Opinion ID: 386199
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Defamation Action

Text: 46 In Count II of its Amended Complaint the Church claimed that Cazares maliciously made a number of statements that defamed the Church. In partially granting defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the trial court struck three of the allegedly defamatory statements from the Amended Complaint, holding that they did not state claims upon which relief could be granted based on theories of libel and slander. 10 47 Discovery proceeded and the Church again amended its complaint. Count II of the Third Amended Complaint alleged that the Mayor maliciously published false and defamatory statements on two occasions. 11 In granting summary judgment for the defendant, the district court found that the Church was a public figure and could recover only by showing the Mayor's statements to be defamatory, false and made with actual malice. The court held that when read in proper context the allegedly defamatory statements constituted mere conclusions or opinions which are constitutionally protected. The court concluded: The entire record and in particular the articles themselves show that the defendant made no malicious, false statement concerning the plaintiff. 48 On appeal the Church argues that the Mayor's statements were capable of defamatory meaning and in any event the court should not have decided the question at the Motion to Dismiss and Summary Judgment stages. 49 Because the defamation count was brought as a diversity action, Florida law applies. In Belli v. Orlando Daily Newspapers, 389 F.2d 579, 583 (5th Cir. 1967), we stated that under Florida law it was for the trial judge in the first instance to determine whether words are reasonably capable of defamatory interpretation or whether they are necessarily so; it is then for the jury to decide whether they were in fact understood as defamatory. Furthermore, any doubt as to the defamatory effect of the publication should be resolved by the common mind of the jury, and not by even the most carefully considered judicial pronouncement. 50 Although in Belli we reversed because we found that the publication was capable of a defamatory meaning, we did not hold that summary judgments or motions to dismiss are necessarily inappropriate in all defamation cases. In his special concurrence Judge Godbold noted that a judge is not precluded from finding defamation exists as a matter of law. 389 F.2d at 589. Nor is a judge precluded from finding, as a matter of law, that the publication was not defamatory. Thus, in Southard v. Forbes, 588 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1979), a lawsuit involving a public figure, summary judgment was held to be appropriate on both the questions of defamation and actual malice. 51 In the present case the Church admits it is a public figure within the doctrine of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). Thus, the Church may not recover for a simple defamatory statement. The statement must be shown to have been made with actual malice that is with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether or not it was false. 12 52 Under Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), the plaintiff must show also that the defamatory falsehood was a false statement of fact as opposed to pure comment or opinion. 53 We begin with the common ground. Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. 54 418 U.S. at 339-40, 94 S.Ct. at 3006-07. 55 Recent Florida decisions define the law of that state. In Palm Beach Newspaper, Inc. v. Early, 334 So.2d 50 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1976), cert. denied, 354 So.2d 351 (1977), the court applied the principles of New York Times and Gertz to defamatory actions in Florida. In Early the court overturned a $1,000,000 jury verdict in a libel action brought by a superintendent of schools against a newspaper and certain members of its editorial staff. The court found that words and phrases, such as cheating, stealing from the public, and fingers in the pot, when read in their proper context, were not defamatory. Other charges made by the newspaper were either protected opinion based on fact and thus not false, not made with malice under the New York Times standard or rhetorical hyperbole statements made in the conventional give and take in our economic and political controversies. In holding that there was no defamation, the court stated: 56 Suffice it to say that while most of the articles and cartoons can fairly be described as slanted, mean, vicious, and substantially below the level of objectivity that one would expect of responsible journalism, there is no evidence called to our attention which clearly and convincingly demonstrates that a single one of the articles was a false statement of fact made with actual malice as defined in the New York Times case. 57 334 So.2d at 53. 58 In Coleman v. Collins, 384 So.2d 229 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1980), the court reaffirmed the holding of Early. The plaintiff in Coleman was the city attorney for the City of Indian Harbour Beach. The alleged defamatory statement was contained in a memo distributed to residents of the city. This document accused plaintiff of sneakyly (sic) including a reverter clause in a deed to the city, and contained the statement we question the ethics of the ... City Attorney ... and we question his fitness to continue to hold that office. Plaintiff sued for defamation the individuals who wrote and distributed the memorandum, and a jury awarded punitive and compensatory damages. The district court of appeals reversed, holding these statements not defamatory as a matter of law. Basing its holding squarely on Early, the court found that plaintiff was a public official and that the statements were clearly matters of opinion, not statements of fact. 384 So.2d at 231. 59 In the present case the Church contends that the following statements allegedly made by Cazares were defamatory: 60 (1) An article published in the Clearwater Sun on March 24, 1976, stated in pertinent part: 61 After reading extensively in the critical literature concerning Scientology, he (Cazares) has vowed to keep up his opposition. 62 He has questioned the group's political objectives and has suggested that United Churches was a so-called gung-ho group that the Scientologists established to infiltrate the power structure of the community. 63 Gung-ho groups, as described in a 1969 talk given by a Scientologist who founded one such organization in Canada, aim to influence what the community thinks about Scientology. The groups involve local organizations such as civic clubs in projects for which the gung-ho group gains credit, according to the talk. 64 The gung-ho groups are names with an inconspicuous and respectable sounding name the Citizens' Improvement something or other and employ an eye-catching symbol, professionally designed, but not a Scientology symbol ... incorporated in the letterhead and on cards, according to a Scientology document. 65 Scientology spokesmen contest that description, saying gung-ho groups were not covert and no longer exist. They say United Churches is not a gung-ho group. 66 But Cazares and other officials are not satisfied, and the Scientologists face a potentially troublesome future if several government agencies considering investigations of the local activities follow through. 67 Prosecutors at several levels of government, who first looked at the Fort Harrison sale because of the secrecy that surrounded it, are reportedly still following activities. And there has been pressure to have the U.S. Senate constitutional rights subcommittee look at Scientology in its examination of religious cults. 68 The Scientologists' strongest opponent continues to be Cazares, who takes both the prestige of the mayor's office and the enthusiastic support of many citizens into battle. 69 Cazares has compared United Churches to the generalized description of gung-ho groups, and he has begun using some of the Scientologists' own language in attacking them. 70 In Scientology, a clear is a person who learns to control his mind fully through counseling. One self-proclaimed clear the Scientologists disavow is mass murderer Charles Manson, subject of a recent book titled Helter Skelter. 71 Cazares does not want Scientology clears to take over Clearwater, and he supports the fears of many citizens that Scientologists are bringing to the city a helter-skelter world and philosophy. 72 I don't see, Cazares said recently, how we can allow a group into our town and be gung-ho about it, and be clear in our minds about it, and not go about it in a helter-skelter fashion. 73 On summary judgment the court held that neither Cazares' use of the phrase helter-skelter nor his statements to the press at various times critical of the Church were defamatory. 74 The Church argues that helter-skelter was used by the Mayor in such a way as to convey to the public that the Church was linked to Charles Manson and was dedicated to the promotion of a general policy of mass murder. The Mayor contends that his statement was meant as a joke and that considered in the context in which it was made, it did not attempt to connect the Church with a philosophy of mass murder. 75 While we do not find the Mayor's helter-skelter statement humorous, neither do we consider it defamatory. Reading the statement in context there is no indication that the Mayor was accusing the Church of advocating mass murder. Apparently, gung-ho and clear have double meanings associated with Scientology. The Church would have us infer that helter-skelter as used in the Mayor's statement refers to the name of a book dealing with Charles Manson. We then must infer that since Manson is considered by some but not the Church to be a clear, the Mayor was trying to connect the Church with Manson. Finally, we are to infer that since Manson was a mass murderer the Mayor's comment suggested Scientology promoted mass murder. 76 We are not prepared to build inference upon inference in order to find defamatory meaning in a statement. Because the Mayor's statement was not capable of defamatory meaning as a matter of law, the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment. As to the other statements made by the Mayor that were before the trial court on summary judgment, after carefully examining the voluminous record in this case, we agree with the trial court that: 77 When read in their proper context, the statements made constitute merely conclusions or opinions which express ideas which defendant had concerning a public figure. The defendant is entitled under the public figure doctrine to express his ideas or opinions as long as he does not maliciously make a false statement of fact. The entire record and in particular the articles themselves show that the defendant made no malicious, false statement concerning the plaintiff. Therefore, the Court grants plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to Count II in its entirety. 78 (2) An article published in The Globe and Mail on May 8, 1976, stated in pertinent part: 79 Bitter clashes with Clearwater interests have resulted in millions of dollars of claims in lawsuits and counter-suits. 80 And there's galloping paranoia on all sides. 81 One example was a worry that the Mayor's office was bugged. Clashing with the cloying music from the ceiling speaker in the office one day was an indecipherable conversation of two men. 82 Crossed wires? said Mayor Gabriel Cazares. You get paranoid. Shrugging apologetically, he calls for someone to check it out. 83 You think maybe speakers can be used in reverse, like microphones, he says. 84 He's smiling but then he points outside to the upper floors of the Fort Harrison Hotel overlooking everything downtown. 85 Some say they could have sophisticated stuff up there that could be aimed at these windows and pick up anything we're talking about. 86 The they to which he referred was what we were talking about: the Scientologists. 87 (3) An article published in the Clearwater Sun on January 29, 1976, stated in pertinent part: 88 He (Mayor Cazares) questioned United Churches use of armed guards and an elaborate alarm system and the group's policy of not allowing area residents into the building, saying this concept did not fit the basis for religious organizations peace and love. 89 I don't like paramilitary religious organizations, he remarked. 90 (4) During a Lions Club luncheon speech, the Mayor stated that the Church of Scientology was not a religious organization as religion was understood in the Clearwater area, but a rip-off, money motivated operation.The trial court struck the allegations referring to the last three articles quoted above on Cazares' Motion to Dismiss, ruling that they did not state claims upon which relief could be granted based upon theories of libel or slander. 91 Read in context, the statements by the Mayor quoted in The Globe and Mail article were not defamatory. The Mayor did not allege that the Church was engaged in illegal wiretaps. Rather, the Mayor's statements demonstrated a paranoia-like perception of a Scientologist lurking behind every mystery, in this case unknown voices on an office speaker. 92 Nor do we find Cazares' statement that he did not like paramilitary organizations defamatory. It was simply an opinion based in fact: the statement reflects his perception of the armed guards and security devices. 93 Finally, the court dismissed as not defamatory the Mayor's characterization of the Church as a rip-off, money motivated operation. The allegation was struck on a 12(b)(6) motion, Fed.R.Civ.P. For purposes of a motion to dismiss, we must assume the allegations in the petition were correct: that the statement was made, that it was false, and that it was made with malice. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). However, in evaluating the statement to determine whether the words used were capable of defamatory meaning, the words cannot be considered in isolation but must be viewed in the context of the statement as a whole. Here, in comparing the appellant Church to religious organizations as religion is understood in Clearwater, the Mayor termed appellant a money motivated rip-off. Under the most recent articulations of Florida law (Coleman, supra, and Early, supra), the words rip-off, read in context, although uncomplimentary, were not defamatory as a matter of law, and the trial court properly granted defendant's motion to dismiss.