Opinion ID: 560384
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Single or multiple conspiracy charge in indictment

Text: 24 Defendants contend that the district court should have dismissed Count 2 of the indictment, the conspiracy count, because it charged multiple conspiracies in a single count, in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 8. 4 25 Count 2 charged that, from 1985 through August 29, 1987, twelve named defendants conspired to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and heroine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1). It presented the different locations of the conspiracy's drug transactions, specific drug sales to undercover agents from those locations, and various telephone calls that facilitated the cocaine sales by Bosko and Roland to Agent Kelly. In addition, Count 2 identified the drugs and firearms found on Bosko and in his car and house, and charged that he attempted to bribe the arresting officers. All the acts described in Count 2 were alleged to further a single drug conspiracy. 26 On appeal defendants claim that Count 2 encompassed two or three separate conspiracies. They contend that, during 1985 and 1986, core participants Bosko and Milevski began the conspiracy and supplied relatively small amounts of cocaine to others to sell, or sold it themselves, in two area restaurants and from Bosko's and Vasil's houses. The defendants then contend that in 1987 the second conspiracy began: that Bosko started working with Suchan and Roland, that former conspirators dropped out, and that larger quantities of cocaine were sold. A third arrangement, suggest the defendants, was an itinerant selling scheme between Bosko and the Simone brothers to distribute cocaine at various restaurants during 1987. Defendants allege that the charging of several conspiracies in one count was an error that warrants reversal. 27 We begin by considering the propriety of appellate review. In this case, the challenge to the indictment was not raised prior to trial as required by Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 5 The failure to object to alleged defects in the indictment before trial constitutes a waiver. Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(f); United States v. Podell, 869 F.2d 328, 331 (7th Cir.1989). An appellate court addresses a waived claim only if cause is shown that might justify the granting of relief from the waiver. Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(f); United States v. Petitjean, 883 F.2d 1341, 1344 (7th Cir.1989); United States v. Whaley, 830 F.2d 1469, 1475 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009, 108 S.Ct. 1738, 100 L.Ed.2d 202 (1988). If there is sufficient cause, the court evaluates the claim under the difficult standard of the plain error doctrine. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); United States v. Balzano, 916 F.2d 1273, 1280 (7th Cir.1990). A 'plain error' is one that results in 'an actual miscarriage of justice,' which implies that the defendant 'probably would have been acquitted but for the erroneously admitted evidence.'  United States v. Mejia, 909 F.2d 242, 247 (7th Cir.1990). See Balzano, 916 F.2d at 1280. 28 Defendants have not given the court any cause to justify relief from the waiver. Consequently we hold that defendants' challenge to the indictment is waived. 6 29