Opinion ID: 2594572
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Claim of Error in Excusing a Prospective Juror Because of Her Views on Capital Punishment

Text: Defendant claims that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution were violated when the trial court granted the prosecution's motion to excuse a prospective juror for substantially impaired ability to follow the law regarding capital punishment. ( Wain-Wright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841.) As we [have] explained ..., `[w]hen a prospective juror's views about the death penalty would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his [or her] duties as a juror' [citation], the juror is not impartial and may be challenged for cause.' ( People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 853, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15.) This test applies equally to defense and prosecution challenges. ( Ibid. ) As stated, `if the juror's statements are equivocal or conflicting, the trial court's determination of the juror's state of mind is binding. If there is no inconsistency, we will uphold the court's ruling if it is supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.]' [Citation.] A juror's bias need not `be proven with unmistakable clarity. [Citations.] Rather, it is sufficient that the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law in the case before the juror.' ( People v. Carpenter, supra, 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1035, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 988 P.2d 531.) Linda J.'s answers were inconsistent. Initially she testified that she would find it difficult to return a verdict of death. She stated that she went beyond being unsure about imposing the death penalty; rather, I don't think I'm capable of that. But she also testified that she favored the death penalty in the abstract, and she hypothesized that the trial might enable her to summon the will to impose it. After initially denying the prosecution's challenge for cause on the ground that Linda J. was impaired, but not substantially, the trial court later reversed itself, finding that her ability to serve as a juror was substantially impaired. Because Linda J.'s answers were inconsistent, but included testimony that she did not think herself capable of imposing the death penalty, we are bound by the trial court's determination that her candid self-assessment showed a substantially impaired ability to carry out her duty as a juror. There was no violation of any constitutional right.