Opinion ID: 1316209
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retention of Juror G.

Text: Defendant insists Mr. G., who sat on the jury, was biased in favor of the death penalty, and was unwilling to consider constitutionally relevant evidence offered in mitigation. According to defendant, the trial court erred in denying a defense challenge for cause made after Juror G. answered questions asked by the court and counsel on both sides during Hovey voir dire. He claims violations of his federal and state constitutional rights to due process and an impartial jury, and his right to a reliable penalty determination under the federal Constitution. It is settled that in order to preserve such claims, the defense either must exhaust its peremptory challenges and object to the jury as finally constituted at trial, or must justify its failure to do so on appeal. ( People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th 690, 715, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46; People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th 415, 480, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373; People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1087, 259 Cal.Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659; cf. United States v. Martinez-Salazar (2000) 528 U.S. 304, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792.) As noted, defendant remained in possession of most of his peremptory challenges at the time he accepted the jury  a panel which included Juror G. No justification for this failure to exhaust is made here. Defendant claims in the alternative that trial counsel was incompetent for failing to remove Juror G. by way of peremptory challenge. However, as suggested earlier, the decision whether to accept the jury as constituted is inherently nuanced and tactical. Nothing in the record shows that counsel's actions were unreasonable or harmful in this regard. Indeed, whether the appellate claim concerning Juror G. is framed in terms of an erroneous denial of a challenge for cause or an incompetent failure to use a peremptory challenge, we see no evidence that he was biased or that he should not have served on the jury for the reasons defendant now suggests. (E.g., People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th 415, 480-481, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373.) On the one hand, defendant emphasizes answers to questions asked by the trial court in which Juror G. said he can't guarantee that he would enter the penalty phase with an open mind, and that he would probably vote for death if first degree murder with special circumstances were found. In response to a question by defense counsel, the juror also said he was not opposed to the notion of an eye for an eye, at least where no mitigating evidence was available to adjus[t] his thinking in this regard. However, after making each of the foregoing statements, Juror G. insisted upon explaining], elaborat[ing], and clarify[ing] his answers. He rejected any insinuation that he was a religious fanatic, and denied acceptance of the eye for an eye principle as literal truth. The juror also made clear that he hoped the parties would present evidence beyond the circumstances of the crime at the penalty phase, and that he would carefully consider and weigh such evidence. Some actions, he said, are a combination of the person and the environment and a lot of other factors, and those are the factors that I could listen to ... as an adjustment in my decision. Finally, in response to questioning by the prosecutor, Juror G. specifically rejected the notion that he would always choose death, and said he would impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole in an appropriate case. Deferring to the manner in which the trial court resolved any conflict or ambiguity in the juror's answers ( People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 146, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 418, 954 P.2d 990), we see no predisposition in favor of a death sentence. The court did not err in implicitly finding no substantial impairment in Juror G.'s ability to function as a juror at the penalty phase. ( People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 121, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887, citing Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841.) We also cannot fault counsel for retaining Juror G. on this record, particularly since he expressed a willingness to consider background and character evidence bearing favorably on defendant. (E.g., People v. Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th 450, 486-187, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249; People v. Montiel, supra, 5 Cal.4th 877, 911, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277.)