Opinion ID: 757025
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Abouhalima--Involuntariness of Statement

Text: 75 Abouhalima made two incriminating remarks during his post-arrest interview. Specifically, shortly after being taken into United States' custody, Abouhalima was informed that he was under arrest for his participation in the World Trade Center bombing. Once FBI agents advised him of his constitutional rights, they interviewed him about the apartment at 40 Pamrapo. During the interview, Abouhalima asked an officer whether he knew an individual by the name of Rashid. Yousef's nickname was Rashed. 4 Abouhalima also corrected an FBI agent's pronunciation of Pamrapo. At trial, Abouhalima requested a suppression hearing directly before these remarks were admitted into evidence. The court, however, found that such a hearing was unnecessary. After introducing these statements into evidence, the government used these statements to assert that Abouhalima had linked the questioning about 40 Pamrapo to the World Trade Center bombing and to Yousef. 76 Abouhalima now argues that we should direct the district court on remand to reconsider Abouhalima's motion to suppress his post-arrest remarks. Specifically, Abouhalima asserts that his comments were given involuntarily and without a valid Miranda waiver because they followed ten days of incarceration and torture in Egypt. Accordingly, Abouhalima argues that the court's failure to hold a suppression hearing violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. 77 Under the circumstances, we find no basis for a suppression hearing. [Courts are not required to] divine a defendant's motivation for speaking or acting as he did [when] there [is] no claim that governmental conduct coerced his decision. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165-66, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). A diminished mental state is only relevant to the voluntariness inquiry if it made mental or physical coercion by the police more effective. United States v. Chrismon, 965 F.2d 1465, 1469 (7th Cir.1992). 78 In the present case, while it is reasonable that Egyptian incarceration and torture, if true, would likely weaken one's mental state, one's mental state does not become part of the calculus for the suppression of evidence unless there is an allegation that agents of the United States engaged in some type of coercion. Because Abouhalima does not contend that federal agents either mentally or physically coerced his remarks during that interrogation, there is no basis for inquiry into a possible constitutional violation. Only if we were to establish a brand new constitutional right--the right of a criminal defendant to confess to his crime only when totally rational and properly motivated--could respondent's present claim be sustained. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166, 107 S.Ct. 515.C. Ayyad--Failure to Grant Funds for Experts 79 Ayyad argues that the district court unreasonably interfered with his efforts to secure expert testimony and consultation by authorizing only a portion of the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) funds that he requested. Specifically, on January 28, 1994, during the fourth month of the trial, Ayyad, who was represented by retained counsel, applied for $35,000 in CJA funds for five expert witnesses concerning DNA evidence, explosives, computers, linguistics and culture. The district court initially responded by authorizing $1,000 for the DNA expert and $1,000 for the explosives expert, but denied Ayyad's request to retain the computer expert, linguist and an expert on culture (sociologist). Ayyad asserts that the district court's response left him unprepared and unable to test the government's direct case ... requir[ing] reversal. 80 The government responds that just three days after its initial ruling, the court reconsidered and granted Ayyad's application in full. Accordingly, the government avers that Ayyad's argument is factually incorrect and does not support a reversal. We agree. 81 The Criminal Justice Act of 1964 provides in pertinent part: Counsel for a person who is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert, or other services necessary for adequate representation may request them in an ex parte application. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1). The statute requires the district court to authorize these funds when a defense attorney makes a reasonable request in circumstances in which he would independently engage such services [if his client was able to pay for them]. United States v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir.1976) (citing United States v. Theriault, 440 F.2d 713, 717 (5th Cir.1971) (Wisdom, J., concurring)); see United States v. Oliver, 626 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir.1980). While the district judge should entertain such requests with a liberal attitude, he is nevertheless obligated to exercise his discretion in determining whether such services are necessary. Oliver, 626 F.2d at 260. Services necessary for an adequate defense include preparation for cross-examination of a government expert as well as presentation of an expert defense witness. Id.; see id. at 828 (district court commits reversible error when it denies CJA funds for fingerprint expert, where fingerprint evidence was likely to be pivotal). 82 In this case, we need not decide whether the district court erred in initially declining to grant Ayyad's application in full. Because the district court timely reconsidered that order and granted Ayyad the full $35,000 in CJA funds, we perceive no prejudice. Moreover, we observe that during the three-week interval between the district court's authorization of the funds and the time that Ayyad rested before the jury, he called no witnesses and never requested a continuance to consult with his experts. Consequently, there is no basis for reversal. D. Ajaj--Eastern District Plea Agreement 83 Ajaj argues that his prosecution under the instant indictment is barred by the express terms of his plea agreement regarding the passport fraud charges in the Eastern District of New York (Eastern District plea agreement). He claims that the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York (Eastern District prosecutor's office) improperly passed along work to the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York (Southern District prosecutor's office) to circumvent a restriction on its own ability to prosecute Ajaj on charges stemming from Ajaj's role in the World Trade Center bombing. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Ajaj's arguments are meritless. 84 Following his arrest and detention at Kennedy Airport, Ajaj was charged in the Eastern District of New York with knowingly using a false passport, 18 U.S.C. § 1543 (Count One), and using the passport of another person, 18 U.S.C. § 1544 (Count Two) (Eastern District indictment). On October 6, 1992, Ajaj, with the assistance of his then-counsel, Douglas Morris, executed a written plea agreement with the Eastern District prosecutor's office. Ajaj agreed to plead guilty to Count Two in return for the Eastern District prosecutor's promise to move to dismiss Count One at sentencing and not oppose a two-level reduction under the Sentencing Guidelines for Ajaj's acceptance of responsibility. Paragraph 4 of that plea agreement provided that [t]his agreement is limited to the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York and cannot bind other federal, state or local prosecuting authorities. 85 On October 6, 1992, Ajaj pled guilty to Count Two of the Eastern District indictment before United States District Judge Raggi. During the course of the allocution, Judge Raggi asked the parties whether they had agreed to any additional terms to supplement the written plea agreement. Attorney Morris, counsel for Ajaj, responded: 86 There's also an agreement that the Government will not bring any charges arising out of Mr. Ajaj's entry into the United States on September 1st, including any false statement charge, and it will not bring any charges arising from any thing or document that Mr. Ajaj was carrying with him on that date. 87 (emphasis added). Following Attorney Morris' articulation of this supplementary oral agreement, the Eastern District prosecutor agreed, stating [t]hat's correct, your Honor. Judge Raggi, to ascertain whether Ajaj understood the agreement in its entirety, questioned Ajaj and paraphrased Attorney Morris' articulation of the oral agreement. Judge Raggi stated: 88 THE COURT: Now, the lawyers tell me that the agreement represents all of the promises and agreements between you and the Government, except that the Government also promises that it's not going to bring any other charges against you relating to your conduct on September 1st. 89 The question I want to put to you, now, is do you know of any other promises [or] agreements made by you or the Government as a part of this decision to plead guilty? 90 Is there anything else? 91 THE DEFENDANT: No. 92 (emphasis added). 93 Prior to trial under the instant indictment filed in the Southern District of New York (Southern District indictment), Ajaj moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the prosecution was barred by the terms of the Eastern District plea agreement. Specifically, Ajaj argued that under the terms of the oral supplement to that agreement, the Government, which included the Southern District prosecutor's office, was barred from prosecuting Ajaj on charges arising from and relating to his September 1 entry into the United States and the terrorist materials in his possession. Ajaj argued that in contravention of that agreement, two overt acts charged in Count One of the Southern District indictment stated: 94 a. On or about September 1, 1992, AHMAD MOHAMMAD AJAJ, using an airline ticket issued in the name of Khurram Khan, and RAMZI AHMED YOUSEF, using an airline ticket issued in the name of Azan Muhammad, traveled together from Pakistan to John F. Kennedy International Airport, in Queens County, New York (Kennedy Airport). 95 b. On or about September 1, 1992, AHMAD MOHAMMAD AJAJ transported from Pakistan to Kennedy Airport, manuals and other materials containing, among other things, instructions on the construction and use of explosive devices, including improvised explosive devices using urea and nitric acid and nitroglycerine. 96 The government, in opposition to Ajaj's motion, argued that the parties to the Eastern District plea agreement never contemplated that the plea agreement would bar the prosecution of Ajaj for terrorist-related activities. According to the government, the parties had entered into the supplementary oral agreement to address Ajaj's concern that (1) he had made false statements to INS officials on September 1, 1992; (2) the government would bring additional fraud-related charges against Ajaj based on his possession of false identification documents; and (3) the possession of terrorist materials themselves might constitute a crime. 97 On September 13, 1993, the district court denied Ajaj's motion, concluding that the written portion of the plea bargain specifically limited the [plea agreement] to the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York. It is unreasonable to believe that anyone, including Ajaj, believed that the addendum announced in open court by his own attorney could bind all levels of government within the United States.... Under the circumstances leading up to Ajaj's guilty plea, the only reasonable expectation Ajaj could have was that he would not be further prosecuted by the United States Attorney in the Eastern District of New York. We agree. 98 It is well settled that a prosecutor's promises made in return for a defendant's guilty plea must be fulfilled. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984) ([W]hen the prosecution breaches its promise with respect to an executed plea agreement, the defendant pleads guilty on a false premise, and hence his conviction cannot stand.); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). When the express terms of a plea agreement set forth promises by the Government, we have held that the plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively appears that the agreement contemplates a broader restriction, United States v. Annabi, 771 F.2d 670, 672 (2d Cir.1985) (per curiam), or unless there [is] evidence to show that [a prosecutor] [i]s attempting to evade its own obligations [under the plea agreement] by transferring a prosecution to another office, United States v. Alessi, 544 F.2d 1139, 1154 (2d Cir.1976); see also United States v. DiNapoli, 817 F.2d 978, 979 (2d Cir.1987) (per curiam); United States v. Papa, 533 F.2d 815, 825 (2d Cir.1976). The mere use of the term  'government' in the plea agreement does not create an affirmative appearance that the agreement contemplated barring districts other than the particular district entering into the agreement. United States v. Laskow, 688 F.Supp. 851, 853 (E.D.N.Y.1988), aff'd, 867 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir.1988). 99 Here, Ajaj presents no evidence that the parties to the Eastern District plea agreement contemplated that it would bar the prosecution of Ajaj in any district other than the Eastern District. Indeed, the explicit terms of the Eastern District plea agreement expressly limited the plea agreement to the Eastern District of New York. Moreover, assuming that the plea agreement would bar the Eastern District prosecutor's office from prosecuting Ajaj for crimes arising from the World Trade Center bombing, Ajaj presents no evidence that the Eastern District prosecutor's office attempted to circumvent a restriction on its authority to prosecute by transferring its work to the Southern District prosecutor's office. The Southern District prosecutor's office independently investigated criminal offenses arising from the World Trade Center bombing and filed an indictment in the Southern District charging Ajaj with crimes that were distinct from the passport fraud charges in the Eastern District. We therefore affirm the district court's denial of Ajaj's motion.