Opinion ID: 766486
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Bicaksiz's Request for Downward Departure for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Text: 30 Bicaksiz next argues that the District Court should have granted him a downward departure at sentencing because of the ineffective assistance of his original trial lawyer, or, at a minimum, that the District Court should have held an evidentiary hearing on the question. 31 Bicaksiz argues that his counsel at the time he entered a plea of not guilty, Jeffrey Cohn, was ineffective because Cohn told Bicaksiz that, if convicted at trial of both the conspiracy and substantive violation counts of the indictment, his maximum sentence would be ten years (the maximum term of imprisonment for a single violation of 18 U.S.C. 1958). 32 According to Bicaksiz, Cohn believed consecutive sentences were not an option because Assistant United States Attorney David Hennessy, when asked at a detention hearing if Bicaksiz could receive consecutive sentences for the conspiracy and the substantive crime, told the magistrate judge, In my experience, I believe that-not that they would merge, but I believe that it would be concurrent, in all fairness. I believe that that's what the result would be. Prior to sentencing, the government changed its view and argued that Bicaksiz should receive consecutive sentences. 33 Bicaksiz claims that his attorney's erroneous advice about the maximum sentence prevented him from entering into serious plea discussions with the government. On this basis, Bicaksiz's new counsel, Ronald Kuby, moved at sentencing for a downward departure due to ineffective assistance of counsel. The District Court declined to give Bicaksiz the requested downward departure, stating that the request was based upon a single statement made by Mr. Hennessy at the detention hearing. The Court found that Hennessy's statement did not suffice to create a ground for departure, but that [i]n any event, even if I were to assume that something about that statement constituted a lawful ground for a departure, departure is solely within the Court's discretion, and given the facts of this case, I would and do decline to depart downward. On appeal, Bicaksiz argues that the District Court erroneously failed to consider that his downward departure request was grounded in not only the government's statement that any sentences would be concurrent, but also defense counsel's alleged advice that the maximum sentence for both offenses would be ten years. 34 Whatever the merits of Bicaksiz's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which we are not required to address at this time, the District Court properly declined to hold a hearing on the matter and properly denied the motion for a departure on that basis. This asserted species of departure has been mentioned in our cases only in glancing dicta, and we have never endorsed it. 9 Squarely presented with the question for the first time, we now answer it in the simplest and most categorical terms: Ineffective assistance of counsel is not a basis for a downward departure at sentencing. A finding that a convicted defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel necessarily calls into question the validity of the conviction. By contrast, the imposition of a sentence (with or without a downward departure) and the entry of judgment necessarily assumes the validity of the conviction. A downward departure on ineffective assistance grounds is impermissible because it simultaneously assumes the validity of a defendant's conviction and conspicuously calls its validity into doubt. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not err in denying Bicaksiz a downward departure for ineffective assistance of counsel, or in denying a request for a hearing on the question. Our decision on this score is without prejudice to the possible raising of the ineffective-assistance contention in a separate 2255 motion. 35