Opinion ID: 2041012
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Appellant's sufficiency argument is predicated upon two claims. First, he maintains that the identification evidence does not establish that he was the perpetrator. Second, he claims that the evidence does not establish that he forcibly compelled the victim to have sexual intercourse with him. Smith maintains that the identification evidence was equivocal because the victim identified him as the assailant only because the assailant had identified himself as Lyle Smith. He maintains that the inadmissibility of his confession mandates that such testimony be unequivocable. He also claims that the victim's identification testimony is unreliable because her vision was impaired by surgery. The victim testified that she knew her assailant was appellant because he identified himself that evening as Lyle Smith. However, her identification was also based upon observation. The victim saw Smith prior to the rape while he was staying with a neighbor, but her vision was poor because she recently had cataracts removed. Her near-sighted vision was poor when she was raped, but she could see up close and remembered seeing him when he was up close. The victim testified that she could see Smith clearly in court and that he was the man who raped her. A rape conviction may be based upon the uncorroborated testimony of the victim. Rutledge v. State (1986), Ind., 495 N.E.2d 535. In this case, the rape victim identified defendant in court twice. She also testified that the cataract surgery primarily affected her ability to see distant objects, not those nearby. Under these circumstances, the reliability of her testimony was a question for the jury's consideration. Cf., Bell v. State (1986), Ind., 497 N.E.2d 556. The evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict. Appellant also argues that the State did not establish that the act of sexual intercourse was compelled by force. He maintains that the victim removed her clothes and engaged in sexual intercourse of her own free will. Appellant reasons that the victim's opportunity to defend herself by using the tear gas gun and her failure to use this as a means of defense negated the force or threat of force by her assailant. Resistance by the rape victim is one way to indicate that the act is against her will, but resistance is not an element of rape. Stowers v. State (1977), 266 Ind. 403, 363 N.E.2d 978; Carroll v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 86, 324 N.E.2d 809. Moreover, the requisite force need not be physical but may be constructive or implied from the circumstances, such as resistance by the victim. Jenkins v. State (1978), 267 Ind. 543, 372 N.E.2d 166; Beard v. State (1975), 262 Ind. 643, 323 N.E.2d 216. As Chief Justice Givan has written: Force or threat of force may be shown even without evidence of the attacker's oral statement of intent or willingness to use a weapon and cause injury, if from the circumstances it is reasonable to infer the attacker was willing to do so. Lewis v. State (1982), Ind., 440 N.E.2d 1125, 1127, cert. denied (1983), 461 U.S. 915, 103 S.Ct. 1895, 77 L.Ed.2d 284. In the case at bar, the victim asked appellant to leave her house. While she was escorting him out, he pulled a knife. After appellant's proposition, the victim attempted, unsuccessfully, to defend herself with a tear gas gun. Appellant remained armed with the knife while he removed his clothes and engaged in sexual intercourse. We find that it was reasonable for the trier of fact to infer from these circumstances that Smith forcibly compelled the victim to engage in sexual intercourse.