Opinion ID: 2455395
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cities and Counties Have Broad Discretion To Adopt Comprehensive Plans Under the GMA

Text: ¶ 96 The necessary starting point when reviewing any GMA case is the broad range of discretion the legislature expressly granted counties and cities to adopt comprehensive plans according to their local growth patterns, resources, and needs. [7] The legislature determined this deference is required because [l]ocal comprehensive plans and development regulations require counties and cities to balance priorities and options for action in full consideration of local circumstances. RCW 36.70A.3201; see also Manke Lumber Co. v. Diehl, 91 Wash.App. 793, 804, 959 P.2d 1173 (1998) (reversing the Western Washington Growth Management Hearings Board's finding of GMA noncompliance due to lack of substantial evidence). To this end, comprehensive plans and development regulations are presumed to be valid upon adoption. RCW 36.70A.320(1). Additionally, upon challenge, the burden is on the petitioner to demonstrate that any action taken by a county or city under the GMA is not in compliance with the requirements of the GMA. RCW 36.70A.320(2). This burden is intentionally very high: hearings boards (and courts) must apply a more deferential standard of review to actions ... than the preponderance of the evidence standard. RCW 36.70A.3201. Neither the majority nor the Board explains how the County fails under this particularized standard of review. ¶ 97 Furthermore, within the constraints of this high level of deference, the hearings board must find that a city or county's action complies with the GMA, unless it determines that the comprehensive plan or development regulation is clearly erroneous in view of the entire record before the board and in light of the goals and requirements of [the GMA]. RCW 36.70A.320(3). A county's action is not clearly erroneous merely because an unelected hearings board has a `firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been committed'; [8] rather, `[a] finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' Ancheta v. Daly, 77 Wash.2d 255, 259-60, 461 P.2d 531 (1969) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)); [9] see also United States v. Or. State Med. Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 72 S.Ct. 690, 96 L.Ed. 978 (1952). In short, whether an action is clearly erroneous should not turn on a hearings board member's firm and definite conviction, but whether the hearings board is firmly convinced that an error of law has occurred after full consideration of the law and the evidence. Neither the majority nor the Board explains why the County's Plan and development regulations, after giving the County this high level of deference, can be found clearly erroneous under this exacting definition. ¶ 98 Finally, because the ultimate burden and responsibility for planning, harmonizing the planning goals of the GMA, and implementing a county's or city's future rests with that community, on remand we should direct the Board to remand to the County to allow its legislative body to make only the necessary adjustments to its Plan and development regulations. See Viking Props., Inc. v. Holm, 155 Wash.2d 112, 125-26, 118 P.3d 322 (2005) (quoting RCW 36.70A.3201). ¶ 99 To summarize my conclusions below, I would hold that the presumption of the validity of the County's Plan and development regulations has not been rebutted, with the partial exception of chapter 17.31 of the Kittitas County Code (KCC). The petitioners have not shown that the County's Plan or the remaining development regulations, after application of a more deferential standard of review than the preponderance of evidence standard, remain clearly erroneous in view of the entire record and the goals and requirements of the GMA.