Opinion ID: 298169
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Intrusion Count

Text: 9 Count One of the complaint alleged that the defendant, acting through its employee-agents, invaded the plaintiff's privacy by means of a wrongful entry and unauthorized physical intrusion into the plaintiff's home on November 1, 1968. It further alleged that, as a result of the defendant's wrongful acts, the plaintiff had been deprived of her right to privacy and of her right to the exclusive and unfettered use and possession of her home, causing the plaintiff mental and physical suffering and to become frightened, nervous, upset and insecure in her home. Count One further alleged that the defendant's acts had been committed wilfully, unlawfully, maliciously, and with total and wanton disregard for plaintiff's rights, for which compensatory damages in excess of $1,000 and punitive damages of $1,000,000 were sought. The demand for compensatory damages in excess of $1,000 was framed to meet the lower jurisdictional limitations of the state court of general jurisdiction. The trial judge, at the request of the defendant, and over the objections of the plaintiff, gave the following instructions respecting Count One to the jury as part of his general charge: 10 If you find, ladies and gentlemen, from a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff, Mrs. Rawls, after she came home, by her conduct gave her actual or implied consent for the defendant's employee to remain in her home and to continue to take photographs, then you cannot award her any damages as to Counts One and Two for wrongful entry or invasion of privacy. During the course of the jury's deliberations, the jury foreman sent an inquiry to the trial judge: 11 If the Conde Nast people entered without Mrs. Rawls' consent, but stayed with her implied consent — are they guilty of trespass? 12 Plaintiff's counsel urged the trial judge to answer the question in the affirmative. The trial judge declined to do so. Instead, upon the jury's return to the courtroom, he reread a portion of his original charge, including the above-quoted excerpt. The giving of this instruction is assigned as error by the plaintiff on her cross-appeal. 13 In Thompson v. City of Jacksonville (Fla. 1st D.C.A.1961), 130 So.2d 105, 1 it was held that a complaint charging that city police officers negligently broke into and searched the plaintiff's premises with negligent disregard for the plaintiff's right to privacy was sufficient to state a cause of action for invasion of privacy. In her appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial judge erroneously obstructed her efforts to prove a Thompson type case to the jury by injecting the allegedly irrelevant factor of consent into its deliberations. 14 Harper and James, with regard to the defense of consent to a tort, states: 15 the general principle that one may not complain of acts to which he had consented is applicable to entries and other intrusions on land. A trespass on land is an intentional intrusion without the consent of the possessor and without a privilege conferred by law irrespective of the possessor's consent. Indeed, the word `intrusion' implies that there is no consent since one who has expressed a willingness that another come onto his land will hardly regard the entry which he has thus authorized as an `intrusion.' 16 Frequently, perhaps more often than otherwise, the consent will be implied rather than expressed. Consent may be implied from custom, local or general, from usage or from the conduct of the parties, or some relationship between them. Harper and James, The Law of Torts, Sec. 1.11, page 38. 17 Dean Prosser discusses the defense of consent in the following manner: 18 Chief among the other defenses available in a privacy action is that of the plaintiff's consent to the invasion, which will bar his recovery as in the case of any other tort    Prosser, Law of Torts, 3rd Ed. 1964, Sec. 112, page 850. 19 The Restatement of the Law of Torts more closely addresses itself to the plaintiff's view of the facts of her case in its discussion of subsequent assent to a tortious act: 20 Except in the case of ratification, subsequent assent by the injured person to a tortious act does not of itself terminate a cause of action. There is no principle under which a tort can be condoned; an agreement not to sue is effective only if it has the elements of an enforceable contract. Thus where one assaults another, a statement by the injured person that he forgives the assault does not terminate the cause of action. Restatement of the Law of Torts, Am.Law.Inst., (1939), Section 892, comment c, page 841. 21 We agree with the Restatement and the plaintiff that, strictly speaking, the defendant may avail itself of the defense of consent only if the consent existed at the time the intrusion took place. Nevertheless, we conclude that the lower court's judgment should be upheld even though the jury was imprecisely instructed in terms of the doctrine of consent. 22 The legal theory underlying Florida's cause of action for the tortious invasion of privacy is succinctly set out in 32 Florida Jurisprudence, Torts, Section 9, pages 136-137: 23 The Florida court recognizes a right of privacy, distinct in and of itself and not merely incidental to some other right, for the violation of which an action for damages will lie. The right of privacy is essentially the right to be let alone. The right is violated by the publicizing of one's private affairs with which the public has no legitimate concern, or the wrongful intrusion into one's private activities, in such a manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities. 24 Our research and the research of counsel in this matter have failed to disclose any reported Florida cases dealing with the exact point, but we believe that Florida courts, presented with a similar factual situation, would sanction a jury instruction similar to the one objected to by plaintiff but would couch it in terms of waiver or estoppel rather than consent. As stated in the Florida Jurisprudence discussion quoted above, the cause of action for the tortious invasion of privacy has as a principal objective the compensation of a party for the outrage or mental suffering, shame, or humiliation caused by the invasion. If at the time of the alleged invasion the plaintiff made no meaningful effort to protect her privacy or demonstrated no visible emotional distress, but rather acquiesced in the continued presence of the defendant's employees in her home, we can perceive no legitimate reason for preventing the jury from taking the plaintiff's reactions to the presence of the defendant's employees into account in determining her entitlement to recover damages. Although it may have been error to instruct the jury in this case in terms of consent, the error was technical only, and not harmful. The trial judge's direction of the jury's attention to the actions and demeanor of the plaintiff upon her return to her home is not ground for reversal.