Opinion ID: 1490462
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Motions for withdrawal of a juror.

Text: At the close of the government's case the defendant Paul moved for a directed verdict on the second count and for the withdrawal of a juror on the ground that the trial on both counts seriously prejudiced his rights. The trial court directed a verdict for Paul on the second count and denied the motion for a mistrial. At the close of the entire case the defendant Paul renewed his motion for a mistrial. This motion was likewise denied. In this we think the trial court committed error. The indictment charged Paul with being one of the co-conspirators in the operation of the stills. There was not a scintilla of evidence connecting Paul with this conspiracy. The trial court could not have known from an examination of the indictment that this was so. The prosecution, however, familiar with the proceedings before the grand jury, with the statements of the witnesses, with the exhibits and all the provable facts of its case against each of the defendants, must have known that Paul had absolutely no connection with the conspiracy to operate the stills. The prosecution must also have known that it was neither necessary nor fair that Paul be tried with the others on this count. Indeed, if the indictment had clearly set forth the facts and had omitted Paul as a co-conspirator in the second count it is quite likely that the trial court would have applied the doctrine of McElroy v. United States, 164 U.S. 76, 17 S.Ct. 31, 41 L.Ed. 355, and compelled the government to elect the count upon which it proposed to prosecute or granted a severance. Because of the misleading character of the indictment and the failure of the government counsel frankly to admit his lack of any evidence against Paul the first clear picture of the situation was presented at the close of the government's case. The extent of the prejudice to Paul which resulted from the joint trial cannot now be determined but became obvious in many rulings upon the evidence. Throughout the course of the trial government counsel, over objection, took every available opportunity to introduce the name of Enoch L. Johnson into the proceedings. This reached a climax in a series of questions asked the defendant Paul upon cross-examination. [3] These questions were not based upon any matter in the record and were obviously intended to leave with the jury the impression that the defendant was linked to the county political leader in some vast criminal scheme. In Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 84, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314, the Supreme Court awarded a new trial based upon its conclusion that the prosecuting attorney in that case overstepped the bounds of that propriety and fairness which should characterize the conduct of such an officer in the prosecution of a criminal offense. What was there said applies with equal force to the case before us. We conclude that the court erred in failing to withdraw a juror as to Paul and that his conviction must be, therefore, reversed, and a new trial granted as to him. The judgments of the District Court are reversed and new trials are ordered.