Opinion ID: 511547
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Government Interest

Text: 33 The Supreme Court recently summarized the elements of government interest that are to be weighed against the employee's interest in speech: 34 We have previously recognized as pertinent considerations whether the statement impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among coworkers, has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the performance of the speaker's duties or interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise. 35 These considerations, and indeed the very nature of the balancing test, make apparent that the state interest element of the test focuses on the effective functioning of the public employer's enterprise. 36 Rankin, 107 S.Ct. at 2899 (citation omitted). 37 Appellant argues that the district court prematurely dismissed the complaint under the government interest prong because the government failed to make an objective showing of concrete harm to the effective functioning of the government enterprise. Brief for Appellant at 8. The complaint, to which the district court was limited under Rule 12(b)(6), contained no such evidence. The complaint did not allege, for example, that Hall's speech disrupted an intimate, day-to-day relationship between Hall and the Board of Trustees or the President. Cf. Rankin, 107 S.Ct. at 2899. Appellant argues that absent objective evidence of concrete harm, the district court's conclusion necessarily was premised on speculation that Hall's speech would damage the government's interest in efficient operation. He maintains that such speculation contravened the clear dictate of Rankin, 107 S.Ct. at 2899, and American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 830 F.2d 294, 303-04 & n. 12 (D.C.Cir.1987) (APWU ). 38 Although unadorned speculation as to the impact of speech, whether public or private, on the government's enterprise will not suffice under Rankin and APWU, neither case forbids us from drawing reasonable inferences of harm from the employee's speech, his position, and his working relationship with his superior. Connick, for example, recognized that the employer need not allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest before taking action. 461 U.S. at 152, 103 S.Ct. at 1692-93. Just as the employer may be permitted to infer these untoward consequences from the content, manner, time, and place of the employee's speech, so may we. Id. at 151-53, 103 S.Ct. at 1692-93. Moreover, Rankin indicates that the higher the level the employee occupies, the less stringent the government's burden of proving interference with its interest: 39 The burden of caution employees bear with respect to the words they speak will vary with the extent of authority and public accountability the employee's role entails. Where, as here, an employee serves no confidential, policymaking, or public contact role, the danger to the agency's successful function from that employee's private speech is minimal. 40 107 S.Ct. at 2900 (emphasis added). 41 The present case requires us to explore this evolving area of constitutional law: balancing the government's interest against the First Amendment rights of high-level employees. The Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed the balance in cases involving speech by such employees, but it has applied an analogous balancing test in cases involving political affiliation, prohibiting patronage dismissals except for certain high-level employees (sometimes described as policymakers). Although not directly applicable, the patronage cases address similar concerns and recognize a government interest that is apposite here. 42
43 In Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976), various ministerial employees of the Sheriff's office (e.g., process servers and bailiffs) were fired by a newly elected Democratic Sheriff because they were Republicans. The Court held that the dismissals were barred by the First Amendment. The three-member plurality thought patronage dismissals impaired freedom of belief and association and damaged the electoral process. The plurality admitted that the government had a legitimate interest in ensuring that representative government not be undercut by tactics obstructing the implementation of policies of the new administration.... 427 U.S. at 367, 96 S.Ct. at 2686. This interest could be met, according to the plurality, by [l]imiting patronage dismissals to policymaking positions. Id. Courts could determine whether an employee occupies a policymaking position by examining the nature of his responsibilities, particularly whether the employee acts as an adviser or formulates plans for the implementation of broad goals. Id. at 368, 96 S.Ct. at 2687. Two members concurred on the ground that a nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential government employee could not be discharged for political belief. Id. at 375, 96 S.Ct. at 2690 (Stewart, J., concurring). 44 In Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980), assistant public defenders were dismissed by a newly appointed Democratic Public Defender because they were Republicans. The Court followed Elrod 's holding that party affiliation is usually an illegitimate basis for dismissal, but qualified its definition of the exception to the general rule: 45 the ultimate inquiry is not whether the label policymaker or confidential fits a particular position; rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved. 46 445 U.S. at 518, 100 S.Ct. at 1295. The Court gave one example of a position for which affiliation is an appropriate requirement: 47 [T]he Governor of a State may appropriately believe that the official duties of various assistants who help him write speeches, explain his views to the press, or communicate with the legislature cannot be performed effectively unless those persons share his political beliefs and party commitments. 48 Id. The Court concluded that although the work of assistant public defenders was confidential and policymaking in one sense, party affiliation was irrelevant to the effective performance of their jobs. 49 The First Circuit, after surveying the lower courts that have interpreted Elrod and Branti, distilled a two-part test for determining whether an employee may be dismissed because of political affiliation. Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d 236, 241-42 (1st Cir.1986) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1888, 95 L.Ed.2d 496 (1987). First, and as a threshold matter, it asks whether the position 50 relates to partisan political interests.... [or] concerns. [Branti,] 445 U.S. at 519 [100 S.Ct. at 1295]. That is, does the position involve government decisionmaking on issues where there is room for political disagreement on goals or their implementation? 51 Id. See also Shondel v. McDermott, 775 F.2d 859, 864 (7th Cir.1985) (employee may be dismissed for affiliation if his job performance has a political dimension in the sense that it cannot be evaluated solely on the basis of neutral, apolitical criteria of professional competence); Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164, 1170 (7th Cir.1981) (does position involve government decision-making on issues where there is room for principled disagreement on goals or their implementation?), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021, 102 S.Ct. 1719, 72 L.Ed.2d 139 (1982). 52 Second, Jimenez Fuentes directs us to examine the particular responsibilities of the position to determine whether it resembles a policymaker.... 807 F.2d at 242. Even though, after Branti, policymaker carries no talismanic significance, it remains a convenient shorthand for the type of employee for whom political affiliation is an appropriate requirement. 807 F.2d at 240; see also Brown v. Trench, 787 F.2d 167, 168-69 (3d Cir.1986); Grossart v. Dinaso, 758 F.2d 1221, 1227 n. 4 (7th Cir.1985). We must focus on the powers inherent in the office, even if a particular incumbent has not exercised all of his authority. Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 242. Among the relevant indicia of policymaking authority are vague or broad responsibilities, relative pay, technical competence, power to control others, authority to speak in the name of policymakers, public perception, influence on programs, contact with elected officials, and responsiveness to partisan politics and political leaders. Id. (quoting Ecker v. Cohalan, 542 F.Supp. 896, 901 (E.D.N.Y.1982), and Elrod, 427 U.S. at 368, 96 S.Ct. at 2687). See also Brown, 787 F.2d at 169-70. 53
54 The Elrod-Branti line is premised upon concerns similar to those animating the employee speech cases. The Elrod plurality, 427 U.S. at 359, 96 S.Ct. at 2682, relied upon Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972), a Pickering case. As a general rule, the government cannot condition employment on the compromise or relinquishment of a constitutional right, be it freedom of belief and association (Elrod ), or freedom of speech (Pickering ). 55 Both Elrod-Branti and Pickering limit this principle by recognizing that government has a legitimate interest in efficient operations. The exception for patronage dismissals of certain employees reflects the importance of allowing officials at the top of the organizational hierarchy to implement their policies through politically compatible deputies. 56 In order for the new administration to be given an opportunity to fulfill expectations, it must have available and also appear to have available significant facilitators of policy, people who have the personal and partisan loyalty, initiative, and enthusiasm that can make the difference between the acclaimed success of a government agency or program and its failure or, more typically, its lackluster performance. 57 Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 241; see also Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367, 96 S.Ct. at 2686; Grossart, 758 F.2d at 1226 (Elected officials must be able to rely on the political loyalty of a policymaking civil servant in order to seize the reigns [sic] of government and realize their electoral mandate.). 58 The same concern for the success of a government program is reflected in the government interest prong of the Pickering test, which focuses on the effective functioning of the public employer's enterprise. Rankin, 107 S.Ct. at 2899. Both Elrod and Pickering balance this government interest against the employee's interest in the exercise of constitutional rights. 59 Given the similarity in the bases and countervailing interests recognized in Pickering and Elrod-Branti, the government interest recognized in the affiliation cases is also relevant in the employee speech cases. As the Fifth Circuit noted, 60 reasoning that permits the President to terminate a Deputy Secretary of Defense because he is a member of the opposition party but prohibits him from firing the Deputy for a public expression of policy contrary to his own suffers for lack of defining principle.... Government has an interest in conceding to elected officials the power to implement policy for which they must answer to the voters. In more familiar language, knowing that the buck stops, and where, is a substantial government interest. 61 Gonzalez v. Benavides, 712 F.2d 142, 148 (5th Cir.1983) (Gonzalez I ), after remand, 774 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir.1985) (Gonzalez II ), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1140, 106 S.Ct. 1789, 90 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986). Stated differently, 62 [t]here is a governmental interest in securing those unique relationships between certain high level executives and the elected officials at whose grace they serve. For this narrow band of relationships, refusing to grant First Amendment found tenure would seem to take away little freedom not already lost in accepting the appointment itself.... 63 Gonzalez I, 712 F.2d at 148. 64 The reason is self-evident. High-level officials must be permitted to accomplish their organizational objectives through key deputies who are loyal, cooperative, willing to carry out their superiors' policies, and perceived by the public as sharing their superiors' aims; this is true whether or not those officials are elected. In the case of key patronage appointments, this government interest is protected because of the presumption that these individuals are compatible with the elected officials they serve. As they belong to the same party, they may be presumed to share common interests and goals, which cannot be said of members of an opposition party. But regardless of whether a key policy level deputy is appointed from among the ranks of party members, the need for compatibility remains. 65 The affiliation cases arise in a discrete context--the unique role of parties in elective politics, the hurlyburly of elections and their aftermath--and the vocabulary of these cases reflects this context. Although the interests recognized in these cases provide a helpful insight into the employee speech cases, the nomenclature is more confusing than illuminating when transferred. Thus, while we adopt the criteria set forth in Jimenez Fuentes as a means of identifying those high-level employees for whom compatibility with superiors is crucial, we modify its terminology by substituting policy for partisan and political. We will ask first whether the employee's position relates to an area as to which there is room for principled disagreement on goals or their implementation. See Nekolny, 653 F.2d at 1170. In other words, is it a policy area? If so, we then ask whether the office gives the employee broad responsibilities with respect to policy formulation, implementation, or enunciation. Put differently, was the individual a policy level employee? If both criteria are met, we ask whether the government interest in accomplishing its organizational objectives through compatible policy level deputies is implicated by the employee's speech. See Gonzalez II, 774 F.2d at 1302. At a minimum, the employee's speech must relate to policy areas for which he is responsible. 66
67 Did Hall and the Board fall into that narrow band of fragile relationships requiring for job security loyalty at the expense of unfettered speech? Gonzalez I, 712 F.2d at 150. The district court rightly concluded that they did, and therefore that the government's interest in the effective functioning of its enterprise outweighed Hall's interest in speaking on a matter of public concern. 68 Hall's position related to a policy area, and his duties were such as to identify him as a prominent policy level official. The University therefore had a significant interest in ensuring that Hall was, and was perceived to be, compatible with the President and the Board. Hall's speech directly interfered with this interest, as he engaged in a pattern of opposition to the policies of his superiors. 69 First, the Athletic Directorship clearly is a position that relates to policy concerns. There is substantial room for principled disagreement on the formulation and implementation of goals for the Athletic Department. Two directors may disagree about which sports to emphasize, whether to focus on league or intramural activities, or whether to insist on compliance with NCAA and University rules even at the expense of negative publicity and competitive setbacks. As the Athletic Director's job performance cannot be measured solely on the basis of neutral, technical criteria of professional competence, his position relates to a policy area. See Shondel, 775 F.2d at 864; cf. Roman Melendez v. Inclan, 826 F.2d 130, 133-34 (1st Cir.1987) (as physical condition of schools is matter of vital public concern, and there was room for disagreement as to priorities for investigating and remedying deficient conditions, position of director of program whose primary responsibility was to repair, maintain, and improve public schools clearly related to institutional policy); Tomczak v. City of Chicago, 765 F.2d 633, 641 (7th Cir.) (deputy water commissioner's duties related to unprotected area because there was room for principled disagreement on how best to accomplish goal of providing public services), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946, 106 S.Ct. 313, 88 L.Ed.2d 289 (1985). 70 Second, Hall's duties as Athletic Director were sufficiently extensive to qualify him as a policy level employee. The Athletic Director is in the excepted service, which is defined by statute as an individual whose primary duties are of a policy determining, confidential, or policy advocacy character and who reports directly to the head of an agency. D.C.Code Ann. Sec. 1-610.2 (1981). Although the statute is not conclusive, it is entitled to some deference. Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 246. The statutory classification is confirmed by the complaint's description of the Athletic Directorship. Hall alleged that the President and the Board placed the position of Athletic Director in the University's 'Excepted Service' so that the President could select the Athletic Director at his sole discretion. Complaint at p 30, App. at 8. Hall was the President's key subordinate, chosen for the express purpose of implementing policy. The President rel[ied] upon [appellant] to bring the UDC Athletic Department into full compliance with NCAA and UDC rules and guidelines. Complaint at p 10, App. at 3. In other words, he was charged with formulat[ing] plans for the implementation of [the University's] broad goals. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 368, 96 S.Ct. at 2687 (plurality opinion). 71 These duties were obviously not well defined [and] of broad scope. Id. Hall was the immediate subordinate of the President and the Board. He reported directly to them, and they were his only superiors. He had the power and primary responsibility to control all employees within his department. At the same time, he was a highly visible spokesman for the University's athletic program, likely to be thought of by the public as responsible for running the department. 72 Finally, the government's interest in having its Athletic Department efficiently operated in accordance with policies established by the President and Board was directly undermined by Hall's contrary views as to how these policies should have been formulated and implemented. He engaged in a pattern of speech concerning the proper response to rule violations within the department. Complaint at p 13, App. at 4. His statements were opposed with increasing frequency by the UDC administration and various members of the Board. Complaint at p 14, App. at 5. Hall's views as to how the department should have been run were obviously at odds with those of the Board. 73 We conclude that Hall could be dismissed for expressing views on matters within the core of his responsibilities that reflected a policy disagreement with his superiors such that they could not expect him to carry out their policy choices vigorously.