Opinion ID: 1057791
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Proportionality Review and Arbitrariness

Text: When a defendant has been sentenced to death, the Tennessee Supreme Court must engage in a comparative proportionality review. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(D) (2006). The purpose of this review is to ensure that the death penalty is applied consistently and not arbitrarily or capriciously. Terry v. State, 46 S.W.3d 147, 163 (Tenn.2001); see also § 39-13-206(c)(1)(A). We have held that comparative proportionality review `presumes that the death penalty is not disproportionate to the crime' in the traditional sense. It purports to inquire instead whether the penalty is nonetheless unacceptable in a particular case because it is disproportionate to the punishment imposed on others convicted of the same crime. Reid, 213 S.W.3d at 820 (quoting State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 662 (Tenn.1997)). To determine whether punishment is disproportionate under the facts of this case, we use the precedent-seeking method of comparative proportionality review. This requires us to compare this case with previous cases involving similar defendants and similar crimes. Before we may hold that the death sentence received by the Defendant was disproportionate, we must find that the facts of this case are plainly lacking in circumstances consistent with those in cases where the death penalty has been imposed. Id. (quoting State v. Davis, 141 S.W.3d 600, 619-20 (Tenn.2004)). For comparison, we look to first degree murder cases where the State seeks the death penalty, a capital sentencing hearing is held, and the sentencing jury determines whether the sentence should be life imprisonment, life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, or death. Id. (quoting Davis, 141 S.W.3d at 620). In assessing the similarity between the case under review and previous cases, we have looked to the following details about the offense: (1) the means of death; (2) the manner of death; (3) the motivation for the killing; (4) the place of death; (5) the victim's age, physical condition, and psychological condition; (6) the absence or presence of premeditation; (7) the absence or presence of provocation; (8) the absence or presence of justification; and (9) the injury to and effect upon non-decedent victims. Id. (quoting Davis, 141 S.W.3d at 620). The Court has also compared the following details about the Defendant: (1) prior criminal record, if any; (2) age, race, and gender; (3) mental, emotional, and physical condition; (4) role in the murder; (5) cooperation with authorities; (6) level of remorse; (7) knowledge of the victim's helplessness; and (8) potential for rehabilitation. Id. (quoting Davis, 141 S.W.3d at 620). We first consider the circumstances of the offense. The Defendant, an estranged boyfriend, murdered an ex-girlfriend, whose testimony had sent him to prison for rape. While he was in prison, he had confided to other inmates his intentions to harm the victim. The threats the Defendant had made suggest that the murder was a premeditated act of vengeance. That the murder took place shortly after his release from prison buttresses that inference. The proof established that on the night of the murder, the Defendant sought out the victim at her place of employment, murdered her, and disposed of her body. While the means of her death is not entirely clear, the bloody crime scene indicated that there was a violent struggle. The body has never been recovered. Shortly after the murder, the Defendant fled the jurisdiction in a stolen car. After his arrest in Indiana, he sought to escape on more than one instance, even hijacking the extradition van during his return to Tennessee. Handmade weapons were found in his cell. After breaking off her relationship with the Defendant, the victim had remarried her husband, Donald Ellsworth, by whom she had two children. According to her husband, the victim had accepted her responsibilities as a wife and parent and had become a dependable employee at the Memphis Inn. The victim's mother, husband, and children were impacted by the murder. The Defendant, having a prior criminal record for violent crimes, was convicted on overwhelmingly persuasive circumstantial evidence. Based on the testimony of two prison inmates, he had planned the murder as an act of revenge. He approached the victim at a time when she was most vulnerable  alone and working after midnight at a hotel. Nothing suggests that the Defendant was mentally, emotionally, or physically impaired at the time of the murder. Although he was not a good student in secondary school, his academic underachievement did not rise to the level of mental disability. To say that the Defendant was cooperative with authorities would be far from accurate. In addition to his escape attempts in Indiana, the Defendant tried to escape the Shelby County Jail. He has portrayed no noticeable signs of remorse for his actions. While the Defendant presented evidence that he had committed to Christianity, ministered to other prisoners, and advocated Bible study, that he was out of prison for such a short time before he committed this murder reveals little hope that he is amenable to rehabilitative efforts. When conducting a proportionality review, we need not search for proof that a defendant's death sentence is perfectly symmetrical. . . . Copeland, 226 S.W.3d at 306 (quoting State v. Stevens, 78 S.W.3d 817, 842 (Tenn.2002)). Given the unique circumstances in each case, perfect symmetry is impossible. Our task is to compare similar cases and similar crimes. In several cases, we have upheld the sentence of death where the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance was the sole aggravating circumstance. See Copeland, 226 S.W.3d at 306-07; State v. Cole, 155 S.W.3d 885, 907-09 (Tenn.2005); State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458, 475-77 (Tenn. 2002); State v. McKinney, 74 S.W.3d 291, 314 (Tenn.2002); State v. Chalmers, 28 S.W.3d 913, 920 (Tenn.2000); State v. Keough, 18 S.W.3d 175, 184 (Tenn.2000). We have also upheld the death penalty in several cases that involved the murder of an estranged lover. See State v. Stephenson, 195 S.W.3d 574, 596 (Tenn.2006); State v. Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 132, 157 (Tenn. 2006); State v. Faulkner, 154 S.W.3d 48, 63 (Tenn.2005); Stevens, 78 S.W.3d at 822-23; State v. Suttles, 30 S.W.3d 252, 255 (Tenn.2000); State v. Hall, 8 S.W.3d 593, 595-96 (Tenn.1999); State v. Porterfield, 746 S.W.2d 441, 443-44 (Tenn.1988). After examining previous applications of the death penalty and restraints from the use of the death penalty, we find that this case is not plainly lacking in circumstances consistent with those in cases where the death penalty has been imposed. Davis, 141 S.W.3d at 620 (quoting Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 668). In addition, after reviewing the record, we find no other evidence that the death penalty was imposed in an arbitrary fashion. We hold, therefore, that the Defendant's death sentence was neither disproportionate nor arbitrary.