Opinion ID: 2091909
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The MHRA and WPA Claims

Text: [¶12] The MHRA prohibits employers from discriminating against employees because of actions protected under the WPA. 5 M.R.S. § 4572(1)(A) (2005). To prevail on a WPA claim, an employee must show that (1) he engaged in activity protected by the WPA; (2) he experienced an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Stanley v. Hancock County Comm'rs, 2004 ME 157, ¶ 11, 864 A.2d 169, 173. Title 26 M.R.S. § 833(1)(A) (2005) provides: 1. Discrimination prohibited. No employer may discharge . . . an employee . . . because: A. The employee, acting in good faith . . . reports orally or in writing to the employer or a public body what the employee has reasonable cause to believe is a violation of a law or rule adopted under the laws of this State, a political subdivision of this State or the United States. Title 26 M.R.S. § 833(2) provides: 2. Initial report to employer required; exception. Subsection 1 does not apply to an employee who has reported . . . a violation, or unsafe condition or practice to a public body, unless the employee has first brought the alleged violation, condition or practice to the attention of a person having supervisory authority with the employer and has allowed the employer a reasonable opportunity to correct that violation, condition or practice. Prior notice to an employer is not required if the employee has specific reason to believe that reports to the employer will not result in promptly correcting the violation, condition or practice.
[¶ 13] Our construction of the MHRA and WPA has been guided by federal law, Maine Human Rights Commission v. City of Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253, 1261 (Me.1979) (stating that, in enacting the MHRA, the Maine Legislature intended the courts to look to the federal case law to `provide significant guidance in [construing the] statute') (quoting Maine Human Rights Comm'n v. Local 1361, United Paperworkers Intern. Union AFL-CIO, Me., 383 A.2d 369, 375 (Me.1978)), and we have previously evaluate[d] WPA claims with the `shifting burdens' analysis articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), Stanley, 2004 ME 157, ¶ 12, 864 A.2d at 174.

[¶ 14] ISI and IFPI claim that Currie was discharged for his February 2001 report to Border Patrol. Currie agrees this was one of the causes of his discharge. ISI and IFPI assert that the report was not protected under the WPA because Currie did not have reasonable cause to believe that a violation of law had occurred and, in any event, did not provide ISI and IFPI with a reasonable opportunity to correct the alleged violation prior to making the report. We consider ISI and IFPI's arguments and, finding them unpersuasive, engage in the remainder of the summary judgment analysis.
[¶ 15] Currie asserts that, because he reasonably believed that the Canadians who came to the mill in January 2000 were unauthorized, and knew that one of the Canadians who came in January 2000 returned in February 2001, he had reasonable cause to believe that the Canadians who came in February 2001 were unauthorized. [¶ 16] Currie's assertion that he reasonably believed that the Canadians who came to the mill in January 2000 were unauthorized is supported by the following: the two evaded Currie's questions regarding their authorization; when Currie said that he was going to call a supervisor, they left the mill; and Border Patrol Agent Merrick later told Currie that to his knowledge neither [of them] had the right to work in the United States. [6] Although ISI and IFPI dispute the above statements, each is properly supported by a citation to the record. If proved at trial, the statements would support a finding that Currie reasonably believed that the Canadians who came to the mill in January 2000 were unauthorized. [¶ 17] Although the parties agree that Currie knew the names of the Canadians who came to the mill in January 2000, they dispute whether he knew the names of the Canadians who came in February 2001. Currie's assertion that he knew the names of the Canadians who came in February 2001 is supported by portions of his deposition testimony (cited in his statements of material facts) indicating that, when he called Merrick in February 2001, he gave Merrick the Canadians' names. If proved at trial, this assertion would support a finding that Currie knew, prior to calling the Border Patrol in February 2001, that one of the same Canadians came to the mill in both January 2000 and February 2001. This knowledge would create a sufficient nexus between the two incidents to provide Currie with reasonable cause to believe that the Canadians who came to the mill in February 2001 were unauthorized.
[¶ 18] Currie contends that Varga's assurances that the Canadians who came to the mill in February 2001 were authorized provided him with a specific reason to believe that ISI and IFPI would not take corrective action, and thereby exempted him from providing them with more of an opportunity to take such action. [¶ 19] The parties agree that, prior to contacting Customs, Currie told Varga that he didn't believe that the two [Canadians] were legally able to work within the United States and he intended to call Border Patrol. Varga's continued assurances that the Canadians were authorized provided Currie with a specific reason to believe that ISI and IFPI would not take corrective action. Currie has presented facts from which a fact-finder could conclude that he was exempt from providing them with a further opportunity to take such action.
[¶ 20] On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that Currie's statements, if proved, would support a finding that his report regarding the unauthorized workers was protected activity that was, at least, a cause of his discharge. Because Currie successfully set forth a prima facie case, and ISI and IFPI failed to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for his discharge, the summary judgment must be vacated on this issue.
[¶ 21] ISI and IFPI argue that the statements of fact are insufficient to support a finding that Currie's reports regarding Ouellette's unsafe driving were causally connected to his discharge. We consider this argument and, finding it unpersuasive, engage in the remainder of the summary judgment analysis.
[¶22] Proof of conduct protected by the WPA[,] . . . followed in close proximity by an adverse employment action, gives rise to an inference that a causal connection is established. DiCentes v. Michaud, 1998 ME 227, ¶ 16, 719 A.2d 509, 514-15. Establishment of such an inference is sufficient to meet the employee's initial burden. Id. [¶ 23] The statements indicate that Ouellette was aware of Currie's reports regarding his driving and that Ouellette generally avoided Currie. They further indicate that, as soon as Ouellette was in a position to recommend Currie's discharge, he did so. Although the parties dispute when the discharge decision was actually made, the discharge itself occurred approximately four months after Ouellette's initial recommendation, during which period Ouellette remained vocal about his desire to discharge Currie. The temporal proximity between Currie's reports regarding Ouellette's unsafe driving, Ouellette's recommendation to discharge Currie, and Currie's actual discharge is sufficient to raise an inference of causation. Currie has, therefore, successfully set forth a prima facie case.
[¶ 24] We next consider whether ISI and IFPI articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Currie's discharge. Stanley, 2004 ME 157, ¶ 12, 864 A.2d at 174. ISI and IFPI assert that Currie was discharged because of his report regarding the unauthorized workers rather than because of his reports regarding Ouellette's driving. If, at trial, the fact-finder concludes that Currie's report regarding the unauthorized workers is not protected activity, it would provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for his discharge. Even if it provided such a reason, however, Currie's statements, if proved, would support a finding that his reports regarding Ouellette's driving also motivated his discharge. The summary judgment must, therefore, be vacated on this issue.
[¶25] ISI and IFPI argue that Currie's report regarding the dumping of paint thinner was not protected because it was not a report within the meaning of the WPA and, in any event, was not made in good faith. We consider these arguments and, finding them unpersuasive, engage in the remainder of the summary judgment analysis.
[¶26] ISI and IFPI assert that, at the time of Currie's internal report, another employee had already reported the dumping to the DEP and management was already aware of the situation. [7] The DEP allegedly received a report regarding the dumping in the spring of 2001, and Currie reported the dumping to management around June 2001. Although the statements do not reveal exactly when ISI and IFPI learned of the dumping, they indicate that Ouellette learned of a DEP investigation regarding the dumping at some point between May and July 2001. Although ISI and IFPI assert that they were aware of the alleged dumping prior to Currie's report, Currie asserts that one of the managers to whom he reported acted like he was astonished upon hearing what had occurred. Currie's statements, if believed, would support a finding that management first learned of the dumping through his report. The report is, therefore, a report within the meaning of the WPA.
[¶27] ISI and IFPI assert that Currie's report to management was made solely to disclaim responsibility for the report to the DEP. Currie's deposition testimony, however, which is cited in his statements of material facts, indicates that his report was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to prevent ISI and IFPI from burning the wood chips on which the paint thinner had been dumped. If believed, this assertion would support a finding that Currie's report was made in good faith.
[¶28] Having concluded that the statements, if established, would support a finding that Currie's report was protected activity, we consider whether it caused his discharge. ISI and IFPI argue that causation cannot be established because the discharge decision was made in March 2001 and the report was made around June 2001. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Currie and assuming that the discharge decision was made in July 2001, however, there is sufficient temporal proximity between his paint thinner report and his discharge to create an inference of causation between the report and his discharge. There is additional evidence of causation in that, at the meeting on the morning of Currie's discharge, Ouellette and Johnson discussed the paint thinner dumping. Currie's statements, if proved, would support a finding that the report contributed to his discharge. We, therefore, find that Currie successfully set forth a prima facie case. [¶29] Even if, at trial, the fact-finder concludes that Currie's report regarding the unauthorized workers provides a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for his discharge, Currie's statements, if believed, could support a finding that his report regarding the dumping of paint thinner also motivated his discharge. The summary judgment must, therefore, be vacated on this issue.