Opinion ID: 202350
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Voir Dire on Prior Conviction

Text: 33 Kater's innovative voir dire argument rests on a mistaken view of the purpose and limits of a defendant's federal constitutional right to conduct voir dire for bias. Again, states may make different choices as to this topic; our concern is Kater's federal constitutional right. 34 Kater's argument is based on these propositions: 35 1. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that jurors be impartial. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992). 36 2. The U.S. Supreme Court has not endorsed the distinction made by the state court between requiring voir dire questioning on extraneous issues—if it appears that a substantial risk exists that the extraneous issue might affect the outcome of the case—and not requiring it on non-extraneous issues relevant to and in the record of the case. He argues that if the U.S. Supreme Court were to address the issue, it would conclude, as apparently have the state courts of California, see People v. Chapman, 15 Cal.App.4th 136, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 738 (1993) (relying on People v. Ranney, 213 Cal. 70, 1 P.2d 423 (1931)), 7 that there is a Sixth Amendment right to question jurors on possible prejudice or bias due to defendant's prior felony conviction. We note that this step of the argument is based on the erroneous assumption rejected above, that de novo review under Fortini eliminates Teague review. 37 3. Kater argues, in any event, that the record here shows that when the questions were asked about his prior bad acts, almost half of the questioned jurors said they would have problems following the court's instructions, and that this entitled Kater to insist that questions be asked at voir dire about the effects of evidence as to his prior conviction. 38 We address Kater's argument on this issue with reference to clearly established law at the time Kater's state court conviction became final, 8 as required by Teague, focusing on the Supreme Court cases on which Kater builds his argument. 39 The Supreme Court has explained that federal authority over voir dire in cases tried in state courts is limited to enforcing the commands of the United States Constitution. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991). 9 So far, the Supreme Court has recognized a defendant's constitutional right to voir dire questioning only about whether jurors might be prejudiced against defendant because of his race. See Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 526-27, 93 S.Ct. 848, 35 L.Ed.2d 46 (1973); Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 314-15, 51 S.Ct. 470, 75 L.Ed. 1054 (1931). Even then, the inquiry in non-death-penalty cases need not be made in every state court case in which the races of the victim and the defendant are different. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597-98, 96 S.Ct. 1017, 47 L.Ed.2d 258 (1976); see generally 5 LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure § 22.3(a), at 293 (2d ed. 1999) ([T]he Court has as yet declined to extend the [ Ham ] doctrine to matters other than racial prejudice.). 40 Death penalty cases present special concerns about what voir dire may be constitutionally required, and there are special voir dire rules in such cases. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27 (1986) (holding that Due Process Clause entitled death-penalty-eligible defendant to voir dire questioning on racial bias where defendant was accused of interracial crime); see also Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 738-39, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992) (state trial court, under Due Process Clause, may not refuse to inquire into whether a potential juror, regardless of facts in the case, would automatically impose the death sentence); 5 LaFave, et al., supra, § 22.3(a), at 295. 41 To date, the Court has recognized no such constitutionally compelled right to voir dire in other contexts, including where the claim involved potential voir dire about extensive and prejudicial pretrial publicity, resulting in further questioning jurors about the content of materials they had seen after they had declared themselves impartial. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 431-32, 111 S.Ct. 1899. 42 There is no claim here of prejudicial bias of potential jurors based on race or, indeed, any other suspect classification. There is no claim the jurors prejudged the matter based on adverse pretrial publicity. Kater was not sentenced to death, but to life imprisonment, and the voir dire requested did not address sentencing at all. All of the categories of cases for which the Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right to voir dire have involved preexisting views, not based on the evidence in the case, which prospective jurors may bring into the courtroom with them that impair their ability to fairly consider the evidence. 43 It is true that some state courts have concluded that, as a matter of state policy, they will permit or even require voir dire on whether a juror who has heard evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts can still follow the judge's instructions about the limited purpose for such testimony. Massachusetts has chosen not to follow that path, and requires voir dire questioning only where there is a substantial risk . . . that an extraneous issue — one that goes beyond the record and raises a serious question of possible prejudice — might affect the outcome of the case. Kater VII, 734 N.E.2d at 1174-75 (citing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 234, § 28). 44 The question is whether, given the clearly established federal law at the time Kater's conviction became final, Massachusetts was compelled by the federal Constitution to require such voir dire on the effect of evidence, yet to be admitted, of defendant's prior bad acts. Massachusetts was not under any such constitutional compulsion. Kater had no constitutional entitlement to question potential jurors on the effect of the prior bad act evidence. 45