Opinion ID: 759696
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bloomer's First Habeas Petition

Text: 14 Meanwhile, after our August 1993 decision in Spencer, Bloomer retained the same counsel and in December 1993 moved for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging that jurors from the local area were deliberately excluded from the jury pool. The motion was denied in an order on January 12, 1994, and no appeal was taken from that order. 15 Nearly two years after the first petition was filed, we decided United States v. Birbal, 62 F.3d 456 (2d Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 256, 139 L.Ed.2d 184 (1997), a case in which the same district judge who presided at Bloomer's trial gave jury instructions including the identical passages quoted above. In reversing defendants' convictions and ordering a new trial on the ground that the jury charge was constitutionally deficient, see id. at 465, we highlighted four flaws in the instructions: (1) failure to inform the jury that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof of such a convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely and act upon it in the most important of his own affairs; (2) equating reasonable doubt with substantial doubt; (3) advising the jury that it need not find every fact beyond a reasonable doubt to support a guilty verdict; and (4) advising the jury that it may (rather than must) acquit if the government failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 460. 16 Four years earlier we had upheld a conviction where the same district court judge had given jury instructions tainted with only the first three deficiencies. See United States v. Delibac, 925 F.2d 610, 614 (2d Cir.1991) (per curiam). When the fourth element was included in the Birbal charge, we ruled that because the jury was given the unconstitutional option of convicting defendant on a lesser standard of proof than beyond a reasonable doubt, the conviction must be set aside. See 62 F.3d at 460.