Opinion ID: 62326
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Butler's argument for alternate calculations

Text: Butler argues that we have misunderstood the discretion that the Louisiana Supreme Court had to consider his late request on direct appeal on the merits. [1] In his view, the January 1999, Supreme Court ruling was on the merits and not just a recognition that he had filed too late for review. Based on that premise, he argues that the one-year statute of limitations did not begin until the Louisiana Supreme Court's January 8, 1999, denial. We examine more closely the relevant Louisiana appellate procedures. The Louisiana Supreme Court's 1999 order contains only one word: denied. See State v. Butler, 734 So.2d 1222. Butler argues that a simple denied cannot be based on untimeliness, relying in part on our statement in 2004 that when the denial of an application is based on untimeliness, Louisiana courts routinely and unmistakably indicate so in their opinions. Grillette v. Warden, 372 F.3d 765, 775 (5th Cir.2004). In Grillette, though, we were evaluating solely the practice of the Louisiana Court of Appeal under a rule applicable only to it and not to the state's Supreme Court; we cited only intermediate court opinions for our conclusion. See id. at 769-70. Conversely, in a pre- Grillette opinion, we found that a single-word denial order from the Louisiana Supreme Court likely indicated untimeliness and not a merits decision. Williams v. Cain, 217 F.3d 303, 304, 309 n. 7 (5th Cir.2000). Butler also refers to numerous Louisiana Supreme Court orders which specifically stated that the application was not considered, not timely filed. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 939 So.2d 1269 (La.2006); State v. Shannon, 766 So.2d 1261 (La. 2000); State v. Jones, 763 So.2d 586 (La. 2000). However, those examples do not prove the negative, that the absence of such language when Butler's application was denied means that the merits were reached. [2] Most persuasive to us, the Louisiana Supreme Court would have violated its own rule if it had considered Butler's petition on the merits. A Louisiana Supreme Court rule requires that an application seeking to review a judgment of the court of appeals, must be filed within thirty days; it specifies that [n]o extension of time therefor will be granted. La. Sup. Ct. R. X, § 5(a). While another section of the Rule  Section 5(b)  allows the Supreme Court to extend the time for filings under the subsection upon proper showing, that applies to narrow categories of applications that do not include cases such as Butler's. [3] Finally, there is no indication that the state court granted an extension or otherwise waived its own rule as to Butler. Butler did not even request an extension of time to file his late direct review application. He has not claimed that he received a letter from that court allowing a late filing such as did the defendant in Hill v. Cooper, 2007 WL 458207, No. 04-2588 (E.D.La.2007). We are not aware of any case in which the Louisiana Supreme Court sua sponte extended the amount of time in which to file under Rule X, § 5(a). Contra Hughes, 249 Fed.Appx. at 341 (Hughes requested and received an extension under § 5(b)); McGee v. Cain, 104 Fed.Appx. 989 (5th Cir.2004) (unpublished) (requested and did not receive an extension under § 5(a)); Hill, 2007 WL 458207 at  (requested and did receive an extension  unclear what basis). We conclude that the Louisiana Supreme Court found Butler's application for further review of his conviction to be untimely. Therefore, that court's order does not bring into question the conclusion that the one-year period for Butler to bring a federal habeas petition began on July 24, 1998.