Opinion ID: 776750
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Denial of a Downward Adjustment for Acceptance of Responsibility

Text: 32 Although Guzman concedes that his post-plea visits to the Department of Motor Vehicle offices violated his Cooperation Agreement, he contends that he is nonetheless entitled to a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. He notes that the district court made no finding that he had a criminal purpose or that he lied about the visits or tried to conceal them. He does note that he entered a timely guilty plea and otherwise demonstrated his acceptance of responsibility. 33 Under the Guidelines, a defendant qualifies for a downward adjustment [i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). The Guidelines also recognize that [t]he sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant's acceptance of responsibility such that the determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review. Id. § 3E1.1, Application Note 5. Thus, we will not disturb the district court's factual determination regarding whether a defendant has accepted responsibility unless it is without foundation. United States v. Austin, 17 F.3d 27, 30 (2d Cir.1994); United States v. Fredette, 15 F.3d 272, 277 (2d Cir.1994). While entry of a guilty plea is significant evidence of acceptance of responsibility, this evidence may be outweighed by conduct ... that is inconsistent with ... acceptance of responsibility. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, Application Note 3. 34 In this case it cannot be said that the district court's factual determination with regard to the question of acceptance of responsibility is without foundation. The district court concluded that the downward adjustment sought was not warranted because any evidence of acceptance of responsibility is outweighed by Mr. Guzman's post-plea conduct, because it is inconsistent with such acceptance of responsibility. This conclusion finds adequate support in the record. In April of 1999, two months after his plea, Guzman was seen in the parking lot of a Motor Vehicles Department office in the Bronx by an undercover detective. Following the incident, he was given explicit instructions to stay away from any such office without express authorization from government agents. He subsequently was observed by detectives in the vicinity of the Worth Street office in Manhattan on at least three occasions. During two of those occasions, he was seen conversing with groups of people while holding what apparently were application forms. Guzman was not authorized by government agents to be present on any of those occasions. 35 Guzman claims that his presence at a Motor Vehicles Department office on one of the occasions was due to the fact that, during his employment as a livery driver, he was asked to drive a passenger to the office. He says he spoke with various people there who knew him from his criminal past in order to avoid revealing that he was cooperating with the government. However, he did not explain why he was present at the office on the other occasions, including a visit after his Cooperation Agreement had been terminated for just that sort of conduct. 36 Given the record of Guzman's post-plea conduct, the district court was justified in determining that he had not sincerely accepted responsibility for his offense. See United States v. Harris, 13 F.3d 555, 557 (2d Cir.1994); United States v. Woods, 927 F.2d 735, 735-36 (2d Cir.1991) (per curiam). The strong inference to be drawn from Guzman's post-plea visits to Motor Vehicles Department offices is that he was continuing to engage in the very criminal activity that led to the charges against him and to his guilty plea to those charges. The only conclusion to be drawn from such post-plea conduct is that it is inconsistent with a full and ungrudging acceptance of responsibility. United States v. Saxena, 229 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir.2000).