Opinion ID: 1475144
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Alleged Common Law Marriage

Text: Mr. Mesa argues that the trial court erred in failing to recognize his relationship with Melani de Guzman, a government witness, as a common law marriage. He complains that because of his common law marriage and the marital privilege, the trial court should have suppressed letters he wrote to and conversations he had with Ms. de Guzman, and that it should have disallowed her testimony. The government maintains that the trial court's determination that no common law marriage existed between Mr. Mesa and Ms. de Guzman was not plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. The trial court concluded that the defense established by more than a preponderance [of the evidence] that [Mr. Mesa and Ms. de Guzman] intended to be married... at some future time ...[,][n]ot that they are presently married. Furthermore, the trial court decided that all the objective material indicated that there was no actual common law marriage between Mr. Mesa and Ms. De Guzman. The elements of a common law marriage in this jurisdiction are cohabitation as husband and wife, following an express mutual agreement, which must be in words of the present tense. Coates v. Watts, 622 A.2d 25, 27 (D.C.1993) (citing East v. East, 536 A.2d 1103, 1105 (D.C. 1988)). The parties may provide direct evidence of their common law marriage. See Marcus v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs v. U.S. Department of Labor, 179 U.S.App.D.C. 89, 548 F.2d 1044 (1976). Other than the testimony of the parties claiming to be in a common law marriage, direct evidence may include deeds to property and tax returns. See Coates, supra, 622 A.2d at 26. In addition, [t]he existence of an agreement may be inferred from the character and duration of cohabitation, or from other circumstantial evidence such as testimony by relatives and acquaintances as to the general reputation regarding the parties' relationship. Marcus, supra, 179 U.S.App.D.C. at 93 n. 9, 548 F.2d at 1048 n. 9 (citation omitted). An inference may nevertheless be rebutted by direct evidence that, in fact, there was no present agreement. Id. However, if an appellant proves the existence of a valid common law marriage, the marital privilege, codified in D.C.Code § 14-306 (2001), is applicable. D.C.Code § 14-306 provides: (a) In civil and criminal proceedings, a husband or his wife is competent but not compellable to testify for or against the other. (b) In civil and criminal proceedings, a husband or his wife is not competent to testify as to any confidential communications made by one to the other during the marriage. Furthermore, while [t]he District of Columbia has long recognized common law marriages, Coates, supra, 622 A.2d at 27 (citing Hoage v. Murch Bros. Constr. Co., 60 App.D.C. 218, 50 F.2d 983 (1931)), such marriages are closely scrutinized, id. (citations omitted). Here, the burden was on Mr. Mesa to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, all of the essential elements of a common law marriage. Id. (citations omitted). Whether a common law marriage exists is largely a factual determination. Thus, we will affirm the trial court's findings regarding the existence of a common law marriage unless appellant can persuade us that it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. East, supra, 536 A.2d at 1106 (citing D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (1981)). And, the applicability of the marital privilege, in Mr. Mesa's case, depends upon the existence of a valid common law marriage. Although Ms. de Guzman testified that Mr. Mesa was her husband and provided examples of how they held themselves out as man and wife, the trial judge discredited her testimony saying, I do not believe her . . . . I think there is too much objective evidence cutting against her. The trial court also found that the various objective indicia that [defense counsel] point[ed] to are things [Ms. de Guzman] has put together somewhat after the fact; and that while the two intended to be married . . . at some future time, . . . they are [not] presently married. . . . Ms. de Guzman testified that: she had been wearing a wedding ring since the year 2000; she and Mr. Mesa lived together at Gallaudet University; she uses the last name of Mesa and had a magazine subscription in the name of Melani Mesa; she and Mr. Mesa used the same post office box; she had a wedding book and a certificate of marriage to commemorate their agreement to marry; and Mr. Mesa gave her a Bible with the inscription Melani de Guzman, wife. Yet, the record before the court showed that Ms. de Guzman's driver's license and financial aid application for Gallaudet bore the name Melani de Guzman, not Melani Mesa, and both documents revealed that she was single. When she spoke with one of the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) detectives, in the grand jury and at the D.C. jail, she represented that Mr. Mesa was her boyfriend rather than her husband. Significantly, she admitted creating the wedding book, and the computer-generated wedding certificate, after Mr. Mesa was arrested in February of 2001. Moreover, the record reflects that she and Mr. Mesa had separate dormitory rooms, and they did not apply for married housing, although it was available. Other indications that the two did not have a common law marriage included the fact that Ms. de Guzman told only a few friends that she was married and often did not wear the wedding ring. As the trial court said: [I]f indeed they were married, not intending to be married, I have heard no reason why they would have been keeping that secret from everyone but people they trusted[,] i[n] her words. Why . . . would [she] call herself fiancee which is someone who intends to be married, or refer to herself as his girlfriend, [and] there is not the sort of cohabitation that one would associate with a common law marriage in the absence of a formal ceremony. Given the trial court's credibility determination regarding Ms. de Guzman's testimony, and the evidence in the record that, although Mr. Mesa and Ms. de Guzman may have intended marriage at some future date, they in fact were only girlfriend and boyfriend or at most affianced, we are satisfied that Mr. Mesa did not sustain his burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, all of the essential elements of a common law marriage, Coates, supra, 622 A.2d at 27. Therefore, Mr. Mesa was not entitled to invoke the marital privilege with respect to Ms. de Guzman's testimony, the letters he wrote to her, and his conversations with her. See Coates and East, supra .