Opinion ID: 3029395
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Wiretapping Evidence

Text: Weaver claims that the District Court improperly admitted wiretapping evidence. In seeking authorization to collect the evidence under 18 U.S.C. § 2518, the Government submitted its applications to Judge Eduardo Robreno of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Counting new applications and extensions, the Government submitted a total of 19 requests for authorization in the course of its investigation of the various defendants in this case. This process, Weaver alleges, violated the District’s local rule, as the various applications should have been submitted to different judges. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s Local Criminal Rule 41.1 provides that applications “shall be assigned on a random basis, to each Judge of the Court, or in his or her absence the Emergency Judge, in accordance with the provisions of Local Civil Rule 6 Section 666 does not require fraudulent intent per se, for one can knowingly convert or steal money without fraud. Here, however, the Government built its case around an allegedly fraudulent scheme, so the Judge correctly instructed the jury only on the “obtains by fraud” language in the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A). 14 40.1.” Local Civil Rule 40.1 provides that all related matters shall be assigned to the same judge. Recognizing that there is no express related-matters criminal rule, Judge Robreno read the local criminal rule in connection with the local civil rule and determined that he should decide all wiretapping applications related to this case. Delores Weaver moved to suppress the wiretapping evidence on the basis of Judge Robreno’s alleged error,7 and Judge Fullam—the trial judge—rejected her motion, finding that the local civil and criminal rules could be read together to allow judges to take assignment of all applications related to the same investigation. See United States v. Weaver, No. 04–320–41, 2004 WL 2399820 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2004). Though the local rules could be clearer on this issue, the District Court’s resolution was sensible. Moreover, Weaver’s statutory rights were adequately protected, as 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) provides only that applications should be decided by a “judge of competent jurisdiction.” Here, there is no question that Judge Robreno fit that description. Weaver’s Fourth Amendment argument hardly warrants discussion, as no court has held that the Amendment requires assigning wiretap applications arising out of an investigation to different judges. As an alternate sustaining ground, we note that Weaver does not have standing to challenge the admission of wiretapping evidence when he was not “a person who was a 7 We note that Weaver has not presented evidence that he joined this motion—or any other motion to suppress the evidence at issue. Because he apparently failed to do so, our standard of review is plain error. United States v. Mornan, 413 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005). We need not delve too far into this issue because we conclude that there was no error at all. 15 party to any intercepted wire or oral communication or a person against whom the interception was directed,” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11). Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175, n.9 (1969); accord In re Harkins, 624 F.2d 1160, 1165 n.8 (3d Cir. 1980). Here, Weaver was not a party to any of the intercepted communications, nor was he mentioned in them. Rather, the evidence was directed against other alleged conspirators only. We note further that we are troubled by defense counsel’s presentation of this issue. He concludes his discussion with the following statement: “[B]ecause the government and Judge Robreno’s collusive actions (and Judge Robreno’s remarkable rationalization of these actions) evidence only of his failure to fulfill his obligation to act independently in reviewing wiretap applications, and because these collusive acts deprived appellant of the protection of the Fourth Amendment, appellant’s conviction should be reversed.” Appellant’s Br. 76–77. Though (as explained above) we disagree with counsel’s argument on the merits, we take special issue with counsel accusing a District Judge of colluding with a party. Here, counsel does not support that charge with any evidence; rather, it is clear that counsel and Judge Robreno merely interpreted a provision of law differently. The rules of professional conduct prohibit making a statement disparaging a judge’s integrity with reckless disregard to the statement’s veracity. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.2(a) (1983). It is decidedly out of bounds for lawyers practicing before our Court to transform disagreements over the law into bald allegations about a judge’s integrity. 16