Opinion ID: 1956982
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence and Jury Instruction Rulings

Text: BASF argues that even if the farmers' claims are not pre-empted by FIFRA, BASF is nevertheless entitled to a new trial because (a) evidence about the contents of the Poast Plus and Poast labels was introduced at trial, inviting the jury to hold BASF liable for fraud on the basis of the labeling, and (b) the court refused to instruct the jury regarding FIFRA labeling regulations, which BASF claims is required by Bates. First, the farmers contend correctly that these arguments were procedurally waived by BASF. Although BASF made these arguments to the court of appeals in Peterson II and the court rejected them, see 657 N.W.2d at 871-73, BASF did not mention either evidentiary rulings or jury instructions in its statement of issues or otherwise in its petition for review to this court from Peterson II. We ruled in Peterson III that issues must be raised in a petition for review or they are waived. 675 N.W.2d at 66-67; see also Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 686 (Minn.1990). Moreover, the evidentiary issues were not raised in BASF's briefs to this court in Peterson III. Jury instructions were not raised as an independent claim of error, but as support for BASF's preemption argument. It is well-established that failure to address an issue in brief constitutes waiver of that issue. E.g., Melina v. Chaplin, 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn.1982). Furthermore, these arguments were not automatically preserved as part of BASF's preemption argument. Although BASF ties these arguments to preemption because their resolution in some degree is related to the nature and permissible scope of the farmers' claims and BASF's defenses, these arguments are more accurately viewed as challenges to trial rulings about evidence and jury instructions. They are not the same as BASF's legal argument that farmers' claims are preempted by FIFRA. Finally, BASF is not permitted to resurrect these waived arguments because of a change in the law by the Supreme Court in Bates. These arguments were available to BASF (and were made by BASF in Peterson II ) prior to Bates. Nothing the Supreme Court said in Bates created new law that made these arguments newly-available, particularly in view of the fact that the Court narrowed the test for FIFRA preemption in Bates, rather than expanding it. Even if these arguments were not waived, BASF would not prevail. First, BASF objects to the district court's decision to allow information from the Poast and Poast Plus labels to be introduced at trial. The evidence to which BASF objects includes the names of the products, the percentages of active ingredients in each, the instructions for use, and the approved uses. BASF claims this evidence should have been excluded because it was irrelevant to any nonlabel-based claim and was strongly prejudicial, because it may have permitted the jury to consider whether the label information was deceptive in reaching its verdict. The district court has broad discretion in ruling on evidentiary matters and we will not overturn a district court's evidentiary rulings unless appellant shows a clear abuse of discretion   . State v. Steward, 645 N.W.2d 115, 120 (Minn. 2002). Evidence is considered relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Minn. R. Evid. 401. However, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Minn. R. Evid. 403. The district court admitted the evidence of the chemical composition of Poast and Poast Plus, instructions for their use, and other label information because it provided background for the evidence of nonlabel conduct that the farmers claimed was deceptive. We conclude that given the significant degree of relevance and the high standard of Minn. R. Evid. 403 (the evidence must be substantially more prejudicial than probative before it is excluded), the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. Next, BASF claims that it is entitled to a new trial because the district court refused to instruct the jury regarding FIFRA regulations, specifically:  That EPA regulations required BASF to register Poast and Poast Plus as separate products.  That EPA's regulations prohibited BASF from using the exact same name for Poast and Poast Plus.  That EPA regulations allow manufacturers to distribute or sell pesticides under labeling bearing any subset of the directions for use approved by the EPA.  That EPA allows a company to label an herbicide for fewer crops than registered by the EPA.  That [a] manufacturer of pesticides has no duty under federal or state law to label pesticides for specific crop uses.  That the jury could not find [t]he omission of any information from, or the inclusion of any information on the Poast Plus label to be a violation of the NJCFA.  That every state requires separate registration of pesticides and may deny registration and bar use of the pesticide notwithstanding EPA registration. BASF argues that the court's refusal to give these instructions violated the Supreme Court's statement in Bates that courts should instruct the jury on the relevant FIFRA misbranding standards, as well as any regulations that add content to those standards. Bates, 125 S.Ct. at 1804. Given the context of the Court's statement about jury instructions in Bates, we do not understand it to require instructions on FIFRA regulations in every case in which FIFRA preemption is raised. As explained above, the Court interpreted two of the Texas farmers' claims in Bates to be based on the truth or falsity of the content of the product label. This raised the question whether the legal standard imposed on the label content by the Texas common law claims was equivalent to the misbranding standards in FIFRA, an issue the Court determined had not been adequately briefed. In remanding for a determination on that issue, the Court also addressed the hypothetical scenario of that issue of equivalence of state and federal labeling requirements going to trial. In that context, the Court raised the issue of jury instructions, stating: To survive pre-emption, the state-law requirement need not be phrased in the identical language as its corresponding FIFRA requirement; indeed, it would be surprising if a common-law requirement used the same phraseology as FIFRA. If a case proceeds to trial, the court's jury instructions must ensure that nominally equivalent labeling requirements are genuinely equivalent. If a defendant so requests, a court should instruct the jury on the relevant FIFRA misbranding standards, as well as any regulations that add content to those standards. For a manufacturer should not be held liable under a state labeling requirement subject to § 136v(b) unless the manufacturer is also liable for misbranding as defined by FIFRA. Bates, 125 S.Ct. at 1804 (third emphasis added). Thus, when liability under state law is alleged to arise based on the content of the label, the court must ensure, through jury instructions if requested, that the defendant is not held liable based on a state standard that is substantively different than the FIFRA misbranding standards. This case, however, did not involve claims of deceptive labeling, but rather deceptive nonlabel conduct. Moreover, appellate review of jury instructions is limited: When determining the adequacy of jury instructions, this court reviews for an abuse of discretion. The district court has considerable latitude in selecting language for jury instructions. Jury instructions are viewed as a whole to determine whether they fairly and adequately explain the law. An instruction is error if it materially misstates the law. State v. Moore, 699 N.W.2d 733, 736 (Minn.2005) (internal citations omitted). The district court's decision must be viewed in the context of the case. During the trial, BASF presented extensive expert testimony on the nature of FIFRA and its regulations. Additionally, BASF admits that the farmers never asserted that BASF violated FIFRA. The farmers' closing and opening statements describe and dwell on BASF's advertising misstatements and its false statements to government officials, mentioning labeling and registration only to explain the nature of the marketing scheme. Finally, BASF's attorney argued extensively in closing about FIFRA, state registration, and their relevance to the case. Given this context, the jury had already been informed at length that BASF was compliant with labeling laws and that BASF could not be held liable for its labels. The court did not want to confuse the jury with instructions on labeling law when it was not alleged that BASF had labeled incorrectly. Therefore, the district court refused to include the requested jury instructions. As the court of appeals stated in rejecting this argument: BASF's proposed instructions do not relate directly to the charge before the jury, which was whether BASF violated the NJCFA. Further, throughout the entire trial, the jury heard numerous discussions of these issues and the various witnesses' descriptions of the effect of the regulations. These topics were more properly the subject of counsel's final argument rather than jury instructions, and the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request to include these instructions. Peterson II, 657 N.W.2d at 871. We agree and conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the requested jury instructions. Affirmed. PAGE and ANDERSON, G. BARRY, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of this matter. GILDEA, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this matter. BLOOMQUIST, Acting J. [14]