Opinion ID: 1890344
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Extending the Time for Appeal Under CR 73.02(1)(d)

Text: Appellee asserts that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to grant Appellant's ten-day extension of time after the filing of his notice of appeal. We disagree. CR 73.02(1)(d) authorizes the trial court; under the stated circumstances, to relieve a party from his or her failure to appeal within the time allowed, providing: [u]pon a showing of excusable neglect based on a failure of a party to learn of the entry of the judgment or an order which affects the running of the time for taking an appeal, the trial court may extend the time for appeal, not exceeding 10 days from the expiration of the original time. The jurisdiction of a trial court to control its judgment is a different matter. Notably, a court only has control over its judgment with a right to order a new trial, or alter, amend or vacate the judgment, either on motion or sua sponte, for ten days after entry of judgment.... Johnson v. Smith, 885 S.W.2d 944, 947 (Ky. 1994). Other rules of procedure, however, can operate to re-invest a trial court with control over its judgment subject to the contingencies and time periods specified therein, i.e., CR 60.01, CR 60.02, and CR 60.03. This may be so even though an appeal is pending, in which case the party commencing such proceeding shall promptly move the appellate court to abate the appeal until a final order is entered therein. CR 60.04; see Wilson v. Commonwealth, 761 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Ky.App.1988) (The trial court and the Commonwealth appear to mistakenly believe that it would be improper to consider a motion to vacate a judgment made pursuant to RCr 10.02 or 11.42 while a direct appeal from the same judgment is pending.). These separate rules work together at different levels because the judicial system is one system designed to operate efficiently in the attainment of fairness and justice. Ky. Const. § 109 (The court shall constitute a unified judicial system for operation and administration.). As such, our rules of procedure should not be interpreted in such a manner as to render them inconsistent with one another. See Kurtsinger v. Board of Trustees of Kentucky Retirement Systems, 90 S.W.3d 454, 456 (Ky.2002) (We should not apply one rule in a manner that destroys another and eliminates its essential purpose.); see also Fluor Construction International, Inc. v. Kirtley, 103 S.W.3d 88, 90 (Ky.2003) ([I]f the latter rule is applied literally, where appellate rights are implicated, the former rule is unavailable.). Neither the ten-day limit for a trial court's control of its judgment, nor the acquisition of jurisdiction over the appeal by an appellate court, diminishes a trial court's right to extend the time for appeal under CR 73.02(1)(d), as each has its own purpose, separate and apart from the other. Nor do Monsour v. Humphrey, 324 S.W.2d 813 (Ky.1959), City of Devondale v. Stallings, 795 S.W.2d 954 (Ky.1990), and Johnson, direct a different conclusion. As aforementioned, Johnson upheld the effectiveness of a prematurely filed notice of appeal. 885 S.W.2d at 950 (The notices of appeal filed forthwith relate forward to the time when final judgment was entered disposing of post-judgment motions made by others.). Stallings dealt only with the question of substantial compliance, where the notice of appeal omitted two indispensable parties. 795 S.W.2d at 955. It did note that [a] notice of appeal, when filed, transfers jurisdiction of the case from the circuit court to the appellate court. Id. at 957. That is true, of course, but otherwise, how could an appellate court act if it did not have jurisdiction? CR 73.02(1)(d) validates that jurisdiction. Quite clearly, the aforementioned comment in Stallings was not intended to deprive the rules discussed above of their purpose. Humphrey , too, is inapposite. In Humphrey , the court had dismissed the appeal as the notice did not show an amount in controversy sufficient to confer jurisdiction on [the] Court, as then required by KRS 21.070 (1959). [3] 324 S.W.2d at 814. The appellant had filed the first notice of appeal six days after entry of the judgment without disclosing the jurisdictional amounts. Id. Ten days after that, she filed a motion with the circuit court asking that the court fix the amount in controversy, to which the circuit court refused, noting it was too late to amend [the] judgment. Id. Nine days later, but still within the original thirty-day period allowed by CR 73.02 for filing the notice of appeal, she filed a second notice of appeal, arguing that, as the first notice of appeal was a nullity, there was no appellate jurisdiction, and therefore, the trial court did have the authority to amend the judgment to reflect the amount in controversy. The court properly responded, however, that: Necessarily, when a notice of appeal has been filed, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to determine the fact of whether there is a proper showing of a jurisdictional amount in controversy [under KRS 21.070 (1959)]. In other words, the Court has jurisdiction to determine the facts upon which its jurisdiction of an appeal depends. Since the Court of Appeals alone can determine whether an attempted appeal is effective, it is our opinion that when a notice of appeal has been filed, and until the Court of Appeals has dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, the circuit court is deprived of jurisdiction of the case to the same extent as when a valid appeal is pending. Humphrey, 324 S.W.2d at 814-15. The court held that the notice of appeal filed [earlier] was not a nullity, and the circuit court had no jurisdiction [later] to amend the judgment under KRS 21.070. Id. at 815. Again, however, Humphrey addressed the circuit court's powers of control (to amend) its judgment under KRS 21.070 (1959), it was not a comment on the relationship between a trial court and the appellate courts under other rules of procedure, such as CR 73.02(1)(d), 60.02, or 60.03. See Kurtsinger, 90 S.W.3d at 456; Fluor Const, 103 S.W.3d at 90; Wilson, 761 S.W.2d at 184. Here, Appellant filed his notice of appeal within the forty-day period allowed and at the same time as his motion requesting the trial court grant a ten-day extension of the time in which to appeal. Pursuant to CR 73.02(1)(d), the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the request to extend, notwithstanding that the notice of appeal was filed prior to the trial court's consideration of the extension. CR 73.02(1)(d). It is clear that an extension of time must be sought within 40 days from the date upon which the time for the taking of the appeal began to run, under CR 73.02(1)(d). Rodgers v. Henderson, 612 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Ky.App.1980). In the interest of allowing the opposing party a chance to respond, the trial court, however, may not rule on the motion until after the expiration of the forty day period. Id. at 744-45. Rodgers cautioned, however, that the order should then be issued nunc pro tunc. Id. at 745. Appellee asserts that to preserve one's rights to petition a trial court for an extension of time for the appeal under CR 73.02(1)(d), the appeal may not be filed, only tendered for filing; otherwise, jurisdiction vests in the appellate court and the trial court is divested of the right to order the extension. We again disagree. On this point, Rodgers notes only that [a]s long as the appellant moves to file the notice of appeal within 10 days from the date that it was originally due pursuant to CR 73.02(1)(a), and tenders a copy of that notice, the circuit court may grant such an extension upon a proper showing of excusable neglect. 612 S.W.2d at 745. Rodgers thus merely reflects that the tendering of the notice of appeal is as good as the actual filing. Otherwise, a notice of appeal filed after the expiration of the forty days, and after the order, would still be untimely. There is no rule, and no sound judicial policy, forbidding such construction. Johnson, 885 S.W.2d at 950.