Opinion ID: 1849941
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the trial court's failure to declare dr. j.e. morris as a hostile witness was harmless error.

Text: The trial judge did not declare Dr. Morris, the school psychologist, to be a hostile witness when he was called by defense counsel. Alexander claims that Dr. Morris was closely aligned to the prosecution of the case, fit all parameters of the definition of hostile witness, and should have been treated as an adverse witness under Rule 611 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. Defense counsel wanted to ask leading questions of Dr. Morris. Alexander argues that she was prejudiced by the judge's failure to label Dr. Morris as hostile because defense counsel could not effectively present the needed testimony from Dr. Morris. The State claims that there was no proffer made as to what additional information might have been introduced into evidence had Alexander been allowed to call Dr. Morris as an adverse witness and that Alexander was not harmed by not being allowed to use leading questions with Dr. Morris. Rule 611(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence provides, When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be by leading questions. As a general rule, leading questions should not be used on direct examination since they suggest the answers the attorney wants from his own witness. This gives unfair advantage to the party who is presenting his case. However, the judge has discretion in allowing leading questions. A party has the right of cross examination when questioning witnesses who are hostile or when questioning an adverse party or someone identified with an adverse party. Comment, Miss.R.Evid. 611(c). The issue of who may be considered as identified with an adverse party was confronted in Harris v. Buxton T.V., Inc., 460 So.2d 828 (Miss. 1984). In Harris, this Court found error where the trial court refused the plaintiff's request to call as an adverse witness and ask leading questions of the defendant's building contractor. This Court reversed because the trial judge failed in his responsibility to determine from the facts and circumstances of the case whether the witness proposed to be called was one who was identified with the adverse party within the meaning and contemplation of the rule. The Harris trial judge had made no such inquiry. Id. at 833. According to Harris, the following test was set forth for determining how closely the witness must be identified with the adverse party in order to be considered hostile: (1) If the witness' acts or omissions are the predicate for a party's claim or defense, ..., then that witness is ordinarily sufficiently identified with an adverse party and may be called as an adverse witness and interrogated by leading questions. (2) If the conduct of the witness plays such an integral part in the transaction or occurrence which is the subject of the action and which gives rise to... potential liability, ..., then again the witness is said to be sufficiently identified with the adverse party so that the witness may be called as an adverse witness and cross examined. Harris, 460 So.2d at 833. The Comment to Miss.R.Evid. 611 indicates that the Advisory Committee is cognizant of the Harris decision but considers the interpretation and application of identified with the adverse party to be broader than expressed in Harris. In a more recent case, this Court considered what constitutes an adverse witness within the criminal context. In Hall v. State, 546 So.2d 673 (Miss. 1989), this Court found that a confidential informant called by the defendant qualified as an adverse witness and it was error to prevent the defendant from questioning the informant regarding a deal with the Government to avoid prosecution which may have indicated bias; however, the error was not reversible since the informant did not participate in the alleged sale of drugs and was not a witness in the State's case in chief, and the informant's possible motive for informing on the defendant was amply displayed to the jury. Id. at 675. Dr. Morris was an adverse witness under Harris. Dr. Morris' acts are the predicate for Alexander's defense that she had been hypnotized. And Dr. Morris was a witness called by the State at the suppression hearing. However, as in Hall, this error is not reversible because Alexander was not prejudiced by not being officially allowed to lead Dr. Smith. The record indicates that defense counsel did ask leading questions of Dr. Morris anyway. For example: Q Well, sir, it was in there about a wooden drill rifle being  suspected as being the murder weapon with blood all over it, that was in the newspaper? A That's true. Q It was in there about the killer probably entered through, in fact, the first story was the killer probably entered through a dormitory window because of the cut outer torn screen in the dormitory? BY MR. BOWEN: Your Honor, we are going to object to the leading nature of these questions. He is his witness on redirect. We object to that, it's extremely leading. BY THE COURT: The objection will be overruled. Even though Dr. Morris may have been a hostile witness, there was no prejudice to Alexander by the failure to declare him as such. Defense counsel was still able to elicit from Dr. Morris that persons under hypnosis may have false memories, that one danger of forensic hypnosis is suggestive questions, that Dr. Morris does not have the ability to determine whether or not a person has been placed under hypnosis, that video tapes should be used when hypnosis is attempted, that a complete history should be taken before hypnosis is attempted, and that Dr. Morris has never been treated as an expert on hypnosis. The failure to declare Dr. Morris a hostile witness was error, but it was harmless error.