Opinion ID: 2744680
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: On appeal, the six surviving children of Mrs. Graham argue that the circuit court erred by ruling that under W.Va. Code § 55-7-6(b), a distributee’s right to recover damages vests upon the decedent’s death, rather than at the time the proceeds recovered in a wrongful death action are distributed. They argue that because Betty Asbury died before the settlement proceeds were distributed, she is not a distributee under the statute. W.Va. Code § 55-7-6(b) is contained in West Virginia’s wrongful death act, W.Va. Code § 55-7-5 [1931] et seq. We begin our analysis with a brief examination of the act. The West Virginia wrongful death act, W.Va. Code § 55-7-5 to -8a, allows a cause of action “[w]henever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action to recover damages in respect thereof[.]” W.Va. Code § 55-7-5. In Bradshaw v. Soulsby, 210 W.Va. 682, 688, 558 S.E.2d 681, 687 (2001), this Court interpreted W.Va. Code § 55-7-5 to mean that in order “[t]o maintain an action for wrongful death, a beneficiary must show two specific elements: that a person has died, and that the death was caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default.” This Court has stated that the “purpose of the wrongful death act is to compensate the beneficiaries for the loss they have suffered as a result of the decedent’s death.” White v. Gosiene, 187 W.Va. 576, 582, 420 S.E.2d 567, 573 (1992). The 6 wrongful death act is a remedial statutory scheme. “Because the wrongful death act alleviates the harshness of the common law, it is to be given a liberal construction to achieve its beneficent purposes.” Syllabus Point 6, Bradshaw v. Soulsby, supra.7 With this background in mind, we turn to the parties’ arguments. The issue presented is whether the circuit court correctly determined that under W.Va. Code § 55-7-6(b), a distributee’s right of action vests upon the decedent’s death, rather than at the time the proceeds recovered in a wrongful death action are distributed. The relevant facts are undisputed—Betty Asbury survived her mother (the subject decedent) and was alive at the time the wrongful death lawsuit was filed, but died prior to the settlement of the lawsuit and the distribution of the settlement proceeds. The parties offer differing interpretations of whether, under this factual scenario, Mr. Asbury, as administrator of Betty Asbury’s estate, is entitled to share in the settlement proceeds. Our resolution of this issue requires us to analyze W.Va. Code § 55-7-6(b). It states: 7 In accord, Farley v. Sartin, 195 W.Va. 671, 680, 466 S.E.2d 522, 531 (1995) (“[O]ur prior decisions . . . firmly established that W.Va. Code, 55-7-5, is a remedial statute and should be liberally construed.”); Martin v. Smith, 190 W.Va. 286, 292, 438 S.E.2d 318, 324 (1993) (“West Virginia's wrongful death statute is remedial, and is liberally construed to effect the Legislature’s intent.”); Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W.Va. 431, 184 S.E.2d 428 (1971); City of Wheeling ex rel. Carter v. Am. Cas. Co., 131 W.Va. 584, 590, 48 S.E.2d 404, 408 (1948) (“The statute, being remedial, should be liberally construed.”); Wilder v. Charleston Transit Co., 120 W.Va. 319, 322, 197 S.E. 814, 816 (1938) (“The policy of the statute is remedial and not punitive.”); Richards v. Riverside Iron Works, 56 W.Va. 510, 515, 49 S.E. 437, 438 (1904) (“The statute is remedial, and should be construed liberally for the purpose of carrying out the legislative intent.”). 7 (b) In every such action for wrongful death, the jury, or in a case tried without a jury, the court, may award such damages as to it may seem fair and just, and, may direct in what proportions the damages shall be distributed to the surviving spouse and children, including adopted children and stepchildren, brothers, sisters, parents and any persons who were financially dependent upon the decedent at the time of his or her death or would otherwise be equitably entitled to share in such distribution after making provision for those expenditures, if any, specified in subdivision (2), subsection (c) of this section. If there are no such survivors, then the damages shall be distributed in accordance with the decedent’s will or, if there is no will, in accordance with the laws of descent and distribution as set forth in chapter fortytwo of this code. If the jury renders only a general verdict on damages and does not provide for the distribution thereof, the court shall distribute the damages in accordance with the provisions of this subsection. (Emphasis added.) The six surviving children of Mrs. Graham argue that under the plain language of W.Va. Code § 55-7-6(b), a “surviving” child of the wrongful death decedent “must survive to the distribution date to receive a share of the proceeds. Mrs. Asbury did not survive until that date. Thus, Mr. Asbury has no entitlement to a share of those damages.” Conversely, Mr. Asbury argues that the plain language of the statute supports the circuit court’s finding that a “surviving” child’s right of action under the statute vests at the time of the wrongful death decedent’s death, and does not require such a distributee to survive to the distribution date. Our resolution of this issue begins with a review of our rules of statutory construction. This Court has held that in deciding the meaning of a statutory provision, “[w]e look first to the statute’s language. If the text, given its plain meaning, answers the 8 interpretive question, the language must prevail and further inquiry is foreclosed.” Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax Dep’t of West Virginia, 195 W.Va. 573, 587, 466 S.E.2d 424, 438 (1995); see also Syllabus Point 2, Crockett v. Andrews, 153 W.Va. 714, 172 S.E.2d 384 (1970) (“Where the language of a statute is free from ambiguity, its plain meaning is to be accepted and applied without resort to interpretation.”); and Syllabus Point 2, State v. Epperly, 135 W.Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d 488 (1951) (“A statutory provision which is clear and unambiguous and plainly expresses the legislative intent will not be interpreted by the courts but will be given full force and effect.”). Additionally, this Court has held that “[a] statute is open to construction only where the language used requires interpretation because of ambiguity which renders it susceptible of two or more constructions or of such doubtful or obscure meaning that reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning.” Sizemore v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 202 W.Va. 591, 596, 505 S.E.2d 654, 659 (1998) (internal quotations and citation omitted.) With these rules of statutory construction in mind, we turn to W.Va. Code § 55-7-6(b). The present dispute centers around the parties’ conflicting interpretations of the word “surviving” contained in W.Va. Code § 55-7-6(b). As this Court recognized in West Virginia Health Care Cost Review Authority v. Boone Memorial Hosp., 196 W.Va. 326, 472 S.E.2d 411 (1996), “[i]t is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but it must be drawn from the context in which it is used.” Id. at 338, 472 S.E.2d at 423. 9 The word “surviving” in W.Va. Code § 55-7-6(b) is contained in a sentence identifying two categories of distributees under the wrongful death act: (1) persons in a specific familial relationship to the decedent irrespective of financial dependence (“surviving” spouse, children, including adopted children and stepchildren, siblings, and parents), and (2) any other persons who were financially dependent on the decedent at the time of the decedent’s death. (Emphasis added.) The statute does not favor one category of distributees over the other; it simply states that a jury or a court may award wrongful death damages to the persons identified in those two categories. Under the petitioners’ suggested construction of the statute, a distributee in the first category (“surviving” family member) must survive until the date of distribution to receive an award of wrongful death damages. Thus, according to the petitioners, the class of distributees in the first category is not fixed at the time of the decedent’s death and may continue to change until the date the damage award is distributed. This construction of the statute creates a substantial difference between the first (“surviving” family members) and second (persons financially dependent on the decedent) categories of distributees. The statute states that persons in the second category are identified based on their relationship to the decedent at the time of the decedent’s death. Thus, the right of action for distributees in the second category vests upon the death of the decedent and such class of distributees is fixed at that time—upon the death of the decedent. After review, we find no support for the petitioners’ suggested construction of W.Va. Code § 55-7-6(b). The plain language of the statute indicates the Legislature’s 10 intent to treat both categories of distributees in an equal manner. W.Va. Code § 55-7­ 6(b) does not prioritize the two categories of distributees for distribution; rather, it places a distributee in the first category (“surviving” family member of the decedent) on equal footing as a distributee in the second category (a person who was financially dependent on the decedent at the time of the decedent’s death). Similarly, the circuit court’s construction of the statute—that the right of action for a “surviving” family member in the first category refers to a family member who is “surviving” at the time of the decedent’s death—results in both categories of distributees being ascertainable and fixed at the time of the decedent’s death. Further, under the circuit court’s ruling, the rights of distributees in both categories to receive a wrongful death damage award vests at the same time: upon the death of the decedent. Additionally, a previous case from this Court addressing the wrongful death act supports the conclusion that a distributee’s right to receive damages in a wrongful death action vests at the time of the decedent’s death, rather than at the time the wrongful death damages are distributed. This Court discussed whether a wrongful death action brought by a distributee is extinguished upon the death of such distributee in Adams v. Sparacio, 156 W.Va. 678, 196 S.E.2d 647 (1973). While the wrongful death statute has been amended since Adams was decided, the Court’s general discussion of the effect of a distributee’s death prior to the resolution of a wrongful death action provides guidance on 11 the issue in the present case.8 The Court in Adams held that when a distributee died during the pendency of a wrongful death action, the action survived to the distributee’s estate. Specifically, Syllabus Point 7 of Adams states, in relevant part: “An action for wrongful death, being one created for the benefit of the distributee of the deceased, does not abate with the death of such distributee[.]”9 Based on all of the foregoing, we hold that that for purposes of awarding wrongful death damages under W.Va. Code § 55-7-6(b) [1992], the determination of whether a spouse, children (including adopted children and stepchildren), brothers, sisters, and parents are “surviving” is made by determining whether they were alive at the time of the wrongful death decedent’s demise. Applying this holding to the present case, 8 For a comprehensive review of West Virginia’s wrongful death act and the numerous statutory changes to the act, see McDavid v. U.S., 213 W.Va. 592, 584 S.E.2d 226 (2003). 9 The full text of Syllabus Point 7 of Adams is as follows: An action for wrongful death, being one created for the benefit of the distributee of the deceased, does not abate with the death of such distributee and if the distributee be a dependent distributee, the administrator who instituted the action may proceed therewith and recover for the estate of the deceased dependent distributee any financial or pecuniary loss suffered by him up to the moment of his death. The Court’s holding in Adams is consistent with the prevailing view on this issue: “The prevailing view is that the cause of action vests in the beneficiary immediately upon the wrongful death, becomes his property, and survives to his representative.” W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 948 (5th ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted). 12 we find that the circuit court correctly determined that Mr. Asbury, as administrator of Betty Asbury’s estate, was entitled to share in the proceeds10 of the wrongful death settlement award because Betty Asbury was alive at the time of her mother’s death.11 10 The petitioners argue that the circuit court erred by awarding Mr. Asbury, as the administrator of the estate of Betty Asbury, an equal share of the wrongful death settlement proceeds. W.Va. Code § 55-7-6(b) provides “the court may award such damages as to it may seem fair and just, and, may direct in what proportions the damages shall be distributed[.]” Given the wide discretion afforded to circuit courts in this statute, we find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by awarding an equal share of the wrongful death settlement proceeds to Mr. Asbury, as administrator of the estate of Betty Asbury. While we find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Mr. Asbury, as the administrator of the estate of Betty Asbury, an equal share in the present case, we emphasize that, in general, a circuit court is not required to award equal shares to all persons who are distributees under the wrongful death act. Instead, pursuant to W.Va. Code § 55-7-6(b), a circuit court or jury has wide discretion to award wrongful death damages “in . . . proportions” that “may seem fair and just” under the facts of a particular case. 11 The petitioners also argue that the circuit court erred because Mr. Asbury, as the administrator of the estate of Betty Asbury, lacked standing to intervene in this case because Betty Asbury’s estate had been closed prior to the distribution of the wrongful death settlement proceeds. Under the facts of this case, we find no merit in this assignment of error. First, the estate of Betty Asbury could have remained open if counsel for Mrs. Graham’s estate had complied with W.Va. Code § 55-7-6 and provided the statutorily required notice to Mr. Asbury, as administrator of the estate of Betty Asbury, informing him that Betty Asbury’s estate was a potential distributee of the wrongful death settlement. Further, when Mr. Asbury filed his “Motion to Set Aside Settlement as Invalid or in the Alternative Motion Seeking Court Ordered Distribution of Wrongful Death Proceeds Pursuant to West Virginia Code § 55-7-6,” any recovery Betty Asbury’s estate could receive was contingent on the circuit court’s determination of whether Betty Asbury was a distributee under W.Va. Code § 55-7-6. Thus, Mr. Asbury had no settlement proceeds to administer in Betty Asbury’s estate, and no need to reopen the estate, prior to the circuit court’s ruling that the estate was entitled to a share of the wrongful death damages. 13