Opinion ID: 615269
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Twigg's FMLA Interference Claim

Text: Twigg's final claim is that HBC unlawfully interfered with her FMLA rights by terminating her employment while she was on FMLA-protected leave. The FMLA allows a qualified employee to take up to twelve weeks of leave during a twelve-month period [b]ecause of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). Under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1), it is unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise this substantive right. We have recognized that this provision of the FMLA gives rise to an interference or entitlement theory of recovery. Metzler, 464 F.3d at 1170 (citing Smith, 298 F.3d at 960). In order to prevail on an FMLA interference claim, the employee must show that she was entitled to FMLA leave and that some action by the employer, such as termination, interfered with her right to take that leave. See Bones v. Honeywell Int'l Inc., 366 F.3d 869, 877 (10th Cir.2004); Smith, 298 F.3d at 960. Section 2615(a)(1) is nevertheless not a strict liability statute, and an employer is not necessarily liable under the FMLA anytime it fires an employee who has requested or is on FMLA leave. Metzler, 464 F.3d at 1180. Rather, because an employee who requests leave or is on leave has no greater rights than an employee who remains at work[,] ... an employee may be dismissed, preventing her from exercising her statutory right to FMLA leave[,] ... if the dismissal would have occurred regardless of the employee's request for or taking of FMLA leave. Smith, 298 F.3d at 960-61 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bones, 366 F.3d at 877 (If dismissal would have occurred regardless of the request for an FMLA leave, ... an employee may be dismissed even if dismissal prevents her exercise of her right to an FMLA leave.); Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1262 (10th Cir.1998) ([A]n employee who requests FMLA leave would have no greater protection against his or her employment being terminated for reasons not related to his or her FMLA request than he or she did before submitting the request.). The burden to demonstrate that `an employee, laid off during FMLA leave, would have been dismissed regardless of the employee's request for, or taking of, FMLA leave' is on the defendant-employer. Metzler, 464 F.3d at 1180 (quoting Smith, 298 F.3d at 963); see also Campbell v. Gambro Healthcare, Inc., 478 F.3d 1282, 1289 (10th Cir.2007) (Once a plaintiff has proved that her employer has interfered with her right to take FMLA leave, the employer bears `the burden of proving that an employee, laid off during FMLA leave, would have been dismissed regardless of the employee's request for, or taking of, FMLA leave.' (quoting Smith, 298 F.3d at 963)). In this case, the district court determined that Twigg's FMLA interference claim failed at each step in the analysis. Specifically, the court concluded that (1) Twigg could not establish her entitlement to FMLA leave because Dr. Lickteig's certification did not support the existence of a serious health condition; (2) there was no evidence that HBC interfered with Twigg's right to take FMLA leave because the company approved six weeks of leave despite Dr. Lickteig's opinion that Twigg could perform non-weight-bearing work; and (3) HBC demonstrated that it terminated Twigg because of her violation of the company's notice-of-absence policy rather than her taking of FMLA leave. On appeal, Twigg claims that one fundamental error tainted the district court's analysis. She argues that Dr. Lickteig's certification, which Twigg submitted in support of her request to take FMLA leave from February 28, 2008, through April 17, 2008, was incomplete because Dr. Lickteig did not specify the amount of time that Twigg would need to be off work and did not answer the question whether Twigg was unable to perform any of the essential functions of her job. According to Twigg, the incomplete certification triggered HBC's obligations under 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(d) (2008), which states that [t]he employer shall advise an employee whenever the employer finds a certification incomplete, and provide the employee a reasonable opportunity to cure any such deficiency. [11] See also Sorrell v. Rinker Materials Corp., 395 F.3d 332, 337 (6th Cir.2005) (emphasizing that 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(d) imposes an affirmative duty on an employer that finds a medical certification incomplete). Because HBC failed to notify Twigg that Dr. Lickteig's certification was incomplete and to give her an opportunity to cure the problem, Twigg contends that HBC is now estopped from contesting her entitlement to FMLA leave through April 17, 2008. She further argues that if HBC is precluded from contesting entitlement, [t]his, in turn, will mean that Ms. Twigg was terminated for exercising her rights under the FMLA, since she was terminated for absences which were in fact protected by the FMLA. (Aplt. R. Br. at 18.) By contrast, HBC argues that Dr. Lickteig's certification was not incomplete, but instead unsupportive of Twigg's request for leave. HBC also contends that an employer's failure to comply with § 825.305(d) does not preclude the employer from later challenging the employee's entitlement to leave. Finally, HBC asserts that Twigg's interference claim fails in any event, as HBC terminated Twigg for her violation of the company's noticeof-absence policy and not for her taking FMLA leave. We need not decide whether a reasonable jury could find that Dr. Lickteig's certification was incomplete or whether an employer who violates 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(d) is estopped from contesting the issue of entitlement. [12] Even if we were to agree with Twigg's position on both of these issues, her FMLA interference claim would fail as a matter of law because HBC has carried its burden of proving that Twigg was dismissed for a reason sufficiently unrelated to her FMLA leave. Our decision in Bones v. Honeywell International, Inc. compels this result. In Bones, the plaintiff missed work to visit a doctor on Thursday, July 22, 1999, and did not call in her absence. 366 F.3d at 874. Likewise, she missed work on Friday, July 23, and Monday, July 26, without notifying anybody at Honeywell of her absences. Id. On Friday, July 23, however, Bones's boyfriend delivered an FMLA leave request to Honeywell's medical department. Id. The request contained a certification from Bones's doctor indicating that Bones was unable to work on all of the days that she missed, as well as several weeks into the future. Id. On Tuesday, July 27, before Honeywell's medical department could process Bones's leave request, Honeywell terminated Bones's employment because she had missed work for three straight days without notifying her supervisor of her absences. Id. Bones sued Honeywell under the FMLA, arguing that Honeywell interfered with her right to take FMLA leave by firing her while she was on FMLA-protected leave. Id. at 877. In reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Honeywell, we assumed that Bones was entitled to FMLA leave on the days that she missed work. Id. Nevertheless, we affirmed the district court. Id. at 878. We explained that [a] reason for dismissal that is unrelated to a request for an FMLA leave will not support recovery under an interference theory. Id. at 877. We further determined that Honeywell met its burden of demonstrating that Bones would have been dismissed regardless of her request for an FMLA leave by putting forth uncontroverted evidence that it fired Bones for violating the company's absence policy. Id. at 878. In conclusion, we observed that Bones was terminated because she did not comply with Honeywell's absence policy; she would have been terminated for doing so irrespective of whether or not these absences were related to a requested medical leave. Bones' request for an FMLA leave does not shelter her from the obligation, which is the same as that of any other Honeywell employee, to comply with Honeywell's employment policies, including its absence policy. Id. (citation omitted). Bones thus makes clear that an employer generally does not violate the FMLA if it terminates an employee for failing to comply with a policy requiring notice of absences, even if the absences that the employee failed to report were protected by the FMLA Accord Bacon v. Hennepin Cnty. Med. Ctr., 550 F.3d 711, 715 (8th Cir.2008) (Employers who enforce [call-in] policies by firing employees on FMLA leave for noncompliance do not violate the FMLA.); Lewis v. Holsum of Fort Wayne, Inc., 278 F.3d 706, 710 (7th Cir.2002) (holding that an employer did not violate the FMLA by discharging an employee on FMLA leave when the employee failed to comply with a company call-in policy). This is so because even if the FMLA entitles an employee to be absent from work, the employee's violation of a notice-of-absence policy can constitute [a] reason for dismissal that is unrelated to a request for an FMLA leave. [13] Bones, 366 F.3d at 877. Formal notice-of-absence policies serve an employer's legitimate business interests in keeping apprised of the status of its employees and ensuring that it has an adequate workforce to carry out its normal operations. In this case, the record shows that HBC's Rules for Personal Conduct require an employee to report absences to her department and indicate that an employee may be terminated for failure to do so on three consecutive days. HBC's FMLA policy creates a limited exception to the general notice-of-absence requirement, providing that an employee need not report absences once the employee receives formal notification that a request for FMLA leave has been approved. When, however, an employee has requested but not yet received formal approval to take FMLA leave, her obligation is the same as that of any other employeeto give proper notification of her absences. Here, it is undisputed that Twigg never received formal approval of her FMLA leave past April 1, 2008, and that she failed to report her absences on April 2, 3, and 4. Furthermore, HBC has provided both documents and deposition testimony indicating that it terminated Twigg because she failed to give proper notice of her absences on these days. Twigg has not come forward with any evidence to contradict HBC's explanation for her termination, nor has she raised any arguments that would call into question the legitimacy of HBC's enforcement of its notice-of-absence policy under the circumstances of this case. See supra note 13. Instead, Twigg argues only that she was terminated for exercising her rights under the FMLA, since she was terminated for absences which were in fact protected by the FMLA (Aplt. R. Br. at 18 (emphasis added).) But Bones, which Twigg makes no effort to distinguish, vitiates this argument. Accordingly, [n]o reasonable juror could deduce from the above evidence that [Twigg's] termination was related to her request for an FMLA leave. Bones, 366 F.3d at 878. The district court therefore properly granted summary judgment in favor of HBC on Twigg's FMLA interference claim.