Opinion ID: 1350430
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Arising Out of and in the Course of EmploymentThe Proper Test.

Text: After determining coemployee immunity required something more than status as a coemployee, i.e., a determination that the coemployee's conduct arises out of and in the course of employment, the district court went on to discuss the applicable test. Consistent with its statutory analysis, the court determined that it had to apply the concept of arising out of and in the course of employment, as used in traditional Iowa workers' compensation cases. For an injury to be compensable, it must occur both in the course of and arise out of employment. Miedema v. Dial Corp., 551 N.W.2d 309, 311 (Iowa 1996). An injury arises out of the employment if a causal connection exists between the employment and the injury. Bailey, 576 N.W.2d at 338. The injury arises in the course of employment when the injury and the employment coincide as to time, place, and circumstances. Id. Both tests must be satisfied for an injury to be deemed compensable. Id. All of our existing cases interpreting the two phrases are in the context of an injured worker's qualification for benefits. Until now, no Iowa case has interpreted the phrases in the context of coemployee immunity. Because the phrases have the same meaning in both settings, we agree with the district court that the analysis should focus on whether Ries would have qualified for benefits had he been injured. Other jurisdictions have followed this approach. See, e.g., Blank v. Chawla, 234 Kan. 975, 678 P.2d 162, 168 (1984) (a co-employee is immune only if he or she would have been entitled to receive workers' compensation had she or he been injured in the same accident); Jackson v. Hutchinson, 453 S.W.2d 269, 270 (Ky.1970) (A test of fellow-employee immunity is whether each of the employees involved would have been entitled to workmen's compensation benefits for any disabling injury suffered in the accident.); Helmic, 119 N.W.2d at 577 (One way in which the case may be tested is whether or not the defendant could obtain compensation benefits if he were a claimant and in the same or similar circumstances.); Mitchell v. Sanborn, 536 N.W.2d 678, 684 (N.D.1995) (in determining co-employee immunity, the test is whether the negligent co-employee would have been entitled to receive workers' compensation benefits if that co-employee had been injured in the same incident) (citing Larson); Carroll v. Dist. Ct., 579 P.2d 828, 832 (Okla.1978) (Had [the coemployee] received injury under these circumstances, his injury would have been compensable.). Meade agrees this is the applicable test. His quarrel is with the district court's application of the test to the facts of this case. Ries, on the other hand, argues that both arising out of and in the course of requirements need not be met for immunity to apply. He cites the following language from Larson in support of his argument that only the in the course of portion of the test need be met: The commonest question that arises in these cases is: which test of course of employment applies? Is it the workers' compensation test, or the vicarious liability test? The answer may be dictated by the wording of the immunity clause itself. .... The more satisfactory test, unless expressly ruled out by statute, is that adopted by Illinois, New Jersey, Kentucky, Indiana, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Florida, which simply use the regular workers' compensation course of employment standard for this purpose. After all, there are troubles and complications enough administering one course of employment test under the act, without adding a second. By adopting the compensation test, a court has at hand a ready-made body of cases with which to dispose of most borderline situations. Larson § 111.03[3], at 111-13 to -15 (emphasis added). In Iowa, however, the regular workers' compensation `course of employment' standard is the arises out of and in the course of employment standard. Bailey, 576 N.W.2d at 338. Other courts have interpreted the Larson language the same way. See, e.g., Sauve v. Winfree, 907 P.2d 7, 11 (Alaska 1995) (after citing Larson, the court states, this court's regular workers' compensation `course of employment' standard is that an injury must have `arisen out of and in the course of ... employment') (citations omitted); Donnelly v. Herron, 88 Ohio St.3d 425, 727 N.E.2d 882, 884-85 (2000) (interpreting the Larson language the same way; in course of and arising out of requirements must be met for immunity to attach). The district court therefore correctly concluded that the proper test was whether Ries's actions causing Meade's injuries arose out of and in the course of Ries's employment. That brings us to the decisive issue in this case. Did the district court err in applying the test?