Opinion ID: 2514778
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Just compensation is required

Text: ¶61 Not only does the majority err when it affirms summary judgment dismissing the trespass claim, it also errs by rejecting Brutsche's alternative claim for just compensation for damaging his property. Article I, section 16 of the Washington Constitution provides in part, No private property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation having first been made. By this provision the framers gave us a simple, clear framework to determine when the State must compensate a property owner. Was this private property? Was it taken or damaged by the State? If the answers are yes, then the property owner must be compensated. ¶62 There was no claim these doors frames were a nuisance or otherwise harmful. A plain reading of article I, section 16 mandates Brutsche be justly compensated. [2] I agree that taking or damaging does not occur in the constitutional sense where the damage is occasioned by a traditional use of the police power, however this was not an exercise of the police power but rather an exercise of the power of eminent domain. ¶63 The majority rejects Brutsche's takings claim based primarily on Eggleston v. Pierce County, 148 Wash.2d 760, 64 P.3d 618 (2003). In Eggleston, police seized a load bearing wall from Mrs. Eggleston's house as evidence for a murder trial involving her son. Id. at 763-65, 64 P.3d 618. Eggleston held collection of evidence is an exercise of the police power, which does not require compensation, rather than eminent domain, which does. Id. at 775, 64 P.3d 618. The court asserted, [t]he gathering and preserving of evidence is a police power function, necessary for the safety and general welfare of society. Id. at 768, 64 P.3d 618. For the reasons set forth in my dissent, Eggleston was wrongly decided, is harmful, and should now be overruled, not extended. [3] ¶64 That court failed to recognize the important distinction between the power of the police and the police power. Appropriating or damaging property for the public good does not absolve the State from compensating the owner, precisely the opposite. [4] That is what the takings clause is all about. We strongly rejected our new majority's opinion almost 90 years ago in Conger v. Pierce County, 116 Wash. 27, 33, 198 P. 377 (1921) (rejecting the argument Pierce County was not liable for damages to private property because the private individual ... must suffer for the public good.). Conger held the county was not relieved from compensating the property owner because [the county was] acting for the good of the public, or simply on the theory that the individual must suffer for the public good. To hold that [the county] would be relieved on any of these grounds would be entirely to disregard the express provisions of our constitution. Id. at 35, 198 P. 377. Conger strongly supported protecting private property rights from encroachment in the name of the public good as [o]ne of the greatest contributions of the English-speaking people to civilization is the protection by law of the private individual in the enjoyment of his property and his personal liberties against the demands and aggressions of the public. Id. at 33-34, 198 P. 377. ¶65 In essence Conger recognized, while Eggleston ignored or misperceived, [t]he talisman of a taking is government action which forces some private persons alone to shoulder affirmative public burdens, `which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.' Mission Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 134 Wash.2d 947, 964, 954 P.2d 250 (1998) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S.Ct. 1563, 4 L.Ed.2d 1554 (1960); accord Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994)). Eggleston erroneously required Mrs. Eggleston to bear the entire cost of this public acquisition of her private property on her lonely shoulders, whereas this burden in fairness and justice should be shared with the public as a whole. The same can be said of Mr. Brutsche, who the majority forces to uniquely shoulder the entire burden of police destruction of his property to gather evidence for the public good. This burden must be appropriately borne by the public as a whole [5] to satisfy the constitutional mandate. ¶66 When considering whether an exercise of the police power immunizes the State from compensating a property owner for damaging or taking his property, it is important to understand the traditional meaning of police power. It seems elementary the police power is not the power of the police, but rather the power to police (or protect) our rights. The most important power surrendered to government is what Locke and others called the executive power and what is sometimes called the police power. This is the power to enforce or police one's rights when they have been violated by others. Indeed, John Locke argued that it was the inconvenience of exercising the executive power in the state of nature that justified the creation of an imperial magistratethat is, government. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 70-71 (2004) (emphasis added); see also CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 4-5 (1886); [6] CATO HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 106TH CONGRESS 206 (Edward H. Crane & David Boaz eds., 1999) (the police power is the power each of us has in the state of nature to secure his rights). For example, if the police acquire land for a police station, which ultimately serves the ends of law enforcement, such is clearly an exercise of the power of eminent domain, requiring just compensation. If, however, government destroys property because that property is harmful, or used in a harmful way, that is not an acquisition (or damaging) for the public good but an abatement of a nuisance, requiring no compensation. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 48 S.Ct. 246, 72 L.Ed. 568 (1928). ¶67 Even if we accept, which I do not, [7] that the police power of the State is limited only by the requirement it reasonably tend to promote some interest of the State, and not violate any constitutional mandate, [8] this does not answer the question of whether this action falls under the police power rather than eminent domain. ¶68 Police power historically has allowed the government to physically destroy, take, or damage, private property to avert an immediate danger posed by the property itself. [9] It is this power which allows the state, without compensation, to raze houses in an effort to contain a fire [10] or destroy diseased cedar trees in an effort to prevent the disease from spreading. [11] But that is not our present case. Here the doors and the jambs in and of themselves presented no danger to the community justifying their destruction. ¶69 The distinction between police power and eminent domain was specifically recognized in Washington nearly 90 years ago in Conger. [12] There the court defined police power as the power of the State to prohibit the owner of property from using his property in ways harmful to others. It held [e]minent domain takes private property for a public use, while the police power regulates its use and enjoyment, or if it takes or damages it, it is not a taking or damaging for the public use, but to conserve the safety, morals, health and general welfare of the public. Conger, 116 Wash. at 36, 198 P. 377. Put another way the police power allows the State to prevent all things harmful to the comfort, welfare and safety of society. Id. As Conger drew the distinction, the police power allows only the State to prohibit the property owner from using his property in ways harmful to others to avoid the just compensation constitutional mandate. ¶70 The Conger distinction was supported by the Latin maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non ldas [13] and by several treatises published at the turn of the 20th Century, roughly contemporaneous with the state constitution. Since constitutional provisions should be interpreted as they were conceived at the time of adoption, sources such as these are invaluable to understanding our constitutional protections. State v. Brunn, 22 Wash.2d 120, 139, 154 P.2d 826 (1945). These treatises uniformly describe the police power as the ability of the State to restrict landowners from using their property to harm the public. The landowner is ... bound so to use and enjoy his own as not to interfere with the general welfare of the community in which he lives. It is the enforcement of this ... duty which pertains to the police power of the State so far as the exercise of that power affects private property. 1 John Lewis, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES § 6, at 14-15 (2d ed.1900) (footnote omitted). [I]t may be said that the state takes property by eminent domain because it is useful to the public, and under the police power because it is harmful.... [14] Ernst Freund, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS § 511, at 546-47 (1904). As stated by Judge Dillon in 1890, [t]his power to restrain a private injurious use of property, is essentially different from the right of eminent domain. It is not a taking of private property for public use, but a salutary restraint on a noxious use by the owner.... John F. Dillon, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 141, at 212 (4th ed. 1890). As these treatises demonstrate, the police power was generally understood to be the power to prevent the use of property to harm others. However where the individual was deprived of the use of his harmless property (or it was damaged) for the public good, the State exercised its power of eminent domain. ¶71 This distinction between the police power and the power of eminent domain, vital and vibrant as it was at the time the constitution was adopted, still remains today. Professor Stoebuck reflected this distinction in his influential work, William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 Wash. L.Rev. 553, 569 (1972), clarifying when the State acquires property for the public good, it exercises its power of eminent domain and not its police power. Other experts continue to recognize this distinction as well, noting eminent domain is the power to take property for public use upon payment of just compensation, whereas the police power is the power to secure rights, through restraints or sanctions, not some general power to provide public goods. Cato Handbook for Congress, supra, at 206. Of importance, this court again recognized this distinction in Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash.2d 1, 15, 829 P.2d 765 (1992), where we held the police power was exceeded where the ordinance went beyond preventing harm. Distinguishing police power (the State's ability to prevent harm to others) from eminent domain (the State's ability to take or damage property for the public good) is based on both historical and current sources and should be followed here. ¶72 Understanding this distinction allows the police power to be harmonized with the power of eminent domain, maintaining the integrity of each. Conceptually we must recognize property as a legal term property denotes not material things but certain rights. Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 Cornell L.Q. 8, 11-12 (1927-28). However those rights simply do not include the right to use property in a manner which harms the public. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 662-63, 8 S.Ct. 273, 31 L.Ed. 205 (1887) (Nor can it be said that government interferes with or impairs any one's constitutional rights ... of property, when it determines that the manufacture and sale of intoxicating drinks ... are, or may become, hurtful to society, and constitute, therefore, a business in which no one may lawfully engage.); see also Conger, 116 Wash. at 36, 198 P. 377 (citing 1 John Lewis, A Treatise on the Law of Eminent Domain in the United States § 6 (2d ed.1900)). As such, no property right is infringed when the State prohibits use of the property in a way that harms the public or creates a nuisance; therefore no property has been taken and hence no compensation is required. See, e.g., Mugler, 123 U.S. at 662-63, 8 S.Ct. 273. On the other hand, when government takes or damages an actual right on has in his property, compensation is mandatory. Const. art. I, § 16 (No property shall be taken or damaged ... without just compensation having been first made. (emphasis added)). ¶73 The majority's analysis is also squarely at odds with the Texas Supreme Court's sensible outcome in Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786 (Tex.1980). There the owners of a house sought compensation after their house was set ablaze by police officers in an effort to capture fugitives hiding in the house. Id. at 789. The Texas court properly rejected the assertion that destroying the property for the safety of the public was a proper exercise of the police power and mandated just compensation. Id. at 793. However our majority would apparently abandon this sensible outcome to reach the absurd conclusion that the property owner should bear the entire loss of their home, even though they were innocent of any wrongdoing and the house was burned for the public good of law enforcement. I agree with the Texas court when it held, innocent third parties are entitled by the Constitution [15] to compensation for their property. Id. Once again, an innocent property owner should not be forced `to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.' Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384, 114 S.Ct. 2309 (quoting Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49, 80 S.Ct. 1563). ¶74 For these reasons Brutsche's constitutional taking or damaging claim falls squarely within article I, section 16, requiring the State to justly compensate Brutsche for the property destroyed during the search. ¶75 The trial court's summary judgment should be reversed to reinstate Brutsche's trespass claim. It is at least a question of fact whether the destruction of Brutsche's property was necessary to conduct a complete search. Otherwise, damage to Brutsche's property requires just compensation pursuant to article I, section 16. This burden must in justice and fairness be borne by society as a whole because it is (allegedly) a necessary cost of law enforcement. ¶76 I dissent. WE CONCUR: Justice JAMES M. JOHNSON.