Opinion ID: 1405659
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sanctions and Fees

Text: Quick-Ruben challenges the trial court's award of fees under RCW 4.84.185 [12] and sanctions under CR 11, [13] urging us to engage in de novo review of the trial court's decision of this issue. However, the appropriate standard of review regarding sanctions under the statute or rule is abuse of discretion. Tiger Oil Corp. v. Department of Licensing, 88 Wash.App. 925, 937-39, 946 P.2d 1235 (1997); Fluke Capital & Management Servs. Co. v. Richmond, 106 Wash.2d 614, 625, 724 P.2d 356 (1986); Biggs v. Vail, 124 Wash.2d 193, 197, 876 P.2d 448 (1994) (Biggs II) . In Biggs v. Vail, 119 Wash.2d 129, 830 P.2d 350 (1992) ( Biggs I ), we noted RCW 4.84.185, was intended to apply to actions which, as a whole, were spite, nuisance or harassment suits[,] id. at 135, 830 P.2d 350, but went on to note: [T]he language and the history of the frivolous lawsuit statute (RCW 4.84.185) are clear. The lawsuit, as a whole, that is in its entirety, must be determined to be frivolous and to have been advanced without reasonable cause before an award of attorneys' fees may be made under the statute. Id. at 137, 830 P.2d 350. In Biggs I, we reversed the trial court's award of fees under RCW 4.84.185 because the trial court found only three of four claims asserted by Biggs to be frivolous. Because the fourth claim advanced to trial, the suit could not be considered frivolous in its entirety. Thus, fees under RCW 4.84.185 were not appropriate. Id. at 132, 137, 830 P.2d 350. Under Biggs I, if any claims advance to trial, a trial court's award of fees under RCW 4.84.185 cannot be sustained. With respect to an award under CR 11, we noted in Biggs II: [I]n imposing CR 11 sanctions, it is incumbent upon the court to specify the sanctionable conduct in its order. The court must make a finding that either the claim is not grounded in fact or law and the attorney or party failed to make a reasonable inquiry into the law or facts, or the paper was filed for an improper purpose. Biggs II, 124 Wash.2d at 201, 876 P.2d 448. Here, although the trial court's May 15, 1997 order did not rule on all five of the motions before it, the order clearly dismissed the case based on Quick-Ruben's lack of standing and premature filing. Unlike Biggs I, no claim survived to trial. Furthermore, in its June 13, 1997 order regarding fees pursuant to RCW 4.84.185 and CR 11, the trial court specifically found Quick-Ruben's theory of the case unfounded and not based on any reasonable theory of the law. Clerk's Papers at 373. The trial court also found [h]aving standing is fundamental to being able to bring an action. Mr. Quick-Ruben did not have standing, which reasonable inquiry would have shown him. Clerk's Papers at 373. The trial court then concluded: 2. The evidence before the court at the time of the motion establishes that Mr. Quick-Ruben's position on standing was untenable. When he filed an action in which he either knew or should have known that he lacked standing, his action was frivolous and was advanced without reasonable cause. An award of attorney fees is appropriate under RCW 4.84.185. 3. Reasonable inquiry by Mr. Quick-Ruben and his counsel would have shown that the theory that Mr. Quick-Ruben had standing, advanced in the summons and complaint and in subsequent pleadings, was not well grounded in fact nor was it warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law. Mr. Quick-Ruben and his counsel violated CR 11 and sanctions are warranted. Clerk's Papers at 373-74. As the trial court met the requirements of Biggs I and II, its award of fees and sanctions under RCW 4.84.185 and CR 11 cannot be said to be an abuse of discretion. In a separate section of his brief, Judge Verharen requests an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to RAP 18.9(a) which provides an appellate court may order a party who files a frivolous appeal to pay terms or compensatory damages to any party harmed by its actions. We have repeatedly noted: An appeal is frivolous if there are no debatable issues upon which reasonable minds might differ and it is so totally devoid of merit that there [is] no reasonable possibility of reversal. Presidential Estates Apartment Assocs. v. Barrett, 129 Wash.2d 320, 330, 917 P.2d 100 (1996) (quoting Fay v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 115 Wash.2d 194, 200-01, 796 P.2d 412 (1990)); State v. Rolax, 104 Wash.2d 129, 136, 702 P.2d 1185 (1985). While we are reluctant to assess fees lest we be viewed as protecting one of our own, Quick-Ruben had no standing to pursue this private quo warranto action, and he actually filed the action prematurely. Quick-Ruben's continuation of a meritless claim through appeal entitles Verharen to attorney fees on appeal. RAP 18.9(a).