Opinion ID: 1238139
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Special Circumstance Claims

Text: Defendant claims that the jury was not properly instructed as to the requisite intent in connection with the special circumstance allegation. (37) The Attorney General responds that any error is harmless under People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104 [240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306], which overruled Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131 [197 Cal. Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862], in holding that intent to kill must be charged and proved for a felony-murder special circumstance only where the defendant was an aider and abettor to the homicide and not the actual killer. (43 Cal.3d at pp. 1138-1147.) Here the evidence showed, and the jury expressly found, that defendant actually fired the shots which killed the victim. To be sure, we have held that retroactive application of Anderson to pre- Carlos crimes does not violate due process because the statute was ambiguous and provided ample pre- Carlos foreseeability of a holding that such intent is not required for the actual killer. ( People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 326-327 [246 Cal. Rptr. 886, 753 P.2d 1082]; People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620, 637-638 [274 Cal. Rptr. 252, 798 P.2d 849].) However, defendant's crimes were committed in the four-year window period between Carlos and Anderson. Retroactive application of Anderson in these circumstances would deprive defendant of a defense against imposition of the death penalty which the law at the time of the crime plainly permitted. ( People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 973 [281 Cal. Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131]; In re Baert (1988) 205 Cal. App.3d 514, 521-522 [252 Cal. Rptr. 418], cert. den. sub nom. California v. Baert (1989) 492 U.S. 918 [106 L.Ed.2d 589, 109 S.Ct. 3242].) Thus we must address defendant's claim on its merits. (38) Defendant contends that because the jury was separately instructed in connection with the robbery-murder special circumstance that they must find an intent to kill if defendant was an accomplice or an aider and abettor, [17] and was further instructed โ at defendant's request โ to determine whether defendant was the actual killer or merely an accomplice, they may have inferred that intent to kill was not a requirement if defendant was the actual killer. The argument lacks merit. The jury was instructed that the special circumstance allegation required findings that the murder was committed while defendant  was engaged in or was an accomplice in the commission or attempted commission of a robbery ...; [and] that the defendant intended to kill a human being or intended to aid another in the killing of a human being.  (Italics added.) In summarizing the special finding forms for the jury, the trial court underscored the intent-to-kill requirement in connection with the special circumstance allegation, making no distinction between liability as the actual killer or as an accomplice: You are going to be asked to make a finding as to whether or not the special circumstance allegation is true; that is, that the murder was committed during the course of the robbery with the specific intent to kill the alleged victim.  (Italics added.) The prosecutor's argument reinforced the trial court's instruction that the jury must find that defendant intended to kill a human being or intended to aid another in the killing of a human being.... Moreover, defense counsel made clear in his argument that he had requested the special verdict simply to focus the jury's attention on the intent requirement: You would want to know in your own mind what you have decided as to who the killer was before you make that special circumstance finding. Nothing in the argument of counsel suggested to the jury that intent to kill was not a requirement if they found that defendant was the actual killer. Accordingly, we perceive no reasonable possibility that the jury was misled with respect to the elements of the special circumstance allegation. ( People v. Duncan, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 974.)
(39) Prior to the commencement of trial, defendant moved to bifurcate trial of the guilt phase and the special circumstance allegation. Relying on People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731 [209 Cal. Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994, 64 A.L.R.4th], defendant claimed that a separate trial was necessary because his defense that he was not present at the scene of the crimes was inconsistent with his defense to the special circumstance allegation that, although present, he did not have the requisite intent to kill. [18] The trial court denied the motion. The court's ruling was correct. The statutory scheme plainly contemplates that, except where the special circumstance alleged is that of a prior murder, the same jury which determines guilt shall also at the same time determine the truth of the special circumstance allegation: The question of the defendant's guilt shall first be determined. If the trier of fact finds the defendant guilty of first degree murder, it shall at the same time determine the truth of all special circumstances charged ... except ... where it is alleged that the defendant had been convicted in a prior proceeding of the offense of murder in the first or second degree. (ง 190.1, subd. (a), italics added.) Defendant's reliance on People v. Bigelow, supra, 37 Cal.3d 731, is misplaced. In that case, one of the special circumstance allegations was murder for the purpose of avoiding arrest or perfecting an escape. (ง 190.2, subd. (a)(5).) At the guilt phase the prosecution presented evidence highly prejudicial to the defendant, indicating that he had committed a dozen uncharged burglaries, robberies and thefts; the prosecution's primary theory of relevance was that the defendant committed each of the crimes to finance and perpetuate an escape from custody, which was relevant to the special circumstance allegation. Because of the highly prejudicial nature of the prior-crimes evidence, we concluded that the trial court should have conducted a separate trial of the special circumstance allegation. (37 Cal.3d at pp. 747-748.) The facts of the present case are not even remotely similar to those in Bigelow. No evidence was presented to the jury during the guilt phase which could be characterized as so highly prejudicial ( Bigelow, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 748) that the jury's ability to render a fair and impartial verdict on the special circumstance allegation would be impaired. People v. Velasquez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 425 [162 Cal. Rptr. 306, 606 P.2d 341], on which defendant relies, is equally inapposite. [19] There we approved the procedure, contemplated by section 190.1, subdivision (a), of bifurcating the guilt and special circumstance trials where the special circumstance allegation was that of a prior murder. Obviously that was not the case here. Defendant also relies on section 190.4, subdivision (c), which provides that the same jury which determines guilt shall also consider any plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the truth of any special circumstance allegation, and the penalty to be applied, unless for good cause shown the court discharges that jury in which case a new jury shall be drawn. As noted earlier, however, defendant did not seek to have a new jury empaneled to hear the special circumstance allegation; he sought only to have the trial bifurcated and the issue tried before the same jury. Thus, even if defendant had shown good cause, under the terms of section 190.4, subdivision (c) (which he did not invoke at trial), he would not have been entitled to the relief requested.