Opinion ID: 2978216
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Merits of Bassam’s application

Text: Bassam seeks asylum only from Lebanon—his country of citizenship and the country to which the IJ designated that Bassam, his wife, and his children be removed. No suggestion appears in the record that the government has contemplated removing Bassam and his family to Kuwait. Indeed, Bassam testified that he no longer has any legal basis to enter Kuwait, and he never stated that he fears persecution in that country. The government correctly points out in its brief that Bassam’s refugee status must be considered solely with respect to Lebanon—his country of nationality. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Nonetheless, Bassam presented information about incidents that happened to him in Kuwait as well as in Lebanon, and the IJ discussed his eligibility for asylum from both countries. See Ouda -7- No. 8-3924 Bassam v. Holder v. INS, 324 F.3d 445, 450-51 (6th Cir. 2003) (reviewing the application of a stateless person for asylum from Kuwait—the person’s last country of residence—even though the applicant was not eligible to enter Kuwait). To the extent that this was an error by the IJ, we conclude that it was harmless. The treatment that Bassam experienced in Kuwait—a single incident of detention and interrogation—was nearly identical to the treatment he experienced in Lebanon. Analysis of his asylum eligibility would therefore not materially differ between the two countries. But because Bassam applied for asylum only from Lebanon, and the IJ designated his removal to that country, we will review the IJ’s decision solely with respect to Lebanon. Bassam described several incidents in Lebanon where he was detained at checkpoints or in the airport and questioned by authorities. The longest of these detentions occurred in July 2000, when he was detained for two days while background checks were conducted. No other incident of detention lasted longer than a few hours. Bassam does not describe any physical harm that was inflicted on him in Lebanon, with the exception of a few minor slaps that left red marks on his skin for brief periods. This treatment does not rise to the level of persecution. See, e.g., Sedrakyan v. Gonzales, 237 F. App’x 76, 83 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that generally, “[d]etention . . . in connection with a police investigation do[es] not constitute persecution.” (citing Ali v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 407, 410 (6th Cir. 2004))). The facts as Bassam describes them are similar to those in Mohammed v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 369, 371-72 (6th Cir. 2007), in which this court concluded that a three-day period of police detention without abuse, together with a single incident where the applicant was slapped and kicked but not -8- No. 8-3924 Bassam v. Holder injured, did not rise to the level of persecution. We therefore agree with the IJ’s conclusion that Bassam has not shown that he has experienced past persecution in Lebanon. Bassam has also failed to show that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution. Although he is understandably fearful of returning to his country because of various unfortunate circumstances there, none of the potential difficulties he faces amount to persecution as defined by the INA. Bassam testified that he fears additional lengthy detentions at checkpoints, similar to those that have occurred in the past. But, as explained above, such detention does not rise to the level of persecution. And Bassam conceded at his hearing that, although he believes that officials might detain him more frequently than others because he has lived in Kuwait, inspections at checkpoints are a routine part of life for everyone in Lebanon. Bassam also stated that work is difficult to find in Lebanon, that his children’s education might be frequently interrupted there, and that civilians are not safe in Lebanon because of bombings and ongoing conflict. We do not doubt that these difficulties exist and that Bassam fears them, but they do not qualify him for a grant of asylum. See, e.g., Pascual v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 483, 488 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that scarce educational and economic opportunities, “regrettable though they are, do not establish a cognizable case of persecution”); Akhtar v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that general civil and social strife does not confer eligibility for asylum). In sum, the record does not compel the conclusion that Bassam has a well-founded fear of future persecution.