Opinion ID: 785798
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defining Adverse Employment Action

Text: 22 Title VII's anti-retaliation provision provides: 23 (a) Discrimination for making charges, testifying, assisting, or participating in enforcement proceedings 24 It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. 25 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (section 704(a) of Title VII) (emphasis added). Title VII does not define the phrase discriminate against, which is repeated in Title VII's other anti-discrimination provisions, but courts have made clear that not just any discriminatory act by an employer constitutes discrimination under Title VII. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) (citing cases requiring a tangible employment action to support a Title VII claim). Employment actions that are de minimis are not actionable under Title VII. Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 462 (6th Cir.2000). If every low evaluation or other action by an employer that makes an employee unhappy or resentful were considered an adverse action, Title VII would be triggered by supervisor criticism or even facial expressions indicating displeasure. Primes v. Reno, 190 F.3d 765, 767 (6th Cir.1999). 26 To prevent lawsuits based upon trivial workplace dissatisfactions, we require that a plaintiff prove the existence of an adverse employment action to support a Title VII claim. Hollins v. Atlantic Co., 188 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir.1999) (defining adverse employment action as a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of [plaintiff's] employment). 1 This case requires us to clarify further the meaning of adverse employment action for purposes of Title VII. 27 The first time this court required a plaintiff to prove the existence of an adverse employment action as part of a Title VII claim was in Geisler v. Folsom, 735 F.2d 991 (6th Cir.1984). In Geisler, the plaintiff alleged that her employer violated Title VII's anti-retaliation provision by discriminating against her for filing a sex discrimination charge with the EEOC. After a bench trial, the district court found that [p]laintiff failed to show any adverse employment action in response to her EEOC charge or any other protected activity. While additional tension arose after others became aware of [plaintiff]'s charge, such `predictable tension' is not `the type of adverse employment action prohibited by Title VII's retaliation clause.' 735 F.2d at 994 (quoting the district court). This court affirmed, stating: 28 We agree with the district judge that a general increase of tension in the workplace would be expected to follow revelation that a claim of discrimination in employment had been filed. However, evidence of such an increase should be considered, and any discrete act or course of conduct which could be construed as retaliation must be examined carefully. After such examination we conclude that the finding that no `adverse employment action' resulted from the filing of the EEOC charge is not clearly erroneous, particularly in view of the contrary evidence.... 29 735 F.2d at 996 (quoting the district court's use of the phrase adverse employment action). 30 A few months after deciding Geisler, this court stated that to support a claim for retaliation under Title VII a plaintiff must establish: (1) that he engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) that he was the subject of adverse employment action; and (3) that there exists a casual [sic] link between his protected activity and the adverse action of his employer. Jackson v. RKO Bottlers of Toledo, Inc., 743 F.2d 370, 375 (6th Cir.1984). The Jackson court did not cite Geisler as a basis for including adverse employment action among the elements of a Title VII retaliation claim; instead it relied upon cases from the Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. Id. (citing Burrus v. United Tel. Co. of Kansas, Inc., 683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir.1982); Jones v. Lumberjack Meats, Inc., 680 F.2d 98, 101 (11th Cir.1982); Whatley v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 632 F.2d 1325, 1328 (5th Cir.1980)). The cases cited by Jackson, like Jackson itself, each involved a termination of employment, and so none of these cases addressed the issue of what types of employment actions short of termination constitute adverse employment actions. 2 31 Ever since Geisler and Jackson, the adverse-employment-action element has remained a part of a Title VII claim in this circuit. After Geisler, the first time that this court decided a case based on the adverse-employment-action element was in Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 638 (6th Cir.1987). In Yates, this court reversed a district court's factual finding of retaliation, holding that it was clear error for the district court to find that a temporary job reassignment that resulted in no pay or benefits reduction was an adverse employment action cognizable under Title VII's anti-retaliation provision. For this holding, the Yates court relied solely upon a district court decision from Delaware. Id. (citing and endorsing Ferguson v. E.I. duPont deNemours and Co., 560 F.Supp. 1172, 1201 (D.Del.1983), which held that a job reassignment is not an adverse employment action if it is only temporary and results in no reduction in pay or benefits). 32 After Yates, it was almost ten years before we had another opportunity to develop the definition of adverse employment action. In Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management Inc., this court considered the definition of adverse employment action in the context of a discrimination claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act. 97 F.3d 876, 885-87. Relying in part upon the Seventh Circuit's definition, this court held that a plaintiff claiming employment discrimination must show that she suffered a materially adverse change in the terms of her employment. Id. at 885 (citing Spring v. Sheboygan Area Sch. Dist., 865 F.2d 883 (7th Cir.1989), which involved an age discrimination claim). A mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities or a bruised ego is not enough to constitute an adverse employment action. Id. at 886 (citing Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir.1993), and Flaherty v. Gas Research Inst., 31 F.3d 451, 456 (7th Cir.1994)). 33 Furthermore, according to Kocsis, reassignments without salary or work hour changes do not ordinarily constitute adverse employment decisions in employment discrimination claims. Id. at 885 (citing Yates, 819 F.2d at 638, which applied to temporary reassignments). A reassignment without salary or work hour changes, however, may be an adverse employment action if it constitutes a demotion evidenced by a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation. Id. at 886 (citing Crady, 993 F.2d at 136). 34 In this circuit, Kocsis is the seminal case for defining adverse employment action. 3 The Supreme Court in Burlington Industries v. Ellerth relied upon Kocsis and several decisions from other circuits when it stated that [a] tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits. 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998). The Supreme Court also observed that: 35 A tangible employment action in most cases inflicts direct economic harm.... Tangible employment actions are the means by which the supervisor brings the official power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates. A tangible employment decision requires an official act of the enterprise, a company act. The decision in most cases is documented in official company records, and may be subject to review by higher level supervisors. 36 Id. at 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257. But see Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242 n. 5 (9th Cir.2000) (rejecting the contention that Burlington Industries set forth a standard for adverse employment actions in the retaliation context). 37 In this appeal, White and the EEOC, which has filed an amicus curiae brief on White's behalf, urge us to revise our definition of adverse employment action for purposes of Title VII retaliation cases and adopt the interpretation included in the EEOC Guidelines. The EEOC has interpreted adverse employment action in the context of a Title VII retaliation claim to mean any adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter a charging party or others from engaging in protected activity. EEOC Compliance Manual § 8, Retaliation, ¶ 8008 (1998). Although EEOC Guidelines are not binding on the courts, they constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944)). 38 The EEOC claims that this court's development of the adverse-employment-action element has been unfaithful to the letter and purpose of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision. According to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 3(a), it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee for engaging in protected conduct. The EEOC contends that the most natural reading of this language is that it prohibits any form of discrimination against an individual for opposing discrimination or filing a charge. The Ninth and Seventh Circuits have also embraced a broad interpretation of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir.2000) (This provision does not limit what type of discrimination is covered, nor does it prescribe a minimum level of severity for actionable discrimination.); Knox v. State of Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir.1996) (There is nothing in the law of retaliation that restricts the type of retaliatory act that might be visited upon an employee who seeks to invoke her rights by filing a complaint.). 4 39 Despite the EEOC's contention that any form of discrimination falls within the most natural reading of the statute, the EEOC acknowledges in its brief that its definition of adverse employment action excludes petty slights and trivial annoyances and anything that is not reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activity. The EEOC does not explain how it justifies excluding such discriminatory acts under its strictly literal reading of the statute, which prohibits discrimination without any explicit textual limitation regarding the type of discrimination or level of severity required. Therefore, the EEOC admits that a strictly literal reading of discriminate against is not a fair interpretation of Title VII since it is unlikely that Congress intended to authorize Title VII claims over trivial matters. 40 We developed the adverse-employment-action element to prevent the kind of claims based upon trivial employment actions that a strictly literal reading of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision would allow. Because the language of Title VII does not explicitly provide any limit on the types of discriminatory acts prohibited, the language of Title VII does not favor the EEOC's proposed limitations over the limitations this court has developed during the last twenty years of defining the adverse-employment-action element of a Title VII claim. 41 The EEOC argues that the purpose of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision supports its definition. In enacting section 2000e-3, Congress unmistakably intended to ensure that no person would be deterred from exercising his rights under Title VII by the threat of discriminatory retaliation. EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541, 543 (6th Cir.1993). While the EEOC's proposed definition more overtly incorporates the purpose of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, this court's definition, properly interpreted, also accomplishes the goal while appropriately counterbalancing the need to prevent lawsuits based upon trivialities. Instead of requiring district courts to determine on a case-by-case basis what actions by an employer are reasonably likely to deter an employee from engaging in protected activity, we have over the last twenty years given some shape to the definition by describing the kinds of material adverse employment actions that rise above the level of trivial. As we recognized in Kocsis, however, it is impossible to list every possible employment action that falls into the definition of adverse employment action and a court must consider indices that might be unique to a particular situation. Kocsis, 97 F.3d at 886. 42 In addition, this court's definition has the benefit of applying equally to all Title VII discrimination claims, not only to retaliation claims. Having a different standard for different provisions of Title VII would be burdensome and unjustified by the text of the statute, which uses the same phrase discriminate against in each of its anti-discrimination provisions. See Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 791-92 (6th Cir.2000) (applying rules of statutory construction to hold that discriminate against means the same thing each time it appears in Title VII); Mattei v. Mattei, 126 F.3d 794, 806 (6th Cir.1997) (presuming that Congress intended the phrase discriminate against to have the same basic meaning each time it is used in a statute). 5 43 We therefore reject White's and the EEOC's request that we adopt a new definition of adverse employment action for purposes of Title VII retaliation cases, and we reaffirm the definition that we have developed in cases such as Kocsis and its progeny. Since the adverse-employment action element developed by this Circuit is an exception to a broad, strictly literal reading of Title VII's anti-discrimination provisions, we will continue to define the exception narrowly so as not to frustrate the purpose of Title VII while deterring lawsuits over trivial matters.