 1981890
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Discovery Requests for Statements by Witnesses

Text: On cross-examination of Charmaine Chambers, it was established that she was interviewed by Prince George's County Police Officers, who took notes of the questions they asked and the answers she gave. Defense counsel notified the court that he had never been given those police officers' notes and made a motion to strike Ms. Chambers' testimony and a motion for mistrial. Both of these motions were denied. Robert Williams testified on cross-examination that he was interviewed by a Prince George's County Detective for many hours. The detective took notes of the questions and answers. After the interview, the witness may have reviewed and approved portions of the detective's notes in certain areas, but did not read, sign, or otherwise adopt or approve all of the detective's notes of the interview. Kenneth Clee, a State's rebuttal witness, testified on cross-examination that he spoke to New York City Police. The Assistant State's Attorney indicated that he had no information about any statements given by Kenneth Clee to New York City Police Officers. A fourth State's witness, Jacqueline Sellers, apparently gave one or more written statements to New York authorities, but the Assistant State's Attorney had no knowledge of any statement by Jacqueline Sellers given to the New York Police Officers. Upon commencing cross-examination of the witnesses, defense counsel requested that the State provide, or at least that he have a recess to secure, the officer's notes of the interviews of Charmaine Chambers, Robert Williams, and Kenneth Clee, as well as the written statement of Jacqueline Sellers. Defense counsel's requests were refused by the trial judge. We note that in determining what statements must be turned over by a prosecutor after a witness has testified on direct examination, the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C., § 3500 (1985) is instructive. Carr v. State, 284 Md. 455, 460-61, 397 A.2d 606, 608-09 (1979). See also State v. Leonard, 290 Md. 295, 429 A.2d 538 (1981), affirming Leonard v. State, 46 Md. App. 631, 638-39, 421 A.2d 85, 88-89 (1980). The Jencks Act provides in part: (e) The term statement, as used in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section in relation to any witness called by the United States, means  (1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him; (2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said witness and recorded contemporaneously with the making of such oral statement ... The testimony elicited by Appellant's counsel did not require the trial judge to find, and he did not find, that any of the notes of the officers were either substantially verbatim and contemporaneously recorded, or signed, or adopted, or otherwise approved by the witnesses. Charmaine Chambers never reviewed the police officer's notes of her interview. Robert Williams only reviewed portions of the officer's notes in certain areas. He was never asked what portions of the notes he reviewed or what subjects were encompassed in his partial review of the notes. The officer's notes of Ms. Chambers' interview were properly held not to be a discoverable statement under the Jencks Act as they were not signed or otherwise adopted or approved by her. Mr. Williams' review and approval of only indefinite portions of the officer's notes are not sufficient to make the notes in their entirety a discoverable statement. See United States v. Hogan, 763 F.2d 697, 704 (5th Cir.1985) (where the witness neither signed, read, nor heard the notes in their entirety, the notes failed to qualify as a statement under subsection (e)(1) of the Jencks Act); see also United States v. Newman, 849 F.2d 156, 160 (5th Cir.1988). The essential purpose for requiring disclosure of statements is to permit the defense an opportunity to impeach the witnesses through these prior statements. United States v. O'Malley, 796 F.2d 891, 900 (7th Cir.1986). Given this purpose, it is obvious that a witness could not be impeached with the police officer's notes which were never adopted or approved by the witness. Collins v. State, 318 Md. 269, 287-89, 568 A.2d 1, 10 (1990). We point out, however, that if the State is aware of prior inconsistent statements made by a witness to a police officer, it may have an obligation to produce this information under the duty to furnish exculpatory evidence. Maryland Rule 4-263(a)(1). With respect to Jacqueline Sellers, who apparently wrote out one or more statements, and Kenneth Clee, who gave statements to New York City Police Officers, Appellant does not contest the fact that the prosecutor in Maryland had no knowledge of those statements. Statements made by a criminal defendant to agents of states other than Maryland are generally discoverable. See Bailey v. State, 303 Md. 650, 496 A.2d 665 (1985). Statements by witnesses which must be furnished by the State at the conclusion of direct examination, are governed by different considerations. Carr 284 Md. at 460-61, 397 A.2d at 608-09; Leonard 46 Md. App. at 638-39, 421 A.2d at 88-89. The discovery rules make no provision for witness statements to be turned over unless exculpatory. The requirement that the State furnish witness statements is spelled out in Carr and Leonard, supra. We first note that the Jencks Act requires production of statements of a witness in the possession of the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a). We further note that several decisions have held that for the purposes of the Jencks Act, statements in possession of the state authorities are not in possession of the United States. See, e.g., United States v. Cagnina, 697 F.2d 915, 922 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 856, 104 S.Ct. 175, 78 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983); United States v. Bermudez, 526 F.2d 89, 100 n. 9 (2nd Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 970, 96 S.Ct. 2166, 48 L.Ed.2d 793 (1976); Beavers v. United States, 351 F.2d 507, 509 (9th Cir.1965). Where, as here, the state's attorney was not in possession of, and was not aware of, statements made by a witness to agents of another state, there is no requirement that the trial be suspended or aborted so that those statements can be secured by defense counsel. For the reasons indicated, we hold that the trial judge did not err in refusing to require the State to produce and turn over the officers' notes and the statement of Jacqueline Sellers.